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POPULATION

SOCIOECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT

IN

AND

CENTRAL America

AND SELECTED COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

DONALD J. BOGUE

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JANUARY 1985

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Executive Summary

I. Overview

A. Major Findings

1. The nations covered in this analysis* have a long list of conditions that must be improved if the standard of living and quality of life of the residents is to be raised to the levels regarded as "minimally adequate" by current world standards, and which the citizens expect their economy and government to provide. Figure A lists these problems. *Rapid population growth has helped to create most of these difficulties and now is a major direct and indirect impediment to their solution.* The validity of this finding is documented in the accompanying report.

2. Although slower population growth alone cannot usher in the hoped-for era of prosperity, without it that era can never materialize. Lowering the present annual growth rate of 3.0 percent (3.5 for some nations) to a level of between 1.0 and 1.5 percent over the next 15-20 years is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for significant acceleration of the pace of improvement. To the extent that slower growth rates are not achieved, all other investments and efforts will be proportionately less effective, and progress will be postponed or slowed.

3. Because population growth is a net balance of births, deaths, and migration, the only practical way for slower growth to occur is through fertility reduction. Emigration to other countries, and especially to the United States, can absorb only a small fraction of the total growth, and re-

^{*}This report emphasizes the countries of "Central America" (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and Belize) and Mexico. For comparative purposes, data on other countries are highlighted, especially Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

sistance to such migration is mounting, not only in North America, but in other Latin American and in Europen nations.

4. Public opinion about population-In every Central American nation for which data are available, there is overwhelming evidence that most of the childbearing beyond the third or fourth child is undesired. Negative attitudes towards contraception, on religious, political, or ethical grounds, are held by only a small minority among the masses. The major reason why debilitating growth rates, fueled by high fertility, persist in Central America is lack of information (including much misinformation) and lack of adequate contraceptive services (both counselling and medical attention). These are services that would be welcomed in rural and urban areas throughout the region.

B. Major Population Recommendations

1. Fertility-Family Planning

(a) All persons of reproductive age should be offered correct and sufficiently detailed information about all methods of contraception to enable them to make an informed, voluntary choice concerning contraceptive use.

(b) All persons of reproductive age should have reasonably convenient access to contraceptive services and supplies, at prices they can afford.

(c) Where the two conditions just listed do not now exist, special programs to bring them into being should be launched, with international financial and technical assistance if necessary. Such programs should give priority to meeting the needs of the rural communities. The resources of the commercial sector, of the private medical sector, and of the private voluntary organizations as well as of the public sector, should be recruited and mobilized for this effort. Opportunities exist to expand the already successful efforts of the commercial and private voluntary organizations.

2. Mortality-Morbidity

(a) Programs to reduce infant and maternal mortality should continue to receive high priority. Although reduction of death rates has the direct effect of increasing the population growth rate, it has an indirect effect to reduce fertility.

(b) The programs of family planning, recommended in 1(c) above, should be promoted both by integration through existing health and medical facilities, including nutrition programs, and as long-term programs through pharmacies, private physicians, and private voluntary organizations.

3. Agriculture and Migration

(a) Little effort should be made to subsidize continued farming subsistence plots of land inappropriate for cropping or of insufficient size to provide an adequate livelihood. Residents of such subsistence operations need to be relocated on more appropriate lands, given supplementary employment in other rural industries, or encouraged to migrate to cities or other areas where a better standard of living is insured.

(b) As agriculture is diversified and modernized, attention should be paid to providing employment to rural workers, thereby reducing the pressure to migrate to cities.

C. Conclusion

Given the favorable attitudes of the population, the already existing trend toward increased use of family planning, and the favorable past experiences of limited family planning efforts, a stepped-up population planning program has excellent chances of improving the quality of life in Central America.

Problems

of Economic and Social Development

Development of the urban sector i

Low growth in industrial employment Low ability to compete in foreign markets Lack of technical manpower Large "informal" sector of low productivity Excess of unskilled labor Lack of consumer demand High rates of unemptoyment High rates of underemployment

Development of the rural sector present

Large number of underemptoyed, landless rural poor population

Large numbers of underemployed, submarginal farm operators Rural economy unable to absorb its own

population growth Decline in exports of traditional products Slow increase in productivity of agriculture

Arable land in accessible to those needing it Cultivation of steep slopes and other areas that should not be used as propland

Education measurements of the second second

Large numbers of children not attending school at primary levels Low rates of secondary school attendance

Low enrollment in vocational, technical, higher level education

Low quality of instruction, all levels Prevalent adult illiteracy, despite recent progress

Low level of adult educational attainment

Health and nutrition management

One-half or more children main ourished High in fant mortality rates, maternal death rates Insufficient and inadequate potable water systems Inadequate environmental sanitation Incomplete inoculation of children Inadequate health care facilities (especially

for infants and mothers) Inadequate medical facilities to treat.

chronic and degenerative diseases

Housing and the second s

Shortage of housing-demand exceeds supply Large amounts of substandard housing needing upgrading/replacing Overcrowding in housing Lack of plumbing, sanitation in housing Lack of electricity in homes

National government approximation and an and Large expenditures on imported food Large expenditures on public services school, health, etc. Rapid urban growth Tax revenues inadequate to needs Large international debt High debt service costs Unfavorable terms of trade Unfavorable income distribution Decline of tourism Fears of foreign investors about long-term security of investment

Effects of Rapid Population Growth

Large families and high fertility help cause: Reserves Develop the Widespread unemployment, especially of youth Low purchasing power per person Need to spend most of income on food Inability to save for investment Children work instead of attending school Incomes too low to tax Rapid growth of lebor force Large families and high fertility help cause: A subscription Large amounts of manpower that the rural economy cannot absorb Surplus labor forced to work at submarginal jobs, low wages, seasonal work

Farming of plots of land too small to provide a livelihood Farming of land unfit for cropland Child labor instead of schooling

Low productivity due to lack of capital for seeds, fertilizer, tools Subsistence rather than commercial farms Misuses of soil, erosion

Massive out-migration to urban areas of surplus population

High fertility exacerbates or causes: means the second

Large numbers of school age children demanding schooling Emphasis on expansion of schools instead of improvement of quality Emphasis on primary education, neglecting secondary, technical, higher education Concentration of educational resources in urban areas, neglecting rural areas

Spreading limited national budget for education over too many pupils-low teacher salaries, loss of teachers

| High fertility helps cause: provide the second s | ł |
|---|---|
| High infant mortality | |
| Malnutrition | |
| Maternal mortality | |
| Heavy comands for health care in excess of | |
| | |

- resources Lack of funds to build water systems, sewage disposal systems Lack of funds to improve quality of health care, build new facilities, provide
- hetter medicines
- Rapid population growth helps cause: SECTION Unmet demands for housing Incomes too small to create market for adequate housing Overcrowding of housing Insufficient saving to afford good housing Use of substandard housing rather than its abandonment and upgrading Construction of slums from scrap Immigrant communities with inadequate

water, sewage, health, school, fire, etc.

Large families and high fertility help cause: 1 Large demands on tax revenue for community

and public services Need to use forcign exchange to import food Need to import essential consumer goods Overcrowded and scarce housing Overcrowded, disorderly slums Increases in social discontent, instability Loss of confidence by foreign investors Avoidance of travel hy tourists Insufficient foreign exchange to purchase capital goods needed to create new jobs

urban sector

Proposed

Solutions

Develop the rural sector

Develop education sector

Develop health/ .nodical/ welfare sector

Develop housing sector

Sec. Sec. States

Improve public service and promote sustained economic growth

How Rapid Population Growth Impedes the Solution of Problems of Social and Economic Development.

II. Chapter Summaries

Part 1.

Demographic Analysis

1.Fertility

Central America and the countries of the surrounding region have a jumble of high, intermediate, and low birth rates. Nations with very high fertility are Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and Belize, where the average woman bears nearly six children or more Mexico, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic have intermediate fertility (four or five children per woman). Low fertility is found in Cuba, Costa Rica, Panama, and Puerto Rico, where the average woman bears two or three children. Since 1970-75, birth rates in the high fertility areas have declined slightly. Areas with intermediate and low fertility acquired this status because of rapid declines in fertility, particularly during the 1970-80 decade.

2. Mortality

Mortality has declined steadily in all nations of Central America, but mortality rates still remain comparatively high in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. A large share of this mortality occurs among infants. Mortality rates are higher among the poor and the rural folks, and lower among the middle and upper classes and in urban areas. Because of prolonged efforts at improving the environment, and more widespread use of modern medicines, great progress has been made in reducing death from the infectious and parasitic diseases, although infectious and parasitic diseases are still pandemic in Central America. As death rates from these diseases fall, death from heart disease, malignant neoplasms, and cerebrovascular diseases is becoming more important. Future progress in controlling mortality must deal with chronic and degenerative diseases, as well as with the diseases that respond readily to primery health care. Additional declines in the death rate are expected. Unless fertility declines also, the growth rate will go even higher.

$\mathcal{3}.$ Population Growth

Population growth is a net balance among births, deaths, and migration. Since death rates have declined sharply while birth rates have remained high, the population of most Central American countries is growing very rapidly. Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Guaternala, and Mexico will treble in population within less than 65-100 years unless their growth rates decline. Because no one wishes to see growth slowed by having death rates rise, and because internationational migration is able to drain only a small fraction of the annual increase, the only possible way for population growth rates to slow is for birth rates to decline.

4. Age and Sex Composition

Wherever tertility rates are high, a high percentage of the population is comprised of children. As a result, the proportion of population of working age Is low, and each worker must support a larger load of dependent children. As fertility declines, this dependency load is reduced almost immediately. It is followed, several decades later, by moderately small increases in the proportion of persons over 65. As fertility declines increase, the dependency load due to aging is small in comparison with the reduced dependency load due to dependent children. If fertility could decline faster, this dependency load would be eased.

5. Marital Status

In Central America, almost one-half of all marriages are consensual unions (common law marriages). Most marriages do not occur at an extraordinarily young age, although in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama, the proportion of women who marry before age 20 is higher than in the other countries of the region. A substantial share of women in most of Centra! America (10 percent or more) go throughout their lives without ever marrying. High fertility is caused by childbearing within marriages at conventional ages.

O. Urban-Rural Residence and Migration

Cities in Central America are growing extremely rapidly-at the rate of 4 to 6 percent per year. This is caused by an inpouring of migrants from rural areas, as well as by moderately high birth rates within cities. Much of this urban growth is taking the form of a ring of squatter slums surrounding the cities. The trend toward urban concentration has been underway for more than three decades, and is expected to continue far into the future. As a result, by the end of this century, Central America will be overwhelmingly urban, with rural people comprising less than one-third of the total. Because fertility tends to be lower in urban than in rural areas, the urbanization trend is expected to help lower the birth rate. Until birth rates in rural areas fall, the flood of immigrants to the cities will continue unabated, because the rural economy cannot absorb them.

7. Educational Attainment and School Enrollment

Although Central America was a region of very low literacy only three decades ago, major efforts to educate oncoming generations have raised literacy levels remarkably.

Rapid population growth, which pours large new cohorts of children into the school system, has impeded this progress. In order for the economy of these nations to modernize, there is need for more persons with secondary and university education. Remedying this deficiency is costly, and becomes even more difficult under conditions of such rapid expansion of the school-age population. A more rapid decline in birth rates would greatly ease the pressure on the educational system and the drain on the national treasuries for investment in building more schools that could otherwise go to improve the quality of schooling, especially at secondary levels.

8 Labor Force and Occupational Status

The labor force of Central American nations is growing even faster than the population, mostly because of the increasing employment of women. Employment is shifting rapidly from agricultural to nonagricultural employment, as urbanization takes places. However, the nonagricultural employment is not being offered by rapidly expanding industrial and modern technical industries. Industry is providing a small part of the total employment, and has grown disappointly slowly over the years. Instead, the urban workers are crowding into "service" occupations, a large percentage of which are submarginal and offer only underemployment, rather than adequate employment. In 1980, the equivalent of about 20 percent of the work force in Central America was unemployedeither because of open unemployment or because of underemployment t anslated into its equivalent in unemployment. Because of high fertility, the supply of workers is outstripping the demand. Underemployment is predicted to remain at about the same level, or even worsen, in the high fertility countries. Improvement in the economic condition of the labor force can occur most rapidly if the supply of new

workers increases at a slower rate and special measures are taken to increase the demand for workers at jobs that pay a sufficient wage on which to live. Only by reducing fertility can be the future flow of new workers into the work force be decelerated.

9. Nutrition and Health

Nutrition-Malnutrition is a serious problem in Central America, especially in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. The problem is two-fold. National production of food is insufficient to meet the demands of the population in several nations, and great poverty makes it impossible for a large segment of the population to get access to sufficient food to avoid malnutrition. In Central America as a whole, slightly more than one-half of all children are malnourished to some degree. and 15-20 percent have moderate or advanced malnutrition. The situation is much worse in the four countries mentioned above. Food production is not keeping up with population growth. The nations with the greatest nutrition problems and that are falling progressively behind in meeting food needs are the nations with the highest birth (growth) rates. Hunger and malnutrition are serious problems in all of the countries of Central America, but are most severe where fertility rates are highest, and are improving least or deteriorating where population growth is most rapid.

Health-Because of the tropical environment and insufficient health/medical facilities (and malnutrition), the health status of the population of Central America is still deficient. Nevertheless, rapid progress has been made in most of the countries, thanks to special programs by national governments and international technical assistance. However, major new investments in health and medical personnel and facilities will be needed in order to keep up with population growth and erase the deficiency. Because a high percentage of clients for health and medical care are pregnant women and young children, declining fertility would bring almost instantaneous relief to the system, enabling faster progress toward better health and medical care.

10.Housing and Amenities

In most countries of Central America. housing is seriously deficient. Much of it is temporary or inadequate shelter constructed by the household members from waste materials. Houses lack sufficient rooms to accommodate the number of occupants. and hence are overcrowded. Far more than one-half lack piped water, electricity, and toilet facilities. Although conditions are better in urban than in rural areas, rapid immigration to cities and the construction of temporary shelters around the peripheries of the large cities has created masses of substandard urban dwellings with few amenities. The high incidence of illness and infant death can be attributed in no small part to housing: unsafe drinking water, unsanitary living conditions, and overcrowding. Rapid population growth is making it extremely difficult to correct these deficiencies; keeping up with the pace of new household formation consumes such a large share of housing investment that improvement is difficult. Slower population growth would ease the pressure for more housing and make easier the goal of improving or replacing substandard housing.

Part II. Economic Development

The nations of Central America have a level of economic development that categorizes them as "middle-income nations" rather than "low-income nations." Some of them, such as Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica, have achieved a level of development which approaches the threshold where they will cease to be classified as "underdeveloped." Even Honduras and El Salvador, the two poorest nations in the region, have more than twice the per capita income of Mainland China, India, and the developing nations of sub-Sahara Africa. However, there is a strong inverse correlation between the rate of population growth and level of development. Nations with the highest rates of population growth have the lowest per capita gross domestic product. Computations of what the per capita GDP would have been had they grown more slowly reveal that, had growth been slowed between 1960 and 1980, the GDP would have been 30-50 percent higher than it actually was. The efforts of individual nations of Central America at closing the gap between themselves and the more developed nations of the world will continue to be disappointing until they have lower birth rates.

Part III. Family Planning

Almost the entire public of Central America is aware that contraception is possible, and are familiar with the principal contraceptive methods. The practice of contraception is rising slowly, especially in the cities. Resistance to family planning on religious or moral grounds is very low. The major barriers seem to be lack of detailed information and counselling and convenient access to contraceptive services, at affordable cost. Thus, national programs to promote family planning would receive strong grassroot support and yield immediate multifold dividends in ameliorating the problems which impede development.

Stimulating such services through the private sector (commercial, medical and private voluntary organizations) may be a faster, cheaper and more enduring way of accomplishing this than subsidies to the public health sector, in some countries at least.

Introduction

Without question, a considerable number of factors, interacting, are responsible for the disappointing slowness of the developing nations of Central America to progress toward the goals of a higher per capita income and a more healthful and comfortable life to which their citizens and leaders aspire. The evidence is strong that population dynamics-rate of growth, changing socioeconomic characteristics, and shifting territorial distribution-have had important effects upon the economic development and social welfare of these nations. It would be absurd to place the full blame on the unprecedentedly high rates of population growth that have affected these countries as they have tried to catch up to the economic and social welfare levels of Europe and northern America. It is equally difficult, in view of the evidence, to dismiss population growth in Central America as an unimportant and unrelated force, and to argue that the high and unfavorable correlation of population dynamics with the pace of socioeconomic progress is sheer coincidence.

This report analyzes demographic trends in eleven countries that geographers would identify as "Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean":

| Central America | Mexico |
|-----------------|---------------|
| Belize | |
| Costa Rica | Caribbean |
| El Salvador | Cuba |
| Guatemala | The Dominican |
| Honduras | Republic |
| Nicaragua | Haiti |
| Panama | |

The countries of Central America (along with Mexico) are emphasized in this report, but for comparative purposes, data for Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic are also highlighted.

This report will review the socioeconomic development situation and trends in the Central America Region and the demographic situation and trends, and examine the impact of each on the other. The hypothesis to be tested is that slower population growth tends to foster economic and social progress, while faster population growth tends to retard it. The Central America Region is an almost ideal laboratory in which to test this hypothesis. On the one hand there is a comparatively high degree of homogeneity of geographic characteristics, natural resources and environmental conditions. But on the other hand there is a wide variety of demographic trends.

This monograph has two principal objectives:

* To describe the present demographic situation existing in these countries and the changes that have taken place recently. This will involve their comparison with each other, with the remainder of Latin America, and with other developing and developed nations of the world.

* To review the evidence that the dynamic population situation has affected, is affecting, and in the future will continue to

affect economic and social development in the countries of this region.

Table P-1 reports the population estimated by the United Nations to have been present in each of these countries, and in the region as a whole, at each decennium since 1930.

The population for all of Latin America as a region is estimated at 410 million (1985). Of this, 140 million (34 percent) is concentrated in the Central America region. An overwhelming proportion (95 percent) of this region is of Spanish or Latin origin. The following tabulation shows the details:

| | Population (millions) | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Central America, total . | . 140.4 | 100.0 | | | | | | | |
| Latin (Spanish) | . 134.4 | 95,7 | | | | | | | |
| Mexico | . 80.5 | 57.3 | | | | | | | |
| Central America . | . 26.2 | 18.7 | | | | | | | |
| Caribbean | . 27.7 | 19.7 | | | | | | | |
| English/other (Caribbean) | • 6.0 | 4.3 | | | | | | | |

Within the Latin category, there are three major clusters of population: Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean. Often it is not appreciated that the Caribbean is also predominantly Latin-only 6.0 million out of 33.7 million speak English or a non-Latin language. (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and the multitude of small islands in the Caribbean comprise less than 20 percent of the population of the Caribbean region.)

Figures P-1 and P-2 chart the dramatic increase in population over the period 1930-1985. It is growth of this magnitude, where population has been doubling in size every 20-25 years, that has worried many observers. Extrapolation of this growth trend for even so short a historical span as 100 years yields astounding figures: 64 times the present number of inhabitantsamounts that clearly cannot be supported at desired standards of living by these coun-

| Region and | | ····· | Pop | ulation (O | 00) | | | | Rate of an | nual change | e (percent | per year) | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | 1930 | 1940 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | 1950-55 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975-80 | 1980 -85 |
| Latin America total ^a | | | 164,053 | 215,731 | 283,496 | 363,704 | 409,743 | 2.73 | 2.80 | 2.66 | 2.54 | 2.45 | 2.38 |
| Central America/other ^b | 29,680 | 35,580 | 49,516 | 65,632 | 88,474 | 117,652 | 134,482 | 3.04 | 3.23 | 3.23 | 3.15 | 2.98 | 2.88 |
| Belize | | | | 198 | 120 | 145 | 170 | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 500 | 620 | 858 | 1.236 | 1,732 | 2,213 | 2.485 | 3.53 | 3.63 | 111 | 3 5 3 | 2 20 | |
| Cuba | 3,650 | 4,290 | 5,858 | 7,029 | 8,580 | 9,732 | 10.036 | 1.85 | 2 11 | 3.11 | 2.52 | 2.38 | 2.31 |
| Dominican Republic | 1,260 | 1,760 | 2,361 | 3,258 | 4,523 | 5,947 | 6,715 | 3.03 | 3 76 | 2.07 | 1.00 | 0.84 | 0.62 |
| El Salvador | 1,440 | 1,630 | 1,940 | 2,574 | 3,582 | 4.797 | 5.552 | 2 68 | 3.30 | 3.21 | 2.91 | 2.56 | 2.43 |
| Guatemala | 1,760 | 2,200 | 2,962 | 2,966 | 5,353 | 7.262 | 8,403 | 2.89 | 3.03 | 3.32 | 2.91 | 2.93 | 2.93 |
| Haiti | 2,420 | 2,830 | 3,097 | 3,723 | 4.605 | 5.809 | 6.585 | 1 73 | 2.03 | . 2.9/ | 3.07 | 3.03 | 2.92 |
| Honduras | 950 | 1,150 | 1,401 | 1,942 | 2.640 | 3,691 | 4.372 | 1 10 | 2.11 | 2.14 | 2.26 | 2.38 | 2.51 |
| Mexico | 16,550 | 19,650 | 26,886 | 36,881 | 51,187 | 69.752 | 80 484 | 3.00 | 3.41 | 2.74 | 3.17 | 3.53 | 3.39 |
| Nicaragua | 680 | 630 | 1,109 | 1,472 | 1,970 | 2,733 | 3 218 | 3.00 | 3.20 | 3.29 | 3.21 | 2.98 | 2.86 |
| Panama | 470 | 620 | 825 | 1,095 | 1.464 | 1,896 | 2 117 | 2.04 | 2.90 | 2.93 | 3.26 | 3.29 | 3.27 |
| Puerto Rico | 1,543 | 1,869 | 2,219 | 2,358 | 2,718 | 3,675 | 4 345 | 2.77 | 2.94 | 2.87 | 2.72 | 2.45 | 2.20 |
| | | | | | -, | 3,013 | 4,545 | 0.20 | 1.91 | 0.93 | 2.67 | 3.37 | 3.35 |
| Tropical South America. | 54,990 | 66,870 | 85,628 | 115,272 | 154,251 | 199,452 | 225,530 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.82 | -2.61 | 2.53 | 2.46 |
| Bolivia | 2 400 | 3 700 | 2 766 | 2 4 2 2 | | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | 33 570 | 41 100 | 2,700 | 3,428 | 4,325 | 5,570 | 6,371 | 2.10 | 2 27 | 2.37 | 2.48 | 2.59 | 2.69 |
| Colombia | 7 430 | 41,100 | 52,842 | /1,513 | 95,322 | 122,320 | 137,233 | 3.11 | 2.98 | 2.77 | 2.57 | 2.42 | 2.30 |
| Ecuador | 1 940 | 3,100 | 11,597 | 15,538 | 20,803 | 25,794 | 28,714 | 2.88 | 3.07 | 2.77 | 2.16 | 2.14 | 2.15 |
| Paraguay | 1,940 | 2,470 | 3,307 | 4,422 | 5,958 | 8,021 | 9,380 | 2.84 | 2.99 | 2.98 | 2.91 | 3.04 | 3.13 |
| Peru | 5 650 | 1,110 | 1,3/1 | 1,778 | 2,290 | 3,168 | 3,681 | 2.67 | 2.54 | 2.52 | 3.19 | 3.30 | 3.00 |
| Venozuola | 3,050 | 0,680 | 7,988 | 10,181 | 13,461 | 17,625 | 20,273 | 2.30 | 2.77 | 2.81 | 2.69 | 2.70 | 2.80 |
| venezueru | 3,129 | 3,710 | 5,139 | 7,550 | 10,962 | 15,620 | 18,386 | 3.78 | 3.68 | 3.5, | 3.58 | 3.50 | 3.26 |
| Temperate South America. | 18,150 | 21,020 | 25,437 | 30,729 | 35,941 | 41,607 | 43,801 | 1.94 | 1.66 | 1.48 | 1.33 | 1.33 | 1.29 |
| Argentina Chile Uruguay | 12,050 4,370 1,730 | 14,170 5,060 1,970 | 17,150 6,091 2,194 | 20,611 7,585 2,531 | 23,748 9,368 2,824 | 27,036 11,104 2,924 | 28,689 12,074 3,036 | 1.97 2.03 1.40 | 1.47 2.30 1.24 | 1.37 1.92 0.95 | 1.33 1.70 0.13 | 1.27 1.71 0.57 | 1.19 1.68 0.75 |
| | | | | | | | 1 | 1 1 | | 1 | | | - |

Table P-1. Number of Inhabitants of Latin American Countries: 1930-1985.

NOTES: ^aLatin America total includes English and other non-Spanish Carribean countries.

^bCentral America rate of annual change does not include Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, or Puerto Rico.

^CTropical South America total includes Guyana from 1950 to 1985.

SOURCE: Years 1930 and 1940 from UCLA, Statistical Postract of Latin America. Years 1950-1985 from United Nations, Demographic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

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Figure P-1. A Half-Century of Population Growth in Central America



Figure P-2. Regional Population Growth in Latin America (including Mexico and Brazil).

tries' present economy. However, as this analysis will show, such a trend is unlikely to continue. There is already evidence that growth rates are slowing down, and a careful review of the forces at work suggests a continued deceleration of growth over the next half-century.

The present report will emphasize, however, that conditions of life are already at the subsistence level for a major share of the citizens in these countries. Efforts to improve those conditions are being confronted by huge annual population increases. Having to absorb this large addition while trying to elevate the already underprivileged majority creates a large array of difficulties. It would appear that the more quickly a transition can be made to slower growth rates the easier it will be to bring the quality of life to the level which the citizens and their leaders aspire.

Sources of information

This report is based on information provided by official organizations and already published research reports. Publications of the United Nations, World Bank, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Pan American Health Organization, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the individual countries being studied provide most of the data. Heavy reliance has been placed on the U.N. Demographic Yearbook, the U.N. Statistical Yearbook, reports of Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía (Santiago), and publications of the World Bank, Pan American Health Organization, and specialized reports, monographs, and articles. Research performed by individuals and private organizations has been used to a limited extent. Each table is accompanied by a source note giving the identification of the source.

Organization of this report

The materials of this report are organized as follows:

Part I. Demographic Analysis

- 1. Fertility
- 2. Mortality
- 3. Population Growth
- 4. Age and Sex Composition and Dependency
- 5. Marital Status
- 6. Urbam-Rural Residence and Migration
- 7. Literacy and Educational Attainment
- 8. Labor Force and Occupational Status
- 9. Nutrition and Health
- 10. Housing and Amenities

Part II. National Economic Development

Part III. Family Planning and Socioeconomic Development

Bibliography



Part I. Demographic Analysis

Fertility 1.

Only thirty years ago, the fertility of Central America was almost everywhere near the upper limits of the biological capacity of the human race to reproduce. Today, in no other region of the world is there more of a jumble of high birth rates, low birth rates, and intermediate birth rates than here. Table F-1 provides data that document the dramatic changes that have taken place in some of the nations—and the comparative lack of change in others.

The two measures of fertility presented in Table F-1 are defined as follows:

- Crude birth rate (CBR) is the number of live births in a given year per 1,000 total population as of the midpoint of that year.
- Total fertility rate (TFR) is the number of children that each woman will bear during her lifetime if she bears children at each age according to the fertility rates of a given year.

(a) High fertility countries. Five countries in the region have very high fertility, although there have been moderately small fertility declines in each since 1965. In Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, and Belize, the average woman bears nearly 6 children or more.

(b) Low fertility countries. Three countries have had truly amazing declines in their fertility, and today have birth rates at levels common in northern America as recently as 1960-65. These are Cuba, Costa Rica, and Panama. The average woman bears only 2 to 3 children in these places.

(c) Intermediate fertility countries. Three nations have fertility rates falling butween high and low: Mexico, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic. In all three, birth rates were very high until about 1970; since then, there has been substantial decline, with evidence that it is continuing. As of

| Region and | | | Crude bi: | rth rate | | Total fertility rate | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | 1950-55 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975-80 | 1980-85 | 1950-55 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975-80 | 1980-85 |
| latin America total Central America/other | 42.4 | 41.0 | 38.6 | 35.8 | 33.6 | 32.3 | 5.87 | 5.0 | 5.0 . | 5.0 | 4.58 | 4 20 |
| Belize Costa Rica Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Funama Puerto Rico ropical South America | 47.6 29.7 51.4 48.8 50.9 45.5 51.3 46.9 53.4 42.2 36.6 | 45.3 35.2 49.8 47.4 47.6 44.4 50.9 44.6 50.0 40.1 31.2 | 38.3 31.9 47.3 44.9 44.6 43.7 50.0 43.9 48.6 38.1 26.7 | 51.0 25.8 42.0 43.2 43.5 42.7 48.6 41.8 48.3 35.1 22.6 | 40.0 29.1 17.0 36.7 42.1 41.1 41.8 47.1 38.3 46.6 31.4 22.1 | 28.1 16.9 14.0 40.2 38.4 41.3 43.9 36.2 44.6 28.4 21.5 | 6.72 4.01 7.50 6.46 7.09 6.15 7.05 6.74 7.32 5.90 5.02 | 6.95 2.27 7.50 6.85 6.85 6.15 7.35 6.74 7.32 5.74 2.11 | 5.80 2.09 7.13 6.62 6.40 6.15 7.43 6.70 7.09 5.41 1.68 | 4.26 1.69 6.19 6.33 6.15 6.07 7.37 6.19 6.93 4.84 2.81 | 5.70 3.57 2.18 5.00 6.01 5.68 5.92 7.14 5.40 6.57 4.12 2.36 | 3.18 1.97 4.25 5.56 5.17 5.74 6.50 4.85 6.21 3.57 2.15 |
| Bolivia. Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. mperate South America Argentina. Chile. | 47.1 44.2 47.6 47.8 45.5 46.3 47.3 25.4 35.2 | 46.1 42.1 44.6 46.1 42.2 46.4 45.2 23.0 35.7 | 45.6 38.8 39.6 44.2 40.4 44.5 40.9 21.9 30.0 | 45.4 35.8 33.3 42.2 37.5 40.0 37.5 21.6 26.0 | 44.8 33.2 32.1 41.6 36.7 38.6 36.9 21.2 25.4 | 44.0 31.4 31.0 40.6 36.0 38.3 35.2 20.6 24.8 | 6.74 6.15 6.72 6.99 6.62 6.65 6.64 | 6.62 6.15 6.72 6.99 6.62 6.85 6.70 | 6.56 5.66 5.94 6.81 6.40 6.56 6.01 | 6.50 5.08 4.78 6.50 5.70 5.84 5.15 | 6.39 4.50 4.31 6.29 5.20 5.49 4.74 | 6.25 4.02 3.93 6.00 4.85 5.29 4.33 2.78 |
| | 22.7 | 22.0 | 21.3 | 21.2 | 20.3 | 24.8 | 4.84 2.87 | 5.02 2.93 | 4.08 2.93 | 3.32 2.99 | 3.10 2.89 | 2.90 2.78 |

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| Table F-1. Fertility: Crude Birth Rate and Total Fertility Rate, Latin American Countries, | 1950-85. |
|--|----------|
| | 1950-85. |

 $\overset{*}{\mathbb{B}}$ Based upon population projections under assumption of continuation of past trends.

1980-85, the average number of children born by women during their lifetime is about 4.5 to 5.0.

Table F-1 also provides fertility measures for the remaining Latin American countries. It may easily be verified that in Central America one finds both the highest and the lowest fertility rates of all of Latin America. Temperate South America's "cone" has low fertility, while most of the nations of Tropical South America fall in the intermediate range, except for Bolivia and Ecuador, which have high fertility.

The following data for the world and its major regions help to place the fertility data for Central America in perspective:

| Region | | | | | | | Crude birth rate (CBR) | Total fertility rate (TFR) |
|--------------|------|------|------|-----|------|-----|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| World | • | • | • | • | • | • | 27.5 | 3.62 |
| Africa . | | | | | | | 45.6 | 6.30 |
| Latin Amer | ica | | • | | | | 32.3 | 4.20 |
| Central Am | eric | а | | • | • | • | 36.6 | 4.80 |
| Northern A | me | ric | a۰ | • | • | • | 17.3 | 2.01 |
| East Asia | • | • | | | | | 19.1 | 2.43 |
| South Asia | | | | | | | 34.8 | 4.79 |
| Europe . | | | | | | | 14.1 | 1.91 |
| Oceania . | | | | | | | 21.4 | 2.74 |
| U.S.S.R. | • | • | | | • | | 18.8 | 2.36 |
| Less develo | ped | re | gioı | ns | | | 31.4 | 4.17 |
| More develo | oper | d re | egic | ns | | • | 15.8 | 2.02 |
| [Source: Un | ited | i 1 | Vati | ons | s. D | len | nographic Indi | icators of |
| Countries: (| Esti | ma | tes | and | 1 Pr | oje | ctions as Asses | ssed in 1980, |
| 1982.1 | | | | | | | | |

This tabulation shows Latin America as a whole to be squarely in the "intermediate fertility" category, together with South Asia. Only Africa remains as a truly high fertility region, with the remainder of the world--Europe, Northern America, East Asia (primarily China, Japan, and Korea), Oceania, and U.S.S.R.—in the low fertility category.

Because of its mixture of high, intermediate, and low rates, Central America falls above

the average for all of Latin America, at about the same level as South Asia. However, in considering this region, the four low fertility nations and the four high fertility nations should not be forgotten. Its intermediate fertility position is based on an average of extremes, rather than a homogeneous condition.

Differentials in fertility

The fertility measure provided for each of the countries in Table F-1 is only an average. Within each country, there is very substantial variation in fertility rates. This variation will be discussed in more detail in later sections of this report. It is important at this point to indicate that two major differentials permeate fertility trends, and influence the recommendations at which the report arrives.

(a) Socioeconomic status. Persons who have a secondary or university level of education in Latin America tend to have low birth rates, not too dissimilar from those of Europe and North America. However, such persons comprise only a tiny fraction of the population. The high birth rates described above are concentrated among the illiterate population living in poverty. There is a strong inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility. The people who are least able to provide for the material, emotional, and social needs of children are having most of them.

(b) Rural-urban residence. Fertility rates are everywhere higher in rural than in urban areas. Moreover, the size of the urban agglomeration affects fertility rates; they are lowest in the large, capital, or industrial/ commercial metropolises, and higher in the hinterland regional or local commercial centers. They are highest of all in the rural setting, and especially in regions remote from urban influence. This differential is explained, in part, by socioeconomic status differences; those who live in rural areas tend to have less education, to be poorer, and to have menial occupations. However, there appears to be a "rural effect" and an "urban

| Region and | Es | timated | age-spec | ific fer | tility r | ate, 198 | Percent of lifetime fertility at each age | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|
| country | 15-19 years | 20-24 years | 25-29 years | 30-34 years | 35-39 years | 40-44 years | 45-49 years | 15-19 years | 20-24 years | 25-29 years | 30-34 years | 35-39 years | 40-44 years | 45-49 years |
| Central America/other Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama. Puerto Rico Tropical South America | 76 68 76 135 128 46 156 79 104 111 65 | 164 121 209 272 250 236 293 239 272 303 146 | 152 - 88 212 254 236 271 294 237 289 170 127 | 116 62 157 210 188 262 256 190 250 123 71 | 81 39 138 157 151 191 187 148 199 73 31 | 39 14 41 64 64 82 92 64 93 28 93 28 9 | 8 2 17 20 17 56 22 13 35 6 1 | 12.4 17.3 8.9 12.1 11.5 4.0 11.0 8.2 8.4 13.3 13.8 | 26.5 30.7 24.6 24.5 25.0 20.6 20.9 24.6 21.9 27.6 29.2 | 24.6 22.2 24.9 22.8 21.9 23.6 21.8 24.4 23.3 24.6 29.4 | 13.8 15.7 18.5 18.9 18.0 22.8 18.1 19.6 20.1 17.2 17.0 | 14.2 10.0 16.2 14.1 15.0 17.0 13.5 15.3 16.0 11 1 7.8 | 7.1 3.5 4.9 5.8 6.9 7.1 6.7 6.6 7.5 5.1 2.4 | 1.4 0.6 2.0 1.8 1.7 4.9 8.0 1.3 2.8 0.8 0.4 |
| Bolivia Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador Paraguay. Peru Venezucla Temperate South America Argentina. Chile. Uruguay. | 71 78 86 103 71 79 94 59 71 61 | 232 216 195 300 187 208 215 145 167 151 | 326 211 186 279 218 270 204 155 244 159 | 275 151 144 223 195 240 169 107 100 107 | 198 98 107 178 157 177 122 61 65 56 | 95 43 48 92 99 72 51 23 28 19 | 53 7 20 25 40 12 11 6 5 3 | 5.7 6.8 10.9 7.6 7.3 7.5 10.8 10.7 12.3 11.0 | 18.6 22.1 24.8 23.0 19.3 19.7 24.8 26.0 28.9 27.1 | 26.1 25.3 23.7 23.8 22.5 25.5 23.5 23.5 27.8 24.8 24.8 28.5 | 22.0 21.6 18.4 19.1 20.4 22.7 J9.6 19.3 17.2 19.2 | 15.8 15.2 13.6 16.3 16.2 16.7 14.1 11.0 11.2 10.1 | 7.6 7.4 6.1 7.9 10.2 6.8 5.9 4.1 4.8 3.5 | 4.2 1.6 2.5 2.3 4.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.6 |

Table F-2. Estimated Age-Specific Fertility Rates and Proportional Distribution of Fertility in Latin American Nations: 1980-85.

