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PLATO'S PHILEBUS

BADHAM

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THE
PHILEBUS OF PLATO

EDITED BY

CHARLES BADHAM.

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Plato. Philebus

T H E
PHILEBUS OF PLATO,

WITH
INTRODUCTION, NOTES, AND APPENDIX;

TOGETHER WITH A
CRITICAL LETTER ON THE LAWS OF PLATO,
AND A CHAPTER OF
PALAEOGRAPHICAL REMARKS;

BY
CHARLES BADHAM, D.D.,
PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES.

SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND ENLARGED.



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TO THE REV. W. H. THOMPSON, D.D.,

MASTER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

My dear MASTER,

A vivid remembrance of you arises in my thoughts whenever I am called upon to occupy myself with Plato; and now that I am once more editing the *Philebus*, I cannot but revert to the time when I derived so much help and encouragement from you in the execution of my earlier task. What then is more natural than that I should wish to see your name appearing in the present work, which is not merely a new edition, but an attempt to redeem a hasty and crude performance by something which I shall be content to leave behind me? There are many reasons why I desire to make this record of our friendship; one is the intrinsic worth of the friendship itself as it affects me. During the two and twenty years which have passed since the First Edition, your good will has never flagged. First you spared no pains to enable me to remain in England; and afterwards when some *δευτερος πλοῦς* became expedient, it was through your good opinion and the weight of your authority, at least as much as through any other cause, that I found my way to a haven not altogether undesirable. You also were one of the few who understood that among the trials of banishment not the least is the fear of being utterly forgotten; so while many good friends, and some very eminent scholars, have scarcely ever found sufficient leisure to prove that fear to be groundless, your letters have sustained my hopes. One other English Scholar, of whose friendship we are both proud, was not less considerate; and now I must record my great affection for him in a Book which he will not read. Never did any one so generously interpret the obligations of his high place to the prejudice of his own ease and comfort, and in favour of all who claimed his help, as the late Lord Lyttelton. He was,

Platonis *Philebus*.

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as you well know, a man of infinite modesty; and of the genuineness of that modesty none could doubt, who saw how perfectly free he was from any sickly fear of publicity. He took his place in the world with frank boldness, and did his work in it according to his sense of right. As an excellent scholar, and as a champion of scholarship, he did good service to a cause not overburdened with defenders; but while he was glad to seek refuge from sadder thoughts in Classical studies, he never hid himself in them to escape from any troubles or labours which could make him useful to mankind. There is yet another common friend of ours, who needs my praise as little as the other, and who is equally removed from all human comments; but this is probably the last time I shall ever publish anything, and I will not lose my only chance of glorying in his friendship. Frederick Denison Maurice was, as he informed me many years ago, an enthusiastic admirer of Plato's Philebus. He saw more deeply into it, and indeed into all Philosophy, by reason of that devout humility which made him so accurate an observer of many things which a man who is thinking half of his author and half of himself is sure to overlook. Where other men perplexed themselves with their own ingenuity and love of systems, his teachable sympathy with all that he studied led him into truths which they had neglected as unmeaning. But it is not for me to celebrate that great Heart and Mind. I merely claim him as one of those friends for whom my affection revived with peculiar vividness while I was busied with the preparations for this Book.

As for the Book itself, you will perhaps have leisure to decide, whether on the whole it contains many improvements on its predecessor: but having once addressed myself to you, I am loth to let you go, without taking some note of certain Platonic lucubrations, the fruit of the past year. They are verbal criticisms; but verbal criticisms which make an author more legible, seem to me no barren exercise. Nor will *you* think so, who have never had any lot or part with the supercilious and ignorant dogmatisers who have brought scholarship to so low an ebb in England. You will be glad to find any text made a little more worthy of its author, than the Græculi have made it; and will rejoice for the sake of those who are to come after us, if they are not scared away from important works by the almost hopeless state in which

they have been left. This is why I have again taken up the same inquiry into the later books of the Laws, which I commenced in a certain Epistola. My belief is now stronger than ever, that three fourths of the bad grammar, obscurity and nonsense which we find in good authors is due to nothing more than interpolations, whether purposely inserted or accidentally derived from the Margin. Not that the other part of criticism which detects the right word lurking under the wrong has done all its work; very far from it. Take the following example from the Sophist, p. 218, A. Ἄρα τοίνυν, ὦ ξένη, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ εἶπε Σωκράτης πᾶσι κεχαρισμένος ἔσει; if you will read Heindorf's note, you will see that second thoughts are not always wiser. One easily confounded letter has caused all this trouble. Theaetetus says: Ἀρᾷ τοίνυν, ὦ ξ., οὕτως—Or take this in the Politicus, 286, D; where for ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνησθαι, it is self-evident that you want ἐφ. δ. μεμερίσθαι.—In the Laws, 904, D where we now read διαφέροντα καὶ μετέβαλε τόπον ἄγιον ὅλον μετακομισθεῖσα, common sense bids us read, δ. κ. μετέλαβε τόπον, ἀγίαν ὁδὸν μετακομισθεῖσα, leaving out what follows. I do not know whether you have seen a striking proof of the audacity of interpolators, which I adduced from the Phædo. It is in the passage¹⁾ beginning σὺ δὲ δεδιώς ἄν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαντοῦ σχιάν, where the *very opposite* precept is put into Socrates' mouth in place of that which Plato had assigned to him; and all for what? Because the two forms ἐφς ἄν and ἐώης ἄν were disputing for admission, some one inserted both, but one with a change of accent and breathing, and then another came and changed χείρειν ἐώης ἄν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρηθέντα, into χείρειν ἐώης ἄν καὶ οὐκ ἀποκρίναιο, ἕως ἄν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρηθέντα σκέψαιο. And on this rubbish Wyttenbach comments as on a sound logical precept. Another such forgery occurs in Euthydemus 305, C, D. Here ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις and so forth down to κολούεσθαι, ought to be removed back so as to precede ὥστε παρὰ πᾶσιν. But because it was inserted out of its place, in order to give it some air of continuity, the scribe built for it this beautiful bridge: εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῆ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους: which Cobet, little dreaming whose work he was correcting, altered into σφεῖς σοφώτατοι. In the same dialogue 287, B, C, we have these glaring interpolations: [ἂ τὸ πρῶτον

1) P. 101, D.

εἶπομεν νῦν ἀναμιμνήσκει καί]—[ῶ λέγεις]—[ἐπεὶ εἰπέ τοῖς λόγοις.]

But I must now enter upon the Laws. Shall I follow Pindar's precept of *πρόσωπον τηλανγές*? or that given in Troilus and Cressida, which I will quote, *ut obiter emendem*?

1) Let us like merchants shew our fouler wares
And think perchance they'll sell: if not, the lustre
O'th' better yet to shew will shew the better
By shewing the worse first.

I will not presume to say that the following correction is better or worse than the general run, but the passage is at all events a strikingly corrupt one, and so an emendation of it, if tenable, deserves a special place.

In the twelfth Book p. 960, c, d, of Stephens we find the following passage, which looks at first impenetrable; but by and by we discern a kind of bush-track, and at last, if I am not altogether mistaken, with a very little thought and very sober dealing with difficulties, we are able to restore an old highway in all its completeness.

ΑΘ. ὦ Κλεινία, πολλὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν καλῶς ὕμνηται, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ τῶν μοιρῶν προσρήματα.

ΚΑ. Ποῖα δῆ;

ΑΘ. Τὸ Λάχεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην εἶναι, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν Ἄτροπον δὲ τρίτην, σώτειραν τῶν λεχθέντων, ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων τῷ πυρί, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζομένων δύναμιν· ἃ δὴ καὶ πόλει καὶ πολιτεία δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῖς σώμασι παρασκευάζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐνομίαν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ σωτηρίαν τῶν νόμων. ἡμῖν δ' ἔτι μοι φαίνεσθαι δοκεῖ τοῦτ' ἐλλεῖπον τοῖς νόμοις εἶναι, πῶς χρὴ τὴν ἀμετάστροφον αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν δύναμιν.

I will not trouble you with the attempts already made: they are one and all random guesses, only half serious, rather indications of an obstacle than attempts to remove it. We see thus much; that as the destiny Atropos preserves the work of her sisters, τὰ κλωσθέντα, so he wishes that his and his friends' work, τὰ λεχθέντα, should be made ἀμετάστροφα. Now Atropos cannot be σώτειρα τῶν λεχθέντων; it is therefore safe, at least provisionally so, to write τὴν Ἄτροπον δὲ τρίτην σώτειραν. τῶν ΔΕΛΕχθέντων—

1) Act 1. Sc. 3.

The allusion to the well known τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι is obvious, and justifies us in placing σώτειραν thus by itself. Then we come to ἀπεικασμένα τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων—, and the question is; who or what is made like to what? But that question is soon answered. The preservation of their statutes is to be made like to the preservation of the fatal thread. But as ἀπεργάζεσθαι must be the act of the old men, and as in these Books we find five or six instances of μεθα being confounded with the participial ending, μενος μενη &c., it is worth while to try ἀπεργαζώμεθα, and therefore to adapt ἀπεικασμένοι to it. The moment this is done the rest of the sentence corrects itself. τῶν δὲ λεχθέντων, ἀπεικασμένοι τῇ τῶν κλωσθέντων σωτείρ AI, τὴν ἀμετάστροφον ἀπεργαζώμεθα δύναμιν. The remainder is likewise faulty; but in the first place a little thought will soon shew us *how* this sentence is to be connected with the foregoing, and a little more will suffice to clear away what is at once an impropriety and a tautology. εἰ δὴ καὶ πολίταις καὶ πολιτίσι δεῖ μὴ μόνον ὑγίειαν κ. τ. εἰ.

A shorter but equally corrupt passage is in the tenth Book, p. 905, c. γινώσκειν δὲ αὐτήν, ὃ πάντων ἀνδρείοτατε, πῶς οὐ δεῖν δοκεῖς; ἢν τις μὴ γινώσκων οὐδ' ἂν τύπον ἴδοι ποτέ, οὐδὲ λόγον ξυμβάλλεσθαι περὶ βίου δυνατὸς ἂν γένοιτο εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν τε καὶ δυσδαίμονα τύχην. This αὐτήν refers to τὴν συντέλειαν. "What you call the neglect of the Gods, you so call, because you do not understand that all which they do contributes to a great whole." We may therefore translate συντέλεια by *joint action*. This then the youth is told that he must know. But it is precisely what he cannot know, and, not knowing, ought to distrust his own judgment concerning the prosperity of the wicked. Eusebius in quoting this passage has πρὸς οὐδέν, the MS Ω has as a correction in the Margin πόσου δεῖν, and although this rests on MS authority, and is confirmed by the corrupt reading in Eusebius, and yields the only admissible sense, the Editors have passed it over. Again though we may use ἀνδρεῖος ironically of an unabashed man, this is not the language of monitors to a youth of infidel tendencies; and here, where they are reminding him of his weakness and incapacity, the word is altogether unsuitable. I have no hesitation in reading; γινώσκειν δ' αὐτήν, ὃ πάντων ἀχρεῖοτατε, πόσου δεῖν δοκεῖς; You will observe that the mere substitution of χ makes the whole difference of the

reading.—I have before me the larger Zurich Edition; what may have since happened to the text of the Laws I know not; but I can scarcely conceive that such obvious blunders as the following can have been left as they were by any subsequent Editor. 878, B, τραυμάτων οὖν ἐνεστώτων ὄργῃ γενομένων for τ. οὖν ἐν ἔστω τῶν ὁ. γ. Thus also in 829, A we read ταῦτόν δὲ τοῦτο ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχειν, γενομένη μὲν ἀγαθῇ βίος εἰρηνικός κ. τ. εἰ. in place of ἔστι καὶ πόλει ὑπάρχει γ. μ. ἀ. κ. τ. εἰ. and in 837, C, ὄρων δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐρῶν τῇ ψυχῇ, δεόντως τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιτεθυμηκῶς κ. τ. ε., for ἢ ἐρῶν, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ ὄντως τ. ψ. εἰ. 836, C, ἀκολουθῶν for ἀκολουθόν, and πιθανῶ for ἀπιθάνω. 898, E, περιπεφυκέναι (an absurd repetition of π) for πεφυκέναι. 899, A, αὐτοῦ δὲ ἄμεινον for ἄρ' οὖν δὲ ἄμεινον, omitting χρεῶν. 903, E, μετασχηματίζων τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς ὕδωρ ἔμψυχον!, καὶ μὴ ξύμπολλα ἐξ ἑνός—for ὕδωρ, ἔμψυχα καὶ μὴ, ξύμπολλα ἐξ ἑνός. and lastly, in 904, B, ὅσον ἀγαθόν ψυχῆς, διανοήθη—for ὅσον ἂν ἀγαθόν ψυχῆ διανοηθῇ. But I will pass to other places, where the correction is not so self-evident. In 829, D, for τοῦτο ἀποδιδόντων, the sense requires οὗτοι δ' ἀποδιδόντων, and in E, for τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ λόγῳ. In 832, C, we find: τὸ δὲ τῆς νῦν πολιτείας, ἣν νομοθετούμενοι λέγομεν, ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφοτέρα. There will be no more harshness or obscurity, if we read ἣν νομοθετοῦμεν, ἃ λέγομεν ἐκπέφευγεν ἀμφοτέρα. In 833, A, for σύστασις which is quite foreign to the purpose, for even if you interpret it according to προσιστώμεθα in the Philebus, it would amount to συμπλοκή, so that we should have, ἐν συμπλοκαῖς συμπλοκή, read σύντασις, *contentio*. 834, A, τόξοις καὶ πέλταις καὶ ἀκοντίοις. This would do very well if the peltasts threw their targets at the enemy. Till this is shown to be the case, I should vastly prefer καὶ παλτοῖς. There is a strange order of words a few lines further: τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ἵππων δὲ περὶ ἀγῶνος γίγνεται ἐξῆς ἂν νομοθετούμενα. The first AH is nothing but AN in its right place, and ἂν νομοθετούμενα is a corruption from ἃ νομοθετοῦμεν. 836, C, I have no doubt that the nearest approach to the true reading now possible, is πρὸς δὲ τοῦτο, ὁ διὰ πάντος τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τίς οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ; τοῦτο is the aim, τούτῳ the advocate of purer manners, τούτοις are the measures he recommends. 839, A, For λήπεται γόνιμον κ. τ. εἰ., a new light breaks in upon us, if we read γόνιμου δ' ἀπεχομένους ἀρούρας θ. πάσης. Thus

we have the opposition between the absolutely sterile, and that which though fertile in itself, we do not mean to use as such. 841, c, For περιλαβόν read παραλαβόν, and for τὰ νῦν λέγομεν' ἐστὶν εὐχαί, read τανῦν λέγομεν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶν εὐχαί κ. τ. ἐ. The interpolations which spoil the next sentence were probably only meant for the margin. You will see that I mean παλλακῶν and ἀρρένων. Who can suppose that Plato would speak of *their* σπέρματα? 844, d, I am altogether for the other reading, παιδιὰν Διονυσιάδα, and in place of ἔχει χάριτος αὕτη, I have no scruple in writing ἡ θεὸς ἐχαρίσατο αὕτη. The copyist wrote εχαχα and forgot to put his dots under the first χα. Then came another, and made this absurd correction. παιδιὰ Διονυσιάς is a very suitable expression for all the fruit obtained by *grafting*. 846, d, For δεόμενον ἐπιτηδεύειν, read δεχόμενος ἐπιτηδεύειν. 864, λ, ἔσεσθαι τούτων should be ἔπεσθαι τούτω. 898, β, The displacement of two words has caused a woeful confusion in an otherwise simple passage. I will merely indicate it. [μηδ' ἐν ἐνὶ] φερομένη μηδ' ἐν (ἐνὶ) τιμὶ λόγῳ κίνησις—. But I must break off from this desultory work, which is fatiguing to any reader who shall be good enough to verify my references, and keep on steadily through one Book; and as the Seventh is that on which I have been very recently engaged, I will ask of you to accompany me through it.

798, λ, καὶ ἂν ποτ' ἄρα ἀναγκασθῆ μεταβάλλειν αὐθις—The sentence, having up to this point turned upon σώματα as the subject, is now varied, and we look for an individual to whom to refer ἀναγκασθῆ, συνταραχθῆς and ἀπολαβῶν. But he is not far off. For αὐθις let us read αὐτῆς, and there he is. In c we have παιδῶν where it is certain that the author meant us to understand ἀνδρῶν. When these children who have made innovations in their games and amusements grow up to be men, they are different from former—*children!* Who can be expected to treat copyists with any respect, after such a taste of their quality? In d the same *mala sedulitas* has bestowed on us the word μεταβαλλόμενα which is out of its place, and the sense of which is expressed by ὅσα πάσχει τὸ τοιοῦτον which is in its place. In ε, the faulty redundancy in οὐδ' αμῶς ἄλλως πως may be accounted for, if we suppose that οὐδ' ΑΑΑΩC was copied twice and subsequently changed by a would-be corrector.

799, E. In speaking of νόμοι he says, οἱ παλαιοὶ τότε περὶ κινθαρφδῖαν οὕτω πως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἠνόμασαν. By reading ΤΟΥΤΕ in place of ΤΟΤΕ we make the sentence clear and get rid of a *then* which points nowhere. "The ancients were not ignorant of the connexion between νόμοι and ᾠδαί," says he; καθ' ὕπνον δὲ οἶόν ποῦ τις ἢ καὶ ὕπαρ [ἐρηγορῶς] ἠνείρωξε μαντευόμενος αὐτό. If he only dreamed it, he would have no right to μαντεύεσθαι; but I presume he dreamed it καθ' ὕπνον θεῖον. 800, B. I see here as elsewhere the utmost confusion between δὲ and δὴ, but it would be rather dull sport to fly the falcons of criticism upon such exiguous game. C. For φαῖμεν, I should much prefer φαμέν in a parenthesis, though I am aware that he has already used it. D. A slight transposition will give the ῥήματα and the ὑπομοὶ their fair share in a necessary epithet. I read ἁρμονίαις γωδεστάταις. E. I hope you will consent to the removal of χορούς. The gibe is all the more bitter when he substitutes these funeral singing men for the Tragic Chorus. I note εἰ . . ἐν τούτῳ . . κείσθω as a confirmation of Elmsley's οἶσθ' ὡς μέτευξαι.

801, A. Instead of μηδὲν ἐπανερωτῶ, which would mean, "am I to ask no question"? I propose μηδέ. "Au ne rogare quidem oportet"? We may surely venture to restore δεῖ to the margin where it must have stood as a help to beginners. C. He says that τὸ τῶν ποιητῶν γένος is οὐ πάνυ ἱκανόν in judging what men should or should not pray for: and that they might put into our mouths prayers for wealth, though we have already decreed that we shall have no gold or silver statue of Plutus in our City. What will be the result? They will make us *contradict* ourselves in our prayers. This is logical; but not so, that they will make us pray εὐχὰς οὐκ ὀρθὰς, for they may be right, and we wrong. Therefore away with the insertion, which while it is not to the purpose of the argument, is a sore let and hindrance to the syntax. D. He has never appointed any νομοθέτας for the purpose mentioned, but certain ἀθλοθέτας, of whom he treats in 764, D & C.

802, B. For ἐπανερόμενον I venture to suggest ἐπανορθώσεως δεόμενον. C. The direction, νομοθέτου βούλημα, cannot begin with πᾶσα δέ. No wonder then that A and Ω omit the conjunction. The γε is also to no purpose. Ought we not to read, πᾶσα τακτὴ ἢ τάξιν λαβοῦσα π. M. διατριβή? This would refer to the originally proper compositions, and those that had been made

so by adaptation. D. Sense and Grammar call for the change of *ἐκατέρως* into *ἐκατέρωα*. E. The passage about suiting the compositions to the sexes looks very hopeless at first; but the observation of a frequent source of mistake in these books, the confusion between the participial endings and *μεθα* will at once set us on the right track. ἔστι δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμενα ἀποδιδόναι, is nothing more than *ἔπει δὲ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν ἀμφοτέρα ἀνάγκη κατεχόμεθα ἀποδιδόναι*. When this is replaced, and Ast's supplement introduced, we need only write *τούτω* for *τούτω*, and the passage is as simple as any in Plato.

803, A. Having settled the general characters of both kinds of songs, he goes into the details of education. But here we are left suddenly in such darkness as this: *τίνα τρόπον χρηὴ καὶ οἷσισι καὶ πότε πράττειν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν*. What are *ἕκαστα*, and of what *αὐτῶν* are they the particulars? As to *οἷσισι* and *πράττειν* they help out each other; for the dative gives us a palpable hint to change *πράττειν* into *προσάπτειν*, and the succeeding sentence about *τρόποι* and *τροπιδεῖα*, and indeed the whole scope of what follows down to the end of this page of Stephanus, shew that our business is to ascertain *τίνα τρόπον χρηὴ καὶ οἷσισι καὶ ὅποτε προσάπτειν ἕκαστων αὐτῶν*, i.e. *τῶν ἀρρένων τε καὶ θηλειῶν*. A, B. οἷον δὴ τις ναυπηγὸς τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν καταβαλλόμενος τὰ τροπιδεῖα ὑπογράφεται τῶν πλοίων σχήματα, ταυτὸν δὴ μοι καγὼ φαίνομαι ἔμαυτῷ δρᾶν τὰ τῶν βίων πειρώμενος σχήματα διασησασθαι κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν, ὅντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα καταβάλλεσθαι, ποία μηχανῆ καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις ξυνόντες τὸν βίον ἄριστα διὰ τοῦ πλοῦ τούτου τῆς ζωῆς διακομισθησόμεθα, τοῦτο σκοπεῖν ὀρθῶς. In this passage it is a matter of controversy whether *τροπιδεῖα* is governed by *καταβαλλόμενος* or by *ὑπογράφεται*, and the rest of the construction will depend on this. But as Ast's *appositio*, that is, that *τὴν τῆς ναυπηγίας ἀρχὴν* is a sort of anticipating description of *τροπιδεῖα*, is in itself unlikely, for then the words might just as well be away; and seeing that, if *καταβαλλόμενος* governs *τροπιδεῖα*, and *ὑπογράφεται* governs *τῶν πλοίων σχήματα*, we have this result; that a man is sketching the ship's hull at the same time that he is laying down its timbers, which is at least a day too late, and lastly since the play on words requires that the stress of the antithesis should fall on *τροπιδεῖα*

ὑπογράφεται = βίων σχήματα κατὰ τρόπους τοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν δια-
 στήσασθαι, I leave σχήματα to find a regimen where it can, only
 not in this text, to which it is a stranger, and I conclude that,
 just as the interpolator borrowed the word σχήματα from the
 following clause, so when he inserted ὄντως αὐτῶν τὰ τροπιδεῖα
 καταβάλλεσθαι, he helped himself from what preceded. Who needs
 such an explanation of a play upon words? and is not ταῦτόν
 κ. φ. ἐ. δρᾶν enough? Then again what have we to do with any
 μηχανή? I think it certain that ποίρα μηχανῆ was added, because
 some one did not see the purport of καὶ in καὶ τίσι ποτὲ τρόποις.
 Of course μοι ought to be expelled, and as for τὸν βίον it looks
 very like a wish to bring back the τῶν βίων which we had be-
 fore.—The next sentence but one ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνταῦθά ἐσμεν, εἴ πως
 διὰ προσήκοντός τινος αὐτὸ πράττομεν, ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν σύμμετρον ἂν
 εἶη is not very clear, nor will the *Gracilus* of διὰ προσήκοντος
 τινός commend itself to you. But ΔΙΑ is the palæographical twin
 of ΑΡΑ, and εἴ πως ἄρα προσηγόντως αὐτὸ πράττομεν seems all
 that is required. D. "We are the playthings of the Gods, and
 our best earnest, such as it is, consists in acting as such, and
 rejoicing before them. People now-a-days say that War is the
 serious part of life, and Peace the playful part; thus they make
 the serious to be for the sake of the playful." τὸ δ' ἦν ἐν πο-
 λέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὐτ' οὐν παιδιὰ πεφυκυῖα οὐτ' αὖ παιδεῖα ποτὲ ἡμῖν
 ἀξιόλογος, οὔτε οὔσα οὔτε ἐσομένη. τὸ δὲ φάμεν ἡμῖν γε εἶναι
 σπουδαιότατον, δεῖ δὲ τὸν κατ' εἰρήνην βίον ἕκαστον πλεῖστόν τε καὶ
 ἄριστον διεξελεῖν. τίς οὖν ὀρθότης παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον, τίνας
 δὲ παιδιάς θύοντα καὶ ἄδοντα καὶ ὀρχούμενον. τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα means
 more than Cornarius understood by it. I should render it: "Whereas
 we have found that in war &c." The stop should be removed
 from ἐσομένη, and we must read, ὃ δὲ φάμεν ἡμῖν γ' εἶναι σπου-
 δαιότατον. "War has no sport nor education worth mentioning,
 and to have that was just what we affirm to be most serious."
 But if you insist upon preferring ὦ . . . σπουδαιότατω, non re-
 pugnabo. The rest I read thus: τίς ΟΤΝ Ἡ ὀρθότης; τίνας δὲ
 παιδιάς παίζοντα ἐστὶ διαβιωτέον; θύοντα κ. τ. ἐ. It is incredible
 that any one should have attempted to correct this passage, and
 that others should have adopted his correction, and yet all have
 consented to leave such an absurdity as παιδιάς θύοντα in the
 text.

804, B. πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπιδὼν καὶ παθῶν—Was it once εἰκότα παθῶν? D. Perhaps you will approve of οὐχ ὄν μὲν ἂν ὁ πατήρ βούληται [φοιτῶντα] ὄν δ' ἂν μὴ ἔωντας [τὰς παιδείας]. D & E. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ δὴ καὶ περὶ θηλειῶν ὁ μὲν ἑμὸς νόμος ἂν εἴποι πάντα, ὅσα περ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρρένων, ἴσα καὶ τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν. καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς εἴποιμ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἱππικῆς οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὡς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπον ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπον. Never was a passago more miserably interpolated than this. First his law speaks, and then *he* speaks; his law would say the same about women as about men, *that women ought to be trained and drilled as much*. Any one who knows what ἴσα καὶ is, will welcome the conjecture, which joins ἴσα καὶ with οὐδὲν φοβηθεῖς¹⁾, and so gets rid of this repetition about women; and as the law is still the subject, the spurious εἴποιμ' ἂν absconds from before it.

805, B. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τελῶν καὶ πόνων. This is untrue; for the women add their labour to that of the men. Read πόρων. C. ἐν τούτοις. Perhaps ἐν τούτῳ γ'; *in the meanwhile*, till he has found some better reasons.

806, A. As ἀργούς μὲν ταλασίας is opposed to θεραπείας δὲ, and not to ἀσκητικόν τινα βίον, for δέ τινα we should read δὴ τινα. Then follows a passage which must be given in its whole state. τῶν δὲ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὥστ' οὐδ' εἴ τις ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεώς τε καὶ παίδων ἀναγκαῖα τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὔτ' ἂν τόξων, ὥς τινες Ἀμαζόνες, οὔτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι, οὐδὲ ἀσπίδα καὶ δόρυ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, ὡς πορθομένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος γενναίως ἀντιστάσας φόβον γε, εἰ μὴδὲν μείζον, πολεμίοισι δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τινὶ κατοφθείσας; Σαυρομάτιδας δὲ οὐδ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειαν μιμήσασθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διαβιοῦσαι, παρὰ γυναικας δὲ αὐτὰς ἄνδρες ἂν αἱ ἐκείνων γυναικας φανεῖεν. I need not point out the impossibilities of this passage, nor refute their champions. One specimen of their logic will suffice. We have κοινωνούσας, δυνάμεναι, λαβοῦσαι, ἀντιστάσας, κατοφθείσας. "It is nothing: the nominative may precede the infinitive". Yes! and so may the accusative; but can both do so indifferently—and in one and the same sentence? This, and the barbarism of ὥστε οὐδὲ suffice to shew the condition of the text; but where is the remedy to

1) Omitting τὰς θηλείας ἀσκεῖν δεῖν.

come from? From the nature of the argument. Which is the worse case? that described by *πορθουμένης τῆς πατρίδος*, or that which is here called *διαμάχεσθαι περὶ τῶν φιλιτάτων*? The latter. Which demands most courage, to appear *ἐν τάξει*, or to use the weapons of close fighting? The latter. Then why does he weaken his sentence by putting the worse case, and the greatest instance of courage, first? Moreover what a clumsy arrangement is this, that he should interrupt his examples of warlike females, the Amazons, Minerva, the Sarmatian women, by a long sentence which might have as well appeared elsewhere?—It did appear elsewhere, till some blunderer left it out, and the same or some equal blunderer brought it back, not *postliminio*, but through a breach in the text. By re-transposing what has been displaced we surmount nearly all these difficulties, grammatical and rhetorical; for the rest we must trust to probable conjecture. *τῶν δ' εἰς πόλεμον μὴ κοινωνούσας, ὥστε (πορθουμένης αὐταῖς τῆς πατρίδος, γενναίως ἀντιτάσας φόβον γε εἰ μηδὲν μείζον πολεμίοις δύνασθαι παρασχεῖν ἐν τάξει τιῶν κατοφθείσας)*;—all this depends upon *φῶμεν δεῖν ζῆν*; Then follows the direct. *οὐδ' εἴ τις ποτε διαμάχεσθαι περὶ πόλεως (πόσεώς?) τε καὶ παιδῶν ἀναγκαῖα τύχη γίγνοιτο, οὔτε τόξων, ὥς τινες Ἀμάζονες, οὔτ' ἄλλης κοινωνῆσαι ποτε βολῆς μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι (φανερῶν ἂν) οὔδ' ἀσπίδα καὶ δορὺ λαβοῦσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν θεόν, Σαυροματίδας δὲ οὐδ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν τολμήσειαν μιμήσασθαι κ. τ. ε.* c. No one need despair of making a brilliant correction: Stallbaum's *οὐχὶ ἤμισυν* founded on the reading of the best MSS, *οὐ ΔΙ' ἤμισυν* is deserving of much praise. e. For *ἀποτελοῦσιν* it is absolutely necessary that we read *ἀποτελοῖεν*. The explanation offered by Ast of *αὐταῖς* in *παιδῶν τε ἅμα θηλειῶν καὶ τῶν μητέρων αὐταῖς*, that it is put for *αὐτῶν*, is only too like many of his notes on the Laws; *αὐταῖς*, as I need not tell you, is *ipsis seorsim*. But this leads me to offer a conjecture on the words immediately preceding. *ξυσίτια δὲ κατεσκευαμένα εἴη χωρὶς μὲν τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγγὺς δ' ἐχόμενα τὰ τῶν υἱέων, ἀυτοῖς*, instead of *τὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων* which is a most vague designation. For what can *οἰκῆιοι* mean? Not a man's household, for his wife and daughters are provided with a mess-table apart; certainly not his *domestics*, who are not members of a *συσίτιον*; and certainly not his friends who, being citizens, would sit with him. Of course *τῶν αὐτοῖς οἰκείων* is not so bad as *τῶν*

αὐταῖς μητέρων, but what writer would ever dream of putting more than τῶν οἰκείων in such a case? Why the youths are apart from their fathers, but the girls are with their mothers, is obvious to that great umpire in all truisms, the meanest capacity.

807, A. Having provided the members of his city with their public meals and festive occupations, he asks whether each member has no needful and suitable work left him to do, ἀλλ' ἐν τρόπῳ βροσκήματος ἕκαστον πιαινόμενον αὐτῶν δεῖ ζῆν; I shall offer you no excuse for altering this into, ἀλλ' ἢ τ. β. ἐ. ἄ. π. διαζῆν. Immediately after, we have οὐκοῦν τό γε δίκαιον φαρμέν οὐδὲ καλόν, οὐδ' οἶόν τε κ. τ. ἐ. where again the explainers τολμῶσιν ἀδύνατα. I read, οὐκοῦν, (τό γε δίκαιον ΦΑΝΑΙ) οὔτε καλόν, οὔθ' οἶόν τε— B. τετροχωμένων. Pray do not alarm yourself: I am not going to discuss the merits of the word; I simply copy it from the Zurich Edition and set it up as a mark to unwary readers; who, while sliding over the smooth surface, will, unless warned, find themselves suddenly in a very comfortless chasm. *One whole paragraph is missing*, either because a page in the source of our MSS was lost, or because the page was too τετροχωμένον to be deciphered. How is this to be proved? By unfulfilled promises. He asks τίς δὴ τρόπος τοῦ βίου and the rest, and after a description of their messes, he again asks ἄρα οὐδὲν λειπόμενόν ἔστι κ. τ. ἐ. This question he does not answer, nor has he told us how he proposes to escape from his own prophecy, that these well-conditioned citizens of his will necessarily become the prey of some wiry hungry daredevils. And yet that he *has* pointed out some escape is evident from the sequel, which whether corrected or left as it is, can yield but this sense. "We cannot hope that *all this* will be done with great minuteness, as long as citizens have separate houses." *All what?* "But if *the other* second-best measures were tried",—*What other?* "But men *living so* have yet another duty and that not a small one"—*Living how? Hardily*; as is plain from the context, and from the sequel; but these precepts of hardihood, voluntary penances or whatever they were, and their effects on the character, are all gone, and as a proof of the diligence with which Plato is read, not an asterisk marks where they were. There is some broken ground, as you would expect, on the brink of this chasm; but if I am not mistaken,

I have pointed it out before¹). εἰ ζητοῖμεν ἄν stands its ground in all editions just now before me. The right reading seems to be; ταῦτ' οὖν δὴ δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν ἱκανῆς, ὡς καὶ νυνὶ ζητούμεν' ἄν, ἴσως οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. c. If the Zurich Editors had thought for a moment, they would have adopted Ast's emendation εἰς ἀρετήν. Of course the scribes wrote ἀρετῆς, because it was next door to ἐπιμέλειαν, and they looked no further.

808, c. Are you very tired of proofs of the *lacuna*? Just one more, and I have done. νῦξ μὲν δὴ διαγομένη τοιαύτη τις πρὸς πᾶσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἀνδρείαν ἄν τινα προσπαρέχοιτο κ. τ. ε. d. For the miserable πω βιωτέον, I have exhausted every verb beginning with π that I could think of, and found no plausible substitute, except perhaps προλειπτέον, which the scribes would very readily change to προλιπτέον. But a certain form of the β, now out of use, is very like the semiuncial λ and one form of π is an ω with a lid to it. But this is dwelling in the "Meadow of Conjecture". d. ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον· ὅσῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ἔχει πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω κατηρτυμένην, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμύ καὶ ὑβριστότατον θηρίων γίγνεται. To speak frankly, this is downright nonsense. "A boy is of all animals the hardest to manage: because having a germ of reason, he becomes the most rebellions of all creatures." This any one can see to be far from neat: but how much worse it becomes if we write;—"having his germ of reason not yet daunted and tamed"? Nor is the grammar a whit better: ὅσῳ μάλιστα with two positives and one superlative; the latter probably contrived "to meet the demand". Again why use μήπω for οὐπω in a direct declaration such as this? There can surely be no doubt that Plato wrote: ὁ δὲ παῖς πάντων θηρίων ἐστὶ δυσμεταχειριστότατον, ὅσῳ γε μάλιστα ἔχει τινὰ πηγὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν. μήπω κατηρτυμένον δὲ, ἐπίβουλον καὶ δριμύ καὶ ὑβριστόν θηρίον γίγνεται. e. One is rather taken aback by the statement that the lad is to be sent τοῖς διδάσκουσι καὶ ὄτιοῦν. (Τί γαρ; ἢ καὶ τοῖς κλέπτειν καὶ ἐπιορκεῖν διδάσκουσι;) And why is καὶ μαθήμασιν added? Grant that they are *bonds*; they are surely not so in the sense in which οἱ διδάσκοντες are so. Consider, pray, whether we have not here a corruption of καὶ ὄτιοῦν ΚΑΛ' (καλόν) ΜΑΘΗΜΑ.

1) Book 10. 905, d. εἰ δ' ἐπιδειῆς ἔτι λόγου τινὸς ἄν εἴης. Read λ. τ. ἄλλου εἰ.

809, B. τὰ μὲν οὖν δὴ χορείας πέρι μελῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως ἐρρήθη. Not even a Dithyrambic poet, unless very drunk, would sing of the χορεία μελῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεως. Plato had discussed the question concerning their employment: χορείας πέρι. c. καὶ τοι τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, ἃ δεῖ μανθάνειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ μελετᾶν, ἔχεις τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰ γράμματα πρῶτον καὶ δευτέρον λύρας πέρι καὶ λογισμῶν, ὧν ἔφαμεν δεῖν, ὅσα τε πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρῆναι ἐκάστους λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἄστρον τε πέρι καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι περὶ ταῦτα πάσῃ πόλει ταῦτα οὐπω σοι πάντα ἱκανῶς, ὧ φίλε, παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου διείρηται. In this sentence, ὅσα τε points to things unkuown and beyond discovery, χρῆναι is out of structure, διοικεῖν occupies a place where μανθάνειν alone is apposite, and this mention of arrangement seems to have dropped from the clouds. The chief author in all this mischief is the man who introduced ὅσα τε: λογισμῶν ὧν ἔφαμεν δεῖν πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν is in perfect order. Then follows, somewhat loosely, but in a highly Platonic manner — χρῆναι δ' ἐκάστους λαβεῖν καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἄστρον τε [πέρι] καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, ὅσα [διοικεῖν] (oh! these interpreters!) ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι [περὶ ταῦτα] πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. (Subaudi λαβεῖν.)—I take this opportunity of observing that in Thuc. II, 102, where we now read, λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμαίωνι τῷ Ἀμφιάρεω, ὅτε δὴ ἀλᾶσθαι αὐτὸν μετὰ τὸν φόνον, τὸν Ἀπόλλω ταύτην τὴν γῆν χρῆσαι οἰκεῖν, the right reading is ὅτ' ἔδει ἀλᾶσθαι.—Soon after the sense is obscured through faulty punctuation; it ought to be pointed: ἐπικαλοῦντες τί τῇ λέξει; τότε: ὡς οὐπω διείρηκε κ. τ. ε. In the next sentence we have προσοιστέον twice; in the first place it occurs in connexion with λίτον: πότερον λίτον, ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ προσοιστέον. And these two verbals have the common complement of εἰς ἀκριβείαν; the second προσοιστέον is followed by εἰς γράμματα. It cannot be denied that such a verbal may be used in a passivo sense; but who ever heard of such an expression as προσφέρεισθαι εἰς γράμματα? My own persuasion is that the Margin of the Vossian MS offers a right conjecture in προσοιτέον. The passage in the beginning of the Republic, τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες is in favour of repeating the same verb, and the pre-

position is added because the verb would look too bald when separated from εἶς. In the very next sentence (810, A) we have a marginal note which changes the construction for the worse. The commands of the law are in the infinitive. προσιτέον μὲν τοίνυν φαμὲν εἰς μὲν γράμματα παιδὶ δεκετεῖ σχεδὸν ἐνιαυτούς τρεῖς, λύρας δὲ ἄψασθαὶ τρία μὲν ἔτη καὶ δέκα γεγυόσιν ἄρχεσθαι, [μέτριος ὁ χρόνος] ἐμμεῖναι δ' ἕτερα τρία. I point out παράνομον which ought to be παρὰ νόμον, and, in B, τισὶν οἷς, which should be οἵστισι, and proceed to lay before you as corrupt a passage as any in the Book. πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλλα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων, τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ὕθμων τμημάτων, ἃ δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ὕθμου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ' ἡμῖν ἔστι παρὰ τινῶν τῶν πολλῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα· οἷς, ὧ πάντων βέλτιστοι νομοφύλακες, τί χρήσεσθε; To what interpreter shall we betake ourselves for help in this labyrinth, saying ἐν σοὶ κείμεθα τλάμονες? But behold our very invocation has helped us so far, that we may confidently read, ποιητῶν κείμεθα ἐν γράμμασι! But what are we to do with ὕθμων τμημάτων? I should certainly reject the former and retain the scornful expression τμημάτων, more especially as ὕθμου occurs very soon after. Then I propose to separate the text from the gloss upon it, thus: ἃ δὴ [συγγράμματα] κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ὕθμου καὶ ἁρμονίας, [σφαλερὰ γράμματα] ἡμῖν ἔστι παρὰ τινῶν [τῶν πολλῶν] τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων καταλειμμένα. He cannot call them σφαλερὰ γράμματα as yet, for though τοιούτων (i.e. τητωμένων ὕθμου καὶ ἁρμονίας) is a sneer, he does not prejudge the question whether they shall use these books. B. The commentators may settle it among them, whether the faulty construction of this sentence is a piece of graceful negligence, or of corruption: but τῆς αὐτῆς is very awkward, even if we understand it to mean that the *same way* pleases some and displeases others, and κελεύεις γὰρ is certainly faulty, for this has no connexion of cause and effect with ἀληθὲς λέγεις. The simplest correction would be, κελεύοις δέ με, ὡς ἐ. φ., ταύτης τῆς ὁδοῦ κ. τ. ἐ.

811, B. The parts of the dialogue are so distributed, that Clinias becomes the protagonist. The persons ought to stand thus:

AΘ. . . . εἰ δ' οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχει, κινδυνόν φημι εἶναι φέρουσαν τοῖς παισὶ τὴν πολυμαθίαν. Πῶς οὖν καὶ τί παραινοίης ἂν τῷ νομοφύλακι;

ΚΑ. Τοῦ περί λέγεις;

ΑΘ. Τοῦ πρός τί παράδειγμά ποτε ἀποβλέψας ἄν τὸ μὲν ἐῷ πάντα μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους, τὸ δ' ἀποκωλύοι.

ΚΑ. Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκνει λέγων.

812, B. C. ΑΘ. Ἐφάμεν, οἶμαι, τοὺς τοῦ Διονύσου τοὺς ἐξηκοντούτας ὧδους διαφερόντως εὐαισθήτους δεῖν γεγονέναι περὶ τε τοὺς θυθμούς καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρμονιῶν συστάσεις, ἵνα τὴν τῶν μελῶν μίμησιν τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην, ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται, τὰ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς ὁμοιώματα καὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὧν τις τὰ μὲν ἀποβάλλῃ, τὰ δὲ προσφέρων εἰς μέσον ὑμνῆ καὶ ἐπάρδῃ ταῖς τῶν νέων ψυχαῖς, προκαλούμενος ἐκάστους εἰς ἀρετῆς ἔπαισθαι κτήσιν συνακολουθοῦντας διὰ τῶν μιμήσεων. Can any one believe that ἐν τοῖς παθήμασιν ὅταν ψυχὴ γίγνηται is correct, or that μίμησις μιμεῖται τὰ ὁμοιώματα means anything conceivable? When a comic actor imitates popular tragedians in a burlesque, he may be said to imitate their imitations; but the province of music is μιμεῖσθαι τὰ παθήματα; and this is, I think, enough to justify us in expelling ὁμοιώματα, which was invented to fill up a fancied gap in the sense, and in reading: ἵνα τὴν τ. μ. μίμησιν, τὴν εὖ καὶ τὴν κακῶς μεμιμημένην ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι, ὅσ' ἄν ἐν ψυχῇ γίγνηται, τὰ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ [τὰ] τῆς ἐναντίας, ἐκλέξασθαι δυνατὸς ὧν κ. τ. εἰ. By this very slight change we have the true object of imitation, παθήματα; and the construction δυνατὸς ἐκλέξασθαι μίμησιν μεμιμημένην τὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι is complete and satisfactory. D & E. The grammar requires παρεχομένου and προσαρμότοντος. Πυκνότης and μανότης appear to be well explained by Mr. Chappell, History of Music, p. 144.

813, A. Ἀληθέστατα τοίνυν. καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κ. τ. εἰ. should be read continuously. E. διεξόδων τακτικῶν. *Significantur*, says Ast, *exercitus in acie constituti expeditiones*. If it signifies this, it signifies nothing, for this has no meaning. Διέοδοι are *evolutions*, and τακτικῶν is a bad gloss. Στρατοπέδων is of no better origin; but the worst corruptions are those in the following passage. πάντων γὰρ τούτων διδασκάλους τε εἶναι δεῖ κοινούς, ἀρνημένους μισθὸν παρὰ τῆς πόλεως, καὶ τούτων μαθητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῇ πόλει παῖδάς τε καὶ ἄνδρας· καὶ [κόρας καὶ γυναῖκας πάντων τούτων ἐπιστήμονας,] κόρας μὲν οὔσας ἔτι πᾶσαν τὴν ἐν ὕπλοις ὄρχησιν [καὶ μάχην] μεμελετηκυίας, γυναῖκας δὲ διεξόδων καὶ τάξεων καὶ θέσεως καὶ ἀναρρέσεως ὅπλων ἡμμένας, εἰ μηδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' εἴ ποτε δεήσει

πανδημει [πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει] καταλιπόντας τὴν πόλιν ἔξω στρατεύεσθαι τοὺς φυλάξαντας παῖδας τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ἱκανὰς εἶναι τό γε τοσοῦτον—I offer you the passage unaltered, but for the brackets, except that I change καταλείποντας into καταλιπόντας; that I follow *A* and *Ω* in φυλάξαντας, (those who had kept guard, youths and others, are gone out, and the women must supply their place); and that I read ἱκανὰς, for which there is no authority except the sense. These then are to be sufficient *at least for this purpose*: and again, ὃν οὐδὲν ἀπόμοτον, *it being an inevitable chance*, that an enemy should some day break into the town, and force them to fight *pro aris et focis*, πολλή που κακία κ. τ. ε.

814, D. Read, if you approve, Νῦν δὴ τῆς μὲν παλαιστρας περὶ δυνάμεως—. Soon after follows a long passage, which I am tempted to place before you, not in its present state, but as it must have been before it met with any misfortunes either from wounds or surgery. He is speaking of κίνησις of the body and observes: δύο μὲν αὐτὰς χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχίωνων τὸ φαῦλον· καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο, καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἐτέρας, τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ἐν βιαίοις ἐμπλεκέντων πόνοις σωμάτων μὲν καλῶν, ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνδρικής, τὴν δ' ἐν εὐπραγίαις τε οὔσης σώφρονος, ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε ἐμμέτρον. εἰρηνικήν δ' ἂν τις λέγων κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοιαύτην ὄρχησιν λέγοι. τὴν δὲ τούτων ἄλλην οὔσαν τῆς εἰρηνικῆς πυρρίχην ἂν τις ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοι, ταῖς τε εὐλαβείαις πασῶν πληγῶν, καὶ βολῶν ἐκνεύσεσι, καὶ ὑπέξει πάσῃ καὶ ἐκπηθήσει καὶ ἐγκύψει, καὶ ταῖς ταύταις ἐναντίαις ταῖς ἐπὶ τὰ δραστικά φερόμεναις αὐτῶν σχήματα, τόξων βολαῖς καὶ ἀκοντίων, καὶ πασῶν πληγῶν μιμήματι, ἐπιχειροῦσαν μιμείσθαι τό τ' ὀρθὸν ἐν τούτοις καὶ τὸ εὐτόνον. τῶν οὖν ἀγαθῶν σωμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν ὁπότεν γίγνηται μίμημα, εὐθυφερεῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν γιγνόμενον, ὀρθὸν μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ δὲ τούτοις τούναντιον ἀποδιδόν οὐκ ὀρθὸν ἀποδεχόμεθα. Though I do not suppose that you ever joined in the charge against me, that I did not sufficiently explain the reason of my corrections, others who read this will perhaps be nursing the accusation, and if I should now leave the above passage without other comment but a recommendation to compare it with the received text, many will say, *There, there!* and a few will even go further and say, *So would we have it.* And yet what a misery it is that a man cannot change τε into γε, or ΠΑΘΟΣ

into ΠΛΗΘΟΣ, without turning showman, and pointing out what every body can see for himself. To explain an emendation is as ungraceful a performance as to comment on a joke, and as *this* is seldom done except when the joke is ψυχρότερον τῶν Πλάτωνος νόμων, as that ribald Lucian has it, so *that* had better be reserved for sorry specimens of criticism. But, assuming that any chance reader will take the same trouble as yourself, to compare the received text with that here given, I will observe that αὐτῆς τὰ εἶδη is an explanation of αὐτάς, that ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν is a Platonic elegance adapted to a wrong place, that ἐμπλεκέντων is an Attic form preserved in our oldest copies, as likewise in the best MS of Thucydides, that ἦδοναὶ are μέγισται, but men are ἔμμετροι, that ταπεινώσει is probably the gloss of ἐγκύψει, or else the substitute for it when it had disappeared into ΕΝΓΨΕΙ, that the pyrrhic dance *and that alone* can undertake to imitate skill and vigour, and can only do so by a twofold representation, namely of defence and of attack, that, if I am wrong in inserting οὖν, I have no objection to any better mode of conjunction, that, if ἀποδιδόν is rash, you can leave a mark of hiatus, or else read ἐναντίον, (in which I should not follow you) and that ἀποδεχόμεθα was first discovered by Ast, and is the fourth instance in this Book of similar confusion of terminations.

In turning over some loose papers, I find the following observations bearing on the next few pages of our author. They are written in Commentator's Latin or an imitation thereof, but with the help of the text, it is to be hoped that they will be intelligible. I present them as they are.

