



The James Blair Historical Review

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

I am the *James Blair Historical Review's* first Editor-in-Chief who was not involved with the journal from its inception. It is an intimidating charge. In fact, last spring, I nearly did not apply to be the Editor-in-Chief of *JBHR*. Senior year was approaching, and I meant to cut back on extra-curricular activities, not add them. Suddenly running a journal with which I had not previously been involved seemed like an especially big challenge, but I ultimately chose to pursue the position of *JBHR's* Editor-in-Chief because I believe very strongly in its mission to encourage undergraduate research through publication. In pursuit of that mission, we have with this published 21 such papers from William & Mary—and two more from outside The College.

That's right! I am not the only new element to *JBHR*: This year, we extended the opportunity of submission to other Virginia schools, and we were thrilled to receive papers written by students at James Madison University, Hampton University, and Richard Bland College, among others. Indeed, two of the following essays are written by students at Norfolk State University and the University of Virginia. I was particularly honored to interact with history departments and authors across the state. I believe that expanding our audience in Virginia will help foster a sense of a greater undergraduate historical community, and I look forward to *JBHR's* next steps in solidifying its growth.

Of course, a significantly wider pool for submissions resulted in significantly more submissions this year than last. I want to thank all of our authors, published or not, for trusting us with their papers. Our indomitable peer reviewers have my gratitude for wading through all of them! I am indebted to our faculty advisors (Dr. Hiroshima Kitamura and Dr. Jeremy Pope) and my fellow editors (Amy Schaffman, Abby Gomulkiewicz, and Matthew Paganussi).

On behalf of the entire 2013-2014 Editorial Board, we thank you for picking up a copy of the *James Blair Historical Review*. It has been very thoughtfully crafted for your enjoyment and edification.

Sincerely,
Deborah Wood
Editor-in-Chief


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Online: In addition to this printed issue, the James Blair Historical Review can also be accessed online through our website <wmpeople.wm.edu/site/page/jbhr/>.

Cover: Detail. F.L. Nicolet, “If Ye Break Faith - We Shall Not Sleep [Canada],” [c. 1918] Archives of Ontario War Poster Collection, C 233-2-0-1-16a.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS:



Jake Douglas is a senior at The College of William & Mary majoring in Government and minoring in Chinese. His research interests include post-WWII American foreign policy in Asia, deterrence theory, and concepts of international justice. Jake's commentary has appeared in *The National Interest*, *The Diplomat*, and *The Strategist*. His honors thesis, "Commitment without Control," explores the relationship between burdensharing and entrapment in the U.S.-Japan alliance. He hopes to return to China upon graduation and eventually join the DC think tank community.



Rachel Azafrani is a freshman and a Sharpe Scholar at The College of William & Mary, potentially majoring in economics and applied mathematics. Her career interests lie in international development and natural resource economics. She is a member of the William & Mary Choir and participates in Model United Nations. She hails from Manhattan Beach, CA.

Corey Wash is a senior history major at Norfolk State University. He comes from Chesapeake, Virginia.



Sabrina Manfield is a history and government major at The College of William & Mary. On campus, Sabrina is an active member of both Kappa Delta Sorority and Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity. Sabrina has studied abroad in Dublin, Ireland, and in Prague, the Czech Republic.

In her free time, she enjoys experimenting with new recipes, yoga and jogging, tasting samples at the Peanut Shop, and reading.



Eric Grube is a fourth-year history major at the University of Virginia. Currently, he is finishing up his thesis on the Nazi manipulation of Frederick the Great's historical image. In the fall, he will be attending graduate school to attain a Ph.D. in modern European history.

*The Editorial Board would like to congratulate **Jake Douglas**, winner of the James Blair Historical Review 2014 **Best Essay Award** for his analysis of diverse Keynes-related documents in “**The Passing of the Carthaginian Peace: Keynes, Britain, and the Reparations Questions, 1918-1920.**”*

THE PASSING OF THE CARTHAGINIAN PEACE:

Keynes, Britain, and the Reparations Question, 1918-1920

Jake Douglas, The College of William & Mary

“No! The economist is not king; quite true. But he ought to be! He is a better and wiser governor than the general or the diplomatist or the oratorical governor.”

—J.M. Keynes, article in the *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, 1922¹

Introduction

Rarely has an economist enjoyed such influence in his own lifetime as John Maynard Keynes. No one disputes that designation. Yet one man in his time plays many parts. Keynes served His Majesty’s Government in both World Wars and attended the 1919 Paris Peace Conference as a member of the British Delegation. A strident critic of the Treaty of Versailles he failed to avert, Keynes was a prolific writer during the interwar period, authoring several books and dozens of articles and editorials. He has been rightly called, in the words of his mentee Austin Robinson, an economist, an author, and a statesman.²

For interwar Europe, Keynes was most influential as a public propagandist. A self-ascribed evangelist for liberal internationalism, he even titled one collection of his own writings “Essays in Persuasion.”³ In Paris, Keynes resigned from the British delegation in a fit of humiliation and rage, convinced the victors were imposing a “Carthaginian peace” on defeated Germany and Austria.⁴ The economic and reparations clauses of the Treaty were so onerous, he believed, that their realization was simultaneously impossible and ruinous for European economic vitality. The dictates of Britain and France would only succeed in starving the German people and exposing all of Europe to the specter of Bolshevism. If the Germans were to pay this tax at all, it would be in blood.

Keynes broadcasted his plea for revision of the Treaty in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, published in Britain on December 12, 1919. The book delivered a unifying ideology for those

beginning to doubt the settlement's prudence and morality. The readership was vast, and its influence is obvious from the correspondence of British statesmen. In taking the first steps towards appeasement, "perhaps," wrote A.J.P. Taylor, "they were influenced by the writings of Keynes."⁵ Indeed, the economist's strictures weighed heavily upon the post-Versailles conferences of 1920.

Keynes was not solely responsible for shifting British policy towards revision in the early 1920s. Nevertheless, John Maynard Keynes was instrumental in accelerating the transformation of British policy from penalty to leniency, and he uniquely contributed to the passing, as it were, of a Carthaginian peace. "It would doubtless be a profitable task," in the words of a famous critic, "to inquire into the Historical Causes of Mr. Keynes."⁶

Pre-Armistice Agreement

Fighting on the Western front officially ended on November 11, 1918, with the signing of the Armistice agreement between Germany and the Allies. Exhausted and demoralized, the German war effort was on the brink of collapse. Yet the Reich was not vanquished decisively on the battlefield; there was no unconditional surrender. The Armistice was a conditional agreement between legally equal parties. It was a situation that conferred Germany some assurances and guarantees.

The ceasefire was predicated upon the fulfillment of principles found in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and associated speeches. The German Note of October 5, 1918, accepted the legitimacy of Wilson's Fourteen Points and requested an armistice. Following a series of communications between German and Allied Governments, Wilson transmitted his own Note back on November 5, 1918. He confirmed all parties had declared their willingness to end the war "on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918 [the Fourteen Points], and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses."⁷ The Allies' sole caveat was that Germany be held accountable for "all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."⁸ The "limiting quality" of these terms is further corroborated by the text of later addresses. In his speech to Congress on February 11, 1918, Wilson vowed the European peace would include neither

“contributions” nor “punitive damages.”⁹

These were the conditions on which Great Britain could legally demand payment from Germany at the Paris Peace Conference. Because of its peculiar role in the war as an “offshore balancer,” Britain had suffered little civilian damage relative to France and Belgium. A strict interpretation of the terms listed above meant, therefore, that Britain could only claim damages to “civilian life and property” due to “air raids, naval bombardments, submarine warfare, and mines,” as well as “compensation for improper treatment of interned civilians.”¹⁰ The direct expenses of warfighting, as well as indirect damages such as lost trade incurred during the war, were on Britain’s tab.¹¹

At first glance, “damage to the civilian population” seems an innocuous phrase—secure from any ambiguity that might allow the Allies to demand larger indemnities. Yet almost immediately, long dormant political tides demanding punishment for Germany swept across Great Britain. Soon the work of “the sophists and the lawyers... discover[ed] in the written word what was not there,” and the claims of British politicians came to cover nearly the entire cost of the war.¹²

Election of 1918

A general election was announced for early December three days after the Armistice.¹³ It was the first held in Britain since 1910. The election quickly morphed into a bedlam of acrimony as “anti-Germanism became the fever of the moment.”¹⁴ Albeit less so than Belgium or France, Britain had suffered terribly in the Great War. Millions of casualties were no easy burden. The crushing weight of war debt had continually strained public finance. A painful task of reconstruction lay ahead. As Winston Churchill observed with haunting expression,

The brave people whom nothing had daunted had suffered too much. Their unpent feelings were lashed by the popular press into fury. The crippled and mutilated soldiers darkened the streets. The returned prisoners told the hard tale of bonds and privation. Every cottage had its empty chair. Hatred of the beaten foe, thirst for his punishment, rushed up from the hearts of deeply injured millions.¹⁵

The oft-cited poetry of Rudyard Kipling, who lost a son to German artillery, was prescient in 1917 of the fierce vindictiveness to come: “We have only the memory left of [our children’s] home-treasured sayings and laughter / The price of our loss shall be paid to our hands, not another’s hereafter.”¹⁶

Across the country, demagogues mounted campaign stages spouting fire and brimstone. The Conservatives—coalition partners of Prime Minister Lloyd George’s Liberal party—smelled blood and forced Liberal and Labour party candidates alike towards more punitive campaign slogans like “Hang the Kaiser” and “Make Germany Pay.”¹⁷ Financier and journalist Horatio Bottomley advised Britons that “if by chance you should discover one day in a restaurant that you are being served by a German waiter, you will throw the soup in his foul face; if you find yourself sitting at the side of a German clerk, you will spill the inkpot over his vile head.”¹⁸ Bottomley sailed into office as an MP that year with eighty percent of the vote.¹⁹

Those who opposed harsh terms for Germany were not so successful. Herbert Henry Asquith, leader of the Liberal party since 1908, did not want Germany destroyed. In the year preceding the election, Asquith argued for a “Clean Peace,” reasoning that heavy reparations would constitute “a ‘veiled war’ continu[ed] ‘by other methods.’”²⁰ A local Conservative candidate ousted Asquith from the East Fife seat he had occupied since 1886.²¹ He did not return to Parliament until 1920.

The Prime Minister himself was no “high reparationer.” At a meeting of Liberal MPs on November 12, 1918, he swore that an oppressive peace would inspire German revanchism, drawing a parallel to the harsh penalty forced on France in 1871.²² He believed the Great War began fundamentally as a result of miscommunication and had wrecked what had historically been neutral Anglo-German relations.²³ Lloyd George maintained in his memoirs that

So far as my own view is concerned, it is on record that I never thought Germany could pay these huge sums. Speaking at Bristol on December 11th, 1918, in the course of the election campaign, I said: ‘If I were to say to you, not merely that Germany ought to pay, but that we can expect every penny, I should be doing so without giving you the whole of the facts...’²⁴

His caution notwithstanding, the Prime Minister’s slogans soon in-

cluded “Make Germany Pay.”²⁵ Lloyd George rode the wave of anti-German zeal, and as Bernard Baruch observed, “the English people, by an overwhelming majority, return[ed] to power their Prime Minister on the basis of an increase in the severity of these terms of the peace, especially those of reparation.”²⁶ The stage was set for a vindictive peace.

Keynes and the Conference

The wrath of British public opinion had not subsided by the time of the Allies met in Versailles. Even if they did not personally support punishing Germany, British, French, and Belgian delegates alike felt constrained by their domestic political conditions. The conference was in essence an act in defining for whom the peace was to be just. As American delegate Bernard Baruch conjectured,

If the ideal peace...had been actually undertaken, with all that it seemingly involved of sacrifice and unselfishness, the result would have been the overthrow of at least three of the major governments. It would have been followed further by the substitution of other representatives who would have come into power under a popular mandate requiring them to be even more exacting in their terms.²⁷

As head of a minority party in a coalition government with the Conservatives, David Lloyd George depended on support from across the British political spectrum. The need for political subservience moderated whatever hopes he held for a temperate peace. In late March and early April, the British press and the House of Commons challenged his claim to leadership. Standing in for the Prime Minister, MP Bonar Law was roundly attacked in an indemnity debate with the Conservative rank-and-file, or backbenchers.²⁸ On April 8, three hundred members of the House of Commons dispatched a telegram to Lloyd George demanding the fulfillment of his campaign pledges.²⁹ So blunt was this act that George felt compelled to return to London and address Parliament, reassuring his countrymen that he ““want[ed] a stern peace, because the occasion demands it. The crime demands it.””³⁰ Given these external constraints, the Prime Minister determined to set upon the most politically acceptable path: Britain must squeeze every penny out of German coffers and industry.³¹

The Prime Minister surrounded himself with three men who shared the rancorous expectations of their national publics. Prime

Minister of the Australian Commonwealth William Morris Hughes made a habit of demagoguery while in Paris.³² At one point, he “insisted that every Australian who had placed a mortgage on his house to buy a war bond was as definitely entitled to reparation as was every Frenchman whose house had been burned by the Germans.”³³ Even before its signing, Hughes had publicly refused to accept the narrow terms of the Pre-Armistice agreement.³⁴ Lord Sumner of Ibstone John Andrew Hamilton had been a lord of appeal in ordinary and a famous lawyer. When cautioned by the Prime Minister “that too much severity might push Germany into Bolshevism, he replied, ... ‘In that case the Germans will be cutting each others’ throats, and there is nothing I would like better.’”³⁵ Together with Lord Cunliffe, an ex-governor of the Bank of England, these three “high reparationers” represented Britain’s most parochial interests.³⁶

Keynes detested these men, especially the Lords Sumner and Cunliffe. As McGill Professor John A. Hall writes, “in Keynes’s demonology of the Conference, Sumner stood, like Lucifer, at the apex, worse even than his satellite Cunliffe. Cunliffe was troublesome because he plucked figures from the sky and threw his considerable weight behind them.”³⁷ The “astronomical” reparations figures the two devised led Keynes to style them the “Heavenly Twins.”³⁸ Keynes again described them in nightmarish terms in one of his notebooks: “A remarkable couple protected British interests, the Lords Sumner and Cunliffe—as though—it seemed to onlookers—a vulture were bedfellow with a pig, the one tearing the flesh from the dying victim but it was the other who was gorged.”³⁹

In Keynes’s estimation, the Lords had no expertise in international affairs. They were above all campaign advisors. Lloyd George, Keynes observed to Sir Bradbury, frequently asked him and the Twins to prepare the same memoranda separately. Keynes’s advice was of economic and practical relevance; theirs was political. The Prime Minister might then strive for a “middle course.”⁴⁰ As he wrote to Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain about the Lords after the Conference,

The Prime Minister was never under the slightest illusion as to the value of their advice. They were, as he well knew, the price he had to pay for electioneering. If I were to give the whole story of his relations with those two as I know it as first hand, I do not think the world would hold

him excused.⁴¹

Guided by the Twins, not Keynes, the Prime Minister finally committed to one of the broadest construction of “damage done to the civilian population” imaginable; he claimed that Germany was liable for all British servicemen’s disability and death pensions.⁴² As Sumner argued, a soldier is ““simply a civilian called to arms in the cause of justice; his uniform makes no difference.””⁴³ They reasoned it was unjust “that Germany was to pay compensation for a broken chimney-pot on a French cottage, but not for the dependents of a British soldier killed defending it.”⁴⁴ The ulterior motive was to enlarge the slice of the pie that Britain was entitled to as a contributor in the war of troops but not occupied territory. In desperation to fix an agreement, President Wilson acceded to Lloyd George’s unyielding demand on April 1.

Keynes was devastated. The terms to be imposed on Germany were not only prohibitive but also in violation to Britain’s previous engagements. In writing to his mother, Keynes expressed a deep sense of personal failure.⁴⁵ On May 26, he wrote to Chamberlain about his justifications for leaving:

We have presented a draft treaty to the Germans which contains much that is unjust and much more that is inexpedient...If this policy is pursued, the consequences will be disastrous in the extreme...I cannot express how strongly I feel as to the gravity of what is in front of us, and I must have my hands quite free....The Prime Minister is leading us all into a morass of destruction...How can you expect me to assist at this tragic farce any longer, seeking to lay the foundations, as a Frenchman puts it, ‘d’une guerre juste et durable’?⁴⁶

The British Government, now hostile to a real peace, had no place for Keynes. On June 5, Keynes tendered a letter of resignation to Lloyd George, “leav[ing] the twins to gloat over the devastation of Europe and to assess to taste what remains for the British taxpayer.”⁴⁷

Europe after the Treaty

Keynes departed Paris in June 1919 in a state of vexation. Many in Parliament and the British delegation shared this lack of sentimentality for the Conference. But for much of the remaining year as Keynes began writing his critique, optimism for the Treaty as

a whole was politically ascendant in Britain. By late fall, however, reports of the Continent's deteriorating economic and political conditions began to chip away at expectations that the Treaty could, after all, be moderately easy to fulfill.

On July 21, Mr. Thomas Shaw, an MP from Preston and a junior whip for the Labour party, addressed the House of Commons as it was debating the adoption of the Treaty. While still affirming his overall support, he questioned some of its provisions in relation to the Pre-Armistice Agreement:

The Armistice was definitely arranged...on the Fourteen Points...Is there a right hon. or hon. Gentleman here who will claim that the annexation for fifteen years of the Saar Valley is not a distinct violation of the terms upon which the Armistice was signed? If that be the fact, in what respect are we better than the Germans were when they tore up the scrap of paper [Belgian neutrality]?⁴⁸

His probe outraged another MP Mr. J. Jones who interrupted *ad hominem*, "We are not to be insulted by members from Jerusalem! Are we to stand insults from a Jew?"⁴⁹ Shaw was not Jewish, but the use of anti-Semitic attacks shows the antipathy with which revision was still regarded. Also in the Commons that July, Lloyd George affirmed the justice of the Treaty despite his constant personal reservations. He maintained, "if the whole cost of the war, all the costs incurred by every country that has been forced into war by the action of Germany, had been thrown upon Germany, it would have been in accord with every principle of civilized jurisprudence in the world."⁵⁰ Britain's war fever was still running high.