SOURCE: The right-hand panel is derived from U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Current Population Reports</u> ["International Fertility Indicators"], Series P-23, no. 123, 1982. The left-hand panel is computed by applying the distribution of the right-hand panel to the values of the total fertility rates reported in Table F-1. Data for Belize not available.

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effect" on fertility, independently or in addition to the socioeconomic effect.

Data illustrating these differentials will be provided in later sections of this report.

Age patterns in fertility

Throughout the world, there is a typical age pattern to fertility. Childbearing is low before age 20, rises rapidly to a peak between ages 20.24 or 25.29, and thereafter declines gradually toward zero at age 50. These patterns may be studied by statistics of age specific fertility rates. [Definition: An age specific fertility rate is the number of births per year per 1,000 women of a given age; thus, the ASFR for age 20-24 is the number of births to women aged 20-24 years divided by the population of women aged 20-24, in thousands.] Table F-2 provides such data for every nation of Central America and the other nations of Latin America for the 1980-85 period. These are estimates, derived by a procedure described at the foot of the table. With these data, it is possible to note regional and intercountry differences. The righthand panel of this table shows what proportion of childbearing is occurring at each age.

Obstetricians and sociologists agree that childbearing before age 20 and after age 40 should be discouraged, for the welfare of both the infant and the mother. On the one hand, childbearing before age 20 and after age 40 is beset with greater medical problems and higher mortality of both mother and child. On the other hand, childbearing during adolescence prevents school attendance, self development, and complete maturation to adulthood before assuming the responsibilities of parenthood. Childbearing after age 40 has adverse sociological implications also-parents often are unable or neglect to give the intensive and sustained loving care essential for intellectual and stable emotional development.

Therefore, if childbearing before age 20 and after age 40 is to be discouraged, it is clear that there are serious problems of birth timing in every nation of this region. In El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, the age-specific rates for ages 15-19 are above 100-one person in ten of these ages bears a child each year. In all of the nations, the birth rates at ages 40-44 are still quite high, and for some nations remain high even at ages 45-49. Teenage pregnancy is serious in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Panama-even though their birth rates are quite low. Late childbearing is especially serious in Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. One of the unmet health and family welfare needs throughout Central America is fertility reduction at these extreme ages.

Mortality 2.

Rapid and steady progress in reducing death rates has been made throughout the world, and the countries of Central America have all participated in this happy accomplishment. Table M-1 provides data on mortality trends in all Latin American countries from 1950 to 1980-85. The following tabulation documents the rapid decline in mortality for Central America as a whole since 1950.

| | Crude death rate | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|------------------|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------|--------|--|--|
| Time | | | | | | | Central America | Europe | | |
| 1950-55 | | | | | | | 16.3 | 10.9 | | |
| 1960-65 | | | | | | | . 12.0 | 10.2 | | |
| 1965-70 | | | • | | | | 10.8 | 10.3 | | |
| 1970-75 | ٠ | • | | | | | 9.5 | 10.4 | | |
| 1975-80 | • | | | | | | 8.3 | 10,5 | | |
| 1980-85 | • | • | • | • | • | ٠ | 7.4 | 10.7 | | |

| | | | | | | | Life expectancy at birth | | | | | | |
|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------|--------|--|--|--|--|--|
| | | | | | | | Central America | Europe | | | | | |
| 1950-55 | | | | | | | 50.2 | 65.4 | | | | | |
| 1960-65 | ٠ | | | | | | 57.2 | 69.6 | | | | | |
| 1965-70 | | | | | • | | 59.2 | 70.5 | | | | | |
| 1970-75 | • | | • | | | | 61.3 | 71.2 | | | | | |
| 1975-80 | • | | | | | | 63.2 | 72.0 | | | | | |
| 1980-85 | • | • | • | • | • | • | 65.1 | 72.7 | | | | | |

[Source: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1990, 1982.]

For purposes of comparison, the data for Europe are shown for the same periods. The definitions of the mortality measures used in the above tables are as follows:

* Crude death rate--Number of deaths in a given year per 1,000 population as of the midpoint of that year.

* Life expectancy at birth--Average number of years a newborn child will live if it is exposed throughout its life to the death rates that are measures for a particular year.

| Region and country | | · | Crude de | ath rate | ····· | | Life expectancy at birth (both sexes) (\hat{e}_0) | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------|---------|----------|----------|---------|---------|---|---------|------------------|---------|---------|--------------|--------|--|
| | 1950-55 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975-80 | 1980-85 | 1950-55 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975-80 | 1980-85 | Change | |
| Latin America total | 15.4 | 12.2 | 11.0 | 9.8 | 8.9 | 9.2 | 51.2 | 56.E | 58.7 | 60.7 | 62.5 | | | |
| Central America/other | 16.3 | 12.0 | 10.8 | 9.5 | 8.3 | 7.4 | 50.2 | 57.2 | 59.2 | 61.7 | 63.2 | | 12.9 | |
| Belize | | | | | 5.0 | | | | 33.4 | 61.3 | 63.2 | 65.1 | 14.9 | |
| Costa Rica | 12.3 | 9.1 | 7.2 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 5.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Cuba | 11.0 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 6.4 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 57.3 | 63.0 | 65. 6 | 68.1 | 69.7 | 70.9 | 13.6 | |
| Dominican Republic | 20.6 | 14.7 | 12.6 | 10.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 58.8 | 65.1 | 68.5 | 70.9 | 72.8 | 73.4 | 14.6 | |
| El Salvador | 20.4 | 15.3 | 12.8 | 11.1 | 9.0 | 7.9 | 45.1 | 52.8 | 55.4 | 57.9 | 60.3 | 62 .6 | 17.5 | |
| Guatemala | 22.0 | 17.3 | 15.0 | 12.8 | 10.9 | 0.1 | 45.3 | 52.3 | 56.0 | 59.1 | 62.2 | 64.8 | 19.5 | |
| Haiti | 26.8 | 21.6 | 19.3 | 17.4 | 10.9 | 9.3 | 42.7 | 48.2 | 51.2 | 54.6 | 57.8 | 60.7 | 18.0 | |
| Honduras | 21.8 | 17.7 | 15.7 | 13.7 | 11 0 | 16.2 | 37.6 | 43.6 | 46.2 | 48.5 | 50.7 | 52.7 | 15.1 | |
| Merico | 15.1 | 10.8 | 10.0 | 8.8 | 11.0 | 10.1 | 42.2 | 47.9 | 50.9 | 54.1 | 57.1 | 59.9 | 17.7 | |
| Nicaragua | 22.5 | 17.7 | 15.6 | 13.0 | 12.2 | 6.9 | 51.8 | 59.2 | 60.8 | 52.7 | 64.4 | 66.0 | 14.2 | |
| Panama | 12.7 | 9.4 | 8.2 | 6.0 | 12.2 | 10.8 | 43.0 | 47.9 | 50.4 | 52.9 | 55.2 | 57.6 | 14.6 | |
| Puerto Rico | 9.0 | 6.9 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 58.8 | 63.2 | 64.9 | 67.4 | 69.6 | 70.7 | 11.9 | |
| | 1 | 1 | | 0.0 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 64.4 | 69.5 | 71.0 | 72.1 | 73.0 | 73.4 | 9.0 | |
| Tropical South America | 16.4 | 13.1 | 11.6 | 10.3 | 9.2 | 8.5 | 49.9 | 55.0 | 57.2 | 59.3 | 61.3 | 63.0 | 13.1 | |
| Bolivia | 24 1 | - 1 E | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | 15 1 | 21.5 | 20.2 | 19.0 | 17.5 | 15.9 | 40.4 | 43.4 | 45.1 | 46.7 | 14 6 | 50.7 | | |
| Colombia | 16.5 | 12.4 | 11.1 | 10.1 | 9.1 | 8.4 | 51.0 | 55.9 | 58.0 | 59.8 | 40.0 | 50.7 | 10.3 | |
| Ecuador | 10.5 | 12.2 | 10.4 | 9.0 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 50.6 | 56.2 | 58.4 | 60 4 | 62.2 | 63.5 | 12.5 | |
| Paraguay | 19.4 | 15.8 | 13.8 | 12.1 | 10.4 | 8.9 | 46.9 | 51.9 | 54.6 | 57 1 | 62.2 | 63.6 | 13.3 | |
| Peru | 19.5 | 11.9 | 10.1 | 8.1 | 7.6 | 7.2 | 51.9 | 56.6 | 50.5 | 67.1 | 60.0 | 62.6 | 15.7 | |
| Venezuela | 23.4 | 18.8 | 16.4 | 13.2 | 11.6 | 10.3 | 43.7 | 48 7 | 51.5 | 63.1 | 64.1 | 65.1 | 13.2 | |
| | 14.9 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 5.6 | 52.3 | 58.9 | 61 0 | 55.0 | 57.1 | 59.1 . | 15.4 | |
| Temporate South Amenias | | | { | | Ĩ | | | 30.5 | 01.0 | 64.5 | 66.2 | 67.8 | 15.5 | |
| remperate South America. | 10.2 | 9.5 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 60.3 | 63.3 | 65.3 | 67.2 | 68.1 | 69.0 | 8.7 | |
| Argentina | 91 | 0 4 | | | | | | | | i | | · | | |
| Chile | 11.6 | 11 0 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 9.0 | 62.7 | 66.0 | 67.4 | 58.4 | 69.7 | أمدء | | |
| Uruguay | 10.6 | 11.9 | 10.0 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 7.7 | 54.1 | 57.6 | 60.6 | 64.2 | 65.7 | 67.9 | /.2 | |
| | 5.0 | 9.1 | 9.4 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 10.2 | 66.3 | 68.3 | 68.5 | 68.6 | 69.5 | 67.0 | 12.9 | |
| | <u></u> | | | İ | | | | | | | 03 | ···3 | 4.0 | |

Table M-1. Mortality: Crude Death Rate and Life Expectancy at Birth (Both Sexes), Latin American Countries, 1950-85.

NOTE: The total for Central America does not include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico (the four Caribbean countries).

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

During the 30 years between 1950-55 and 1980-85, the crude death rate of Central America was reduced by more than 50 percent, and the expectancy of life at birth increased by 15 years. The crude death rate for Europe has been *higher* than that of Central America since 1970, and this may create the mistaken belief that mortality conditions are better in Central America than in Europe. However, this is a mirage created by age distribution.*

A much more reliable measure of the force of mortality is "life expectancy at birth." derived from life tables. Data for life expectancy at birth (identified by the symbol \hat{e}_{a}) are reported in the righthand panel of Table M-1. The average newborn child in Central America can look forward to enjoying his or her 65th birthday, whereas only three decades ago the expectation was 50 years. This life expectancy of 65 years was the level which Europe had in 1950-55. after more than a century of public health. economic development, and progress of medical science. Because of the rapid international diffusion of technical, medical, and health knowledge and practice, the developing countries have managed to accomplish in a few decades what it took Europe and North America a century or more to achieve. However, there is an upper limit to the extension of life, and as this is approached, progress becomes slower. For example, during the 30 years while Central America was adding 15 years to its life expectation, the nations of Europe were only adding 7 years, to achieve 72.7. At the present time, demographers estimate that 75-80 years in the maximum average expectancy that Europe or any other region can attain in this century, with current technology. Thus, Central America now has mortality conditions that are definitely "modern," and it stands on the

threshold of reaching toward the biological upper limit—adding 10 to 15 more years to present life expectancy.

Figure M-1 orients the mortality site of Latin America as a whole in relation to other world regions. It very clearly falls between the "developed" regions and the "underdeveloped" regions of South Asia and Africa. This figure also reports the expected future trend in mortality as projected by the United Nations. There are reasons to believe that the projections for Central America are too pessimistic. The U.N. estimates imply that a life expectancy of 70 years will not be attained until 2010. As argued below, this goal is likely to be attained as early as 1995 or shortly thereafter.

Table M-1 shows great diversity in mortality rates for nations of the region. Two places-Cuba and Puerto Rico-have already attained the same low level as Europe, and two more nations-Panama and Costa Rica-have very nearly achieved this. Three nations-Nicaragua, Honduras, and Haiti-stand out as having distressingly high mortality. In these countries, the expectation of life is still low, in the 50s, which is twenty years behind the rest of Central America. Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic have intermediate levels of mortality--life expectancy of 60-66 years.

As Table M-1 shows, life expectancy has increased at a rapid pace in all of the nations of Central America (as throughout all Latin America). During the 1970-80 decade, life expectancy increased by 3.8 years or .38 years of life for each calendar year of time. If this annual increase were to continue into the future, Central America would

^{*}Because of high fertility, Central America (and other developing countries) has a young age composition. At the younger ages (between infancy and age 45-50), mortality rates are low, which permits the developing countries to have unusually low crude death rates. Because of prolonged low fertility, Europe has a higher proportion of persons in the oider ages, where mortality rates are higher. This causes the crude death rate of Europe to be higher than that of the developing countries, even though the rate of death at each age is lower than in the developing countries.



Figure M-1. Life Expectance at Birth (Both Sexes) by Region: Medium Variant, 1950-2025, as Assessed in 1980.

Source: United Nations, Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982, p. 37.

attain a life expectancy of 70 years in only 12-13 years after 1982-83--about 1995. Because of the other social and economic changes (described later in this report), it is plausible that this pace can be maintained for the remainder of this centuryparticularly if projected international technical assistance for health and medicine at older ages is provided in the quantitites needed. The technology for accomplishing it has already been developed in Europe and North America, and only awaits export and investments in facilities.

Sex differentials in mortality

Trends in life expectancy at birth are reported separately for females and males in Table M-2 for each nation in Central America and of the other regions of Latin America. Without exception, women have a higher life expectancy than men; the advantage is 2 to 6 years. This differential was clearly manifest in 1950 and has tended to increase over time, rather than decline. Moreover, the differential between sexes tends to be higher under favorable socioeconomic conditions with low mortality (compare Honduras with Costa Rica). Thus, one of the side effects of mortality reduction is an increasing tendency for women to outlive their husbands, and spend a longer period of widowhood before their own death. This increased survival of women has been accomplished in part by reducing the dangers of childbearing, so that more women survive through the entire reproductive period, to bear more children.

Socioeconomic differentials in mortality

Wherever research has been undertaken, it has found that mortality tends to be much higher among the illiterate and the uneducated than among the literate and better educated. In fact, there is a uniform relationship—as socioeconomic well-being rises, so does life expectancy. This relationship is found if one measures socioeconomic status in terms of education, income, or occupation. A typical example is Honduras. A demographic survey taken in 1971-72 obtained data for mortality by socioeconomic category of the heads of households. The results for the various categories were:

| Socioeconomic status | Expectation of life at birth | Infant mortality rate | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|--|--|
| High and | | | | |
| medium | 66.90 | 95.20 | | |
| Medium low | 50.90 | 114.10 | | |
| Low | 48.30 | 126.30 | | |
| Ratio of low | | | | |
| to high | 0.72 | 1.33 | | |

Source: Encuesta demográfica nacional de Honduras, (EDENH), 1975, p.32.

Among the lower socioeconomic group expectation of life was only 72 percent as high as among the top group.

Urban-rural differentials in mortality

Although it is difficult to obtain mortality data separately for urban and rural areas, the research that has been done points overwhelmingly to the finding that mortality is much higher in rural than in urban areas. This can be due, in part, to greater educationincome-occupation (socioeconomic status). But it also appears to be related to the quantity and quality of medical and health services and sanitation, and to the education in preventive health care the public has received. Rural areas tend to lag far behind urban areas in their integration into the modernizing health system. The demographic survey of Honduras, mentioned above, found urban-rural differences in mutuality:

| Агња | | | | Expectation of life at birth | Infant mortality rate |
|----------|------|----|---|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Urban . | | | | 61.50 | 85.60 |
| Rural . | • | • | • | 50.10 | 127.20 |
| Ratio of | rura | al | | | |
| to urbar | ۱. | • | • | 0.81 | 1.49 |

Source: Encuesta demográfica nacional de Honduras (EDENH), 1975, p. 34.

Infant mortality

In Central America, as in all places where mortality is comparatively high. a very large share of all deaths is to infants in their first year of life. The United Nations has estimated the rate of infant mortality for all nations for the period of 1950-1980. [The infant mortality rate is defined as the number of deaths to infants under one year of age during a specified year per 1,000 live births during the same year.] Rates for each of the nations of Latin America are reported in Table M-3. In almost all nations, the decline in infant deaths has been very dramatic; within thirty years the rate has been cut to one-half or less of its 1950-55 level. This reduction in infant deaths is a major component of the increasing life expectancy described above.

Figure M-2 graphs the decline in infant mortality throughout the world, and places Latin America in perspective. Central America conforms rather closely to the Latin America trend. The figure shows that Latin America and Central America are far ahead of Africa and South Asian countries, but behind East Asia, in prevention of infant deaths. This figure also reports the projected decline in infant mortality expected by United Nations demographers in future years. Further declines are expected to take place in the remainder of this century and into the next, with the result that the rates for all regions converge toward the low level now occupied by the more developed countries, which can hope only for minor further declines.

In the various countries, there is wide diversity in infant mortality rates. In descending order, the nations fall into the following ranking:

| | | | | | Infant mortality rate, 1975-80 | Total fertility rate, 1980 |
|-------------|----|-----|-----|---|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Haiti | | | | | 120.9 | 5.92 |
| Nicaragua | | | | | 96.5 | 6.57 |
| Honduras | | • | | | 95.4 | 7.14 |
| El Salvador | r. | | | | 84.5 | 6.01 |
| Guatemala | | ÷ | | | 79.0 | 5.68 |
| Dominican | Re | pub | lic | • | 73.1 | 5.00 |
| Mexico , | | | | • | 59.8 | 5.40 |
| Panama . · | | | | | 36.2 | 4.12 |
| Costa Rica | | • | | | 29.3 | 3.57 |
| Cuba . | | | | | 22.5 | 2.18 |
| Puerto Ricc |). | • | • | • | 19.5 | 2.36 |

Source: Table M-3.

The first six nations in this list clearly have infant mortality rates that are still excessively high. A great deal of effort, both by the nations themselves and by international technical assistance, is being made to bring them under control. On the expectation that these efforts will be successful, significant further declines may be predicted for future years.

Infant mortality is higher among low income than among high income classes, and higher in rural than in urban areas. The data for Honduras, provided above, illustrates this differential. Rising levels of education and income plus rapid urbanization (coupled with improved health and medical services) lead one to expect further rapid declines in infant mortality in

| | | | | | | | | | | · | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| Region and country | Female ($\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{0}$) | | | | | Male (8 ₀) | | | | Difference (female - male) | | | | |
| | 1950-55 | 1 96 0-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975 - 80 | 1980-35 | 1950-55 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970-75 | 1975-80 | 1980-8 5 | 1980-85 | 1950-55 |
| Latin America total | 52.7 | 58.4 | 6D.5 | 62.7 | 54.5 | 66.3 | 49.7 | 54.9 | 56.9 | 58.8 | 60.5 | 62.1 | 4.2 | 3.0 |
| Central America/other | 51.6 | 50.9 | 60.9 | 63.2 | 65.2 | 67.1 | 48.9 | 55.7 | 57.5 | 59.5 | 61.3 | 63.1 | 4.0 | 2.7 |
| Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador | 58.6 61.0 46.7 46.5 | 64.5 67.1 54.4 54.0 | 67.5 70.3 57.2 58.0 | 70.2 72.6 59.8 61.2 | 71.9 74.4 62.2 64.5 | 73.3 75.2 64.6 67.1 | 56.0 56.7 43.6 44.1 | 61.6 63.3 50.9 50.8 | 63.9 66.8 53.6 54.1 | 66.1 69.3 56.1 | 67.5 71.1 58.4 | 68.7 71.8 60.7 | 4.6 3.4 3.9 | 2.6 4.3 3.1 |
| Guatemala. Naiti. Honduras. Mexico. | 43.3 38.9 43.5 53,3 | 49.0 44.9 49.7 61.0 | 52.0 47.6 52.7 62.6 | 55.5 50.0 55.9 64.7 | 58.£ 52.2 58.9 65.5 | 61.8 54.4 61.7 68.2 | 42.1 36.3 40.9 50.3 | 47.5 42.3 46.3 57.6 | 50.4 44.9 49.2 59.0 | 53.7 47.1 52.4 60.7 | 56.9 49.1 55.4 62.4 | 59.7 51.2 58.2 63.9 | 2.1 3.0 3.5 4.3 | 1.2 2.6 2.6 3.0 |
| Nicaragua Panama. Puerto Rico | 43.6 60.1 66.7 | 49.0 64.4 72.4 | 52.1 66.3 73.5 | 54.6 69.3 74.7 | 57.1 71.9 76.5 | 59.5 73.0 96.7 | 41.5 57.6 63.0 | 46.4 62.0 66.7 | 48.9 63.5 68.0 | 51.2 65.7 69.7 | 53.5 67.5 69.6 | 55.8 68.5 70.2 | 3.4 4.5 6.5 | 3.1 2.5 3.7 |
| Tropical South America | 51.3 | 56.6 | 58.9 | 61.1 | 63.2 | 65.0 | 48.5 | 53.4 | 55.5 | 57.5 | 59.4 | 61.0 | 4.0 | 2.5 |
| Bolivia. Brazil Colembia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. | 42.5 52.2 52.6 17.9 54.0 46.8 54.4 | 45.6 57.3 58.4 53.6 58.8 50.0 61.5 | 47.3 59.5 60.7 56.4 61.7 52.6 64.5 | 49.0 61.5 62.7 59.1 65.2 56.3 67.2 | 50.9 63.6 64.5 62.0 66.4 58.6 69.0 | 53.0 65.4 66.0 64.7 67.5 60.7 70.6 | 38.5 49.8 48.8 46.0 50.0 42.6 50.3 | 41.4 54.6 54.1 50.2 54.6 47.6 56.5 | 42.9 56.5 56.3 32.9 57.5 50.0 59.3 | 44.6 58.2 55.2 61.0 53.7 61.9 | 46.5 60.1 60.0 58.0 61.9 55.7 63.6 | 48.6 61.6 61.4 60.6 62.8 57.6 65.1 | 4.4 3.8 4.6 4.1 •4.7 3.1 5.5 | 4.0 2.4 3.8 1.9 4.0 2.2 4.1 |
| Temperate South America | 62.6 | 66.3 | 68.5 | 70.5 | 71.4 | 72.4 | 58.1 | 60.5 | 62.1 | 64.0 | 65.0 | 65.8 | 6.6 | 4.5 |
| Argentina Chile Uruguay | 65.1 56.0 69.4 | 69.1 60.4 71.6 | 70.8 63.6 71.9 | 71.7 67.5 72.0 | 72.5 69.0 72.8 | 73.3 70.4 73.7 | 60.4 52.3 63.3 | 63.1 55.0 65.1 | 64.1 57.6 65.3 | 65.3 61.0 65.4 | 66.0 62.4 66.3 | 66.7 63.8 67.1 | 6.6 6.6 6.6 | 4.7 3.7 6.1 |

Table M-2. Mortality: Life Expectancy at Birth by Sex, Latin American Countries, 1950-85.

NOTE: The total for Central America does not include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.



Figure M-2. Estimates and Projections of Infant Mortality Rate by Major Regions, 1950-2025. [SOURCE: United Nations, *Demographic Indicators of Countries, Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980*, 1982, page 43.]

all nations where these rates are 30 or higher.

All over the world a close correlation between the level of infarit mortality rates and fertility rates has been noted, and this region is no exception. In order to illustrate the close correlation, the total fertility rate for 1975-80 is repeated above, from Table F-1.

Demographers believe that the two sets of rates influence each other. As infant mortality rates decline, couples soon discover that their family size is exceeding their expectations, and there is pressure to reduce fertility. At the same time, research has repeatedly shown infant mortality rates become progressively higher for the fourth, fifth, sixth, or higher order children, so that reducing family size tends to reduce infant mortality.

Because of the anticipated continued decline in infant mortality one would prodict additional pressures to be exerted on birth rates to decline in the future.

Causes of death

It is well known that high mortality rates among infants and adults of working age are due primarily to infectious and parasitic diseases, which yield readily to hygiene, sanitation, immunization, and medical treatment. War against these ailments has been waged by Ministries of Health, assisted by international technical assistance for more than three decades. The declines in 22

| Region and | Infant mortality rate (per thousand births) | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--|--|--|
| country | 1950-55 | 1955-60 | 1960-65 | 1965-70 | 1970~75 | 1975-80 | 19 8 0-85 | | | |
| Latin America total | 127.9 | 114.3 | 101.8 | 91.7 | 81.8 | 71.4 | 62.9 | | | |
| Central America/other | 117.5 | 105.0 | 94.2 | 84.9 | 71.6 | 64.9 | 56.3. | | | |
| Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic | 92.5 85.1 149.4 | 85.5 72.2 128.9 | 80.6 59.6 110.0 | 65.6 47.8 96.3 | 50.9 33.8 83.6 | 29.3 22.5 73.1 | 25.7 20.4 | | | |
| £) Salvador Guatemala | 155.0 144.0 219.6 | 143.0 129.5 | 128.0 114.9 | 112.0 101.5 | 101.0 90.2 | 84.8 79.0 | 71.0 67.7 | | | |
| Honduras. Mexico. | 169.3 108.1 | 152.6 95.9 | 136.8 86.2 | 124.0 78.6 | 134.9 110.7 68.6 | 95.4 59.8 | 81.5 52.1 | | | |
| Panama. Puerto Rico | 83.9 63.2 | 72.6 51.2 | 136.4 62.6 44.5 | 122.2 53.9 33.3 | 100.9 43.8 25.3 | 96.5 36.2 19.5 | 84.5 32.5 15.9 | | | |
| Tropical South America | 140.9 | 175.3 | 111.0 | 100.3 | 90.7 | 79.0 | 69.7 | | | |
| Bolivia Brazil Colombia | 175.7 1 37. 7 | 169.7 124.5 | 163.6 111.8 84 5 | 157.5 102.3. | 151.3 94.9 | 138.2 82.4 | 124.4 | | | |
| Ecuador Paraguay Peru | 167.7 105.7 195.1 | 147.6 91.1 173.4 | 132.3 80.6 | 114.5 66.9 | 100.1 52.6 | 59.4 86.0 48.6 | 53.3 77.2 45.0 | | | |
| Venezuela | 110.9 | 92.2 | 76.9 | 64.9 | 52.4 | 44.8 | 38.6 | | | |
| Temperate South America. | 82.7 | 79.7 | 76.2 | 68.2 | 56.4 | 46.5 | 41.8 | | | |
| Argentina Chile Uruguay | 64.2 126.1 57.4 | 61.6 117.3 53.0 | 59.5 110.5 47.9 | 56.4 95.1 '47.1 | 51.3 69.5 46.3 | 47.2 46.3 41.7 | 43.2 40.0 37.6 | | | |

Table M-3. Infant Mortality Rate (per Thousand Births).

SOURCE: United Nations. Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 14, 1982.

mortality described above have been achieved mainly by success in controlling infectious and parasitic diseases—malaria, smallpox, typhoid fever, whooping cough, measles, enteritis, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Most of the nations of Latin America have long been active in these campaigns.

As a consequence, the infectious and parasitic diseases are becoming a progressively small part of mortality. This may be learned from Table M-4. Causes of death data for developing nations are notoriously defective, and must be treated with great caution. Data assembled by the Pan American Health Organization suggest, however, that in no country of Central America

do these diseases account for more than 20 percent of all deaths, except for Guatemala, where the share is 30 percent. Increasingly, the causes of death are shifting from the acute to the degenerative diseasediseases of the heart, malignant neoplasms, and other related to the malfunctioning of basic organs. Table M-5, which reports the percentage of all deaths from the five leading causes of death shows that the chronic and degenerative diseases are important in all countries, but that the infectious and parasitic diseases are still more important in the high mortality countries. Accidents and "homicides, legal intervention, and operations of war" also are leading causes of death in Central America. Progress in

| Region and | Yea. | Infective | Parasitic | Potel | Rate per 100,000 inhabitants | | | |
|-------------------------|------|-----------|-----------|-------|------------------------------|-----------|-------|--|
| country | | diseases | diseasos | | Infective | Parasitic | Total | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | |
| Costa E ca | 1978 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 50 | | 104 | 20.2 | |
| Сира | 1978 | 0.8 | 1.6 | 24 | 3.5 | 10.4 | 20.3 | |
| Dominican Republic | 1977 | 8.2 | 7.2 | 15.4 | 41.0 | 3.1 | 14./ | |
| El Salvador | 1974 | 13.3 | 4.7 | 18.0 | 104.8 | 30.1 | 142 1 | |
| Guatemala | 1978 | 17.7 | 12.1 | 29.8 | 171 3 | 116.0 | 500 1 | |
| Haiti | | | | | | 110.0 | 200.1 | |
| Honduras | 1976 | 12.2 | 7.7 | 19.9 | 69.1 | 44 0 | 1121 | |
| Mexico | 1976 | 11.2 | 7.0 | 18.2 | 82.2 | 51 0 | 122.2 | |
| Nicaragua | 1978 | 9.8 | 5.1 | 14.9 | 37.3 | 17.9 | 55 2 | |
| Panama | 1974 | 5.5 | 8.5 | 14.0 | 30.9 | 47.3 | 79.2 | |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | 1 | | |
| Bolivia | | | | | | | | |
| Brazil | | | | | | | | |
| Colombia | 1975 | 7.7 | 6.7 | 14.4 | 49.6 | 43.7 | 93.7 | |
| Ecuador | 1977 | 13.6 | 10.1 | 23.7 | 106.2 | 79.9 | 186.1 | |
| Paraguay | 1978 | 12.2 | 6.5 | 19.7 | 98.4 | 37.2 | 135.6 | |
| Peru | 1977 | 12.6 | 11.8 | 24.4 | 62.7 | 58.8 | 121.5 | |
| Veneguela | 1978 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 10.2 | 28.3 | 28.4 | 56.7 | |
| Temperate South America | | ļ | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1978 | 1.4 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 12.7 | 29.7 | 47.4 | |
| Chile | 1978 | 1.9 | 4.4 | 6.3 | 12.4 | 29.1 | 41 5 | |
| Uruguay | 1978 | 1.4 | 18.4 | 19.8 | 14.0 | 17.8 | 31.8 | |

Table M-4. Percent of All Deaths Caused by Infective and Parasitic Diseases.

NOTE: -- indicates current data not available.

SOURCE: Pan American Health Organization, <u>Health Conditions in the Americas, 1977-1980</u>, 1982, Table 11-5.

treating the chronic and degenerative diseases must be made if the momentum of death control is to be maintained. This will require more than the "primary health care" and "barefoot doctor" approach so popular today in many developing countries. International donor agencies interested in promoting health in Central America should take note that, although infectious and parasitic diseases are still pandemic, the fight against them is already being won, and within a decade or so, they will approach the minor importance they enjoy in Europe and other developed areas.

| Region and | Year | Leading cruses of deathPercent of death, from cause specified | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|----------------------------------|--|--|---|--|--|--------------------------------|--|
| country | | Diseases of the heart | Malignant neoplasms | Cerebro- vascular discases | Accidents | Influenza and pneumonia | Enteritia and other diarrheal diseases | Causes of perinatal mortality | Homicide and legal interventions | Bronchitis and emphysema | Other Causes |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Belize | 1975 1979 1978 1978 1974 1978 1976 1976 1977 *1974 | 15.4 16.7 29.9 9.2 3.8 8.9 10.6 11.2 12.3 | 7.6 16.3 17.5 4.8 5.0 7.8 | 6.0 9.5 6.8 | 10.6 11.3 5.8 6.0 7.1 9.3 7.5 8.8 | 5.3 7.9 4.1 14.4 3.8 13.4 4.1 7.3 | 12.0 | 6.1 6.5 7.3 4.5 9.4 3.3 | 4.2 7.2 5.5 | | 53.6 43.9 23.9 66.4 67.9 47.6 50.5 58.1 |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | | 57.0 |
| Bolivia Brazil Colombia Ecuadoz Paraguay Peru Venezuela | 1977 1978 1974 1978 1978 | 16.4 8.6 12.5 6.5 14.9 | 9.0 7.1 7.0 9.7 | 5.9 7.8 5.8 | 7.8 8.2 | | 7.8 12.2 12.2 11.4 | | 6.3 | | 46.1 56.6 53.5 54.2 |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | - | 50.5 |
| Argentina Chile Uruguay United States | 1978 1979 1978 | 28.0 13.6 24.3 | 17.0 15.1 21.4 | 9.6 8.6 12.2 | 6.0 9.8 4.5 | 7.6 | | 4.4 | | | 41.0 45.3 33.8 |
| Data not available | 19/8 | 38.1 | 20.6 | 9.1 | 5.7 | 3.0 | | | | | 23.5 |

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Table M-5. Percent of All Deaths Resulting from Five Leading Causes: Latin American Countries.

... Not applicable

Source: Pan American Health Organization, Health Conditions in the Americas: 1977-1980, 1982; Table II-6A.

Population Growth **3**.

Population growth is a net balance among births, deaths, and emigration/immigration. The combination of high and only slightly declining fertility rates and greatly reduced mortality rates, described in the preceding sections, would lead one to expect rapid population growth, and this is the case in Central America. Figure PG-1 shows how declining mortality with high fertility has created rapid population growth in the past and will continue to do so in the future if fertility remains high. All of the nations in the region, except Cuba, are growing at rates between 2.2 and 3.4 percent per year-all very rapid rates by demographic standards. Table PG-1 reports these rates for 1980-85. (The historical trend of growth rates for each country is reported in Table P-1 in the introduction to this report.) An orientation to the meaning of these rates may be attained by comparing them with the following tabulation of 1980-85 rates for regions of the world:

| | Annual rate of growth (% / year) | Years required to double |
|----------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| World total • • • • | <u>1.70</u> | <u>41.2</u> |
| More developed nations. | 0.61 | 117 |
| Less developed nations • • | 2.04 | 34 |
| Latin America • • • | 2.38 | 29 |
| Central America • | 2.88 | 24 |
| South Asia • • • • | 2.17 | 32 |
| East Asia 🔹 🔹 🔹 🔹 | 1.24 | 56 |
| Africa | 3.00 | 23 |

Source: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

Only in Africa is population growth higher than in Central America, and two of its nations (Honduras and Nicaragua) equal the highest rates in Africa.

These rates may appear deceptively low


Figure PG-1. Population Increase Resulting from High Birth Rates and Low Death Rates, 1950-1980, and From Projected Birth Rates and Death Rates to 2025.

CENTRAL AMERICA

| Region and | | | Med | ium varia | int | | | Low variant | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|--------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--|--|
| country | 1980-85 | 1985-90 | 1990-95 | 1995-00 | 2000-05 | 2010-15 | 2020-25 | 1980-85 | 1985-90 | 1990-95 | 1995-00 | 2010-15 | 2020-25 | | |
| Latin America total | 2.38 | 2.28 | 2.15 | 2.02 | 1.92 | 1.70 | 1.48 | 2.29 | 2.11 | 1.92 | 1.75 | 1.33 | 1.13 | | |
| Central America/other | 2.88 | 2.72 | 2.51 | 2.31 | 2.13 | 1,78 | 1.43 | 2.80 | 2.57 | 2.30 | 2.05 | 1.46 | 1.35 | | |
| Costa Rica | 2.31 | 2.22 | 2.05 | 1,89 | 1.74 | 1,49 | 1.21 | 2.09 | 1.95 | 1.78 | 1.60 | 1.10 | 0.77 | | |
| Dominican Republic | 0.62 | 0.98 | 1.13 | 0.99 | 0.76 | 0.60 | 0.40 | 0.62 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.46 | 0.26 | | |
| El Salvador | 2.43 | 2.30 | 2.21 | 2.06 | 2.04 | 1.81 | 1.36 | 2.13 | 1.80 | 1.46 | 1.39 | ۱.08 | 0.79 | | |
| Guatemala | 2.97 | 2.10 | 2.99 | 2.90 | 2.62 | 2.18 | 1.78 | 2.66 | 2.68 | 2.46 | 2.27 | 1.51 | 1.14 | | |
| Haiti | 2.51 | 2.62 | 2.76 | 2.74 | 2.44 | 2.13 | 1.83 | 2.60 | 2.33 | 2.18 | 2.12 | 1.59 | 1.28 | | |
| Honduras | 3.39 | 3.10 | 3 07 | 3 /8 | 2.70 | 2.52 | 2.16 | 2.41 | 2.49 | 2.52 | 2.50 | 2.07 | 1.69 | | |
| Mexico | 2.86 | 2.67 | 2 42 | 2 16 | 1 90 | 2.59 | 2.09 | 3.35 | 2.85 | 2.65 | 2.72 | 1.38 | 1.38 | | |
| Nicaragua | 3.27 | 3.21 | 3, 15 | 3.06 | 2,97 | 2 50 | 1.20 | 2.83 | 2.60 | 2.30 | 2.00 | 1.42 | 1.39 | | |
| Panama | 2.20 | 2.06 | 1.93 | 1 78 | 1 61 | 2.39 | 2.12 | 2.99 | 2.84 | 2.68 | 2.47 | 1.91 | 1.58 | | |
| Puerto Rico | 3.35 | 1.77 | 1.21 | 1.04 | 1.07 | 0.79 | 0.49 | 3.29 | 1.94 | 1.70 | 1.51 1.04 | 1.04 | 0.73 0.49 | | |
| Tropical South America | 2.46 | 2.36 | 2.23 | 2.10 | 2.02 | 1.83 | 1.66 | 2.39 | 2.20 | 2.00 | 1.81 | 1.41 | 1.16 | | |
| Bolivia | 2.69 | 2.76 | 2.82 | 2.88 | 2 66 | 2.69 | 2 20 | 2 50 | 2.67 | 2.40 | | . (7) | | | |
| Brazil | 2.30 | 2.20 | 2.07 | 1.97 | 1.88 | 1.76 | 1.65 | 2.39 | 2.57 | 2.49 | 2.38 | 1.03 | 1.34 | | |
| Colombia | 2.15 | 2.05 | 1.87 | 1.68 | 1.50 | 1.23 | 0.97 | 1 96 | 1 79 | 1.04 | 1.66 | 1.20 | 1.05 | | |
| Ecuador | 3.13 | 3.09 | 2.97 | 2.78 | 2.57 | 2.27 | 1.96 | 3.04 | 2 02 | 2 71 | 1.30 | 1 02 | 0.03 | | |
| Paraguay | 3.00 | 2.78 | 2.56 | 2.34 | 2.16 | 1.84 | 1.51 | 2.86 | 2.52 | 2.11 | 2.44 | 1.93 | 1.55 | | |
| Peru | 2.80 | 2.63 | 2.76 | 2.69 | 2.59 | 2.42 | 2.21 | 2.76 | 2.75 | 2.10 | 2.52 | 2 16 | 1.10 | | |
| Venezuela | 3.26 | 2.93 | 2.59 | 2.32 | 2.14 | 1.81 | 1.50 | 3.17 | 2.80 | 2.43 | 2.15 | 1.60 | 1.27 | | |
| Temperate South America | 1.29 | 1.20 | 1.09 | 0.99 | 0.90 | 0.73 | 0.55 | 1.11 | 0.99 | 0.88 | 0.78 | 0.50 | 0.33 | | |
| Argentina | 1.19 | 1.08 | 0.97 | 6.88 | 0.80 | 0.65 | 0.50 | 1.03 | 0.89 | 0.76 | 0.67 | 0.44 | 0.29 | | |
| Uruguay | 0.75 | 0.84 | 0.86 | .0.85 | 0.81 | 0.92 | 0.67 | 1.43 0.61 | 1.32 - 0.67 | 1.19 0.68 | 1.05 0.64 | 0.67 0.43 | 0.41 0.35 | | |
| | | L | | h | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 | | 1 | | 1 | | | |

Table PG-1. Population Growth Rates Expected Under Medium and Low Variants of United Nations/CELADE Projections for Nations of Latin America, 1980-2025.

