

November 2, 1972

Mr. President:

The head of the South Vietnamese delegation arrived in Paris on December 8, 1968. On January 18, 1969, agreement was finally reached on procedures for the Paris meetings. The first of the meetings was held on January 25, 1969.

W. W. Rostow

November 2, 1972, about 10:50 a. m.

WWR --

Joe Volz, Washington Star, telephoned you. He said it "is very important," they are working on a story. I asked him the subject of his story. He didn't want to tell me. When I pressed him a bit more, he said "it is a major story about the Johnson administration."

His telephone number: area code 202, 484-4220.

Lois N.

Pat Collins, Washington Star, 484-4285
1:55pm

November 2, 1972

Mr. President:

You may wish to know the following.

I was telephoned today by Pat Collins of the Washington Evening Star. He said that a team on the Star, including Jeremiah O'Leary, has been working for some time on a story which involves President Johnson. The story runs as follows:

President Johnson put the FBI to work investigating the Nixon campaign in 1968. There are two versions of what the FBI did. One version alleges that President Johnson instructed the FBI to investigate Communist infiltration of the Nixon camp. The other version alleges that President Johnson instructed the FBI to investigate action by members of the Nixon camp to slow down the peace negotiations in Paris before the 1968 election.

After the election J. Edgar Hoover informed President Nixon of what he had been instructed to do by President Johnson. President Nixon is alleged to have been outraged. He stated that responsibility for investigating Communist infiltration of American political parties should be transferred to the CIA.

Mr. Collins went on to say that 4 of the men involved in the Watergate operation are believed to have had CIA connections. It is also reported that in 1969 the CIA, according to this account, investigated the possibility of Communist infiltration into the Democratic Party.

Mr. Collins asked did I have any information bearing on this story and any comment on it. I said that I knew nothing about the matter and have no comment.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

51

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Thursday, November 7, 1968 - 12:10pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a full chronological file
of the special intelligence items you
asked for.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By JOW, NARA, Date 8/4/94

~~1668~~
November 2, 1972

no - stat.
This is response to
a 1472 question
of LBJ WJ

Mr. President:

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~~Walt~~ Rostow

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By Judith Viorst

ANNA CHENNAULT says someday she'll write a book about Vietnam. Maybe then we'll all find out whether or not this exotic Oriental beauty really did try to stall the peace talks in Paris long enough to give Richard Nixon the Presidency.

Meanwhile, the story remains one of those titillating tales which, along with the latest reports on her celebrity-studded parties and the VIP men in her life, help keep Anna Chennault in the news. Anna, her critics maintain, adores being newsworthy, even if she has to prepare the press releases herself.

There is no doubt that, in the publicity sweepstakes, Anna has a lot going for her. She is a hero's widow, an effective Republican fund-raiser, a successful businesswoman, author, and lecturer. She has money, charm, good looks, and friends in high places. But, like her beauty, which is a combination of natural resources and skillful development, Anna's assets have been enhanced by Anna. One of her greatest talents has always been to make the very most of what she's got.

Take her role as widow of General Claire Chennault, Second World War commander of the Fourteenth Air Force in China and, earlier, leader of the dashing American volunteer group known as the Flying Tigers. It is one of Anna's most successful roles and probably her favorite. Almost everyone who knows her agrees that despite her relative youth—she says she is forty-four, *Who's Who of American Women* says forty-six—she will never remarry because she so enjoys being Chennault's widow. Or, as her friend, financial adviser, and bedazzled admirer Thomas "Tommy the Cork" Corcoran (braintruster of the New Deal days) would have it: "Anna is the pre-Onassis Jackie Kennedy of the Far East."

Although the Chennault legend has been loyally and lovingly maintained by men such as Corcoran, who worked with the general back in the early war years, and by members of the Flying Tigers and the Fourteenth Air Force, who still hold a ceremony in his honor on Memorial Day, Anna has been the leading Keeper of the Flame. In *A Thousand Springs* (one of the eighteen books she has written in English and Chinese), she does for her late husband what Jack Valenti used to do for LBJ. And if, in the course of her book, the wife of the great man emerges as rather remarkable in her own right, well . . . maybe that's what happens when you tell it like it is.

In *A Thousand Springs*, Anna relates how East meets West in wartime and

discovers that love is a many splendored thing. Published in 1962 and destined to become an MGM movie any time now, the book is a kind of dual biography of the Chennaults. It introduces us to nineteen-year-old Peiping-born Anna Chan, girl reporter, on the brink of her first assignment for the Chinese Central News Agency. "Would I, a convent-bred girl fresh from college, be able to write intelligently about important military affairs? Or about the grim-faced commanding general of the Fourteenth Air Force, Major General Chennault?"

Yes, it turns out, she would. Anna, in rapturous prose, then unfolds her story of the great romance between the innocent young reporter and the imposing general. There are, however, variations on this story which rather dim the luster of the love theme. In one, Anna is featured not as the innocent young reporter, but as an employe of Chinese intelligence in charge of keeping an eye on the general. In another, Anna's attraction to Chennault is attributed less to passion than to the appeal of his exalted status in Asia. And while everyone agrees that Claire Chennault did indeed care for the lady, there are some doubts about the mushy dialogue attributed to him in *A Thousand Springs*. "He would never have talked that way," insists an old friend of Chennault. "After I finished that book I went upstairs and threw up."

In any case, the book tells us, business eventually became pleasure, and friendship blossomed into marriage. But that's on page 176. Before we get there, we learn about Anna's rich and prestigious family background—about grandfather Liao, China's first ambassador to Cuba, who married a Chinese girl from Washington, D.C., and "settled her in the most elegant residential district of Peiping"; about Anna's highly accomplished mother, one of "the greatest beauties in Peiping"; about Anna's Oxford-educated father, a member of the Chinese diplomatic service now retired in California with his second wife, a doctor; about her five sisters, her school years in Hong Kong, and her work as a newspaper-woman in war-torn China.

We also learn about her general who, she points out a couple of times, was aptly described by his men as "the nearest thing to God that a guy ever met." Anna herself simply sees him as "a man of destiny," an incredibly brilliant air strategist with a terrific sense of humor who excelled at cards, tennis, softball, and badminton. His dog, she declares solemnly, was "the most faithful and intelligent dog I ever knew."

The book goes on to describe Chennault's launching of a China-based commercial airline, the Civil Air Transport,

after the war; their wedding in 1947; the birth of their daughters, Claire Anna and Cynthia Louise (Madame Chiang Kai-shek was godmother to both girls, while the Generalissimo provided them with Chinese names); and their move from Shanghai to Canton to Kowloon to Taiwan and, finally, to the United States. Until his death from lung cancer in 1958 at the age of sixty-seven, Chennault, his wife tells us, was passionately concerned with alerting America to the dangers of the International Communist Conspiracy, including what he called our "pinkos, professional liberals, far left-wingers, and all the entire crew of bleeding hearts and fuzzy-thinking pseudo-intellectuals. . . ."

It was the "abandonment of China," Tommy Corcoran says, that led the Chennaults—in a dramatic gesture—to desert the Democrats in 1952. General Eisenhower was campaigning in the South and Corcoran himself quietly stage-managed the scene in which Claire and Anna greeted Ike at the foot of the ramp in the airport at New Orleans. (Chennault was the son of a Louisiana cotton planter.) As Corcoran recalls with some pride, "It made a hell of a stir."

After that, explains Corcoran, Claire Chennault was a Republican, "and Anna obediently went along." Somewhere down the line, her obedience gave way to dedication—after working for Nixon in 1960 and Goldwater in 1964, she became what one Washington reporter described last year as "the most titled woman in the Nixon campaign and the one most likely to be offered a post in his Administration if he wins." Her titles in the 1968 race included cochairman of the Women for Nixon-Agnew National Advisory Committee, chairman of the Republican Women's National Finance Committee, and vice chairman of the Republican National Finance Committee. But Anna Chennault has no job with the Nixon Administration and it's not expected that she will.

According to Madame Chennault, she has always made it clear that "I have no ambitions to join the Administration." After all, she points out logically, "If I wanted a job, every Republican would have recommended me, including Dirksen."

Her friend Karl Mundt, Senator from South Dakota, backs up Anna's contention that she has no yearning to go to work for Nixon. "She knows my connections with Dick," he says, "yet she's never implied, directly or indirectly, that she'd be interested." Mundt, who regards Anna as "smart as a whip," "a bundle of personality," and "a real cosmopolite," thinks she would make a terrific ambassador. (continued) 27

Other friends—Mrs. Robert McCormick, widow of the *Chicago Tribune's* Colonel is one—think that Anna's chances for a political payoff in the Nixon Administration were killed by all those Dragon Lady stories that came out after the Presidential election.

There are two or three versions of the story, but they always star Anna as the mystery woman who, after LBJ made his preelection move to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and get the peace negotiations going, quietly persuaded Saigon to delay participation in the Paris talks until after November 5, thus taking the peace initiative away from the Democrats. The argument she presumably made to her friends in South Vietnam was that a slowdown in peace negotiations would guarantee a Republican victory, and that Saigon would get a better deal from Nixon than from Humphrey. Whether or not Nixon approved this strategy is open to some debate, though one scenario has Nixon's aides "in a state of near-panic" over Anna's activities.

In his recent book, *The Making of the President 1968*, author Theodore White reports that Hubert Humphrey was well aware of Mrs. Chennault's sabotage efforts but chose not to expose them. "I know of no more essentially decent story in American politics," writes White, "than Humphrey's refusal to do so; his instinct was that Richard Nixon, personally, had no knowledge of Mrs. Chennault's activities; had no hand in them; and would have forbidden them had he known."

One of Humphrey's aides, however, offered a more hard-headed explanation of Hubert's failure to exploit the Chennault intrigue. "Anna's activities," he pointed out, "surfaced as the result of a wiretap. How were we going to explain that?"

The Vietnam caper has been denied publicly by Anna's buddy, Senator John Tower of Texas ("Any story that Mrs. Chennault tried to stall peace talks is manifestly untrue"), and privately by Senator Mundt ("I was pretty close to the Nixon campaign and I think it's sheer fabrication"). Another top Republican, who considers the story "totally preposterous," suggests that Anna may have helped it along herself because "she loves being the mystery woman, the Dragon Lady. Who, after all, has ever really heard of Mrs. Omar Bradley or Mrs. Westmoreland?"

Tommy Corcoran, who probably knows Anna longer and better than any other gentleman in town, was asked by both Lyndon Johnson and Clark Clifford to find out what exactly Anna was up to with the peace negotiations. But, says Corcoran, "I was very careful *not* to ask



In 1954, Anna Chennault was living on Formosa with her husband, Flying Tiger General Claire Chennault, and daughters Claire Anna and Cynthia Louise. The General died in 1958; now Anna lives in a plush Watergate apartment and her name is linked romantically with lawyers, governors, and heads of state.

her." He adds, however, noting her deep concern with the fate of Asia, that "if I had been Anna I'd have done what they say she did. But I'd have been goddamn careful I didn't do it without orders from the top."

The lady herself, recently discussing the matter, responded with an exquisitely careful choice of words that actually managed to reveal very little. "What the stories reported," she said, "are completely untrue. Whatever I did during the campaign the Republicans, including Mr. Nixon, knew about." She then murmured something to the effect that "lots of things are said in anger" but that she had no ill feelings because "that's politics, and if you can't stand the heat get out of the kitchen."

P rivate conversations with Anna Chennault tend frequently to be burdened with clichés of this sort, which don't do very much for a mystery-woman image. It is, indeed, somewhat dispiriting to hear things like "laugh and the world will laugh with you; cry and you cry alone" from a lady who is in the process of acquiring—or perhaps constructing—a glamorous legend of her own.

For, in addition to those stories of international intrigue, Anna Chennault also has a reputation, in certain circles, as one of those rare women who can captivate every man in a room merely by

entering it. The local gossips have her being eagerly pursued by Governor Warren Knowles of Wisconsin, or madly adored by steady-date Tommy Corcoran, or quietly longed for by one of Asia's most powerful politicians. (Anna's comment: "One of my rules is never go out with women at night.")

Even those gentlemen who don't qualify as Anna's suitors—Karl Mundt, for instance—grow considerably less than businesslike when discussing her physical charms. Many of those who know her describe her as a man's woman, a woman who skillfully mellows her shrewd intelligence with an oblique femininity, a woman who can make a fellow feel that all those bright ideas she thinks up are his own. Robert Gray, a former Eisenhower aide, says he sees her as a kind of geisha girl "in the old, complimentary sense of the word—very solicitous, very gracious, and quite capable of providing anything from the right conversation to the right neck massage." (Anna's comment: "In the East we were trained to serve men.")

Anna dresses and dwells in a manner well suited to her emerging legend. Small, slim, and curvy, she wears short clingy cheongsams custom-made in Hong Kong and Taiwan, always accompanied by a wispy floating scarf at the throat. Her hair is elaborately piled and lacquered, and flashy slashes of black pencil dramatize her eyes. Whether she really is forty-four, forty-six, or older—as a



couple of women insist—doesn't matter a bit. She looks younger than her given age, and she looks swell.

Anna's swanky Watergate East penthouse (estimated cost: between \$165,000 and \$250,000) displays her grandfather's antiques and lots of amber, jade, ivory, Ming vases, and Oriental screens. It is a setting worthy of a competitor for top Washington hostess, and Anna—with her homemade Chinese specialties and smooth charm—is right in there competing. (In June she received the ultimate accolade—*Life* photographers showed up on three occasions to snap pictures of her party preparations.)

Although her guest list doesn't, and probably won't, include President Nixon or his top aides ("I'm not, as everyone else claims to be, good friends of the Nixons"), she draws a good assortment of Senators (including Democrats such as Speaker McCormack and Harry Byrd of Virginia) and all the Cabinet officers, as well as plenty of Asian celebrities such as President Marcos of the Philippines and General and Mrs. Ky. Her "doves are murderers" view of the war in Vietnam undoubtedly makes her hospitality more congenial, say, to the Goldwaters and J. Edgar Hoovers than to the William Fulbrights.

It's difficult to reconcile the adept hostess, the alluring female, the intriguing Dragon Lady with the purveyor of such pearls of wisdom as "the more you give, the more you receive," but maybe Anna

is saving herself for a worthier audience. Yet the speeches she delivers on the lecture circuit, alas, also appear to abound in the same sort of commonplaces, although she is a well-paid and popular professional speaker on subjects such as *Women of Two Worlds*, *Our Crisis in Vietnam*, and *The Many Faces of Southeast Asia*. Last May, in fact, she was invited to talk before the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco which, she likes to remind people, confines its invitations to speakers of national stature such as Senators and Presidential candidates. The speech pointed out, among other revelations, that America is a young nation and the Asians much older, that power is a lonely business, and that the forces of freedom are stronger than the forces of tyranny.

Anna keeps up with the many faces of Southeast Asia by traveling there several times a year. Some of her trips are made on behalf of the Flying Tiger Line, an all-freight airline based in Los Angeles with routes in the United States and the Pacific. (Founded by men who fought under her husband, the Flying Tiger Line is the largest freight airline in the world. It should not be confused with the Civil Air Transport, now located in Taiwan and no longer connected, "except sentimentally," says Anna, with the Chennault family.) Madame Chennault is a salaried employe of the Flying Tiger Line with the title of vice president in charge of international affairs—the only woman vice president in aviation, she points out proudly. Most people who've seen her in action regard her as a shrewd and highly competent businesswoman whose discreet lobbying in high places at home and abroad more than earns her keep.

There is little doubt that Anna Chennault has access to high places, as documented by the photos of famous folks lovingly displayed in her living room—folks such as General Westmoreland, the Chiang Kai-sheks, and Vietnam's Thieu and Ky. "Anna," says Senator Mundt, "can knock on any door throughout the world and the door will open up." And Tommy Corcoran adds appreciatively, "They'd let her in anywhere—if only to see her miniskirt." It is, of course, Anna's chumminess with the top dogs in Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, and elsewhere that lends credence to that Paris sabotage story and to other tales that have her serving as an occasional consultant to the CIA.

The real question, obviously, is what use Anna Chennault makes of her access. If you believe Tommy Corcoran, a man celebrated for his own behind-the-scenes wheeling and dealing, "Anna's power and influence are greater than any woman's

in Washington," though how and to what end she exercises them remain unclear. The skeptics around town, however, insist that Anna sometimes allows people to carry away the impression that she is far more of an international operator than, in truth, she is. Her connections may be of some help to the Flying Tiger Line, they admit, but it's unlikely that she's changing world history.

The many mysteries of Anna Chennault extend to her family life, her finances, and her back-breaking schedule.

Is she the concerned mother of nineteen-year-old Cynthia Louise, now in her third year at Wellesley, and twenty-year-old Claire Anna, who has just spent a year studying Chinese in Taiwan? Columnist Jack Anderson, co-worker with Anna in Chinese Refugee Relief and proud father of nine, describes her as a devoted mama who has sometimes sought his advice on the rearing of her girls. Another close friend, however, says Anna likes men much better than kids and "will be delighted to have them settled and out of her hair."

Is Anna Chennault a woman of great wealth whose shrewd investments in the stock market have parlayed the reported \$300,000 or \$400,000 left to her by Chennault into a fortune? Or does she maintain her feverish pace because, as one friend suspects, "she needs the money to keep up that front"?

And, finally, what makes Anna run? Certainly she does drive herself—writing all those books (she's currently working on a novel), delivering all those lectures (about forty a year), entertaining all those famous people, putting in time for the Republican party and the airline and the General Claire L. Chennault Foundation (an organization, housed in the same K Street building as Corcoran's law firm, which provides scholarships to American children whose fathers fought and died in Asia during the Second World War).

Anna's critics see her as a woman of fierce ambition, whose self-control and self-discipline have been enlisted in the cause of winning for herself attention, recognition, and what in this city passes for glory. She is, they say, a clever but not terribly extraordinary lady who has gone a long, long way on an exotic background, the Chennault legend, good looks, and a great flair for publicity.

Anna herself has a different explanation for the frenetic activity. "A life without a purpose," she says, "is not to live but just to exist. I like to do things not for the sake of self but to help others." □

Chennault Dinner Delights GOP Guests

By JEAN POWELL
Star Staff Writer

The "New Party" definitely has emerged on the social scene.

Take last night.

Mrs. Anna Chennault, a longtime worker for the Republican party, staged a dinner at her Watergate East penthouse.

Who was there?

Those folks who'll be taking over after Jan. 20. And some Democrats, too.

Mrs. Chennault, who's been touted as the new mostest hostess in the new regime, teamed with an old friend, J. Raymond Bell, vice president with Columbia Pictures, for last night's soiree.

Bell wanted the guests to see "Oliver!" at the MacArthur Theater. Anna Chennault wanted them to have dinner with her. The result was a delightful evening at the Chennault penthouse, high atop the Watergate, and busing for guests from there to the theater.

Active in Inaugural

Many of the guests seemed to be embroiled in inaugural plans of one type or another.

Edward McGinnis, who's working on inaugural plans and formerly was with Seagram's, was there with his blonde wife. Although admitting she was dieting, she said, "I can't resist trying some of all of the food" which the hostess served.