Meanwhile, Keynes had begun what was to become his seminal work. General Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and Keynes's closest ally in Paris, was the original inspiration. While leaving the conference, Smuts urged Keynes to write an economic critique of the Treaty's provisions. It would be for mass consumption, "not be too long or technical, as we may want to appeal to the plain man more than to the well informed or the specialist."⁵¹ Keynes's target audience had become the general public. In the light Paris had shown on the nature of populist politics, he saw that "it was very doubtful how far the various governments concerned would be prepared to act unless they were stimulated by outside action."⁵²

General Smuts soon had second thoughts about the essay,

but Keynes was not so easily deterred.⁵³ His spirits rose with encouragement from other members of the British political elite. On July 17, Keynes wrote to Lord Robert Cecil, chairman of the Supreme Economic Council:

After some weeks of rest and reflection, I find I take a not less pessimistic view as to the prospects of Europe and of European order, unless early steps are taken to make and *admit* as a dead letter many of the *economic* clauses of the treaty. Do you agree? Has not the time come for explaining a little what a damnable and disastrous document the treaty is?⁵⁴

An admirer of Keynes, Cecil responded that “all [he said] shall be most carefully considered” by the Council, but in the interim, Keynes should write “a brilliant article...exposing from a strictly economic point of view the dangers of the treaty.”⁵⁵ Keynes devoted himself to this task until early December.

That summer, elation over the conclusion of the Treaty still gripped many members of Parliament with romanticism. Mr. Adamson, MP from Fife Western, spoke before the Commons about an “ideal” “spirit of reconciliation.”⁵⁶ In Adamson’s calculation, not only could the harsh terms of the Treaty be fulfilled, but also Germany could welcome them with open arms—Britain and Germany together sweeping away all national animosities from the littered battlefields of Europe. The foundations of this fanciful thinking began to crack as the year wore on.

By November, the British Parliament became aware that Central Europe—in particular Austria but also Germany—had fallen into near total economic dislocation. On October 30, the Prime Minister stated in the Commons that “Germany this year is broken. Her people are enfeebled and her production has fallen 40 per cent.”⁵⁷ Bonar Law, leader of the Coalition Conservatives, conceded the point but maintained he had no doubts a reasonable sum could be extracted from Germany in the near future.⁵⁸ On November 20, Lord Cecil urged the Prime Minister to consider what impact further degradation in Austria and Central Europe might have on the European security.⁵⁹ By December 4, MP Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck admonished the Prime Minister that,

In order to prevent a further collapse of economic life in

Central Europe, he would use his influence to have either the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or both, summoned, in order that the League might itself initiate measures for international credit, or any other measures of international co-operation necessary to prevent a further international economic breakdown...⁶⁰

Slowly awakening to the hopelessness of the terms of Versailles being satisfied in the near term, Britain was ready for a framework to help it understand the complexities of the economic problems facing Europe. That framework, a liberal internationalist apology for revision, appeared between the pages of Keynes's book.

Economic Consequences of the Peace

Keynes's treatise begins with a challenge to its English reader: "the British people received the Treaty without reading it."⁶¹ The leaders of Europe, he argued, had deceived by their peoples into believing in the dictates of an impossible Treaty. His purpose, he continued, was "to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not *practically* right or possible."⁶² Keynes thrusts a hard truth onto his readers, something that by the start of 1920 they already knew with frightening certitude: "In continental Europe the earth heaves and no one but is aware of the rumblings. There it is... a matter of... life and death, of starvation and existence, and of the fearful convulsions of a dying civilization."⁶³ Central Europe was in its death throes, no doubt, but the war was not alone responsible for its poor lot. No, since the war, the allies had "abus[ed] their momentary victorious power to destroy" their erstwhile adversaries.⁶⁴ Indeed,

So far as possible... it was the policy of France to set the clock back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures, her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed.⁶⁵

This scheme of national vengefulness had been obscured from public view because it was "clothed, for [President Wilson's] sake, in the august language of freedom and international equality."⁶⁶ Lip service was paid to Wilsonian ideals, but "it would be stupid to believe that

there is much room in the world, as it really is, for such affairs as the League of Nations, or any sense in the principle of self-determination except as an ingenuous formula for rearranging the balance of power in one's own interests."⁶⁷

The economic and reparations clauses of the Treaty, wrote Keynes, "are comprehensive, and little has been overlooked which might impoverish Germany now or obstruct her development in the future."⁶⁸ Before the war, German vitality was essential for the economic health of Central (as well as Western and Northern) Europe. Now the allies aimed at the "systematic destruction" of the German industrial giant.⁶⁹ Under the Treaty, Germany ceded to the Allies all of her merchant marine vessels, all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions, all public and private property in Alsace-Lorraine, the coal-mines of the Saar Basin and Upper Silesia, and most of her rolling stock.⁷⁰ Out of what little resources remained, Germany was obliged to replace yearly the losses France and Belgium sustained in coal production as a consequence of the war.⁷¹ These charges were demanded outright; their forfeiture would in no way reduce the total indemnity eventually demanded of Germany. "Thus," said Keynes, "Germany's influence is eliminated and her capital confiscated in all those neighboring countries to which she might naturally look for her future livelihood, and for an outlet for her energy, enterprise, and technical skill."⁷² This burden was further imposed by a clause guaranteeing the Reparation Commission "dictatorial powers over all Germany property of every description whatever."⁷³

Using inferential logic and pre-war statistical data, Keynes calculated both the maximum indemnity for which Germany was *liable* based on the Pre-Armistice Agreement and the maximum she was *capable* of paying over thirty years: £10,000 million and £2,000 million, respectively. A major component of the latter figure, as well, would have to be realized by the material transfers listed above. Since "Germany's capacity to pay will be exhausted by the direct and legitimate claims which the allies hold against her, the question of her contingent liability...becomes academic. Prudent and honorable statesmanship would therefore have given her the benefit of the doubt."⁷⁴

The Treaty did not enumerate a specific, fixed indemnity. However, Keynes reasoned from the text of the economic and reparations clauses that the Allies could now demand at least £40,000

million, an order of magnitude higher than what Germany could ever feasibly pay. Moreover, the lack of a fixed indemnity meant that the figure could be revised upwards periodically as the German economy recovered, locking Germany into the Allies' permanent debt.

Thus were the terms of the Treaty a practical impossibility. Germany could not pay the astronomical sums demanded by the Allies. Britain and France would never be compensated—all the more so if they destroyed the machine tasked to remunerate them by their severity of their demands. As President Wilson asserted to Lloyd George in 1919,

You have suggested that we all address ourselves to the problem of helping to put Germany on her feet, but how can your experts or ours be expected to work out a *new* plan to furnish working capital to Germany when we deliberately start out by taking away all Germany's *present* capital? How can anyone expect America to turn over to Germany in any considerable measure new working capital to take the place of that which the European nations have determined to take from her?⁷⁵

If this “European Civil War” was continued by economic means, Keynes prophesied, the victors would “invite their own destruction also, being so deeply and inextricably intertwined with their victims by hidden psychic and economic bonds.”⁷⁶ Economic depression threatened Bolshevism, militarism, or anarchy in Central Europe. These movements could not leave Western Europe unscathed. “How greatly,” resolves Keynes, “if it is to understand its destiny, the world needs light.”⁷⁷

Reception in Britain

The Economic Consequences of the Peace became a classic of the English language virtually overnight.⁷⁸ It made publishing history in 1920, selling more than 60,000 copies in the United States and Britain in the first two months. The Labour Party sold tens of thousands of a special cheap edition for a fourth the cost.⁷⁹ Keynes sent 73 advance copies to a group that included H.H. Asquith, Bonar Law, Austen Chamberlain, General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil, Reginald McKenna, Winston Churchill, Lord Beaverbrook, Edwin Montagu, A.J. Balfour, Sir John Bradbury, and Sir Robert Chalmers.⁸⁰ The publishing of his book was, in Keynes's own account, “followed by con-

gratulations from half the Cabinet, and invitations from three parties to stand for Parliament!”⁸¹ In the following months, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* was reviewed by hundreds of journals and translated into dozens of languages.⁸² As late as August 1920, Keynes’s book was still selling at a rate of 200 copies per week, even excluding the cheap Labour edition.⁸³ By 1924, “‘it had been read,’ in the opinion of Sir William Beveridge, ‘by—at a moderate computation—half a million people who never read an economic work before and probably will not read one again’.”⁸⁴

By this time, Keynes held the stature of an ultimate “authority” or “expert” in Britain—an impartial demigod in all matters economic. The British weekly political and literary review *Time and Tide* published a personality sketch of Keynes in July 1921: “Persons of all parties and nationalities seek out and consult him; he is accessible, quite without any sort of personal arrogance, and endowed, in a high degree, with the power of making half an hour’s conversation an event that lives in the memory and feeds the mind.”⁸⁵ A December 2, 1920, article in the *Manchester Guardian* introduced Keynes as “the most distinguished British authority on the whole question of ‘reparation’.”⁸⁶

Keynes received one of his first responses on December 22, 1919, from Austen Chamberlain. The Chancellor expressed some regret that “a late public servant” would risk damaging his country’s image abroad with irreverent rhetoric. Yet, continued Chamberlain, “I wish I thought your reasoning as to Germany’s capacity to pay, and your picture of the economic state of Europe, less accurate than I do. I think you a little too pessimistic, but in the main I believe you to be right.”⁸⁷ Chamberlain’s response is typical for British politicians and journalists already doubtful of the practicability of the Treaty. On January 14, 1920, a poem titled “The Candour of Keynes” was printed in *Punch* magazine:

There was a superior young person named KEYNES
Who possessed an extensive equipment of brains...
So, after five months of progressive disgust,
He shook from his feet the Parisian dust,...
And his arguments cannot be lightly dismissed
With cries of ‘Pro-Hun’ or of ‘Pacifist’...
Still we feel, as he zealously damns the Allies
For grudging the Germans the means to arise

That possibly some of the Ultimate Things
May even be hidden from Fellows of King's.

Acceptance of Keynes economic strictures and hesitation for his political ones: these were the key twin features for most responses. This led Keynes, time and time again in personal correspondence, authored articles, and discussions with MPs, to state that no one seriously challenged his claims any longer.⁸⁸

In a letter to *The Times* titled "Mr. Keynes's Demand for Revisions," Keynes received his first "serious and responsible criticism" from John Foster Dulles, former legal adviser to the American financial delegation in Paris. As Keynes observed in a reply to *The Times*, Dulles did not dispute his £2,000 million figure for Germany's capacity to pay.⁸⁹ They agreed on the economic fundamentals. What Dulles did contest was Keynes's censure of the Reparation Commission's "dictatorial powers." For Dulles, the commission's freedom opened an avenue for

An intelligent alleviation of terms and modes of payment in the event that they prove to be excessive; the whole operation to be akin to that of a settlement in which the creditors recognize that their own interest lies in preserving and enhancing the economic vitality of their debtor.⁹⁰

Writing in his memoirs years later, David Lloyd George came to a very similar conclusion.⁹¹ Bernard Baruch held that "steps are provided in the elastic mechanism for the Reparation Commission which will enable us, in the calmer days to come, to climb nearer perfection."⁹² Keynes, however, believed that only formal treaty revision would relieve European relations of the friction of the reparations debate.⁹³ "Until the treaty is *formally revised*," Keynes averred, "it is wiser and safer to take seriously some even of [the Treaty's] more extravagant clauses."⁹⁴

The impact of Keynesianism was felt throughout the British government. Mr. H. D. Beaumont, British Commissioner on the Interallied Commission for the Administration and Plebiscite in Marienwerder (East Prussia), wrote to Foreign Secretary Earl Curzon in February 1920 that "the difficulties foreseen by J. M. Keynes ('Economic Consequences of the Peace') are more real than when he wrote in October last and his pessimism is only too clearly justified."⁹⁵ Keynes's book was not the only source of information driving

doubts about the Treaty, but it provided an ideology that made sense of the facts on the ground. Also in February, acting Chargé d'affaires at Washington Mr. R. C. Lindsay stressed to Curzon Keynes's diplomatic impact in America: "from the point of view of Anglo-American relations, I would think it wise for His Majesty's Government to follow a [conciliatory] course in the matter of reparation."⁹⁶

The Economic Consequences of the Peace featured prominently in a House of Commons debate over the peace settlement on February 12, 1920. Sir William Mitchell-Thomson began by roundly denouncing Keynes, arguing much like Chamberlain that he had damaged the Allies' negotiating position abroad. He maintained that if treaty revision ultimately proved necessary, the Reparations Commission, not the advocacy of Mr. Keynes, should conduct it. He did not seriously critique Keynes's economics, however, stating that "he may be right, he may be wrong, but who can say?"⁹⁷ Bonar Law defended Keynes to a point, arguing that

Anyone who has read his book or listened to his argument would feel that judging by the experience of the world in the past it is very difficult to see how the Germans can pay outside their own country even the sum which I think they ought to be made to pay. That is true, but things do not turn out in this world precisely as you expect them to turn out.⁹⁸

Law defended his own political behavior and that of the House during the Paris Peace Conference, asking "what human being could have put... any figure which by any possibility could have been regarded as one that under all the circumstances would be fair and reasonable? It was not possible."⁹⁹ Applying the same coping mechanism as Mitchell-Thompson, Law opened the possibility of treaty revision while protecting his self-image and reputation.

A.J. Balfour denounced Keynes as a German apologist and dismissed his £2,000 million figure for Germany's capacity to pay altogether, holding that "Germany herself... plac[es] her maximum possible contribution at two and a half times... above that which Mr. Keynes fixed."¹⁰⁰ Keynes contacted Balfour personally, directing him to a passage in *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* demonstrating that when correcting for technicalities, the German offer of £5,000 million actually only amounted to £1,500 million. Balfour renounced his allegation publically in a letter to *The Times*

on February 24.¹⁰¹ Perhaps this had some effect on his anti-Keynesite campaign.

Nearly all contemporaries wrote that Keynes's book had effected a massive shift in British public opinion away from harsh reparations almost immediately. On New Year's Eve 1919, Lord Robert Cecil congratulated Keynes on his triumph, claiming that it "ha[d] produced and will produce great and increasing changes in public opinion."¹⁰² On March 20, 1920, Basil Blackett, a British Treasury official, wrote to Keynes, "Your book has undoubtedly borne some fruit, and though as you know I am not a whole-hearted admirer of it, I readily give you the credit for much of the advance in British and other public opinion."¹⁰³ Britain was becoming less unforgiving. This transformation would allow politicians like David Lloyd George to begin the task of revision, gradual and de facto if not de jure as Keynes preferred.

Post-Paris Conferences of 1920

"'Hope,'" wrote French critic Étienne Mantoux, "'hope' was what Mr. Keynes was offering in 1919." Indeed, notes Professor Richard Grayson, "*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*... provided the intellectual foundation of Liberal proposals for revising the economic settlement of Europe in the 1920s."¹⁰⁴ In 1920, that project was admittedly modest. Nonetheless, Liberal politicians made small, definite gains at post-Versailles international conferences in 1920.

H.H. Asquith, leader of the Liberal party, returned to Parliament in the 1920 Paisley by-election. Sensing a shift in public opinion, Asquith and other Liberals began demanding that the reparations bill be fixed and lowered immediately.¹⁰⁵ He never said so in public, but Asquith's quick adoption of the figure £2,000 million for Germany's capacity to pay could have come from only one source—*The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. MP Mitchell-Thomson, at the February 12th debate in the House of Commons, felt "bound to say I have a strong suspicion that, although the voice was the voice of Paisley, the inspiration really comes from somewhere very close to King's College, Cambridge."¹⁰⁶

Perhaps inspired by Asquith's reelection, the Prime Minister began snaking his way back to a moderate position on reparations. Keynes observed him closely:

The deeper and the fouler the bogs into which Mr. Lloyd

George leads us, the more credit is his for getting us out.
He leads us in to satisfy our desires; he leads us out to
save our souls. He hands us down the primrose path and
puts out the bonfire just in time. Who, ever before, en-
joyed the best of heaven and hell as we do?¹⁰⁷

Through the entire period, Keynes's opinion of George was deeply torn. He vacillated between spitting ethnic epithets about leprechauns (Lloyd George was Welsh) to praising his ingenious knack for politicking. In 1920, the latter sentiment won out as the Prime Minister carefully obviated the worst features of the Treaty's economic and reparations clauses.

The European powers held six conferences in 1920. At San Remo from April 19 to 26, Lloyd George was forced to pledge to maintain the overall integrity of the Treaty to French Premier Millerand. Yet he succeeded in convincing the French to allow a German party to attend the Spa conference that summer. In his speech to the House of Commons upon his return, the Prime Minister announced his intention for a loose interpretation.¹⁰⁸ A fixed indemnity was tentatively selected at Boulogne on June 21 and 22. The total, 269,000,000,000 gold marks, fell to 226,000,000,000 at the Paris conference at the beginning of 1921.¹⁰⁹ At Spa on July 5-16, 1920, British, French, and German delegates conducted negotiations face-to-face and settled on a schedule of payments for coal deliveries.¹¹⁰ 1920's last conference, December 16-22 in Brussels, was also its most significant. Germany, Britain, and France agreed upon leniency in payment until 1923; payment in material deliveries not cash; a limitation on total expenses that could be charged for the Allied occupation armies in the Rhineland; and a waiver for Allied claims to demand free German shipbuilding.¹¹¹

Beset by Anglo-French friction over the severity of the terms of the Treaty, the atmosphere of each conference was usually hostile. Yet, Keynes grasped,

The total effect was cumulative; and by gradual stages the project of revising the Treaty gained ground in every quarter. The Conferences furnish an extraordinary example of Mr. Lloyd George's methods. At each of them he pushed the French as far as he could, but not as far as he wanted; and then came home to acclaim the settlement provisionally reached (and destined to be changed a month later)

as an expression of complete accord between himself and his French colleague...he steadily gained his object.¹¹²

These tactics won the Prime Minister no friends in France. Neither, though, did the shadow of Keynes. "Pertinax," anonymous editor of the Paris *Echo*, wrote in July 1920 on the Spa Agreement that "unexpectedly between the covers of a book appears the great opponent whose strength Millerand must overcome...The ideas set forth in this volume are permeating the whole atmosphere of the Spa Conference."¹¹³ In an August letter to *The Times*, French economist Henri Brenier grumbled that "British opinion has been so poisoned by Mr Keynes's paradoxes and fallacies—(which, we sincerely hope, will be exploded some time by indisputable figures), that it is really necessary to insist with some detail on Germany's 'coal-capacity' to pay at least."¹¹⁴ Whether through his direct economic counsel or the freedom from fear of political repercussion that his advocacy had extended to treaty revisionists, every conference felt Keynes's presence. Notwithstanding that Keynes played no role in the Spa Coal Agreement, T.E. Lawrence sent him a note upon its resolution saying, simply, "In the *Times* today—magnificent! Do keep it up."¹¹⁵

Conclusion

History remembers John Maynard Keynes principally as an economist, sometimes as a statesman. Seldom do we think of him as the marketer of an ideology. Yet it is obvious from the historical record that this profession consumed most of his time and all of his passions for years after the war. The image of a man pulling at the heartstrings of a desperate public is not unusual for the time period. Hence the question of how much one person can mold the worldviews of whole countries bears real weight. The impact of Keynes and *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* in the early days of interwar Britain was substantial. Certainly his efforts constituted some of the first steps towards appeasement. It is difficult to know whether Britain would have settled its reparations question in a Keynes-less vacuum. This is always true with history, but maybe it is all the more so because it is simply impossible to conceive of a post-war Britain without John Maynard Keynes.