815, c. ὅση μὲν βακχεία τ' ἐστί, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἃς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὧς φασί, μιμοῦνται κατωνωμένους, περικαθαρομῶς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελούντων, ξύμπαν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος κ. τ. ε. Diu mihi suspectum fuit verbum ἐπονομάζοντες. *Saltationes quasdam Nympharum et Faunorum aliorumque numinum nominibus appellant. Fac Platonem illud voluisse. Sed quid porro imitantur? Eadem hæc numina ebria. Quæ est hæc negligentia, ut eadem vocabula utpote ab ἐπονομάζοντες pendentia saltationum nomina significant, ad μιμοῦνται autem relata de numinibus ipsis capiantur? Adde quod ἐπονομάζοντες, ὧς φασί, ita conjuncta sunt, ut hoc ad illud necessario referatur. Quasi his saltatoribus proprium esset, ut his*

b *

nominiibus uterentur; vel potius non uterentur, sed uti se dictarent. Quod vero ad Nymphas attinet, quis unquam illas ebrias finxit, nedum saltatione imitatus sit? Quid vero sibi volunt τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων? Si sic interpretaberis: "qui Bacchas sequuntur", praesto erit Astius, qui te commonefaciat, ἄς referendum esse ad ταύταις. Quod quoniam rectissime et ex linguæ norma dictum est, sequitur ut ἄς etiam de Bacchabus ipsis intelligi oporteat, non de saltatoribus. Atqui si hoc concesseris, quid de reliqua sententia fiet? Quid multa? Corruptam orationem agnosceas necesse est; vel si forte etiamnum dubitas, vide num vera lectio te ab ista religione liberet. ὅση μὲν βακχεία τ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἄς Νύμφας ἐπονομάζοντες, Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ὧς φασὶ μιμοῦνται κατανωμένους. Mulieres Nympharum partes agunt: viri Faunos temulentos Nympharum fugientium amatores imitantur. In verbis τοῦτο [τῆς ὀρχήσεως] τὸ γένος, quae et infra repetuntur, non difficile est Platonem ab interpolatore dignoscere.

Ibid. D. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπολέμου Μούσης, ἐν ὀρχήσεσι δὲ τοὺς τε θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν θεῶν παῖδας τιμῶν—Si scriptum esset ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσεσι δὲ τιμώσης, vel ἀπολέμου μὲν ἐν ὀρχήσεσι δὲ σπουδαίαις τιμῶν, quidquid de reliqua oratione statueremus, δὲ saltem suo loco positum videretur. Nunc autem plane supervacaneum est. Vide, num aliquando a margine in orationem invectum fuerit. Nam in Cod. E scriptum est τὸ δὴ τῆς ἀ. M.: unde suspiceris, dubitasse librariorum utrum δὲ an δὴ scribendum esset. Equidem neutrum probo. Ad propositum redeuntes μὲν οὖν usurpant. Sed de τιμῶν longe gravior est controversia; quæ lectio nullus dubito quin alteri, τιμώντων, præferenda sit. Sed unde factum est ut illam nullus bonæ notæ Codex praeter E præbuerit? Scilicet qui illum librum exaravit, ipse finxit. Minime; nam si ita esset, verba illa quae Bekkerus ex illo codice enotavit, "τὸ τιμῶν οὐδέτερος", in margine, non in orationis serie, scripta fuissent. Itaque hoc statuendum; vel lectionem τιμῶν etiam in A vel Ω exstare, sed a Bekkero prætervisam fuisse, vel E non totum ab illis pendere, sed habere propriam auctoritatem, utpote ab antiquiore libro, qui nonnunquam meliores lectiones præberet, descriptum. Mox pro τὸ μὲν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κινδύνων διαπεφευγότων, lege: τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ, τῶν ἐκ πόνων τινῶν κ. τ. ἐ.

816, c. ἐν τάξει. Hæc non intelligo. Aliud est καθιεροῦν,

aliud τάττειν, neque illud fieri potest nisi hoc præcesserit. Quæ vero ad τάξιν pertinent omnia supra memorata sunt; ut jam nihil supersit quam καθιεροῦν πάντα, ἂν τάξη.

Ibid. d. Lege: Τὰ μὲν οὖν . . ψυχῶν, οἷα εἰς τὰς χορείας, εἴρηται. Cetera quam primum abjicienda. Mox dele κωμωδήματα, et κατὰ ante ὄρχησιν, et lege: καὶ τὰ τοιούτων πάντων κωμωδήματα.

818, A. ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχόμενα. “Cum perfectione conjuncta, h. e. perfecte s. exacte, ἀκριβῶς s. δι’ ἀκριβείας”. Sic Astius, falsa veris permiscens. Lege: ταῦτα δὲ ζύμπαντα οὐχ ὡς ἀκριβείας ἐχομένο υς δεῖ διαπονεῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀλλὰ τινὰς ὀλίγους.—Mox sequuntur hæc: οὕτω γὰρ πρέπον ἂν εἴη. τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα καὶ πῶς ὀρθότατα λέγεται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, δι’ ἀκριβείας δὲ ζητεῖν πάντα οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατόν. Quæ sit horum verborum grammatica ratio, οὔτε ῥάδιον οὔτε τὸ παράπαν δυνατόν ἐξηγεῖσθαι. Locus sic mihi constituendus videtur: τῷ πλήθει δὲ ὅσα αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα πῶς ὀρθότατα λέγεται; ἂ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς αἰσχρόν, κ. τ. ε.

Ibid. c. οἷος δυνατός. “Alterutrum fortasse delendum est”. Ast. Imo δυνατός quantocius expellendum. De Dis loquens consulto maluit οἷος h. e. idoneus dicere, quam de potentia eorum videri dubitare.

819, A. οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν. Hic οὐ δεινὸν οὐδὲ σφοδρὸν οὐδὲ μέγιστον haud minus absurde collocantur quam μέγιστος καὶ σφοδρὸς ξρως, quæ Cobetus, sprete certissima nostra correctione, in Convivio legenda proposuit. Et quemadmodum illic, ubi de universo amore sermo est, τὸ σφοδρὸν, quod in partem tantum cadit, prorsus alienum est, sic in nostro loco omnium rerum ignorantiam σφοδρὸν κακόν vocare nec Græcitas nec rei natura patitur. Lege: οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δεινὸν οὐδ’ ἢ σφοδρὰ ἀπειρία τῶν πάντων, οὐδὲ μέγιστον κακόν. Neque vero hinc exemplum petere possis adjectivi positivi cum superlativo conjuncti; nam δεινὸν nequaquam ad κακόν pertinet. “Nulla in civitate periculosa est—neque est summum malum.” Mox dele τούτων.

Ibid. b. c. Lege: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοὺς ἀτεχνῶς πάρεστιν ἐξηρημένα μαθήματα μετὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μανθάνειν. Vulgo παισίν. Tum enumerantur τὰ μαθήματα, sc. μῆλων καὶ στεφάνων διανομαί, καὶ πυκτῶν . . . ἐφεδρῆαι τε καὶ συλλήξεις ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, [καί] ὡς πεφύκασι γίγνεσθαι. Vulgo ἐφεδρῆας

—συλλήξεως; unde effectum est ut πεφύκασι sine nominativo esset, et genitivi a διανομαὶ pendere crederentur; quasi quis pugiles spectantibus eodem modo quo poma vel coronas distribueret. Alterum καὶ omisi; quod qui inseruit, parum intellexit quid esset ἐν μέρει καὶ ἐφεξῆς, et tanquam inter se opposita essent, (quod fuisset, ἐν μ. τε καὶ ἐ.) tertium aliquid in ὡς πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι contineri putavit. Sed unumquodque par et singuli tertiarii priores ἐν μέρει excipiebant, atque hoc in omnibus *deinceps* fiebat. ὡς πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι adjectum est ut significaretur certam esse harum permutationum conjunctionumque rationem, si quidem numeri natura immutabiles essent. καὶ δὴ καὶ παίζοντες, φιάλας ἅμα χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κεραυνύντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πῶς διαδιδόντες, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἰς παιδίαν ἐναρμόττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις—Tria hic præcipue quaerenda sunt. 1. Quid sit φιάλας κεραυνύντες, 2. quo modo ab ὅλας διαδιδόντες differat, 3. ubi dixerit, quod hic se iterum dicere ait. Duplex, nisi fallor, discrimen in poculis fingitur; nam et e diversa materia facta sunt, et diversum liquorem continent. Si hoc verum est, recte opponuntur οἱ κεραυνύντες τὰς φιάλας, h.e. qui pocula vino cum aqua permixto implent, et οἱ φ. ὅλας διαδιδόντες, quod idem est ac φ. ἀκράτου πότου πλήρεις διαδιδόντες. Sed vocem ἄκρατος consulto vitavit, quoniam non minus de aqua pura quam de vino mero cogitabat. Quo autem spectant illa, ὅπερ εἶπον? Planissime ad verba ἀρμοττόντων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν. Atqui non prorsus idem est, sive numeros *convenire* dicas, sive numeros *accommodari*; et quoniam hoc verius, malim ἀρμοττομένων. Nam qui hoc dixit, idem dixit quod infra, εἰς παιδίαν κ. τ. ἐ. Præterea cum prorsus otiosum sit ἄλλων, et οἱ δὲ alterum quoddam sui simile flagitet, lego: ἄλλοι μὲν κεραυνύντες. At unde illud μὲν arripui? Nempe a Cod. E, qui pro κεραυνύντες μεραυνύντας habere dicitur. Ceterum si quis inutilem esse particulam πῶς contendet, simulque ὅλας φιάλας ægre feret, quidni ὅλας πόσεις reponat?

Ibid. D. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς μετρήσεσιν, ὡς, ὅσα ἔχει μήκη καὶ πλάτη καὶ βάθη, περὶ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἐνοῦσαν τινα φύσει γελοῖαν τε καὶ αἰσχρὰν ἄγνοϊαν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι, ταύτης ἀπαλλάττουσιν. Supplevi ὡς. Idem valet ὡς ἐνοῦσαν atque κρίνοντες ἐνεῖναι. Mox pro ὑγνῶν lege ὑνῶν.

820, A. Εἰ δ' ἔστι μήτε σφόδρα μήτε ἡρέμα [δυνατὰ ἔνια, ἀλλά]

τὰ μὲν, [τὰ δὲ μή,] σὺ δὲ πάντα ἤγει, πῶς οἶμι πρὸς ταῦτα διακεῖσθαι; Non defuturos scio, qui hos uncinos meos tanquam summæ audaciæ exempla citaturi sint. Ego contra librariorum audaciam me compescere arbitror, qui talem compositionem οὐκ ἔνια ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, pro Platonica nobis obtulerunt. Sed cur δυνατὰ inelusi? Videamus præcedentia. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δοκεῖ . . ταῦτα εἶναι μετρητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα; Ναί. Μῆκός τε, οἶμαι, πρὸς μήκος κ. τ. ἐ. Vides orationem continuari, et hæc omnia a μετρητὰ εἶναι pendere. "Ἰμο", inquit, "ἀ δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει". Atqui, ut hoc concesserim, qua ratione hæc inter se conciliabis: δυνατὸν ἔστι ταῦτα μετρεῖν et ταῦτα δυνατὰ ἔστι? Scilicet intelligendo μετρεῖσθαι. Et ubi erit Platonice ille nitor sermonis, quem omnes laudant, paucissimi tuentur? Sed paucissimi illi δυνατὸν εἶναι μετρεῖν φύσει sine ulla dubitatione damnabunt.

Ibid. A. Τί δ' αὖ; μήκός τε καὶ πλάτος πρὸς βάθος, ἢ πλάτος τε καὶ μήκος πρὸς ἄλληλα ὥστε πως ἄρ' οὐ διανοοῦμεθα περὶ ταῦτα οὕτως κ. τ. ἐ. Sic A et Ω. Pro ὥστε πως Winkelmannus infelicitè ἀμῶς γέ πως conjecit. Scribendum videtur: πρὸς ἄλληλα ὡσαύτως; ΚΑ. Πῶς; ΑΘ. Ἄρ' οὐ διανοοῦμεθα—.

Returning from the Latin notes the first thing we meet with in the text, that seems to require notice is in 820, c. ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ σκοποῦντα διαγιγνώσκειν ἀναγκαῖον ἢ παντάπασιν εἶναι φαῦλον, προβάλλοντά τε ἀλλήλοις ἀεί, διατριβὴν τῆς πεττείας πολὺν χαριεστῆραν πρεσβυτῶν διατρίβοντα, φιλονεικεῖν ἐν ταῖς τούτων ἀξίαισι σχολαῖς. You will probably assent to ἀλλοις—πρεσβύτην—φιλονεικεῖν, and likewise to the removal of τὰ μαθήματα in Clinias' answer. Those who want to remove οὐ, shew that they do not understand the force of the particle in ἔοικέ γ' οὖν. E. The Zurich Editors have gone back to the wrong distribution of persons, which Bekker had rectified. Why should the Athenian not call Clinias ὧ ξένη; And how can οὐκοῦν κείσθω suit any other mouth than τοῦ θέντος?

821, c. Orellins is right in proposing ταῦτὰ ἀεί, but there are worse faults in the next sentence. ΑΘ. Ταῦτ' ἔστι τοίνυν, ὧ Μεγίλλε τε καὶ Κλεινία, νῦν ἂ δὴ φημι δεῖν περὶ θεῶν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν τοὺς γε ἡμετέρους πολίτας τε καὶ τοὺς νέους τὸ μέχρι τοσούτου μαθεῖν περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, μέχρι τοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά, εὐφημεῖν δὲ ἀεί θύοντάς τε καὶ ἐν εὐχαῖς εὐχομένους εὐσεβῶς. How can the following bear each other's company: τοίνυν—νῦν, περὶ θεῶν

τῶν κατ' οὐρανόν—περὶ ἀπάντων τούτων, τοὺς πολίτας τε—καὶ τοὺς νέους? Nῦν and the celestial clause must go, and the *cross* division must be changed into a *subdivision* by removing τοὺς. "Those who are *at once* our fellow-citizens and our youth." ε. The words ἐγὼ τούτων οὔτε νέος οὔτε πάλαι ἀκηκοῶς σφῶν ἂν νῦν οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ δηλωῶσαι δυναίμην. καίτοι χαλεπά γε ὄντα οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἶος ἦν δηλοῦν τηλικούτοις οὔσι τηλιοῦτος ᾧν. I have added the last word, but there are other difficulties which you will require to see solved before you will look on me as the corrector of the passage. I presume you do not approve of either νέον or νεωστί: for a man who has heard a thing οὔτε νεωστί οὔτε πάλαι can scarcely have heard it at all. Τούτων seems to have given no offence, though it is wrong both in number and case. Now as one of the possible hindrances to teaching is the age of the teacher, to which the speaker again alludes, we may restore this feature while we correct τούτων, by supposing that the old reading was τουτουτων (i.e. τοῦτ' οὔτ' ᾧν) νέος—but what second hindrance does he allude to? "That he had not heard it for some time:" but the Greek for "it is long since I heard it", would be πάλαι οὐκ ἀκήκοα, not οὐ πάλαι ἀκήκοα, and with οὔτε the same difference would hold good. I therefore incline to read: τοῦτ' οὔτ' ᾧν νέος πάλαι τ' οὐκ ἀκηκοῶς—. Perhaps the belief that there was something wrong in οὔτε—τε induced the scribe to make the alteration.

822, A. Read: τὴν [αὐτὴν] γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁδόν, καὶ ἕκαστον . . μίαν κ. τ. ε., and soon after τὸν ἡττημένον. c. I should print the text as follows: ἄρ' οὐκ ολόμεθα τὸ γελοῖόν τε καὶ οὐκ ὀρθὸν ἐκεῖ γιγνόμενον ἂν, ἐνταυθὶ καὶ ἐν τούτοις γίνεσθαι; ΚΑ. Γελοῖον μὲν, ὀρθὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς. After this I return to another scrap of *Adversaria*, which will lead us to the end of the Book.

Ibid. d. ἐπὶ μείζον *nullo modo ferri potest; sed non mutandum in ἔτι μείζον, quod neseio quis proposuit; nam quis dixerit hoc etiam majus, nisi qui prius alterum quiddam magnum esse contendit? Nec quæ sequuntur sine offensione legi possunt. Quorsum enim τι iteratur, ἔτερόν τι—μεταξύ τι? Deinde si quis doceat πεφυκέναι τι μεταξύ νοουθητέσεώς τε καὶ νόμων, quis hoc intelligat; sin adjiciat νοουθητέσεώς τε ἅμα καὶ νόμων, diversa confudisse videatur, sc. τὸ μετέχειν ἅμα τούτου καὶ ἐκείνου, et τὸ μεταξύ τούτου καὶ ἐκείνου πεφυκέναι. Satis patere arbitror verborum ordinem a scribis*

turbatum parum feliciter a correctore aliquo constitutum esse. Quid si sic legamus? κινδυνεύει γὰρ δὴ νομοθέτῃ τὸ προστατιόμενον ἕτερόν τι μείζον εἶναι τοῦ τούς νόμους θέντα ἀπῆλλάχθαι, ἅμα δ' εἶναι μεταξύ τι νουθετήσεώς τε πεφυκὸς καὶ νόμων.

Ibid. E. οἶον περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφήν· οὐ γὰρ ζητᾶ φαμεν εἶναι, λέγοντές τε αὐτὰ ὡς νόμους οἶσθαι τιθεμένους εἶναι πολλῆς ἀνοίας γέμειν. Non ζητᾶ sed ἄρρητα desiderari vidit C. F. Hermannus, sed non vidit id ipsum leviter corruptum in omnibus libris haberi. Post λόγοις plenius interpungendum est, legendumque οἶον (τὰ) περὶ τὴν τῶν σφόδρα νέων παίδων τροφήν οὐτ' ἄρρητὰ φαμεν (δεῖν) εἶναι, λέγοντές τ' αὐτὰ νόμους οἶσθαι τιθέναι πολλῆς (ἂν) ἀνοίας γέμειν.

Ibid. E. Dele αὐτόν τις. Structura est οὐ τέλος ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅταν φῆ τὸν ὑπηρετήσαντα κ. τ. ε. Mox quod Ἐ præbet ad sensum loci necessarium est. ὡς ἄρα ὃς ἂν τοῖς τοῦ (νομοθέτου) νομοθετοῦντός τε καὶ ἐπαινοῦντος καὶ ψέγοντος πειθόμενος γράμμασι διεξέλθῃ τὸν βίον ἄκρατον. οὗτος ὃ τε λόγος ὀρθότατος—Locum huensque descripsi ut maneam esse sententiam ostenderem. “Quicumque non modo legibus verum etiam præceptis consiliisque legum latoris vitam regit”—quid tum? Inepte autem dicitur βίος ἄκρατος, et conjunctio sic posita οὗτος ὃ τε λόγος neminem non offendat. Scripsit Plato: ἀκρότατος οὗτος. ὃ τε λόγος κ. τ. ε. Horum partem video jam a Winckelmanno occupatam. Mox post μόνον dele γράφειν.

823, B. Jampridem monui legendum: οἶον μάρτυρα ἐπαγόμενοι δηλοῖμεν ἂν ὃ βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον.

Ibid. B. Locum sic interpungi et corrigi velim: πάμπαν δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ ἀθηρέματα [, οὐ μόνον θηρίων]. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄξιον ἐννοεῖν θήραν, τὴν τε κατὰ πόλεμον καὶ κλωπίαν καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων. πολλή δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλίαν—Vulgo hæc per amicitiam venatio, in qua procul dubio rem amatoriam, atque omnem suadendi artem et omnia blanditiarum genera includi volebat, inter τὴν κατὰ πόλεμον θήραν atque hujus exempla media interposita est; ipsa autem verba sic corrupta sunt: καὶ κλωπίαι καὶ ληστῶν καὶ στρατοπέδων στρατοπέδοις θῆραι. Quem nostra reponit correctio chiasmum librarius parum intellexit.

Ibid. C. Transpone sic: καὶ μετὰ ζημίας νομοθετηθέντων.

Ibid. E. Lege διαπονουμένης . . alioquin nec erit que τῆς referri

possit, et dativi illi ἐρηγορόσι, εὔδουσι, prorsus ἀσύντακτοι erunt. Ordo est, τῆς διαπονουμένης κύρτοις ἀργὸν θήραν τῶν ἐνύδρων ζώων, μήτε ἐρηγορόσι μήτε εὔδουσι. Mox incredibile est quemquam in verbis μηδ' εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον ἐπέλθοι νοῦν hæsisse. Qui tot ineptias invito Platoni obtrusas defendunt, simul atque Plato ipso in notissimo proverbio jocari cœpit, statim nauseant, et cum procellis jactu decidere parant.

824, A. Lege: ἡ τὸν δι' ἀναπαύματα πόνον ἔχουσα. Mox pro ὁ διειρημένος lege ὄδ' ὁ εἰρημένος. Pro ἐν ἐργασίμοις δὲ καὶ ἱεροῖς ἀγίοις suspicor olim lectum esse ἐν ἐργ. καὶ ἀγίοις, quod ultimum nescio quis per ἱεροῖς interpretatus est. Melius fecisset, si in ΑΓΙΟΙC veram lectionem ΑΓΡΟΙC latere admonisset. In Α et Ω dittographia ex proba et mala lectione conflata servatur ΑΓ(P)ΙΟΙC.

I had hoped to wander through two or three more Books with you, picking up specimens of palæography and discoursing on them as we went. But from this egotistical design you and all others are delivered for the present by the peculiar character of this ἀντίθων; which, though we are not quite so remote as Philolaus would place us, holds too scanty a communication with you to satisfy a garrulous correspondent, and forces me, if I would see this in print before the end of this year, to address it forthwith to the European Publisher. With heartiest respect and affection,

Believe me,

Yours ever,

CHARLES BADHAM.

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY,
FEBRUARY, 1877.

CORRIGENDA.

P. VI last line. For me: read we.
 „ IX 9th „ After τούτω add (i.e. τὸ σχήματε).
 „ XIII 26th „ For became: read become.
 „ XVI 6th „ from bottom. For κελεύσις: read κελεύεις.

PLATONIS PHILEBUS

WITH

INTRODUCTION AND NOTES.

Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

INTRODUCTION.

THE aim of this noble Dialogue is to ascertain the relation of Pleasure and of Intellect to the absolute Good.

The form of the inquiry is a controversy between Socrates and two young Athenians named Philebus and Protarchus. The latter, espousing the cause which his friend had first taken up, and then through laziness abandoned, affirms that pleasure, using the word in its largest sense, is entitled to the name of *good*; to which Socrates advances an opposite claim on behalf of intellect, knowledge, and all kindred species; observing that, if it should prove that some third competitor showed a better title than either of the original claimants, then, whichever of the two should be found most akin to the successful candidate would be entitled to the *second* prize.

Protarchus is then reminded of the great variety and discrepancy in the kinds of pleasure, and is invited to show what common nature there is in all these, over and above their being *pleasant*, which nobody disputes, in virtue of which he calls them all pleasures. In reply, he denies that there is any variety or discrepancy between them, *in so far as they are pleasures*. Socrates shows the fallacy of his argument, and points out that this reliance upon the identity implied by a common name, as if it excluded all diversity, would put an end to all reasoning. This leads to the mention of the great problem about Identity and Diversity, the delight of young arguers and the terror of quiet, respectable people, the argument of ἓν καὶ πολλά.* The contradiction between the individual as *one* in nature, and yet *many* in his many changes of circumstance, and that between the Whole as *one* and

* The bearing of this discussion on the main subject is twofold. The importance of the πέραις in dialectics is a suitable introduction to the part which it is to play in physics; and the necessity of the careful division of pleasure under its several heads is shown beforehand.

the Parts as *many*, are touched upon; but Socrates affirms that, though men now look upon these paradoxes as childish and sophistical, there exist other forms of the contradiction which are really important. For, if we consider any genus as one in itself, and then again observe that the representatives of it are many and unlimited, it is difficult to conceive how this One, at the same time that it remains one in itself, is yet one in all the individuals and in each of them. This contradiction is the inherent and unchangeable property of *all* objects of reasoning; but though as such we cannot remove it, there is a remedy provided against its practical difficulty. For, while all things are constituted out of the One and the Many, they have, associated in their constitution, the Limit and the Indefinite. We must therefore, in all objects of inquiry, accepting this natural constitution, begin by taking a unit, which we are sure to find if we look for it; from this we must proceed to the next definite number supplied by the object itself in its own natural divisions, and so, continually advancing through all subordinate divisions, proceed till we arrive at the point where the limit (or given numbers) ceases, and the unlimited begins. This process from the one to the indefinite by means of *number*, or the contrary process from the indefinite to the one, is the gift of the Gods, the true dialectical method, the origin of all discovery, and the opposite of that sophistical manner which passes *per saltum* from either extreme to the other. Socrates beautifully exemplifies this position by language, music, metre, and the art of writing; and proposes that the rival claimants, pleasure and intellect, should be subjected to the same method of scrutiny.

But finding that Protarchus is scared by the difficulty of the undertaking, he professes to remember a shorter solution of the problem before them, by which it can be shown that neither competitor can hope for the *first* prize. It lies in the very conception of the Good that it should be *perfect* and *self-sufficient*. But, if we take either pleasure or intellect in absolute isolation from each other, they are alike imperfect and insufficient; for no one would accept pleasure alone as all in all, if he had no memory, no consciousness, no faculty by which he could be cognisant of the pleasure enjoyed: nor would any one accept a life of mere intellect without at least some admixture of

pleasurable feeling. To either of these states of being, all men would certainly prefer *a combination of the two*; therefore each has failed in its pretensions to be the absolute Good. But which comes the nearest to the mark? That which has most right to be considered either itself the Cause of the Combination, or at least as having most affinity with that Cause. Thus we are led to inquire into the nature of combination itself, and the laws which govern it.

Now it has already been said, that the Limit and the Indefinite* are the elements out of which all things are compounded; these, therefore, will be the first two *γένη* or kinds which we must consider; the Combination of these two will be the third kind, and the Cause which effects their union, the fourth.

Every quality of matter considered in its abstraction, extends indefinitely in the direction of two opposites, as in the instances of moister and drier †, hotter and colder, &c. The attempt to limit it at once dissolves the abstraction, because it fixes to a point that which is only conceivable as continually capable of *more* and *less*. All things which thus admit of more and less are comprehended in one *ιδέα*, and receive the name of the Indefinite, τὸ ἄπειρον. The opposites of these are the things which effect equality and proportion, and these are classed under the name of the Limit, τὸ πέρασ ‡ or περατοειδές. The examples of this kind are *all definite numbers* whatever and their relations to each other, but they can be more easily seen at the same time with the third kind, that is to say, in Combinations of τὸ ἄπειρον and τὸ πέρασ. In music, bodily health and strength and beauty, the temperature of the seasons, and above all, in the instance of pleasure, which would be absorbed in its own indefinite cravings, but for the imposition of law and order to limit and preserve it,—

* This doctrine Plato is said to have borrowed from the Pythagorean Philolaus, who, through extreme poverty, consented to sell him the book in which he had embodied the tenets of his sect.—See Diog. Laert. in *Philolaus*, and the Extract from Böckh's *Philolaus* in the Appendix.

† The comparatives of all such words are used by Plato because the positive might be misunderstood as implying a ποσόν, or definite quantity, or proportion; but afterwards, he uses the positive, Ἐν δ' ὅξει καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχέει καὶ βραδέει, ἀπείροισ ούσιν. (26, A.)

‡ πέρασ is properly the *ιδέα*, or that according to which they are one, and περατοειδές, the *γένος*: τὰ περατοειδῆ again would be the *γέννη*, which we must not confound with *γένος*, as Ast and others have done, but which is the multitude contained in the *γένος*, its numerous specimens.

in all such instances, where *qualities* are blended with definite *proportion*, we see at once the second element of the combination, and the result of that Combination as manifested in some *γένεσις*. In the fourth place there must be a Cause of such combinations; for that which *is made* cannot be the same as that which *makes*, but must always be subsequent to it. Therefore we may consider the first three kinds to be (1) (2) the elements* of natural things, and (3) the natural things themselves; but the fourth kind is that which operates with these and upon them.

The question then arises: To which of these four kinds does the Mixed Life of pleasure and intellect bear most resemblance? It is decided that it resembles most the third kind or the Combination. Pleasure again seems most akin to the Indefinite.

The kind which answers to Intellect is not so evident, and Socrates warns his friend against any rashness in the decision, as touching upon impiety. The gay Philebus laughs at his scruples, but Protarchus has more reverence, and is so awe-struck by Socrates' manner, that he is afraid to make any conjecture. Then Socrates declares that his own solemnity was all in sport, and that it is no wonder if philosophers are so ready to pay themselves a compliment, in declaring Intellect to be the King of the Universe; but that it is worth while to see what right it has to the designation. Protarchus is then asked to choose between two opinions; one that the universe is subject to chance and blind caprice, and the other, that it is governed by intellect and mind. He unhesitatingly chooses the latter. But, argues Socrates, in this universe there are the same elements which we find also in the constitution of our own bodies, only that here they occur small in quantity and poor in quality, while in the universe they are abundant and wondrous. Now, the terrestrial elements must have been derived from the universal ones, the earthly body from the body of the universe: but our body has a *mind* which

* Socrates speaks also presently (29, A) of the Four Elements, as they are called, which are as old as Empedocles, and probably much older. But the elements with which we are here concerned are elements in a different sense. They are not matter, nor even properties of matter, but the ἄπειρον is the condition of all the properties of matter, and of number itself, till controlled by πέρας. Though the Pythagoreans held ἀριθμὸς to be the condition of existence and the ground of knowledge; this its virtue was derived from the decad, that is from proportion, for the decad contained every kind of proportion. Indefinite number, ἡ ἀόριστος δυνάς, was reckoned among the ἄπειρα.

it must have also derived from the same source; for if we men have a mind, much more must the universe, possessing as it does all that we possess, only in greater perfection, have one also: and if it is in virtue of the fourth of our kinds, viz. Cause, working through the human mind, that that mind gains credit for skill and wisdom (as when, for instance, it trains the body to health and repairs its disorders), much more must the heavens and the order of nature be recognised as effects of the same Cause, operating therein on a grander scale and through a nobler and purer mind. It follows from this, that the Cause which is the chief of the four kinds, will be supreme in heaven and in earth, being the essence of the mind and of the soul of Zeus himself.* The result of this inquiry is to establish that Intellect rules over all things, and that *our* intellect is therefore also akin to the fourth or highest of the kinds.

The next step is to consider Pleasure and Intellect not abstractedly, but as they are, and to enquire how they arise in living creatures.

The first kind of Pleasure noted is that which arises when the constituent elements of the creature tend towards *Harmony*; but, when that harmony is more or less dissolved, pain is the consequence. This is illustrated by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, in all which there is a tendency to some loss or dissolution, which is pain, and in the relief of which there is a return to natural completeness, which return is pleasure. A second kind of pleasure (and pain) is in *Expectation*: this kind belongs to the mind alone, without the body participating in it.

These two classes are considered sufficient for the present purpose, and another observation is added, of which Protarchus is told that he will see the importance further on. It is, that there must be an *intermediate state* of the body, when it is tending neither towards completeness nor dissolution of any part; when this state prevails, there can be neither pleasure nor pain. Such a state is quite compatible with a life of mere intellect; it is also such a life as we may conceive the gods to possess.†

* That is, of the highest mundane divinity. The argument is, that ἀτρία ἐν τῷ ἔλῳ is the highest of all the four kinds; but ἀτρία is νοῦς, and νοῦς is inseparable from ψυχή; consequently, ἀτρία is the ground of the highest νοῦς and ψυχή, i. e., that of Ζεὺς.

† Page 33, B. The sense I have given here is not very clearly expressed in Platonis Philobus.

This, therefore, is another point to be scored in favour of *νοῦς* in its competition for the second prize.

It is in the second kind of Pleasure, that which springs from Expectation and belongs to the mind, that the nature of pleasure and its relation to *νοῦς* become most apparent. Expectation of pleasure must depend upon Memory (that is, not recollection, but the state which is the necessary condition of recollection), and this memory presupposes Sensation. If the body alone is affected, and the movement does not reach to the mind, there is no sensation and no memory. In addition to sensation, which is the common movement of body and mind, and memory, which is the preservation of sensation, we must also notice Recollection, which is the rehearsal by the mind alone of the sensations which it formerly experienced in common with the body; and lastly, Desire. For desire also is a property of the mind and not of the body, as may be shown thus: We desire the opposite of that which we feel; but desire implies memory of the thing desired; for all our relations to things desirable must be either through sensation or through memory: but sensation is occupied with the present state, whereas desire yearns for the opposite of the present state;* therefore, it must be through memory that desire is brought into relation with the thing desired; and hence it follows that desire belongs not to the body but to the mind.

A third state of pleasure (and pain) is, when, whilst the body suffers through a present void, the mind is conscious of a former satisfaction; in such a case, if there is hope of attaining the desired satisfaction, the memory of it affords a pleasure simultaneous with the bodily pain; but if there be no hope, then there is a double pain: a present void in the body, and a consciousness in the mind that the satisfaction is unattainable.

The great importance of this observation is, that it will enable us to answer a question, without settling which we cannot hope to bring the controversy to an issue: Are there *False Pleasures*?

Protarchus denies this, and affirms that *beliefs* † may be true

in the original as it stands in the Editions: it would come out much more forcibly by the very slight change of *γε* into *τε*. Οὐκ οὖν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνω τε δικάχοι, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ βελιότατος.

* The same argument is used by Soerates in the Convivium.

† I have rendered *δόξαι* in this manner; it is on the whole a handier word than *impressions*, but is to be taken in the sense of that word as popularly used.

or false, but that *pleasures* are all true. And yet, says Socrates, we speak of the pleasures of dreams or of madness as false. And if it be objected that pleasure is still pleasure though the ground of it may be false, surely the same may be said of beliefs also. If again it should be said that, in such a case, the belief is false though real, but the pleasure is true as well as real, this must be shown to arise from some peculiarity in the nature of pleasure which differentiates it from belief. But we do not find any such; for both alike admit of all other qualities, such as great and small, and good and bad. There are also correct and mistaken pleasures following on correct and mistaken beliefs. And here it is worth while to consider the nature of these *δόξαι* in general. What we believe, results from a comparison of that which we see or feel with that which we remember. This result we record either to ourselves or to others. Now, suppose the former case: then a man carries the record about with him; and it may be said to be written on his mind. Besides this power which writes impressions upon us, there is another which paints them; that is the power by which we recall to the fancy the very images which we formerly beheld with our eyes; and when the beliefs are false, these images will be false also. Among these written and painted records there will be some which have reference to future time, and these are called *Hopes*. The good man will have true hopes and true images of the future, and the bad will have false ones. But these images are *pleasures*, for it was before admitted that some pleasures arose from expectation; consequently, there are false pleasures, which bad men have, and which are the caricatures of the true pleasures of good men. Having established this analogy between *δόξα* and pleasure, Socrates argues that, as only those *δόξαι*, which do not answer to things past or present or future, but are false, are admitted to be *bad*, so those pleasures only, which are false, are bad also. Protarchus objects to this, that the badness of pleasures has very little to do with their falsehood; but Socrates defers his answer to a later stage in the controversy, and proceeds to another and stronger proof of the possibility of the falsehood of pleasure. When the body is in pleasure, and the mind at the same time is apprehensive of pain, or the body is in pain and the mind anticipating pleasure, the simultaneous presence of pleasure and pain will produce a similar

effect to the illusion of the eyes when they attribute greater size to near objects and less to those more distant. For the *immediate* pleasures or pains will seem greater than they are, in proportion to those expected; but that degree of pleasure or pain by which they exceed their real dimensions will be false, and cause a false belief: so that not only false beliefs cause false pleasures and pains, but false pleasures and pains cause false beliefs also. The strongest example of falsehood in pleasure is that which is next adduced. If we suppose a state in which there is no change either towards satisfaction or dissolution, such a state will be one devoid both of pleasure and pain. Now it is true that they who maintain the doctrine of a perpetual flux* deny the possibility of such a motionless state; but it will be enough to suppose that the motion or change is not great enough to reach the sense and the mind; and that there is such a condition nobody will deny. If a man in this state should say that he has pleasure, he would say what is false, and the pleasure which he speaks of would be false. But this is the very thing which happens when a man is relieved from pain without the acquisition of pleasure, and calls this negative state by the name of pleasure; for this supposed pleasure is false, since that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot *come to be* truly either. But there is another set of teachers,† who tell us that these things which we have been considering as three, are in fact only two; that pleasure is a mere illusion, and is nothing more than the removal of pain. Though we shall find reasons for disagreeing with them, they have something to teach us. For if we would judge rightly of pleasure, we must take in view the *highest degree* of it. Now the highest degree of pleasure is that which follows the gratification of the strongest desires; but it is in morbid conditions of the body that the strongest desires arise. Upon this, Socrates enters into a painfully vivid description of the mingled sensations which are produced by the application of relief to an itching surface or an inward irritation, and of the intense pleasure alternating with pain which men in these cases experience. In all such instances the pain is the condition of the pleasure; and these may be

* The schools of Heraclitus and Protagoras. *Theætet.* 152, 180. *Sophist.* 146.

† Antisthenes and the Cynics. A saying is attributed to Antisthenes, *μειναι μᾶλλον τῆ ἡσυχίᾳ*. *Diog. Laert.* 6, 3.

classed with the former examples where the body and the mind were differently affected, either mingling its pleasure with the pain of the other. Then again, the mind by itself has pleasures inseparable from pains; for of this nature are all the passions. Such is the sweetness of anger, and the indulgence of violent grief, and the mimic sympathies with tragic heroes. Nay, in comedy also, the same principle is at work; for ridicule deals with that which is evil; e.g. the ignorant conceit of men about their wealth or their bodily perfections or their wisdom, is evil, and it is in such foibles that ridicule finds its objects. When, therefore, we laugh at our friend's ignorance, we have, it is true, pleasure, for laughter is a sign of pleasure; but we have also pain, for taking pleasure in a friend's evil is *φθόρος*; and *φθόρος* is unquestionably a pain of the mind. Thus we see that those stern despisers of pleasure are so far right, that there are many and intense kinds of enjoyment, which owe their very intensity to the pain with which they are connected.

But then there are other species of pleasure which this School has overlooked: *pure pleasures* not resulting from any previous perceptible want, such as those of Sight, when it has for its objects beautiful outline or beautiful colour, unassociated with desire; those of Hearing, when they are of the same kind, and those of Smelling. (It is remarkable that Touch and Taste are excluded from this list.) And lastly, there are the Intellectual pleasures, which are not preceded by any painful want, and the loss of which is not followed by any sense of void.

Such being the Impure and the Pure pleasures respectively, which are most truly pleasures? As a little *White*, if perfectly unmingled, is more truly white than ever so great a quantity having the admixture of some other colour, so pure and unmingled pleasure, however small, is more truly pleasure than a mixed kind, however great. Consequently, when we come to the comparison of pleasure and intellect (in order to determine which of the two is the *predominant* element in that Mixed Life, which was found to be better than either of them alone), we shall have to remember that the *pure* pleasure is the true kind, and, therefore, that by which we must make our judgment.

But before the judgment commences, Socrates proposes two more reflexions concerning pleasure. All things may be divided into

two classes; that which exists for the sake of something else, and that for the sake of which something else exists. The former will include *γένεσις*, temporal existence, that which *is ever becoming*; the latter, *οὐσία*, eternal being, that which *is*; indeed, the entire former class exists for the sake of the latter. But whereas the Good must be that for the sake of which other things exist, pleasure, we are told by certain ingenious men,* is a *γένεσις*; and if so, it will be in the *opposite* class to that of the Good. And again, if pleasure be a *γένεσις*, they who make it their good, and pursue it, are most irrational; for they pursue also the state opposite to pleasure, that of want or desire, on the relief of which the generation of pleasure depends; but if pleasure be a genesis or production, its opposite is a corruption; so that those who choose pleasure as the Good, choose generation and corruption rather than pure being.

There are also many other absurdities following on the supposition that pleasure is the Good, but the greatest, and indeed the sum of them all, is that, if it were so, a man would be good in proportion to the pleasure of which he partook, and bad in the opposite proportion.

The next step is, to subject *νοῦς* and *ἐπιστήμη* to the same process, and to ascertain if here too we shall find purer and impurer sorts. Science is divided into the Productive and the Instructive. In the former class, some branches are more immediately associated with mathematical science, and others are content, to a great degree, with mere guesswork and practical skill. Such a difference marks some as more, and others as less, pure. But the mathematical sciences themselves may be viewed either as they are conversant with absolute properties of figure and number, or as dealing with figures and numbers in the concrete; so that we may say there is a twofold arithmetic and a twofold geometry; and so in like manner of other mathematical sciences, of which the one branch is pure, the other impure. But the pure science above all others, is Dialectic; for it is that which has for its object the absolute, invariable, and eternal, and which therefore seeks after the truest of all knowledge. Other sciences may be more immediately useful or imposing, but this is more truly science than all

* Trendelenburg gives it as his opinion that Aristippus is here meant.

others; for whereas they depend on opinions, and are busied about mere phenomenal existence, Dialectic deals with immutable realities.

Having now determined the Pure and Impure both of Pleasures and of Sciences, we are ready to blend them so as to effect that combination of which the Mixed Life consisted. But which shall we use? To begin with intellect and knowledge, shall only the purer sorts enter into the combination? If it were so, there would be an end to all practical life, which is obliged to content itself with the imperfect and impure sciences. Therefore we are compelled to admit into the combination *both* sorts of intellect and knowledge. Shall we do the same with pleasure? Certainly not; for while the pleasures themselves would desire an union with intellect, as that which should give to them a meaning which they have not in themselves, intellect would reject all impure and tumultuous delights, as hindering its efforts and stifling its productions; but with the temperate and healthful pleasures, and such as walk in the train of virtue, as priestesses in the procession of some deity, with these it is willing to have fellowship.

Having, then, the elements of the mixture, it remains for us to enquire according to what law they must be combined. Now, first, no combination can be worth anything which is not a *true* blending: *Truth*, therefore, is a necessary condition; and if it is a condition of combination, and the Good is a result of combination, we must look for the Good in Truth. Again, no mixture can be successful which is without *Measure*; on measure and proportion all combination depends, and in these, therefore, likewise the Good must abide. Lastly, the effect of measure and proportion is *Beauty* and symmetry; and thus we conclude that herein also the Good is to be found.

And now, having not indeed a perfect comprehension of the Good,* but a knowledge of the three shapes in which it manifests itself, we may endeavour to decide the question, which of the two, Pleasure or Intellect, is most akin to it. This is easily determined, for pleasure is false and fickle, but intellect is either the same as Truth or the nearest akin to it: pleasure is in its own nature immoderate, but intellect and knowledge depend upon Measure: pleasure has so little claim to Beauty, that it often

* Which Plato thought unattainable. See *Republic*, vi. 508, 509.

shuns the light, and its expression is always unseemly, but intellect is a stranger to all that is not comely and decent.

Upon arriving at this conclusion of the whole argument, Socrates delivers the joint decision of the disputants in these words: Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπὸ τ' ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμ' οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῆ περι μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζειν τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν. (66, A.) We shall presently have to consider the exact reading and interpretation of these words; it is sufficient for the summary of the Dialogue which I have attempted to give, if we gather from them that Measure and things partaking of the nature of measure are declared to be the nearest approach to the Good. Next to this, and in the second place, Socrates places the Beautiful, the Symmetrical, the Self-sufficient and Perfect; the third place is given to Intellect and Thought; the fourth to the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs; and the fifth to the Purer Pleasures. The Dialogue concludes with a short recapitulation, and a noble warning, in forming our judgment of pleasure, not to rely, as the meaner soothsayers do, on the teaching of irrational natures, but on the oracles of the philosophic Muse.

Of the difficulties presented by this Dialogue none is so important, and at the same time so perplexing, as the assignment of places to the five different Classes.

The classification proposed by Ast needs only to be stated for any attentive reader to see that it is perfectly irreconcilable with the words of Plato, and with the whole tenor of the argument. He arranges them thus:—1. The Definite, which is the νοῦς βασιλεύς, the controlling and arranging principle of the world; 2. The Indefinite, which is the material substratum on which the supreme intelligence is exercised; 3. The Real Synthesis of the two former, the Pythagorean κόσμος; 4. The Ideal Synthesis, the human intelligence as the reflex of the divine; 5. Pleasure. Nothing, as Trendelenburg observes, can be more remote from the terms σύμμετρον and καλόν, than the formless and discordant elements of matter; nor are νοῦς and φρόνησις capable of being understood as the world of beauty and harmony, the living work of the supreme mind. Such manifest violence to the plain words

of the author can only be accounted for by the desire of making a system for Plato, and the vain notion of helping out his supposed imperfect strivings after a regular gradation from the most absolute intellectual to the most sensual.

Schleiermacher proceeded on a much more reverent and a sounder principle. It seemed to him very remarkable that the two competitors whose relative claims the whole Dialogue is occupied in discussing, should appear at the final award not as second and third, but as fourth and fifth. How could the introduction of these new claimants be accounted for? His answer is, that we must look for the explanation to those treatises to which the *Philebus* is intended to be subordinate and introductory, the *Timæus* and the *Republic*. As in the former Plato proposed to give an account of the constitution of the world, and in the latter, that of human society, he prepares us for both by intimating that in the gradation of Good that which is universal must be placed before that which concerns men in particular. He accounts for the third place only being assigned to *νοῦς* and *φρόνησις* by observing that it is not the *divine* mind which is here intended, but that mind, which is itself an element in the Mixture. This mind, according to him, is the *truth* spoken of above as one of the three conditions of combination. 'For the mind is the sole home of Truth, which first gives a reality to things, and it occupies therefore, as a kind of mediator, a middle place between the universal generated good, and the particular good of man.' Few readers will be satisfied with an explanation which accounts for the introduction of new and important matter into the very conclusion of an argument, by supposing an anticipation of what is to be said elsewhere. There is an end to the unity of the Dialogue, and, indeed, to all the laws of disputation, if we are suddenly to be informed of some most important doctrines, as to the proof of which we are left to guess (for no promise of the kind is held out) that it may be forthcoming on a future occasion. But the distribution of Schleiermacher is likewise so far unsatisfactory, that he does not explain in what respect the second class differs from the first. I cannot however assent to Trendelenburg's objection to his view of the third class, that the mind which gives reality to things is the *Supreme Mind*, and consequently can have nothing to do with the *νοῦς*

and φρόνησις, which are ingredients in the Mixture. For it is evident that the meaning of Schleiermacher is, that the mind here spoken of *gives to us* a sense of the reality of things, and is therefore convertible with ἀλήθεια, and is thus a fit intermediate between the Universe and Man. But this question will be better discussed when we have examined Trendelenburg's own classification.

Trendelenburg himself understands the-μέτρον καὶ μέτριον *z. τ. έ.* to include all the three conditions of combination; for, according to his view, the first class contains the absolute Idea of Good and all those Ideas which are connected with it; and the second differs from the first, as being the realisation of these same Ideas in the Universe. But it is unaccountable why Plato, if he had intended the καλόν and ἀλήθεια to occur twice in his enumeration, should have suppressed the latter altogether, and mentioned the former only in its secondary phasis; and altogether it is a strange way of indicating *the same things*, to designate them, first as absolute, and then as manifested in forms, by a perfectly distinct set of names. But the whole hypothesis rests on a translation which the words above quoted will not bear: "*et quidquid ejusmodi eternam naturam suscepisse credendum est.*" In the first place, ὅποσα χρῆ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν *z. τ. έ.* cannot be taken so: for this would be expressed by ὅποσα, τοιαῦτ' ὄντα, χρῆ νομίζειν,—and though the order might be changed, the participle would still be indispensable.* But even if we conceded such an interpretation, what would become of πρῶτον μὲν πῆ περὶ μέτρον? It is obvious that, in such a case, περὶ has neither meaning nor construction. But, above all, such an expression as "to have adopted (or received) the eternal nature," is at variance with the whole method of Plato. For if the Good is to be sought for in these things, it must be because they are emanations or productions of it; whereas, according to this view, the Good is *superadded* to them, and that through their seeking it. But no one conversant with the language will understand ἡρῆσθαι in the sense of παρειληφέναι, or still less of

* The order *has* been changed, and most injuriously to the sense, on the authority of the Bodleian MS., from τοιαῦτα χρῆ to χρῆ τοιαῦτα. Χρῆ νομίζειν is plain enough when used of some conclusion, which, but for the argument, disputants would not have admitted. But what force or even sense is there in saying, 'all such things as we are bound to believe to have taken upon themselves the eternal nature?' It is therefore evident that we must read ὅποσα τοιαῦτα, and understand ἐστὶ.

εἰληχέναι. And then, again, why have we the perfect? In speaking of a fact which has no reference to any particular time, the only proper tense would have been *ἐλέσθαι*. Those who feel these objections will not need to have them confirmed by a consideration of the unsuitableness of the sense thus extorted from them; and yet the *senso* is in itself very objectionable, because it would amount to this,—that Plato having sought, by a laborious argument, for that which had most affinity with the Good, at last found it—in the Idea of the Good! The continual allusions to this *search*, finding its neighbourhood, coming to its threshold, its taking refuge with the Beautiful and the like, all point to the true reading of the passage, which, by the slight change of 'HIP into 'HYP, removes all the objections alleged above.* It will not be necessary to do more than point out the other misconceptions on which Trendelenburg's explanations are built, viz. the supposed opposition between *ἡρῆσθαι* and *γενεᾶς*, which is annihilated by the particle *αὐ*, which shows that *another* kind is spoken of; and the notion that the third kind is the Idea considered subjectively, the Idea in so far as it is the ground of human knowledge. Surely if the Idea is not just this and nothing else, it is a mere abstraction, and Plato would not bid us look for the Good in *that*.

