JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION - Society for Scientific ...

JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION 

A Publication of the Society for Scientific Exploration 

Volume 11, Number 1 I 

CONTENTS I 

Page 

Research Articles 

1 Biased Data Selection in Mars Effect Research Suitbert Ertel and 

Kenneth Irving 

19 Is the "Mars Effect" Genuine? 

41 Fortean Phenomena on Film: 

Paul Kurtz, 

Jan Willem Nienhuys, and 

Ranjit Sandhu 

Rense Lunge and 

James Houran 

47 Wishing for Good Weather: A Natural Experiment in Roger D. Nelson 

Group Consciousness 

59 Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classical Experimenter Harald Walach and 

Effect: An Experimental, Double-Blind Investigation Stefan Schmidt 

of Unconventional Information Transfer 

Essay 

69 Consciousness, Causality, and Quantum Physics David Pratt 

Guest Column 

79 Testing the Survival of Consciousness Hypothesis: Gary E. R. Schwartz and 

The Goal of the Codes Linda G. S. Russek 

Letter to the Editor 

89 Can Animals Understand Human Speech? Henry H. Bauer 

1 89 Comments on "Recent Responses to Survival Research" Gerald L. Eberlein I 

Book Reviews 

91 Alien Discussions: Proceedings of the Abduction Michael D. Swords 

Study Conference Held at MIT, Cambridge by A 

Pritchard, D. Pritchard, Mack, Kasey, and Yapp (eds.) 

93 Confronting the Experts by Brian Martin (ed.) Don Eldridge 

96 Natural Grace by Matthew Fox and Rupert Sheldrake Lorraine Ethridge 

1 98 Deceived by the Light, by Doug Groothuis Paul Alper I 

1 100 Top SecretIMajic, by Stanton T. Friedman Robert M. Wood I 

105 SSE News Item 

1 ISSN 0892-3310 1



Volume 11, Number 2 1997 

Page 


CONTENTS 

Apparent Association Between Effect Size in Free 

Response Anomalous Cognition Experiments and 

Local Sidereal Time 

Evidence in Support of the Hypothesis that Certain 

Objects on Mars are Artificial in Origin 

The Astrology of Time Twins: A Re-Analysis 

Commentary on French et al. 

Reply to Roberts 

Unconscious Perception of Future Emotions: 

An Experiment in Presentiment 

A Bayesian Maximum-Entropy Approach to 

Hypothesis Testing, for Application to RNG and 

Similar Experiments 

Planetary Diameters in the Surya-Siddhanta 

Essay 

Science of the Subjective 

Guest Column 

Curious, Creative and Critical Thinking 

Letters to the Editor 

Comments on "Wishing for Good Weather" & Reply 

On the Wood Book Review of "Top Secret/Magic9 

Comments and Replies 

Fortean Phenomena on Film? & Reply 

Answer to: "Can Animals Understand Human Speech?' 

Book Reviews 

Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the 

Meanings of Life by Daniel C. Dennett 

Review of 3 Books on the "Bell Curve" 

Leaps of Faith by Nicholas Humphrey 

Leaps of Faith by Nicholas Humphrey 

Review of 8 Books on "Prostrate Cancer" 

Expedientes Insolitos by Vincente J. Ballester Olmos 

S. J. P. Spottiswoode 

Mark J. Carlotto 

C. C. French, G. Dean 

and A. Leadbetter 

Peter Roberts 

C. C. French, et al. 

Dean I. Radin 

l? A. Sturrock 

Richard Thompson 

Robert G. Jahn and 

Brenda J. Dunne 

P. A. Sturrock 

I. Woodhouse/R. Nelson 

J. Vallee/R. Wood 

K. Randle/S. Friedman 

A. Imich/J. Houran&R. Lunge 

Remy Chauvin 

Carl Hester 

Paul Alper 

Paul AlpedHenry Bauer 

Ian Stevenson 

Paul Alper 

Richard Haines 

ISSN 0892-3310 

(836)


Volume 11, Number 3 

Page 


CONTENTS 


263 Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with 

a Binaural Beat Technology 

275 The "Mars Effect" As Seen by the Committee PARA 

297 Astrology and Sociability: A Comparative Analysis 

of the Results of a Psychological Test 

3 17 Report of Referee on Fuzeau-Braesch 

320 Reply to McGrew 

323 A Psychological Comparison Between Ordinary 

Children and Those Who Claim Previous-Life 

Memories 

337 Did Life Originate in Space? A Discussion of the 

Implications of Recent Research 

Review Article 

345 Correlations of Random Binary Sequences With 

Pre-Stated Operator Intention: A Review of a 

1 2-Year Program 

Essay 

369 The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli: An Eminent 

Physicist's Extraordinary Encounter With Depth 

Psychology 

Guest Column 

Who Lives'? Who Dies? Helpless Patients and ESP 


Comments on Walach & Schmidt 

Response to Houtkooper and Vaitl 

U.S.-Soviet Disinformation Game 

Response to Playfair 

Book Reviews 

The Biological Universe: The Twentieth-Century 

Extraterrestrial Life Debate by Steven Dick 

Philosophical Interactions With Parapsychology: 

Major Writings of H. H. Price, ed. Frank Dilley 

The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal, ed. Gordon Stein 

The AIDS Cult: Essays on the Gay Health Crisis by 

John Lauritsen & Ian Young 

Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics, and 

Creative Lives by Frank Sulloway 

F. Holmes Atwater 

J. Dommanget 

S. Fuzeau-Braesch 

John H. McGrew 


Erlendur Haraldsson 

Anthony Mugan 

R. G. Jahn, B. J. Dunne, 

R. D. Nelson, Y. H. Dobyns 

and G. J. Bradish 

Harald Atmanspacher and 

Huns Primas 

Arthur S. Berger 

J. Hootkooper & D. Vaitl 

H. Waluch & S. Schmidt 

Guy Playfair 

H. Puthoff 

Michael E. Zimmerman 

James M. 0. Wheatley 

Carlos S. Alvarado 

Henry H. Bauer 


- - 

ISSN 0892-3310 

(836)

"7 1t4 JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION 


Volume 11, Number 4 1997 I 

CONTENTS I 

Page 


435 Topographic Brain Mapping of UFO Experiencers Norman S. Don and 

Gilda Moura 

455 Toward a Model Relating Empathy, Charisma, James M. Donovan 

and Telepathy 

473 The Zero-Point Field and the NASA Challenge to Bernhard Haisch and 

Create the Space Drive Alfonso Rueda 

487 Motivation and Meaningful Coincidence: A Further T. C. Rowe, J. M. Lemke, E. PI 

Examination of Synchronicity Pitsch, and D. B. Henderson 

Essays 

499 A Critique of Arguments Offered Against 

Reincarnation 

527 The Archaeology of Consciousness 

Guest Column 

539 Academic Science and Anomalies 

Book Reviews 

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental 

Theory by David J. Chalmers 

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental 

Theory by David Chalmers 

The Oz Files by Bill Chalker 

A Skeptics Guide to the New Age by Harry Edwards 

Close Encounters? Science and Science Fiction 

by R. Lambourne, M. Shallis, and M. Shortland 

The Great Dinosaur Extinction Controversy by 

Charles Officer and Jake Page 

The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle 

in the Dark by Carl Sagan 

The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle 

in the Dark by Carl Sagan 

Additional Comments on Carl Sagan 

In the Footsteps of the Russian Snowman 

by Dmitri Bayanov 

Reincarnation: A Critical Examination by 

Paul Edwards 

Forming Concepts in Physics by Georg Unger 

SSE News Item 

Index: Volume 11 

Robert Almeder 

Paul Devereux 

Halton Arp 

John Beloff 

Robert Almeder 

Don Eldridge 

Thomas E. Bullard 


John O'M. Bockris 


Ian Stevenson 

Edward Winn 

James G. Matlock 

I 

ISSN 0892-3310 

(836) I

[s] JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION 

(ISSN 0892-33 10) 


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Journal of ScientiJic Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 1-18, 1997 0892-33 10197 

0 1997 Society for Scientific Exploration 

Biased Data Selection in Mars Effect Research 

SUITBERT ERTEL 

Institut fur Psychologie, Gosslerstr. 14, 37073 Gottingen, Germany 

KENNETH IRVING 

596 Villa Ave., Staten Island, NY 10302, U.S.A. 

Abstract - An earlier study (Ertel, 1988) showed that original evidence for 

Gauquelin's Mars effect with eminent athletes (Gauquelin and Gauqelin 1970) 

was based on an incomplete data sample. When athletes initially discarded by 

Gauquelin were included the Mars effect declined. The present study bears on a 

more subtle effect of the same bias. Gauquelin's original definition of planetary 

effects was based on birth frequences obtained in a "narrow" zone of the plan- 

et's daily circle (G-sector zone). After accumulating results over decades of 

research, he found that the area just preceding his narrow zone indicated initial 

planetary effects; he therefore proposed to include initial sectors in an "extend- 

ed G-sector zone definition. Assuming that these initial G-sectors had been 

ignored prior to 1984, the authors suspected that an unbiased proportion of 

births for these sectors in Gauquelin's exempted data should contrast with the 

biased proportion known to exist in the "narrow-zone" sectors. This idea gave 

rise to a new bias detector (IMQ, initial vs. main sector quotient), whose validi- 

ty was confirmed with the biased Gauquelin data. Selection bias for Gauquelin 

turned up in his athletes study only; the IMQ did not indicate like anomalies for 

six other professional investigations conducted by Gauquelin. 

The IMQ was also applied to three athlete samples collected by skeptic organi- 

zations. Among them, the CSICOP data for U.S. athletes revealed an anom- 

alous IMQ similar to Gauquelin's unpublished athletes. The results therefore 

suggest that a certain proportion of U.S. athletes with unwelcome positions 

might have been exempted from analysis (p = 0.01). Support for this suspicion 

is provided by complementary evidence indicating biased admissions of less 

eminent athletes to the U.S. sample while the preference for most eminent ath- 

letes was required. Thus an avoidance of G-sector cases, consistent with this 

bent, cannot be disavowed. Nevertheless the authors refrain from firm conclu- 

sions as this case is circumstantial. It is suggested to merely disregard the CSI- 

COP'S negative result of their study in future discussions of the Mars effect as 

long as appropriate steps to convincingly resolve remaining ambiguities have 

not been not made. 

1. Evidence for a Mars Effect Despite Biased Sampling 

Considerable evidence has been provided in favor of Michel Gauquelin's 

claim of a Mars effect (Ertel, 1988, 1992): Gauquelin claimed that athletes were 

born more frequently than would be expected by chance with Mars rising above 

the earth's horizon or culminating on its daily circle (i.e., when Mars was cross- 

1

2 S. Ertel & K. Irving 

ing "G-sectors"). Furthermore, he maintained that the percentage of births with 

Mars in G-sectors (G%) was more pronounced with eminent than with mediocre 

athletes, thus an eminence effect was claimed as a specification of the Mars 

effect. 

Support for the Gauquelin claims resulted when citation counts were intro- 

duced as an improved procedure (Ertel, 1988). An athlete's eminence was objec- 

tively defined by the number of sports reference sources among a standard set of 

such sources (N = 18) in which the athlete was referred to at least once. The 

Mars-sports eminence connection attained convincing strength when it was 

operationalized in this way by numbers of citations. 

These conclusions were confirmed by scrutinizing Gauquelin's unpublished 

data. Gauquelin had occasionally referred to his exempting low-eminence ath- 

letes from analysis, which is a legitimate procedure in principle, if done without 

awareness of planetary positions. Ertel suspected, however, that on occasion 

Gauquelin might have been aware of Mars positions when he decided whether 

an athlete was or was not eminent enough to be added to the final sample. With 

Gauquelin's permission, Ertel searched out and analyzed this unpublished data, 

finding that indeed Gauquelin had tended not to exclude marginal athletes from 

his high-eminence sample when Mars at their births was in either the rising or 

culminating zones. In other words, he tended to rank Mars G-sector cases among 

low-eminence athletes more favorably than non-G sector cases. 

This can be seen in Figure 1, by first noting that the Mars G% levels of all ath- 

letes in Gauquelin's samples (circles and a solid trend line) increase along with 

the citation ranks. Gauquelin's unpublished athletes (triangles and the lower 

dashed line) are predominantly those with few citations (see the respective num- 

bers). This is as it should be, but at the same time the Mars G% levels of unpub- 

lished low rank athletes (triangles) are much lower overall than the Mars G% lev- 

els of published low-rank athletes (squares), and even at most points below the 

line of mean expectancy. This indicates that Gauquelin must have been aware, to 

a certain degree, of Mars sector positions when he selected individual cases for 

his sample. Note, however, that when Gauquelin's unpublished cases are added 

to the pool of published athletes (solid line), the correlation between eminence 

and Mars G% is not diminished as it should have been if the Mars effect were 

simply a product of Gauquelin's selection bias. Instead, the correlation increases 

(the line becomes steeper) as it should if the effect is genuine. Hence, the idea 

that Gauquelin's planetary claim was due to biased selection was clearly refuted. 

In what follows, a more subtle effect of Gauquelin's selection bias will be 

investigated as it might provide helpful cues at assessing the objectivity of birth 

data samples. A new bias indicator (IMQ) is derived and its validity is first tested 

with the Gauquelin data as already known to have been influenced by bias. It 

will then be applied to other professions for which Gauquelin claimed a Mars 

effect in order to find out whether his bias affected more of his samples. The bias 

probe will also be applied to data collected by organized skeptics who have test-

Fig. 1. 

I 

~ 

34 , 

- 

Biased Data Selection 

Published (N=2888) 

3 

- Total (N=4391) 

- 

Eminence rank 

G-sector percentages of athletes for five citation ranks, separately for Gauquelin's 

unpublished samples, and total. Absolute frequencies for each citation rank. 

expectancy for Mars is generally abouve (8/36)*(100)= 22.2. 

published, 

(Chance 

CP (Belgian skeptics, Comite Para, 1976), the CSICOP (U.S. skeptics, Kurtz, 

Zelen, and Abell, 1979/80), and the CFEPP (French skeptics, CFEPP, 1990). 

These studies engendered controversy both inside and outside the organizations 

which carried them out (Cuny, 1982; Lippard, 1993; Irving, 1995), and the pos- 

sibility of biased data selection was one of several matters at issue. If the IMQ 

reliably indicates Gauquelin's selection bias with his unpublished data, then it 

might also indicate whether the skeptics' published data suffer from the same 

type of deflection.' 

2. Defining IMQ, A New Bias Indicator 

12 Sector vs. 36 Sector DeBnitions I 

For each birth in his sample, Gauquelin determined planetary positions on a ~ 

scale representing the diurnal circle by 36 sectors. In his first report (Gauquelin, 

1955) he generally summed birth frequencies for three adjacent sectors resulting 

in 3613 = 12 frequencies for each sample. In the same publication, he alterna- 

tively summed frequencies for 18 adjacent sectors (resulting in 18 frequencies), 

'The skeptics' data (computer printouts) was kindly provided on request by Professor Jean Dommanget 

(CP data in 1986) and by Professor Paul Kurtz (CSICOP data in 1986, CFEPP data in 1994). Analyses of 

CSICOP data in chronological order (three successive batches) were provided by D. Rawlins in 1993). 

Mars sector positions in these lists were based on the 12 sector scale with decimal precision (range 1- 

12.99). CSICOP's sector numbers (S 12') were obtained by rounding decimal values (S 12) down: S 12' = 

Int (S12). Transformation to 36 scale precision was obtained by S36 = Int ((S12)(3)-2)).


but in subsequent publications he generally restricted analysis to 12 units 

(Gauquelin, 1960, see Figure 2). The Mars effect was thus defined by significant 

deviations from chance of birth frequencies for sectors 1 and 4 of the 12-sector 

scale. These were labeled "significant" or "sensitive" or "key" sectors. 

After three decades of planetary research, Gauquelin, assisted by Thomas 

Shanks, who provided programming expertise, subjected his entire data base to 

computer calculation, reconsidering the problem of sector zone definition. His 

conclusion: "...the two significant zones of the sky.. .begin about 10 degrees 

before the rise or the upper culmination; extend through the ends of sectors 1 and 

4 (in the 12 sector mapping) and even slightly beyond, then rapidly lose their 

prominence. Since the significant zones somewhat exceed the sector 1 and 4 

boundaries, I now speak of 'enlarged key sectors' or 'plus' zones. In the 36-sec- 

tor arrangement these comprise four sectors surrounding the rise (nos. 36, 1, 2 

and 3) and four at the upper culmination (nos. 9, 10, 11 and 12), respectively" 

(Gauquelin, 1988[a], p. 38, citing Gauquelin, 1984). Mean birth frequencies for 

samples for which Gauquelin claimed positive planetary effects indeed show that 

frequencies of births begin to increase in sectors 36 (preceding the rise of the 

planet) and 9 (preceding its culmination) (see Figure 3).2 

Terminological changes over several decades of dealing with planetary sectors 

("sensitive," "key," "plus" etc.) are likely to cause confusion, so Mueller and 

Ertel have suggested "G-sectors" as a standardized label, with "G-percentage" 

for the percentage of subjects with a given planet in G-sectors and "G-effects" 

for the general presence of a significant effect involving these sector^.^ Note that 

Gauquelin's "enlarged" G-sector calculation deviates from the "narrower" calcu- 

lation by simply adding the frequencies for the initial sectors no. 36 (preceding 

the rise of the planet) and no. 9 (preceding its culmination) to the main sector 

frequencies (see Figure 2). 

IMQ: The Indicator 

At the time the Gauquelin athlete data were published (M. and F Gauquelin, 

1970), Gauquelin based G% on the narrow zone, not yet considering the initial 

'Even though Gauquelin had surmised that planetary effects for professionals might include an area just 

before rise and culmination as early as 1955 (See Gauquelin, 1988b). all work on planetary effects for professionals 

by Gauquelin was done within the "narrow" 12-sector framework until 1982 (Gauquelin's study 

on American data) when he used the extended mode of analysis for the first time alongside with his narrow 

prcedure. Gauquelin, Michel (1988b). Planetary Heredity. San Diego, CA: ACS Publications, p. 74. 

'As the terminology became confusing, I agreed with Mueller (Mueller and Ertel, 1994) - Gauquelin 

died in 1991 - to refer to riselculmination zone as "G-zones" irrespective of their precise definition, the 

latter may be indicated by subscripts as given by the following examples: 

G I : sectors 1 and 4 of Mars' diurnal circle divided into 12 sector units 

fMAGl, : frequencies of births for Mars summed over ,,GI, sectors 

N : the sample's total 

MAGIZ% (~MAGIz)/(N) (100) 

MAG,, : sectors 36, 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12 of Mars' diurnal circle divided 36 units 

fMAG,, : frequencies of births for Mars summed over MAG36 sectors 

N : the sample's total 

MAG3h% : (fMAG36)/(N) (loo)


CULYINA~~ 

Narrow rentltlve zone . Enlarged tensltlve zone 

Fig. 2. Two sector divisions for the diurnal planetary circle:12 and 36 sectors with "sensitive" 

zones. Note that with the 36 sector division, the sensitive zones include "initial" sectors 36 

(before rise) and 9 (before culmination), which precede the "main" sectors that comprised 

the 12-sector division used in Gauguelin's work up until 1984. 

Planetary sector 

Fig. 3. Mean percent frequencies (a.m.) with standard errors (s.e.) of births across 14 professional 

samples for 36 planetary sectors (Gauquelin data), the samples being distinguished by sig- 

nificant positive planetary effects. Arrows at sectors no. 36 (preceeding rise) and no. 9 (pre- 

ceeding culmination) point at regions of rising birth frequencies ("initial" sectors, see 

below). Samp1es:Actors (JU), athletes (MA), executives (MA), executives (JU), journalists 

(MA), military leaders (MA)(JU), musicians (VE), physicians (MA)(SA), politicians 

(MO)(JU), scientists (SA), writers (MO). (MO=Moon, VE=Venus, MA=Mars, JU=Jupiter, 

SA=Saturn). Total of percent frequencies across 36 sectors = 100%.


Planetary sector 

Fig. 4. Percent birth frequencies of Gauquelin's published (N=2,888) and unpublished (N= 1,053) 

athletes across Mars sectors 30 ... 36, 1...15. Arrows point at unbaised frequencies in the 

sample, for initial sectors only. 

Sectors - - - - - . - I 

1 pq 

CULMIN. 

Gauquelin published 

N=2,888 

Gauquelin unpublished 

N=1,053 

3619 

FEPP 

1/10 N=l,076 

Birth frequency (%) 

Ordinary people 

N=13,560 

Fig. 5. Concise descriptive results of birth frequencies across initial sectors 36 and 9, and main sec- 

tos pairs 1 and 10, 2 and 11, and 3 and 12. Arrows pointing right (e.g. Gauquelin published) 

indicate either unbaised selections or baised selections with additive effect on G%. Arrows 

pointing left (e.g. Gauquelin unpublished) indicate known or suspected biased selections 

with subtractive effects on G%.

Biased Data Selection 7 

sectors nos. 36 and 9 of the later, enlarged definition. It is thus reasonable to 

assume that while Gauquelin tended to include low-eminence athletes born with 

Mars in main sectors in his published sample of champions, he would have treat- 

ed low-eminence cases with Mars in initial sectors 36 and 9 in the same way as 

he treated low-eminence cases with Mars anywhere else outside the main sectors. 

Thus, among his unpublished athletes, initial sector cases would not be deficient. 

In Figure 4, birth frequencies of Gauquelin's published and unpublished ath- 

letes are compared across sectors 30, 3 1 ... I... 15. For main sectors, the difference 

is large, indicating biased selections, while for initial sectors there is almost no 

difference, as expected, indicating unbiased selections. It may be concluded that 

Gauquelin's wished-for cases in main sectors 1, 2, 3, 10, 11 and 12 tended to be 

admitted to the published sample, even when they were of lesser eminence. On 

the other hand, low-eminence cases with Mars in initial sectors 36 and 9, of 

whose numerical contribution to the Mars effect Gauquelin was still unaware, 

slipped into the unpublished sample as easily as ordinary non-G sector cases. 

Initial and main sector results for Gauquelin's two samples are summarized by 

Figure 5, in the first two sections at the top. Each bar represents percent devia- 

tion from expectancy for either initial (solid) or main sectors (dashed). An arrow 

pointing to the right, as with Gauquelin's published athletes, indicates that birth 

frequencies rise from initial to main sectors, which is the direction of change for 

unbiased athletes samples. An arrow pointing to the left, as with Gauquelin's 

unpublished athletes, shows that birth frequencies drop from initial to main sec- 

tors, indicating a bias effect (i.e., main sector cases have been subtracted while 

initial sector cases have been kept in the sample). 

Figure 5 also shows the three skeptics' samples underneath the Gauquelin 

results. Interestingly, the CSICOP results strongly resemble the result for 

Gauquelin's unpublished athletes (arrow pointing to the left). The CP's and the 

CFEPP's samples, on the other hand, do not show the Gauquelin att tern.^ 

The Gauquelin and CSICOP cases therefore deserve more scrutiny. As a quan- 

titative indicator for possibly biased selections, the "initial vs. main sector quo- 

tient," or IMQ, is suggested: It is the ratio between the mean frequency for the 

initial sectors 36 and 9 (signified by IL) and the mean frequency for the main 

sectors 1, 2, 3 and 10, 1 1, 12 (denoted collectively by ML). Thus, IMQ = ILIML. 

The IMQ under ordinary positive Mars effect conditions, observed in unbiased 

data, should be near unity, though generally somewhat less, since birth frequen- 

cies for initial sector positions do not attain the average frequency level of main 

sector positions - the effect is only beginning at that point, and has not yet 

reached the peak attained in the main sectors. 

How is the IMQ affected by biased selection of data? Gauquelin's published 

and unpublished athlete samples serve as examples. If Gauquelin had used noth- 

ing but achievement criteria to divide his total sample into eminent (to be ana- 

lyzed and published) and less eminent groups (not to be analyzed and not to be 

4CP's low initial sector frequency is most probably due to chance, as this deviation can hardly result 

from any biased selections (see also Discussion).

Gauquelin's 

published data 

IMQ-diminished 

Effect on G% additive 

Total data 

Bias removed 

No IMQ deviation 

S. Ertel & K. Irving 

Gauquelin's 

unpublished data 

IMQ- enhanced 

Effect on G% subtractive 

IMQ 

Fig. 6. Initiallmain sectors qotient (IMQ) for Gauquelin's publishedunpublished, and total samples. 

0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 

Mars IMQ 

Fig. 7. Mean (=0.95) and confidence limits of IMQ (horizontal axis) for samples of varying size 

(vertical axis). Various empirical IMQs plotted.


published), the IMQs for the two subsamples would hardly differ. Apparently, 

however, his awareness of Mars sector positions influenced his decision to 

include certain low-rank athletes in the eminent (published) subsample and thus 

to exclude them from the less eminent (unpublished) subsample. In both cases 

the ratio IMQ is affected; it is raised for the sample from which he removed 

cases, and lowered for the sample to which he added cases. This is shown clearly 

in Figure 6, in which the IMQ for the latter sample (published data, G-cases 

added) is 0.83, while the IMQ for the former sample (unpublished data, G-cases 

removed) is noticeably high, at 1.3 1. When the two samples are combined, eras- 

ing any effect of shifting data from one to the other, the IMQ is 0.95 and no 

longer conspicuous. 

Figure 5 above has shown that the anomalous pattern of the initial and main 

sectors for the CSICOP data resembles that of the Gauquelin unpublished sub- 

sample. The IMQ for the American skeptics' data, is 1.58 which is close to 

Gauquelin's IMQ of 1.3 1. Is CSICOP's anomalous IMQ explainable correspond- 

ingly? Have cases been eliminated before the data had been submitted to official 

calculation? This would imply that prior knowledge of Mars sector positions had 

been obtained. Alternatively, the effect might be explainable by random fluctua- 

tions. The question arises which is the more likely explanation, the underlying 

error probabilities are thus called for. 

3. IMQ: Significance Tests 

Which variation of IMQ, as shown in Figures 5 and 6, is due to mere chance 

and which not? A randomization test for the IMQ was devised using control 

samples drawn from Gauquelin's ordinary people (N = 13,650), which is lacking 

planetary effects and is therefore suitable for comparison. The test provides esti- 

mates of significance (confidence limits) of Mars IMQs for all possible sample 

sizes between 200 and 4000 cases, at intervals of 50 cases (see Figure 7). For 

each sample size N = 200, 250, 300 ... 4000, one thousand samples were drawn at 

random from these ordinary people, and IMQs were determined in each case. 

Thus for each N, 1000 IMQs were obtained and they were rank-ordered 

upwards. Ranks 100 and 900 yield confidence limit p = 0.10, ranks 50 and 950 

yield p = 0.05, ranks 10 and 990 determine p = 0.01. Figure 7 shows, as it 

should, that the distance of confidence lines from the mean (see the vertical line 

at IMQ = 0.95) decreases with increasing sample size. 

As an example of how the probabilities apply, we determine the IMQ for 

Gauquelin's unpublished sample (N = 1,503 athletes, IMQ = 1.3 1). Is it larger 

than what might be expected by chance. We locate the intersection of 1.31 (ver- 

tical) and N = 1,503 (horizontal) and find that it lies beyond the confidence line 

p = 0.01; thus IMQ for Gauquelin's unpublished athletes is p < 0.01.' The IMQ 

for Gauquelin's published sample is within confidence limits, and the same is 

true for the IMQ of the CFEPP sample. Only CSCOP's IMQ is significantly 

'See Appendix.


greater than expected from randomized controls (p = 0.02). It is also noted that 

CP's IMQ deviates from chance expectation (p = 0.01), though in a direction 

opposite to CSICOP's, which will be discussed below. 

Next, the IMQs of three additional professions were checked for which 

Gauquelin claimed positive Mars effects (executives, N = 673; military leaders, 

N = 3,924; and physicians, N = 3,288). For them, the Mars IMQs as plotted in 

Figure 7 fall within the range of what might be expected by chance. Thus 

Gauquelin's published executives, military leaders and physicians are apparently 

not affected by selection bias in any significant way.6 Two samples collected by 

Mueller, German physicians (N = 1,286, Mueller, 1986) and French physicians 

(N = 1,083, Mueller and Ertel, 1994) were also subjected to this test: IMQs for 

these samples are not conspicuous either. 

4. IMQs and Mars G-Effects Compared 

As a side-step improving an understanding of IMQ it was examined whether 

the IMQ and G% are correlated, which, given the indications of Figures 5 and 6, 

they should be. First the data for ordinary people were examined. Since such 

data lack planetary effects, and thus any special emphasis on either main or initial 

sectors, Mars G% and IMQs for ordinary people would be expected to vary 

randomly and independently. Birth frequencies for, say, sectors 35 and 8 or 1 and 

10 are expected to vary across samples of ordinary people no less, and no less 

randomly, than sectors 36 and 9. 

From Gauquelin's large database samples of 800 ordinary persons were randomly 

drawn, 300 times. For each sample we noted G% and the corresponding 

IMQ, the results are plotted in Figure 8a. As expected, for ordinary people IMQs 

vary independently from G%, with Pearson's r = -.04. 

By contrast, in samples displaying planetary effects, the IMQs and G% values 

should correlate significantly. In the case of positive effects, birth frequencies 

begin to rise in sectors 36 and 9 and they continue rising up to the level of the 

main G-sectors. The IMQ is therefore expected to be 1, representing the downward slopes. The correlation between the Mars IMQs 

and G% for Gauquelin's, the skeptics', and Mueller's professional samples displaying 

positive and negative Mars effects is shown by Figure 8b, based on Table 

2, Appendix. As can be seen, IMQs and G% for these data sets are highly correlated 

(r = -0.77). For CSICOP's data and Gauquelin's unpublished athletes, G% 

6The most plausible reason for Gauquelin's anomalous IMQs, particularly with athletes, seems to be his 

defending the Mars effect against skeptic attacks that focused on athletes only. 

'With negative planetary effects, the direction of the relationship reverses, with birth frequencies drop- 

ping in sectors 36 and 9 toward the level of the main G-sectors. IMQ in this case is expected to be > 1 and 

to increase with increasing planetary effects (G%).


o Random samples (ord. people) 

0 ---- Reression (r=-0.04) 

0 

18 1 I I I I , I I I , I , I 

0,4 096 088 190 

IMQ 

192 1,4 In6 

Fig. 8a. IMQ and G% for ordinary people, based on 300 samples N = 800 people drawn randomly 

from a large database (N = 13,650). 

0 Prof. samples 

- Regression (r=-0.77) 

' " 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 - * 

094 096 098 190 192 1 94 196 

IMQ 

Fig. 8b. IMQ and G% for athletes and additional Mars-effect samples, based on Table 2 (Appendix).


is much lower than for other samples, and the IMQs are therefore inflated even 

above the level of samples with unbiased negative Mars effects (musicians, writ- 

ers, painters). As already noted, the CP's G% appears larger than other samples 

with positive Mars effect. But its IMQ is negatively inflated, opposite in direction 

from the CSICOP or Gauquelin's unpublished samples. 

5. Discussion 

The negative outlier IMQ of the Belgian skeptics (CP) is somewhat puzzling. 

Even though the CP has steadfastly defended the integrity of its sample and its 

freedom from any possible taint due to Gauquelin's participation 8 Ertel (1995) 

had discovered what appeared to be a pro-Gauquelin selection bias in the CP 

data (admitting low-eminent G-sector cases). 

In fact it had been noted earlier (Ertel (1988) that Gauquelin had assisted this 

group in collecting birth data as the author found documents for N = 73 cases 

excluded from the CP sample in Gauquelin's files in Paris (CP's office is in Brus- 

sels). But the known Gauquelin-bias (admitting low eminent G-sector cases), 

unquestionably in operation with CP's sample, could merely raise its main G- 

sector level. The initial G-sector level should remain untouched; biased selec- 

tions of the Gauquelin-type could not depress it (see Figure 5 for comparison of 

CP with other samples). Likewise, even if Gauquelin had excluded non-G sector 

cases from analysis irrespective of eminence criteria - which would imply 

fraud - only main G-sector frequencies would have been affected. It is not 

immediately clear why such handling of G-sector andlor non-G sector cases 

might ever cause an initial sector level to move out of the range of normal varia- 

tion. 

CP's lack of initial sector frequences might possibly be explained as follows: 

Gauquelin, at his speedily screening Mars sectors of CP athletes', might have 

separated near-hits (missing the G-zone by one sector) from the rest (clear hits 

and misses). He might have done this in order to look up near-hit cases more 

carefully later hoping to find among them additional hits. Eventually he might 

have joined the subsamples thereby excluding athletes of lesser eminence. At 

this moment his reluctance to exclude cases with Mars in G-zones would have 

become effective. At his joining of the subsamples, however, while forming a 

subsample of exclusions, the subsample of near-hits - small anyway - might 

have escaped him, inadvertantly he might have taken it as part of what he was 

going to exclude. 

'Prof. Dommanget replied (15 March 1993) to Ertel's question concerning Gauquelin's possible influ- 

ence on the Committee's data: "I consider it very difficult to fake a material like the one of 535 sports 

champions in such a way that this could not be seen. This material has been 'peeled' by us in different 

ways when trying to understand the problem and we never observed any indices permitting any suspicion 

of falsification. Moreover, all decisions about the material have been taken in common .... Of course, I may 

be wrong ...."


Is there any evidence for this conjecture? If Gauquelin had really behaved that 

way we would have to expect that birth frequencies are not only rare for initial 

sectors 36 and 9 (preceding sector numbers 1, 2, 3 and 10, 1 1, 1 2), but also for 

G-zone-succeeding sectors 4 and 13. Our prediction is testable. A quotient can be 

formed analogous to IMQ, let us call it SMQ, representing the level of G-zone- 

Succeeding sectors: (s4+s 13)/(s 1 +s2+s3+s 10+s 1 1 +s 1 2)/6. In fact, for the CP 

sample SMQ is conspicuously low (0.71), much lower than for the athlete sam- 

ples which did not suffer from IMQ-deflections: CFEPP (0.92), GAUQ- 

publ.+unpubl.(0.95), lower than for the unbiased Mueller samples (PH-German: 

0.87, PH-French: 0.96) and lower than for the ordinary people's SMQ (1.05). 

All Mars SMQ values obtained from 15 available files exceed CP's low level 

except the executives' SMQ (sample size N = 673) which is almost at the CP's 

level. Admittedly, the present guesswork is somewhat daring, but the available 

evidence suggests that CP's IMQ anomaly is not necessarily incomprehensible. 

The IMQ for the study by the French skeptics (CFEPP) was not conspicuous, 

thus giving no indication of a suppression of G-sector cases. This is not to say 

that their sample was not biased, however, since an appreciable bent towards 

low-eminence admissions has distorted it (Ertel, 1995). Nevertheless, even under 

such unfavorable conditions, when the 36-sector division was used, a Mars 

effect became manifest. The present results also indicate a positive Mars effect 

(see Figure 5), as the deviations of the CFEPP's G-sector frequencies from 

chance expectancy resemble the G-sector frequencies obtained from Gauquelin's 

published athletes (displaying the Mars effect), they do not resemble those 

obtained from ordinary people (not displaying the Mars effect), see bottom graph 

in Figure 5. 

The IMQ for the U.S. skeptics (CSICOP) appears anomalous. It deviates from 

expectancy in a way as was found with Gauquelin's problem data. The pattern of 

their initial and main G-sectors, as shown in Figure 5, fits the pattern of 

Gauquelin's unpublished athletes, and their IMQ of 1.58 is equally significant. 

Regarding Gauquelin's IMQ, there is no doubt that it indicates selection bias, 

considering Ertel's (1988) independent evidence. Selection bias of a similar 

nature should thus be considered as a possible explanation for CSICOP's IMQ. 

Is independent evidence here also a~ailable?~ 

In fact it is. Additional support for an understanding of the CSICOP's anomaly 

in terms of bias is obtained in view of an observation connected with CSICOP's 

collecting the data in three successive canvasses, with sector calculations run for 

each batch before the next was gathered. This procedure was criticized for possi- 

ble feedback effects in the commentaries that followed publication of the study 

(e.g. Rawlins, 1981 ; Curry, 1982), and statistical evidence for such effects has 

now been established. Figure 9a shows that in the CSICOP study the eminence 

criteria appear to have been lowered from one batch to the next. This judgment is 

backed by independent evidence from citation counts, as G-percentages for suc- 

cessive batches declined in lock step with eminence levels (see Ertel, 1995, Fig- 

ure 9b) (a scrutiny of this effect has been provided by Ertel, 1995).

S. Ertel & K. Irving 

1 2 3 

Canvass no. 

Fig. 9a. Declining eminence levels for CSICOP's three successive canvasses. 

25 

20: 

15: 

1 

- 

-.- 

T 

Chance expectaricy 

1 2 3 

Canvass no. 

Fig. 9b. Declining Mars effect indications (G%) for CSICOP's three canvasses. 

1


Thus, the evideilce, obtained by both, eyewitness of former reseachers and 

present statistical analysis, betrays an increasing eminence loss across batches. If 

CSICOP's IMQ is truly indicative of biased selections one would expect that 

their IMQ should rise correspondingly from one canvass to the next. The data are 

consequent with this expectation (see Table 3, Appendix), as the IMQ rises 

sharply across batches. That is, the level of the main sectors drops, while the 

level of the initial sectors remains constant. Looking at the error probabilities 

illustrated in Figure 7, we find the IMQs for the first canvass to be within normal 

range, while the IMQs for the second and third canvasses combined (N = 280), at 

1.52, deviate at the 0.05 level.'' 

The above argument implies that the two types of bias, G-sector avoidance 

and low-eminence admission, must be properly distinguished. Only G-sector 

avoidance affects the IMQ, due to the discrepancy between the untouched initial 

sector frequencies and the altered main sector frequencies. By contrast, low-emi- 

nence admission by itself will not affect the IMQ, since admitting less eminent 

athletes lowers frequencies in both the extended and narrow sectors equally - 

that is to say, the effect is fairly distributed across all 8 sectors involved. Unques- 

tionably, as was shown in Ertel, 1995, CSICOP's sample has been affected by a 

low-eminence bias, as shown in Figure 9a and 9b. The evidence of our present 

study suggests that their sample might suffer in addition from effects by G-sector 

avoidance. 

But is the evidence compelling? Combining the significance levels of our two 

independent indicators, IMQ (p = 0.02), and its rise over three successive can- 

'Rawlins (1979) explicitly addressed questions about the CSICOP sample, saying that "I vainly urged 

that the rest of CSICOP also stay out of sampling, as a matter of policy. However, since some have 

expressed suspicions regarding the fairness in this instance, I am bound to state that 1 (more than anyone) 

can vouch for the fact that Kurtz's selection was unbiased. To fudge the sample, one must correctly pre- 

compute celestial position, but Kurtz, Zelen, and Abell never did accomplish this before the samples were 

finally turned over to me and the solutions given to them." However, as the above-mentioned researchers 

themselves point out (Kurtz, Zelen, Abell, 1979), the Gauquelin sections are "similar to the 'Placidean' 

houses" which means they are easily approximated with standard horoscopes widely available from com- 

puter calculation services for a nominal fee. This is only to point out that the potential problems denied by 

Rawlins and alleged by others are within the realm of possibility, not to state that they are fact. As for 

"neutral researchers" Frank Dolce and Germaine Harnden, who were said to have made the "actual selec- 

tion" of the data in order to "avoid any bias by Kurtz, Zelen, and Abell" (Kurtz, Zelen, Abell, 1979), 

despite this statement, their role in the experiment is decidedly unclear, particularly with respect to who con- 

trolled the process of monitoring the responses to requests for birth data from various states and forwarding 

it to Rawlins. No account which details either of these two crucial steps mentions either Hamden or Dolce 

as having been involved in them. See Curry (1962) and Rawlins (1981). 

'@Though only Dennis Rawlins, member of the CSICOP research team, apparently had the expertise to 

do the astronomical computer calculations and he, by his own choice, had no part in the sampling process, 

this does not exclude the possibility that researchers in charge of data selection obtained Mars sector posi- 

tions independently. Since the Gauquelin "sectors are roughly equivalent to the 9th and 12th houses of a 

standard horoscope using Placidus houses (Jerome, 1975), any birth for which the horoscope shows Mars in 

one of these houses will likely have Mars in a key sector. No expertise is required to obtain such horoscopes. 

As one example, widely-advertised computer calculation services have offered batch calculations of such 

horoscopes for nominal sums since the early 1970s, and all that is required to use them is the raw data. Dis- 

cussion of the relation of Placidus houses to Gauquelin sectors is found at several points in the extensive lit- 

erature on CSICOP and the Mars effect, so knowledge of the relation between the two was available to all 

principals.


vasses (p = 0.05), yields p = 0.01. For ordinary research, effects associated with 

this level of error probability are conventionally considered as "very significant." 

However, in the present case we expressly abstain from any firm interpretation of 

this finding. After all, an error probability of p = .O1 does not exclude error. Even 

though G-sector avoidance would fit as just another aspect of the conspicious 

drop of G-sector frequencies from one batch to the next the anomalous IMQ 

might be fortuitous. 

Only one conclusion appears unavoidable: CSICOP's alleged negative evi- 

dence for a Mars effect must henceforth be disregarded unless the CSICOP 

would prove that a chance interpretation of the present IMQ-finding has in fact 

no alternative. For example, the CSICOP might invite critical non-CSICOP 

researchers to check their original lists of data and their correspondence with 

birth registry offices. This would be in keeping with the open files policy fol- 

lowed by Gauquelin, and also consequent with the CSICOP's own generously 

providing their data in the past to critical researchers. Alternative ways of prov- 

ing the integrity of CSICOP's data are hardly conceivable, but if convincing, 

might certainly be accepted. 

Disclosures of retarding episodes obtained by probes into past research are less 

urgent than is the advancement of our understanding of the planetary effects in 

future perspective. If nothing else, the IMQ has added another element to the 

evidence of Gauquelin's findings, a seemingly small one, but powerful enough to 

reveal at one blow the discoverer's personal weakness as well as the strength of 

his discovery. 

Acknowledgment 

We received helpful comments on the first draft of this paper from Geoffrey 

Dean, David Valentiner, and Mark Urban-Lurain. 

Appendix: Further Explanation of IMQ 

Gauquelin's published sample of (N = 2,888) is biased by individual selections 

favoring a Mars effect, since cases born with Mars in main G-sectors tended to 

be included. We therefore expect an IMQ smaller than chance level. The effect 

for the published sample, however, should be numerically smaller than that for 

the unpublished sample, considering the greater size of the published compared 

to the unpublished sample. The logic will become clear through the examples in 

Table 1. 

An athletes' sample may have, say, 720 cases, 20 cases in each of 36 Mars 

sectors. So 20 cases are assumed to be born with Mars in each of 8 G-sectors 

(for sector numbers, see first row). We may divide the total equally into two 

subsamples (PUB and U-PUB) in such a way that each subsamples has 10 cases 

in each G-sector (second row). IMQs for PUB or U-PUB are therefore 

( lo)/) 10+ 10+ 10)/3 = 1.0 (see last column). We now simulate biased selections 

such that each main G-sector of the U-PUB sample obtains 8 instead of 10 cases


(third row, IMQ = 1.25). In this instance the published counterpart sample 

PUB(1) gets 12 G-sector cases instead of 10 (fourth row, IMQ = 0.83). 

Suppose the original sample has 30 cases with Mars in each G-sector and our 

dividing the total allocates 10 cases to U-PUB and 20 cases to PUB. In that 

case, biased allocation to U-PUB as shown in the third row would give rise to 

TABLE 1 

Effects on IMQs by Biased Sampling for Fictive Samples 

I M M M I M M M 

I sectors 36 1 2 3 9 10 11 12 IMQ 

2 PUB & U-PUB 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1.0 

3 U-PUB 10 8 8 8 10 8 8 8 1.25 

4 PUB (1) 10 12 I2 12 12 12 12 12 0.83 

5 PUB (2) 20 22 22 22 20 20 20 20 0.91 

I: initial G-sector 

M: main G-sector 

CFEPP 

CP 

CSICOP 

EX 

MI 

MU 

SP (Pub) 

SP (Upub) 

PA 

PH 

PH(D) 

PH(F) 

WR 

TABLE 2 

Mars G-Sector Percentages 

Profession Source N PI^ G% IMQ 

Athletes, French 

Athletes, Belg./Fr. 

Athletes, U.S.A. 

Executives 

Milit. Leaders 

Musicians 

Athletes, Publ. 

Ahtletes, Unpubl. 

Painters 

Physicians 

Physicians, German 

Physicians, French 

Writers 

CFEPP 

CP 

CSICOP 

Gauq. 

Gauq. 

Gauq. 

Gauq. 

Gauq. 

Gauq. 

Gauq. 

Muel. 

Muel. 

Gauq. 

pos 

pos 

- 

pos 

PO s 

neg 

PO s 

- 

neg 

PO s 

POS 

PO s 

neg 

(G%) direction of Mars effect, (poslneg), and initiallmain sector quotient (IMQ) for athletes and 

additional samples. 

TABLE 3 

IMQs for CSICOP's Three Canvasses Separately and Total (cd. Figs. 9a & 9b) 

Canvass: I st 2nd 3rd Total 

N 128 198 82 408 

f(I) 6 16 7 29 

f(M) 25 24 6 5 5 

MQ 0.72 2.00 3.50 1.58 

f(1) frequencies of births for initial sectors 36,9 f(M) frequencies of births for main sectors 1,2, 3, 

10, 1 1, 12. Example for IMQ calculation, 2nd canvass: (1 6/2)/(24/6)= 2.00. 

I


biased allocations for PUB(2) is 0.91, and the distortion of IMQ for PUB (2) is 

thus numerically smaller than IMQ for PUB ( 1). 

Gauquelin's published sample is almost twice as large as Gauquelin's unpub- 

lished sample, so its IMQ (= 0.87) deviates less from expectation (which is < 1 

anyway) than the IMQ of the unpublished sample, IMQ = 0.87 is, for that rea- 

son, not significant, as Figure 7 shows. 

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Research Report. 

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sur une recherche faite par M. M. Gauquelin dans le domain des influences planktaires. Nouvelles 

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[Cosmic influences on human behavior], London: Futura, 1976). Freiburg i. Br.: Bauer. 

(Reprinted: 1 988). 

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on the same material. Correlation, 4, 1, 8. 

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Gauquelin, M. (1988b). Planetaty Heredity. ACS Publications. San Diego. 

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10,70. 

Irving, K. (1995). The Mars effect controversy. In: S. Ertel, T. and K. Irving, The Tenacious Mars 

Effect. London: Urania. 

Kammann, R. (1982). The true believers: Mars effect drives skeptics to irrationality. Zetetic Scholar, 

10, 50. 

Kurtz, P., Zelen, M., and Abell, G. 0. (1979180 b). Results of the US test of the "Mars effect" are 

negative. The Skeptical Inquirer, 4,2, 19. 

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Journal of Scientijic Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 19-39, 1997 0892-33 10197 

O 1997 Society for Scientific Exploration 

Is the "Mars Effect" Genuine? 

PAUL KURTZ, JAN WILLEM NIENHUYS, RANJIT SANDHU 

State University ofNew York, c/o PO Box 32, BufSalo, NY 14215 

Abstract - Gauquelin claimed that there is a statistically significant correlation 

between the positions of Mars and the times and places of birth of sports cham- 

pions. Independent scientists have attempted to replicate this hypothesis without 

success. We provide a brief history: the Cornit6 Para, the Zelen and U.S. tests, 

and a recent French test. Ertel and Irving, in sifting through the data, attempt to 

rescue Gauquelin's thesis. Ertel introduced his "eminence test", and Ertel and 

Irving their "IMQ bias indicator." However, they presuppose what they set out 

to prove. We conclude that there is insufficient evidence for the "Mars effect", 

and that this effect may be attributed to Gauquelin's selective bias in either dis- 

carding or adding data post hoc. 

Gauquelin's Claim 

French psychologist and writer Michel Gauquelin, in collaboration with his wife, 

Frangoise Schneider-Gauquelin, wrote that although classical astrology was mis- 

taken, there were "astrobiological" or "cosmobiological" correlations between 

planetary positions and birth times on the one hand and personality traits and 

professional achievements on the other - between Jupiter and military men, 

Saturn and scientists, Mars and sports champions, etc. 

The planet Mars rises and sets just like any other celestial phenomenon. Mr. 

and Mrs. Gauquelin divide the time between rising and setting into six equal 

intervals, numbered 1 through 6. Likewise, they divide the time between setting 

and rising into another six equal intervals, numbered 7 through 12. These sectors 

coincide with one of a dozen or so popular astrological house systems, namely 

that of Placidus, though the Placidean numbering is different. 

The Gauquelins suggested that sports champions were somewhat more likely 

to be born when Mars is passing through the first sector (approximately the first 

two hours after the rise of Mars) and the fourth sector (roughly the two hours 

after culmination). Interestingly, in the traditional astrology of Ptolemy (Tetra- 

biblos), the two most important points in the house divisions are the Ascendant 

("oroscopos") and the Midheaven or Medium Celi - which are the initial 

boundaries of the Gauquelins' sectors 1 and 4. 

It would appear that the chance of being born in either the first or fourth sec- 

tors is 2 out of 12, or 16.67%. A small adjustment is necessary, however, to take 

two factors into account: (1) the astronomic factor, namely the positions of Mars 

as seen from Earth, or more specifically from the latitude of France, and (2) the 

demographic factor, namely the daily pattern of births (more in the early morn-

20 Kurtz et al. 

ing, fewer in the evening). This adjustment has been estimated at about 0.5%, 

making the chance expectation 17.17% (Rawlins, 1979-80, p. 30). Sports cham- 

pions, said Gauquelin, were born in the first and fourth sectors about 22% (more 

exactly, 452 in 2,088, or 21.65%) of the time. The deviation was too small to be 

of any practical use. One must meticulously collect hundreds of cases to observe 

it at all. Yet if Gauquelin was correct, the deviation was theoretically interesting.' 

Michel Gauquelin collected champions' names from sports directories, and 

then tried to locate their actual birth data in the town registries. In support of his 

claim, he published in 1955 a total of 567 French champions with their names 

and birth data (plus one erroneous name) (Gauquelin, 1955). In 1960 he reported 

915 additional foreign champions, together with 717 "less well known" sports 

people that served as a control, but without specific names and data (Gauquelin 

1 960). 

He added further data to his files from a replication by the Belgian ComitC 

Para (more on this below). With Gauquelin's help, the ComitC Para derived a 

sample of sports champions, which by 1968 produced 330 new names (mostly of 

French champions). 

Gauquelin added another 276 names (among whom were 113 aviators and 76 

rugby players) to his total sample, to yield 2,088 "well-known" champions 

(Gauquelin, 1970). Meanwhile he collected piecemeal another 278 "lesser" 

champions before 1976. We mention this, because in the discussions Michel 

Gauquelin and others have stated several times that the 2,088 consisted of 1,553 

champions collected first, followed by the ComitC Para test of 535 champion^.^ 

The Test by the Belgian Cornit6 Para 

As mentioned above, the Belgian Comiti Para, beginning in 1967, attempted 

to test Gauquelin's thesis. Their 535 champions consisted of 205 already in 

Gauquelin's 1955 book (it was thus not an entirely fresh sample) and 330 "new" 

ones. In 1976 the Comiti Para published its final report (1976), and found that 

22.2% of these sports champions were born with Mars in sectors 1 or 4. (We 

shall hereafter refer to the percentage born with Mars in sectors 1 and 4 as the 

Mars percentage.) The Comite Para maintained, however, that Gauquelin's theo- 

retical expectation (of about 17 percent) was not computed correctly. There was 

thus some dispute between the ComitC Para and Gauquelin about whether the 

test constituted a replication. The ComitC Para thought that demographic factors 

-- -- -- 

'A sympathetic account of the Gauquelins' studies can be found in Eysenck and Nias (1982, 

pp. 182-209), and interested readers are encouraged to consult this source. Though the two authors were 

favorable to the Gauquelins' hypotheses, we believe that they might modify their views were they to exam- 

ine the recent research and findings, which we summarize below. 

2For example, in "The Truth about the Mars Effect on Sports Champions" (M. and E Gauquelin 1976) 

the Gauquelins refer to "the committee's results for 535 sports champions ... our former results for the group 

of 1,553 other champions." In the next issue of The Humanist (Abell and Gauquelin 1976, p. 40) this 

evolved into 1,553 champions from the 1960 publication and a separate sample of 535 m&ng a total of 

2,088. M. and F. Gauquelin (1977) refer in their report on the Zelen test to "our first group of 1,553" and 

"the Cornit6 Para's group of 535," and in 1979 they distinguish "the effect observed by the Belgian Cornit6 

Para (22.2 percent) and by us (21.4 percent)," ie. 119 in 535 and 333 in 1,553. (See also Gauquelin, 1978.)

Mars Effect 21 

were not properly taken into account: the births of the athletes were not uniform- 

ly distributed in the time-period studied (1872-1945), and the daily patterns of 

births varied during this period. Gauquelin insisted that the Comit6 Para's test 

had confirmed his hypothesis. The Comit6 Para denied it. 

Gauquelin had helped to supply the data for the test of the Comit6 Para. How- 

ever, the circumstances surrounding the data compilation of the test are most 

unclear. Ertel (1988) claims that the 332 "new" champions of the Para test (a 

counting error; it should be 330) had already been collected by Gauquelin in 

1962, along with 76 Belgian soccer players that had not been used in the Para 

test. Luc de Mart-6 states that at the meeting between Gauquelin and the Comitk 

Para in 1967 the list of 535 names was already decided upon (Ertel & Irving, 

1996, pp. SE-18, 19, and 50). This claim is hardly credible; it presupposes that 

the Comitk Para was clairvoyant and knew in advance the precise number of 

champions about whom they would receive information from town halls. The 

Comitk Para collected 430 French champions from their main source book, but 

Professor J. Dommanget has provided documents indicating that data of 589 

champions from this book were requested. 

Concerning the Belgian soccer players, it was decided to select only the 43 

who had been chosen to defend the glory of Belgium at least 20 times. It is 

unknown how that decision was arrived at and if any prior knowledge of the 

Mars effect among Belgian soccer players played a role in that decision. If 

Ertel's information about the year 1962 is accurate then Gauquelin knew already 

the Mars positions of 119 Belgian soccer players when the decision about the 

cut-off at 20 was taken. We do know that above that cut-off the Mars percentage 

happens to be 21% and below that line it is only 12%. 

We think there is sufficient reason to reject the result of the Para test. There are 

too many doubts surrounding the process of data gathering. 

The "Zelen Test" 

The dispute between Gauquelin and the Cornit6 Para concerned the expected 

"Mars percentage" for the general population. Marvin Zelen, then a professor of 

statistics at State University of New York, now at Harvard, proposed a test of the 

baseline percentage. This became known as the "Zelen test," and it was devel- 

oped in cooperation with astronomer George Abell and Paul Kurtz. Zelen recom- 

mended Gauquelin randomly draw 100 or 200 names from his sample of cham- 

pions,3 and then compare their Mars sectors with all other births occurring at the 

same times and places (Zelen, 1976). Zelen designed this test to help determine 

the baseline Mars percentage, and also to control for various other demographic 

aspects that had so far not been a matter of dispute. 

Michel and Fran~oise Gauquelin assembled birth data on 16,756 ordinary per- 

sons born at about the same times and places as a subsample of 303 champions. 

- - - --- -- -- --- -- - 

3Zelen specifically referred to "Gauquelin's sample of 1,553 sports champions." Apparently Zelen had 

been led to believe that there was a neat batch of pre-Comitt Para champions that could be used to generate 

a null-hypothesis for the new batch of Comitk Para-champions.


They observed that the Zelen method yielded a theoretical prediction of 51.4 

births in sectors 1 and 4 among the 303, i.e. 16.96%. More precisely, this result 

means that the "true" percentage is between 16.4% and 17.5% (95% confidence 

limits) and that there is no reason to suppose that the astrodemographic correc- 

tion should vastly exceed 0.5%. There was again some dispute as to the validity 

of the test, particularly since the Gauquelins did not follow Zelen's original pro- 

tocol (Zelen et al., 1977). For example, Gauquelin did not draw the names ran- 

domly. His total sample of 2,088 champions included 42 Parisian athletes, and 

he included all 42 in his subsample of 303. He selected the remaining champions 

from those who had been born in capitals of Departments of France or Provinces 

of Belgium. 

The Gauquelins also chose the matching non-champions in Paris from only 

one of the 20 arrondissements. Strictly speaking, this was a breach of the proto- 

col, but it is difficult to see what difference it could make for the expected per- 

centage, as the weight of "Paris" in the 16.96% was less than one-seventh. A 

more important deviation was Gauquelin's decision to examine only capitals of 

Departments and provinces, though this might mean no more than a few tenths 

of a percent. Nonetheless, the results suggested that demographic factors were 

not the explanation of the "Mars effect". 

The Gauquelins pointed out that among their 303 champions were 66 Mars 

champions, i.e., 66 born with Mars in sectors 1 and 4. Given the expectation of 

5 1.4, they wrote that this was "clearly significant at the 0.05 level." Now "signif- 

icant" in statistics merely means "worth a closer investigation," even though it is 

often misinterpreted as "incontrovertible proof." Zelen, Abell, and Kurtz's com- 

ments on the Zelen test constituted such a closer investigation. Zelen pointed out 

that the subsample of 303 was not randomly drawn from the 2,088. More specif- 

ically, about half of the "excess" of 15 Mars champions came from Paris. In 

other words, the comments of Zelen, Abell, and Kurtz constituted a very mildly 

formulated suggestion that it was not the astrodemographic factor, but some 

peculiarity associated with Gauquelin's data handling and collection, that might 

be the ultimate explanation of the Mars Effect. 

Some critics have interpreted these comments as inadmissible sample splitting. 

However, the core of these comments constituted a legitimate inquiry. If a non- 

random procedure compromises the representativeness of a sample, then surely it 

is permissible at least to discuss the effects of such deviations from the protocol. 

Much of the ensuing controversies have centered on these remarks about 

champions from Paris and elsewhere. Dennis Rawlins was much more outspoken 

in his conviction that the main problem might be Gauqelin's data handling. He 

predicted that the outcome of the Zelen test would not been seen as the exclusion 

of an astrodemographic explanation of Gauquelin's findings, but instead would 

mistakenly be seen as an independent test of the Mars effect. He advised that the 

Zelen test episode should be treated as a tactical error. With the wisdom of 20120 

hindsight Rawlins no doubt was correct. The Zelen test was proposed and under-


ble claim of a giant astrodemographic effect, in the expectation of possibly find- 

ing a naturalistic explanation of the Mars effect. 

The U.S. Test 

Since it was Gauquelin himself who had done almost all data gathering in support 

of the Mars effect claim, an independent replication was called for. When 

Marvin Zelen first suggested the Zelen test, he also said that at least one further 

replication, on a fresh sample, would be necessary. George Abell (1976) put this 

suggestion into print: "if ... [Gauquelin's] results hold up, then it is necessary to 

repeat the experiment with a new sample, say in the United States." (Since the 

genesis of this test actually predates the formation of the Committee for the Scientific 

Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), we call it the U.S. 

test. And even before the publication of the results of the Zelen test, Paul Kurtz, 

Marvin Zelen, and George Abell met with Michel Gauquelin and together they 

outlined plans for a test in the U.S.) 

Zelen, Abell, and Kurtz constituted themselves as an ad hoc committee to 

devise and supervise the test. It was a blind experiment, with the data drawn by 

students at the State University of New York, Gerrnain Hamden and Frank 

Dolce. Dennis Rawlins in San Diego calculated the positions of Mars. Although 

the American group consulted with Gauquelin throughout, he had no direct role 

in compiling the data. The American group used five sports dictionaries - The 

Lincoln Library of Sports Champions (1974), Who's Who in Football (Mendell 

and Phares 1974), Who's Who in Basketball (Mendell 1973), Who's Who in Boxing 

(Burrill 1974), and Who's Who in Track and Field (Hanley, 1973). 

The U.S. researchers believed that consulting sports directories or Who's Whos 

of sports champions would be the most reliable guide. These volumes generally 

publish lists of the highest achievers in sports and the best-known champions. 

Some do so by listing athletes across many sports, and others only provide a 

Who's Who for specific sports. Of the millions and millions of individuals 

engaged in competitive sports in America, these directories only contain a few 

thousand champions, the cr2me de la cr2me, as it were. These volumes were 

compiled by editors and authors who were surely unaware of Gauquelin's 

hypothesis. Some of them contain citations of several hundred of the leading 

champions in a specific sport. The Lincoln Library of Sports Champions contains 

493 entries derived from all of the fields of sports. Who's Who in Football contains 

1,397 of the most famous names from the very beginning of the sport to 

1974.~ Who's Who in Basketball contains 921 names, Who's Who in Boxing 499 

names, and Who's Who in Track and Field 420 names. When we delete the 

champions born outside of the U.S., the champions for whom insufficient birth 

data are supplied, the duplicate entries, the coaches, umpires, referees, reporters, 

4~rtel is rather arbitrary in classifying sports. He treats American and European football as if these two 

sports have more in common than the name (see Ertel and Irving 1996, p. SE-56, note 33) and he goes so 

far as to suggest that basketball is not a sport at all, but rather a form of art like ballet (Ertel and Irving 1996, 

p. SE-54, note 3 1). 

. -


managers, promoters, team owners, and so forth, we are left with a grand total of 

2,4 19 eligible champions. 

These numbers suggest that the standards used were comparable to 

Gauquelin's own, which had yielded his 22% hypothesis; for these 2,419 eligible 

champions are from a country with five times the population of France. 

Gauquelin's 1,356 French published champions number more than half of this 

amount, and that is after he had selected the "best" and after the loss due to the 

untraceability of champions' birth data. 

Given the then recently enacted Privacy Act in the United States, many reg- 

istries would not supply birth data without the permission of the athletes, which 

was difficult to obtain. Accordingly, the American group deemed it essential to 

send for the birth data of all the sports champions listed in those directories, 

without selection, provided they were born in states that agreed to supply data. 

The American group was able to assemble a sample of 408 sports champions. 

The results were negative, with 55 (13.5%) of the sports champions born with 

Mars in the first and fourth sectors. With a null-hypothesis of 16.67% the 

p-value was reported at 0.09. Hence, Zelen, Abell, and Kurtz concluded that an 

effort at replication of a fresh U.S. sample showed no evidence for the Mars 

effect (Kurtz et al., 1979-80; Rawlins, 1979-80). 

Those who sent for the data did not have any prior knowledge of the Mars 

positions. The Mars effect was calculated by Dennis Rawlins in San Diego only 

after the data were received. The U.S. researchers sent for all the data and they 

published all of the data received from the states waiving the Privacy Act. They 

at no time knew the Mars positions before they were included in the sample, nor 

were any data omitted. 

These facts are clearly stated in the report on the U.S. test (Kurtz, et al., 1979, 

pp. 21-23). One of our authors, Ranjit Sandhu, in response to an earlier version 

of Ertel and Irving's paper, independently reviewed (in late 1995) the original 

data from the U.S. test. He corroborates that the above test was conducted as the 

published accounts indicate. 

Gauquelin immediately disputed the interpretation of the results of the U.S. 

test, claiming that too many U.S. champions were not outstanding enough (M. & 

F. Gauquelin, 1979-1980). For example, he argued that the names listed in 

Who's Who in Football were "surely too many to represent the top athletes." He 

wrote that the selections should have been made from within the five directories, 

and that one must winnow names from these lists. By what criteria? Only the 

"most famous," said Gauquelin, and only those, he insisted, who were "interna- 

tionally known." 

But these champions are famous! Anyone who wishes to examine whether the 

champions listed in these directories are anything less than eminent is encour- 

aged to visit a library and inspect these books thoroughly. He or she will find that 

very many of these champions are still being mentioned frequently on the sports 

pages of U.S. newspapers. Gauquelin tried to select a subsample from the total 

set of 408 by pointing to other American reference books in which they were


mentioned. Eventually he included only 192 in his files, and he discarded 216 

names entirely, even though they had been published. His selection, however, 

was clearly made in full awareness of the positions of Mars at the birth of all 

408 champions. 

Gauquelin's 1979 Test 

Gauquelin had meanwhile published in 1979 another test of 432 French sports 

champions who had not been included in his original studies, which he claimed 

further corroborated his thesis (Gauquelin, 1979). The U.S. group was hesitant to 

accept his conclusion, because the criteria by which Gauquelin selected notable 

sports champions seemed to vary from test to test. They wondered whether 

Gauquelin's own selective bias was not the real explanation for the "Mars 

effect." Kurtz, Zelen, and Abell speculated that Gauquelin knew the Mars sec- 

tors of athletes beforehand and introduced the criteria post hoc in order to favor 

those with Mars in key sectors (Kurtz et al., 1980). 

Gauquelin's study excluded the names of 423 "lesser" champions. Gauquelin 

never honored the American team's repeated requests that he provide this list. 

According to Gauquelin these 423 lesser champions were composed of two 

groups: "minor" French champions taken from Le Roy's Dictionnaire ency- 

clope'dique des sports, and Italian cyclists taken from the reference books Ve'lo 

1968 and Ve'lo 1970. (Gauquelin, 1979, pp. 21 and 28). Gauquelin said that these 

three works together contain 42 champions in Mars sector 1. In Ertel's database 

of Gauquelin's champions there are 24 Italian cyclists marked "GMINV",5 and 

only one of them is born in Mars sector 1. Thus one would expect 399 French 

"minor" Dictionnaire champions, with 41 of them born in sector 1. Between 

1979 and 1986 Gauquelin located additional names (Ertel, 1988). According to 

Ertel, the original "minor" French champions numbered 432, not 423. So Ertel's 

database contains 455 champions marked "GMIND, though after correction for 

duplicates the number should be 453. However, these 453 contain only 32 cham- 

pions born in Mars sector 1. So something does not tally: either Gauquelin's sec- 

tor count in 1979 is wrong or Ertel's database is incorrect. The numbers 

Gauquelin reported give the impression that his "control group" had a Mars per- 

centage of 16.8% (71 out of 423) instead of something like 13%. In actuality, the 

453 "lesser" champions in Ertel's files contain 61 Mars champions (13.5%), and 

the "lesser" champions found by the CFEPP had a Mars percentage of 12.2%. 

Gauquelin continued to collect data after he published this test. In 1982 he 

gathered, on his own, another 159 U.S. champions. By 1986 he had added anoth- 

er 50 French athletes (both "famous" and "lesser"), whose data he said had been 

untraceable in earlier studies. 

5We understand that GMlNV means "Gauquelin Minor Ve'lo Champions," and that GMlND means 

"Gauquelin Minor Dictionnaire champions."


The New French Test 

Until then the evidence for Gauquelin's "Mars effect" was based largely on 

French sports champions collected by Gauquelin himself. So it was proposed 

that an independent group of French scientists attempt a replication, using data 

on French athletes. Gauquelin agreed to this proposal. 

The protocol for this test was published in the leading French popular science 

journal Science & Vie in October 1982. Of course these French athletes had been 

gone over thrice already, resulting in publications by Gauquelin in 1955, 1970 

and 1979, and it was to be expected that not many new champions could be 

found. The value of the new test was entirely in its protocol, which covered all 

aspects of such a test from the setting of criteria to the final comparison with a 

control sample, and it aimed at a procedure that excluded even the smallest intru- 

sion of Gauquelin's prior knowledge of Mars positions into the selection and 

data-gat hering process. 

This new test was performed under the auspices of the French Committee for 

the Study of Paranormal Phenomena (Comitk Fran~ais pour 1'Etude des 

Phknomknes Paranormaux, or CFEPP). Many researchers were involved at vari- 

ous times, and the support of two prestigious national institutes (INED, the 

National Institute for Demographic Studies, and ING, the National Geographical 

Institute) was enlisted. The French researchers tried to solicit sports journalists to 

assist them in the selection of champions. The journalists declined, though sever- 

al recommended the use of the Dictionnaire encyclope'dique des sports (1973) as 

the primary reference. Gauquelin urged the addition of another reference, L'ath- 

l2ge (195 l), which the Committee added. The data were compiled independently 

of Gauquelin. Altogether 1,439 champions were selected, and these resulted 

eventually (after corrections by Nienhuys) in 1,120 reliable data received. The 

construction of the control group seemed to present insuperable logistical diffi- 

culties. By the time all the champions' data had been received, the CFEPP was 

plagued by various problems, and was unable to do any more data gathering, 

which would have required sending out many thousands of letters and gathering 

an estimated 24,000 names from Paris alone and many more from elsewhere. So 

a different method was proposed for the control group, namely the creation of a 

group of fictitious individuals by scrambling the data. Gauquelin agreed with this 

procedure (which had already been used by the Comit6 Para) and he was also 

given extensive opportunity to comment on both the selection criteria and the 

data received. The protocol stated that Gauquelin's proposals should be taken 

into consideration, which the CFEPP did by publishing them and analyzing them 

carefully. Among the 1,120 champions, 207 (18.48%) were born in the 1 st and 

4th sector, which does not differ significantly from the values obtained from the 

control group 6 . Thus the French test did not reveal a Mars effect. 

Gauquelin's proposals to the French Committee consisted of modifications of 

the sample. He suggested that certain athletes be removed from the list because 

"they were not famous enough and that others be added. His proposals appeared 

to the French Committee to be extremely biased. He suggested names to be


added that the CFEPP had not been able to find, he pointed out data received that 

contained errors, and he mentioned individual champions and entire groups that 

were overlooked or overrated, but these suggestions skewed the results in the 

direction Gauquelin wanted. For example, he conveniently recommended data 

corrections that increased the Mars percentage, and withheld those corrections 

that decreased the Mars percentage. Regarding the corrections that would neither 

increase nor decrease the Mars effect, he mentioned only one-sixth. The CFEPP 

researchers concluded: "In our considered judgment, the Mars effect study 

demonstrates some bias in the selective process on the part of M. Gauquelin" 

(Benski et al., 1996). 

One of us (Nienhuys) carefully reviewed the CFEPP's study. He found a few 

errors and omissions, but these did not change the results of the study. Nienhuys 

formulates the conclusion to be drawn from the French test as follows: "the 

whole point in this laborious test was to find out what remains cfthe Mars efect 

when one starts from scratch without the help of Gauquelin. The answer is: noth- 

ing " (Benski et al., 1996). 

Gauquelin committed suicide on May 20, 1991 in Paris. Ertel wrote: 

The root of the Gauquelin tragedy might be found in his struggle of many years, to no 

effect, for acknowledgement of his discovery in mainstream science. Great efforts at 

defending his empirical observations against successive attacks from three skeptical orga- 

nizations had worn him out. In each of them he became entangled with ill-will and strate- 

gies so dubious some members of the adversary camps even left their organizations in 

protest. Michel Gauquelin stayed on the battlefield for nearly three decades, but toward 

the end of his life he repeatedly complained that the strain of those decades of combat had 

used up his physical resources. 

Gauquelin did not leave behind any document explaining his decision, but there is one 

deplorable hint. By his last will he demanded that all empirical data amassed through his 

lifetime, more than 30,000 birth documents on file in perfect order, must be destroyed. His 

will was put into effect, and it is almost inevitable to understand his act as a charge, not 

only directed at those who had not played fair with him but directed at all scientists not 

serving and suffering as much as he did in the pursuit of scientific truth (Ertel, 1993).~ 

We believe that these charges are unfair. Gauquelin seemed seriously ill in 

January of that year, and it is said that he privately expressed negative opinions 

about skeptics. However, most of the skeptics who worked with Gauquelin were 

personally cordial, even though they raised legitimate questions whether there 

was sufficient evidence to corroborate his thesis. 

fThe CFEPP reports that the control group yields 18.2% as the "theoretical estimate." This seems to be 

the result of a slowly convergent algorithm, and Nienhuys found about 17.7%, a value close to what Ertel 

claims to be correct. This implies a p-value of about 0.42, i.e. a chance of about two in five of accidentally 

getting a value that deviates at least as much from 17.7% as the CFEPP's result. Even with this modifica- 

tion, however, the results are still not significant.


The "Eminence Effect" 

A new dimension to the controversy is the work of Suitbert Ertel, who claims 

to find independent corroboration for Gauquelin's thesis. In the foregoing paper, 

he and Irving attempt to dismiss the negative tests disconfirming Gauquelin and 

to show why the Mars effect is still valid. 

They base their method on Gauquelin's post hoc analysis of the U.S. test, in 

which he claimed that "internationally famous sports champions" (of a sample 

selected by him) showed a higher percentage born in Mars key sectors than the 

sports champions who were merely famous. The latter group had a Mars percent- 

age far below the expected 17% attributed to "ordinary" people. It is at this point 

that the entire procedure became rather strange and peculiar. The independent 

tests of Gauquelin's thesis ultimately settled for simple criteria such as being 

mentioned in an authoritative source and meeting general across-the-board mini- 

mum quality requirements. The introduction of extra eminence criteria intro- 

duces a great deal of latitude into the analysis of data of people with known Mars 

positions. 

In fact, Gauquelin's criteria of fame shifted from publication to publication. 

He would change criteria midstream. For example, in some studies only 

Olympic Gold Medalists would be included as sufficiently famous international- 

ly; for other studies Silver and Bronze Medalists might be included. 

Ertel claims to be able to resolve the question of "eminence" on more objec- 

tive grounds, by proposing that we count the number of citations of an athlete in 

various directories. Ertel and Irving maintain that a citation count might mean 

only that an athlete was "referred to at least once." Referred to in what manner? 

A passing remark to an athlete or to a non-sport-related matter should not prop- 

erly be counted as a citation or an indicator of eminence. Ertel assembled 18 

directories, most of them European, and he claims to find a correlation between 

them and the Mars effect. The Gauquelin "Mars effect" hypothesis says that 

highly qualified champions show a high Mars percentage. The Ertel "eminence 

effect" hypothesis says that any group of athletes will show an increasing relation 

between "eminence" and Mars percentage. So if the Mars percentage happens to 

be low in a sample, the "eminence effect" still has a chance, thus allowing the 

claimant to bet on two horses for the price of one. 

The contents of dictionaries are based on athletes' achievements. However, 

many items in a dictionary are not related to sporting achievement. Often a dic- 

- - -- 

7The information about Gauquelin's "last will" is only a friend-of-a-friend tale: "I was told by one of 

Gauquelin's friends who said he had contacted relatives who had told him that Michel wanted the data to be 

burned" (e-mail message of November 14, 1994 from Suitbert Ertel to Jan Willem Nienhuys). The only 

thing that seems certain is that Gauquelin's files are gone. They might have been destroyed by people who 

were unaware of their value and who fibbed about it afterwards. There seems little evidence to justify the 

grand picture of a desperate last act directed to fellow scientists who had not played fair. All genuine 

research scientists hope that after their deaths their results, or at least their honor, will survive. Ertel ascribes 

to Gauquelin an uncharacteristic petty meanness. If Gauquelin thought his data of any value, should he not 

have made them available to any friend or colleague that was interested in them? If Gauquelin had actually 

left instructions to destroy his entire data file, this could only raise the most serious questions about the 

integrity of his research.


tionary will mention many recent "hopefuls" at the expense of champions of the 

past. The use of many dictionaries carries the risk of introducing a new bias. If 

one branch of sport happens to have a high Mars percentage, it is attractive to 

validate this by using a specialized dictionary for that branch of sport. If an 

investigator wants to argue that American sports people are less famous than 

Europeans, all he needs to do is avoid the use of American sources. In any case, 

there is a priori no reason to think that the mere mention in a directory is a better 

indicator of an athlete's quality than the achievements of the champions them- 

selves. And of course, until a test has unequivocally shown the contrary, there is 

also no reason to assume that Mars has anything to do with sports. So an "emi- 

nence effect" at best would be a result of exploratory analysis, and not support 

for a hypothesis framed before any data are collected. 

In his "Commentary" on the CFEPP investigation (Benski et al., 1996), Nien- 

huys presented a method of rating sports people by their achievements. That 

method is - in its present form - perhaps not so suitable for comparing cham- 

pions from different countries, but at least it avoids the arbitrariness in the choice 

of sources. Ertel decided in 1988 not to look at the sporting achievements them- 

selves. We question whether that was because he did not know how, or because 

the method gave unsatisfactory results. 

Ertel and Irving select groups of "eminent athletes" from the U.S. and CFEPP 

tests by various means, and they claim that both tests show some kind of emi- 

nence effect. These procedures constitute overanalyses of non-rejections of the 

null hypothesis. Such reanalyses - though less arbitrary ones - might be called 

for if planetary effects were firmly proved already, for instance by tests that had 

been independently replicated with fresh data. Further, Ertel's conclusion that 

the CFEPP test confirms Gauquelin's hypothesis was largely based upon his 

study of earlier incomplete and only partially corrected data. Strangely, Ertel did 

not include any of the five directories used in the U.S. test in his eminence 

appraisal, though they are easily available through interlibrary loan. Nor did he 

consistently use L'athl2ge or Dictionnaire encyclopkdique des sports, the key 

French directories used by both Gauquelin and the French Committee. Moreover, 

Ertel drops and adds dictionaries in subsequent studies. These omissions are puz- 

zling in a test that he claims is objective. Ertel's eminence test thus is a function 

of the directories that he had in his possession at that time or that he borrowed 

from Gauquelin, and it is not based on all of the directories avail- 

able, and we suggest that this might be attributed to Ertel's own bias in selecting 

directories. 

This eminence-effect hypothesis took its inspiration from Gauquelin's efforts 

to dispute the U.S. test; so it is not strange that Ertel would claim that the U.S. 

test provided evidence for the eminence effect. But it is invalid to use the same 

data twice in such a way: once to provide the inspiration for a conjecture, and 

then to "explain" that same data by the conjecture. Incidentally, the evidence 

here is very weak: when a one-tailed test yields p = 0.06, it is clearly nonsignifi- 

cant (Ertel, 1992).


What does the eminence effect show here? In 1988 Ertel observed that there 

was apparently a more or less linear relation between the number of times a 

Gauquelin athlete was mentioned in 18 specific sources and the athlete's chance 

of having been born in Mars sectors 1 and 4. Yet Koppeschaar (1992) observed 

that the total aggregate of Gauquelin's French champions did not show much of 

an eminence effect. This was confirmed by the CFEPP test. Ertel's database in 

1988 included 933 of the 1,066 CFEPP champions. Though his results looked 

interesting, he made many errors in attributing citations to the Dictionnaire ency- 

clopbdique des sports. We have corrected these. We have also corrected the Mars 

calculations, using the sectors as computed by the CFEPP. The following table 

shows the result. 

TABLE 1 

Citation Counts for 933 CFEPP Athletes 

Number of citations: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4 + 

Number of athletes (N): 130 385 270 95 30 17 5 1 53 

In primary sector (M): 28 62 52 23 6 5 1 0 1 2 

M as percent of N: 21.5 16.1 19.3 24.2 22.6 

Percentages of numbers 30 and lower are omitted. The last column is the sum of all columns of 4 

or more citations.' 

As one can see, there is no trend, which is not surprising because the "emi- 

nence effect" had already been found to be statistically insignificant if only the 

French champions were considered (Nienhuys 1993). Ertel also reports that the 

Comitk Para sample does not exhibit the eminence effect (Ertel & Irving 1996, 

p. SE-16). 

Though there is no trend as such, the oft-quoted champions do have a some- 

what higher Mars percentage. This calls for a closer investigation. Such a higher 

percentage is only meaningful if we can be absolutely sure that no data are sup- 

pressed. From the example of the 216 U.S. champions that Gauquelin discarded 

we see that this is doubtful. 

Ertel has contributed something of value to this discussion. He visited 

Gauquelin in Paris in 1986 to obtain the data on Gauquelin's unpublished sports 

champions. It was known, of course, that Gauquelin had published the names of 

2,889 champions, and from Gauquelin's publications it is obvious that he was 

continually collecting data. In his publications of 1960 and 1979 he mentioned 

1 1 8 Germans, 599 Italians, and 432 French and Italian sports people that he had 

used as control groups, altogether 1,149. So there were many more names in his 

files, and it is not surprising that he had not yet published all of them. But there 

are two surprises. The first is the large number (347) of additional and unexpect- 

ed unpublished data (raising the total of all Gauquelin champions to 4,385, of 

whom 6 had two near-identical records in Ertel's database), and the second is the 

large negative Mars effect in the total of unpublished data. In 1982 Michel and 

'~rtel's 

files did not contain 133 of the 1,066. And according to Ertel and Irving (1996, p. SM3) there 

are 17 more that are absent. Ertel, who has had four years to compare the CFEPP's data with Gauquelin's, 

acknowledged in the summer of 1996 that 133 is correct.


Fran~oise Gauquelin published their version of an American test. It contained 

35 1 names, including 192 from the previous U.S. test. But they did not retain the 

216 other names of the U.S. test in their files9 - an egregious procedure. 

In their above paper, Ertel and Irving, however, corroborate the conclusions of 

the U.S. and French tests, namely that Gauquelin had allowed his bias to inter- 

vene in the selection process. Ertel and Irving state that ($ 1 .): 

Gauquelin had occasionally referred to his exempting low-eminence athletes from analy- 

sis, which is a legitimate procedure in principle, if done without awareness of planetary 

positions. Ertel suspected, however, that on occasion Gauquelin might have been aware of 

Mars positions when he decided whether an athlete was or was not eminent enough to be 

added to the final sample. With Gauquelin's permission, Ertel searched out and analyzed 

this unpublished data, finding that indeed, Gauquelin had tended not to exclude marginal 

athletes from his high-eminence sample when Mars at their births was in either the rising 

or culminating zones. In other words, he tended to rank Mars G-sector cases among low- 

eminence athletes more favorably than non-G sector cases.. .. This indicates that 

Gauquelin must have been aware, to a certain degree, of Mars-sector positions ... (empha- 

sis added). 

Ertel discovered in Gauquelin's archives 1,503 champions whose birth times 

Gauquelin had requested but whose names and birth data he had not published. 

The Mars percentage among these was 14.77%, whereas among the total of 

2,888 published champions it was 21.75%. The discovery of such a strong bias 

should have been reason to dismiss all of Gauquelin's data. However, Ertel did 

not do so. He assumed that a bias in judging people's athletic prowess was 

Gauquelin's only bias, and he developed his new "eminence" definition of the 

Mars effect. Moreover, from Ertel's collective writings it seems that he feels free 

to demonstrate the Mars effect, as either the original "high percentage" claim or 

his newer "increasing eminence character is ti^."'^ 

Let us explore Ertel's discovery of Gauquelin's bias further. In his comments 

on the champions collected by the CFEPP, Gauquelin objected to several names 

because their birth data did not seem "reliable" enough, arguing that certain birth 

records that were difficult to find might be the wrong records. Gauquelin, of 

course, did not reject all records that were difficult to find, and we can examine 

those that he retained. During the Belgian Comitk Para's investigation a total of 

88 champions turned up whose birth records we may say were truly difficult to 

find - for example, those born in Paris or in a place other than what the dictio- 

nary stated, or those born in a place with a fairly common name (like Saint-Eti- 

enne, Fontaine, Montreuil, or Saint-Nazaire), or those in which the actual birth 

month did not agree with the month found in the dictionary, including all cases 

where the dictionary gives the wrong year or only the year. Among these 88 "dif- 

ficult to find" Para champions the Mars percentage is about 30%. This refers to 

the champions taken from the Dictionnaire des sports (Seidler & Pariente, 

1963). 

'Ertel also discards these 2 16 names (Ertel & Irving, 1996).


"An illustration of the failure of Ertel's eminence criterion is his recently published test of 1083 Mem- 

bers of the French "Acadkmie de Mkdicine" (coauthored with Arno Muller). This refers to a correlation 

with eminent physicians and the planet Mars. In this he explicitly contradicts his own eminence criteria on 

key points; for the Mars effect decreases as higher levels of eminence are achieved; he also abandons his 

own citation-of-biographical-dictionaries method to determine eminence. We quote from this study. 

For Mars the eminence relationship in the present study was less satisfactory. The effect 

decreased at higher eminence levels, but did not increase at low eminence levels. However, 

it is possible that G% for certain planets (here Mars) is less related to eminence for certain 

professions (here physicians) (Muller & Ertel 1994, p. 28, emphasis added). 

The great majority of members of the AcadCmie de Mtdicine did not obtain any citation in 

586 biographical dictionaries indexed by Arlan Appelletier. Therefore a count of citations 

cannot be used as a measure of eminence (Muller & Ertel 1994, p. 19, emphasis added). 

Ertel changes the criterion of "eminence" and uses instead the physicians' ages of admission to the 

Academy. He ranks the total group of 1,083 according to this age. Then he splits the group into six almost 

equal portions. The first portion are the 181 youngest academicians. The next portion are the 180 next 

youngest academicians, and so on. Ertel here uses a wider definition for the Mars percentage, based on the 

inclusion of the "initial sectors" (see part 111). As the total Mars percentage among these academicians is 

25.2%, we can compare the expectations on the basis of this percentage with the actual numbers. 

Age groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 

Group size 181 180 181 180 181 180 

Expected Mars number 45.6 45.4 45.6 45.4 45.6 45.4 

Actual Mars number 40 50 45 44 47 47 

This is after Ertel decided for himself that a division into 6 groups (and not into 3, 4 or 5 groups) would 

be most appropriate. Ertel shows the results only in graph form, without mentioning the actual numbers. 

We submit that the numbers display only one peculiarity: they are unusually close to their expected val- 

ues. A chi-squared test yields p > 0.9; in other words, it rarely happens (1 in 10 times) that actual values are 

all this close to the expected values. Subdivisions into different numbers of groups give even flatter pictures. 

Since the French Academy physicians served as the original inspiration for the planetary hypotheses, the 

Mars percentage of 25.2% cannot very well serve as support for this hypothesis. Moreover, randomizations 

of the CFEPP's sports champions - admittedly not the same population - yield a Mars percentage of 

23.6%, and the 25.2% of the physicians does not differ by an impressive amount from that. 

Yet Ertel believes that this table shows that planetary effects increase up to medium eminence and then 

decrease at high eminence. He calls this "curvilinear." We would say the eminence hypothesis falls dead 

flat. Incidentally, his co-author Muller does not agree with Ertel's interpretation, and instead finds the results 

"ambiguous" at best. 

Further, in The Tenacious Mars Effect (Ertel & Irving, 1996, p. SE-43), Ertel's table 10 contains many 

indications of the use of invalid statistics. We merely discuss the column referring to "all athletes" com- 

bined. The number of these is said to be 1,683. This number is wrong. Apparently Ertel did not notice 13 

champions who occur both in the ComitC Para sample and in the CFEPP sample. Then Ertel includes 5 

champions from Gauquelin's proposed additions, plus some of Gauquelin "corrections," raising the Mars 

score by 4. More than a year before publication of The Tenacious Mars Effect Ertel was informed about the 

nature of these additions and corrections; he even refers to the very e-mail messages that contained this 

information. Ertel reports that he scrambled the data 200 times, simply by alphabetically shifting the birth 

years, a rather crude method. Of these 200 scrambles, 14 yielded a higher Mars score than the actual value, 

but one should, of course, look at equal or higher. These 14, divided by 200, yield then a "p-value" of 0.07, 

which is dubious, because to get a theoretical number like a p-value in this way with any precision, one 

needs about ten times as many scrambles. Then a few lines further the average Mars percentage of these 

200 scrambles is reported, together with a p-value of 0.09. Given the error of including these Gauquelin 

proposals, the correct value is probably something like 0.13. As this is a one-tailed test, there is nothing spe- 

cial about this. Nonetheless, the result is called "near significant" on the strength of "p = 0.07." So this one 

column is, so to speak, a panoptic display of things that can go wrong in statistics: inefficient data search, 

unwarranted inclusion of data, confusion of "more" with "equal or more," inaccurate computation of theo- 

retical probabilities, and attaching meaning to a result that is both post hoc and not significant by the words 

"near significant."


The champions in Gauquelin's 1979 publication were partly obtained from 

Le Roy's Dictionnaire encyclopkdique des sports (1973). Of these, 134 were not 

French, and again these yielded a set of "difficult to find," again with a large 

Mars percentage. Gauquelin also extracted 224 famous French champions (born 

before 1950) from Le Roy's Dictionnaire, and the same situation prevails. The 

actual numbers are shown in the table below. The overall Mars percentage of 

30.9% in these three groups is very high, even compared to Gauquelin's 22% 

hypothesis. These champions are as a group not better qualified than the groups 

from which they are taken. 

TABLE 2 

"Difficult to Find" Champions in Three Gauquelin Investigations 

Para Dictionnaire champions 430 8 8 

Foreign Le Roy champions 134 37 

French Le Roy champions 224 40 

Together 788 165 

All "Difficult to find Born in key sector Percentage 

The 1963 Dictionnaire des sports contained many more potential candidates 

for selection, namely French people born in either France or Algeria. Though 

Gauquelin later found data for a few of them, he was never able to find informa- 

tion on many others - at least they are not in Ertel's files. The CFEPP investiga- 

tion found quite a few of these, mostly from Paris, with a small Mars percentage. 

Also, in the CFEPP's investigation there were 104 champions that were diffi- 

cult to find, as the month or place of birth was different from what the source 

indicated. Again, a number of these were not in Ertel's files, and again the Mars 

percentage among them was low (see table below). The last two groups com- 

bined have a very low Mars percentage, even more so compared to the three 

groups in the previous table. They comprise champions that Gauquelin must 

have tried to find. 

Para candidates 

"Difficult to find 7 

' 

Together 

TABLE 3 

Two Subsets of Champions Found by the CFEPP and Not in Ertel's Files 

All Born in key sector Percentage 

This suggests that Gauquelin was suppressing data he thought "unreliable," 

and also that the data of the champions born in a favorable Mars position were 

not rejected as easily as the others. Possibly this happened more often with 

champions about whom he had information from different sources.

I 

34 Kurtz et a/. 

Ertel's finding can be summarized by the observation that the champions who 

occur in many books, especially books known to Gauquelin, have a somewhat 

higher Mars percentage than the others. Could this be due to a Gauquelin bias? 

Ertel says no, because Gauquelin may have been selectively publishing, but he 

did not discard data. But it is rather clear that Gauquelin was taking unwarranted 

liberties with the data. The evidence in short is (1) conflicting numbers between 

his 1979 publication and Ertel's database, (2) the muddled matter of the 76 Bel- 

gian soccer players that were never published, (3) the deletion of 21 6 Americans, 

and (4) the matter of the "difficult to find cases. Moreover, (5) in his comments 

on the CFEPP investigation, Gauquelin was strangely silent about 39 champions 

that he almost certainly must have tried to find, but that are not included in 

Ertel's database (Benski et al., 1996, pp. 141-142). 

In the light of these five points the 1988 Ertel eminence effect becomes only 

mildly interesting, rather than an ultimate proof that science as we know it must 

be revised drastically. It suggests that it was primarily not fame but having avail- 

able several sources of possibly conflicting information that correlated with 

Gauquelin's selection bias. The 1995 Ertel eminence effect raises another matter. 

It still relies heavily on Ertel's assumption of the integrity of Gauquelin's data, 

which we question. 

We indicated that we believe there is sufficient reason to reject the result of the 

Comit6 Para test. And as the doubts also extend to the foreign champions col- 

lected by Gauquelin, we see no reason to consider the eminence effect as any- 

thing but a side effect of Gauquelin's bias. Whether Gauquelin's bias was inten- 

tional or not is irrelevant; his data are unreliable, scientifically speaking. 

The IMQ Bias Indicator 

In their above paper, Ertel and Irving introduce a concept they call the "IMQ" 

(Initial versus Main sector Quotient), which, they argue, shows a likely bias in 

the data selection in the U.S. test. Again, for the general reader, we will first 

explain the term "initial sectors". 

In Ertel and Irving's G-zone scale, the time between rising and setting is 

divided into 18 (rather than 6) equal intervals, numbered from 1 through 18, 

which we shall call minisectors. So when a planet rises it will first be for some 

time in minisector 1, then pass into 2, and so on. Likewise, the time between set- 

ting and rising is divided into 18 minisectors, numbered 19 through 36. Sectors 

comprise three consecutive minisectors. So sector 1 consists of minisectors 1, 2, 

and 3; sector 2 consists of minisectors 4,5, and 6; and so on. 

Gauquelin's original planetary hypothesis claimed that sectors 1 and 4 (mini- 

sectors 1, 2, 3, 10, 1 1, and 12) were the ones with special meaning. These are the 

ones that Ertel and Irving now call "main sectors". What we have loosely called 

"Mars percentage" in the preceding, actually means the percentage born with 

Mars in the main sectors. A planet will enter main sector 1 by leaving minisector 

36, and it will enter main sector 4 by leaving minisector 9. Hence these two 

minisectors may be called "initial minisectors". In Gauquelin's view these initial

Mars Effect 3 5 

minisectors were almost as important or even equally as important as the main 

sectors. This can be seen from diagrams in his books, written in 1955 and 1960; 

and he stated this explicitly in 1972. 

Ertel claims that to explore the Mars effect properly, one should look at the 

enlarged "G-sectors" or "plus zones" of the tests that had already been conducted 

on the 12-sector scale. We submit that this is just one of the many arbitrary 

choices made post hoe in full knowledge of the data. Such delicate refinements 

might be studied once the main effect is proved beyond reasonable doubt, which 

is not the case here. As Abell, Kurtz, and Zelen stated in their reappraisal of the 

Zelen test: "This sort of exploratory data analysis is common in analysis of com- 

plicated data sets, but only for generating hypotheses to be tested, not necessarily 

for generating conclusions" (1983). Neither can it serve to detect significance. 

Ertel and Irving, however, attempt to generate conclusions and to detect "signifi- 

cance." 

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a new test would yield a significant 

result in terms of classical sectors, but not in terms of "plus zones." Would the 

Mars effect then be dead? Surely not. It would have been proved just as well, and 

the puzzle of the failing initial sectors would be the subject of further tinkering; 

such as the tinkering that Ertel performed (Ertel & Irving, 1996, pp. SE-16 - 

SE-19). So introducing the "plus zones" is just another ploy to bet on two horses 

for the price of one, and after the race has been run as well. 

Ertel and Irving investigate the ratio between the number of champions in a 

sample that is born in an initial minisector and the number born in a main sector. 

They call this ratio a "bias indicator." Their idea is that a low value indicates a 

bias that raises the Mars effect, and a high value indicates a bias that lowers the 

Mars effect. The idea seems to be that whoever has some kind of bias cannot 

know about the special significance of the initial sectors. Since they maintain 

that the IMQ indicates a Gauquelin bias, it can also serve to indicate bias in the 

U.S. test. But this is a non sequitur. It is not necessary to demonstrate 

Gauquelin's bias by such complicated means. The IMQ concept was developed 

by them with the specific purpose of attacking the U.S. test. 

More specifically, the IMQ test presupposes that there is a Mars effect - thus 

begging the question. Ertel and Irving apply the IMQ test to a grand total of three 

samples by skeptics: (a) the test of the Comiti Para, (b) the French CFEPP test, 

and (c) the U.S. test. On that basis, Ertel and Irving imply that there could have 

been data manipulation in the U.S. test. 

Apparently Ertel and Irving consider the U.S. test to be a stumbling block for 

the Mars effect; so now another peculiarity of the U.S. test is used to seek to dis- 

credit, in one fell swoop, both its results and the researchers who set it up. This 

peculiarity is the rather low Mars percentage of 13.5% that was found, where 

about 17% was expected. Ertel and Irving look at the initial minisectors, and try 

to argue that the percentage shown by them is suspiciously high. 

Ertel and Irving's laborious computations are irrelevant. The purported small 

negative correlation between IMQs and key-sector percentages holds when one


considers the full spectrum of possible outcomes. But we are dealing here with a 

tactic developed in full knowledge of the results of the U.S. test. So the condi- 

tional probability applies: one should look at the chance that the IMQ would 

score so high in a test that accidentally scored as low as the U.S. test. The IMQ is 

a quotient and naturally one would expect it to have a high value when the 

denominator is small. Ertel and Irving do not give any specific data for the IMQ 

of the U.S. test, but we shall endeavor to do so. The U.S. test concerned 408 

champions, of whom 55 were born in the main sectors and 29 in the initial mini- 

sectors. Ertel and Irving argue that the ratio 2955 is rather large. We maintain 

that it is not. We have examined by computer simulation how often such a high 

IMQ might occur. A random process was simulated in which 408 times a random 

"champion" was drawn that had a chance of about 17% of being born in a main 

sector and a chance of 2/36 of being born in an initial sector. This was repeated 

10,000 times, and the cases in which at most 55 were born in a main sector were 

retained; among these we counted the cases in which the IMQ ratio reached at 

least 55:29. These turned out to amount to just over 20% of the total. 

If data are analyzed post hoc some prudence is called for. Two rules of thumb 

apply. First, only use the most straightforward statistical tests and avoid selecting 

only one peculiarity out of many possibilities. Second, only attach meaning to 

highly significant (p < 0.001) results. Ertel and Irving do neither and they feel 

there must be some kind of explanation for the low Mars percentage. They point 

to "low-eminence" admissions. This is implausible for reasons indicated already: 

the so-called "low eminent" were still famous sports champions. 

Ertel and Irving offer another contrived "explanation" in their footnote 10. 

They suggest that the protocol of the U.S. test admitted the possibility that one 

of us received data by mail, then had them quickly computed by a computer 

astrologer, and then suppressed unwanted data. Of course, other outcomes of the 

IMQ test could have produced the same accusation. If it had been low, then the 

sum of the initial sectors and main sectors would have come out "significantly" 

low, also pointing to a "bias." Ertel and Irving are trying to play a game of 

"heads I win, tails you lose," after the coin has fallen. 

It is amusing that Dennis Rawlins's statement that the American researchers 

did not have the expertise to compute the Mars effect is now used to insinuate a 

clever plot (involving astronomical insight and sleight of hand in experimental 

design) to deceive the other investigators of the project. Such insinuations are 

truly irresponsible, to put it kindly. In retrospect, the U.S. test did have a design 

error in that it did not foresee that it should have to defend itself against such 

unfounded charges, 18 years later. However, the records of that test are still avail- 

able, and they clearly show that all names requested from the 22 cooperative 

states are there." Champions who could not be included are mentioned either 

with the indication that no records could be found or that their birth times are not 

given. 

Interestingly, the IMQ test does not apply to the Para test. Hence Ertel and Irv- 

ing conclude that the Cornit6 Para's IMQ deviation in the negative direction is


probably fortuitous, "due to chance." Apparently the reader needs the guidance 

of Ertel and Irving to decide when mere chance is operating and when deviations 

have a deeper meaning. 

Let us take a close look at the IMQ in the case of the Para test. The Comit6 

Para reported 119 champions born in the main sectors. Actually both 

Gauquelin's and the CFEPP's investigations showed that the birth date of the 

boxing champion Hippolyte Annex was wrong - so there are only 118 main- 

sector champions in the Para sample. In any case, the number of champions 

born in initial minisectors was 27. A computer simulation comparable to the one 

mentioned above demonstrated that an IMQ ratio on or below 27:118 has a 

chance of 50% in this situation. So there is nothing special there. 

Again, Ertel and Irving give no explicit numbers, but from their graphs it 

seems they assume there are only 23 in those initial minisectors. This is a conse- 

quence of taking Gauquelin's data too seriously. The table below shows this. 

Minisectors 

TABLE 4 

Three Mars-Sector Computations of the Para Test 

Initial Main Main Main Total Main 

36&9 1 & 10 2& 11 3& 12 (1,2,3, 10, 11, 12) 

According to Gauquelin (1970) 23 33 39 5 1 123 

According to Ertel & Irving 23 33 3 8 5 1 122 

According to ComitC Para 27 35 36 47 118 

Clearly Ertel and Irving have relied on the 1970 numbers of the Gauquelins, 

and did not use the values of the Cornit6 Para. We have checked the Para com- 

putations. There are a few minor errors, especially in the geographical locations; 

but there are over 60 differences between the Gauquelin minisectors and the Para 

computations, and in almost all cases the Comit6 Para had the correct result. 

Gauquelin's data are clearly unreliable. They must be suspected of suffering 

from at least three types of bias: computational errors, errors from rejecting 

"unreliable" data (such as in the "difficult to find cases), and errors in judging 

the "quality" of the athlete. As Ertel attempts to validate his theories by these 

data, they are likewise irrelevant or, at best, further evidence for Gauquelin's 

bias. Thus Ertel and Irving's IMQ test is a fiction. 

The CFEPP investigation has made it clear that such studies have a great error 

potential: erroneous sources, clerical errors, etc. As long as the majority of the 

records is correct, there is little risk that a genuine effect will vanish in the noise. 

But when error correction is not kept strictly separated from knowledge of the 

results, a spurious signal can be produced. Irving and Ertel's statistical manipula- 

tions with old and well-known data sets constitute such a spurious signal. 

"Ultimately Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachu- 

setts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 

Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin all supplied data.


Conclusion 

What are we to draw from this protracted controversy? Researchers have spent 

decades patiently sifting through the claims of the so-called evidence adduced to 

support the Mars effect. There are two possible inferences: 

First, that there is a genuine Mars effect. If this were the case, however, it 

would apply to only about 2,888 sports champions in the Western world, and 

would exclude many other famous sports champions (published and unpublished 

and discarded by Gauquelin). If the Mars effect was real, it should be confirmed 

by independent researchers. The U.S. and French tests have been unable to replicate 

the "Mars effect". 

Second, that the Mars effect is based upon Gauquelin's bias. There are several 

rather compelling indications that this is so. His reactions to the U.S. test showed 

his efforts to redefine eminence, in full knowledge of the results, after the test 

was over. An examination of his files showed that he was doing the same thing 

privately with his own data. He also tried to influence the French CFEPP test in 

various ways by adding, deleting and changing records. We have adduced evidence 

that both in the 1960s and in the 1970s he discarded data that he thought 

unreliable. Perhaps some of this evidence could have been discovered 20 years 

ago or more, if scientists at that time had focused less on astronomy and more on 

Gauquelin's procedures in data collection. In other words, the key witness who 

claimed a remarkable effect turns out to be unreliable, and we must return a verdict 

of "not proven." The witness was probably the victim of his own illusion. 

Some proponents of Mr. Gauquelin's hypothesis have repeatedly accused 

~ skeptical researchers of being biased. These charges have been hurled against the 

I Belgian Comitk Para, the U.S. group, and the French CFEPP. Yet the many scientists 

and scholars associated with this work who questioned Gauquelin's theories 

have exerted every caution to be fair-minded and objective. Regrettably, proparanormalists 

often accuse "establishment scientists" of being dogmatic. But 

Gauquelin's theories have not been summarily rejected with an appeal to infallible 

authority. They have been carefully examined, and a great deal of effort has 

been spent on that. 

We conclude that after persistent and painstaking examination, there is no evidence 

for the Mars eflect. It is time, we submit, to move on to other more productive 

topics. 

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Journal of Scientijic Exploration, Vol. I 1, No. 1, pp. 41-46, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Fortean Phenomena on Film: Evidence or Artifact? 

RENSE LANGE & JAMES HOURAN 

Psychology Dept. G-46, University of Illinois at Springfield, Springfield, IL 62794 

Abstract - This research tested the hypotheses that anomalous photograph- 

ic effects must be attributed to the specific recording medium being used, and 

that the interpretations of such anomalies as paranormal or Fortean are the re- 

sult of the situational context under which the photographs were obtained. As 

predicted, an analysis of 67 previously published photographic anomalies in- 

dicated that the type of effect was significantly related to the photographic 

medium, and that the interpretation imposed on these anomalies was congru- 

ent with the contextual variables operating during the recording. 

Introduction 

It has repeatedly been shown that the content and the perceptual modality of 

ostensibly paranormal phenomena like poltergeist-like experiences, death- 

bed visions, or angelic encounters, are affected by contextual variables such as 

demand characteristics, embedded cues, and prior belief or expectations 

(Lange, Houran, Harte & Havens, 1996; Houran and Lange,1996b; Lange & 

Houran, 1996). However, the implication that paranormal experiences are pri- 

marily of a psychological, rather than an ontological, origin appears to be con- 

tradicted by the existence of various types of photographic (as well as filmed 

or videotaped) "anomalies" as published or described in the popular press 

(e.g., Myers, 1986, 1993; Nichols, 1994) and in the parapsychological litera- 

ture (e.g., Maher & Hansen, 1992, 1995). Typically, these photographic anom- 

alies consist of one or more luminous and partially translucent patches in the 

expected image which are subsequently interpreted as evidence for the onto- 

logical reality of paranormal or other "Fortean" phenomena (e.g., religious ap- 

paritions, UFOs, and human auras or psychic bioforms). 

Although it is sometimes possible to identify technical causes for photo- 

graphic effects (e.g., Hattersley, 198 1 ; Nickell, 1994, 1996a, 1996b), most 

cases cannot be explained through objective analysis. Also, photographic 

analysis typically provides little insight in the ensuing interpretation of the 

image (Mayer, 1988). However, consistent with the research on contextual 

variables cited above, we expect that such interpretations are the result of 

viewers' expectations, beliefs, and the presence of demand characteristics. 

Consequently, it is predicted that the interpretation of photographic evidence 

is highly consistent with the label applied to the context in which the image 

was obtained (Hypothesis 1). Both the occurrence of paranormal phenomena 

and the availability and use of particular recording methods are typically high-

42 R. Lange & J. Houran 

ly unpredictable. Presumably, however, similar paranormal occurrences have 

similar physical manifestations. Hence, an ontological interpretation requires 

that particular photographic anomalies should occur regardless of the record- 

ing medium being used. Conversely, a contextual explanation would be sup- 

ported by the finding of a relation between the nature of the photographic ef- 

fects and the nature of the recording medium (Hypothesis 2). 

Photographs 

Method 

A sample of published photographs' (n = 96) purportedly depicting Fortean 

anomalies on various film media (i.e., Polaroid, videotape, motion-picture, in- 

frared, black & white, and color) was compiled from commercially available 

sources (Haining, 1975; Piney, 1975; Constable, 1978; That Wedding Photo 

(Fate), 1978; Brittle, 1980; McClure, 1983; Macer-Story, 1984; Kaczmerak, 

1986; Kingsley, 1986; Myers, 1986, 1993; Eden, 1988; Levine, 1988; Stan- 

ford, 1988; Bord & Bord, 1989; Riccio & Bingham, 1989; Bingham, & Riccio, 

1991; Guiley, 1992; Randles, 1992; Lynch, 1993; Nichols, 1994; Underwood, 

1986, 1993; Maher & Hansen, 1992*, 1995*; Michaels, 1996; Persinger, Hart, 

& Thomas, 1996*). The citations marked (*) provided only descriptions of the 

photographic artifacts (n = 4). It should be noted that it was not possible for 

the authors to screen the sample of photographs for deliberate misrepresenta- 

tion by either those who submitted them or their respective publishing 

sources. For this reason, we do not maintain that the sample under considera- 

tion here is representative of the total number of Fortean photographic effects 

which may exist but are not publicly reported or available. 

Scoring System 

Photogra~hic Anomalies. Seven general categories of artifacts were distinguished: 

1) Light Streaks: Irregular or linear steaks of light. 2) Fogging: Blanketing 

of the photograph frame with a cloud-like translucency. 3) Density 

Spots: Defined, opaque shapes within the frame (e.g., spherical, triangular, or 

disc-shaped). 4) Amorphous forms: Similar to fogging, but having a confined, 

discernible border or limit. 5) Shadows: Dark, amorphous-like forms resembling 

shadows. 6) Defined Images: Images with clearly recognizable content, 

such as a face or object. 7) Other: Images which cannot be clearly categorized 

into any of the six categories outlined above. 

'This research excluded the controversial and often fraudulent "classic Spiritualism" photographs of 

so-called phantom materializations (e.g., Haining, 1975; Stemman, 1975; Burger, 1986), as well as pho- 

tographic anomalies allegedly produced by "psychics" (e.g., Carrington, 1939; Eisenbud, 1977). For a 

discussion of these types of anomalies, the interested reader is referred to Eisenbud (1977), Nichols 

(1994), and Randi (1982).

Photographic Artifacts 43 

Recording Medium. Six general media were identified: Color Film, Black 

and White, Infrared, Videotape, Motion-Picture, and Polaroid. 

Congruency Ratings. The correspondence between the interpretation of the 

photographic anomaly and the situational context when the picture was taken 

was rated on a three-point scale with categories: 1) Incongruent: The interpre- 

tation of the artifact does not agree with the situational context (e.g., a photo- 

graph taken during a poltergeist investigation reveals a density spot and is sub- 

sequently interpreted as a UFO). 2) Uncertain: The detail concerning the 

situational context or the interpretation of the artifact is too vague for proper 

discrimination (e.g., A photograph taken at a wedding reveals an unusual arc 

of light which was not visible at the time the picture was taken, yet the effect is 

not given a specific interpretation, and is simply referred to as "odd"). 3) Con- 

gruent: The interpretation of the artifact has close congruence to the situation- 

al context (e.g., a Polaroid photograph taken at a "haunted house" reveals a 

fogging effect over the entire photograph and is subsequently interpreted as an 

apparition or an indication of a possible paranormal presence). 

Results and Discussion 

All cases were scored by a single rater. To determine the inter-rater reliability, 

a random sample of 24 cases (25%) were also coded by an amateur photographer 

who was blind to the hypotheses. The two raters agreed on 21 of the 24 

classifications (87%) of both the medium used and the type of photographic 

effect. Further, in support of Hypothesis 1, in 93 of the 96 (97%) cases, the single 

rater judged the photographic effect as "congruent" with the context in 

which the image was obtained. None of the images were rated as "incongruent," 

and the remaining three photographs (3%) lacked enough detail about the 

situational context to warrant a congruency rating. Thus, the intraclass correlation 

(Bartko, 1966) for the congruency ratings was highly significant (r = 

.88, F (23,23) = 8.30,~ < .001). No film medium was specified for 29 of the 96 

photographs; therefore, all statistical analyses reported below are based on the 

remaining 67 examples. 

As is shown in Table 1, the most frequently used photographic medium was 

Color Film (n = 36). Consistent with the findings of earlier research (Maher 

and Hansen, 1992,1995; Nichols, 1994), Amorphous Forms (n = 32) and Density 

Spots (n = 19) were the most frequently occurring effects. By contrast, 

Shadows and Light Streaks were observed least often (n = 5). In agreement 

with Hypothesis 2, a significant relation was found between the film medium 

being used and the qualitative type of photographic effect, as expressed by the 

proportional reduction in error based on entropy criteria (Symmetric Uncertainty 

Coefficient = 0.3 1, p < .001). Although there appears to be no clear difference 

in the direction of this association (Coefficient with the medium dependent 

= 0.35 versus with the effect dependent = 0.27), it can be excluded 

that a photographic effect would change the recording medium. Thus, Table 1


TABLE 1 

Type of Photographic Anomaly by Recording Medium Used. 

Recording Medium Photographic Anomaly 

Amorph. Density Defined Light 

Shadow Form Spot Fogging Image Streak Other Total 

Polaroid 0 3 1 5 0 0 0 9 

Color 3 11 4 1 11 5 1 3 6 

Infrared 2 6 3 0 1 0 0 12 

Black /White 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 

Motion Pict. 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 

Videotape 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 6 

Total 5 20 18 6 12 5 1 67 

can be interpreted as showing that videotape, motion picture film, and black 

and white film showed density spots only, whereas color film yielded mainly 

amorphous forms and defined images. Thus, the medium determines the effect 

and not vice-versa. 

The current research is descriptive only, and it therefore does not address the 

cause for these photographic artifacts. This issue remains a topic of debate 

among professional photographers (see e.g., Mayer, 1988; Nickell, 1994), and 

researchers occasionally cite this fact as a justification for labeling some 

anomalies as "paranormal" or "Fortean" (e.g., Kaczmarek, 1986; Maher & 

Hansen, 1992,1995). It must be emphasized, however, that there are many po- 

tential causes for photographic anomalies. For instance, earthquake lights and 

other geophysical luminosities (Derr & Persinger, 1989; for a review see 

Persinger, 1985), ball lighting (Lebelson, 1984), atypical cloud formations 

(Friedrich, 1987), and atmospheric fluctuations (Frizzell & Walls, 1987; Ran- 

dles, 1992) often cause impressive visual effects that prompt individuals to 

take pictures as the effect is occurring. On the other hand, unusual effects are 

sometimes discovered only after the film has already been processed. In this 

case, processing error, mishandling of film, and defective film can produce ef- 

fects that may puzzle even professional photographers (Mayer, 1988; Nickell, 

1994, 1996a). For instance, a number of ghost photographs (e.g., The Fate 

Ghost Contest, 1995) were shown to be the result of the camera's cord inadver- 

tently captured within the frame (Nickell, 1996b). Moreover, Hattersley 

(1 981) noted that environmental contaminants like dust, air bubbles, and elec-

Photographic Artifacts 45 

trostatic charges can individually or collectively result in anomalies similar to 

the ones described in the present research. 

The present findings imply that anomalous film effects should be attributed 

to the particular film medium being used rather than to paranormal or Fortean 

influences. By contrast, some investigators seem to engage in a form of simu- 

lacra (i.e., perceiving images out of random background patterns) when inter- 

preting photographic data, and we suspect that such interpretations are the re- 

sult of contextual influences. For example, during research in a known haunted 

location (Maher & Schmeidler, 1975), one psychical researcher responded to 

the finding of an ambiguous "parabola of light" and "dark spot" on an infrared 

picture (for a reprint of the photograph see: Guiley, 1992, p. 212) by stating 

"Look at this dark spot ... why would this be here? What could have produced 

this strange effect at this one spot?" (Cochran, 1988, p. 83). Note, however, 

that the present findings predict that such amorphous forms are a typical arti- 

fact of the use of infrared film. Consequently, we suggest that most of the 

"proofs" of the paranormal based on photographic data are often the result of 

the tendency to interpret ambiguous stimuli as meaningful due to a paranormal 

context (Houran & Lange, 1996a). 

Acknowledgements 

We would like to acknowledge Timothy M. Harte and Michael Komen for 

their assistance in this study. We also thank John S. Derr for comments on an 

earlier draft of this paper. Address correspondence to the second author at the 

301 University Ct. West, Springfield, Illinois, 62703. 

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Wishing for Good Weather: 

A Natural Experiment in Group Consciousness 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08540 

email rdnelson @princeton.edu 

Abstract - Many human activities are affected by the weather, and there is a 

long history of rituals and ceremonial efforts aimed at controlling it. In mod- 

ern societies, such efforts are largely vestigial and amount to informal hoping 

or wishing for good weather for special occasions. Reunion and commence- 

ment activities at Princeton University, involving thousands of alumni, grad- 

uates, family and others, are held outdoors, and it is often remarked that they 

are almost always blessed with good weather. A comparison of the recorded 

rainfall in Princeton vs. nearby communities shows that there is significantly 

less rain, less often, in Princeton on those days with major outdoor activities. 

Introduction 

Large gatherings of people with a common interest provide opportunities to 

assess a possible effect of their collective intentions or wishes on the environ- 

ment. Repeated gatherings may provide the essential components of a natural 

experiment allowing formal assessment of potential effects of group con- 

sciousness. For example, many of the year-end ceremonies at Princeton Uni- 

versity traditionally bring huge numbers of people together in planned out- 

door events. Of course everyone involved hopes the weather will be pleasant 

and dry for Reunions, the traditional P-Rade of alumni, and all the varied ac- 

tivities associated with Princeton's Commencement, and it seems remarkably 

often to be so. It is quite common to hear someone remark, "As usual, the rain 

stayed away, but no wonder, with all those people wishing for good weather." 

Indeed, it is likely that most Princetonians have heard this idea expressed, and 

many will half-seriously have said something along these lines themselves. 

President Clinton was invited to give an address at the 1996 Commencement, 

making contingency plans considerably more difficult than usual. An article in 

the local newspaper' about the complex preparations included a description of 

the conditions that could require moving 10,000 people indoors: 

The third scenario is the Monsoon scenario, where it rains hard and commencement 

has to be moved to Jadwin Gym. Traditionally, this never happens at a Princeton Uni- 

versity commencement. Those few times in recent years when precipitation is not only 

forecast but seems imminent, the rain has miraculously held off. 

--- 

'Barbara Johnson, Princeton Town Topics, Wednesday, May 22, 1996.

48 R. D. Nelson 

For most people it feels natural to wish and hope for good weather for the 

springtime alumni celebrations and the ceremonies of Commencement, but 

it's something else again to expect any corresponding result. Nevertheless, 

whether there might indeed be some effect of those hopes and wishes is an in- 

teresting question. By modern, scientifically conditioned standards, it seems 

unlikely, but with a properly formulated analytical approach it is possible to 

obtain an objective answer to the question. 

The Archives 

The Seeley G. Mudd Library archives includes documents on Commence- 

ment and related activities going back 250 years. Autumn was the season for 

graduation during Princeton's first century, with nearly all ceremonies held in 

September, but in 1844 the University began celebrating Commencement in 

the Spring, nearly always in June. Beginning in 1922 the graduates received 

their degrees on the lawn outside Nassau Hall and, weather permitting, this 

has been the venue since that time. 

By tradition, the day of Commencement is a Tuesday, with Baccalaureate 

and Class Day on the preceding Sunday and Monday, respectively. The actual 

date varies considerably, and in this century the Tuesday chosen has gradually 

moved from late and middle June to earlier dates until, as in 1995, Com- 

mencement was held in late May. 

Traditionally, the graduation festivities begin with the Reunions of the large 

and deeply interconnected Princeton alumni family, a gathering that culmi- 

nates in the renowned Alumni P-Rade on the Saturday preceding commence- 

ment. Thus, there are actually four days packed with major events related to 

Reunions and Commencement, and most of the activities are planned for the 

outdoors, with large numbers of people sharing an interest in having good 

weather. In recent times, as many as 15,000 alumni, their families and friends, 

and many well-wishers from the town, crowd the campus for the P-Rade. On 

the day of Commencement, some 9000 tickets are provided to the 1100-odd 

graduating seniors, 300 graduate students, their families and friends to attend 

the ceremonies, planned for the green in front of Nassau Hall, with a contin- 

gency plan for relocation to Jadwin Gymnasium in the event of bad weather. 

The Weather Database 

Given the dates of graduation over the years, the second part of our devel- 

oping analytical picture requires data from the daily records of weather for 

stations at Princeton and surrounding communities. The most important ques- 

tion for the graduates, the alumni and the University administration, concerns 

rain, since it definitely affects outdoor activities, and makes a rain contin- 

gency plan necessary where possible. Although the weather is notoriously 

fickle, because it is of abiding interest, our government provides services that

Wishing for Good Weather 49 

temperature, pressure, precipitation, etc., on a daily basis. A widely dispersed 

network of stations records weather parameters in a standardized way, and 

some have been doing so for much of the present century. One of these stations 

operated in Princeton from 1950 to 1986, and some stations in surrounding 

communities, e. g., New Brunswick, have daily records going back more than 

70 years. 

An Analytical Question 

With the history of Princeton Commencements and the historical record of 

local weather in hand, we can ask whether there is any difference in rainfall on 

Commencement Tuesday in Princeton over the years, compared with rainfall 

in nearby New Brunswick or Trenton on the same day. For a clearer picture, the 

survey can be extended to other communities surrounding Princeton, and the 

question formulated more specifically: Does the amount of precipitation on 

the Tuesday of Princeton's Commencement tend to be less than the average 

across surrounding communities on the same day? Such a comparison can be 

made for the P-Rade, Baccalaureate and Class Day as well, and the days with 

significant outdoor activities can be combined to give a larger and more gener- 

al sample. The question needs refinement, however, to address the possibility 

that Princeton might have a slightly different micro-climate relative to the sur- 

rounding area (many people apparently do think of Princeton as something of 

an oasis). An appropriate check on this possibility is a repetition of the analy- 

sis on days that should be otherwise similar, but do not have a coherent group 

motivated to wish away the rain. Presuming everyone's attention has turned to 

other things, the days immediately following Commencement would seem to 

provide a reasonably apt comparison standard for the eventuality that Prince- 

ton's weather at this time of year is typically different from that of its neigh- 

bors. 

Because any analysis of already existing data must be considered post hoc, it 

is essential to consider the implications of the choices made in conducting 

such a "natural experiment". Given an explicit experimental hypothesis, e. g., 

the weather is susceptible to influence from the conscious or unconscious 

wishes of a group, and a well-justified choice of venue made before any actual 

analysis, the results will correctly represent the viability of the hypothesis. The 

present case meets these criteria, in that the experimental question was raised 

specifically for the Princeton situation, with no prior examination of any rele- 

vant data, and the records chosen for analysis were specific and appropriate to 

the hypothesis. Replications of this natural experiment elsewhere will be re- 

quired to assess the robustness and generality of its findings, and they can 

readily be performed using the same approach. For example, the Rosebowl 

game and parade in Pasadena are said nearly always to have good weather, de- 

spite that they occur on New Years day, during California's rainy season. 

Again there is a human expectation and desire for good weather, and a simple 

analysis can compare the rainfall in Pasadena on New Years day with sur-


rounding locales and days to determine whether there is a difference in accor- 

dance with the hypothesis. 

The Analysis 

The daily records of precipitation at Princeton and six surrounding stations 

were obtained from the National Climatic Data Center, in Asheville, North 

~arolina.~ The other communities used for comparison were Trenton, 

Moorestown, Indian Mills, New Brunswick, Boonton and Belvidere, and the 

data, measured in 100th~ of an inch, were obtained for each day in June for all 

years with daily records. Figure 1 is a map of the area, with Princeton and the 

six surrounding stations indicated; their distance from Princeton varies from 

about 10 to 40 miles. 

For each station, an epoch of the nine days centered on the date of Princeton's 

Commencement was generated for each of the years the Princeton station 

was operating, and the precipitation index for those days was retrieved 

from the database. Most measurements were made at either 6:00 AM, or 6:00 

PM and, although the activities of interest are typically set closer to noon, the 

readings were used directly as the amount of rain for the day. Averaging each 

day separately across the 36-year period (1984 is missing from the Princeton 

data) for Princeton and for all six of the other stations, a mean precipitation 

index was obtained for each of the stations and days of interest. Figure 2 shows 

a comparison of Princeton's average precipitation during the four days from 

Reunions to Commencement with the corresponding composite for the six 

other communities, and it does appear that the mean level of rain is lower for 

Princeton on the days of the P-Rade, Baccalaureate and Class Day. However, 

the average rainfall on Commencement over this period is slightly higher at 

Princeton, mainly attributable to a downpour of some 2.6 inches on June 12, 

1962. (The average for the surrounding stations on that day was a mere 0.95 

inches.) Interestingly, members of the class of 1962 report that the rain held 

off until after the ceremony. 

Although they look suggestive, the variability of these data is too great to 

justify a conclusion that any of the apparent differences are meaningful, and a 

more incisive approach is needed. The common statistical tests for differences 

are not appropriate because the data are not normally distributed. Figure 3 displays 

the frequency with which various amounts of rain occur, and indicates 

why a simple test of the mean differences would be inappropriate. Both the 

median and the modal precipitation levels are zero, and because of the enormously 

skewed distribution, the mean is clearly not an ideal measure of centrality 

for the comparisons we wish to make. 

The figure clearly shows the large number of days with very little rain, and 

progressively fewer days with larger amounts. About 72% of days in this time 

period have no rain at all in Princeton, while the surrounding communities av- 

*More information may be found at http://www.ucar.edu/, or by contacting data support specialist 

Will Spangler, spangle& niwot.scd.ucar.edu.

Fig. I 

Wishing for Good Weather 5 1

7 

R. D. Nelson 

AVERAGE RAINFALL ON FOUR DAYS 

PRINCETON REUNIONS TO CONMENCEMENT 

l ' ' ' r l ' ' ' ' l ' l ' ' l 

I 

+ PRINCETON % 

+ AVG 6 TOWNS 

ERR PRINCTN 

ERR 6 TOWNS 

- - 

- 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 

2 3 

DAYS 

Fig. 2. Mean precipitation for Princeton compared with six surrounding towns on the four days: 

P-Rade, Baccalaureate, Class Day and Commencement. One sigma error is indicated. 

GAMMA FIT TO AVERAGE RAIN IN SIX TOWNS 

ALL NON-ZERO ACCUMULATIONS 

0 40 80 120 160 200 240 

HUNDREDTHS OF AN INCH 

Fig. 3. A distribution of daily precipitation amounts displays a rapid decrease in the proportion 

of larger accumulations. 

- 

- 

% - 

-


erage about 67% dry days, again suggesting that Princeton's weather tends to 

be better than might be expected for the period of interest. 

Proceeding to a more formal assessment, a non-parametric analytical ap- 

proach that is designed to accommodate variables of this nature compares cu- 

mulative distributions of the daily precipitation totals. Figure 4 displays, for 

each of the four days of interest, Princeton's cumulative rainfall against the 

composite of the six surrounding stations. 

In this display, where the extraordinary rainfall recorded in 1962 plays a less 

weighty role, Commencement day appears to be fair and dry somewhat more 

often in Princeton than in the neighboring communities (Fig. 4d). Such a trend 

toward less rain, less often, is quite persuasive on Saturday, Monday and Tues- 

day, but on Sunday, the day of Baccalaureate (Fig. 4b), no clear tendency is ev- 

ident. The amount of data available for these comparisons is too small to justi- 

fy much interpretation, but it is noteworthy that this is the only day without 

major outdoor activities since the Baccalaureate ceremonies take place inside 

the University Chapel, regardless of the weather. In the other cases, the 

Princeton data are shifted toward lower daily precipitation rates, but only on 

Class Day (Fig. 4c) does the difference approach conventional statistical sig- 

nificance, based on a non-parametric Mann-Whitney Ranks test, yielding a 2- 

score of 1.607, with a corresponding probability of 0.054. 

When we combine the data from the three days with major outdoor activi- 

ties, the distributions are smoother, as can be seen in Figure 5, and the statisti- 

cal power to determine whether there is a consistent difference between 

Princeton and its neighbors is enhanced. 

In this case it is necessary to consider any autocorrelation indicating non-in- 

dependence among the days, but this is negligible for the sample in hand, with 

a lag-one autocorrelation coefficient of 0.049. Pooling the rainfall accumula- 

tions for these three days in Princeton to compare with the corresponding 

pooled data from the surrounding stations, the Mann-Whitney test for a differ- 

ence in the predicted direction yields a Z-score of 1.656, just exceeding the 

conventional 5% threshold for statistical significance. 

Thus, although the graphical displays are striking, and consistent with the 

hypothesis, the formal statistical assessment based on data from 1950 to 1986 

yields only nominally significant evidence that the apparent difference be- 

tween Princeton and the surrounding communities is other than a chance fluc- 

tuation. Moreover, to evaluate the situation fairly, we still must consider 

whether Princeton might have a micro-climate that is different from its geo- 

graphical surround. A similar comparison of the days following Commence- 

ment, using the same cumulative distribution approach, is shown in Figure 6. 

Here, the curves are scarcely distinguishable, and the Mann-Whitney test for 

the pooled data comparing Princeton to the surrounding area yields a 2-score 

of 0.222, with a related probability of 0.412. 

While the formal comparison appropriately uses data for the surrounding 

towns only from the years 1950 to 1986, most of these stations have a longer

R. D. Nelson 

CUMULATIUE RAINFALL SATURDAY 

REUNIONS P-RADE 

0 4 0 8 0 120 160 200 240 


CUMULATIUE RAINFALL SUNDAY 

BACCALAUREATE 

0 40 8 0 120 160 200 240 


Fig. 4. An ordered accumulation of daily precipitation totals shows less frequent, and smaller 

amounts of precipitation in Princeton for three of the four days.

0.5 

Wishing for Good Weather 

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL MONDAY 

CLASS DAY 

rt- AVO 6 TOWNS 

++ PRINCETON 

3 0 60 9 0 120 150 180 


CUMULATIVE RAINFALL TUESDAY 

COMMENCEWENT 

0 5 0 100 150 200 25 0 300 


Fig. 4. An ordered accumulation of daily precipitation totals shows less frequent, and smaller 

amounts of precipitation in Princeton for three of the four days.

R. D. Nelson 

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL ON THREE DAYS 

P-RADE, CLASS DAY, AND COMMENCEMENT 

-&- AUG 6 TOWNS - PRINCETON 

5 0 100 150 200 26 0 30 0 


Fig. 5. Comparison of Princeton vs. the surrounding area, of rainfall accumulating on the three 

days with planned outdoor activities: P-Rade, Class Day, and Commencement. 

CUMULATIVE RAINFALL ON THREE DAYS 

FOLLOWING COMMENCEMENT 

4 AVO 6 TOWNS 

-LC PRINCETON 

100 20 0 300 400 60 0 


Fig. 6. Comparison of rainfall accumulating on three days just after Commencement, in Prince- 

ton vs. the surrounding area.


record, and if all years are used, nearly twice as many days are available to es- 

timate the amount of precipitation accumulating in the surrounding area 

around the time of Princeton's Commencement. If Class Day is compared with 

this more comprehensive estimate, the 2-score is 1.8 14, with p = 0.035. When 

this estimate is used in the comparison of the three outdoor days combined, the 

result is Z = 1.996, andp = 0.023. Comparison of the three days following com- 

mencement yields a corresponding result of 2 = 0.540, p = 0.295. Though con- 

sistent with the formal calculations, these "full database" values are vulnera- 

ble to any longer-term changes in weather patterns. A direct comparison of the 

data from the 36-year period of the Princeton weather station against the re- 

maining data shows a marginally significant 2-score of 1.610, suggesting that 

there may have been a change, and that we should not place as much weight on 

these as on the statistically less powerful formal calculations. 

Finally, we may ask whether the amount of precipitation is different over 

time in Princeton itself, by comparing the days of interest with immediately 

surrounding days, to see if this time period in Princeton differs from the sea- 

sonal trend. This temporal comparison has a pattern similar to that of the spa- 

tial differences. The composite 2- score ranges from 1.370 to 1.972 (p = 0.085, 

0.024, respectively), depending on the number of surrounding days chosen for 

the comparison. No obvious criterion is available for a fully formal compari- 

son of the temporal trends, but again the data suggest that a small decrease in 

the probability of rain is correlated with this large gathering of people for 

shared enjoyment of outdoor ceremonies and activities. 

A Curious Situation 

Although many of us wish fervently for nice weather for special occasions, 

and some are even motivated to offer up a little prayer, it doesn't seem likely 

that many of us believe it will do any good. A modern education (such as 

Princeton delivers) tends to include a surfeit of implicit reasons and arguments 

against such an eventuality, and it certainly doesn't fit easily within our cur- 

rent scientific models of the world. Yet, we recognize that these models are in- 

complete, perhaps most glaringly because they have so little to say about 

human consciousness, including such hopes and wishes as might, possibly, af- 

fect the weather. 

We have recently learned to view weather patterns in terms of chaos theory, 

where infinitesimally small effects can expand into great changes; the beat of a 

Brazilian butterfly wing may propagate through complex weather systems to 

cause a downpour in a small New Jersey town. Could the effects of communal 

interest from a great concentration of Princetonians compete with that butter- 

fly wing? 

A look at actual weather data seems to suggest that precipitation tends to 

stay away from Princeton for the P-Rade, and Class Day, and Commencement, 

to a somewhat unlikely degree. These intriguing results certainly aren't strong 

enough to compel belief, but the case presents a very challenging possibility,


because if the analysis is correct, the only good candidate to explain the appar- 

ent differences, other than chance, would seem to be an influence from an in- 

formal but powerful communal wish for dry weather. In any case, it surely is 

premature to conclude, as the graffito has it, that God went to Princeton, but 

we may need to reconsider the old saw, "Everyone talks about the weather, but 

nobody does anything about it." 

Acknowledgments 

The Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research program is supported by a 

number of foundations and individuals, including the John E. Fetzer Institute, 

the Institut fiir Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygeine, the 

Lifebridge Foundation, the McDonnell Foundation, the Ohrstrom Founda- 

tion, Mr. Richard Adams, Mr. Laurance S. Rockefeller, and Mr. Donald Web- 

ster.



Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classical Experimenter Effect: 

An Experimental, Double-Blind Investigation of 

Unconventional Information lkansfer 

Department of Psychology, University of Freiburg, Rehabilitation Psychology, 0-79085 Freiburg, 

Germany 

Abstract - We set up a rigidly controlled, double-blind dowsing experiment 

with three repetitions to test whether dowsers are able to extract information 

out of a system in an unconventional way. One hundred and four professional 

and lay dowsers had to distinguish between randomly distributed, sealed and 

indistinguishable probes of pure mineral water or parathione, using a one- 

hand dowsing rod. The subjects were unable, on the whole, to distinguish be- 

tween the probes better than chance. Performance was significantly nega- 

tively correlated with paranormal beliefs. Subjects instructed by one among 

three blinded experimenters were able to distinguish between the probes sig- 

nificantly better than chance. As we have excluded any conceivable way of 

leakage of relevant information, we conclude that we found a non-classical 

experimenter effect. 

1. Introduction 

Dowsers and users of pendulums typically claim to be able to extract informa- 

tion from physical systems without any known causal pathway. This can be 

geological information (Betz, 1995), information on missed or distant objects 

or persons, information on suitability of food, or the like. It was this claim 

which we tested, since it is relevant to know whether there are pathways of in- 

formation transfer other than known causal pathways. While unusual water 

prospection and other geological dowsing phenomena could possibly be ex- 

plained by specific electromagnetic and corresponding neural sensitivity, 

other kinds of information extraction could, if proven, rest on unknown path- 

ways. Earlier experiments have yielded inconclusive results. While the issue 

of dowsing for water has been investigated recently with promising results 

(Betz, 1995), the question of unconventional information transfer on the 

whole is far from settled. 

Generally, tightly controlled experiments were unable to find evidence for 

unconventional information transfer (Hansen, 1982) in dowsing and pendu- 

lum experiments. In the tightly controlled experiment reported here, the ques- 

tion was whether professional and lay dowsers are able to extract information 

out of a system under blind and controlled conditions, using a commercially

60 H. Walach & S. Schmidt 

available one-hand rod, which is sold for its easy-to-use properties and well 

known in German speaking countries. 

Throughout this article we use two terms in different contexts: We speak of 

"unconventional" in the context of information transfer, thereby suggesting 

that information retrieval does not occur by known physical or sensory chan- 

nels. We use the notion "non-classical" when we speak about the influence of 

an experimenter on an experimental system, distinguishing this effect from the 

known Rosenthal effect (Rosenthal, 1976), which is mediated by sensory, al- 

beit subliminal, channels. 

Material and Procedures 

2. Methods 

The commercially available one-hand rod, developed by Erich Korbler, that 

we used is claimed to be generally usable and applicable to all sorts of dowsing 

problems (Raum & Zeit, 1995). Its use allegedly requires very little training 

and no specific dowsing faculties. It is an elastic plastic rod, 58 cm long, with a 

wooden ball (2 cm diam.) attached to its top end, and a plastic handle. All rel- 

evant steps of the experiment and the material used were checked with dows- 

ing experts, named by the producer of the rod. Ten probes of the purest known 

mineral water (Volvic, 2.5 ml) and ten probes with parathion, a once widely 

used, now prohibited insecticide, (E 605, 0.2 g disolved in distilled water to 

2.5 ml, a lethal dose) were placed in quartz glass vials (45 mm, 11 mm diam.) 

with silicone stoppers, wrapped in wild silk, and put in brass containers (100 

mm, 16 mm diam.) soldered to brass stands (100mm x 20mm x lmm), which 

were sealed with a rubber stopper, and a paper seal. The paper seal was strong- 

ly adhesive and gave the date of preparation. Tests showed that the seal could 

not be detached without leaving traces. 

The probes were randomized using a real random number code stemming 

from a Zener-diode. They were fixed between two wooden boards such that 

they could only be touched and not handled in any other way. The boards were 

screwed together from the downside, and firmly taped on tables using double- 

sided tape which is usually used for fixing carpets. Every experimental testing 

was videotaped to make sure that subjects adhered to the protocol, which al- 

lowed them only to touch the probes, not to handle or open them. The subjects 

neither knew the contents of the probes nor the number of respective probes. 

The only information they had was that they had to distinguish 20 probes as to 

whether they would have a positive or negative effect on their organism. We 

had the experimental room, a quiet seminar room on the first floor in the build- 

ing of the Department of Psychology at the University of Freiburg, checked by 

a professional dowser for "ley lines", to make sure that purported geological 

signals would not interfere with the experiment. The probes were all placed 

outside so-called geopathic zones. The experimental room was locked after 

each experimental session and only opened for experimental trials. The trials

Non-Classical Experimenter Effect 61 

were carried out during summer vacation, when the building generally is quiet 

and not highly populated. 

Every subject filled in a questionnaire, asking for basic sociodemographic 

data, and information on experience with dowsing rods and pendulums, theo- 

retical and practical knowledge, and professional use of dowsing. Part of the 

questionnaire was a scale of paranormal beliefs, which had been constructed, 

tested, and validated in a different study (Brednich, 1993) with four to six 

items for each of the following subscales for belief in "magical forces", "astrol- 

ogy", "ESP and precognition", and "reincarnation". 

Design 

We carried out three independent experiments with approximately 35 sub- 

jects per experiment. Every experiment was randomized independently, the 

code was locked; the randomization procedure was videotaped. Each experi- 

ment took three successive days in a week. Experiment 1 and 2 were on two 

successive weeks in August 1995, experiment 3 followed one week later. Since 

we also wanted to test the specific hypothesis that the information gained in an 

experimental setting reduces the magnitude of the effect size discovered in a 

repetition of this experiment (Lucadou, 1995; Model of Pragmatic Informa- 

tion), it had been specified in the protocol that the data of experiment l and 2 

should be evaluated together after experiment 2, and the pooled data at the 

end. Therefore, we evaluated experiments I and 2 after experiment 2 was fin- 

ished, and randomized experiment 3 with the information obtained by the two 

preceding experiments. Before the beginning of the experiments, the protocol 

was deposited with Eberhard Bauer, the editor of the Zeitschrift fiir Parapsy- 

chologie und Grenzgebiete der Psychologie, the German Parapsychology 

Journal. 

Subjects and Experimenters 

One hundred and twenty five volunteers, 20 professional dowsers as well as 

interested lay persons, responded to a publicity campaign in the press and local 

media, 11 1 attended four experiments, 106 gave data. Two persons had miss- 

ing data of more than a quarter and therefore were excluded, leaving the final 

number at 104. Volunteers came from all over Germany at their own expense 

and participated without reward or reimbursement. Fifty seven (54%) were fe- 

male, 47 were male, with a mean age of 44.1 years (sd = 13.3; range 22-76 

years). 

Different individuals with different degrees of information about the design 

and sequence of probes were involved with the experiment. The supervisor 

(HW) knew about the design, set up the randomized sequences, kept the code 

in a locker, and did not interfere with the actual experimental procedure during 

the whole experiment. He was in a separate building about 500 yards away 

from the experimental rooms, unknown to the subjects. The senior experi-


menter (SS) knew about the design, but was blind to the actual sequence. He 

resided in a room in the third floor of the building, and saw the experimental 

subjects only after they had deposited their data, when they were invited to 

come up to the third floor to relate their experience. Three hired junior experi- 

menters, one graduate psychology student, a teacher, and a social worker, 

knew nothing about the actual design, except that probes had to be distin- 

guished as positive or negative using a rod, and were also blind to the random- 

ized sequence. They had to explain the task to the subjects in a training session 

in a different room, on the ground floor of the building, next to the entrance, 

before the commencement of the experiment, using open test material and 

written information. 

Procedure 

Subjects were scheduled by phone to arrive one by one. When subjects ar- 

rived for the experiment, they were greeted by one of the junior experimenters, 

and brought into the waiting room. Here they could read introductory material, 

learn how to handle the rod, and use it on different specimens. Having learned 

about the general purpose of the experiment, namely, to find out whether 

something unknown to them was "good" or "bad" for them, subjects were 

taught how to interpret the different movements of the rod: They were instruct- 

ed to close the eyes and to recreate the memory of a very pleasant situation, to 

remember the feeling, feel an inner "yes", and then to observe the movement 

of the rod. After that they were instructed to remember an unpleasant situa- 

tion, feel an inner "no", and again observe the movement of the rod. This was 

repeated until each subject was sure and felt that he or she knew exactly the 

idiosyncratic "yes" and "no" sign of the rod. They could then try this experi- 

ence on open material, like a rotten and a good tomato, water with a lot of, and 

a little, salt, and to specimens of the sealed probes to be tested afterwards, 

marked "+" and "-". Thus subjects learned to "gauge" the movements of the 

rods to receive clear "yes" and "no" "answers" from the rod. Experimenters 

were instructed to leave as much time to the subjects as they wished. Subjects 

only proceeded to the testing, when they felt sure that they could handle the 

rod. The training was deemed sufficient, since nearly all subjects described the 

task in the experimental room as easy and clear. After training, subjects pro- 

ceeded to fill in the questionnaire. Specific care was taken that experimental 

subjects would not meet each other between trials. They were then guided to 

the experimental room, the video camera was switched on, and the subjects 

were left alone for as long as they needed to do their testing. 

The task was to find out whether the probe was "good for me" or not, and to 

tick a box on the data sheet with a plus or minus sign accordingly. The data 

sheets were then sealed and put in a ballot box and were not handled until the 

experiment was finished. The ballot box was a box normally used for Universi- 

ty elections, locked with a key which was held by the senior experimenter 

(SS). It was left in the locked room with the data in it, until the end of the sec-

I 

I 


ond experimental week, and again for the last week. After subjects had fin- 

ished their testing and deposited their data in the ballot box, they were invited 

to come upstairs for a drink to the third floor in order to give them the opportu- 

nity to meet the experimenter (SS) and to keep them out of reach of other per- 

sons at the same time. Participants generally had a very positive attitude to- 

wards the experiment and found the task easy and clear-cut. 

Evaluation 

Coded data were double checked against the data sheets. Number of hits 

("+" with water and "-" with parathion) and number of misses were compared 

using Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests for paired data. When testing for hypotheses 

stated in the protocol, we used one-sided p-values for apriori hypotheses. 

When, on the other hand, we tested for exploratory hypotheses, we used two- 

sidedp-values for exploratory analysis. Correlations of hit rates and other vari- 

ables recorded before the experiments - professionality of dowsing, paranor- 

mal beliefs - were evaluated by Spearman's correlation. All calculations were 

carried out using SPSS for Windows. 

3. Results 

The expected chance rate of 10 hits out of 20 was not exceeded under strict- 

ly double-blind conditions ( ;= 10.16, sd = 1.98, range 6 - 15). The protocol 

called for an evaluation of the data after experiment 2 (see section 2). When, at 

that point, we further explored and broke down the data according to different 

experimenters, however, subjects instructed by experimenter 3 had a hit rate 

significantly above chance (p = 0.04, Wilcoxon, two-sided) for experiments 1 

and 2 together. We subsequently checked, whether this significance would be 

repeatable by testing an additional hypothesis introduced after experiment 2 

stating that there will be no differential effects of experimenters. Experiment 3 

in itself was not significant due to a lack of statistical power, but showed the 

same tendency. Nevertheless, the overall result was stable: Subjects intro- 

duced to the experiment by experimenter 3 had a hit rate significantly higher 

than chance (p 5 0.01, Wilcoxon, one-sided). Details are given in Table 1. 

There was a significant negative correlation between paranormal belief and 

hit rate (r = -.29; p = .002, two-sided). Therefore we blocked this variable into 

TABLE 1 

Experiment 1 & 2 Experiment 3 All Experiments 

Experimenter 1 9.86 (1.83) [22] 9.00 (2.00) [9] 9.61 (1.89) (311 

Experimenter 2 9.91 (1.95) [22] 10.13 (2.00) [I51 10.00 (1.94) [37] 

Experimenter 3 10.96 (2.13) [25]* 10.45 (1.57) [1 11 10.81 (1.97) [36]** 

Total 10.28 (2.02) [69] 9.94 (1.91) [35] 10.16 (1.98) [lo41 

Mean hit rate (standard deviation) [n] globally and per experimenter, as evaluated (i.e. experi- 

ments 1 & 2, experiment 3, all), *: p 10.04 (Wilcoxon, two-sided), **: p 10.01 (Wilcoxon, one- 

sided)


the categories high, medium and low and checked visually, whether by chance 

experimenter 3 had most of the subjects low in paranormal belief. This was not 

the case. Subjects with experimenter 3 had higher hit rates independent of belief 

(Figure 1). 

Profession, age and sex were not significantly correlated with hit rate. The 

effect size for the resulting experimenter - - effect is d = 0.5, a medium size effect 

in Cohen's terminology: [ G- ( x, + x,)l2]lsd (Cohen, 1987). We had an approximate 

power of p = 0.60 to discover the effect. 

The negative correlation between hit-rate and paranormal belief can be considered 

as a potential "signal" in the sense of Lucadou (1995). For the first experiment, 

this correlation was -.26 (p = .14), for the second -.44 (p = .007), 

and for the third -.I9 (p = .28). This means that the correlation increases with 

experiment 2, and decreases at experiment 3. A meta-analysis according to 

Rosenthal (1991), i.e. transforming the correlation coefficients and testing for 

homogeneity, yields the result that all three correlations, as well as the correlation 

of experiment 3 against the mean correlation of experiment 1 and 2 together, 

belong to the same population of correlations. We have, therefore, not 

found conclusive statistical evidence for a decline-effect between experiments, 

although this might be suggested by visual inspection of a corresponding 

plot. 

4. Discussion 

The statistical analysis of the data shows no evidence that subjects under 

strictly double blind conditions are generally able to extract information out of 

a system using a dowsing rod, neither as a group nor in individual perfor- 

mance. It is hard to dispute this result, since we tried to enhance external valid- 

ity as much as possible. The experiment was praised by experts, named by the 

hit rate (mean) 

I I I / 

Experimenter 1 Experimenter 2 Experimenter 3 

mlow mmedium mhigh 

paranormal belief 

N =I04 

Fig. 1. Hit rate by experimenters and by paranormal beliefs low, medium, and high.


producer of the rod, as valid, before we started. Volvic water and parathion are 

universally positive or negative for people. No known allergy or medical con- 

dition exists which speaks against Volvic water, and, given the normal rates for 

suicidal inclinations, parathion could have been subjectively "good" for at 

most 2 persons in our sample. For the others it would have been lethal and 

therefore bad. Besides, in using parathion we employed a substance which in 

sub-toxic doses is widely distributed in the ecological chain due to its former 

use as insecticide. Shielding and interference of probes was checked with ex- 

perts. Feedback of the participants regarding the experimental in general was 

favorable. A point for debate would be that all subjects had to use the same 

rod. This could have compromised the "dowsing faculty" of experienced 

dowsers. However, the rod used in our experiment is said to be universally ap- 

plicable and easy to use by everyone, and is explicitly sold as such. We did not 

receive negative feedback about the rod except indirectly by the seven people 

who did not finish the experiment or did not want to use the rod. This dropout- 

rate of 6% can hardly be a hint that the rod might have been a problem. 

As we kept a strictly blind regimen and covered the whole experimental 

process with videotaping, there was no overt or covert information whatsoever 

which could have been conveyed by the experimenters to the subjects. Experi- 

menters did not know contents or ratios of probes, nor the actual sequence, nor 

hypotheses. All they knew was that a rod is being tested using probes that 

would be "good" or "bad" for people. Their only interaction with experimental 

subjects took place in the instruction phase of the experiment, by showing and 

explaining the rod, and helping the subject to get acquainted with the task. 

After they had switched on the video tape and closed the door of the experi- 

mental room, they had no contact with subjects and their data any more. By 

keeping the data in a ballot box within the experimental room, which was 

locked all the time, we made sure that the data would not be handled during the 

experiment. 

Against this background of rigid control, it is surprising that subjects were 

able to distinguish significantly better than chance only when instructed by 

one specific experimenter. This experimenter effect is small but significant 

and consistent within the whole set of experiments: We found this result when 

evaluating experiments 1 and 2 with a two-sided test by chance. We then for- 

mulated a hypothesis, and did in fact not expect to see it again after the third 

experiment. It became stronger after all three experiments, due to more statis- 

tical power. We did four tests; one for the group as a whole and three for each 

experimenter, using very robust statistics. The result remains significant even 

when corrected for multiple testing. Given the fact that we had roughly 35 sub- 

jects per experimenter, ten per week and experimenter, and that the effect re- 

mained stable, this is a puzzling result, which cannot be considered as an ex- 

perimental artifact. The negative correlation between paranormal belief and 

hit rate does not explain it. There was no weekday or serial effect, as every ex- 

perimenter participated in every experiment, but in a different sequence. Nei-


ther did one of the three experiments in itself show a significant effect of such 

a kind. We also checked for position effects and did not find any. 

It could be the case that with one experimenter the subjects felt more at 

ease, thus being able to employ a capacity to extract information unconven- 

tionally, whereas with the other experimenters subjects felt more tense. We do 

not have data on the way subjects perceived experimenters. But even if there 

were a remarkable difference in this sense, this would mean that a capacity to 

function in an unconventional way can be triggered or catalyzed by a person 

not himself familiar with the task itself. 

So called psi-experimenter effects are well-known in the literature 

(Kennedy & Taddonio, 1976). They refer to experimenter influence which is 

not mediated by known sensory channels, in contrast to classical experimenter 

effects, which are supposed to work by subliminal perception and hidden cues 

(Rosenthal, 1976). We saw in a comparatively simple, tightly controlled ex- 

periment that an experimenter clearly modifies the result of a task by uncon- 

ventional means. He does this without any information about the target and the 

task to be performed. We conducted informal interviews with the experi- 

menters after the study, asking them about their attitudes and expectations. All 

of them were positive about the experiment without expecting particular re- 

sults. The experimenter in question (the student) described himself as interest- 

ed, having come to believe in dowsing, and hoped the experiment would prove 

the dowsing phenomenon, the chance of which he rated at 50:50. The other ex- 

perimenters had also positive attitudes towards the experiment, one being con- 

fident to see an effect, the other not. There is no striking difference between 

the experimenters, except that the attitude of experimenter 3 was a little more 

enthusiastic, without, however, being strongly biased towards a specific out- 

come. None of the experimenters had any relevant information whatsoever to 

be conveyed . 

What has been found for our quite artificial system "probe-rod-dowser-ex- 

perimenter" could be the case for any system under experimental control, and 

even mores so for uncontrolled systems. The experimental doctrine according 

to which it is only the actual information about a system that matters could 

well be too shortsighted. Our results suggest that not only the information that 

an experimenter has about an experimental system is relevant. Perhaps also 

other psychological variables, which we do not know yet, can, in hitherto un- 

known ways, modify experimental outcomes. Due to often heard, yet rarely 

officially published scientific gossip some labs are more lucky than others in 

reproducing or finding results in different areas of science. This quasi-fact 

might have its root in the observation that a specific experimenter can modify 

the outcome. 

This result needs repetition. Our third experiment can be seen as a first posi- 

tive experimental a priori test of the hypothesis of a non-classical experi- 

menter effect. Moreover, we do not know which aspects of the experimenter's 

personality are vital to this purported effect. Apart from that, we suggest that


investigators not only report blinding procedures in experiments, but also de- 

scribe circumstances which might have a bearing on the results: importance of 

the experiment to one's career, expectation, motivation, attitudes, and the like. 

Our results show that the cut which is usually assumed between the "mental 

world" of our concepts and the "material world" out there, between models 

and facts (Atmanspacher, 1994) is not as thorough and stringent, as some 

might wish. They also show that under certain circumstances, which need clar- 

ification, unconventional "transfer" of information can occur. 

Another effect exhibited by the data was the strong negative correlation be- 

tween paranormal belief and hit rate: the higher the belief, the poorer the out- 

come. Contrary to expectation, professionality does not correlate with hit rate. 

This could be an indication that "believers", who might have put pressure on 

themselves to "prove" a paranormal fact such as unconventional information 

transfer, performed poorly because of their self-generated tension. This sug- 

gests that a "playful" attitude is favorable for demonstrating paranormal ef- 

fects. 

Lucadou's hypothesis that the effect size for paranormal phenomena de- 

creases between successive experiments if there is a consistent effect which 

could be used to code a signal, as soon as the effect is known, was not vindicat- 

ed by our experiment. Assuming that the negative correlation between para- 

normal belief and hit rate represents a potential "signal" in the sense of Lu- 

cadou, our experimental results remained inconclusive with respect to a 

corresponding decline effect. Presumably one would have to use larger data- 

bases to actually model the effect. As it is, we have a qualitative hint that the 

hypothesis might be valid, but we have no clear quantitative evidence from our 

experiment. 


We gratefully acknowledge financial support by Ehlers-Verlag, Hans- 

Joachim Ehlers, for the setup of the experiment, logistic support by Dr. Joop 

M. Houtkooper, who provided the random numbers, Dipl. Psych. Anke Bred- 

nich, who helped with installing the probes, and Dipl. Psych. Eberhard Bauer, 

Dr. Dr. Walter von Lucadou, Prof. H.D. Betz, Prof. J. Mischo, Dipl.Ing. 

Karsten Krause, and Ruth Timter, who gave helpful advice in planning the ex- 

periment. We thank our three experimenters Christina, Thomas and Gerd, and 

all the participants. We gratefully acknowledge helpful criticisms by Dr. Har- 

ald Atmanspacher. 

References 

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of Consciousness Studies 1, 168. 

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zones: part 1 & 2. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 9,l-43; 159-189.


Brednich, A. (1993). Eine Fragebogenuntersuchung zur Elfassung von magisch-irrationalem 

Denken und der Schizotypischen Personlichkeitsstorung bei Erwachsenen. University of 

Freiburg, Department of Psychology, unpublished thesis. 

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baum. 