NOTE: Central America total does not include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

unless one realizes that population growth is compounded, just as interest on a bank account. The implication of these rates of growth may be appreciated better by translating them into the number of years required for a population to double in size when compounding at a specified rate. Thus, at the present rate of growth of the world population (1.70 percent per year), the 4.8 billion people of the earth (as of 1984-85) will double in 41 years, to be nearly 10 billion in 2025. The much faster growth rates of Central America will cause the population there to double in a much shorter time-within 24 years. (Honduras and Nicaragua will double in 20-21 years at their present rates of growth.) A great many economists, planners, demographers, environmentalists, and others who are concerned about long-term welfare of nations regard population growth rates in excess of 1.0 or 1.5 to impose severe obstacles to the accomplishment of other development goals. (Later sections of this report discuss the reasons why this is the case.) Although few of these experts would recommend bringing the rate of growth to zero, manyif not most--would advise a reduction in the growth rate to below 2.0 per year as quickly as possible, with further decline toward 1.0 over the longer term.

Emigration

Although there undoubtedly is much undocumented emigration from Central American nations to the U.S. and to other Latin American countries, the volume of documented (legal) movement is much smaller than many impressionistic estimates. Table PG-2 reports the counts of immigrants, from selected Central American nations, as reported in the censuses of potential receiving countries. These statistics represent net accumulation over many years. The net flow for any one year would be only 5 percent or so of these numbers. In comparison with the annual growth of the Central American republics, their net emigration is a negligible drain.*

There is only one practical way for the growth rates to be lowered: the fertility rate must decline. Migration cannot possibly be a solution. All of the nations of this region now send out more migrants to the other countries (particularly to the United States) than they receive, but the effect upon the growth rate is negligible-it reduces the rate by only 0.1 or 0.2 percentage points per year. (Mexico is partially an exception; even though it may lose as many as 150,000 emigrants each year-1.5 million per decadethis would reduce its rate of growth by only 0.2 percentage points per year.) Most of the developed nations (including the United States) are trying to make immigration to their countries more difficult, and opportunities for migration between the Latin American countries themselves are limited. The problem of rapid growth . rates will not be willingly solved by having mortality rates rise, because this could occur only because of poverty, famine, and breakdown of the health/medical system, Since migration and death rates cannot be manipulated to reduce growth, lowering fertility is the only remaining option. And there is widespread hope and expectation that the fertility rates will decline in the future.

Future growth: population projections

The United Nations and the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) have projected what the population of each nation in Latin America would be in future years under different combinations of fertility rates. They assumed that death rates

*Although the years to which Table PG-2 refers are taken from censuses now several years old, it is believed that the results will not be changed greatly when newer data become available.

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will continue to decline, and used a single set of death rates for all projections. Three sets of projections were prepared under the following assumptions:

| | Fertility | Mortality |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|
| High variant | little decline | moderate decline |
| Medium variant | moderate decline | moderate decline |
| Low variant | rapio declino | moderate decline |

Table PG-3 reports the expected fertility rates under the medium and the low variant. (For the high variant, little change from 1980-85 levels is expected, so the rates are not reported.) Expected declines in mortality are reported in Table PG-4.

The population that is estimated to be residing in each country in the year 2025 under conditions of high, medium, and low fertility is reported in Table PG-5. For Central America as a whole, the population makes a major leap in all three projections. It will almost double under the low projection, but under the high variant it will be 2.5 times its 1985 size. Under the medium variant, it will grow by 120 percent. The projected trends are very different for the individual places, however. For Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico, which already have slow growth, the high, medium, and low projections give population estimates not substantially different from each other. But for the rapidly growing population, the choice of whether to grow rapidly or more slowly makes a very great difference in growth rates. Honduras, for example, will quadruple in size under the high variant, and will grow by 143 percent under the low variant. Similar major differences are projected for the other areas. Even with moderately declining fertility, growth rates in Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti will still be above 2.0 percent per year in 2025. (See Table PG-5.) Under

these conditions, each of the nations will have roughly three times their present population by that date.

Public awareness and general social change (rising educational attainment, increased urbanization, greater public awareness of the implications of large families upon personal household finances) should prevent the high variant from materializing. Instead, the U.N. medium projection will materialize if modest additional efforts are made to encourage the public to reduce fertility. The low variant, however, can be attained only by special additional efforts to reduce childbearing before age 20, curtail childbearing after age 35, and to reduce family size from five or six to two or three children by the year 2025. If this is the case, there is a policy choice to be made: whether to pursue a course that will almost inevitably produce a population about the size indicated by the medium variant, or to make special additional efforts to reduce growth and arrive at the population size indicated by the low variant.

Table PG-6 reports the population that would be resident in each country in selected years between 1980 and 2025 under the medium and low variants. Figure.PG-2 gives a visual presentation of what these options mean in terms of future population size for each country. It is a policy matter of basic importance, and particularly for Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico. The remaining sections of this report will elaborate some of the reasons why this is so.

Table PG-2. Emigration from Central America: Population Born in North and Central America and Enumerated in Countries of the Americas Other than Country of Birth.

| Country of | Census | Country of birth | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|--|--|-----------------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| residence | year | Canada | Costa Rica | El Salvador | Guatemala | Honduras | Mexico | Nicaragus | Panama | United States | | | |
| Argentina ^a | 1960 1950 1950 1970 1964 1950 1960 1972 1972 1975 | 373 117 402 350 384 40 215 1.529 | 209 10 47 101 400 42 | 64 8 16 109 146 11 | 102 9 88 66 164 18 | 88 8 31 122 | 739 70 299 319 753 41 646 | 53 5 25 56 272 | 212 9 65 216 2.208 127 | 6,747 858 7,987 3,661 7,561 728 317 927 5,991 | | | |
| Canada ^a Costa Rica ^a Costa Rica ^a El Salvador ^a Guatemala ^a Honduras ^a Nicaragua ^a Vnicat States ^c | 1971 1963 1973 1971 1973 1961 1970 1971 1970 1970 | 847 82 86 46 179 82 3,352 133 99 | 1,314 422 805 294 998 4,693 3,825 16,691 | 342 766 14,052 38,002 1,213 2,210 15,717 | 181 404 3.413 4.497 6.969 451 17,356 | 165 452 14,290 6,231 | 1,717 5,380 471 425 636 3,196 379 703 591 759,711 | 866 11,871 784 1,098 3,553 3,674 | 1,079 3,232 1,598 5 217 159 1,183 590 20,046 | 10,832 309,640 1,955 2,151 1,461 3,527 1,433 97,246 1,848 6,894 | | | |
| Barbados ^a Cuba ^a Dominican Republic ^a Haiti ^a Jamaica ^a Trinidad and Tobago ^a | 1960 1970 1970 1950 1960 1960 | 315 87 131 162 506 525 | 40 ••• | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | ···· 4 ···· | 32 | 1,201 161 | 15 | 19 | 719 2,178 2,663 389 1,781 1,420 | | | |

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^aPopulation classified by country of birth

^bPopulation classified by nationality

^CCorresponds to natives of Latin American countries with both parents also born in Latin America

SOURCE: CELADE. Boletin Demográfico, Año X, No. 20; Santiago de Chile, July 1977.

| Region and | | | Med | ium varia | int. | | | | | Ĩ | .ow variar | et. | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| country | 1980-85 | 198 5- 90 | 1990-95 | 1995-00 | 2000-05 | 2010-15 | 2020-25 | 1980-85 | 1985-90 | 1990-95 | 1995-00 | 2000-05 | 2010-15 |
| Latin America total | 4.20 | 3.86 | 3.57 | 3.36 | 3.18 | 2.94 | 2.77 | 4.05 | 3.58 | 3.21 | 2.92 | 2.45 | 2.28 |
| Central America/other | 4.95 | 4, 39 | 3.90 | 3.51 | 3.22 | 2.79 | 2.52 | 4.80 | 4.13 | 3.55 | 3.08 | 2 .3 8 | 2.12 |
| Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicagua Puerto Rico | 3.18 1.97 4.25 5.56 5.17 5.74 6.50 4.85 6.21 3.57 2.15 | 2.99 1.97 3.70 5.10 4.76 5.56 5.59 4.27 5.86 3.24 2.01 | 2.91 2.02 3.40 4.74 4.67 5.36 5.14 3.72 5.47 3.01 1.95 | 2.87 2.10 3.20 4.45 4.31 5.15 5.00 3.25 5.04 2.85 1.91 | 2.83 2.08 3.08 3.37 3.35 4.86 4.73 2.97 4.67 2.'3 2.09 | 2.69 2.10 2.93 3.32 3.36 4.24 3.95 2.57 4.00 2.54 2.09 | 2.52 2.09 2.50 2.80 2.97 3.49 3.20 2.35 3.28 2.44 2.09 | 2.85 1.97 3.77 5.04 4.59 5.58 6.47 4.80 5.62 3.51 2.09 | 2.60 1.81 2.95 4.30 5.31 5.09 4.15 5.04 3.07 2.01 | 2.50 1.65 2.35 3.44 5.02 4.35 3.53 4.47 2.71 1.95 | 2.46 1.83 2.21 3.32 4.72 4.10 3.00 3.90 2.48 1.91 | 2.25 2.04 2.10 2.40 2.71 3.57 2.86 2.29 2.97 2.97 2.19 2.09 | 2.09 2.09 2.08 2.12 2.46 2.87 2.26 2.55 2.67 2.11 2.09 |
| Tropical South America | 4.29 | 3.95 | 3.69 | 3.49 | 3.33 | 3.12 | 2.98 | 4.17 | 3.59 | 3.31 | 3.01 | 2.54 | 2.39 |
| Bolivia Brazil. Culombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela. Temperate South America | 6.25 4.02 3.93 6.00 4.85 5.29 4.33 | 6.06 3.67 3.58 5.64 4.48 5.07 3.93 | 5.81 3.42 3.26 5.20 4.11 4.84 3.58 | 5.50 3.29 3.00 2.72 3.75 4.60 3.27 | 6.50 3.18 2.78 4.26 3.42 4.37 3.03 | 4.73 3.10 2.49 3.61 2.93 3.91 2.69 | 3.50 3.05 2.31 3.18 2.56 3.50 2.50 | 6.05 3.94 3.66 5.83 4.62 5.21 4.18 | 5.65 3.42 3.17 5.32 4.07 4.91 3.72 | 5.12 3.05 2.80 4.72 3.46 4.60 3.32 | 4.50 2.79 2.52 4.10 3.02 4.29 2.99 | 2.86 2.42 2.13 3.07 2.33 3.44 2.41 | 2.36 2.34 2.05 2.66 2.19 3.00 2.25 |
| Argentina | 2.78 | 2.67 | 2.57 | 2.46 | 2.37 | 2.22 | 2.14 | 2.53 | 2.37 | 2.23 | 2.17 | 2.08 | 2.05 |
| Chile Uruguay | 2.90 2.78 | 2.74 2.69 | 2.61 2.61 | 2.50 2.55 | 2.42 2.50 | 2.28 2.36 | 2.19 2.15 | 2.56 2.56 | 2.37 2.42 | 2.20 2.32 | 2.20 2.25 | 2.09 2. 0 9 | 2.05 2.05 |

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Table PG-3. Total Fertility Rates Assumed Under Medium and Low Variants of United Nations/CELADE Projections for Nations of Latin America, 1980-2025.

NOTE: Central America total does not include Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries: Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

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| Region and Country | | | Life exp | æctancy a | t birth | | | | | Crud | le death i | rate | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| | 1980-85 | 1985-90 | 1990-95 | 1995-00 | 2000-05 | 2010 - 15 | 2020-25 | 1980-85 | 1985-90 | 1990-95 | 1995-00 | 2000-05 | 2010-15 | 2020-25 |
| Latin America total | 64.1 | 65.6 | 66.9 | 68.1 | 69.0 | 70.6 | 71.8 | 8.2 | 7.6 | 7.1 | 6.8 | 6.6 | | |
| Central America/other | 65.1 | 66.7 | 68.3 | 69.7 | 70.7 | 71.9 | 72.6 | 7.4 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 6.7 |
| Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Denen | 70.9 73.4 62.6 64.8 60.7 52.7 59.9 66.0 57.6 | 71.9 74.0 64.6 67.1 63.4 54.7 62.6 67.5 60.0 | 72.5 74.4 66.4 69.2 65.8 56.6 65.3 68.8 62.4 | 72.8 74.7 68.1 71.3 68.0 58.4 67.3 70.1 64.7 | 73.1 74.9 69.2 72.1 69.1 60.3 69.4 71.0 66.1 | 73.6 75.0 71.1 72.8 71.0 63.4 71.5 72.1 68.4 | 73.9 75.1 72.4 73.1 72.2 66.0 72.2 72.7 70.1 | 5.0 6.4 7.9 8.1 9.3 14.2 10.1 6.9 | 4.9 6.7 7.1 7.0 8.0 12.8 8.4 6.2 | 4.9 6.9 6.5 6.0 7.9 11.5 7.2 5.7 | 5.1 7.2 6.0 5.2 6.3 10.3 6.3 5.3 | 5.3 7.4 5.8 4.9 5.9 9.1 5.7 5.1 | 5.9 8.4 5.8 4.9 5.6 7.5 4.9 5.3 | 6.9 9.9 6.0 5.2 5.7 6.5 4.9 6.0 |
| Puerto Rico | 70.7 73.4 | 71.7 73.8 | 72.4 74.1 | 72.8 74.4 | 72.8 74.8 | 73.1 75.3 | 73.5 75.7 | 5.6 5.5 | 9.1 5.4 5.4 | 7.8 5.4 5.6 | 6.6 5.5 5.8 | 6.1 5.6 6.1 | 5.4 6.2 7.1 | 5.2 7.2 8.9 |
| Poliuis | 63.0 | 64.4 | 65.B | 67.1 | 68.1 | 70.0 | 71.7 | 8.5 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 6.5 | 6.6 |
| Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. | 50.7 63.5 63.6 62.6 55.1 59.1 67.8 | 53.1 64.9 64.8 64.9 66.1 61.0 69.0 | 55.9 66.2 65.9 67.1 67.0 62.7 70.0 | 59.4 67.4 66.9 69.0 67.8 64.4 70.9 | 61.6 68.5 67.9 69.6 68.7 65.9 71.7 | 64.8 70.3 69.7 70.7 70.2 68.6 73.0 | 67.2 71.9 71.3 71.5 71.7 71.2 73.9 | 15.9 8.4 7.7 8.9 7.2 10.3 5.6 | 14.1 • 7.9 7.4 7.5 6.8 9.3 5.2 | 12.2 7.5 7.1 6.4 6.4 8.3 4.9 | 10.0 7.2 6.9 5.6 6.1 7.5 4 8 | 9.2 7.0 6.8 5.4 5.9 6.9 | 6.9 6.9 5.3 5.7 6.0 | 6.0 6.9 7.5 5.4 6.0 5.5 |
| Temperate South America | 69.0 | 69.7 | 70.4 | 71.1 | 71.5 | 71.8 | 72.1 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 5.7 |
| Argentina Chile Uruguay | 69.9 67.0 70.3 | 70.3 68.3 71.1 | 70.8 69.5 71.9 | 71.2 70.6 72.7 | 71.5 71.1 73.0 | 71.8 71.6 73.3 | 72.0 71.9 73.6 | 9.0 7.7 10.2 | 9.2 7.5 10.2 | 9.4 7.3 10.1 | 9.5 7.2 10.0 | 9.7 7.3 10.0 | 10.0 8.1 9.8 | 10.5 9.3 9.7 |

Table PG-4. Projected Life Expectancy at Birth and Crude Death Rates Assumed Under Medium and Low Variants of United Nations/CELADE Projections for Nations of Latin America, 1980-2025.

NOTE: Central America total excludes Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

| | | Popu | lation in | 2025 | Diffe | | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|---|--|--|---|---|---|--|
| Region and Country | tion in | <u> </u> | (000) | r | | _(U00) | ween: | Percent | change 1 | 985-2025 |
| | 1985 (000) | High Variant | Medium variant | Low Variant | High and medium | Medium and low | High and low | High varíant | Medium variant | Low variant |
| Latin America total | 409,743 | 984,284 | 865,198 | 760,670 | 119,086 | 104,528 | 223,614 | 140 | 111 | |
| Central Americs/other | 134, 314 | 346,049 | 295,445 | 265,157 | 50,604 | 30,288 | 80,892 | 158 | 111 | 85 |
| Costa kica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Nicaragua Panama Puerto Rico Tropical South America | 2,485 10,038 6,715 5,552 8,403 6,585 4,372 80,484 3,218 2,117 4,345 224,038 | 5,889 13,994 18,208 18,895 27,269 20,406 17,038 J97,534 12,906 4,230 6,680 | 4,893 13,575 14,495 15,048 21,717 18,312 13,293 173,960 9,752 3,937 6,463 | 4,192 12,735 10,904 11,590 17,075 15,921 10,642 164,537 7,586 3,537 6,438 | 996 419 3,713 3,847 5,552 2,094 3,745 23,574 6,154 239 217 | 701 840 3,591 3,458 4,642 2,391 2,651 9,423 2,166 400 25 | 1,697 1,259 7,304 7,305 10,194 4,485 6,396 32,997 8,320 693 242 | 137 39 171 240 225 210 290 145 394 100 78 | 97 35 116 171 158 178 204 116 203 93 75 | 68 27 62 109 103 142 143 104 136 84 75 |
| Bolivia. Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. emperate South America | 6,371 137,233 28,714 9,380 3,681 20,273 18,386 43,799 | 21,690 332,808 57,626 28,582 9,969 60,249 47,480 66,315 | 19,525 291,252 51,718 25,725 8,552 56,936 42,846 61,924 | 14,089 248,366 45,136 22,531 7,230 51,283 39,471 55,867 | 62,750 2,165 41,556 5,908 2,857 1,417 4,213 4,634 4,391 | 67,548 5,436 42,886 6,582 3,194 1,322 4,753 3,375 6,057 | 130,298 7,601 84,442 12,490 6,051 2,739 8,966 8,009 10,448 | 149 241 143 101 205 171 197 158 51 | 121 207 112 81 174 132 176 133 41 | 91 121 61 57 140 96 153 115 28 |
| ChileUruguay | 28,689 12,074 3,036 | 41,781 20,118 4,416 | 39,058 18,758 4,108 | 35,494 16,673 3,700 | 2,723 1,750 1 3 | 3,564 2,085 408 | 6,287 3,445 716 | 46 67 46 | 36 55 35 | 24 38 22 |

Table PG-5. Projections of Population for the Year 2025 by Three Variants: Nations of Latin America, 1985-2025.

NOTE: Central America total excludes Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

| Medium variant (000) | | | | | | Low variant | | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|--|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2010 | 2025 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | | |
| 363,704 | 409,743 | 459,298 | 511,433 | 565,747 | 681,494 | 865,198 | 363,166 | 407,213 | 452,738 | 543,912 | 760,670 | | |
| 92,539 | 106,848 | 122,382 | 138747 | 155,709 | 191020 | 242,909 | 92,416 | 106,293 | 120,864 | 150,222 | 219,461 | | |
| 2,213 9,732 5,947 4,797 7,262 5,809 3,691 69,752 2,733 1,896 3,675 199,452 | 2,485 10,038 6,715 5,552 8,403 6,585 4,372 80,484 3,218 2,117 4,345 225,530 | 2,776 10,540 7,534 6,484 9,676 7,509 5,105 91,976 3,778 2,346 4,747 253,792 | 3,075 11,152 8,414 7,531 11,109 8,596 5,953 103,814 4,422 2,583 5,043 283,689 | 3,377 11,718 9,329 8,708 12,739 9,860 6,978 115,659 5,154 2,823 5,312 315,146 | 3,994 12,584 11,371 11,188 16,125 12,868 9,394 139,886 6,854 3,291 5,876 383,629 | 4,893 13,575 14,495 15,048 21,717 18,312 13,293 173,960 9,752 3,937 6,463 498,476 | 2,199 9,732 5,925 4,769 7,213 3,668 69,752 2,709 1,895 3,675 199,301 | 2,440 10,038 6,569 5,447 8,213 6,536 4,357 80,365 3,145 2,111 4,333 224,523 | 2,690 10,464 7,209 6,228 9,230 7,402 5,024 91,504 3,626 2,325 4,735 250,566 | 3,185 11,343 8,313 7,891 11,444 9,516 6,571 113,443 4,692 2,731 5,300 303,102 | 4,192 12,735 10,904 11,5(J) 17,075 15,921 10,642 164,537, 7,586 3,537 6,438 430,755 | | |
| 5,570 122,320 25,794 8,021 3,168 17,625 15,620 41,067 27,C36 | 6,371 137,233 26,714 9,380 3,681 20,273 18,366 43,801 28,689 12,074 | 7,314 153,171 31,820 10,949 4,231 23,355 21,284 46,505 30,277 13,061 | 8,422 169,899 34,940 12,704 4,807 26,843 24,225 49,109 31,786 14,017 | 9,724 187,494 37,999 14,596 5,405 30,703 27,207 51,605 33,222 14,934 | 13,451 225,557 43,840 19,740 6,653 39,597 33,432 56,221 35,843 16,647 | 19,525 291,252 51,718 25,725 8,552 56,036 42,846 61,925 39,058 18,758 | 5,561 122,320 25,709 8,007 3,168 17,625 15,588 40,833 26,909 11,011 | 6,331 136,892 28,359 9,320 3,656 20,232 18,266 43,164 28,332 11,828 | 7,199 151,588 30,993 10,785 4,144 23,214 21,013 45,347 29,605 12,636 | 9,184 180,536 35,888 13,952 5,037 30,086 26,427 49,259. 31,806 14,136 | 14,089 248,366 45,136 22,531 7,230 51,283 39,471 55,869 35,494 16,673 | | |
| | 1980 963,704 92,539 2,213 9,732 5,947 7,262 5,947 7,262 5,947 1,896 3,697 1,896 3,675 199,452 5,570 122,320 25,794 8,021 3,168 17,625 15,620 41,067 27,c36 11,104 2,924 | 1980 1985 363,704 409,743 92,539 106,848 2,213 2,485 9,732 10.038 5,947 6,715 4,797 5,552 7,262 8,403 5,809 6,585 3,691 4,372 69,752 80,484 2,733 3,218 1,896 2,117 3,675 4,345 199,452 225,530 5,570 6,371 122,320 137,233 25,794 26,714 8,021 9,380 3,168 3,661 17,625 20,273 15,620 18,366 41,067 43,801 27,C36 28,689 11,104 12,074 2,924 3,036 | 1980 1985 1990 163,704 409,743 459,298 92,539 106,848 122,382 2,213 2,485 2,776 9,732 10.038 10,540 5,947 6,715 7,534 4,797 5,552 6,484 7,262 8,403 9,676 5,809 6,585 7,509 3,691 4,372 5,105 69,752 80,484 91,976 2,733 3,218 3,778 1,896 2,117 2,346 3,675 4,345 4,747 199,452 225,530 253,792 5,570 6,371 7,314 122,320 137,233 153,171 25,794 26,714 31,820 8,021 9,380 10,949 3,168 3,681 4,231 17,625 20,273 23,355 15,620 18,366 21,284 41,067 43,801 46,5 | 1980 1985 1990 1995 363,704 409,743 459,298 511,433 92,539 106,848 122,382 138747 2,213 2,485 2,776 3,075 9,732 10.038 10,540 11,152 5,947 6,715 7,534 8,414 4,797 5,552 6,484 7,531 7,262 8,403 9,676 11,109 5,809 6,585 7,509 8,596 6,752 80,484 91,976 103,814 2,733 3,218 3,778 4,422 1,896 2,117 2,346 2,583 3,675 4,345 4,747 5,043 199,452 225,530 253,792 283,689 5,570 6,371 7,314 8,422 122,320 137,233 153,171 169,899 25,794 26,714 31,820 34,940 8,021 9,380 10,949 12,704 <t< td=""><td>1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 363,704 409,743 459,298 511,433 565,747 92,539 106,848 122,382 138747 155,709 2,213 2,485 2,776 3,075 3,377 9,732 10.038 10,540 11,152 11,718 5,947 6,715 7,534 8,414 9,329 4,797 5,552 6,484 7,531 8,708 7,262 8,403 9,676 11,109 12,739 5,809 6,585 7,509 8,596 9,860 69,752 80,484 91,976 103,814 115,659 2,733 3,218 3,778 4,422 5,154 1,896 2,117 2,346 2,583 2,823 3,675 4,345 4,747 5,043 5,312 199,452 225,530 253,792 283,689 315,146 5,570 6,371 7,314 8,422 9,724 <td>1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 363,704 409,743 459,298 511,433 565,747 681,494 92,539 106,848 122,382 138747 155,709 191020 2,213 2,485 2,776 3,075 3,377 3,994 9,732 10.038 10,540 11,152 11,718 12,584 5,947 6,715 7,534 8,414 9,329 11,371 4,797 5,552 6,484 7,531 8,708 11,188 7,262 8,403 9,676 11,109 12,739 16,125 5,809 6,585 7,509 8,596 9,860 12,868 3,691 4,372 5,105 5,953 6,978 9,394 69,752 80,484 91,976 103,814 115,659 139,886 2,733 3,218 3,778 4,422 5,154 6,854 1,896 2,117 2,346 2,583 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$7,262$ $8,036$ $9,575$ $8,996$ $9,860$ $12,868$ $18,312$ $5,793$ $6,536$ $7,602$ $3,691$ $4,372$ $5,105$ $5,953$ $6,978$ $9,394$ $13,293$ $3,688$ $4,575$ $5,024$ $69,752$ $80,484$ $91,976$ $103,814$ $115,659$ $139,886$ $173,960$ $69,752$ $80,365$ $91,504$ $2,733$ $3,218$ $3,778$ $4,422$ $5,157$ $6,6453$ $3,675$ $4,333$ $4,735$ $199,452$ $225,530$ $253,792$ $283,689$ $315,146$ $383,629$ $498,476$ $199,301$ $224,5$ | 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2025 1980 1985 1990 1995 163,704 409,743 459,298 511,433 565,747 681,494 865,198 363,166 407,213 452,728 543,912 92,538 106,848 122,382 138747 155,709 191020 242,909 92,416 106,293 120,864 150,222 2,213 2,485 2,776 3,075 3,377 3,994 4,893 2,199 2,440 2,690 3,185 9,732 10.038 10,540 11,152 11,718 12,758 9,732 10,038 10,464 11,343 4,797 5,555 6,484 7,531 8,414 9,291 14,495 8,4769 5,447 6,228 7,891 7,622 8,403 9,676 11,109 12,739 16,125 21,717 7,213 8,213 9,230 11,444 5,809 6,6585 7,509 8,960 12,66 | | |

Table PG-6. Population Projections for Selected Years: Nations of Latin America, 1935-2025.

NOTE: Central America total excludes Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Naiti, and Fuerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.



Figure PG-2. Projections of Population Growth Rates: Regions of Latin America and Mexico and Brazil, 1980-2025.

Source: Table PG-6.



Figure PG-2. Projections of Population Growth Rates: Regions of Latin America and Mexico and Brazil, 1980-2025-continued.

Age and Sex Composition and Dependency

Wherever fertility rates are high, a high percentage of the population is comprised of children. Where fertility rates are low, the ratio of children to adults is smaller. If each woman bears 5 or 6 children, as in most of the countries in Central America, it is self-evident that the offspring will far outnumber the parents, and the population will have a young age composition.

Dependency ratio and median age

One way of measuring the age composition is "median age." The median age of the population is the age at which one-half of the population is younger and one-half of the population is older.

Demographers also use a measure called the "dependency ratio" to study a population's age composition. It is simply the population under age 15 plus the population aged 65 or over divided by the population of working age (15-64 years). This ratio is multiplied by 100 to express it as the number of dependents per 100 adults of working age.

Dependency Ratio =
$$\frac{(0.15) + (65 \text{-over})}{(15 - 64)} \times 100$$

Where the dependency ratio is nearly 100, as in Honduras and Nicaragua, there is one dependent person for every adult. Where the dependency ratio is only 52, as in Cuba, the dependency load of adults is reduced by one-half. The dependency ratio thus is a measure of the demands that children make upon family income and upon the national economy. The United Nations has provided measures of age composition, dependency ratios, and median age for all nations of the world.

Table A-1 provides measures both of median age and dependency ratios for each of the nations of Latin America, taken from the U.N. source. It is clear there is great diversity of age composition. In Cuba, Costa Rica, Panama, and Puerto Rico, where fertility is low, the dependency ratios are also low and the median ages are higher, while in the high fertility countries of Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, the reverse is true. Also, it can be seen that in the countries which now have low birth rates, the decline of fertility over the past 30 years has been paralleled by declines in the dependency load of the children that adults must support. Where fertility has changed little, dependency ratios have stayed at the same high levels. Figure A-1 shows the correlation between fertility and age composition for all of Latin America to emphasize the importance of this variable.

The age pyramid

The above measures of age composition do not show the full detail of a population's age distribution. An "age pyramid"a diagram which shows the size of each age group in comparison with other ageshelps to explain the effect of high fertility on age composition. Figure A-2 shows the age pyramid for a typical less developed population and for a typical more developed population. The very large number of children in relation to adults is apparent in the less developed population, whereas in the more developed regions children are less numerous in relation to adults. Panel D of this figure shows what the age composition of the population of the less developed regions would be like if a decline in fertility were to remain in effect for a prolonged time: the dependency ratio declines, and children become a smaller proportion of the total, just as the more developed countries presently exhibit.

A comparison of the age pyramids for the more developed nations with the less devel-

oped nations shows that one side effect of declining fertility is an increase in the propertion of elderly persons age 65 or over. Some alarmists mistakenly believe that reducing the dependency load of children merely shifts the dependency from child dependency to old-age dependency. This is not true. Although the proportion of adults age 65 or above rises from about 3 or 4 percent to about 7 or 8 percent as birth rates decline toward the three or four child family, at no time does it even begin to approach the 40 to 50 percent children comprise of the total population under conditions of high fertility. Table A-2 shows the two components of the dependency ratio, children and aged, for each country. By comparing the data for the low fertility countries with that of the high fertility countries, and by comparing the trends over the decades of youth dependency and oldage dependency as birth rates have declined, the validity of the above demographic principle can be observed: reducing fertility always reduces total dependency-the immediate decline in childhood dependency always far outweighs the smaller increase in old-age dependency which occurs much later.

Women of childbearing age

The dependency ratios fail to measure the childbearing potential of the population under conditions of high and low fertility. Table A-3 reports data on the percentage of all women ages 15-49 for each nation for dates between 1950 and 1985. An interesting demographic fact emerges: the proportion of women in the childbearing ages remains almost constant at 22-26 percent, irrespective of fertility levels or trends. This means that the potential for childbearing is almost identical irrespective of how quickly or how slowly the population has grown in the past. The birth rate in a particular year is influenced only to a minor degree by the age composition of the childbearing women; the rate at which they bear children at each age is a much more important factor. This is determined, in large part, by the degree to

| | | | | | | Π | | | | |
|-------------------------|------|---------------------------------------|-----------|------|------|------|-------|------------|-------------|-------|
| Region and | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | Median ag | e | | | Depe | ndency rat | tio (total) | |
| | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 198 |
| Latin America total | 19.7 | 18.9 | 18.6 | 19.7 | 20.5 | 78.2 | 85.4 | 86.8 | 79.8 | 74.7 |
| Cent:al America/other | 18.4 | 17.0 | 16.6 | 17.5 | 18.1 | 65.6 | 96.8 | 99.1 | 92.3 | 86.6 |
| Costa Rica | 18.2 | 16.4 | 16.8 | 19.9 | 21.7 | 88.1 | 101.9 | 07.2 | | |
| | 22.9 | 23.3 | 22.4 | 24.4 | 25.8 | 68.5 | 101.9 | 97.2 | 71.0 | 64.0 |
| Fl Saluador | 17.5 | 16.1 | 15.5 | 17.2 | 18.5 | 92.6 | 102.0 | 1 /5.7 | 62.9 | 52.1 |
| | 18.7 | 17.6 | 16.9 | 17.2 | 17.5 | 82.1 | 102.9 | 107.0 | 101.5 | 90.9 |
| Uniti | 17.7 | 16.9 | 17.0 | 17.7 | 18.3 | 88 6 | 92.2 | 97.2 | 94.6 | 92.2 |
| Raiti. | 20.2 | 19.6 | 18.5 | 18.1 | 18.0 | 77 2 | 95.7 | 94.0 | 88.5 | 85.4 |
| Honduras | 17.5 | 17.2 | 16.2 | 16.0 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 61.3 | 87.5 | 89.1 | 88.7 |
| Hexico | 18.6 | 17.0 | 16.6 | 17.4 | 18 2 | 07.4 | 91.4 | 99.8 | 102.3 | 99.2 |
| Nicaragua | 17.9 | 16.1 | 15.6 | 15.0 | 16.2 | 85.1 | 97.3 | 100.0 | 92.8 | 86.4 |
| Panama | 19.3 | 18.1 | 18.1 | 19.7 | 10.1 | 89.0 | 101.4 | 104.0 | 101.8 | 100.0 |
| Puerto Rico | 18.4 | 18.5 | 21.4 | 24.0 | 21.0 | 89.6 | 93.0 | 89.0 | 78.5 | 71.6 |
| | | | | 1 | 25.5 | 89.2 | 92.0 | 77.0 | 59.4 | 55.7 |
| Tropical South America, | 18.8 | 18.1 | 19.0 | 19.4 | 20.3 | 82.6 | 89.1 | 88.6 | 78.2 | 74.2 |
| Bolivia | 18.9 | 10 6 | | | | | | | <u>+</u> | |
| Brazil | 18 7 | 10.0 | 18.4 | 18.2 | 13.0 | 82.3 | 85.3 | 86.2 | 87.7 | 89.5 |
| Colombia | 18 1 | 10.4 | 18.5 | 19.9 | 20.9 | 81.2 | 86.4 | 85.7 | 76.1 | 71 0 |
| Ecuador | 19.0 | 17.9 | 17.1 | 19.4 | 20.7 | 87.9 | 97.5 | 93.6 | 75.2 | 60 7 |
| Paraguay | 18.0 | 17.9 | 17.2 | 17.6 | 17.7 | 82.6 | 92.3 | 96.7 | 97.7 | 09.3 |
| Peru | 20.3 | 1/.1 | 16.9 | 18.3 | 18.8 | 85.6 | 97.3 | 96.0 | 85 7 | 30.7 |
| Venezuela | 20.1 | 18.7 | 17.9 | 18.5 | 18.9 | 83.0 | 89.5 | 92.0 | 84.0 | 04.0 |
| | 19.0 | 17.1 | 16.9 | 18.5 | 19.2 | 84.1 | 94.8 | 94.5 | 01.0 | 80.9 |
| Comperate South America | 24.7 | 25.5 | 25.8 | 27 0 | 27.6 | | | J4.J | at*o | /8.5 |
| | | | | | 27.0 | 57.6 | 61.5 | 61.4 | 58.9 | 58.6 |
| Argentina | 25.7 | 27.0 | 27 C | 20.5 | | | | | | |
| Chile | 21.3 | 20.5 | 27.0 | 28.5 | 29.0 | 53.2 | 57.0 | 57.0 | 57.8 | 58.4 |
| Uruguay. | 27.4 | 20.5 | 21.2 | 23.2 | 24.5 | 72.9 | 76.9 | 75.0 | 61.3 | 58.5 |
| | | 40.0 | 29.2 | 29.6 | 29.7 | 54.2 | 56.5 | 58.2 | 60.0 | 60 0 |

Table A-1. Age Composition: Median Age and Dependency Ratio, Latin American Countries, 1950-85.

NOTE: Central America total excludes Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

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Figure A-1. Scattergrams of Median Age and Dependency Ratios Plotted Against Total Fertility Rate: Latin America, 1980-85.