Sen. John McClellan, D-Ark., and his wife attended.

"I don't know anybody here," Mrs. McClellan declared on arrival, although eventually she was surrounded by friends.

Both McClellans, who spent the Christmas holiday in Goldsboro, N.C., have had the flu.

"We got back before New Year's," Mrs. McClellan said of their visit to their daughter and son-in-law, the Fred Laffers. He retired from the Air Force in Goldsboro and they've bought a house fronting a lake just outside town.

Among the guests was Mary Jane McCaffree, who is executive director of the Distinguished Ladies' Reception, the

first event of the Inaugural weekend.

Also on hand was Gerry VanderHeuvel, Mrs. Nixon's press secretary. And who could be more GOP than Gov. Romney and his wife?

Catching a good bit of attention when they arrived were Sen. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and his bride. "I believe Mendel Rivers is here," she bubbled.

Attending without his wife

was New York Sen. Jacob Javits. Also attending were GOP Sen. Robert Dole and Mrs. Dole of Kansas, the John Marriotts, James Day of the Maritime Commission and Maryland Sen. Louise Gore.

Among the more than 125 guests were Rep. and Mrs. John Buchanan, Rep. and Mrs. Donald G. Brotzman, Army Gen. and Mrs. Wendell Coats and Admiral and Mrs. Tazewell Shepard.



—Star Staff

MRS. CLAIRE
CHENNAULT

Kept Lid on Nixon Supporter's 'Sabotage' Try

Did HHH's 'Fair Play' Cost Election?

WASHINGTON (AP) — Could Hubert H. Humphrey have changed the course of the 1968 presidential campaign by disclosing information that a Richard M. Nixon supporter tried to sabotage preliminary Vietnam peace talks?

Author Theodore H. White speculates in his book "The Making of a President 1968" that Humphrey might have won the election if he had ballyhooed the story.

But William Connell, Humphrey chief political aide, doubts it and says he recommended against making the alleged intrigue a public issue.

"I thought we were on the way, anyway, and that we might get a backlash from it," says Connell.

White reports in his recently published book the Johnson Administration intercepted messages from Anna Chan Chen-

nault, a Nixon supporter, undertaking to sabotage the Paris agreement preceding the U.S. bombing halt and peace negotiations.

But, White reports, Humphrey refused to air the story despite urgings from some in his campaign staff.

When Nixon aides learned of the activities of the Chinese-born Mrs. Chennault, White says, there was "fury and dismay" and the feeling that "if they lost the election, Mrs. Chennault might have lost it for them."

When asked for comment Mrs. Chennault's secretary in Washington said Mrs. Chennault was in Asia.

Mrs. Chennault, widow of the wartime hero Gen. Claire Chennault and now an American citizen, had raised funds for the Nixon campaign and was chair-

man or co-chairman of several Nixon citizens committees.

She learned by gossip, rumor and speculation of the October halt, White says, and "she had undertaken most energetically to sabotage them."

He adds: "In contact with the Formosan, the South Korean and the South Vietnamese governments she had begun early, by cable and telephone, to mobilize their resistance to the agreement—apparently implying, as she went, that she spoke for the Nixon campaign."

But, White continues, her communications with Asia were tapped by the U.S. government and turned over to Johnson.

White says Johnson was aware of Mrs. Chennault's Asian messages before he made his announcement Thursday, Oct. 31—just five days before the election—of the bombing

halt and the anticipation of the peace talks, but had not taken them seriously.

But two days later when 11 South Vietnamese senators expressed their support of Nixon and South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu repudiated the Paris agreement "The President's wrath was lit," White says and he adds:

"By Saturday he had accused Sen. Everett Dirksen of a Republican plot to sabotage peace (which Dirksen, presumably, hastened to relay to Nixon headquarters); and by Sunday, Johnson was in direct and bitter telephonic contact with Richard Nixon in Los Angeles."

White says, "What could have been made of an open charge that the Nixon leaders were saboteurs of the peace one cannot guess; how quickly it might, if aired, have brought the last 48 hours of the American cam-

paign to squalor is a matter of speculation."

"But," he added, "the good instinct of that small town boy Hubert Humphrey prevailed. Fully informed of the sabotage of the negotiations and the recalcitrance of the Saigon government, Humphrey might have won the presidency of the United States by making it the prime story of the last four days of the campaign. He was urged by several members of his staff to do so.

White says "I know of no more essentially decent story in American politics than Humphrey's refusal to do so; his instinct was that Richard Nixon, personally, had no knowledge of Mrs. Chennault's activities; had no hand in them; and would have forbidden them had he known; Humphrey would not air the story."

The Austin Statesman, Austin, Texas, Wednesday, July 9, 1969, Vol. 98 -- No. 245 page 1
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TOM OTTENAD

Was Saigon's peace talk delay due to Republican promises?

WASHINGTON — A well-known top official of committees working for the election of Richard M. Nixon secretly got in touch with representatives of South Vietnam shortly before the presidential election.

It was in connection with an apparent effort to encourage them to delay in joining the Paris peace talks in hopes of getting a better deal if the Republicans won the White House.

The government of South Vietnam had been expected to join the Paris discussions soon after President Lyndon B. Johnson announced plans Oct. 31 to bring both it and the Communist National Liberation Front into the peace talks and to halt all American bombing of North Vietnam. However, it delayed doing so for four weeks.

Its action is credited by some political experts, including some of Nixon's staff, with cutting the loss of votes that his aides believe he suffered in the election from the last-minute peace move. In this view, the Vietnamese delay lent credence to Republican charges that Mr. Johnson's action was a political maneuver to help the Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey.

Informed diplomats as well as administration sources and a number of Republicans, including some within Nixon's own organization, have said that Republican contact with South Vietnamese representatives was made by Mrs. Anna Chennault. The initial contact was reported to have been made a few days before Mr. Johnson's Oct. 31 announcement.

A high ranking official at the South Vietnamese Embassy here said it was "entirely untrue" that Mrs. Chennault had urged officials of his government to go slow in joining the Paris peace talks. He said:

"There has been a lot of speculation about our attitude in the talks. We base our decision on a lot of factors and not on internal politics here."

He conceded that he and his colleagues had been "in touch with a lot of our

friends, both Democrats and Republicans." He did not identify them.

The official said Mrs. Chennault had had a long relationship with South Vietnam. She is a visitor at the embassy here "from time to time — not really frequently," he added.

Mrs. Chennault, widow of Gen Claire L. Chennault, commander of the World War II Flying Tigers, was co-chairman with Mrs. Dwight D. Eisenhower of the Women for Nixon-Agnew National Advisory Committee and a vice chairman of the Republican National Finance Committee.

She was a hard-working fund-raiser and said she collected more than \$250,000 for Nixon's campaign. Campaign records on file in the House of Representatives show that she contributed at least \$1000 herself to the G.O.P. presidential campaign.

About the same time, in a separate move, representatives of South Vietnam reportedly made contact with the Nixon camp two or three times, unsuccessfully seeking a meeting with the Republican presidential candidate and hinting that their government would put off until after the Nov. 5 election any move toward joining the Paris negotiations.

Herbert G. Klein, director of communications for the President-elect, and other Nixon aides have said that Nixon had no personal connection with either action. Both moves were said to be contrary to his expressed wish and his avowed policy of avoiding any action that might jeopardize chances for peace.

The aides say further that the reported Republican contact with South Vietnamese sources was an individual action that had not been authorized by Nixon. As for the overtures from the South Vietnamese to the Republican organization, they say that, on Nixon's instructions, these were ignored.

Mrs. Chennault, who was born in Peking, is of Chinese descent, but became an American citizen in 1950. She is a vice chairman of one of the committees plan-

ning Nixon's inauguration Jan. 20. The attractive 45-year-old woman, who claims many friends in high government and Republican circles, is to be escorted to the inaugural ball by Gov. Warren P. Knowles of Wisconsin, it was announced recently. Her name figures in speculation for possible appointment to a key position in the Nixon administration.

In a recent interview, she declined to confirm or deny reports that she had been in frequent touch with representatives of the South Vietnamese Embassy shortly before the Nov. 5 election. "Who told you that?" she asked with a half smile.

In response to further questions the petite, vivacious woman, who rates Bui Diem, South Vietnam's ambassador to the U.S., and other diplomats and world leaders among her friends, refused to give much information.

"You're going to get me in a lot of trouble," she remarked. Toying with the high collar of her Chinese-style dress, a personal fashion trademark, she continued with a laugh:

"I can't say anything . . . come back and ask me that after the inauguration. We're at a very sensitive time . . . I know so much and can say so little."

Asked whether others had made contact with the South Vietnamese she replied enigmatically, "I certainly was not alone at that time."

Friends of Mrs. Chennault have said that she was in sympathy with high South Vietnamese officials, including some at the country's embassy here, who favored awaiting the outcome of the American presidential election before making any move toward joining the Paris peace negotiations.

High administration sources here say that key South Vietnamese officials generally favored the election of Nixon over Humphrey. They say also that they received information from Saigon indicating that many South Vietnamese officials there believed Mrs. Chennault was acting on Nixon's behalf in contacts with representatives of that country. They termed

this belief understandable in view of South Vietnam's reputation for political intrigue.

When told that the Nixon forces disclaimed any connection with her reported actions, Mrs. Chennault remarked with a laugh: "You've covered politics. What would you expect? In politics nothing is fair."

Asked whether she had feared that Mr. Johnson's peace initiative might cost Nixon the presidential election, she said, "I think many people had that concern." Asked whether she regarded the President's move as politically motivated, she replied indirectly:

"We have been very much concerned. Every time we have a bombing halt the enemy takes advantage to supply their troops and move more men south. Our casualties in the last few weeks have not decreased noticeably."

Mrs. Chennault said that since Nixon's election she had received "personal invitation" from both President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam and President Chung Hee Park of South Korea "to come and talk to them as a friend." She has made frequent trips to South Vietnam.

She said that since Nixon's election she has encouraged "my friends" to join in the Paris peace talks. "I told them it is important for South Vietnam to send a delegation to Paris," she remarked. On Nov. 28 South Vietnam finally announced that it would take part in the Paris discussion. However, because of a procedural dispute, the broadened talks have not yet started.

Mrs. Chennault, who is rated by many observers as a hawk on Vietnam and a hard-liner on Asian Policy has said that she regarded herself as "a bridge to build better relations between the East and the West. I understand American politics and also the feelings of our friends in Asia. But I am first an American and second a Republican."

Although Nixon advisers say they learned of Mrs. Chennault's activities several days before the Nov. 5 election, they apparently took no steps to halt her or remove her from her connection with the

campaign. Explaining why, one G.O.P. official said, "She wasn't our baby. She wasn't really part of the campaign."

Another Nixon adviser also emphasized this thought, stressing that Mrs. Chennault was not part of Nixon's personal campaign staff.

"She was co-chairman of a volunteer organization," he said. "She wasn't a foreign policy adviser. We were faced with all kinds of people who claimed to speak for Nixon on various issues but really didn't."

Another Republican aide said, "The difficulty is she is pretty free-wheeling. She took a number of independent actions in the campaign. We had to pull her back several times."

Some sources who are friendly to Mrs. Chennault have said privately that the Nixon camp was aware of her actions. They did not make clear, however, at what point this reported awareness developed.

Sources in the Nixon camp insisted strongly that Nixon was adamant in his refusal to make political capital out of the Vietnamese conflict or of the peace negotiations. "I saw him explode one time and say he was not going to make the war a political issue even if it cost him the election," said one aide.

The reported overtures by South Vietnamese representatives to the Nixon campaign organization came in the last week of the presidential campaign. "On two and maybe three occasions we received messages indirectly from high South Vietnamese representatives," a Nixon adviser has said.

The message, he said, requested a meeting with Nixon or one of his top aides. The communications suggested also that South Vietnam might delay until after the American election its final decision on whether or not to join the Paris peace talks, it was said.

The Republican sources said that the Nixon camp "did nothing" about the South Vietnamese overtures. "Our instructions from Nixon were to give no response," he explained.



By Harry Naltchayan—The Washington Post

Anna Chennault and Rep. Gerald Ford.

... and Republicans

Plenty Worth Seeing

By Dorothy McCardle

Anna Chennault gave a party for Republicans at her penthouse at the Watergate last night. Only one representative of the incoming Nixon Cabinet was present but there was plenty worth seeing anyway.

In fact, George W. Romney, the new Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and Mrs. Romney wondered, after looking at the Chennault view of the city, whether they did right by signing up for an apartment at the Shoreham.

Sen. Strom Thurmond, the Republican from South Carolina who did so much to swing the South to President-elect Richard M. Nixon, brought his mother-in-law as well as his bride, Nancy. He introduced Mrs. Paul Moore, of Aiken, S.C., Nancy's mother, and pulled Mrs. Moore into all the pictures.

Sen. Thurmond, 66, told everyone how lucky he is to have such a wonderful mother-in-law. His 22-year-

old bride said how lucky she was to have such a great husband. The mother-in-law smiled.

The party was planned as a supper before the guests went on by bus to a showing of the Columbia Pictures' "Oliver" at the MacArthur Theatre. But most of the guests passed up the film to return to the Capitol for President Johnson's State of the Union message.

"Though I have opposed the President on the war in Vietnam," said New York Republican Jacob Javits, "I would not refuse to pay him the respect of going to hear his final message.

"Who knows, but that history may say he was right and we are wrong about the war."

The hostess served her guests an all-Chinese buffet dinner in a Chinese setting of handsome Chinese antiques and priceless ornaments, including an exquisite tree of pure jade. Scattered among the Oriental treasures were modern

See REPUBLICAN, B8, Col. 5

Romneys Attend Party

REPUBLICAN, From B1

touches of Mrs. Chennault's political friendships.

She stood in front of a picture of herself taken with former GOP Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. Scattered along the Chinese tables and buffets were pictures of Anna with President John F. Kennedy, Anna with JFK, and Anna with President Thieu and Vice President Ky of South Korea. On one sideboard was a picture of Richard Nixon and another of the Nixon daughters. On the back of the Chennault apartment front door was a Nixon-Agnew sign left over from the recent campaign.

Two Democratic women set the style pace. Mrs. Tazewell Shepard was wearing

an exotic mini-dress which her husband, Rear Admiral Shepard, former Presidential Naval Aide, had brought her from Hong Kong. It was of black velvet, bound at neck, arms and hemline in wide gold braid.

Margaret Corcoran, youthful lawyer daughter of Tommy (The Cork) Corcoran, wore a pajama dress in shades of yellow, pink and white.

SUNNY'S SURPLUS

U.S. ARMY



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White Reports Nixon Backer Tried to Block Peace Talks

By HARRY KELLY
Associated Press Staff Writer

Could Hubert H. Humphrey have changed the course of the 1968 presidential campaign by disclosing reports that a Richard M. Nixon supporter tried to sabotage preliminary Vietnam peace talks?

Author Theodore H. White speculates in his book "The Making of a President 1968" that Humphrey might have won the election if he had ballyhooed the story.

But William Connell, Humphrey's chief political aide, doubts it and says he recommended against making the reports of the intrigues a public issue.

"I thought we were on the way, anyway, and that we might get a backlash from it," Connell said.

Messages Found

White reports in his recently published book the Johnson administration intercepted messages from Anna Chan Chennault, a Nixon supporter, undertaking to sabotage the Paris agreement preceding the U.S. bombing halt in Vietnam and peace negotiations.

But, White reports, Humphrey refused to air the story despite the advice of some on his campaign staff.

When Nixon aides learned of the activities of the Chinese-born Mrs. Chennault, White says, there was "fury and dismay" and the feeling that "if they lost the election, Mrs. Chennault might have lost it for them."

When asked to comment on the story, Mrs. Chennault's secretary in Washington said Mrs. Chennault was in Asia.

Nixon Fund-Raiser

Mrs. Chennault, widow of the wartime hero Gen. Claire Chennault and now an American citizen, had raised funds for the Nixon campaign and was chairman or co-chairman of several Nixon citizens committees.

She learned by gossip and speculation of the October plans,



-Star Staff

Mrs. Chennault announces a Nixon committee.

White says, and "she had undertaken most energetically to sabotage them."

He adds: "In contact with the Formosan, the South Korean and the South Vietnamese governments she had begun early, by cable and telephone, to mobilize their resistance to the agreement — apparently implying, as she went, that she spoke for the Nixon campaign."

But, White continues, her communications with Asia were tapped by the U.S. government and turned over to Johnson.

Plot Charged

White says Johnson was aware of Mrs. Chennault's Asian messages but had not taken them seriously before he announced on Oct. 31 — just five days before the election — the bombing halt and the anticipation of the peace talks.

But two days later when South Vietnamese senators expressed their support of Nixon and South Vietnamese President

Nguyen Van Thieu repudiated the Paris agreement, "the President's wrath was lit," White says and he adds:

"By Saturday he had accused Sen. Everett Dirksen of a Republican plot to sabotage peace which Dirksen, presumably, hastened to relay to Nixon headquarters; and by Sunday, Johnson was in direct and bitter telephonic contact with Richard Nixon in Los Angeles."

Connell said he recommended against making it a public issue because he thought Humphrey was in the winning lane and he didn't want a public opinion backlash.


In addition Connell said, "There was no indication Nixon was involved and we know these things can happen without the principal being involved."

Does Connell think now that breaking the story would have won the White House for Humphrey? "I don't think it would have made any difference."

INTRIGUE

SPECTRUM

ONE OF THE most dramatic incidents of the American Presidential election took place entirely behind the scenes. It revolved around an attractive woman working unofficially for Mr Nixon and it came within an ace of costing him the election. The story was discovered by the Sunday Times team in the course of research for their book on the election "An American Melodrama."



Nixon: he knew the danger



Anna Chennault: good contacts



Johnson: an angry phone call

The woman who scared Nixon

PRESIDENT JOHNSON had set enormous store by the Paris peace negotiations which he hoped would follow his announcement of a complete halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. Personally, he hoped the talks would bring peace and vindicate his own reputation in the closing weeks of his Presidency. Politically he believed that the announcement of serious talks might be enough to swing the election for the Democrats.

On Monday night, October 28, just one week before the eve of the election, there was euphoria in the White House. Agreement between the Americans and the South Vietnamese on a joint communiqué concerning the talks seemed to have been reached, and the Americans felt they had persuaded their allies, albeit reluctantly, to accept the accomplished fact that the National Liberation Front, political wing of the Viet Cong, would take some part in the talks. Arrangements were made for the President to broadcast the momentous news on Wednesday, October 30.

The first indication that something had gone wrong came in a message from the Saigon embassy at 7 a.m. on Tuesday. By the end of the day it was plain that the South Vietnamese were objecting to the presence of the NLF in Paris.

What had happened? There

was no reason to think that the South Vietnamese were in possession of any new information from Paris to explain their sudden access of suspicion. On the other hand the Administration did know—from tapped telephone calls, among other sources—that something was going on which might explain Saigon baulking.

The horrible suspicion exploded within the tiny group of officials who knew what was happening—and how precarious the talks were—that the South Vietnamese were holding back because they had been encouraged by the Republicans to believe that if they did so, they would stop the Democrats' last-minute surge, ensure a Republican victory—and get better terms from Nixon after it.