Hansen, G. P. (1982). Dowsing: a review of experimental research. Journal of the Society for Psy- 

chical Research, 5 1,345. 

Kennedy, J. E. & Taddonio, J. L. (1976). Experimenter effects in parapsychological research. 

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Lucadou, W. v. (1995). The model of pragmatic information (MPI). European Journal of Parapsy- 

chology, 1 1,58. 

Raum & Zeit, Special 3 (1995). Die Sprache der Natur verstehen. Das Lebenswerk Erich Kor- 

blers. Sauerlach: Ehlers Verlag. 

Rosenthal, R. (1976). Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research (enlarged edition). New York: 

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Rosenthal, R. (1991). Meta-Analytic Procedures for Social Research, Newbury Park: Sage.

Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 69-78, 1997 0892-33 10197 


ESSAY 

Consciousness, Causality, and Quantum Physics 

DAVID PRATT 

Nicolaas Tulpstraat 37, 2563 XK The Hague, The Netherlands 

Abstract - Quantum theory is open to different interpretations, and this 

paper reviews some of the points of contention. The standard interpretation 

of quantum physics assumes that the quantum world is characterized by ab- 

solute indeterminism and that quantum systems exist objectively only when 

they are being measured or observed. David Bohm's ontological interpreta- 

tion of quantum theory rejects both these assumptions. Bohm's theory that 

quantum events are party determined by subtler forces operating at deeper 

levels of reality ties in with John Eccles' theory that our minds exist outside 

the material world and interact with our brains at the quantum level. Paranor- 

mal phenomena indicate that our minds can communicate with other minds 

and affect distant physical systems by nonordinary means. Whether such 

phenomena can be adequately explained in terms of quantum effects and the 

quantum vacuum or whether they involve super-physical forces and states of 

matter as yet unknown to science is still an open question, and one which 

merits further experimental study. 

Quantum Uncertainty 

Quantum theory is generally regarded as one of the most successful scientific 

theories ever formulated. But while the mathematical description of the quan- 

tum world allows the probabilities of experimental results to be calculated 

with a high degree of accuracy, there is no consensus on what it means in con- 

ceptual terms. Some of the issues involved are explored below. 

According to the uncertainty principle, the position and momentum of a 

subatomic particle cannot be measured simultaneously with an accuracy 

greater than that set by Planck's constant. This is because in any measurement 

a particle must interact with at least one photon, or quantum of energy, which 

acts both like a particle and like a wave, and disturbs it in an unpredictable and 

uncontrollable manner. An accurate measurement of the position of an orbit- 

ing electron by means of a microscope, for example, requires the use of light 

of short wavelengths, with the result that a large but unpredictable momentum 

is transferred to the electron. An accurate measurement of the electron's mo- 

mentum, on the other hand, requires light quanta of very low momentum (and

70 D. Pratt 

therefore long wavelength), which leads to a large angle of diffraction in the 

lens and a poor definition of the position. 

According to the conventional interpretation of quantum physics, however, 

not only is it impossible for us to measure a particle's position and momentum 

simultaneously with equal precision, a particle does not possess well-defined 

properties when it is not interacting with a measuring instrument. Furthermore, 

the uncertainty principle implies that a particle can never be at rest, but is sub- 

ject to constant fluctuations even when no measurement is taking place, and 

these fluctuations are assumed to have no causes at all. In other words, the 

quantum world is believed to be characterized by absolute indeterminism, in- 

trinsic ambiguity, and irreducible lawlessness. As the late physicist David 

Bohm (1984, p. 87) put it: "it is assumed that in any particular experiment, the 

precise result that will be obtained is completely arbitrary in the sense that it 

has no relationship whatever to anything else that exists in the world or that 

ever has existed." 

Bohm (1984, p. 95) took the view that the abandonment of causality had 

been too hasty: "It is quite possible that while the quantum theory, and with it 

the indeterminacy principle, are valid to a very high degree of approximation 

in a certain domain, they both cease to have relevance in new domains below 

that in which the current theory is applicable. Thus, the conclusion that there is 

no deeper level of causally determined motion is just a piece of circular rea- 

soning, since it will follow only if we assume beforehand that no such level ex- 

ists." Most physicists, however, are content to accept the assumption of ab- 

solute chance. We shall return to this issue later in connection with free will. 

Collapsing the Wave Function 

A quantum system is represented mathematically by a wave function, which 

is derived from Schrodinger's equation. The wave function can be used to cal- 

culate the probability of finding a particle at any particular point in space. 

When a measurement is made, the particle is of course found in only one place, 

but if the wave function is assumed to provide a complete and literal descrip- 

tion of the state of a quantum system - as it is in the conventional interpreta- 

tion - it would mean that in between measurements the particle dissolves into 

a "superposition of probability waves" and is potentially present in many dif- 

ferent places at once. Then, when the next measurement is made, this wave 

packet is supposed to instantaneously "collapse," in some random and myste- 

rious manner, into a localized particle again. This sudden and discontinuous 

"collapse" violates the Schrodinger equation, and is not further explained in 

the conventional interpretation. 

Since the measuring device that is supposed to collapse a particle's wave 

function is itself made up of subatomic particles, it seems that its own wave 

function would have to be collapsed by another measuring device (which 

might be the eye and brain of a human observer), which would in turn need to 

be collapsed by a further measuring device, and so on, leading to an infinite

Consciousness, Causality, and Quantum Physics 71 

regress. In fact, the standard interpretation of quantum theory implies that all 

the macroscopic objects we see around us exist in an objective, unambiguous 

state only when they are being measured or observed. Schrodinger devised a 

famous thought-experiment to expose the absurd implications of this interpre- 

tation. A cat is placed in a box containing a radioactive substance, so that there 

is a fifty-fifty chance of an atom decaying in one hour. If an atom decays, it 

triggers the release of a poison gas, which kills the cat. After one hour the cat is 

supposedly both dead and alive (and everything in between) until someone 

opens the box and instantly collapses its wave function into a dead or alive cat. 

Various solutions to the "measurement problem" associated with wave- 

function collapse have been proposed. Some physicists maintain that the clas- 

sical or macro-world does not suffer from quantum ambiguity because it can 

store information and is subject to an "arrow of time," whereas the quantum or 

micro-world is alleged to be unable to store information and time-reversible 

(Pagels, 1983). A more extravagant approach is the many-worlds hypothesis, 

which claims that the universe splits each time a measurement (or measure- 

ment-like interaction) takes place, so that all the possibilities represented by 

the wave function (e.g. a dead cat and a living cat) exist objectively but in dif- 

ferent universes. Our own consciousness, too, is supposed to be constantly 

splitting into different selves, which inhabit these proliferating, non-commu- 

nicating worlds. 

Other theorists speculate that it is consciousness that collapses the wave 

function and thereby creates reality. In this view, a subatomic particle does not 

assume definite properties when it interacts with a measuring device, but only 

when the reading of the measuring device is registered in the mind of an ob- 

server (which may of course be long after the measurement has taken place). 

According to the most extreme, anthropocentric version of this theory, only 

self-conscious beings such as ourselves can collapse wave functions. This 

means that the whole universe must have existed originally as "potentia" in 

some transcendental realm of quantum probabilities until self-conscious be- 

ings evolved and collapsed themselves and the rest of their branch of reality 

into the material world, and that objects remain in a state of actuality only so 

long as they are being observed by humans (Goswami, 1993). Other theorists, 

however, believe that non-self-conscious entities, including cats and possibly 

even electrons, may be able to collapse their own wave functions (Herbert, 

1993). 

The theory of wave-function collapse (or state-vector collapse, as it is 

sometimes called) raises the question of how the "probability waves" that the 

wave function is thought to represent can collapse into a particle if they are no 

more than abstract mathematical constructs. Since the very idea of wave pack- 

ets spreading out and collapsing is not based on hard experimental evidence 

but only on a particular interpretation of the wave equation, it is worth taking a 

look at one of the main alternative interpretations, that of David Bohm and his

72 D. Pratt 

associates, which provides an intelligible account of what may be taking place 

at the quantum level. 

The Implicate Order 

Bohm's ontological interpretation of quantum physics rejects the assumption 

that the wave function gives the most complete description of reality possible, 

and thereby avoids the need to introduce the ill-defined and unsatisfactory 

notion of wave-function collapse (and all the paradoxes that go with it). 

Instead, it assumes the real existence of particles and fields: particles have a 

complex inner structure and are always accompanied by a quantum wave 

field; they are acted upon not only by classical electromagnetic forces but also 

by a subtler force, the quantum potential, determined by their quantum field, 

which obeys Schrodinger's equation. (Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Bohm & Peat, 

1 989; Hiley & Peat, 199 1) 

The quantum potential carries information from the whole environment and 

provides direct, nonlocal connections among quantum systems. It guides particles 

in the same way that radio waves guide a ship on automatic pilot - not by 

its intensity but by its form. It is extremely sensitive and complex, so that particle 

trajectories appear chaotic. It corresponds to what Bohm calls the implicate 

order, which can be thought of as a vast ocean of energy on which the 

physical, or explicate, world is just a ripple. Bohm points out that the existence 

of an energy pool of this kind is recognized, but given little consideration, by 

standard quantum theory, which postulates a universal quantum field - the 

quantum vacuum or zero-point field - underlying the material world. Very 

little is known about the quantum vacuum at present, but its energy density is 

estimated to be an astronomical 10'~~ ~/cm~ (Forward, 1996, pp. 328-37). 

In his treatment of quantum field theory, Bohm proposes that the quantum 

field (the implicate order) is subject to the formative and organizing influence 

of a super-quantum potential, which expresses the activity of a super-implicate 

order. The super-quantum potential causes waves to converge and diverge 

again and again, producing a kind of average particle-like behavior. The apparently 

separate forms that we see around us are therefore only relatively stable 

and independent patterns, generated and sustained by a ceaseless underlying 

movement of enfoldment and unfoldment, with particles constantly 

dissolving into the implicate order and then re-crystallizing. This process takes 

place incessantly, and with incredible rapidity, and is not dependent upon a 

measurement being made. 

In Bohm's model, then, the quantum world exists even when it is not being 

observed and measured. He rejects the positivist view that something that cannot 

be measured or known precisely cannot be said to exist. In other words, he 

does not confuse epistemology with ontology, the map with the territory. For 

Bohm, the probabilities calculated from the wave function indicate the 

chances of a particle being at different positions regardless of whether a measurement 

is made, whereas in the conventional interpretation they indicate the


chances of a particle coming into existence at different positions when a mea- 

surement is made. The universe is constantly defining itself through its cease- 

less interactions - of which measurement is only a particular instance - and 

absurd situations such as dead-and-alive cats therefore cannot arise. 

Thus, although Bohm rejects the view that human consciousness brings 

quantum systems into existence, and does not believe that our minds normally 

have a significant effect on the outcome of a measurement (except in the sense 

that we choose the experimental set-up), his interpretation opens the way for 

the operation of deeper, subtler, more mind-like levels of reality. He argues 

that consciousness is rooted deep in the implicate order, and is therefore pre- 

sent to some degree in all material forms. He suggests that there may be an in- 

finite series of implicate orders, each having both a matter aspect and a con- 

sciousness aspect: "everything material is also mental and everything mental is 

also material, but there are many more infinitely subtle levels of matter than 

we are aware of' (Weber, 1990, p. 151). The concept of the implicate domain 

could be seen as an extended form of materialism, but, he says, "it could equal- 

ly well be called idealism, spirit, consciousness. The separation of the two - 

matter and spirit - is an abstraction. The ground is always one." (Weber, 

1990, p. 101) 

Mind and Free Will 

Quantum indeterminism is clearly open to interpretation: it either means 

hidden (to us) causes, or a complete absence of causes. The position that some 

events "just happen" for no reason at all is impossible to prove, for our inabili- 

ty to identify a cause does not necessarily mean that there is no cause. The no- 

tion of absolute chance implies that quantum systems can act absolutely spon- 

taneously, totally isolated from, and uninfluenced by, anything else in the 

universe. The opposing standpoint is that all systems are continuously partici- 

pating in an intricate network of causal interactions and interconnections at 

many different levels. Individual quantum systems certainly behave unpre- 

dictably, but if they were not subject to any causal factors whatsoever, it would 

be difficult to understand why their collective behavior displays statistical reg- 

ularities. 

The position that everything has a cause, or rather many causes, does not 

necessarily imply that all events, including our own acts and choices, are rigid- 

ly predetermined by purely physical processes - a standpoint sometimes 

called "hard determinism" (Thornton, 1989). The indeterminism at the quan- 

tum level provides an opening for creativity and free will. But if this indeter- 

minism is interpreted to mean absolute chance, it would mean that our choices 

and actions just "pop up" in a totally random and arbitrary way, in which case 

they could hardly be said to be our choices and the expression of our own free 

will. Alternatively, quantum indeterminism could be interpreted as causation 

from subtler, non-physical levels, so that our acts of free will are caused -but 

by our own self-conscious minds. From this point of view - sometimes called

74 D. Pratt 

"soft determinism" - free will involves active, self-conscious self-determina- 

tion. 

According to orthodox scientific materialism, mental states are identical 

with brain states; our thoughts and feelings, and our sense of self, are generat- 

ed by electrochemical activity in the brain. This would mean either that one 

part of the brain activates another part, which then activates another part, etc., 

or that a particular region of the brain is activated spontaneously, without any 

cause, and it is hard to see how either alternative would provide a basis for a 

conscious self and free will. Francis Crick (1994), for example, who believes 

that consciousness is basically a pack of neurons, says that the main seat of 

free will is probably in or near a part of the cerebral cortex known as the anteri- 

or cingulate sulcus, but he implies that our feeling of being free is largely, if not 

entirely, an illusion. 

Those who reduce consciousness to a by-product of the brain disagree on 

the relevance of the quantum-mechanical aspects of neural networks: for ex- 

ample, Francis Crick, the late Roger Sperry (1 994), and Daniel Dennett (1 991) 

tend to ignore quantum physics, while Stuart Hameroff (1994) believes that 

consciousness arises from quantum coherence in microtubules within the 

brain's neurons. Some researchers see a connection between consciousness 

and the quantum vacuum: for example, Charles Laughlin (1996) argues that 

the neural structures that mediate consciousness may interact nonlocally with 

the vacuum (or quantum sea), while Edgar Mitchell (1996) believes that both 

matter and consciousness arise out of the energy potential of the vacuum. 

Neuroscientist Sir John Eccles dismisses the materialistic standpoint as a 

"superstition," and advocates dualist interactionism: he argues that there is a 

mental world in addition to the material world, and that our mind or self acts 

on the brain (particularly the supplementary motor area of the neocortex) at 

the quantum level by increasing the probability of the firing of selected neu- 

rons (Eccles, 1994; Giroldini, 1991). He contends that the mind is not only 

non-physical but absolutely non-material and non-substantial. However, if it 

were not associated with any form of energy-substance whatsoever, it would 

be a pure abstraction and therefore unable to exert any influence on the physi- 

cal world. This objection also applies to anti-reductionists who shun the word 

"dualist" and describe matter and consciousness as complementary or dyadic 

aspects of reality, yet deny consciousness any energetic or substantial nature, 

thereby implying that it is fundamentally different from matter and in fact a 

mere abstraction. 

An alternative position is that which is echoed in many mystical and spiritu- 

al traditions: that physical matter is just one "octave" in an infinite spectrum of 

matter-energy, or consciousness-substance, and that just as the physical world 

is largely organized and coordinated by inner worlds (astral, mental, and spiri- 

tual), so the physical body is largely energized and controlled by subtler bod- 

ies or energy-fields, including an astral model-body and a mind or soul (see 

Purucker, 1973). According to this view, nature in general, and all the entities


that compose it, are formed and organized mainly from within outwards, from 

deeper levels of their constitution. This inner guidance is sometimes automatic 

and passive, giving rise to our automatic bodily functions and habitual and in- 

stinctual behavior, and to the regular, law-like operations of nature in general, 

and sometimes it is active and self-conscious, as in our acts of intention and 

volition. A physical system subjected to such subtler influences is not so much 

acted upon from without as guided from within. As well as influencing our own 

brains and bodies, our minds also appear to be able to affect other minds and 

bodies and other physical objects at a distance, as seen in paranormal phenom- 

ena. 

EPR and ESP 

It was David Bohm and one of his supporters, John Bell of CERN, who laid 

most of the theoretical groundwork for the EPR experiments performed by 

Alain Aspect in 1982 (the original thought-experiment was proposed by Ein- 

stein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935). These experiments demonstrated that if 

two quantum systems interact and then move apart, their behavior is correlated 

in a way that cannot be explained in terms of signals traveling between them at 

or slower than the speed of light. This phenomenon is known as nonlocality, 

and is open to two main interpretations: either it involves unmediated, instan- 

taneous action at a distance, or it involves faster-than-light signaling. 

If nonlocal correlations are literally instantaneous, they would effectively 

be non-causal; if two events occur absolutely simultaneously, "cause" and "ef- 

fect" would be indistinguishable, and one of the events could not be said to 

cause the other through the transfer of force or energy, for no such transfer 

could take place infinitely fast. There would therefore be no causal transmis- 

sion mechanism to be explained, and any investigations would be confined to 

the conditions that allow correlated events to occur at different places. 

It is interesting to note that light and other electromagnetic effects were also 

once thought to be transmitted instantaneously, until observational evidence 

proved otherwise. The hypothesis that nonlocal connections are absolutely in- 

stantaneous is impossible to verify, as it would require two perfectly simulta- 

neous measurements, which would demand an infinite degree of accuracy. 

However, as David Bohm and Basil Hiley (1993, pp. 293-4,347) have pointed 

out, it could be experimentally falsified. For if nonlocal connections are prop- 

agated not at infinite speeds but at speeds greater than that of light through a 

"quantum ether" - a subquantum domain where current quantum theory and 

relativity theory break down - then the correlations predicted by quantum 

theory would vanish if measurements were made in periods shorter than those 

required for the transmission of quantum connections between particles. Such 

experiments are beyond the capabilities of present technology but might be 

possible in the future. If superluminal interactions exist, they would be "non- 

local" only in the sense of non-physical. 

Nonlocality has been invoked as an explanation for telepathy and clairvoy-

76 D. Pratt 

ance, though some investigators believe that they might involve a deeper level 

of nonlocality, or what Bohm calls "super-nonlocality" (similar perhaps to 

Sheldrake's "morphic resonance" ( 1989)). As already pointed out, if nonlocal- 

ity is interpreted to mean instantaneous connectedness, it would imply that in- 

formation could be "received" at a distance at exactly the same moment as it is 

generated, without undergoing any form of transmission. At most, one could 

then try to understand the conditions that allow the instant appearance of in- 

formation. 

The alternative position is that information - which is basically a pattern of 

energy - always takes time to travel from its source to another location, that 

information is stored at some paraphysical level, and that we can access this in- 

formation, or exchange information with other minds, if the necessary condi- 

tions of "sympathetic resonance" exist. As with EPR, the hypothesis that 

telepathy is absolutely instantaneous is unprovable, but it might be possible to 

devise experiments that could falsify it. For if ESP phenomena do involve sub- 

tler forms of energy traveling at finite but perhaps superluminal speeds 

through super-physical realms, it might be possible to detect a delay between 

transmission and reception, and also some weakening of the effect over very 

long distances, though it is already evident that any attenuation must be far less 

than that experienced by electromagnetic energy, which is subject to the in- 

verse-square law. 

As for precognition, the third main category of ESP, one possible explana- 

tion is that it involves direct, "nonlocal" access to the actual future. Alterna- 

tively, it may involve clairvoyant perception of a probable future scenario that 

is beginning to take shape on the basis of current tendencies and intentions, in 

accordance with the traditional idea that coming events cast their shadows be- 

fore them. Bohm says that such foreshadowing takes place "deep in the impli- 

cate order" (Talbot, 1992, p. 212) - which some mystical traditions would 

call the astral or akashic realms. 

Psychokinesis and the Unseen World 

Micro-psychokinesis involves the influence of consciousness on atomic par- 

ticles. In certain micro-PK experiments conducted by Helmut Schmidt, groups 

of subjects were typically able to alter the probabilities of quantum events 

from 50% to between 51 and 52%, and a few individuals managed over 54% 

(Broughton, 199 1, p. 177). Experiments at the PEAR lab at Princeton Univer- 

sity have yielded a smaller shift of 1 part in 10,000 (Jahn & Dunne, 1987). 

Some researchers have invoked the theory of the collapse of wave functions by 

consciousness in order to explain such effects. It is argued that in micro-PK, in 

contrast to ordinary perception, the observing subject helps to specify what the 

outcome of the collapse of the wave function will be, perhaps by some sort of 

informational process (Broughton, 1991, pp. 177-8 1). Eccles follows a similar 

approach in explaining how our minds act on our own brains. However, the 

concept of wave-function collapse is not essential to explaining mind-matter


interaction. We could equally well adopt the standpoint that subatomic parti- 

cles are ceaselessly flickering into and out of physical existence, and that the 

outcome of the process is modifiable by our will - a psychic force. 

Macro-PK involves the movement of stable, normally unmoving objects by 

mental effort. Related phenomena include poltergeist activity, materializa- 

tions and dematerializations, teleportation, and levitation. Although an im- 

pressive amount of evidence for such phenomena has been gathered by investi- 

gators over the past one hundred and fifty years (Inglis, 1984, 1992; Milton, 

1994), macro-PK is a taboo area, and attracts little interest, despite - or per- 

haps because of - its potential to overthrow the current materialistic para- 

digm and revolutionize science. Such phenomena clearly involve far more 

than altering the probabilistic behavior of atomic particles, and could be re- 

garded as evidence for forces, states of matter, and non-physical living entities 

currently unknown to science. Confirmation that such things exist would pro- 

vide a further indication that within the all-embracing unity of nature there is 

endless diversity. 

The possible existence of subtler planes interpenetrating the physical plane 

is at any rate open to investigation (see Tiller, 1993), and this is more than can 

be said for the hypothetical extra dimensions postulated by superstring theory, 

which are said to be curled up in an area a billion-trillion-trillionth of a cen- 

timeter across and therefore completely inaccessible, or the hypothetical 

"baby universes" and "bubble universes" postulated by some cosmologists, 

which are said to exist in some equally inaccessible "dimension." 

The hypothesis of super-physical realms does not seem to be favored by 

many researchers. Edgar Mitchell (1996), for example, believes that all psy- 

chic phenomena involve nonlocal resonance between the brain and the quan- 

tum vacuum, and consequent access to holographic, nonlocal information. In 

his view, this hypothesis could explain not only PK and ESP, but also out-of- 

body and near-death experiences, visions and apparitions, and evidence usual- 

ly cited in favor of a reincarnating soul. He admits that this theory is specula- 

tive, unvalidated, and may require new physics. 

Further experimental studies of consciousness-related phenomena, both 

normal and paranormal, will hopefully allow the merits of the various con- 

tending theories to be tested. Such investigations could deepen our knowledge 

of the workings of both the quantum realm and our minds, and the relationship 

between them, and indicate whether the quantum vacuum really is the bottom 

level of all existence, or whether there are deeper realms of nature waiting to 

be explored. 

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Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 1, pp. 79-87, 1997 0892-33 10197 


GUEST COLUMN: 

TESTING THE SURVIVAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS HYPOTHESIS: 

THE GOAL OF THE CODES 

GARY E. R. SCHWARTZ AND LINDA G. S. RUSSEK 

Department of Psychology, P 0. Box 210068, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721-0068 

One of the most challenging scientific and philosophical questions concerns 

the possibility of the survival of consciousness after death. This theoretical 

and empirical question is not mentioned in most textbooks in psychology or 

cognitive neuroscience, and to the best of our knowledge, receives no federal 

funding from any governmental agency. However, Ethel Elizabeth Smith, a 

professional writer who published 29 books in parapsychology under the 

name Susy Smith (e.g. Smith, 1964, 197 1, 1974, 1990) , has been interested in 

this question for over 40 years. In 1971, Smith established the Survival Re- 

search Foundation to encourage scientific research on this topic. Smith, who 

recently celebrated her 8Sh birthday, has designed an experiment to test the 

hypothesis. She is offering a $10,000 award, most of her life's savings, to any- 

one who can successfully decipher a message she will attempt to communicate 

after she dies. The purpose of this Guest Column is to bring this experiment to 

the attention of the scientific community. 

We learned of the experiment through an article published in the January 

3rd, 1995 issue of The Arizona Daily Star, a Tucson newspaper. The article, 

written by James Reel, described a "great experiment" supported and designed 

by Smith. The article was brought to our attention by Richard Lane, M. D., an 

Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Arizona, who was fa- 

miliar with some of our recent theoretical writings (Russek & Schwartz, 1996; 

Schwartz & Russek, 1997) concerning the implications of systems theory's 

(von Bertalanffy, 1968; Miller, 1978) conceptualizations of energy and infor- 

mation for conventional medicine, mind-body medicine, and alternative medi- 

cine. Though we were familiar with the well known, presumably failed, lay 

experiment by Harry Houdini and his wife Beatrice (discussed in Berger & 

Berger, 1991), we were not then aware of any serious scientific attempts to ad- 

dress this question (e.g., Almeder, 1996). 

The logic of Smith's experiment, and the history of research using enci- 

phered codes, are reviewed in Berger (1984). Berger, the current President of 

the Survival Research Foundation, is an attorney and scholar who has pub- 

lished books on death and dying in the legal and medical fields (Berger and 

Berger, 1990; Berger, 1993, 1995a, b) as well as books on parapsychology

80 G. Schwartz and L. Russek 

To test the hypothesis that survival of consciousness exists after death, a 

phrase is enciphered using a coding system. The purpose of the enciphering 

system is to ensure that no one who is living can infer the message (decipher 

the code) through means other than communication with the departed. Three 

coding systems have been published, one by a British psychologist from Cam- 

bridge University (Thouless, 1948) and two by American attorneys (Tribbe, 

1980; Berger, 1982). The methods are complex and cannot be explicated in 

the space available for this column (see Berger, 1984). 

The basic paradigm is for individuals to encipher codes and store them in a 

secure place (in the Foundation's Miami, Florida, bank vault) before they die. 

A secret phrase, such as a common saying, a line of poetry, or a sentence from 

a nursery rhyme, is required to decipher the code. The task is to determine 

whether the secret phrase can be communicated after the person has died, 

thereby breaking the code. 

Using the TribbeIMulders code (Tribbe, 1980), Smith enciphered a mes- 

sage which was sealed in the bank vault. However, Smith and Berger were 

concerned with the well known alternative hypothesis. Could the message 

have been received telepathically (Bem and Honorton, 1994)' by someone 

who is living, even though the code was presumably known by no one except 

Smith? If the code was broken after death, an alternative explanation could be 

that someone had already read the message by telepathy from the deceased's 

mind before slhe died. They therefore decided to test whether the message 

could be deciphered while Smith was still alive. 

In October, 1994, the Survival Research Foundation challenged "psychics, 

sensitives, and all who feel a mental rapport with Smith", to attempt to win 

$1,000 by telepathically guessing what the secret phrase was while she was 

still alive. If her message was received and her code was broken before her 

demise, the winner would receive the Award. If no one was able to break the 

code from October, 1994 to October, 1995, and then the code was broken after 

her demise, Smith and Berger proposed that "this would be persuasive evi- 

dence for her (Smith's) continued existence." 

Over 100 letters were received by the Foundation, attempting to break the 

code. At the time this Guest Column was written, the code was still intact. 

Smith, disappointed that the pre-death response was not larger, recently in- 

creased the Award to $10,000 (most of her savings) with the hope of stimulat- 

ing greater interest in people attempting to decipher her code after she dies. 

When we began extended conversations with Smith in the spring of 1996, 

Smith was in poor health and was preparing to die. She could barely walk and 

was confined to electric scooters and wheel chairs. She had prepared her will, 

and had written her own obituary. The draft we were given is quoted below: 

"Susy Smith (born Ethel Elizabeth Smith), well-known author of 29 published books, 

at the age of ." 

died

Born June 2, 19 1 1, in Washington, 

D. C., she was the only child of ~ erton 

M. Smith and Eli7abeth Hardegen 

Smith. Her father was an Army officer 

and the family traveled frequently, 

spending 10 years in San Antonio, 

Texas. She majored in Journalism at 

the University of Texas and the University 

of Arizona and also attended 

Hunter College in New York City. 

After several years of newspaper work 

for the Salt Lake Trib~lne and the Deseret 

News and other paper\, \he began 

her career as a writer ol iron-lictiori 

books. Over the next 40 year\ \he wa\ 

published by such prominent firm\ a\ 

Macmillan, Doubleday, I'utnarn, Pren- 

Survival of Consciousness 

tice Hall, I>ell, the New American ],I- l+,,hcl Elg~abeth (susy) Smith, age 85, founder 

brary and ChiltO11 Pre~\. Six Of her alld flr\t president of the Survival Research faun- 

books were tran\lated into ti)reign Ian- cfCttlon. authol of 29 books In parnpjychology. 

guages and one into Braille. 

She was listed in Wlzo'j Wl7o in Anit~rrc*co~ Wonlen, Wllo'.c Who in the South urzd 

Southwe.st, Collroml~orarv Autlror.), f+'onjrrrost W ~I~IPII in Cot~znzi~ni(~~~tion~, Two 7'110~sarztl 

Wonzrn of Achiovrrnr~tlt, Wlro's Who irl l%clr~~p,\\lc,hology, and The Encvclopeciiu of 

Par-~p.\vc~holo,gv crncc' P.\vc.lric crl Kt>nc(rrc.h. klcr work was primarily in the psychic field, 

where her critical and objective re\earch brought a con5tderable arnoui1t of information 

to the public's view. All ot her book\, file\ and paper5 ;ire on permanent exhibit in the 

Susy Smith Collection, Popular C'ulture I,lbrary, Bowling Green State Universily, 

Bowling Green, Ohio. 

Over the years she traveled exten\ivcly throughout thc Un~ted States and Europe on 

research and lecture tours anci returned in 197 1 to reside in Tucwn, where she has been 

active in club work as well a\ cont~nuing to write. She ha\ belonged to the National 

League of American Pen Wotne11 (lor which \erved as president), \he 'Tuc\on Opera 

Dames, the Pilot Club, the W5ternel-s. and Chi Omega. She was one of the Sounders 

and also a president of the Society of Southwestern Author\. 

Although Susy Smith was marrled brrefly in her 20'5, she has no survivors and no 

close relatives. After conling to '17uc\on she founded and became the first pre5ident of 

the Survival Research Foundation, which is still in operation. She has left $10,000 in 

her will for anyone who might possibly be able to rcceive a message from her after her 

death. A code which will reveal the accuracy of the mc.\\ape if receiver1 ha\ hem left 

with the current president of the organization: Arthur Berger, J. D., the Survival Research 

Foundation, P. 0. Box 63-0026, Miami, FL 33 163-0026. Anyone believing 

they have received a message should contact Berger at the above addre\\. 

Srnith is clearly an unusual women. She appearsto be extremely intelligent, 

capable of both critical and creative thinking, and has a yuick wit. Despite her 

age and poor physical health, her mind appears to be intact. The authors of the 

present paper, trained in clinical psychology, have not observed signs of psy- 

chosis or thought disordcr in Smith's many conversations with us. This is con- 

sistent with what she wrote in her autobiography:


I have been told by a competent psychiatrist friend that whatever I am, I'm not schizo- 

phrenic. (Smith, 1971) 

Over the years, Smith has become a believer in paranormal phenomena. 

However, she is still a skeptic, even about her own experiences. For example, 

even though she entertains the hypothesis that she herself has communicated 

with people who have died (Smith, 1971; 1974; 1990), she is aware of alterna- 

tive hypotheses (e.g. the information she presumably received may reflect her 

creative unconscious). Her analysis: 

Might it be possible that my subconscious mind, with strange, unfathomable powers, 

has gathered together brief bits from my purposely very limited reading of philosophi- 

cal or occult literature, compiled, coordinated, reconstructed, and embellished it with a 

great deal of additional information, and then poured it forth as automatic writing? 

(Smith, 197 1). 

Searching for data, positive or negative, based on her personal experience, 

she writes: 

To confound this theory is the fact told me by three well-versed Swedenborgians ... that 

a vast amount of the material written through me parallels exactly the accounts given in 

the 18th century by Emanuel Swedenborg, whose works I have never read. (Smith, 

1971). 

Swedenborg was a scientific engineer who published Sweden's first scien- 

tific journal in 1715. He published the three volume treatise, Philosophical 

and Metalurgical Works, about mining, and published The Economy of the An- 

imal Kingdom, in which he dealt with the relation between soul and body. Ac- 

cording to Berger and Berger (1971), he was "the most eminent Swedish sa- 

vant of his time" as well as "one of the strangest and greatest mystics of all 

time." 

Though some of Smith's personal experiences are hard to believe, they 

should not be simply dismissed. Smith is well aware of the anecdotal nature 

of these experiences. The elegance of Smith's current experiment is that pre- 

dictions have been made apriori, and they can be confirmed or unconfirmed in 

the future. 

Smith is clearly committed to scientific research in this controversial area. 

She is sophisticated enough to understand that science can never prove the null 

hypothesis. However, she is also aware that if her research efforts fail, nega- 

tive results may be interpreted as strongly suggestive, seriously questioning 

the survival of consciousness hypothesis. We have learned that at least one 

person who left a code with the Survival Research Foundation has since died, 

and thus far, her code-breaking phrase has not been discovered. Other nega- 

tive results have been reported (S tevenenson, Oram and Markwick, 1989).

Survival of Consciousness 83 

However, one difficulty with the existing coding systems is that they are unfor- 

giving - if a few letters of a complex phrase are misheard or miscommunicat- 

ed, the message will not be decoded correctly, and the experiment will be inter- 

preted as a complete failure. 

We have proposed that Smith expand her experiment, and moreover, that 

she should attempt to complete a 3oth book about this research before she dies. 

At of the time of this writing, she has completed the first draft of a book about 

her life and this experiment. 

Her experiment has been expanded in the following four ways: 

1. She has created a second personal phrase, known only to her. The pur- 

pose of this second phrase is to increase the possibility that someone 

might guess one of the secret phrases while she is still alive. Moreover, if 

one of the phrases is guessed while she is alive, there will still be a sec- 

ond phrase on record that can potentially be communicated after she 

dies. Finally, it gives Smith two possible opportunities to communicate 

after death. 

2. She has created a "telepathy" phrase, known not only to herself but also 

to the authors of this paper. The purpose of this phrase is to test the 

telepathy hypothesis. It is Smith's intention to attempt to communicate 

her two personal phrases, and not the telepathy phrase, after she dies. 

However, if after Smith dies, someone should claim to receive a message 

and reports the telepathy phrase, this will imply that the receiver has 

registered information from the living (the authors) and not Smith. 

3. The authors have created a second telepathy phrase, not known to 

Smith. The purpose of this phrase is also to test the telepathy hypothesis. 

If after Smith dies, someone should claim to receive a message and re- 

ports this second telepathy phrase, this will certainly imply that the re- 

ceiver has registered information from the living (the authors) and not 

Smith, 

4. The authors have created a simple letter-number coding system to enci- 

pher the phrases in addition to the TribbeIMulder's (Tribbe, 1980) code. 

Though the letter-number code is not as foolproof as the prior codes 

(Berger, 1984), it is relatively straightforward to implement accurately 

and is more forgiving. 

Consider the phrase "The most beautiful emotion we can experience is the 

mystical." (Albert Einstein). Four levels of letter-number codes are created. 

For each word, a given letter is selected, and its numeric position is noted. For 

example, for the word "the", three possible letters (t, h, e) could be chosen. If 

the letter t was selected, the letter-number combination "t 1" would be record- 

ed. For the next word, "most", the letter "ow could be selected and recorded as 

"02." Following this logic, the first level of code could be tl-o2-t5-t4-e2-a2- 

p3-s2-e3-c6. This first level of code would be written on the outside of the


first envelop stored in the bank vault. Only the research assistant would have 

access to the vault and the envelop. 

The research assistant would know that this phrase contained 10 words, and 

that the words contained at least the following: t -0 ----t ---t -e -a --p -s --e ----- 

e. Notice that it is virtually impossible to guess what the phrase is, even if one 

knows the first level of the code. 

The research assistant would take the phrase guessed by a given receiver and 

look to see if a match existed at this level. If a match occurred, then the envel- 

op would be opened, revealing a second code. The second code reflects a sec- 

ond set of letter-number pairs. Care must be taken in creating the code to se- 

lect those letters that minimize guessing what the phrase is when the second 

level is reached. For example, a second level could be e3-s3-a3-03-w 1 -n3-e4- 

11-h2-a7. At this point, the research assistant would know that the words con- 

tained at least the following: t-e -0s --a-t --ot we -an --pe is -he -----ca. 

Notice that it would still be virtually impossible to guess the phrase at the 

second level. However, if a match occurred at the second level, the probability 

would be very great that the receiver had correctly guessed the message. If the 

phrase matched the second level code, a second envelop would be opened, re- 

vealing a third level of the code. At this point, the research assistant might be 

able to begin to guess the secret phrase (depending upon the phrase chosen and 

the selection of the letters). For example, two words, "we" and "is", would 

now be known as consisting of two letters each. Presuming that the third level 

code was also correctly matched, the research assistant would open a third let- 

ter, containing a fourth level code. If this level of code was also correct, a 

fourth letter would be opened revealing the secret phrase. 

Using this letter-number coding system plus the TribbeIMulder coding sys- 

tem, Smith has encoded a second personal phrase known only to herself, she 

has encoded a telepathy phrase shared with the authors, and the authors have 

encoded a second telepathy phrase known only to themselves. Smith has also 

taken her original personal phrase, previously encoded using the TribbeIMul- 

der coding system, and also encoded it using the letter-number coding system. 

The four phrases that have been encoded with both systems are in the Survival 

Research Foundation's bank vault. 

The letter-number code requires integrity on the part of the research assis- 

tant. It does not rule out the possibility that a receiver might telepathically get 

some information about the code from the research assistant who is privy to 

the code. However, even if the level 1 and level 2 code was guessed telepathi- 

cally, the receiver would find it extremely difficult to guess the secret phrase. 

What is important is that even if a few letters are miscommunicated and hence 

mismatched, the research assistant will be able to tell that a near match has 

been made. 

Smith and Berger are again encouraging all interested persons to attempt to 

guess Smith's personal phrases while she is still alive. A correct guess (imply-

Survival of Consciousness 85 

guessed before she dies, the authors will provide $10,000 from a private foun- 

dation to continue Smith's experiment. In the highly unlikely event that both 

phrases are guessed before Smith dies, other people preparing to die will have 

to carry on Smith's mission, creating codes and collecting pre-death telepathy 

data before they die. 

Smith believes that many of her friends and colleagues who have died will 

join forces and help her communicate her two secret phrases. She speculates 

that her experiment may be successful where others have failed because of this 

hypothesized spiritual collaboration. 

We believe that the scientific and academic community should be aware of 

Smith's experiment. More sophisticated research designs can be developed in 

the future to address this question. An automated computer enciphering pro- 

gram can be written in the future to implement and evaluate future codes, 

thereby eliminating conscious awareness of the enciphered code by a research 

assistant as a possible source of error, and making it possible to quantify the 

degree of the match. 

Students taking parapsychology courses are especially encouraged to pur- 

sue Smith's challenge to mankind. Should positive results be obtained after 

Smith dies, Smith's experiment will be remembered in the history of science. 

Such findings will contribute to changing our understanding of life and the 

meaning of death in a profound way. Hopefully other individuals, interested in 

this deep philosophical and empirical question, will be inspired by Smith's ef- 

forts, and collaborate with her in conducting this great experiment. 

At the time this article was going to print, the authors had formally estab- 

lished the Susy Smith Project in the Human Energy Systems Laboratory, De- 

partment of Psychology, University of Arizona. The purpose is to honor Smith 

and her mission and to bring increased scientific talent and rigor to research 

testing the survival of consciousnesss hypothesis. The Susy Smith Project has 

a University Scientific Advisory Committee consisting of Lynn Nadel, Ph.D., 

Professor and Head, Department of Psychology, Allen W. Kaszniak, Ph.D., 

Professor and Director, Clinical Psychology Training Program, and John J. B. 

Allen, Ph.D., Assistant Professor and Director, Psychophysiology Laboratory, 

and an International Scientific Advisory Committee including Daryl G. Bem, 

Ph.D., Professor of Psychology, Comell University (Chair of the Committee), 

and Arthur S . Berger, J.D., President, the Survival Research Foundation. Per- 

sons interested in this research should contact the authors of this paper. 

References 

Almeden, R. (1996). Recent responses to survival research. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 10, 

495. 

Bem, D. G., and Honorton, C. (1994). Does psi exist? Replicable evidence for an anomalous 

process of information transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 1 15,4. 

Berger, A. S. (1982). Learning Tests for Survival. Pembroke Pines, FL: Survival Research Foun- 

dation. 

Berger, A. S. (1984). Experiments with false keys. The Journal of the American Society for Psy- 

chical Research, 78,41.


Berger, A. S. (1987). Aristocracy of the Dead. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co. 

Berger, A. S. (1988a). Lives and Letters in American Parapsychology: A Biographical History 

1850-1987. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co. 

Berger, A. S. (1988b). Evidence of Life after Death: A Casebook for the Tough-Minded. Spring- 

field, IL: Charles C. Thomas. 

Berger, A. S. and Berger, J., Eds. (1991). The Encyclopedia of Parapsychology and Psychical Re- 

search. New York, NY: Paragon House. 

Berger. A. S. and Berger, J. (1990). To Die or Not to Die: Cross-Disciplinary, Cultural and Legal 

Perspectives on the Right to Choose Death. Westport, CT: Praeger. 

Berger, A. S. (1993). Dying and Death in Law and Medicine: A Forensic Primer for Health and 

Legal Professionals. Westport, CT: Praeger. 

Berger, A. S. (1995a). When Life Ends: Legal Overviews, Medicolegal Forms, and Hospital Poli- 

cies. Westport, CT Praeger. 

Berger, A. S. (1995b). Fear of the Unknown: Enlightened Aid-in-Dying. Westport, CT: Praeger. 

Miller, J. G. (1978). Living Systems. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 

Russek, L. G., and Schwartz, G. E. (1996). Energy Cardiology: A dynamical energy systems ap- 

proach for integrating conventional and alternative medicine. Advances, 12(4), 4. 

Schwartz, G. E., and Russek, L. G. (1997 in press). Do all dynamic systems have memory? Impli- 

cations of the systemic memory hypothesis for science and society." Brain and Values: Be- 

havioral Neurodynamics V (K. H. Pribram and J. S. King, eds.). Hillsdale, NJ.: Erlbaum. 

Smith, S. (1 964). The Mediumship of Mrs. Leonard. New Hyde Park, NY: University Books. 

Smith, S. (1971). Confessions of a Psychic. New York, NY: Macmillan. 

Smith, S. (1974). The Book of James. New York, NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 

Smith, S. (1990). Ghost Writers in the Sky: More Communication from James. Tucson, AZ: Vi- 

sion Press. 

Stevenson, I., Oram, A., and Markwick, B. (1989). Two tests of survival after death: Negative re- 

sults. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 55,329. 

Thouless, R. H. (1948). A test of survival. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 48, 

253. 

Tribbe, F. C. (1980). The TribbeIMulders code. Journal of the Academy of Religion and Psychical 

Research, 3,44. 

von Bertalanffy, L. (1 968). General Systems Theory. New York, NY: Braziller.

Gary E. R. Schwartz is Professor 

of Psychology, Neurology, and 

Psychiatry and Director of the 

Human Energy Systems Laborato- 

ry at the University of Arizona. 

Linda G. S. Russek is a Research 

Psychologist at the Harvard Uni- 

versity Student Health Service, 

and also is a Research Associate 

in the Department of Psychology 

and Co-Director of the Human 

Energy Systems Laboratory, at 

the University of Arizona.

Journal ofScientijc Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. I, pp. 89-90, 1997 0892-33 10197 


LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 

Can Animals Understand Human Speech? 

In my Humanities, Science & Technology class we considered the different 

suggestions that have been made as to what distinguishes humans from ani- 

mals. Language is one of them. Here's a note I got from a student about that. I 

think members of the Society might find it intriguing and even suggestive of 

worthwhile research to be done: 

"In class we talked about how human 'language' is unique ... We also dis- 

cussed the possibility of animals having their own 'language' in each species. 

What we did not discuss is: Is it possible for animals to understand the human 

language ... If not, explain the following case: My sister recently adopted a kit- 

ten. One afternoon my mom visited ... and while there, she explained how her 

own cat would rip and tear toilet paper with his teeth and claws. She did not 

demonstrate this, just explained it. During the next few days, my sister's kitten 

began to shred rolls of toilet paper just like my mom's cat ...." 

So, did that kitten understand what the people were saying about the cat? 

Has there been any research done specifically on the understanding of human 

language by animals? 


Professor of Chemistry & Science Studies 

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 

Blacksburg, VA 24061 -0247 

Comments on Almeder's "Recent Responses to Survival Research" 

and "Reply" 

As a studied psychologist, now working in the field of sociology, special- 

ized in analytic philosophy of social sciences, I wonder if we should really 

stick to traditional points of view when discussing the problem of survival and 

the reincarnation hypothesis. Classical philosophy and our western languages 

both see "person" as a psycho-physic and spiritual system, whereas "personal- 

ity" is regarded as a psychosomatic system. A person can not have bodiless 

survival, meaning it can't "disincarnate", without contradictio in adiecto 

("shouldn't it say linguistically correct "discarnate"?). To restrict human per- 

sonality to consciousness (p. 5 12) is empirically unsound, because psycholo- 

gy knows a lot of other functions. I feel the question "does human personality 

admit of reincarnation" should hypothetically be asked as: What functions of 

a personality or normally not accessible information can be found in a later 

personality?

90 Letters to the Editor 

Let's try to define the subject by taking K. Sayre's cybernetic approach 

(Sayre, 1979). His approach begins with the concept of information. Sayre 

conceives the human subject "...as sustaining several fields of awareness" (p. 

247). In ch. 6 "Immaterial Existence", he introduces 'spirit' as a hypothetical 

concept: "...(it) is best conceived as the capacity to respond to information, 

however received initially, in conscious patterns without sensory input" (p. 

248). He continues: "I think it is possible for human consciousness to exist in 

a form that is neither spatial nor temporal" (p. 249). The cybernetical analogy 

should be applied as follows: "...the procedures by which the human organism 

operates may be understood as a set of statistical structures. Consciousness in 

particular is a mode of information processing, and as such is describable in 

terms of communication theory. However formidable the task might be in 

practice, the informational structures of consciousness across a transmitting 

line, or in any other fashion .... There is no necessity that this means of repre- 

sentation itself be dependent upon material structures." (ibidem). 

Sayre points out the elements have no properties beyond these states of ex- 

istence, and hence are not related either spatially or temporally, only in serial 

order. He continues: "But since the ordering relation by itself is neither spa- 

tial nor temporal, the elements have no existence in a spatio-temporal ma- 

trix ... what we have conceived is not a material system." (p. 250). He says: 

"Any two series of this sort can be conceived as constituting an information 

channel, characterized by a specific set of conditional probabilities. And any 

group of more than two is a cascade of channels ... cascades of this sort consti- 

tute the information-processing functions of human consciousness ... by an 

appropriate selection of ordered series, the spirit of a given human being 

could in principle be constituted on an immaterial basis." (ibid.). It's under- 

stood that all this goes back to N. Wiener's famous statement from 1948: "In- 

formation is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does 

not admit this can survive at the present day" (Weiner, 1948, p. 155). We 

might be well advised to rephrase our statement to: "Not a bodiless person 

reincarnates, but a part of the information structure of a deceased person in- 

carnates becoming another person." 

Can the accordance of characteristics of the information structure of an ear- 

lier personality with those of a later personality be in principle tested, e.g. 

motor skills or the ability to speak a foreign language, which has not been 

studied. The survival/reincarnation hypothesis must be rationally considered. 

Gerald L. Eberlein 

Institute for Social Sciences, Technical University of Munich 

Lothstr. 17, 80335 Munich, Germany 

References 

Sayre, K. (1979). Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind. London: Henley. 

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine.



BOOK REVIEWS 

Alien Discussions: Proceedings of the Abduction Study Conference Held 

at MIT, Cambridge by Andrea Pritchard, David E. Pritchard, John E. Mack, 

Pam Kasey, and Claudia Yapp, editors. North Cambridge Press: Cambridge, 

MA (1994), 684pp., $69.95 (illus.), ISBN 0-96449 17-0-2. 

This is a formidable book (almost 700 pages) about a controversial, difficult, 

and confusing subject. That line should indicate why it will not be well read 

by our academic colleagues. However, for anyone with the slightest serious in- 

terest in the topic, it should be. Persons wishing to immerse themselves in the 

many dimensions, layers, and schools of thought about alleged UFO abduc- 

tions cannot find a more eclectic and stimulating pool. 

The book presents an essentially verbatim account of the talks, panels, and 

discussions of the Abductions Study Conference of June 13-17, 1992. The 

editing of these, especially the accurate transcriptions of audio tapes and attri- 

butions of comments, was a heroic task. The editors, particularly the indefati- 

gable Andrea Pritchard, are to be saluted for producing a volume which (bar- 

ring videotaping) comes as close as possible to placing the reader right there in 

the MIT lecture hall alongside the participants. 

There are nearly 150 separate presentations transcribed in the volume. 

World famous UFO researchers like Budd Hopkins, David Jacobs, and John 

Mack hold forth beside relative novices and the abductees themselves. Repre- 

sentatives of some non-U.S . research also contributed (ex. Brazil, Canada, 

United Kingdom, Australia). Even the skeptics were represented and spoke. 

Actually, it would be more accurate to have used the term "debunkers" (or ab- 

solutist a priori skeptics), since the conference had many true skeptics in at- 

tendance: the UFOlogists themselves, who disagree (amicably) with one an- 

other, and expressed those disagreements here. 

This conference was deliberately eclectic. The field of study is new and in 

much internal debate. The program was meant to be an occasion to bring 

everything from well-conceived-academic quality research to partially baked- 

intuitions onto the stage, and roll the mix together to see what we could see. 

The contributions to the book are, therefore, of a wildly diverse quality. If the 

reader is an intolerant academic purist, much of this will not appeal. If the 

reader is a flexible explorer, it should be stimulating caveat emptor. There 

seems to be much gold in here somewhere, but which the gold and which the 

hematite? 

The conference, in line with the above, marked a UFOlogical watershed of 

sorts, as it is the formal moment symbolizing the cracking apart of the almost 

monolithic paradigm of UFO abductions which issued from the seminal work 

of Budd Hopkins in the early 1980s and had come to dominate public UFOlog- 

ical thinking. Hopkins' work, strongly supported by the research of David Ja- 

cobs, pictured the Abductions Phenomenon as not only truly extraterrestrial in

92 Book Reviews 

origin, but essentially uncaring and negative toward its abductee victims. Al- 

though some counter-views existed, they carried very little impact in the 

mainstream UFO literature and symposia of the later eighties and nineties. 

The European researchers had rebelled and created a non extraterrestrial psy- 

chosocial hypothesis, and the communities were engaging in a trans Atlantic 

debate wherein the Hopkins Jacobs school of thought was largely thought of 

as the sum of American Abductions Ideology. 

The conference at MIT split the public unity of American researchers into 

(at least) two major schools of opinion, which deeply disagree to this day. 

Both continue to believe that the phenomenon is extraterrestrially-based. 

Hopkins, Jacobs, and others were present to elaborate what some have come 

to refer to as the Dark Marauders view of abductions. But conference co-or- 

ganizer, and world-known Harvard psychologist, John Mack, presented an en- 

tirely different spin: these experiences are extraterrestrially caused but are 

positively transformational for the human spirit. Despite the severe disagree- 

ments that followed, this gave researchers like Joseph Nyman a foundation 

stone authority figure around whom to rally. The so-calledpessimist and opti- 

mist schools took shape before the attendees' eyes. A third major position, of 

course, exists within the U.S. research community, the "probably extraterres- 

trial but I don't know the details" viewpoint. They were also there in the per- 

sons of Mark Rodeghier, Stuart Appelle, David Gotlib, et al. Kenneth Ring 

also presented his interesting view comparing abductions and near-death ex- 

periences, and David Hufford did likewise regarding the centuries old Old 

Hag phenomenon. 

The Proceedings are split, like the conference itself, into a stack of logically 

organized sections, as follows: Introduction; The Abduction Experience; Ev- 

idence; The Psychology of Abductees; Hypotheses; Ethics, Therapy, and In- 

vestigation; and What Should We Consider Next? Sections 2,3,6, and 7 fea- 

ture some talks and panels by the abductees themselves, and are among the 

few places that a reader can get a relatively undistilled feeling for what these 

folks are all about. At the end of the volume, the Pritchards have tacked on a 

50 page investigator survey analysis by Thomas Bullard. This analysis is done 

with Bullard's usual awe-inspiring thoroughness, and with the insightfulness 

also displayed in his seven symposia contributions. 

Being an empathetic but semi-stick-in-the-mud academic, this reviewer 

was most impressed with Section Four: The Psychology of Abductees. Be- 

cause the major skeptical barrier to taking this phenomenon as anything other 

than the Carnival of the Human Mind is the assertion that the abductees are all 

liars and confabulators (at best) or psychiatric (at worst), this issue of psychol- 

ogy, must be firmly addressed before the subject can even get off the ground. 

This is a point which abduction researchers often agree to, and then naively as- 

sume that no further attention need be paid to it if one study or one authority 

pronounces abductees "OK." Fortunately, the symposium did not short shrift 

this issue, and, led by the extremely important work of Rodeghier, Good-

Book Reviews 93 

paster, and Blatterbauer, gave an intellectually honest and well balanced as- 

sessment of what is known. And, the verdict is generally positive for the per- 

sons reporting abductions. This continuing emphasis is all the more important 

due to the relative weakness of Section Three: Evidence. Despite all manner 

of anecdotal claims which (some at least) should in theory be testable, basical- 

ly none of the physical attributes of the reports are documented (even today). 

The almighty power and control of the ETs can be alluded to explain this lack 

(and it is a suflicient hypothesis), but that is not very helpful in the long run for 

acceptance. If one is dependent upon testimony, one better continually 

demonstrate dependability. 

Whereas that last analysis might not be welcome to those who have already 

concluded upon reality, reliability, and reasons, I do not apologize. The sub- 

ject matter is astonishing, and perhaps astonishingly important, but to this re- 

viewer is not in a state of fixed certainty. In fact, this is the charm and the value 

of this book. In these pages are all the puzzlements, complexities, and argu- 

ments of an exciting something, bursting to be revealed. This book has no con- 

clusion. That's why it is a good book. Let a free wind blow through the attic of 

your consciousness and read it. 

Michael D. Swords 

Professor of Natural Sciences 

Western Michigan University 

Kalamazoo, MI 49008 

Confronting the Experts by Brian Martin (ed.). Albany (N.Y.): State Univer- 

sity of New York Press. 1996.204 pp. $44.50 (c), $14.95 (p). 

Normally one might suspect that a collection of articles ranging from art histo- 

ry to atomic energy, from terrorism to sewage disposal, would be leftovers 

hastily flung together to meet a commitment. Such is not the case here. 

Dr. Brian Martin, who lectures at the Department of Science and Technolo- 

gy Studies at the University of Wollongong in Australia, has for many years 

done research in the field of intellectual suppression. For this volume he delib- 

erately chose dissenting experts, in a variety of fields, to tell their stories, the 

aim being to see the commonality of criticism and the reactions from establish- 

ments subject to critical examination. In his introduction, Martin explains how 

establishment experts always have more power than critics, even when the 

gadflies are right. The power comes from the inherent prestige of high office, 

from control of what gets published, and from the backing of powerful and 

wealthy organizations. It is hard for lone individuals to make an impact (it is 

too easy to label them as cranks) unless these individuals have an expertise to 

match the establishment defenders. And even then it almost always is neces- 

sary for critics to get the support of a pressure group and some co-operation 

from the media. 

This engaging collection begins with Sharon Beder's account of forcing the


Sydney Water Board to acknowledge faults in its method of dumping nearly 

raw sewage into the ocean. The fact that Beder previously had worked as an 

engineer enabled her to face the authorities as an equal. The second account is 

by Mark Diesendorf, who has devoted much time to questioning socially unde- 

sirable scientific activity. He found himself forced to become an expert in the 

debate over fluoridation, a questionable form of mass medication adopted by 

much of the English-speaking world, and here he explains what went on. (My 

only criticism of the book is the confused way in which Diesendorf's material 

has been type-set.) Edward S. Herman then deals with the way democratic 

governments have seduced the mass media into believing, and spreading, the 

line that some countries are lepers deserving of the utmost condemnation and 

economic sanctions ... plus the occasional righteously delivered bomb. The 

fact that a leper country overnight can turn into a friendly nation, or vice versa, 

somehow doesn't seem strange to editors and publishers, content to push the 

Establishment Line. 

Harold Hillman's account of unsavory practices in the field of microbiology 

should have special interest to readers of this journal, and I'll return to it below. 

In the late 1970s Michael Mallory and Gordon Moran innocently tried to ex- 

plain that a portion of Simone Martini's famous Guido Riccio fresco, in Siena, 

Italy, had been done by a close follower. They were amazed at the passions that 

erupted and how experts refused to accept evidence that in other situations 

they would accept. Too many people had money and prestige at stake for the 

truth to be accepted. 

The final article is an account of Dhirendra Sharma's lonely battle to ques- 

tion the Indian Government's policy to develop atomic power (and weapons) 

while ignoring renewable (especially solar) energy. With virtually no help 

from colleagues-most of whom were dependent on the establishment for their 

incomes-Sharma grimly struggled against the might of the establishment. In 

the end it was only public support from overseas colleagues that enabled him 

to retire with dignity from his university. We may feel that Sharma's ordeal 

couldn't happen in a democracy, but it does. Henry Hillman, a senior biologist 

at the University of Surrey (England), in a country that takes pride in its long 

tradition of parliamentary democracy, was treated shamefully. Of the two, I 

feel Hillman has had the worse of it. Sharma was a critic of scientific and ener- 

gy policy. It is hard to get consensus in policy matters, as by definition the ef- 

fects are so wide-ranging. While admiring his lone struggle, I can see the ratio- 

nale for India's rulers wanting to become a nuclear power in a world which 

already has nuclear powers. But Hillman's case involves scientific research- 

specific experimental results-in which a country's defense or survival are not 

at stake. 

From the start of his career, Hillman saw shoddy science being conducted, 

for example raw data manipulated, even deleted, to fit expected results. As 

years went by he became more and more suspicious of the basic fundamentals


assumptions used in sub-cellular fractionation, electron microscopy, histo- 

chemistry, chromatography, electrophoresis, and radioactive measurements. 

His request for funds denied (no-one wanting the basic assumptions chal- 

lenged') he pressed on and found large areas where standard procedures had 

never been validated. They were taken for granted but easily could be wrong. 

This work was derided and suppressed. The same thing happened with much of 

his research. Despite hundreds of experiments demonstrating that a chemical, 

adenosine triphosphate, could show biochemical effects, his papers were re- 

jected by journals, even though no-one could fault his work. The results con- 

tradicted orthodoxy, which was enough to have them rejected. 

Using new techniques, Hillman was able to see a membrane surrounding the 

nucleolus. Since standard electron microscopy could not detect this mem- 

brane, journals refused to accept the research. Hillman went on to demonstrate 

that the orderly internal structure of cells, as depicted in textbooks, was im- 

possible. While some of Hillman's colleagues privately conceded that the 

textbook explanations were rubbish, they refused to support him publicly 

against the establishment. 

What I find amazing are Hillman's allegations regarding nervous tissue: he 

says he has shown that the CNS (Central Nervous System) is composed of 

only nerve cells and naked cells; that synapses don't exist and are an artifact of 

electron microscopy; and that the popular view of nerve transmission is highly 

dubious. 

I've long wondered about the complicated way messages are thought to be 

relayed in our nervous systems: an electrical signal is switched into a chemical 

signal, back to an electrical signal, back to chemical, back to electrical .... No 

engineer would dream of designing such a system. But then Mother Nature 

didn't make us from scratch, but through evolution adapted existing features 

for new uses. Nevertheless the nerve-conduction system has never seemed 

sensible. My lack of scientific expertise prevents me from evaluating this 

work; but I have enough schooling in the sociology of science to see that Hill- 

man has been a victim of establishment experts who simply don't want their 

comfortable world all shook up and to be forced to re-learn the basics. 

Hillman had to resign. He writes (p. 123): "I believe that I am the only 

tenured academic in Britain who has lost his tenure because of his or her scien- 

tific views".* The distressing thing about his forced resignation is that the Es- 

tablishment were unable to refute many of his criticisms of scientific conduct 

and technique, and were unwilling to replicate his experiments. He was judged 

'This reminds me of John Ott's Health and Light (N.Y.: Pocket Books, 1977), in which he outlined 

experiments that called into question a great deal of biological research in which sources of light were 

not controlled. To my knowledge, no-one has gone back to redo the research. Correcting the mistakes of 

the past is not a fast-track way to promotion or prizes. Ott also demonstrated the harm done by using 

sunglasses, yet their use is still urged by "experts". 

'This was tragically ironic, for a short time earlier Hillman had published an article in the Times 

Higher Education Supplement dealing with academic freedom. He had ended his piece expressing 

thanks that he lived in a democratic country where tenure was respected.


guilty not because he was found to be wrong, but because his work exposed 

dishonest science and awkward anomalies. This sort of behavior continues; in 

the cold fusion controversy a lot of bad language has been uttered and reputa- 

tions smeared. Some Italian researchers felt strongly enough to go to court. 

They write, of the anti-cold-fusion Establishment: 

" ... the leaders of the scientific community don't want to do their homework 

and prove their point (either experimentally or theoretically). They simply 

dismiss everything that supports this new scientific development and, when 

cornered by fact and logic, they explode in a burst of insults, while, when re- 

quired to give a proof of their charges (fraud like cold fusion should in the end 

be proven!), they appeal to the right of 'free press"' (Del Giudice & Preparata, 

1996). Some people pay a high price for having ethical standards, as Brian 

Martin points out in his conclusion. There are lessons to be learned from these 

stories, he writes: most people are more obedient than necessary, even taking 

into consideration threats to career or character; it is hard to alter the behavior 

of an establishment that has become fixed over time (inertia itself is an imped- 

iment to change); but the hopeful part is that the lone individual, if determined 

and knowledgeable enough, can change the world. 

Don Eldridge 

I? 0. Box 5563 

West End, QLD 

AUSTRALIA 4101 

Reference 

Del Giudice, Emilio and Preparata, Guilianio (1996). Jury still out on cold fusion? Nature, 381, 

729. 

Natural Grace by Matthew Fox and Rupert Sheldrake. New York: Double- 

day, 1996, $22.00 (c). 

Subtitled "dialogues on creation, darkness, and the soul in spirituality and sci- 

ence," Natural Grace is a modem intellectual discourse on the connection be- 

tween science and spirituality. While these discussions provide insight on spir- 

itual questions, the reader is also exposed to related issues that need further 

scientific inquiry. Those rooted in a wide spiritual cosmology will probably 

find kindred spirits in Matthew Fox and Rupert Sheldrake, scientific skeptics 

may have difficulty accepting this forum. 

Rupert Sheldrake says he was always curious about living things, develop- 

ing an early interest in biology, but later found himself caught in the teachings 

of mechanistic biology where organisms are treated as machines. He felt a need 

for a more holistic approach that integrated direct experience and analysis of 

scientific data and turned to studying the history of science and philosophy to 

deepen his understanding of how the separatism of spirit and Nature became 

the modern scientific view of the world.


Matthew Fox found mysticism at an early age and was led to join the clergy 

as a Dominican. As a priest, he was involved in the feminist movement in its 

early days and later in the gay and lesbian liberation movement and, most re- 

cently, the ecological movement. He has worked closely with physicist Brian 

Swimme for the last fourteen years. Although he was a Catholic priest for thir- 

ty years, Fox's unorthodox viewpoint created enough turmoil for Church fa- 

thers that he was expelled from the order in 1993. 

Fox and Sheldrake are dynamic thinkers. Their combined backgrounds in 

science, philosophy and spirituality offer enlivening viewpoints about life, 

grace, and spirit in Nature. Fox says that "the issue of grace lies at the heart of 

an ecological consciousness, for it presents the issue of how we envision our 

relationship to Nature .... The ecological crisis has its origin in a theology that 

separates Nature from grace; if we deny Nature its being graced, then it has no 

defense when people set out to destroy it for their own ends because it holds no 

intrinsic value on its own." In defining grace, Sheldrake says it is "a sense of 

connection, openness, blessedness. Openness and connection with what's 

around us." From this point of view grace cannot be separated from science or 

Nature, and has a valid place in a scientific discussion. 

As an example, in discussing the light spectrum, Sheldrake provides us with 

a basic scientific overview, then correlates facts about the electromagnetic 

spectrum with the spiritual meaning of darkness and light. He makes an associ- 

ation between modern physics and the book of Genesis in that the primal cre- 

ative acts involve the establishment of divisions between light and darkness. In 

modern physics we learn there was once a primal undifferentiated unity which 

then underwent a series of progressive differentiations through a splitting 

apart of polarities. Even the fields of Nature are supposed to originate from a 

primal unified field by a process called "spontaneous symmetry breaking." 

In each section, Sheldrake is open to discussing his own experiences with 

spirit in Nature, while Matthew Fox offers his years of experience as a Do- 

minican priest to expand the thought. Fox talks about the relationship between 

cosmos and psyche. He reminds us that in mystical tradition the Godhead is 

dark, not seen by its actions. It is all a great mystery. And certainly in every ex- 

ample, he provides a depth of understanding beyond the traditional religious 

teachings. 

Sheldrake naturally includes his hypothesis of morphic resonance, here re- 

lating it to ritual. He begins by creating an historical context, acknowledging 

the modern clash regarding the scientific model of reality. On the one hand 

there are those grounded in the teachings of ancient Greece who believe there 

is an eternal, timeless reality governing the changing world we experience. The 

evolutionary cosmology says that over time everything changes and develops, 

the laws of Nature were not set in stone at the time of the Big Bang. Shel- 

drake's theory of morphic resonance is that "Nature has a kind of inherent 

memory rather than an eternal mathematical mind," that the regularities of 

Nature are habits rather than laws. Ritual, too, is based on events that occurred


in the past, crossing time and distance barriers between the current practition- 

er and the ancients. The presence of those who have performed the ritual in the 

past is felt in the present. Fox takes this idea a step further, defining liturgy, or 

ritual, as celebration as education. Through ritual, he says, we learn about the 

source of our existence and we experience an inner connectivity. We also learn 

not only about our past and present, but our future as well. Fox and Sheldrake 

both call for rituals that employ technology, "Electronic media, including TV 

screens, could, through their flickering, liquid light, tap into very ancient ritual 

morphic fields, while being thoroughly modern at the same time." In another 

sense, Sheldrake says that what scientists do already has a ritual dimension, 

"Scientists are like priests in an interesting sense insofar as they're reading the 

oracles of Nature." 

In the end, the purpose of these discussions on Natural Grace is not to pro- 

vide conclusive answers. Rather, it's a call for developing a new way of ex- 

ploring the questions of the universe and then educating the public to this new 

world view. The separation of science and nature can be turned around by the 

modem scientist who reclaims the initial, emotional, perhaps even spiritual, 

sense of curiosity and wonder that drew him or her into a particular field. By 

remembering their personal journey, scientists can participate in ritual and ex- 

plore the "meaning of ritual as memory" says Fox. 

Much of what science has revealed about Nature has been left in a sterile state, insulat- 

ed from the world of the spirit. With the riches of Nature that science has opened up 

come new opportunities for thanksgiving, for praise, and for wonder at the creativity 

underlying all things. In this fuller context the truth of the mind and the truth of the 

heart can come together. Effective praise depends on paying attention, and science 

makes available to us both a new image of the creative, evolving cosmos and an amaz- 

ing wealth of detail through which our praise can be informed. 

Lorraine Ethridge 

4 Rydal PI., #I 

Montclair, NJ 07042 

Deceived by the Light, by Doug Groothuis. Eugene, Oregon: Harvest House, 

1995,203 pp. ISBN 1-56507-301-0. 

As someone once remarked, the problem with America is that you can't tell 

the inmates from the ones walking around the streets. As an example, back in 

1968 and thus long before diversity, multi-culturalism and PC were words 

which inspired conflict, I was attending an evening fireside talk by a US park 

ranger in one of our national parks. The park ranger spoke glowingly about 

how we (i.e., middle-class whites) could learn much from the Indians - they 

became "Native Americans" only many years later - in the way of treating 

the land, respecting the elderly and so on. After the talk, some of us chatted 

with the speaker, expressing how much we agreed with what he had to say. One


of the people in the audience said that he was a missionary who had just re- 

turned from a long stay with south-sea islanders and he could reaffirm that in- 

digenous people had much we of the West could learn from. Then, rather casu- 

ally he remarked that the way to heaven is through the hole in Orion's belt. 

This was meant entirely literally, exemplifying the danger inherent when 

judging someone by outward appearance. He looked as sane as any other typi- 

cal American and perhaps that should have tipped me off. Likewise for the 

book, Deceived by the Light, by Doug Groothuis. With the word deceived in 

the title, I imagined it would be a debunking of all the other light books - Em- 

braced by the Light, Saved by the Light, Beyond the Light, and Closer to the 

Light - which deal with near-death experiences (NDEs). Groothuis's picture 

on the back cover, however, shows him to be a reasonable-looking fellow in a 

blue shirt, tie and jacket so I should have been wary. 

Light plays a ubiquitous role in NDEs, hence its place in the titles. People 

who have claimed NDEs almost always use this metaphor literally and specif- 

ically to represent their feelings of emerging from a physical and/or a spiritual 

darkness. Almost invariably they see Jesus, some see spirits, some see angels, 

some have a life-review, some have an out of body experience, some subse- 

quently become psychics and so on. In the appendix, "Is it all in the Brain?" 

Groothuis presents a summary of the scientific evidence to the contrary, that 

is, wholly physical explanations such as lack of oxygen, powerful drugs, re- 

lease of endorphins and so on. He rejects outright any purely scientific exege- 

sis: 

The near-death experience proves to be a challenge to the materialism of modern sci- 

ence, just as it challenges those who are spiritually inclined to interpret its meaning 

properly. 

While modem science's failings are reserved for the appendix, the majority 

of the book is given over to critiquing the spiritual interpretations of NDEs. 

Groothuis feels that "some NDEs are real experiences of the spiritual world, 

and that they indicate that the soul can exist apart from the body. However, this 

does not guarantee that all NDEs reveal the truth about the afterlife." 

The truth, according to him is to be found exclusively in the New Testament 

or at least in his interpretation of what is found in the New Testament. He dis- 

misses Betty J. Eadie's Embraced by the Light because of its Mormonism 

heresy while other NDE participants are seen as bearers of new-age fluff who 

proclaim "that religious doctrines don't matter" or who deny the existence of 

hell, a very important place in conventional Christianity according to 

Groothuis. 

In fact, I suspect his real dislike for NDEs is because "The Christian faith is 

rooted in one who has returned from the dead, not as an NDEr, but as the risen 

Lord of the universe." In other words, the NDErs have taken on some sort of 

Christ fixation, a point of view I would have guessed myself without resorting


to a discussion of the putative wavelengths of the various lights, kundalini en- 

ergy (divine energy coiling at the base of the spine) or the absolute necessity 

of the literal validity of the resurrection as Groothuis does. 

Consequently, just as with that missionary back in 1968 who agreed with the 

progressive view concerning aboriginal people but had a weird concept of as- 

tronomy, Groothuis and I share a skepticism regarding NDEs and the associat- 

ed mystical prose; but we part company rapidly after that as he seeks a justifi- 

cation for his theological position that Scripture explains all and always. 

We further share, as demonstrated by the very opening lines to the first 

chapter of Deceived by the Light, a leaning towards the words of someone who 

has made a living at poking fun of his need for psychiatric care, Woody Allen. 

Although Allen is not a scientist, a theologian, a Christian or an NDEr, he may 

have said it completely with, "I'm not afraid of death. I just don't want to be 

there when it happens." 

Paul Alper 

Mail Stop 4005 

University of St. Thomas 

21 15 Summit Ave. 

St. Paul, MN 551 05 

Top SecretIMajic, by Stanton T. Friedman, Marlowe and Company, New 

York, 1996,272 pp., $22.95, ISBN 1-56924-830-3. 

This is Stan Friedman's first book authored solely by himself. Although some 

of the material has appeared in other publications such as the Mufon Journal 

or the International UFO Reporter, this book is a unified presentation of the 

principal documents bearing the code word Majic within them, and includes 

several previously unpublished new documents, including an alleged 1954 op- 

erations manual that gives instructions to various project teams on how to "be 

able to more expertly deal with Unidentified Flying Objects, Extraterrestrial 

Technology and Entities, and increase the efficiency of future operations." 

Mr. Friedman presents his often stated trademark position that some UFOs 

are someone else's spacecraft, and introduces with high clarity the documenta- 

tion that strongly suggests that our government contains agencies which have 

consistently, successfully and intentionally misled the public by trying to 

cover up the evidence: the evidence of crashes, the testimony of witnesses, and 

the existence of a covert UFO investigation program. 

Friedman's book begins with a foreword by Whitley Strieber, who speaks to 

the quality of the book, and does not refer to his own experience or reputation 

as an abductee. This very readable foreword provides some facts about the 

bizarre record of federal court judge Gesell's decision to keep 156 classified 

National Security Agency UFO documents secret, including the majority of


Following the foreword is an introduction by Friedman himself, who inter- 

weaves his own career with the UFO history in an engaging manner, revealing 

for the first time in print that he was hired for three months in the late 60s by 

McDonnell Douglas to do technical work on novel propulsion ideas. An inter- 

woven bonus is an understandable summary of U. S. work on nuclear propul- 

sion in the 50s and 60s, with a tribute to John Luce: "technological progress 

comes from doing things differently in an unpredictable way." Much of Fried- 

man's technical background, presented in a fairly unassuming manner, is high- 

ly relevant to qualifications for evaluating UFO data. 

The main text presents, in twelve chapters, a more or less chronological 

summary of what Friedman thinks is very likely to have happened, starting 

with the famous Roswell crash of July 1947. Friedman was the one who 

"found" Jesse Marcel on February 20, 1978, the first military person to see one 

part of the Roswell wreckage and was the officer responsible for gathering 

parts and submitting the report. And he describes how the first Top 

Secret/Majic document arrived by mail in December 1984 at the home of 

Jaime Shandera, a producer with a plan to direct a UFO movie. 

His important chapter on "The Double Life of Dr. Menzel" provides an im- 

pressive and highly credible scenario that resulted in Donald Menzel being 

both the principal UFO debunker to the public and "insider" for Government 

projects. He well makes the point that secrets CAN be kept. It is suggested that 

the reason Menzel doodled pictures of Martians, for which he was well known, 

is that he had seen what the aliens actually looked like. 

Principal Majic-related documents presented and discussed in the book are: 

Directive from Harry Truman to Lieutenant General Twining (9 July 

1947) 

Memorandum from G. C. Marshall for the President (19 September 

1947) 

Letter from L. Gen. Twining to Brig. Gen. George Schulgen (23 Septem- 

ber 1947) 

Memorandum from Hillenkoetter for the President (February 1948) 

Memorandum from W. B. Smith to unknown Canadian official (21 No- 

vember 1950) 

The Eisenhower Briefing Documents including Memorandum from 

Harry Truman to Secretary Forrestal dtd 24 September 1947 (1 8 Novem- 

ber 1952,8 pp.) 

Memorandum from Robert Cutler to Gen. Twining (1 3 July 1953) 

Special Operations Manual, "Extraterrestrial Entities and Technology, 

Recovery and Disposal," SOM 1-0 1 (7 April 1954) 

Memorandum from Robert Cutler to Gen. Twining (14 July 1954) 

Letter from the Truman Library to Friedman (23 June 1987) 

It is regrettable that more of these documents were not included in their en-


tirety without re-keystroking, because the security markings, signatures, 

dates, and printing details are all germane to authentication issues. 

The Eisenhower Briefing Document is the one that shows the names of the 

13 "members" of the alleged Majestic- 12 Group, with one extra to replace 

James Forrestal, who was dead by 1952. The other twelve are covered with in- 

teresting little mini-biographical sketches, highlighting their linkages and as- 

sociations outside the MJ- 12 group. A nice touch is a high quality photograph- 

ic section in the middle of the book, showing good photos of each of the group 

members, as they looked at the time. A helpful tabular summary of what each 

of these men was doing in July 1947 permits one to calculate their average age 

as 49.8. 

The chapter on authenticating the briefing documents provides correlation 

with other related documents and events, and deals with issues that have 

arisen: similarity of Truman's signature to another one (suggesting forgery to 

the skeptics), date format, language style. In this presentation Friedman shows 

an easy familiarity with the archive process, important for document authenti- 

cation. However, he fails to establish an objective authentication procedure. 

Furthermore, there has been so much criticism of the authenticity of the Eisen- 

hower Briefing Document in print by skeptics that a simple table with the best 

answer to each challenge would have been a welcome addition. 

One whole chapter is devoted to "Cutler-Twining" memos, declassified top 

secret notes showing the MJ- 12 alphanumeric in the text and alluding to covert 

meetings with President Eisenhower. 

Chapter 6 highlights the government rebuttal of MJ- 12 material and also the 

Roswell crash. Friedman makes it clear that there has been aggressive avoid- 

ance of responding to the Freedom of Information Act requests, coupled with 

deception. In the process, the Air Force has officially stated that documents 

relating to MJ-12 are "not classified" and "bogus," thereby presumably permit- 

ting their presentation in public without violating any security laws even if 

they are genuine. The degree to which a letter from an Air Force counterintel- 

ligence Colonel might protect a citizen from prosecution of revealing UFO se- 

crets has not yet been tested. Friedman takes to task the media for failing to 

perform their famous "watchdog" role in this area, but does not speculate what 

they might have done. 

In his chapter on the MJ-12 debunkers, he takes on an impressive array of 

personalities. Friedman has no fear when he thinks he has the facts, attacking 

Carl Sagan just as hard as Phil Klass and Kevin Randle. His rebuttals are gen- 

erally effective because Friedman usually deals with very factual material, 

while challenging the specifics and the sources of the others. His "top ten" list 

of debunker principles apply to many more topics than UFOs. Occasionally 

his analogies stretch beyond the limits of professional debate to a humorous 

chiding, such as: "Klass's second ... article ... contained so much baloney it 

should have been distributed by a delicatessen."


Timothy Cooper, a California researcher who has been sending Friedman ma- 

terial from unknown sources. These three documents are supportive of the ex- 

istence of an MJ-12 Majic project. The chronology and to some extent their 

authenticity is discussed. 

Chapter 9 presents the entire available content of the alleged Majestic 12 

Operations Manual, mentioned at the beginning of this book review. The Spe- 

cial Operations Manual SOM 1-01 has been totally retyped by the printer, and 

therefore unfortunately introduced several errors. For example, the number in 

fine print on the title page has been typed incorrectly, the type size is different, 

the pagination has been redone to tighten up the text, and no attempt has been 

made to preserve the original hyphenation. There is no guarantee that mis- 

spellings originally present have been retained, although two misspellings I am 

aware of have been spelled as in the original: incorrectly. 

Chapter 10 discusses security and classification management, the develop- 

ment process for classified programs, and speculates that the development of 

the transistor might have been related to prior UFO crash recoveries, noting 

that the official birthday for the transistor is December 23, 1947. But one gets 

the impression that Friedman doesn't really believe that we were smart enough 

to recover an extraterrestrial solid state device in July and make a working 

transistor in December. 

The recent famous "alien autopsy" film is discussed, and Friedman joins 

nearly all other researchers in suspecting that it is not an autopsy of a genuine 

recovered alien. 

Friedman's concluding chapter is the beginning of a reasoned conversation 

about why the cover-up, what is the alien agenda, and why is all this important 

anyway? Friedman joins most of us in believing that it would be good if the se- 

crecy would end, but concedes that a lack of knowledge of the alien agenda is 

disturbing. He leaves room for the possibility that our government could be 

making a wise societal decision in keeping the secret ... but like most of us, 

would like to keep going into space with the expectation that Homo sapiens 

would be better off thereby. 

The material at the back of the book warrants mention. Appendix A presents 

the complete (photocopied) Eisenhower Briefing Document. Appendix B pre- 

sents a (declassified from Secret) letter from Twining to Schulgen issued one 

day before the alleged Executive Order creating MJ- 12. Appendix C provides 

insider information about relevant chronological events, special interests and 

activities of Don Menzel, and procedures and data pertinent to document au- 

thentication. Appendix D lists the exclusions from the Freedom on Informa- 

tion Act, thereby clearly demonstrating that the Government is almost certain- 

ly acting within the law to aggressively withhold UFO data if they think it is 

related to national defense, foreign policy or to a legitimate Executive Order. 

Appendix E is the standard non-information USAF response to a Senator 

denying any knowledge of records pertaining to Roswell, including Friedman's 

devastating rebuttal to the Air Force. Appendix F is a chronological list of the


17 Directors of the CIA, showing that the first four were all said to be members 

of the MJ-12 Group. Whether subsequent Directors have been privy or not is 

left to the reader to guess. His list of sources is helpfully grouped by category, 

but is not helpful for the novice who might just want to spend a day or so on a 

few references. The index is quite complete and contains many multiple page 

references to the same topic. 

Top Secret/Majic will be eagerly read by both those who are looking for evi- 

dence of a decades-old cover-up as well as those who feel that such documents 

can be easily faked. However, Friedman has raised the bar higher for those who 

would suggest that the documents are fake by showing how they interweave 

with unquestioned genuine documents, and dealing with most of the criticisms 

offered in the past. His publication of the Special Operations Manual 1-01 

might be, perhaps, premature, because he does not deal with any of the known 

criticisms of authenticity or their rebuttals. But because this manual has been 

widely circulated among researchers since it was received in 1994, it may not 

hurt much to have it available without caveat, since the content of the docu- 

ment is self-evident, and because establishing the authenticity beyond doubt 

will require a professional, dedicated and comprehensive effort. 

For the scientist who has not really been exposed to the UFO literature in an 

orderly manner, this book might not be the place to start. Better to read it after 

reading the excellent guide to the literature by Michael Swords (1 993), "A 

Guide to UFO Research, " Journal of Scientific Exploration, 7, No. 1. But Top 

Secret/Majic is very focused on just a tiny sliver of the broad UFO subject, and 

will not overwhelm those unfamiliar with the literature. 

I recommend that everyone who wonders whether there may be evidence 

that we recovered craft with occupants, and everyone who assumes that gov- 

ernments cannot keep secrets should read Top Secret/Majic. In this reviewer's 

opinion, It is increasingly clear to all who pay attention to the Government re- 

actions of today and the documents included in Top Secret/Majic that a project 

was real in the 40s and 50s and that it has not gone away. The success in con- 

cealing this sophisticated UFO investigation project is a significant achieve- 

ment of our highly refined counter intelligence community, simultaneously 

duping the media and educational institutions along with the public. 

Robert M. Wood 

1 72 7 Candlestick Lane

Journal of Scient$c Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 10 5-108, 1997 0892-33 10197 


16th Annual Meeting of the Society for Scientific Exploration 

Hosted by the University of Nevada 

at the Monte Carlo Resort, Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas 

June 5 - 7, 1997 

Meeting Program 

The program Committee for this year's meeting consists of Dean Radin, Bren- 

da Dunne, Bob Wood, and Peter Sturrock. Local arrangements are being made 

by Jannine Rebman and Dean Radin. 

Anomalies in Biology 

Invited Speakers 

Garret Yount, molecular biologist, California Pacific Medical Center, will 

talk about his research on the effects of Qi Kung healing on brain tumor cells. 

Gordana Vitaliano, psychiatrist, will describe her research on biological 

techniques of detecting changes in consciousness. 

Parapsvchological Topics 

Yoichiro Sako, Director, SONY Corporation's "ESPER Laboratory," will 

discuss a unique psi research program at one of the premier high-technology 

laboratories in the world. 

Dean Radin, Director, Consciousness Research Division, University of 

Nevada, Las Vegas, will present a quantitative analysis of a century of experi- 

mental psi research. 

Controversies in Anthropologv 

Stephan Schwartz, author and anthropologist, will describe his research on 

evidence of sophisticated civilizations that thrived in North America thou- 

sands of years before Columbus. 

Topics Associated with Anomalous Aerial Phenomena 

John Alexander, Director, National Institute for Discovery Science, will dis- 

cuss some of the research projects underway at this frontier science institute in

106 SSE News 

John Schuessler, Center for UFO Studies, will describe medical injury re- 

search cases associated with UFO abductions. 

Jacques Vallee, computer network pioneer and UFO researcher, will explore 

relationships between UFO experiences and consciousness. 

Sociology yf Studvina Anomalous Phenomena 

Barry Markovsky, Professor of Sociology, University of Iowa, will discuss 

his research on professionals who study the paranormal. 

Contributed Talks 

Members of SSE are invited to present brief contributed talks at the Meet- 

ing. SSE Associates may present a paper if sponsored by a Member. Abstracts 

of no more than 300 words should be sent to Dr. Dean Radin, Consciousness 

Research DivisionIHRC, University of Nevada, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 

454009, Las Vegas, NV, 89 154-4009, USA (fax: 702-895- 1602). 

Submissions by mail, fax, Mac or Windows disk or email are acceptable, 

but email is preferred to . 

DEADLINE FOR ABSTRACTS - APRIL 11. 

Registering with the Hotel 

A block of rooms has been reserved at the new Monte Carlo Resort, Hotel 

and Casino at a special conference rate of $69 per room per night (tax not in- 

cluded) for singles, doubles, triples or quads. Please make your own reserva- 

tion with the hotel directly by calling 800-3 11-8999 (from outside the US 

702-730-7777). The fax numbers are 702-730-7250 (for reservations) or 702- 

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Meeting of the Society for Scientific Exploration for the guaranteed rate. 

A credit card guarantee or one-night deposit is required to confirm a reserva- 

tion. Cancellations must be made no less that 48 hours in advance. The block 

of rooms will be held by the hotel only until May 5. Bookings after that date 

are subject to availability and the rate may be different. 

The Monte Carlo Hotel is located in the middle of the famous Las Vegas 

Strip. Two other hotel/casinos are within easy walking distance, including the 

brand new "New York, New York" casino and the world's largest hotel, the 

MGM Grand. The Monte Carlo hotel is about 3 miles from McCarran Interna- 

tional airport. Taxi service to and from the airport should cost about $10 each 

way. 

General Information 

The conference talks will be held in the Lance Burton Theater on June 5 and 

6 and a large conference room on June 7. This will be in a nice, quiet, air-con- 

ditioned environment, apart from the casino.

SSE News 107 

Las Vegas is in the Mojave Desert. The weather should be sunny and dry, 

with afternoon temperatures of 40 C (104 F) or more likely. 

Nevada is on Pacific Time (same as California). 

A reception will be held in a micro-brewery located in the Monte Carlo 

Hotel on Wednesday evening, June 4. The Society banquet will be held Satur- 

day, June 7; there will be an after-dinner address by SSE Member Prof. Grego- 

ry Benford, physicist and well-known science-fiction writer, who will speak 

on "The Biology Century." The price for the banquet will be $25 per person. 

Las Vegas is a major tourist destination. Ample time will be available in the 

late afternoons and evenings to take advantage of the casinos, restaurants, and 

huge array of entertainment opportunities that have made Las Vegas both fa- 

mous and infamous. For those interested in other wonders, Red Rock National 

Monument, a beautiful high desert nature preserve, is a 30-minute drive away; 

Death Valley, one of the lowest, hottest places on earth (record maximum of 57 

C, 134 F; elevation -70 m) is a 2-hour drive into California; the Hoover Dam, 

a marvel of engineering, is a half-hour drive to the northeast. The Grand 

Canyon in Arizona is not far away for trips before or after the meeting. 

Registering for the Meeting and Banquet 

The registration fee for the Meeting is $100 on or before May 1 and $120 if 

paid after May 1. Single-day registration is also possible at $35 per meeting 

day on or before May 1 and $45 per meeting-day thereafter. The Saturday 

evening Society banquet will be $25 per person. Please indicate on the form if 

you would like a vegetarian meal. 

For any further questions about the local arrangements please phone or 

email Jannine Rebman at 702-895- 1480 and . 

Special Airline Rates 

Getz International Travel has offered to provide the lowest available airfares 

on all airlines (phone: 800-233-2976, email: ) . 

In addition, a 5% discount will be given for flights on American Airlines and 

America West Airlines. Getz can also offer "zone" fares which represent sav- 

ings of up to 50% or more off coach fares for guests staying over Saturday 

night. (Thanks to SSE Councilor Marsha Adams.) 

Registration Form 

Please copy and return this form with a check made out to the Society for 

Scientific Exploration or credit card information to Prof. Charles Tolbert, Box 

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Please submit one form for each registrant. Note though that a single check 

or credit card payment can be made for 2 or more people if mailed together.

108 SSE News 

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Officers 

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Dr. Robert Wood 

1727 Candlestick Lane 

Newport Beach, CA 92660

Journal of Scientijic Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 2, pp. 109-122, 1997 0892-33 10/97 


Apparent Association Between Effect Size in Free Response 

Anomalous Cognition Experiments and Local Sidereal Time 

Cognitive Sciences Laboratory, 330 Cowper St., Suite 200, 

Palo Alto, CA 94301 

Abstract - Nothing is known about the physical mechanism of anomalous 

cognition (AC), or ESP. A first step towards generating focused hypotheses 

would be the discovery of a physical parameter which clearly modulated AC 

performance. In this paper, an association between the local sidereal time 

(LST) at which a trial occurs and the resulting effect size is described. In an 

existing database of 1,468 free response trials, the effect size increased 340% 

for trials within 1 hour of 13.5 h LST @ = 0.001). An independent database 

of 1,015 similar trials was subsequently obtained in which trials within 1 

hour of 13.5 h LST showed an effect size increase of 450% (p = 0.05) provid- 

ing confirmation of the effect. Possible artifacts due to the non-uniform dis- 

tribution of trials in clock time and variations of effect size with experiment 

are discussed and rejected as explanations. Assuming that some unknown 

systematic bias is not present in the data, it appears that AC performance is 

strongly dependent upon the LST at which the trial occurs. This is evidence 

of a causal connection between performance and the orientation of the re- 

ceiver (i.e., a term for subject or participant), the earth and the fixed stars. 

Keywords: consciousness - parapsychology - anomalous cognition - ESP - 

physical correlates 

Introduction 

Over the last decade of research into anomalous cognition (AC), a new term 

for extrasensory perception or ESP, considerable progress has been made to- 

ward understanding the experimental factors needed to ensure that the effect is 

observed. In fact the question of existence can now reasonably be said to have 

been answered positively (Utts, 1996a). In contrast, little headway has been 

made in understanding the mechanism of the information transfer in physical 

terms. Currently there are no known physical parameters which unambigu- 

ously modify AC performance, and the discovery of such a variable would be 

a first step to elucidating the physical mechanisms involved. 

From a physics point of view, a puzzling feature of anomalous cognition is 

that there is no evidence that performance falls off with the distance between 

receiver and target over separations up to several thousand kilometers 

(Puthoff and Targ, 1976; Dunne et al. 1989). More problematic still, the evi- 

dence for precognitive AC is strong and performance in this situation is

110 S. J. P. Spottiswoode 

comparable to that in real-time protocols; Dunne et al. (1989) show that effect 

size in their database is independent of the interval between remote viewing 

session and target definition over a range of 2150 h. Recently, a theory has 

been developed by May et al. (1995), which explains another class of parapsy- 

chological experiments involving attempts to "influence" random systems, in 

so-called micro-PK experiments. Their model proposes that the results of 

these experiments are due to a weak precognitive information channel as op- 

posed to a force-like interaction. Thus in looking for some underlying mecha- 

nism that might explain all these data, it appears that precognition is a good 

possibility: the notion encompasses micro-PK effects and precognitive AC re- 

sults. Data from real time protocols can also be explained by precognition if it 

is assumed that the signal source is the eventual observation of the correct an- 

swer. 

Given these properties of the putative physical carrier responsible for 

anomalous cognition, it is not obvious where one would look amongst known 

physics for a model or for an extension of fundamental theory that would 

allow for these effects. It has been suggested that the non-local correlations of 

quantum mechanics might be used to explain AC (Walker, 1975), but the fact 

that these correlations do not permit causal signaling rules them out as a mech- 

anism. In searching for a model, knowledge of a physical variable which mod- 

ified the performance of the AC channel would be extremely useful. 

It is outside the scope of this paper to review the research on physical mod- 

ulators of AC, but mention will be made of the two most prevalent in the liter- 

ature. There is weak evidence that performance is enhanced by screening 

electrical fields with Faraday cages (Tart, 1988) and that it is improved during 

periods when the geomagnetic field is relatively quiescent (Spottiswoode, 

1993). More attention has been paid to the latter effect, but the correlation of 

AC with the geomagnetic field fluctuations, if it exists at all in laboratory data, 

is very small. For instance, in the extensive collection of trials examined in 

this paper the correlation between the up geomagnetic index and AC effect 

size is small (Spearman's p = -0.05, n = 2,483, p = 0.01) though in the hypoth- 

esized direction. The possibility that performance is affected by a globally av- 

eraged parameter like the geomagnetic index suggests that it might be fruitful 

to broaden the search for a physical variable describing the environment of 

the receiver, such as electric or magnetic fields, to the larger scale. 

Consider how the data of anomalous cognition might have been approached 

if, instead of emerging from a protocol based in the psychological sciences, 

these signals had appeared as sporadic bursts of information from a complex 

physical experiment. In that case, the effort to find the source of the unex- 

pected signals would have progressed from local sources of noise to an exami- 

nation of whether the noise was correlated with activity outside the laborato- 

ry. A useful technique for achieving this would be to examine whether the 

sporadic noise was correlated with local time, which might indicate that power 

fluctuations, ground vibration or other human activity tied to local time were

Anomalous Cognition and Local Sidereal Time 111 

responsible. Failing that, it would be natural to see if the noise were correlated 

with sidereal time, indicating a cosmic origin. Pulsars were in fact discovered 

in just this manner. This paper asks this latter question of the AC data and 

thereby takes a first step in addressing the question of whether performance is 

dependent upon the receiver's orientation relative to the fixed star back- 

ground. 

The Anomalous Cognition Data 

To search for a potential physical correlate of AC functioning requires either 

large numbers of prospective studies or the retrospective examination of exist- 

ing data which were collected for other reasons. As collecting high quality 

anomalous cognition trials is time consuming and expensive, there is a motiva- 

tion for using existing data where possible. The author had already assembled 

a database of free response data for another purpose and a subset of these data 

were suitable for this study; from now on, this will be referred to as the original 

data set. This original data set comprised results from 22 different studies, 

which utilized either remote viewing or the ganzfeld protocol and for which 

exact times, dates and locations of the trials were known. The 1,524 trials in 

these studies were collected in various laboratories by different experimenters 

over the last 20 years and are shown in Table 1. Most of these studies have 

been published in peer reviewed journals, conference proceedings, or laborato- 

ry reports. It should be emphasized however, that this collection is not exhaus- 

tive of remote viewing and ganzfeld experimentation. The criteria for inclu- 

sion in the original data set were merely that the laboratory was able to provide 

data at the trial level with time, location and score, and that the experiment 

was of a free response design. The criterion of free response was established in 

order to collect data with the highest possible effect size and thus maximize 

the efficiency of the search for a physical correlate. It should be noted that the 

division into studies was based purely upon the way the experimenter present- 

ed the data. In several cases data from a single protocol was presented as a 

number of experiment series, or studies, while in fact in publication they may 

have been presented as a single experiment. In some cases the division into se- 

ries may correspond to a division by receiver, in others to a division by time pe- 

riod. 

The contributing laboratories included most of the major centers where free 

response AC work has occurred. One of the data sets used here, that from the 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research (PEAR) group, has been subjected 

to some methodological criticism (Hansen et al., 1992; Dobyns, 1992). How- 

ever the effect size and associated 95% confidence interval of the PEAR data 

fall within the range reported by other free-response investigations (Utts, 

1996b; Radin, 1997). Therefore, their data were included in the original data 

set. 

This paper examines a relationship between AC performance and the receiv- 

er's orientation relative to the celestial sphere and therefore the appropriate


TABLE 1 

Original Data Set 

Study Start End N Effect Z P 

Year Year Size 

PEAR 76 

Schlitz & Gruber 79 

Schlitz & Haight 80 

Carpenter 86 

Edinburgh. Pilot 90 

Edinburgh. Training Study 9 1 

IfP Manual ganzfeld Series 003 86 




PRL Series 102 (partial) 89 

PRL Series 302 (partial) 87 

SJPS GMF Study 9 1 

SJPS PRV 8 3 

SJPS RAE3 84 

SRI Tachistoscope 87 

SRI Precognitive vs Real-Time 87 

SRI Hypnosis 8 7 

SRI Fax 8 7 

Utrecht (PA 1993) 92 

Utrecht (PA 1993) 92 

1. PEAR - Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research, Dept. of Engineering, Princeton Uni- 

versity; IfP - Institute for Parapsychology, formerly Foundation for Research on the Nature of 

Man; PRL - Psychophysical Research Laboratories; SRI - SRI International; SJPS - the author; 

Utrecht - Parapsychological Institute, Utrecht. 

2. Published study Z scores may differ from those shown here due to alternative methods of cal- 

culating overall Z. 

celestial coordinate system is briefly reviewed. Directions in the sky are con- 

ventionally measured with respect to a coordinate system defined by the 

earth's rotational axis and equatorial plane. The celestial equator is the projec- 

tion of the earth's equator onto the sky and the declination of an object is de- 

fined as the angle north, or south, of this great circle. An object's right ascen- 

sion, or RA, is defined as the angle around the celestial equator between 

the great circle passing through the object and the celestial poles and a 

fixed point on the celestial equator, the vernal equinox. Thus, declination and 

RA comprise a coordinate system for the celestial sphere in the same way that 

latitude and longitude do for the earth's surface. At any given point on the 

earth's surface the stars return to their same positions after one sidereal day 

has elapsed, this day being approximately 3 minutes 56 seconds shorter than a 

solar day.' At any location and time, the local sidereal time (LST) is defined as 

the RA of the meridian, that is the great circle which passes through the zenith 

'The ordinary 24-hour solar day is slighly longer than the sidereal day owing to the revolution of the 

Earth around the Sun in the same direction as the daily rotation of the Earth. The Earth must rotate a lit- 

tle more to bring the Sun back overhead from one noon to the next since the Sun has advanced slightly 

with respect to the stars in the course of a day. In the course of a year there is one extra rotation of the 

Earth with respect to the stars compensating for the single yearly revolution around the Sun.


and celestial poles. Thus at a same value of LST for any observer, the same 

strip of sky will be directly overhead. 

The trials comprising the AC database occurred at locations in North Amer- 

ica and Europe at times and dates determined by the scheduling of those exper- 

iments and entirely unconnected with the purpose of this study. As such they 

occurred mostly during normal working hours, at various times of the year and 

therefore covered the whole range of LST values since LST advances steadily 

with respect to the ordinary 24-hour day. However, the range of latitudes at 

which these experiments occurred was quite limited, nearly all the data being 

taken between 32 and 55 degrees North. Thus the range of declination was 

similarly restricted. This study therefore sought to examine whether there was 

any relationship between LST and AC performance. 

Met hod 

The received data were first filtered to eliminate cases where the local time 

was omitted or location information was either absent or very approximate. 

One entire experiment was removed from the original data set since reliable 

time information for each trial was not available. This winnowing reduced the 

data to 1,468 trials from 2 1 studies for the original data set. LST values for all 

trials were calculated from the longitude and given local time of each trial. It 

should be noted that the time data given by the various experimenters is prob- 

ably that of the start of each AC trial and may differ from the time of the actu- 

al mentation by a few minutes to as much as a quarter of an hour. The majority 

of trials occurred in laboratories in cities and towns and the longitude for these 

trials was taken from the values for the city given in an atlas. Local times were 

corrected for daylight savings time and used to calculate LST by means of the 

program Xephem version 2.9. As a check, LST values for several randomly 

chosen points were hand calculated to confirm the accuracy of the software. 

The AC score data for the trials was delivered from the various experiments 

in one of two forms. In some cases an effect size for each trial had been calcu- 

lated from a quasi-continuous measure used in the experiment. These values 

were used in this analysis without further processing. In other cases, the trials 

had been assessed by a ranking procedure in which either the receiver, in the 

ganzfeld experiments, or an analyst, in the remote viewing experiments, had 

rated the receiver's description against the actual target and a number of decoy 

targets in a blind judging procedure. These trials therefore were scored as a 

rank, where a value of 1 indicated that the actual target was rated as the closest 

fit to the receiver's description, 2 as the second closest fit, and so on. These 

ranks were converted to trial effect sizes by means of the formula:


where rMCE is the mean chance expectation rank, r,,, is the observed rank and 

N is the number of targets used in the ranking procedure. In a few experiments 

the scores were reported both as quasi-continuous scores obtained from receivers 

estimating their preference for the target on a scale and as rankings. In 

these cases the effect sizes calculated by the experimenter from the continuous 

measure were used rather than computing an effect size from the rank since it 

is likely that the continuous measure contains more information about the degree 

of match between description and target than does the rank. 

Results from the Original Data Set 

The original data set had an overall mean effect size of 0.148 (n = 1,468), 

corresponding to a Stouffer's Z = 5.99, (p < 7 x loF9), while individual study 

effect sizes ranged from -0.28 up to 0.56. These data were collected into 1- 

hour wide bins of LST and the mean and standard deviation of the effect size 

data for each bin were found. An increase in the mean effect size for trials oc- 

curring between 12 and 14 h LST was observed. The data are shown boxcar 

smoothed in Figure 1 where the mean effect size for data points within a 2- 

hour wide window, moving in 0.1-hour steps, is plotted. When calculating 

these and subsequent smoothed plots, the data set was padded with two copies 

of itself where the time values were 24 h later and 24 h earlier than the actual 

time. Thus the averaging occurred over a 2-hour window also for points at the 

ends of the plots. The dashed line in Figure 1 is the average effect size and the 

error bars correspond to +1 standard deviation (SD). 

The local sidereal time corresponding to maximum effect size was estimated 

by computing the centroid of the subset of the data comprising the upper half 

of the 12 h to 14 h peak and gave a value of 13.47 h. To assess the significance 

of this deviation from the average effect size of the whole data set, various val- 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Q 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 I9 20 21 22 23 24 

Local Sidereal Time (h) 

Fig. 1. Mean effect size versus"LST for the original data set.


ues of time intervals around 13.47 h were taken and the mean effect size of 

these subsets compared to that of the remainder of the data. The results are 

shown in Table 2 where the gain is calculated as the ratio of the effect size 

within the chosen time range to the effect size for the complete data set. The t 

values shown compare the data in the subset around the peak with the remain- 

der of the data. For instance, the trials which occurred within *I hour of 13.47 

h showed an average effect size of 0.507 (n = 83) as compared to the complete 

data set effect size of 0.148, an increase of effect size by a factor of 3.42. 

It appears therefore that the trials occurring within + 3.0 hours, or less, of 

13.47 h are significantly different from the remainder of the data, and the ob- 

served effect size increases the closer the trial time to 13.47 h. 

Validation Data: Collection and Results 

After the above analysis was completed, it was hypothesized that there was 

an approximately three to four times enhancement in anomalous cognition ef- 

fect size for trials occurring near 13.5 h local sidereal time. In order to test this 

hypothesis against a new set of data, laboratories were contacted with a request 

for any further free response data meeting the same criteria as used for the 

original data set. Table 3 shows an additional 23 experiments which were re- 

ceived comprising 1,015 trials. This data set also shows evidence of AC with 

an overall effect size of 0.085 (n = 1,015), yielding a Stouffer's Z = 2.70 (p < 

0.004). 

These new data were processed through the same analysis as used with the 

original data set and a smoothed plot of the validation data, using a 2-hour av- 

eraging window as before, is shown in Figure 2 along with the original data set 

for comparison and +- 1 SD error bars. The validation data set also has a broad 

peak in effect size near 13 h and the LST for maximum effect size was found to 

be 13.47 h, identical to the value found from the original data set. The effect 

sizes as a function of window width around 13.47 h for the validation data are 

shown in Table 4. 

Results of the Combined Data Sets 

Given that the effect sizes and gains shown here for the validation data set 

are close to those from the original data set and that the LST values corre- 

sponding to maximum effect size are not different, it seems reasonable to 

TABLE 2 

Original Data 

Time period Around 13.47 h es N Gain t df p (1 - tail)


TABLE 3 

Validation Data Set 

STUDY Start End N Effect Z P 

Year Year Size 

SJPS ARV 9 5 

Edinburgh - KD 95 

Edinburgh Sender-No Sender 94 

Amsterdam ganzfeld 1982 82 












IfP Auto ganzfeld Series CLAIR 1 94 

IfP Auto ganzfeld Series EC1 93 

IfP Auto ganzfeld Series FT1 93 

IfP Auto ganzfeld Series FT2 94 

IfP Auto ganzfeld Series GEN 1 93 

1. Edinburgh - Koestler Chair of Parapsychology, University of Edinburgh; Amsterdam - Dept. 

of Psychology, University of Amsterdam. 

2. Published study Z scores may differ from those shown here due to alternative methods of 

calculating overall 2. 


Fig. 2. Mean effect size versus LST for original and validation data sets.


TABLE 4 

Validation Data 

Time period around 13.47 h es N Gain t df p(I -tail) 

conclude that the hypothesized peak in effect size has been confirmed in the 

validation data set. The data sets were therefore combined and the analysis re- 

peated for all the data taken together. In this case the overall effect size is 

0.122 (n = 2,483) for a Stouffer's Z = 6.09 (p = 6 x lo-''). Using the same 

methods as before, the LST for maximum effect size was found to be 13.47 h. 

The complete data set is plotted with a 2-hour wide averaging window and +1 

SD error bars in Figure 3, with the mean for the whole data set dashed. In a 

Monte Carlo test the effect sizes were randomly permuted with respect to the 

time data and the means of all 2-hour wide windows with centers spaced at 

0.1 -hour intervals were computed. In 10,000 such runs 14 produced a window 

mean effect size at some value of LST which was greater than or equal to that 

seen in the actual data. Thus the probability of finding an effect size peak of 

the magnitude observed at any value of LST was estimated to be 0.0014. The 

increases in effect size observed in time windows centered on the maximum 

are shown in Table 5. As can be seen from these data, it may be possible to in- 

crease effect size in AC experiments as much as four-fold by timing them near 

13.5 h. The width of the 13.5 h peak was a1.25 h, measured at half height 

-0.2 1 I 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Q 1011 1213141516 1718 192021 222324 


Figure 3. Mean effect size versus local sidereal time for the entire data set.

S. J. P. Spottiswoode 

TABLE 5 

Original and Validation Data Combined 

-- -- 

Time period Around 13.47 h es N Gain t df p (I -tail) 

above the mean. This plot also shows a suggestion of a minimum of effect size 

occurring near 18 h. It is worth noting that although the data used here are very 

disparate, both in terms of study effect size and protocol, the subset which 

were accidentally taken within k1 h of 13.47 h yield an overall significance of 

Z=5.20,p= 1 x 10-~(n= 124). 

Replication Across Studies 

To check whether the 13.5 h effect replicated across these studies, the effect 

size in the region of 13.5 h, and outside this time interval, was calculated for 

each study. Owing to the small numbers of trials in many of the studies, 15 of 

the 41 total studies failed to have any data falling in the 13.5 h peak, taken here 

as 13.47 +. 2 h, while one experiment had all its data on the peak and none else- 

where. This study contributed 10 trials with a mean effect size of 0.147. Of the 

remaining 26 studies, with data both on and off the peak, 18 had a mean effect 

size on the peak greater than mean effect size for the remainder of the data (p = 

0.02). There is evidence from other types of parapsychological research that 

receivers at times consistently miss targets and produce significant negative 

scores. Taking the bi-directional hypothesis that the magnitude of the on-peak 

effect size will be greater than the off-peak, regardless of sign, it was found 

that 25 out of the 26 studies with data on and off peak had a greater absolute 

magnitude of effect size on the peak 0, = 4 x 

Possible Artifacts 

The trials in these studies occurred primarily during office hours, 81% 

falling between 0900 and 1700 local time. Since the trials occurred through- 

out the year, the conversion to LST for each trial time effectively smeared the 

distribution of trial times approximately evenly across the range of LST. One 

possible explanation for the peak at 13.5 h would be provided if two things 

were true: that the effect size in this data was dependent on local clock time, 

and that the trials responsible for the LST peak fell at a value of local time 

which maximized their effect size. 

Figure 4 shows the distribution of effect size as a function of local clock 

time with the mean of the whole data set dashed. It is apparent that while the 

effect size in this data is approximately independent of clock time over most of


-0.8 

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 


Fig. 4. Mean effect size versus local time for the entire data set. 

the day, there is an increase in effect size at 6 a.m. However, the maximum 

point of this is due to only 4 data points, 3 of which are from one experiment 

(PEAR) which had a relatively high average effect size of 0.33. In fact the 

whole region from 3 a.m. to 8 a.m. contains only 18 trials and with such a 

small number of data points no reliable estimate of the behavior of effect size 

versus clock time in this period can be made. Four trials from this period fall 

in the 13.47 + 2 h LST peak and cannot significantly influence the statistics of 

the 21 7 trials comprising this region of LST. Apart from this early morning pe- 

riod, the clock-time distribution is statistically flat. 

As an alternative way of looking at the impact of the variations in effect size 

with local time, the data was normalized to remove the variation with clock 

time. This was achieved by subtracting from each trial's effect size the differ- 

ence between the overall mean of the data set and the mean for the data in the 

1-hour clock time bin containing that point. This normalized data set therefore 

had a uniform effect size when plotted against clock time in 1-hour bins. When 

plotted against LST it produced a plot which was virtually indistinguishable 

from the un-normalized plot shown in Figure 3. Thus, any contribution to the 

LST peak from clock-time variations in effect size is negligible. 

Another possible artifact could be created by an interaction between experi- 

ments of differing effect size with restricted ranges of LST values. Due to the 

slow drifting of LST versus solar time at approximately four minutes a day, an 

experiment which was scheduled to collect data at the same time every day for, 

say, a month would produce a data set that all fitted within a two hour slot of 

LST. If this were an experiment which, for other reasons, produced a high ef- 

fect size, and where the scheduled times fell near 13 h LST, then the apparent 

increase of effect size observed at that value of LST would be explained by the 

arbitrary timing of such a high effect size experiment.


Before addressing this potential artifact, it is worthwhile clarifying some as- 

sumptions implicit in this retrospective analysis. It is being assumed that the 

effect size in an anomalous cognition trial is a function of several parameters: 

where R is the type of receiver, expert or novice, E is the experimenter, X repre- 

sents all other unknown sources of variance and f is an unknown but fixed, 

function. It is also being assumed that in any one experiment R and E were 

held constant and that R, E and X are not functions of LST. Under the null hy- 

pothesis of no LST effect it is presumed that the variation in effect size be- 

tween studies is due solely to differing values of R, E and X. Utilizing the 26 

studies with data on and off the 13.47 ~c- 2 h peak, the expected value for the av- 

erage effect size on the peak can then be calculated as the weighted average of 

individual study effect sizes, where the weighting factor is the number of on- 

peak trials for each study. This results in a weighted effect size of 0.154, 

which is not significantly different from the effect size of 0.148 for all the data 

in the 26 studies. In contrast, the observed effect size on the peak is 0.342 for 

these 26 studies. Thus, the LST peak cannot be explained by a fortuitous com- 

bination of R, E and X, or by the happenstance timing of trials in each study. 

Since LST is a linear function of local solar time and the day of the year, there 

remains the possibility that some undiscovered systematic relationship be- 

tween effect size and these variables might be responsible for the observed 

peak. 

Discussion 

Evidence has been given to support a relationship between the local sidereal 

time at which an anomalous cognition experiment occurs and the resulting ef- 

fect size. The primary association is an approximately four-fold enhancement 

in AC effect size at 13.5 h LST. This association was found in one large data 

set and confirmed in another of comparable size, each set comprising AC ex- 

periments with a range of free response protocols, from different laboratories 

and investigators. It is likely that the increase of effect size for AC trials oc- 

curring at 13.5 h LST is real, replicable across different laboratories and occurs 

in the diverse protocols of the ganzfeld and remote viewing experiments. 

The discovery of this effect was motivated by the search for a physical para- 

meter which unambiguously modulated AC performance. What classes of 

mechanism are suggested by the LST effect found here? The prima facie im- 

plication is that a causal relationship exists between an unknown influence at a 

fixed RA in the sky and AC functioning. Such an influence must originate 

from outside the solar system since within the heliopause the interplanetary 

space environment is dominated by solar and planetary effects which would 

not be locked to a fixed RA. Similarly, all known solar system objects have 

varying positions in the sky; only objects as remote as Neptune and Pluto have


moved less than 3 h of RA during the data collection period of this analysis. 

As to the nature of the influence at fixed RA, there are a wide range of signals 

potentially available to the appropriate detector at the earth's surface which 

are locked to sidereal time. Most of the electromagnetic spectrum from 

gamma rays through low frequency radio have known cosmic sources. There 

are also particle fluxes from discrete sources. It may be possible to single out 

amongst all these emissions a factor at 13.5 h RA which is associated with the 

effect described here. 

A noteworthy feature of the 13.5 h effect size enhancement is the narrow- 

ness of the peak, which was +- 1.25 h wide at half height. As was noted earlier, 

the trial time data used in this paper may differ from the actual time of the re- 

ceiver's mentations. Such errors would broaden the peak and the actual effect 

may therefore be more time sensitive. This argues against the hypothesis that 

the increase in effect size is due to a region of the sky simply being above the 

horizon, since if this were the case the peak would be much wider. If the LST 

effect were dependent on the altitude of a source, then one would expect the 

width of the peak to be dependent on latitude. Interestingly, when the 13.5 h 

peak is examined for data taken at high latitudes versus low latitudes there is a 

suggestion that the peak is narrower for the high latitude data, but this analysis 

is confounded by the fact that particular laboratories and protocols are being 

selected by the latitude division. Further work in this direction must await a 

data set collected with accurate timings of the receiver's mentations, using a 

consistent protocol and over a wide range of latitudes. 

Another implication of this LST effect is that some property of the earth is 

important to AC functioning. For instance, one class of models that would be 

consistent with the LST effect would posit an AC-enhancing signal from a di- 

rection in space associated with RA = 13.5 h and that this signal was at least 

partially blocked by the earth. An alternative class of models would postulate 

a signal from a direction opposite to 13.5 h RA acting as an AC inhibitor, 

though this would result in a broader peak than observed. While it is clearly 

impossible to reach any conclusions about the mechanism of this effect, it 

would seem that any model must include the earth as a causal part of the 

mechanism, either as an absorber or reflector. In this regard it is interesting to 

note that there is evidence that AC performance does not decrease with the dis- 

tance between target and receiver, at least up to separations of several thou- 

sand km and these long range tests demonstrate that no difference in AC per- 

formance is made by interposing the earth between receiver and target. 

Assuming that this effect replicates in prospective tests, it will have some 

important consequences aside from its impact on theory. Parapsychology has 

struggled to establish its main effect, anomalous cognition, in part because of 

the small effect size seen in these protocols. The fourfold increase in effect 

size produced by timing trials at the optimal value of LST will make a consid- 

erable difference in designing proof-oriented experiments as well as


increasing the statistical power of any experiment looking for other moderat- 

ing factors. 

Much further work needs to be done to elucidate this effect. Prospective 

tests of the relationship between AC effect size and LST need to be undertak- 

en, and in designing these it would be useful to collect data at a range of times 

around the 13.5 h maximum so that the exact shape of the peak can be found. 

It may also be important to collect AC data at a wide range of latitudes to see if 

AC effect size is related to the declination of the zenith at the site of the trials. 

Evidence of a maximum in effect size versus latitude would suggest that a lim- 

ited region of the sky, bracketed in both RA and declination, was responsible 

for modulating anomalous cognition performance. 


First, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the many laboratories 

and individual researchers who generously provided their data for this analy- 

sis. 

The manuscript has seen many iterations and has been significantly im- 

proved in content and in form. The contributions of Dr. Edwin C. May, CSL; 

Prof. Jessica Utts, University of California at Davis; Prof. Peter Sturrock, 

Stanford University; and Dr. Richard Broughton, Institute for Parapsychology 

are deeply appreciated. This work could not have proceeded without their sup- 

port and counsel. 

References 

Dobyns, Y. H., Dunne, B. J., Jahn, R. G. and Nelson, R. D. (1992). Response to Hansen, Utts and 

Markwick: Statistical and methodological problems of the PEAR remote viewing (sic) experi- 

ments. Journal of Parapsychology, 56, 115. 

Dunne, B. J., Dobyns, Y. H., Intner, S. M. (1989). Precognitive Remote Perception 111: Complete 

Binary Data Base with Analytical Refinements. Technical Note PEAR 89002, Princeton Uni- 

versity. 

Hansen, G. P., Utts, J. and Markwick, B. (1992). Critique of the PEAR remote viewing experi- 

ments. Journal of Parapsychology, 56,97. 

May, E. C., Utts, J. M., Spottiswoode, S. J. P. (1995). Decision augmentation theory: toward a 

model of anomalous phenomena. Journal of Parapsychology, 59,195. 

Puthoff, H. E. and Targ. R. (1976). A perceptual channel for information transfer over kilometer 

distances: Historical perspective and recent research. Proceedings of the IEEE, 64,3,329. 

Radin, D. I. (1997). The Conscious Universe. San Francisco, CA: Harper Edge. 

Spottiswoode, S. J. P. (1993). Effect of ambient magnetic field fluctuations on performance in a 

free response anomalous cognition task: A pilot study. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Con- 

vention of the Parapsychological Association, 143. 

Tart, C. T. (1988). Effects of electrical shielding on GESP performance. Journal of the American 

Society for Psychical Research, 82, 129. 

Utts, J. M. (1996a). Science in the age of (mis)information. First World Skeptics Congress, 20th 

Anniversary of CSICOP, Amherst, New York. 

Utts, J. M. (1996b). An assessment of the evidence for psychic functioning. Journal of Scientific 

Exploration, 10,3. 

Walker, E. H. (1 975). Foundations of paraphysical and parapsychological phenomena. In Oteri, 

L. (Ed.), Quantum Physics and Parapsychology (pp. 1-53). New York: Parapsychology Foun- 

dation.

I 

I Journal of Scientijc Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 123- 145, 1997 0892-33 10/97 

~ 


Evidence in Support of the Hypothesis that Certain Objects on 

Mars are Artificial in Origin 

5 Ryans Place, Beverly MA 01915 (markjc@mindspring.com) 

Abstract - Findings from a series of independent investigations are summa- 

rized and presented as evidence in support of the hypothesis that certain fea- 

tures on the Martian surface are artificial in origin. The discussion focuses on 

the Cydonia region in Mars' northern hemisphere. The features under investi- 

gation include a formation approximately 2.5 by 2 km in size that resembles a 

humanoid face staring up into space from the surface and a number of nearby 

objects. One set of objects located 10-20 km southwest of the Face which has 

been termed the "City" contains several unusual structures comparable in 

size to the Face and a number of smaller structures which together with the 

larger objects in the City appear to be arranged in an organized pattern. Sev- 

eral other anomalous features in the area are also examined. Three types of 

evidence are presented which support the hypothesis that the objects in ques- 

tion are artificial. The first is based on a detailed examination of the objects 

themselves, the second concerns spatial and angular relationships, and the 

third involves a comparative analysis of the shape of certain objects. Using a 

Bayesian inference model and assuming the above sources of evidence are 

mutually independent we show that the existing evidence strongly supports 

the hypothesis that these objects may be artificial in origin. 

Keywords: astronomy - mars - image processing - search for extraterrestrial 

intelligence - archaeological anomalies 

Introduction 

Since 1976 there has been growing interest in a collection of unusual surface 

features in the Cydonia region of Mars. It is the opinion of the planetary sci- 

ence community that these objects are natural geologic formations. However 

in a number of independent studies an alternative hypothesis has been suggest- 

ed - that certain objects on the surface of Mars may be artificial in origin. 

This paper considers this hypothesis and presents evidence from a variety of 

sources to support it. 

Background 

The Face was first imaged by a Viking orbiter spacecraft in July 1976. Dis- 

missed by NASA as an optical illusion the Face on Mars was soon forgotten. 

Several years later it was rediscovered in the NASA archives by DiPietro and 

Molenaar who first published the results of their analysis in 1982 (DiPietro

124 M. Carlotto 

and Molenaar, 1988). At about the same time the Face had attracted the attention 

of individuals in Austria (Hain, 1979) and in the former Soviet Union 

(Avinsky, 1984). DiPietro and Molenaar's work led to the formation of'the independent 

Mar(, invc\tigation group (Po~os, 1987). Subscy~~ent threads of'research 

involved O1l.eary ( 1990). Rrandenburg, DiPietro and Molenaar ( 199 1 ), 

Iloagland ( 1992). tloaglanci and Torun (Hoagland. 1992), and Garlotto 

(1992). An independent revicw of these research et'forts was recently performed 

by Mcllaniel ( 1994). 

?'he Hypothesis 

Simply stated, our hypothe\i\ is that the Face and other nearby objects in 

the Cydonia region of Marc may be artii'icial in origin. The objects under consideration 

are (~hown in Figures I and 2. These objects have been selected 

based on their shape, prcaence of internal detail, and sirililarity in six, shape, 

and orientation to other objects. Previously, four hypotheses have been put 

forth concerning these ot3.jects: 

1 . Cydonian Hypothesis (Rrandenburg et a/., 199 1) - Conditions necessary 

to \upport life on Mars cxisted long enough for an indigenous race 

of Martians to evolve and build the objects in question. 

2. Previous Technological Civilization Hypothesis (Hoagland, 1992) - 

The ob.]ects were constructed by a previous techt~ological civilization 

frorn Earth. 

Frg 1 Moia~c of ievernl Vihrtlg Orb~ter flame\ fro~n o~hrt 15 4howing the object\ tirlder consid- 

eratloll on (Ire \u~f;tce nt Mar\ The inlage cover\ an a]-ca roughly 70 x 40 krn 111 rife. 'The 

Face, ncar thc ccritet ol the picture, i\ 1oc;lted at ,rpprox~nately at 41" N lat~tude ;tnd 9.5' 

E lo~lgitucle

Evidence that Ob-jects on Mars are Artificial 125 

located Ltb~~~t 30 km \o~xtllweit ot the Face originally 

~dent~fled bq Hoagland Three oblectj ioiirp,l~able 111 ilze to the Fxe dnd a ~~urnber of 

51nallel nrountl-l~he object\ \hon11 ,rho\e (front 15/47?) ale con\~ciercd here 

Flg 2 'The C~ty 15 J collcclron ol lo~rn;lt~on\ 

3. Prior Coloni/atio~i H ypothe\is (Hoagland, 1 992; Carlotto and Stein, 

1990; Foster, 1972) - The objects were con\tructed by visitors from 

out.;idc {?if 

our ~ .jl$l sj xtcnr~. 

4. The Null I-lypothe\ir - A11 ol' the objects are 11atura1 occurring geologi- 

cal Sol-mationc, 

Recently Larnrnel- (1996) ha5 argued that the Cydoniarl Hypothesis is not 

consistent with what we currently know about Mars' geological and climatic 

history. We believe that there is insufficient information at this time to differentiate 

between the second and third hypotheses. However ecti~~iates of extraterrestrial 

(ET) visitation in our solar system (Foster, 1972) derived from a 

variation of tlie 1-hake Equation used to justify tlae search for extraterrestrial


intelligence (SETI) by radio does suggest that ETs may have visited our solar 

system in the last ten million years. If ETs did construct large artificial struc- 

tures on Mars over this period (for whatever purpose) it is likely that they have 

been fairly well preserved by the Martian environment and are detectable by 

remote sensing (Foster, 1972; Carlotto and Stein, 1990). This in itself provides 

a plausible justification for our hypothesis. The null hypothesis that none of 

the objects are artificial represents the view of many in the planetary science 

community (e.g., Sagan, 1996). 

Geological Context 

The objects under consideration are located in the northern portion of Cydo- 

nia Mensae bordering Acidalia Planitia and the northern plains. It is a region 

containing a variety of flat-topped prominences with cliff-like walls (mesas) 

and conical hills or knobs. The origin of the landforms in Cydonia has been at- 

tributed to erosion processes that have removed an overlying cratered plateau 

material, leaving a knobby terrain that is a combination of exhumed remnants 

of cratered terrain, igneous intrusives or cratered plateau material (Guest and 

Butterworth, 1977). This explanation has simply been extended to explain the 

Face and other formations under investigation as by-products of differential 

erosion (McDaniel, 1994). However it is not universally accepted that erosion 

has played as great a role in shaping the northern plains as suggested above. 

The topography of Mars is asymmetric with the majority of the southern 

hemisphere rising above the reference datum and the northern hemisphere 

falling below it. The southern hemisphere is more heavily cratered and thus 

thought to be older than the northern plains. One explanation for this differ- 

ence is the northern hemisphere was lowered by an erosion process that re- 

moved 2-3 km of older cratered material. But this raises the question as to 

where the material has been transported (Cattermole, 1992). McGi11 (1989) 

used crater dimensional equations to conclude that only a slight to modest ero- 

sion of the northern lowland plains could have occurred since Middle Noachi- 

an times (-3.85-4.4 billion years ago) and that at best, 200 meters of material 

may have been stripped off the plains. (We note that many of the features 

under investigation are greater than 200 meters in height.) It is more likely that 

the lowering of the northern plains was due to an internal mechanism that af- 

fected the crust from below (Cattermole, 1992). 

But assume that all of the objects under study were formed by differential 

erosion. If so, the surrounding terrain should be eroded in a uniform fashion. 

Erjavec and Nicks (1 997) analyzed crater counts over a 100,000 sq. km region 

in Cydonia consisting of knobby and cratered terrains (Guest and Butterworth, 

1977). They found that although the number of larger impacts (> 1 km) was 

similar, there was a significant difference (at least 2 to 1) in the number of 

small impacts (< 1 km) between the cratered and knobby terrains. The approx- 

imate line of demarcation between these two regions splits the area of interest

Evidence that Objects on Mars are Artificial 127 

(Figure 3). Objects in the City and the D&M pyramid lie in the knobby terrain 

while the Face, Tholus, and Cliff lie in the cratered terrain. 

The difference in cratering statistics for the two terrains implies that more 

than one process has been at work to shape laardforms in this part of Mars. 

Baker et al. ( 199 1 ) suggest that a great ocean covering the northern plains of 

Mars periodically forms ancl dissipates. Erjavec and Nicks ( 1997) have found 

evidence of the erosion and deposition of' a large standing body of water on 

certain landforms in Cytionia. Although it is possible that the objects under 

consideration are natural geological li,rnlatiorr\, that differential erosion in it- 

self was responsible for their Sol-mation secrns unlikely. 

Eviderrcc in Support of Artificiality 

Without a doubt, the humanoid face is a powerful and evocative symbol. 

The formation known as the Face possesses all of the salient features of a hu- 

manoid face: head, eyes, ridge-like noise, and mouth. This fact has been veri- 

fied by two images taken (Figure 4) at slightly different sun angles (35A72 and 

70A13). In 35A72 the sun angle is only 10 degrees above the horizon and so 

most of the right side of the Face is in shadow. But in 70A13 the sun is 15 de- 

grees higher and reveals more of the Face's right side. Instead of an ordinary 

rock formation, this second image not only confirms the facial features first 

seen in 35A72, but also reveals the overall symmetry of the head, the 

Fig. 3. Boundary between knobby terrain (left) and cratered terraln (r~ght). Face and City at 

top middle.

M. Carlotto 

Fig. 4. Ilivo image\ uf the Face tro~n 35A72 (left) dnii 70A 13 (nght). 

extension of the mouth, and a matching eye on the right side - features not 

visible in 351472 because they were in shadow (DiPietro and Molenaar 1988). 

Facial proportion,^ 

The artist uses certain proportions and relationships between facial features 

when constructing the human face. Measurements between the eyes, nose, 

mouth, chin, and crown of the head fall within conventional humanoid propor- 

tions (Hoagland, 1992). Sagan ( 1985) ha\ pointed out the hunian tendency to 

see faces in nature, i.e., random features which the brain organizes into facial 

forms. Although it is possible for natural rock formations to look like a face, 

they typically do not possess all of the necessary features and are usually not 

correctly proportioned (Figure 5). 

I Architectural Synzrnetr?; of Face 

The platform on which the Face is placed exhibi 1s a high degree of architec- 

tural symmetry. Were the Face not present, one would still see in its supporting 

I platform four sets of parallel lines circumscribing four sloped areas of equal 

size. Having these four equally proportioned sides at right angles to each other 

creates a highly symmetrical geometric rectangle (Hoagland, 1992). It has 

been noted that the symmetry is not perfect, particularly on the right shadowed 

side of the Face (Figure 6). If the Face is an artificial object constructed long 

ago, a certain amount of degradation can be expected and does not necessarily 

rule out the possibility that the object was originally much more symmetrical


Fig. 5. Cr'itet wrrh i~lterri~il lc,iturcs ~eiernblirig 'i ' Slnllcy bdce" u ~cl to illustr,ite hulrian tendency 

to \ee lace\ in ndture 

Suhtlc Dt't~cils in 

In acidition to its gross hurnitnoid features, the Face contains ;l rrumber of 

si~btle details or embellishments (Figure 7). They include a dark cavity within 

the eye socket that looks like an eyeball (DiPietro and Molenaar, 1988). broad 

stripes across the face (Hoagland, 1992), thin lines that intersect above the 

eyes, and fine structure in the mouth that appear as teeth (Carlotto, 1988). 

These features are visible in both images and so it is very unlikely that they are 

due to noise in the imagery or artifacts of irnage prcrces\ing. It is also noted that 

if erosion processes are 1.esponsible for the Face they would also have to explain 

these subtle details -- details that one woulci expect to habe been ohliterated 

by erosio~~ over time. 

Fig. 6, 'I'hree highest rc\olutron view\ ot the Face froin 35A72 (lelt), 70AI3 (middlcr, 'ind 

561,425 (right) at 47 1 43 .3, arld 162 7 n~cters/prxel The appiiient iynlrnetry ol the Face 

is dl\toltecl \ornewhat in 35A72 and 70A 13 slnce it I\ illum~nated from ~lrghtlj above 1ett. 

A better ~nd~cation of rtj overall \hape 15 Seen in 56lA25 where the illu~n~~iat~on is almo\t 

perpendrcular to the axis of symmetry.


Fig. 7. Subtle details in Face. Contrast enhanced image left showing broad stripes (black arrows) 

and crossed lines (white arrows). Magnified image on right shows eyeball (white arrow) 

and "teeth" (black arrows). 

Persistence of Facial Features 

The visual impression of a face persists over a wide range of sun angles and 

viewing geometry. Such is not the case for naturally occurring rock formations 

that look like faces when viewed in profile (Carlotto, 1992). An image pro- 

cessing technique known as shape from shading was used to determine the 

three dimensional structure of the Face from its image (Carlotto, 1988). Two 

irnages (35A72 and 70A 13) were used to check the accuracy of the recon- 

structed surface by using the surface computed from one image to predict what 

the other should look like, and vice versa (O'Leary, 1990). Computer graphics 

techniques were then used to predict how the surface would appear under dif- 

ferent lighting conditions and from other perspectives. Results of this analysis 

showed that the impression of facial features is not a transient phenomena - 

that facial features seen in the image are also present in the underlying topog- 

raphy and produce the visual impression of a face over a wide range of illumi- 

nation conditions and perspectives (Figure 8). 

Fractal Analysis I$' Fuckr 

By using fractals to model images, areas that are least natural can be identi- 

fied according to how well they fit a fractal model (Stein, 1987). The Face was 

found to be the least fractal object in Viking frame 35A72 and was also highly 

anomalous in frame 70A13 (Figure 9). Results of fractal analysis indicate that 

the Face is the least natural object over an area of about 15,000 square kilome- 

ters (Carlotto and Stein, 1990). An analysis of the fractal technique in detect- 

ing man-made objects in high resolution terrestrial satellite imagery is exam-


Fig. 8. Face rendered under simulated summer lighting conditions (left) and from different per- 

spectives (right). 

ined in Appendix A for the purpose of estimating the weight of the evidence 

for artificiality provided by the technique. 

Similurity Betw~en Face and Rounded Fonnation in City 

The Face and a rounded formation in the City are approximately the same in 

size, overall shape, and orientation (Figure 10). Both objects also seem to be 

emplaced on a similar kind of platform. The resemblance between the two sug- 

gests the possibility that if the Face is artificial it could have been carved from 

a similar pre-existing landform. 

Geometrical Shape of the Fortras 

The Fortress is a geometrically shaped object in the northeastern portion of 

the City, closest to the Face. The straight sides and sharp angles of the Fort 

(Figure 1 I) are in stark contrast to the sculpted appearance of the Face. Four 

straight sides or walls are visible in the two available images (70Al 1 and 

35A72) of this object. These walls enclose an inner space; i.e., an area that is 

lower in height than the surrounding walls. 

Subtle 1)etail iuz Fortre,ss 

Like the Face, the Fortress also contains subtle details that are at or slightly 

below the resolution of the imagery. In particular, two of the walls appear to 

contain regularly spaced marks or indentations. These features are visible in 

both images and thus must be real surface features (Figure 1 1). As in the Face 

one would not expect to find the subtle details seen in the Fortress if it was a 

naturally occurring formation.

lotto 

Fig 9 Fract'il cincilysrs re\ults tor Face and surroundrng 'ire;i 35,472 and corresponding fractal 

model-f~t Image (top) 70,413 ant1 corre\pondrng lra~tal model-t~t rrnage (bottom). 

Rrrght areas ~n rnoclel-trt irnage ~ndrcate where 5tlucture of the Image ~nten\rty surface 

(wh~ch I\ related to the s11'1pe ot the uncterly~ng terra~n) doe\ not frt a fractal model and 

thus 14 lenst natural by the fractal crrterron 

The Fortress and an adjacent pyramidal object are similar in size, overall 

shape, anci orientation (Figure 12). This similarity suggests the possibility that 

FIE 10. Sequence fading from rounded formation (left) to the Face (r~ght) These itnages from 

15A72 have not been rotated or scaled in \ize


1:1g 1 I Tcco i~n~tgci ol ltrrtgecc, fro111 1SA72 (icft) and 70A I 1 (right) 

if the Fortress is artif'icial, it rnay have been an enclosed pyramidal structure 

that collapsed inward. This also suggests the possibility that the pyramid next 

to the Fort rnay be hollow. 

Similar Orientation c!J'Folfr~.c.s, FLI~'~, Rouna'ed Fornmtion and Pyramid in City 

The Fortress, Face, rounded formation and pyramid in City, though different 

in shape, are similar ill si~e and orientation (Figure 13). The orientations 

of the best defined edge on each of these objects are as follows: left edge of 

Face, 120.9"; right edge of Fortress, 124.5": left edge of pyramid in City, 

120.8"; left edge of rounded formation in City, 120.8. Angles are measured 

counter-clockwise from east (positive x direction) in images projected to a 

Mercator coordinate system (Malin, 1996). Each of the above values is the average 

of three separate measurements. The average value (standard deviation) 

for the fbur objects is 12 1.8" ( 1.6"). 

Smclll Mound-Like 0bj~c.t~~ in City Arr~lng~d it2 Rec'tilinrur Grid 

Within the City, a group of small mound-like objects appears to be arrayed 

in a grid-like pattern (Figure 2). Hoagland first discovered these objects in the 

Fig. 12. Sequence der~ved from coregistered Image\ froin 70A 1 I and fade from pyramid (left) to 

Fortre\\ (r~ght). The Image\ hake not been rotated or \caled in hizc.

I34 M. Carlotto 

Fig. I I. Similarity in orientation and icale of four c7bjccti (fmm 35A72). Ai in previous figures, 

the\e image9 have not heen rotated or-

Evidence that Objects on Mars are Artificial 

Ftg. 14 I)&M pyr'rnlrd tlr 70A 13 wdrped to a Mercalor projection. 

Fortress, the Tholus contains fine scale details. These details which are clearly 

visible in three images (70A 13, 70A 15, and 35A74) include two grooves that 

wind half-way up the feature. One grove appears to lead into an opening in the 

side ol'the mound (Figure 15). 

The Cliff is an elongated mesa topped by a sharp ridge-like feature running 

down its length (Figure 16). It is similarly oriented and roughly in line with the 

Face, Fortress, adjacent pyramid and rounded fornlation in the City. The Cliff 

is located next to a "Yuty-type" crater, clearly of impact origin. Although it is 

located within the crater's surrounding e-jecta blanket, there is no evidence of 

debris flow over or around the Cliff. Also tliere does not appear to be any evidence 

of a pre-existing surface removed by differential erosion (Erjavec and 

Nicks, 1997). One possible interpretation of lhcse observations is that the Cliff 

was formed (or constrt~ctcd) afler rhe ir~lpitcl CICCXITT~~ 

Interpretation 

No single piece of evidence has been found that conclusively proves that 

these objects on the surface of Mars are either natural or artificial. The archi- 

tectural design, facial proportions, and overall artistic impression suggested 

the possibility at the outset that the Face rilight be an articicial object (Pozos, 

1987). Subsequent tests of this hypothesis involving the enhancement of subtle 

detail in the Face, shape-from-shadinglsynthetic image generation to deter- 

mine if the Face is an optical illusionj and fractal analysis to assess its shape in 

a quantitative manner have all provided cross-confirming evidence that


support the original hypothesis. Other unusi~al objects have also been found 

nearby that appear to be related to one another. 

The previous section has s~~rnn~ari/ed nli1c1-i of the evidence offered to date 

in support of the hypothesis that certain objects on Mars are artificial ill origin. 

Not discussed in this paper are the \urnmcr wlsticc alignrnerrt (I-loagland, 

1992), or angular relationshipsselatcd to tetrahedral geometry discovered by 

Hoagland and Torun (McDaniel, 1994) since they are difficult at present to 

evaluate. The evidence is of the type that could be used in practice to detect a 

new archaeological site on earth uhing aerial or {atellite i111ager.y. ']The question 

that remains is to what extent can the evidence be asses\ed collectively and 

quantitatively'? 

Bayesian inference is one method of evaluating a set of t~ypotheses against a 

body of evidence (Sturrock, 1993). It involve\ ~r\inkz R:a;:tc- rhrrlrcl-ka tea Jbttr 

rnirie the posterlor probability fhr the hypothesis N given the evidence 

{E, 1%) 

where P[H] is the prior probability that the hypothesis is true. P(E, ... EN / H] 

is the probability that a given body crf evidence will be trbserved given the hypothesis 

is true, and P[E, ... EN] is a normali~ing constant. The likelihood ratio


where P[~H] is the prior probability that the hypothesis is false and 

P[E, EN.17H] is the probability that a given body of evidence will be 

observed given the hypothesis is false. 

H represents the hypothesis that the objects under consideration are artificial; 

,His the null hypothesis that they are natural. Taking into account only 

the prior belief, i.e., without examining any evidence at all, the probability 

that the hypothesis is true divided by the probability that it is false is called to 

the prior odds 

50-50 odds means that the hypothesis is equally likely to be true or false. An 

extraordinary claim, i.e., a "long shot", might correspond to odds of, say, one 

in a million. The likelihood ratio after the evidence has been taken into ac- 

count ( ost odds) is equal to the weight of the evidence times the prior odds, 

L = $/&,* 

Our goal is to determine the likelihood that the collection of features in 

question is artificial given a set of evidence. In order to do this we need to esti- 

mate the weight of the evidence. For one piece of evidence, the likelihood 

ratio is 

where is the weight of that piece of evidence. Unfortunately, most of the evi- 

dence presented in the previous section is qualitative in nature. For example, is 

difficult to try to quantify the probability that the Face is artificial given its 

symmetry, facial proportions, fine scale detail, etc. On the other hand it is pos- 

sible in principle to determine the weight of the evidence provided by fractal 

analysis (Carlotto and Stein, 1990). In terrestrial imagery, fractal analysis of 

man-made objects gives a higher fractal model-fit error than that of natural ob- 

jects. In other words the probability of observing a high value of the fractal 

model-fit will be greater for man-made objects than for natural objects. Pre- 

liminary analysis of terrestrial data give weights between 3 to 5 for fractal 

analysis (Appendix A). 

Ultimately we want to determine the likelihood ratio that the objects are ar- 

tificial given all of the evidence presented in the previous section. To obtain a 

rough estimate for the purpose of the present discussion assume that: 

1. The sources of evidence are independent,

I 


2. The weight of the evidence for fractal analysis obtained over terrestrial 

study areas can be extended to Mars, and 

3. This value is representative of the weight of the other sources. 

The first assumption is reasonable since different methods have been used 

to examine different aspects of this collection of features and no piece evi- 

dence is dependent on another. If we assume that the Face is artificial, it turns 

out that the performance of the fractal technique in differentiating between the 

Face and the surrounding background on Mars is comparable to its perfor- 

mance on Earth in differentiating between man-made objects and natural ter- 

rain (Appendix A). This provides some justification for the second assump- 

tion. The third assumption is made in lieu of specific data concerning the 

weight of other sources of evidence at this time. 

The first assumption allows us to write Equation (2) as a product of N terms: 

If we make the simplifying assumption that weights are the same (all equal 

to W) then the post odds increases exponentially as the number of sources in- 

creases. 

The implication of this is that for a large number of sources, the weight of each 

individual piece of evidence does not have to be very large for the total evi- 

dence to be large (Figure 17). Sixteen pieces of evidence were presented in the 

previous section. Thus for N = 14, 3 < W c 5, and a prior odds of one in a mil- 

lion, likelihoods between 43 to l and 152,600 to l in favor of our hypothesis 

are obtained in Figure 18. 

Discussion 

It has been said that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence 

(Sagan, 1985). No single piece of evidence has been found that conclusively 

proves that these objects on the surface of Mars are either natural or artificial 

(i.e., there is no "smoking gun"). But as noted by Sturrock (1994) weak evidence 

from multiple independent sources will do just as well. We have demonstrated 

that it is the quantity and diversity of all of the evidence, rather than 

any one piece, that makes the evidence in support of our hypothesis so strong. 

The alternative hypothesis is, of course, that the Face and other nearby objects 

are simply naturally-occurring geological formations. However no specific 

geological mechanism(s) have to date been put forth that are capable of ex-


1 E-06 

1 E-07 

H 0 

2 2 

Number of Sources 

Fig. 17. Post-odds increases dramatically as the number of sources increases for weights greater 

than one. 

Number of Sources 

Figure 18. Post odds for N= 16 sources with individual source likelihood ratio IS between 3 and 5.


plaining the diversity of forms, the patterns of organization, and the subtlety in 

design exhibited by this collection of objects. 

A similar argument has been recently used to justify the claim that a mete- 

orite thought to be from Mars may contain fossilized micro-organisms 

(McKay et al., 1996). These researchers cite only five pieces of evidence to 

support their claim and state that "although there are alternative explanations 

for each of these phenomena taken individually, when they are considered col- 

lectively, particularly in view of their spatial association, we conclude that 

they are evidence for primitive life on early Mars." Surely a similar argument 

can be used here to justify another extraordinary claim - that there may be 

large artificial structures on the surface of Mars. A claim that is, in fact, sup- 

ported by considerably more evidence. 

The planetary science community's reluctance to even consider the possi- 

bility of artificial structures on Mars seems to be based on two premises: 

1. Liquid water was present for too short a period of time for indigenous 

life to evolve on Mars; thus a native intelligence could not have created 

these objects, and 

2. The possibility that they were built by a visiting intelligence (from earth 

or outside the solar system) is considered to be too remote to warrant se- 

rious investigation. 

Although current models do not favor the Cydonian Hypothesis (Branden- 

burg et al., 1991; Lammer, 1996) there is too little data to rule it out at this 

time. However the second premise is clearly not consistent with on-going 

SETI projects which assume that there are a sufficient number of technologi- 

cal civilizations in the galaxy to warrant such a search in the first place. To 

date, SETI has been almost exclusively a radio search program and has pro- 

duced no convincing evidence for ETs. Alternative SETI proposals have been 

put forth that involve a search for ET artifacts on planetary surfaces within our 

solar system (Foster, 1997; Carlotto and Stein, 1990). Although the same argu- 

ments which support radio search also justify a search for ET artifacts, these 

alternative SETI proposals have not received mainstream support. The reluc- 

tance to accept near earth SETI strategies (as well as the possibility of UFOs) 

is based on the widespread view in the space science community that few if 

any extraterrestrial intelligence is capable of traveling the great distances be- 

tween stars. Such a view strongly biases opinion against near-earth SETI pro- 

grams. This bias is so strong that it appears that very strong evidence is re- 

quired to even consider the question. 

This bias also seems to be compounded by the expectation that ET artifacts 

on planetary surfaces will be clearly recognizable. For example, in a study per- 

formed before the launch of Mariner 9, Sagan and Wallace (1971) concluded 

that a resolution of 50 meterslpixel or better is required to detect signs of intel- 

ligent activity (roads, dams, urban areas) from low earth orbit. Since Viking


it should have been able to detect similar patterns of activity on Mars. But the 

expected signs of activity mentioned in Sagan and Wallace's paper were those 

of an active planetary civilization (our own) and thus do not apply to Mars 

today. The study did not account for the collapse and deterioration of struc- 

tures that might have been constructed on Mars long ago. One estimate pro- 

vides for one ET visitation to our solar system every 10 million years (Foster, 

1972). If large structures were constructed tens of millions of years ago they 

have probably become significantly degraded by the Martian environment. 

The objects under investigation were imaged at resolutions slightly below 

50 meterslpixel. They do not resemble contemporary structures but appear to 

be sophisticated in design and layout. Is it possible that they are really quite 

old and have undergone deterioration over time? Perhaps the trained eye and 

experience of an archaeologist may be just as important, if not more important 

than that of the planetary scientist in this regard. However the specific ques- 

tion concerning the origin of these objects on Mars is one that can and must be 

answered through a dedicated effort to re-image these objects in the future. 

Appendix A: Analysis of Fractal Technique 

The model-fit error image ~ (i, j) produced by the fractal analysis technique 

described by Carlotto and Stein (1990) is a measure of how well an image fits a 

fractal model on a local basis. Natural terrain is self-similar over a range of 

scales and thus tends to give low fractal model-fit errors. Manmade objects 

tend not to be self-similar and thus give higher fractal model-fit errors. If the 

model-fit error over a region is greater than a given threshold (evidence occurs) 

the region is classified as artificial. If the model-fit error over a region is 

less than the threshold (evidence does not occur) the region is classified as natural. 

When ground truth data (training set) is available, one can estimate the conditional 

probability densities of the fractal model-fit error over regions known 

to contain artificial objects and natural terrain, P[E IH] and ~[&I~H]res~ectively. 

The threshold E* which satisfies 

is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the probability of misclassification 

over the training set (Ziemer and Tranter, 1976). Since the frequency of occurrence 

of manmade objects outside the training set is usually unknown, one 

typically assumes equal priors P[H] = P[~H]. The threshold E* which satisfies


is the point where the two conditional probability density curves cross. The re- 

sultant detection and false alarm probabilities are 

and the weight (4) 

In order to determine typical weight values for fractal analysis, a series of ex- 

periments were performed using de-classified national intelligence imagery 

containing a mix of manmade objects embedded in complex natural back- 

grounds. In these images the manmade objects are about the size (in pixels) of 

those on Mars and were imaged under similar lighting conditions. Three im- 

ages were analyzed. The first was over a U.S. military base, Ft. Drum in New 

York (Figure A-1). The image contained a variety of military hardware ar- 

rayed in an open area surrounded by trees. The fractal model fit was computed 

using 10 scales and a 21 by 21 pixel window (Carlotto and Stein, 1990). The 

conditional density curves intersect at E = 38 and give W = PJP, = 3.28. 

Two other images, one containing an SA-2 anti-aircraft site surrounded by 

brush and tropical vegetation (imaged in August 1962 near Havana, Cuba), 

the other containing a group of SCUD storage bunkers in the desert (imaged in 

February 1991 near Quebaysah, Iraq) were analyzed in the same way. The 

weights computed from these two images were 5.04 for Cuba, and 2.99 for 

Iraq. 

Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are a standard metric used 

to describe the performance of statistical detection techniques (Ziemer and 

Tranter, 1976). ROC curves plot the probability of detection versus the proba- 

bility of a false alarm as a function of the detection threshold. Figure A-2a 

shows the ROC curves computed for the U.S., Cuban, and Iraqi images. The 

same experiment was performed on the Viking images shown in Figure 9. We 

assumed that the Face was the only non-natural object in the portion of the im- 

ages shown. The ROC curves for 35A72 and 70A13 are plotted in Figure A-2b. 

The performance appears comparable, if not somewhat better, in the Viking 

images (possibly because the background in the Viking images is less complex 

than in the three terrestrial images). 

Based on the results of these experiments we conclude that:

Fig. A-l Image over U.S rnllitary base (top lett), tractal model-fit errol linage (top rtght), 

ground truth overlay (bottom left), and corlclitiorr~~l den5lty curve\ (bottom I rght) 

1, weights between 3 and 5 are reasonable for the fractal analysis tech- 

n i q tl e 

Falx Alarm Prohah~l~ly Falw R~~ISIII I-'roh;tl~l~tv 

Fig. A-2. ROC' curve\ for fractal technique tor three terrestrial \cene\ (left) and two Image\ 

contairling Face on Mar\ (right)


2. the similarity in performance curves suggests that the fractal technique 

can be extended and applied to Mars. 

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The Astrology of Time Mns: A Re-Analysis 

Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths' College, University of London, New Cross, 

London SE14 6NW United Kingdom 

GEOFFREY DEAN 

Analogic, Box 466, Subiaco 6008, Western Australia 

Abstract - Roberts and Greengrass (1994) tested the astrological claim that 

persons born close together in time are more alike than those born far apart. 

They collected a total of 128 subjects born on six dates spanning a period of 

thirty years. Each subject provided their time of birth and completed the 

short form EPQ. After comparing the interval between births with the differ- 

ence in EPQ scores the authors concluded that their data showed no strong 

support for astrology. However, they claimed that the proportion of close per- 

sonalities increased as the birth interval decreased, which would provide 

some support for astrology. We have re-analyzed their data and find that their 

results can be explained as an artifact of data division, sampling errors and 

age trends. A careful examination of correlations and serial correlations 

(which are more appropriate tests than the ones used by Roberts and Green- 

grass) confirmed the absence of astrological effects in their data. If anything, 

the results were in the wrong direction. A new finding not reported by 

Roberts and Greengrass was a very small and non-significant difference be- 

tween younger and older subjects, consistent with the effect of prior knowl- 

edge, which suggests that their sample may be slightly contaminated. We 

conclude that an astrological interpretation of their results is unwarranted. 

Keywords: astrology - time twins - post hoc data selection 

The Results of Roberts and Greengrass (1994) 

In their book, Roberts and Greengrass (1994) tested the astrological claim that 

"time twins" or persons born close together in time are more alike than those 

born far apart. This claim is of scientific interest for two reasons. First, it is a 

logical consequence of the fundamental astrological claim that people resem- 

ble their birth charts. Second, it promises to be decisive in astrological re- 

search because it avoids the problem of how the various factors in a birth chart 

should be interpreted and combined. Thus a failure to validate sun signs might 

be dismissed as a failure to address the correct interpretation or to properly 

allow for competing factors, but a failure to show that time twins are signifi- 

cantly alike is less easily dismissed. Unfortunately, the evidence for time twins 

'Now at the Department of Psychology, University of East London 

147

148 C. C. French et al. 

has hitherto been mostly anecdotal and therefore suspect, for example the fa- 

mous case of Samuel Hemmings and George 111 is actually fictitious (Dean, 

1994). Roberts and Greengrass's study is the first to submit time twins to sys- 

tematic controlled scrutiny. 

Roberts and Greengrass collected, via publicity on the BBC and in national 

newspapers, a total of 128 subjects born on six dates spanning a period of thir- 

ty years (see Table 1). Their mean sample size of 2 1 is roughly I % of the 2000 

people born every day in the U.K. Each subject provided their birth time and 

completed the short form Eysenck Personality Questionnaire or EPQ, which 

measures extraversion (E), psychoticism (P), neuroticism (N), and dissimula- 

tion (L), each on a 12-item scale (Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett, 1985). L is 

also related to social naivete. For all possible pairs of subjects the authors 

compared the interval between births with the difference between EPQ 

scores. According to astrology, the closer the births the closer the personali- 

ties and therefore the closer the EPQ scores. The authors (p. 45) concluded 

that their data showed no strong support for this idea. However, they claimed 

that the proportion of close personalities increased as the birth interval de- 

creased, which would provide some support for astrology. This claim was 

based not on the individual EPQ scores for each pair, but on a single aggregate 

measure that we will call the EPNL difference, defined as follows: 

EPNL difference = ~ (AE~ + AP~ + AN 2 + AL 2 ) 

where A is the difference between individual EPQ scores for each pair. For ex- 

ample, their main graph (p. 110) divides the 1400 pairs into four sub-samples 

and plots the percentage of pairs with close personalities, defined as pairs with 

an EPNL difference of less than three units. As the mean birth interval in- 

creases from 0.5 hour to 24.5 hours the proportion of close personalities de- 

creases from 4.1 % to 1.7% (see Table 2). The authors concluded (p. 1 1 1) that 

"the resembling effect is much more powerful for pairs who are born close to- 

gether than for pairs who merely share the same day," and that this result pro- 

vides support for astrology. 

