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<strong>COMPUTE</strong>!<strong>'s</strong><br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>R<br />

VIRUSES<br />

Ralph Roberts<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>! Books<br />

Greensboro, North Carolina<br />

Radnor, Pennsylvania


Other Books by Ralph Roberts:<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>l<strong>'s</strong> Using Turbo Basic<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>l<strong>'s</strong> Using Borland<strong>'s</strong> Sprint<br />

The Price Guide to Autographs<br />

Auction Action!<br />

Analysis with Reflect<br />

The Power of Turbo Prolog<br />

The Word Processor Buyer<strong>'s</strong> Survival Manual<br />

Editor: Stephen Levy<br />

Copyright 1988, <strong>COMPUTE</strong>! Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.<br />

Reproduction or translation of any part of this work beyond that permitted by<br />

Sections 107 and 108 of the United States Copyright Act without the permission of<br />

the copyright owner is unlawful.<br />

Printed in the United States of America<br />

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1<br />

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data<br />

Roberts, Ralph<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>t<strong>'s</strong> <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong><br />

p. cm.<br />

Includes index.<br />

ISBN 0-87455-178-1<br />

1. Computer <strong>viruses</strong>. I. Title.<br />

QA76.76.C68R62 1988<br />

005.8--dc19 88-28556<br />

The authors and publisher have made every effort in the preparation of this book to insure the accuracy<br />

of the programs and information. However, the information in this book is sold without<br />

warranty, either express or implied. Neither the authors nor <strong>COMPUTE</strong>! Publications, Inc. will be<br />

liable for any damages caused or alleged to be caused directly, indirectly, incidentally, or consequentially<br />

by the programs or information in this book.<br />

The opinions expressed in this book are solely those of the author and are not necessarily those of<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>! Publications, Inc.<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>! Books, Post Office Box 5406, Greensboro, NC 27403, (919) 275-9809, is a<br />

Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. company, and is not associated with any manufacturer of<br />

personal <strong>computer</strong>s. IBM is a registered trademark and OS/2 is a trademark of International<br />

Business Machines Corporation. MS-DOS is a registered trademark of<br />

Microsoft Corporation. Apple and Macintosh are trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc.<br />

Amiga is a trademark of Commodore-Amiga. Atari and Atari ST are trademarks of<br />

Atari Corporation.


CONTENTS<br />

Preface ....................................... v<br />

Acknowledgements ............................. vi<br />

1. Your Computer May Be Sick! ................. 1<br />

2. History and Infamous Viruses ................. 9<br />

3. How Viruses Work ......................... 17<br />

4. Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing . 31<br />

5. How the Experts Deal with Viruses .... . . . . . . .. 55<br />

6. Corporate Initiatives for PC Data Security<br />

Pamela Kane ............................ 81<br />

7. The Case of the Gerbil Virus that Wasn't<br />

Raymond M. Glath ....................... 91<br />

8. IBM PCs and Compatibles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 95<br />

9. Macintosh ............................... 133<br />

10. Atari ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 145<br />

11. Amiga .................................. 151<br />

12. The Only Good Virus Is a Dead Virus ........ 163<br />

Index ...................................... 168


PREFACE<br />

What if all the data on your <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> hard disk and/or<br />

floppies suddenly disappears? Millions of characters of information<br />

are irretrievably gone and the only thing left in return<br />

is an infantile message like "Arfl Arfl Gotcha!"or "Welcome to<br />

the dungeon ... beware the virus."<br />

The destructive rampages of these terrible little hidden<br />

programs from sick minds are not limited to high risk users<br />

who download indiscriminately from pirate electronic bulletin<br />

boards. Associated Press and United Press International stories<br />

in recent months have reported that such major institutions as<br />

NASA, Lehigh University, Miami (Ohio) University, AReO<br />

Oil, Hebrew University in Israel, and others have had <strong>computer</strong><br />

virus attacks. Viruses can attack your system even if you<br />

don't have a telephone modem.<br />

Like a biological virus, a <strong>computer</strong> virus can replicate itself<br />

and be spread (through the use of "Trojan horse" programs)<br />

from system to system. Trade a floppy disk with a friend and<br />

you may unwittingly be destroying large amounts of important<br />

data in your system, be it a single-user <strong>computer</strong> or a large telephone-linked<br />

network of 20,000 terminals. It<strong>'s</strong> not even enough<br />

to have good backup-a timed release virus can also be in the<br />

backup disks or tape, destroying data time after frustrating time.<br />

There have been <strong>viruses</strong> reported for all of the major<br />

brands of <strong>computer</strong>s. Those with IBM and compatibles, and<br />

Macintoshes are currently the most vulnerable, but the potential<br />

threat to all machines is scary. Like vaccinating ag<strong>ai</strong>nst<br />

smallpox or typhoid fever, there are prudent steps <strong>computer</strong><br />

users can take that may very well save them hours and days of<br />

work, or even more than that.<br />

Whether you're a single <strong>computer</strong> owner or the manager of<br />

a large area network, this book offers relief from the fear and<br />

the very real danger of a viral infection in your system. It will<br />

v


help you understand and implement ways to protect your system,<br />

as well as those of your friends and clients who put programs<br />

into their own systems that were copied off your disks.<br />

Typhoid Mary was a dishwasher who, while not sick herself,<br />

spread that disease to many others. Imagine how poor<br />

Mary would be sued today. This book helps you protect yourself<br />

in many ways.<br />

Acknowledgments<br />

The author gratefully acknowledges all those who helped in the<br />

preparation of this book, with special thanks to: Ray Glath,<br />

Ross Greenberg, and Pam Kane.<br />

And to those other staunch virus fighters: Ron Benvenisti,<br />

Dennis Director, Chuck Gilmore, Eric Hansen, Dr. Harold<br />

Highland, John McAfee, Mike Riemer, Howard Upchurch,<br />

Steve Tibbett, and Jeff Shulman.<br />

And to: Stephen Levy, Claudia Earhart, Pam Williams,<br />

and all my other friends at <strong>COMPUTE</strong>! Books.<br />

And most especially to you, the reader, in hopes that this<br />

book proves helpful.<br />

vi


1<br />

YOUR<br />

<strong>COMPUTE</strong>R<br />

MAY BE SICK!<br />

Virus: "Something that corrupts or poisons the mind or the soul. "<br />

Webster<strong>'s</strong> New Collegiate Dictionary<br />

"Over one percent, or about a quarter of a million IBM PCs<br />

and compatibles are already infected," says Larry DiMartin,<br />

president of Computer Integrity Corporation, publishers of the<br />

commercial viral protection program, Vaccinate.<br />

A <strong>computer</strong> virus is a small program, usually hidden as a<br />

code segment of a larger host or Trojan horse program. It has<br />

the ability to replicate itself, and to move from <strong>computer</strong> to<br />

<strong>computer</strong> through the transfer of disks, or by electronic<br />

communications. You're safe only if you never buy a program,<br />

never borrow a disk from a friend, never call a <strong>computer</strong> network<br />

or electronic bulletin board, never turn on and use your<br />

<strong>computer</strong> at all. In other words, the possibility of a <strong>computer</strong><br />

viral infection cannot be eliminated totally, only minimized.<br />

While not alive, the resemblance in the actions of a <strong>computer</strong><br />

virus to the reproductive and infectious qualities of a biological<br />

virus is uncanny, even horrifying. Hence the name<br />

<strong>computer</strong> virus.<br />

Viruses mayor may not be harmful. Their effects range<br />

from the humorous to the catastrophic. A destructive virus<br />

could wipe out data it has taken you or your company years to<br />

accumulate, including backups. Whatever the effect, someone is<br />

messing with your system without your permission. This book<br />

helps you to: Avoid neglect! Detect! Protect!<br />

1


Chapter 1<br />

One factor on our side is that a <strong>computer</strong> virus must be<br />

machine-specific. An Amiga virus isn't going to thrive in an<br />

IBM environment; a Macintosh virus can't wipe out Atari disks.<br />

This is the good news. The bad news is that the Computer<br />

Virus Industry Association-a group of software companies<br />

who manufacture and sell antiviral products-has already<br />

identified <strong>viruses</strong> on most of the major categories of personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s being sold today. These include over 20 different<br />

types that attack IBM pes and compatibles, 4 are Macintoshspecific,<br />

4 prey on Amigas, and 6 more infect other types of<br />

<strong>computer</strong> architecture.<br />

These, of course, are just the ones that have been verified<br />

as existing. The scope of the virus problem (as evidenced by<br />

more and more reports) continues to grow. The odds are with<br />

an individual <strong>computer</strong> owner right now; however, the odds will<br />

continue to drop if things go unchecked. Next month, next<br />

year, your <strong>computer</strong> might catch a virus. It could be sick<br />

already.<br />

Where Do Viruses Come From?<br />

Computers have always been prone to losing large amounts of<br />

data in the blink of an eye. Equipment malfunction, operator<br />

error-the reasons are many and varied. In this crazy world,<br />

you must also add those who deliberately want to destroy your<br />

data. These electronic terrorists come in many stripes.<br />

Some, like medical experimenters who may have carelessly<br />

let a biological bug escape from the laboratory, did not unleash<br />

their <strong>viruses</strong> into the world information pool intentionally.<br />

The term virus was coined by a University of California<br />

graduate student, Fred Cohen. He demonstrated how to write a<br />

<strong>computer</strong> program that could infiltrate and attack a <strong>computer</strong><br />

system in much the same way that a biological virus infects a<br />

human. Other students and educators have experimented with<br />

these nasty little codes. So have hackers (a description that<br />

used to be honorable, but now has been sullied by those few<br />

who abuse their knowledge) and various research and development<br />

groups.<br />

An intelligence agency is not going to overlook this means<br />

of disrupting an enemy country<strong>'s</strong> informational infrastructure.<br />

2


Your Computer May Be Sick<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> obvious and logical that a good many governments could<br />

already be experimenting, perhaps even field testing such <strong>computer</strong><br />

<strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

A second group are pranksters, those individuals or groups<br />

who have a "message" to disseminate, or just pure jokers who<br />

want to mess with your system (though not necessarily destructively).<br />

The Macintosh Peace virus-supposedly benign and<br />

well-intentioned, but still frightening many <strong>computer</strong> ownersis<br />

a prime example of this.<br />

According to a February 12, 1988 UPI report, the source<br />

of this Macintosh virus is Richard Brandow, publisher of a<br />

40,OOO-circulation magazine called MacMag, based in Montreal,<br />

Quebec. The report quotes a spokesman for the magazine<br />

as confirming this.<br />

The Brandow message reads:<br />

Richard Brandow, Publisher of MacMag, and its entire staff would<br />

like to take this opportunity to convey their Universal Message of<br />

Peace to all Macintosh users around the world.<br />

The message includes a small drawing of the world and is<br />

signed by a Drew Davidson.<br />

The virus was designed to infect the Macintosh operating<br />

system and to flash the above message on the screen on March<br />

2, 1988, the anniversary of the Mac II<strong>'s</strong> introduction. To say<br />

the reaction among thousands of Macintosh users was irate is<br />

an understatement. Many hundreds of messages condemning<br />

Mr. Brandow and the Peace virus were posted in the Macintosh<br />

special interest groups on Delphi (where they still can be<br />

read in the Mac Group), Compuserve, and Genie.<br />

In his own defense, Brandow s<strong>ai</strong>d: "If other people do<br />

nasty things (with a virus), it is their responsibility. You can't<br />

blame Einstein for Hiroshima."<br />

True, but the furor and uproar came from people who did<br />

not want an infectious "disease," no matter how allegedly benign,<br />

lurking in their operating systems.<br />

Viruses maliciously designed to be destructive come from<br />

intentional electronic terrorists. These may be individuals harboring<br />

ill ag<strong>ai</strong>nst a particular company or institution, or ideological<br />

organizations. If Palestinian commandos could unleash<br />

3


Chapter 1<br />

a virus that would attack Israel<strong>'s</strong> <strong>computer</strong>s, might they not do<br />

it? Well, perhaps they already have. A little later we'll look at<br />

the Friday the 13th virus attack first reported by the Hebrew<br />

University in Jerusalem.<br />

Do Viruses Really Exist?<br />

The short answer is yes. Prior to 1988, although <strong>viruses</strong> were<br />

reported even in the 1970<strong>'s</strong>, industry pundits tended to downplay<br />

the possibility of their existence. Anything that caused fear<br />

and reduced sales of the mushrooming personal <strong>computer</strong> industry<br />

was to be assiduously avoided.<br />

Yet, it<strong>'s</strong> the very success of the industry that has provided<br />

the medium for <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> to grow and spread. Their<br />

existence is no longer a matter of speculation, it<strong>'s</strong> proven fact,<br />

with many incidents of viral attack now documented.<br />

The Computer Virus Industry Association lists the top five<br />

viral str<strong>ai</strong>ns (by reported incidence) as:<br />

Scores (Macintosh)<br />

Pakistani Br<strong>ai</strong>n (IBM PC)<br />

SCSI (Amiga)<br />

Lehigh (IBM PC)<br />

Merritt (IBM PC)<br />

The National BBS Association reports 39 known <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Computer <strong>viruses</strong>, however, are hard to pin down and even<br />

more difficult to trace to the perpetrator. A major problem is<br />

the lack of expertise of most <strong>computer</strong> users to recognizing viral-related<br />

problems. The Computer Virus Industry Association<br />

reports the following statistics on their investigation of virus<br />

incidents:<br />

• 94% of submissions are non <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

30% of these are bombs, Trojans, and so forth.<br />

50% are nonanalyzable (<strong>viruses</strong> tend to destroy the<br />

evidence).<br />

14% are attributable to operator error.<br />

• Half of the rem<strong>ai</strong>ning 6% are only partial <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Missing sectors were not collected.<br />

The virus was partially destroyed by its activation.<br />

4


Your Computer May Be Sick<br />

• There is an unknown, but probably large, number of <strong>viruses</strong><br />

unreported because the user assumed the problem was in the<br />

hardware or through personal error.<br />

The problem of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> is so new and still so<br />

misunderstood that many people are still reacting out of fear.<br />

In its own way, the scourge of these data-destroying <strong>viruses</strong> can<br />

have just as frightening an effect on our society as some of the<br />

most deadly biological <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Imagine your bank. A place of many branches and millions<br />

upon millions of dollars in deposits, all documented by a<br />

massive <strong>computer</strong> system. What if just one of thousands of<br />

bank employees downloads a game from an electronic bulletin<br />

board somewhere and plays it on the bank<strong>'s</strong> time, using one of<br />

their PC workstations which, acting as a terminal, is connected<br />

to the bank<strong>'s</strong> m<strong>ai</strong>n <strong>computer</strong> system.<br />

The innocuous-seeming little game is a Trojan horse, hiding<br />

a malicious virus. The virus replicates and spreads through<br />

the system. A time-released monster, it doesn't show any<br />

destructive tendencies until after it has not only made many<br />

copies of itself, but is also firmly lodged on the bank<strong>'s</strong> backup<br />

tapes. The virus finally activates, and destroys or modifies perhaps<br />

millions of records.<br />

Modification is even more frightening than out and out<br />

destruction. The random changing of one digit here and one<br />

digit there is far harder to detect. But one day you, your neighbor,<br />

the guy who runs the convenience store down the street,<br />

and the lady across town with the florist shop all go to the<br />

bank. You find there is no record of your money, or your life<br />

savings has been instantly reduced from fifteen thousand to fifteen<br />

cents!<br />

Scary? Sure it is. A major virus attack is a catastrophe just<br />

w<strong>ai</strong>ting to happen. Worse, it could be you or your best friend<br />

who unwittingly copied the game from a bulletin board out of<br />

state and gave it to that bank employee.<br />

Avoid neglect! Detect! Protect!<br />

As the onslaught of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> continue, we all have<br />

a collective responsibility. It<strong>'s</strong> not enough to just safeguard our<br />

own data, we must help our fellow <strong>computer</strong> owner as well.<br />

5


Chapter 1<br />

That, ag<strong>ai</strong>n, is what this book is all about: How to institute<br />

methods of detecting and erasing any virus that may attempt to<br />

infiltrate your system and how to keep from passing along the<br />

infection.<br />

The Jargon<br />

Below are definitions of the terms used in this book. These<br />

terms follow the definitions issued by the Computer Virus Industry<br />

Association.<br />

Virus: A <strong>computer</strong> virus is a small program that can lay<br />

dormant for months before performing its destructive mission,<br />

such as erasing the contents of your hard disk. The resemblance<br />

in action to biological <strong>viruses</strong> is almost uncanny. A<br />

<strong>computer</strong> virus can replicate itself and be unwittingly spread<br />

from system to system. It "infects" and hides inside of another<br />

program, such as the <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> operating system or an application<br />

program.<br />

Activation: The final phase of the virus life cycle, during<br />

which it does whatever was programmed in as the end goal.<br />

This can be full or partial destruction of its environment, sending<br />

a message to the screen, or some other system disturbance.<br />

Activation Period: The time of delay programmed into the<br />

virus that it w<strong>ai</strong>ts between the initial infection and its<br />

activation.<br />

Bomb: A program that, through intent or programmer error,<br />

malfunctions and causes destructive results.<br />

Boot Infector: A virus that attaches itself to the boot sector<br />

of a disk, either floppy or hard.<br />

Generic Infector: A virus that can attach itself to any general<br />

program (such as those with the extension .COM or .EXE<br />

in the IBM world).<br />

Hacked Programs: Hacked (and also Pirated) programs are<br />

regular commercial programs whose copy protection or other<br />

normal operation has been modified. Often not intentional, the<br />

destructiveness of these programs is simply the result of a novice<br />

programmer<strong>'s</strong> poor technique.<br />

Host Program: Host programs are those to which a <strong>computer</strong><br />

virus attaches itself. This is an executable program such<br />

as those with .COM or .EXE extensions.<br />

6


Your Computer May Be Sick<br />

Infection Detection Product: Any hardware or software<br />

product that detects virus infection after it occurs.<br />

Infection Identification Product: Any hardware or software<br />

product that identifies specific virus str<strong>ai</strong>ns in an infected<br />

system.<br />

Infection Prevention Product: Any hardware or software<br />

product that prevents a virus from initially infecting a system.<br />

Isolation: The method the virus uses to distinguish itself<br />

from the host program.<br />

System Infector: A virus that replicates by attaching itself<br />

to operating or environment system files.<br />

Trojan Horse: A Trojan or Trojan Horse is either a vehicle<br />

to transmit a virus into <strong>computer</strong> systems, or a destructive program<br />

on its own. Like the ancient Greeks who were supposed<br />

to have captured the city of Troy by leaving a huge wooden<br />

horse full of soldiers outside the gates, pulling such a program<br />

into your system can have similar disastrous results. A disaster<br />

may not occur for months. On the other hand, your hard disk<strong>'s</strong><br />

light may come on when the program is run (and all files<br />

erased) and an infantile message like "Arf! Arfl Gotcha!" may<br />

appear on the screen.<br />

Replication: The process of reproduction, where the virus<br />

copies itself (or detaches) from the present host to a new one.<br />

Worms: Worms are an earlier name for <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

7


2<br />

HISTORY AND<br />

INFAMOUS<br />

VIRUSES<br />

You cannot judge the horse by the harness.<br />

Old Proverb<br />

The popular press has suddenly discovered <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

As is human nature with something newly learned, many<br />

reporters treat the specter of <strong>viruses</strong> and Trojan horses as a<br />

brand new horror just now looming over the horizon of the<br />

Information Age like black storm clouds billowing and brewing.<br />

However, the lightning-cracklings presaging the storm have<br />

been around much longer than the <strong>computer</strong> industry has previously<br />

been willing to admit In 1974, the first self-replicating<br />

code was demonstrated at the Xerox Corporation, but the<br />

problem is even older than that<br />

Viral History<br />

During the sixties, when hacker was a term of respect, young<br />

people at such places as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology<br />

were doing things with <strong>computer</strong>s that had never been<br />

done before. They did wondrous and glorious things like<br />

inventing the game Space War and sitting up all night coding<br />

the most elegant "hack" (program) possible, subsisting on<br />

candy bars and soft drinks. Out of this group came many of the<br />

people who first conceived of personal computing. It was these<br />

early hackers who made personal computing possible, despite<br />

9


Chapter 2<br />

all the nay saying of the big machine people. We owe them a<br />

great debt.<br />

One honorable pursuit, in this infancy of personal interaction<br />

with <strong>computer</strong>s, was to play with friends' minds by<br />

messing up their program code. Hackers won points and respect<br />

by introducing a problem that would be undetectable for<br />

as long as possible. Watching the friend go crazy as the program<br />

bombed time after time for inexplicable reasons was<br />

considered great sport.<br />

These clandestine modifications to code were not <strong>viruses</strong>,<br />

they were bombs (taking immediate effect). Yet, these bombs<br />

proved that controlling another person<strong>'s</strong> program to someone<strong>'s</strong><br />

own ends was possible. Perhaps the one universal rule of all<br />

mankind is if something is possible, someone, somewhere, for<br />

some reason (sane or not), will do it. We can then attach the<br />

addendum that someone else will hear of this thing being done,<br />

and do it. When a <strong>computer</strong> virus is reported in the press, other<br />

programmers may decide to construct <strong>viruses</strong> of their own.<br />

Computer Crime<br />

The subject of <strong>viruses</strong> is not the only one the <strong>computer</strong> industry<br />

has been silent on-another area is <strong>computer</strong> crime. A<br />

major reason for the silence is simply self-interest. The companies<br />

are afr<strong>ai</strong>d-justified to some extent-that talk of <strong>viruses</strong><br />

will hurt sales, and that public discussion of <strong>computer</strong> crime will<br />

encourage other programmers to emulate it.<br />

Some of the same techniques used in the late fifties to defraud<br />

by <strong>computer</strong> are also being used in the sick world of<br />

those who hatch and unleash <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>. A logic bomb is<br />

one of these. This is a clandestine portion of a program which<br />

is executed when the <strong>computer</strong> determines that cert<strong>ai</strong>n conditions<br />

have been met. These conditions can be satisfied by<br />

elapsed time, the number of times the program has run, or<br />

more commonly, on a cert<strong>ai</strong>n date.<br />

There have been numerous instances where a programmer<br />

who quit or was fired from a large company left such a bomb<br />

in the system. These logic bombs have done such things as<br />

simply shut down the system on the programmer<strong>'s</strong> birthday, in<br />

effect, taking the day off, to maliciously destroying thousands of<br />

10


History and Infamous Viruses<br />

important records. Ag<strong>ai</strong>n, if it can be done (and it cert<strong>ai</strong>nly<br />

can), someone will attempt it.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> much harder to implant an undetectable program that<br />

will accomplish a useful feat for the warped programmer-such<br />

as rounding down all cents figures and routing the overage into<br />

an account belonging to the <strong>computer</strong> burglar. It<strong>'s</strong> easier to slip<br />

in a virus or bomb that will do malicious damage. Such programs<br />

usually destroy themselves and make it almost impossible<br />

to find the perpetrator.<br />

Thus, <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> are a more common problem than<br />

<strong>computer</strong> crime for profit. They are also more widespread.<br />

While it may pay to slip a "round down" program into a<br />

bank<strong>'s</strong> system (a task security people continue to make harder<br />

and harder), the same is not true of a personal <strong>computer</strong> system.<br />

Most likely, no one wants to steal your data, someone<br />

wants to destroy it.<br />

The Recent Viral Explosion<br />

The <strong>computer</strong> industry<strong>'s</strong> tight lid on virus information began<br />

leaking in 1984, when scientific papers on <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong><br />

started appearing. The first virus to cause widespread infection<br />

and damage appeared in 1986. By 1988, public reports from<br />

Associated Press and others, and articles in the various industry<br />

trade periodicals, have caused the industry pundits not<br />

only to pull their heads from the sand, but in many cases, to<br />

glare around in a state close to panic.<br />

Many software publishers are spurring their programmers<br />

to build in virus protection for commercial programs (and let<strong>'s</strong><br />

hope that none of those programmers become disaffected). A<br />

number of companies have sprung up who make products to<br />

detect and protect systems ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>, and many shareware<br />

and public dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs are also now av<strong>ai</strong>lable.<br />

The basis for this sudden concern about <strong>viruses</strong> by the industry<br />

and the increased public awareness of the problem is the<br />

same-it<strong>'s</strong> gotten worse. Literally several million more <strong>computer</strong>s<br />

exist today than did a mere two years ago. Telephone<br />

modems are selling for under one hundred dollars. Tens of<br />

thousands of users are calling electronic bulletin boards and<br />

<strong>computer</strong> networks d<strong>ai</strong>ly. The medium for <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> to<br />

11


Chapter 2<br />

thrive and spread has become a hundredfold more fertile. As<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s continue to spew from scores of assembly lines in<br />

the many thousands per year, "living" space for <strong>viruses</strong> increases<br />

dramatically.<br />

Let<strong>'s</strong> be frank. The virus problem is going to get worse<br />

before it gets better. We're all going to have to take measures to<br />

protect ourselves and those who we come in contact with<br />

electronically. This is why the bulk of this book is concerned<br />

with actual detection and protection instead of theory.<br />

The Scores Virus<br />

The Environmental Protection Agency, NASA, and Apple<br />

Computer<strong>'s</strong> Washington, D.C. sales office were all hit this year,<br />

according to the April 11, 1988 issue of Info World. In each<br />

case, systems were affected by a virus program on personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s within their systems (in this case, Macintoshes). It<br />

spread from there throughout the system. As reported by Bill<br />

Pike in the Virus Newsletter, private contractors in the Washington<br />

and North Carolina area inadvertently sold dozens of<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s that carried the virus on hard disk to government<br />

agencies.<br />

It is not yet known how much damage was done over a<br />

five month period starting in January. Damage to government<br />

data appears to be limited, due mostly to the virus being designed<br />

for personal <strong>computer</strong>s while most of the sensitive data<br />

was in m<strong>ai</strong>n frame <strong>computer</strong>s that the virus couldn't infect.<br />

The FBI was called in to investigate. Because the original<br />

source is so difficult to determine, the efforts of the investigators<br />

are being spent more on trying to prevent future occurrences<br />

rather than pinning the blame on an individual or group.<br />

"This was definitely a criminal act," Cynthia Macon, a<br />

spokeswoman for Apple s<strong>ai</strong>d.<br />

The Scores virus has built in time bombs that activate at<br />

two, four, and seven days after a disk has become infected. The<br />

results are varied, but include printing problems, system<br />

crashes, and the malfunction of desk accessory operations.<br />

Data files are not affected by this particular virus, but all<br />

application programs including system files have to be deleted<br />

to erase the virus. A government technician, who preferred not<br />

12


History and Infamous Viruses<br />

to be named, s<strong>ai</strong>d the Scores virus had now been widely dispersed<br />

throughout the country.<br />

Apple now admits the problem and has released an antiviral<br />

program (called Virus RX) which will be discussed later.<br />

Scores is the most commonly reported type of virus, but the<br />

IBM and compatibles world make up for this by having many<br />

more str<strong>ai</strong>ns of <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

The Br<strong>ai</strong>n Virus<br />

The Providence, R.I. Journal-Bulletin newspaper, in a widelypublished<br />

UPI report, s<strong>ai</strong>d it spent a week and a half stamping<br />

out a virus that infected their in-house PC network used by<br />

reporters and editors. The virus apparently destroyed one<br />

reporter<strong>'s</strong> data and infected scores of floppy disks before it<br />

could be removed.<br />

Journal reporter Jeffrey L. Hiday s<strong>ai</strong>d the virus was "a<br />

well-known, highly sophisticated variation called the br<strong>ai</strong>n virus,<br />

which was created by two brothers who run a <strong>computer</strong><br />

store in Lahore, Pakistan." Variations of this alleged virus have<br />

cropped up at companies and colleges across the country,<br />

including Bowie State College in Maryland, where it destroyed<br />

five students' disks, and Miami University in Ohio, where it<br />

threatened to wipe out stored term papers.<br />

Hiday wrote that the newspaper contacted one of the Pakistan<br />

brothers by phone, who s<strong>ai</strong>d he created the virus merely to<br />

keep track of software he wrote and sold, adding that he did<br />

not know how it got to the United States.<br />

"U.S. <strong>computer</strong> programming experts, however, believe<br />

the Pakistanis developed the virus with malicious intent,"<br />

Hiday wrote. "The original version may be relatively harmless,<br />

they point out, but its elegance lends itself to alterations by<br />

other programmers that would make it more destructive."<br />

The newspaper discovered the virus on May 6 when a<br />

message popped up on <strong>computer</strong> screens reading, "Welcome to<br />

the Dungeon ... Beware of this VIRUS. Contact us for<br />

vaccination." The message included a 1986 copyright date, two<br />

names (Basit and Amjad), a company (Br<strong>ai</strong>n Computer Services),<br />

an address (730 Nizam Block Allama Iqbal in Lahore,<br />

Pakistan) and three phone numbers.<br />

13


Chapter 2<br />

The Lehigh Virus<br />

Here<strong>'s</strong> how Kenneth R. van Wyk, User Services Senior Consultant,<br />

Lehigh University Computing Center, described the Lehigh<br />

virus that attacked their system in 1987, destroying a large<br />

percentage of their public site disks.<br />

"The virus is cont<strong>ai</strong>ned in the stack space of COMMAND.<br />

COM. When a PC is booted from an infected disk, all a user<br />

need do to spread the virus is to access another disk via TYPE,<br />

COPY, DIR, etc. If the other disk cont<strong>ai</strong>ns COMMAND.COM,<br />

the virus code is copied to the other disk. Then, a counter is<br />

incremented on the parent. When this counter reaches a value<br />

of 4, any and every disk in the PC is erased thoroughly. The<br />

boot tracks are nulled, as are the FAT tables, etc.<br />

"All Norton<strong>'s</strong> horses couldn't put it back together ag<strong>ai</strong>n.<br />

"This affects both floppy and hard disks. Meanwhile, the<br />

four children that were created, go on to tell four friends, and<br />

then they tell four friends, and so on, and so on."<br />

The Friday the 13th Virus<br />

Y. Rad<strong>ai</strong> of the Computation Center at the Hebrew University<br />

of Jerusalem recently described the Friday the 13th virus,<br />

which also affects IBM PCs and compatibles. He did so in a<br />

warning message disseminated widely on the ARPLANET<br />

<strong>computer</strong> network (which connects government agencies,<br />

universities, and similar institutions worldwide), and which<br />

was then copied to the various commercial networks such as<br />

CompuServe and Delphi.<br />

"Our version," Rad<strong>ai</strong> s<strong>ai</strong>d (comparing it to the Lehigh virus),<br />

"instead of inhabiting only COMMAND. COM, can infect<br />

any executable file. It works in two stages: When you execute<br />

an infected .EXE or .COM file the first time after booting, the<br />

virus captures interrupt 21 (hexadecimal) and inserts its own<br />

code. After this has been done, whenever any .EXE file is executed,<br />

the virus code is written to the end of that file, increasing<br />

its size by 1808 bytes .. COM files are also affected, but the<br />

1808 bytes are written to the beginning of the file, another 5<br />

bytes (the string MsDos) are written to the end, and this extension<br />

occurs only once."<br />

14


History and Infamous Viruses<br />

The disease, according to Rad<strong>ai</strong>, manifests itself in at least<br />

three ways:<br />

1. Because of this continual increase in the size of .EXE files,<br />

such programs eventually become too large to be loaded into<br />

memory or there is insufficient room on the disk for further<br />

extension.<br />

2. After a cert<strong>ai</strong>n interval of time (apparently 30 minutes after<br />

infection of memory), delays are inserted so execution of<br />

programs slows down considerably. (The speed seems to be<br />

reduced by a factor of 5 on ordinary pes, but by a smaller<br />

factor on faster models.)<br />

3. After memory has been infected on a Friday the 13th, any<br />

.COM or .EXE file executed on that date gets deleted.<br />

"It is possible," Rad<strong>ai</strong> continues in the message, that the<br />

whole thing might not have been discovered in time were it not<br />

for the fact that when the virus code is present, an .EXE file is<br />

increased in size every time it is executed. This enlargement of<br />

.EXE files on each execution is apparently a bug; probably the<br />

intention was that it should grow only once, as with .COM<br />

files, and it is fortunate that the continual growth of the .EXE<br />

files enabled us to discover the virus much sooner than<br />

otherwise.<br />

"From the above it follows that you can f<strong>ai</strong>rly easily detect<br />

whether your files have become infected. Simply choose one of<br />

your .EXE files (preferably your most frequently executed one),<br />

note its length, and execute it twice. If it does not grow, it is<br />

not infected by this virus. If it does, the present file is infected,<br />

and so, probably, are some of your other files. (Another way of<br />

detecting this virus is to look for the string <strong>'s</strong>UMsDos' in bytes<br />

4-10 of .COM files or about 1800 bytes before the end of .EXE<br />

files; however, this method is less reliable since the string can<br />

be altered without attenuating the virus.)<br />

"Of course, this is only the beginning. We can expect to see<br />

many new <strong>viruses</strong> both here and abroad. In fact, two others<br />

have already been discovered here. In both cases the target date<br />

is April 1. One affects only .COM files, while the other affects<br />

only .EXE files. What they do on that date is to display a 'Ha<br />

ha' message and lock up, forcing you to cold boot. Moreover<br />

(at least in the .EXE version), there is also a lockup one hour<br />

15


Chapter 2<br />

after infection of memory on any day on which you use the default<br />

date of 1-1-80. (These <strong>viruses</strong> may actually be older than<br />

the above-described virus, but simply weren't noticed earlier<br />

since they extend files only once.)"<br />

The Sunnyvale Slug<br />

An article in the July, 1988 Personal Computing reported that a<br />

northern California company (who prefers not to be named)<br />

was suffering attacks in their IBM PCs from a virus dubbed the<br />

Sunnyvale Slug.<br />

The Slug does various things, some benign and some<br />

destructive. It may flash a message on the screen reading:<br />

"Greetings from Sunnyvale. Can you find me?" Worse, it<br />

sometimes modifies DOS<strong>'s</strong> COpy command so it deletes instead<br />

of copies.<br />

The company, as more and more are doing, turned to an<br />

outside virus expert to help clean their system-in this case,<br />

Panda Systems of Wilmington, Delaware. Panda manufactures<br />

a commercial virus protection program, the Dr. Panda utilities<br />

(which, along with many others, are discussed later in this<br />

book).<br />

President Pam Kane and her programming staff serve as<br />

an equivalent in the computing field to famous oil well fire<br />

extinguisher Red Ad<strong>ai</strong>r in the petroleum industry. If a company<br />

is suffering a viral attack in its system, Pam and her troops can<br />

"cap the fire."<br />

Conclusion<br />

Computer <strong>viruses</strong> exist and have existed for some time. There<br />

are many documented examples, like those above, of their attacks.<br />

The explosive spread of personal <strong>computer</strong>s in their<br />

many millions give <strong>viruses</strong> a fertile medium in which to replicate<br />

and spread as well.<br />

16


3<br />

HOW VIRUSES<br />

WORK<br />

The disaster originating in this source, spread throughout the<br />

country and the people.<br />

Horace<br />

Let<strong>'s</strong> tell it like it is.<br />

Computer data storage is a lot more vulnerable than most<br />

people realize. The problem of <strong>viruses</strong>, bombs, and Trojan<br />

horses aside, there are still numerous operator errors and<br />

equipment malfunctions that can scramble the contents of a<br />

floppy disk or even an entire 20 megabyte hard disk in less<br />

than a second!<br />

Salespeople and others connected with the <strong>computer</strong> industry<br />

tend to not mention or, at best, gloss over this<br />

vulnerability. It has been the experience of this writer, wearing<br />

the hat of <strong>computer</strong> consultant, that most people are simply<br />

unaware of how precarious their data storage really is. On IBM<br />

and other MS-DOS <strong>computer</strong>s, how often are disks examined<br />

with CHKDSK? Not nearly enough. Lost cluster ch<strong>ai</strong>ns and<br />

files corrupted for a variety of reasons crop up constantly on<br />

the best of systems.<br />

An Accident W<strong>ai</strong>ting to Happen<br />

If CHKDSK is not used often to check that a disk is storing<br />

data properly-and appropriate m<strong>ai</strong>ntenance implemented<br />

when a problem is detected-any MS-DOS file system will<br />

eventually tear itself apart. This is a fact of life.<br />

The <strong>computer</strong> industry has greatly downplayed the areas in<br />

which <strong>computer</strong>s can be unreliable. Backup and DOS-level<br />

17


Chapter 3<br />

m<strong>ai</strong>ntenance is not stressed at all, and end users waste hours<br />

upon hours recovering data (or trying to).<br />

Every file read/write operation is an "accident w<strong>ai</strong>ting to<br />

happen." Not just on IBM and compatibles, but on all <strong>computer</strong>s.<br />

The disk is spinning (in the case of most PC hard disks) at<br />

perhaps 3600 rpm. The heads are whipping back and forth.<br />

There are millions of operations per second going on in the<br />

<strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> memory. A momentary voltage surge, a minute<br />

mechanical slippage, an error in one of thousands of program<br />

instructions, and the data on the disk is ruined or damaged.<br />

It is beyond the province of this book to expl<strong>ai</strong>n DOSlevel<br />

m<strong>ai</strong>ntenance (although it<strong>'s</strong> strongly recommended that<br />

you learn and use these techniques for your own protection),<br />

but the point to be made here is that <strong>computer</strong>s are already<br />

easy enough to foul up. Because of this vulnerability, <strong>viruses</strong><br />

can quickly and easily do serious damage-in mere milliseconds.<br />

Disks Present a Bare Throat to Viruses<br />

For programs to work reliably, data must be stored in a consistent<br />

manner on all <strong>computer</strong>s of a specific type. The actual<br />

structure of information recorded on MS-DOS disks is different<br />

from that used for Macintosh <strong>computer</strong>s (reflecting the demands<br />

of their respective operating systems), but is essentially<br />

the same for all <strong>computer</strong>s within that class. In other words, an<br />

IBM PC compatible disk from a <strong>computer</strong> in Hong Kong can<br />

be read by one in New Jersey or Scotland or Pago Pago,<br />

American Samoa.<br />

This interchangeability is both a strength and a weakness.<br />

It allows the free exchange of information, but it also facilitates<br />

the spread of <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Without getting too technical, understanding how disks<br />

work (and their vulnerable nature) will show you just why <strong>viruses</strong><br />

can have such a field day trashing your system. All disks<br />

work in the same general way, but let<strong>'s</strong> use the MS-DOS (IBM<br />

and compatibles) as an example.<br />

All disks (5W' floppies, 312" disks, or fixed hard disks) are<br />

all basically the same in operation. The only difference, essentially,<br />

is a matter of capacity. Each of these disks has a number<br />

of magnetic tracks (sometimes referred to as cylinders). Tracks<br />

18


How Viruses Work<br />

may be thought of as similar to the grooves on a phonograph<br />

record.<br />

Each track is subdivided into sectors (all of this done<br />

magnetically by the <strong>computer</strong> that formatted the disk). Tracks<br />

and sectors have specific numbers: Every part of the disk has<br />

an address.<br />

A program can then send a request to the <strong>computer</strong> to<br />

read or write data into or out of Track X, Sector Y. This command<br />

is sent by the <strong>computer</strong> to the disk controller card, which<br />

figures out how to physically position the read/write head in<br />

order to comply with the instructions received.<br />

Thus, if a program can send erroneous address information<br />

during a write process, data belonging to a file other<br />

than the one being worked on can be overwritten. So any of<br />

perhaps hundreds of programs on a hard disk can, through<br />

simple error, foul up any of literally millions of pieces of data.<br />

The disk controller has no way of knowing whether the command<br />

was right or not-or whether it came from a legitimate<br />

program or a virus-it just blindly writes to the location<br />

specified.<br />

The first track on a disk, especially on a hard disk, usually<br />

has a small program that<strong>'s</strong> read and run when you first turn on<br />

your <strong>computer</strong>. This process is called booting and the first track<br />

is the boot track. The boot program initializes the <strong>computer</strong><br />

and readies it to do work. If the boot program is infected by a<br />

virus, you've lost control from the start.<br />

Now for a really soft place in disk structure, the jugular<br />

vein that sharp-fanged <strong>viruses</strong> often go for-the File Allocation<br />