Source: Data of this report.





Source: Population Division, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, 1982.

| | | | | | _ | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | | and the second |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|--|---|---|--|
| Region and | | Percer | t 0-14 yea | rt of age | | | Percent | 65 years | and older | |
| | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1930 | 1985 |
| Latin America total | 40.5 | 42.5 | 42.6 | 39.8 | 38.4 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.4 |
| Central America/other | 43.0 | 46.1 | 46.5 | 44.6 | 43.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Costa Rica. Cuba. Dominican Republic. El Salvador. Guatemala. Haiti. Honduras. Nicaragua. Penara. Puerto Rico. Tropical South Incoder | 43.5 36.2 44.8 42.2 39.5 44.7 42.8 44.1 41.6 43.3 | 47.5 34.4 47.8 45.1 46.2 40.9 45.6 46.1 47.8 44.0 42.7 | 46.1 37.2 49.0 46.1 45.7 42.9 47.5 46.5 46.5 48.5 43.4 37.0 | 37.9 31.3 44.8 45.2 44.1 43.6 47.8 44.6 48.0 39.8 31.2 | 35.1 26.4 41.5 44.6 43.1 43.6 46.9 42.9 47.6 37.2 29.9 | 3.4 4.5 3.3 2.9 2.7 4.1 1.9 3.2 3.0 5.7 3.8 | 3.0 4.8 2.9 2.7 3.9 2.1 3.2 2.5 4.2 5.2 | 3.2 5.9 2.7 3.2 2.7 3.7 2.4 3.5 2.4 3.7 6.5 | 3.7 7.3 2.8 3.4 2.9 3.6 2.7 3.5 2.4 4.2 6.1 | 3.9 7.9 3.0 3.4 3.0 3.4 2.9 3.4 2.4 4.5 5.8 |
| Hopical Juli: America | 42.2 | 44.0 | 43.6 | 40.0 | 38.7 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.9 |
| Bolivia. Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. Temperata South America Argentina. Chile. Uruguay. | 42.0 42.4 43.2 41.7 42.3 40.1 42.2 32.2 30.5 38.2 28.2 | 42.9 43.4 46.3 44.4 46.0 42.7 46.2 32.7 30.8 39.1 | 43.0 42.7 45.4 45.3 45.7 44.1 46.0 31.4 29.1 38.1 | 43.5 39.2 39.4 44.4 42.7 42.3 42.2 29.1 27.9 32.5 | 43.8 37.5 37.2 44.2 41.7 41.4 41.0 28.6 27.6 31.2 | 3.1 2.4 3.5 3.8 5.2 3.5 4.4 4.2 4.0 | 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.6 3.3 4.5 2.5 5.4 5.4 | 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.8 3.3 3.8 2.5 6.6 7.2 4.8 | 3.3 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 2.8 8.0 8.7 5.5 | 3.2 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.3 2.9 8.4 9.3 5.7 |
| Uruguay | 28.2 | 28.5 | 28.2 | 27.2 | 27.0 | 6.9 | 7.6 | 8.6 | 10.3 | 10.8 |

Table A-2. Age Composition: Percent of Population Age 15 and Under and 65 and Over,Latin American Countries, 1950-85.

NOTE: Central America total excludes Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982.

| Region and | Pist | cent of w | cmen in ch | ildbearing | age | Sex ratio | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| country | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | . 1985 | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | | |
| Latin America total | 23.8 | 22.8 | 22.6 | 23.8 | 24.4 | 101.1 | 101.0 | 100.9 | 100.6 | 100.5 | | |
| Central America/other | 23.2 | 21.8 | 21.7 | 22.6 | 23.3 | 100.1 | 100.6 | 100.5 | 101.0 | 101.1 | | |
| Costa Rica. Cuba. Dominican Republic. El Salvador. Guatemala. Haiti. Honduras. Mexico. Nicaragua. Panama. Puerto Rico. Tropical South America | 23.0 23.9 21.7 24.0 22.8 24.5 23.4 23.3 23.3 21.9 22.8 23.5 | 21.2 24.3 21.2 22.3 22.0 24.1 22.7 21.7 21.7 21.7 22.7 22.6 | 21.8 22.8 21.0 21.6 22.3 21.6 21.6 21.9 21.9 24.2 22.7 | 25.3 24.9 22.9 22.1 22.7 23.2 21.4 22.6 22.1 23.4 29.1 24.0 | 26.3 26.8 24.2 22.4 23.0 23.3 21.8 23.4 22.4 24.4 29.6 24.6 | 101.0 109.2 105.3 100.6 102.3 94.5 102.0 99.6 100.1 104.4 101.2 100.6 | 101.5 106.1 103.1 101.1 102.6 95.0 101.4 100.2 99.4 104.4 98.2 101.1 | 101.7 105.2 102.5 101.5 102.8 96.0 100.7 97.6 104.5 96.4 101.1 | 101.6 104.0 102.3 101.0 102.8 96.9 100.6 100.9 98.6 104.0 85.0 100.9 | 101.4 103.8 102.2 100.9 102.8 97.3 100.5 100.9 99.1 103.7 86.7 100.8 | | |
| Bolivia. Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. Temperate South America Argentina. Chile. Uruguay. | 23.4 23.8 23.2 23.2 23.4 22.5 22.7 25.7 26.2 24.2 25.5 | 23.2 22.9 22.1 22.0 22.2 21.4 24.8 25.2 23.7 25.2 | 23.4 22.9 22.3 21.9 22.0 22.4 22.1 24.5 24.5 24.8 23.9 24.5 | 23.2 24.2 24.5 22.5 23.4 23.4 24.1 24.7 24.7 24.2 26.1 23.6 | 23.2 24.8 25.4 22.7 24.0 23.8 24.6 24.7 24.1 26.5 23.4 | 99.3 101.8 98.6 97.1 97.4 96.9 103.4 103.9 106.1 98.7 102.2 | 98.1 102.0 98.6 99.2 97.3 98.9 104.1 102.0 103.4 98.6 100.5 | 97.4 101.8 99.6 99.9 98.7 100.0 102.1 100.3 101.2 98.3 98.9 | 97.1 101.5 100.4 100.2 99.5 100.5 100.4 99.1 99.8 98.1 96.6 | 97.1 101.3 100.7 100.3 99.7 100.7 100.0 98.8 99.3 98.1 96.2 | | |

Table A-3. Sex Ratio and Percent of Women in Childbearing Ages (15-49): Latin American Countries, 1950-85.

SOURCE: The sex Tatios are from the United Nations, Demographic Indicators of Countries; Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980, 1982. The percent of women of childbearing age was compiled from this same source.

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which they are married or in a consensual union and the extent to which those who are exposed to pregnancy use contraception for spacing or limiting family size.

Sex ratios

The sex ratio is defined as the number of males per 100 female population. At birth, there are about 104 males per 100 females. Because female death rates are lower than male rates (as was discussed in the section on mortality), this predominance of males slowly diminishes with advancing age, until at the older ages females outnumber males by a substantial amount. In countries with high birth rates and younger populations, males tend to outnumber females because of the young age composition. In countries with low birth rates, the reverse tends to be true because of the older age composition of the population. Central America has the sex composition of a typical high fertility population: in most of the nations males slightly outnumber females. Areas which have had extensive international migration with relation to the U.S. and other nations may have unusual sex ratios; Cuba, Panama, and Puerto Rico are examples.

For the long-term future, one could predict that as birth rates decline, the sex ratios of all of the Central American countries will gradually decline below 100 by the end of the present century or early in the next.

Marital Status 5.

In order to understand fertility in Central America, familiarity with its pattern of marriage and family formation is important. Fertility tends to be high where marriage occurs at young age and where a high proportion of people get married. Where marriage occurs at a later age and there is a great deal of spinsterhood and bachelorhood, fertility tends to be lower. Furthermore, when marriages last throughout the entire reproductive period, fertility tends 'o be high; when they are broken by separation, divorce, or widowhood, fertility may be reduced. Table N-1 shows indicators of the marital status composition of the population as estimated for 1985.

The following measures will be used in the analysis that follows:

(a) *Percent adolescent marriage--per*cent of persons 15-19 who are married.*

(b) *Percent early adult marriage*—percent of persons aged 20-24 who are married.*

(c) *Percent of persons of childbearing age currently married*—percent of population aged 30-34 who are married.*

(d) *Percent of never married*—percent of population aged 45-49 single (never married).

(e) *Percent of widowhood--*percent of population aged 45-49 widowed.

(f) Percent of disrupted marriage-per-

*As defined here, "married" includes consensual (common law) unions.

| Table N-1. Indicators of Marital Status: | Latin American Countries, 1985. |
|--|---------------------------------|
|--|---------------------------------|

| | | | Ter | ale | | | hale | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------|---------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|-------|------------|-------|-------------------|---|-----------------------------------|--|
| Region and | · Pe | rcent marr | ied | Popul | ation age | d 45-49 | Pe | rcent mari | ied | Popul | ation age | d 45-49 | |
| country | 15-19 | 20 –24 | 30-34 | Percent single | Percent widowed | Percent separated/ divorced | 15-19 | 20-24 | 30-34 | Percent single | Percent widowed | Percent separated/ divorced | |
| Central America/other Cosra Rica | 14 | 51 | 79 | 13 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 29 | 79 | | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | , | |
| Cuba | 27 | 68 | 83 | 10 | 5 | 6 | Ā | 36 | 80 | | 1 | 1 | |
| Dominican Republic | 20 | 59 | 81 | 16 | 6 | 3 | 6 | 24 | 67 | 22 | 1 | | |
| El Salvador | 19 | 56 | 78 | 20 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 32 | 78 | 14 | 2 | 1 | |
| Guatemala | 18 | 55 | 78 | 20 | 7 | 2 | 3 | 32 | 78 | 14 | 2 | 1 î | |
| Haiti | 6 | 40 | 78 | 18 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 59 | 13 | ī | ī | |
| Honduras | 27 | 47 | 78 | 13 | 7 | 4 | 15 | 24 | 74 | 12 | ī | 3 | |
| Mexico | 19 | 60 | 84 | 7 | 9 | 5 | 5 | 37 | 84 | 6 | 2 | 2 | |
| Nicaragua | 27 | 47 | 78 | 12 | 6 | 4 | 15 | 24 | 74 | 13 | 2 | 2 | |
| Panamaa | 24 | 65 | 79 | 7 | 5 | 15 | 5 | 34 | 74 | 12 | 2 | 7 | |
| Puerto Rico | - | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivis | 27 | 47 | 79 | 13 | 7 | 5 | 15 | 24 | 74 | 11 | 2 | 2 | |
| Brazil | 12 | 49 | 80 | 9 | 10 | 6 | 2 | 25 | 80 | 7 | 2 | 3 | |
| Colom'ia | 13 | 49 | 76 | 14 | 11 | 5 | 3 | 25 | 76 | 12 | 2 | 2 | |
| Ecuador | 18 | 58 | 81 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 33 | 80 | 9 | 2 | 2 | |
| Paraguay | 11 | 46 | 77 | 18 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 21 | 77 | 11 | 2 | 2 | |
| Peru | 15 | 54 | 83 | 10 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 30 | 81 | 8 | 3 | 1 | |
| Venezuela | 15 | 50 | 78 | 19 | 7 | 3 | 2 | 25 | 75 | 14 | 1 | 1 | |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 10 | 45 | 81 | 10 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 22 | 76 | 12 | 1 | 2 | |
| Chile | 9 | 45 | 77 | 12 | 10 | 5 | 2 | 27 | 78 | 11 | 1 | | |
| Uruguay | 28 | 47 | 78 | 13 | 7 | Š | 15 | 24 | 74 | 12 | ĩ | 2 | |

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NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

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SOURCE: Amy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979.

cent of population aged 45-49 divorced and separated.

Because the marital status of women affects fertility and population growth directly, women are here given primary attention, with secondary attention to the marital status of men. Table N-1 reports the six summary indicators listed above for both males and females as projected to 1985. From this table one learns the following about marriage and family formation in the region:

(a) Average age at marriage in most of the countries is not particularly early. Women marry between age 20 and 22, and men at about age 25—similar to the pattern of Europe and North America.

(b) Adolescent marriage—before age 20 is moderately high only in four countries: Honduras, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Panama. In the other countries, it is lower.

(c) The proportion of marriages that are disrupted by separation or divorce is small, except in Panama.

(d) Because of past moderately high mortality, widowhood at an early age is relatively common among women—6 to 7 percent of all women aged 45-49 are widows. It is uncommon among men.

(e) Except in Panama, Mexico, and Cuba, a substantial share of women (13-20 percent) remain single throughout their childbearing years.

(f) The percent of the population aged 30-34 that is currently married is high—about 80 percent.

Consensual (common law) marriage

One of the unique traits of family life in these countries is the high proportion of marriages that are formed consensually, without a formal ceremony or legal or religious registration. Table N-2 reports the percentages of currently married persons who are in a consensual union, for each country. In Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Panama, one-half or more of all marriages are of this type, and more than one-third of marriages in Nicaragua and Cuba are consensual. In the remainder of Latin America, Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia also have this form of marriage to a substantial, but less prevalent degree.

Because consensual unions often are less stable than formal marriages, and the children may receive less financial support and have fewer legal rights to inheritance of property from the father, this form of marriage may represent family "instability." Research on the effect of consensual unions on fertility is ambiguous. On the one hand, many of these unions form because a pregnancy has already occurred, and this tends to boost fertility. However, if the union dissolves, there may be an extended period in which the woman is not exposed to the likelihood of pregnancy. On the other hand, if she takes another partner, they may want additional children. Also, it is hypothesized that consensual unions need to have numerous dependent children to keep them cemented.

In summary, the marital status patterns of 1980-85 are not inherently conducive to high fertility. High fertility is caused by rapid childbearing within marriages of conventional ages, rather than by high levels of teenage childbearing. The substantial share of never married women, moderately frequent widowhood, and separation and divorce should tend to retard fertility, except where there are significant numbers of children born outside an established marital union.

| | | | _ |
|------------------------|--------|------|------|
| Region and country | Female | Male | Year |
| Central America/other | | | 1 |
| Belize | - | | |
| Costa Rica | 16 | 15 | 1973 |
| Cuba | 35 | 34 | 1970 |
| Dominican Republic | 49 | 45 | 1970 |
| El Salvador | 50 | 49 | 1971 |
| Guatemala | 53 | 52 | 1973 |
| Haiti | 64 | 61 | 1971 |
| Honduras | 54 | 53 | 1974 |
| Mexico | 16 | 15 | 1970 |
| Nicaragua | 38 | 37 | 1971 |
| Panama | 53 | 51 | 1970 |
| Puerto Rico | 7 | 7 | 1970 |
| Tropical South America | | | |
| Bolivia | 18 | 16 | 1950 |
| Brazil | 7 | 7 | 1970 |
| Colombia | 19 | 17 | 1973 |
| Ecuador | 26 | 24 | 1974 |
| Paraguay | 22 | 21 | 1972 |
| Peru. | 27 | 26 | 1972 |
| venezuela | 32 | 31 | 1971 |
| emperate South America | | | |
| Argentina | 10 | 9 | 1970 |
| Chile | 5 | 4 | 1970 |
| Henry | | | |

Table N.2. Percentage of Currently Married Persons Who Are in a Consensual (Common Law) Marriage, by Sex.

Source: United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, Historical Supplement, 1979.

Urban-Rural Residence and Migration 6.

The most visible and one of the most dramatic aspects of population change in Central America (as in all of Latin America) has been the almost magical mushroom growth of cities. In 1950, all of the nations of Central America were predominantly rural, with the urban component comprising one-third or even much less of the total. By 1980, urban population outnumbered rural in the region as a whole, with less than 50 percent urban only in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras-with the transition to predominantly urban only a decade or so away in most of them. Movies, television programs, newspaper accounts, and scientific monographs have brought international as well as national attention to the invasions of squatters on underoccupied land surrounding the major cities, and to the ring of substandard housing made of scrap materials hastily improvised by the thousands of migrants pouring in monthly from the rural areas to seek

a more tolerable life in the cities. These rings of slums usually have inadequate facilities for potable water, sanitation, electricity, waste disposal, fire and police protection, public health clinics, schools and other public services. (See Chapter 10 for details.) They are truly marginal urban populations.

Table UR-1 summarizes, in cold statistics, the magnitude and persistence of this hot urbanization movement in each Latin American country. Without exception, the proportion of the population that is urban has risen steadily since 1950. In some of them, the proportion urban doubled between 1950 and 1980. (Honduras went from 18 to 36 percent; Haiti from 12 to 24 percent, Dominican Republic from 24 to 51 percent.) The United Nations has projected the expected trend of urbanization into the future, as reported in the righthand panel of Table UR-1. By the year

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Table UR-1. Percent of Population Living in Urban Places: Latin America, 1950-1985, and Projected 1985-2025.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, 1971, 1973, 1974 and 1976.

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2000, every nation of the region (except Haiti) will be predominantly urban. If the projections of the United Nations materialize, two-thirds or more of the population of every nation except Haiti will be urban by the year 2025, with most nations approaching or having already achieved 70 percent urban by that date. Thus, urbanization appears to be an inexorable and irreversible transformation in which the Central America region is now only in midstream. This transition is, of course, only a regional example of similar urban explosions taking place in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

It is apparent that the general trends mask a great deal of variation; one of the greater diversities of this region is the country-to-country differences in the mix of urban and rural populations. In actuality, there are three groups of areas (percent urban in 1985 is indicated for each):

| urbanized Cuba 68% Mexico 70% Puerto Rico 75% | |
|--|-----|
| Cuba 68% Mexico 70% Puerto Rico 75% | |
| Mexico 70% Puerto Rico . | |
| Puerto Rico | |
| 16 - 1 | |
| Moderately | |
| urbanized | |
| Dominican Republic | |
| Nicaragua | |
| Panama | |
| Predominan | tly |
| rura! | - |
| Costa Rica | |
| El Salvador | |
| Haiti | |
| Honduras 40% | |

The statistics on trends show that the presently highly urbanized areas have literally raced toward urbanity, making great shifts each decade.

The four least urbanized nations have also urbanized steadily over the same period of time, but began the process in a more rural context. Table UR-2 provides additional information about the urbanization process. The average annual rate of growth of the urban population for two periods, 1960-70 and 1970-81, may be compared with the average annual rate of growth of the nation as a whole, for the same periods. For every nation, the growth rate for urban areas is much higher than for the nation. In most of the countries, it is between 3.5 and 5.5 percent per year. At these rates, the urban population would double every 13-20 years. Because urban areas are growing so much faster than average, it can only imply that rural areas are growing much more slowly than average.

Primate cities. Students of urbanism often talk about the tendency for a single major city to dominate a nation, rather than permitting a number of smaller cities to grow. Table UR-2 provides a measure of this tendency toward a single "primate city" by reporting the percentage of urban population contained in the largest city. There is a wide diversity, but with a strong tendency toward concentration in a single urban place—especially in Panama, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Haiti. In general, the tendency toward this primate concentration appears to have increased between 1960 and 1980.

Large cities. When cities attain a population of half-a-million, they must be considered a major international and national economic force. Table UR-2 reports the number of cities of this size in each country, and the percentage of the urban population they contain. In Central America, every country except Honduras and El Salvador now has at least one such city, and one-half or more of the population tends to be contained in them.

This major change in residential settlement pattern has a great many economic and social implications. It appears also to carry a major demographic effect, in the form of fertility decline. Figure UR-1 plots the total fertility rate of Latin American na-

| | | Average an (per- | nual growth cent) | | | Perce urban po | Num | Number | | |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Region and country | Total | | Urban population | | In largest city | | Citien 500 | over ,000 | Cities over 500,000 | |
| | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | <u> </u> |
| Belíze. Costa Rica. Cuba. Cuba. Dominican Republic. Dominican Republic. Bominican Republic. Cubachememory Balvador Cubachememory Guatemala Cubachememory Haiti Cubachememory Honduras Cubachememory Mexico. Cubachememory Panama. Cubachememory Puerto Rico Cubachememory Tropícal South America Cubachememory | 3.4 2.0 2.9 3.0 1.6 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.9 | | 4.2 2.9 5.6 3.2 3.8 4.0 5.4 4.7 4.0 4.4 | 3.6 1.9 5.3 3.4 3.9 4.7 5.5 4.2 5.0 3.6 | 67 32 50 26 41 42 31 28 41 61 | 64 38 0 22 36 56 33 32 47 66 | 0 38 54 0 41 0 0 36 0 0 | | | |
| Bolivia | 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.9 3.4 | 2.6 2.1 1.9 3.4 2.6 2.6 3.4 | 3.9 4.7 5.2 4.4 2.9 5.3 4.7 | 6.9 3.9 2.6 4.6 3.3 3.5 4.2 | 47 14 17 31 44 38 26 | 44 15 26 29 44 39 26 | 0 35 28 0 0 38 26 | 44 52 51 51 44 44 44 | 0 6 3 0 0 1 | 1 14 2 1 2 4 |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1.4 2.1 1.6 | 1.6 1.7 0.4 | 2.0 3.1 1.3 | 2.0 2.4 0.6 | 46 38 56 | 45 44 52 | 54 38 56 | 60 44 52 | 3 1 1 | 5 1 1 |

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Table UR-2. Urbanization in Latin American Countries: Rates of Growth and Degree of Concentration: 1960 and 1980.

SOURCE: World Bank. World Development Report, 1983; Table 22.

tions against the proportion urban. The correlation is moderate, but is believed by many demographers to be causal. It is said that in a rural setting, the children in large families can help to support themselves through child labor in the fields and pastures. But in the city, having numerous children usually means a negative economic impact upon the household economy. In the cities, children also cost more to rear-they are expected to have more education, better clothes, more recreation, and less crowded living conditions than is acceptable in rural areas. Thus, urbanization may be viewed as a pressure to reduce fertility from present extraordinarily high levels to more intermediate levels. However, the pressure is not equally effective everywhere. For example, Nicaragua and Panama are almost equally urbanized, but one has very high fertility and the other has very low fertility.

Within each of the nations of this region. birth rates tend to be lower in urban areas. Therefore, the high rates of urbanization are not due to the natural increase of the urban population through reproduction. but to in-migration to the cities from rural areas. Urbanward migration has been a highly visible demographic event throughout Central America (as in all of Latin America) for the past three decades. Campesinos have abandoned their marginal agricultural operations, with a subsistence level of living, and have migrated to the cities. A part of this movement is stepwise-migration: first to nearby district centers, and then to the major metropolises. Much of it, however, is direct migration to the largest metropolises. The migration a primarily one of youth, and particularly literate youth. Often the migrants are forced to work at low paying occupations and trades.



Figure UR-1. Scattergram of Fertility Rates Plotted Against Percent Urban, 1980-85.

SOURCE: Compiled from data of this report.

There is a great deal of disagreement over the economic, political, and social significance of the giant favelas, or slums, that have been created by inflooding migrants from rural areas. Some regard them as human waste-heaps of surplus population which the economy cannot absorb, which survive by engaging in scavenging, begging, street vending, and other activities outside the mainstream of the economy-and which become a source of political and social turmoil and upheaval. Others claim there is steady upward mobility among the residents of these settlements, and that a majority of the migrants from rural areas slowly work their way into regular occupations while educating their children to be a part of the national mainstream. (Those who fail may return to their rural place of origin.) As their economic lot in life improves, they upgrade their housing and other living conditions. Whichever view is taken, it is highly likely that the trend will continue, if not accelerate in the four least urbanized nations and the three moderately urbanized nations, until about 75 percent or more of the total population lives in urban areas. This appears to be the pattern toward which the whole world, developed and developing, is tending.

Population density

Latin America was long described as an "empty continent" because of the unusually low density of population found there. This certainly is not the case for Central America. Table UR-3 provides data on the number of residents per square kilometer in each country.

In order to assist in interpreting these density statistics, the following data on the population density of other regions may be helpful:

| | | | | | | | | | square km (1978) |
|----------|------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|------------------|
| Work | <i>d</i> . | • | , | • | • | • | • | • | <u>31</u> |
| Africa | | • | • | | | | | | 16 |
| Asia | | | • | | | | | | 89 |
| Europe | | • | • | | • | | | | 97 |
| United S | tate | s | | • | | | | | 23 |
| U.S.S.R. | | • | • | | | | | | 12 |

Population per

Every nation of Central America is more densely inhabited than the United States, and some of them have astoundingly high densities, such as El Salvador, with densities twice or more than the average for Europe. Much of the area is not conducive to economically productive agriculture. Large areas are mountainous with slopes too steep to cultivate, or semi-arid with insufficient rainfall to produce crops. Despite this fact, Guatemala, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Honduras already have nearly twice or more the density of the U.S.-and still are growing at four times the U.S. rate! If population density is computed in terms of arable land, this region becomes one of the most densely inhabited in the world. Density as such does not appear to have any correlation with fertility (see Figure UR-2). For example, two of the most densely settled nations, El Salvador and Haiti, have high fertility rates. Each year rapid population growth causes the density to deviate even more from world patterns.

While it is true that there are lands remaining which can be reclaimed for agricultural production, there are also large amounts of badly eroded or submarginal mountainous and semidesert croplands which should be abandoned and permitted to return to forest or other uses. The surge of population toward the city, instead of toward an agricultural "frontier," is a

| Region and | Population density (per sq. km.) | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|--|--|--|--|--|
| country | 1950 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | | | | | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 17 | 24 | 34 | 44 | 49 | | | | | |
| Cuba | 51 | 61 | 75 | 85 | 88 | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | 48 | 67 | 93 | 122 | 138 | | | | | |
| El Salvador | 91 | 120 | 167 | 224 | 260 | | | | | |
| Guatemala | 27 | 36 | 49 | 67 | 77 | | | | | |
| Haiti | 112 | 134 | 166 | 209 | 237 | | | | | |
| Honduras | 13 | 17 | 24 | 33 | 39 | | | | | |
| Nexico | 14 | 19 | 26 | 35 | 41 | | | | | |
| Nicaragua | 9 | 11 | 15 | 21 | 25 | | | | | |
| Panama | 11 | 14 | 19 | 25 | 28 | | | | | |
| Puerto Rico | 249 | 265 | 305 | 413 | 488 | | | | | |
| ropical South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | | | | | |
| Brazil | 6 | 8 | 11 | 14 | 16 | | | | | |
| Colombia | 10 | 14 | 18 | 23 | 25 | | | | | |
| Ecuador | 22 | 16 | 21 | 28 | 33 | | | | | |
| Paraguay | 3 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 9 | | | | | |
| Peru | 6 | 8 | 10 | 14 | 16 | | | | | |
| Venezuela | 6 | 8 | 12 | 17 | 20 | | | | | |
| emperate South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina: | 6 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 17 | | | | | |
| Chile | 8 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 16 | | | | | |
| Uruguay | 12 | 14 | 16 | 17 | 17 | | | | | |

Table UR-3. Population Density: Latin America, 1950-85.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, 1971, 1973, 1974, and 1976.



Figure UR-2. Scattergram of Fertility Rates Plotted Against Population Density (Population per Square Kilometer).

Source: Tables UR-3 and F-1.

response to the diminished opportunities for developing new lands. While the developable lands may not be easily available to individual pioneering farm families, the environment in which the lands are located is such that development can proceed only with large organized investments and large-scale planning.

The prospect for the future, therefore, is for densities in Central America to continue to mount rapidly, but primarily in urban places. The size of the rural agricultural population will remain about the same or slightly increase or decrease—using its slowly improving productivity to feed the evergrowing urban masses, supplemented by importation of food from abroad.

Number and size of cities

Table UR-4 lists the larger cities for the nations examined in this report, with an estimate of population, as provided by the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook* and by other sources. The data are for varying years, much of which are several years old. Since most of these places are growing at an annual average in excess of 5 percent, their size in 1984-85 is considerably larger than indicated.

Table UR-4. Population of Principal Cities of Central America.

| City | Population | City | Population |
|---|----------------------------|---|------------|
| A. Costa Rica (1973) | | G. Henduras (1974) | |
| San José, San José (1977) | 395.401 | Tegucigalpa, D.C., Francisco Morazan (1974) | 273.894* |
| Lipon. Lipon. | 35,000 | San Pedro Sula, Cortes (1973) | 150.991* |
| Puntarenas, Puntarenas, | 30,000 | La Ceiba, Atlántida (1961) | 25,000 |
| Alajuela, Alajuela | 28,000 | Puerto Cortes, Cortes (1961). | 17.000 |
| Heredia. Heredia | 22.000 | El Progreso, Yoro (1961) | 14-000 |
| Cartago, Cartago, | 21.000 | | |
| | | B. Mex(co (1979) | |
| B. Cuba (1981) | | Ciudad de Mexico. Distrito Federal | 14.750.182 |
| Gran Habana, Habana | 1.924.886 | Guadajatara, Jalisco | 2.467.657 |
| La Habana, Habana | 1,008,500 | Monterrey Nuevo Leon | 2.018.625 |
| Santiago de Cuba Oriente | 345 789 | leon Guarajuato | 624 816* |
| Camaguay Camaguey | 345 235 | Puebla Puebla | 710 8338 |
| Santa Clara Lag Villag | 171 914 | Cludad Juarez, Chibuabua | 625 040# |
| | 167 /05 | Noricali Esia California | 3/8 528# |
| | 107,405 | Chibushus Chibushus | 295 0534 |
| Clear degos | 102,425 | | 374 2024 |
| | 81,000 | Thissen, Sincioa | 324,292 |
| Matanzas, Matanzas (1970) | 31,000 | fijuana, baja california | |
| no1g31n | 100,013 | Acapoico | 402,144* |
| $C = D_{-1} + (10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 7, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10$ | | Cuernavaca | 241,337 |
| C. Dominican Republic (1967/1976) | 017 (15 (1) (1) (1) | San Luis Potosi, San Luis Potosi | 327,333* |
| Santo Domingo, Distrito Nacional (1970) | 817,645 (1,164,711) | iorreon, Loahuila | 407,271 |
| Santiago de los Caballeros, Santiago (1970) | 245,165 (306,302) | Merida, Iucatan | 269,582* |
| Sab i remeisco de Macoris, Duarte (1960) | 27,000 (144,246) | Veracruz, Veracru: | 306,843* |
| La Romana, La Romana (1960) | 22,000 (54,870) | Aguascalientes, Aguascalientes | 257,179* |
| San Pedro de Macoris, San Pedro | | Morelia, Michoacan | 251,011= |
| de Macoris (1960) | 22,000 (99,055) | Hermosillo, Sonora | 251,011* |
| San Juan de la Maguana, San Juan | 22,000 (133,824) | Tampico, Tamaulipas | 389,940 |
| La Vega | (179,860) | Durango, Durango | 228,686* |
| San Cristobal | (122,305) | Saltillo, Coahuila | 258,492* |
| | | Matamoros, Tamaulipas | 193,305* |
| D. El Salvador (1969/1978) | | Villa de Guadalupe, Hidalgo (1974) | 124,573 |
| San Salvador, San Salvador (1971) | 335,930 (408,811) | Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas | 223,606* |
| Santa Ana, Santa Ana | 168,047 (194,690) | Jalapa | 201,473 |
| San Miguel, San Miguel | 107,658 (149,630) | Reynosa | 231,082 |
| Nueva San Salvador, La Libertad (1961) | 36,000 (65,497) | Toluca | 241,920 |
| Villa Delgado, San Salvador (1961) | 30,000 (79,730) | (10(7) | |
| E Customale (1970) | | <u>I. Nicaragua (1967)</u> Managua D.N. Managua (1979) | 608 020* |
| Ciudad de Customala (1970) | 703 336 | Loop Loop | 58,000 |
| Quetraltenance Quetraltenance | 54,000 | Cranada Cranada | 36,000 |
| Querzaitenango, Querzaitenango | 33,000 | | 30,000 |
| Escuincia, Escuincia | 32,000 | Chienden Chienden | 30,000 |
| ruerto barrios, izabel | 29,000 | connandega, chinandega | 30,000 |
| Mazantenango, Suchitepequez | 24,000 | I Papama (1970) | |
| E Waitt (1971) | | Banama (1970) Banama (1980) | 389 277 |
| <u>Port-au-Prince</u> (1980) | 862 900 # | | 68 000 |
| Con-Weiten Word | 602,500 ⁴ | David Chistori | 36,000 |
| Capiture Interior | | La Chestaría Danza | 26,000 |
| Lonaives, Artibonite | 23,000 | Buorto Armuellos Chiricad | 12,000 |
| Les Layes, Jug | #2,000 | ruerto Armuertes, Uniriqui | 152 9074 |
| | 1 | San Arguetito (1900) | 130,03/~ |

NOTE: All population figures are for urban agglomerations except for those marked (*), which indicates city only. -- indicates data not available. For Dominican Republic and El Salvador, two sets of numbers are provided. The first column represents the census figures published in the United Nations <u>Demographic Yearbooks</u>, and are accurate for the year in parentheses. The second column (in parentheses) represents an up-dated national census; see source note for details.

SOURCE: United Nations. Demographic Yearbook. New York: United Nations, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1976, and 1983. Second column for Dominican Republic is from Secretariado Técnico de la Presidencia, Oficina Nacional de Estadística, Republica Dominicana. Estadística Demográfica de la República Dominicana, 1976. Santo Domingo: Oficina Nacional de Estadística, 1976, volume 33, pp. 1-3. Second column for El Salvador is from Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, El Salvador. Anuario Estadístico, 1978. San Salvador: Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, 1980.

Literacy and Educational Attainment

One of the most serious errors that could be made in judging the capacity of Central America to modernize and participate in a modern world economy is in literacy and educational attainment. Although it is true that at the close of World War II most of the population of these nations could neither read nor write, those days are long past. Today, illiteracy is definitely a minority trait everywhere except Haiti. Table E-1 presents data showing the percent of adult population illiterate as of the 1970-75 period, by sex and by urban-rural residence. Data on percent literate in 1980 and 1960 are reported on Table E-2. Aside from Haiti, the nations with the lowest proportion literate are Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador--where the proportion is about 60 percent as of 1980. Moreover, the remaining illiterate population tends to be concentrated in the older ages. The younger generations have had greater opportunities for schooling, and as

they replace the older generations, illiteracy may be expected to decline even further. If estimates for 1985 were available, they would very likely show one-third or less illiteracy for every nation except Guatemala and Haiti.

The rapid decline in illiteracy has been a result of intensive efforts, both by national governments and international technical assistance agencies. Table E-2 prepared by CEPAL, provides some insights into the educational revolution that has taken place, and continues to take place. This table shows the proportion of population of each age enrolled in school as of 1960 and of 1980, and the change in the two-decade period. Table E-3 shows similar information by educational level prepared by the World Bank. Throughout Central America (as in the remainder of Latin America) the transformation has been truly phenomenal. In most developed nations of

| Region and | Total | | Total | | | tirban | _ | Rural | | | |
|-------------------------|-------|---------------|-------|--------|---------------|--------|--------|---------------|-------|--------|--|
| country | IUCAI | Both sexes | Male | Female | Both sexes | Male | Female | Both sexes | Male | Female | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | t | |
| Costa Rica | 1973 | 11.6 | 11.4 | 11.8 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 57 | 17.0 | 16.6 | 175 | |
| Cuba | 1953 | 22.1 | 24.2 | 20.0 | 11 1 | 11.0 | 11.2 | 40.0 | 10.0 | 26 7 | |
| Dominican Republic | 1970 | 32.8 | 31.2 | 34.3 | 19.0 | | | 43.4 | 44.0 | 30.7 | |
| El Salvador | 1975 | 37.9 | | | | | | | | | |
| Guatemala | 1973 | 53.9 | 46.1 | 61.5 | 28.2 | 20.0 | 35.5 | 68.6 | 59.9 | 77.6 | |
| Haiti | 1971 | 76.7 | 71.3 | 81.6 | | | | | | | |
| Honduras | 1974 | 43.1 | 41.1 | 44.9 | 21.1 | 17.6 | 24.0 | 54.4 | 52 1 | 56.8 | |
| Mexico | 1970 | 25.8 | 21.8 | 29.6 | 16.7 | 13.1 | 20.0 | 39.7 | 34 3 | 45 3 | |
| Nicaragua | 1971 | 42.5 | 42.0 | 42.9 | 19.5 | 16.1 | 22.1 | 65.4 | 63.8 | 67.0 | |
| Panama | 1970 | 21.7 | 21.0 | 22.2 | 6.3 | 5.6 | 7.0 | 38.1 | 35.5 | 41.1 | |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Propical South America | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Polivia | 1976 | 37.3 | 24.8 | 49.0 | 16.0 | 5.6 | 24.3 | 5.0 | 7 7 5 | 67.8 | |
| Brazil | 1976 | 24.3 | 22.0 | 26.5 | 14.4 | 12.0 | 16.6 | 40.6 | 39.4 | 41.9 | |
| Colombia | 1973 | 19.2 | 18.0 | 20.2 | 11.2 | 9.0 | 13.0 | 34.7 | 32.8 | 36.8 | |
| Ecuador | 1974 | 25.8 | 21.8 | 29.6 | 9.7 | 6.9 | 12.2 | 38.2 | 32.3 | 44.4 | |
| Paraguay | 1972 | 19.9 | 14.9 | 24.5 | 11.4 | 7.4 | 14.7 | 25.9 | 19.7 | 32.3 | |
| Peru | 1972 | 27.5 | 16.7 | 32.2 | 12.6 | 5.9 | 19.1 | 50.9 | 32.9 | 69.2 | |
| Venezuela | 1971 | 23.5 | 20.3 | 26.6 | | | | | | | |
| remperate South America | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1970 | 7.4 | 6.5 | 83 | | | 1 | | | Í | |
| Chile | 1970 | 11.9 | 11.1 | 12.8 | 7 6 | 6.4 | 8.6 | | 25 1 | 20 7 | |
| Uruguay | 1975 | 6.1 | 6.6 | 5.7 | 5.2 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 11.0 | 12.6 | 8.6 | |

Table E-1. Percent of Population Aged 15 and Over Illiterate: Latin America, Urban and Rural Areas, by Sex.