The South Vietnamese "had come to a series of expectations about Nixon," one of Johnson's officials said at the time, "and they had been encouraged in those expectations. It was very dirty work."

Saigon had been encouraged to believe that they could profit by delaying the peace talks; but not, as Johnson and his men assumed, by Mr Nixon or his immediate advisers. Who then had dared to play such a dangerous game on their behalf, and without their leave?

One of the co-chairmen of the prestigious Women for Nixon

Agnew National Advisory Committee was an attractive 45-year-old Washington hostess of Chinese birth called Anna Chennault.

Mrs Chennault was born in Peking and in 1947 she married General Claire Chennault, commander of the American Flying Tiger squadrons. After the General's death in 1968, she became a well-known hostess and diner-out in Washington political circles and in particular a frequent guest at the South Vietnamese Embassy, where the Ambassador, Bui Diem, was one of her friends.

As early as June Mrs Chennault had written a letter to one of Mr Nixon's foreign policy advisers offering to arrange for Mr Nixon to meet President Thieu of South Vietnam in Washington.

Mr Nixon's aides were immediately aware of the misinterpretations that could be put on such a meeting. "NO NO!" an adviser scrawled in the margin of her letter. And to Nixon himself he wrote: "This not to be done for any reason and under no circumstances. Proposal dangerous in the extreme and injurious to our Vietnam position—that is, to US national interests."

Mrs Chennault did not give up easily. In the course of the summer she called several of Nixon's staff repeatedly. They were

adamant that Nixon should not be mixed up in the peace talks.

On Wednesday, October 30, John Mitchell, Nixon's campaign manager (now Attorney-General), made a series of calls to certain members of his staff. As a result of these he was able to assure the White House that no member of Nixon's campaign staff had been in touch with the South Vietnamese.

The situation was still potentially lethal. That same night the American negotiators met the North Vietnamese secretly in Paris and assured them that President Johnson would announce the bombing halt the next day—and that the bombing would actually stop on November 1.

The South Vietnamese had still not given their agreement, which was essential to the talks, and the Republicans knew that a charge of intriguing with Saigon would be a catastrophe at this point. "I thought that if this thing hit the fan," one man who knew what was going on said, "it would be Monday"—election eve—"and that would make for an unprecedented mess."

On Thursday, October 31, Mrs Chennault made a lot of 'phone calls. She complained in one of them that she could no longer get through to John Mitchell. She boasted about her influence within the Nixon team and claimed that she had played a role in the

recent endorsement of Nixon by 11 South Vietnamese senators. But she got no encouragement.

That night President Johnson went on the air and announced his bombing halt. But the next day President Thieu issued a communiqué denouncing it, and the South Vietnamese National Assembly said Johnson had "betrayed an ally."

It was Saturday when the news arrived that Saigon was baulking. Nixon was campaigning in Texas, his staff were back in New York and in a state of near-panic. The office was specially manned until three o'clock in the morning in case the big row broke.

On Sunday afternoon President Johnson finally placed a call to Nixon who had returned to New York. The conversation began in a stormy mood. The President himself brought up Mrs Chennault's name and appeared well-informed about her phone calls. Finally Mr Nixon was able to convince him that her activities had not been licensed by him or his staff and the President changed the subject.

When he finally hung up, Mr Nixon and his friends collapsed with laughter. It was partly in sheer relief that their victory had not been taken from them at the eleventh hour.

Godfrey Hodgson

The Washington Post 61
Wednesday, July 23, 1969

Letters to The Editor

Black Mark for Teddy White

Being personally acquainted with Mrs. Anna Chennault, I have read with some distaste an Associated Press account of how the latest book by Theodore H. White (*The Making of a President 1968*) portrays her. It seems only decent that the right tag should be put on work of this kind.

To try to re-inflate HHH into a political Sir Galahad in a post mortem of a presidential election quite understandably makes a bookman blow pretty hard. But it takes an ink-slinging stinker to try it by character assassination of a woman as perceptive and consecutive in her thinking, resolute in speaking her mind and as delicately charming personally as Anna Chennault.

Among other political sins—as the weasel words slither over them—Mrs. Chennault “neglected to take the most elementary precautions of an intriguer.”

Actually, what could be better proof that her political activities on the Republican side of the campaign were out in the open?

It turns out that she, a Chinese by birth and an American citizen by choice, knew her Asia deeply enough to know how to thwart a sell-out of South Vietnam, which was being pushed at the time for election purposes by Asia amateurs whispering little fables about “peace” in Lyndon Johnson’s ear. If, as acknowledged in the book, she did it single-handedly, it was quite an accomplishment.

As for HHH’s decency, diminished by excessive awe at it, when he chose not to win the election by charging Richard Nixon with complicity in Mrs. Chennault’s “sabotage” of this allegedly surefire Democratic issue in the last four days of the campaign: wherein lies the decency? The charge would have been crooked in the first place.

EDMUND ZAWACKI,
Department of Slavic Languages,
University of Wisconsin.

Madison, Wis.

Mrs. Chennault Denies Seeking Peace Talk Delay

Widow of General Describes White's Account as 'Insult'

TAIPEI, Taiwan, July 22 (UPI)—Mrs. Anna Chan Chennault, widow of Lieut. Gen. Claire Lee Chennault, described as an "insult" today a published report that she had tried to delay the Vietnam peace talks in Paris to help the Nixon campaign.

The report was contained in Theodore H. White's book "The Making of the President — 1968."

Mr. White said Mrs. Chennault, an active supporter of Richard M. Nixon's Presidential campaign, had tried to work up resistance to the peace talks in Saigon as well as in South Korea and Nationalist China.

Working Up Resistance

"This is an insult to my intellect and the integrity of the South Vietnamese Government," she said in a news conference. "Now that we have elected a President, we should support him, whoever he is," said Mrs. Chennault, a former Chinese journalist who became a United States citizen after marrying General Chennault during World War II.

In his book, Mr. White said Mrs. Chennault tried to work up resistance to the Paris peace



Mrs. Anna Chan Chennault

talks in Saigon, Seoul and Taipei while President Johnson was trying to get them started. Mr. White wrote that Mrs. Chennault talked with Government leaders of the three countries "apparently implying as she went that she spoke for the Nixon campaign."

Mr. White reported that Mr. Nixon's Democratic opponent, Hubert H. Humphrey, knew of Mrs. Chennault's activity, but declined to raise the point in the campaign because he did not believe Mr. Nixon had approved or was aware of her actions. The Nixon campaign headquarters was furious when

At Taipei News Conference, She Rebuts Book's Charge

it learned of Mrs. Chennault's activity, Mr. White said.

Mrs. Chennault, who arrived in Taipei Sunday on a tour of Asia, said she planned to return to Washington Friday.

Her husband won fame as commander of the Flying Tigers, a group of volunteer American pilots who helped defend China early in World War II.

Further Comments Offered

TAIPEI, Taiwan, July 22 (AP)—Elaborating on her remarks, Mrs. Chennault said:

"Some day when the right time comes, all the facts will be made known."

"I have never met Mr. White, although he is described as a China expert. He was on the China mainland before, while I was still a high school girl."

"Mr. White is an excellent writer, but sometimes good writers can make mistakes. It would be naive to say any individual man or woman could influence the nation."

"Today, we already have people who have gone to the moon. And as far as I am concerned, the election campaign is over. To me, America's interest comes first and the Republican party second."

Humphrey Agrees ^{copy} The Austin American, Friday, July 11, 1969 With 'Sabotage' Charge

MOSCOW (AP) — Hubert H. Humphrey acknowledged Thursday that he knew a supporter of Richard Nixon was trying to "sabotage" the Paris peace talks but turned down the chance to make the information an issue in the 1968 presidential campaign.

Humphrey described as "accurate" a report in Theodore White's book, "The Making of the President 1968," which says Mrs. Claire Chennault, widow of the World War II hero and a Nixon supporter, made an attempt to "sabotage" the Johnson administration's Vietnam negotiations.

"That account is accurate as far as I'm concerned," Humphrey said.

White said the 1968 Democratic presidential candidate refused to use the information because he did not believe Nixon knew of what had been done.

Asked if he agreed with White that publicizing the incident might have won him the presidency, Humphrey said: "I don't know what the results would have been. It's no good musing over that sort of thing. It's all in the past."

White says Mrs. Chennault learned through gossip, rumor and speculation of the October negotiations preceding the bombing halt and the Paris talks.

"In contact with the Formosan, the South Korean and the South Vietnamese governments," White writes, "she had begun early, by cable and telephone, to mobilize their resistance to the agreement—apparently implying, as she went, that she spoke for the Nixon Campaign."

Humphrey arrived in Leningrad Wednesday night for what he said was part of a private

tour. He and his wife plan to visit Kiev and the Black Sea resort of Sochi, then come here Tuesday for about a week.

PROCESSING NOTE 8/1/94

Documents 65 through 114 were fastened to the right side of the original folder.

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1968 DEC 21 20 32

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322 PM 12-21-68 HWL
PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 001 N VATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

1968 DEC 21 PM 4:15
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

ON DECEMBER TWENTY ONE, INSTANT, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, LEARNED THE FOLLOWING FROM VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC).

ON THE SAME DATE, DIEM WAS IN CONTACT WITH VICE-PRESIDENT KY, IN PARIS, AT WHICH TIME KY INFORMED DIEM THAT HE, KY, HAD JUST FINISHED MAKING QUOTE THE CBS THING UNQUOTE (POSSIBLY REFERRING TO THE TELEVISION PROGRAM "FACE THE NATION") AND KY SAID HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT QUOTE FACE UNQUOTE AND THE TABLE-SEATING PROBLEM, TO WHICH H, KY, REPLIED THAT HE SAID THIS WAS A MATTER OF QUOTE SUBSTANCE UNQUOTE. KY CONTINUED THAT HE SAID THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH WHICH REQUIRED ALLIED TROOPS TO BE BROUGHT IN AND THAT IF QUOTE BOTH KINDS OF FOREIGN TROOPS UNQUOTE WERE WITHDRAWN, UNDER INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE, THEN THE
END PAGE ONE

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Authority NLS 00-231

By cb/jrw vARA Date 12-19-00

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH, INCLUDING THAT OF QUOTE THE OPPOSITION UNQUOTE, COULD BE SOLVED BY THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT. KY ALSO STATED HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) AND HAD REPLIED THAT THE NLF COULD NEVER BE RECOGNIZED AS A LEGAT ENTITY, BUT THAT QUOTE WE UNQUOTE DO RECOGNIZE THE REALITY.

DIEM INQUIRED IF THE QUOTE ONE, TWO, OR THREE UNQUOTE STAGE TALKS WERE DISCUSSED AND KY REPLIED THAT HE, KY, DID NOT DISCUSS QUOTE MY PLAN UNQUOTE, BUT INSTEAD SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REMAIN IN THE SOUTH AND THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) CONTINUES TO FIGHT THEM THERE, THERE CAN BE NO INTERNAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE SOUTH. KY FURTHER STATED THAT IF WORLD OPINION WANTS THE WAR TO END, FOREIGN TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN AND LET THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SETTLE THE INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE NLF.

KY INQUIRED OF DIEM AS TO THE STATUS OF THE DISCUSSION ON HIS, KY'S QUOTE THREE STAGE PLAN UNQUOTE AND DIEM REPLIED HE HAD JUST OBTAINED QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE, SO FAR AND NOTHING CERTAIN. KY ADVISED DIEM HE WOULD BE SEEING QUOTE MR. HA UNQUOTE (POSSIBLY PRESIDENT THIEU), WOULD TALK IT OVER WITH HIM AND REQUESTED THAT DIEM QUOTE TALK IT UP UNQUOTE SOME MORE. DIEM INDICATED THAT THERE IS POSSIBLY SOME QUESTION AS TO
END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE ~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
WHETHER THE PLAN IS QUOTE OFFICIAL UNQUOTE AND CY REPLIED THAT
IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS HIS OWN IDEA, BUT THAT
HERE (IN PARIS), QUOTE I AM THE CHIEF UNQUOTE. INFORMANT
HAS ADVISED THAT PARTS OF THE INFORMATION IMMEDIATELY ABOVE,
WERE INAUDIBLE AND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND, BUT INFORMANT IS
OF THE OPINION THAT THE INFORMATION IS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT.

KY CONTINUED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE U.S. DELEGATION ON
SEVENTEEN OCCASIONS DURING THE PAST TWELVE DAYS AND THAT THIS
SHOULD SHOW THERE IS NO QUOTE DISPUTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE AND
THAT INSOFAR AS QUOTE CLIFFORD UNQUOTE (POSSIBLY CLARK CLIFFORD,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE), IS CONCERNED, HE, KY, HAD BEEN ASKED IF
QUOTE THIS UNQUOTE CONSTITUTED PRESSURE ON HIM, KY, AND THAT
HE HAD REPLIED QUOTE WE UNQUOTE WILL NOT BE PRESSURED BY ANY
COUNTRY.

KY ADVISED DIEM THAT HE, KY, WOULD BE LEAVING PARIS
ON DECEMBER TWENTY-TWO; THAT THE PRESS WILL SPECULATE AS TO
THE REASON AND THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN THAT IT IS A ROUTINE TRIP
TO CONSULT BACK HOME. DIEM ASKED HOW LONG KY WOULD BE GONE
AND HE REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, EXACTLY, BUT WOULD BE GONE
PERHAPS SIX OR SEVEN DAYS.
END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR ~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

A COMPANION OF KY'S IN PARIS, NAMED KHOI, ASKED DIEM
ABOUT WHAT INFORMANT UNDERSTOOD TO BE THE QUOTE RUSK MESSAGE
UNQUOTE AND DIEM REPLIED THAT THE FIRST POINT IS AS TO WHETHER
OR NOT THIS (POSSIBLY REFERRING TO KY'S PLAN), IS A QUOTE SIDE-
STEP OR SIDE TRACK UNQUOTE AND SECONDLY THE MATTER OF QUOTE
FACE UNQUOTE. DIEM INQUIRED OF KHOI AS TO WHEN HE WOULD BE
COMING TO WDC AND KHOI REPLIED THAT POSSIBLY HE WILL COME ON
DECEMBER TWENTY-TWO, BUT WOULD LET DIEM KNOW IN ADVANCE.

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348 PM 12-20-68 EFH
PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, 001
ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

Rastow

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) EMBASSY OF
VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

ON DECEMBER TWENTY, INSTANT, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED
RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, LEARNED THE FOLLOWING FROM
VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC):

ON THE SAME DATE, DIEM WAS IN CONTACT WITH VICE-PRESIDENT
KY, IN PARIS. DIEM STATED "THEY ARE VERY INTERESTED" (NOT
FURTHER IDENTIFIED). KY COMMENTED THAT CONTACT WAS MADE WITH
"JORDAN" (NOR FURTHER IDENTIFIED) IN PARIS ON DECEMBER NINETEEN,
LAST, AND HE, JORDAN, IS ALSO INTERESTED. FURTHER COMMENTS
WERE MADE AGAINST DISCLOSURE (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) BECAUSE
"IT" IS ONLY A GENERAL OUTLINE AS OF NOW AND PREMATURE DIS-
CLOSURE COULD ROB "IT" OF IMPACT.

DIEM STATED HE HAD SENT KY THE VERBATIM TEXT OF AN ARTICLE
BY KISSINGER (POSSIBLY HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER, RECENTLY
NAMED BY PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 00-231

By cb/JOW vARA Date 12-19-00

PAGE TWO (SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS). DIEM COMMENTED THERE ARE
SEVERAL TERRIBLE THINGS IN THE ARTICLE.

IN RESPONSE TO AN INQUIRY BY DIEM, CONCERNING THE
APPEARANCE OF KY ON THE TELEVISION PROGRAM "FACE THE NATION",
KY STATED HE WAS UNCERTAIN, COMMENTING HE FELT HE MUST RETURN
TO SAIGON THE WEEKEND OF DECEMBER TWENTY ONE, NEXT, BUT WAS
HAVING TROUBLE GETTING A PLANE. KY STATED HE MUST CONSULT
WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, COMMENTING
THAT SHOULD HE TAKE THE INITIATIVE PRIOR TO THIS CONSULATION
IT WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR PRESIDENT THIEU AND LEAD TO
CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM DELEGATION, INDICATING
IT HAD GIVEN IN TO PRESSURES WHILE ABROAD. IT WAS MUTUALLY
DECIDED THAT AMBASSADOR DIEM SHOULD REMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES,
AND DIEM INDICATED HE WOULDHCONTINUE TO PURSUE THE "MATTER"
WITH THE OTHER SIDE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE TELEVISION PROGRAM "FACE THE NATION"
KY STATED HE WOULD HAVE TO POSTPONE IT, SINCE HE FELT HE
COULD SAY NOTHING IN ADVANCE CONCERNING THE NEW INITIATIVES.
IN REGARDS TO COMMENTS BY AMBASSADOR DIEM THAT DIFFICULTY

PAGE THREE (SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
WOULD BE CREATED FOR THE NETWORK, KY STATED HIS RETURN TO
SAIGON MUST TAKE PRIORITY, AND PERHAPS BY SUNDAY, DECEMBER
TWENTYNINEN NEXT, HE, KY, WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY.

IN RESPONSE TO KY'S QUESTION, DIEM STATED THAT KY'S
DENIAL CONCERNING KISSINGER'S ARTICLE HAD BEEN PUBLISHED IN
THE UNITED STATES.

GP-1

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

END

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

67

1968 DEC 20 02 09

904PM 12-19-68 JDR

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 007
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

Rostow

ON DECEMBER NINETEEN INSTANT, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, LEARNED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM:

LAWRENCE SPIVAK, MODERATOR OF THE TELEVISION PROGRAM, "MEET THE PRESS" ADVISED DIEM THERE IS AN ARTICLE IN THE DECEMBER NINETEEN INSTANT ISSUE OF THE "NEW YORK POST" STATING THAT VICE-PRESIDENT KY OF SOUTH VIETNAM WILL APPEAR ON THE TELEVISION PROGRAM "FACE THE NATION" ON DECEMBER TWENTYTWO NEXT. DIEM STATED THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THIS. SPIVAK RELATED THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED BY KHOI, A COMPANION OF KY'S IN PARIS, FRANCE, THAT IF KY WAS TO APPEAR ON TELEVISION IT WOULD BE ON SPIVAKS "MEET THE PRESS."

DIEM STATED HE HAD NO OPINION ON THIS MATTER YET AND ASSUMED THAT IF THE NEWSPAPER ARTICLE IS TRUE, THEN IT STEMS
END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
FROM THE FACT THAT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLARK CLIFFORD APPEARED ON "FACE THE NATION" DECEMBER FIFTEEN LAST AND KY WOULD LIKE TO RESPOND ON "FACE THE NATION" AS AN ANSWER TO CLIFFORD.