Table. After a while, disks become fragmented. That is, if there<br />

is a 40K file to be written but there<strong>'s</strong> not 40K of contiguous<br />

space, the disk controller will break up the file and put the fragments<br />

here and there as it tries to effectively use all the space<br />

on the disk. (This, by the way, has the effect of slowing down<br />

disk accesses as the heads eventually have to hunt all over the<br />

disk to find the sectors belonging to a particular file. A utility<br />

to optimize disks, like Norton<strong>'s</strong> Speed Disk, speeds up access<br />

time by simply redoing the disk so files are cont<strong>ai</strong>ned in adjacent<br />

clusters instead of randomly distributed.)<br />

The real problem occurs because of the just-described way<br />

19


Chapter 3<br />

in which sectors are put on disks-in any open space. For the<br />

<strong>computer</strong>, through the disk controller, to find all of our 40K<br />

file ag<strong>ai</strong>n, there has to be an index (actually, in this case,<br />

indexes).<br />

On a MS-DOS disk, the directory structure on the first<br />

part of the disk references the first cluster of all files (beginning<br />

address) and another index, the FAT or File Allocation Table.<br />

The FAT has the other addresses for the scattered clusters that<br />

cont<strong>ai</strong>n the rem<strong>ai</strong>nder of the file. A cluster represents the<br />

smallest amount of information about a file that the operating<br />

system knows how to read or write.<br />

The disk controller, when given the address (track and sector)<br />

of this cluster, can access the first portion of the file. Next,<br />

the FAT is referred to for the location of the next cluster, and<br />

so on until the end of the file is reached.<br />

Every cluster on the disk is referenced in the FAT table.<br />

The information cont<strong>ai</strong>ned here can indicate that the cluster is<br />

unused, damaged (marked as a bad cluster), that it<strong>'s</strong> the last<br />

cluster in a file, or show where the next cluster in that file is located.<br />

In other words, the FAT provides the ch<strong>ai</strong>n that links<br />

clusters together to form files.<br />

A standard 360K floppy has 354 clusters. A 24 megabyte<br />

hard disk has over 12,000. Each of these 12,000 plus clusters is<br />

referenced in the FAT for that disk. It<strong>'s</strong> the only way files can<br />

be properly read or written to.<br />

If you think all this sounds like a cumbersome, error-prone<br />

way to do things, you're right! There is no need to erase files or<br />

cause the disk to be reformatted for a virus or worm to make a<br />

disk unusable. Just trash the FAT. All the information will still<br />

be on the disk but you can't get to it (a good programmer, with<br />

a lot of headaches and cursing can recover parts of the disk).<br />

Because of the delicacy and openness of your <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong><br />

read/write procedures, <strong>viruses</strong> can also do much more subtle<br />

and insidious things. If a virus is just occasionally changing<br />

data randomly, you may not even detect the problem before<br />

wholesale file corruption has set in.<br />

Let<strong>'s</strong> look now at the types of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>. We'll follow<br />

up with ways to protect ag<strong>ai</strong>nst viral infection and how to<br />

detect and get rid of any you might already have.<br />

20


Types of Viruses<br />

How Viruses Work<br />

The Computer Virus Industry Association, whose members are<br />

companies manufacturing antiviral software and hardware, is<br />

one group attempting to define standard terms. There are,<br />

according to the association, currently three classes of <strong>viruses</strong>:<br />

Boot infectors, system infectors, and general executable program<br />

infectors.<br />

Steve Gibson, the popular "Tech Talk" columnist in the<br />

<strong>computer</strong> trade weekly, InfoWorld, says there are four classes of<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>. He defines them as: General Purpose Infector (GPV),<br />

Special Purpose Infector (SPV), Very Clever General Purpose<br />

Infector Virus (VCGPV), and the Central System Infecting Virus<br />

(CSIV). The first three can infect any application program,<br />

while the last infects the operating system only.<br />

Both classifications fit what is now known about <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Gibson<strong>'s</strong> system, as might be expected, is the more technical.<br />

Since this book is <strong>ai</strong>med more toward the general user who just<br />

wants to protect his or her system, not become a virus expert,<br />

we'll use the Computer Virus Industry Association<strong>'s</strong> definitions.<br />

The National BBS Society has identified 39 different <strong>viruses</strong>,<br />

and there are cert<strong>ai</strong>nly more str<strong>ai</strong>ns than that. The good<br />

news is (despite how easily a virus can damage your system)<br />

there is only a very limited way in which this can be accomplished.<br />

A <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> disk storage techniques are wide open to<br />

interference, but there are generally only four ways in which a<br />

virus can do so. These are:<br />

High-level format. A high level format is what happens<br />

when you use DOS<strong>'s</strong> FORMAT command. This lays down the<br />

magnetic structure used to store files. While this type of damage<br />

is aggravating, you can restore the disk if you've taken the<br />

precaution of using a format recovery program like those by<br />

Norton or Mace ahead of time. High-level formatting on an already<br />

formatted disk does not actually erase data except for<br />

initializing the Directory and FAT areas. This is true for both<br />

floppies and hard disks.<br />

Low-level format. Hard disks, when initially installed, require<br />

a process called low-level formatting. In essence, this lays<br />

down a foundation for a highllevel format. Low-level format-<br />

21


Chapter 3<br />

ting does erase all data. You cannot do a low-level format with<br />

regular operating system commands (such as MS-DOS). Usually<br />

these are done by hard disk installation programs, or by<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

System operation. FAT, Directory, and Boot Sector scrambling<br />

are ways in which system operation can be played with. It<br />

takes just a few milliseconds for a virus to destroy the file<br />

allocation table, erase the directory, or overwrite the boot sector.<br />

Overwriting the boot sector is an effective way of killing a<br />

hard disk. The system simply refuses to boot up. You may get<br />

an error message such as Probable Non-DOS Disk. The system<br />

may also be slowed down and other unacceptable operations<br />

occur.<br />

Data scrambling. The effects here are usually more subtle<br />

and may not be caught for months. Numbers are randomly<br />

changed. Customer accounts and other data become corrupted.<br />

If the <strong>computer</strong> is used for billing you may learn this immediately<br />

in a scorching phone call, or, in the case of under-billing,<br />

you may lose a lot of money before finding out you have viral<br />

problems.<br />

Boot Infectors<br />

The Computer Virus Industry Association<strong>'s</strong> three classes of <strong>viruses</strong><br />

are described in the online file "Anti-Virus Measures"<br />

from association member InterPath Corporation (manufacturers<br />

of C-4 and Tracer). Boot infectors attach themselves to<br />

sector 0 of floppy disks and, occasionally, hard disks. This area<br />

of the disk is part of the boot track.<br />

Viruses that have infected the boot track g<strong>ai</strong>n control when<br />

the system is first turned on and rem<strong>ai</strong>n in control at all times.<br />

Many have the capability to trap warm boot requests (holding<br />

down the Ctrl and Alt keys and pressing the Del key) and rem<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

in control even if booted from a noninfected floppy, with<br />

the result that the clean floppy becomes instantly infected.<br />

Boot infectors typically create bad disk sectors to which<br />

the original boot sector is copied, along with the rem<strong>ai</strong>nder of<br />

the virus code. Boot infectors may be from 2 to 7 sectors in<br />

length.<br />

22


How Viruses Work<br />

Boot infectors can be benign or malignant. The Pakistani<br />

Br<strong>ai</strong>n virus (described in the previous chapter), for example,<br />

was cl<strong>ai</strong>med to be a benign boot infector virus in its original<br />

form. The company in Lahore, Pakistan supposedly wrote it<br />

merely as a way to keep track of their software.<br />

Programmers refer to code that is extremely efficient for a<br />

particular task as elegant. The Br<strong>ai</strong>n virus program is elegant at<br />

doing its task of infection, and is also easy to modify into a<br />

very malignant form.<br />

Whether it was originally meant to be this or not, the virus<br />

is now a nasty little monster that can infect hard disks and destroy<br />

FAT entries, delete files, and perform other destructive<br />

activities.<br />

Boot infectors can do the following:<br />

• Move or overwrite the original boot sector<br />

• Replace the boot sector with themselves<br />

• Create bad sectors cont<strong>ai</strong>ning virus rem<strong>ai</strong>nder<br />

• Infect through soft reboot (Ctrl-Alt-Del) or other functions.<br />

System Infectors<br />

Several kinds of <strong>viruses</strong>, ag<strong>ai</strong>n as described in InterPath<strong>'s</strong><br />

informational file, attach themselves to COMMAND. COM<br />

and other system files that rem<strong>ai</strong>n memory resident. They g<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

control after system boot and infect hard disks or other<br />

bootable floppies that cont<strong>ai</strong>n the appropriate system files.<br />

Memory resident programs (also called TSR<strong>'s</strong> for Terminate<br />

and Stay Resident) are prime candidates for infection<br />

by this type of virus. Any power user of <strong>computer</strong>s has several<br />

of these programs, such as Borland<strong>'s</strong> Sidekick on both IBM<br />

PCs and compatibles, and also for Apple<strong>'s</strong> Macintosh.<br />

However, even if you have no TSR programs in memory,<br />

the operating system probably already has. Such MS-DOS commands<br />

as COPY, DIR, and ERASE are loaded into memory<br />

when the <strong>computer</strong> boots. These miniprograms can be accessed<br />

and manipulated (to your detriment) by system infectors.<br />

System infectors may activate after a given period of time<br />

or they may instantly begin subtle modifications in system<br />

processing-including increasing the time to perform system<br />

23


Chapter 3<br />

functions, subtle scrambling of data or modification of system<br />

error messages, or informational messages. The Friday the 13th<br />

virus first discovered at the Hebrew University in Israel is an<br />

example of such a virus. (This virus is also able to act as a general<br />

.COM and .EXE infector as well as being a system infector).<br />

Like the time-release pills in such medicines as Contac,<br />

activation of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> can take place after a specified<br />

period of time or times have elapsed. A specific number of<br />

times a program is run can also serve as a trigger. Activation<br />

may include scrambling the FAT, erasure of specific files, low<br />

level disk format, or modification of nonexecutable files<br />

cont<strong>ai</strong>ning numeric or other ASCII data.<br />

General.COM and .EXE Infectors<br />

General Infectors is the third and final class defined by the<br />

Computer Virus Industry Association. This class of virus is the<br />

most dangerous from an infection standpoint since these <strong>viruses</strong><br />

can spread to almost any executable program in any system.<br />

Your spreadsheet, word processor, games, utilities, or any<br />

program you run can be a target. These <strong>viruses</strong> infect in three<br />

general ways, by<br />

1. G<strong>ai</strong>ning control each time the infected program is executed<br />

and copying itself to other .COM or .EXE files on the fixed<br />

or floppy disk prior to passing control to the host program.<br />

This is the most common infection technique. Since the<br />

drive light is already on, and the whole process takes almost<br />

no time, it<strong>'s</strong> practically undetectable.<br />

2. Rem<strong>ai</strong>ning memory resident and infecting each program<br />

that<strong>'s</strong> loaded for execution. This technique is used by the<br />

Friday 13th virus but is less common than the above<br />

method.<br />

3. Attaching themselves externally to .COM or .EXE files and<br />

thus changing the file size. They mayor may not modify the<br />

creation date and time. Others insert themselves internally<br />

in the executable host program<strong>'s</strong> dead space and are thus invisible<br />

to anything other than a binary compare routine.<br />

Some <strong>viruses</strong> continue to infect the same program multiple<br />

24


How Viruses Work<br />

times until the program becomes too large to fit into memory.<br />

Most, however, check to see if the host has already been<br />

infected and pass over previously infected files.<br />

Viruses Battling for Supremacy<br />

Viruses, like life forms, may fight for territory and "eat" other<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>. Here<strong>'s</strong> an example:<br />

There is a public dom<strong>ai</strong>n program called "Core War,"<br />

which has been av<strong>ai</strong>lable for several types of <strong>computer</strong>s including<br />

IBMs and compatibles for at least four years now. It<strong>'s</strong> a<br />

<strong>computer</strong> game played both with and by <strong>computer</strong>s. In Core<br />

War, two player-written <strong>computer</strong> programs operate concurrently<br />

in a circular memory array. A program loses when it hits<br />

an instruction it can't execute.<br />

The information below comes from the documentation file<br />

included with the program. There is no attribution to the author<br />

of the distributed version, but COREWARS.C was written<br />

by Kevin A. Bjorke in May of 1984, in Small-C version 2.03,<br />

and placed in the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n.<br />

Most of us think of a <strong>computer</strong> loading a program into its<br />

working memory and running it. When we're word processing<br />

or using a spread sheet, that<strong>'s</strong> all that<strong>'s</strong> happening. Right?<br />

Wrong. There are still lots of things going on in memory, many<br />

of them unrelated to the program now running. What<strong>'s</strong> worse,<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> could be battling to see which can do the most damage.<br />

Core War is just a game, but it demonstrates the freedom<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> have in an unprotected system once they get into memory.<br />

Also, these types of programs can (and no doubt did) serve<br />

as the models for actual <strong>viruses</strong>. Core war programs are described<br />

more fully by A. K. Dewdney in the "Computer<br />

Recreations" column of Scientific American, May 1984. Here<strong>'s</strong><br />

a short synopsis of Mr. Dewdney<strong>'s</strong> article (omitting the<br />

technicalities).<br />

Neither program originally knows where in memory the<br />

other is, or even where the program itself has started-however,<br />

the memory array used by Core War is circular, and all<br />

addressing is relative, so absolute memory addresses are not<br />

important. Both battle programs are executed by the Core War<br />

25


Chapter 3<br />

operating system, MARS. In the version included with the IBM<br />

public dom<strong>ai</strong>n version, MARS is also the program loader.<br />

Programs are loaded either from the keyboard or from disk<br />

(when you give the program a name, it will check the directory<br />

for that name; if it finds it, it will load it from disk, assuming<br />

the program is an ASCII file). The MARS interpreter simply<br />

keeps switching its program counter from one program to another-ABABABABABABAB<br />

... until one program loses,<br />

some maximum number of instruction cycles have been performed<br />

(as a safeguard ag<strong>ai</strong>nst endless loops), or you hit<br />

to abort.<br />

Here<strong>'s</strong> the shortest possible battle program, called "IMP:"<br />

MOV 01<br />

IMP just copies the current location to the next location,<br />

then advances to the next location, and so forth. While the<br />

original program is short, it will eventually gobble up every<br />

memory location if unchecked, thus becoming the largest possible<br />

battle program as well. It can even spread to its opponent,<br />

since any program that jumps to a location written by IMP will<br />

become an identical clone of IMP.<br />

ANTI.IMP sets up a marker byte at - 5 relative to its first<br />

byte and then w<strong>ai</strong>ts for IMP to come along. When the marker<br />

changes, it bombards the area that IMP is moving into with<br />

DAT 0 instructions, which IMP can't execute and thus "bites" it.<br />

ANTIANTI.IMP writes a block of code that looks like<br />

IMP into progressively higher memory locations. When<br />

ANTI.IMP senses this drone IMP, it will attack it, but to no<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>l-it will still get overwritten and then become a clone of<br />

IMP. At this point it turns around and wreaks havoc on<br />

ANTIANTI.IMP, which has no protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst IMP itself<br />

Other examples are given in Dewdney<strong>'s</strong> article, such as<br />

DWARF, which fires "Zero Bombs" in a fashion similar to<br />

ANTIANTLIMP; GEMINI, which simply runs away; or<br />

RAIDAR, which is able to leapfrog over advancing attacks.<br />

There may come a time, if the virus problem continues to<br />

grow at the rate it is now, when killer <strong>viruses</strong> will have to be<br />

developed. These "good" <strong>viruses</strong> might be unleashed in a <strong>computer</strong><br />

system much as you would get an injection of antibiotics<br />

to fight an infection in your biological body.<br />

26


How Viruses Work<br />

So far, as we will see in the next chapter, eradicating <strong>viruses</strong><br />

from a <strong>computer</strong> system follows more conventional lines.<br />

But, until the <strong>computer</strong> hardware manufacturers make systems<br />

that aren't so delicate and open to <strong>viruses</strong>, don't count on<br />

things staying the same. Viruses will escalate, and so will<br />

protective programs.<br />

How Does Your Computer Get Infected?<br />

A virus invades your system in a carrier or Trojan horse program.<br />

Basically there are only two ways a virus can enter your<br />

<strong>computer</strong>: You've either physically placed a disk into the machine<br />

that has a virus on it or you've downloaded a virus over<br />

the telephone or a LAN (Local Area Network).<br />

Just doing a quick DIR (directory) of a disk (if it has a system<br />

file like COMMAND.COM on it) lets the virus jump into<br />

your <strong>computer</strong>. The infected disk may have been in the drive<br />

for only five seconds or so. It takes much less time than that<br />

for a nimble virus program. The more programs you buy or<br />

trade for, or have been given to you, the greater the chance of<br />

viral infection.<br />

Booting from a floppy disk is even worse. InterPath,<br />

maker of the C-4 antiviral program, stresses that booting from<br />

a floppy is a high risk practice and the single largest cause of<br />

viral infection.<br />

Calling another <strong>computer</strong> over the phone lines, such as<br />

electronic bulletin boards (BBSs) also puts you at risk if that<br />

<strong>computer</strong> is infected. The more <strong>computer</strong>s you call, the greater<br />

the chance of viral infection.<br />

However, all the above are useful things to do. Why<br />

should we let a few sick minds keep the vast majority of <strong>computer</strong><br />

users from enjoying the fantastic benefits of telecommunications?<br />

The answer is there is no reason! In the next chapter<br />

we'll discuss ways of fighting <strong>viruses</strong> and practicing safe<br />

computing.<br />

The Reproductive Urge<br />

Computers, even personal <strong>computer</strong>s, have become so sophisticated<br />

now that they support a very crude imitation of life cycle<br />

processes. Viruses can burrow into host programs like<br />

27


Chapter 3<br />

biological <strong>viruses</strong> into living cells. They have an urge to reproduce<br />

or replicate themselves. Like in real life, they seek the<br />

immortality given by offspring.<br />

As are life forms, <strong>viruses</strong> are usually specialized, some<br />

str<strong>ai</strong>ns inhabiting boot sectors, others system files such as<br />

COMMAND. COM or the hidden BIOS files, and some hardy<br />

ones that are able to exist in almost any .COM or .EXE executable<br />

program.<br />

Like genetic codes in living microorganisms, <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong><br />

also have a greater instinctual reason for existence. They<br />

have the drive to reproduce, but reproduction accomplishes<br />

their final goal. That goal may be something as innocuous as<br />

flashing a humorous message on the screen, or as malignant<br />

even as a low level format of your hard disk.<br />

A <strong>computer</strong> virus enters your system concealed in a Trojan<br />

horse carrier program. Most programs, especially large ones,<br />

have empty or unused areas in their code where a smaller program<br />

can easily be concealed.<br />

When this Trojan horse program is run, a replicating virus<br />

will take control of it for a brief time during the start up phase.<br />

Since the disk light is already on because the program is loading,<br />

you'll probably notice nothing out of the ordinary. The virus<br />

quickly checks to find an uninfected host program. It<br />

copies itself into that one, then returns control to the program<br />

starting up, which then runs as if nothing has happened.<br />

Such activity will happen each time the Trojan is invoked<br />

until all the programs the virus can reach are infected. At that<br />

time, the virus may trigger and do whatever goal its creator has<br />

programmed in (usually something quite nasty). Or, it may<br />

w<strong>ai</strong>t until a specific time, infecting any new programs you put<br />

into the system and, of course, going out with all programs you<br />

give or trade to friends, or upload to BBSs.<br />

The more sophisticated <strong>viruses</strong>, even when triggered, do<br />

not engage in wholesale destruction. They change data randomly<br />

and degrade system performance, all while rem<strong>ai</strong>ning<br />

hidden in the hopes of spreading to other systems. In such<br />

manner, the virus goes through many generations and can infect<br />

thousands of systems, thus achieving the goals (usually<br />

sick) of the person who programmed it.<br />

28


The Retro-Virus<br />

How Viruses Work<br />

The latest virus discovered and verified by the National BBS<br />

Association is called the retro-virus. It was first publicly described<br />

by Steve Gibson in the May 9, 1988 InJoWorld.<br />

Three popular shareware programs (which are not named)<br />

are the hosts for this viral str<strong>ai</strong>n. The programs are infected by<br />

the virus and reproduce by attaching passive carrier clones of<br />

itself to other executable programs. It rides these programs in<br />

hopes of finding one of the three programs it can live inside.<br />

The name retro-virus was given because it communicates<br />

with the carrier clones of itself using a clever flag hidden<br />

within the system. When any of the viral clones activates, this<br />

flag is turned on. When one of the three infected programs is<br />

run, the flag is checked and turned off. If it was already off, the<br />

virus assumes the infected programs must have been removed<br />

from the system. Then it w<strong>ai</strong>ts for several months to reinject<br />

the target programs. Like a submarine rigged for silent running,<br />

the retro-virus w<strong>ai</strong>ts until the destroyers have stowed the depth<br />

charges and gone back to port before returning to sink ships.<br />

Conclusions<br />

Computer <strong>viruses</strong> imitate real life <strong>viruses</strong> in the way they reproduce.<br />

On a hard disk they can infect hundreds of programs<br />

and spread to new systems as these programs are entered via<br />

disks or telephone modem. Running an infected program<br />

spreads the infection.<br />

Viruses are becoming more and more sophisticated and already<br />

lurk in thousands of systems. The National BBS Society<br />

has identified 39 str<strong>ai</strong>ns (most of which are on the IBM and<br />

compatibles, or Apple<strong>'s</strong> Macintosh <strong>computer</strong>s). It is obvious<br />

that the problem will only get worse before it gets better.<br />

What can you do to rid your system of any <strong>viruses</strong> that<br />

may be present and to make sure no infection occurs? The<br />

rem<strong>ai</strong>nder of this book is concerned with the specifics of detection<br />

and protection.<br />

29


4<br />

FIGHTING<br />

VIRUSESAND<br />

PRACTICING<br />

SAFE<br />

COMPUTING<br />

When false things are brought low . ..<br />

Thomas Hardy<br />

The best cure for any virus is not to catch it in the first place.<br />

Alas, unless you do all your computing in an underground bunker<br />

on a totally isolated <strong>computer</strong>, and use only programs<br />

you've written and personally typed into the <strong>computer</strong> yourself,<br />

chances are your system will sooner or later be exposed to a virus,<br />

Trojan, worm, or hacked program of some sort. The Third<br />

Marine Division is useless ag<strong>ai</strong>nst this kind of invasion.<br />

This chapter gives you the general precepts needed to detect<br />

and prevent viral infections, as well as attacks by Trojans,<br />

bombs and pl<strong>ai</strong>n old operator error. It acqu<strong>ai</strong>nts you with how<br />

to practice safe computing and shows ways of fighting <strong>viruses</strong><br />

instead of just passively worrying about the danger of an intrusion<br />

into your system.<br />

If you use public dom<strong>ai</strong>n, freeware, or shareware programs,<br />

the chances of attack or infection increases. The obvious answer<br />

touted by some writers is never use a public dom<strong>ai</strong>n or<br />

shareware program, and never hook your <strong>computer</strong> up to the<br />

telephone line.<br />

31


Chapter 4<br />

This, despite the very real danger of <strong>viruses</strong> and other<br />

destructive programs, is still poor advice. In my utility directory<br />

right now are 314 programs (the result of weeding out hundreds<br />

of downloads). There are some real gems in this<br />

collection; useful programs I got free or for a minimal registration<br />

fee that could not otherwise have been bought for any<br />

amount of money. Some of them I use every day.<br />

Power Computing<br />

For a commercial program to succeed, it must meet the needs<br />

of the widest possible market. Major compromises are made to<br />

fit a program within this criteria. Often public dom<strong>ai</strong>n or shareware<br />

programs will better do your specific tasks. These programs<br />

also offer features on the leading edge of programmingthings<br />

the commercial companies, with their much longer<br />

development period, will not implement for a year or more.<br />

Pull-down menus, windows, and many other now takenfor-granted<br />

features of commercial software first appeared in<br />

public dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs. Of the many thousands of such programs<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable on Compuserve, Delphi, and the other major<br />

<strong>computer</strong> networks, and on hundreds of local electronic bulletin<br />

boards, probably far less than 1 percent are currently infected<br />

with a virus, or will cause damage in some other way.<br />

Why let the few sickies who turn out <strong>viruses</strong> keep you<br />

from this power?<br />

Far too many people buy a <strong>computer</strong> for one particular<br />

purpose. Often they purchase just one or two programs and run<br />

them all the time. This is akin to owning a 928 Porsche but<br />

only using it to drive to the grocery store down the street,<br />

never taking it out of first gear.<br />

Computers are performance enhancers. Like the six-gun<br />

"equalizer" in the Old West, they are the iron you "pack" to<br />

survive in the information age. If you let the threat of <strong>viruses</strong><br />

scare you away from the networks and bulletin boards, or cause<br />

you to shun public dom<strong>ai</strong>n and shareware, that six-shooter is<br />

going to soon click empty.<br />

On the other hand, you don't want to sit with your back to<br />

the door. Viruses are ornery varmints, but they can be<br />

overcome.<br />

32


Risky Practices<br />

Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

If you ask for trouble, chances are someone, sometime, will<br />

oblige you. In fact, these days, it<strong>'s</strong> not necessary to even asksome<br />

worm out there is probably unleashing a new virus as<br />

you read this book. Tomorrow, next month, a year from now<br />

that virus may mount an assault on the bastions of your precious<br />

and valuable data.<br />

The first group to start having virus problems were modem<br />

junkies-those of us who like to s<strong>ai</strong>l the telecommunications<br />

sea at night, visiting electronic bulletin boards all<br />

over the United States and Canada. With PC Pursuit (a service<br />

offered by Telenet), you can make unlimited calls from 6 p.m.<br />

to 7 a.m for only $25 total per month. Thousands of boards are<br />

now reachable for practically no cost.<br />

A wealth of interesting, usable, and even valuable programs<br />

can be quickly accumulated in this way. Unfortunately,<br />

viral infection is also spread in the same manner.<br />

Most of the news articles now appearing in your local<br />

newspaper from AP or UPI are about virus attacks in large networks<br />

of <strong>computer</strong>s such as the Macintoshes at NASA and the<br />

EPA, which were infected by the Scores virus, or Lehigh<br />

University<strong>'s</strong> virus last year, which hit IBM PCs.<br />

There is a good chance that the initial infection came<br />

about because some person with access to the network had<br />

downloaded a program on his or her personal <strong>computer</strong> from a<br />

bulletin board somewhere, and then either tried it out at work,<br />

or put it on the system in order to share with others.<br />

This is a common practice and, unless a viral infection occurs,<br />

a good one. The free interchange of information among its<br />

employees helps a company or institution become stronger.<br />

The better adroit its people are in informational techniques, the<br />

more efficient the company or institution.<br />

The problem is that viral infections must be protected<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst. Computer users in general must have the techniques or<br />

software av<strong>ai</strong>lable to them that detects and protects ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

More about that in just a bit, but first, what are the risky<br />

practices that can result in viral infection?<br />

Here are some practices that increase the chance of your<br />

33


Chapter 4<br />

<strong>computer</strong> system contracting a virus or being otherwise damaged<br />

by a Trojan or hacked program:<br />

• Putting a disk of unknown origin into your <strong>computer</strong>.<br />

• Using other people<strong>'s</strong> disks and programs, and letting them use<br />

yours.<br />

• Trading <strong>computer</strong> programs with strangers, or with people<br />

who trade frequently.<br />

• Running a <strong>computer</strong> program if you're unsure of the following:<br />

its origin; the number of times it has been copied; if it<br />

has been altered; or what generation copy of the original this<br />

one might be.<br />

• Executing any new <strong>computer</strong> program for the first time without<br />

first making backup copies of every program and data file<br />

on your <strong>computer</strong>.<br />

• Calling another <strong>computer</strong> using a telephone modemespecially<br />

a <strong>computer</strong> of the same type as your own.<br />

• Booting from a floppy disk.<br />

• Hooking your machine into a LAN (Local Area Network).<br />

• Letting anyone else put a disk into your machine.<br />

• Using unauthorized copies of commercial software or operating<br />

systems.<br />

• Using public dom<strong>ai</strong>n or shareware programs.<br />

The more of the above that apply to you, the greater the<br />

risk of catching a virus. Since most <strong>computer</strong> users engage in<br />

one or more of these activities the real problem is not so much<br />

avoiding the chance of infection as protecting ag<strong>ai</strong>nst infection.<br />

David J. Buerger, in his article "A Specter Is Haunting<br />

Networks-The Specter of Viruses, Hidden in Horses"<br />

(Info World, March 7, 1988), says there is only one sure way to<br />

avoid a virus from a program you get from a network. You<br />

download only the source code, examine it carefully line by line<br />

to "verify the absence of mischievous programmed logic; and<br />

then compile the code yourself."<br />

This ultimate precaution could be just as well applied to<br />

each and every program obt<strong>ai</strong>ned for your system, even the<br />

ones you buy shrink wrapped off the shelf at the local <strong>computer</strong><br />

store. But, alas and alack, few of us want to be put to that<br />

much bother, even assuming we have the expertise in Pascal<br />

34


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

and C, which most public dom<strong>ai</strong>n and shareware programs are<br />

written in, or the wide variety of compilers all this code would<br />

require.<br />

Buerger also points out the difficult task faced by network<br />

system operators in preventing the spread of <strong>viruses</strong>. The example<br />

he gives is that of a virus-infected Macintosh program<br />

inadvertently published in Compuserve<strong>'s</strong> HyperCard forum.<br />

The virus was exterminated in one day but, writes Buerger, 40<br />

people had already unsuspectingly downloaded the program. If<br />

the virus program is not caught on a busy day at any major<br />

network, several hundred people might have their <strong>computer</strong>s<br />

unknowingly contaminated in the course of a year<strong>'s</strong> time, and<br />

spread the virus by trading disks with their friends who are not<br />

online.<br />

To reiterate, the real problem is not avoiding the chance of<br />

infection (because that is practically impossible), but protecting<br />

your system from being infected. Make your <strong>computer</strong> a wasteland<br />

for <strong>viruses</strong>, full of nothing but shifting sand and the occasional<br />

dead cactus. Leave one little oasis of unprotected turf,<br />

and the virus will put down roots and bide its time until you<br />

make another mistake.<br />

How Safe Can You Be? Not Very!<br />

There<strong>'s</strong> a common misconception that if you use only commercial<br />

software you'll be sure to avoid infection. Although this<br />

practice will lessen the chance of catching a virus, it will not<br />

cancel it entirely, as Aldus Corporation recently found out. Aldus<br />

has the somewhat dubious distinction of being the first<br />

commercial software publisher to inadvertently ship a product<br />

with a viral infection.<br />

A March 16, 1988 Associated Press story reported that a<br />

virus had gotten into copies of FreeHand, a new program that<br />

Aldus had just released for Apple Macintosh <strong>computer</strong>s. This<br />

was acknowledged by Aldus spokesperson Laury Bryant.<br />

The virus str<strong>ai</strong>n involved was one of the supposedly benign<br />

ones, the Macintosh Peace virus described in Chapter 1. It<br />

was intended to put a message of universal peace on <strong>computer</strong><br />

screens on March 2, 1988 and then die out.<br />

35


Chapter 4<br />

Software at Aldus was apparently infected when a contractor<br />

provided an infected <strong>computer</strong> tr<strong>ai</strong>ning disk to the company.<br />

The contractor traced the virus back to a game program<br />

obt<strong>ai</strong>ned from a <strong>computer</strong> bulletin board. As we discussed earlier,<br />

this is a classic way that large <strong>computer</strong> systems become<br />

infected.<br />

Since March, 1988 Aldus has applied stringent virus<br />

protection measures. However, the significance of this incident<br />

cannot be underrated. Until this incident, it was assumed personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> only resided in noncommercial software.<br />

Many <strong>computer</strong> virus "experts" had m<strong>ai</strong>nt<strong>ai</strong>ned that the<br />

best protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong> was to buy all software "off the<br />

shelf." Computer store salespeople gleefully echoed this, and totaled<br />

up their commissions from extra sales. For, while many<br />

$10 or $15 registration-fee shareware might be better than a lot<br />

of$99.95 commercial software, who wanted to take the chance<br />

of a viral infection? The ease with which the Peace virus invaded<br />

Aldus' inhouse system and duplicated software shrinkwrapped<br />

for market belied all the experts.<br />

Aldus declined to say how many disks were infected, but<br />

as det<strong>ai</strong>led in the AP report, they did admit it was a sizable<br />

number. A disk duplicating machine copied the infected Free­<br />

Hand disks for three days. Half of these had already been<br />

distributed to ret<strong>ai</strong>l outlets when the viral infection was<br />

discovered.<br />

Marc Canter, president of MacroMind Inc. of Chicago, was<br />

the one who inadvertently passed the virus to Aldus on a tr<strong>ai</strong>ning<br />

disk. He had been on a trip to Canada when he received an<br />

infected program from the Mr. Potato Head game, which is a<br />

<strong>computer</strong>ized version of the popular toy.<br />

Unaware of the infection, Canter ran the game once, then<br />

used the same <strong>computer</strong> to work on software for Aldus. The<br />

disk he eventually sent to Aldus was infected and the infection<br />

spread from it into their system. From there, the virus went<br />

out on disks sold to customers and infected their systems, Canter<br />

told the AP.<br />

This incident also caused other companies to worry because<br />

they also use Canter<strong>'s</strong> services. These clients include such<br />

major names as Microsoft, Ashton-Tate, Lotus Development<br />

36


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

Corporation, and Apple Computers. Officials at Microsoft, Apple<br />

and Lotus all told AP that none of their software was infected,<br />

while Ashton-Tate had not replied at the time of these<br />

reports.<br />

The Peace virus originated at the Canadian publication<br />

MacMag. It was distributed by many <strong>computer</strong> bulletin boards<br />

in a program that was supposedly a listing of products made by<br />

Apple.<br />

The message in full reads: "Richard Brandow, the publisher<br />

of MacMag, and its entire staff would like to take this<br />

opportunity to convey their universal message of peace to all<br />

Macintosh users around the world." A picture of a globe appears<br />

below the message.<br />

Brandow s<strong>ai</strong>d that originally he expected people making<br />

unauthorized copies of programs on the machine would spread<br />

the virus in the Montreal area and possibly a few other areas of<br />

Canada and the United States. However, he s<strong>ai</strong>d he was<br />

shocked later to find that, after the virus program began to appear<br />

in the databases of online information services, an estimated<br />

350,000 people in North America and Europe saw the<br />

message pop up on their <strong>computer</strong>s on March 2nd, 1988!<br />

Like medical detectives following a ch<strong>ai</strong>n of biological<br />

infections, <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> can be traced in the same manner.<br />

What <strong>computer</strong>s or disks did the infected <strong>computer</strong> have contact<br />

with? What <strong>computer</strong>s and/or disks did the newly infected<br />

carriers come in contact with? This goes on and on, in the<br />

manner of ripples spreading out from a pebble tossed in a still<br />

pond.<br />

Aldus, a large and respected software manufacturer acted<br />

responsibly. They tracked the serial numbers of the product affected<br />

by the virus. Those customers received a letter expl<strong>ai</strong>ning<br />

the situation and offering them the opportunity to exchange<br />

the disks for free.<br />

Aldus is now taking additional security precautions in the<br />

creation, testing, and duplication of all software products.<br />

These measures include the use of specific tests and vaccines<br />

for known <strong>viruses</strong> in the market at any given time, and the creation<br />

of an isolated secure system for master disk duplication.<br />

37


Chapter 4<br />

"We believe authors of the <strong>viruses</strong> deserve to be condemned<br />

by every member of the Macintosh community. Viruses<br />

affect not just Aldus Corporation, but every software<br />

company, and potentially every Macintosh owner," s<strong>ai</strong>d Laury<br />

Bryant, Aldus public relations manager. "While we believe that<br />

the best insurance ag<strong>ai</strong>nst future outbreaks of software <strong>viruses</strong><br />

is the moral outrage of the Macintosh community, we are also<br />

exploring potential legal remedies with our attorneys."<br />

Unlike many <strong>viruses</strong>, the source of the Peace virus is<br />

known. While this virus is apparently benign, it<strong>'s</strong> probably still<br />

out there, in hundreds if not thousands of systems.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> time to hit the m<strong>ai</strong>n point of this chapter yet ag<strong>ai</strong>n. No<br />

matter how assiduously you practice safe computing, in the<br />

long run your <strong>computer</strong> stands a good chance of coming in<br />

contact with a virus. The best strategy is to protect ag<strong>ai</strong>nst<br />

infection. Make it impossible for a virus to g<strong>ai</strong>n a toehold in<br />

your system.<br />

Department of Defense Fights Viruses<br />

Cathryn Conroy, writing in Compuserve<strong>'s</strong> OnLine Today for<br />

May 18th, 1988 (a service offered on the Compuserve <strong>computer</strong><br />

network), describes how the Department of Defense is<br />

fighting <strong>viruses</strong> in their systems. Naturally, in the matter of national<br />

security, our <strong>computer</strong>ized armed forces have an intense<br />

interest in keeping their many <strong>computer</strong> networks virus-free.<br />

The DOD has instituted procedures to detect and prevent<br />

the electronic sabotage. The general concerns of DOD about its<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s were reported recently in Government Computer<br />

News.<br />

"It can spread through <strong>computer</strong> networks in the same<br />

way it spreads through <strong>computer</strong>s," s<strong>ai</strong>d DOD spokeswoman<br />

Sherry Hanson. "The major problem areas are denial of service<br />

and compromising data integrity."<br />

Computer scientists at the National Security Agency are in<br />

charge of installing hardware and software to prevent viral<br />

infection of military systems. The NSA is the largest intelligence<br />

agency of the Federal Government and charged with<br />

electronic intelligence ranging from vast amounts of cable and<br />

radio intercepts to the newer fields of <strong>computer</strong> communications.<br />

38


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

Hanson told Government Computer News that DOD is<br />

also using specialized ROM devices and intrusion detectors.<br />

Because <strong>viruses</strong> are only a few lines of programming code,<br />

they're easy to develop and slip into a system.<br />

After IBM<strong>'s</strong> worldwide internal m<strong>ai</strong>l system was infected<br />

in December 1987 with an innocent-looking Christmas message<br />

that kept duplicating itself many times over (slowing down and<br />

even halting the company<strong>'s</strong> massive message system), virusspecialist<br />

programmers have installed a filter program that<br />

monitors the system and protects from new infections.<br />

As reported in GCN, executable programs can't be transferred<br />

from one <strong>computer</strong> to another within IBM<strong>'s</strong> network.<br />

Executable programs, of course can serve as Trojan horses to<br />

carry <strong>viruses</strong> from one system to another and, when run, allow<br />

the virus to infect new hosts.<br />

Personal Computer Users<br />

Conroy<strong>'s</strong> article continues to relate how personal <strong>computer</strong><br />

users are also worried. Because a virus rem<strong>ai</strong>ns hidden in a<br />

<strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> m<strong>ai</strong>n memory, she writes, and gives the example of<br />

a recent Amiga-specific virus which infected almost the entire<br />

membership of a Florida Commodore Amiga users group<br />

before it was discovered.<br />

The president of the group s<strong>ai</strong>d he believed the virus originated<br />

in Europe on a disk of programs the group received from<br />

an overseas source. Like many companies, clubs, institutions,<br />

and private individuals, the club now has a checker program to<br />

check disks for <strong>viruses</strong> before they're used.<br />

Al Gengler, a member of the Amiga group, compared the<br />

virus to AIDS. "You've got to watch who you compute with<br />

now," he s<strong>ai</strong>d.<br />

In a later OnLine Today report by James Moran (May 19),<br />

our lawmakers reacted. As might be expected, <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong><br />

have now come to the attention of Congress and legislators<br />

who would like to be assured that U.S. defense <strong>computer</strong>s are<br />

safe from viral infections. While defense systems are usually<br />

isolated and can't be reached merely by calling via a telephone<br />

modem, <strong>viruses</strong> could enter those systems from an infected<br />

disk. After all, even servicepeople play games.<br />

39


Chapter 4<br />

The Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1989 will<br />

most likely be concerned with the virus problem. It is expected<br />

to direct the Defense Department (DOD) to report on its methods<br />

for handling potential viral infections. Congress also wants<br />

to know what DOD has done about safeguarding vital military<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s. They'd like some assurance that the Defense<br />

Department also has considered situations where a primary<br />

contractor<strong>'s</strong> <strong>computer</strong> could be infected and subsequently endanger<br />

DOD<strong>'s</strong> own <strong>computer</strong>s (as recently happened to NASA<br />

and EPA machines).<br />

Anticipating future hearings, Congressional staffers are<br />

soliciting comments from knowledgeable users as to what the<br />

report to Congress should cover. Interested parties should forward<br />

their comments to Mr. Herb Lin, House Armed Services<br />

Committee, 2120 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington<br />