Stallbaum's view will be at once understood from the classification with which he accompanies that of Plato. 1. τὸ αἴτιον. 2. τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον. 3. τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ πέρας. 4. τὸ καθαρὸν πέρας. 5. τὸ καθαρὸν ἄπειρον. Those who look for realities in Plato, and who believe that Plato looked for them himself, will never be brought to admit that his own desire—*μαθεῖν περιᾶσθαι τί ποτ' ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τίς ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον* (64, A) could be satisfied with a barren dialectic scheme, or that he would offer such a result to his readers. There is not a single hint (and we know how fond Plato is of hints) to show that he any longer dwells upon the fourfold division of *γένη*, propounded before. Nor does the classification of Stallbaum at all tally with that of Plato; for *τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα* is such a way of expressing the Idea of the Good (which Stallbaum rightly looks

* For a further discussion of this point see Notes on the Text.

upon as synonymous with αἰτία)* as nobody would ever have thought of, unless he had been predetermined by some theory to find that meaning in the words: and this remark applies to many other interpreters of the passage under consideration.† As to the second class,—τὸ ζυμμισγόμενον is, doubtless, equivalent to τὰ ὄντα; but I deny that τὰ ὄντα are intended, or could be conveyed, by such a periphrasis as τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλόν, καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἰκανόν, καὶ πάνθ' ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ἐστίν. The only observation that need be made as to the third class, is, that it is a confusion in place of a division. The νοῦς which is αἰτία, (A), may be considered as πέρας, that is, the absolute Mind may be thought of only as contemplating its own Ideas. And, again, the νοῦς which is πέρας, (B), may be considered as so far αἰτία, that it imitates the productions of the νοῦς which is αἰτία. But B is identical with the fourth class, or ἐπιστήμη, and A is liable to the same objection as Trendelenburg's explanation; namely, that such a view supposes us to look for the Good in that which is no *thing*, but the mere common name or property of two things.

I will now venture to offer my own solution of these difficulties.

The Good which appeared most suitable for *man* was found in the combination of two *human* conditions. It is reasonable, then, to expect that in combination *universally* we approach most nearly to the *universal* Good; but combination depends upon three things—Measure, Beauty, Truth: and wherever we trace these, the Good cannot be far off. Now, we trace Measure in τὸ μέτρον, τὸ καίριον, and all that evinces adaptation *of one to another*; Beauty in τὸ καλόν, τὸ ἰκανόν, τὸ τέλειον, and all that is complete and harmonious *in itself*; Truth (subjective) in the νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις of man, as that wherein the real is distinguished from the seeming, and the eternal from the accidental: νοῦς δ' ἦτοι ταύτων καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν, ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατον. (65, D.) But why do the three occur in this order? Not because there is any superiority of *πρεσβεία* or *δύναμις* in any of them, as in the case of *τάγαθόν*, but because there is a difference between them as to priority

* *Phæd.* 97, foll. *Tim.* 30. A. *Rep.* 508, foll. Nevertheless, I entirely agree with Trendelenburg, that τὰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον and ὁ δημιουργός were held by Plato to be quite distinct.

† The very multiplication of kindred adjectives is a proof that we are to find one object in many, not to contemplate an Idea in itself.

in thought, or because the sphere in which they are exhibited differs as to extent. Everything in the whole universe presents an example of τὸ μέτριον in some form or other; this, therefore, comes first. One of the results of this adaptation is the perfection of individual things as to beauty or use (τὸ ἰκανόν): and this, being a result and part of the former, is placed after it. The least comprehensive of the trio is Intellect and Thought; to these therefore, as the embodiment of Truth, (whence it is plain that the pure speculative faculty is meant) the third place is assigned. In the fourth place come the subordinates of νοῦς, viz. the Sciences, the Arts, and Right Beliefs. Nor are we unprepared for this division, since all along νοῦς has been used to express either the Divine Intelligence or the Human indifferently; whereas it is to the latter that, the practical faculties belong so that when the corresponding division to that of ἡδοναὶ had to be made, it was made not in νοῦς, which did not admit of it, but in the ἐπιστήμαι. The Pure Pleasures will naturally come next in order.

It may be objected that something more than a greater extent of sphere is implied in the question in p. 64, c: *Τί δ᾽ ἦτ' ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει τιμιώτατον ἄμα καὶ μάλιστα ἄτιον κ. τ. ἐ.* which is answered by naming τὸ μέτρον: with the further remark that from μέτρον κάλλος necessarily flows, so that the first would seem to be upheld as the antecedent condition, and the second as one of the effects of that condition. In like manner also it may be said that the third, which in the inquiry figures as ἀλήθεια, but in the declaration of the verdict is called νοῦς καὶ φρόνησις (a variation which is accounted for by the paragraph at the end of p. 63, *Ὁ δέ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος κ. τ. ἐ.*) is spoken of as necessary to the κρᾶσις, only because, as had been formerly said, without Truth "no true mixture can be made, nor, being made, exist"; so that this also is inferior to the first, because, though it is a condition as the other is, it is one in the quality of the ingredients, and not lying in the very conception of all mixture.

But this mode of explanation does not help us when we come to enquire why ἀλήθεια is postponed to κάλλος; why, if Socrates had intended to bring these three as rival claimants into competition, and to assign them their places according to their comparative merits, he should have made that remarkable state-

ment at the beginning of p. 65, *Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μίξ δυνάμεθα ἰδέειν τὰγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σύντρισι κ. τ. ε.*; and lastly, why, in mentioning the three, which he does seven or eight times, he observes no order, but places any one of them indifferently in the middle or at either extreme of the series.

It must be remembered that the main object of enquiry is to ascertain the relative claims of Intellect and Pleasure to the name of Good, and that the question arising out of this is, not *What* is the Good, but *Where* is it? To such a question the first answer would naturally be *in Measure*, which is the largest sphere, (because Measure contains all things,) and in things according to Measure, which are in fact all things made conformably to the great pattern, the οὐ ξενεκα, according to which the supreme αἰτία works. In brief, the wider and more populous region deserves the first mention in a question of dwelling-place, or place of manifestation, such as has here been the object of search. If we do not understand Plato thus, there is no other possible way of understanding him except as intending to tell us that mere Form is a better thing than Beauty, and Beauty than Reason, which is quite incredible.

This way of explaining the enumeration of the classes is very different from that which is given in an author quoted by Stobæus *Ecl. Eth.* ii. 6, 4, *Πρωτων μὲν γὰρ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνεται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ θεῖον καὶ χωριστόν· δευτερον δὲ τὸ ἐκ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς σύνθετον, ὅπερ ἐνίοις δοκεῖ κατ' αὐτὸ εἶναι τέλος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου ζωῆς· τρίτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν φρόνησιν· τέταρτον τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν σύνθετον· πέμπτον αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἡδονήν.* This division is expressly referred to the *Philebus*; but when we consider that the writer was himself making a system of Plato's definitions, and dividing them under the heads τῷ γένει, τοῖς τόποις, τοῖς εἶδεσι, we are prepared for a little straining of his author to suit his theory. The objections to this theory are the same as have been urged against Stallbaum, and may be summed up in this, that such a division is not reconcilable with the language of Plato. At the same time, I do not deny that Measure and all its cognates, are, according to Plato, the *nearest* approach to the Idea, nor that the κοινὸς βίος in its quality of ἴκανόν will come under the *second* denomination, in that it partakes of it; but in a discussion as to

what causes make a certain thing an object of choice, in ascertaining which, we find the Good, it is absurd to class the thing itself as one of the results of our search. Else indeed, it might be thought to have an equal right to the *first* place; but Plato seems to have confined this to the instances of *antecedent suitability*, or *of the modes of combination*, and to have reserved for the *second* those things which owe their own excellence to such combinations.

The parts in this Dialogue which are confessedly Pythagorean, namely the power of Number, the elementary and opposite properties of *πέραις* and *ἀπειρον*, and the distinction between Empirical and Mathematical knowledge as applied to music, could not be better illustrated than by setting before the reader the Extracts from Böckh's *Philolaus*, and the fragments of Philolaus himself, which bear upon these topics. These will be found in the Appendix. A few other Extracts from different authors are added in order to illustrate various matters touched upon in the course of the Dialogue.

For all other more or less certain information, such as the bearing of the *Philebus* on the rest of the Platonic doctrines, the date of its composition, its intrinsic value as a contribution to Moral Philosophy etc., I must leave the reader to those who profess to teach them; I have been content to confine myself to the task of endeavouring to understand what appeared on the face of the text, and of ascertaining as far as possible the very words of the author, unnumbered by the additions of ignorant men, and set free from the blunders of negligent transcribers. I have trusted no other MS. authority save that of the Bodleian in the first place, and of the Coislinian in the second. Where these guides have failed to satisfy me, I have endeavoured to constitute the text according to the principles of Criticism, without caring to suit the taste or to defer to the prejudices of any School. Much that I had spared, and even tried to defend, in a former Edition I now unhesitatingly condemn, whether I have seen my way to correcting it or not. I have known critics to be charged with making difficulties and fancying faults for the pleasure of displaying their ingenuity in conjecture. The charge shows a thorough ignorance of the very frame of mind in which a critical scholar is obliged to work: such an one well knows

that, if he durst so tamper with his own sense of truth, he would most certainly and speedily injure the one instrument on which he relies for success, his judgment. Others there are who treat all conjecturing as at best an effort of wit, and a pretty pastime. Such persons seem not to have considered that, if the ἄπειρον of verbal criticism consists of changes of similar letters and compendia, transpositions, bracketings and indications of hiatus, the πέρασ which is to bring these elements to a γένεσις is, not a dithyrambic ecstasy which exults in its own contortions and tosses about wildly whatever it picks up, but a cold, severe, watchful calculation of probabilities, which shuns all outbreaks of fancy as interruptions of its work. But why should any one try to expostulate with the gainsayers? Some of them are too ignorant of the language to see any faults, and therefore cannot see the use of corrections. And yet it is useless to tell them so, for they can count on the applause of the many hundred minds which they have perverted. Some have tried verbal criticism and failed; and hate the pursuit which would not gratify their vanity and yield them fame. Let us dismiss the former with:

εὐδαιμονίζων ὄγλος ἐξέπληξέ σε.

and the latter with:

ἀπόλωλεν ἀλήθει', ἐπεὶ σὺ δύστηχεῖς;

The only kind of observation to which I do not feel indifferent, is the imputation of having offered the corrections of others as my own. But this I anticipate by saying that I possess no edition of Plato later than that of Didot, and no Philological journal except the two series of the Mnemosyne. If any one has claims on aught that appears in this Book, let him give me the opportunity of righting him, and I shall be thankful for it.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΠΡΩΤΑΡΧΟΣ,
ΦΙΛΗΒΟΣ.

1. Ὅρα δὴ, Πρωτάρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλίβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν Β μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ἢ λεγόμενος. βούλει συγχεφαλαιωσώμεθ' ἐλάτερον;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φίλιβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζώοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τοῦτου σύμφωνα· τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημ' ἐστὶ μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦτων

Πρωτάρχε] The dialogue is supposed to commence at the moment when Socrates turns from Philebus to Protarchus. When the speaker changes his address from one person to another, or from several to some one or more out of the whole number, ὃ is often omitted before the vocative, as in *Parm.* 136 D; *Symp.* 216 A, 217 N; *Euthyd.* 296 E; *Prot.* 358 E, 359 A; *Phileb.* 12 A, 28 B. The same omission also takes place when the speaker is represented as calling in an especial manner on the attention of the person addressed; as in *Gorg.* 489 A, 521 A (where Callicles would fain let the conversation drop), *Symp.* 172 A, 175 A, 213 E; *Euthyd.* 293 D, 294 C, 295 D. In *Symp.* 173 E, if a second ἑταῖρος is speaking (which is probable on other grounds), the omission may be accounted for in the same manner. I confess that in *Phaedr.* 261 A, *Soph.* 220 D, 234 D, *Euthyd.* 300 A, the reason is not so evident: though in the first three instances there is a suspension of the argument, and an appeal to the person addressed.

ἀγαθόν] Not τῶν ἀγαθῶν; for Philebus'

Platonis Philebus.

assertion is not represented as being one about The Good in itself, but merely this; that pleasure, and that which is akin to it, has a right to the name of good in its proper signification, which Socrates denies, while claiming the name for mind, knowledge and all things belonging to that class.

τέρψιν] Why not τὴν τέρψιν? Probably because verbal forms of this kind have less of the nature of the noun than ἀρετή, δόξα, ἡδονή; and because, as denoting a process, and not a state, they cannot assume the article without being thereby confined to a particular instance.

μὴ ταῦτα] not ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, but ἀμείνω γίνεσθαι, which is equivalent to ἀμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα γίνεσθαι. I have no doubt that τῆς γ' ἡδονῆς is an interpolation. A still worse one is δυνατοῦς, which was probably inserted to fill up a lacuna caused by the obliteration of the syllable ΤΟ. There is no way of avoiding an absurd repetition, but to make μετασχεῖν a new subject, and this cannot be done without the article.

αὐ ξυγγενῆ, δόξαν τ' ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, [τῆς γ' ἡδο-
C νῆς] ἀμείνω καὶ λῶφω γίνεσθαι ξύμπασιν, ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ
μειλαβεῖν· τὸ [δυνατοῖς] δὲ μείσασχιν ὡφελιμώτατον ἀπάν-
των εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσί τε καὶ ἔσομένοις. μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως
λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἐκάτεροι;

ΦΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὐν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δέχει δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε,
λόγον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπέι-
ρηγεν.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπον παντὶ τάλιθ' ἐς πη περαν-
θῆναι;

D ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὐν.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, πρὸς τοῦτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅς νῦν ἡμῶν ἐκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀπο-
φαίνειν τιν' ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον
ἐδαίμονα παρέχειν. ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὐν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δ' αὐτὴν τοῦ
φρονεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῆ; μῶν οὐκ,
E ἂν μὲν ἡδοῆ μᾶλλον φαίνεται ξυγγενῆς, ἠτιώμεθα μὲν ἀμφό-
τεροι ταῦ ταύτην ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίον, κρατεῖ δ' ὁ τῆς ἡδοῆς
12 τοῦ τῆς φρονήσεως;

[Δέχει] It is a fond fancy of one of the Editors that δέχεσθαι τὸ διδόμενον is a proverb; and that the answer Ἀνάγκη is in allusion to this. In the passage quoted for the purpose (*Gorg.* 499, C) τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν is the popular saying referred to. The oracle given to *Myscellus* δῶρον δ' ὅ τι δῶ τις ἐπάσσει, "be content with your portion" is quoted indeed by the *Paroemiographers*, but it is not alluded to here. I take this opportunity of restoring another proverbial saying to one of the so called *Platonic Dialogues*. (*Amatores* 134, B.) Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡμην

τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ νῦν γινώσκω. Read καὶ νῦν γινώσκω. See *Laches* 196, D, and the *Scholium* thereon.

[διάθεσιν] The place of this word and its redundancy, to say nothing of the technical character of the word itself, incline me to put καὶ διάθεσιν in brackets.

[ταύτην ἔχοντος] The common reading is ταῦτα, which is explained as referring to τὸ κρείττω φανῆναι; but though ἔχειν might be used in such a sense, ἔχειν βεβαίως shows that a real possession is intended,—that is, the ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς spoken of above.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ δ' ἡττᾶται; ταῦθ' οὕτως ὁμολογοῦμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Φιλίβρι; τί φῆς;

ΦΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾷ ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρωταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσει.

ΠΡΩ. Παραδούς, ὦ Φίλιβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κέρως εἶης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τούναντιον.

ΦΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιῶμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι Β νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γ' αὐτῶν συμμάχους ἂν εἴμεν, [ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἢ λέγεις]. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἐξῆς, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλίβου ἐκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλη πειρώμεθα περαινέιν.

Nor again is it conceivable that Plato would indicate these by a neuter plural, or by any plural at all, since they are not really two things, but the same thing differently viewed. The confusion between the apostrophus and the compendium for ην is one of the commonest which occur in manuscripts. I have changed τὸν τ. φ. into τοῦ τ. φ. It is ridiculous to appeal to Greek Tragedy as a standard of prose syntax. The spurious passage in the Birds (v. 420) κρατεῖν ἂν ἢ τὸν ἐχθρὸν, is worthy of φιλοκισιν ὠφελεῖν which follows it.

ἢ δ' ἡττᾶται] I formerly proposed τῆς δ' ἡττᾶται, but this would be almost as much a repetition as the other. Perhaps the redundancy is due to the construction with μὲν, which was wanted for the sake of emphasis.

δοκεῖ τε καὶ δόξει] Unless we are prepared to suppose with Stallbaum that a certain climax is intended in these words, *videtur, et vero etiam videtur* we must believe τε to be indispensable, though 'all the MSS.' (that is, two independent sources, and the copies made from them) omit it.

αὐτὸς γνώσει] Literally, *yourself shall determine; you shall do as you please.* Gorgias 505, c. Σω. Εἴην· τί οὐκ ποιήσομεν; μεταξύ τὸν λόγον κατα-

λύομεν; Κα. Αὐτὸς γνώσει. Eurip. Ion 1356 Πυθ.: λαβῶν νῦν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκοῦσαν ἐκπόνει. Ἴων: Ἀσιάδ' ἐπέλθω πάσαν. Εὐρώπης δ' ὄρους; Πυθ.: γνώσει τὰδ' αὐτός.—for this is the true reading of that passage. See also *Thucyd.* Δ, 99, init. and *Xen. Hell.* v, 1. 34, where the men implicated in the bloodshed αὐτοὶ γόντες ἀπῆλθον ἐκ τῆς Κορίνθου.

ἀφοσιῶμαι] *I set myself free from the pollution; I disclaim all share in the guilt.* This was done by a variety of trifling formal acts, such as pretending to spit, &c., or by the use of certain words. Hence, in the later Greek writers, to do anything for form's sake and without serious purpose, is δρᾶν τι ὅσας χάρην or ὅσον ἀφοσιώσασθαι. In the Attic authors I know of no instance where the words are thus used without some accompanying notion of the discharge from a religious obligation or compliance with a religious ceremony.

[ὡς ταῦτ' ἔλεγες ἢ λέγεις] A most unnecessary addition after τούτων αὐτῶν, or rather a false gloss, for τούτων αὐτῶν means τὸ ἀφοσιώσασθαι σε καὶ μαρτύρασθαι τὴν θεόν.

ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλη] A polite way of implying ἢ βίᾳ Φιλίβου.

ΣΩ. Πειρατέον, ἀπ' αὐτῆς δὲ τῆς Θεοῦ, ἣν ὑδ' Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαι φησι, τὸ δ' ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἰδονὴν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

C ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἕμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αἰεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν Θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὕπῃ κείνη φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω· τὴν δ' ἰδονὴν οἶδ' ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὕπερ εἶπον, ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμῆσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥτινα φύσιν ἔχει. ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς, ἐν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληψε καὶ ἕνα τρόπον ἀνο-

D μοίους ἀλλήλαις. ἰδὲ γάρ, ἴδεσθαι μὲν φαιεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντι ἀνθρώπων, ἴδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντι αὐτῇ τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἴδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀνομιάνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἴδεσθαι δ' αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντι αὐτῇ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδονῶν ἐκατέρως πῶς ἂν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνεται ἐνδίκως;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αἵται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταὶ γ' ἀλλήλαις ἐναντία. πῶς γὰρ ἰδονὴ E γ' ἰδονῆ [μῆ] οὐκ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐαυτῆ, πάντων χρημάτων;

ἀπ' αὐτῆς δέ] Some MSS. have δῆ. It is impossible to decide between them while the rest of the sentence remains faulty. Every one will perceive that ἀρξαμένους, or ἀρχτέον, or some word to that effect, must have dropped out.

Τὸ δ' ἕμὸν δέος] That this was the real feeling of Socrates as well as of the men of his time is plain from many passages. Compare *Cratylus* 400, E where nevertheless he regards the current names of the Gods as of human invention. The fear is that there is more risk of offending Ἀφροδίτην, by giving her a *new* name, though even the old one is not certainly correct, or free from offence.

κέ(νη) This pronoun is here used in preference to ταύτη, because the person is in her own nature remete and invisible. In the next sentence, ἀπ' ἐκείνης is put for ἀπὸ ταύτης, on account of ὅπερ εἶπον, which makes ἰδονὴν ap-

pear not as the present subject, but as that of a former preposition.

οὕτως ἀπλῶς] There has been a strange scruple, whether these words, which are so commonly joined together, can be so here; and recourse has been had to the expedient of a comma in order to separate them. In the double contrast which follows it is to be observed, that on one side the healthy desires and the healthy intellect are themselves the *source* of the satisfaction, αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν, αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν, whereas their opposites are but the *channels* of pleasure. This is why he adds ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν.

πῶς γὰρ κ. τ. ε.] We have above πῶς οὐκ ἂν φαίνοιο, which is the ordinary construction. The μῆ is nothing more than a result of carelessly reading ΗΔΟΝΗΟΥΧ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὃ δαιμόνιε, [χρῶματι] κατὰ γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' οὐδὲν διοίσει, τὸ χρῶμ' εἶναι πᾶν· τὸ γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γινώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὃν τιγγάνει· καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα [σχῆματι] κατὰ ταῦτων γένει μὲν ἔστι πᾶν ἓν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατ' ἀλλήλοισ, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητ' ἔχοντα μυρίαν 13 ποῦ τιγγάνει. καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερ' οὕτως ἔχονθ' εἰρήσομεν, ὥστε τοῦτω γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τᾶναντιώταθ' ἓν ποιοῦναι. φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τις αἰσ ἡδονᾶς ἡδοναῖς εἰρήσομεν ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθ' ἡμῶν βλάβει τὸν λόγον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτ' ἀνόμοι' ὄνθ' ἕτερον, εἰρήσομεν, ὀνόματι. λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πᾶντ' εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα. τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οἶχ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ· κατὰ δ' Β ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φραμέν, ὁμοίως σὺ προσαγορεύεις [ἀγάθ' αὐτά,] ὁμολογῶν ἂν ἀνόμοι' εἶναι τῷ λόγῳ,

[χρῶματι] This addition is due to some blunderer, who made two sentences out of one. Had κατὰ γ' been the beginning of a new sentence we should have had some conjunction. The same reason applies to σχῆματι. Any one may see how much elegance is gained by their omission.

μυρίαν] This is to be understood not of the number of differences, but of the extent of some particular differences. Comp. *Apolog.* 23, c. ἐν πενήκ μυρίαι εἰμί.

φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή] Compare, among other passages, *Rep.* 451, A; *Theodo* 84, F, φοβεῖσθε μὴ διάχειμαί, and *Arist. Nub.* 493, δέδοικά σ', ὡ πρεσβύτα, μὴ πλετῶν δέει.

Ὅτι προσαγορεύεις] *Because, my side will say, you call all these, though unlike each other, by a new common name.* This would be assuming a second ground of agreement between them; for that they agree in being pleasures is proved by their common name of pleasure; but it does not follow that they agree in anything else, as, for instance, in being good. But if Protarchus asserts that they are all alike, and yet must confess that they are not alike good, he is bound to mention some other ground

of likeness. Socrates therefore cannot be introduced as asking him for a proof that they are ἀγαθὰ, but as wanting to know, forasmuch as they do not agree in this respect, in what else they do agree. But the received text makes him say: "You know they are not all good, and you are ready to admit that they are so far unlike; and yet you call them all good": which is so absurd that I have changed ὅμως into ὁμοίως, and put ἀγαθ' αὐτά and ἀγαθὸν εἶναι in brackets. The worse MSS. have πάντα before σὺ. Had Plato written it, he would certainly have placed it immediately next to αὐτά; but it is due to a misconception of the meaning, caused by ὅμως. I have supplied ἂν after ὁμολογῶν, τε before ταῖς, and ταῖς before ἀγαθᾶς for obvious reasons. The restoration of ἂν is necessary for the sense; it was probably absorbed by the following word.

τῷ λόγῳ] This belongs to ἀνόμοιοι: for προσαγορεύειν implies ὄνομα, and the ground of the ὄνομα is in the λόγος or description. It is worth while to quote a passage from the *Laws* which bears on this point, and which has been suffered to remain hitherto in a very corrupt state. *Legg.* 895, 896,

εἴ τις σε προσαναγκάζοι. τί οὖν δὴ ταῦτόν ἐν τε ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς [ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] προσαγορεύεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; οἶει γὰρ τινα [συγχωρήσασθαι,] θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὰ γὰθόν, εἰτ' ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονὰς, τὰς δὲ τινὰς [ἐτέρας] αὐτῶν κακάς;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καὶ τινὰς ἐναντίας.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐτι καθ' ὅσον γ' ἡδοναί.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντ' οὐδὲν τιτρώσκειν, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων φηλότατοι τε περὶ λόγους ἅμια καὶ νέοι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σὲ μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμνησόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιοτάτον ἔστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὁμοιό-

"Ἔστι (τί) που δίχα διαιρούμενον ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀρισμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ' ἀρισμὸν ὄνομα μὲν Ἄρτιον, λόγος δὲ, Ἀρισμός διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη. . . . Μῶν οὖν οὐ ταῦτόν ἐκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἂν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι τούνομα ἀποδιδώμεν, ἂν τε τούνομα τὸν λόγον, "ἄρτιον" ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ, "δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀρισμὸν" προσαγορεύοντες ταῦτόν ὄν; Ἐὶ δ' ἔστι τοῦτ' οὕτως ἔχον, ἀρ' ἔτι (τι) ποθοῦμεν, ἢ ἱκανῶς δέδικται ψυχῇν κ. τ. ἔ. (A little lower down after γενομένη supply φανερώσῃ γε.)

[συγχωρήσασθαι.] As εἰτα depends immediately on the participle θέμενον, if we retain συγχωρήσασθαι we have two infinitives συγχωρήσασθαι and ἀνέξεσθαι with an equal right to a position which cannot belong to more than one, unless we suppose *this* to be Greek: νομίζω σφαλῆναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀνωθέντας ἀμαρτεῖν. Ἐτέρας is the supplement of a man who had never heard of τὰς μὲν τινὰς.

τιτρώσκειν] The MSS. have τίτρωσκει. But it cannot be said that "these examples do not damage them"; but

only that they refuse to see it. Nor could a new independent clause be added by means of καὶ . . . οὐδὲν in place of οὐδέ.

πεισόμεθα] The common reading is πειρασόμεθα, but some of the better MSS. have πειρώμεθα, and the best of all, the Bodleian or Codex Clarkianus, πειρόμεθα. The common reading is probably the conjecture of a copyist, who felt that a future was wanted. It will not be expected that I should adduce any proof in support of so obvious a correction as that introduced into the text. The critic who approved of my correction, but at the same time wondered that, in finding it, I did not also find that καὶ ἐροῦμεν was spurious, does not appear to have considered that φερόμεθα is connected with πεισόμεθα, and φήσομεν with ἐροῦμεν. "We shall be in the condition of unpractised disputants, and talk their language". As φηλότατοι does not refer to any other φηλότης but that in the art of disputation, I have transposed καὶ from before περὶ to before νέοι.

ταιον, ἔξω ταῦτ' ἀ σοὶ λέγειν, καὶ φανόμ' ἐγὼ γὰρ νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγός ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχθήσεται. πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουόμεθα, καὶ τάχ' ἂν λόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἕως ἂν πρὸς ἀλλήλους συγχωρήσασιν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐμὲ θεὸς ἐπὶ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρωτάρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὲ;

ΣΩ. Φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ὁποῖα δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θεόμενος εἶπον [ἀγαθόν], διερωτώμενος ὁ τί ποῦ' ἐστὶ τ' ἀγαθόν, ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτ' οὐκ αὐτὸν πείσονται τοῦθ' ἢ περὶ ὁ σοὶ λόγος;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ θ' αἰ ξενάπασαι ἐπιστήμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοι τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντία πῆ γίγνονταί τινες, ἄρ' ἄξιός ἂν εἶην τοῦ, [διαλέγεσθαι ἄν], εἰ 14 φοβηθεὶς τοῦτ' ἀπὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμη γίνεσθαι, κἀπειθ' ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σωζοίμεθ' ἐπὶ τινὸς ἀλογίας;

νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος] *Euthyd.* 295 D, ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος. The latter is obviously the familiar expression, and that in the text a play upon it.

ἀνακρουόμεθα] This figurative expression, which is properly used of backing a ship, has induced some to believe that ἐκπεσὼν οἰχθήσεται is part of the same metaphor. But in all the instances given, ἐκπίπτειν is used of the *casting away of a voyager*, not of the *stranding of a vessel*. Its use here is rather singular, but it probably means nothing more than *having failed*. Why ἀνακρ. is in the middle voice, and whether αὐτὸν is genuine, others must determine. Perhaps we should read αὐτόν.

τὰς ὁμοίας] We must supply λαβὰς. The Scholiast explains the phrase as a metaphor from wrestling. Socrates, therefore, proposes that they should resume their former position as disputants, in order that he may show Protarchus the unfairness of the feint through which he sought to elude Socrates' question, by professing that he should consider himself bound to afford

Protarchus the same grip or handle, that is to distinguish the kinds of ἐπιστήμαι, when called upon to do so. As the phrase is ἐλθεῖν, and not ἀνελεῖν, εἰς λαβὰς, it is better to read τάχ' ἂν λόντες. With τάχ' and ἕως repeated separately the ἂν is sometimes repeated even in prose.

[ἀγαθόν] As διερωτώμενος κ. τ. ε. contains the occasion—"which I mentioned when I was asked what was The Good",—the word ἀγαθόν is as superfluous, as it is inelegant.

ἄξιός] It is altogether foreign to the spirit of Attic dialogue to speak of being worthy of the honour of disputing &c.; and even if such a sentiment were allowed, it would have been expressed by ἄξιός διαλέγεσθαι without the article. But all that Plato wrote was: ἄρ' ἄξιός ἂν εἶην τοῦ.

μῦθος ἀπολόμενος] It is not clear whether the original proverb was ὁ μῦθος ἐσώθη or ὁ μῦθος ἀπόλετο. Photius' testimony is in favour of the former: μ. ἐσώθη. . . Ἐπιρρημά ἐστι λεγόμενον ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ τοῖς λεγομένοις μῦθοις τοῖς παιδίοις. The Scholiast on

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆ-
ναι. τό γε μὴν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει·
πολλὰ μὲν ἰδοῦναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλὰ δ' ἐπιστι-
μαι καὶ διάφοροι.

Β ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
τοῦ τ' ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δ'
εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἤτολμῶμεν ἂν πῆ ἐλεγχόμενοι μινύσωσι, πότερον
ἰδοῦναι τὰγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι.
νῦν γὰρ οὐ δῆπου πρὸς γ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγῶ-
τίθεμα, ταῦτ' ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθ' ἂ σί, τῷ δ' ἀληθε-
σιάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφο.

ΠΡΩ. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

Γ ΣΩ. Τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον δι' ὁμολογίας
βεβαιωσώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸν ποῖον δῆ;

ΣΩ. Τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντ' ἀνθρώπους πράγματα ἐκοῦσί τε
καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Τὸν νῦν δὴ παραπέσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως περνεῖα
θαυμαστόν. ἔν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πόλλ' εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ θαυ-

this place, with less probability, ex-
plains ὁ μ. ἀπόλετο, as used by those
who find they are speaking to *inattentive hearers*; and he quotes the comic
poets, Crates and Cratinus, as employing
it, but without adducing the pas-
sages. I suspect from the otherwise
unnecessary redundancy in *Rep.* 621, B
μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλετο, that
the latter is the original form, and that
the former is Plato's own coining. The
allusion in this passage is to men
suffering shipwreck and escaping on a
raft. (Compare *Phædo* 85, D.) *And so
the argument would, like a tale, come
to nothing, and we should make our
escape upon an unreason.*

τολμῶμεν] This word appears to be
the main difficulty of a sentence which
has perplexed so many critics and
editors; but for it I should have ad-
opted Winckelmann's conjecture, and
inserted οἱ λόγοι after ἐλεγχόμενοι, but
nothing can be determined with cer-
tainty till we know what ails τολμῶ-

μεν. Either some other verb has been
corrupted into this, and we might read
κατατιθ. δ' εἰς τὸ μ. τὸ λόγῳ, ἐρώ-
μεν—or a whole line has dropped out.
The words ἐλεγχόμενοι μινύσωσι would
seem to favour the latter supposition,
for there seems to be an allusion to
the practice of giving up one's servant
to the judicial "question". τολμῶμεν
(ἐκάτεροι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον παρέχοντες
εἰς τὴν κρίσιν) ἂν πῆ κ. τ. ε. may serve
to represent the sense of the missing
clause.

ἢ τι τρίτον ἄλλο] The best MSS.
omit τι; but the sense is incomplete
without it. I believe the right reading
to be ἢ ἄλλο τι τρίτον εἶναι. See below
20, B, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον.

Τοῦτον τοίνυν] We should have ex-
pected τόνδε, for this λόγος has not
yet been mentioned, but is now to
follow. I am inclined to read τούτου.
"Let us by question and answer make
good the λόγος, not of you or me, but
τοῦ ἀληθεσιτάτου."

μαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥάδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερον-
οῦν τιθεμένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρώταρχον, ἕνα D
γεγονότα φύσει, πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους
ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ μικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον
τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυσία;

ΣΩ. Σὺ μὲν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν
θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δ' ὡς ἔπος
εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἀπτεσθαι, παι-
δαριώδη καὶ ῥάδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ἔπολαμ-
βανόντων γίνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἐκάστου τὰ
μέλη τε καὶ ἄλλα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἐν E
ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα
διηνάγκασται γράναι, τό τε ἐν ὡς πόλλ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ
πολλὰ ὡς ἐν μόνον.

ῥάδιον ἀμφ.] *Affording a ready ob-
jection against any one who advances
either.*

Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις κ. τ. ἐ.] Unless καὶ
joins ἐναντίους with πολλοὺς, it is of
no use in the sentence; I have there-
fore removed the comma from πάλιν.
The sense is as clear and well-expressed
as could be desired. *Do you mean,
when a man says of me Protarchus, who
am one by nature, that I am again
many and opposite 'me's', bringing for-
ward the same person as at once great
and small, heavy and light, and so
forth?*

τῶν θαυμαστῶν] Rather θαυμάτων.
Conjuring tricks. Συγκεχωρημένα μὴ
δεῖν, *given up and admitted* to be such
as men ought not to meddle with. ὡς
ἔπος εἰπεῖν qualifies πάντων. It is
strange that one of the editors should
not have known such a common usage.

ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε] The proper con-
struction would have been either, μηδὲ
τῶν τοιῶνδε (ἀπτεσθαι δεῖν συγγω-
ροῦσι,) or ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὰ τοιάδε (συγ-
χωροῦσι, δεῖν αὐτῶν ἀπτεσθαι). But
as the very form ἐπεὶ μηδὲ is collo-
quial, a certain looseness of syntax is
perhaps allowed, and the reader is left
to supply μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἐλέγχεσθαι,
προσφέρεσθαι, (δεῖν συγχωροῦσι,) or any

other passive answering to ἀπτεσθαι.
Otherwise we must look on τὰ τοιάδε
as interpolated.

μέλη] *Legg.* 795, E, μελῶν καὶ με-
ρῶν. The MSS. and edd. all exhibit
μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη, which, if it
means anything, means that the μέλη
and μέρη are the same, whereas it is
plain that μέρη is added because the
body cannot be properly divided into
μέλη only. If it were μέλη ὅ ἅμα καὶ
μέρη, there would be no objection to
the word but its inutility. I have
written ἄλλα, which is continually con-
founded with ἅμα by the copyists. In
p. 17 D, ἅμα ἔνοσεν, the Bodleian and
Vatican have made the opposite mis-
take.

διομολογησάμενος] *Having made
another admitt.* Properly, *having ad-
mitted each to the other.* Διομολογεῖ-
σθαι is to ἐμολογεῖν, what διαλέγεσθαι
is to λέγειν, διακελεύεσθαι to κελύειν
&c., διὰ and the middle voice together
expressing reciprocal action. No one
will regret to see συγκεχωρημένα in
the next speech of Protarchus banished
from the text; the wonder is, who could
have taken it into his head to put it
there. οὐ γὰρ δῆπου τὰ συγκεχωρημένα
δημεύομεν, τὰ δὲ δεδημευμένα, ὅταν
δόξη, συγχωροῦμεν.

- ΠΡΩ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ἰὸ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἢ μήλα [συγχεωρημένα] δεδιόμενα περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;
- 15 ΣΩ. Οποῖαν, ἰὸ παῖ, τὸ ἐν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀκριβῶς ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν. ἐνταυθὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νῦν δὴ, συγχεώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βούν ἕνα καὶ τὸ γαλόν ἐν καὶ τὸ ἀγάθον ἐν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἐνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἢ πολλῇ [σπουδῇ.] μετὰ διαρῆσεως ἀμισθότησις γίγνεται.
- B ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ἐπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὐσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἐκάστην οὐσαν αἰετὴν αὐτήν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτ' ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως μὴ εἶναι βεβαίαιατα μίαν ταύτην· μετὰ δὲ τοῦτ'

ἐνταυθ[ι] So with Elmsley for ἐνταυθῶ. ἢ πολλῇ [σπουδῇ]) I once thought σπουδῇ to be genuine, and therefore added δὲ after μετὰ; I am now convinced that the word is neither appropriate nor genuine, but supplied by a copyist who had in his head the well known passage in the *Phaedrus* 248, πού δ' ἐνεχ' ἢ πολλῇ σπουδῇ κ. τ. ε. *Then arises the great controversy as soon as we attempt to decide.*—What else is needed? or what have we to do with the earnestness of the disputants, except indeed as a measure of their difficulty? But the difficulty being expressed, any other word is superfluous.

Πρῶτον μὲν) When I endeavoured to explain this passage in a former edition, I maintained that there were only two questions proposed, although πρῶτον, εἶτα, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο made it appear that there were three. As the text then stood, it was impossible to see more than two questions, that beginning with πρῶτον, and a second; for if εἶτα μίαν ταύτην were considered as an independent question, and not rather as the beginning of that propounded afterwards, the question would have been, *how it was conceivable that that which is one and imperishable should be nevertheless unchangeably one:*—than which nothing could be more absurd. But the words πρῶτον, εἶτα, μετὰ δὲ

τοῦτο ought to have opened my eyes to the absolute necessity of finding three points of enquiry, or, if they were not to be found, of treating the text as corrupt. I now feel confident that I have discovered the source of all the perplexity in the omission of μὴ after ὅμως. The first question is; have these monads a real being? The second is; if each of them is one and not subject to the changes of γένεσις and ὄλεθρος, how can we imagine it ever to vary in the least from this oneness? The third is; when it *does so vary* by entering into individuals, does the unity cease when the plurality begins, or are they concurrent?—in other words are the monads to be regarded as distributed into as many parts as there are individuals to partake of them, or as remaining as wholes in each individual, so that each monad is at once one in each, and again one in many? This last supposition is πάντων ἀδυνατότατον, because in this case the one both agrees with itself and contradicts itself. *Parm.* 131, Α οὐκοῦν ἦτο: ὄλον τοῦ εἶδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει:—πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὄλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν, ἐν ὄν; ἢ πῶς: Τί γὰρ κωλύει—εἶνεναί; Ἐν ἀρα ὄν καὶ ταῦτόν ἐν πολλοῖς χωρὶς οὐσιν ὄλον ἅμα ἐῖσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη.

ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὐ καὶ ἀπειροῖς εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρὶς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνεται ἄν, ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν ἡμ' ἐν ἐνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι. ταῦτ' ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦθ' ἐν C καὶ πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ἀπάσης ἀπορίας αἷτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας [ἄν] αὐ καλῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;

ΣΩ. Ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἐπόλαβε συγχορεῖν σοι τοῖσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα. Φίληβον δ' ἴσως κρείτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν [ἐπερωτῶντα] μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. πόθεν οὖν τις [ταύτης] ἀρξήται, πολλῆς οὐσίας D καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης; ἀρ' ἐνθένδε;

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν;

ΣΩ. Φαμέν που ταῦτόν ἐν καὶ πολλά ἐπὶ λόγων γιγνόμενον περιτρέχειν πάντη καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων αἰεὶ καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτ' οὔτε μὴ παύσηται ποτ' οὔτ' ἤρξεται

εὐπορίας κ. τ. ἔ.] Not ὄντα but ἐστὶ being understood, the construction with ἄν is a barbarism. The sense is not conditional; for we have the statement of a fact founded on experience no less than its opposite. The appearance of ἄν in the text is due to a repetition of αὐ, and a subsequent attempt to correct what should have been expunged.

τὰ τοιαῦτα] One would rather have expected ταῦτά ταῦτα, for this does not refer to the ἐν κ. π., but to the proposed investigation.

Φίληβον] The proverbial saying was μὴ κινεῖν κακὸν εὖ κείμενον: for κακὸν he puts Φίληβον. We had better let well alone, and not ask Philebus for his consent. But ἐπερωτῶντα thus placed before μὴ κινεῖν would make it appear that the participle is a means not τοῦ κινεῖν, but τοῦ μὴ κινεῖν; and as it is quite superfluous, there can be little doubt of its origin.

[ταύτης] I have cancelled this word without hesitation. He is not going to begin a fight; but to begin a subject, of which the very beginning point is

difficult to find, because almost everything is a matter of controversy. Besides ταύτης μάχης is bad Greek.

Φαμέν που] The construction is not φ. π. ἐν κ. π. ὁ λ. ταῦτόν γιγνόμενα (Stallb.), for if Socrates had spoken here of the reconciliation effected between the one and the many by dialectics, it is inconceivable that Protagoras should answer, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην παραχὴν ἡμῖν ἕξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμεινῶς πῶς ἀπελθεῖν. Nor are the young men described as delighting in the discovery and exercise 'of the synthetical and analytical processes', but on the contrary, in the sophistical employment of this contradiction which is the inherent property (ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος) in all objects of conception, by which they throw into perplexity both themselves and others. Either therefore we must read ταῦτόν . . . γιγνόμενον, or suppose that πολλὰ has by attraction affected the number of the participle, which, considering the presence of ἐν, is most unlikely.

παύσηται] I formerly wrote παύσει-

ἄλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων ἀ-
 τῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον
 αὐτοῦ γενεσάμενος ἐκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεῖς ὡς τινα σοφίας
 Ε εἰρηγῶς θησαυρόν, ἐφ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κενεῖ
 λόγον ἄσμενος, τοιῶν μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς
 ἓν, τοιῶν δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὐ-
 τὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλον, δεύτερον δ' αἰεὶ τὸν
 ἐχόμενον, ἅν τε νεώτερος ἅν τε πρεσβύτερος ἅν θ' ἡλιξ ὦν
 16 τυγχάνη, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτ' ἄλλου τῶν
 ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, [οὐ μόνον
 τῶν ἀνθρώπων,] ἐπεὶ βιωβάρων γε οὐδενός ἂν φείσαστο, εἴπερ
 μόνον ἐρηγέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρ'; ὃ Σώκρατες, οἷχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ
 ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν; καὶ οὐ φοβεῖ μὴ σοι μετὰ Φιλίβου
 ξυρεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῆς; ὅμως δέ, μανθάνομεν γὰρ

ται in obedience to Dawes' Canon. But it is only in the older Attic that the first aorist subjunctive with οὐ μὴ need excite our suspicion; whereas οὐ μὴ with the future in this sense I take to be a poetical usage.

πάντα κενεῖ λόγον] This is an allusion to the proverbial saying πάντα λίσσον κενεῖν. But the expressions ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν, and πάλιν ἀνειλίττων, *rolling them up one way, and again unrolling them another* allude to the manner of handling a volume. Συμφύρων εἰς ἓν, and διαμερίζων are added to shew the application of the figurative words.

ὀλίγου δ' οὐδέ] This I have written in lieu of ὀλίγου δὲ καί, which would mean *nearly sparing*. The repetition οὐδε-οὐδε was probably treated by some copyist as a blunder, and one half was left out. Then came the corrector who felt the want of a conjunction and inserted καί. I agree with Stallbaum as to the spuriousness of οὐ μ. τ. ἄ.; but ἐπεὶ β. γε shews that some bolder assertion has just been made, and justifies τ. ἄ. ζ. In the next sentence I have added καί, because Protarchus gives two grounds for Socrates' fear, their number and their youth.

ὅμως δέ] In this sentence Protarchus is made to offer two suppositions; "if it is possible either to conjure away

the perplexity, or to find some other method of investigation". I believe that the second alternative is Socrates' suggestion. Εἴ τις ἔστι τρόπος καὶ μηχανή καλλίω ὁδὸν ἀνευρεῖν is in itself a clumsy circumlocution for εἴ τις ἔστι καλλίω ὁδός, and what is the subject of ἀνευρεῖν? Σὲ or ἡμᾶς cannot be understood; μὲν and δὲ would imply that the two requests put into the mouth of Protarchus are not alternative; but if so, the latter must be the means to the former, and in that case what becomes of *coaxing the difficulty out of the way*? Σὺ τε προθύμου τοῦτο is quite proper as answering to τὴν ταρραχὴν ἀπελθεῖν, but as the clause now stands in immediate dependence on ἀνευρεῖν, προθύμου is not only enough, but rejects anything between itself and the infinitive. The New Way is said to be ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, instead of out of it. For these reasons, and because it is more in keeping that Socrates should be the first to suggest some other method, I condemn ὁδόν—ἀνευρεῖν as spurious, and μὲν as invented to give it currency. As in most cases of this kind, the interpolator has borrowed his words from the neighbourhood, καλλίω ὁδός from Socrates' next speech, ἀνευρέθη from his next but one.

ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν [μὲν] τοιαύτην τιραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, [ὁδὸν δὲ Β τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνερεῖν,] σὺ τε προθυμῶς τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ σμιζρός ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὡς Σόκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὡς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων Φίληβος. οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδ' ἂν γένοιτο, ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μὲν εἰμι ἀεὶ, πολλαῖς δὲ μ' ἤδη διαφρυγῶσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς αὖτι; λεγέσθω μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἦν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πᾶν χαλεπὸν, χρῆσθαι δὲ πικρὸν χαλεπὸν. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμεν' ἀνερέθη πῶποτε, διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε. σκόπει δὲ ἦν λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. †Θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἡμῶν, ποθὲν ἐκ Θεῶν ἐρρίφη διὰ τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φωνοτάτην τινὴ περὶ καὶ οἱ μὲν πωλιωτοὶ, κρείττονες ὄντες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω Θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, τὴν φήμην παρέδωσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἐνός μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν αἰεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ξέμφυτον ἐχόντων. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τοῦτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων αἰεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἐκά-

Θεῶν μὲν] In this remarkable passage everything seems out of its place. For εἰς ἀνθρώπους belongs not to δόσις but to ἐρρίφη. ὡς γε κ. ἡμῶν ought to be ὡς ἕμοιγε καταφαίνεται, the enclitic ποθὲν can scarcely come first after such a break in the sentence, Θεῶν δόσις ἐκ Θεῶν ἐρρίφη is also quite intolerable; add to this that if the gift was *throna* from Heaven, it could not be sent διὰ τινος Προμηθέως. Though I have thus stated why I can no longer stand by this reading, I cannot offer any certain emendation of it; but I believe that the following is not very far from our author's sentence. ΣΩ. Εἰς ἀνθρώπους, ὡς ἕμοιγε καταφαίνεται, ἢ δόσις ποθὲν ἐκ Θεῶν ἐρρίφη τινός, [Sch. in Marg. Προμηθέως] ἅμα φωνοτάτην τινὴ περὶ.—I have supplied ὄντες, which is necessary to the construction, and was absorbed by the preceding termination οὐς.

ἐγγ. θεῶν οἰκοῦντες] *Dwelling nearer to the gods,—i.e., in more familiar intercourse with them.*

τὴν φήμην] Bodleian has ταύτην φήμην, Coislinian φήμη. The former, if for ταύτην we read τὴν, seems preferable to the latter, because,—although there is no impropriety in saying that *they handed down the gift by traditional report*,—the construction ὡς—δύτων—ἐχόντων must depend on a word meaning belief, and therefore on φήμη rather than δόσις; and this is less apparent if the φήμη is made the mere instrument, in which case δόσις as the principal word would be that on which the subsequent construction rested.

πέρας] We must not confound this with the ἐν or γενns, as Stallbaum does. It is the determinate number, the production of the one, which reconciles the one and the many.

στοιτε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εἰρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν. εἰν οὖν [μετὰ] λάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, στοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τιν' ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν, καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ οὐ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ [καὶ ἄπειρά] ἐστι μόνον ἴδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατῆδη τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· τότε δὴ δεῖν τὸ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαιρεῖν εἶν. οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδωσαν στοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσκειν ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, 17 [καὶ πολλὰ] ἴσταν καὶ βραχύτερον ποιούσι τοῦ δέοντος [μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν] ἄπειρα εὐθὺς· τὰ δὲ μέσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει· οἷς διακεχώρισται τὸ τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμῶς ποιῆσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

θεμένους ζητεῖν] It is difficult to see how these words can be reconciled, for how can a man look for that which he has already laid down? I strongly suspect that the passage originally ran thus; ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντός ἐκάστοτε θεμένους, εὐρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν, μετὰ μίαν κ. τ. ε.

[μετὰ] λάβωμεν] μεταλάβωμεν is the reading of the MSS., which Stallbaum in vain endeavours to defend. In place of adopting Stephens' conjecture, καταλάβωμεν, I suspect that the copyist had at first omitted the verb, and written the following μετὰ, and then on discovering his mistake, neglected to place the usual dots over the superfluous letters. I have therefore put μετὰ in brackets.

τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων] Ast, with Stallbaum's approval, reads τῶν ἐν ἐκείνω,—i.e., τῷ παντί. But we must not adopt any correction of this passage which removes ἐν, for this ἐν is evidently referred to immediately afterwards, where it is distinguished from τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν. But as the *subordinate Ones* are to be distinguished from the *original One*, this can only be done by speaking of the former as ταῦτα, and the latter as ἐκείνω; and this is as fatal to Schütz's conjecture—τὸ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, as it is to the received reading.

But what should prevent Plato from using τὰ ἐν, τῶν ἐν, τοῖς ἐν, if he had occasion for a plural? Thus below we have ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὀπίου. For this reason I incline to read either τῶν ἐν ἕκαστον or τῶν ἐν τῶν ἐν ἐκείνω ἕκαστον.