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² Austin Robinson, "John Maynard Keynes: Economist, Author, Statesman," *The Economic Journal* 82:326 (1972): 531-426.

³ John Maynard Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: Norton & Company, 1963).

⁴ The allusion "Carthaginian peace" is to the first of two settlements concluded between Rome and Carthage. "After her defeat at Zama, Carthage lost practically all her vessels of war, and all her overseas possessions; she had to abandon large slices of her metropolitan dominions to her neighbors; and to pay to Rome an indemnity of four thousand talents." See Étienne Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic Consequence of Mr. Keynes* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 179.

⁵ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Touchstone, 1961), 45.

⁶ Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace*, xvi.

⁷ Quoted in John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 59.

⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, 113.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 113.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹² *Ibid.*, 115-117.

¹³ Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* (New York: The New American Library, 1966), 44.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis*, vol. 5 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), 28-29.

¹⁶ Quoted in Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 33.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, 33.

¹⁹ Julian Symons, *Horatio Bottomley* (London: The Cresset Press, 1955), 218.

²⁰ Richard S. Grayson, *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement: The Liberal Party, 1919-1939* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 101.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 100.

²² *Ibid.*, 108.

²³ Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement*, 29.

²⁴ David Lloyd George, *The Truth About Reparations and War-Debts* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), 14-15.

²⁵ Grayson, *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement*, 108.

²⁶ Bernard M. Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920), 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁸ John A. Hall and Michael R. Smith, "The Political and Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes," *The Canadian Journal of Sociology* 27:2 (2002): 739.

²⁹ Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty*, 6.

³⁰ Quoted in Grayson, *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement*, 108.

³¹ Hall, "The Political and Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes," 737-738.

³² *Ibid.*, 739.

³³ Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty*, 6.

³⁴ Hall, "The Political and Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes," 731.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 740.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 731.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 732.

³⁹ Elizabeth Johnson (ed), *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, vol. 7 (Cambridge: MacMillan and Co, 1971), 8.

⁴⁰ John Maynard Keynes, "To Bradbury, Sir John, 6 June 1919 (final arrangements in Paris)," in Elizabeth Johnson (ed), *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, vol. 6 (Cambridge: MacMillan and Co, 1971), 472.

⁴¹ John Maynard Keynes, "To Chamberlain, Austen 28 December 1919—excerpts," in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 13.

⁴² Hall, "The Political and Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes," 734.

⁴³ Quoted in *ibid.*, 735.

⁴⁴ Quoted in *ibid.*, 742.

⁴⁵ John Maynard Keynes, "To Keynes, Mrs F. A., 14 May 1919—excerpt (Keynes's decision to leave the Peace Conference)," in Johnson, *The Col-*

lected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, 6: 458.

⁴⁶ John Maynard Keynes, "To Chamberlain, Austen, 26 May 1919 (Keynes's reasons for resignation)," in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 6: 459-460.

⁴⁷ John Maynard Keynes, "To Lloyd Georg, David, 5 June 1919 (on leaving the Peace Conference)," in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 6: 469.

⁴⁸ 118 H.C. Deb. 21 July 1919, col. 1077-1155, accessed April 30, 2013, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/jul/21/clause-1-power-of-his-majesty-to-give#column_1077.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ George, *The Truth About Reparations and War-Debts*, 8.

⁵¹ Elizabeth Johnson (ed), *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, vol. 7 (Cambridge: MacMillan and Co, 1971), 3.

⁵² John Maynard Keynes, "To ter Meulen, C. E., 9 December 1919," in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 145-146.

⁵³ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 3.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ 117 H.C. Deb. 03 July 1919, col. 1231-1235, accessed April 30, 2013, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/jul/03/spirt-of-patriotism#column_1231.

⁵⁷ 120 H.C. Deb. 30 October 1919, col. 939-1052, accessed April 30, 2013, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/oct/30/finance#column_939.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ 121 H.C. Deb. 20 November 1919, col. 1125-1127, accessed April 30, 2013, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1919/nov/20/vienna-relief-of-distress#column_1125.

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⁶¹ Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 8.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 36.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 4

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

- ⁶⁸ Ibid., 111-112.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid., 65-66.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid., 66, 67, 82, 85, 106.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., 86.
- ⁷² Ibid., 76.
- ⁷³ Ibid., 78.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid., 120.
- ⁷⁵ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 6: 441.
- ⁷⁶ Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, 5.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., 27.
- ⁷⁸ Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace*, 6.
- ⁷⁹ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 15.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., 10.
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- ⁸⁴ Mantoux, *The Carthaginian Peace*, 6.
- ⁸⁵ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 240.
- ⁸⁶ John Maynard Keynes, "America at the Paris Conference: a Delegate's Story," *Manchester Guardian*, December 2, 1920, reproduced in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 91.
- ⁸⁷ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 10-11.
- ⁸⁸ John Maynard Keynes, "Peace of Versailles," *The Everybody's Magazine*, September 1920, reproduced in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 51.
- ⁸⁹ John Maynard Keynes, "To The Times, 19 February, 1920," reproduced in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 27.
- ⁹⁰ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 25.
- ⁹¹ George, *The Truth About Reparations and War-Debts*, 29-30.
- ⁹² Baruch, *The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty*, 8.
- ⁹³ John Maynard Keynes, "To The Times, 19 February, 1920," reproduced in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 27.
- ⁹⁴ John Maynard Keynes, "To the Evening Post, 18 March 1920," reproduced in Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7:

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⁹⁶ Mr. Lindsay, "Mr. Linday (Washington) to Earl Curzon (Received March 8)," in series 1, vol. 10 of *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, ed. Woodward and Butler, February 24, 1920, 202-203.

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⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 31.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹⁰⁴ Grayson, *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement*, 29.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁰⁶ 125 H.C. Deb. 12 February 1920, col. 256-377, accessed April 30, 2013, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1920/feb/12/peace-settlement>.

¹⁰⁷ John Maynard Keynes, *A Revision of the Treaty* (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1922), 179.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹⁰⁹ George, *The Truth About Reparations and War-Debts*, 30.

¹¹⁰ Keynes, *A Revision of the Treaty*, 23.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 17.

¹¹³ Johnson, *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes*, 7: 153.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 157.

SOLIDARITY IN SLAVERY:

Examining Urban Slavery in Brazil

Rachel Azfrani, The College of William & Mary

The African slave trade drove the Brazilian economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, permanently impacting the demographic and cultural composition of the area. The millions of slaves that arrived in Brazil encountered a series of different fates, largely determined by where they landed and the work they performed. While the majority of slaves were sent to work on rural plantations, the quickly developing urban areas of Brazil attracted a growing market for the slave trade. As the population of Africans came to outnumber the Portuguese population, the struggle to adapt a social hierarchy ensued in urban regions. Attempting to create a social network while shaping autonomy generated fierce competition between slaves. The social, religious, and economic activities of urban Brazil influenced the ethnic solidarity of African slaves in their occupational lives and in their social interactions both within the enslaved community and with the Portuguese population. Ultimately, the tensions provoked by these conditions prevented fluid ethnic solidarity in Brazilian society.

The variety of different positions for slaves in urban society contributed to the diverse experiences of African slaves. Slaves looking to gain opportunities for camaraderie as well as personal advantages in the urban setting created a startling ethnic discord. Each slave brought his or her tribal origins to Brazil, where the various African identities immediately clashed and remained divided. Provided the opportunity to marry, slaves most often married within their ethnic group in an effort to maintain their cultural heritage.¹ Even while waiting to be sold, the slaves' actions in urban slave markets show their mutual fear of each other's foreignness. In her *Journal of a voyage to Brazil*, Maria Calcott of Britain describes the anxiety of newly purchased slaves and their "listlessness of despair...[The patriots] have put arms into the hands of new negroes, while the recollection of their own country, and of the slave-ship, and of the slave-market, is fresh in their memory."² Many tribal groups were traditionally disposed to conflict, and this led to frequent brawls in the city streets

that housed slave markets. These bursts of violence created significant tension in Brazilian urban society, especially during the Latin American independence movements when Calcott wrote her travelogue. As slaves integrated into colonial society, they adapted their cultural identities and hostilities with them.

Occupations further stratified the social hierarchy of slaves in urban Brazil. The most underprivileged groups were primarily united by their loathing for the relatively privileged domestic slaves. Urban domestic slaves, especially those belonging to the elite, received certain benefits that placed them on a higher social rung than other urban slaves. Domestic slaves were sometimes able to escort their masters on outings, given a stipend, or given fine clothing in order to reflect the status of their master.³ When a slave had a close relationship with his master, he increased his chances of manumission—that is, of being released from slavery—and this exacerbated strained relations with other slaves. Calcott observed that relationships between masters and slaves “diminish the evils of slavery to one, the tyranny of Mastery to the other.”⁴ As historian Zephyr Frank has outlined, certain jobs possessed certain racial associations, and “it meant that in the lower and middle sectors of society there was a great deal of crosscutting of social categories: higher-status work accorded a ‘lighter’ racial characterization; the work associated with slaves carried a ‘darker’ classification.”⁵ Domestic slavery, although strenuous, was looked upon by other urban slaves as one of the most esteemed lines of work. Furthermore, the opportunity for domestic slaves to attend church with their masters provided a social similarity to the Portuguese elite. Calcott’s journals suggest that religion was a common ground between slaves and the Portuguese, and “everything that [united] men in one common sentiment [was] interesting. The church doors were open, the altars illuminated, and the very slave felt that he was addressing the same Deity, by the same privilege with his master.”⁶ Those who lacked such stability in their work and social standing often found themselves shifting markets to get a job wherever they could. The rivalry between different trades contributed to the lack of solidarity between slaves in urban occupations.

Urban slaves that worked in outdoor markets often had relatively more social and economic freedom than their domestic counterparts. Urban slave peddlers were often able to keep some of their earnings, and thus distinguish themselves from slaves with more

formidable tasks. Henry Koster, a British resident of Portugal who journeyed to Brazil, observed that enslaved urban women could be seen “selling oranges, other kinds of fruits and cakes, and canoe-men with their long poles, unable to delay, bargaining with them for some of their commodities.”⁷ While the limited freedom of action in an outdoor market like the one Koster described empowered many urban slaves, this environment fostered conflict. In addition, the government, fearful of a black majority, “found it advantageous to encourage hostility between Africans and creoles, blacks and mulattoes, freed men and slaves, in order to prevent them from forming a common front against the ruling establishment.”⁸ Even though the government tried to prevent it, slaves that engaged in the same trade often formed close bonds with the free blacks and mulattos they worked with, especially when they were of the same ethnic background. These partnerships can be attributed to the dynastic urban setting that allowed for the growth of informal economies. Such relationships were positive for the solidarity of the entire slave community, serving as the basis for the foundation of religious confraternities, which played a major role in developing communities for slaves in urban Brazil.⁹

As societies of mutual aid and brotherhood, these religious confraternities provided a framework for limited cooperation and solidarity between slaves. The Church was an integral part of an African slave’s life from the time he arrived to Brazil to the day he died, and it greatly influenced creole slaves from their birth. A new slave was completely cut off from their past familial relationships, and they often looked to the Church to find community. Slaves who became members of confraternities believed that they had important rights and responsibilities, and even developed executive boards with a “king” and “queen” that mimicked the Portuguese royal court.¹¹ Influenced by the traditional West African definition of “brother,” which meant sharing origins in the same ethnic group, and pressure from their masters to find training within the Church to become skilled workers, slaves formed confraternities with increased frequency. Many Portuguese elites felt that this type of solidarity through the Church was dangerous to their high status. In his travels, Koster recalled that “the number of churches, chapels, and niches in the street for saints [of lay brotherhoods], is quite preposterous.”¹¹ Confraternities provided a popular platform for urban slaves and

freed blacks to establish community and develop a semblance of solidarity, although outside of these circles they divided the loyalty and allegiance of urban slaves to each other.

As confraternities flourished, the rivalry between them sharply contrasted the brotherhood within them. In 1639, two brotherhoods united to form the Black Men's Brotherhood of Our Lady of the Rosarió and São Benedito, solidifying its superiority over other confraternities. This large organization provided money for Christian funerals, owned churches, and established a new means of manumission. Although there was positive solidarity between members of the same confraternity, relationships between confraternities themselves were strained. Koster noted discrimination between confraternities, and that there were clear "shades" of slaves in different brotherhoods. In addition, he observed that some confraternities were exclusive with the "shades" of their members.¹² Some groups displayed their superiority over other slaves during religious parades by relegating recently arrived slaves to the back of the processions. The discrimination against new slaves demonstrates how established slaves rarely sympathized with those outside of their social circles. The Brothers of the Rosarió, along this vein, wrote a letter to King Joseph I, stating that "it would serve your majesty well to annex [the lesser black brotherhoods], and in demolishing them and their gruesome cemeteries Your Majesty would be providing a great service to God."¹³ This hostility demonstrates how urban slaves struggled to differentiate themselves through the European ideals of social class during this time period. Although loyalty within confraternities was a lifelong bond, the scarcity of cooperation between them illustrates a broader lack of solidarity in the enslaved urban community as a whole.

The solidarity of urban slaves in Brazil depended upon occupation, class, ethnic origin, and gender. Where differences existed, a sharp increase in hostility and exclusivity arose, and where similarities occurred, deep and familial bonds between slaves developed. Scholars have put an emphasis on solidarity between slaves simply because of their status as slaves, but the urban setting of Brazil points to an entirely different trend. The stratification of slave society can be attributed to movements in the lower and middling classes of both Portuguese and Spanish America to distinguish themselves and attempt to rise up the social ladder however they could. Established

slaves considered newly arrived slaves to be in the lowest ranks because they lacked knowledge of European thought.¹⁴ Freed black slaves often purchased their own slaves so that they could elevate themselves by acting similarly to their former white masters.¹⁵ Within their strategies to establish community as well as their own autonomy, the urban slaves of Brazil perpetuated competition amongst themselves. Scholars have often simplified the experiences of slaves in colonial Latin America by brushing over their uniqueness, however, their true complexity mirrored the diversity of the era. Despite the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888, the Afro-Brazilian community maintained many of their previously held notions of ethnic and occupational divisions. These continue to affect perceptions of social status within populations of both African and European descent in modern urban Brazil.¹⁶ Although the struggles of an enslaved life would seem to inspire unity, in Brazil, it created irreconcilable disunity.

Endnotes

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⁵ Zephyr L. Frank, *Dutra's World: Wealth and Family in Nineteenth Century Rio de Janeiro* (University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 31.

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⁸ Katia M. de Queirós Mattoso, *To Be a Slave in Brazil: 1550-1888* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 1986), 124.

⁹ See *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁰ Mariza de Carvalho Soares, *People of Faith: Slavery and African Catholics in Eighteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2011), 114-145.

¹¹ See Koster, *Travels in Brazil*, 52.

¹² See *Ibid.*, 19.

¹³ Petition of the Brotherhood of the Rosarió to the king, July 27, 1774

¹⁴ New slaves were often labelled *boçal* if they spoke no Portuguese and were judged in their occupational abilities based on their country of origin. A slave that arrived with proficient knowledge of Iberian customs was termed *ladino*, and was considered to be more competent. Leslie B. Rout, Jr., "Race and Slavery in Brazil," *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1976): 75.

¹⁵ Many slaves aspired to purchase a *limpeze-de-sange* document, a certification to legally "purify their blood" and obtain the same rights as a white European. The degree to which these certificates were honored depended upon the region. (See Rout, "Race and Slavery," 87.)

¹⁶ In the late 20th century, a school of thought rose that praised *branqueamento*, or a "whitening process," perpetuating the idea of racial divisions, much like the *limpeze-de-sange*. (See Rout, "Race and Slavery," 89.)

COVERAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIATION IN HAMPTON ROADS

Corey Wash, Norfolk State University

It was roughly 12:00 PM on October 6, 1923 when unionized longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News, Virginia, walked out on their jobs after failed negotiations of a new wage scale. The longshoremen's contract was about to expire, and the shipping companies made an offer of 75 cents regular pay and \$1.07 for overtime. Although the new wage was an increase in 10 cents, the offer was not acceptable to the officials of the International Longshoremen Association (ILA), who were seeking 80 cents regular pay and \$1.20 for overtime, which was the wage that other workers in the North-Atlantic ports earned. During the strike, the shipping lines brought in strike breakers—who worked for the old wage of 65 cents an hour—and took out the possibility of organized labor in their deal. The three-week-long strike ended in what could be seen as a victory for both sides. They did not receive the 80 cents an hour that they had hoped for, but the ILA was allowed to continue representing the longshoremen in negotiations for better wages and working conditions.¹ What made the affiliation of Norfolk's longshoremen with the ILA unique, at the time, was that they were predominantly black workers in a mixed-race organization.