D.C. 20515.<br />

Radioactive Viruses?<br />

Computer <strong>viruses</strong> are scary enough on their own, but how<br />

about this? The Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced on<br />

August 11, 1988 that it was proposing to fine the Peach Bottom<br />

nuclear power plant on the Susquehanna River (near the Pennsylvania-Maryland<br />

line) a whopping 1.25 million dollars.<br />

This came about after NRC inspectors caught operators<br />

numerous times "sleeping and/or other acts of inattention to<br />

duty." Sleeping is bad enough when you are supposed to be<br />

monitoring a nuclear plant, but it<strong>'s</strong> the "other acts of inattention"<br />

that<strong>'s</strong> really more frightening.<br />

They were playing <strong>computer</strong> games!<br />

One ofthe classic ways in which large systems receive viral<br />

infections, as we discussed earlier, is through people bringing in<br />

games downloaded from who knows where. The thought of a<br />

virus loose in <strong>computer</strong>s that have anything at all to do with<br />

nuclear power plants is very unsettling.<br />

40


Antiviral Products<br />

Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

A growth industry has sprung up in answer to the virus problem.<br />

There are dozens of small startup companies and older already<br />

established firms putting out a wide variety of antiviral<br />

products.<br />

The Computer Virus Industry Association, while not<br />

representing the majority of these companies, is in the lead<br />

now in defining standards and terms for such products in the<br />

popular and <strong>computer</strong> press. A July 20, 1988 news release describes<br />

the product definitions that members of the association<br />

have agreed on.<br />

This standard classification system is for virus protection<br />

products and tools. The system was developed to help the public<br />

understand the appropriate application of the various tools<br />

and to clarify advertising cl<strong>ai</strong>ms.<br />

The Classification system identifies three product groups:<br />

Infection Prevention products, Infection Detection products,<br />

and Infection Identification products. They are defined as:<br />

Class I Infection Prevention This class of product stops the<br />

virus replication process and<br />

prevents the initial infection<br />

from occurring.<br />

Class II Infection Detection This class of products detects<br />

infection soon after it has occurred<br />

and marks the specific<br />

components or segments of the<br />

system that have become<br />

infected.<br />

Class III Infection Identifications This class of products identifies<br />

specific viral str<strong>ai</strong>ns on systems<br />

that are already infected and removes<br />

the virus, returning the<br />

system to its state prior to<br />

infection.<br />

"The industry anticipates that this standard classification<br />

system will assist users in choosing antiviral products that meet<br />

the needs of their specific situations," s<strong>ai</strong>d John McAfee, ch<strong>ai</strong>rman<br />

of the association. "The different product classes address<br />

41


Chapter 4<br />

equally different virus problem areas, and a public understanding<br />

of these differences is essential."<br />

The Computer Virus Industry Association, the news release<br />

continues, is composed of nine major vendors and developers<br />

of antiviral hardware and software products. It was<br />

formed to address the problems of misleading advertising, the<br />

spread of misinformation, and the distribution of ineffective<br />

products. The association may be contacted at 4423 Cheeney<br />

Street, Santa Clara, California 95054. The phone number is<br />

(408) 727-4559.<br />

Prevention Techniques<br />

John McAfee, president of the Computer Virus Industry<br />

Association and InterPath Corporation (a manufacturer of antiviral<br />

software), offers the following tips on preventing viral<br />

infections and the tools with which to fight infections that do<br />

occur. Prevention, he says, can be divided into two areas: safe<br />

computing practices and antiviral tools.<br />

(Much of the information below is courtesy of InterPath,<br />

the Computer Industry Association, and the National BBS<br />

Society.)<br />

Approximately 90 percent of all virus infections, or the<br />

damaging results of infection, can be easily prevented by implementing<br />

the safe usage guidelines below (provided courtesy<br />

of InterPath). Most of the other 10 percent of infections, or<br />

damaging results, can be avoided by the use of antiviral software<br />

or hardware tools.<br />

Here are the recommended safe user practices:<br />

• Never boot from any floppy other than the original write protected<br />

disk from the original distribution package! This<br />

recommendation is extremely important. Most of the boot<br />

sector infector <strong>viruses</strong> can only infect your system if you boot<br />

from an infected floppy disk. Booting from borrowed,<br />

unknown or multiple disks greatly increases the opportunity<br />

for infection.<br />

• One and only one boot disk should be assigned to each and<br />

every floppy based PC (systems without a fixed disk), and<br />

42


Fighting Viroses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

that disk should be clearly labeled as the boot disk for that<br />

system.<br />

• If you have a system with a fixed disk, never boot from a<br />

floppy drive. The only exceptions to this involve recovering<br />

from a viral infection as described in the section below.<br />

• Treat public dom<strong>ai</strong>n and shareware software with caution. Viruses<br />

are difficult to detect and usually do not modify the operation<br />

of the infected program in any way prior to activation.<br />

• Since a friend or acqu<strong>ai</strong>ntance might, in good f<strong>ai</strong>th, recommend<br />

a program that is infected without their knowledge, it<strong>'s</strong><br />

best to limit use of such programs to systems without fixed<br />

disks. If you do use them on fixed disks, allocate separate<br />

subdirectories for the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs. This will limit<br />

exposure since some <strong>viruses</strong> limit their replication activities<br />

to the current subdirectory. You should not place public dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

or shareware software in the root directory.<br />

• Create meaningful volume labels on all fixed and floppy disks<br />

at format time. Develop a habit of checking volume labels<br />

each time a DIR command is executed. Look out for changes<br />

in the volume labels.<br />

• Watch for changes in the pattern of your system<strong>'s</strong> activities.<br />

Do program loads take longer than normal? Do disk accesses<br />

seem excessive for simple tasks? Do unusual error messages<br />

occur with regularity? Do access lights on any of the system<br />

devices turn on when there should be no activity on that device?<br />

Do you have less system memory av<strong>ai</strong>lable than usual?<br />

Do programs or files disappear mysteriously? Do you suddenly<br />

notice a reduction in av<strong>ai</strong>lable disk space? Any of these<br />

signs can be indicative of viral infections.<br />

• If you are in a corporate or multisystem environment, minimize<br />

the exchange of executable code between systems wherever<br />

feasible. When using resources on someone else<strong>'s</strong> PC (a<br />

laser printer, for example), transfer the necessary data on a<br />

disk that cont<strong>ai</strong>ns no executable code. Also, do not use disks<br />

which are bootable or that cont<strong>ai</strong>n system files.<br />

• If operating in a network environment, do not place public<br />

dom<strong>ai</strong>n or shareware programs in a common file server directory<br />

that could be accessible to any other PC on the network.<br />

43


Chapter 4<br />

• If operating in a network environment, allow no one other<br />

than the system administrator to use the file server node.<br />

• If using 3270 emulators connected to m<strong>ai</strong>nframe systems,<br />

keep all 3270 emulation software together in a separate subdirectory<br />

and do not include any executable code in the subdirectory<br />

that isn't part of the emulator suite. If possible, limit<br />

such terminals to 3270 emulation only, and remove all other<br />

software from the disk. 3270 emulators are the major gateways<br />

through which <strong>viruses</strong> jump from PCs to m<strong>ai</strong>nframes.<br />

Antiviral Tools: Hardware<br />

The use of write-protect tabs is very important in limiting viral<br />

spread, and is one of the easiest things you can do. You have<br />

most likely bought a box of new, blank disks. In boxes of 51f4inch<br />

disks is a pack of labels and one of small peel-off-stick-on<br />

tabs, probably black or silver. On one side of each disk is a<br />

small notch called the write-protect notch. Placing one of the<br />

small tabs over each notch, bending it so it sticks to both sides<br />

of the disk and completely covers the hole, prevents the <strong>computer</strong><br />

from writing (recording) to the disk.<br />

If you use 31/Z-inch disks, simply slide the write-protect tab<br />

found in the upper-right-hand corner of the disk so you can see<br />

through the disk. This will prevent the <strong>computer</strong> from writing<br />

(recording) to the disk.<br />

Covering the notch on 51f4-inch disks and sliding the writeprotect<br />

tab to the open position on 3'/z-inch disks is similar to<br />

punching out the two plastic tongues on the edge of a cassette<br />

tape opposite the recording head side-it makes the disk a<br />

read-only device to the <strong>computer</strong>. In other words, neither you<br />

nor your <strong>computer</strong> can accidentally mess it up should some<br />

malfunction occur.<br />

All boot floppies (the ones used to initialize your system)<br />

should be write-protected as a matter of course. There are also<br />

commercial products that will write-protect hard disks, and<br />

public dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs such as WPHD.COM for MS-DOS<br />

machines.<br />

Besides using write protection, it<strong>'s</strong> a good habit to remove<br />

disks from drive slots and store them away when they're not<br />

44


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

actually being used. No virus is going to jump out of the <strong>computer</strong><br />

and get on a disk that<strong>'s</strong> filed away. Obviously, this<br />

doesn't hold for a disk inserted in a drive that<strong>'s</strong> just sitting<br />

there fat, dumb, and vulnerable.<br />

More complex (and expensive) hardware solutions exist<br />

also. Several manufacturers have plug-in boards that provide<br />

protection from viral infection, although these are generally<br />

more <strong>ai</strong>med toward overall <strong>computer</strong> security. However, denying<br />

unauthorized access to people also works to some extent<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Antiviral Tools: Software<br />

Software protection, as defined by the Computer Virus Industry<br />

Association, falls into three general categories. These are<br />

programs that help prevent the virus from initially infecting<br />

your system, programs that detect infection after it has occurred,<br />

and programs that identify pre-existing infections. All<br />

three types of protection have their strong and weak points.<br />

Later in this book we'll look at specific software packages<br />

from the various manufacturers of antiviral products, such as<br />

InterPath, the makers of C-4, Tracer, and Detect. These three<br />

products, respectively, fit each of the three categories defined<br />

below (and ag<strong>ai</strong>n thanks to John McAfee, President of Inter­<br />

Path, for all of his kind assistance).<br />

Here<strong>'s</strong> an overview of the three types of virus-fighting<br />

programs:<br />

Infection Prevention Programs. These programs are TSR<br />

(terminate and stay resident) programs that monitor system<br />

activity and watch for characteristic viral replication activities.<br />

They check all disk I/O and cause a warning to be displayed<br />

when unauthorized activities are attempted. Such activities include<br />

writes to executable programs, system device drivers, the<br />

boot sector, and so forth. They typically redirect the operating<br />

system<strong>'s</strong> interrupt vectors and thus intercept requests from all<br />

other programs.<br />

This type of protection has the advantage of stopping <strong>viruses</strong><br />

before they enter the system, thus avoiding the tasks associated<br />

with removing <strong>viruses</strong>. The disadvantage, however, is<br />

45


Chapter 4<br />

that <strong>viruses</strong> can be, and have been, written to avoid detection<br />

using this type of system. Also, no software technique can prevent<br />

initial infection from a boot sector virus. (This is another<br />

reason to follow the above procedures to avoid boot sector<br />

infections).<br />

Infection Detection Systems. First, as a note of explanation,<br />

these programs only work if the system they're running on<br />

has not been infected prior to installation. They cannot tell you<br />

whether your system has already been infected. They all assume<br />

the system is clean.<br />

They work by looking at key information on the system<br />

disks (such as file sizes, dates, checksums) and periodically<br />

rechecking this information to see if it has changed.<br />

The advantage of this approach is that it<strong>'s</strong> much more<br />

difficult for <strong>viruses</strong> to avoid detection and the technique is<br />

therefore much more secure. The disadvantage is that the system<br />

must become infected in order to detect the virus. However,<br />

if an infection can be identified soon after it occurs, it can<br />

be easily removed before it can replicate further and before it<br />

has a chance to activate.<br />

Infection Identification Systems. Programs in this category<br />

identify specific <strong>viruses</strong> on systems that are already infected<br />

and remove the virus, returning the system to its state prior to<br />

infection. This class of products mayor may not rep<strong>ai</strong>r damage<br />

done by virus activation. Products in this class may identify<br />

only a single virus or multiple types.<br />

The advantage to this class of products is that they can<br />

identify pre-existing infection and perform the removal process.<br />

The disadvantage is that they work for only a few of the specific<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> and cannot provide general purpose virus<br />

protection.<br />

Recovering from a Virus Infection<br />

As might be expected, the procedures needed to recover from<br />

an infection are more difficult than initially preventing the<br />

infection. However, recovery is possible, usually with a minimum<br />

loss of data.<br />

46


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

The major concern in recovering from a virus is not just<br />

the loss of data (which can be great), but the near cert<strong>ai</strong>nty of<br />

reinfection if the proper procedures aren't followed. Nine out of<br />

ten installations that get infected, according to InterPath, suffer<br />

a relapse within a week of "cleaning out" the virus. Some<br />

organizations have "eradicated" a virus as many as a dozen<br />

times, only to have it reoccur shortly after each eradication.<br />

The causes of these reappearances can be traced to two<br />

things:<br />

Many <strong>viruses</strong> do not go away after a warm boot. The Pakistani<br />

Br<strong>ai</strong>n virus is a good example. In many organizations, the<br />

PC is seldom turned off and the prev<strong>ai</strong>ling assumption is that a<br />

Ctrl-Alt-Del will clean out system memory. This is an incorrect<br />

assumption.<br />

Viruses initially infect fixed disk systems by way of a<br />

floppy disk. After infection, every floppy that has been placed<br />

in the system is also likely to be infected. In large organizations,<br />

this can amount to thousands of infected disks that can<br />

reinfect systems if not deactivated.<br />

Understanding the above issues goes a long way toward a<br />

successful recovery from a virus infection.<br />

The following are the recommended procedures from<br />

InterPath and the Computer Virus Industry Association. When<br />

an infection is detected, the following procedures should be<br />

followed:<br />

1. Determine the extent of the infection. If the virus has not<br />

attacked any fixed disks, go to step 12. If the virus has infected<br />

the boot sector only, go to addendum.<br />

2. Power down the infected system.<br />

3. Retrieve the original DOS disk from the distribution package.<br />

Write-protect it. Place it in the floppy boot drive and<br />

power up the system.<br />

4. Ensure that the system has booted properly.<br />

5. Back up all nonexecutable files from all directories onto<br />

newly formatted floppy disks or to a tape backup unit. If<br />

backing up to another fixed disk, ensure that the disk has<br />

not been infected. (If there are any doubts, assume it is infected.)<br />

Do not use the backup utility on the fixed disk. Use<br />

47


Chapter 4<br />

a utility from the original package. Note: At no point in<br />

these procedures should you execute any program from the<br />

infected flxed disk.<br />

6. List all batch files on the infected disk. If any line within<br />

any of the batch files seems unusual or unfamiliar do not<br />

back up. Otherwise, include the batch fIles with the backup.<br />

7. Perform a low level format of the infected disk. Recover<br />

the initial disk configuration using FDISK and FORMAT.<br />

8. Execute the SYS command for the fixed disk.<br />

9. Restructure your directories.<br />

10. Replace all executable programs from the original distribution<br />

packages.<br />

11. Restore the files that were backed up.<br />

12. Locate all floppy disks that may have been inserted in the<br />

infected system within the past two years. (We know it<br />

sounds extreme, but if this and subsequent steps are not<br />

followed, you can be guaranteed to be reinfected within a<br />

short period of time.) At your discretion, either destroy<br />

them all or continue with the next two steps.<br />

13. Back up all nonexecutable files onto newly formatted<br />

floppy disks.<br />

14. Format the suspect disks.<br />

If the virus is a boot sector infector, the recovery process is<br />

somewhat simplified. Since boot infectors do not infect executable<br />

programs, they can be removed by doing a SYS command<br />

on the affected drive. The procedures are:<br />

1. Power down the affected system.<br />

2. Boot from the original DOS write-protected distribution<br />

disk.<br />

3. Perform the SYS command on all affected devices.<br />

The above procedures will leave the virus intact on the<br />

additional bad sectors originally allocated by the virus, but<br />

these viral segments will be deactivated.<br />

Recovery From Trojans, Bombs, and Goof-ups<br />

Viruses are still relatively rare when compared to Trojan programs<br />

or bombs which, when run, immediately damage your<br />

system. First of all, it takes a good deal more programming<br />

48


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

skills to construct a survivable virus than it does some stupid<br />

little program that immediately trashes a disk<strong>'s</strong> file allocation<br />

table (FAT).<br />

Remember that a Trojan is simply an attractive utility or<br />

some other program that serves as a carrier. The evil secreted<br />

inside can be either a virus or a bomb that goes off as soon as<br />

the program is run.<br />

Most of the really good programmers, those having the<br />

technical know-how and creativity to construct a virus, would<br />

consider it unthinkable to do so. Programmers are intelligent,<br />

likable people for the most part-good people who hate the rot<br />

of the current virus plague even more than most of us (because<br />

they understand the true frightfulness of the ramifications that<br />

could be caused by unchecked, widespread viral infection).<br />

Only a very few twisted souls of this elite group create <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Hence, the discrete str<strong>ai</strong>ns of <strong>viruses</strong> rem<strong>ai</strong>n moderately<br />

small and, so far, infect probably less than 1 percent of IBMs<br />

and clones, and Macintoshes. This percentage is even less than<br />

that for other brands.<br />

However, this is not so for bombs. We saw in the last<br />

chapter that destroying disks, since they are so vulnerable to<br />

start with, is easy to do. Any bad kid (as opposed to the many<br />

honorable hackers among our youth) can whip up a working<br />

bomb in an evening<strong>'s</strong> time and slide it into almost any program.<br />

An unhappy employee can leave a cybernetic bomb in<br />

his employer<strong>'s</strong> system.<br />

So, your system is more likely to be hit by a Trojan bomb<br />

than a virus. One good, very good, side effect of most viral<br />

protection programs is they will also intercept a bomb<strong>'s</strong> unauthorized<br />

attempts at disk access and alert you before damage<br />

can occur. They not only protect ag<strong>ai</strong>nst intentional destructive<br />

efforts, but also ag<strong>ai</strong>nst honest mistakes (bugs) in programs and<br />

operator error. We all foul up from time to time, and <strong>computer</strong>s<br />

can be unforgiving-a viral protection program sometimes<br />

gives us a second chance.<br />

One person doing some excellent work in alerting people<br />

to Trojans, worms, <strong>viruses</strong>, and pirated software is Eric<br />

Newhouse. Eric electronically publishes The Dirty Dozen, a file<br />

now found on all the major <strong>computer</strong> networks and hundreds<br />

of local <strong>computer</strong> bulletin boards.<br />

49


Chapter 4<br />

Now in its eighth edition, this online publication expl<strong>ai</strong>ns<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>, Trojans, worms and other such pests. It specifically<br />

lists scores of programs known to be "dirty." If you use public<br />

dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs and shareware, it<strong>'s</strong> a very wise precaution to<br />

download and check out each new issue of The Dirty Dozen,<br />

and to support Eric in his work.<br />

Should a Trojan get into your system, Eric Newhouse offers<br />

some good tips in recovering from it.<br />

"Perhaps," writes Eric, "your hard disk sounds like a sick<br />

moose. Perhaps your drive light starts flashing repeatedly, like a<br />

police car<strong>'s</strong> lights. Perhaps your drive just sits in the <strong>computer</strong>,<br />

and the <strong>computer</strong> doesn't acknowledge its presence."<br />

This has happened to me personally on more than one<br />

occasion. There is nothing more frustrating, while fighting a<br />

deadline, than having the hard disk go. While sometimes it<br />

may be a hardware problem-such as a faulty cable, disk<br />

controller, or the hard drive itself-more often the problem is<br />

with software. Fixing the hardware costs money, recovering<br />

from a software problem, such as one caused by a Trojan, can<br />

often be accomplished with only a little effort.<br />

Should you get hit by a Trojan or a bomb (and its going to<br />

be pretty obvious that something bad has happened), first rem<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

calm. Try to diagnose the damage and determine if your<br />

hard drive was reformatted, the FAT table scrambled, files<br />

erased, or the boot sector affected. A Trojan usually does one<br />

or more of these four things.<br />

If the Trojan did a low-level format of your hard disk, the<br />

only option open is to do a new high-level format and reload<br />

your data from your most recent backup. Everything you've<br />

done between the time of backup and the bomb hit is gone<br />

forever.<br />

Here<strong>'s</strong> an analogy to help you better understand the difference<br />

between low- and high-level formats. If you've recorded<br />

a cassette tape of, say, 1950s rock songs, you might have labeled<br />

it for convenience<strong>'s</strong> sake. The label consists of the title<br />

and the counter number so you can fast forward or rewind the<br />

tape to the beginning of the wanted song.<br />

If you lay this cassette tape down on a strong magnet, it<br />

will be completely erased. This is essentially what low-level<br />

50


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

formatting does. If, on the other hand, some nerd merely rips<br />

off your label, all the songs are still on the tape. It<strong>'s</strong> merely a<br />

matter of taking a little time to make a new label. Cleaning off<br />

the label is what a high-level format does.<br />

If the Trojan high-level formatted your disk (and this applies<br />

to both hard disks and regular floppies), you're in much<br />

better shape for recovery of your data. Paul Mace, sometime<br />

back, introduced a way to recover data on a disk that had been<br />

high-level formatted. Peter Norton and others now offer similar<br />

techniques.<br />

The bad news is that most of these format-recovery programs<br />

require a snapshot of the disk in order to bring back all the data.<br />

This can be an automatic process in your AUTOEXEC.BAT file<br />

on IBM PCs and compatibles, or equivalent boot-up programs<br />

on other types of <strong>computer</strong>s. You might lose one day<strong>'s</strong> work in<br />

this case, but that<strong>'s</strong> much better than two week<strong>'s</strong> worth, or six<br />

months' worth.<br />

In the IBM and MS-DOS world, the problem is that the<br />

operating system (DOS) fragments large files and sticks parts of<br />

them all over the disk to more efficiently fill it. This is mapped<br />

out in the FAT (file allocation table) so the file can be found<br />

and used in its entirety ag<strong>ai</strong>n. For an "unformatting" program<br />

to work, an accurate map of the disk is required, hence the<br />

snapshot. Naturally, any file created after this snapshot was<br />

taken will be ignored, even though its still on the disk.<br />

Here are three commercial programs that, among many<br />

other useful utilities, offer format recovery:<br />

PC-Tools Central Point, $79.95 ret<strong>ai</strong>l<br />

Mace+ Utilities Paul Mace $99.95 ret<strong>ai</strong>l<br />

Advanced Norton Utilities Peter Norton, $150.00 ret<strong>ai</strong>l<br />

While these types of utilities may sound expensive, one<br />

recovery can more than pay for them. How much is your time<br />

worth?<br />

If the Trojan scrambled your FAT table and left the rest of<br />

the disk intact, you would have recovery options also. Remember<br />

that the FAT is the map for the operating system to find all<br />

parts of a file-this map has to be reconstructed.<br />

The best way to reconstruct is to keep constant backups of<br />

51


Chapter 4<br />

the FAT table using Norton<strong>'s</strong> or PC-Tools, or a public dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

program such as FATBACK.COM. If you can't simply recopy<br />

the FAT back to the hard disk, you'll have to p<strong>ai</strong>nstakingly use<br />

a sector editor, like those included in the Norton Utilities, PC­<br />

Tools and lots of other popular utility packages.<br />

Sector editors will allow experienced users to reconstruct<br />

their FAT from the garbage now in its place. This type of recovery<br />

does require more than a little knowledge of your <strong>computer</strong><br />

operating system<strong>'s</strong> disk structure.<br />

Undeleting Files<br />

The situation of erased files is the easiest to recover from (and<br />

something you should know just for files deleted by mistake).<br />

Lots of commercial and public dom<strong>ai</strong>n packages are av<strong>ai</strong>lable<br />

that undelete deleted files.<br />

The Norton Utilities, PC-Tools, MACE+, and UNDEL.<br />

COM (a public dom<strong>ai</strong>n program) will all accomplish undelete<br />

files for you. The commercial products are somewhat more reliable<br />

in undeleting and are obviously more expensive.<br />

You should always undelete your most recent files first.<br />

Since the operating system (DOS) fragments files to fill all<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable space, older erased files (which are now invisible to<br />

DOS) may have segments already overwritten.<br />

The first sector on a hard disk (and a floppy) is called the<br />

boot sector. This cont<strong>ai</strong>ns the necessary information for the<br />

<strong>computer</strong> to initialize itself. Not too long ago, the boot sector<br />

on my own system was overwritten. All my files were still<br />

there, but the <strong>computer</strong> simply would not boot-responding<br />

only with a Probable Non-DOS Disk error message. It wound<br />

up costing me several hours to back up the files on the disk, reformat<br />

it with new system files, and reload the backup.<br />

In this case, it was not a Trojan or virus that caused the<br />

problem. I do a lot of reviews and books about various programs.<br />

Some companies are kind enough to send me pre-release<br />

versions so I get a head start in doing a book on their<br />

product. One of these versions had a bug in it (long since<br />

fixed), but it did cause me some hassle at a time when I had<br />

several deadlines to meet.<br />

52


Fighting Viruses and Practicing Safe Computing<br />

If the boot sector on your hard disk should get erased or<br />

written over, there are four things to do. Before you do them,<br />

however, if you don't have a current backup of the disk, make<br />

one now. There is the possibility that you might have to destroy<br />

some files to restore your hard disk to boot status. With a<br />

good backup, you can then load these files back in place.<br />

First, attempt to restore the system to the disk. On MS­<br />

DOS disks, these include two hidden files as well as<br />

COMMAND.COM. To do so, insert the floppy disk that came<br />

with your <strong>computer</strong> that has SYS.COM on it. Using the syntax<br />

SYS C: for a hard disk (or SYS A: for a floppy) will transfer<br />

these system files to the hard disk (maybe).<br />

If the system did transfer (you got no error message), copy<br />

COMMAND. COM back onto the hard drive. If the hard drive<br />

still won't boot, try the next remedy.<br />

Should you have the MACE + utilities from Paul Mace, go<br />

to the "other utilities" section and "restore boot sector." If you<br />

have installed and have been using MACE+ correctly, this will<br />

cure your problem.<br />

If none of the above works do a complete backup of the<br />

disk (if you haven't already done it). Now you're going to have<br />

to do a low-level format of the hard disk. Instructions on how<br />

to do this depends on which controller card you have. This<br />

information should have come with your hard disk controller<br />

card.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> important to map out bad sectors (which all hard disks<br />

have) using a program for that purpose (Eric Newhouse recommends<br />

SCAY.COM by Chris Dunford) or by manually entering<br />

the locations of bad sectors into the low-level format program.<br />

After the low-level format, run the utility FDISKCOM (it<br />

comes with DOS) to create a DOS partition. You can use your<br />

DOS manual for help in using FDISK.<br />

Once this low-level format is finished, you'll have to do a<br />

high-level format on your hard disk (yes, Trojans are a nuisance,<br />

aren't they?). Do this by putting your original DOS disk<br />

(the one that came with the <strong>computer</strong>) in drive A: and type<br />

FORMAT :jS/v. represents the<br />

letter of the disk you're formatting. This formats the disk,<br />

putting the necessary DOS system files on it and verifying that<br />

the copy is exact.<br />

53


Chapter 4<br />

Try rebooting ag<strong>ai</strong>n.<br />

Should things still be fouled, you'll have to find a professional<br />

<strong>computer</strong> rep<strong>ai</strong>rperson to fix your drive or accept the<br />

fact that the drive cannot be booted. I recommend strongly<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the latter-having to boot from a floppy increases the<br />

chances of viral infections.<br />

54


5<br />

HOWTHE<br />

EXPERTS DEAL<br />

WITH VIRUSES<br />

All the wit in the world is not in one head.<br />

Old Proverb<br />

The <strong>computer</strong> virus problem is both old and new. It is (at least<br />

theoretically) as old as <strong>computer</strong>s themselves, but new to the<br />

general public. Because <strong>computer</strong>s-thanks to immense drops<br />

in prices and incredible increases in unit production in the last<br />

few years-are now in so many more hands, <strong>viruses</strong> now can<br />

affect large numbers of people instead of just a few companies<br />

or institutions. Virus stories are in the newspapers almost<br />

weekly now, and they've been featured on national news<br />

broadcasts.<br />

With actual virus infections and, even more importantly,<br />

the threat of infection, a wide spectrum of system managers,<br />

programmers, and others in the <strong>computer</strong> industry have been<br />

forced to become experts on <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Computer <strong>viruses</strong> are still, for most, a relatively new problem.<br />

This holds true for the majority of the <strong>computer</strong> industry<br />

as well. In the process of researching this book, we've found<br />

that some very good people are devising ways to detect and<br />

protect ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

This chapter is a brief look at just a few people on the<br />

"front lines" and how they're leading the fight ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>computer</strong><br />

<strong>viruses</strong>. We regret that lack of space doesn't allow us to<br />

include everyone spoken to. While the virus problem is not yet<br />

55


Chapter 5<br />

as severe as it could very easily get, the future of the Information<br />

Age might well depend on people like those quoted below.<br />

They are soldiers in the war to preserve data.<br />

Ross Greenberg: A Flu_Shot<br />

Ag<strong>ai</strong>nst Viruses<br />

According to Steve Gibson, writing in his "Tech Talk" column<br />

in the <strong>computer</strong> industry weekly newspaper, Info World, one of<br />

the most effective virus protection programs av<strong>ai</strong>lable is also<br />

one of the least expensive: Flu_Shot+, by Ross Greenberg (the<br />

product is reviewed later in this book). A software author and<br />

nationally recognized virus expert and consultant, Greenberg<br />

lives in New York City and runs his own company, Software<br />

Concepts Design.<br />

Ross has been very gracious in providing both information<br />

and additional contacts for this book. The interview below<br />

came from comments Ross made to the author over the phone,<br />

from a Round Table conference on GEnie, and extracts from<br />

Flu_Shot+ <strong>'s</strong> documentation. All are combined and reproduced<br />

here through his kind consent.<br />

"The right to use Flu_Shot + ," Ross s<strong>ai</strong>d, in expl<strong>ai</strong>ning<br />

the shareware concept under which his viral-protection product<br />

is marketed, "is contingent upon your paying for the right to<br />

use it. I ask for ten dollars as a registration fee. This entitles<br />

you to get the next update shipped to you when av<strong>ai</strong>lable, and<br />

allows you to pay me, in part, for my labor in creating the entire<br />

FIu-Shot series. I don't expect to get my normal consulting<br />

rate or to get a return equal to that of other programs which<br />

I've developed and sell through more traditional channels. That<strong>'s</strong><br />

not my intent, or I would have made Flu_Shot+ a commercial<br />

program and you'd be paying lots more money for it.<br />

"Some people are uncomfortable with the shareware concept,<br />

or believe there<strong>'s</strong> no such thing as Trojan or Virus programs,<br />

and that a person who profits from the distribution of a<br />

program such as FIlLShot must be in it for the money. I've<br />

created an alternative for these folks. I'll call it 'charityware.'<br />

You can also register Flu_Shot+ by sending me a check for<br />

56


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

$10 made out to your favorite charity. Be sure to include a<br />

stamped and addressed envelope. I'll forward the money on to<br />

them and register you fully."<br />

Ross Greenberg has been involved with the <strong>computer</strong> virus<br />

problem since the current scare first came to the public<strong>'s</strong><br />

attention.<br />

"When Flu-Shot came out, and the news of <strong>viruses</strong> first<br />

hit the media," he s<strong>ai</strong>d, "I was getting about 40 calls a day on<br />

the average. These were from people who were totally convinced<br />

they were infected. Of those people, I'd say that no<br />

more than five calls per day were legitimate <strong>viruses</strong>. Obviously<br />

those people had been hit bad. They usually called me up because<br />

they had FlU-Shot but had not installed it yet. They figured<br />

they'd try one more piece of software out and boom, they<br />

got hit."<br />

A Trojan, Ross expl<strong>ai</strong>ns, is a program which does something<br />

other than that which you intended it to do. A virus, by<br />

that definition is a Trojan. The m<strong>ai</strong>n difference is a virus will<br />

infect other programs with a copy of itself, and later will turn<br />

"normal" Trojan on you. This implies that the virus is a far<br />

more dangerous case of being "Trojaned."<br />

The normal Trojan, when it goes off, will only erase or<br />

damage the data on whatever disks are currently av<strong>ai</strong>lable to it.<br />

The virus allows for the Trojan to be transmitted to other<br />

disks, and therefore other <strong>computer</strong>s. Additionally, an infected<br />

program can lay dormant until you run it at some later time.<br />

The virus hangs out, w<strong>ai</strong>ting to be executed and will eventually<br />

"go off' causing a bit of havoc on your all important data.<br />

"In FlU-Shot," he s<strong>ai</strong>d, "I've attempted to make the program<br />

only advise you of suspicious operations as they occur.<br />

You are then given the choice of allowing the operation to continue,<br />

allowing all operations to continue until the program<br />

ends, or aborting the operation. This allows you to run programs<br />

such as DOS<strong>'s</strong> own FORMAT program and allows it to<br />

continue to operate normally, but advises you of potentially<br />

dangerous operations which normally shouldn't happen. You<br />

don't expect, for example, a FORMAT operation to take place<br />

when you're using that spiffy new checkbook balancing<br />

program.<br />

57


Chapter 5<br />

"These days, anybody who wants to be protected can be<br />

with Flu-Shot on the el cheapo, so many people are being protected.<br />

Plus, a lot of bulletin board operators out there are<br />

much more cautious now. However, there are a few bulletin<br />

boards I know of where the sysop does nothing but make them<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable to you. Unfortunately my own <strong>computer</strong> club board<br />

does this. I had to fight them tooth and n<strong>ai</strong>l to get FllLShot on<br />

there.<br />

"For the most part, bulletin board operators and most<br />

users are much more cautious overall now. The people who are<br />

getting hit the hardest these days I would say are probably<br />

universities-for a whole variety of reasons.<br />

"Some of the large corporate structures are being hit, but<br />

not that badly. Obviously if you hit a GE with 40,000 pes,<br />

that<strong>'s</strong> going to do considerably more damage than if you hit<br />

Fred<strong>'s</strong> <strong>computer</strong> in the other room. Of course, you won't hear<br />

anything from the folks at big companies if they get hit. They<br />

might call me up and say 'Hi, we're infected, but don't tell anybody.<br />

What do we doT And a couple of very large corporations<br />

have called me up and s<strong>ai</strong>d 'Hi, we're infected, but don't tell<br />

anybody. What do we do?'"<br />

Ross then made a very important point about virus<br />

infections:<br />

"The thing to remember," he s<strong>ai</strong>d, "is right now it<strong>'s</strong> summer.<br />

A lot of those university students are probably at home<br />

now concocting their favorite <strong>viruses</strong>. So when they come back<br />

in September, I suspect there will be an increase in infections.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> a nice, interesting, fun hobby for some people.<br />

"Given that, I expect us to have more virus hits in<br />

September and October. Additionally, I'm a little worried about<br />

virus infections in general. Right now, programs like Flu-Shot<br />

or anyone of the others, they do everything they can to protect<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>. There<strong>'s</strong> no virus that I know of which currently<br />

gets around Flu-Shot. Yet, if I wanted to, I could write one tomorrow<br />

that would get around every single piece of software<br />

out there, including FllLShot.<br />

"Writing a virus to attack an unprotected system is really<br />

easy. On a protected system, however-with FllLShot or Vaccine<br />

or one of the others-writing a virus is much more dim-<br />

58


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

cult. The folks who are capable of getting around F1U-Shot or<br />

whatever else are not typically the virus-writer type.<br />

"No one has been caught that I'm aware of. I'm not cert<strong>ai</strong>n,<br />

actually, of what crime they could be prosecuted under.<br />

Assumption: If one were caught, the authorities would n<strong>ai</strong>l<br />

them on some seemingly weird charge, such as 'malicious mischief'<br />

and then they'd get huge fines, a reasonable j<strong>ai</strong>l sentence,<br />

and all of their equipment would be confiscated. Remember<br />

also that 'breaking' into a government <strong>computer</strong> system is a<br />

federal offense of pretty serious merit. I would assume that the<br />

first time your local Congressman lost his re-election data, well,<br />

they'd be pretty angry and some laws would be changed pretty<br />

quickly.<br />

"Getting back to your point, it<strong>'s</strong> impossible to say how<br />

many <strong>computer</strong>s are infected. I am just going to pick a guess<br />

here. I think nationwide 10,000 people."<br />

Since <strong>computer</strong> filing systems are so vulnerable (see Chapter<br />

3: How Viruses Work), we asked Ross his opinion on<br />

whether <strong>computer</strong> manufacturers would move soon to make<br />

their equipment more resistant to infection.<br />

"I doubt it," he s<strong>ai</strong>d. "First, to my knowledge, with the<br />

exception of Apple, none of the major manufacturers have yet<br />

come out and s<strong>ai</strong>d that there are <strong>viruses</strong>. No one has s<strong>ai</strong>d 'We<br />

are doing something about it.' Apple s<strong>ai</strong>d, 'Well, here<strong>'s</strong> something<br />

to make you feel better.'"<br />

Ross is referring here to the Virus RX program released at<br />

the end of April by Apple Computer. This free antiviral program<br />

was created to answer the Scores virus infection in Macintosh<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s (see "The Scores Virus" in Chapter 2). The<br />

program is av<strong>ai</strong>lable at no charge through Apple dealers and on<br />

various <strong>computer</strong> bulletin boards, and will be covered in<br />

greater det<strong>ai</strong>l later in this book.<br />

"Operating systems," Ross continued, "like OS/2 as an example,<br />

now do have a protection mechanism to prevent a virus<br />

from spreading. Are they currently effective? Yes. But, while<br />

these techniques do fight ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>, they are just the natural<br />

progression of filing systems rather than specific virusprotection<br />

design on the part of manufacturers."<br />

59


Chapter 5<br />

Some programmers are beginning to include virus protection<br />

routines in their application programs. Ross Greenberg has<br />

also done this, especially in his commercial product, RamNet<br />

(a powerful background, memory resident communications<br />

program that enables you to run a bulletin board, upload and<br />

download, or complete a wide range of other tasks automatically<br />

in the background while using other programs in the<br />

foreground).<br />

"Yes," he s<strong>ai</strong>d, "RamNet had that from day one. But it<br />

originally wasn't for <strong>viruses</strong> but to make sure no one was tapping<br />

the code. Such techniques are easy in .COM programs, but<br />

very difficult to do with .EXE programs.<br />

"I guess most of the people out there have a simple question:<br />

Do <strong>viruses</strong> exist, and how common are they? Additionally<br />

people are concerned about what their chances are of picking<br />

one up off of their local BBS or from CompuServe, GEnie, or<br />

BIX.<br />

"Well, they do exist. I have about 20 <strong>viruses</strong> in 'quarantine'<br />

on my BBS machine. The odds of you picking one up<br />

on a service like GEnie is pretty slim, though. Their files are<br />

checked and rechecked, and then verified to make sure they're<br />

as safe as possible.<br />

"Does this mean that you can't get one at all? No. I have<br />

one virus here which is <strong>'s</strong>et to go off' in September. Another<br />

one w<strong>ai</strong>ts for your disk to get over 90 percent full. So, the<br />

problem does exist. Your odds of getting one, though, is about<br />

the same as the odds of you getting a laced Tylenol capsule.<br />

"My Flu_Shot+ program attempts to thwart the attempts<br />

of the virus program. It tries to intercept any of the 'normal'<br />

things a virus would do, including direct disk writes, and<br />

changes to any type of .COM or .EXE program.<br />

"I am specifically not in the business of protecting people.<br />

FIu-Shot has dr<strong>ai</strong>ned a lot of my resources from my normal<br />

business. I get about 30 calls per day regarding <strong>viruses</strong> and Trojans.<br />

That is time I can't give to my normal customer base.<br />

Now, I created FIU-Shot to help people who can't protect<br />

themselves. I felt that putting it out as a $10 shareware product<br />

would allow me to pay for distribution, maybe pay for a new<br />

phone line, and otherwise allow me to break even. I love this<br />

60


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

silly little field of ours, and feel privileged to get p<strong>ai</strong>d to do<br />

work I enjoy.<br />

"The little worms who write <strong>viruses</strong> are hurting the field I<br />

love. Hence, I desire to make them extinct. As to publicity:<br />

The amount of publicity that the whole virus question generates<br />

is a feedback loop. I'm more than a little embarrassed<br />

that the normal, non<strong>computer</strong> media reported on the virus<br />

problem long before the <strong>computer</strong> press did. However, this is a<br />

subject which has to be reported on, just as the Tylenol problem<br />

had to be reported on. The Tylenol problem changed society<br />

a small amount. The virus problem will change <strong>computer</strong><br />

society a little. But, I tend to think that the vehement disgust of<br />

people such as you and I is going to tum the little worms off. If<br />

they wanted favorable opinion, they sure are not getting it!<br />

Hence, the publicity is, in my opinion, not a bad thing. You're<br />

now all aware of the problem, which I've known about for<br />

three years!<br />

Protecting Yourself<br />

Ross offers the following suggestions on how you can protect<br />

your system ag<strong>ai</strong>nst viral infection.<br />

"After you make a backup, you might want to consider<br />

using one of the myriad vaccine programs out there. I'm biased,<br />

and like FllL.Shot, but some of the others are quite good<br />

as well.<br />

"You want to be cert<strong>ai</strong>n that your data is secure. Programs<br />

you can always replace with the distribution copy. Aside from<br />

that, know where you get your programs from. Although a<br />

shrink-wrap is not a guarantee that your program is uninfected,<br />

it<strong>'s</strong> a 99.999 percent guarantee.<br />

"If you use PD software, make sure that the BBS you get it<br />

from has checked it out. I know that the managers on GEnie<br />

spend a great deal of time insuring their own public dom<strong>ai</strong>n library,<br />

and that other commercial services do as well.<br />

"Remember that people who log onto GEnie and the other<br />

national services are all verified, and have their credit card<br />

information on file. So, it would be rare for someone to even<br />

try to pass a Trojan or a virus intentionally. The same cannot<br />

be s<strong>ai</strong>d of many BBS systems who allow you to download from<br />