TABLE 1 

Sample Size for Each Date, from Roberts and Greengrass (1994: 109) 

Birth Date Age in Years Sample Size Pairs 

- - 

9 Dec 1934 

21 Feb 1937 

14 Nov 1948 

18 Ju1 1950 

29 Aug 1958 

1 May 1964 

Total 128 1400

Astrology of Time Twins 149 

TABLE 2 

Percentage with EPNL Difference < 3 Units vs. Birth Interval* 

Mean birth interval (hours) 0.5 3.5 12.5 24.5 

% with EPNL differeence < 3 units 4.1 3.1 2.2** 1.7 

* From the graphed results of Roberts and Greengrass (1994: 110) 

**Professor Robersts kindly advised us that this value, plotted on their graph as 2.2, 

should be 2.5. 

Our Re-analysis 

Roberts and Greengrass (pp. 105- 109) give the birth times and EPQ scores 

for each of their 128 subjects. Our re-analysis of these data confirmed their 

conclusion that the difference in EPQ scores was generally unrelated to the 

birth interval, the mean correlation for the 1400 pairs being -0.001. As a pre- 

caution we repeated the analysis excluding 26 subjects (20% of the total) who 

had L scores of 8 or more, because high L scorers may tend to bias their re- 

sponses in the direction of social desirability. The results were essentially un- 

changed. 

However our re-analysis did not confirm the authors' second claim that the 

proportion of close personalities increased as the birth interval decreased. We 

were able to reproduce the trend shown in Table 2 when we divided the data 

their way, but this involved very uneven sample sizes for each data point (re- 

spectively 98,493,688, and 12 1 pairs), whereas to equalize the sampling vari- 

ances we should prefer them to be uniform. In other words, the trend could be 

an artifact of data division and sampling error. And indeed, when we selected 

the time intervals and EPNL differences to give uniform sample sizes, the 

trend was no longer evident (see Table 3). The results were no better when in- 

dividual EPQ scores were analyzed, as for E (see Table 4). 

Within Days vs. Between Days 

Roberts and Greengrass note that the mean EPNL difference measured 

within the six dates was smaller than the same difference measured between 

TABLE 3 

EPNL Difference vs. Birth Interval Using Uniform Sample Sizes 

Birth Interval (hours) EPNL Difference 

0-5.99 6-8.99 

Range Mean Pairs N % N % 

0.0-3.099 1.5 360 104 29 125 35 

3.1-7.499 5.2 341 104 31 119 35 

7.5-13.099 10.2 352 102 29 132 38 

13.1-30 17.8 347 103 30 114 33 

Does trend support claim? No Yes 

9-11.99 >= 12 

N % N % 

97 27 34 9 

84 25 34 10 

91 26 27 8 

99 29 31 9 

No Yes


TABLE 4 

E Difference vs. Birth Interval Using Uniform Sample Sizes 

Birth Interval (hours) Difference Between Extraversion Scores 

0- 2.99 3-5.99 6-8.99 > = 9 

Range Mean Pairs N % N % N % N % 

0.0-3.099 1.5 360 123 34 118 33 71 20 48 13 

3.1-7.499 5.2 34 1 117 34 100 29 77 23 47 14 

7.5-13.099 10.2 352 127 36 101 29 77 22 47 13 

13.1-30 17.8 347 129 37 98 28 78 22 42 12 

Does trend support claim? No Yes No Yes 

dates, which they interpret as showing further support for the astrological 

claim that persons born closer in time are more alike than those born further 

apart. Their results (p. 11 1) are as follows: 

Mean EPNL difference within dates 7.87 N= 1400 pairs 

Mean EPNL difference between dates 8.13 N = 1400 pairs drawn at random 

When we repeated the same comparison but using all possible pairs between 

dates, for which N = 6728 pairs, our results confirmed the above observation. 

The difference within dates was generally smaller than between dates, often 

very significantly smaller (see Table 5). However, EPQ scores generally 

change slightly with increasing age (ENP downwards and L upwards), so the 

difference in scores is bound to increase with increasing age gap, other things 

being equal. Despite the small sample sizes for each age, such trends occur in 

the data precisely as predicted (see Table 6, last column), which suggests that 

Roberts and Greengrass's astrological interpretation of the results is unwar- 

ranted. 

TABLE 5 

Mean Difference Between EPQ Scores Measured Within Dates and Between Dates 

Difference Difference 

Within Dates Between Dates 

Measure Mean SD Mean SD t P 

E 4.364 3.151 4.505 3.359 1.444 .15 

P 1.833 1.405 1.793 1.455 0.941 .35 

N 3.828 2.766 4.032 3.029 2.326 .02 

L 2.948 2.118 3.209 2.454 3.703 .0002 

EN 6.437 3.136 6.688 3.504 2.481 .01 

EPNL 7.823 2.929 8.135 3.533 3.091 .002 

Pairs 1400 6728 df=8126 

The last two columns indicate the significance (two-tailed) of the difference between means 

using a t-test.

Astrology of Time Twins 

TABLE 6 

Mean EPQ Scores vs. Age of Subjects 

Measure Age in Years of Older Subjects Age in Years of Younger Subjects 

Sample Size 16 2 1 33 17 2 3 18 

The last column shows the correlation between mean EPQ score and age. 

Serial Correlation 

Roberts and Greengrass relate the supposed astrological connections to 

planets passing through Gauquelin key sectors (areas of the sky just above the 

eastern horizon and just past the culminating point), which passage takes on 

average about two hours per planet. Therefore, as the day progresses, one two- 

hour period might tend towards E+, the next towards E-, and so on. Two hours 

is longer than the mean birth interval between adjacent subjects of 1.2 hours 

for 122 pairs, i.e., excluding pairs involving different dates. For 104 pairs 

(85%) the birth interval was two hours or less, and for 79 pairs (65%) it was 

one hour or less, which means that adjacent subjects would tend to share the 

same planetary connection. Consequently, if the subjects for each date are 

taken in order of birth, the E score of one should tend to be related to that of the 

next. In other words, the serial correlation should be positive - a simple test 

that does not require dividing the sample, but which Roberts and Greengrass 

neglect to apply. In fact the serial correlations for the four EPQ scores for each 

of the six dates show no such tendency (see Table 7). In terms of significance 

level, the two most significant results arep= .07 andp= .08, which among 4 x 6 

= 24 results is the number expected by chance. In terms of direction, there is a 

very slight preponderance of positive r values over negative r values (13 vs. 

1 l), but the preponderance is reversed as the maximum birth interval is pro- 

gressively reduced to one hour, which is contrary to what astrology would pre- 

dic t. 

For completeness Table 7 also shows the aggregate serial correlation ob- 

tained by treating all dates combined as a single sample, excluding of course 

those pairs involving different dates. The larger sample size increases the sen- 

sitivity, but the results are less easily interpreted because the assumption that 

all dates are from the same population may not hold. However, as they stand, 

the aggregate correlations are almost exactly at chance level. Their direction 

tends to agree with that of the mean correlations, otherwise some differences 

are to be expected due to sampling fluctuations. 

As a control, the samples for each date were randomized by redistributing

1 152 C. C. French et al. 

TABLE 7 

Serial Correlations for EPQ Scores When Subjects Are in Birth Order 

Sample Supportive?* Min 

Age Size E P N L Mean Pairs Yes No p** 

Mean -.092 .050 .014 -.I50 -.045 20 13 11 .53 

Aggregate ,030 .074 .046 -.014 .034 122 .42 

Same but maximum birth interval = 2 hours 

Mean -.I08 .040 .033 -.I92 -.057 17 12 12 .46 

Aggregate ,011 ,083 .043 -.031 .027 104 .40 

Same but maximum birth interval = 1 hour 

Mean -.I35 -.090 -.060 -.I43 -.lo7 13 9 15 .64 

Aggregate -.015 -.076 -.053 -.024 -.030 79 .5 1 

*Serial correlation is supportive of astrology if positive. 

**Two-tailedp of largest serial correlation (ignoring sign), df = pairs-2. 

Aggregate = all subjects combined into a single sample, see text. 

the birth times and EPQ scores at random within each date. The mean serial 

correlation for 10,000 replications was -0.053 with a mean SD of 0.21 9, in 

good agreement with the expected values of approximately -1/(N-1) and 

1/(~+1)"~ respectively, where N = sample size, here 21. When the mean SDs 

were used to calculate p levels for the means in Table 7, the results were in 

good agreement with thep levels shown in Table 7. 

Contamination by Prior Knowledge of Astrology 

Interestingly, when the sample was divided into older and younger subjects, 

the corresponding Pearson r correlations between the difference in EPQ scores 

and birth interval were consistently positive and negative respectively, even 

though the difference was extremely small. When the sample was randomized 

by redistributing the birth times and EPQ scores at random within each date, 

the mean Pearson r for 10,000 replications was zero, as expected, and the dif- 

ference disappeared (see Table 8). None of the observed Pearson r values in 

Table 8 differ from zero by more than 1.15 of their respective standard devia- 

tions (p= .25), so none are even marginally significant. Nevertheless the dif- 

ference in direction seems too consistent to be easily explained by chance. In- 

deed, the mean correlations for each of the six dates show a clear tendency to

Astrology of Time Twins 

TABLE 8 

Pearson r Correlations Between Difference in EPQ Scores and Birth Times 

Subjects E P N L EN EPNL Mean p** Pairs 

70 older Subs. Observed -.000 -.019 -.058 -.017 -.027 -.029 -.025 .46 858 

(N= 16+21+33) Random* -.000 .001 .001 -.000 .000 .000 ,000 858 

SD .045 .056 ,052 ,051 ,049 .051 .051 

58 younger Subs. Observed .047 .019 ,047 .003 .057 .068 .040 .35 542 

(N=17+23+18) Random* -.000 -.000 -.000 .000 -.000 -.000 -.000 542 

SD .055 ,056 ,058 .059 .059 ,060 .058 

*Pearson r after EPQ scores and birthtimes were redistributed at random within each date, mean of 10,000 

replications. Mean SD for 1400 pairs = 0.038. 

**p significance level (two-tailed) of the mean correlation in the previous column, df = pairs -2. 

TABLE 9 

Pearson r Correlations Between Difference in EPQ Scores and Birth Interval for Each Age Group 

Older Subjects Younger Subjects 

Age 5 9 56 45 43 35 29 

Mean r -.090 -.029 -.009 .022 -.026 .I77 

Pairs 120 2 10 528 136 253 153 

Each mean r is the mean of the r values for E, P, N, L, EN, and EPNL. 

relation between mean r and age being -.79, df=4, p= .06, almost significant 

despite the small df. 

This result might be explained by prior knowledge of astrology. Given that 

the subjects were recruited in the name of astrology and were required to know 

their birth time, and that birth charts and interpretations are readily available, 

it seems likely that some of them would have known their own birth chart, 

which knowledge could have biased their EPQ scores in the direction of in- 

creased similarity. In this case the results are consistent with a decrease in bias 

as age increases, as would apply if disinterest in astrology increased with age. 

This is not implausible, for disinterest in astrology would logically increase as 

family commitments or other interests take over. Of course the opposite case 

could also be argued, namely that older persons would have had more time to 

study astrology and become more knowledgeable, but this would overlook the 

much lower availability of personal birth charts in their youth. What matters 

here is not interest in astrology but actual familiarity with their personal birth 

chart. 

In a crude simulation of such prior knowledge effects, we found that the cor- 

relation between the difference in say E scores and birth interval was shifted 

by typically 0.02 when all the E scores in a four-hour window (involving about 

20% of the total sample) were increased or decreased by one point. Further- 

more, the correlation between E score and sun sign observed in tests of sun- 

sign prior knowledge is typically around 0.10. Both are compatible with the


correlations observed in Table 9, so it seems reasonable to conclude that the 

sample may be slightly contaminated by prior knowledge. 

Analysis by Gauquelin Sector 

Roberts and Greengrass claim that the planetary positions in Gauquelin sec- 

tors for the top 10% of EPQ scores match the Gauquelin findings. But 10% 

corresponds to a sample of only 12 subjects, which in terms of statistical power 

is so weak that it requires a correlation above 0.7 before it can be detected in 

four out of five tests at a significance level of p= 0.05. If a correlation of say 

0.8 genuinely existed for 12 subjects, progressively decreasing to 0.0 in the re- 

maining 116, the overall r should have reached the detection limit (r= 0.25) of 

the previous serial correlation tests. But the observed serial r did not reach 

even 0.05. 

Furthermore, of the sixteen possible combinations (4 planets x 4 EPQ 

scores), Roberts and Greengrass selected their six positive results by inspec- 

tion, so the role of random fluctuations would seem to be decisive, which point 

they recognize (p. 1 12). They attempted to overcome this problem by compar- 

ing the pooled distribution for their six positive results with the pooled distrib- 

ution for the bottom 10% of EPQ scores, obtained by "the same procedure" (p. 

112) and therefore presumably also involving selection by inspection, which 

revealed a difference in accord with the Gauquelin findings. Unfortunately, 

Roberts and Greengrass do not provide the birthplaces required to calculate ac- 

curate sector positions, so we were unable to check their claim. 

However, we have seen how the Gauquelin model predicts that, as the day 

progresses, one two-hour period might tend towards E+, the next towards E-, 

and so on. We can therefore plot the EPQ scores against birth time to see if the 

ups and downs coincide with the presence of relevant planets in key sectors. 

This avoids the problem of selection bias that arises whenever results are se- 

lected after the event. We made a provisional attempt using a fixed birthplace 

centered on the UK, but the results showed no obvious tendency to support the 

Gauquelin model. This interesting test deserves to be repeated using the actual 

birthplaces. 

Non-EPQ Variables 

We were necessarily unable to check variables other than EPQ scores, but 

the Roberts and Greengrass findings (which are generally negative) are inter- 

esting. They gave their subjects further questionnaires, and interviewed and 

photographed the closest 18 pairs, all born one hour apart or less, to assess 

similarities. They concluded that there were no clear resemblances in appear- 

ance, in handwriting, in names, in interests, in occupation, or in the events in 

their lives. What similarities existed could be explained as coincidences. How- 

ever the most compelling similarities existed in the areas of occupation and in- 

terests, which they noted was in accord with the Gauquelin findings. The au-

Astrology of Time Twins 155 

thors conclude that their overall results provide no firm support for traditional 

astrology but "some support for the new astrology" (p. 78), i.e., the astrology 

according to Michel Gauquelin. Curiously, the authors' Appendix 2 is devoted 

to a chart interpretation based on factors previously dismissed as "a litany of 

failure" (p. 11). 

Our Conclusion 

Our re-analysis of the data of Roberts and Greengrass found no support for 

their claim that some astrological effects are discernible in their sample of 128 

time twins. Instead their claimed effects can be explained by data division arti- 

facts, misinterpretation of age trends, and misinterpretation of sampling er- 

rors, any small residual effects being explained by prior knowledge. Our con- 

clusion is that an astrological interpretation of their results is unwarranted. 

References 

Dean, G. (1994). Was there ever a Samuel Hemmings? Correlation, 13,2, 17. 

Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1985). A revised version of the psychoticism 

scale. Personality and Individual DifSerences, 6,21. 

Roberts, P., & Greengrass, H. (1994). The Astrology of Time Twins. Edinburgh: Pentland Press.



Commentary on French et al. 

PETER ROBERTS 

Lark Cottage, Rack Hill, Chalford, Glos GM 8LA, U.K. 

French et al. have taken much trouble to prove a point which has already been 

admitted in The Astrology of Time Twins i.e. that for the generality of pairs in 

the data there is no clear correlation between birth time separation and person- 

ality resemblance. The possible alternative hypotheses were stated on p. 44 : 

1. All those who are born at a particular time share in the 'qualities of that 

moment of time' and will therefore tend towards a higher resemblance to one 

another than any of them will towards someone born at a different time. 

2. Among those born at a particular time will be a few whose innate charac- 

teristics correspond closely to the 'planetary indicators' at that time and place. 

The first of these hypotheses was dismissed on p. 45 after showing that the 

average EPNL separation over all pairs hardly changed as groups with birth 

time intervals of 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4 hours were selected. French et al. have 

used an alternative technique (serial correlation) to demonstrate the same 

point. (They have set up their straw man and then firmly knocked him down). 

However, the second hypothesis is of interest -even though it is more diffi- 

cult to test. It is not a novel hypothesis; it was offered, with a variety of sup- 

porting evidence in The Message of Astrology published in 1990. (French et 

al. appear to be unaware of it.) 

Given that a minority of individuals do have personality traits correspond- 

ing to planetary indicators, then it is necessary to examine pairs whose EPNL 

separation is quite small (referred to in the text as 'close resemblers'). Of all 

pairs born within an hour, the proportion of close resemblers is substantially 

higher than the proportion of such close resemblers found among pairs born 

with a higher birth time separation. Because the number of such pairs in- 

volved is quite small, it is necessary to devise the most effective tool practica- 

ble. On p. l 10 are shown the separate trends for three groups of closely resem- 

bling pairs (EPNLc3, between 3 and 4 and between 4 and 5. 

The percent of close resemblers is a function of both the birth time separa- 

tion and of the EPNL distance interval. Thus, multiple regression is appropri- 

ate. When the 10 data points shown on p. 1 10 were subjected to regression 

analysis, the regression equation found was:

P. Roberts 

TABLE 1 

Predictor Coefficient St. Dev. t-ratio 

Constant 1.3758 0.6022 2.28 

x -0.1 1284 0.025 17 -4.48 

Y 1.7627 0.1789 9.86 

For 7 Degrees of Freedom: 

P t-ratio 

1% 3.499 

0.1% 5.405 

where z = proportion of close resemblers (%) 

x = Birth time separation (hours) 

y = personality difference (EPNL distance) 

To test for significance the t-ratio is needed. 

The value of 4.48 for the x coefficient t-ratio lies between that for the p-val- 

ues of 1% and 0.1%. Hence the comment on p. 11 1 that "...the statistical sig- 

nificance ... is about 300 to 1 against its occurring by chance." 

This analysis was not considered appropriate for inclusion in the book, be- 

cause the book was intended primarily for an essentially lay readership. 

French et al. state that the finding of a correlation between birth time sepa- 

ration and personality resemblance derives from selection and sampling error. 

It is true that uneven intervals have been used in the analysis but this was ne- 

cessitated by the drastic fall-off in numbers of pairs at high birth time separa- 

tion. (In a 24 hour period, only a small proportion of all birth pairs will be sep- 

arated by more than, say, 20 hours). Despite the undesirability of uneven 

intervals, it is very unlikely that the level of significance noted has occurred 

fortuitously. 

The points made by French et al. concerning the tests which were attempted 

to find any association between diurnal positions of planets and personality, 

are readily admitted. Indeed, the reservations necessary when considering 

these findings were indicated clearly in the book. However, this was a piece of 

exploratory research rather than a specific test - and the results, even though 

only suggestive are of great interest. First, the findings accord quite well with 

Gauquelin's research on the association of personality traits with diurnal posi- 

tions of the planets in the natal chart. Secondly, the findings suggest that, 

given personality tests more closely geared to 'planetary personality profiles', 

the results of such experiments could well be much more impressive. As a di- 

rect result of these time-twin findings, the Astro-Questionnaire Research 

Group in the U.K. devised experiments based on 'planetary characteristics'

Reply to Roberts 159 

(rather than traditional psychological vectors) and showed a very similar result 

to that found for the time-twin subjects. 

The study of time twins carried out for The Astrology of Time Twins was not 

regarded as conclusive. In chapter 6 the authors are suitably humble about the 

importance of their findings, given that it is based on a quite small sample of 

128 individuals. It was suggested that for any further progress it will be neces- 

sary for the experiment to be repeated, preferably with a larger sample. 

Reply to Roberts 

We thank Professor Roberts for his rejoinder. But it provides no convincing ar- 

gument against our conclusion, namely that an astrological interpretation of 

his results is unwarranted. That is, we agree with Roberts that his data contain 

measurable effects, but we disagree that astrology is needed to explain them. 

To the specific points raised by Professor Roberts's rejoinder we reply as fol- 

lows: 

1. We take much trouble to prove a point already conceded. But we devoted 

only one short paragraph under "Our Re-analysis" to this. 

2. Hypothesis 2 says that, of those born at a particular time, a few will have the 

personality predicted by planetary indicators. But this is no different from the 

null hypothesis, which says hits will happen by chance anyway, so the hypoth- 

esis is meaningless unless it predicts how many. Nevertheless to test it Roberts 

says "it is necessary to examine pairs whose EPNL separation is quite small." 

That is, given people born with the same planetary indicators, we cannot ex- 

amine personality vs. planets unless we select those who are alike in personal- 

ity to start with, otherwise we have nothing definite to examine. Fair enough. 

But the test described by Roberts does not look at personality vs. planets, it 

looks at whether the proportion of "alikes" varies with the interval between 

births. 

3. The regression equation found was: percent pairs with EPNL diflerence


the prediction that, as the EPNL difference increases, the percent of differ- 

ences

Reply to Roberts 161 

been arcsine transformed to improve normality before being regressed, but in 

this case it made no appreciable difference.) The factors 0.042 and 0.23 were 

non-significant (by t test p = 0.47 and 0.66, df = 27), as was the multiple corre- 

lation coefficient R of 0.144, or 0.07 1 after correction for shrinkage (p = 0.7 1). 

Finally, in keeping with its nonsignificance, the equation makes little sense, 

see point (2) above, but less markedly than in Roberts's case. The above results 

support our conclusion that Roberts's findings are an artifact of data division 

and sampling error. 

6. Our serial correlation test involves a straw man. But our test was aimed at 

the Gauquelin effect (described next), which Roberts says is in accord with his 

findings. How can this be a straw man? 

7. Gauquelin found an association between personality traits and planets in 

Gauquelin sectors. But he found this only for eminent professionals (then 

about 0.005% of the population), and not for ordinary people. So Roberts's 

sample of 128 is likely to contain only about 128 x 0.00005 = 0.006 such peo- 

ple "at risk." Furthermore the association with personality is now in doubt, for 

example see Ertel(1993). So what is the more likely explanation for Roberts's 

findings, a genuine planetary effect or artifacts due to tiny sample sizes and 

after-the-event selection bias? 

8. Yes, problems due to sampling error and selection bias exist for the 

Gauquelin sector results. But Roberts's rejoinder ignores these problems in 

favor of repeating the very arguments that such problems would invalidate. It 

also ignores the test that we suggested would avoid selection bias, namely 

plotting EPQ scores against birth time. Why have arguments when you can 

have tests? 

9. The experiment should be repeated, preferably with a larger sample. As it 

happens one of us has been able to repeat the experiment using cognitive and 

other variables for a sample of over 5000 adult subjects all born in the same 

week, and all with birth times recorded to within five minutes or better. The re- 

sults (which will be reported elsewhere) were uniformly negative. 

Reference 

Ertel, S. (1993). Why the character trait hypothesis still fails. Correlation, 12, 1 , 2.

Journal of Scientijc Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 2, pp. 163-180, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Unconscious Perception of Future Emotions: 

An Experiment in Presentiment 

Consciousness Research Laboratory, Box 454009 

4505 Maryland Pkwy, Harry Reid Centerfor Environmental Studies 

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, NV 89154-4009 

Abstract - Is consciousness limited to perception of the sensory present and 

memory of the past, or does it also have access to future information? In an 

experiment designed to explore this question, a computer was used to ran- 

domly select and present target photos from a pool of digitized photographs. 

Some targets labeled "calm" included landscapes and cheerful people; other 

targets labeled "extreme" included violent and erotic topics. Heart rate, blood 

volume, and electrodermal activity were recorded before, during and after 

presentation of the target photo to see whether the body would unconscious- 

ly respond differentially to the two types of future targets. Extreme targets 

were expected to produce classical orienting responses after the targets were 

displayed, and a "presentiment" (future feeling) effect was predicted to pro- 

duce orienting pre-sponses before the pictures were displayed. Calm targets 

were expected to cause no unusual responses before or after the target was 

displayed. Four experiments, involving 3 1 participants who viewed a total of 

1,060 target photos, showed the expected orienting response after the target 

photo was displayed. In accordance with a presentiment hypothesis, there 

was a clear orienting pre-sponse that peaked with a four standard error differ- 

ence in physiological measures between extreme and calm targets one second 

before the target photo was displayed. 

Keywords: consciousness - precognition - parapsychology - presentiment - 

psychophysiology - unconscious 

Introduction 

Freedom stretches only as far as the limits of our consciousness. - Carl Jung, 1942 

If consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the physical brain (Grush & Church- 

land, 1995), or as Francis Crick (1994) put it, "nothing but a pack of neurons," 

then presumably all aspects of consciousness are inextricably bound to the 

physical, sensory present, intermingled with fading memories of the past. In 

arguing against consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon, Beloff (1994) asks: 

"If it is the case that a mind can, on occasion, extract information from an object other 

than its own brain ... it would be futile to doubt that a mind can interact with its own 

brain in the ordinary course of life. [This] is precisely what interactionism or radical

164 D. Radin 

dualism asserts and what epiphenomenalism denies." (p. 36). 

If the mind does indeed extract information unfettered by known physical 

constraints, this would immediately anneal the so-called "hard" problem of 

consciousness. The mystery would no longer be limited to "the question of 

how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience," as the 

hard problem is described by Chalmers (1995), instead the mystery would be 

compounded with the additional question of how information can arise in the 

physical brain even when the origin of the information is beyond the reach of 

the physical senses. 

Now consider an extension of Beloff's question, and ask whether mind may 

also extract information about events in the future, suggesting some sort of 

"transtemporal" aspect to consciousness. Such an extraction would be a form 

of perception called precognition, the non-inferential prediction of future 

events. 

To explore the possibility that the mind can access its future brain state, a 

series of experiments was conducted. In particular, unconscious physiological 

responses to future events were studied. Strictly speaking, such responses 

would be a subset of precognition known as "presentiment," a vague sense or 

feeling of something about to occur without conscious awareness of a particu- 

lar event. Unconscious physiological measures were employed mainly be- 

cause the relevant experimental literature suggests that precognitive percep- 

tion, like the majority of sensory information, only rarely reaches the level of 

conscious awareness (Schmeidler, 1988). 

Physiological Responses 

The effect used in this study to detect transtemporal consciousness is a well- 

known psychophysical reflex known as the orienting response (OR), first de- 

scribed by Pavlov in the 1920's. The OR is associated with enhancing an or- 

ganism's ability to analyze the content and meaning of novel or unexpected 

stimuli. It is characterized by a host of simultaneous, physiological changes, 

including pupillary dilation, EEG blockage, a rise in phasic electrodermal ac- 

tivity, a deceleration-acceleration pattern in heart rate, and vasoconstriction in 

the finger (Andreassi, 1989, Bouscein, 1992). 

It is relatively straightforward to produce an OR in an experiment by pre- 

senting a participant with an emotionally provocative stimulus. Pictures were 

used in the present experiment, although sounds, meaningful words, electrical 

shocks, and sudden tactile stimuli are also effective. Because an organism's 

general level of arousal is affected cumulatively by such stimuli, the strength 

of an OR tends to diminish after 3 to 5 sequential presentations. In this study, 

to avoid such habituation, the novel or "extreme" stimuli used to produce the 

ORs were randomly interspersed with a larger number of control or "calm" 

stimuli.

Unconscious Perception of Future Emotions 

Previous Research 

The use of physiological measures in psi research can be traced back at least 

40 years (e.g., Otani, 1955), but this general approach to studying psi gained 

popularity in the 1960s (e.g., Beloff, 1974; Morris, 1977; Schouten, 1976). 

The literature reveals two general types of physiological psi experiments: In- 

vestigations of physiological correlates of conscious psi perception, and use of 

physiological measures as unconscious detectors of psi. 

The majority of the previous studies employed physiological measures in an 

agent-receiver paradigm to examine the autonomic or central nervous system 

of a percipient while a remote agent attempted to send emotional or other 

meaningful information (Delanoy, 1989; Delanoy and Sah (1994). Tart 

(1963), for example, measured electrodermal activity, blood volume, heart 

rate, and verbal reports in an agent-receiver study where he as agent received 

random electrical shocks to see if the percipients would detect those events. 

Tart reported that the percipients' physiology reacted significantly to the re- 

mote shocks, but there was no evidence that they were consciously aware of 

the events. 

Later, Dean (1966), Barry (1967), and Haraldsson (I 972) all independently 

found significant changes in blood volume when an agent sent emotional 

thoughts towards a percipient, located sometimes thousands of miles away. 

Duane and Behrendt (1965) studied correlated EEG between identical twins, 

and Grinberg-Zylberbaum et a1 (1992), Targ and Puthoff (1 974) and May, Targ 

and Puthoff (1 979) studied EEG event-related potentials between pairs of par- 

ticipants. More recently, Warren, McDonough and Don (1992) have been 

studying event-related brain potential changes in participants who are involved 

in psi perception tasks. 

The largest single body of psi experiments using physiological measures has 

been reported by William Braud and colleagues (e.g., Braud, 1981; Braud & 

Schlitz, 1989, 199 1). Braud's highly successful series of experiments, like the 

majority of studies on the psychophysiology of psi, have generally focused on 

agents attempting to influence autonomic or CNS responses in remote people. 

Overall, these studies all support the idea that people can unconsciously re- 

spond to information beyond the reach of the normal senses. 

Present Research 

The present experiment differs from most previous physiological studies in 

that it examines psi performance in one person in the same place but at differ- 

ent times. This is in contrast to the more common design, where psi is studied 

among two people in different places at the same time. If psi is space-time 

equivalent, as most of the empirical and anecdotal data suggests, then these 

two forms of experiments should be equivalent. 

Moreover, we speculated that a time-separated design may be more efficient

166 D. Radin 

than space-separated designs because it may be easier for a person to detect or 

"resonate" with their own future thoughts than for a person to resonate with an- 

other person's thoughts. In addition, the present technique offers a significant 

pragmatic advantage over experiments studying distant mental influence of 

human physiology - it does not require expensively shielded laboratory 

rooms or extensive security methods to prevent sensory leakage from one per- 

son to the other. Sensory leakage is completely avoided by using time to 

"shield" the target. 

The Basic Experimental Method 

In a series of four experiments, participants sat in a comfortable, reclining 

chair approximately two feet in front of a color computer monitor. On the 

pads of the first and second fingers of the left hand, electrodes were attached to 

record electrodermal activity (EDA). On the pad of the third finger of the left 

hand, a photoplethysmograph was attached to record both heart rate (HR) and 

blood volume pulse (BVP). Signals from these electrodes were monitored by 

an electrically isolated, computer-controlled physiological data acquisition 

system (J & J Engineering, Model 1-330). 

After all electrodes were attached, the participant rested her wired-up left 

hand comfortably in her lap. In her right hand, she held a computer mouse 

with her right index finger resting on the left mouse button. When ready to 

begin, she pressed the mouse button and prepared to look at a picture about to 

be displayed on the computer monitor in front of her. After the button press, 

the computer randomly selected a target photo, there was a 5 second delay 

during which the screen remained blank, then the selected picture was dis- 

played for 3 seconds (as shown in Figure 1). 

This was followed by a blank screen for 5 seconds, and this was followed by 

a 5 second rest period. After the rest period, a message indicated that when the 

participant was ready to begin the next trial, the button could be pressed again 

(in practice, participants waited from less than one second to more than 30 sec- 

onds between trials). The three physiological responses were continuously 

monitored during the 13 second recording epoch. The participant viewed 41 

pictures in a single session, one picture at a time. The experimenter watched 

the participant on the first trial to make sure that the procedure was followed 

correctly, and the remaining 40 trials were conducted by the participant alone. 

Only the last 40 trials were used for subsequent analysis. 

On each trial, the computer selected (uniformly at random, with replace- 

ment) one target photo from a pool of 120 digitized high-quality color pho- 

tographs (later experiments used a pool of 150 targets). The target photos were 

divided into two subjective categories, calm and emotional. Calm targets in- 

cluded pleasant pictures of landscapes, nature scenes, and cheerful people; 

emotional targets included arousing, disturbing or shocking pictures, including 

photos of explicit sexual activity, genital piercings, and mutilated bodies. The

Unconscious Perception of Future Emotions 

participant 

presses 

button 

J 

computer 

randomly 

selects 

photo 

computer 

display 

photo 

screen 

goes 

blank 

screen 

remains 

blank 

5 seconds 3 seconds 5 seconds 5 seconds 

continuous physiological record 

Fig. I. Illustration of experimental procedure. 

pool consisted of 100 calm and 50 emotional photos). These pictures were dis- 

played by the computer in 256 colors, with 600 x 800 resolution. 

Due to the nature of this experiment, in which it was necessary to occasion- 

ally display emotionally shocking pictures, the participant population was re- 

stricted to mature adult volunteers. All of the participants were asked to read 

an informed consent form explaining that some disturbing pictures might be 

shown, and to provide their verbal consent before the experiment began. 

Method of Analysis 

The basic analytic technique applied to the data was a superposed epoch 

analysis. Data on each trial is a 13-second epoch of continuous physiological 

measurements consisting of 5 seconds in a "before" period, 3 seconds in a 

"during" period, and 5 seconds in an "after" period. The sampling rate was 5 

samples per second, thus a single trial epoch consisted of 65 contiguous physi- 

ological measurements (of EDA, HR, and BVP). Figure 2 illustrates the raw 

EDA values collected in a sequence of 40 trials for one participant. 

The analysis was designed to take into account the fact that physiological 

measurements drift over time within individuals, and people have different 

baseline or tonic levels (Andreassi, 1989). Therefore, instead of examining the 

absolute values returned by the physiological monitor for a given trial epoch, 

for each 65-sample epoch the different underlying baselines were taken into 

account by taking the differences between the mean value of a given epoch, 

per physiological measure, versus all of the individual samples in that epoch. 

The baseline mean per epoch was based upon the physiological values of the 

first 5 seconds of the epoch - the before-display period - rather than the en- 

tire 13-second epoch, because after display of the target photo it was expected

168 

A nnn 

D. Radin 

Time, 0.2 Seconds per Sample 

Fig. 2. EDA data record for one participant. The vertical lines are the boundaries of each record- 

ing epoch. The ordinate is the raw EDA value (with 12-bit resolution ) returned by the 

physiology monitor. 

(by design, for emotional targets) that phasic responses would significantly 

shift the baseline. 

Thus, for trial epoch i, sample j, and target category c (i.e., emotional or 

calm), the raw physiological measure e,,, was transformed into A, = e ijc - e ', 

where e ',, was the mean of trial epoch i, target category c, over samples j = 1 to 

25 (i.e., the first five seconds of the epoch). This transform created 65 "mean- 

difference" A, samples per epoch, per target category. 

Next, the grand mean and standard errors for the 65 A* were separately de- 

termined for calm and emotional target categories. That is, the grand mean A), 

and standard error o(e,,)were determined across all i epochs, separately per 

target category c, for each of the 65 mean-difference samples. We called these 

65 A), values "average mean-differences." 

Finally, because this study was interested in how physiology changed from 

the moment the button was pressed, the first average mean-difference calm 

sample A), (i.e., A', was independently clamped to zero, and the difSer- 

ences were determined between A', , and the rest of the Atj samples. The 

same procedure was followed for the Atj samples. The result is illustrat- 

ed in Figure 3 for the participant's data shown in Figure 2. It is important to 

emphasize that these data transformations were identically applied to the calm 

and emotional target epochs for data collected before, during and after display 

conditions. 

Predictions 

This experimental procedure creates one of two types of events five seconds 

after pressing a button: a calm event or an emotional event. The emotional 

event was expected to produce a classical orienting response which we would

Unconscious Perception of Future Emotions 169 

Time, 0.2 Seconds per Sample 

Fig. 3. Superposed epoch analysis for one participant's EDA data (based on the raw data shown 

in Figure 2). The error bars are one standard error. The four sections correspond to Be- 

fore the target was displayed, During, After, and a Rest. Presentiment is seen as a higher 

EDA response for extreme targets in the Before period. 

detect, typically, as a rise in skin conductance, a drop in heart rate, and a drop 

in finger blood volume (Andreassi, 1989; McNaughton, 1989; Thayer, 1989). 

By contrast, a calm picture was expected to show little or no orienting re- 

sponse. 

The presentiment hypothesis predicts that the emotional shock caused by 

viewing an emotional picture in the future causes an unconscious physiologi- 

cal "pre-action" in the present. Specifically, the emotional targets were pre- 

dicted to show orienting "pre-sponses" just before display of the target photos. 

These pre-sponses were expected to mimic the future orienting responses. No 

Change in , . , Mean 

0 .oo 

Difference 

Before During After 

Time, Seconds 

Fig. 4. As expected by the classical orienting response. EDA after display of the target photos 

was higher for Extreme targets than for Calm targets. As predicted by the presentiment 

hypothesis, EDA was also higher before display of Extreme targets, but not for Calm tar- 

gets. Errors bars are one standard error.

170 D. Radin 

unusual responses were expected in the calm target category, either before, 

during or after the target is displayed. 

Results: Experiment I 

Eight participants (3 women, 5 men) participated in a total of 260 trials: 104 

were randomly selected by the computer as emotional, 156 as calm. The first 

three people ran 20 trials in a single session; the remaining five ran 40 trials in 

a single session. Result of the superposed epoch analysis for EDA is shown in 

Figure 4. The Figure shows a statistically clean separation of EDA between 

calm and emotional targets in accordance with the presentiment hypothesis. 

Notice that this experimental design has a built-in control: The physiologi- 

cal results observed in the during and after-display condition must reflect what 

is expected according to the orienting response, otherwise something would be 

wrong with the analysis technique. We see in Figure 4 that the expected re- 

sponses did occur, and because the identical analysis technique was applied to 

data recorded in the before-display period, we know then that the separation 

observed in EDA in Figure 4 reflects a genuine presentiment effect. 

Figure 5 shows the result of a superposed epoch analysis for changes in fin- 

ger blood volume. This shows the expected drop in blood volume for emotion- 

al targets in the after-display period, and as predicted by the presentiment hy- 

pothesis, there is also a significant drop in blood volume in the before-display 

period. The heart rate epoch analysis did not reveal a significant drop in heart 

rate in the before-display period. 

Results: Experiment 2 

Three participants contributed a total of 40 trials. A one-second target dis- 

play period was used rather than the 3 seconds used in Experiment 1. Because 

the primary results of interest were obtained with EDA in the first experiment, 

this replication concentrated only on EDA. Figure 6 shows the result of a su- 

1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 

Time in 0.2 Second Samples 

Fig. 5. Changes in mean difference blood volume in Experiment 1.

Change in 

Mean 

Difference 


1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 

Time, 0.2 Second Samples 

Fig. 6. Change in mean difference EDA for Experiment 2. 

Time, 0.2 Second Samples 

Fig. 7. Change in mean difference EDA in Experiment 3. 

I TTTIIITT, Extreme I 

perposed epoch analysis, revealing results similar to those obtained in Experi- 

ment 1. 

Results: Experiment 3 

Sixteen participants (8 men, 8 women) contributed a total of 640 trials. The 

experimental method was identical to that used in Experiment 1, with the ex- 

ception that the entire experiment was controlled, and the target photos dis- 

played, on a portable notebook computer (Toshiba 75 Mhz 80486 vs. a Dell 

Optiplex 66 Mhz 80486 used in Experiments 1 and 2). Figure 7 shows the re- 

sult of a superposed epoch analysis for EDA, revealing results similar to those 

obtained in Experiments 1 and 2.

Redundancy Analysis 

D. Radin 

We then pooled EDA, HR, and BVP data from Experiments 1 and 3 (be- 

cause the methods were virtually identical) into a single measure consistent 

with what is expected for an operating response. That is, because we know that 

for most people EDA would rise and HR and BVP would drop after exposure 

to emotional targets, we can form a single score to reflect this expectation by 

taking the following steps: (1) form a z-score of the difference between the av- 

erage mean-difference EDA for emotional and calm target categories, for all 

samples 1 - 65. (2) Do the same for average mean-different HR and BVP. (3) 

Create a single Stouffer z-score using the formula Sz = [zdEDA - zdHR - 

zdB,,]1d(3), where "zd" refers to "z of the difference." 

We could predict that this Sz-score should rise to very high levels after dis- 

play of the targets, because we know how the autonomic nervous system re- 

sponds according to the nature of the target. In fact, this Sz-score must rise to 

high levels, otherwise something would be wrong with either the experimental 

or analytic methods. We see in Figure 8 that this rise does indeed occur, peak- 

ing at nearly 9 standard normal deviates. 

Now we can predict, based on the presentiment hypothesis, that there should 

be a significant rise in Sz both before and after the target is displayed. Figure 8 

shows that the Sz-score indeed rises to a peak of nearly 5 standard normal devi- 

ates. This suggests that use of redundant autonomic measures may provide a 

more efficient method of detecting presentiment, especially if these measures 

are customized to take into account individual, idiosyncratic responses. 

6 

Combined 5 

Stouffer 

Z-score 

3 

-1 

Before 

I 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 

0.2 Seconds per Sample 

Fig. 8. Combined Stouffer z-scores for the differences in EDA, BVP, and HR for Extreme and 

Calm targets in Experiments 1 and 3. As expected, the orienting response after display of 

the target photos rises to extremely high levels, peaking at nearly 9 normal standard devi- 

ates. Also evident is an orienting presponse that peaks at nearly 5 normal standard devi- 

ates about one second before the target photos are displayed.

1 


0.2 Seconds per Sample 

Fig. 9. Combined Stouffer z-scores for the differences in EDA, BVP, and HR for Extreme and 

Calm targets in Experiment 4. 

Experiment 4 

Figure 9 shows the result of combining EDA, HR, and BVP data in another 

experiment involving four people who contributed 40 trials each. The method 

here differed from the previous three experiments because the target photo 

was selected immediately before it was displayed - i.e., after sample 25 - 

rather than as soon as the participant pressed the button to begin the trial. 

Thus, this was a "true" presentiment experiment (i.e., excluded real-time clair- 

voyance as a possibility) in the sense that the target identity did not exist in 

any form, not even as a software variable, until just before it was displayed. 

Discussion 

Let anyone try, I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend to, the present moment of 

time. One of the most bafling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melt- 

ed in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming. 

- William James, The Principles of Psychology (1890) 

William James may have been on to something. The present may not be 

where - or when - we thought it was. The experiments described here suggest 

that under certain circumstances we unconsciously respond to emotional 

events in our immediate future, events that we have no normal way of predicting. 

In informal post-interviews, none of the participants reported conscious 

awareness of the targets that they were about to see, and no one systematically 

noticed any physiological differences before presentation of the targets. As 

noted by previous researchers (e.g., Schmeidler, 1988), if precognitive and 

other forms of so-called "extra-sensory" perception are largely unconscious,

174 D. Radin 

this may be why such phenomena are so difficult to detect using experimental 

designs that rely solely upon conscious reports. 

Efects of Physiological Arousal 

Figures 4, 6, and 7 show clear operating presponse (OP) separations be- 

tween Extreme and Calm EDA in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. But what these 

graphs do not reveal is whether the magnitude of the OP corresponds to ex- 

pected differences in generalized physiological arousal. We know, for in- 

stance, that higher tonic levels of electrodermal activity are associated with in- 

creased attention and better vigilance on perceptual tasks (Prokasy & Raskin, 

1973). Persons with widely varying EDA, called "labiles," are better than so- 

called "stabiles" at keeping their attention focused on an ongoing task. Labiles 

also manifest larger electrodermal responses to emotionally significant stim- 

uli. 

This allows us to predict that the higher the tonic level of EDA, which is as- 

sociated with higher lability, the larger the EDA OP should be. To test this, a 

correlation was determined between the tonic EDA per trial epoch (i.e., the av- 

erage skin conductance level for the first 5 seconds of each trial) versus the 

mean-difference EDA (called Ai,, above) for sample 10, which corresponds to 

second 2 of the 5-second before-display period. Then the correlation was cal- 

culated between the tonic EDA per epoch vs. sample 1 l, and so on up to sam- 

ple 40, or 8 seconds into the epoch. 

If the present results are consistent with the physiological effects of arousal, 

if the OP is a genuine effect linked to a future OR, and if the OP increases with 

enhanced attention and perceptual ability, then there should be positive corre- 

Z Y 2 ~ E R P i 7 , X R B E Z F , R S 

Sample 

Fig. 10. Correlation between tonic EDA level per trial epoch vs. mean difference EDA at different 

points in the epoch. This shows that at highter levels of nervous system arousal, the orienting 

presponse for Extreme targets is larger, peaking just before the target is displayed, 

at sample 24 (r = 0.241, t = 4.368,~ = 1.7 x lo-'). At no point is the same correlation significant 

for Calm targets.


lations between tonic level and OP for Extreme targets, but not for Calm tar- 

gets. Results, shown in Figure 10, confirm this prediction. 

Alternative Hypotheses 

Results are Due to Chance. To determine a probability of the difference be- 

tween data in the two target conditions in the before-display period, we must 

take into account (a) autocorrelations between successive samples, (b) within- 

subject repeated measures, and (c) assumptions about the underlying distribu- 

tions. To do this, we pooled all EDA data for Experiments 1 and 3, then calcu- 

lated a t-score of the difference in EDA for calm and emotional targets for each 

of the first 25 samples (the before-display condition). The maximum t-score 

in this group of 25 was t = 2.92. Next, the assignment of calm and emotional 

conditions in this dataset were scrambled, maintaining the same number of 

calm and emotional targets as in the original dataset, but randomly reassigning 

the labels. From this new dataset, a maximum t-score was determined as be- 

fore. This procedure was repeated 1,000 times to form an empirical distribu- 

tion of maximum t-scores. The original maximum t-score was then compared 

to this distribution, and the result showed that there were 8 maximum t-scores 

greater than 2.92 out of 1,000. In other words, differences larger than those 

observed in the actual data would be unlikely with p = .008. This suggests that 

chance is not a viable explanation for the observed results. 

Results are Due to a Cueing Artifact. In the first three experiments, after the 

participant presses a button the computer evaluates a pseudorandom algorithm 

based on a seed-number set to the current value of the computer system clock. 

The result, a number pointing to a particular picture, is stored in software, and 

the screen remains blank with no external indication of its value. The comput- 

er does not access its hard drive to read the picture until it is time to display the 

picture, and thus there are no disk access sounds or other computer hardware 

actions that might conceivably provide a hint as to the identity of the target. 

Thus, there is no way a participant can know which target is about to be shown 

on any given trial. In addition, in Experiment 4, the target is not even selected 

until immediately (about 10 milliseconds) before it is displayed. 

Results are Due to an Analysis Artifact. This is unlikely because the identi- 

cal analysis procedure was employed for all EDA, HR and BVP data uniform- 

ly across each epoch, and the analyses revealed the expected OR in the after- 

display condition. Given this, we can infer that the analysis of results before 

the target was displayed should also be valid. 

Results are Due to Targets Being Presented in a Nun-random Order. After 

combining the 260 targets selected in Experiment 1 and the 656 targets (16 

people x 41 target selections per person) from Experiment 3, the distribution 

of the total of 9 16 targets was examined to see how often each of the 120 target 

pictures were selected. The distribution was tested by chi-square, with the re- 

sulting x2(1 19df) = 104.52, p = 0.825. Thus, targets were selected uniformly at

Observed 

Expected 

D. Radin 

TABLE 1 

Distribution of Sequential Pairs of Targets 

random, so it should not have been possible to successfully guess the identity 

of a target on any given trial. 

Next, the distribution of pairs of sequential targets was examined, i.e., the 

number of times an Extreme target was followed by another Extreme target 

(EE), Extreme was followed by Calm (EC), and so on. The observed and ex- 

pected counts are shown in Table 1, and the resulting x2(3df) = 1.29, p = 0.73. 

Thus, the identity of a given target did not provide a hint about the nature of 

the succeeding target. 

The distribution of target types was also examined. Of 9 16 targets (all tar- 

gets used in the first three experiments), 320 were Extreme and 596 were 

Calm. Compared against the expected number of Extreme targets (assuming 

extreme) = 401120, or 113), this results in z = 1.03, p = .303 (two-tailed). 

Thus, the two types of target categories were distributed as expected, and there 

should not have been any way for a participant to guess the category of succes- 

sive targets. 

How do we know that extreme targets were as provocative as they were 

intended to be ? 

By inspection, the physiological results demonstrated that the pool of Ex- 

treme targets produced the expected OR and the Calm targets did not. Howev- 

er, to confirm that the target categories were also subjectively separable, 6 

people (3 men, 3 women) were asked to look at each of the 120 pictures used in 

the third experiment (in a new random order for each person), and rate each 

Calm Extreme 

Fig. 1 1. Subjective ratings for Calm and Extreme target pools for Experiment 3, with one standard 

error bar.


picture from 1 (calm) to 5 (extreme). Results, shown in Figure 11, leave little 

doubt that the pool of Extreme pictures was subjectively more arousing than 

the Calm pictures. 

While it is clear that the two target pools were subjectively different, it is not 

possible to tell from a purely dichotomous analysis whether the magnitude of 

the postulated OP was associated with the degree of subjective arousal, which 

seems like a reasonable assumption. To test this question, a correlation was 

determined for all trials in Experiment 3 between EDA mean difference for 

samples 10 through 40 in a given epoch, versus the subjective rating for the 

target used in that epoch. A positive correlation was predicted that would peak 

around the time the OP was expected to crest. Figure 12 shows the result, 

which confirms the prediction with a peak correlation at sample 24, r = 0.096, t 

= 2.365,~ = 0.018. 

The Effect is Due to Anticipatory Effects. This is the suggestion that participants' 

arousal levels progressively increased on each successive trial until an 

extreme target occurred, then it reset back to a baseline level. Such an "anticipatory 

strategy" might create a difference between the average physiological 

measures obtained on calm and extreme trials, in favor of slightly higher 

arousal levels for extreme trials. This was tested through Monte Carlo tests 

where a simulated participant used an optimal anticipatory strategy to raise 

arousal levels uniformly on each successive calm trial until a extreme trial randomly 

occurred. The simulation resulted in statistically non-significant differences 

in average arousal levels, far too small to account for the observed physiological 

effects. In addition, in a recent replication of this experiment by an 

independent researcher (Bierman & Radin, 1997), internal consistencies within 

the data related to differences in stimulus display time were discovered 

(shorter display times were associated with larger presponse effects than 

- o . o 8 ! : : : : : : : : ; : : ; ; : : : : : : ; : : : : : : ; ; : I 

Z " Z 2 Z B M Z ? 3 % 8 E Z S % B 

Sample 

Fig. 12. Correlation for all trials in Experiment 3 between EDA mean difference in a given epoch 

versus the subjective rating for the target used in that epoch. This shows that the more 

subjectively extreme the target photo, the larger the orienting presponse. The presponse 

peaks just before the target is actually displayed (r = 0.096, t = 2.365, N = 600, p = 0.018, 

two-tailed).

178 D. Radin 

longer display times). This again argues against simple anticipatory strategies 

as an adequate explanation of the presponse effect. 

Conclusion 

The quote at the beginning of this article is preceded by the following few sen- 

tences: 

No one can flatter himself that he is immune to the spirit of his own epoch, or even that 

he possesses a full understanding of it. Irrespective of our conscious convictions, each 

one of us, without exception, being a particle of the general mass, is somewhere at- 

tached to, colored by, or even undermined by the spirit which goes through the mass. 

Freedom stretches only as far as the limits of our consciousness. - Carl Jung , 1942 

In exploring the limits of consciousness, especially when confronting ex- 

perimental results suggesting the existence of unconscious precognition, we 

are indeed challenged by the spirit of our own epoch. In spite of the persua- 

siveness of conventional wisdom, consciousness may in fact have transtempo- 

ral aspects, and if so, the hard problem of consciousness takes on a mysterious 

new gleam. 

However, before adopting Beloff's (1994) contention that a transtemporal 

or transpatial consciousness argues against epiphenomenalism, it is worth- 

while to consider an alternative. It may be, for example, that consciousness 

does indeed emerge from the workings of the physical brain, but our notion of 

"physical" must be significantly expanded. After all, the mechanistic, New- 

tonian model of physical reality has radically changed over the past century 

through developments in quantum theory, chaos theory, and non-linear dy- 

namics, and we now know that the world is not simply a deterministic mecha- 

nism. Reality must be non-local. Non-locality in this sense means that physi- 

cal matter is influenced not only by events local to that matter, but by events at 

arbitrary distances, including events outside the light cone (Herbert, 1985). 

Given the properties of this strange new view of the world, a phenomenon like 

transtemporal perception is not only possible, but likely. 

In fact, from the post-Newtonian viewpoint, the supposed intractable gulf 

between epiphenomenalism and interactionism is revealed as an illusion. The 

former promises to tell us much about how the brain processes information, but 

it says little about where all the information comes from. The latter promises 

to tell us about strange ways that information can impinge upon the brain, but 

not much about how the brain processes that information. Any model of con- 

sciousness which aspires to be comprehensive must judiciously combine theo- 

ries and evidence from both the former and the latter views. 


The Consciousness Research Division of the Harry Reid Center for Envi-


ronmental Studies, UNLV, gratefully acknowledges past and present grant 

support from the Parapsychology Foundation (USA); Institut fiir Grenzgebi- 

ete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene (Germany); Bigelow Foundation 

(USA); Society for Psychical Research (England); Bial Foundation (Portu- 

gal); and the John Bjorkhem Memorial Foundation (Sweden). 

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Journal of Scient$c Exploration, Vol. 11, No.2, pp. 181-192 1997 0892-33 10197 


A Bayesian Maximum-Entropy Approach to Hypothesis 

Testing, for Application to RNG and Similar Experiments 

Center for Space Science and Astrophysics, Varian 302G 

Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4060 

Abstract - In assessing the results of RNG (random number generator) ex- 

periments, and in similar problems of the Bernoulli type, one needs to evalu- 

ate the proposition that the results are compatible with a specific hypothesis, 

such as the so-called "null hypothesis" that no extraordinary process is at 

work. This evaluation is often based on the "p-value" test according to which 

one calculates the probability of obtaining, on the basis of the specific hy- 

pothesis, the actual result or a "more extreme" result. Textbooks caution that 

the p-value does not give the probability that the specific hypothesis is true, 

and one recent textbook asserts "Although that might be a more interesting 

question to answer, there is no way to answer it." A Bayesian approach re- 

quires that we consider not just one hypothesis but a complete set of hypothe- 

ses. This may be achieved very simply by supplementing the specific hy- 

pothesis with the maximum-entropy hypothesis that covers all other 

possibilities in a way that is maximally non-committal. This procedure 

yields an estimate of the probability that the specific hypothesis is true. This 

estimate is found to be more conservative than that which one might infer 

from the p-value test. 

Keywords: bayesian analysis - statistics - methodology 

1. Introduction 

A recent exchange of letters between Jefferys (1995a, 1995b), on the one 

hand, and Dobyns and Jahn (1995) and Dobyns (1995), on the other hand, 

raises a basic question concerning the analysis of results of experiments such 

as RNG experiments. The central point in the discussion is the standard pro- 

cedure for evaluating the significance of an experimental result in terms of a 

"one-sided p-value." According to this procedure, one tests the "null hypoth- 

esis" that the result obtained is due to chance by evaluating the probability 

that, on the basis of chance, the experiment would yield the value actually ob- 

tained or a "more extreme" value. 

This may seem a reasonable procedure if the probability distribution has a 

single peak, and the observed value is way out to one side of that peak. How- 

ever, one can certainly construct experiments for which the expected distribu- 

tion would have more than one peak. As an example, suppose one is told that 

a box contains two dice. One die has only one spot on one of its six faces; the 

other die has one spot on each of five of its six faces. The experiment is to

182 P. A. Sturrock 

draw a die, toss it 30 times, and count the number of spots. One expects that 

the number will either be close to 5 or close to 25. The probability distribution 

is shown in Figure 1. 

Since a linear plot of probability does not give a clear indication of the de- 

parture of the probability from either zero or unity, it is helpful to introduce 

first the concept of "odds," defined by 

where P is the probability, and then the concept of "log-odds," defined by 

A = log(R) = log - 

(1:P) a 

The distribution of Figure 1 is shown as a distribution of log-odds in Figure 2. 

It would be very surprising if the number were close to zero, or close to 30, 

but it would be much more surprising if the number were close to 15. Specifi- 

cally there is probability 0.002 of getting zero spots, the same probability of 

getting 30 spots, but probability only 2 lo-' of getting 15 spots. If the number 

turned out to be, say, 10, how would one carry out ap-value test? If one were 

to carry out the sum of the probabilities expected of counts zero through 10, 

one would obtain almost 0.5 (in fact, one would get 0.497). The same would 

be true if the count were 20 and one were to count from 20 to 30. 

It is clear from the preceding example that there are problems to which the 

p-value "tail test" would be inapplicable. Even if the p-value test is applica- 

10 20 

COUNT n 

Fig. 1. The probability of getting n spots in 30 tosses of one of two dice, one of which has a spot 

on only one face, the other of which has a spot on each of five faces.

Hypothesis Testing 

10 20 

COUNT n 

Fig 2. The same data as in Figure 1, displayed in terms of log-odds. 

ble, it is not at all clear how it should be interpreted; this issue will be dis- 

cussed further in Section 2. An alternative to the standard p-value test, one 

that arises naturally from Bayesian thinking, is proposed in Section 3. Further 

discussion is presented in Section 4. 

2. Thep-Value Test 

Even in simple problems with one or two well-defined "tails," how is the p- 

value test to be interpreted, and how is this interpretation to be justified? Sup- 

pose that one considers a well defined distribution over 101 possible out- 

comes, with only one peak, and one obtains 95 positive results where only 50 

are expected, why should one add the probabilities of getting 95 or more? If 

one is going to go up 5 in one direction, why not go down 5 in the opposite di- 

rection also, so that one would be considering the probability of getting 90 

successes or more? 

Furthermore, how is one to interpret the p-value? If the p-value turns out to 

be .05, does that mean that the odds are 19 to 1 that the null hypothesis is in- 

correct? Utts (1996) is very clear on this point. She cautions that the p-value 

does not give the probability that the null hypothesis is true, and adds "Al- 

though that might be a more interesting question to answer, there is no way to 

answer it." That may be true of non-Bayesian statistics but, as we shall see, it 

is not true of Bayesian statistics. 

The Bayesian approach offers a useful perspective on the p-value test. Ac- 

cording to the Bayesian approach to scientific issues (see, for instance, Good, 

1950; Jeffreys, 193 1 ; Sturrock, 1994), it is essential to consider not a single 

hypothesis, but a complete set of hypotheses. If the p-value test were robust, it 

should not make much difference how one chooses to complete the set of


hypotheses. If, on the other hand, our interpretation of the p-value test de- 

pends sensitively on which hypotheses are adopted to form a complete set, 

then we have cause for concern. 

Let us examine this issue. We consider a specific hypothesis, e.g. that a coin 

is a fair coin. It is conventional to refer to this as the "null hypothesis," but this 

term makes sense only if one is considering also the consequences of another 

hypothesis ( a "non-null" hypothesis), e.g. that the coin is biased by a specified 

amount. Since p-value test theory does not involve a second hypothesis, it 

seems gratuitous to refer to the only considered hypothesis as the "null hy- 

pothesis." For this reason, we will use the term "specific hypothesis" in place 

of the usual "null hypothesis." (Furthermore, in the next section we consider a 

"maximum entropy" hypothesis that is even more deserving of the term "null 

hypothesis" if we wish to use that term.) We designate the specific hypothesis 

as HI. 

In order to pursue Bayesian thinking on this problem, it is essential to sup- 

plement HI with one or more additional hypotheses, so that all hypotheses are 

mutually exclusive and form a complete set. For present didactic purposes, we 

make the simplest assumption, that there is only one supplementary hypothe- 

sis that we call H2. We will assume that, if H1 is true, the probability of a cer- 

tain event (say a coin coming up heads) is p, and that, if H2 is true, the proba- 

bility is p,. To be specific, we can consider the situation that a bag contains a 

fair coin for whichp, = 0.5, and a biased coin for whichp, is some known num- 

ber different from 0.5. In using the p-value test to evaluate the probability that 

the specific hypothesis H1 is false, we are now evaluating the probability that 

the supplementary hypothesis H2 is true. If thep-value test were a robust test, 

it should not much matter what we choose for H2: then the relationship be- 

tween the p-value and the post-probability that H1 is correct (the probability 

evaluated on the basis of prior knowledge and also on knowledge of the out- 

come of the experiment) would not depend sensitively onp,. Let us see if this 

is the case. 

We introduce P(H1 II) to denote the probability that H1 is true, evaluated on 

the basis of "initial" information I, with a similar interpretation for P(H21I). 

Since I is assumed throughout, we ignore it where we can without loss of clari- 

ty, and write these probabilities as P(H1I) and P(H21). We next suppose that an 

experiment is carried out in which one coin is drawn from the bag and tossed N 

times, yielding n heads. We denote by P(nlN,HI) and P(nlN,H2) the probabil- 

ity of this result based on the assumption that H1 is correct, or on the assump- 

tion that H2 is correct, respectively. Then the p-value, that we write as V1, is 

given by

Hypothesis Testing 185 

n N 

Vj = CP(rI HI) or I/i = CP(rl HI) (2.1) 

r=O r=n 

for n is close to zero and for n close to N, respectively. To be definite, we sub- 

sequently consider the former alternative. 

We denote by P(Hlln,N) the "post probability" that HI is true, based on 

knowledge of the result of the experiment (and, implicitly, on the initial infor- 

mation I also), with a similar interpretation of P(H2ln,N). Since we are told 

that the only relevant hypotheses are HI and H2, it follows that 

P(H1 I) + P(H2 I) = I, P(H1 I n, N) + P(H2 I n, N) = 1, etc. (2.2) 

The Bayes (or Bayes-Laplace) theorem (see, for instance, Jaynes, 1989) tells 

us that 

P(HI I n, N) = 

P(n I N, HI) 

P(n I N) 

P(H1 I), 

where P(nlN) may be evaluated from I 

We assume, for simplicity, that the prior probabilities of H1 and H2 are 

equal, so that P(H1I) = 0.5 and P(H21) = 0.5. Then we see that 

Since H2 is equivalent to "not-Hl," the left-hand side of (2.5) is the "odds" on 

Hl, so that we can rewrite (2.5) as 

On noting that 

with a similar expression for P(nlN ,H2), we see that (2.6) becomes

P. A. Sturrock 

By using this expression and noting (2.2), we may calculate P(Hlln,N) for 

given values of p, andp,. We can then compare this with V,, evaluated from 

(2.1) and (2.7), and we can then examine conditions under which the Bayesian 

evaluation of the post probability of the null hypothesis agrees with the p- 

value. 

Figure 3 has four panels giving both the p-value V, and the post-probability 

P(H1lnN) for values n = 0, 1,2 and 3, for the case thatp, = 0.5 and N = 10, and 

: (c) 

1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 ' 1 1 

1.0- n=2 10 

0.8 - 

: (4 

\ ' I , I , " I I I I" ' - 

o . o - ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ l l ~ , , , ~ l , l ~ , l , l , , l ~ , l l ~ . ~ l ~ ~ 

Fig. 3. The upper curve is the post-probability that H1 is true, plotted as a function of p,, and the 

lower curve (a straight line) is the p-value, for (a) n = 0, (b) n = 1, (c) n = 2, and (d) n = 3. 

Note that for n = 0 [case (a)], V1 = 0.001 so that the p-value line is indistinguishable from 

the axis. 

1.2 

0.8 

0.6 - 0.6 

0 4 - 

0.2 

p-value V, - 

- 

p-value V, - 

0.2 

0.0 

0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 

0 4 

P2 Pz


for all values of p, from 0 to 1. Figure 4 shows the same results expressed dif- 

ferently: it shows the post-log-odds A(Hlln,N) and the "log-p-value-odds" 

LPVO defined analogously as 

v 

LPVO = log(-) . 

1-v 

(2.9) 

We may note from these displays the following comparison of the p-value 

and post-probability - 

(a) Thep-value coincides with the post-probability only for the special case 

that n = 0 and p, = 0. 

(b) For all other cases, thep-value is smaller than the post probability. 

i . . . LPVO . I 

Fig. 4. The same data as in Figure 3, displayed in terms of log-odds and LPVO (log-p-value- 

odds).


(c) The relationship between the p-value and the post probability is very 

sensitive to the choice of p,. Consider, for instance, the case n = 0. If p, = 0.1, 

the post-odds is larger than the p-value-odds by a factor of only 3.9, but if p, = 

0.9, it is larger by a factor of 9 lo8. 

(d) We see from Figure 3 that, even when one adopts the maximum-likeli- 

hood value of p, (namely nlN), the p-value is still smaller than the post-odds. 

The difference is small, with a logarithmic difference of 0.36, 0.40 and 0.32 

for n = 1, 2, and 3, respectively, but that does not obviate that fact that the p- 

value is clearly misleading. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to give equal prior 

probabilities to the specific hypothesis and to the maximum-likelihood value 

ofp,, since the latter is determined by the result of the experiment! 

We see that there is little reason to adopt the p-value method for hypothesis- 

testing, and plenty of reason to seek an alternative. 

3. Maximum Entropy Hypothesis 

In order to apply Bayesian methods, one must propose a complete set of mu- 

tually exclusive hypotheses. If one hypothesis is that one is tossing a fair coin, 

for which the probability of heads or tails is 0.5, one must specify one or more 

additional hypotheses so that we have a complete and mutually exclusive set. 

It is here proposed that we seek a hypothesis that is, in some sense, as unspe- 

cific as possible, so that it covers all other specific hypotheses. This can be 

viewed also as the "maximum entropy" or "maximum ignorance" hypothesis. 

The maximum-entropy hypothesis, that we denote by "ME," must allow p, 

to adopt all possible values, except the value p,. It turns out that, when it 

comes to performing calculations, it makes no difference to the final formulae 

whether or not p, covers the value p,, so we can ignore that issue and simply 

consider that the maximum entropy hypothesis represents a distribution D(p) 

of all probability values from 0 to 1. 

The entropy of the distribution is given (see, for instance, Jaynes, 1957) by 

where we now regard p simply as a parameter, and D(p) is a probability distri- 

bution that represents our knowledge - or ignorance - about the parameter 

p. We now require that H take its maximum value subject to the constraint that 

We require that 6H = 0, i.e.

for all 6D(p) subject to 


This clearly requires that D = constant, and (3.2) then shows that D = 1. Hence 

the maximum-entropy distribution is the uniform distribution. 

We may now evaluate P(nlN,ME) from 

We may evaluate this integral by noting that 

On integrating both sides over p from 0 to 1, and separating coefficients of 

xn, we obtain 

that leads to the result 

This shows that the post-probability distribution of the maximum-entropy hypothesis 

is the uniform distribution. 

It is now straightforward to find the post-probability of H1 (that p = p,) by 

using (2.2) and (2.7). If we make the assumption ("r') that HI and MI have 

equal prior probabilities, so that 

we finally obtain the following expression for the odds on H1: 

(N + I)! N-n 

R(HI~I) = 

n! (N - n)! PI"(^- PI)


4. Discussion 

We may now return to the simple problem discussed in Section 2, for which 

p, = 0.5 and N = 10. For all values of n, we may estimate the post odds, given 

by (3. lo), and hence obtain the post-probability from 

We can also evaluate thep-value V,. Figure 5 shows both the post-probabil- 

ity of H1, and the p-values, computed for each "tail." Figure 6 presents the 

same data in the form of the post-log-odds and the log-p-value-odds LPVO in- 

troduced earlier. The same data are listed in Table 1. We see that the post odds 

and the LPVO behave very similarly, but the former is about an order of magni- 

tude larger than the latter. In general, the post-log-odds will be larger than the 

LPVO by a factor of order N. We see, therefore, that the present "maximum- 

entropy" test is more conservative than the p-value test. 

We may now return to the bimodal distribution presented (see Figures 1 and 

2) in Section 1. There is now no problem is using the same method that we 

have applied to a simple unimodal distribution. We may use the same maxi- 

mum-entropy hypothesis to be the considered alternative to the bimodal 

model. Then, if we get zero spots, the post-odds on the bimodal model is 3 1 x 

0.002, i.e. 0.06. If we get exactly 15 spots, the post-odds on the bimodal 

model is 31 x (2 lop5), i.e. 0.0006. 

In examining the p-value test in Section 2, we saw cause for concern in the 

fact that, for the cases we examined, thep-value is smaller than the post-prob- 

ability even when the specific hypothesis is compared with the hypothesis that 

the probability has its maximum-likelihood value. In examining the maxi- 

mum-entropy analysis, we find that it is not subject to the same objection. 

TABLE 1 

Copmarison of p-Values and Post Probabilities 

n p-Value Left Tail p-Value Right Tail Post Probability 

Forpl = 0.5 and N = 10, this table lists the p-values for each tail and the post-probability for 

n=Oto 10


Fig. 5. The upper curve is the post-probability of H 1 , as estimated by the maximum-entropy test. 

The lower curves show the p-values for the left-hand tail and the right-hand tail. 

Fig. 6. The same data as in Figure 5, displayed in terms of log-odds and LPVO (log-p-value- 

odds). 

Considering once more the case that p, = 0.5 and N = 10, we find that for n = 0, 

1, 2 and 3, the post-odds on H1 are 0.01 1, 0.1 1, 0.48 and 1.29, respectively. 

When we take p, to be the maximum likelihood value (0, 0.1, 0,2 and 0.3, re- 

spectively), we obtain a post-odds of 0.001, 0.026, 0.15, and 0.44, respective- 

ly. Hence the maximum-entropy analysis yields estimates of the post-proba- 

bility that are (appropriately enough) more conservative than the values that 

would be obtained by identifyingp, with the maximum-likelihood value. 

Finally, we may note that (unlike the p-value test that only gives evidence 

against the considered hypothesis), the maximum-entropy test yields evidence


in favor of the considered hypothesis when that is appropriate. For instance, 

for the simple problem that p, = 0.5 and N = 10, we see from Table 1 that the 

experiment favors the considered hypothesis if it yields n = 3,4,5,6 or 7. The 

experiment yields evidence against the considered hypothesis if n = 0, 1, 2, 8, 

9, or 10. Utts (1996) may well be correct when she writes, concerning the p- 

value test, that "(although) the probability that the null hypothesis is true ... 

might be a more interesting question to answer, there is no way to answer it." 

We see, however, that a simple Bayesian approach to the same problem does 

yield an estimate of the probability that the considered hypothesis is true. 

References 

Dobyns, Y. H., and Jahn, R. G. (1995). Journal of Scientific Exploration (Letters to the Editor), 9, 

122. 

Dobyns, Y. H. (1995). Journal of Scientific Exploration (Letters to the Editor), 9,597. 

Good, I. J. (1950). Probability and the Weighing of Evidence. London: Griffin. 

Jaynes, E. T. (1957). Information theory and statistical mechanics I. Physics Review, 106,620. 

Jaynes, E. T. (1989). Papers on Probability, Statistics and Statistical Physics. Ed. R. D. 

Rosenkrantz, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 216. 

Jefferys, W. H. (1995). Journal of Scientific Exploration (Letters to the Editor), 9, 12 1. 

Jefferys, W. H. (1995). Journal of Scientific Exploration (Letters to the Editor), 9,595. 

Jeffreys, H. (1931). Scientific Inference. Cambridge University Press. 

Sturrock, P.A. (1 994). Applied scientific inference. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 8,49 1. 

Utts, J. (1996). Seeing Through Statistics. Duxbury Press.

Journal of Scienti$c Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 193-200, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Planetary Diameters in the Surya-Siddhanta 

RICHARD THOMPSON 

Bhaktivedanta Institute, f? 0. Box 1920, Alachua, Florida 3261 6-1 920 

Abstract -This paper discusses a rule given in the Indian astronomical text 

Surya-siddhanta for computing the angular diameters of the planets. By com- 

bining these angular diameters with the circumferences of the planetary or- 

bits listed in this text, it is possible to compute the diameters of the planets. 

When these computations are carried out, the results agree surprisingly well 

with modern astronomical data. Several possible explanations for this are dis- 

cussed, and it is hypothesized that the angular diameter rule in the Surya-sid- 

dhanta may be based on advanced astronomical knowledge that was devel- 

oped in ancient times but has now been largely forgotten. 

Keywords: Astronomy - Surya-Siddhanta - Indology 

Introduction 

In chapter 7 of the Surya-siddhanta (Burgess, 1989), the 13th verse gives the 

following rule for calculating the apparent diameters of the planets Mars, Sat- 

urn, Mercury, Jupiter, and Venus: 

7.13. The diameters upon the moon's orbit of Mars, Saturn, Mercury, and Jupiter, are 

declared to be thirty, increased successively by half the half; that of Venus is sixty. 

The meaning is as follows: The diameters are measured in a unit of distance 

called the yojana, which in the Surya-siddhanta is about five miles. The 

phrase "upon the moon's orbit" means that the planets look from our vantage 

point as though they were globes of the indicated diameters situated at the dis- 

tance of the moon. (Our vantage point is ideally the center of the earth.) Half 

the half of 30 is 7.5. Thus the verse says that the diameters "upon the moon's 

orbit" of the indicated planets are given by 30,37.5,45,52.5, and 60 yojanas, 

respectively. 

The next verse uses this information to compute the angular diameters of 

the planets. This computation takes into account the variable distance of the 

planets from the earth, but for the purposes of this paper it is enough to consid- 

er the angular diameters at mean planetary distances. The diameters upon the 

moon's orbit were given for the planets at these mean distances from the earth. 

The Surya-siddhanta says that there are 15 yojanas per minute of arc at the 

distance of the moon (giving 324,000 yojanas as the circumference of the 

moon's orbit). Thus the mean angular diameters of the planets can be

194 R. Thompson 

TABLE 1 

Angular Diameters of Planets in Minutes of Arc. 

Planet Su rva - Ptolemy Tycho Modern Modern 

Siddhanta Brahe Minimum Maximum 

Mars 2.0 1.57 1.67 0.058 0.392 

Saturn 2.5 1.74 1.83 0.249 0.344 

Mercury 3.0 2.09 2.17 0.076 0.166 

Jupiter 3.5 2.61 2.75 0.507 0.827 

Venus 4.0 3.13 3.25 0.159 1.050 

The modern angular diameters are for the greatest and least distances of the planets from the 

earth. 

computed by dividing the diameters upon the moon's orbit by 15. Table 1 

gives the results of this computation and lists other estimates of planetary an- 

gular diameters for comparison. 

The Surya-siddhanta figures are roughly the same size as the planetary an- 

gular diameters reported by the 2nd century Alexandrian astronomer Claudius 

Ptolemy in his book Planetary Hypotheses. Ptolemy attributed his angular di- 

ameters to the Greek astronomer Hipparchus, but he did not say how they 

were measured. According to the historian of astronomy Noel Swerdlow 

(1 968), no earlier reports of planetary angular diameters are known, and Ptole- 

my's angular diameters were reproduced without change by later Greco- 

Roman, Islamic, and European astronomers up until the rise of modem astron- 

omy in the days of Galileo, Kepler, and Tycho Brahe. 

Brahe's figures were obtained by sighting through calibrated pinholes by 

the naked eye. They are very similar to Ptolemy's, and they are clearly much 

larger than the angular diameters measured in more recent times by means of 

telescopes (Burgess, 1989). It is well known that a small, distant light source 

looks larger to the naked eye than it really is. This phenomenon makes it likely 

that angular diameters of planets would inevitably have been over-estimated 

by astronomers before the age of the telescope. 

It has been argued that Indian astronomy was heavily influenced by Hel- 

lenistic astronomy between the second and fifth centuries A. D. (Pingree, 

1976). This suggests that the angular diameters given in the Surya-siddhanta 

may have been based on Ptolemy's angular diameters. Indeed, Ptolemy's fig- 

ures are very close to 94/(60 - 7.5n), where n+l is the line number in Table 1. 

The corresponding Surya-siddhanta figures are given by (30 + 7.5n)/15. 

Whether or not this indicates an Indian adaptation of Greek material, the 

angular diameters from Surya-siddhanta have an important property that the 

Ptolemaic angular diameters lack. To see this, it is first necessary to examine 

the sizes of the planetary orbits, as given in Surya-siddhanta. 

Orbital Dimensions in the Surya-Siddhanta 

Verses 12.85-90 of the Surya-siddhanta give the circumferences of the

Planetary Diameters 195 

planetary orbits in yojanas, and these figures are reproduced in Table 2. The 

orbits are represented as simple circles centered on the earth, and their circum- 

ferences are proportional to the mean orbital periods of the planets. For Mer- 

cury and Venus, the mean planetary position is the same as the position of the 

sun, and thus the orbital circumferences in the table are the same for Mercury, 

Venus, and the sun. For Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, the mean position corre- 

sponds to the average motion of the planet in its heliocentric orbit. 

Verse 1.59 of the Surya-siddhanta gives the diameter of the earth as 1,600 

yojanas. Several scholars have argued that the yojana in the Surya-siddhanta 

is about 5 miles, thereby bringing the earth's diameter to the realistic value of 

5x1600 = 8,000 miles. Examples are Sarma (1956), Burgess ( 1989), and Dik- 

shit (1969). 

Different standards were adopted for the yojana by different medieval Indi- 

an astronomers. This was noted by the astronomer Paramesvara (1 380-1450 

A. D.), who said: 

What is given by Aryabhata as the measure of the earth and the distances [of the Planets 

from it], etc., is given as more than one and a half times by other [astronomers]; this is 

due to the difference in the measure of the yojana [adopted by them] (Sarma, 1956). 

Verse 4.1 of the Surya-siddhanta gives the diameters of the sun and moon as 

6,500 and 480 yojanas, respectively. Given 5 miles per yojana, the resulting 

lunar diameter of 5x480 = 2,400 miles is about 11% higher than the modem 

value. The corresponding earth-moon distance of about 258,000 miles (listed 

in Table 2) is high by 8.3%. However, the sun's diameter comes to 5x6500 = 

32,500 miles, which is far too small. 

It is easy to see why the diameter of the moon should be reasonably accu- 

rate. The dimensions of the moon and its orbit were well known in ancient 

times. For example, the lunar diameter given by Ptolemy in his Planetary Hy- 

potheses falls within about 7% of the modern value, if we convert his earth-di- 

ameters into miles using the modem diameter of the earth (Swerdlow, 1968). 

TABLE 2 

Geocentric Orbital Circumferences 

Planet Surya-siddhanta Orbital Surya-siddhanta 

Circumference (yojanas) Orbital Radius (miles) 

Moon 

Mercury 

Venus 

Sun 

Mars 

Jupiter 

Saturn 

As given in texts 12.85-90 of the Surya-siddhanta. The orbital radii are computed from these 

circumferences using 5 miles per yojana.


It is also easy to see why the diameter for the sun is too small. Ancient astronomers 

tended to greatly underestimate the earth-sun distance, and Table 2 

shows that this also happened in the Surya-siddhanta, The angular diameter of 

the sun is easily seen to be about the same as that of the moon - about 112 degree. 

This angular diameter, combined with a small earth-sun distance, leads 

inevitably to a small estimate for the diameter of the sun. Ptolemy's solar diameter 

figure is similar to the Surya-siddhanta 7 

s. 

Computing Planetary Diameters 

What about the planets? Ptolemy listed wildly inaccurate diameters for Mer- 

cury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn in his Planetary Hypotheses. To see 

what the Surya-siddhanta says about the diameters of these planets, we should 

multiply the orbital radii in Table 2 by the angular diameters (converted to ra- 

dians) in Table 1. This is done in Table 3. 

Note that even though the angular diameters are too large, and the orbital 

radii are too small, the calculated diameters are close to modern values for 

Mercury, Mars, and Saturn. For Venus and Jupiter, they are too small by about 

50%. One might argue that this balancing is due to pure chance. However, 

since the balancing works for five distinct cases, it is worthwhile to estimate 

just how probable it is. 

This probability can be evaluated by setting up a model in which diameters 

are chosen at random. One can then check to see if the observed correlation be- 

tween modem and Surya-siddhanta diameters is likely to show up in this 

model. Of course, it is difficult to propose a realistic probabilistic model of 

how ancient people would have generated astronomical data. But it is possible 

to set up a simple model in which it is assumed that all planetary diameters, an- 

cient and modern, are given by positive random numbers. It is easy to show 

that the observed correlation between modern and Surya-siddhanta diameters 

is highly unlikely to arise by chance, according to this model. This is discussed 

in the appendix. 

If the observed correlation did not happen by chance, then perhaps it hap- 

pened by design. One hypothesis is that at some time in the past, ancient as- 

TABLE 3 

Planetary Diameters in Miles 

Planet Modern Diameter Surya-siddhanta Diameter % Error 

Mercury 

Venus 

Mars 

Jupiter 

Saturn 

Computed using the Surya-siddhanta orbital radii from Table 2 and angular diameters from 

Table 1. The error percentages compare the Surya-siddhanta diameters with the corresponding


tronomers possessed realistic values for the diameters of the planets. They 

might have acquired this knowledge during a forgotten period in which astron- 

omy reached a high level of sophistication. Later on, much of this knowledge 

was lost, but fragmentary remnants were preserved and eventually incorporat- 

ed into texts such as the Surya-siddhanta. In particular, the real diameters of 

the planets were later combined with erroneous orbital circumferences to com- 

pute the diameters "upon the moon" given in verse 7.13. These figures were 

then accepted because they gave realistic values for the angular diameters of 

the planets as seen by the naked eye. 

This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the Surya-siddhanta diameters 

of Jupiter and Venus in Table 3 are almost exactly half of the corresponding 

modern diameters. If we multiply these Surya-siddhanta diameters by 2, we 

get 83248 miles for Jupiter and 8022 miles for Venus. These figures differ 

from the corresponding modern values by -6% and +7%. Given this correc- 

tion, all five planets have an error of 1 1 % or less. (The root-mean-square error 

comes to 6.3%.) 

One can argue that the Surya-siddhanta diameters for Jupiter and Venus 

were actually the radii for these planets, and somehow they were accepted as 

diameters by mistake. Or radii might have been deliberately used instead of di- 

ameters in order to allow for the simple rule of 30+7.5n used in verse 7.13. 

This is consistent with the fact that such verses were intended as memory aids 

and brevity was considered to be a virtue. 

Alternative Explanations 

Of course, it could be argued that this is just number jugglery, and by jug- 

gling numbers one can create false correlations. But let us review the steps 

taken thus far. The angular diameters in Table 1 were given by the text of the 

Surya-siddhanta. The orbital radii of Table 2 were computed from Surya-sid- 

dhanta orbital circumferences using the conversion factor of 5 miles per yo- 

jana. This factor is based on the Surya-siddhanta's diameter for the earth, and 

it has been discussed by other authors. There is no scope for juggling numbers 

here. 

The only proposed adjustment of the numbers is the doubling of the Surya- 

siddhanta diameters of Jupiter and Venus. Since the Surya-siddhanta numbers 

can be so easily brought into line with modem data, it may be that they have a 

genuine relationship with this data. 

One possible explanation is that verse 7.13 may have been written recently, 

using modem planetary data, and falsely interpolated into the text. But this is 

ruled out by the fact that there is a manuscript of the Surya-siddhanta that 

scholars date to the year 143 1 A. D. (Shukla, 1957). This manuscript includes 

a commentary by Paramesvara, who died in 1450 A. D., and thus it definitely 

dates back to the 15th century. Verse 7.13 is present in this manuscript, and it 

agrees with the Burgess translation quoted above. The commentary explains


the verse point by point, and thus it confirms that the verse was present in the 

manuscript in the same form in which it appears today. 

In 15th century Europe, the prevailing ideas concerning the sizes of the 

planets came from medieval Islamic astronomers who were following the 

teachings of Ptolemy. The first telescopic observations of planets were made 

by Galileo in 1609- 10 (Drake, 1976). As late as 163 1, Pierre Gassendi of Paris 

was shocked when his telescopic observation of a transit of Mercury across the 

sun revealed that its angular diameter was much smaller than he had believed 

possible (Van Helden, 1976). It is clear that the information on planetary di- 

ameters in the Surya-siddhanta antedates the development of modern knowl- 

edge of these diameters. 

It is also clear that Hellenistic astronomers did not have accurate diameters 

for the planets. Ptolemy computed planetary diameters from his angular diam- 

eters and his estimates of planetary distances, and these were reproduced with- 

out significant change by European and Islamic astronomers for centuries 

(Swerdlow, 1968). However, his figures disagree strongly both with modem 

data and with the diameters computed from Surya-siddhanta in Table 3. 

Deriving the Surya-siddhanta Rule 

If we hypothesize that verse 7.13 incorporates knowledge of the actual di- 

ameters of the planets, then one natural question is this: If one started with the 

modem diameters of the planets and the Suva-siddhanta orbital circumfer- 

ences, could one arrive at the rule given in this verse? We can answer this ques- 

tion by computing planetary diameters "upon the moon's orbit" as follows: 

For each planet, multiply its modem diameter, converted to yojanas, by the 

ratio between the orbital circumferences of the moon and the given planet, as 

listed in Table 2. Here we use the radius in place of the diameter for Jupiter and 

Venus. The resulting values are listed in the leftmost column of Table 4. 

The idea behind the rule in verse 7.13 is to arrange the planets so that the di- 

ameters on the moon's orbit are in increasing order and then approximate them 

by a simple arithmetic progression. We can see from Table 4 that the order of 

the planets used in this rule does put the computed diameters "on the moon's 

orbit" in increasing order. One can approximate them by an arithmetic pro- 

gression of the form an+b either by trial and error or by using an optimization 

method such as least squares. I did this by least squares and got a= 6.356 and 

TABLE 4 

Deriving Verse 7.13 from Modern Data 

Planet Modern projection Least squares fit Angular diameter 

Mars 

Saturn 

Mercury 

Jupiter 

Venus


b= 33.089. This arithmetic progression is listed in the middle column of Table 

4. 

In the leftmost column, modern planetary diameters are projected to the 

orbit of the moon, assuming the planetary orbits given in Surya-siddhanta. 

The projected diameters are expressed in yojanas (and radii are used in place of 

diameters for Jupiter and Venus). In the middle column, these projected diam- 

eters are fit to an arithmetic progression using least squares. The angular diam- 

eters in the rightmost column are obtained by dividing the figures in the mid- 

dle column by 15 yojanas per minute of arc. 

One could arrive at the rule in verse 7.13 by observing that 33.1 is about 30, 

45.8 is about 45, and 58.5 is about 60. Or one could compute the angular diam- 

eters listed in the rightmost column of Table 4 by dividing the numbers in the 

arithmetic progression by 15. It is plausible that someone looking for a simple 

rule might round off these angular diameters to the Surya-siddhanta series of 

2,2.5, 3,3.5,4. 

Thus it is possible to derive the rule in verse 7.13 from modern values for the 

diameters of the planets. 

Conclusion 

In summary, verses 7.13 and 12.85-90 of the Surya-siddhanta contain in- 

formation regarding the true diameters of the five planets Mercury, Venus, 

Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. This information enables us to compute the diame- 

ters of three of these planets with errors of 1 1 % or less. If the computed figures 

for Jupiter and Venus are interpreted as their radii rather than their diameters, 

then these radii are in error by about 6% and 7%, respectively. This may not be 

due to mere coincidence. Rather, it may indicate that accurate knowledge of 

planetary diameters was possessed by ancient astronomers and used in the 

composition either of the Surya-siddhanta or of some earlier astronomical 

text on which it was based. It is not apparent how such knowledge may have 

been obtained, but we should be on the alert for other possible examples. 

References 

Burgess, Ebenezer, trans. (1989). The Surya Siddhanta. Gangooly, P., ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsi- 

dass. 

Dikshit, S. B. (1969). English Translation of Bharatiya Jyotish Sastra. R. V. Vaidya, trans., 

Delhi: Manager of Publications, Civil Lines. 

Drake, Stillman (1976). Galilee's first telescopic observations. Journal for the History ofAstron- 

omy, 7, 153. 

Pingree, David (1976). The recovery of early Greek astronomy from India. Journal for the Histo- 

ry ofAstronomy, 7, 109. 

Sarma, K. V., tram. (1956). The Goladipika by Paramesvara. Madras: The Adyar Library and 

Research Center. 

Shukla, K. S. (1957). The Surya Siddhanta with the Commentary of Paramesvara. Dept. of Math- 

ematics and Astronomy: Lucknow University. 

Swerdlow, Noel Mark (1968). Ptolerny 's Theory of the Distances and Sizes of the Planets: A Study 

of the Scientific Foundations of Medieval Cosmology. Yale Univ. Ph.D. thesis.


Van Helden, Albert, (1976). The importance of the transit of Mercury of 1631. Journal for the 

History of Astronomy, 7, 1. 

Appendix: Statistical Evaluation 

In this appendix a simple probabilistic model is used to evaluate whether or 

not the correlation between modern and Surya-siddhanta diameters shown in 

Table 3 could have arisen by chance. First, randomly choose 5 numbers between 

0 and B, where B is some fixed positive number. Call these numbers 

X,, ..., X,, and let them represent the diameters of Mercury, Venus, Mars, 

Jupiter, and Saturn, as calculated from data in the Surya-siddhanta. Then randomly 

choose 5 numbers Yl ,..., Y5 between 0 and B to represent the modem 

values for these diameters. What is the probability that the X's will agree with 

the Y's as well as do the Surya-siddhanta and modem diameters listed in Table 

3? 

For each (X, Y), let P = 1 - min(XIY, YIX). P is a measure of how close X is to 

Y, and P= 0 if X=Y. It is easy to see that if X and Yare chosen independently in 

(0,B) with a uniform distribution, then P is distributed uniformly on [O, 1). (It 

does not matter what value we choose for B.) 

Let S be the sum of the P's for the 5 pairs (X,Y). If we compute S using the 5 

pairs of diameters from Table 3, we get S = 1.12 1. What is the probability that 

S will be no greater than this for the 5 randomly chosen (X,Y) pairs? 

It is easy to compute an upper bound on the probability that S < y, where S is 

the sum of n independent random variables distributed uniformly on [O,l). 

This upper bound is ynln!. Using S = 1.12 1 and n = 5, we get .0147 for this 

upper bound. Therefore, the actual pairs of diameters in Table 3 exhibit a significant 

deviation from chance expectation. 

Note that in this probability estimate, the Surya-siddhanta diameters of 

Jupiter and Venus have not been doubled. Thus the probability estimate of 

.0147 is for the unedited Surya-siddhanta diameters. If we do double the diameters 

of Venus and Jupiter (taking them to be radii), then the probability estimate 

becomes 7 .7~ 1 oP6.

Journal of Scientijc Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 2, pp. 20 1-224, 1997 0892-33 10197 


ESSAY 

Science of the subjective 1 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research (PEAR) Laboratory 

School of Engineering and Applied Science, Princeton University 

Abstract - Over the greater portion of its long scholarly history, the particu- 

lar form of human observation, reasoning, and technical deployment we 

properly term "science" has relied at least as much on subjective experience 

and inspiration as it has on objective experiments and theories. Only over the 

past few centuries has subjectivity been progressively excluded from the 

practice of science, leaving an essentially secular analytical paradigm. Quite 

recently, however, a compounding constellation of newly inexplicable physi- 

cal evidence, coupled with a growing scholarly interest in the nature and ca- 

pability of human consciousness, are beginning to suggest that this steriliza- 

tion of science may have been excessive and could ultimately limit its 

epistemological reach and cultural relevance. In particular, an array of 

demonstrable consciousness-related anomalous physical phenomena, a per- 

sistent pattern of biological and medical anomalies, systematic studies of 

mindlbrain relationships and the mechanics of human creativity, and a bur- 

geoning catalogue of human factors effects within contemporary information 

processing technologies, all display empirical correlations with subjective as- 

pects that greatly complicate, and in many cases preclude, their comprehen- 

sion on strictly objective grounds. However, any disciplined re-admission of 

subjective elements into rigorous scientific methodology will hinge on the 

precision with which they can be defined, measured, and represented, and on 

the resilience of established scientific techniques to their inclusion. For ex- 

ample, any neo-subjective science, while retaining the logical rigor, empiri- 

calltheoretical dialogue, and cultural purpose of its rigidly objective prede- 

cessor, would have the following requirements: acknowledgment of a 

proactive role for human consciousness; more explicit and profound use of 

interdisciplinary metaphors; more generous interpretations of measurability, 

replicability, and resonance; a reduction of ontological aspirations; and an 

overarching teleological causality. Most importantly, the subjective and ob- 

jective aspects of this holistic science would have to stand in mutually re- 

spectful and constructive complementarity to one another if the composite 

discipline were to fulfill itself and its role in society. 

'This essay has been developed from a presentation to a symposium held in the John M. Clayton Hall 

of the University of Delaware on September 27-29, 1997, entitled "Return to the Source: Rediscovering 

Lost Knowledge and Ancient Wisdom," which was sponsored by the Society for Scientific Exploration 

and supported in part by a generous grant from The Lifebridge Foundation.

202 R. Jahn and B. Dunne 

Scientific Definition 

The word "science" derives from a Latin verb, scire, meaning to know or to 

understand; it could thus properly apply to any process of comprehension of 

any topic or form of experience. But in contemporary usage the term has 

taken on an array of more specific implications, depending on the context, the 

user, or the audience. In some instances it connotes bodies of established tech- 

nical knowledge, such as biology, chemistry, geology, or physics, or the tech- 

nological applications thereof. In other situations it conveys more dynamic 

images of visionary, portentous research into new and exciting natural or cul- 

tural phenomena. In yet another variant, it refers to the communities of schol- 

ars and practitioners of such topics, or to the social authority they exert. Or fi- 

nally, the term science can imply a methodology, or standard, or ethic of 

intellectual exploration that distinguishes its process from other less rigorous 

forms of human reasoning and creativity, regardless of the particular subjects 

addressed, or of the credentials of the persons addressing them. In most situa- 

tions, the distinctions matter little; largely the same impressions can be con- 

veyed and the same conclusions reached by any of these definitions. But in 

certain rarer cases, such definitions can conflict in serious ways, with much 

less agreement on the proper circumscription of the topics, on the requisite 

qualifications of the scholars studying them, or on the proper methods for 

their study. It is just such examples that test the fundamentality and integrity 

of any definition, doctrine, or demonstration that claims the authority of sci- 

ence, and it is our conviction that when such contradictions arise, criteria 

based on methodology, epistemological purposes, and ethical values should 

take precedence over any topical, academic, or cultural circumscriptions. It is 

in this spirit that we shall address our subject, referring for background to the 

historical evolution of scientific methodologies, attitudes, and conceptual cur- 

rencies. 

Scientific Methodology 

The early scientific heritage that evolved through the cultures of the Egyp- 

tians, Greeks, Romans, Orientals, Byzantines, and Medieval alchemists in- 

volved intimate admixtures of metaphysical rituals with rigorous analytical 

techniques, yet generated extensive pragmatic knowledge and products, some 

of which, like the ancient pyramids or stone circles, still defy modem replica- 

tion or comprehension. The initiation of more secular scientific practice is 

usually attributed to the renowned renaissance scholar and statesman, Sir 

Francis Bacon, who pleaded for constructive dialogue between experiment 

and theory in his characteristically florid terms: 

... Those who have treated the sciences were either empirics or rationalists. The empir- 

ics, like ants, only lay up stores, and use them; the rationalists, like spiders, spin webs 

out of themselves; but the bee takes a middle course, gathering her matter from the 

flowers of the field and garden, and digesting and preparing it by her native powers. In

Science of the Subjective 203 

like manner, that is the true offices and work of philosophy, which, not trusting too 

much to the faculties of the mind, does not lay up the matter, afforded by natural history 

and mechanical experience, entire or unfashioned, in the memory, but treasures it, after 

being first elaborated and digested in the understanding; and, therefore, we have a good 

ground of hope, from the close and strict union of the experimental and rational faculty, 

which have not hitherto been united [I]. 

Notwithstanding this plea, it should be noted that Bacon, along with many 

of his peers and successors in this period of "scientific enlightenment", includ- 

ing Robert Boyle, Robert Hooke, and Isaac Newton, were practicing Hermeti- 

cists who retained lifelong interests in the metaphysical dimensions of physi- 

cal phenomena [2-51. It has been argued that it was only their need to insulate 

scientific inquiry from the prevailing theological dogma that engendered pro- 

gressively more objective interpretation of this "scientific method [6]", which 

in the hands of their successors has led to the exclusion of virtually all subjec- 

tive material. While the immense accomplishments of this modern objective 

science are abundantly evident, the consequences of continued future exclu- 

sion of all subjective elements from scientific purview, which Bacon and his 

colleagues certainly would not have endorsed, merit some careful considera- 

tion. 

Scientific Attitude 

Beyond its disciplined reliance upon constructive iteration of sound experi- 

mental data with incisive theoretical models, good science is characterized by 

thorough and respectful cognizance of relevant past and present work by oth- 

ers, humility in the face of empirical evidence, and openness of mind to new 

topics, new approaches, new ideas, and new scholars. In particular, it main- 

tains a profound respect for demonstrable experimental and theoretical anom- 

alies and their crucial role within the scientific dialogue of experiment and 

theory [7]. There is no more critical test of the integrity of any scientific 

process than its reaction to anomalous features uncovered in either its experi- 

mental or theoretical endeavors, i.e. empirical observations demonstrably in- 

consistent with established theoretical expectations, or theoretical predictions 

that conflict with established experimental data. Such anomalies demand im- 

mediate attention to discriminate between artifacts of flawed experimentation 

or theoretical logic, and the entry of genuine new phenomena onto the scien- 

tific stage. Error in this discrimination can divert or extend science along false 

scholarly trails, while proper identification and assimilation of real anomalies 

can open more penetrating paths than those previously followed. 

Unfortunately, such intellectual respect for the role of anomalies has tended 

to be more honored in the abstract than in actual practice. As physician Larry 

Dossey has observed:


In any field of science there are always phenomena that do not fit in what can be called 

'low' and 'high' anomalies. Low anomalies are those that offer minor and temporary 

challenges to prevailing concepts and that can eventually be explained according to ex- 

tant wisdom. High anomalies, on the other hand, cannot in principle be 

accommodated by conventional, orthodox models. They require a break with 

current thinking. They may be emotionally wrenching even for those most 

familiar with them, and are generally surrounded by a swirl of controversy. 

It is simply the nature of workers in any field in science to feel more comfortable with 

what they can explain. That is why high anomalies tend to be ignored, usually with the 

mystification that they will be cleared up at some future date. That is also why they are 

frequently dismissed as erroneous observation and sometimes condemned as fraudu- 

lent. High anomalies do not go down easily [8]. 

But good science, of any topic, cannot turn away from anomalies; they are 

the most precious resource, however unrefined, for its future growth and re- 

finement. 

Scientific Currency 

To conduct its business effectively, any science must ordain a set of concep- 

tual currencies in terms of which it can represent and evaluate its phenomenol- 

ogy. In most of the classical physical sciences, these currencies strive to em- 

body precisely measurable, unambiguously quantifiable, and strictly 

replicable properties, with minimal statistical variance. In the quantum-based 

physical sciences, however, as well as the biological, medical, psychological, 

and social sciences, progressively more reliance has come to be placed upon 

statistical rather than uniquely deterministic measurables. In most cases, a cu- 

mulative sequence of three genres of such conceptual currencies can be traced, 

relating to tangible substance, energy in various forms, and information. For 

example, most early science tended to focus on the behavior of palpable mat- 

ter, its gross mechanics, chemical and physical properties, with primary re- 

liance on the quantitative measurable we now call "mass". Midway through 

the 19th century, the concept of "energy" - mechanical, thermal, electromag- 

netic, atomic - was added to the arsenal of scientific endeavor as a somewhat 

less tangible, but still quantifiable currency of phenomenological representa- 

tion. Over the past few decades, a third scientific currency, loosely termed "in- 

formation", has taken center stage, and clearly will dominate basic research 

and its applications over the foreseeable future. 

A similar conceptual genealogy has characterized the evolution of the bio- 

logical and medical sciences. Early preoccupation with the properties of bio- 

logical substance - bone, tissue, blood, cell - led inevitably to confrontation 

of the energetic processes of living organisms - their metabolism, kinesiolog- 

ical dynamics, immune and restorative activities. At present, the overriding 

emphasis is on biological information, as manifested in the mechanisms of 

neurophysiological reaction and communication, immune response, brain 

function, genetic coding, and a host of psychophysical correlates.

I 


Originally, these three currencies of matter, energy, and information were 

presumed to be orthogonal, but subsequently they have been shown to be fun- 

damentally interchangeable, with immense consequences. Einstein's trans- 

mutation relation, E = mc 2 , has impelled much of 20th century physics, and its 

technological, political, and sociological implications can hardly be overstat- 

ed. Somewhat subtler equivalence of energy and information has also been es- 

tablished in various thermodynamic and quantum mechanical contexts and in 

basic information science itself, and this may well drive much of 21st century 

science and its applications. 

Objective vs. Subjective Information 

The escalating reliance of science and technology on information currency 

brings with it two intriguing problems, neither of which have been adequately 

acknowledged, let alone addressed. First, there is the self-evident distinction 

between "objective" and "subjective" information. The former, the hard cur- 

rency of information-processing devices of all kinds, is used to transmit imper- 

sonal knowledge, and is readily quantifiable and ultimately reducible to binary 

digits. The latter is inextricably bound with issues of meaning, value, and per- 

spective, and thus would seem to defy such universal quantification. For ex- 

ample, the objective information contained in any book could, in principle, be 

uniquely quantified by suitable digitization of its array of letters, symbols, and 

illustrations, but the subjective information communicated would depend 

keenly on the reader's interest in the subject matter, intellectual heritage, emo- 

tional perspective, and personal value system. Likewise, while we might 

quantify the objective information displayed by a brilliant sunset or a magnifi- 

cent waterfall in terrns of the prevailing distributions of optical frequencies 

and amplitudes, in so doing we would fail to convey the subjective beauty of 

the scene. For that purpose, we would more likely resort to descriptive adjec- 

tives in our linguistic syntax, or even try to express in some pseudo-quantita- 

tive terms how much that book, or that experience impressed or delighted us. 

In fact, it could be argued that much of human language has evolved from our 

need to express subjective feelings in a broadly communicable format. 

Such pseudo-quantitative representations of subjective qualities, while 

falling far short of scientific rigor, appear in many diverse contexts. In some 

cases, the objective and subjective specifications are intrinsically intertwined. 

For example, the objective information contained in any musical work is rou- 

tinely recorded in a quantitative array of notes of given pitch and duration in- 

scribed on a well-defined grid. The amplitude of the desired sound, however, 

is usually specified in semi-quantitative terms, e.g., piano or fortissimo, that 

allow the performer some subjective latitude. The tempi intended by the com- 

poser are noted in even more subjective instructions, e.g. andante expressivo, 

or allegro vivace, overlaid with particular local nuances, such as sostenuto or 

rallentando. The total information transmitted to a listener by a performance 

of this piece thus ranges from an analytic sense of its harmonic and thematic


structure that would be commonly agreed upon, to an impressionistic, even 

emotional reaction that depends heavily on that listener's cultural heritage, 

musical sophistication, and personal taste. 

Inclusion of subjective information within the framework of science clearly 

constitutes a huge analytical challenge. Many contend that it should not even 

be attempted - that subjectivity should be categorically excluded from any of 

the "exact" sciences. Others feel equally keenly that in a world progressively 

more driven by individual and collective emotional resonances, orchestrated 

consumer reactions, media-manipulated politics, and delicate interpersonal 

expectations, for science to deny its immense intellectual power and cultural 

influence to this entire hemisphere of common human experience and expres- 

sion would not only be irresponsible, it could be dangerously self-constrain- 

ing . 

The Role of Consciousness 

Imposing as this accommodation of subjectivity may be, the deeper penetra- 

tion of science and technology into the forest of information stands to be con- 

siderably more complicated by a second, even more subtle issue, namely the 

demonstrated capacity of consciousness to afSect both subjective and objec- 

tive elements of information. Few will quarrel with the first half of this claim. 

The self-evident capabilities of human consciousness to create profound sub- 

jective experiences for itself and others to enjoy via art, music, literary compo- 

sition, or even via scientific and mathematical reasoning, can hardly be disput- 

ed. The sublime experiences engendered by love and empathy equally well 

qualify as enhancements of subjective information for their donors as well as 

for their recipients. But quantifiable alteration of the objective information 

content of a physical or biological system by some attending consciousness, 

while far more difficult to demonstrate and vastly more controversial to dis- 

cuss, has also been convincingly established over recent decades, by reputable 

scholars working in many venues. The bottom line of their research results is 

inescapable: consciousness has the capacity not only to absorb and process ob- 

jective information, but to create it, in rigorously measurable quantities. With 

this capability comes all manner of foreseeable and unforeseeable opportunity, 

and associated responsibility, which a more profound, open-minded science 

could endeavor to activate, discipline, and deploy productively. 

Nor is this challenge totally confined to the information segment of scientif- 

ic currency. Once the fungibility of subjective information is conceded, it be- 

hooves us to revisit the energy and matter domains as well. The pages of this 

journal have frequently reported on such topics as "subtle energies", "healing 

energies", and "psychokinetic" phenomena; other sources have presented us 

with evidence of auras, apparitions, and manifestations. All of vacuum 

physics traces to zero-point fluctuations, and thence to the uncertainty 

principle. For that matter, how much subjectivity underlies the materiallener- 

geticlinformational qualities of the fundamental particles, of the photons and


neutrinos, and of the quarks, gluons, and other sub-nuclear events? Is there 

not some subjectivity implicit in the wavelparticle duality? In the indistin- 

guishability principle? In the Copenhagen interpretation? And, while we are 

at it, is it not possible that a subjective science might aid in the comprehension 

of UFO phenomena? 

Scientific Purview 

The thesis is thus that science must soon make a deliberate and considered 

choice whether to continue to deny all subjective currency access to its table of 

scholarly business, thus excluding itself from comprehension of the universe 

of aesthetic and creative experience, including that which bears on objective 

efSects, or to broaden its purview to encompass these softer parameters in 

some disciplined yet productive fashion. The scientific method and the scien- 

tific attitude, as defined above, should tolerate, indeed should encourage, pro- 

visional exploration of the disciplined re-inclusion of subjective concepts and 

properties within the enterprise of the natural research sciences. As William 

James put it over a century ago: 

The spirit and principles of science are mere affairs of method; there is nothing in them 

that need hinder science from dealing successfully with a world in which personal 

forces are the starting point of new effects. The only form of thing that we directly en- 

counter, the only experience that we concretely have is our own personal life. The only 

completed category of our thinking, our professors of philosophy tell us, is the catego- 

ry of personality, every other category being one of the abstract elements of that. And 

this systematic denial on science's part of personality as a condition of events, this rig- 

orous belief that in its own essential and innermost nature our world is a strictly imper- 

sonal world, may, conceivably, as the whirligig of time goes round, prove to be the very 

defect that our descendants will be most surprised at in our boasted science, the omis- 

sion that to their eyes will most tend to make it look perspectiveless and short [9]. 

Henri Bergson saw the same vision: 

Science and metaphysics therefore come together in intuition. A truly intuitive philos- 

ophy would realize the much-desired union of science and metaphysics. While it 

would make of metaphysics a positive science - that is, a progressive and indefinitely 

perfectible one - it would at the same time lead the positive sciences, properly so 

called, to become conscious of their true scope, often far greater than they imagine. It 

would put more science into metaphysics, and more metaphysics into science [lo]. 

Ultimately, the proposition must stand or fall on whether it is possible to es- 

tablish a subjective conceptual currency, and a viable mechanics thereof, that 

can enable profitable dialogue between empirical experience and theoretical 

predictors, akin to that which has taken modern objective science to its lofty 

heights. If this fails, natural science must halt outside of the gates of "person-


ality as a condition of events"; if it succeeds, those gates will open to a glori- 

ous new domain of scientific exploration. 

The Physics of Consciousness 

Any commitment toward scientific representation of subjective properties 

and effects clearly requires one immediate major concession: the acknowledg- 

ment of consciousness as a proactive agency in the establishment of reality. 

This in turn demands a viable definition and model of consciousness itself, one 

that goes well beyond any neurological wiring diagram of the brain. Rather, 

we need a model that can encompass all four quadrants of objective and sub- 

jective, reactive and proactive, experiences of the physical world. Substantial 

bodies of established theory addressing some elements of this matrix exist, but 

unfortunately they are largely disconnected and leave major gaps in the con- 

verge. For example, contemporary natural science is replete with objective, 

reactive models of the physical world, most of which have been well con- 

firmed empirically. Objective models of consciousness also abound in the 

regimes of cognitive psychology and neuroscience, albeit tending to focus on 

brain structure and function rather than on the nature of consciousness, per se. 

On the subjective side of the matrix the reservoirs of established models stand 

more shallow. Present physical science has virtually nothing to say about sub- 

jective experience and, with the possible exception of the "observational" in- 

terpretations of quantum mechanics, acknowledges no proactive role for 

human participants. The situation is little better in the psychological and neu- 

rophysiological sectors, where subjective and proactive aspects of the psyche 

have seldom been treated in other than qualitative terms. While contemporary 

parapsychology or clinical psychiatry may contain some useful empirical ex- 

perience, conceptualization, and nomenclature, here, too, viable quantitative 

models are lacking [ll-121. Thus, our theoretical task becomes much more 

than re-deployment of established models and methods; major extensions in 

concept, as well as in structure, will be required. 

We have faced this problem in the context of our own PEAR program, in at- 

tempting to correlate, explicate, and predict the results of a spectrum of 

humanlmachine and remote perception experiments. Without attempting de- 

tailed review of these studies [7,13-161, it may be illustrative to summarize 

the protocols and results of those portions of this research that bear on the de- 

velopment of such a theoretical framework. 

Anomalous HumanIMachine Interactions 

Over the eighteen year history of the PEAR program, some 150 volunteer 

operators have performed a wide range of humanlmachine experiments de- 

signed to assess the influence of human intention on the output behavior of a 

variety of random physical devices. These devices are electrical, mechanical,


scopic in scale; digital or analog in their information processing and feedback 

displays. They generate data over a broad range of rates, in formats that are 

theoretically, or at least empirically, predictable. All are equipped with nu- 

merous fail-safe features to guarantee the integrity of their data and their free- 

dom from artifact, and all can be precisely calibrated to establish their unat- 

tended statistical output distributions. 

The participating operators have varied greatly in personality, background, 

intellectual sophistication, and style of interaction with the machines, but all 

have been anonymous, untrained, and uncompensated for their work, and none 

has claimed extraordinary abilities before or after the experimental efforts. 

Throughout, we have regarded these operators as research colleagues, rather 

than as subjects of study, and no psychological or physiological tests have 

been attempted. 

In all "benchmark" experiments, the operators, seated in front of the ma- 

chines but in no physical contact with them, using whatever personal strategies 

they wish, endeavor to produce statistically higher mean values of the output 

distributions, lower mean values, or "baseline" or unaltered mean values, over 

interspersed periods of pre-stated intentions. Great care is taken in the experi- 

mental design and data acquisition to preclude any form of spurious interfer- 

ence with the machine operation, so that any systematic deviation of these 

three data streams from one another can only indicate the existence and scale 

of the sought anomalous effect. 

A number of variants of the benchmark protocols have been explored, such 

as whether the intended direction of effort is chosen by the operator or as- 

signed by some random indicator; whether the machine runs continuously or is 

initiated at intervals imposed by the operator; the pace and size of the data 

blocks; the presence or absence of feedback, and its character; the number of 

operators addressing the machine; the distance of the operator from the ma- 

chine; and the time of machine operation relative to the time of operator effort. 

All told, some fifty million experimental trials have been performed to this 

date, containing more than three billion bits of binary information. From this 

large body of results, the following salient features have been extracted: 

1. Anomalous correlations of the machine output distribution means with 

pre-stated operator intentions are clearly evident. These mean shifts are 

statistically replicable and quantifiable in the range of a few parts in ten 

thousand deviation from chance expectation. Over the total data base, 

the composite anomaly is unlikely by chance to less than one part in a 

trillion. 

2. The output mean shifts, or "effect sizes", achieved by the various indi- 

vidual operators on any given experiment range smoothly over distribu- 

tions that would be expected by chance, except that the composite 

means are displaced from the chance nulls to the extent specified above.

R. Jahn and B. Dunne 

No outlying effect sizes, indicative of "superstar" performance, are 

found. 

3. Several of the individual operator data bases are sufficiently distinctive 

and replicable in their relative effectiveness under high, low, and baseline 

intentions, and in their responses to particular protocol variations, 

to constitute characteristic "signatures" of achievement. 

4. Both individually and collectively, the interior structures of the distributions 

of anomalous mean shifts are consistent with a model wherein the 

elemental binary probability intrinsic in each experiment has been altered 

from its design value of precisely one-half, to slightly higher or 

lower values, depending on the operator, the intention, and the protocol. 

5. The scale and character of the results are relatively insensitive to the 

particular random device employed. In some cases, the characteristic 

operator signatures are quite similar from one device to another. 

6. Significant differences in the patterns of male and female performance 

have been identified. 

7. Two operators addressing a given experiment together do not simply 

combine their individual achievement signatures; rather, their "co-operator" 

results are characteristic of the pair. Co-operators of the same sex 

are less effective than malelfemale pairs, and "bonded" malelfemale 

pairs produce the highest scores of any operator subsets. 

8. No learning or experience benefits are observed. To the contrary, operators 

tend to perform best over their first major experimental series, then 

to decline in performance over the next one or two series, after which 

they recover better performance that stabilizes to their individual values 

over subsequent series. 

9. No dependence of individual or collective effect sizes on the distance of 

the operators from the machines appears in the data. Operators addressing 

the machines from thousands of miles away produce effect sizes and 

characteristic signatures similar to those they achieve seated next to the 

machines in the laboratory. 

10. Experiments performed "off-time," i.e., with operators exerting their intentions 

several hours or days before, or after, the machines actually produce 

their data strings, show similar effect sizes and internal characteristics 

to those performed "on-time," i.e., with machine operation 

concurrent with the operators' periods of effort. 

11. Subjective reports from the most successful operators speak of a sense 

of "resonance 7 

' or "bond" with the machine; of surrendering their sense 

of identity to merge with the machine into a unified system; of exchanging 

roles with the machine; of "falling in love" with it; of "having fun" 

with it. 

From this array of empirical indications, it seems inescapable to conclude 

that operator consciousness is capable of inserting information, in its most

Science of the Subjective 21 1 

rudimentary objective form, namely binary bits, into these random physical 

systems, by some anomalous means that is independent of space and time. 

Humanlmachine experiments similar to these have been conducted at many 

other laboratories with anomalous results commensurate with our own [I 1 1. 

Responses from biological substances or living organisms employed as the 

random targets of the operators' intentions have also been demonstrated [I 7- 

191. Equally relevant are a small body of experiments in which the role of the 

operators has been played by other than human species, e.g., chicks and rab- 

bits, who seem capable of influencing random electronic processors to respond 

to some biological or emotional needs [20]. These results, combined with fur- 

ther studies in our own program that demonstrate anomalous bi-directional re- 

sponses of portable REG units unobtrusively placed in various human group 

environments, such as religious services, sporting events, professional meet- 

ings, medical counseling sessions, or other convocations entailing some col- 

lective emotional potential [2 11, confirm the ubiquitous character of these in- 

formation anomalies and broaden their potential importance to individual and 

cultural welfare. 

Remote Perception 

In a complementary class of PEAR experiments, the "target" is not a physi- 

cal device or process in a laboratory environment, but a physical scene at some 

remote geographical location. The goal of the human participant is not to in- 

sert information into the target, but to extract information from it, by anom- 

alous means. In the usual protocol, two participants are involved in any given 

experiment. One, the "agent", is physically present at a target location select- 

ed by some random process, and there, immersed emotionally and cognitively 

in the scene, records its characteristics on a standard check sheet, and takes 

photographs of it. The other, the "percipient", situated at some distance from 

the scene and with no prior knowledge of it, attempts to perceive aspects of its 

ambiance and detail, and then records those impressions on an identical check 

sheet and in some less structured narrative or sketch. The agent and percipient 

check sheets are subsequently digitized and their degree of consonance scored 

numerically by a variety of algorithms. The results, indicative of the amount 

of objective information acquired by the percipient, can then be arrayed in 

quantitative statistical formats similar to those used in the humadmachine ex- 

periments. 

Several hundred such remote perception experiments have been performed 

and scored, with results quite similar to those of the humanlmachine experi- 

ments [7, 13,22, 231. The overall anomalous effect size is actually somewhat 

larger, but the interior statistical details are qualitatively much the same, and 

participant-specific characteristics are again evident. Again, the effect sizes 

are statistically independent of the distance between the percipient and the tar- 

get, up to ranges of several thousand miles, and also independent of the time 

interval between the perception effort and the agent's immersion in the target,


up to several days before or after the target visitation. And again, the partici- 

pants testify to the efficacy of some sort of "resonance" or "bond" between the 

percipient and agent in facilitating the information acquisition. Remote per- 

ception studies such as these have also been performed elsewhere, albeit using 

somewhat different protocols and scoring methods, with similar anomalous 

yields 124-261. A recent issue of this Journal featured an ensemble of articles 

reviewing the history of government sponsored research in this field from sev- 

eral empirical, analytical, and critical perspectives [27]. From all these re- 

sults, we must draw a second basic conclusion, namely that human conscious- 

ness is also able to extract information from physical aspects of its 

environment, by some anomalou,~ means that is independent of space and 

time. Note that although the information acquired by the percipient is largely 

subjective in character, it nonetheless survives the transposition to an objec- 

tive, digital information format imposed by the scoring methods. Indeed, one 

may speculate that the somewhat larger yield is related to the richer subjective 

content of the primary information, compared to that of the humanlmachine 

interactions. 

Theoretical Models 

Any attempt to set forth a theoretical model to complement such experi- 

mental data in a traditional scientific dialogue is an awesome epistemological 

task. Not only are the empirical effects keenly anomalous in the current scien- 

tific framework, but in their demonstrably participant-specific characteristics 

they clearly involve important subjective parameters not readily accommodat- 

ed by contemporary scientific language, let alone by scientific formalism. Be- 

yond this, the results are inescapably hyper-statistical, i.e., they involve a fold- 

ing of the individual and collective statistical variations in participant 

performances with the normal statistical behavior of the physical systems. The 

series position sensitivity of the results, along with the lack of superposability 

of individual operator effects in co-operator experiments, imply further strong 

non-linearities in the underlying mechanisms. On the psychological side, a 

number of informal observations suggest that unconscious as well as con- 

scious processes are likely to be involved. And finally, the demonstrated lack 

of dependence of the phenomena on distance and time will severely strain any 

model rooted in classical physical theory. Clearly, we must face some funda- 

mental reassessment of several entrenched assumptions about the nature of re- 

ality before attempting to compose an explicating model of these humanlma- 

chine and remote perception information anomalies. 

Given all of this, it is essential to approach the modeling task at a very rudi- 

mentary level. As a start, we might reiterate the four generic ingredients that 

pervade all of the research outlined above:


1. A random physical process, driving an output data stream from a simple 

device; or an array of physical details embodied in a randomly selected 

geographical target. 

2. Consciousness, of the operators, percipients, or agents, acting under 

some intention, volition, or desire. 

3. Information, coded in binary form, being added to, or extracted from, the 

random process. 

4. A resonance, or bond, or sharing of identity between operator and ma- 

chine, percipient and agent, percipient and target, or two operators, that 

facilitates the information transfer between the consciousness and the 

random process. 

It may also be helpful to note that these are just special cases of the more 

general ingredients that characterize virtually any form of creative human ex- 

perience: 

1. An unrefined or unfocused environment, resource, or context that pro- 

vides raw material for the creation. 

2. Consciousness, driven by some intention, purpose, or desire. 

3. Information, in some physical, intellectual, or emotional form, flowing 

between the consciousness and the pertinent environment. 

4. A resonance between the consciousness and the environment that nur- 

tures the creative task, be it artistic achievement, athletic performance, 

intellectual rumination, or emotional stimulation, 

In other words, the narrow range of consciousness-related anomalous phe- 

nomena we have been studying in the laboratory may be an indicative micro- 

cosm of a much broader genre of human capacity - the capacity to create, to 

order, to heal, or to stimulate. Thus, in attempting to model our empirical data, 

we may in fact be modeling the essence of human creativity. 

Very briefly, our strategy has been to appropriate the one form of existing 

physical theory that acknowledges a proactive component of human observa- 

tion, however obliquely, namely the so-called "Copenhagen" interpretation of 

quantum mechanics, and to extend its concepts and formalisms to include con- 

sciousness much more broadly and explicitly. We thereby attempt to extend 

what has been termed the "physics of observation" into a "physics of experi- 

ence" that encompasses both objective and subjective components of the in- 

formation acquisition. The main postulates of this experiential model, which 

are developed in detail elsewhere [7,28], may be summarized as follows: 

I. Like elementary particles (a form of matter), and physical light (a form 

of energy), consciousness (a processor and generator of information) en- 

joys a "wave/particle duality'' which allows it to circumvent and pene- 

trate barriers, and to resonate with other consciousnesses and with ap- 

propriate aspects of its environment. Thereby it can both acquire and 

insert information, both objective and subjective, from and to its reso-

R. Jahn and B. Dunne 

nant partners, in a manner that would be anomalous in its "particulate" 

representation. 

2. The celebrated quantum mechanical principles of "uncertainty", "exclu- 

sion", "superposition", "indistinguishability", etc., all of which are inex- 

plicable in classical scientific terms, may be regarded as metaphors that 

are at least as characteristic of the experiencing/observing consciousness 

as of the physical systems and processes with which it interacts. Mani- 

festations of these metaphorical "consciousness principles" can readily 

be noted in a broad range of human activities and relationships. 

3. The traditional objective properties and coordinates of physical theory, 

such as distance, time, mass, charge, momentum, energy, etc., can simi- 

larly be generalized to encompass corresponding subjective experi- 

ences, the more rigidly defined objective descriptions of which are use- 

ful tools for analytical purposes. 

4. The composite theory is not a model of consciousness, per se, nor of the 

physical world. It is rather a model of the experiential products of the 

interpenetration of an otherwise ineffable consciousness into an equally 

ineffable physical surround. 

Using such a perspective and vocabulary, it is possible to erect various consciousness 

"structures" and "interactions", using much the same metaphoric 

license that early quantum physics invoked in postulating its "planetary" atom 

or the "standing wave patterns" of bound electronic structures. In similar spirit, 

con~ciou~ne~~ "atoms" may be assembled wherein the experiences of an individual 

are represented by patterns of standing waves, akin to the bound electronic 

configurations of physical atoms. These consciousness atoms thus 

defined may be combined into consciousness "molecules" that display distinctly 

different characteristics than their constituents. This bonding process, 

which is classically inexplicable even in physical situations, is a serviceable 

format for representation of the anomalous operatorlmachine and percipientltarget 

interactions observed in the laboratory, and for broader comprehension 

of many other subjectively experienced phenomena as well. For example, 

in the physical regime, when the wave patterns of the valence electrons of 

two atoms come into close interaction, they cannot be distinguished in any observable 

sense. This loss of information about the electron identities, when 

properly acknowledged in the quantum mechanical formalism, leads to an "exchange 

energy" which is anomalous in classical terms, but is nonetheless the 

basis of the molecular bond. (This process is an excellent example of the fungibility 

of energy and information mentioned earlier.) Our metaphor would 

thus predict that an individual consciousness immersed in a given physical situation 

would sustain a set of characteristic experiences. A second individual, 

exposed to the same situation, would manifest a different set of experiences. 

However, if these two consciousnesses were strongly interacting, their experiential 

wave patterns would become resonantly intertwined, resulting in a new 

pattern of standing waves in their common environment. As demonstrated in


the co-operator experiments mentioned above, these "molecular" experiences 

may be quite different from the simple sum of their "atomic" behaviors, and if 

we insist on treating them as such, they will appear anomalous. In their own 

properly constituted "molecular" context, however, they are quite normal and, 

in principle, predictable. 

Even our individual operatorlmachine effects may be addressed in this fash- 

ion if we are willing to concede some form of "consciousness" to the machine, 

in the sense that it, too, is a system capable of exchanging information with its 

environment. Thus, a bonded operator1 machine system should not be expect- 

ed to conform to the isolated operator and isolated machine "atomic" behav- 

iors, but to establish its own characteristic "molecular" behavior. Viewed as an 

influence of one "particulate" system (the operator) upon another (the REG), 

the empirical results are inexplicable within the canonical behaviors of the iso- 

lated systems; viewed as a process of wave-mechanical resonance between 

two components of a single interactive system, the behavior is appropriate. 

Otherwise put, the surrender of individual subjective identity within the 

humanlmachine bond is manifested in the appearance of objective information 

on the digital output string of the bonded system; i.e., the entropy of that data 

string has literally been reduced by the resonance. And when this humanlma- 

chine resonance is enhanced by a bond between co-operating participants, the 

entropy reduction appears to be more pronounced. 

Such a model can also be applied to the remote perception effects in terms of 

a bond between the percipient and the agent that enables the "anomalous" ac- 

quisition of information about the prevailing physical target environment in 

which both are subjectively immersed. Alternatively, the resonance may be 

between the percipient and the target scene itself, with the agent assigned to a 

more passive facilitating role. In either representation, the merging of subjec- 

tive identities again enables the transfer of objective information, in this case 

manifesting as a quantitative coherence between the agent and percipient re- 

sponse forms. 

In this fashion, we have succeeded to some extent in establishing a scholarly 

dialogue between empirical data and a representative theoretical model that 

encompasses both objective and subjective dimensions of the phenomena. To 

be sure, this dialogue yet lacks a precise metric and full quantification, but it 

has nonetheless proven useful in correlating experimental results, suggesting 

new experimental designs and tests, identifying salient parameters, and 

prompting subjective conceptualizations of the nature of the phenomena. For 

the remainder of this paper, let us indulge in some speculations regarding the 

possible generalization of such a strategy to the establishment of a more com- 

prehensive science of the subjective. 

Requisites and Tactics of a Subjective Science 

The construction of a comprehensive science of the subjective will require 

the harmonious melding of many components, some of which may be trans-


posed intact from established objective science, others of which will require 

modification or generalization, and yet others of which must be added anew. 

In the first category, for example, we certainly must retain the commitment to, 

and reliance upon, sound empirical data and incisive theoretical models that 

are maintained in a healthy dialogue with one another. Nor can there be any 

abrogation of the proper scientific attitude: well-informed on previous and 

contemporary work; open to new ideas, new scholars, and new results; and 

humble in the face of empirical evidence, especially those anomalous effects 

that seem to contradict established beliefs. But in the second category, there 

will be the need to generalize conceptual vocabularies and currencies to ac- 

commodate both subjective and objective experience, to search for their mea- 

surable quantifiers and standards, and to loosen the constraints on replicability 

as applied to subjective parameters. And in the third category, certain prevail- 

ing epistemological and ontological presumptions will need to be replaced by 

radically different perspectives. Let us develop a few of these components in a 

bit more detail. 

Replicability 

To begin with, it will be necessary to broaden quite generously the defini- 

tion of experimental replicability to accommodate the hyper-statistical charac- 

ter of the interactive processes and their participants, the intrinsically elusive 

nature of many of the phenomena, and the subjective dimensions to which 

they relate. For example, any event involving a proactive consciousness must 

be expected to reflect personal characteristics, which in turn may vary widely 

from individual to individual, from mood to mood, from context to context, 

and from environment to environment. To require that all participants and 

their physical targets display the same patterns of behavior in any given sub- 

jective-objective interaction with infallible replicability makes no more sense 

than expecting everyone to be a great artist, a great mathematician, or a great 

lover, or any creative genius to perform with the same effectiveness on a 

day-in, day-out basis. To ignore the influence of environment, be it physical, 

cultural, or emotional, on such processes would be as silly as expecting a great 

composer to produce the same quality of work in a boiler factory as in his 

music chamber. But this futility of imposing quantitative micro-replicability 

standards need not obscure the useful parametric correlations that the subjec- 

tive science could provide concerning the macro-statistical pattern of experi- 

ence. In our PEAR experiments, for example, the evidence that female effects 

distribute differently than male; that bonded couples perform better on average 

than unbonded or like-sex pairs; or that overall effect sizes are independent of 

intervening distance or time, are consequential statistical generalizations that 

can stimulate theoretical models, predicate more incisive empirical studies, 

and enable more powerful conceptualizations. Similarly broad statistical dia- 

logues will need to be accommodated in any other application of subjective 

science.

Science of the Subjective 

Subjective Metrics 

Closely related to the issue of replicability is the need to identify viable 

quantifiers and standards of the subjective coordinates and properties that will 

appear in the data and the models. We know how it feels to be "heavy" or 

"light-hearted; to have our mind "miles away" from a given topic; to be "all 

charged up" about an issue; or to be "spinning" in confusion. Through our lan- 

guage, we have developed means of expressing these feelings in terms that are 

broadly comprehensible to others. But can we find the meters, in the internal 

neurophysiology or elsewhere, that will enable us to quantify these parameters 

to a degree permitting constructive dialogue between subjective experience 

and objective physical events? Our own first attempts at such codification 

drew from an assortment of psychological and physiological anecdotes, lin- 

guistic precedents, and intuitive speculations and served more to sketch the 

problem than to solve it [7, 281. Clearly, quantification of the subjective is a 

crucial and complex task that will require open-minded colloquy and innova- 

tive collaboration among such diverse disciplines as neuroscience, psycholo- 

gy, anthropology, physics, and engineering, to make more substantial 

progress. Perhaps we may take heart from Arthur Eddington's reminder that 

the "objective" physical metric itself is not all that tidy: 

Quantities like lengths, duration, mass, force, etc. have no absolute significance; their 

values will depend on the mesh-system to which they are referred ... there is no funda- 

mental mesh-system. In particular problems, and more particularly in restricted re- 

gions, it may be possible to choose a mesh-system which follows more or less closely 

the lines of absolute structure in the world, and so simplify the phenomena which are 

related to it. But the world structure is not of a kind which can be traced in an exact way 

by mesh-systems, and in any large region the mesh-system drawn must be considered 

arbitrary. In any case the systems used in current physics are arbitrary [29]. 

Metaphor 

The PEAR approach to a model of reality based on the interpenetration of 

consciousness and its environment outlined earlier has occasionally been crit- 

icized as being "only a metaphor". This troubles us little, for upon deeper re- 

flection, all of science is, to a large degree, metaphoric. Any search for new 

knowledge begins with some form of subjective experience, which conscious- 

ness then attempts to describe, catalogue, and comprehend by comparison 

with other previously catalogued and comprehended descriptions of experi- 

ence. The metaphoric ladder thus constructed may reach lofty intellectual 

heights, but its lowest rungs inevitably rest on very subjective, perhaps even ar- 

chetypal, ground. The most basic physical concepts of distance, time, mass, 

charge, force, energy, linear and angular momentum, et al., are all metaphori- 

cal representations with self-evident analogies in subjective human experience 

that doubtless impelled their first objective specifications. Indeed, one may


argue that all of the formalisms of mathematics and statistics, and the number 

system on which they are based, are themselves symbolic metaphorical extrap- 

olations of the primordial human propensities to establish order and to count. 

No, metaphor is not a sloppy form of conceptual representation; it is a critical 

step in establishing the foundations of any objective science, and it will be 

even more indispensable in creating a subjective science. In fact, the implicit 

reliance of objective science on metaphor as a means of sensorial association 

will need to be elevated to a more explicit functional role, wherein the com- 

monalties of superficially disparate experiences can be assembled into an in- 

terdisciplinary skeletonic structure of corporate, rather than cellular, cause 

and effect. Jonas Salk focuses on this point in his book, Survival of the Wisest: 

Man has come to the threshold of a state of consciousness, regarding his nature and his 

relationship to the Cosmos, in terms that reflect 'reality.' By using the processes of Na- 

ture as metaphor, to describe the forces by which it operates upon and within Man, we 

come as close to describing 'reality' as we can within the limits of our comprehension. 

Men will be very uneven in their capacity for such understanding, which, naturally, dif- 

fers for different ages and cultures, and develops and changes in the course of time. For 

these reasons it will always be necessary to use metaphor and myth to provide 'compre- 

hensible' guides to living. In this way, Man's imagination and intellect play vital roles 

in his survival and evolution [30]. 

Epistemology, Ontology, and Teleology 

It will also be crucial for the subjective science to distinguish far more 

sharply between its epistemology and its ontology than is commonly acknowl- 

edged in prevailing objective science. Indeed it may be most productive to rel- 

egate objective ontology to an irrelevant, or at least ineffable, status. The need 

for an absolute reality, so precious to objective science, now must evaporate in 

favor of more participatory, probabilistic, and holistic experiential patterns 

whose characteristics are represented and analyzed by the same minds who ex- 

perience them and, in this sense, create them. This subtlety was well recog- 

nized by Albert Einstein, who articulated it in many of his philosophical writ- 

ings: 

Concepts which have been proved to be useful in ordering things easily acquire such an 

authority over us that we forget their human origin and accept them as invariable [3 11. 

The system of concepts is a creation of man together with the rules of syntax, which 

constitute the structure of the conceptual systems ... All concepts, even those which are 

closest to experience, are from the point of view of logic freely chosen conventions, 

just as is the case with the concept of causality [32]. 

Even scholars of audacious spirit and fine instinct can be obstructed in the interpre- 

tation of facts by philosophical prejudices. The prejudice ... consists in the faith that


facts by themselves can and should yield scientific knowledge without free conceptual 

construction [33]. 

In other words, any physical model is no more than an objectification of 

some form of subjective experience, useful for analytical purposes but not to 

be confused with any deeper ontological reality. In pursuing this wisdom, one 

is struck by yet another metaphor; namely, that much as the elementary physi- 

cal particles reveal their properties only in their interactions with some physi- 

cal environment, e.g., a bubble chamber, Geiger counter, or photographic 

emulsion, so consciousness also defines itself only in its interactions with its 

physical surround. Conversely, just as physical detectors respond only to ex- 

ternal stimuli, the "objective" properties of the universe are, without excep- 

tion, only defined by some inquiring, ordering consciousness. 

This recognition, in turn, opens the door to admittance of the most powerful, 

but most difficult to represent, family of subjective parameters, those of the 

teleological genre that comprise conscious (and very possibly unconscious) 

intention, desire, will, need, or purpose. These are demonstrably primary cor- 

relates of empirical consciousness-related anomalies of all ranks, from labora- 

tory-based microscopic humanlmachine effects, to macroscopic poltergeist 

phenomena, to creativity of all forms. They are explicitly postulated in 

Lamarckian evolutionary models, clearly implicated in many forms of medical 

anomalies, and central to most religious belief systems. This teleological abil- 

ity of living systems to influence their environments desperately needs to be 

postulated in clearly testable form, corresponding experiments performed with 

precision, and the results interpreted in sound and enlightened scientific 

methodology, attitude, and conceptual currency. The role of teleology will be 

a keystone of the proposed science of the subjective, and thereby of the ad- 

vance of our culture. 

Resonance 

One of the most proliferate and dramatic modes of interaction in all objec- 

tive science is that of resonance, the coupled sympathetic oscillations of par- 

ticipating components of mechanical, electromagnetic, thermodynamic, quan- 

tum, or biological systems that can produce extraordinary physical effects and 

responses. The corresponding subjective concept of resonance as facilitator of 

deeper personal experiences such as trust, hope, and affection are also well ac- 

knowledged. But in the new science of the subjective, resonance assumes the 

even more critical role of coupling the subjective and objectives hemispheres 

of experience to one another via its demonstrated capacity for imparting order 

to random physical processes. Such resonance devolves from the principle of 

indistinguishability mentioned earlier, whereby the surrender of information 

distinguishing the two interacting subsystems within a single complex system 

translates into enhancement of the structural strength of the bonded system. 

Thus, when the perceived boundary between consciousness and its physical


environment is permeated via subjective merging of the "I" with the "Not I", 

the resultant bonded system may manifest tangible alterations in both the envi- 

ronment and the corresponding experience of the consciousness. If this reso- 

nance entails a teleological component, be it conscious or unconscious, the 

bonded system may acknowledge that intention in some characteristic manner. 

As suggested by our experimental results, the scales of such effects may be 

marginally small, making them difficult to identify on an incident-by-incident 

basis. Nonetheless, they can manifest in significant probabilistic trends accu- 

mulated over large bodies of experience. This leaves us with the intriguing 

possibility that what we denote as "chance" or "random" behavior, in any con- 

text, rather than deriving from some ultimately predictable, fully mechanistic 

behavior of a deterministic physical world, is actually an immense subsump- 

tion of a broad distribution of potentialities reflective of all relevant reso- 

nances and intentions of consciousness with respect to the system or process in 

question. Eddington proposed the possibility in only slightly different terms: 

It seems that we must attribute to the mind power not only to decide the behavior of 

atoms individually but to affect systematically large groups - in fact to tamper with 

the odds on atomic behavior ... Unless it belies its name, probability can be modified in 

ways in which ordinary physical entities would not admit of. There can be no unique 

probability attached to any event or behavior; we can only speak of 'probability in the 

light of certain given information,' and the probability alters according to the extent of 

the information [34]. 

Complementarity 

It would be wrong to cast this plea for creation of a science of the subjective 

solely in terms of a replacement for, or even an extension of, precise objective 

science. Rather, if they are to be mutually productive, the two perspectives 

need to complement each other, in very much the same spirit as the Comple- 

mentarity Principle first proposed and later generalized by several early quan- 

tum physicists. Niels Bohr originally conceived this profound idea to amelio- 

rate the wavelparticle dilemma in quantum mechanics, in the sense that 

neither the wave nor the particle was to be regarded as the "correct" represen- 

tation of atomic-scale physical matter, but that both were needed to triangulate 

its evidence and comprehension. Bohr himself quickly recognized that this 

complementarity was not solely a physical property, but a much more funda- 

mental aspect of human consciousness: 

... we must, indeed, remember that the nature of our consciousness brings about a com- 

plementary relationship in all domains of knowledge, between the analysis of a concept 

and its immediate application ... in associating the physical and the psychical aspects of 

existence, we are concerned with the special relationship with complementarity which 

it is not possible thoroughly to understand by one-sided application either of physical 

or of psychological laws ... only a renunciation in this respect will enable us to compre-

Science of the Subjective 22 1 

hend ... that harmony that is experienced as free will and analyzed in terms of causali- 

ty ... The real problem is: how can that part of reality that begins with consciousness be 

combined with those parts that are treated in physics and chemistry? Here we obvious- 

ly have a genuine case of complementarity [35]. 

Bohr's colleague, Werner Heisenberg, author of the uncertainty principal, 

expressed a very similar recognition: 

We realize that the situation of complementarity is not confined to the atomic world 

alone; we meet it when we reflect about a decision and the motives for our decision, or 

when we have the choice for enjoying music and analyzing its structure [36]. 

They were joined in this generalization by Wolfgang Pauli, most celebrated 

for his "Exclusion Principle", but perhaps more importantly for our purpose, 

for his collaboration with Carl Jung on the concept of "sychronicity". Pauli 

wrote: 

On the one hand, the idea of complementarity in modern physics has demonstrated to 

us, in a new kind of synthesis, that the contradiction in the applications of the old con- 

trasting conceptions (such as particle and wave) is only apparent; on the other hand, the 

employability of old alchemical ideas in the psychology of Jung points to a deeper 

unity of physical and psychical occurrences. To us ... the only acceptable point of view 

appears to be to the one that recognizes both sides of reality -the quantitative and the 

qualitative, the physical and the psychical - as compatible with each other, and can 

embrace them simultaneously ... It would be most satisfactory of all if physics and psy- 

che could be seen as complementary aspects of the same reality [37]. 

While it may be presumptive to embellish this wisdom, it is our opinion that 

the powerful philosophical extension of the principle of complementary into 

the domain of human consciousness that Bohr first proposed propagates its 

roots even more deeply into the subjective foundations of modern science than 

even he may have imagined. Objective science, in its neoclassical format, and 

subjective science, as we now propose it, should be regarded as two comple- 

mentary ethics, fundamentally united by the yearning of the human conscious- 

ness for understanding of its relationship to the cosmos and for participation in 

the creation of reality, although necessarily distinguished by the tactical ap- 

proaches employed in pursuing these goals. Thus, objective science, launch- 

ing itself from the sharp distinction between self and non-self implicit in its 

Aristotelian heritage, must continue to utilize its ability to discriminate, to iso- 

late, and to represent elements of reality via precise observation and dispas- 

sionate logic. Subjective science should complement this thrust by acknowl- 

edging and utilizing the innate consciousness strategies of association and 

assimilation to achieve a unity of self and not-self, in its search for a participa- 

tory role in the mechanics of creation. Failure to recognize and utilize the es- 

sential complementarity between these objective and subjective strategies and


purposes of consciousness within an integrated scientific method will ulti- 

mately frustrate any research, experimental or theoretical, that attempts to 

comprehend either the dimensions of human consciousness or the subtleties of 

the physical world. In fact, it is this very failure that lies at the heart of the 

generic philosophical impasse that is confounding our contemporary cultural 

condition. Einstein stated the problem succinctly several decades ago: 

Science without religion is lame; religion without science is blind [38]. 

In the interplay of objective intellect and subjective spirit, we are dealing 

with the primordial conjugate perspectives whereby consciousness triangu- 

lates its experience. The issue is whether these will be deployed in mutually 

encumbering contradiction, or in mutually fulfilling complementarity. The 

desirability of the latter course has long been recognized and propounded in 

various abstract contexts, but it has never been satisfactorily formulated in 

practical terms. Clearly, we do not yet have an explicit formula, but we can 

now rigorously demonstrate on the laboratory bench, and to some extent in the 

corresponding models, that human intention, will, volition, desire, by any 

name, deployed in self-surrendering resonance with even a simple physical 

system or process, can significantly affect the latter's behavior, and that the 

same deployment of human intention in resonance with another human con- 

sciousness can condition their mutual reality to a significant extent. The chal- 

lenge ahead of us is to extend such databases and models into many other 

scholarly and pragmatic sectors, from whence to weave a new fabric of com- 

plementary science that respects and utilizes subjective qualities as much as 

objective, aesthetic sensitivities as much as analytical logic, and mystical in- 

sights as much as tangible evidence. Although we face monumental obstacles 

of conceptualization, vocabulary, and measurability on our road to this holistic 

science, we should be sustained in the effort by the recognition that science of 

any era has always been no more than a particularly disciplined form of human 

inquiry; that scientific vocabulary has always been only a subset of human lin- 

guistics; and that scientific observation and scientific conceptualization have 

always drawn metaphorically from broader and less tangible human experi- 

ence. It is not unfounded, therefore, to hope that the same exquisite conscious- 

ness that has so brilliantly conceived and refined its science of the objective, 

and that has at the same time so fully experienced and celebrated the subjec- 

tive dimensions of its life, can now finally integrate these complementary per- 

spectives into a super-science of the whole, wherein consciousness will stand 

as full partner with its cosmos in the establishment of reality. 


The authors are deeply grateful to their colleagues John Bradish, York


ing research contributions to the PEAR program. We are also indebted to the 

many operators who have diligently contributed to our large databases, and to 

the numerous philanthropic individuals and foundations who have supported 

our work over the past two decades. 

The substance and style of this essay have benefited greatly from numerous 

discussions among the members of the International Consciousness Research 

Laboratories, an interdisciplinary consortium addressing the role of con- 

sciousness in the establishment of physical reality. (http://www.ICRL.org) 

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IL: The Library of Living Philosophers, p. 175- 176. 


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Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 11, No.2, pp. 225-230, 1997 0892-33 10197 


GUEST COLUMN: 

CURIOUS, CREATIVE AND CRITICAL THINKING 

Center for Space Science and Astrophysics, Varian 302G 

Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-4060 

Edward Ginzton, one of the founders of Varian Associates, once remarked 

concerning his colleague Russell Varian that "he had many modes of thought, 

of which logic was only a special case." So it is, most likely, with all great in- 

ventors and so it is, I believe, with all truly productive scientists. In this 

essay, I will argue that scientists need at least three modes of thought that I 

call "curious," "creative" and "critical". 

These requirements, though they may be quite general in their applicabili- 

ty, come sharply into focus when one deals with anomalies within mainstream 

science or with anomalous phenomena that seem to reside outside of science 

as we know it. 

Let us take just one example from within mainstream science. It has been 

claimed for some years by Halton Arp of The Max-Planck Institute for Astro- 

physics in Garching, Germany and by William Tifft of the Steward Observa- 

tory in Tucson, Arizona, that there is evidence indicating that our interpreta- 

tion of the redshifts of astronomical objects is incomplete. Their results, if 

taken at face value, contradict the usual assumption that the redshift of distant 

objects (such as distant galaxies and quasars) is due almost entirely to the ex- 

pansion of the universe. Arp and Tifft have been curious in examining strange 

patterns that arose in their early observations; they have also been creative in 

trying to seek an interpretation of their results; and they have been critical of 

their own work by seeking new observations and encouraging others to make 

their independent observations. 

Then what is the problem? It is that the astronomical community has, by 

and large, applied only critical thinking to the same problem. There have 

been some attempts to reproduce Tifft's results, with mixed success, but the 

general attitude has been "It cannot happen, therefore it does not happen," 

just the opposite of good advice once given by the great physicist Robert 

Leighton of the California Institute of Technology, "If it does happen, it can 

happen." As a result of this attitude, Arp and Tifft have come to be regarded 

somewhat as heretics. Indeed, Arp lost his observing privileges at the Mount 

Wilson and Palomar Observatories, forcing him to leave the United States to 

go to his present home in Germany. 

An even more disturbing and challenging situation arises if a scientist takes 

an interest in a topic that is outside of mainstream science and is believed by 

the scientific community to represent "pseudoscience," the "paranormal," or 

"pathological science." Some of the best known examples that are regarded 

in this light are "parapsychology," "ufology" (the study of UFO reports) and


"cryptozoology" (the search for zoological anomalies, including "Big Foot" 

and the so-called "Loch Ness Monster" ). Even the mention of such terms will 

send a shudder through the frame of almost any self-respecting scientist. Why 

is this so? 

Typical responses to this question are in fact indicated by the terms I have 

just used. If I assert that a subject is "pseudoscience," I am stating that the ac- 

tivity is not truly scientific but merely pretends to be scientific. However, 

such an assertion is indefensible. A "subject" is neither scientific nor nonsci- 

entific. It is only the study carried out by a particular person or group of per- 

sons that can be so described. One may be able to make a legitimate case that 

this person who studies parapsychology is being pseudo-scientific, but that 

does not mean that it is impossible for some other person to carry out a study 

in the same field that meets the highest standards of the scientific enterprise. 

There is a similar problem connected with the term "paranormal." If I as- 

sert that a subject is "paranormal," I am implying that I know what is "nor- 

mal." I am further implying that any subject that is not "normal," according 

to my definition of the term, does not accord with scientific knowledge and 

must be rejected as bogus. This would be a huge responsibility to take on. If 

pressed on this issue, most scientists would agree that science is incomplete. 

They would agree with Isaac Newton who stated that he felt like a boy "find- 

ing a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean 

of truth lay all undiscovered before me." If we do not know all there is to 

know about the universe (including human beings and everything else in the 

universe), then clearly we cannot claim to know what is "normal," and it is 

therefore foolish to use the term "paranormal." 

On the other hand, the term "pathological science" is somewhat more use- 

ful. It refers to poor, slipshod and misleading research that yields results that 

turn out to be false. However, the term was originally coined by the Nobel 

Laureate Irving Langmuir to imply that certain fields are made up only of bad 

science. If this were the case (an assertion that is in itself debatable), it would 

prove only that better work needs to be done, not that such fields should be 

placed off-limits to scientific research. 

In thinking about such questions over the years, I have come to the conclu- 

sion that the problem with such topics is not a purely intellectual difficulty in 

trying to understand the nature of the phenomenon or to assess the quality and 

conclusions of the research. I have concluded that the key to the puzzle is to 

be found in non-scientific and non-intellectual considerations. Although the 

prototype of a scientist is that of a lone researcher following the truth accord- 

ing to his own light, with little heed to the world around him, such is not the 

scientist that we know today, and perhaps the image was never more than a 

myth. Science today is a collective enterprise. Much of the work is done in 

groups. Even an individual scientist is dependent upon the good will and sup- 

port of his fellow scientists for the wherewithal1 to continue his work. Fur- 

thermore, the activities of science are supported by, and to some extent con-

Curious, Creative and Critical Thinking 227 

trolled by, organizations such as scientific societies, agencies of the federal 

government and (to a lesser but non-negligible extent) by the structuring of 

universities and corporations into schools, divisions, departments, laborato- 

ries, etc. These organizations in turn need respect from their competitors, ap- 

proval from their colleagues, support from the public, and favorable press 

from the media. Any scientist who jeopardizes the good standing of these im- 

portant scientific organizations may, knowingly or unknowingly, weaken or- 

ganized science and thereby hurt his fellow scientists. In this way, the issue is 

converted from one that is purely intellectual to one that has sociological and 

political consequences. Such issues are perceived as heretical precisely be- 

cause they involve a combination of intellectual and political considerations. 

My understanding of the term "heresy" is the following: A heresy is a 

proposition that is, at the same time, a challenge to understanding and a chal- 

lenge to power. Galileo faced the investigators of the Holy Inquisition in 1633 

as a result of his assertion that the Ptolemaic model of the solar system, in 

which the Earth is at rest and all bodies revolve around the Earth, is wrong, 

and that the Copernican model (the creation of a Protestant!), that places the 

Sun at the center and has the Earth revolve around the Sun, is correct. Perhaps 

more important was his implicit assertion that we may discover truth about the 

universe by observation rather than through the reading of Holy Scripture. In 

addition to the purely intellectual challenge of offering a new model of the 

solar system, Galileo was challenging the Church as the ultimate arbiter of 

truth. Galileo was thereby challenging the status and power of the Church. 

Similarly, in their assertions, Arp and Tifft are challenging the status and 

power of astronomers who have based their study of the structure of the uni- 

verse on the assumption that the redshift of galaxies and quasars is a measure 

of their distance. These astronomers may legitimately fear that, if Arp and 

Tifft prove to be correct, much of present-day astronomical research - in- 

cluding their own research - will be destined for the dustbin. 

One may discern a similar conflict in relation to fields such as parapsychol- 

ogy. The very term "parapsychology" is unfortunate, since it gives the mis- 

leading impression that it is somehow related to "psychology," thereby im- 

plying that psychologists should know whether or not there is anything to this 

subject. Since psychologists, in fact, know very little about parapsychology, 

this creates a situation of some tension. If it turns out that the claims of para- 

psychologists are correct, and that the human mind has abilities that are not 

now understood on the basis of 20th century science, organized psychology 

will (fairly or unfairly) suffer something of a setback. One can imagine that 

the public and the news media will implicitly or explicitly criticize the psy- 

chological community for not realizing early on that there was something to 

parapsychology. The psychological community would, to some extent, lose 

face. Hence the current conflict between parapsychology investigators and 

organized psychology is not unlike the conflict between Galileo and the 

Church. Whether or not these investigators will prove to be correct in their as-

228 P. A. S turrock 

sertions, as Galileo has been proved to be correct, remains to be seen, but the 

ultimate truth or falsity of a proposition is not, in my opinion, a relevant con- 

sideration in trying to determine whether or not a challenge constitutes a 

heresy. 

Of course, some important challenges are not regarded as heresies at all. 

For instance, it was a major intellectual challenge to try to understand the na- 

ture of pulsars or of quasars when they were first discovered. However, these 

discoveries were made by world-class scientists, at prestigious universities, 

who were already members of the scientific establishment. Far from being 

perceived as a demonstration of the shortcomings of the establishment, they 

were hailed as shining examples of what the establishment does that is right. 

Far from weakening organized science, these discoveries help to cement the 

power of those organizations and of science in general. 

In summary, I claim that in trying to understand topics that get an emotional 

reaction from scientists, it is first essential that we understand the reason for 

the emotional reaction. Only when one is past that point can one move on to a 

more rational consideration of these topics: the way to advance curious, cre- 

ative and critical thinking is to remove the subtle (and perhaps subliminal) ob- 

stacles to such thinking. 

Even when the nonintellectual barriers are removed, there can still be some 

confusion about the nature of scientific investigation. One may detect in some 

discussions the implicit assumption that scientific knowledge is absolute. The 

term "law" promotes such a belief, but a scientific "law" is not an absolute and 

immutable truth; indeed, it may be more accurate to regard it simply as a 

short-hand summary of the results of observations and experiments carried 

out to date. Further observation or new experiments may show that the "law" 

must be revised if not rescinded. 

Science advances by trial and error. Linda Pauling, daughter of the famous 

chemist Linus Pauling, once asked her father "How is it you had so many good 

ideas?" to which he replied, "I had many more ideas, and threw away all the 

bad ones." With luck, a scientist can recognize a bad idea very quickly, hope- 

fully before he or she publishes. However, some ideas prove to be wrong or, 

expressed more charitably, "less than universal in their applicability," only 

after centuries of research. It took 300 years for Newtonian dynamics to be 

superseded by relativity and quantum mechanics. Who is to say that relativity 

and quantum mechanics will not, in their turn, at some time be superseded by a 

more intricate and subtle theory of which we now have no conception? 

It is obvious that, if we wish to learn something new, we should be curious. 