Earl Lewis explained in his book, *In Their Own Interests*, how blacks came to dominate the longshoremen trade in Norfolk by the 1920s, how they used their strength in numbers to create two successful unions, and how the success of those two unions gained them recognition from the ILA.² This paper will take a closer look at the International Longshoremen's Association by comparing the *Virginian Pilot's* coverage to the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, which was one of the most prominent African-American papers in the South East. This closer look is necessary in order to understand how the ILA became one of the most dominant longshoreman's unions during this time.

Industrialization and a world war created a high demand for labor in the early 20th century, which caused a mass migration from

rural to urban areas. Nearly 1.5 million African Americans took part in the rural to urban movement known as the great migration and many ended up in Norfolk, a city that was emerging as a major shipping center. Between 1910 and 1920, the black population in Norfolk nearly doubled from 25,000 to 43,000 people.³ The demand for labor during World War I accounted for much of the population increase, but as blacks were finding new jobs, the same discrimination they faced in everyday life was also found in the workplace. Whites were earning more than black workers who did the same work, few blacks were able to hold high positions, and most blacks were only allowed to work unskilled-labor jobs. In Virginia, the segregation of the work force meant that African Americans held dominant roles in certain fields. In Norfolk, they made up about 90 percent of the longshoremen's trade, and they used their strength in numbers to fight for better wages and working conditions.⁴

As World War I brought new opportunities for employment, the rhetoric that was used to bring the country together gave blacks an opportunity to seek advancements in the workplace. The two major black organizations that emerged in Norfolk were the Coal Trimmers Union Local 15227 and the Transportation Workers Association (TWA). Together they organized workers in trades dominated by African Americans, including: longshoremen, oyster shuckers, tobacco stemmers, and domestic workers. However, other than the longshoremen, the organized workers had little success. Cigar stemmers were able to gain higher wages, but their horrible working conditions remained the same. Hardly any gains were made by the oyster shuckers or domestic workers after city officials used police to end their strikes.⁵

Because of the limited success of the organization of other black-dominated trades, and economic problems brought on by the post-war recession, the longshoremen of Norfolk realized they had a better opportunity to advance in the workplace by shifting their focus away from organizing local black workers and, instead, affiliating with a national union. In 1921 the Coal Trimmers Union and the TWA joined the ILA. The merger was unique; the ILA was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, which rarely allowed blacks to participate in the union.⁶ The negative effect of the merger was that the longshoremen were no longer organized in a way that would help the black community as a whole, and in some

cases hurt the cause of other black workers. For instance, when black longshoremen not affiliated with the ILA went on strike, the union used its dominance to ensure that the strike was unsuccessful. But, the acceptance of Hampton Road's longshoremen into the ILA was important in the fight for racial equality because it meant that black workers would have a prominent role in an interracial union, and an opportunity for black leaders like George Milner, who was elected Third Vice President of the ILA, to achieve high ranking positions. But the merger meant the longshoremen would have to focus their attention nationally, and that brought on its own challenges.⁷

In *A People's History of the United States*, Howard Zinn changed the narrative of the United State's history, and gave a voice to groups that were overlooked in most textbooks. Workers in the early 20th century formed one of the groups Zinn focused on in his textbook. He explained towards the end of the 19th, and in the beginning of the 20th century, labor unions were rising up all over the United States. Workers were fighting for better wages and conditions, and many of the strikes led to violent clashes between workers and police forces. Zinn's theory was that government officials and industrial leaders learned that they could eliminate the threat of radical labor groups if they allowed the existence of conservative labor unions, and made small concessions to workers.⁸ In the early 1900s, government officials and business leaders feared radical, socialist labor unions would disrupt the economy and bring major changes to the country.⁹ The government limited free speech and threw radicals in jail in an attempt to deal with the problem, but that only added fuel to the fire and gave workers even more reason to rebel. Industrial leaders took a different approach and allowed for small wage increases and better working conditions, and by the end of the First World War, it appeared that socialism was no longer a threat to the country. Later, in the 1930s, communism took on the role that socialism played in the early 1900s, and again leaders granted small concessions to workers in order to encourage conservative labor unions to keep business uninterrupted. After the First World War, and through most the 1920s, the threat of radical labor unions seemed to be eliminated. Although strikes still took place, industrial leaders were less inclined to make concessions to workers.

It is in this setting that the strike of 1923 occurred, when the longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area, represented by the ILA,

struck for better wages. That would be their only strike in the years of 1920-1935, but throughout those years, the longshoremen would see their wages increase to the point where in 1934 they earned double what other longshoremen in the area earned. This paper will take a look at how the ILA was covered by the *Virginian Pilot* and the *Norfolk Journal and Guide* during the years of 1920-1935, and show that while the Journal and Guide's coverage remained favorable, the *Virginian Pilot*'s coverage of the ILA in the Hampton Roads area gradually went from negative, to neutral, to favorable, when the union proved to be conservative and good for business.

Three key events took place between 1920 and 1935 that will be used to compare the two papers, and show how the *Virginian Pilot*'s view of the ILA changed during that time. In the midst of the first event, the strike of 1923, the *Virginian Pilot* presented the ILA in a negative light. In 1931, during wage negotiations, when the ILA had proved that it operated in a conservative manner, the *Virginian Pilot* was neutral in its reports. Then in 1934, the MWIU, a radical union with ties to communism, emerged in the Hampton Roads area. When longshoremen of the MWIU demanded higher wages, the ILA used the strength of its union to put an end to their strike. In doing so, the ILA showed that their union was beneficial to the shipping industry, and this showed in the *Virginian Pilot* when the paper began to write favorably of it. Throughout these events, the *Journal and Guide*'s coverage of the ILA remained favorable, even when the MWIU emerged in Hampton Roads. Even though the MWIU represented black longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News, it was alleged in the *Pilot* and *Journal and Guide* that they were associated with the Communist Party. P.B. Young, who was the owner and editor of the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, expressed that African Americans should not use the Communist Party, but rather, find "safer and saner" ways to achieve advancements.¹⁰

1923: Members of the ILA in Hampton Roads Go on Strike

It was roughly 12:00 PM on October 6, 1923, when unionized longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News walked out on their jobs after failed negotiations of a new wage scale. The longshoremen were offered 75 cents an hour for straight time and \$1.07 for over time, holidays, and weekend pay. The new offer was 10 cents more than the longshoremen's previous contract, but the workers were not

satisfied. Since the acceptance of Hampton Roads' longshoremen into the ILA, they had always been paid five cents an hour less than the workers of the North-Atlantic ports they were associated with, and when the five cent differential was not abolished in the new wage agreements, the 2,500 longshoremen of Norfolk and Newport News walked off their jobs and went on strike.¹¹ The *Norfolk Journal and Guide* and the *Virginian Pilot* took opposing sides when covering the strike. The *Journal and Guide's* support of the longshoremen was more visible compared to support the *Virginian Pilot* showed for the shipping lines. The segregation of the Hampton Roads work force meant that the longshoremen in the area were mostly African American, and their affiliation with the ILA meant that they were black workers associated in a primarily white union. Although race was never mentioned by the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, it would have been important for the writers at an African-American paper to prove that an all-black union could succeed, and to ensure that the African-American longshoremen received the same wage as the white longshoremen working in other ports. Likewise, the *Virginian Pilot* was pro-business, which explains why the paper's coverage favored the shipping lines. Also, it was catered to a white audience, which meant that supporting an all-black union that wanted to be paid the same as whites would have been bad for business. Although the *Virginian Pilot's* bias was slightly more subtle than the *Norfolk Journal and Guide's*, the headlines and articles of both papers left little to the imagination as to where each paper's support lied.¹²

The papers did report both sides of the dispute; however, each paper's articles were heavily slanted to favor one side over the other. One way that they did this was to present information and then to follow it up by quoting an official, either representing the shipping lines or the union. When the *Journal and Guide* reported on rumors of strikers giving in and going back to work, they gave the union's Third Vice President, George Milner, the last word when they quoted him as saying, "we are standing just as we walked out... every man is loyal to the principles of organized labor."¹³ The *Pilot* used the same tactic. When the paper reported that the shipping lines denied the Union Official's request for a meeting, the *Pilot* ended the article with a three-paragraph quote from the shipping lines as to why the meeting was denied. In some cases, this made their support of one side subtler, but by leaving out important information, it likely

caused readers to have different views as to who was right in the argument. For example, whenever the *Pilot* explained why the longshoremen went on strike, it was said that they were rejecting a 10-cent increase in their hourly wage, or that they “demanded 80 cents an hour.”¹⁴ While the statements were true, they were worded in a way that demonized the longshoremen and did not present the whole side of the argument. Not realizing that the longshoremen were striking for equal pay, readers of the *Virginian Pilot* likely thought that the strikers were unreasonable for not accepting the 10-cent wage increase. Subscribers to the *Journal and Guide* were encouraged to view the longshoremen differently. Readers likely thought the longshoremen were justified in their demands when they read: “There has been some dissatisfaction among members of the International Longshoremen’s Union of the port of Hampton Roads for some time on account of the preferential enjoyed by longshoremen of the ports of New York and Boston engaged in similar work and affiliated with the same organization.”¹⁵ In case there was any doubt that the wage gap was unjustified, the *Norfolk Journal and Guide* went further and explained that the difference in cost of living of cities like New York and Boston did not warrant the wage differential.¹⁶ This assertion by Young’s paper was probably more hopeful than thoughtful, because, even then, living costs were higher in North Eastern cities than in Southern ports.

The articles not only had an effect on the opinions of outsiders reading about the strike, but the morale of the strikers themselves likely depended upon which paper that they read. On the first day of the *Virginian Pilot*’s coverage of the strike, their headline read, “Superabundance of Unemployed Workers Counteracts Effects of Strike here, Shipping Conditions Practically Normal.” The paper went on to say that, not only had the shipping lines found enough workers to load and unload the ships, they were doing it for the old wage of 65 cents an hour.¹⁷ In its later articles, the *Pilot* went further when it said that they had so many workers who wanted to work for the old wage that they had to turn many away.¹⁸ Any striker that read this probably felt that their cause was hopeless. But if their morale was weakened when they read the *Pilot*’s articles, then their spirits might have been lifted when they read what was written in the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*. The *Journal and Guide*’s headlines contradicted the *Pilot*’s by saying “2,000 men hold out for demands, Ship sailings

delayed.”¹⁹ Nowhere in the paper’s coverage did it mention that non-union workers were working for the old wage.

Given that the two papers were divided by race, and that the longshoremen were African-American, it is surprising that race did not play a large role in the coverage of either paper. Maybe it was understood at the time and did not need to be said, but when the *Journal and Guide* mentioned that the longshoremen went on strike because they wanted to be paid the same as the workers in the other ports, they did not mention that the workers in the other ports were primarily white, and the pay inequality could have been based on race. The paper’s status as a southern black publication meant it had to be calculated in the way it covered racial issues.²⁰ The one instance when race was mentioned happened in the *Virginian Pilot* on the fourth day, when the strike turned violent.

It was approximately 5:00 PM on October 10, 1923, when shots were fired on the corner of Hampton Boulevard and Titustown. Although non-union workers were called in to break the strike, the ILA urged the longshoremen to keep the strike peaceful, but on the fourth day of the strike a group of strikebreakers were shot at as they were heading home from a day of unloading ships at the army base. The event left one man dead and another injured.²¹

When comparing the coverage of the shooting, two key differences stood out. The *Virginian Pilot*’s coverage emphasized race wherever possible, while race was hardly mentioned in the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*. There was also a difference in writing style. The *Virginian Pilot*’s story was over-sensationalized, especially when compared to the version printed in the *Journal and Guide*.

The racism of the early 20th century is evident in the *Virginian Pilot*’s coverage of the shooting. The author let the reader know, in almost every instance, when an individual that was mentioned was black. If a white person was being described, Captain J.A. Rawls for example, their name was all that was used to describe them, but William H. Ashley is described as William H. Ashley, colored. The race of an individual did not appear once in the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, but it appeared twelve times in the *Virginian Pilot*’s article.²² But the fact that race was used so heavily in the *Pilot*’s article is not as important as how it was used. While the *Journal and Guide* described the shooters as “the occupants who opened fire on the truck,” the *Virginian Pilot* called them “the negroes who fired

upon the truck,” and then shortens it to just “the Negroes.”²³ It is just speculation to say why the *Pilot* chose to cover the story the manner in which they did. Nevertheless, the paper was known for being pro-business, and emphasizing that the shooters were black could have been a tactic to deter the public’s support of the strikers. The fact that the paper exaggerated the number of “negroes” doing the shooting supports this theory.

The writing styles of the two papers could not be more different in their coverage of the shooting. The *Virginian Pilot*’s article on the shooting was over-sensationalized, and in some cases exaggerated, while the *Journal and Guide*’s version of the shooting was a bland but seemingly accurate story. The reason behind this was the *Journal and Guide* wanted to expand its readership and, at the same time, work towards racial equality. Since it was a black publication in the south, the paper had to walk a fine line in order to appeal to a broader base.²⁴ As a result, the *Journal and Guide*’s report of the shooting was short and to the point. It stated that a car with about “four or five occupants” opened fire on a truckload of strikebreakers on the corner of Hampton Boulevard and Titustown, one person died and another was injured, and that the police raided the ILA headquarters shortly after but no arrests were made. In an attempt to sell more papers, the *Virginian Pilot*’s version exaggerated the amount of shooters, saying “ten or more negroes” opened fire on the truck that was carrying strike breakers. The paper also reported misleading and irrelevant information, such as the initial reports were that three police officers had been killed when in fact no police officers were shot. The paper went on to describe how three detectives commandeered a vehicle and eventually chased after four suspects but no arrests were made—which was also information that was not found in the *Journal and Guide*’s report.²⁵

Two weeks into the strike, it looked like neither side would be able to come to an agreement. The shipping lines took their offer of 75 cents an hour off the table, and went further when they stated that a deal would not be made unless the ILA no longer represented the longshoremen. In the end, the Federal Government was called in, and the United States Shipping Board negotiated what was claimed to be a victory by both sides. The Longshoremen’s wage of 80 cents was rejected, the 75-cent an hour rate was set in place, and the ILA was granted the right to be the official bargaining agent of the long-

shoremen.²⁶

Both the *Virginian Pilot* and the *Norfolk Journal and Guide* had reasons for printing the story of the strike and the shooting in the way that they did. The *Virginian Pilot* wanted to sell papers, so they used yellow journalism tactics to sensationalize the story.²⁷ The paper was pro-business, which meant that there was a motive to discourage the strikers. The paper wrote that not only were unorganized laborers working for the old wage of 65 cents, but so many people were willing to work for that wage that workers were turned away. The paper also used race to make the people involved in the strike seem different and unworthy of the public's support. On the other hand, because of the class and race of the striking longshoremen, it was in the *Norfolk Journal and Guide's* interest to support the longshoremen. They did so by reporting that the strikers were determined to continue the fight, were not responsible for the shooting, and that the ships were not being loaded on schedule. The paper's location in the South meant that, since it was a black publication, then it was not in its best interest to use sensationalizing tactics, or place an emphasis on race in its writings.

It was not until 1927 that the longshoremen of Norfolk and Newport News would receive the 80 cents an hour that they struck for in 1923, but just like the circumstances of the 1923 strike, the local longshoremen's pay was five cents less than the other North Atlantic ports.²⁸ The *Journal and Guide* reported on the wage increase but did not mention that the five-cent differential still remained. It appeared that the ILA had the longshoremen under control. There was no fuss from the longshoremen, and the *Journal and Guide* wrote that "harmonious relations exist between the ILA and employers."²⁹ The *Virginian Pilot* did not report on the wage increase. For the next four years, their wages remained the same, and the ILA continued their policy of cooperation.

Things changed in 1929; the Great Depression began and had a decade-long impact on the economy of the United States. The "Roaring Twenties" came to an end when the stock market crashed on October 29th, 1929. Large numbers of banks and businesses closed. Industrial production fell by 50 percent, and many employees were laid off.³⁰ For example, the Ford Motor Company had 128,000 workers, and by 1931 they had laid off 91,000 people, leaving them with a total of 37,000 workers.³¹ All over the country, workers wages

were drastically slashed, and most considered themselves lucky to be employed and did not protest. The *Encyclopedia of Virginia* stated that the effects of the Depression were not felt as hard in Virginia, although the state wasn't "depression proof." Virginia produced many goods that the nation's poor could afford, like cigarettes, food, and clothing, which meant that the state was able to bounce back from depression sooner than other states.³²

1931: Strike Averted

In 1931, near the end of September, it was time for the shipping lines and the longshoremen to negotiate their contracts for the following year. Industries all over the United States were cutting the wages of their employees as a result of the economic collapse in the country. Going into the negotiations, the longshoremen were earning a wage of 80 cents an hour straight time, \$2.60 during meal times, and \$1.30 for overtime—which went into effect after 44 hours, and included the weekends and holidays. Union officials were in charge of how many workers were assigned to load and unload each ship. The new contract that the shipping lines proposed sought to cut the workers wages to 65 cents straight time and \$1.00 for overtime, increase the work week from 44 to 48 hours, eliminate overtime pay for weekends, and eliminate double-time pay for working during meal times. The differences in their demands were drastic, and the longshoremen declared if their terms were not met, they would strike.³³

Just as they did in the strike of 1923, the *Norfolk Journal and Guide* advocated for the longshoremen. They did present both sides of the dispute; however, union officials were always given the last word any time that they reported on a claim made by the shipping lines. In a change to their reporting on the 1923 strike, the *Virginian Pilot*, for the most part, left their opinion out of their coverage of the negotiation process. They did once give the final say to the shipping lines over one claim made by Union Officials, but that was the only instance (to be discussed below) where it appeared that the paper favored one side over the other.