61


Chapter 5<br />

the new uploads section immediately after a program is posted.<br />

Ask your sysop if they check out the code. If the answer is<br />

'No,' get it from someplace else.<br />

"Viruses can infect any program that is executed. They can<br />

infect device drivers (the SYS files in your root directory), and<br />

can infect the boot sector as well. As such, these 'nonspecific'<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> can infect an entire disk pretty quickly, and are the<br />

most dangerous ones. Making a file read-only is done through a<br />

normal DOS call. Any program can change the attributes easily,<br />

then change them back if it wishes. Finally, just as you can<br />

get a directory listing, a program can as well and can put out a<br />

call for all files matching a pattern, such as *.COM, or *.EXE.<br />

"Think of what you can do from the command line. You<br />

type DIR C*.COM from the A: drive, and you find the COM<br />

files on C. A Virus or Trojan can exploit the DOS system<br />

conventions just as easily. Some of the older monochrome<br />

monitors could be burned out by a program, but I've not seen<br />

a virus which does this.<br />

"As for sysops who are nonprogrammers: Make a full system<br />

backup, close the system down, test out the code, then release<br />

only the tested code. Try checksumming every file on the<br />

disk, then comparing it after you test out the newly uploaded<br />

code.<br />

"The Dirty Dozen list is a great list! But, remember that<br />

any program can cont<strong>ai</strong>n a virus. An upload of your favorite<br />

PD program could (potentially) have a virus in it. That<strong>'s</strong> why<br />

testing, such as GEnie does, is so important. Trojans, since<br />

they don't spread, will eventually end up on the DD list, so it<br />

is extraordinarily valuable in that regard."<br />

Ross was then asked about the names of known <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"Well, I don't give the little suckers names! I have about<br />

20 <strong>viruses</strong> that have been uploaded to my board (remember<br />

that I actually ask for them, so that isn't a normal number<br />

we're speaking of). Flu_Shot+ does work ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the Br<strong>ai</strong>n virus,<br />

though. A virus (or a Trojan) is only dangerous when it is<br />

run. You can safely examine the program you suspect of<br />

cont<strong>ai</strong>ning a virus, including deARCing it. Only when you execute<br />

a program does it get tricky.<br />

"My favorite virus was one which went TSR (Terminate<br />

62


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

and Stay Resident), and attached itself onto the timer tick.<br />

Once per minute it would examine the screen and search out<br />

four consecutive numbers. When it found a set, it would randomly<br />

transpose two of them. Sounds cute, but could be dangerous<br />

if you're using Lotus 1-2-3 to run a multimillion dollar<br />

company!<br />

"Your BIOS is in two parts. One, in ROM, can't be<br />

changed except by physically pulling the chip. The second part<br />

is stored on disk, as a hidden file, and is called IBMBIO on<br />

IBM-DOS, IOSYS on MS-DOS. That can be changed and can<br />

be infected. The other part of your configuration is in CMOS<br />

RAM, that is, battery backed up RAM. It can be modified by a<br />

virus, but isn't really dangerous. Flu_Shot+ tries to protect<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst that particular change. Alas, that<strong>'s</strong> been a problem spot<br />

(read that as 'bug!') in F11LShot for longer than I like to admit.<br />

Copy-protected software can be a problem if it gets infected.<br />

My suggestion: Call up the manufacturer and ask them what<br />

they intend to do about it!"<br />

Ross Greenberg<strong>'s</strong> virus protection program, Flu_Shot+<br />

will be reviewed later in the book. It<strong>'s</strong> a shareware program,<br />

meaning that you'll find it on many <strong>computer</strong> networks and<br />

bulletins boards. You can download it and try it free-paying<br />

the $10 registration fee only if you decide that the program is<br />

worthwhile for you.<br />

"Copies which you download from the RamNet BBS (212-<br />

889-6438)," Ross s<strong>ai</strong>d, "or from the NYACC BBS (718-539-<br />

3338), BIX, COMPUSERVE, DELPHI, GEnie or from<br />

USENET are all good clean copies.<br />

"Copies from most BBS<strong>'s</strong> are going to be clean, too. I suggest<br />

that you do not use a copy unless the sysop of the BBS<br />

states that he or she has tried out the uploaded copy and procl<strong>ai</strong>ms<br />

it not to be Trojaned or wormed in any way. I do expect<br />

that some worm out there, disappointed at my attempts to<br />

remove what little joy they get out of life will attempt to use<br />

the popularity of Flu Shot+ in some way to further spread the<br />

disease in his or her mind."<br />

You may also order a copy direct from Greenberg by sending<br />

$10 to Software Concepts Design, 594 Third Avenue, New<br />

York, New York 10016.<br />

63


Chapter 5<br />

Reward Offered<br />

There is one additional service Ross Greenberg is doing for the<br />

<strong>computer</strong> industry. He is offering rewards for anyone turning in<br />

someone who has deliberately spread viral infection. This<br />

worthwhile effort should be supported. Below is the text of his<br />

reward offer:<br />

64<br />

* * *<br />

Somebody out there knows who the worms are.<br />

Even they must have someone who is a friend. True, I<br />

can't think of any reason someone would befriend a<br />

worm, but somebody who doesn't know better has.<br />

Well, I'm offering a reward for the capture and conviction<br />

of these worms. Enough already with software<br />

protection schemes, hardware protection schemes, or<br />

any protection at all. It shouldn't be required!<br />

Here<strong>'s</strong> the deal: If you're a software or hardware<br />

manufacturer, or you have some software or hardware<br />

you don't need, consider donating it to this worthy<br />

cause. I don't know what the legal and tax ramifications<br />

of that donation would be. I'm not a lawyer and we can<br />

cross that bridge when we get to it (donations are not<br />

sent unless a person actually qualifies to receive them).<br />

Anyway, if you know one of these worms, turn<br />

them in! Call me up, send me a letter, a telegram, or<br />

leave a message for me on my BBS. Indicate who you<br />

know is worming about. I'll keep your name confidential.<br />

It is surprisingly easy to get the authorities in on<br />

this-they're as concerned about what is happening to<br />

our community as we are. I'll presume that they'll end<br />

up putting a data tap on the phone line of the accused<br />

worm. Then, when he next uploads a Trojan or a virus<br />

to a BBS, he'll get n<strong>ai</strong>led. The authorities are pretty<br />

good about this stuff: They'll not tap a phone or take<br />

any action whatsoever without adequate proof<br />

Will your dropping a dime on this worm be adequate<br />

proof? I don't know. Ag<strong>ai</strong>n, a bridge to cross when<br />

we approach it. However, assuming that this slimeball


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

gets n<strong>ai</strong>led, you'll get all of the software and hardware<br />

other people have donated. You'll also get the satisfaction<br />

of knowing you've done a good thing-you've<br />

helped an industry and community continue to grow.<br />

This is your community, and the vast majority of people<br />

in it are good people who shouldn't have to fear others.<br />

Your friend is not really a friend; he uses you to<br />

justify his own existence. When people use you like<br />

that, they're not friends; they're leeches. And you've<br />

probably got better things to do than let others use you<br />

like that. Most importantly, the worm out there won't<br />

know if one of his friends has already turned him in, so<br />

he won't know if his phone is tapped.<br />

If I were a worm, and considering what kind of<br />

friends I would have, I'd be sure that somebody<br />

dropped a dime on me. And therefore intelligent worms<br />

(perhaps I'm giving them too much credit?) must presume<br />

that their lines are tapped and that they're gonna<br />

go to j<strong>ai</strong>l if they continue what they're doing. So just<br />

stop, you miserable little lowlifes, huh? You're going to<br />

be arrested. You're going to have to put up with indignities<br />

which even you don't deserve! Your equipment<br />

will be confiscated. You'll never get a job in the industry.<br />

You're going to go to j<strong>ai</strong>l. All this will happen<br />

because one of your friends actually has a conscience<br />

and knows what<strong>'s</strong> right and what<strong>'s</strong> wrong. And what<br />

you're doing is wrong.<br />

So, let me get back to the kind of programming I<br />

enjoy-productive programming. And turn your programming<br />

to useful, interesting, and productive programming.<br />

You have the talent to do something useful<br />

and good with your life. What you're doing is hurting<br />

the industry and hurting the community that would<br />

welcome someone with your talents with open arms.<br />

The satisfaction of helping far surpasses the satisfaction<br />

you must get from hurting innocent people. So just stop.<br />

Sincerely, Ross M. Greenberg<br />

* * *<br />

65


Chapter 5<br />

A registration form for pledging software or hardware to<br />

the reward fund is included in the archive of Flu_Shot + ,<br />

which is av<strong>ai</strong>lable from all the major <strong>computer</strong> networks or<br />

from Mr. Greenberg<strong>'s</strong> own board (see below).<br />

Ross Greenberg may be contacted at Software Concepts<br />

Design, 594 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10016 or<br />

phone 1-212-889-6431 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Eastern<br />

Time. Ross also provides a 24-hour per day <strong>computer</strong> bulletin<br />

board with virus information. Use 1200 or 2400 baud, no<br />

parity, 8 bits, 1 stop bit (8Nl) and call 1-212-889-6438. He also<br />

may be contacted via MCI M<strong>ai</strong>l and on BIX as 'greenber' and<br />

on CompuServe/PCMagNet as 72241,36.<br />

Raymond M. Glath: Keeping<br />

Watch for Viruses<br />

Ray Glath is president of RG Software Systems (2300 Computer<br />

Avenue, Suite I-51, Willow Grove PA 19090 or call 1-<br />

215-659-5300). His company<strong>'s</strong> virus protection product, Disk<br />

Watcher, is reviewed later in this book. The firm also manufactures<br />

the PC Tracker micro<strong>computer</strong> inventory and management<br />

system used by many large companies. This interview<br />

cont<strong>ai</strong>ns material from a phone conversation and from documentation<br />

supplied, courtesy of Mr. Glath.<br />

"Many who create virus programs view them as a joke,"<br />

Ray Glath s<strong>ai</strong>d, "but even nondestructive <strong>viruses</strong>, like ones<br />

that display 'gotcha' messages on a screen, cost a business time,<br />

money, and morale. We think our simple pop-up warning of<br />

unusual activity happening in a system can save incalculable<br />

headaches. "<br />

RG Software Systems, Glath continued, now offers a white<br />

paper that det<strong>ai</strong>ls its rational view of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong> and expl<strong>ai</strong>ns<br />

countermeasures that won't limit access to shareware,<br />

online services, electronic m<strong>ai</strong>l, or user groups. The paper outlines<br />

steps that Information Center managers, MIS/DP groups,<br />

and office managers should take immediately to avoid viral<br />

infection and lost productivity caused by disk-borne <strong>computer</strong><br />

virus, time-bomb, and "Trojan horse" programs. The free<br />

66


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

white paper, av<strong>ai</strong>lable by request on company letterhead, provides<br />

practical solutions business users can implement quickly<br />

without sacrificing system flexibility.<br />

"So far," Ray s<strong>ai</strong>d, "<strong>viruses</strong> are better publicized in the<br />

academic environment, but they're spreading among businesses.<br />

Smart companies are taking steps to guard ag<strong>ai</strong>nst<br />

them.<br />

"Several attacks have been documented by the press and,<br />

from firsthand experience, I can attest to the fact that those reported<br />

do exist. We have seen them and successfully tested our<br />

Disk Watcher product ag<strong>ai</strong>nst them. Reputable individuals<br />

have reported additional <strong>viruses</strong> to us, but these have not<br />

reached the scale of distribution achieved by the now infamous<br />

'Lehigh,' 'Br<strong>ai</strong>n,' 'Israeli,' and 'Macintosh' <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"We do expect the situation to worsen due to the attention<br />

it<strong>'s</strong> received. Taking simple lessons from history, a new<br />

phenomenon, once given attention, will be replicated by individuals<br />

who otherwise have no opportunity for personal<br />

attention.<br />

"Now that there are products for defense from <strong>viruses</strong>, the<br />

virus writers have been given a challenge; and for those people<br />

who have always wanted to anonymously strike out at someone<br />

but didn't know of a method to do so, the coverage has<br />

provided a 'How To' guide."<br />

Glath then addressed the problem of distinguishing a bug<br />

or hardware malfunction from a true virus.<br />

"This can be a tough one. With the publicity surrounding<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>, many people are ready to believe that any strange<br />

occurrence while computing may have been caused by a virus,<br />

when it could simply be an operational error, hardware component<br />

f<strong>ai</strong>lure, or a software bug.<br />

"While most commercial software developers test their<br />

products exhaustively. There is always the possibility that some<br />

combination of hardware, mix of installed TSRs, user actions,<br />

or slight incompatibilities with compatible or clone machines<br />

or components can cause a problem to surface."<br />

Glath recommends that you remember the following key<br />

points:<br />

1. Examine the probabilities of your having contacted a virus.<br />

67


Chapter 5<br />

2. Don't just assume that you've been attacked by a virus and<br />

abandon your normal troubleshooting techniques or those<br />

recommended by the product manufacturer.<br />

3. When in doubt contact your supplier or the manufacturer for<br />

tech support.<br />

4. Having an effective "Virus Protection" system installed may<br />

help you determine the cause of the problem.<br />

Protection from Viruses<br />

Do you need some form of protection from <strong>viruses</strong>?<br />

"It wouldn't hurt," Glath s<strong>ai</strong>d. "You do lock the door to<br />

your home when you go out, right?<br />

"Plan in advance the methods you'll use to ward off virus<br />

attacks. It<strong>'s</strong> a far more effective use of management time to<br />

establish preventive measures in a calm environment instead of<br />

making panic decisions after a virus attack has occurred."<br />

Can you be absolutely safe?<br />

"No! Any security system can be broken by someone dedicated<br />

and knowledgeable enough to put forth the effort to break<br />

the system."<br />

How can a software product protect ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>?<br />

"There are several approaches that have been developed.<br />

"One form is an 'inoculation' or <strong>'s</strong>ignature' process<br />

whereby the key files on a disk are marked in a special way<br />

and periodically checked to see if the files have been changed.<br />

Depending on the way in which this is implemented, this<br />

method can actually interfere with programs that have built-in<br />

integrity checks.<br />

"Another method is to write protect specific key areas of<br />

the disk so that no software is permitted to change the data in<br />

those places.<br />

"We at RG Software Systems believe that preventive measures<br />

are the most effective. The Disk Watch system provides<br />

multiple lines of defense:<br />

"A batch type program automatically checks all active disk<br />

drives for the presence of cert<strong>ai</strong>n hidden virus characteristics<br />

when the <strong>computer</strong> is started, and a TSR (Terminate and Stay<br />

Resident) program monitors ongoing disk activity throughout<br />

all processing. The batch program can also be run on demand<br />

68


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

at any time to check the disk in a specific drive.<br />

"The TSR program, in addition to its other 'Disaster<br />

Prevention' features, cont<strong>ai</strong>ns a series of proprietary algorithms<br />

that detect the behavior characteristics of a myriad of virus<br />

programs and yet produce minimal overhead in processing<br />

time and 'false alarm' reports. Disk Watcher is uniquely able to<br />

tell the difference between legitimate IP activity and the 10<br />

activity of a virus program.<br />

"When an action occurs indicative of a virus attempting to<br />

reproduce itself, alter another program, set itself up to be automatically<br />

run the next time the system is started or attempting<br />

to perform a massively damaging act, Disk Watcher will automatically<br />

pop up. The user will then have several options, one<br />

of which is to immediately stop the <strong>computer</strong> before any damage<br />

can be done. Detection occurs before the action takes place.<br />

Other options allow the user to tell Disk Watcher to continue<br />

the application program and remember that this program is<br />

permitted to perform the action that triggered the pop-up."<br />

Choosing a Virus Protection Package<br />

Mr. Glath then provided some tips on how to choose the best<br />

virus protection package for you.<br />

"Since the first reports of virus attacks appeared in the<br />

press, a number of virus prevention products have quickly appeared<br />

on the market, produced by companies wishing to take<br />

advantage of a unique market opportunity. This is to be expected.<br />

We are one of them with our Disk Watcher product.<br />

"It should be pointed out, however, that only a few<br />

months have transpired since the first major media stories<br />

started appearing.<br />

"Those companies that have had to build a product from<br />

scratch during this limited amount of time have had to design<br />

the defensive system, write the program code, write the user<strong>'s</strong><br />

manual, design the packaging, Alpha test, Beta test, and bring<br />

their product through manufacturing to market. A monumental<br />

task in a miraculously short period of time.<br />

"Companies that have had products on the market that include<br />

virus protection, or products that were enhanced to include<br />

virus protection, such as Disk Watcher, have had extra<br />

69


Chapter 5<br />

time and field experience for the stabilization of their products.<br />

"As a professional in this industry, I sincerely hope that<br />

the quickly developed products are stable in their released<br />

form."<br />

Glath suggests the following evaluation points be applied<br />

as a standard for all types of software products:<br />

• Price<br />

• Performance<br />

• Ease of Use<br />

• Ease of Learning<br />

• Ease of Installation<br />

• Documentation<br />

• Copy Protection<br />

• Support<br />

"A virus protection package, like a security system for your<br />

home, requires a close scrutiny. You want the system to do the<br />

job unobtrusively and yet be effective."<br />

Special Considerations for Virus Protection<br />

Packages<br />

Ray Glath of RG Software Systems provides the following list<br />

of twelve special considerations in choosing a virus protection<br />

package:<br />

Amount of impact the package may have on your <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong><br />

performance. If the package is RAM Resident, does it<br />

noticeably slow down your machine<strong>'s</strong> operations? If so, with<br />

what type of operation? Are program startups slowed? Are database<br />

operations slowed?<br />

Level of dependency on operator intervention. Does the<br />

package require the operator to perform cert<strong>ai</strong>n tasks on a regular<br />

basis in order for it to be effective? (Such as only checking<br />

for virus conditions on command). Does the package require<br />

much time to install and keep operation? For example, must<br />

the protection package be used each time new software is installed<br />

on the system?<br />

70


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

Impact on productivity ••• Annoyance level. Does the package<br />

periodically stop processing and/or require the operator to<br />

take some action? If so, does the package have any capability<br />

to learn its environment and stop its interference?<br />

False alarms. How does the package handle situations that<br />

appear to be <strong>viruses</strong>, but are legitimate actions made by legitimate<br />

programs? Are there situations where legitimate jobs will<br />

have to be rerun or the system rebooted because of the protection<br />

package? How frequently will this occur? How much additional<br />

end-user support will the package require?<br />

The probability the package will rem<strong>ai</strong>n in use? Will there<br />

be any interference or usage requirements that will discourage<br />

the user from keeping the package active? (It won't be effective<br />

if they quickly desire to de-install it and perhaps only pretend<br />

they are using it when management is present.)<br />

Level of effectiveness it provides in combating <strong>viruses</strong>. Will<br />

it be effective ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong> produced by individuals in the<br />

following experience levels?<br />

Levell-Typical End User (Basic knowledge of using<br />

applications and DOS commands.)<br />

Level 2-Power User (Knowledge of DOS command<br />

processor, hardware functions, BASIC programming,<br />

and other advanced features.)<br />

Level 3-Applications Programmer (Knowledge of<br />

programming languages and DOS service calls.)<br />

Level 4-Systems Engineer (Knowledge of DOS and<br />

Hardware internal functions.)<br />

Level 5-Computer Science Professor who develops <strong>viruses</strong><br />

for research purposes.<br />

Which types of <strong>viruses</strong> intrusion will it be effective<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst? Covert Entry? Overt Entry?<br />

Does it detect a virus attempting to spread or clone itself?<br />

Does it detect a virus attempting to place itself into a position<br />

to be automatically run?<br />

If a virus gets into the <strong>computer</strong>, which types of virus<br />

damage will it detect: Massive Destruction? Partial Destruction?<br />

Selective Destruction? Random Havoc Destruction?<br />

Annoyance?<br />

71


Chapter 5<br />

Does the software detect a virus before or after it has infected<br />

a program or made its attack?<br />

Does the publisher cl<strong>ai</strong>m total protection from all <strong>viruses</strong>?<br />

Does the software provide any assistance for post mortem<br />

analysis of suspected problems? If a virus symptom is detected<br />

and the <strong>computer</strong> is brought to a halt, is there any supporting<br />

information for analyzing the problem other than the operator<strong>'s</strong><br />

recall of events?<br />

Impact on your machine<strong>'s</strong> resources. How much RAM is<br />

used? Is any special hardware required?<br />

Is the product compatible with your hardware configuration?<br />

Your operating system version? Your network? Other software<br />

you use, especially TSRs?<br />

Can the package be used by current computing personnel<br />

without substantial tr<strong>ai</strong>ning? What type of computing experience<br />

is required to install the package?<br />

Background of the publisher. References. Who is using this<br />

or other products from this publisher? How is this company<br />

perceived by its customers? The press? How long has the publisher<br />

been in business?<br />

Was the product Beta tested? By valid, well-known<br />

organizations or by friends of the company<strong>'s</strong> owner? Was the<br />

product tested ag<strong>ai</strong>nst any known <strong>viruses</strong>? Successfully?<br />

What about ongoing support? In what form? At what cost?<br />

Does the company plan to upgrade its product periodically?<br />

What is the upgrade policy? Expected costs?<br />

Does the package provide any other useful benefits to the<br />

user besides virus protection?<br />

From the Oracles at Delphi<br />

One of the large public worldwide <strong>computer</strong> services is Delphi.<br />

Located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Delphi has local telephone<br />

number access throughout the United States and Canada.<br />

In the various special interest groups of Delphi are many<br />

thousands of public dom<strong>ai</strong>n and shareware programs for downloading.<br />

The author of this book (whose user name on Delphi<br />

is also AUTHOR) manages the Writers Group, which has several<br />

hundred av<strong>ai</strong>lable programs just by itsel£<br />

72


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

There are special interest groups for the various types of<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s, and groups for hobbies, science fiction, theology,<br />

business, games, and others. Each of these groups has a database<br />

section that offers programs.<br />

Like all the other major networks, Delphi management in<br />

general and various sysops in particular are concerned with<br />

preventing viral infection in the programs provided to users.<br />

While it is impossible for any network to fully guarantee that<br />

no virus-infected program will ever slip through, Delphi has<br />

been one of the leaders in protecting its users.<br />

Jeff Shulman and the Macintosh<br />

Jeff Shulman, the new ICONtact Manager (Delphi<strong>'s</strong> Macintoshoriented<br />

special interest group) is one of the sysops concerned<br />

with preventing virus infections. In fact, he is the author of a<br />

virus detection program for the Macintosh. He was also the<br />

first person to inform Aldus that their FreeHand program was<br />

being distributed with the Peace virus.<br />

"When <strong>viruses</strong> first appeared on the Mac," Jeff s<strong>ai</strong>d, "I,<br />

too, wondered how to protect Delphi users from downloading<br />

an infected file. Using tools like ResEdit to examine each file<br />

was an extremely time consuming process. What I needed was<br />

a tool that could quickly scan files for the various 'tags' <strong>viruses</strong><br />

left in files. This utility should also be easily modifiable should<br />

new str<strong>ai</strong>ns of <strong>viruses</strong> come along.<br />

"That was how VirusDetective was born. VirusDetective<br />

(VD) was written as a DA so it could be run at any time from<br />

any program (like immediately after I download a file). What<br />

VD does is search through all the files in a given folder, recursively<br />

(or the entire disk) looking for files that meet its matching<br />

criteria. Here is where I used my knowledge of Mac<br />

programming (I have several programs on the market, like<br />

FontDisplay, DiskLock and WriteFontSize) and how <strong>viruses</strong><br />

work to come up with a list of programmable search criteria.<br />

"VD can be configured to select a file by its type, creator,<br />

or by looking for specific resources. The resources may be<br />

searched for by name, ID, type, size, or size range. Once a file<br />

is found that matches its search criteria, it tells the user and<br />

gives him a chance to remove that particular resource.<br />

73


Chapter 5<br />

"Now, most <strong>viruses</strong> in the Mac world cannot be fully<br />

eradicated by removing a single resource. YO<strong>'s</strong> m<strong>ai</strong>n purpose is<br />

virus detection, not eradication. There are several other programs<br />

that are built to eradicate specific <strong>viruses</strong>. VO also does<br />

not search for suspect <strong>viruses</strong> like Interferon does. You must<br />

tell VO exactly what to look for. Thus, it is possible for a new<br />

virus to sneak by VD (as well as the other programs).<br />

"However, in the highly connected Mac community, it will<br />

quickly be identified. Once identified, VO can easily be<br />

reconfigured by the user to also include that virus in its search<br />

criteria. The other detection programs may require reprogramming<br />

and redownloading to include a new virus.<br />

"VO is being marketed as shareware. It has had little return<br />

so far. This is probably due in part to the fact the other<br />

programs are free.<br />

"Another feature of VD is its ability to keep a log of all the<br />

files searched and those that matched the search criteria. It<strong>'s</strong><br />

this logging capability and the ability to easily configure the<br />

search criteria that enables VD to search for just about anything<br />

and not just for <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"I also use CE Software<strong>'s</strong> Vaccine INIT and run every program<br />

posted before it is released. That way, should a new<br />

unknown virus pass YO<strong>'s</strong> testing, hopefully, Vaccine would<br />

pick it up. I'm also extra careful with postings from new<br />

uploaders and people whose names I don't recognize. A majority<br />

of the stuff I cross-post from the noncommercial networks<br />

is also checked by those moderators.<br />

"I'm not saying that a virus infected program will never be<br />

posted. Just as the virus scare started, all three major networks<br />

did have a virus program up on the board but it was quickly<br />

detected and removed with 24 hours on all the services. I regularly<br />

read messages from both CIS and GEnie as well as Usenet<br />

and INFO-MAC. Between all five networks, Mac <strong>viruses</strong> are<br />

caught and removed before they have a chance to spread.<br />

"My advice to someone who wants to be extra careful is to<br />

not download any new file when it first comes out but to w<strong>ai</strong>t<br />

a week. Unless it is a very clever virus with a long time delay,<br />

it will be found out and removed in the week<strong>'s</strong> time.<br />

"The telecommunicating Mac community is very large and<br />

very quick at finding these things out."<br />

74


Marty Goodman of Delphi<br />

How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

Marty Goodman is SIGOP for Delphi<strong>'s</strong> CoCo Sig, and also is<br />

involved with the OS9 and Portable Place groups as well.<br />

"The Radio Shack color <strong>computer</strong>," Marty s<strong>ai</strong>d, "is operated<br />

under one of two operating systems: RS DOS (otherwise<br />

known as DISK EXTENDED COLOR BASIC) and OS9.<br />

"Now, RS DOS is a ROM-based operating system and so<br />

is totally, utterly, and completely invulnerable to any possible<br />

virus by virtue of its existing only as unalterable firmware. This<br />

takes care of the majority of Color Computer users.<br />

"The more advanced minority who use OS9 use a UNIXlike<br />

operating system. (Described by Dr. Dobbs Journal as<br />

"Leaner and Meaner than Unix"). Because it is a disk-based<br />

operating system, OS9 is in theory as vulnerable as MS-DOS or<br />

any other disk-based operating system to <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"In practice, though, to date I know of not one authenticated<br />

report of a CoCo OS9 virus ever being discovered. This<br />

may in part be due to the fact that OS9 users are a serious lot,<br />

and a very tiny minority among <strong>computer</strong> users-especially<br />

6809jCoCo OS9-and so tend to support each other and are by<br />

nature less likely to spend their time concocting diabolical<br />

nasties. That may sound a bit corny but actually probably is to<br />

some real degree true.<br />

"In the Portable Place, the Tandy 100 and 200 are relatively<br />

immune to any virus, ag<strong>ai</strong>n by virtue of the fact that<br />

their operating software is in the form of ROM-based firmware,<br />

so in the worst case, a freezing cold start will wipe out any viral<br />

infection.<br />

"In the case of the MS-DOS-based lap portables, the issues<br />

are of course the same as those with MS-DOS desktop<br />

machines.<br />

"Although real <strong>viruses</strong> have been created for MS-DOS machines,<br />

these are extremely rare, and roughly 99.99 percent of<br />

the time someone thinks a problem is due to a virus; it is instead<br />

due to software misuse, damaged software, or a hardware<br />

f<strong>ai</strong>lure of some kind (the latter being relatively unlikely, too).<br />

Thus, at present, I for one am not honestly very worried about<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>, and (please take no offense here) tend to watch all the<br />

hysteria about them with just a little amusement.<br />

75


Chapter 5<br />

"Since <strong>viruses</strong> can be created to merge with and contaminate<br />

the operating system in any of a number of ways, there<br />

does not seem to me any means of a sysop protecting users<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong> in any practical sort of way, apart from employing<br />

top notch assembly language programmers with extreme<br />

familiarity with MS-DOS operating system at the machine level<br />

to disassemble totally and analyze every program posted. This,<br />

of course, is a logistical and financial impossibility.<br />

"Beyond that, it is hard for me to imagine any other<br />

means of dealing with the 'viral threat' than carefully examining<br />

any member report of problems that might be associated<br />

with a file one has downloaded. Of course, as we all note, software<br />

here is 'as is' and 'at your own risk.'"<br />

Michael A. Banks, science fiction and <strong>computer</strong> book author,<br />

and manager of Science Fiction Group has found what he<br />

feels to be the ideal solution.<br />

"We are concerned with the virus problem. After all, science<br />

fiction writers have long predicted it. But I let my Assistant<br />

Manager handle the actual checking out. He seems to<br />

know something about the subject."<br />

(The author of this book in addition to managing the Writers<br />

Group is also assistant manager in the SF Group.).<br />

One Man<strong>'s</strong> Opinion<br />

Now, I get to talk for me! As manager of Delphi<strong>'s</strong> Writers<br />

Group for the past two years, the threat of <strong>viruses</strong>, Trojans,<br />

and logic-bombs has been a fact of life. There are over 300 programs<br />

now in the Writer<strong>'s</strong> Software topic of my database. And,<br />

while system-wide and group discl<strong>ai</strong>mers protect us from a<br />

legal standpoint, users cert<strong>ai</strong>nly won't come back if they get a<br />

bad program.<br />

I started using the CHK4BOMB program from the first.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> pretty simple (and was designed more for Trojans than <strong>viruses</strong>,<br />

having come out in 1985). You enter "CHK4BOMB<br />

" for a listing of all ASCII strings, and potentially<br />

dangerous disk activity. You get warning messages such as<br />

"****WARNING**** This program writes to absolute sectors.<br />

The possibility exists to overwrite important data." Or<br />

76


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

"****WARNING**** This program FORMATS a disk! All data<br />

on the disk could be lost!"<br />

A brave soul (or at least dedicated), I also run programs on<br />

my system before making them public in the Writers Group on<br />

Delphi. As might be expected, I've been burned. The FAT on<br />

my hard disk was trashed by a program that purported to be a<br />

"directory packer." After that, I also started using<br />

WPHD.COM, a nifty little utility that "write protects" your<br />

hard disk.<br />

Now, of course, things are much better. Because of writing<br />

this book, I am receiving all sorts of virus protection and detection<br />

programs for review. I've taken to trying out all programs<br />

submitted or that I intend to upload to the Writers Group with<br />

a variety of these programs.<br />

The recent programs in Writer<strong>'s</strong> Software are probably the<br />

most thoroughly checked programs on any of the networks<br />

(grin). This does not mean a virus-infected program will never<br />

slip in, just that it<strong>'s</strong> much more difficult now than it used to be.<br />

Mike Riemer: Providing a Firm Foundation<br />

Foundation Ware<strong>'s</strong> Mike Riemer is enthusiastic about his<br />

company<strong>'s</strong> products (both the products and Mike himself have<br />

good reputations in the field). FoundationWare takes a somewhat<br />

different approach to fighting <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"We do FAT table backup like PC Tools and Mace," Mike<br />

s<strong>ai</strong>d, describing Foundation Ware<strong>'s</strong> programs. "We do FAT table<br />

recovery, we do low-level partition check and recoverybattery<br />

cellular recovery for AT&T. In that vein, we compete<br />

with people like Norton and Mace and we do it all<br />

automatically.<br />

"We also provide what<strong>'s</strong> called user control, which is a<br />

600-byte memory resident program that prevents anything getting<br />

into memory that hasn't been approved to get there. So,<br />

with that a system manager can control what software is being<br />

run on a system.<br />

"In addition to all that, we do a direct disk I/O monitor to<br />

make sure a bomb doesn't go off or someone doesn't accidentally<br />

format the hard disk. Generally, most of our competitors<br />

do one or two of those things. We have eight modules<br />

77


Chapter 5<br />

now, all in the same package. They are optional and have different<br />

switches to turn them on or off, and can be regulated for<br />

specific security levels.<br />

"Generally, people like to hear the philosophy behind a<br />

product. Ours is if you are going to deal with the consumer, especially<br />

MIS people (Manager Information Systems) you have<br />

to provide them wjth tools which are useful in their environment.<br />

Give them control.<br />

"The major problem inside of corporations, excluding the<br />

end user for a second, is the fact that people just bring in software<br />

that they are not supposed to. With our program, they<br />

can't do that. Nothing but nothing that hasn't been approved<br />

will run.<br />

"A funny thing. Hal Highland came up to us at an Expo.<br />

He had six or eight <strong>viruses</strong> in his briefcase. He kept sticking in<br />

one after another and trying to run it. Obviously none of them<br />

were approved to run and wouldn't. We got a pretty good<br />

chuckle out of it.<br />

"We're coming out with what we call 'blue disk' technology.<br />

We have the ability with our user interface to create external<br />

databases, so we made signature checks of a couple of<br />

the largest public dom<strong>ai</strong>n and shareware libraries in the world<br />

and put them on a disk. So if you download a program, you<br />

can check it ag<strong>ai</strong>nst your Blue Disk, which is a floppy disk, and<br />

see whether that version you just downloaded is one of the<br />

ones approved as being virus-free."<br />

Mike Riemer and Foundation Ware may be contacted at<br />

2135 Renrock Rd., Cleveland, OH 44118, phone 1-800-722-<br />

8737.<br />

More Experts than Room<br />

There are several other people whose comments we wanted to<br />

add to this chapter, but lack of space prevents it. Ron<br />

Benvenisti at Worldwide Data was especially helpful, as was<br />

Dennis Director at Director Technologies, Larry DiMartin of<br />

Computer Integrity Corporation, Pam Kane and her fabulous<br />

Dr. Panda, and many others.<br />

78


How the Experts Deal with Viruses<br />

One of few really reassuring things about the <strong>computer</strong> virus<br />

problem is the high caliber of the people fighting viral<br />

infection. How can the sickies prev<strong>ai</strong>l when all the good guys<br />

and gals are on the side of right and might?<br />

79


6<br />

CORPORATE<br />

INITIATIVES<br />

FORPCDATA<br />

SECURITY<br />

Pamela Kane<br />

President Panda Systems<br />

The strength of a ch<strong>ai</strong>n is its weakest link.<br />

Old Proverb<br />

Pam Kane<strong>'s</strong> Panda Systems has been featured on the<br />

front page of The Wall Street Journal (June 17,1988) and<br />

included in several of the major <strong>computer</strong> magazines. Dr.<br />

Panda utilities are one of the most highly rated virus-fighting<br />

systems currently av<strong>ai</strong>lable. "His round, soft and furry<br />

exterior," writes Hal Nieburg about Dr. Panda in the June<br />

Computer Shopper (page 316), "is deceiving. Inside is a<br />

set of three utilities that cont<strong>ai</strong>n the heart of a tiger, the<br />

unrelenting persistence of an Inspector Hercule Poirot, and<br />

the savvy and skill of a James Bond . .. " Panda Systems<br />

also develops custom installation programs and additional<br />

security and data protection utilities for sensitive<br />

operations.<br />

81


Chapter 6<br />

Destructive code, whether virus, worm, Trojan Horse or a<br />

combination, seems to have proliferated in a constant and direct<br />

ratio to the number of personal <strong>computer</strong>s in use. IBM<strong>'s</strong><br />

original estimate of PC sales was less than one-half million; no<br />

one could envision in 1980 that the personal <strong>computer</strong> would<br />

become a standard tool of corporate America in a few short<br />

years.<br />

Had the architects of the PC been able to see the future,<br />

the operating system might have included many of the security<br />

safeguards standard on the larger <strong>computer</strong>s targeted for corporate<br />

use. On the other hand, if the PC operating system had<br />

been more sophisticated and arcane, PC acceptance and growth<br />

could have been sharply limited by the increased difficulty of use.<br />

An Achilles Heel<br />

The best example of DOS<strong>'s</strong> elementary nature is the FORMAT<br />

command. Any user able to type FORMAT can render an entire<br />

disk<strong>'s</strong> data unusable, at least temporarily. Fortunes have<br />

been made by utility software vendors who provide "fixes" for<br />

the "holes" in DOS. Countless corporate overhead hours have<br />

been expended in developing end-user interfaces that minimize<br />

the possibility of inadvertent data destruction. It is the very<br />

simplicity of the PC<strong>'s</strong> operating system that creates the<br />

environment where <strong>viruses</strong> can grow.<br />

Just as the simplicity of DOS allows the easy incursion of<br />

destructive code, it provides for simple and inexpensive methods<br />

to prevent data destruction. Further, executable programs<br />

for personal <strong>computer</strong>s, whether commercial or proprietary,<br />

may be replaced rapidly, allowing security techniques to focus<br />

on data and work product.<br />

Practically and pragmatically, <strong>viruses</strong> are a fact of life in<br />

the late 1980s; they will continue to be spread, innocently for<br />

the most part, and responsible users and managers will take<br />

positive steps to prevent data loss from destructive code just as<br />

from any other source.<br />

Experience tells us that the possibility of data loss due to<br />

destructive programs can reasonably be compared to the possibility<br />

of data loss due to power reductions or f<strong>ai</strong>lures. Just as<br />

a surge protector is an essential part of a PC<strong>'s</strong> hardware<br />

82


Corporate Initiatives for PC Data Security<br />

configuration, data protection procedures and utilities should<br />

be an essential part of system software configurations.<br />

Looking back to the early days of the IBM PC-AT, another<br />

example is worth pointing out: Careful users and managers<br />

planned for when the drive would crash and spent no time at<br />

all on if.<br />

Areas of Concern in Corporate Security<br />

The three areas corporate security managers must consider in<br />

developing policies and procedures and the selection of data<br />

protection software are Risk Assessment and Management,<br />

Cost/Benefit Analyses, and Human Resources.<br />

Risk assessment can involve lengthy and convoluted studies,<br />

particularly difficult when data loss or destruction for any<br />

reason is a taboo subject for publication in the corporate world.<br />

Using the example above, managers who choose not to include<br />

surge protectors in their installations are consciously taking an<br />

identifiable risk; f<strong>ai</strong>ling to use antivirus procedures and software<br />

constitutes at least an equal risk.<br />

Cost/Benefit Analysis is more str<strong>ai</strong>ghtforward. The cost of<br />

returning a single PC to service following data destruction can<br />

be calculated by adding technical support time, loss of<br />

productivity, and the cost of data recovery or re-creation. The<br />

cost of security software programs may be calculated in a similar<br />

fashion: the cost of the software program itself with costs of<br />

installation, tr<strong>ai</strong>ning, and user support added.<br />

Human Resources concerns are the most subtle and the<br />

most important. People costs far outweigh the costs of hardware<br />

or software in any organization. Tr<strong>ai</strong>ning may be ineffective<br />

or confusing. Additional decision-making responsibility,<br />

particularly if the consequences of an error are great, is often<br />

unwelcome and stress-producing. Changes to the operation of a<br />

familiar system inevitably result in loss of productivity, if only<br />

for a brief time.<br />

The ideal antiviral security procedures and software, therefore,<br />

will be absolutely unseen to the user unless there is evidence<br />

of potential data destruction at the end user level. While<br />

the end users should be relatively uninvolved in data security<br />

on the software level, managers and power users must be pro-<br />

83


Chapter 6<br />

vided with powerful tools to prevent data destruction and to<br />

recover lost work product.<br />

The ratio of end users to managers and technical support<br />

staff must also be considered in the development of security<br />

solutions and the associated budgeting. PC support departments<br />

are frequently understaffed and underbudgeted. Many<br />

companies rely on outside contractors for many services, often<br />

with a resulting lack of control or direction. These factors must<br />

also be given serious consideration in the planning process.<br />

Difficulty may be encountered by PC managers or security<br />

administrators in "selling" the cost of such programs to the<br />

department heads who will ultimately "pay the bill." It is a<br />

Catch-22 of corporate reality that, should disaster strike, these<br />

same department heads will take the PC staff to task for f<strong>ai</strong>ling<br />

to provide adequate security.<br />

Prevention Techniques<br />

Common sense, DOS functions, and standard commercial utilities<br />

will enable managers to begin a security program for safe<br />

computing and to perform some of the basic functions of antivirus<br />

utilities. The following activities and functions can be extremely<br />

effective:<br />

84<br />

1. Add the CHKDSK command to AUTOEXEC.BAT. If the<br />

number of hidden files or disk space av<strong>ai</strong>lable changes, find<br />

the reason before using the system.<br />

2. Prepare a "clean model" disk cont<strong>ai</strong>ning at least<br />

COMMAND. COM, IBM/MS DOS, IBMBIO/MSIO. Add<br />

other target files a virus writer might predict to be on a<br />

disk such as CONFIG.SYS, AUTOEXEC.BAT or 123.EXE.<br />

Write-protect the disk. Write a batch file using the DOS<br />

COMP command to check the selected files for changes or<br />

include the COMP function in AUTOEXEC.BAT. If a file<br />

has been changed, assume it<strong>'s</strong> corrupted. Replace the file<br />

with a clean version. Do not assume the virus has<br />

disappeared.<br />

3. Write batch files for COPY and FORMAT functions that<br />

include a CHKDSK on the target disk after the DOS operation.<br />

A system disk with a label will show three hidden


. Corporate Initiatives/or PC Data Security<br />

files, DOS, BIO/IO and the label. If additional hidden files<br />

are present, a virus may have been passed. Note: some copyprotected<br />

programs install hidden files.<br />

4. Change the attributes of system or predictable files to Read<br />

Only using the DOS ATTRIB command or a utility.<br />

5. M<strong>ai</strong>nt<strong>ai</strong>n an up to date hardcopy of your directories and<br />

their contents. TREE> IPT 1 prints the directory structure.<br />

DIR>IPTl for each subdirectory prints complete information<br />

about a directory<strong>'s</strong> contents. Watch for unexpl<strong>ai</strong>nable<br />

changes in file size or addition of new files.<br />

6. Use only software from reliable sources. If using public<br />

dom<strong>ai</strong>n/shareware/freeware, contact the writer/distributor<br />

to compare file date and file size before using. If the<br />

share/freeware does not include a contact address or te]ephone<br />

number, do not use it. Say no to "borrowware."<br />

7. Begin the habit of clean boot operating system use before<br />

detection activities. Prepare a clean boot ["CB"] disk by<br />

turning off the PC, inserting an original DOS disk in A:<br />

and turning the power on. Type DISKCOPY A: A: and follow<br />

screen prompts. Use the write-protected duplicate as a<br />

clean boot disk.<br />

8. Before copying data from a floppy to hard drive, cold boot<br />

and use CHKDSK to look for any hidden files. If hidden<br />

files other than the DOS LABEL O-byte file are present, do<br />

not copy the data.<br />

9. Always reFORMAT used floppies. A format from C: followed<br />

by cold boot and CHKDSK may detect a virus but<br />

produce a bad disk. For a cleaner result, format all disks<br />

after a cold boot.<br />

10. Always download data to a floppy disk and look for hidden<br />

files on the floppy with CHKDSK. Run communications<br />

and .ARC programs from floppies after a cold boot.<br />

11. Use a utility program to sort each subdirectory by date and<br />

time. Any date before 01/01/80 is a cert<strong>ai</strong>n warning. Dates<br />

in the future should be carefully checked. Look for 00 in<br />

dates and times and any time greater than 23:59:59.<br />

12. Sort on file size. Be alert for unusually large or O-byte files.<br />

Compare file sizes with your hardcopy. Any change in<br />

.COM, .EXE, .BAT, or .SYS files should r<strong>ai</strong>se a warning<br />

flag.<br />

85


Chapter 6<br />

13. Sort on file name. If a program is called by .EXE (123 for<br />

example) and a file with the same name and the extension<br />

.COM is present, this spells serious trouble. The .COM file<br />

executes first in the DOS hierarchy. Look for filenames that<br />

seem odd according to your naming conventions.<br />

14. Another sort, this time on extension. You might not pick<br />

up DBASE.EVL or a file in the 123 subdirectory with<br />

. WK8 as an extension the first time through.<br />

15. Remove suspicious files with a utility to WIPE them. Do<br />

not use the DOS DEL function that merely replaces the<br />

first letter of the filename so it won't show on a DIR. The<br />

file rem<strong>ai</strong>ns in place until written over.<br />

16. Evaluate the risk factor for an individual system or installation.<br />

Any access of external data from disk, network, or<br />

modem ent<strong>ai</strong>ls risk.<br />

17. Develop procedures and utilities that oversee or limit transfer<br />

of data among PCs. Network with other users for ideas<br />

and solutions.<br />

18. Understand the meaning and operation of virus, worm, and<br />

Trojan Horse programs. The seeding of a virus from one<br />

system to another is a separate event from the operation of<br />

any destructive code the virus may implant. Worms w<strong>ai</strong>t<br />

for a signal such as a specific date or "x" numbers of access<br />

of "Y.EXE" to execute. Trojan Horse programs execute<br />

wi th the first access.<br />

The above procedures, though based in sound practice, are<br />

time and effort intensive and, therefore, appropriate only for<br />

managers and the small group of experienced PC professionals<br />

in any organizational group. The large time requirement and<br />

the low security level achieved must be balanced ag<strong>ai</strong>nst<br />

commercial utility products.<br />

Virus Detection and Protection Software<br />

According to the trade press, there are more than 100 antiviral<br />

software packages av<strong>ai</strong>lable, ranging in price from $10<br />

shareware to thousands of dollars when a CD-ROM approach<br />

is used. Evaluation of the various products and approaches can<br />

be costly and time-consuming once an initiative is identified.<br />

86


Corporate Initiatives for PC Data Security<br />

Virus detection programs or those that "inoculate" ag<strong>ai</strong>nst<br />

particular "str<strong>ai</strong>ns" of virus should be eliminated out of hand.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> impossible to conceive of a software program that can constantly<br />

be refreshed to counter the destructive code that just appeared<br />

yesterday. The cost involved in an almost constant<br />

update/upgrade situation is unacceptable for even the smallest<br />

installations.<br />

Programs that require significant tr<strong>ai</strong>ning or decisionmaking<br />

at end user levels are also to be avoided. A $20 package<br />

that requires $200 per user in tr<strong>ai</strong>ning is not a barg<strong>ai</strong>n.<br />