πολλὰ [καὶ ἄπειρα]] It is possible by application to discover τὰ πολλὰ ἐπόσα ἐστὶ: but all the dialectic in the world will not enable you to find τὰ ἄπειρα ὀπόσα ἐστὶ. It is therefore inconceivable that Socrates should bid them "not only see that the original ἐν is one, and many, and indefinite, but also how many it is." The word αὐτοῦ in τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ refers to πλῆθος.

τότε δὴ δεῖν] See Addenda.

οἱ δὲ νῦν κ. τ. ε.] This passage has been corrupted and interpolated so as to become quite unintelligible. I have changed βραδύτερον into βραχύτερον, and separated the genuine parts of the sentence from the spurious. It is impossible to *make* ἐν καὶ πολλὰ either quickly or slowly; for they are not things of man's making, but ready to his hand. What your modern captious disputers do, is to make ἐν to be ἄπειρα without passing through the intermediate stages. As to βραχύτερον, compare *Politicus* 279 c, ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ βραχέων ταχύ πάντ' ἐπελθόντες.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ μὲν πως, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκῶ σοι μαρτυρεῖν, τὰ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον δεῶμαι ἅ λέγεις ἀκοῦσαι.

ΣΩ. Σαφές μὲν, ὦ Πρωτίρχε, ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς γραμμασιν ὃ λέγω, καὶ λάμβανε αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖτοις οἷσπερ καὶ πεπαίδενσαι. Β

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ πού μίᾳ διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰούσα, καὶ ἄπειρος αὐτὴ πλήθει πάντων τε καὶ ἐκαστόν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὲν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ οὐδετέρῃ γε τοῦτων ἐσμέν πῶ σοφοί, οὐδ' οὐκ ἐν ἄπειρον αὐτῆς ἴσμεν οὐδ' οὐκ ἐν τὸ ἐν· ἀλλ' οὐκ πῶσα τέ ἐστι καὶ ὅποια, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γραμματικὸν ἕκαστον ποιοῦν ἡμῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν καὶ τὸ μουσικὸν ὃ τεχνάει ποιοῦν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φωνὴ μὲν πού καὶ τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν τέχνην ἐστὶ ὅ μίᾳ [ἐν αὐτῇ].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν, βαρὴ καὶ ὀξύ, καὶ τρίτον ὁμότροπον. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἄνω σοφός ἂν εἴης τὴν μουσικὴν εἰδὼς ταῦτα μόνα, μὴ δὲ εἰδὼς ὡς γ' ἔπος εἰπεῖν εἰς ταῦτα οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἔσει.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἐπειδὴν λάβης τὰ διαστήματα ὁποῖα

ἐν τοῖτοις οἷσπερ] Either ἐν οἷσπερ, or ἐν τοῖτοις ἐν οἷσπερ.

οὐδετέρῃ] The books have οὐδὲν ἐτέρῳ, which is inadmissible. οὐδ' ἐν ἐτέρῳ for ἐν οὐδετέρῳ would be according to Attic usage. But if he were speaking of that *wherein* a man is skilled, he would say οὐδέτερον, not ἐν οὐδετέρῳ; the dative expresses that whereby he becomes skilful.

Φωνὴ μὲν πού] The text follows the inferior MSS. in reading καὶ τὸ—, καὶ is so useful an addition, that one is justified in adopting it; nor is τὸ κατ' ἐκείνην a likely variation for a scribe

to have made *de suo*. I formerly thought that κατ' ἐκείνην must refer to the first mentioned art, that of grammar, but οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος, though never used capriciously, as some learned men tell us, sometimes apply not to the greater or less proximity of *mention*, but to that of *interest*, as in the beginning of the Euthydemus, or to the different degrees of familiarity, as here. Of ἐν αὐτῇ I can make nothing, unless we transpose it to a place where it would be welcome if not necessary. Δύο δὲ θῶμεν ἐν αὐτῇ.

διαστήματα] These intervals are

ἔσι· τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς ὀξείητός τε πέρι καὶ βαρύτητος,
 D καὶ ὅποια, καὶ τοὺς ὄρους τῶν διαστημάτων, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τού-
 των ὅσα συστήματα γέγονεν, ἃ καιδιόντες οἱ πρόσθεν παρέ-
 δσαν ἡμῖν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ἐκείνοις καλεῖν αὐτὰ ἀρμονίας, ἔν
 τε ταῖς κινήσειν αὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτ' ἐνόητα πάθη
 γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ δι' ἀριθμῶν μετριθέντα δεῖν αὐ γασί ἔνθ-
 μοὺς καὶ μέτρα ἐπονομάζειν, καὶ ἅμ' ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περι
 παντός ἐνός καὶ πολλῶν σκοπεῖν· ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτά τε λάβῃς
 E οὕτω, τότε' ἐγένου σοφός, ὅταν τ' ἄλλο τῶν ἐν ὀτιοῦν ταύτῃ
 σκοποῦμενος ἔλῃς [, οὕτως ἔμψρων περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας]. τὸ δ'
 ἄπειρόν σ' ἐκάστων καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις πληθὺς ἄπειρον ἐκάστοτε
 ποιεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον οὐδ' ἐνάριθμον, ἅτ' οὐκ
 εἰς ἀριθμὸν οὐδέν' ἐν οὐδενὶ πώποι' ἀπιδόντα.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλιστα, ὦ Φίληβε, ἔμοιγε τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα εἰρη-
 ζέουα φαίνεται Σωκράτης.

18 ΦΙ. Κάμοί γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς
 ὁ λόγος οὕτως νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;

nothing more than musical notes; ὄροι are musical proportions. See Plat. *Timæus* 36, B, and Cicero's translation.

ὅταν γὰρ ταῦτα κ. τ. ε.] The particle γὰρ marks the resumption of an incomplete sentence. The antithesis between τότε' ἐγένου σοφός, and ἔμψρων γέγονας, is a poor verbal contrivance, and the tenses are strangely chosen, ὅταν λάβῃς, ἐγένου . . ὅταν ἔλῃς, γέγονας. Stallbaum translates the last word by "evades" which would answer to γεγώς ἔσει. Ἐγένου may be defended by the well known usage of the aorist; compare παρέσχοτο in 46, E. If the words οὕτως—γέγονας were omitted, nobody would miss them. I have followed the Bodleian in ὅταν τε for ἔταν δέ, and in τῶν ἐν ὀτιοῦν for τῶν ὄτων ὀτιοῦν. That a writer can if he likes, break his sentence so as to give more emphasis to the second half, by introducing such terms as ἀλλά σύ τε κατὰ νοῦν ἀγωνεῖ τῆν σῆν δίκην, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμέ τῆν ἐμῆν, in place of σύ τε, —ἐγώ τε, no one will deny. But here the speaker begins with a

general precept, and then applies it to the particular instance of music, and so returns to the general rule. A very little reflexion will shew that in such a case if he commenced with "and indeed whatever you take up", he would have the air of opening out some new application in place of resuming a previous statement. I prefer ἐν το δόντων, because it is more likely that a scribe should stumble at τῶν ἐν than invent it. The Bodleian has also περὶ τούτων which I prefer, because it is a worse reading, and so throws more discredit on a suspected passage.

τὸ δ' ἄπειρον] The reader will not fail to admire the skilful play upon the words ἄπειρον, ἐλλόγιμον, and ἐνάριθμον. Stallbaum compares *Tim.* 55, C, τὸ ἀπίερος κόσμος εἶναι λέγειν ἠγήσασθ' ἂν τις ὄντως ἀπίερος τινός δόγμα ὧν ἔμπερον χρεῶν εἶναι: and the oracle given to the Megarians, Ὑμεῖς δ', ὦ Μεγαρεῖς, οὔτε τρίτοι οὔτε τέταρτοι οὔτε δυωδέκατοι, οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὔτ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ.***

Κάμοί γ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα] Commonly Καὶ

*** A sheet of the Editor's MS. has been lost in transmission from Sydney. The missing notes will appear in the Addenda. [Publisher's Note.]

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς μέντοι ταῦθ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρωτάρχε, ἠρώτηκε Φίληβος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.

ΣΩ. Δράσω ταῦτα, διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ὄτιον ἐῖ τίς ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφραμεν, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀπείρου φύσιν ἔδει βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τιν' ἀριθμὸν, οὕτω καὶ τοῦναντίον, ὅταν τις τὸ ἀπείρον ἀναγκασθῆ B
πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, [μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν εὐθὺς ἀλλ' ἐπ'] ἀριθμὸν αὐτὴν τινὰ πλῆθος ἕλαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν δεῖ, τελεντᾶν τ' ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἓν. πάλιν δ' ἐν τοῖς γραμμασι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἀπείρου κατενόησεν] εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῖθ' τινὰ τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐκ ἐν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὐ, C
φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δὲ τινὰ καὶ τούτων εἶναι· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διήρει τὰ τ' ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα, καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἐνὶ θ' ἐκάστῳ καὶ ξύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε. καθορῶν δ' ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὐτὸν λογισάμενος ὡς ὄνθ' ἓνα καὶ πάντα ταῦθ' ἐν D
πως ποιοῦντα, μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγγετο προσειπῶν.

ἔμοι ταῦτά γε αὐτά. The first change I have adopted from Bodl., which has καί μοι, the second from Coisl., which has ταῦτά γε ὄντα αὐτά. Stallbaum has a strange way of explaining the misplaced αὐτά—*per se scorsum spectata*.
τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφραμεν] ***
ἔδει] ***

[μὴ ἐπὶ κ. τ. ἐ.] ***

Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἄ. κ.] ***

λέγων, πρῶτος] ***

τὰ τ' ἀφθογγα] We should rather have expected τὰ ἀφθογγά τε καὶ ἄφωνα, but τε is sometimes moved from its place

(cf. Elmsl. *ad Heracl.* 622), and in this place the hiatus is avoided by the change. The μέσα, which he describes above as partaking not of voice but yet of sound, are the liquids which stand midway between vowels and mute consonants.

καθορῶν δέ] Because we can have no true conception of φωνή except as distinct from φθόγγος; nor of this again without also knowing both φωνή and τὸ ἄφωνον.

μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν is explained by Stallbaum as ὡς οὖσαν μίαν;

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ΦΙ. Ταῦτ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὡς Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἠλλείπεται.

ΣΩ. Μῶν, ὡς Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἐστίν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τοῦτ' ἐστίν ὁ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Πρώταρχος.

Ε ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ' ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φηs, πάλαι.

ΦΙ. Πῶs;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆs ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆs ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἰρετέον;

ΦΙ. Πῶs γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔν γ' ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι φαιμεν.

ΦΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶs ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, ἥπως ἐστίν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ [πῶs μὴ] ἄπειρα

he has illustrated this position of ὡs by *Sophist*, 242, c. πασιὼν ὡs οὖσιν ἡμῖν, and other examples; but he should not have quoted for this purpose *Arist. Clouds* 256, οἴμοι Σωκράτην (sic) Ὡσπερ με τὸν Ἀτάμανδ' ὅπως μὴ δύσετε.

αὐτά γε π. ἀ.] This means that the several parts of the last λόγος are consistent with each other. ἠλλείπεται, *is left unperformed, is deficient.*

τί πρὸς ἔπος] *Euthyd.* 295, c. ἐξ ἡμῶν πρὸς ἔπος ἀποκρίνωμαι, *i.e. nothing to the purpose.*

Καὶ μὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ γ'] *And yet you are close upon that which, as you say, you have been some time looking for.* The Zurich editors have placed a mark of interrogation after this sentence, which is certainly incorrect; but as the common formula is καὶ μὴν—γε, and H is continually confounded with the compendium of καὶ, I have altered ἦ into καὶ accordingly.

πῶs ἐστίν ἐν] The impudence of the interpolation in this passage betrays the author of it. In place of letting Socrates ask what number of kinds we can discern in ἡδονῆ and φρόνησιs, he makes him enquire, *how* they are not straightway indefinite (as if there could be a *how* of that which is simply negative,) and again how either of them

has some number, a question which Plato himself could not have answered. I have no hesitation in condemning what appears in brackets, and in making τίνα interrogative, without which it would have no right to ποτέ. But even πῶs ἐστίν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ ἐκάτερον is far from satisfactory. Either it is a clumsy way of asking what is more plainly asked in τίνα ποτ' ἀριμὸν κέκτηται, or it proposes a question which the upholders of Ideas have been content to leave unsolved (*Phaedo* 100, D, τοῦ καλοῦ παρουσία, εἴτε κοινωνία, εἴδ' ὅπηρ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη) for so that passage should be read. In our text I propose to read ἀπαιτεῖ πῶs, εἰ ἐστίν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, τίνα ποτ' ἀριμὸν ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα γεγονέναι. The reasons for interpolating ἐκάτερον and αὐτῶν ἕκαστα are quite obvious; the first word was repeated because of the previous supplement, and itself was thought to be inconsistent with ἄπειρα; to accord with which ἕκαστα was contrived. And the result of all this ingenuity is that we have the same things designated twice as ἐκάτερον, and once as ἕκαστα in such proximity, that a single designation was alone needful or bearable.

εὐθύς, ἀλλά] τίνα ποτ' ἀριθμὸν [ἐκάτερον] ἔμπροσθεν κέκτη-
ται τοῦ ἄπειρα [αὐτῶν ἕκαστα] γεγονέναι; 19

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γ' ἐρώτημα, ὃ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινα τρόπον κύλιω πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης. καὶ σοῦτοι δὴ πρότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον. ἴσως δὴ γελοιὸν τὸ ἐμέ, τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάτειν· γελοιότερον δ' οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ Β μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι. σοῦτοι δὴ τί δράσομεν. εἶδη γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, εἴτ' ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὅπως ἔστι καὶ ὅποια· τῆς τ' αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὃ καὶ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἐνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταυτοῦ δραῖν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνησεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἡμῶν εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἄξιός.

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν. ἀλλὰ κα- C
λὸν μὲν τὸ ξύμπαντα γινώσκειν τῇ σῶφρονι, δεύτερος δ' εἶ-
ναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὐτόν. τί δὴ μοι τοῦτ' εἴρηται τὰ νῦν; ἐγὼ σοι φράσω. σὺ τήνδ' ἡμῖν τὴν συνοσίαν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι [καὶ σεαυτὸν] πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι

διάδ. παντελῶς ὑποστάντα] *Having unreservedly taken your place as your successor.* παντελῶς qualifies διάδοχον ὑποστάντα as taken together. The Attic Orators have χρηγῶς ὑπέστην, ὑποστῆναι πρατῆρα, ἐβελοντήν ὑποστῆναι τριτάρχον, without any infinitive to follow. In Xen. *Anab.* iv, 1, εἴ τις ἐβλεῖ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι καὶ ὑποστάς ἐβελόντης πορευέσθαι, the order of construction is, καὶ πορευέσθαι, ἐβελόντης ὑποστάς.

οὐδεὶς ἂν ἡμῶν] The received text reads ἂν ἡμῶν after οὐδενός, the ἂν being placed most perversely in the midst of all these negatives; but as ἡμῶν certainly belongs to the first of them, we may infer that the words ἂν ἡμῶν were both omitted together, and then restored, but to a wrong place.

τῷ σῶφρονι] I cannot explain why

this was added, unless there was some current saying πάντα κατὰ τῷ σῶφρονι, on which Protarchus plays by adding γινώσκων.

ἐπέδωκας] *You bestowed upon us all this conversation [and yourself.] for the purpose of discussing what is the best of human possessions.* Compare *Laws*, xii, 944, A, ὅπλα, ἃ Πηλεὶ φησὶν ὁ ποιητῆς παρὰ θεῶν προῖκα ἐν τοῖς γάμοις ἐπιδοῦναι Θετίδι. The difference between ἐπιδοῦναι in such passages, and the simple verb, is that the former applies only to *making presents*. But for these very reasons a man could not be said ἐπιδοῦναι ἑαυτόν. The addition is borrowed from a passage occurring a few lines below, where the reading of all authorities is ἐδωκας; but this is said of a later period and one contained within our own dialogue (p. 16, A. n.). The present reference is to

τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον. Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, D σὺ πρὸς αὐτ' ἀντιῆπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτ' ἀλλ' ἐκεῖν' ἐστί, ἃ πολλὰκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνήσκομεν ἐκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρωῖντες, ἵν' ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἐλάτερα βασανίζηται. ἤγης δ' ὡς ἔοικε σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς [ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γ'] ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντ' αὐτὰ τοῦτων ξυγγενῆ, ἃ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα. τούτων δὲ μετ' ἀμυρσβητήσεως ἐκατέρων λεχθέντων, ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς E ἠμειλίχσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε, πρὶν ἂν τοῦτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηται τι διορισθέντων. σὺ δὲ συνεχώρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθ' ἡμῖν σαντόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαιρέσεις οὐκ ἔστι. παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.

ΣΩ. Τίνα λέγεις;

20 ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυναίμεθ' ἂν ἱκανῆν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν. ἀλλ' εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθ' ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δρασιέον ὑπέσχου γάρ. βουλεύου δὲ πρὸς ταῦτ' αὐτός, πότερον ἡδονῆς εἶδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἑατέον, εἴ πῃ [καθ' ἕτερόν] τινα τρόπον οἷός τ' εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλώσαι πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμυρσβητούμενα παρ' ἡμῖν.

B ΣΩ. Δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν λείπει πάντα

his first consenting to hold the conversation, so that σαντόν ἐπέδωκας would be a ludicrous hyperbole.

τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς [δ. ἢ γ'] See Addenda.

τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι] i.e. the end and aim.

καθ' ἕτερόν] There cannot be a more feeble tautology than καθ' ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον πως ἄλλως. The first two words were added by a scribe who did not see that τινὰ τρόπον belongs to οἷός τ' εἶ.

τὸν ἐμέ] i.e., me, the threatened one,

—*proof me.* Plat. Ep. 7. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ἐμέ παρεμυθεῖτο.—i.e., Plato, who had apprehended mischief from Dionysius. *Theat.* 166, A, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμέ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε,—i.e., Protagoras, who complains of hard usage.

τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν] It has not been observed that this is said generally, and ἐκάστων πέρι has been mistranslated in consequence. The sense is, *When men say 'if you please', it does away with all fear in every case.* I confess that I have no great faith in the genuineness of ἐπειδὴ τοῦθ' οὐ. εἶπ.

φόβον ἐκάστων πέρι. πρὸς δ' αὖ τούτοις μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ
τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ τίτων;

ΣΩ. Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάσαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐργη-
γορῶς νῦν ἐννοῶ περὶ θ' ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον
αὐτοῖν ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων,
ἡμεινὸν δ' ἀμφοῖν. καίτοι τοῦτο γ' ἂν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῆ
νῦν, ἀπήλλακται μὲν ἡδονῇ τοῦ καλῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν
ἔτι ταῦτόν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τῶν δέ γ' [εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι
προσδεησόμεθα κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν. †πρῶτόν δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον
δείξει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλιστ' εἰπὼν, οὕτω καὶ διαπέρανε.

πρὸς δ' αὖ τούτοις] The Bodleian has αὖ τοῖς, which form is inadmissible here. The origin of the error, which has been corrected from Coisl., is obvious.

καίτοι τοῦτο γ' ἂν] The Bodleian has καίτοι οὕτω γε ἂν, which Orelli changed into καὶ τοιοῦτο γ' ἂν. But this will not mean what we want. For as he has not yet named this *something better*, he cannot say "if it should appear such", but either "if any such thing should appear" which would require τι, or, "if this thing should appear". As γε is in the best MSS., it is admitted by Orelli into his correction: but καὶ—γε means "and besides", whereas καίτοι—γε is equivalent to "and yet you must admit", which is the proper transition. I therefore retain τοῦτο from the inferior MSS., but adopt γε from the Bodleian.

[εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν] In order to get rid of the awkwardness of saying: "we shall not want the εἶδη of pleasure to serve the purpose of διαίρεσις", (as though they had to look for the εἶδη first, and then to begin διαίρεσιν into those very εἶδη) as well as to escape the intolerable harshness of the construction, I resorted to the expedient of taking τῶν by itself and not as the article of εἰδῶν. But this was too violent a proceeding. I now believe that any attempt to reconcile oneself

to εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν is a waste of time on words which do not belong to the author. Those who understand, "εἶδη for the purpose of διαίρεσις", will say that transposition would be a milder remedy; but Socrates intends to give up the διαίρεσις *itself*, and not merely some particular means towards that end.

πρῶτόν δ' ἔ. σ. δείξει] The proverbial expression is, αὐτὸ δείξει, *the event will make things clear*. But we are told that both δείξει and δηλώσει are used in the same manner without αὐτό. The first occurs in Arist. *Frogs*, 1261, where, however, μέλη may be the subject, and in Herodotus iii, 82, where διέδειξε follows the impersonal ἀπέβη. All the other instances quoted are of δηλοῖ or ἐδήλωσε. If therefore this is a real instance, it is a very rare one. It is uncertain whether the thing which is to shew itself is the ἄλλο τί τρίτον, or the correctness of Socrates' δόξα, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κ. τ. ἔ. In either case, what is the meaning of ἔτι σαφέστερον, where at present nothing is σαφέστερον? If it be said that ἔτι belongs to πρῶτόν, this is only admissible if εἰς τὸ ἐμπροσθεν or some equivalent phrase be added to it. A MS. of no authority gives δέ τι. I should prefer πρῶτόντι δέ, "It will appear more clearly (whether I am right) as I proceed".

ΣΩ. Σμίξ' ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

D ΣΩ. Τὴν τάγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον [ἢ μὴ τέλειον] εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντων δὴ που τελεώτατον, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἱκανὸν [τάγαθόν];

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; καὶ πάντων γ' εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.

ΣΩ. Τόδε γε μὴν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γινώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεῖται καὶ ἐφίεται [βουλόμενον] ἔλειν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει [πλήν] τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.

E ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρινώμεν τὸν θ' ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονίσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρὶς.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς εἶπες;

ΣΩ. Μήτ' ἐν τῇ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις, μήτ' ἐν τῇ τῆς φρονίσεως ἡδονή. δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδεὶς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δ' ἂν φανῆ πό-
21 τερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτ' ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὔν.

[ἢ μὴ τέλειον] No one in his senses would ask "whether the Idea of Good necessarily implied incompleteness". And yet this nonsense has been left unchallenged since the revival of letters, nay was so perhaps even under the Ptolemies. Another evident addition is τάγαθόν. For with τάγαθόν we must understand ἐστὶ. But that the true construction is ἀνάγκη . . . εἶναι appears from the answer, in which all the MSS. give διαφέρειν. A third interpolation disfigures the clause ὡς πᾶν τὸ γινώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεῖται καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἔλειν. Ἐφίεται is sometimes followed by the infinitive as in Eur. Ion 521, εἰ φίλειν ἐφίεμαι; but some one who did not know this, supposed αὐτοῦ to be understood, and introduced βουλόμενον to govern ἔλειν.

πλήν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς is the reading of all MSS. and Editions, as far as I know; and one editor undertakes to explain it, and his explanation is commended by another. But we may be quite certain that Socrates is intended to say, that men care for no other results than such as are in themselves good. Why then represent him introducing, as the sole objects of men's care, other results produced along with good things? I had once proposed to cancel πλήν and to read ἀλλ' ἢ ἀγαθῶν. But this violent change is unnecessary. *Antiquum obtinet*. The intrusion of πλήν has made nonsense of a simple and easy sentence.

πότερον] used here and elsewhere as = ὁποτερονούν.

ΣΩ. Ἀποκρίνου δή.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

ΣΩ. Δέξαι' ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἰδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτ' ἔχοις παντελῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίεσθαι [τὰ δέοντα], καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι; B

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τί; πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμ' ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου [ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς] χαίροις ἄν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖν;

ΣΩ. Νοῦν δέ γε [καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν]

Πρώταρχε] ὧ seems to be omitted here on account of the pronoun being placed after the name of the person addressed, which is usual either when the speaker first turns to him, or makes an especial appeal to him.

[τὰ δέοντα] Five lines lower down the list of mental powers or qualities is again given as νοῦς, μνήμη, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα ἀληθείας. Of that list it will be time to speak when we come to it: but a third series follows immediately upon the second one, which tallies pretty exactly both in substance and order with that before us: 1. τὸ φρονεῖν=φρόνησις. 2. τὸ νοεῖν=a. μνήμη of past things, b. δόξα of future. 3. τὸ λογίεσθαι=λογισμός. 1. *Consciousness or immediate Perception.* 2. *The Representative faculty.* 3. *Inference*, not logical, but in its lowest type. If any one will compare this passage with the other, he will see why τὰ δέοντα ought to be rejected without hesitation.

μῶν μὴ δέοι' ἄν τι] The MSS. have μηδὲ ὄραν τι. Several scholars have proposed to change ὄραν into ὄναρ, but they all appear to leave τι, which in this case would be contrary to Greek usage. I made this correction in the year '55; but, unless my memory fails me, the Leipzig Edition by C. F. Herrmann appeared in '54. Any one who

has that Edition will see in Herrmann's Preface the name of the scholar to whom he attributes the emendation. I am unable to recall it, but I confess that I have been beaten by at least one year.

[ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς] Even supposing that Plato could use χαίρειν ἡδοναῖς in the sense of *enjoying pleasures*, the words τ. μ. ἡ. are nothing to the purpose, for the amount has been already mentioned, and the drift of this passage is, that he would be in a *continual* state of pleasure—and never once know it.

νοῦν δέ γε] It has been shewn above that there is an exact correspondence between the series given in the sentence beginning "Ὅρα δὴ," and that which occurs in the argument commencing with πρώτων. But the list now before us, though so much nearer to this last, has no such congruity. And indeed it is worse than unnecessary; for what sort of reasoning is this? "As you do not possess Memory, Knowledge, and Belief, you cannot know whether you are in pleasure or not, because you have no Consciousness." All that Plato wrote was Νοῦν δέ γε μὴ χακτημένον πρώτων μὲν κ. τ. ε. As he has no νοῦς, he cannot have φρόνησις, which is a part of νοῦς.

μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ], πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτ' αὐτό, εἰ ἢ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δὴ πού σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γ' ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

C ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὥσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δὴ πού σε μίθ' ὅτι ποτε ἔχαιρες μεμνήσθαι, τῆς τ' ἐν τῇ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μὴδ' ἠντιοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δ' αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον [ἀληθῆ] μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μὴδ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαίρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον ἀλλὰ τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα [θαλάττια] μετ' ὀστρεῶνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμαίων. ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτ' ἔχομεν ἄλ-

D λως πως διανοηθῆναι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐκ αἰρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις δέξαιτ' ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένους, ἡδονῆς E δὲ μετέχων μίτε μέγα μίτε σμικρόν, μὴδ' αὖ λέπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθῆς πάντων ὧν τῶν τοιούτων.

πού σε μίθ'] που μὴδὲ is the reading of the MSS. But it is necessary to insert the pronoun, and Stallbaum was right in his first edition when he changed μὴδὲ into μήτε. There is no reason why μὴ μεμνήσθαι should receive more stress than μὴ δοξάζειν or μὴ λογίζεσθαι; (for though we have μὴδὲ in this last instance, the "uot even" or "also not" refers not to δυνατὸν εἶναι λ., but to εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον).

[ἀληθῆ] The reason for putting ἀληθῆ in brackets is that any δόξα, whether false or true, would suffice πρὸς τὸ δοξάζειν χαίρειν, and, where there is no νοῦς, there can be no δόξα.

[θαλάττια] If Plato had cared to tell

us that shellfish lived in the sea, he would not have done so by placing an adjective where it is out of construction. He would at least have written θαλάττια ὄντα. Let us therefore leave the commentators to decide, when they can, whether the sense is ὅσα θαλάττια ἐστὶν ἔμψυχά, or ὅσα ἔμψυχά ἐστὶ θαλάττια.

μεταλαβόντες] i.e. ἐν μέρει λαβόντες. Compare below 51, A.

πάντων ὧν] I have supplied ὧν, which is required by the rules of the language. Not even an inferior writer would say, μὴ μετέχων ἀλλ' ἀπαθῆς. The syllable was absorbed by that which preceded it.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἰρετός, οὐδ' ἄλλω μὴ ποτε, ὡς ἐγώ μιν, φανῆ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ὁ ξυναμφοτέρος, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμ-
μυχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;

ΠΡΩ. Ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ [καὶ φρονήσεως];

ΣΩ. Οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον λέγω ἔγωγε.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς δήπου τοῦτον γ' αἰρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ἐκείνων ἠποτερονοῦν, καὶ ἑπὶ τούτοις γ' οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅ τι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ξυμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προὔτεθισαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δ' οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδ' αἰρετός οὗτ' ἀνθρώπων οὔτε Β ζώων οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτῶν εἶχε τάγαθόν; ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλος καὶ πᾶσι [φρυτοῖς καὶ] ζώοις αἰρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν. εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἤρειθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἰρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τὴν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖ-
σθαι ταῦτον καὶ τάγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρησθᾶί μοι δοκεῖ.

ΦΙ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶ τάγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἔξει που ταῦτ' ἐγκλίματα.

ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμυχθεὶς] i.e., διὰ τὸ συμμυχθῆναι. This use of the participle is very frequent in Plato. Compare *Rep.* 506, B, προϋμνούμενος ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτ' ὀφλήσω,—i.e., διὰ τὸ προϋμνεῖσθαι. In the next sentence καὶ φρονήσεως is a manifest interpolation.

καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις γε] This is commonly understood to mean *and besides*; but it is evident that nothing additional is stated. Stallbaum's defence of it, 'notio atque vis precedentis p̄s confirmatur et augetur,' is only true as to confirmatur, whereas augetur is the point in question. Schleiermacher understands, in addition to those lives (the unmixed); but this would have been ἐκείνοις, and, besides, how can a man

choose both contraries, the unmixed and the mixed together? I cannot uphold my own former solution of this difficulty, for "in addition to my friends here" would be πρὸς τοῖσδε. As some addition is intended, the only conceivable addition to "every body will choose this life", is "and one and all will bear me out in saying so". This might be, καὶ προσῴησεται τοῦτοις γ' οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ.

[φυτοῖς καὶ] ζώοις] He afterwards adds, εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν, and is evidently thinking of ζῶα capable of choice, and possessed of intellect. It is therefore high time these φυτὰ were weeded out of the text. Ἀνάγκη οὐκ εὐδαίμων is one of the many euphemisms for Madness.

ΣΩ. Τάχ' ἄν, ὃ Φίληβε, ὃ γ' ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τὸν γ' ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλ' ἄλλως πως ἔχειν. τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ [πῶ] ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὄραν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι D τί δράσομεν. τάχα γὰρ ἄν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιήμεθ' ἄν ἐκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν [αἴτιον], ὁ δ' ἡδονὴν [εἶνα], καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἄν εἴη, τάχα δ' ἄν αἰτιὸν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι. τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἄν, ὡς ἐν τῇ μικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστι τοῦθ' ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἰρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ ξυγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον E οὐτ' ἄν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδ' αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο. πορρωτέρω δὲ ἐστι τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῇ ἐμῇ νῦν δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονὴ σοι πεπτωκέναι καθάπερ εἰ πληγείσα ὑπὸ τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται. τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς 23 ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιοῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ ἔπαθεν ἄν. τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στέρηθεῖσα

οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ [πῶ]] It is difficult to account for πῶ in this place, for he evidently renounces for ever the claims of νοῦς to the first prize, and contends only for the second. Perhaps the reservation may be accounted for by his mention of the θεῖος νοῦς, the relation of which to that of man is afterwards treated of. But then again if this had been intended, he would scarcely have used the words πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον: and altogether why confuse the argument with an afterthought about some other νοῦς? I now believe πῶ to be a mere reproduction of the preceding τῶ in ἀμφισβητῶ.

αὐτιήμεθ' ἄν] See Addenda.

οὔτε—οὐδ' αὖ] Of this construction Stallbaum gives the following instances: *Phileb.* 42, c; *Laws* 840, a; *Rep.* 608, b; *Ibid.* 426, b; from which it appears that although οὔτε—οὐδέ is inadmissible, οὔτε—οὐδ' αὖ or οὐδέ γε is correct.

μετόν] As you cannot say λέγεται ὦν, but λέγεται εἶναι, you would here expect μετεῖναι, not μετόν. But μετόν came to be looked upon as almost a noun, so that in λέγοιτ' ἄν μετόν we understand the infinitive εἶναι. Thus in *Laws* 900, e, we read: θεοῖς δὲ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν τῶν τοιούτων μετόν ἐροῦμεν.

νῦν μὲν] The Bodleian has no μὲν, but I think it is an accidental omission, for the opposition is between this *first* bout and *another*, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων—.

σοι πεπτωκέναι] σοι cannot belong to πεπτωκέναι, for ὑπό σου is the proper construction after πίπτειν. Nor can it belong to πληγείσα, for theu Socrates the agent, and λόγοι the instruments, would be made to change places. It is difficult to say what should be done with the word, for it does not look like an interpolation. Did Plato write ὑποπεπτωκέναι?

ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἂν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὐτῆς ἐρασιῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔν' ἂν ὁμοίως φαινέτο καλή·

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἔαν ἦδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεσιᾶτιν αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγγοντα λυπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν; B

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ μόνον γε, ἀλλ' οὐ καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδεὶς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει, πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.

ΣΩ. Βαβαὶ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ πᾶν τι ῥαδίον. νῦν γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς], ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον, ὅλον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν [λόγων]· ἔστι δ' ἴσως ἕνα καὶ ταῦτά.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; τὴν δὲ γ' ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διενλαβεῖσθαι C πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῆ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῆ.

ΠΡΩ. Καθ' ὃ τι φράζοις ἂν.

ῥαδίον] The best MSS. have ῥάδιον; but the μὲν after συχοῦ appears to me conclusive in favour of the other reading. In the common text, we have ῥαδίον πᾶν τι νῦν.

νῦν γὰρ δὴ κ. τ. ἐ.] But the enquiry is no more difficult now than at any other time; whereas we want νῦν with φ. δ. "we must now begin a new argument". Because the misplaced πᾶν τι seemed an awkward desinence, some scribe brought the νῦν into the first sentence, and contrived καὶ as the beginning of the next.

δεῖν [ἄλλης μηχανῆς]] This is a singular construction of δεῖν, at once with a genitive and an infinitive; it may be said that as the ἄλλη μηχανῆ consists in ἔχειν β. ἐ., this is added by way of explanation. But is there any beauty or propriety in such a manner of writing? Plato imitated the freedom, even the license, of common conversation,

if you will. But is this tolerable even in common conversation, or is it the slipshod talk of uneducated men? Again we have another such *pleasing negligence* in βέλη ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;] This is given in the Books as the answer to Socrates. But Οὐκοῦν χρῆ is the answer, and Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; is Socrates' assent. Χρῆ is the answer to δεῖν . . . πορευόμενον . . . ἔχειν, another proof of the spuriousness of ἄλλης μηχανῆς.

διενλαβεῖσθαι παρώμεθα τιθέμενοι furnishes one of the editors with the excuse for a learned note to shew that verbs and participles sometimes change hands. Surely it needed neither Heindorf ad Gorgiam, nor Schæfer on Gregorius Corinthus, nor Seidler on the Iphigenia in Tauris to shew that you can say either *percurro ridens*, or *rideo percurrens*. It costs more effort διενλαβεῖσθαι than τιθεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμεν ἅτα τῶν νῦν δὴ λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομεν πού τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθάμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον
D ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτων ἔν τι ξυμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν,
ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις [ἴκ]ανός, τὰ τ' εἶδη διστὰς καὶ συναριθμού-
μενος.

ΠΡΩ. Τί φῆς, ὃ γὰθέ;

ΣΩ. Τετάρτον μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνας.

ΣΩ. Τῆς ξυμμίξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα,
καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.

ΠΡΩ. Μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτον προσδεήσει διάκρισιν
τινα δυναμένον;

ἄπειρον . . πέρας] It is evident that the πέρας and ἄπειρον of 16, c, are different from those now brought forward. In the former case they express the indefinite multitude of the individuals and the definite number of species; in the latter, the unlimited nature of all quality and quantity in the abstract, and the definite proportions of the same in existing things. But in both cases we find that the effect of the πέρας is analogous; that knowledge in dialectics and life in physics are the result of a certain limitation.

πέρας] Heindorf and Schleiermacher are by no means to be followed in reading πέρας ἔχον. As Böckh rightly observes in his *Philolaus*, the opposite power to the ἄπειρον is not that which is limited, but that which limits. Unless we keep πέρας here clear from the proposed addition, and cancel ἔχον in two subsequent places, we make nonsense of the whole disputation.

Τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν] I have adopted Stallbaum's emendation, which the context makes necessary. "Let us lay down these two, as two of the Classes required." But in the manifestly corrupt sentence which follows, something less weak and flat than γελοῖός τις, οὐχ

ἱκανῶς κατ' εἶδη δ. is wanted. The Bodleian has ἱκανὸς τὰ τ' εἶδη. It is probable that in the archetypal MS. the text ran thus: ΓΕΛΟΙΟΣ ΤΙCΑΝΟΣ, i.e. γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος, and that some scribe thought that in ICANOC he saw ἱκανός. The other various reading τὰ τ' appears decidedly preferable to κατὰ, for he is endeavouring not to separate things according to their kinds, but to point out distinct kinds, and then to repeat the catalogue of them. On the whole there is little violence done to the oldest text, and nothing left unsaid or said improperly, in the reading: εἰμὶ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος, τὰ τ' εἶδη διστὰς καὶ συναριθμῶ.
πρὸς τοῖς τρισίν] See Addenda.

Μῶν οὖν] This question and the answer given to it are of importance, being introduced by Plato not only as an example of the care which is requisite in every dialectic process to leave no distinction unnoticed which may help towards a complete classification, but still more because it serves to bring out in its full significance the ἀτὰρ τῆς ξυμμίξεως. Had this latter been a mere agent, one would expect the counter-agent to be also mentioned; but Socrates observing in his ironical

ΣΩ. Τίχ' ἂν οὐ μὴν οἶμαι γ' ἐν τῷ νῦν. εἰν δέ τι δέη, συγγνώσει πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι [πέμπτον βίον].

E

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τετάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων περὶόμεθα, πολλὰ ἐλάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διασπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἐλάτερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῆ ποτὲ ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἐλάτερον.

ΠΡΩ. Εἴ μοι σαφέστερον εἴτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχ' ἂν ἐπιόμην.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν τὰ δύο, ἃ προτίθεμαι, ταῦτ' εἶναι ἄπερ 24 νῦν δὴ, τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον, τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχον]. ὅτι δὲ τρόπον τινὰ τὸ ἄπειρον πολλὰ ἐστὶ, πειράσομαι φράζειν· τὸ δὲ πέρας [ἔχον] ἡμῶς περιμενέτω.

ΠΡΩ. Μένει.

ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ. χαλεπὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀμφοιβητίσιμον ὃ κελεῖτό σε σκοπεῖν, ὁμῶς δὲ σκόπει. Θερμοτέρον καὶ ψυχροτέρου πέραν πρῶτον ὄρα πέρας εἴ που ἔστι νοῆσαι, ἢ τὸ μᾶλ-

manner, 'that he does not think he shall want any such,' prepares us to attach a higher importance to the αἰτία than to anything yet spoken of. Nor indeed is there any εἶδος διακρίσιν τινα δυνάμενον. For these ἄπειρα are represented as forced into this conjunction with the πέρας, and kept so against their will. So that dissolution is not an act of the αἰτία but a consequence of its not acting. I have changed τινός into τινά, and further on, I have followed all later editors in bracketing βίον, which is clearly out of place; but it is probable that πέμπτον was added at the same time; at all events it is needless and worthless.

τὰ τρία] More probably τὸ τρίτον i.e. γένος: for the process is not to take three out of the four, and then two from those three; nor would διελόμενοι be the right word in such a sense as separating, but ἀπολαβόντες. Such a roundabout way of getting at the first two is evidently unmeaning; but we are bidden to take the κοινόν, which is the third, and resolve it into its constituents, πέρας and ἄπειρον. And this is the simplest way of arriving at those two: for the instances of the

κοινόν are found in sensible objects, out of which we obtain by analysis the qualities which in their own nature are More or Less, and the proportion which limits and confines them. τὰ δύο τούτων, if the reading is correct, must be taken to mean the first and second of these γένη. We shall find lower down another striking instance of the cardinal and ordinal numbers being confused through their being expressed by the same compendia. πολλὰ ἐσχισμένον is like μέρος διαιρεῖν *Polii*. 283, d, and elsewhere. It is a variety of the accusative of effect, like ὑψηλὸν αἶρειν, βραχὺ συστέλλειν, σμικρὰ κατακόπτειν &c.

πέρας [ἔχον] This expression both here, and two lines lower, is certainly faulty. Τὸ πέρας ἔχον is that ἄπειρον which has ceased to be such by being submitted to the πέρας; so that this description belongs properly to the third γένος.

εἴ που εἴ ποτέ τι νοήσαις ἂν is the reading of all the MSS., and followed by, I believe, all editors. Nothing can be more unsuitable than the use of the optative, or rather the conditional, where all that the speaker

Β λόν τε καὶ ἤττον ἐν αὐτοῖς οἰκοῦντε, τοῖς γένεσιν, ἕωςπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον, τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεται γίνεσθαι· γενομένης γὰρ τελευτῆς καὶ αὐτῷ τετελευτήματον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Αἰὲ δέ γε, φαιμέν, ἐν τε τῷ θερμότερῳ καὶ τῷ ψυχρότερῳ τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤττον ἐνι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Αἰὲ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τούτῳ μὴ τέλος ἔχειν· ἀτελεῆ δ' ὄντε δήπου παντάπασιν ἀπειρῶ γίνεσθον.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἴ γ', ὦ φίλε Πρωταρχε, ὑπέλαβες, καὶ ἀνέμνησας μ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦθ', ὃ σὺ νῦν ἐφθόγγω, καὶ τὸ γ' ἡρέμα τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ἔχεται τῷ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤττον. ὅπου γὰρ ἂν ἐνήτον, οὐκ αἶτιον εἶναι ποσὸν ἕκαστον, ἀλλ', αἰὲ σφοδρότερον ἴσχυαιτέρου καὶ τοῦναντίον ἐκάσταις πράξεσιν ἐμποιοῦντε, τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀπεργάζεσθον, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἀφανίζετον. ὃ γὰρ ἐλέχθη νῦν δή, μὴ ἀφανίσαντε τὸ ποσόν, ἀλλ' εἴσαντε αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ μέτριον ἐν τῇ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ D ἤττον [καὶ] σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα ἔδρα ἐγγενέσθαι, αὐτὰ ἔρρει ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν χώρας ἐν ἧ ἐνήτ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι θερμότερον οὐδὲ ψυχρότερον εἴτην ἂν, λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν· προχωρεῖ γὰρ

intends is, "tell me if you can discern." The common copy from which our MSS. are derived was probably made by a scribe who had before him, ΕΠΠΟΥ ΕCΤΙ ΝΟΗCΑΙ, and as the Y looked very like T (with which it is continually confounded) he thought he saw ΠΟΤΕ; and out of ΠΟΤΕCΤΙ he made ΠΟΤΕ ΤΙ. After this, νοησαι would necessarily pass for an optative, and the sense would suggest the correction of νοήσαις ἂν. The same mood has been forced upon the next sentence through the prevailing habit among the later Greeks of confounding, (as indeed they still do), ε and αι; so that the word would pass through the following changes: ἐπιτρέψατον—ἐπιτρέψαιτον—ἐπιτρέψαίτην with ἂν. A due consideration of ἕωςπερ ἂν ἐνοικῆτον would have stopped the course of this corruption.

οἰκοῦντε] This is Stallbaum's correction for οἰκον.

The words τοῖς γένεσιν are not to be taken with ἐν αὐτοῖς, in the kinds themselves, which would be needlessly emphatical, but with τέλος οὐκ ἐπιτρέψεται γίνεσθαι, will not allow any bound to be fixed to the kinds (hotter and colder), as long as they reside in them.

αὐτῷ] i.e., the More and the Less.

ἀνέμνησας μ'] See Addenda.

[καὶ] He is no longer speaking of μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον in the abstract, but of a new instance of them in σφοδρότερον καὶ ἴσχυαιτέρου, an expression which he here varies by μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα.

λαβόντε τὸ ποσόν] If they were to admit Quantity. As λαβόντε here = εἰ λάβοιεν, and not εἰ ἔλαβον, the optative εἴτην which rests on ἔτην in Bodl. and ἔστην in Ven. is better than ἦστην (Bekk. and Stallb.), which was conjectured by the scribe of the Vat. MS., who could make nothing of ἔστην.

καὶ οὐ μένει τό τε θερμότερον αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ ψυχρότερον ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο. κατὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄπειρον γίγναι ἂν τὸ θερμότερον καὶ τοῦναντίον ἅμα.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἔστι δ', ὅπερ εἶπες, οὐ ῥάδια ταῦτα ξινέπεσθαι. τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθίς τε καὶ αὐθίς ἴσως [λεχθέντα] τὸν τ' ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἰκανῶς Ἐ ἂν ξιμφονοῦντας ἀπορήθειεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ μὲν λέγεις, καὶ πειρατέον οὕτω ποιεῖν· νῦν μέντοι ἄθρει τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσεως εἰ τοῦτο δεξόμεθα σιγμειῶν, ἵνα μὴ πάντ' ἐπεξιόντες μηζύνωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπισ' ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνεται μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρέμα δεχόμενα καὶ τὸ λίαν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα, εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου γένος ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖν πάντα 25 ταῦτα τιθέσθαι, κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν λόγον, ὃν ἔγραμεν, ὅσα διέσπασται καὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χρῆναι κατὰ δύναμιν μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τίνα φύσιν, εἰ μέμνησαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μέμνημαι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεχόμενα ταῦτα, τούτων δὲ τάναντία πάντα δεχόμενα, πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ δὲ τὸ

τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔστη καὶ προῖον ἐπαύσατο] *But the So Much stood still, and ceased to advance,—namely, before it was expelled by μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον. This will account for the use of the aorists. The difference between μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον and σφόδρα καὶ ἥρέμα is not such as Stallbaum expresses in his paraphrase, 'It is an Indefinite, not only extensively as to quantity, but also intensively as to quality;' for the example chosen (of heat and cold) belongs much more properly to the latter. Besides, if quantity had been intended, he would have expressed that by πλέον καὶ ἕλαττον. Intensity of degree is meant in both instances, but the distinction is marked by the speaker himself, when he adds to one τοῖς γένεσιν, and to the other ταῖς πράξεσιν. In the first case the quality is looked upon as a state; in the second, as an immediate effect. τὸ ποσὸν is the limit of the*

former; τὸ μέτριον of the latter.

τὸ δὲ εἰς αὐθίς τε καὶ αὐθίς] *The article which formerly gave me so much trouble is restored to its just rights by the expulsion of the word λεχθέντα; for it gives to the words which follow it the nature of a subject. "Hereafter and Hereafter will bring us into unison." He does not say τὸ αὐθίς, because this repetition is not to take place now, as is evident from the opposition νῦν μέντοι.*

δεῖν] *For δεῖ I read δεῖν, which depends on λέγω, as implied in τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;*

μίαν ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τίνα φύσιν] *To set upon them the seal of some one nature,—i.e., by giving them a generic name. We should have expected τούτοις, but where two regimens occur together, as here συναγαγόντας and ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, the case of one or the other is suppressed. See Porson on *Medea* v. 734.*

ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὃ τί περ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθ-
B μὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέτρον, ταῦτα ξέμπαντα εἰς τὸ πέρας
ἀπολογιζόμενοι καλῶς ἂν δοκοῖμεν δρᾶν τοῦτο; ἢ πῶς σὺ φῆς;

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστά γ', ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ μικτὸν ἐκ τούτων ἀμφῶν τίνα
ιδέα φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς οἶμαι.

ΣΩ. Θεὸς μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γ' ἐμαῖς εὐχαιῖς ἐπήχοος γένη-
ταί τις θεῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐῦχον δὴ καὶ σκόπει.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶ, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος
ἡμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

C ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις τοῦτο; καὶ τίνι τεκμηρίῳ χρῆ;

ΣΩ. Φράσω δῆλον ὅτι. σὺ δέ μοι συνακολούθησον τῷ
λόγῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Θερμότερον ἐφθεγγόμεθα νῦν δὴ πού τι καὶ ψυχρό-
τερον. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πρόσθετες δὴ ξηρότερον καὶ ἐγρότερον αὐτοῖς, καὶ πλέον
καὶ ἔλαττον, καὶ θῦκτον καὶ βραδύτερον, καὶ μείζον καὶ συμ-
κρότερον, καὶ ὅποσα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν τῆς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἤτ-
τον δεχομένης ἐτίθεμεν [εἰς ἓν] φύσεως.

D ΠΡΩ. Τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ναί. συμμίγνυ δέ γε εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν
αὐτὸ τοῦ πέρατος γένναν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Ἦν καὶ νῦν δὴ, δέον ἡμᾶς, καθάπερ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου
συνηγάγομεν εἰς ἓν, οὕτω καὶ τὴν τοῦ περατοειδοῦς συναγα-

καὶ πᾶν ὃ τί περ κ. τ. ἐ.] That is the triple, the quadruple, the third, the fourth, and so on with all multiples and all measures, whether in numbers or magnitudes.