In the paper's initial report, the *Journal and Guide* wrote that the shipping lines sought to cut the wages of the longshoremen, and if that were to happen, the longshoremen would strike. Unlike the strike of 1923, the *Journal and Guide* presented their readers with a lengthy quote from an official of the shipping lines, which al-

lowed them to give reasoning for their stance, and why they thought the cut in wages was fair. Mr. Toppin, representing one of the major shipping lines stated that the longshoremen were earning 30 cents an hour in 1912, before the First World War, when "general world conditions might have been considered normal." By 1931 their wages had increased to 85 cents an hour (he was referring to wage workers earned in the North-Atlantic ports; Hampton Road's longshoremen still suffered from the five cent wage differential, which meant that they were earning 80 cents an hour), which was nearly a 200 percent increase. Mr. Toppin stated that the cost of living since 1912 had risen by 60 percent, which meant that the longshoremen should have been earning no more than 60 cents an hour.³⁴ His math was a little off; a 60 percent increase from 30 cents would equal 48 cents, but his point remained the same. His view was, given the fact that the longshoremen's wages had increased so much since 1912, a 15-cent cut in their rates was not as drastic as it sounded, especially given the circumstances of the economy. The *Journal and Guide* gave the last word to the ILA when they allowed the union's President, Joseph P. Ryan to respond to the claim made by Mr. Toppin. Joseph Ryan's response was that the wage longshoremen earned in 1912 was not a decent wage, and "conditions were such at that time that the men had no alternative but to accept that scale."³⁵ Giving the last word to a union official indicated which side the *Journal and Guide* favored in the dispute, but the paper made its stance on the issue clearer the following week, when it went into greater detail as to why the longshoremen should not receive a cut to their wages.

After the first meeting between the Union Officials and representatives of the shipping lines, it looked as if there would be no way to avoid a strike. The *Journal and Guide's* second article made a reasonable argument in favor of the longshoremen.

The publishers of the paper probably understood that the massive unemployment caused by the depression might have made readers unsympathetic to the longshoremen's demands, which explains why the author was diplomatic in his defense for the longshoremen. The article mentioned that when other industries attempted maintain the rates they paid to employees, the result was a massive layoff, which made the unemployment problem worse. The author went further by explaining that those industries then decided to cut worker's wages so that more men would be able to work, and in every case

those workers did not threaten to strike. But according to the *Journal and Guide*, the longshoremen's dilemma was different. It was stated that, although the wage they were earning was high, few of the longshoremen worked a full week, and their average weekly salary was \$15.³⁶ Given the rate the workers were earning, \$15 dollars a week meant that the average worker was working roughly 17 hours a week. So although their wages were higher than workers in other industries on paper, in reality, the longshoremen were earning much less than they appeared to earn. The weekly salary was the major grievance that the longshoreman had in regards to their wages being cut. The fact that *Journal and Guide* wrote "there is great merit to the contentions which have been raised by the longshoremen" showed that the paper favored the longshoremen over the shipping lines. The *Virginian Pilot*, on the other hand, appeared to be neutral throughout the dispute, except for one instance.

The *Pilot's* report of the dispute between the ILA and the shipping lines was noticeably different than the paper's coverage of the 1923 strike. There were no eye-popping headlines that would have led the reader to favor one side over the other. The sentences were not phrased in a way that would have made the longshoremen seem greedy or unreasonable. Instead, the paper stated what each side offered, and updated the reader, each day, on how the negotiations went. The only time the *Pilot* appeared to favor the shipping lines was in its September 26th article, in which the headline read: "Longshoremen's Strike Looming Over Wage Cuts." In the article, the longshoremen's main argument of only earning \$15 dollars a week was presented. The last word was given to the shipping lines when it reported that the ship owners could not understand Ryan's claim, when the longshoremen were paid 85 cents an hour, and guaranteed "at least half a days pay if they worked one hour in loading or unloading ships." It did point to the paper's bias when it gave the shipping lines the final word over the longshoremen's major argument against wage cuts, but it was the only instance where the shipping lines received favor. The depression caused extreme unemployment, and workers in almost all industries were accepting wage cuts in order to not be laid off. It would have been easy for the *Virginian Pilot* to demonize the longshoremen for threatening to strike at a time when most people consider themselves lucky for having a job.

So, what changed between 1923 and 1931 that made the *Vir-*

ginian Pilot's coverage of the ILA so different when compared to the strike of the previous decade? The *Pilot* was a pro-business paper, so it would be reasonable to suspect that the paper would have favored heavily on the side of the shipping lines—especially when it would have been easy to do so. The most likely reason for this was the fact that the ILA had proved itself to be an anti-radical union. The *Journal and Guide* gave weight to this claim when it quoted Joseph Ryan as saying “our men have put their brains and brawn into the steam ship business, and have successfully fought to keep communist, radicals, the I.W.W. and the like out of the game.”³⁷ Union officials were often accused of being in collusion with the shipping lines. So, in a way, the ILA was good for business. Even though the longshoremen's wages increased nearly every year, the alternative could have been much worse for the shipping lines. The union maintained the status quo, which the *Pilot* pointed out when it wrote that “there has been no strike of longshoremen for a number of years in Norfolk or Newport News.”³⁸

1934: The Emergence of a Radical Union

Since the emergence of the ILA in the Hampton Roads area, the union received favorable coverage from the *Norfolk Journal and Guide*. From 1920 to 1930, the *Virginian Pilot's* coverage of the union seemed to have transitioned from hostile to neutral. But in 1934, the emergence of a second, and more radical longshoremen's union would turn the *Pilot's* coverage of the ILA from neutral to favorable.

The ILA's policy of cooperation with the shipping lines allowed for some dockworkers to feel that the union officials were too cozy with the shipping lines. In 1934 that argument was made by local longshoremen who joined the Marine Workers Industrial Union (MWIU).³⁹ The leader of the local MWIU was Alexander Wright, who was a spokesperson for the Communist Party, and although union representatives denied that it was a communist organization, both the *Pilot* and *Journal and Guide* made multiple allegations of the MWIU's ties to communism.

Longshoremen not affiliated with the ILA had reason to protest; their hourly wage was 40 cents an hour, which was half the rate the ILA longshoremen earned.⁴⁰ The MWIU made its demands on April 30th, 1934, which included a wage increase to 60 cents an

hour. When the time to meet their demands expired, roughly 350 longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area went on strike.⁴¹

The *Virginian Pilot's* coverage of the MWIU strike was very similar to its reports of the 1923 ILA strike. It discouraged the strikers by writing how little the shipping industry was affected and how many workers showed up to work at the wage that the striking longshoremen were not satisfied with. The *Pilot* went further with an article that denounced the merits of the striking longshoremen. The article mentioned that the MWIU was "less conservatively led and advised" than the ILA, and went on to say that their strike was "ill-timed and ill-advised" and that "common sense took a vacation" when the officials made their demands.⁴²

Throughout the strike, the *Pilot* repeatedly reported that the ILA was not involved, and spoke favorably of the union. In doing so, the *Pilot's* reporting of the ILA went from neutral to positive. During the ordeal, the ILA proved why they were worthy of the favorable light that the paper was beginning to portray them in. The *Pilot* quoted the Third Vice President of the ILA, George Milner in saying he was willing to "throw every single one of its members into the breach so that shipping would not be affected by the strike."⁴³ Milner's remarks proved just how beneficial the union had become to the shipping industry. Not only had the union kept its members in line by not allowing a strike in the area in 11 years, the union was now using its members to break strikes and prevent any radical unions from seeing the light of day. As a result, the MWIU's strike ended a few days after it began, with none of their demands met. A few months later, the union was non-existent in the area.⁴⁴

Later that year, the ILA would be rewarded for the role they played in breaking up the strike of the MWIU. After negotiations, longshoremen represented by the ILA received a pay increase of 10 cents an hour. The *Journal and Guide* again reported that "relations between the laborers and employers are very harmonious."⁴⁵ ILA members in Norfolk and Newport News had come a long way since their strike in 1923. In 1922, the longshoremen were earning 65 cents an hour, and by the end of 1934 their wage had increased to 90 cents an hour. There was a negative side to the advancements that they made. Their wages and working conditions had improved, but those advancements were only shared by members of the ILA. Other longshoremen in the area were paid half of what the ILA mem-

bers earned. The strength of their union meant that a strike of longshoremen could not be successful without their participation, but as shown in the MWIU strike, they were not willing to participate and even volunteered to use their men to break strikes. This showed that the ILA not only kept its members in line—there had not been an ILA strike in Hampton Roads since 1923—but by preventing other strikes from being successful, they kept all longshoremen, including those not represented by their union, in line. This meant that the union was good for business and explains why the *Virginian Pilot*, a pro-business paper, changed its stance on the ILA. In the strike of 1923, when it was unclear what role the ILA would play in this area, the *Pilot* covered the union negatively. In 1931, when the ILA acted conservatively, the paper was neutral in its coverage of the union. Finally, in 1934 when the ILA showed that they were beneficial to the shipping industry, the *Pilot* spoke highly of the union. During the same time period, the *Journal and Guide's* support for the ILA never wavered. The paper advocated for the union in every dispute and wage negotiation that took place. The conservative nature of the ILA was beneficial to the *Journal and Guide's* pursuit of racial equality. The ILA improved the wages and working conditions of black longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area, and although this meant that other black workers suffered because of their success, they were working towards equality in a way that the *Journal and Guide's* owner, P.B. Young considered “safe and sane.”⁴⁶ In other words, the ILA had become part of Tidewater's establishment, both black and white.

Endnotes

¹ “Longshoremen Determined in Labor Dispute,” *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 20 October 1923, 1; “Dock Laborers go Back on Job After Months of Idleness,” *Virginian Pilot*, 2 November 1923, front page continued to page 4.

² Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests: Race, Class, and Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, Virginia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 46-59.

³ *Ibid*, 30.

⁴ *Ibid*, 50.

⁵ *Ibid*, 49, 52, 54-57.

⁶ Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests*, 59; Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States: 1492-Present* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), 328.

⁷ Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests*, 59.

⁸ Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*, 352-353.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests*, 135-136.

¹¹ "Striking Longshoremen Disclaim Any Responsibility for Violence," *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 13 October 1923, 1.

¹² For instance, the headline in the October 13th, 1923, issue of the *Norfolk Journal and Guide* read "2,000 Men Hold Out for Demands; Ship Sailings Delayed," while the October 8th issue of the *Virginian Pilot* stated that a "Super Abundance of Unemployed Workers Counteracts Effect of Strike Here" and "Shipping Conditions Practically Normal."

¹³ "Longshoremen Determined in Labor Dispute," *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 20 October 1923, 1.

¹⁴ "Union Demands Rejected; Dock Laborers Quit," *Virginian Pilot and Ledger Dispatch*, 7 October 1923, Front Page.

¹⁵ "Striking Longshoremen Disclaim Any Responsibility for Violence," 1.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Non-Union Labor takes Over Task of Unloading Ships," *Virginian Pilot*, 8 October 1923, Front Page.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "The *Norfolk Journal and Guide*: Founder Editor-P.B. Young," *The Black Press: Soldiers without Words*, PBS online exhibit, accessed 3 December, 2013, http://www.pbs.org/blackpress/news_bios/newbios/nwsprr/Norfolk/norflk.html

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Bloodshed Marks Inauguration of Open Shop Policy," *Virginian Pilot*, 11 October 1923, Front Page.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "The *Norfolk Journal and Guide*: Founder Editor-P.B. Young."

²⁵ "Bloodshed Marks Inauguration of Open Shop Policy," Front Page.

²⁶ "Dock Workers Go Back On Job After Month of Idleness," Front Page.

²⁷ Yellow Journalism refers to the use of embellishment and exaggeration of facts in order to capture a reader's attention.

²⁸ "2,000 Longshoremen of Hampton Roads Share Wage Raise," *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 29 October 1927, 1.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Howard Zinn, *A People's History of the United States*, 387.

³¹ Ibid.

³² *Encyclopedia Virginia*, s.v. "The Great Depression in Virginia," by Ronald L. Heinemann, accessed 3 December, 2013, http://www.encyclopedia-virginia.org/Great_Depression_in_Virginia

³³ "Longshoremen, Rejecting Wage Cut, Talk of Strike," *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 26 September 1931, 1.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "The Longshoremen's Difficulties," *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 3 October 1931, A10.

³⁷ "Longshoremen, Rejecting Wage Cut, Talk of Strike," 1.

³⁸ "Wage Conference of Longshoremen Closely Watched," *Virginian Pilot*, 22 September 1931, Back Page. The last strike had been the one in 1923.

³⁹ Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests*, 137-140.

⁴⁰ "Dock Workers' Strike Flops," *Virginian Pilot*, 3 May 1934, 9.

⁴¹ "Dock Workers Go On Strike in Two Cities," *Virginian Pilot*, 4 May 1934, Back Page.

⁴² "Norfolk's Touch of the Strike Fever," *Virginian Pilot*, 5 May 1934, 4.

⁴³ "Dock Workers Go On Strike in Two Cities," Back Page continued to 8.

⁴⁴ Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests*, 139.

⁴⁵ "Coastwise Longshoremen Here Granted Wage Boost," *Norfolk Journal and Guide*, 4 December 1937, 2.

⁴⁶ Earl Lewis, *In Their Own Interests*, 136.

A CYCLE OF REVENGE:

A Guerilla Warfare and Union Policies in the Border States,
1861-1865

Sabrina Manfield, The College of William & Mary

Pulling out his pistol, Confederate guerrilla Joseph M. Bailey fired at a Federal raider, intent on murdering him. At that same moment, the man desperately declared his wish to surrender and fell to the ground. Bailey believed he had killed him; however, the cap of his pistol was caught inside the round pipe of the gun. The man suddenly jumped to his feet and began to run. Bailey quickly caught up to him, seething with fury and prepared to shoot him again. As he ran, the man collapsed, begging Bailey for mercy. He announced that his wife was dead, and he had five small children at home who needed him. After hearing that appeal, Bailey's desire to kill the man evaporated, and the Federal raider extended his hand to him. Bailey recalled, "I took the proffered hand and freely confess that in spite of my greatest effort, sympathetic tears trickled down my cheeks. Such is the fickleness of the human heart. One moment ready to commit atrocities and the next melting with tenderness."¹ Even when writing his memoir, this moment still resonated lucidly with Bailey.

While Civil War guerrillas were responsible for some of the most cutthroat killings in American history, Bailey's story reveals that they were still capable of showing mercy. Regardless of the guerrillas' true motivations, the Union army perceived them to be uncontrollable and brutal. These negative perceptions influenced the Union to develop stringent policies against the Confederate guerrillas; as a result, the guerrillas ruthlessly sought retaliation against the Federals. Ultimately, the vengeful relationship between the two forces infiltrated and destroyed the lives of innocent civilians.

Historian Stephen Ash articulates, "Clearly, guerrillaism was a masculine phenomenon representing, at least in part, the defense of personal honor against the degrading tyranny of Federal rule."² Taking Ash's argument a step further, this paper assesses both the concept of personal honor and of revenge as they relate to guerrilla warfare. While guerrillas wanted to protect their own manhood, they were largely driven by injuries that were inflicted upon their families

and their communities. In addition, Historian Daniel E. Sutherland argues, “Confederate guerrillas influenced the military policies of both sides. Rebel irregulars also helped their nation lose the war.”³ In Sutherland’s book, *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War*, he provides insightful analysis about the relationship between guerrillas, Union policy, and Confederate morale. This paper conducts a detailed examination of Union policies and establishes a causal relationship between the undertakings of the Union army and the actions of the Confederate guerrillas. This essay uses letters, newspapers, memoirs, and the established arguments of historians to put forth a comprehensive explanation of the connection between the actions of the Confederate irregulars and the policies of the Union army.

The use of irregular warfare during the Civil War began with an incident in Baltimore, Maryland, on April 19, 1861. The Sixth Massachusetts regiment had come to take control of the city in order to protect the border of Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States. In addition to sending troops to Maryland, Lincoln also attempted to enlist Marylanders into the Union Army. These two factors caused the city of Baltimore’s support for the Union cause to plummet. As the Sixth Massachusetts regiment marched through the city, soldiers were shot, pegged with bricks, and hit by stones.⁴ The author of an editorial in the *Boston Daily Advertiser* stated that the regiment “was attacked by lawless men and boys, with stones, brickbats and firearms... The attack was disgraceful, and was not participated in by any Union man, or upholder of the laws of this country.”⁵ As this article suggests, the conflict in Baltimore instigated tensions between the Union army and irregular raiders. The U.S. government subdued the chaos, but the atmosphere of dissent in Maryland had been established.

While most Maryland secessionists left the state to join the Confederate army, a small number remained in order to wreak havoc on the Unionists. The Confederate sympathizers acted as spies in Federal camps, concocting plans to kidnap Union officials and raiders. The conflict in Baltimore inspired similar instances of violence throughout the Border States over the remainder of the Civil War. Most significantly, after the initial irregular activity in Baltimore, the infliction of revenge became routine; as a consequence, there were often instances of “violence against those who retaliated.”⁶ This

nasty cycle of revenge defined the relationship between Confederate guerrillas and the Unionists throughout the Civil War.

Following the incident in Baltimore, widespread support for guerrilla warfare emerged throughout the Confederacy. Confederate leaders such as Virginia lawyer and polemicist George Fitzhugh anticipated that the war was about to take a violent turn. In early 1862, he argued that if the Union infiltrated the interior of the South, the nation's "chief reliance... must be on irregular troops and partisan warfare."⁷ In addition to the endorsements of respected figures such as Fitzhugh, the civilians of the Confederacy were strongly influenced by the words of the press. In May of 1862, *The Semi-Weekly Raleigh Register*, which was based in Raleigh, North Carolina, released an article advocating for civilians to join partisan bands. The article emphasized that partisan rangers would be much more beneficial to the Confederate cause than "a regiment of undisciplined" soldiers.⁸ The piece also stated that as partisans, they would not have to "chafe under the restraints and dull monotony of camp life, but lead a life full of adventure and excitement."⁹ The ideas propagated by the press matched the desires of Confederate citizens, who wanted to contribute to the war cause while remaining in charge of their own actions.