The ideal antivirus software for corporate use should be<br />

absolutely transparent to the user until potentially destructive<br />

activity is identified.<br />

If this sounds too easy, consider ag<strong>ai</strong>n the simplicity of<br />

PC/MS-DOS coupled with the goal of a virus-to place itself in<br />

as many places as possible as often as possible. There are only<br />

three required and therefore, absolutely predictable files on a<br />

Pc. These are COMMAND.COM, DOS, and BIO/IO. Next in<br />

predictability are files with extensions .COM, .EXE, and .SYS.<br />

Antiviral software that constantly checks for changes to such<br />

files and looks for changes in the hidden file structure will<br />

identify most virus incursions, even before they can begin their<br />

dirty work.<br />

Should the presence of a virus not be identified, there are<br />

only four likely destructive activities, thanks ag<strong>ai</strong>n to the elementary<br />

nature of DOS. The four are: destruction of the boot<br />

sector, scrambling the initial bytes of the file allocation table, a<br />

logical format of any drive, or a virtual format of the default<br />

hard drive. By eliminating the possibility of any of these four<br />

events, antiviral software can provide an almost perfect foil for<br />

destructive programming.<br />

By logical extension, the presence of destructive code is<br />

identified at the same time that data loss is prevented.<br />

The "Yeah, but what if. .. " contingent in any organization<br />

may be counted on to develop scenarios where such a basic<br />

software approach will be defeated or circumvented. Clearly, no<br />

software will be 100 percent foolproof, especially ag<strong>ai</strong>nst intentional<br />

sabotage. The overriding goal must be to provide the<br />

highest security level at the lowest cost with the least intrusion.<br />

87


Chapter 6<br />

The port of entry for PC <strong>viruses</strong> should also be given careful<br />

consideration. Most destructive code is unwittingly brought<br />

into the workplace by <strong>computer</strong> literate employees. Employees<br />

who use home <strong>computer</strong>s for both work and hobbies and<br />

employees seeking additional education in the <strong>computer</strong> field<br />

are the significant carriers. It would be unwise, to say nothing<br />

of unenforceable, to attempt to limit the external use of PCs by<br />

valuable employees.<br />

Other Protective and Recovery Measures<br />

Many companies are also attempting to ban the use of public<br />

dom<strong>ai</strong>n and/or shareware programs on corporate machines.<br />

This is also policy that is practically unenforceable. Every PC<br />

guru, whether a member of the technical support staff or a<br />

departmental local expert has his or her own tool kit of favorite<br />

utilities.<br />

Many of the best utilities av<strong>ai</strong>lable and in use today are in<br />

the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n and are freely shared among users. Power<br />

users are, at least by reputation, highly independent sorts and<br />

often have strong opinions on methodology. This, combined<br />

with the tradition of sharing information among PC users<br />

would render such policies useless in practice. It<strong>'s</strong> far better to<br />

institute "clean room" procedures for public dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs.<br />

The increased employee involvement not only provides a<br />

significant benefit, but also a level of protection for possible<br />

licensing or copyright problems that might accrue to the<br />

company.<br />

The business that is truly committed to human relation<br />

concerns will also provide home PC users with antiviral software<br />

and utilities, thereby further involving the employee with<br />

the chosen positive solution.<br />

A written protocol should be developed for use by the<br />

technical support staff in case of a suspected virus attack. Such<br />

a document should include strong cautions not to construe any<br />

anomaly of operation as a virus situation without careful<br />

evaluation. It should also resist the temptation to reformat a<br />

hard drive immediately.<br />

The best procedure is to simply swap out either the CPU<br />

or hard drive of the PC in question so troubleshooting and<br />

evaluation can take place without a serious loss of productivity.<br />

88


Corporate Initiatives for PC Data Security<br />

If data backups are not av<strong>ai</strong>lable, data should be unloaded<br />

from the suspect PC using the DOS COpy command following<br />

a clean boot. Ideally, the replacement drive should be formatted<br />

and all standard applications software installed. If additional<br />

programs are required, they should be loaded from<br />

original disks, not copied from the questionable system.<br />

If a working virus is identified, immediate and stringent<br />

quarantine measures should be implemented as well as mounting<br />

a search for any and all disks that were in contact with<br />

the virus site. It<strong>'s</strong> difficult to state any general rules for these<br />

measures as the "patient zero" PC could be a stand-alone<br />

workstation with negligible access to other machines or it could<br />

be a node on a 500-PC local area network. If the virus leaves<br />

an identifiable footprint such as a message hidden within<br />

COMMAND. COM or a hidden file, any hard drive or disk exposed<br />

to the infected PC should be examined.<br />

Commercial utilities that search for text strings ("@#$&<br />

YOU!") are readily av<strong>ai</strong>lable. Simple programs can also be<br />

written in assembly language and DOS DEBUG can be used to<br />

examine files.<br />

Conclusions<br />

The search for virus code can be lengthy and exhausting; recovery<br />

of lost data may be impossible. Data files on infected machines<br />

should be transferred with the utmost care and carefully<br />

inspected for accuracy. Infected disks should be physically destroyed<br />

and infected hard drives reformatted using FDISK<br />

from a clean boot. (The virtual, rather than logical, format of a<br />

hard drive is essential to remove all traces of virus code.)<br />

Above all, don't trust to luck. Install viral-protection software<br />

and institute the procedures recommended above. Being<br />

safe is infinitely better than being sorry. If troubles persist, call<br />

a professional in the field of virus removal.<br />

89


7<br />

THECASEOF<br />

THE GERBIL<br />

VIRUSTHAT<br />

WASN'T<br />

Raymond M. Glath<br />

President, RG Software Systems, Inc.<br />

Imagination rules the world.<br />

Napoleon I (1769-1821)<br />

RG Software Systems is the manufacturer of the Disk<br />

Watcher "disaster prevention" utility, and PC Tracker,<br />

used by many large corporations to keep track of their personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s. Ray Glath, its president, is a very<br />

knowledgable virus fighter. We feel the amusing incident<br />

he relates below is exceptionally appropriate for this book.<br />

It was a quiet, pleasant Friday afternoon when we received the<br />

urgent call from the pastor of a small Pennsylvania church.<br />

Quite upset, he expressed his need to immediately purchase our<br />

antivirus product as he had lost a major section of his doctoral<br />

thesis, along with many other files, to the "Gerbil" virus.<br />

"All of a sudden, the word GERBIL appeared in the upper<br />

left corner of my screen; footprints were scattered all over the<br />

display and my system locked up" he excl<strong>ai</strong>med. "When I<br />

turned the system off and on ag<strong>ai</strong>n, my document was gone ...<br />

All that work lost." Upon questioning, the pastor stated that he<br />

91


Chapter 7<br />

had used nothing but legitimate, purchased, professional software<br />

other than a DOS update disk he had received from his<br />

dealer.<br />

Appalled at the thought of an innocent man of the cloth<br />

being attacked by an anonymous virus writer, we requested<br />

that he send us a copy of the disk he was using so we could attempt<br />

to track down this dastardly culprit.<br />

After many hours of p<strong>ai</strong>nstaking analysis, we determined<br />

that his disk simply cont<strong>ai</strong>ned a normal DOS system, several<br />

programs, and nothing unusual. Further discussions with the<br />

good pastor led to the discovery that this problem only appeared<br />

when he was using a specific commercial word processor,<br />

and he had returned the package to the store where he<br />

bought it. "With your antivirus package installed, I've had no<br />

further problems," he s<strong>ai</strong>d.<br />

Something just didn't sound right. We decided to purchase<br />

a copy of the package in question, and when we looked through<br />

the program code, 10 and behold, there it was ••• : "GERBIL.OOC',<br />

"GERBIL.2" and several other uses of the word GERBIL ...<br />

right there in the middle of this commercial package<strong>'s</strong> program<br />

code!<br />

We immediately contacted the publisher of the word<br />

processing system to alert them to the fact that we found something<br />

suspicious in their package and were continuing to research<br />

the matter. They responded that they had no reports of<br />

problems of this nature and that the package had been on the<br />

market for six months in many installations.<br />

They did recognize the term GERBIL however, because<br />

that was the project Code Name while it was in development.<br />

Aha ... a clue.<br />

As it turns out, the GERBIL references were never removed<br />

from the production version of the system. Each word<br />

processing document begins with an internally used id record<br />

that starts off with-you guessed it-GERBIL.DOC.<br />

Additionally, this package allows you to bring program and<br />

other supporting files into the word processor as you would any<br />

other document.<br />

And guess what some of the files begin with? Right<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>n-GERBIL.<br />

92


The Footprints?<br />

The Case of the Gerbil Virus that Wasn't<br />

Well, they turned out to be the happy faces, spade, club diamond,<br />

and other symbols you'll see when program code<br />

consisting of low value ASCII characters appears on a display.<br />

(They sure looked like footprints to the pastor. He didn't know<br />

what else to call them.)<br />

In the meantime, fearful that he had been thoroughly infected<br />

by a virus and wanting to be sure that it would go no<br />

further, the pastor used his disk recovery utility to locate all<br />

occurrences of the word GERBIL on his disk, and he proceeded<br />

to erase all sectors that had the word GERBIL appearing.<br />

Now all his documents are unreadable; all his work is lost.<br />

Did he ever contact the word processing publisher for support<br />

on the problem? Yes. No one had any idea what he was<br />

talking about. He also contacted his <strong>computer</strong> dealer, the regional<br />

rep for the <strong>computer</strong> system he was using, and the store<br />

where he bought the word processing package. His efforts were<br />

all to no av<strong>ai</strong>l.<br />

Are there any lessons to be learned from this sad tale? You<br />

betcha!<br />

Lessons for Software Publishers<br />

Especially now that the concerns regarding <strong>viruses</strong> are high,<br />

let<strong>'s</strong> start using less cute code names for projects. And when the<br />

project is complete and ready for commercial distribution, let<strong>'s</strong><br />

remove all references to the code name.<br />

For those products already on the market with cute or<br />

questionable terminology embedded, let the customer support<br />

personnel in on it so the end users can have their fears allayed<br />

without causing major heartache.<br />

Lessons for End Users<br />

Every unusual event does not a virus indicate.<br />

Make sure you have a static free environment surrounding<br />

your <strong>computer</strong>.<br />

Immediately after encountering a strange event, make<br />

notes in as det<strong>ai</strong>led a form as possible, regarding each step you<br />

performed in the few moments preceding the event. You'll<br />

93


Chapter 7<br />

need these to help the manufacturer<strong>'s</strong> customer support personnel<br />

determine corrective actions for you. And you may have to<br />

repeat them several times. You should be prepared to answer<br />

questions such as these:<br />

What job were you running?<br />

Precisely what were you doing?<br />

What keys did you press?<br />

Did the power f<strong>ai</strong>l?<br />

Did the plug get pulled?<br />

What file were you working on?<br />

Have you had any recent hardware problems while<br />

running any job?<br />

Run the DOS CHKDSK program on the disk you were<br />

using. If the disk has been partially damaged by a power<br />

surge/drop/outage or static charge, you can encounter very<br />

strange results. If CHKDSK reports errors on a given disk,<br />

you'll need to check all the files from that disk to see if they're<br />

still intact.<br />

Check with the tech support group from the publisher of<br />

the product you were using. In addition to the above det<strong>ai</strong>ls,<br />

you should also be prepared to give them the names of any<br />

TSR software you were using at the time, a description of your<br />

hardware configuration, and your DOS version number.<br />

Finally, if you're concerned about your susceptibility to<br />

acquiring a virus, it may be helpful to install an antivirus program<br />

that could alert you to a possible virus problem.<br />

But, you've got to exercise care in the selection of such a<br />

program. One that<strong>'s</strong> been thrown together quickly without regard<br />

to compatibility and false alarm issues can be more<br />

troublesome than an actual virus.<br />

94


8<br />

IBMPCsAND<br />

COMPATIBLES<br />

When most the world applauds you, most beware,' 'tis often less<br />

a blessing than a snare.<br />

Rev. Edward Young (1683-1765)<br />

If those twisted and despicable few who concoct <strong>viruses</strong> have a<br />

favorite song, it is surely "Send in the Clones!"<br />

The standard that IBM set back in 1981 with the personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong> has resulted in millions of <strong>computer</strong>s that all can run<br />

the same software. Inexpensive compatibles or clones of the<br />

IBM PC can be ordered from any of the myriad of <strong>computer</strong><br />

magazines for prices in the $500 range.<br />

Thousands upon thousands upon thousands of public dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

and shareware programs are av<strong>ai</strong>lable. The base of<br />

commercial programs is in the many tens of thousands. Businesses,<br />

schools, and individuals buy IBM or compatible<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s because of these huge software resources.<br />

Overall-with apologies to the Mac people for pointing<br />

out what is, alas, true-the most important work is done on<br />

IBM and compatible machines. The reason is simple (and one<br />

which Apple keeps trying unsuccessfully to overcome): There<br />

are so many more business-oriented programs av<strong>ai</strong>lable for<br />

IBM personal <strong>computer</strong>s and clones that a large corporation<br />

doesn't hesitate as to which personal <strong>computer</strong> to buy in<br />

quantities.<br />

As Ross Greenberg pointed out in Chapter 5, a corporation<br />

the size of General Electric, for example, might have a network<br />

of 40,000 PCs or more. This same propensity for choosing IBM<br />

compatibles applies to the majority of companies, institutions,<br />

95


Chapter 8<br />

and individuals who do serious work on a personal <strong>computer</strong>.<br />

Cr<strong>ai</strong>g Zarley, Feature Editor for PC Week wrote (April 26,<br />

1988 issue, page 41): "PCs are the biggest capital asset at many<br />

companies."<br />

John Markoff, writing in The New York Times' "Business<br />

Day" (March 18, 1988, page 1) says " ... Companies will have<br />

to monitor the software on personal <strong>computer</strong>s used in the<br />

workplace."<br />

Those of us who make a living with our <strong>computer</strong>s have a<br />

big enough problem-our data integrity is exceptionally important.<br />

Companies, corporations, universities, and all the rest<br />

who use networks of personal <strong>computer</strong>s have a problem that<strong>'s</strong><br />

directly proportional to the number of machines they have<br />

linked together. Each and every machine is a potential source<br />

of infection for the whole network!<br />

Those who might only use their PC for fun must also<br />

worry about <strong>viruses</strong> and the liability you incur. If you pass<br />

along a virus to someone else, even though it was inadvertent,<br />

you may wind up in court. In fact, one of the first cases of this<br />

type was filed with the United States District Court, District of<br />

New Mexico on August 12, 1988 at 10:34 a.m. The pl<strong>ai</strong>ntiff is<br />

a <strong>computer</strong> bulletin board operator who contends that a Trojan<br />

horse program named BBSMON.COM was uploaded to his<br />

board by the individual who the suit is ag<strong>ai</strong>nst.<br />

The lawsuit was authorized ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the defendant "pursuant<br />

to 18 U.S.c. sec. 2707 and providing for injunctive relief<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst unlawful access to stored electronic communications."<br />

For interested attorneys, jurisdiction was invoked "pursuant<br />

to 28 U.S.c., sec. 1331,28 U.S.c., sec. 2001, 28 U.S.c., sec.<br />

2202. This action is instituted pursuant to 18 U.S.c., sec.<br />

2707." The initials U.S.c. stand for United States Code, the<br />

body of Federal laws.<br />

In other words, IBM personal <strong>computer</strong>s and the hundreds<br />

of compatible brands present an exceptionally large, slowmoving<br />

target. Concocters of <strong>viruses</strong> simply can't miss.<br />

Whether you're an individual end user or involved with a<br />

larger network of personal <strong>computer</strong>s, the virus-makers have<br />

p<strong>ai</strong>nted a big bull<strong>'s</strong>-eye on your back. It<strong>'s</strong> not f<strong>ai</strong>r, but IBM and<br />

clones comprise the major virus battleground right now.<br />

96


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

The millions of PCs already in use are like a great fertile<br />

pl<strong>ai</strong>n to <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>-much like Fertile Crescent that<br />

gave rise to the world<strong>'s</strong> first great civilizations: the Sumerians,<br />

Ur, Babylonian, the Caldeans, the Medes, and Persians. Like<br />

they learned the hard way, it<strong>'s</strong> time to start putting walls<br />

around the villages.<br />

This does not mean to lock everyone out. In ancient days,<br />

doing so would have stifled trade. In today<strong>'s</strong> Information Age,<br />

not being able to telecommunicate is stagnation and a foolish<br />

self-immobilization. So, like the Sumerians put gates in their<br />

village walls-letting the villages grow to cities through tradewe<br />

need to do the same thing.<br />

In blunt words, if you have an IBM or compatible personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong>, you need virus protection and detection. Not<br />

having this opens yourself to losing valuable data and to being<br />

legally liable for unwittingly spreading <strong>viruses</strong> to others.<br />

The rem<strong>ai</strong>nder of this chapter gives a brief overview of a<br />

number of commercial, public dom<strong>ai</strong>n, and shareware programs.<br />

This information will help you determine what programs<br />

are av<strong>ai</strong>lable and choose the best type of protection and<br />

detection for your IBM or compatible.<br />

Note: Shareware and public dom<strong>ai</strong>n products are av<strong>ai</strong>lable<br />

from the <strong>computer</strong> networks such as Delphi and CompuServe,<br />

and from many local boards. To insure you get an uncontaminated<br />

product (infected virus detection software is obviously<br />

less than reliable), it<strong>'s</strong> best to download the program from a<br />

<strong>computer</strong> network where you can be sure the program has been<br />

checked, or from the program author<strong>'s</strong> personal board. For example,<br />

Ross Greenberg m<strong>ai</strong>nt<strong>ai</strong>ns a BBS in his office on which<br />

the latest clean version of Flu_Shot + is av<strong>ai</strong>lable. So does<br />

Chuck Gilmore, author of Ficheck.<br />

Shareware, by the way, means you can obt<strong>ai</strong>n and try the<br />

program, and register it only if you decide it<strong>'s</strong> of benefit on<br />

your system. This is an honor system-if you don't register,<br />

you are expected to stop using the product.<br />

97


Chapter 8<br />

Bombsqad<br />

Product BOMBSQAD.COM 1.3 (Bomb Squad)<br />

CHK4BOMB (Check/or Bomb)<br />

Company Andy Hopkins<br />

26 Walnut Lane<br />

Swarthmore, PA 19081<br />

Type Freeware<br />

Av<strong>ai</strong>lable in IBMSW on CompuServe<br />

These two programs have been around for several years,<br />

coming about originally to fight Trojans, bombs, and worms.<br />

They are almost classics, and the price is cert<strong>ai</strong>nly right.<br />

Bomb Squad (BOMBSQAD.COM), says Andy Hopkins, is<br />

not a game. It<strong>'s</strong> a further attempt to prevent pranksters from<br />

destroying your data. The proliferation of the Trojan Horse<br />

type programs that purport to be games (but actually plant<br />

bombs in your system that format your hard disk or erase the<br />

disk directory) has prompted the writing of this program as<br />

well as CHK4BOMB.EXE, Check for Bomb.<br />

CHK4BOMB.EXE reads the program file from disk and<br />

attempts to spot dangerous code and suspicious messages, but<br />

since code is often a function of runtime memory situations, it<br />

could miss spotting the bombs. BOMBSQAD.COM is a program<br />

that intercepts calls to the BIOS code in ROM as a suspicious<br />

program is run, displays what is going to happen during<br />

the call, and asks if you want to continue. You can abort or<br />

continue as you see fit.<br />

"In the spirit of cooperation with fellow PC users and hoping<br />

to discourage those whose idea of a joke is destroying other<br />

people<strong>'s</strong> valuable data," writes Andy, "I encourage you to make<br />

copies of this program and documentation and give it to anyone<br />

who may be susceptible to these pranksters. Users who frequently<br />

download BBS programs of unknown origin may find<br />

BOMBSQAD particularly useful. Complete rights to the program<br />

itself, and the routines used in the program, however, rem<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

with the author, Andy Hopkins, through Swarthmore<br />

Software Systems."<br />

98


C-4<br />

Product<br />

Company<br />

Type<br />

C-4 Antiviral Shield<br />

InterPath<br />

4423 Cheeney Street<br />

Santa Clara, CA 95054<br />

(408) 988-3832<br />

Commercial<br />

$39.95<br />

IBM pes and Compatibles<br />

Its manufacturer describes C-4 as running permanently in<br />

the background of your system. It monitors all system activity,<br />

including program loads, BIOS calls, interrupt requests and accesses<br />

to system and application files. The monitor checks for<br />

characteristic viral replication activity-such as attempts to<br />

write to executable programs or DOS system files; access to a<br />

disk<strong>'s</strong> boot sector; attempted modification of COMMAND.COM<br />

and other techniques that <strong>viruses</strong> typically use to reproduce<br />

themselves. C-4 also checks for activities that indicate a virus is<br />

active and attempting to destroy or corrupt the system. These<br />

activities include access to the system<strong>'s</strong> file allocation table,<br />

low-level formats, and other low-level disk access requests.<br />

If a virus does enter your system, C-4 will identify the virus<br />

and prevent it from infecting any existing programs on<br />

your disks. It will freeze the virus and display a warning window,<br />

identifying the name of the offending program and the<br />

name of the file or disk area where it was attempting to replicate<br />

itself Likewise, if your system was infected prior to<br />

installing C-4 and an existing virus attempts to activate, it will<br />

be frozen before it can cause harm, and you will be notified.<br />

Steve Gibson, writing in his "Tech Talk" column in<br />

Info World (May 9, 1988) calls C-4 one of "The two most effective<br />

virus detection monitors av<strong>ai</strong>lable ... " (For the other one,<br />

see the description of Flu_Shot + below).<br />

99


Chapter 8<br />

Caware<br />

Product Caware<br />

Company Chuck Gilmore<br />

Gilmore Systems<br />

P.O. Box 3831<br />

Beverly Hills, CA 90212-0831<br />

Voice: (213) 275-8006 BBS: (213) 276-5263<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$10 registration fee<br />

Gilmore Systems offers a way in which you can allow your<br />

compiled Turbo C programs to check themselves for changes in<br />

their CRC or file size, thus detecting if a virus has modified<br />

them. Viruses have become a problem-altering *.EXE and<br />

*.COM files these days. Not just <strong>viruses</strong>, but hackers also modify<br />

shareware programs because they don't like looking at the<br />

openmg screens.<br />

If you're a programmer using Turbo C, you now have a<br />

means of protection. You can make your programs aware of<br />

their own CRC and file size-the two most likely things to<br />

change in the event of a virus or hacker attack. aWARE.ARC,<br />

the archived file in which this system is distributed (av<strong>ai</strong>lable<br />

in CompuServe IBMSW and elsewhere) cont<strong>ai</strong>ns a READ. ME<br />

file, MAKAWARE.EXE (EXE initializer), EXAMPLE.C (sample<br />

source for using the checker), and six OBJs-one for each<br />

memory model you can link with your programs to offer you<br />

(or your program) security. This code offers protection that no<br />

external programs can offer.<br />

"At least now," s<strong>ai</strong>d Chuck Gilmore, "nobody can accuse<br />

your program of cont<strong>ai</strong>ning a virus. Although nothing<strong>'s</strong> perfect,<br />

I'm sure some hacker will come up with a way of defeating this<br />

code manually, but it would be extremely difficult for a virus<br />

to alter or defeat this code."<br />

As with all shareware, try it first. If you like it, send<br />

Gilmore Systems $10. In return for your $10, they will send<br />

you the source code. You'll receive:<br />

EXEAWARE.C-source code needed to reproduce the<br />

EXEAWAR?OBJ files.<br />

MAKAWARE.C-source code needed to reproduce the<br />

MAKAWARE.EXE file.<br />

100


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

If you register for $15 instead of $10, you get six months<br />

of full access to Gilmore<strong>'s</strong> "Virus Info" BBS in addition to the<br />

source code (see the review ofFICHECK for more information<br />

on the BBS; it<strong>'s</strong> worthwhile). The "Virus Info" BBS deals<br />

strictly with the topic of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>. You can download<br />

text, source, and programs all pert<strong>ai</strong>ning to <strong>computer</strong> virus<br />

prevention and detection. This is a great way to keep informed<br />

of the latest <strong>viruses</strong> going around.<br />

Checkup<br />

Product Checkup<br />

Company Richard B. Levin<br />

BBSoft<br />

9405 Bustleton Ave.<br />

P.O. Box 14546<br />

Philadelphia, PA 19115<br />

Lab: (215) 333-6922<br />

BBS: (215) 333-6923<br />

BBS: (215) 635-5226<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$5 registration fee<br />

Checkup is one of several excellent shareware answers to<br />

viral protection. Author Richard B. Levin describes the software<strong>'s</strong><br />

operation as being able to detect viral infections by<br />

comparing a target file<strong>'s</strong> size, its incremental checksum, and its<br />

total checksum to previously stored baseline values. The program<br />

breaks the target filespec down to a series of randomly<br />

sized blocks of data. These data blocks may vary from one byte<br />

to near total file size. If the size of the file being checked is less<br />

than the block size selected, Checkup revises the block size<br />

downward. Checkup<strong>'s</strong> dynamic block size allocation allows files<br />

as small as one byte to be accurately checked.<br />

Checkup scans and compares every byte of the target<br />

filespec on a block-by-block basis. If the recorded file size, any<br />

of the block checksum comparisons, or the checksum totals<br />

don't match, Checkup alerts the user that the target file has<br />

been altered and possibly infected.<br />

Checkup<strong>'s</strong> incremental file checksum technique is preferable<br />

to simply adding the bytes in a file and comparing past<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

and present checksum totals. Future <strong>viruses</strong> may be intelligent<br />

enough to calculate a host file<strong>'s</strong> checksum total, pad their own<br />

code with dummy characters to m<strong>ai</strong>nt<strong>ai</strong>n total checksum integrity,<br />

and then infect. Such <strong>viruses</strong>, says Levin, would defeat<br />

other checksum calculation programs, but not Checkup.<br />

"We believe it is impossible for a virus to m<strong>ai</strong>nt<strong>ai</strong>n an accurate<br />

intra-block checksum. This is especially true when the<br />

checked block size varies from one byte to near the total file<br />

size; the method for calculating the checksum is unknown, and<br />

the results are encrypted."<br />

To survive Checkup<strong>'s</strong> scrutiny, a virus would need to<br />

know the block size, exact calculation entry point, checksum<br />

calculation algorithm, and the encryption key Checkup used on<br />

the target filespec at initialization. The encroaching virus would<br />

then have the difficult (if not impossible) task of padding its<br />

own code with dummy characters, since the adjustments would<br />

have to occur every few hundred bytes. If a super-virus were<br />

able to achieve this high degree of adaptability, it would still be<br />

unable to operate in an internally scrambled condition.<br />

The latest version of Checkup is av<strong>ai</strong>lable for downloading<br />

on the BBSoft Support BBSs. Support is also av<strong>ai</strong>lable through<br />

the BBSoft Lab. Please leave a message on the answering machine<br />

if your call is not answered personally. Long distance<br />

calls will be returned after 6:00 p.m. EST, collect.<br />

Condom<br />

Product Condom (FCBIN.PAS version l.OI-June 1, 1988)<br />

Company Jim Murphy<br />

CompuServe ID 74030,2643<br />

Type Public Dom<strong>ai</strong>n Freeware<br />

Dr. C. Everett Koop, the Su:geon General of the United<br />

States addresses the problem of AIDS: "The only protection<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the virus, short of total abstinence is the use of a<br />

condom."<br />

Jim Murphy applies this same philosophy to his antiviral<br />

program, which he generously placed in the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n.<br />

The program is distributed as a file named CONDOM.ARC,<br />

and is av<strong>ai</strong>lable in such places as Chuck Gilmore<strong>'s</strong> Virus Info<br />

Palladium <strong>computer</strong> bulletin board (see the review of Ficheck<br />

102


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

for the telephone number}. It includes the Turbo Pascal source<br />

code so you can see exactly what you're getting and recompile<br />

it if you want to be absolutely cert<strong>ai</strong>n it<strong>'s</strong> clean.<br />

"I first became aware of the existence of the software virus<br />

in magazine articles," Jim says in his documentation, "and I<br />

wondered what I could do to protect my <strong>computer</strong> from their<br />

insidious attack. The prime target was usually reported to be<br />

COMMAND.COM, although just about any program could be<br />

its target.<br />

"I reasoned that if I could compare COMMAND. COM<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst a known healthy copy, I could be sure that at least it had<br />

not been contaminated. I figured I would use FCEXE (file compare)<br />

that came with MS-DOS, in my AUTOEXECBAT file to<br />

check COMMAND.COM each time I booted up, and if there<br />

was a difference, flag it so I could replace COMMAND. COM<br />

before any damage was done.<br />

"Let me regress for a minute. The demented individuals<br />

who write these <strong>viruses</strong> want to make sure it gets spread around,<br />

so they design them to work a few days, or a few boot ups after<br />

the virus installs itself. It is done this way to insure that the virus<br />

will be spread by formatting other disks, or looking at a<br />

directory in another drive that cont<strong>ai</strong>ns the program the virus<br />

installs itself in (usually COMMAND.COM). This being the<br />

ca'le, you can most likely catch it when you boot up the <strong>computer</strong><br />

for the next session. If it did its dirty work immediately, I<br />

would call it a Trojan horse problem, and that requires different<br />

techniques, although you could use some of those protection<br />

methods along with the one I am describing to get close to 100<br />

percent protection.<br />

"I wanted the boot up to be automatic, stopping only if<br />

COMMAND.COM was changed. Using FCEXE would not<br />

work as it doesn't send an errorlevel code after it terminates, so<br />

I decided to write my own File Compare utility that would output<br />

an errorlevel code. I wanted it to be fast, and it would not<br />

have to show every byte that was different, just tell me that the<br />

two files were not identical. I could use FCEXE later to get a<br />

complete report of the differences.<br />

"I called my program FCBIN.EXE (File Compare Binary);<br />

it is written in Turbo Pascal version 4.0 and it will compare any<br />

103


Chapter 8<br />

file, reporting all the general differences, such as Date and<br />

Length, and that the bytes did not compare. It also tells you at<br />

which byte the first difference occurred.<br />

"I decided to check all my files in the root directory as<br />

well by creating a subdirectory called ZROOT in which were<br />

placed uncontaminated copies of all the files in the root directory.<br />

The file copies were renamed for additional safety;<br />

COMMAND.COM is called CMD.BAK; CONFIG.SYS is<br />

called CFG.BAK, and so on.<br />

Cop<br />

Product Cop (Command Obfuscation Processor)<br />

Company Jack A. Orman<br />

Box 858<br />

Southaven, MS 38671<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$15 registration fee<br />

This program is used to encode a .COM program to make<br />

the data or programming techniques indecipherable. It will<br />

make hacking or modification of the program that much more<br />

difficult. This is not, the author points out, a surefire, guaranteed<br />

safeguard system, but is merely to keep the average programmer<br />

from tinkering with your code.<br />

"It is not foolproof," Jack Orman s<strong>ai</strong>d, "and I'm sure that<br />

an expert programmer can break the system easily."<br />

Note: Only use COP. COM on copies of your programs,<br />

not the originals!<br />

To encode a .COM program, type in the following:<br />

COP [d:]filename code-phrase <br />

Cop will read the program and by using the code-phrase,<br />

write a modified version back to the disk. The modified version<br />

is encoded and makes disassembling of the code quite<br />

difficult. Note that Cop writes over the original version of the<br />

file that<strong>'s</strong> being processed. The Cop modified program will still<br />

run from the DOS prompt and perform just as the original.<br />

104


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

Cop is av<strong>ai</strong>lable on a number of bulletin boards and the<br />

national networks. The Writers Group on Delphi has Cop and<br />

several of Jack Orman<strong>'s</strong> other excellent shareware programs<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable for downloading. There is no charge for this service<br />

other than normal Delphi connect time.<br />

Data Physician<br />

Product Data Physician Software Protection System, including<br />

VirAlert<br />

Company Digital Dispatch, Inc.<br />

55 Lakeland Shores<br />

St. Paul, MN 55043<br />

(800) 221-8091<br />

(612) 436-1000 (in Minnesota)<br />

Type Commercial<br />

$199<br />

Data Physician is a set of programs designed to help protect<br />

your PC-DOS or MS-DOS <strong>computer</strong> system from software<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> and logic bombs. The programs consist of the following:<br />

Datamd. This is the m<strong>ai</strong>n virus protection, detection, and<br />

removal program. It allows you to detect whether an unauthorized<br />

change has occurred in any file or system area on<br />

your disk, and also allows the removal of cert<strong>ai</strong>n types of<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

Padlock. Along with Disklock provides an intelligent disk<br />

write-protect function. They intercept attempted writes to disk<br />

that a virus may use as it infects or attacks your system. They<br />

also provide protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst logic bombs that don't spread<br />

on their own, but can attack in much the same manner as a<br />

virus.<br />

Novirus works with the data created by Datamd and runs<br />

virus detection in background mode while you perform other<br />

tasks on your system. This can be helpful if you have many<br />

files to watch over, or if you want continuous security<br />

monitoring.<br />

Antigen. Allows virus protection to be installed directly on<br />

any executable program. Each time a protected program is run,<br />

it checks itself for tampering and is capable of removing cert<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

types of <strong>viruses</strong> on its own. Antigen is useful when it<strong>'s</strong> not<br />

practical to have Datamd or Novirus in operation, or where the<br />

protected program needs to be widely distributed and you want<br />

it to continue to be protected.<br />

Viralert is a program (actually a device driver) that runs<br />

continually in the background to intercept changes to executable<br />

and operating system files (.EXE, .COM, and .SYS).<br />

VirAlert also watches for changes to the boot record, and any<br />

disk formatting attempts.<br />

Data Physician is a powerful, well-thought-out system with<br />

a lot of tools. The documentation is above average.<br />

Disk Defender<br />

Product Disk Defender<br />

Company Director Technologies, Inc.<br />

906 University Place<br />

Evanston, IL 60201<br />

(312) 491-2334<br />

Type Commercial (hardware)<br />

U.S. Patent #4,734,851<br />

$240<br />

"In the war on <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>, while everyone else is<br />

trying to perfect the bow and arrow, Director Technologies is<br />

manufacturing a tank! It<strong>'s</strong> called Disk Defender."<br />

As we discussed early in this book, the MS-DOS system of<br />

file management is very vulnerable. Viruses succeed, in most<br />

cases, simply because hard disks and floppies are wide open to<br />

infiltration and destruction. The Disk Defender system of plug<br />

in card and external control box rectifies this design deficiency<br />

of all IBM and compatible <strong>computer</strong>s.<br />

Dennis Director, president of the company, points out that<br />

Disk Defender operates independently of any software, and cannot<br />

be circumvented by any software. It can be used with multiple<br />

operating systems on one disk, and will work regardless of<br />

networking configurations. Disconnect the control box and the<br />

zone protect is locked in for maximum data safety.<br />

Disk Defender automatically write-protects all or part of<br />

any fixed Winchester disk having an ST-506j412 standard<br />

interface. It does not affect the use of the second hard disk on<br />

106


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

two drive systems, but allows reading at all times.<br />

Activation is by an external control box, which can be<br />

placed anywhere up to five feet from the <strong>computer</strong> system. The<br />

operator activates protection by placing the switch on the face<br />

of the control box in the desired protection mode. Three status<br />

lights keep the operator advised on disk access, reading, and<br />

writing functions.<br />

The external control box can easily be removed if it<strong>'s</strong> preferred<br />

that the operator not have access to the protected portion<br />

of the disk. Without the control box in place, the unit is in<br />

the Zone protect mode at all times, and no one can get access<br />

to the protected portion of the disk.<br />

"Software cures," Dennis Director s<strong>ai</strong>d, speaking of the virus<br />

problem, "are not the answer. The destructive virus, itself,<br />

is a piece of software. Of course, software can be developed to<br />

neutralize a particular virus, but it will not stop other <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