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NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1980.

LITERACY

| Region and | | 6 to 11 yea | ars . | 12 | to 17 yea | AT S | 18 to 23 years | | | |
|-----------------------|------|-------------|--------|---------------|-----------|--------|----------------|----------|--------|--|
| country | 1960 | 1980 | Changa | 1 96 0 | 1980 | Change | 1960 | 1980 | Change | |
| Central America/other | | 1 | | | | 1 | | <u> </u> | + | |
| Costa Rica | 74.4 | 97.5 | 23.1 | 35.7 | 54 7 | 19.0 | 8.0 | | | |
| Cuba | 77.7 | 100.0 | 22.3 | 43.0 | 83.4 | 40.4 | 6.0 | 21.4 | 13.4 | |
| Dominican Republic | 66.8 | 82.2 | 15.4 | 39.4 | 64 4 | 25.0 | 3.7 | 23.5 | 23.3 | |
| El Salvador | 48.7 | 69.2 | 20.5 | 40.3 | 58 1 | 17.0 | 5.7 | 20.0 | 16.9 | |
| Guatemala | 32.0 | 53.3 | 21.3 | 17.7 | 33.6 | 16.3 | 3.5 | 18.9 | 10.4 | |
| Haiti | 33.6 | 41.4 | 7.8 | 16.4 | 21 9 | 5 5 | 3.0 | 10.1 | 0.5 | |
| Honduras | 49.5 | 71.3 | 21.8 | 24 6 | 44 7 | 20.3 | 1.7 | 4.3 | 2.4 | |
| Mexico | 58.4 | 94.2 | 35.8 | 37 4 | 67 3 | 20.1 | 3.2 | 14.8 | 11.6 | |
| Nicaragua | 42.9 | 60.8 | 17.9 | 29.7 | 57.5 | 23.5 | 7.6 | 18.2 | 13.5 | |
| Panama | 68.3 | 95.7 | 27.4 | 50.3 | 83.7 | 17.0 | 3.0 | 10.0 | 15.0 | |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | | 30.6 | |
| ropical South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 45.1 | 76.6 | 31.5 | 29.0 | 54.2 | 25.2 | 5.0 | | | |
| Brazil | 47.7 | 76.2 | 28.5 | 29.6 | 58.6 | 29.0 | 3.0 | 17.5 | 12.1 | |
| Colombia | 47.9 | 70.0 | 22.1 | 28.8 | 63.8 | 35.0 | 4.7 | 32.0 | 2/.3 | |
| Ecuador | 66.3 | 80.0 | 13.7 | 30.3 | 60.8 | 30.5 | 5 1 | 34.9 | 28.5 | |
| Paraguay | 69.7 | 80.0 | 10.3 | 44.8 | 51.9 | 71 | 5.8 | 20.5 | 23.4 | |
| Peru | 56.7 | 83.9 | 27.2 | 43.2 | 84.0 | 40 9 | 12.0 | 1 13.3 | 1.5 | |
| Venezuela | 68.8 | 83.2 | 14.4 | 49.0 | 60.9 | 11.9 | 8.6 | 24.0 | 19.6 | |
| emperal South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 91.2 | 99.9 | 8.7 | 48.1 | 72 7 | 346 | 12.2 | | | |
| Chile | 76.4 | 100.0 | 23.6 | 54 7 | 96.5 | 24.0 | 13.2 | 30.7 | 23.5 | |
| Uruguay | 89.9 | | | 51 2 | 67 2 | 14.0 | 1.2 | 22.2 | 15.0 | |

Table E-2. Students enrolled in School as Share of Eligible Ages: Latin America, 1960 and 1980.

SOURCE: CEPAL, 1982.

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| | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | · | |
|-----------------------|---|--|---|---|---|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| | | Number | r enrolled s percentag | in primary ge of age g | school roup | | Number en secondar | Number enrolled in secondary school | | Number enrolled in higher education | | eracy rate | |
| Region and country | Total | | | Male | | Fcmale | | as percentage of age group 12-17 | | population aged 20-24 | | (percent) | |
| | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 19 80 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | |
| Central America/other | | | | | † —— | <u>†</u> | | | | | | | |
| Belize | 96 109 98 80 45 46 67 80 66 96 | 108 112 106 74 69 64 89 120 100 113 | 97 109 99 82 50 50 68 82 65 98 | 109 116 105 74 69 92 123 97 115 | 95 109 98 77 39 42 67 77 66 94 | 106 109 107 74 63 59 85 116 103 111 | | 48 71 32 23 16 12 21 37 43 65 | 5 3 1 1 2 1 3 1 5 | 26 20 10 8 8 1 8 15 9 23 | | 90 95 67 62 23 60 83 90 85 | |
| Bolivia | 64 95 77 83 98 83 100 98 | 84 93 128 107 102 112 104 | 78 97 77 87 105 95 100 98 | 90 93 127 109 106 116 104 | 50 93 77 79 90 71 100 | 78 93 130 105 98 108 104 | 12 11 12 12 11 15 21 | 36 32 46 26 56 39 56 | 4 2 3 2 4 4 4 | 12 11 35 7 16 21 23 | 39 61 63 68 75 61 63 91 | 63 76 81 81 80 80 82 93 | |
| Uruguay | 109 111 | 117 105 | 111 111 | 118 107 | 107 111 | 116 104 | 24 37 | 55 60 | 4 8 | 12 16 | 84 | 94 94 | |

Table E-3. Education Indicators for Latin American Countries: 1960 and 1980.

SOURCE: World Bank. World Development Report, 1983.
Europe and the rest of the world, more than 90 percent of children 6 to 11 years of age are attending school. That level of achievement has already been attained by one-half of the nations in this region (including Mexico, the largest) and will rapidly be achieved by almost all of the rest within another decade if present trends continue. Only in Haiti has progress toward improving literacy been slow. Guatemala, with its large indigenous population, is also making slower progress against illiteracy than the other nations of the region.

Table E-3 shows that females have almost achieved equality with males in the phenomenal increase in the rates of attendance at elementary schools. Only in Haiti, Guatemala, and Honduras do girls have substantially lower rates of attendance than boys.

The above optimistic picture should not be overemphasized, however. Tables E-2 and E-3 show that large numbers of youngsters (10-20 percent) still are not attending school, especially in Guatemala, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Moreover, the tables show these countries are lagging behind the rest of Latin America.

This means that a substantial, though greatly diminished, adult illiteracy will persist well into the next century.

Educational attainment

It is not sufficient that a population be merely literate. Modern economies demand large numbers of persons with secondary and college education. It is in this sphere, more than in elementary education, that the Central American nations are deficient. Table E-4 reports the educational attainment of the population. Although the statistics are incomplete and a bit difficult to interpret, they make it abundantly clear that as of the early and mid 1970s (the dates for which information is available), only about 10 percent or less of the population of most of these nations had received any secondary education, and that only 1-4 percent had attended college.

That this situation is being greatly improved is detailed in Table E-2 and Table E-3 which show the proportion of persons of secondary and college age who are enrolled in school. In all of these countries (except Haiti) the situation improved greatly between 1960 and 1980, with the result that as of about 1980:

- (a) The percent of students of secondary school age atteding school nearly doubled between 1960 and 1980.
- (b) The percent of young adults of college age attending school nearly quadrupled in most of Central American nations. (A certain percentage of these would still be completing secondary school.)

The rates of school attendance at the secondary and college levels are still far below the rates typical of Europe and other industrialized countries. One of the great needs, it would appear, is for more training (and perhaps better training) at the secondary and college levels. The present trends are certainly in the direction of promoting this goal.

Demographers are fond of showing how rapid population growth impedes the fight against illiteracy and the effort to provide basic elementary education. Although rapid population growth does undoubtedly make this difficult, the national governments of most of these countries have been willing to expend an extraordinary portion of their budget for elementary education, and have been surprisingly successful in overcoming absolute illiteracy. Perhaps the sacrifice has been more in low quality of education offered than in inability to offer basic literacy education to the growing number of school children. What may be

| Region and | Year | Age | | Pirst leve | 1 | Entered le | second vel | Post |
|------------------------|--------------|-------|--------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------|------|
| country | | group | No school | Incom- pleted | Com- pleted | First cycle | Second cycle | dary |
| Central America/other | · · · · · | | | | | | • | |
| Costa Rica | 1973 | 25+ | 16.1 | 49.1 | 17.8 | 6.3 | 4.9 | 5 8 |
| Cuba | | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | 1970 | 25+ | 40.1 | 41.6 | 4.3 | 9.6 | 2.5 | 1.9 |
| El Salvador | 1971 | 25+ | 54.7 | 36 | .3 | 6 | .1 | 0.9 |
| Guatemala | 1973 | 25+ | | 93.9 | | 4 | .9 | 1.7 |
| Haiti | 1971 | 25+ | 83.5 | 8.5 | 4.0 | 2.0 | 1_8 | 0.3 |
| Honduras | 1974 | 25+ | 53.1 | 34.5 | 6.0 | 1.5 | 3.8 | 1.0 |
| Mexico | 1970 | 20+ | | 89.8 | | 4.1 | 3.6 | 2.6 |
| Nicaragua | 1971 | 25+ | 53.9 | 19.3 - | | 25.5 | | .4 |
| Panama | 1970 | 25+ | 24.9 | 53 | .5 | 9.0 | 8.4 | 4.2 |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 1976 | 20+ | 43.0 | 41 | .7 | 9 | . 3 | 5.9 |
| Brazil | 1976 | 25+ | 32.7 | 53.0 | 4.3 | s | .7 | 4.3 |
| Colombia | 1973 | 20+ | 22.4 | 55 | .9 (| | .4 | 3.3 |
| Ecuador | 1974 | 25+ | 31.9 | 53 | .7 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 3.2 |
| Paraguay | 1972 | 25+ | 19.6 | 57.7 | 10.3 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 2.0 |
| Peru | 1972 | 25+ | 35.0 | 47 | .1 | | .4 | 4.5 |
| Venezuela | 1961 | 25+ | 49.1 | 28.4 | 15.7 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 1.5 |
| emperate South America | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 197 0 | 25+ | 8.3 | 41.8 | 30.6 | 7.8 | 7.5 | 4.0 |
| Chile | 1970 | 25+ | 12.4 | 57 | .2 | 26 | .6 | 3.8 |
| Uruguay | 1975 | 25+ | 9.9 | 36.7 | 29.6 | 17 | 4 | 6 1 |

Table E-4. Educational Attainment of Adult Population: Latin American Countries.

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NOTE: Percentages in some countries include two or more groups.

SOURCE: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1980.

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under-appreciated is the very great difficulty of providing secondary and advanced education to the growing population. At these levels, the outlays for laboratories and other essential facilities are far greater than for elementary education. It is clear, however, that Central America is rapidly attaining not only literacy, but an educational level which qualifies its population for full participation in a modern urban-industrial-commercial-high technology econorny. This is being accomplished in spite of rapid population growth, although it admittedly could be accomplished faster, better, and at less cost under conditions of lower arowth.

Differentials in education

Table E-1 shows that illiteracy is much higher in rural than in urban areas, and that it is significantly higher among females than among males. This situation is a consequence of several factors:

- Inferior facilities for providing education to rural populations, in comparison with urban facilities
- Propensity of rural families to require their children to work instead of attending school
- Propensity of both rural and urban families to educate a son in preference to daughters.

However, all three of these factors have changed and are still changing over time, with a tendency for convergence in school attendance in urban and rural areas, and between males and females. The school attendance rates of Tables E-2 and E-3 are not shown separately for urban and rural areas. From other studies of individual countries, it is known that in rural areas elementary school attendance rates are climbing rapidly toward those of urban areas, although still lagging behind. Secondary school education is also increasing in rural areas, though with even more of a lag behind urban areas. As a consequence of these trends, the urban-rural differential will diminish at the elementary school level, moderately at the secondary school level, and remain large at the college level.

Education and fertility

One side-effect of rising literacy and educational attainment is to stimulate fertility decline. Where illiteracy is high, fertility almost invariably is high; where illiteracy is low, fertility tends to be much lower. This relationship may be observed in Figure E-1, which plots total fertility rates against the proportion of population literate, for all nations of Latin America. (The statistics of percent literate indicate not only literacy as such, but the tendency of a population to have primary, secondary, and advanced education.) The nations of Central America fall into position rather neatly, as a part of a regionwide tendency. There are a number of causal factors lying behind this inverse correlation between education and fertility:

- (a) Education tends to postpone marriage, both for men and women, and hence causes reproduction to begin later.
- (b) Education changes expectations and goals, so that having a large family ceases to be a priority, and may actually have a negative significance.
- (c) Enucation provides women with the alternative of remunerative employment versus childbearing at something above the subsistence level.
- (d) Education provides information on how to change desires and expectations into reality, and makes family planning more effective when it is used.

This inverse relationship has a very important implication for the future of fertility trends and growth rates in Central Amer-



Figure E-1. Percent of Population Literate (15 Years and Over)

[Source: Derived from data of this report.]

ica. Rising literacy and levels of educational attainment will generate even greater public approval of and efforts to reduce fertility, in order to have smaller families. This demand will be strong in rural as well as urban areas.

Projected school enrollment

There is a mistaken tendency to view future educational requirements as a simple function of population growth. In addition to meeting the needs of population growth, the educational system must simultaneously raise the educational attainment of its students by keeping them longer in school—especially secondary and college levels.

Demographic change combined with

modernization is placing pressure-and will place even stronger pressure--on the secondary and college education systems of Central America. Table E-5 provides the expected proportion of persons of each age that would be in school (attendance rates) in order to raise the educational attainment of the population toward the modern level. These changes in attendance ratios indicate the increased attendance needed simply to modernize the educational level of the population independent of population growth. The ages correspond roughly to these three educational levels. The increases in ages 12-17 and 18-23 involve large relative increases over the attendance ratios of 1970.

Assuming that there would be a moderately steady fertility decline combined with a strong program to raise educational

| Region and | | Аде | 6-11 | | | λge | 12-17 | | | Age | 18-23 | | incr | Amount o ease 196 | f 0-85 |
|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|---|--|---|--|
| country | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1985 | Age 6-11 | Age 12-17 | Age 18-23 |
| Central America/other Costa Rica Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Nexico Nicaragua Puerto Rico | 74.4 77.7 66.8 52.3 32.0 33.6 49.5 58.4 42.9 68.3 100.3 | 89.0 93.7 65.7 55.1 41.7 36.2 67.8 81.4 81.4 77.3 100.0 | 97.0 100.0 82.2 66.1 53.3 41.4 72.4 94.4 60.8 96.6 100.0 | 98.4 100.0 86.1 69.6 58.2 43.7 76.4 96.9 65.3 98.0 100.0 | 35.7 43.0 39.4 35.0 17.3 16.4 24.6 37.4 29.7 50.3 61.7 | 46.8 54.0 51.8 45.4 25.1 18.0 35.8 47.3 43.6 61.9 87.6 | 56.3 76.8 64.4 55.5 33.9 21.9 43.7 61.3 53.7 81.2 93.0 | 61.5 81.5 69.6 61.3 38.0 24.8 46.3 66.2 58.2 58.2 85.0 95.4 | 8.0 6.6 3.7 9.3 3.4 1.9 3.2 4.7 3.6 12.7 16.7 | 10.4 7.4 13.4 15.5 6.6 3.0 6.0 9.2 11.1 18.6 26.7 | 23.1 24.2 20.6 19.7 9.8 4.3 12.6 16.4 15.9 45.6 34.5 | 26.5 26.2 24.7 25.3 12.6 5.4 15.3 19.6 18.8 51.6 35.9 | 24.0 22.3 19.3 17.3 26.2 10.1 26.9 38.5 22.4 29.7 | 25.8 38.5 30.2 26.3 20.7 8.4 21.7 28.8 28.5 34.7 | 18.5 19.6 21.0 16.0 9.2 3.5 12.1 14.9 15.2 38.9 19.2 |
| Tropical South America Bolivia Brazi: Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela Temperate South America Argentina Chile Uruguay ^a | 46.2 47.7 47.9 66.3 69.7 56.7 68.8 91.2 78.9 89.9 | 60.9 63.1 51.1 78.0 77.1 78.6 70.3 98.5 93.0 78.8 | 72.7 76.2 70.4 82.9 78.4 84.3 78.2 100.0 100.0 | 77.4 81.4 75.4 86.3 80.7 86.9 81.4 100.0 100.0 | 28.1 29.6 28.8 30.3 44.8 43.2 49.0 47.6 50.6 53.2 | 41.0 46.5 45.6 41.9 47.1 63.4 52.3 56.4 74.5 75.1 | 54.5 58.6 65.5 58.4 50.8 82.9 60.7 68.9 88.9 | 59.7 62.5 72.4 63.1 54.4 85.5 66.2 72.0 96.0 | 5.2 4.7 4.4 5.1 5.8 12.9 8.6 13.1 8.1 14.1 | 12.4 13.6 10.4 14.4 8.1 26.7 15.1 18.2 14.3 20.5 | 17.8 32.0 23.5 34.9 11.9 32.9 24.2 35.5 25.4 | 22.1 36.8 28.2 40.7 13.7 39.9 26.3 40.5 25.9 | 31.2 33.7 27.5 20.0 11.0 30.2 12.6 8.8 21.1 | 31.6 32.9 43.6 32.8 9.6 42.3 17.2 24.4 45.4 | 16.9 32.1 23.8 35.6 7.9 27.0 17.7 27.4 17.8 |

Table E-5. Trends in Enrollment Ratios of Latin American Nations by Age: 1960-1985.

NOTE: (*) Projections have not been made for Uruguay, since its enrollment ratio for the age-group 6-11 was declining for several consecutive recent years, SOURCE: UNESCO. Trends and Projections of Enrollment by Level of Education and by Age, 1977, Table VII.

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| | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|---|
| Region and | | Firs | t level | . | | Secon | d level | | | Thir | d level | | Percen | t change | 1980-2000 |
| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | First level | Second level | Third level |
| Latin America total | 63,042 | 71,129 | 78,569 | 90,582 | 14,246 | 17,784 | 19,906 | 29,117 | 4,648 | 6,112 | 7,862 | 11.755 | 43.7 | 104.4 | 152.0 |
| Central America/other | 20,422 | 23,183 | 26,019 | 31,053 | 5,299 | 6,846 | 6,969 | 12,446 | 1,180 | 1,669 | 2,240 | 3,648 | 52.1 | 114.9 | 209.2 |
| Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador. Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico. Nicaragua Panama. Puerto Rico Tropical South America | 366 1,795 1,060 846 886 503 574 13,595 424 373 36,320 | 371 1,665 1,115 960 1,170 694 708 15,607 502 391 41,562 | 376 1,539 1,114 1,091 1,474 928 856 17,660 577 404 46,116 | 358 1,522 1,127 1,343 2,000 1,310 1,259 20,971 773 390 53,193 | 127 645 251 117 214 123 111 3,463 106 142 6,867 | 136 716 340 193 329 205 176 4,432 150 155 8,664 | 146 710 432 289 477 313 253 5,568 196 162 | 162 699 535 524 807 605 450 8,196 298 170 | 42 106 62 46 54 21 24 765 24 36 2,588 | 48 146 83 69 88 42 40 1,073 38 42 3,417 | 51 176 108 96 128 65 65 1,449 54 48 4,462 | 55 189 143 158 246 138 138 2,434 91 56 6,698 | -2.2 -15.2 6.3 58.7 125.7 160.4 119.3 54.3 82.3 4.6 46.5 | 27.6 8.4 113.1 347.0 277.1 391.9 305.4 136.7 181.1 19.7 | 31.0 78.3 130.6 241.4 355.6 557.1 475.0 218.2 279.2 55.6 |
| Bolivia Brazil Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela Temperate South America Argentina. Chile Uruguay | 873 23,211 4,403 1,460 550 3,529 2,294 6,300 3,806 2,167 327 | 1,115 26,917 4,539 1,675 627 4,062 2,627 6,384 4,023 2,009 352 | 1,417 29,978 4,374 1,908 699 4,656 3,084 6,434 4,161 1,890 383 | 2,055 32,714 4,987 2,516 859 6,111 3,951 6,336 4,176 1,714 446 | 156 2,863 1,422 430 100 1,134 762 2,080 1,351 540 189 | 209 4,190 1,591 492 133 1,241 808 2,274 1,486 595 192 | 282 5,763 1,563 534 161 1,321 853 2,460 1,633 637 190 | 482 8,819 1,294 616 218 1,453 1,011 2,778 1,833 754 191 | 58 1,514 269 138 28 266 257 880 618 224 38 | 81 2,030 423 176 44 346 317 1.026 683 290 53 | 111 2,677 590 217 65 439 363 1,160 761 331 58 | 206 4,242 746 283 104 653 464 1,409 931 386 95 | 135.4 40.9 13.3 72.3 56.2 73.2 72.2 0.6 9.7 -20.9 36.4 | 209.0 209.0 -9.0 43.3 118.0 28.1 32.7 33.6 35.7 39.6 1.1 | 255.2 180.2 177.3 105.1 271.4 145.5 80.5 60.1 |

Table E-6. Projected School Enrollment for Both Sexes: Latin America, 1980-2000 (Medium Assumption).

NOTE: -- indicates information not available.

SOURCE: Amy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000 (Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979), Table 4.

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attainment toward the levels common in Europe and America, the demands on enrollment at each level were projected for each country.* Table E-6 summarizes the results:

(a) Declining fertility greatly eases demands for expansion at the elementary level where school attendance in the elementary grades is already high. Expected fertility declines will cause oncoming generations to be only moderately larger than previous generations, so less expansion is needed. However, in Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, where only a small fraction completes elementary school, there is still need for a doubling or more within the two decades 1980-2000. Nicaragua will need to increase elementary enrollment by more than 80 percent.

(b) Far greater expansion is being required at the secondary level. In countries with rapid population growth and a prior history of providing secondary education only to a small fraction of youth, modernization of the educational system calls for a 200 or 300 percent increase in secondary enrollment (in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Honduras) and increases of more than 100 percent in Mexico, Panama, and Dominican Republic. Costa Rica, Cuba, and Panama will require only modest increases because of their lower fertility and prior expansion of secondary educational systems.

(c) The greatest expansion, however, is being demanded at the third, or college/ university level. Increases of 400 or 500 percent are required in Honduras and Haiti, and in almost all countries the expansion is considerably greater for college than for secondary school.

The overall educational need in Central America is for the educational system to expand as follows between 1980 and 2000:

| Level | | | | | | | | Percent |
|------------|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|---------|
| Elementary | | | | | | | | 52 |
| Secondary | • | • | • | | | • | • | 135 |
| College . | • | • | • | | • | • | • | 209 |

*Amy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, 1979.

Labor Force and Occupational Status 8.

Babies born in one year become applicants for jobs only 15 to 20 years later. Rapid population growth in Central America therefore means a rapidly expanding labor force. If the proportion of people who are working remains unchanged over time. the labor force tends to grow at about the same rate the population grew 15-20 years earlier. Under these assumptions, there should be an annual growth in the work force of Central America of 2.8 to 3.5 percent for the remainder of this century in the various countries, except in those that have brought fertility rates to lower rates. However, a new and important factor has developed in recent years that causes the labor force in most of these nations to grow even faster than population. This is the increasing participation of women. As women receive more education, as they become more urbanized, and as they achieve greater legal and cultural privileges, they tend to enter the work force in greater

numbers. They tend to work before marriage, and a higher proportion continue to work after marriage, even though they bear children meanwhile. (This increase is partially offset by lowered participation rates of persons under 25 and over 65 years of age, due to increased school attendance and retirement.) Table PEA-1 (economically active population) reports the work force participation rates, as compiled by the International Labor Organization, for each sex for each nation. These rates are not very satisfactory, because they are based on total population instead of population of working ages. In interpreting them it should be kept in mind that about 40 percent of the population is comprised of children, most of whom are ineligible to be in the work force and about 5 percent of population aged 65 or older of retirement age. However, they reveal the major outlines of what is known from studies of individual countries:

| Year | Both sexes | Hale | Female |
|------|--|--|---|
| | | | |
| 1979 | 34.3 | 51.1 | 17.7 |
| 1970 | 30.8 | 49.2 | 11.5 |
| 1979 | 30.2 | 44.7 | 15.7 |
| 1978 | 33.4 | 47.0 | 20.5 |
| 1979 | 30.5 | 51.9 | 8.5 |
| 1971 | 56.0 | 57.6 | 54.5 |
| 1979 | 29.3 | 49.2 | 9.3 |
| 1979 | 28.3 | 42.4 | 14.0 |
| 1977 | 30.7 | 43.9 | 18.0 |
| 1970 | 34.2 | 50.2 | 17.8 |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| 1976 | 32.5 | 51.2 | 14.4 |
| 1976 | 37.5 | 53.9 | 21.4 |
| 1973 | 30.3 | 46.0 | 15.4 |
| 1974 | 31.5 | 49.8 | 13.2 |
| 1980 | 36.3 | 51.9 | 20.7 |
| 1980 | 31.6 | 45.1 | 18.0 |
| 1977 | 31.6 | 45.9 | 17.3 |
| | | | |
| 1979 | 38.7 | 55.5 | 21.9 |
| 1980 | 33.4 | | |
| 1975 | 39.2 | 57.1 | 22.0 |
| | Year 1979 1970 1979 1978 1979 1971 1979 1977 1977 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1977 1979 1980 1975 | Year Both sexes 1979 34.3 1970 30.6 1979 30.2 1978 33.4 1979 30.5 1971 56.0 1979 29.3 1979 28.3 1977 30.7 1970 34.2 1976 32.5 1976 32.5 1976 32.5 1976 32.5 1976 32.5 1976 32.5 1976 32.5 1977 30.3 1974 31.5 1980 36.3 1980 31.6 1977 30.7 1980 33.4 1975 39.2 | Year Both sexes Hale 1979 34.3 51.1 1970 30.8 49.2 1979 30.2 44.7 1979 30.5 51.9 1979 30.5 51.9 1971 56.0 57.6 1979 28.3 42.4 1977 30.7 43.9 1970 34.2 50.2 1976 32.5 51.2 1976 32.5 51.2 1976 37.5 53.9 1973 30.3 46.0 1974 31.5 49.8 1980 31.6 45.1 1977 31.6 45.9 1979 38.7 55.5 1980 33.4 1975 39.2 57.1 |

Table PEA-1. Work Force Participation of Latin American Countries: Percent of Total Population Economically Active.

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: International Labor Organization. Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1982.

- Almost all males between the ages of 15 and 65 are in the work force except for the comparatively few who are attending school, disabled, or retired.
- Because of childbearing responsibilities, lack of opportunity, and tradition, the participation rates for women are far below those of men—only one-third to one-fifth those of men for most countries.

Because of differences between countries in the work habits of the people and in the definition of gainful employment, the statistics for female employment are confusing and difficult to interpret. In some countries, such as Haiti, women work extensively in agriculture, and hence work force participation rates are high. In other nations, women work too little in active agricultural production to be counted in the labor force or are not all counted as gainfully employed even if they are. Although data are not shown here, the trend for increased female work force participation in the nonagriculture sectors is present in almost all countries.

Industry of employment

Table PEA-2 reports the sector of the economy in which work participants gain their livelihood. In all countries of Central America except Mexico and Costa Rica, agriculture is still the dominant activity, occupying from 40 to 60 percent of the total employment. The second largest industry is a category called "services," which includes domestic and personal services as well as some of the more technical services. In this category fall a great deal of female employment and most of the submarginal occupations that the immigrants from rural areas and poverty-stricken slum dwellers follow. Hence, the service in-

| | | T | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|---|--|
| Region and country | Year | Agri- culture, forestry, fishing | Mining and quarry | Manufac- turing | Con- struction | Elec- tricity, water, gas | Commerce | Trans- port | Services | Other/ not classi- fied |
| Central America/other Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Puerto Rico | 1973 1970 1970 1978 1979 1971 1977 1979 1977 1970 | 36.4 30.0 44.3 41.0 57.2 61.5 60.9 40.1 42.0 38.4 | 0.3 * 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.1 0.1 | 11.9 20.3 8.1 14.2 13.7 5.1 12.0 18.2 16.1 8.0 | 6.7 6.0 2.3 5.4 4.1 0.8 3.3 4.6 4.8 5.7 | 0.9 * 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 | 11.6 11.6 6.2 15.5 7.4 8.4 8.1 10.1 13.2 11.8 | 4.3 6.1 3.5 3.8 2.6 0.5 2.8 3.0 2.9 3.5 | 22.6 24.6 14.0 18.6 12.5 6.9 12.3 22.1 19.7 22.9 | 5.3 1.4 21.4 0.7 2.1 16.8 |
| Tropical South America Bolivia Brazil Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru Venezuela Temperate South America Argentina Chile Uruguay | 1976 1976 1973 1974 1980 1980 1977 1970 1980 1975 | 44.7 36.2 25.9 46.5 40.0 17.0 14.8 15.9 15.6 | 3.7 0.6 0.4 1.2 1.4 0.5 2.1 0.2 | 3.0 16.5 11.4 11.5 17.7 12.7 16.2 19.7 16.2 18.8 | 5.8 6.7 3.4 4.4 5.6 4.3 8.8 7.9 5.2 5.3 | 0.1 0.4 0.5 3.7 0.2 1.1 1.1 6.3 1.4 | 7.4 9.3 9.6 9.4 17.4 14.7 14.0 12.1 | 4.1 3.9 2.8 2.9 **** 4.7 6.7 6.6 | 19.2 24.6 15.5 17.8 29.5 36.9 30.3 26.0 * 28.1 | 5.0 2.8 30.4 6.6 0.0 2.1 8.7 12.2 |

Table PEA-2. Industrial Composition of the Economically Active Population of Latin American Countries.

NOTE: -- indicates data not available, except for: (*) Electricity, gas. water, and sanitary services, and mining and quarrying industries included in manufacturing industries. (**) Activities not adequately described included in services. (***) Included in electricity, gas, water, and sanitary services. (****) Included in unemployed.

SOURCE: International Labor Organization. Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, and 1980.

dustries are a heterogeneous mixture of modern technical activities and marginal or submarginal subsistence activities. Aside from agriculture and services, there are two other major categories: the technical or "modern" category (comprised of the industries of manufacturing, energy, transport, and construction), and the "commerce" category. If the data of Table PEA-2 are gouped in this fashion and ranked according to their share of "modern" employment, the results are as follows: working age is high, and as birth rates fall this proportion rises. This verifies the findings of Chapter 4 concerning dependency.

 In every nation, the proportion of the work force employed in agriculture has declined between 1960 and 1981. In some countries, such as Honduras and Haiti, the decline was moderately small. In others, such as Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama the

| | "Modern" | | | | |
|----------------|------------|--------------|----------|----------|--------|
| Country | industrial | Agricultural | Commerce | Services | 0 ther |
| Cuba | . 32.4 | 30.0 | 11.6 | 24.6 | 1.4 |
| Mexico | . 27.7 | 40.1 | 10.1 | 22.1 | • • • |
| Nicaragua | . 24.5 | 42.0 | 13.2 | 19.7 | 0.6 |
| El Salvador | . 24.2 | 41.0 | 15.5 | 18.6 | . 0.7 |
| Costa Rica 🛛 . | . 24.1 | 36.4 | 11.6 | 22.6 | 5.3 |
| Guatemala | . 20.8 | 57.2 | 7.4 | 12.5 | 2.1 |
| Honduras | . 18.7 | 60.9 | 8.1 | 12.3 | • • • |
| Panama | . 18.2 | 38.4 | 11.8 | 22.9 | 8.7 |
| Dominican Rep. | . 14.1 | 44.3 | 6.2 | 14.0 | 21.4 |
| Haiti | . 6.5 | 61.5 | 8.4 | 6.9 | 16.8 |

[NOTE: The data for the last three countries in the list are defective, with a large percentage in the "other" category.]

The major demonstration of these statistics is the comparatively small "modern" component and the very large "service" component in the nonagricultural sector of these nations.

Occupation of employment

In its World Development Report for 1983, the World Bank summarized labor force data for all nations of the world. The data for Latin America are reported in Table PEA-3. This table reports for 1960 and again for 1981 estimates of the proportion of population of working age the industry of employment, and the average annual rate of labor force growth for two periods, 1960-70 and 1970-1981. Although less detailed than Table PEA-2, this table provides information about trends:

 In nations where birth rates are low, the proportion of the population of decline was precipitous. (The data for the other nations of Latin America show equal country-to-country diversity, with major declines in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela, and only minor declines in Bolivia and Ecuador.)

- In all Central American nations the growth of industry has been disappointingly small. In most nations, the percentage of the work force employed in this "modern" sector is increased by only 4 or 5 percentage points. At the end of the 20-year period less than one-fourth of the work force was in this sector in almost every nation, and even in the remaining countries the proportion was just slightly higher.
- Meanwhile, the category of "urban services" has increased rapidly. Thus, this sector has absorbed the lion's share not only of the transfer for

| Booder - I | Percer | Percentage of Percentage of labor force in: population in | | | | a: | Âve | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| Country | worki (15-64 | ng ages years) | Agriculture | | Iadu | istry | Serv | vices | | of labor force (percent) | wen |
| | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1900 | 1960 | 1980 | 1960-1970 | 1970-1980 | 1980-2000 |
| Central America/other | · · | | | | | 1 | | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| Belize Costa Rica Dominican Republic. El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Puerto Rico Tropical South America | 50 61 49 52 51 55 52 51 50 52 | | 51 39 67 62 67 80 70 55 62 51 | 29 23 49 50 55 74 63 36 43 27 | 19 22 12 17 14 6 11 20 20 24 | 23 31 18 22 21 7 15 26 20 18 | 30 39 21 21 19 14 19 25 22 35 | 48 46 33 27 25 19 23 39 37 55 | 3.5 0.8 2.2 2.6 2.8 0.6 2.5 2.8 2.3 3.4 | 3.9 1.7 3.6 2.8 3.2 1.3 3.1 3.2 3.8 2.4 | 2.8 1.9 3.3 3.5 2.9 2.1 3.5 3.5 3.9 2.6 |
| Bolivia Brazil | 55 54 50 52 51 52 51 | 53 55 60 52 53 54 55 | 61 52 51 57 56 52 35 | 50 30 26 52 44 39 10 | 18 15 19 19 20 22 | 24 24 21 17 20 18 27 | 21 33 29 23 25 28 43 | 26 46 53 31 36 43 55 | 1.7 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.3 2.1 2.8 | 2.3 1.0 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 4.0 | 2.9 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.1 |
| Chile | 57 64 | 63 62 63 | 20 31 21 | 13 19 11 | 36 20 30 | 28 19 32 | 44 50 50 | 59 61 57 | 1.3 1.4 0.8 | 1.4 2.0 0.2 | 1.1 2.2 1.1 |

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Table PEA-3. Labor Force Data for Latin American Countries: 1960 and 1981.

--- indicates no data available

SOURCE: World Bank. World Development Report, 1983.

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population from agricultural to nonagricultural (rural to urban) employment, but also of the growth of the labor force resulting from high fertility.

- In most of the nations, the average annual growth rate of the labor force has increased over these two decades. This is due almost entirely to the increased participation of women.
- The World Bank has projected the expected future growth of the labor force in each of these countries to the year 2000. (Almost all of the persons who will join the work force between 1980 and 2000 were already born in 1980.) These projections anticipate some previous and future decline in fertility, but this decline will affect labor force participation primarily in the next ceritury. On the other hand, these projections anticipate continued increased participation of women. As a result, the projected rate for most Central American nations, except for the low birth rate countries, is just as high or even higher than in the past. A similar prediction is made for the remainder of Latin America.

The occupational classification of the work force in each country is reported in Table PEA-4, as compiled by the International Labor Organization. In the interests of obtaining international comparability, some of the categories are heterogeneous. This table is valuable for showing the comparative *scarcity* of occupations in the nonagricultural sector that could be called "modein." It is unfortunate that data showing occupational trends are not available.

The above data have led many demographers to infer that urbanization in Central America is proceeding despite lack of a strong technical and industrial base, fueled by large masses of persons who have chosen urban poverty with hope instead of rural poverty without hope. One of the most significant aspects of this situation is that it adds impetus to the other forces stimulating fertility decline (and hence slower growth) through urbanization.