However, curiosity is not enough. To conceive of a pattern or law or theory, 

one must make an unjustified leap beyond the evidence. Newton's proposal of 

a universal law of gravity was simply a guess - but an inspired guess, one 

that was confirmed by many subsequent observations and analyses. Even so, 

the guess proved eventually to be not quite right and to require modification

Curious, Creative and Critical Thinking 229 

It is only after curiosity and creativity have done their work that critical 

thinking should come into play. At this stage, it is essential to cast a stern crit- 

ical eye on one's latest act of creation. (We may count upon our colleagues to 

help us wholeheartedly in this activity.) However, it is essential that criticism 

be even-handed: it should be applied to old ideas as well as to new ideas. As 

the astrophysicist Tommy Gold once remarked, "Old ideas are not right sim- 

ply because they are old, and new ideas are not wrong simply because they are 

new." In facing any new proposition, one brings to it years of observation, 

learning - and perhaps indoctrination. As a human being, one may feel "this 

idea is so preposterous that I do not even want to consider the evidence," but 

as a scientist one should state "this proposition seems very unlikely, and it will 

take a lot of evidence to persuade me to take it seriously." Carl Sagan was cor- 

rect in asserting that "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence," 

but that does not mean that anything less than extraordinary evidence may be 

ignored. We learn from the study of scientific inference that a strong case for 

a new proposition can be built either from one very strong piece of evidence or 

from the combination of a number of independent and less spectacular pieces 

of evidence. In science, as in real life, one may get from point A to point B ei- 

ther in one giant leap or by a number of small steps - either by flying or by 

walking. 

We should also remember that evidence that appears resistant to under- 

standing and to require an "extraordinary claim" may, when viewed from a 

different - perhaps broader - perspective, prove to be comprehensible in 

terms of existing scientific knowledge, or only a slight re-arrangement of that 

knowledge. An example is the story of meteorites. These were impossible to 

understand, and therefore very difficult to accept, when they were viewed 

simply as "stones falling from the sky," because the sky does not contain 

stones. However, a very thorough investigation by the great French scientist 

Jean-Batiste Biot of a dramatic meteorite fall that occurred in L'Aigle, France, 

in 1803, eventually forced reluctant acceptance. This led in turn to a change in 

perspective, as a result of which the intellectual difficulty disappeared. Now 

that we regard meteorites as objects from outer space, it is hard to understand 

what the fuss was all about. Is it not possible that, some time in the future, a 

similar broadening of our present perspective will lead to the comprehension 

of some of the phenomena that now seem "extraordinary?" 

However that may be, there is no doubt that there now exists something of a 

no-man's-land between organized science on the one hand, and the public and 

news media on the other hand, an area that contains topics such as parapsy- 

chology, ufology and cryptozoology. The public is curious and wants answers 

to these questions. The average citizen does not have the skills necessary to 

resolve these mysteries. The scientific community has a store of knowledge 

and an arsenal of techniques that could be brought to bear on these problems, 

but this is not happening because the scientific community views these sub- 

jects as being "off limits." Such topics are "beyond the pale."

I 230 P. A. Sturrock 

I 

I 

I The Society for Scientific Exploration was founded in I982 to help redress 

this situation, The Society offers a forum, through its meetings and through 

its journal the Journal of Scientific Exploration, f'or the presentation of the re- 

I 

I 

I 

I 

sults of serious investigations into any topic amenable to such investigation. 

All the topics mentioned in this essay (and many rnore) have been discussed at 

our meetings and in our journal. There have been, to date, no major break- 

throughs in the sense of research that establishes the reality and nature of any 

of these phenomena. On the other hand, our knowledge is improving and our 

insight is increasing. It is my conviction that, if we persevere with the judi- 

cious application of curious, creative and critical thinking, it will be only a 

matter of time before each of these unignrcrs i.3 fl~l~~lly 

Y e~uIved. 

Peter A. Sturrock 6tudied rnathemat~cll at Cam- 

bridge Univer\ity (w~th an ~rirerruptron for 

radar research from 1944 unt~l 1947) and wa\ 

awarded the Univer\rty Kaylergh Ps~/e rn 1939, 

a Ph.D. in 195 1, and a Prue Fellowship at St 

John's College In 1952. After re,e;~rch at the 

National Bureau of Standards, the Univers~ty of 

Paris, the Cavendish Laboratory, and the Atom- 

ic Energy Research Establi\hment, Sturrock 

went to Stanford University in 1955. After re- 

search at the European Organi~ation for Nu- 

clear Research (1957-58), he returned to Stan- 

ford and was appointed professor in 1961. He is 

now Professor of Space Science and A\tro- 

physics in the Applied Physics Department, and 

Director of the Center for Space Science and 

Astrophysics. He has served as Chairman of the 

Plasma Physics Division of the American As- 

tronomical Society, as Chairman of the Solar 

Physics Division of the American A~tronomical 

Society and currently serves as President of the 

Society for Scientific Exploration. His research 

interests have included electron physics, parti- 

cle accelerators, plasma physics, solar physic\, 

astrophysics, and sc~entific ~nference. He has 

received the annual prize ot the Gravity Foun- 

dation (1967), the Hale Pr~re of the American 

Astronomical Society ( 1086), the Arctowski 

Medal of thc National Acadetny of Sciences 

(l990), and the Space Science Award of the 

American Institute of Aeronautic\ and Astro- 

nautics (1992).

Journal of Scientijic Exploration, Vol. 11, No.2, pp. 231-242, 1997 0892-33 10197 



Comments on Nelson's "Wishing for Good Weather: 

A Natural Experiment in Group Consciousness'' 

Dr. Nelson describes an interesting analysis of meteorological data around 

the Princeton area in "Wishing for Good Weather: A Natural Experiment in 

Group Consciousness," (JSE, 11, pp. 47-58, 1997). He is, however, quite 

wrong to assert that "the only good candidate to explain the apparent differ- 

ences, other than chance, would seem to be an influence from an informal but 

powerful communal wish for dry weather." In fact, Nelson's data, which indi- 

cates a tendency for better weather on special occasions in Princeton, is quite 

compatible with a number of similar observations of the urban climate over 

the last 100 years or so. It seems more likely that the data presented is a conse- 

quence of the change in activity of the occupants of Princeton, rather than 

their wishful thinking. 

The climate within any built-up area can vary significantly from the climate 

of the surrounding countryside. In general, urban areas produce what is known 

as an "urban heat island" (UHI), whereby the air temperatures are consistently 

higher within urban areas compared to their rural surroundings (Lowry, 1967; 

Landsberg, 1970, 198 1 ; Walker, 1977). This phenomenon is a result of a num- 

ber of factors that influence the local climatic conditions. Some of these fac- 

tors, such as the wind-breaking effect of buildings, and the radiative and ther- 

mal properties of the materials that make up the surfaces of the urban 

environment, change very little over an extended period of time. Others can 

vary considerably over 24 hours: e.g. heat production by cars, people, air-con- 

ditioning units, as well as the aerosols and gases produced by exhaust fumes 

and industrial activity. In general the overall effect is to produce higher local 

temperatures within urban areas. 

The effect on precipitation, however, is much more complex. The effect of 

local topography and land use, and existing macro-scale meteorological condi- 

tions, may combine with the UHI effect to result in higher or lower total pre- 

cipitation within the city compared to the surroundings. Alternatively, the city 

may have similar average levels of precipitation, but the manner in which it 

falls may be different: shorter periods of heavier rainfall, for instance. 

Daily variations on urban climate have also been observed such that the 

weekend in some cities has better weather, on average, than during the week 

(Landsberg, 198 1). This has less to do with wishful thinking (the effect is not 

always uniform throughout the different seasons, for instance), and more to do 

with changes in urban activity. The effect is small, but is more than enough to 

accommodate the results from the Princeton area. 

I would not care to speculate on the exact climatic mechanisms that occur in 

Princeton each spring (I am not a meteorologist), but it would seem that the 

UHI effect is a far better candidate to explain the observations. A comparison


of a Monday and Sunday of all the towns in the area, perhaps for the weekend 

following the celebrations, may have helped to shed some light on the prob- 

lem. Certainly it is interesting to note that the Sunday comparison between 

Princeton and surrounding towns shows a less impressive improvement in 

weather conditions for Princeton. 

I must admit to finding it rather worrying that such a paper was published in 

JSE without reference to an effect which has been well documented in both the 

popular as well as the technical science literature for many years. While it is 

understandable that an individual author might miss such a detail, an effective 

peer-review process should pick up on such an omission. If the JSE is ever to 

obtain a lasting credibility within the wider scientific community it is surely 

necessary that research papers undergo a thorough review of their scientific 

content, as well as their statistical analysis. 

References 

Landsberg, H. E. (1970). Man-made climatic changes. Science, 170,3964, 1265. 

Landsberg, H. E. (1981). The Urban Climate. Academic Press, New York, NY, USA. 

Lowry, W. P. (1967). The climate of cities. Scientific American, 2 17,2, 15. 

Walker, J. (1 977). The Flying Circus of Physics, With Answers. John Wiley and Sons. 

Iain Woodhouse 

Department of Water Resources, Wageningen Agricultural University 

Nieuwe Kanaal 11, 6709 PA Wageningen, The Netherlands 

woodhouse @ rcl. wau. nl 

Reply to Woodhouse 

The interesting and informative letter from Iain Woodhouse proposes a can- 

didate explanation for notable differences in rainfall correlated with the annu- 

al Princeton University reunions and commencement, based on the well docu- 

mented finding that urban areas can have a significantly different climate from 

the surrounding countryside. As described in the letter, this speculation would 

be reasonable only if the comparisons made in the "Wishing for Good Weath- 

er" paper were between urban and countryside areas (which they were not). 

However, the letter implicitly raises the possibility that the small town of 

Princeton is transformed temporarily into a functional urban environment with 

concomitant climatic effects. Although we cannot resolve the likelihood of 

this proposition without the usual "further research", some additional infor- 

mation and comments may be of value to readers. 

The six stations comprising the comparison sample are locations with vari- 

ous population densities, including Trenton, to the south, and New Brunswick, 

to the north. Both of these actually are large cities where the effects Dr. Wood- 

house describes would be expected in much greater measure than in Princeton, 

even when several thousand people are added to its normal population of

Letters to the Editor 233 

urban, or becomes urban temporarily. He suggests that effects of "urban ac- 

tivity" on weekends compared with weekdays could accommodate the "Good 

Weather" findings, then notes that the Sunday comparison shows little im- 

provement for Princeton. While the data are too sparse for reliable analysis in 

such detail, it would seem that this observation, in the context of the findings 

for the other days (Saturday, Monday, Tuesday), is incompatible with both the 

"weekend" model and the proposition that Princeton temporarily becomes an 

urban environment. 

In a private note also stimulated by the article, Robert Matthews wondered 

more explicitly whether the mere physical presence of so many people out- 

doors might constitute a heat source adequate to change the microclimate, but 

doubted this, primarily because local weather systems are so large. In this 

case, the comparison stations sample an area with a radius of about 40 miles, 

and the essential equivalence of rainfall during the "control" days (cf. Fig. 6 in 

the original paper) indicates that Princeton and the surrounding stations typi- 

cally are included within a consistent local system. Dr. Matthews also makes 

the point that warmer, urban areas tend to have more precipitation rather than 

less, for various reasons, but agrees with Dr. Woodhouse that local climatic 

changes are complex and influenced by other factors such as pollution from 

exhaust fumes and industrial processes. 

I believe it is important to consider the issues raised in the letter from Dr. 

Woodhouse, but he goes on to say it worries him that JSE published this paper 

without mention of the "urban heat island" effect. 

On the latter point I must differ with him, for it is quite clear that the publi- 

cation and the resulting discussion of his comments and those of other corre- 

spondents will result in more complete examination and understanding of a 

noteworthy phenomenon, both in the present instance and in any new assess- 

ments of the topic. Given the exchange, it is obvious that possible effects from 

physical sources on a micro-climate should be given serious consideration by 

anyone intending to do a replication or a similar "natural experiment" taking 

advantage of the tremendous resource of meteorological data. It is my hope 

that the possibilities discussed in the article and in these letters are sufficiently 

interesting that other investigators will do so. 

Roger Nelson 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research, C131 

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 

On the Wood Book Review of "Top Secret/MajicV 

In his book Top Secret/Majic Mr. Friedman has ferreted out many important 

facts of UFO history and has proposed some tantalizing speculations, but his 

~ work invites the same skeptical scrutiny he uses so appropriately in his criti- 

1 cism of the official denials on UFOs. The review by Dr. Robert Wood pub-


lished by the Journal (JSE, 1 1, pp.100-104, 1997) fell short of providing such 

scrutiny. 

While endorsing Wood's and Friedman's call for the release of all relevant 

government documents on UFOs, several experienced researchers of unques- 

tioned integrity now differ from them in the strong suspicion that the MJ- 12 

documents are bogus and that the reliability of crash reports has been contra- 

dicted by later facts. It is distressing to find that such contrasting views are left 

unmentioned in this context. In my own study of information patterns I ob- 

serve that, as new data come to light, the Roswell story as a whole tends to fol- 

low more and more closely the distortion exhibited by the fraudulent tale of 

the Philadelphia Experiment (Vallee, 1994), where a series of unusual but ex- 

plainable events came to be magnified into a breathless tale of interplanetary 

intrigue through the combination of simple trickery and not-so-simple human 

belief. I found nothing in the book to alter this conclusion. 

Friedman's interesting revelation that Prof. Menzel did considerable secret 

work for the Intelligence community does not imply that his skepticism to- 

wards UFOs was part of a conspiracy to cover-up the retrieval of alien space- 

craft and bodies. Menzel could have become aware of classified psychological 

warfare programs using UFO-like platforms. This would account for his obses- 

sive compulsion to warn his scientific colleagues away from involvement in 

the field. 

The often-heard notion that some contemporary inventions such as the tran- 

sistor were derived from the Roswell crash will be met with puzzlement here in 

Silicon Valley. Not only did the work of Bell Labs begin well before July 

1947, but the scientific literature shows that German inventor Oskar Heil had 

already demonstrated a transistor on a lab bench in Germany in the early thir- 

ties. Heil is listed as owner of British patent 439 457, filed in 1934. "The docu- 

ment neatly described the working principles of a modern FET," according to 

New Scientist (I 997). 

I share Friedman's and Wood's view that the UFO phenomenon is important 

for modem science. This makes it all the more important for our Society to 

weigh all the alternatives and to guard against unsupported conclusions. 

References 

Jacques Vallee 

1550 California St. #6L 

San Francisco, CA 941 09 

New Scientist (1997). 1 March, p. 92. 

Vallee, J. F. (1994). Anatomy of a hoax: The Philadelphia experiment fifty years later. Journal of 

Scientific Exploration, 8,47.


Response to Vallee 

The preceding letter to the editor would appear to be more a criticism of my 

review than of Friedman's book Top Secret/Majic being reviewed. 

I think that "skeptical scrutiny" has its place, but I also feel that much more 

harm has been done to the progress of science by skepticism than by gullibili- 

ty. There are four points in the Jacques Vallee letter that warrant response. 

(1) I agree that Friedman's book, which alludes to several of the MJ- 12 

documents, does not deal systematically with the authentication issue. How- 

ever, the unidentified evaluations of MJ- 12 documents performed by "several 

experienced researchers of unquestioned integrity" do not impress me. In- 

tegrity is not the issue here, but the skill of the researchers as document exam- 

iners. There exists in print no scholarly evaluation of these documents, based 

on the normal criteria for document authenticity of physical testing, paleogra- 

phy, chronology, and content. Presently, I am undertaking this work, and have 

come to the preliminary conclusion that every claim supporting "bogus" can 

be refuted. I do not think that a book reviewer is obligated to make note of op- 

posing views if they are thought to be false. 

(2) The reference to Vallee's own scholarly evaluation of the Philadelphia 

Experiment is a non-sequitur, a classic case of "proof by analogy", or "guilt by 

association", techniques that in general the SSE tries to avoid. The relevance 

of the Philadelphia Experiment to the authenticity of the MJ- 12 documents is 

quite unclear, and issues of intrigue, trickery, and beliefs are common factors 

in almost any anomaly study. 

(3) Friedman has provided information that suggests that Prof. Menzel 

could have been deeply involved in an alien spacecraft retrieval cover-up. 

Vallee suggests that this might have been merely psychological warfare using 

UFO-like platforms. Neither one offers a way to discriminate between such 

alternatives. The existence of such a psychological warfare project would be 

an innovative cover-up, and be remarkable on its own. 

(4) Neither Friedman (who used the phrase "speculative example") nor I 

claim that there is evidence that the transistor was derived from the Roswell 

crash. The point is much more a question than an answer. "If indeed our gov- 

ernment or parts of it had successfully recovered alien craft, have we been suc- 

cessful in reverse-engineering (or "reverse-science-ing") any products now in 

use in our society?" I believe that this is a legitimate question, not to be reject- 

ed on the basis that inhabitants of Silicon Valley might be "puzzled". I am 

aware of no serious attempts to answer this question. It is certainly a question 

intimately within the scope and thrust of the Society for Scientific Explo- 

ration. 

I regard Top Secret/Majic as providing a large body of information that can


serve as a stimulus and reference source for investigations that would include 

some skeptical scrutiny. 


172 7 Candlestick Lane 

Newport Beach, CA 92660 

On the Wood Book Review of "Top Secret/Majic9' 

I was somewhat surprised to see a glowing review of Top Secret Majic by Stan- 

ton Friedman in the latest issue (JSE, 11, pp. 100-104, 1997). I was even more 

surprised to see that there was no mention of the major problems with those 

documents. Quite simply, there is no provenance for them. We do not know in 

which government department they originated, we have been unable to trace 

them to any credible government source, and there are no direct links from ei- 

ther the documents to the government or from the government to the docu- 

ments. 

What we do know is that the MJ-12 Briefing to President-elect Dwight 

Eisenhower, and the memo written by President Harry Truman, were received 

at the home of an obscure UFO researcher and friend of William L. Moore 

some two or three years after Moore had suggested creating such a document. 

Moore, who had been investigating the Roswell, New Mexico UFO crash told 

several friends and fellow researchers that he had run into a brick wall and was 

thinking of creating a "Roswell-type document" to shake things loose. Most 

suggested it was a bad idea. Curiously, and according to Brad Sparks, Fried- 

man encouraged him. Two years later the first of the document appeared. 

It is also surprising that the review made no mention, nor does Friedman, of 

the many negative points in the documents. When a questioned document ex- 

pert from New York City told Friedman to "wash his hands" of the whole 

thing, Friedman ignored the advice. Instead he suggested CIA ties in a fairly 

transparent attempt to belittle the negative results. 

That same man said that the Truman signature on the memo was not a close 

match, but an exact match of one lifted from a letter dated October 1, 1947 

signed by Truman. The exact nature of the match proved it was lifted. And, it 

was placed uncharacteristically high on the memo. This proved the memo a 

fake, and if the memo is a fake, then the briefing that accompanied it is also a 

fake, and the core drops out of the MJ- 12 documents. 

I'm surprised at the importance attached to the "startling" finding that Dr. 

Donald Menzel, the former Harvard astronomer, had worked for the United 

States government. Anyone who had read Menzel's UFO's - The Modern 

Myth, contained in Carl Sagan and Thornton Page's 1972 book, UFO's A Sci- 

entific Debate would have known about his government work because Menzel 

mentioned it. Menzel wrote about his years as a Naval officer and provided us 

with a brief run-down on what he did during the Second World War. Fried- 

man's biography of Menzel was certainly interesting - and totally irrelevant.


tions Manual detailed in Friedman's book. Although the manual is dated April 

1954, it refers to Area 5 11s-4. The evidence shows that Groom Lake, Nevada, 

which is now part of Area 51, was in private hands in 1954. There were no 

classified facilities there to house the recovered alien debris. And, there is no 

evidence that the term Area 5 1 was used earlier than 1960. In other words, the 

manual referred to a place that didn't exist when it was written. 

The whole thing can be summarized in the first part of the review where it 

refers to Friedman's trademark position that UFOs are someone else's space- 

craft. The idea was not original with Friedman, but was the major theory long 

before he began to walk the UFO territory. More important is Friedman's own 

stated position, "As I gave more lectures, I found that I enjoyed speaking and 

that people would believe me no matter what I said. " 

The MJ- 12 documents are a hoax, created to convince us that flying saucers 

are real and that they crash. However, without the proper research, without a 

clear provenance for them, and with the technical, as well as historical, inaccu- 

racies, we should ignore them. To do otherwise is to violate the principles of 

science, something we in the UFO field do all too frequently. 

Response to Randle 

Kevin D. Randle 

R 0. Box 264 

Marion, IA 52402 

The letter from Kevin Randle implies that there is evidence that the docu- 

ments in question are fake. There is no such evidence. 

The process of authentication of documents is an orderly one, which consid- 

ers the provenance as just one of several factors to be considered. The key is to 

provide discriminators that will help determine the real from the fake. 

For example: 

Absence of a credible government source is not a discriminator if the 

sources queried do not know of the documents in question. 

The backgrounds of the recipients of the documents are not discrimina- 

tors, since there is no evidence that they did anything more than open the 

mail and find undeveloped negatives. 

The field abounds with unidentified "document experts" whose identity, 

and more importantly, whose detailed rationale, remain obscure and un- 

published. 

The exact match of a signature of Truman with another genuine one may 

be the result of his using an auto-pen, a mechanical device permitting 

him to sign five documents at once. He is known to have sometimes 

used such a device. In fact, the discovery of a third authentic signature


would essentially guarantee the authenticity. The exact match is there- 

fore not yet a discriminator one way or the other. 

Dr. Menzel's involvement with the UFO subject and the Government 

likewise provides no clear discriminant. 

The Operations Manual has been challenged on several points, each of 

which has logical responses. The inability to identify the very first Area 

5 11s-4 reference from unclassified literature is not a discriminator. I am 

aware of a witness who says that there were classified facilities being 

constructed there in the early 50's. Other challenges, such as the refer- 

ence to "downed satellites" prior to the first successful satellite launch, 

also require non-trivial awareness of the subtleties involved. These are 

not things to be disposed of in a sentence or two. 

It is premature to declare the documents either authentic or a hoax. I believe 

that the correct statement is that there is presently no compelling evidence to 

permit one to conclude that the Eisenhower Briefing Document or the Special 

Operations Manual 1-01 are hoaxes. The final determination will depend on a 

scholarly and objective evaluation of the relevant facts. 

It will be noted that I said that Friedman "fails to establish an objective au- 

thentication procedure.'' I would encourage attention to the methods, logic 

and results of careful evaluations of authenticity concerns with a minimum of 

personal allegations. I do not think these two documents described in Top Se- 

cret/Majic have yet received such attention, and therefore stand by my book 

review. 


1 72 7 Candlestick Lane 

Newport Beach, CA 92660 

Response to Vallee and Randle 

The history of science is littered with wrong conclusions derived from inap- 

propriate assumptions, a failure to dig deeply, and research by "proclamation" 

rather than investigation. 

Both Vallee and Randle ignore my Appendix C list of more than two 

dozen details not known to be true before receipt of the documents. 

I spoke with the document examiner who advised staying away from the 

documents and with another examiner, one who had opposite views. 

Neither would put his findings in writing or allow his name to be men- 

tioned. Neither they nor Randle deal with the use of two typewriters on 

the Truman-Forrestal memo, one matching that in Vannevar Bush's of- 

fice. 

The case for the reality of the recovery of crashed saucers in New Mexi- 

co was described in Crash at Corona and in a series of papers. 

I noted that Menzel's World War I1 Navy record was well-known. It is 

NOT true that there is discussion of his hefty post World War I1 involve-


ment with the NSA, CIA and other intelligence activities in anything 

published prior to my research, Randle's claim notwithstanding. 

Randle's use of the quote ending in "... people would believe me no mat- 

ter what I said" is a splendid example of what lawyers refer to as "signif- 

icant omission of material fact (fraud)." The same paragraph (p. 9 of 

Top Secret/Majic) has these words: 

The blind acceptance frightened me - now I knew how the demagogues of the twenti- 

eth century had had such success. I wanted people to think, to explore, to look at the 

data and make up their own minds. I decided that I would try to reach more technical 

groups, who presumably wouldn't accept everything I said as gospel. 

Scientific criticism should NOT use the tools of the propagandist. Anyone 

wishing a free list of UFO papers may send an SASE to UFORI, POB 958, 

Houlton, ME 04730-0958. 

Reference 

Stanton 7: Friedman 

79 Pembroke Crescent 

Fredericton, NB Canada E3B2 Vl 

S. T. Friedman and D. Berliner (1992). Crash at Corona, Marlowe and Co.: New York. 

Fortean Phenomena on Film? Evidence or Artifact 

Lange and Houran's article, "Fortean Phenomena on Film: Evidence or Ar- 

tifact" (JSE, 11, p. 41-46) lists 53 references. Among these is only one work 

published in 1939, one in 1966; all other references are published at later dates, 

and the majority in nineteen eighties. According to the authors, photographic 

materials from these times contain mostly "shadows, amorphous forms, densi- 

ty spots, fogging, and light streaks," and the authors conclude that "most of the 

paranormal 'proofs' or based on photographic data are often the result of the 

tendency to interpret the ambiguous stimuli as meaningful due to paranormal 

context." 

Among the cited works is the chapter from Wollman's Handbook of Para- 

psychology written by Jules Eisenbud. It contains at least 15 photographs, 

projected on photographic plates by Ted Serios, that are not density spots, fog- 

ging or light streaks, but human figures, architectural buildings, airplane, win- 

dow, basilica, geometric design, photo camera, and other. Not listed in the ref- 

erence is the 1995 book Incredible Tales of the Paranormal which contains 

photographs of phantoms and of a bird produced by the Polish psychic Kluski. 

Photography of anomalous phenomena did not start in the seventh decade of 

our century. It is well-known that materialization - the great phenomena of 

the Victorian era - disappeared from the paranormal horizon at the time of


World War I1 (they were replaced by spoon bending). A study that does not 

take under consideration works of Crookes, Besterman, Aksakof, Richet, von 

Schrenck-Notzing, Gelay, Osty, Ochorowicz, Gerloff, Tiller, Moss, and sever- 

al others misses the main body of carefully collected data. The authors of the 

paper conclude that the proofs of paranormal often - that means not always 

- are nothing else but the tendency to interpret ambiguous pictures as mean- 

ingful paranormal events. However, this study that omits the main body of 

data creates the impression that all anomalousness in photography is only the 

product of the photographers wishful thinking. Because it does not present the 

true status of things, this impression is erroneous. 

Response to Imich 

Alexander Imich, Ph. D. 

305 West End Avenue 

New York, NY 10023 

We thank the editors for the opportunity to respond to the issues identified 

by Dr. Imich in his recent letter. Dr. Imich is correct when he writes that we 

omit the literature on individuals purported to "psychically alter" film. We are 

aware of the long history of psychiclspirit photography starting with William 

Mumler in 1861 and continuing into more recent times with investigations of 

the Veilleux family, Nina Kulagina, Ted Serios, William Hope, John Myers, 

Uri Geller, and Masuaki Kiyota, to name but a few. It is true that anomalous 

photographic effects have been obtained in the laboratory as well as under less 

formal conditions (e.g., Carrington, 1925; Fukurai, 1975; Hasted & Robert- 

son, 1980; Herbert, 1972; Rindge, Cook, & Owen, 1972; Shafer & Phillips, 

1982; Stevenson & Pratt, 1968; for a review see Shepard, 1991). At the begin- 

ning of the footnote on page 42 of our article, we stated that we deliberately 

omitted these types of photographic anomalies due to questionable validity 

(see e.g., Eisendrath, 1967; Randi, 1982; Reynolds, 1967; Burger, 1986). Fur- 

ther, in the next sentence we cited sources for interested readers that defended 

psychic photographers. Perhaps the best summary of the status of spirit pho- 

tography as discussed by Dr. Imich is provided by Eisenbud himself (1977) 

who stated, "It seems certain that fraud was practiced, though how widely will 

never be known" (p. 415). For reasons like this, our study was based on pho- 

tographs taken during investigations of locations associated with anomalous 

experiences such as haunted houses and religious shrines, but without the in- 

tervention of spirit photographers. 

The fraud of spirit photography eventually led to its decline, as is true for 

Spiritualism and feats of metal-bending as well. Yet, well-respected individu- 

als have been deceived. For example, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was fooled by 

the photographs of the Cottingley fairies. Does this mean that all spirit pho- 

tography, both in historical and recent cases, is suspect? From his letter, Dr. 

Imich seems confident that Ted Serios and the Polish psychic Kluski were re-

Letters to the Editor 24 1 

sponsible for anomalous images obtained during film tests and that these effects 

were accomplished with psychic ability. We feel that the evidence is inconclusive 

at best. Although there are intriguing reports that particular individuals 

possess abilities which could account for some macro-psychokinetic 

effects (e.g., Green, et al., 1991), this still does not mean that such individuals 

can also produce photographic effects. 

Photographic anomalies certainly exist, but the term "anomalous" should 

not be used synonymously with "paranormal." However, our own research 

(e.g., Lange, et al., 1996; Lange & Houran, 1996, Houran & Lange, 1996) suggests 

that this label is the product of contextual influences, such as belief in the 

paranormal, demand characteristics, or symbolic metaphorical references, as 

they guide the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. We maintain that the photographic 

anomalies studied in our article form just another type of ambiguous 

stimulation. In case the reader needs further evidence for our position, we 

refer to website 'http://www.aone.com/-starwest/' which as of April 22, 1997 

contained 41 photographic anomalies recorded by amateur ghost hunters on 

color film (Note: the medium is often not reported, and color film is the most 

frequently used). Consistent with the results reported in our article, amorphous 

forms (n = 18) again occurred the most frequently (x2 = 9.44, p< -05) as compared 

to other effects such as fogging (n = 6) or light streaks (n = 6). 

We thank the Journal of Scientific Exploration for this opportunity to clarify 

our position. 

James Houran and Rense Lange 

301 University Court West 

Springfield, Illinois 62 703 

References 

Burger, E. ( 1986). Spirit Theater. Silver Springs, MD: Kaufman & Greenberg. 

Carrington, H. (1925). Experiences in psychic photography. Journal of the American Society for 

Psychical Research, 19,258. 

Eisenbud, J. (1977). Paranormal photography. In B. B. Wolman (Ed.), Handbook of Parapsychol- 

ogy. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 414. 

Eisendrath, D. B., Jr. (1967). An amazing weekend with the amazing Ted Serios. Part 11. Popular 

Photography, 61,4, 85ff. 

Fukurai, T. (1975). Clairvoyance and Thoughtography (first publ. 1931). New York: Pocket 

Books. 

Green, E. E., Parks, P. A., Guyer, P. M., Fahrion, S. L., & Coyne, L. (199 1). Anomalous electrosta- 

tic phenomena in exceptional subjects. Subtle Energies, 2,69. 

Hasted, J. B, & Robertson, D. (1980). Paranormal action on metal and its surroundings. Journal of 

the Society for Psychical Research, 50,379. 

Herbert, B. (1972). Report on Nina Kulagina. Parapsychology Review, 3, 8. 

Houran, J., & Lange, R. (1996). Diary of events in a thoroughly unhaunted house. Perceptual and 

Motor Skills, 83,499. 

Lange, R., & Houran, J. (1996). Role of contextual mediation in direct versus reconstructed angel- 

ic encounters. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 83, 1259. 

Lange, R., Houran, J., Harte, T. M., & Havens, R. A. (1996). Contextual mediation of perceptions 

in hauntings and poltergeist-like experiences. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 82,755. 

Randi, J. (1982). Flim-Jam! New York: Prometheus. 

Reynolds, C. (1967). An amazing weekend with the amazing Ted Serios. Part I. Popular Photog- 

raphy, 61,4,81ff.


Rindge, J. P., Cook, W., & Owen, A. R. G. (1972). An investigation of psychic photography with 

the Veilleux family. New Horizons, 1,28. 

Shafer, M., & Phillips, P. R. (1982). Some Investigations of Claims of PKeffects on metal and film 

by Masuaki Kiyota. 11. The St. Louis experiments. Journal of the American Society for Psychi- 

cal Research, 76,233. 

Shepard, L. A. (Ed.) (1991). Encyclopedia of Occultism & Parapsychology (3rd ed.). Detroit, MI: 

Gale Research. 

Stevenson, I., & Pratt, J. G. (1968). Exploratory investigations of the psychic photography of Ted 

Serios. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 62, 103. 

An Answer to Professor Bauer on a Possible Understanding of Human 

Language by Animals 

Yes, apes (chimpanzees and especially the Bonobo Pan paniscus) can un- 

derstand human language when spoken; (chimpanzees understand 150 words, 

bonobos do much better, they understand even elementary orders). If they are 

definitely unable to speak, they can use American sign language for the deaf, 

ask elementary questions, and answer; bonobos actively studied in USA, go 

much further than chimps. The pioneer work in that direction was done by the 

Gardners . 

But another worker Irene Pepperberg, demonstrated conclusively some 

years ago that parrots (or precisely the Gabon parrot Psittacus erithacus) can 

not only imitate human language but also ask questions and answers using not 

American Sign language, but the human vocal language. 

Dolphins also can learn a mode of expression adapted to their aquatic life. 

Extensive bibliography can be found in Bekoff & Jamieson (1990). 

Pro$ Remy Chauvin 

Honorary Professor at the Sorbonne 

Le Chateau, 18380 Ivoy Le Pre, France 

Reference 

Bekoff and Jamieson eds. (1990). Readings in Animal Cognition. Bradford Books, the MIT Press: 

Cambridge, MA.

Journal of Scientijc Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 243-262, 1997 0892-33 10197 


BOOK REVIEWS 

Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life by Daniel 

C. Dennett. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995,586 pp. $30.00 (c). 

In a spirited, uncompromising defense of neo-Darwinian orthodoxy, Daniel 

Dennett, the eminent American philosopher of mind, and head of the Center 

for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, proposes to answer our theoretical 

doubts and allay our moral misgivings about evolution by natural selection. 

He explains "why Darwin's idea is so powerful, and why it promises - not 

threatens - to put our most cherished visions of life on a new foundation" (p. 

1 I). In the process, Dennett shows us how this idea, in a somewhat new guise 

(natural selection as algorithmic process), transforms the old "mind first" 

world view, how the fundamental core of neo-Darwinism survives the chal- 

lenges from within biology itself intact and strengthened, and finally, how 

Darwinian thinking may properly be applied to human affairs. 

Although intended for a general, educated audience, this book may prove 

demanding to the uninitiated. Its approach is interdisciplinary and wide-rang- 

ing, and the relation of the parts to the whole is not always apparent. Dennett 

does, however, provide us with an Ariadne's thread in the form of brief sum- 

maries and previews at the end of each chapter. Those who persevere will be 

richly rewarded. 

Evolution by natural selection, Dennett asserts, is the best single idea that 

anyone has ever had. It unifies, at once, "the realm of life, meaning, and pur- 

pose with the realm of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and phys- 

ical law" (p. 21). Darwin made one world out of two through a radical mecha- 

nistic reduction that banished consciousness and purpose from the process of 

design in nature. Before Darwin, no one knew how to take the hypothesis of 

design without mind seriously (p. 83). For John Locke or even David Hume, it 

was simply inconceivable. After Darwin, we could explain how design can 

emerge by way of a purposeless, mindless, mechanical process. 

Dennett underscores the mindlessness of natural selection by defining it as 

an algorithmic process. "Here, then, is Darwin's dangerous idea: the algorith- 

mic level is the level that best accounts for the speed of the antelope, the wing 

of the eagle, the shape of the orchid, the diversity of species, and all the other 

occasions for wonder in the world of nature" (p. 59). At the algorithmic level 

of analysis, design procedures are "broken into bits so tiny and stupid" that 

they no longer count as intelligence (p. 133). An algorithm is a recipe pre- 

scribing an exact sequence of steps that are utterly simple and guaranteed to 

produce results. The power of the procedure is found in its logical structure, 

not in the materials used to execute it - long division works with pencil and 

paper, a calculator, or a stick in the sand. Unlike mathematical algorithms that 

usually involve procedures for computing specific functions, the algorithms


that govern the winnowing work of evolution are, strictly speaking, not for 

anything. These foolproof, rote, mechanical procedures have no goal. 

The interpretation of natural selection as an algorithmic process allows 

Dennett to tie his defense of neo-Darwinian orthodoxy to his advocacy of 

"strong Artificial Intelligence," the position that our intelligence can be me- 

chanically duplicated, that machines can be made to "think." After all, every 

computer program is an algorithm, and perhaps, Dennett suggests, the mind is 

also. He sees evolution and artificial intelligence as the same story being 

played out on different time scales. Dennett's book is a defense of "strong AI" 

as well as of neo-Darwinian orthodoxy. For he seems convinced that if the 

former falls to its critics, the latter is likely to be found among the casualties. 

Artificial intelligence says we are made of robots; evolution tells us we are 

descended from robots. Together evolution and artificial intelligence "strike a 

fundamental blow at the last refuge to which people have retreated in the face 

of the Copernican Revolution: the mind as an inner sanctum that science can- 

not reach" (207). 

Much of the hostility both toward evolution and an engineering approach to 

the mind rests on the fear that such reasoning will subvert our sense of self, 

drain life of meaning and purpose, and explain away our very minds. This hid- 

den agenda of fear, Dennett argues, misdirects scientific debate about evolu- 

tion. Behind the hot-tempered controversy, the announced revolution that 

changes little or nothing, and "the tremendous - and largely misguided - 

animosity" to Darwinian accounts of language and the human mind, Dennett 

detects a failure of nerve. It is not that the "Modern Synthesis" is in dispute, it 

is rather that its consequences are too hard to bear. 

Dennett wants to cut through the smoke screens of avoidance, confront and 

disarm the animosity, and work out answers to responsible objections. In this 

regard, he singles out a number of distinguished thinkers for special criticism: 

paleontologist, Stephen Jay Gould; linguist, Noam Chomsky; philosopher, 

John Searle; and mathematical physicist, Roger Penrose. Gould's anti-adap- 

tationism and insistence on "radical contingency" and "punctuated equilibri- 

um," Chomsky's suggestion that evolutionary theory has as yet little to say 

about language, Searle's argument that only human minds have "original in- 

tentionality," and Penrose's conviction that our ability to "see" and "under- 

stand" mathematical truth is non-algorithmic - all these positions, Dennett 

suspects, represent attempts to refute the idea that evolution is an algorithmic 

process and to shield the mysteries of free will, language, and the mind from 

Darwinian mechanisms. 

Each of these thinkers, Dennett claims, betrays a yearning for "skyhooks", 

when they should be looking only for "cranes." Skyhooks are, in Dennett's in- 

ventive terminology, impossible, imaginary devices that spring the frame of 

mechanical, algorithmic explanation. They are "mind first" forces or process- 

es, moments of special creation, exempt from, and discontinuous with the 

mindless mechanics of design. Cranes, on the other hand, are the real lifters in


the evolutionary process. Cranes are complex intermediary mechanisms that 

arise from the process of evolution itself, and in turn, speed the process along 

by promoting the development of still more complex structures. In Dennett's 

view, God is a skyhook; sex is a crane. 

Though Gould might regard Dennett's position as "hyper-" or "ultra-Dar- 

winism," Dennett sees himself simply as a champion of "no-skyhooks-al- 

lowed" Darwinism. Dennett distinguishes "good" and "greedy" forms of re- 

ductionism. Greedy reductionism underestimates complexities in its haste to 

secure everything to the foundation; good reductionism is "simply the com- 

mitment to non-question-begging scienceV(p. 82). Good reductionists "think 

everything in nature can all be explained without skyhooks; greedy reduction- 

ists think it can all be explained without cranes" (p. 394). 

We must, Dennett insists, look unflinchingly at Darwin's idea and its conse- 

quences. For we have listened to the wrong sirens and underestimated its 

power and reach. Like some universal acid, it cannot be contained. It eats its 

way through every barrier and into the fabric of our traditional concepts of 

cosmology and psychology, revolutionizing our view of the world and of our- 

selves. 

The revolution, Dennett thinks, holds more promise than threat. Even after 

the acid of Darwin's idea has passed unadulterated through our most cherished 

monuments of purpose and meaning, it leaves them still standing, fundamen- 

tally transformed, but enhanced. What really matters is preserved in the Dar- 

winian view. Everything great and important to us survives, burned clean of 

mystery and miracle, "demystified, unified, placed on more secure founda- 

tions" (p. 82). 

What do the world and our values look like after they are demystified and 

unified by Darwin's idea? In the final section of the book, Dennett turns di- 

rectly to the implications of Darwinian thinking for culture, mind, meaning, 

and morality. Dennett makes his way between "skyhookers" and "greedy re- 

ductionists," but it is apparent that if he errs he wants it to be on the side of re- 

ductionism. We humans are vastly different from other species, Dennett 

makes clear at the outset. We have culture, language, minds - cranes that 

allow us to rise above "the imperatives of our genes" (p. 365). We are design- 

ers and not just designed. Yet characteristically, Dennett makes equally clear 

that all of our talents as designers emerge from mechanical, Darwinian 

processes. Spiders make webs, birds make nests, beavers make dams, and we 

make culture. Dennett acknowledges no radical discontinuities. 

In his analysis of culture, Dennett adopts a perspective which corresponds 

to the "gene's eye" view in current Darwinian theory. Seeking a cultural paral- 

lel to the gene, Dennett borrows Richard Dawkins' notion of a "meme." A 

meme is the basic unit of information which spreads by copying from one site 

to another and obeys, according to Dawkins, the laws of natural selection 

quite exactly. Meme evolution is not just analogous to genetic evolution. It is 

the same phenomenon. Cultural evolution simply uses a different unit of


transmission evolving in a different medium at a faster rate. Evolution by nat- 

ural selection occurs wherever conditions of variation, replication and differ- 

ential "fitness" exist. 

Despite Dennett's enthusiasm for memes, the notion is, it seems to me, 

rather vague and atomistic. A meme "for music," for example, might refer to 

anything from a jingle to a conservatory. The meme notion may very well illu- 

minate the study of modest forms of replicated wisdom like proverbs. But 

how do we move from the simple, isolated, and ill-defined unit of the meme to 

the complex forms of cultural transmission and transformation? 

Unfortunately, Dennett also uses the meme notion to explain just how our 

minds are shaped. According to Dennett, human brains provide shelter for 

memes, and these memes to a very great degree create human minds. We are 

who and what we are because of earlier "infestations of memes." Our highest 

values are products of the memes that have spread most successfully. 

Although memes allow us to transcend the tyranny of "selfish genes," Den- 

nett rejects the idea of an independent mind. He uses the meme to counter the 

common view that we are "godlike creators of ideas" who can manipulate, 

judge, and control them from an independent "Olympian standpoint" (p. 

346). "This 'we' that transcends not only its genetic creators but also its 

memetic creators is ... a myth" (p. 366) 

Certainly, we are products of our genetic and cultural heritage. This is hard- 

ly a new idea. But Dennett's view has deeper implications: the "I" is nothing 

over and above a system of complex interactions between the body and the 

memes that infest it. Dennett's image of memes nesting unauthored and un- 

criticized in the mind reflects a rejection of Cartesian dualism in all its forms, 

along with any language that might encourage a picture of the mind as an 

"Inner Theater" with an observing self. Such images of inner states are, Den- 

nett would contend, symptomatic of anti-scientific yearnings for skyhooks. 

Dennett wishes to rid the world of "mind first" forces, of all occult causes and 

ghostly processes, eliminating from the architecture of science the last traces 

of mindlbody, consciousnesslmatter dualism. He wishes to refute, in the 

words of Dennett's mentor, Gilbert Ryle, Descartes' "dogma of the ghost in 

the machine." 

In his discussion of the human mind, intentionality, and meaning, Dennett 

carefully remains within a framework of understanding which consorts well 

with "strong AI." He likens human autonomy to the Viking spacecraft on au- 

tomatic pilot and denies any fundamental distinction between the intentional- 

ity of robots and the intentionality of humans. In a chapter entitled "Losing 

Our Minds to Darwin," Dennett once more links evolutionary theory and arti- 

ficial intelligence: "if human minds are nonmiraculous products of evolution, 

then they are, in the requisite sense, artifacts, and all their powers must have 

an ultimately 'mechanical' explanation. We are descended from macros and 

made of macros, and nothing we can do is anything beyond the power of huge 

assemblies of macros" (p. 371).


This mechanistic, strictly third-person approach to human mentality has led 

some philosophers, including John Searle and Colin McGinn, to assert that 

Dennett has nothing to say about consciousness, that he denies its very exis- 

tence. See Searle and Dennett, "'The Mystery of Consciousness': An Ex- 

change" (The New York Review of Books, December 2 I, 1995, p.83). 

While it seems to me unlikely that Dennett thinks we are zombies, his "re- 

markably counterintuitive" position does appear to take little or no account of 

the immediate experience of consciousness. Dennett's view of science appar- 

ently leaves no place for first-person descriptions of inner states. 

Yet when Dennett looks at moral values in a Darwinian context, the results 

are not earth-shaking. He sees, I think correctly, that any naturalistic ethic 

must be grounded in a view of human nature, but he avoids the simplistic 

"evolutionary ethics" of Social Darwinism. Dennett warns against rushing too 

quickly from facts to values and against the "genetic fallacy" - apparent in 

old fashioned behaviorism and sociobiology - of inferring current meaning 

from ancestral function. Culture, no doubt, grew out of our biological inheri- 

tance, but it does not follow that our genes are the principle beneficiaries of 

our current values - "our reasons aren't the reasons of fish just because fish 

are our ancestors" (p. 472). 

Dennett is convinced that only evolutionary analysis can make sense of the 

origins of ethical norms, but in the final analysis, he sheds little new light on 

the key question of how selective pressure might produce characteristics of al- 

truism and cooperation. Following Thomas Hobbes and Friedrich Nietzsche, 

he argues that morality requires the evolution of a capacity for mutual recog- 

nition and an ability to communicate a promise, but he does not develop these 

ideas. The chapter on "Redesigning Morality" is a very modest "Moral First 

Aid Manual," recycled from an earlier publication, reflecting perhaps a cer- 

tain discomfort with a form of discourse that does not lend itself to the strict 

objectivity and precision of good science. 

The impact of the Darwinian vision on our values extends, of course, be- 

yond specific issues of ethics. We have learned from experience that no sani- 

tary cordon can keep Darwinian thinking out of human affairs. It would seem 

that evolutionary theory cannot help functioning, like ancient creation myths, 

as a foundational narrative teaching us not only where we came from and how 

we are made, but also how we are to feel about our world, what we should ven- 

erate and protect, and what types of behavior we should regard as essential 

(see in this connection, Mary Midgley, Evolution as a Religion). 

Dennett recognizes this power of Darwinism as drama. He shapes his 

method of presentation to that end, deliberately setting aside formal argument 

and messy detail, in order to tell a grand story of panoptic sweep. He asks us to 

exchange pre-Darwinian views for synoptic insight into a shared history, a vi- 

sion of a single Tree of Life that allowed us to see organisms and artifacts, bi- 

ology and culture, indeed, all design in the universe, from a single perspec- 

tive. He uses fascinating thought experiments and imagination-stretching


images and metaphors - the Tree of Life branching and blossoming through 

the vast expanse of Design Space, the Library of Mendel containing all possi- 

ble genomes. Dennett tells a story with pantheistic overtones, concluding with 

a hymn to biodiversity and an affirmation of the sacredness of the world. It is a 

world without mystery or miracle, but nonetheless worthy of awe and wonder. 

The Tree of Life, like Anselm's God, is "a being that is greater than any of us 

will ever conceive of in detail worthy of its detail" (p. 520). "The 'miracles' of 

life and consciousness turn out to be even better than we imagined back when 

we were sure they were inexplicable" (p. 521). 

Some readers may feel themselves pulled in opposing directions by con- 

trasting images. This bright vision, Dennett repeatedly reminds us, rests upon 

a sober foundation of mechanistic materialism. When describing humans, 

Dennett seems to go out of his way to avoid anthropomorphic language, re- 

serving it instead for machines. His choice of metaphors is occasionally 

shocking: "I don't know about you, but I am not initially attracted by the idea 

of my brain as a sort of dungheap in which the larvae of other people's ideas 

renew themselves, before sending out copies of themselves in an information- 

al diaspora. It does seem to rob my mind of its importance as both author and 

critic" (p. 346). 

Such choices are puzzling. The words abase rather than enhance. They are 

not dictated by reason or science and do nothing to foster enlightened consid- 

eration of the issues. 

Dennett's lucid and lively presentation is marred by a penchant for rhetori- 

cal excess. "Foes" have planted themselves on the isthmus connecting our 

species to all the others, "like Horatio at the bridge" (p. 335). Dennett detects 

a "depth of loathing of Darwin's dangerous idea" in the esteem that some non- 

scientists have for Teilhard de Chardin (p. 321). Safety demands that reli- 

gions, like lions, "be put in cages, too" (p. 5 15). Dennett does not hesitate to 

impute motives and assign labels. Opponents are "Darwin Dreaders" and 

"Skyhookers." - "What hidden agendas - moral, political, religious -have 

driven Gould himself?" (p. 266) While such tactics may draw cheers from 

supporters, they do not promote understanding. Noam Chomsky's response to 

John Maynard Smith's review of this book, states the matter plainly: "The 

frantic efforts to 'defend Darwin's dangerous idea' from evil forces that re- 

gard it as neither 'dangerous' nor even particularly controversial, at this level 

of discussion, hardly merit comment" (The New York Review of Books, Febru- 

ary 1, 1996, p.41). 

That, of course, should not be the last word on this provocative book. Den- 

nett shows us how Darwinism has succeeded as an orthodoxy and suggests 

how we can live with this success. At times, his stress on the utter mindless- 

ness of the processes of evolution seems to work at cross-purposes with his 

desire to reassure us that we can live comfortably with Darwin. Immanuel 

Kant recognized long ago that if our values clash irrationally with our picture 

of the world, we may be left fearing for our moral sanity. But while not every-


one will agree with Dennett that mindless, mechanistic materialism is a beau- 

tiful idea, most readers will not fail to be impressed by his consistent outlook 

and vast learning. As Dennett informs newcomers and challenges old oppo- 

nents, even experts might listen in to refresh their understanding of some fun- 

damental issues. 

Carl Hester 

Department of Religion 

Randolph-Macon Woman's College 

Lynchburg, Virginia 24503 

The Bell Curve Wars ed. Steven Fraser. New York: Basic Books, 1995, 216 

pp. ISBN 0-465-00693-0. 

The Bell Curve Debate ed. Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman. New 

York: Times Books, 1995,720 pp. ISBN 0-8129-2587-4. 

Measured Lies ed. Joe L. Kincheloe, Shirley R. Steinberg & Aaron D. Gres- 

son 111. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996,454 pp. ISBN 0-3 12-12929-7. 

I belong to what must be the least exclusive club in the country: People who 

have written critical reviews of The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Struc- 

ture in American Life by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein. I counted 20 

in The Bell Curve Wars, and 40 in Measured Lies. The number in The Bell 

Curve Debate is hard to calculate because, as in many numerical quantities, it 

all depends on the definition. As best as I can figure, there are 46 named au- 

thors, eight anonymous authors - newspaper and magazine editorial writers 

- and ten named writers who defend The Bell Curve, plus 17 who wrote on 

the subject before the book was written. Indeed, the last-mentioned category 

goes back to an 1865 publication of Galton - the founder and creator of the 

name "eugenics" - and includes as well several 1922 articles of Walter Lipp- 

mann on the nurture side of the debate. Clearly, not much is all that new under 

the sun. 

Nevertheless, every dawn is unique, so to speak, and Murray and Herrnstein 

somehow captured the Zeitgeist of our time without really anything fresh to 

say on the subject. Or, so claim the many critics who point out that the argu- 

ments put forward are rehashes of plausibly quaint racialist ideas such as cran- 

iometry and I.Q. equals destiny which have long since been discredited. While 

craniometry is unlikely to make a comeback, I.Q.'s congruence with destiny 

fits neatly into the current hereditarian calculus of explaining the American 

universe in which some are affluent and many more are not. 

Most critics of The Bell Curve fasten on its assertions about race and the 

I.Q. inferiority of African Americans. In actuality, most of the book is about 

class structure, a subject often avoided in the U.S. because we are in theory a 

mobile, classless society. Murray and Herrnstein claim that we have lost the 

mobility of bygone days because the low-I.Q. people keep begetting low-I.Q. 

children who will form an increasing threat to the peaceful existence of the


"cognitive elite," the high-I.Q. people. The obvious threat comes in the shape 

of crime; the not-so-obvious threat is affirmative action and other social pro- 

grams which will put inappropriate persons into positions that should be re- 

served for the properly qualified who, it just so happens, usually are white and 

male. 

Of the three books, Measured Lies is the least interesting both from a statis- 

tical-mathematical and polemical point of view despite its publication being 

the latest of the three. For what it is worth, nine of the authors work at Penn 

State University and six at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 

The essays are original but decidedly uninteresting compared to the contribu- 

tions in the other two books. I read The Bell Curve Wars first and had seen 

most of those articles previously in the New Republic issue devoted exclu- 

sively to The Bell Curve when it first came out. However, the best piece is 

Gould's "Curveball," which is taken from his New Yorker review. I liked that 

the best because it is one of the only reviews that challenges the statistical 

quackery directly and doesn't leave the mathematical high ground to Murray 

and Herrnstein. Besides, Gould is a terrific writer on any subject. 

Gould's article appears again in The Bell Curve Debate and once more is the 

lead article but this time it is entitled "Measure by any Measure". In fact, 

many of the articles in this book have rechristened titles from the original, pre- 

sumably for copyright reasons. Rechristened or otherwise, the one I enjoyed 

the most was "Blacktop Basketball and the Bell Curve," nee "The Case 

Against the Bell Curve," by Gregg Easterbrook. He recounts the time when he 

was looking for a job and was forced to live in "seedy neighborhood" of Wash- 

ington, D.C. To pass the time, "I played basketball on the local court several 

hours each day. I was the only white player in the game, accepted at first as a 

charity case... After two months of daily basketball, I found myself able to 

hold my own in one-on-one matches against the hot players ... I had never been 

able to do before and have not been able to do so since." 

Easterbrook attributes his increase and his subsequent decrease in skills to 

practice or lack thereof whereas "Charles Murray and the late Richard Herrn- 

stein would say I had suddenly acquired basketball genes. Then just as sud- 

denly I lost them!" He is in effect revealing that it is amazing that we are so 

willing to believe in physical training and to pay exorbitant sums to coaches of 

athletes and then claim that intellectual achievement is entirely formed at 

birth and is totally immutable, beyond adjustment. Blacks do well at basket- 

ball because "many black kids practice the sport intensely. For good or ill, 

thousands of black kids spend several hours per day through their youth play- 

ing basketball". For me, "Blacktop basketball offers an entry point for under- 

standing why [The Bell Curve has] common-sense faults" despite its plausible 

appeal to those comfortable with the status quo. It is now over two years since 

The Bell Curve was published and, therefore, I doubt that there will be another 

compendium of critiques. My not-so-little club has perhaps gotten pretty 

close to its asymptote but then again, I wouldn't have wagered the farm on the

Book Reviews 25 1 

financial and popular success of The Bell Curve in the first place. As statisti- 

cians are wont to say, randomness is everywhere and who knows, we may get 

Son of the Bell Curve, or for the cognoscenti elite, Raus mit Gauss. 

Paul Alper 


St. Paul, MN 55105 

Leaps of Faith: Science, Miracles and the Search for Supernatural Caus- 

es by Nicholas Humphrey. New York: Basic Books, 1996,244 pp. $23.00, (c) 

ISBN 0-465-08044-8. 

Book reviews tend to be predictable. A newspaper, a magazine or a journal has 

an agenda, sometimes more obvious for some than for others. Part of the en- 

joyment of reading a review is to see if it is possible to guess beforehand what 

its tone is, given the reviewer and the particular publication in which the re- 

view appears. In the Wall Street Journal, for example, it is easy to predict what 

will be said about works by what it deems "so-called" environmentalists such 

as Nader and Greenpeace. 

Though the Journal of Scientific Exploration specifically eschews any pre- 

determined position, nevertheless it also takes a fairly predictable stance re- 

garding phenomena and the people who write about phenomena. So it 

wouldn't surprise me if among the readership of the Journal of Scientific Ex- 

ploration, I may be the only one to enjoy Nicholas Humphrey's Leaps of 

Faith. This is an entirely normal prediction on my part and unrelated to clair- 

voyance of any form. Humphrey has the standard Skeptical Inquirer position 

regarding PK and ESP and therefore won't impress the JSE readership with 

his standard answers concerning Uri Geller, UFOs, alien abduction and mira- 

cle cures. What is decidedly different about his book is the long treatment of 

Jesus Christ's putative paranormal abilities: 

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Jesus really had no more paranormal 

powers than any other human being, and that this means in effect that he had no para- 

normal powers at all. Why might he have been deluded into thinking that he did have 

them? 

Humphrey goes on to speculate how Jesus could have deceived himself and 

others concerning his family connections and his power to perform miracles 

via a "virtuous circle." "Success in bringing about a cure feeds back to the 

healer, boosting both his image in the eyes of the world and his image of him- 

self.". Equating Jesus with a run-of-the-mill magician is startling enough: 

In their [Jewish and pagan commentators at the time] view, while Jesus might have 

been an especially classy conjurer, he was certainly not in an altogether separate class.


but Humphrey even suggests that Christ is the paradigm, the very exemplar, of 

Western paranormal charlatans: 

The miracles recorded in the Bible, especially those attributed to Jesus, have done 

more to set the stage for all subsequent paranormal phenomena in Western culture, out- 

side as well as inside a specifically religious text. 

While ridiculing the views of anomalists is commonplace, doubting the 

miracles of Jesus is, to mix a few metaphors, beyond the pale of the American 

canon. So much so, that I can only speculate that Humphrey, counting on the 

outcry engendered by his blasphemy, did this deliberately in order to increase 

sales. He also cleverly covered his tracks by publishing it first as a trial bal- 

loon in England, a country far less prone to miracles, secular or sacred. 

And perhaps all of this, my review included, has been predicted in the Bible 

just as Humphrey shows on page 78 that Psalm 46 forecasts the birth of Shake- 

speare. Further, according to Humphrey, "People have been known to tell lies 

even in books." The same applies to book reviews, particularly and pre- 

dictably, those written by others. 

Paul Alper 

QMCS Department 



Editorial Addendum from Henry Bauer: 

The book's title in its British publication is Soul Searching (Chatto & Windus, 

1995). 

My own disappointment with this book stems less from its debunking 

stance than from its focus on a priori argument. Humphrey held the Perrott- 

Warwick Fellowship in Psychical Research at Cambridge, and one might have 

expected that to give him the time and means to examine the evidence for and 

against actual claims. However, the book says little about actual or claimed 

phenomena or events. It argues largely from first principles and therefore of- 

fers little if anything for serious anomalists: they rarely insist that their claims 

are highly probable, only that they happen to be true. My own delight in the 

actual existence of the Loch Ness monsters is precisely because that existence 

is so unlikely. 

That would be understandable to religious believers who delight in the oc- 

currence of miracles, and perhaps that connection does somehow support 

Humphrey's lumping together of religion and parapsychology. But why does 

he (and why do so many other CSICOP-type "skeptics") so disdain religious 

belief, when (p. 15) studies show that religious believers "show many fewer 

symptoms of psychological disturbance" than non-believers? 

The late Gordon Stein reviewed this book in Skeptical Inquirer


(September/October 1996, pp. 52-53) as one "that both skeptics and believers 

in the paranormal would do well to read," while also finding, as I do, that it 

poses too sharp a division between possible beliefs on these matters. 



Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University 

Blacksburg, VA 24061-0247 

Leaps of Faith: Science, Miracles, and the Search for Supernatural Caus- 

es by Nicholas Humphrey. New York: Basic Books, 1996,244 pp. $23.00, (c) 

ISBN 0-465-08044-8. 

The subtitle of this book describes it well: Science, Miracles, and the Search 

for Supernatural Consolation. Humphrey attributes the belief in paranormal 

phenomena to an ineradicable need of humans for some meaning to their life 

beyond mere physical existence and the death that terminates it. This craving 

lowers or even suppresses our critical faculties when we confront testimony 

that suggests a less bleak eschatology. 

Humphrey tries to show that the miracles attributed to Jesus and the entire 

edifice of the Christian religion, which he is convinced largely derives from 

belief in these miracles, illustrate nothing more than gullibility. He suggests 

that Jesus was initially just an unexceptional itinerant conjurer who happened 

to attract a following of believers. His skill in magic impressed early ob- 

servers; his healings could have occurred as described, through the power of 

faith. Witnesses of his phenomena began to believe that he had paranormal 

powers. The first believers influenced others to believe. In the end, Jesus came 

to believe he really possessed the powers he claimed to have. The throng ador- 

ing him troubled the religious and governmental authorities for whom he ap- 

peared to be a potentially dangerous agitator. 

Humphrey's preoccupation with the miracles of Jesus and other miracles 

continues through nearly the entire first half of his book. In the remainder he 

addresses the question of whether an intelligent person should take seriously 

modern claims of paranormal phenomena. The titles of some chapters, such as 

"PK" and "ESP" exemplify Humphrey's light-hearted approach to his task. 

He raises the well-known complaint that parapsychologists offer no coherent 

explanation of how the purported paranormal phenomena occur. He objects to 

the patchiness of the phenomena and its unpredictability. He also thinks that 

paranormal phenomena make no sense. There is, he contends, "no rhyme or 

reason for what gets through [in claimed extrasensory perception] and what 

does not." With one exception, Humphrey speaks in generalities only and 

never confronts the details of particular experiments. (Spontaneous cases of 

apparent paranormal experiences are seemingly not even worthy of his dis- 

missal.) In the exception, which, he writes, "breaks with the convention of this


book," he describes (with what he calls "a certain amount of experimental de- 

tail") the Ganzfeld experiments in telepathy by Charles Honorton and his col- 

leagues. He then devotes slightly more than one page to a summary of several 

years of research. (In fact, Honorton's research with the Ganzfeld method ex- 

tended over nearly two decades.) Although Honorton's experiments are wide- 

ly regarded as among the best controlled as well as most successful of modern 

experiments, Humphrey discounts them because one of Honorton's former 

colleagues found that possible sensory leakage might have accounted for the 

positive results. 

Humphrey has read widely in the history of science, which makes it surpris- 

ing that he reifies science and tells us what science does and does not allow. In 

his view, paranormal forces can have no place "in a world of normal laws." 

Yet surely no one should speak in the name of science; one can only say what 

scientists believe. The "laws" declared by scientists are just as perishable as 

the physical bodies of the persons promulgating them. For example, physi- 

cists of the latter part of the 19th century believed firmly in the existence of a 

pervasive ether filling the spaces between material objects, but by the end of 

the fourth decade of this century new physicists had relegated the concept of 

ether to the history of their field. 

Although this book contains much of value about the psychology and soci- 

ology of credulity, I cannot recommend it to anyone beginning a study of re- 

search on paranormal phenomena. Humphrey does provide excellent refer- 

ences to his numerous quotations and citations; the only inaccuracy I noticed 

was the anachronistic misplacement of Sir Thomas Browne as an Elizabethan. 

These references and the index, however, offer no guide to the serious litera- 

ture that would help a reader to make an independent appraisal of the phenom- 

ena the importance of which Humphrey denies. An informed reader cannot 

tell from his references whether he is as well acquainted with that literature as 

the author of a book like this should be. My doubts about this do not derive 

only from Humphrey's incorrect spelling of the first name of Frederic Myers, 

one of the best known figures in the history of psychical research. They derive 

much more from his assertion that paranormal phenomena show no "rhyme or 

reason." Despite its many limitations, research on some paranormal phenome- 

na has certainly shown recurrent features and circumstances of their occur- 

rence. 

I do nevertheless recommend this book to scientists or students already ac- 

quainted with the field. They should know how a highly intelligent outsider - 

himself a qualified scientist and one who can write well - regards claims of 

paranormal phenomena. Most scientists in conventional lines of inquiry ig- 

nore research on these phenomena. Humphrey at least takes the subject seri- 

ously enough to think it worth the trouble of writing a book deploring it. 

Because Humphrey spends so much of his effort in an endeavor to under- 

mine belief in the miracles attributed to Jesus, I think it appropriate for me to 

draw the attention of readers to two recently published and more balanced

I 


appraisals of the life of Jesus and its value for us today (Wilson, 1993; Polk- 

inghorne, 1994). 

Ian Stevenson 

Division of Personality Studies 

Box 152, Health Sciences Center 

University of Virginia, 

Charlottesvi22e, VA 22908 

References 

Wilson, A. N. (1993). Jesus. London: Harper Collins. 

Polkinghorne, J. (1994). The Faith of a Physicist - Reflections of a Bottom-Up Thinker. Prince- 

ton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 

Man to Man: Surviving Prostate Cancer by Michael Korda. New York: 

Random House, 1996,254 pp., $20.00 (c). Author: need ISBN# 

Me Too: A Doctor Survives Prostate Cancer by James Payne. Waco: WRS 

Publishing, 1995,141 pp., $1 1.95. ISBN 1567960863. 

How I Survived Prostate Cancer. .. and So Can You: A Guide for Diagnosing 

and Treating Prostate Cancer by James Lewis. Westbury: Health Education 

Literary Publisher, 1994,264 pp. $18.95 (p). ISBN 1883257069. 

Prostate and Cancer: A Family Guide to Diagnosis, Treatment & Survival 

by Sheldon Marks. Tucson: Fisher Books, 1995, 342 pp., $14.95 (p). ISBN 

1555610781. 

Prostate and Cancer: A Non-Surgical Perspective by Kent Wallner. 

Canaan: SmartMedicine Press, 1996, 156 pp., $15.95 (p). ISBN 0964899108. 

I The Prostate Book: Sound Advice on Symptoms and Treatment by 

Stephen N. Rous. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994,287 pp., $22.95 (c). 

A Patient's Guide to Prostate Cancer: An Expert's Successful Treatment 

Strategies and Options by Marc Garnick. New York: NAL/Dutton (Plume 

Book), 1996,276 pp., $1 1.95 (p). ISBN 0452274559. 

The Prostate Cancer Answer Book: An Unbiased Guide to Treatment 

Choices by Marion Morra and Eve Potts. New York: Avon Books, 263 pp., 

$12.50 (p). ISBN 0380785641. 

Frankly, blips in random number generators, unexplained output from white 

noise devices or barely detectable magnetic fields are, to use a fashionable 

colloquialism, not where it's at. A much richer vein of anomalous science may 

be found in the medical field with the true mother lode being prostate cancer. 

To use another metaphor, prostate cancer is a growth industry which has be- 

gotten a growth industry in books about prostate cancer; the above eight books 

are merely a sample of what can be found in libraries and book stores. 

The boom in prostate cancer and its subsequent literature - unlike TB, 

AIDS or the Ebola virus - has nothing to do with any sudden epidemic that 

threatens the foundations of Western Civilization. The amazing rise in


detection rates and the consequent rise in treatment rates are due to the rela- 

tively new blood test, the PSA (Prostate Specific Antigen), and ultrasound- 

guided biopsies prescribed after an abnormal PSA. An earlier blood-test had 

been unreliable to the point of being useless while the familiar but often- 

dreaded DRE (digital rectum exam) was likewise too crude. Men who are 

completely asymptomatic suddenly find out that they have prostate cancer. In 

the era of the PSA, this is now so common that there is a new category just for 

them, TIC, which means that except for the PSA which generated the referral 

for the biopsy, these men would have been given a clean bill of health on a 

general physical. 

An interesting issue is whether or not society is better off now that the PSA 

is so widely available. Obviously, for some men, early detection of prostate 

cancer plausibly leads to cure because if the cancer is not treated, cancer being 

cancer, eventually it will spread and the patient will die. However, prostate 

cancer is rather unique among cancers in that it is often very slow growing and 

many can die with it and not of it. In fact, autopsies of elderly men who die of 

other causes and who were never diagnosed as having prostate cancer, reveal 

that some 40% to 50% of them have prostate cancer and most not only never 

knew it but also never suffered any consequences from the cancer. And just as 

important, they never suffered the consequences of the treatment, which can 

be severe especially when one considers that the effects of the disease may 

never have arisen. 

Compounding the dilemma of continually screening millions of men at $50 

to $100 per PSA test is the notoriously high number of false positives and 

false negatives. The PSA, while specific to the prostate, is not specific to 

prostate cancer; as men grow older, the prostate tends to get larger and se- 

cretes more of what the PSA measures. The range of 0 to 4 is usually given as 

a normal PSA although even this is often age-adjusted so that normal for a 

young man might be 0 to 3.5 while for a much older person, the upper limit for 

normal might be 6.5. Prostate infection might markedly raise the PSA as 

might having the test done at a different laboratory which uses a different 

scale of measurement! Whether or not bike riding alters the PSA or whether or 

not the test should be done within 24 hours of an ejaculation is also debatable. 

What about a low PSA? Well, if you have prostate cancer and your PSA is 

low, that is perhaps the worst case because the cancer cells are so unlike nor- 

mal prostate cells that they are unable to secrete the antigen. Nevertheless, the 

typical case is a high PSA which results in the need for monitoring over time 

along with biopsies which can only rule in prostate cancer but cannot rule it 

out because the guidance mechanism is such that the tumor may be missed by 

the biopsy needle. 

Once a pathologist determines there is a malignancy, the patient's next step 

depends on his knowledge and the information forthcoming from his urolo- 

gist. That is where science fades out and luck along with tenacity in the form 

of a computer comes in. As validated by my own experience and the Internet


e-mail postings I've seen emanating from many others, the urologist is likely 

to recommend a bone scan to rule out metastasis and then if the bone scan is 

negative, strongly suggest that as soon as possible a radical prostatectomy 

(RP) be done because an RP is the "gold standard." External-beam radiation 

(XBRT), if mentioned at all, is likely to be denigrated by the urologist as not 

having as good a long-term track record as RP and besides, he (and more than 

likely it is a he) will say that if the RP fails, radiation can follow as a so-called 

salvage treatment while the reverse order - radiation followed by surgery - 

is extremely difficult. 

Most of the above advice is at best self-serving and, as I and others have dis- 

covered, most probably very much in error. Urologists are surgeons who have 

spent many years honing their skills and it is only natural that they believe in 

surgery as a cure. Look carefully at the second sentence of the third paragraph 

where the word "plausibly" appears. It turns out that, even when the surgery is 

undertaken because there is no evidence of metastasis and the pathology exam 

indicates that the cancer is confined to the prostate gland, the patient may still 

not be cured because some micro cells exist undetected elsewhere in the body; 

after months or years, the PSA, which should have remained at zero, starts to 

rise indicating that the cure did not take place. 

The curative rate of RP is much lower than I have just indicated because of 

understaging of the cancer. A relatively large percentage of men go into 

surgery believing that they are candidates for a "cure" only to find out that the 

pathology exam performed at surgery indicates that the cancer has escaped the 

capsule or is in the seminal vesicles or is in the surrounding lymph nodes and 

the entire operation has to be aborted. 

Radiologists protest the assertion of the urologists that surgery is preferable 

to radiation. Patients who are too feeble or too old to undergo the rigors of 

surgery receive XBRT and this difference in parent populations between the 

two techniques vitiates any comparison. Furthermore, no truly large random- 

ized, double-blind experiment comparing surgery with any other modality - 

including doing nothing but monitoring, otherwise known as watchful waiting 

(WW) - has ever been undertaken. Some effort is underway in this regard but 

the long incubation period and the lack of immediate symptoms act to inhibit 

such efforts. Not to mention the resistance of the surgeons who consider it 

criminal to doubt the efficacy of their profession. European medical practice 

is far less aggressive than its American counterpart and hence, observational 

- that is, non-experimental - studies emanating from Europe tend to indi- 

cate that watchful waiting was equally good as surgery; the reaction from my 

first urologist was entirely typical: he called the European attitude "malprac- 

tice." 

America is too proactive a country to adopt the attitude of watchful waiting. 

The prostate Listserve which I am on bears witness to this remark. As soon as 

WW is mentioned as a legitimate form of treatment, the members of the List- 

serve who are prostate-cancer victims go predictably bananas using analogies


to the necessity of guns in a world replete with criminals, or the need for 

weapons in face of a threat from a foreign power. The few WW adherents in 

the Internet audience are slammed every time they suggest that all too fre- 

quently more harm than good is done to the quality of life of someone who is 

experiencing no symptoms whatever at the present but who will likely be in- 

continent for at least a few months, impotent for perhaps a lot longer and 

maybe for life even though the aggressive procedure has a relatively high 

probability of failure anyway. 

However, there is now a bigger European danger to surgery and to XBRT al- 

though at this moment few would identify it as European and most would say 

it is from Washington, the State not the District of Columbia. In the early 

1980s, a Danish doctor, H. Holm, modified an earlier technique known as 

"brachytherapy" or the implantation of radioactive seeds (SI) directly into the 

prostate; previous implantation of seeds was done during surgery and so to 

speak, freehand. Holm's idea of ultrasound guidance for the placing of the ra- 

dioactive seeds via needles was picked up by Dr. Blasko at Seattle's North- 

west Tumor Institute where it was greatly improved technically. Blasko and 

his team have trained many others in this technique and within the last two 

years I have seen a phenomenal growth in the brachytherapy industry. 

The reasons for the growth are simple. Urologists can no longer say that SI 

hasn't proved itself because now there is seven years, worth of data from Seat- 

tle and pushing over five from other centers. My claim that "Urologists can no 

longer say" does not mean that the average urologist will recommend SI; in 

fact, more than likely, the average urologist will refer to the failures of the pre- 

Holm freehand method and either be unaware of Blasko entirely or still insist 

that 15 years of SI is needed or that Blasko was selective in the patients and 

dealt only with those whose cancer was indolent. 

There is one fact that no one will dispute about SI. Its morbidity and mortal- 

ity rates are far, far lower than RP or XBRT. There is virtually no incontinence 

and a much lower rate of impotence. RP requires 5 to 7 days in a hospital with 

another two weeks of a very uncomfortable catheter. SI is done on an outpa- 

tient basis or an overnight. And SI costs less than either RP or XBRT. 

That last sentence needs some explaining and like everything connected 

with money and medicine, it all depends. What one pays for any of these pro- 

cedures depends entirely on what deals one's insurer has cut with the hospital 

or the practitioner. My personal experience is illuminating and illustrative. 

After over a year and one half since my diagnosis and a subsequent accumula- 

tion of many pounds of information, I attempted to have my SI done locally 

even though it was not very frequently performed here. My HMO would pay 

for everything. Unfortunately, my gland was too large for the equipment; in 

addition, the local people were changing their protocol such that I would need 

to undergo six months of hormone therapy to reduce the size of the gland and I 

would need an XBRT topping in addition to the SI. I balked at what I consid- 

ered unnecessary treatment with too many side effects: hormones produce a


loss of libido and hot flashes while the XBRT could lead to its own complica- 

tions. Instead, I decided to choose my out-of-network option, and have the SI 

done without hormones and without XBRT at one of the Blasko-trained cen- 

ters where the procedure was performed very frequently. I litigated with my 

HMO claiming that because the treatment of SI only was not available locally, 

I should be reimbursed for the $3,000 maximum out-of-pocket expense; I lost 

even though by avoiding hormones and XBRT I saved the HMO money no 

matter how much of a discount the HMO had arranged locally. This was to no 

avail. Insurers want gate-keeping control of the purse and will fight with 

everything they've got; in my case, the HMO brought in five people to defend 

their case, including their chief statistician in case I mumbled something ob- 

scene such as standard deviation. 

Two other conventional treatments for prostate cancer exist, although one 

of them is deemed experimental and most probably won't be covered by insur- 

ance. Cryotherapy, the freezing of the gland, makes good sense for those who 

are not willing or able to undergo surgery or radiation of any form. It has the 

distinct advantage that if it fails, it can be repeated unlike surgery or radiation. 

One disadvantage in addition to a relatively high likelihood of impotence is 

that the people pushing it have a vested financial interest in the device for 

doing the freezing. It is also new enough that there is little data accumulated 

regarding its efficacy 

A well-established treatment for prostate cancer which has escaped the 

gland is hormones. Unfortunately, eventually the hormone-resistant cancer 

cells start to thrive after the hormone-sensitive cancer cells are killed and the 

patient gets progressively worse. The time period for which the hormones are 

providing good results is very variable from patient to patient; months for 

some, many years for others and is rather unpredictable. Although hormone 

therapy has been around for many years, it is only recently that it is being rec- 

ommended early on in conjunction with RP, XBRT and SI. The chief recom- 

mender is an organization known as Patient Advocates for Advanced Cancer 

Treatments (PAACT) which is but one of the increasingly many patient-advo- 

cate groups in this age of desk-top publishing, the Internet and the World Wide 

Web. PAACT is very critical of the medical profession in general and stresses 

the need for the patient to take control of the decision making and not let that 

be left up to the first medical doctor who is the bearer of the bad news. 

In order to take control, a lot of reading of the literature is in order. No one 

book suffices and frankly, some of the books have bad advice and/or bad 

prose. Rous' book was first written in 1988 and is out of date completely even 

though the claim is that it was revised in 1992 and 1994; it is very much a urol- 

ogist's out-of-date book. Payne's book has no index and is especially disap- 

pointing given that he is both a prostate-cancer victim and a medical doctor. 

He seems to be surprised at every turn of events despite his being a general


surgeon. Impotence is very much on his mind and his RP does result in that 

and a urethral stricture as well. 

Korda's book has been very widely read because of his prominent position 

as editor-in-chief of Simon and Schuster. But like Payne, he seems woefully 

uninformed and childish in his concern about the possibility of impotence; 

again, there is no index. Unlike Payne, Korda has lots of money behind him 

and he can afford to explore around to find the most famous medical doctors 

including the most famous of them all, Patrick Walsh of Johns Hopkins. 

Walsh is the inventor of the so-called "nerve sparing'' operation. Until Walsh 

discovered back in the 1980s that the nerves for an erection are on the outside 

of the prostate and therefore, severing them could be avoided, impotence was 

always the result of RP. Walsh is invariably quoted and cited in any article 

having to do with prostate cancer and he is considered the god in the field. Un- 

less, of course, you believe that his success rate is due to his very careful se- 

lection of candidates who are likely to be young, otherwise healthy, have 

small tumors and are potent before the operation. Urologists who don't train 

at Hopkins tend to view Walsh with a great deal of statistical suspicion; those 

who trained at Hopkins tend to idolize him. 

Korda's opinion is very strange. From what Korda has written, the care and 

advice he received at Hopkins was terrible. He still is unable to have an erec- 

tion and many complications resulted which could have been avoided, yet he 

still seems to believe that selecting a Walsh RP was a wise choice. Korda is a 

relatively wealthy man so money was no object but few of us can afford heli- 

copters from Hopkins to home as he did. 

The book that was the most useful to me was the one by Lewis because it ar- 

rived at the time I was about to make my decision. The 1994 publication date 

means that the book did not contain the latest statistics on SI but was very de- 

tailed as to the procedure and why it should be considered along with any of 

the others. Lewis is an African-American, a group that has a much higher inci- 

dence of prostate cancer than whites do. He chose XBRT and by all indica- 

tions is doing very well. His book was sent to me courtesy of PAACT and in 

many ways reflects PAACT's view of things but happily, without PAACT's 

oft-times unnecessary bombastic pronouncements. Of all the survivor books, 

Lewis' is the best and the one the patient should get first even if it is two-years 

old in this fast-changing field. To show how fast things are changing, during 

the time I have composed this review, the SI world was reeling because it was 

announced that Blasko was severing his connections with NWT and would be 

moving to another part of Seattle to join the University of Washington to 

launch an academic career. The consternation has to do with litigation be- 

tween Blasko and what would be his former associates over who owns the 

data. The implication is that the public will be denied further post-treatment 

information regarding how well SI is doing while the lawyers fight over own-


Wallner is very highly thought of by the people on my Listserve. He is a 

radiation oncologist and thus doesn't suffer from the same biases as urolo- 

gists. His book is short and the type is large yet he seems to cover all the bases. 

This is a good book to own. The other two books by medical doctors, Garnick 

and Marks, are longer and certainly worth reading, especially Garnick's. In 

fact, the issue of length of a book on prostate cancer is not without interest. 

Some men such as myself have an insatiable appetite for reading the literature 

while others are far more likely to trust any authority figure in a white jacket. 

The former group can suffer from "analysis paralysis" while the latter group 

can repent at leisure for a decision based on faith. For those of us hooked on 

the subject of prostate cancer, Garnick's is the best read. 

The book by Morra and Potts is rather dry but it is exceptional in that it is 

written by two (non-medical) people who will never get the disease because 

they are women. The Listserve which I have referred to has an increasing 

number of women members but understandably they are in the minority. And 

sometimes they object vigorously to the more infantile sexual comments 

made by prostate-cancer victims who have too much bandwidth at their dis- 

posal. The clutter - chit chat about dogs, God, soy protein, quality of erec- 

tions, saw palmetto and shark cartilage -has become so acute that I routinely 

delete most of the messages before reading them. If I go away from my com- 

puter for an extended period, my mailer gets swamped with childish messages 

by men who have too much time on their hands and an overactive modem. 

Unsubscribing to the Listserve is easy but I hesitate to take that step inas- 

much as the course of the disease is unpredictable as are the medical (and sta- 

tistical) advances in treatment and prevention; my fellow victims, despite 

their immaturity, are a valuable resource for conventional and anomalous re- 

sults delivered several times daily. It would be difficult to find another area of 

human endeavor where such a vast quantity of personally-relevant and contra- 

dictory scientific information arrives so effortlessly. 

Paul Alper 

QMCS Department 



Expedientes Insolitos: El Fenomeno OVNI y 10s Archivos de Defensa by 

Vicente Juan Ballester Olmos. Madrid, Spain: Temas'de hoy, 1995. 

Having known Vicente-Juan for many years I continue to marvel at his long- 

standing personal dedication to high quality UFO research and his prolific 

writing for the benefit of others. He has produced four major and excellently 

written books about UFOs and, unfortunately for English speaking people, all 

are in Spanish so far. Nevertheless, his research is first rate and his selection 

of topics is both interesting and valuable. This is no less true for his latest


book whose title in English is Weird Files: The UFO Phenomenon and the De- 

fense Archives. Published by the large and prestigious firm of Temas 'de Hoy 

(Madrid) in April 1995, this 300 page book presents many diagrams, photos, 

and actual facsimiles of Spanish military documents obtained by the author 

over the years. 

The book's prologue is by noted Spanish journalist Javier Sierra and its epi- 

logue is by Jacques Vallee, a writer and student of the phenomena who needs 

no introduction. 

The first two chapters include a collection of twelve UFO reports of high 

strangeness from Spain obtained over the past ten years followed by several 

cases about objects and other phenomena which were subsequently identified. 

The objective? To show that most UFO observations are misidentifications of 

natural, i.e., explainable events. The third chapter turns to the important sub- 

ject of the kinds of research methods one needs in order to study UFO phe- 

nomena. In order to stay as close to the evidence as possible, the author wise- 

ly focuses on his own research findings over the past thirty years - landings 

and trace statistics, human testimony, even cases involving death ("probably 

caused by UFO radiation"), etc., are covered. 

The longest (Fourth) chapter (83 pages long) is titled "The Air Force Re- 

veals its Secrets." It presents, for the first time, declassified abstracts of this 

valuable material. Ballester Olmos begins this seminal chapter with how he 

succeeded, almost single-handedly, in getting formerly closed military files 

declassified and released. Many American, British, French, German and 

other investigators would do well to read how he did it. He moves forward to 

outline some statistics on the forty-five air force cases he received (e.g., the 

frequency of UFO report occurrence continues at a rate of about zero to three 

cases per year except for 1968 which had 21). The remainder of this chapter 

presents extended abstracts of 37 selected reports of sightings made by air 

force personnel and others; they should be translated into English for the ben- 

efit of American researchers. 

The last two chapters focus on the efforts and accomplishments of numer- 

ous so-called "first" and "second" generation UFO researchers in Spain 

(chapter 5), and a well-known American UFO investigator (chapter 6) not 

only to recognize their efforts but to encourage younger enthusiasts to follow 

in their footsteps. Ballester Olmos states in this regard, "...if science does not 

cover this subject (proving that this enigma is amenable of scientific study), it 

will be a field entirely left to charlatans." 

Expedients Insolitos is a valuable addition to the collections of serious UFO 

investigators of any country. Those of us in the United States can only hope 

for an English language edition in the near future. 

Richard E Haines 

325 Langton Ave.


Physics Dept. 

Varian 302 




Officers 



P. 0. Box 38 18 



Ms. Brenda Dunne, Executive Vice President Prof. Charles R. Tolbert, Treasurer 

C 13 1, School of Engineering & Applied Science Department of Astronomy 

Princeton University P. 0. Box 3818 













VPI & SU 

Blacksburg, VA 24061-0247 

Dr. Roger Nelson 

PEAR, D334 Engineering Quad 



Dr. H. E. Puthoff 


4030 Braker Lane West, Suite 300 

Austin, TX 78759 


Center for Frontier Sciences 

Temple University 

Ritter Hall 003-00 

Philadelphia, PA 19 122 

Council 

Dr. Marilyn J. Schlitz 

Institute of Noetic Sciences 

475 Gate Five Rd., #300 

Sausalito, CA 94965-2835 

Prof. Ian Stevenson 

Behavioral Medicine and Psychiatry 


Charlottesville, VA 22908 





Dr. Robert Wood 

1727 Candlestick Lane 


Journal of Scienti$c Explorutian, Vol. 1 1, No. 3, pp. 263-274, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Accessing Anomalous States of Consciousness with a Binaural 

Beat Technology 

F. HOLMES ATWATER 

The Monroe Institute, 62 Roberts Mountain Roud, Fuber, VA 22938-231 7 

Abstract - Exposure to binaural beats in an environment of restricted stim- 

ulation coupled with a guidance process can safely provide access to and ex- 

periences in many propitious states of consciousness. This method requires a 

unique combination of well-understood psycho-physiological inductive 

techniques with the addition of a refined binaural-beat technology. Binaural 

beats provide potential consciousness-altering information to the brain's 

reticular activating system. The reticular activating system in turn interprets 

and reacts to this information by stimulating the thalamus and cortex - 

thereby altering arousal states, attentional focus, and the level of awareness, 

i.e., the elements of consciousness itself. This effective binaural-beat 

process offers a wide variety of beneficial applications and vehicle for the ex- 

ploration of expanded states of consciousness. 

Keywords: consciousness - altered states 

Introduction 

The audio phenomenon known as binaural beating can be used to access al- 

tered states of consciousness. This is done through a process in which individ- 

uals in an environment of restricted stimulation willfully focus attention on a 

combination of multiplexed audio binaural beats that are mixed with music, 

pink sound', and/or assorted natural sounds. In most cases the process also in- 

cludes breathing exercises, guided relaxation, affirmation, and visualization. 

The binaural-beat element of the process appears to be associated with an 

electroencephalographic (EEG) frequency-following response in the brain.2 

Many studies have demonstrated the presence of a frequency-following re- 

sponse to auditory stimuli, recorded at the vertex of the human brain (top of 

the head). This EEG activity was termed "frequency-following response" be- 

cause its period (cycles per second) corresponds to the fundamental frequency 

of the stimulus (Smith, Marsh, and Brown, 1975). Stated plainly, if the audio 

stimulus is 40 Hz the resulting measured EEG will show a 40 Hz frequency- 

-- -- - 

' Pink sound is "white noise" (like the hiss sound from a television after a station has stopped trans- 

mitting) which has been equalized for human hearing. Lower-frequency components have been ampli- 

fied and higher-frequency components reduced to create a more pleasing natural sound. 

A frequency-following response to a binaural beat has been demonstrated by Oster (1973) and in the 

context of hearing-acuity research (Hink et al., 1980).

264 F. Holmes Atwater 

following response using appropriate time-domain averaging protocols. Binaural-beat 

stimulation, coupled with the effects of the other procedures within 

the process outlined above, appears to regulate neuronal activity and encourage 

access to propitious mental states. The effectiveness of binaural beats 

in engendering state changes is supported by the consistent reports of thousands 

of users, as well as the documentation of physiological changes associated 

with its use. 

The reported uses of this binaural-beat method for accessing propitious 

states of consciousness range from sensory integration (Morris, 1990), relaxation, 

meditation, stress reduction, pain management, improved sleep (Wilson, 

1990; Rhodes, 1993), health care (Carter, 1993), enriched learning environments 

and enhanced memory (Kennerly, 1994) to creativity (Hiew, 1995), 

enhanced intuition, remote viewing 3 (McMoneagle, 1993), telepathy 4 , and 

out-of-body e~perience.~ An understanding of the applied binaural-beat technology 

involves the well- known autonomic effects of controlled breathing and 

progressive relaxation and the psychology of affirmations and visualizations 

(subjects not addressed in this paper). For the purposes of this paper, discussion 

is limited to the physiology of the brain, the brain-mind model, brain 

waves and their relationship to the behavioral psychology of consciousness, 

and the role of the reticular activating system (RAS) in regulating brain waves 

and consciousness. 

Binaural Beats and the Physiology of the Brain 

Binaural beats were discovered in 1839 by a German experimenter, H. W. 

Dove. The human ability to "hear" binaural beats appears to be the result of 

evolutionary adaptation. Many evolved species can detect binaural beats be- 

cause of their brain structure. The frequencies at which binaural beats can be 

detected change depending upon the size of the species' cranium. In the 

human, binaural beats can be detected when carrier tones 6 are below approxi- 

-- - - - - . . . . . . . 

. . . - . -. . . -. 

. . -. . . . . - -. 

. .- .- -. . 

"emote viewing is described as an ability to perceive locations remote in time or space by mental 

means alone. Remote viewers can describe and sketch locations and events beyond the range of the 

usual sensory input (cf. JSE, Vol. 10, No. 1 for several reports). 

Telepathy is commonly referred to as direct mind-to-mind communication without the aid of con- 

ventional external sensory input. Robert Monroe referred to this as nonverbal communication. 

The expressions "in" and "out-of-body" refer to individual awareness. In the out-of-body experi- 

ence, mind-consciousness does not separate from the human tissue as in death. One's mind is always ex- 

perienced as being either in or out of the body. It depends on where awareness is focused. Being out-of- 

body simply means that there is no direct connection to certain material levels of consciousness, 

including the normally unconscious activities of breathing and heart function which continue without 

one's attention. Being out-of-body is a consciousness experience with a shift of mind-consciousness 

and locale. Some enjoy this shift. Others become frightened that they may get lost and be unable to find 

their way back to their bodies. If one believes that the mind is in the brain, and one experiences what one 

believes is out-of-body awareness, it is easy to feel that one is too far from the "gas station" and that one 

can get stranded. But the mind is not the brain so there is no reason to fear. If one knows one is "out" one 

can always get back because there is some normally subconscious activity (respiration, heart beat, etc.) 

on the brain-material level to tether one back (Hunt, 1995). 

' Electronically produced binaural beats can be "heard" when audio tones of slightly different fre- 

quencies are presented one to each ear. These audio tones are referred to as carriers.

Binaural Beat Technology 265 

mately 1000 Hz (Oster, 1973). Below I000 Hz the wave length of the signal is 

longer than the diameter of the human skull. Thus, signals below 1000 Hz 

curve around the skull by diffraction. The same effect can be observed with 

radio wave propagation. Lower-frequency (longer wave length) radio waves 

(such as AM radio) travel around the earth over and in between mountains and 

structures. Higher-frequency (shorter wave length) radio waves (such as FM 

radio, TV, and microwaves) travel in a straight line and cannot curve around 

the earth. Mountains and structures block these high-frequency signals. Because 

frequencies below 1000 Hz curve around the skull, incoming signals 

below 1000 Hz are heard by both ears. But due to the distance between the 

ears, the brain "hears" the inputs from the ears as out of phase with each other. 

As the sound wave passes around the skull, each ear gets a different portion of 

the wave. It is this phase difference that allows for accurate location of sounds 

below 1000 HZ.~ Audio direction finding at higher frequencies is less accurate 

than it is for frequencies below 1000 Hz. At 8000 Hz the pinna (external ear) 

becomes effective as an aid to localization. Virtually all animal sounds are 

below 1000 Hz. It is easy to imagine why animals developed the ability to ac- 

curately detect the location of each others' sounds. The relevant issue here, 

however, is that it is this innate ability of the brain to detect a phase difference 

that enables it to perceive binaural beats. 

The sensation of "hearing" binaural beats occurs when two coherent sounds 

of nearly similar frequencies are presented, one to each ear, and the brain de- 

tects phase differences between these sounds. This phase difference normally 

provides directional information to the listener, but when presented with stereo 

headphones or speakers the brain integrates the two signals, producing a sen- 

sation of a third sound called the binaural beat. Perceived as a fluctuating 

rhythm at the frequency of the difference between the two (stereo left and 

right) auditory inputs, binaural beats appear to originate in the brain stem's su- 

perior olivary nucleus, the site of contralateral integration of auditory input 

(Oster, 1973). This auditory sensation is neurologically routed to the reticular 

formation (Swann et al., 1982) and simultaneously volume conducted to the 

cortex where it can be objectively measured as a frequency-following response 

(Oster, 1973; Smith, Marsh, and Brown, 1975; Marsh, Brown, and Smith, 

1975; Smith et al., 1978; Hink et al., 1980). The frequency-following re- 

sponse provides proof that the sensation of binaural beating has neurological 

efficacy. 

Binaural beats can easily be heard at the low frequencies (< 30 Hz) that are 

characteristic of the EEG spectrum (Oster, 1973; Atwater, 1997). This percep- 

tual phenomenon of binaural beating and the objective measurement of the 

frequency-following response (Oster, 1973; Hink et al., 1980) suggest condi- 

tions which facilitate alteration of brain waves and states of consciousness. 

There have been numerous anecdotal reports and a growing number of 

-- -- - - - - - -- 

In the case of signals above 1000 Hz the skull blocks the signal from the lee-side ear. The source of 

the sound 1s then determined by the brain to be in the general direction of the loud noise, there being a 

lower amplitude heard by the lee-side ear.


research efforts reporting changes in consciousness associated with binaural- 

beats. Binaural beats in the delta ( 1 to 4 Hz) and theta (4 to 8 Hz) ranges have 

been associated with reports of relaxed, meditative, and creative states (Hiew, 

1995), sensory integration (Morris, 1990), and used as an aid to falling asleep 

(Wilson, 1990; Rhodes, 1993). Exposure to audio-guidance training using 

lower-frequency binaural beats in concert with cognitive therapy resulted in 

decreased depressive symptoms in alcoholic patients (Waldkoetter & Sanders, 

1997). Binaural beats in the alpha frequencies (8 to 12 Hz) have increased 

alpha brain waves (Foster, 1990) and binaural beats in the beta frequencies 

(typically 16 to 24 Hz) have been associated with reports of increased concen- 

tration or alertness (Monroe, 1985), improved memory (Kennerly, 1994), and 

increases in focused attention in mentally retarded adults (Guilfoyle & Car- 

bone, 1996). 

Passively listening to binaural beats may not automatically engender an al- 

tered state of consciousness. The process usually used when listening to bin- 

aural beats includes a number of procedures; binaural beats are only one ele- 

ment. We all maintain a psycho-physiological momentum, a homeostasis 

which may resist the influence of the binaural beats. These homeostatic states 

are generally controlled by life situations as well as by acts of will, both con- 

scious and subconscious. The willingness and ability of the listener to relax 

and focus attention or their level of practice in meditative processes may in 

some way contribute to binaural-beat effectiveness. Naturally occurring neu- 

rological ultradian rhythms, characterized by periodic changes in arousal and 

states of consciousness (Webb & Dube, 198 1 ; Rossi, 1986; Shannahoff-Khal- 

sa, 1991), may underlie the anecdotal reports of fluctuations in the effective- 

ness of binaural beats. The perception of a binaural beat is said to be height- 

ened by the addition of masking noise to the carrier signal (Oster, 1973), so 

white or pink noise is often used as background. Practices such as humming, 

toning, breathing exercises, autogenic training, andlor biofeedback can also be 

used to interrupt the homeostasis of subjects resistant to the effects of binaural 

beats (Tart, 1975). 

Brain Waves and Consciousness 

Controversies concerning the brain, mind, and consciousness have existed 

since the early Greek philosophers argued about the nature of the mind-body 

relationship, and none of these disputes have been resolved. Modern neurolo- 

gists have located the mind in the brain and have said that consciousness is the 

result of electrochemical neurological activity. There are, however, growing 

observations challenging the completeness of these assertions. There is no 

neuro-physiological research which conclusively shows that the higher levels 

of mind (intuition, insight, creativity, imagination, understanding, thought, 

reasoning, intent, decision, knowing, will, spirit, or soul) are located in brain 

tissue (Hunt, 1995). A resolution to the controversies surrounding the higher


involve an epistemological shift to include extra-rational ways of knowing (de 

Quincey, 1994) and may well not be comprehended by neuro-chemical brain 

studies alone. Penfield (1 975), an eminent contemporary neuro-physiologist, 

found that the human mind continued to work in spite of the brain's reduced 

activity under anesthesia. Brain waves were nearly absent while the mind was 

just as active as in the waking state. The only difference was in the content of 

the conscious experience. Following Penfield's work, other researchers have 

reported awareness in comatose patients (Hunt, 1995), and there is a growing 

body of evidence which suggests that reduced cortical arousal while maintain- 

ing conscious awareness is possible (Fischer, 197 1 ; West, 1980; Delmonte, 

1984; Wallace, 1986; Goleman, 1988; Mavromatis, 199 1 ; Jevning, Wallace, 

and Beidenbach, 1992). These states are variously referred to as meditative, 

trance, altered, hypnagogic, hypnotic, and twilight-learning states (Budzynski, 

1986). Broadly defined, the various forms of altered states rest on the mainte- 

nance of conscious awareness in a physiologically reduced state of arousal 

marked by parasympathetic dominance (Mavromatis, 199 1). Recent physio- 

logical studies of highly hypnotizable subjects and adept meditators indicate 

that maintaining awareness with reduced cortical arousal is indeed possible in 

selected individuals as a natural ability or as an acquired skill (Sabourin, Cut- 

comb, Crawford, and Pribram, 1993). More and more scientists are expressing 

doubts about the neurologists' brain-mind model because it fails to answer so 

many questions about our ordinary experiences, as well as evading our mysti- 

cal and spiritual ones. Studies in distant mental influence and mental healing 

also challenge the notion of a mind localized within the brain (Dossey, 1994, 

1996a). Nonlocal events have been proven to occur at the subatomic level, and 

some researchers believe that the physics principles behind these events un- 

derlie nonlocal consciousness-mediated effects (Dossey, 1996a). conscious- 

ness-associated anomalies appear unrestricted by spatial or temporal bound- 

aries and many experiments have been done to shed light on this remarkable 

quality of the mind (Dossey, 1996b). The scientific evidence supporting the 

phenomenon of remote viewing alone is sufficient to show that mind-con- 

sciousness is not a local phenomenon (McMoneagle, 1993). 

If mind-consciousness is not the brain, why then does science relate states of 

consciousness and mental functioning to brain-wave frequencies? There is no 

objective way to measure mind or consciousness with an instrument. Mind- 

consciousness appears to be a field phenomenon which interfaces with the 

body and the neurological structures of the brain (Hunt, 1995). One cannot 

measure this field directly with current instrumentation. On the other hand, 

the electrical potentials of the body can be measured and easily quantified. 

The problem here lies in oversimplification of the observations. EEG patterns 

measured on the cortex are the result of electro-neurological activity of the 

brain. But the brain's electro-neurological activity is not mind-consciousness. 

EEG measurements then are only an indirect means of assessing the mind-con- 

sciousness interface with the neurological structures of the brain. As crude as


this may seem, the EEG has been a reliable way for researchers to estimate 

states of consciousness based on the relative proportions of EEG frequencies. 

Stated another way, certain EEG patterns have been historically associated 

with specific states of consciousness. Although not an absolute, it is reason- 

able to assume, given the current EEG literature, that if a specific EEG pattern 

emerges it is probably accompanied by a particular state of consciousness. 

Binaural beats can alter the electrochemical environment of the brain allow- 

ing mind-consciousness to have different experiences. When brain waves 

move to lower frequencies and awareness is maintained, a unique state of con- 

sciousness emerges. Practitioners of the binaural-beat process call this state of 

hypnagogia "mind awakelbody asleep". Slightly higher frequencies can lead 

to hyper-suggestive states of consciousness. Still higher-frequency EEG states 

are associated with alert and focused mental activity needed for the optimal 

performance of many tasks. 

Perceived reality changes depending on the state of consciousness of the 

perceiver (Tart, 1975). Some states of consciousness provide limited views of 

reality, while others provide an expanded awareness of reality. For the most 

part, states of consciousness change in response to the ever-changing internal 

environment and surrounding stimulation. For example, states of conscious- 

ness are subject to influences like drugs and circadian and ultradian rhythms 

(Webb & Dube, 198 1 ; Rossi, 1986; Shannahoff-Khalsa, 199 1). Specific states 

of consciousness can also be learned as adaptive behaviors to demanding cir- 

cumstances (Green & Green, 1986). Binaural-beat technology offers access to 

a wide variety of altered-state experiences for those wanting to explore the 

realms of consciousness. 

Hemispheric Synchronization 

Many of the states of consciousness available through this technology have 

been identified as presenting unique hemispherically synchronized brain-wave 

frequencies. Although synchronized brain waves have long been associated 

with meditative and hypnagogic states, the binaural-beat process may be 

unique in its ability to induce and improve such states of consciousness. The 

reason for this is physiological. Each ear is "hardwired" (so to speak) to both 

hemispheres of the brain (Rosenzweig, 1961). Each hemisphere has its own 

olivary nucleus (sound-processing center) which receives signals from each 

ear. In keeping with this physiological structure, when a binaural beat is per- 

ceived there are actually two electrochemical synaptic waves of equal ampli- 

tude and frequency present, one in each hemisphere. This is, in and of itself, 

hemispheric synchrony of synaptic activity. Binaural beats appear to con- 

tribute to the hemispheric synchronization evidenced in meditative and hypna- 

gogic states of consciousness. Binaural beats may also enhance brain function 

by enabling the user to mediate cross-colossal connectivity at designated


The two cerebral hemispheres of the brain are like two separate information 

processing modules. Both are complex cognitive systems; both process infor- 

mation independently and in parallel; and their interaction is neither arbitrary 

nor continuous (Zaidel, 1985). Because of this, states of consciousness (mind- 

consciousness interfacing with the brain) can be defined not only in terms of 

brain-wave frequency ratios, but also in terms of hemispheric specialization 

and/or interaction. Some desired states of consciousness may require facile 

inter-hemispheric integration, while others may call for a unique hemispheric 

processing style. An individual's cognitive repertoire and, therefore, his abili- 

ty to perceive reality and deal with the everyday world, is subject to his ability 

to experience various states of consciousness (Tart, 1975). Binaural beats 

provide the tools for individuals to expand their ability to experience a wide 

range of mind-consciousness states. 

Each state of consciousness is not represented by one simple brain wave but 

involves a milieu of inner-mixing wave forms, a field effect. The reason for 

this lies in the structure of the brain itself. Not only is the brain divided hori- 

zontally into hemispheres, it is also divided vertically from the brain stem to 

the cerebellum, the thalamus, the limbic system, and the cerebral cortex. The 

cerebral cortex is further divided into such functional areas as the frontal 

lobes, the parietal lobes, the temporal lobes, and the occipital lobes. There are, 

of course, many other subdivisions of the brain which have not been men- 

tioned. The critical point is that for each discrete state of consciousness, 

mind-consciousness interfaces with each area of the brain and each area res- 

onates at a specific brain-wave frequency unique to that interface because it 

performs a localized function (Luria, 1970). 

Developing Effective Binaural Beats 

The process of developing effective stimuli relied initially on the feedback 

of those experiencing altered states while listening to binaural beats (Atwater, 

1997), and more recently with the aid of EEG technology. Originally, re- 

searchers tested many subjects under laboratory conditions for their responses 

to binaural-beat stimuli. Records were kept as to the effect each binaural-beat 

frequency had on these subjects. Then binaural beats were mixed and records 

were again kept on the subjects' responses. After months (in some cases, 

years), test results began to show population-wide similar responses to specific 

mixes of binaural beats. Certain complex, brain-wave-like combinations of 

binaural beats were reported more effective than other combinations, and 

more effective than binaural beats of single frequencies (sine waves). Effec- 

tive binaural beats are, therefore, unique in that they are designed to be com- 

plex brain-wave-like patterns rather than simple sine waves. (See Figures 1


2 Seconds 

Fi; 1. Complex Binaural Beat 

2 Seconds 

Fig. 2. Sine Wave Binaural Beat 

How Binaural Beats Alter States of Consciousness 

Two decades ago it was assumed that the mechanism behind the conscious- 

ness-altering effects of binaural beats was somehow related to entrainment of 

the auditory frequency-following response - a theorized process of nonlinear 

stochastic resonance of brain waves with the frequency of the auditory stimu- 

lus. Since an auditory frequency-following response could be measured at the 

cortex it seemed logical to assume that the underlying consciousness-altering 

mechanism must be some form of Newtonian entrainment process at work. 

Continuing research revealed, however, that there is no effect-mechanism to 

support the notion that entrainment of the auditory frequency-following re- 

sponse could occur or is responsible for alterations in consciousness. Compar- 

isons to photic entrainment models are not supported because the EEG signal 

strength of the measured auditory frequency-following response of binaural

Binaural Beat Technology 27 1 

beats is too low. At this point it is hard to even speculate that the neural activi- 

ty of the frequency-following response could, in some electromagnetically in- 

ductive way, alter ongoing brain-wave activity. 

A review of the appropriate literature reveals that brain waves and related 

states of consciousness are said to be regulated by the brain's reticular forma- 

tion stimulating the thalamus and cortex. The extended reticular-thalamic ac- 

tivation system (ERTAS) is implicated in a variety of functions associated 

with consciousness (Newman, 1997). The word reticular means "net-like" 

and the neural reticular formation itself is a large, net-like diffuse area of the 

brainstem (Anch et al., 1988). The reticular activating system (RAS) inter- 

prets and reacts to information from internal stimuli, feelings, attitudes, and 

beliefs as well as external sensory stimuli by regulating arousal states, atten- 

tional focus, and the level of awareness - the elements of consciousness itself 

(Empson, 1986; Tice & Steinberg, 1989). How we interpret, respond, and 

react to information then, is managed by the brain's reticular formation stimu- 

lating the thalamus and cortex, and controlling attentiveness and level of 

arousal (Empson, 1986). "It would seem that the basic mechanisms underly- 

ing consciousness are closely bound up with the brainstem reticular system ..." 

(Henry, 1 992). 

In order to alter consciousness it is necessary to provide some sort of infor- 

mation input to the RAS. Binaural beats appear to influence consciousness by 

providing this informatiorz. The information referred to here includes the char- 

acter, quality, and traits of the state of consciousness of the complex, brain- 

wave-like pattern of the binaural beat (see Figure 2). These unique binaural- 

beat wave forms (neurologically evidenced by the EEG frequency-following 

response) are recognized by the RAS as brain-wave pattern information. If in- 

ternal stimuli, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, and external sensory stimuli are not 

in conflict with this information (e.g., an internal, even unconscious, fear may 

be a source of conflict), the RAS will alter the state of consciousness as a nat- 

ural function of maintaining homeostasis 8 by regulating brain activity to syn- 

thesize the integrated binaural-beat stimulus (sensing it as a component of on- 

going neural activity). 

Without conflict, the RAS initiates replication of the character, quality, and 

traits of the neurologically evident and persistent binaural beating. As time 

passes, the RAS monitors both the internal and external environment and the 

state of consciousness itself (in terms of neural activity) to determine, from 

moment to moment, its suitability for dealing with existing conditions. As 

long as no conflicts develop, the RAS naturally continues aligning the listen- 

er's state of consciousness with the information in the brain-wave-like pattern 

of the binaural sound field. 

- -- -- - -- - - ..- - - - 

The brain automatically and actively regulates all body functions to maintain homeostasis - an internal 

equilibrium (Green & Green, 1977; Swann et al., 1982). In a nathral and constant attempt to 

maintain a homeostasis of the elements of consciousness, the RAS actively monitors and continues the 

neural replicat~on of ongoing brain-wave states (unless, of course, there is reason to make an adjustment 

due to new information from ~nternal sources or external sensory input).


In objective, measurable terms EEG-based research provides evidence of 

binaural beat's influence on consciousness. Since the RAS regulates cortical 

EEG (Swann, et al., 1982), monitoring EEG chronicles performance of the 

RAS. There have been several free-running EEG studies (Foster, 1990; 

Sadigh, 1990; Hiew, 1995, among others) which suggest that binaural beating 

induces alterations in EEG. Because the RAS is responsible for regulating 

EEG (Swann et al., 1982; Empson, 1986), these studies document measurable 

changes in RAS function during exposure to binaural beats. 

It is tempting to speculate about a neuro-physiological model underlying a 

binaural-beat-engendered state of consciousness labeled mind awake/body 

asleep, a hypnagogic experience common to many. In this state, a greater pro- 

portion of lower frequency brain waves (theta and delta) have been recorded in 

the EEG. The "body asleep" part of this state may be tied to the increase in 

delta waves associated with hyper-polarization of thalamocortical cells (Steri- 

ade, McCormick, and Sejnowski, 1993). The "mind awake" part of this state 

may be associated with theta frequencies in a portion of the hippo-campus. 

One is said to have achieved this state of mind-consciousness when a new con- 

dition of hypnagogic homeostasis is established and one becomes oblivious to 

the location of body extremities (hands, feet, etc.), still without losing con- 

sciousness (falling asleep). 

Summary 

The binaural-beat auditory-guidance process provides access to many bene- 

ficial mind-consciousness states. This process is a unique combination of 

well-understood psycho-physiological inductive techniques (restricted envi- 

ronmental stimulation, controlled breathing, progressive relaxation, affinna- 

tion, visualization, etc.) with the addition of a refined binaural-beat technolo- 

gy providing potential consciousness-altering information to the brain's 

reticular activating system. This safe and effective binaural-beat process offers 

a wide variety of applications which include, but are not limited to: relaxation, 

meditation, enhanced creativity, intuition development, enriched learning, im- 

proved sleep, wellness, and the exploration of expanded mind-cosciousness 

states. 

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Journal of Scientijic Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 3, pp. 275-295, 1997 0892-33 10197 


The "Mars Effect" 

As Seen by the Committee PARA 

J. DOMMANGET 

Obsewatoire Rovul de Belgique, Avenue Circulaire, 3-B/l180 Bruxelles, Belgique. 

Abstract - This paper deals primarily with the research carried out by the 

Committee PARA (the Belgian Committee for the Scientific Investigation of 

Claims of Paranormal phenomenon)' on a problem proposed by Michel 

Gauquelin in 1960, effectively undertaken in 1967, and of which conclusions 

have been published in 1976 in the Committee's Bulletin: Nouvelles Brkves 

(N.B., No. 43, September, 1976). It also contains some comments on newer 

research, including those by other authors. The problem concerns correla- 

tions that Gauquelin claims to exist between sports champions and the posi- 

tions of the planet Mars in the sky at the time of their births. The Committee 

PARA has rejected the belief in any Mars effect in the case of sports champi- 

ons. It is the position of the Committee PARA that, while some of 

Gauquelin's astronomical and statistical computations appeared perfectly 

correct, the theoretical principles proposed by Gauquelin to support his re- 

search have to be rejected because they do not correctly take into account the 

fundamentals of the problem - the secular and diurnal socio-demographic 

factors. The objective of this article is to correct the many mistakes, misinter- 

pretations, and false inferences which have been made regarding the research 

of the Committee PARA. 

Keywords: Mars Effect - astrology -paranormal 

Introduction 

Michel Gauquelin has claimed that correlations exist between sports champi- 

ons and the position of the planet Mars at the time of their births. The Com- 

mittee's research contains two parts. The first part concerns the establishment 

of specific statistical material and its analysis following the principles pro- 

posed by Gauquelin in order to verify - at his request - his astronomical and 

statistical computations. These computations as made by Gauquelin appeared 

perfectly correct. 

A second part of the research consists of the establishment of a model for 

the theoretical mechanism of the purported phenomenon. From this analysis, 

it clearly appears that the theoretical principles proposed by Gauquelin to sup- 

port his research have to be rejected because they do not correctly take into ac- 

-- - - -- - - - --- 

' Comitk Belge pour l11nvestigation Scientifique des PhCnomknes rCputks paranormaux (Belgian 

Committee for the scientific investigation of claims of paranormal phenomenon). In short: Committee 

PARA (Dommanget, 1993).

276 J. Dommanget 

count the fundamentals of the problem - the secular and diurnal socio-demo- 

graphic factors. 

As a consequence, the Committee has rejected the validity of any Mars ef- 

fect in the case of sports champions. There is no reason for not extending this 

conclusion to any other planetary effect on human beings. 

Since then, many other tentative solutions for solving the problem have 

been realized, but unfortunately, without reaching a common agreement. This 

is not surprising because whatever one may try to find in favor or in disfavor of 

the reality of the Mars effect, the fundamental question consists of establishing 

the theoretical reference diagram to which the one observed should be com- 

pared, and that has not been properly considered. Unfortunately, this seems 

impossible as long as no one knows how to handle the socio-demographic fac- 

tors. 

Some complementary, unpublished results obtained by the Committee 

PARA are also given. They were ready for publication in 1977-1978, but it 

was impossible to come to an agreement with Gauquelin on our proposed 

model of the phenomenon. This impasse required us to wait.* The inability to 

come to an agreement concerning a model became a stumbling-block to any 

discussion. Unfortunately, this model has also been ignored by all those who 

studied the problem during the last twenty years. 

Background 

Forty years ago, Gauquelin started researching the planetary influences on 

human beings. But it wasn't until 1960 that he proposed to our committee to 

verify his computations. For a variety of reasons, the real start of a collabora- 

tion between Gauquelin and PARA did not take place until 1967. As far as I 

know, this was the first time that the work of Gauquelin was checked on a seri- 

ous, scientific basis. The most significant experiment to consider, according 

to Gauquelin, was the Mars/sports champion theory one. 

This experiment consists of establishing a sample set of sports champions 

and dividing the daily motion of Mars into twelve classes: six equal intervals 

(diurnal) between rise and set, and six others (nocturnal) between set and rise 

for each birth-date of the sample. The problem hinges on the normal or abnor- 

mal shape of the corresponding histogram. In the opinion of Gauquelin, the 

classes I (just after rise) and 4 (just after meridian transit) should be consid- 

ered a priority. 

The results of this check (Figure 1) were published in 1976 after long dis- 

cussions, various computations, and tests. The conclusion was that 

Gauquelin's numerical computations were correct, but some criticisms had to 

be made about his conception of the statistical mechanisms. We must keep in 

mind that the solution of such a problem necessarily includes two parts: first, 

-- - - - 

Much later, in one of his last papers, Gauquelin (1988) pursued his idea and considered that his 

analysis was the only right one.


Fig. 1. Diagram of the observed frequencies (dark drawing) and the theoretical frequencies 

(clear drawing) of the sport-champions in the twelve classes of Mars. 

the establishment of a sample, which may be subject to complications and un- 

certainties, and second, the computation of the theoretical frequencies that the 

sample should confirm if chance alone is responsible. 

After having conducted some tests, the sample was considered as sufficient- 

ly correct, but the computation of the theoretical distribution of the sports 

champions in classes seemed to the Committee to need further investigations. 

These investigations based on a statistical model specifically established by 

the Committee for the present problem, showed that the formulae adopted by 

Gauquelin were not correct. 

Therefore, the committee considered that it could not accept Gauquelin's 

conclusions as long as they were based on the methods and formulae that he 

proposed (N.B., No. 43, p. 343, lines: 15- 17). 

Gauquelin did not agree with our theoretical research, and a long "discus- 

sion" started - traces of which may be found in the papers published after- 

wards by both sides. Considering that our demonstration of the statistical 

mechanism was not understood, and considering that this understanding was 

fundamentally needed to authorize any further discussion, the Committee de- 

cided to stop any further comments and reactions. 

Since then, similar misunderstandings have unfortunately occurred with 

nearly all the other authors who started studying this question. Except for au- 

thors Kurtz, Zelen and Abell (1 979) - who gave a correct (but unfortunately 

much too short) report on our research -most of them were not sufficiently 

patient enough to study our paper, and preferred to repeat what was written by 

Gauquelin. 

We clearly stated our position in The Humanist (1976b) and The Zetetic 

Scholar (1 982). Current reports from other sources differ greatly from our po- 

sition. The existence of our paper is mentioned in general, but its conclusions 

have never been clearly detailed or correctly reproduced. Furthermore, our 

model of the statistical mechanisms leading to the class distribution - the 

most important part of our research - is simply ignored. 

In a letter, written April 19, 1982, to M. Truzzi, Editor of The Zetetic Schol-


ten in French. My hope was that the Editor would then propose a solution for 

publishing a translation of our paper. But I was not successful in my efforts to 

achieve clarification. 

It is surprising to note that even the analysis of Gauquelin - as far as I 

know - has never been reported and detailed in any such papers in which he 

(at least) was conscious of the necessity of computing a theoretical reference 

diagram. 

Therefore,when Brenda Dunne, Vice-President of the Society for Scientific 

Exploration, and L. W. Fredrick, Secretary of the Society, gave me the oppor- 

tunity to speak about the position of the Committee PARA as described twenty 

years ago - an opportunity to recount the details accurately - in the field of 

the Mars influences investigated by Gauquelin on the athletic proficiency of 

individuals, I was delighted. This article is a recounting of that presentation at 

the Third European SSE Meeting in Freiburg, Germany. It was my hope then, 

as it is now, that the Committee PARA'S position will finally be understood, 

and its fundamental idea correctly described for the future reference. 

Therefore, this article is not really a new contribution to the research made 

by the Committee PARA. It is a statement needed because of too many incon- 

sistent papers and comments written about the Committee's research. It is a 

definitive answer to the erroneous assertions published in various reviews and 

magazines. 

Rough Historical Sketch 

The Mars effect has been announced and discussed by Gauquelin successively 

in: LIIn.uence des Astres ( 1 955), Mkthodes pour ~tudier la rkpartition 

des Astres duns le Mouvement Diurne (1957) and Les Hommes et les Astres 

(1960). These are the basic references used by the Committee PARA during its 

research. 

At that time, a first contact was established by Gauquelin with some representatives 

(mainly A. Bessemans and S. Arend) of the Committee PARA 

known then as the only existing Skeptics Committee (Dommanget, 1993)' but 

did not lead (as recounted only) to any successful "collaboration". 

The first positive meeting occurred in 1967 when a firm agreement was 

adopted to conduct an examination by the Committee PARA of the research 

carried out by Gauquelin. It was then decided to establish a new sample of 

sports champions, and to perform all the computations on both sides in order 

to verify Gauquelin's proposed phenomenon and theory, step by step. 

This phenomenon hinged upon the histogram obtained by Gauquelin for the 

position of the planet Mars for the birth times of any sample of sports champions. 

The sample consisted of: 430 French sportsmen objectively chosen in the 

Dictionnaire des Sports by E. Seidler and R. Pariente (1963)' 43 French soccer 

players, and 62 Belgian international soccer players chosen as the most promi-


nent sportsmen of their time. Thus, the sample totaled 535 sports champions 

whose birthdates are spread over the period 1872-1945. 

The year 1968 was devoted to the search of all needed data: precise birth- 

dates and hours (by collecting officiai documents, geographic positions of the 

birthplaces), reduction of all birth-hours to Universal Time by considering the 

corrections to be made to the official times as a function of the birthplaces 

(Ex.: Alsace-Lorraine during the first World-War). This was done by a com- 

mon effort by Gauquelin, the Committee PARA, and Luc de Marre. 

In agreement with Gauquelin, the aims of the Committee have been defined 

as follows: (I) astronomical aspect - to verify Gauquelin's computations of 

the astronomical positions of Mars and the sport-champions' affiliations to 

the different sectors or classes as defined by the author, thus to verify the ob- 

served histogram; (2) statistical aspects - to verify the computations that 

construct the theoretical histogram .fi)llowing the rules proposed by M. 

Gauquelin and also the computation of the x2 test. The results of these checks 

have been published in N.B, No. 43, ( 1976). 

The PARA conclusions were: (I ) astronomical aspect - the computations 

made independently on both sides are in perfect agreement. The observed dis- 

tribution histogram was thus clearly confirmed and accepted by PARA (ibi- 

dem, IX, Conclusion: items a and b, pp. 342-343); (2) statistical aspects - 

the computation of the theoretical histogram following the rules proposed by 

Gauquelin as well as that of the x2 test did not seem to contain any error (ibi- 

dem, item c, p. 343). 

But, concerning the method used by Gauquelin to compute the theoretical 

histogram, the Committee has expressed serious criticism because of the fol- 

lowing considerations: 

This method does not take into account the theoretical probability of the 

occurrence of the configurations C, (see: explanation below). 

It does not allow to correctly take into consideration the possible evolu- 

tion of the nycthemeral curve with time. 

It makes use of the sample itself, which is generally not allowed because 

it has an influence on the degrees of freedom. 

To summarize, it is clearly stated in N.B., No. 43 that the Committee: 

agrees with Gauquelin's computations as long as his method is used, but dis- 

agrees with his method for computing the theoretical histogram. 

This position has been recounted on many occasions (see for instance: The 

Humanist, 1976b and: The Zetetic Scholar, 1982) as well as the very recent 

paper given at the Oostende Meeting (September 1994) organized by Skepp, 

another Belgian group of Skeptics. Unfortunately, no proceedings of this 

meeting have been published. 

Many authors did not understand (or did not want to understand!) this posi- 

tion, and considered that the Committee "has replicated the results found by


Gauquelin" - leading to the impression that it thus agreed with the existence 

of a Mars Effect. 

Here are some examples: 

1) In Skepter, Nanninga (1993), mentioning skeptics who tried to reject the 

Mars Effect, writes: "The Belgian skeptics, who conducted their research to- 

gether with Gauquelin, did not succeed. They also found an always unex- 

plained Mars Effect". 

This is incorrect because: 

The Committee's research had not been conducted with Gauquelin, who 

only helped in establishing the statistical sample of sports champions. I 

suppose that no one would consider that "Kepler conducted his re- 

search" on the three laws of the celestial mechanics "together with 

Tycho-Brahe" because he used the observations of the latter. 

The Committee never found a Mars Effect, but found the same his- 

togram as Gauquelin which - as we have shown - does not prove any- 

thing. 

The Committee has proposed a model for the statistical analysis, to 

which Gauquelin did not agree. This is not mentioned by Nanninga. 

An answer to Nanninga was published in the next issue of the series. But 

he did not consider the various items of our response, and preferred to 

comment on other unproven assertions. (For example, what do the 

words "verwachte aantal" mean? Translation: "expected number".) Un- 

fortunately, the editors chose not to reproduce our second response re- 

garding the erroneous report of Nanninga. 

2) In The Skeptical Inquirer, Kurtz (1995) mentions three reasons (unfortu- 

nately unknown to us) why PARA rejected the claim of Gauquelin. He ignored 

completely the committee's real reasons for rejecting this claim, clearly re- 

called in The Humanist. Kurtz, as Editor, was present at the talk I gave in 1993 

at the Oostende Meeting. In this reference (as in others), there is not one word 

about the mechanism we proposed to explain the formation of the theoretical 

histogram. 

3) In Science et Avenir, Pecker ( 1995) has published a very good paper on 

the subject, but there are only six words (p. 24) about PARA'S work. Although 

he reports the work done by the French committee - absolutely similar to the 

one conducted by PARA - he does not say anything about an analysis of the 

statistical mechanism as the one given by PARA in 1976. 

4) Nienhuys (1993) in his article, "Dutch Investigations of the M. Gauquelin 

Mars Effect" in the Journal of Scientific Exploration, writes concerning our 

Committee: 

p. 277: " ... a test was undertaken that confirmed the effect" and "The Corn- 

itee PARA doubted the constancy of the births rhythm." But Nienhuys forgets 

to say that our criticism mainly concerns the ignorance of the probability of

Mars Effect 28 1 

the configuration C, , and thus the secular demography. On the other hand, our 

check confirmed the computations made by Gauquelin. but never the Mars Ef- 

fect. 

p. 273: "...but the idea that athletes might differ from ordinary people is 

new" (by comparison of the Dutch research to the idea developed by the Com- 

mittee PARA). Actually this is not new because it is evidently included in the 

probability of the configurations Ck the computation of which requires the 

knowledge of the secular demographic distribution of the sports champion 

(not of ordinary people, of course). This has been recounted in The Humanist, 

36, 1, 1976, item 2. 

5) In the Journal of Scientific Exploration, Ertel (1993) writes concerning 

refutations: "The first was the Belgian attempt, which failed (Committee 

PARA, 1976)". Where did the author find that PARA "failed"? Since the 

Committee clearly said that it could not accept Gauquelin's claim because it 

disagreed with the method used by him for computing the theoretical his- 

togram, how can this be construed as failure by the Committee? 

6) In The Mars-Effect, Benski et al. (1996), the French Committee gives a 

correct but very incomplete report on PARA'S work. It is important to remark 

that their observation histogram shows the same "shape" as the one claimed by 

Gauquelin. 

To make our position very clear, hereafter I summarize the difference exist- 

ing between the understandings of the problem by Gauquelin vs. by the Com- 

mittee PARA. 

Differences in Methods 

There are substantial differences between the method used by Gauquelin 

and that proposed by PARA to compute the theoretical histogram. 

M. Gauquelin'.~ Method 

As explained in Mkthodes pour i'tudier la repartition des Astres duns le 

Mouvement Diurne ( 1957), Gauquelin considers three different parameters: 

M, Ai and Di , the product of which should give the theoretical frequency of 

occurrence in a given class i (i = 1 , . . . 1 2) : 

According to Gauquelin, the definitions of these factors are : 

1) factor M = mathematical mean: corresponding to a uniform distribution of 

the n sports champions of the sample in twelve classes of the same size. In the 

case of the sample considered by PARA, M = 535112. 

2) factor Ai = astronomical factor: computed for each class i = 1 to 12. Its


value is obtained, for the diurnal classes or sectors, by the formula (ibidem. p. 

59). See equation following. 

1 535 (semi diurnal arc)" n 

Ai=-x C 

535 .=, 90" 

A similar formula exists for the nocturnal classes i = 7 to 12. 

These formulae are not really "given" by Gauquelin, but they may be easily 

established by following the description given by him of the successive steps 

for the computation of A, as explained in PARA's paper. 

The time t, really elapsed during the transit of the planet in any diurnal sec- 

tor i (1 to 6), is (in days) for a given date: 

1 (semi diurnal arc)" 

td =- 

12 90" 

and as a consequence, for the product M x A; one finds: 

where: t,,,, is the value of t, for each of the n = 1,2,3, ... 535 individuals. This 

last expression is thus the mean value of the intervals of time that the planet 

sojourned in a given class i for the n = 535 birthdates. 

3.- factor Di = diurnal demographic factor: computed as proposed by 

Gauquelin by two different methods that have been reported in PARA's paper 

and of which the second has been retained by PARA because it appears more 

easy to handle, and because Gauquelin (1957, p. 82) estimates that it is the 

most accurate one. The expression of D, is then (Committee PARA, 1976a, p. 

340): 

(i, j = 1,2 ... 12) (4) 

where fa,, 

and f,,l,,, are respectively: 1) the frequencies for the Sun to be in 

the twelve classes j of Mars for all birthdates; and 2) those for the planet Mars


for the same birthdates to be in the same classes, but numbered from that occu- 

pied by the Sun and called i. This automatically takes into account the nycthe- 

meral distribution through the factor fA,,(i,, (for the definition of Aa, see Figure 

4). 

The computation of Di as well as of Ai are thus dependent upon the statisti- 

cal characteristics of the sample, which is generally not allowed. More, the 

demographic factor should be applied individually to each of the elementary 

periods of the interval of time 1872-1 945 - and not replaced by means. 

Now, as for the value of Di being practically uniform for the twelve 

classes - Gauquelin proposed to consider it as a constant (according to his 

letter, March 28, 1969) and to write: 

Using this expression and fully applying the prescriptions of Gauquelin, we 

found the distribution given in Table 1 of our paper of 1976 (p. 330) and shown 

in Figure 1 (dark drawing) with the theoretical distribution (gray drawing). 

The value of x2 was 26.66 for a degree of freedom of 12-1 = 1 1, leading to a 

probability of 0.5%, which is significant. 

The Committee PARA Analysis and Method (Statistical Model) 

In order to avoid any confusion such as those sometimes found in papers on 

the subject, we first want to recall that this method has been exclusively estab- 

lished by members of the Committee, and that Gauquelin had no hand in it. 

It is well known that the position of the planet in the sky moves in right as- 

cension (a) and declination (6) but very slowly, by such a small amount that its 

position may be considered as invariant in one day and even in a few days to 

the needed accuracy. As a consequence, at any given date and thus for a given 

position (a, 6) of Mars, the "configuration" of the set of the twelve classes is 

entirely defined by these two parameters, but better by two others to which 

they are bound and that are described hereafter. 

If Aa is the difference in right ascension between the planet and the Sun, the 

planet will have an hour-angle of Aa at noon (Figure 2 as given in our first 

paper of 1976a). Let us call x = 12h + Aa. 

Now, if we call y, the time elapsed by the planet in a diurnal class for the cor- 

responding declination, the configuration of the set of the twelve classes for 

the considered date is entirely defined by the parameters (x, y). As a conse- 

quence, the instants of entries and exits of the planet in the 12 successive 

classes are those given in Table 1. 

The reason for having substituted these parameters for the parameters (a, 6) 

lies in the fact that their tie is not biunivocal: to an (a, 6) group of parameters


Fig. 2. Details of the configuration of the twelve classes of Mars inside a given day. 

Table 1 

Entries and Exits in the Twelve Classes as Functions of the Parameters x and y 

C1. entries exits C1. entries exits 

(diurnal) (nocturnal) 

corresponds an (x,y) group and only one, but to an (x, y) group may correspond 

many different (a, 8) groups. 

This is due to the fact that the relative position of the Sun, Mars and the 

Earth shows a periodic motion (equivalent to the Saros in case of the Moon) of 

some 15 years (similar Aa and 8 after one period) as illustrated by Figure 3 es- 

tablished for the period 1922-1937. The dots (in Figure 3) are the positions of 

Mars for the first days of each month in this period. 

Moreover, the frequency distribution of the groups (x, y) for a uniform distri- 

bution of dates within the period 1872-1945 covered by the sample of the 535 

Fig. 3. The dots represent the successive positions of Mars for the first days of each month in the 

period 1922-1937 (period similar to the Saros in case of the Moon).

Mars Effect 

Table 2 

Frequency Distribution of x and y ( 1872- 1945) 

limits in x Oh 4h 8h 12h 16h 20h 24h 

x 2h 6h 1Oh 14h 18h 22h 

limits in y y 

sports champions is not uniform. Such a frequency distribution has been com- 

puted for equal intervals in x and y respectively by considering the 888 first 

days of each month in this period (January 1, 1872; February 1, 1872; .. .De- 

cember 1, 1945). It is given in Table 2. The probability of the arrival of the re- 

lated configuration C,, is thus not uniform also - even within a given interval 

of time where the dates are uniformly distributed. 

This being said, the birth time of a given individual (sports champions or 

not) in a given class i should be considered as the successive "arrivals" of two 

different events (as follows). 

1) The arrival of a day and thus of the related configuration Ck where k = 1 

to 54, if we consider the subdivisions in x (6 intervals) and y (8 intervals) 

adopted in Table 2. 

2) The arrival in this day, of the birth-hour and thus the arrival in one of the 

12 classes of the diurnal motion of Mars in the sky, taking into account the 

nycthemeral distribution (Figure 4) - established for example by Mrs. Fr. 

Gauquelin (1959) who showed that it is secularly evolving. 

The probability of the arrival of the sequence (day + hour) is then given (as 

is well known), by the product of the probability of the arrival of the configu- 

ration C, by the probability of the arrival Pi/ck of the class i in case that C, 

has appeared. So that finally (as illustrated by Figure 5), the total probability 

C


1 f lever coucher lever 

Fig. 4. Diagram of a typical nycthemeral curve. 

Configurations C1, C2 ,...,...,. Ck, . , . , 

Fig. 5. Different statistical ways (k = 1 to n) leading to the arrival of a given class c,. 

of the arrival of any birth instant in a given class i, is the sum of the probabili- 

ties corresponding to each C,: 

If we compare this formula to the formula (5) finally proposed by 

Gauquelin, it appears that he admits: 

pck = constant = 1/535 (k = 1 to 54)

Mars Effect 

which is erroneous ! 

After an extensive mail exchange on this aspect of the problem during many 

years, Gauquelin finally recognized the following - in a letter to us on March 

7, 1970. 

"Tout d'abord, je suis parfaitement d'accord avec vous sur deux points: les naissances 

des sportifs ne se rkpartissent pas de fa~on uniforme dans le temps (annie, mois, jours). 

En soi, la relation proposke par M. Dath dans sa note: 

*It should be 54, and not 535! 

ne souffre aucune discussion. 

L'essentiel de notre dksaccord provient de ce que vous appelez p~, ce qui, B mon 

avis est clairement des pi/?, . 

En conclusion, comme je vous l'icrivais dans ma lettre prickdente du 2 dkcembre 

1969: "dans le problkme qui nous occupe, classique ii ce point de vue, doit etre considkrk 

comme constant par dkfinition et uniformkment kgal ii 11535." 

Free Translation of the Above Letter 

First of all, I perfectly agree with you on two points: the birthdates of the sportsmen are 

not uniformly distributed with time (year, month, day). 

In itself, the relation proposed by M. Dath in his note suffers no discussion. 

The essential of our disagreement corrles from what you are calling pc,which, in my 

opinion, is clearly pi/~,. 

As a conclusion, as I wrote it to you in my preceding letter of December 2, 1969: 

"concerning the problem we are interested in, classical from this point of view, pc, 

must be considered as constant by definition and uniformly equal to 11535." 

We may conclude therefore that the error of Gauquelin lies in the misunder- 

standing of the role of the configurations C,. 

First Conclusion 

It has thus been clearly shown that the establishment of the theoretical his- 

togram is the fundamental problem to consider, a problem essentially depen- 

dent on demographic factors. 

The nycthemeral diagram is certainly such an important factor, but it ap- 

pears that the secular distribution is probably the more important one. The


expression (Equation 5) of the probability of the arrival of any birthdate in any 

of the 12 classes in which the diurnal motion of Mars may be divided is the 

only one to consider. 

Now, suppose that instead of a classical human population distributed over a 

given period, we consider a particular category of this population, as for exam- 

ple, the sports champions. One should take into account all other factors that 

are responsible for the characteristics of this population subset, such as eco- 

nomic or social features, etc. This may introduce various biases, and drastical- 

ly change the numerical figures given in Table 2. And in that case, the theoref- 

ical histogram obtained by using Equation 5 may be very different from the 

one expected for the original population and thus, absolutely independent of 

any Mars Effect. 

In the case of sports champions, it is easy to understand that there will be an 

important difference in their distribution diagram if: 

On one hand they are selected in a uniformly-distributed population 

over the considered period where the chances of being sports champions 

are equally distributed during this period or if 

On the other hand these distributions are not uniform. 

One may imagine that the periods of the world wars have not been favorable 

in some countries to develop inclination towards sports activities as seen by 

the distribution diagram of the birthdates of the 535 sports champions in the 

period 1872-1945 (Figure 6). This, for example, could explain the differences 

in the results respectively found with American samples and European ones. 

To secular socio-demographic effects may also be added some others as 

yearly ones, as shown by Dudink (1994). Samples of soccer players born in a 

1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 

years 

Fig. 6. Distribution diagram of the birth-dates of the sport-champions in the period 1870-1950.


same competition year show a typical non-uniform distribution diagram (Fig- 

ure 7) which seems to be bound to their ages. This author also states that in a 

sample of 60 young tennis players - apparently because of a selection due to 

competition organization rules - half of them happen to have been born in the 

first quarter of the year. 

The real problem is that in the present situation it seems difficult - if not 

impossible - to correctly estimate these impacts on the true concerned distri- 

bution diagram in such a way that it appears impossible to establish the correct 

theoretical histogram to whia the observed one should be compared. 

But in any case - as we hope to have shown in this article - the research 

made by Gauquelin is based on incorrect statistical principles, and finally does 

not prove anything. 

Research Conducted Since 1976 

As we said at the beginning of this article, a few research studies completed 

by the Committee PARA were conducted after the publication of N.B., No. 43. 

But this research was not communicated to Gauquelin - or to anyone else. 

This was because they would have needed an understanding of the mechanism 

of formation of the histogram expressed by our model, and also because (we 

learned by experience) it was difficult to keep them as unofficial working pa- 

pers. On the other hand, none of the authors interested in the problem ever 

showed any agreement with our analysis - or ever contested it. So any dis- 

cussion of this new results would have led to a blind alley. 

Significant Questions and Considerations 

But today, twenty years later, to be complete and to close our concern with 

this subject, the time has come to clarify the situation by making here - on 

the basis of some unpublished results - some general and final comments. 

Aug - Ocl Nov - Jan Feb - Apr May - Jul 

Birth date (quarters) 

Fig. 7. Distribution diagram of soccer players in a same competition year.


Why are the majority of the studies concentrated on classes 1 and 4 in 

the straight line of Gauquelin's proposal? Class 12 is as interesting as 

class 1 or the group of classes 8, 9 and 10 together (Figure 1). Actually 

we consider that none of these classes should be isolated from all the 

others. Only the whole histogram may have some significance and 

should be considered. Furthermore, one must remark (at least with our 

sample) that it may be represented by a tilted sinusoid showing an important 

and surprising discontinuity between class ! 2 and 1 - which has 

never been brought to attention nor explained! The observed sample recently 

considered by the French Committee shows the same shape (Benski 

et al., 1996, p. 26) although less conspicuous (Figure 8). (It is regrettable 

that the theoretical or control histogram is not given.) 

It is surprising that nobody seems to be aware of the need for computing 

the theoretical histogram. Many authors speak about results "expected 

by chance" without giving the formula used to compute them. The im- 

pression that "by chance" the members of a sample of sports champions 

must be uniformly distributed in the twelve classes, is erroneous - as 

we have shown. The only correct formula has been given by the Com- 

mittee PARA. If now someone does not accept it, he should explain 

why, and give his own understanding of the problem. It is surprising that 

we have been awaiting that for twenty years! 

The dependency of the results from the secular socio-demography is 

clearly shown in Figure 9, in which it appears that the shape of the his- 

tograms (obtained by dividing the material in three parts of equal impor- 

tance) is evolving and is weakening from the oldest epochs to the more 

recent ones. 

This characteristic is even observed with histograms obtained by dividing 

the statistical material in more than three similar subsets, as a function of the 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9101112 

classes 

Fig. 8. Observed distribution diagram of the sports champions sample considered by the French- 

Committee.

Mars Effect 

Fig. 9. Diagrams of the observed frequencies of the sport-champions for three successive periods 

of similar importance and for the complete one. 

Fig. 10. Diagrams of the observed frequencies of the sport-champions for six succesive periods of 

similar importance. 

dates. Figure 10 has been obtained by considering six such subsets. One 

should particularly notice the histogram concerning the period 19 10-1 92 1 - 

including the First World War - and which, for obvious reasons, should not 

be retained for discussion. 

From these diagrams it appears that Gauquelin's shape of the diagram is


more pronounced for the oldest epochs, and is thus dependent on secular ef- 

fects. 

Counter experiments conducted by various authors seem not to have 

been more successful in clarifying the situation. Such experiments were 

conducted by PARA, but on the basis of its theoretical conception of the 

problem - and was ready for publication in the years 1977-78 in our 

N.B., No, 44. It did not happen - as I said -because no one seemed to 

accept our analysis of what was needed to understand these experiments. 

The first experiment consisted of keeping the birth dates of the sports cham- 

pions, but mixing the birth hours as proposed by Gauquelin. But this has the 

disadvantage of using the sample itself to establish the reference diagram, and 

of keeping the same secular distribution of the dates and of the Ck . This is also 

the basic conception of the research by the French committee. 

The second counter experiment deals with the idea that to avoid the consid- 

eration of Equation (6), one should need a sample of sports champions all born 

on the same day (or epoch). This is similar to the idea of Zelen (1 976) - or at 

least on days (or epochs) leading to the same related configuration Ck because 

in that case one has: 

and thus: 

The theoretical probabilities may then be computed if, of course, the nyc- 

themeral curve is known. For a first approximation, this may be ignored. 

Following Table 2, it appears that the probability of the Ck is more constant 

in y than in x . Therefore the samples obtained by dividing the whole statistical 

material in subsets as narrow as possible in x will be more or less homoge- 

neous, and thus more consistent with the wanted constancy of C, . We tried a 

division in x as given - in Table 3. 

The observed frequency diagrams are those given in the last "column" of 

Figure 11 where the histograms obtained for the three intervals of time: from 

TABLE 3 

Distribution of Birth Dates of 535 Sports Champions


Fig. 11. Diagrams of the observed frequencies of the sport-champions obtained by considering 

the three periods of Fig. 9 and four intervals of the parameter x given in Table 2.


1872 to 1909, from 19 10 to 1927 and from 1928 to 1945 (as given in Figure 9) 

are also retained for comparison. 

From these four last diagrams, it appears that Gauquelin's shape of the dia- 

gram is more pronounced for x between 12 and 16 hours, and thus when the 

planet Mars is at its greatest distance from the Earth. 

But it is more important to state that this subset is the one containing the 

largest percentage of early birth dates as given in Table 3 (last column), show- 

ing again a dependency of the shape of the histogram on the secular distribu- 

tion of the birth dates which confirms the role of the secular socio-demogra- 

phy (not astro-demography!) - unless one considers that the larger the 

distance of Mars, the more efficient is its influence. 

Conclusion 

All the above considerations have been conducted on the assumption that 

the sample of the 535 sports champions does not contain any clerical errors or 

bias introduced by Gauquelin in order to modify the statistical results. 

Some authors claim that Gauquelin has falsified the data -without our 

knowing - or even falsified the whole sample. From our point of view, we 

never imagined (when starting our research), that this could have been 

possible - for various practical reasons. 

Today we are even more certain -because no one could imagine Gauquelin 

modifying our sample in such a way that the diagrams of Figures 9, 10 and 1 1 

would reveal socio-demographic effects whereas they were unknown to him! 

This does not mean that there may be no erroneous data in the considered 

sample. But in such a case, we always come up again with the same problem of 

how to establish the theoretical histogram that could serve for comparison. 

Who could assure that the sample corrected for all these eventual anomalies is 

better than the original one? 

The Opinion of the Committee PARA - Summarized 

In a given population, the sports champions constitute a particular subset. 

The membership of each sports champion to this set results from a constella- 

tion of selection effects under which one must count socio-demographic phe- 

nomena (economy, wars, climate, baby-booms, etc.) and possibly other exter- 

nal factors, as for example - if real - a Mars Effect. 

To isolate any of these effects, one must be able to compare a subset contain- 

ing the considered effect to another subset free from this effect and from this 

one only. That means in the present case a subset containing the Mars Effect 

(the sports champions) to another free from the Mars Effect but containing all 

other selection effects. Unfortunately the latter sets are unknown and the com- 

parison appears impossible. 

What also should be retained from the discussion on this problem for 20 

years, is that:


All who believe in the phenomenon propose samples leading apparently 

to the existence of a Mars Effect. 

All who do not believe in it, propose samples leading apparently to the 

absence of any Mars Effect. 

In conclusion, I think that this incredible problem will never receive any de- 

cisive answer. As we have already shown, Gauquelin has never demonstrated 

the reality of the Mars Effect - neither have those who later supported his 

ideas. 

As people who a priori do not believe in astrology, we do not have to prove 

that the phenomenon does not exist. It should be the aim of the believers in as- 

trology to prove that the Mars Effect is real and on the basis of acceptable 

demonstrations. To our knowledge, acceptable evidence has never been pre- 

sented! 

Acknowledgement 

Dedicated to the memory of J. Dath (1918-1996), Professor of Statistics 

(Royal Military School of Belgium) one of the principal investigators of the 

Committee PARA in the Mars effect research. 

References 

Note: this bibliography is limited to only the papers here mentioned. More 

complete ones will be found in some of these papers. 

Benski, C., Caudron, D., Galifret, Y., Krivine, J-C, Pecker, J-P, RouzC, M., and Schatzman, E. 

(1996). The Mars Effect. Ed. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. 

Committee PARA (1976a). Considtrations critiques sur une recherche faite par M. M.Gauquelin 

dans le domaine des influences planktaires. Nouvelles Bre'ves, 43,327. 

Committee PARA (1976b). The Committee Para replies to Gauquelin. The Humanist, 36, 1,3 1. 

Committee PARA (1982). On the Mars effect: A last answer to M. Gauquelin. The Zetetic Scholar, 

10,66. 

Dommanget, J. (1993). Guest column: The Comite PARA - A European skeptics committee. Journal 

of Scientific Exploration, 7,3 17. 

Dudink, A. (1994). Birth date and sporting success. Nature, 368, April, 592. 

Ertel, S. (1993). Comments on the Dutch investigations of the Gauquelin Mars Effect. Journal of 

Scientific Exploration, 7, 283. 

Gauquelin, Fr. (1959). L'heure de la naissance. Population, 14,683. 

Gauquelin, M. (1955). L'lnfluence des Astres. Paris: Editions du Dauphin. 

Gauquelin, M. F. & Gauqelin, M. (1 957). ~e'thodes~our ~tudier la Re'partition des Astres dans le 

Mouvement Diurne. Paris: Imprimerie Graphi-Service. 

Gauquelin, M. (1960). Les Hommes et les Astres. Paris: Edition Denoel. 

Gauquelin, M. (1988). Is there a Mars effect? Journal of Scientific Exploration, 2, 29. 

Kurtz, P., Zelen, M. and Abell, G (1979). Results on the US test of the "Mars effect" are negative. 

The Skeptical Inquirer, 4, 19. 

Kurtz, P. (1995). New departure for the Skeptical Inquirer. Skeptical Inquirer, 19,3. 

Nanninga, R. (1 993). Skepter, 6, p. 19. 

Nienhuys, J. W. (1993). Dutch Investigations of the Gauquelin Mars Effect. Journal of Scientific 

Exploration, 7,27 1. 

Pecker, J. C1. ( 1995). Science et Avenir, June-July, 101,20-27. 

Seidler, E. & Parientt, R. (1963). Dictionnaire des Sports. Collection Seghers. 

Zelen, M. (1976). Astrology and statistics: A challenge. The Humanist, January-February, 32.



Astrology and Sociability: A Comparative Analysis of the 

Results of a Psychological Test 

Dkpurtement de Biologie et Physiologie animales, Bdtiment 440-443 

Universite' de Paris-Sud 91405 Orsay, France 

Abstract - The aim of this study is to compare sociability scores with clas- 

sic astrological data found in the natal charts of a population of 524 students 

(Ss), of an average age of 22.09 years, by using the Eysenck and Wilson psy- 

chological test. The position of the Sun in eleven out of the twelve zodiacal 

signs (months) corresponds significantly to alternations of higher and lower 

sociability for the odd and even signs of the zodiac respectively, this being in 

complete conformity with astrological tradition. Since other alternations are 

also revealed, particularly in the case of the planet of Mars, it would appear 

that the argument of self-attribution by the Ss cannot be used to undermine 

these results. Moreover, the division into months of the calendar year elimi- 

nates all alternations, thus fully justifying an astrological, zodiacal and sea- 

sonal division - the Vernal point corresponds to 0' of Aries - which can- 

cels out any influence of the precession of the equinoxes phenomenon. On 

the other hand, in the two types of annual divisions - zodiacal and calendar 

- a significant sinusoidal evolution (COSINOR) in the sociability scores 

appears, with a maximum in OctoberILibra. At present this cycle cannot be 

explained. The Moon, Mercury, Venus and the Ascendant show little or no 

connection with sociability. The positions of the planets at the four astrolog- 

ical "angles" (Ascendant, Midheaven, Descendant and Nadir) correspond 

slightly to astrological data, while the "aspects" (angles in degrees) formed 

between the Sun and planets partially confirm the astrological data for 

Jupiter and Saturn. 

Keywords: Astrology - sociability - personality inventory - statistical 

analysis - COSINOR 

Introduction 

The problem of a correlation between astrological factors based on the one 

hand on data relating to birth, and on the other, on personality traits, has been 

the object of several studies, few of which have turned out to be positive. 

Pellegrini (1973) and Angst & Scheidegger (1976) searched, without any 

success, for a relationship between the solar sign of the zodiac and values ob- 

tained through the use of a psychological test (Freiburger PI and CPl respec- 

tively). However, Mayo, White and Eysenck (1978), who adopted a similar 

approach in 1978, found a clear relationship between the solar sign and extro- 

introversion (Eysenck, Personality Inventory): the odd signs (Aries, Gemini, 

297

298 S. Fuzeau-Braesch 

Leo, Libra, Sagittarius and Aquarius) are notably more extrovert than the six 

others (Taurus, Cancer, Virgo, Scorpio, Capricorn and Pisces). 

These findings sparked many years of controversy, usually calling into 

question the test which was believed to be biased because of "self-attribution" 

by candidates who were assumed to have had prior knowledge of their signs 

(Pawlik & Buse, 1979; Kelly & Sasklofske, 1981; Eysenck & Nias 1982; Rus- 

sell & Wagstaff 1983; Fourie 1984). Only van Rooij et al. (1988) found the 

result of Mayo et al. to be positive in 1988, but this seems to have been subse- 

quently refuted by van Rooij (1 99 1). 

Another type of study consists in comparing the results of a test with the 

views of astrologers. However, this method does not seem to be a very valid 

one, and its results are usually negative: Tyson (1984), Angevent & Man 

( 1988) or McGrew & McFall, ( 1990) to cite a few examples. 

One imperative emerged in the face of such contradictory studies. This was 

to resort to additional astrological data other than just the solar sign (Fuzeau- 

Braesch (1 989)) and to construct more advanced methods for statistical analy- 

sis. 

To our knowledge, only one publication has partially answered this need. 

Hume and Goldstein (1977) took into consideration a large number of astro- 

logical factors (the eight planets, the Sun and Moon, the Ascendant, the 

twelve signs of the zodiac, the twelve houses, and the five aspects, in the trop- 

ical and sidereal zodiacs). However, their failure to find a correlation was 

largely due to their statistical methods. They divided the test results of 196 in- 

dividuals into two groups according to their score levels (two tests were used: 

Leary and MMPI) and carried out 632 chi-2 tests. Since only 23 of them were 

significant, the entire astrological hypothesis was rejected by the authors who 

did not study the 23 positive chi-square tests in question, even though this 

could have been of some interest. This is why we wished to examine the prob- 

lem again, using new data and reliable statistical methods. 

Psychological Test 

Methods 

The Eysenck and Wilson (1975) test, translated into French by the author, 

was selected to carry out this study, and provides a score ranging from 0 to 30 

for each subject (Ss). Among the 2 1 items of this test, it was decided to focus 

primarily on the analysis of sociability which, in fact, was shown by Eysenck 

et al. (1992) to be highly correlated with extroversion. The French translation 

of the test was submitted to the author, Professor Eysenck, who did not ex- 

press any disapproval. It has worked very well in France and Ss have had no 

problem in answering it. It should however be pointed out that the mean of the 

French population is 18.05, and is therefore higher than the 16.6 of the English 

population tested. This is not surprising and in no way invalidates our results.

Astrology and Sociability Analysis 299 

The general method used consists in adhering closely to the concrete, un- 

weighted and objective results of the test by working on the quantitative scores 

obtained. 

Population Studied 

The population consisted of 524 French voluntary students from seven dif- 

ferent high-level schools or universities studying in various fields, including 

science, architecture, business administration and psychology (Ecoles Poly- 

technique, Supklec, Institut Universitaire de Technologie, Hautes Etudes 

Commerciales, Ecole Supkrieure de Commerce, Ecole Supkrieure d' Architec- 

ture, UFR Universitaire de Psychologie). These different professional streams 

were chosen deliberately in order to avoid any eventual psychological bias 

linked to a specialization. Their ages ranged from 18 to 30 years, with an aver- 

age of 22.09 years. This had the advantage of limiting the dispersal of posi- 

tions of the so-called "slow" planets. 

It was clear from contacts with the students that they had very little or no 

knowledge of astrology, as they were all engaged in studies which occupied 

most of their time and energy. In view of the imbalance between the number 

of females and males (21 3 females compared to 3 11 males) and the restricted 

number in each category, the decision was made not to analyze the genders 

separately in this study. 

Methods of Astrological Analysis 

The date and time of birth of each of the 524 students made it possible to 

calculate their natal charts with the position of the ten elements of the sky, tak- 

ing into account by traditional astrology: the Sun, the Moon, Mercury, Venus, 

Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Pluto, as well as the axes of the horizon (As- 

cendant to the East, Descendant to the West) and of the Meridian (Midheaven 

= m.c. and Nadir = i.c. for the upper and lower culminations), that is to say, the 

four traditional "angles". One should also add the "aspects" between the plan- 

ets, that is to say, the geometric angles formed between them from 0 to 360". 

The astrological base considered is the tropical zodiac, of which the twelve 

signs correspond to the following divisions, according to the axes of the 

equinoxes and solstices: 

Aries 

Taurus 

Gemini 

Cancer 

Leo 

Virgo 

Libra 

Scorpio 

2 1 March-20 April 

2 1 April-20 May 

21 May-2 1 June 

22 June-22 July 

23 July-22 August 

23 August-22 September 

23 September-22 October 

23 October-2 1 November


Sagittarius 22 November-20 December 

Capricorn 2 1 December- 19 January 

Aquarius 20 January-1 8 February 

Pisces 19 February-20 March 

The theory of Ptolemy was carefully taken into consideration. According to 

this theory, the signs alternate in their "masculine" (odd) and "feminine" 

(even) traits; it has been used again by contemporary astrologists under the re- 

spective terms of "extrovert" and "introvert". 