[εἰς ἓν] τίθέναι εἰς ἓν "to place in a genus" is correct, and so likewise is τίθέναι τί τινος φύσεως, "to declare anything as belonging to a certain nature." But τίθέναι τι εἰς ἓν τινος φύ-

σεως is unexampled and inconceivable. Here again we have a specimen of that officious interference which has ruined so many texts.

γένναν] Not 'finitis genus' (Stallb.), a misconception which has led to a wrong view of the whole passage, but the whole race or family, τὰ δεχόμενα τὸ πέρας. See the following notes.

γείν, [οὐ] συνηγάγομεν. ἀλλ' ἕως καὶ νῦν ταῦτ' ὀνόμασι δράσεις.
[τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανῆς χάκειν γενήσεται.]

[οὐ] συνηγάγομεν "It may be asked, was there not a sufficient συναγωγή above in Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεγόμενα κ. τ. ε. ? or if not, in what is the definition which follows better than that former one? But this is not Plato's meaning. The deficiency complained of is, that they had not made an enumeration of the things which contain the πέρασ. For while we have πέρασ corresponding to ἄπειρον, and ἕως καὶ διπλάσιον to μᾶλλον καὶ ἤττον, σφόδρα καὶ ἴρέμα, and the like, we have nothing to answer to ὑγρότερον καὶ ξηρότερον and the other examples. These are supplied by Socrates further on in the passage beginning Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις." I leave this note as I find it in the first Edition, but I have two serious objections to make to it. 1. The passage beginning Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις regards the κοινὸν and not the πέρασ, nor can any other enumeration of the πέρασ in itself be given, except what occurs above in Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὴ δεγόμενα κ. τ. ε., and immediately after this passage, in Τῆν τοῦ ἕσου κ. τ. ε. 2. ταῦτ' ὄνομασι, whatever is added to it, implies that the thing has been done before. Moreover, although, as a general rule, after δέξιν you expect a negative, this is the result of circumstances, and not involved in the nature of the word; and it appears to me, that neither καὶ nor νῦν δὲ is compatible with οὐ συνηγάγομεν. "The very thing which we just now did" is so natural, and "the very thing which we just now did not do" so much the reverse, that I have not hesitated to cancel οὐ. It is true that one of my reasons depends on a disputed passage, to the consideration of which I now pass. ταῦτ' ὄνομασι is interpreted by Stallbaum, "it will do as well." His example is taken from *Epist.* 5, 322. ταῦτ' ὄνομασι δὲ οἶμαι δρᾶσαι ἂν καὶ τὴν ἐμὴν συμβουλήν. But if any one will give himself the trouble to read the context, he will see that the sense required is this. "I offered no advice to my own people, because I thought them incurable, and it was of no use running into jeopardy where

"I could get none to listen. I suppose any adviser would do the same by my company: εἰ δόξαίμεν ἀναπαύσασθαι ἕξιν, "he would leave us to our own devices." Of the passages quoted by Winkelmann, that from the Republic ἤδη—ποιεῖ ταῦτ' ὄνομασι, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαχῶς, needs no comment; that from Thucydides *B.* 2, οἶονταί σφίσι καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσασθαι τὸ αὐτὸ, would not be to the purpose even were it sound; but "Read, σφείδ." "They think they will do as much by sea." That in *Thuc. B.* 7. ταῦτ' ὄνομασι ἤδη ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς νικᾶν τε μαχομένοις διὰ παντός καὶ μηδὲ μάχασθαι is very much to the purpose, and shews that an infinitive is the subject of the phrase in question, and that the phrase is (as one would expect) not ταῦτ' ὄνομασι, but ταῦτ' ὄνομασι ποιήσασθαι. Another difficulty is presented by τούτων ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων καταφανῆς χάκειν γενήσεται. ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν καὶ πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἕσου κ. τ. ε.: for beyond all doubt χάκειν refers to the third γέννα which they have been some time in quest of. But who could help taking ποίαν to refer to χάκειν? and yet ποίαν is answered by Socrates as referring to the second. If the reader will look very closely into this matter, he will see that ἀμφοτέρων συναγομένων μ. κ. γ. is an interruption to the argument. "We have (or have not) already told over the members of the πέρασ family. Let us do it again (or let us do so now)." What ought to follow? Most undoubtedly the question of Protarchus: "What do you mean by family? and what family?" Then would follow the enumeration; but after this it is most surprising that Protarchus should answer:—"I understand: you mean, I suppose, that if we mix them, certain products will result"—How could he say this, if something about this combination had not been mentioned after the description of the family itself? I think there cannot be any doubt that a clause has strayed from its place, and that we should restore it after ἀπεργάζεται, at the end of Socrates' next speech.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου καὶ διπλασίου, καὶ ὁπόση παῖε πρὸς ἑ ἄλληλα τὰναντία διαφόρως ἔχοντα, σύμμετρα δὲ καὶ σύμφορα, ἐνθεῖσα ἀριθμὸν, ἀπεργάζεται. (τούτων δ' ἀμφοτέρων συναγομιέων καταφανῆς κάκεινη γενήσεται.)

ΠΡΩ. Μανθάνω· φαίνει γάρ μοι λέγειν, μὴ γῆσι ταῦτα, γενέσεις τινὰς ἄφ' ἐκάστων συμβαίνειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς γὰρ φαίνομαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις *** ἢ τούτων ὀρθῇ κοινωνία τὴν ὑμείας φύσιν ἐγέννησεν;

26 ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δ' ὅξει καὶ βαρεῖ καὶ ταχεῖ καὶ βραδεῖ, ἀπείροις.

Τὴν τοῦ ἴσου] Socrates describes the πέραις family as, *whatever puts an end to the contradiction in Opposites*. For every Indefinite has two opposite extremes, μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον, which being unlimited, and having no proportion in themselves, would be in continual contradiction, if they were not tempered and harmonized *by the agencies belonging to the class of πέραις*, which effects this end by introducing in each case a suitable number or basis of proportion. He does not say τὸν ἀριθμὸν, for he is speaking of particulars. This doctrine of the power of Number as the ground both of things in themselves, and of our perception of them, is the chief characteristic of the Pythagorean School, from whom it was adopted by the semi-Pythagorean Epicharmus. Böckh has an ingenious remark that this basis of the Doric Philosophy stands half way between the material groundwork of the Ionic School, and the intellectual principle of the Attic. See Extracts from the "Philolaus" in the Appendix.

μὴ γῆσι ταῦτα] The MSS. and Edd. have μὴ γῆσι, an anacolouthon, where such a figure is a capricious violation of grammar, serving no purpose of clearness or emphasis. I have therefore adopted the correction proposed by Klitsch.

νόσοις] "The indefinite extremes of hot and cold, moist and dry, &c. τούτων and ταῦτά ταῦτα are the γέννη τοῦ πέρατος, instances of the Limit, not

the πέραις and ἄπειρον, as Stallbaum supposes, for how can they be said to be ἐν τοῖς ἀπείροις or πέραις ἀπεργάσασθαι? On the other hand, we can say with perfect propriety that each limitative agent produces a Limit." When I wrote the above, if any one had asked me why these Limits were not mentioned by name, I could not have answered him. But I now see by other certain signs that this defect is chargeable upon our present text, which is very different from that of Plato. When Schleiermacher met with ταῦτά ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦτα in the very next sentence, he was surprised that it was not rather αὕτη ἐγγιγνόμενη, (sc. κοινωνία) and proposed a transposition, which would not have mended matters; for the previous τούτων was still to be accounted for. But no one seems to have stumbled at the worst difficulty; namely that in Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν νόσοις, followed by Ἐν δ' ὅξει καὶ βαρεῖ, κ. τ. ἔ., we have a most ludicrous attempt at antithesis. The same remedy will allay both *this* perplexity, and that caused by τούτων. There is a *lacuna* in the text, where I have indicated one. This the reader can fill up for himself; but the substance of his supplement must be as follows: ἐν μὲν νόσοις (τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν ἐν ἀλλήλοις στασιάζετον, τὸ δὲ πσοδὸν καὶ τὸ μέτριον ὅταν ἐγγήνηται,) ἢ τούτων ὀρθῇ κοινωνία κ. τ. ἔ.

οὔσιν, ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῦθ' ἅμα πέρας τ' ἀπειργά-
σατο, καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασαν † τελεώτατα ξυρεστήσατο;

ΠΡΩ. Μάλιστα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε χειμῶσι καὶ πνίγεσιν ἐγγεγόμενα τὸ
μὲν πολὺ λίαν καὶ ἄπειρον ἀφείλετο, τὸ δ' ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα
σέμμετρον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν ἐκ τούτων ὥραί τε καὶ ὅσα κατὰ πάνθ' ἡμῖν B
γέγοιτε, τῶν τ' ἀπείρων καὶ τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων συμμιχθέντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρ' ἐπιλείπω λέγων, οἷον μεθ' υγιείας
κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύν, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὐτὰ πάμπολλα ἕτερα καὶ
πάγκαλα. ὕβριν γάρ που καὶ ξύμπασαν πάντων πονηρίαν αὐτὴ
κατιδοῦσα ἢ σὴ θεός, ὃ καλὸ Φίληβε, πέρας ἐχόντων οὔθ'

ξύμπασαν τελεώτατα] I do not profess to understand the force of either of these words. The first seems false in fact; for although all music arises from this source, each several combination does not produce all music. And again why ξύμπασαν, not ἄπασαν? There is one use of ξύμπας which we often meet with in Plato; where, after speaking of a subordinate genus, he passes to a more comprehensive one: as for instance he would say τὴν τακτικὴν καὶ τὴν στρατηγικὴν ξύμπασαν. (Compare below; ὕβριν καὶ ξ. πονηρίαν.) As for τελεώτατα, that will surely depend on the purity of the medium and the variety of the ποσά. But this attempering of flat and sharp, and swift and slow, produces effects on recitation also, and on movement. The one good quality of all these is λειότης; and I venture to suggest, καὶ μουσικὴν ξύμπασάν τε λειότητα.

Μάλιστα γέ] The best authenticated reading is Κάλλιστα; but the continual confusion of the two words is known to all who are familiar with palæography, and there cannot be a doubt which of the two is most appropriate here. In *Phædr.* 263 c, for καλὸν γούν ἄν, we must read μάλλον γούν ἄν. A few pages further on, the Vatican MS. has κάλλιστα for μάλλιστα, where the latter is obviously right.

τῶν πέρας ἐχόντων is correct: the par-

ticular proportions belong to the πέρας. Elsewhere they are called περατοειδῆ.

ὕβριν γάρ που] There seems no occasion for που: it is not improbable that Plato wrote: γάρ ποτε.

ἢ σὴ θεός] The notion that ἡ θεός is a personification of the third γένος as ὄρση κοινωνία is sufficiently refuted by the appeal to Philebus, which could only be made because his goddess was in question. It is so probable that σὴ was lost in consequence of its nearness to ἡ, and it seems so necessary for the sense, that I have restored it conjecturally.

πέρας ἐχόντων οὔθ' ἡδονῶν] πέρας οὔτε ἡδονῶν οὔδεν οὔτε πλησμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν πέρας ἐχόντων ἔδειτο. Such is the reading of the Bodleian and the two MSS. which mostly agree with it. It is utterly out of construction, and even Stallbaum appears to be only half in earnest in defending it. The inferior copies have ἔχοντ', which I regard as a conjecture, such as one often finds from the hands of the more recent scribes; nor are they always unfortunate ones. But of what use can ἔχοντε be to us? Law and order are the limit in this case, and can scarcely be said to have it. I have therefore accepted ἐχόντων as right, but in its wrong place; that is omitted by accident, and then restored to a part of the text to which it did

ἴδοντων οὐδὲν οὔτε πλιθμονῶν ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, νόμον καὶ τάξιν
C πέρας ἔθετο· καὶ σὺ μὲν ἀποκναῖσαι φησὶ αὐτήν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦ-
ναντίον ἀποσῶσαι λέγω. σοὶ δ', ὦ Πρωταρχε, πῶς φαίνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε κατὰ νοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία ταῦτ' εἶρημα, εἰ ξινοοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οἶμαι κατανοεῖν· ἐν μὲν γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς τὸ
ἄπειρον λέγειν, ἐν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον τὸ πέρας ἐν τοῖς οὔσι· τρί-
τον δ' οὐ σφόδρα κατέχω τί βούλει φράζειν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ πληθὸς σε, ὦ θαναμάσειε, ἐξέπληξε τῆς τοῦ
D τρίτου γέννης· καὶ τοι πολλὰ γε καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον παρέσχετο
[γέννη], ὅμως δ' ἐπισφραγισθέντα τῷ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐναντίου
γένει ἐν ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε πέρας † οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν, οὔτ' ἐδυσκο-
λαίνομεν ὡς οὐκ ἴν ἐν φύσει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οἶδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τρίτον φάθι με λέγειν, ἐν τοῦτο τι-
θέντα, τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, γένεσιν [εἰς] οὐσ[ί]αν ἐκ τῶν
μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος ἀπειρασμαμένων μέτρων.

not belong, after the second πέρας in-
stead of the first.

ἀποκναῖσαι] Plato uses this word in
Rep. 406, B, for *to enfeeble*. In comedy
it occurs in the sense of *to bore to
death*. There is no evidence of its
being 'verbum palæstricum,' as Winkel-
mann supposes; at least, not in the
sense he intends by his paraphrase,
'Deam Veluptatem rationibus et argu-
mentis tanquam ictibus percussam con-
cidisse.' The sense is, *and you say
that she has enfeebled them (πάντας),
but I affirm that she has saved them*.
Though if we durst insert τῆμας after
αὐτήν, the *Asio te Aeacida* ambiguity
of the syntax, which has led more
than one scholar a strange dance,
would be removed by the order of the
two accusatives.

γέννης] The Books have γενέσεως,
and one editor informs us that πληθός
τῆς γενέσεως means αἱ πολλὰί γενέ-
σεις. If so, πληθός τοῦ ἀνθρώπου will
be an equally elegant variation of οἱ
πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι. Till this is certain,
it will be more prudent to take the
word which has occurred so often, and

always in the very same acceptation.

[γέννη]] This supplement, which I have
put in brackets, is in the true style of
the interpolator.

οὔτε πολλὰ εἶχεν] This is a strange
assertion after πέρας had been declared
to contain 'every possible relation of
number to number and measure to
measure,' and the instances of it were
said to be μυρία. I propose ὅτι for
οὔτε, and οὔτοι: ἔδ. for οὔτ' ἔδ.

γένεσι] κ. τ. ἐ.] "In order to un-
derstand this passage, it is again ne-
cessary to observe the same kind of
distinction as was made in the case of
πέρας between the ἰσότης, ἡμίσιον, δι-
πλοῦν, on the one side, and the in-
stances of it in Nature on the other.
τὸ τούτων ἔκγονον ἅπαν, is here equi-
valent to the instances; these are also
included under the term γένεσις εἰς
οὔσιαν, by which is implied that every
existing thing arises from this combina-
tion. They are said to arise ἐκ τῶν
μέτρων, from the proportions, or pro-
portionate quantities and degrees, ἀπειρ-
γασμένων μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος, which are
effected simultaneously with the πέρας

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθόν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτόν τι τότ' ἔραμεν εἶναι γένος σκεπτόν. κοινή δ' ἡ σκέψις· ὄρα γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ γινόμενα διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν γίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοιγε· πῶς γὰρ ἂν χωρὶς [τούτου] γίνοιτο;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ ποιούντος φύσις οὐδὲν [πλὴν ὀνόματι] τῆς αἰτίας διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ὁρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἔν];

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε ποιούμενον αὖ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον οὐ-27 δὲν πλὴν ὀνόματι, καθάπερ τὸ νῦν δὴ, διαφέρον εὐρήσομεν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡγεῖται μὲν τὸ ποιῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον ἐπακολουθεῖ [γινόμενον] ἐκείνῃ;

ΠΡΩ. Πανύ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα καὶ οὐ ταῦτόν αἰτία τ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ δου-
λεῖον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία.

(Proportion in the abstract), for as soon as ever the πέρας enters into anything, its properties immediately receive their due proportion. The whole passage may therefore be translated, — *But understand me to mean by the third kind the whole produce of these two, considering all such produce as one, as a coming into being, derived from the proportions produced along with the Limit.*" On looking over this old note, I feel but one misgiving; and that is as to my implied approval of the words γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν. As every γένεσις must be εἰς οὐσίαν, understanding οὐσία in a lower sense as a γεγεννημένη οὐσία, (see *inf.* 27, n), the redundancy is in itself suspicious; but this suspicion becomes still more serious, when we reflect that according to Greek usage this kind of apposition would be connected by a participle; for it is not a description appended, but a reason for the previous name. Ἐκγονον γένεσιν ἂν would of course by attraction become ἔ. γένεσιν οὐσαν.

πρὸς τοῖς τρισί] τοῖς has been at last inserted before τρισί, *in vitis codicibus*.
χωρὶς [τούτου] The attempts to de-

ferend τούτου are conclusive against it. χωρὶς is used adverbially, *ut seorsentens*.

ὁρθῶς ἂν εἴη λεγόμενον [ἔν] The sentence which ends thus, consists of two parts, the first in which Cause and that which makes are affirmed to have no difference as to nature, and the second in which the two names are said to be convertible. The first has been confused with the second by the intrusion of πλὴν ὀνόματι, borrowed from below. This makes Plato say, "that there is no difference in their essence, except their name;" which is like saying, there is no difference in their stature, except their complexion. The second part is made ungrammatical by the intrusion of ἔν; for if τὸ ποιῶν and τὸ αἴτιον are both of them subjects, λεγόμενα is indispensable. But what a clumsy way of saying, "that you can apply either name indifferently" is this? "The Maker and the Cause would rightly be called one." Now can λεγόμενον ἂν εἴη be used for λέγουτ' ἂν with ἔν or with any name we may apply occasionally, but only where some declaration of a name to be permanently borne henceforth is intended.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν τὰ μὲν γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

B ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν λέγωμεν τέταρτον, [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἰκανῶς ἕτερον ὃν ἐκείνων δεδηλωμένον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς μὴν ἔχει, διωρισμένων τῶν τεττάρων, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μνήμης ἕνεκα ἐρεξῆς αὐτὰ καταριθμήσασθα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἄπειρον λέγω, δεύτερον δὲ πέρας, ἔπειτ' ἐκ τούτων τρίτον μικρὴν καὶ γενημένην οὐσίαν τὴν δὲ τῆς μίξεως αἰτίαν καὶ γενέσεως τέταρτην λέγων ἄρα μὴ πλημ-
C μελοῖην ἂν τι;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

[τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἰκ. ἕτερον ὃν] See Addenda.

ἕτερον γὰρ οὖν] The inferior MSS. have Λέγωμεν γὰρ οὖν. Stallbaum, who is always haunted by a perverse suspicion that the *older* MSS. are full of grammatical corrections (a fact notoriously truer of the recent copies), prefers the latter, and asserts that γὰρ οὖν is better suited to λέγωμεν than to ἕτερον. But if λέγωμεν means anything, it means βούλει λέγωμεν (it *could* not be used for λέγειν ἡμῖν ἔξεστι), and is therefore a proposal; and γὰρ οὖν is not, and cannot be, used in the assent to a proposal; whereas in the admission of a thing proved, nothing is more common. The drift of the whole argument confirms the correctness of the Bodleian ἕτερον. ποιῶν precedes, ποιούμενον follows, but ποιῶν=αἰτία and ποιούμενον=δουλεῖον κ. τ. έ. Therefore αἰτία and δουλεῖον are different. Now our first three Classes belonged to the ποιούμενα=γινόμενα, or their elements, and as ποιῶν is different from these, it has a right to a separate (fourth) Class. (Strictly speaking only one Class, the *third*, is γινόμενον, and for that reason he uses the expression δουλεῖον εἰς γένεσιν αἰτία, in order to include the first and second, and in like manner he speaks of τὰ γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται.) The distinctness then of Cause

from the other three Classes is that on which the whole stress of the sentence falls. But it was not necessary to change λέγωμεν into λέγομεν. I did so, because the rules of dialogue are very strictly observed by Plato, and therefore Protarchus would have to answer to λέγωμεν. But why should he not answer to both that and ἕτερον, by the adoption of *both* readings? For γὰρ οὖν compare in this Dialogue 14, B. 16, B. 17, c. 30, c, D. 32, c.

ἄρα μὴ πλημμελοῖην] The Bodleian and its two followers have no μὴ. But as it is easier to account for its omission in some copies than for its interpolation in others, there is *prima facie* evidence in its favour; for, although μὴ and μή ποτε are very common forms of interrogation among the lower Greeks, ἄρα μὴ is a colloquial Atticism, of which they could know nothing save from books. The following passages will shew the manner in which this form of interrogation is used, and that it is employed alike where the speaker is uncertain of the answer, and where he merely demands an assent on which he has a right to reckon: *Phædo* 64, c (twice) and *Parmenides* 163, c (in these instances ἄλλο τι makes the question negative) *Phædo* 103, c. *Crito* 44, E. *Charmides* 174, A.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τίς ὁ λόγος; καὶ τί ποτε βουληθέντες εἰς ταῦτ' ἀγικόμεθα; ἄρ' οὐ τόδ' ἦν; δευτερεῖα ἐζητοῦμεν πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνοιτ' [ἂν] ἢ φρονήσεως. οὐχ οὕτως ἦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν νῦν, ἐπειδὴ ταῦθ' οὕτω διειλόμεθα, κάλλιον ἂν καὶ τὴν κρίσιν ἐπιτελεσαίμεθα πρώτου πέρι καὶ δευτέρου, περὶ ὧν δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἠμφισβητήσαμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

D

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, κλιῶντα μὲν ἔθεμέν που τὸν μικτὸν βίον ἡδονῆς τε καὶ φρονήσεως. ἦν οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον μὲν τὸν βίον ὀρωμέν που τίς τέ ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖον γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μέρος γ' αὐτὸν φήσομεν εἶναι τοῦ τρίτου, οἶμαι, γένους. οὐ γὰρ δυοῖν τινοῖν ἐστὶ μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλὰ ξυμπάντων τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, ὥστ' ὀρθῶς ὁ νικηφόρος οὗτος βίος μέρος ἐκείνου γίγνοιτ' ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἶεν. τί δ' ὁ σός, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡδὺς καὶ ἄμικτος ὢν; E ἐν τίνι γένει τῶν εἰρημένων λεγόμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε λέγοιτο; ὧδε δ' ἀπόκριναί μοι πρὶν ἀποφίρασθαι.

γίγνοιτ'] As the direct question is not, "to whom would the second prize belong" but, "to whom does it," (πότερον ἡδονῆς γίγνεται ἢ φρονήσεως;) the dependent question should take the optative without ἂν. I have accordingly expelled ἂν, *invisis codicibus*.

μικτὸν ἐκεῖνο] As the whole γένος is meant, of which the βίος is a part, it is plain that the common reading, μικτὸς ἐκεῖνος, is a blunder of the copyist. The correction was long ago proposed by Schütz. It may be objected: 'If all mixtures belong to the κοινὸν γένος, of course the μικτὸς βίος does so: but, as Socrates has only shewn that the κοινὸν γένος contains all mixtures of a particular kind, namely τῶν ἀπείρων ὑπὸ τοῦ πέρατος δεδεμένων, unless he can first shew that this βίος is compounded of ἀπειρον and πέρας, his case is not

proved.' The answer to this objection is, that the fourfold division professes to be exhaustive; there are no other elements in any mixed thing, than these two: consequently, if any thing is found mixed, we may at once conclude that it is compounded of ἀπειρον and πέρας. But later on, though we learn that ἡδονῆ is of the ἀπειρα, νοῦς is declared to be of close kin to αἰτία, the fourth Class. To this apparent contradiction I make answer that νοῦς has more than one relation to τὰ γινόμενα. In that it blends with the qualities of matter, and appears as consciousness, it is πέρας; in that it controls and adapts matter to its ends, it appears as σοφία, and as such resembles the σοφία of the Universal νοῦς, which is αἰτία. This remark will prepare the reader for the next turn in the dialogue.

ΦΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρας ἔχεται; ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦντον δεχομένων ἐστὸν;

ΦΙ. Ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὃ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἡδονὴ παράγαθον ἦν, εἰ μὴ ἄπειρον ἐτύγγανε πεφυκὸς καὶ πλήθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον.

28 ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γ' ἂν, ὃ Φίληβε, λύπη πάγκακον· ὥστ' ἄλλο τι νῦν ἴσχεπτόν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν, ὡς παρέχεται τι μέρος ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀγαθοῦ. τοῦτο δέ σοι τῶν ἀπεράντων γεγονὸς ἔστω. φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ νοῦν εἰς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων, ὃ Πρώταρχέ τε καὶ Φίληβε, νῦν θέντες οὐκ ἂν ἀσεβοῦμεν; οὐ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖ σμικρὸς ἡμῖν εἶναι ὁ κίνδυνος κατορθώσασι καὶ μὴ περὶ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

B ΦΙ. Σεμνύνεις γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸν σεαυτοῦ θεόν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ σύ, ὃ ἑταῖρε, τὴν σεαυτοῦ· τὸ δ' ἐρωτώμενον ὁμῶς ἡμῖν λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς τοι λέγει Σωκράτης, ὃ Φίληβε, καὶ αὐτῷ πιστέον.

ΦΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ σύ, Πρώταρχε, προήρησαι λέγειν;

πανάγαθον] πᾶν ἀγαθὸν is the reading of the MSS. But whether this be taken, like πᾶς ἀναγκῶς in Soph. *Ed. R.* 823, as *good throughout*, or as being *all the good* that is in the world, and therefore *the only good*, neither of these facts would prove that it was without limit; for it might be all good so far as it went, and yet not go very far, or it might have an exclusive title to the name, and yet be ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε. Nothing therefore can be truer or more necessary than Bekker's corrections, πανάγαθον and πάγκακον. In Philebus' creed ἡδονὴ is simply the very best and λύπη the very worst thing.

Οὐδέ γ' ἂν, ὃ Φ.] Socrates' just and ingenious retort supplies the omission in Philebus' answer, and brings us to the twofold conclusion that pleasure and pain are in their own nature without limit, and that this want of a limit, since it admits pain as well as pleasure, the supposed evil as well as the supposed good, cannot be that in which the good of pleasure consists,

for as it is alike the condition of both opposites, it cannot belong to either of them to the exclusion of the other.

σκεπτέον . . ὡς] Some Editors have changed ὡς into ὃ without authority. If σκεπτέον could be used in the sense of "we must look for", this would have been a plausible change. But this sense it cannot have; and therefore the suspicion falls upon σκεπτέον itself. It is possible that λεκτέον or ὑποληπτέον is the right reading, either of which would require ὡς.

τοῦτο δέ] The MSS. have τούτων δὴ τούτων is a blunder due to τῶν ἀπεράντων. I have substituted δὲ for δὴ, because we need the conjunction to oppose τοῦτο to ἄλλο τι. γεγονὸς ἔστω is somewhat unusual for ὠμολογησέω εἶναι.

ὃ Φαίηβε] The accidental omission of these words in the Bodleian, has supplied Stallbaum with another confirmation of his strange theory that the better MSS. have undergone the revision of fastidious critics. Fastidious critics in the eleventh century must have been *rare aves*.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε· νῦν μέντοι σχεδὸν ἀπορωῶ, καὶ δέομαί γ', ὡ Σώκρατες, αὐτόν σε ἡμῖν γενέσθαι προφήτην, [ἵνα] μὴ δὴ ἡμεῖς σοι περὶ τὸν ἀγωνιστὴν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες παρὰ μέλος φθεγξώμεθά τι.

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὡ Πρώταρχε· οὐδὲ γὰρ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲν ἐπι- C τάττεις. ἀλλ' ὄντως σε ἐγώ, καθάπερ εἶπε Φίληβος, σεμνύ- νων [ἐν τῷ παίζειν] ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος ὁποίου γένους εἶεν.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασί γ', ὡ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ῥάδιον. πάντες γὰρ συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ σο- φοί, ἑαυτοὺς ὄντως σεμνύοντες, ὡς νοῦς ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς. καὶ ἴσως εὖ λέγουσι. διὰ μακροτέρων δ', εἰ βούλει, τὴν σκέψιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους ποιησώμεθα.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ὅπως βούλει, μηδὲν μῆκος ἡμῖν ὑπολογιζό- D μενος, ὡ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐκ ἀπεχθισόμενος.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες. ἀρξώμεθα δὲ πῶς ὧδ' ἐπανερωτῶντες.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πότερον, ὡ Πρώταρχε, τὰ ξύμπαντα καὶ τόδε τὸ καλούμενον ὄλον ἐπιτροπεύειν αἴωμεν τὴν τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ εἰκῆ δύναμιν καὶ τὸ ὅπῃ ἔτυχεν· ἢ τὰναντία, καθάπερ οἱ πρόσθεν ἡμῶν ἔλεγον, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστὴν συντάττουσαν διακυβερνᾶν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν, ὡ θαυμάσιε Σώκρατες, ὃ μὲν E

[ἵνα] μὴ δὴ . . . φθ. τι] The MSS. have ἵνα μηδέν. This μηδέν must belong to φθεγξώμεθα, because μηδὲν ἐξαμαρτάνοντες would be the very contrary of that which he dreads. But μηδὲν and τι are incompatible, except in the combined form μηδ' ἐν τι, which is foreign to our purpose. The most probable correction seems to be [ἵνα] μὴ δὴ, ἵνα having been supplied after μὴ δὴ was corrupted. ἵνα δὴ and μὴ δὴ are used where the person addressed is appealed to as to the reasonable nature of the thing expected or feared.

Πειστέον κ. τ. εἰ.] The connection of the clauses is this. "You thought it difficult, because I frightened you."—"You certainly did."—"Nay but it is easy." I have therefore removed the sign

of interrogation after εἶεν. The words ἐν τῷ παίζειν are very suspicious. They explain what might be left to the intelligence of the hearer, and force σεμνύων to stand alone, whereas σεμνύων ἐθορύβησα, νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἐρόμενος is not a very violent displacement of the natural order, and any reader will see why it is made.

ὑπολογιζόμενος] This is properly a term of book-keeping, and is used of anything which we set against the account of profit, such as κίνδυνος, πόνος &c. ἀπεχθάνομαι, I give offence.

Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν] When Soerates offers to Protarchus the alternative belief either in capricious and hap-hazard power, and mere accident, as that which has the universe in its keeping, or in mind and marvellous intelligence, as

ἐν ἀρχῇ σὺ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγες, οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ νῦν πάντα διαλοομεῖν αὐτὰ γράναι καὶ τῆς ὕψεως τοῦ λό-
 σμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περι-
 φορᾶς ἄξιον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποιμι
 οὐδ' ἂν δοξάσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτ' ἔτι καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν [ὁμολο-
 29 γούμενον] ξυμφῶμεν, ὡς ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ μὴ μόνον οἰώ-
 μεθα δεῖν τὰλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συγιν-
 δυνεύομεν καὶ μετέχωμεν τοῦ ψόγου, ὅταν ἀνὴρ δεινὸς φῆ ταῦτα
 μὴ οὕτως ἀλλ' ἀτάκτως ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βουλοίμην;

that which arranges and regulates it, we expect Protarchus to reject the former, and approve the latter supposition. Now Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is a most complete rejection, and so is οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι μοι φαίνεται; but there is in the received text a fatal want of distinctness as to *what* he rejects; for Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is left by itself, and οὐδ' ὅσιον is predicated of ὅ . . σὺ . . λέγεις. This shews that the copyists cannot have done their duty. The difference of the readings is remarkable. Bodl. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν δὴ λέγεις: Coisl. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις: Eusebius, ὁ μὲν γὰρ δὴ σὺ λέγεις. It will be seen that they all three concur in μὲν γὰρ, which is the source of all the difficulty. But Eusebius' ΜΕΝΓΑΡΔΗ I take to have been the first deflection from the true reading ΜΕΝΕΝΑΡΧΗ, and the νῦν δὴ of the best MS. will justify the change of λέγεις into ἔλεγες. Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν is properly, *Nothing like*, and is so used by Isocrates. 270 init. (Steph.) 277 med. 279 med. 241 extr. (τι τῶν αὐτῶν) and περὶ Ἄντ. p. 302. Lips. 1825. We may here render it by *Nothing of the kind*, or *Nothing like the fact*.

Βούλει δῆτ' ἔτι καὶ ἡμεῖς] *Do you wish, then, that we also should agree in affirming that which is professed by the ancients before mentioned?* I have changed δῆτ' αὐτὰ into δῆτ' ἔτι; τι, which the inferior MSS. omit, is quite foreign to the sentence, while ἔτι καὶ in this sense is of continual occurrence in Plato and other writers.

[ὁμολογούμενον] The MSS. generally agree in this reading. Schleiermacher

reads ὁμολογούμενα, some worthless copies ὁμολογούμενοις. But if we adopt -μενα or -μενον, we must have the article, and the perfect is more correct, as Theodoret quotes it, ὁμολογημένοις: and lastly, whether Anaxagoras be meant, or, as I suspect, some older seer or poet, it is not proper to speak of the first exponents of a dogma as ὁμολογούντας. Some one may propose ὁμολογούμενοι, *agreeing with*, but this is said of *things* that agree, not of *persons*. It is wonderful that no one has seen that ἔξυμφημι is followed by a dative in its own right, and that ὁμολογεῖν, in whatever form you use it, introduces either a tautology or a redundancy.

ἔξυμφόμεν] MSS. give ἔξυμφήσωμεν. It is true we have ἔξυμφήσει μόγις, *Rep.* 242, E, and in *Sophist.* 236, D, πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ ἔξυμφήσει—but as to the first example, we have ἔξυμφήσει both preceding and following it, and as to the second, the whole clause is an interpolation. In *Timæus* 72, D, ἔξυμφήσαντος may be defended on the ground that the God does not simply assent to their doctrine, but *reasserts* it with higher authority. Where *assertion* is intended, we find the form ἔφησα, so that practically it is an aorist of φάσκειν, but for this very reason ἔξυμφημι would seldom want any such inflexion. ἔξυμφόμεν in this place is to be looked upon as a present tense, like οἰώμεθα, ἔξυμκινδυνεύομεν, μετέχωμεν.

τὰλλότρια ἄνευ κινδύνου λέγειν] This is evidently a proverbial phrase, slightly changed, probably from ἔγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, τὸν ἐπιόντα περὶ τούτων νῦν ἡμῖν λόγον ἄφρει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Τὰ περὶ τῆν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων τῶν ζώων, πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα, καθορωμένον, καὶ γῆν, καθάπερ Β οἱ χεημαζόμενοί φασιν [, ἐνόηται ἐν τῇ συστάσει].

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα χευμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ἐπ' ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι σμικρὸν τε [τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν] ἔνεστι καὶ φαῦλον, [καὶ] οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινές ὄν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. ἐν ἐνὶ δὲ λαβῶν περὶ πάντων νόει ταῦτόν. οἷον πῦρ μὲν ἔστι παρ' ἡμῖν, ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν σμικρὸν μὲν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἀσθενές C καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντί πλήθει τε θανάσιον καὶ κάλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθές ὃ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τρέφεται καὶ γίγνεται [ἐκ τούτου] καὶ ἄρχεται τὸ τοῦ παντός πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν πυρός; ἢ τοῦναντίον ἐπ' ἐκείνου τό τ' ἐμόν καὶ τὸ σὸν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἀπαντ' ἴσχει ταῦτα;

[ἐνόηται ἐν τῇ συστάσει]] If this means the σύστασις of our bodies, it is an idle repetition; if of the Universe, it comes too soon. The question is, not whether we see the Elements in composition, but whether we see them at all; that they are περὶ τῆν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν is assumed as the general belief. He argues from the elements παρ' ἡμῖν which we do see, to the same elements ἐν τῷ παντί.

[τούτων ἕ. π. ἡ.]] Note the miserable repetition περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν . . . τούτων ἕκαστον παρ' ἡμῖν in one sentence, for this is virtually the case, since ὅτι depends on λαβὲ τὸ τοιόνδε.

The sentence which I have relieved of this burden affords us the very ἔνεστι from which the interpolator helped himself above. "It is present here in small quantity and poor quality," and then the double nature of this φαῦλον is shewn; it is *impure* and *feeble in its effects*. This connexion is spoiled, and the grammar made to suffer, by the intrusion of καὶ.

[ἐκ τούτου]] ἐκ τ. is quite suitable to γίγνεται, but by no means to τρέφεται; when we omit the words, the sentence becomes ten times more elegant and forcible, ὑπὸ being quite appropriate enough for the thrée verbs taken together.

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν οὐδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἄξιον ἐρωτᾷς.

D ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ταῦτα γὰρ ἐρεῖς, οἶμαι, περὶ τε [τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις] γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων †δὴ πάντων ὅσων ἠρώτησα ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν, οὕτως ἀποκριεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τίς γὰρ ἀποκρινόμενος ἄλλως ὑγιαίνων ἂν ποτε φανείη;

ΣΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδ' ὅστισοῦν. ἀλλὰ τῷ μετὰ τοῦθ' ἐξῆς ἔπον. πάντα γὰρ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντ' ἄρ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν συγκαίμενα ἰδόντες ἐπινομάσαμεν σῶμα;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

E ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν δὴ λαβὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦθ' ὃν κόσμον λέγομεν. [διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἂν εἴη που σῶμα, σύνθετον ὃν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν ἐκ τούτου τοῦ σώματος ὅλως τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν τοῦτο, τρέφεται τε καί, ὅσα νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἵπομεν, εἴληφέ τε καὶ ἴσχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ τοῦθ' ἔτερον, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐρωτήσεως.

30 ΣΩ. Τί δέ; τόδ' ἄρ' ἄξιον; ἢ πῶς ἐρεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τὸ ποῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα ἄρ' οὐ ψυχὴν φήσομεν ἔχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Πόθεν, ὃ φιλε Πρώταρχε, λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τό γε τοῦ

Ὅρθως] Compare *inf.* 53, A. In instances of this kind, we must not take this word as merely expressive of assent, but rather of satisfaction that the argument is advancing as was intended. This will justify the use of γὰρ in the next clause.—The designations τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις (*inf.* 31, D) and τῆς ἐνθάδε both apply to γῆς; but one would be sufficient, and the latter is better here as contrasting with τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί. In place of καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ πάντων I suspect that we ought to read καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ περὶ πάντων.—I have changed τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο into τῷ μ. τ.

[διὰ] τὸν αὐτὸν γ. τρόπον] The cause of its being a body is given in σύνθετον ὃν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. Therefore the causal διὰ seems out of place here as

well as unsuited to τρόπον. We should rather have expected κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, but τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον expresses nearly the same thing. The copyist was perhaps thinking of διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν.

ὅσα νῦν δὴ [περὶ αὐτῶν] εἵπομεν] This refers to καὶ γίνεται καὶ ἄρχεται. But περὶ αὐτῶν is surely out of place; for that, concerning which they are speaking here, is τὸ παρ' ἡμῖν σῶμα, and though that σῶμα contains the four elements, those elements have already passed out of the argument.—ἴσχει is both better supported than ἔχει, and more appropriate, as Socrates is speaking of a continual derivation.

Πόθεν] The reasons given seem to be two "The Universe has a soul, for

πανιὸς σῶμα ἔμψυχον ὃν ἐτύγγανε, ταῦτά γ' ἔχον τούτῳ καὶ ἔτι πάντῃ καλλίονα;

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδαμῶθεν ἄλλοθεν, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦμέν γ', ὃ Πρώταρχε, τὰ τέτταρ' ἐκεῖνα, ἡπέρας καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ κοινόν ** καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν [ψυχῆν B τε παρέχον] καὶ σωμασίαν ἐμποιοῦν καὶ πταίσαντος σώματος

what else could have given us our souls?" and "The Universe has a soul, because it has all that we have in greater perfection". But the latter alone is intended. "If we have a soul, the Universe which has all that we have &c. must likewise have one". πάντῃ refers to quantity, purity, intensity &c. mentioned above.

Οὐ γάρ που] The subject of ἐπακαλεῖσθαι is evidently Cause. But if so, there is no predicate to τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα. To remedy this, some propose to read ὄντα before τέτταρα; but neither Grammar nor Logic allows such a contrivance. Not Grammar, because if Plato had intended the clause to be taken absolutely, he would certainly have written ὄντων τῶν τεττάρων. Nor Logic, for if we were to take it thus: "Seeing that these four are"—we should immediately ask "are where"? If παρ' ἡμῖν, that could not be omitted. If every where, that is as yet unproved, nay the very thing to be proved, for in the next sentence of Socrates the conclusion is stated ὡς ἔστιν ἄπειρόν τε ἐν τῷ παντὶ κ. τ. ἔ. There can be no doubt that the four γένη ought to be mentioned, else how can he make any conclusion about them? So that the words τὰ τ. ἐκεῖνα are not an interpolation. On the other hand we know that there is an hiatus in the best MS., for it omits πέρας, and though the others have it, it is just as likely that in these it was supplied by conjecture. But the hiatus may have been far greater than that of one word. My impression is that the text in this place was in a very bad condition even in remote times, and that all which intervened between ἐκεῖνα and καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος was unreadable. The place was then filled up pretty nearly as we find it. But not correctly: for the

enumeration of these γένη without an article is in itself most unlikely, and if κοινόν had been mentioned here, it is scarcely credible that Protarchus should so very soon afterwards beg to be reminded what κοινόν meant. I believe that a more probable mode of filling up the gap would be in this fashion: τὰ τέτταρα ἐκεῖνα ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν μόνοις εἶναι, καὶ τὸ τῆς αἰτίας γένος, ἐν ἅπασι τέταρτον ἐνόν, τοῦτ' ἐν μὲν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῖν κ. τ. ἔ.

[Ψυχῆν τε παρέχον] He argues that αἰτία here below enjoys many and various appellations of σοφία (as we say σοφὸς παιδοτρίβης, ἱατρὸς, τέκτων, χαλκεύς, and so forth) and he divides the operations of αἰτία under two heads of combining and repairing (συντιθέν καὶ ἀκούμενον) and gives an example of each in σωμασίαν ἐμποιοῦν and ἱατρικὴν (ἐμποιοῦν). It is evident throughout that he is speaking of the human ψυχῆ being enabled by this αἰτία to work on our inferior elements by introducing πέρας into the ἄπειρα, and, when the μέτρον thus introduced has been disturbed, by readjusting it; in other words he is speaking of human skill. And, pray, what human skill can be said ψυχῆν παρέχειν? But some Greek reader, who did not understand the argument, saw something about cause, and something about σῶμα, and thought it was a pity that the ψυχῆ should be missing, and so by his ψυχῆν τε παρέχον he killed all the sense of the passage. The application of these facts concerning human skill to a higher skill must be carefully noted. He does not say "there must be some other higher effects elsewhere"; but "we know of certain effects; we know that there is a φύσις τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τεμνωτάτων (i.e. the planets and the whole Heavens) and this must be an

ιατρικὴν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλα συντιθέν καὶ ἀνοούμενον, πᾶσαν καὶ παντοίαν σοφίαν επικαλεῖσθαι· τῶν δ' αὐτῶν τοῦτων ὄντων ἐν ὅλῳ τε οὐρανῷ καὶ κατὰ μεγάλα μέρη, καὶ προσέτι καλῶν καὶ εἰλικρινῶν, ἐν τοῦτοις δ' οὐκ ἔρα μεμνηανῆσθαι τὴν τῶν καλλίστων καὶ τιμωτάτων φήσιν.

C ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδαμῶς τοῦτό γ' ἂν λόγον ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν [εἰ μὴ τοῦτο,] μετ' ἐκείνου τοῦ λόγου ἂν ἐπόμενοι βέλτιον λέγοιμεν, ὡς ἔστιν, ἃ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ἄπειρόν τ' ἐν τῇ παντὶ πολὺ, καὶ πέρασ ἰκανόν, καὶ τις ἐπ' αὐτοῖς αἰτία οὐ φάυλη, ζωμοῦσά τε καὶ συντάττουσα ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ ὥρας καὶ μῆρας, σοφία καὶ νοῦς λεγομένη δικαιοτάτ' ἴν.

ΠΡΩ. Δικαιοτάτα δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Σοφία μὲν καὶ νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γενοίσθην.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οἶν.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φήσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, ἐν δ' ἄλλοις ἄλλα καλά, καθ' ὃ φίλον ἐκάστοις λέγεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἡμᾶς μὴ τι μάτην δόξης, ὧ Πρώταρχε, εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τοῖς μὲν πάλα ἀποφηραμένοις ὡς αἰεὶ τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει, ξύμμαχος ἐκείνοις.

effect of this same αἰτία operating in a higher ψυχή." Ast's Lexicon will give the student several examples of ἔρα in this kind of reasoning, where we would show the absurdity of denying in one case, what has been admitted in another less evident case. I should prefer ἐν ὅλῳ τε τῷ οὐρανῷ.

[εἰ μὴ τοῦτο]] These words are out of construction, and redundant. Let them be restored to the margin, or, better still, be forgotten. In this sentence the reader will perceive the playful way in which ἀπειρον is called πολὺ, and πέρασ ἰκανόν, and αἰτία οὐ φάυλη, and will be able to judge of the worth of Winekelmann's conjecture, when he proposes to foist κοινὸν without an epithet into the text.

Διὸς] Then Jove is subordinate to αἰτία. This looks like Pantheism, but

in the *Timaeus* we are told of a δημιουργός καὶ πατήρ by whom Jove and all other Deities were made. He too is not independent of αἰτία, for the αἰτία is given which caused him to make the world, namely that he was good, and since in that which is good there is no grudge, he begrudged not the world its being, but would have all things like himself. Thus the First Cause is The Good, but the δημιουργός does not owe his being to ταχάδεν = αἰτία; but through its presence in him he becomes the author of all things, including the Gods. Jove himself appears among these divine beings whom he addresses thus: Θεοί, ὅσων ἐγὼ δημιουργός πατήρ τε ἔργων, ἅτε δι' ἐμοῦ γεγόμενα. ἅλυστα ἐμοῦ γ' ἐπέλλοντο— for so the passage ought to be read. *Tim.* 41, A.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τῆ δέ γ' ἐμῆ ζήτησι πεπορικῶς ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτι νοῦς ἐστὶ γυνοούσις τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου λεχθέντος. [τῶν τεττάρων Ε ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῦτο.] ἔχεις γὰρ δήπου νῦν ἡμῶν ἴδη τὴν ἀπόκρισιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔχω καὶ μάλ' ἱκανῶς· καὶ τοί με ἀποκρινάμενος ἔλαθες.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάπαντα γάρ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τῆς σπουδῆς γίγνεται ἐνίοθ' ἢ παιδιά.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Νοῦς δὴ που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὗ μὲν γένους ἐστὶ καὶ τίνα 31 ποτὲ δύναμιν κέκτηται, σχεδὸν ἐπεικτικῶς ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν δεδῆλωται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἰδονῆς γ' ὡσαύτως πάλα τὸ γένος ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Μεμνόμεθα δὴ καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀμφοῖν, ὅτι νοῦς μὲν αἰτίας ἦν ξυγγενὴς καὶ τοῦτου σχεδὸν τοῦ γένους, ἰδονὴ δ' ἀπειρός τ' αὐτῆ καὶ τοῦ μήτ' ἀρχὴν μήτε μέσα μήτε τέλος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχοντος μηδ' ἐξορκτός ποτε γένους.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνησόμεθα· πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

B

ΣΩ. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τ' ἐστὶν ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν, καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίνεσθον, ὁπόταν γίνησθον, ἰδεῖν ἡμᾶς· πρῶτον τὴν ἰδονήν· ὡσπερ τὸ γένος αὐτῆς πρότερον ἐβασανίσασμεν, οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα πρότερα. λέπης δ' αὖ χωρὶς τὴν ἰδονήν οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθ' ἱκανῶς βασανίσειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ ταύτη χρὴ πορεύεσθαι, ταύτη πορευόμεθα.

γυνοούσις] This word is quoted from this passage by the lexicographers. It is not formed according to analogy, and offers no meaning but what γυνοούσις would have supplied. It may have arisen from a dittographia, γένους, γυνοούσις.—I once thought that Stallbaum's conjecture, when he put a stop after λεχθέντος and supplied δὲ after τεττάρων, was undoubtedly right. I now see in the words τῶν τεττάρων ἦν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῦτο a marginal note, on which all correction is thrown away.

ἔχεις γὰρ ought to follow immediately upon the statement of the ἀπόκρισις, in place of being separated from it by this reference, which is itself quite superfluous.

ταῦτα πρότερα] Namely, where it is to be found existing, and how it arises. Henceforth, pleasure is no longer considered as an abstraction, and belonging to the class of ἀπειρα, but as having come into being, and consequently as belonging to the κοινά.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν σοὶ καθάπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν πέρι;

C ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένοι ἅμα φαίνεσθον λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονὴ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Κοινὸν δέ γ', ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, ὑπομίμησθε ἡμᾶς τί ποτε τῶν προειρημένων βούλει δηλοῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἔσται ταῦτ' εἰς δύναμιν, ὃ θαυμάσιε.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούωμεν ὃ δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἐλέγομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅ μετὰ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ πέρασ ἔλεγες; ἐν ᾧ καὶ ἡγίαια, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄρμονίαν, ἐτίθεσο;

D ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. τὸν νοῦν δ' ὅ τι μάλιστ' ἤδη πρόσεχε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοίνυν, τῆς ἄρμονίας μὲν λυομένης ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, ἅμα λέσιν τῆς φύσεως καὶ γένεσιν ἀλγηδόνων ἐν τῷ τότε γίγνεσθαι χρόνῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ λέγεις εὐκός.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δ' ἀρμοττομένης τε καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν ἄπιούσης, ἡδονὴν γίγνεσθαι λεπτέον, εἰ δεῖ δι' ὀλίγων περὶ μεγίστων ὅ τι τάχιστα ἡθῆναι.

E ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν σε ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐμφανέστερον δ' ἔτι ταῦτά ταῦτα περιώμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν τὰ δημόσιά που καὶ περιφανῆ ἥϊστον συνοεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Πείνη μὲν που λύσις καὶ λύπη;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐδωδὴ δέ, πλήρωσις γιγνομένη πάλιν, ἡδονή;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ἀπιούσης] The same word is again used below of the same thing, and there also with πάλιν. The expression seems strange for a *return* to a natural state. On the faith of εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν

ὀδόν, and τὴν ἀναχώρησιν, I should be inclined to write πάλιν λύσεως, or ἐπαπιούσης, which last is perhaps more like the text.

ΣΩ. Δίψος δ' αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη [καὶ λύσις], ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἰγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθῆν πληροῦσα δύναμις, ἡδονή. διάκρισις³² δὲ [γ'] αὖ καὶ [διάλυσις] ἡ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη· κατὰ φύσιν δ' ἡ ῥίγους πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψῦξις, ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ [ρίγους] ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζώου τῆς ὑγρό-
τητος πῆξις, λύπη. πάλιν δ' φεῖς ταῦτ' ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρι-
νομένων ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδός, ἡδονή. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι
μέτριος ὁ λόγος, ὃς ἂν φῆι τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπειροῦ καὶ πέρατος
κατὰ φύσιν ἐμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρό- B
σθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι,
τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δ' αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀνα-
χώρησιν πάντων, ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τιν' ἔχειν.

[διάλυσις] This differs so little in sense from διάκρισις that it is useless, and moreover it answers to nothing in the antithesis. The opposites are διάκρισις=ἀπόδοσις, παρὰ φύσιν=κατὰ φύσιν, πνίγους πάθη=ψῦξις, λύπη=ἡδονή. In this scheme the only word that suggests any scruple is ἀπόδοσις; a word which conveys no meaning unless we are told what is τὸ ἀποδιδόμενον. That is to say, we want a genitive, and it must be the genitive of that which is opposed to πνίγους. But, for this we need not look very far, for in the very next speech we have ῥίγους, where it is as much in the way as it would be serviceable here. It seems almost certain that we should read ἡ ῥίγους πάλιν ἀπόδοσις τε καὶ ψῦξις, ἡδονή.

[ρίγους] See the preceding note. But a more serious difficulty is offered by εἰς ταῦτ' ἀπιόντων, which is doubtful not only because of the preposition ἀπό, but also because the plural refers to nothing yet mentioned; nor does ταῦτ' satisfy me, for, though εἰς ταῦτ' ἰόντων would do very well for the meeting of things separated, here the natural way is that of separation, as is plain from the nature of the case, and from the word διακρινομένων.

Schleiermacher, in view of Stohæus' reading, εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν, for εἰς ταῦτόν, conjectured εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν. Stallbaum finds every thing to his mind: ἀπιόντων is said of τῶν ὑγρῶν, implied in ὑγρότητος, and εἰς ταῦτόν is "to the same state in which they were before". The reader will observe that there may be as much rashness in defence as in attack. Our only guide is the antithesis, in which τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις can only answer to τῆς ὑγρότητος διάκρισις. From this it would appear to follow that πάλιν δὲ ταύτης διακρινομένης was the original reading. Or perhaps it was πάλιν δὲ τῶν παγέντων διακρινομένων: but at all events it was something very different from what we now read on the authority of some unknown person who did his best to patch up a reading from his damaged copy. In what follows, the construction is purposely loose, in order to admit of more detail, and especially to prevent the φθορὰ being understood of anything save the dissolution of the compound formed from the union of τὸ ἀπειρον and πέρας: hence also the double μὲν and its double apodosis.

τύπον] A general outline of truth. See Trendelenburg's *Excerpta*, where there is a very good note on the word.

Ω. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέρους.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖθω.

Ω. Τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τοῦτον τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων [ἐπιζόμενον] ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οἷν τοῦθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος [αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

Ω. Ὅρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσι θ' ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ἴδως δοκεῖ, καὶ

[ἐπιζόμενον] It is not the expected thing, but the state of expectation which is either painful or pleasant. Nor can we put τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιζόμενον for τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιζούσης πάθος with any shadow of propriety.

[αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς] Protarchus' answer is an admission that there is another species of pain and pleasure *independent of the body*, for so he varies the expression of that which Socrates had called αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς. But this variety does not satisfy the sciolist; so he gives us a tautology in its place, by again repeating αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς.

Ὅρθῶς ὑπέλαβες. ἐν γὰρ after ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες shews that a certain satisfaction is implied. See above 29, p.

ἐν γ. τούτοις οἶμαι] It is commonly supposed that Socrates is here speaking of the προσδοκίματα alone; but it would be strange that he should speak of these as pure, and unmingled with pleasure and pain, just after he has made them appear as one kind of them. Nor is it easy to see why he should lay so much stress on this particular εἶδος, as expecting from it a solution of the whole question. ἐν τούτοις however manifestly means not ἐν τούτοις τοῖς προσδοκίμασι, but ἐν τούτοις τοῖς εἶδεσι, for it follows immediately on Protarchus' ἕτερον εἶδος. But ἑκατέροις cannot be so applied, because ταῦτα here involving only two εἶδη, each of them would be ἑκάτερον. This is one difficulty; and here is another. Socrates cannot speak of either εἶδος

as unmingled with pain and pleasure, since they are kinds of them. But the plurals εἰλικρινέσι &c., if they do not refer to εἶδεσι, must refer to λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς; and by substituting this emendation for λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, we get rid of both difficulties at once. It may appear somewhat bold to change so many terminations, but only to those who are unfamiliar with the wholesale dealing of the ancient correctors, who would think themselves quite justified in adapting all the neighbouring endings to τούτοις. I do not however admit this conjecture into the text, because, until we are certain about ὡς δοκεῖ, we must be content with uncertainty in every thing else. I once thought that these words meant, that Socrates wished to represent himself as not sure till after further examination whether he should find those pure and unmingled εἶδη, but in that case he would have said ἐὰν εὐρωμεν or οἶα μοι δοκῶ εὐρῆσαι or any thing sooner than ὡς δοκεῖ. If we adopt εἰλ. ἢ ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις καὶ ἀμίκτοις λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς, they will be the instrumental datives to ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι. Perhaps ὡς δοκεῖ is merely a gloss to κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν, before δόξαν was added by way of explanation.

οἶμαι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν] The second of these phrases modifies the confident air of the first; there is therefore no redundancy, such as some have imagined to be purposely introduced to imitate ordinary conversation!

ἀμίκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἕσσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ὁ ἐτέρω τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῆ δὲ καὶ λύπη, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δ' οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ἦντα, ἐπίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅπη γίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις ὅτι ταύτη πῆ δεῖ διαπορευθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε ξενίδωμεν. [ὡς] εἴπερ ὄντως ἐστὶ τῶν γενομένων διαφθειρομένων μὲν [αὐτῶν] ἀλγηδῶν, Ἐ ἀνασωζομένων δ' ἡδονῆ, τῶν μῆτε διαφθειρομένων μῆτ' ἀνασωζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποθ' ἔξιν δεῖ τότ' ἐν ἐλάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζώοις, ὅταν οὕτω σχῆ. σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὴν νοῦν εἶπε· ἄρ' οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῶον μῆτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι μῆδ' ἠδεσθαι, μῆτε μέγα μῆτε σμικρόν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν ἐστὶ τις τρίτη ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρὰ τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου.

33

ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς τοτὲ μὲν) After δοτέον governing these several datives, the sentence requires ὅτι or ὡς; I have inserted the latter.

ἔστιν ὅπη] For the MS. reading ἔστιν ὅτε, which is a mere repetition of ἐπίοτε, the nearest paleographical change would be ἔστιν οὐ, the Y and T being often confounded; but the most appropriate and, in itself, a very probable change, is ἔστιν ὅπη, "on certain conditions". This I have admitted into the text.

διαπορευθῆναι] The argument is compared, as in many other parts of Plato, to a beast of the chase being tracked.

τῶν γενομένων] τὸ λεγόμενον is the reading of all MSS. and Edd. in place of my τῶν γενομένων. But without some qualifying adverb τ. λ. cannot be used in any other sense but "what is commonly said". And again αὐτῶν refers to no plural expressed or implied. Stallbaum tells us, first that αὐτῶν is put for

ἐκείνων (motive unknown) and that ἐκεῖνα are ὑγρόν, πνίγος, βίγος and so forth. The reader need scarcely be reminded that ὑγρόν and the rest never perish, but the γενέσεις from them do, and it is these γενέσεις, if ἐμψυχοί, which feel the pain or the pleasure of their jarring or blending. It is also usual to say ἀληθῶς λέγεται of statements and ὄντως ἐστὶ of facts, whereas here we have a confusion of the two. I have restored what in my opinion must have been the original text.

ὅταν οὕτω σχῆ] I have put σχῆ for ἔσχη; we want the aorist, and ἔσχη here is as misplaced as if we should ask a man, Πῶς ἔσχεις;

μῆτε [τι] λυπεῖσθαι] μῆτε λυπεῖσθαι has no more right to τι than μῆτ' ἠδεσθαι, and neither needs it.

ἡμῖν ἢ τοιαύτη] ἡμῖν is the reading of the Coislinian and is much to be preferred to that of the Bodleian, ἡμῶν.

ΣΩ. Ἄγε δὴ τοῖνον, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνήσθαι· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν [μεμνήσθαι ταύτην] ἔσθ' ἡμῖν [ἢ μί]. βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ποῖον.

ΣΩ. [Τῷ] τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν [ἐλομένῳ] βίον οἷσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.

Β ΠΡΩ. Τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαιρεῖν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἐρρήθη γὰρ πού τοτ' ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαιρεῖν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἐλομένῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' οὕτως ἐρρήθη.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ θ' ἐπάροχοι, καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θεϊότατος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰκόσ γ' οὔτε χαιρεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε τοῦραντίον.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκόσ· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰσαυθίς
C ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἔαν πρὸς λόγον τι ἦ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἔαν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.

[μεμνήσθαι ταύτην] Protarchus is to try and remember this, because it is an important fact; not because it is important to remember it. The change from ταύτης, which the author of this foolish supplement saw above to ταύτην, which he certainly wrote, would almost make one suspect that he meant μεμνήσθαι for a passive. Just so in the *Politics*, 286, c, we read, μὴ πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ μήκη κρίνοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ τῆς μετρητικῆς μέρος, ὃ τότε ἔφαμεν δεῖν μεμνήσθαι πρὸς τὸ πρέπον. But there the whole context shews that Plato wrote μεμερίσθαι.

[Τῷ] . . [ἐλομένῳ] This again has been borrowed from below, and placed here so that it makes ἀποκωλύειν govern a dative. As to οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει being used with the accusative suppressed, this is a common idiom. "It is quite possible to live the intellectual life in this manner."

Οὐκοῦν οὕτως] I ought not to have followed two previous editors in preferring οὕτος, which rests on no good authority. The argument runs thus: "This neutral life is compatible with pure intelligence; for the man who chose the life of intelligence was obliged to forego all delight. *In this way then* (this being so) it would be the very life which he *had already chosen*, and it would also probably be the nearest approach to the life of the Gods." The transition from the philosopher to the Gods is marked by ἐκείνῳ τε καὶ. The γε which has usurped the place of τε in the Editions, is absolutely without meaning.

ἐπισκεψόμεθα] This is Bekker's conjecture for ἐπισκεψώμεθα, which occurs in all the Books, but is both less suitable in itself, unusual with εἰσαυθίς, which requires a future, and quite incompatible with προσθήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γ' ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστὶ γεγονός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ τι ποτ' ἔστι, πρότερον φάναληπτέον. καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἰσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πη γενήσεσθαι. D

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς φής;

ΣΩ. Θές τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆν κείνην εἰσάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καὶ τιν' ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρω.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἀρ' ὀρθότατ' ἐροῦμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

E

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν λεληθῆναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένησιν. ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἕξοδος· ἢ δ' ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὐκ ἔγωγε γέγονε· τοῦ δὲ μήτ' ἦντος μήτε. γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τιν' ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ἀναληπτέον] Δηπτέον alone is the proper verb. Παραληπτέον would be just as unsuitable as ἀναληπτέον; for they are not going to receive the information from others, but to learn it by observation. Nor is it at all likely that Plato would play on the word ἀναλαμβάνειν, as denoting the proper function of μνήμη. I therefore conjecture πρότερον ἂν εἴη ληπτέον.

κατὰ τρόπον] This is the opposite of ἀπὸ τρόπου. See below, 34, A.

ἐνταῦθά που] Somewhere here,—i.e., in the state we have been describing. By λήθης γένησις is meant a state of forgetfulness arising out of a previous

opposite state. With this he contrasts that state of unconsciousness as to any particular impression which precedes αἰσθησις, and consequently μνήμη. The latter is described in order to bring into greater relief the proposition which he is now advancing, that Desire being of the opposite to that which is present, as the body is taken up with that which is present, the mind alone can be conversant with the absent opposite, and this through Memory, without which Desire is impossible.

μήτε γεγονότος πω] I have adopted Stallbaum's conjecture for πῶς without hesitation.

ΣΩ. Ἀντί μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅταν ἀπαθῆς αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, [ἦν νῦν λήθην
34 καλεῖς,] ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμεσον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμαθον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνώμενα κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἰσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοι' ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἰσθησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς
B ἄν τις λέγοι, κατὰ γε τὴν ἑμὴν δόξαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὄρθῶς γὰρ οὔν.

ΣΩ. Μνήμης δ' ἀναμνησιν ἄρ' οὐ διαφέρουσιν λέγομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὔν οὐ τόδε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν, ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέ ποθ' ἢ ψυχῇ, ταῦτ' ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὕτη ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὃ τι μάλιστ' ἀναλαμβάνη, τότε ἀναμνήσκεσθαι που λέγομεν. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὔν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτ' αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος, αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὕτη ἐν
C ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντ' ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν.

[ἦν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς] Protarchus does no such thing. He is bidden to use ἀναισθησία in place of τὸ λεληθέναι, and to keep λήθη in the same sense as hitherto.

γιγνώμενα] "Pro γιγνώμενον *Sydenhamus γιγνώμενα tentat. Non video causam.*" Stallb. And then, of course, we are referred to Matthiæ. That the compiler of a Grammar should treasure up all the anomalies and exceptional instances, which either the self-will of authors or the stupidity of scribes supplies him with, is no more than we should expect. But the province of an editor is, as far as possible, to resist such

evidence and to oppose common sense to the craving after curiosities. In such a passage as this a departure from the common rule is above all things improbable, for here the notion uppermost in the mind of the writer is the *joint participation* in a certain state, the *common effect* of two things, which a singular participle would render less apparent.

ποθ' ἢ] The Zurich editors have not improved this passage by the conjectural reading of πάθη; the word ποτέ adds to the clearness of the sentence, and is fully supported by analogous passages in this part of the dialogue.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντ' εἴρηται ταῦτα, ἔστι τόδε.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἴν' ἅμα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σίματος ὅ τι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμ' ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτ' ἀμρότερ' ἔοικε δηλοῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πολλὰ γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορ- D φὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἰρόντες ἃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, [ἀπολοῦμεν] τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἀπορίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως ἡμῖν· τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τοῖτοις περὶ ὁμῶς λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν νῦν δὴ πείνῃ τε καὶ δίψῃ καὶ πόλλ' ἕτερα τοιαῦτ' ἔχαμεν εἶναι τινὰς ἐπιθυμίας; E

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί ποτ' ἄρα ταῦτὸν βλέψαντες, οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθ' ἐνὶ προσαγορευόμεν ὀνόματι;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δῖ οὐ ῥάδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὁμῶς λεκτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐκείθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβοιμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πόθεν δὴ;

Ἴν' ἅμα] The reading of all the MSS., ἔνα μή, has sorely puzzled the editors; some have left it in despair, others have betaken themselves to πη; but this particle is in contradiction to the superlatives which follow, and would be more appropriate to an attempt then commencing, than to a review of the ground already won. I once adopted δὴ, but with misgivings. I now see that INAMA was divided amiss, and so MA was changed into μή. Ἄμα τοῦτο καὶ ἅμα ἐκείνο is a very common formula. See below 41, D, ἅμα παρακείσθαι καὶ ἅμα γίνεσθαι.

πᾶσαν [τὴν] μορφήν] As he means every phase of it, and not its whole

appearance, the article has no business here.

ἃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν] The common reading is, Ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν, καὶ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Π., εἰρόντες δ νῦν ζητοῦμεν· ἀπολοῦμεν κ. τ. ε. It is impossible to make any sense of καὶ ταῦτά γε, nor is the first ἀπολοῦμεν, without a case, supported by usage. The corruption of the passage appears to have originated with the insertion of the second ἀπολοῦμεν, which probably stood at first as a gloss in the margin. Under any circumstances ὅ would be untenable, for αὐτὰ ταῦτα proves that a plural must have preceded.

ΣΩ. “Διψῆ” λέγοντες, λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε τι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δέ γ’ ἐστὶ κενούται.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ’ οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, πώματος γε.

35 ΣΩ. Πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει. κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατά γε:

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁλόθεν εἴτ’ αἰσθήσει [πληρώσεως] ἐφάπτοιτ’ ἂν εἴτε μνήμη τούτου, ὃ μίτ’ ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μίτ’ ἐν τῷ πρόσθε πώποτ’ ἔπαθεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

B ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γ’ ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαιμέν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ’ ὃ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. διψῆ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὃ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πληρώσεώς [γ’] ἄρα πῆ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενούται γὰρ που.

“Διψῆ”] There are two readings Διψῆ γέ που and Διψῆν που. As to the variety in the Bodleian ἐκάστου ἔτι, we have but to turn it back into the uncial character and we see that it was simply another instance of Y being mistaken for T, ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥΕΤΙ. Now if we try to make sense of Διψῆ x. τ. ἐ. it can only mean, that *something sometimes thirsts*, which is an incredible manner of expression, to say nothing of the perfect uselessness of γε. If we try Διψῆν, we may by some effort obtain this sense, “We speak of thirsting as something”, i.e. There is such a thing as thirsting. But then ἐκάστοτε loses all its meaning, and we are obliged further on to read κενούσθαι, whereas

all the Books have κενούται. This is one of those examples that in criticism nothing should be looked on as insignificant. Just as in one of the old Epigrams, I have shewn that ἐν δὲ χθῶν is ἐν δὲ ἧ Ἰθῶν i.e. ἐν δὲ χοροῖσι Θεῶν, so here Διψῆ ΔΕΓ was read as if it were Διψῆ ΓΕΠ. The rest was either invisible or neglected, and γεπ was so supplemented as to become γεπου.

Πληρώσεώς [γ’] ἄρα] The construction is ἄρα τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἐφάπτοιτ’ ἂν πη πληρώσεως. *Some part, then, of the man who is thirsting is in contact with repletion.* The γε is useless, unless we change its place and read Π. ἄρα ἐν γε τι.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐγράφεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτ' ἄλλω ἐγράφαιτο; C

ΠΡΩ. Σχεδὸν οὐδενί.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὗ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν αἰὲ παντὸς ζωῶν μνήμει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ὁρμὴ γ' ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμεν' ἀποδείξας D μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς ξύμπασαν τὴν θ' ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζωῶν παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Διψῆν ἄρ' ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἐπι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν. βίου γὰρ εἶδός τι μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου περὶ βίου φράξεις; E

ΣΩ. Ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζωῶν καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἐκατέρῳ γιγνώμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Τὴν ἄρ' ἐπάγουσαν] *The argument, ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ] Evinces, makes good. then, in showing that Memory is that which introduces one to objects of desire, Compare Rep. 604 c; Parm. 141 D; Crito 48, c. The figure of speech seems to be borrowed from the draught-board.*

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;

ΣΩ. Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῆ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ὧν
γεομιένων παύοιτ' ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω· τί
36 τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀλγοῦνθ' ὄλωσ ἢ χαίροντα;

ΠΡΩ. Μὰ Δί', ἀλλὰ διπλῆ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ
μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας
τινὶ πόθῳ.

ΣΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λέπτης εἶπες;
ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανεροῦ
τοῦ πληρωθίσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τὸναντίον ἀνελπίστως
B ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθίσεσθαι τῷ με-
μῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις τοῖς
χρόνοις ἀλγεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Τότ' ἄρ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ τἄλλα ζῶα λυπεῖται θ' ἅμα
καὶ χαίρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχη κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πλη-
ρώσεως; ἄρ' οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτ' ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας
C πάθος, ὃ σὺ νῦν δὴ κατιδὼν φήθης ἀπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε
χρησώμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ
ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν ἢ τὰς μὲν τινὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δ' οὐ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λύπαι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φάβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς,
ἢ προσδοκία ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξα ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;

D ΠΡΩ. Δόξας μὲν ἔγωγ' ἂν πον συγχωροίην, τὰ δ' ἕτερα
ταῦτ' οὐκ ἂν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πᾶν σμικρὸν ἐπεγεῖρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὧ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρός, προσήγοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως τοῦτό γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκειν ἢ καὶ ὀτωῶν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσήγον λεγομένων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὲ μοι· θαῦμα γὰρ ἐμέ γ' ἔχει διὰ τέλους αἰεὶ Ἐπερὶ ταῦτα, ἃ νῦν δὴ προὔθεμεθα, ἀπορήματα. πῶς δὴ φῆς; ψευδεῖς, αἱ δ' ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Οὔτε δὴ ἕναρ οὔθ' ἕπαρ, ὡς φῆς, [ἔστιν] οὔτ' ἐν μανίαις οὔτ' ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθ' ὅς τις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δ' οὐδαμῶς, οὐδ' αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δ' οὔ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνθ' οὔτω ταῦτ', ὧ Σώκρατες, ἔχην πάντες ὑπελήφαμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὀρθῶς, ἢ σκεπτέον εἶτ' ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;

ΠΡΩ. Σκεπτέον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαιήν ἄν.

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ΣΩ. Διορισώμεθα δὴ σαφέστερον ἔτι τὸ νῦν δὴ λεγόμενον ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ δόξης. ἔστι γὰρ που δοξάζειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἠδεσθαι;

ὧ παῖ 'κείνου τάνδρός] The word ἐκείνος is often substituted for the proper name in speaking of an absent or deceased person with respect. Soph. *Fragm.* οὐ παῖς Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλ' ἐκείνος αὐτός εἰ. In the *Republic*, Socrates addresses Glaucon and Adimantus as ὧ παῖδες ἐκείνου τάνδρός. It is not known who was Protarchus' father, except that Socrates above calls him Callias, but he no doubt belonged to a principal family in Athens. Stallbaum's notion that Protarchus is addressed as *the disciple of that man*, meaning Philebus, is, I regret to see, repeated in his last

edition.

τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκειν] *All other long discourses*, except those which are to the purpose: ἢ καὶ ὀτωῶν κ. τ. ἐ., is equivalent to, or *even short ones, when they are not to the point.*

αἰεὶ περὶ ταῦτα] I have substituted ταῦτα for the unmeaning τὰ αὐτὰ of the Editions. A little further on, I have restored πῶς δὴ φῆς; from Protarchus to Socrates.

[ἔστιν] I have followed Stallbaum in bracketing this word, which arose from the scribe not understanding the adverbial use of ὄναρ and ἕπαρ.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἐστὶ τι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ τό γε, ᾧ τὸ ἠδόμενον ἠδεύεται;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον, ἂν τ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς
B δοξάσῃ, τό γε [δοξάζειν] ὄντως οὐδέποτε' ἀπόλλυσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἠδόμενον, ἂν τ' ὀρθῶς ἂν τε μὴ ὀρθῶς ἠδῆται, τό γ' ὄντως ἠδεσθαι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέποτε' ἀπολεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει.

ΣΩ. Ὅτι ποί' οὖν δὴ τρόπῳ δόξα ψευδῆς τε καὶ ἀληθῆς ἡμῖν φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἰδονῆς μόνον ἀληθές, [δοξάζειν δ' ὄντως καὶ χαιρῆν ἀμφοτέρω ὁμοίως εἴληφεν,] σκεπτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄρα, ὅπῃ δόξη μὲν ἐπιγίγνεσθον ψεῦδος τε καὶ
C ἀληθές, καὶ ἐγένετ' οὐ μόνον δόξα διὰ ταῦτ' ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιὰ
τις ἑκατέρω, σκεπτέον φῆς τοῦτ' εἶναι;

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρὸς δέ γε τοῦτοις, εἰ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡμῖν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ ποί' ἄττα, ἰδονὴ δὲ καὶ λύπη μόνον ἄπερ ἐστὶ, ποιῶ τινε δ' οὐ γίγνεσθον, καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν διομολογητέον.

ΠΡΩ. Δίηλον.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν τοῦτο γε χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν ὅτι καὶ ποιῶ τινε.
πάλα γὰρ εἴπομεν ὅτι μεγάλα τε καὶ σμιρρὰ καὶ σφόδρα
D ἑκάτεραι γίγνονται [, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἰδοναί].

Οὐκοῦν τὸ δοξάζον] *That which fancies, whether it fancies correctly, or incorrectly, never loses its property of really fancying.* It is an actual notion, though it may not correspond to an object. The same may be said of pleasure; the feeling is actually present, though the object is unreal. Thus there is no difference as to truth and falsehood between τὸ δοξάζον and τὸ ἠδόμενον. Unless indeed we say that pleasure is of such nature that it does not admit of any *quality*; but this is not so, for we speak of great and little pleasures, of good and bad pleasures, and so forth: then why not of false and true? I have removed the idle supplement δοξάζειν, which betrays its origin by not knowing its place.

Ἄρα] This is the reading of the best MS. for Γδ. I have adopted it, and added σκεπτέον as Baier first suggested, but my σκεπτέον is that already given to Protarchus. It would exceed the compass of a note to discuss the other changes which I have made, and the reasons for them are sufficiently obvious. Let it suffice to note that the disputants do not consider, nor have they any reason for considering, why both δοξάζειν and χαιρῆν have the ὄντως, so that, had the sentence in brackets been as well expressed as it is clumsy, it could not have belonged to Plato.

σφόδρα ἑκάτεραι] *Violently the one or violently the other*, as the gloss λῦπαί τε καὶ ἰδοναί explains the words.

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γε πονηρία τούτων, ὃ Πρώταρχε, προσγίγνηται τι, πονηρὰν μὲν φήσομεν οὕτω γίνεσθαι δόξαν, πονηρὰν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὲν, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν ὁρθότης ἢ τοῖναντίον ὁρθότητι τινὲ τούτων προσγίγνηται; μῶν οὐκ ὁρθὴν μὲν δόξαν ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ὁρθότη' ἴσχη; ταῦτόν δ' ἡδονήν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Ἄν δέ γ' ἁμαρτανόμενον τὸ δοξαζόμενον ἦ, τὴν δόξαν τὴν δ' ἁμαρτανουσάν γ' οὐκ ὁρθὴν ὁμολογητέον οὐδ' ὁρθῶς δοξάζουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ἂν αὐ λύπην ἢ τιν' ἡδονὴν περὶ τὸ ἐφ' ᾧ λυπεῖται ἢ τοῖναντίον ἁμαρτανουσαν φωρῶμεν, ὁρθὴν ἢ χρηστὴν ἢ τι τῶν καλῶν ὀνομάτιων αὐτῇ προσθήσομεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ ἁμαρτῆσεται γ' ἡδονή.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὲν εἰσὶ γ' ἡδονὴ πολλάκις οὐ μετὰ δόξης ὁρθῆς ἀλλὰ μετὰ ψεύδους ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; καὶ τὴν μὲν δόξαν γε, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ τότε λέγομεν ψευδῆ, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν οὐδεὶς ἂν ποτε προσείποι ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ προθύμως ἀμύνεις τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὃ Πρώταρχε, λόγῳ τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐδέν γε, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

ΣΩ. Διαφέρει δ' ἡμῖν οὐδέν, ὃ ἑταῖρε, ἢ μετὰ δόξης τ'

"Ἄν δέ γ' ἁμαρτανόμενον] "If, when the object of a belief is misapprehended, the belief itself is wrong, shall we not also call that pain or pleasure wrong, which arises from a misapprehended object? If not, we must call it ὁρθή, χρηστή, and all manner of handsome names."

φωρῶμεν] The Books have ἐφορῶμεν, which is out of the question. Inquirers are not supposed to gaze upon an error, but to detect it.

λέγομεν] This is Stallbaum's conjecture for ἐλέγομεν; the change was

owing to ΤΟΤΕΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, which some copyists read as τότε ἐλέγομεν, supposing the imperfect to be required after τότε. When the bad fashion began to prevail of writing the words without the apostrophus, a practice which has led to endless corruption and confusion, this would become τότε ἐλέγομεν.

Οὐδέν γε] The γε is added to οὐδεὶς and οὐδέν before πλήν and its equivalents. Compare *Iph. T.* 548 (564) οὐδεὶς γε πλήν Ἐανούσαν οὐκ ὄραν φάος. *Arist. Nub.* 734. οὐδέν γε πλήν ἦ. *Protag.* 310, B, Οὐδέν γ' εἰ μὴ.

ὁρθῆς καὶ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἡδονὴ τῆς μετὰ τοῦ ψεύδους καὶ ἀγνοίας πολλάκις ἐκαστοῖς ἡμῶν ἐγγιγνομένης;

B ΠΡΩ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν μὴ συμικρὸν διαφέρειν.

ΣΩ. Τῆς δὴ διαφορᾶς αὐτοῖν ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ἔλθωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄγε ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τῆδε δὴ ἄγω;

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Δόξα, φαιμέν, ἡμῖν ἔστι μὲν ψευδής, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀληθής.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπετα μὲν ταύτας, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεῖ καὶ ψευδεῖ δόξῃ λέγω.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ

C τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν γίνεσθον ἐκαστοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ὧδε περὶ ταῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμεθ' ἴσχειν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πολλάκις ἰδόντι τινὶ πόρρωθεν μὴ πάνν σαφῶς [τὰ καθορώμενα] ξυμβαίνειν βοῦλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν ταῦθ' ἄπερ ὁρᾷ.

καὶ τὸ δὴ δοξάζειν ἐγχωρεῖν] The MSS. have, with few exceptions, τὸ διαδοξάζειν. This is interpreted as *distinguishing one notion from another*. But the argument throughout turns upon the mere act of δοξάζειν, and not a single allusion is made to the distinction here introduced. The confusion of δὴ and διὰ is one of the commonest in MSS., and there is a peculiar force in δὴ which may be illustrated by *Sophist*, 234 C, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἅπαντ' εἶναι. In this and other instances it is of the same force as καὶ δὴ καί, and expresses a kind of accumulation. The word ἐγχωρεῖν has been changed on the authority of the Bodleian, &c., to ἐγγχερεῖν, but to *undertake* is surely less appropriate here than to be *capable*, for so we may render the impersonal ἐγχωρεῖ.

γίνεσθον] Most MSS. read γίνεσθ', a strange elision; but the Bodleian has preserved the traces of the true reading which I have restored; for γίνεσθ' in that Book is one of the many examples of the compendium for *ov*, the sign of the grave accent, being mistaken for an apostrophus. The sense is plain enough. "From Memory, then, and from Sensation, our notions, and indeed the capacity for forming notions at all, are derived in every instance."

[τὰ καθορώμενα] . . κρίνειν . . ταῦθ' ἄπερ ὁρᾷ] It is very unnecessary for a man κρίνειν τὰ καθορώμενα. But whoever is capable κρίνειν ταῦθ' ἄπερ ὁρᾷ, will not fail καθορᾶν the reason why we are thus mocked with a double object. A little further we read something from the same source in ἐστάναι φανταζόμενον. If any place requires simple language, it is that where such a simple

ΠΡΩ. Φαίρη ἄν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' αὐτὸς αὐτὸν οὗτος ἀνέροιτ' ἂν ἴδδε.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' [ἔστινα φανταζόμενον] ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ; ταῦτ' εἰπεῖν ἂν τις πρὸς Δ ἑαυτὸν δοκεῖ σοι, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα κατιδὼν φαντασθέντα ἑαυτῷ ποτέ;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν μετὰ ταῦθ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὡς ἀποκρινόμενος ἂν πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴποι ὡς ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπιτηχῶς εἰπῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παρενεχθεῖς γ' αὖ τάχ' ἄν, ὡς τι τινῶν ποιμένων ἔργον ἄν, τὸ καθοριώμενον ἄγαλμα προσείποι.

ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Κἂν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῆ, τά τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντι' Ε ἐντεινας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντ' αὐτὰ ταῦτ' ἂν πάλιν φθέγγεσθαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ἄν δ' ἄρα μόνος ἦ, τοῦτο ταῦτὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν διανοούμενος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρα σοὶ φαίνεται τὸ περὶ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον ὄπερ ἐμοί;

every-day occurrence is described. It is ludicrous to see such words as "What's that yonder by the rock under a tree"? turned into bombast which we cannot even translate, for φανταζόμενον ἐστάναι is not even Greek.

Τί ποτ' ἄρα] *Iph. T.* 387 (399). *Soph. Ajax* 905. τίνας ποτ' ἄρ' ἔπραξε χειρὶ δύσμορος;

ἐπιτηχῶς εἰπῶν] *Chancing on the truth in what he says.* To this is afterwards opposed παρενεχθεῖς, *straying from the mark, or swerving.*

προσείποι] This is understood to mean, *He would say in addition.* But what he says here is no addition, but a substitution. By changing ἔστι into

τι, and adding οὖν to ἔργον, I think I have restored the passage to its old form and sense. "Looking upon it as the work of some shepherds or other, he would call what he descried, a figure."

περὶ τοῦτο] The reading of the MSS. is περὶ τούτων, in defence of which one Editor quotes from *Phaedo* 58, A, Οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίαιτης ἐπέβεσθε, and refers to Heindorf's note on that passage. Heindorf's note is well worth reading and so likewise is his note to another passage in the same dialogue to which reference is made. But it is very unlikely that he would have looked upon this as an example, or have defended it. The analogy is merely ap-

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τόθ' ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῇ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσεοιζέμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

39 ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη, ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ξυμπέπτοσα εἰς ταῦτόν, [καί] ἐκεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταύτας ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα φαίνεται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε [λόγους]. καί,

parent. It would be a great mistake to explain τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης as a change made from περὶ τὴν δίκην because of ἐπίθεσις. The main thought is περὶ τῆς δίκης πυθέσθαι; to which another is added, πυθέσθαι τὰ γενόμενα, or, if any one likes it better, πυθέσθαι τὰ περὶ τὴν δίκην. The idiom therefore arises from an attempt to make an article do more than its natural function, and to graft an additional, though more direct, object, on that first one which is attached to the verb by the preposition. Here, on the contrary, περὶ τούτων is not an object at all. Socrates does not want to know Protarchus' opinion about things of any kind, but whether what happens in this case appears to him to be such and such. The mere occurrence of the word γυγόμενον disposes of the whole argument; nor would περὶ τούτων be intelligible in any case, for the topic of conversation is singular; namely the man ὃς τὰ φαντασθέντα πλείω χρόνον ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ πορεύεται.

Ἡ μνήμη] The reading of the Books is the same as that in my text, except that it has περὶ ταῦτα and φαίνονται, and, of course, I am answerable for the brackets. I will briefly point out the misconceptions which have prevailed about this sentence, and the difficulties which must have sorely perplexed every Editor or reader who desired clearness. We are told by one Editor that ἃ κεῖνα ἃ περὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα, is to be understood as "those things which belong to these faculties, namely to Memory and the Senses". But what *other* things besides Memory and the Senses, yet belonging to the same, are intended, we are not told, nor is it easy to guess. Nor is any example given of that most extraordinary use of παθήματα which is thus transferred from the affection of an organ, or of a power, to the

organ or power itself. When I remember *this*, or see *that*, the remembering and the seeing produce no doubt παθήματα of my mind or of my sense of vision, but to call Mind a πάθημα or Vision a πάθημα is a monstrous abuse of language. Thus the second clause of the sentence must be so rendered that ἐκεῖνα τὰ παθήματα may mean 'those above-mentioned sensations' or perceptions, and ἃ περὶ τ. ἐστὶ, *which are connected* with these αἰσθήσεις. Well, what do these do? "They write, as it were, words in our minds." Are these words what we should call *impressions*? If so, it is an odd thing that Memory and the Senses and the Impressions upon them should be said to write *impressions* upon us. But these λόγοι, it will be said, are more than the momentary impressions, they are the abiding records, the subjective facts. If so, let us pass on: "and when this affection (here the commentators haste to the rescue, saying "Do not be alarmed at this break-down of the plural; he is here speaking of a particular case", and like men obliged to change carriages at the small hours of the night, we try to make ourselves comfortable in this new singular, and proceed) "inscribes true things, the results are true λόγοι". That is to say, that true λόγοι are—the results of true λόγοι. At last we come to a γραμματεὺς who opens our eyes. "I am Memory, the Recorder (ὁ γραμματεὺς) also called the Writer (ὁ γραμματιστής); all that has been done above has been done by me. When I am quickened by any of the senses being moved, I write their παθήματα on your mind; and when these παθήματα which I write are true, then my λόγοι are true". Can there be any doubt about a correction which brings such light out of all this smoke?

ὅταν μὲν ἀληθῆ γράψῃ [τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα], δόξα τ' ἀληθείης καὶ λόγοι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ξυμβαίνουνσιν ἀληθεῖς ἐν ἡμῖν γιγνόμενοι· ψευδῆ δ' ὅταν ὁ τοιοῦτος παρ' ἡμῖν γραμματεὺς γράψῃ, τὰναντία τοῖς ἀληθείσιν ἀπέβῃ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ῥη- Β
θέντα οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς
ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, ὃς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγομένων
εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἴτούτων γράφει.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τοῦτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγομεν;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἀπ' ὄψεως ἢ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε
δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγόν τις τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων
καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῇ ὁρᾷ πως. ἢ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἔστι C
γιγνόμενον παρ' ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΧ. Οὐλοῦν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀληθῶν δοξῶν καὶ λόγων εἰκόνας
ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ψευδεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάσασιν.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι καὶ τόδ' ἐπὶ τού-
τοις σκεψώμεθα, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων ταῦθ'
ἡμῖν οὕτω πάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον, περὶ δὲ τῶν μελλόντων οὔ.

ΠΡΩ. Περὶ ἀπάντων μὲν οὖν τῶν χρόνων ὡσαύτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἰδοῦναι καὶ λῦναι D

τούτων γράφει] τούτων can have no other construction here except as agreeing with λεγομένων, which does not want it, and is too far removed from it to be taken with it, and not far enough to require being repeated in it, or represented by it. It is also probable that Plato would use a different verb for the second artificer; and for these reasons I venture to propose in place of τούτων γράφει, που ζωγραφεῖ.

Οὐκοῦν αἱ γε διὰ τ. ψ.] Two things were said of the second εἶδος of Pleasures and Pains, (the mental class),

Platois Philebus.

first, that they preceded the others, ὅτι προγίγνοντο, and secondly, that our anticipation was thus connected with future time: ὡς ξυμβαίνει . . εἶναι γιγνόμενον. The scribes have turned this into προγίγοντ' ἄν, and ὥστε ξυμβαίνει. Eleven lines above we have had ἔστι γιγνόμενον, (not γίγνεται,) something that occurs; and in 42, A, we shall find the same usage. So here εἶναι γιγνόμενον is not a mere periphrasis of γίγνεσθαι, but = εἶναι τι τῶν γιγνομένων. Another instance which I have seen quoted, is nothing to the purpose:

ἐλέχθισαν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὡς πρὸ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν προγίνονται, ὡς θ' ἡμῖν ξυμβαίνει τὸ προχαίρειν τε καὶ τὸ προλυπεῖσθαι περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον εἶναι γιγνόμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκὼν τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ ζωγραφήματα, ἃ μικροῦ πρότερον ἐτίθεμεν ἐν ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν γενοῦντα Ε καὶ τὸν παρόντα χρόνον ἐστί, περὶ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα οὐκ ἔστιν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα σφόδρα λέγεις, ὅτι πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτ' ἐλπίδες εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὔσαι, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου αἰεὶ γέμομεν ἐλπίδων;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄγε δῆ, πρὸς τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις καὶ τόδ' ἀποκρίναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἐστίν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄδικός τε καὶ παντάπασι κακὸς ἄρ' οὐ τοῦ-
40 ναντίον ἐκείνου;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΣΩ. Πολλῶν μῆν ἐλπίδων, ὡς ἐλέγομεν ἄρτι, πᾶς ἀνθρωπος γέμει.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστι: "Either of these is unsightly, when it occurs." (Above 33, v.)

Οὐκὼν] The Books have Πότερον οὖν. I make a very bold change, but not, as I think, a rash one. First, the argument requires it: "You admit that mental pleasures and pains have to do with the future; then surely you cannot say that, whereas our records and images concern the past and the present, they have no relation with the future." Secondly, Protarchus' answer Σφόδρα γε is a reply not to a question Πότερον, but to an assertion. Some Grammarian who read Οὐκοῦν = *igitur*, and saw that

it gave the opposite sense to that intended, bethought of πότερον as the nearest suitable word, in point of meaning, to that which he supposed to require his correction.

παντάπασι κακός] I am disposed to believe that the word παντάπασι has been added to κακός by way of bringing it into correspondence with the πάντως of the preceding speech of Socrates, which the interpolator supposed to belong to ἀγαθός, whereas it is in fact intended to colour the whole question, and to give it the air of an appeal to the conscience or good sense of the person questioned.

ΣΩ. Λόγοι μὴν εἰσιν ἐν ἐκάστοις ἡμῶν, ὡς ἐλπίδας ὀνομάζομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ φαντάσματα ἔξωγραφημένα· καὶ τις ὁρᾷ πολλάκις ἐαυτῷ χρυσὸν γιγνόμενον ἄφθονον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ πολλὰς ἡδονάς· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐνεξωγραφημένον αὐτὸν ἐφ' αὐτῷ χαίροντα σφόδρα καθορᾷ.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὖν;

B

ΣΩ. Τούτων οὖν πρότερα φῶμεν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ὡς τὸ πολὺ τὰ γεγραμμένα παρατίθεσθαι ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ θεοφιλεῖς εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ὡς αὐτὸ πολὺ τοῦναντίον, ἢ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα φατέον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς ἡδοναί γ' οὐδὲν ἦντιον πάρεσιν ἔξωγραφημένα, ψευδεῖς δ' αἰταί που.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ψευδέσιν ἄρ' ἡδοναῖς τὰ πολλὰ οἱ πονηροὶ χαίρουσιν, οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀληθεῖσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ δὴ, κατὰ τοὺς νῦν λόγους, ψευδεῖς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς ἡδοναί, μεμιμημένοι μέντοι τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ γελιοῦτερα· καὶ λῦμαι δ' ὡσαύτως.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἦν δοξάζειν μὲν ἥντιως αἰὲν τῷ τὸ παράπαν δοξάζοντι, μὴ ἐπ' οὔσι δὲ μηδ' ἐπὶ γεγονόσι μηδ' ἐπ' ἐσομένοις ἐνίοτε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτά γ' ἦν, οἶμαι, τὰ ἀπεργαζόμενα δόξαν D ψευδοῦ τότε καὶ τὸ ψευδῶς δοξάζειν. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

ἐνεξωγραφημένον] 'He sees the gold, and the pleasures which depend upon it, and moreover he sees himself, as part of the picture, rejoicing in himself exceedingly.' It is strange that any difficulty could have been occasioned by so simple and well-chosen an expression. The change of αὐτὸν into αὐτὸν is indispensable; but the Editors have thought it more prudent to make αὐτὸν mean *himself*, than to change a breathing.

ἐπὶ τὰ γελιοῦτερα] *Conviv.* 215, A. *Polit.* 293, E, ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίονα. Horace, *Epist.* ii. 1, 265.

ficto

In pejus vultu proponi cereus.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν ἐν ἐκείνοις;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἢν μὲν χαίρειν ὄντως αἰεὶ τῷ τὸ παράπαν ὁπωσοῦν καὶ εὐκὴ χαίροντι, μὴ μέντοι ἐπὶ τοῖς οὔσι μηδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς γεγονόσιν ἐνίοτε, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἴσως πλειστάκις ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδὲ μέλλουσί ποτε γενήσεσθαι.

Ε ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἀναγκαῖον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη περὶ φόβον τε καὶ θνυμῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὡς ἔστι καὶ ψευδῆ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐνίοτε;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας [καὶ χρηστὰς] ἄλλως [ἢ] ψευδεῖς] γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἡδονὰς γ', οἶμαι, κατανοοῦμεν ὡς ἄλλον τινα
41 τρόπον εἰσὶ πονηραὶ πλὴν τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴρηκας.

τὴν τούτων ἀντίστροφον ἔξιν] If all that precedes is genuine, I fear that it is a waste of ingenuity to endeavour to explain τούτων. The ἔξιν (namely that a thing may be real, and yet rest on false grounds,) has been shewn to be ἐν ἐκείνοις, that is in δόξα and τὸ δοξάζειν: and we are invited to attribute an analogous ἔξιν to pleasures and pains; but if so, until this is granted and done, it is surely premature to talk of τὴν τούτων ἔξιν. The ἔξιν also which we grant to these must be ἀντίστροφος to another, which is in those. This would lead us to read ἀντ. ἔξιν τῇ ἐν ἐκείνοις; but as to τούτων, it is difficult to see what can be done with it, except to leave it out altogether. But what if we could reverse the direction of the pronouns, and by τούτων understand the notions and beliefs, and by ἐκείνοις pleasures and pains? To do this we must remove ταῖς λύπαις τε καὶ ἡδοναῖς, and frame the sentence thus: οὐκ ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν τούτων ἔξιν ἀντίστροφον ἐκείνοις; For those who think this remedy too bold I can offer no other.

Τί δέ; πονηρὰς] Nothing is plainer than this sentence when we leave out the interpolations. καὶ χρηστὰς is evidently out of place; and a little attention to γιγνομένας shews that ἢ ψευδεῖς is no better. The complete sentence would be ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν πονηρὰς δόξας ἄλλως γιγνομένας (πονηρὰς ἢ τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι);

Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον] The MSS. and Edd. have all Πάνν μὲν οὖν τούναντίον, which is not Greek. As μὲν οὖν, like *immo*, is used when one improves upon another's assertion, and this may be done either by adding to it, or by completely changing it, it denotes either assent or contradiction, according to the words which accompany it. Thus πάνν μὲν οὖν implies that the answerer does not think the first speaker positive enough; it amounts, therefore, to a strong assent. But an assent is out of the question in this passage; so that nothing would remain but to join πάνν with τούναντίον, which would be as absurd in Greek as to say that one thing is *very opposite* to another would be in English.

σχεδὸν γὰρ τῷ ψευδεῖ μὲν οὐ πᾶν πονηρὰς ἂν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θείη, μεγάλη δ' ἄλλη καὶ πολλῇ συμπιπτούσας πονηρίας.

ΣΩ. Τὰς μὲν τοίνυν πονηρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ διὰ πονηρίαν οὐσας τοιαύτας ὀλίγον ἕστερον ἐροῦμεν, ἂν ἔτι δοκῇ νῦν· τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον ἐν ἡμῖν πολλὰς καὶ πολλάκις ἐνοίσας τε καὶ ἐγγυρομένας λεκτέον. τούτῳ γὰρ ἕως ἄχρησθ-
μεθα πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; εἶπερ γ' εἰσίν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Πρωτάρχε, εἰσὶ κατὰ γέ τὴν ἐμὴν. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα, ἕως ἂν κέηται παρ' ἡμῖν, ἀδύνατον ἀνέλεγκτον δί-
που γίγνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Προσιστώμεθα δὴ καθάπερ ἀθληταὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὖ
τὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἶπομεν, εἶπερ μεμνήμεθα, [ὀλίγον] ἐν
τοῖς πρόσθεν, ὡς, ὅταν αἱ λεγόμεναι ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν ἡμῖν ὦσι, C
δίχα ἄρα τότε τὸ σῶμα καὶ χωρὶς τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς παθήμασι
διείληπται.

ΠΡΩ. Μεμνήμεθα, καὶ προερρήθη ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦν ἦν ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν τοῦ σώμα-
τος ἐναντίων ἕξεων ἢ τότε, τὴν δ' ἀλγηδόνα ἢ τινα διὰ πάθος
ἡδονὴν τὸ σῶμα ἦν τὸ παρεχόμενον.

τῷ ψευδεῖ] I have altered τῷ ψεύδει into τῷ ψευδεῖ. He is speaking of the abstract quality, not of some particular lie.

τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δόγμα] It is necessary to caution the reader against Stallbaum's translation of this passage. He explains τὸ δόγμα as the belief that no pleasures are false; ἕως ἂν κέηται is consequently made to mean *so long as it continues*. To such a remark as is thus attributed to Socrates, Protarchus, who was maintaining the opposite side, would scarcely have answered Καλῶς. But τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα (not ἐκεῖνο) obviously refers to the preceding εἰσὶ κατὰ γέ τὴν ἐμὴν, and means the belief that pleasures may be false or true. This is made certain by παρ' ἡμῖν, and no less by κέηται;

for παρ' ἡμῖν must apply to both Socrates and Protarchus, and κείσθαι, which is the passive of θεῖναι, is a word of unequivocal force, whether applied to a law or a proposition. The sense of the passage thus becomes plain: *But until this judgment (of mine) is approved and established in us both, it is impossible for it to escape (or become exempt from) examination*. I have endeavoured to give the force of the word γίγνεσθαι, which, as will be seen, signifies a great deal more than εἶναι.