SPIVAK STATED THAT KHOI INDICATED AS SOON AS IT WAS DECIDED HE WOULD LET SPIVAK KNOW IN ORDER TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO INTERVIEW KY VIA SATELLITE. SPIVAK ADDED THAT KHOI HAS NOT BEEN VERY FRANK IN THIS ARRANGEMENT. DIEM ASSURED SPIVAK THAT HE (DIEM) WOULD CONSULT WITH PARIS, FRANCE, AND CLARIFY THE QUESTION. SPIVAK OFFERED HIS APPRECIATION AND ADDED THAT HE HAD GONE TO CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE TO ENGAGE THE SATELLITE.

GP-1

END

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ-00-231
By cb/sow *ARA Date 12-19-00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

68
12/19

Mr. Rostow

The information
in these two intercepts
was incorporated in
my summary memo—
except for the paragraph
about Kissinger's
article being referred
to as "pink".

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

BKS

NLJ 00-232

By , NARA Date 8-29-00

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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V5:40 PM 12-19-68 CJD
PRIORITY
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ATT: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

1968 DEC 19 22 46

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY DASH VIETNAM.

ON DECEMBER NINETEEN INSTANT, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, LEARNED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM:

ON THE SAME DATE, DIEM HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH VICE PRESIDENT KY. DIEM TOLD KY THAT HE, DIEM, HAD AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK THIS DATE AND HOPED TO SEE QUOTE THE OTHER SIDE UNQUOTE THEREAFTER. DIEM STATED HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO BE IN PARIS BY SATURDAY MORNING. KY TOLD DIEM HE WANTED DIEM TO COMPLETE HIS CONTACTS IN WASHINGTON, BUT THAT KY WANTS TO HOLD A BIG PRESS CONFERENCE AND THERE WAS THE MATTER OF THE TELEVISION APPEARANCE (POSSIBLY A REFERENCE TO QUOTE FACE THE NATION UNQUOTE SCHEDULED FOR NEXT SUNDAY).

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

KY MENTIONED HE HAD TALKED TO A QUOTE FRIEND UNQUOTE (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) THE PREVIOUS NIGHT AND THE FRIEND HAD AGREED WITH KY'S IDEA (NOT FURTHER EXPLAINED). DIEM STATED HE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNABLE TO BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, WHO IS IN THE HOSPITAL. KY INSTRUCTED DIEM TO TELL IT TO WHOEVER DIEM THOUGHT NECESSARY. KY REMARKED THAT IF THERE IS AGREEMENT, HE WOULD LIKE TO ANNOUNCE IT PUBLICLY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS; HOWEVER, IF THE REACTION IS DIFFERENT (DISAGREEMENT), KY DESIRED TO SAY SOMETHING DIFFERENT. KY EMPHASIZED THAT HE WANTED TO KNOW THE REACTION TO HIS QUOTE PLAN UNQUOTE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. KY WANTED TO ANNOUNCE IT BEFORE HE RETURNED TO SAIGON AND ASKED DIEM TO LET HIM KNOW RIGHT AWAY. DIEM AFFIRMED HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER DIRECTLY WITH KY THERE ON SATURDAY AND PROMISED TO INFORM KY IMMEDIATELY IF DIEM OBTAINED ANYTHING SOONER.

PAGE THREE (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

A COMPANION OF KY'S IN PARIS NAMED KHOI THEREAFTER TOLD DIEM THAT KY HAD BEEN REPORTED TO HAVE MADE REMARKS AT A RECEPTION LAST NIGHT TO THE EFFECT THAT AN ARTICLE BY KISSINGER (POSSIBLY HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER, RECENTLY NAMED BY PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) WAS QUOTE JUNK UNQUOTE. KHOI ADVISED A STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED DENYING KY MADE THIS REMARK BECAUSE KY HAD NOT EVEN READ THE ARTICLE YET AND HAD REQUESTED DIEM TO SEND HIM A COPY OF THE ARTICLE.

GP-1

END
WH PLS ACK

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLS 00-231
By: cb/jow sARA Date: 12-19-08

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN

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1257AM 12-19-68 RM

PRIORITY

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TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ;-55.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 02V
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

1968 DEC 19 06 55

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

ON DECEMBER EIGHTEEN LAST, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST LEARNED THAT AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM WAS IN TOUCH WITH AN UNKNOWN MALE (POSSIBLY VICE-PRESIDENT KY).

DIEM STATED HE EXPLAINED TO QUOTE THEM UNQUOTE THAT WE HAD CHANGED QUOTE MEANS UNQUOTE AND THERE WAS NO PROBLEM, BUT ON MATTERS OF QUOTE SUBSTANCE UNQUOTE WE DISCUSSED THINGS CLEARLY AND NOW THERE ARE AMBIGUITIES ARISING LIKE THOSE JUST EXPRESSED A FEW DAYS AGO.

UNKNOWN MALE STATED HE HAD TALKED WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND AT HOME THEY FEAR THERE HAS BEEN TOO MUCH YIELDING ALREADY. THEY THINK QUOTE WE INQUOTE HAVE GIVEN IN TOO MUCH ON THE
END PAG ONE

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

MATTER OF THE TABLE, BUT IT WAS EXPLAINED WE HAD TO SHOW THEM OUR GOOD WILL. THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE GONE TOO FAR ALREADY AND THAT IS THE KIND OF DIFFICULTY BEING RECEIVED FROM BACK HOME.

THE AMBASSADOR STATED HE HAD SPOKEN WITH THE PEOPLE ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE QUOTE NEW PEOPLE UNQUOTE, AS THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. THE UNKNOWN MALE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR TO MEET BOTH THE OLD AND THE NEW PEOPLE AND EXPLAIN SO THEY ALL UNDERSTAND, AND IF NECESSARY LITH THE NEW PEOPLE, EXPLAIN QUOTE MY PLAN UNQUOTE.

THE UNKNOWN MALE STATED HE HAD ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO APPEAR ON QUOTE FACE THE NATION UNQUOTE PAREN ON TAPE PAREN NEXT SUNDAY, AND THAT AFTERWARDS HE WOULD PERHAPS RETURN HOME. UNKNOWN MALE REQUESTED THE AMBASSADOR TO COME QUOTE HERE UNQUOTE BY THURSDAY IF POSSIBLE.

GP-1

~~SECRET~~

NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NCS 00-231
By cb/jdw *ARA Date 12-19-00

NEW CRISIS FOR TFX "WONDER PLANE"

The highly touted plane that plagued both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations is again in trouble—headed directly into Richard Nixon's lap this time. At stake: a 4-billion-dollar investment.

The long-troubled F-111 warplane—originally the TFX—is once again caught up in a fight for survival. Its fate will almost certainly become one of Richard Nixon's first big decisions in defense.

The plane—called "McNamara's biggest blooper" by its critics—was born in controversy in 1961, buffeted by years of congressional and military opposition, and plagued with seemingly endless problems from the start.

Latest troubles: The Navy version of the plane has been canceled outright. The strategic-bomber version is under heavy fire. The fighter-bomber models in Thailand, restricted from combat after three crashes, are being called home. Australia has refused to accept any more of its order at this time.

At the Pentagon, officials are debating how much of the remaining program—after a 4-billion-dollar investment—should be canceled. Position papers and opinions have been gathered from the Pentagon's top officials.

End of a dream? Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford has acknowledged that the question of the plane's future was on his desk. Mr. Clifford at the same time came to the defense of the Air Force's fighter-bomber version—the model that is now operational.

In November, in a pre-election speech in Texas, Mr. Nixon indicated he would oppose any plans to scrap the F-111 fighter-bomber entirely.

With congressional opposition hardening, however, and some of the Pentagon's top civilian advisers now urging a cutback, the initial reaction of Mr. Nixon and the support of the Air Force itself may not be enough to head off future deep cuts in the program.

How it began. Perhaps no military project in the 1960s began with more promise and hope. It was to introduce one of the most radical innovations in aeronautics since the jet engine—wings to be spread for short takeoffs and landings, then pulled back close to the plane's body for speeds more than twice the velocity of sound. The TFX—as it was known in development—was to be the prime example of former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's pet theory of purchasing—"commonality."

Within days after he became Defense Secretary in 1961, Mr. McNamara began pushing the Navy and Air Force to get together on a common design for an airplane they could both use. Mr. McNamara estimated that this principle of commonality in an all-purpose airplane would save 1 billion dollars.

Cost was to be 3 million dollars each. The plane was to be a fighter, strategic bomber, reconnaissance plane and fleet-

defense interceptor for the Air Force and Navy. The public was told in 1962 that as many as 1,700 might be built. Besides Air Force and Navy purchases, Britain and Australia had also agreed to buy. Canada and West Germany were considered prospective customers.

From the start, critics said "commonality" was a concept doomed to failure. It was opposed on both military and economic grounds.

Now the cost has soared to 7 million dollars per plane. The British have canceled their order entirely. The Canadian Government has made no overture at all for the plane. West Germany is stocking up with America's more proven warplanes. On top of that, the long-term purchasing plans of the Air Force, the plane's biggest potential user, have steadily dwindled.

After 11 crashes, the Defense Department owns only 94 F-111s: 89 are Air Force fighter-bombers, one is an Air Force strategic bomber, and four remain of the Navy test version.

Unhappy landing. It has been a long and bitter road for the F-111, but 1968 has been particularly difficult:

- In January, Prime Minister Harold Wilson canceled Britain's entire order for 50 of the F-111s, at an estimated cost of \$1,020,000,000 with supporting equipment. The decision meant that Britain preferred to lose about 450 million dollars in penalties.

- In April, the loss of three planes in Southeast Asia less than a month after they had begun combat missions caused the Air Force to take the F-111s out of the war. They did not fly in combat again. Because the wings of a test F-111 broke off during a structural test two months before the planes went into combat, the planes were operating under "flight restrictions" when they crashed. Air Force officers say these restrictions were normal for a new plane.

- In July, Air Force Secretary Harold Brown ordered all work halted on the Navy version of the plane. The decision was forced by Congress, dissatisfied with progress in making the plane suitable for aircraft carriers. At the time of the decision, only six had been delivered to the Navy. The Navy at one time was to have ordered 200 to 300.

- In early September the Air Force announced at Australian presentation ceremonies in Texas that the F-111 was ready to resume combat flights in Vietnam. This meant to the Australians that they were getting a combat-ready plane.

A week previous to the ceremonies, however, a vital part of the swing-wing operation had failed in stress tests. The day after the ceremonies in Texas, the

stress-test results were announced by the Defense Department and severe flight restrictions were imposed on all F-111s. The Australian Government was disturbed and announced it would accept no more aircraft until they were completely cleared. Metal-fatigue experts were sent to the U.S. to make an independent assessment.

- In late September, the Air Force imposed still further restrictions, ordering a temporary halt of all F-111 flights. It was the second time in 1968 that all flights of the plane had been stopped. The Air Force had a new reason: Two more planes within the month had gone down while flying under more lenient flight restrictions. The crashes in September brought the total to 11—nine Air Force planes and two Navy versions, at an estimated cost of between 70 millions and 100 millions.

- In October, an even harder blow was struck at the F-111 program. The Office of Systems Analysis, where policy is refined for the Defense Secretary, reportedly recommended that the strategic-bomber version of the plane be cut back sharply, and suggested that even the fighter-bomber version be reconsidered. The Pentagon's "whiz kids," under Assistant Defense Secretary Alain C. Enthoven, were said to have determined that the strategic-bomber version was inadequate for its long-range mission, and that this model had become too expensive—10 million dollars a copy.

- Late in October, the Air Force announced once again that the F-111 was no longer restricted from flying. In permitting the F-111 to fly again, the Air Force imposed rules restricting the pilot's ability to maneuver until the latest wing problem could be corrected. All present and future aircraft must be modified so the structure holding the wings—called the wing box—is reinforced.

McNamara's baby. As much as any airplane program can be said to belong to a Defense Secretary, it is agreed at the Pentagon that the F-111 is Mr. McNamara's. He carefully shepherded the plane through its many crises, until he resigned earlier this year. For many months, top executives of the firms building the planes gathered each Saturday morning in Mr. McNamara's office at the Pentagon to tackle problems head on.

When Mr. McNamara left the Pentagon on February 28, the planes were being prepared for duty in Southeast Asia. Combat missions began in March, despite complaints by critics that the plane had been rushed into battle too soon.

Three of the eight sent to Asia crashed in a month. The planes were restricted less than two months after Mr. McNamara left the Pentagon. They are now being returned to the U.S. for modification.

However much Mr. McNamara is criticized for the F-111, even his bitterest opponents agree the Australian contract alone should insure the Pentagon under his administration a reputation for shrewd bargaining. The Australians signed a contract that had no definite price tag—but contained strict penalties for cancellation.

Now that the price has been set, it

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

LN
Put in special file

U.S. Assesses Its Asia "Crisis Policy"

By Warren Unna
Washington Post Staff Writer

NOT LONG AGO, Harvard Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, in a talk here before the American Political Science Association, urged that the United States Government develop some mechanism to plan ahead and thereby avoid the "piece-by-piece" small decisions which resulted in the present huge commitment in Vietnam.

Reischauer noted that the one section of the Government which supposedly does long-range planning, the State Department's 15-man Policy Planning Council, had "sunk into the vast bureaucratic sea," now was too remote from a busy President and his busy aides to have its thoughtful papers given the proper attention.

As one remedy, Reischauer suggested that a group of five to ten be chosen personally by the President to concentrate on long-range problems. Reischauer specified that the group have direct access to both the President and the Secretary of State, and be freed of political and emotional commitments to past Government policies.

Reischauer said he had his eyes opened when he joined the Kennedy Administration as U.S. Ambassador to Japan and discovered the top decision makers in Washington simply weren't concerning themselves with Japanese-American relations. Reischauer later came to the conclusion that the fundamental law in government planning was: "The more important the decision, the less thought is given to it."

c-3

REISCHAUER'S FINDING seemed to be borne out this summer when Georgetown

University's Center for Strategic Studies issued a report on critical issues affecting U.S.-Japanese political relations.

The panel members making the report made no attempt at unanimity. But they did conclude that two things were vital to U.S. interests: a friendly, peaceful, stable Japan, and retention of the U.S. military base at Okinawa.

Since even the revision of the U.S.-Japanese mutual defense treaty in 1960 caused anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese government riots and the fall of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's government, it could well be that the two vital U.S. interests mentioned by the panel are incompatible.

Yet when this question was put to Adm. Arleigh Burke, former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and now director of the Center for Strategic Studies, he replied the U.S. Okinawa base and a friendly, peaceful, stable Japan were "two different babies." And Gen. Paul W. Caraway, a panel member who formerly was both U.S. High Commissioner for the Ryukyus and commanding general of the U.S. Army there, declared the fall of any future Japanese government over a firm U.S. stand on Okinawa "simply wouldn't happen."

The late Gen. George C. Marshall, who during his career was both Secretary of State and Defense, tried to anticipate such compartmentalized thinking by setting up State's first Policy Planning Council under a leading foreign service philosopher, George F. Kennan. Marshall ordered Kennan and his group to sign no cables and assume no operational responsibilities.

By contrast, the Council's present chairman, Henry D. Owen, a career foreign service officer, is known as one of the conceivers of the now abortive NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) and, more importantly, its chief advocate.

The ideal situation, of course, would be

to have U.S. long-range planning in such fine form that all you would need do is pull out the blueprint for each future objective and press a button for the what-to-do card on each unexpected contingency. But today's planning, as Reischauer notes, is far from ideal.

c-3

WHEN HE MOVED over from being Attorney General to becoming Under Secretary of State, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach tried to stiffen long-range planning through the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG).

And under SIG's direction, a State-Defense study now is being conducted of U.S. military bases abroad. The idea is to hand the President a long inventory listing costs in gold drain and manpower, security importance and alternatives should the bases be considered unnecessary, marginal, even vital.

There has been no indication that anybody in Washington is yet focusing upon a post-Vietnam Southeast Asia when the liberative business of war no longer is available to provide prosperous trade for such countries as Thailand and South Korea.

As far as can be learned, all new suggestions for future U.S. relations with Communist China have been waved off by Secretary of State Dean Rusk with the comment, "not the time."

But as Reischauer declared, and most U.S. officials now acknowledge, the present U.S. predicament in Vietnam is the result of lack of forward planning and crisis-to-crisis decisions ending up with a de facto involvement.

Presumably the new Administration would like to protect itself with some mechanism for long-range planning which, at least, would alert it to the dangers of future "piece by piece" commitments.

TFX ... CONTINUED

will cost Australia about 300 million dollars, one quarter of Australia's defense budget for 1968-69, for 24 planes and equipment. To cancel, the Australian Government would have to pay a penalty of about 200 million dollars.

Expert's appraisal. Senator Stuart Symington, the Missouri Democrat who once was Secretary of the Air Force, makes this assessment of the fighter-bomber version, the most promising of all the models:

"The F-111A has range. It has payload roughly the same as the F-105, F-4, A-6 and A-7; but cannot carry on combat missions those bombs we were led to believe it could. It does have blind-bombing capability more accurate than the F-4 or F-105. But it is too large and too expensive to be used for daylight dive bombing, too sluggish and too unmaneuverable to risk in air-to-air combat, and too expensive to commit to the kind of action where a man with a rifle might knock it down. Nor can the F-111 do the fighter role it was supposed to be capable of. No one even claims that any more.

"Let us look at the FB-111 for SAC [Strategic Air Command]. It is going to replace the early B-52s and the B-58s, but it does not have the payload capability of either—actually has shorter range than the planes it would be replacing."

Dark future. What then are the prospects for the F-111?

The Navy says: "Count us out." Top admirals never wanted the plane, and

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 2 DEC. 1968 (24 NOV.)

At least half a dozen Americans now in Saigon have been telling both Vietnamese officials and Americans that they are "Nixon contact men"—thereby aggravating an already messy negotiating situation involving the U. S. Embassy and top Vietnamese officials.

were glad to see the Navy version killed by Congress.

The British will not come back for a second look. Burned badly when the U. S. in 1962 withdrew the Skybolt missile they had ordered, the British had few qualms about canceling out after a new disappointment and are not expected to change their minds.

The Australians still are doubtful. They say they will accept 24, if the plane is set right. But they are not likely to double their order, as was considered at one time. Moreover, steadily rising criticism at home could still force the Australian Government to back out.

The Air Force is deeply committed. It has nothing better in sight at this moment. The Air Force may have to settle for only 100 of the 253 strategic-bomber planes it was counting on, but the generals will fight to get all of the 493 fighter-bombers that are still being planned for.

The betting is that, in the end, there will be 600 F-111s in the Air Force inventory, at very high cost, rather than the 1,700 economical planes Mr. McNamara had expected to serve all. [END]

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 2 DEC. 1968 (24 NOV.)

An important group in the Australian Cabinet is urging that the country adopt a "Fortress Australia" strategy, developing a nuclear deterrent of its own and pulling back from a "forward policy" of defending Malaysia and Singapore.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 2 DEC. 1968 (24 NOV.)

Russian soldiers who took part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia are being stationed in remote sites in Siberia when they return to the Soviet Union, according to intelligence sources. Many Russian soldiers were disillusioned by what they found in Czechoslovakia, and they are being reassigned to isolated areas where few fellow Russians can hear their complaints.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 2 DEC. 1968 (24 NOV.)