The most simple, objective, reliable and appropriate statistical method was 

adopted for each problem under investigation. The aim was to compare the re- 

sults obtained with the rules of traditional astrology, which will be explained 

and discussed in the section on working methods, so as to avoid the need for 

the reader to have either a formal preliminary account of astrology or prior 

knowledge. Thus, after an account of the raw results, a general discussion will 

expound their meaning. 

Results 

This study should start with an analysis of the list of objective astronomical 

data relating to the 524 Ss. Table 1 shows the positions of the ten elements of 

the sky and the Ascendant distributed among the twelve signs of the zodiac 

(tropic: 0" Aries = Vernal point, equinox of spring in the northern hemisphere), 

followed by the four angles, indicating the number of Ss and the mean scores 

for each group. 

It should be noted in this table that the so-called "rapid planets" cover all the 

twelve signs of the zodiac, but that this does not apply to the "slow" ones since 

the births occurred mainly within a three-year period. Thus, Jupiter was to be 

found in eight signs (Aries, Taurus, Gemini, Cancer, Leo, Virgo, Libra, Scor- 

pio), but mainly in the last two; Saturn in six signs (Aries, Taurus, Gemini, 

Cancer, Leo, Pisces, but mainly in the first three); Uranus in Libra in the case 

of 498 Ss; Neptune in Sagittarius in the case 438 Ss; Pluto in Virgo and Libra 

in the case of, respectively, 206 and 3 18 out of the 524 Ss. 

The standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated: in many 

cases, they were high compared to the mean, ranging from 0.52 to 2.76. It was 

therefore observed that the significance of the mean of each group could not be 

studied by resorting to such methods. In fact, the analysis of variance 

(ANOVA) produces global probabilities (F for Fisher) which are nearly al- 

ways higher than 0.05. Consequently, such analyses are overall irrelevant for 

the purposes of this kind of study. This is due to the wide disparity in the values 

of the psychological scores frequently encountered in this kind of work. In the 

rare cases in which the probability obtained was equal to, or lower than, 0.05, 

the analysis of variance was obviously retained. Whenever necessary, other

Astrology and Sociability Analysis 

TABLE 1 

Individual Mean Scores on ~ociability' 

Factor N Mean Factor N Mean Factor N Mean 

SU-AR 

SU-TA 

SU-GE 

SU-CN 

SU-LE 

SU-VI 

SU-LI 

SU-SC 

SU-SG 

SU-CP 

SU-AQ 

SU-PI 

SU-AS 

SU-NA 

SU-DS 

SU-MH 

MO-AR 

MO-TA 

MO-GE 

MO-CN 

MO-LE 

MO-VI 

MO-LI 

MO-SC 

MO-SG 

MO-CP 

MO-AQ 

MO-PI 

MO-AS 

MO-NA 

MO-DS 

MO-MH 

ME-AR 

ME-TA 

ME-GE 

ME-CN 

ME-LE 

ME-VI 

ME-LI 

ME-SC 

ME-SG 

ME-CP 

ME- AQ 

ME-PI 

ME-AS 

ME-N A 

ME-DS 

ME-MH 

VE-AR 

VE-TA 

VE-GE 

VE-CN 

VE-LE 

VE-VI 

VE-LI 

VE-SC 

VE-SG 

VE-CP 

VE-AQ 

VE-PI 

VE-AS 

VE-NA 

VE-DS 

VE-MH 

MA-AR 

MA-TA 

MA-GE 

M A-CN 

MA-LE 

MA-VI 

MA-LI 

MA-SC 

MA-SG 

MA-CP 

MA-AQ 

MA-PI 

MA- AS 

M A-N A 

MA-DS 

MA-MH 

JU-AR 

JU-TA 

JU-GE 

JU-CN 

JU-LE 

JU-VI 

JU-LI 

JU-SC 

JU-SG 

JU-CP 

JU- AQ 

JU-PI 

JU-AS 

JU-NA 

JU-DS 

JU-MH 

SA-AR 

SA-TA 

S A-GE 

SA-CN 

SA-LE 

SA-PI 

SA-AS 

SA-NA 

SA-DS 

SA-MH 

UR-VI 

UR-LI 

UR-SC 

UR-AS 

UR-NA 

UR-DS 

UR-MH 

NE-SC 

NE-SG 

NE-AS 

NE-N A 

NE-DS 

NE-MH 

PL-VI 

PL-LI 

PL-AS 

PL-NA 

PL-DS 

PL-MH 

AS-AR 

AS-TA 

AS-GE 

AS-CN 

AS-LE 

AS-VI 

AS-LI 

AS-SC 

AS-SG 

AS-CP 

AS-AQ 

AS-PI 

AR = Aries, TA = Taurus, GE =Gemini, CN = Cancer, LE = Leo, VI = Virgo, LI = Libra, SC = Scorpio, SA = 

Sagittarius,CA = Capricorn, AQ - Aquarius, PI = Pisces.SU = Sun, MO = Moon, ME = Mercury, VE = Venus, 

MA = Mars,JU = Jupiter, SA = Saturn, UR = Uranus, NE = Neptune, PL = Pluto.AS = Ascendant, DS = Descen- 

dant, MH = Midheaven, NA = Nadir. 

'Values of the individual mean scores on sociability for each factor considered: each sign of the zodiac and 

each angle, for each element of the sky successively.


Sun 

Figure 1 represents the differences to the mean as a percentage of the psy- 

chological scores distributed among each of the twelve zodiacal signs for the 

Sun. The values for a certain number of signs are lower than the mean while 

others are higher. It is striking to note that from Taurus to Pisces, the differ- 

ences to the mean alternate regularly, following an odd-even sign order of one 

lower and one higher. A Student-t of the general formula: 

makes it possible to test the alternation hypothesis by considering on the one 

hand, the six odd signs (Aries, Gemini, Leo, Libra, Sagittarius and Aquarius) 

and the six even signs (Taurus, Cancer, Virgo, Scorpio, Capricorn and Pisces). 

SUN 1 ZODIACAL YEAR 

Fig. 1. Difference to the mean in percentage for each sign of the zodiac and the Sun. See caption 

of Table 1 for abbreviations.


It shows a probability higher than 0.05 (t = 1.92) which is therefore insignifi- 

cant. On the other hand, by eliminating Aries, as clearly suggested by Figure 

1, and by testing the alternation hypothesis on five odd and six even signs, the 

following result is obtained. 

Group Mean Number 

1 (even 2 to 12) 17.803 255 

2 (odd 3 to 1 1 ) 18.716 212 

The statistics thus signify, in this particular case for the Sun : 

which is higher than 1.96 and indicates a p > 0.05 level. 

The mean scores therefore alternate significantly between odd and even 

signs, with the exception of Aries, the justification of which will be found fur- 

ther on through the means of a COSINOR analysis. 

In addition, 35 computerized random draws of the 524 values of the scores, 

with the same distribution in number of individuals in each of the twelve 

signs, failed to bring to the fore any regular alternation between them, as de- 

tected in the case of the real values. 

Figure 2 represents the differences to the mean according to a division into 

months of the calendar year: the alternations disappear completely, showing 

higher means from July to November and lower means from December to 

April. It should be pointed out that this distribution does not follow the birth 

curve of France, the well-known maximum of which is in May and the mini- 

mum in January (INSEE data). This phenomenon can be analyzed by the fol- 

lowing method. 

Analysis by the COSINOR Method 

This method (Halberg et al., 1972) shows a sinusoid of the 524 scores, the 

acrophase of which is situated in October of the calendar year, with a very high 

significance of 0.02. This sinusoid also appears in the zodiacal year but with a 

p = 0.04 that is a little lower but still significant at the 5% threshold. The A am- 

plitudes correspond to one half of the intra-annual rhythmic variability. The 

COSINOR sinusoid is shown in Figure 2. 

Other Elements of the Sky in the Signs 

Similar analyses were carried out for the Moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars and 

Ascendant (Figures 3 to 6), the other planets not being retained for the above- 

I mentioned astronomical reasons. The COSINOR analysis does not detect any 

sinusoid at a significant level.


SUN / CIVIL YEAR 

Fig. 2. Idem Figure 1, for each of the months of the calendar year. Dotted line: COSINOR sinu- 

soid. 

JU = June, JL =July, AU = August, SE = September, OC = October, 

NO = November, DE = December, JA = January, FE = February, 

MR = March, AP = April, MA = May. See caption of Table 1 for abbreviations. 

Moon 

A clear alternation from Cancer to Pisces, visible in Figure 3, is not con- 

firmed by the calculation of the t described above, which gives a probability of 

over 0.05. Nor does the classic Student-t between adjacent signs provide any 

significance. 

Mercury and Venus 

The mean scores for these two planets do not reveal any visible alternation 

(Figures 4 and 5). However, a significant difference is detected for Venus by 

the calculation of the Student-t between adjacent signs: Taurus-Gemini p = 

0.02, Gemini-Cancerp = 0.02, as well as Pisces-Ariesp = 0.05.

Mars 


MOON 

Fig. 3. Idem Figure 1, Moon. 

The graph (Figure 6) provides a means to test the clearly alternated signs of 

Aries-Taurus, Libra-Scorpio, Sagittarius-Capricorn and Aquarius-Pisces for 

which the weighed t linked to the alternation hypothesis is 2.8 1, that is to say, 

a probability lower than 0.05. Furthermore, the classic Student-t calculated 

between Capricorn-Aquarius, Aquarius-Pisces and Pisces-Aries indicates a 

highly significant p of 0.02,0.005 and 0.03 respectively. 

Ascendant 

General and regular alternations do not emerge (Figure 7), but certain dif- 

ferences to the mean are notable. An alternation hypothesis between Aries- 

Taurus, Virgo-Libra and Scorpio-Sagittarius is statistically significant with a 

t = 2.33, in other words, a p lower than 0.05. Moreover, the Student-t between 

the adjacent groups Virgo-Libra and Capricorn-Aquarius gives values of 

p = 0.03 and 0.009 respectively.


Angles 

lo T 

MERCURE 

Fig. 4. Idem Figure 1, Mercury. 

Figure 8 represents the differences to the mean scores for the four angles, 

Ascendant, Midheaven, Descendant and Nadir, by considering each of the ten 

elements of the sky as being at an angle of nearly f 10" to these points. The 

values vary considerably. 

The astrological hypothesis consists in affirming an enhancement of the 

planets situated in these positions compared to the zones situated between 

each of them, that is to say, in the four zones of the zodiacal circumference: 10 

to 80°, 100 to 170°, 190 to 260" and 280 to 350" respectively. The calculation 

method of the Student-t between adjacent groups only detects four signifi- 

cances 

SunIMidheaven (p = 0.02), SaturnIMidheaven (p = 0.02), NeptuneIAscen- 

dant (p = 0.05) and PlutoIAscendant (p = 0.009). The other columns of the 

graph merely represent statistically insignificant tendencies at a 5% threshold.

Aspects 


VENUS 

Fig. 5. Idem Figure 1, Venus. 

The astrological "aspects 7 

' are constituted by special geometric angles 

formed between the different elements of the sky. The means of the sociabili- 

ty scores were therefore calculated, in view of the results described above, ac- 

cording to the angles formed by the Sun on the one hand, and the Moon, Mars, 

Jupiter and Saturn on the other. The planets Mercury and Venus were not ex- 

amined in this analysis since they never shift away from the Sun by more than 

27 degrees in the case of Mercury and by 48 degrees in the case of Venus, 

owing to their orbits. 

The calculations were carried out in 30" sections, from 0 to 360°, in the 

trigonometric sense of "positive" or "direct" (anti-clockwise). Thus, for ex- 

ample, a positive angle of 300" is also a negative angle of 60°, starting from the 

base 0". 

Here, the analysis of variance (calculation of F) only indicates a significant 

probability in the case of Jupiter and Saturn, of 0.0006 and 0.01 8 respectively 

(Figures 9 and 10). It can be seen that the mean scores are usually higher or 

lower than the general average.


AS 

Fig. 7. Idem Figure 1, Ascendant. 

In addition, the alternation of odd and even signs is confirmed by 35 random 

draws for which regular alternations of all consecutive signs were never ob- 

tained. 

Thus, with the exception of the sign Aries, this alternation seems to clearly 

confirm and reproduce the results of Mayo et a1 (1978). However, the alterna- 

tion of the more potentially sociable individuals born with the Sun in odd 

signs, and the least sociable individuals in even signs, is a traditional astrolog- 

ical fact. 

Druzhinin (1995) recently treated in a similar way the results of several psy- 

chological tests carried out among 523 students attending a secondary school 

in Kaliningrad (Russia). The rather complex results show an excess of extro- 

version in Leo, but since regular alternations did not emerge, the author 

searched for other classic astrological groupings. He believed the most appro- 

priate was an arrangement in signs known as "mutable" (Gemini, Virgo, Sagit- 

tarius and Pisces), "fixed" (Taurus, Leo, Scorpio and Aquarius) and "cardinal" 

(Aries, Cancer, Libra and Capricorn). The Sun in "mutable" signs

Fig. 8. Differences to the mean in percentage for the four angles (Ascendant, Midheaven, De- 

scendant, Nadir) according to the ten elements of the sky considered. See caption of Table 

1 for abbreviations. 

corresponded to the most extrovert Ss. However, such groupings were not ap- 

plicable to the results presented here (see Figure 1). 

Our findings are therefore closer to the work of Mayo & Eysenck, 1978. In 

the lengthy and worldwide controversy they provoked, the main criticism of 

their work - and which could consequently include us - is that of "self-at- 

tribution". According to this theory, the Ss replying to the test questions are 

likely to be influenced by a knowledge of their own solar birth sign. However, 

it is difficult to put credence in such a theory because the test is composed of a 

total of 630 questions on 20 psychological items other than sociability, and 

these questions are intermingled in such a way that their order cannot be per- 

ceived by the Ss. Yet an additional opinion could be sought further on: this 

concerns the results relating to other elements of the sky which are not as 

widely known as the solar birth sign.


Comparison Between the Calendar and Zodiacal Years 

The calculation of the mean of sociability scores for the twelve months of 

the calendar year (Figure 2: June to May) removes any alternation. The astro- 

logical phenomena therefore seem to be definitely linked to a seasonal division 

according to the equinox/solstice axes which not only permits the actual defin- 

ition of the twelve zodiacal signs but also fully justifies it. 

COSINOR Analyses 

The entire annual trend of the sociability scores corresponds very signifi- 

cantly to a sinusoid with an acrophase in October, including, through the alter- 

nations described above, the zodiacal zones from Cancer to Aries in the part 

situated under the mean. This sinusoid does not correspond to the seasons 

since the winter of our hemisphere only consists of three signs: Capricorn, 

Aquarius and Pisces. 

It is interesting to observe that the sinusoid in question can be found in both 

cases: the zodiacal and the calendar years. In the zodiacal year, the significant 

alternations are modulated by a remarkable annual rhythmic phenomenon 

which includes, and can explain, the paradoxically low mean of the Aries sign. 

It is impossible to state what this annual rhythm corresponds to. As far as 

we know, no such cycle has ever been described. Is it climatic? It would be 

very interesting to replicate this analysis in the southern hemisphere. 

Other Elements of the Sky 

The Moon shows regular variations which, strangely enough, are opposite to 

those of the Sun, but the alternation hypothesis is not statistically significant. 

No regular alternations correspond to Mercury and Venus. Yet in the case of 

Venus, the scores of Taurus and Cancer are notably higher than Gemini; like- 

wise, those of Pisces are notably lower than Aquarius. In the case of Mars, sta- 

tistically significant alternations have been demonstrated for eight out of the 

twelve signs. 

These results, therefore, indicate a partial link between Venus and Mars and 

sociability. This is yet another argument for rejecting the self-attribution theo- 

ry. Although knowledge of the solar sign is fairly widespread among the pre- 

sent population, it is inconceivable that the same applies for the signs in which 

Venus or Mars are to be found. 

Ascendant 

Several significances of the mean scores relating to the signs of the Ascen- 

dant have been demonstrated, indicating a partial linkage with sociability. 

However, in this respect, they diverge from the rules of astrology in which ten- 

dencies traditionally correspond to those of the solar signs.

3 12 S. Fuzeau-Braesch 

Angles 

According to the method adopted, only the Sun and Saturn in Midheaven 

and Pluto in the Ascendant correspond to a significantly higher-than-average 

sociability, while Neptune in the Ascendant produces an.extremely low score. 

The initial result concerning the Sun fully confirms traditional astrology, 

that of Saturn and Pluto is in conflict, while Neptune is not contradictory. 

It should be observed that the strong notions of classic astrology, such as the 

angular Jupiter linked to a profound sociability, do not appear here, while 

Uranus, always below the mean in our analysis - even though not to a signifi- 

cant extent - is very relevant to it. It can also be observed that our results, 

even the insignificant ones, seem to indicate a certain heterogeneity among the 

four angles (higher or lower than the mean) for the same element of the sky, 

which is not a traditional notion in astrology. 

One should mention here the findings of the very numerous analyses under- 

taken in France by the Gauquelins (Fuzeau-Braesch, 1996; see also Ertel & 

Irving, 1997 and Kurtz, Nienhuys & Sandhu, 1997 for contradictory view) 

showing a strong correspondence between professions (and related personality 

traits) and planets situated at the angles: Saturn for scientists, Jupiter for actors 

and politicians, Mars for sportsmen, Moon for painters and writers. However, 

these analyses are not similar to the present study on sociability, and cannot be 

legitimately compared. 

Aspects 

The traditional aspects of astrology, accurately described by Kepler, 

(Simon, 1979) are: 

conjunction : 0" (*lo0) 

semi-sextile : 30" 

sextile 60" 

semi-square : 45" 

square 90" 

trigon 120" 

sesqui-square : 135" 

quinconce 150" 

opposition 180" 

Astrological interpretation does not usually make a distinction between "di- 

rect" or positive angles and "indirect" or negative angles. Thus, a sextile or a 

trigon may be interpreted in an identical fashion on both sides of the conjunc- 

tion position of 0". 

It has been seen that only the planets Jupiter and Saturn form angles with the 

Sun that are significantly different. Jupiter is considered in astrology to be an 

element corresponding to a high degree of sociability, especially when it forms 

a conjunction, sextile or trigon with Sun. Figure 9, in fact, indicates that the 

angles 0 to 30°, in the positive and the negative sense, show a sociability

lo T 


SUN/JUPITER 

Fig. 9. Differences to the mean according to the angle in degrees (trigonometric, positive or di- 

rect sense (anti-clockwise) from 30 to 360°, formed by the Sun and Jupiter. Example: 

30 = mean of the scores of individuals having in their natal chart an angle from 0 to 30' 

between the Sun and Jupiter. 

higher than the mean, but also the angles 60 to 90" (square), and then to a large 

extent, the angles 180 to 240" (opposition and following positions). But a re- 

verse result has been noted for the angles 30 to 60°, and 120 to 150": the mean 

scores are very low, thus contradicting traditional astrology. 

The same applies to the angles formed by the Sun and Saturn. Unlike 

Jupiter, Saturn is traditionally considered to be a rather negative element in 

terms of sociability. Figure 10 shows that for angles 90 to 120'; then angles 

2 10 to 360°, that is to say, conjunction, sextile, trigon and quinconce in the 

negative sense, this is indeed the case. On the other hand, three sections can 

be detected in which the mean scores are higher than the average: from 0 to 

30°, from 60 to 90° and from 180 to 210"; this does not accord with traditional 

astrology. 

To conclude this kind of analysis, it would obviously be interesting to accu- 

mulate several elements, such as those which increase sociability (for exam- 

ple, for the sign Libra: the Sun with the addition of Venus, Mercury and Mars)


lo T 

SUNIS ATURN 

Fig. 10. Idem Figure 9, angle in degrees between the Sun and Saturn. 

or others which decrease it (for example, Libra once again: the Moon and the 

Ascendant) in the separate results described above. But the operation would 

be impossible here since the number of Ss replying to the accumulations taken 

into account for Libra is too small for a study of this kind (for instance, only 

two Ss have the Sun, Mercury and Mars in Libra in their natal chart). An ex- 

periment permitting this type of research would initially require several thou- 

sand tested students. 

Conclusions 

A certain number of results are in keeping with astrological data (Fuzeau- 

Braesch, 1996), particularly with respect to the zodiacal division, strongly 

confirmed in the case of the Sun, and also Mars. The sociability scores gener- 

ally alternate in the odd and even signs of the zodiac. 

Furthermore, an annual non-astrological evolution was disclosed by the 

COSINOR method, showing a significant sinusoid of sociability at its maxi- 

mum in LibraIOctober and at its minimum six months later. This is a new fact 

which should be interpreted, for example, by comparisons with different cli-


matic regions. This sinusoid (which has never been described as far as we 

know) helps to understand fully why the significant alternational hypothesis 

excludes the sign of Aries which has a particularly low level of sociability 

even though it is an odd sign. 

It is interesting to observe that the results of the mean sociability scores 

change when studied according to a division into months of the calendar year, 

in which case zodiacal alternations disappear completely. This can be seen as 

a justification of the so-called "tropic" zodiac, indicating that the 0" Aries cor- 

responds to the Vernal Equinox of astronomers and that the fundamentally 

seasonal signs used have nothing to do with the background of so-called 

"fixed" stars and, consequently, nothing to do either with the "precession of 

the equinoxes" phenomenon. 

On the other hand, it appears that the zodiacal signs of the Moon and Mer- 

cury are not related to sociability; that of Venus only moderately; but that of 

Mars to a great extent. This is not in conflict with astrological knowledge. 

As for the planets situated at the astrological angles (that is to say, the As- 

cendant and Descendant points of the horizon, the Midheaven and Nadir of the 

meridian line), the results diverge from astrological data since only the Sun 

seems to be linked to increased sociability, while Jupiter, which is considered 

to correspond closely to such an increase, does not appear in a significant man- 

ner here. 

Other data conflict with astrology; the latter definitely takes into account the 

zodiacal sign of the Ascendant in psychological interpretation, whereas only a 

few scattered links have been found here, sometimes even in contradiction 

with astrology, such as scores that are lower than the mean for Ascendants sit- 

uated in the signs of Leo or Sagittarius. 

A study of variations in sociability scores, according to the angles, from 0 to 

360°, formed between the Sun and different elements of the sky produces in- 

teresting results for the planets Jupiter and Saturn, both traditionally associat- 

ed with sociability. In both cases, a certain number of positions correspond 

closely to astrological data: increased sociability in the case of Jupiter and de- 

creased sociability in the case of Saturn, but only for certain angles or "as- 

pects"; others that have come to light show reverse tendencies. Of course, the 

comprehensive analysis required by traditional astrology calls for even finer 

and more synthetic notions which have not been tested in this study. This 

should be taken into account in the future. 

Finally, it would be appropriate to make a few comments on the personality 

test. A number of psychologists have refused to validate this type of method, 

arguing that the subjects can deliberately or unconsciously answer in an erro- 

neous manner, thus leading to significant biases. Yet it is known that this 

method continues to be used for practical purposes. Basically, it is difficult to 

believe that the subjects can succeed in "lying" deliberately to 630 questions, 

mainly about problems of everyday life which are often trivial. On the other 

hand, as far as the influence of the subconscious and the "image of oneself' are


concerned, the reply can be just as interesting and does not invalidate the 

method as a whole. Obviously, there are no perfect solutions, but we had a 

tool at our disposal which seemed worth testing. 

The detailed scores of the personality test and the birth dates of the 524 sub- 

jects are available for further research to anyone who is interested. 


The author wishes to thank the 524 students for their collaboration, F. San- 

toni, computer scientist, for his computerized translation of the psychological 

test, and P. Dicharry, computer scientist, who carried out all the computerized 

calculations of this study. 

References 

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62, 650. 

Angst, J. & Scheidegger, P. (1976). Tierkreiszeichen und personlichkeit. Sozial und Praventivmedizin, 

2 1, 39. 

Druzhinin, V. H. (1995). Personality and horoscope. Psikhologicheskii Zhurnal, 16,44. 

Ertel, S & Irving, K. (1997). Biased Data Selection in Mars Effect Research. Journal of Scientific 

Exploration, 1 1, 1. 

Eysenck, H. J. & Wilson, G. (1975). Know Your Own Personality. London: Penguin Books. 

Eysenck, H. J. & Nias, D. K. B. (1982). Astrology: Science or Superstition? New York: St. Martin's 

Press. 

Eysenck, H. J., Barrett, P., Wilson, G. and Jackson, C. (1992). Primary trait measurement of the 21 

Components of the P-E-N System. European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 8, 109 

Fourie, D. P. (1984). Self attribution theory and the sun sign. Journal of Social Psychology, 122, 

121. 

Fuzeau-Braesch, S. (1996). L'astrologie. Collection Que Sais-Je? Third edition, earlier edition 

1989. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 

Halberg, F,, Johnson, E. A., Nelson, W., Runge, W. and Sothern, R. (1972). Auto-rhythmometry 

procedures for physiologic self-measurements and their analysis. Physiology Teacher, 1, 1. 

Hume, N. & Goldstein, G. (1977). Is there an association between astrological data and personality? 

Journal of Clinical Psychology, 33,7 1 1. 

Kelly, I. W. & Sasklofske, D. H. (198 1). Alternative explanation in science: the extroversion - introversion 

astrological effect. The Skeptical Inquirer, 5,33. 

Kurtz, P., Nienhuys, J.W. & Sandhu, R. (1997). Is the "Mars EffectWGenuine?, Journal of Scientific 

Exploration, 1 I, 19. 

Mayo, J., White, D. and Eysenck, H. J. (1978). An empirical study of the relation between astrological 

factors and personality. Social Psychology, 105, 229. 

McGrew, J. H. & McFall, R. M. (1990). A scientific inquiry into the validity of astrology. Journal 

of Scientific Exploration, 4, 75. 

Pawlik, V. & Buse, L. (1979). Selbst attribuerung als differentiell-psychologische moderatorvariable. 

Zeitschrift.fur Sozial Psychologie, 10,54. 

Pellegrini, R. J. (1 973). The astrological "theory" of personality: an unbiased test by a biased observer. 

Journal of Psychology, 85,21. 

Ptolemy (1940). Terrabiblos, English translation. Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press. 

Russell, J. & Wagstaff, G. F. (1983). Extroversion, Neuroticism and the time and birth. British 

Journal of Social Psychology, 22,27. 

Simon, G. (1979). Kepler, Astronome Astrologue. Paris: Ed. Gallimard. 

Tyson, G. A. (1984). An empirical test of the astrological theory of personality. Personality and 

Individual DifSerences, 5,247. 

Van Rooij, J., Brak, M. A. and Commandeur, J. J. (1988). Extroversion-introversion astrological 

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Van Rooij, J. (1991). Paper Presented at the Skepsis Conference. Utrecht, the Netherlands.

Journal of ScientiJic Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 3, pp. 3 17-321, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Report of Referee on "Astrology and Sociability: A 

Comparative Analysis of the Results of a Psychological Test'' 

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, 402 N. Blackford St., 

LD 124, Indianapolis, IN 46202-3275 

I was the reviewer for Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch's paper. Because I continued to 

have reservations about the manuscript even after revision, I was asked to 

write a brief comment outlining my concerns. Before beginning, however, I 

would like to commend the author for her efforts. She has collected data on a 

point of great interest to the field, i.e., validity of astrological predictions of 

personality. Moreover, the sample size is large and adequate to test the ques- 

tion (a rarity), the sample used is appropriate for the question, and the calcula- 

tion of natal charts appears to be valid and well done. The issue for me, then, is 

neither with the research question nor with the data collection method, but 

with the analytic procedure used and the rules of evidence thus implied. 

Science has developed a set of rules for sifting evidence. Although not per- 

fect, the rules are public, consensual and provide some protection against 

making erroneous conclusions about the likelihood of the data for a given hy- 

pothesis. Two errors of primary concern are Type I error, erroneously conclud- 

ing that the data supports the hypothesis when it does not, and Type I1 error, er- 

roneously concluding that the data does not support the hypothesis when it 

does. In more lay terms, Type I error is gullibility concerning an effect and 

Type I1 error is blindness to an effect (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 199 1). Tradition- 

ally, science has been more concerned with the Type I error and has developed 

several techniques to guard against it. For example, researchers nearly univer- 

sally assign a stringent alpha level (e.g., p < .05) when performing statistical 

tests, as did Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch. However, a stringent alpha level is not suffi- 

cient to protect against Type I error. For example, running multiple tests can 

lead to compounded error rates, such that the experiment-wide error rate is no 

longer at the .05 level, but considerably higher. This is especially problematic 

when the "independent" tests are largely exploratory and do not test specific a 

priori hypotheses. Another common problem is to use the data in a post hoc 

fashion to guide decisions about the data analysis. As discussed below, all of 

these were problems for Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch's paper. 

Before reviewing specific examples of potential Type I error in the revised- 

manuscript, I would like to mention one overarching, but "hidden" problem, 

which developed during the revision process. The original manuscript exam- 

ined the relationship between elements of the natal chart and 21 different

318 J. McGrew 

personality traits, not just sociability. Out of 630 possible correlations exam- 

ined, however, only 25 were significant, less than the 31 expected by chance 

alone (at the .05 significance level). In the current manuscript Dr. Fuzeau- 

Braesch limited the analyses to one trait, sociability. However, the choice to 

limit to one trait was made post hoc, after the results of the earlier analyses 

were known. Because sociability was one of the very few traits to show any re- 

lationship to astrological characteristics in the original manuscript, it could be 

argued that Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch is capitalizing on chance, leading to Type I 

error. That is, if the choice of trait were to be made randomly from the original 

21 traits, the results likely would look very different, with fewer or no signifi- 

cant findings. 

With respect to the revised manuscript, I will mention two further examples 

where Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch appears to be capitalizing on chance, thereby plac- 

ing the obtained results into question. In the first instance, the author notes the 

systematic alternation of sociability scores below and above the group mean 

for the odd and even Sun signs, and constructs a t-test, which is significant, to 

test this. However, prior to testing for this alternation, she eliminated one of 

the twelve signs, AR (Aries), but with no a priori hypothesis about why she 

did this. The impression is that Aries didn't fit the pattern, and was eliminated 

so that the significant result could be obtained. Without a clear a priori hy- 

pothesis, this post hoc elimination capitalizes on chance and is an incorrect use 

of the statistic. 

A second example is in the procedure Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch uses to test for 

mean sociability differences across the 12 signs of the zodiac for each of the 

"planets" (e.g., sun, moon) and other natal characteristics (e.g., midheaven, 

ascendant). Assuming our interest is limited to comparisons between pairs of 

signs, given 12 signs, there are 66 possible pairwise combinations to test for 

each planet or natal characteristic. It would be both inefficient and highly 

prone to Type I error to test each of these possible 66 pairwise combinations 

individually for each characteristic. Two potential solutions to this problem 

are to identify specific sign pairs to test apriori (e.g., Aries vs. Cancer), i.e., to 

have specific hypotheses, or, in the absence of specific hypotheses, to use an 

omnibus test like the ANOVA prior to running any follow-up t-tests or post- 

hoc tests. This latter two-step procedure is used to protect against Type I error. 

The ANOVA tests the hypothesis that mean levels of sociability are equal 

across all 12 astrological signs for a given planet or natal characteristic. If the 

ANOVA is significant, then it is considered appropriate to try to discover 

which (pairs of) signs contributed to the finding that not all means were equal. 

If the ANOVA is not significant, then it is considered inappropriate to conduct 

follow-up tests. Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch, however, neither clearly identified spe- 

cific sign pairs to test a priori nor used the ANOVA as an omnibus "screen- 

ing" test prior to running further t-tests. In contrast, the author ran multiple t- 

tests to compare mean sociability levels for adjacent astrological signs, and 

did so even after the overall ANOVA test for a particular planet or natal char-

Report of Referee 319 

acteristic was found to be not significant (e.g., see Mercury, Venus, Mars, As- 

cendant, and Angles). If the ANOVA is not significant (which I am assuming it 

is not, because Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch noted it when it was), this means that there 

are no overall statistical (i.e., real) differences between any of the signs for that 

planet. To then test for differences between subsets of the signs (e.g., differ- 

ences between adjacent signs), without specific a priori hypotheses is capital- 

izing on chance and adds to Type I error. Moreover, in marked contrast to the 

preferred practice of specifying sign pairs a priori, Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch seems 

to imply that particular tests were run because the "graph is an invitation" to 

examine a particular relationship. That is, the author appears to have used 

post-hoc knowledge about the data to identify the sign pairs to be tested, which 

further adds to the Type I error. 

A general problem is in the exploratory nature of the study. Although the 

study purports to test astrological hypotheses, they are never specifically out- 

lined. I am unclear what the hypotheses were, other than a general belief that a 

person's sociability would vary as a function of astrological characteristics in 

"expected" ways. In a few places Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch notes where a result does 

or does not confirm a particular astrological prediction. However, there rarely 

is a precise test of a specific astrological hypothesis. In other words, the author 

simply has carried out a series of tests and noted when they were significant 

(i.e., an exploratory study), rather than limiting testing to examining specific 

questions. The latter approach is much preferred and tends to be less prone to 

Type I error. In contrast, however, the author has not applied the usual safe- 

guards of an exploratory study, which are to be very conservative in both cal- 

culating and interpreting findings. 

On a more positive note, I should mention that the COSINOR analyses are 

interesting and innovative. I am not familiar with this test but it appears to be a 

valid test of trend (in this case sinusoidal), and she appears to use it correctly. 

The findings concerning a sinusoidal pattern, then, and the ANOVA findings 

for the aspects (where the ANOVA was significant first) appear to be plausi- 

ble. Many of the other findings, however, are suspect due to possible capital- 

ization on chance in the data. I am somewhat uncomfortable playing the role 

of criticizer. Partly, this is because I am sympathetic to Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch's 

apparent motivations in her choice of analytic strategy. She seems to want to 

avoid ignoring potential findings based on some rigid, inappropriate rules that 

serve to hide rather than illuminate findings. That is, she is concerned with 

Type I1 error. This is a legitimate concern, although it is of less concern in this 

case, because the large sample provides adequate power to detect even small 

effects. However, we do not need to choose between Type I and Type I1 error. 

To ignore either one is to risk making false conclusions. Unfortunately, Dr. 

Fuzeau-Braesch, in her efforts not to be blind to possible effects (Type I1 error) 

has left herself open to being gullible (Type I error). Perhaps, a more accept- 

able alternate strategy might be to split her sample in half, document any sig- 

nificant effects in the first half and then see if they replicate in the second half.

320 J. McGrew 

This would allow Dr. Fuzeau-Braesch to freely explore significant effects in 

the first sample (lowering Type I1 error); replication in the second sample 

would control for Type I errors. 

References 

Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R L. (1991). Essentials of Behavioral Research: Methods and Data 

Analysis (2nd ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 

1. Choice of Method 

Reply to J. McGrew's Comments 

S. FUZEAU-BRAESCH 

Focusing on sociability alone in this paper does not "capitalize on chance" 

since the method used is totally different. I attributed subjective and arbitrary 

values to the astrological elements of each natal chart to search for eventual 

correlations with 21 psychological scores of 524 Ss. Obviously, out of the 630 

possibilities, very few were significant and the astrological significance was 

consequently very low. This is why I resorted to another method which was 

completely different, without attribution of arbitrary astrological values but 

based exclusively on direct objective scores, and without any subjective attri- 

butions. Thus, I had the option to study each item separately, and for this par- 

ticular paper, chose sociability. Naturally, I would like to treat the other items 

in this way but I would need to write not just a paper but an entire book. This 

method has turned out be to reliable but gives rise to many successive studies, 

as can be seen in my text. 

2. "Aries Problem" 

Dr. McGrew writes that "without a clear a priori hypothesis (of elimination 

of Aries in the alternation hypothesis), this post hoe elimination capitalizes on 

chance and is an incorrect use of the statistic. I do not capitalize on chance be- 

cause: 

(a) I have stated objectively that the hypothesis of alternation is significant 

in the case of eleven signs, without Aries, in the exploratory part of the study. 

(b) The COSINOR study that follows shows Aries to be situated at the mini- 

mum of a non-astrological sinusoid discovered through an analysis of the an- 

nual evolution of scores. 

(c) In the discussion, I interpreted these results several times, in particular, 

when I mentioned that "the significant alternations are modulated by a re-

Reply to McGrew 32 1 

paradoxocially low mean of the Aries sign." The same applies in the conclu- 

sion. 

3. General Spirit of the Study 

This study aims to be fundamentally exploratory and is as objective as pos- 

sible, a policy I have adopted for most of my 150 previous publications on bio- 

logical topics. This is why I eliminated an investigation of all the laws of spe- 

cific astrological hypothesis and reviewed instead, some of the principal 

astrological rules: planets in signs, ascendants, angles and aspects between 

two elements of the sky (sun and planets). In order to do so, the variance 

analyses seemed to be the most appropriate for the purposes of this strategy. 

More complete research work could, of course, be undertaken but this would 

go beyond the scope of a simple and preliminary article.

Journal of ScientiJic Exploration, Vol. I 1, No. 3, pp. 323-335, 1997 0892-33 10197 


A Psychological Comparison Between Ordinary Children and 

Those Who Claim Previous-Life Memories 

ERLENDUR HARALDSSON 

Faculty of Social Science, University of Iceland, 101 Reykjavik, Iceland 

Abstract - It has been proposed that some normal-psychological factors 

may explain why some children speak of having had a previous life. Some of 

these and other psychological factors, which may further our understanding 

of children claiming prcvious-life memories, =ere ihe siibjeci of this siudy. 

Psychological tests were administered to 30 children in Sri Lanka, aged 7 to 

13, who at an earlier age had claimed to remember a previous life, and a con- 

trol group of equal size. Children claiming previous-life memories show a 

higher level of cognitive functioning; perform much better in school, have a 

larger vocabulary, obtain higher scores on the Raven Progressive Matrices 

(brief test of intelligence), have better memory, and are not more suggestible 

than their peers. As a group they are gifted children. Parents found them to 

argue a lot, prefer being alone, be more nervous and stubborn than their peers, 

more perfectionistic, and more concerned about cleanliness. Teachers found 

them excellent to be pupils. As research continues the alleged memories of 

these children are found to be only one part of a pattern of characteristics that 

so far seem to defy a normal explanation. 

Keywords: reincarnation - children - traits - abilities 

Introduction 

Investigations of cases of the reincarnation type (CORTs) have primarily been 

concerned with their verification: Do the statements reported by the children 

about a previous life correspond to verifiable events in the life of some de- 

ceased person? There is another potential research approach to these cases, 

which has until now been given only slight attention. It is concerned with the 

psychological aspect of the children. Does the psychological make-up of chil- 

dren speaking of previous-life memories contribute to an explanation of their 

claims? Do these children differ psychologically from children in general? 

In critical discussions of child cases of alleged memories of a previous life, 

it has been argued that some normal psychological or socio-psychological fac- 

tors may lead a child to make claims of previous-life memories. For example, 

in a review of Stevenson's Cases of the Reincarnation Type, Vol. 11, Ten Cases 

in Sri Lanka (1977a), Brody (1979) proposed some potential factors: a rich 

fantasy life, a need to compensate for social isolation, high suggestibility (in 

cultures where belief in reincarnation plays a major role), dissociative tenden- 

cies, attention seeking, and disturbed relations with parents which may cause

324 E. Haraldsson 

the child to claim that it belongs somewhere else. Twenty years ago Stevenson 

(1977a) pointed out that subjects of these cases who claimed a life in a socio- 

economic class different from that of their families seemed to remember a life 

in a higher class more often than one in a lower class. This could support a hy- 

pothesis of "escapist fantasies", but it is also open to other interpretations. 

The aim of this paper is to test some of these normal psychological hypotheses. 

There are also claims concerning the psychological characteristics of 

CORTs that come not from thoughtful critics but from those who live with the 

young children and know them best. For example, it is sometimes reported to 

investigators that CORTs are more mature than other children, or that their 

command over their mother tongue is extraordinary in that they speak more 

like grown-ups than children. These claims have not yet been formally tested. 

In 1973, I. Stevenson, L. P. Mehrotra, and the author started a psychological 

study of children in India claiming previous life memories, but this study came 

to an abrupt end when one of us met with a seribus traffic accident in India. 

The main concern of the present study is the cognitive development of chil- 

dren who claim to remember a previous life, and the question of whether they 

differ from other children on some of the above-mentioned psychological fac- 

tors, which may dispose children to make claims about a previous life. Do the 

abilities and personalities of children reporting previous-life memories differ 

significantly from children in general? Do they show a greater tendency to 

confabulate than other children? Are they more suggestible? Do they tend to 

live in social isolation? Are there indications of a greater tendency for disso- 

ciative processes in them than in other children? 

In the present study a group of Sri Lankan children reporting previous-life 

memories and an equal number of control children were administered a battery 

of psychological tests, and their parents and teachers were interviewed and 

given questionnaires about their behavior; their school records were also ob- 

tained. 

During the last eight years I have investigated over forty new cases in Sri 

Lanka, which is one of the countries where some CORTs can be found each 

year (Stevenson, 1977a). In a few of these cases the child's statements fit 

facts in the life of some person who lived before the child was born (Haralds- 

son, 1991; Mills, Haraldsson and Keil, 1994). In other cases - and they are 

more common in Sri Lanka than in most other countries - no person was 

found whose life corresponded to the child's statements (see also Cook et al., 

1983a, 1983b). In some of these "unsolved" cases, some of the statements 

were detailed enough to be verifiable or falsifiable, and they were found to be 

false. 

Most children with active previous-life memories are aged 3 to 5 years, and 

few objective psychological tests exist to assess the above-mentioned factors 

in children so young. A further complication is that these children are rare and 

difficult to find; but a meaningful comparison of them with other children re- 

quires a sample of adequate size. Therefore, in order to obtain a sufficiently

Psychological Comparison Between Children 325 

large sample for this study, all available subjects up to age 13 had to be includ- 

ed. Since some of the tests could not be used with children younger than 7, the 

children in our sample ranged in age from 7 to 13 years. At this age most of the 

children had stopped talking about their previous-life memories but all of 

them had at an earlier age consistently talked about these memories over some 

period of time. 

Part of the data of this study was presented in a paper published in the Jour- 

nal of Nervous and Mental Disease (Haraldsson, 1995). This paper presents 

an extended sample, and contains almost no missing data. 

Subjects 

Method 

The subjects were 30 children in Sri Lanka who had reported memories of a 

previous life. There were 12 boys and 18 girls, who ranged in age from 7 years 

and 1 month to 13 years and 2 months. A control group consisted of 30 chil- 

dren of the same age, the same sex, and from the same neighborhood, who had 

not spoken of a previous life. The mean age for children with memories was 9 

years and 4.7 months, and it was 9 years and 4.1 months for the control group 

(t = 1.08, n = 60, n.s.). The children were from a large area of south and central 

Sri Lanka and were about equally located in towns and in rural areas. Of the 30 

cases involving claimed previous-life memories, 22 had previously been in- 

vestigated by the author, and detailed reports had been published on five of 

them (Haraldsson, 1991; Mills et al., 1994). Eight cases had been investigated 

by Stevenson and his associates, but no report has been published on them. 

Psychological Tests 

The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test - Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) 

consists of a list of 175 words arranged in order of increasing difficulty. As 

each item is read to the child, the child is shown four black-and-white illustra- 

tions on a page and asked to select the picture that best illustrates the meaning 

of the orally presented stimulus word. The test was translated into Sinhalese 

by P. Vimala. It was administered without being standardized for Sinhalese 

children. Instead, a control group was used for comparison. 

The Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, and Raven, 1976, 1984) 

is described as "a test of clear thinking and observation". It tests the capacity 

to reason by analogy (Raven, 1963) and is frequently used as a brief test of in- 

tellectual efficiency. It was designed for use with young children and anthro- 

pological studies with people who do not understand the English language. 

The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS) (Gudjonsson, 1984, 1987) was 

developed "to assess the individual's responses to 'leading questions' and 

'negative feedback' instructions when being asked to report a factual event


from recall" (Gudjonsson, 1992). A short fictitious story is read to the subject, 

after which helshe is asked to relate what is remembered of the story. Then the 

subject is asked 20 questions about the content of the story, 15 of which are 

suggestive in some way. Finally, the subject is firmly told that helshe has 

made a number of errors, and that it is therefore necessary to go through the 

questions once more. 

The GSS measures: 1) Free Recall (the number of items remembered from 

the story); 2) Confabulations (the number of items offered under free recall 

that are not found in the story); 3) Yield Suggestibility (the number of items 

yielded to before negative feedback is given); 4) Shift Suggestibility (a distinct 

change in the nature of the reply to the 15 suggestible and 5 non-suggestible 

questions; 5) Total Suggestibility (the sum of Yield and Shift). There are two 

forms of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, the story of Form 2 being more 

appropriate for children (Gudjonsson, 1987; Danielsdottir et al., 1993). The 

test was translated into Sinhalese and adapted for Sri Lankan children by two 

Sri Lankan psychologists (Shanez Fernando and P. Vimala). 

Child Behavior Checklist - Parent's Form (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 

1983) is designed to record competencies and behavioral problems of children 

aged 4 to 16, It also surveys social competence and school performance and 

reveals the kind and number of a broad range of problems (1 18 items) that 

children may have. It was administered by P. Vimala to the mother of the child 

or to another close relative. The CBCL was translated into Sinhalese by P. Vi- 

mala, and hand-scored. Our testing sessions were quite long, and at the sug- 

gestion of P. Vimala, we decided not to ask about items I11 (social compe- 

tence), IV (social activity), and four additional items (no. 59, 60, 73, 96) 

concerning sexual problems. 

Child Behavior Checklist - Teacher's Form (Achenbach & Edelbrock, 

1986) was administered to one of the teachers of each child. The CBCL-T is 

designed to obtain teachers' reports of their pupils' problems, adaptive func- 

tioning, and school performance. Most of the items are the same as in the Par- 

ent's Form. School performance figures (grades for test results) were obtained 

directly from school principals or from the children's school-performance 

books. 

Statistical Methods 

The data for this matched sample of subjects and control children were ana- 

lyzed by the paired-samples t-test and the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed- 

ranks test. The comparisons between "solved" and "unsolved" cases in Table 

4 are analyzed by the two-sample t-test.

Procedure 


Each subject was visited unannounced at his or her home or school by the 

author, an interpreter, and a Sri Lankan psychologist. Some member of our 

team had in most cases previously interviewed the child and his or her parents 

about the case. Teachers helped us find a control child in the same class as the 

subject whose birthday was closest to that of the subject. If the subject was at 

home, we searched for a control child from the neighborhood, who was as 

close in age to the subject as possible. We expressed our appreciation by gifts 

of sweets and ball-point pens to these and to other children of the house, par- 

ticularly after the session was over. All the families were cooperative and 

helpful. The CBCL - Teacher's Form was administered almost a year and a 

half later than the other tests/questionnaires to the teachers of 22 of the 30 

pairs. 

Results 

Children claiming previous-life memories were found to differ in several re- 

spects from other children, as can be seen in Table 1. A pair-wise comparison 

of them with the group of control children revealed that their performance on 

the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) was much higher (t = 5.38, n = 

60, p < .0001, all tests two-tailed), which indicates that they had a substantial- 

ly greater knowledge of words and a better understanding of language. This 

finding is strengthened by their higher average school grades for Sinhalese 

(their mother tongue) of 69.68, compared to 52.83 for the control group (t = 

4.54, n = 60, p < .001). 

The results of the Raven's Progressive Matrices are also significantly higher 

for children claiming previous-life memories (t = 3.23, n= 60, p

Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 

Memory 11.27 f 4.72 

Confabulations 3.10f2.17 

Conf., % of total resp. 23.00 f 16.50 

Yield suggestibility 6.67 f 2.93 

Shift suggestibility 4.43 f 3.34 

Total suggestibility 11.610 f 4.53 

Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 

117.67 f 27.64 

Raven Coloured Progressive Matrices 

23.80 f 5.97 

Child Behavior Checklist - Parent's Form 

Social activities 4.86 f 2.16 

Social competence 8.38 f 1.64 

School perfomance 2.78 f 0.36 

Problem score 41.33 f 18.83 

E. Haraldsson 

TABLE 1 

Various Psychological Measures' 

Child Behavior Checklist - Teacher's ~ orm~ 

Working hard 4.64 f 1.25 

Behaving 5.07 f 1.22 

Learning 4.70k 1.14 

Happy 4.44 f 1.22 

Total Adaptive 4.82 f 1.04 

Problem Score 26.29 f 20.49 

Subjects Controls Paired 

(n= 30) (n= 30) t-test 

This table shows the means and standard deviations of various psychological measures and re- 

sults of t-test for paired samples comparing 30 children claiming previous-life memories and 30 

control children. 

*pc.05; **p

Rank in class percentile 

Average school marks 

Sinhalese 

Religion 

Mathematics 

Social Science 

English 

Science 

Art 

Health 

Music 


TABLE 2 

Means, Standard Deviations and Results of Paired Samples' 

Subjects Controls Paired 

(n= 30) (n= 30) t-test 

*p

1 330 E. Haraldsson 

Argues a lot 

Nervous, high-strung or tense 

Feels helshe has to be perfect 

Likes to be alone 

Withdrawn, does not get involved with others 

Confused or seems to be in a fog 

Too concerned with neatness or cleanliness 

Poor schoolwork 

Talks too much 

Too fearful or anxious 

Gets teased a lot 

Talks or walks in sleep 2 

Threatens people 

Self-conscious or easily embarrassed 

Stubborn, sullen or irritable 

Relused to talk 

Feelslcomplains that no one loves himlher 

Stores up things helshe does not need 

Daydreams or gets lost in thoughts 

Nervous movements or twitching 

Fears might do something bad 

~ Unhappy, sad, or depressed 

Disobedient at school 

Doesn't get along with other children 

Impulsive, acts without thinking 

Difficulty following directions 

Explosive and unpredictable behavior 

TABLE 3 

Individual Items of the Child Behavior checklist' 

Parent's Form 

3.3 1 ** 

3.18"" 

3.08*** 

2.92** 

2.80** 

2.80"" 

2.74** 

-2.72"" 

2.53** 

2.49"" 

2.45** 

2.40" 

2.36** 

2.28* 

2.28* 

2.20* 

2.13* 

2.03* 

2.02* 

2.02" 

1.43 

1.96* 

1 .oo 

0.3 1 

1.57 

0.34 

1.24 

Teacher's Form 

0.98 

0.98 

2.5 1 * 

2.3 1 * 

2.02* 

0.77 

1.19 

-1.96 

0.7 1 

1.43 

0.45 

*p

Psychological Comparison Between Children 33 1 

The children of this study all reported memories of a previous life during the 

typical age range of around 3 to 5 years. When they were given psychological 

tests at the ages of 7 to 13, they were found to differ in many respects from 

other children. They were different both in cognitive development and in be- 

havior. Their greater verbal skills were particularly distinctive. They had a 

larger vocabulary and a greater command of language than their matched 

peers. They performed excellently at school. The evidence for this comes both 

from their grades and their teachers, who found them to work harder, learn 

more readily, and behave better than other children. Children claiming memo- 

ries of a previous life tend more than other children to think they must be per- 

fect; such perfectionism could well contribute to their excellent performance 

in school. 

These findings were somewhat unexpected and away from earlier conjec- 

tures about what would predispose a child to claim memories of a previous life. 

One of these suggests that the children are unusually prone to fantasies. The 

present study included no entirely satisfactory measure of this trait; neverthe- 

less, the number of items added during free recall of the story given in the 

Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale provided an indication of confabulation. The 

children who claimed past-life memories had a slightly lower score on this 

measure, although the difference was not statistically significant. We must 

note, however, that children who have a tendency to fantasize and who also 

have good memories and reasoning powers may not add details to a verbal test 

of memory. 

One subsidiary finding relevant to the question of suggestibility deserves 

noting. Our sample included 16 children whose cases are "unsolved", which 

means that no person has identified the events of whose life corresponded to 

the child's statements; in the other 14 cases such a person was identified and 

their cases are considered "solved". The total suggestibility scores of the 

solved cases were significantly lower than the scores for the unsolved cases 

(t= 2.27, n= 30, p= .03). See details in Table 4. 

This finding indicates that children who make verified statements about a 

previous life are less suggestible than other children, who may be narrating 

fantasies. The latter group of children are about as suggestible as children in 

TABLE 4 

Suggestibility ~easurements' 

Controls Unsolved Cases Solved Cases Difference Solved-Unsolved 

(n= 30) (n= 16) (n= 14) (t-test) 

Yield suggestibility 7.43 7.87 5.29 2.65"" 

Shift suggestibility 5.68 4.87 3.93 0.77 

Total suggestibility 13.1 1 12.75 9.2 1 2.27* 

*p


general. Cook et al. (1983a; 1983b) have already shown that these two groups 

- of solved and unsolved cases - have other important differences. It follows 

that we should distinguish the two groups of cases in future studies. Such fu- 

ture studies should, however, investigate larger samples. 

The role of suggestion has especially been favored by persons who point out 

that the cultures in which these cases are most readily found have strong beliefs 

in reincarnation. Those who put forward this undoubted fact as a sufficient ex- 

planation of the cases overlook the evidence that parents often try to suppress 

the children and that the children for their part may vehemently oppose at- 

tempts at suppression. A good example of a child's persistence against 

parental opposition occurred in the case of Dilupa Nanayakkara, whose 

Roman Catholic parents tried to suppress her talk of a previous life (Haralds- 

son, 1991). Stevenson and Chadha (1990) and Mills (1989) have also some- 

times observed how these children (in India) withstand considerable pressure 

from their parents to stop talking about their apparent memories. Some of the 

children are scolded and a few even beaten for talking about a previous life. 

Many of them tell their mothers that they are not their real mothers, something 

the mothers do not like to hear and that often makes them afraid they may lose 

the child. It must, however, be added that in many cases the children's claims 

receive support and even encouragement from the parents, especially in solved 

cases. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that the solved cases at least can be at- 

tributed solely to suggestions from the cultures in which they occur. 

Social isolation is another factor that might contribute causally to a child's 

claiming to remember a previous life. The data of the present study do not indi- 

cate this clearly. On the one hand, the parents of the children claiming past-life 

memories do not rate them as less active or less competent socially than their 

peers. Their teachers, moreover, report that they are higher than their peers in 

adaptive functioning, which does not indicate that they are socially isolated. 

On the other hand, these children do like to be alone more than other children 

and they are often withdrawn. Other children sometimes tease them (probably 

often about their claimed memories) and this may stimulate them to withdraw. 

They seem to live under a considerable emotional strain. They are also, how- 

ever, argumentative, stubborn, and garrulous; these are characteristics that, on 

balance, hardly indicate social isolation. It is also pertinent to note that only 5 

of the 30 children had no brother or sister; on average the children had two or 

three siblings and therefore could not have had a socially isolating environ- 

ment. The hypothesis that children who live in social isolation are more likely 

to claim memories of a previous life does not seem to be supported by this 

study. 

As already mentioned, the children claiming past-life memories show "op- 

positional" characteristics: they are argumentative, stubborn, excessively talk- 

ative, and sometimes combative and threatening toward other persons. They 

score high on the parents' ratings for the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL). It 

is difficult to know how to interpret such behavior, especially since the chil-


dren seem in other respects more mature than other children. Is the abnormal 

behavior the result of antagonisms they have brought on themselves by their 

claims to remember a previous life - claims that are often uncongenial to 

their parents? Also, could their preference for being alone derive from a wish 

to think quietly about their memories? Or do they feel different and estranged 

from other persons because they have memories of a previous life and the oth- 

ers do not? We must be cautious in interpreting these differences. 

What conclusions may be drawn from this study? Brody's (1979) hypothe- 

ses of social isolation and high suggestibility as possible causative factors for 

the reporting of memories of a previous life in young children were not con- 

firmed in the present study. The same is true for a rich fantasy life as far as it is 

tested by a tendency to confabulate. We can say that so far as they have been 

tested, the normal psychological hypotheses have not been found adequate to 

explain why some children claim to remember a previous life. It is still possi- 

ble that unusual tendencies to dissociation may cause children to talk about a 

previous life; this hypothesis will be tested in a further study. 

It clearly emerges from this study that children reporting previous-life mem- 

ories are a group of unusually gifted children. Experts on gifted and talented 

children often speak of "giftedness" to describe such children (Heller, Monks 

& Passow, 1993). Furthermore, an expert on gifted children has made the 

comment that the pattern of the problem items of the children who claim to re- 

member previous lives in this study is similar to that encountered with children 

of high ability (F. J. Monks, personal communication). 

This brings us to the question of why children in this study who claim past- 

life memories show such a high level of cognitive development compared to 

ordinary children. Are children of high ability more likely than other children 

to create stories of a previous life, or, are children who remember a previous 

life more gifted? 

The fact that a few of the cases investigated by the author (Haraldsson, 

1991; Mills, Haraldsson & Keil, 1994) give rather striking evidence of para- 

normally acquired knowledge or memories of past events which the child is not 

found to have experienced in its life span, does not indicate that all these chil- 

dren are telling stories of fantasies. It is also the impression of Keil (1991), 

Mills (1989) and Pasricha (1990) for some of their cases, and, of course, of 

Stevenson, that some paranormality is involved. It is hence more likely that 

the giftedness of children who claim to remember past lives is one of a pattern 

of characteristics found in these children, rather than that gifted children are 

more likely than other children to imagine stories of a previous life. 

Of course, our finding of giftedness needs a replication in another country 

before we can say that giftedness is a general characteristic of children who 

claim to remember past lives. If giftedness is found to be a general characteris- 

tic of the cases, and informal impressions make it seem rather likely, we have 

found one more characteristic of children who claim to remember previous


behavior patterns unusual or not found in the child's environment), birthmarks 

and deformities, we find in a fair number of cases no easy normal explanation. 

Furthermore, Stevenson (1987) has reported that some children reveal un- 

taught or unlearned skills, some of which may require a paranormal interpreta- 

tion. 

These above mentioned characteristics fall increasingly into a pattern which 

must be viewed as a whole. The alleged memories have gradually become only 

one part of the phenomena that defy any easy normal explanation, and hence 

make these characteristics open to a paranormal interpretation. All of those 

(Keil, Mills, Pasricha and the present author) who in recent years have made a 

consistent effort to independently investigate these cases, have come to the 

conclusion that some of them do require a paranormal interpretation. 

The crucial and most difficult question is, which paranormal interpretation? 

Mills and Pasricha have tended to support the reincarnation hypothesis, 

whereas Keil has argued that the hypothesis of extrasensory perception (super- 

psi) can sufficiently explain the phenomena (Keil deals mostly with claimed 

memories). I have remained silent on this issue. I wanted to wait until I had 

personally gathered more data on which to base my evaluation. 

This area of research has many uncertainties and potential pitfalls which 

make solid data often difficult to obtain. After investigating more than 50 

cases in Sri Lanka during a period of eight years, I have gradually found my- 

self increasingly critical of the super-psi hypothesis. It may suffice to explain 

the claimed memories, but I find it unconvincing (intuitively I must admit) as 

an explanation of deep-seated phobias and perplexing behavior patterns, not to 

mention birthmarks and malformations, for which, I must add, I have so far 

found rather little evidence in Sri Lanka. Birthmarks and malformations must 

begin to form during the development of the embryo and long before the child 

is born, which makes the super-psi hypothesis look even less satisfactory. 

It may be premature to ask the question, but, tentatively accepting the rein- 

carnation hypothesis, is the early maturity and giftedness of these children also 

something that they, in some form or sense, bring with them into their child- 

hood in the same way as some of their other characteristics? 


A grant from the Institut fiir Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohy- 

giene in Freiburg is gratefully acknowledged. Many thanks are due to P. Vi- 

mala for administering most of the psychological tests, to Hector Samararatne, 

Godwin Samararatne and Tissa Jayawardane for acting as interpreters and for 

locating new cases, and to Patrick Fowler for thoughtful comments. 

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Journal of Scientijc Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 337-343, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Did Life Originate in Space? A Discussion of the Implications 

of Recent Research 

Oldham Education Authority, Center for Professional Development, Rosary Rd, 

Fitton Hill, Oldham, OLA 2QE, United Kingdom 

Abstract - At the time of writing the alleged Martian microfossils remain 

the subject of much debate. If their validity is accepted their existence great- 

ly strengthens the view of the origin and evolution of life proposed by many 

theorists within the study of complex systems theory. The implications of the 

complexity theory for the extraterrestrial hypothesis of the origin of life pro- 

posed by Hoyle and Wickramasinghe is discussed, together with other lines 

of evidence for this hypothesis, in the light of the morphological evidence 

from the alleged Martian microfossils. 

Keywords: evolution of life - extraterrestrial hypothesis - interstellar 

molecules 

Introduction 

The evidence for, or against the alleged Martian microfossils is complex 

(McKay et al., 1996). The sulfide crystals originally included with other evi- 

dence for biological origins of the objects within the meteorite no longer ap- 

pear to be biological in origin. Other aspects of the evidence, however, appear 

compelling. In particular the carbon isotope ratio within the carbonate de- 

posits is consistent with biological activity. Some misleading press reports 

concerning oxygen isotope studies, which determine temperature ranges for 

the formation of the carbonate, have circulated, suggesting they preclude a bi- 

ological origin. This is not the case. Two initial studies were contradictory, 

giving temperature ranges of 0-80 "C and >450 "C. A more thorough examina- 

tion of the oxygen isotope ratios has subsequently given a temperature range 

of 40-250 "C. While the upper extreme of this possible range is uncomfortably 

high, it does not exceed the highest tolerance recorded for therrnophilic bacte- 

ria, which is 305 "C (Hoyle, 1983). The carbonate has the appearance of a 

freshwater mineral deposit (McKay et al., 1996). The apparent temperature 

range certainly does not disprove the biological origin of the microfossils, al- 

though it does largely remove the possibility that the carbonate may have been 

a terrestrial contaminant from Antarctica. In addition, supraglacial melt water 

is usually very pure in terms of calcium carbonate or magnesium carbonate 

(Collins, 1979) and is typically oxidizing (Mugan, 1997) while the mineral

composition of the carbonate globules in ALH84001 includes reduced sul- 

phide minerals. More recently Pillinger, Wright and Grady reported at a con- 

ference of the Royal Society in London that carbon isotope ratios consistent 

with biological activity had been found in another Martian meteorite. The 

simple existence of the microfossils has profound implications, which will be 

considered below. However, one further point needs to be mentioned. The mi- 

crofossils have a noticeable morphological similarity with the alleged micro- 

organisms discovered by Folk (Folk, 1993; see also McBride et. al., 1994), 

which were found on ground-water-deposited calcite concretions, limestone 

and travertine. The biological nature of these latter alleged micro-organisms is 

still a matter of controversy, due to their small size and the fact that they have 

yet to be cultured. However, in a recent letter to Science, Folk (1996) refers to 

a paper in preparation concerning the successful culturing of nannobacteria. 

Should the validity of both sets of fossils become accepted, some interesting 

questions concerning the origin and evolution of life and its universality, 

which have already been raised by developments in complexity theory, will 

become unavoidable. 

Complexity and the Origin of Life 

It has often been suggested (Zuckerman & Hart, 1995 and references there- 

in; Hoyle & Wickramasinghe, 1993) that life is an extremely improbable 

event. This view is based upon information theory, in which the probability of 

a simple micro-organism forming by chance is viewed as the probability of the 

random arrangement of its constituent molecules producing a viable organism. 

In this view, the probability of life forming at any time or place in the history 

of the universe is extremely remote. The fact that life has not only appeared, 

here on Earth, but that it appeared very early in the history of our planet, by 3.5 

billion years ago at the latest, and probably by 3.85 billion years ago, was a 

significant difficulty for this point of view. This difficulty, combined with the 

paleontological evidence for punctuated evolution, led Hoyle and Wickramas- 

inghe (1978, 1993) to propose that as the molecular constituents of life are 

present within molecular clouds, and therefore presumably in comets, life 

could have originated in one of the billions of comets that exist in the galaxy 

that may have had liquid cores ( in the case of larger comets) for up to 100 mil- 

lion years after their formation (Hoyle & Wickramasinghe, 1993). 

The development of the complex systems theory (Bak & Kan, 199 1 ; Kauff- 

man 1993a, b, and references therein) has largely removed the apparent diffi- 

culty posed by information theory to the origin of life. The phenomena known 

as autocatalytic sets provide the key to this hypothesis. In a relatively small 

collection of molecules the probability that any one molecule will catalyze the 

reactions of any others is relatively small. As the number of molecular species 

in a system (its complexity) increases, the number of possible interactions will 

increase. The rate of increase has been shown to be exponential so that as the

Did Life Originate in Space? 

lar species (nodes) increases. It has been shown that as the ratio of edges to 

nodes in a system passes 0.5, the system tends to rapidly develop large inter- 

connected webs of reactions, in a state known as autocatalytic closure. It has 

been suggested that a complex collection of organic molecules confined in 

space within, for example, a bilipid layer or a thermal protenoid, both of which 

tend to form naturally under certain conditions, may become an autocatalytic 

set. Such sets have been shown to possess the characteristics of simple organ- 

isms, including reproduction and evolution (Kauffman, 1993a). Mathematical 

simulations of organisms produced in this fashion are generally robust to ran- 

dom mutations (Kauffman, 1993b), due to the existence of attractor states, sta- 

ble states towards which many initial configurations rapidly converge. Evolu- 

tion in this framework is seen as the result of occasional mutations, which 

induce a pattern of chaotic disturbance within the system. Most such distur- 

bances return to the original attractor, while occasionally the system returns to 

a different attractor in a "species jump", as is often observed in the fossil 

record. 

Once formed, an autocatalytic set is subject to a form of chemical natural se- 

lection so that over time, primitive autocatalytic sets evolve towards forms 

that are better able to sustain themselves. Those that succeed in becoming "fit- 

ter", are likely to become more numerous. Computer simulations (Kauffman, 

1993b) have shown that autocatalytic sets can evolve the power to reproduce. 

Autocatalytic sets that evolve towards less competitive attractor states will 

tend to be driven to "extinction" by those that are more competitive in the 

competition for resources, giving a possible hint of why organisms are de- 

scended from a single basic form of genetic material. Significant variations 

upon the basic genetic code (i.e. species) are more probably attracted to nearby 

peaks on a rugged fitness landscape (Kauffman, 1993b), which form an area of 

generally high fitness (less fit variations, on more distant, lower fitness peaks, 

do not survive), again encouraging a broad similarity in the genetic structures 

between different species. 

Many of the above ideas are tentative, but considerable quantities of en- 

couraging data from computer simulations are now available. A prediction of 

complexity theory is that there should be a limited number of basic morpholo- 

gies within the plant and animal kingdoms, represented by the various phyla, 

corresponding to the main attractor states in the phase space of the gene pool 

(Goodwin, 1994). It is interesting that at the Cambrian "explosion", at which a 

great diversification of life occurred very abruptly, a large range of new phyla 

came into existence very quickly (Gould 1989). Some of these have since be- 

come extinct, but no new phyla have emerged. The rapid appearance of life on 

Earth, (and, it now appears - Mars), combined with the paleontological evi- 

dence is strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that life is a natural and pre- 

dictable outcome of physical processes in environments like the early Earth 

and Mars. In the words of Kauffman (1993b), "We are at home in the uni- 

verse." Life should appear in virtually any suitable environment, given a

comparatively short period of time, on the order of a few million to 100 mil- 

lion years. Life would appear to be a universal phenomena. 

The Implications of Complexity 

As Hoyle and Wickramasinghe (1 978, 1993) have pointed out, complex or- 

ganic molecules are present in space ( Hoyle, 1983; Hoyle, Wickramasinghe 

and Watkins, 1985). Many amino acids have now been detected in carbona- 

ceous chondrites, a form of meteorite. (Mason, 1990, and references therein). 

It is generally accepted that the early Earth had been seeded by complex or- 

ganic molecules which had greatly accelerated the process of prebiotic chemi- 

cal evolution (Ponnamperuma dr. Novarro-Gonzalez, 1995). Such complex or- 

ganic molecules must have been incorporated into comets, and indeed organic 

material has been detected in the tails of comets (Mason, 1990; Hoyle & 

Wickramasinghe, 1993). It appears plausible from the chemical constituents of 

chondrules within some meteorites that a supernova explosion occurred near 

the proto solar system (Mason, 1990). The incorporation of radioactive ele- 

ments, perhaps most importantly aluminum 26, together with exothermic 

chemical reactions, could have kept the cores of some comets liquid for up to 

around 100 million years. It is generally thought that only larger comets would 

have the structural integrity to maintain a solid crust over a liquid core, al- 

though much remains to be learned about the actual structure of comets in the 

light of recent observations (Hoyle & Wickramasinghe, 1993). With an esti- 

mated 100 billion comets in the Oort cloud, and a probable interchange of 

comets between solar systems, the potential number of Darwinian "warm little 

ponds" is considerable. It is difficult to see why the evolution of life within a 

comet is prohibited by the known laws of chemistry or physics. The implica- 

tion of complexity theory is that life should have evolved in comets, and in- 

deed within many of them as well as at many times and places within the uni- 

verse. 

This astonishing hypothesis, that life originated in space and seeded the 

early Earth (and any other suitable habitat) must be thoroughly tested before it 

can be considered plausible. Fortunately many tests are possible. Hoyle and 

Wickramasinghe (1978) initially developed the hypothesis in order to explain 

the pattern of absorption found in the spectra of interstellar clouds. The combi- 

nation of molecules found in bacteria, together with the optical properties of 

dehydrated bacteria, mixed with small quantities of other, plausible materials 

such as silica, carbon and ice, produces an extremely close match with the ob- 

served spectra. Perhaps most fundamentally, if bacteria are hypothesized to 

have originated in space, they should possess evolutionary adaptations to it, 

for which there would be no explanation if they originated on Earth. When the 

camera unit on the lunar probe Surveyor 3 was returned to Earth in quarantine 

conditions by Apollo 12, it was found to contain live bacteria that had survived 

two years in deep space conditions (Hoyle, 1983). Micro-organisms are 

known to posses high, though variable tolerance of radiation, extremes of tem-

Did Life Originate in Space? 34 1 

perature, dehydration and exposure to vacuum (Hoyle & Wickramasinghe, 

1993). 

Other tests of this hypothesis are possible. The tropopause marks a tempera- 

ture inversion in the atmosphere, above which convection is extremely limited 

(Barry & Chorley, 1982). The density of micro-organisms should be very low 

above the tropopause, while quite the reverse is found (Hoyle, 1983). In 1961 

Claus and Nagy (Hoyle, 1983) claimed to have found microfossils within a 

meteorite. The rejection of these findings rested upon the contamination of the 

meteorite with terrestrial organic material, and upon the similarity of the struc- 

tures to thermal protenoids. Structures remarkably similar to microfossils, in- 

cluding Pedomicrobium, which is hard to account for as a chemical microfos- 

sil, have been found in the Murchison meteorite (Hoyle, 1983) in what appears 

to be a methodologically sound study. 

The extraterrestrial hypothesis for the origin of life can also be tested 

against the incidence of disease from influxes of space born viruses, (Hoyle, 

Wickramasinghe and Watkins, 1985) and against the fossil record. In addition, 

the extraterrestrial hypothesis predicts species jumps by the disruption to 

genes caused occasionally by viruses. It also addresses one of the remaining 

difficulties of complexity, namely how likely is it that two mutated specimens 

will find each other in order to reproduce? In the extraterrestrial hypothesis 

large sections of a population may find themselves transformed. 

Hoyle and Wickramasinghe (1993) begin their argument by suggesting that 

the origin of life is extremely improbable on Earth, and that it needs to be a 

cosmic phenomena. I believe this assumption is flawed, but that the implica- 

tions of complex systems theory leads us inevitably back to an extraterrestrial 

origin of life, and indeed perhaps many origins through space and time. 

It has been clearly established (Hoyle & Wickramsinghe, 1978) that objects 

up to 0.1 mm in diameter can soft-land on Earth without exceeding the heating 

tolerances of micro-organisms. Thus there is no reason why, if they exist in 

space, viruses, bacteria and even whole bacterial colonies, could not survive 

entry to the atmosphere. 

The extraterrestrial hypothesis can also make predictions. If the Martian mi- 

crofossils are biological in origin, then that species could probably also have 

existed on Earth, and its fossils will be found. Examples may indeed already 

have been found by Folk (1993). Life will probably also exist on Europa, 

which appears to possess liquid water beneath an ice crust, due to tidal effects 

from Jupiter, and possibly in the atmospheres of the giant planets. 

It is not inconceivable that niche environments exist today on Mars. The bi- 

ological experiments from the Viking landers are very unclear on this issue, 

despite popular misconceptions. The gas chromatograph indeed showed a neg- 

ative result, while the labeled release experiment (where radionuclide labeled 

nutrients were placed on the Martian soil, and the gases given off monitored) 

gave a positive result. Subsequent control experiments showed that the gas

LR experiment was a thousand times more sensitive, at 10,000 microbes per 

gram. No inorganic method has been found to replicate the LR results (Levin 

& Straat, 1976, 1977). At best these results should be regarded as inconclu- 

sive, but suggestive. 

A note of caution needs to be raised at this point. While complexity theory 

tells us how reproducible complex systems can arise, it does not yet allow us to 

precisely quantify the probability of life itself (a very particular complex sys- 

tem) arising in a given environment in a certain length of time. If the number 

of possible attractor states for complex organic systems is exceptionally high, 

then the origin of life becomes less probable in a particular location and time 

scale. There is clearly a need for empirical data to attempt to address this ques- 

tion. If the number of attractor states is so high as to give odds on life forming 

comparable to those suggested by information theory, then we are still faced 

with a need to invoke an origin of life away from our own planet in order to ex- 

plain the observed data. 

Conclusions 

Life appears to be a natural and probable outcome of physical and chemical 

laws, an attractor state for complex organic systems. Life should, therefore, be 

expected elsewhere in the universe - as there are plausibly 600,000 to 2.5 

million planets offering long term habitability (2 billion years or more) in our 

galaxy alone ( Zuckerrnan &Hart, 1995). Furthermore life had the opportunity 

to arise within many comets, and should have done so on many occasions 

throughout the universe, assuming the number of possible attractor states for 

complex organic systems is not super-astronomical. The implications of both 

complexity, and even more so the extraterrestrial theory, for areas of study as 

diverse as biology and Ufology need hardly be specified. Perhaps not least 

amongst the implications is the possibility of broad morphological similarities 

between extraterrestrial and terrestrial species, though detailed evolutionary 

differences should remain. 

References 

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Barry, R. G., & Chorley, R. J., (1982). Earth Weather and Climate. 4th edition, London and New 

York: Methuen. 

Collins, D. N., (1979). Quantitative determination of the subglacial drainage system of two 

Alpine glaciers. Journal of Glaciology, 23, 347. 

Folk, R. L., (1993). SEM imaging of bacteria and nannobacteria in carbonate sediments and rocks 

Journal of Sedimentary Petrology, 63,990. 

Folk, R. L., (1996). In defense of nannobacteria. Science, 274, 1288. 

Goodwin, B., (1994). How the Leopard Changed its Spots. New York: Charles Scribners. 

Gould, S. J., (1989). Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History. New York: 

Norton. 

Hoyle, F., & Wickramsinghe, C., (1978). Lifecloud. London: J. M. Dent and Sons. 

Hoyle, F. (1983). Intelligent Universe. London: Cambridge University Press. 

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Did Life Originate in Space? 343 

Hoyle, F., Wickramsinghe, C. and Watkins, J., (1985). Diseases From Space. London: J . M. Dent 

and Sons. 

Kauffman, S. A., (1993a). The Origins of Order: Self Organization and Selection in Evolution. 

New York: Oxford University Press. 

Kauffman, S. A., (1993b). At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Complexity. Pen- 

guin Science, New York. 

Levin, G. V., & Straat, P. A., (1976). Viking labeled release experiments: Interim results. Science, 

194,1322. 

Levin, G. V., & Straat, P. A., (1977). Recent results from the Viking labeled release experiments 

on Mars. JGR, Journal of Geophysical Research, 82,4663. 

Mason, E., (1 990). Evolutionary Chemistry. London: Cambridge University Press. 

McBride, E. F., Dane Picard, M. and Folk, R. L., (1994). Oriented concretions, Ionian coast, Italy: 

Evidence of groundwater flow direction. Journal of Sedimentary Research, 64A, 535. 

Mckay, D. S., Gibson, E. K. Jr., Thomas-Keprta, L. L., Vali, H., Romanek, C. S., Clemett, S. J., 

Chillier, X. D. F., Maechling, C. R., and Zare, R. N., (1996). Search for past life on Mars: Pos- 

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Processes and Landforms. 

Ponnamperuna, C. & Novarro-Gonzalez. R., (1995). Primordial organic cosmochemistry. In 

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London: Cambridge University Press. p. 108- 123. 

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London: Cambridge University Press.



Correlations of Random Binary Sequences With Pre-Stated 

Operator Intention: A Review of a 12-Year Program 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research, School of Engineering and Applied Science, 

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-5263 

Abstract - Strong correlations between output distribution means of a vari- 

ety of random binary processes and pre-stated intentions of some 100 indi- 

vidual human operators have been established over a 12-year experimental 

program. More than 1000 experimental series, employing four different cat- 

egories of random devices and several distinctive protocols, show compara- 

ble magnitudes of anomalous mean shifts from chance expectation, with sim- 

ilar distribution structures. Although the absolute effect sizes are quite small, 

of the order of bits deviation per bit processed, over the huge databases 

accumulated, the composite effect exceeds 70 (p = 3.5 x 10-13). These data 

display significant disparities between female and male operator perfor- 

mances, and consistent serial position effects in individual and collective re- 

sults. Data generated by operators far removed from the machines and exert- 

ing their efforts at times other than those of machine operation show similar 

effect sizes and structural details to those of the local, on-time experiments. 

Most other secondary parameters tested are found to have little effect on the 

scale and character of the results, with one important exception: studies per- 

formed using fully deterministic pseudorandom sources, either hard-wired or 

algorithmic, yield null overall mean shifts, and display no other anomalous 

features. 

Keywords: consciousness - anomolies - humanlmachine interaction - 

random event generators 

I. Background 

The role of human consciousness in the establishment of physical reality has 

been debated in many contexts and formats throughout every era of scientific 

history. The issue was central to ancient Egyptian and Greek philosophy, and 

to the enduring Hermetic tradition from which classical empirical science 

emerged. Even well into the period of scientific enlightenment, scholars of 

the stature of Francis Bacon [I], Robert Hooke [2], Robert Boyle [3], and 

Isaac Newton [4] addressed many of their empirical investigations to "the 

mystery by which mind could control matter" [5]. Although the maturing sci- 

entific establishment of the following two centuries came largely to dismiss 

such possibility, a number of distinguished physicists, including J. J. Thomp- 

son, William Crookes, Lord Rayleigh, and Marie and Pierre Curie continued 

to regard this topic as relevant to their scholarship, and were active partici- 

pants in the Society for Psychical Research [6]. A subtler form of the question 

arose in the early "observational" interpretations of quantum mechanics

346 R. G. Jahn et. al. 

which were construed by a number of the patriarchs of modern physics, in- 

cluding Planck [7], Bohr [8], Schrijdinger [9], de Broglie [lo], Heisen- 

berg [l 11, Pauli [12], Einstein [13], Jeans [14], Eddington [15], Wigner [16], 

Jordan [I 71, and von Weisacker [I 81, to raise important questions of the im- 

plicit or explicit role of human consciousness in the collapse of the wave func- 

tion. Although they vigorously debated such possibilities from both scientific 

and philosophical perspectives, little consensus was reached, other than the 

need for better direct experimental data. 

The enigma of consciousness continues to interest some contemporary 

physicists in such contexts as the non-locality/EPR paradoxIBell's theorem 

debates [19], single photon interference [20], causality violations in thermo- 

dynamics [21], neurophysics [22], complexity and chaos theory [23], and nu- 

merous other aspects of quantum epistemology and measurement [24, 251, 

once again without much resolution. Indeed, although a myriad of theoretical 

and empirical attempts have been made to define the elusive concept of con- 

sciousness itself, curiously little agreement on its origins, substance, charac- 

teristics, or functions has yet been achieved. Some of these efforts relegate 

consciousness to a complex of emergent phenomena of the human brain, and 

thus to an ensemble of neurochemical and neuroelectrical processes [26, 271. 

Others attempt to invoke quantum indeterminacy in explication of brain func- 

tion [28]. While many philosophers of science maintain that the concept of 

consciousness is so intrinsically subjective that it must be excluded from sci- 

entific attention, others plead that scientific scholarship cannot indefinitely 

ignore such dimensions [29]. 

Earlier in this century, attempts to codify the psychological dimensions of 

the problem were undertaken by a community of "parapsychologists" rooted 

in the pioneering research of J. B. and Louisa Rhine [30]. In most such studies, 

the consciousness aspect hypothesized to correlate with the behavior of physi- 

cal systems entailed some form of volition, intention, or desire, a presumption 

consistent with the premises of most religions, mystical traditions, personal 

superstitious practices, and the innate human propensity to hope or to wish. 

Portions of this early work attracted the attention of Pauli [3 11 and other quan- 

tum physicists. Einstein reports on a conversation he held with "an important 

theoretical physicist" regarding the relevance of Rhine's research to the EPR 

paradox: 

He: I am inclined to believe in telepathy. 

I: This has probably more to do with physics than with psychology. 

He: Yes. - [32] 

Notwithstanding this interest, much of the subsequent research of this genre 

proved vulnerable to technical criticism and unpersuasive to the scientific 

mainstream. 

Most recently, the more sophisticated information processing technology

Correlations of Random Binary Sequences 347 

that has advanced our understanding of the physical world over the last half 

century has also provided tools for addressing this class of anomalous phe- 

nomena with a methodological rigor unimaginable in the earlier parapsycho- 

logical research. For example, over the period 1959 to 1987, some 832 experi- 

mental studies conducted by 68 investigators directly addressed the influence 

of human intention on the performance of a broad variety of random event 

generators. Meta-analytical assessment of these results yields strong statisti- 

cal evidence for small but consistent anomalous effects that correlate with the 

intentions or desires of their operators [33], raising possible implications for 

experimental and theoretical study of many other probabilistic physical 

events, and for their technological applications. At the least, these findings 

should motivate performance and contemplation of yet more precise and ex- 

tensive empirical studies. 

The purpose of this article is to present a major body of new data that bears 

on this issue, acquired over twelve years of experimental study of anomalous 

humanlmachine interactions, conducted in an engineering laboratory context. 

Specifically, these studies have searched for possible correlations between the 

output data distributions of various random binary processes and the pre-stat- 

ed intentions of attendant human operators. The history of this laboratory pro- 

gram, details of its instrumentation, protocols, data reduction and interpreta- 

tion techniques, its attempts to model the observed effects, and the possible 

implications of the results for various regimes of basic science and technical 

applications have been described elsewhere [34-381. Here we shall focus only 

on the empirical results and their individual and collective statistical merit. 

11. Equipment and Protocol 

The machine employed in the "benchmark" experiments of this program is a 

microelectronic random event generator (REG) driven by a commercial noise 

board (Elgenco #3602A - 15 124), involving a reverse-biased semi-conductor 

junction, precision preamplifiers, and filters. The output spectrum of this 

noise source, essentially constant (k 1 db) from 50 Hz to 20 KHz, is clipped 

and further amplified to provide a randomly alternating flat-topped wave form 

off 10 volt amplitude with 0.5 psec rise and fall times which is gate-sampled 

at selectable regular intervals to yield a randomly alternating sequence of pos- 

itive and negative pulses. A set number of these are then counted against a reg- 

ularly alternating +,-,+,-,. . . template, thereby differentially eliminating any 

distortion of randomicity due to ground reference drift. The immediate and 

cumulative results are displayed via LEDs on the machine face and graphically 

on a computer screen, and transmitted on-line to a data management system. 

The balance of the device entails a variety of voltage and thermal monitors, re- 

dundant counters, and other fail-safe features that ensure its nominal opera- 

tion and preclude tampering, and other security features are incorporated in 

the operational software. The machine is extensively and frequently calibrat-


cal binomial combinatorial distributions having the appropriate means and 

standard deviations, with all higher moments and sequential correlations neg- 

ligible, to statistical confidence more than adequate to support the claimed ex- 

perimental correlations. A block diagram of this REG is shown in Figure 1; 

further technical details are available upon request. 

For the benchmark experiments, this REG is set to generate trials of 200 bi- 

nary samples each, which are counted at a rate of 1000 per second. The proto- 

col requires individual human operators, seated in front of the machine but 

having no physical contact with it, to accumulate prescribed equal size blocks 

of data under three interspersed states of intention: to achieve a higher number 

of bit counts than the theoretical mean (HI); to achieve a lower number of bit 

counts than the theoretical mean (LO); or not to influence the output, i.e. to es- 

tablish a baseline (BL). Data are collected in runs of 50, 100, or 1000 trials, 

depending on operator preference and protocol variations, and compounded 

over some number of experimental sessions into predefined data series of a 

specified number of trials, ranging from 1000 to 5000 per intention. Data pro- 

cessing is performed at the level of these individual series, which are regarded 

as the basic experimental units for interpretation and replication of any results. 

The essential criteria for anomalous correlations are statistically significant 

departures of the HI and/or LO series mean scores from the theoretical chance 

expectation and, most indicatively, the separation of the high- and low-inten- 

tion data (HI-LO). 

The order of the operator intentions is established either by their own choice 

1 f f PRE- 

I-+ 

ELCENGO 

NOISE SOURCE 

+ 3602115124 

I 

I --- 

PRECISION ! LOW- 

PASS --). AMP t CLIP - AMP --) .t SELECTOR A COUNTER - 

DISRAYS 

Ah4RIFIER FILTER 

7 - 

I - - - - 

I 

I I A 

I I 

I I 

t 

I I 

I I 

L- - - - -- -- --------- -J 

FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM OF REG 

Fig. 1. Functional diagram of electronic Random Event Generator (REG) used in benchmark ex- 

periments. A commercial noise source based on a reverse-biased semi-conductor junc- 

tion is processed to yield a randomly altei-nating sequence of positive and negative pulses, 

which are compared with a regularly alternating binary template. The number of coinci- 

dences from a specified number of samples are displayed immediately and cumulatively 

on the machine face and graphically on a computer screen, and are transmitted on-line to 

a data management system.


(volitional protocol) or by random assignment (instructed protocol), and is 

unalterably recorded in the database manager before the REG is activated by a 

remote switch. All subsequent data are automatically recorded on-line, print- 

ed simultaneously on a permanent strip recorder, and summarized by the oper- 

ators in a dedicated logbook. Any discrepancy among these redundant 

records, or any fail-safe indication from the REG or its supporting equipment 

(both extraordinarily rare), invoke preestablished contingency procedures that 

preclude inclusion of any fouled data or any possible means of favorable data 

selection. 

A. Collective Mean Shifts 

111. Primary Results 

Over a 12-year period of experimentation, 9 1 individual operators, all 

anonymous, uncompensated adults, none of whom claimed unusual abilities, 

accumulated a total of 2,497,200 trials distributed over 522 tripolar series in 

this benchmark experiment. Table 1 lists the overall results for the three categories 

of intention, HI, LO, and BL, and for the HI-LO separations, for comparison 

with the concomitant calibration data and the theoretical chance expectations. 

With reference to the symbol list below the table, the salient 

indicators are the mean shifts from the theoretical expectation, 6,, the corresponding 

z-scores, z,, and the one-tail probabilities of chance occurrence of 

these or larger deviations, p,. Also listed are the proportions of the 522 series 

yielding results in the intended directions, S. I. D., and the proportions of operators 

achieving results in the intended directions, 0. I. D. (Note that as defined, 

6, is expressed in units of bitsltrial. We could equally well represent the 

effect size in absolute units of bitslbit processed, i.e. E, = 6,/2p,, which in turn 

differs by a factor of two from the common statistical effect size, 

z P / m = 6,//.~~, where N, denotes the total number of bits processed. We 

shall henceforth use 6, and E, more or less interchangeably, as befits the context). 

The measures tabulated in Table I individually and collectively define the 

scale and character of the primary anomaly addressed in these studies, i.e. the 

statistically significant correlations of the output of this microelectronic random 

binary process with the pre-recorded intentions of a large pool of unselected 

human operators. Specifically to be noted is the overall scale of the effect, 

0(10-4) bits inverted per bit processed; the somewhat higher deviation in 

the HI results compared to the LO; the slight departure of the BL results from 

both the theoretical chance expectation and the calibration value, and the negligible 

alterations in the variances of the score distributions. The overall figure 

of merit for the HI-LO separation, which is the postulated primary indicator, 

is z, = 3.81 @, = 7 x 

The anomalous correlations also manifest in the fraction of experimental


TABLE 1 

Statistical data from benchmark REG experiments, listed for passive calibrations (CAL); Opera- 

tor high intentions (HI), Low intentions (LO), and null intentions(B1); and HI-LO separations. 

Parameter CAL HI LO BL HI-LO 

KEY 

Nt: Number of trials (200 binary samples each) 

p: Mean of trial score distribution 

st: Standard deviation of trial score distribution 

a,: Measurement uncertainty (statistical) in the observed value 

of st ; o, E o O / m where oo = is the theoretical 

trial standard deviation. 

6,: Difference of mean from theoretical chance expectation; 

6, r p - po for HI and LO; 

6,(HI - LO) p(HI) - p(L0) G 6,(HI) - 6,(LO) 

0,: Measurement uncertainty 

- 

(statistical) in the observed 

value of 6, ; o, = o o / a for HI and LO; 

o,(HI - LO) = o~J~/N~(HI) + l/Nt(LO) 

z,: z-score of mean shift; z, S,/o, (calculated with full precision 

from raw data values, not from the rounded values 

presented above in the table.) 

p,: One-tail probability of z, (CAL, BL two-tail) 

S.I.D.: Proportion of series having z, in the intended direction 

O.I.D.: Proportion of operators with overall results in the intended 

direction 

* p-values for CAL and BL are two-tailed due to lack of intention. 

t BL is treated as in intended direction when positive. 

I series in which the terminal results confirm the intended directions. For exam- 

I ple, 57% of the series display HI-LO score separations in the intended direction 

(z, = 3.15, p, = 8 x In contrast, the anomaly is not statistically evil 

dent in the 52% of individual operators producing databases in the intended

Correlations of Random Binary Sequences 35 1 

directions (z, = 0.31, p, = 0.38), a feature having possible structural implica- 

tions, as discussed below. 

B. Cumulative Deviations 

An instructive alternative display of these results is in the form of cumula- 

tive deviation graphs, wherein are plotted the accumulating total departures 

from the chance mean sequentially compounded by this group of operators in 

their HI, LO, and BL efforts over the long history of the experiment (Figure 2). 

The superimposed parabolic envelopes indicate the increasing width of one- 

tailed 95% confidence intervals about the theoretical mean as the database 

evolves. In this format, the deviant trends in the HI and LO performances ap- 

pear as essentially random walk-s about shifted mean values, leading to steadi- 

ly increasing departures from expectation. Consistent with the terminal values 

listed in Table I, the average slopes of these two patterns of achievement, in 

units of bits deviation per bit processed, are roughly 1.3 x and -7.8 x lo-' 

respectively. Although local segments reflective of individual operators or 

particular periods of operation may differ somewhat from these overall effect 

sizes, as described below, this lop4 order of magnitude tends to characterize 

virtually all of the anomalous correlations achieved in these experiments. 

C. Count Distributions 

Any structural details of the trial count distributions that compound to the 

observed anomalous mean shifts may hold useful implications for modeling 

such correlations. While no statistically significant departures of the variance, 

skew, kurtosis, or higher moments from the appropriate chance values appear 

Thousands of Trials 

Fig. 2. Cumulative deviation graphs of benchmark REG results for HI, LO, and BL operator in- 

tentions. Parabolic envelopes are one-tail 95% confidence intervals about the theoretical 

chance mean. The scale on the right ordinate refers to the terminal z-scores.


in the overall data, regular patterns of certain finer scale features can be discerned. 

For example, deviations of the trial count populations, n,, from their 

theoretical chance values, n,, conform to statistical linear regressibns of the 

form Aniln, = ~E~(X,- po) where xi denotes the given trial count (e.g. 100, 102, 

94, etc.), p, is the theoretical chance mean of the full distribution (loo), and 

4~, is the slope of the linear regression fit. Figure 3 depicts this effect graphi- 

Fig. 3. Normalized deviations of benchmark REG individual count populations from chance ex- 

pectations: (a) HI intention data: linear fit, z, = 3.27; quadratic correction, z, = 0.69; 

(b) LO intention data: linear fit, z, = 1.55; quadratic correction, z, = 0.48.


cally for the database of Table 1 and Figure 2. Such functional behavior is 

consistent with a simple displacement of the chance Gaussian distribution to 

the observed mean value or, equivalently, to a shift in the elementary binomial 

probability from the exact theoretical value of 0.5 to (0.5 + E,) [39]. Given the 

consistency of all other features of the distributions with chance expectation, 

this suggests that the most parsimonious model of the anomalous correlation is 

between operator intention and the binary probability intrinsic to the experi- 

ment. 

D. Individual Operator Effects 

Given the correlation of operator intentions with the anomalous mean shifts, 

it is reasonable to search the data for operator-specific features that might es- 

tablish some pattern of individual operator contributions to the overall results. 

Unfortunately, quantitative statistical assessment of these is complicated by 

the unavoidably wide disparity among the operator database sizes, and by the 

small signal-to-noise ratio of the raw data, leaving graphical and analytical 

representations of the distribution of individual operator effects only margin- 

ally enlightening. For example, Figure 4 deploys the 91 individual operator 

HI-LO mean shift separations as a function of their various data base sizes. 

Superimposed are the theoretical mean value, the mean value of the composite 

data, and the 1.640 (p, = 0.05) deviation loci with respect to these two means. 

Of interest here are the ratios of positive and negative points about the theoret- 

ical and empirical means, their dependence on data base size and on operator 

gender, and the positions and genders of the outliers. 

The limited number of operator data points make density plots of these 

mean shift data sensitive to the bin sizes and locations selected, but Figure 5 

compares one such display with appropriate theoretical distributions centered 

on the chance and empirical mean values. The attached chi-squared values in- 

dicate some preference for the latter model, but for these data the direct z, cal- 

culation underlying Table l is a far more accurate indicator of the anomalous 

mean shift. Attempts to interpret the operator distribution of z-scores, rather 

than mean shifts, suffer from the same limitations of available data points, and 

are similarly inconclusive. 

Given the specification of the experimental series as the pre-established unit 

for data interpretation, and the significantly larger fraction of series having 

HI-LO differences in the intended directions (Table I), it is also reasonable to 

search for indications of data structure in the distribution of series scores 

achieved by all operators. Since a total of 522 such data units are available, the 

resolution of mean shift and z-score distributions is considerably better here, 

but as shown in Figure 6, beyond more clearly confirming the overall shifts of 

the mean, further identification of structural detail remains speculative. This 

situation is further confused by the obvious operator gender disparity in the

0.2- 

R. G. Jahn et. al. 

V Female 

+ Male 

0 Overlay 

Fig. 4. Deployment of 91 individual operator HI-LO mean shift separations achieved in the 

benchmark REG experiments, as a function of their database sizes. The inset table high- 

lights the imbalances in male and female operator performance with respect to the empir- 

ical and theoretical chance mean-shift values. 

IV. Secondary Correlations 

Possible secondary correlations of effect sizes with a host of technical, psy- 

chological, and environmental factors e.g., the type of random source; the dis- 

tance of the operator from the machine; operator gender; two or more opera- 

tors attempting the task together; feedback modes; the rate of bit generation; 

the number of bits sampled per trial; the number of trials comprising a run or 

series; the volitional/instructed protocol options; the degree of operator expe- 

rience; and others have been explored to various extents within the course of 

these experiments, and in many other related studies not discussed here. Very 

briefly, qualitative inspection of these data, along with a comprehensive analy- 

sis of variance [40] indicate that most of these factors do not consistently alter 

the character or scale of the combined operator effects from those outlined 

above, although some may be important in certain individual operator perfor- 

mance patterns. The few potentially important exceptions to this generaliza- 

tion that have been identified are described in the following paragraphs.


-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 

Mean Shift (ap) 

Fig. 5. Density plot of 91 individual operator HI-LO mean shifts achieved on benchmark REG 

experiments, superimposed on theoretical distributions centered on the chance and empirical 

mean-shift values. These two comparison curves are constructed as the sums of 91 

operator normal distributions, each of observation error oi oc l/Ni where N, is the individual 

database size. The "chance" curve assumes all individual effect sizes are zero; the 

"shifted" curve assumes all are the same as the composite effect size. The latter assumption 

yields a better x2 fit. 

800- 

-1 .O -0.5 0.0 0.5 1 .O 

Mean Shift (613 

Fig 6 Density plot of 522 series HI-LO mean shifts achieved on benchmark experiments, superimposed 

on theoretical distributions centered on the chance and empirical mean-shift 

values (constructed as in Fig. 5).


A. Gender-Related Efects 

Segregation of the total REG database described above into male and fe- 

male operator components reveals several striking disparities. As evident in 

Figure 4, although three of the female operators have produced the largest in- 

dividual z-scores, the overall correlations of mean shifts with intention are 

much weaker for the females than for the males. In fact, while a majority of 

the males succeed in both directions of effort, most of the females' low inten- 

tion results are opposite to intention. Specifically, some 66% of the male oper- 

ators succeed in separating their overall HI and LO scores in the intended di- 

rection, compared to only 34% of the females. In other words, there is some 

indication that the total operator performance distribution has three compo- 

nents: a) three outstanding female datasets; b) 38 female datasets indistin- 

guishable from a chance distribution; and c) 50 well-distributed male datasets 

compounding to significant positive performance. Many other aspects of the 

gender-related disparities are detailed in Ref. [4 11. 

B. Device Dependence 

The sensitivity of the anomalous correlations to the particular random 

source employed or to its form of implementation into an experimental device 

has been extensively explored via a variety of machines and protocols [36,40, 

411. In the simplest varients, the commercial microelectronic noise diode in 

the benchmark configuration was replaced by identical and similar units, with 

no detectable changes in the character of the results. In a more substantial and, 

as it turned out, more critical set of modifications, the physical noise source 

was replaced by three distinctly different pseudorandom sources: 

1) A pseudorandom-number generating algorithm included in the Borland 

Turbo Basic programming package was implemented on an IBM AT-286 

computer to provide binary strings that could be counted and displayed 

in the same formats as the benchmark experiments. More specifically, 

the floating-point numbers provided by the Borland function, which dis- 

tribute uniformly over the interval 0 to 1, were converted into bits by as- 

signing I to all values above 0.5, and 0 to all values below. The initiating 

seeds were obtained by starting a microsecond clock when the operator 

prompts first appeared on the screen, and stopping it when the operators 

responded by pressing a key. The accumulated values were then added to 

the number of seconds since midnight to compound the seeds. In per- 

forming these experiments, the operators had the options of digital, dig- 

ital cumulative, or graphical cumulative deviation displays on the moni- 

tor, akin to those available on the benchmark version. 

2) The benchmark equipment was modified to allow replacement of the El- 

genco noise source by a hard-wired electronic shift register containing 

31 flip-flops comprising a sequence length of over 2 x lo6 steps. This


tial seed that, at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz, recycled roughly every 60 

hours, far exceeding the length of any single experimental session. 

From the operator's perspective, all other aspects of the protocol, ma- 

chine operation, and feedback display were identical to those of the 

benchmark experiments. 

3) A random element was overlaid on the pseudorandom processor just de- 

scribed by introducing an asynchronous shift frequency for the register, 

driven by an anolog element that swept from a few kHz to a few tens of 

kHz over a period of several minutes. This unpredictable component of 

the sampling imbued the device with a complex combination of random 

and pseudorandom characteristics. 

As discussed further below, when source #3, which retains some physically 

random features, is utilized, statistically significant correlations of results with 

operator intention, comparable to those seen in the benchmark experiments, 

continue to appear. For the strictly deterministic sources #I and #2, however, 

no such correlations are observed. 

A more substantial extension of the experimental concept employs a large 

scale mechanical device called a "Random Mechanical Cascade" (RMC), in 

which 9000 x 314" dia. polystyrene spheres trickle downward through a quin- 

cunx array of 330 x 314" dia. nylon pegs, whereby they are scattered into 19 

collection bins in a close approximation to a Gaussian population distribution. 

In this experiment, operators endeavor to shift the mean bin population to the 

right or left, or to exert no intention in randomly interspersed trials. The large 

databases from this experiment display a similar size and character of anom- 

alous correlations to those of the smaller scale random source experiments, 

and similar count population and other structural details [42]. 

C. Series Position Efects 

While it might be reasonable to expect that operators' proficiency at these 

experimental tasks would improve with increasing experience, no systematic 

learning tendencies are evident in the data. Rather, the progression of the 

anomalous effect sizes as a function of the number of series completed by the 

operators is found to take the somewhat unanticipated form shown in Figure 7. 

Namely, when the mean shifts obtained by all operators on their respective 

first, second, third, ... series are plotted against that series ordinal position, a 

peak of initial success is followed by sharp reduction on the second and third 

series, whereafter the effect gradually recovers to an asymptotic intermediate 

value over the higher series numbers [43]. This pattern obtains, with minor 

disparities, for the overall HI, LO, and HI-LO data, but not for the baselines. 

It also appears in a majority of the individual operator databases having five or 

more series. The interpretation of this pattern on psychological or physical 

grounds can only be speculative at this point, but its ubiquitous appearance 

clearly complicates any consistency or replicability criteria.


L I J 

1 2 3 4 5+ All 

Series Number 

Fig. 7. Benchmark REG HI-LO mean separations achieved by all 91 operators on their first, sec- 

ond, third ... experimental series. The value at 5+ subsumes all series beyond the fourth. 

The value at "all" is the grand average of all data. 

D. Distance and Time Dependence 

The dependence of the effect sizes on the distance of the operator from the 

machine could also be an important indicator of fundamental mechanism. Ac- 

tually, no such dependence has been found over the dimensions available in 

the laboratory itself. More remarkably, these operatorlmachine aberrations 

continue to manifest in a substantial body of experiments wherein operators 

are physically separated from the devices by distances of up to several thou- 

sand miles, again with no statistically detectable dependence of the effect sizes 

on the degree of separation. Rather, the results of some 396,000 trials per in- 

tention conducted under this "remote" protocol, wherein the device is run un- 

observed at prearranged times by staff members who remain blind to the oper- 

ators' intentions, are very similar in character to those of the local 

experiments, including the scale of effect, and the relatively larger results 

under HI intentions compared to LO [44]. 

In a subset of this remote database, comprising some 87,000 trials per inten- 

tion, the operators address their attention to the machine's operation at times 

other than those at which the data are actually generated. Such "off-time" ex- 

periments have ranged from 73 hours before to 336 hours after machine opera- 

tion, and display a scale and character of anomalous results similar to those of 

the locally generated data, including gender effects and count population dis- 

tortions. In fact, the overall mean shift in the high-intention efforts in these 

"off-time" remote experiments is twice as large as that in the "on-time" remote 

data, although this difference is not statistically significant, given the smaller 

size off-time database. As with the distance separations, no dependence of the


yield on the magnitude of the tempgral separations is observed over the range 

tested. Comparable remote and off-time results are found in the RMC experi- 

ment, as well. 

E. Operator Strategy and Psychological Correlates 

Although no systematic assessment of any of the multitude of potentially 

relevant psychological parameters characterizing the operators has been at- 

tempted, on the basis of informal discussions, casual observations of their 

styles, occasional remarks they record in the experimental logbooks, and our 

own experiences as operators, it is clear that individual strategies vary widely. 

Most operators simply attend to the task in a quiet, straightforward manner. A 

few use meditation or visualization techniques or attempt to identify with the 

device or process in some transpersonal manner; others employ more assertive 

or competitive strategies. Some concentrate intently on the process; others are 

more passive, maintaining only diffuse attention to the machine and diverting 

their immediate focus to some other activity, such as glancing through a maga- 

zine, or listening to music. We find little pattern of correlation of such strate- 

gies with achievement. Rather, the effectiveness of any particular operational 

style seems to be operator-specific and transitory; what seems to help one op- 

erator does not appeal to another, and what seems to help on one occasion may 

fail on the next. If there is any commonality to be found in this diversity of 

strategy, it would be that the most effective operators tend to speak of the de- 

vices in frankly anthropomorphic terms, and to associate successful perfor- 

mance with the establishment of some form of bond or resonance with the de- 

vice, akin to that one might feel for one's car, tools, musical instruments, or 

sports equipment. 

V. Combined Results 

A summary of the results from all of the experimental excursions noted 

above, along with a few others not specifically mentioned, is presented in 

Table 2. Listed here are the number of complete experimental series, N,y; the 

number of binary samples processed, N,; the z-scores based on the difference 

of the HI-LO means, z,; the statistical effect sizes per bit, here reconstructed 

from E,, i.e. E~ = z p/2a, as discussed in Section 111-A; and the one-tail 

probabilities associated with z, p,. Note that the table segregates those exper- 

iments having truly random sources from those whose sources are determinis- 

tic pseudorandom. Of the former, only the two with the smallest data sets fail 

to contribute positively to the overall HI-LO separation; in fact, all but three 

independently achieve significance by thep, < .05 criterion. In contrast, none 

of the deterministic experiments show any correlations with operator inten- 

tion, despite their identical protocols and data processing, and their similar op- 

erator pools. 

Combination of data from all of these experiments into an overall statistical


TABLE 2 

HI-LO mean shift statistics for all REG-class experiments, as defined in Key below. 

EXP~ . Ns Nb ll EJX lo5) pll 

Random Experiments 

Deterministic Experiments 

KEY 

Ns: Number of series 

Nb: Number of binary samples 

2,: z-score of mean shift 

c,: Statistical effect size per bit; E, +/a. (See text) 

p,: One-tail probability of r, 

DL: Diode REG, local 

D R: Diode REG, remote (includes off-time data) 

PRLR: Pseudorandom REG (hardwired with random element), local 

and remote 

Dc: Diode REG, co-operator data 

D2K: Diode REG, 2000-sample trials. 

Dzo: Diode REG, 20-sample trials 

MCL : Random Mechanical Cascade, local 

MCR: Random Mechanical Cascade, remote (includes off-time data) 

MCc: Random Mechanical Cascade, co-operator 

PDLR: Pseudorandom REG (hardwired, no random element), local 

and remote 

APL : Algorithmic pseudorandom REG, local 

APR: Algorithmic pseudorandom REG, remote (includes off-time 

data) 

APc : Algorithmic pseudorandom REG, co-operator data 

* This dataset includes 7 series by 2 operators that used the PR source 

rather than the D source. Since there is no detectable difference between 

the two subsets, they are combined as a single table entry.


figure of merit is complicated by the major disparities in the various database 

sizes, some distinctions in the protocols and measureables, the absence of the- 

oretical expectations in the RMC experiments, the pervasive gender dispari- 

ties and the HI vs. LO asymmetries associated with them, and the ambiguities 

associated with the interplay of series position effects with individual operator 

database sizes. However, a number of meta-analytic techniques can be in- 

voked to provide composite estimates for the overall likelihood of the entire 

collection of anomalous mean shifts. For example, one could simply com- 

pound the values of z, listed in Table 2 into an unweighted composite value. 

Alternatively, one could weight the individual experiment z, values by the 

numbers of series in the databases, or by the numbers of binary samples each 

contains. Finally, one could combine results at the level of p, values, rather 

than z,, using a method proposed by Rosenthal [45]. In a separate paper, we 

have presented detailed arguments for preference of the sample-weighted 

recipe for this type of data combination [46] although, as displayed in Table 3, 

the quantitative disparities among all of these methods are insufficient to ob- 

scure the magnitude of the bottom-line results. Again note that by any of the 

recipes the ensemble of experiments utilizing physically random sources com- 

pound to overwhelming statistical likelihood, while the deterministic group 

lies well within chance expectation. 

A similar sharp discrimination appears in both the composite series success 

rate and operator success rate criteria. In the former, 58.4% of the total of 

101 4 random source experimental series show a positive HI-LO separation 

(z,= 5.339, p, = 4.68 x lo-'), compared to 49.7% for the deterministic group 

(z, = -0.132, p, = 0.55). In the latter, 57.3% of the 199 operators of the random 

source experiments succeed in splitting their HI and LO results in the intended 

direction (z, = 2.056, p, = 0.0199), compared to 45.7% of the 46 operators of 

the deterministic group (z, = -0.590, p, = 0.722). By either criterion, the suc- 

cess rates are broadly distributed over the various random source experiments, 

with eight of the nine contributing positively to both the series and operator 

composites. 

The strong distinction between the results using random and deterministic 

sources may help discriminate among various theoretical models that have 

been proposed for effects of this genre. For example, the "Decision Augmen- 

tation Theory" proposed by May et al.[47], which predicts that the nature of 

TABLE 3 

Combined HI-LO z-scores of all REG-class experiments computed by four methods described in 

the text references, (with associated one-tail probabilities of chance occurrence in parentheses). 

Method Random Expts. Determ. Expts. Both 

Unweighted 6.058(6.88 x lo-'') -0.637(0.738) 4.687(1.38 x 

Series Weighted 6.588(2.22 x lo-") -0.67 l(0.749) 4.980(3.18 x 

Data Weighted 7.180(3.50 x 10-13) -0.67 l(0.749) 6.492(4.24 x lo-") 

Rosenthal 6.445(5.80 x lo-") -0.7 14(0.762) 5.812(3.09 x lo-') 

-


the source should be irrelevant to the presence or scale of the effect, is clearly 

incompatible with this observed difference in performance. (A more detailed 

and quantitative review of the implications of this database for the "D.A.T." 

model can be found in reference [48]). 

VI. Replicability Requirements 

From time to time, the experiments reported here have been assessed, both 

formally and informally, by a number of critical observers, who have generally 

agreed that the equipment, protocols, and data processing are sound [49]. Fre- 

quently, however, the caveat is added that such results must be "replicated" be- 

fore they can be fully accepted, with the replication criteria variously defined 

to require strict preservation of all technical and procedural details, or to allow 

more flexible similarities in equipment and protocols. It is our opinion that for 

experiments of this sort, involving as they clearly do substantial psychological 

factors and therefore both individual and collective statistical behaviors, to re- 

quire that any given operator, on any given day, should produce identical re- 

sults, or that any given operator group should quantitatively replicate the re- 

sults of any other, is clearly unreasonable. Rather more apt would be such 

criteria as might be applied to controlled experiments in human creativity, per- 

ception, learning, or athletic achievement, where broad statistical ranges of in- 

dividual and collective performance must be anticipated, and results therefore 

interpreted in statistically generic terms. 

By such criteria, the experiments outlined here can be claimed both to show 

internal consistency, and to replicate results of similar experiments in many 

other laboratories. For example, the statistical consistency of individual oper- 

ator performances across multiple experimental series that compound to their 

particular positions on Figure 4 defines one level of internal replicability. The 

systematic accumulation of intention-correlated effects across many opera- 

tors, as displayed in Table 1, defines a second level. The consistently similar 

results of the same group of operators on the various extensions of the basic 

REG experiment to other protocols, noise sources, and categorically different 

random physical devices, shown in Table 3, establishes a third, inter-experi- 

ment level of replicability. 

With respect to inter-laboratory reproducibility, it should first be noted that 

the experiments reported here were originally undertaken as an attempt to 

replicate previous studies by Schmidt [50] and others [5 11, albeit with modifi- 

cations in design and equipment that would respond to various criticisms and 

allow more rapid accumulation of very large quantities of data. Our results in- 

deed reinforce this earlier work in confirming the existence, scale, and charac- 

ter of anomalous correlations with pre-stated operator intentions. On a broad- 

er front, the previously mentioned quantitative review of 30 years of research 

of this genre, covering more than 800 experiments reported by 68 principal in-


ment in experimental quality, a statistically constant anomalous effect size has 

pervaded most of the results [33]. 

VII. Theoretical Modeling 

Any attempts to model phenomena like those reported here must be im- 

mensely complicated by the evidence that human volition is the primary cor- 

relate of the observed anomalous physical effects, and thus that some proac- 

tive role for consciousness must somehow be represented. This challenge is 

compounded by the absence of clear-cut psychological or physiological indi- 

cators, and by the lack of demonstrable space and time dependence. While a 

variety of attempts to combine conventional psychological and neurophysio- 

logical concepts with established physical and mathematical formalisms, such 

as electromagnetic theory, statistical thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, 

geophysical mechanics, and hyperspace formalisms have been proposed [50], 

few of these propositions seem competent to accommodate the salient features 

of the empirical data, let alone to survive critical scientific and epistemologi- 

cal criteria. 

Rather, a more comprehensive approach to formulation of the interaction of 

consciousness with the physical world seems requisite. Over the past two 

decades, a growing number of theoretical physicists and philosophers of sci- 

ence have addressed the problem of consciousness from this broader perspec- 

tive, and have offered an assortment of more sophisticated models which may 

eventually prove effective for dialogue with the empirical results. Some of 

these apply quantum physical concepts and formalisms to neurological 

processes and functions [28,53]. Others employ non-linear systems concepts 

underlying information science, chaos, and complexity theories to provide de- 

grees of freedom to accommodate the intervention of consciousness into phys- 

ical processes [54]. Still others propose a holistic complementarity between 

the epistemology of human experience and the ontology of the physical 

world [37]. While each of these approaches at least acknowledges the prob- 

lem, the chasm between the role of consciousness and self-consistent physical 

theory is far from bridged and, given its troublesome empirical and conceptual 

aspects, will require much more visionary work from both the experimental 

and theoretical sides. 

VIII. Extended Experiments 

Since completion of the databases described above, a number of new exper- 

iments involving substantially different physical processes, modes of feed- 

back, and protocols have been deployed in the hope of better identification of 

the most critical physical and psychological properties bearing on the anom- 

alous phenomena. For example, similar but more compact REG units are 

being used to drive an "ArtREG" experiment, wherein two competing scenes 

are superimposed on a computer screen with relative illumination determined


by the accumulating balance of binary events from the noise source. The task 

of the operator is to cause one pre-selected scene to dominate over the other, 

without current knowledge of the binary balance. In another experiment, a 

compact REG drives a large musical drum to produce a random alternation of 

equally spaced loud and soft beats or, in another variant, a random alternation 

of long and short intervals of equal amplitude. The goal of the operator in ei- 

ther version is to impose some regularity of pattern on the audible beat stream. 

Analysis programs compute the overall entropy of the bit stream and search 

for repetitive sub-patterns indicative of an imposed cadence. Other devices, 

such as classical single and double slit diffraction equipment, and REGS that 

alternate digital and analog data sampling, or that compare two grossly differ- 

ent bit-sampling rates, help search for further physical correlates. In a comple- 

mentary effort to access the importance of operator feedback modalities, vari- 

ous aesthetically engaging systems, such as a large linear pendulum or an 

upward bubbling water fountain, have been employed, along with a mobile 

robot driven in random motion by an on-board REG. Although the databases 

from these new experiments are not yet sufficient to provide robust quantita- 

tive results, various anomalous effects correlated with operator,intention are 

apparent in the structural details of their data distributions, of comparable 

scales to those seen in the direct REG interactions. 

IX. Summary 

The extensive databases described above, comprising more than 1500 com- 

plete experimental series generated over a period of 12 years in rigid tripolar 

protocols by over 100 unselected human operators using several random digi- 

tal processors, display the following salient features: 

1) Strong statistical correlations between the means of the output distribu- 

tions and the pre-recorded intentions of the operators appear in virtually 

all of the experiments using random sources. 

2) Such correlations are not found in those experiments using deterministic 

pseudo-random sources. 

3) The overall scale of the anomalous mean shifts are of the order of lov4 

bits per bit processed which, over the full composite database, com- 

pounds to a statistical deviation of more than 70 (p = 3.5 x 10-13). 

4) While characteristic distinctions among individual operator perfor- 

mances are difficult to confirm analytically, a number of significant dif- 

ferences between female and male operator performance are demonstra- 

ble. 

5) The series score distributions and the count population distributions in 

both the collective and individual operator data are consistent with


6) Oscillatory series position patterns in collective and individual operator 

performance appear in much of the data, complicating the replication 

criteria. 

7) Experiments performed by operators far removed from the devices, or 

exerting their intentions at times other than that of device operation, 

yield results of comparable scale and character to those of the local, on- 

time experiments. Such remote, off-time results have been demonstrat- 

ed on all of the random sources. 

8) Appropriate internal consistency, and inter-experiment and inter-labora- 

tory replicability of the generic features of these anomalous results have 

been established. 

9) A much broader range of random-source experiments currently in 

progress display a similar scale and character of anomalous results. 


The authors are deeply indebted to the many anonymous and uncompensat- 

ed operators who have unselfishly contributed immense time and effort to gen- 

eration of the data on which this study is based. We also appreciate the sugges- 

tions of many professional colleagues, both supportive and critical, that have 

helped us refine and solidify these complex experiments. 

This work has been supported in part by grants from the McDonnell Foun- 

dation, the Ohrstrom Foundation, the Fetzer Institute, Mr. Laurance Rocke- 

feller, Mr. Donald Webster, and several other philanthropic organizations and 

individuals. 

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Journal of Scientijic Exploration, Vol. 1 1 , No. 3, pp. 369-386, 1997 0892-33 10197 


ESSAY 

The Hidden Side of Wolkang Pauli: 

An Eminent Physicist's Extraordinary 

Encounter With Depth ~sychology' 

HARALD ATMANSPACHER 

Max-Planck-Institut fiir extraterrestrische Physik, 0-85740 Garching, Germany 

Laboratorium fiir Physikalische Chemie, Eidgenossische Technische Hochschule, 

CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland 

Abstract - Wolfgang Pauli is well recognized as an outstanding theoretical 

physicist, famous for his formulation of the two-valuedness of the electron 

spin, for the exclusion principle, and for his prediction of the neutrino. Less 

well known is the fact that Pauli spent a lot of time in different avenues of 

human experience and scholarship, ranging over fields such as the history of 

ideas, philosophy, religion, alchemy, and Jung's psychology. Pauli's philo- 

sophical and particularly his psychological background is not overt in his sci- 

entific papers and was unknown even to many specialist scholars until a num- 

ber of enthralling and perplexing documents of a close interaction between 

Wolfgang Pauli and the psychologist Carl Gustav Jung became publicly 

available in recent years. Both scholars stressed the inseparability of the 

physical and the psychical and called upon a sense of more openness toward 

the unconscious. Decades after his death, Pauli's innovative perspective and 

his vision of a wholeness of psyche and matter are more than ever before of 

great relevance. 

Keywords: physics - philosophy - psyche - archetype 

I. Who Was Wolkang Pauli? 

Wolfgang Pauli (1900-1958) was a most critical theoretical physicist with 

profound insight as well as a deep thinker. He was a child prodigy - while 

still a teenager Pauli wrote three erudite papers on general relativity which 

were highly esteemed by experts like the mathematician, Hermann Weyl 

(1 9 19):~ "But how you at your young age have managed to get access to the intellectual 

power and freedom of thought required to assimilate the theory of 

relativity is almost inconceivable to me." His teacher Arnold Sommerfeld 

'This article originally appeared in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1996 and is 

reprinted by permission. 

'This and all following quotations cited from German text passages have been translated by the au- 

thors.

370 H. Atmanspacher & H. Primas 

(1 868- 195 1), one of the leading figures in the old quantum theory of the atom, 

was so impressed by Pauli's mathematical knowledge, physical insight, and 

his familiarity with the most subtle arguments in the theory of relativity that 

he transmitted an invitation to write a review article on relativity theory for the 

Enzyklopadie der Mathematischen Wissenschaften from his student, Pauli. 

When the twenty-year-old Pauli delivered a five pound manuscript, Max 

Born (1921) wrote to Albert Einstein, full of praise: "This little chap is not 

only clever but industrious as well." And Einstein (1922) applauded: 

Whoever studies this mature and grandly composed work would not believe that the 

author is a man of twenty-one. One does not know what to admire most: the psycholog- 

ical understanding of the evolution of ideas, the accuracy of mathematical deduction, 

the deep physical insight, the capacity for lucid systematic presentation, the knowledge 

of literature, the factual completeness, or the infallibility of criticism. 

In spite of later deep philosophical disagreement, Einstein always held 

Pauli in high esteem, and in an address in 1946 on occasion of Pauli's Nobel 

prize the old Einstein called Pauli his spiritual son. 

In June 1921 Pauli received his PhD from the University of Munich on a 

topic of the old quantum theory. After postdoctoral work with Max Born at 

Gottingen (1921/22), Niels Bohr at Copenhagen (1922/23), and his habilita- 

tion in Hamburg (1 924), he discovered in 1925 the exclusion principle (the so- 

called "Pauli-Verbot"), ascribing the spin as a new discrete degree of freedom 

to the electron. From 1926 to 1928 he was professor for theoretical physics in 

Hamburg. In 1928 he accepted an offer for a full professorship for theoretical 

physics at the ETH (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) in Ziirich. 

Together with Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Paul Adrien Maurice 

Dirac, Wolfgang Pauli was one of the principal creators of quantum mechan- 

ics, relativistic quantum field theory, and the orthodox "Copenhagen interpre- 

tation" of quantum mechanics. He became renowned for his fundamental orig- 

inal contributions and brilliant reviews on quantum mechanics and quantum 

field theory and for his role as "the living conscience of theoretical physics." 

I Pauli was particularly fascinated by the fine structure constant which Som- 

merfeld had introduced and which has the approximate value 111 37. The mys- 

terious number 137 haunted Pauli all his life, and he did not get weary of 

stressing that its theoretical understanding would be crucial, but missing so far. 

Wolfgang Pauli was one of the most penetrating and most outspoken of crit- 

ics, merciless in dismissing work that he considered superficial or inadequate: 

"Though I have sometimes regarded something right as wrong, I have never 

regarded something wrong as right" (Pauli, 1984). Also typical for Pauli were 

phrases like "ganz falsch" ("utterly wrong") and, even worse: "nicht einmal 

falsch" ("not even wrong"). Remarks like "I don't mind your thinking slowly, 

but I mind your publishing faster than you think," forced many a scientist to

The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli 37 1 

his critical letters with "der fiirchterliche Pauli" ("the terrible Pauli") or with 

"die Geissel Gottes" ("god's whip"), but his criticism was almost always 

sound and fertile. 

Pauli was never what our experts in didactics would call a good lecturer. 

Nevertheless he was an inspiring and intoxicating teacher. In particular when 

he was not too well prepared - this happened not infrequently - one could 

experience the spirit in statu nascendi, and this was awesome. With his ruth- 

less demand for precision and lucidity, Pauli never intended to hurt his students 

or colleagues. His sharp tongue notwithstanding, his criticism was always hon- 

est and reflected not only his dislike of half-truths but also his demonic depths. 

The rational one-sidedness of the young Pauli received a strong blow in his 

early thirties, a crisis that he later described as his "big neurosis" (Pauli, 1939; 

1956a). Together with stem strokes of fate (1927 suicide of his mother; 1930 

divorce from his first wife), it was basically his excessively rational attitude 

which brought Pauli into serious inner conflicts which he could not master in- 

tellectually. Following the advice of his father, he asked the psychologist Carl 

Gustav Jung for help. After an interview, Jung recognized the outstanding sci- 

entific training and intellectual capability of Pauli. Jung recounts (Jung, 

1935a; of course, without mentioning Pauli's name): 

I saw that he was chock-full of archaic material, and I said to myself: Now I am going 

to make an interesting experiment to get that material absolutely pure, without any in- 

fluence from myself, and therefore I won't touch it. So I sent him to a woman doctor 

[Erna Rosenbaum] who was then just a beginner and who did not know much about ar- 

chetypal material ... [Pauli] was five months with that doctor, and then for three months 

he was doing the work all by himself, continuing the observations of his unconscious 

with minute accuracy. He was very gifted in this respect. 

During a period of three years, about fifteen hundred dreams of Pauli have 

been recorded, containing an extraordinary series of archetypal images. Jung 

used four hundred dreams out of this material for his 1935 Eranos lecture on 

dream symbols of the process of individuation (Jung, 1936, revised: Jung, 

1944, republished in English: Jung, 1968). Other publications by Jung which 

contain dreams of Pauli are, e.g., his Tavistock Lectures (Jung, 1935a), his 

Terry Lectures (Jung, 1937a), and his New York seminars Dream Symbols of 

the Individuation Process (Jung, 1937b). In all these lectures and publications 

the dreamer's identity has always been kept anonymous by Jung ("a scientifi- 

cally educated young man," "a great scientist," "a very famous man, who lives 

today"). It was revealed by the English editors of the transcription of Jung's 

London seminar The Symbolic Life (Jung, 1977). 

Pauli finished his analysis in 1934, and married again in the same year. Nev- 

ertheless, Jung found his dreams so important that he asked Pauli to continue 

recording and interpreting his dreams and to stay in contact with him. When 

the Second World War began, he was not yet a Swiss citizen and got leave-of-


Princeton. For five years he was in close contact with Einstein and held intense 

discussions with him, Kurt Godel, Bertrand Russell, and many others (Pais 

1982). In 1945 Pauli received the Nobel prize for the exclusion principle. One 

year later he returned to Zurich, and stayed there for the rest of his life. Late in 

1958 Pauli fell seriously ill, and on December 14 of that year he died of cancer 

in room number 137 at the Rotkreuzspital, Zurich. 

11. Source Material 

Pauli published only few articles dealing with philosophical problems (Pauli 

1994) - his technical papers are remarkably free of philosophical comments, 

but this state of affairs gives an entirely misleading impression of Pauli's wide 

range of philosophical, psychological and historical interests, including the 

foundations of science as well as the limits of scientific methodology. He was 

interested in those phenomena which elude the grasp of reason and in explor- 

ing the meaning of scientific enterprise in general. Pauli took Jung's ideas seri- 

ously. He did not share the prevalent cheap attitude, "this is all nonsense," but 

tried hard to understand. In spite of his critical stance, he was certainly not one 

of these "petty reasoning minds which cannot endure any paradoxes" de- 

nounced by Jung (Jung, 1968, Ziff. 19). 

Pauli was a compulsive writer, seemingly unable to think without a pen in 

his hand. He never published his ideas as quickly as possible but preferred to 

communicate his thoughts in long letters to his friends and colleagues, trying 

out new ideas. The often colloquial and sometimes speculative style of his let- 

ters is in striking contrast to his cautious and refined publications. A consider- 

able portion of Pauli's unpublished writings were released for publication only 

within the last few years. These consist basically of his extremely rich personal 

correspondence - many thousands of letters - and a few previously unpub- 

lished manuscripts. But a lot of further material which was never intended for 

publication, remains unpublished, inaccessible or hard to find. 

This situation is barely reflected in the papers published by Pauli himself, 

but is evident from his exchange of letters, particularly in his correspondence 

with Jung (Meier, 1992) and with his younger colleague, the physicist Markus 

Fierz. The extensive and exciting Pauli-Fierz correspondence (1 943-1958) is 

not yet published in its entirety. Its first six years are included in the third vol- 

ume of von Meyenn's edition of Pauli's scientific correspondence (Hermann et 

al. 1979; von Meyenn 1985; 1993). Further volumes of this comprehensive 

work are in preparation. Important excerpts from later letters of Pauli to Fierz 

(but without the responses of Fierz) have been published and commented in 

Laurikainen's book Beyond the Atom (Laurikainen, 1988) and in his article 

"Wolfgang Pauli and Philosophy" (Laurikainen, 1984). Two letters of Pauli to 

Hermann Levin Goldschmidt are published in Nochmals Dialogik (Gold- 

schmidt, 1990). A lot of additional manuscripts are deposited in the Pauli Let- 

ter Collection (PLC) at CERN in Geneva and in the Wissenschaftshistorische 

Sammlungen der ETH in Ziirich (for details see Atmanspacher et al., 1995).

The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli 373 

111. Carl Gustav Jung and Some Central Elements of His Psychology 

When Carl Gustav Jung (1 875- 1961 ) had finished school, he had severe dif- 

ficulties in deciding what faculty to choose at the University. His father com- 

plained (Jung, 1963): "The boy is interested in everything imaginable, but he 

does not know what he wants." He had developed strong interests not only in 

science - specifically in zoology, paleontology and geology - but also in the 

humanities and in archeology. Considering that he had to earn his living, he fi- 

nally started studying medicine at the University of Basel. Jung received his 

MD at the faculty of medicine of the University of Zurich in 1902 for a thesis 

on the psychology of occult phenomena. Then he specialized in psychiatry, 

and after a stay with Pierre Janet in Paris, he became an assistant to Eugen 

Bleuler, director of Burgholzli, a psychiatric clinic in Zurich. He was fascinat- 

ed by Freud's psychoanalysis, met Freud in Vienna in 1907, and a close father- 

and-son-like relationship began to emerge between the two (see McGuire & 

Sauerlander, 1974). In 1909, Jung moved to his new home in Kusnacht near 

Ziirich, where he lived together with his family until he died in 196 1. 

Jung's early work was based on Freud's sexual theory of repression, but 

later he began to doubt the universal significance of this theory to which Freud 

attached much emphasis. In 19 13, Jung broke with Freud and cut all connec- 

tions with his psychoanalytic school. In the ensuing period he was virtually 

isolated, and found that the personal psyche is grounded in archaic and histori- 

cal roots. In his studies of the unconscious, Jung used anthropological materi- 

al, the writings of alchemists, and carried out field studies among primitives. 

He was blessed with tremendous intuitive capabilities and he did not always 

aim at formulating his profound insights in razor-sharp and intellectually unas- 

sailable terms. He refused to reject anything which cannot be phrased in a 

clear-cut analytical language since he was aware that such efforts would be 

self-defeating. Realizing that logical contradictions are disastrous only from 

the restricted viewpoint of pure intellect, Jung took the burden to explicitly ac- 

cept thinking in paradoxes. 

Unlike Freud's conception of the unconscious as a storehouse of repressed 

emotions, thoughts, and memories, Jung's therapeutic work brought him to 

consider contents of the psyche which could not be attributed to a person's in- 

dividual development. In Jung's analytical psychology (also called complex 

psychology), this deeper realm of non-personal, collective character is called 

the collective unconscious. Its contents are not individually acquired but in- 

herited. They include instincts and other autonomous driving forces as well as 

typical modes of apprehension, which Jung, adopting a notion of St. Augus- 

tine, called archetypes (Jung, 1935b). 

According to Jung, three layers can be distinguished in the human psyche: 

the conscious, the personal unconscious, and the collective unconscious. The 

archetypes belong to the contents of the collective unconscious. Jung uses the 

term archetype to paraphrase the Platonic "forms", the eidola. Archetypes are 

universal dispositions and, like instincts, they are common to all mankind


(Jung, 1935b). Their presence can be demonstrated wherever the relevant 

records are preserved. Jung considers the collective unconscious as "objec- 

tive", prior to individual experience, and acting as a source of imagination and 

creative work. Such a transcendental realm of the psyche was alien to Freud's 

rather mechanistic conception of the unconscious. In his earlier writings, Jung 

treated archetypal phenomena as essentially psychic, but later he considered 

the unconscious as a realm which encompasses non-material and material as- 

pects and denoted the nature of the archetype as "psychoid" rather than psy- 

chic (Jung, 1969a): 

Since psyche and matter are contained in one and the same world, and moreover are in 

continuous contact with one another, and ultimately rest on irrepresentable, transcen- 

dental factors, it is not only possible but even fairly probable that psyche and matter are 

two different aspects of one and the same thing. 

Archetypes are not directly perceivable. They are logically prior to mental 

constructs like concepts or images but can manifest themselves in such con- 

structs. Typical examples are the shadow, the feminine in men, the masculine 

in women, the old wise man, the old wise woman. With respect to the mathe- 

matical sciences, the archetype of the natural numbers is of particular impor- 

tance. The totality of the personality that entails both the conscious and the 

unconscious psyche is called the "self ': an archetype representing the whole- 

ness of man and, moreover, the goal of the process of his psychic development. 

This process is called individuation in Jung's parlance, and in his treatise Psy- 

chology and Alchemy, he unfolded the thesis "that there is in the psyche a 

process that seeks its own goal independently of external factors" (Jung, 1968, 

Ziff. 4). 

For Pauli, the importance of Jung's depth psychology was not only in thera- 

py and analysis but predominantly in its potential to conceive our scientific ap- 

proach to nature via primordial ideas. Pauli favored the thesis that creative 

ideas are formed through a correspondence between the outer reality and ar- 

chetypal images. He believed that "the ideas of the unconscious will not be de- 

veloped further in the narrow frame of its therapeutic applications, but that 

their connection with the general development of the life sciences will be de- 

cisive for them" (Pauli, 1954a). Similarly, Jung was convinced (Jung, 1968, 

Ziff. 4) "that the treatment of neurosis opens up a problem which goes far be- 

yond purely medical considerations and to which medical knowledge alone 

cannot hope to do justice." 

Another example of an archetype which Jung considered to be particularly 

important was the principle of quaternity, reflected by structures like man- 

dalas, squares, and crosses. According to Jung (1969b), "quaternity is an ar- 

chetype of almost universal occurrence. It forms the logical basis for any 

whole judgment." Quaternarian structures - one could also say: structures 

based on the number four - can be interpreted as symbols of all concepts of


unbroken wholeness, whatever they may be, in both psychology and in 

physics, in the internal and in the external world. The historical significance of 

quaternity in European culture can be traced back to the Pythagoreans where 

the tetraktys was the holiest of the numbers. It is implicitly used in various 

principles of systematic philosophy (cf. Kant's or Schopenhauer's fourfold 

classification schemes), and it is clearly seen in many distinctions of every day 

life: four points of the compass, four seasons, four basic colors, four dimen- 

sions of space-time, and so on. Jung's work on psychological functions sug- 

gests the four classes of thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. Individua- 

tion, i.e., the realization of the wholeness of one's self, is thus also meant as an 

integration of these functions. Quaternity often has a 3+1 structure, in which 

one of the four elements is of particular significance and creates "a totality" to- 

gether with the other three. (An example: the dimension of time together with 

the three dimensions of space provides the four-dimensional space-time struc- 

ture of general relativity.) Jung's discussions with Pauli have often been about 

the principle of quaternity as compared to that of trinity, related to the number 

three. 

IV. The Pauli-Jung Dialog: General Aspects 

The psychology of the unconscious and modern quantum physics intro- 

duced independently new concepts (e.g., complementarity, holism) in a re- 

markably and peculiarly coincident manner. The corresponding relations be- 

tween the two fields formed the core of the Pauli-Jung-dialog. Other than 

most of his physicist fellows, Pauli tried to interpret the scientific revolution 

that relativity theory and quantum theory implied for the world view of 

physics not only from a philosophical perspective but also from a psychologi- 

cal one. And other than most psychologists, Jung seriously looked for an ob- 

jective basis that modern physics might provide for his models of the psyche. 

Pauli once wrote to Jung (Pauli, 1953a): "As physics strives after complete- 

ness, your analytical psychology longs for a home." 

From a general point of view, the key topic of the Pauli-Jung-dialog was the 

problem of psychophysical relationships. In Pauli's words (Pauli, 1952a): 

"More and more I see the key to the whole spiritual situation of our time in the 

psycho-physical problem." From the viewpoint of modern natural sciences, 

one might be tempted to speak of relationships between psyche and matter, 

across the Cartesian cut between the two. This common denominator notwith- 

standing, Pauli's and Jung's approaches were different in motivation and 

method. The articles they published together in the volume The Interpretation 

($Nature and the Psyche (Naturerklarung und Psyche, Jung and Pauli, 1952) 

illustrate both their agreement and their differences paradigmatically. 

Pauli's contribution to the joint book investigated "The Influence of Arche- 

typal Ideas on the Scientific Theories of Kepler" (Pauli, 1952b). The goal of 

this study was to explore the role of the unconscious in the development of sci-


Carl Gustav Jung Wolfgang Pauli 

Born July 26, 1875 in Kesswil (Switzerland) Born April 25, 1900 in Vienna 

1902 MD thesis "Zur Psychologie und 1918 Completes his first paper on general 

Pathologie sogenannter occulter Phino- relativity 

mene" (University of Zurich, Switzerland) 19 19- 192 1 Still a student, Pauli writes his 

1905 Habilitation at the faculty of medicine masterly exposition of special and general 

of the University of Zurich 

relativity for the Encyklopadie der mathe- 

1906-19 13 Extensive exchange of letters with matischen Wissenschaften 

Sigmund Freud 

192 1 PhD thesis Uher dus Model1 des Wass- 

1907 Jung meets Freud and becomes an ad- erstoffmolekiilions under the supervision of 

herent of Freudian psychoanalysis 

Arnold Sommerfeld at the University of 

1910 Foundation of the International Psycho- Munich 

analytic Association with Jung as president 1923 Pauli joins the faculty of the Universi- 

19 12 Jung publishes The Psychology of the ty of Hamburg 

Unconscious 

1925 Pauli announces the exclusion princi- 

1913 Open break between Jung and Freud ~ l e 

1932- 194 1 Lecturer at the ETH Zurich 1928-1958 Professor for theoretical physics 

1935 Honorary professor ETH Zurich at ETH Zurich 

1930 Pauli suggests the existence of the 

- -- 

neutrino 

- - - - .- - 

1932-57 Discussions and extensive exchange of letters between Carl G. Jung and Wolfgang Pauli 

- - - - -- - - -- 

a 1935 Jung's lectures Traumsymbole des Indi- 1940 Pauli derives the exclusion principle 

viduationsprozesses and his later book Psy- from first principles 

chologie und Alchemie include the empirical 1940- 1946 Sojourn at the Institute for Admaterial 

of dreams of Pauli 

vanced Study in Princeton 

1943 Professor at the University of Basel 

1948 Opening of the C. G. Jung Institute, 

1945 Nobel prize for physics 

Zurich 

- - - - -- - - - - 

1952 C. G. Jung and W. Pauli publish the book Naturerklarung und Psyche (English translation 

1955: The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche). 

- - -- 

C. G. Jung, W Pauli, 

Synchronizitat als ein Prinzip akausaler Der EinJluss archetypischer Vortstellungen 

Zusammenhange 

auf die Bildung natunvissenschaftlicher The- 

(Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting orien bei Kepler (The InJluence of Archetypal 

Principle) 

Ideas on the Scientijc Theories of Kepler) 

- -- -- - -. - - - - 

1955 Honorary doctor (Dr.sc.nat.h.c.) at ETH Died December 15, 1958 in Zurich 

Zurich (Switzerland) 

Died June 6, 1961 in Kusnacht (Switzerland) 

Fig. I. Pauli and Jung Timetable


show how inner images initiate and guide the process of the formation of a sci- 

entific theory. This issue clearly relates to what was later denoted as the con- 

text of discovery by historians of science, but it goes beyond this concept in ex- 

plicitly focusing on the "objective" archetypal contents of Jung's collective 

unconscious. As the archetypal image most relevant for Kepler's work, Pauli 

found the religious symbol of trinity which operates as a central motivation, 

and even "explanation", of a number of Kepler's main ideas. For instance, 

Pauli ascribed Kepler's evidence for the heliocentricity of the planetary sys- 

tem and for the three-dimensionality of space to a trinitarian world view. 

Pauli's essay contrasts Johannes Kepler ( 157 1 - 1630) with his contemporary 

Robert Fludd (1574- 1637), alchemist and Rosicrucian at Oxford, with whom 

he staged extended and intensive controversies. Fludd's world view was dom- 

inated by the symbol of quaternity instead of trinity. It included the concrete 

and dirty world of matter and evil in addition to Kepler's abstract and clean 

world of heavenly harmony. Fludd commented on Kepler's narrow perspective 

with the words: "He has hold of the tail, I grasp the head." Kepler responded: 

"I hold the tail but I hold it in my hand. You may grasp the head mentally, 

though only, I fear, in your dreams" (quoted after Pauli, 1952b, p. 155-156). 

Although Kepler accused Fludd of being unscientific, overly speculative, and 

a dreamer, Fludd's quaternarian attitude contained insights which Pauli con- 

sidered useful, e.g., in the sense of a qualitative complementation of Kepler's 

"scientific", quantitative approach. Another interesting point is that a quater- 

narian world view symbolically adds another dimension to the "trinitarian" 

dimensions of space. This is particularly remarkable in regard of the notori- 

ously underrated issue of time and the corresponding misconception of space 

and time from that period of the history of science until now (Pauli, 1947a, b). 

In contrast to the attitude of today's mainstream science, Pauli did not fol- 

low Kepler in his unconditional condemnation of Fludd's world view. Pauli re- 

alized that presently, four centuries after the Kepler-Fludd-controversy, a rec- 

onciliation of trinitarian and quaternarian approaches is appropriate rather 

than a decision for one of them and against the other. Pauli saw that Fludd was 

a part of Kepler as Kepler was a part of Fludd, and he himself felt like Kepler 

and Fludd in one person (Pauli, 1953b). Again and again, this tension turned 

out to be of strong influence in his scientific work as well as for the develop- 

ment of his personality - in Jungian terms: his individuation (Pauli, 1951). 

However, beyond these personal, individual aspects, he was also well aware 

of the collective significance of this same conflict for the difficulties and prob- 

lems of the present state of mankind as a whole. It would be unpardonable to 

dismiss these issues as his mere personal matter (Pauli, 1939). 

Jung's contribution to The Interpretation ofNature and the Psyche is enti- 

tled "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle" (Jung, 1952), a sub- 

ject which he first mentioned in an obituary for Richard Wilhelm in 1930 

(Jung, 1930). For years Jung hesitated to publish his corresponding ideas. It 

was Pauli who encouraged him to write this treatise (Jung, 1949), and the final


Fig. 2. Ouroboros (the tail eater). Inscription: Fig. 3. Fludd's quaternity as doubled trinity 

en to pan (the one, the all) (Codex (reproduced from Pauli 1952b, p. 148) 

Marcianus, Venice, loth11 lth century) 

version was the result of several revisions inspired by Pauli's numerous com- 

ments. 

Pauli's interest in synchronicity was not purely theoretical - he was haunt- 

ed by strange phenomena during his entire life. Pauli lived in a permanent state 

of tension with our technical world, and he was notoriously clumsy with ex- 

perimental tools. It is reported that his very presence in the vicinity of a labora- 

tory was sufficient to cause the breakdown of experimental equipment in most 

inexplicable ways. Pauli's sardonic humor and his sense for the burlesque per- 

mitted him to enjoy the countless anecdotes about this so-called Pauli effect 

(Weizsacker, 1959; Jordan, 1973). Their authenticity is well documented by 

many independent accounts. Indeed, several experimental physicists became 

nervous whenever Pauli approached their labs, and one of them, Otto Stern, 

categorically prohibited his close friend Pauli from ever entering his laborato- 

ry (Fierz, 1979). Pauli did not take these phenomena lightly, he considered 

them as possible synchronistic manifestations of a deep conflict between his 

rational and non-rational side. 

V. A Closer Look on Synchronicity 

What precisely is synchronicity? In a few words, two (or more) seemingly- 

accidental, but not necessarily simultaneous (Jung, 1947) events are called 

synchronistic, if the following three conditions are satisfied. 

Any presumption of a causal relationship between the events is absurd or 

even inconceivable. 

The events correspond with one another by a common meaning, often 

expressed symbolically.


Each pair of synchronistic events contains an internally produced and an 

externally perceived component. 

Particularly the last one of these criteria makes clear that synchronistic phe- 

nomena are psycho-physical phenomena, and that they are intractable by any 

science dealing with psyche or matter alone. The first criterion indicates a cen- 

tral principle of traditional science which has to be re-evaluated if synchronis- 

tic phenomena are to be studied: causality in the narrow sense of a cause-and- 

effect-relation. The second criterion suggests the concept of meaning as a' 

constructive perspective into this direction. Since synchronistic phenomena 

are not necessarily "synchronistic" in the sense of "simultaneous", syn- 

chronicity is a somewhat misleading term. For this reason Pauli preferred to 

speak of meaningful correspondences ("Sinnkorrespondenzen") under the in- 

fluence of an archetypal "acausal ordering". He considered both Jung's syn- 

chronicity and the old teleological idea of finality (in the general sense of a 

process oriented toward a goal) as particular instances of such an acausal or- 

dering which cannot be set up intentionally. Accordingly, the concept of 

chance (referring to seemingly accidental events) might also be interpretable 

in terms of meaningful correspondences. 

From the viewpoint of the history of science, Pauli suggested to regard such 

an interpretation as the reverse of what happened when Darwin introduced the 

concept of chance in order to model biological evolution. In his article "Scien- 

tific and Epistemological Aspects of Concepts of the Unconscious," Pauli 

wrote (Pauli, 1954a, p. 297): "This model of evolution is an attempt to theoret- 

ically cling, according to the ideas of the second half of the 19th century, to 

the total elimination of any finality. As a consequence, this has in some way to 

be replaced by the introduction of chance." Pauli suggested that the concept of 

synchronicity might force science to revive the historically repressed concept 

of finality as a complement to causality. In "Die Vorlesung an die fremden 

Leute" (part of the very personal essay Die Klavierstunde, Pauli, 1953c, Ziff. 

41), Pauli speculated about a "third kind of natural law which consists in cor- 

recting the fluctuations of chance by meaningful or functional coincidences of 

causally not connected events." But he hesitated to publish such thoughts. 

(Pauli, 1953c, Ziff. 45) "If one really would like to make such ideas public, it 

would be imperative to show something which is verifiable." 

Discussing finality and goal-oriented evolution with respect to the question 

of meaningful correspondences, it is essential to have criteria for the meaning 

constituting the correspondence. This was one of the big issues of the Pauli- 

Jung-correspondence between November 1950 and February 195 1 (Meier, 

1992, p. 56-73). Jung had originally claimed that such a criterion has to be 

found in the individual response (communicated by language, gestures, or 

other kinds of behavior) of a subject that understands the meaning. But how 

can understanding be judged if an individual response is missing or remains 

unrecognized? Obviously, this point is of importance for early forms of life 

and, in particular, for so-called inanimate matter.


Postponing the difficult question of "meaning", Pauli and Jung generalized 

the notion of meaningful correspondence to similarity or mimesis ("~hn- 

lichkeit"), holistic order ("ganzheitliche Anordnung"), or simply to correspon- 

dence. Pauli suggested to start detailed studies of synchronicity in strictly non- 

psychological situations (e.g., radioactive decay). 

Jung , however, favored the reverse approach. He focused on synchronistic 

events on the fully psychological level (even including psychokinesis) and ex- 

pected that chance in the sense of physics, reinterpreted in a finalistic manner, 

would turn out as a special case under certain restrictions (Jung, 1951). While 

Pauli's approach would allow one to start within the framework of a strict de- 

tachment of the psyche of an observer and any observed phenomenon, Jung's 

would clearly imply that the observer's psyche is implicitly involved in any 

experimental setup or result. 

This difference points to the decades-old and notorious question of observer 

detachment. In conventional quantum mechanics, the so-called "observer" is 

always an inanimate observer, that is, an observing apparatus. In spite of the 

fact that even such an observing apparatus is never completely detached from 

the observed system, the achievements of modern physics imply that under ap- 

propriate circumstances it is possible to place the conceptual cut (the so-called 

Heisenberg cut) between the two in such a way that the interactions can be 

minimized with respect to the observables under study. In contrast, an animate 

observer, e.g., a human observer's psyche, is not at any place part of the stan- 

dard formalism of quantum mechanics and does therefore play no role as far as 

a physical description of external material reality is concerned. Although Pauli 

always stressed the latter point, he was not happy with this state of affairs 

(compare Pauli, 1956b). In a letter to Fierz (Pauli, 1954b) he expressed doubts 

that matter is always treated correctly, "if we observe it, as we do in quantum 

mechanics, namely leaving the internal state of the observer totally out of con- 

sideration." However, it must be clearly kept in mind that this statement is an 

offspring from his speculative Fluddian side, and must not be taken as more 

than it is: an honest indication of an important but unresolved problem. 

Pauli's compliance with a strictly detached observer psyche corresponds to 

his scientific Keplerian side. As far as we know today, chance on the non-psy- 

chological, purely physical level is "blind chance", hence governed by the em- 

pirically reproducible statistical rules of mathematical probability theory. As 

opposed to this, many psychological experiments suggest the existence of a 

"decline effect", characterized by decreasing statistical significance with in- 

creasing number of "identical" experiments. Pauli and Jung discussed this fea- 

ture in terms of a possible complementarity of statistical method and synchro- 

nistic events, indicating that synchronistic phenomena cannot be corroborated 

by statistical methods as they are usually applied. They proposed that the triad 

"momentum-energy, space-time, causality" should be complemented by "syn- 

chronicity", thus once more emphasizing a transition from a trinitarian to a 

quaternarian scheme. During the last decade a number of pertinent investiga-


tions have been carried out in the field of parapsychology, an area of research 

which Pauli often mentioned as a hopeful candidate for a better understanding 

of synchronistic phenomena: "If the positive results in the yet controversial 

field of 'extra sensory perception' can be verified, this could lead to conse- 

quences which are totally unforeseeable at present" (Pauli, 1956b). 

VI. Matter and Psyche as Two Aspects of One Reality 

If synchronicity has to do with some kind of holistic order, then it is a natur- 

al question to ask for the ordering factors. Pauli and Jung agreed that matter 

and psyche should be understood as complementary aspects of the same reali- 

ty which is governed by common ordering principles: the archetypes (Pauli, 

1952b; Pauli, 1953d; Jung, 1953). This implies that the archetypes are ele- 

ments of a realm beyond matter and psyche. Their influence reaches concur- 

rently into both domains. It is their phenomenological appearance, not their 

intrinsic status, that refers either to internal psychological or external physical 

events. The notion of "psychoid archetypes" which Jung used in his later writ- 

ings reflects this important distinction from a purely psychological relevance. 

These concepts - admittedly not easy to grasp for a traditionally educated 

scientist - have been sketched in a letter from Pauli to Fierz as early as 1948 

(Pauli, 1948a): 

The ordering factors must be considered beyond the distinction of "physical" and 

"'psychic" - as Plato's "ideas" share the character of a notion with that of a "natural 

force". I am very much in favor of calling these ordering factors "archetypes", but then 

it would be inadmissible to define them as contents of the psyche. Instead, the inner 

images are psychic manifestations of the archetypes, which, however, also would have 

to create, produce, cause everything in the material world that happens according to the 

laws of nature. The laws of the material world would thus refer to the physical mani- 

festations of the archetypes ... Each natural law should then have an inner correspon- 

dence and vice versa, even if this is not always immediately visible today. 

Unzcrstorbare Encrgic 

Inkonstariter Lu;amm:n. 

Kon;?zntel Zusammcnhang I hang durch Kontingenz 

durch Wirkung bzw. Gleichartigkcit oder 

(Kausalitat) I aSinnx (Synchronizitlt) 

Raum-Zeitkontinuum 

Fig. 4: Quaternity of momentum-energy, space-time, causality, and synchronicity according to 

Pauli und Jung (reproduced from Jung, 1952, p. 102).


With his strong emphasis on inner images (and symbols), the Platonist side 

of Pauli can clearly be recognized. But he also knew that Plato's "mysticism is 

so light that it overlooks large fields of darkness - what we today are neither 

allowed nor able to do." (Pauli, 1956b) Whatever these fields of darkness 

might refer to, the lightness of the Platonic world view in this conception re- 

flects itself in the trinitarian attitude of one archetypal level with its two 

realms of manifestation. 

However, this picture alone would be unbalanced with respect to Pauli's 

other, Fludd-like, quaternarian side. In the context of his corresponding inter- 

ests, a number of similar ideas have been formulated in his privately distrib- 

uted essay Modern Examples of Background Physics (Pauli, 1948b). Here he 

advocates the opinion that a complete quaternarian world view 

would not show up within physics alone, but it could well be related to the wholeness of 

physics and psychology .... It would be conceivable, and it even seems plausible to me, 

that there might be phenomena for which the full quaternity plays an essential role. 

Later in the same essay, Pauli emphasizes that physics by definition excludes 

anything having to do with judgments, feelings, and emotions - psychological 

forces which also exceed the clean and nice trinitarian frame of archetypes 

with their manifestations in natural laws and the material world. 

Alluding to Einstein's claim of an alleged incompleteness of quantum mechanics, 

he concludes (Pauli, 1948b, p. 192; see also Pauli, 1954b): "However, 

this does not indicate an incompleteness of quantum theory within physics, but 

an incompleteness of physics within the totality of life." 

This strong statement also confines the sense in which the psychoid realm of 

the archetypes might be the realm of a neutral, universal language for psyche 

and matter for which Pauli and Jung have yearned so strongly (compare Pauli, 

1948~). Pauli agreed with Jung that in ancient and medieval alchemy one can 

recognize first steps into such a direction. However, Pauli pointed out "that the 

alchemistic attempt to establish a psycho-physical universal language failed 

because it referred to a visible concrete reality," and that such an effort seems 

to be much more promising if it "would refer to a deeper invisible reality." 

While alchemy overemphasized the concrete (Pauli, 1953e; Heisenberg, 

1959), today's situation rather seems to be the reverse. If not only abstract intellectual 

reflection, but also the concrete experience of life is relevant for such 

a mode of communication, then its essence cannot possibly be covered by 

something like a final unified theory, a world formula, or a theory of everything. 

All these attempts at universal models include - in Jungian terms - 

the potential aspect of an implicit urge toward the exertion of power. At the 

same time they have a strong flavor of a theory of a stomach that ignores digestion. 

The cartoon with which Pauli commented his withdrawal from his own 

and Heisenberg's work on such an approach (a unified spinor theory of elementary 

particles) expresses this better than a thousand words.