Underemployment and unemployment

In Central America, as well as in many other Latin American countries, the phenomenon of underemployment or under-utilization of persons in the labor force is very widespread. Although difficult to measure, the principle i clear: when truly productive work is unavailable, persons occupy themselves at activities which yield a small submarginal income as a strategy for survival. They may work only a few hours per day, or a few days per week; or the work may be so unproductive that it could be done by a worker in the regular work force in only a fraction of the time consumed by the underemployed. Street vending, submarginal farming on infertile and small parcels of land, and the performance of services in excess of public need (examples are shoe-shining, porters, taxi-driving, and sewing) are occupations where this is common. Economists have tried to estimate this, and to measure its trend over time. A widely accepted study, sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), researched by one of its branches, Regional Program for Employment in Latin America and the Caribbean (PRELAC) has estimated the amount of this underemployment and converted it into the equivalent of full-time unemployed persons. By adding this "underemployment equivalent" to "open unemployment" (persons seeking work) it is possible to obtain a measure of the true level of inactive or underutilized labor force. PRELAC's estimates for 14 nations of Latin America are reported in Table PEA-5. Data are snown separately for equivalent underemployment and open unemployment, and the sum total under-utilization. Such estimates are shown for two dates, 1950 and 1980-thereby per-

| Region and country | Year | Profes- sional related | Admini- stration, menagers ^b | Clerical ^C | Sales workers ^d | Service workers | Farmers ^f | Produc- tion, laborers ^g |
|------------------------|--------|------------------------------|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---|
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 1973 | 8.0 | 1.7 | 5.7 | 7.8 | 11.6 | 35.4 | 29.8* |
| Cuba | 1970 | 8.4 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 21.4 | ** | 26.9 | 33.8 |
| Dominican Republic | 1970 | 2.7 | 0.3 | 6.5 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 44.4 | 36.0 |
| El Salvador | i 1978 | 4.6 | 0.5 | 5.3 | 14.2 | 9.2 | 40.5 | 25.7* |
| Guatemala | 1979 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 2.7 | 6.2 | 9.1 | 56.7 | 20.6 |
| Raiti | 1971 | 1.0 | | 0.5 | 8.6 | 5.2 | 63.2 | 7.3 |
| Honduras | 1974 | 4.1 | 0.9 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 6.5 | 59.4 | 19.1* |
| Mexico | 1977 | 6.2 | 2.6 | 8.1 | 8.1 | 13.2 | 39.3 | 22.5 |
| Nicaragua | 1971 | 5.2 | 0.9 | 4.2 | 7.1 | 10.9 | 46.7 | 25.0 |
| Panama | 1970 | 6.8 | 2.1 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 14.5 | 37.2 | 25.5* |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 1976 | 5.9 | 1.9 | 4.0 | 5.2 | 8.5*** | 45.1 | 29.4*** |
| Brazil | 1970 | 4.8 | 1.7 | 5.3 | 7.4 | 10.4 | 44.0 | 25.2 |
| Colombia | 1973 | 4.5 | 0.7 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 10.0 | 26.8 | 30.4 |
| Ecuador | 1974 | 5.0 | 0.8 | 3.6 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 46.4 | 28.3 |
| Paraguay | 1972 | 4.2 | 0.6 | 3.6 | 6.6 | 9.6 | 48.7 | 26.7**** |
| Peru | 1972 | 7.6 | 0.4 | 5.9 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 40.2 | 29.1* |
| Venezuela | 1977 | 9.5 | 6.1 | 9.0 | 10.2 | 13.7 | 12.0 | 40.8* |
| emperate South America | | | | 1 | | | | |
| Argentina | 1970 | 7.5 | 1.5 | 11.4 | 11.9 | 12.6*** | * 14.4 | 40.7** |
| Chile | 1970 | 7.1 | 1.9 | 9.6 | 8.2 | 11.6 | 21.1 | 40.6*** |
| Uruguay | 1975 | 7.2 | 1.5 | 10.4 | 9.1 | 13.5 | 15.6 | 42.7* |

Table PEA-4. Occupational Composition of the Economically Active Population.

NOTE: -- indicates no data available. (*) Figure includes workers not classified by occupation and persons seeking work for the first time. (**) Includes work not classified by occupation. (***) Includes miners, quarrymen, and related workers, as well as workers not classifiable by occupation. (****) Include members of the armged forces.

Actual titles of categories are as follows: ^aProfessional, technical, and related workers. ^bAdministrative and managerial workers. ^cClerical workers. ^dSales workers. ^cService workers. ^fFarmers, fishermen, hunters, loggers, and related workers. ^BProduction, crafts, transport, and communication workers, plus laborers not classified claewhere.

2022: International Labor Organization. Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1979, and 1980.

Table PEA-5. Trend of Underemployment and of Open Unemployment in14 Latin American Nations: 1950 to 1980 and Projectionsto the Year 2000.

| | 1 | | - | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-----------------|------------|----------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------|--|--|
| Country | Underen (equi | ployment valent) | Oper unemplo | n yment | | Total r underuti | ate of lization | te of zation | | |
| | 1950 | 1980 | 1050 | 1000 | Estimate | d Percent | Project | ed Percent | | |
| •· | + | 1960 | 1950 | 1980 | 1950 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | | |
| Latin America total | 19.5 | 16.0 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 22.9 | 19.9 | 20.5 | 20.8 | | |
| Central America/other | • | | 1 | 1 | | : | 1 | | | |
| Costa Rica | 16.9 | 9.3 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 21.0 | 13.2 | 12.0 | 7.7 | | |
| | | | | | | | | - | | |
| Dominican Republic. | | | | | | | | | | |
| El Salvador | 24.5 | 22.4 | 5.1 | 11.2 | 29.6 | 33.6 | 77 5 | 41 6 | | |
| Guatemala | 26.2 | 1 22.2 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 26.6 | 23.6 | 26.1 | 26.1 | | |
| Haiti | | 1 | | | | 13.0 | 20+1 | 20.1 | | |
| Honduras. | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mexico. | 22.4 | 12.7 | 1 2 | | | | | - | | |
| Nicarapus | | 14.1 | 1.5 | 4.3 | 23.7 | 17.0 | 21.7 | 27.5 | | |
| Panama. | 1 77 0 | 1 | | | | | | | | |
| | 27.8 | 13.0 | 9.3 | 7.3 | 37.1 | 35.8 | 15.3 | 5.0 | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 37.2 | 20 6 | | 1 | | | | | | |
| Brazil. | 20.2 | 1 30.3 | 0.8 | 3.0 | 38.0 | 41.5 | 48.0 | 53.6 | | |
| Colombia | 20.2 | 17.0 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 23.6 | 19.9 | 16.6 | 12.8 | | |
| Foundar | 27.3 | 22.8 | 6.2 | 5.2 | 33.5 | 28.0 | 27.6 | 25.3 | | |
| Besterius | 28.0 | 31.1 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 32.0 | 34.1 | 40.8 | 45.6 | | |
| raraguay. | | | | | I | | | | | |
| Peru. | 34.3 | 29.6 | 3.8 | 6.7 | 38.1 | 36.3 | 40.6 | 44.9 | | |
| Veneruela | 11.0 | 8.0 | 6.3 | 4.2 | 17.3 | 12.2 | 18.7 | 19.6 | | |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | | | | 1 | | | | | | |
| Chile | 1 10 6 | 4.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 2.8 | | |
| | 12.6 | 9.7 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 17.8 | 18.7 | 20.0 | 20.0 | | |
| oraguey | 1 3.3 | 6.6 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 11.3 | 12.6 | 6.6 | 4.0 | | |
| | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | |

-- indicates data not available

SOURCE: United Nationr, CEPAL/PRELAC. DinÉmica del Subempleo en America Latina, Estudios e informes de la CEPAL, número 10, Santiago Chile, 1981; Tables 4 and 6, pp. 26 and 41.

mitting a study of change. On the basis of these trends, projections of underemployment into the future (to the year 2000) were made. The estimates reveal that underemployment is extremely high (one worker in five is underutilized) and has declined only slightly in the past 30 years. It is highest in countries with high birth rates and lowest in countries with low birth rates. Throughout this 30-year period the economies of most of these nations grew comparatively rapidly-5 percent per year or more--yet made only slight progress toward putting the underemployed to work at more remunerative jobs. The fault seems to lie in the comparative lack of modern industrial growth and the rapid expansion of marginal urban economic activities. When it looks to the future, CEPAL/PRELAC is pessimistic. They find that prospects for reducing underemployment in this century are not bright; for most of the nations little improvement can be expected, and for several a further deterioration is expected. Only for Costa Rica, Panama, Argentina, and Uruguay (all low birth rate countries) is a significant decline expected or already attained. In explaining this result, the PRELAC authors state.

> The eight countries which show a tendency toward worsening of under-employment are characterized by two principal problems: (a) all of them expect an acceleration in the supply of workers, particularly in urban areas, in comparison with the rates for 1950-1980, and (b) the economic growti, trend is insufficient to achieve a decline in under-employment, even if the precipitous increase in growth of the labor force were not present. That is to say, there are factors both of supply and of demand of manpower which explain the worsening.*

It is more than coincidental that all of the

nations now having, and at the end of this century still having, high underemployment rates are the nations pouring in large amounts of new workers each year because of past and continuing high fertility.

Future growth of the work force

On the assumption that recent trends in work force would continue in the future (including greater participation by women) and that there will be a moderate fertility decline in each nation, a series of projections of the future size of the work force in each country in the year 2000 has been prepared by Dr. Amy O. Tsui.+ Table PEA-6 reports the number of persons of each sex estimated to be either at work or seeking work at selected dates. Because of high fertility in the past (the children who will be entering the labor force between 1980 and 2000 are already born), these projections are quite accurate. The labor force will increase by about 75 percent between 1960 and 2000. In almost every country, the rate for females will be higher than for males-in most cases, there will be more than a doubling of the female work force within 20 years.

Providing this many new jobs to the large, on-coming generations is going to be a major challenge to the economies of Central America. Table PEA-7 shows the projected industrial composition of this work force. These projections anticipate a resurgence of industrialization and modernization and more vigorous growth of the economies, and that trends continue toward urbanization. They are more "optimistic" than the CEPAL/PRELAC projections of underemployment, and call for an absorption of large numbers of submarginal

*Unitad Nations, CEPAL/PRELAC, Dinámica del Subempleo en América Latina, Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL, número 10, Santiago, Chile, 1981, p. 37.

tAmy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000, Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979.

| | | | ***** | | γ | | | | 1 | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| Region and country | | Both | sexes | T | | Ma | le | | | Fem | ale | | Percent | change | 1980-2000 |
| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | Both | Male | Female |
| Latin America total | 114,200 | 131,861 | 152,488 | 198,260 | 87,114 | 100,172 | 114,343 | 145,215 | 26,474 | 31.689 | 38,145 | 53,045 | 73.6 | 66.7 | 100 (|
| Central America/other | 35,263 | 41,904 | 49,323 | 66,373 | 27,785 | 32,676 | 38,042 | 50,139 | 7,478 | 9,228 | 11,281 | 16,234 | 88.2 | 80.5 | 117.1 |
| Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Republic | 775 3,196 1,546 | 921 3,694 1,682 | 1,065 4,198 | 1,319 | 614 2,525 | 719 2,873 | 820 3,216 | 995 3,793 | 161 671 | 202 821 | 244 982 | 324 | 70.2 | 62.1 | 101.2 |
| El Salvador Guatemala Haiti | 1,524 2,288 2,695 | 1,845 2,687 3,062 | 2,191 3,096 | 2,963 2,962 4,063 | 1,345 1,217 1,961 | 1,625 1,455 2,284 | 1,926 1,704 2,601 | 2,505 2,243 3,336 | 201 307 327 | 257 390 403 | 320 487 495 | 458 719 727 | 91.7 94.4 | 86.2 76.5 | 127.9 134.2 |
| Honduras Mexico Nicaragua | 1,041 20,696 834 | 1,255 24,747 1,028 | 1,502 29,433 | 2.089 | 1,462 896 16,628 | 1,684 1,073 19,606 |],910 1,273 22,991 | 2,434 1,745 30,986 | 1,233 145 4,068 |],378 182 5,141 | 1,525 229 6,442 | 1,825 344 9'788 | 58.0 100.7 | 66.5 94.8 | 48.0 137.2 |
| Panama Puerto Rico | 668 | 783 | 908 | 1,150 | 491 | 783 574 | 938 663 | 1,265 837 | 188 177 | 245 209 | 312 245 | 472 313 | 108.3 72.2 | 95.8 70.5 | 151.1 76.8 |
| Tropical South America | 63,536 | 73,251 | 85,199 | 111,620 | 47,930 | 55,235 | 63,233 | 80,576 | 14,994 | 19,016 | 21,966 | 31,044 | 75.7 | 68.1 | 107.0 |
| Bolivia Brazil | 1,793 39,224 | 2,109 | 2,449 | 3,301 | 1,412 | 1,639 | 1,876 | 2,442 | 381 | 470 | 573 | 850 | 84.1 | 72.0 | |
| Colombia Ecuador | 8,346 2,604 | 9,901 | 11,507 | 68,893 14,297 4 954 | 30,179 | 34,369 | 39,044 8,508 | 49,420 10,574 | 9,045 2,104 | 11,112 2,542 | 13,575 2,999 | 19,473 | 75.6 | 63.8 69.4 | 125.5 |
| Peru. Venezuela. | 993 5,310 | 1,203 6,262 | 1,433 7,372 | 1,915 10,086 | 756 | 901 4,680 | 2,826 | 3,660 1,375 7 189 | 556 237 | 708 | 883 376 | 1,294 540 | 90.2 92.8 | 79.7 81.9 | 132.7 |
| Temperate South America | 4,273 15,401 | 5,162 | 6,110 17 966 | 8,174 | 3.243 | 3,862 | 4,514 | 5,916 | 1,030 | 1,300 | 1,964 1,596 | 2,897 2,258 | 89.9 91.3 | 77.5 73.2 | 129.9 11 9.2 |
| Argentina | 10 464 | | 1,700 | 20;207 | 11,399 | 12,261 | 13,068 | 14,500 | 4,002 | 4,445 | 4,898 | 5,767 | 31.6 | 27.2 | 44.1 |
| Chile. Uruguay. | 3,789 1,148 | 11,145 4,332 1.729 | 11,822 4,831 1,313 | 13,195 5,618 1,454 | 7,722 2,662 815 | 8,161 3,233 867 | 8,585 3,570 917 | 9,421 4,082 997 | 2,742 927 333 | 2,984 1,059 362 | 3,241 1,261 396 | 3,774 1,536 457 | 26.1 48.3 26.7 | 22.0 42.6 22.3 | 37.6 65.7 37.2 |

Table FEA-6. Projected Size of the Work Force, by Sex: Latin America, 1980-2000. (In thousands)

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: Amy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979, Table 6.

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| | r | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | | r | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|---|
| Region and country | | Agricultur | re | | Industry | r | | Services | | Percei | nt change : | 1980-2000 |
| | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | Agri- culture | Industry | Services |
| Latin America total | 42,393 | 45,622 | 44,781 | 27,703 | 46,635 | 72,860 | 43,299 | 60,915 | 73,814 | 6 | 163 | 71 |
| Central America/other | 15,232 | 16,215 | 15,320 | 8,359 | 14,897 | 24,292 | 11,677 | 18,234 | 26,481 | 0.6 | 191 | 127 |
| Costa Rica. Cuba. Dominican Republic. El Salvador. Guatemala. Haiti. Honduras. Mexico. Nicaragua. Panama. Puerto Rico. Tropical South America. | 300 915 864 782 1,181 1,857 634 8,063 391 245 | 355 1,082 942 1,058 1,989 760 8,237 493 247 26,126 | 376 1,178 1,130 1,043 715 1,992 851 7,261 568 206 25,697 | 172 889 260 333 509 272 162 5,473 150 139 14,368 | 280 1,279 502 571 988 550 321 9,846 286 274 25,448 | 397 1,674 824 991 1,675 940 566 16,390 479 456 40,916 | 303 1,392 422 413 598 566 246 7.160 293 284 23,953 | 431 1,838 692 693 1,050 896 421 11,349 471 397 34,274 | 545 2,207 1,009 1,079 1,343 1,327 671 17,123 689 488 | 25 29 31 33 -40 7 34 -10 45 -16 5 | 131 98 217 168 229 246 249 200 219 228 | 80 59 139 161 125 135 173 139 135 72 |
| Bolivia. Brazil. Colombia. Ecuador. Paraguay. Peru. Venezuela. Temperate South America. Argentina. Chile Uruguay. | 916 15,449 2,972 1,218 478 2,357 999 2,772 1,723 871 178 | 1,054 14,889 3,616 1,469 582 3,269 1,247 3,281 2,024 1,037 220 | 1,166 12,363 3,940 1,631 646 4,486 1,465 3,764 2,369 1,132 263 | 413 8,839 1,915 632 214 1,173 1,182 4,976 3,502 1,098 376 | 657 16,345 3,072 1,036 370 1,912 2,056 6,290 4,309 1,510 471 | 1,006 27,199 4,355 1,553 570 2,997 3,236 7,652 5,202 1,884 566 | 475 14,936 3,461 755 301 1,943 2,092 7,669 5,239 1,836 594 | 737 21,384 4,820 1,205 481 2,839 2,808 6,407 5,489 2,295 623 | 1,129 29,329 6,003 1.771 700 4,043 3,473 8,851 5,624 2,602 625 | 27 -20 33 34 35 9 47 36 38 30 48 | 144 208 127 146 166 155 174 54 49 72 51 | 143 96 73 135 133 108 66 15 7 42 5 |

Table PEA-7. Projected Industrial Composition: 1980-2000 (in Thousands).

NOTE: -- indicates no data available.

SOURCE: Amy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979, table 7.

workers into more productive work. These projections show only small growth in the agricultural sector (declines in several countries), with very rapid expansion in industry and moderately rapid expansion in services. This industrialization can occur only if there is sufficient investment in new plants and equipment to provide the jobs. Otherwise, the rural masses will continue to crowd into the cities, earning a subsistence living in the so-called service sector.

Unless birth rates decline more quickly than at present, the future growth of the labor force will place such demands on the urban economy that in the years immediately following 2000 it can neutralize economic gains made in the last years of this century. It can cause an accumulation of economically disenfranchised unemployed and underemployed that can become politically destabilizing.

Nutrition and Health 9.

Two of the goals of social and economic development are to eliminate hunger and to improve health and medical care. This section of the report deals with these aspirations as they are related to population dynamics. Part I considers nutrition and food production, and Part II deals with health and medical care.

I. Nutrition and food production

Economists seem never to tire of pointing out that if one sums the total food production of the world and divides by the total world's population, the number of calories per person is adequate to feed everyone, and that there is sufficient scope for improving agricultural productivity to maintain this situation for the remainder of this century and well into the next. From these valid statistics, two invalid generalizations are often in plied: (a) the problem of malnutrition in developing countries is

not serious and can be easily solved, and (b) rapid population growth is not a threat to economic development because there is plenty of food for all. Perhaps these implications would be valid if the world had a single collective, centrally directed economy, in which every child, woman and man would be guaranteed at least the minimum nutritional requirements from these international resources necessary to maintain growth, preserve health, provide energy for daily activities, and never suffer the panes of starvation. The cruel fact is that food supplies are very unequally distributed over the face of the globe, and that within each country, individual citizens have very unequal access to the food available there. Central America is one of the world's "nutritional trouble spots." In at least one-half of the countries, and for at least one-half of the residents, both the national supply of food in inadequate and unequal access to food is more acute than average. Table NH-1 reports the average food supply in terms of calories and proteins per capita for countries in Latin America around 1975-77. These data were published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations; although they represent the average daily supply available for the total population, they should not be interpreted as the amounts actually consumed by individuals. Nevertheless, they do reveal nation-to-nation disparity in food supplies.

In general, a daily average of 2,500 calories per person is regarded as the desirable level. Column 3 of Table NH-1 shows that 8 of the 11 nations in the region fall below this standard.

The World Bank has converted data similar to these into a measure of the supply as a percentage of daily requirements (column 4 of Table NH-1). It is less stringent than the criterion of 2,500 calories. Simultaneously using both sets of criteria, the countries with the greatest food supply deficit are Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, and El Salvador. Only Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Mexico have adequate indices of national food supply on both indicators.

The four right-hand columns of Table NH-1 measure the results of inequality of access to food within Central American countries, in terms of its effect on young children. These data summarize the findings of surveys of nutritional status of children under 5 years of age, taken between 1976 and 1980, reported by the Pan American Health Organization, Malnutrition is gauged by relating amount of major deficiency in height and weight in comparison with samples of infants known to be free of malnutrition. Grade I is "mild," Grade II is "moderate," and Grade III is "advanced" malnutrition. From this evidence, one can conclude that less than onehalf of the children of Central America (perhaps 45 percent) could be declared wholly free of malnutrition. Overall distribution would appear to be about as follows:

| Level of malnutrition | | | | | | Percent |
|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---------|
| Normal (no | | | | | | |
| malnutrition) . | | | | | | 45 |
| Grade I (mild) | • | | | | | 38 |
| Grade II (moderate) . | | | | | | 15 |
| Grade III (advanced) | • | ٠ | • | • | • | 2 |
| Total | | | • | | | 100 |

Because of the combination of inadequate total national food supply and unequal food distribution, the situation in Honduras, Guatemala, and Haiti is much worse than this average, with about 30 percent of all children suffering from moderate to advanced malnutrition, with only slightly more than one-quarter being normal.

Food production

It is important to make a clear distinction between "crop production," "agricultural production," and "food production." The first includes field crops grown for industrial or nonfood use: cotton, hemp, wool, and noncaloric products such as tobacco, coffee, tea, and spices, or forage for animals. The second includes crop production minus a deduction of food for animals, plus animals produced for food or nonfood use. Food production refers only to that portion of agricultural production devoted to the production of edible food products with caloric value, including animal products. In Central America, much food is produced for export, especially bananas and sugarcane products, and much agricultural production is not for food (cotton, coffee).

Statistics on each of the above three types of production are assembled and published annually by the International Economics Division of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Table NH-2 reports measures of food production for Latin American countries from 1972 to 1981. These statis-

| | | | 7 | T | | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|---|---|--|---|-------------------------|------------------|
| Region and country | Daily capita | per supply | Calorie ratio to | Supply as ratio | Nutri -under | tional sta 5 years o | itus of ch of age: p | ildren ercent |
| | Calories | Protein | 2500 | toquirement | Normal | Grade I | Grade 11 | Grade III |
| Central America/other | | | | | 1 | 1 | | |
| Belize | 2,510 2,487 2,630 2,109 2,111 2,023 2,041 2,084 2,668 2,452 2,346 | 64.3 58.1 67.7 43.0 50.1 53.7 49.1 51.5 66.1 70.4 57.8 | 100 99 105 84 81 82 83 107 98 94 | 1.16 1.22 1.05 .99 .93 .96 .96 1.21 .99 1.03 | 54.2 54.2 47.1 27.4 26.8 27.5 | 36.8 42.5 43.0 46.0 43.0 41.28 38.6 | 8.5 | 0.5 |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | - | |
| Bolivia | 2,049 2,521 2,246 2,111 2,808 2,284 2,284 2,436 | 53.4 60.9 48.6 54.4 80.1 58.5 64.9 | 82 101 90 84 112 91 97 | .87 1.09 1.08 .88 1.34 .99 | 48.5 | 37.2 | 12.0 | 2.3 |
| Temperate South America | | | | 1.12 | | | | |
| Argentina | 3,358 2,644 2,927 | 110.2 70.3 87.5 | 134 106 117 | 1.25 1.14 1.10 | | = | | |
| North America | | | | | | | | |
| Canada | 3,345 3,339 | 101.1 106.2 | 134 118 | | | | | |

Table NH-1. Food Supply and the Nutritional Status of Population of Children in Latin American Countries.

SOURCES: Daily per capita supply, Food and Agricultural Organization, Food Balance Sheets, 1975-77, average, Rome, 1980; ratio of daily requirements (col. 4), World Bank, <u>World Development Report</u>, 1983; nutritional status, Pan American Health Organization, <u>Health Conditions in the Americas</u>, 1977-1980, 1982, p. 102.

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| Region and country | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 |
|-------------------------|---|-------|-------|------|----------|------|----------|------|--------------|----------|
| Latin America total | 97 | 100 | 102 | 105 | 108 | 103 | 110 | 111 | 112 | 114 |
| Central America/other | | | | 1 | <u> </u> | | <u> </u> | | | <u> </u> |
| Costa Rica | 106 | 107 | 103 | 1 | | | [| | 1 | 1 |
| Cuba | 83 | 10/ | 107 | 119 | 112 | 112 | 119 | 113 | 100 | 101 |
| Dominican Republic | 101 | 100 | 85 | 89 | 89 | 84 | 97 | 103 | 94 | 95 |
| El Salvador | 101 | 101 | 101 | 92 | 100 | 103 | 108 | 103 | 103 | 105 |
| Guatemala | | 103 | 90 | 105 | 99 | 98 | 110 | 116 | 99 | 89 |
| Haiti | 108 | 103 | 100 | 109 | 115 | 114 | 111 | 107 | 102 | 109 |
| Honduras | 93 | 101 | 92 | 90 | 88 | 97 | 108 | 104 | 96 | 103 |
| Mexico | 98 | 102 | 00 | 15 | 83 | 85 | 90 | 93 | 88 | 84 |
| Nicaragua | 96 | 102 | 102 | 104 | 100 | 98 | 102 | 97 | 101 | 104 |
| Panama | 96 | 102 | 102 | 106 | 102 | 99 | 105 | 77 | 71 | 76 |
| Puerto Rico | | ,,, | 55 | 98 | 97 | 101 | 98 | 94 | 88 | 94 |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 80 | 1 102 | 1 305 | 1 | | | | | 1 | |
| Brazil | 100 | 105 | 105 | 113 | 116 | 107 | 103 | 103 | 99 | 94 |
| Colombia. | 103 | 103 | 1 112 | 113 | 124 | 125 | 118 | 121 | 135 | 134 |
| Ecuador | 1 60 | 1 00 | 107 | | 110 | 108 | 119 | 124 | 129 | 128 |
| Paraguay | 1 61 | 33 | 1 102 | 109 | 106 | 114 | 132 | 109 | 117 | 119 |
| Peru. | 98 | 90 | 101 | 99 | 104 | 118 | 114 | 121 | 123 | 123 |
| Venenzuela | 96 | 30 | 100 | 98 | 100 | 95 | 82 | 80 | 76 | · 84 |
| | | 30 | 102 | 108 | 101 | 114 | 113 | 118 | 118 | 112 |
| Temperate South America | I | | 1 | | | | | | | ĺ |
| Argentine | 92 | | 101 | | | | | | | |
| Chile | 96 | 90 | 101 | 103 | 111 | 110 | 121 | 124 | 113 | 121 |
| Uruguay. | 89 | .04 | 1 100 | 101 | 95 | 102 | 91 | 98 | 98 | 106 |
| | | , " | 108 | 108 | 119 | 97 | 101 | 91 | 99 | 116 |
| United States | 102 | 103 | | 144 | | | | | | |
| Canada | 98 | 103 | 70 | 100 | 107 | 111 | 112 | 116 | 111 | 120 |
| | ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, | 70 | 60 | 99 | 107 | 108 | 110 | 106 | 107 | 113 |

Table NH-2. Indices of Per Capita Food Production in Latin America, by Country: 1972-1981.

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: United States Department of Agriculture, 1982, page 22.

tics do *not* measure nutritional levels (as discussed in the preceding section), but simply *trends* in production and production per capita. It is presumed that if per capita production increases, nutritional status will be facorably affected, but that if per capita production declines, nutritional deterioration is occurring.

Table NH-2 shows that the nutrition situation has not improved (indeed, it appears to have deteriorated) in Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Although a few nations with rapid growth rates increased their productivity per capita (Haiti, Paraguay), the negative relationship between per capita production of food and rate of population growth is strong.

The statistics in Tables NH-1 and NH-2 fail to give a full picture of the human misery associated with malnutrition in Central America. The following case study of Honduras provides more insight. It applies with equal vigor to Guatemala, Haiti, and parts of Nicaragua. El Salvador, and Mexico.

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Malnutrition in Honduras: a case study*

The nutritionally at risk population. The target group for national policies and programs aimed at nutritional improvement should be the "nutritionally at risk population." This is defined to be that segment of the population that lives continually on the brink of malnutrition, and for whom relatively minor changes in income, food prices, health status, family size, or environmental conditions, can create not inconsiderable nutritional impacts. Within this population, we can expect a high percentage of the members to be experiencing malnutrition at any given time. The must visible effects of this malnutrition will be manifested in the most vulnerable segments of the nutritionally at-risk population, which experience has shown to be infants, young children, and pregnant and lactating women.

Honduras faces serious nutritional problems, with widespread effects that impact the lives of the great majority of the population, both urban and rural. The nutritionally at risk population comprises more than 60 percent of all urban families and more than 90 percent of all rural families, for a total of over 80 percent of the total Honduran population.

The principal nutritional problems in Honduras are protein-caloric malnutrition and a series of other nutritional deficiencies, caused by dietary inadequacies and/or the presence of infections which prevent proper utilization of food consumed, or which radically increase the body's nutrient requirements. A study of food consumption in Central America undertaken in 1971 and 1972 by GAFICA, an FAO advisory group attached to the Secretariat of the Central American Common Market, found that in 1970 the lower 50 percent of the Honduran population, in income terms, consumed less than 1,500 calories per person per day, an average deficit of over 700 calories per person per day.

Surveys conducted by the Honduran Ministry of Public Health and by the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) show that between 75 and 85 percent of all children under the age of 6 years suffer from some degree of proteincaloric malnutrition.

Subsequent surveys have been conducted in Honduras by the Ministry of Public

*SOURCE: George V. Poynor. Agricultural Sector Assessment for Honduras. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1978. Health (MSP). They have demonstrated the following levels of malnutrition among children under the age of six in rural areas: 43 percent in Grade 1; 32 percent in Grade II; and 6 percent in Grade III; for a total of 83 percent of children surveyed malnourished. The Honduran national nutrition planning group, SAPLAN, concluded in its 1976 assessment of the nutritional situation that malnutrition had increased in the period subsequent to the INCAP survey.

The effects of malnutrition. The effects of malnutrition in Honduras are pervasive and costly. Infant mortality, according to official estimates, is 117 deaths for each 1,000 live births (1977), which places Honduras among the countries with very high rates of infant mortality. In rural Honduras the official statistic for infant mortality is 127.2, and is acknowledged by Honduran health and nutrition planners to be underestimated because of problems of registration of infant deaths.

These statistics and others place Honduras among the countries of the world most seriously affected by malnutrition. The World Food Council's list of countries that face severe food problems, for example, includes only four countries of the western hemisphere; El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, and Honduras.

Ninety percent of all children admitted for treatment to pediatric hospitals or clinics in Honduras, for whatever causes, suffer from some degree of malnutrition. The great majority of all illnesses which result in infant and child mortality are nutrition-related, in the sense that these same illnesses, in the well-nourished child, are either mild or routinely treated; whereas in the malnourished child they prove serious, and often fatal.

Malnutrition among women of childbearing age affects their own health as well as that of their infant children. A considerable percentage of maternal deaths associated with childbirth in Honduras have nutritional anemias as a contributing factor. Anemia and other maternal nutritional disorders are also factors in the low birthweights of children, and infant mortality is significantly higher among children of low birthweight. Chronic caloric shortages in the diets of lactating women lead to problems in breast feeding, and increases the probability of illness in the mother. These conditions, in turn, have deleterious effects upon the nutritional status, and health, of the infant.

Malnutrition affects the ability of members of the economically active population to sustain themselves and their families. Research undertaken by INCAP, and aimed at a better understanding of the relationship between nutritional status and work performance, has shown that a daily supplement of 600-900 calories in the diets of low income adults produces a surprisingly sharp increase in work stamina. Turning this around, we may conclude what many observers have long held: that chronic shortages of food energy (calories) in the diets of the poor lead to decreased work performance, and therefore, to overall reductions in labor productivity.

Conclusion. Hunger and malnutrition are serious problems in Central America. They are greatest where fertility is highest, and are improving least or deteriorating most rupidly where population growth is most rapid.

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| Region and | | Daily ca requirer | Percent change 1980-2000 | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|----------------------|-----------------------------|---------|------------------------|-----------------|
| country | 1 9 80 | 1985 | 1990 | 2000 | Food re- quirements | Popula- tion |
| Central America/other | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 4.647 | 5 161 | 6.00/ | 7 5 7 9 | (D. 0. | |
| Cuba | 21.098 | 23 624 | 26 127 | 0.000 | 62.2 | 43.3 |
| Dominican Republic | 11 321 | 13 370 | 15 (0) | 31,320 | 48.5 | 31.2 |
| El Salvador. | 9,713 | 11 7/3 | 15,491 | 19,731 | 74.3 | 52.8 |
| Guatemala | 15 202 | 18 766 | 21 5/0 | 18,996 | 95.6 | 72.5 |
| Haiti | 10 882 | 12 845 | 21,540 | 28,694 | 88.8 | 79.4 |
| Honduras | 7 001 | 12,045 | 14,934 | 19,299 | 17.3 | 54.5 |
| Mexico | 147 621 | 172 740 | 10,083 | 15,484 | 118.4 | 95.2 |
| Nicaragua. | 5 450 | 112,149 | 205,984 | 282,389 | 96 .6 | 73.2 |
| Panama | 3 981 | 6,035 | 7,974 | 10,955 | 101.0 | 78.0 |
| Puerto Rico | | 4,703 | 5,448 | 6,942 | 74.3 | 53.3 |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 10 990 | 17 260 | 15 005 | 22.242 | | |
| Brazil | 252 000 | 205 207 | 13,905 | 22,242 | 102.4 | 79.8 |
| Colombia | 56 375 | 61 054 | 241,400 | 438,446 | 74.0 | 52.5 |
| Ecuador | 16 218 | 10 272 | 09,372 | 84,636 | 55.7 | 37.8 |
| Parayuay. | 6 120 | 7 22/ | 22,856 | 30,564 | 88.5 | 66.3 |
| Peru | 3 760 | 1,524 | 8,624 | 11,377 | 85.6 | 63.5 |
| ?enezuela | 28 616 | 22,677 | 5,431 | 7,457 | 97.9 | 70.1 |
| | 20,010 | 11,011 | 39,256 | 51,578 | 80.2 | 59.0 |
| Temperate South America | | | | | 1 | |
| Argentina | \$5,615 | 61.015 | 66.478 | 77 313 | 10 0 | 22.0 |
| Chile | 23,004 | 25.455 | 27.937 | 31,011 | 116 | 44.9 |
| Uruguay | 6,104 | 6,726 | 7,325 | 8,455 | 38.5 | 22.4 |

Table NH-3. Projected Focd Requirements: Latin American Countries, 1980-2000.

NOTE: -- indicates no data available.

SOURCE: Amy Ong Taui. <u>Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000</u>. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979.

Future requirements for food

Projections of the food requirements of the population of each nation of Central America were prepared on the assumptions that (a) malnutrition and hunger would gradually be eliminated by the end of this century and (b) there would be moderately strong declines in fertility.*

Table NH-3 summarizes the projected needs for food. In every country, the elimination of malnutrition requires food production to grow at a considerably faster rate than population—in some nations, by 25-40 percent faster. Yet as Table NH-2 reports, food production is not keeping pace with population in the most seriously malnourished countries. Thus, the malnutrition problem appears to be soluble only if there is a two-pronged program to raise agricultural production and productivity and to slow down population growth to permit the agricultural sector to catch up to the nations' nutritional needs.

II. Health and medical care

Because of its tropical climate, Central America harbors a wide variety of serious disease hazards that require major health and medical programs, along with rigorous self-care by the public, to overcome or control them. These illnesses are most severe, and cause death most often, among three high-risk groups: infants and children under one year, pregnant women and recent mothers, and the elderly. Among the

*Amy Ung Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979.

infectious and parasitic diseases posing major health problems are these: *

1. Vaccine preventable diseases. The Pan American Health Organization estimates in Latin America as a whole, 24 percent of all deaths in recent years from infectious and parasitic diseases in the 1-4 age group were due to vaccine-preventable diseases. The rate in Central America cannot be less. Measles, poliomyelitis, diptheria, whooping cough and teranus are in this group. Incomplete inoculation permits this hazard to persist.

2. Diseases requiring environmental control. Central America is estimated to have had more than 250,000 cases of malaria in 1980—a 35 percent increase over 1970. There have been periodic epidemics of dengue fever, which has spread to all nations of Central America. It is estimated that there are 280,000 new cases of tuberculosis each year. In addition, hepatitis, typhoid fever, and leprosy are not rare.

3. Acute respiratory infections. Influenza and prieumonia are among the five leading causes of deaths in infants and children in all nations of Central America for which data are recorded.

4. Diarrheal diseases. Such diseases are a leading cause of infant and childhood morbidity and mortality. Unsafe drinking water and inadequate environmental sanitation are basic sources of infection. Malnutrition resulting in low resistance to infection increases the rate at which such infections turn into serious illness.

5. Complications of pregnancy. Complications of pregnancy, childbirth, and the puerperium are a leading cause of death among women 15-49. In all countries of Central America for which data are available, 10 percent or more of the deaths of women in this age group are due to this category of causes. Lack of or insufficient prenatal care, high parity, delivery outside medical facilities, and malnutrition are contributing causes.

6. Chronic and degenerative diseases. The diseases that affect the elderly in all populations are no less important in Central America: diseases of the heart, malignant neoplasms, cerebrovascular disease, and diabetes mellitus require sestained medical attention.

Because a large proportion of the public is poor and uneducated, knowledge of preventive health self-care is limited. Because the national governments have severe limitations upon their resources, expenditures to improve the quantity and quality of health and medical services are insufficient to meet the needs.

Nevertheless, progress has been and is being made. Increasing expectation of life and declining infant and adult mortality rates described in Chapter 2 of this report are evidence that there have been improve ments in the health status of the population and in the medical care being provided. Yet, as that chapter reported, several nations of the region (especially Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti) lag behind most other Latin American countries in lower mortality. Most of these nations have major programs, assisted by the United Nations and other international agencies, to bring about further improvement.