General de Gaulle is being criticized in France for pulling most of the French fleet out of the Mediterranean and basing it in the Atlantic at a time when Russia is a growing threat in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Soviet control of the Algerian Air Force through use of technicians and instructors is another worry to the French.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Rostow:

Sol W. Sanders is
on staff of US news +
World Report

BKS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE 7/a

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PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

19 21 37 Nov 68

CITE TDCS DB-315/04260-68

DIST 18 NOVEMBER 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [REDACTED] NOVEMBER 1968

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S COMMENTS ON PEACE TALKS

IMPASSE [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-31 appeal
By cbm , NARA Date 6+01

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 NOVEMBER 1968) [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

SOURCE HAS BEEN AN

INFREQUENT REPORTER SINCE 1964 BUT HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN FAIRLY RELIABLE.

[REDACTED]

SOURCE IS NEW AND UNTESTED;

HOWEVER, HIS FIRST FEW REPORTS INDICATE HE MAY PROVE TO BE AN ARTICULATE AND CAREFUL REPORTER.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABRDAD~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE PRESSURE EXERTED ON HIM BY THE U. S. DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT DISCUSSIONS. HE TERMED THE U. S. ACTION A "BETRAYAL" AND SAID VICE PRESIDENT KY FULLY SUPPORTED HIS POLICY ON THE PEACE TALKS ISSUE, INCLUDING HIS TWO-DELEGATION PROPOSAL. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT RESHUFFLE HIS CABINET IN AN EFFORT TO PLEASE THE NEW U. S. ADMINISTRATION.

[REDACTED] THIEU REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION NEVER TO TALK WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) REPRESENTATIVES OUTSIDE OF SAIGON. THE ONLY FORMULA FOR THE PARIS TALKS HE WILL ACCEPT IS ONE WHICH REQUIRES THE NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES TO BE A PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION. THIEU THINKS PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON WILL LET PRESIDENT JOHNSON TRY TO SOLVE THE TALKS IMPASSE SINCE A SOLUTION BY JOHNSON WOULD MAKE NIXON'S JOB AFTER INAUGURATION EASIER.

END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: OTHER INFORMATION [REDACTED] INDICATES THAT BY 15 NOVEMBER PRESIDENT THIEU HAD RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE U. S. AND FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE HARD LINE ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS THAT HE TOOK IN HIS 2 NOVEMBER

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABRDAD~~~~SECRET~~


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SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THIS REPORT IS, THEREFORE, ALREADY OUTDATED AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ON THE PARIS TALKS. IT DOES SERVE TO SHOW, HOWEVER, THE STRENGTH OF THIEU'S RESENTMENT OVER AMERICAN POLICY AND SEVERAL OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS ON WHICH HIS OWN STAND WAS BASED. IT ALSO SHOWS THAT, AS LATE AS 11 NOVEMBER, THIEU WAS STILL ENJOYING PLAYING THE POPULAR ROLE OF DEFENDER OF VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INTERESTS.)

2.

 PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE TO WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD SUBJECTED HIM DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT DISCUSSIONS. ACCORDING TO THIEU, THE AMERICANS HAD CITED THE SIZE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT IN BLOOD AND MONEY AS JUSTIFICATION FOR INSISTING THAT U.S. INTERESTS PREVAIL AND HAD CITED THE PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) OF A HALF MILLION U.S. TROOPS. THIEU SAID HE HAD HAD TO REMIND THE AMERICANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR WAS IN FACT, LARGER THAN THE U.S. COMMITMENT.

3. THIEU CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION AS A

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

"BETRAYAL" COMPARABLE TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK AS A RESULT OF THE YALTA, TEHERAN AND CASABLANCA CONFERENCES. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SENT THE AUSTRALIAN, AND KOREAN AMBASSADORS TO BADGER HIM INTO ACCEPTING THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW. THIEU OBSERVED THAT VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, WHO WAS NOT PRESENT, WAS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH HIS POLICY ON THE PARIS TALKS QUESTION, INCLUDING HIS RECENTLY ENUNCIATED "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA.

4. THIEU TOLD HIS [REDACTED] THAT DURING THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN HE HAD SENT TWO SECRET EMISSARIES TO THE U.S. TO CONTACT RICHARD NIXON. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT RESHUFFLE THE CABINET IN AN EFFORT TO PLEASE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE POSTS OF PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER.

5. THERE WAS SOME CONFIDENTIAL TALK AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S GUESTS ABOUT ORGANIZING CATHOLICS "TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS WHEN THE TIME COMES." THIEU HIMSELF REFERRED ONCE TO HIS "KNOWLEDGE" OF AMERICAN-PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS FOR PEACE BY THE AN QUANG BUDDHIST FACTION.

6. [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

7.

ASKED

TO EXPLAIN HIS

"TWO-DELEGATION" FORMULA, THIEU SAID HIS IDEA WAS THAT ALL POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN PARIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE GVN AND HANOI REPRESENTATIVES, ALTHOUGH THE GVN WOULD DEFER TO THE U.S. ON SUCH MATTERS AS DISPOSITION OF MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS.

8. IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION [REDACTED]

THIEU SAID HE WAS FIRM IN HIS DETERMINATION TO TALK ONLY WITH HANOI. HE WILL NEVER TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) OUTSIDE OF SVN, THIEU SAID, ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUES TO HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT TALKS WITH NFLSV SPOKESMEN IN SAIGON. THE OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TO AND FROM SUCH TALKS STILL STANDS. THIEU SAID HE HAS A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO OLDER PEOPLE TO KEEP UP THEIR CONFIDENCE HE WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE THE NFLSV. TALKING WITH NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

OUTSIDE OF SAIGON WOULD AMOUNT TO SUCH RECOGNITION. HE EMPHASIZED HE WOULD WELCOME AS WITNESSES TO GVN/HANOI TALKS ALL COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE UNITED NATIONS BUT WOULD REMAIN FIRM ON HIS STAND THAT THE ONLY FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO HIM IS ONE WHICH REQUIRED THE NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES TO BE PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION IN PARIS. :

9. THIEU SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS TWO-DELEGATION PROPOSAL SINCE THE RECENT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON. HE EXPECTS NIXON TO LET JOHNSON TRY TO SOLVE THE TALKS CRISIS AND TO GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD REACHING A SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD MAKE NIXON'S OWN JOB EASIER AFTER INAUGURATION AND WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION THE OBVIOUS MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO DISENGAGE THE U.S. FROM SVN, THUS ALLOWING NIXON TO BE THE "HERO" WHO DE-AMERICANIZED THE WAR.

10. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, MR. COLBY, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL BROWN) (ALSO SENT [REDACTED] REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/

~~SECRET~~

Nixon Holding Talks With Staff

By GARNETT D. HORNER
Star Staff Writer

MIAMI — President-elect Richard M. Nixon planned some meetings with his staff today after spending most of Sunday relaxing — and thinking — alone.

Presumably he was giving some thought to the selection of his Cabinet as well as mulling over and writing down ideas for the inaugural address in which he will set the tone of his presidency on Jan. 20.

Aides said the President-elect has made no final decision on who will fill any of the 12 Cabinet posts at the start of his administration. He has served notice that he will not announce any Cabinet appointments until after Dec. 5.

Talent Is Sought

Talent scouts — men he trusts who worked with him in his campaign — are said to be scouring the country for the kind of men Nixon wants for top government posts.

One of his key aides, Herbert G. Klein, said on a CBS television interview program yesterday that Nixon's effort is "to get the best qualified men regardless of their party or color" for his Cabinet.

Klein himself may or may not be in the Nixon administration. He served as "director of communications" in the 1968 campaign and has been associated with most of Nixon's political campaigns as his top public relations adviser.

Offered Position

He said yesterday he has been offered a "policy position" and is considering it. He added that he would like to have a role in the Nixon administration "if I think it is structured right." Otherwise, he said, "I would be going into private enterprise."

Klein said he will be talking with Nixon some more about whether the position under consideration for him "will work."

Klein said that Nixon, like any new chief executive, must give



President-elect Richard Nixon looks over the Miami-Alabama football game program with "Bebe" Rebozo at the Orange Bowl.

—United Press International

areas but you win it by concrete programs. The way you get at them is to prove yourself through practical programs.

"Probably the most dynamic program proposed during the campaign was the program for black capitalism. I think that by implementing some of these programs as rapidly as possible . . . and by working with their leaders . . . is the way you get confidence from that community.

"And you show them there really is an opportunity for them."

Klein said the Democrats "during the early stages of the Eisenhower administration" gave Nixon the image of a man who uses subterfuge and stratagems, but that this was not an issue this year.

"There was very little emotional opposition to Mr. Nixon," he said. "The emotionalism was mostly in terms of issues—Vietnam and other things."

Bomb Halt Discounted

Klein said he did not think that President Johnson's halt in the bombing of North Vietnam five days before the election was very damaging to Nixon.

"Had it come 48 hours later it might have made a greater impact," he said.

During the first 48 hours "it gave a major shot in the arm to Mr. Humphrey and Democratic party workers," he said, but later, when it became apparent that the South Vietnamese were reluctant to go along with the plan, things "started swinging back to us."

Aides said Nixon did not talk business with anybody yesterday. He went out for about an hour with C. G. "Bebe" Rebozo, an old friend who lives next door to the house Nixon is renting, for a cruise around parts of Biscayne Bay. The rest of the time he spent alone in the house.

He plans to remain here through tomorrow. He is expected to fly back to his transition headquarters in New York Wednesday for an active schedule of conferences with staff members and leaders in several fields of national interest.

top priority to establishing individual trust and support among the people.

through a very personalized leadership."

Asked what efforts Nixon would make to win support of

Negroes and other minority groups, Klein said:

"You don't win the confidence by motorcades through the

Washington-Saigon Feud

Details Leak Out of Backstage Fight Between U.S. and South Vietnam

By Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson

THE EXPLOSIVE details have now leaked out about the backstage blowup between the United States and South Vietnam, which threaten to wreck the Paris peace negotiations before they start.

All along, the South Vietnamese had agreed, in principle, to a bombing halt, provided they were given a place at the truce table. As the delicate negotiations were about to bear fruit, however, they suddenly began throwing up procedural objections. In both Paris and Saigon, the Americans and South Vietnamese wound up shouting angry insults at each other.

The South Vietnamese leaders became convinced that President Johnson was trying to rush through an agreement on a bombing halt just before the election in order to win votes for Hubert Humphrey. They felt strongly that LBJ was selling them out, that he was more concerned about winning the election than winning the war.

The President, meanwhile, learned that Saigon's Ambassador Bui Diem had been in touch secretly with Richard Nixon's people. There were unconfirmed reports that South Vietnamese leaders had even slipped campaign cash to Nixon representatives. These reports made Mr. Johnson suspicious that the South Vietnamese were trying to sabotage the peace negotiations in the hope that Nixon would win the election and take a harder line.

THE FINAL BLOWUP really was sparked in Paris, where Ambassador Averell Harriman had carefully kept Saigon's chief observer, Pham Dang Lam, informed on the progress of the bombing halt negotiations.

Lam understood, of course, that the National Liberation Front would accompany the North Vietnamese delegation to the conference. But he began bickering over whether they would sit apart from the Hanoi delegation and whether they would be allowed to display the Vietcong flag.

When he demanded that the NLF be regarded as part of the Hanoi delegation and that the negotiations be billed as a three-power conference, Harriman exploded.

"All your pretensions are out of this world!" he is reported to have scolded.

After an angry exchange, Harriman told Lam bluntly: "Your government does not represent all of South Vietnam, Mr. Ambassador, and

you would do well to remember that."

The infuriated Lam fired off a scathing cable to Saigon, accusing the Americans of tricking the South Vietnamese. The cable quoted Harriman as stating that Hanoi had agreed to nothing except that a South Vietnamese delegation could be seated.

AS IT HAPPENED, the cable arrived while President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky were conferring in Saigon's Independence Palace with U. S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Deputy Ambassador Samuel Berger.

They had already agreed upon a joint statement which would have announced the bombing halt and the expanded peace conference. At South Vietnamese insistence, they had also agreed to add: "The two Presidents wish to make it clear that neither the Republic of Vietnam nor the United States will recognize the National Liberation Front as an entity separate from North Vietnam."

The approval of the joint communique seemed to clear the way for a bombing halt. When Bunker informed Thieu that the peace talks would begin on Nov. 2, however, the South Vietnamese President balked. He secretly believed, it later came out, that the date had been set to help Humphrey on the eve of the Nov. 5 election.

Thieu objected that the South Vietnamese delegation couldn't possibly be ready in time for a Nov. 2 meeting. It would take time, he said, to arrange the accreditation and transportation.

At this point, Lam's explosive cable was delivered to President Thieu. His face clouded as he read it and he asked the Americans to step into the next room so he could consult with his advisers. After the consultation, an angry Thieu handed Bunker the cable and de-

manded an explanation. Bunker suggested that Lam must have misunderstood Harriman and promised to return with a clarification.

It was 1 a.m. Saigon time when Bunker and Berger hurried back to the American Embassy. They put through an urgent phone call to President Johnson, who dictated a letter to Thieu over the phone. In the letter, the President stated that he had no idea what Lam was talking about and that the United States would be bound by Bunker's word.

Bunker hand-delivered the letter to President Thieu at 2:30 a.m. and the bombing halt was postponed 24 hours while the South Vietnamese stewed over it.

THE NEXT meeting was heated. Thieu said he had never understood that the NLF would be accepted in Paris as an independent delegation. He demanded "firm and unequivocal assurances" from Hanoi that the Paris negotiations would be between Saigon and Hanoi, not Saigon and the NLF.

Ambassador Berger replied that President Johnson had made a commitment to end the bombing and indicated that he would go ahead without Saigon's approval. Thieu asked Berger acidly whether he was a "representative from Hanoi" and said South Vietnam couldn't stop President Johnson from doing whatever he wanted.

Ironically, both Bunker and Berger have glowingly praised Thieu in their secret dispatches to Washington and have quietly supported him in his political struggles with his flamboyant Vice President Ky. As evidence that Thieu and Ky now stood together against Washington, however, Ky stood dramatically behind Thieu's chair.

"You have been asking me for a year to stand behind this man," Ky told Berger. "Well, I am standing behind him now."

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Saigon boast: 'We helped elect Nixon'

By Georgie Anne Geyer
Daily News Foreign Service

SAIGON — Top Saigon officials are boasting privately they helped assure the election of Richard M. Nixon.

They are pleased about it. "We did it," one of them said. "We helped elect an American President."

Their reasoning is that by

sabotaging President Johnson's attempt to call a bombing halt two weeks before the elections they eliminated the support this would have brought for Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey.

"FIFTEEN DAYS would have done it," one cabinet minister said, obviously pleased, "but four days wasn't

enough, and we saw to that."

The same minister charged, privately, that since last spring, when the United States began meetings with Hanoi in Paris, Washington has been "working for Hanoi." The Saigon government characterizes any negotiation with its enemy as tantamount to treason.

But with Nixon as President, they believe they will have not only a more understanding fellow hard-liner but also will have time. "Johnson was under pressures to get this thing over," the minister said, "but Nixon will have at least six months or a year."

THE GOVERNMENT has long said it does not want

peace now, that it wants it only when it controls more of the country and can make better use of it. The reasoning is: "We are winning now. Why should we give up anything?"

To many American officials here it is offensive that the government for which Mr. Johnson literally gave up the Presidency and sacrificed his

political career should treat him in this way.

These officials predict, with grim satisfaction, that the Saigon government will be unpleasantly surprised with the man they think they helped put in the White House.

NIXON HAS already voiced his solidarity with President Johnson's policies. He ap-

pointed Robert Murphy, a diplomat of long experience, to be his liaison man with the White House on foreign policy during the two-months interlude before Nixon takes office.

Murphy is not considered to be the kind of man to coddle dependent, if obstreperous, allies.

INFORMATION

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
4:08 p.m.

Mr. President:

This text of Saigon's Minister of Information's press conference on the Clifford statement may interest you in general; but paragraph 15 (marked in red) will certainly interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 42588

WWRostow:rln

NOV 13 15 49

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 42588 131529Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO SAH 02, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMCONSUL DANANG

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

SUBJ: MININFO PRESS CONFERENCE ON CLIFFORD STATEMENT

1. AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 13 MINISTER OF INFORMATION TON THAT THIEN
HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR THE FOREIGN PRESS FOR THE SPECIFIC
PURPOSE

OF DENYING CERTAIN STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY CLIFFORD. (A PRESS
CONFERENCE FOR THE VIETNAMESE PRESS WAS HELD IN THE MORNING WHICH
HIGHLIGHTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:)

HIGHLIGHTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

2. THIEN OPENED BY SAYING HE HAD CONVENED THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO
COMMENT ON THE REMARKS OF SECRETARY CLIFFORD AS TO WHAT
PRESIDENT THIEU HAD SAID AND NOT SAID, ESPECIALLY THE STATEMENT
THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAD MADE A PROMISE AND THEN GONE BACK

Restow

UNCLASSIFIED

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ON HIS WORD. THIEN EXPRESSED GREAT REGRET THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR AN OFFICIAL OF THE GVN TO SPEAK PUBLICLY ON SUCH A MATTER BUT SAID THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE A HIGH OFFICIAL OF THE USG HAD MADE SUCH A STATEMENT.

3. THIEN AFFIRMED THAT "AT NO STAGE, AT NO TIME, WITH NO ONE, HAD PRESIDENT THIEU AGREED TO THE SO-CALLED TWO-SIDE, FOUR DELEGATION FORMULA."

4. THIEN THEN SAID ON OCTOBER 19 AMB. BUNKER PRESENTED THIEU WITH A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ON A BOMBING HALT. THIEU REFUSED TO SIGN BECAUSE THE TWO-SIDES FORMULATION WAS NOT CLEAR. DISCUSSIONS CONTINUED UNTIL OCTOBER 31, WHEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON DECIDED TO MAKE A UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENT. THIEN STATED "ON OCTOBER 25, PRESIDENT THIEU ASKED BUNKER WHY IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO MODIFY YOUR POSITION ON THIS FOUR-DELEGATION FORMULA, AND MR. BUNKER SAID THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY MADE A COMMITMENT FIVE MONTHS EARLIER (TO HANOI)". THIEN POINTED OUT THIS WAS ABOUT THE TIME OF THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE. IN CLOSING HIS OPENING REMARKS, THIEN SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD BE THE FIRST AND LAST TIME IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE UP SUCH MATTERS.

5. THIEN WAS ASKED WHAT HAPPENS IF THE US GOES AHEAD WITH THE PARIS TALKS. HE REPLIED THAT THE US HAS BEEN TALKING FOR 5 MONTHS ALREADY, AND MAY CONTINUE IF IT SO DESIRES. HOWEVER, ANY RESULT AFFECTING THE FATE OR INTERESTS OF VN WOULD NOT BE BINDING ON VN.

6. UNDER QUESTIONING THIEN CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN FIRMLY THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAD NEVER AGREED, EVEN TENTATIVELY, TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO HAVE ALMOST DAILY MEETINGS IF THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT.