, The 

Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli 383 

VII. What Does All This Mean For Us Today? 

It was a basic tenet of Pauli that the walk on the ridge between psychology 

and physics is as difficult as the way "between the scylla of a blue dust of mysticism 

and the Charybdis of a sterile rationalism" (Pauli, 1954~). In a letter to 

Fierz, in which Pauli (1954b) meditates about "holistic relationships between 

inside and outside which present science does not contain" and which might 

imply correlations of the inner state of an observer with the observed, Pauli 

warns (Pauli, 1 954b): 

I have here reached the limits of what might be knowable in the framework of contem- 

porary knowledge, and I have even approached the realm of "magic" ... I am very well 

aware that this amounts to the threatening danger of a regression into most primitive su- 

perstition, that this would be much worse than Einstein's regressive obligation to clas- 

sical field physics, and that everything depends on retaining the positive results and 

values of rationality. 

If we take Pauli's views seriously, we have to re-evaluate fundamental ques- 

tions in natural science and ponder about the repressed concepts and ideas in 

Western culture. Such a re-evaluation involves cases like the psychological 

and physical aspects of space and time, the old question of whether the psy- 

chic state of the observer be correlated with the external material course of na- 

ture, the problem of finality and its relation to chance, the role of meaning in 

the exact sciences, and the relations between "inside" and "outside". More- 

over, such an endeavor requires us to consider additional topics like conscious 

Fig. 5 Pauli's comment in a letter to leading physicists all over the world in response to Heisen- 

berg's radio announcement of a so-called "world formula" in 1958 (Pauli, 1958).


and unconscious, light and shadow, good and evil, and the connections be- 

tween them. In one or another way all these examples may be put under the 

common heading of the psychophysical problem, i.e., the problem of the rela- 

tionships between psyche and matter. 

This problem may be one of the crucial issues in a future-oriented science as 

well as society. Typical scientific aspects (besides those points already raised) 

are the fields of psychosomatic relationships and the so-called "hard problem" 

of cognitive science: the interface between psychology and neurophysiology. 

Today there is a strong tendency to tackle all these age-old questions afresh, 

on a basis of scientific knowledge that is more solid and more profound than 

ever before. The Pauli-Jung-dialog does not solve any of the issues indicated. 

But it helps to recognize a number of problems more clearly. In this sense it 

might serve as a starting point to define a reasonable research program. Never- 

theless, it would be overly naive and unwise to believe that the psychophysical 

problem can be ultimately resolved by science alone and to dismiss the non- 

rational side of the whole as irrelevant. Metaphorically speaking, this would 

amount to building an amazing complex of thoughts, but living in a barn next 

door. 

Pauli insisted that in the future we can no longer ignore the relationship be- 

tween our knowledge of the external material world and the inner world of 

meaning-giving contents of the psyche. We have to acknowlcdge the rational 

scientific approach as but one way of seeing and interpreting the world. A 

complementary approach implies that our investigations of reality must not 

any more deal with matter and psyche separately but that we have to take both 

sides into one common account. This is easily said, but it obviously addresses 

enormously difficult and ambitious problems. The normative principles of 

contemporary science - often tacit, hence applied without awareness of their 

meaning and consequences - will have to be specified and criticized more ex- 

plicitly. In this regard (and others), we need an ecology of mind in addition to 

an ecology of matter. 

Wholeness seems to be an extremely influential archetype in our time - it 

radiates an immense fascination and naturally triggers rejection to the same 

extent. Hence not only enthusiasm, but also much resistance is to be expected 

- against possible misunderstandings and abuses of a holistic science - and 

by no means will all the objections be simply wrong-headed or pointless. At 

present it is hard to be specific about details in this regard, but the issue of a hu- 

mane science with scientists who feel responsible both for their research on its 

scientific level and also for the way it is practiced on a day-to-day-basis is cer- 

tainly of utmost significance. Moreover, within a perspective that includes the 

dignity of human beings and respect for nature, ethical and religious aspects 

can no longer be left aside as subordinate details.


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Pauli, W. (1994). Writings on Physics and Philosophy. Ed. by C. P. Enz and K. von Meyenn. 

Berlin: Springer. 

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Journal of Scientijc Exploration, Vol. I 1, No. 3, pp. 387-394, 1997 0892-33 10197 


GUEST COLUMN: 

WHO LIVES? WHO DIES? HELPLESS PATIENTS AND ESP 

ARTHUR S. BERGER 

International Institute for the Study of Death, P: 0. Box 63-0026, Miami, FL 33163-0026 

The Debated Questions 

On the night of June 11, 1983, Nancy Cruzan lost control of her car. It over- 

turned. She was found lying face down in a ditch without respiratory or cardiac 

functions. Paramedics restored her breathing and heartbeat at the accident 

scene. Unconscious and with cerebral contusions and anoxia, she was taken to 

the Mt. Vernon State Hospital in Missouri. She suffered permanent brain dam- 

age, went into a coma and, three weeks later, lapsed into a persistent vegetative 

state. She was kept alive by nutrition and hydration delivered through a gas- 

trostomy tube implanted in her stomach. She could breathe. But she could not 

swallow and gave no evidence of being aware of her environment. 

Five years later her parents asked that her feeding tube be removed even 

though the removal would cause her death. A Missouri trial court authorized 

the removal of the tube because Nancy Cruzan had made some statements to a 

friend that, if so sick or injured that she could not live at least "halfway nor- 

mally", she would not wish to continue her life. But the Missouri Supreme 

Court, finding the friend's statements unreliable and not established by clear 

and convincing evidence, reversed the lower court. The U. S. Supreme Court 

resolved the issue when it upheld the Missouri Supreme Court: Missouri could 

insist on the continued treatment of the patient in the absence of clear and con- 

vincing evidence that before her accident she had expressed her wishes that 

treatment be stopped (Cruzan vs. Director, 1990). With her case, the national 

debate, ignited by the almost identical case of Karen Ann Quinlan in 1976, 

flared up again over the issue of medical decision-making for patients whose 

mental states were questionable. Apart from the legal issue in the Cruzan case, 

there are troubling medical and ethical issues that remain unresolved. 

When should life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn or withheld from adult 

terminally ill patients, whose mental states are different from those of their 

caregivers or families, and who have left no advance directives and have not 

made any clear or convincing prior oral or written statements about the use of 

such treatment? How can society protect helpless Cruzan-type patients who 

cannot speak to us of their values and choices? Two beliefs underlie this paper: 

that medical treatment choices now being made by others for such patients are 

highly suspect because, as will be shown in a later section, the standards they

388 A. S. Berger 

are to meet allow conflicts of interest and guesswork; and that such patients 

need to be protected against the twin dangers of being kept alive when they 

would have chosen to die and of being allowed to die when they would have 

chosen to live. 

What creative approach can be devised and used to try to elicit evidence of 

the live - or die treatment decisions for Cruzan-type patients and to help them 

communicate, if they could, so that others can carry out their instructions? 

Scope of the Problem 

The scope and importance of the problem becomes obvious when we look 

at the numbers of people affected by it. Every day there are about 10,000 pa- 

tients in the U. S. with medical conditions like Nancy Cruzan's (Bopp, 1990) 

and, as medical technology advances, so will their number. Since surveys 

show that a huge percentage of people have not executed advance directives, 

such as living wills or designations of people to make treatment decisions for 

them (AMA Survey, 1988), we can infer that few of the 10,000 unconscious 

patients have made advance directives. 

Decision-Makers 

In the Cruzan case, the U. S. Supreme Court suggested (See 497 U. S. 261 at 

279) that every competent adult, whether or not terminally ill or confronted by 

imminent death, has the right to refuse medical treatment even if it means 

death. It can be argued that adult patients, like Nancy Cruzan, who are not 

competent in the conventional sense continue to have this same substantive 

right. But how can they exercise it when they did not make an advance direc- 

tive prior to losing their ability to communicate their wishes and when they 

don't have the present ability personally and directly to express their choices? 

This is the real question. The only way to prevent this right from being lost or 

destroyed, the only way to give it meaning, is for decision-makers to act for 

them and to exercise their rights to consent to or refuse treatment. Decision- 

makers may be surrogates, such as legal guardians appointed by a court or 

someone designated by a patient in an advance directive, or may be proxies 

authorized by a state statute to act. In de facto practice, proxies generally will 

be family members believed to be most familiar with the patient's values. 

Subjective and Objective Standards 

The decisions of surrogates or proxies, however, must conform to one of 

two standards. The prevailing one is the "subjective" standard or legal doc- 

trine of "substituted judgment". It requires the decision-maker to make a deci- 

sion that the evidence shows the patient would have made if the patient had 

been able to do so. If the evidence is lacking or fails to establish what the pa- 

tient would have decided, an "objective" standard is to be met. This standard

Who Lives? Who Dies? 389 

requires that a decision be made of what treatment would be in the "best inter- 

ests" of the patient. 

Criticisms of Standards 

Both standards are open to criticism. Where a patient like Nancy Cruzan has 

left no advance directive or made no clear statements before an accident, the 

"subjective" standard may be used but is highly suspect as a basis for pulling or 

not pulling plugs. For in these cases, decision-makers are permitted to base 

their decisions on the past values or philosophical, religious or moral beliefs of 

patients or their reactions to other people's illnesses or medical situations. But 

no matter how reasonable they may appear to be, inferences from such values, 

beliefs or reactions cannot be equated with clear and convincing evidence. 

There is no evidential basis for decisions to pull or not pull plugs. 

Moreover, when no advance and clear instructions have been given by a pa- 

tient, decision-making by surrogates or proxies is, to quote one court, "at best 

only an optimistic approximation" (Jobes, 1987). The decisions of surrogates 

or proxies, families in particular, may actually violate a patient's wishes about 

treatment because they may be tainted by improper motives and self-interest 

(Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992). Others have written: "far from having scien- 

tific accuracy and objectivity - in most cases [surrogate or proxy decision 

making] represents a complicated form of guesswork, suffused by the decision 

maker's biases" (Gutheil and Applebaum, 1983). 

Whereas the "subjective" standard focuses on a patient's prior expressed 

statements, values or beliefs, the "objective" test concentrates only on the pre- 

sent physical condition, treatment or pain of the patient. It forces decision- 

makers to arrive at personal evaluations about what may be burdensome or 

painful or bad for a given patient and what will be good or pleasurable. One 

court has rejected the standard because the "decision-maker seems to make 

the decision which a public referendum or benign leader would reach" 

(Browning, 1989). Besides, according to the American Academy of Neurology 

(American Academy of Neurology, 1989), when a patient is in a persistent 

vegetative state as was Nancy Cruzan, for example, the patient cannot experi- 

ence pain or burdensome treatment. The "objective" test makes no sense in 

their cases. 

Both the "subjective" and "objective" standards should be rejected as im- 

practicable in Cruzan-type cases. 

Yet we cannot abandon decision-making by surrogates or proxies. It remains 

the only way in which the right of a patient without decision-communicating 

capacity to refuse or accept life-sustaining treatment can be made meaningful. 

Since decision-making by surrogates or proxies seems the best legal machin- 

ery we have at present, my proposal is to try to find a new approach that may 

make it more ethically sound, better and more effective for that vulnerable cat- 

egory of patients who, like Nancy Cruzan, cannot speak to us in ways to which 

we are accustomed and have left no clear proof of their desires. We need to


discover means for increasing the probability that a surrogate's or proxy's de- 

cision to stop or continue treatment for such patients is neither guesswork nor 

suspect and fairly replicates the wishes of Cruzan-type patients in their current 

medical situations. 

To this end, first I will try to explicate an approach in which attempts can be 

made to interact extrasensorially with the patients in the category described to 

learn the patients' present wishes. Then I will describe a methodology that can 

be used in order to record objective evidence of the interaction, if any. This 

methodology is only suggestive and is offered in the hope of sparking interest 

and stimulating better clinical or research protocols and trials by the scientific 

community. 

ESP Hypothesis 

The existence of at least prima facie evidence of ESP was established by the 

earliest reports of the English and American societies for psychical research 

and continues to be established by recent research (Dunne, et. al., 1983; Hon- 

orton, 1985; Ullman, et. al., 1973; Utts, 1996). I propose that we put ESP to 

use as another mechanism to increase the probability that medical decision- 

making for Cruzan-type patients replicates the wishes of the helpless patient. 

The hypothesis proposed in this paper is that there is a relationship between 

ESP and Cruzan-type patients who are in states entirely different from their 

waking states and do not appear to experience sensory input. Such states ap- 

pear to be psi-conducive. 

Altered States of Consciousness 

That ESP experiences can take place when people are fully awake is shown 

by anecdotal reports and such experiments as J. B. Rhine's use of Zener cards 

in card-guessing experiments with alert subjects at Duke University. An al- 

tered state of consciousness was not required. But research into these states - 

such as investigations of ESP and meditation (Schmeidler, 1970), of ESP and 

hypnosis (Ryzl, 1962), and by use of the Ganzfeld sensory deprivation proce- 

dure that disoriented people subjected to patternless light and boring white 

noise through headphones (Honorton, 1983) -has demonstrated that some al- 

tered states are productive of significantly high ESP scores. 

An altered state of consciousness is the experiencing of levels of the uncon- 

scious that we do not enter during our normal waking states. It differs from the 

normal state and is characterized by the reduction or elimination of awareness 

of environmental stimuli. It may be produced by taking psychedelic drugs or 

be experienced from time to time in dreams or during meditation. The psychia- 

trist Nils Jacobson adds to this list "loss of consciousness, coma" (Jacobson, 

1971) , the condition in which the Cruzan-type patients who provide no evi- 

dence of awareness of external stimulation are to be found. Their altered states

Who Lives? Who Dies? 39 1 

patients are appropriate subjects for ESP experiments and may be capable of 

receiving information from us by non-sensory means. 

Dreams 

Since some dreams seem to be the carriers of spontaneous paranormal expe- 

riences, an important investigation of their relation to ESP was conducted in 

the Dream Laboratory at Maimonides Hospital in Brooklyn, New York, where 

a sleep research laboratory was directed by Dr. Montague Ullman and psychol- 

ogist and parapsychologist Stanley Krippner. In 1964, the sleep cycles of sub- 

jects were monitored by electroencephalogram and the measurement of rapid- 

eye movements. When a subject came out of a dream and awakened, the 

subject would record a narrative of the dream. In another part of the hospital, 

agents had been concentrating on randomly selected target material, such as 

art prints, to see if they could use ESP to influence the content of the subject's 

dreams. In nine of the twelve studies, positive results were obtained (Ullman & 

Krippner with Vaughn, 1973). 

A second basis for the hypothesis comes from these positive results. They 

strongly suggest that paranormal influence may be exerted on patients who are 

not awake and, for all we know, may be also dreaming. 

Mental Impairment 

A third source of support for the hypothesis originates in anecdotal and ex- 

perimental accounts in the parapsychological literature that imply that suc- 

cessful ESP outcomes may be enhanced in people whose brains have been in- 

jured from a variety of causes. Although it is not the brain injury itself that 

results in these successes, the injury may be a factor that facilitates or induces 

the production of paranormal phenomena. For example, significant results 

were obtained in a series of ESP tests with 18 hospitalized patients suffering 

from cerebral concussion (Schmeidler, 1952) while another experimenter ob- 

tained extraordinarily high results in ESP tests of 25 brain-damaged, 25 mon- 

goloid and 25 mentally defective subjects (Shields, 1976). The suggestion 

made by these accounts is that patients such as Nancy Cruzan may be predis- 

posed to an ESP transfer of information because of an impairment of brain 

functions. 

Nevertheless there remains a towering problem. It is the counter-hypothesis 

that a test result ostensibly providing a patient's expression of treatment pref- 

erence has in reality come not from the patient but from family members, the 

hospital staff or the experimenters themselves who are expressing what they 

believe is best for the patient (or what they believe is best for themselves). 

Whatever methodology is designed, it must meet this counter-explanation and 

lead to a firm conclusion that the test result is inexplicable except as a response 

from the patient. Safeguards must exclude all outside sources and point clear-


expression. Since patients will be unable to corroborate any expression or 

communication by normal means, the validity of a test result must be estab- 

lished without doubt by some other method. If it is not, we shall be left by the 

experiment where we are now - ignorant or uncertain of the patient's real 

wishes and using guesswork to decide if the patient lives or dies. 

Overcoming Difficulties: Methodology 

It is not my aim in this paper to provide any detailed experimental procedure 

but only a methodology that may show the operational utility of ESP with 

Cruzan-type patients, and that may ignite others to develop clinical or research 

protocols. 

It is my belief that if devices were to be used and experiments could be de- 

signed to watch for and record a patient's body language to see if there was any 

correlation between autonomic activity, such as heart beat, brain (alpha) activ- 

ity, rate or sound of breathing or changes of skin resistance, and the patient's 

response to ESP stimuli, the methodology would effectively: a) meet the 

counter-hypothesis described by showing that the unconscious patient and 

only the patient is responding to questions about treatment preference; and b) 

determine whether there is evidence that stimuli have reached the unconscious 

patient through extrasensory communication. 

To accomplish these results, any number of devices might be used - for ex- 

ample, the electroencephalogram to record changes in electrical activity in the 

brain or the psycho-galvanometer to measure changes in skin resistance. Let us 

focus on the plethysmograph used to measure the volume of blood in the 

peripheral blood vessels of the patient. When the volume fluctuates, the fluctu- 

ation suggests alterations in the patient's emotions and responses. 

In extrasensory experiments with patients, the finger of the patient would be 

inserted into a plethysomograph cup. In the design of the experiment, an ex- 

perimenter using the sensory method or a blind agent or "sender" using ESP, 

would transmit questions dealing with emotionally laden subjects and about 

which the patient was known to have strong preferences. Each trial would be 

divided into general subjects -politics, personalities, sports, ideas, for exam- 

ple - some of which the patient was known to favor highly, desire, choose or 

value, and some of which the patient was known to disfavor, oppose, reject. 

The trials would also include the specific subject of whether the patient want- 

ed life-sustaining treatment administered so that the patient would go on living 

or wanted the treatment terminated and to be allowed to die. The plethysmo- 

graphic deflections would record and establish the intensity of the patient's op- 

posite emotions and responses with regard to general subjects chosen or reject- 

ed, as well as the specific subject of life versus death. If the plethysomograph 

has shown a deflection in one direction for what the patient favors and a deflec- 

tion in the opposite direction for what the patient rejects, it has provided the 

means of getting objective evidence that a sensory or ESP channel of commu- 

nication had been established between the patient and experimenters and that

Who Lives? Who Dies? 393 

information has been received by the patient, of the patient's emotional state, 

and of a response received from the patient about his or her wishes concerning 

the termination of life-sustaining treatment which response points clearly at 

the patient as its source. 

Conclusion 

In termination of treatment cases, we are confronted by the question of when 

or whether an adult terminally ill patient without the ability to communicate 

health care decisions should die or should live. The question is forced on us be- 

cause the patient has failed to leave an advance directive or to express con- 

vincingly prior oral or written wishes regarding the withholding or withdraw- 

ing of life-sustaining treatment. In this kind of situation the helpless patient is 

most exposed to surrogate or proxy decision-making based on poor standards 

and to abuse. This is an area that invites experiments to establish ESP commu- 

nication with such a patient. They hold out the promise of getting more defi- 

nite evidence than we have now of the real wishes of the patient in the patient's 

present situation and of protecting his or her interests. We would be remiss in 

our ethical responsibility to safeguard the patient if we ignore the opportuni- 

ties the experimental method presents. 

References 

AMA Survey of Physicians and Public Opinion on Health Care Issues. (1988). Chicago: American 

Medical Association, 29. 

Bopp, J. R. (1990). Choosing death for Nancy Cruzan. Hustings Center Report, 20,42. 

Browning, Estelle M. (1989). In re Guardianship of, 543 So. 2d 258, 275 (Florida Supreme 

Court). 

Cruzan vs. Director (1990). Missouri Department of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 11 1 L. Ed. 2d 224, 

110 S. Ct. 841. 

Dunne, B. J., Jahn, R. G. and Nelson, R. D. (1983). Precognitive Remote Perception. Technical 

Note PEAR 83003 Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Engineering Anomolies Research 

Laboratory. 

Emanuel, E. J. & Emanuel, L. L. (1992). Proxy decision making for incompetent patients: an ethical 

and empirical analysis. Journal of the American Medical Association, 267,2067. 

Emanuel, Z. & Emanuel, L. (1989). The medical directive: a new comprehensive advance care 

document. Journal of the American Medical Association, 261,328. 

Ethics and Humanities Subcommittee of the Academy of Neurology (1989). American Academy 

of Neurology position statements on certain aspects of the care and management of the persistent 

vegetative patient. Neurology, 39, 125. 

Gutheil, T. G. & Applebaum, P. S. (1983). Substituted judgment: best interests in disguise. Hasting~ 

Center Report, 13,8. 

Honorton, C. (1985). Meta-analysis of psi Ganzfeld research: A response to Hyman. Journal of 

Parapsychology, 49,5 1. 

Honorton, C. (1983). Response to Hyman's critique of psi Ganzfeld. In W. G. Roll, J. Beloff and 

R. White (Eds.) Research in Parapsychology 1982. Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press, 23. 

Jacobson, N. 0. (1971). Life Without Death? On Parapsychology, Mysticism and the Question of 

Survival. New York: Dell Publishing Co., p. 218. 

Jobes (1987). In re 108 N. J. 397. 

May, E. C. (1996). The American Institutes for Research Review of the Department of Defense's 

STAR GATE Program: A commentary. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 10,89.


Ryzl, M. (1962). Training the psi faculty by hypnosis. Journal of the Socletvfor Psvchlcal Research, 

41,234 

Schmeidler, C. R. (1 970). High ESP scores after a swami's brief introduction in meditation and 

breathing. Journal of the American Society jor Ps~chiccil Research., 64,100. 

Schmeidler, C. (1952) Rohrschachs and ESP scores ot patients suffering froin cerebral concussion. 

Jourrzcll oJ Pcir-apsvchologv, 16, 80. 

Shields, E. (1976) Severely mentally retarded children'spsi ability. In J. D. Morrls, W. C;. Roll and 

R. L. Morr~s,(Eds.). Re.\earc.h ~n Purapsvcholog\' 1975. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow 

Press. 135,139. 

Ullman M. and K~~ppner S. with Vaughan, A. (1973). Drennl Snrtlie.\ and Telepczthv. New York: 

Macmillan. 

Utts, J. ( 1996). A\se\\mcnt of the evldence for psychic functioning. Journal of Sclenlific Explorc~iiorr, 

10, 3 

Arthur S Berger w:~\ educated at New Yorh Unl- 

versity School of Law where he recc~ved the 

Newrnan f'rize tor Public Law and a Certificate of 

Honor for Scholarship. He was elected tncmber of 

New York University School of Law Revlew and 

received a Juris Doctor c.ltr?r luude. I-Te wa\ adm~t- 

ted to the Bar of the State of New Yorh, was 1:ac- 

ulty Assistant, New York University School of 

Law and Municipal Attorney for School Distr~cts 

and Municipalities. 

He is the author of over 60 publicat~ons, in- 

cluding six books, two books co-authored, four 

books edited, chapters contributed to seven book, 

and numerous papers appearing in profe5sional 

journals. His writings cover the fields of health 

ethics and law, thanatology and parapsychology. 

He is the rccipicnt of two grants to pursue re- 

search into dying and death. He is the winner of 

the Ashby Memorial Award of the Academy of 

Religion and Psychical Research. Currently he 

serves as Councilman, City of Aventura, Florida; 

Director, International Institute for the Study of 

Death; President, Survival Research Foundation; 

Mcinber ol Urocrhi~s Curi~lrlretees ol ~wo large 

inctropol~tan hospitals; Adjunct Professor, 

Broward College, Continuing Education for 

Health Professionals; Adjunct Professor, Elders 

In\titute, Florida Internat~onal Ilniversity.




Comments on Walach & Schmidt's 

"Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classical Experimenter Effect" 

We wish to comment upon the article by Harald Walach and Stefan Schmidt 

(JSE, 1 1, p. 59, 1997) entitled: "Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classical Ex- 

periment Effect: An Experimental, Double-Blind Investigation of Unconven- 

tional Information Transfer," which contains a number of serious errors, inval- 

idating their conclusions: 

I. The Stacking EfSect 

Using the same randomized target sequence for more than one subject, 

causes the subject's score to be dependent, rather than independently drawn 

samples from the population. This problem invalidates the evaluation by 

Walach & Schmidt of: 

a. Overall information transfer 

b. Differences between experimenters 

c. Correlation between numbers of hits obtained and paranormal belief 

scores by the subjects 

d. Cohen's h 

The stacking effect is mentioned in textbooks on parapsychology (Rhine, 

1973; Wolman, 1977; Edge, Morris, Palmer and Rush, 1986). Its solution is 

either to apply a majority vote procedure or the more sophisticated method 

due to Greville (1 944). 

2. The Closed Deck 

This is also well-known in parapsychological literature. In this case, it 

means that by fixing the members of targets of each kind, the 20 trials are not 

independent of each other. This is most easily demonstrated by the fact that if 

19 of the targets are known, the 20th can be predicted with certainty. 

This also has to be taken into account if a majority-vote evaluation is under- 

taken. 

3. Correction for Multiple Analyses 

If the experimenter effect was indeed a pre-specified hypothesis, the proper 

analysis would have been an evaluation of the variance between experi- 

menters. Selecting the best experimenter out of 3, at least involves introducing


a selection factor of 3. Thereby, the p value of this "finding" becomes p = .12, 

two-tailed, for experiments 1 and 2 combined. 

Walach and Schmidt subsequently add experiment 3 to the - doubtful - 

result of experiments 1 and 2. Switching from 2-tailed to 1 -tailed testing is not 

exactly unveiling the result: their "p


While it is true that we had to take into account the stacking effect, it is com- 

pletely misleading (a) to say that we have not, and (b) to claim that the stacking 

effect invalidates all our data and conclusions. 

In the literature quoted, the stacking effect is discussed within a parametric 

framework of statistical evaluation. This, however, is not applicable to our 

evaluation, since we chose a non-parametric approach using the Wilcoxon 

test, which calculates exact probabilities and does not rely on parametric as- 

sumptions. Apart from that, the Wilcoxon test is in fact applicable to depen- 

dent data. Therefore, it is wrong to say that this effect hampers our conclu- 

sions. 

We tested for position effects (as was mentioned in the paper and was known 

to Houtkooper), which would be likely candidates to reflect a stacking effect. 

We found only one significant departure in 20 tests at a p-level of 5%, which is 

easily explained by chance departure. 

2. Closed Decks 

The closed deck situation also creates dependency in the data, at least in 

principle. The closed deck problem is discussed in the literature mainly in the 

context of a fixed range of possibilities - if this range was also known to the 

test subjects, and in case of feedback. It would have been a problem for our ex- 

periment, had the subjects known the chance expectation, and had they been 

given feedback, which was not the case. The way the experiment was actually 

set up, the subjects knew neither how many different or identical probes they 

would encounter, nor how many of one kind they could possibly find. There- 

fore, the usual problems which beset experiments with closed decks can not be 

claimed to invalidate our data. Furthermore, the closed deck situation would 

have forced us to correct for data dependency, had we used the parametric ap- 

proach, which we didn't, as was pointed out above. Thus, it can hardly be 

claimed that this invalidates our findings. 

3. Multiple Testing and Statistical Evaluation 

We broke the code after experiment 2, found this experimenter effect at a 

two-sided and uncorrected p-value of p = 0.04, after an exploratory test. It is 

common and accepted practice to do exploratory tests at somewhat lower lev- 

els of significance and without correction for multiplicity of testing. So we do 

not see a problem with that. Then we made an additional, prespecified hypoth- 

esis. After experiment 3, we tested the complete body of one-sided data, since 

it was prespecified in direction, and found ap-value of 0.01. This, of course, is 

uncorrected, but it is immediately obvious that the correctedp-value would be 

p = 0.03 orp < 0.05. One could argue, whether this was correct, or whether one 

should have used a two-sided test, which would have given ap-value of 0.06. 

But we feel that fixing the problem at the exact p-value or at the question,


current standard statistical wisdom that not only should p-values, being quite 

arbitrary conventions, be considered, since they depend on sample-size and 

effect-size, but whether effects themselves are stable and sizeable (Utts, 1991 ; 

Cohen, 1987; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rosen- 

thal, 1991; Rosenthal, 1994). In the same vein, as can be seen from our data, 

the effect of experimenter 3 is always in the same direction, and of about the 

same size. This, and not the p-values themselves, is in our minds the interest- 

ing phenomenon. We have used a simple estimation of effect size d, following 

Cohen (1987), of d = 0.51 for all three experiments together, 

d = 0.53 for experiments I and 2, and d = 0.46 for experiment 3 alone. We dis- 

covered the experimenter effect after experiments 1 and 2 had been finished, 

were very surprised, formulated an a-priori hypothesis, found it again after ex- 

periment 3 alone (non-significantly, though, since statistical power was 

small), and it was remarkably stable in size. 

Houtkooper and Vaitl suggest that analysis of variance would have been the 

correct method to evaluate the data. Just for curiosity's sake, we have done 

such an evaluation. A simple analysis of variance (hit-rate by experimenters) 

is significant at p = 0.039. If we take into account paranormal beliefs as a co- 

variate, which is significantly correlated, thep-value drops top = 0.059, which 

is, in conventional terminology, marginally significant. But, we would like to 

stress that we did not feel entitled to rely on this analysis, since the presupposi- 

tion of statistical independence was not met. 

It is true that making the subjects more at ease could be a good explanation 

for their performing better than chance with experimenter 3, as we said. The 

interesting thing is that the task to be solved was not solvable by classical 

means. We would not expect that being more at ease would enable subjects to 

perform better than chance in such a task. In psychological parlance, a Rosen- 

thal-effect normally points to the fact that either the results of an experimenter 

tend toward a direction expected by the experimenter, or that the experimenter 

conveys cues toward a solution unwittingly. Both types of experimenter-ef- 

fects are not likely explanations for the result of our experiment: the experi- 

menters had no knowledge to convey and no specific result to expect, simply 

because they did not know anything about the details of the experiment. 

Therefore, they could not have influenced the results in any way known and 

plausible to us. This is what we call a non-classical experimenter effect. To say 

that making subjects more easy going and less tense is quite classical, veils the 

fact that the ensuing performance of subjects is still not expected under classi- 

cal descriptions, and postpones the necessity to explain what happened. 

However, Houtkooper and Vaitl remind us of a plight which we have ne- 

glected - to express explicitly gratefulness for all the help we received in 

writing and discussing the manuscript. Houtkooper's comments, even if mis- 

placed, were helpful to us in clarifying for ourselves what we did and did not 

do. Others, whom we forgot to thank and to mention in the Acknowledgement


tions. These were Deborah Delanoy and Suitbert Ertel, apart from Houtkoop- 

er, and Prof. Schulte-Monting, statistical advisor at the Department of Biosta- 

tistics of our University, who advised us with the statistical evaluation. We are 

grateful to Holger Bosch who has helped us with the literature. 

Harald Walach & Stefan Schmidt 

Dept. of Psychology, University of Freiburg 

Rehabilitation Psychology, 0-79085 Freiburg, Germany 

U.S.-Soviet Disinforrnation Game 

In a lengthy interview in a Russian journal (Dyomkin, 1966) a certain "Ivan 

Ivanov" (Russian for John Doe), described as "the man who knew everything" 

relating to the Soviet use of parapsychology for military purposes, tells us how 

the U.S.-Soviet disinformation game began in the late 1950s with false report 

of telepathy experiments on the submarine Nautilus. This, he says, prompted 

the Soviets to leak equally bogus information about a submarine experiment 

of their own involving rabbits, and also to pass presumably false military se- 

crets to Israel through certain Soviet Jews. 

Then, he goes on, the Soviets heard that the CIA was conducting "astral pro- 

jection" experiments with "the well-known American sensitives Ingo Swann 

and Pat Price," during one of which the latter gave a detailed description of a 

Soviet military base east of the Urals. However, he notes, in what seems to me 

a fairly serious allegation: 

"Later it was established that the information in question was actually ob- 

tained by American secret agents, but at the time this produced a big impres- 

sion in this country at the highest levels." The Soviet reply to the remote view- 

ing scare, according to Ivanov, was "to add a new topic to the game: 

bioengineering, or as it is now called, psychotronics." 

It is customary, he explains helpfully, to prepare "a highly detailed plan of a 

long-term disinforrnation operation" in which those involved "play the parts 

assigned to them without even suspecting their true role," the false informa- 

tion leaked being "carefully camouflaged by truthful information." 

I wonder if any of the contributors to this journal (10, 1, 1996) would like to 

comment? 

Guy Lyon Playfair 

7 Earls Court Square 

London SW5 9BY, U. K. 

Reference


Response to Playfair 

Based on my decade-plus experience at SRI, carrying out "operational" re- 

mote viewing experiments for various components of the government, the 

"disinformation" claim by anonymous interviewee "Ivan Ivanov" concerning 

"astral projection" experiments with "the well-known American sensitives 

Ingo Swann and Pat Price" is totally spurious. 

The specific experiment referred to is without a doubt the remote viewing of 

a Semipalatinsk, USSR nuclear facility that we carried out at SRI in 1974 for 

the CIA with viewer Pat Price, described in detail in this journal (Puthoff, 

1996; Targ, 1996). Contrary to "Ivan Ivanov's" implication that the data was 

actually obtained by American secret agents, and that its attribution to our re- 

mote viewing effort was part of a cover operation, Russell Targ and I saw the 

data being generated de novo under our very noses in remote viewing sessions 

under our control. The apparent success of this and other early experiments 

then led to more than two decades of similar efforts, juxtaposing many view- 

ers, interviewers, targeting methods and sponsors, interspersed with academic 

studies, with comparable levels of performance. My day-to-day, hands-on ex- 

perience involving operational remote viewing leaves me no alternative but to 

conclude that the idea that such results might be part of "a highly detailed plan 

of long-term disinformation operation" must be relegated to fiction. 

Incidentally, speaking of fiction, there is a novel by George O'Toole, enti- 

tled An Agent from the Other Side (Dell Pub., New York, 1973), that has as its 

theme just the idea posed by "Ivan Ivanov." 

H. E. Puthof 


4030 W Baker Ln., Suite 300 

Austin, TX 78759-5329 

References 

Puthoff, H., E. (1996). CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute. 

Journal of Scientific Exploration, 10, 1,63. 

Targ, R. (1996). Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute in the 1970's: A Memoir. Journal 

of Scientific Exploration, 10, l,77.

Journal of Scienti$c Exploration, Vol. 1 I, No. 3, pp. 401-433, 1997 0892-33 10197 


BOOK REVIEWS 

The Biological Universe: The Twentieth-Century Extraterrestrial Life 

Debate and the Limits of Science, by Steven J. Dick. New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 1996,578 pages, index, illustrations. $54.95. 

The timing for the publication of this outstanding volume, which is handsome- 

ly produced and illustrated with photos, diagrams, and drawings, could hardly 

have been better. It appeared at virtually the same moment that a team of sci- 

entists announced, at a NASA press conference in the summer of 1996, that a 

meteorite from Mars contained evidence of ancient extraterrestrial life. Al- 

though critics are already contesting the claims made by that scientific team, 

few critics will be able to dispute the achievement constituted by this book, 

which brings to a culmination the Cambridge University Press series that 

began in 1982 with Dick's Plurality of Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterres- 

trial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant, and that was followed in 1986 by 

Michael J. Crowe's The Extraterrestrial Life Debate 1750-1 900: The Idea of a 

Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell. The present volume is a truly remark- 

able achievement, deserving to be read by everyone interested in the history of 

twentieth century astronomy, in the emergence of fledgling scientific fields 

such as exobiology (or "bioastronomy") and SET1 (Search for Extra-Terrestri- 

a1 Intelligence), and in the behavior of scientists who explore phenomena at 

the very limits of empirical science. An astronomer and historian of science at 

the US Naval Observatory in Washington, DC, Dick has written a book whose 

erudition, good judgment, and insight place it on the same shelf as the very 

best works dealing with the history of science. 

The book examines how, during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 

scientists from a number of different fields have speculated about the possibil- 

ity of and have sought evidence for extraterrestrial life in the solar system and 

beyond. In describing the struggles of daring scientists to establish research 

programs based in part on debatable assumptions, Dick elaborates his major 

thesis: namely, that science cannot adequately be understood as the monolith- 

ic culture that C. P. Snow once contrasted so famously with the humanities, 

but rather must be viewed as involving different cultures. These cultural dif- 

ferences become most evident when natural science is "functioning at its lim- 

its. And nowhere are scientists pushed to more extreme limits, by the public 

and by their own perception of the gravity of the question, than in the extrater- 

restrial life debate." (p. 7) 

Conflicts that have arisen in connection with this debate include defining 

the place of assumption and speculation in science, and determining whether 

scarce research funding should be allocated to fields whose hypotheses are 

scarcely subject to empirical testing. Dick is evidently on the side of scientists


who have hypothesized that the universe is biological, i. e., who hold that life 

is a common feature in any suitable solar system, and who have fought to gain 

standing for their new field of research, precisely by developing methods to 

gain the empirical evidence needed to test that hypothesis. Although granting 

that some of the assumptions made by exobiologists, SET1 researchers, and 

others who adopt the "biophysical cosmology" are probably false, Dick ob- 

serves : 

While exobiological assumptions might be more grandiose than those found in most 

sciences, they were not qualitatively different, and those who termed exobiology a sci- 

ence without a subject would seem either to have mistaken the nature of science or to 

have had an agenda of their own. No forefront science could be sure if its subject exist- 

ed until the observations were made or the experiments undertaken. ... Over whatever 

period one chooses in the history of science, substantial progress was most often made 

by making bold assumptions and following leads to their sometimes dead-end conclu- 

sions. (p. 545-546) 

In Chapter One, after briefly reviewing the history of the extraterrestrial 

(ET) life debate in Western science, Dick asserts that much subsequent 

progress in ET research can be attributed to two mid-nineteenth century devel- 

opments: evolutionary theory and stellar spectroscopy. The latter enabled as- 

tronomers to derive significant empirical data about other stars, while the for- 

mer freed scientists from the shackles of Biblically-based anthropocentrism 

and creationism, and thus encouraged speculation that there are a plurality of 

worlds on which life has also evolved. As Dick points out in Chapter Two, 

however, anthropocentrism did not die easily. Relying on contemporary astro- 

nomical research indicating that the sun is near the center of the Milky Way, 

for example, Alfred Lord Wallace, co-developer of evolutionary theory, ar- 

gued in 1903 that life could have emerged only on Earth. Although the subse- 

quent findings that the Sun is rather closer to the outer edge of the Milky Way, 

and that the universe is enormous, had by 1930 tipped the scales in favor of the 

plurality-of-worlds hypothesis, a number of scientists have continued to hold 

that the emergence of life on this planet was such an unlikely event that it 

could almost certainly not be duplicated, even in a universe with billions of 

galaxies. 

In Chapter Three, Dick provides a stimulating review of the search for life in 

the solar system, with special emphasis on the debate aroused by Lowell's 

claim to have found "canals" on Mars. Far from denigrating Lowell and others 

who believed that they saw artificial structures on the Red Planet, Dick con- 

cludes that the controversy was difficult to resolve, because "the observations 

were extremely difficult [with available instruments] and the stakes extremely 

high, the latter ensuring all possible attempts at resolution." (p. 99) Given that 

the discovery of life, especially intelligent life, on another planet would prob- 

ably be the greatest scientific discovery ever made, and would have incalcula- 

ble effects on human culture, one can well understand why scientists and the


general public were gripped by the debate sparked off by Lowell, a scientist 

with an "ample imagination". The canal controversy exemplifies Dick's con- 

tention that science is composed of at least two "extreme" cultures: "the one 

concentrating on gathering the hard facts and unwilling to go beyond them, the 

other seeing the hard facts as a basis for a larger theory, with all of the imagi- 

native leaps that this implies." (p. 104) 

Even after the canal question was decided against Lowell, in 1924 scientists 

began debating whether the Martian atmosphere could support the vegetation 

which some astronomers said could be seen advancing and retreating with the 

coming of Martian summer and winter. Once again, developments in instru- 

mentation - especially spectography - eventually demonstrated that there 

was far less oxygen in the Martian atmosphere than earlier findings had sug- 

gested, thereby casting great doubt on the vegetation hypothesis. By the 1950s, 

however, new data had breathed new life into this hypothesis. In this debate, 

too, Dick discerns the presence of two scientific cultures, members of one of 

which are "much more likely to go out on a limb and to extrapolate than the 

other." (p. 125) Even after the 1976 Viking mission, which found little evi- 

dence in support of Martian life, some scientists continued to hold out for the 

possibility that life of some form could exist on that planet. Dick's account of 

the debate about life in the solar system, as well as his detailed description of 

the debates over what kinds of experiments the Viking mission should carry 

out on the Martian surface, is fascinating. 

The debate carried on between hard-data types and speculators resurfaces in 

Dick's absorbing account of how debates about the formation of planetary sys- 

tems (including the birth, death, and resurrection of the nebular hypothesis) in- 

fluenced the attitudes of early twentieth century astronomers toward the issue 

of ET life. Sir James Jeans, for example, at one time concluded that life else- 

where was highly unlikely, but toward the end of his life, further astronomical 

research convinced him to adopt the opposite viewpoint, namely, that ET life 

was probably common. The ET life debate itself was affected by whether the 

speculators, i.e., those favoring the idea that planets are common companions 

of stars everywhere, could gather sufficient data to give credibility to the plu- 

rality-of-planets hypothesis. Only very recently has the existence of planets 

around other stars been confirmed to the satisfaction of most astronomers. 

Ever resourceful, Dick tries his hand (successfully) at literary criticism, 

when in Chapter Five he examines the role played by science fiction both in 

developing and in expressing modem humanity's deeply felt interest in alien 

life. Discussing writings by Jules Verne (who, curiously, rarely explored the 

idea of ET intelligent life), H. G. Wells, Kurd Lasswitz, Olaf Stapledon, C. S. 

Lewis, Ray Bradbury, Edgar Rice Burroughs, David Lindsay, Stanley G. Wein- 

baum, John W. Campbell, Arthur C. Clarke, Stanislaw Lem, and Isaac Asi- 

mov, as well as popular TV programs such as Star Trek, and films such as 

2001: A Space Odyssey, Alien, Close Encounters of the Third Kind, and E. T, 

Dick points out that a number of scientists were not only attracted to science


fiction, which fed their imagination in a way that empirical science could not, 

but also wrote science fiction. In so doing, such scientists lent credibility to a 

subject by which much of the public was already fascinated. As Stanislaw 

Lem, Soviet author of the brooding novel Solaris, once remarked, however, 

"Man has gone out to explore other worlds and other civilizations without 

having explored his own labyrinth of dark passages and secret chambers, and 

without finding what lies behind doorways that he himself has sealed." (p. 

259) That envisioning ET life is inevitably characterized by human psycholog- 

ical issues, including projection of good and evil, is evidenced by the com- 

monly polarized representation of aliens as either threatening or benevolent, 

rarely as neutral parties. 

As if taking on science fiction were not a sufficiently risky business for a 

historian of science, Dick includes a well-balanced and informative chapter on 

"The UFO Controversy and the Extraterrestrial Hypothesis." While noting 

that from 1947- 1965 the media happily pushed the alien hypothesis to explain 

UFOs to a gullible public, Dick forthrightly asserts that "scientists in many 

ways abdicated their role as critical analyzers of an unexplained phenome- 

non." (p. 269) Concern for personal credibility and difficulties in obtaining re- 

liable empirical data led many scientists to remain silent about UFO sightings, 

but Dick suggests that the most important obstacle was that "the concept of 

extraterrestrial intelligence ... was not yet a part of the collective scientific 

consciousness, as it certainly would be in later years." (p. 269, My emphasis.) 

This assertion leads me to raise the following question: What if the UFO phe- 

nomenon had begun to manifest itself not in 1947, but in 1987, after forty 

years of media hype about ET life, and nearly thirty years after Sputnik 

spawned the massive federal investment in the Space Program? Would more 

scientists be willing to investigate the UFO phenomenon, now that their "col- 

lective consciousness" has been imbued with interest in ET life? The question 

is problematic, of course, because UFO sightings that began in 1947 were 

themselves largely responsible for the subsequent media hype about ET life. 

The best chance for serious UFO investigation occurred in the late 1960s, 

which Dick describes as the "peak" of the ET hypothesis. Spurred by a huge 

number of UFO sightings, Congress held hearings in 1966 that led the Air 

Force to sponsor a major study to be carried out by Edward U. Condon. 

Around this time Donald Menzel was passing the torch of UFO skepticism to 

Philip Klass, while Northwestern University astronomer, J. Allen Hynek was 

moving from skepticism to the conviction that UFOs constituted a genuinely 

new phenomenon worthy of scientific investigation. Meanwhile, James Mc- 

Donald of the University of Arizona strongly favored the ET hypothesis to ex- 

plain UFOs, and helped to lead the critical attack against the 1969 Condon Re- 

port, in which Condon asserted that UFOs did not merit scientific 

investigation, despite the fact that members of his own research team had con- 

cluded that about one-third of the cases studied could not be explained in terms 

of known phenomena. Even the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-


nautics (AIAA) "turned its back on Condon's conclusions after its own study." 

(p. 305). Dick emphasizes that the many-cultures dimension of science was 

nowhere more evident than in the UFO debate in the 1960s. 

By 1970, however, despite dissenting voices, scientific interest in the ET hy- 

pothesis had begun to wane, for three reasons: 1) no incontrovertible evidence 

had been found to support the ET hypothesis; 2) ethereal "New Age" theories 

about UFOs had made study of them increasingly unpalatable for serious sci- 

entists; and 3) the "evidence" produced in favor of "ancient astronaut" theo- 

ries advanced by best-selling authors like Erik von Daniken helped to bring 

"the entire extraterrestrial hypothesis into disrepute." (p. 308) 

Hynek and others countered by suggesting that the ET hypothesis be set 

aside, not only because it generated unnecessary emotional reactions but also 

because there was no reason to favor that hypothesis. From Hynek's point of 

view, UFOs merited study because they could well constitute a new phenome- 

non unknown to science. Klass and other debunkers continued to insist, how- 

ever, that UFO sightings could be explained in terms of known phenomena. In- 

creasingly strange claims, including reports that people were being abducted 

by UFO aliens, made UFO research even more taboo to many scientists. Con- 

ceding that career concerns and peer pressure understandably make scientists 

unwilling to investigate UFOs, Dick goes on to assert 

that the desire of some to squash the subject without considering the evidence flies in 

the face of scientific curiosity that supposedly led them to science to begin with. On the 

other side, the outrageous claims and hoaxes that presently flood the field are unworthy 

of scientific attention .... In the middle of these extremes may yet be a phenomenon that 

requires study, if only one can find it in the midst of the twin human failings in percep- 

tion and deception. (p. 3 19) 

Chapter Seven offers a superb account of how biological debates about the 

origin and evolution of life eventually became intertwined with the astronomi- 

cal search for life on other worlds, so as to give rise to a new scientific field, 

exobiology, which is still in its infancy. For a long time, many biologists were 

so convinced of the sheer contingency of life's emergence on Earth that they 

could not imagine its emergence elsewhere, despite the contention of as- 

tronomers that there were probably billions of planets suitable for life. (p. 33 1) 

Yet as some biologists became increasingly skeptical that existing hypotheses 

could explain the origin of life even on Earth, they suggested the "pansper- 

mia" hypothesis, according to which life arrived from elsewhere, though this 

merely pushes the problem of life's origins to somewhere else. (p. 339) In the 

1950s, however, Miller and Urey's successful synthesis of amino acids from a 

mixture of chemicals that supposedly resembled terrestrial conditions at the 

dawn of life, convinced biologists like George Wald that life will appear any- 

where where the conditions are ripe, which would be on many planets in such a 

vast cosmos. (p. 348) The new gospel of "abundant life" led some biologists to


same universality as physics and chemistry. Henceforth, exobiology and the 

study of life's origin on Earth became interconnected, as life on Earth came to 

be viewed as the result of "normal" evolutionary processes rather than as a sin- 

gularity. 

Despite the early promise of the Miller-Urey experiments, and despite the 

subsequent discovery by astronomers that organic matter is present in many 

parts of the universe, critics emphasized that no one had demonstrated how to 

cross the enormous gap between non-life and life. Such difficulties led Fred 

Hoyle, Francis Crick, and others to revive the panspermia hypothesis in the 

1980s. Others maintained that such an explanation only delays confronting the 

possibility that purpose, teleology, and design may have to be reintroduced to 

explain the emergence of a phenomenon as complex as life, since the odds 

against life emerging by accidental processes are far too great.' 

Evolutionary theorists such as George Gaylord Simpson, Theodosius 

Dobzhansky, Ernst Mayr, and Steven Jay Gould entered the debate about 

whether evolutionary theory could be plausibly used in favor of the idea of life 

on other worlds. Even more daunting than the conceptual difficulties facing 

the idea that there is such life, is the assumption that human beings could 

somehow communicate with beings who evolved on other planets. This as- 

sumption, however, has driven the remarkable program known as SETI, the 

Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. 

SETI enthusiasts proposed to leapfrog problems concerning the origin of 

life by seeking to make direct contact with ET intelligence. Dick describes in 

great detail the history of such attempts, ranging from Marconi's claim in the 

1920s that he had picked up radio signals from Mars, to early efforts to use 

radio telescopes in order to pick up possible signals from other planets, all the 

way to the vicissitudes undergone by SETI proponents seeking to find a place 

(and a budget) for themselves in NASA. The "Bible" of SETI, I.S. Shklovskii 

and Carl Sagan's Intelligent Life in the Universe, argued that intelligent life is 

common throughout the universe and in our own galaxy, but the credibility of 

SETI was harmed by a second major trend in late-twentieth-century space sci- 

ence: interstellar colonization. Conceptual to proponents of the idea of human 

colonization of space, if there were any ETs out there, they would have al- 

ready visited us by now. Since there is no evidence of such visitation (here, of 

course, as Dick notes, one must set aside the ET hypothesis regarding UFOs), 

ETs don't exist. SETI skeptics, including Frank Tipler, emphasized the prob- 

lematic assumptions at work in the famous "Drake equation" often used to es- 

'In one of the few inconsistencies that I found in this book, Dick observes the following: "If the leap 

from the synthesis of amino acids to the origin of life was large, the leap from first life to intelligence 

was, in the eyes of some (although not all), even more monumental. But it is a matter of terrestrial histo- 

ry that chemical evolution not only begat biological evolution, Biological evolution also begat intelli- 

gence." (p. 389) In fact, however, that such evolutionary processes occurred is not "a matter of terrestri- 

al history," but instead a current scientific hypothesis to explain the origin of life and intelligent life. 

Because Dick's own discussion shows that evolutionary theory faces apparently insurmountable obsta- 

cles in explaining macroevolutionary events, I am puzzled about why he reasserts (without comment) 

the validity of the evolutionary hypothesis at this point.


timate the number of communicative civilizations beyond Earth. SETI propo- 

nents won points by emphasizing that in science nothing can replace observa- 

tion when deciding the validity of a hypothesis, and that attempts to make such 

observation are justified because the stakes are so very high regarding the pos- 

sibility of ET life. 

In Chapter Nine, Dick explains that the protoscience of exobiology (a term 

coined in 1960 by later Nobel laureate, Joshua Lederberg) followed from the 

convergence of four separate fields: 1) planetary-spectroscopy, 2) planetary- 

systems science, 3) radio astronomy and 4) biochemistry. Between 1953 and 

1963 these fields themselves "were profoundly transformed in relation to the 

extraterrestrial life debate." (p. 474) Many scientists have continued to view 

the whole SETI quest as a waste of time, money, and resources, but Dick con- 

cludes that SETI and exobiology "have surely achieved some measure of suc- 

cess in their claims of discipline status," though their greatest achievements 

presumably lie in the future. (p. 500-50 1) 

Dick explores a host of philosophical and theological themes in his penulti- 

mate chapter, which deals with how the discovery of ET intelligence would 

change the meaning of human life. Ranging from fears that discovery of Earth 

by an ET race would doom human civilization to hopes that contact with ETs 

would mean that humankind would become a member of a galactic federation 

or even achieve a kind of cosmic "salvation", the views expressed by scientists 

are quite various, a fact that supports Dick's thesis that science is by no means 

a monolithic enterprise. Consider that, despite natural science's efforts to rid 

itself of anthropocentrism and teleology, the Anthropic Principle has helped to 

restore interest in the possibility that the universe exhibits purpose, including 

the generation of intelligent life capable of reflecting on the origin and mean- 

ing of that universe. Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg once concluded that the 

universe seems pointless, but Dick counters that this conclusion 

did not take into account the possibilities inherent in the biological universe, where in- 

telligence, whatever else its characteristics, is likely to be purposeful by definition. 

What that purpose may be we have not yet the slightest inkling, but if there is a meaning 

to life on Earth, it is undoubtedly linked ultimately to intelligence in the universe, if 

this exists. (p. 537) 

Although intrigued by the implications of the Anthropic Principle, Dick 

concludes that many scientists (and the general public) have embraced the 

idea that evolution is not a one-time event on Earth, but instead that life has 

arisen throughout this vast universe. This "cosmic Darwinism" may forever 

end the myth of human specialness, but it makes up for this by suggesting that 

we are not alone in what has sometimes seemed a lonely universe. 

In concluding, Dick reminds the reader that his aim has been to show the 

many cultures of science as they emerge when scientists are working in 

"boundary regions", such as those involved in the SETI and exobiology. A


host of different sociological and personal factors including worldview and re- 

ligious concerns, led individual scientists to take up the question of life on 

other planets. These scientists preferred empirical data, but "did not hesitate to 

use theory in the absence of observation to further their argument." (p. 548) 

Even when data were available, scientists read them in a number of different 

ways (suggesting once again that data are theory-laden). Often, the optimism 

or pessimism of a particular scientist helped to shape how such data were inter- 

preted. 

Presumably, those who are experts about the particular fields studied in such 

detail by Dick could contest some of his claims, and living participants might 

have even sharper criticism to make about his assessment of their views and 

actions. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that The Biological Universe is 

a landmark achievement both as a brilliant historical treatment of the search 

for ET life and as an examination of how this search at the limits of science 

sheds light on the plurality of cultures within science. 

Michael E. Zirnrnerrnan 

Department of Philosophy, Tulane University 

New Orleans, LA 701 18 

Philosophical Interactions With Parapsychology: The Major Writings of 

H. H. Price on Parapsychology and Survival, edited by Frank B. Dilley. 

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.294 + xix pp. $59.95, cloth. ISBN 0-3 12- 

12607-7. 

H. H. Price (1 899- 1984) was succeeded in the Chair of Wykeham Professor 

of Logic at Oxford by A. J. Ayer. In a tribute to his predecessor, Ayer (1960) 

says that Price "addressed himself always to difficult and important questions, 

and ... treated them with the open-mindedness and the fertility of invention ... 

characteristic of him" (Ayer, p. 3). Price, Ayer continues, was 

inclined to think that the world is a much stranger place than we ordinarily take it to be, 

so that even the most fanciful theories about it may ... contain an element of truth .... 

But ... the theories are subjected to a very rigorous scrutiny .... Whatever the subject of 

his investigation, his treatment of it is thoroughly systematic. With his manifest enjoy- 

ment of philosophy, there goes a belief in its seriousness and importance. (Ayer, p. 3-4) 

In the present volume Price refers to a book by C. J. Ducasse, and says that 

it "is an important and very interesting book" (p. 270), which is a good descrip- 

tion of Frank B. Dilley's excellent new collection of Price's writings on psy- 

chical research. Dr. Dilley teaches philosophy at the University of Delaware. 

His interest in the philosophical study of the paranormal is of long standing and 

has resulted in numerous articles and presentations in the field. With this an-


thology of Price's writings, he has given us a book that will be welcomed by 

parapsychologists and philosophers, and ought to be read by many others, as 

well. Dilley says in his Introduction that "philosophers interested in psychical 

research and parapsychologists interested in philosophical approaches have 

needed a collection such as this" (p. x). I agree. 

The useful introduction raises questions germane to understanding Price, 

and facilitates both our grasp of the issues he discusses and our sense of why 

he discusses them and how he approaches them. It concludes with a brief but 

orienting account of five key ideas to be encountered in the writings that follow: 

the psychic ether; Price's conception of persistent mental images; the collective 

or common unconscious; analysis of the self into spirit, mind, and 

body; and personal survival of bodily death. Unfortunately, Dilley's point that 

"it is never quite clear just how exactly these ideas relate to each other" (p. 

xiii) seems well taken. 

The earliest piece Dilley includes is from 1937 and deals with precognition 

and C. D. Broad's intriguing hypothesis of two-dimensional time; the latest is 

titled "C. J. Ducasse on the Problem of Survival," and is one of a number of essays 

in honor of Ducasse that were published in the Journal of the American 

Society for Psychical Research in 1970. It is fair to say, as Dilley does, that the 

book includes "most of the major long pieces and a few of the important shorter 

ones" (p. ix) that Price wrote on parapsychological topics - an area in 

which, Price says elsewhere, he was interested "for almost as long as I can remember" 

(Price, 1972, p. v). 

Altogether, the Price material reprinted here comprises 10 lectures or articles, 

two contributions to symposia, and five book reviews. They are divided 

between the book's two main parts, "Writings on Parapsychology 7 

' and "Writings 

on Survival." (Perhaps "Writings on Paranormal Cognition" would have 

been a better title for Part I.) With one exception, Dilley says, "the pieces ... included 

in this volume are presented in their entirety" (p. ix). 

Broadly, the topics Price examines are paranormal, or supernormal, cognition 

(ESP); psychokinesis (PK); the nature and role of symbolism in ESP; conflict 

between science and religion; hauntings and apparitions; and personal 

survival of death. (Is it likely, and what would it be like?) In the course of 

Price's explorations, we find certain recurrent themes, such as there being a 

strong possibility that ESP occurs in everyone all the time and that the proper 

question, therefore, may be not why it occurs, if only sporadically, but rather 

why it manifests so rarely. In this connection Price reminds us that in the system 

of Leibniz, from which "we may gather useful hints" (p. 56) for constructing 

a conceptual framework for paranormal cognition, "every monad has clairvoyant 

and telepathic powers ... always, as part of its essential nature" (p. 56). 

And he adds: 

We must not be too proud ... to take what hints we can from the theories of speculative 

metaphysicians. They may turn out to have ... empirical application ... especially when


we consider that seamier side of Nature which Psychical Research gives us a glimpse 

of. (p. 56) 

The book's three-page bibliography serves well, though I would have in- 

cluded the whole of Price's lambent Essays in the Philosophy of Religion 

rather than just two of its chapters. (Indeed, since I think Essays is no longer in 

print, I wish that an excerpt could have been included in the present work.) 

And whereas the bibliography says that Price's review of LeShan's Toward a 

General Theory of the Paranormal appeared in the Journal of the American 

Societyfor Psychical Research, it actually appeared in the Journal ofthe Soci- 

ety for Psychical Research. 

Inexplicably, there is no name index or subject index. There is a one-page 

"Index of Discussions", but it is not very usable. The typos in the book are dis- 

tractingly numerous. 

Chapter 4 ("Mind Over Mind and Mind Over Matter"), which dates from 

1949, though it is sometimes unclear, is to my mind the most ingenious and 

original chapter, at least in Part I. In it, Price attempts to provide a unified the- 

ory of telepathy and PK in terms of the nature of ideas. All that telepathy and 

PK seem to have in common, he says, is that they are both supernormal, a term 

he only vaguely defines as "things which ought not to happen if our ordinary 

scientific assumptions about the world are correct" (p. 62). But in fact, if Price 

is right, telepathy, of whose occurrence he is "sure" (p. 69), and PK, the evi- 

dence for which he thinks is appreciable, are "two different manifestations of 

the same thing" (p. 62).' 

Price's unified theory rests on two assumptions. The first is that human per- 

sonality is to be divided not into just mind and body, but into mind, body, and 

spirit, in which mind "is the subject matter of psychical research" (p. 64) and 

spirit is "the fundamental 'I,' the pure ego" (p. 63), with which psychical re- 

search is not concerned. But although psychical research is concerned with 

mind, we must, in attempting to make sense of the supernormal-and this is 

Price's second assumption - take "the ultimate elements of the mental 

world" (p. 65) to be not minds but ideas, to which Price's attributes surprising 

characteristics. (In an earlier chapter he speculates that telepathy may be a re- 

lation between ideas, rather than one between minds.) 

If we take ideas as mentally ultimate, "we can then build up [out of them] 

the various grades of psychical entity ... from not very purposive ghosts and 

Freudian complexes ... to the complete and healthily integrated individual 

'Because Price argues in this chapter from 1949 that there is a very close relationship between telepa- 

thy and PK, I was surprised to find him suggesting in a 1949 review of Rhine's Reach of the Mind (see 

Chapter 5) that the connection between ESP and PK is much less close than some (e.g., Rhine himself) 

have thought. Relevant to understanding the seeming discrepancy, I would think, is the fact that "ESP" 

includes clairvoyance as well as telepathy, and Price, at the end of Chapter 4, says that although "telepa- 

thy and PK are two manifestations of the same thing" (p. 76), his hypothesis "will not account for clair- 

voyance .... Clairvoyance is something radically different" (p. 76). He sees telepathy and PK as ways in 

which ideas operate, but clairvoyance as "a way in which ideas are acquired" (p. 76).


human mind" (p. 65). Riskily, Price decides not to define the term idea: "I shall 

assume that its meaning is sufficiently well understood" (p. 65). (At one point 

he seemingly invites us to speak of thoughts and images instead of ideas.) 

Ideas do depend for their creation on minds, Price holds, but it is his auda- 

cious supposition that once created, ideas do not depend on minds for their 

continued existence. What's more, ideas are causally efficacious, competitive, 

and the possessors of needs, urges, and inherent tendencies. And in other chap- 

ters they acquire "telepathic charges" (p. 176) and varying degrees of "tele- 

pathic affinity" (p. 33) with one another. In Price's unified theory, two of the 

tendencies inherent in ideas become crucially important for an understanding 

of telepathy and PK. For one of an idea's tendencies is "to materialize itself in 

a physical form, which is the explanation of PK" (p. 70), and another is "to 

emerge into consciousness - into any consciousness, no matter whose - and 

that is the explanation of telepathy" (p. 70). Although such claims that those 

properties of ideas explain PK and telepathy seem excessive, I find Price's 

focus on ideas instead of minds and his theorizing about their role in psi excit- 

ing and in need of reexamination by parapsychologists. 

Telepathy, Price thinks, shows "that there is a common unconscious, that at 

the unconscious level there is no sharp distinction between one mind and an- 

other" (p. 68). If there is a distinction "between the personal unconscious and a 

'deeper' impersonal unconscious" (p. 68), it is one of degree. In Chapter 4 he 

views telepathy basically in terms of an idea's being originated by one person, 

getting into the unconscious, and emerging thence into the consciousness of 

another person. But that culminating moment in the telepathic process when 

an idea breaks into consciousness can occur only if the idea succeeds in over- 

coming "some barrier or ... repressive mechanism" (p. 7) that tends to keep it 

out of consciousness. For Price this marks "the threshold of consciousness" (p. 

68), and to get into my consciousness, he writes, an idea originated by some- 

one else must "cross my threshold and compete with all the other ideas there 

which were trying to do the same" (p. 69). Because of the threshold, telepathy 

is rare. Were it not for the threshold's presence we would be having telepathic 

experiences constantly, and "we literally could not bear [to do so] .... If the 

threshold were not there, we should all be mad .... We should no longer be per- 

sons" (p. 69-70). 

Is the idea that crosses the threshold into B's consciousness numerically the 

same as the idea that A originates? That it is, is indeed an impression that Price 

gives, and the notion of its being the very same idea that gets from one con- 

scious mind to another causes Dilley understandable difficulty. He writes that 

in Chapter 4 Price "seems to present telepathy ... [as the activity] of a single 

image moving from one mind into another" (p. xvi), to present "the image as 

travelling from one censor to another, knocking at various doors until it finds 

one which will open and thus allow the image to reach consciousness in anoth- 

er mind" (p. xvi). True, but nonetheless I don't think Price can mean that the


later time t 'are numerically the same, even if they are synonymous. (Price, by 

the way, is silent about the average temporal distance in telepathy between an 

idea's being originated by A at t and its emergence into B's consciousness at t '. 

But one may infer from what he says that t 'is always later than t, sometimes - 

depending on how many doors an idea has to knock at - considerably later. 

Curiously, this seems to imply that for Price in Chapter 4, telepathy is always 

retrocognitive. (I don't mean to rule out, of course, the possibility that at ei- 

ther t or t 'A and B both are conscious of "the same" idea. But if they are, could 

that count as telepathy, according to Price's analysis?) 

From various things Price says in the book, Dilley infers that the theory he 

"really meant to endorse" (p. xvi) is one that entails that in telepathic cogni- 

tion involving A and B, for example, B's image was not identical with A's, but 

was copied from it - that "in telepathic cognition ... two minds do not possess 

the same image (p. xvi). Here, I think Dilley is on the right track. (His infer- 

ence pertains also to Price's views on the unconscious, where I won't follow 

it.) If only because, in a case of telepathy, A's idea may be transformed before 

emerging subsequently into B's consciousness, it seems most likely that for 

Price - what gets into B's consciousness is never numerically identical with 

A's original idea. But with regard to Dilley's inference, I shall add the follow- 

ing caveat. It is plain that what emerges into my consciousness (in a telepathic 

interaction between us) need not be a copy of your original idea. Perhaps the 

latter was a "distinct 'message'" (p. 70) that was able to cross the treshold into 

my consciousness only in severely distorted form, or only as the pervasive 

"feeling of gloom or of elation" (p. 70) that Price says may be all that gets 

across, if the original idea or message fails to make it. In a telepathic transac- 

tion between A and B, evidently, the idea of which B is conscious, though pre- 

sumably a causal descendant of the idea that A originated, may well not be a 

copy of it, though Dilley plausibly suggests that a copy of it may exist in B's 

unconscious. 

"PK," Price writes, "is ideo-motor operation occurring apart from the ner- 

vous system and muscles, instead of by means of them" (p. 67). We have seen 

that according to him, what an idea's inherent tendency to break into con- 

sciousness is to an explanation of telepathy, so its tendency to manifest in 

physical form is to an explanation of PK. Civilized man's physical environ- 

ment, he says, including "houses, factories, streets, buses, machines of all 

kinds" (p. 66), largely consists of ideas or thoughts that have materialized 

themselves in normal fashion, that is by means of nervous systems and mus- 

cles; yet if PK is a fact, it must be the case that "sometimes an idea succeeds in 

materializing itself in a physical object ... without making use of anybody's 

brain or muscles" (p. 66). A drive toward materialization, if really inherent in 

ideas, is what makes thought very dangerous, Price observes. From what he 

has said about ideas it follows that 

what anybody thinks has some tendency to come about ... even when the thought is no


longer in anybody's consciousness. If it does not [come about], that is because there are 

other contrary thoughts ... opposed to it. Ideas are dangerous things because they have a 

tendency, however slight, to come true. (p. 67) 

The assumption that ideas have a tendency to become materialized, Price 

tells us, is made by believers in primitive magic, which perhaps "has a little 

grain of sense in it after all" (p. 67); and prayer, he continues, which "I sus- 

pect ... does work sometimes" (p. 67), "seems to be based on a similar assump- 

tion" (p. 67). 

Price attempts to explain the tendencies that he suggests hold the answer to 

telepathy and PK: why is there a need on the part of ideas to materialize or to 

emerge into consciousness? His reflections lead to a tentative conclusion that 

both needs are probably "effects or derivatives of something more fundamen- 

tal" (p. 74), which he identifies as a "fundamental tendency ideas have ... to ex- 

press themselves" (p. 74). He acknowledges that his account "is far from 

clear" (p. 74), but if he is right, the tendencies ideas have to get materialized 

and break into consciousness derive from this basic impulse toward self-ex- 

pression, and therefore "both telepathy and PK are manifestations of one fun- 

damental property which all ideas have, their need or urge to express them- 

selves by any means available" (p. 75). Mentioning mental imagery, words, 

gestures, dreams, hallucination, and material embodiment, he notes that an 

idea may express itself in many forms. But he offers no definition of express: 

I suspect the notion of expressing is one of the fundamental undefinables of all the psy- 

chological sciences .... But I think we are all sufficiently familiar with the notion that 

works of art express something in the mind of the artist, and that a man's words ... ex- 

press his state of mind. (p. 74) 

Not discussed by Price is why ideas inherently need to express themselves. He 

would explain telepathy and PK in terms of this basic impulse, but he leaves it 

unexplained. 

"Mind Over Mind and Mind Over Matter" is a fascinating chapter. Of the 

theory Price proposes there he says that it "is certainly ... very queer ... on the 

face of it, though perhaps no queerer than the phenomena to be explained" (p. 

75). There is much in the chapter that seems bizarre. It describes ideas that en- 

dure with no support from the minds that create them; that are causally potent 

and possess inherent needs, urges, or tendencies; that compete with one anoth- 

er in a sort of struggle to break into consciousness or to become materially em- 

bodied; that fundamentally pursue self-expression; and that operate so as to 

bring about telepathy and PK. 

The chapter's descriptions may conjure up a picture in which mental func- 

tioning is determined by the need-driven activities of ideas that have become 

quasi-living entities serving the cause of explanation in the mental realm - as,


that if we aspire to make sense of the paranormal, we mustn't be afraid of talk- 

ing nonsense, and however striking and stimulating its theory of ideas is, it 

may well be that Chapter 4 is one occasion on which Price does talk nonsense. 

Not that there is no truth in what Price says here; indeed, I suspect there is a 

good deal. We seem no closer now to an understanding of telepathy and PK 

than when the ideas of this chapter first appeared nearly half a century ago. 

But the notion that we should seek an explanation through a study of the prop- 

erties of ideas may contain that element of truth Ayer refers to, though presum- 

ably ideas are better viewed less anthropomorphically than Price depicts them 

in this chapter. And there seems to be nothing nonsensical about his concep- 

tion of ideas as "dangerous things because they have a tendency ... to come 

true" (p. 67). "It is said that hard words break no bones," as he puts it, "but per- 

haps they sometimes may, if there are hard thoughts behind them" (p. 67). 

In the five chapters that comprise Part 11, Price makes an extraordinary con- 

tribution to an understanding of the problem of survival of death. He writes in- 

formatively about trance mediumship and the difficulty of explaining the phe- 

nomena of mediumship generally without recourse to survival. He contends 

that although the evidence is not conclusive7 there is a real risk that any given 

person will survive and urges compassionately that we do what we can about 

it. He portrays afterlife experience vividly though in terms that should foster 

in few readers any desire to survive. He examines illuminatingly the ramified 

question of whether those who survived death would be embodied. And final- 

ly, he comments on two works by C. J. Ducasse that discuss the survival prob- 

lem. In a reference to out-of-body experiences, Price makes a very interesting 

suggestion: If OBEs "were much more common than they actually are .... I 

think that the survival hypothesis would in fact be accepted by almost every- 

one" (p. 289). Whether this acceptance would be justified, he says, "is a diffi- 

cult question" (p. 289), and in one shape or another the question to what extent 

belief in survival is justified occupies Price through much of Part 11. 

With regard to such phenomena of mediumship as are often cited as evi- 

dence for survival, Price is respectful of the super-ESP hypothesis, which 

would explain the alleged evidence in terms of ESP among the living, but 

holds that in some cases the rival survival hypothesis offers a simpler explana- 

tion of the source of a medium's information. Yet because "we do not know 

what the limits of this-worldly ESP are" (p. 21 6), he doubts that there are any 

cases where the super-ESP hypothesis - Price sometimes calls it the This- 

World-ESP hypothesis - can be absolutely excluded. He observes, though, 

that "the more you deflate the Survival Hypothesis, the more you have to in- 

flate the powers of the human unconscious" (p. 234) and that "if you want to 

be skeptical about survival, you have to be unskeptical about ... ESP. Indeed ... 

you have to be more than unskeptical. You have to be almost credulous" (p. 

2 12). Moreover, Price states that - and why - he thinks the problem of deter-


what is, as far as I know, a novel solution (though probably an impractical 

one). But for the present, he concludes, 

we cannot ... reach a decision between the This-World-ESP hypothesis and the survival 

hypothesis; or rather between the hypothesis that This-World ESP accounts for all the 

phenomena and the hypothesis that it accounts for some of them but not all, and that 

the remainder can only be accounted for by supposing that there are discarnate person- 

alities. (p. 217) 

Although we have no proof of survival, the inconclusive evidence we do 

have for it suffices, Price states, "to give the survival hypothesis an apprecia- 

ble probability" (p. 217), one that makes it reasonable to believe that "it is by 

no means out of the question that the survival hypothesis might be true" (p. 

2 17). Given the available evidence, he judges, "it would not be so very surpris- 

ing" (p. 217) if it is true. To those who find the idea of survival repellent, as 

Price himself does ("at least sometimes" [p. 2 1 a]), he offers advice. He writes: 

To such people ... I should say "Do not be absolutely sure that your personal existence 

will come to an end when you die. There is an appreciable risk that it may continue, and 

it will be reasonable for you to pay some attention to that risk, much as you may dislike 

doing so." (p. 218) 

And he goes on to explain why questions of both moral obligation and pru- 

dence arise if we are faced with the risk or possibility of surviving. 

Whether believing in survival increases the risk that one will survive is not 

discussed by Price directly, though there are clues in the book to how he might 

respond. And in an arresting passage in another work, he entertains the possi- 

bility "that a very firm disbelief in survival would prevent the surviving per- 

sonality from having any post-mortem experiences at all .... He would never 

know that he had survived" (Price, 1972, p. 107). Yet is it clear that he would 

have survived, given a complete absence of postmortem experiences? 

We can form an idea of the "next world," Price believes, and the kind of ex- 

periences that disembodied minds might have. The next world, he suggests, 

might be a kind of dream-world, imagy but not imaginary, "a world of mental 

images" (p. 240), and here he invokes "the Hindu conception of Kama Loka 

(literally 'the world of desire')" (p. 240). At death we can take with us only 

"our memories and desires, and the power of constructing out of them an 

image world to suit us" (p. 255). Memories would supply "the 'stuff' or 'mate- 

rial' of such a world" (p. 253), desires the "form." "Memory," Price writes, 

"would provide the pigments, and desire would paint the picture" (p. 253). 

A world of mental images, he says, would be subjective, i.e., "dependent for 

its existence upon mental processes" (p. 252), but not necessarily private. It 

might "be the joint-product of a group of telepathically-interacting minds and 

public to all of them .... Likely ... there would ... be many next worlds, a


after-death environment" (p. 265). He thinks, however, that it may be possible 

to reconcile these seemingly contrasting accounts, which perhaps "are not 

quite so different as they look" (p. 268). He describes ways in which they 

agree. Would the two lines of thought, he wonders, meet in the middle if 

pushed far enough? Possibly there are 

realities in the universe ... intermediate between the physical and the psychological 

realms as ... ordinarily conceived. The contents of the other world, if there is one, may 

be in this intermediate position, more material than ordinary dream-images, more ... 

dream-like than ordinary material objects; like material objects in possessing spatial 

properties ... and some degree at any rate of permanence; like mental images in ... 

obey[ing] ... the laws of psychology rather than the laws of physics. (p. 269) 

It seems to me that Price moves in the course of time from having a strong 

inclination to see the "disembodied" conception as the more plausible (on the 

assumption that survival is a fact) to where he is much more receptive than be- 

fore to the "embodied" conception. In the latest writing that Dilley includes, 

the one from 1970, Price, following Antony Flew, observes that "an essential 

characteristic of a person [is] that he is capable of 'meeting' other persons and 

of 'being met' by them" (p. 290) and he asks how such a meeting would "be 

possible unless both parties were in some way embodied" (p. 290). He con- 

cludes that if we conceive of life after death "as a social state (as nearly all be- 

lievers in survival do), I think we must pay some attention to the idea of post- 

mortem embodiment" (p. 290). In a later writing not included here, moreover, 

he endorses considerations that "suggest that personal existence, in anything 

like the form [in which we] know it now, requires that one should be in some 

way embodied" (Price, 1972, p. 1 12), though he does add that an image-body 

would likely suffice. 

The doctrine of recycled psyches, or reincarnation, is one conception of sur- 

vival about which Price has very little to say. It arises in his examination of 

Ducasse's views, and he lauds Ducasse's discussion of reincarnation as "ex- 

cellent" (p. 284). But it is Price's opinion "that in our present state of igno- 

rance, discussions of reincarnation are premature" (p. 284). That was his opin- 

ion in 1952, and when he briefly mentions reincarnation in the 1970 paper, he 

notes that the "theory has been very widely held" (p. 288), but gives no indica- 

tion that his opinion has changed. If writing today, would he still think it pre- 

mature to discuss reincarnation? My guess is that he would not. 

Philosophical Interactions With Parapsychology is a book that I strongly 

recommend, one that should be widely read and meditated on. In it, readers 

will find rich insights and rare wisdom, startling suggestions, and brilliant 

ideas. Professor Dilley has earned our gratitude for his conception of the book 

and for all the labor of compilation. 

James M. 0. Wheatley 

500 Duplex Ave., Apt. 2601


References 

Ayer, A. J. (1960). Philosophy and Language (lecture) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 

Price, H. H. (1972). Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. 

The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal edited by Gordon Stein. Amherst, 

New York: Prometheus Books, 1996,859 pp. $149.95 (C). ISBN 1-57392- 

021-5. 

In recent times there have been several encyclopedias whose purpose is to 

summarize aspects of parapsychology and other unorthodox fields for the 

general public. Stein's Encyclopedia of the Paranormal is the most recent of 

this genre. However, unlike previous reference works of this sort, the entries in 

this book are written by a variety of authors and are generally slanted towards 

a skeptical perspective. That is, with some exceptions, most of the writers of 

the entries do not accept the validity of claims made by the proponents of the 

paranormal and have much to say about the unreliability and lack of validity 

of research in parapsychology and other areas. Having a more skeptical work 

helps to balance the excess of credulity that abound around these topics. Many 

of these views are expressed in the encyclopedia by such authors as James Al- 

cock, Robert Baker, Barry Beyerstein, Paul Edwards, Martin Gardner, Ray 

Hyman, and Joe Nickell, among many others. The few authors who write 

more positively of the existence of paranormal phenomena include Alan 

Gauld, Andrew MacKenzie, Daryl Bem, and Robert Morris. 

The topics cover a wide range of aspects of the paranormal. Some entries 

focus on psychological phenomena that have some relevance to our interpre- 

tation of what many consider to be paranormal (e.g., altered states of con- 

sciousness, cryptomnesia, hypnosis). Others discuss fields or general areas of 

study (e.g., astrology, cryptozoology, palmistry, parapsychology), general 

problems or perspectives on the fields in question (e.g., magic and psi, media 

and the paranormal, photography, statistics and the paranormal), particular 

claims or phenomena (e.g., cattle mutilations, extrasensory perception, psy- 

chokinesis, spontaneous human combustion), and attitudes or philosophical 

perspectives (e.g., New Age thinking, Satan and Satanism, scientific creation- 

ism, skepticism and the paranormal). In addition, there are entries on individ- 

uals who were associated with particular claims. These include mediums 

Leonora Piper and Eusapia Palladino, and such individuals as Carlos Castafie- 

da and Don Juan, Nostradamus, and Sai Baba. In addition to alphabetical list- 

ing, an index facilitates searches for these and other topics. 

Several entries deserve mention for their thoroughness. The entries by 

Susan Blackmore on near-death-experiences and out-of- body experiences are 

very complete and informative. I found Stanley Krippner and Michael Win-


most discussions on the topic, the authors also consider the need to disbelieve, 

presenting a model that may inspire further research on the subject. Marcello 

Truzzi's comprehensive discussion of "Pseudoscience" brings together a large 

literature from the philosophy and sociology of science that shows the com- 

plexity of the issues involved and the problems of using simple demarcation 

criteria and simple definitions of what is scientific or what is not. 

Although presumably not intended as such, this work can be seen as a skep- 

tical manifesto on the wide range of the paranormal. As such, it balances the 

perspectives presented by believers and more neutral observers and students of 

these subjects in other similar works. Much of what is said is common sense, 

alerting everyone to the possibility of alternate explanations for a variety of 

claims. An example of this is the entry on psychic healing by Christopher 

French. But regardless of these virtues, I would argue that there are several 

ways in which the critical and skeptical view that characterizes this work 

could have been improved. I will list some of them. 

1. Missing entries. Although it is not possible to cover all relevant topics, 

there are some omissions that are puzzling because they are important issues 

and phenomena to discuss critically. For example, the entry "Unidentified 

Flying Objects" does not provide sufficient coverage of the vast field of UFO 

studies. Taking discussions of parapsychological claims as a guide, one would 

expect more detailed information on important individuals (e.g., George 

Adamski), incidents (e.g., the Roswell case), and general issues (e.g., UFO ab- 

ductions). These topics are very popular and influential and, as such, deserve 

more than passing mentions. The treatment of UFOs is one of the weaker as- 

pects of this encyclopedia. 

Similarly, cryptozoology is surveyed less well than expected. Although 

Henry Bauer's entry on this topic is comprehensive, the encyclopedia should 

have contained more information about specific "creatures". Readers will un- 

doubtedly search for dinosaurs or sea serpents, or such specific "creatures" as 

Champ, Ogopogo, and the Loch Ness Monster, and be disappointed. 

Although the problem of fraud is mentioned in many entries, the topic does 

not receive attention in its own entry. This is a pity, in that such expanded cov- 

erage would have allowed a more in-depth discussion of the psychology of 

fraud, including the motivations for and rewards of fraudulent practices. One 

also wonders why there is no entry on auras, a phenomenon discussed by many 

and one that is central to a variety of systems of thought and healing practices. 

In addition, it is equally regrettable that there was no entry on Kirlian photog- 

raphy. The short discussion in the entry on photography (p. 522-523) does not 

adequately cover the methodological problems of this topic. Kirlian photogra- 

phy is one of those "supporting" claims cited by every believer in auras, and as 

such, needs to be discussed in much more detail than is presented in this book. 

Stein argues in the introduction of The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal that


individuals to do so. Although that may apply to some topics, this certainly 

does not apply to UFOs, Kirlian photography, or auras. 

2. Excessively long entries. Although there is a clear need for more informa- 

tion about many topics, some of the entries are overly long, including those on 

astrology (Geoffrey Dean, Arthur Mather, Ivan Kelly), CSICOP (Kendrick 

Frazier), and reincarnation (Paul Edwards). These, and other entries, could 

have benefitted from tighter editorial control. The best of them are only too 

long; the worst are, frankly, rambling and repetitive. 

3. Missing information. Although many of the entries are fairly comprehen- 

sive, some of them miss basic information about important classic studies that 

should appear in any work claiming to be a reference encyclopedia. For exam- 

ple, there are no mentions of the studies of Louisa Rhine and Ian Stevenson 

(entry on "Prophetic Dreams"), Flournoy's work with Hklkne Smith ("Chan- 

neling"), Stevenson's important discussion of cryptomnesia and the criteria 

proposed for the use of the concept ("Cryptomnesia"), and studies of develop- 

mental correlates and absorption correlates of hypnotic susceptibility ("Hyp- 

nosis"). In other cases the entries lack important critical information that 

should be present in a skeptical encyclopedia. 

For example, the entry "The Medium Margery" does not include evidence 

unearthed by Tietze and presented in his book Margery which discusses both 

Malcolm Bird's observations and discovery of fraud on the part of the medium 

and Bird's concealment of that fraud. Similarly, although the entry on "Jung 

and the Paranormal" mentions the incidents of loud noises in Freud's bookcas- 

es when Jung was present, it does not mention a later letter Freud wrote to Jung 

in which he (Freud) said the sounds happened at later occasions, suggesting 

conventional explanations for the original event. 

Other problems arise from undocumented fraud claims. For example, Mar- 

tin Gardner, in his entry on the medium Leonora Piper, claims that the records 

of her seances contain evidence of fraud, in the form of the medium's attempt 

to fish out information from the sitters. In his entry on D. D. Home, Gordon 

Stein claims that Home was privately "caught in fraud several times" (p. 329). 

Unfortunately, neither of these authors present any evidence to support their 

accusations. 

It is not good enough to claim that space considerations preclude discus- 

sions of these issues, or that the evidence appears elsewhere. As writers of en- 

cyclopedia entries, these authors have the responsibility of providing support 

for strong accusations such as these, especially when the encyclopedia is like- 

ly to be used by individuals who know little or nothing about these mediums, 

nor about the likely sources of information that might have been consulted. 

Although Barry Beyerstein's entries on "Altered States of Consciousness," 

"Possession and Exorcism," and "Visions and Hallucinations" provide good 

discussions of the psychology and neuropsychology of the phenomena in 

question, there is no attempt to relate these topics to the overall concerns of the


would argue that these concerns would have been better addressed if the au- 

thor had discussed the claims presented for a relationship between altered 

states and hallucinations to ESP claims. Also, he should have analyzed actual 

possession cases that have been reported to include such phenomena as levita- 

tion and xenoglossy, as well as the well-known writings of individuals like 

Corrado Balducci which claim that "real" possession exists, and that such pos- 

sessions shows its nature through paranormal phenomena. Again, if one wants 

to critically analyze claims of the paranormal, one needs to examine relevant 

evidence presented in support of the claim. 

4. Failure to discuss the point of view of the "other". A common problem in 

reference works is that the writers only consider their particular viewpoint, 

without representing the views of others. This does not happen in every entry 

of this encyclopedia, but it happens frequently enough to affect the quality of 

the reference work. 

For example, in his discussion of reincarnation, Paul Edwards mentions 

some criticisms of Stevenson's work by such authors as Roll and Chari (p. 

650-65 1). But Edwards does not refer the reader to Stevenson's counter replies 

nor to James Matlock's discussion of these criticisms in his comprehensive re- 

view of reincarnation research published in the sixth volume of Advances in 

Parapsychological Research. Similarly, in his entry "Extrasensory Percep- 

tion," Alcock noted that Hyman published a commentary on Bem and Honor- 

ton's well-known ganzfeld paper published in the Psychological Bulletin. Al- 

cock pointed out that Hyman had highlighted inconsistencies in Honorton's 

earlier findings. However, Alcock forgot to mention that Bem replied to Hym- 

man's paper and reported analyses that disconfirmed Hymman's criticism. 

French's entry on psychokinesis suffers from a similar problem when he 

brings up the well-known criticism of the PEAR PK work which contends that 

one subject's results explained most of the significance of the studies, and that 

this subject was a staff member (p. 61 1). The PEAR group's replies to these 

criticisms, which included statistical analysis directly contradicting the "single 

subject" hypotheses are not mentioned. 

Authors of encyclopedia entries may, of course, express their own opinion 

on controversy, but they have the responsibility to present the whole picture of 

the issue first. 

5. Exaggerated claims. Many authors of this encyclopedia make the point 

repetitiously that the world of the paranormal is full of exaggerated claims. 

This is true, of course, as seen, for example, in Eugene Emery's entry "The 

Media and the Paranormal." But it is also unfortunate that the criticism of the 

paranormal is also full of exaggerated claims. Some, such as Alcock when he 

writes about ESP, make the point that evidence for ESP depends too much on 

statistical analyses. Although true, his concerns will be seen as exaggerated in 

the eyes of those scientists who work in psychology and physics, among other


Unfortunately, recent remarks by critics of parapsychology regarding the 

"problems" with dependence on statistical analysis do not realize that they are 

hurting their own credibility by presenting vague statements that are not wide- 

ly accepted by the scientific community. Other exaggerated claims are found 

in arguments for the acceptance of conventional explanations. Blackmore (p. 

478), for example, affirms that psychological theories of the out-of-body ex- 

perience can explain much of the experience's phenomenology. 

I would argue that although the psychological theories are promising, they 

still are too underdeveloped to offer much explanatory power. Similarly, Baker 

seems to take much too seriously an anecdote described by a colleague in 

which a sensory explanation is offered for what some will call an ESP experi- 

ence (p. 560). The anecdote may illustrate the point, but reliance on such flim- 

sy evidence in support of a psychological process signals a double standard, 

when one remembers that anecdotal evidence is strongly disparaged by critics 

when it is offered as support of paranormal claims. 

Although the above mentioned problems reduce the value of this encyclope- 

dia, the work is still a useful contribution to its subject matter. Many of the 

concerns listed in this work are shared by numerous investigators of the para- 

normal, and others will remind us why there still is resistance to proponent's 

claims. 

I have listed some problems in the book that I think hinder the message 

many of the authors of the encyclopedia want to convey. But there is one other 

problem that I would like to address that is not directly concerned with the en- 

cyclopedia. Paul Kurtz has argued in this work that: "The key point of skepti- 

cism is not doubt. . . but inquiry; skepticism is only one element in the process 

of inquiry. It is not the belief or disbelief that is the main issue, but the facts, 

theories, and methods of verification" (p. 699). The problem is that the skepti- 

cal approach in general seems to avoid active (empirical) inquiry altogether, 

limiting itself to armchair criticism. While many of the writers of this encyclo- 

pedia have much to offer in their critical analyses (one important aspect of sci- 

entific inquiry), they fail to bring to their work a necessary part of science: em- 

pirical research. 

In science, a claim needs to be accompanied by supporting empirical data. 

However, a good proportion of the work of critics is limited to enumerating 

possible flaws and then stating that the case for the paranormal has not been 

proven. How much more productive it would be if critics engaged in research 

themselves. Conventional explanations of paranormal claims - fantasy, dis- 

sociation, sensory cues, motivated recollection, and so on - need to be tested 

in new research. Instead, critics generally use the name of science, or talk 

about inquiry, but refrain from actively taking part as scientists in the sense of 

engaging in research. 

Certainly not every hypothesis or model can be easily tested, and there is


such as those presented in this book, would be more acceptable if they were ac- 

companied by empirical work testing the speculations. 

One hopes that the skeptical viewpoints expressed in this volume will in- 

form those who do research in ufology, parapsychology, cryptozoology and 

other fields. But likewise, it would be more constructive if many of the critics 

of these fields would develop their own research programs, utilizing the tools 

of science they all cherish and recommend that others use. 

A deeper understanding of the topics discussed in the encyclopedia would 

result if both sides of the argument engaged in competing research programs. 

Some of these programs could follow conventional approaches and thus have 

the potential of teaching us much about the physics, psychology, neuropsy- 

chology and other aspects of the "paranormal". This course of action would 

eventually provide us with enough information to revise this encyclopedia so 

that its contents would reflect a more empirically based skepticism. 

Carlos S. Alvarado 

Centro de Estudios Integrales de Puerto Rico, P. 0. Box 1941 76 

San Juan, Puerto Rico 0091 9-41 76 

email: 72240.3357@ compuserve.com 

The AIDS Cult: Essays on the Gay Health Crisis by John Lauritsen & Ian 

Young, eds. Provincetown: ASKLEPIOS (Box 1902, Provincetown MA 

02657-0245, 1997.223 pp. $15 (p). ISBN 0-943742- 10-2. 

That HIV is not the sufficient and necessary cause of AIDS continues to be 

argued by some mainstream scientists (see reviews in JSE Vol. 10, no. 3, 1996: 

430-42); indeed, the ranks of those who take this view are swelling - see the 

lists of names and other information at http://www.xs4all.nl/-raidol. The pre- 

sent collection of essays takes as a medical given that HIV=AIDS is wrong and 

considers psycho-social and psychosomatic factors. The discussions are rele- 

vant to psychosomatic illness, social psychology, faith-healing, alternative 

medicine. 

The first essay, "The group-fantasy origins of AIDS," is reprinted from 

Journal of Psychohistory (Summer 1984). It is by Casper Schmidt, M.D. and 

psychoanalyst, and will not find much favor with those who dislike dogmatic 

Freudian assertiveness expressed in sweeping generalizations, say "China is 

ignored as a superpower for purposes of fantasy, since one has only two par- 

ents" (p. 38) or "This curb on phallic-assertiveness created a feeling of gender 

dysphoria, which was then injected into the nation's homosexuals in fantasy" 

(p. 39). However, some indubitably substantive points are made: 

The scapegoating of lepers during the Middle Ages bears similarities to 

attitudes toward PWAs (People With AIDS) nowadays. 

Epidemic hysteria is a well attested phenomenon. Schmidt gives useful 

references to the literature about this, mentioning several items that


many anomalists will have come across, for example the June-Bug epi- 

demic and the phantom anesthetist of Mattoon. The specificity such an 

epidemic can have is illustrated by such incidents as one in Singapore in 

which Malays were predominantly affected and the Thai koro epidemic 

in which no ethnic Chinese (10% of the population) became infected. 

Clinicians' skepticism can be undermined by subconscious beliefs. 

Casper Schmidt tries to make the case that the causes of AIDS are psycho- 

social. Take this with as much salt as you wish: the subsequent essays make a 

very strong case that psycho-social factors do play an important role in who 

gets sick or dies. Lauritsen's chapter 11, "Psychological and toxicological 

causes of AIDS," briefly reviews salient points made in his earlier writings: 

that "HIV infection" is diagnosed by presence of antibodies, which in other 

diseases is taken as a sign of immunization that it is only a small sub-set of gay 

men that seem at special risk for AIDS; that this small sub-set is known to have 

typically suffered recurring sexually-transmitted diseases, treatment and over- 

treatment with antibiotics, and high use of alcohol, tobacco and "recreational" 

drugs including the "poppers" that are almost certainly the prime cause of 

Karposi's sarcoma. 

Why did these men not mend their ways after the AIDS syndrome was 

noted? For one thing, "denial: the lies an addict tells himself and others in 

order to conceal, rationalize, and ultimately sustain his addiction." There but 

for the grace of God go we all: think of the lies most of us tell ourselves, after 

all, to avoid actually dieting or actually giving up cigarettes or maintaining 

any of our other annual New-Year's resolutions. Both Lauritsen and long-time 

surviving PWA Michael Callen claim to have not found an AIDS sufferer who 

did not fit this sub-set description, albeit a few of them had initially lied about 

it (p. 85). 

The gay scene after "liberation", Lauritsen points out, involved group activ- 

ity: "If something was done, everyone did it. At a disco like The Saint, several 

thousand gay men would be on the same drug at the same time. An hour or so 

later, word would get around that it was "Special K time", and everybody 

would go on that" (p. 9 1 ). What might the long-term effects be of even a short 

period of high intakes of "poppers, MDA, Quaaludes, LSD, alcohol, cocaine 

and Special K" in combination?! 

Lauritsen also reminds us of the changing definition of "AIDS" after HIV 

was discovered: "In 1982 someone who earned an AIDS diagnosis was very 

close to death; after 1992 someone could acquire an AIDS diagnosis without 

even being sick" (p. 97). Here the psycho-social factors can hardly be gain- 

said: given a positive HIV-antibody test, "Gay men were programmed by the 

AIDS Establishment to become sick; they were provided with a schedule, told 

not only that they ought to become sick, but exactly how and when to become 

sick" (p. 98). Recall the well-known epidemic hysteria that affects medical 

students, who "suffer" vicariously many of the symptoms of many diseases as 

they learn about them - without anyone telling them that they have those dis-


eases. If HIV doesn't cause AIDS, but everyone is convinced it does, what 

might we expect to happen to someone who tests positive and is then pre- 

scribed significant doses of toxic "drugs" which themselves mimic many of 

the symptoms of AIDS, thereby reinforcing the belief that he is ill? 

In Chapters I11 & IV, George Hazlehurst draws parallels with his experience 

of survivors at Hiroshima, where the rate of premature death exceeded that 

medically traceable to radiation effects. He reminds us that HIV-AIDS is 

unique in postulating no natural survivors; and "the only disease ... where treat- 

ment with powerful drugs is begun several to many years prior to the actual 

onset of any illness, when there is still the possibility that AIDS may never de- 

velop" (p. 105). How well the Establishment and the media silence dissidents 

is illustrated by the fact that Hazlehurst, a medical practitioner, learned first in 

the summer of 1994 that a significant number of scientists dispute the HIV- 

AIDS hypothesis. Today, he points out, "The doctor is a technician ... a highly 

trained professional caught up in a narrowly mechanistic medical system ... to 

follow the strict rules provided from above" (p. 1 14) - illustrated say by the 

Virginia doctor whose license was recently suspended for 6 months because he 

had given many patients with intolerable pain enough narcotics to ease their 

suffering; the pharmacist who filled the prescriptions also lost his license! Ha- 

zlehurst does a fine job of describing how the system can produce nauseating 

results even when the actors have no malevolent intent, just "play it safe", "go 

with the rules", wishfully think that the drugs they invent or produce might be 

of benefit. 

The psychological pressure on PWAs includes "a glorification of 

HIVIAIDS ... as a magnet of compassion and a celebrity life - a meaning and 

purpose for lives that may have lacked such qualities before being infected and 

pitied, and even taking on heroic proportions as kinds of martyrs. Here were 

lives perhaps lacking in self-esteem suddenly in the forefront of an historic 

meaning, victims of the great AIDS epidemic of the latter part of the 20th cen- 

tury" (p. 117). "Primitive peoples ... would recognize a hex when they saw 

one" but we are "far too civilized, educated, and sophisticated to believe in the 

casting of spells, and when we are all hexed by the AIDS industry's hoax, we ... 

have no remedies in place to deal with" it. 

Chapter V is an interview with Casper Schmidt, raising an intriguing issue 

about "the psychology of hemophilia. All the male children with hemophilia 

are subjected to the most restrictive regimen, which inhibits their ability to ex- 

press aggression" - a stress that Schmidt thought might weaken the immune 

system. At the end of the chapter we learn that Schmidt himself died of AIDS, 

far from the first physician who could not heal himself. 

Michael Ellner & Andrew Cort, in "Programmed to die: cultural hypothesis 

& AIDS" (Chapter VI) remind us that people in Africa, Australia, and Haiti in- 

dubitably do die when they have been marked for death by voodoo or by bone- 

pointing. It is then chilling to read the following chapter, in which Cass Mann


advice of Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, innumerable "counselors" urge their clients 

to prepare for death as soon as they have tested HIV-positive! It seems hard to 

believe that at a Westminster Abbey "Celebration of Life" associated with the 

Fifth International Conference for People with HIV/AIDS there was this read- 

ing from Kubler-Ross (p. 152): 

Is it possible that people with HIV and AIDS, children and adults alike, chose to con- 

tribute their short life spans on planet Earth to help us to open our eyes, to raise our 

consciousness, to open our heart and minds, and finally to see the light? [Emphasis 

added.] 

"Being a gay man today in a commercial gay culture is, in and of itself, a 

toxic and dangerous condition": for gay "liberation" led to infantile excesses; 

a life-style inappropriate for adults became the cultural norm, and now there's 

added a supposedly incurable virus that makes living beyond 40 or so in any 

case moot. 

Chapter VIII, by Lauritsen, is a telling indictment of AZT, reprinted from his 

The Aids War. Chapter IX is by Michael Callen who survived a dozen years 

after a diagnosis of AIDS (note, not just HIV antibodies). He makes this unfa- 

miliar but crucial point: "The activists only seem to talk about two possible 

outcomes to taking an experimental drug: one is that it works, and the other is 

that it doesn't work. But there is a third, much more common possibility, 

which is that you will be worse off than if you did nothing at all" (p. 186). 

The last chapter by Ian Young returns to some chilling psychological facts, 

notably "a psychological epidemic among uninfected gay men" (p. 188). They 

suffer "survivor's guilt": "in today's breezy, out-of-the-closet gay ghetto, HIV 

Negative men tend to be profoundly clinically depressed, anxious, disoriented, 

hypochondriacal, uncertain about the future, sexually dysfunctional, deeply 

demoralized and psychically numb" (p. 189). "AIDS is increasingly presented 

as the new Gay Lifestyle ... everything revolves around AIDS" (p. 192). "All 

my friends are Positive - how can I relate to them?" "I feel like I'm being left 

out of the great event of our time". "I feel as if I won't really have come out 

until I'm HIV Positive" (p. 195) ... There is also the "attitude, widespread in 

the gay community, that only PWAs and HIV Positives have a right to express 

strong feelings" (p. 193). "In 1992, the Act Up chapter in Chicago split into 

two factions, one for HIV Positive people, the other for HIV Negatives. The 

possibility that a member might not know his status, was presumably unthink- 

able" (p. 207n). 

So "the actual consequences of the AIDS System are at variance with its 

stated aims." Part of that stems indubitably from the preoccupation of modern 

medicine with technological fixings. This book makes the case that this part is 

a very large one. There is no index, but a useful brief bibliography and URLs 

for Internet sites with much further information. 


Professor of Chemistry & Science Studies


Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family Dynamics, and Creative Lives by 

Frank J. Sulloway. New York: Pantheon, 1996. xviii + 653 pp. $30 (c). ISBN 

0-679-44232-4. 

Few books are so worth reading as this one. Few if any readers will not learn 

from it about a variety of matters. Anomalists intrigued by the Mars Effect, for 

example, may be particularly interested in the demonstration that reported sea- 

sonal birth-effects were an artefact of improper analysis (414ff); or that "Indi- 

viduals who are most familiar with empirical evidence tend to give it the great- 

est weight" (534n22); or in further examples of resistance to innovation to add 

to Barber's (1961) seminal list: thus William Hamilton's (1963) "theory of kin 

selection has inspired a staggering amount of empirical research" but was "not 

immediately appreciated ... [and] judged insufficient for a doctoral degree at 

the University of London" (p. 59). 

Though the book's title is accurate enough, still it may mislead, for one 

learns from this book more than the title suggests: this work is a model for 

what social science can accomplish, given enough data and sufficiently care- 

ful, skeptical, statistically savvy interpretation. The prime focus indeed is on 

the profound influence that birth order among siblings exerts; but Sulloway 

considers many other influences as well, in quantitative fashion: "birth order.. . 

sums up several important considerations ... It is a proxy for differences in age, 

size, power, and privilege within the family system" (p. 21). It is indicative of 

the importance of birth order that its influence is often considerably greater 

than that of sex difference (p. 75); "the influence of birth order [even] on traits 

related to gender is two-thirds as large as the influence of sex [itself] !" (p. 77; 

emphasis added); "family niches often override biology" in "gender-related 

traits ... just as they often transcend cultural stereotypes" (p. 149). 

Apparent exceptions to initial generalizations from the data are mined for 

further understanding: thus later-borns may be raised in such a manner - like 

Austrian Archduke Ferdinand I (p. 270) - as to be functionally first-borns: 

"biological laterborns ... raised as firstborns ... (29 such instances in my sam- 

ple) ... are statistically indistinguishable from other firstborns ... significantly 

less likely to support liberal innovations than.. . functional laterhorns.. . [who] 

were 4.4 times more likely to support liberal scientific breakthroughs" 

(465118 1). 

Sulloway has a magisterial command of the literature and of research tech- 

niques. His data and his approach to it inspire confidence. He drives points 

home through graphic use of anecdotal material; yet the use of anecdotes can- 

not be faulted since they are just illustrations of what the massive statistical 

data-set reveals. Thus the memorable anecdote about the astronomer Tycho 

Brahe, functionally a first-born, so unwilling to go against convention that he 

would not excuse himself from the table to empty his bladder and died as a re- 

sult: "A man who was incapable of setting aside table manners for a call of na-


ture was hardly suited to challenging, as Copernicus did, the foundations of 

cosmology" (p. 27); is validated by the data-analysis that shows "individual 

laterborns, such as Darwin and Wallace, were 9.7 times more likely than indi- 

vidual firstborns, such as Lye11 and Agassiz, to advocate evolutionary ideas" 

(P. 34). 

Part One of Born to Rebel asks, "Why do some scientists, but not others, 

readily accept radical ideas?" (p. xiii). Far more than evidence, we all know, is 

needed to change someone's mind: "Most people, including scientists, resist 

radical innovations" (p. xiii). Well, Part Two of the book notes that siblings 

raised together typically differ from one another as much as if they had been 

members of different families. Why? Because siblings compete for parental 

attention and care. First-borns usually find it a successful strategy to conform, 

to be as much like their parents as parents typically like. Later-borns can hard- 

ly displace the first-born from that niche of parental favor, so they seek some 

different niche through which they can still attain a share of parental devotion: 

"The longer siblings live with one another, the more different they become" 

(p. 83)! Part Three considers the role of social influences, particularly class; 

and finds that social class apparently has no influence on whether one is or is 

not a radical in social or in scientific matters. Part Four is a synthesis and sum- 

mary discussion. There are nearly 85 pages of notes - amid which there is 

much worth reading; 70 pages of appendices with detail about coding, statis- 

tics, and some of the specific data-sets; 75 pages of bibliography. 

Chapter 8, which ends Part Two of the book, is a fine summary of the data on 

receptivity to scientific innovation. An 8-variable model correctly classifies 

two-thirds of Sulloway's sample of more than 3000 scientists in respect to re- 

ceptivity to innovation. The 8 variables consist of three main ones - birth 

order, parent-offspring conflict, sibship size - together with another five that 

exert an influence through interaction effects (gender, age gaps, age at parental 

loss, social class, temperament). Then Sulloway looks at the exceptions, and is 

able to account for them in various ways, finding roles for social attitude, 

parental social attitude, parental birth order, age, personal influences, national 

styles, weight of evidence; but finding no effect of social class (p. 213). 

While the book's main theses are straightforward, the discussions do justice 

to the complexity of actual instances. A major distinction is between conserv- 

ative and radical innovations or revolutions: first-borns "lead fashionable re- 

forms, populist revolutions, and orthodox science" (p. 35 l), innovations that 

do not threaten a status quo, for example Spiritualism, eugenics, refutations of 

spontaneous generation; whereas they oppose such radical changes as Darwin- 

ian evolution, Freudian psychoanalysis, continental drift. The latter are typi- 

cally supported by later-borns who are in "politics ... radical revolutionaries, 

fostering protest long before it is stylish to do so. As social reformers they sup- 

port the most unpopular causes, such as abolition, socialism, anarchism, and 

atheism. In science ... those innovations that are heterodox within the episte-


radical change. Instead, they work hard to precipitate crises on their compla- 

cent elder siblings, who generally see little reason to abandon the status quo .... 

As a general rule, the more heterodox the innovation, the more siblings are 

likely to disagree over its merits" (p. 35 1). 

In fact, Sulloway finds that the data distinguish between four (rather than 

two, radical and conservative) categories (p. 39-4 1): radical ideological revo- 

lutions like the Copernican; technical revolutions like the Newtonian; contro- 

versial innovations like phrenology or antisepsis; and conservative theories 

like eugenics. The book carefully analyzes how these types of innovation were 

greeted by the various participants at diferent times, for naturally the opposi- 

tion to even the most radical departure dissipates after (if!) it turns out to have 

been substantively justified. 

Another significant distinction is between "genetic" and "hereditary." 

"Properly understood, evolutionary accounts of human behavior are far from 

deterministic. A Darwinian approach calls attention to the constant interaction 

between nature and nurture ... within a developmental framework ... Darwinian 

evolution highlights the uniqueness of the individual." 

"One would think a 50 percent overlap in genes [as siblings have] would 

cause substantial resemblances ... but this is not the case. Sexual reproduc- 

tion.. . rearranges the sequence of genes through.. . 'recombination' ... many ge- 

netic influences are unique to the individual and cannot be passed on through 

inheritance" (p. 87-89). 

"We are all very different from one another, even from our siblings - a cir- 

cumstance that confounds most sociological claims about group differences. 

Our minds, in particular, embody an astonishing diversity of abilities that fa- 

cilitate intelligent behavior. There are no simple 'types' of intelligence, just as 

no single specimen of Darwin's finches can be said to represent the 'type' of 

the species" (356: 1). 

"IQ is only weakly related to achievement among people who are smart 

enough to become scientists ... a scientist who has an IQ of 130 is just as likely 

to win a Nobel Prize as a scientist whose IQ is 180 (357n). "As Darwin himself 

once pointed out about science, the smartest people do not tend to make the 

most important discoveries" (p. 360). "Nearly 90 percent of my sample either 

accepted or rejected both ... [evolution and phrenology] ... [But] Darwin ... re- 

jected ... [phrenology] on scientific grounds" (p. 248, p. 25 1). 

Interaction efSects are crucial; for example, "Being female makes some 

women more agreeable, empathetic, and liberal. Because of family niches, 

being female has the opposite effect on other women. In particular, firstborns 

of both sexes tend to be 'alpha males"' (p. 170). "Shyness makes firstborns 

more open to experience - the opposite effect to that which it has on later- 

borns" (p. 179, p. 193). 

Here is one illustration of the power and sweep of Sulloway's analysis. Dar- 

winism was accepted or supported according to age - in keeping with the con- 

ventional wisdom that we become less open to innovation as we grow older,


both later-borns and first-borns were less likely to have accepted evolutionary 

theory, the older they were. But 80% of later-borns aged 25, as contrasted to 

only 30% of first-borns aged 25, supported Darwinism. It was only by 1875 

that first-borns accepted evolutionary notions at the same level (40%) as later- 

borns had shown (pre-Darwin!) in 1775. 

Why were "French scientists ... so hostile to Darwinism compared to scien- 

tists from other nations"? "France began the demographic shift during the late 

eighteenth century, about 50 years earlier than other European countries ... In 

1859, French scientists had had only 1.1 siblings compared with 2.8 siblings 

among scientists in other countries". Ergo, French scientists were much more 

often first-borns and therefore innately unlikely to accept a radical innova- 

tion.. . . 

"Throughout the debates over evolution, 80-year-old laterborns were as 

open to this theory as were 25-year-old firstborns ... being laterborn was equiv- 

alent to a 55-year dose of the openmindedness that typically resides in youth" 

(p. 36). Surely these findings indicate the desirability of research on birth- 

order influences among anomalists and in anomalistics! 

The success of Sulloway's model is also demonstrated by the range of topics 

it illuminates: 

It may require little analysis to conclude that "the varied outcomes of 

Henry VIII's six marriages are directly related to the obedience that each 

wife showed to his authority"; but Sulloway can explain the degree of 

obedience: "Controlled for differences in shyness, birth order is a signif- 

icant predictor of the fates of the six wives. The best marriages were to 

spouses of early birth rank or ... to shy and cautious laterborns. Those 

wives who lost their heads tended to be late in birth order and outspoken 

in their opinions" (p. 280-1). 

"During the past five centuries, the highest proportion of firstborn revo- 

lutionaries - including such creative scientists as Johannes Kepler, 

William Harvey, and Isaac Newton - occurred in the immediate wake 

of the Protestant Reformation. To a substantial degree, this cultural trend 

was the legacy of sibling differences that had taken hold during the pre- 

vious century" (p. 283). 

An intriguing effect not explicated by Sulloway is that later-borns exceed 

first-borns among supporters of radical innovation to a greater extent than 

among initiators of those innovations (42, 464n70). Plausibly this difference 

reflects the role of sheer serendipity in the making of scientific discoveries. 

Part Three of Born to Rebel considers social radicalism. The findings will be 

anathema to Marxists of all stripes: "social class is a surprisingly poor predic- 

tor of social radicalism" (p. 93) - "the correlation between social attitudes 

and social class is .04" (509n49); "some liberals are close-minded, whereas 

some conservatives are open to new ways of thinking" (p. 2 17). "For all practi- 

cal purposes, the causes of sibling differences in social radicalism are the same 

as ... in science ... This ... model is 138 times more predictive of social attitudes


than is social class" (p. 226-7). "Primogeniture, not aristocratic origins, is 

what causes most monarchs to be conservatives" (p. 23 1-2). "In spite of being 

raised in disparate classes, the three codiscoverers of the theory of natural se- 

lection [Matthew, Darwin, Wallace] shared similar social attitudes" (p. 241). 

"When historians seek to explain radical thinking, they often call upon social 

class. Most ... who do so are already convinced of a causal relationship, so they 

rarely bother to test their claims. The moral urgency of Marxist thought, which 

bolsters such beliefs, tends to render them 'emotionally resistant to disconfir- 

mation' ... Social class is relevant to participation in science: peasants rarely 

become scientists. But the causes of intellectual radicalism are another matter 

entirely ... Compared with laterborns, firstborns are generally better educated 

and hence more likely to become scientists. Firstborns are especially overrep- 

resented among the members of establishment science. Such tendencies to- 

ward intellectual primogeniture create a trap for the unwary historian who, 

without adequate hypothesis testing, opts for a Marxist explanation of radical 

thought .... Marx's theory of class struggle sheds almost no light on individual 

differences in personality, including openness to radical ideas" (p. 253-4). 

Again, "many people became Protestants 'against their own economic and so- 

cial best interests' ... a Marxist approach sheds surprisingly little light on reli- 

gious loyalties during the Reformation" (p. 270- 1). 

That Sulloway's model explains so much about science by considering such 

social factors as birth order should give no comfort to relativist social con- 

structivists or their ilk. At a number of places the book emphasizes the impor- 

tance of individual characteristics that result from the idiosyncratic combined 

influence of the eight or more factors Sulloway has been able to identify as sig- 

nificantly predictive of human behavior. Evidence causes "empirical argu- 

ments to uncouple from ideological ones. This.. . occurs regularly during scien- 

tific controversies and reveals the insufficiency of explanations that reduce 

science to a social activity. Rational considerations play a substantial part in 

scientific deliberations, although in most cases the power of rationality 

changes over the course of debate" (p. 345); "social constructionists are dead 

wrong in their efforts to minimize the cognitive and empirical aspects of sci- 

ence .... Neither Latour nor any other social constructionist has ever bothered 

to test their claims ... these scholars ought perhaps to recognize that, in choos- 

ing to forgo testing, their own research program ... embodies a moratorium on 

critical inquiry. Without hypothesis testing, claims about the nature of scientif- 

ic thought are likely to end up as intellectual fads. Crews (1986) offers a lucid 

critique of such relativist views about knowledge, as do Gross and Levitt 

(1994)" (535n28). 

By implication of the stunningly informative nature of this book as well as 

by the occasional critical comment like those immediately above and follow- 

ing, Sulloway challenges much traditional work in social science and in histo-


"The historian who feels uncomfortable with statistical generalizations 

is uncomfortable with the nature of history" (p. 365). So historians must 

get used to such Sullowegian conclusions as "Owing to high parental 

conflict, Lincecum's probability of accepting new scientific ideas was 

80 percent" (p. 124); "Kepler's predicted probability of supporting radi- 

cal causes is 65 percent. Compared with other firstborns, this predicted 

probability places him in the 97th percentile" (487n22); "Newton's 

probability of supporting innovation is 60 percent, which places him in 

the 89th percentile for all firstborns" (487n23); "Born's support for 

these novel theories [quantum & relativity ideas] would be more diffi- 

cult to understand had he not lost a parent when he was young. Based on 

the multivariate model ... in Chapter 10, Born's likelihood of supporting 

these ... theories was 6 1 percent" (4901156). 

"Systematic within-family differences introduce a trap for unwary histo- 

rians who assume that social class and other group differences are major 

forces of historical change. The integrity of narrative history is constant- 

ly being compromised by a failure to understand this explanatory trap" 

(p. 240). 

"Hypothesis testing possesses another distinct virtue. It reduces the 

siren-like lure of those interpretive fads that pass for progress within the 

humanities. This is why so many recent humanistic approaches are now 

labeled as being 'post' some other once-popular approach. There is no 

post-physics, post-biology, or post-chemistry" (p. 367). 

Social science is notoriously unable to make good predictions; but Sul- 

loway's multivariate model can: 

- "Relative to firstborn justices, laterborn justices have been significant- 

ly more likely to vote in a liberal direction." President Eisenhower and 

other leading Republicans were taken aback at what Chief Justice Earl 

Warren wrought; but they could have known better than to appoint him, 

had they recognized that as the younger of two children he would harbor 

liberal views that had of necessity been suppressed during his time as a 

Republican politician (p. 294-6). "For relative birth rank and Supreme 

Court voting in a liberal direction, r = .38" (521n43). "For the entire his- 

tory of the Supreme Court, with its I08 appointments, the correlation 

between relative birth rank and the party of the nominating president is 

0.36 .... Republican presidents have tended to nominate firstborns" 

(521n42). 

- "If you happen to be a shy individual and have radical aspirations, con- 

sider collaborating with a lastborn extravert" (p. 187); 

- "Whenever scientific commissions are staffed by eminent experts from 

'establishment science', they tend to be biased for firstborns (and hence 

conservative conclusions). This.. . has important implications for sci- 

ence policy" (513n48); "Because commission [sic] tend to be packed 

with eminent individuals (and hence firstborns), their votes should per-


haps be 'weighted' to adjust for individual biases in attitudes toward in- 

novation" (537n43). 

Sulloway's unorthodox push to understand irrespective of disciplinary tra- 

ditions has to-be-expected corollaries, like the rejection by the National Sci- 

ence Foundation of his proposal to study "aging and creativity in science ... 

using multivariate methods". The reviewing panel stated: "One of the most 

pervasive issues discussed by the panelists was the approach the Principal In- 

vestigator was taking toward history ... applying a heavy-duty statistical analy- 

sis to history is naive, inappropriate, and even peculiar ... as if the Principal In- 

vestigator was going back to 19th-century beliefs that history is a science 

which could uncover laws. Panelists were opposed to such a narrow [sic] view 

of history" (538113 1). These pygmies will not climb onto a giant shoulder. 

One criterion of ground-breaking work is that it stimulate new studies. Rare 

will be the person who can read this book without thinking of things worth 

looking into; what do we know about birth-order effects in animals, for exam- 

ple? But there is a danger here too. Others less willing to put in as much effort 

as Sulloway has, in data-gathering and analysis, may seize on "birth order" 

and some of the other variables as thought-bites and slogans, ignoring the cru- 

cial interaction-effects and need for multivariate controls. It is profoundly to 

be wished that this does not happen, that Sulloway will not suffer the death of a 

thousand epigones but rather will presage much furtherance of understanding 

of history and in social science. 



Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0227 

References 

Barber, B. (1961). Resistance by scientists to scientific discovery. Science, 134,596. 

Crews, F. (1986). Skeptical Engagements. Oxford University Press. 

Gross, P. R. and Levitt, N. (1994). Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with 

Science. Johns Hopkins University Press 

Hamilton, W. D. (1963). The evolution of altruistic behavior. American Naturalist, 97,354.


OfFicers 

Prof. Peter A. Sturrock, President Prof. L. W. Fredrick, Secretary 

Physics Dept. Department of Astronomy 

Varian 302 P. O.Box3818 

Stanford University University of Virginia 

Stanford, CA 94305-4060 Charlottesville, VA 22903-08 18 

Ms. Brenda Dunne, Executive Vice President Prof. Charles R. Tolbert, Treasurer 

for Education, C 13 1, School of Engineering & Department of Astronomy 

Applied Science, Princeton University P. 0. Box 3818 

Princeton, NJ 08544-5263 University of Virginia 











VPI & su 


Dr. John Bockris 

Department of Chemistry 

Texas A&M University 

College Station, TX 77843 

Dr. John S. Derr 

Albq. Seismology Center 

Albuquerque, NM 87 1 15 

Dr. Roger D. Nelson 

C 13 1, Engineering Quad. 


Princeton, NJ 08544 

Council 

Dr. Harold E. Puthoff 

Institute of Advanced Studies-Austin 

4030 W. Braker Ln., Suite 300 

Austin, TX 78759-5329 


Institute for Frontier Science 

6 1 14 LaSalle Avenue, #605 

Oakland, CA 9461 1 





Dr. Robert M. Wood 

1727 Candlestick Ln. 


Journal ofscientijic Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 435-453, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Topographic Brain Mapping of UFO Experiencers 

Kuiros Foundation and University of Illinois rrt Chicago, 

1187 Wilmette Ave., #174, Wilmerre, IL 60091 

normun.s.don @uic.edu 

Kuiros Foundation, Cuixa Postal 14528, 

CEP 22412-000, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 

gildu.moura @ unikey. com. hr 

Abstract - A cohort of Brazilian subjects, claiming experiences with UFOs 

involving contact or abduction, were selected for topographic brain mapping. 

One of the most important selection criteria was the ability to enter into a 

self-reported, non-ordinary state of consciousness or trance that developed 

spontaneously after their abduction or contact experiences. Analysis of their 

EEGs revealed that all subjects entered voluntarily into an hyperaroused 

trance. In this state, they maintained a condition of muscular relaxation and 

immobility while their EEGs exhibited high frequency (beta) activity at all 

19 electrode sites, but with maximum activity at the prefrontal and adjacent 

loci. Inspection of the EEGs from the prefrontallfrontal sites revealed inter- 

mittent trains of rhythmic, approximately 40 Hz activity, attaining very high 

amplitudes, at times exceeding 40 microvolts. This activity was distinct in 

morphology and frequency from faster, usually concurrent activity, probably 

attributable to scalp muscle discharge (EMG). Analysis of 40 Hz, midline 

scalp activity, statistically controlling for the effects of EMG, revealed sig- 

nificantly more 40 Hz activity in trance than in baseline (p < .006). Also, the 

dominant alpha frequency increased during trance (p < .01). Both EEG find- 

ings suggest the occurrence of a state of hyperarousal. There was no evidence 

of epileptiform discharges in our data or clinical indications of possible 

epilepsy. Also, there was no brain activity suggestive of psychopathology, 

particularly schizophrenia, nor were there clinical indications of psy- 

chopathology. The EEG results were related to the physiological effects of 

highly focused attention and recent findings in neuroscience. Also noted were 

similarities to advanced meditative states and differences from psy- 

chopathology. 

Keywords: UFO experiencers - hyperaroused trance - EEG - abduction 

Brazil - meditation -topographic brain mapping 

I. Introduction 

As part of a larger program of research into brain function and altered states of 

consciousness (ASC), the authors have recorded electroencephalograms 

(EEGs) and produced topographic brain maps for over 100 people in Brazil 

who engage in various types of trances, most of whom were not involved in the

436 N. Don & G. Maura 

UFO phenomenon. This particular study reports data from the subgroup that 

claims episodes of abduction by or contact with nonhuman (alien) beings from 

unidentified flying objects (UFOs). "Contact," or "close encounters of the 

third kind," involves the supposed meeting and interaction with alien beings, 

and is usually reported to be a beneficial experience. "Abduction," or "close 

encounters of the fourth kind," involves kidnapping, either in a conscious or 

unconscious state, and the performance of medical-like procedures on the ab- 

ductee. The sequelae of these reported abductions usually involve significant 

psychological trauma. 

In the preliminary phase of our investigations, which involved 10 UFO ex- 

periencers who were not in the final sample of 13, the data suggested that these 

subjects could voluntarily self-induce a state of hyperaroused trance, with 

high frequency, high amplitude brain waves, probably not attributable to scalp 

muscle artifact. For reports on the early phase of this work, please see Moura 

(1994a, p. 186-190; 1994b, p. 485-492) and Don (1994, p. 493-496). 

We chose to investigate the UFO experiencers because they evidenced ad- 

vanced stages of hyperaroused trance not found in Brazilian mystics and rare 

even among experienced yogi meditators from India. 

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the frequency and am- 

plitude characteristics (as evidenced in EEG recordings) of the subjects' brain 

function while in trance differed significantly from baseline, pre-trance mea- 

surements. Also, if such differences existed, we wanted to compare our results 

with EEG studies done on people who meditate. The veridicality of the sub- 

jects' experiences was not addressed. ' 

For an introduction to the literature on the abduction/contact phenomenon, 

see Moura (1996/1992), Mack (1994a), Sprinkle (1994), and Pritchard et al. 

(1 994). 

11. Background 

The electrical activity of the brain, recorded from the scalp with surface 

electrodes, consists of waves with frequencies which range from approximate- 

ly 0.1 cycles per second (Hertz or Hz) up to approximately 70 Hz for the nor- 

mal adult (but possibly extending higher for selected subjects under unusual 

conditions). In most clinical EEG tests, only activity up to approximately 30 

Hz is examined. The amplitude of these waves is in the range of 2 or 3 micro- 

volts up to 100 microvolts. 

Within these broad frequency bands, there are different frequency sub- 

groups associated with differing states of arousal and brain function, each with 

- -- - - ---- - - -- - - -- - -- - 

'Recently, experiments involving PET scans have shown that different parts of the brain are activated 

by true and false memories of recently spoken words (Schacter et al., 1996). Additionally, PET scans of 

survivors of trauma reveal a differential brain response under conditions of symptom provocation com- 

pared to control conditions (Rauch et al., 1996). Therefore, beyond the issue of whether or not there is 

an altered state of brain function during the trances, it may in the future also be possible to examine 

whether or not brain function characteristics tend to support or disconfirm the veridicality of at least

Topographic Brain Mapping 437 

characteristic amplitude ranges in the normal adult. At the lowest end of the 

arousal continuum are "delta" waves, which range from approximately 0.1- 

3.5 Hz and are found during stage I11 and IV, normally dreamless sleep. 

"Theta" waves, approximately 4-7.5 Hz, are found most abundantly during 

transitions from the waking to sleep state (and vice-versa). "Alpha" waves 

(approximately 8-13 Hz) occur during relaxed, awake states, mostly with 

closed eyes, and are usually the highest-amplitude feature of the EEG record 

under these conditions. There is considerable individual variance in alpha 

wave amplitude; it is reported that 66% of subjects have 20-60 microvolts of 

activity, whereas 6% of subjects exceed 60 microvolts (Simonova et al., 

1967). 

"Beta" rhythms are faster than 13 Hz, and usually predominate the EEG of 

the awake, alert, adult subject with open eyes, with amplitudes typically below 

20 microvolts. The beta range can be subdivided into beta I (14-30 Hz) and 

beta I1 for rhythms above approximately 30 Hz; the latter are sometimes 

termed "gamma" rhythms. 

A. Brain Function and High Frequency Brain Waves 

In recent studies of brain function, mounting evidence supports the impor- 

tance of high frequency brain oscillations above 30 Hz, especially in the 36-44 

Hz frequency band.2 

Animal studies with implanted electrodes, magnetoencephalographic and 

scalp recorded EEG studies with humans, and computer simulations, suggest 

that 40 Hz activity plays a central role in cognition and sensory processing 

(Sheer, 1984; Llinhs & Pare, 1991 ; Llinhs & Ribary, 1992, 1993; Steriade et 

al., 199 1, 1993). Further, the thalamic intralaminar nuclei, part of the thalam- 

ocortical circuits involved in the generation of 40 Hz activity, along with the 

midbrain reticular formation, have been shown in PET studies to be activated 

by attentional processes (Kinomura et al., 1996). Highly focused attention is 

considered necessary in the generation of certain advanced meditative states, 

which we would therefore expect to be accompanied by broad band 40 Hz 

waves in the EEG. 

Therefore, while it is well-known that beta waves are associated with states 

of alert wakefulness, recent work suggests that the higher-frequency beta 

rhythms are associated with heightened levels of brain function, or more 

broadly, consciousness. 

B. Altered States of Consciousness 

In the psychophysiological literature on meditation and ASCs, there are 

only four reports of beta wave (14 Hz or higher) increases during an ASC. Das 

- - - - - - - - -- -- 

'Gray and Singer (1989) found power increases throughout the entire 30-46 Hz region of the frequen- 

cy spectrum. In our analyses, the 30-50 Hz band was used, which we termed beta 11. However, in the lit- 

erature, these effects are usually reported as maximal in the 36-44 Hz band, which has come to be termed 

"40 Hz."

438 N. Don & G. Moura 

and Gastaut (1 957) reported an EEG study conducted in India. Seven members 

of a spiritual community, practicing Kriya yoga, were measured in 20 record- 

ing sessions. However, Das and Gastaut reported only data from the "guru," 

the spiritual leader of the community, apparently because of his extraordinary 

ASC. He entered twice into a state of yogic ecstasy ("l'extase yogique") or 

"samadhi," during which he was physiologically hyperaroused, as indicated by 

the EEG and EKG, while the EMG recorded from the quadriceps remained flat 

(cf. Kugler, 1982). Among other findings, the subject's brain waves were re- 

ported to be 20-30 Hz and 40 Hz, generally distributed over both hemispheres, 

with amplitudes in the range of 30-50 microvolts. 

This case study remains a landmark in the psychophysiological literature on 

meditation since it is the only one examining a very advanced subject in the 

state of yogic ecstasy or "samadhi," the culmination of meditation, which is 

considered to be the direct, conscious experience of the godhead (Eliade, 

1958, p. 91-95). Since its publication some 40 years ago, even though it is just 

a single-case study, it apparently has not been challenged seriously. At that 

time, Henri Gastaut was widely considered to be the world's foremost epilep- 

tologist. It should be noted that Das and Gastaut used the terms yogic ecstasy 

and "samadhi" synonymously, whereas other sources, such as Fischer (1 97 1 ) 

and Eliade (1964, p. 41 7), differentiate between ecstasy and "samadhi." Fisch- 

er, however, states that there is ultimately a joining of these two states at a cer- 

tain, advanced point in the meditative process. 

In a conference presentation in 1960 (cited in West, 1980), Fenwick reported 

three meditators practicing a mantra meditation (similar to the method of 

Transcendental Meditation). In the later stages of meditation, theta bursts were 

observed accompanied by beta activity. 

The next study reporting high frequency brain activity (20 and 40 Hz) was 

by Banquet (1973). This cortical activity was found in four advanced Tran- 

scendental Meditation (TM) practitioners during the state of "transcendence," 

as defined in TM. The 20 Hz beta amplitude was very high (30-60 microvolts) 

while the 40 Hz activity was just a few microvolts. The high frequencies pre- 

dominated in the anterior channels but were found sometimes in all eight chan- 

nels recorded. However, since Banquet's studies, recent experiments have 

failed to replicate the presence of high frequency beta among TM meditators 

(F. T. Travis, personal communication, April 12, 1996). 

The fourth and last study reporting fast beta waves during meditation was by 

Benson et aE. (1 990), who measured three Tibetan Buddhist monks in Sikkim 

while they practiced "g Turn-mo w yoga. They found that resting metabolism 

was raised voluntarily (a maximum of 61 %) or lowered (a maximum of 64%). 

In one of the three subjects, EEG power in the 12-35 Hz band (a maximum fre- 

quency recorded) increased over 50%. 

Additionally, Surwillo and Hobson (1978) found acceleration of the domi- 

nant alpha frequency with Christians during prayer and with a Moslem subject 

during Sufi meditation. Das and Gastaut also found this effect. This alpha ef-


fect is another indicator of hyperarousal. In contrast to this, forms of medita- 

tion promoting cortical quieting or hypoarousal, such as the earlier stages of 

TM, produce a slowing of the dominant alpha frequency and a state of con- 

sciousness different from practices promoting hyperarousal (Kugler, 1982; 

Fischer, 197 1 ). 

Therefore, while data from a very large number of meditators in hy- 

poaroused states such as TM have been reported in the past 25 years (for a re- 

view see Jevning et al. (1 992)), there are EEG reports of only a few subjects in 

an hyperaroused ASC. 

However, hyperaroused altered states are well known to anthropologists 

from their study of some native peoples (Bateson & Meade, 1952; Deren, 

1953; Rouch, 1960; Jorgensen, 1972). Experiences of very bright light are 

often associated with these trances and are a well-known characteristic of ad- 

vanced meditative and mystical states (Eliade, 1964, p. 60-62). A common 

experience among our subjects when in trance was of a very strong light near 

the forehead. It therefore appears likely that this experience is another indica- 

tor of hyperaroused, non-ordinary states of consciousness. 

Ring (1 992) has reported the incidence of very bright, white light during the 

near-death experience. He has proposed that the "kundalini" syndrome, 

which is elucidated in tantric yoga (Eliade, 1958, p. 134), is the process com- 

mon to both UFO and near-death experiences. Moura (1 99611992) has argued 

that while the "kundalini" process is involved in UFO experiences, it does not 

adequately account for all the reported phenomena. Das and Gastaut also re- 

lated the hyperaroused ecstasy and "samadhi" of their yogic adept, or "guru," 

to the "kundalini" process of yoga. 

Hence, although there have been many reports of behaviors or mental states 

suggestive of hyperaroused trance, there is a notable lack of advanced subjects 

capable of entering these states under laboratory conditions or controlled con- 

ditions in field settings. 

A. Subject Selection 

111. Methods 

There were 5 males and 8 females who at the time of testing ranged in age 

from 19 to 72, with a mean age of 47.23 years. Their reported abduction or 

contact experiences occurred a minimum of two years before. 

Criteria for selection in the study included: 

1. Self-reports of UFO experiencers, including memories of contact or ab- 

duction by extra-terrestrial or nonhuman beings. All or part of the mem- 

ories of the reported events were conscious, without the use of hypnosis. 

2. The ability to enter voluntarily into a non-ordinary state of conscious- 

ness which reportedly commenced with the reported UFO experience.


All the subjects who agreed to participate in this experiment had received 

some form of psychological or spiritual counseling. As a result, there was 

amelioration of the psychological trauma, which enabled them to participate 

in the study. However, the subjects possessed varying tolerances for the hyper- 

aroused condition, some claiming that the intensity of the experience was sus- 

tainable for only a few minutes. 

B. EEG Recording Procedure 

The investigators traveled extensively in Brazil with a portable, 23-channel 

EEG and computer in order to gather the data. Recording sessions took place 

in a wide variety of field settings. Each session began with the recording of 

resting baselines with eyes open and closed. Following this, subjects were re- 

quested to enter their special state of consciousness. 

C. EEG Equipment 

The EEG was recorded using a Lexicor Medical Technology, Inc., Neu- 

rosearch-24 system. This equipment consisted of 19 AC-coupled amplifiers 

for EEG recording (low frequency cut-off at 0.5 Hz, time constant approxi- 

mately 0.3 sec; high-frequency cut-off at 128 Hz with a 48 dB roll off/octave) 

plus five additional channels and related software for data editing and analysis. 

The sampling rate was 5 12lsecond for 10 subjects and 256lsecond for an addi- 

tional 3 subjects. Electrodes were applied using an electrode cap and conduct- 

ing gel made by Electro-Cap International, Inc. This consisted of an elastic 

skull cap with tin electrodes pre-positioned over the 19 International 10-20 

scalp electrode sites with a forehead ground. Reference electrodes were ap- 

plied to the left and right earlobes and linked. For most sessions, two addition- 

al electrodes were affixed to the center of the forehead, approximately one 

centimeter apart, for bipolar recording of frontalis EMG, or over the left mas- 

seter muscle. Over all testing sessions, the impedances at the scalp, ground and 

reference electrodes were usually kept below 3 k ohms. 

D. Baselines 

For all subjects, eyes-open and eyes-closed EEG baselines of 1 1/2 to 2 min- 

utes duration were collected outside of trance while subjects were seated, re- 

laxed, and in an upright position. For the last four subjects, eyes-closed control 

trials were also collected under instructions to tense the forehead musculature. 

This provided a control condition used in assessing and correcting for potential 

scalp muscle artifacts in the frontal EEG. 

E. Trance 

The recording period during trance ranged from a minimum of 1 1/2 to 2 

minutes in duration in some subjects to as long as 10-15 minutes in others.

Topographic Brain Mapping 44 1 

EEG analyses were restricted to the trance periods when subjects were rela- 

tively still with eyes closed. 

A. Baselines 

IV. Results 

The baseline recordings of the cohort were typical of normal, resting EEGs, 

with no sign of abnormal brain function such as epileptiform patterns or slow- 

ing in the EEG; however, clinical challenges were not performed to assess for 

potential abnormalities. 

The records showed the usual inter-subject variability of amplitude and 

varying amounts of alpha rhythms. 

B. Trance 

During the trance portion of the recording sessions, all subjects were able to 

enter trance voluntarily within a few minutes or sooner. At the commencement 

of trance, the EEGs changed to a generalized pattern of low voltage, fast activ- 

ity which was sustained throughout the session. Further into the trance period, 

there was a gradual increase of frequency and amplitude of the brain waves at 

all 1 9 electrode sites. For most subjects, it was at the prefrontal (EEG record- 

ing sites Fpl and Fp2), and for some subjects at adjacent frontal sites, that the 

trance EEG was most affected. However, for three subjects, the effects were 

distributed widely over the scalp. 

Two features were salient: 

1) Intermittent trains of rhythmic (sinusoid-like) brain waves, approxi- 

mately 40 Hz activity, attaining as much as 40-50 microvolts amplitude. 

This was interpreted to be brain activity. 

2) Faster, pervasive, approximately 80 Hz activity with some spiked mor- 

phology, up to 100 microvolts amplitude, probably attributable to 

frontalis muscle discharge. 

Data from the control trials which simulated scalp muscle activation did not 

resemble data from the recordings made during trance conditions. 

It therefore appears that both the 40 Hz brain activity and the very high am- 

plitude 80 Hz discharge, probably due to scalp muscle activation, may both be 

indicators of a single, high-energy process affecting maximally the fronto-or- 

bital regions, at the front of the brain. 

C. Post- Trance 

As the trance lightened, the fast activity gradually diminished; the subjects 

returned within a few minutes to the non-trance condition. The post-trance


recording resembled the baseline, and for some subjects showed evidence of a 

condition somewhat more hypoaroused than the original baseline. 

D. Figures 1 and 2 

Data from a representative subject are presented. Fast activity, due primari- 

ly to scalp muscle discharge, occurred most noticeably at the left temporal 

electrode site, T3, during pre-trance baseline and trance. Activation at the 

pre-frontal, supra-orbital sites, Fpl and Fp2, occurred only in trance, and 

shows a mixture of 40 Hz, sinusoid-like brain rhythms, and faster, higher am- 

plitude scalp muscle activity. Please see Figure 1. 

In Figure 2, the EEG from pre-frontal sites, Fp 1 and Fp2, are displayed for a 

100 rv 1 

Raw EEG of a Representative Subject 

1 sec 

PRE-TRANCE TRANCE POST-TRANCE 

Fig. 1. Raw EEG tracings plotted at 30 mmlsec from a representative abductee during a pre- 

trance baseline (left column). Channel names are shown at far left. Scale bars for 100 pV 

amplitude and I second duration are provided at the top of the figure. A 0.1 second seg- 

ment of channel Fpl, over the left pre-frontal scalp, during trance is zoomed (inset) to re- 

veal a nearly sinosoidal rhythm of approximately 50 pV amplitude at 40 Hz. Scalp- 

recorded muscle artifact is usually irregular and arrhythmic.

1wPv 1 

1 sec 


Pre-Frontal EEG During Trance Stages 

LIGHT (1) MEDIUM (52) DEEP (151) MEDIUM (200) LIGHT (236) 

Fig. 2. Pre-frontal EEG of a second abductee showing the waxing and waning of brain activation 

during stages of trance. The number of seconds from commencement of the trance record 

are shown in parentheses. 

second subject while in trance. Over the approximately four-minute duration 

of the trance, the progressive speed-up and slowing of the EEG is discernible. 

V. Analysis of EEG Data 

Raw EEG data were stored on the hard disk of a computer during sessions 

and later transferred to a 250-megabyte tape drive. Data editing and reduction 

were performed off-line. The data were recorded in sequential, one-half sec- 

ond samples or "epochs." All epochs of EEG data were inspected visually for 

eye movement and other artifacts. Epochs found containing such artifacts 

were excluded from further analyses. Power spectra were computed on arti- 

fact-free EEG epochs by a digital signal processing chip and associated hard- 

ware in the Lexicor NeuroSearch-24. For each of 19 channels, log power den- 

sity in the theta (4-8 Hz), alpha (8-14 Hz), beta I(14-30 Hz), and beta I1 (30-50 

Hz), and the 70-128 Hz frequency bands was ~ornputed.~ 

Because at higher frequencies (above 14 Hz and especially above 30 Hz) the 

EEG may also contain signals from scalp muscle discharge, it is necessary to 

control for EMG activity when computing the statistical effects of trance com- 

pared to baseline. See Appendix I for a discussion of the methodology used. 

The following statistical comparisons of baseline with trance were computed 

on data in which possible contamination by scalp muscle was controlled for. 

Two statistically significant differences were found: The first for the midline 

electrodes (taken as a group) Fz, Cz, Pz, which are least susceptible to scalp 

- - - 

'Power density was computed by dividing the total power in each frequency band by the number of 2- 

Hz wide spectral lines comprising the band.


muscle contamination. In trance, there was more log power (0.13) in the 30-50 

Hz frequency band than in baseline (0.04), F(116) = 17.57, p = .006. Secondly, 

in trance, the dominant alpha frequency (group maximum = 11.90 Hz) was 

faster than in baseline (group maximum = 10.85 Hz), p = .018, two-tailed, 

matched-sample, t-test. For a complete description of all statistical test results, 

see Appendix 11. 

VI. Clinical Neurological Assessment of EEGs 

There was no evidence of organic brain syndromes among our subjects. In 

cases where there is organicity, one finds slowing of the EEG rhythms (Nieder- 

meyer & Lopes da Silva, 1993). 

It is well known that temporal lobe instabilities lead to disturbances of con- 

scious experience (Fenwick, 1983; Fenwick et al., 1985). Persinger (1989a, 

1989b) has hypothesized that some people with such labile brain function, es- 

pecially when exposed to increases in geomagnetic radiation, will have unusu- 

al conscious experiences such as of nonhuman beings and UFOs. 

A more likely explanation for these experiences in adults with no history of 

physical trauma to the brain is complex partial epileptic seizures. These most 

often occur in the temporal lobes, the limbic system, or are temperolimbic. 

The temporal lobes are associated with emotion and states of consciousness; 

ictally (during epileptic episodes), 4-7 Hz waveforms are found over the tem- 

poral lobes, and extending onto frontal regions. No such waves were found 

among our trance data. Fronto-orbital seizures also occur but are much less 

common. 

During epileptic crises, there is typically a narrowing of the field of con- 

sciousness with delusions, hallucinations, and distortions in visual reality. 

Ictal experiences of ecstasy have been reported but are rare. 

None of the thirteen people in this study has been diagnosed as epileptic and 

none was medicated. Because of their experiences, several had full diagnostic 

neurological evaluations prior to involvement in this study, which found no 

evidence of epilepsy. In an extended review of our physiological data and sub- 

jects' histories, our Brazilian epileptologist consultant concluded that they did 

not present any critical phenomena suggestive of epilepsy (H. Bello, personal 

communications, March - October, 1996). Additionally, unlike epileptic pa- 

tients, our subjects voluntarily entered and left the state of altered brain func- 

tion. 

In order to obtain a second opinion regarding the possible presence of 

epileptiform EEG patterns during trance, we submitted samples of our data for 

examination by a senior-level, American neurologist specializing in the EEG 

and diagnosis of epilepsy. We were informed that there was no epileptiform ac- 

tivity present in those EEGs (J. R. Hughes, personal communication, June 24, 

1996). 

Both neurologists concluded that the rhythmic, approximately 40 Hz activi- 

ty appeared to be cortical in origin. Additionally, our Brazilian consultant, Dr.


Bello, rendered an opinion that some of the above 40 Hz activity might be cor- 

tical in origin. 

VII. Psychopathology of UFO Experiencers 

A common reaction to reports of UFO experiences is that the claimants are 

somehow psychologically disturbed. While the UFO reports, taken at face 

value, seem to fall outside the range of possibilities of the Western world view, 

and sound delusional, hallucinatory, and even psychotic, careful psychological 

examination of UFO experiencers has failed to support the psychopathology 

hypothesis (Spanos et al., 1993; Mack, 1994a, 1994b). This was also true of 

the thirteen subjects studied here, all of whom were interviewed by a licensed 

clinical psychologist, who is one of the present investigators (GM). 

Moreover, the EEG results observed for the present sample of UFO experiencers 

displayed a different pattern than is typically seen in depression or hysterical 

attack (Niedermeyer & Lopes da Silva, 1993, p. 345, 569-570). Most 

potentially relevant are the EEG findings from studies of schizophrenia.' 

Since the initial reports of Davis (1940), there have been numerous observations 

of increased fast beta activity in schizophrenic patients relative to controls 

which may sometimes have overlapped with the beta band studied here 

(For review, see Itil, 1977). However, the pattern of the EEG findings for our 

UFO experiencers is differentiated from the findings reported for schizophrenics. 

For the UFO experiencers, only the amount of fast beta activity was affected, 

whereas in schizophrenics, the amount of activity in lower frequency 

bands, including delta, theta, alpha, and low beta, may also be affected (Itil et 

al., 1972; Morstyn, et al., 1983; Gattaz et al., 1992). Further, the topographic 

distribution of the fast beta activity appeared to differentiate our UFO experiencers 

from schizophrenics, in that the beta activity was observed predominately 

over the frontal scalp in our subjects but was observed mostly at sites 

posterior to the frontal scalp in schizophrenics (e.g., Morstyn et al., 1983; Gattaz 

et al., 1992).~ Finally, our subjects could voluntarily commence and terminate 

the high frequency activity which was only present in the trance condition. 

Voluntary control of this activity is not found in schizophrenics. 

VIII. Discussion 

Brain activity of approximately 40 Hz, with 40 or more microvolts ampli- 

tude, was observed during the trances of all 13 of the UFO experiencers in this 

study. This unusual physiological condition has been reported only once 

- - ~~~~~ 

41ncreases in fast beta activity may also be produced by ingestion of hallucinogenic drugs, such as 

LSD, mescaline or psilocybin; however, none of our subjects were using these substances at the time of 

testing. Furthermore, baseline was recorded a few minutes before trance and no high frequency activity 

was found there. 

'Attempts to localize precisely the beta activity in many earlier studies of schizophrenia were limited 

by the small number of scalp sites recorded.


before, by Das and Gastaut (1957) in their case study of an East Indian adept in 

a very advanced state of meditation. 

In common with or overlapping Das and Gastaut's results we found: 

1 ) a statistically significant increase in power for 30-50 Hz, high amplitude 

brain waves, probably not due entirely to scalp muscle discharge; 

2) a statistically significant increase of frequency in the dominant alpha 

frequency; 

3) our subjects reported feelings of paralysis (reduced motor outflow) dur- 

ing their ASCs, suggesting inhibition of skeletal muscle tone; 

4) although no formal challenges were presented, the subjects appeared to 

be unresponsive to normally distracting environmental disturbances; 

5) states of unusual conscious experience. 

Also, for most subjects, there was an easily observed increase in eye sac- 

cade frequency and amplitude, also indicative of hyperarousal (Fischer, 197 1). 

Since the recall of the reported experiences occurs in a non-ordinary state of 

consciousness, it seems likely that they are "state dependent." According to 

Rossi and Cheek (1988, p. 7): "It has been found that hormonal information 

substances released by the stress of any novel life situation can act as neuro- 

modulators. These information substances can modulate the action of neural 

systems of the brain so as to encode memory and learning in a special manner." 

Therefore, it is likely that 40 Hz (and possibly higher frequency) brain activity 

was associated with the encoding of the reported experiences, as well as its re- 

call. In order to re-experience contact/abduction, the state of brain function 

associated with the high-frequency rhythms must be reinstated. 

Our results differ from Banquet's 1973 report on advanced TM meditators 

in their deepest stage of practice, in which high power 20 Hz activity was ob- 

served, while 40 Hz activity was present but much weaker. In our data, 20 Hz 

effects were absent while broad band 40 Hz effects were robust. 

All our subjects were able to enter an extreme hyperaroused ASC, showing 

EEG similarities to the state reported by Das and Gastaut in their one advanced 

subject as yogic ecstasy or "samadhi." As we noted previously, although Das 

and Gastaut did not differentiate between these two states, they are usually not 

considered to be synonymous. We submit that our subjects were in an ecstatic 

state. Fischer (1 97 1) assigns extreme hyperaroused trance to the ecstatic state. 

Also, the experience of "blissful excitement" (George, 1995, p. 82), a com- 

mon characteristic of the ecstatic state, was reported by our subjects. They 

also related feeling that they were linked to a higher consciousness, and some- 

times being connected with a non-human being or even with God. 

Mack (1994a) and Moura (199611992) have reported on the ecstatic dimen- 

sion of this class of subject. However, in contrast to the present study, al- 

though there are many accounts of the mystical experiences of yogis, there is 

no mention of abduction or UFO contact, suggesting that while there are com-


monalities between yogic states and the trance state of our subjects, there also 

are significant areas of difference. 

The ability of the experiencers to enter trance developed after their reported 

contact with nonhuman beings and was not the fruit of years of intense prac- 

tice of yoga or meditation. Whereas most of Das and Gastaut's seven Indian 

yogis had been practicing five to ten years, in 20 data-recording sessions with 

this group, only the spiritual head of the community attained the hyperaroused 

state, doing so on two occasions. 

Almost all studies in the meditation literature involve hypoaroused states, 

such as are found in TM and Zen. These are characterized by the physiological 

slowing of a host of parameters (for a review see Jevning et al., 1992) although 

Banquet (1973) reported the presence of fast beta predominantly at anterior 

scalp sites in more advanced TM meditators during the state they term "tran- 

scendence." However, as noted earlier, that beta has not been replicable in re- 

cent attempts. In contrast to the advanced TM meditators, our subjects did not 

exhibit increased beta I power, but did have a large increase of 40 Hz (and 

broad band 30-50 Hz beta 11) power. 

Also noted earlier, PET scans during focused attention by humans have re- 

vealed an activation of the midbrain reticular formation and the thalamic in- 

tralaminar nuclei (Kinomura et al., 1996). Corollary to this finding, Llings and 

Pare (1 991) and Lliniis and Ribary (1 992, 1993) earlier proposed that the thala- 

mic intralaminar nuclei, comprising the diffuse thalamic system, generates 40 

Hz activity which integrates corticothalamic activity and so bears importantly 

on consciousness. 

Also, earlier work by Sheer (1984, p. 64-84) found that scalp-recorded 40 

Hz was associated with "focused arousal'' and learning tasks. Q-sorts, investi- 

gating subjective aspects of different brain states, revealed differences be- 

tween high and low frequency beta. The descriptors for the experience of 5- 10 

microvolt 40 Hz were: "attentive, concentrating, effortful, focused, investigat- 

ing, searching, scrutinizing, studying, thinking, and vigilant." For low frequen- 

cy beta (21 -3 1 Hz), the descriptors were: "active, alert, anxious, energetic, ex- 

cited, exhilarated, lively, restless, stimulated, and tense" (Bird et al., 1978). 

It therefore appears that as the focus of attention sharpens, the integrative 

activity of the diffuse thalamic system increases through the action of 40 Hz 

brain rhythms. Apparently, when attentional focusing becomes "laser-like," an 

extreme state of corticothalamic integration occurs and with it an amplifica- 

tion of normally unconscious brain activity. 

At the extremes, either ecstasy or "samadhi," Fischer (1 971) proposed that 

the constraints on normal, waking consciousness are bridged and a 

higher-order self or personality prevails which seems to transcend time and 

space. 

While Das and Gastaut's "guru" had high-amplitude, very high frequency 

brain activity widely-spread over the scalp, the extreme activation pattern of 

our subjects was centered on the prefrontal and adjacent loci of the brain, but


in three subjects was more widely distributed. This suggests that for most of 

our subjects, the hyperaroused state was more circumscribed than for the 

"guru." In "samadhi," one is said to experience mystical unity with the Divine 

(Eliade, 1958, p. 91-95). While many of our subjects did report some degree 

of unitive experience, they all experienced a range of unusual phenomena that 

were not constrained by space and time in ordinary ways and appear to be 

unique to UFO experiencers. 

The rarity of the extreme hyperaroused state of ecstasy is further supported 

by Bagchi and Wenger's study (1957) in which they recorded EEGs from 14 

Indian yogis in a variety of settings, including caves. They found only changes 

in the alpha rhythms and no evidence of high amplitude fast waves. It is of im- 

portance to note that these advanced subjects did not report the experience of 

yogic ecstasy. 

In contrast to this evidence, suggesting the rarity of ecstasy, all our subjects 

attained this physiologic state. They therefore constitute the largest cohort of 

subjects reported to this date exhibiting this apparently rare state of brain func- 

tion. However, these results are correlational, and it awaits further investiga- 

tion in order to establish a conclusive link between extreme, hyperaroused 

states of brain function and transcendental experiences. 

VIII. Summary 

Over a six-year period, we measured EEGs and produced topographic brain 

maps of over 100 people in Brazil who engage in various trances. Although it is 

true that there are many people engaged in mediumistic or other trance prac- 

tices in that country, only the subjects who claimed contact or abduction expe- 

riences with UFOs - both in the preliminary and final phases of our investiga- 

tions - presented evidence of advanced stages of hyperaroused trance. But in 

addition to involvement in "super-conscious" states, recent investigations in 

neuroscience have revealed the significance of high frequency brain rhythms 

in cognition, learning, attention, sensory processing, and as indicated by our 

results, state-dependent memory. However our subjects actually came by the 

ability to enter into their unusual ASC, it is important to point out that all our 

subjects could do so voluntarily, apparently without practicing for many years 

or initiation by yogic adepts. 


We first wish to thank our research subjects who generously cooperated in 

this investigation. We also thank Hklio Bello, M.D., for the neurological con- 

sultations and the large amount of advice, encouragement and support he has 

given so graciously to the authors of this study. We wish to acknowledge 

Bruce E. McDonough, Ph.D., for his assistance with the analysis of the data. 

Additionally, the financial support of the Kairos Foundation is gratefully ac- 

knowledged.

Controlling for Levels of EMG 


Appendix I - EMG Correction 

The beta region of the frequency spectrum, especially above 30 Hz, is 

known to be particularly susceptible to scalp muscle contamination. Hence, 

comparisons of beta power between baseline and trance, known to differ in 

EMG levels, would be potentially biased. Ideally, all epochs containing poten- 

tial EMG contamination would be excluded from analyses. However, because 

high amplitude activity over 30 Hz was apparent for most subjects throughout 

their trance periods, a simple data-exclusion criterion could not be employed. 