While many Confederate leaders doubted the reliability and loyalty of partisans, the Confederate army decided to use irregular warfare because it produced quick results. The Confederate army used a variety of tactics in order to control Union invaders, but the threat of guerrilla violence was the most efficient way to deter intruders.¹⁰ On April 16, 1862, the Confederacy passed the First Conscription Act, which called all white men from the ages of eighteen to thirty-five into service. Five days later, on April 21, the Confederate Congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act (PRA), which officially allowed irregular groups to be formed with the President's approval. Inspired by images of mystery, freedom, and adventure, thousands of Confederate civilians became partisan rangers or joined guerrilla bands.¹¹

While guerrillas and partisan rangers each participated in forms of irregular warfare, it is important to examine the differences between these two types of fighters. In theory, partisan rangers were supposed to be subjected to all of the same treatment and rules as Confederate soldiers. The Confederate army also compensated them for their actions, but they were only paid for "subsistence and forage."¹²

Partisans also served as a defensive support system for the Confederacy. This type of fighting “legitimized the sort of free-wheeling operations” that many Confederates preferred to more structured kinds of warfare.¹³ On the other hand, rebel guerrillas were outlaws, who acted completely independently of the government. As historian Leo Huff stated, guerrillas were “troops not belonging to a regular army” who employed tactics such as “raids, extortion, destruction and massacre...They were peculiarly dangerous.”¹⁴ Guerrillas were known for their unmatched ruthlessness, their elusiveness, and their cunning.

In spite of their differences, guerrillas and partisans generally had one important motivation in common: they wanted to fight for their own communities.¹⁵ Many men in the Confederate army were sent away from their families, but independent partisan groups almost always remained close to their homes. Another common thread that connected both groups was the desire for retaliation. Partisan rangers and even members of the regular army often breached the restrictions of standard warfare in order to avenge their family and friends.¹⁶ The most significant difference between partisans and guerrillas was the latter group’s focus on the infliction of fear. Daniel Sutherland articulated, “Guerrilla strategy...recognized terrorization of civilians as a legitimate goal. Unfortunately the best *method* of achieving the *goal* of terror was, likewise, terror.” While the two groups were similar, the goal to infuse their victims with horror was unique to the guerrilla culture, and it differentiated them from partisan warriors.

In the summer of 1862, the nature of the Civil War transformed. After General George B. McClellan conducted an unsuccessful attempt to seize Richmond, the Union started to employ new tactics.¹⁷ A major turning point in the relationship between the guerrillas and the Union army occurred on August 13th. A large brick building, which was located on 1409 Grand Avenue in Kansas City, Missouri, collapsed. Thomas J. Ewing, the Union Army general from Kansas, had been using the building as a prison for Southern women and girls, who had been accused of serving as spies for the Confederacy. The collapse killed and injured several sisters of guerrilla Bill Anderson, and it was rumored that Ewing had engineered the collapse.¹⁸ Historian Richard S. Brown argued that the collapse contributed to rise of guerrilla activity during the war. He claimed

that the tragedy “tore the last thin covering of mercy from the hearts of Quantrill’s boys.”¹⁹ Though the incident was likely an unfortunate accident, it fueled guerrillas with a powerful desire for revenge.

The summer of 1862 was also significant because the Federals began utilizing a strategy of “hard war” and moving away from their traditionally conciliatory policy.²⁰ Only five days after the collapse of the Kansas City prison, General Thomas Ewing issued Order No. 10, which established the Union’s aggressive policy toward guerrilla warfare. The order proclaimed, “Officers will arrest and send to the district provost-marshal for punishment, all men...who willfully aid and encourage guerrillas, with a written statement...of the proof against them.”²¹ Ewing specified that the marshals would attempt to determine which guerrillas were coerced to act against the Union and which ones were genuinely disloyal; however, it was difficult to make these distinctions without knowledge of the guerrillas’ thoughts. This lack of clarity resulted in the tragic execution of many innocent citizens, who had been accused of guerrilla activity. Most significantly, the order specifically stated that the “wives and children of known guerrillas...will be notified by such officers to move out of this district....”²² Clearly, this provision indicated that the family members of guerrillas were going to be required to leave their homes. The combination of the collapse of the prison and Order No. 10 infused many guerrillas with fury, inspiring them to act more violently and ruthlessly.

While the Union’s transition away from conciliation inspired an increase in irregular warfare, in turn, the upsurge in guerrilla activity caused the Union to further harshen their attitudes towards unregulated actions. In the summer of 1862, Union General William T. Sherman declared, “All the people are now guerrillas.”²³ Despite the fact that not all Confederate civilians were actually guerrillas, the actions of the Union army often reflected Sherman’s philosophy. The Federals killed Confederate band member John L. Owen because he was accused of bushwhacking.²⁴ In the words of Worthington Davis, a veteran campaigner in Kentucky and Tennessee, “The bushwhacker was not a soldier but a cowardly, contemptible individual, who never carried out hostilities unless he was unopposed...At night he could be found lying in ambush to kill some unwary victim simply for the plunder.”²⁵ While guerrillas made up only a small number of irregular fighters, partisans and guerrillas were commonly accused

of bushwhacking. In reality, Owen served in a group of sanctioned partisan rangers. His wife, Nancy Owen, articulated, "I do know and can say with truth that he never engaged in what is termed bushwhacking...."²⁶ After six months of spying on him, the Federals invaded Owen's home. Nancy Owen recounted, "They made him sit down on a log which lay close to a fence...and there took the life of an innocent, unresisting man. They left him, there on the public road, shot down like a wild beast."²⁷ It was incidents like this that inspired guerrillas to seek revenge. Owen was a sanctioned partisan ranger, and in the absence of proof, he was brutally murdered. Clearly, the Union at times failed to successfully differentiate between partisans and rebel guerrillas.

As the tragic story of John L. Owen reveals, it was often difficult to distinguish between partisan rangers, guerrillas, and even Union soldiers. As a consequence, seeking revenge was a challenge and sometimes the wrong people were hurt or killed. This confusion had a significant impact on the civilians. For example, it was impossible to know whether a person's clothing reflected his true identity. According to Thomas A. Peters, a citizen of Bolivar, Missouri, "Civilians were terrorized by this uncertainty; caught in the middle of a chaotic struggle, they could never assume that the stranger at the gate—whom in peacetime they would have made welcome—was not their despoiler or even their killer."²⁸ This uncertainty created a wave of paranoia throughout the Border States. The Union soldiers used this panic and ambiguity to their advantage. They would rob the homes of innocent civilians, but they would not wear their uniforms; as a result, the people mistook them for bushwhackers, and their actions were not traced back to the Union army. This fluidity between guerrillas and Union soldiers pervaded the Confederate civilians with a feeling of perpetual fear.

The subject of appearances led to intense conflicts over the issue of dealing with imprisoned partisans. During the summer of 1862, commanders of both sides argued vigorously about "the relationship of irregular and semi-regular troops to regular forces, and the proper treatment of captured partisans."²⁹ In a letter exchange between Thomas Hindman, a Congressman and Major General from Arkansas, and William T. Sherman, Sherman argued that those who fought without uniforms should not anticipate receiving the same punishments as soldiers.³⁰ Most Union commanders treated guerril-

las and partisans in the same way because neither of them were regular soldiers. Alexander Walker, a prisoner of the Union Army, wrote in a letter to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, "A number of our citizens enrolled as partisan rangers or in the State militia have been closely imprisoned and threatened with death as guerrillas or pirates." While rangers acted legally under the orders of the Confederacy, the Union often deliberately ignored the Confederacy's policy on partisan warfare. This defiance contributed to the heated conflict between the Union army and Confederate irregulars.

Towards the end of 1862, the Union began emulating the methods of Confederate guerrillas. The aforementioned prisoner, Alexander Walker, wrote in a letter to Jefferson Davis about the villainous nature of General Benjamin Butler. Walker articulated, "The malice of Butler against females is more bitter and insatiable than that against males...And this is but a feeble and deficient presentment of the enormities and brutalities of this cowardly and brutal monster."³¹ Especially following 1863, the Union soldiers grew increasingly undisciplined, harming innocent communities.³² Historian Michael Fellman articulates, "Lawlessness was not true of all regiments, but it was far more characteristic than post-war regimental histories suggest."³³ Troops in border-towns scoured the countryside searching for guerrillas, and they believed that "*all* Missourians were by nature traitors."³⁴ While guerrillas presented a dangerous threat to the civilian populations in the Border States, the actions of Union troops proved to have equally as malignant effects on border communities.

The confusion that defined guerrilla warfare in 1862 resulted in the creation of an official Federal policy towards irregular warriors. Henry W. Halleck, who was the U.S. Army General-in-Chief, created a system to help differentiate among the diverse types of irregulars. The policy, which passed on April 24, 1863, was called War Department General Order No. 100, and it separated these fighters into four sections.³⁵ The "partisan" was awarded the designation of a soldier; however, insurgents, brigands, and the guerrilla proper were all deemed to be outlaws, who if caught, could be punished by death; however, these categories caused more heated contention, since the definition of partisan warfare was limited to the disturbance of an enemy's communication system.³⁶ Robbery or pillaging, even if it was sanctioned by the Confederacy, was punishable by death. The order

had the opposite of the desired effect. It aimed to decrease tension and limit irregular activity, but partisan warfare was employed to a greater extent following the provisions. Historian Daniel E. Sutherland argues that as a result of this policy failure, “retaliation against local non-combatants and denying captured guerrillas their rights as prisoners of war became the most widely used means of restricting partisan operations.”³⁷ As of 1863, the United States had begun to encourage the brutalization of civilians as a method for seeking revenge against guerrillas.

As the Union policies towards guerrillas harshened, the attitudes of the Union army grew more hostile towards irregular fighters in general. Daniel Robinson Hundley, a resident of Kentucky, articulated that the Yankee court had “guerrilla-on-the-brain” as a result of John Morgan’s raids and the activity of other partisans.³⁸ Hundley assessed, “Every man arrested within the limits of the State of Kentucky, be he soldier or citizen, was considered a guerrilla or bushwhacker.”³⁹ He specifically recalled the execution of J.J. Nickell, a Confederate soldier, who was an unfortunate “victim of Yankee tyranny.”⁴⁰ Massachusetts’ politician and Union General, Benjamin Franklin Butler, held very strong negative sentiments towards guerrillas. He believed that guerrilla warfare should be punished with “the last severity,” and that rebels who murdered Union men should have their property burned.⁴¹ He argued that \$1000 was the appropriate reward for every “Guerilla head.”⁴² He justified this statement by articulating that the Union would bring the rebels “uncivilized system of warfare to a sudden termination” by employing “an equally uncivilized remedy.”⁴³ Similarly, General William Tecumseh Sherman found guerrilla groups to be equally “injurious” to both the Rebels and the Unionists.⁴⁴ As the opinions of army officials towards guerrillas worsened, the merciless punishment of guerrillas became commonplace.

While the Union generals had always perceived the guerrillas negatively, Northern soldiers and civilians developed intense feelings of animosity towards guerrillas in the latter years of the war. Albert O’Connell Marshall, a soldier from New Lenox, Illinois, stated, “These guerrilla bands are thieves and murderers by occupation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by nature. They terrorize over those they pretend to befriend.”⁴⁵ Marshall had formed his perception of guerrilla bands based on rumors

about guerrilla leader Timothy Reaves. Though Marshall had never met Reaves, he heard that he was “one of the meanest leaders of an irregular band” along the border of Missouri and Arkansas. Name-calling was an easy way to dehumanize the guerrillas, making them easier to kill. Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, who was a Union commander in North Missouri, recalled an instance where a band of guerrillas was “yelling like demons.” The Union men then proceeded to swiftly kill “thirteen of the villains.”⁴⁶ The tactic of euphemistic labeling helped the Union army to morally justify their actions.⁴⁷

On the other hand, there were Union soldiers who saw the humanity behind the actions of Confederate irregulars. Union soldier John E. Whipple recognized the compassion that the actions of guerrilla John Hunt Morgan illustrated. While Morgan burned bridges up in the Tennessee mountains on multiples occasions, he always informed “the trains on the road after he [had] burned the bridges which shows he is something of a man after all.”⁴⁸ Though Morgan used drastic tactics to fight for the Confederacy, Whipple’s words elucidate that Morgan did show respect for the lives of innocent civilians. While the North perceived guerrillas to be ruthless killers, some of them did show mercy.

Because of the increasingly vicious actions that the Union army took against alleged guerrillas, irregulars considered violence to be the only way for them to defend their communities.⁴⁹ Missouri guerrilla leader Clifton D. Holtzclaw wrote to the post-commander at Keytesville, Missouri, declaring his intentions to avenge any innocent Southern civilian who was harmed by Union troops. He emphasized that he did not wish to kill any Union soldiers or burn their homes, but he was “determined to kill two Union for every So[uthern] sympathizer” that the Union army killed.⁵⁰ Many guerrillas, particularly leaders such as William Clarke Quantrill and Bill Anderson, believed that they were protecting their people, avenging their lost friends and family, and defending the Southern cause. Historian Michael Fellman observes, “the nasty means they usually employed were forced upon them, by a barbarian foe. Inside, they were pure.”⁵¹ The guerrillas genuinely moral disengaged from their actions, redefining murder as an act of justice. In the process, murder evolved into a necessary deed of retribution. In other words, it was the moral obligation of Confederate guerrillas to avenge the deaths of their loved ones.

In August of 1863, the nature of the war took on a condition of emotionless violence. On August 21st, Quantrill and 450 of his men stormed into Lawrence, Kansas, and they committed one of the largest atrocities of the Civil War. They murdered 150 men and boys in order to avenge all of the Missouri citizens who had been robbed or harmed by Kansans during the war. When the Civil War reached August of 1863, “a cycle of retaliation and counterretaliation had deadened human sympathies and heightened tolerance for death and rapine.”⁵² There had been so much violence that people had grown numb to cruelty, and the perpetrators on both the Union and the guerrilla sides no longer attempted to justify their actions. Violence had become an accepted state of normalcy. On August 25th, Brigadier-General Ewing issued Order No. 11, which forced all residents of the Kansas City area to vacate their homes and leave their possessions behind.⁵³ Essentially, this order left the citizens both homeless and penniless.

The vengeful relations between the guerrillas and the Union men continued to escalate during the later months of 1863. Guerrilla leader Champ Ferguson invaded the home of Union sympathizer John B. Rodgers while he was out of the house. Ferguson and his band of guerrillas attacked Rodgers’ wife and his seventeen-year-old daughter, threatening them with guns and pistols. Then, they proceeded to force the women to take off their clothes, while a group of twenty to thirty men pillaged the home.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Union men vowed to avenge their families for the physical and emotional pain that the guerrillas had caused. Some Federals chose to become designated guerrilla hunters as a means of retaliation. Fielding Hurst, William B. Stoke, and George W. Kirk scoured after guerrillas throughout Tennessee and other border states. They employed tactics similar to those used by guerrillas, including stealing and burning Confederate homes. A woman from western Tennessee declared that Fielding Hurst had “visited almost every corner in the county, taking stock, plundering houses, burning and every other meanness you could imagine.”⁵⁵ As of 1864, the tactics of the Union soldiers and the techniques of the Confederate guerrillas were nearly replicas of each other.

As the duel between the Union army and the raiders intensified, guerrillas were portrayed scathingly in the Northern press. While throughout the war the press had depicted guerrillas negatively, the

number of cutting articles pertaining to guerrillas escalated in 1864. The *Daily National Intelligencer* from Washington, D.C. referred to guerrillas as “merciless bands of robbers and murderers,” who inflicted pain upon their own countrymen.⁵⁶ *The Liberator*, a strongly liberal and abolitionist paper, stated that the guerrilla Sterling Price had been “seduced by bad ambition,” and that he had made himself the head of a “perjured crew” and “a leader among traitors.”⁵⁷ *Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper*, which was published in New York City, featured an article about Champ Ferguson following his execution in 1865. The article referred to Ferguson as a “notorious guerrilla and murderer, whose deeds” had “stained the war record of the Southwestern States.”⁵⁸ The representation of guerrillas in the press illustrates the gradual transition of the Union’s attitude toward guerrillas. As the war reached its conclusion, the Federals believed that the guerrillas deserved no sympathy.

The relationship between the Union army and the Confederate guerrillas had grown to be mutually merciless. This shift towards total war caused the Confederate perceptions of guerrilla warfare to change. In 1864, exiled Confederate governor of Missouri, Thomas Reynolds, who was once a guerrilla supporter, denied help to both Quantrill and Sterling Price when they asked for his endorsement.⁵⁹ He recognized that guerrilla warfare had submerged the Confederacy under a state of anarchy, and the irregular fighting was endangering the survival of the Confederacy. During January of 1864, General Thomas Rosser of Virginia began to criticize publically all types of irregular warfare for its detrimental impact on both the standard of military warfare and the morale of Confederate civilians. He referred to the partisan rangers as “a band of thieves,” who participated in “stealing, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief and crime.”⁶⁰ The majority of Confederate officers had initially supported the partisan system, but they recognized that it was harming both the people and the Confederate cause. A civilian from Tennessee declared, “The whole country is so demoralized we cannot tell what may happen.”⁶¹ The Confederacy was clearly losing not just manpower but hope. The guerrillas were desperately committing ruthless atrocities, and the drained Southern civilians had come to expect banditry and brutality.

The repeal of the PRA on February 16, 1864 marked the Confederate government’s official condemnation of irregular war-

fare; nevertheless, guerrillas continued to resist. A band of Tennessee guerrillas killed two Union scouts and gang-raped a woman in early June.⁶² However, since Mosby's Rangers and McNeill's Rangers remained the only two official partisan groups, their impact on the war was dwindling. Quantrill was killed on June 6 after a month of battling a bullet wound, and Bloody Bill Anderson was killed in late October.⁶³ This loss of leadership combined with the Confederacy's condemnation of partisan activity diminished the influence of guerrilla warfare in the Border States.

Caught up in a coldblooded battle of retaliation, the guerrillas and the Union soldiers both sacrificed their ideologies for the sake of violence. The Union's invasive policies stirred up revolutionary sentiments in the Confederacy, which inspired the guerrillas to fight relentlessly against the Union. Ultimately, the rise of guerrilla warfare created an atmosphere of violence and fear in the Confederacy. Irregular activity transformed the war into an anarchic bloodbath, which eventually hurt the Confederate cause. Their brutality motivated the Union to implement more stringent policies and use harsher strategies. In addition, the perpetual violence damaged the morale of the Confederate people and created cracks in the unity of the Confederacy. Overcome by their thirst for revenge, both the Union army and the Confederate guerrillas destroyed the lives of many innocent civilians. Ultimately, both groups were directly responsible for the widespread destruction of the Confederacy and the emergence of total war in the Border States.