7. ASKED WHETHER THE US PROPOSAL WAS NOT TWO-SIDED RATHER THAN FOUR-SIDED, THIEN RESPONDED THAT IT DID NOT MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NLF WOULD NOT BE A SEPARATE DELEGATION. HANOI AND THE NLF WOULD CLAIM THE NLF WOULD BE THERE AS A SEPARATE DELEGATION.

8. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE GUARANTEES

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NEEDED FROM HANOI FOR THE GVN TO PARTICIPATE, THIEN SAID THAT THERE MUST BE A STATEMENT OF HANOI ON PAPER. HE STATED THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING PUBLIC ON THE RECORD WHICH THE WHOLE WORLD CAN KNOW ABOUT.

9. THIEN SPECIFICALLY DENIED, IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES, SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S STATEMENT THAT AT ONE POINT THE ONLY REASON FOR DELAY PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT THIEU WAS THE TIME NEEDED TO ASSEMBLE A DELEGATION.

THIEN SAID THIS WAS ONLY ONE OF MANY REASONS. ACCORDING TO THIEN, IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY, AND ONLY RAISE FALSE HOPES, IF A DELEGATION WENT TO PARIS BEFORE PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN AGREED.

10. REPEATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MADE CLEAR THE USUAL GVN POSITION ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NLF: AS MANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF AS HANOI WANTS CAN BE PRESENT, AND THEY CAN SIT ANYWHERE, BUT THEY MANY NOT CALL THEMSELVES REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF OR SVN WILL WALK OUT.

11. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE US IS ACTING IN BAD FAITH, THIEN SAID SOME THINK SO BUT HE DOESN'T, AND PREFERS TO CONSIDER IT A MISUNDERSTANDING.

12. THIEN AVOIDED A DIRECT REPLY TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER US ACTIONS WERE RELATED TO THE US ELECTIONS.

13. ASKED WHAT SVN WILL DO IF THE US NEGOTIATES A MILITARY WITHDRAWAL WITH HANOI AND LEAVES SVN. THIEN REPLIED THAT THE US IS INDEPENDENT AND CAN DO AS IT LIKES. HE SAID "SOME SAY WE CAN'T WIN THE WAR WITHOUT THE US, BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THE US CANNOT WIN THE WAR WITHOUT US." HE ADDED THAT THIS REASONING ALSO APPLIES TO PEACE.

14. QUERIED AS TO WHETHER HE EXPECTED MORE SUPPORT FOR THE GVN FROM NIXON, THIEN REPLIED "ASK HIM".

15. ASKED WHETHER NIXON HAD ENCOURAGED THE GVN TO DELAY AGREEMENT WITH THE US, THIEN REPLIED THAT, WHILE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CONTACTS BETWEEN NIXON STAFFERS AND PERSONNEL OF THE SVN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, A PERSON OF THE CALIBER OF NIXON WOULD NOT DO SUCH A THING.

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BUNKER

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25

INFORMATION 77

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

read
1 30p

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
1:15 p. m.

read
1 30p

Mr. President:

Herewith the Vietnamese DCM in Washington reports in a straightforward way Nixon's and Clifford's statements.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By *id* NLJ 10-96
NARA, Date 1-10-11

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

10
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

78

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
4:40 p. m.

*Rec'd
503p*

Mr. President:

Herewith a cable from Thieu to Bui Diem (after Bui Diem left) indicating that, perhaps, Dirksen didn't complete the job and that Thieu retains an interest in the U. S. domestic political scene.

DECLASSIFIED *W. W. Rostow*
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By *isl* NLJ 10-96
NARA, Date 1-10-11

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

M. Rest

81

145 PM 11-10-68 HWL

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATT.: MR. BRONLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

P/R

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

1968 NOV 10 18 50

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

ON NOVEMBER TEN, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT HE HAD ASCERTAINED THE FOLLOWING TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR BUI DIEM, AMBASSADOR FROM VIETNAM TO THE UNITED STATES, EMBASSY OF VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.

DIEM WILL DEPART WASHINGTON, D.C., MONDAY, NOVEMBER ELEVEN NEXT, VIA UNITED AIRLINES FLIGHT NUMBER FIVE EIGHT FIVE FROM DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AT FOUR FIFTEEN PM AND ARRIVE IN SAN FRANCISCO AT SEVEN FORTY PM. ON THE SAME DATE AT NINE PM, HE WILL DEPART FROM SAN FRANCISCO ON PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS FLIGHT NUMBER EIGHT FOUR ONE AND ARRIVE IN SAIGON ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER THIRTEENTH, NEXT, AT TEN FIFTEEN AM.

GP-1

DECLASSIFIED

no for NLS 00-231

By cb/JOW ARA Date 2-9-16

END

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

82

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Sunday, November 10, 1968
12:00 noon.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message of November 8
from Bui Diem to President Thieu's office
indicating Nixon's apparent plans with
respect to Vietnam as of that time.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By *isl* NLJ 10-96
NARA, Date 1-10-11

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

83

1968 NOV 9 16 22

1116 AM 11-9-68 HWL
PRIORITY
TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 003
ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

ON NOVEMBER NINE, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED AS FOLLOWS:

SENATOR EVERETT DIRKSEN OF ILLINOIS CONTACTED VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, INSTANT DATE, ADVISING DIEM THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE DIEM AT TWELVE O'CLOCK (NOON) AT THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C., CONCERNING A VERY URGENT MATTER. DIEM ADVISED DIRKSEN THAT HE WILL BE AT EMBASSY TO SEE HIM.

GP-1

ENDAD

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-231

By CB/JOW *ARA Date 12-19-00

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 00-234
Document # 84

1:20 pm

INFORMATION *3*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

84

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Saturday, November 9, 1968
1:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a conversation of yesterday between [redacted] and a CIA official who has been in touch with him regularly. Dick Helms tells me he is a professional and accurate reporter.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

SANITIZED

8 November 1968

The following is a report by a reliable and trustworthy American of his breakfast meeting with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Ambassador Bui Diem on 8 November 1968, at the residence.

1. On the way to this meeting, the news had come over the radio that President Thieu had proposed that, under the "our side, your side", formula, South Vietnam be designated head of the Allies delegation while North Vietnam be head of the Communist one. Bui Diem had the full text of Thieu's statement. He commented that the GVN position represented only a small change in the original U. S. proposal - rather than a totally new and different formula - but that it satisfied a number of Vietnamese concerns: it gave the GVN a more prominent status than the NLF, it would put negotiations on a Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese basis rather than a U. S. -to-Vietnamese basis, and it would clearly represent a new stage of negotiations rather than a continuation of the previous phase. Asked if he thought there was much chance of Hanoi's acceptance, he replied "no," but he added that it put the GVN on the offensive rather than in the position of appearing to scuttle negotiations.

2. Asked if he thought that, under one formula or another, the negotiations would be able to resume soon, Bui Diem said that he thought it would take some time. He said that he thought the fact that the U. S. now had a President-elect would slow down the planning process on the U. S. side, since President Johnson would wish to inform and seek the opinions of the President-elect's team, and it would also take some time to repair the damage to GVN-U. S. relations. Regarding the latter point, Bui Diem said that, while there was minor substantive difference in the U. S. and GVN positions - such as the U. S. willingness to leave GVN and NLF status at the peace talks ambiguous while the GVN wanted more precision - much of the difficulty

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-233
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-11-01

in GVN-U. S. relations had derived from misunderstanding and misinterpretation. He said that there were delicate nuances in the concept of negotiations and that the two governments "used the same language but gave it different meanings". Bui Diem said he had discussed this problem with Mr. Bundy and that they had agreed that, at some time in the near future, they should go over all that has transpired between the governments in recent days and seek to find in it some guidelines for future policy.

3. Asked if the GVN felt there was any U. S. attempt at deception, referring specifically to the apparent conflict between what Ambassador Bunker reportedly told President Thieu about proposals made to Hanoi and what Ambassador Phan Dang Lam had been told by Ambassador Harriman, Bui Diem replied he could not say that that was the case, but there apparently was some feeling in the GVN that President Johnson acted with undue haste and that he may have been influenced in part by domestic politics.

4. Bui Diem said that though he would handle things differently if he was in Ambassador Lam's position, he could not criticize Lam's actions because Lam's cables only pointed up substantive differences which did exist. Although the GVN and the U. S. did agree on the bombing halt, they did not agree on the arrangements proposed for negotiations, but these disagreements could probably have been resolved amicably if the announcement of the bombing halt had not been made so precipitously.

5. Asked how he would have handled things differently if he had been in Lam's place, Bui Diem said that relations between the U. S. and GVN delegations in Paris should be warmer than they now are. He said that when relations are stiff, it is impossible to chat at length informally and assure that each side understands all the nuances of the other side's position. He said that, for example, he knew Jordan and Vance well and could joke with them; if they had disagreements, each side would know fully the reason for the disagreement and they could still joke with each other. Bui Diem said that while he could risk a joke with Ambassador Harriman, Lam could not.

6. When asked if he knew of any planning in the GVN for sending a delegation to Paris, Bui Diem replied that if the newly-proposed GVN formula was accepted, Vice President Ky could lead a delegation without having to face a woman (Mrs. Binh). He thought General Nguyen Duc Thang should accompany Ky. However, Bui Diem cautioned that a delegation should not be composed of too many Northerners. For example, if Dang Duc Khoi went, it would probably be better that he not be a member of the delegation but a behind-the-scenes public relations man. Bui Diem said he would recommend that Senator Tran Van Lam (a Southerner) be included in the delegation, and Nguyen Luu Vien might also be considered.

7. Bui Diem said he expected to return to Saigon soon. He could not state precisely when, but would wait a short time to see if his return was requested, and if that did not happen he would propose it himself. He felt it would be normal for him to report back to Saigon in person on the results and implications of the U.S. elections.

8. He repeated the statement made at our last meeting that he had no desire to be included in a GVN delegation to negotiations, but he added that he would like to visit Paris from time to time during negotiations to assist behind the scenes in any way he could.

9. In a final comment on the elections, Bui Diem said he was pleased that Senators Morse, Gruening and Clark had not been re-elected, and he said that Senator Fulbright's re-election was offset by the election of Barry Goldwater.

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

86

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

Thursday, November 7, 1968
5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

If you wish to get the story raw,
read the last paragraph, marked.

Walt
Walt Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY JOW ON 8/2/94

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

86a

'68 NOV 7 PM 3:51

1968 NOV 7 20 43

Roston

3:39PM RNK
PRIORITY 11-7-68 RNK
TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 89
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

(~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

ON NOVEMBER SEVEN, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON INSTANT DATE, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE WAS IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR BUI CONG MINH, ASSISTANT ARMED FORCES ATTACHE, EMBASSY OF VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC). THE UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL ADVISED MAJOR MINH THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A CALL FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S OFFICE, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND DESIRED TO SEE THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN DURING THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER SEVEN, INSTANT. IN VIEW OF THIS APPOINTMENT, THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN DESIRED TO DELAY HIS VISIT TO SEE MAJOR MINH UNTIL SATURDAY, NOVEMBER NINE,

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSIMINATION)
NEXT. MAJOR MINH AGREED AND THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN AND HIS WIFE WILL VISIT MAJOR AND MRS. MINH ON SATURDAY NOVEMBER NINE, NEXT, (POSSIBLY AT MAJOR MINH'S RESIDENCE ONE ZERO EIGHT ZERO FIVE GEORGIA AVENUE, APARTMENT TWO ZERO ONE, WHEATON, MARYLAND).

THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN INQUIRED AS TO HOW THE PEACE TALKS WERE COMING, AND MAJOR MINH EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE MOVE BY SAIGON WAS TO HELP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE NIXON, AND THAT HAD SAIGON GONE TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HUMPHREY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE WON.

GP-1

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-231

By 6/30/04 vARA Date 12/19/00

106 PM 11-6-68 LL
PRIORITY
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

004 ~~SECRET NOFORN~~

89

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

✓ Rostow

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM. 1968 NOV 6 18 11

ON NOVEMBER SIX INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

MRS. NGUYEN THE LOC, SECOND SECRETARY, EMBASSY OF VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., ON INSTANT DATE, CONTACTED MRS. ROSS ADAIR, WIFE OF CONGRESSMAN E. ROSS ADAIR OF INDIANA. MRS. LOC CONGRATULATED MRS. ADAIR ON THEIR REELECTION AND MRS. ADAIR EXPRESSED SUSPICIONS THAT THE VOTES HAD NOT AS YET BEEN COUNTED AND FELT THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON, DESCRIBING THE SITUATION AS TRAGIC. MRS. ADAIR IN MENTIONING THE NATIONAL ELECTION IN NINETEEN HUNDRED SIXTY, COMMENTED THAT "IT" HAPPENED THEN AND FORTUNATELY "WE" HAVE PEOPLE WORKING ON
END PAGE ONE

68 NOV 6 PM 1:19
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~
BOTH SIDES NOW TO KEEP MATTERS IN LINE. SHE COMMENTED FURTHER THAT IN SOME AREAS ONE HAS TO BE VERY WATCHFUL.

THE NINETEEN HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY LISTS CONGRESSMAN E. ROSS ADAIR, REPUBLICAN, FOURTH DISTRICT, INDIANA.
GP-1

END AND HOLD FOR ACK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 00-231
By JOW v.ARA Date 12-19-00

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

323 PM 11-4-68 HWL
PRIORITY
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, 004
ATT; MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

1968 NOV 4 20 26

Restow

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM

DURING LATE MORNING OF NOVEMBER FOUR INSTANT, AN UNKNOWN WHITE MALE ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY OF VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., IN TAXI CAB. UNIDENTIFIED WHITE MALE EXITED THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY ABOUT FORTY-FIVE MINUTES LATER AND LEFT BY CAB. ENROUTE THE UNIDENTIFIED WHITE MALE WAS OBSERVED TO BE READING A LEGAL SIZE WHITE PAPER. AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE NOON HE WAS OBSERVED TO ARRIVE AT THE WEST GATE OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND ENTER.

ON INSTANT DATE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WHITE HOUSE POLICE, IDENTIFIED THE INDIVIDUAL WHO HAD JUST ENTERED THE WHITE HOUSE AS SAVILLE DAVIS OF THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR.
GP-1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-231
By CB/JDW vARA Date 12-19-00

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

END AND ACK
XCKV

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

91
Received Washington CommCen
12:00 P.M. EDT Monday 4 Nov 68

ps
EYES ONLY

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
12:12 P.M. CDT Monday 4 Nov 68

EEA686
*****ZZ WTE10
DE WTE 4219

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82675

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-218

By cb/50w vARA Date 9-26-95

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
HEREWITH FULL ACCOUNT SAVILLE DAVIS - BUI DIEM CONVERSATION.

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT ON THE LATE MORNING OF NOVEMBER
FOUR, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT SAVILLE DAVIS, WASHINGTON BUREAU.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR NEWSPAPER, CONTACTED A REPRESENTA-
TIVE OF THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND
ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM. WHEN
INFORMED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS BUSY, DAVIS STATED HE WANTED
TO CHECK OUT A STORY RECEIVED FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN SAIGON
AND THAT DAVIS PLANS TO COME TO THE EMBASSY AND WAIT FOR
THE AMBASSADOR TO SEE HIM.

DAVIS SAID THAT THE DISPATCH FROM SAIGON CONTAINS THE
ELEMENTS OF A MAJOR SCANDAL WHICH ALSO INVOLVES THE VIETNAMESE
AMBASSADOR AND WHICH WILL AFFECT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
RICHARD NIXON IF THE MONITOR PUBLISHES IT. TIME IS OF THE
ESSENCE INASMUCH AS DAVIS HAS A DEADLINE TO MEET IF HE
PUBLISHES IT. HE SPECULATED THAT SHOULD THE STORY BE
PUBLISHED, IT WILL CREATE A GREAT DEAL OF EXCITEMENT.

DTG: 041800Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

ln

11/4/68 12 10

91a

Saville Davis of the Christian Science Monitor
is upstairs: 347-4953

He said they are holding out of the paper a
sensational dispatch from Saigon (from their
Saigon correspondent) the 1st para of which reads:
"Purported political encouragement from the
Richard Nixon camp was a significant factor in the
last-minute decision of President Thieu's refusal
to send a delegation to the Paris peace talks --
at least until the American Presidential election
is over. "

He said he will await WWR's comments.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
HEREWITH FULL ACCOUNT SAVILLE DAVIS - BUI DIEM CONVERSATION.

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

916

A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT ON THE LATE MORNING OF NOVEMBER FOUR, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT SAVILLE DAVIS, WASHINGTON BUREAU. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR NEWSPAPER, CONTACTED A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM. WHEN INFORMED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS BUSY, DAVIS STATED HE WANTED TO CHECK OUT A STORY RECEIVED FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN SAIGON AND THAT DAVIS PLANS TO COME TO THE EMBASSY AND WAIT FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO SEE HIM.

*delivered to
Pres at 1:23pm*

DAVIS SAID THAT THE DISPATCH FROM SAIGON CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A MAJOR SCANDAL WHICH ALSO INVOLVES THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AND WHICH WILL AFFECT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE RICHARD NIXON IF THE MONITOR PUBLISHES IT. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE INASMUCH AS DAVIS HAS A DEADLINE TO MEET IF HE PUBLISHES IT. HE SPECULATED THAT SHOULD THE STORY BE PUBLISHED, IT WILL CREATE A GREAT DEAL OF EXCITEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DTG: 041800Z NOV 68

12:42 PM 11-4-68 NSM
PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 002
ATT: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

1968 NOV 4 17 46

*Literally Eyes Only
for the President
For the President
From what
Rustow
Harcourt
Full account
Saville Davis -
Bui Dien
Conspirators.*

(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) EMBASSY
OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

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*sent Pres at
Rund via wire
CAP 82675*

PAGE TWO (SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
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ADMINISTRATIVE:

INFORMA
BUST PAGE TWO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 94-218
By cb/sow *ARA Date 9-26-95

PAGE TWO (SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
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GP-1

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

END AND ACK

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

EEA686
*****ZZ WTE 10
DE WTE 4219

1968 NOV 4 18 17

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82675

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
HEREWITH FULL ACCOUNT SAVILLE DAVIS - BUI DIEM CONVERSATION.

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

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DTG: 041800Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

12:42 PM 11-4-68 NEM

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 002

ATT: MR. BROMLEY SMITH

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

1968 NOV 4 17 46

~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~
OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

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PAGE TWO

~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~
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ADMINISTRATIVE:

INFORMA

BUST PAGE TWO

PAGE TWO ~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~

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GP-1

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

END AND ACK

November 4, 1968

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Bui Diem to Thieu on U. S. reaction to your speech.

*sent Pres at Ranch
via wire
CAPS 26 85*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By NLJ 10-96
NARA, Date 1-10-11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Senator Smathers called to report on a call he got from Nixon. Nixon said he understands the President is ready to blast him for allegedly collaborating with Tower and Chennault to slow the peace talks. Nixon says there is not any truth at all in this allegation. Nixon says there has been no contact at all.