Therefore, in order to avoid potentially biasing the EEG comparisons between 

the baseline and trance conditions, an effort was made to balance the levels of 

EMG activity in these two conditions. EMG balancing between conditions 

was considered necessary only for analyses of beta activity. Analyses of theta 

and alpha activity were conducted on unbalanced data. 

To control for EMG levels between conditions, EMG activity (defined oper- 

ationally as total power in the 70-1 28 Hz region of the frequency spectrum) 

was calculated for each one-half second recording epoch. In accord with 

Davidson (1988; personal communications, 1994-1995), we assumed that any 

scalp recorded activity over 70 Hz was solely from muscle activity. However, 

there is no reported data on what the upper frequency limit for scalp recorded 

EEGs actually is, due only to brain activity. Especially with unusual subjects 

in an hyperaroused trance, the 70 Hz criterion may be arbitrary, and require re- 

vision in future research. 

Because of limitations of our software, power in the EMG band could be 

computed only for the 10 subjects whose data were recorded at 512 

samples/second. Separately, for each subject and electrode site, log EMG 

power for trance and baseline was compared by t-test. Trance epochs showing 

the highest EMG levels and/or baseline epochs showing the lowest EMG levels 

were then dropped and remaining epochs compared again; this process contin- 

uing iteratively until the log EMG levels were nonsignificantly different (t-test 

p > .lo).' For 7 subjects, EMG levels between trance and baseline conditions 

could be brought into balance in this way at the midline sites Fz, Cz, and Pz. In 

general, midline sites, especially Cz and Pz, are least affected by scalp muscle 

discharge. Other scalp sites could also be balanced for some, but not all, of 

these subjects. Therefore, in order to maintain a sample size of at least 7 sub- 

jects, group analyses of beta activity considered only the 3 midline sites. That 

the EMG levels in the baseline and trance conditions did not differ for these 7 

subjects after balancing was confirmed by 2-factor (condition x scalp site) 

-- - - -- -- 

"When data are correlated and cannot meet the assumption underlying the t-test that observations be 

independent, as is the case in the analysis of multiple EEG epochs from a single subject, the statistical 

significance of the result is likely to be inflated. Thus, the single subject t-test results may be regarded as 

conservative in the sense that they tend to overstate the extent to which the trance and baseline EMG lev- 

els differ for each subject.


Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), F(116) = 0.03, p = .874. Total log EMG 

power in the 70- 1 28 Hz band was 1.24 for baseline and 1.23 for trance after 

balancing (averaged across 7 subjects and 3 scalp sites.) For the remaining 3 

subjects, the distributions of EMG power in baseline and trance conditions 

were largely non-overlapping at all 19 sites, thus these data could not be bal- 

anced. 

Appendix I1 - Statistical Analysis of Trance vs. Nontrance 

Efects of Trance on Beta Activity 

Log transforms were performed on power density data in the EEG bands for 

epochs remaining after EMG balancing. The log power density of single 

epochs was then averaged within subjects, separately for each channel and 

frequency band. Visual inspection of the data histograms suggested that the 

log power-density distributions were approximately normal. Questions of 

EEG power density differences between baseline and trance were examined in 

2-factor ANOVAs with repeated measures across electrode site (Fz, Cz, Pz) 

and condition (baseline, trance). A separate 2-factor ANOVA was performed 

for each frequency band examined. 

Marginal mean log power density in the 30-50 Hz beta I1 band was observed 

to be larger in trance (0.13) than during baseline (0.04), F(116) = 17.57, 

p = .006. A tendency for beta I1 to increase from posterior to anterior scalp 

was also observed, F(2112) = 3.26,~ = .l14, e = .5655, with marginal mean log 

power density of 0.22, 0.08, and -0.04, at Fz, Cz, and Pz, re~pectively.~ The 

condition by scalp-site interaction was nonsignificant, F(2112) = 0.33, 

p = .724, e = .5528. 

Marginal mean log power density in the 14-30 Hz beta I band was not different 

between trance (0.70) and baseline (0.69) conditions, F(116) = 0.09, 

p = .780. Neither the main effect of scalp site, F(116) = 0.37, p = .699, e = 

.9598, nor the condition by scalp-site interaction, F(2112) = 0.98, p = .404, e = 

.636 1, were significant for beta I. 

EfSects of Trance on Alpha and Theta Activity 

Log power density in the alpha and theta bands was evaluated for all 13 

subjects over the occipital scalp sites (01 and 02) in separate 2-factor 

ANOVAs. It was possible to include all subjects since EMG infiltration into 

these lower regions of the frequency spectrum is likely to be minimal and, 

therefore, controlling for EMG levels was regarded as unnecessary. For analy- 

ses of alpha and theta activity, the power density of single epochs was aver- 

aged, within each subject and scalp site, before log transformation. 

- 

'Main effects and interactions involving the scalp-site factor were evaluated using the Greenhouse- 

Geisser adjustment where appropriate. Greenhouse-Geisser tail prohabillties and epsilon factors (e) are 

listed in the text.

Topographic Brain Mapping 45 1 

An ANOVA on log alpha power density, for all 13 subjects and 2 occipital 

scalp sites, indicated nonsignificant differences between baseline and trance, 

F(1112) = 0.26, p = .621. The main effect of scalp site and the condition by 

scalp site interaction were nonsignificant as well. A separate ANOVA on log 

theta power over 13 subjects and 2 occipital scalp sites also failed to show differences 

between baseline and trance, F(1112) = 0.56,~ = .470. The main scalp 

site effect and the condition by scalp site interaction were also nonsignificant 

on log theta power density. 

Effect of Trance on Dominant Alpha Frequency 

We also examined our data for baseline to trance changes in the dominant 

alpha frequency, which were found in the hyperaroused states reported by Das 

and Gastaut (1 957) and Surwillo and Hobson (1978). Six of the seven subjects 

analyzed above for beta I and I1 had well-developed alpha trains in baseline 

and trance. Their data from the left occipital site (01) were low-pass filtered 

at 14 Hz and the mean alpha frequency in baseline and in trance for each sub- 

ject was determined with signal-processing software. 

For all six subjects analyzed, the dominant alpha frequency increased in fre- 

quency from baseline to trance. The mean baseline alpha frequency was 10.06 

Hz (range, 9.36 Hz - 10.85 Hz) and the mean trance frequency was 10.67 Hz 

(range, 9.70 Hz - 11.90 Hz); (Matched-sample t-test, t = 3.47, df = 5, p = .018, 

two-tailed). 

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Toward A Model Relating Empathy, Charisma, and Telepathy 

Abstract - Telepathy is often dismissed because it is judged to be so weird 

as to be counterintuitive. This article argues that telepathy may be interpret- 

ed as phenomenologically impressive events of a social psychological 

process which in less dramatic instances would be termed empathy and 

charisma. Such an equation, herein called the "possible world model," 

would perhaps normalize telepathy, and lessen the opprobrium attached to its 

study. A first step is taken to validate the model when a comparative litera- 

ture search finds that telepathy and empathy relate very similarly to other ex- 

perimental variables. 

Keywords: paranormal - telepathy - ESP - charisma - empathy 

Telepathy = Extraordinary Empathy andlor Overwhelming Charisma: 

The Possible World Model 

Telepathy has often been judged to be "miraculous," "paranormal," and cer- 

tainly "anomalous." For no other reason than its apparent "weirdness," zeal- 

ous skeptics would dismiss the possibility that reports of telepathy are re- 

counting true experiences, and stigmatize both the persons involved and those 

who study them as being anti-scientific if not downright moronic. The Journal 

of Personality and Social Psychology, for example, refuses on principle to re- 

view any submission which has "parapsychological content" (personal com- 

munication from Chester A. Insko, JPSP-IRGP section editor). 

This paper does not argue that telepathy is "real"; instead, it aims for the 

more modest goal of demonstrating that telepathy is as real as other social 

psychological phenomena which both scientists and the general public accept 

routinely, and to which telepathy can perhaps be ultimately reduced. Per- 

ceived weirdness should not be a determining factor in ascertaining truth, 

since on the one hand many things we take as true - such as charisma and em- 

pathy - are much more bizarre than commonly assumed, while telepathy, ex- 

amined rationally, is less bizarre than some might hope. If the proposed model 

is correct, telepathy can be discarded only at the cost of these other constructs. 

The Skeptical Challenge 

Skepticism about the reality of phenomena deemed "paranormal" tends to 

take the form David Hume directed toward the "miraculous": "No testimony is 

sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its

456 J. Donovan 

falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to es- 

tablish" (174811 985). 

G. Price (1 955, p. 360) adopts just this tactic, and arrives at his conclusion 

that "the findings of the parapsychologists ... are dependent on clerical and sta- 

tistical errors and unintentional use of sensory cues, and that all extrachance 

results not so explicable are dependent on deliberate fraud or mildly abnormal 

mental conditions." His would seem to be an extreme case of Davies' (1 97 1, 

p. 577) observation about "that much mistrusted individual, the layman, to 

whom is attributed the property of being able to observe objectively anything 

that can be explained, but imagining everything that can't." Price finds it 

more likely that all witnesses should lie (consciously or not) than that nature 

be subverted, or more accurately, that his understanding of that nature should 

be incomplete. 

Tellingly, Price assumes that by discarding laboratory work in parapsychol- 

ogy, he has done away with parapsychology itself. He forgets, like many para- 

psychologists themselves, that the genuinely important data for parapsycholo- 

gy, its disciplinary charter as it were, come not from the laboratory but from 

the case reports. Laboratory work is but a reaction to, an effort to recreate and 

control the experiences reported from everyday life (cf. Irwin, 1989, p. 47). To 

dismiss the former successfully leaves untouched the legitimate questions 

posed by the latter. 

Applying Hume's criterion to these case reports, many social scientists are 

likely to arrive at the opposite conclusion from Price's. It is more reasonable 

to conclude that there is something going on which motivates descriptions of 

psi experiences, than that everyone who reports such events is actually 

gullible, mentally ill, or a cad; it seems more probable that our understanding 

of nature should be incomplete, than that men and women should continually, 

consistently, and independently deceive others or themselves about their own 

experiences. At the very least, the social reality of the phenomena must be 

conceded and studied, even if the question of their independent reality is de- 

ferred or bracketed (McClenon, 1991). 

Without substantial evidence to the contrary, we should conclude that para- 

psychological case reports have at their core a uniquely impressive experience 

which the individual has tried to communicate honestly using a particular vo- 

cabulary. The experiences, in other words, are genuine enough, and their ex- 

planation constitutes a legitimate problem for students of the lived human ex- 

perience (Rao & Palmer, 1987). 

The task of parapsychology can be stated simply: to make sense of these re- 

ported experiences, experiences which on their face should not be happening 

and are thereby termed either "anomalous" or "paranormal." This task may 

entail the discovery and articulation of heretofore unrealized processes. More 

likely, the answers may lie with renewed consideration of processes which we 

have already identified, but whose scope we have underestimated. This paper 

suggests that events termed "telepathic" are extreme examples of the social

Empathy, Charisma, and Telepathy 457 

psychological processes of charisma and/or empathy, and as such are both as 

real as and no more mysterious than these other phenomena we discuss and 

routinely acknowledge. 

Telepathy 

Telepathy was first and best defined in 1882 by F. W. H. Myers as the "trans- 

mission of thought independently of the recognized channels of sense" (Fodor, 

1966, p. 376). More recent articulations have subsumed telepathy within a 

larger class of "anomalous processes of information or energy transfer ... that 

are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological mecha- 

nisms" (Bem & Honorton, 1994, p. 4; ct Palmer, 1986; Rao & Palmer, 1987), 

which collectively go by the term "psi." At least two reasons exist to prefer the 

original definition. First, Myers defines telepathy as a positive event; he tells 

us what telepathy is. Definitions in terms of anomalies tell us what telepathy is 

not, that is, it is not currently explainable. But that is a status which may 

change one day, hence is unsuitable as a defining criterion for a science's focal 

phenomenon (cf. Hess, 1993; Irwin, 1989). 

Bertrand Russell (1959, p. 155) claims that just this negative definition is 

what characterizes philosophy: "Those questions which are already capable of 

definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at pre- 

sent, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is 

called philosophy." Just as parapsychology's goal is to empty itself gradually 

of any anomalies, "as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject be- 

comes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a sep- 

arate science." From this perspective, at least, parapsychologists do them- 

selves a potential disservice by constructing their discipline as a philosophy 

rather than a science. 

Perhaps even worse, the standard of "anomalies" may render parapsycholo- 

gy a subfield of theology. "Miracle, by definition," claims anthropologist 

Raymond Firth (1996, p. 28), "is an event which stands outside the ordinary 

processes of nature, is remarkable for its discontinuity, and is not explainable 

by physical principles." If parapsychology is the study of miracles, it overtly 

positions itself in opposition to religious discourse. Thus Firth is able to sup- 

pose that "recent work by the psychologists on precognition and extra-sensory 

perception attracts attention for its religious bearing rather than for its scien- 

tific interest" (p. 39). The fact that parapsychology seeks to explain miracles, 

that is to say, to render them unmiraculous, must be construed as a fundamen- 

tally anti-religious endeavor. While this may be true of much scientific dis- 

course, it is usually by implication and not by design. It is unclear that this is 

not a confrontation which is best avoided. 

The second objection is more important. The alternative definition speaks 

in terms of "physical or biological mechanisms." It is unclear that these are the 

appropriate idioms or models through which telepathy can be most produc- 

tively scrutinized. Examples of such attempts may be found in Walker (1 977;


1984) and William (1986). Glaringly absent in this definition for a putative 

event of human communication, and in the work it inspires, is any reference to 

social or psychological variables. Parapsychological physics-envy is perva- 

sive in the field, and is perhaps one of its major obstacles blocking a break- 

through reconceptualization of the problem. This possibility has been dis- 

cussed at length elsewhere (Donovan, 1992). 

An opposing trend is that offered by Schmeidler (1 990, p. 32 1). She admits 

to having assumed "that psi is a psychological process and that it therefore 

functions the way other psychological processes do," but that heretofore nei- 

ther she "nor anyone else had made a systematic effort to find if it was true.'' 

Indeed, the guiding dictum here should be her own understated suggestion that 

"normal and paranormal functions are so similar that learning about psycho- 

logical processes will give useful information about parapsychological ones" 

(Schmeidler, 1988, p. 7; cf. White, 1994). Might they not, in fact, be the same? 

Perhaps only the powerful phenomenology emboldening these grotesque 

events has prevented us from seeing more clearly a genetic relationship to 

more mundane psychological happenings (cf. Irwin, 1989, p. 1 I). Only after 

this possibility has been exhausted should one resort to more exotic explanato- 

ry schemata. 

The present discussion shares Schmeidler's assumption that psi phenomena, 

such as telepathy, are psychological and not mechanical. Thus, the appropri- 

ate discourse to model telepathy successfully will not come from the material 

sciences, but rather from the social and psychological disciplines. 

The Charismatic Agent and the Empathic Percipient 

The present section paints in broad strokes the thesis that telepathy can be 

accounted for by the social psychological processes known as empathy and 

charisma, a possibility which first presents itself through comparison of the 

language used to document the case reports. 

"What human communication achieves in general," says anthropologist 

Dan Sperber, "is merely some degree of resemblance between the communica- 

tor's and the audience's thoughts" (Boyer, 1994, p. 284). Charisma, empathy, 

and telepathy share a surface similarity of language characterizing each as a 

process of communication involving the convergence of the participants' 

mindsets and through which emotional tones are shared between persons. 

Friedman, Riggio, and Casella (1988, p. 204) tellingly define charisma as a 

"dramatic flair irivolving the desire and ability to communicate emotions and 

thereby inspire others." Lindholm (1990, p. 26) suggests that "the intense 

emotional state of the charismatic is transmitted spontaneously to onlookers.'' 

Empathy, on the other hand, has been defined as "the imaginative transpos- 

ing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another and so structuring 

the world as he does" (Dymond, 1949, p. 127), so that "the perceiver actually 

comes to experience the thoughts and feelings of the other person" (Grover & 

Brockner, 1989, p. 470; Hickson, 1985). The "core of the empathic experience


[is]. . . a 'free-association' or loosening of self-other boundaries in allowing 

stimuli impinging on the other to be experienced by the self' (Strayer, 1987, p. 

227). 

The precise relationship of charisma to empathy requires further and future 

clarification. "Mental contagion" could be instances of either empathy or 

charisma: "We are all 'moved' by other people's emotions .... The teacher 

complains of the one pupil who is having a bad influence on his class .... The 

psychiatrist ... describes infectious mass psychoses or psychoses a' deux" 

(Meerloo, 1964, p. 82-83). Lindholm (1990), when describing prototypical 

examples of charismatic personalities (Adolph Hitler, Charles Manson, and 

Jim Jones), attributes to them also extraordinary levels of empathy. Does this 

mean that these persons were in joint possession of two independent abilities 

(e.g., Cunningham, 1977, p. 577, found that "a good sender in any condition ... 

was a poor receiver of others' nonverbal communication"), or perhaps the two 

are distinct but nonseverable? What are the theoretical implications of de- 

scribing the charismatic leader and his followers as "entangled in an empathet- 

ic communion" (Lindholm, 1990, p. 67)? 

For purposes herein, charisma is provisionally conceived as an attribute in- 

trinsic to the individual actor (Lindholm, 1990; Weber, 192211 963). Others, 

however, define charisma as a quality of the perceivers than of the perceived, 

by virtue of their own qualities, such as anomie or lack of values (Greenfield, 

1985), alienation (Miyahara, 1983), distress (Tucker, 1968), or dissociative 

ability (Ludwig, 1983). Kluckhohn (194911985, p. 217) finds that individuals 

with diffuse childhood attachments, as is common among the Zufii Indians, are 

"peculiarly resistant to leaders of the Hitler type." If indeed charisma is not an 

action, but a mere attribution of an action (Lipman & Pizzurro, 1956; Tucker, 

1968), then it seems likely that charisma is reducible to empathy, since the end 

result would be indistinguishable. On the other hand, if charisma is a quality 

of the charismatic, it seems more plausible that the same variables are em- 

ployed as those which generate empathy, but that they interact differently. In 

any event, charisma and empathy seemingly are either identical, or at worst 

composed of identical but differently interacting elements. 

Both empathy and charisma reveal strong descriptive overlaps with com- 

mon accounts of telepathic experiences. Indeed, Weber's original conceptual- 

ization of charisma explicitly included telepathy as one of its constituent "ex- 

traordinary powers (192211963, p. 2). Lindholm (1990, p. 132) recounts 

Susan Atkins' claims "that when she was delegated to command some of the 

followers, she found herself able to read their thoughts and to manipulate 

them, just as she believed [Charles] Manson did." Such descriptions afford a 

prima facie reasonableness to the idea that charisma might be related to telepa- 

thy. 

Likewise, Strayer's description of empathy, given above, sounds much like 

the following analysis of psychic interactions:


Psychics often commented that "reading" a client was simple, a matter of "becoming 

one with" that client and then "reading themselves." What psychics do, then, is predi- 

cated on the ability to literally or metaphorically "let go" of their ego boundaries. 

(Galanti, 1989, p. 6) 

Wagenfeld (1976, p. 44) also noticed the convergence: "Since it appears 

that many of these views of empathy and telepathy come so close to being syn- 

onymous, perhaps telepathy is the most intense type of empathy" (cf. Sanchez, 

1989). Describing the experience of two subjects who underwent mutual hyp- 

nosis, Stet (1969, p. 305) reports that they "showed a great sensitivity and em- 

pathy to the other's experiences (but not necessarily an agreement). Subse- 

quent conversations revealed that the [subjects] felt so much rapport with 

each other that it seemed telepathic ...." Similar examples abound within psy- 

choanalytic literature especially (cf. Beahrs, 1982; Devereux, 1953; Mar- 

gulies, 1989; Meerloo, 1964). Central to our model is the repeated observation 

that successful empathic connection is often a function of similarity between 

the involved parties (WispC, 1987; Hoffman, 1987). 

There is a level, then, at which the descriptive language characterizing both 

charisma and empathy overlap with that used to recount details of alleged tele- 

pathic phenomena. This hypothesis has been termed the "possible world 

model" (Donovan, 1992), evoking a method of analysis within linguistic theo- 

ry (McCawley, 198 1). Within the possible world model, successful communi- 

cation is achieved when parties agree on communicationally relevant reality 

postulates which may be taken for granted. The more postulates which are 

shared, the more successful is that exchange. Karniol (1 990) extends the no- 

tion of shared postulates to include not only factual (or declarative) knowl- 

edge, but also procedural knowledge used to manipulate and prioritize facts 

and beliefs. 

Each combination of differences on these postulates defines a unique possi- 

ble world for that conversation. To share that single possible world where all 

postulates are identical is literally to "be of one mind." Clearly, such synchro- 

nization is extremely rare and never sustained. The more typical instance is 

one of relative degree of similarity. Crapanzano (1980) accurately depicts 

how ethnographic field-workers must negotiate a joint reality of shared reality 

postulates with their other-cultured informants. 

Charisma and empathy, when viewed from the possible world model, are 

mechanisms for achieving postulate convergence which, when it occurs in 

phenomenologically strong events, is termed telepathy. Charisma would be 

the process by which one imposes one's own postulates upon the other; empa- 

thy, on the other hand, would be that process by which one willingly suspends 

one's own postulates and incorporates those of the other. Telepathy is an expe- 

rience of postulate convergence, achieved through the dual processes of 

charisma and empathy, which is of such an extraordinary degree that that mo- 

ment stands out in the minds of the participants, but which involves little or

Empathy, Charisma, and Telepathy 46 1 

nothing which is not included in more ordinary instances of empathic or charis- 

matic connection. As such, the possible world model would seem to have 

something in common with Ehrenwald's (1972) hypothesis which features 

"the concept of a symbiotic gradient, reaching out from the ego to the 

nonego," and with the state-sharing model examined by Bohm (1984). In 

keeping with this model, we are not surprised to learn that telepathy reports are 

more successful between those who share a common language (Greist, 1977), 

those who are "culturally proximate" (Stoller & Olkes, 1987, p. 21 l), or those 

who share "a close personal relationship" (Rice & Townsend, 1962). 

The remainder of this essay sifts through existing experimental literature to 

ascertain whether known correlates of empathy have parallel findings in the 

researches on charisma and telepathy. The hope is that results will reveal 

whether the justification for the possible world model goes any deeper than 

superficial terminological similarities. 

Comparing the Experimental Correlates 

If charisma, empathy, and telepathy are intimately related, then significant 

overlap should appear when we directly compare the experimental correlates 

of each. The basis of comparison is empathy, which is by far the best studied 

of the three processes. After listing the discerned experimental correlates of 

empathy, a review was conducted with the purpose of identifying parallel re- 

searches on either charisma or telepathy. Results of this comparison are syn- 

opsized in Table 1. 

Empathy 

Developmental/Historical Correlates. Only three variables were identified 

which belong in the first category of developmental or historical correlates of 

empathy. Kalliopuska (1984a) found that, from among four social classes, 

middle-class fathers, but not mothers, were most empathic. This same author 

also noted a tendency for middle-born children to be more empathic than ei- 

ther first-borns or later-borns, although she acknowledges many contrary 

trends in the literature (Kalliopuska, 1984b; cf. Wise & Cramer, 1988). Final- 

ly, reviewing the pertinent studies, Chlopan et al. (1985) concluded that high 

marijuana use correlated with high empathy scores. This finding can be inter- 

preted to suggest that altered states of consciousness encourage empathic re- 

sponses. 

Personality Correlates. A common finding is that empathy correlates posi- 

tively with measures of emotional arousability generally, and with neuroticism 

specifically (Hogan, 1969; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972; Chlopan et al., 1985). 

This relationship with neuroticism does not necessarily mean that empathy is a 

precursor of mental illness. On the contrary, high empaths are perhaps better 

adjusted emotionally than are low empaths (Chlopan et al., 1985). Intuitively, 

we would also expect empaths to have low competitive drives, since the


TABLE 1 

Experimental Correlates of Empathy, Charisma, and Telepathy 

Empathy Charisma Telepathy 

High marijuana usage Yes N/A Yes 

Chlopan et ul., 1985 Schmeidler, 1988 

Middle class socio- Yes N/ A 

economic standing Kalliopuska, 1984a 

Middle-born Yes N/ A 

birth order Kalliopuska, 1984b 

PERSONALITY 

High neuroticism/ Yes 

arousability Hogan, 1969 

Less anxious/ Yes 

better adjusted Chlopan et al., 1985 

Field-dependent No 

Wise & Cramer, 1988 

Meditation No 

Pearl & Carlozzi. 1994 

Androgynous Yes 

Yarnold et al., 1993 

Low emphasis on inter- Yes 

personal competition Barnett, 1987 

No 

Friedman et al., 1980 

Femininity N/A No 

Sahoo, 1987 

Extraversion N/ A Yes 

Friedman eb al., 1980 

High attitudinal Yes 

similarity Grover & Brockner, 1989 

SOMATIC 

No 

Irwin, 1989 

Yes 

Schmeidler, 1988 

Yes 

Schmeidler, 1988 

Yes 

Schmeidler. 1988 

Yes 

Bem & Honorton. 1994 

Yes 

Bem & Honorton, 1994 

Women more prone Yes Yes Yes 

Grover & Brockner, 1989 Riggio, 1987 Virtanen, 1990 

Heritable Yes N/A 

Zahn-Waxler et a]., 1992 

Physiological Yes N/A 

linkage facilitates Levenson & Ruef, 1992 

Yes 

Bohm, 1984 

Yes 

Bohm, 1984 

Right brain N/ A N/ A Yes 

hemisphere function Wagenfeld, 1976


essence of the phenomena is a yielding to the other's perspective. Some re- 

search bears out this assumption (Barnett, 1987). 

Empathy occurs most often in those with strong attitudinal similarity and at- 

traction (Grover & Brockner, 1989). One study also found androgyny to be 

"predictive of an empathetic orientation" (Yarnold et al., 1993). 

Other experimental results are more ambivalent. One could imagine that 

empaths are more field-dependent, since this cognitive style correlates well 

with heightened interpersonal sociality (Witkin & Goodenough, 1981). How- 

ever, Wise and Cramer (1988) failed to discern this relationship using the 

Group Embedded Figures Test, while Krieger and Reznikoff (1 992), deploying 

the individually administered Embedded Figures Test, found only a slight ten- 

dency for field dependent men (but not women) to score well on some mea- 

sures of empathy. 

Equally contested is the effect of meditation upon empathy. Although Pearl 

and Carlozzi ( 1 994) review several reports which found a positive interaction, 

their own study failed to replicate these findings. 

Somatic Correlates. Three variables fell into the category of physical or ge- 

netic correlates of empathy. First, empathy is probably heritable, as was dis- 

cerned by twin studies (Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992). This study 

also found "indications that girls and women are more empathic than boys and 

men." The finding of a sex difference favoring women as high empaths is 

commonly reported (cf. Grover & Brockner, 1989; Krieger & Reznikoff, 

1992), although there is a good likelihood that this finding may be an artifact 

of the methods used to quantify empathy. According to the meta-analysis con- 

ducted by Eisenberg and Lennon (1983), strong sex differences appear only 

when self-report scales were used. Other research designs, such as physiolog- 

ical or unobtrusive observation, fail to reveal similar sex differences (cf Ickes 

et al., 1990). 

Finally, Levenson and Ruef (1992, p. 239) found that "the greater the physi- 

ological linkage between subject and target, the greater the accuracy of the 

subject's rating of the target's negative affect." While accurate empathy of 

negative emotions were thus dependent upon intersubjective physiology (i.e., 

the subject's body responded as did the target's), empathy for positive emo- 

tions depended only upon the level of cardiovascular arousal of the subject. 

Only in the positive emotion arm of the design did a sex difference appear, 

again favoring women. 

Charisma 

Developmental/Historical Correlates. Despite the familiarity of the charis- 

ma concept, it has been little studied. Political scientists and sociologists will 

discuss it theoretically in the context of great historical leaders, but rarely has 

it been operationalized in the context of ordinary mortals. At best, all one 

could hope for is a thorough case study of a specific charismatic individual, but 

of unknown generalizability. No empirical studies examining the


developmental and historical correlates of the charismatic personality could be 

identified for this review. 

Personality Correlates. Likewise, few studies examine the personality cor- 

relates of charisma. In fact, Dow (1969) opines that there is no type or tem- 

perament which characterizes charisma. The one relevant finding that could be 

identified was the result from Friedman et al. (1980) that charisma was posi- 

tively correlated with extraversion, but slightly negatively with neuroticism. 

The inverse relationship with neuroticism runs counter to the theoretical ex- 

pectations of many psychoanalysts, who regard charisma as inherently a neu- 

rotic phenomenon (Lipman & Pizzurro, 1956; cf. Lindholm, 1990, p. 62). 

Finally, one study by Sahoo (1987, p. 13) offers the conclusion that charis- 

matics "tend to be more sociable, responsible, and accepting of self; they tend 

to achieve things through conformance." That author also found a strong neg- 

ative relationship by gender, between charisma and femininity as measured by 

California Personality Inventory. 

Somatic Correlates. The issue of sex, which was so contentious within em- 

pathy, reappears concerning charisma. Lindholm (1 990, p. 198) observes that 

"the number of female charismatics has been relatively few," and notes that 

according to orthodox Freudian theory, only men can fill this role. However, 

others would give the edge to women: "Women tend to have more charisma 

potential than men, based on their total possession of basic social skills" (Rig- 

gio, 1987, p. 46). If sides must be chosen, the prudent reviewer would select 

the latter, since Riggio attempts a more rigorous methodology than psycho- 

analysis is usually known for. 

Telepathy 

Developmental/Historical Correlates. Only one reference is made to the de- 

velopmental and historical correlates found for empathy. Schmeidler (1988, p. 

149) notes the existence of "unpublished research on marijuana, reported only 

by the grapevine .... [Often] but not always the reports tell of high ESP scores." 

Personality Correlates. A wide variety of personality variables have been 

considered in relation to good performance ofpsi tasks. High I.Q. "may lead to 

more [accuracy] in cases where high I.Q. does not lead to disbelief in psi" 

(Walker, 1977, p. 95), although Spinelli (1 983) reports the opposite result. Ex- 

traversion has displayed a consistent relationship with psi performance (Bem 

& Honorton, 1994; Broughton, 1991 ; Schmeidler, 1988; Irwin, 1989). Neu- 

roticism has for the most part been negatively correlated with successful psi 

testing (Irwin, 1989; Schmeidler, 1988), although the description of one psy- 

choanalytic patient by Saul (1938, p. 333) could lead one to expect the con- 

trary. Schmeidler (1 988, p. 142) identifies three studies which used standard 

methods to investigate cognitive style. These results "tend to find more evi- 

dence for psi from field dependent subjects." 

Attitudinal similarity also proved to be a recurring correlate of telepathic 

episodes. Bem and Honorton (1994) noted that studies that allowed partici-


pants to bring in their own friends to act as senders "had significantly higher 

hit rates than did the studies that used only laboratory-assigned senders." 

Their own research, however, failed to demonstrate that sender-receiver pair- 

ing of friends was a significant correlate ofpsi performance. Still, upon the cu- 

mulative evidence, both Schmeidler (1 961) and Virtanen (1 990) conclude that 

agent-percipient similarity facilitates telepathic connections. 

The last cell of the table concerns the effect of meditation upon psi. In her 

review, Schmeidler (1988, p. 104) writes that "meditation may be psi-con- 

ducive; but the multiple analyses, the possibility that other variables enter in, 

and the large number or null or unanticipated results prevent a firm conclu- 

sion" (cf. Broughton, 1991, p. 11 1 ; Winkelman, 1990). 

These personality traits do not exhaust those which have been found to facil- 

itate telepathic events. Both Virtanen (1990) and Schmeidler (1988) review 

many other personality variables for which no empathy results were identified. 

Physical/Genetic Correlates. Virtanen (1990, p. 107) records the opinion 

that "men are better senders of telepathic messages (agents), whereas women 

are better receivers (percipients)." If agency is synonymous with charisma, 

and percipience with empathy, then this statement is in perfect keeping with 

earlier results. Since psi scores are usually attributed to the percipient, this 

gender difference would normally appear as women being deemed better test 

performers than men. 

This same author relates the opinion of a Swedish psychiatrist that "genuine 

talent as a medium for telepathic or extrasensory communication is clearly an 

inherited trait" (Virtanen, 1990, p. 18). Spirit possession mediumship almost 

certainly requires a genetic predisposition (Donovan, 1994, p. 553-561); to the 

extent that this role involves telepathic performance, then the latter may also 

be a heritable quality. Bohm (1984) reviews the relevant twin studies, which 

are "consistent with the hypothesis that variations in ESP have a genetic 

basis." 

Parapsychologists have long recognized the theoretical importance of possi- 

ble physiological linkages between parties to a telepathic event (Virtanen, 

1990). While one experiment testing this hypothesis failed to yield the expect- 

ed relationships (Barron & Mordkoff, 1968), Bohm (1984) describes many in- 

stances where galvanic skin response fluctuations in reaction to emotional 

stimuli were echoed in the GSR recordings of an intimate attached to a second 

machine. While Johnson and Millay failed to find a one-to-one correspon- 

dence between brain wave synchronization and success on a free-response 

telepathy test, overall team totals did reveal a significant correlation between 

synchronization and telepathy success (Johnson, 1993). 

Finally, Wagenfeld (1976) reviews suggestions that ESP ability is a right- 

brain function (cf. Roig & Neaman, 1992).


Discussion 

This review does not permit any conclusions about charisma and its 

relationship to either empathy or telepathy. Very little empirical research on 

this social psychological trait has been performed, and even less which ex- 

plored the same variables as those in the study of the other concepts. 

Although the experimental correlates of empathy and telepathy are not ex- 

actly matched, they do seem to be more similar than dissimilar. They share re- 

sults on the one developmentallhistorical dimension explored for them both, 

the effects of marijuana use. Two additional possibilities for future study 

under this heading would first be the appearance of age effects (are the young 

more likely to be empathetic than the old, as Spinelli (1983, 1987) notes is 

true of telepathy). A second question pertains to the influence of events in the 

personal history of the person, analogous to the impact of child abuse on the 

etiology of multiple personality (Kluft, 1985). 

All three common physicallgenetic variables match. On the personality di- 

mension, it is probably the assertion that empathy is correlated with high neu- 

roticism which will change under improved study. As Hamer and Copeland 

(1994, p. 198) note, neuroticism is a "superfactor" into which are lumped 

many different qualities. It is "a general measure of emotional instability or 

maladjustment, rather than a particular neurosis. People who score high on the 

neuroticism factor tend to be anxious, moody, hostile, and depressed. They 

are unable to cope with stress and may panic or feel hopeless when faced with 

an emergency." To the extent that the measure of neuroticism emphasizes 

emotional flexibility, one could expect a positive correlation; if the opera- 

tionalized focus is on the negative dimensions, however, a negative correla- 

tion should emerge between neuroticism, telepathy, and empathy. Additional 

studies should resolve this ambiguity. 

Over all, the more unequivocal the findings, the more empathy resembles 

telepathy. Divergence appears most commonly on those questions for which 

the literature displays conflicting conclusions. For instance, one potentially 

serious difference seems to be that related to cognitive style. Yet the failure to 

find empathy related to field dependence was ambiguous; resolution of this 

ambiguity will perhaps reveal the relationship expected with this well-devel- 

oped facet of personality theory. 

No final conclusions should be asserted based upon this literature review. 

As additional correlates are identified, and further cells in the table filled with 

new or better quality research, a more compelling pattern may emerge. As it 

stands, though, if one were to draw a conclusion from what we have before us 

now, the more prudent conclusion would be that empathy and telepathy are 

very similar at the level of experimental correlates.

Empathy, Charisma, and Telepathy 

Conclusion 

The argument has been made that empathy, charisma, and telepathy resem- 

ble each other sufficiently to warrant the suggestion that they are intimately 

related processes, and may even be identical. The existing literature on these 

three processes is suggestive in the direction of the proposed possible world 

model, but it is clear that the model's verification will depend on other studies 

especially designed to test its implications. Such work is presently underway. 

The value of the possible world model to parapsychology (and social psy- 

chology) is great and varied. Consider the implications of empathy and 

charisma being distinctive variables, whose interaction generates the experi- 

ence called "telepathy." First, the model promises a significant advance for 

laboratory modeling of real-life experiences by suggesting that telepathic 

"sensitives" and "psychics" do not in fact exist, at least to the extent that they 

should be the sole focus of parapsychological research. If the event is the out- 

come of a symbiotic relationship, then no single party can be credited with ini- 

tiating anomalous information transfer. Such synergistic interaction runs con- 

trary to the early expectations of the founder of modern parapsychology, J. B. 

Rhine (Wagenfeld, 1976, p. 27; cf. Carr, 1983), who thought that the percipient 

was the active mind (L. Rhine, 1956), and much more in keeping with the writ- 

ings of Gardner Murphy (1945; 1962) and his student, Gertrude Schmeidler 

(1 96 1 ; 1988). Moreover, given the dynamism of interpersonal relationships, a 

pair which performs well at one session cannot be assumed to perform well at 

the next unless it is known that the relationship, and the valuation of that rela- 

tionship, has not altered in the interim. In this view, the unreliability of tele- 

pathic connection is an inherent, and theoretically predictable quality of the 

phenomenon, and not the undesirable effect of static, interference, or even 

poor research methodology. 

The immediate impact of this assimilation of telepathy into empathy and 

charisma is to remove much of the "weirdness" which permeates the idea of 

telepathy. What it does not do is give us an easy answer to telepathy, since so 

very little is known about either charisma or empathy. In fact, empathy has 

sometimes been suggested to be a "riddle in social psychology" (Allport, 

1968, p. 30), one which cannot be studied scientifically (Strayer, 1987, p. 235) 

and which cannot be explained "any more than one can explain memory or 

imagination" (Wispk, 1987, p. 34). Perhaps what Sullivan (1953, p. 41-42) 

said about empathy will in time apply to telepathy: "So although empathy may 

sound mysterious, remember that there is much that sounds mysterious in the 

universe, only you have got used to it; and perhaps you will get used to empa- 

thy." 

There is not an immediate benefit of increased understanding about telepa- 

thy, then, to claim that it is intimately related to empathy, but there is increased 

legitimacy. Telepathy is both as real as, and no more (and no less) "paranor- 

mal" than is charisma or empathy, and its acceptance should rise and fall with 

our commitment to and understanding of these two social psychological


constructs. If empathy and charisma are real and non-paranormal, telepathy 

must be as well. Or, if telepathy is real and paranormal, so too must be empa- 

thy and charisma. If any one of them is illusory, the other two probably are, 

also. 

What you cannot do, if the possible world model is accurate, without sacri- 

ficing intellectual consistency, is accept charisma and empathy as 

uncontroversially real social phenomena, while simultaneously denying the 

reality of telepathy. 

Acknowledgment 

The author wishes to single out the moral support offered by Christina B. 

Turner, Ph.D., for this and other projects. 

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The Zero-Point Field and the NASA Challenge to Create the 

Space Drive 

(Invited Presentation at NASA Breakthrough Propulsion Physics Workshop, 

NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, Aug. 12-14, 1997) 

Solur and Astrophysics Luboratory, Lockheed Martin 

3251 Hunover St., Palo Alto, CA 94304 

E-mail: haisch @starspot. com 

Dept. of Electrical Engineering & Dept. of Physics, California State University 

Long Beach, CA 90840 

E-mail: arueda @csulh.edu 

Abstract - This NASA Breakthrough Propulsion Physics Workshop seeks 

to explore concepts that could someday enable interstellar travel. The effec- 

tive superluminal motion proposed by Alcubierre (1994) to be a possibility 

owing to theoretically allowed space-time metric distortions within general 

relativity has since been shown by Pfenning and Ford (1997) to be physically 

unattainable. A number of other hypothetical possibilities have been summa- 

rized by Millis (1997). We present herein an overview of a concept that has 

implications for radically new propulsion possibilities and has a basis in the- 

oretical physics: the hypothesis that the inertia and gravitation of matter orig- 

inate in electromagetic interactions between the zero-point field (ZPF) and 

the quarks and electrons constituting atoms. A new derivation of the connec- 

tion between the ZPF and inertia has been carried through that is properly co- 

variant, yielding the relativistic equation of motion from Maxwell's equa- 

tions. This opens new possibilites, but also rules out the basis of one 

hypothetical propulsion mechanism: Bondi's "negative inertial mass" ap- 

pears to be an impossibility. 

Keywords: zero-point field - interstellar travel - inertia - gravitation 

Introduction 

The objective of this NASA Breakthrough Propulsion Physics Workshop is to 

explore ideas ranging from extrapolations of known technologies to hypothet- 

ical new physics which could someday lead to means for interstellar travel. 

One concept that has generated interest is the proposal by Alcubierre (1994) 

that effectively superluminal motion should be a possibility owing to theoreti- 

cally allowed space-time metric distortions within general relativity. In this

474 B. Haisch & A. Rueda 

model, motion between two locations could take place at effectively hyperlight 

speed without violating special relativity because the motion is not 

through space at v > c, but rather within a space-time distortion: somewhat 

like the "stretching of space itself 7 

implied by the Hubble expansion. Alcu- 

bierre 7 

s concept would indeed be a "warp drive." Unfortunately Pfenning and 

Ford (1997) demonstrated that, while the theory may be correct in principle, 

the necessary conditions are physically unattainable. In "The Challenge to 

Create the Space Drive" Millis (1997) has summarized a number of other pos- 

sibilities for radically new propulsion methods that could someday lead to in- 

terstellar travel if various hypothetical physics concepts should prove to be 

true. Seven different propulsion concepts were presented: three involved hy- 

pothetical collision sails and four were based on hypothetical field drives. 

The purpose of this paper is to discuss a new physics concept that no longer 

falls in the category of "purely hypothetical," but rather has a theoretical 

foundation and is relevant to radically new propulsion schemes: the zero- 

point field (ZPF) as the basis of inertia and gravitation. On the basis of this 

concept we can definitively rule out one of the hypothesized propulsion mech- 

anisms since the existence of negative inertial mass is conclusively shown to 

be an impossibility. On the other hand, a differential space sail becomes a dis- 

tinct possiblity. More importantly, though, the door is theoretically open to the 

possibility of manipulation of inertia and gravitation of matter since both 

properties are shown to stem at least in part from electrodynamics. This raises 

the stakes considerably as Arthur C. Clarke (1997) writes in his novel, 3001 

referring to the ZPF-inertia concept of Haisch, Rueda and Puthoff (1994; here- 

after HRP) : 

An "inertialess drive," which would act exactly like a controllable gravity field, had 

never been discussed seriously outside the pages of science fiction until very recently. 

But in 1994 three American physicists did exactly this, developing some ideas of the 

great Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov. 

The Zero-Point Field From Planck's Work 

In the year 1900 there were two main clouds on the horizon of classical 

physics: the failure to measure the motion of the earth relative to the ether and 

the inability to explain blackbody radiation. The first problem was resolved in 

1905 with the publication of Einstein's "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Korper" 

in the journal Annalen der Physik, proposing what has come to be known 

as the special theory of relativity. It is usually stated that the latter problem, 

known as the "ultraviolet catastrophe," was resolved in 1901 when Planck, in 

"~ber das Gesetz der Energieverteilung im Normalspektrum" in the same 

journal, derived a mathematical expression that fit the measured spectral distribution 

of thermal radiation by hypothesizing a quantization of the average 

energy per mode of oscillation, E = hv.

The Zero-Point Field 475 

The actual story is somewhat more complex (cf. Kuhn, 1978). Since the ob- 

jective is to calculate an electromagnetic spectrum one has to represent the 

electromagnetic field in some fashion. Well-known theorems of Weyl allow 

for an expansion in countably many infinite electromagnetic modes (e.g. 

Kurokawa, 1958). Every electromagnetic field mode behaves exactly as a lin- 

ear harmonic oscillator. The Hamiltonian of a one-dimensional oscillator has 

two terms, one for the kinetic energy and one for the potential energy: 

The classical equipartition theorem states that each quadratic term in position 

or momentum contributes kT/2 to the mean energy (e.g. Peebles, 1992). 

The mean energy of each mode of the electromagnetic field is then 

< E >= kT. The number of modes per unit volume is (87rv2/c3)du leading to 

the Rayleigh-Jeans spectral energy density (87rv2/c3)kTdv with its v2 divergence 

(the ultraviolet catastrophe). 

In his "first theory" Planck actually did more than simply assume E = hv. 

He considered the statistics of how "P indistinguishable balls can be put into 

N distinguishable boxes." (Milonni, 1994) So Planck anticipated the 

importance of the fundamental indistinguishability of elementary particles. 

With those statistics, the average energy of each oscillator becomes 

< E >= ~/(exp(~/kT) - 1). Assuming that E = hv together with the use of 

statistics appropriate to indistinguishable energy elements then led to the spectral 

energy distribution consistent with measurements, now known as the 

Planck (or blackbody) function: 

Contrary to the cursory textbook history, Planck did not immediately regard 

his E = hv assumption as a new fundamental law of physical quantization; he 

viewed it rather as a largely ad hoc theory with unknown implications for fun- 

damental laws of physics. In 1912 he published his "second theory" which led 

to the concept of zero-point energy. The average energy of a thermal oscillator 

treated in this fashion (cf. Milonni, 1994 for details) turned out to be 

< E >= hv/(exp(hv/kT) - 1) + hv/2 leading to a spectral energy density: 

The significance of this additional term, hv/2, was unknown. While this 

appeared to result in a v 3 ultraviolet catastrophe in the second term, in the con-


text of present-day stochastic electrodynamics (SED; see below) that is in- 

tepreted as not to be the case, because this component now refers not to mea- 

surable excess radiation from a heated object, but rather to a uniform, isotrop- 

ic background radiation field that cannot be directly measured because of its 

homogeneity. Planck came to the conclusion that the zero-point energy would 

have no experimental consequences. It could be thought of as analagous to an 

arbitrary additive constant for potential energy. Nernst (1916), on the other 

hand, took it seriously and proposed that the Universe might actually contain 

enormous amounts of zero-point energy. 

Work on zero-point energy in the context of classical physics was essential- 

ly abandoned at this stage as the development of quantum mechanics, and then 

quantum electrodynamics (QED), took center stage. However the parallel 

concept of an electromagnetic quantum vacuum soon emerged. 

The Zero-Point Field From Quantum Physics 

For a one-dimensional harmonic oscillator of unit mass the quantum-me- 

chanical Hamiltonian analagous to Eq. (1) may be written (cf. Loudon, 1983) 

where p and ij are momentum and position operators respectively. Linear 

combination of the p and q result in the ladder operators, also known as de- 

struction (or lowering) and creation (or raising) operators respectively: 

The application of the destruction operator on the nth eigenstate of a quantum 

oscillator results in a lowering of the state, and similarly the creation operator 

results in a raising of the state: 

It can be seen that the number operator has the In) states as its eigenstates as


The Hamiltonian or energy operator of Eq. (3) becomes 

The ground state energy of the quantum oscillator, lo), is greater than zero, 

and indeed has the energy $hw , 

and thus for excited states 

Now let us turn to the case of classical electromagnetic waves. Plane elec- 

tromagnetic waves propagating in a direction k may be written in terms of a 

vector potential Ak as 

Using generalized mode coordinates analogous to momentum ( P k) and posi- 

tion (Qk) in the manner of Eqs. (4ab) above one can write Ak and A: as 

where ik is the polarization unit vector and V the cavity volume. In terms of 

these variables, the single-mode phase-averaged energy is 

Note the parallels between equations (10) and (4) and equations (1 1) and 

(3). Just as mechanical quantization is done by replacing position, x, and mo- 

mentum, p, by quantum operators x and p, so is the "second" quantization of


the electromagnetic field accomplished by replacing A with the quantum op- 

erator A, which in turn converts E into the operator E, and B into B. In this 

way, the electromagnetic field is quantized by associating each k-mode (fre- 

quency, direction and polarization) with a quantum-mechanical harmonic os- 

cillator. The ground-state of the quantized field has the energy 

that originates in the non-commutative algebra of the creation and annihila- 

tion operators. It is as if there were on average half a photon in each mode. 

Zero-Point Field In Stochastic Electrodynamics 

A common SED treatment (cf. Boyer, 1975 and references therein; also the 

comprehensive review of SED theory by de la Pefia & Cetto 1996) has been to 

posit a zero-point field (ZPF) consisting of plane electromagnetic waves 

whose amplitude is exactly such as to result in a phase-averaged energy of 

hw/2 in each mode (k,a), where we now explicitly include the polarization, 

a. After passing to the continuum such that summation over discrete modes of 

propagation becomes an integral (valid when space is unbounded or nearly so) 

this can be written as: 

(13b) 

where Ok,g is the phase of the waves. The stochasticity is entirely in the phase 

of each wave: There is no correlation in phase between any two plane electro- 

magnetic waves k and k', and this is represented by having the ok,, phase ran- 

dom variables independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 27r. 

Davies-Unruh Effect 

In connection with "Hawking radiation" from evaporating black holes, 

Davies (1975) and Unruh (1976) determined that a Planck-like component of 

the ZPF will arise in a uniformly-accelerated cordinate system with constant 

proper acceleration a (where la1 = a) having an effective temperature,


This temperature is negligible for most accelerations. Only in the extremely 

large gravitational fields of black holes or in high-energy particle collisions 

can this become significant. This effect has been studied using both quantum 

field theory (Davies, 1975; Unruh, 1976) and in the SED formalism (Boyer, 

1980). For the classical SED case it is found that the spectrum is quasi-Planck- 

ian in T,. Thus for the case of no true external thermal radiation (T = 0) but 

including this acceleration effect (T,) , equation (2b) becomes 

where the acceleration-dependent pseudo-Planckian component is placed 

after the hv/2 term to indicate that except for extreme accelerations (e.g. par- 

ticle collisions at high energies) this term is very small. While these additional 

acceleration-dependent terms do not show any spatial asymmetry in the ex- 

pression for the ZPF spectral energy density, certain asymmetries do appear 

when the electromagnetic field interactions with charged particles are ana- 

lyzed, or when the momentum flux of the ZPF is calculated. The ordinary plus 

a 2 radiation reaction terms in Eq. (1 2) of HRP mirror the two leading terms in 

Eq. (15). 

Newtonian Inertia From ZPF Electrodynamics 

The HRP analysis resulted in the apparent derivation of Newton's equation 

of motion, F = ma, from Maxwell-Lorentz electrodynamics as applied to the 

ZPF. In that analysis it appeared that the resistance to acceleration known as 

inertia was in reality the electromagnetic Lorentz force stemming from inter- 

actions between a charged particle (such as an electron or a quark) and the 

ZPF, i.e. it was found that the stochastically-averaged expression 

< v, x B ZP > was proportional to and in the opposite direction to the ac- 

celeration a. The velocity v, represented the internal velocity of oscillation 

induced by the electric component of the ZPF, E'~, on the harmonic oscilla- 

tor. For simplicity of calculation, this internal motion was restricted to a plane 

orthogonal to the external direction of motion (acceleration) of the particle as 

a whole. The Lorentz force was found using a perturbation technique; this ap- 

proach followed the method of Einstein and Hopf (19lOa, b). Owing to its lin- 

ear dependence on acceleration we interpreted this resulting force as Newton's 

inertia reaction force on the particle. 

The analysis can be summarized as follows. The simplest possible model of 

a structured particle (which, borrowing Feynman's terminology, we referred to 

as a parton) is that of a harmonically-oscillating point charge ("Planck oscilla- 

tor"). Such a model would apply to electrons or to the quarks constituting pro- 

tons and neutrons for example. (Given the peculiar character of the strong in-


teration that it increases in strength with distance, to a first approximation it is 

reasonable in such an exploratory attempt to treat the three quarks in a proton 

or neutron as independent oscillators.) This Planck oscillator is driven by the 

electric component of the ZPF, E ZP, to harmonic motion, v,,,, assumed for 

simplicity to be in a plane. The oscillator is then forced by an external agent to 

undergo a constant acceleration, a, in a direction perpendicular to that plane 

of oscillation, i.e. perpendicular to the v,,, motions. New components of the 

ZPF will appear in the frame of the accelerating particle having a similar origin 

to the terms in equation (15). The leading term of the acceleration-dependent 

terms is taken; the electric and magnetic fields are transformed into a constant 

proper acceleration frame using well-known relations. The Lorentz force aris- 

ing from the acceleration-dependent part of the B ZP acting upon the Planck 

oscillator is calculated. This is found to be proportional to the imposed accel- 

eration. The constant of proportionality is interpreted as the inertial mass, mi, 

of the Planck oscillator. The inertial mass, mi, is a function of the Abraham- 

Lorentz radiation damping constant of the oscillator and of the interaction fre- 

quency with the ZPF, 

where we have written vo to indicate that this may be a resonance rather than 

the cutoff assumed by HRP. Since both I? and v, are unknown, we can make 

no absolute prediction of mass values in this simple model. Nevertheless, if 

correct, the HRP concept substitutes for Mach's principle a very specific elec- 

tromagnetic effect acting between the ZPF and the charge inherent in matter. 

Inertia is an acceleration-dependent electromagnetic (Lorentz) force. Newton- 

ian mechanics would then be derivable in principle from Maxwell electrody- 

namics. Note that this coupling of the electric and magnetic components of the 

ZPF via the technique of Einstein and Hopf is very similar to that found in or- 

dinary electromagnetic radiation pressure. 

The Relativistic Equation of Motion and ZPF Electrodynamics 

The physical oversimplification of an idealized oscillator interacting with 

the ZPF as well as the mathematical complexity of the HRP analysis are un- 

derstandable sources of skepticism, as is the limitation to Newtonian mechan- 

ics. A relativistic form of the equation of motion having standard covariant 

properties has been obtained (Rueda & Haisch, 1997a,b). To understand how 

this comes about, it is useful to back up to fundamentals. 

Newton's third law states that if an agent applies a force to a point on an ob- 

ject, at that point there arises an equal and opposite force back upon the agent. 

Were this not the case, the agent would not experience the process of exerting 

a force and we would have no basis for mechanics. The law of equal and oppo-

The Zero-Point Field 48 1 

site contact forces is thus fundamental both conceptually and perceptually, but 

it is legitimate to seek further underlying connections. In the case of a stationary 

object (fixed to the earth, say), the equal and opposite force can be said to 

arise in interatomic forces in the neighborhood of the point of contact which 

act to resist compression. This can be traced more deeply still to electromagnetic 

interactions involving orbital electrons of adjacent atoms or molecules, 

etc. 

A similar experience of equal and opposite forces arises in the process of accelerating 

(pushing on) an object that is free to move. It is an experimental fact 

that to accelerate an object, a force must be applied by an agent and that the 

agent will thus experience an equal and opposite reaction force so long as the 

acceleration continues. It appears that this equal and opposite reaction force 

also has a deeper physical cause, which turns out to also be electromagnetic 

and is specifically due to the scattering of ZPF radiation. Rueda and Haisch 

(1997a,b) demonstrate that from the point of view of the pushing agent there 

exists a net momentum flux (related to the Poynting vector) of ZPF radiation 

transiting the accelerating object in a direction necessarily opposite to the acceleration 

vector. The scattering opacity of the object to the transiting flux creates 

the back reaction force customarily called the inertia of the object. Inertia 

is thus a special kind of electromagnetic drag force, namely one that is acceleration-dependent 

since only in accelerating frames is the ZPF perceived as 

asymmetric. In stationary or uniform-motion frames the ZPF is perfectly 

isotropic with a zero net Poynting vector. 

The relativistic form of the equation of motion results because, from the 

point of view of the agent, the accelerating object has a velocity dependent 

proper volume due to length contraction in the direction of motion which modifies 

the amount of scattering of ZPF flux that takes place within the object. 

The physical interpretation that springs from this analysis is the following. 

In stationary or uniform-motion frames the interaction of a particle with the 

ZPF will result in random oscillatory motions. Fluctuating charged particles 

will produce dipole scattering of the ZPF which may be parametrized by an effective 

scattering spectral coefficient ~(w) that depends on frequency. Owing 

to the relativistic transformations of the ZPF, in an accelerated frame the interactions 

between a particle and the field acquire a definite direction, i.e. the 

"scattering" of ZPF radiation generates a directional resistance force. This directional 

resistance force is proportional to and directed against the acceleration 

vector for the subrelativisitic case and it proves to have the proper relativistic 

generalization. 

Gravitation 

If inertial mass, mi, originates in ZPF-charge interactions, then, by the 

principle of equivalence so must gravitational mass, m,. In this view, gravita- 

tion would be a force originating in ZPF-charge interactions analogous to the 

HRP inertia concept. Sakharov (1968) was the first to conjecture this interpre-

I 


tation of gravity. If true, gravitation would be unified with the other forces: it 

would be a manifestation of electromagnetism. 

The general relativistic mathematical treatment of gravitation as a space- 

time curvature works extremely well. However if it could be shown that a dif- 

ferent theoretical basis can be made analytically equivalent to space-time cur- 

vature, with its prediction of gravitational lensing, black holes, etc. this may 

reopen the possibility that gravitation should be viewed as a force. 

The following points are worth noting: (I) space-time curvature is inferred 

from the propagation of light; (2) general relativity and quantum physics are at 

present irreconcilable, therefore something substantive is either wrong or 

missing in our understanding of one or both; (3) the propagation of gravita- 

tional waves is not rigorously consistent with space-time curvature. (The issue 

revolves around whether gravitational waves can be made to vanish in a prop- 

erly chosen coordinate system. The discovery of apparent gravitational energy 

loss by the Hulse-Taylor pulsar provides indirect evidence for the existence of 

gravitational waves. Theoretical developments and calculations have not yet 

been performed to examine whether an approach based on the Sakharov 

(1 968) ideas would predict gravitational waves, but the coordinate ambiguities 

of GR should not appear in a ZPF-referenced theory of gravitation.) 

There were some early pioneering attempts, inspired by Sakharov's conjec- 

ture, to link gravity to the vacuum from a quantum field theoretical viewpoint 

(by Amati, Adler and others, see discussion and references in Misner, Thorne 

and Wheeler [1973]) as well as within SED. The first step in developing 

Sakharov's conjecture in any detail within the classical context of nonrela- 

tivistic SED was the work of Puthoff (1989). Gravity is treated as a residuum 

force in the manner of the van der Waals forces. Expressed in the most rudi- 

mentary way this can be viewed as follows. The electric component of the ZPF 

causes a given charged particle to oscillate. Such oscillations give rise to sec- 

ondary electromagnetic fields. An adjacent charged particle will thus experi- 

ence both the ZPF driving forces causing it to oscillate, and in addition forces 

due to the secondary fields produced by the ZPF-driven oscillations of the first 

particle. Similarly, the ZPF-driven oscillations of the second particle will 

cause their own secondary fields acting back upon the first particle. The net ef- 

fect is an attractive force between the particles. The sign of the charge does not 

matter: it only affects the phasing of the interactions. Unlike the Coulomb 

force which, classically viewed, acts directly between charged particles, this 

interaction is mediated by extremely minute propagating secondary fields cre- 

ated by the ZPF-driven oscillations, and so is enormously weaker than the 

Coulomb force. Gravitation, in this view, appears to be a long-range interac- 

tion akin to the van der Waals force. 

The ZPF-driven ultrarelativistic oscillations were named Zitterbewegung by 

Schrodinger. The Puthoff analysis consists of two separate parts. In the first, 

the energy of the Zitterbewegung motion is equated to gravitational mass, m,


namic parameters that is identical to the HRP inertial mass, mi, apart from a 

factor of two. This factor of two is discussed in the appendix of HRP, in which 

it is concluded that the Puthoff m, should be reduced by a factor of two, yield- 

ing mi = m, precisely. 

The second part of Puthoff's analysis is more controversial. He quantita- 

tively examines the van der Waals force-like interactions between two driven 

oscillating dipoles and derives an inverse square force of attraction. This part 

of the analysis has been challenged by Carlip (1993), to which Puthoff (1993) 

has responded, but, since problems remain (Danley, 1994), this aspect of the 

ZPF-gravitation concept requires further theoretical development, in particu- 

lar the implementation of a fully relativistic model. 

Clearly the ZPF-inertia and the ZPF-gravitation concepts must stand or fall 

together, given the principle of equivalence. However, that being the case, the 

Sakharov-Puthoff-type gravity concept does legitimately refute the objection 

that "the ZPF cannot be a real electromagnetic field since the energy density 

of this field would be enormous and thereby act as a cosmological constant, A, 

of enormous proportions that would curve the Universe into something micro- 

scopic in size." This cannot happen in the Sakharov-Puthoff view. This situa- 

tion is clearly ruled out by the elementary fact that, in this view, the ZPF can- 

not act upon itself to gravitate. Gravitation is not caused by the mere presence 

of the ZPF, rather by secondary motions of charged particles driven by the 

ZPF. In this view it is impossible for the ZPF to give rise to a cosmological 

constant. (The possibility of non-gravitating vacuum energy has recently been 

investigated in quantum cosmology in the framework of the modified Born- 

Oppenheimer approximation by Datta [1995].) 

The other side of this argument is of course that as electromagnetic radia- 

tion is not made of polarizable entities, one might naively no longer expect de- 

viation of light rays by massive bodies. We speculate, however, that such devi- 

ation will be part of a fully relativistic theory that besides the ZPF, properly 

takes into account the polarization of the Dirac vacuum when light rays pass 

through the particle-antiparticle Dirac sea. It should act, in effect, as a medium 

with an index of refraction modified in the vicinity of massive objects. This is 

very much in line with the original Sakharov (1968) concept. Indeed, within a 

more general field-theoretical framework one would expect that the role of the 

ZPF in the inertia and gravitation developments mentioned above will be 

played by a more general quantum vacuum field, as was already suggested in 

the HRP appendix. 

Summary of Four Qpes of Masses and Impossibility of Negative Mass 

The proposed ZPF perspective associates very definite charged particle- 

field interactions with each of the four fundamental masses: inertial mass, ac- 

tive vs. passive gravitational mass and relativistic rest mass. It is important to 

be clear on the origin and interrelation of these "masses" when considering


something as fundamental as the possibility of altering inertial (or gravitation- 

al) mass. 

Inertial mass is seen as the reaction force due to the asymmetry of the per- 

ceived ZPF in any accelerated frame. A flux of ZPF radiation arises in an ac- 

celerated frame. When this flux is scattered by the charged particles (quarks or 

electrons) within any object a reaction force is generated proportional to the 

acceleration and to the proper volume of the object. This immediately rules 

out any science-fiction-like possibility of "negative mass" (not to be confused 

with anti-matter) originally hypothesized by Bondi (1957). If an observer 

moves to the right, the perceived motion of the surroundings must be to the 

left. There is no other rational possibility. Thus the flux scattering which is the 

physical basis of inertia must be directed against the motion, since the (accel- 

erated) motion is into the flux: an object being accelerated must push back 

upon the accelerating agent, because from the point of view of the object, the 

radiation is coming toward it, which in turn points back upon the accelerating 

agent. 

Active gravitational mass is attributed to the generation of secondary radia- 

tion fields as a result of the ZPF-driven oscillation. Passive gravitational mass 

is attributed to the response to such secondary radiation fields. Finally, the rel- 

ativistic rest mass in the E = mc 2 relation reflects the energy of the ZPF-in- 

duced Zitterbewegung oscillations. Mass is the manifestation of energy in the 

ZPF acting upon charged particles to create forces. 

The Need for a Quantum Derivation 

Clearly a quantum field theoretical derivation of the ZPF-inertia connection 

is highly desireable. Another approach would be to demonstrate the exact 

equivalence of SED and QED. However as shown convincingly by de la Pefia 

and Cetto (1996), the present form of SED is not compatible with QED, but 

modified forms could well be, such as their own proposed "linear SED." An- 

other step in the direction of reconciling SED and QED is the proposed modi- 

fication of SED by Ibison and Haisch (1996), who showed that a modification 

of the standard ZPF representation (Eqs. 1 3a and 13b) can exactly reproduce 

the statistics of the electromagnetic vacuum of QED. This gives us confidence 

that the SED basis of the inertia and gravitation concepts is a valid one. 


B. Haisch acknowledges the hospitality of Prof. J. Trumper and the Max- 

Planck-Institut fur Extraterrestrische Physik in Garching, Germany, where 

some of these ideas originated during several extended stays as a Visiting Fel- 

low. A. Rueda thanks Dr. D. C. Cole for much stimulating discussion and cor- 

respondence. We thank Marc Millis for the invitation to address this NASA 

workshop. This research is supported by NASA contract NASW-5050.

The Zero-Point Field 

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Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 11, No. 4 pp. 487-498, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Motivation and Meaningful Coincidence: A Further 

Examination of Synchronicity 

College of Letters & Science, Dept. of Psychology, 

University of Wisconsin - Stevens Point, WI 54481 -3897 

Abstract - Male and female, mostly Freshman college students were paired 

at random, placed in one of three motivational conditions, and asked to dis- 

cover as many life coincidences as possible in a 45 minute time period. The 

resulting coincidences were coded by category of event and compared with a 

larger cohort sample of students to determine the rate of statistically unusual 

coincidences. It was discovered that while motivational set affected the total 

number of coincidences found, the rate of unusual coincidences was indepen- 

dent of motivation. The results are discussed in terms of future research for 

measuring synchronicity in a population of reunited birth relatives. 

Keywords: synchronicity - coincidence 

Introduction 

Orthodox science and Western thinking assumes all cause-effect relationships 

to be mediated by some form of local interaction: a bat hits a ball, the turn of a 

key unlocks a door; alternatively that information must have a carrier in some 

energy form such as radio waves or light waves. These immediate effects fol- 

lowing an event come under the heading of "locality" and serve as a basis for 

everyday common sense beliefs about normal cause-effect, rational interac- 

tions. However, Jung (1955) suggested the possibility of another dimension 

of reality to explain phenomena that we may discard or leave unaccounted, 

such as the commonalities found between reunited birth relatives. We cannot 

simply discount these occurrences on the basis of our inability to understand 

them. Jung postulated the idea of synchronicity to explain these phenomena 

that do not follow the common sense views of cause-effect relationships. 

In describing the essentials of synchronicity, Jung often resorted to exam- 

ples of ESP-like phenomena. He suggested the existence of two simultaneous 

states, one a normal or ordinary state, the other a psychic state which is not 

causally derivable from the first, but whose objective reality is confirmed at a 

later time. In psychic experiences such as a dream or feeling that a friend has 

died, it is not uncommon for the feeling or dream to be removed by a short time 

period, such as one hour, from the actual event of death. In such a case, even 

though the feeling and the event are not synchronous, they are nevertheless 

synchronistic.

488 T. Rowe et. al. 

Causality operates on many levels, but human minds have difficulty con- 

ceptualizing beyond the first level (Herbert, 1988; Gatlin, 1977). Tart (1981) 

thought synchronicity needed to be defined more clearly and explains the dif- 

ference between several types of causality. As infants, we build an internal 

map to organize and make sense of the physical world by learning proximity, 

order, and then causal relationships. Naturally, we try to explain things by un- 

derstanding their underlying mechanisms. We learn from repeated occur- 

rences, for example when we let go of a ball and it falls to the ground. Tart 

claims these explanations to be purely psychological. We assume these "caus- 

es" to exist in the external world when, in fact, all we experience directly are 

neural impulses. 

Shallis (1983) brings to attention the limited view people are prone to take 

at times concerning everyday situations. What causes a bus to stop? The per- 

son pulling the bell believes that action caused the bus to stop, while the peo- 

ple waiting at the bus stop think they are the reason. The bus driver believes 

she stopped the bus by pressing on the brake pedal, while a mechanic suggests 

that friction between brake shoes and brake drums is the reason. One's per- 

spective formed as a result of knowledge gained through cultural and personal 

experiences is the basis from which we draw conclusions, which may overlook 

what the actual cause or causes may be (Rowe & Henderson, 1995). The prob- 

lem of perspective in causal events can be mitigated to some degree by exam- 

ining only the proximal causes. However, while the friction caused by the 

brake shoes pressing on the brake drums may be the actual, proximal cause of 

the bus stopping, it may prove more meaningful to follow the causal event 

chain further back than that. 

Jung also suggested that a desire to find synchronicities or increased emo- 

tionality may lead to a higher number of synchronicities found. Emotion plays 

a key role by creating a bridge between the unconscious and conscious mind 

(Jung, 1955). Therefore, a distinction needs to be made between increased 

awareness and meaningfulness when discussing chance and coincidence. 

Herbert (1 988) defines coincidence as "the simultaneous (or nearly so) oc- 

currence of two or more causally unconnected events that are significantly 

linked by the person to whom the coincidence occurs as being meaningful" 

(p. 134). For example, Car A collides with Car B. The reason for this happen- 

ing involves many events. The driver of Car A previously spilled coffee on 

himself that morning and delayed his departure, resulting in his arrival at the 

scene of the collision at the exact moment as Car B; if the driver of Car B had 

not been distracted by thoughts of Vietnam memories, he would have been 

paying more attention to where he was driving and not have collided with Car 

A; if the traffic light on the road that Car A was on would have turned a mo- 

ment sooner, again the cars would not have met; and so on. That is, viewed as 

a consequence of all possible causal factors, any specific event could be seen 

as extremely unlikely. These chance events had the end result of a collision. 

This event of a car accident does not strike us as unusual or amazing, even

Synchronicity 489 

though the chance of these two cars meeting at a precise moment is statistically 

extremely unlikely. However, if the driver of Car A had been in the same 

Army unit in Vietnam with the driver of Car B, we would most likely view this 

as an unusual coincidence. This is a result of connecting meaningfulness to the 

incident (Shallis, 1983). 

We also would not consider it amazing that a person sitting at a desk sees a 

blue Ford drive by. But if precisely at the moment before the car passed by the 

person had thought "whatever happened to that old blue Ford I sold 8 years 

ago," and then saw the same car go by, such a coincidence would likely be 

seen as amazing. However, noticing this event might have been due to in- 

creased awareness due to thinking of the blue Ford at that time, when in fact 

that Ford may pass the window several times a day. 

These two examples highlight the difficulties of separating statistically re- 

lated coincidences from true synchronicities. It would be virtually impossible 

to statistically analyze the true probability of such chance occurrences as 

noticing the blue Ford passing by because, to do so, it would be necessary to 

chart how many times that Ford passes by the window, how often the ex-owner 

sits at the window, at what time of day, how often the ex-owner thinks about 

the car - a virtually endless stream of events. Likewise, for Cars A and B col- 

liding, the chance of either car colliding with another may be only slightly 

more or less possible. The influencing factors are simply too numerous to cal- 

culate. 

Herbert (1988, p. 129) noted that "Causality and chance are only ways of de- 

scribing what is believed known and unknown." A mistake could also be made 

in attribution of randomness to events that are not. A random event such as ra- 

dioactive decay has no discernible pattern and it is impossible to predict which 

of a large number of atoms is going to decay in any given time period. On the 

other hand, the overall average rate of radioactive decay is known with consid- 

erable precision. We can use the rate of radioactive decay as a model for ran- 

domness. But if we should so happen to find a way to predict the activity of in- 

dividual atoms, then it would no longer be random. It may be that we are not 

looking at the big picture, as seen in the example of a pattern detected in a se- 

ries of ten thousand numbers that is not detected in one hundred numbers. In 

such cases it would be unenlightened of us to assume randomness of occur- 

rences we cannot explain. 

By the same token, we should not attribute cause and purpose where there 

may be none. For example, the average number of dog bites per day in New 

York City remains fairly constant from day to day. Although the full pattern is 

well-ordered, there is no apparent cause that links each specific dog bite inci- 

dent to the next. Thus, one could not discover the number of people bitten thus 

far in one given day and, should that number surpass the average, have any 

confidence that there is no possibility of being bitten for the rest of the day. 

Applying such a rationale would be ridiculous. Even though the probability of 

a coin landing on heads or tails is calculable and subject to being predicted for


large sample averages, there still is no reason that it should land on either side 

on any given toss based on previous tosses. 

It is necessary to keep such examples in mind when considering new para- 

digms to explain what Jung described as synchronicities and to accurately ac- 

count for them. In a previous paper, Rowe and Henderson (1995) devised a 

methodology for determining a baseline rate of statistically unusual coinci- 

dences in a given population. However, for that method to be useful in a popu- 

lation with high motivation to find such coincidences, such as one might ex- 

pect in a population of reunited birth relatives, it must be shown to be robust 

with respect to motivation. That is, it is unlikely that the motivational set of 

reunited birth relatives could be matched in a cohort population of strangers. 

The current study is an attempt to both validate the methodology previously 

used and examine the effects of motivation on the frequency of discovered sta- 

tistically unusual coincidences. 

Met hod 

The methodology used in both parts one and two of the experiment is essen- 

tially the same as used previously by Rowe and Henderson (1995) with the ad- 

dition of a motivational independent variable in part one. 

Participants 

Part One 

Participants in part one of this experiment were all students taking the 

introductory psychology course at the University of Wisconsin - Stevens 

Point in the Fall, 1995 Semester. All students in that course must complete a 

Human Subjects Pool requirement which they can satisfy by being participants 

in experiments. Sign-up sheets, which include a general description of the ex- 

periments and any special requirements, are posted periodically. 

For this experiment, participants were required to be 18 or 19 years old and 

to not know any other person already signed up for their time slot. They were 

recruited in same sex groups, four participants per time slot. A total of 72 pairs 

of students (36 each male and female) were tested. Each group of four partici- 

pants was randomly assigned to one of three motivational conditions on the 

day of testing. 

Apparatus 

The participants were placed with their partner in one of two small multi- 

purpose experimental laboratory rooms. Each contained a padded chair for 

each subject, was carpeted, and had two permanently mounted video cameras 

with lenses covered in corners near the ceiling. One subject was handed a clip- 

board and a pen along with written instructions.

Procedure 

Synchronicity 49 1 

Two Senior undergraduate psychology majors served as research assistants. 

Each subject was greeted in a small anteroom for the experimental laborato- 

ries. In the cases where one subject did not show up at the appointed time, an- 

other subject was randomly chosen to participate. The assistant confirmed 

that participants were all strangers to each other and assigned pairs at random 

from the group of four. 

Each pair was then placed in a laboratory room. They were instructed to talk 

with each other in an attempt to find commonalities in their lives. The written 

instructions for each condition can be found in Appendix A. The instructions 

for the control group were identical to those in the previous study. However, 

the other two groups had a paragraph inserted designed to induce higher levels 

of motivation. In one group it was suggested that the results would provide a 

personality measure and could be used to assist them in making a career 

choice. In the other, they were given an expectation of an unrealistically high 

number of coincidences to find. In this case they were told that the average 

pair found 55 or more coincidences, a number that was two standard devia- 

tions above the mean found in the previous study. 

The assistant also pointed out to them that lens caps were covering the cam- 

era lenses and that they were not being observed or taped. They were then left 

alone for approximately 20 minutes. The assistant then reentered the room and 

presented the subject pairs with a list of topics that might include areas of com- 

monalities. A copy of that list can be found in Appendix B. At the end of an- 

other 20 minutes, all of the data were collected and the participants debriefed 

and dismissed. 

The responses from each of the subject pairs were coded for type of coinci- 

dence and entered into a database by the research assistants. The assistants 

were given training on the coding process and eventually produced an inter- 

judge reliability of 1.00. The six categories were: 1. personal data over which 

the subject has little control (information about the subject; things that hap- 

pened to the subject, e.g. names, skills, weaknesses, objects received as gifts, 

illnesses); 2. personal experiences generated by choices made (things the sub- 

ject chose to do once or twice, including activities that only involve one 

"choice," even though they may occur regularly after making the choice, e.g. 

non-family vacations, jobs, educational activities, life or future occupational 

plans); 3. family based experiences (experiences the subject had because of 

living in a particular family, e.g. family vacations, religion or religious cele- 

brations, relatives' common experiences, family members' occupations); 4. 

personal habits (things the subject chose to do regularly, things the subject 

plans to do in the future, good or bad habits and peculiarities, e.g. tastes in 

food, music, etc., likes or dislikes, recreational activities); 5. items owned 

(anything possessed, purchased or acquired by the subject, e.g. any form of


temperament or values, e.g. sense of humor, promptness, honesty, chastity, 

outlook on life, preference for time of day). 

Participants 

Part lbo 

Participants in part two consisted of 1 14 Male and 164 Female 18 and 19 

year old students recruited in the same manner as in part one. The unequal 

number of participants by sex was caused by the voluntary nature of the 

recruitment process. Each of these groups were further divided in half by ran- 

dom assignment. 

Apparatus 

The apparatus consisted of a list of descriptive statements generated from 

the commonalities identified in part one. The participants were handed this 

along with a pencil and answer sheets and allowed to find their own place to sit 

in a lecture auditorium. Each of two Female sets had 364 statements and each 

Male set had 409. 

Procedure 

The initial list of 2,656 commonalities generated by the 72 pairs of partici- 

pants was reduced by removing items which could not be coded for individual 

participants (e.g., responses such as "Both know the same guy from Wausau," 

something that would be meaningless to an individual trying to answer true or 

false of themselves) or, more commonly, redundant responses (e.g., "Favorite 

color is green," used 5 times) to arrive at a list of 728 items generated by fe- 

male pairs and 8 18 by male pairs. This was judged to be too long a list for any 

one subject to go through, so each of these lists was randomly divided into two 

lists and assigned at random to half the participants. 

The participants were instructed to answer A if a given statement was true of 

them and B if it was not true. In cases where they could not be sure or there was 

any confusion about what the item meant, they were instructed to answer B. 

Results and Discussion 

There were two sets of data generated. One set consisted of the total number 

of commonalities found by each pair of participants. The other was a subset of 

statistically unusual commonalities. This subset was determined by using the 

frequency of items marked as true by 22 percent or fewer of the cohort popula- 

tion measured in part two. That is, if an item is true of less than 23 percent of a 

population, then the chance that two persons paired at random will share that 

item is less than .05. 

An analysis of variance performed on the number of total commonalities 

found by pair in part one revealed several significant effects. Each of the main


effects of motivation (F(,,,,) = 4.54) and code (F(,,,,,, = 123.27) were signifi- 

cant at the a = .05 level, although sex was not significant. Likewise, there 

were significant interactions between sex and motivation (F(,,$,) = 4.70), sex 

and code (F,, ,,,,, = 3.43), and code with motivation (F(,,,,,,, = 2.80). However, 

an examination of sex by code and code by motivation interactions reveals 

only minor differences, and that the pattern of responses across conditions 

were very similar. Therefore, despite reaching statistical significance, the ac- 

tual differences found were deemed not to be meaningful when the size of the 

data set was considered. 

The significant effect due to motivation was almost entirely due to an in- 

creased number of coincidences generated by the motivational set that sug- 

gested the student pairs should be finding a large number of coincidences. The 

other motivational set, suggesting this could be used to help determine a career 

choice, was not effective in increasing the number of discovered coincidences. 

Anecdotal evidence reported by the research assistants confirmed that this in- 

structional set was not an effective motivator. 

Of more interest is the significant interaction between sex and motivation. 

This is presented in Figure 1. It appears that the male participants were not 

much affected by motivational set and, paradoxically, their highest total was 

produced by the control condition. On the other hand, females reacted strong- 

ly to the set suggesting they should find a large number of coincidences. In the 

two remaining motivational conditions, their total was below that of males, a 

result which is in accord with the first study. 

In terms of the significant code effect, the numbers are in close correspon- 

dence with the first study. The largest number of hits occurred in the personal 

habits category accounting for 38.9% of all responses as compared to 41% in 

Motivation Condition 

-I+ Female -0- Male 

Fig. 1. Interaction of Sex with Motivation for total number of coincidences found.


the first study. The next largest number occurred in chosen personal experiences 

with 21.3% of hits (versus 18.7% in the first study), then family based 

experiences with 16.3% (versus 10.3%), followed by a tie in personal data and 

personality with 8.9% each (versus 15.4% and 8.4% respectively). The possessions 

category was in last place with 5.6% of the hits (versus 5.8%). The 

small variation between personal data and family based experiences between 

the two studies most likely comes from a minor revision in categorizing these 

two types of events between studies. The close correspondence between the 

other categories strongly suggests that, when using these categories of events, 

there is stability across time within this population. Note, however, that the 

preponderance of hits in the personal habits category may be a function of the 

experimental situation itself and the restricted subject population. 

When the data for significant coincidences were analyzed, a very different 

picture emerged. The only significant effect was that for category of event 

(F(,,,,,, = 23.56;~ < .05). There were no other significant main effects or interactions. 

Furthermore, the pattern of significant coincidences was quite different 

from that of total hits. The most common category here was personal experiences 

generated by choice accounting for 32.9% of the hits, then family 

based experiences with 25.6% of the hits, and personal habits in third place 

with 19.9% of the hits. The next three categories in order were personal data 

with 12.0%, items owned with 7.3% and personality with only 2.2%. A Newman-Keuls 

test indicated that all pairwise comparisons between categories 

were significant (p < .05) except for family based experiences compared with 

personal habits, personal data with items owned, and items owned with personality. 

A comparison of average number of hits by category for each data set is presented 

in Figure 2. 

General Discussion 

In the present study there is no reason to believe there were true synchronic- 

ities in the Jungian sense when the rare coincidences were observed. Instead, 

they would most likely fall into the category of synchronisms - mere coinci- 

dental events. However, had there been an actual connection between the 

pairs of subjects, such as in a population of reunited birth relatives, many of 

these coincidental events would likely be labeled synchronicities by the par- 

ties involved. It is therefore paramount to determine a methodology that al- 

lows one to discriminate between the occasional rare coincidence and a true 

synchronicity. 

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these results comes from a compari- 

son between the pattern of total hits by type of event with the statistically un- 

usual hits. These patterns are quite different. By far the largest category of 

total hits was that of personal habits, a category that encompasses likes and 

dislikes. That is not too surprising since all pairs of participants and their co- 

horts come from the same restricted population group, and it could be assumed

40 


Total v. Significant Hits by Category 

J 1 

I 1 I I I I 

Personal Data Exper~ences Family Habits Items Owned Personality 

Category 

Fig. 2. Comparison of percentage of total coincidences with statistically unusual coincidences as 

a function of category of event. 

that culture is a major component in producing likes and dislikes. However, 

when the measure is the frequency of statistically unusual hits, this was only 

the third largest category, and personal experiences was by far the largest cate- 

gory. 

The marked similarity of the patterns of significant hits with the first study 

combined with the marked dissimilarity between the pattern of significant hits 

and that of total hits in both studies suggests that these are independent mea- 

sures. This independence, in turn, suggests this methodology can be used to 

compare populations with very different motivational sets. 

It is unlikely that any experimental condition could produce the level of 

emotion felt by reunited birth relatives. Conversely, if motivation affected not 

only true synchronicities but the relative frequency of synchronous events as 

well, then it could be reasonably assumed the two measures of coincidences 

and significant coincidences would not be independent of each other as they 

appear to be in this study. Thus, it should be possible to match reunited birth 

relatives with a cohort group who have been paired at random and compare the 

patterns of significant coincidences. If there is a reliable difference in either 

frequency or patterns of significant coincidences, then at least some of those 

coincidences could be evidence of true synchronicities. 

References 

Gatlin, L. L. (1977). Meaningful information creation: an alternative interpretation of the psi phe- 

nomenon. Journal of the American Societyjbr Psychical Research, 7 1, 1.


Herbert, N. (1988). How the bell proved reality cannot be local. Psychological Perspectives, 19, 

313. 

Jung, C. G. (1955). Synchronicity: An acausal connecting principle. In C. Jung and W. Pauli, The 

Interpretation ofNature and the Psyche. New York: Pantheon Books. 

Rowe, T. & Henderson, D. (1995). Establishing prevalence of commonalities in randomly paired 

individuals as a method for assessing synchronicity. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 9, 3, 

323. 

Shallis, M. (1983). On Time. New York: Shocken Books. 

Tart, C. T. (1981). Causality and synchronicity: steps toward clarification. Journal of American 

Societyfor Psychical Research, 75, 12 1. 

Appendix A 

Written Instructions To Participants - Control Group 

The concept of synchronicity has been defined by Carl Jung as "a meaning- 

ful coincidence of two or more events, where something other than chance is 

involved." Jung also states that in synchronicity the coincidences are "con- 

nected so meaningfully that their 'chance' occurrence would represent a de- 

gree of improbability that would have to be expressed by an astronomical fig- 

ure." There is some thought that synchronous events occur more often in cases 

of people who are genetically related. Certainly people who grew up in the 

same family environment would be expected to have a high number of shared 

experiences, but commonalities in the lives of biological relatives separated 

early in life by such things as war or adoption have also been noted. 

A problem with the concept of synchronicity is that there have been few if 

any studies in which a "baseline" measurement of the number of common life 

experiences in non-genetically related strangers has been made. This study is 

an attempt to determine this baseline. 

We realize that you and your partner in this study are not related to each 

other and grew up in different family environments. We would like you to talk 

with each other for the next 45 minutes and to look for as many similarities in 

your lives as you can discover. Please begin on the back side of this paper and 

list, in as exact a fashion as possible, specifically what these similarities are. 

Please write the similarities down as you discover them rather than waiting 

until the end of your discussion. 

After you have worked for 45 minutes or so on this task, the experimenter 

will discuss with you your reaction to what you have been asked to do and will 

answer any questions you have about the study. 

Written Instructions To Participants - Social Index Group 





gree of improbability that would have to be expressed by an astronomical


figure." There is some thought that synchronous events occur more often in 

cases of people who are genetically related. Certainly people who grew up in 

the same family environment would be expected to have a high number of 

shared experiences, but commonalities in the lives of biological relatives sepa- 

rated early in life by such things as war or adoption have also been noted. 

In a study we conducted last year we discovered a second connection with 

events which seem synchronous: A relationship between the level of syn- 

chronicities that unrelated people can discover and a new sociability index. 

This index may very well be included in a number of new psychological inven- 

tories. That, in turn, will allow us to provide you with an evaluation relevant to 

career choice. Certainly, it is much easier and less costly to obtain this data 

with our procedure than to take a full psychological inventory. 

We would like you to talk with each other for the next 45 minutes and to 

look for as many similarities in your lives as you can discover. Please begin on 

the back side of this paper and list, in as exact a fashion as possible, specifical- 

ly what these similarities are. Please write the similarities down as you discov- 

er them rather than waiting until the end of your discussion. 




Written Instructions To Participants - High Expectation Group 





gree of improbability that would have to be expressed by an astronomical fig- 

ure." There is some thought that synchronous events occur more often in cases 

of people who are genetically related. Certainly people who grew up in the 

same family environment would be expected to have a high number of shared 

experiences, but commonalities in the lives of biological relatives separated 

early in life by such things as war or adoption have also been noted. 

A problem with the concept of synchronicity is that there have been few if 

any studies in which a "baseline" measurement of the number of common life 

experiences in non-genetically related strangers has been made. This study is 

an attempt to determine this baseline. 

We realize that you and your partner in this study are not related to each 

other and grew up in different family environments. We would like you to talk 

with each other for the next 45 minutes and to look for as many similarities in 

your lives as you can discover. Please begin on the back side of this paper and 

list, in as exact a fashion as possible, specifically what these similarities are. 

Please write the similarities down as you discover them rather than waiting 

until the end of your discussion. 

In a study we conducted last year using unrelated persons, we discovered


that the average pair of college students finds 55 similarities. We are currently 

attempting to replicate that study and hope you will do at least as well. 




Interim Instruction List 

Appendix B 

Now that you have had a chance to discuss for a while, we would like you to 

think about some of the types of similarities that have been identified by oth- 

ers. Be sure to note down when and where you were when you note that a co- 

incidence happened. 

Possible categories to cover are: Names (first, middle, family, pets, rela- 

tives); Places (vacations; where you want to go); Times or Dates (birthdays; 

age at a particular experience); Health/Illness (never sick; asthma); Personal 

interests (hobbies, sports, games, recreation); Education (public school; col- 

lege major); Tastes in food (love pickles, etc.); Preferences in Art, Music, 

Clothing, or Colors; Personal hygiene products (toothpaste, deodorant); 

Habits, good and bad (bite fingernails; always fold clothes); Plans for a career; 

Personal temperament (slow to anger; impatient; sense of humor); Personality 

(procrastinate; flexible; always on time); Things owned (large cars, black 

labs); Religion or Spirituality (believe in God; Muslim).

Journal of Scienti$c Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 4, pp. 499-526, 1997 0892-33 10197 


ESSAY 

A Critique of Arguments Offered Against Reincarnation 

Department of Philosophy, University Plazu, 

Georgia State University Atlanta, Georgia 30303-3083 

Abstract - In his recently published book Reincarnation: A Critical Exami- 

nation (Amherst, New York: Promethius Books, 1996). Paul Edwards has of- 

fered a number of arguments against the possibility of reincarnation. It is a 

sweeping effort to show that the very idea of reincarnation is illogical and in- 

defensible. While not arguing directly for reincarnation, this essay criticizes 

the main arguments, methodology and polemics wielded in what is more an 

effort to debunk than to carry out the critical examination claimed in the title 

of the book. In criticizing Edward's arguments this essay is criticizing the 

major objections available against the reincarnation hypothesis. 

Keywords: reincarnation - philosophy 

Introduction 

In his recent book Reincarnation: A Critical Examination (Amherst, New 

York: Prometheus Books, 1996), Paul Edwards examines critically both the 

belief in reincarnation and the belief in the Law of Karma. For the author, both 

beliefs are mutually entailing and demonstrably indefensible. The author is 

strongly inclined to think that the belief in reincarnation is conceptually inco- 

herent (rather than simply false) because of the "nonsensicality" of such no- 

tions as the "astral body" and the "womb-invasion" of the prospective mother 

by the soul or astral body. (p. 28) However popular such beliefs may be, the 

author seeks to show that they are not only foolish myths, unworthy of any ra- 

tional human being, but also part of the tide of irrationalism sweeping the 

Western World. (p. 7) People who believe in reincarnation are lost to some fan- 

tastic form of occultism. (p. 58) Indeed, at every turn in the book the author 

feels quite strongly that no reasonable human being could take belief in rein- 

carnation seriously, as even a minimally rational thesis. In passing, the author 

also defends the view that any argument for any form of personal post mortem 

survival is indefensible. Reincarnation is especially absurd, and any form of 

- 

Editor's Note: Via an intermediary, Edwards declined an offer to publish a response to this essay. 

See also in this issue of the Journal (p. 569) an additional book review by James G. Matlock of Paul Ed- 

wards' Reincarnation: A Critical Examination (Amherst, New York: Promethius Books, 1996).

500 R. Almeder 

Cartesian dualism runs on all fours with it, primarily because any form of 

mind-body dualism entails the existence of astral bodies. 

For the author, taking any form of reincarnation seriously is certainly a sign 

of deep cognitive inadequacy; and, not infrequently, advancing the belief as a 

sound belief may well be a mark of moral turpitude falling under the rubric of 

a "holy lie" not uncommonly offered by religious fanatics or amusing brain- 

dead spiritualists. Indeed, nobody who knows anything at all about philosophy 

or science could be tempted to take the belief in any form of post mortem sur- 

vival seriously. Often the author asserts, either directly or indirectly, that be- 

lievers in reincarnation and mind-body dualism are not at all different from the 

kind of true believer associated with fanatical religious sects or fanatical oc- 

cultists. What is interesting about the book is that it contains all of the major 

objections one can find in the literature against the belief in reincarnation, and 

examining the arguments offered by Edwards should count as an examination 

of the available arguments against the thesis, although, to be sure, as we shall 

see, Edwards has a few objections of his own that are not likely to be found 

anywhere else. 

The book, incidentally, has seventeen sections, all of which confront, either 

directly or indirectly, arguments favoring either reincarnation, or some form 

of personal survival of death. These sections bear the titles: 1. Reincarnation, 

Karma, and Competing Doctrines of Survival; 2. The Moral Argument; 3. The 

Law of Karma; 4. Child Prodigies, Deja Vu Experiences, and Group Reincar- 

nations; 5. The Rise and Fall of Bridey Murphy; 6. More Hypnotic Regres- 

sions and "Progressions"; 7. Spontaneous Memories of Earlier Lives; 8. The 

Conservation of Spiritual Energy; 9. The Astral Body; 10. Telephone Calls 

from the Dead, Birth-marks, and the Modus Operandi Problem; 11. Dr. 

Kubler Ross, Dr. Moody, and the New Immortality Movement; 12. The Fan- 

tasies of Dr. Kubler Ross; 13. Dr. Grof, LSD and the Amorous Snake Woman; 

14. The Population Problem and Other Common Sense and Scientific Objec- 

tions; 15. The "Interregnum": What Happens Between Lives?; 16. More about 

Dr. Ian Stevenson, the "Galileo of Reincarnation"; 17. The Dependence of 

Consciousness on the Brain; and Irreverent Postscript: God and the Modus 

Operandi Problem. 

In any case, I submit that no argument offered in this book succeeds in ad- 

vancing a plausible skeptical position because, apart from a number of other 

problems, the book conspicuously fails to confront effectively the central ar- 

gument favoring the only rationally defensible form of reincarnation (or some 

form of personal survival) with any persuasive objections. To be sure, belief in 

reincarnation, as the author conceives it, may well be worthy of rational re- 

jection or consignment to the realm of religious inspiration or fanaticism; but 

the central question is whether the author's construal of the nature of reincar- 

nation is a strawman that excludes the only form of reincarnation for which 

there is no adequate refutation, and for which the empirical evidence offered 

on its behalf amounts to offering a sound argument which it would be irra-

I 

Critique of Arguments Against Reincarnation 501 

tional to reject. Let me explain, and then proceed to examine other specific ar- 

guments offered in the various sections of the book. 

The Definition of Reincarnation 

What seems basically problematic about this book is that the reincarnation 

hypothesis means different things to different people, and the author seeks to 

refute what he takes to be the main reincarnation thesis; but nowhere do we 

find a clear definition of what the main reincarnation thesis is, although the au- 

thor is quite certain that any and all forms of reincarnation have certain collat- 

eral assumptions that are patently absurd - before one even looks at any pro- 

posed argument or evidence for the belief. Doubtless, there are some forms of 

reincarnation that are rationally indefensible, depending on what the advo- 

cates of those forms see as implied by the belief in reincarnation. But, as noted 

above, the question is whether there is any form of personal reincarnation (and 

by implication, the mind-body dualism) that is defensible by appeal to empiri- 

cal evidence. To characterize the reincarnation thesis (along with mind-body 

dualism) in such a way that it must imply a host of absurd claims is, as we shall 

see, to offer a strawman of the thesis because we can defend a common form of 

reincarnation that does not imply such absurdity. Even so, the author has not 

the slightest doubt that there is no form of reincarnation that is even minimally 

defensible in any way. 

Moreover, the author never states just what he would accept as evidence for 

belief in some form of reincarnation because his every inclination is to think 

that the thesis is so absurd that nothing could possibly count as evidence for 

the view. Curiously enough, however, the author also asserts that certain em- 

pirical facts show conclusively that the belief in reincarnation must be false. 

He says, for example, that absence of true memory beliefs in the evidence 

often offered counts powerfully for the falsity of the thesis (p. 27; 234). This is 

curious because if the reincarnation hypothesis is empirically meaningless, it 

should not be empirically testable and falsifiable, and if it is empirically 

testable and falsifiable by appeal to some fact or other, it should not be vacu- 

ously falsifiable. To say that a hypothesis is a meaningful empirical hypothesis 

is to say that the hypothesis has test implications at the sensory level, sensory 

implications that allow us to either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. If 

nothing could conceivably count by way of test implications at the sensory 

level for either the truth of the hypothesis or the falsity of the hypothesis, it is 

not an empirical hypothesis. Moreover, standardly, if one can only empirically 

falsify a particular hypothesis (and nothing could conceivably count for con- 

firming it or accepting it), or if one could only confirm the hypothesis (and 

nothing could conceivably count for falsifying the hypothesis), it is not an em- 

pirical hypothesis; it is a dogma. One cannot have it both ways: the thesis can- 

not be both absurd and yet empirically falsified. Nor can it be empirically fal-


acceptability. (Hempel, Introduction to Philosophy of Natural Science, Pren- 

tice Hall, 1972. p. 54) 

At any rate, for the sake of discussing adequately some of the author's more 

central objections to belief in reincarnation, let us simply assert the following 

statement as a hypothesis - without caring to say what might prompt the hy- 

pothesis: 

There is something essential to some human personalities, however we ultimately char- 

acterize it, which we cannot plausibly construe solely in terms of either brain states, or 

properties of brain states, or biological properties caused by the brain and, further, after 

biological death this non-reducible essential trait sometimes persists for some time, in 

some way, in some place, and for some reason or other, existing independently of the 

person's former brain and body. Moreover, after some time, some of these irreducible 

essential traits of human personality, for some reason or other, and by some mechanism 

or other, come to reside in other human bodies either some time during the gestation pe- 

riod, at birth, or shortly after birth. 

Call this the minimalist reincarnation hypothesis or thesis. Notice that this 

hypothesis can also serve as a particular definition of reincarnation. As such, it 

does not commit us to any particular characterization of the nature of the core 

of human personality, or of what is essential to it, except that it not be con- 

strued straightforwardly and exclusively in customary terms of either a brain 

state, properties of a brain state, a complex of brain states, or biological prop- 

erties caused by the brain. It is, if you will, a certain Lockean something-we- 

know-not-what which seems to be a basic causal agent and, as C. D. Broad 

says, possibly shares certain properties common to physical matter as we now 

understand it. It is the repository of certain memories and other dispositional 

traits not identifiable with brain states, properties of brain states, or biological 

states caused by the brain. Nor does the above definition commit us to knowing 

why or how reincarnation occurs, or for how long, or for what end. Nor is there 

any implication as to what the surviving essential stuff does while between in- 

carnations, whether it is visible in any way, or where it goes; and the definition 

implies nothing as to how frequently the process of reincarnation occurs for 

those core traits which might reincarnate. Nor does the definition commit us to 

the belief that what is essential to everybody in some way always reincarnates, 

rather than that it only sometimes occurs. Finally, our definition does not say 

that every aspect of a personality reincarnates whenever reincarnation occurs, 

but only what is essential (or core) to the personality, namely only that which 

would be sufficient to identify the person. This minimalist conception of rein- 

carnation is consistent with both Platonic conceptions of personality (which 

exclude bodily continuity as a necessary condition for personal identity) and 

Aristotelian conceptions of personality which may require bodily continuity as 

essential to human personality. Reincarnationists all agree that something es- 

sential to human personality sometimes survives biological death. Under the 

above definition, the full person may well be more than what survives, but


what survives is certainly essential or core to the person, and sufficient to dis- 

tinguish the person from any other person that might have existed. I believe 

that this definition of reincarnation is something that would be accepted mini- 

mally by all major forms of the belief in reincarnation and the question is 

whether we have any evidence for this definition as a hypothesis about the na- 

ture of human personality. 

What are the empirical test implications for the above hypothesis? What 

might one accept as evidence empirically confirming to some degree that this 

sentence is true? The reincarnation hypothesis, as defined above, is, I submit, 

confirmed by the evidence offered in the stronger cases presented by Ian 

Stevenson, and in the growing number of cases presented by others. In other 

words, given a basic assumption about what human personality must include 

(namely systematic memories proper to only that person, and perhaps other in- 

dividuating traits having to do with other non-propositional dispositions) if we 

came across a large number of non-fraudulent, methodologically sound cases 

in which subjects claim to remember having lived an earlier life, and if their 

claims are accompanied by a rich number of detailed and verified memory 

claims about events that only the former personality could know, and if they 

had non-propositional skills that could not have been learned but which were 

demonstrably the skills possessed by the former historically authenticated per- 

sonality, then we would need to conclude that we had confirmed the above hy- 

pothesis ... because that is what we would expect if the hypothesis were true, 

and if having certain systemic memories is necessary and sufficient for identi- 

fying a particular person. Nothing else could plausibly explain as well the data 

in these cases. Similarly, if such data never occurred, we would not have any 

reason to accept the hypothesis; or if we subsequently found that such cases 

were all items of fraud or hoax (or a significant number of the stronger cases 

were subsequently discovered to be so), then the thesis would be empirically 

disconfirmed. In fact, in some of the past examined cases, Stevenson, for ex- 

ample, concluded quite properly that the data in those particular cases did not 

support the thesis and that the data in those particular cases clearly failed to 

support the hypothesis as an explanation of that data. Let us assume that this is 

the main reincarnationist thesis and ask whether Edwards' objections to rein- 

carnation apply successfully to it. If they do not, then, we will need to con- 

clude that we have no strong objection to the empirical proof that there are 

minds that reincarnate. Whether there are minds that do not reincarnate, is not 

an empirical question that one can answer by looking at only the data for rein- 

carnation. Let us turn to the specific arguments offered in the book. 

Edwards' Objections to Reincarnation 

1. For the author, the belief in reincarnation is opposed to all of the most 

widely held views on the mind-body problem, and is also opposed to one of 

the major current theories about personal identity. The latter view holds that 

however much more than a body a human being may be, personal identity


involves bodily continuity. For the author, unless this latter view can be shown 

to be false, reincarnation is ruled out from the start. (p. 15) 

Certainly, if some essential human traits survive biological death and then 

reincarnate, widely held views on the mind-body problem are false and, cer- 

tainly also, that would show that even if bodily continuity is essential to 

human personality, what is also essential to human personality can, and does, 

sometimes survive biological death. If bodily continuity is both necessary and 

sufficient for personal identity, then of course, reincarnation is impossible, 

along with any form of survival. Indeed, if the evidence for reincarnation, as 

defined above, is compelling, then those views are false. What the author 

seems to think is that one must have some evidence independently of the evi- 

dence offered for reincarnation to show that bodily continuity cannot be neces- 

sary for personal identity, that one must refute the view that personal identity 

involves bodily continuity before one looks at the evidence for reincarnation, 

when in fact the evidence for reincarnation is the evidence against just such a 

view of personal identity. The evidence for reincarnation would be evidence 

against such views; and one cannot defend such views by insisting that we not 

look at the evidence for reincarnation until we find other evidence showing 

that bodily continuity is not a necessary condition for personal identity. Cor- 

porealism is directly challenged by the evidence for reincarnation; one does 

not need to show such corporealism false before one is epistemically justified 

in examining the evidence for reincarnation. If we took this argument serious- 

ly we would need to defeat those hypotheses which we challenge before we 

could appeal to the evidence challenging those hypotheses. That just cannot be 

done; and to insist on it would be to render one's cherished (and possibly philo- 

sophically popular) beliefs ever incapable of being refuted. Such a move 

makes the belief in any form of reincarnation a priori false because nothing 

could ever count as evidence in favor of the hypothesis. Besides, appealing to 

the popularity of a philosophical position is hardly a good reason showing that 

one ought to adopt such views. In a fair argument the burden of proof is equal- 

ly distributed. The evidence offered for reincarnation is at one and the same 

time the evidence against the kind of dualism the author seeks to defend. 

2. In characterizing reincarnation further, the author claims that the belief in 

reincarnation assumes that a person's mind does not require the particular 

body or brain with which it is connected in the present life; and the author 

claims, as we shall see, that this assumption is almost certainly false. (p. 16) 

For the reincarnationist, however, this would be less an assumption than it 

would be an implication of the thesis if it were true. To call it an assumption is 

tantamount to saying that reincarnationists assume, without benefit of any evi- 

dence, the thesis which they assert. Perhaps some reincarnationists act that 

way, but the thesis in favor of reincarnation could not rest on such an assump- 

tion without it simultaneously begging the question in favor of reincarnation. 

The richer case studies do not assume reincarnation, arguably they show it as


3. In Chapter Two, the author makes short shrift of the argument based on 

the moral order of the world. This is the argument to the effect that the exis- 

tence of injustice in the world requires belief in reincarnation. It is a bad argu- 

ment and the author is quite right for criticizing it, and wondering how it man- 

aged to become so widely accepted. One might add, of course, that it is likely 

that the only reincarnationists who offer it are those who accept the doctrine 

on religious grounds, and who, for some reason or other, are committed to the 

view that one of the main purposes of reincarnation is to balance the scales of 

justice in some way. But none of that is implied by the minimalist definition 

offered above and for which the evidence offered in the stronger cases is rele- 

vant. 

4. Chapter Three is an attack on Karma and the attack seems quite sound. 

The author considers this an attack on reincarnation because he believes that 

reincarnation, as it is generally understood and widely accepted, implies a doc- 

trine of Karma, as the author construes it. Here again, however, it is important 

to note that belief in reincarnation, as minimally construed above, does not re- 

quire any position at all on what the purpose of reincarnation is. Religious be- 

lievers in reincarnation make such claims, but the essential empirical evidence 

for reincarnation implies nothing at all about Karma. So, the objection is irrel- 

evant to the empirically defensible form of reincarnation offered above. 

5. Chapter Four examines the argument from Child Prodigies, Deja Vu Ex- 

periences, and Group Reincarnations. Here the author examines and quite 

rightly rejects arguments going back as far as 1888 which say that we cannot 

explain the existence of child prodigies (such as Sir William Hamilton), deja 

vu experiences, or groups of genius without appealing to reincarnation. And, 

of course, some people have made those bad arguments. In this chapter, inci- 

dentally, under a section entitled "God of the Gaps," the author accuses 

Stevenson of being guilty of the "God of the Gaps" fallacy which, as we know, 

as the fallacy of exploiting gaps in scientific explanations by plugging in God 

as the cause of certain phenomena. According to the author, Stevenson, by 

analogy, exploits gaps in scientific explanations by appealing to reincarnation 

as the only possible way to fill in the gaps. Such a move, for the author is "pre- 

posterous" and he states, there "is no need to bring in reincarnation or any oc- 

cult causes." (p. 57) 

In defense of Stevenson, however, we should note that the author's charge is 

a straw man. Stevenson does not argue for reincarnation on the grounds that 

the belief explains items (such as certain phobias) not explained in current sci- 

ence. We all know that a good scientific hypothesis, when independently con- 

firmed and not falsified in terms of its deductive consequences invariably pro- 

vides unanticipated explanatory power for other phenomena not yet explained. 

However, this latter phenomena is not part of the independent evidence that 

confirms the hypothesis rather than a logically positive feature of a theory or 

hypothesis well-established on independent grounds. But it is neither a neces-


confirmatory value and justifiably increases confidence in the hypothesis. 

Stevenson was merely pointing out the explanatory power the thesis might 

have after it is confirmed as true on independent grounds evidenced in the rich- 

er case studies. So, the author distorts Stevenson's comments here by asserting 

that these comments are somehow to be taken as the independent evidence for 

the hypothesis. 

Moreover, Stevenson's point on this issue is actually quite cautious. He as- 

serts that there seems to be some need for a factor in addition to heredity and 

environment to explain certain behaviors. He then goes on to say that if rein- 

carnation occurs then "appeal to reincarnation to explain these phenomena is 

at least worthy of consideration as a possible explanation" ( as cited on p. 55- 

56 in Edwards). This ascription of the "god of the gaps" fallacy to Stevenson is 

based on only one of many of this author's misunderstandings (I do not say de- 

liberate distortions) of Stevenson's views and positions. 

6. In Chapter Four the author also asserts what he reasserts at length later in 

Chapter 15 and what he also takes to be the basic objection to reincarnation 

explaining anything in a scientific context, namely that the hypothesis ex- 

plains nothing. For the author the belief in reincarnation cannot compete with 

physiology, genetics, or psychology as explanations of human behavior. Rein- 

carnation, for the author, is not even a testable hypothesis. (p. 58) 

But the response to this objection seems straightforward. Apart from the fact 

that there are fine explanations in science that are not causal explanations (we 

explained, for example, the data in twin studies on schizophrenia by hypothe- 

sizing that the cause was in fact purely genetic long before we identified the 

gene causing it in a certain portion of the cases), we have also shown above just 

how the reincarnation hypothesis, as defined above, is quite testable and con- 

firmable in terms of what we can reasonably specify as the deductive implica- 

tions of the hypothesis, if only we assume that having certain systemic memo- 

ries is essential to being the persons we are. 

7. He also says here in Chapter Four that reincarnationists, in general, talk 

vaguely about the soul acquiring skills and knowledge in a previous life and 

taking these along to the next incarnation. He claims that one must pin them 

down and inquire about the mechanics of transmission.(p. 58) In other words, 

if reincarnationists cannot explain how the soul transmits from one body to an- 

other the previous skills or dispositions, then the argument for reincarnation is 

unacceptable. He then asserts that the only plausible explanation of the trans- 

mission makes belief in reincarnation false. He says: 

I think that reincarnationists who are not altogether lost to some fantastic form of oc- 

cultism will admit that the transmission from the Hanauer to the Mozart body occurred 

via the brain and nervous system of the new embryo. If they admit this they have tacit- 

ly admitted that Mozart's special ability is due to certain features of his brain that are 

not present in the brain of other human beings. Reincarnation has in a sense become re- 

dundant. It will no doubt be replied that reincarnation is still necessary to account for 

the special features of Mozart's brain. However, if we have reason to believe in what I


call the "sufficiency" of genetics and embryology, this will take care of the last reincar- 

nationist stand.(p. 58) 

He develops this argument again in Chapter 15. The obvious response to the 

author here is that one may well know that something has occurred without 

knowing how it occurs, and a failure to know how it occurs does not undermine 

the evidence that it occurs. In the definition of reincarnation offered above, the 

evidence confirming it confirms nothing about how it occurs but only that it 

occurs, and no defensible form of reincarnation need deal with any form of the 

modus operandi problem. The author seems to think that we cannot know that 

Citation won the fourth race at Suffolk Downs unless we know how he did it. 

At any rate, as the definition above makes explicit, the essential reincarnation 

hypothesis can be shown to be true without our being able to show how it oc- 

curs, or why it occurs, or how often it occurs, or whether everybody reincar- 

nates in this minimalist way. 

8. Chapter Five is about the famous Bridey Murphy case, and the author dis- 

credits it as a compelling case for belief in reincarnation. Cryptomnesia and 

suggestibility under hypnosis can, according to the author, explain the whole 

case. He says that this case is "total and utter rubbish." He also says this is a 

fairly typical case, and we are supposed to generalize from it. In fact, the au- 

thor never considers even one rich xenoglossy case because, as he says in the 

preface, Sarah Thomason has shown in a "devastating" critique that it is im- 

possible that a person could speak in a foreign language not learned in the nor- 

mal way. The author does not consider or present Thomason's arguments, nor 

does he examine any of the replies to her position; he rather asserts that they 

are devastating refutations of the claim that one can speak in a language not 

learned. He simply refuses to look at some of the most interesting evidence for 

reincarnation because one person wrote a criticism of the evidence in one case, 

and then, without saying what her arguments were and why they hold up in the 

light of serious criticism from other sources, illegitimately generalized to all 

other cases of xenoglossy. This is the same section where he states, by implica- 

tion, that most who believe in reincarnation or mind-body dualism (both of 

which he classifies as occult beliefs because they entail belief in astral bodies) 

are either insane or semi-insane. He said, for example, of the main subject in 

the Bridey Murphey case: 

Virginia (Tighe) sounds like a basically sensible, down-to-earth middle American, 

quite different from most of the insane or semi-insane persons who are attracted to the 

occult. I doubt that she would ever take any talk about astral bodies seriously. (p. 72) 

Never mind that this makes of Plato, Aristotle, all the best medieval Philoso- 

phers, Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Kant (for openers) be- 

lievers in the occult because they believed in the existence of minds, the im- 

portant point is that for so doing they were either insane or semi-insane.


By the way, even if the author is quite right in believing that The Bridey 

Murphey Case is not much of a case to rely upon for evidence for reincarnation 

(although some thoughtful people at the time thought differently), it is diffi- 

cult to imagine anybody who would now defend belief in reincarnation based 

on solely confirmed memory claims taking this case as a particularly rich or 

clear case. Oddly, the author admits that "far better books in defense of rein- 

carnation - containing more substantial documentation and less flimsy argu- 

ments have been totally ignored by the press." (p. 62) So why spend a whole 

chapter arguing against this case and not looking at better cases, cases such as 

those involving rich and independently confirmed memory claims, memories 

that only the deceased could have had, along with certain acquired skills and 

responsive xenoglossy? And certainly Stevenson, while admitting that it of- 

fered some reasonably confirming evidence, never listed the Bridey Murphey 

Case as a particularly evidential case. It was never properly investigated. 

Compare it with the Bishen Chand Kapoor case, or the Lydia Johnson qua 

Jensen case, the Gretchen case, the Swarnlata case, and a host of others that 

satisfy the memorial standards of high reliability and independent corrobora- 

tion. In other words, attacking the Bridey Murphy case in great detail is attack- 

ing another straw man in the discussion. There are much stronger cases, and 

very many of them. Incidentally, Stevenson does not regard cryptomnesia as a 

plausible explanation of all of Bridey Murphy's memory claims ... (see p. 78 

and Footnote 38 and whether the Irish exhibition could plausibly hold the in- 

formation Murphy testified to). 

9. Chapter 6 justifiably criticizes new-age types who believe they have good 

evidence for reincarnation (as well as for future lives) simply from regression 

therapy in the absence of verified memory claims. But this criticism is not new. 

We all know that for certain purposes regression therapy is generally problem- 

atic as a technique for producing the sort of memory claims that can provide 

strong evidence, although on occasion one might come up with interesting 

memory claims that are authenticated as memories that only the former per- 

sonality could have. Witness, for example, the Lydia Johnson qua Jensen case. 

Admittedly, however, the best evidence comes from spontaneous cases involv- 

ing young children between the ages of two and five who are not hypnotized. 

Moreover, in confronting the evidence from spontaneous memories of earli- 

er lives, the author offers a critique of the Ryall Case (p. 103) which Stevenson 

regards as strong but somewhat damaged by the fact that we have no record of 

the historical existence of the former personality where we would expect to 

find it. Here again, however, as in the Bridey Murphy Case, the author selects 

problematic cases as typical cases and where there is some evidential problem 

and ignores the rest of the confirming evidence in demonstrably stronger 

cases. Of the Ryall case, moreover, the author asserts without evidence, that 

Ryall was eventually exposed as either a hoaxer or the victim of delusions 

(p. 103). Michael Green was supposed to have shown as much. But we never


many of the best cases and finding all of them wanting. In fact, some of Ryall's 

memory claims did check out, but the author never says how many or whether 

the ones that did check out are memory claims that only the deceased could 

have had. And because some of Ryall's (he does not say how many) crucial 

memories were not confirmed, the case fails as evidence for reincarnation. The 

fact that Stevenson admits that the Ryall case was not as strong as he original- 

ly thought does not mean that it is not probative at all. Any failed memory 

shoots down the case for the author even if the remaining number of memories 

is very large and cannot be explained on natural or normal grounds, and even if 

they are confirmed memories that only the previous personality could have 

had. 

11. The Astral Body is the topic of discussion in Chapter Nine and the au- 

thor again asserts that the very concept of an astral body is absurd and, because 

all reincarnationists are required to believe in astral bodies or souls, belief in 

reincarnation is, by implication, absurd. As the author sees it, the evidence 

usually given for astral bodies from OBEs and NDEs is more evidence for 

delusion than anything else. Here the author cites Susan Blackmore, and he 

also goes after the Wilmot case, a case which one should never list as an evi- 

dential case: again, another straw man (p. 113). Space prohibits here a detailed 

examination of the author's position on astral bodies, but I submit that, for all 

the wrong reasons he has overlooked the evidence that counts strongly for be- 

lief in the existence of minds based on OBEs and NDEs. Like Blackmore, he 

overlooks those strongly confirmed cases with veridical content that cannot be 

explained by appeal to hallucination or even ESP, and, like so many others, ig- 

nores the Osis-McCormick experiments. 

By the way, nothing the author discusses on OBEs or NDEs is relevant to 

reincarnation as defined above, because, as we noted above, belief in reincar- 

nation does not require anyone to positively characterize the surviving part of 

personality in terms of astral bodies as the author construes them. In fact, the 

evidence gleaned from OBEs and NDEs need not commit us to anything like 

an astral body as the author characterizes it. Nothing in the evidence confirm- 

ing belief in reincarnation, as characterized above, entails the existence of as- 

tral bodies as the author describes them: in short, another straw man. 

Moreover, the author argues that unless one can explain how astral travel 

can take place at speeds in excess of airplanes, how astral bodies acquire navi- 

gational skills for getting to certain distant and unknown locations and finding 

without maps a friend's house in San Francisco (for example), nobody ought to 

take this astral travel stuff seriously. In short, for the author, neither Ritchie 

nor any other astral traveler should be taken seriously until they can explain 

how astral bodies succeed in making their trips. Here again, the author com- 

mits the simple epistemological error of thinking that because we do not know 

how something takes place, or what the cause of it is, we do not know that it 

takes place. In the end, the point worth repeating here is that any attack on as- 

tral bodies based on evidence from OBEs or NDEs is irrelevant to the question


of reincarnation because the reincarnation hypothesis is not committed to a de- 

scription of what survives in terms of what the author characterizes as an astral 

body. It will be enough to describe the post-mortem surviving stuff as essential 

to human personality and not a visible part of the brain, or any brain state, or 

biological property caused by the brain. As we saw above, the reincarnation 

hypothesis does not require that one be able to see the surviving stuff in a dis- 

embodied state, as one might an astral body of the sort the author character- 

izes. Naturally, the author also thinks that anybody who believes in mind-body 

dualism needs to believe in astral bodies and therefore must be equally com- 

mitted to the absurd or occult. 

12. In Chapter Ten the author discusses Telephone Calls from the Dead, 

Birthmarks, and the Modus Operandi Problem. On the question of Birth- 

marks, the author examines the Corliss Chotkin case and says: 

Although Stevenson's multi-volume work on birthmarks has not been published, sever- 

al of the case histories he has reported do include, as an essential part of the evidence 

for reincarnation, details about the birthmarks of the individuals and their alleged rela- 

tion to wounds and illnesses of the earlier bodies. I will briefly discuss the case of 

Corliss Chotkin Jr. It will serve as a useful illustration of the kind of evidence that so 

greatly impresses Stevenson. It is a typical Stevensonian case and the objections to it 

would, with some minor adjustments, apply to all the others. (p. 136) 

Unfortunately, the author examines the case as it is presented briefly in a 

synopsis in Children Who Remember Previous Lives and not as it is presented 

originally in Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation. Here, as elsewhere, 

what the author says about the details of the cases presented by Stevenson, and 

the possibility of fraud, shows that he has not read the cases as presented in 

Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation. And claiming that the Chotkin 

case is a typical Stevensonian case, is quite false as there are at least three log- 

ically distinct kinds of cases which Stevenson presents and which vary in terms 

of evidential force, although in each kind of case the evidence offered is suffi- 

cient. At any rate, for the author, the main objection to the Chotkin Case is that 

there is no conceivable way in which the scars of Victor Vincent could have 

been transferred to the body of Corliss Chotkin. For the author, nonphysical 

bodies are just not the sort of thing to which physical scars could be trans- 

ferred. Moreover, do the scars shrink for the new body? (p. 139) This is anoth- 

er instance of the modus operandi objection of which the author is demonstra- 

bly fond. (p. 139) Interestingly, here the author says that although we 

sometimes know (as in the case of aspirin, for example) that something was 

the case without being able to say how it occurred, in the case of reincarnation 

we have not even the foggiest idea how the scars move around. (p. 140) Unfor- 

tunately, the author claims that this modus operandi problem, as he explicates 

it, is "fatal" not only for birthmark cases, but also for the entire reincarnation

Critique of Arguments Against Reincarnation 51 1 

By the way, I do hope that Stevenson's four volume work will find a publisher. He 

seems to me a sincere but deluded man and he does deserve his day in court. What is 

more, publication of the book would give pleasure all around. Stevenson and his sup- 

porters would be delighted. As for the publishers I do not believe that they would lose 

any money. Given the state of education in the world, especially the United States, 

there will be plenty of believers or would-be believers to buy such a profusely illustrat- 

ed defense of reincarnation. As for myself, it would be a joyous occasion for additional 

comments about this absurd nonsense in a later edition. (p. 140) 

Presumably, somebody will inform the author that Praeger has now pub- 

lished the two-volume work entitled Reincarnation and Biology (after 

Paragon Press earlier reneged on a signed contract to publish it in 1991) and 

that the author can begin anew showing joyfully that such body scars did not 

and could not occur because we do not know how they could occur in the way 

depicted. Doubtless, the author is so committed to the modus operandi prob- 

lem that he will infer it a waste of time and money to read these two volumes, 

since he already knows that, given this fatal objection, all the cases presented 

must be instances of fraud, delusion, hoax, sloppy methodology, holy lies or 

insanity. 

Nowhere, incidentally, does Stevenson claim that the existence of body- 

scars from wounds received earlier is necessary in order to justify belief in 

reincarnation. As noted above, there are at least three distinct kinds of cases, 

no one of which involves body-scars, that would be sufficient for drawing the 

conclusion in favor of the minimalist belief in reincarnation. Stevenson is im- 

pressed, as indeed we all should be, with the fact that sometimes in well-con- 

firmed cases based on non-fraudulent and verified memory claims and on such 

cases combined with the presence of relevant non-propositional skills not 

learned, we have such scars as appeared in the same location on the bodies of 

the previous historical personality. 

Chapters 11 and 12 are on Kubler-Ross, Moody and the new immortality 

movement. Here the author attacks Kubler-Ross after noting that she is the 

most uncritical person in the history of the world. He adds that she definitely 

belongs in the book because she believes in astral bodies, and the author wants 

to say more about how stupid it is to believe in astral bodies. He also pillories 

those who might think minds exist because, he claims, believing in minds actu- 

ally commits one to belief in astral bodies. This chapter is also similar to the 

next chapter (Chapter 13) bearing the title Grof, LSD and the Amorous Snake- 

Woman. 

In the name of Victorian humor, these last three chapters involve tasteless 

ridicule more than anything else, and none of the discussion advances a criti- 

cal examination of the most plausible evidence for belief in reincarnation. 

Since it is very unlikely that Kubler-Ross, or Moody, or Grof seek to offer a 

critical and philosophically defensible proof of survival based on OBEs, it 

serves no purpose to attack them for failing to do so. (In my book, (Almeder, 

1992), incidentally, I spent much time on OBEs and it might have been better


for the author to have examined those arguments, including the Osis-Mc- 

Cormick experiments, rather than look at other arguments that are so easily 

dismissed). 

Chapter 14 is about The Population Problem and Other Commonsense and 

Scientific Objections. Here the author presents five objections against Rein- 

carnation. They are: 

(l)Tertullianls Objection. According to this objection, the reincarnated per- 

son begins as a baby and not as a fully mature person "How is it that they come 

back at one uniform age?" (Why?) As the author sees it, John Hick also en- 

dorses this objection when he points out that babies are not born with adult 

egos "as they would be if they were direct continuations of egos that had died 

at the end of normal lifespan" (as cited on p. 223). The author (Edwards) goes 

on to say that "it is little less than scandalous that no reincarnationist ever at- 

tempted to reply to this argument." (p. 223- 224) He then goes on to say that 

the one plausible explanation in terms of the metaphysical soul (which does 

age) is distinct from the empirical ego ... and naturally this answer is absurd be- 

cause the distinction presupposes that we can make sense of a metaphysical 

soul which is really nothing more than an astral body, and belief in astral bod- 

ies is absurd beyond belief. 

The proper response to Tertullian's objection, of course, is that it is not an 

objection, but rather a question; and even if somebody were to answer that 

helshe does not know why reincarnated souls do not begin as full continua- 

tions of past adult egos, that is irrelevant to the evidence that some essential 

traits of human personality sometimes reincarnate, and that some of these 

traits are adult memories and non-propositional skills. If Tertullian's question 

is by implication to be taken as a worthy objection, what exactly is the objec- 

tion? That reincarnation, as we defined it above, cannot occur because if rein- 

carnation were ever a fact it would need to occur in the way Tertullian thinks it 

would be suitable for it to occur? Or that it cannot take place in the way speci- 

fied in the minimalist's thesis because we can imagine another way in which it 

might take place? Even if Tertullian's question is an interesting question, 

(rather than the bold undefended assertion that reincarnation as defined above 

cannot occur) the answer is irrelevant as evidence against the thesis defined 

above which asserts that it does occur in the way specified in the thesis. 

(2) Reincarnation is Incompatible with Darwinian Evolution. "Evolution 

teaches that our consciousness developed gradually along with the develop- 

ment of the brain and the nervous system (p. 225). The reincarnationist is com- 

mitted to holding that no such development has occurred because it is the same 

soul that has migrated from body to body." 

The response to this objection seems simple enough. Evolutionary theory 

does not teach that consciousness developed gradually along with the develop- 

ment of the brain and the nervous system. To see that this is so, one can simply 

consult any reputable and standard college text in biology treating the subject 

of evolution. Nor does biology even teach that consciousness, as we under-


stand it, is no more than a brain state or a biological property caused by brain 

states. Biology makes no claim that minds or souls or consciousness is a bio- 

logical property of any sort. That is an inference drawn by others who choose 

to conclude as much from the fact that biology makes no testable claims about 

such entities. Biologists tend not to make philosophical claims about the na- 

ture of the mind and the degree to which biology is prepared to defend the view 

that minds or souls are really brains, brain states, or biological properties 

caused by the brain. And it would be remarkable if it did, because such claims 

could not be empirically testable without begging the question against the be- 

lief in minds. 

(3) The Recency of Life. (p. 225) According to this objection, science shows 

that after the big bang there was no life here for billions of years; but "Reincar- 

nation in all forms postulates a series of incarnations stretching back into the 

past without limit, and this is clearly inconsistent with the facts." By implica- 

tion, for the author, contemporary western believers in reincarnation are not 

the least bit interested in the findings of science. 

In response to this objection, it should be obvious that the thesis of reincar- 

nation specified above as the minimalist thesis makes no such claims about 

when the process started, and the defense of that thesis requires no such belief. 

It is just not true that reincarnation in all its forms postulates a series of incar- 

nations stretching back into the past without limit. The empirical evidence for 

the minimalist thesis does not imply that at all. 

(4) The Population Objection. This is the author's favorite objection 

(p. 226), and it seems to him quite conclusive against the major form of rein- 

carnation, in spite of the imaginative responses of "true" believers. (p. 226). 

The earliest statement of the population objection is found in Tertullian's Trea- 

tise on the Soul in which Tertullian speaks of the "luxuriant growth of the 

human race" observing that this cannot be reconciled with the notion of the 

stationery population to which reincarnationists are committed. (p. 226) Ter- 

tullian's argument is as follows: the population will be some 10 billion by the 

year 2016 while at the time of Christ the population of the world was 200 mil- 

lion. The author goes on to say: 

As we saw earlier, reincarnationists are opposed to any doctrine of "special creation" of 

souls. It denies that new souls are ever added to the world. All souls have always exist- 

ed. Every birth is a rebirth, the rebirth of a soul that has already existed. All this clearly 

rules out any population increase. Reincarnationists who believe that some souls are 

eventually allowed to give up their earthly existence and merge into the Absolute or 

Nirvana are committed to the view that in the long run the population must decrease. 

Other reincarnationists imply that the total human population is stationary. In either 

case, whether committed to a stationary or decreasing population, reincarnation ap- 

pears to be refuted by the population statistics. (p. 226)


The author then says: 

It is noteworthy that this argument has hardly ever been discussed by any of the acade- 

mically respectable reincarnationists. I suspect that the reason for this is the great diffi- 

culty of finding an answer that would strike a sober person as even remotely credible. 

(P. 227) 

The author then lists a number of inadequate responses from Buddhist rein- 

carnationists, and he also lists Geddes MacGregor's objection to the effect that 

now that we know how vast the universe is and how vastly populated it must be 

by rational souls, the objection has no weight, as an objection that is given 

over to noxious ad hoc assumptions. Reincarnationism, Edwards urges, is not 

a theory for which there is any observational evidence. (p. 230) And, of 

course, such assumptions as those made by MacGregor are not, according to 

the author, testable. He also distorts Stevenson's position in Stevenson's reply. 

Indeed, the author accuses Stevenson of stating the issue obscurely and mis- 

leadingly. The author then goes on to say that the problem is that "the popula- 

tion increase seems (emphasis added) incompatible with the stationary or de- 

creasing population implied by the major form of reincarnationism." He then 

goes on to say that the population problem can be avoided by anybody pre- 

pared to offer a drastically modified version of reincarnationism, namely the 

version that says only that people sometimes reincarnate. (p. 253) In other 

words, for the author, somebody who holds that reincarnation occurs, but that 

it need not be universal, could quite consistently admit the population growth 

without invoking any of the ad hoc assumptions. "There is something appeal- 

ing about the modesty of this revised position, but it is easy to see why it has 

not commended itself to most believers in reincarnation.. .. Many of the argu- 

ments for reincarnation, if they were valid, would show that all human beings 

are the reincarnation of previously existing souls." (p. 233) Moreover, accord- 

ing to the author, if this modest form of reincarnation were true we would have 

difficulty figuring out who was, and who was not, reincarnated and hence not 

be able to explain human behavior in terms of Karma. 

In brief response to this objection, one might note that the minimalist form 

of reincarnation, as defined above, is in fact the only defensible form of rein- 

carnation; and because that form does not imply that everybody reincarnates 

the population objection does not work against it. The question is whether the 

modest form is supported by the empirical evidence. If it should turn out that 

under the modest form of reincarnation we would not be able to pick out who 

among us have as part of our current persona a reincarnated person (or person- 

part), then the author says we would not be able to explain human behavior in 

terms of Karma. On this point, it is worth noting again that the modest form 

does not seek to explain human behavior in terms of Karma. It makes no claim 

as to why such a process would occur. If the modest form is not identifiable 

with the common forms accepted by certain religious beliefs, then the author


should deal with the question of whether the evidence offered by Stevenson 

and others actually supports this modest form and, if it does, what that means 

by implication for understanding human nature. Incidentally, I argued for the 

modest form of reincarnation in my book, and argued that that is all Steven- 

son's evidence requires; and, in light of this argument, I also argued that the as- 

sumptions behind the population objection would presuppose a form of rein- 

carnation that Stevenson did not argue for and for which the evidence he offers 

does not support. I submit that sane, sober and academically respectable rein- 

carnationists have replied quite successfully to the population objection and 

that if the author were not so busy wantonly vilifying those who disagree with 

his views, he might have seen the replies. As a matter of fact, Stevenson's reply 

to the population objection is subtle and quite telling. I also argued that even if 

one did hold out for universal reincarnation, the population objection would 

still have no weight rather than simply be an implication of the truth of the 

thesis. The population objection, like so many other objections here, is a red 

herring because based on a straw man construal of what a reasonable reincar- 

nationist must believe. In fact, many people (including MacGregor, Ducasse, 

Stevenson and myself) have replied quite well to the population objection. 

(5) The Absence of Genuine Memories of Previous Lives is Powerful Evi- 

dence Against Belief in Reincarnation. (p. 234) The author made this claim 

back on p. 27, where he says that "the two criteria of bodily continuity and 

memory are not on a par and that the memory criterion presupposes that of 

bodily continuity while the converse does not hold." According to the author, 

we need a criterion for distinguishing between false and true memories be- 

cause "people often sincerely remember things that did not happen ...." For the 

author, it is evident that the memory criterion cannot help us to distinguish be- 

tween such true and false memories. We have to fall back on another criterion 

and the only one that seems to be available is bodily continuity. (p. 237) 

In response to this objection, it is easy to determine whether a person's mem- 

ory claims are false. If the event which she claims to remember can be shown 

never to have taken place, then the memory claim is false. And if there is no 

way of confirming the claim then there is no good reason to accept the claim as 

a true memory claim. Similarly, if a person claims to remember having buried 

his money forty years ago in a jar under his hen house, then finding the jar 

there with the specified sum and certifying that nobody else could have buried 

it there at that time or at a later time, then his memory claim is true. Of course, 

sometimes some memory claims are not testable because they testify to events 

for which there could be no empirical evidence presently available ..., for ex- 

ample, what my father said just before he died when we were alone in the 

room. On the question of reincarnation, if somebody claims to remember hav- 

ing buried his golden spoon with his initials in the cement foundation of the 

State Street Church in Boston on April 3, 1843 then finding the spoon after 

breaking up the foundation (and knowing that the location of the spoon was 

not known to anybody else and that the spoon was in fact placed in the founda-


tion on April 3, 1843), surely counts for verifying the memory claim, unless, 

of course, one holds apriori that one cannot have a true memory of an event 

that one did not witness in his current lifetime; and if one does hold this latter 

view, how explain the fact that the memory claim is true and that the subject's 

belief is true? As Derek Parfit claims, if we saw such events transpire, we 

might want to change our definition of what memory consists in, and abandon 

the view that the brain is the carrier of memory (p. 227 in pb edition of Rea- 

sons and Persons, Oxford, 1980). If there is nothing that I would accept as a 

valid memory claim of a past event that the subject could not have witnessed in 

his current body, then it seems to be a dogma with me that bodily continuity is 

both necessary and sufficient for personal identity, when there is as strong an 

intuitive basis for thinking that systemic memories are sufficient for identify- 

ing distinct persons. 

Chapter 15. The Interregnum: What Happens Between Lives 

In this chapter, the author offers some vintage remarks on post rnortem sur- 

vival. He notes, for example, that belief in reincarnation could not be true be- 

cause we would have no idea where the surviving personality traits would be 

after death. This is another form of the modus operandi objection, no better for 

the repetition. After pointing to Stevenson's claim that the mind is a non-phys- 

ical body composed of some kind of matter, but that it must be matter quite dif- 

ferent from what we usually mean by that term, the author concludes that 

Stevenson does not say he believes in astral bodies, but that it is hard to see 

how Stevenson can avoid believing in something of the same kind. The author 

goes on to say: 

When I first read the remarks just quoted I could not help wondering where the interme- 

diate body came from. The answer to this question is given in Stevenson's 1980 Presi- 

dential Address to the Parapsychological Association, in which he reveals himself as an 

out-and-out occultist. The second body, which we have available at death, is nothing 

other than our mind which we had or which we were all along. Stevenson is, of course, 

a dualist and he calls himself a radical interactionist, but no dualistic interactionist 

known to me among philosophers, of the Cartesian or the Humean variety, has ever 

identified the mind with a body. We are once again told that images have spatial loca- 

tion ... the mind is thus "extended." ... Before leaving this topic, I should observe that 

Stevenson has in no way established what he evidently desires to show, that the mind, 

i.e. the second body, exists in a space that is just as objective as physical space. (p. 245) 

In response, C. D. Broad, C. J. Ducasse, and H. H. Price, (among others) in 

fact identified the surviving mind as an object that shared in common with 

physical objects some physical properties and thus they held to a modified 

Cartesian substance-dualism that allows for personal survival of a substance 

that had to be extended without being fully identifiable with physical objects 

as we now understand them. Besides, if we do have minds (distinct from brains 

and not reducible to brains or biological properties caused by brain states) they


are certainly extended in some way, as my mind would be everywhere I am and 

not now anywhere else. That is why my mind would exist in real space, name- 

ly, because my body is in real space and my mind is everywhere my body is. 

Rather than call Stevenson, C. D. Broad and all other mind-body dualists 

(such as Plato, Aristotle, all the medievals, Locke, Berkeley, Descartes, Leib- 

nitz, Spinoza, Kant, and right up to MacTaggart, Sidgwick, Ducasse, James, 

Peirce, David Lewis, and David Chalmers) out-and-out believers in the occult, 

why not call them metaphysicians, who posit theoretical entities because the 

existence of such entities provides unique explanatory power for bodies of data 

that cannot be plausibly explained otherwise? After all, that is how we came to 

believe in quarks and the particles contained in them. 

And, moreover, for the author, womb invasions would need explanation. 

How would nonphysical bodies succeed in invading wombs? Here again, ac- 

cording to the author, unless we can explain how the surviving person (or per- 

son part) can succeed in invading wombs for the purpose of reincarnation, we 

have no reason to believe that reincarnation takes place. In response, of course, 

it is helpful to remember that the defensible form of reincarnation, the mini- 

malist form, implies nothing as to when the reincarnation takes place. For all 

we know, it takes place immediately after birth, without benefit, if you will, of 

unwelcome womb invasions. 

Chapter 16 is about Dr. Ian Stevenson. After ridiculing my supportive 

claims about Stevenson's work, the author then claims, in proceeding to exam- 

ine Stevenson's views, that anybody who believes in reincarnation is commit- 

ted to a host of collateral assumptions the most important of which are: 

(a) when a human being dies, he continues to exist not on the earth but in a 

region we know not where as a pure disembodied mind or else as an astral or 

some other kind of a nonphysical body; 

(b) although deprived of his brain, he retains memories of life on earth as 

well as some of his characteristic skills and traits; 

(c) after a period varying from a few months to hundreds of years, this pure 

mind or non-physical body, which lacks not only a brain but any physical 

sense organs, picks out a suitable woman on earth as its mother in the next in- 

carnation, invades this woman's womb at the moment of conception of a new 

embryo, and unites with it to form a full-fledged human being; 

(d) although the person who died may have been an adult and indeed quite 

old, when he is reborn he begins a new life with the intellectual and emotional 

attitudes of a baby; 

(e) finally, many people born in this way did not previously live on the earth, 

but (depending on which version of reincarnation one subscribes to) in other 

planes or on other planets from which they migrate (invisibly, of course) most 

of them preferring to enter the wombs of mothers in poor and overpopulated 

countries where their lives are likely to be wretched; 

(f) the collateral assumptions listed so far are implied by practically all 

forms of reincarnation, but in Stevenson's case there is the additional implica-


tion that the memories and skills that the individual took over from the person 

who died and that are transmitted to the new regular body appear there for a 

relatively short time during childhood to disappear forever after; 

(g) If Stevenson's reports are evidence for reincarnation they must also be 

evidence for the collateral assumptions just mentioned (p. 255). 

For the author, all these assumptions constitute the crucifixion of reason, 

and a rational person will conclude that Stevenson's reports are seriously de- 

fective or that his alleged facts can be explained without bringing in reincarna- 

tion. In short, the initial presumption against reincarnation is so strong that the 

burden of refuting it will be heavy indeed. He then says: 

In a simplified form, the question before a rational person can be stated in the following 

words: Which is more likely - that there are astral bodies, that they invade the womb 

of prospective mothers, and that the children can remember events from a previous life 

although the brains of the previous persons have long been dead, or that Stevenson's 

children, their parents or some of the other witnesses and informants are, intentionally 

or unintentionally, not telling the truth: that they are lying, or that their very fallible 

memories and powers of observations have led them to make false statements and 

bogus identifications? (p. 256) 

In response to all this, please notice that, given the above definition of the 

minimalist thesis of reincarnation (that form of reincarnation for which 

Stevenson argues exclusively in terms of the case studies he presented), the 

sentences stating the alleged collateral assumptions a, c, e, f, and g are clearly 

false. A and d are true, but hardly constitute a "crucifixion of reason" rather 

than what is implied by the minimalist thesis. 

Further, philosophers will recognize the type of argument offered in the last 

of the above quotes. It is not unlike the Bayesian move made by David Hume 

offered in one of his arguments against the existence of miracles. The argu- 

ment in question is that because, apart from evidence at hand, there is no prior 

probability for such an extraordinary event as a miracle, and because there is 

indeed a fairly high probability of error based on simple sense perception and 

human fallibility, then it is obviously more probable that miracles do not exist. 

One need not believe in miracles to notice that Hume's argument is as nice a 

case of question-begging as one could ever find in any introductory logic book. 

The structure of the argument strategy proceeds as follows: whenever anybody 

offers an argument that challenges the paradigm position of materialistic 

monism, argue that it has no real probability in its favor because it conflicts 

with those theses that have a prior probability of being correct because they 

are consistent with what we already know, namely, what is asserted in the para- 

digm position. In such a case, then any probability in favor of human error and 

deceit in these matters will show that the evidence offered against the para- 

digm is defective. There is a great deal of epistemological voodoo in this par- 

ticular Bayesian move, apart from the implicit claim that any adequate expla- 

nation of anything must be consistent with the current paradigm. If this


strategy were sound, then there would never be any way to show the paradigm 

theory false, or crucially defective. There are other reasons why this Bayesian 

move is unacceptable, but space here prohibits any further discussion. 

In this Chapter we also get a discussion under Holes in the Reincarnation 

Cases. These cases are supposed to read better in summary than when they are 

examined in close detail (p. 256) According to the author, they all have big 

holes in them. This we are supposed to know, of course, because the author ex- 

amines one case that originally appears in Cases of the Reincarnation Type, 

Volume One - Ten Cases in India.( 1975) This is the case of Jagdish Chandra, 

born March 4,1923. Here the author actually examines (after reminding us that 

he has shown the fatal flaws in the Corliss Chotkin case) only one of the cases 

offered by Stevenson and criticized by one J. Fraser Nicol (Parapsychological 

Review, 1976). The author simply repeats the assertions made by Nicol about 

this one case, and makes much of the fact that neither Stevenson nor any of his 

associates has bothered to respond to Nicolls critique. In fact, incidentally, 

Stevenson did respond (quite convincingly I believe) to Nicol's main criticism 

of this case. The response occurs in Children Who Remember Previous Lives 

(University Press of Virginia, 1978) p. 297, note #19. But, in the face of the 

supposedly devastating objection offered by Nicol, (and unanswered by 

Stevenson or anybody else) the author's allegedly plausible alternative expla- 

nation for the data in the Jagdish Chandra case, is simply that the case in ques- 

tion is a religious fabrication not uncommon in India. Given other features of 

the case (such as verified memory claims of events that only the previous per- 

sonality could have known) this alternative explanation could not explain cru- 

cial facts in the case, facts ignored by both the author and Nicol. Moreover, 

even if the author were right to reject the Jagdish Chandra case for the reasons 

offered by Nicol, logically generalizing to the remaining thousands of cases is, 

of course, nothing short of breathtaking in the effort to convince us that all the 

cases offered (under any of the three distinct types) have big holes in them. 

In this chapter the author also endorses another critique of another case of- 

fered by Stevenson. This time the case is the Sujith case and the critique is of- 

fered by one B. N. Moore whose main criticism is that the previous personality 

died only a little more than six months before the birth of Sujith. Sujith's 

mother said that he was born only after a seven month pregnancy (something 

that has not been independently confirmed). (p. 258) In other words, according 

to Moore, Sujithls mother was pregnant with him one month before the previ- 

ous personality died. In any event, by way of response here, whatever the em- 

bryological facts, the objection clearly presupposes that any form of reincarna- 

tion is committed to the view that reincarnation must take place sometime very 

early in the gestation process, when in fact the minimalist view, as defined 

above, makes no such assumption. All the evidence for the defensible form of 

reincarnation is consistent with reincarnation taking place at any time during 

the period of gestation, or at the moment of birth, or shortly after birth. And so 

it goes.


In this chapter, the author repeats objections to Stevenson's case studies, ob- 

jections raised by Wilson, Roll and Chari. These criticisms I have already dis- 

cussed in my book (Almeder, 1992), but the author chose to ignore them. And, 

of course, we need to look at the objections the author ascribes to an anthro- 

pologist, Dr. Barker. Barker could not find a convincing case in which there 

was convincing evidence of the presence of an element of the paranormal. 

Why this should count as evidence against reincarnation rather than show the 

failure of Dr. Barker to read or understand the most interesting cases is quite 

unfathomable. 

Here also the author raises the question of why most of the cases reported 

occur outside the Western World. His answer is that this is because in those 

countries where such cases are reported the level of intelligence is consider- 

ably lower and, most often, in cultures where people already believe in reincar- 

nation. The implication is obvious: we only find such cases where religious fa- 

naticism and ignorance reign supreme in cultures where there is antecedent 

belief in reincarnation. In America, for example, the reporting of such cases is 

almost nonexistent because, according to the author, given the presence of in- 

telligent critics the cases could not hold up under careful scrutiny. 

In reply to this objection, it may be helpful to remember that, however 

tempting it is to construe cases reported from non-Western sources as cultural 

constructs, the richer cases hinge on verified memory claims of events in the 

subject's previous life that only the previous personality could know or have 

witnessed. Such cases also sometimes include the subject speaking in the language 

of the former personality, a language the subject has not learned in her current 

life. In no case would we find a particularly evidential case in which the mem- 

ories of the subject pertain to items of information that were a matter of public 

record and hence known to the subject's immediate family or relatives. 

Moreover, there is a substantial number of credible cases from America, 

England, and Canada. Stevenson is preparing for publication, a book on cases 

in America. The author remains convinced, of course, that even after the pub- 

lication of this book, there will be nothing of any real evidential value in the 

cases examined. Prior to even looking at it, the author is sure they will reveal 

gaping holes when examined. Although there is a substantial number of cases 

reported and examined in America, Stevenson's hypothesis on why there have 

not been as many cases reported in America as in other lands is that, among 

other factors, in America children are more often dissuaded from telling such 

stories. He also entertains the hypothesis that this latter phenomena could also 

be due to the fact that if there are a large number of reincarnations in America, 

then since people often reincarnate in the same general locale, children rein- 

carnated in America are likely to have some antecedent disposition to strongly 

disbelieve, and hence not take seriously, what would otherwise count as per- 

suasive memories of a past life. To this hypothesis the author responds with the 

following philosophical comments:


Stevenson evidently lives in a cloud-cuckoo-land, and he regards the wildest and most 

fanciful assumptions, many of which are of questionable conceptual coherence, as 

being on an equal footing with straightforward empirical hypotheses. He resorts to such 

extravaganzas whenever the specter of cultural factors accounting for reincarnation be- 

liefs raises its menacing head. (p. 268) 

In fact, however, even if not directly verifiable, Stevenson's proffered explanation 

of why we do not seem to have very many evidential cases reported 

in America is by no means incoherent. Besides, the author's objection (if 

name-calling can be called an objection) overlooks the fact that there is now a 

substantial number of credible cases in America, and the important issue is to 

explain the data in the richer cases, wherever they occur, when the appeal to 

cultural factors alone fails, as it invariably does in the richer cases. Indeed, as 

people have frequently noted, the appeal to cultural factors to explain the richer 

cases fails very demonstrably when one looks at the details in the cases offered. 

The author has not, of course, looked at those arguments nor at the richer 

cases that do not lend themselves to the thesis that such cases are cultural or 

religious fabrications. Finally, Stevenson has examined and published a number 

of cases in which subjects claim to remember having lived past lives and 

has concluded that in those cases the subject's claims are of little evidential 

value and should not be taken as verified. In those cases, alternative hypotheses 

are as plausible if not more plausible. We all know what would count for 

empirically falsifying the hypothesis of reincarnation, but it seems clear that 

the author does not know what would count for empirically falsifying his 

claim that this hypothesis could never be true. 

In the end, incidentally, even if there had been no cases of reincarnation reported 

in America, that would not show that the cases reported in foreign lands 

are dismissable as cultural fabrications. For all we know, it could just as easily 

show that, for some reason or other, people just do not reincarnate in America. 

After all, who ever said that if the minimalist reincarnation hypothesis is true 

then it must follow that people will reincarnate in every geographical area on 

the planet so that we end up with a nice politically correct geographical distribution? 

In fact, however interesting it may be, one does not need to explain 

why there may be no cases reported in any particular geographical area; the 

problem for the author and others is to explain the data in those cases where 

they do appear and when the appeal to cultural factors fails, as it clearly does 

in the richer cases. As it is, there are many noteworthy cases reported in America 

and some of these will appear in Stevenson's forthcoming publication on 

cases in America. 

The author's claim that Stevenson has a penchant for advancing totally unfalsifiable 

statements (p. 269) is an irrespo~~ible claim. Belief in reincarnation 

is an empirically falsifiable and verifiable hypothesis for all the reasons we 

saw above, and the data confirming or falsifying the hypothesis in any particular 

case is in the data offered in that case. The author further attempts to undermine 

the evidence for reincarnation by attacking Stevenson for bad judgment


because of the so-called Ransom report. Mr. Ransom was an assistant to 

Stevenson many years back who claimed that he became disillusioned in 

working on reincarnation-type cases because he thought the methods em- 

ployed were sloppy, and that there were various forms of bias in the investiga- 

tive methods. Ransom said this back in the 1970's. He also said there was a 

bias among the investigators to find the paranormal where he thought it did not 

exist. He also wrote a summary of his reflections for the author (see p. 276) in 

which he states, inter alia, that in only 11 of the approximately 1,111 cases 

then examined, had there been no contact between the two previous families 

before the scientific examination had begun. (p. 277) Whether what Ransom 

says is true or not is certainly interesting. Of course, if what Ransom wrote in 

private correspondence is true, one can also see it as supporting the claim that 

in at least 11 of the approximate 1,111 cases examined early in the research 

project, we have strong evidence for reincarnation. Did Stevenson claim that 

those early 1,111 examined cases were all verified cases or particularly rich 

cases? Did the author read the Preface to Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincar- 

nation and the Introduction (p. 17) to Children Who Remember Previous 

Lives? In both places Stevenson states clearly that no case can be a clearly 

paranormal case if the information the subject has about a previous life could 

have been conveyed normally to the subject from either the subject's family or 

the existing family of the subject in the alleged former life. The point here is 

that we need to examine the richer cases that Stevenson and others offer as 

strong cases and see if they have the methodological defects Mr. Ransom said 

were there. In none of the richer verified cases supporting the minimalist thesis 

(that some people reincarnate) will one find the sort of methodological prob- 

lems Mr. Ransom claimed were there. Besides, citing private correspondence 

without offering Stevenson an opportunity to reply also seems unwholesomely 

biased and is of no evidential value when the cases offered as rich evidence 

have none of the problematic methodological features Mr. Ransom cites. Here 

again, if anybody takes the time to look at the large and growing number of 

case studies actually offered (and I believe very few critics actually do so), Mr. 

Ransom's and other's criticisms about the methodology employed will dis- 

solve. Let them begin with the Swarnlata Case, and see if what Ransom says 

fits that case. 

The last Chapter is on consciousness, and the author develops what he calls 

"the weightiest argument," namely, that if anybody knew anything at all about 

science one would readily see that consciousness cannot exist independently 

of brains. For the author, the evident or obvious dependence of consciousness 

upon the brain makes reincarnation and other forms of personal survival im- 

possible. He also notes that according to H. H. Price the evidence for reincar- 

nation is the best challenge to data against materialism, understood as the view 

that consciousness is either a particular brain state or a biological property of a 

particular brain state. The author goes on to reject this argument primarily be- 

cause of all the holes he has already noted in the case studies. In this discus-


sion, moreover, the author shows no awareness of the sophisticated arguments 

and literature offered by many philosophers such as Noam Chomsky, C. D. 

Broad, David Lewis, David Chalmers, and John Smythies, for example, on ei- 

ther the qualia problem or on other reasons why reductive materialism, as it is 

usually understood, is so terribly unsatisfactory. As it is, one can argue that 

one of the strongest empirical challenges to the author's view that conscious- 

ness cannot exist independently of brains is offered in the best case studies of- 

fered by Stevenson and others, cases most of which (including the xenoglossy 

cases) are ignored by the author who illegitimately generalizes from such 

weak and strikingly different cases as the Chotkin Case and the Bridey Mur- 

phy case. 

Finally, all too often in his book the author asserts, without showing as 

much, that the views of those with whom he disagrees have been devastatingly 

criticized by others, and that those who disagree with what the author asserts 

are guilty of various outrageous distortions, not to say forms of delusion, stu- 

pidity, insanity, malice and even holy lies. Indeed, it seems that for the author, 

anybody who ever believed even in mind-body dualism is a philosophically in- 

competent dolt or a dishonest knave - and in most cases both. But good argu- 

ments for his bottom line are never there. In fact, this book may stand as an en- 

during monument of ad hominems, false charges of fallacy, straw men, 

illegitimate generalizations and sloppy scholarship. 

It is all part of the author's rhetoric of seeking to poison the well for any hon- 

est defense of mind-body dualism. This is how the strategy works: Take some 

well-known advocates of a certain thesis (preferably somebody who is not a 

philosopher or a scientist ... somebody such as Shirley Maclain or Sylvester 

Stalone) and show how their statements about the existence of minds are wor- 

thy of sarcasm and ridicule; and then if you come across a philosopher or a sci- 

entist of note who may take the question seriously, either ignore them or 

ridicule them while distorting their views. In this way, one can succeed in poi- 

soning the well without examining the strongest arguments; and also create an 

emotional hostility to the thesis by asserting simply that all people who adopt 

these views are equally ridiculous. It will also help if you can insinuate that 

their spouses left them justifiably for more psychologically normal compan- 

ionship. Thereafter, assure everybody that the reason you do all this is to disin- 

terestedly raise the intellectual and moral standards of Western Civilization 

out of a high-minded search for, and love of, the truth which is very much 

threatened by those who may find the view you reject as even mildly plausible. 

Then when one finally gets to the interesting arguments for belief in reincarna- 

tion or mind-body dualism (as in Chapter 17) distort it, misrepresent it in vari- 

ous nonsubtle ways, and then walk off into the sunset, having defeated one's 

personal enemies ... all of whom fall naturally into the category of fundamental 

religious fanatics. In this way we advance the cause of rational belief forma- 

tion.


In fact, this book calls to mind Bertrand Russell's claim that nothing so con- 

vinced him more of Plato's Theory of Forms than Aristotle's critique of it. But 

at least Aristotle had the good sense to realize that name-calling and gross dis- 

tortion, or deliberately ignoring other people's central arguments is neither 

philosophical nor particularly informative. 

Any good this book might have done in pointing to the excesses of the new- 

age community is eclipsed by a thorough failure to do what it set out to do. If 

good logic counts for anything, the author fails to notice that while pointing to 

those who believe in reincarnation as religious fanatics or mental incompe- 

tents, there are three fingers pointing backwards toward him. 