The creator of that virus has but to change one small part of<br />

the code for that virus to easily thwart the original software<br />

'cure.'"<br />

Hardware, he points out, affords 100 percent protection<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst all <strong>viruses</strong> because the PC needs a device that makes it<br />

impossible for write signals to reach the hard disk and corrupt<br />

its stored programs. Disk Defender is such a device, and lets<br />

you select all or a portion of the hard disk as a protected zone.<br />

The programs and data files to be protected are placed in this<br />

protected zone of the hard disk.<br />

Mr. Director s<strong>ai</strong>d that IBM had even bought several of his<br />

units to protect its own large software library. Director Technologies<br />

is also working on a similar device for the Apple Macintosh<br />

series of <strong>computer</strong>s.<br />

The company also publishes the Computer Virology newsletter,<br />

which is offered free. Contact the above address for more<br />

information.<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

Disk Watcher<br />

Product<br />

Company<br />

Type<br />

Disk Watcher<br />

Raymond M. Glath<br />

RG Software Systems<br />

2300 Computer Avenue<br />

Willow Grove, PA 19090<br />

(215) 659-5300<br />

Commercial<br />

$99.95<br />

Disk Watcher is more than just another viral protection<br />

program, it<strong>'s</strong> also disaster prevention software.<br />

First, of course, it provides multiple lines of defense<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>. Here<strong>'s</strong> how the system of programs included in<br />

the Disk Watcher package handles viral protection.<br />

The first program automatically checks all active disk<br />

drives and the <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> RAM for the presence of cert<strong>ai</strong>n hidden<br />

virus characteristics when the <strong>computer</strong> is started. This<br />

program can also be run on demand at any time to check the<br />

disk in a specific drive.<br />

Disk Watcher, itself, is a TSR program that when installed,<br />

monitors ongoing disk activity throughout all processing with a<br />

series of proprietary algorithms that detect the behavior<br />

characteristics of a myriad of virus programs. Depsite this, the<br />

product uses minimal overhead in processing time and false<br />

alarm reports.<br />

Disk Watcher has the unique ability to differentiate between<br />

legitimate I/O activity and the I/O activity of a virus<br />

program. When an action occurs indicative of a virus attempting<br />

to reproduce itself, alter another program, set itself up to be<br />

automatically run the next time the system is started, or attempting<br />

to preform a massively damaging act, Disk Watcher will<br />

pop up. You will then have several options, one of which is to<br />

immediately stop the <strong>computer</strong> before any damage can be done.<br />

Whenever the "Stop the <strong>computer</strong>" option is selected, both<br />

the application program screen image and Disk Watcher<strong>'s</strong><br />

screen image will be automatically set to the system printer<br />

before the machine is stopped. This helps in performing an<br />

effective analysis of the problem.<br />

108


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

Disk Watcher also protects ag<strong>ai</strong>nst cert<strong>ai</strong>n other mishaps<br />

such as accidentally or carelessly losing valuable data, or just<br />

time and paper wasting actions such as unintentionally hitting<br />

Shift-PrtSc.<br />

The program also protests ag<strong>ai</strong>nst a full disk error message,<br />

accidental format of a hard disk, the printer not being ready,<br />

and the system date and time not being set (or the battery in<br />

the clock expiring). Numerous file and disk management tasks<br />

are also added, all for an expenditure of about 40K of RAM<br />

(the program is a TSR). Disk Watcher works on IBM PCs,<br />

ATs, PS/2s, and compatibles.<br />

It is also a very well-behaved program, being able to coexist<br />

with a variety of other TSRs without causing lockups (a<br />

condition not true of products tested from several other<br />

companies). Disk Watcher is a viral protection system (and<br />

more) that you should take a serious look at.<br />

Dr. Panda<br />

Product Dr. Panda Utilities<br />

Company Pam Kane<br />

Panda Systems<br />

801 Wilson Road<br />

Wilmington, DE 19803<br />

(302) 764-4722<br />

Type Commercial<br />

$79.95<br />

Panda Systems and their virus-fighting software offer the<br />

viral detection and protection package described below. Their<br />

system is one of the highest rated for effectiveness.<br />

The Dr. Panda Utilities detect virus, worm and Trojan<br />

horse programs. Dr. Panda is a three-part software approach<br />

that should be used in conjunction with sound management<br />

practices.<br />

Physical, the virus detection utility, compares essential system<br />

files and user selected files ag<strong>ai</strong>nst an unique installation<br />

record. The system status is reported onscreen each time Physical<br />

is run. If a file has been changed, the filename is displayed<br />

onscreen. Any change in a system file, *.SYS, *.COM, *.EXE,<br />

*.OVL or other program file may indicate a virus. Physical also<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

reports the name and location of all hidden files on a disk at<br />

each operation.<br />

Labtest displays the hidden ASCII strings of a selected file<br />

after reporting warning messages for calls bypassing DOS.<br />

Through the function key interface, the user may scroll through<br />

the file onscreen, perform basic editing functions, and direct<br />

output to a file or printer. Help screens assist in identifying and<br />

analyzing potentially destructive code.<br />

Monitor automatically intercepts disk operation calls that<br />

request a format of any drive or writes to the File Allocation<br />

Table of C: (or the first designated hard drive). The user may<br />

also select additional disk operations for checking (Read, Write,<br />

Verify) at installation. Control of a program passes to the keyboard<br />

at each interrupt with a Proceed/Bypass option. Monitor<br />

is particularly effective ag<strong>ai</strong>nst Trojan horse programs that destroy<br />

data immediately as part of their operation.<br />

The utilities provide a basic security system for PC/MS­<br />

DOS micro<strong>computer</strong>s. Viruses in <strong>computer</strong>s, as in their users,<br />

come from contact.<br />

Panda Systems recommends the following: Any system<br />

that ever accesses external data is at risk. To practice safe<br />

computing, never use an unknown program without checking it<br />

first. Using the Dr. Panda Utilities from the original Dr. Panda<br />

disk will check a PC<strong>'s</strong> files for any changes (destructive or benign)<br />

and allow evaluation of any file for potentially harmful<br />

operations. The responsibility for good computing practices depends<br />

upon <strong>computer</strong> users and managers. Panda Systems'<br />

consulting and technical staff are av<strong>ai</strong>lable to assist in troubleshooting<br />

advanced processes and development of security policies<br />

and procedures.<br />

110


Ficheck<br />

Product Ficheck 4.0<br />

Company Chuck Gilmore<br />

Gilmore Systems<br />

P.O. Box 3831<br />

Beverly Hills, CA 90212-0831<br />

IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

Voice: (213) 275-8006 BBS: (213) 276-5263<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$15 registration fee<br />

Ficheck is one of several effective shareware virus protection<br />

programs. Don't let their low price scare you off; some of<br />

these programs are worth far more than the low registration<br />

fees. This one, for example, is but a mere $15. Below is a<br />

description of how Ficheck works, as expl<strong>ai</strong>ned in the documentation<br />

that comes with version 4.0.<br />

There are some viral-fighting programs av<strong>ai</strong>lable such as<br />

Flu_Shot + , and versions of Vaccine. These programs attempt<br />

to block <strong>viruses</strong> from doing things that <strong>viruses</strong> typically do.<br />

They attempt to block any altering of COMMAND.COM or<br />

your other operating system<strong>'s</strong> system files. They try to alert you<br />

of low-level disk writing. These programs look for other things<br />

as well, but may slow your system down as a result. Some require<br />

you to make lists of approved programs and TSRs. The<br />

problem with these programs are that they're running on your<br />

system which may cont<strong>ai</strong>n a virus that looks for these particular<br />

programs and renders them inactive or makes them think<br />

everything<strong>'s</strong> okay while they do their dirty work.<br />

Ficheck is a program that differs from vaccine-type programs<br />

and other programs that attempt to find, block, or alert<br />

you to <strong>viruses</strong>. Ficheck does none of these things. As a matter<br />

of fact, Ficheck can't even be run from your fixed disk! Ficheck<br />

is a preventive medicine program that takes an "x-ray" of your<br />

entire fixed disk(s) and logs it to a file. Ficheck logs the date,<br />

time, size, attribute, and CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) of<br />

every file on your fixed disk(s). It looks for differences in all<br />

these things whenever you decide to run it ag<strong>ai</strong>n and alerts you<br />

to any changes. Any changes potentially mean a virus is at<br />

work. Viruses have to alter files in some way in order to spread<br />

themselves.<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

Ficheck should not be placed on your fixed disk-it will<br />

only run from a floppy, and furthermore, it won't even run<br />

from a floppy unless you boot DOS from a floppy.<br />

Why all the hassle of booting from and running from a<br />

floppy? It<strong>'s</strong> Simple.<br />

If you boot from a fixed disk, you may boot from an infected<br />

copy of your operating system, start an infected TSR,<br />

have an infected device driver, or run an infected program. If<br />

you boot from floppy, you don't give the <strong>viruses</strong> on your fixed<br />

disk a chance to become active. Therefore, the first thing you<br />

should do to prepare for using the Ficheck program is:<br />

l. Boot DOS from your original distribution disk.<br />

2. Format a bootable floppy (not the distribution disk); use the<br />

command FORMAT A:/S<br />

3. Copy FICHECK.EXE to the newly formatted disk.<br />

4. Diskcopy this new disk for as many fixed disk drives or logical<br />

drives you have on your system and label each one for a<br />

specific drive.<br />

Ficheck searches all me attributes. Once processing has<br />

started, Ficheck starts a timer and when processing finishes,<br />

Ficheck prints how long it ran. On <strong>computer</strong>s running at 4.77<br />

Mhz such as the original IBM XTs, Ficheck may take a while<br />

to complete its job. On <strong>computer</strong>s such as the IBM PS/2<br />

Model 80 running at 20 Mhz, Ficheck flies right through.<br />

Gilmore Systems has incorporated fast algorithms so Ficheck<br />

will run through your system as fast as possible.<br />

* * *<br />

In conjunction with the shareware and commercial products<br />

offered by Gilmore Systems, Chuck Gilmore also runs the<br />

VIP (Virus Info Palladium) <strong>computer</strong> bulletin board in Los Angeles<br />

(1-213 276-5263). You can call this board and download<br />

FICHECK4.ARC from the FREE area of the FILES menu. You<br />

can do this regardless of whether you're a registered user of the<br />

BBS or not.<br />

If you become a registered user of Ficheck, Gilmore Systems<br />

will automatically m<strong>ai</strong>l you the latest commercial version<br />

112


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

of Xficheck on disk. Xficheck is a copyrighted commercial program<br />

(nonshareware, non-public dom<strong>ai</strong>n) that<strong>'s</strong> offered to their<br />

registered users at no charge. Xficheck is distributed exclusively<br />

from the Virus Info Palladium BBS-no distribution to the<br />

public by other BBS systems or by any other means is allowed<br />

without the prior written permission of Gilmore Systems.<br />

If you've registered your Ficheck program with Gilmore<br />

Systems (remember, shareware authors have to eat, too), your<br />

access level will be upgraded within 72 hours of your first call.<br />

Until then, all you can really do is download anything in the<br />

[F]ree area of the [F]iles section. The other sections will not be<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable to you until your access level has been updated. Also<br />

note that the [M]essage section will not allow you to read or<br />

write messages (you can only scan) until upgrade has been<br />

implemented.<br />

If you don't have a copy of FICHECK., you can download<br />

FICHECK4.ARC from the Free area of the Files section.<br />

Instructions in the documentation expl<strong>ai</strong>n how to register. Also<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable in the Free area is a sample listing (SAMPLE.LST) of<br />

some of the antiviral and virus related text files, programs,<br />

source code, and other relevant files av<strong>ai</strong>lable to you for downloading<br />

once you've registered. You are allowed to download<br />

anything in the Free area-you don't need to be a registered<br />

user to download from that area.<br />

Both Ficheck and the VIP BBS are worth checking out.<br />

Chuck Gilmore and his Gilmore Systems have become one of<br />

the respected names in the ongoing fight ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>computer</strong><br />

<strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

Flu-Shot+<br />

Product Flu_Shot+ 1.4<br />

Company Ross M. Greenberg<br />

Software Concepts Design<br />

594 Third Avenue<br />

New York, New York 10016<br />

BBS: (212)-889-6438 1200, 2400, N/8/1<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$10 registration fee<br />

The original Flu_Shot, one of the first virus protection<br />

programs, now has a new name: Flu_Shot + . Some "worm"<br />

(as Ross Greenberg so aptly calls them) put out a program<br />

called FLUSHOT4 which was a Trojan. Greenberg opted to<br />

change the name.<br />

"Besides," Greenberg s<strong>ai</strong>d, "Flu_Shot+ is the result of<br />

some real effort on my part, instead of being a part-time quick<br />

hack. I hope the effort shows."<br />

Flu_Shot is now table driven. That table is in a file named<br />

FLUSHOT.DAT. It exists in the root directory on your C:<br />

drive. However, you can change its location to one of your<br />

choice so a worm can't create a Trojan to modify that file.<br />

This data file allows you to write- andlor read-protect entire<br />

classes of programs. This means you can write-protect from<br />

damage all of your *.COM, *.EXE, *.BAT, and *.SYS files.<br />

You can read-protect all your *.BAT files so a nasty program<br />

can't even determine what name you used for Flu_Shot+<br />

when you invoked it.<br />

Additionally, you can now automatically check programs<br />

when you first invoke Flu_Shot+ to determine if they've<br />

changed since you last looked at them. Called checksumming,<br />

it allows you to know immediately if one of the protected programs<br />

has been changed when you're not looking. Additionally,<br />

this checksumming can even take place each time you load the<br />

program for execution.<br />

Also, Flu_Shot+ will advise you when any program "goes<br />

TSR." TSR stands for Terminate and Stay Resident, allowing<br />

pop-ups and other useful programs to be created. A worm<br />

could create a program that leaves a bit of slime behind. Pro-<br />

114


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

grams like Borland<strong>'s</strong> SideKick, a wonderful program and cert<strong>ai</strong>nly<br />

not a Trojan or virus, is probably the best known TSR.<br />

Flu_Shot+ will advise you if any program you haven't already<br />

registered in your FLUSHOT.DAT file attempts to go TSR.<br />

Finally, Flu_Shot+ will also now pop up a small window<br />

in the middle of your screen when it gets triggered. It also will<br />

more fully expl<strong>ai</strong>n why it was triggered. The pop-up window<br />

means your screen won't get changed beyond recognition-unless<br />

you're in graphics mode when it pops up; this is a problem<br />

common to many TSR programs.<br />

Steve Gibson, writing in his "Tech Talk" column in<br />

Info World (May 9, 1988) calls Flu_Shot+ one of "The two<br />

most effective virus detection monitors av<strong>ai</strong>lable ... "<br />

The right to use Flu_Shot + ," Ross s<strong>ai</strong>d, in expl<strong>ai</strong>ning the<br />

shareware concept under which his viral-protection product is<br />

marketed, "is contingent upon your paying for the right to use<br />

it. I ask for ten dollars as a registration fee. This entitles you to<br />

get the next update shipped to you when av<strong>ai</strong>lable. And it allows<br />

you to pay me, in part, for my labor in creating the entire<br />

FllLShot series. I don't expect to get my normal consulting<br />

rate or to get a return equal to that of other programs which<br />

I've developed and sell through more traditional channels.<br />

That<strong>'s</strong> not my intent, or I would have made Flu_Shot+ a<br />

commercial program and you'd be paying lots more money for<br />

it.<br />

"Some people are uncomfortable with the shareware concept,<br />

or believe there<strong>'s</strong> no such thing as Trojan or Virus programs,<br />

and that a person who profits from the distribution of a<br />

program such as Flu_Shot must be in it for the money. I've<br />

created an alternative for these folks. I'll call it 'charityware.'<br />

You can also register Flu_Shot+ by sending me a check for<br />

$10 made out to your favorite charity. Be sure to include a<br />

stamped and addressed envelope. I'll forward the money on to<br />

them and register you fully."<br />

115


Chapter 8<br />

Guard Card<br />

Product Guard Card<br />

Company NorthBank Corporation<br />

10811 NorthBank Road<br />

Richmond, VA 23333<br />

(804) 741-7591<br />

Type Commercial (hardware)<br />

$194<br />

NorthBank takes a hardware approach to viral protection.<br />

Their Guard Card is a plug-in board that provides "true hardware-based<br />

write protection for your hard disk! It n<strong>ai</strong>ls <strong>viruses</strong><br />

and Trojans (and warts!) dead in their tracks."<br />

The Guard Card prevents accidental erasures and formats<br />

when persons share a PC, such as in a networked system. It<br />

also protects turnkey user libraries from user error. The card<br />

supports one or two drives. One drive can be area-protected<br />

(Requires partitioning. Works with any ST -506 controller). A<br />

system reset button is included.<br />

Ice<br />

Product ICE.COM (Intrusion Countermeasure Electronics<br />

COM File<br />

Security)<br />

Company Keith P. Graham<br />

c/o PC-Rockland BBS (914) 353-2157<br />

Type Freeware<br />

Av<strong>ai</strong>lable in IBMSW on CompuServe<br />

Ice is a program that scrambles and compresses .COM files<br />

(not .EXE files) yet allows them to be fully functional. The program<br />

makes it difficult to alter the original program and it has<br />

the added bonus of compressing .COM files without detracting<br />

from their usefulness. Iced .COM files still run as they did<br />

before except they're usually smaller and disk load times are<br />

shorter. Ice offers protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong> in that Ice can<br />

scramble COMMAND. COM and make it difficult for <strong>viruses</strong><br />

to attach themselves to the scramble program.<br />

116


The format of the Ice command:<br />

ICE FILE.COM encryption-key<br />

IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

FILE is the name of a .COM file to Ice and encryption key<br />

is a string of numbers and/or letters that will help make your<br />

scramble unique.<br />

Ice will compress and scramble the .COM file and replace<br />

the original. It<strong>'s</strong> important to have a backup of the original<br />

.COM file in case Ice doesn't work properly on a particular file.<br />

"I have written," says Keith Graham, "an Ice Breaker for<br />

Iced programs and I am sure that any good hacker could also<br />

figure it out after awhile. No software resource can be protected<br />

entirely by software. I can only guarantee that Ice makes .COM<br />

files safer, not 100 percent safe."<br />

Ice is distributed as freeware but rem<strong>ai</strong>ns the property of<br />

Keith P. Graham and is not for sale, but you are allowed to<br />

share it with your friends as long as no fee is associated with<br />

the copying of Ice or distribution of Ice other than nominal<br />

disk copy or access charges.<br />

IFCRC<br />

Product IFCRC<br />

Company David Bennett<br />

Bennett Software Solutions<br />

151 West Geospace Drive<br />

Independence, MO 64056.<br />

CompuServe ID: 74635,1671<br />

Type Freeware<br />

Av<strong>ai</strong>lable in IBMSW on CompuServe<br />

This program (compiled using Borland<strong>'s</strong> Turbo Pascal 4.0<br />

compiler) is for use in a batch file. It allows you to execute<br />

commands based on whether or not a cert<strong>ai</strong>n file matches the<br />

given CRC value. The program can also be used to check the<br />

CRC value of a file (CRC stands for Cyclic Redundancy<br />

Check).<br />

"Although I primarily wrote this program to execute a cert<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

command based on whether a file has been altered or<br />

not," writes David, "it could also be used to check a d<strong>ai</strong>ly<br />

117


Chapter 8<br />

transfer from a remote site or even used to check for <strong>computer</strong><br />

<strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"I hereby release this program to the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n (Guilt<br />

FreeWare!)."<br />

Mace Vaccine<br />

Product Mace Vaccine<br />

Company Paul Mace<br />

Paul Mace Software<br />

499 Williamson Way<br />

Ashland, OR 97520<br />

(503) 488-0224<br />

Type Commercial<br />

$20<br />

Paul Mace is an extremely respected name in the field of<br />

IBM and compatible software. The Mace Utilities (version 4.1,<br />

$99.00) is one of the leaders in hard disk format recovery and<br />

m<strong>ai</strong>ntenance. Their familiar ads featuring a Swiss Army knife<br />

appear in most major <strong>computer</strong> magazines. The Mace Vaccine<br />

antiviral package, just introduced as this book was being written,<br />

is currently being included free for purchasers of the Mace<br />

Utilities.<br />

Mace Vaccine, says the company, is designed to warn you<br />

when unusual attempts are made to access vital disk areas and<br />

system files, not just by a <strong>computer</strong> flu or virus, but by any<br />

application that has no business modifying these vital areas of<br />

your disk. You can also r<strong>ai</strong>se the protection level to prevent<br />

any unauthorized access outside of DOS. This will stop any of<br />

the current <strong>viruses</strong> "before it stops you."<br />

The unique feature that Mace Vaccine has over most other<br />

viral protection software is the option to increase or decrease<br />

levels of protection. Levell (the default) will write-protect the<br />

drive ag<strong>ai</strong>nst access to vital areas and system files. Your permission<br />

is required before any vital area or file can be<br />

modified.<br />

Level 2 provides all Level 1 protection of vital areas and<br />

files. Additionally, it write-protects the drive ag<strong>ai</strong>nst all attempts<br />

at direct access. Only normal DOS applications are<br />

permitted to write, unless you grant permission.<br />

118


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

Those things that aren't granted direct access include <strong>viruses</strong>,<br />

DOS format, CHKDSK/F and Debug, disk reorganizers<br />

such as Mace UnFrag, Disk Optimizer, Norton SpeedDisk, and<br />

disk sector editors such as Norton and PC Tools.<br />

You may also turn Mace Vaccine off. This does not remove<br />

it from memory; it simply turns off protection. You can<br />

use this feature (judiciously) when there<strong>'s</strong> a conflict with other<br />

software.<br />

Mace Vaccine is a resident program, and takes up approximately<br />

4,000 bytes (4K) of memory. It is most effective when<br />

placed first in your AUTOEXEC.BAT file. It<strong>'s</strong> a solid effort<br />

from a solid company.<br />

NoVirus<br />

Product Ni5Virus<br />

Company Matt Hill<br />

MLH Software Systems<br />

1007 Chelten Parkway<br />

Cherry Hill, NJ 08034<br />

(609) 795-5257<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$10 registration fee<br />

The earliest symptom of a virus, Matt Hill says in the<br />

documentation enclosed with Ni5Virus, is usually a change in<br />

the size of one or more of your system files. These are the files<br />

that most <strong>viruses</strong> will attack first.<br />

The authors of <strong>viruses</strong> are concerned with one thing<br />

only-the destruction of data, and the more the better! For this<br />

reason, <strong>viruses</strong> are generally planted into the system files because<br />

they're the only files copied and run enough to do any<br />

substantial amount of damage. When a system disk becomes<br />

infected, the modifications to the system files will almost always<br />

be manifested in a change of the size or one or more of<br />

these files.<br />

"Due to the fact that two out of these three files are invisible<br />

via the DIR command," Matt writes in expl<strong>ai</strong>ning his<br />

logic philosophy of virus protection, "I have developed a utility<br />

called Ni5Virus which monitors the sizes of these files<br />

automatically. "<br />

119


Chapter 8<br />

When properly installed, NoVirus automatically monitors<br />

the sizes of system files on any system disk you choose. Every<br />

time it encounters a new disk, it will determine the sizes of<br />

each of the individual system files on that disk and store these<br />

figures onto the disk itself in a hidden, write-protected file. The<br />

next time you run NoVirus on that disk, it will find its file and<br />

compare the stored sizes to the current sizes of the files. If the<br />

sizes are the same, it<strong>'s</strong> unlikely that the disk had become infected<br />

and NoVirus will quietly notify you of that fact. However,<br />

if NoVirus detects even the slightest change in the size of<br />

any of these files, it will give you adequate warning to that<br />

effect.<br />

To initialize N6Virus on your hard disk drive, simply copy<br />

the program onto the disk. Matt suggests placing it into a utility<br />

or system subdirectory to which you have a path set up.<br />

If you'd like to verify that your system files have actually<br />

been hooked or you are just curious to see what your system<br />

files are called, you may now obt<strong>ai</strong>n a formatted listing of all of<br />

the files that were identified as system files on your disk by<br />

entering:<br />

c: \>NOVIRUS /L<br />

N6Virus will then perform a size-check and provide a listing<br />

of the system files as per your request. Please note that<br />

N6Virus does not detect the presence of a virus. It merely<br />

watches out for changes in the sizes of your system files after<br />

the time of the initial installation which may have been caused<br />

by viral modification. Although it<strong>'s</strong> unlikely that your system is<br />

already infected, you may want to reinstall your operating system<br />

before using N6Virus for the first time.<br />

To be effective, N6Virus needs to be run often. Matt suggests<br />

placing it into your AUTOEXEC.BAT. This should be<br />

enough, unless you do a reasonable amount of downloading or<br />

have reason to believe that your system may have come into<br />

contact with an infected disk. In this case, you may want to<br />

manually invoke the program at the DOS prompt immediately<br />

after you think a change may have taken place. You may<br />

accomplish this by typing:<br />

C: \>NOVIRUS<br />

120


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

"A lot of time and hard work went into the planning and<br />

development of this product," writes Matt Hill, "and I'd like to<br />

think that my effort was not in v<strong>ai</strong>n. I have been using<br />

N6Virus for some time now and I feel that it<strong>'s</strong> something that I<br />

can trust. I sincerely hope that you will feel the same way after<br />

you've gotten to know the program. It is my goal that if enough<br />

people take preventive measures like these we can stop the<br />

spread of the horrible <strong>computer</strong> virus."<br />

SYSCHKl<br />

Product SYSCHKI<br />

Company Terratech<br />

19817 61st Ave. S.E.<br />

Snohomish, WA 98290<br />

Type Shareware<br />

donation requested<br />

SYSCHK1.ARC is the distributed file and cont<strong>ai</strong>ns<br />

SYSCHK.EXE and SYSCHK.DOC. The program performs<br />

checksums of the first and second files in the root directory<br />

and the COMSPEC file. These, of course, are usually the three<br />

most important system files. The first time the program is invoked,<br />

the checksums are displayed. You can then record those<br />

values. If the program is then run with the checksum for the<br />

file given as a parameter, it<strong>'s</strong> compared ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the current<br />

value. Error levels are set so a batch file can test the results. A<br />

simple (and not totally effective) approach.<br />

SoftSafe<br />

Product SoftSafe<br />

Company Software Directions, Inc.<br />

1572 Sussex Turnpike<br />

Randolph, NJ 07869<br />

(800) 346-7638<br />

Type Commercial<br />

$99<br />

SoftSafe provides more than just virus protection; it<strong>'s</strong> also<br />

a means of insuring data security for personal <strong>computer</strong>s. This<br />

includes preventing unauthorized viewing, copying, modifying,<br />

121


ChapterS<br />

or destruction of your valuable data, as well as offering powerful<br />

virus protection, according to the manufacturer, Software<br />

Directions, Inc. (who also makes the printer control program,<br />

PrintQ).<br />

"The primary objective in SoftSafe<strong>'s</strong> design is ease of use,"<br />

s<strong>ai</strong>d Geoffrey Wiener, president of SD.<br />

SoftSafe gives you password protection of your hard disk,<br />

allowing one "owner" to create up to seven authorized "users"<br />

for each Pc. The owner can also delete users or change any<br />

password, and users can change their own password at any<br />

time.<br />

Interruptions are no longer a problem when working with<br />

sensitive data. SoftSafe<strong>'s</strong> lockout feature allows you to hit a hot<br />

key sequence to cover the entire screen with the SoftSafe password<br />

display. Then, only your password unlocks the machine,<br />

protecting your data from unauthorized access. SoftSafe automatically<br />

encrypts data in designated subdirectories, so only the<br />

user who generated the file or the <strong>computer</strong> owner can access<br />

the files.<br />

Finally, of course, SoftSafe provides powerful virus protection<br />

for your Pc. Soft Safe m<strong>ai</strong>nt<strong>ai</strong>ns a protected copy of the<br />

critical system files and compares these to the working files<br />

each time you boot up. If SoftSafe detects tampering, it gives<br />

you the option of replacing the infected files with a clean copy,<br />

or ignoring the change if it was intentional, such as with a DOS<br />

version upgrade.<br />

SoftSafe works on IBM PC XT/AT and 100 percent compatibles<br />

including the PS/2. The list price of $99 includes<br />

floppy disk and a manual, as well as 30 days free technical<br />

support.<br />

122


Tracer<br />

Product<br />

Company<br />

Type<br />

Tracer Virus Detector<br />

InterPath<br />

4423 Cheeney Street<br />

Santa Clara, CA 95054<br />

(408) 988-3832<br />

Commercial<br />

$49.95<br />

IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

Tracer is a <strong>computer</strong> virus detection system that catches<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> which enter your system. It uses, according to the documentation,<br />

a high reliability detection mechanism that monitors<br />

all system areas susceptible to viral attacks. If a virus does<br />

enter your system, Tracer will identify the specific system area<br />

or program files that have been infected, so virus removal is<br />

simplified.<br />

There are two phases of operation for Tracer. The initial<br />

install phase logs the system<strong>'s</strong> hardware and software parameters-including<br />

the initial interrupt vector states, boot sector<br />

instructions, hidden DOS files, device drivers, and all executable<br />

code on the hard disks. Initial load instructions, branch<br />

addresses, and other program states are also logged for each<br />

program on the hard disk. The subsequent check phase executes<br />

each time the system is powered on or rebooted, and it<br />

checks all system parameters for tracers of infection.<br />

Tracer is designed to detect all types of <strong>viruses</strong>, including<br />

boot sector infectors and embedded <strong>viruses</strong> (<strong>viruses</strong> that leave<br />

the infected program<strong>'s</strong> size and external indicators unchanged).<br />

It provides, says its manufacturer, "a timely and near foolproof<br />

indication of infection.<br />

123


Chapter 8<br />

Trojan Stop<br />

Product Trojan Stop Deluxe version 1.1<br />

Company Carey Nash<br />

The Programmer<strong>'s</strong> Forum<br />

Type Freeware<br />

Av<strong>ai</strong>lable in IBMSW on CompuServe<br />

"Trojan Stop Deluxe," writes Carey Nash in the documentation<br />

included with this freeware offering, "is a program I<br />

wrote while learning assembly. It can successfully stop any attempt<br />

to do harmful damage to your hard disk or floppy disk<br />

system. If you suspect a program is a Trojan, all you have to<br />

do is load STOP. COM before you run it."<br />

Trojan Stop Deluxe works by hooking onto interrupt 13<br />

hex. Interrupt 13 is used for all low-level disk I/O, and any<br />

program that accesses the disk must use it. STOP. COM monitors<br />

interrupt 13 and checks to see which function is being requested:<br />

read, write, or format. If write or format is requested,<br />

STOP.COM does not allow interrupt 13 to perform the command;<br />

instead it returns a value to tell the calling program that<br />

the write, or format was successful. It will also place a colored<br />

square on the upper right corner of your screen.<br />

Here<strong>'s</strong> an example from the documentation that comes<br />

with Trojan Stop Deluxe:<br />

You have a program that has little documentation and<br />

seems much too small to do what it should do. You suspect it<strong>'s</strong><br />

a Trojan. First, run STOP. COM and then proceed to run the<br />

suspected Trojan. If the program does any disk writes or formats,<br />

you'll see a little red or blue square on your screen, and<br />

the program will be disabled-however, the suspected Trojan<br />

won't know this. If the program turns out to be okay (no nasty<br />

messages after it<strong>'s</strong> done or other mischief), everything is fine.<br />

However, if it turns out to be a Trojan and cl<strong>ai</strong>ms to have<br />

done harm to your disk, merely reboot your <strong>computer</strong> and<br />

you're safe!<br />

"Stop," Carey continues, "has been tested with everything<br />

from the FORMAT command, to DEL *.*. However, I accept<br />

no responsibility for what happens to your system while<br />

STOP. COM is in memory. This is just an attempt to supply<br />

people with a way to safeguard their systems ag<strong>ai</strong>nst Trojans."<br />

124


Universal Viral Simulator<br />

Product Universal Viral Simulator<br />

Company National BBS Society<br />

6226 Channel Drive<br />

San Jose, CA 95123<br />

IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

Voice (408) 727-4559, BBS (408) 988-4004<br />

Type Commercial<br />

This program is made av<strong>ai</strong>lable to universities and<br />

government research organizations and on a limited<br />

basis to appropriate divisions within private industry.<br />

To apply for access, see the above address.<br />

The Universal Viral Simulator is a program that simulates<br />

characteristic activities that .COM and .EXE infector <strong>viruses</strong><br />

use for replication. It also simulates some of the destructive<br />

activities used by <strong>viruses</strong> to destroy disk information. It does<br />

not simulate the infection techniques of boot infector <strong>viruses</strong><br />

(such as the Pakistani Br<strong>ai</strong>n Virus).<br />

The Universal Viral Simulator is not a virus protection<br />

program; it<strong>'s</strong> meant to be used as a tool to test the effectiveness<br />

of antiviral measures and as a demonstration tool for viral<br />

replication activities.<br />

"The use of live <strong>viruses</strong> for testing the security of individual<br />

or multiple system installations is extremely impractical,"<br />

s<strong>ai</strong>d Tim McCurry, technology director for the Society. "If the<br />

security system f<strong>ai</strong>led during the testing/assurance process, the<br />

results could be disastrous. Clearly, a noninvasive approach to<br />

the validation of in-house antiviral systems and off the shelf<br />

products is needed."<br />

The viral simulator is executed after any antiviral systems<br />

have been loaded and activated. It then attempts to infect the<br />

system in a variety of different ways. Each time it<strong>'s</strong> blocked by<br />

the antiviral system, an appropriate message is displayed, naming<br />

the replication attempt technique and the fact that the attempt<br />

was unsuccessful. Likewise, if the simulator is successful<br />

in "infecting" the system, it will identify the procedure it used<br />

to "fool" the antiviral system.<br />

The pseudo-virus will also simulate events typical of a virus<br />

that has activated and is attempting to destroy or disable<br />

system data. The Universal Viral Simulator is nondestructive<br />

and has no permanent effect on the system. 125


Chapter 8<br />

Vaccine from Foundation Ware<br />

Product<br />

Company<br />

Type<br />

Vaccine<br />

Mike Riemer<br />

Foundation Ware<br />

2135 Renrock<br />

Cleveland, OR 44118<br />

(800) 722-8737<br />

Commercial<br />

$189<br />

Vaccine from Foundation Ware (as distinct from the simi­<br />

larly-named Vaccine from World Wide Data below, and several<br />

public dom<strong>ai</strong>n programs of the same name) is a sophisticated,<br />

top-end viral protection software. It<strong>'s</strong> especially appropriate for<br />

networked <strong>computer</strong>s. When Vaccine is installed on your hard<br />

disk, it continually tests files for the presence of any <strong>viruses</strong>,<br />

without the interruption of your <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> operation. If a Vaccine<br />

detects a virus, it will prevent the virus from damaging<br />

your system while alerting you to the danger.<br />

Vaccine also protects ag<strong>ai</strong>nst bombs. The second a bomb<br />

tries to override the operating system with an illegal "write to<br />

disk" command, Vaccine halts the process and flashes you a<br />

warning. Vaccine can even electronically remove your hard<br />

disk from the rest of the system and provide a safe area for<br />

testing dubious software.<br />

Bugs are also caught. Bugs, of course, are those unintentionallittle<br />

things that go wrong with software after prolonged<br />

use. They also result from power surges, static electricity, and<br />

other often unexpl<strong>ai</strong>ned causes. Bugs often aren't as destructive<br />

as <strong>viruses</strong>, but commonly disrupt the integrity of your data.<br />

You probably don't want many people playing with your<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s. If for no other reason, employees using software not<br />

approved by the company waste valuable corporate resources.<br />

Vaccine is designed to allow the system manager to control<br />

what software can exist and be utilized on a system, thus<br />

disallowing any unapproved software to run. This helps to<br />

standardize software and tr<strong>ai</strong>ning within an organization and<br />

keeps people from playing games on your <strong>computer</strong>s.<br />

126


IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

For additional usage control, Vaccine has a tracking feature<br />

that enables you to monitor what software has been run<br />

on your system and when. You can also install Vaccine to <strong>ai</strong>d<br />

in determining the source of a virus (even if you approve an<br />

infected program).<br />

Vaccine also reduces human error and recovers damaged<br />

or lost data. Ag<strong>ai</strong>n, this is sophisticated software. You may obt<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

additional information on it by calling the toll-free number<br />

listed above.<br />

Vaccine from World Wide Data<br />

Product<br />

Company<br />

Type<br />

Vaccine 2.1<br />

Ron Benvenisti<br />

World Wide Data Corp.<br />

17 Battery Place<br />

New York, NY 10004<br />

(212) 422-4100<br />

Commercial<br />

$79.95 ($25 site licensing)<br />

Vaccine is a software viral protection package consisting of<br />

the Vaccine program, and two other utilities, Antidote and<br />

Checkup.<br />

Antidote scans your disk for all <strong>viruses</strong> known to World<br />

Wide Data. It then notifies you if any of them appear to have<br />

attacked any of your programs. Checkup keeps a record of the<br />

state of your system and informs you if any of your executable<br />

fields (.EXE and .COM) have been changed since the last time<br />

Checkup was run.<br />

Vaccine is a resident program. Once you run it, you can<br />

continue to use your system as you normally do. Vaccine automatically<br />

and transparently checks every exceptional situation<br />

described above. If any program you run tries to alter your system<br />

in a suspicious way, Vaccine warns you about what the<br />

program is trying to do and gives you the chance to stop the<br />

destructive operation.<br />

An example given in the well-written Vaccine User<strong>'s</strong> Manual<br />

is that of TSR programs. No memory resident program is<br />

permitted to rem<strong>ai</strong>n in memory unless its name is declared<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

legal to Vaccine. No program is permitted to perform an absolute<br />

write to any device or to modify another executable program<br />

unless the user specifically and intentionally grants it<br />

permission. Memory addresses are checked as well to prevent<br />

any virus from corrupting the programs and data in your<br />

machine.<br />

These functions are performed in the background; thus<br />

they are transparent to the user. Once the program is loaded,<br />

the only time you see it work is when it warns you of possible<br />

danger. Trusted and approved programs that might otherwise<br />

trigger Vaccine are listed in an exceptions file (an ASCII file<br />

you can create with any text editor). These will include the<br />

names of all programs that change memory tables or install<br />

themselves as resident. Debuggers and communication programs,<br />

for example, often legitimately change memory tables.<br />

There is one situation the user<strong>'s</strong> manual cautions you<br />

about (and one that applies equally to all viral protection software).<br />

The programs you list as exceptions must be clean to begin<br />

with-if they've been infected with <strong>viruses</strong> that Vaccine<br />

does not recognize, you may not be protected from them. Any<br />

program you approve then, should be a reliable legitimate<br />

copy, generated from a known original source. This includes<br />

Vaccine itself Ag<strong>ai</strong>n, this should apply to all protection<br />

programs.<br />

Vaccine is a strong, well-programmed package already in<br />

wide use. It<strong>'s</strong> well worth checking out for your own system.<br />

Vacine<br />

Product Vacine 1.3<br />

Company Art Hill<br />

936 S. Kensington Ave.<br />

La Grange, IL 60525<br />

Type Shareware<br />

contribution (amount up to you)<br />

This program, says its author Art Hill, will give you some<br />

protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the recent crop of so-called virus programs.<br />

The program has only two modes of operation: INSTALL and<br />

CHECK. To install the program, copy it to the root directory<br />

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IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

of your hard disk. Run it by typing VACINE and selecting the<br />

appropriate option. The program works by comparing critical<br />

files to known good copies. It will record cert<strong>ai</strong>n information it<br />

needs to check for <strong>viruses</strong> in a subdirectory on your hard disk.<br />

You may also compare critical files to those on a floppy disk.<br />

Typing VACINE C will perform the comparison ag<strong>ai</strong>nst copies<br />

on your hard disk. Just typing VACINE allows you to compare<br />

to critical files on an original DOS disk.<br />

"No doubt," Art s<strong>ai</strong>d, "one of these low life creeps who<br />

create the virus programs will get hold of this program and figure<br />

out a way to defeat it. With your contribution I can keep<br />

upgrading the program with more and more elaborate schemes<br />

to defeat the jerks."<br />

Despite the author<strong>'s</strong> unique way of spelling "vacine" as<br />

opposed to "vaccine," the program appears to run well and is<br />

worth looking at. Its viral protection is limited to file comparison,<br />

but should be an important part of your overall system<br />

defenses.<br />

V_Check<br />

Product V _Check 1.0<br />

Company Dave Millis<br />

P.O. Box 2371<br />

Glenview, IL 60025<br />

Type Shareware<br />

$5, av<strong>ai</strong>lable in CompuServe IBMSW<br />

V _Check Series 1.0, according to Dave Millis in the documentation<br />

supplied with the program, was written as a service<br />

for the many <strong>computer</strong> users who may be concerned about the<br />

growing number of virus programs and the destruction that can<br />

result from them.<br />

"The inspiration for V_Check," Dave writes, "comes from<br />

not only the extensive reading of current <strong>computer</strong> literature,<br />

but also from my experience consulting people who work with<br />

micro <strong>computer</strong>s in a university setting. Software needs to be<br />

protected, but not everyone can afford a commercial package,<br />

some of which can be very expensive. In fact, with the extensive<br />

network of <strong>computer</strong> users throughout the world, less<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

expensive tools for detecting and preventing the wrath of <strong>viruses</strong><br />

are extremely necessary. For this reason 1 wrote the<br />

V _Check program series."<br />

V _Check is a conglomeration of six programs to do a<br />

comprehensive check on your important files and on DOS system<br />

files. The programs supplied in the archived distribution<br />

file are:<br />

SCC.COM. Run this first. This program compares date,<br />

time, size and checksum of system files ag<strong>ai</strong>nst an original copy<br />

in the A: or B: drive.<br />

SFC.COM creates a hidden file with date, time, and size<br />

of system files if one does not exist. On successive runs, it<br />

checks this information ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the current status of the file.<br />