Tonight on "Meet the Press" Nixon will again back up the President and say he (Nixon) would rather get peace now than be President. Also tomorrow night, Nixon will say he will undertake any assignment the President has for him whether that be to go to Hanoi or Paris or whatever in order to get peace.

Nixon told Smathers he hoped the President would not make such a charge.

JimJ
11:25 am
11-3-68

5-40 PM 11-1-68 LRC

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 010
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

Roblow
95

~~SECRET~~ -- NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

ON NOVEMBER ONE INSTANT, AN INFORMANT, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, LEARNED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FROM VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES BUI DIEM: 1968 NOV 1 22 49

ON THE SAME DATE, DIEM DISCUSSED THE VIETNAM SITUATION WITH SPENCER DAVIS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS. IN REPLY TO DAVIS' QUESTION IF DIEM WAS GOING TO PARIS, DIEM STATED HE WISHED TO AVOID ANY COMMENT AT THIS TIME, ADDING THAT HE, DIEM, WAS STILL IN TOUCH WITH HIS GOVERNMENT, AND, FOR THE TIME BEING, HE WAS WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. DIEM CONFIRMED THAT THE VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT WAS TO SPEAK TONIGHT AND DIEM REQUESTED DAVIS TO PRINT NOTHING UNTIL AFTER HIS SPEECH. DIEM REQUESTED AND DAVIS AGREED NOT TO PUT OUT ANYTHING ABOUT DIEM TODAY. DIEM COMMENTED THAT AS FAR AS WASHINGTON WAS CONCERNED, HE THOUGHT THE SUSPENSE WAS COMING TO AN END.

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

DAVIS STATED HE HAD NOT NOTICED ANY WILD EXCITEMENT ON THE PART OF THE AVERAGE PEOPLE, BUT A LOT OF INTEREST. DAVIS EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT "THIS" WOULD NOT HAVE ANY DECISIVE EFFECT ON THE ELECTION. DAVIS NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME WONDERING ABOUT THE ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AT THE PEACE TABLE. DAVIS REMARKED THAT UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN HAD DROPPED A HINT THIS MORNING THAT SOUTH VIETNAM MIGHT NOT HAVE ITS DELEGATION THERE IN TIME FOR THE MEETING NEXT WEDNESDAY. IN REPLY TO DAVIS' QUESTION WHETHER DIEM HAD ANY REASON TO FEEL THAT SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE, DIEM STATED THAT HE HAD NO COMMENT TO MAKE ON THIS PROBLEM AT THIS TIME. DIEM CONTINUED THAT HE PREFERRED TO WAIT FOR MORE QUALIFICATIONS FROM SAIGON BEFORE EVEN DISCUSSING "BACKGROUND" ON THIS PROBLEM. DAVIS AND DIEM AGREED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION FURTHER ABOUT FIVE P.M. THIS DATE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 00-231
R/cb/jdw vARA Date 12-19-00

PAGE THREE (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

DIEM ALSO TOLD THE INFORMANT THAT WARD JUST OF "THE WASHINGTON POST" HAD CONTACTED DIEM THIS DATE CONCERNING THE VIETNAM SITUATION. IN REPLY TO JUST'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER DIEM EXPECTED ANY STATEMENT FROM DIEM'S GOVERNMENT THIS DATE, DIEM INFORMED HE EXPECTED SOMETHING TODAY, BUT DID NOT KNOW WHAT TIME. JUST SAID HE WAS GOING TO DO AN EDITORIAL ON THE MATTER TODAY, AND FROM ACCOUNTS WHICH JUST HAD RECEIVED, SAIGON IS PRETTY SKEPTICAL ABOUT "THIS." DIEM STATED HE HAD TO REFRAIN FROM COMMENT UNTIL HE HAD FURTHER NOTICE FROM SAIGON. DIEM AGREED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER WITH JUST ABOUT FIVE OR SIX P.M. THIS DATE.

GP-1

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

97

Take with us.

LBJ:mr
11/1/68

INFORMATION

OS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

97a

Friday, November 1, 1968
1:50 p.m.

*Rec'd
rf*

Mr. President:

Here, again, from Thieu to the
Koreans the wish to wait for Nixon.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 94-215
100w, NARA, Date 10.22.09

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

976

REF ID: A66868
PP [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 5D 3061729
P 011701Z
FM DIRNSA
TO [REDACTED]
ZEM

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC D2-118 and NLJ 94-413
By isl, NARA, Date 10-26-09

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

XMMENP81 FTB31108
3/0/ [REDACTED] T44-68

THIEU'S VIEWS ON PEACE TALKS AND BOMBING HALT

*Restow
more complete text*

XXCC

28 OCT 68

~~SECRET.~~

((THIS IS)) A SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON MR. THIEU'S SPEECH [REDACTED]

1. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS ARDENTLY LABORING TOGETHER WITH THE U.S. SIDE TO PUT INTO PRACTICE THE ITEMS THAT WERE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON AT THE U.S.-VIETNAMESE HONOLULU SUMMIT CONFERENCE (19 JULY), PRESIDENT THIEU EMPHASIZED THE POINT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON MUST ALSO KEEP HIS PROMISES.

((THIEU)) SAID THAT IT APPEARS THAT MR. NIXON WILL BE ELECTED AS THE NEXT PRESIDENT, AND HE THINKS IT WOULD BE GOOD TO TRY TO SOLVE THE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL TALKS WITH THE NEXT PRESIDENT (NO MATTER WHO IS ELECTED). ((THIEU)) BELIEVES THAT OUR STANDPOINT SHOULD BE PREPARED AND STRENGTHENED NOW RATHER THAN IN THE FUTURE.

3. AS FOR THE VIETNAMESE REACTION TO MR. HUMPHREY'S STATEMENT THAT "VIETNAM DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO REJECT A DECISION TO HALT THE BOMBING", ETC, ETC, THERE WAS A TEMPORARY AGGRAVATION, AND THERE WAS AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION WITH ADHERENTS TO THE CATHOLIC AND HOA HAO RELIGIONS TAKING THE INITIATIVE.

4. THE GENERAL SENTIMENT ((BOTH)) DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, TOWARDS THIEU'S 22 OCTOBER SPECIAL PROCLAMATION WAS THAT IT WAS GOOD AND A NUMBER OF PARIS NEWSPAPERS SUPPORTED HIS VIEWS ((THE [REDACTED] WAS NOT MENTIONED), AND NEXT, ((IT)) WILL DEPEND UPON HANOI'S ATTITUDE.

5. ON THE U.S. SIDE, RUMORS ARE SPREADING THAT ONE CANNOT PREDICT WHAT PRESIDENT THIEU IS GOING TO DO AND IS ADOPTING A MUCH TOO STUBBORN ATTITUDE.

REFERENCES: AT THE TIME OF THE VIETNAMESE-U.S. TALKS, THE VIETNAMESE SIDE CONSISTED FOR THE MOST PART OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER, THE U.S. SIDE ATTENDED WITH THEIR AMBASSADOR, DEPUTY-AMBASSADOR, AND MR. WERTZ, MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

PRESERVATION COPY

XXHH
350

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

98

1968 OCT 31 02 31 21 22 21
1968 OCT 23 12 22 21

FBI
REPORTS

S

5 14 PM 10-31-68 EFH
PRIORITY
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 8
ATT: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED AN UNKNOWN WHITE MALE WAS OBSERVED ENTERING THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY AT APPROXIMATELY FIVE THIRTYFIVE P. M., OCTOBER THIRTY SIXTY EIGHT. HE ARRIVED AT VICINITY OF EMBASSY IN LATE MODEL PONTIAC BEARING CURRENT MARYLAND REGISTRATION A R SEVEN FIVE THREE FIVE WHICH IS REGISTERED TO CHARLES RICHARD MELLOR, SIX TWO ZERO ZERO MEADOW COURT, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND.

ON OCTOBER THIRTY ONE, RECORDS, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD), WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), DISCLOSED CHARLES RICHARD MELLOR WAS CHARGED WITH SPEEDING ON MAY TEN, NINETEEN FIFTYFIVE. MELLOR DESCRIBED AS SIX FEET ONE INCH, ONE SIXTY POUNDS, BROWN HAIR, BROWN EYES, BORN NOVEMBER TWENTYFIVE, NINETEEN TWENTYSIX.
END PAGE ONE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 00-231
By cb/50w *ARA Date 12-19-00

PAGE TWO

ON SAME DATE, RECORDS, THE CREDIT BUREAU, WDC, DISCLOSED CREDIT REPORT OF JULY FIFTEEN, ONE NINE SIX SIX, LISTED CHARLES RICHARD MELLOR, RESIDING SIX TWO ZERO ZERO MEADOW COURT, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND, MARRIED TO LAN DROU AND EMPLOYED AS UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE FOR VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, SAIGON, VIETNAM, M

BUST PAGE TWO

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

ON SAME DATE, RECORDS, THE CREDIT BUREAU, WDC, DISCLOSED CREDIT REPORT OF JULY FIFTEEN, ONE NINE SIX SIX, LISTED CHARLES RICHARD MELLOR, RESIDING SIX TWO ZERO ZERO MEADOW COURT, ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND, MARRIED TO LAN DROU AND EMPLOYED AS UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE FOR VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, SAIGON, VIETNAM, MANUFACTURING AND EXPORTING FIRM. MELLOR HAD SATISFACTORY CREDIT RATING. CREDIT REPORT OF SEPTEMBER, ONE NINE SIX FIVE, DISCLOSED MELLOR WAS RESIDING EIGHT SIX TWO NINE HEMPSTEAD AVENUE, BETHESDA, MARYLAND AND WAS EMPLOYED BY TUY HOA SUOE CORPORATION, SAIGON, VIETNAM AND HE FORMERLY RESIDED IN SAIGON, VIETNAM FOR TEN YEARS.
GP-1

END
WH QSL K

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

99

12:00 (18-31-68 NSM)
PRIORITYTO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 001
ATTENTION: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBIFBI
REPORTS

1968 OCT 31 17 06

S

~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~ EMBASSY OF VIETNAM.

AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE THREE FIVE P.M. OCTOBER TWENTY-NINE LAST AN UNIDENTIFIED WHITE MALE, AGE ABOUT TWO FOUR YEARS, BLOND HAIR, DRESSED IN DARK BROWN SPORTS COAT, TAN TROUSERS, WAS OBSERVED TO LEAVE EMBASSY OF VIETNAM, TWO TWO FIVE ONE R STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C., IN COMPANY OF SHORT YOUNG ORIENTAL-LOOKING WOMAN, ENTER A LATE MODEL PONTIAC GTO, DARK BLUE WITH BLACK VINYL TOP, BEARING CURRENT PENNSYLVANIA LICENSE EIGHT A FOUR DASH FOUR ONE FOUR, AND FORT DIX, NEW JERSEY, BUMPER STICKER A (IN SQUARE) SIX SEVEN SEVEN, ONE ONE (IN SQUARE.) HE PURCHASED GASOLINE USING TEXACO CREDIT CARD NUMBER ONE FOUR ZERO ONE FIVE SEVEN SIX FOUR SEVEN SEVEN MADE TO AMERICAN CORRUGATED COMPANY. HE SIGNED THIS PURCHASE SLIP "LEON DAVIS."

PAGE TWO ~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~

OUR PHILADELPHIA OFFICE HAS DETERMINED PENNSYLVANIA LICENSE EIGHT A FOUR DASH FOUR ONE FOUR REGISTERED TO GARRETT N. DAVIS, TWO FOUR TWO LLOYD LANE, WYNNEWOOD, PENNSYLVANIA. OUR FILES CONTAIN NO IDENTIFIABLE REFERENCES TO LEON DAVIS OR GARRETT N. DAVIS. PHILADELPHIA TELEPHONE DIRECTORY SHOWS AN AMERICAN CORRUGATED CONTAINER COMPANY, KING AND ESSEX, GLOUCESTER, NEW JERSEY.
GP-1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLS 00-231By: 6/JDW *ARA Date: 12-19-00~~SECRET NOFORN~~WH PLS ACK FBI 01
FBI DE WH AND ZEV UP 001 IMI 001

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 31, 1968 -- 11:50 a.m.

Rec'd
12:52 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are two documents:

1. President Thieu's older brother [REDACTED] believed that it would be better to deal with the next President, no matter who is elected, on issues pertaining to the peace conference. [REDACTED] according to rumors, the U. S. did not expect President Thieu to take such a stubborn attitude.
2. South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thanh told the Advisory Council on October 30 that Ambassador Bunker was not "pressuring" President Thieu to accept an unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. This Council, composed of labor, academic, legislative, and religious leaders is being consulted on Bunker's negotiations with Thieu.

W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

984- 13
KAD984

KAD984

3.3(b)(1)(3) KAD984

ZCZCKAE984

.....

101

OO [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 3051055

O 31045Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: HR MCCAFFERTY)

ZEM

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-115 and 11-94-413
By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 10-26-09

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3.3(b)(1,3)

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A [REDACTED]
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

VIETNAMESE

[REDACTED]
XXMMENF01FTB31103
3/0 [REDACTED] -68

PRESIDENT THIEU SENT REPORT OF BUNDY-BUI DIEM TALK

KXCC

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS [REDACTED] FILLED BUNDY IN ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATIONS HELD BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER. BUNDY POINTED OUT THE FOLLOWING:

1. AMBASSADOR LAM "MISQUOTED" ((A) GOVERNOR HARRIMAN.
2. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO LIMIT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ESSENTIAL MATTERS TO SAIGON, THUS AVOIDING MISUNDERSTANDINGS CAUSED BY DIFFERENT REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS. MOREOVER, AMBASSADOR BUNKER IS MORE QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON.
3. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AS STATED IN THE U.S. THREE-POINT MEMORANDUM AND IN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT.
4. THE ELECTIONS HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. ON THIS SUBJECT [REDACTED] THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE COMING ELECTIONS AND THE RUMORS OF AN IMMINENT BOMBING HALT HAVE MADE THE SITUATION HERE CONFUSED AND TENSE.

AS ALREADY [REDACTED] STILL IN TOUCH WITH THE VARIOUS POLITICAL CIRCLES TO TRY TO FIND OUT ((WHAT IS GOING ON)), BUT WITHOUT, HOWEVER, MAKING IT TOO OBVIOUS BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS DELICATE AND THERE IS MUCH DANGER OF MISUNDERSTANDING ((B)).

((A)) [REDACTED]
((B)) [REDACTED]

PRESERVATION COPY

XXHH
358

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

NNNN
ZCZCKAE966
PP [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 3042215
P 302150Z
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEM

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-15 and NLJ 94-13
By isl, NARA, Date 10-26-09

1968 OCT 31 001 000

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [REDACTED]
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XXHHENP01 FTB0108
3/0 [REDACTED] T -68

VICE PRESIDENT KY EXPRESSES OPINIONS ON CONDUCT OF BOMB
HALT [REDACTED]

XXCC

-- 29 OCT 68 --
-- -- --

AT 1030 ((HOURS)), 26 OCTOBER, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] PAID A VISIT ON VICE-PRESIDENT KY
AT THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE, AND VICE PRESIDENT KY EXPRESSED
THE FOLLOWING OPINIONS, FROM HIS POSITION, ON THE RECENT
SITUATION.

- A. THERE CANNOT BE AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING OF THE NORTH.
- B. ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WANTS A BOMBING HALT IN THE INTEREST OF THE NUMBER OF VOTES FOR VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, AND THERE CANNOT BE THE RUINATION OF [REDACTED] PERSON FOR THE SAKE OF ONE PERSON, VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY.
- C. IF THE U.S. UNILATERALLY SAYS TO CEASE BOMBING OF THE NORTH UNCONDITIONALLY, SOUTH VIETNAM UNILATERALLY SHOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT UNRESTRICTED BOMBING OF THE NORTH.
- D. SOUTH VIETNAM WILL FIGHT THE COMMUNISTS UNTIL THE END.
- E. ((SOUTH VIETNAM)) CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF. (RECOGNITION) IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE NLF IS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF [REDACTED] AS A GROUP.
- F. AT SUCH TIME AS WHEN WE ((SOUTH VIETNAM)) HAVE ASSUMED A STRONG ANTI-COMMUNIST COURSE, FOR THE FIRST TIME THE SUPPORT OF ((OUR)) ALLIES WILL NOT BE IN VAIN.

[REDACTED]

XXHH
490

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

NLJ 02-137
6-17-03

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

tab A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2001

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WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
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103

Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 00-233 29 October 1968

Document # 103

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Views Concerning the
Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. [REDACTED]

2. Between 23 and 25 October 1968, President Nguyen Van Thieu continued to hold discussions with a number of government officials concerning a bombing halt and the Paris talks. Among others, Thieu spoke with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the Prime Minister, Thieu's Special Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc, the Interior and Foreign Ministers, possibly Ambassador Bui Diem, and the Chairmen of the Upper and Lower Houses.

3. While speaking with the Legislative Chairmen, the President said he had told the Americans that he had instructed several people to contact Hanoi to determine if Hanoi felt the time was propitious to engage in talks. If the DRV does not feel the time right, the Americans had been informed that the Paris talks as well as the fighting in Vietnam would continue as is. However, if Hanoi judges the occasion right, Hanoi must then talk directly to Saigon to resolve the issues. It is imperative though, that Hanoi be serious about wanting to engage in talks. Thieu added parenthetically that if Hanoi would not agree to talks with the GVN Ambassador, Thieu would be willing to dispatch a GVN Cabinet Minister to handle the discussions. If the DRV is serious, the two sides could sit down and discuss the future of Vietnam, the question of peace, or any and all issues that either side cared to bring up.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

4. The President continued, then if Hanoi "tells me to recognize the NLF, I would be willing to make that sacrifice. However, if Hanoi demands a coalition government, I would say that is unacceptable. If Hanoi asks to return to nationalist activities, I would say OK."

5. Thieu said that he was willing to see the talks drag on for months or even a year, as long as NVN was serious about the talks. They should not be used for bickering or propaganda purposes, Thieu explained, and once the talks commence, the North Vietnamese "will realize that I am serious". Thieu reiterated that it did not matter if the NLF was included in the NVN delegation. However, he would never let NVN tell the GVN to talk with the NLF.

6. Thieu was obviously concerned that NVN was guaranteeing nothing in return for a bombing halt. He stated he had told the Americans that reciprocity was the most important issue. In Thieu's opinion, the best reciprocal act would be for Hanoi to begin talks with the GVN, rather than a military de-escalation or troop withdrawal from the DMZ.

7. He was also concerned that the U. S. Government wished to do something "dramatic" in order to help Humphrey on 5 November. The inclusion of the NLF at Paris would aid Humphrey, said Thieu, but the benefits are short-range. Thieu told Vice President Ky on 25 October that he was afraid the U. S. would force the GVN to deal with the NLF. He observed, however, that the U. S. was caught between the DRV and the GVN positions on the status of the NLF at a conference.