Appendix 

Incidentally, in a footnote which occurs on p. 254. The author says: 

I should hate to have Almeder as a supporter. We already noted his false claim that Ni- 

etzsche was a believer in reincarnation. An article of his, which was rejected by Free In- 

quiry in 1988 is listed in his 1992 book as "Forthcoming in Free Inquiry." In Chapter 

Two of his book he presents as established fact the reincarnation case of Dr. Arthur 

Guirdham who was thoroughly exposed in Ian Wilson's Mind Out of Time. Almeder 

mentions Wilson's book a number of times, but does not tell the reader of Wilson's ex- 

pose' of Guirdham. In a devastating review of Almeder's earlier Beyond Death in the 

Journal of Psychical Research (April 1989) the reviewer, Michael Coleman, after list- 

ing Almeder's numerous quite outrageous distortions, remarks, "Such practices would 

be reprehensible for a layman, and are inexcusable in a professional philosopher." I 

could not agree more. 

For the record, and by way of response, while one might still defend the 

claim that Nietzsche argued for some form of reincarnation, (although, to be 

sure, not the minimalist version outlined above) I never argued that the mini- 

malist thesis was plausible or even worthy of acceptance because other famous 

philosophers believed in it. So whether Nietzsche, or anybody else for that 

matter, happened to believe in reincarnation is irrelevant to the main argument 

I offered in defense of belief in reincarnation. No philosopher before Steven- 

son had such compelling evidence. Concentrating on whether Nietzsche be- 

lieved in reincarnation while ignoring what I did argue (especially by way of 

response to Edwards' earlier views which re-appear in this book) is a red her- 

ring. If I made a mistake on what Nietzsche argued in this regard it pales by 

way of significance in the presence of the author's claim that anybody who 

ever believed in Cartesian mind-body substance dualism was an irrational be- 

liever in the occult because it implies belief in the existence of astral bodies of 

the sort the author has described. I will happily admit I was wrong in ascribing 

any reasonable form of reincarnation to Nietzsche, and then add by way of 

substitution the names of McTaggart, Price, Ducasse, and C. D. Broad ... to a


vant to the main argument and would, if anyone took it as evidence for reincar- 

nation, be a simple instance of the fallacy of appeal to authority. 

Secondly, in response to his second comment (that I listed in my book as 

forthcoming, an essay which was rejected by Free Inquiry), I have a copy of 

the corrected galleys of that essay which was invited and, after suitable revi- 

sions and shortening, accepted for publication in 1986 by the editor at the time. 

After numerous telephone inquiries and letters that were not answered by the 

editor, I was informed only very recently by the current editor, Mr. Madigan, 

that he knew nothing about the paper, but that I could, if I so chose, write an- 

other paper on humanism and reincarnation and submit it to Free Inquiry for 

editorial review and possible publication. What is interesting is that he never 

asked to see the galleys of the earlier essay, and apparently never took the time 

to contact the earlier editor who accepted the essay for publication. I take this 

last letter as confirmation for the claim that Free Inquiry invited and accepted 

a paper for publication, which it subsequently decided to not publish, without 

informing the author until ten years after the corrected galleys were sent forth. 

Naturally, I will no longer list this essay as forthcoming. 

Thirdly, with regard to Dr. Guirdham's case and the author's claim that I pre- 

sented it as an established fact (meaning, presumably that I presented it as con- 

clusive evidence of reincarnation); what I argued in that section was rather 

that the Bishen Chand case and the Swarnlata case were the strongest. What I 

said about Guirdham's investigation, or the Mrs. Smith case was the following: 

The Mrs. Smith case may not match all the ideal-typical characteristics, involving as it 

does a long-ago past life. But the recitative xenoglossy exhibited by Mrs. Smith, and 

her consistent memory of previously unknown but then often verified historical facts, 

qualify the case as worthy of serious consideration in the context of this study. 

All the cases I discussed were listed as sorts of cases. They typify certain 

logical features that would be hard to explain assuming absence of fraud, hoax, 

cultural influences, or sloppy methodology. In the cases I listed as excellent, 

there was strong evidence that fraud, hoax, cultural influence, and sloppy 

methodology could not be seriously entertained as the cause of the data. With 

regard to the Mrs. Smith case, I argued later (p. 30 of Death and Personal Sur- 

vival) that the recitative xenoglossy in these cases could not be refuted for the 

reasons Thomason offered. And I know of nobody (Wilson notwithstanding) 

who has shown that Smith's memories of past events about things that were not 

part of the public record could be explained normally. This could not be ex- 

plained by appeal to paramnesia, or cryptomnesia or, by implication to cultur- 

al forces because the evidence confirming those memories was not available to 

her or to anybody at the time she first made the claim. (I refer to the color of 

the robes worn by the Cathar priests, for example). And in the Swarnlata case, 

there were 20 instances in which someone wrote down what the child said long 

before any attempt was made to verify those statements. Finally, after


discussing the possibility of fraud, hoax and sloppy methodology as a way of 

explaining the stronger cases, what I said in the book was simply this: 

Indeed, in the absence of our being able to show that the case studies are flawed in one 

of the ways just suggested, what the cases do show is that human personality (whatever 

it is) survives death and, by implication, that human consciousness can ( emphasis 

added) exist (along with propositional memories and non-propositional skills) inde- 

pendently of brains, flourish for a period without a body as we know it, and reincarnate. 

So, the charge that all this is just too incredible for any rational person to believe is a 

blatant bit of question-begging, unworthy of a reasoned response. 

Fourthly, Mr. Coleman's review of my earlier book was not a "devastating 

review mentioning numerous outrageous distortions." This is a general claim 

that the author makes of many others. Incidentally, he never mentions just 

what made the reviews "devastating" or just what were the "distortions." I 

saw Coleman's criticism as a criticism for failing to write a different book, 

namely a more ambitious one. I responded to his criticism, in any event, by 

writing Death and Personal Survival where I showed how his basic criticism, a 

criticism of one case in the earlier book, was mistaken. Otherwise, Coleman 

claims I overlooked important criticisms which others made of the cases I dis- 

cussed in the earlier book. At any rate, I wonder if Edwards is aware of other 

positive and generous reviews offered even by others ... including the editor of 

the Journal of Psychical Research (where Colemen's original review oc- 

curred) who thought the latter book excellent. In the same journal, I have also 

recently responded to some of Coleman's recent reservations about my latest 

book. Doubtless, Edwards will find Coleman's latest comments a "devastating 

critique pointing to numerous and outrageous distortions" and see no real need 

to mention what the arguments were, or even that a response was made to the 

offering. 

Reference 

Alrneder, R. ( 1992). Death and Personal Survival, the Evidence for Life after Death. Lanham, 

MD: Rowrnan and Littlefield.



The Archaeology of Consciousness 

International Consciousness Research Laboratories, 4 Crossway Road 

Hudson View Park, Beacon, NY 12508, U. S. A. 

Email: devereux@aol. com 

Abstract -It is suggested that ancient sacred places provide the opportunity 

for consciousness study - if we know how to approach them. The emer- 

gence of a new discipline, "cognitive archaeology," is noted, in which archae- 

ologists are learning to overcome intrinsic Western assumptions in the study 

of ancient sites and landscapes. The nature of place is then considered: it is ar- 

gued that place can be expressive and evoke and organize memories, images, 

feelings and imagination. The curious notion of "sacred place" is next ad- 

dressed. The concept of treating prehistory as being analogous to the uncon- 

scious mind is presented. Sacred places, it is suggested, may be those which 

yield greater information than secular ones; locations where information is 

received more effectively by the unconscious mind. It is argued that we can 

never fully understand an ancient sacred site by use of modem rationalism 

alone. Plato's distinction of two kinds of space, chora and topos, is consid- 

ered, and the accessing of chora by "dreaming with our eyes open." A de- 

tailed description of such a process is offered, and unfamiliar ways of ap- 

proaching ancient monuments described. 

Keywords: consciousness - archaeology - prehistory 

Introduction 

For me, the lost knowledge and wisdom of the ancient world does not relate to 

how the ancient people built certain monuments, whether or not they could 

levitate stones, had help from ancient astronauts or whatever other notions 

might occupy our 20th-century minds. Rather, I feel what was known in some 

societies in the remote past was an intimate knowledge of the mind, of con- 

sciousness. These archaic peoples knew how to navigate mental space, and 

had a deep working knowledge of altered mind states. Vestiges of such ancient 

wisdom still linger in some traditional tribal societies today, but they are 

rapidly becoming extinguished. We need to catch that wisdom before it finally 

evaporates, for while our modern culture is learning much about the workings 

of the brain, its knowledge of the mind is still fairly primitive. 

Our culture is a monophasic one, that is, one locked into a single culturally- 

acceptable state of consciousness and a single worldview which it insists is re- 

ality. Other ways of seeing the world, of relating to it, are being eliminated re- 

morselessly from our view. In a broad cultural sense, we are losing the "news 

of difference," to use Gregory Bateson's phrase. I argue that we need to find

528 P. Devereux 

again a mythic or imaginal dimension to add to our modern perceptions of the 

world. 

Western problems with relating to the environment, which at heart means 

relating to place, lay with changes of perception that occurred in ancient 

Greece, on the one hand, and with the cultural worldview reinforced by our 

twentieth-century psychology, on the other. Both these elements are well cap- 

tured in a true story concerning Sigmund Freud, the father of modern psychol- 

ogy, when he visited the Acropolis in Athens in 1906. When he had the blind- 

ing white and blue experience that the ruined temples and rich Athenian sky 

create on this sacred hilltop, he just could not believe it - he really could not. 

Over three decades afterwards he wrote that what he had felt there and then he 

had "never understood" and that it had kept recurring to his mind. Standing 

there surrounded by the remains of the classically beautiful Parthenon and 

other temples of antiquity, he had felt a curious alienation. Somehow, he was 

not sure if he was present in a real place. He eventually tracked down this odd 

feeling of estrangement to his schooldays, when he had first learnt of the 

Acropolis. He realized that as a schoolboy he had never believed that he would 

ever visit this famous place, and a dissonance had been set up between his boy- 

hood visualizations about the place and the actuality of his being there. He re- 

alized that "the original factor must have been a sense of some feeling of the 

unbelievable and the unreal in the situation at the moment. The situation in- 

cluded myself, the Acropolis and my perception of it." In other words, Freud 

literally experienced a feeling of dis-location. 

The Nature of Place 

This anecdote brings us to the deceptively simple question of "What is a 

place?" In the growing monophasic mind state of our culture and times, we are 

encouraged to virtually dismiss, or at least downgrade, ideas concerning the 

power of place. We are generally unconscious of place at any level other than 

the superficial one of it being a co-ordinate, an address. This mental habit can 

be traced back to ancient Greece, as I have already indicated, where a crucial 

switch in the history of the Western intellect took place. The ancient Greeks 

had words for two senses of place - chora and topos. Chora is the older of 

the two terms, and was a holistic reference to place: place as expressively po- 

tent, place as experience, place as a trigger to memory, imagination and myth- 

ic presence. Topos, on the other hand, signified place in much the way we 

think of it nowadays - simple location, and the objective, physical features 

of a locale. Topography. Aristotle took this sense of place, and abstracted it 

further into the pure concept of position. Ultimately, even sacred places be- 

came topoi, shorn of their mythic dimension, shorn of chora. 

In his Timaeus, Plato, on the cusp of the old mythic worldview and the new 

rationalist, intellectual order, struggled to define the process of becoming 

aware of chora, of primeval space. He claimed that chora could not be appre- 

hended by the senses alone, but required in addition a kind of "bastard reason-

The Archaeology of Consciousness 529 

ing"; it could only be known "in a kind of dream," (Lee, 1965) a phrase Eu- 

gene Walter interprets as "dreaming with our eyes open" (Walter, 1988). This 

is not metaphor, it is technique, that Plato was referring to. What he was saying 

about a special kind of dreaming, was in effect, that we need to place a mythic 

filter onto our perception if we are to experience chora, the imaginal qualities, 

of a place. (The visionary poet William Blake expressed this ability well when 

he stated that "double the vision" was always with him, so that a thistle across 

his way could also appear to him as "an old man grey.") 

So, in short, chora relates to an engaged, mythic or imaginal sense of place 

rather than a physical, utilitarian and mundane one. Our present disengage- 

ment from a soulful sense of place is leading us to the danger of no longer 

standing on meaningful ground. 

Meaningful Ground 

This danger has been interestingly considered by Edmund Bunske of the 

University of Delaware. He feels that modern Westerners, especially in the 

United States, are beginning to display the symptoms of exile. He says: 

"Where people work and how they live is increasingly being organized accord- 

ing to world market criteria ... Global market forces ... together with a global 

communications and information industry, and postmodern cultural styles and 

forms, are squeezing out local culture, history, society, and nature .... Places are 

either losing their identity, or entirely "new" places are being created without a 

distinct identity.. . ." Bunkse refers to a "a corporate footprint" in which shop- 

ping malls, office and hi-tech complexes, warehouses, hotels, and the like are 

packaged onto the landscape, and states that "people's internal lives may be 

becoming as discontinuous with their environment as it is for classic exiles." 

(Bunkse, 1994) 

Cognitive Archaeology 

This estrangement from place is also projected back in time by our scholars, 

when they study ancient sites and landscapes. A new branch of archaeology 

called "cognitive archaeology" has come into being to try to check this 

process. One young cognitive archaeologist, Julian Thomas, has written: 

Landscape is not a universal concept, applied in the same way by all people at all 

times ... the modern West has developed a particular and distinctive way of looking, 

which is deployed against place as it is deployed against other phenomena. (Thomas, 

1993) 

He goes on to explain that we have developed a particular way of seeing - 

the gaze has become the dominant mode of perception within our civilization. 

Thomas draws on the work of Susan Ford to suggest that we moderners char- 

acteristically look at landscape through the medium of the male gaze. Thomas


warns that archaeology may be guilty of studying ancient landscapes in just 

such a manner, and this leads to typical Western approaches to studying land- 

scapes involving distribution maps, air photos, satellite imagery, and so on, 

which all imply a considerable distance between subject and object. Thomas 

points out that modern archaeology often presents a picture of past landscapes 

which their inhabitants would not recognize. 

Another cognitive archaeologist, Christopher Tilley, attacks what has been 

the tendency of modern geography and archaeology to falsely assume that 

there is no difference in our understanding of the environment and the nature 

of space from that had by prehistoric peoples. Tilley stresses that earlier and 

non-Western peoples tend to experience the space around them as a medium 

rather than as simply a "container" (Tilley, 1994). 

Our present cultural worldview is increasingly seeing the land in terms of 

economic and social utility. Imaginative, expressive qualities of place are re- 

morselessly marginalized. This worldview can actually be seen growing 

throughout history in the development of maps, with the mythic content in 

early cartographic essays gradually being shunted to the margins, ("Here be 

Dragons"), until now we are left with our clinically exact maps, technical mas- 

terpieces certainly, but bereft of expressive, mythic quality. Topography has 

replaced chorography. With modern technological power, our emerging mono- 

culture is enforcing its socio-economic worldview with gathering speed and 

effectiveness. Wherever the Western mind goes, it marginalizes local, indige- 

nous and often very different worldviews and systems of knowledge. Soon all 

news of difference will be gone; we will be living in Marshall Mcluhan's long- 

prophesized "global village," and it will be built in our monophasic cultural 

image. 

The world will have fallen silent around us. 

The World As Information 

Fortunately there are some items of good news! One is that none of us real- 

ly perceives places in the neutral manner good Westerners are supposed to do. 

Deep down, we are aware that we actually cannot think of a place without the 

elements of memory, imagination and feeling becoming part of the internal 

picture of it, which we construct. A second item of good news, even though it 

may not seem like it at first, is that we never actually see the world. At least, 

not as it is . Whatever the world is, we will never know -physicists tell us that 

it is an "n-dimensional energy soup." The data that stream into the brain 

through our sensory mediators are constantly changing and developing, so that 

countless models are always being made by the brain-mind. All that we can 

ever be aware of are these mental models; they are the only world we are ever 

in contact with. We draw these models out of the infinite possibilities that the 

"n-dimensional energy soup" we are part of contains. Even what seems to be 

stable three-dimensional space is, like time, a construction of our brain-minds,


idea of a place, of the environment, of the world, is but an informational model 

which is dependent on the way our brain-minds work, and how the processing 

of that information is affected by the culture we are immersed in. The world- 

view of, say, Western science, is no more and no less than a particular cognitive 

model, differing from that of a tribal, shamanistic worldview, for example, but 

not necessarily superior to it: the same world, but a different reading of it. 

(Nor is this simply poetic or metaphorical. It is how it really is. For instance, a 

German cultural anthropologist, Christian Ratsch, told me of incidents he ex- 

perienced when he lived for some time with the Lacandon Indians of the south 

Mexican rain forest. He spoke their language and took part in their village life. 

As the months went by, he began to see things that his Western sensibility and 

worldview struggled to redefine as non-existent. So he saw trees, and even shot 

birds, that his deep-rooted Western self would cause to disappear. He eventual- 

ly joined in the Lacandon ritual life, and was trained in the use of complex 

spells for healing and other purposes. One of these saved him from an injury so 

severe that his Western common sense told him he was going to die, yet the 

spell apparently caused instant healing.) 

The "good news" in all this is that any informational model of the world can 

be changed. It takes an effort, but it can be done. So, if we want to modify our 

cultural way of seeing the world, if we want to add a mythic element to our 

Western perception, which would result in an alteration of our relationship 

with the world, then we have to expose ourselves to different worldviews and 

ways of perceiving. 

Sacred Places 

There are various ways of attempting to do this, and I feel the visiting of pre- 

or proto-historic sacred places is an often overlooked opportunity. The visiting 

of sacred monuments in my view need not be simply tourism, or archaeology, 

or worship, but above all it can become a form of consciousness study. There 

are distinct reasons for this. For a start, place is not passive, if we take the 

meaning of place in the terms of the old Greek chora. A place can interact with 

our consciousness in a dynamic way. It contains its own memory of events and 

its own mythic nature, its genius loci or spirit of place, that may not be visible 

but can be apprehended by the human - and animal - interloper, especially 

in the appropriate mental state. (The bringing of information into the focus of 

conscious awareness is a state-specific activity.) On a less dramatic (or con- 

tentious) level, the forms, textures, smells, sounds or light of a particular place 

can trigger associations within us that another place would not. It can bring 

things to the fore, into awareness, that were until then existing in the uncon- 

scious mind. Places can therefore illuminate us, and can provoke mythic imagining~ 

within us. 

These considerations about place and cognition in general have particular 

relevance with regard to sacred places. For various reasons, people through the 

ages have separated out certain places as being different, sanctified - in some


way specially powerful. Sacred places take many forms, and I will not waste 

time here by describing them. Suffice it to say that whether a sacred site is a 

natural feature that is simply recognized as being a powerful spot, or whether 

it is a constructed monument, a temple, for instance, it has until modem times 

been the place that matters. Why? German theologian Rudolf Otto explored 

this matter in his The Idea of the Holy. He considered feelings of eeriness or 

awe to be the "earliest manifestation" of the holy. (Otto, 1924) This mental ef- 

fect can pass away, but sometimes, he noted, it can be articulated through, or 

by reference to a place. A place recognized as sacred possessed what Otto 

called a numen loci. We are therefore looking at a sacred place being a focus of 

numinosity (Jung's noun coined from Otto's adjective, "numinous") - it is a 

place which provokes a feeling of awe, eeriness, or, in mythical terms, which is 

haunted by a localized spirit. Similarly, Eliade considered a sacred place to be 

that where a breakthrough between the material and spiritual worlds could 

occur, a manifestation of the supernatural he called a hierophany. Hindus call 

sacred places Tirthas, meaning a ford or crossing, and all traditional peoples 

recognize the power of certain locations to encourage a person's mind or spirit 

to cross into the other-worlds. 

I have come to view the visiting of ancient sacred places as a form of con- 

sciousness study because I have spent half of my adult life exploring, studying, 

or simply being at ancient sacred sites around the world, and I have a working 

conceptual framework that I use. I think of prehistory as analogous to the un- 

conscious mind, and the sacred sites as being like fragments of dreams we 

struggle to remember. (It is therefore apt that the word "monument" derives 

from the Latin monumentum, which has the meaning "anything that recalls the 

mind.") 

This could, in fact, be more than just an analogy. The nature of "prehistory" 

is qualitatively different to the condition we call "history." History is recorded, 

documented, linear time. We all too readily think of prehistory as a kind of il- 

literate history, but the difference is more fundamental than this. To chronicle, 

document, write, record requires a particular type of mentation, a certain kind 

of consciousness, as compared with a people who do not write, who do not 

chronicle and record in that way. "Prehistory" and "history" are really labels 

for different overall states of mind. They are not connected with chronological 

absolutes, for prehistory ends at different times in different parts of the world. 

History floats on the ocean of prehistory in the way the waking, conscious self 

or ego floats on the deeps of the unconscious mind. The two are mirror images 

of one another. Proto-history we could liken to those transitionary waking mo- 

ments in which the mythic dissolves away leaving the bleached bones and 

gaunt stones of the mundane - the stuff of archaeology. 

In attempting to understand the long, silent change of worldview that has 

occurred from the unchronicled cyclic archaic past to the present, documented 

linear time we have to recognize that the ego, the sense of the self, has changed


prehistory, the mind experienced time as slow, cyclical and seasonal, and the 

ego was soft-edged and merged with the physical world in a dreamy way. Now 

we watch the clock and count the seconds and our ego-sense is hardened, its 

boundaries are clear-cut; self and others are clearly demarcated. This has its 

expression on the land. Land becomes property. We have physical boundaries 

defining and containing our property, and they are recorded in legal docu- 

ments. 

The idea of enclosed land inevitably emerged from the settling of human be- 

ings and the beginning of agriculture. This simply became more defined, more 

exact, more entrenched "as time went on" (a phrase that is itself an expression 

of the historical mindset). Prior to such settlement, people moved through the 

land, hunting and gathering. Land was not seen in blocks, in defined areas, any 

more than it is today by the tribal Aborigine. The ego, the sense of self, was 

like-wise soft-edged, diffuse. 

This brings us to what I would suggest is a critical principle: state of con- 

sciousness and the view of the land, of the world, always relate to one another. 

Further, I would suggest that we can gather more information from an ancient 

sacred site or landscape by apprehending it in changed frames of conscious- 

ness. When we visit a sacred site built or used in the prehistoric past, we are 

dealing with a place that comes from a different space of the mind, the archaic 

chora of the Greeks. We cannot apprehend its full essence by modern, Western 

analytical thinking, because it emerges into our rational worldview in just the 

way the fragments of a dream survive into waking consciousness. But if a 

place can organize our perceptions, feelings, memories and imaginings, if it is 

meaningful and expressive space, it may be able to speak to those dark areas of 

the mind beyond the bounds of the modern conscious self. 

At a sacred site it is perhaps the case that information can pass between the 

place and our unconscious mind, without our ego-self being aware of the 

transaction. 

If we can "dream with our eyes open" it might be that we can include a 

greater range of information in our cognized model of the monument or sacred 

locale. A monument, after all, is for recalling the mind. Such sanctified places 

can possess physical properties that "draw the believer into a meditative mood 

or even an altered state of consciousness," Eugene Walter has written (Walter, 

1988). Psychologist Julian Jaynes says much the same thing, referring to the 

hallucinogenic properties of certain places (Jaynes, 1976). 

How to apprehend place is possibly the greatest single lesson we have to 

learn from the archaic mindset or worldview. The environment we apprehend 

is a mental or cognitive construction, an informational model built within the 

recesses of our brain-minds. Sacred space is therefore a division of that cogni- 

tive construction. If we find ourselves engaged by sacred places, and have our 

consciousness provoked by them, it may be because we receive more informa- 

tion from them. The very fact that there are, and have always been sacred

I 


a camera with you. Encounter the site with as few other people round as possi- 

ble. Choose your moment. In that first encounter, try to catch the diflerence 

you sense between the place as you experience it and the place as you imag- 

ined it before you came. Play with that difference, both at the monument and 

afterwards. Try to identify what it is that is different. Is it the size of the monu- 

ment? The area it encloses? The extent and nature of the surroundings? (I re- 

call visiting the mystery temple of Eleusis, and being shocked to discover that 

there were cement factories and housing hemming it in on all sides. Yet the site 

itself maintained its own sense. In fact, the unfortunate surroundings actually 

amplified the power of the place.) Do not tell yourself the difference, try to 

make yourself feel it. Remember that feeling. 

As you move about the site, use not only your eyes but other senses and sen- 

sibilities as well. Are there any legends associated with this place? If there are, 

run them through your mind as you "take in" the site. How does your body 

feel; how does it relate to the space the site creates? How do you feel on an 

emotional level? A little fearful? Somehow enhanced and liberated? 

Awestruck? Disappointed? Do not analyze these feelings, simply be conscious 

of them. How does the site smell? There may not be a particular smell that you 

are readily conscious of, but sometimes there is. I recall visiting Delphi for the 

first time on the sunny morning after a torrential rainstorm. Walking up the Sa- 

cred Way, the smell of flowers, of freshened earth, and above all the scent of 

cypress trees, was noticeably strong. Now, whenever I smell the scent of cy- 

press, I am instantly transported to Delphi; a sunlit picture of that powerfully 

expressive place is flashed into my mind. 

Smell is, of course, strongly linked to memory. It is a direct sense, in that it 

does not "cross over" in the way that, for example, the information impinging 

on the right eye is "read" in the left brain. Smell connects to the limbic system, 

and can evoke emotion and memory in powerful ways. (And smell can be at 

work on you without your being aware: it takes only eight molecules of sub- 

stance to trigger an impulse in a nerve ending in the olfactory lobe, but it takes 

forty triggered nerve endings for you to consciously smell anything.) So if you 

have the opportunity, visit your selected site either prior to or just after a 

storm, when the smell rising from the soil is most noticeable, or during low 

pressure when there is more moisture in the atmosphere and scents carry more 

readily. In the evening, too, ambient scents tend to be stronger. Perhaps it is the 

earth at the site that gives off a recognizable odor, or local plants, bushes or 

trees. But if you can not detect a "site scent," come prepared so that you can 

"cheat" by taking a lump of incense, a sprig of herb or an essential oil with you 

- any scent with which you have no prior personal associations, and which 

you feel is appropriate to the site. (So, for instance, I might take cypress to 

Delphi, frankincense or myrrh to an Egyptian temple, sage or copal to a Na- 

tive American place of power.) As you walk around the site, quietly sniff the 

scent you have selected. Touch the place, too, where it is permissible to do so.


surroundings viewed from the site, and perhaps a series of pictures to produce 

a panorama of overlapping shots. If you have even rudimentary drawing abili- 

ty, take a sketch pad along too: there is nothing like drawing a place or an ob- 

ject to make you see it. And spend some time just sitting or being at the place, 

not doing anything or thinking or concentrating on anything in particular. Be- 

fore you leave, scan the surroundings so as to visually and haptically note how 

the site relates to its broader environment. If it is permissible and non-harmful 

to do so, go into the vicinity of the site (not the site itself) and take a blade of 

grass, or a leaf off a weed or plant, a pebble or a small handful of soil or sand 

(but take nothing if it would cause noticeable material damage to the site or its 

surroundings, and never take any archaeological fragment from an ancient 

place). 

Later, when you are back home, and back in your routine lifeway, put the 

photographs you took of the site, the associated scent of the place, and a tactile 

reminder (should you have been able to bring one back), and put them together 

in a box. On one or two nights every week, go through this material, looking, 

touching, smelling, remembering, immediately before going to sleep. If a scent 

is involved, then see that it is sprinkled on your bedclothes or in the air of the 

bedroom. Repeat this (perhaps for several weeks) until you recall having a 

dream about the place. However brief and inconsequential it might seem, 

make a written note of it and add that to your box of the site's memorabilia. 

Keep at this until your dreams about the place become more frequent and, per- 

haps, more complex. Note the imagery and associations that creep into your 

site dreams. Continue with all this until you get to a point where no fresh de- 

velopment in your dreamlife regarding the place seems to be happening. Hope- 

fully, by means of this process, which may take some months, you will develop 

a mythic relationship with the site you visited. Ponder the story that your un- 

conscious mind tells you about the place (and, inevitably about yourself 

through the medium of the place). In this way you stand a chance of recovering 

some of the interaction that went on unconsciously between you and the site; 

the primal, information superhighway that by-passed your conscious mind. 

Give yourself the freedom to slip out of the monophasic straitjacket of your 

culture to explore the mythic dimensions of your mind, and your perceptions. 

Do not decry or denigrate the activity -just do it. (And it's best not to tell 

friends what weirdness you are up to!) Slip out of your time to engage with a 

prehistoric place in its time. 

A New Archaeology 

Even if we choose not to engage in such a regimen, we can still approach 

places in ways that will challenge our expectations. By using senses other than 

just sight, upon which we are dependent in our culture. Hearing, for example. 

We are beginning to discover the acoustical resonances of Neolithic cham- 

bered mounds, for instance, and find their frequencies to center on those of the


such as ancient Greek theaters, Mayan pyramids and ball courts, and east 

Mediterranean oracle sites have strange acoustic properties that might actually 

affect the consciousness of people at them. In our heavily dominant visual cul- 

ture, we forget that there are peoples in the world, especially rain forest peo- 

ples with their close-spaced environments, whose primary sense is hearing, 

whose secondary sense is smell, with vision only third. In the forests of Papua 

New Guinea, for example, there are people who listen to mountains, who in- 

corporate the sounds of waterfalls into the phonetics of their poetic language, 

who identify birds by their songs and not by their plumage, and who can hear 

the voices of the ancestors emerge from the "soft, green, scented gloom" that 

surrounds them. (Gell, 1 995) 

Again, we could look at how sacred places were used for dreaming by former 

peoples. A sacred waterfall, that is, one haunted by a spirit, might be used by a 

South American Shuar Indian as a site for a vision quest, or by a Celtic seer, 

wrapped in animal skins, as a place of entry to the underworld where prophetic 

dreams could be had. And we can understand this perhaps, again considering 

the acoustic properties, for we all know how the roar of water can conjure the 

semblance of voices in our ears, voices that sound like the spirits of the place 

calling to us, or like the voices of our own dead friends or relatives - perhaps 

spirits we brought with us. In ancient Greece, and Ptolemaic Egypt, people 

would go to special dreaming temples to be healed. Today, the Dragon Project 

Trust in England, with Stanley Krippner at the Saybrook Institute in San Fran- 

cisco, is undertaking a program involving a scientific study of dreaming at se- 

lected ancient sacred places. 

By learning how to enter such a dreaming or mythic state of awareness at an- 

cient places, Plato's "dreaming with our eyes open," one can find out factual 

information from a site that is invisible to analytical awareness. 

For example, I was fortunate enough to solve much of the mystery of Sil- 

bury Hill in the Avebury complex in southern England. I actually learned how 

to lock into a state of consciousness in which I could treat this enigmatic artifi- 

cial hill, the largest such structure in all Neolithic Europe, as a sentient being, 

even resulting in auditory hallucinations. (Devereux, 1992) This led to the dis- 

covery of the monument's purpose and nature, which archaeologists had as- 

sumed could never be known. In a real sense, the site had its own memory, and 

it was possible to access that information in the appropriate state of mind. That 

information is now in the mainstream archaeological literature. (Devereux, 

1991) We are also just learning that the ancients had the ability to see mytho- 

logical presence in the very outlines of the land - as one dramatic example of 

this, giant heads and figures formed by artfully enhanced natural simulacra in 

remote pre-dynastic times are being rediscovered by Egyptologists in eroded 

rocks and cliff-faces behind temple sites in Egypt. In our monophasic cultural 

mode of consciousness we say we are "awake" (as if that were some absolute 

state instead of simply a particular mode of consciousness), and we have dis- 

tinct boundaries between what we think of as ourselves and the outside world.


Other peoples have had a more dreamy, and thus more mythical relationship 

with their environment. We are only now coming to fully realize that even an- 

cient dreams have left their monuments behind. 

And we are beginning to understand that previously unexplained features 

such as the mysterious straight lines on desert areas such as the Nazca pampa, 

Peru, are maps of the mind - the geography of trance. (Devereux, 1993) 

An archaeology that uses more senses and different modes of cognition will 

become a new, and superior archaeology. It will yield a wider spectrum of in- 

formation about the past and ancient places. In so doing, it will uncover a more 

precise account of the heritage of the human mind. We may have to go back to 

find out just who we are. This new cognitive archaeology has as much to con- 

tribute to the new, burgeoning wave of consciousness research as neuro- 

science or any other aspect of the cognitive sciences. More importantly, it of- 

fers us new tools with which to help us explore our minds. Those tools look 

like Delphi, Avebury, Hatshepsut's temple and other sacred places. By explor- 

ing the sacred spaces of prehistory, we can reach into undiscovered realms of 

the mind. 

References 

Bunkse, Edmunds V. (1994). The emerging postindustrial landscape as exile and its possible con- 

sequences for sense of place. In The Spirit and Power of Place. Ed. Rana P. B. Singh, National 

Geographic Society of India: Varanasi. 

Devereux, Paul (1991). Three-dimensional aspects of apparent relationships between selected 

natural and artificial features within the topography of the Avebury Complex. Antiquity, 65, 

249. 

Devereux, Paul (1992). Symbolic Landscapes. Glastonbury: Gothic Image. 

Devereux, Paul (1993). Acculturated topographical effects of shamanic trance consciousness in 

archaic and medieval sacred landscapes. Journal of Scientific Exploration, 7, 1. 

Devereux, Paul (1996). Re-Visioning the Earth. New York: Fireside OriginallSimon & Schuster. 

Devereux, Paul & Jahn, Robert G. (1996). Preliminary investigations and cognitive considera- 

tions of the acoustical resonances of selected archaeological sites. Antiquity, 70, 269. 

Gell, Alfred (1995). The language of the forest: Landscape and phonological iconism in Umeda. 

The Anthropology of Landscape. Eds. Eric Hirsch & Michael O'Hanlon. Oxford: Clarendon 

Press. 

Jahn, Robert G., Devereux, Paul and Ibison, Michael (1996). Acoustical resonances of assorted 

ancient structures. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 99,2. 

Jaynes, Julian (1976). The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. 

Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 

Lee, Desmond, translation. (1965, 1967). Pluto: Timaeas and Critia. Harmondsworth: Penguin 

Books. 

Otto, Rudolf (1 924). The Idea of the Holy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Tilley, Christopher (1994). A Phenomenology of Landscape. Berg, Oxford and Providence. 

Thomas, Julian (1993). The politics of vision and the archaeologies of landscape. In Landscape: 

Politics and Perspectives. Ed. Barbara Bender. Berg, Oxford and Providence. 

Walter, E.V. (1988). Placeways. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 

[Expanded from a paper delivered at the "Return to the Source" conference, 

University of Delaware, 1996.1



GUEST COLUMN: ACADEMIC SCIENCE AND ANOMALIES 

HALTON ARP 

Max Plunck Institut fur Astrophysik, Schwarzschild Strasse I, Garching, Munich, Germany 

Most scientists will readily admit that, "theories can never be proved, they can 

only be disproved.'' But like many people, they can routinely act in a com- 

pletely opposite sense to the obvious wisdom by which they believe they 

guide their life. Of course, anomalies, being essentially defined as events 

which contradict accepted theories, are not "academic" which is essentially 

defined as teaching our present understanding of the world. Academia is not in 

the business of searching out fundamental errors in our knowledge. Perhaps 

not in theory, but certainly in practice, they feel their mission is to communi- 

cate our currently final version of the immutable truths. 

I have viewed close up for 40 years, the struggle to publish discordant re- 

sults in establishment journals. No matter how well credentialled the contribu- 

tor, editors choose referees who savage observational results that disagree with 

current theory. The few results that slip into these journals are ignored and, as 

the field "matures," they are increasingly just plain rejected. I feel it is quite 

the antithesis of science, and a waste of everybody's time and money. 

It is interesting to note, however, that as much as professional journals resist 

discordant observational results, some alternative journals try to attract them. 

This is a wise attempt to inject some observational facts into what is often a 

chaotic melange of unconnected theories. The multitude of alternative theo- 

ries reminds us that the corollary to the first theorem is: "Just because the cur- 

rent theory is disproved, doesn't mean the alternative theory is true." Obvious- 

ly there are an infinity of possible theories for any given set of facts, and only 

one can be true, i.e. currently most useful. 

This journal, JSE, in my opinion is rather good in this respect because even 

though it reports startling anomalies, it generally does not try to justify them 

with complicated theories. Of course the establishment always tries to defend 

itself by saying, "Well, those observations cannot be correct because there is 

no possible theory to explain them." This is a trap because alternative theories 

tend to lack precedent, and quickly get into arcane disagreements over details 

which even specialists cannot follow. But it is probably also true that no matter 

how devastating the evidence against a widely held theory, the paradigm can- 

not change until there is some alternative model to connect together the essen- 

tial facts. The trick is, I believe, to make the alternative model an empirical 

one - a working hypothesis that everyone is encouraged to realize can change

540 H. Arp 

with additional observations. Unfortunately this is a more democratic attitude 

than current academic science can support. 

As readers of this Journal know, all this is a rather frustrating and discourag- 

ing state of affairs which it seems difficult to change. My personal disillusion- 

ment with the system came when I was presented with a directive to stop using 

my allotted telescope time to observe novel phenomena. But I realized after 

some anguish that in this particular case I was in a rare, fortunate position to 

possibly affect some fundamental change in a very powerful but very decadent 

system. 

The situation was essentially that the accepted theory of the universe re- 

quired everything to have been created instantaneously out of nothing from a 

single, dimensionless point. This Big Bang theory required that all extragalac- 

tic objects had to be receding from each other with speeds that increased with 

their distances - speeds reaching up to almost the velocity of light. But I had 

photographic images taken through powerful telescopes which clearly contra- 

dicted this! They were pictures of objects with significantly different redshifts 

(spectral shifts to longer wavelengths which were supposed to measure veloci- 

ties of recession), but which were unmistakably interacting with each other 

and thereby must be at the same distance. The high redshift objects were clear- 

ly not out at the edge of the universe if they were associated with nearby ob- 

jects - as my telescopic photographs demonstrated! 

What makes this such a unique opportunity is that this situation could be 

proved to any non-specialist by simply showing photographs and maps. These 

were pictures that no one could argue were faked because new images could be 

taken which would show the same thing again and again. (Although it was, of 

course, argued that the pictures did not prove anything and determined efforts 

were made to stop taking any more like them - but I think that will eventually 

rebound to even greater embarrassment for the system). The greatest potential 

for this situation, however, is that it destroys at a glance the official theory of 

the universe. If academic science, the universities and the media could be 

shown to have gotten the nature of the whole universe so completely wrong, 

for so long, in the face of such incontrovertible evidence, then surely this 

would represent such a scandal as to force some meaningful structural 

changes. 

But enough generalizations. Even the conventional press is filled with noble 

sentiments. It is only the specific cases that count. I have chosen just three rep- 

resentative cases in Figures 1,2 and 3. They are pictures of different regions in 

the sky taken in three extremely different wavelengths: radio, optical and X- 

ray. 

Figure 1 shows a pair of radio sources with a disturbed optical galaxy be- 

tween them. The galaxy is bright enough to have been discovered visually in 

the late 1800's. The radio sources are bright enough to have been discovered in 

the first radios surveys in the early 1960's. The two radio sources turned out to 

be quasars of redshift z = .62 and .67 while the redshift of the galaxy is much

Academic Science and Anomolies 541 

Fig. 1. The two strongest radio sources in the pictured area fall across the disturbed spiral galaxy 

IC1767. The redshifts of these radio quasars at z = .62 and .67 are so close as to confirm 

their physical relation (Arp, 1968), while the redshift of the galaxy is far less (z - .01). 

less (about z = .01). On the conventional interpretation of redshift as a Doppler 

recession velocity, that meant the quasars would be in completely different 

parts of the universe. But the textbooks say that already in the 1950's it was 

discovered that galaxies ejected radio sources out in opposite directions from 

their active interiors, just as this pair seems to be. The eye can immediately ap- 

preciate from the isolation of the pair of sources, their close alignment across 

the unusual galaxy and the similarities of the two quasars, that this is not like- 

ly to be an accidental arrangement of unrelated background objects. The 

quasars and the galaxy must belong together even though the redshifts would 

separate them by billions of light years according to the conventional interpre- 

taion. Then when one sees this pattern of discordant redshifts repeated in a 

number of other instances one grows certain that groups of objects like this are 

indeed physically associated, not mere accidental alignment. There goes the 

Big Bang. And this data was available in 1968! 

Figure 2 shows an optical photograph of part of a six-by-six degree area of 

the sky surveyed by Cyril Hazard in about 1978. Shown are two cases of mod- 

erately redshifted quasars exactly between two fainter, very high redshift 

quasars. It is as if nature, realizing that humans are not too quick, repeats the 

configurations immediately adjacent to each other. But regardless of their in- 

terpretation, these ArpIHazard triplets as they qre known, demonstrate at a

H. Arp 

.pi 

intrinsic* Az 

;: . . 

. 

. . 

.60 . -.06 . 

, 1.96 -.21 

* . i 

\. 

C 

. ' 1.96 +.25 . 

.60 +.03 i 

.. . 

. 1.96- -:26 ' 

Fig.2. The two triplets of aligned quasars are pictured with their measured redshifts written to 

the right of each quasar. In the box to the right are written the nearest of the quantized, in- 

trinsic redshift peaks and the velocities of ejection which are required to give equal and 

opposite ejection (Arp & Hazard, 1980). 

. 

?

Academic Science and Anomolies 543 

glance that the quasars of different redshift are indeed physically associated, 

and that redshift is thus not simply a measure of distance. Again, bye bye Big 

Bang . 

Now flash forward to the present time. Technologically wonderful and ex- 

pensive satellite telescopes are orbiting above the atmosphere telemetering 

down, among other things, X-ray pictures. The high energy wavelengths pick 

out the highly energetic quasars very easily. They also pick out a very highly 

energetic kind of object called a Seyfert galaxy. Seyfert galaxies are well 

known for violently ejecting material from concentrated, stellar-like cores 

which have spectra and physical conditions almost exactly like quasars. As the 

example in Figure 3 shows, it turns out now that these low redshift, ejecting X- 

ray galaxies, are almost exactly at the center of pairs of X-ray emitting quasars 

of considerably higher redshift. 

What is there to say? The experts respond, "...could be just chance align- 

ments ..." and " ... as a theorist, I'll be cautious as long as the observers 

F -5000 

NGC 2639 

-5000 0 5000 

Posltlon (SKY-PIX) 

Fig.3. An X-ray map of the field around the Seyfert galaxy NGC2639. The bright X-ray sources 

(38 and 26 photon counts per kilosec) are quasars measured to have redshifts of z = .325 

and .307. This is the closest match in redshift of any pair so far found. But if the redshifts 

were to be interpreted as recession velocities the quasars would both be about five billion 

light years away from the Seyfert galaxy (Arp , 1997; Burbidge, 1997).

544 H. Arp 

disagree." (Schilling, 1996). Of course the statistics of association have been 

overwhelming for 30 years (see my book "Quasars, Redshifts and Controver- 

sies, Interstellar Media, Berkeley) and they continue to be for the X-ray 

quasars (Arp, 1997). 

Is there an explanation for all this besides "just another accident?" Well, 

there is an empirical model that says the quasars are small, young objects that 

are ejected from the centers of active galaxies from time to time and then 

evolve into normal galaxies. That is, we are seeing the birth of galaxies like our 

own. If atoms are not created instantaneously out of nothing with their present 

values of mass (as in the present theory), then they must grow from small val- 

ues too large with time. Then we can explain very well the observed decay of 

initially high redshift to the low intrinsic values of galaxies our age or greater. 

"But the Big Bang is based on the solution of the equations of General Rela- 

tivity," it is immediately objected. "And they are so correct that only a handful 

of people can understand them." My opinion is that the equations simply ex- 

press conservation of energylmomentum, and it is just the elaborations which 

are only intelligible to the few. Moreover, I think the expanding universe solu- 

tion made in 1922 by Friedmann is incorrect because it assumes particle mass- 

es are constant in time. The general solution of these equations, where the par- 

ticle masses are created near zero mass, accounts very nicely for the 

observations in a non-curved space time, non-expanding, episodically creating 

universe (see Narlikar & Arp, 1993). 

Well, there I go, doing just what I inveighed against in the beginning of this 

piece, and justifying the observations with a theory. It really isn't necessary. 

One can just inspect the numbers of pictures now available, and trace the em- 

pirical evolution of objects as they age. That conventional extragalactic as- 

tronomy has ignored this for 75 years is an embarrassment of such gigantic 

proportions that I cannot see how it could fail to force fundamental changes in 

academic science. 

Of course, aging and time is a relative concept, and in operationally defining 

it one must refer to the rest of the universe. That to my mind is the fundamental 

failing of the current theory. Einstein at the end of the day admitted ruefully 

that his theory was local physics, unlike Machian physics where the matter in 

the far universe affected the matter even in our own little anthropomorphic 

niche of spaceltime. That is where I think the downfall of the Big Bang theory 

would interest JSE readers and contributors. In my opinion the observations 

require a non-local theory, like quantum theory for example, where the matter 

in our planetary system is in communication by wavelparticle mechanisms 

with the matter within our visible universe (the sphere defined by the speed of 

light times the age of our galaxy). Moreover the origin of our atoms is connect- 

ed with the whole of the indefinitely old, indefinitely large, non-local universe 

out of which our particular galaxy materialized some 15 billion years ago. 

So perhaps disproving theories does promote progress! Or would that be too 

great an anomaly in today's academic science?

I 

Aca,demic Science and Anomolies 545 

References 

Arp, EI.(1968). Radio sou~ccs and their galnxiea of orlgin A\trof~z~hii, Armenian Acdd Screrzcc~, 

4, 59. 

Arp, H.& Ha~ard, C (1980) Pect~lta~ conflgu~at~on\ of y~~~\at\ In two 'idl'icent areas of the shy 

Ap. .I., 240, 726 

Arp, H ( 1087) Qunwr s , Ke(ltl2rftt rrnd C'otztmrvrtr~\ Bet heley Inlelstellar Med~a 

Arp, H. ( 1997). Idcntif lc,lt~on of x-~dy wurces 

319,33 

Burbidge, E. M. (1997). Spectid 01 two x-ray cmlttlng q~~i\i-stellar objects dl?l)rl~eIltly ejected 

ftom the Seyfert galaxy N6C' 2693. A/). .I Lcrtor-\, 481, I,09 

Narllkar & Arp, II (1993) Fl'it sp'icc tirrlc cosmology A ~I~IT~CWOI h fo~ ext~,tg,~l,tctic redshiftc. 

Ap .I.. 405, 5 1 

Sch~lllng, G ( 1996) Quasdl ~ L I I I \ A 1e11,lhlc pu//lc ) Jt rent e, 274, 1305 

Halton Arp received his bachelors 

degree from Harvard College in 

1949 and his Ph.D. from the Califor- 

nia Institute of Technology in 1953, 

both curn laude. For 29 years he was 

a Staff Astronomer at the Observato- 

ries known originally as the Mt. Wil- 

son and Palomar Observatories. 

A recognized expert observer of 

quasars and galaxies, Arp is the au- 

thor of the Atlas of Peculiar Gulux- 

ies and numerous scholarly publica- 

tions. He has been awarded the 

Helen B. Warner prize of the Ameri- 

can Astronomical Society and the 

Newcomb Cleveland award of the 

American Association for the Ad- 

vancement of Science. He was Pres- 

ident of the Astronomical Society of 

the Pacific 1980 to 1983 and re- 

ceived the Alexander von Humboldt 

Senior Scientist Award in 1984. 

He is currently visiting As- 

tronomer of the Max-Planck-Insti- 

tute for Physics and Astrophysics in 

Munich, Germany.

Journal ofscientijc Exploration, Vol. 1 1 , No. 4, pp. 547-574, 1997 0892-33 10197 


BOOK REVIEWS 

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, by David J. 

Chalmers. Oxford University Press 1996.4 14 pp. $29.95. 

Consciousness, as a philosophical issue, has been attracting increasing atten- 

tion in recent years. There is now a Journal of Consciousness Studies, to which 

the author of this book contributed a keynote article, and a recent conference 

at the University of Arizona, Tucson, attracted entries from some 640 philoso- 

phers including David Chalmers. His book is essential reading for anyone in- 

terested in what philosophers are now saying on the issue of consciousness. 

In his Introduction, the author confesses that "temperamentally, I am 

strongly inclined towards materialist reductive explanation and have no strong 

spiritual or religious inclination." This avowal sets the tone of the book which 

seems to assume that his critics are likely to be more materialistic than he is. 

Nevertheless, consciousness, whatever we may make of it, is a fact of life that 

cannot be ignored just because there is no ready materialistic explanation. On 

the contrary, "we are," the author points out, "surer of the existence of con- 

scious experience than we are of anything else in the world." At the same 

time, from an evolutionary standpoint, there is no obvious reason why we 

should be conscious. We could just as well have evolved as intelligent au- 

tomata or "zombies," to use the current philosophical jargon. 

The author does not attempt to define "consciousness," but points out that a 

given object is conscious if there is "something that it is like to be that object" 

(to use Thomas Nagel's telling phrase). We do not normally ascribe con- 

sciousness to a computer, however impressive its cognitive capacities, simply 

because we do not believe that there is anything that it is like to be that com- 

puter. To maltreat a computer may indeed be an act of vandalism but hardly an 

act of cruelty! On the other hand, we are'prepared to accord some degree of 

consciousness to organisms quite low on the evolutionary scale. However, in 

his penultimate chapter, on "Strong Artificial Intelligence," Chalmers con- 

cedes that we cannot rule out apriori the possibility of a computer or robot ac- 

quiring consciousness. Indeed, he offers an ingenious thought experiment in 

which the neurons of a live human being are replaced, one by one, by silicon 

chips that perform exactly the same functions as neurons. At what point, he 

asks, rhetorically, would the person in question be no longer a conscious 

being? 

Eventually, the author comes to the conclusion that consciousness is a func- 

tion of a cognitive system which exhibits the appropriate kind of "awareness" 

or "the availability of global control." Unlike consciousness, which is unique, 

awareness can be defined in purely behavioral terms. Given, therefore, the

Book Reviews 

appropriate material substrate, we may assume that consciousness will super- 

vene. 

A final chapter discusses the role of consciousness in quantum theory. Ac- 

cording to the prevailing interpretation of quantum theory, matter persists in 

an indeterminate state up to the point at which it is observed. This implies that 

consciousness does make a difference to the world that we know directly and 

must, therefore, be more than just an epiphenomenon of brain processes. How- 

ever, little attempt is made to integrate these considerations with the interpre- 

tation of consciousness as set out in the previous chapters. 

Such, then, is the tenor of this thought-provoking book but no such bald out- 

line can do justice to its closely reasoned argumentation or to the author's con- 

scientious rebuttals of alternative positions. However, given such thorough- 

ness, it is all the more to be regretted that Chalmers sees no need to look 

beyond scientific orthodoxy. Parapsychology and the paranormal do not so 

much as figure in the index. Yet, had he deigned to take such evidence into ac- 

count, he would have been hard put to treat the physical universe as a causally 

closed system. Since there is, by definition, no physical explanation for ESP or 

PK, the author would have been forced either to justify rejecting the evidence 

for such phenomena or to accept a type of mental causation that defies a phys- 

icalist analysis. In that case, he would have had to reconsider the "naturalistic 

dualism" which he here advocates in favor of an "interactionist dualism" 

which he here curtly dismisses. (p. 163) 

John BelofS 

6 Blacket Place 

Edinburgh EH9 IRL, Scotland UK 

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory by David 

Chalmers. (Oxford University Press, 1996.) Clothback. 413 pp. $29.95. 

The readers of this Journal may be familiar with Chalmers' work from his 

December 1995 Scientific American piece entitled "The Puzzle of Conscious- 

ness." In that piece, and in this book, he offers an arresting thesis. 

After all, it is no small thing to say that contemporary science, in spite of its 

self-congratulatory confidence is completely in the dark in understanding the 

nature of consciousness and its role in nature. Hence this exciting and well- 

written book is controversial in that it is a most serious challenge to the long- 

standing materialist orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind. Indeed, prominent 

philosophers have made the claim that it is the most serious challenge to date 

and may well change the focus and direction of future discussion on the basic 

question about human nature. Words such as "brilliant," "honest,'' "formida- 

ble," "instructive," "stimulating" and "stunning" often appear in the reviews. 

Even among those philosophers who are true believers in the current material- 

ist orthodoxy to the effect that consciousness must be construed as a physical


object not different in kind from any other object in the physical world, there is 

an increasing awareness that currently orthodox reductionist forms of materi- 

alism in neuroscience and cognitive-science may be problematic for some of 

the reasons Chalmers presents. 

For Chalmers, contemporary science, neuroscience and cognitive-science 

have not even begun to answer the central question about the nature of con- 

sciousness. They simply assume, at the outset and in the name of taking sci- 

ence seriously, that consciousness must be reducible to a physical object of 

some sort (otherwise, as they say, it could have no causal role in explaining 

anything). But consciousness, or subjective experience, is not plausibly con- 

strued in that way; it is more an irreducible entity not unlike space, time and 

mass and it cannot be understood as the sum of physical parts. 

The central question is how subjective experience (consciousness) emerges 

from neural processes in the brain. Science has not even started to answer the 

question because it misconstrues the nature of the entity from the outset, and 

therefore seeks to answer the wrong question, as if the question were essential- 

ly a matter of how the brain processes environmental stimulation, or how the 

brain integrates information, or how we produce reports on internal states. 

For these reasons it is Chalmers' view that we are completely ignorant 

about how consciousness fits into the natural order. We answer the wrong 

questions and avoid the hard ones. Why are we not trying to answer instead, 

questions such as, "Why is all this mental processing accompanied by an expe- 

rienced inner life?" For Chalmers, not to take such questions seriously is not to 

take consciousness seriously. Chalmers also takes science seriously, and seeks 

to answer the central question within natural science while also arguing 

against standard reductionist moves to classify consciousness as some sort of a 

physical object. No small task. He does not claim to have succeeded at the task 

of completing a scientific answer to the central question, but he does claim to 

have set the project on the right footing and moved along the correct path of 

showing how consciousness, while not being reducible to a physical object, is 

nonetheless subject to physical laws and thus understandable in natural sci- 

ence. Other than that, the book argues for the causal efficacy of consciousness, 

(as opposed to epiphenomenalism) and in the end, via a defense of strong Arti- 

ficial Intelligence (AI), argues for a form of panpsychism ... or at least shows 

that belief in panpsychism is not so horrendously counterintuitive. 

The book, incidentally, has already been reviewed frequently, and is the ob- 

ject of several critical notices by the well-known and prominent philosophers 

of mind. What is so interesting about the general tone of the reviews is that 

they generally agree that this book is very-well argued and important for any 

future discussion on the nature of consciousness. To be sure, there are some 

philosophers (John Searle) who will call its main theses (endorsing strong A1 

and panpsychism certainly) crazy, absurd, and massively counterintuitive; and 

others (David Papineau) will reject the book out of hand because they reject 

the basic view that there is any problem about consciousness, at least as


Chalmers describes it. For Papineau, for example, there is simply no need to 

explain the connection between consciousness and brain states because it is an 

identity, and identities do not need explanations. ( British Journal for the Philosophy 

of Science, 1997) And naturally there have been the predictable 20%- 

25% of philosophers with true-believer tendencies who have been comical in 

their excessive negativity about it, while showing no real understanding of the 

arguments. 

But the general feeling, even among those who thoughtfully disagree with 

the conclusion and cannot quite go all the way to Chalmers' particular brand 

of naturalism and a Cartesian property dualism, is that it is nonetheless an important 

book, well-argued, and that it may turn out to be the best book on the 

issue over the last fifty years. It has the distinct potential for generating a large 

body of literature that will need to take some form of Cartesian property dualism 

(even if of the epiphenomenalist bent) seriously. One notable philosopher, 

David Lewis, for example, has said: 

"The Conscious Mind is exceptionally ambitious and exceptionally successful 

- the best book in the philosophy of mind in many years. It flies in the face 

of fashion, making a formidable case against materialist orthodoxy. Legions of 

materialists are no doubt busy writing their rejoinders; but there will be few 

points left for them to make that Chalmers hasn't made already. We of the materialist 

opposition cannot go on about how he has overlooked this and misunderstood 

that - because he has not. All we can do is to disagree about which 

way the balance of consideration tilts." (Mind, 1997) (See also Web site: 

http://ling.ucsc.edu/-chalmers/reviews.html for Chalmers' responses to his 

critics.) 

And Sydney Shoemaker (one of philosophy's most insightful of materialists) 

believes that if Chalmers' arguments succeed, his achievement will be 

enormous, for he will then have succeeded in overthrowing materialist orthodoxy 

that has reigned in philosophy of mind and cognition for the last half century. 

As it is, Shoemaker thinks the arguments fail, but he adds that even so, 

the achievement is considerable because his arguments draw on and give 

forceful and eloquent expression to widely held intuitions. (Szee same web 

site as in above paragraph) So, it seems fair to say that anybody who is interested 

in the long-standing discussion on the nature of human consciousness 

and its role in scientific theorizing, will need to read this book and decide for 

themselves whether the arguments work. Let me be a bit more specific about 

what is in the book. 

The book comes in four parts, and is chock full of good arguments at every 

turn. The first part lays out the problems and sets the framework in which they 

can be addressed. Chapters one and two talk about the basic questions about 

consciousness, defines the central problem and offers a strikingly clear (even 

if somewhat incomplete) and informative discussion about qualia and supervenience, 

that sets the stage for a discussion on reductive explanations and a


The second part of the book (embracing chapters three, four, and five) ar- 

gues for the irreducibility of consciousness and a naturalistic dualism, in which 

consciousness is part of nature and governed by the laws of nature. This is 

where, in the light of earlier work done in the first two chapters, he drives 

home the thesis that consciousness cannot be reductively explained, and ar- 

gues against materialism without abandoning a naturalistic dualism, which he 

discusses in the context of asking whether his position amounts to epiphenom- 

enalism. Chapter five is an engaging discussion on the paradox of phenomenal 

judgment. 

The third part of the book moves toward constructing a positive theory of 

consciousness. Each of the three chapters in this part (chapters 6, 7, and 8 re- 

spectively) develops a component of a positive theory of consciousness. These 

are fascinating chapters, full of nice thought experiments, and quite specula- 

tive. The fourth, and last part has to do with his defense of strong A1 theory and 

the application of the whole theory to the two basic mysteries of quantum 

physics. 

While it is quite tempting to offer here an evaluation of the book, to do so in 

this limited space would be unfair to the sweep and sustained argumentation of 

such a fine book. It calls for an extended critical study rather than this short re- 

view. 

Like others, I have some doubts about certain crucial arguments and 

whether consciousness as so defined (or characterized) is indubitably known 

to exist as characterized. And I certainly feel he missed important information 

for failing to look at empirical studies on reincarnation and the paranormal. 

That kind of discussion and information (largely lost to the mainstream discus- 

sion in philosophy for reasons of moving in "spooky" directions) would drive 

home the empirical nature of the inquiry and the continued failure of the mate- 

rialist paradigm (and all its deeply entrenched intuitions). 

Even so, it is hard not to feel in one's bones the force of the intuitions that 

drive the book, and that fund the basic set of arguments. Indeed, if one accepts 

the basic intuitions David Chalmers describes at the outset, it is difficult to see 

how any form of contemporary orthodox materialism could possibly explain 

them; and, by way of understanding the nature of consciousness, the implica- 

tions of that are quite moving in terms of all the energies expended in neuro- 

science, cognitive science and psychology in general. 

It is no easy thing to admit that what one has dedicated one's life to is basi- 

cally wrong-headed. So we should not expect the current orthodoxy to roll 

over, belly-up, without much of a struggle. But there must be emerging now a 

feeling in the land that there has been something terribly stale about the dis- 

cussion in philosophy on the mind-body problem in the last twenty-five years. 

And in the face of certain objections of the sort offered by David Papineau in 

defense of the identity thesis, taking science seriously may require a different 

body of data to be explained in defense of the sort of dualism defended by 

Chalmers. But this is no place to argue that. Doubtless, we shall see more than


a good number of seminars and colloquia on this very interesting and engaging 

book, and doubtless we shall all benefit from the activity. In the meantime, it is 

undoubtedly a book we should all read very carefully - twice. 

Robert Almeder, Department of Philosophy 

Georgia State University, University Plaza 

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 

The Oz Files by Bill Chalker. Sydney: Duffy & Snellgrove, 1996, 239 pp., 

AUS $16.95, ISBN 1 875989 04 8. 

A Skeptics Guide to the New Age by Harry Edwards. Sydney: Australian 

Skeptics, 1995,437 pp., AUS $20.00, US $19.95, ISBN 0 646 24502 3. 

For those who maintain a library of UFO sightings, Bill Chalker's The Oz 

Files seems worth getting, for he was the first researcher given access to mate- 

rial collected by the RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force), which until 1993 

was responsible for collating, and at times investigating, UFO sightings (now 

done by volunteer groups). Chalker's compilation cannot, however, be consid- 

ered definitive, for he was not allowed to see files held by Defense Intelligence 

or the Australian Security Intelligence Organization. 

In Chalker's opinion, the RAAF felt its task was to appease the public and 

that investigations were largely a waste of time and resources. There was con- 

siderable apathy and a habit of classifying sightings as "unknown" or Venus. 

One man saw a light so bright he had to put on sunglasses, yet according to the 

RAAF he mistook Venus for a UFO! (While some of the incidents in the book 

are interesting, for reasons of space I cannot go into details.) 

The RAAF hired a university professor, Harry Turner, to conduct a classified 

analysis of sightings. His conclusion, that there seemed to be a need for closer 

study, was not what the RAAF wanted, and they repudiated his work. Accord- 

ing to Chalker (p. 65): "This incident provides fairly strong evidence that the 

RAAF has just not been interested in the whole UFO issue." 

While Chalker feels there has to be something going on, he is not convinced 

that alien species are involved. He is also skeptical of several aspects that some 

take as concrete evidence. For example, he feels the famous videos of UFOs 

over Mexico City fail to show evidence of UFO activity; and his own research 

into Australian abduction cases, from the early 1970s to the present, has con- 

vinced him that the events say more about human psychology than alien kid- 

nappers. As for allegations that governments have suppressed hard evidence 

for UFO crashes, he feels (p. 57) that: "If UFO crashes occur, it seems likely 

they would do so in a number of countries, and it is highly unlikely that all the 

governments involved would want to, or be able to, keep them secret." 

While Chalker's writing is clear, the text needs better editing. For example, 

on p. 21 1 we read that Dr. John Mack is a Harvard professor of psychiatry; this


extensive bibliography and suggested further reading, plus an adequate index. 

There are two appendices; one a brief history of Australia's UFO groups, the 

other giving the names and contact details of Australian UFO groups. 

What I like about Chalker is that while he maintains a skeptical stance, he is 

willing to concede that there cannot be millions of sightings without some- 

thing odd going on. Harry Edwards, on the other hand, in A Skeptic's Guide to 

the New Age, will concede nothing; any alleged event that conflicts with reduc- 

tionist science simply has to be confusion or fraud. 

Edwards' work is a compilation of very short debunkings of all things, from 

A to Z, connected to ESP, UFOs, and the New Age. Readers will find little that 

is new and much that is old (even Clever Hans!). For example, in order to dis- 

credit New-Age phenomena through guilt-by-association, there is a brief ac- 

count of alchemy in which the most recent reference is 1782! 

I noticed several examples of confusion. In the section 'proving' that the 

ESP research of the Rhines was either falsified or methodologically flawed, 

there is mention of the possibility that Sir Cyril Burt may have altered data in 

his famous work on twins and heredity. What this has to do with ESP is a mys- 

tery. 

A similar thing occurs in the debunking of psychokinesis (PK). After laud- 

ing Randi's efforts to unmask cheats, and with no mention of the rigorous 

work done at PEAR (Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research), Edwards 

presents the failure of two Russians in an ESP experiment as part of his prooj? 

It seems that anything aiding the cause of skepticism can be used anywhere; 

logic or continuity of thought do not matter when confronting the enemy. 

Then, there are blunders. Sclerology is defined (p. 185) as "the study of the 

red lines in the whites of the eyes," which is an odd way of referring to blood 

vessels. Ghee is defined as a solid white oil used for making ointments and 

soap, even though oils are liquids, and ghee is actually clarified butter (minus 

milk solids) much used in India and elsewhere for cooking. Still on the sub- 

continent, Edwards claims that Buddha founded the Buddhist religion, which 

is as inaccurate as saying that Jesus founded Christianity. 

In other matters, Edwards accepts the opinions of debunkers even when 

they conflict with accepted experts. For example, there have been cases of 

spontaneous combustion that have baffled those who have been fighting and 

investigating fires all their lives. But Edwards ignores their accounts as anec- 

dotal. 

Homeopathy is scientifically impossible, according to Edwards, who ne- 

glects to mention hormesis, a well-documented phenomenon where smaller 

quantities (of chemicals or radiation, for example) may have greater effects on 

organisms than larger quantities. His references in this section are out-of-date, 

and he ignores, or is unaware of, rigorously-refereed articles documented in 

mainstream medical journals showing homeopathy at times producing results 

greater than the placebo effect. 

One aspect of UFO sightings frequently mentioned is their ability


seemingly to violate physical laws, to do things that are impossible in mun- 

dane jet or rocket propelled aircraft. Oddly, Edwards feels crop circles cannot 

be created by UFOs, as their rocket-propulsion systems would cause de- 

tectable damage ! 

The fact that some crop circles have been faked is enough for Edwards to 

claim that all could have been faked. This is the same as saying that since a few 

scientists have been caught cheating, all scientists could be cheats. In the same 

vein, Edwards gives a short account of Arigo (the Brazilian who for years said 

a dead doctor was working through him to cure the sick) and then says that 

since some unorthodox healers have been exposed as frauds, Arigo must be 

one also. This overlooks the fact that the frauds are in it for personal gain, 

while Arigo began as a poor man, remained poor while he was amazing people 

with his powers to heal, and died as poor as he began. Why would anyone 

spend a lifetime using unusual skills to trick people and yet remain in poverty? 

In a case such as this, surely some common sense should prevail. 

Of course there are many aspects of New-Age culture (Atlantis, the Bemu- 

da Triangle, pyramid-sharpened razor blades, for example) that are highly du- 

bious, and there are people taking money from the gullible. But what is the 

point of debunking all fringe subjects if the proof offered is highly selective? 

For example, according to Edwards acupuncture has no medical validity, and 

no scientific research supports it. His proof mostly comes from a book pub- 

lished in 1977. There is no mention of more modern research showing that 

acupuncture meridians actually exist. And if he is right about it being medical 

quackery, why does a conservative Australian medical establishment allow 

qualified doctors to use acupuncture on patients? 

Edwards does have a few good points to make. He reports (p. 83) that J. Z. 

Knight, of Ramtha fame (and fortune), said in 1986 that "I am nobody's savior. 

This is a business." This unusual frankness did not deter clients, who continue 

to buy banal news from beyond. Another case involved the visit to Australia of 

two Americans who claimed they could fix teeth through psychic means. In 

NSW they were charged and found guilty of practicing dentistry without a li- 

cense after a dentist examined 28 people before and after the alleged psychic 

treatment. 

Then there is Wiley Brooks, a Californian who promotes Breathaniarism. 

People pay the aptly-named Wiley to learn how to live forever without food, 

since all those who eat food eventually die. He claims to have consumed noth- 

ing in 18 years except a little fruit and fruit juice to neutralize the effects of 

acid air and rain on his body. When he was once spotted with a bag of junk 

food, he claimed that since it contained no nutrients, it wasn't really food at 

all. 

To finish, one part of the book struck me as being quite Australian. In the 

chapter on religion, Edwards writes (p. 22): "The idolatry, veneration and de- 

pendence on artifacts or holy relics ... attests to the ignorance and superstitious 

nature of man still prevalent in many societies today." As if this was not strong


enough, there follows a cartoon so vulgar and so lacking in humor that I think 

many American publishers would hesitate to allow it in one of their books. 

I wish I could end this review on a happy note, but I cannot. The book is 

badly type-set, and has many typos; poor editing has allowed unusual spelling, 

grammar and punctuation to proliferate. There is also no index, but this hardly 

matters, as the subjects debunked are in alphabetical order and each section is 

short. 

Don Eldridge 

Science-Art Research Centre 

Brisbane, QLD, Australia 

Close Encounters? Science and Science Fiction by Robert Lambourne, 

Michael Shallis, and Michael Shortland. Bristol and New York: Adam Hilger, 

1990, 184 + xiii pp. 

Science fiction today serves many functions reserved for folklore in the past. 

The parallels between the two are often close and striking. 

In bygone eras myths described the relationships of gods with humans, leg- 

ends told of extranormal encounters in an everyday setting, and tales spun fan- 

ciful yarns of quests and adventures in magical realms, providing audiences 

with explanations of how the universe was ordered, warnings of supernatural 

dangers, and entertainment to escape from the humdrum of daily existence. 

Times change. The medium has switched from oral narrative to literature 

and movies, supernatural powers have metamorphosed into futuristic technol- 

ogy to maintain plausibility in the modern world; but for all the alterations in 

outer guises, the underlying story endures. Visits to the other-world and visi- 

tors from it are the stuff of folk narratives, and equally the substance of science 

fiction. Strange beings, wonderful powers, worlds that might be or ought to be, 

our worst fears and fondest hopes for the future - these subjects have always 

held a favored place in storytelling, long ago as well as today, and whether the 

narrator is "primitive" or "civilized," it still seems no exaggeration to say that 

such themes orbit a permanent core of human concerns. 

Paranormal beliefs draw from a similar pool of wonders, and represent an- 

other mode of expression for the same timeless concerns. Accounts of UFOs, 

monsters, ESP, apparitions, and fortean phenomena thrive today as claims of 

true experiences, mirror images of fantasy, horror, or scientific fiction. Yet, 

paranormal reports occupy a gray area between fiction and truth. They are be- 

liefs with a basis in experience, but not necessarily a basis in truth, subjective 

realities that may or may not rest on objective foundations. Paranormal claims 

tantalize the investigator with too much substance to dismiss them entirely, 

and too little evidence to accept them as fact. 

Wherever claims of fact mingle with fiction and new beliefs entangle with 

the old, the researcher enters dangerous territory. Here be monsters; and any


map to show the way offers a welcome aid. One candidate to guide the reader 

through the cultural influences of science fiction is the book, Close Encoun- 

ters? Science and Science Fiction. The three authors include two practicing 

physical scientists and a lecturer in the history and philosophy of science. 

Their goal is a look at the portrayal of science and scientists in science fiction, 

with an emphasis on movies, oft-neglected, oft-despised aspects of the genre, 

but immensely influential with the public. Movies are especially important in 

studies of paranormal phenomena as seedbeds of imagery and ideas with a po- 

tential to influence millions of viewers. Movies are the leading exponents of 

the science fiction message, for better or worse. Any insights into the drift of 

that message are welcome, though this book offers only limited glimpses of 

how science fiction shapes and is shaped by cultural beliefs. 

The book begins with a history of science fiction and its scientific roots, hit- 

ting such high spots as Jules Verne and H. G. Wells, Hugo Gernsback and 

Amazing Stories, the golden age of the 1940s-1950s and subsequent direc- 

tions. This story has been better told, but the chapter serves as a useful summa- 

ry to prepare for the chapters to come. 

A second chapter treats the scientific content of science fiction, and be- 

moans the relative poverty of good science throughout the genre. The science 

ranges from rigorous application of known or hypothetical principles through- 

out the plot to jargon or patter thrown in as a backdrop to conventional adven- 

tures or romances, with the balance tilted heavily toward the latter. An enlight- 

ening classification of such usages serves purposes of literary criticism well, 

but says little about cultural ties. In fact the entertainment dimension largely 

slips away as the authors seem to frown on the scientific impurities an igno- 

rant public swallows, without analyzing what the public really looks for in sci- 

ence fiction. A chapter concentrating on the science of time travel movies con- 

tinues this line by recognizing their misuse of causality rather than the human 

interest in things to come or things as they might be, where the audience-pleas- 

ing potential of these stories usually lies. 

Some redress follows in the remaining chapters, which treat how science and 

scientists relate to society, religion, and morality in science fiction, and trace a 

downward arc in esteem for science over the past 40 years. The 1950s marked a 

high tide of confidence in science. Atomic energy offered hope in those days; 

space travel a new frontier. Hollywood retired Dr. Frankenstein and adopted 

the favorable image of the scientist as a romantically eligible "regular guy," 

who spoke down-to-earth vernacular and acted in harmony with military and 

civil authorities to defeat monsters or invaders - a team player whose hero- 

ism lay in achievement of the common goal rather than in single-handed salva- 

tion. 

A darker image intertwined with this prevailing view, an image of the scien- 

tist as an impious magus who tampered with things better left to God. This side 

grew over the years into dystopic, even anti-scientific stereotypes of blind, 

greedy exploitation of the earth, a form of science without noble purpose and


fraught with unforeseen consequences. The thrill of exploration and the quest 

for knowledge have been reduced to a stock morality play where scientists 

tamper with nature and suffer the consequences of their temerity - along with 

a great many innocent victims. 

In this way science fiction has reversed its former role as an exponent of sci- 

ence to become its critic, even its enemy. Such emphasis on the sinister possi- 

bilities inherent in exploring the unknown contribute to a climate supportive of 

mysticism and uncritical belief. This much the book makes clear, but it leaves 

aside cultural consequences of the trend. Despite the use of "close encounters" 

in the title, the authors pay little attention to the paranormal and its relation- 

ship with science fiction, either the borrowing and lending between them, or 

how they assume the functions of folklore for a modern audience. The authors 

aim inward toward analysis of the genre itself, rather than outward toward its 

influence in the real world. 

It is of course unfair to criticize a book for omitting subjects its authors 

never intended to treat, but for students of the paranormal and its cultural alle- 

giances, this book provides background reading rather than substantive exam- 

ination of the complex currents where imaginative fiction crosses supernormal 

belief. For this crucial understanding, the reader must look elsewhere. 

Thomas E. Bullard 

51 7 E. University St. #2 

Bloomington,IN 47401 

The Great Dinosaur Extinction Controversy by Charles Officer & Jake 

Page. Reading (MA): Addison-Wesley, 1996. xiii+209 pp. $25 (c). ISBN O- 

201-48384-X. (Available at $23 from Sourcebook Project, P. 0. Box 107, Glen 

Arm, MD 21057.) 

What "everyone knows," may be quite wrong (Martin, 1988). The common 

knowledge that AIDS is caused directly and solely by HIV may be an instance. 

(See book reviews in JSE 10,3, 1996, p. 430-42.) 

Since about 1980, just about everyone has known that the extinction of the 

dinosaurs, which occurred 65 million years ago at the boundary between the 

Cretaceous and the Tertiary Periods, was caused by the impact on Earth of a 

large meteor or asteroid. Among the silent or unnoticed groups that did not 

know this was the majority of the paleontological community - those geolo- 

gists whose special interest it is to understand the history of life, in large part 

through proper dating and interpretation of the fossil record and geological


a paleontologist long and deeply involved in the study of extinctions; so I was 

aware from the outset of the publicity over the asteroid hypothesis, that it has 

major flaws, and that better explanations are available. 

I also know the truth of allegations of disgraceful conduct made in this book 

against the chief publicist of the asteroid hypothesis, physics Nobelist Luis Al- 

varez. McLean debated Alvarez and his team for two days at a meeting in Ot- 

tawa in 1981; Alvarez was upset, and threatened McLean's career if he pub- 

licly opposed the asteroid theory; and Alvarez carried through on the threat: he 

or his cohorts tried to block McLean's promotion to full professor, failed to in- 

vite him to conferences, and told reporters that no-one invited him to meetings 

any more. 

Among the problems with the asteroid hypothesis: 

It is not known whether the dinosaurs became extinct "all at once." 

Some experts believe they were dwindling away in the Late Cretaceous 

and disappeared at or near the end of the Cretaceous; others believe the 

final extinction was right at the K-T boundary. 

If that "asteroid winter" killed the dinosaurs so efficiently, how could 

about 50% of living species have survived? In fact, the geo-biological 

record reveals no evidence of blackout and cold at the K-T boundary 

(McLean, 199 1). 

One reason why, despite such insurmountable obstacles, the extinction-by- 

impact notion remains common knowledge, will be easily appreciated by 

anomalists: the media chose not to let their audiences know about anything 

else, nor about the fatal flaws in the asteroid theory. Officer and Page give 

chapter and verse to illustrate that. Dewey McLean has shared with me his own 

huge file of correspondence on that score with Science magazine, whose cov- 

erage has been as one-sided as any. 

The Great Dinosaur Extinction Controversy is a wonderful book. Officer is a 

geologist, Page a science writer, and this is a truly winning combination: very 

easy to read yet tightly argued and soundly documented. Having no formal 

study of geology under my belt, I appreciated the introduction that reviewed 

geologic periods and sub-periods in the clearest, most relevant manner. Having 

studied scientific controversies and anomalies for some time, I applauded the 

accuracy of comments about such things as switching fields: on the one hand, 

it sometimes makes for splendid discoveries; on the other hand, those who 

venture into new fields may make quite elementary blunders or leap to sim- 

plistic conclusions on too little evidence. Fred Hoyle is cited in a brief but co- 

gent discussion (p. 12-14) of Hoyle's suggestion that feathers in Ar- 

chaeopteryx fossils were hoaxes. 

As one truly interested in the dinosaur extinctions and associated issues, I 

am profoundly grateful to this book for the clarity and the care with which it 

addresses such aspects as: Do there exist craters of the right sort and of the 

right age to support the impact theory? (In short, the evidence is not finally in.


Officer & Page say "No" to the latest claimed "culprit" at Chicxulub, but 

equally qualified people consider it a possibility.) Are any of the other major 

extinctions associated with known craters of the supposed magnitude? (In 

short, "No".) 

Having learned some history and sociology of science, I heartily agree 

(Bauer, 1992) with the several points this book makes about the consequences 

of the prestigious aura that surrounds physics as the popularly viewed epitome 

of science, and the cultural differences between geology and physics (p. 9-10, 

p. 14-15). It is significant that the chief proponent of the asteroid hypothesis 

was a physics Nobelist. The way the geological record is interpreted shows 

pronounced discipline-influenced disparities. Alvarez's hubris is perhaps best 

exemplified by his comment that "Clemens, who is a paleontologist, was not 

qualified to make statements about the fossil record." (p. 77) 

As icing on the cake of this nourishing book, Chapter 11 gives a convincing 

account of "What Did Happen" to the dinosaurs; and as an extra bonus for 

anomalists there is an Afterword on "Pathological Science." A must read, a 

book well worth owning. 





References 

Bauer, Henry H. (1992). Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method. Urbana: Uni- 

versity of Illinois Press, p. 27,36-9. 

Martin, Josef (1988). To Rise Above Principle: The Memoirs of an Unreconstructed Dean. Ur- 

bana: University of Illinois Press, p. 45-46. 

McLean, D. M. (1991). "Impact winter in the global WT extinctions: no definitive evidences." In 

J. S. Levine, Eds., Global Biomass Burning: Atmospheric, Climatic, and Biospheric Implica- 

tions. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 493-503. 

The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark by Carl 

Sagan. New York: Random House, 1995, 457 + xviii pp. $25.95(c). ISBN O- 

394-535 12-X. 

This book is a diatribe by its author against the preference of U.S. citizens 

for what he regarded as demonology (e.g., religion, astrology, UFO's), as well 

as their increasing rejection of the solid world of scientific values, the repro- 

ducible experiment, reliable thermodynamics, and the banner holder, Einstein. 

Sagan thought that a mighty effort should be made, nationally, to drag 

Americans out of the morass of unsound values, ridiculous beliefs in such 

scams as telepathy, homeopathy, dowsing, and (of course) anything to do with 

organized religion. 

Sagan gives evidence that Americans are stupid compared with Canadians 

or British and indeed, the citizens of some 14-15 other nations. They come


17th or 18th in the yearly intellectual competitions. Only half of the popula- 

tion accepts that the earth goes around the sun; they can see the converse any 

sunny day. A recent popular movie is called "Dumb and Dumber." Being good 

at anything intellectual in high school earns one the title of "nerd." Continua- 

tion of the growth of antiscience and the replacement of validated science by 

all these new ideas cannot be right and will obviously give rise to the demise of 

America. 

In spite of Sagan casting himself as the St. George of Science, a number of 

the views he held will surprise scientists, certainly the younger ones, and may 

shock some members of the Society for Scientific Exploration. 

Religion and Spiritual Beliefs 

These are cast down "as very difficult to prove." As an example of a proof, 

Sagan suggests that if Hoyle's view of continuous creation could be sustained 

(no Big Bang), the universe would have had no beginning and there would be 

no need for a Creator God. 

This might be true. But the disappointing part - and it becomes a pattern - 

is that the scientific evidence for "something greater" does exist but is kept out 

of Sagan's account. Perhaps a clear cut "Proof of God" may escape the intel- 

lectual approach, but the experimental method has been applied to the efficacy 

of prayer, and it seems most unscientific to leave out a reference to the work of 

Dossey (1 993) which gives descriptions of scientific measurements on the ef- 

fects of prayer (in which there is good evidence for a positive effect on cardiac 

patients in well controlled modem U. S. experiments). 

Sensitives 

In the book, Sagan calls sensitives witches, and takes the attitude that any 

reality behind what they are said to do is too ridiculous to justify dismissal. He 

uses the section concerning them to enhance one of his main themes, the terrible 

consequences of an ascendent Church, giving the most detailed description 

I have read of its methods of prosecution and torture', leading inexorably to 

the burning alive of thousands accused (by gossip only sometimes) of extrasensory 

activity. 

This is a very effective red herring to avoid facing the extensive scientific effort 

- now a century old - to substantiate the reality of the feats of sensitive~. 

The latest is surely the much published work of Robert Jahn and Brenda 

Dunne at Princeton University (Jahn & Dunne, 1987) on the ability of some 

operatives to affect the output of a random event generator by concentration 

thereon. These are impeccably managed experiments with strong statistics. 

' One method of finding who else in the village might be suspect was to put the alleged miscreant's 

foot in an iron boot and pour in molten lead.

Dowsing 


Sagan's book states that dowsing is a non-effect, that it just cannot be, that it 

is fraud - water does not radiate. However, he fails to cite Christopher Bird's 

massive volume (1993) relating a wealth of dowsing experiments, with very 

extensive verification. Dowsers not only detect underground water but also 

metal deposits. Is this just hearsay? No. But the trouble is, it does not fit the 

paradigm of physics in the 1990s, hence it is presented as fraud or faulty obser- 

vation - even though the observations have been going on for 2000 years. 

Homeopathy 

Homeopathy claims effects from preparations in which no molecules of the 

active agent are present at all! The reader does not need to be told what Sagan 

says of this! 

But, surely, if Sagan was this White Knight of Science (and a member of a 

committee to show up the sham behind paranormal events) he ought to have 

been in touch with Benveniste, and the recent London experiments with home- 

opathy. I was called about them earlier in the year. A professor of engineering 

from King's College, University of London, told me how a verification had 

been obtained; there was even a critical proving experiment devised and car- 

ried out successfully. 

Telepathy 

Once I had gotten the drift of Sagan's viewpoint, I was not surprised at his 

rejection of so many phenomena with which present physics cannot deal. But 

that he rejects telepathy too, did shock me. There is not only detailed modern 

work funded by the Russian Government but also the poll of British scientists, 

some 25% of whom attest an acceptance of the fact of telepathy. (Evans, 1973) 

Consider also the research on remote viewing by Targ and Puthoff (1977). 

Here, in the section on telepathy, I think one gets an entry into the way 

Sagan thought and why such thinking was so far removed from reality. He 

opines that, were there evidence for telepathy, there would be a huge rush of 

scientists to embrace it. Indeed not so! Very unfortunately, the indications 

from history are all the other way. The Wrights flew their plane up and down 

and around over two main highways and a railroad track for five years. No one 

took any notice. It is clear as to why. Those who saw this large object in the air 

were in an older paradigm which said heavier than air machines cannotfly. Or, 

more recently, take John Maddox's attacks in Nature on Benveniste, who 

dared to claim something that many consider outrageous - that medical ef- 

fects could be obtained although the molecules supposed to cause them were 

no longer there ! 

So there it is: the tragic epitome of the viewpoint of many scientists, "if it 

does not fit the present (always temporary) theory, it isn't so." Anyone who


suggests that it is the other way around should contemplate the examples 

given above and also other examples in Sagan's book. 

The contents of the book present a good example of the technique of deni- 

gration. One first gives a hefty thump against the detested anomaly (e.g., 100 

years of UFO observations), contemptuously declaring the 2% of the US pop- 

ulation which believes it has been abducted as suffering from hallucinations, 

and then (just as the knowledgeable reader is forming his "Ah, -but...") slams 

home an association with tabloid ridiculousness (e.g., "Captain of the Titanic, 

found on iceberg, awaiting rescue.") "There!" he implies - "you see." 

One aspect of the book, the attacks on the authority of the Catholic Church 

and all the suffering it caused, merits specific comments. Is it not now reason- 

able to see the authoritative priest of the medieval time replaced by scientists 

of the authoritative type well represented by the recently deceased author? 

And as to punishment - no, you do not get burned to death any more. But if 

you come with new ideas (say, in a university setting), and these ideas are not 

linear extensions from the present paradigm, you may be declared to be doing 

"bad science," and the Personnel and Tenure Committee may throw you out. 

Or, if tenured, say, with a team, your papers may be refused publication (with 

the comment, "this is not really sound work"). Indeed, in the Catholic Church, 

the accepted document has to be stamped: "Nihil obstat." What is the differ- 

ence between that and the referee's acceptance of your paper? For he, of 

course, will be in paradigm (for which read "one of the present Faith"). 

The author may have been selective when he suppresses information, but he 

shows a depth of study on many items, some of which are outside the main 

theme, as in the description of the techniques used in the medieval Church's 

fight to suppress "heresy" (i.e., new ideas). In the last eight chapters of the 

book there is much, too, of admirable stuff as to how we might jump start a 

greater interest in science in the USA. He suggests we might pay students who 

study it an extra stipend, a technique used with success in the former Soviet 

Union. But he does not shine a light on the reason for lack of interest: it is the 

epitome of America - the culture of pleasure and instant gratification, which 

leads students to choose easy causes and takes attention away from those caus- 

es needing effort. 

But perhaps the greatest effect of a book showing so much lack of compre- 

hension of the new is in the counter-reaction it is likely to bring. So, the 

tabloids and the popular press do portray a lot of nonsense from the scientific 

point of view, and I at once accept that not every popular astrologer, in it as a 

business, is scrupulous in making his proclamations arise from the rules of as- 

trology rather than his common-sense evaluation of his client. 

But if it is really true, as the book brings out, that such a large number of un- 

deniable phenomena (telepathy, dowsing, the experience of those who die and 

are resuscitated) offer present science facts for which it has utterly no clue, 

then, maybe, it is time to stop yelling fraud, sober up, and take a good hard 

look at the basics of consciousness and our relation to the world we experi-


ence. And that, indeed, should lead to the next paradigm, for, as Sagan's book 

tacitly implies, the present scientific world view is gradually becoming harder 

to sustain. 

John O'M. Bockris 



College Station, TX 77843-3255 

References 

Bird, C. (1993). The Divining Hand. Atglen, PA: Schiffer Press. 

Dossey, L. (1993). Healing Words: The Power of Prayer and the Practice of Medicine. San Fran- 

cisco: Harper. 

Evans, C. (1973). Parapsychology - What the questionnaire revealed. New Scientist, 57,209. 

Jahn, R. G., & Dunne, B. J. (1987). Margins of Reality: The Role of Consciousness in the Physical 

World. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 

Targ, R. G. & Puthoff, H. (1977). Mind-Reach: Scientists Look at Psychic Ability. New York: 

Delacorte PressIEleanor Friede. 

The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark by Carl 

Sagan. New York: Random House, 1995,457 + xviii pp. $25.95(c). ISBN O- 

394-535 12-X. 

Opinions about Sagan run the gamut from disdain by science observers like 

Jeremy Bernstein and a National Academy of Sciences that will not elect him, 

through profusely respectful groups like physics teachers and CSICOP who 

lavish him with praise and awards. What one thinks of this book will also de- 

pend strongly on one's own viewpoint. Heartfelt attempts like Sagan's to 

arouse interest in science, to combat superstition and silliness, and to be intel- 

lectually rigorous and honest make inevitable certain compromises that are 

bound to strike the one group or the other as unwarranted. 

The book is a strange mixture: well argued in places, but superficial and 

sophomoric in others: it deals with science and with anomalies, but it is also 

replete with socio-political opining of the politically correct flavor. The index 

is comprehensive, but the bibliography is quite inadequate for checking quotes 

and generalizations in the text. While in several ways it is acknowledged that 

much of the material has appeared elsewhere, the reader is not helped to dis- 

cover exactly what was published where and when. 

Sagan's reputation would be best served if readers who are serious about 

anomalies begin with Chapter 17, "The Marriage of Skepticism and Wonder," 

go on to Chapter 18, and then turn to Chapters 4 to 10 inclusive. 

The less said about the other chapters, the better for Sagan and the publish- 

ers, who should bear most of the blame - they, after all, had contracted with 

him years ago for a series of books, for straightforward commercial reasons 

and not on the basis of a substantive plan outlining material that deserved pub- 

lication. Good copy-editors would surely have caught most of the logical non- 

sequiturs or contradictions that abound in chapters that read like stream-of-


consciousness dictation. Thus in Chapter 1 (p. 4), "the ocean keeps many se- 

crets" followed immediately by "there isn't a trace of oceanographic or geo- 

physical support for Atlantis and Lemuria." 

In uncountable places the author(s) postulate(s) that everyone shares their 

emotional and intellectual passions, e.g. "so much in real science ... [is] excit- 

ing." Someone is sympathized with for "never [having been] taught ... how to 

distinguish real science from the cheap imitation," a trick that no one has yet 

been taught including those who read this book from cover to cover. "If it were 

widely understood that claims to knowledge require adequate evidence before 

they can be accepted, there would be no room for pseudoscience," (p. 6) is 

hardly adequate enough instruction. Tired scientific shibboleths are repeated 

throughout the book, how "perilous and foolhardy for the average citizen to re- 

main ignorant about global warming [etc., etc.]" (p. 7), how dangerous if 

everyone doesn't share Sagan's views on science, politics, and all else. Naive 

anti-religious sentiments abound: "For me, it is far better to grasp the Universe 

as it really is [no mean feat!] than to persist in delusion [but how to avoid 

that?] (p. 12)"; "to entertain the notion that we are a particularly complex 

arrangement of atoms, and not some breath of divinity, at the very least en- 

hances our [what, everybody's?] respect for atoms" (p. 13). Quite often after 

such silly generalizations, Sagan puts in a qualification, e.g. "although there's 

no reason why religions have to play that role." (p. 15) But this putting togeth- 

er of opposing thought-bites does not amount to a useful discussion. 

In some places, the book's carelessness makes it downright misleading, for 

example, that "Under Communism, both religion and pseudoscience were sys- 

tematically suppressed." (p. 17) What about Lysenko? What about the stric- 

tures against quantum mechanics? What about the paeans to Stalin and Party 

as guides to correct science? 

"The devil is in the details," and the book is replete with errors of fact, over- 

simplifications, opinion stated as fact, and the like. But enough about the 

book's inadequacies. 

Sagan's heart is clearly in the right place, about science, education and soci- 

ety in general. The Preface has him at his most disarming: open about the per- 

sonal background that shaped his views; slipping in the occasional deep ques- 

tion: "How can you tell when someone is only imagining?" (xii); introducing 

the view expanded in Chapter 17, that science invokes "the two uneasily co- 

habiting modes of thought" of skepticism and wonder (xiii). "Both ... are skills 

that need honing and practice. Their harmonious marriage within the mind of 

every schoolchild ought to be a principal goal of public education ... [By every- 

one,] stringent standards of evidence ... should be applied with at least as much 

rigor to what they hold dear as to what they are tempted to reject with impuni- 

ty." (p. 306) 

Sagan is clear that skeptics sometimes "wax superior and contemptuous ... 

I've even sometimes heard, to my retrospective dismay, that unpleasant tone in 

my own voice." (p. 297) I suggest that much can be forgiven one who makes

~ 


such an admission; and I was reminded of the respect Sagan earned years ago 

when, giving a splendid explanation, he refused to sign the authoritarian "Ob- 

jections to Astrology" that sparked CSICOP's founding. (p. 302) 

In Chapter 17, Sagan is open about the dilemma of how to deal with people 

who have deep-seated beliefs or faiths that one believes to be wrong: "Many 

pseudoscientific and New Age belief systems emerge out of dissatisfaction 

with conventional values and perspectives - and are therefore themselves a 

kind of skepticism." (p. 300) "No stuffy dismissal by a gaggle of scientists 

makes contact with the social needs that astrology ... addresses, and science 

does not." (304) "Mere skepticism is not enough.'' (p. 305) 

He is open that "CSICOP is imperfect. In certain cases such a critique is to 

some degree justified" that "It's hostile to every new idea ... will go to absurd 

lengths in its knee-jerk debunking, is a vigilante organization, a New Inquisi- 

tion." (p. 299) 

Sagan also admits that what is called pseudo-science might not be pseudo: 

"Perhaps one percent of the time, someone who has an idea that smells, feels 

and looks indistinguishable from the usual run of pseudoscience will turn out 

to be right." (p. 302) "Objections to pseudoscience on the grounds of unavail- 

able mechanisms can be mistaken." (p. 303) 

With those credentials, the book's discussions of anomalies in Chapters 4 to 

10 ought to be respected. Chapter 4 ("Aliens"), Chapter 5 ("Spoofing and Se- 

crecy") and Chapter 6 ("Hallucinations") are well argued, though of course 

they will displease some because Sagan's opinion is that we have not (yet) 

come into contact. Sagan disagrees with most ufologists as to the likelihood 

that any UFO observations cannot be explained in mundane ways; though he is 

"perfectly prepared to believe that at least some UFO reports and analyses, and 

perhaps voluminous files, have been made inaccessible to the public ... It's 

time for the files to be declassified and made generally available." (p. 88) 

Chapter 7, "The Demon-Haunted World," will be relatively uncontroversial 

since few contemporary anomalists believe in a reality of traditional demons. 

Many will agree with much in Chapter 8, "On the Distinction Between True 

and False Visions" - especially of course on the generalities while sometimes 

disagreeing on their application to specific instances such as abductions. 

Chapter 9, "Therapy," and 10, "The Dragon in My Garage," completes the 

list of chapters that serious anomalists might do well to peruse. Sagan says he 

has known John Mack for many years. Taking his patients' "stories at face 

value is not the only option available" (p. 185). "What Mack really means 

when he talks about beings from other dimensions is that ... he hasn't the foggi- 

est notion of what they are." (p. 183) "The main challenge posed by Mack's 

cases is the old one of how to teach critical thinking more broadly and more 

deeply in a society - conceivably even including Harvard professors of psy- 

chiatry - awash in gullibility" (p. 184). No indubitable bit of extra-terrestrial


"These failures must tell us something." (p. 186) "Their absence must tell us 

something." (p. 187) 

Sagan can be incisive, clear-headed, fair-minded; I wish those qualities 

could be applied to the whole book rather than to only a third of its chapters. 

Additional Comments on Carl Sagan by Zan Stevenson 





Carl Sagan died - too young - on December 20,1996. We must acknowl- 

edge that he was not averse to the scientific study of anomalies nor to the pur- 

poses of the Society for Scientific Exploration. In 1988 he addressed the Soci- 

ety's Seventh Annual Meeting (at Cornell University) on the topic of "Critical 

Thinking." 

In the book reviewed here we find on page 302 an exemption from his stric- 

tures for three lines of investigation. He wrote: "...there are three claims in the 

ESP field which, in my opinion, deserve serious study: (I) that by thought 

alone humans can (barely) affect random number generators in computers; (2) 

that people under mild sensory deprivation can receive thoughts or images 

'projected' at them; and (3) that young children sometimes report the details 

of a previous life, which upon checking, turn out to be accurate and which they 

could not have known about in any other way than reincarnation. I pick these 

claims not because I think they are likely to be valid (I don't), but as examples 

of contentions that might be true." 

Reports of two of the three lines of investigation that Sagan believed "de- 

serve serious study" have figured prominently in the pages of this Journal. He 

would have approved of that. 

Ian Stevenson 

Division Personality Studies 

Health Science Ceter, Box 152 

Charlottesville. VA 22908 

In the Footsteps of the Russian Snowman, by Dmitri Bayanov. Cryptologos 

Publishers, 12, Bloc 3, Osenny Boulevard, Moscow, 121 614 Russia, 1996, 

240 pp., ISBN 5-900229-1 8- 1. 

This is the world's first English-language book on the searches, conducted 

throughout the lands of the former Soviet Union, for the elusive relict homi- 

noids known popularly as "snowmen." Although a number of books by for- 

eign authors have been written, at least in part, about snowmen in Russia, this 

is the first one written entirely by Russian researchers on the subject.


umes about how freedom of expression has evolved there since the collapse of 

the Soviet Union. Earlier, as is well known, the Soviet state controlled all pub- 

lishing and other communications and media activities, and only those ele- 

ments of information and opinions and other lines of thought which met with 

government approval could hope to see the light of day in print. 

In 1958, the Soviet Academy of Sciences became interested for a time in the 

subject of the Himalayan yeti, and a major expedition was undertaken into the 

Pamirs in an effort to establish the existence of yetis or other "snowmen" there. 

Unfortunately, this expedition failed to bring back any meaningful evidence. 

As a result, in a great scramble to protect reputations and to save face, the So- 

viet scientific establishment promptly declared research on "snowmen" to be a 

pseudo-science, to be classified along with astrology and parapsychology. 

This meant that any further publication on the topic was banned, a ban which 

lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet state. 

One small and carping criticism which I might make of this book relates to 

its title: The use of the term "snowman" is derived from the expression "abom- 

inable snowman," which has been used to designate the yeti of the Himalayas. 

It is generally held, however, that the yeti is not a hominoid but, rather, is quite 

likely an as-yet unidentified species of ape.' In consequence, the yeti techni- 

cally does not merit the designation of "man" or "snowman." On the other 

hand, the creatures described in Bayanov's book are clearly hominoids, and 

thus deserving to be called some sort of "man." However, because of the asso- 

ciation of the term "snowman" with the yeti, I have here used the expression 

"wildman" to designate the hominoids reported by Bayanov. 

Properly speaking, Dmitri Bayanov is both author and editor of this work; 

he has assembled and edited a variety of reports by various Russian re- 

searchers, all of whom are respected scientists in their own fields, and he has 

also contributed a number of sections describing his own, original field re- 

search work. 

The contents of the book are well-organized, well edited, and provide fasci- 

nating and colorful reading both for the scientist and the interested layman. 

There are numerous illustrations, including photographs, drawings and 

sketches, and the reports are well referenced. Moreover, the quality of printing 

and binding of the book is surprisingly good, considering the unsettled and 

chaotic conditions prevailing when it was produced. 

In summary, the book is a compilation of much of what is known about the 

hairy, bipedal, man-like creaturess, known variously as "snowmen," "wild- 

men," "men of the forest," etc., which apparently have been encountered in 

various regions of Russia, Central Asia and Siberia throughout most of record- 

ed history. The creatures have appeared regularly in art and writings, in travel- 

ers' accounts and scientific reports, for at least the past 2500 years. 

' Heuvelmans, B.(1995). On the Track of Unknown Animals. London: Kegan Paul International 

Ltd.


The material is presented separately by major geographic regions, and then 

in chronological or historical order within each region. The major regions cov- 

ered are scattered across the lands of the former Soviet Union: the Caucasus, 

the Pamirs and the Tien-Shan Mountains, Siberia, European Russia, and the 

Russian Far East. 

Within each region, the unfolding story begins with ancient artifacts, such 

as carvings and gold and silver works from the pre-Christian era, as well as 

Middle Eastern and Oriental writings and drawings from olden times, all illus- 

trating hairy, man-like creatures. The story progresses through tales of long- 

ago encounters with such creatures, and moves on into modern times with de- 

tailed eyewitness reports of encounters and sightings, a number of these having 

occurred just in the past few years. 

There would appear to be at least two distinct family types of these hairy 

hominoids: One is the creature of the Caucasus, studied extensively by Dr. 

Marie-Jeanne Koffmann, and known by its name in the Kabardino-Balkarian 

language as "almasty." The other seems to be somewhat larger, and to bear 

more than a passing resemblance to the sasquatch of the Pacific Northwest of 

the North American continent. 

Indeed, this latter leads Bayanov to ask, with tongue in cheek, "Does Russia 

also have its own 'sasquatchski'?" 

The reports of earlier encounters as well as recent eyewitness reports all are 

consistent in their description of the creatures: they are bipedal, they walk 

erect, they are covered with hair that is generally brown to light gray in color; 

they are extremely powerful, with proportionately longer arms than in man; 

they are remarkably fast runners, and can climb steep slopes and cliffs with as- 

tonishing ease; they have no speech, but make mumbling, whistling sounds. 

The sasquatch-like hominoids stand two meters or more in height, and many 

eyewitnesses report that their eyes glow brilliantly at night. They are said in 

general not to be hostile to man but, rather, to retreat from the presence of man. 

One cannot fail to be impressed by the abundance of indirect evidence for 

the existence of these creatures which this book presents: detailed eyewitness 

reports, plaster cards of footprints, droppings, tufts of fur and hair, observation 

of nests, etc., and, in one case, even the discovery of bones, not human but also 

not belonging to any known animal. 

Most telling of all are the carefully screened and selected eyewitness re- 

ports, which come across with eminent credibility: Marie-Jeanne Koffmann 

alone has assembled and checked out more than 500 such reports. These re- 

ports come from two categories of witnesses: first, there are reliable local peo- 

ple (country people), such as villagers and elders, shepherds, farmers, hunters, 

fishermen, reindeer herders, who have little formal education and little knowl- 

edge of the world at large, but whose knowledge of nature and whose faculties 

of observation are beyond reproach. Then, there are the serious and objective 

outsiders; people such as government officials, veterinary physicians, military


them to the remote areas where they experienced chance encounters with 

"wildmen." 

In the late 19th and early 20th century there are a number of reports of 

"wildmen" being killed or captured. In some instances the captured creature 

succeeded in escaping, while in others it was confined and ultimately domesti- 

cated to a certain extent. Several reports tell of female "wildmen" being 

trained to do simple household tasks, although no language ability ever 

emerged. Perhaps more astonishingly, there are also reports of crossbreeding 

between female "wildmen" and human men. The offspring were reported to 

have a strange combination of physical and mental traits - some human, 

some not. In one instance, the grave of such an offspring was found long after 

its death, and the skeleton exhumed. The skull was reported to show both an- 

cient features as well as features of modern man. This, of course, would sug- 

gest that the "wildmen" are very close relatives of our own species. 

In general, all of the enormous body of evidence accumulated for the exis- 

tence of "wildmen" in Russia is indirect and circumstantial; the "clincher" still 

eludes us - we still do not have a verifiable specimen, either living or dead, 

nor do we even have so much as a complete hide or skull. Nevertheless, the in- 

direct evidence assembled by Bayanov and his colleagues is so extensive and 

abundant, and so convincing, that one cannot avoid the conclusion that these 

creatures do indeed exist. Thus, it would seem only logical to pursue field re- 

search to the point where one or more living specimens have been captured un- 

harmed, examined thoroughly by qualified zoologists, and the findings an- 

nounced to the world. 

Overall, the eyewitness reports over the past century show a pattern of mod- 

ern man extending his territory steadily outwards, and pushing his primate ri- 

vals farther back into increasingly remote and inaccessible mountain fastness- 

es. Earlier, observations of man-like creatures occurred across great expanses 

of remote parts of Russia, but, beginning in the early part of the 20th century, 

these have declined steadily in frequency, which suggests that human pressure 

is pushing the "wildman" population steadily back and back, toward the edge 

of extinction. 

Will this happen before we are able finally to establish firm and verifiable 

contact with our cousins - to make their acquaintance, to establish links with 

them, and so be able to provide them with shelter and protection? 

For hominologists, cryptozoologists and other scientists, for amateur zoolo- 

gists and the interested layman, this book is fascinating and highly recom- 

mended reading. 

Edward Winn 

5-1 7 Cam Castle Gate 

St. Catharines, Ontario L2N 5V4 

Canada


Reincarnation: A Critical Examination, by Paul Edwards. Buffalo, NY: 

Prometheus Books, 1996.313 pp., $28.95 (c) ISBN 1573920053 TC. 

What amazes me about such people is their smug dogmatism and their colossal arro- 

gance. They "know," and are completely certain of things that cannot be known, and 

their "knowledge" is not harmless because it is made the basis for vicious conduct. To 

such fanatics one can only quote the words (suitably adjusted) of Oliver Cromwell in a 

letter he wrote to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland: "I beseech you, in 

the bowels of Gautama, think it possible you may be mistaken." (p. 46) 

Edwards, in the above passage, is referring to philosophers sympathetic to 

the concept of karma, but it is tempting to read it as referring to himself and 

others of skeptical inclination. The very qualities he laments are clearly on dis- 

play in his book, and the bastardized quotation from Cromwell could properly 

be addressed to many skeptics as well. 

Reincarnation: A Critical Examination is a much expanded version of a se- 

ries of articles that appeared in the humanist journal, Free Inquiry, in 1986 and 

1987. It contains 17 chapters and an "Irreverent Postscript" that deals with 

"God and the Modus Operandi Problem." Although the relevance of the post- 

script to the rest of the book is not altogether clear, Edwards appears to mean it 

to underscore what he sees as the central problem with the idea of survival 

after death. This is the difficulty of specifying exactly how survival occurs, es- 

pecially given the amount of data from biology and the brain sciences that 

seems to weigh against it. 

The 17 chapters that form the body of the book cover a variety of topics di- 

rectly or indirectly related to reincarnation - among them karma, cases (child 

prodigies, e.g.) sometimes thought to be explicable in terms of reincarnation, 

past-life regressions (a chapter is devoted to Bridey Murphy), "future-life pro- 

gressions," spontaneous past life memories, the "astral body," out-of-body ex- 

periences, near-death experiences, deathbed visions, reports by Stanislav Grof 

of past life memories under LSD, reports of memories of the period between 

lives (called the "interregnum" by Edwards), and finally the work of Ian 

Stevenson. 

Reincarnation logically entails some form of survival, so it is appropriate 

that a book dealing with reincarnation (especially one with philosophical pre- 

tensions) treat the survival problem more generally. Many readers, however, 

may wonder about the amount of space given to out-of-body and near-death 

experiences. They may also be disappointed to find serious reincarnation re- 

search of the sort associated with Ian Stevenson given such short shrift. 

Stevenson receives most of one chapter and a small portion of a second, for a 

total of about 30 pages. This compares to 38 pages devoted to Elisabeth 

Kiibler-Ross and 27 pages devoted to Stanislav Grof.


phy or reference list), and appears at first glance to be exhaustively researched. 

However, a closer look at sources is revealing. Edwards has a decided tendency 

to prefer popular treatments, especially skeptical ones. Astonishingly little is 

cited from scientific journals or scholarly books, and when cited, the refer- 

ences are sometimes incorrect. Edwards' seeming uncertainty about the title of 

the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease is emblematic of his difficulties 

here. In the text on p. 243 the journal is called the Journal of Nervous and 

Mental Diseases, whereas in a footnote on the same page it is identified as the 

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disorders. 

The reluctance to engage primary source material may be part of the reason 

for important omissions. Apparitions and mediumship, both with considerable 

literatures of their own but with much more direct relevance to the survival 

problem than out-of-body and near-death experiences, are hardly mentioned. 

There is no mention of the now considerable number of statistical and cross- 

cultural studies of children who remember previous lives, or of the patterns 

that have emerged from such studies. Several important theoretical and philo- 

sophical approaches to explaining survival and reincarnation are ignored. 

Xenoglossy (the use of unlearned language) is acknowledged but exempted 

from treatment, with a reference to an article in the Skeptical Inquirer. 

Edwards frequently cites the views of fellow skeptics, but does not attempt 

to address the responses of survival researchers, even when these are available 

to him. For instance, he references my 1990 review of reincarnation research 

(Matlock, 1990), which deals with all of the issues cited in the last paragraph, 

and which includes detailed rebuttals to a number of critical comments on 

Stevenson's research. However, not only does Edwards fail to take note of my 

comments, he ignores them and trots out many of the same tired arguments. 

At times, Edwards seems not to grasp the relevant issues. What is wrong 

with the "dreariness" of Virginia Tighe's memories as Bridey Murphy? (p. 62). 

Their very dreariness suggests their authenticity more than a dramatic account 

would. In discussing a spontaneous child case from India, Edwards wonders 

whether the word for "prostitute" would be known to children in India (p. 

257). Probably not - but perhaps the child recalled the word in association 

with the past life memories he was describing. Edwards writes (p. 269) that 

"Stevenson assumes" that the previous personalities of Western subjects also 

lived in the West. However, this is not an assumption on Stevenson's part, but a 

conclusion based on the characteristics of cases he has investigated. 

There are several outright mistakes, which betray a less than sure grasp of 

the relevant literature and personalities. Although Osis and Haraldsson have 

written a book about deathbed visions, they do not "specialize" in their study 

(p. 8). (Indeed, as readers of this Journal know, Haraldsson has lately taken up 

the study of children who remember previous lives.) Edwards states that a 

movie based on The Search for Bridey Murphy was never made (p. 61), where- 

as one was released by Paramount in 1956 (and is now available on home 

video). He states that Stevenson has never investigated a hypnotic regression


case (p. 102), an error he would have been able to correct had he taken the 

trouble to review the xenoglossy literature. He claims that "birthmarks are 

cited as evidence only among some of the cultures in which reincarnation is 

prevalent" (p. 138), thereby overlooking (among many other cases) the Eng- 

lish Pollock twins discussed in at least three of the works he cites. 

The tone of the book often is condescending. Edwards repeatedly expresses 

"joy" (e.g., p. 89, 140) and congratulates himself on having an "irrepressible 

Voltairean sense of humor" (p. 9). An example of this presumably is his allu- 

sion to the "bowels of Gautama" cited above. Here is another sample: "It is 

widely believed that the poet Edith Sitwell was a flamingo in an earlier life and 

there cannot be a serious doubt that Winston Churchill had once been a bull- 

dog .... As for Marlene Dietrich, the general consensus now is that she was 

once an emu. There seems to be no other way of explaining her treatment of 

her daughter, Maria Riva" (p. 12- 13). 

Edwards is not beyond putting others down, sometimes to the point of slan- 

der. "I cannot rid myself of the suspicion that the brilliant thinker quoted here 

is none other than Bernstein himself' (p. 64). Of Raymond Moody he writes, 

"the suspicion is that he has fudged his data so that the cases would exhibit a 

far higher degree of similarity than what was actually reported" (p. 153). Of 

Alexander Cannon, "I cannot decide whether Cannon was mad or a fraud. It is 

possible that he was both, with madness predominating" (p. 83). 

As philosophy, the book is disappointing. Edwards mostly rehearses the ar- 

guments of others, makes few original points, and does not closely examine 

any issue. Moreover, his bias sometimes leads him into circular arguments. For 

example, since he dismisses the possibility of an "astral body," he can say of 

birthmarks in reincarnation cases that there is "no conceivable way" that a 

wound could be transmitted from a dead person to an embryo (p. 139). Again, 

"the absence of genuine memories of previous lives" are said to constitute 

"powerful evidence against reincarnation" (p. 27, italics in original), whereas 

reports of such memories are dismissed partly because they imply reincarna- 

tion. 

Edwards is not at all sympathetic to the possibility that there are limitations 

to the scientific world view to which he adheres. "Reincarnationists, at least 

those who know a little science," he tells us, "constantly look for gaps in exist- 

ing scientific explanations, which reincarnation is then supposed to fill" (p. 

56). It is not clear, at least to this reviewer, why this is such a bad strategy - if 

we are not willing to dismiss empirical evidence, as Edwards is, what more 

likely place to look for explanation than in the gaps in mainstream scientific 

knowledge? At one point he notes that "Stevenson, too, does not accept this ar- 

gument [on dkjh vu] but, as is usual with him in the cases of arguments he finds 

inadequate, he sees some significant merits in it" (p. 52). This is something 

Edwards cannot (or will not) do. The world appears to him in black and white, 

never shades of gray. 

Who is this book for? Edwards spends much time on issues to which no seri-


ous researcher gives much attention (Kiibler-Ross, Grof), and does not deal at 

all adequately with the more important scholarly literature, so serious re- 

searchers will find little of value here. Another potential audience is the large 

popular audience drawn to subjects like reincarnation. This presumably is the 

target audience, but readers expecting an even-handed, if critical, treatment of 

the subject matter will be disappointed, and I suspect that many will be put off 

by the unrelenting skepticism, put-downs, and outright dismissals. This leaves 

the like-minded skeptic, the reader already committed to Edwards' point of 

view. This reader is likely to find a great deal of interest in this book. Such a 

reader is likely to enjoy Edwards' writing style, his treatment of other authors, 

his minute dissection of many of the more vacuous writings on survival, and to 

come away from this book all the more deeply convinced that he or she is right. 

Reference 

Matlock, J. G. (1990). Past life memory case studies. In S. Krippner (Ed.), Advances in Parapsy- 

chological Research. McFarland: Jefferson, NC, Vol. 6, p. 187-267. 

James G. Matlock 

Department of Anthropology 

Southern Illinois University 

Carbondale, IL 62901 

Forming Concepts in Physics, by Georg Unger, Parker Courtney Press of the 

Science and Mathematics Association for Research and Teaching, 307 Hungry 

Hollow Road, Chestnut Ridge, NY 10977, $24.75. 

Georg Unger's book, Forming Concepts in Physics, is a seminal study of the 

conceptual foundations of modern science of quantum mechanics, probability 

and relativity theory, and mathematics. Central to the book is an examination 

of the role of thinking in gaining physical knowledge. Unger focuses on the 

transition from classical to modem physics to suggest what will be a radical 

shift in consciousness for most readers. Unger shows that, far from passive 

observing, scientists employ active thinking to gain access to the world of phe- 

nomena. In other words, seeing employs thinking in order to organize sense 

data into coherent experience. Reality is in this coherent experience of phe- 

nomena and does not lie in a metaphysical world behind experience. In this 

phenomenological analysis, thought is taken to bring reality to existence with- 

in human beings. 

In a careful and insightful analysis, Unger discusses in detail what actually 

happened in the transition to Twentieth Century physics. Of particular impor- 

tance in this regard is Unger's treatment of the concept of matter. Unger for- 

mulates the concept of matter as the togetherness or simultaneous appearance 

of sense qualities. It follows from such an understanding that the boundaries 

of sense reality are reached when the condition of such togetherness is no


longer present. The failure of classical ideas is unavoidable in the face of the 

"non-togetherness" that is characteristic of quantum phenomena. One of the 

beauties of Unger's approach is that we can understand the so-called paradox- 

ical nature of pseudo-realistic elements such as the atom or other fundamental 

particles as an artifact of forgetting the role of thinking when we gain coher- 

ence of sense reality. Once it is realized that the boundary of the sense percep- 

tible has been crossed, then the supposed paradoxical nature of the fundamen- 

tal particles disappears, and other paradoxes such as wave particle duality 

make sense. 

Unger takes special note of the role of statistics in quantum theory. He de- 

votes a chapter to a detailed discussion of the mathematical concept of proba- 

bility, and concludes that fundamentally statistical phenomena point to some- 

thing other than a classically describable system. In his final chapter Unger 

returns to this idea. This final chapter, titled "Physical World View and Spiri- 

tual Science," is a radical departure from the previous approach of the book. 

Here, instead of a philosophical/historical analysis of modern physics but nev- 

ertheless based on it, Unger imagines how the facts of the so-called micro- 

world might be differently described if the self-limitation of physics (based on 

ignorance of the role of thinking) were removed. Here he discusses how the 

"fundamentally statistical phenomena" of modern physics might be interpret- 

ed in terms of sensible effects of supersensible spiritual beings acting across 

the boundary of the sense perceptible. Unger uses Rudolf Steiner's descrip- 

tion of a supersensible world for his examples, but his ideas need not be limit- 

ed to the particulars of Steiner's description of a spiritual world. 

Forming Concepts in Physics is highly recommended for anyone who is in- 

terested in understanding the epistomological ground of modern science. It 

will be of special interest to anyone who wishes to move beyond the habitual 

assumptions of reductionism and quasimaterialism. 

Jay KapprafS 

Department of Mathematics 

New Jersey Institute of Technology 

University Heights 

Newark. NJ 071 02-1 982

Journal of Scient$c Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 4, p. 575, 1997 0892-33 10197 


17th Annual SSE Meeting Announcement 

The seventeenth annual SSE meeting will be held on the campus of the Uni- 

versity of Virginia in Charlottesville on May 28-30, 1998. The theme is "His- 

tory and Philosophy of Science" with sessions stressing "Research on the 

Edges of Medicine," "Ideas for a New Biology," "Global Warming," and "The 

Sociology of Science Reporting." 

Contributed papers from the membership on these and other subjects are 

welcome. Titles and Abstracts should be sent by mail or via email (in plain 

ASCII text) to Prof. L. W. Fredrick, Chair of the Local Organizing Committee, 

Society for Scientific Exploration, P.O. Box 38 18, Charlottesville, Virginia, 

22903, email . Those presenting contributed papers 

should be prepared to present their paper in "poster paper" format. 

A reception will take place on the evening of Wednesday, May 27 and the 

Annual Banquet will be held in the Rotunda of the University of Virginia on 

Saturday evening May 30. Provision will be made for members wishing to see 

some of the local historical sights, such as the plantation of Thomas Jefferson 

in Monticello. 

A block of rooms has been reserved in the Cavalier Inn, 105 N. Emmet 

Street (804-296-8111 or 800-528-1234 via the Best Western Chain.) This 

hotel has offered a reduced rate to the Society for Scientific Exploration: $59 

per night for single rooms and $65 per night for double occupancy. The room 

rate includes van service between the airport and the hotel and a continental 

breakfast. The hotel is 8 miles from the airport, and adjoins the grounds of the 

University of Virginia. The meeting will be held in a building within easy 

walking distance of the hotel. Other motels within strolling distance are the 

Red Roof Inn, the Hampton Inn & Suites, the EconoLodge, and the Budget 

Inn. 

For those traveling from overseas or the west coast, an alternative (in terms 

of non-stop flights) to flying directly into Charlottesville is to arrive at the 

Dulles International Airport serving Washington, DC in northern Virginia and 

then drive a rental car to Charlottesville, a reasonably pleasant trip of about 

100 miles. 

A formal announcement will be mailed in early February 1998 to Society 

members and associates concerning registration, program, and other arrange- 

ments.

Journal of Scienti$c Exploration, Vol. 1 1, No. 4, pp. 577-590, 1997 0892-33 10197 


Index for Volume 11 

The following pages provide comprehensive subject and name indexes for 

volume 11 of the Journal. 

The Name Index includes, by author, all articles and book reviews that have 

appeared over the last year, as well as books by authors that have been re- 

viewed by someone else. Substantive citations to, and quotes from, an au- 

thor's work have also been indexed; routine references have not. 

The Subject Index includes a list, sorted alphabetically by author, of all 

books reviewed in the Journal, under the header "Book reviews." The name 

of the reviewer is included in parentheses at the end of each entry. 

The Editors wish to thank Nell Benton, Dawn Hunt, and James Matlock for 

their diligence in compiling and checking the indexes. 

Abell, George, 21-24,35 

Almeder, Robert 

A Critique of Arguments Offered 

Against Reincarnation, 499-526 

book review by, 548-52 

Alper, Paul 

book reviews by, 98- 100,249-52, 

255-61 

Alvarado, Carlos S. 

book review by, 41 8-23 

Arp, Halton 

Guest Column: Academic Science 

and Anomalies, 539-45 

Atmanspacher, Harald 

The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli: 

An Eminent Physicist's Extraordi- 

nary Encounter With Depth Psy- 

chology, 369-86 (co-author) 

Atwater, F. Holmes 

Accessing Anomalous States of Con- 

sciousness with a Binaural Beat 

Technology, 263-7 

Bacon, Sir Francis, 202-203 

Ballester-Olmos, V-.J. 

Expedientes Insolitos: El Fenomeno 

OVNI y 10s Archivos de Defensa, 

26 1-62 (book review) 

Banquet, J.P., 438,447 

Name Index 

Bauer, Henry H., 242 

book reviews by, 252-53,423-26, 

427-33,563-66 

Can Animals Understand Human 

Speech?, 89 

Bayanov, Dmitri 

In the Footsteps of the Russian Snow- 

man, 566-69 (book review) 

Beloff, John, 163-64 


Benson, H., 438 

Berger, Arthur S., 79,80,81,84 

Guest Column: Who Lives? Who 

Dies? Helpless Patients and ESP, 

387-94 

Bergson, Henri, 207 

Bockris, John O'M. 


Bohm, David, 70,71-73,75 

Bohr, Niels, 220-2 1 

Bradish, G. J. 

Correlations of Random Binary Se- 

quences With Pre-Stated Operator 

Intention: A Review of a 12-Year 

Program, 345-67 (co-author) 

Brahe, Tycho, 194,427 

Braud, William, 165 

Bullard, Thomas E., 92 

book review by, 555-57

578 Name Index: Volume 1 1 

Bunske, Edmund, 529 

Carlotto, Mark J. 

Evidence in Support of the Hypothe- 

sis that Certain Objects on Mars 

are Artificial in Origin, 123-45 

Chalker, Bill 

The Oz Files, 552-55 (book review) 

Chalmers, David J. 

The Conscious Mind: In Search of a 

Fundamental Theory, 547-48, 

548-52 (book reviews) 

Chandra, Jagdish, 5 19 

Chauvin, Remy 

An Answer to Professor Bauer on a 

Possible Understanding of Human 

Language by Animals, 242 

Cheek, D.B ., 446 

Chomsky, Noam, 248 

Chotkin, Corliss, 5 10 

Crick, Francis, 74 

Cruzan, Nancy, 387-88,389 

Darwin, Charles, 243-49, 429 

Das, N. N., 437-38,446,447 

Dean, Geoffrey 

Reply to Roberts [re: The Astrology 

of Time Twins], 159-6 1 (co- 

author) 

The Astrology of Time Twins: A Re- 

Analysis, 147-55 (co-author) 

Dennett, Daniel 

Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution 

and the Meanings of Life, 243-49 

(book review) 

Devereux, Paul 

The Archeology of Consciousness, 

527-38 

Dick, Steven J. 

The Biological Universe: The Twenti- 

eth-Century Extraterrestrial Life 

Debate and the Limits of Science, 


Dilley, Frank 

Philosophical Interactions With 

Parapsychology: The Major Writ- 

chology and Survival, 408- 17 

(book review) 

Dobyns, Y. H. 





Dommanget, J., 12 

The "Mars Effect" As Seen by the 

Committee PARA, 275-95 

Don, Norman S. 

Topographic Brain Mapping of UFO 

Experiencers, 435-53 (co-author) 

Donovan, James M. 

Toward a Model Relating Empathy, 

Charisma, and Telepathy, 455-7 1 

Dossey, Larry, 203-4 

Dunne, Brenda J. 





Science of the Subjective, 201-24 

(co-author) 

Eberlein, Gerald L. 

Comments on Almeder's "Recent Re- 

sponses to Survival Research" and 

"Reply" 89-90 

Eccles, Sir John, 74 

Eddington, Arthur, 217,220 

Edwards, Harry 

A Skeptics Guide to the New Age, 

552-55 (book review) 

Edwards, Paul, 42 1 

Reincarnation: A Critical Examina- 

tion, 499-526 (critique), 570-73 

(book review) 

Einstein, Albert, 218-19,346,370 

Eldridge, Don 

book reviews by, 93-96,552-55 

Ertel, Suitbert, 19-38 

Biased Data Selection in Mars Effect 

Research, 1 - 18 (co-author) 

Ethridge, Lorraine 

book reviews by, 96-98

Fox, Matthew 

Natural Grace, 96-98 (co-author) 

(book review) 

Fraser, Steven 

The Bell Cuwe Wars, 249-5 1 (book 

review) 

French, Christopher C. 


of Time Twins], 159-61 (co- 

author) 



Freud, Sigmund, 528 

Friedman, Stan ton T. 

Response to Vallee and Randle [re: 

Top SecretIMajic], 238-39 

Top Secret/Majic, 100- 104 (book re- 

view) 

Fuzeau-Braesch, Suzel, 3 17-20 

Astrology and Sociability: A Com- 

parative Analysis of the Results of 

a Psychological Test, 297-3 16 

Reply to McGrew's Comments [re: 

Astrology and Sociability], 320-21 

Garnick, Marc 

A Patient's Guide to Prostate Cancer: 

An Expert's Successful Treatment 

Strategies and Options, 255-61 

(book review) 

Gastaut, Henri, 437-38,446,447 

Gauquelin, Fran~oise, 19,21,3 1 

Gauquelin, Michel, 1 - 18, 19-38, 15 1, 

154-55, 158, 161,275-95,312 

Glauberman, Naomi 

The Bell Curve Wars, 249-5 1 (coauthor) 

(book review) 

Gould, Stephen J., 250 

Greengrass, H., 147-55, 160 

Gresson, Aaron D., 111 

Measured Lies, 249-5 1 (co-author) 

(book review) 

Grof, Stanilav, 5 1 1 - 12 

Groothuis, Doug 

Deceived by the Light, 98- 100 (book 

Name Index: Volume 11 579 

Haines, Richard F. 


Haisch, Bernhard 

The Zero-point Field and the NASA 

Challenge to Create the Space 

Drive, 473-85 (co-author) 

Haraldsson, Erlendur 

A Psychological Comparison Be- 

tween Ordinary Children and 

Those Who Claim Previous-Life 

Memories, 323-35 

Heisenberg, Werner, 221,382,383 

Henderson, Douglas B. 

Motivation and Meaningful Coinci- 

dence: A Further Examination of 

Synchronicity, 487-98 (co-author) 

Hester, Carl 

Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution 

and the Meanings of Life, 243-49 

(book review) 

Hillman, Harold, 94-96 

Hobson, D. P., 438-39 

Honorton, Charles, 254 

Houran, James 

Fortean Phenomena on Film: Evi- 

dence or Artifact?, 4 1-46 (co- 

author) 

Reply to Imich [re: Fortean Phenome- 

na on Film], 240-4 1 (co-author) 

Houtkooper, Joop M., 396-99 

Comments on Walach & Schmidt's 

"Empirical Evidence for a Non- 

classical Experimenter Effect," 

395-96 (co-author) 

Humphrey, Nicholas 

Leaps of Faith: Science, Miracles and 

the Search for Supernatural Caus- 

es, 25 1-55 (book reviews) 

Imich, Alexander 

Comments on "Fortean Phenomena 

on Film? Evidence or Artifact," 

239-40 

Irving, Kenneth 

Biased Data Selection in Mars Effect

580 Name Index: Volume 1 1 

Jacoby, Russell 

The Bell Curve Wars, 249-5 1 (co- 

author) (book review) 

Jahn, Robert G. 





Science of the Subjective, 201 -24 

(co-author) 

James, William, 207 

Jung, Carl Gustav,37 1,372,373-84, 

487-88,497 

Kappraff, Jay 


Kasey, Pam 

Alien Discussions: Proceedings of the 

Abduction Study Conference Held 

at MIT, Cambridge, 91-93 (co- 

editor) (book review) 

Kepler, Johannes, 375, 377, 430,432 

Kinchloe, Joe L. 


(book review) 

Klass, Philip, 102 

Korda, Michael 

Man to Man: Surviving Prostate Can- 

cer, 255-6 1 (book review) 

Kubler-Ross, Elisabeth, 426,5 1 1 - 12 

Kurtz, Paul, 280,422 

Is the "Mars Effect" Genuine?, 19-39 

(co-author) 

Lambourne, Robert 

Close Encounters? Science and Sci- 

ence Fiction, 555-57 (book re- 

view) 

Lange, Rense 

Fortean Phenomena on Film: Evi- 

dence or Artifact?, 41-46 (co- 

author) 

Reply to Imich [re: Fortean Phenome- 

na on Film], 240-41 (co-author) 

Lauritsen, John 

The AIDS Cult: Essays on the Gay 

Health Crisis, 423-26 (co-author) 

Leadbetter, Antony 


of Time Twins], 159-61 (co- 

author) 



Lemke, Jessica M. 



Synchronicity, 487-98 (co- author) 

Lewis, James 

How I Survived Prostate Cancer. .. 

and So Can You, 255-6 1 (book re- 

view) 

Lucadou, Walter von, 67 

MacGregor, Geddes, 5 14 

McGrew, John H. 

Report of Referee on "Astrology and 

Sociability: A Comparative 

Analysis of the Results of a 

Psychological Test," 3 17-20 

Mack, John E. 

Alien Discussions: Proceedings ofthe 


at MIT, Cambridge, 9 1-93 (co-au- 

thor) (book review) 

Martin, Brian 

Confronting the Experts, 93-96 (edi- 

tor) (book review) 

Matlock, James G. 


Menzel, Donald, 101,234,235,236 

Mitchell, Edgar, 77 

Moody, Raymond, 5 1 1 - 12 

Morra, Marion 

The Prostate Cancer Answer Book: 

An Unbiased Guide to Treatment 

Choices, 255-6 1 (co- author) 

(book review) 

Moura, Gilda 

Topographic Brain Mapping of UFO 

Experiencers, 435-53 (co-author) 

Mugan, Anthony 

Did Life Originate in Space? A Dis- 

cussion of the Implications of Re- 

cent Research, 337-43

Nanninga,R., 280 

Nelson, Roger D., 23 1-33 





Reply to Woodhouse [re: Wishing for 

Good Weather], 232-33 

Wishing for Good Weather: A Natural 

Experiment in Group Conscious- 

ness, 47-58 

Newton, Sir Isaac, 226,228 

Nienhuys, Jan Willem, 280-81 


(co-author) 

Officer, Charles 

The Great Dinosaur Extinction Con- 

troversy, 557-59 (co-author) (book 

review) 

Page, Jake 

The Great Dinosaur Extinction Con- 

troversy, 557-59 (co-author) (book 

review) 

Pauli, Wolfgang, 221,346,369-386 

Payne, James 

Me Too: A Doctor Survives Prostate 

Cancer, 255-61 (book review) 

Penrose, Roger, 244 

Pitsch, Eric P. 



Synchronicity, 487-98 (co-author) 

Planck, M., 474-76 

Plato, 381-82 

Playfair, Guy Lyon 

U.S.-Soviet Disinformation Game, 

399 

Potts, Eve 

The Prostate Cancer Answer Book: 

An Unbiased Guide to Treatment 

Choices, 255-61 (co-author) (book 

review) 

Pratt, David 

Consciousness, Causality and Quan- 

tum Physics, 69-78 


Price, H.H., 408-17 

Primas, Hans 

The Hidden Side of Wolfgang Pauli: 

An Eminent Physicist's Extraordi- 

nary Encounter With Depth Psy- 

chology, 369-86 (co-author) 

Pritchard, Andrea 



at MI?; Cambridge, 9 1-93 (co- 


Pritchard, David E. 



at MI?; Cambridge, 9 1-93 (co- 


Ptolemy, Claudius, 19, 194, 195, 196, 

198,227,300 

Puthoff, Harold 

Response to Playfair [re: U.S.-Soviet 

Disinformation Game], 400 

Radin, Dean I. 

Unconscious Perception of Future 

Emotions: An Experiment in Pre- 

sentiment, 163-80 

Randle, Kevin D., 102,237-38,238-39 

On the Wood Book Review of "Top 

SecretIMajic," 236-37 

Ransom, Champe, 521 

Ratsch, Christian, 53 1 

Rawlins, Dennis, 15,22,23,24,36 

Rhine, J. B., 346,390,410 

Rhine, Louisa, 346,420 

Ring, Kenneth, 92,439 

Roberts, Peter, 147-5 1, 154-55, 159-61 

Commentary on French et al. [The 

Astrology of Time Twins], 157-59 

Rossi, E. L., 446 

Rous, Stephan N. 

The Prostate Book: Sound Advice on 

Symptoms & Treatment, 255-61 

(book review) 

Rowe, Thomas C. 



Synchronicity, 487-98 (co-author)

582 Name Index: Volume 11 

Rueda, Alfonso 

The Zero-point Field and the NASA 

Challenge to Create the Space 

Drive, 473-85 (co-author) 

Russek, Linda G. S. 

Guest Column: Testing the Survival 

of Consciousness Hypothesis: The 

Goal of the Codes, 79-87 (co- 

author) 

Sagan, Carl, 102, 128, 141-42,229,236, 

406 

The Demon-Haunted World: Science 

as a Candle in the Dark, 559-63, 

563-66 (book reviews) 

Salk, Jonas, 2 18 

Sandhu, Ranjit 


(co-author) 

Sayre, K., 90 

Schmidt, Helmut, 76,362 

Schmidt, Stefan 

Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classi- 

cal Experimenter Effect: An Ex- 

perimental, Double-Blind Investi- 

gation of Unconventional 

Information Transfer, 59-68 (co- 

author) 


[re: Non-classical Experimenter 

Effect], 396-99 (co-author) 

Schwartz, Gary E. R. 

Guest Column: Testing the Survival 

of Consciousness Hypothesis: The 

Goal of the Codes, 79-87 (co- 

author) 

Searle, John, 244,247 

Serios, Ted, 239,240-41 

Shallis, Michael 


ence Fiction, 555-57 (co-author) 

(book review) 

Sheldrake, Rupert, 76 

Natural Grace, 96-98 (co-author) 

(book review) 

Shortland, Michael 


ence Fiction, 555-57 (co-author) 

(book review) 

Smith, Susy, 79-85 

Sperry, Roger, 74 

Spottiswoode, S. James P. 

Apparent Association Between Ef- 

fect Size in Free Response Anom- 

alous Cognition Experiments and 

Local Sidereal Time, 109-22 

Stein, Gordon 

The Encyclopedia of the Paranormal, 


Steinberg, Shirley 


(book review) 

Stevenson, Ian, 323,324,325,332,420, 

42 1,499-526 

book reviews by, 253-55,566 

Strieber. Whitley, 100 

Sturrock, Peter A., 139 

A Bayesian Maximum-Entropy Ap- 

proach to Hypothesis Testing, for 

Application to RNG and Similar 

Experiments, 18 1-92 

Guest Column: Curious, Creative and 

Critical Thinking, 225-30 

Sulloway, Frank J. 

Born to Rebel: Birth Order, Family 

Dynamics, and Creative Lives, 

427-33 (book review) 

Surwillo, W. W., 438-39 

Swords, Michael D., 104 

book review by, 91 -93 

Targ, Russell, 400 

Tertullian, 5 12,5 13 

Thomason, Sarah, 507 

Thompson, Richard 

Planetary Diameters in the Surya- 

Siddhanta, 193-200 

Truzzi, Marcello, 277,419 

Unger, Georg 

Forming Concepts in Physics, 573-74 

(book review) 

Vaitl, Dieter, 396-99


"Empirical Evidence for a Non- Zimmerman, Michael E. 

Classical Experimenter Effect," book review by, 40 1-8 

395-96 (co-author) 

Vallee, Jacques, 235-36 

On the Wood Book Review of "Top 

SecretIMajic," 233-34 

Walach, Harald 

Empirical Evidence for a Non-Classi- 

cal Experimenter Effect: An Ex- 

perimental, Double-Blind Investi- 

gation of Unconventional 

Information Transfer, 59-68 (co- 

author) 


[re: Non-classical Experimenter 

Effect], 396-99 (co-author) 

Wallace, Alfred Lord, 402,428,431 

Wallner, Kent 

Prostate and Cancer: A Non-Surgical 

Perspective, 255-61 (book review) 

Wheatley, James M. 0. 

book review by, 408- 17 

Winn, Edward 

book reviewed by, 566-69 

Wood, Robert M. 

book review by, 100- 104 

Reply to Randle [re: Review of Top 

Secret/Majic], 237-38 

Reply to Vallee [re: Review of Top 

Secret/Majic], 235-36 

Woodhouse, Iain 

Comments on Nelson's "Wishing for 

Good Weather: A Natural Experi- 

ment in Group Consciousness," 

231-32 

Yapp, Claudia 



at MIZ Cambridge, 91-93 (co- 


Young, Ian 

The AIDS Cult: Essays on the Gay 

Health Crisis, 423-26 (co-author) 

(book review) 

Zelen, Marvin, 21-24,35,277,292

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 

(AIDS), 423-26 

Aliens 

see Extraterrestrials 

Altered states of consciousness (ACSs), 

263-74,390-91 

UFO experiencers, 435-39 

Analytical psychology, 22 1,373-75 

Wolfgang Pauli and, 375-86 

Ancient monuments, 534-36 

acoustic properties, 537 

Animals, 

human speech and, 89,242 

Anomalous cognition, 109- 122 

see also Consciousness-related 

anomalies; Extrasensory percep- 

tion; Psychokinesis; Remote per- 

ceptionlviewing; Telepathy 

Anomalous phenomena 

experimenter effect, 59-67, 345-67, 

395-96 

limits of concept, 45 

photography, 4 1-46,239-4 1 

science and, 69-78,201-30,539-45, 

559-66 

spacialltemporal boundaries, 69-78, 

109-22, 147-55, 157-61, 163-80, 

487-98 

see also Astrology; Astronomy; Con- 

sciousness-related anomalies; 

Cryptozoology; Engineering 

anomalies research; Experimenter 

effect; Extraterrestrials; Near- 

death experiences; Out-of-body 

experiences; Parapsychology; 

Psychokinesis; Reincarnation; Re- 

mote perceptionlviewing; Telepa- 

thy; UFOs and ufology 

Apparitions, 409 

Archeology 

consciousness, 527-38 

Artificial intelligence 

and evolution, 244,246 

Astrology 

Index: Volume 11 

Subject Index 

Mars effect (Gauquelin effect), 1 - 18, 

19-39,275-95 

sociability and, 297-321 

time twins, 147-55, 157-61 

Astronomy 

ancient Indian, 193-200 

big bang theory, 540-44 

galaxies, 543 

Bayesian analysis. see under Statistics 

and methodology 

Belgian Committee for the Scientific In- 

vestigation of Alleged Paranormal 

Phenomena (Para Committee) 

Mars effect research, 1-39,275-95 

Bell curve and race 

criticisms, 249-5 1 

Binaural beats. see Consciousness, al- 

tered states of 

Birth order, influence on character traits, 

427-33 

Book reviews 

Ballester-Olmos, V.-J., Expedientes 

Insolitos: El Fenomeno OVNI y 

10s Archivos de Defensa, 261 -62 

(R.F. Haines) 

Bayanov, D., In the Footsteps of the 

Russian Snowmen, 566-69 (E. 

Winn) 

Chalker, B., The Oz Files, 552-55 (D. 

Eldridge) 

Chalmers, D.J., The Conscious Mind: 

In Search of a Fundamental Theo- 

ry, 547-48 (J. Beloff), 548-52 (R. 

Almeder) 

Dennett, D.C., Danvin's Dangerous 

Idea: Evolution and the Meanings 

of Life, 243-49 (C. Hester) 

Dick, S.J., The Biological Universe: 

The Twentieth-Century Extrater- 

restrial Life Debate and the Limits 

of Science, 40 1 -8 (M.E. Zimmer- 

man) 

Dilley, F.B.(ed.), Philosophical Inter- 

actions with Parapsychology: The

586 Subject Index: Volume 11 

Major Writings of H. H. Price on 

Parapsychology and Survival, 

408- 17 (J.M.O. Wheatley) 

Edwards, H., A Skeptic's Guide to the 

New Age, 552-55 (D. Eldridge) 

Edwards, P., Reincarnation: A Criti- 

cal Examination, 570-73 (J.G. 

Matlock) 

Fox, M., and Sheldrake, R., Natural 

Grace, 96-98 (L. Ethridge) 

Fraser, S. (ed.), The Bell Curve Wars, 

249-52 (P. Alper) 

Friedman, S.T., Top Secret/Majik, 

100-104 (R.M. Wood) 

Garnick, M., A Patient's Guide to 

Prostate Cancer: An Expert's Suc- 

cessful Treatment Strategies and 

Options, 255-61 (P. Alper) 

Groothuis, D., Deceived by the Light, 

98- 100 (P. Alper) 

Humphrey, N., Leaps of Faith: Sci- 

ence, Miracles and the Search for 

Supernatural Causes, 25 1-52 (P. 

Alper), 252-53 (H.H. Bauer), 253- 

55 (I. Stevenson) 

Jacoby, R. and Glauberman, N. 

(eds.), The Bell Curve Debate, 

249-52 (P. Alper) 

Kincheloe, S., Steinberg, S.R., and 

Gresson 111, A.D. (eds.), Measured 

Lies, 249-51 (P. Alper) 

Korda, M., Man to Man: Surviving 

Prostate Cancer, 255-61 (P. Alper) 

Lambourne, R., Shallis, M., and 

Shortland, M., Close Encounters? 

Science and Science Fiction, 555- 

57 (T.E. Bullard) 

Lauritsen, J. and Young, I. (eds.), The 

AIDS Cult: Essays on the Gay 

Health Crisis, 423-27 (H.H. 

Bauer) 

Lewis, J., How I Survived Prostate 

Cancer.. . And So Can You: A 

Guide for Diagnosing and Treating 


Marks, S., Prostate and Cancer: A 

Family Guide to Diagnosis, Treat- 

ment and Survival, 255-61 (P. 

Alper) 

Martin, B. (ed.), Confronting the Ex- 

perts, 93-96 (D. Eldridge) 

Morra, M. and Potts, E., The Prostate 

Cancer Answer Book: An Unbi- 

ased Guide to Treatment Choices, 

255-6 1 (P. Alper) 

Officer, C., and Page, J., The Great 

Dinosaur Extinction Controversy, 

557-59 (H.H. Bauer) 

Payne, J., Me Too: A Doctor Survives 


Pritchard, A., Pritchard, D.E., Mack, 

J.E., Kasey, P. and Yapp, C. (eds), 

Alien Discussions: Proceedings of 

the Abduction Study Conference 

Held at MII: Cambridge, 9 1-93 

(M.D. Swords) 

Rous, S.N., The Prostate Book: 

Sound Advice on Symptoms and 

Treatment, 255-6 1 (P. Alper) 

Sagan, C., The Demon-Haunted 

World: Science as a Candle in the 

Dark, 559-63 (J. O'M. Bockris), 

563-66 (H.H. Bauer), 566 (I. 

Stevenson) 

Stein, G. (ed.), The Encyclopedia of 

the Paranormal, 418-23 (C.S. Al- 

varado) 

Sulloway, F.J., Born to Rebel: Birth 

Order, Family Dynamics, and Cre- 

ative Lives, 427-33 (H.H. Bauer) 

Unger, G., Forming Concepts in 

Physics, 573-74 (J. Kappraff) 

Wallner, K., Prostate and Cancer: A 

Non-Surgical Perspective, 255-6 1 

(P. Alper) 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

parapsychological research and, 399, 

400 

UFO investigations and, 104,236, 

239 

Chaos theory, 57,346 

Charisma 

definitions, 458-6 1

developmental/historical correlates, 

463-64 

personality correlates, 464 

Clairvoyance, 75 

Coincidence. see Synchronicity 

ComitC Belge pour 1'Investigation Sci- 

entifique des PhCnom2nes RCputCs 

Paranormaux. See Belgian Com- 

mittee for the Scientific Investiga- 

tion of Alleged Paranormal Phe- 

nomena (Para Committee) 

ComitC Frangais pour 1'Etude des 

PhCnomenSs Paranormeaux 

(CFEPP) 

astrology study of, 1 - 18,25-38 

Committee for the Scientific Investiga- 

tion of Claims of the Paranormal 

(CSICOP) 

astrology study of, 1-18,21-25,252, 

420,565 

Complex psychology. see Analytical 

psychology 

Consciousness 

altered states of (ASCs), 263-74,390- 

91,435-39 

archeology of, 527-38 

communications theory and, 90 

group, 47-58,23 1-33 

interpretations and theories, 246, 

266-68,410-414,547-52 

presentiment and, 163-78 

quantum physics and, 69-78,206-7, 

213-15,219-23,345-46,375,548 

scientific research problem of, 20 1 - 

224 

survival of after death, 79-86,89-90, 

499-526 

telepathy and, 41 1 

Consciousness field effects. see under 

Engineering anomalies research 

Consciousness-related anomalies 

human-machine interactions, 208- 1 1, 

267, 345-67 

interpretations and theories, 201-224 

weather, anomalous correlations, 47- 

58,231-33 

see also Anomalous phenomena; En- 

Subject Inde x: Volume 11 5 87 

trasensory perception; Meditation, 

UFO experiencers; Precognition; 

Psychokinesis; Remote percep- 

tionlviewing; Super-psi hypothe- 

sis; Telepathy 

Cryptozoology, 4 19 

hominoids, 566-69 

Cydonian hypothesis, 123-45 

Death and dying, 387-94 

Dinosaur extinction, 557-59 

Dowsing, 59-68,560 

Dreams and dreaming, 37 1,39 1 

Emotions, unconscious perceptions of 

future, 163-80 

Empathy 

definitions, 458-6 1 

developmentallhistorical correlates, 

46 1 

models, 455-7 1 

personality correlates, 461 


Bayesian analysis vs. frequentist hy- 

potheses: see under Statistics and 

methodology 

consciousness field effects, 47-58, 

231-33 

gender differences, 356 

interpretations and theories, 20 1-224, 

363 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Re- 

search (PEAR) lab, 76, 1 1 1, 1 19, 

201 -224,345-67,42 1 

pseudorandom event generators, null 

results, 356-57 

random event generators (REGS), 

208-11,215,345-67 

random number generators (RNGs), 

181-82 

replicability, 362-63 

theoretical models, 2 12- 15 

see also Anomalous phenomena; 

Consciousness-related phenome- 

na; Psychokinesis; Remote percep- 

tionlviewing; Statistics and 

methodology

588 Subject Index: Volume 11 

artificial intelligence and, 244 

birth order and receptivity to among 

scientists, 428-30 

extraterrestrial life and, 337-43,401- 

408 

natural selection, 243-49 

reincarnation and, 5 12- 13 

scientific methodologies, 202-205 

Experimenter effect, 59-68,345-67, 

395-99 

Extrasensory perception (ESP), 387-94, 

409,553 

statistical analysis, 42 1-22 

theoretical models, 75-77 

see also Clairvoyance; Precognition; 

Remote perceptionlviewing; Super 

psi; Telepathy 

Extraterrestrials (ETs), 9 1-93, 124- 126, 

141-142,401-8 

Fortean phenomena. see Anomalous 

phenomena 

Genetics 

birth order vs., 429 

Geomagnetic activity, phenomena asso- 

ciated with, 110 

Gravitation, 473-85 

Homeopathy, 553,560 

Hypnosis, 267 

Inertia, 473-85 

Intellectual suppression, 93-96,539-45, 

557-59 

Interstellar travel, theoretical, 473-85 

Jesus, miracles of, 25 1-52,254-55 

Kirlian photography, 4 19 

Life, origin of, 

extraterrestrial, 337-43,401-408 

Majestic- 12 (MJ- 12) documents, 102-4, 

234-37 

Mars 

artificial objects on, 123-45 

intelligent life on (the Cydonian Hy- 

pothesis), 123-45 

life forms on, 402-403 

meteorite microfossils, 337-38,341 

Mars effect. see under Astrology 

Meditation 


Mediumship, 4 14,420 

Methodology and statistics. see Statis- 

tics and methodoIogy 

Mind, 69-86 

brain and, 244-49,263-74,503-504, 

5 16- 17,522-23 

philosophy of, 408-17,547-52 

see also Consciousness 

Morphic resonance 

ritual and, 97-98 

National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 

istration (NASA), 473 

Near-death experiences (NDEs), 98- 

100,509-510 

Neuroscience applications to 

psychology 

brain mapping of UFO experiencers, 

435-53 

Origin of life, 337-43,405-6 

Out-of-body experiences (OBEs), 414, 

422,509- 12 

Parapsychology, 12 1,208,227-28,467 

CIA and, 399,400 

gansfeld, 1 1 1 - 12,42 1 

philosophy and, 408-41 7 

skepticism regarding, 25 1-54,4 18-23 

Soviet research on, 399,400 



na; Engineering anomalies re- 

search, Psychokinesis; Telepathy 

Photographic anomalies, 4 1-46,239-40, 

419 

Physics 

development of knowledge in, 573-74 

gravitation, 473-85 

inertia, 473-85

negative mass, impossibility of, 483- 

84 

quantum theory, 69-78,204,205, 

206-207,213-15,219-22,345-46, 

363,370,375,380,382,573-74 

zero-point field, 473-85 

Places 

nature of, 528-29 

Precognition, 76, 109, 110, 164 

of emotions, 163-80 

see also Anomalous cognition; Re- 

mote perceptionlviewing 

Princeton Engineering Anomalies Re- 

search (PEAR) Laboratory. see 

Consciousness-related anomalies; 


Prostate cancer, conflicting therapies, 

255-62 

Psi phenomena, 165-66,390,411,418. 

see also Anomalous cognition; Ex- 

perimenter effect; Extrasensory 

perception; Telepathy 

Psychokinesis (PK), 410- 14 

macro, 77 

micro, 76-77, 1 10 

see also Consciousness-related phe- 

nomena Engineering anomalies re- 

search; Remote perceptionlview- 

ing 

Quantum physics. see under Physics 

Reincarnation, 417,421,570-73 

birthmarks and birth defects, 5 10-5 1 1 

cases suggestive of in Sri Lanka, 323- 

35 

consciousness and, 89-90 

evolution and, 5 12- 13 

definition, 501-3 

philosophical arguments, 499-526 

psychological traits and, 323-35 

Remote perceptionlviewing, 399,400 

experiments, 109- 122,202-203,211- 

12 

interpretations and theories, 2 12- 15, 

218-19,267 

see also Consciousness-related anom- 

Subject Index: Volume 11 589 

alies; Engineering anomalies re- 

search 

Sacred places, 527-38 

Science 

censorship of discordant results, 93- 

96,225,539-45,557-59 

consciousness and, 201-224,266-68, 

548-52 

epistomology of, 20 1-224,40 1-408, 

573-74 

heresy, 225-30 

innovations in related to birth order, 

427-33 

religion and, 25 1-52,560 

science fiction and, 555-57 

spirituality and, 96-98,560 

study of intangibles and, 201-224, 

559-66 

Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence 

(SETI), 125-26,141,401,402, 

406-408 

Sidereal time 

anomalous cognition and, 109- 122 

Skeptical Inquirer, The, 25 1,252, 280 

Skeptics and skepticism, 2-3,4 1-46, 

25 1-55 

Mars effect, 280 

NDEs, 99-100 

parapsychology, 25 1-54,418-23 

reincarnation, 499-526,570-73 

survival of consciousness, 82 

UFOs, 91-93, 100-104,233-39,404-5 

see also Committee for the Scientific 

Investigation of Claims of the 

Paranormal (CSICOP); Belgian 

Committee for the Scientific In- 

vestigation of Alleged Paranormal 

Phenomena (Para Committee); 

Comite Franqais pour 1'Etude des 

PhCnomen2s Paranormeaux 

(CFEPP) 

"Snowmen" of Russia. see Cryptozoolo- 

gy, hominoids 

Society for Scientific Exploration (SSE), 

230,235 

Statistics and methodology, 395-99 

Bayesian analysis, 137-38,18 1-92 

history, 202-203

590 Subject Index: Volume 1 1 

maximum-entropy, 18 1-92 

meta-analysis, 64,347,361 

Super-psi hypothesis, 334,4 14- 15 

Survival after death, 79-86,89-90,99, 

414-17 

see also Near-death experience; 

Reincarnation 

Survival Research Foundation, 79,80, 

8 1 

Synchronicity, 221, 377-81,487-98 

Telepathy, 75-76, 346,410-13,561 

after death, 79-85 

definitions, 264,457-58,460 

developmental/historical correlates, 

464 

personality correlates, 464-65 

physicallgenetic correlates, 465 

related to charisma and empathy, 455- 

7 1 



na; Engineering anomalies re- 

search; Remote perceptionlview- 

ing 

Trances 


UFOs and ufology, 261 -62,404-405, 

552-54 

documents, 100-104,233-39,262 

experiencers, 91-93,409,435-53 

skepticism, 91-93, 100-104,233-39, 

404-5,552-53 

see also Extraterrestrials 

Weather, anomalous correlations, 47-58, 

231-33 

Zelen test, 21-23,35 

see also Astrology, "Mars effect"


Varian 302 




Ms. Brenda Dunne 

Executive Vice President for Education 

C 13 1, School of Engineering &Applied Science, 

Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-5263 




Princeton. NJ 08544-5263 






VPI & su 


Prof. John Bockris 



College Station, TX 77843 

Dr. John S. Derr 

Albq. Seismology Center 

Albuquerque, NM 87 1 15 

Dr. Roger D. Nelson 

C 13 1, Engineering Quad. 


Princeton, NJ 08544 

Council 



P. 0. Box 3818 



Prof. Charles R. Tolbert, Treasurer 


P. 0. Box 3818 



Dr. Harold E. Puthoff 

Institute of Advanced Studies-Austin 

4030 W. Braker Ln., Suite 300 

Austin, TX 78759-5329 


Institute for Frontier Science 

61 14 LaSalle Avenue, #605 

Oakland, CA 946 1 1 





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1727 Candlestick Ln.

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