Endnotes

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⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵ "The Baltimore Fight," *Boston Daily Advertiser*, (Boston, MA), April 25, 1861.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ George Fitzhugh, "The Times and the War," *DeBow's Review* 31 (July 1861): 2-4, quoted in Daniel Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict*, 26

⁸ "The Partisan Rangers," *The Semi-Weekly Raleigh Register*, May 31, 1862.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Daniel Sutherland, "Introduction," in *Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the Confederate Home Front*, ed. Daniel Sutherland (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1999), 8.

¹¹ Scott Reynolds Nelson and Carol Sheriff, "Union Occupation and Guerrilla Warfare," *A People at War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, 1854-1877* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 96.

¹² Daniel E. Sutherland, "Guerrillas: The Real War in Arkansas," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 52 (1993): 261.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 262.

¹⁴ Leo E. Huff, "Guerrillas, Jayhawkers and Bushwhackers in Northern Arkansas during the Civil War," *The Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 24 (1965): 128.

¹⁵ Daniel E. Sutherland, "The Real War in Arkansas," 262.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 264.

¹⁷ Nelson and Sheriff, "Union Occupation and Guerrilla Warfare," 85.

¹⁸ Edward E. Leslie, *The Devil Knows How to Ride: The Story of William Clarke Quantrill and His Confederate Raiders* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1996), 197.

¹⁹ The members of Quantrill's guerrilla band, who sought revenge against the Federalists. Richard S. Brownlee, *Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), 119

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 94.

²¹ Edward E. Leslie, *The Devil Knows How to Ride*, 199.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ William T. Sherman, October 9, 1862, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series 1, 17 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1887), 272-274.

²⁴ A type of guerrilla fighter in the American Civil War. They usually acted in rural areas, and they generally were on the side of the Confederacy. *Ibid.*

²⁵ Worthington Davis, *Camp-fire Chats of the Civil War*, 1887 in B. Franklin Cooling, "A People's War: Partisan Conflict in Tennessee and Kentucky," ed. by Daniel E. Sutherland (Fayetteville, AK: The University of Arkansas Press, 1999), 130.

²⁶ Report from Nancy Owens, July 3, 1862, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series 2, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899), 503.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Thomas A. Peters quoted in Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the American Civil War* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1989), 32.

²⁹ Daniel Sutherland, "The Real War in Arkansas," 276.

³⁰ Ibid., 276-277.

³¹ Letter from Alexander Walker to Jefferson Davis, October 9, 1862, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series 1, 17 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1887), 885.

³² Fellman, *Inside War*, 34.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 36.

³⁵ Sutherland, "The Real War in Arkansas," 268.

³⁶ Ibid., 277.

³⁷ Ibid., 278.

³⁸ Daniel Robinson Hundley, *Memoir of Daniel Robinson Hundley*, in *Prison Echoes of the Great Rebellion* (New York, NY: S.W. Green, 1874), 63.

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⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Benjamin Franklin Butler, *Letter from Benjamin Franklin Butler to Edwin McMasters Stanton*, July 3, 1862.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ William Tecumseh Sherman, "Letter from William Tecumseh Sherman to John Aaron Rawlins, May 9, 1865," in *The Story of the Great March. From the Diary of a Staff Officer* (NY: Harper & Brothers, 1865), 100.

⁴⁵ Albert O. Marshall, *Army Life: From a Soldier's Journal: Incidents, Sketches and Record of a Union Soldier's Army Life, in Camp and Field; 1861-64* (Joliet, Ill., 1884), 157.

⁴⁶ Report by Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, 416.

⁴⁷ Albert Bandura, "The Moral Desengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* (1999): 195.

⁴⁸ John E. Whipple, Letter from John E. Whipple, 1864, in *Soldiers' Letters, from Camp, Battle-field and Prison* (New York, NY: Bunce & Huntington, 1865), 472.

⁴⁹ Michael Fellman, *Inside War*, 140.

⁵⁰ Clifton D. Holtzclaw quoted in Michael Fellman, *Inside War*, 138.

⁵¹ Michael Fellman, *Inside War*, 140.

⁵² Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict*, 193.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 230.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ "R.R. Livingston, "From Arkansas" *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington D.C.), January 28, 1864.

⁵⁷ "The Death of A Bad Man" *The Liberator* (Boston, MA), February 17, 1865.

⁵⁸ "The Execution of Champ Ferguson," *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper* (New York, NY), November 11, 1865.

⁵⁹ Michael Fellman, *Inside War*, 110.

⁶⁰ Thomas Rosser quoted in Daniel Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict*, 238.

⁶¹ Tennessee civilian quoted in Daniel Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict*, 234.

⁶² Daniel E. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict*, 270.

⁶³ Leslie, *The Devil Knows How to Ride*, 369.

HISTORICAL ALTERNATIVES IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR:
German Conceptualization, Creation, and Loss of Its Central
Europe

Eric Grube, University of Virginia

Introduction: Friedrich Naumann's Place in Historiography

In 2008, historian Eric Weitz published in *The American Historical Review* an argument concerning the organization of different groups of peoples within European political states. He claimed that from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, there had been a marked shift in how political states received their legitimacy to rule. States had been based around multi-nationalism, where the imperial political entity derived its power from tradition and ruled over numerous cultures that defined themselves primarily not based on ethnicity but on other determining factors, such as religion. By 1919, however, political states were to be based on nationalized populations, where individual states corresponded to an ethnically uniform population. He argued that over the nineteenth century and into the First World War, nationalism became a powerful political force—whereby a people both identified primarily with its constructed national identity and viewed its state's authority as being based on the population being homogenous. Ethnic minorities were seen as undermining the legitimacy of a self-determined state and were thus personifications of issues that needed to be resolved.¹

Weitz's argument commendably sheds light on a belief central to understanding the twentieth century, but it does so at the expense of other historical possibilities. He focuses solely on what came to pass, while only briefly touching on the topic of historical alternatives. Such an approach begs the question: Were there alternatives to the historical processes described by Weitz that offered something different but were just not followed through due to contextualized contingencies?

Friedrich Naumann, a Christian-Socialist member of the German Reichstag during the First World War, argued for just that: he drafted a proposal of Germany's plans for organizing Europe after an assumed victory, a proposal that offered an alternative to self-de-

terminated states based on nationalized populations. Naumann wrote this proposal, entitled *Mitteleuropa* (or *Central Europe*), in 1915, a year after the war began.² In this piece, he argued for the unification of the main Central Powers—the German Empire and the Empire of Austria-Hungary—after the conclusion of the war. He articulated the purpose of this action: to realize Central Europe’s potential as a powerhouse able to compete with Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.³ Naumann also articulated how he wanted this goal to be achieved. Namely, he wanted to use as models the previous German Customs Unions, which established joint economic policies, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. This dual monarchy system had been established with the *Ausgleich* of 1867 and was organized such that Austria and Hungary had separate domestic policies but were united in terms of foreign policy. Thus, Naumann essentially hoped for a Central European confederation that would maintain the Hohenzollern Kaiser of Germany and the Habsburg Emperor of Austria-Hungary as rulers of their own domestic realms. He also hoped this new entity would have joint commissions to set external economic and diplomatic policy.⁴ It was to be the taking of the German-Austrian-Hungarian Alliance to the next level of cooperation.

What this political plan implied was exactly what made it a historical alternative to Weitz’s conclusion concerning an obsession with nationally uniform states: Naumann was proposing a political entity that would be even *more* ethnically diverse than the already multinational Habsburg Empire, the fragmentation of which due to rising centrifugal national forces had initiated the war in the first place. This combined political entity was to be a demographic brew of nationalities—Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Hungarians, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians—and religious confessions—Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and Jews. This plan meant to incorporate people with different identities in a manner reminiscent of the earlier system of states ruling ethnically heterogeneous populations in multinational conglomerations. Naumann anticipated and reacted to counter-arguments to his plan—namely, problems concerning this confederation’s ability to maintain its power over such a diverse population—by claiming that he wanted this confederation in Central Europe to transcend the issue of nationality. He hoped the creation of his Central Europe, which

was to be a new nexus of world power, would maximize the potential of all the included nationalities and thus lead to the disappearance of conflicts concerning nationalities needing their own states. Naumann unequivocally rejected the idea of national self-determination on the grounds that in Central Europe, divided self-determined states could not compete in the world.⁵ He claimed that “The parliamentary system which is a product of the democratic age has become unusable because it is handicapped by nationalism, the second result of democracy,” and thus he hoped to bolster the support for his multinational super-state whose power would create a transcendence of the question and problem of national differences.⁶

What Naumann hoped was that the war—which he saw as an immense test, the culmination of diplomatic competition—would be the sparking event for creating his confederation; the war would prove how well Germany and Austria-Hungary worked together and would also demonstrate the absolute necessity of consolidating their power in such a pugnacious diplomatic arena. The First World War was to be, for Naumann, the impetus and justification for creating his Central Europe, and he expressed his sentiments when he stated, “We all wish to begin anew,” a use of rhetoric reminiscent of Paine’s desires for a fresh start for civilization in America.⁷ But, in the context of the Eastern Front, where Germany would occupy, administer, and briefly acquire territories of Central Europe, what the Germans would find was not a melting pot, but rather, a crucible of war. By 1918, this crucible resulted in a Russian desire for peace, subsequently leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia. The German demands at this peace conference in what is today Belarus gave Germany the opportunity to carry out Naumann’s plan: Germany essentially dictated a short-lived political layout of eastern Central Europe. However, the final treaty was by no means a transcription of Naumann’s ideas, but rather, a document shaped by numerous other historical processes, as will be discussed. To what extent was Naumann’s plan, which offered an alternative to the self-determination model for which Weitz argues, manifested in and yet also contradicted by this treaty? Questions such as this yield important conclusions concerning just how Germany’s plan for eastern Central Europe came to be, and how it created, albeit briefly, an alternative to the idea of national self-determination.

War in the East: Organization and Policies of Occupation

In order to understand the terms of Brest-Litovsk, the German army's policies on the Eastern Front must first be examined—not only as a case study of human rights violations but also to see how a dissonance began to grow between Naumann's theoretical ideas and actual German actions in eastern Central Europe.

Western constructions and perceptions of the East very much shaped how the First World War played out, as evident by the strategies the German High Command had created for dealing with a two front war. As the European powers mobilized in 1914, the Germans put into motion their decisive blow against France. The German High Command thought Russia was too backward to mobilize itself promptly but also too vast to be conquered swiftly. Removing France from the war first would let Germany then focus all of its forces on Russia and achieve an overall victory on both fronts. However, the advance of the German war machine in the West was halted because of the German decision to invade France by violating Belgium's neutrality, a gamble that brought Great Britain into the conflict against Germany. The German objective of Paris, upon which the German High Command had placed all their hope of victory, was out of reach. The Western Front stalled into the trench stalemate already studied extensively in historiography. Germany's fear—a protracted two-front war—had become a reality.

To make matters worse for the German High Command, the Russian forces mobilized much faster than had been calculated. The feared swarms of Russian troops began their advance into eastern Germany while the bulk of the German army was *not* advancing in the Western Front. However, Germany had two advantages that led to its victory at Tannenberg in August of 1914: the presence of Germany's great (and brutal) military tacticians, Ludendorff and Hindenburg, on the Eastern Front and grave blunders on the part of Russia's military command. The Battle of Tannenberg and, shortly thereafter, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes effectively ended the Russian push into Germany and led to the German advance into Russian territory.⁸

The unexpected success of the German Eastern Front in the first few months of the war is critical to understanding the story of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The two giants of the Eastern Front, Lu-

Ludendorff and Hindenburg, had achieved tangible successes, which continued to evade the High Command in the West. These clear-cut German triumphs in a time of growing frustration in the West unequivocally made these German commanders war heroes at home. Their basis for support from the German masses was solidified, and this domestic backing led to a historical process central to the war's outcome: these commanders would be able to aggrandize their own influence in politics over the course of the war without much complaint from the civilian population.⁹

By 1915, Germany had gained control over what had been Russian Poland, the Russian Baltic regions of today's Latvia and Lithuania, and much of what is today's Belarus. This advance was when human rights violations first emerged, ironically, by the Russians. The Russian troops, carrying out a scorched-earth retreat, shot or forcibly moved eastward many of their own peoples who lived in rural settings, all because of the fear that these peoples could become collaborators with the invading Germans. A disproportionate number of Jews were forced out, as their language, Yiddish, was more linked to German than the Slavic languages were, and thus they were more likely to be accused of collaboration.¹⁰

In August of 1915, the German advance continued, and, to Ludendorff's chagrin, what had been Poland was to be administered by the German civilian government's bureaucrats under the name of the Government General of Warsaw. Ludendorff then became determined not to lose custody of the Baltic regions, and he was in fact successful in this endeavor. This region received the name *Oberbefehlshaber Ost*—meaning Supreme Command of the East—or *Ober Ost* for short. The city of Kowno became the main site of the German military's occupation apparatus, and *Ober Ost* was kept under military control for the duration of the war. And in terms of human rights, this region saw the gender-specific violations that unfortunately seem to be the rule rather than the exception in modern warfare. Local men were beaten while women were raped, crimes which the German High Command failed to address.¹¹

In November of 1915, the German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, convened separate meetings to discuss Germany's policies toward both its allies and its enemies. Naumann was asked to attend despite being just a regular member of the Reichstag. However, his role in this process was that of an observer; rather than being molded

actively by him, the policies were simply reported to him after the deliberations had taken place.¹² The high authorities' decision to marginalize Naumann in these initial meetings might seem benign, but it was truly indicative of what was to pan out on the Eastern front. At this moment in the war, numerous disconnects between Naumann's theories, still being finalized into its published form, and German policies began to emerge.

Naumann argued for two main things: an economic and political union of Central Europe that was mutually beneficial to all of its inhabitants and a powerful super-confederation that transcended the divisionary nature of nationalism and national identity.¹³ Reality, however, was much different. Germany's three main principles of occupation in *Ober Ost*, as will be explained, were "Order of Rule," *Verkehrspolitik* (literally, "transport politics"), and the spread of German culture, or *Kultur*, by means of the educational institutions. All three of these policies ran counter to Naumann's two central tenets. Under Order of Rule, German military needs took priority over any local or civilian needs, thus contradicting Naumann's first tenet. With *Verkehrspolitik*, or movement policy, the German occupiers committed abuses that led to a process of solidification of the occupied peoples' national identities, a growing national consciousness that directly contradicted Naumann's second tenet. The implementation of German education policy in the schools of *Ober Ost* further crystallized the national identities of the occupied peoples, and thus, the *Kultur* policies also led to the opposite of Naumann's second tenet.¹⁴

Order of Rule manifested itself mainly in the German exploitation of the agricultural and other natural resources of *Ober Ost*. Nature itself, the physical essence of a nation, was violated on a mass scale, with horrendous consequences for the local inhabitants. Because the German war machine required large amounts of foodstuffs, and because the Allied blockade halted the import of food from around the world, eastern Central Europe's fields and granaries were exploited immensely. The local peoples were robbed of their livestock—especially horses, vital as they were for transporting war supplies—and locals who refused were sometimes shot on the spot. Tickets were administered to people whose property had been taken so they could be reimbursed after the war, but the backing of those reimbursements depended on a German victory. The total monetary

value of the goods taken from *Ober Ost* came to about 338,606,000 marks.¹⁵ Clearly and unsurprisingly, the practical and logistical needs of the war trumped the Reichstag's rhetoric of maximizing all nationalities' potentials, but what is surprising is the extent to which the German policy worked against itself. The requisition of livestock and the abuse of locals that drove them into smuggling or stealing actually significantly crippled the agricultural productivity of the area. The destructiveness of Germany's Order of Rule thus sometimes trumped its own best interest.¹⁶

German *Verkehrspolitik* ("transport politics") focused on the movement of peoples. This policy had two main facets. The first blended with Order of Rule and centered on extracting men from their local towns and forcing them into labor brigades, which were then shuffled around *Ober Ost* to wherever labor for the German war effort was needed. In total, about 60,000 Lithuanian men were forced into labor companies, many of whom were grabbed by German soldiers waiting for them to come out of churches. Malnutrition, overwork, and disease were a deadly triad, and many laborers never returned home. Although this policy of labor units was officially done away with in September 1917, the use of forced and exploited labor continued up until the end of the war.¹⁷ The second facet of *Verkehrspolitik* was about restricting the movement of the rest of the civilian populations by means of identification cards. Inhabitants of *Ober Ost* ten and older were required, adding insult to injury, to buy an individualized identity card, complete with fingerprints. A total of 1,800,000 were issued, and they were to be presented anytime a German occupier requested to see them. These cards made it difficult to travel, as the Germans did not like people leaving the locality printed on their card.¹⁸

Ironically, Order Rule and this shuffling of laborers around, causing detrimental economic consequences, made it such that the national identities of the people affected actually became more solidified. The inhabitants of *Ober Ost* began to relate with other people who had been similarly abused and realized what they had in common as opposed to the abusive Germans. The locals depended on each other more and more for help, strengthening the national identities of the occupied regions. Thus, the German war policies in the East, specifically in *Ober Ost*, led to a strengthened sense of national awareness amongst the occupied people, directly counteracting Nau-

mann's goal of a Central Europe that transcended the question of nationality.¹⁹

The education policies contained within the German plan for establishing German *Kultur* in *Ober Ost* also hardened the resolve of local people to identify with their nationality because of two important aspects. First, the Germans hoped to eliminate all traces of Russian influences from the schools. Thus, the Germans allowed for the instruction of most subjects to be conducted in the local languages of the inhabitants, as opposed to the traditional Russian that had been used. This helped lead to the standardization of local languages, such as Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish, as more uniform styles of these languages were used to instruct school children. Thus, the educational policy linked the identity of the locals with their native languages, further fanning the intensity of nationality in this region, all against Naumann's hopes. The second aspect of the German educational policy was that *Ober Ost* unsurprisingly deemed the German language a necessary subject. This mandatory teaching of German grammar and vocabulary, however, led to a spiteful backlash against German culture, as the locals resented the fact that they *had* to learn German. Thus, *Ober Ost* contradicted Naumann's proposal because it attempted to establish German cultural dominance and consequently, although inadvertently, increased the tendency of local inhabitants to identify with their own culture and nationality.²⁰