8. Ky said he felt Thieu should propose that a three-way conference be convened including the GVN, U. S. and DRV. Thieu responded that the Americans had told him that Hanoi may refer to a three-way conference between the DRV, the U. S. and the NLF. Thieu felt, however, that if the DRV would not accept the inclusion of the NLF within the DRV delegation, then Hanoi was not yet ready to engage in serious talks.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

9. The President also mentioned that he was having difficulty with the Americans in that they were urging him not to speak to the press or make public statements to avoid leaks on the US/GVN talks. Thieu noted that he was trying to convey the impression that he was a man of peace who would die, not for the world, but for the people of SVN.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-112 and NLJ 94-413
By id, NARA, Date 10-26-99

KAB851 *****

DE [REDACTED]
ZUI [REDACTED] 3021935 ZDK

KAB841
OO [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 3021903

O 281845Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)

ZEM
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [REDACTED] MESSAGE.
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XXMMENP01FTB28108
3/0/[REDACTED] T -68

[REDACTED] DELAYS IMPROVE SOUTH VIETNAM'S POSITION

XXCC

[REDACTED] 27 OCT 68 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GRASPED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF [REDACTED] STATEMENT OF
22 (OCTOBER)) WHICH HAS DISPELLED CONSIDERABLY THE IMPRESSION
[REDACTED] ARE SYSTEMATICALLY OPPOSING THE PEACE EFFORTS. I
[REDACTED] FIRM ATTITUDE
[REDACTED] PLAN TO ADHERE TO THAT POSITION. IN THIS CONNECTION,
[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO INFORMATION
FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE, HUMPHREY'S STATEMENT THAT VIETNAM
OUGHT NOT TO HAVE THE RIGHT OF VETO, WAS PROVOKED, LEADING ONE
TO BELIEVE THAT PERHAPS THE ADMINISTRATION WISHED INDIRECTLY
TO RAISE THE IDEA TO TEST [REDACTED] REACTION. DURING [REDACTED] CONTINUAL
DISCUSSIONS LATELY WITH BUNNY AND ROSTON [REDACTED] THE
U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS IMPRESSED BY [REDACTED] DETERMINATION WHICH
WARRANTS THE PROPOSAL OF A PLAN FOR A COMMON STATEMENT.

[IN ACCORDANCE WITH [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS, [REDACTED] CONTINUING
MY CONVERSATIONS TO TRY TO GAIN A CLEAR-CUT ATTITUDE. [REDACTED]
THE LONGER THE SITUATION CONTINUES, THE MORE [REDACTED] FAVORED,
FOR THE ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN A WEEK AND PRESIDENT
JOHNSON WOULD PROBABLY HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN FORCING [REDACTED] HAND.
[REDACTED] STILL IN CONTACT WITH THE NIXON ENTOURAGE WHICH CONTINUES
TO BE THE FAVORITE DESPITE THE UNCERTAINTY PROVOKED BY THE
NEWS OF AN IMMINENT BOMBING HALT. [REDACTED] INFORMED THAT
IF NIXON SHOULD BE ELECTED, HE WOULD FIRST SEND AN UNOFFICIAL
PERSON [REDACTED] AND WOULD HIMSELF CONSIDER LATER GOING TO
SAIGON BEFORE THE INAUGURATION.]

XHH
400

SANITIZED

1.3(a)(4)
106

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-31

By CB, NARA, Date 1-18-96

October 1968 1.3(a)(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: President Thieu's Views Regarding the Issues
Involved in Agreeing to a Bombing Halt

1. [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] President Nguyen Van Thieu 1.3(a)(4)

conducted business very much as usual although his main concern during the period centered around the current talks relating to a bombing halt. He discussed the situation with almost everyone who visited his office including senior Cabinet officials, aides and secretaries, and religious and political personages. Thieu's comments to his visitors indicate two main concerns about the discussions underway. The first concern involves the status of the NLF at the negotiating table following a halt in the bombing. The second point entails Thieu's strong conviction that DRV concessions in return for a bombing halt must be spelled out and guaranteed. On both points the President is adamant and his position remains consistent throughout the reporting period.

3. The President insists he will be intransigent against separate NLF participation in negotiations. Thieu stated that he will never negotiate with the NLF as an equal. He has no objection to their inclusion in the North Vietnamese Delegation but he will not agree to their sitting at the conference table as a separate entity. NVN and SVN have recognized governments, Thieu noted, but this is not true of the NLF, which is only a tool of Hanoi. Thieu asked, "In whose Army do the Generals of the other side hold rank?"

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

4. Inherent in his concern about the status of participating delegations is Thieu's obvious desire to avoid appearing to be a "U. S. lackey". At one point the President stated that Hanoi wants to meet with the U. S., the GVN and the NLF. Thieu exclaimed that this would make the GVN appear to be a U. S. front. Unless the NLF is denied equal status with the GVN, he disagrees with the American argument that Hanoi's willingness to include the GVN in the Paris talks represents a victory. Negotiating with the NLF also raises the question of honor and he has stated: there is no honor in talking to thieves, let alone the servants of thieves.

5. Thieu stated that South Vietnam could be represented at Paris either separately or jointly with the U. S. However, the question of makeup and seating of all delegations should be clearly defined ahead of time so that no confusion exists about these points.

6. As regards a bombing halt and POW exchanges, Thieu told his Foreign Minister [REDACTED] that on these issues, which are the only ones which concern the U. S., he feels the U. S. can play the leading role. Thieu noted, however, his fear that the U. S. might disassociate the bombing issue from the issue of GVN participation. The President reiterated his belief that what constitutes reciprocity should be agreed to and clearly spelled out prior to a bombing halt.

1.3(a)(4)

7. Thieu also sees a definite connection between the moves now underway and President Johnson's wish to see Vice President Humphrey elected. Thieu referred many times to the U. S. elections and suggested to his visitors that the current talks are designed to aid Humphrey's candidacy. Thieu has said that Johnson and Humphrey will be replaced and then Nixon could change the U. S. position.

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

109

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, October 29, 1968
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a further [REDACTED]
Thieu talking to the South Korean
Ambassador in Seoul in quite a
disturbing way on 18 October.

3.4(b)(1,3)

Walt Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-114 and NLJ 94-414
By isl, NARA, Date 10-26-09

Paris Codeword

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

109a

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 02-115 and NLI 94-413
By isl, NARA, Date 10-26-09

1968 OCT 23 23 33

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3.3 (b)(1,3)

PP [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 2972250
P 232045Z
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEM

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~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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3.3 (b)
(1,3)

XXMMENP01 FT23108
3/0 T -68

THIEU'S VIEWS ON NLF PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

XXCC

19 OCT 68

[REDACTED] OF WHAT PRESIDENT THIEU SAID
ON 18 OCTOBER.

1. PRESIDENT THIEU POINTED OUT THE FACTS THAT HAD BEEN
DISCUSSED [REDACTED] ALONG WITH WHAT WAS REPORTED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CONCERNING THE NLF DELEGATION'S ELIGIBILITY TO
PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL TALKS, THE THING THEY CANNOT COME
TO AN AGREEMENT ON, PRESIDENT THIEU SAID HE CONCURS ON THE
ITEMS THAT WERE AGREED UPON AT THE UNOFFICIAL TALKS BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATIONS, AND, AS FOR WHAT
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KOREA PORTER SAID, THE PROBLEM LIES IN
THE UNDERSTANDING.

HE SAID THAT THE REASON FOR THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT
OPPOSING THE NLF'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL TALKS IN
AN INDEPENDENT CAPACITY IS THAT THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION
HOLDS THE COMMUNIST PARTY TO BE ILLEGAL, AND THE POINT IS
THAT THE NLF SHIFTS ITS POSITION AT HANOI'S BECK AND CALL;
ACCORDINGLY, ((THIEU)) IS ADOPTING THE VIEWPOINT THAT IT IS
ALL RIGHT FOR THE ((NLF)) TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF HANOI'S
DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT THAT THE NLF DELE
GATION PARTICIPATES IN AN INDEPENDENT CAPACITY IT WOULD NOT
MERELY MEAN THAT WE ARE LEGALIZING THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BUT
THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR COALITION, AND SINCE
WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT DEMANDS THEY WOULD MAKE ON THE U.S. AND
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS, WE MUST PREVENT THIS.

4. IN THIS MATTER OF THE NLF DELEGATION'S ELIGIBILITY,
HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE NECESSITY OF [REDACTED] CLEARLY TO THE U.S.
SIDE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWPOINT BEFORE THE OPENING
OF THE POLITICAL TALKS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT, FOR
THE SAKE OF PROTECTING OURSELVES AGAINST THE GREAT POSSIBILITY,
AFTER THE POLITICAL TALKS ARE HELD, OF U.S. AND WORLD OPINION
CRITICIZING JUST THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ONE-SIDEDLY WHEN
THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION THINKS THE CIRCUMSTANCES

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS, WE MUST PREVENT THIS.

4. IN THIS MATTER OF THE NLF DELEGATION'S ELIGIBILITY, HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE NECESSITY OF [REDACTED] CLEARLY TO THE U.S. SIDE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWPOINT BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE POLITICAL TALKS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT, FOR THE SAKE OF PROTECTING OURSELVES AGAINST THE GREAT POSSIBILITY, AFTER THE POLITICAL TALKS ARE HELD, OF U.S. AND WORLD OPINION CRITICIZING JUST THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ONE-SIDEDLY WHEN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION THINKS THE CIRCUMSTANCES ((DICTATED)), WITHDRAWING FROM THE SITE OF THE TALKS ON THE NLF MATTER.

3.3
(b)(1,3)

5. [REDACTED] AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE VIETNAMESE ARE OPPOSING THE U.S. IN THIS AND CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY ((OF THE U.S.)) MAKING A DECISIVE MOVE TO HALT THE BOMBING ALONE; THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED]

HE SAID THE U.S. CAN, OF COURSE, CEASE BOMBING, BUT IS UNABLE TO BLOCK VIETNAM ((FROM BOMBING)). CONCERNING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOMBING HALT, THIS WILL HELP CANDIDATE HUMPHREY AND THIS IS THE PURPOSE OF IT; BUT THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD OCCUR AS THE RESULT OF A BOMBING HALT, WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN BEING A DISADVANTAGE TO CANDIDATE HUMPHREY, WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF CANDIDATE NIXON. ACCORDINGLY, HE SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON ENFORCING A BOMBING HALT WITHOUT VIETNAM'S AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE WEAK; [REDACTED] JUST HOW EFFECTIVE CAN IT BE WITHIN THE SHORT TIME BEFORE THE ELECTION, EVEN THOUGH IT IS EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED?

3.3
(b)(1,3)

6. HE SAID THAT SINCE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS WITHIN VIETNAM ARE DEVELOPING TO OUR ADVANTAGE, THE LONGER WE CAN DELAY THE TIME ((OF THE BOMBING HALT)) THE GREATER WILL BE THE ADVANTAGE TO THE VIETNAMESE SIDE.

7. HE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE NLF, THEY WILL LOSE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO (([REDACTED] CONTROL) THEM. MILITARY AUTHORITIES OR A GROUP OF POWERFUL ANTI-COMMUNIST PEOPLE MIGHT UNDERTAKE A REVOLUTION.

8. AT THIS TIME, [REDACTED] TO PRESIDENT THIEU THE NEW STAND THAT [REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT IS ADOPTING, AS IN ITEM TWO OF [REDACTED] THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KOREA'S STAND IN THE MATTER AND THAT OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, SHED LIGHT ON THE POINT THAT ((KOREA)) IS STRONGLY BACKING ((THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT)), AND [REDACTED] THE OPINION THAT IT IS BEST THAT [REDACTED] TWO COUNTRIES WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AND TAKE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE ((ON THESE MATTERS)).

((A)) NOT AVAILABLE.
((B)) IN SERIES CHECK.

XX44
800

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE --EYES ONLY~~

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 12:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a sensitive report on Ky's views about our conditions.

I do happen to believe that, Harriman or no Harriman, Thieu has to be given some latitude to deal with his political problem, as well as to save Hanoi's face.

When you get a good feel for the situation, you may wish to give us guidance.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-234
By ebm, NARA, Date 9-10-01

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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 13-94Document # 1102a

18 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow ✓
Special Assistant to the PresidentThe Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of StateSUBJECT: Reactions of the GVN and Vice President Ky
Concerning the Proposed Bombing Halt

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the GVN's and particularly Vice President Ky's reaction concerning the proposed bombing halt. That information is summarized in the following paragraphs:

a. Ambassador Bunker had informed Thieu that the DRV had offered, in exchange for an American bombing halt, to respect the DMZ, to launch no attacks against major cities in SVN, and to accept a GVN presence at the Paris talks. The DRV had insisted, however, that these concessions remain secret and Ambassador Bunker had pressed this requirement on Thieu.

b. At a meeting called by Thieu of key GVN officials including Ky, Foreign Minister Thanh "seemed concerned only with getting his delegation off to Paris" while Thieu appeared worried and uncertain. Ky called the first two DRV offers concessions of very limited military value since the DRV was already unable to cause much trouble in these areas. The third point, Ky said, was really no concession at all unless the DRV would also agree to exclude the NLF from the talks. He asked Thieu if he were willing to talk with NLF representatives in Paris. When Thieu answered no, Ky advised him to agree to the bombing halt only if the NLF were excluded from the Paris

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talks. It was, Ky argued, necessary to extract whatever concessions Thieu deemed essential now, since his leverage after the bombing stopped would obviously be less. Ky also questioned whether Thieu could agree politically to the bombing halt without being able to state publicly that the DRV had offered some concessions in return. Thieu said he would ask Ambassador Bunker to return and would raise the NLF issue with him.

c. For the past two days Ky has sought to find a policy which will preserve the "Vietnamese identity" without jeopardizing the GVN's vital ties to the U.S. or giving comfort to the DRV. Ky is uncertain over what has motivated President Johnson's latest initiative. Is he trying to carve his niche in history at the expense of the GVN? Is he trying to pull off the near-miracle which, according to reports Ky gets from Washington, will be needed to stave off defeat for Mr. Humphrey and the Democrats in November? Or is President Johnson genuinely searching for an honorable peace? Given political realities, Ky wonders whether this is not a bad time to tie oneself too closely to the present Washington leadership.

d. Ky also believes that the timing of a bombing halt so close on the heels of the spurious coup attempt is unfortunate. Many people believe that the Americans floated the coup rumors to divide the GVN and point up to Thieu how dependent he is on American support so that Thieu could not effectively oppose the new American initiative. Ky believes that the rumors now circulating have caused near panic among many of the Vietnamese elite.

e. Ky hopes to see Thieu again and offer other suggestions which he has not yet firmed up. Ky believes that this is the time for him and Thieu to join hands in a true government of national reconciliation. Both should appear on TV together, Thieu to announce the halt and Ky to say that the DRV offered a significant quid pro quo. If he cannot say this, the government will be in trouble, with many believing that it is selling out to the Americans.

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f. Ky is ready to stand by Thieu if Thieu wants a genuine reconciliation, but Ky has some doubts that he does. Ky is considering what unilateral steps he might take if Thieu does not meet him halfway, but emphasized that he will do nothing to endanger chances for peace or strain relations with the GVN's allies. One possibility he is considering, if the U.S. stops the bombing without the GVN's agreement, is the issuance of a GVN statement reserving the right to bomb or take any other actions against North Vietnam which is deemed in the GVN national interest.

g. Ky would like to have a chance to discuss these important issues alone with Ambassador Bunker or Ambassador Berger.

2. This report was given to and discussed with Ambassador Bunker and Berger. They agreed the report should be sent via CIA channels for passing to the White House and the Secretary of State.

3. In passing the report we noted:

a. [REDACTED]

b. Our judgement that nevertheless in matters of such fundamental importance [REDACTED] to distort and mislead us in the essentials; and

c. The necessity to keep in mind [REDACTED]

4. With Ambassador Bunker's approval, the CIA station in Saigon [REDACTED]

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1968 OCT 1 00 09

7:00 PM 10-31-68 FJB
PRIORITY
TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, 012 009
ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

F5

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EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

SUITABLE PRETEXT INTERVIEW OF NEIGHBOR ON NINE THREE TWO EIGHT SOUTH TROY AVENUE, EVERGREEN PARK, ILLINOIS, REFLECTED THAT A NORMAN JOHNSON, MIDDLE TWENTIES, IS ELDEST SON OF ELMER R. AND MARJORIE JOHNSON, NINE THREE TWO EIGHT SOUTH TROY AVENUE, EVERGREEN PARK, ILLINOIS; DISCHARGED FROM MILITARY SERVICE ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO; SINGLE; CURRENTLY UNEMPLOYED, AND LIVING AT HOME ENTERED MILITARY SERVICE SOON AFTER COMPLETION OF HIGH SCHOOL; WAS MEMBER OF U.S. AIR FORCE IN VIET NAM WHERE HE WAS INJURED AND SUBSEQUENTLY HOSPITALIZED IN UNKNOWN CITY IN PENNSYLVANIA PRIOR TO DISCHARGE. FAMILY CONSIDERED OF GOOD REPUTATION.

PASSPORT DIVISION, CHICAGO, REFLECTS NORMAN ELMER JOHNSON, NINE THREE TWO EIGHT SOUTH TROY AVENUE, EVERGREEN PARK, ILLINOIS, BORN JULY EIGHTEEN NINETEEN FORTYTHREE IN ILLINOIS, SIX FEET TALL, BROWN HAIR, HAZEL EYES, AND ISSUED PASSPORT NUMBER J ONE ONE NINE NINE NINE EIGHT FIVE SEPTEMBER SIXTEEN LAST.
END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
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RECORD FORWARDED CENTRAL PASSPORT OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

NO IDENTIFIABLE REFERENCES CHICAGO FBI OFFICE RE NORMAN
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By: CS/304 ARA Date: 12-19-00

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7:00 PM 10-31-68 FJB

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, 012 009

ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

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EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

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By cl, NARA, Date 5-3-75

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. I have just noted UP item No. 50 of August 29 which notes Minister of Economy, Au Ngoc Ho, as saying: "I think Nixon finally has the presidency in the bag this time and I think that means not much change in the course of the war."

2. Ho's alleged statement underlines the problem which will be confronting us between now and the election. In view of the high interest which it will generate and the obvious importance of the Viet-Nam problem as an election issue, there will be undoubtedly heavy pressure on various members of the GVN to comment on the various public statements of the two candidates on Viet-Nam and even to express a preference between the candidates. It would seem to me that it is in the best interests of the GVN and ourselves that its public officials take a

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SR

The Secretary

EA/VN:JRBurke:aoa 8/29/68

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Clearances:

EA-Amb. Leonhart

EA-Mr. Bundy

S/S-Mr. Walsh

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position of no comment on ^{the} presidential campaign. It is realized, of course, that members of the National Assembly as elected officials will be compelled to comment from time to time and we would certainly not be interested in trying to muffle their ^{expressions.} ~~comments~~ However, the actual members of the government are another thing, speaking as they do for Prime Minister Huong and Thieu and the entity with which we have a legal relationship. I wonder, therefore, if it would be worthwhile having a quiet word with President Thieu and perhaps with Prime Minister Huong within the next few days, ^{gently} making the suggestion that they and their Ministers refrain from commenting on the progress of the electoral campaign in the United States and particularly expression of preference for either one of the two principal candidates. This would seem to be in our mutual interest.

GP-2

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
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TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81797

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