The magnitude of the deficit in health care in Central America can be roughly estimated from Table NH-4, which presents statistics on health and medical personnel in relation to population for the Latin

*The following summary was extracted from Pan American Health Organization, *Health Conditions in the Americas, 1977-80,* 1982.

| | | Popula | tion per: | | Medic | Medical personnel per 100,000 inhabitants | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Region and country | Phys | ician | Nursing | persons | - | | [| 1 | <u> </u> | | | |
| | 1960 | 1980 | 1960 | 1980 | Year | cians | Pharma- cists | Graduate nurses | Dentista | | | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 2,700 1,060 8,220 5,260 4,420 9,320 12,620 1,630 2,690 2,730 | 1,470 700 4,020 3,040 3,600 8,200 3,120 1,260 1,800 980 | 710 950 9,040 4,020 3,650 1,250 3,460 | 450 360 2,150 870 1,620 2,490 700 1,420 550 420 | 1977 1374 1973 1977 1971 1976 1975 1974 1976 1975 | 72 89 54 27 24 9 32 56 61 75 | 6 8 24 13 | 220 75 109 15 25 75 73 170 | 22 32 ^a 12 9 5 2 7 3 11 13 | | | |
| Tropical South AmericaBoliviaBrazilColombiaEcuadorParaguayPeruVenezuela | 3,830 2,670 2,649 2,676 1,810 1,910 1,510 | 1,850 1,700 1,929 1,620 1,710 1,390 950 | 2,810 4,220 2,360 1,380 2,210 2,840 | 3,070 820 1,220 1,130 690 370 | 1974 1974 1977 1977 1976 1977 1977 | 51 61 51 62 47 63 115 | 37 8 ^a 5 ^b 19 25 | 30 42 ^a 80 16 44 ^b 133 278 | 23 28 ^a 18 18 26 ^b 19 34 | | | |
| Temperate South America Argentina | 740 1,780 960 | 530 1,920 540 | 750 640 800 | 450 190 | 1975 1977 1975 | 192 61 130 | 3 ^c 22 | 94 ^C 30 | 19 ^C 40 23 | | | |

Table NH-4. Population per Physician and Medical Personnel per 100,000 Inhabitants: Latin American Countries.

NOTE: -- indicates data not available

^aBased on 1972 data

^bBased on 1975 data

^CBased on 1973 data

SOURCE: Population per physician, World Bank, World Development Report, 1983; medical personnel, United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1980. American nations. If a ratio of one physician per 500 persons is accepted as the minimum desirable standard, it is obvious that no nation in Central America even approaches it. However, the table does provide evidence of very rapid improvement in all nations of the region except Haiti in the 1960-80 period. If progress continues at this rate, the shortage of medical personnel will be greatly eased—despite rapid population growth.

Table NH-4 also provides statistics of the ratio of selected categories of medical personnel to population. If the ratios for Argentina and Venezuela can be used as a point of comparison, as minimally desireable, then it is clear that all of Central America is seriously deficient. The greatest deficiencies are found in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (also in Haiti). The shortage is far greater in these countries than in any other Latin American nation. (El Salvador has a comparative shortage of physicians and doctors, but less of nurses.)

Table NH-5 reports projections of the number of medical personnel and facilities required in each country if it were to try to move gradually to the level of medical care common in Europe and North America. The need for growth is very large. Facilities must be expanded at a pace even greater than the rapid population growth rates in order to make up for pre-existing deficits. These projections illustrate and emphasize how extremely difficult it will be for the nations with the greatest health and medical deficiencies ever to catch up with the rest of Latin America and the world while continuing to grow rapidly. Because a very large percentage of the clients in any health system of Central American countries are expectant mothers and infants, reducing fertility rates provides almost immediate relief on the pressure to expand facilities. and reduces the quantity of facilities that will be ultimately required. If present growth rates continue, attainment of the goals set for this century might not be reached until well into the next.

| Region and | Numbe | Number of physicians | | | Number of hospital beds | | | er of hosp | oita ls | Percent | change 1 | 980-2000 |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------------|---------|---------|-------------------------|-----------|-------|---------------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------|
| country . | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 1990 | 2000 | 1980 | 19 9 0 | 2000 | Doctors | Beds | Hospitals |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 1.606 | 2.377 | 3,232 | 9.562 | 14,562 | 20,199 | 53 | 76 | 102 | 101.2 | 111.2 | \$2.5 |
| Cuba | 9.653 | 12.321 | 15,178 | 49.134 | 67.591 | 38.271 | 411 | 482 | 551 | 57.2 | 79.7 | 34.1 |
| Dominican Republic | 3,385 | 5.499 | 7,979 | 14.887 | 28,547 | 45.524 | 347 | 471 | 595 | 135.7 | 205.8 | 71.5 |
| El Salvador | 1.835 | 3,906 | 6.742 | 11.988 | 25,337 | 43.592 | 102 | 169 | 252 | 267.4 | 263.5 | 147.1 |
| Guatemala | 2.587 | 5,696 | 5.914 | 22.284 | 42.506 | 69.049 | 238 | 339 | 451 | 283.2 | 209.9 | 89.5 |
| Haiti | 1.147 | 3,254 | 6.025 | 8,788 | 22.359 | 40.014 | 103 | 169 | 244 | 425.3 | 355.3 | 136.9 |
| Honduras | 1.428 | 3,102 | 5.700 | 7.837 | 18,474 | 35.246 | 60 | 114 | 193 | 299.2 | 349.7 | 221.7 |
| Mexico | 49.803 | 98.692 | 167.090 | 189.376 | 547.026 | 1.076.420 | 2,118 | 3.437 | 5.157 | 235.2 | 468.4 | 143.5 |
| Niceragua | 1.914 | 3.175 | 4.773 | 7.522 | 15.287 | 25,994 | 83 | 124 | 171 | 149.4 | 245.6 | 106.0 |
| Panama | 1,798 | 2,864 | 4.054 | 8,725 | 16,613 | 26,115 | 71 | 99 | 125 | 125.5 | 199.3 | 76.1 |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | i | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 3,036 | 5,484 | 8,961 | 13,465 | 28,844 | 15,639 | 268 | 376 | 508 | 195.2 | 293.5 | 89.6 |
| Brazil | 92,921 | 166,028 | 257,206 | 597,788 | 1,069,060 | 1,656,963 | 5,563 | 7,213 | 8,846 | 176.8 | 177.2 | 59.0 |
| Colombia | 14,291 | 22,748 | 32,832 | 68,050 | 124,253 | 193,124 | 942 | 1,168 | 1,397 | 129.7 | 183.8 | 48.3 |
| Ecuador | 4,360 | 7,700 | 12,035 | 21,307 | 42,596 | 71,260 | 266 | 374 | 493 | 176.0 | 234.4 | 85.3 |
| Paraguay | 2,671 | 3,953 | 5,404 | 6,510 | 14,462 | 25,100 | 165 | 227 | 292 | 102.3 | 285.6 | 77.0 |
| Peru | 11,042 | 18,516 | 25,585 | 46,904 | 94,385 | 144,534 | 542 | 779 | 958 | 131.7 | 208.1 | 76.8 |
| Venezuela | 16,195 | 22,750 | 30,227 | 58,642 | 117,035 | 194,727 | \$79 | 689 | 933 | 86.6 | 232.1 | 94.8 |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | • | 1 | | | | |
| Argentina | 64,482 | 82,587 | 101,590 | 167,561 | 228,780 | 295,028 | 3,608 | 4,970 | 6,449 | 57.5 | 76.1 | 78.7 |
| Chile | 5,799 | 8,975 | 12,678 | 46,942 | 66,304 | 83,448 | 342 | 421 | 506 | 118.6 | 88.4 | 48.0 |
| Uruguay | 3,462 | 4,280 | 5,043 | 14,895 | 23,391 | 32,487 | 77 | 115 | 156 | 45.7 | 118.1 | 102.6 |

Table NH-5. Projected Health and Medical Facilities in Latin America: 1980-2000.

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: Amy Ong Tsui. Illustrative Functional Projections 1975-2000. Chicago: Community and Family Study Center, 1979.

Housing and Amenities 10.

One of the greatest development needs in Central America, as in all of Latin America, is the improvement of the quality of housing and the provision of basic facilities required for healthful living with at least minimal comfort. Tables H-1, H-2, and H-3 report some indicators of the present housing quality in each country. Where available, data are provided separately for urban and rural residence. From these data, the following facts emerge:

(a) The average house is small (only 2 or 3 rooms), yet the average household contains 4-6 persons, with the result that the density per room tends to be very high-2 or 3 persons per room. By international housing standards, 1.0 person per room is regarded as the density desirable, and density above 1.5 indicates definite over-crowding. Hence, there is severe over-crowding in Central America.

(b) In most of the countries, only 20 to 50 percent of the homes have electricity. This means that food cannot be refrigerated, illumination must be deficient, there can be no piped water outside urban areas, and all amenities and electrical appliances (such as TVs, clothes irons, washing machines) must be foregone.

(c) Except for Mexico, Costa Rica, and Cuba, less than one-half of the dwellings have piped water available. This deficiency is most serious in rural areas, where only about 20 percent of dwellings have piped water. In rural areas, a high proportion of households take their water from streams or other unprotected sources or from wells, a high percentage of which are subject to contamination. Even in urban areas, 10-30 percent of dwellings must use water that is not delivered by pipes.

| Region and | | Private b | ouseholds | | Dwe I | lings | Percent | t of dwelli | ngs with | |
|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|
| country | Year | Number (000) | Average persons | Number (000) | Number occupied | Rooms per dwelling | Persons per room | piped water | elec- tricity | Toilet |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | - h | |
| Costa Rica | 1973 | | | 337 | 315 | 4.0 | 1 1 4 | 81.0 | 60.0 | |
| Cuba | 1970 | 1,905 | 45 | 1 924 | 1 911 | 3.7 | 1.4 | 81.U | 68.8 | 46.2 |
| Dominican Republic | 1970 | 746 | 5.2 | 719 | 1,501 | 3.7 | 1.2 | 45.6 | 70.7 | |
| El Salvador | 1971 | | | | 654 | 1 7 | 1.5 | 22.9 | 30.8 | /4.5 |
| Guatemala | 1973 | 998 | 5.0 | 998 | 975 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 20.0 | 34.1 | 41.3 |
| Haiti | 1976 | 1.065 | 4.4 | | 1 065 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 25.4 | 28.5 | 40.8 |
| Honduras | 1974 | | | 527 | 1,005 | 2.2 | | | | |
| Mexico | 1970 | 8.286 | 5.8 | | 9 786 | 2.4 | | 15.4 | 25.0 | 33.2 |
| Nicarajua | 1971 | 1 | | | 306 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 49.4 | 58.9 | 41.5 |
| Panama | 1970 | | | | 305 | 2.2 | ; | 27.9 | 40.9 | 19.3 |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | | 51.9 | 71.9 |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 1976 | 1.041 | 4.4 | 1.114 | 1 078 | | | | | |
| Brazil | 1973 | | | 1,114 | 19 402 | 2.0 | | 14.4 | 33.0 | 14.3 |
| Colombia | 1973 | 3.472 | 5.7 | 2.956 | 2 800 | 3.5 | , . | 33.8 | 55.6 | 67.5 |
| Ecuador | 1974 | | | 1,313 | 1 189 | 2.4 | 1.0 | 04.2 | 58.1 | |
| Paraguay | 1972 | 428 | 5.5 | | 1,105 | 2.4 | | 20.0 | 41.2 | 42.0 |
| Peru | 1972 | 2.772 | 4.9 | 2.904 | 2.771 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 26.2 | 1/.5 | 93.8 |
| Venezuela | 1 971 | | | 2,127 | 1,844 | 3.9 | 1.5 | 53.3 | 76.8 | 77.4 |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1970 | 6.056 | 3.8 | | 1 | | | | | |
| Cnile | 1970 | 1,690 | 5.0 | 1 775 | | 2.0 | 1.4 | | | |
| Uruguay | 1975 | 769 | 3.6 | 848 | 751 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 59.6 83.9 | 80.7 | 43.6 92.1 |

Table H-1. Households, Dwellings, and Housing Facilities: Latin American Countries.

NOTE: -- indicates no data or data not available.

SOURCE: United Nations. Statistical Yearbook, 1979, 1980.

| | | Total | | | | Urban | | | Rural | |
|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------|-------------------------------|
| Region and country | Ye ar | Piped system | Well | Streams or other source | Piped system | Well | Streams or other source | Piped system | Well | Streams or other source |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 1973 | 69.8 | 8.0 | 22.2 | | _ | | | | |
| Cuba | 1970 | 56.3 | 33.2 | 10.5 | 87.6 | 14.3 | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | | | | 10.5 | 04.0 | 14.3 | 3.1 | 1.5 | 68.2 | 24.4 |
| El Salvador | 1971 | 47.2 | 15 3 | 37.5 | 87 5 | 6.2 | | 10.6 | | |
| Guatemala. | 1973 | 42.3 | 27 3 | 30.5 | 0/.0 | 0.2 | 6.0 | 18.5 | 21.7 | 59.8 |
| Haiti | | | | 30.4 | 82.3 | 9.3 | 8.9 | 18.9 | 37.8 | 43.3 |
| Honduras | 1974 | 43.1 | 29 7 | 27 1 | 90.5 | 5 7 | 1 2 0 | | | |
| Merico | 1970 | 61.0 | | 27.1 | 90.5 | J./ | 3.0 | 21.2 | 40.8 | 37.9 |
| Nicaregya | 1971 | 37.5 | 31 7 | | 71 0 | 10 6 | | 33.8 | | |
| Parama | 1970 | 51.1 | 12 2 | 36.7 | 90.7 | 10.6 | 8.7 | 4.4 | 43.3 | 52.4 |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | 4.0 | | ; | 20.2 | 67.9 |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | ļ | | |
| Bolivia | 1976 | 36.8 | 23.5 | 10.0 | 70 0 | £ 7 | | 7.0 | | |
| Brazil | 1970 | 32.8 | 24.7 | 42 4 | 55.0 | 22 6 | 14.3 | 1.9 | 34.9 | 57.2 |
| Colcubia | 1973 | 69.9 | 11.8 | 18.3 | 91 4 | 23.0 | 5.0 | 2.5 | 26.3 | /1.2 |
| Ecuador | 1970 | 42.9 | 26.1 | 30.9 | 83.4 | 3.8 | 17.0 | 30.2 | 28.4 | 41.3 |
| Paraguay | 1972 | 11.1 | 80.6 | 8.3 | 27.6 | 6.7.7 | 12.0 | 13.1 | 41.5 | 43.4 |
| Peru | 1972 | 41.4 | 9.1 | 49.5 | 69.1 | 57 | 25.2 | | 89.2 | 10.8 |
| Venezuela | 1971 | 78.6 | | 21.4 | | | | 4.0 | | |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1960 | 51.5 | 41.6 | 6.7 | 67.9 | 33 5 | 1 7 6 | | 69.0 | 1.0 |
| Chile | 1970 | 71.0 | 18.9 | 10.1 | 89.5 | 5.8 | | 19-1 | 60.9 | 10.9 |
| Uruguay | 1975 | 72.8 | 17.0 | 10.2 | 73.2 | 17.0 | 9.5 | 3.6 | 58.4 | 38.1 |

Table H-2. Source of Household Water Supply, Urban and Rural Areas: Latin American Countries (Percent of Households That Obtain Water from Specified Sources).

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

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SOURCE: Economic Commission on Latin America, 1983, United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1977, 1976, 1975, 1974, and 1972.

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| Region and | | | Total | | | Urban | | | Rural | | | |
|-------------------------|---------|-----------------|---------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|--------------------|-----------------|---------|--------------------|--|--|
| country | Year | Water clcset | Latrine | None or unknown | Water closet | Latrine | None or unknown | Water closet | Latrine | None or unknown | | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | + | | | |
| Costa Rica | 1973 | 44.3 | 44.7 | | | | | | | | | |
| Cuba | 1970 | 43.8 | 36.2 | 11.1 | (1) | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | | | | 10.0 | 64.1 | 29.0 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 55.1 | 38.8 | | |
| El Salvador | 1971 | 22.4 | าคร | 50 0 | | | | | | | | |
| Guatemala | 1973 | 17 9 | 22 9 | 50.0 | 51.8 | 30.5 | 17.8 | 1.7 | 10.6 | 87.8 | | |
| Haiti | | | | 39.2 | 40.0 | . 6.9 | 17.6 | 1.8 | 14.6 | 83.6 | | |
| Honduras | 1974 | 14.4 | 17.0 | 67.0 | | | | | | | | |
| Mexico | 1970 | | 59.5 | D7.0 | 41.9 | 36.9 | 21.2 | 1.6 | 9.0 | 89.4 | | |
| Nicaragua | 1971 | 19.3 | 34.0 | | | 39.0 | | | 86.2 | | | |
| Panama | 1970 | 40 1 | 31.6 | 40.7 | 37.9 | 52.7 | 9.4 | 1.3 | 16.1 | 82.6 | | |
| Puerto Rico | | | | 28.3 | /4.0 | 23.1 | 2.9 | 6.6 | 40.1 | 53.3 | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | 1 | | | | | ! | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 1976 | 14.5 | 6.B | 78.7 | 34.4 | 12.2 | 53.4 | 0 9 | | 96 1 | | |
| Brazil | 1970 | 26.9 | 33.3 | 39.7 | 45.1 | 40.9 | 14.0 | 2.1 | 22.8 | 75 1 | | |
| Colombia | 1973 | 57.6 | 10.5 | 31.9 | 82.2 | 9.4 | 8.4 | 123 | 12.0 | 75.0 | | |
| Ecuador | 1974 | 28.1 | 9.9 | 62.0 | 64.4 | 15.8 | 19.8 | 3.2 | 59 | 90.9 | | |
| Paraguay | 1972 | 14.3 | 79.4 | 6.2 | 33.6 | 63.9 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 89.9 | 90.9 | | |
| Peru | 1972 | 22.2 | 4.8 | 73.0 | 38.6 | 7.7 | 53.7 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.0 | | |
| Venczuela | 1971 | 53.5 | 23.9 | 22.6 | | | | | | | | |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1260 | 61.5 | 75.2 | 12.2 | 77.0 | | | | ļ | | | |
| Chile | 1970 | 51.5 | 45 7 | 13.3 | /3.0 | 19-3 | 6.9 | 21.1 | 44.7 | 34.2 | | |
| Uruguay | 1975 | 43.8 | 49.7 | 4.4 | 04.5 | 35.2 | 0.3 | 8.1 | 81.2 | 10.7 | | |
| | 1,1,1,1 | 43.0 | 40.3 | 1.9 | 25.4 | 67.4 | 7.3 | 0.9 | 74.7 | 24.5 | | |

Table H-3. Type of Sanitary Facilities in Living Quarters: Latin American Countries (Percent of Households with Specified Facilities).

SOURCES: United Nations, Economic Commission on Latin America, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1983.

(d) Sanitary facilities are seriously deficient in both urban and rural areas. Less than one-half of the homes have water closets, even in urban areas (except Panama, Cuba, and El Salvador). Latrines, which are a health hazard in cities, or no facilities at all, are used to dispose of much human waste in cities. In rural areas, water closets are almost non-existent, and latrines are rare (except in Mexico and Cuba). As much as 80 percent of the human waste in rural areas of Centra! America is disposed of without sanitary facilities.

The housing situation in urban areas and environs of Central America has been described in a recent report as follows,

The provisions of... housing has lagged far behind population growth. Overcrowded, deteriorating rooming houses in central cities, squatter settlements on precarious riverbanks close to central cities, illegal subdivisions in outlying areas and makeshift semi-rural settlements on the margins of the urban periphery bear testimony to urbanization fueled by demographic and economic forces....*

Haechel and collaborators estimated that in five key Central American nations from 60 to 90 percent of all housing is inadequate even for minimal comfort and health. They classified housing units into two categories:

(a) Not capable of upgrading, fit only to be replaced;

(b) Capable of upgrading, including addition of basic facilities of water, sanitary disposal, electricity.

A summary of their findings is contained in Table H-4.

Rural housing. Thirty to fifty percent of rural housing is basically deficient and

needs to be totally replaced (constructed of inadequate materials, deteriorated conditions, insuffient ventilation and facilities for cooking). Moreover, a high percentage of units that do have minimally adequate construction are without even basic waste disposal facilities. Many rural folk do not own the land on which their dwelling is located, or the dwelling itself, and must rely on the owner to provide amenities. Throughout the rural areas, income is so low that there is very little money to invest in shelter, even if it is owried. Overall, in Central America at least one-third of rural housing units need to be destroyed and replaced and an additional one-half need to undergo major upgrading.

Urban housing. The standards for adequate housing in urban places are only slightly better than that in rural areas. About one-fourth of all housing units are too deficient for upgrading, and an additional 30 to 50 percent lack plumbing and toilet facilities essential for congested living and other needed improvements.

Population growth demands that the housing supply be increased at the rate of 2.5 to 3.0 percent per year merely to provide housing to families newly formed. In order to remedy the present deplorable housing situation two things should occur:

(a) The construction of more inadequate housing should be prevented,

(b) Each year a portion of the inadequate housing should be replaced with adequate housing.

Accomplishing the first goal, under conditions of present rapid growth, is extremely difficult in view of the many other development needs of these nations and the low incomes of a majority of the people. Achiev-

*Haechel, Bernard et al. Basic Shelter Needs in Central America, 1980-2000. Washington, DC: Dffice of Housing, Agency for International Development, 1980.

| Area and indicator | Costs Rica | El Sal- vador | Gua- temala | Hon- đuras | Nica- ragua |
|----------------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Urban | | | | | |
| Units not capable of up- | | | | | |
| grading | 7.3 | 32.2 | 20.6 | 22,8 | 21.4 |
| Other units without flush | | | | | |
| toilet | 57.0 | 30.9 | 50.3 | 47.7 | 44.2 |
| Total | 64.0 | 63.0 | 71.0 · | 71.0 | 66.0 |
| Rural | | | | | |
| Units not capable of up- | | | | | |
| grading | 54.0 | 34.8 | 39.1 | 29.5 | 37.4 |
| Units without waste dispo- | | | | | |
| sal facilities | 9.0 | 48.6 | 47.8 | 60.8 | 43.8 |
| Total inadequate units | 64.0 | 83.0 | 87.0 | 90.0 | 81.0 |

Table H-4. Indicators of Inadequate Housing in Five Nations of Central America: 1975.

Source: Haeche', Bernard et al. <u>Basic Shelter Needs in Central America, 1980-</u> 2000. Washington, DC: Office of Housing, Agency for International Development, 1980.

ing the second, as an additional effort added to population growth, makes the goal of offering minimally adequate housing to all extremely difficult to attain.

Haechel and his collaborators estimated the necessary costs of constructing a minimally adequate house with basic facilities in urban and rural areas (in terms of U.S. dollars). Their estimates are between \$5,000 and \$7,000 per unit.

If the per capita income in a nation is \$800, the income of an average family of four persons would be about \$3,200. Thus, the average cost of a house to an average family would be the equivalent of about two years' income. If the housing estimates and income estimates are even approximately correct, the rates between the cost of housing and family income in Central America is not too dissimilar from that of industrialized nations, where the value for an owner-occupied house normally may vary between 2 to 7 times annual family income. This leads Haechel et al. to conclude: Adequate and acceptable shelter solutions can be provided in most developing countries, for all except perhaps the lowest 10% of the income distribution, at a cost not exceeding the share of income that poorer households normally spend on shelter services. Conversely, lower income groups can and are willing to spend a sufficient portion of their limited income for secure and sanitary shelter and income is rarely the paramount constraint in the orovision of adequate shelter. Given this experience and aware of the lack of resources and political will in most countries for subsidizing shelter programs for a large share of the lower income population, programs for meeting basic shelter needs should be self-supporting.

Since, based on these assumptions the effective demand for shelter is adequate to meet the basic needs of all but the poorest of the poor, the widespread lack of acceptable shelter in developing countries can only be explained by the failure of the supply system. Institutional constraints on the supply of land, public services and financing as well as excessively high standards have driven the cost of adequate shelter beyond the reach of a large share of the population.*

One qualification which the analysis of Haechel et al. overlooks is the large public
service expenditure which would be required to provide minimally adequate housing. Streets, water mains, sewers, electric power lines, police protection, fire protection, and other community services which now are minimally available to squatter settlements must be supplied. These expenditures must be taken from government revenues, badly needed for schools, health, industrial development, and other economic and social development needs.

Rapid population growth is placing demands on governments to expand rapidly in so many sectors simultaneously that a "path of least resistance" is to permit rural people to continue to live in substandard housing and build more as they need it, and to permit the ring of squatters' huts at the peripheries of the cities to accumulate--postponing to the future the task of trying to deal comprehensively with the housing problems. Meanwhile, the construction industry, with limited capital and facilities for mortgage credit, has other more remunerative outlets for its limited capital and facilities than to construct homes for the poor at low profit prices.

Bringing housing up to a minimum standard of safety for health, density, and essential facilities requires tremendous investments and major programs. Rapid population growth is making the task far more difficult. Each year, larger and larger amounts of substandard housing are built to house a burgeoning population living in poverty. By slowing population growth, accompanied by special national programs to increase the supply of housing, the goal of better, minimally adequate homes for all might be achieved by the end of this century or in the first decades of the next. Part II. National Economic Development

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National Economic Development

Throughout Central America, few if any public issues are more discussed by government officials and the public at large than "economic development." A less developed country (LDC) is one in which a majority of the citizens are unable to obtain a minimally adequate level of living. The average household is poor, both by national and international standards, and a substantial fraction (20 percent or more) are desperately poor. The citizens of these countries have strong expectations that their business and governmental leaders will correct this situation and develop an improved economy incorporating modern technology which will permit them to earn at least a minimum livelihood that will at least meet their minimum needs. Central America is n midstream in the transition from being less developed to becoming more developed countries (MDC). The materials pre-

sented in earlier chapters (education, health, nutrition, housing) show considerable progress but much nation-to-nation variation. This chapter attempts to measure the economic status of the region in monetary terms and discuss the prospects for completing the transition to the desired state of development. This analysis will show that population growth is centrally involved in this transition, and should be taken into acccunt in all efforts to speed up the economic development process.

One of the most consistent correlations that demographers have uncovered is the inverse relationship that exists between economic development and population growth rates. This relationship is so strong and consistent that it could almost be said to be a "natural law" of modern demography:*

^{*}The only outstanding exception to this relationship are the nations with large exports of petroleum. In these countries, the generosity of nature and a small technological work force is able to generate huge revenues which the citizens as a whole do not earn, in the conventional sense, but which is earned for them.

- (a) Wealthy nations have low growth rates, based on low fertility.
- (b) Poor nations have high growth rates, based on high fertility.

The United Nations, which maintains the official classification between LDCs and MDCs, reports the following growth rates and fertility rates for the two groups of countries. Data for Central America are repeated for comparison with other LDCs. "cause" economic development, rapid population growth in Central America places handicaps and impediments on development in so many different ways that full economic development cannot be achieved there unless population growth rates decline concurrently or beforehand. The clear implication is that any developing nation in Central America which succeeds in slowing down population growth to more moderate rates will establish preconditions which will make other direct efforts at de-

| | Nore developed countries | Less developed countries | Ratio LDC to MDC | Central American |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| Annual average | · ···· | | | |
| growth rate: | | | | |
| 1950-55 | 1.28 | 1.99 | 1.55 | 3.04 |
| 1960-65 | 1.19 | 2,33 | 1.95 | 1 22 |
| 1965-70 | 0.87 | 2.38 | 2.73 | 3.23 |
| 1970-75 | 0.84 | 2.32 | 2.76 | 3.15 |
| 1975-80 | 0.71 | 2.08 | 2.93 | 2.98 |
| Totsi fertility | | | | |
| rate: | | | | |
| 1950-55 | 2.84 | 6.10 | 2.14 | 6 77 |
| 1960-65 | 2.56 | 5.81 | 2 27 | 6.47 |
| 1965-70 | 2.28 | 5.59 | 2.27 | 6 96 |
| 1970-75 | 2.19 | 5.22 | 2.40 | 0.24 |
| 1975-80 | 2.05 | 4.64 | 2.26 | 5.47 |

[Source: United Nations, Demographic Indicators of Countries, 1982.]

The growth rate of LDCs has been nearly three times, and those of Central America about four times, those of the MDCs between 1970 and 1980. Fertility rates in the LDCs have been 2¼ times and those of Central America more than 2½ times those of the MDCs during the same period. Few social and economic indicators separate the LDC and the MDC nations more cleanly than this differential in population growth and fertility.

Much theoretical and academic controversy has taken place concerning the interpretation to be placed upon this "demographic gap" between rich and poor countries. Does low fertility "cause" the economic development or does economic development "cause" the low fertility? The theme of this chapter is that ulthough slow population growth alone cannot velopment more effective. Equally unambiguous is the implication that nations where population growth rates do not slow down will have great difficulty in closing the gap between themselves and the MDC nations.

Population growth and per capita wealth

One much-used indicator of the level of economic development of nations is the per capita gross domestic product (PCGDP). This is the value of all goods and services produced by the economy of the nation during a calendar year divided by the population of the country. On the one hand it is a crude measure of the productivity of the work force and on the other hand it is a crude measure of average income. It suffers in that it fails to reveal anything about the distribution of income. Since it is an approximate statistic that can be computed for almost every country, it is widely accepted as an approximate measure of economic development or national level of living. Statistics for PCGDP are reported for the nations of Latin America in Table EC-1, expressed in U.S. dollars as of 1980. Equivalent statistics, adjusted for inflation, are provided for 1960 and 1970 to permit the measurement of change. The table also provides statistics of fertility. Figure EC-1 graphs the total fertility rate against PCGDP. The graph and the table reveal the following information:

- (a) There is wide variation among the nations in per capita GDP, ranging from \$271 in Haiti to \$2,615 in Venezuela. In comparison with the other less developed nations, most of the nations of Central America (especially Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Panama) tend to fall in an intermediate position between the very poor nations of Africa and Asia and the industrialized nations of Europe and North America. Thus, like most Latin American nations, the nations of this region are approaching the threshold of minimum development to cease being classified as "underdeveloped." Government plans and policies are aimed at closing this gap. It is foolish to talk of population problems in the economic development of Central America in terms of famine, starvation, and disaster. Instead, it should be analyzed in terms of the extent to which population factors favor or impede the closing of the gap petween the Latin American nations and the already industrialized nations.
- (b) There is a significant but moderate negative correlation between the level of fertility and the per capita gross domestic product: the higher the fertility, the poorer the nation tends to be.
- (c) There is also a small but low negative correlation between the amount of

change in PCGDP between 1980 and 1980 and the total fertility rate in 1975-80. Countries with lower fertility tended to have more growth in PCGDP than did countries with high fertility. However, the differences are great. On the one hand, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua and several high fertility nations grew by less than average amounts. On the other hand, countries like Mexico and Brazil managed to grow very rapidly despite comparatively high fertility. Some nations with lower birth rates also had comparatively stagnant economies; Argentina is an example.

Hence, it is clear that although high fertility may be a factor, a great number of other factors enter into the equation to determine how fast the economy of a nation grows, even on a per capita basis. Among these factors is the quality of natural resources, and especially those that can be exported in the international market as well as consumed internally. Other factors are the quantity and quality of arable lands, rainfall, altitude, slope, and other factors that affect agricultural production. Table EC-2 shows the source of CDP in the various nations. Seven nations derive 5 percent or more of their GDP from mining or petroleum extraction:

| Dominican | Re | pu | bli | c | | • | • | • | gold, bauxite |
|-----------|----|----|-----|---|---|----|---|---|-------------------|
| Mexico . | | | | | | | | | petroleum, |
| | | | | | | | | | copper, silver, |
| | | | | | | | • | | lead, zinc, |
| | | | | | | | | | others |
| Bolivia | | | | | | ۰. | | • | tin, tungsten |
| Ecuador . | | | • | | | • | | • | petroleum |
| Peru | | | | • | • | | | | iron ore, copper, |
| | | | | | | | | | silver, lead, |
| | | | | | | | | | petroleum |
| Venezuela | | | | • | | | | | petroleum, |
| | | | | | | | | | iron ore |
| Chile | | • | | | | | | • | copper |

Except for Chile, these tend to be high fertility nations, whose GDP relies substantial-

| | Fer capita CDP | | | | | Change in GDF per capita | | | | | |
|-------------------------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|--------------------------|---------|---------|------|--|--|
| Region and country | 1960 | 1970 | 1980 | 1981 | 1960-70 | 1970-80 | 196080 | 1980-81 | rate | | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 838.1 | 1,150.1 | 1,535.9 | 1,446.1 | 312.0 | 385.8 | 697.8 | -89.8 | 3.57 | | |
| Cuba | | | | | | | | | 2.16 | | |
| Dominican Republic | 513.0 | 673.0 | 1,033.6 | 1,043.9 | 160.0 | .360.6 | 520.6 | 10.3 | 5.00 | | |
| El Salvador | 529.6 | 681.7 | 688.2 | 604.7 | 152.1 | 6.5 | 158.6 | -83.5 | 6.01 | | |
| Guatemala | 728.2 | 927.6 | 1,205.1 | 1,182.8 | 199.4 | 277.5 | 476.9 | -22.3 | 5.68 | | |
| Haiti | 234.0 | 213.6 | 274.3 | 270.9 | -20.4 | 60.7 | 40.3 | -3.4 | 5.92 | | |
| Honduras | 469.5 | 570.6 | 634.0 | 616.3 | 101.1 | 63.4 | 164.5 | -17.7 | 7.14 | | |
| Mexico | 975.4 | 1,376.4 | 1,868.6 | 1,953.7 | 401 .0 | 492.2 | 893.2 | 85.1 | 5.40 | | |
| Nicaragua | 653.3 | 1,003.4 | 835.2 | 888.8 | 350.1 | -168.2 | 181.9 | 53.6 | 6.5/ | | |
| Panama | 892.2 | 1,564.3 | 1,958.4 | 1,982.7 | 672.1 | 394.1 | 1,055.2 | 24.3 | 4.12 | | |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | | 2.30 | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | Í | | |
| Bolivia | 382.5 | 477.0 | 568.5 | 549.9 | 94.5 | 91.5 | 186.0 | -18.6 | 6.39 | | |
| Brazil | 650.6 | 923.9 | 1,656 | 1,554.9 | 273.3 | 727.7 | 1,001.0 | -96.7 | 4.50 | | |
| Colombia | 478.7 | 646.8 | 921.8 | 925,9 | 168.1 | 275.0 | 443.1 | 3.1 | 4.31 | | |
| Ecuador | 507.2 | 645.2 | 1,0:0.1 | 1,053.2 | 138.0 | 394.9 | 532.9 | 13.1 | 6.29 | | |
| Paraguay | 525.6 | 637.8 | 1,145.5 | 1,205.0 | 112.2 | 507.7 | 619.9 | 59.5 | 5.20 | | |
| Peru | 910.4 | 1,142.0 | 1,271.3 | 1,294.0 | 231.6 | 129.3 | 360.9 | 22.7 | 5.49 | | |
| Venezuela | 1,779.5 | 2,295.6 | 2,658.0 | 2,615.2 | 516.1 | 362.4 | 878.5 | -42.8 | 4.74 | | |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 1,371.2 | 1,767.2 | 1,941.9 | 1,795.9 | 396.0 | 174.7 | 570.7 | -146.0 | 2.87 | | |
| Chile | 1,126.7 | 1,414.3 | 1,612.4 | 1,674.6 | 287.6 | 198.1 | 485.7 | 62.2 | 3.10 | | |
| Uruguay | 1.514.4 | 1.671.5 | 2.183.3 | 2,155.9 | 157.1 | 511.8 | 668.9 | -27.4 | 2.89 | | |

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Table EC-1. Per Capita Gross Domestic Product of Latin American Countries: 1960-81(In U.S. Dollars as of 1980).

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: World Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1982.





Source: Tables F-1 and EC-1.



Figure EC-2. Percent of Gross Domestic Product Derived from Agriculture and Mining Extraction.



| | | 7 | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|----------------|--|----------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Region and country | Agri- culture | Mining and quarrying | Manufac- turing | Con- struction | Util- ities | Trans- port and communi- cation | Commerce and finance | Housing | Defense and gov't services | Other services |
| Central America total . | 11.9 | 3.4 | 25.2 | 5.6 | 2.1 | 6.4 | 20.9 | 6.8 | 8.6 | 9.0 |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 19.3 | ^b | 18.0 | 6.5 | 2.3 | 6.8 | 16.5 | 13.8 | a | 16.7 |
| Сива | | | | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | 19.6 | 5.0 | 16.4 | 7.8 | 1.8 | 9.1 | 13.8 | 7.4 | a | 18,6 |
| El Salvador · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | 26.2 | 0.1 | 18.3 | 5.3 | 2.3 | 6.0 | 20.5 | 3.6 | a | 17.0 |
| Guatemala | 28.5 | 0.2 | 15.0 | 4.2 | 1.3 | 4.2 | 27.5 | 5.4 | a | 13.6 |
| Haiti | 43.8 | 1.3 | 12.0 | 4.5 | 1.8 | 2.9 | 12.1 | 8.5 | а | 12.9 |
| Honduras | 28.0 | 1.8 | 15.9 | 6.1 | 1.6 | 7.9 | 17.4 | 7.3 | a | 14.6 |
| Mexico | 9.5 | 4.9 | 24 7 | 5.9 | 1.8 | 3.4 | 26.7 | 6.1 | a | 16.3 |
| Nicaragua | 29.5 | 0.2 | 21.1 | 3.2 | 2.4 | 5.0 | 19.6 | 4.9 | ۵ | 15.0 |
| Panama | 18.5 | 0.2 | 11.6 | 4.9 | 3.0 | 9.9 | 13.4 | 7.0 | ····a | 30 1 |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | | | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia ····· | 16.9 | 6.1 | 15 7 | | 1 4 | | 17.6 | | а | |
| Brazil ····· | 7.5 | 0.8 | 29.6 | 6.0 | 1.0 | 11.4 | 17.6 | 8.ź | ···a | 18.7 |
| Colombia ····· | 26.0 | 0.5 | 19.7 | | 1.0 | 0.0 | 20.3 | | ···a | 24.5 |
| Ecuador | 24.0 | 6.6 | 21.2 | 5.5 | 1.0 | 9.3 | 19.4 | 5./ | ····a | 13.6 |
| Paraguay | 30.4 | 0.5 | 17.0 | 6.5 | 2.3 | 5.0 | 10.2 | 10.7 | ··· a | 15.1 |
| Peru | 14 7 | 9.9 | 21 2 | 0.5 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 20.3 | 3.0 | ···-a | 15.5 |
| Venenzuela | 6.5 | 9.7 | 12.9 | 8.2 | 2.3 | 13.9 | 11.1 | 4.5 | a | 42.6 |
| Temperate South America | | | | | | | | | | |
| Argentina | 13.3 | 2.0 | 29.3 | 6.4 | 2 9 | 0.5 | 12.6 | | ۵ | |
| Chile | 8.3 | 12.8 | 23.4 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 12.0 | 4.9 | ••• | 19.8 |
| Uruguay ····· | 10.4 | | 26.3 | 5.0 | 1.7 | 9.4 9.4 | 16.8 | a | a | 43.3 30.2 |

Table EC-2. Percent Distribution of Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity: Latin America, 1978.