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Germany Organizes Eastern Central Europe

By 1917, the Russian ability to make war was broken while the Tsarist regime toppled under the pressure. A revolution in March introduced a parliamentary government headed by Kerensky, but this government's unwillingness to make peace with the Central Powers reduced its own base of support. The Germans aided Lenin's return to Russia in order to spark another revolution that would weaken Russia further and force a conclusion of the Eastern Front. The Bolsheviks seized power, and on November 8, 1917, declared their desire for peace. The delegates of the belligerent powers—notably Trotsky from Russia and, after the armistice of December 15, Kühlmann from Germany—met in the town of Brest-Litovsk in German-occupied Russia.²¹ The temporary dividing line created by the armistice, according the Third Article of the Armistice document, was

the front line of the war itself—from the Gulf of Riga to the border of Austria-Hungary.²²

However, a noticeable shift in the German rhetoric had occurred, and that led to serious resentments on the part of the Russians. Initially, the German claims about its war goals had been strictly, even if only superficially, non-expansionist in the East. This more modest rhetoric was evident in Naumann's emphasis on a political realignment of the Central Powers as they were, in such a way that did not emphasize the German desire to annex lands. Indeed, he even stated, "It is difficult to believe that Prussia will alter her eastern frontier very much unless she is compelled to do so."²³ Furthermore, Naumann claimed that it was not necessary for Russian Poland to be included in Central Europe as he envisioned it, given that it was unknowable in 1915 where the line between German and Russian forces would crystallize.²⁴ Even as late as July 1917, the Reichstag re-emphasized the non-aggrandizing war aims of Germany in its "Peace Resolution."²⁵

However, upon the discussion of a peace treaty in December, the German terms had shifted to be very annexationist—indicating the extent to which the duration of the war had drained Germany and thus pressured the German diplomats for stricter peace terms. More insidiously, these harsher terms revealed the extent to which the German High Command had stolen political power from Kaiser Wilhelm II and extended this political power into the legislature's jurisdiction. The intensification of the war effort provided the pretext and the cover for this transfer of political power to the German High Command, marked most notably by the decision to make the ever-popular Hindenburg and Ludendorff in charge of the entire German war effort on August 29, 1916. The goals of the German High Command, having gained more and more political power, were of course centered on annexing territory that it had been administering. This shift in the German demands also led to protracted negotiations with the Bolsheviks, including numerous hiatuses, but ultimately the Bolsheviks had no choice but to accept German annexationist desires, as they were under threat of a renewed German offensive. On March 3, 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was officially finalized and established peace between the Central Powers and Russia.²⁶

The Third Article of this treaty is critical in two respects. First, it set in diplomatic writing Russia's losses. Russia officially

had to abandon its claims to any land west of the negotiated line, which was actually significantly deeper into Russian territory than the armistice line had been.²⁷ Second, the Third Article clearly stated, “Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose to determine the future status of these territories in agreement with their population.”²⁸ However, there was no doubt that these regions were to be incorporated into a bloated Germany, as the German High Command wanted a prize that could be useful in any future wars, which it was already anticipating. The High Command hoped to use the argument of self-determination, as articulated in the final treaty, to justify any annexations.²⁹ The High Command claimed that the populations of these regions were, in fact, German. Thus, the German High Command hoped to use the ethnic Germans already inhabiting these territories to claim these lands for Germany in the name of self-determination, which was to be their rationalization for their ravenously annexationist peace.³⁰

Thus, the German High Command paradoxically adopted the rhetoric of its enemy, Wilson’s United States, but perverted it to fit their annexationist desires and cover up what was clearly a case of conquest. By directly appealing to popular self-determination based on nations, albeit with a pre-set German result, the German High Command directly contradicted Naumann’s rejection of nationalized self-determination and his hope for the transcendence of the question of nationality. However, the German High Command’s designs were also reconciled with Naumann’s text. On a broader level, Naumann’s *Central Europe* had already created a framework for thinking of maximizing the power of Central Europe, as evident by his claims for creating a political entity in Central Europe that could compete with Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.³¹ But now, the German High Command inserted Wilsonian rhetoric in order to take Naumann’s plan—the creation of a large state in Central Europe—and manipulate it to fit their expansionist desires. Thus, Naumann’s proposal was manifested in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a mindset that set the terms of creating a super-state in Central Europe, but it was contradicted by the fact that the use of self-determination in the treaty underscored the importance of nationality and was used to justify the German domination of other nationalities. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, self-determination, the foil to Naumann’s ideas, was ironically infused into Naumann’s broader objectives.

In order to justify the German-dominated Central Europe with the rhetoric of national self-determination, the state structure of *Ober Ost* created petitions, which the inhabitants of *Ober Ost* were to sign if they wanted to be a part of Germany. Since the vast majority did not want that fate, *Ober Ost* was left in an awkward position where its attempt to justify annexation was proving to be an argument against it. Undeterred, the German High Command had the state agents of *Ober Ost* force the local inhabitants to sign these documents. The methods ranged from the use of intimidation to making signatures the price for needed foodstuffs, all for the purpose of creating a falsified argument for national self-determination.³² However unilateral Germany's acquisition of *Ober Ost* had been, the German occupation regime went through cumbersome travails to acquire a Wilsonian rationalization for its expansionism. Unfortunately for Naumann's hopes, both this rationalization and this German expansionism were in conflict with his original proposal.

Responses to Brest-Litovsk: Naumann, the Signing Powers, *Ober Ost*, and the Western Allies

As the terms for Brest-Litovsk were being solidified, Naumann and numerous other politicians expressed their desires—they prioritized the ultimate goal of a Central Europe above any annexations pushed for by the High Command.³³ Later, in August of 1918, Naumann himself articulated his thoughts on Germany's diplomatic exploits. He claimed that, for better or for worse, the Treaty had determined exactly where the eastern border of his desired Central Europe was to be. He specifically commented on how the question he left open in his 1915 document concerning Poland had been answered by military force, as he stated in his 1918 response, "Since the treaty of Brest-Litovsk it is no longer a question whether Poland shall lie to the east or west of the border. The die is cast, Poland remains Middle European."³⁴ More importantly, Naumann expressed exactly what he thought needed to happen as a result of the conclusion of peace on the Eastern Front—namely, the time for creating his Central Europe, the joining of the Central Powers into an economic and diplomatic conglomeration, needed to happen immediately.³⁵ The sense of urgency found throughout Naumann's response indicates the amount of stress being felt from the Western Front—he seemed to know that the claims from the East needed to be solidified as the war dragged

on with the Western Allies.

Further evidence of the gravity of the situation on the Western Front was apparent in the German High Command's response to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk just months after its finalization. On August 27, 1918, two addendum treaties were attached to the end of the original document. The first was a general modification of certain articles of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, both clarifying old and attaching new agreements.³⁶ Most interesting is the Third Article of this first addendum, which claimed Germany was to abandon some of its land taken from Russia in exchange for financial reimbursement from Russia. By extension, this Article also established the principle that Germany could abandon any territory it wished in exchange for Russian financial resources.³⁷ Essentially, Germany was so strapped for cash as the Western Front caved in that the High Command was willing to sell back to the Russians some of its acquisitions from the East. Clearly, the situation was critical if the annexationist German High Command was willing to sacrifice parts of its prize for currency. And here is where another historical irony was made apparent. The context of the war was no longer the delivery room for Naumann's Central Europe, but rather, it had become the alter upon which his idea was being sacrificed.

The second addendum treaty to Brest-Litovsk was strictly a financial agreement, which again revealed the desperation of Germany by August of 1918.³⁸ The Ninth Article of the original treaty had specified no indemnities were to be paid by either signing party.³⁹ Five months later, however, the Germans demanded in the Second Article of the financial addendum that "Russia shall pay Germany a sum of 6,000,000,000 marks as compensation for the loss to Germans caused by Russian measures..."⁴⁰ Clearly, the circumstances of the war had shifted since the time of the original document: Germany had such a need to pay for the worsening situation on the Western Front that it edited the original Treaty with Russia to make up for the German High Command's previous miscalculation.

All of this German back-peddling to impose harsher terms in addition to the already ravenous territorial claims in the original treaty culminated in another unexpected development with important implications for Naumann's dream. Ironically, the victory of the Central Powers in the East (and the attaining of an opportune moment to realize Naumann's blueprint) ended up driving a wedge

between Germany and Austria-Hungary diplomatically. All of the territorially and financially ravenous terms forced upon the Russians made Austria-Hungary feel like it was now waging a war it could no longer afford just to secure Germany's annexations.⁴¹ The drawing up of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been, in theory, the moment when the Central Powers could have dictated the organization of Central Europe in a way that realized Naumann's vision. However, the German High Command chose not to, favoring instead a strategy that brewed mistrust between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus, the results of Brest-Litovsk led to the exact opposite of what Naumann had originally planned.

Furthermore, the overambitious appetite of the German High Command on the Eastern Front contributed to the collapse of its Western Front. The German military's final drive for Paris, the 1918 Michael Offensive, disintegrated in the face of the Western Allies, now bolstered by the United States. Meanwhile, one million German troops remained idle in the occupation and administration of Germany's newly acquired lands in the East.⁴² Two important historical processes explain the German decision to keep so much manpower fallow in the East. Ludendorff feared Bolshevik propaganda had too heavily influenced the Eastern troops. Therefore, he concluded it would be too dangerous to move them to Western Front, where it was feared morale was faltering. Also, the High Command believed that number of soldiers was needed to maintain order in the vast new territories for which it was now responsible. Ludendorff did realize his mistake and decided to double back on his miscalculation. Over the summer and fall of 1918, he moved around half a million troops to the West—but the momentum from the start of the spring offensive had already been lost.⁴³ While the failure on the Western Front eventually cost Germany its prize in the East, the prize from the East interestingly took away from Germany any chance of a more favorable bargaining position in the West.

The Lithuanian political elite in *Ober Ost* had their own response to the peace making between the Central Powers and Russia. As the Russian forces collapsed in late 1917, intellectual leaders in Lithuania met in Vilnius to establish the Taryba, an executive committee to speak on behalf of Lithuania. The Taryba tried to play different factions within the German government off of each other in an effort to gain legitimacy. It appealed to the more liberal civilian gov-

ernment of the Reichstag against the increasingly powerful German High Command that had essentially supplanted the Kaiser. The Taryba found the Catholic *Zentrum* party to be particularly responsive. Its leader, Matthias Erzberger, continuously spoke for the legitimacy of the Taryba as the true voice of the territory of *Ober Ost*, or rather, of Lithuania. The Taryba's boldness grew such that it declared Lithuania to be an independent state on February 16, 1918, just two weeks before the finalization of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Now, to be sure, the German High Command's desire to have Lithuania trumped any declaration the Taryba made.⁴⁴ However, this increasing boldness further illuminated just how German policies led to the solidification of the idea of states based on nationality in eastern Central Europe—the exact antithesis of what Naumann had had in mind.

The responses of the Western Allies to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk further revealed the historical significance of the German High Command manipulating ideas of self-determination to support its own annexations. Upon discovering the German perversion of his own ideals, Wilson realized that Germany truly intended to treat this war as an annexationist war. The precedent Germany set in the East confirmed a fear among the Allied powers that the German military-controlled government had similar intentions in the West, and thus the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk led to a radicalization of the war aims of the United States. Wilson was no longer willing to appeal to any German liberal sentiments to establish a compromising peace based solely on his Fourteen Points, a peace that would not have included such a vindictive punishment for Germany and could have included Germany in the post-war order. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, however, Germany proved to Wilson that it truly was a military state that needed to be defeated. Wilson now accepted that unilateral peace terms, which would restructure the political organization of Central Europe according to the Allies' desires, had to be forced on Germany.⁴⁵ Thus, in another historical irony, while Brest-Litovsk had been Germany's opportunity to construct its Central Europe, it ended up being the Allied impetus for dictating the postwar organization of Central Europe. And this Allied-imposed organization was to embody national self-determination—the intellectual foil to Naumann's ideas presented in *Central Europe*.

Consequently, both the Central Powers *and* the Allies responded to Brest-Litovsk in ways that conflicted with Naumann's

proposal—the treaty drove a diplomatic wedge between Germany and Austria-Hungary, while it simultaneously gave the Allies cause to make sure their terms of self-determination for Central European nationalities were implemented in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.⁴⁶ If Naumann expected the war to be the forge used to create his Central Europe, it ended up being the kiln in which his plans were consumed. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany's moment to make real the idea of Central Europe, had become the petrol that turned the Allied flame into an inferno.

Concluding Reflections

Naumann, writing his proposal when the war had been going well for Germany on the East, had hoped to construct a political entity based on principles that ran counter to the trend of his times; he directly opposed the concept of political self-determination for nationalities. Instead, he hoped to reuse an older concept of multi-ethnic political entities, such as that used by the crumbling Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the very crumbling of which resulted from this rising national consciousness that had initiated the war.⁴⁷ However, the German policies in their occupation of eastern Central Europe showed the ease with which national consciousness arose in *Ober Ost*.⁴⁸ Also, the German diplomatic policy at Brest-Litovsk revealed how a perverse fusion of both Naumann's ideas of a super-state in Central Europe and Wilson's ideas of self-determination led to the justification for an annexationist peace. Furthermore, as has been argued in this paper, the Treaty itself ended up creating reactions from both within and without the two main Central Powers that made Naumann's goal of Central Europe even less of a reality.

Historian Fritz Fischer claims, "Friedrich Naumann's book, *Mitteleuropa*, which caused such a sensation at the time, appears merely as a remarkable, but yet thoroughly unrealistic, flight of fantasy." Is this to say Naumann's text is not useful in understanding the past? On the contrary, even Fischer concedes such a text helps reveal the *mentalité* of German policy makers when he claims it elicited tremendous amounts of responses and debates.⁴⁹ Thus, an investigation of this source shows the conceptual contingencies discussed during the First World War and helps construct an understanding of how people in this historical context thought of their world. Furthermore, what makes Naumann's text historiographically significant is that

it reveals what seems natural to us—the belief that political states should be based on nationally uniform populations—was originally just one historical possibility, a single option among many. Thus, this assumption concerning states and populations was neither a historical inevitability nor the result of some linear historical trajectory.

To be sure, Weitz's theory that the twentieth century saw a marked obsession with uniform populations within political states is based in historical reality, but a broader and more complete historical understanding can be acquired when intellectual alternatives are also examined.⁵⁰ This is exactly what Naumann's text has to offer—an idealized conceptualization of political unity that was supposed to transcend questions of national heterogeneity as all peoples within the state reached their maximum potentials.⁵¹ Furthermore, many aspects of Naumann's intellectual creation would later manifest themselves in Europe. It just took an even more destructive World War to provide a sufficient enough impetus for forming, by way of cooperative economic policies, a multinational confederation in Europe.

Thus, Weitz's theory does create a basic model for thinking of historical processes from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries. However, it falls short in terms of studying contingencies—alternatives in history that did not last but still help create an understanding of the past. It also does not account for the development of post-World War II confederations composed of numerous European nationalities and marked by shared political and economic institutions. Naumann's *Central Europe* could provide useful insights into these historical concepts and more recent processes, and consequently, this text should be the topic of future historical study.

Endnotes

¹ Eric D. Weitz, "From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," *The American Historical Review* 113 (December 2008): 1313-1316.

² Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 169-170.

³ Friedrich Naumann, *Central Europe* (London: P.S. King & Son, Limited, 1917) 1, 4-5, 182.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 259-287.

⁵ Ibid., 63-101.

⁶ Ibid., 101.

⁷ Ibid., 1-5, 196.

⁸ Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 12-17.

⁹ G. J. Meyer, *A World Undone: The Story of the Great War 1914 to 1918* (New York: Random House, Inc., 2006), 245.

¹⁰ Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 19-20.

¹¹ Ibid., 21, 54-63.

¹² Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York City: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967), 254-255.

¹³ Naumann, *Central Europe*, 63-101.

¹⁴ Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 54-150.

¹⁵ Ibid., 73.

¹⁶ Ibid., 54-88.

¹⁷ Ibid., 73-74.

¹⁸ Ibid., 102-104.

¹⁹ Ibid., 75.

²⁰ Ibid., 125-128.

²¹ John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace March 1918*, (London: Macmillan and Company, 1966), 23-110.

²² "The Armistice Agreement of Brest-Litovsk (December 15, 1917)," from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 380.

²³ Naumann, *Central Europe*, 107.

²⁴ Ibid., 107-108.

²⁵ Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 99-103.

²⁶ Ibid., 100-308.

²⁷ "The Peace of Brest-Litovsk—The Treaty of Peace Between Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey (Signed at Brest-Litovsk, March 3, 1918)," from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 403-408; Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 206-207.

²⁸ "The Peace of Brest-Litovsk," from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 405.

²⁹ Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 108-109.

³⁰ Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 204-209.

³¹ Ibid., 169-170; Naumann, *Central Europe*, 182.

³² Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 208-209.

³³ Fischer, *Germany's Aims*, 611.

³⁴ Friedrich Naumann, "The Constitution of Middle Europe," from *International Conciliation*, (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1918), 38.

³⁵ Ibid., 37-42.

³⁶“Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of Peace Between Russia and the Central Powers (Signed at Berlin, August 27, 1918),” from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 427-434.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 428.

³⁸“Financial Agreement Supplementing the Russo-German Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty of Peace Between Russia and the Central Powers (Signed at Berlin, August 27, 1918),” from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 439-446.

³⁹“The Peace of Brest-Litovsk,” from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 407.

⁴⁰“Financial Agreement,” from Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 440.

⁴¹Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 312-314.

⁴²Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 212.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 210-212.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 200-206.

⁴⁵Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 363-371.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 312-314, 363-371.

⁴⁷Naumann, *Central Europe*, 259-287.

⁴⁸Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front*, 75, 126-128.

⁴⁹Fischer, *Germany's Aims*, 208.

⁵⁰Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System,” *The American Historical Review*, 1313-1316.

⁵¹Naumann, *Central Europe*, 63-101.