MCF.COM creates a database of information (in a hidden<br />

file) that cont<strong>ai</strong>ns time, date, size, and checksum for each file<br />

entered.<br />

CCF.COM uses the data file created by MCECOM and<br />

runs a check on the current status of the files, making sure<br />

there are no changes to time, date, size or checksum.<br />

DSFC.COM deletes the hidden file created by SFC.COM.<br />

DMCF.COM deletes the hidden file created by MCECOM.<br />

In these times, continues the V _Check documentation,<br />

when more and more people are offering protection from <strong>viruses</strong>,<br />

V _Check programs offer detection of <strong>viruses</strong> that change<br />

a file<strong>'s</strong> time, date, size or checksum.<br />

"Although some other programs offer much ofthe same as<br />

V _Check," Dave continues, "I have tried to produce a much<br />

more complete set of programs and have also made the source<br />

code av<strong>ai</strong>lable for those who would like to customize or<br />

personalize the routines for either special additions or other<br />

purposes.<br />

"I have had a lot of people try out V _Check and tell me<br />

what they thought of it. (Of course, more feedback and suggestions<br />

are always welcome.) Having been tested on a large number<br />

of IBM and IBM compatible <strong>computer</strong>s, incorporating at<br />

least ten different types of DOS, both PC-DOS and MS-DOS, I<br />

have not found an MS type DOS that could not be checked<br />

with V_Check.<br />

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IBM PCs and Compatibles<br />

"However, I offer V _Check as is and make absolutely no<br />

guarantees implied or otherwise. If used as recommended,<br />

V _Check Series 1.0 will hopefully help people detect and eliminate<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> infecting <strong>computer</strong>s which result in costly<br />

damage."<br />

WPHD.COM<br />

Product WPHD (Write Protect Hard Disk)<br />

Type Unattributed Public Dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

free<br />

av<strong>ai</strong>lable in Delphi Writers Group,<br />

CompuServe IBMSW, and numerous other places<br />

This little gem will write- and format-protect your hard<br />

disks. Run once it protects, run it ag<strong>ai</strong>n it unprotects.<br />

Run this to write- and format-protect your hard disk. It<strong>'s</strong><br />

useful when you let someone else use your PC or try out new<br />

BBS software. Each time it<strong>'s</strong> run, it toggles the protection off or<br />

on-no need to reboot to get rid of it. The toggle on/off feature<br />

will not work if, after running WPHD, you run another resident<br />

program that revectors INT 13. In other words, run WPHD<br />

after running other resident programs, such as Sidekick.<br />

If the DOS FORMAT command is run when this is on, it<br />

will appear to be formatting your hard disk, but it<strong>'s</strong> actually<br />

VERIFYing each sector, which does not harm the disk. Your<br />

data is actually lost during a format when DOS writes a new<br />

Directory and FAT-WPHD will prevent that. Actually, if<br />

WPHD is not installed and you accidentally start formatting<br />

your hard disk, you can type CtrI-Break to stop the formatting.<br />

The Ctrl-Break will not be acknowledged right away, but that<strong>'s</strong><br />

all right-it will still break you out of format before any damage<br />

is done. This one is highly recommended. Get it and use it.<br />

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Chapter 8<br />

XFICHECK<br />

Product XFICHECK 4.0<br />

Company Chuck Gilmore<br />

Gilmore Systems<br />

P.O. Box 3831<br />

Beverly Hills, CA 90212-0831<br />

Voice: (213) 275-8006 BBS: (213) 276-5263<br />

Type Shareware<br />

Extended version of FICHECK., free to registered<br />

users<br />

When you register your copy of FICHECK with Gilmore<br />

Systems (see FICHECK), they will send you not only guaranteed,<br />

virus-free copies of FICHECK and MFICHECK., but<br />

XFICHECK as well. XFICHECK (eXtended FICHECK) incorporates<br />

both CRC and MCRC checking in a single pass, and<br />

doesn't take much longer to run than MFICHECK. The added<br />

security and peace of mind of dual-checking for CRC and<br />

MCRC alone is worth the registration fee, but that<strong>'s</strong> not all<br />

XFICHECK does. XFICHECK does everything FICHECK and<br />

MFICHECK do together, and more.<br />

XFICHECK., like FICHECK and MFICHECK can only be<br />

run from a system that was booted from a DOS floppy. However,<br />

some people simply don't want to bother taking the extra<br />

precaution of booting from a floppy. Although the company<br />

does not endorse the practice, XFICHECK comes with information<br />

expl<strong>ai</strong>ning how to defeat the check so you may run the<br />

program without actually booting DOS from a floppy.<br />

132


9<br />

MACINTOSH<br />

The rotten apple injures its neighbour.<br />

Chaucer<br />

The Macintosh has been beset with <strong>viruses</strong> for at least the past<br />

two years. The Scores virus (see its description in Chapter 2)<br />

was first reported in 1987, and it<strong>'s</strong> still out there and still causing<br />

trouble.<br />

Viruses get into Macintosh systems disguised as Hyper­<br />

Card stacks or applications. The virus is self-replicating and<br />

thus spreads from machine to machine. They can (and do) infect<br />

such Macintosh resources as INITs and CODE. A welldesigned<br />

virus infects other systems and attempts to hide code<br />

in as many carriers or Trojan horses as possible.<br />

A virus, in the end, is eventually triggered and completes<br />

whatever tasks (usually nefarious) planned by the twisted mind<br />

that created it. This can and does include numerous things, up<br />

to and including erasing a disk on a specific date.<br />

Computer <strong>viruses</strong> have an uncanny resemblance to biological<br />

<strong>viruses</strong>. In the Macintosh, it can spread from the carrier<br />

or Trojan (the stack or application that received it "through the<br />

door") into other places such as System files. Once entrenched,<br />

the replicated copies of the virus can lay dormant for days,<br />

weeks, months, or maybe even years.<br />

If your Macintosh got infected last year and you do nothing,<br />

you may not know it until next year. Next year, however,<br />

boy will you know it as files disappear.<br />

There are three major virus infestations of Macs. Two of<br />

these we've already discussed in the course of this book-the<br />

Scores and the Peace virus from MacMag. The latter bears the<br />

"honor" of being the first virus to infect commercial shrinkwrapped<br />

software, Aldus' FreeHand (see "How Safe Can You<br />

Be?" in Chapter 4).<br />

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Chapter 9<br />

In this chapter we introduce the third type of Macintoshspecific<br />

virus and discuss some ways to avoid or purge <strong>viruses</strong><br />

in and from your system. We'll also look at some of the viral<br />

protection tools av<strong>ai</strong>lable for Macintosh <strong>computer</strong>s and take a<br />

look at the virus problem on other Apple <strong>computer</strong>s as well.<br />

nVIR<br />

The major Macintosh virus not yet discussed is called n VIR.<br />

While it doesn't have the fame of Scores and the Peace virus,<br />

it<strong>'s</strong> out there. One sign of its presence is beep infected programs<br />

make when you start them.<br />

In the same manner as Scores-reports Kristi Coale in her<br />

excellent article about <strong>viruses</strong> in the September, 1988 MacUsern<br />

VIR installs its own code segments into an application<strong>'s</strong> resources.<br />

Each time you call the application after that, the n VIR<br />

virus resources are also installed. The code searches the System<br />

folder for its INIT, and should this not be there, it will copy it<br />

to the System folder and include nVIR resources 0-7.<br />

After the virus has established itself, it will then infect<br />

applications through its INIT (ID = 32). This virus will also<br />

add CODE ID = 256 as a resource. Here<strong>'s</strong> one procedure for<br />

getting rid of n VIR infection. It comes from Chris Borton at<br />

the University of California at San Diego (USeD) and is av<strong>ai</strong>lable<br />

on many of the <strong>computer</strong> networks, including Compu­<br />

Serve. A good knowledge of how to use ResEdit is required.<br />

First, open INIT 32 in your System File with ResEdit.<br />

Next, select all hex code and delete. Enter in two bytes-4E<br />

75-which merely puts an RTS there. Go into each nVIR resource<br />

and delete all information in them. Don't delete those<br />

resources! The virus checks for their existence (only); if they are<br />

there, it assumes they're okay. With the changes above, they<br />

are harmless and won't spread the virus further.<br />

The virus depends upon INIT 32 and n VIR 0-7 resources<br />

in the System file. It modifies the CODE #0 resource to each<br />

application, altering eight bytes in the jump table to execute the<br />

code in CODE #256, which it also installs. The n VIR resources<br />

hold copies of important information-#2 has the eight original<br />

bytes from the applications CODE 0 resource. #6 is a copy of<br />

134


Macintosh<br />

IN IT 32, and so on. The eight bytes are the first eight on the<br />

third line in ResEdit.<br />

For those who might not be that comfortable with ResEdit,<br />

Mike Scanlin has written Virus WarningINIT and Vaccination.<br />

The first is a virus alarm that goes off whenever one of the<br />

nVIR resources are found, or if the nVIR CODE segment is<br />

detected. The second program, Vaccination, looks for n VIR<br />

and reports on the status of an application. It also acts to prevent<br />

n VIR from infecting your system in the first place.<br />

Mike<strong>'s</strong> programs are distributed as the "stuffed" file<br />

VACCIN.SIT in the Macintosh area (Personal) on CompuServe.<br />

Virus RX<br />

Apple, like the other major players in the <strong>computer</strong> hardware<br />

and software business, rem<strong>ai</strong>ned markedly silent on the subject<br />

of <strong>viruses</strong> for a long time. Unlike the others, however, Apple<br />

did finally react to the pleas of their customers-especially after<br />

they were hit themselves with the Scores virus in at least their<br />

Washington office (according to an AP report-see Chapter 2).<br />

First, Apple called in the FBI. This writer talked with a<br />

number of people who thought the perpetrator of the Scores virus<br />

would soon be brought to justice, but no one would say<br />

anything for publication. (Let<strong>'s</strong> hope the slimebucket finds out<br />

that justice is not blind after all).<br />

Second, Apple is providing a program, Virus RX, free<br />

along with guidelines on how to use it. This is, says Apple, "a<br />

public service."<br />

Virus RX, according to the documentation Apple supplies<br />

with it, wi1llist damaged applications, INIT, cdev and RDEV<br />

files, invisible files, altered system files, and altered applications.<br />

The program reports different levels of concern, from<br />

simple comments to dangerous to fatal.<br />

Damaged applications are the first to be listed. These have<br />

not been infected by the virus, but they will not work and<br />

should probably be removed from your disk. The program next<br />

lists all INIT, cdev, and RDEV files (such as the Easy Access,<br />

Mouse or AppleShare files) in your System Folder. Many of<br />

these are common, but you should make sure you know why<br />

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Chapter 9<br />

they're on your disks. Some files are normally invisible; Virus<br />

Rx checks these and lists them. The documentation continues,<br />

expl<strong>ai</strong>ning how to determine if you have a virus and how to remove<br />

the infection.<br />

Virus RX is av<strong>ai</strong>lable free on Delphi, CompuServe, other<br />

networks, various <strong>computer</strong> bulletin boards, and through your<br />

local Apple dealer. It<strong>'s</strong> designed primarily for the Scores virus.<br />

Below is more det<strong>ai</strong>led information on killing Scores.<br />

Killing the Scores Virus<br />

The following information on the Scores virus was written and<br />

provided to the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n by Howard Upchurch, a Macintosh<br />

<strong>computer</strong> consultant in Garland, Texas and distributed<br />

by the Mac Pack and the Dallas Apple Corps for all members<br />

of the Macintosh community. Mr. Upchurch gives special<br />

thanks to John C<strong>ai</strong>l, Doug Ruddman, Kelly and Cheney Coker,<br />

and Steve Schroader for their assistance. It<strong>'s</strong> reprinted here<br />

with Howard<strong>'s</strong> kind permission.<br />

136<br />

Introduction. A virus is an organism that attacks<br />

and feeds off a host until either the virus or the host<br />

dies. A so-called Scores virus has spread throughout the<br />

Macintosh community. This virus, however, is a nasty<br />

piece of software written by a demented individual. Just<br />

like a living organism, it reproduces itself and has<br />

spread like an epidemic. Rumors (and there are plenty!)<br />

are that thousands of U.S. Government Macintoshes<br />

including those owned by NASA are infected, and that<br />

the FBI is investigating the outbreak.<br />

In addition, Apple, other major corporations, and<br />

probably hundreds ofthousands of business and private<br />

users are infected. This is not the M acM ag virus, which<br />

was relatively benign and was inadvertently spread by<br />

Aldus in a few copies of FreeHand. It is not the nVIR<br />

virus, which so far has spread very little, according to<br />

published sources. It is a virus that was purposely designed<br />

to spread itself as rapidly as possible. Scores will<br />

enter a disk as part of an application. It will spread to<br />

the System, then to other applications, some of which


will be given to a friend or taken to work, spreading it<br />

even further.<br />

There is evidence that it can spread through a network.<br />

Scores will damage programs, causing unpredictable<br />

problems. Its primary intent has not yet been<br />

discerned. Don't be the first to discover the evil purpose<br />

for which this virus was designed. Get it out of all systems<br />

in which it is located, and do it now!<br />

Detection: Open the System Folder on all disks in<br />

your possession, especially hard disks. Look for two<br />

icons representing the Scrapbook File and Note Pad<br />

File. The System is infected if both of them are there<br />

and if both icons are generic document icons-for example,<br />

blank dog-eared pages. The System is probably<br />

not infected if neither or only one icon is present or if<br />

the icons look like Macintoshes, the same icon used for<br />

the System and Finder.<br />

If the disk is infected, don't panic. The information<br />

below tells how to remove the virus from the System<br />

and prevent its recurrence. If the disk is not infected,<br />

learn here how to protect yourself and to help someone<br />

else remove the virus.<br />

Macintosh programs used to perform productive<br />

tasks are called applications. Common applications are<br />

Mac Write, MacP<strong>ai</strong>nt, and Microsoft Word. Other applications<br />

with which everyone is familiar are the Font/<br />

DA Mover, HyperCard, and Teach Text. Many users<br />

don?t realize that the Finder is also an application.<br />

Items created by applications are called documents.<br />

A letter created with MacWrite, for instance, is a document.<br />

There are other items on a Mac like System and<br />

General, which are neither applications nor documents.<br />

These items, along with applications and documents,<br />

may be termed files. Generically, any item that has an<br />

icon on a Macintosh is called a file.<br />

Macintosh files are composed of smaller groups of<br />

software called resources and data. Thus any Macintosh<br />

file may cont<strong>ai</strong>n data, resources, or both. An application<br />

is comprised primarily of resources; a document is comprised<br />

primarily of data.<br />

Macintosh<br />

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Chapter 9<br />

138<br />

Resources with which everyone is familiar are<br />

fonts and icons. Others of importance to this discussion<br />

are CODE and INITs. CODE is cont<strong>ai</strong>ned in virtually<br />

every application, for it<strong>'s</strong> really the heart of the application<br />

itself. CODE is the set of commands that controls<br />

all the other resources. An INIT is a set of instructions<br />

loaded into the Mac<strong>'s</strong> memory when power is turned on<br />

and a disk is inserted. INITs are executed in alphabetical<br />

order.<br />

Common INITs are Suitcase and Pyro. Apple has<br />

provided an application called the Resource Editor,<br />

ResEdit, or ResEd for short. It is a necessary tool for<br />

both identification and removal of this virus, but it is<br />

quite powerful and beginners are urged to avoid any<br />

uses of this program other than those described here.<br />

Analysis of Infected Application. The Scores virus<br />

seems to attack only files that have CODE resources,<br />

primarily applications. Although it<strong>'s</strong> possible for documents<br />

to cont<strong>ai</strong>n CODE, no specific examples are<br />

known. It should be mentioned that files that have been<br />

stored in the Stuffit format cont<strong>ai</strong>n no resources at all,<br />

so a file saved or archived in that manner should be<br />

impervious to infection IF it was clean when Stuffed.<br />

Effects of Using an Infected Application. When an<br />

infected application is opened, its new CODE commands<br />

tell it to add several new pieces of software to the<br />

System Folder. The Scrapbook File and Note Pad File<br />

are quite important because they provide the best clue<br />

that something is wrong.<br />

The virus makes other changes to the System<br />

Folder that are less obvious: It adds a Desktop file and a<br />

file called Scores, from which the virus gets its name.<br />

These files cannot be observed from the Finder because<br />

they're invisible. Programs such as ResEd and Mac­<br />

Tools show them to be there, however.<br />

The virus also modifies the System itself, adding<br />

the following resources: atpl ID 128, DATA ID-4001,<br />

and INITs with IDs of 10, 6, and 17. With these new<br />

INIT resources in the System, the Mac is figuratively a


Macintosh<br />

fused bomb, ready to do damage the next time it<strong>'s</strong><br />

turned on.<br />

Spread of Virus to Uncontaminated Applications.<br />

Because these new resources are primarily INITs, they<br />

are activated the next time the Mac is started. Once<br />

initialized, the virus begins to execute the commands<br />

that cause it to spread. As the infected disk is used, the<br />

virus continually seeks uncontaminated applications.<br />

The present thought is that it searches in a random fashion<br />

at an interval of three and a half minutes. At times a<br />

disk drive will begin operating when nothing should be<br />

happening. This occurs because the virus is writing its<br />

code resource to another application. After a long<br />

enough period of time, every application on the disk<br />

will be infected, apparently whether it has been used or<br />

not.<br />

Prevention of Occurrence or Recurrence. CE Software<br />

has released into the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n a utility called<br />

Vaccine. Vaccine is a "cdev," which means "Control<br />

Panel Device." Copies are free. Get it from a Disk-ofthe-Month<br />

(DaM) at a user group meeting or from a<br />

telephone communication service such as Compu­<br />

Serve, Delphi, or GEnie.<br />

To use it, place the Vaccine icon in the System<br />

Folder. Select Control Panel from the Apple menu and<br />

you'll see Vaccine listed right under General. Close<br />

examination will reveal that the name begins with a<br />

space before the "V." Leave it that way so it will be the<br />

first thing that operates when the Mac is started or reset.<br />

Select the Vaccine icon and read the instructions.<br />

In case you don't understand them, putting an X in<br />

the top and bottom boxes is recommended. Be sure to<br />

restart the Mac after setting Vaccine in order to start it<br />

working. To help assure you have a clean copy of Vaccine,<br />

select the Vaccine icon while at the Finder (not the<br />

Control Panel) and choose Get Info from the File menu.<br />

Verify that the size is 11,875 bytes and that the creation<br />

date is Saturday, March 19, 1988 at 11:49 p.m. We must<br />

assure that no one creates a bogus version of this fine<br />

work. And thank you, CE Software!<br />

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Chapter 9<br />

140<br />

After Vaccine has been installed, look for the<br />

following symptoms when using the Mac or opening an<br />

application; each is an indication that the virus is in<br />

operation:<br />

1. Vaccine randomly asks for permission to alter a<br />

resource.<br />

2. Opening an application triggers Vaccine.<br />

3. Opening a resource causes a bomb (usually ID = 02).<br />

4. Opening an application causes the Mac to hang up.<br />

Do not put a copy of any application on a hard disk<br />

until it has been checked for contamination. Do not run<br />

a new copy of any program until it has been checked<br />

out. Examine any program before uploading it to a Bulletin<br />

Board.<br />

Removal of Virus from System. Since the relatively<br />

recent discovery of this virus, several programmers are<br />

working on developing software that will do any or all<br />

of the following: detect the presence of the virus, remove<br />

it from the System Folder, detect infected applications,<br />

and/or rep<strong>ai</strong>r the infected applications. As of<br />

this writing, however, none are av<strong>ai</strong>lable. What follows<br />

is a step-by-step procedure that will enable you to clean<br />

up a disk with or without one or more of these utility<br />

programs.<br />

First, install the Vaccine utility if it<strong>'s</strong> av<strong>ai</strong>lable and<br />

reboot the Mac. (Note: If you see a bomb, a hangup, or a<br />

message from Vaccine when booting, the Finder is<br />

contaminated. Boot with a clean floppy and replace the<br />

Finder on the virused disk.) Open ResEd. (Note: If you<br />

see a bomb, a hangup, or a message from Vaccine when<br />

trying to open ResEd, ResEd itself is contaminated; replace<br />

it with a clean copy.) At this point you'll see the<br />

files at the so-called root level of the disk.<br />

Notice the file called DeskTop. This is not the bad<br />

file. Scroll through the window and open the System<br />

Folder by double clicking on its name.<br />

Select the Desktop file by clicking on it one time;<br />

then choose Clear from the Edit menu. Do the same<br />

thing for the other three infection files, Note Pad File,


Macintosh<br />

Scores, and Scrapbook File. Locate the System and double<br />

click on its name to open it.<br />

Locate atpl and open it by double clicking. Select<br />

atplID 128 and Clear it by using the Clear command<br />

under the Edit menu. Close atpl and open DATA. Clear<br />

DATA ID-4001. Close it and open INIT. Clear ID 10,<br />

ID 17, and ID 6. Close all windows except the root level<br />

window and save the changes when asked if you wish to.<br />

Important: A virgin System (4.1, at least) from Apple<br />

does not cont<strong>ai</strong>n either resource of the types atpl or<br />

DATA, but some programs, LaserSpeed, for one, legitimately<br />

place them in the System. Remove only the ID<br />

numbers listed.<br />

The System is now free of infection, but the work is<br />

far from over. When Vaccine has been properly installed<br />

on the disk, opening an infected application will<br />

cause either a bomb or a message from Vaccine. The<br />

Mac may also hang up.<br />

In any case, the application should be examined<br />

more closely: Use ResEdto open the CODE resource of<br />

the suspected application. If the top CODE ID is two<br />

numbers higher than the next highest, Get Info on it. If<br />

the size is 7026, it is an infected application. Throw it in<br />

the trash because it<strong>'s</strong> unusable and will reinstall the virus<br />

into the System if it is run with Vaccine off or not<br />

installed.<br />

Even if you don't yet have a copy of Vaccine, use<br />

ResEd to examine every application on your disks.<br />

Check all of the applications in the manner described<br />

above. It<strong>'s</strong> easy to overlook some ofthe smaller and perhaps<br />

lesser used ones like FontjDA Mover and backup<br />

programs.<br />

Remember, the Finder is an application. And an<br />

application doesn't have to be run to be contaminated.<br />

Experiences with this virus over the past four months<br />

have shown this to be an effective and relatively simple<br />

way to clean a disk. There<strong>'s</strong> nothing wrong with replacing<br />

the System, replacing the System Folder, or reinitializing<br />

the hard drive. These, however, are extreme<br />

141


Chapter 9<br />

142<br />

measures and are not considered by the author (for example,<br />

Howard Upchurch) to be necessary.<br />

In any case, make sure with ResEd that all applications<br />

put back on the hard drive are clean, especially if<br />

Vaccine has not yet been installed. Otherwise, the whole<br />

cycle could begin ag<strong>ai</strong>n. For more advanced users: After<br />

it<strong>'s</strong> felt that all infected applications have been removed<br />

and replaced, run Disk Express, if av<strong>ai</strong>lable, with the<br />

Erase Free Space option turned on. This will cluster the<br />

data to the start of the disk and zero out all rem<strong>ai</strong>ning<br />

space.<br />

Then use Fedit, MacTools, or a similar program to<br />

search for two strings virtually unique to this virus:<br />

VULT and ERIC. Each string is all caps. If these strings<br />

are nowhere on the disk, it<strong>'s</strong> clean. If they're still there,<br />

do everything possible to find out which file they're in<br />

and remove it from the disk. Repeat this until there is<br />

no ERIC or VULT. (The only application so far discovered<br />

that cont<strong>ai</strong>ns the VULT string is one called DD<br />

Editor, and it does not cont<strong>ai</strong>n ERIC).<br />

Searching a previously infected disk in this manner<br />

without running Disk Express first does no good because<br />

the infected files weren't actually erased when<br />

trashed; the remnants are probably still on the disk. In<br />

other words, the presence of ERIC and VULT at this<br />

stage of the removal process does not mean the disk is<br />

still infected, but their absence DOES mean the disk is<br />

clean.<br />

Removal of Virus from Infected Applications. Unfortunately,<br />

at this time there is no known method to rep<strong>ai</strong>r<br />

infected applications, and perhaps there never will<br />

be. There is evidence that when the virus attaches itself<br />

to an application and inserts the new CODE resource, at<br />

least a part of the new CODE is apparently written over<br />

some part of the original application software, permanently<br />

destroying it. If true, this would account for the<br />

many strange effects of the virus because the missing<br />

code would be different in each application.<br />

There would have to be a separate fix for every


Macintosh<br />

application. The safest thing to do is trash every bad<br />

application from the disk and replace it with a known<br />

clean copy. If there is no clean copy backed up, save the<br />

infected version on a floppy in hopes that a fix will be<br />

found.<br />

Comments. Cleaning the virus from one disk will<br />

not fix the problem. ALL Macintosh disks must be<br />

clean or the problem will be around for a long, long<br />

time. And not just your disks: EVERYONE'S disks!<br />

After you're familiar with the problem and its solution,<br />

share your knowledge.<br />

"Why am I taking the time to create this document?"<br />

writes Howard Upchurch. "I had the virus as<br />

early as November of 1987, but dismissed the problem<br />

as an offshoot of Multi Finder, due to the fact that the virus<br />

struck me just as I had decided to quit using<br />

MultiFinder and return to using System 4.1.<br />

"I spent many hours of work over several weeks<br />

figuring it out and ridding myself of its effects. At the<br />

time I did not recognize it as a virus, and for that I am<br />

very sorry. I should have pounded on Apple<strong>'s</strong> doors<br />

relentlessly asking about this problem.<br />

"Possibly someone there would have recognized it<br />

for what it was, early enough to prevent the present<br />

massive outbreak of the problem. I have enjoyed my<br />

Mac for well over four years now. I have created three<br />

fonts with it, one shareware and two that have actually<br />

been published. I have had fun with my Mac, and I have<br />

earned money with it. I am a member of two Macintosh<br />

clubs and have made many good friends because ofthis<br />

small <strong>computer</strong>.<br />

"I can't stand by while some jerk destroys so much<br />

of my life. The time has come to repay the Mac community<br />

and this is my way. Help me. One hates to publish a<br />

phone number in a document designed for public distribution,<br />

but without it you could not relay any important<br />

information.<br />

"I have reported information as I have found it. If<br />

there are any errors in the above, I apologize but ask not<br />

to be held responsible. Some statements may prove<br />

143


Chapter 9<br />

false or incomplete as more information comes to light<br />

"Please call only from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. Central<br />

time, and only if you have found some information not<br />

in this document Long distance callers, please leave a<br />

complete message on the answering machine if it answers,<br />

as I cannot afford to return many long distance<br />

calls.<br />

"Both User Groups of which I am a member have<br />

access to AppleLink, a worldwide communications network<br />

operated by Apple Computer, so any new information<br />

can be relayed directly to the people at Apple<br />

who are working on solving this problem. And thanks<br />

for any help."<br />

Howard Upchurch may be reached at 3409 O'Henry<br />

Drive, Garland, TX 75042 (214) 272-7826.<br />

Other Apples<br />

The Macintosh and IBM types of <strong>computer</strong>s have borne the<br />

brunt of viral attacks, but older Apple machines are not totally<br />

immune either. Checking the Apple II and III area on Compu­<br />

Serve, we fmd the programs listed below av<strong>ai</strong>lable for Apple II<br />

owners. Alas, the Apple III seems to have been abandoned<br />

even by the virus-makers.,<br />

Appie.Rx 1.7: This is a software virus detection program.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> listed as shareware ($20) but is not to be distributed elsewhere<br />

than CompuServe. This revision corrects one bug and<br />

adds enhancements: prints only error lines if desired, adds an<br />

automatic, hands off, check mode (for use in a queue). This requires<br />

a IIGS or a lIe or IIc with a 65802 chip or 65816 board<br />

substituted for the 65C02. Copyright 1988 by Glen Bredon.<br />

VACCINE II: This is the latest version (1.1) of VACCINE<br />

II, a full-function Virus Analyzer and detector for the IIGS.<br />

This version adds additional checks not found in the previous<br />

version, and fIxes the FINDER restart problem experienced by<br />

some users. You should destroy your previous copies of VAC­<br />

CINE after download.<br />

ANTIVI.BQY: Checks for virus on the boot block (block 0)<br />

of any ProDOS disk. Unpack with BLU to get program and<br />

documentation.<br />

144


10<br />

ATARI<br />

R<strong>ai</strong>se no more spirits than you can conjure down.<br />

Old Proverb<br />

Atari is no more immune from <strong>viruses</strong> than are IBM and Macintosh.<br />

Both the older 8-bit machines and the newer STs have<br />

been struck by <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

The ST appears to have been the hardest hit. Two STspecific<br />

<strong>viruses</strong> have already been identified, and more are suspected.<br />

The worst of these, according to John J<strong>ai</strong>nschigg writing<br />

in the September/October 1988 issue of Atari Explorer, seems<br />

to have originated in West Germany. The ST is very popular<br />

in that country.<br />

This viral beastie has been named the Boot Sector virus<br />

because it inhabits the boot sector on auto-booting disks.<br />

Should an infected disk be used to initialize an ST system, the<br />

virus loads itself into memory and attaches itself to a system<br />

call vector that is related to disk access. By doing this, it can<br />

infect other appropriately configured disks whenever an access<br />

call is made.<br />

The procedure used by this virus is to first check the disk<br />

for its own presence. If no clone of the virus exists, it makes a<br />

copy of itself into the boot sector. In such manner, the virus<br />

can be spread easily from machine to machine. When the virus<br />

decides it has replicated enough, it goes active and corrupts the<br />

File Allocation Tables (FAT) of however many floppies are put<br />

into the ST during an operating session.<br />

The other known ST virus is somewhat less destlUctive. It<br />

also lives in the boot sector of autobooting disks. Its active life<br />

consists of simulating memory errors like you might expect to<br />

see if some of your <strong>computer</strong><strong>'s</strong> memory chips had become defective.<br />

This virus is not very amusing if you go to the consid-<br />

145


Chapter 10<br />

erable expense of replacing chips only to find (seemingly) that<br />

you still have the same problem.<br />

Fighting ST Viruses<br />

ST <strong>viruses</strong> (and 8-bit too) are spread by the exchange of infected<br />

auto-booting disks. This affects user groups much more<br />

than isolated users, since user groups do a lot of disk trading.<br />

One user who found this out, to his dismay, is Gerd Sender of<br />

Koeln, West Germany. Herr Sender was kind enough to pass<br />

along his experiences to the global community of Atari users<br />

via a text file that<strong>'s</strong> been posted on numerous bulletin boards<br />

worldwide, and the full text is av<strong>ai</strong>lable in the Atari special interest<br />

group on CompuServe. Here<strong>'s</strong> an excerpt from that file.<br />

"This weekend I received a number of pd software disks<br />

from a <strong>computer</strong> store. I found that three of these cont<strong>ai</strong>ned<br />

the ST Virus that has been mentioned on the net recently. I did<br />

not however discover this until it had trashed one disk and infected<br />

a very large number of disks.<br />

"I have since disassembled the virus and worked out exactly<br />

what it does and I am posting a summary of what I found<br />

here.<br />

"When the ST is reset or switched on, it reads some information<br />

from track 0 sector 0 of the disk in drive A. It is possible<br />

to set up that sector so that the ST will execute its<br />

contents. The virus program is written into this sector so that it<br />

is loaded whenever the ST is booted on the offending disk.<br />

"Once loaded into memory, the virus locates itself at the<br />

end of the system disk buffer (address cont<strong>ai</strong>ned at Ox4c2 I<br />

think) and attaches itself to the bios getbpb( ) function.<br />

"Every time getbpb( ) is called, the virus is activated. It<br />

tests the disk to see if it cont<strong>ai</strong>ns the virus. If it doesn't then<br />

the virus is written out to the boot sector and a counter is<br />

initialized.<br />

"If the disk does cont<strong>ai</strong>n the virus, then the counter is incremented.<br />

Once the counter reaches a cert<strong>ai</strong>n value, random<br />

data is written across the root directory & FAT tables for the<br />

disk, thus making it unusable. The virus then removes itself<br />

from the boot sector of the damaged disk (destroys the<br />

evidence?).<br />

146


Alar;<br />

"Once the virus is installed in the ST it will copy itself to<br />

EVERY non-write-protected disk you use-EVEN IF YOU<br />

ONLY DO A DIRECfORY -or open a window to it from the<br />

desktop.<br />

"The virus CANNOT copy itself to a write-protected disk.<br />

"I think (but am not cert<strong>ai</strong>n) that it survives a reset.<br />

"The current virus does not affect hard disks (it uses the<br />

flopwr( ) call). However, if you are using an auto-boot hard<br />

disk such as Supra, and the disk in drive A cont<strong>ai</strong>ns the virus,<br />

THE FlDPPY BOOT SECfOR IS EXECUTED BEFORE<br />

THE HARD DISK BOOT SECfOR and consequently the virus<br />

will still be loaded and transferred to every floppy you use.<br />

"To test for the virus, look at sector 0 of a floppy with a<br />

disk editor. If the boot sector is executable, it will cont<strong>ai</strong>n 60<br />

hex as its first byte. Note that a number of games have executable<br />

boot sectors as part of their loading. However, if this is the<br />

case, they should not load when infected by the virus.<br />

"If people are worried about this and haven't been able to<br />

get the other killer (l have not seen it yet) then I will post the<br />

source/object for a simple virus detector/killer that I have<br />

written.<br />

"It would appear that this virus is not the end of the story.<br />

I have heard that there is a new virus around. This one is almost<br />

impossible to detect. For each disk inserted, it scans for<br />

any *.prg and appends itself to the text segment in some way.<br />

Thus, it is very difficult to tell whether or not the virus is actually<br />

on a disk."<br />

8-Bits Take Hits<br />

Nor, of course, do the older Atari models get off scot-free. Portland<br />

(Oregon) Atari Club president, Bill Pike, warns Atari users<br />

of a virus that, different from ST boot sector <strong>viruses</strong>, can actually<br />

attach itself to application programs.<br />

Writing in the widely published electronic version of the<br />

PAC newsletter, he says that an original program may run fine<br />

the first time. Yet, unknown to you, the file is a Trojan horse<br />

that lets the virus write a program to the disk.<br />

Like some fat, crafty spider, the virus sets inside the <strong>computer</strong><br />

memory and w<strong>ai</strong>ts for a disk Input/Output operation.<br />

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Chapter 10<br />

Each time a disk is placed in the drive and an Input/Output<br />

operation is performed, a copy of the virus is written to the<br />

disk. If a file cont<strong>ai</strong>ning the virus is transferred to a BBS, the<br />

virus goes along with the program.<br />

The virus then sets in w<strong>ai</strong>t on the disk. As Bill reminds us<br />

in his article, its not listed in the directory and mayor may not<br />

change the VTOC. Later, at some predetermined time, the virus<br />

goes to work and may wipe out the directory and VTOC or<br />

it just might format the entire disk. Some virus programs modify<br />

DOS so the virus program is appended to every file on the<br />

disk when a file is loaded off of disk or transferred via modem.<br />

Bill also says boot sector <strong>viruses</strong> exist that prey on 8-bit<br />

machines too, but Atari owners have a big advantage over<br />

other types of <strong>computer</strong>s since the disk drive is a "smartdrive."<br />

This means if the disk is write-protected the drive will<br />

not write to or format that disk.<br />

"This is part of the ROM instructions within the drive itself,"<br />

Pike writes, "and a virus cannot modify ROM. However<br />

there is a modification av<strong>ai</strong>lable to bypass this feature. I would<br />

suggest that it be removed for obvious reasons."<br />

He continues to point out that keeping the virus out of<br />

your library is much easier than removing it when it already<br />

exists. You can never be sure you've caught every disk the virus<br />

has infected. If all infected disks aren't destroyed, the virus<br />

will simply reinfect all of your disks.<br />

Here are three basic rules of protecting yourself from <strong>viruses</strong><br />

while using an Atari <strong>computer</strong>:<br />

1. Disks that aren't supposed to be written to should be writeprotected.<br />

It<strong>'s</strong> easy enough, should you need to put something<br />

on the disk, to remove the write-protect tab and then<br />

replace it. It<strong>'s</strong> better to be safe than sorry.<br />

2. A cold start removes a virus from memory. Turn the <strong>computer</strong><br />

off, then reboot it with a known good DOS disk. You<br />

should always have a good, pristine backup of the DOS<br />

disk-write-protected and never used except to make copies.<br />

3. If you trade programs or download them from bulletin<br />

boards, keep these on a separate disk. After trying them out,<br />

do a cold boot of your <strong>computer</strong> as described above.<br />

148


Atari<br />

Finally, here<strong>'s</strong> a method suggested by Bill Pike for checking<br />

out new programs:<br />

Format a blank disk, using a known good copy of DOS.<br />

Then use a sector editor to check the first 4 sectors (0-3) of the<br />

suspect disk ag<strong>ai</strong>nst the freshly formatted disk. If these don't<br />

match, one of the files on the disk has a virus. You can find<br />

the infected file by using a known good DOS and copying each<br />

file individually to another disk and comparing the boot sectors<br />

(0-3) with the newly formatted disk. You might also wish to<br />

compare all file lengths including the DOS.SYS and DUP.SYS<br />

files. If any file is longer than the original file, suspect a virus.<br />

Conclusion<br />

So far, the best protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong> on either an ST or 8bit<br />

Atari seems to be simply to use the write-protect tab. There<br />

are a few public dom<strong>ai</strong>n antiviral programs for Atari beginning<br />

to appear, also.<br />

One gets the feeling that the Atari community is where the<br />

IBM and Macintosh were last year. Rumors are flying and actual<br />

infestations are appearing, but <strong>viruses</strong> are not yet as widespread<br />

as they are on IBM and compatibles, and on the<br />

Macintosh.<br />

Alas, Atari<strong>'s</strong> time seems to be coming, just like the others.<br />

149


11<br />

AMIGA<br />

These are called the pious frauds of friendship.<br />

Henry Fielding (1707-1754)<br />

Commodore<strong>'s</strong> Amiga <strong>computer</strong>s are mighty machines, yet<br />

one little program entering in the guise of friendship can lay<br />

them low.<br />

One of the first Amiga <strong>viruses</strong> was widely reported in<br />

October 1987 by Pete Goodeve and others on various networks<br />

and <strong>computer</strong> bulletin boards. This particular virus seems to be<br />

relatively innocuous, merely popping a message up on your<br />

screen. However, it doesn't show itself until a number of your<br />

disks are infected. Goodeve posted a message on GEnie on<br />

October 15, 1987 in which he det<strong>ai</strong>ls having seen the virus the<br />

previous evening at the Winners Circle User Group meeting.<br />

The virus works like this: When a warm boot (Ctrl-Amiga­<br />

Amiga) is done from an infected disk, the virus writes itself<br />

into memory. Subsequent warm boots will not delete it. After<br />

that, until such time as power has been removed from the machine,<br />

other disks placed into the <strong>computer</strong> have the virus written<br />

to their boot sectors, and will pass the infection on in the<br />

same manner.<br />

The message this virus throws onto the screen, as best Pete<br />

could remember, was:<br />

"Something wonderful has happened-Your Amiga is<br />

alive! And what is more, some of your disks are infected by a<br />

virus! Brought to you by [something ... something] SCA."<br />

Apparently this virus was meant to be benign. However, it<br />

may have spread to thousands of Amiga <strong>computer</strong>s, disrupting<br />

the normal operating parameters of these machines. A report<br />

about this virus in CompuServe<strong>'s</strong> Online Today pointed out<br />

that some commercial software developers use coded infor-<br />

151


Chapter 11<br />

mation in the boot block of their distribution disks. In such<br />

cases the virus can inadvertently damage these disks and render<br />

the software useless. The virus was evidently meant to be a<br />

high-tech joke, displaying the message above after having invaded<br />

and entrenched itself in a user<strong>'s</strong> disk library.<br />

Like the supposedly benign Macintosh Peace virus, this<br />

Amiga infestation at the very least caused a lot of users<br />

consternation. None of us want anyone messing with our precious<br />

disks.<br />

Viruses Go South for the Winter<br />

After October 1987, the next major virus outbreak in the<br />

Amiga community occurred in sunny Florida during January<br />

1988. A United Press International report quotes members of<br />

the Tampa Amiga User<strong>'s</strong> Group as saying they were engaged in<br />

a fight ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>. One person s<strong>ai</strong>d the virus was set to<br />

start destroying fIles on May 13th (see the Friday the 13th virus<br />

described in Chapter 2).<br />

"It kind of creeps up on you," president JeifWhite of the<br />

Amiga group s<strong>ai</strong>d to UPI, and continued to say that many of<br />

the group<strong>'s</strong> membership now had disks infected by this virus.<br />