ἕξεων ἢ τότε] ἕξεων, τὸ δὲ τὴν ἀλγ. is the reading of the received text. The Bodl. has however τοὺς for τὸ δέ, that is, the copyist had before him ΤΟΤΕ and read it as ΤΟΥΣ. On this is founded the emendation ΕΞΕΩΝΗΤΟΤΕ. The

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Συλλογίζου δὲ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν τούτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε.

D ΣΩ. †Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ὁπόταν ἢ ταῦτα, ἅμα παρακεῖσθαι
λέπας τε καὶ ἡδονάς, καὶ τούτων αἰσθήσεις ἅμα παρ' ἀλλή-
λας ἐναντίων οὐσῶν γίνεσθαι, ὃ καὶ νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδ' εἴρηται καὶ συνωμολογημένον ἡμῖν
ἐμπροσθε κεῖται, —

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἦττον ἄμφω τούτω δέχεσθον,
λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, [καὶ] ὅτι τῶν ἀπειρώων εἴτην;

ΠΡΩ. Εἴρηται· τί μῦν;

ΣΩ. †Τίς οὖν μηχανή ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι;

necessary conjunction Δ' was probably lost from its resemblance to the succeeding A, as H was from its likeness to N. The continual confusion of ΔH and AN in MSS., illustrates both these phenomena.

τινα διὰ πάθος ἡδονήν] The best MSS. have πλῆθος for πάθος, an error which arose from a confusion of A and Λ. But though the sentence is thus rid of a second difficulty, another still lies in the sense. Plato is speaking of that condition in which the mind desires the opposite to what the body feels; so that the addition of ἡδονήν makes the mind to desire pain. Many ways might be proposed to remove this difficulty, but the question is not what Plato might have written, but what he wrote, and the ways are too numerous to allow us to fix upon the very one. The sense would be secured by τῆν δ' ἀληθῆσθαι τὴν διὰ ΤΙ Πάθος ἡδονήν ἐνόν κ. τ. ε. The meaning of διὰ πάθος appears to be, *through actual impression*, as opposed to the pleasure of *expectation*.

Γίγνεται] is not this an error occasioned by the reminiscence of the foregoing γινόμενον? If we read Φαίνεται, we shall get rid of the clumsy γίγνεται γίνεσθαι, and we shall have a better correspondence to ἐφάνη, and to Protagoras' Φαίνεται γοῦν.

εἴτην] The construction is εἴρηται

ὡς δέχεσθον, ὅτι εἴτην,—where ὡς introduces the fact, and ὅτι the reason of it. This gets rid of the causeless departure from the ordinary rules of construction, in defence of which I formerly quoted *Phædo* 95, D. But there also the text is not trustworthy. καὶ ταλαιπωρουμένη τε δὴ κ. τ. ε. has already excited the suspicion of Heindorf, though I do not assent to his mode of correcting it. By striking out ἀποφαίνεσθαι and by changing καὶ into ἦ; we clear away the two only difficulties. Then ἢ would take ζῶν and ἀπολλύοιτο for the same reason that ὅτι takes εἴτην.

Τίς οὖν μηχανή] The Zurich editors have adopted Stallbaum's reading, Τίς οὖν; but if Plato had wanted to use the enclitic, he would have written ἔστι τις, or have placed the enclitic anywhere rather than at the beginning of the sentence. A better correction would have been, Τί οὖν; μηχανή ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; There is a want of adjustment in the different parts of the dialogue. For the question here asked is not more fully explained afterwards, and εἰ is no answer to ἢ ἢ or to Bekker's conjectural Ποῖα. It is not improbable that something has fallen out, perhaps to the following effect. Τί οὖν; μηχανή ταῦτ' ὁρθῶς κρίνεσθαι; (τῆδε δὲ σκεψάμενος περὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.)

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ δὴ καὶ πῶς;

E

ΣΩ. Εἰ τόδε τὸ βούλημα ἡμῖν τῆς κρίσεως τοῦτων· ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ διαγνῶναι [βούλεται] ἐλάσσιτε, τίς τοῦτων πρὸς ἀλλήλας μείζων καὶ τίς ἐλάτιων καὶ τίς μᾶλλον [καὶ τίς σφοδρότερα], λύπη τε πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπη πρὸς λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴ πρὸς ἡδονήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι ταῦτά τε τοιαῦτα καὶ ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἐν μὲν ὕψει τὸ πόρρωθεν καὶ ἐγγύθεν ὁρᾶν τὰ μεγέθη τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀφανίζει καὶ ψευδῆ ποιεῖ δοξάζειν, 42 ἐν λύπαις δ' ἄρα καὶ ἡδοναῖς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτὸν τοῦτο γινόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Πολὺ μὲν οὖν μᾶλλον, ὃ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἐναντίον δὴ τὸ νῦν τῷ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθε γέγονεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τότε μὲν αἱ δόξαι ψευδεῖς τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς αὐταὶ γινόμεναι τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἅμα τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς παθήματος ἀνεπίπλασαν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

B

Εἰ τόδε τὸ βούλημα] I have changed the reading and punctuation. τοῦτων ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ is certainly not elegant, but by explaining τοῦτων to be the pleasures and pains and ἐν τοιούτοις τισὶ to be on such occasions, some of us may be brought to tolerate it. But τὸ βούλημα τῆς κρίσεως διαγνῶναι βούλεται brings its own eudemnation with it. It may be said that there is no impropriety in the expression—"The will wills". But τὸ βούλημα is not the will, but a particular wish, and τὸ β. τῆς κρίσεως is the wish to judge. In the *Laws* 863, B, Plato declares Pleasure πράττειν ὅ τι περ ἂν αὐτῆς ἢ βούλησις ἐβέλῃσῃ; but this expression though unusual was inevitable; for Pleasure cannot desire, and if he had said ἐπιθυμία, he would have been obliged to forego the main ground of opposition to θυμός, περὶ μετ' ἀπάτης. In that passage I will take this opportunity of remarking that βιάζεσθαι written compendiously has been miscopied βιάλου. But how can the wish to judge judge?

—and if it cannot judge, how can it wish to judge? My correction is fully borne out by Protarchus' answer—ἡ βούλησις τῆς κρίσεως αὐτῆ. By leaving out καὶ τίς σφοδρότερα, the difficulty which beset τίς μᾶλλον disappears. Compare above 37, D, σφόδρα ἐχάτεραι, which answers exactly to μᾶλλον λύπη &c.

Ἐναντίον] This is perhaps the most beautiful of all the remarks in this admirable disquisition on pleasure. Formerly it had been agreed that notions, as they happened to be true or false, occasioned a corresponding difference in the pleasures and pains depending on them; but now it has been shown that pleasures and pains, by their comparative distance in time, and by their mutual contrast, produce false notions about themselves.

ἀνεπίπλασαν] Observe the imperfect: *Were found to communicate their quality* (of truth or falsehood) *to the pains and pleasures.*

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' αὐταὶ διὰ τὸ πόρρωθὲν τε καὶ ἐγγύθεν ἐκάστοτε μεταβαλλόμεναι θεωρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἅμα τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας, αἱ μὲν ἴδοναὶ παρὰ τὸ λυπηρὸν μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι, λῦπαι δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ παρ' ἴδονάς τοῦναντίον ἐκείνας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα διὰ ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὅσων μείζους τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐκάτεραι καὶ ἐλάτους φαίνονται, τοῦτ' ἀποτεμόμενος ἐκατέρων τὸ φαινόμενον C ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, οὐτ' αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς φαινόμενον ἔρεῖς, οὐδ' αὖ ποτὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος τῆς ἴδουσης καὶ λύπης γιγνόμενον ὁρθόν τε καὶ ἀληθές τολμήσεις λέγειν.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὐδ'.

ΣΩ. Τούτων τοίνυν ἐξῆς ὀψόμεθα, ἐὰν τῆδ' ἀπαντῶμεν, ἴδονάς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζώοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ καὶ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Εἴρηται που πολλάκις ὅτι, τῆς φύσεως ἐκάστων δια- D φθειρομένης μὲν συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει καὶ πληρώσει καὶ κενώσει καὶ τισιν αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεισι, λῦπαί τε καὶ ἀληθῆνες καὶ ὁδύναὶ καὶ πάντα, ὅπῃσα τοιαῦτ' ὀνόματ' ἔχει, ξυμβαίνει γιγνόμενα.

ΠΡΩ. Ναί, ταῦτ' εἴρηται πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Εἰς δέ γε τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν ὅταν καθιστῆται, ταύτην αὖ τὴν κατάστασιν ἴδουὴν ἀπεδεξάμεθα παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὅταν περὶ τὸ σῶμα μηδὲν τούτων γιγνόμενον ἡμῶν ἦ;

ΠΡΩ. Πότε δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν γένοιτο, ὦ Σόκρατες;

E ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν πρὸς λόγον ἐστίν, ὦ Πρωταρχε, ὃ σὺ νῦν ἔρου, τὸ ἐρώτημα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διότι τὴν ἐμὴν ἐρώτησιν οὐ κωλύει ἐμὲ διερέσθαι σε πάλιν.

Οὐκοῦν, ὅσῳ] *That much then, by that the appearance itself is a right ap- which either appears greater than it really appearance, nor will you venture to call is, that apparent and unreal quantity, that part of the pleasure or the pain you will cut off, and you will neither say which is founded upon it, right and true.*

ΠΡΩ. Ποίαν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ γίγνοιτο, ὃ Πρώταρχε, φήσω, τὸ τοιοῦτον, τί ποτ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐξ αὐτοῦ συμβαίνειν ἡμῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἐλάτερα φήης;

ΣΩ. Οὕτως.

ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτό γ', ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς οὐθ' ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ποτ' οὐτ' ἂν τις λύπη.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, οἶμαι, τόδε λέγεις, ὡς 43
αἰεὶ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν συμβαίνειν, ὡς οἱ σοφοὶ φασιν·
αἰεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγουσι γὰρ οὖν, καὶ δοκοῦσί γ' οὐ φάυλως λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, μὴ φαῦλοί γ' ὄντες; ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔπεκ-
στῆραι τὸν λόγον ἐπιφερόμενον τοῦτον βούλομαι. τῆδ' οὖν δια-
νοοῦμαι φεῖγειν, καὶ σύ μοι ξύμφευγε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε ὅπη.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖνυν οὕτως ἔστω, φῶμεν πρὸς τούτους.
σὺ δ' ἀπόκριαι· πρότερον αἰεὶ πάντα, ὅποσα πάσχει τι τῶν B
ἐμψύχων, ταῦτ' αἰσθάνεται τὸ πάσχον, καὶ οὐτ' ἀξινόμενοι
λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὔτε τι τῶν τοιοῦτων οὐδὲν πάσχον-
τες, ἢ πᾶν τούναντίον; ὀλίγου γὰρ τά γε τοιαῦτα λέληθε πάνθ'
ἡμᾶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἄπαν δῆπου τούναντίον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοῖνυν καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθέν, ὡς
αἰ μεταβολαὶ κάτω τε καὶ ἄνω γιγνόμενα λύπας τε καὶ ἡδο-
νὰς ἀπεργάζονται.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὡδ' ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον. C

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

αἰεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα) The passages in Plato, from which we may learn a full account of this doctrine of Heraclitus, are *Theaet.* 179—80, *Sophist.* 249—50, and *Cratyl.* 402. It is here alluded to, because at first sight it would appear to exclude the possibility of that state of indifference to pleasure and pain from which Socrates is about to show another instance of a false pleasure, namely,

where relief from pain (which is indifference) is thought and spoken of as positive pleasure.

ἔπεκστῆραι] *Soph.* *Ajax*, 82. φρονοῦντα γὰρ νῦν οὐκ ἂν ἐξέστην ἄκωφ.

Τί μὴν] This generally amounts to nothing more than an assent; but as its original meaning is *What else?* it is perfectly suitable here.

ΣΩ. Ὡς αἱ μὲν μεγάλαι μεταβολαὶ λύπας τε καὶ ἰδονὰς ποιοῦσιν ἡμῖν, αἱ δ' αὖ μέτριαί τε καὶ σμικραὶ τὸ παράπαν οὐδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότερον οὕτως ἢ κείνως, ὦ Σόφρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν εἰ ταῦθ' οὕτω, πάλιν ὁ νῦν δὴ ἠρθεῖς βίος ἂν ἦλοι.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖος;

ΣΩ. Ὅν ἀλυπὸν τε καὶ ἄνευ χαρμονῶν ἔφαμεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τιθῶμεν τριτοὺς ἡμῖν βίους, ἓνα μὲν Ἰ ἡδύν, τὸν δ' αὖ λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἓνα μηδέτερα. ἢ πῶς ἂν φαιῖς σὺ περὶ τούτων;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγ' ἢ ταύτῃ, τρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς βίους.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτὸν τῷ χαίρειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ὅποταν οὖν ἀκούσῃς ὡς ἡδιστον πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλύπως διατελεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα, τί τόθ' ἐπολαμβάνεις λέγειν τὸν τοιοῦτον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἢδὺ λέγειν φαίνεται ἔμοιγ' οὕτως τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τριῶν οὖν ἦντων ἡμῖν, ὧντινων βούλει, τίθει, καλ-
Ε λίσσιν ἔν' ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα, τὸ μὲν χρυσόν, τὸ δ' ἄργυρον, τρίτον δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ μηδέτερα τούτων ἔσθ' ἡμῖν ὅπως θάτερα γέ-
νοιτ' ἂν, χρυσὸς ἢ ἄργυρος;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ὁ μέσος βίος ἰδὺς ἢ λυπηρὸς γενόμενος

ὧντινων βούλει] He is not speaking of the three *lives* in particular, but supposes any three things, to two of which names have been given, but the third is merely known as *not either*. The question then is, can it *become* either? See the next note.

γενόμενος] Commonly λεγόμενος. But when we consider how awkwardly this word is placed, and then look to the preceding γένοιτ' ἂν, it seems scarcely

possible to doubt that this is one of the many instances where λεγόμενος has usurped the place of γενόμενος. It would be childish to say ὁ μέσος βίος is not, and cannot be rightly thought to be, that from which it has been formally distinguished; but it is necessary for the argument to show that the circumstance of its coming immediately after pain cannot *alter* its nature, and make it *become* pleasure.

ὀρθῶς ἂν ποτε, οὐτ' εἰ δοξάζοι τις, δοξάζεται, οὐτ' εἰ λέγοι, λεχθεῖν, κατὰ γε τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὃ ἔταίρε, λεγόντων γε ταῦτα καὶ δοξαζόντων αἰσθανόμεθα.

44

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν καὶ χαίρειν οἴονται τότε, ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται;

ΠΡΩ. Φασὶ γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν οἴονται τότε χαίρειν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔλεγόν που.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ψευδῆ γε μὴν δοξάζουσι περὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εἴπερ χωρὶς [τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν] ἡ φύσις ἐκατέρου.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μὴν χωρὶς γ' ἦν.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αἰρώμεθα παρ' ἡμῖν ταῦτ' εἶναι, καθάπερ ἄρτι, τρία, ἢ δύο μόνα, λύπην μὲν κακὸν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, Β τὴν δ' ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν, αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ὄν, ἡδὺ προσ-αγορεύεσθαι;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ νῦν τοῦτο, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτώμεθα ὑφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ μανθάνω.

ΣΩ. Ὅντως γὰρ τοὺς πολεμίους Φιλῆβου τοῦδε, ὃ Πρωταρχε, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις δ' αὐτοὺς τίνας;

ΣΩ. Καὶ μάλα δεινοὺς λεγομένους τὰ περὶ φύσιν, οὐ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὐ φασιν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Λυπῶν ταύτας εἶναι πάσας ἀποφυγὰς, ὡς νῦν οἱ περὶ C Φίληβον ἡδονὰς ἐπονομάζουσιν.

εἴπερ χωρὶς] See Appendix.

Πότερον οὖν αἰρώμεθα] One alternative having been disposed of, the other is taken up: "If freedom from pain is not pleasure, is there such a thing as absolute pleasure?" And thus is introduced another question: "Is pleasure possible without pain?" I have added, in the Appendix, a translation of a passage from Kant's *Anthropologie*, which may perhaps interest some readers.

τοὺς πολεμίους] This is generally understood of Antisthenes. The description applies very well to what we learn of him from Diogenes Laertius. οὐ τέχνη reminds one of the many sneers against the Platonic Ideas which are attributed to him and his friends. *A disposition without meanness but harsh*, is also in keeping with his character, though not with Plato's general appreciation of the Cynics.

· ΠΡΩ. Τούτοις οὖν ἡμᾶς πότερα πείθεσθαι ξυμβουλεύεις, ἢ πῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ μάντεσι προσχρῆσθαι τισι, μαντενομένοις οὐ τέχνη ἀλλὰ τιμ δυσχερεία φύσεως οὐκ ἔργον οὐς λίαν μεμισηκότων τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμιν καὶ νερομιζότων οὐδὲν ἕγιές, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπαγωγόν, γοίτημα, D οὐκ ἡδονή, εἶναι. τούτοις μὲν οὖν ταῦτ' ἂν προσχρήσαιο, σκεψάμενος εἶτι καὶ τᾶλλ' αὐτῶν δυσχεράσματα· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, αἶ γέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἡδοναὶ ἀλιθεῖς εἶναι, πεύσει, ἔν' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν λόγοιν σκεψάμενοι τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς παραθώμεθα πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Μεταδιώκομεν δὴ τούτους ὥσπερ ξυμμάχους, κατὰ τὸ τῆς δυσχερείας αὐτῶν ἴχνος. οἶμαι γὰρ τοιόνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ἀρχομένους ποθὲν ἄνωθεν, ὡς, εἰ βουληθεῖμεν ὁτοοῦν E εἶδος τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, οἶον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατ' ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἂν μᾶλλον συννοήσαιμεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι; δεῖ δὴ σε, ὃ Πρώταρχε, καθάπερ ἐμοί, καὶ τούτοις τοῖς δυσχεραίνουσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ λέγω γ' αὐτοῖς ὅτι πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος ἰδεῖν ἦντινὰ ποτ' ἔχει φύσιν βουληθεῖμεν, οὐκ εἰς τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς ἀπο- 45 βλεπτόν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς ἀροστάτας καὶ σφοδροστάτας λεγομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πᾶς ἂν σοι ταύτη συγχωροίη τὰ νῦν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροί γε, [αἵπερ καὶ μέγιστα τῶν ἡδονῶν,] ὃ λέγομεν πολλάκις, αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμά εἰσιν αὐταί.

μεμισηκότων] This is not a capricious change from the dative to the genitive, nor is to be taken absolutely, for then αὐτῶν would have been necessary; but it is in construction with δυσχερεῖα φύσεως—With the severity of men who have too much hated, &c.

ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' αὐτῆς] So that this very attractiveness of it is a trick and imposture, and not pleasure.

δυσχεράσματα is condemned by Pol- lux as bad Greek, and Lobeck observes that such compound verbs as ἀνοηταίνω, δυσθυμαίνω, and the like (where the

noun from which the verb comes is already a compound), have no substantives derived from them. But ἀκολαστάσματα in Aristoph. *Lysis* 398 is a sound reading, and the scarcity of such formations would arise partly from the scarcity of the verbs, and partly from a fear of their length.

τὰς πολλοστὰς ἡδονὰς] The smallest pleasures. τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητι, things having the smallest degrees of hardness. The word is formed like the ordinal numbers used to express fractions.

'ΑΛΛ' οὖν] The MSS. have Ἄρ' οὖν,

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν μείζους εἰσὶ τε καὶ γίγνεται περὶ τοὺς [κείμενους] ἐν ταῖς νόσοις ἢ περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας; ἐλάβηθῶμεν δὲ μὴ προπειῶς ἀποκρινόμενοι πταισώμεν πη. τάχα γὰρ ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν περὶ ὑγιαίνοντας.

ΠΡΩ. Εἰζός γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐχ αὔται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑπερβάλλουσιν, ὧν ἂν καὶ ἐπιθυμία μέγισται προγίγνεται;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθές.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οἱ πυρέττοντες καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι μᾶλλον διψῶσι καὶ ἕργοσι, καὶ πάντων, ὅποσα διὰ

which is incompatible with γε, and as γε is not found in the Bodleian and its fellows, it has been omitted in the recent Editions. But as it is impossible to account for the intrusion of the word in the other MSS., its omission in the first-mentioned must be ascribed to negligence. With γε once restored, the change of Ἄρ' into Ἀλλ' becomes inevitable; and the latter appears to me to be infinitely more in keeping with the nature of the observation; as it is more reasonable in speaking of a matter of every-day talk, to say that *we conclude it is admitted*, than to *ask whether it is so*. But the rest of the sentence requires careful consideration. The subject for inquiry is simply this: "Which are the greatest pleasures?" "Whether they are easily procured", does not concern the inquiry, though it may serve to designate them when found. If we remember that αὐταῖ represents αἱ ἀκρόταται καὶ σφοδρόταται, we see that so far there is nothing unsound in the sentence. Ἀλλ' οὖν αἱ πρόχειροί γε, ὁ λέγομεν πολλάκις, εἰσὶν αὐταί: but we may go further and introduce αἱ περὶ τὸ σῶμα. If then we look at the remainder, we see not only that it was unsuited to our purpose, but that it begins with ΑΠΠΕΡ, the same beginning as that of one of the unsuspecting parts already admitted. That is to say; a copyist had got as far as ΑΠΠΕΡ and stopped. Afterwards he saw that he had skipped ὁ λέγομεν πολλάκις; so he returns to this, but forgets to cancel ΑΠΠΕΡ. "Here is some gap", says a grammarian, "which

we must fill up"; and he fills it up so as to make Plato say that the common bodily pleasures which are also the greatest are *the most intense*. *En cor Zenodoti! En jecur Cratetis!*

[κείμενους] I have put κείμενους in brackets. Plato could not use the article with one participle and not with the other, but he must use it with ἐν ταῖς νόσοις, whether the participle had it or not.

προγίγνεται] This is Stephens' emendation for προσγίγνεται; any one who will take the trouble to attend to the *Variæ Lectiones* of even the best collations, and see the blunders com-

mitted in πρὸ and πρ (i.e., πρὸς), will at once see that it is perfectly absurd to decide such differences as these by the authority of the MSS.

πάντων, ὅποσα] The received text is πάντα ὅποσα. I have written πάντων, both because it is necessary, and because the neglect of terminations and the habit of giving the same termination to two consecutive words is confessedly of common occurrence. ἐνδείξα alone might leave us in doubt whether it ought not to be περὶ πάντα; but the addition of ἀποπληρουμένων decides the question in favour of the genitive. Stallbaum's explanatory paraphrase πάντα εἰώθασι πάσχειν ὅποσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν shews an utter misconception of what brevity authorises or not, is untrue in fact, and while it gives καὶ the office of joining two coordinate clauses, leaves τε to join two sentences.

τοῦ σώματος εἰώθασι πάσχειν, μᾶλλον τ' ἐνδεία ξυντείνονται καὶ ἀποπληρουμένων μείζους ἡδονὰς ἴσχυουσιν; ἢ τοῦτ' οὐ γίνομεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι;

C ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν τοῦν ῥηθὲν φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ὁρθῶς ἂν φανοίμεθα λέγοντες ὡς, εἴ τις τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ἰδεῖν βούλοιο, οὐκ εἰς ὑγίειαν ἀλλ' εἰς νόσον ἰόντας δεῖ σκοπεῖν; ὅρα δέ· μή με [ἡγῆ] διανοῦ[μενον] ἐρωτᾷν σε εἰ πλείω χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα νοσοῦντες τῶν ὑγιαινότων, ἀλλ' οἷον μέγεθός με ζητεῖν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα [περὶ τοῦ] τοιοῦτον ποῦ ποτὲ γίγνεται ἐλάχιστε. νοῆσαι γὰρ δεῖν φαιμέν ἦντινα φύσιν ἔχει, καὶ τίνα λέγουσιν οἱ φάσιοντες

D μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν αὐτήν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἐπομαι [τῷ λόγῳ σου].

ΣΩ. Τάχα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐχ ἦττον δεῖξεις, ἀποκρινεῖ γάρ· ἐν ὕβρει μείζους ἡδονὰς, οὐ πλείους λέγω, τῷ σφόδρα δὲ καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον ὑπερεχούσας ὁρᾷς ἢ ἐν τῷ σώφρονι βίῳ; λέγε δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' ἔμαθον ὃ λέγεις, καὶ πολὺ τὸ διαφέρειν ὁρῶ. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ σώφρονάς που καὶ ὁ παροικιαζόμενος ἐπίσχει

ξυντείνονται] The Books have συγγίγονται. Τέλομαι and γένομαι (for so it is often written in MS.) are continually confounded. This I first learned from a note of Cohet in his Edition of a Fragment of Philostratus. I have since found another instance in Strabo xvi, 3, where we must read ὥστε ἐπιτείνεσθαι τὸ παράδοξον "so that the marvel is intensified". Compare below 46, D, ξύντασιν ἀγρίαν, and 47, A, ξυντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ. I am acquainted with the fragments of Eupolis and Teleclides where συγγίγνεσθαι is coupled with μᾶζους and with φάγοισι; but they are merely comic expressions for enjoying, like Aristophanes' *having an interview with grapes*. Φροντίσι συγγεγέννημαι (Eup. fragm.) is a little more apposite, but συγγίγνεσθαι οὐκ ἔστι τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον δεχομένων.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ῥηθὲν] νῦν ῥηθὲν is the common reading; but there is no authority but that of a worthless copy for νῦν. My impression is that οὖν should be οὕτω, which will make νῦν unnecessary.

ὅρα δέ] If any one still retains his belief that all the writers of our copies were scrupulous about the text, so as even to prefer nonsense to falsification (for doubtless there were some such) let him look at the words which follow ὅρα δέ. διανοῦ is thought to be mutilated, so it is turned into διανοούμενον; then the sense demands the very thing which has been thus sacrificed, and so ἡγῆ is invented. Again τοιοῦτον by some blunder is read or written as ταίουτου; immediately some one is at hand with a healing supplement, and περὶ τοῦ is plastered upon the text; in the meanwhile τὸ σφόδρα ταίουτου is utterly lost.

τῷ λόγῳ σου] I have put this Alexandrian phrase in brackets.

οὐχ ἦττον δεῖ[ξαις] I entirely agree with Stallbaum that it is, 'nodum in scirpo quærere,' to be dissatisfied with these words; but his own translation of them has led him to suspect another word which is equally sound. The sense is, *You will presently prove it (that you understand me) no less (than you now*

λόγος ἐκάστοτε, ὃ τὸ Μηδὲν ἔγαν παρακλεινόμενος, ᾧ πεί- E
θονται· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀφρόνων τε καὶ ὑβριστῶν μέχρι μανίας ἢ
σοφοδρά ἡδονὴ κατέχονσα περιβοήτους ἀπεργάζεται.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς· καὶ εἴ γε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς ἐν τινι
πονηρία ψυχῆς [καὶ τοῦ σώματος], ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἀρετῇ μέγισται
μὲν ἡδοναί, μέγισται δὲ καὶ λύπαι, γίνονται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτων τινὰς προελομενον δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι,
τίνα ποτὲ τρόπον ἐχούσας ἐλέγομεν αὐτὰς εἶναι μεγίστας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

46

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ τὰς τῶν τοιῶνδε νοσημάτων ἡδονὰς, τίνα
ποτ' ἔχουσι τρόπον.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίων;

ΣΩ. Τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων, ἃς οὐκ εἵπομεν δυσχερεῖς μι-
σοῦσι παντελῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας;

ΣΩ. Οἶον τὰς τῆς ψύρας ἰάσεις τῷ τρίβειν, καὶ ὅσα
τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἄλλης δεόμενα φαρμάξεως. τοῦτο γὰρ δὴ τὸ πά-
θος ἡμῖν, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, τί ποτε γῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι; πότερον
ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην;

ΠΡΩ. Σύμμικτον τοῦτο γε [ἄρα], ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔοικε γί-
γνεσθαί τι καλόν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μὴν ἂν Φιλῆβου γ' ἔνεκα παρεθέμην τὸν λόγον· B

*profess it), for you will answer my ques-
tion.*

περιβοήτους] *Frantic.* The word is properly applied to men maddened by the noise of some Bacchanalian or other orgies, and then generally of extravagant and impetuous characters. It is here apposed to the staid and seemly demeanour of the temperate.

[καὶ τοῦ σώματος] It is impossible that this passage should be correct as we now read it. Plato has passed from the diseases of the body to ὑβρις, which is a disease of the mind. The presence of the article betrays the interpolator.

[ἄρα] I have cancelled ἄρα as perfectly unmeaning. Some scribe had written σύμμικτον τοῦτο γὰρ through mistaking γε. Another came and turned γὰρ into γ' ἄρ'.

Οὐ μὴν ἂν Φιλῆβου γ'] The Coislinian has μὴν, which one Editor adopts and so affords to another the opportunity for telling the world that δὴ is never put after μὴν. A little attention to the sense would have been better bestowed than it is on such a truism. As the words stand in the Books, Soerates is made to say that he did not bring forward these instances about iteh on account of Philebus. Probably not; but why say so? Is he afraid lest Φιλῆβος ὁ καλὸς should be troubled with the complaint? Or can he think it necessary to declare that it was not to make fun of him that he alluded to it? As this is out of the question, the only other reason for bringing Philebus in at all must be that Philebus is fastidious, and will look upon him as

ἀλλ' ἄνευ τούτων, ὃ Προίαρχε, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἐπομένων, ἂν μὴ κατορθῶσι, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα διακρίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον.

ΣΩ. Ἐπὶ τὰς τούτων ξυγγενεῖς, τὰς ἐν τῇ μίξει κοινοῦσας, λέγεις;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Εἰςὶ τοῖνον [μίξεις] αἱ μὲν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. τὰς δ' αὖ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀνευρόσομεν λύπας ἡδοναῖς μιχθείσας, τοτὲ μὲν ἡδονὰς τὰ ξυναμφοτέρα, τοτὲ δὲ λύπας ἐπι-καλουμένας.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὅποταν ἐν τῇ καταστάσει τις ἢ τῇ διαφθορᾷ τάναντι ἕμα πάθη πάσχη, ποτὲ ἠγῶν θέρηται καὶ θερμανόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχεται, ζητῶν, οἶμαι, τὸ μὲν ἔχειν, τοῦ δ' ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον πικρόγλυκυ [μεμιγμένον], μετὰ δὲ δυσπαλλακτίας παρόν, ἀγανάκτησιν καὶ ὕστερον ξέντασιν ἀγρίαν ποιεῖ.

φορτικὸς for making such nasty allusions. This is in keeping with the other traits of him in the dialogue; but then he must say: "For Philebus' sake I would not have introduced this topic, but I cannot do without it." And so the ΔΗ which helped Stallbaum to chastise Fischer disappears into ΑΝ, and as μήν is the equivalent of μένοι and γε is found in all the Books, I have adopted the latter particle also.

Οὐκοῦν ἰτέον] In the Books Protarchus' speech in continued down to ξυγγενεῖς: which arrangement makes the young man show the way and the philosopher follow it.

Εἰςὶ τοῖνον] I have cancelled μίξεις. Unless this be done, and ἡδονὰς κοινοῦσας be understood, the following clauses make downright nonsense. "There are bodily pleasures which mix in bodies, and mental pleasures which mix in the mind", is true and simple. But if you say there are mixtures—then one of each pair, either κατὰ τὸ σῶμα or ἐν ἄ. τ. σώμασι, either αὖ-

τῆς τ. ψ. or ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ becomes quite meaningless.

ποτέ] This word occurs twice in the Bodleian, both before and after ἠγῶν. It is properly cancelled in the second place, for being used in opposition to ἐνίοτε, it would be placed in such a part of the sentence as would mark that it is not used as a mere enclitic. Bekker's correction of πικρόγλυκυ for πικρῶ γλυκὺ is fully borne out by τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον: but in recommending it he should also have advised the expulsion of μεμιγμένον. For δυσπαλλακτίας Hirschig reads δυσπαλλαξίας. But the departure from analogy is in favour of our reading, as a probable Atticism.

ξέντασιν] This is the reading of the best MSS.; the others have σύστασιν, which is irreconcilable with ἀγρίαν, such an epithet being only applicable to a word signifying some active process. Besides, σύστασις after ἀγανάκτησις would be an anticlimax; for it is properly used to denote the effect of sadness

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλ' ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν αἱ τοιαῦται μίξεις αἱ μὲν ἐξ ἴσων εἰσὶ λυ-
πῶν τε καὶ ἡδονῶν, αἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐτέρων πλείονων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν, ὅταν πλείους λῦπαι τῶν ἡδονῶν
γίνωνται, τὰς τῆς ψώρας λεγομένας νῦν δὴ ταύτας εἶναι καὶ
τὰς τῶν γαργαλισμῶν. ὁπότεν δ' ἐντὸς τὸ ζέον ἦ καὶ τὸ
φλεγμαῖνον, τῇ τρίψει δὲ καὶ τῇ κνήσει μὴ ἐφικνῆται τις, τὰ
δ' ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέη, τοτὲ φέροντες εἰς πῦρ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς E
τοῦναντίον μεταβάλλοντες, ἀπορίας ἐνίот' ἀμηγάνους. [ἡδονάς],
τοτὲ δὲ τοῦναντίον τοῖς ἐντὸς πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἔξω λύπας ἡδο-
νάς ξυγχερασθείσας, εἰς ὁπότερ' ἂν ῥέψῃ, παρῆσχοντο, τῷ τὰ
συγκεκριμένα βία διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν καὶ ἁμοῦ
λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέναι.

47

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν ὁπότεν [αὐ] πλείων ἡδονῇ κατὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα
πάντα ξυμμυχθῆ, τὸ μὲν ὑπομεμιγμένον τῆς λύπης γαργαλίζει
τε καὶ ἡρέμα ἀγανακτεῖν ποιεῖ, τὸ δ' αὐ τῆς ἡδονῆς πολὺ
πλεῖον ἐγχευμένον συντείνει τε καὶ ἐνίοτε πηδᾶν ποιεῖ, καὶ

in turning the mind back upon itself. Συντείνειν is used a little further on as the effect of pleasure; it is obvious that the figure of speech being derived from the strain upon a cord, is applicable alike to the rackings of pain (renes morbo tentantur acuto) or the thrill of pleasure (pertentant gaudia pectus).

Λέγε δὴ τὰς μὲν] The first part of this passage is easy enough, when once we learn to separate the process referred to in the sentence ending with γαργαλισμῶν from that described afterwards. I have put δ' after ὁπότεν. The first case is that where κνήσεις and τρίψεις are said διαχεῖν, because they discuss the heat in the part affected. When this is insufficient, the affection being too deep-seated, then recourse is had to irritation of the surface in order to relieve the interior. This is effected by bringing the parts to the fire, and shifting the affection to the opposite place: that is to say, by producing external heat in place of internal. When men do this, they sometimes produce terrible

ἀπορίας, states where pleasure and pain are confounded, and the patient does not know what to do with himself. This sense is brought out by transposing ἀπορίας, and cancelling ἡδονάς. The only difficulty that remains is in the last clause; they procure, as the case may turn out, sometimes great embarrassments, and sometimes mingled pleasure for the inner parts contrasted with the pain of the outer, by forcibly dissolving what is compacted and compacting what is separate, and by procuring to themselves pain mingled with pleasure. This is saying that they do a thing by doing it; what we need to be told is, how that which they do involves a mixture of pain and pleasure. I therefore propose to read τῷ τὰ σ. β. δ. ἢ τὰ δ. συγχεῖν, ὁμοῦ λύπας ἡδοναῖς παρατιθέντες: procuring pain along with pleasure, by forcibly dispersing (κνήσει καὶ τρίψει) what is congested (the accumulated heat), and determining what is dispersed (by inflaming the surface artificially).

παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, παντοῖα δὲ πνεύματα ἡ ἀπεργαζόμενα πᾶσαν ἐκπλήξιν καὶ βράς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπεργάζεται.

B ΠΡΩ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγειν γ', ὃ ἔταίρε, αὐτόν τε περὶ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖ καὶ ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλον, ὡς ταύταις ταῖς ἡδοναῖς τερπόμενος οἷον ἀποθνήσκει. καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ ἡπαντάπασιν αἰεὶ μεταδιώκει τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τε καὶ ἀφρονέστερος ὢν τυγχάνῃ· καὶ καλεῖ δὴ μεγίστας ταύτας, καὶ τὸν ἐν ταύταις ὃ τι μάλιστα' αἰεὶ ζῶντ' εὐδαιμονέστατον καταριθμεῖται.

ΠΡΩ. Πάντα, ὃ Σόκρατες, τὰ συμβαίνοντα πρὸς τῶν
C πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς δόξαν διεπέραναι.

παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα] It causes all manner of changes in complexion, and changes in posture, and changes in breathing, which produce the utmost excitement and shouting with delirium. Though I have retained ἀπεργαζόμενα, and endeavoured to render it as above, it is rather as against Buttmann's ἀπεργαζόμενον than as believing in the genuineness of the word. The singular would mean that the excess of the pleasure by producing the changes in complexion, posture &c., produced the mental defects; which is no truer than that these changes cause them. But the very combination ἀπεργαζόμενα ἀπεργάζεται is unworthy of even a third-rate writer. I say ἀπεργάζεται, for this is the Bodleian reading, and ἐνεργάζεται is merely a contrivance, and not a successful one, made by the corrector of some inferior copy, to avoid the inelegant repetition. As to πνεύματα, no doubt the respiration would be troubled; as in the description of Hercules' madness, we read (H. F. 869) ἀμνοῦς δ' οὐ σωφρονίζει, ταῦρος ὡς ἐς ἐμβολήν. But πνεύματα do not admit of sufficient variety to be called παντοῖα. It is not unlikely that this addition is due to some corrupt dittographia, and that the old text ran thus; παντοῖα μὲν χρώματα, παντοῖα δὲ σχήματα, πᾶσαν δ' ἐκπλήξιν καὶ βράς μετ' ἀφροσύνης ἀπεργάζεται.

ἄλλον περὶ ἄλλου] One class of MSS. has ἄλλον, the other περὶ ἄλλου. I

have combined the two readings.

παντάπασιν αἰεὶ μεταδιώκει] The word παντάπασιν is not applicable to αἰεὶ, nor does it seem compatible with τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον, for while the first denotes thoroughness of pursuit, the other graduates the pursuit according to the moral condition of the man. As this whole speech is about what men say and think, what if Plato wrote thus: καὶ ταύτας γε δὴ πάντας φασὶ δεῖν μεταδιώκειν τ. μ., ὅσῳ ἂν ἀκολαστότερός τις κ. α. ὢν τυγχάνῃ?

τὰ συμβαίνοντα] One Editor approves of Ficinus' translation, *omnia quae apud multos in existimationem veniunt*. But neither this rendering, nor what I once gave, that which one meets with from the common run of men as to opinion, is in keeping with the Greek; for we have not συμβαίνοντα τοῖς πολλοῖς nor συμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν but ἔ. πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν. If this is equivalent to περὶ ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ συμβαίνουσι, the sense will not be unsuitable; but I know of no such phrase. Perhaps Plato wrote: τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξαν. I can offer no better rendering of εἰς δόξαν than, *as far as belief*. In the *Euthydemus* (305, υ) we have it in this sense; νικητήρια εἰς δόξαν οἴεσθαι σοφίας πέρι, "that they will carry off the prize of wisdom, *as far as public belief is concerned*". But this sense would make men's agreement a mere pretence or a delusion, which is not intended.

ΣΩ. Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ Πρώταρχε, τῶν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς παθήμασιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐπιπολῆς τε καὶ ἐντός [κερασθέντων]. Ἐπερὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι τάναντία ξυμβάλλεται, λύπην θ' ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην, ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφοτέρα κράσιν ἵεσαι, ταῦτ' ἔμπροσθε μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡς ἴδοίταν αὐ κενῶται πληρώσεως ἐπιθυμεῖ, καὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν χαίρει, κενούμενος δ' ἀλγεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ τότε μὲν οὐκ ἐμαρτυράμεθα, νῦν δὲ λέγομεν, ὡς ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα Ἰ διαφερομένης ἐν πᾶσι τοῦτοις πλήθει ἀμυχάνοις οἷσι μῖξις μία λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ξυμπίπτει γυνομένη.

ΠΡΩ. Κινδυνεύεις ὀρθότατα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἡμῖν τῶν μίξεων λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς λοιπὴ μία.

ἐντός [κερασθέντων] As it is not the outward and inward parts which are mingled, but the pain of one with the pleasure of the other, the word κερασθέντων, which is borrowed from above, must be looked upon as a false gloss. In the rest of this sentence I have left everything as the MSS. present it, not because it is all sound, but because the remedy will perhaps not appear so certain to some as to myself. He says: "I have indeed told you all about these cases where pleasure and pain are mingled in the body; as to those where the mind contributes the opposites to the body **** those we have formerly described; one fact however we did not then bear witness to, but we declare it now, that, in the innumerable examples of mind and body being thus opposed, there is always one and the same mixture of pleasure and pain." This is true; for, when he mentioned this subject before, it was not to point out this κράσις, but to show the nature of Desire. But in that part of his statement, where I have marked a gap, there occurs this phrase: λύπην τε ἅμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν, καὶ ἡδονὴν πρὸς λύπην. The ἡδονή of the mind is ἐπιθυμία; and this he has fully described; but the λύπη, which is φόβος, he has never brought forward as co-existing with present bodily satisfaction. And yet ταῦτα μὲν διήλθομεν looks as if

he claimed to have done this. Again in the same gap, we have ὥστ' εἰς μίαν ἀμφοτέρα κράσιν ἵεσαι, but this μῖξις μία is the very thing which he declares that he now points out for the first time. There remains ἐπόταν αὐ x. τ. ἐ. Stallbaum proposed at one time to change αὐ into τις, while I thought that it proved a lacuna, where the opposite ἐπόταν πληρῶται had once played its part; but it seems to follow from what I have said above that Socrates cannot have entered into any such detail. I will not conceal the suspicion which I have conceived about this very corrupt part of the Dialogue. I believe that of the words, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ΨΥΧῆ alone has any claims to legitimacy: that the damaged text was restored by a conjecture founded on the antithetical Περὶ γε τῶν ἡδονῶν x. τ. ἐ.: but that we may easily find such a beginning as will leave undisturbed and free from all taint of suspicion both ψυχῇ . . . ξυμβάλλεται and ὥστε . . . ἵεσαι, viz. ἐπέλ δὲ καὶ ψυχῇ x. τ. ἐ. "Since this is the fact, part of this fact has been stated, but part we now declare". Instead of ἐπόταν αὐ κενῶται, I conjecture ὄστις ἂν x.

ξυμπίπτει γυνομένη] For ξυμπίπτει γυνομένη I have adopted ξ. γυνομένη, which I formerly advocated without knowing that it had been already proposed by others.

ΠΡΩ. Ποία;

ΣΩ. Φημί αὐτήν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῇ πολλὰκις λαμβάνειν σύγ-
κρασιν [ἔφαμεν].

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸ λέγομεν;

Ε ΣΩ. Ὅργην καὶ φόβον καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον καὶ ἔρωτα
καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόρον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἅρ' οὐκ αὐτῆς τῆς
ψυχῆς τίθεσσι ταύτας λύπας τινάς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτὰς ἰδονῶν μεστὰς εὐρήσομεν ἀμιχάνων;
ἢ δεόμεθ' ὑπομιμνήσκεισθαι τὸ

ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε πολέφρονά περ χαλεπῆμα,

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο,

48 καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἰδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὔσας
ἀναμεμιγμένας;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' οὕτω ταῦτά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν συμ-
βαίνοι γιγνόμενα.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἄμμι
χαίροντες κλάωσι, μέμνησαι;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὴν δ' ἐν ταῖς κωμωδίαις διάθεσιν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς
ἅρ' οἶσθ' ὡς ἔστι [κάν τούτοις] μῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἰδονῆς;

Ποία] The Books have Ποία, φῆς; to which the answer given is "Ἦν αὐτὴν τ. ψ. α. π. λ. σύγκρασιν ἔφαμεν. Nobody believes in Ποία, φῆς; and some have the courage to replace it by Ποίαν φῆς; which is at least grammatical. But there is no reason for φῆς at all, and if any one will compare the instances where we have Πῶς φῆς; Πῆ φῆς; and the rest, with the innumerable examples of the mere interrogative pronoun or adverb, he will desire a special reason for the departure from the ordinary expression; here no such reason exists, and the presence of the verb may be easily accounted for in another way. No exception has been taken to ἔφαμεν, and yet it is quite untrue that they have said anything as yet on this mixture, and Socrates declares as much in the foregoing paragraph. But if ἔφα-

μέν? No; for until Protarchus assents to it, it is no *joint* assertion. Again "Ἦν is μῖξις; and how can we have μῖξις and σύγκρασιν governed both by λαμβάνειν? A single correction (for I attribute the interpolation to the false reading) removes all these difficulties. It is probable that the MS. had ημ' αὐτήν, the rubricator having neglected to put an initial Φ.

τὸ—ὅς τ' ἐφέηκε] Hom. *Il.* xviii. 108. I have omitted the words which all recent Editors are agreed in considering an interpolation, τοῖς θυμοῖς καὶ ταῖς ὀργαῖς τό, standing after ἐφέηκε.

[κάν τούτοις] No ταῦτα have been mentioned, but the corrector was unfamiliar with so common an Atticism as οἶσθαι τὴν διάθεσιν ὡς ἔστι μῖξις. Nor is ἐν τούτῳ at all more intelligible; there the neuters αὐτὸ and σκοτεινότερον, which obviously refer to

ΠΡΩ. Οὐ πᾶν κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Παντάσασι γὰρ οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, [ἐν τούτῳ] Β
 ξυνοεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ οὖν ὡς γ' εἴκειεν ἐμοί.

ΣΩ. Λάβωμέν γε μὴν αὐτὸ τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ σκοτει-
 νότερόν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ῥᾶον καταμαθεῖν τις οἶός τ'
 ἢ μῆξιν λέπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγεις ἄν.

ΣΩ. Τό τοι νῦν δὴ ἤρθεν ὄνομα φθόνου πότερα λέπην
 τινὰ ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ φθονῶν γ' ἐπὶ κακοῖς τοῖς τῶν πέλας
 ἰδόμενος ἀναφανήσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν μὴν ἄγνοια καὶ ἦν δὴ λέγομεν ἀβελτέραν εἶεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐκ δὴ τούτων ἰδὲ τὸ γελοῖον ἦντινα φῦσιν ἔχει.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία μὲν τις τὸ κεφάλαιον, ἔξωός τινος
 ἐπίκλην λεγομένη· τῆς δ' αὖ πάσης πονηρίας ἐστὶ τι τοῦναντίον
 πάθος ἔχον ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς γραμμάτων.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ Ἰνῶθι σαυτὸν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἔγωγε. τοῦναντίον μὴν ἐκείνῳ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μηδαμῆ Δ
 γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν [λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ γραμματός] ἔν εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ὡ Πρώταρχε, πειρῶ δὴ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τριχῆ τέμνειν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ φῆς; οὐ γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸς ὦ.

πάθος, were supposed to refer to some example or instance.

[Ἔστι δὴ πονηρία] The genitive ἔξωός τινος does not depend on πονηρία, but upon ἐπίκλην. There is a certain πονηρία in general, called after name of a particular habit; that is, called so from πονηρός, which denotes a particular habit. I have added τι after ἐστὶ. A subject to ἔχον is indispensable.

[λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τ. γ.] It is better to bracket these words, as Beck recom-

mended, than to think Plato capable of such a frigid joke, as Stallbaum, with some violence to the language, has extracted from them.

Πῆ φῆς;] Here is an instance of what was mentioned above. Had Socrates said not πειρῶ τέμνειν, but τέμνωμεν, the answer would have been Πῆ;

οὐ γ. μὴ δ. ὦ] οὐ μὴ ὦ is supported by Plato *Rep.* 341, c. οὐ μὴ οἶός τε ἦς and by Xen. *Hiero* xi fin. οὐ μὴ δύνωνται. The passage, οὐ μὴ—φῶμεν

ΣΩ. Λέγεις δὴ δεῖν ἐμὲ τοῦτο διελέσθαι τὰ νῦν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγω, καὶ δέομαί γε πρὸς τῇ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τῶν ἀγνοούντων αὐτοὺς κατὰ τρι' ἀνάγκη τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πάσχειν ἕκαστον;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ χρήματα, δοξάζειν εἶναι πλουσιώ-
E τεροι ἢ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλοὶ γοῦν εἰσὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ἔχοντες.

ΣΩ. Πλείους δέ γε, οἳ μείζους καὶ καλλίους αὐτοὺς δο-
ξάζουσι, καὶ πάντα, ὅσα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, εἶναι διαφερόντως τῆς
οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀληθείας.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

ΣΩ. Πολὺ δὲ πλείστοί γε, οἶμαι, περὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶδος τὸ
τῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς διημαρτήρασιν, ἀρετὴν δοξάζοντες βελτίους
ἑαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντες.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

49 ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀρετῶν δ' ἄρ' οὐ σοφίας [πέρι] τὸ πλῆθος
πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστί [ψευ-
δοῦς];

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἂν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς
ἂν εἴποι πάθος.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διααιρετέον, ὃ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ

in *Rep.* 486, d, has been changed on the best MS. authority. I should doubt of the rest, but that they all refer to *being able*.