NOTES: (... a) included in other services. (... b) included in manufacturing.

SOURCE: Economic Commission on Latin America, Series históricas de crecimiento de América Latina, Santiago, 1978, 1980.

ly on export of raw irreplaceable natural resources, rather than on internal manufacture From Table EC-2, it is clear that if GDP from agriculture and mining are combined to get a measure of the proportion of GDP derived from "exploitation of natural resources" and correlated with fertility, the relation is quite strongly negative, as Figure EC-2 shows.

Alternative growth and PCGDP

Still another way of measuring the impact of population growth upon economic development is to estimate what the per capita gross domestic product would have been in 1980 if each nation

had grown at the rate of 1.0 percent or 1.5 percent per year between 1960 and 1980, instead of the higher rate actually experienced. Table EC-3 reports such estimates. This is a valid computation because all but a small fraction of the babies born during this 20-year period were still too young in 1980 to have been in the labor force, and would have added little to the GDP. This computation "holds constant" country-to-country differences in resources and quality of labor force, and hence is a much more valid basis for estimating the impact of population growth than the tables and scattergram of Figures EC-1 and EC-2. From Table EC-3, one can learn that:

| Region and country | Estimated pop 1960 nopu- | | d popula- 980 under | 1980 | Estima capit in 1980 | ted per a per 0 under | Difference in per- cent growth of GNP under | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|--|-------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|--|
| | lation (000) | 17 growth (000) | 1% 1.5% rowth growth (000) (000) | | 1% pop- ulation growth | 1.5% pop- ulation growth | 17 pop- ulation growth | 1.5% pop- ulation growth | |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | |
| Costa Rica | 1,236 | 1,510 | 1,668 | 1,539 | 2,256 | 2,042 | 717 | 503 | |
| Cuba | | | | | | | | | |
| Dominican Republic | 3,258 | 3,979 | 4,398 | 958 | 1,433 | 1,296 | 475 | 338 | |
| El Salvador | 2,574 | 3,144 | 3,475 | 690 | 1,054 | 1 : 3 | 364 | 263 | |
| Guatemala | 3,966 | 4,844 | 5,354 | 1,161 | 1,741 | 1,575 | 580 | 414 | |
| Haiti | 3,723 | 4,547 | 5,026 | 236 | 302 | 273 | 66 | 37 | |
| Honduras | 1,942 | 2,372 | 2,611 | 636 | 990 | 696 | 354 | 260 | |
| Mexico | 36,881 | 45,046 | 49,784 | 1,873 | 2,900 | 2,624 | 1,027 | 751 | |
| Nicaragua | 1,472 | 1,798 | 1,987 | 740 | 1,125 | 1,018 | 385 | 278 | |
| Panama | 1,095 | 1,337 | 1,478 | 1,957 | 2,776 | 2,514 | 819 | 553 | |
| Puerto Rico | | | | | | · | | | |
| Tropical South America | | | | | | | | | |
| Bolivia | 3,428 | 41,87 | 4,627 | 572 | 760 | 688 | 188 | 116 | |
| Brazil | 71,513 | 87,346 | 96,533 | 1,601 | 2,242 | 2,029 | 641 | 428 | |
| Colombia | 15,538 | 18,978 | 20,974 | 935 | 1,271 | 1,150 | 336 | 215 | |
| Ecuador | 4,422 | 5,401 | 5,969 | 1,037 | 1,540 | 1,393 | 503 | 356 | |
| Paraguay | 1,778 | 2,172 | 2,400 | 1,116 | 1,671 | 1,512 | 626 | 366 | |
| Peru | 10,181 | 12,435 | 13,743 | 1,203 | 1,705 | 1,543 | 502 | 340 | |
| Venezuela | 7,550 | 9,222 | 10,191 | 2,373 | 4,019 | 3,637 | 1,646 | 1,264 | |
| • | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | |
| Temperate South America | 1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | |
| Argentina | 20,611 | 25,174 | 27,822 | 1,987 | 2,134 | 1,931 | 147 | -56 | |
| Chile | 7,585 | 9,264 | 10,239 | 1,591 | 1,907 | 1,725 | 316 | 134 | |
| Uruguay | 2,531 | 3,091 | 3,416 | 2,162 | 2,045 | 1,850 | -117 | -312 | |

Table EC-3, Per Capita Gross Domestic Product Under Two Assumptions of Population Growth.

NOTE: -- indicates data not available.

SOURCE: Gross domestic product from the Inter-America De lopment Bank. Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1982 Report (Washington, D.C.: IADB, 1982). Population figure. from United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries, 1982.

- (a) In most of the nations, if population had grown at a rate of 1.0 instead of the much faster rate, the per capita gross domestic product in 1980 would have been 50-65 percent higher than it actually was.
- (b) If population had grown at a rate of 1.5 percent per year, the PCGDP in most of the nations would have been 30-50 percent higher than it actually was.
- (c) Under either the 1.0 or the 1.5 percent assumptions, some of the nations of Latin America would now be approaching the level of development of Europe, and would definitely be passing out of the "underdeveloped" state into the "developed" category.
- (d) The conclusion is almost inescapable that one of the reasons the following nations are still in the low per capita PCGDP category is their high rate of population growth caused by continuing high fertility:

| El Salvador | Nicaragua |
|-------------|-----------|
| Guatemala | Honduras |
| Dominican R | epublic |

Income distribution and population growth

In nearly all nations of the world, incomes are not distributed equally; some individuals and families get more money than others because of differences in occupation, skill, fame, power, ownership of property or other advantages. That the unevenness of income distribution is greater in Central America (and in other less developed countries) than it is in industrialized nations of Europe and North America is well known, and its causes and consequences are much discussed. Table EC-4 reports estimated income distribution data for eight nations of Latin America. (This table also reports per capita GDP data for 1981 to supplement Table EC-1.) Table EC-5 reports estimates of the per capita income of each income decile of the population for five nations of Central America. Together these two tables permit a general assessment of income distribution in Central America.

- (a) The poorest 20 percent of the population is very poor; it receives only
 3 percent of the income, and has per capita incomes almost unbelievably low.
- (b) The range of inequality is extremely great. A crude measure of inequality is the ratio of the per capita income in the first decile of the rural population to the per capita income of the tenth decile of the metropolitan population. For five nations of Central America as of 1975 these ratios were as follows:

| | Ratio |
|-------------|--------|
| Costa Rica | . 31.3 |
| El Salvador | 48.8 |
| Guatemala | . 89.3 |
| Honduras | 92,1 |
| Nicaragua | 39.0 |

Thus, in these nations, the wealthiest 10 percent of the metropolitan population received incomes between 30 and 90 times those of the poorest decile of the rural population. Within the rural and urban areas, the wealthiest decile received incomes 10 times or more those of the poorest decile.

Social scientists have pointed out a number of implications which poverty and unequal income distributions have for economic development.

(a) The poor must spend almost all of their small incomes on basic survival needs (food, shelter, clothing) and have practically no purchasing power to consume other goods produced by the modernizing cconomy.

| - <u>-</u> | | | Gross domestic product per capita | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|--|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--|--------------------------|---|---|
| Region and country | Year | Lowest 20 percent | Second quintile | Third quintile | Fourth quintile | Highest 20 percent | Highest 10 percent | 1981 dollarв | Average annual percent growth 1960-81 |
| Central America/other | | | | | | | | | |
| Belize | 1971 1977 1977 1972 1972 1970 1970 1970 1970 | 3.3 | 8.7 | | | 54.8 57.7 61.8 66.6 61.0 54.0 50.3 51.4 | 39.5 | 1,430 1,260 650 1,440 300 600 2,250 860 1,910 600 2,200 1,380 1,180 1,180 1,170 4,220 2,560 2,560 2,870 | 3.0 3.3 6.5 2.6 0.5 1.1 3.8 0.6 3.1 1.9 5.1 3.2 4.3 3.5 1.0 2.4 1.9 0.7 1.6 |
| Argentina Chile Uruguay | 1970 1968 | 4.4 4.4 | 9.7 9.0 | 14.1 13.8 | 21.5 21.4 | 50.3 51.4 | 35.2 34.8 | 2,560 2,560 2,820 | 1.9 0.7 1.6 |

Table EC-4. Per Capita Gross Domestic Product, 1981, and Indicators of Income Distribution for Selected Latin American Countries.

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983.

| Table EC-5. Estimated Per Capita Incove by D Countries, by Residence: 1980. | Deciles in Five Central American |
|--|----------------------------------|
| | |

| Area and decile | Costa Rica | El Sal- vador | Gua- temala | Hon- duras | Nica- ragua |
|-----------------------|---------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|--|
| Rural | Τ | | |] | ************************************** |
| First decile | 1 114 | 109 | 70 | 6.7 | ar |
| Second decile | 459 | 186 | 07 | 52 | 63 |
| Third decile | 571 | 226 | 126 | 03 | 149 |
| Fourth decile | 681 | 271 | 152 | | 10/ |
| Fifth decile | 886 | 310 | 179 | 122 | 234 |
| Sixth decile | 941 | 360 | 208 | 152 | 2/5 |
| Seventh decile | 1.11 | 416 | 200 | 106 | 1 319 |
| Eighth decile | 1.377 | 473 | 415 | 257 | 100 |
| Ninth decile | 1.769 | 582 | 553 | 178 | 500 |
| Tenth decile | 3,147 | 1 099 | 854 | 962 | 109 |
| Nonmetropolitan urban | | | | | |
| First decile | 523 | 204 | 451 | 123 | 214 |
| Second decile | 886 | 351 | 605 | 200 | 273 |
| Third decile | 1.091 | 384 | 760 | 321 | 401 |
| Fourth decile | 1,395 | 539 | 929 | 415 | 487 |
| Fifth decile | 1,500 | 629 | 1.084 | 510 | 623 |
| Sixth decile | 1.863 | 719 | 1.267 | 652 | 649 |
| Seventh decile | 2,182 | 964 | 1.492 | 704 | 777 |
| Eighth decile | 2,841 | 1,095 | 1.838 | 1.124 | 974 |
| Winth decile | 3,909 | 1,275 | 2.225 | 1.539 | 1.255 |
| Centh decile | 6,636 | 2,011 | 3,436 | 3,768 | 2,887 |
| fetropolitan | | | | | |
| first decile | 597 | 354 | 468 | 220 | 225 |
| econd decile | 909 | 546 | 766 | 366 | 768 |
| hird decile | 1,193 | 830 | 915 | 463 | 677 |
| ourth decile | 1,478 | 938 | 1.128 | 561 | 512 |
| lfth decile | 1,819 | 1,107 | 1,383 | 683 | 568 |
| ixth decile | 2,168 | 1.415 | 1.766 | 854 | 616 |
| eventh decile | 2,671 | 1 522 | 2,170 | 1.049 | 711 |
| ighth decile | 3,296 | 1,614 | 2,660 | 1.366 | 1.100 |
| inth decile | 4,461 | 2,243 | 3,766 | 1.927 | 1.650 |
| | 1 0 000 | 1 | · · | , | - • • • • • • |

Source: Haechel, Bernard et al. <u>Basic Shelter Needs in Central America, 1980-</u> 2000. Washington, DC: Office of Housing, Agency for International Development, 1980.

- (b) The poor can save very little money to help accumulate capital for economic development.
- (c) The poor cannot be taxed very much to help with the capital expenditures which the government must make in order to stimulate economic development.
- (d) Poverty is prevalent in both rural and urban areas, but is far worse in rural areas. If a per capita GDP of \$600 is accepted as the poverty line, then 90 percent or more of the rural population of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua were below that line in 1975, whereas only 50 percent or less of the urban and metropolitan population fell below it. This explains why there is such massive exodus from rural to urban areas, even when hopes for adequate urban employment are dim.
- (e) The "poorest of the poor" tend to become discontented with their lot in life, and to be potential recruits for radical political movements.

High fertility is an important contributing factor in causing unequal distribution of income and in perpetuating it. Previous chapters have established that fertility rates are much higher in rural than in urban areas throughout Central America and that fertility rates among the illiterate and less educated are much higher than among the population with secondary or university education. These fertility differences affect income distribution in two ways:

 (a) Poverty and wealth tends to be transmitted from generation to generation. Because the poorest levels of population are growing at a rate double that of the wealthy, fertility is causing an extremely rapid expansion of this poorest segment and thereby worsening the income distribution situation.

(b) The very small incomes which rural and low income urban earners receive must be shared among a larger number of family dependents, resulting in even less income available for each. This constraint makes it difficult for the family to improve its housing, save money, or afford modern goods.

The combined effect of these two demographic processes is to perpetuate income inequality, independently of whatever economic efforts are being made to equalize it. With this in view, it would appear that the best strategy for lessening the inequality of income distribution would be to make special efforts to increase the flow of income to the "poorest of the poor" simultaneously with a program to encourage a decrease in family size among the lower income groups (both rural and urban). This would help the poor to have the advantages of declining fertility already being enjoyed by the wealthy.

National finance and population growth

Economic development requires the construction of additional modern factories and facilities that make use of modern technology in both the agricultural and industrial sectors.

Acquisition of the machinery, equipment, and raw materials required for these innovations requires foreign exchange for overseas purchases and investments at home to establish them. The government must obtain the foreign exchange by an excess of exports over imports, by investments from abroad, from loans, or from gifts and grants from industrialized nations. Rapid population growth has the tendency to counteract and neutralize these national financial efforts.

(a) Population has expanded faster than

agricultural production, forcing the government to spend foreign exchange for the purchase of basic foods needed to prevent a national food crisis.

- (b) Population growth tends to increase the volume of imports of basic or essential consumer goods not produced in the country,
- (c) Rapid population growth makes it difficult to develop the skilled, professional and managerial work force required to diversify the economy and make use of modern technology so efficiently that it will enable the nations to compete in world markets.
- (d) The products of new industries and diversified production can find only a limited market within the home country if purchasing power is low and concentrated in a small fraction of the population.
- (e) Rapid population growth forces the government to spend more of its revenues on education, health care, public facilities, and special welfare programs which otherwise could be invested in economic expansion.

Thus, in international finance, rapid population growth tends to upset the balance of trade for the nation, forcing consumer imports to compete for scarce foreign exchange with capital production goods needed for economic development. In national finance, rapid population growth tends to consume tax and other revenues by compelling them to be spent for expanding public services to a growing populace which otherwise could be used for development. As a consequence, the ability of the government to support new ventures in economic development is drained off by forced expenditures to meet the basic needs of the population. When the population is growing at the rate of 3.0 percent per year, this drain is very heavy.

Economic recession and population growth

Since the onset of World War II until 1980, the closs domestic product of most nations of Central America grew at rates in excess of 5 percent per year. Under these circustances, a population growth rate of 2.5 to 3.0 percent did not seem disastrous, because the excess of economic growth over population growth permitted about 2 percent per year improvement in the national economic situation.

However, this 30-40 year surge of economic growth (which suffered severe fluctuations in some Central American countries during this time) came to an abrupt end in 1980, with the onset of world recession.

Instead of increasing at the rate of 5 percent or more, the gross domestic product grew by only 2 percent or even less (becoming negative in some countries). The data for 1981 may be compared with the record for earlier years in Table EC-1. The world recession did not affect population growth appreciably, however, and governments have been forced to increase their expenditures for population-related services despite the sharp decrease in revenues. The result has been a deterioration in the per capita gross national product and a contribution to the acute financial crises for governments. Although population growth is only one of many elements in this situation, it is not a negligible one. The prospect of continued rapid population growth is an important consideration in plans for dealing with the future. This leads to the principle: A given rate of economic stagnation in a nation with a low rate of population growth has a less negative impact than the same rate of stagnation in a nation with high population growth rates, other factors being equal. Recovery from protonged recession is more difficult and prolonged for a nation with high population growth rates than for one with low growth rates. This principle applies directly to the hopes of Central American countries, to recover

from the effects upon their economies of the world economic recession.

Conclusion

These findings contain the basis for an inference that the efforts of individual nations of Central America at closing the gap between themselves and the more developed nations of the world will continue to be thwarted in proportion to the level of their birth rates. The small fertility declines now underway are very possibly providing as much benefit to this campaign to raise levels of living as much of the international loans being incurred for this purpose. A combination of investing in

- (a) industrial growth and development and
- (b) fertility reduction

is plausibly the most economical and quickest strategy for "closing the gap" between the rich and poor nations in the Americas.



Part III. Family Planning and Socioeconomic Development

Family Planning and Socioeconomic Development

Throughout this report, there has been frequent mention of the beneficial effects that a slower rate of growth of the population would have over numerous aspects of social and economic development in the nations of Central America. This analysis has demonstrated that a slower rate of growth can be achieved only by a reduction in the fertility rates, which have remained high while mortality has plummeted to levels approaching those of the developed countries. This reduction in fertility could take place if more married couples were to decide to have three or four children instead of six as at present. The most socially acceptable way to achieve this would be by means of "family planning," or the use of contraceptive methods (natural, chemical, or mechanical) to plan how many children to have and when to have them.

It is essential, therefore, to conclude this report by presenting information concern-

ing family planning as it now is being practiced in the region to reveal the desires and intentions of the public with respect to the use of family planning methods in the future.

Awareness of contraceptive methods

It can be said with confidence that almost every adult (especially women) in Central America (as in all of Latin America) knows that contraception is possible and can name at least one or two modern, reliable methods. Moreover, there is almost universal awareness of the oral pill, injections, and female sterilization, the mostused methods to plan family size, and very high awareness of the intrauterine device (also a very popular method). Table FP-1 summarizes information derived from reports of the World Fertility Survey and contraceptive practice surveys. If it is accepted that Honduras represents the nation where the level of information is lowest (excepting Haiti), due to its high fertility, low literacy, and rural concentration in comparison with other regional countries, it must be inferred that in every nation of the area the principle of family planning is widely known and that most adult women know of more than one of the modern reliable methods. Moreover, because of continuing publicity about the topic, it can also be safely inferred that the level of knowledge will continue to rise steadily.

Motivation for family planning

Awareness of contraception, in itself, cannot promote adoption of family planning unless the public can perceive some benefit or advantage to its use. An indica-

tor of the public acceptance and approval of the principle of family planning is provided by a question, "Do you wish to have any more children?" Young women with 0, 1, or 2 children tend to respond over whelmingly "yes" to this question, but numerous surveys show that as the size of the family increases, the tendency to respond "no" increases rapidly. Table FP-2 summarizes some information on this point for several Central American countries. More than one-half of all fecund married women who have born three children claim they do not wish to have any more. The proportion expressing this wish rises with increasing family size until it attains 90 percent at family size 8 or 9. This pattern is very consistent in all countries surveyed, with only relatively minor country-to-country variation. The data for Honduras are evidence that even in nations with the

Table FP-1. Percent of Ever-Married Women Aged 15-49 Reporting Knowledge of Contraception, by Method: Selected Countries of Latin America, 1982.

| Country | Any method | Oral pill | Injec- tion | Condom | Female steri- lization | Rhythm | 1170 | Male steri- lization |
|--|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Costa Rica Dominican Republic Honduras Mexico Panama Peru | 100 98 91 90 99 82 | 98 91 88 83 95 63 | 88 68 65 68 26 61 | 91 72 35 42 76 40 | 94 95 77 68 93 60 | 81 43 25 48 66 55 | 91 78 63 75 89 42 | 67 30 18 38 65 19 |

SOURCE: World Fertility Survey, except Honduras, which is derived from a Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (Westinghouse Health Systems, 1982).

 Table FP-2. Percent of Currently Married Fecund Women Who Want No More Children, by Number of Living Children: Selected Countries of Latin America, 1980-82.

| the second se |
|---|
| |

| Count ry | Sumber of living children | | | | | | |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | 3 | 4 | 5 | b | 7 | 8 | 9+ |
| Costa Rica Colombia Dominican Republic Honduras | 58,9 64,5 61,8 72 | 68,4 79,0 69,6 81 | 74.5 78.2 78.1 83 | 77.8 85.1 73.6 | 77.3 92.5 75.0 | 86,7 89,1 83,6 | 85.0 90.1 78.3 |
| Mexico., Panama Panama Peru | 53.5 72.6 62.1 | 69.4 81.7 74.2 | 77.2 85.1 80.1 | 81.6 86.7 80.7 | 86,3 96,1 87,2 | 89.0 86.6 38.1 | 91.1 88.6 94.7 |

SOURCE: World Fertility Survey, except Honduras, which is derived from a Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (Westinghouse Health Systems, 1982).

highest fertility there seems to be very great desire to have fewer children than are actually being born.

On the basis of this overwheln ing multinational data, it is clearly evident that there is little public resistance to the idea of contraception. It is difficult not to conclude that a large majority of the public is positively motivated and that it believes family planning can be beneficial.

Use of contraception

In view of the highly positive results specified above-almost universal knowledge of contraception, and widespread desire for no more children after having borne a third or fourth child-one would expect a reasonably high prevalence of family planning throughout Central America. This is the case in at least two countries that have been shown to have low fertility-Costa Rica and Panama (Table FP-3). In the countries with high fertility (such as Honduras), the prevalence is much lower, but still is impressively high when one considers the low level of literacy, the poverty, and the fact that there is little organized family planning service as a part of the public health system.

From these surveys, it is known that:

- (a) Practice of contraception is much higher in urban than in rural areas.
- (b) Practice of contraception is much higher among women with a primary education or higher than among illiterate women or with incomplete primary education.
 When one-third or more of the currently married women are using family planning

and a majority want no more children, the fact must be recognized that contraception is now a part of the normal culture and family life of Central America. It is no longer an "innovative" idea—it is a socially approved customary action.

Intention to use in the future

Additional evidence of the attitude of the public toward contraception is provided by responses to a question asked in Honduras of all women who were not currently using a contraceptive method: "Do you intend to use contraception at some time in the future?" The responses were as follows:

| Response | Total | Urban | Rural |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Yes, will use | 47.5 | 57.7 | 43.9 |
| Not sure, don't know | 12.8 | 7.5 | 14.8 |
| No, will not use | 39.5 | 34.8 | 41.3 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100,0 | 100.0 |

Table FP-3. Percent of Currently Married Fecund Women Who Are Using an Efficient Method of Contraception, 1980-82, by Number of Living Children: Selected Nations of Latin America.

| | | Number of living children | | | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|---------------------------|----|----|----|----|----|--|
| Country | Total | None | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5+ | |
| Costa Rica | 73 | 41 | 77 | 81 | 78 | 77 | 69 | |
| Colombia | 47 | 24 | 44 | 54 | 54 | 53 | 46 | |
| Dominican Republic | 37 | 14 | 28 | 45 | 46 | 49 | 39 | |
| londuras | | 2 | 24 | 29 | 35 | 28 | 27 | |
| lexico | 35 | 13 | 33 | 45 | 43 | 39 | 34 | |
| anama | 63 | 37 | 60 | 69 | 70 | 70 | 59 | |
| eru | 23 | 9 | 17 | 30 | 30 | 25 | 20 | |

SOURCE: World Fertility Survey, except Honduras, which is derived from a Contraceptive Prevalence Survey (Westinghouse Health Systems, 1982).

| lable FP-4. | Married Women Who Are Familiar With But Do Not Use a Contraceptive |
|-------------|---|
| | Method: Reasons for Nonuse by Intention to Use in the Future: Honduras. |

| | Inte | | | |
|--------------------------------|------|------------|---------------|-------|
| Reasons for hot using | Use | Not use | Don't know | Total |
| Temporary | 47 | 11 | 19 | 30 |
| Pregnant | 26 | 6 | 12 | 16 |
| Breastfeeding | 19 | 4 | 6 | 12 |
| Separated from spouse | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Physiological/health | 5 | 20 | .6 | 12 |
| Menopause | 2 | 18 | 4 | 9 |
| Illness/medical recommendation | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Cultural/moral | 16 | 16 | 27 | 22 |
| Wants to have children | 12 | 1 13 | 11 | 13 |
| Religion does not permit | 0 | 10 | 2 | |
| Spouse does not permit | 4 | 3 | 9 | 4 |
| Psychological | 27 | 38 | 44 | 11 |
| Does not like/is apprehensive | 14 | 25 | 24 | 19 |
| Does not have information | 13 | 13 | 20 | 14 |
| Other reasons | 4 | 4 | | 4 |
| Cost | ż | | | 2 |
| Other | ī | 4 | 2 | 2 |

SOURCE: Westinghouse Health Systems. <u>Contraceptive Prevalence</u> Survey: Honduras, 1982.

Thus, those not already making use of a method are not doing so out of firm resistance in most cases. When asked why they were not using a method, women in Honduras responded according to the pattern show in Table FP-4. Firm resistance would be indicated by cultural and moral reasons, which constituted only 16 percent of the "do not intend to use" group. Of far more importance were the psychological reasons, such as lack of information and unfounded fear of the effects upon health of the methods. Lack of access to services and prohibitive costs when prescribed by private physicians are other reasons commonly supposed to explain the considerable gap between intention to use and actual use.

The family planning movement in Central America*

The high level of awareness of the population problem, the universal familiarity with contraceptive methods, and the strong motivation of the public of all socioeconomic classes to limit fertility to the number of children that can be provided for adequately are not accidental occurrences. Much of this favorable situation is due to the organized efforts of a number of private voluntary organizations and semigovernmental or governmental agencies to sensitize and inform the public about the need for family planning and to provide family planning services.

*Most of the materials of this section have been summarized from an article by Dr. Benjamin Viel, "El Problema Demográfico de Mexico y el Istmo Contro-Americano: Pasado, Presente y Futuro Inmediato." Dr. Viel is a former dean of the School of Medicine, University of Chile, and the retired Executive Director of the International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere Region.

| Country Name of organization | |
|---|---|
| Asociación Demogr∜fica Costarricense (ADC) | 1967 |
| Авосіасібп Demográfica Salvadoreña (ADS) | 1969 |
| Asociación Pro-Bienestar de la Familia de Guatemala (APROFAM) | 1969 |
| Asociación Hondoreña de Planifi- cación de la Familia (ASHONPLAFA) | 1965 |
| Fundación para Estudios de la Población (FEPAC) | 1967 |
| Asociación Demográfica Nicaragüense (ADN) | 1975 |
| Авосіасібп Panameña para el Planeamiento de la familia (APLAFA) | 1969 |
| | Name of organization Asociación Demográfica Costarricense (ADC) Asociación Demográfica Salvadoreña (ADS) Asociación Pro-Bienestar de la Familia de Guatemala (APROFAM) Asociación Hondoreña de Planifi- cación de la Familia (ASHONPLAFA) Fundación para Estudios de la Población (FEPAC) Asociación Demográfica Nicaragüense (ADN) Asociación Panameña para el Planeamiento de la familia (APLAFA) |

 Table FP 5. Private Organizations for Family Planning in Central America, Affiliated with International Planned Parenthood Federation.

Private organizations. Among the forefront of these groups have been the national groups affiliated with the International Planned Parenthood Federation, a nonprofit organization with headquarters in London and a regional office for the Western Hemisphere in New York. Table F-5 lists these organizations and the year in which they were organized in each country. As the table shows, every country in Central America has such an organization. Most of them have been working for 10 to 15 years or more. They are small, with limited financing. Their goal has been to advise national leaders that an unmet need for family planning exists in their country and to demonstrate it by successfully operating specialized clinics where such services are offered. The work of these organizations has consisted of three activities:

(a) Disseminate public information about the reasons for family planning and about the methods of contraception available. They have promoted family planning primarily on humanitarian and health grounds and not for demographic reasons.

- (b) Provide training in family planning service, both informational and medical, for medical and social welfare personnel in the nation.
- (c) Provide contraceptive services to clients, at a high level of medical and counselling quality, as a model commonstration. This often takes the form of special programs of community distribution door-to-door or at special outposts, or of subsidized commercial distribution.

Because their budgets are small, they have been able to satisfy only a small fraction of the need and demand for information and services. They have conducted information programs via mass media, using radio, television, newspapers, magazines and special printed bulletins, brochures, leaflets and posters. They have held public meetings where adults can come to receive information and ask questions. The clients for their services have spread the news of family planning by word of mouth to their friends and neighbors and relatives. At times there have been public controversies over family planning, sometimes provoked by criticism from extreme right or extreme left political groups, or from conservative religious leaders. Such controversies have tended to serve the useful purpose of bringing the issue to public attention. Such confrontations have stimulated the flow of discussion and information, both pro and con, thereby allowing the citizenry at large to be better informed and able to develop an opinion.

Because of limited resources, the family planning units have been concentrated in the capital cities and in the other major cities of the country. The rural areas have been able to receive information about family planning via radio and other mass media, but have had little access to contraceptive services except by travelling to a source of service--often a considerable distance.

The Declaration of Bucharest. In 1974 the United Nations sponsored a World Population Conference in Bucharest, which culminated in a resolution that knowledge of family planning was a fundamental right of every couple, and that it was an obligation of governments to provide it. Every nation of Central America signed this agreement. The conference arrived at unambiguous conclusions about the possible humanitarian benefits of family planning for children, mothers, and family economic and social velfare. This resolution provoked further debate and discussion among political and religious groups throughout Central America.

All nations in Central America (as in all of Latin America) participated in another World Population Conference, held in Mexico City in August, 1984. At that time, most of the themes concerning population and socioeconomic development discussed in this report were topics for discussion and resolutions promoting family as well as national welfare.

Commarcial distribution. Meanwhile, the rising level of interest and information has caused private pharmacies to stock contra-

ceptives and to sell them to the segment of the population wealthy enough to afford to purchase them at commercial prices. In some countries, the private family planning associations have worked with pharmacies to arrange for commercial distribution at subsidized prices, in order to make contraceptives available to low income families. Thus, a combination of private voluntary organizations and private commercial enterprise has brought at least minimal access to family planning to the middle and upper classes, and to much of the poorer classes, especially in urban areas.

Ministries of health and other public agencies. In 1977 the United Nations organized the Fund for Population Activities, which began to award grants to developing countries which promised to integrate family planning as a part of their regular maternal and child health services. This program caused Ministries of Health to have increased interest in family planning. Beginning somewhat earlier, bilateral assistance from the United States Agency for International Development to some nations of Central America supported programs integrating family planning with maternal and child health programs. Programs for health and medical facilities funded by loans from the World Bank also had some family planning elements. As a result of interaction with the private voluntary organizations and with the international assistance programs for health, the Ministries of Health in all Central American countries have been thoroughly exposed to the philosophy of family planning. A limited number of physicians, nurses, and public health educators have been trained for family planning. In several nations, the Social Security System operates its own medical and health facilities, and has included family planning as a regular service. In almost all countries, Ministries of Welfare, planning agencies, and even offices of presidents and vice presidents have also become directly involved in population and family planning programs.

A positive government policy permitting family planning services to be offered through public health clinics has been implemented in almost all Central American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. In some cases these programs are operated jointly by the private family planning associations and by the Ministry of Health.

The quantity and quality of services offered through the Ministries of Health differ from country to country, and even from province to province within each country, depending upon the attitudes and beliefs of the chief medical officers and their superior officers. Because family planning has been both a political and a religious issue, some officers have been slow to implement the Declaration of Bucharest. Because they are fully employed caring for the sick, and have limited budgets, combined with political and religious sensitivities, the integration of family planning with health services has often been mostly maternal and child health with compara-

tively little family planning services. As a result, a very important share of family planning services is being provided by the private family planning associations and private pharmacies, despite their limited budgets and few outlets for services. Table FP-6 for El Salvador illustrates the situation: In metropolitan areas where birth rates are lowest, only slightly more than one-half of family planning services are provided by public facilities, and nearly onehalf are provided by private sources. In rural areas, in contrast (where the practice of family planning is still very limited and birth rates are very high), 80 percent of all family planning services are provided by government sources,

The present situation. As a result of a decade or more of exposure to the family planning issue, with opportunity for repeated discussion and sustained dialogue among representatives of all political and religious views, family planning has ceased to be an issue of whether family planning is "to-be-or-not-to-be" and has become a policy planning one of "who-what-how"

| lable FP-6 | . Source for Obtaining Contraceptives by Married Women 15-44 Years of Age |
|------------|---|
| | Who Are Currently Practicing Contraception, by Area of Residence: |
| | El Salvador, 1978. |

| | Area of residence | | | | |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|---|--|
| Source of contraceptives | Total | Metro- politan | Other urban areas | Rural | |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |
| Ministry of Health | 61.7 11.8 7.7 7.2 5.1 0.0 0.7 5.7 | 38.1 23.0 11.5 12.9 10.4 0.0 0.4 3.7 | 59.4 15.8 6.3 6.9 4.4 0.0 0.2 7.1 | 75.7 3.6 6.5 4.4 2.7 0.0 1.2 6.0 | |
| Number of cases | 590 | 224 | 198 | 168 | |

^aUsing rhythm or withdrawal methods.

SOURCE: Asociación Demográfica Salvadoreña, <u>Enquesta Nacional de Fecundidad,</u> Planificacion Familiar y communicacion masiva, El Salvador, 1978 (FESAL-73).

(what services are to be offered, by who, n, and by what channels). There are still sensitivities in some countries over the use of particular methods of contraception. There are still sensitivities by government agencies toward doing a great deal of publicity favoring family planning, even though they may be ready to serve those clients who request it. There is universal shortage of funds from national budgets to purchase supplies and employ the additional personnel required to meet the public demand in addition to providing essential health care. However, increasing coordination between public and private sources is permitting a division of labor to evolve appropriate for each nation, with official approval by governments for such cooperation. Meanwhile, the shortages of funds, of trained personnel, and of materials and facilities both for public education and for contraceptive services continue to be major impediments to progress.

Unmet need and demand for family planning

A basic premise of the family planning movement throughout Central America has been that there exists among the population a very large unmet need and demand for family planning information and services, which should be provided to those who desire it as a part of the Bucharest Declaration. Meeting such needs does not require a discussion or decision concerning the effect of rapid population growth on economic development and other policy decisions. It is only a movement to supply, on humanitarian grounds, information and service which by international agreement (certified by each Central American nation) ought to be provided. Consequently, there is much interest in attempting to measure this demand. Table FP-7 presents estimates for Honduras, made in a survey in 1981. B hause of the country's

| Set Service | Place of residence | | | |
|--|--------------------|-------|-------|--|
| | l'rban | Rural | Total | |
| Group A: No Demand. Components: Women pregnant at time of survey Women who want a child within two years of the date of survey | 21.8 | 25.0 | 25.8 | |
| Group B: Unsatisfied Demand Components: Women whe want no more children but are not using contraception Women who want more children, but only after two years or more from date of survey | 30.8 | 5n.0 | 47.3 | |
| Group C: Satisfiel Demand Component: Women who are using contraception | 47.4 | 16.1 | 26,9 | |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | |
| Number | 754 | 1,431 | 2,185 | |

Table FP-7. Estimate of Demand and Unmet Demand for Family Planning, by Urban and Rural Residence: Honduras, 1981.

SOURCE: Encuesta Nacional de Prevalencia del Uso de Anticonceptivos (ENPA). <u>Honduras</u>, 1981.

high fertility, low level of educational attainment, and high poverty one could suspect the demand to be quite low in Honduraslower perhaps than in any other Central American nation. The results contradict this. The data indicate that 75 percent of the population demands services for family planning, and that only one-third of this demand is being met. The unmet needs are tremendously large in rural areas, where 72 percent of the couples want family planning services, and less than onethird of this demand is being satisfied. Even in urban areas, only moderately more than one-half of the demand is being satisfied.

Experience in Central America as a whole has shown similar results-everywhere couples want family planning information and services which are not being supplied to them adequately. The result has been high maternal mortality (and other related medical complications), which is now a major health problem and a leading cause of death among women of reproductive age in these countries. Experience in Latin American countries has also shown that when the national government accepts family planning as a part of its health system, the birth rates begin to decline within a very short time, and quickly descend to levels which meet the targets for more effective economic development. Two of the outstanding examples of this policy are Costa Rica and Mexico. Both had extremely rapid fertility and growth rates, despite rapid economic growth until family planning programs were offered by the national governments. In both cases the effect was observable within two years, and was remarkable after five years. Similar results have not yet occurred in Guatemala. Honduras, or Nicaragua because of ambivalent policies and insufficient commitment as yet by their governments. Meanwhile, their citizens desire such services, in the ratio of at least three or more persons in favor for every one against.

Conclusion

The analyses of Parts I and II of this report have demonstrated that slower population growth, through reduced fertility, is an essential component of a comprehensive plan for social and economic development in the nations of Central America. A family planning program that offers information and contraceptive services to the population on a voluntary basis is the mechanism for accomplishing this slower growth. This final part of the report has demonstrated that family planning, on humanitarian grounds to help individual couples bear only children which they wish to have, in order to give each one a good upbringing, is approved and wanted by an overwhelming majority of the population. Lack of information and services to fulfill this need is a major reason why fertility rates and population growth remain so high. Therefore, by accelerating family planning information and services in these countries, two highly important functions can be performed: National population growth can be slowed to a pace that will not neutralize efforts at socioeconomic development. Simultaneously, an essential service will be provided to the majority of couples who keenly realize that their own welfare and the future welfare of their children rest upon their ability to plan their families.



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