The UPI report continued, "Experts don't yet know what,<br />

if any, damage the virus can cause to the disks or programs.<br />

Similar problems have erased programs and information ....<br />

White s<strong>ai</strong>d the program spread itself to more than 20 of his<br />

floppy disks before he discovered it. But by then, the program<br />

had spread to the disks of many of the club<strong>'s</strong> members via its<br />

regular disk-of-the-month distribution."<br />

White told UPI the program works invisibly. "When the<br />

<strong>computer</strong> is turned on, the program stores itself in the machine<strong>'s</strong><br />

m<strong>ai</strong>n memory and then begins spreading copies of itself<br />

to new disks used in the machine," he s<strong>ai</strong>d.<br />

He stated that Tampa Amiga User<strong>'s</strong> Group members now<br />

employ a virus-checker program to test disks and prevent<br />

infections.<br />

SCA, All the Way!<br />

The virus discussed above also resurfaced in January 1988now<br />

named the SCA virus. Chet Solace, Assistant Editor of the<br />

152


Amiga<br />

Amiga-oriented AMnews Magazine, posted public warning<br />

messages on various boards saying the magazine had inadvertently<br />

spread the virus.<br />

"If you got a copy of AMnews, Vol. 2, No.1 (WHITE<br />

Cover) at AMI-EXPO," reads the warning in part, "install<br />

Disk# 1, using a write-protected copy of WorkBench! If you AL­<br />

READY used AM news, any BOOTABLE disk used prior to<br />

POWER-OFF is also infected! Check ALL such disks/memory<br />

with VCheck19.arc. NON-BOOT ABLE DISKS ARE SAFE!"<br />

Like the Aldus FreeHand case and the Macintosh Peace<br />

virus, the Amiga community now had to face the fact that even<br />

commercial software was not safe from viral infection.<br />

Solace went on to describe what had happened and the<br />

steps the magazine was taking to rectify the situation. He wrote<br />

that after the January master disks had been sent for copying,<br />

someone added the virus to Disk#l before duplication.<br />

Through the three days of demonstrations at the show, the virus<br />

rem<strong>ai</strong>ned hidden until 300 prerelease copies had been sold.<br />

Chet then emphasizes that no other infected copies were<br />

released and that all copies were being certified virus free and<br />

repackaged.<br />

"Since all copies ofDisk#l had the same 'generation' of<br />

virus," he s<strong>ai</strong>d, "it had to be done just prior to, or during copying.<br />

We've added security, and future issues will automatically<br />

check for <strong>viruses</strong>! We are stunned at this senseless violence,<br />

and apologize to all those affected for the inconvenience,<br />

aggravation and delay."<br />

VirusX: Steve Tibbett<strong>'s</strong> Virus Killer<br />

Product VirusX<br />

Company Steve Tibbett<br />

2710 Saratoga PI. # 11 08<br />

Gloucester, Ontario<br />

KIT lZ2<br />

BBS 613-731-3419<br />

BIX s.tibbett, People/Link SteveX<br />

Type Copyrighted, but freely distributable and not<br />

shareware<br />

153


Chapter 11<br />

Steve Tibbett<strong>'s</strong> VirusX is one of the leading programs in<br />

virus-fighting on the Amiga, and Steve himself is a leading<br />

authority on Amiga <strong>viruses</strong>. VirusX has gone through several<br />

revisions (we looked at 1.7 here) and is t<strong>ai</strong>lored to protect<br />

ag<strong>ai</strong>nst not only the SCA virus, but several others as well. The<br />

first he addresses, however, is the SCA virus.<br />

"There are a number of CLI-based Virus Checkers out<br />

there," writes Steve in the documentation included in the archived<br />

VirusX distribution file, "which do their job just fine,<br />

but if you're not into using CLI, what do you do? You use<br />

VirusX!<br />

"Please, I encourage you to give this program to anybody<br />

who might have the virus. Including your local dealer-some<br />

of the dealers in this area have the virus all over their disks,<br />

which they allow customers to copy, and they don't do anything<br />

about it because they don't know how. VirusX makes it<br />

extremely simple."<br />

VirusX can be put in your Startup-Sequence. When run, it<br />

will open a small window so you know it<strong>'s</strong> there (and it will<br />

display the occasional message in it). Whenever a disk is inserted<br />

into any of the 3lh-inch drives, that disk is automatically<br />

checked for the SCA virus and is also checked to see if its boot<br />

sector is Standard.<br />

"If the disk has a nonstandard boot sector," writes Steve,<br />

·'it is either a new form of virus which I don't know about yet,<br />

or it is a commercial program which uses the boot block for<br />

something constructive (like booting their game)."<br />

If VirusX finds a boot block it is suspicious about, it will<br />

present the user with a requester either warning him that the<br />

disk has the SCA virus or telling him that the boot code is nonstandard.<br />

In either case, he is given the option to either ignore<br />

it or Remove it.<br />

If the user selects Remove, after he says he<strong>'s</strong> sure he wants<br />

to rewrite the disk<strong>'s</strong> boot sector, the boot code written back to<br />

the disk by VirusX is the same boot code that the AmigaDOS<br />

INSTALL command writes. (Remember: Never rewrite the<br />

boot sector of a commercial program unless you know that program<br />

doesn't use it for something else. If the program gives you<br />

the AmigaDOS window before running, you know it<strong>'s</strong> safe to<br />

rep<strong>ai</strong>r that disk.)<br />

154


Amiga<br />

"If you run across a str<strong>ai</strong>n of the virus, or any other virus<br />

that VirusX doesn't specifically warn of, please send me a copy<br />

of a disk with that virus on it! I want to keep VirusX current,<br />

and to do so, I need the <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"Of course, there are those of you who are thinking that I<br />

am some nut case trying to spread my own virus hidden under<br />

the guise of a virus checker. Well, just for you, I've included<br />

the C source code. Please, if you don't trust me, don't discard a<br />

useful utility as untrustworthy for no reason, CHECK THE<br />

SOURCE! Recompile it if you think I'm trying to slip a fast<br />

one on you. I just want to see the virus out of all of our lives."<br />

The Byte Bandit Virus<br />

Steve Tibbett<strong>'s</strong> VirusX also goes for the throat of the Byte Bandit<br />

virus. Once it<strong>'s</strong> in memory, the Byte Bandit virus copies itself<br />

to just above the high memory point on the first hunk of<br />

RAM it can find. This means it<strong>'s</strong> not always in the same place.<br />

The virus wedges itself into the Interrupt Server ch<strong>ai</strong>n, into the<br />

Trackdisk.device<strong>'s</strong> vectors, and creates itself a Resident structure<br />

so it can hang around after reboot.<br />

Byte Bandit watches every disk inserted and will write itself<br />

to any bootable disk that<strong>'s</strong> inserted. This one, says Steve,<br />

can spread like wildfire. Every disk you insert into your external<br />

drive during a session with this Virus loaded will result<br />

in all those disks being infected. If you install a disk while this<br />

virus is going, it will just copy itself back to the disk.<br />

When VirusX finds this virus on a disk, it will also display<br />

a Copy Count, which is the number of disks that have been infected<br />

by that Branch on the Tree that the virus is on. If you<br />

infect a disk with your copy, and your copy is number 300,<br />

that copy will be #301.<br />

"If that one infects somebody," writes Steve, "that will be<br />

#302, but on your copy, two infestations down the line, there<br />

will be another #302. Anyway, the copy count on my Byte Bandit<br />

virus is #879. Note that VirusX will check RAM for this virus<br />

as well as the disk. This was necessary as you can tell from<br />

the description above.<br />

"Special thanks must go here to Dave Hewett who, 2 days<br />

after I gave him a copy of the virus, gave me a printed, com-<br />

155


Chapter 11<br />

mented disassembly of the virus with meaningful labels and<br />

everything I needed to stomp it. Thanks Dave!<br />

"Thanks must also go to Bruce Dawson of CygnusSoft<br />

Software, who went to the trouble of being the first person to<br />

send me this Virus."<br />

The Revenge Virus<br />

"This virus is not yet common in North America (I think I'm<br />

the first person here to have a copy of it)," says Steve Tibbett,<br />

"but it is apparently making the rounds in Sweden and Germany,<br />

so that<strong>'s</strong> who this version of VirusX is more or less directed<br />

to. (I'm sure we'll get that virus over here soon enough!)<br />

"What this virus does, is everything that the Byte Bandit<br />

virus does; plus, after infecting a disk, it will w<strong>ai</strong>t one minute<br />

after every reboot and change your mouse pointer into an image<br />

of a cert<strong>ai</strong>n part of the male anatomy.<br />

"I think the reason this virus is called the Revenge virus is<br />

because it looks specifically for the Byte Bandit and for the<br />

SCA Virus. If it finds either of these, it rigs that virus so that it<br />

will crash the machine unless this virus is loaded first. Note<br />

that I might be wrong about this-that<strong>'s</strong> the way it looks from<br />

the disassembly, but I don't have an SCA virus here to test it<br />

with. I tried it with the Byte Bandit and it didn't seem to do<br />

anything like this-but be warned in case it pops up later or<br />

something.<br />

"The Revenge virus stays in RAM via changing the Cool­<br />

Capture vector to point to his own code. He then intercepts the<br />

DoIO( ) call and watches for any attempts to rewrite or to read<br />

the boot block and acts accordingly. He also has an interrupt<br />

around counting VBlanks until it<strong>'s</strong> time to bring up his sicko<br />

pointer.<br />

"To get this virus out of memory is simple. Hold down<br />

the Joystick button (plug a joystick into port 2, and hold down<br />

the button while you are rebooting) and the screen will briefly<br />

turn RED during the boot, and it<strong>'s</strong> out of memory. (If you hold<br />

down Joystick button and mouse button, he will half-remove<br />

himself from RAM and turn the screen Blue.)<br />

"VirusX will alert you if the virus is present in RAM and<br />

will render it helpless in RAM before telling you about it. It<br />

will also report its presence on disk."<br />

156


Amiga<br />

Other Amiga Viruses<br />

The Byte Warrior virus, reports Steve Tibbett, is a lot like the<br />

Byte Bandit virus except it<strong>'s</strong> not designed to hurt anything. It<br />

will start an Alarm sound if it sees another virus, but other<br />

than that, it will write itself to any disk inserted. There is also a<br />

hidden message in it, asking us to spread it around and not to<br />

erase it ... Right.<br />

The latest Amiga virus Steve has found is the Obelisk<br />

Softworks Crew virus (sent to him by Jason Allen Smith, who<br />

he wishes to thank). Ag<strong>ai</strong>n, Steve wants you to send him any<br />

Amiga <strong>viruses</strong> so he can include defenses ag<strong>ai</strong>nst them in<br />

VirusX. Our congratulations to Steve Tibbett for the fine job<br />

he<strong>'s</strong> doing.<br />

The Clock Virus<br />

Product Chronos<br />

Company Dave Thomas<br />

contact via PhilAMIGA BBS (215-533-3191)<br />

Type public dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

The following information on the Clock virus is supplied<br />

to the public dom<strong>ai</strong>n by Dave Thomas along with a program<br />

to fight the virus. The program is av<strong>ai</strong>lable from the board<br />

above, or on GEnie, among other places.<br />

As many of you are aware, writes Dave, there<strong>'s</strong> a virus<br />

floating about that causes trouble by causing your batterybacked-up<br />

clock to accelerate at incredible speed. There were<br />

two solutions to this problem. One was to physically remove<br />

the battery from your clock and short the terminals. This was,<br />

shall we say, inconvenient. The second solution was a program<br />

called Clock_Doctor, which would correct this problem.<br />

Now, there<strong>'s</strong> a new (dare we say, mutated) clock virus that<br />

causes the exact problem. It turns off your hardware clock.<br />

When you try to load or save the time using SetClock, you receive<br />

a message stating that the hardware clock is not functioning.<br />

Don't Panic!<br />

The first solution mentioned above will also solve this<br />

problem, but the same inconvenience exists. Clock_Doctor<br />

doesn't detect this condition. What is a time conscious Amigan<br />

to do?<br />

157


Interview with Steve Tibbett<br />

Amiga<br />

We called Steve Tibbett<strong>'s</strong> <strong>computer</strong> bulletin board in Ottawa,<br />

the capital of Canada, to verify the information on his program,<br />

VirusX, and to make sure he had no objection to<br />

publishing it. While online, Steve switched his BBS into chat<br />

mode, and the following interview occurred (online interviewing<br />

is great for a writer, since the interviewee writes all your<br />

notes for you!).<br />

Tibbett: Just wanted to mention that Discovery Software<br />

has a program called VIp, a Virus protection program. Have<br />

you heard of or looked into it? Talk to Randy at Discovery<br />

Software, at 301-268-9877. The reason I mention it is that they<br />

just arranged with me to do some work on it, and I think it<strong>'s</strong><br />

going to be the best Amiga virus protection program.<br />

The thing about VIP is that it will let you classify a new<br />

(as in, a virus you don't already know the name of) into a database.<br />

Whenever you check a disk, it will compare it ag<strong>ai</strong>nst all<br />

the ones it knows-if it doesn't recognize it, you can add it.<br />

Also, a m<strong>ai</strong>n function of VIP is to make BACKUPs of<br />

boot blocks. You take all your commercial games, back up the<br />

boot blocks, and then even if a new virus does wipe something<br />

out, you can restore the disk.<br />

Roberts: Sounds good, Steve. Hey, I might as well do a<br />

very quick mini-interview of you (if you don't mind) since<br />

you're on. Is that okay?<br />

Tibbett: Sure. Typing fast comes in handy at long distance<br />

(grin).<br />

Roberts: My phone bill must be getting really big talking to<br />

Canada. How serious do you see the virus problem in the<br />

Amiga community?<br />

Tibbett: Well, the way I see it right now, there are a bunch<br />

of hackers/pirates over in Germany /Sweden/Holland/wherever,<br />

who are trading software back and forth and including <strong>viruses</strong><br />

just for their own amusement. There aren't any <strong>viruses</strong> currently<br />

that go after anything but the boot block. That is, there<strong>'s</strong><br />

nothing malicious. It<strong>'s</strong> cert<strong>ai</strong>nly possible and I'm not looking<br />

forward to the day someone decides to start. There was the<br />

Byte Bandit virus which would crash your machine every five<br />

minutes or so on purpose, but at least it didn't cost you anything.<br />

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Chapter 11<br />

Roberts: Say, you're a great typist! So, no <strong>viruses</strong> yet that<br />

attach to or infect application programs?<br />

Tibbett: Nope. I hear they are all the rage on the PC and<br />

on the Mac. It<strong>'s</strong> just too easy with all those system files to infect<br />

them. Ag<strong>ai</strong>n, it<strong>'s</strong> cert<strong>ai</strong>nly possible on the Amiga. I've<br />

thought of a few easy ways of doing it, but I'm not going to be<br />

the one to try it.<br />

Roberts: Right. Is there a lot of concern among users on<br />

this side of the Atlantic about <strong>viruses</strong>?<br />

Tibbett: Well, it seems to me that over here, people are a<br />

lot different than people over there (<strong>computer</strong> users that is).<br />

Over here, it seems that there is ummm ummm (thinking) ...<br />

There don't seem to be as many hard core "hackers" as there<br />

are over there. If you look at the arsenal of the typical pirate,<br />

it<strong>'s</strong> very rare to see programs broken in North America. I'm<br />

not really sure why this is, but it seems that <strong>viruses</strong> and piracy<br />

go hand in hand, and piracy is cert<strong>ai</strong>nly much more rampant<br />

over there.<br />

Roberts: Hmmmmm ... That<strong>'s</strong> interesting, and not true in<br />

other brands of <strong>computer</strong>s (grin), but from what I've read on<br />

Amiga, I cert<strong>ai</strong>nly agree. How serious do you think the problem<br />

will get? Worse? Better? More malicious <strong>viruses</strong>?<br />

Tibbett: Right now, there are six different <strong>viruses</strong> (and a<br />

couple of other ones which are just the same six with different<br />

text in them). I think that because all these <strong>viruses</strong> basically do<br />

the same thing (infect the boot block, spreading from machine<br />

to machine via the boot block) and because there are good PD<br />

programs out there to find boot block <strong>viruses</strong> (grin), and the<br />

amount of media attention given the issue seems to be helping.<br />

Sure, it<strong>'s</strong> spawning MORE <strong>viruses</strong>, but since they all basically<br />

do the same thing, we know what they are and we know how<br />

to handle them. I have not seen a Trojan on the Amiga yet, no<br />

logic bombs, none of the other malicious stuff. Hopefully this<br />

says something about Amiga users in general.<br />

Until somebody goes malicious, I don't see things getting<br />

any worse. Another 20 boot block <strong>viruses</strong> wouldn't surprise<br />

me, but wouldn't really hurt.<br />

Roberts: Well, sounds like it<strong>'s</strong> a lot better in Amiga-land<br />

than IBM. Most of the IBM-specific <strong>viruses</strong> are destructive. Do<br />

160


Amiga<br />

you see a commercial virus software market springing up for<br />

Amiga?<br />

Tibbett: I hope so (grin) with me working on VIP Seriously,<br />

though, I think that the PD software is great, but it<strong>'s</strong> not<br />

as good as what VIP is going to be, because VIP is the culmination<br />

of a lot of people<strong>'s</strong> work. It<strong>'s</strong> also got the advantage of<br />

advertising-meaning that ... [Launching into a story here].<br />

I work in a <strong>computer</strong> store. Quite often, people will drag<br />

in their hardware, and a bunch of their disks, and say "It<strong>'s</strong> broken.<br />

None of my games work anymore." Those type things. I<br />

grab one of their disks, pop it into our machine, and up comes<br />

"Disk in DFO: is infected with the WHATEVER virus." These<br />

people might even have known that they had the virus, but<br />

they have no way of protecting themselves. One thing about<br />

PD software (on the Amiga) is that it usually requires that you<br />

be able to understand ARC and the Amiga-CLI which the average<br />

"Oh, I just bought it to play games" type person doesn't<br />

care about. A commercial program with a good manual is<br />

<strong>ai</strong>med at these people.<br />

Roberts: Hey! Good stuff. What is the company developing<br />

VIp, and how much will it sell for, etc.?<br />

Tibbett: VIP is already av<strong>ai</strong>lable from Discovery Software<br />

International, makers of some of the best Amiga software<br />

(Arkanoid, Zoom, Marauder). These guys have a real interest in<br />

the matter. I don't think they're just out to make a quick buck.<br />

With the Amiga market being as small as it is (less than 1 million),<br />

it seems that for a lot of applications, one company can<br />

fill the whole market. Example: Marauder, is about the only<br />

Amiga disk copier that went anywhere. If this were the PC<br />

market or Mac market, there'd be many of them. (Right? Are<br />

there?)<br />

Roberts: Yes. I have almost 30 IBM packages here for review<br />

and more are coming to market. So VIP is sold through<br />

stores, m<strong>ai</strong>l order, etc.?<br />

Tibbett: All of the above. Yes. At a reasonable price. I hear<br />

some of the PC ones are big bucks. VIP is $49.95 Canadian,<br />

probably $37.95 or so U.S. That<strong>'s</strong> pretty reasonable.<br />

Roberts: "Yes, and you are working on it?"<br />

Tibbett: Right. The first release wasn't quite adequate for<br />

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Chapter 11<br />

the job. The next release (probably 1.1) is going to have a really<br />

neat method of identifying new <strong>viruses</strong>, and will also keep a<br />

catalog database of all your commercial boot block blocks. So,<br />

with it, you can spot the brand new virus that just wiped out<br />

your Arkanoid, store the virus (so it can be spotted later on),<br />

and then fix your Arkanoid.<br />

Roberts: Sounds great. Let<strong>'s</strong> see, you're in Ottawa, right?<br />

The capital of Canada?<br />

Tibbett: Gloucester, actually-a few minutes from Ottawa.<br />

Roberts: How long have you been working with <strong>computer</strong>s?<br />

Tibbett: Oh, gee, when I was about 13 I was hanging out at<br />

a local CompuMart bugging them day and night about their<br />

Apple lIs and PETs.<br />

Computers have changed a lot. It seems that for any <strong>computer</strong><br />

to be taken seriously these days, it has to be IBM<br />

compatible, and I think that<strong>'s</strong> a waste. In Europe, they don't<br />

depend on IBM compatibility. They buy the best <strong>computer</strong> for<br />

the job (or so I hear). That<strong>'s</strong> why the ST and the Amiga are doing<br />

so much better over there than here. The Mac is a great<br />

machine and would have done a lot better if it wasn't for Big<br />

Blue stifling things. Same for the Amiga!<br />

BBS System: Less than 2 minutes rem<strong>ai</strong>ning.<br />

Roberts: Thanks, Steve. I'll spell check this and make us<br />

both sound erudite. Bye.<br />

Tibbett: Yes (grin), make me sound better! Okay, Ralph,<br />

been great talking to you. Looking forward to seeing the book!<br />

BBS System: Online for 31 mins, 51 sees. Logged out at<br />

27-Aug-88 20:24.<br />

Steve and his Amiga-oriented BBS may be reached at 613-<br />

731-3419. The BBS now supports 2400 baud.<br />

162


12<br />

THEONLY<br />

GOOD VIRUS IS<br />

ADEADVIRUS<br />

Will toys amuse when medicines cannot cure?<br />

Reverend Edward Young (1683-1765)<br />

"The basic rule is, where information can go, a virus can go<br />

with it," s<strong>ai</strong>d Dr. Fred Cohen, a University of Cincinnati<br />

professor who has been doing research on the threat of <strong>computer</strong><br />

<strong>viruses</strong> since 1983. He was quoted in an article in The<br />

New York Times that appeared on Sunday, January 31, 1988.<br />

Dr. Cohen continues to point out that research performed<br />

by him in 1983 and 1984 has shown that most m<strong>ai</strong>nframe<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s can be successfully subverted within an hour. Computer<br />

networks, even huge international ones with thousands of<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s spread over continents, can be opened up to an illicit<br />

intruder within days.<br />

The possibility of <strong>computer</strong> networks becoming a primary<br />

medium for subversion and warfare-the "softwar" depicted in<br />

a dozen classic science-fiction thrillers-"has become much<br />

more real," Dr. Cohen s<strong>ai</strong>d.<br />

It all becomes a matter of scale. Your neighbor is going to<br />

lose little sleep if a virus wipes out the files on the personal<br />

<strong>computer</strong> in your den. However, if his or her bank<strong>'s</strong> data files<br />

are destroyed, not only your neighbor, but a lot of people are<br />

going to be demanding some answers about <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

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Chapter 12<br />

Potential for Major Disasters<br />

The practice of germ warfare, the deliberate release of deadly<br />

biological bacteria or <strong>viruses</strong>, is a practice so abhorrent it<strong>'s</strong><br />

firmly outlawed by international treaty. However, <strong>computer</strong><br />

scientists, security experts, and <strong>computer</strong> users at all levels<br />

must now consider the possibility that something similar could<br />

be used to disable their systems.<br />

Personal <strong>computer</strong>s are the least of our worries.<br />

Imagine the sudden shutdown of <strong>ai</strong>r traffic control, medical<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s monitoring and running life support systems<br />

malfunctioning, financial networks penniless in the blink of an<br />

eye, widespread destruction of government and business<br />

records. We are now a <strong>computer</strong>ized society at all levels and<br />

thus, particularly vulnerable to <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"Suppose your virus attacked by deleting files in the system,"<br />

Cohen s<strong>ai</strong>d (this time in a report av<strong>ai</strong>lable in the public<br />

area of the Naval Weapons Support BBS and written by Lee<br />

Dembart). "If it started doing that right away, then as soon as<br />

your files got infected they would start to disappear and you'd<br />

say 'Hey, something<strong>'s</strong> wrong here.' You'd probably be able to<br />

identify whoever did it."<br />

To avoid early detection of the virus, a clever saboteur<br />

might add instructions to the virus program, causing it to check<br />

the date each time it ran. It would attack only if the date was<br />

identical to, or later than, some date months or years in the future.<br />

"Then," says Cohen, "one day, everything would stop.<br />

Even if they tried to replace the infected programs with programs<br />

that had been stored on backup tapes, the backup copies<br />

wouldn't work either-provided the copies were made after the<br />

system was infected."<br />

The idea of virus-like programs has been around since at<br />

least 1975, when the science fiction writer John Brunner included<br />

one in his novel The Shockwave Rider. Brunner<strong>'s</strong> "tapeworm"<br />

program ran loose through the <strong>computer</strong> network,<br />

gobbling up <strong>computer</strong> memory in order to duplicate itself. "It<br />

can't be killed," one character in the book excl<strong>ai</strong>ms in desperation.<br />

"It<strong>'s</strong> indefinitely self-perpetuating as long as the network<br />

exists."<br />

164


The Only Good Virus Is a Dead Virus<br />

Two other experts were quoted in a report in The New<br />

York Times.<br />

"A virus is deadly because it can jump-actually slide<br />

right through-the barriers everyone uses to control access to<br />

valuable information," s<strong>ai</strong>d Kenneth Weiss, technical director<br />

at Security Dynamics Technologies Inc., a <strong>computer</strong> security<br />

division of the American Defense Preparedness Association.<br />

"The solution is to put a wall with a good solid gate around the<br />

jungle-most <strong>computer</strong>s still have the equivalent of a sleepy<br />

guard at the door. But the larger problem is how to secure the<br />

system ag<strong>ai</strong>nst people who have legitimate work inside."<br />

"It<strong>'s</strong> apparently going to be the game this year-to see who<br />

can come up with the best virus," s<strong>ai</strong>d Dennis Steinaur, a senior<br />

security specialist at the National Bureau of Standards,<br />

which promotes <strong>computer</strong> security in nonmilitary Federal agencies<br />

and the private sector. "We've all very vulnerable."<br />

Yet he s<strong>ai</strong>d the bureau planned no immediate recommendations<br />

on the virus threat. "With limited resources," he<br />

s<strong>ai</strong>d, "we like to put our priorities in areas where we can see<br />

solution."<br />

Let<strong>'s</strong> bo back to the public report by Lee Dembert from<br />

the Naval Weapons Support BBS.<br />

Dembert writes that Marvin Schaefer, chief scientist at the<br />

Pentagon<strong>'s</strong> <strong>computer</strong> security center, says the military has been<br />

concerned about penetration by virus-like programs for years.<br />

Defense planners have protected some top-secret <strong>computer</strong>s by<br />

isolating them.<br />

The secret <strong>computer</strong>s of the military and such intelligence<br />

agencies as NSA and the National Reconn<strong>ai</strong>ssance Office are<br />

highly shielded electronically and connected to each other only<br />

when necessary by wires that run through pipes cont<strong>ai</strong>ning gas<br />

under pressure. Should anyone try to penetrate the pipes in order<br />

to tap into the wires, the drop in gas pressure would immediately<br />

cause an alarm. But, Schaefer admits, "in systems<br />

that don't have good access controls, there really is no way to<br />

cont<strong>ai</strong>n a virus. It<strong>'s</strong> quite possible for an attack to take over a<br />

machine."<br />

Many in government and the <strong>computer</strong> industry very<br />

strongly believe that neither Cohen nor any other responsible<br />

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Chapter 12<br />

expert should even open a public discussion of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

"It only takes a halfway decent programmer about half a<br />

day of thinking to figure out how to do it," Jerry Lobel of<br />

Honeywell says, as quoted in Dembart<strong>'s</strong> article. "If you tell<br />

enough people about it, there<strong>'s</strong> going to be one crazy enough<br />

out there who<strong>'s</strong> going to try."<br />

Cohen disagrees, insisting that it<strong>'s</strong> more dangerous not to<br />

discuss and study <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong>. "The point of these experiments,"<br />

he says, "is that if! can figure out how to do it, somebody<br />

else can too. It<strong>'s</strong> better to have somebody friendly do the<br />

experiment, tell you how bad it is, show you how it works and<br />

help you counteract it, than to have somebody vicious come<br />

along and do it." If you w<strong>ai</strong>t for the bad guys to create a virus<br />

first, Cohen says, then by the time you find out about it, it will<br />

be too late.<br />

The Future of Viruses<br />

In this book, we have been primarily concerned with <strong>viruses</strong><br />

that attack personal <strong>computer</strong>s. As stated earlier, one thing in<br />

our favor is that <strong>viruses</strong> are machine-specific. In other words, a<br />

Macintosh virus won't work on an IBM or compatible <strong>computer</strong>,<br />

and an Atari virus cannot inhabit a m<strong>ai</strong>nframe machine.<br />

But, what if the personal <strong>computer</strong> program is merely a<br />

carrier for a virus that would infect another type of <strong>computer</strong>,<br />

such as a DEC VAX or an IBM System 370? Don't think this<br />

hasn't already occurred in the devious and twisted minds of<br />

virus-makers.<br />

How does the virus get from the personal <strong>computer</strong> into<br />

the larger machine? Simplicity itself We are now a world of<br />

networks. Millions of <strong>computer</strong>s communicate with other<br />

<strong>computer</strong>s. A m<strong>ai</strong>nframe virus concealed in a personal <strong>computer</strong><br />

file could be easily transmitted to a m<strong>ai</strong>nframe.<br />

Tomorrow you have no bank account. The morning after<br />

that, all the traffic lights in New York lock on red. That afternoon,<br />

an atomic power plant melts down.<br />

Viruses are serious stuff.<br />

There are no firm answers yet, no cut and dried guaranteed<br />

solutions. We are faced with electronic terrorism that<br />

could become horribly damaging to all of us, that could disrupt<br />

166


The Only Good Virus Is a Dead Virus<br />

and endanger all of our lives. Everyone. Worldwide.<br />

This book has been a start. Using the techniques and software<br />

described in these pages gives you a good measure of<br />

protection ag<strong>ai</strong>nst <strong>viruses</strong>.<br />

There are far more personal <strong>computer</strong>s than m<strong>ai</strong>nframes,<br />

and all the media attention has been on the smaller <strong>computer</strong>s.<br />

If we, as <strong>computer</strong> users, can all act responsibly to employ safe<br />

computing practices, we can halt the spread of <strong>computer</strong> <strong>viruses</strong><br />

on IBM and compatibles, on Macs and Ataris, on Amigas<br />

and all the rest.<br />

If those who concoct <strong>viruses</strong> are no longer getting publicity,<br />

maybe they'll quit. And maybe they won't make the effort<br />

to come up with <strong>viruses</strong> that can exist in a m<strong>ai</strong>nframe<br />

environment. Then all we have to worry about are disgruntled<br />

employees, and political terrorists, and foreign enemies.<br />

Viruses are serious stuff.<br />

We should be scared, and we should do something about it.<br />

Good luck, and stomp a virus whenever you see it.<br />

167


INDEX<br />

activation 6<br />

activation period 6<br />

Aldus Corporation 35-38<br />

Amiga 151-62<br />

virus information 158<br />

ANTlVI.BQY 144<br />

antivirus hardware 45-46<br />

antivirus software 41, 44-45, 86-88<br />

choosing 69-72<br />

Apple II 144<br />

Apple III 144<br />

Apple.Rx 1.7 144<br />

applications 137<br />

contaminated 141<br />

infected 138, 142-43<br />

uncontaminated 139<br />

Atari 8-bit machines 147-49<br />

protection 148-49<br />

Atari ST 145-49<br />

protection 148-49<br />

attributes 85<br />

AUTOEXEC.BAT 51, 84<br />

backup 47, 51, 53<br />

Banks, Michael A. 76<br />

BBSoft Support BBS 102<br />

Bennett, David 117<br />

BIO/IO 87<br />

BIOS 63<br />

BIX 60<br />

blue disk technology 78<br />

bombs 6, 10,48-52, 126<br />

logic 10<br />

Bomhsqad 98<br />

boot blocks 159<br />

boot infectors 6, 21-23<br />

booting 19, 42-43<br />

from floppy 27, 132<br />

boot sector 52-53, 62, 87<br />

Brandow, Richard 3<br />

Buerger, David J. 34-35<br />

bugs 49, 67, 126<br />

C-499<br />

Canter, Marc 36<br />

Caware 100<br />

charityware 115<br />

Checkup 101-2<br />

CHKDSK 84, 94<br />

CHK4BOMB 76, 98<br />

Chronos 157-58<br />

clean boot disk 85<br />

clean model disk 84<br />

168<br />

clean room procedures 88<br />

cluster 20<br />

CMOS RAM 63<br />

CODE 138<br />

code names 93<br />

codes<br />

elegant 23<br />

executable 43-44<br />

Cohen, Fred 2, 163-64<br />

COMMAND. COM 87<br />

CompuServe 60, 97<br />

<strong>computer</strong> crime 10-11<br />

<strong>computer</strong> networks 163<br />

Computer Virology 107<br />

<strong>computer</strong> virus 1-7, 57<br />

and legislation 39-40<br />

danger of 163-66<br />

definition of 6<br />

fighting 31-54<br />

future of 166-67<br />

history of 9-12<br />

publicity 61, 67<br />

seeding 86<br />

types of 21-29<br />

working of 17-29<br />

Computer Virus Industry Association 2,<br />

4, 6, 21, 41-42, 47<br />

Condom 102-4<br />

control panel device 139<br />

Cop 104-5<br />

COpy 84<br />

CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) 111,<br />

117<br />

Cyclic Redundancy Check. See CRC<br />

cylinders 18<br />

data 137<br />

Data Physician 105-6<br />

data scrambling 22<br />

Defense Authorization Bill 40<br />

Delphi 72-73, 75, 97<br />

Department of Defense 38-40<br />

destructive codes 82, 87-88<br />

device drivers 62<br />

Dewdney, AX 25<br />

DiMartin, Larry 1<br />

Director, Dennis 106-7<br />

directories 85<br />

Dirty Dozen, The 49-50, 62<br />

Disk Defender 106-7<br />

Disk Express 142<br />

disks 18-20


disk trading 146<br />

Disk Watcher 66, 68-69, 108-9<br />

documents 137<br />

DOS 62, 82, 87<br />

DOS ATTRIB 85<br />

DOS COMP 84<br />

DOS DEBUG 89<br />

Dr. Panda 81, 109-10<br />

electronic bulletin boards 27, 33<br />

electronic terrorists 2-3<br />

emulator (3270) 44<br />

encoding 104<br />

extension 86<br />

FAT (File Allocation Table) 19-20,<br />

49-52, 77, 87, 145<br />

FDISK 89<br />

Ficheck 97,111-13<br />

File Allocation Table. See FAT<br />

file checksums 101, 121<br />

filenames 86<br />

files 137<br />

AUTOEXEC.BAT 51, 84<br />

batch 84, 117<br />

command 14-15,24, 116<br />

.EXE 14-15, 24<br />

hidden 85, 87<br />

system 23, 119, 134<br />

undeleting 52-54<br />

file size, checking 85<br />

file size, monitoring 120<br />

F1U-Shot+ 56-63,97, 114-15<br />

fonts 138<br />

FORMAT 82, 84<br />

formatting 85<br />

high-level 21, 50-51,53<br />

low-level 21-22, 50-51, 53<br />

FoundationWare 77<br />

FreeHand 35-36<br />

freeware. See programs, public dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

general executable infectors 21, 24-25<br />

generic infector 6<br />

GEnie 60-61, 158<br />

Gibson, Steve 21, 29<br />

Gilmore, Chuck 97,100,111-13, 132<br />

Glath, Raymond M. 66-72, 91, 108-9<br />

Goodman, Marty 75-76<br />

Graham, Keith P. 116-17<br />

Greenberg, Ross 56-66, 97,114-15<br />

Guard Card 116<br />

Hill, Matt 119-21<br />

Hopkins, Andy 98<br />

HyperCard stacks 133<br />

IBMBIO 63<br />

IBM PC 95-97<br />

Ice 116-17<br />

icon 137-38<br />

IFCRC 117<br />

infection detection product 7<br />

infection identification product 7<br />

infection prevention product 7<br />

INIT 134, 138-39<br />

inoculation process 68<br />

Interferon 74<br />

InterPath Corporation 22, 42, 47<br />

IOSYS 63<br />

isolation 7<br />

Kane, Pamela 81, 109<br />

LAN (Local Area Network) 27, 34<br />

Levin, Richard B. 101<br />

liability 96<br />

logical format 87, 89<br />

Mace, Paul 118<br />

Mace Vaccine 118-19<br />

Macintosh 73-74,133-44<br />

detecting the Scores virus 137<br />

removal of virus in 140<br />

MacMag 3,37<br />

MARS interpreter 26<br />

McAfee, John 42<br />

memory addresses 25<br />

memory, simulated errors in 145<br />

Millis, Dave 129-31<br />

MS-DOS 75-76, 106<br />

Murphy, Jim 102-4<br />

Nash, Carey 124<br />

National BBS Association 4<br />

National BBS Society 21<br />

Newhouse, Eric 49-50<br />

NWirus 119-21<br />

OS975<br />

PC operating system 82<br />

PC Tracker 66<br />

piracy 160<br />

pranksters 3<br />

prevention, techniques 42-44<br />

products<br />

antiviral 41-42<br />

write-protect 44<br />

programs<br />

application 147<br />

batch 68<br />

battle 26<br />

C-4 antiviral 27<br />

checker 39<br />

CHKDSK 17<br />

Core war 25<br />

hacked 6<br />

host 1,6<br />

infection detection 41, 46<br />

infection identification 41, 46<br />

infection prevention 41, 45-46<br />

memory resident 23<br />

169


public dom<strong>ai</strong>n 32, 34, 43, 85, 88, 97<br />

Trojan horse 1, 5, 7, 27-28, 48-52,<br />

57,86, 124<br />

TSR 23, 45, 68-69,94-114, 127<br />

Turbo ClOD<br />

quarantine 89<br />

Radio Shack color <strong>computer</strong> 75<br />

RamNet 60<br />

recovery 46-54<br />

from bomb 48-52<br />

from boot sector infector 48<br />

from bugs 48-49<br />

from Trojan Horses 48-52<br />

Riemer, Mike 77-78<br />

replication 7, 27-28, 125<br />

ResEd 140-42<br />

ResEdit 134-35<br />

resources 137-38<br />

reward fund 64-66<br />

RG Software Systems 66, 91<br />

risky practices 33-35<br />

RS DOS 75<br />

sector editors 52, 149<br />

sectors 19<br />

security 61, 121-22<br />

corporate 81-89<br />

shareware. See programs, public<br />

dom<strong>ai</strong>n<br />

Shulman, Jeff 73-74<br />

signature process 68<br />

SoftSafe 121-22<br />

static free environment 93<br />

subdirectories 43<br />

sorting 85<br />

surge protection 82-83<br />

SYSCHKl 121<br />

SYS command 48<br />

system infector 7, 21, 23-24<br />

system operation 22<br />

Terminate and Stay Resident program.<br />

See TSR<br />

Tibbett, Steve 153-55, 159-62<br />

Tracer 123<br />

tracking 127<br />

tracks 18-19<br />

boot 19<br />

Trojan Stop 124<br />

TSR (Terminate and Stay Resident) 23,<br />

45, 68-69,94, 114, 127<br />

Turbo Pascal source code 103<br />

undeleting files 52-54<br />

Universal Viral Simulator 125<br />

170<br />

Upchurch, Howard 136, 143-44<br />

user control 77<br />

utilities<br />

File Compare 103<br />

wipe 86<br />

Vaccinate 1<br />

Vaccination 135<br />

Vaccine 139-42<br />

Vaccine from FoundationWare 126-27<br />

Vaccine from World Wide Data 127-28<br />

Vaccine INIT 74<br />

VACCINE II 144<br />

Vacine 128-29<br />

V_Check 129-31<br />

VIP 159, 161<br />

virtual format 87, 89<br />

VirusDetective 73-74<br />

<strong>viruses</strong><br />

Boot Sector 145<br />

boot sector infector 42, 46, 48<br />

Br<strong>ai</strong>n 13, 23, 47, 62<br />

Byte Bandit 155-56, 159<br />

Byte Warrior 157<br />

Clock 157-58<br />

common to the Amiga 151-62<br />

Friday the 13th 14-16, 24<br />

GERBIL 91-93<br />

killer 25-27<br />

Lehigh 14<br />

Macintosh Peace 3, 35, 37, 133<br />

nVIR 134-35<br />

Obelisk Softworks Crew 157<br />

retro 29<br />

Revenge 156<br />

SCA 152-54<br />

Scores 12-13, 59, 133-34, 136-37<br />

ST 146-47<br />

SUllnyvale Slug 16<br />

Virus Info Palladium BBS 101, 112<br />

Virus RX 59, 135-36<br />

VirusWarningINIT 135<br />

Virus X 153-56, 159<br />

volume labels, changing 43<br />

worms 7, 86<br />

WPHD.COM 77, 131<br />

write protection 44, 68<br />

and the Atari 148-49<br />

hard disk 131<br />

write-protect notch 44<br />

write-protect tabs 44<br />

XFICHECK 113, 132

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