πλουσιώτεροι] The MSS. have πλουσιώτερον, which is indefensible. The construction of δοξάζειν may be with εἶναι, in which case the subject of a reflexive sentence follows in the nominative, or it may govern a direct accusative, as in the next sentences.

καὶ πάντα] *And who, as to all things pertaining to the body, conceive themselves to be far above what they really are.* Literally, 'to be all things which pertain to the body in a degree beyond the reality which belongs to them.' The

neuter πάντα is put for *masculine* adjectives understood. See for examples my *Prefatio ad Ionem* p. xvii.

τὸ τῶν] The Books have τούτων, which is utterly superfluous; nor could ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς follow τὸ εἶδος without a repetition of the article.

ἀντεχόμενον] One Editor says: *Intellegendum relinquatur αὐτῆς.* I myself was driven to a conjecture: ἀντίτεχνον ὄν, but fortunately I admitted it to be too audacious. These are the shifts to which we are driven by the dunce who inserted πέρι. I have no faith in ψευδοῦς, for who ever heard of δοξοσοφία ἀληθῆς?

μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἰδούης καὶ λέ-
πης ὕψεσθαι μῖξιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν τέμνωμεν δίχα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν Β
ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ὑπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων
ἀναγκαιότατον ἔπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν,
τοῖς δέ, οἶμαι, τοῖναντίον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην τοίνυν διέλε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσὶ μετ'
ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελοῦμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι,
γελοῖους τοίτους φάσκων εἶναι τάλιθῆ φθέγγει· τοὺς δὲ δυνα-
τοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι φοβεροὺς καὶ ἰσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἐχθροὺς προσαγο-
ρεῶν ἠρθότατον τούτων σαντιῶ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἄγνοια γάρ C
ἢ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά· βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς
πέλας αὐτῆ τε καὶ ὅσα εἰκόνας αὐτῆς εἰσὶν· ἢ δ' ἀσθενῆς ἡμῖν
τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἢ τῶν ἰδούων καὶ λε-
πῶν μῖξις ἐν τούτοις οὐπω μοι καταφανής.

ΣΩ. Τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὴ δύναμιν πρῶτον.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἀνὴρ τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἰδούης; D

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὐτ' ἄδικον
οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χιῶρειν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ἠρώντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λε-
πεῖσθαι, χιῶρειν δέ, ἄρ' οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ

ἰσχυροὺς [καὶ] ἐχθροὺς] I have re-
moved the conjunction, which made
utter nonsense of the passage, and drove
me to follow Schütz's conjecture at-
σχυρούς. The strong become strong
enemies, the weak objects of laughter.

Τὴν οὖν] The completion of the

sentence would have been ἄρ' οὐ φατέον
γελοῖον εἶναι καὶ κακόν; But instead
of finishing the question, he breaks it
into two, τῆ μὴ φῶμεν—; and Κακὸν
δ' οὐκ ὁμολογοῦμεν—; I have put τῶν
φίλων in brackets. No addition was
ever more perverse.

Ε ὅσα νῦν δὴ διήλομεν, ἐν τρισὶ λέγοντες εἶδеси γίνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὀπόσ' ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δ' ὀπόσ' ἐρρωμένα—ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν [τῶν φίλων] ἔξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχη τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοῖαν εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Κακὸν δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτήν, ἄγνωιαν οὔσαν, εἶναι;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Χαίρομεν δ' ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπ' αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;

50 ΠΡΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.

ΣΩ. Ἡδονὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόγον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν [τοῦτο] ἀπεραζόμενον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Γελῶντας ἄρ' ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύοντας ἡδονὴν φθόνῳ, λύπη τὴν ἡδονὴν ξυκεραννύει· τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὁμολογήσθαι λύπην τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίνεσθαι δὲ τούτῳ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ.

B ΣΩ. Μηρεὶ δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ [ἐν τραγωδίαις,] μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγωδίᾳ καὶ κωμωδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μερίοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καὶ τις φιλονεικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία.

ΣΩ. Ὅργην μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρήνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προὔθήμεθα καὶ ὀπόσα τοιαῦτα,

C ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὐρήσειν μινύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα. ἢ γάρ;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

τούτῳ] φθόνον καὶ γελῶτα. The MSS. seeo, in the eyes of these men a gap have τοῦτο. without a corresponding mention of comedy; but the words are an idle addition. The unusual break after ἐν τῶν φίλων καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προὔθήμεθα καὶ ὀπόσα τοιαῦτα, has one preposition too many. ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὐρήσειν] ἔφαμεν is my correction of the MS. reading φαμέν. The reference is to 46, E.

ΣΩ. Μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόρου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ διαπεραθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθ' ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαι σοὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ζωμφδίᾳ μῆξιν; ἄρ' οὐ πίστεως χάριν ὅτι τὴν γ' ἐν τοῖς φθόροις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡρόδιον χρᾶσιν ἐπιδειξαι; Δ λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαντῷ [ἀφείναι με] μηκέτι ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἕνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἕνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστὶ συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις; νῦν οὖν λέγε, πότερα ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας; εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σοι τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναι με· τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοὶ λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ Ε νῦν δ' ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.

ΠΡΩ. Καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὄλλ' ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελεθε ὅπῃ σοὶ φίλον.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μυχθεύσεις ἡδονὰς ἐπὶ δὴ νινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμίκτους πορευοίμεθ' ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλιστ' εἶπες.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταλαβὼν σημαίνειν ἑμῖν αὐτάς.

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λαβόντα δὲ] When I affirmed that λαβόντα ἀφείναι could not depend on πίστεως χάριν, I was so little aware of the extent to which the text had been choked with foolish comments that sooner than suspect ἀφείναι, I threw the construction upon ἀρ' οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις δεῖν, confessing that δεῖν was out of its place, but pleading that there was no other possible way of accounting for these infinitives. But when we remove ἀφείναι με, everything is right: what Socrates has said is a pledge, that it would be easy to say more, and a proof that having given this earnest he need not prolong the conversation by proceeding to the consideration of the other passions. ἀφείναι με μηκέτι δεῖν μηκύνειν is a strange combination to ex-

press ἀφείναι με τοῦ μηκύνειν; for while it is longer than the other, it is really more elliptical.

μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας] Will you make it midnight? The plural is used in speaking of the progress of the night, as πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. *Symp.* 217, D; *Prot.* 310, D; *Arist. Nub.* 1. μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, *Rep.* 621, B.

μεταλαβὼν] Only a few inferior copies have this reading in place of μεταβλῶν. But they have blundered on the truth. Socrates does not change but takes in exchange. Stallbaum has confounded these two senses in his note on 21, D, quoting passages from the *Parmenides* and the *Symposium* where μεταβλῶν is correctly given. There is a passage in the *Laws* which

τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἰδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως κείθουμαι, ἀλλ', ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἰδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὐσας δ' οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἐτέρας τινὰς ἕμῃ καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, [εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς] συμπεφυρμένας ἁμοῦ λέπειαι τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυρῶν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας.

B ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθεῖς δ' αὖ τίνας, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὁρθῶς τις διανοοῖτ' ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὰς περὶ τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα, καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ τῶν ὁσμῶν τὰς πλείστας, καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων, καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀνασθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύτους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἰδέας καθαρὰς λυπῶν παραδίδωσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ ταῦτ', ὃ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτως;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν [οὐν] οὐκ εὐθὺς δηλὰ ἐστὶν ἂ λέγω, πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν. σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐκ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζώων ἢ τιῶν ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλ' εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερές καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τὰ τε τοῖς τῶνοις γινόμεν' ἐπί-

contains both words, and will shew the distinction between the two. It is here given as, in my opinion, it ought to be read. *Lives*, 904, D. μελίζω δ' ἦθη ψυχὴ κακίας ἢ ἀρετῆς ὅταν μεταβάλλῃ διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς βούλησίν τε καὶ ὁμιλίαν γενομένην ἰσχυράν, ὁπόταν μὲν ἀρετῇ ζεῖα προσμίξασα γίγνηται διαφερόντως τοιαύτη, διαφέροντα καὶ μετέλαβε τόπον, ἀγίαν ὁδὸν μετακομισθεῖσα [εἰς ἀμείνω τινὰ τόπον ἕτερον]. Compare what has preceded: μεμηχανῆται δὴ πρὸς πᾶν τοῦτο τὸ ποῖόν τι γινόμενον αἰεὶ ποῖαν ἔδραν δεῖ μεταλαμβάνον οὐκ ἐξῆσαι, καὶ τίνας ποτὲ τόπους.

[εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς] These words interrupt the continuity of the description; πολλὰς φαντασθείσας *appearing in many shapes, why?*—*συμπεφυρμένας*—*because they are adulterated with pains and reliefs &c.*

ἰδέας καθαρὰς λυπῶν] The two last words neither require a conjunction to precede them, nor is there the least ground of suspicion against them; they are added as descriptive of the manner in which the πληρώσεις are ἰδέαιαι.

Πάνυ μὲν [οὐν] Nothing can be more out of place here than this frequent formula. Socrates is not correcting, but conceding; and in this sense μὲν οὐν cannot be employed. But it may be said that μὲν belongs to the sentence, and is in apodosis to a suppressed δὲ contained in μὴν, while οὐν characterises the answer, so that the combination of the two words here is purely accidental. I have no doubt that this is the true explanation of μὲν, but the particle after it in this case would most certainly be γοῦν. We must either restore this—but γοῦν οὐκ generally becomes οὐκουν—γε, or suppose οὐν itself to be owing to the frequent combination of μὲν and οὐν. Πάνυ belongs more especially to δηλὰ.

τὰ τε τοῖς τῶνοις] As Hesychius defines the τῶνος as a carpenter's instrument by which circular figures are described, ἐπίπεδα cannot be *trianguli* or *quadrata* (Stallb.). The order followed is an inverted one; the products of rules and compasses correspond to the εὐθύ σχῆμα, and those of the τῶνος to the περιφερές.

πεδά τε καὶ σιερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου
μανθάνεις. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ
ἄλλα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πεφικέναι καὶ τινὰς ἡδονὰς D
οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κινήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώ-
ματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα [καλὰ καὶ ἡδονάς]. ἀλλ'
ἄρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Πειρῶμαι μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράσθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ
σαφέστερον εἶπε λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων *** τὰς λείας καὶ λαμι-
πράς, τὰς ἐν τι καθαρὸν εἰσάσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς
ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ξυμφύτους ἡδονὰς
ἐπομένους.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς ἦρτον μὲν τούτων θείον γένος E
ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμῆχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας,
καὶ ὅτι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτ' ἐλεί-
νοις τίθῃμι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν. ἀλλ', εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἶδη
δύο λέγομεν ἡδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Κατανοῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μι- 52
θήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὐταὶ πείνας μὲν μὴ
ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀληθῆνας ἐξ
ἀρχῆς γενομένας.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ξυνδοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀπο-
βολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίνωνται, καθορῆς τινὰς ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλ-
γηδόνους;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ τι φέσει γε, ἀλλ' ἐν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθί-
ματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεῖς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν. B

κινήσεων] This is Van Heusde's cor-
rection for κινήσεων; the same scholar
also changed κινήσει to κινήσει in the
passage above. It is strange that the
Zurich editors should not have adopted
these corrections.

φθόγγων] The feminine noun which
denotes the description of sounds, and
which has dropped out here, as is evi-
dent from the repetition of the article,
is perhaps ἰδέας. Some propose φω-

νῶν in place of φθόγγων, but leave the
second τὰς to shift for itself. It is
more likely that Plato would use φθόγ-
γων, as he had done so before, and as
it is more comprehensive than φωνῶν.

λέγομεν] For this all MSS. and Edi-
tions have λεγομένων; but Plato would
not speak of the real pleasures as things
called pleasures.

λογισμοῖς τ. π.] The genitive does
not express concerning, but λογίζονται

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γ' ἡμεῖς ἀντὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις, ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῶν λήθη γίγνεται ἐκάστω' ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ἑρτέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ἑρτέον;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τὰς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθεῖσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ τὰς μὲν κατὰ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὐτῶν καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένης τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπειροῦ τ' ἐκείνου καὶ ἦττον καὶ μᾶλλον διὰ τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου εἶναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτῶν διαθεατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι τὸ καθαρὸν

τὸ πάθημα is what they do; so that the phrase should be rendered "in the account they take of the accident".

Οὐκοῦν] I should have bracketed but left in the text the interpolations, by which this passage has been so long rendered unintelligible, but that there were other corrections needed, so that it would only have created confusion to put the new and the old together. προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ is surely not difficult to understand. Socrates wishes to add one more remark to this part of his subject. But some one who took no notice of τῷ λόγῳ must needs have it that some quality is to be added to some kind; so he inserts after τῷ λόγῳ the sentence ταῖς μὲν σφοδαῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρῶν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τούναντίον ἐμμετρῶν. But the λόγος is intent not merely on giving the names but on dividing into the several classes of τὰ ἄπειρα and τὰ ἐμμετρα, and does not even use the greatness and the intensity as proofs,

but says that all such as vary in their greatness and intensity belong to the ἄπειρον which itself pervades mind and matter, now less and now more. I will now mention the other changes I have made, ταῖς μὲν—τὰς μὲν, καὶ τὸ—κατὰ τό, σφοδρὸν αὐ—σφοδρὸν αὐ i.e. αὐτῶν, ἀπειροῦ γε—ἀπειροῦ τε, (the Bodleian has τε γε), [προσθῶμεν αὐ—ταῖς] after φερομένου, ταῖς—τὰς, the last with MS. authority.

διαθεατέον] This is Van Hensde's emendation for διατετέον; it had been anticipated by the Venice MS. Σ, a copy full of conjectural variations.

πρὸς ἀλήθειαν] "i.e. in relation to truth. As this is the constant and only admissible meaning of these words, ἢ before ελιχρονές can only be retained on condition of our changing τί ποτε into τί πρότερον. Otherwise, we must change ἢ itself into καί. The remainder of the sentence is faulty as to the arrangement of the conjunctions and articles. I would

τε καὶ εἰλικρινές καὶ τὸ σφόδρα τε [καὶ τὸ] πολὺ καὶ [τὸ] μέγα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν;

ΠΡΩ. Τί ποτ' ἄρα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος;

ΣΩ. Μηδέν, ὃ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν ἐκατέρου καθαρόν ἐστι, Ἐ τὸ δ' οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρόν ἐκάτερον ἴδον εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ ξυνάκασι τοῖσδε ἴσῳ παρέχη τὴν κρίσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Ἴδι δι', περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὕτως διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἐν τι διωσσομένην. 53

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν προελόμεθα;

ΣΩ. Τὸ λεγὸν ἐν τοῖς πρώτων, εἰ βούλει, θεασόμεθα γένος.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν λευκοῦ καὶ τίς καθαρότης ἡμῖν εἴη; πότερα τὸ μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον ἢ τὸ ἀκρατέστατον, ἐν ᾧ χρώματος μηδεμίᾳ μοῖρα ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐνεῖη;

read τὸ σφόδρα πολὺ τε καὶ μέγα, καὶ τὸ ἱκανόν. Which must we consider as the first in relation to Truth? The pure and the unmixed? or the exceedingly numerous or great, and the sufficient? According to this arrangement, each member of the comparison will consist of two parts, for πολὺ ἢ μέγα or πολὺ καὶ μέγα are merely explanatory adjuncts of σφόδρα; compare below μέγιστόν τε καὶ πλεῖστον." I leave this note as I wrote it many years ago. There is very little in it that I would wish to modify, except as to ἱκανόν. On reference to the Introduction it will be seen that μέτρον which is just disposed of, and ἀλήθεια and κάλλος are those Ideas which play a most important part in the concluding pages of the Dialogue. It will also be seen in the very next page that ἀληθέστατον and κάλλιστον, κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον, ἀληθέστερα καὶ καλλίων are dwelt on together in the conclusion of the argument here started. Now what was to be proved, must have been propounded; and it cannot have been propounded elsewhere. For this reason I have written καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλόν.

εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρ' αὐτῶν] Not whether but ἵ, as is plain from the addition of ἄρα. If it should prove that one part of either is pure, and another impure.

ἵνα καθαρόν] This depends upon μηδέν ἐπιλείπειν. Socrates wants to find all the pure kinds so far as he is able, because in these alone can the comparative merits of ἡδονῆ and γούς be determined. I believe the MS. εἰς τὴν κρίσιν to be a corruption, for it is unnecessary, and occasions an inelegant repetition. As the κρίσις was to be, 'Which ingredient was of most importance in the mixture,' and this must be determined by mixing the purest specimens of each, I have so little doubt that εἰς τὴν κρᾶσιν is the true reading that I have now admitted it into the Text.

ἀκρατέστατον] The ancient grammarians inform us that this is the superlative of ἀκρατος, an usage which to our ears destroys all distinction between the superlative of this word and that of ἀκρατής. I distrust them, but make no change.

ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐνεῖη] I have changed ἄλλη into ἄλλου, which is absolutely necessary for the sense. We must not

ΠΡΩ. Ἀῖλον ὅτι τὸ μάλιστ' εἰλιζονῆς ἔν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθῶς. ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τοῦτ' ἀληθέστατον, ὃ Πρωτάρχε, καὶ ἅμα δὴ κάλλιστον τῶν λευκῶν πάντων θύσομεν, ἀλλ' οὐ
B τὸ πλεῖστον οὐδὲ τὸ μέγιστον;

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατά γε.

ΣΩ. Σμιζρὸν ἄρα καθαρὸν λευκὸν μεμιγμένον πολλοῦ λευκοῦ
λευκότερον ἅμα καὶ κάλλιον καὶ ἀληθέστερον ἐὰν ἰδῶμεν
γίγνεσθαι, παντάπασιν ἐροῦμεν ὀρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ὁρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐ δὴ πον πολλῶν δεησόμεθα παραδειγμα-
των τοιούτων ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἡδονῆς περί λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖ νοεῖν
ἡμῖν αὐτόθεν, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ξύμπασα ἡδονῆ σμιζρὰ μεγάλης καὶ
C ὀλίγῃ πολλῆς καθαρὰ λύπης ἰδίων καὶ ἀληθεστέρα καὶ καλ-
λίων γίγνοιτ' ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν, καὶ τό γε παραδειγμ' ἱκανόν.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε; ἄρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκηθάμεν
ὡς ἕει γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δ' οὐκ ἔστι τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς;
κομποὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μνητεῖν
ἡμῖν, οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί δή;

ΣΩ. Διαπερανοῦμαι σοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἐπανερωτῶν, ὃ Πρω-
D τάρχε φίλε.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε καὶ ἐρώτα μόνον.

ΣΩ. Ἐστὸν δὴ τινε δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, τὸ δ'
αἰεὶ ἐφιέμενον ἄλλον.

suppose that ἔν is omitted before ἐνσίη: it would be as contrary to Greek usage to employ it after a descriptive relative, as after εἰ with the optative.

καθαρὰ λύπη] If it be unmixed with pain, which of course supposes that the other is not. ἡδίων is in fact ἀληθεστέρα, but it is added because of λευκότερον.

κομποὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες] Trendelenburg understands this of Aristippus, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, ii. 87, taught that all pleasure was in κίνησις. But the school of Heraclitus and of Protagoras must have held the same doctrine. These could not, indeed, have

formally denied οὐσία to pleasure, for that would have implied their concession of it to other things; but pleasure itself would probably be one of the examples by which they supported their argument.

Τί δή;] Protarchus' answer is not germane to the question ἄρα οὐκ ἀκηθάμεν. Probably the words belong not to Protarchus but to Socrates, who stops himself and says—τί δέ; διαπεράνωμαι κ. τ. ἐ. To which Protarchus answers not by an ungracious Λέγε, but by ὦ φίλε, λέγε κ. τ. ἐ. This will rid us of the absurd collocation, ὃ Πρωτάρχε φίλε.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνα λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν σεμνότατον αἰεὶ πεφυκόσ, τὸ δ' ἑλλιπές ἐλείπου.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ΣΩ. Παιδικὰ πον καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τεθεωρήσαμεν ἅμα καὶ ἐραστὰς ἀνδρείους αὐτῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Σφρόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Τούτοις ταίνεν εὐκρίτητα δυοῖν οὔσι δὲ ἄλλα ζήγει κατὰ πάντα ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρωῶ, λέγε σαφέστερον, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἢ τι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν τι ποιχίλον, ὃ Πρωτάρχε· ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐρεσχηλεῖ νῦν, λέγει δ' ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἕνεκά του τῶν ὄντων ἔστ' αἰεὶ, τὸ δ' οὐ χάριν ἐκαστοτε τὸ τινὸς ἕνεκα γυγνόμενον αἰεὶ γίγνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Μάγισ ἕμαθον διὰ τὸ πολλάκις λεχθῆναι.

ΣΩ. Τάχα δ' ἴσως, ὃ παῖ, μᾶλλον μαθησόμεθα προσελθόντος τοῦ λόγου.

ΠΡΩ. Τί γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Δύο δὴ τὰδ' ἕνερα λάβωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν τι γένεσιν πάντων, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν ἕτερον ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Δὲ ἀποδέχομαί σου ταῦτα, οὐσίαν καὶ γένεσιν.

ΣΩ. Ὁρθότατα. πότερον οὖν τούτων ἕνεκα ποτέρου, τὴν γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα φῶμεν ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι γενέσεως ἕνεκα;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῦτο, ἢ προσαγορεύεται οὐσία, εἰ γενέσεως ἕνεκα τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὅπερ ἐστί, νῦν πυνθάνει;

Τὸ τρίτον ἔτ' ἐρώ] The Books have ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρω, out of which some have endeavoured to extract a miserable metaphysical joke. Protarchus had already asked twice for Socrates' meaning.—Πῶς τούτω καὶ τίνα λέγεις; and again Λέγ' ἔτι σαφέστερον. For ὅσα λέγομεν εἶναι, compare above 16, c., τῶν λεγυμένων εἶναι. The correction proposed by Hirschig in the Paris edition was made after I had communicated mine to him. I suppose that by this time he is convinced that Protarchus is for the third

time telling Socrates to speak more plainly. It is true that he has only used λέγε σαφέστερον once before.

ἐρεσχηλεῖ] The quotation from Parthenius in the *Etyim. Mag.* referred to by Pierson on *Metis* in v. ἐρεσχηλεῖ, is apparently decisive as to the orthography of this word. If Pierson had known that the oldest MSS. of Plato have the η, he would have pronounced with greater certainty in its favour. Ἐρεσχηλεῖ seems to have been a later form.

ΣΩ. Φαίνομαι.

B ΠΡΩ. Πρὸς θεῶν, ἄρ' [ἄν] ἐπανερωτῆς με τοιόνδε τι; λέγ', ὃ Πρώταρχέ, μοι, πότερα πλοίων ναυπηγίαν ἕνεκα φῆς γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ πλοῖα ἕνεκα ναυπηγίας; καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτ' ἐστί;

ΣΩ. Λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὃ Πρώταρχε.

ΠΡΩ. Τί οὖν οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνω σαυτῷ, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ὃ τι οὐ· σὺ μέντοι τοῦ λόγου συμμετέχε.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Φημί δὴ γενέσεως μὲν ἕνεκα φάρμακά τε καὶ πάντ'
C ὄργανα καὶ πᾶσαν ἕλην παρατίθεσθαι πῦσιν, ἐκάστην δὲ γέ-
νεσιν ἄλλην ἄλλης οὐσίας τινὸς ἐκάστης ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι, ξύμ-
πασιν δὲ γένεσιν οὐσίας ἕνεκα γίγνεσθαι ξυμπάσης.

ΠΡΩ. Σαφέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν ἡδονή γε, εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, ἕνεκά τινος οὐσίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεται ἄν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τό γε μὴν οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ ἕνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γί-
γνεται, ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρᾳ ἐκεῖνό ἐστι· τὸ δὲ τινὸς ἕνεκα
γιγνόμενον εἰς ἄλλην, ὃ ἄριστε, μοῖραν θετέον.

D ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖοτάτον.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν ἡδονή γ' εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλην ἢ
τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὀρθῶς θήσομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τούτου τοῦ λόγου, τῷ

Πρὸς θεῶν] The MSS. and Edd. have Πρὸς θεῶν, ἄρ' ἄν ἐπανερωτῆς με; Σω. Τοιόνδε τι λέγω, ὃ Πρώταρχέ μοι, — τοιαῦτ' ἐστί, λέγω τοῦτ' αὐτό, ὃ Πρώταρχε. It is strange that Bekker's note, 'τοιόνδε—hæc eidem dant Ξ E H,' has never led any one to the right distribution of this passage. ἄν before ἐπανερωτῆς has led to all manner of conjectural emendations, but I believe it to have arisen from a negligent repetition of ἄρ'. The absurdity of Socrates calling the same thing τοιόνδε τι and τοῦτ' αὐτό, seems not to have struck the Editors.

γίγνεται] Commonly γίγνεται' ἄν,

which is barbarous. Ἦδ ἐκεῖνο ἄν εἴη followed, γίγνεται without ἄν would have been correct; but with ἐστί we must have either εἴη γίγνεται or εἴη ἄν γίγνεται, and even the latter would be in much better accordance with something more remote than ἐστί, such as ἐσται or ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Ἀλλ' οὖν—γε] Here again the MSS. have the absurd reading Ἄρ' οὖν. The conclusion follows so necessarily from that which has been said, that it would be quite out of place to make it the subject of a question; the presence of γε shows not only the corruption, but the sure method of correcting it.

μηρύσαντι τῆς ἡδονῆς πέρι τὸ γένεσιν μὲν, οὐσίαν δὲ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν αὐτῆς εἶναι, χάριν ἔχειν δεῖ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὗτος τῶν φασκόντων ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καταγελά.

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἐλάχιστε καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐγενέσεσιν ἀποτελουμένων καταγελάσεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποίων λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Τῶν ὅσοι ἐξιώμενοι ἢ πείνην ἢ δίψαν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα γέनेσις ἐξιάται, χαίρουσι διὰ τὴν γένεσιν ἕτε ἡδονῆς οὐσης αὐτῆς, καὶ φασὶ ζῆν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι μὴ διψῶντές τε καὶ πεινῶντες, καὶ τᾶλλα, ἃ τις ἂν εἴποι, πάντα τὰ ἐπόμενα τοῖς τοιούτοις παθήμασι, μὴ πάσχοντες.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐοίκασι γοῦν.

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ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῷ γίγνεσθαι γε τὸνναντίον ἅπαντες τὸ φθείρεσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δὴ φθορὰν καὶ γένεσιν αἰροῦτ' ἂν τις τοῦθ' αἰρούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν τρίτον ἐκεῖνον βίον, τὸν ἐν ᾧ μῆτε χαίρειν μῆτε λυπεῖσθαι, φρονεῖν δ' ἦν δυνατὸν ὡς οἷόν τε καθαρῶτατα.

ΠΡΩ. Πολλὴ τις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλογία ξυμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, ἐάν τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἡμῖν τιθῆται.

ΣΩ. Πολλή, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῆδ' ἔτι λέγωμεν,—

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μὴδὲ κατὰ τὸν μῆτ' ἐν σώμασι μῆτ' ἐν πολλοῖς ἄλλοις πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον, ἀνδρίαν δ' ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσ' [ἀγαθὰ] εἴληχε ψυχῇ, μὴδὲν τοιοῦτον εἶναι;

ἔχειν δεῖ] The best MSS. have δεῖν. This error is of continual occurrence in infinitives having the circumflex, which is so easily confounded with the sigla of ν.

ὁ αὐτὸς οὔτος] This is a bitter sneer at Aristippus, defining pleasure as a γένεσις, and yet preaching pleasure. The difference between οἱ φάσκοντες and οἱ ἀποτελούμενοι is that between philosophers, and men who follow a

certain mode of life. By understanding this difference we are enabled to do without my change of ὅσοι into ὅσ' οἱ, but I still doubt whether we do not require εὐδαιμόνων or μακαρίων after ἀποτελουμένων.

[ἀγαθὰ] "It is unreasonable to suppose that of all the things which belong to the mind such as courage, temperance, intolligence, &c. pleasure is the only one entitled to be called good."

πρὸς τοῦτοις δ' ἔτι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα, ἀλλοῦντα δέ, ἀναγκάζεσθαι φάναι κακὸν εἶναι τότε, ὅταν ἀλγῆ, καὶ ἢ ἄριστος πάντων, καὶ τὸν χαίροντ' αὖ, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, τότε, ὅταν χαιρή, C τοσοῦτω διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς δυνατὸν ἀλογιώτατα.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἡδονῆς μὲν πάντως ἐξέτασιν πᾶσαν ἐπιχειρῶμεν ποιήσασθαι, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης οἷον φειδόμενοι σφόδρα φανῶμεν· γενναίως δέ, εἴ πῆ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούμεν, [ἔως] ὅ τι δὲ καθαρώτατόν ἐστ' αὐτῶν φύσει, τοῦτο κατιδόντες εἰς τὴν κράσιν χρώμεθα τὴν κοινήν τοῖς τε τούτων καὶ τοῖς τῆς ἡδονῆς μέρεσιν ἀληθεστάτοις.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν τὸ μὲν, οἶμαι, δημιουργικὸν ἐστὶ τῆς

This is a fair appeal to common sense; but if you add ἀγαθὰ, you beg the question. Philebus could not say that of all ἀγαθὰ this is the only one without a manifest contradiction.

εἴ πῆ τι σαθρὸν ἔχει] The verb σήζω, to strain or percolate, has the same relation to σαθρός as σήπω to σαπρός. Hence the proper meaning of the word σαθρός is, that which suffers anything to run through it; it is therefore used of a leaky or cracked vessel. To ring a vessel in order to ascertain its soundness, is περικρούειν (with coins κωδωνίζειν); and then it was said either ὑγιές or σαθρὸν βουβεῖν—ἡχεῖν—φθέγγεσθαι. The conjecture on this place, σαθρὸν ἡχεῖ, is not admissible, for if this had been the meaning, the future must have been used.

ὅ τι δὲ καθαρώτατον] The common reading is ἔως ὅ τι καθαρώτατον—. But ἔως χρώμεθα is barbarous; and if we desired to retain ἔως, no change short of the following would be really sufficient: ἔως ἂν κατιδόμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ—χρῶμεθα.

εἰς τὴν κράσιν] Stallbaum has unsuccessfully defended κρίσιν against Schleiermacher, who proposed κράσιν. There is no question of the comparison at present, but of the admixture, in order to which, as Socrates had already observed (52, ε), it is necessary to have

each kind in its purest state. χρῆσθαι μέρεσιν εἰς κράσιν is as elegant as χρῆσθαι μ. εἰς κρίσιν (τῶν μερῶν) is the reverse.

Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν] If we would understand the drift of this question, we must divest ourselves of any notion that Plato is intending to establish a formal classification. His sole object is to show that there are two elements in ἐπιστήμη, namely the production of tangible results, and the information of the mind. The latter is not pointed out for its own sake, but to give relief and definiteness to the former which is its opposite; and the former is mentioned, because it enables him to introduce music and several other arts under one head as χειροτεχνία. This explanation disposes of the suspicion about some portion of the text having been lost, and fully accounts for the fact that Socrates never returns to the head of arts περὶ παιδείαν. But why does he choose the arts which he calls χειροτεχνία as the subject of particular enquiry? Because in these again there is a twofold element; the element of certainty derived from the mathematical sciences under which they work, and the empirical element. Now as one of these is scientific (ἐπιστήμης ἐχόμενον) and the other not, it is necessary to show this, as determining the greater or less

[περὶ τὰ μαθήματα] ἐπιστήμης, τὸ δὲ περὶ παιδείαν καὶ τροφήν. ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὴ ταῖς χειροτεχνίαις διανοηθῶμεν πρώταις εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμης αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἐχόμενον, τὸ δ' ἦντιον ἐν, καὶ δεῖ τὰ μὲν ὡς καθαρώτερα νομίζειν, τὰ δ' ὡς ἀκαθαρτότερα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκοῦν χερί.

ΣΩ. Τὰς τοίων ἡγεμονικὰς διαληπτέον ἐκάστων αὐτῶν χωρίς.

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Οἷον πασῶν που τεχνῶν ἂν τις ἀριθμητικὴν χωρίζῃ καὶ μετροδικὴν καὶ στατικὴν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, φαῦλον τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἐκάστις [ἂν γίγνωιτο].

ΠΡΩ. Φαῦλον μὲν δὴ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰκάζειν λείποιτ' ἂν καὶ τὰς αἰσθησεις καταμελετᾶν ἐμπειρίᾳ καὶ τινι τριβῇ, ταῖς τῆς στοχαστικῆς προσχρωμένους δυνάμεσιν, ἃς πολλοὶ τέχνας ἐπονομάζουσι, μελέτη καὶ πόνῳ τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένης.

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pureness of these parts of Intellect, as they had already sought out the greater or less pureness of the several kinds of Pleasure. As for the text, περὶ τὰ μαθήματα is to be understood either in its widest sense, and then it is superfluous; for what ἐπιστήμη is there which is not π. τ. μαθήματα? Or it is to be taken in a restricted sense and then it is on its wrong side; for a knowledge περὶ τὰ μαθήματα is a knowledge περὶ τὴν παιδείαν. Sydenham saw that, χειροτεχνιαῖς being an adjective, you must understand either τέχναις, which would be ridiculous, or ἐπιστήμαις; but no ἐπιστήμαι have been mentioned, (only ἐπιστήμη in general) so that there is nothing to justify the omission of ἐπιστήμαις here. These reasons seem to have been quite beyond the discernment of Stallbaum, who dismisses Sydenham with an authoritative "male", and one of his usual non-appetite quotations. Thirdly I have written πρώταις for reasons very obvious and very little regarded. In place of αὐτῶν, which is unmeaning, I have put αὐτῶν which marks the second distinction.

καθαρώτατα has been already changed into καθαρώτερα before me. Not only ought the comparative to match the comparative, but any art which is καθαρώτατη would on the withdrawal of the scientific element cease altogether; for if the pureness is according to the presence of the mathematical science, the most pure must have this not only as predominating but as excluding all empirical admixture, and when this is withdrawn, there remains—nothing.

ἂν τις ἀ. χωρίζῃ—[ἂν γίγνωιτο] This combination is not Greek; and the second half can be omitted without any detriment to the sense.

Φαῦλον μὲν δὴ] This is the form of simple assent; if, in place of repeating φαῦλον, he had said φαυλότατον, μὲν οὖν would have been added; if his assent had been restricted, γοῦν. There is also a shade of difference between μέντοι the old reading, and μὲν δὴ the reading of the Bodleian. The former is the more suitable when the answerer adds the weight of his own authority to the mere assent.

τὴν ῥώμην ἀπειργασμένης] The pro-

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαιότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μεστή μὲν που μουσικὴ πρῶτον, τὸ ξύμφωνον ἀριότιουσα οὐ μέτρῳ ἀλλὰ μελέτῃ στοχασμοῦ, καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτὴ καὶ ἀλλητικὴ, τὸ μέτρον ἐκάστης χορδῆς τῷ στοχάζεσθαι τ' φερομένης θηρεύουσα, ὥστε πολὺ μεμιγμένον ἔχειν τὸ μὴ σαφές, σμικρὸν δὲ τὸ βέβαιον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

B ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἰατρικὴν τε καὶ γεωργίαν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν καὶ στρατηγικὴν ὡσαύτως εὐρήσομεν ἐχούσας.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τεκτονικὴν δὲ γε, οἶμαι, πλείστοις μέτροις τε καὶ ὄργανοις χρωμένῃ, τὰ πολλὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτῇ πορίζοντα τεχνικωτέραν τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν παρέχεται.

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ;

ΣΩ. Κατὰ γε ναυπηγίαν καὶ κατ' οἰκοδομίαν καὶ ἐν πολ-

priety of the word ῥώμη depends on μελέτῃ καὶ πόνῳ, which are used of training in the palaestra. The subject of προσχρωμένους is the possessors of the senses, that of ἀπειραγμένας is δυνάμεις.

μεστή κ. τ. ἐ.] This passage has suffered from the well-known practice of transcribers, who, when they could not or would not decipher terminations, invented those which the immediate neighbourhood suggested. From οὐ μέτρῳ the copyist inferred that he must write στοχασμῶ and then altered μελέτῃ into μελέτης. The reasoning proves clearly what Plato must have written. In proportion as an art trusts less to measure and more to practice, it must be full of guesswork.

αὐτὴ καὶ ἀλλητικὴ] The MSS. have καὶ ξύμπασα αὐτῆς ἀλλητικῆ. But ξύμπασα belongs to the *symposium genus*, and flute-playing has no subdivisions worth notice. It was an old subject of dispute between two schools of early musicians whether questions about the intervals in music should be determined by proportions of strings only or also by ear; but in the case of ἀλλητικῆ the task of settling such questions by length of pipe was too intricate, so that there especially the empirical method was pursued.

χορδῆς] It is unnecessary to enter into the question whether χορδῆ is applicable to wind instruments, although the passage quoted with such confidence by Mr. Chappell (*Hist. of Music* p. 146) from Plato *Rep.* 399, D. is quite inconclusive, being itself confessedly corrupt; and I can find no other. The very context in that passage would seem to show that Socrates objects to the flute, because the admitted defects of stringed instruments were due to an imitation of the flute. I am inclined to read ἢ οὐ τὸ πολύχορδον αὐτό, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ παναρμόνια αὐλοῦ τυγχάνει ὄντα μιμήματα; But here ἀλλητικῆ is represented as hunting after the measure of the chord in a *stringed instrument*: that is, having no measure of its own to trust to, it derives its certainty from that which possesses such a measure. φερομένης] For this word which, though a term in music (see Chappell *H.* of M. p. 98) is quite inapplicable here, I conjecture θηρωμένη, of which the more common form θηρεύουσα was a gloss.

τὰ πολλήν] In place of this reading, the Zurich Editors have adopted the conjectural one of ἄ. This only spoils what is perfectly plain. "The things which give this art its accuracy, make it τεχνικωτέραν, and therefore more akin to pure ἐπιστήμη."

λοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς ξυλουργικῆς. κανόνι γάρ, οἶμαι, καὶ τόρνον χρῆται καὶ διαβήτη καὶ στάθμη καὶ τιμὴ προσαγωγῆ κεκομψευμένη.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Θῶμεν τοίνυν διχῆ τὰς λεγομένας τέχνας, τὰς μὲν μουσικῇ ξυνεπομένας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἐλάτιονος ἀκριβείας μετασχούσας, τὰς δὲ τεκτονικῇ πλείονος.

ΠΡΩ. Κεῖσθω.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δὲ ταύτας ἀκριβεστάτας εἶναι τέχνας, ἅς νῦν δὴ πρώτας εἴπομεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν φαίνει μοι λέγειν καὶ ἕσας μετὰ ταύτης τέχνας ἐφθέρξω τῶν δὴ.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἀλλ', ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἄρ' οὐ διττὰς αὖ D καὶ ταύτας λεπτέον; ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Ποίας δὴ λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ἀριθμητικὴν πρώτον ἄρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν τινα τὴν τῶν πολλῶν φασίον, ἄλλην δ' αὖ τὴν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων;

ΠΡΩ. Πῆ ποτὲ διορισάμενος οὖν ἄλλην, τὴν δ' ἄλλην εἰρή τις ἂν ἀριθμητικὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐ μικρῶ ὄρω, ὦ Πρώταρχε. οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βοῦς δύο καὶ δύο τὰ μικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάν- E

κανόνι] κανὼν is the rule for measuring straight lines; τόρνος for curved; διαβήτης the cross pieces, (in shape of a compass stretched out,) from the angle of which the plumb-line depended; στάθμη the plumb-line itself; and προσαγωγῆον is explained to be the instrument for reducing warped timber to straightness. If this is correct, it is much less κεκομψευμένον than the rest, which are scientific helps, while this is a mere engine of force. Perhaps it was an instrument for taking the angles of curves. It is scarcely necessary to say that κεκομψευμένον has nothing to do with the workmanship, though Stallbaum translates "scite factum".

ἄλλην, τὴν δ' ἄλλην] This is a common ellipsis for τὴν μὲν ἄ. τὴν δὲ ἄ. Compare *Laws* 862, B. which I quote for the sake of correcting it: καὶ τὸ

μὲν βλαβὲν ἀβλαβὲς τοῖς νόμοις εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ποιητέον, τὸ τε ἀπολόμενον σώζοντα, καὶ τὸ πεσόν ὑπὸ του πάλιν ἐξορθοῦντα, καὶ τὸ θανατωδὲν ἢ τραυδὲν ὑγιές, τὸ δὲ ἀπολοῖαι ἐξήλασθὲν τοῖς δρωσὶ καὶ τοῖς πάσχουσι (παρέχοντα) ἐκάστους ἐκ διαφορᾶς εἰς φιλιαν πειρατέον αἰε καθιστάναι τοῖς νόμοις.

Οὐ μικρῶ ὄρω] οὐ μικρὸς ὄρος is the common reading. But this is out of structure, and if any one wishes to understand ἐστὶ, he must at least insert the article. But the words are evidently an answer to Πῆ ποτὲ διορισάμενος.—The word αὐτοῖς three lines below was supplied to give a case to συνακολουθήσειαν, and the consequence is that the condition of B assenting to A is not, A changing his mind, but some third C propounding the same doctrine as B.

των μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ποτε [αὐτοῖς] συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα γ' εὖ λέγεις οὐ μικρὰν διαφορὰν τῶν περὶ ἀριθμῶν τεταζόντων, ὥστε λόγον ἔχειν δὴ αὐτὰς εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ λογιστικὴ καὶ μειρητικὴ ἢ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῆ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρία τε καὶ λογισμῶν 57 [καταμελετωμένων]; πότερον ὡς μία ἐκατέρα λεπτέον, ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐπόμενος ἔγωγ' ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἐκατέραν τούτων.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. οὐ δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτα προηρηγάμεθ' εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἄρ' ἔννοοεῖς;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφίνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγ' οὗτος ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἦντον ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἠρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον ἐν- Β ταῦθα προβεβηκέναι σκοπῶν εἰ ἄρ' ἐστὶ τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθ' ἔνεκα τούτων ἐπιχειρήσμεν.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπ' ἄλλοις

εἰ μὴ μονάδα] *Except a man shall consider no monad to differ from any other single monad out of all innumerable monads.* There is an intentional redundancy in this triple opposition (μονάδα —μονάδος, μηδεμίαν—ε. τ. μ., ἄλλην —ἄλλης) in order to mark the perfect indifference of every monad from every other.

τεταζόντων] *Rep.* 521 E, *Tim.* 90 B, who give their time to Arithmetic.

Τί δὲ λογιστικὴ] In this passage I have changed τῆς κ. φ. γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν, so as to render the sentence complete. This is far better than supplying διαφέρει, which would make Socrates first ask whether two things differ, then whether they are one, and again whether they differ. The only question that can by any possibility be asked as introductory to the other

two is "How do these stand to each other"? The word καταμελετωμένων is nothing but a wretched attempt to bolster up the construction by making a genitive absolute of it; and for this purpose some one has borrowed the remarkably elegant word from its context above and used it where it means about as much as would τυπτομένων.

ἀντίστροφον] I have added the article which is necessary to the sense. ἀντίστροφόν τι is not to be thought of. The case of ἡδοναῖς has been already determined, and the corresponding case is to be sought in νοῦς.

προβεβηκέναι] This is Schleiermacher's emendation for προβέβληκέναι; it is obvious that no πρόβλημα is put forward.

Τί οὖν] In this sentence the Books turn two distinct questions into one

ἄλλην τέχνην οὕσαν ἀνεύρισκε [σαφεστέραν] καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐν τούτοις δ' ἄρ' οὐ τίνα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθεγγόμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μίαν, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ὄντων ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτων αὐτοῖν [τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρόν περὶ ταῦτα] πότερον ἢ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.

ΣΩ. Τίν' οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῇ διδῶμεν ἀπόκρισιν;

ΠΡΩ. Ὡς Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προελκλύθαιμεν ἐπιστημῶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν ἀποκρινόμεθα ἕαρον.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν; καὶ εἰρήσθω γ' ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὐταῖ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμύχανον ἀκριβεία τε καὶ ἀληθεία περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαυροῦντες ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὀλκήν—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μειρητικαὶ καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται ξυνεπόμεναι συγκαί, τὴν διδυμότην ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δ' ἐνὸς κεκοινωμένοι.

ΠΡΩ. Διδῶμεν τύχη ἀγαθῇ τούτοις, οὓς φῆς δεινοὺς εἶ-
ναι, ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστα εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

question asked twice. I have removed *σαφεστέραν* and for *ἀνεύρισκειν* written *ἀνεύρισκε*.

εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας] The same expression occurs in *Euthyd.* 305 D. Compare also *Cratyl.* 431 A, εἰς τὴν αἰσθησιν καταστήσας.

ὡς μίαν] The MSS. have ὡς μίας, an alteration probably made to suit *δυοῖν*, as if the constraction were the same. I have also supplied *ὄντων* in its right place, and put the absurd

supplement τὸ σαφές . . . περὶ ταῦτα into brackets. *ἀκριβέστερον ἔχειν* is precisely the same as τὸ σαφές καὶ τὸ καθαρόν. A little further on εἰς σαφήνειαν is used as to this same quality; and still further he uses ἀληθεία and ἀκρίβεια in the same sense.

περὶ λόγων ὀλκήν] Compare *Cratylus*, 435 C, *Theaet.* 168 C, ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄπρη ἂν τύχων ἐλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς παρέχουσι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.

58 ΠΡΩ. Τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὐ δεῖ λέγειν;

ΣΩ. Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἂν τὴν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνώη. τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὄν [καὶ τὸ] ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγ' οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι ξύμπαντας, ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρηται, μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνώσιν. σὺ δὲ τί; [πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνεις ἄν;]

ΠΡΩ. Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλὰκις, ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέρει πασῶν τεχνῶν· B πάντα γὰρ ὑφ' αὐτῆ δουῖα ἴδι' ἐκόντων ἄλλ' οὐ διὰ βίας ποιῶντο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν. νῦν δ' οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τὰ ὄπλα μοι ἴδοκεῖς βουληθεῖς εἰπεῖν ἀσχευθεῖς ἀπολιπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτη, ὅπη σοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Δῆλον ὅτι πᾶς ἂν] For this emendation we are indebted to W. H. Thompson. The old reading was Δῆλον ἔτι ἢ πᾶσιν. There can be no doubt that the phrase περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως is incorrect. τὸ ὄντως would be rightly placed where the question was about the *meaning of the word*, but here we are considering the objects of a given science. But the object of Dialectic is Truth, and Truth is found either in that which is absolute (τὸ ὄν ὄντως), or in that which is invariable, because it is the effect of the absolute; and this latter Plato expressed by καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκός (γίγνεσθαι). To make τὸ ὄντως, and even τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκός, mere explanations of τὸ ὄν, as one Editor has done, betrays great looseness of thought.

σὺ δὲ τί; [πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνεις ἄν;]] I have made separate sentences: σὺ δὲ τί; answering to ἔγωγε οἶμαι and πῶς τ. δ. ἄν; to the general question. But πῶς διακρίνεις ἄν is so contrary to the usual order, and a second quotation of a more vague sort

following the only question to the purpose is so unworthy of our author, that I cannot but look on it as a later addition.

πολλὰκις] I cannot say what should be done with this word which is quite incompatible with ἐκάστοτε. Nor can I propose anything certain in place of δι' ἐκόντων, of which the sense seem as necessary as the mode of expression is objectionable. But it is not unlikely that the right reading is δι' ἐκόντων αὐτῶν.

Τὰ ὄπλα] This is a play upon the word τίθεσθαι, which Protarchus had used merely in the sense of *advancing an opinion*; but Socrates, taking up the words ἐναντία τίθεσθαι, replies, *I think you were going to say ὄπλα, but you were ashamed, and dropped the word.* τὰ ὄπλα ἐναντία τίθεσθαι is in *acie stare*, as in Herod. 1. 62, καὶ ἀντία ἔθεντο τὰ ἔπλα. There is a further play upon ἀπολιπεῖν; for ἀπολιπεῖν τὰ ὄπλα would properly mean to *desert*, but here it is merely to *forego* or *give up the word*.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρωταρχε, τοῦτ' ἔγωγ' ἐζήτειν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν [διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλείστ' ὠφελούσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφές καὶ τὰκριβές καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν ἢ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὄνινᾶσα. τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐζητοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὄρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθῆσει Γοργία, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπερέχειν τέχνη διδοὺς πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κρατεῖν δ' ἢ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεία, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότ' ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρὸν δ' εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιοῦτου διαφέρειν, τούτῳ γ' ἀντὶ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ. καὶ νῦν δὲ τσοφόρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἰκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτ' εἰς τινὰς ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκίμιας, ἀλλ' εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάνθ' ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διερευνησάμενοι [τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως,] εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἐζήτων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἢ τιν' ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.

[διαφέρει τῷ] μεγίστη] I once attempted to defend this construction by such examples as that of Aristophanes (*Wasps* 666) τοὺς "οὐχὶ προδώσω κ. τ. ἐ." There never was an interpolation which more clearly betrayed itself. If Plato had used any such word as διαφέρει, he would have made both grounds of comparison, *certainly* as well as *general merit*, depend upon it. ἐζητοῦμεν] MSS. and Edd. give ζη-

τοῦμεν. πρὸς χρεῖαν] These words are to be taken as governing τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *to surpass as to their use to men.*

κρατεῖν δ' ἢ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεία] The reading of the MSS. and Edd. is ὑπάρχεν (for ὑπερέχειν) and κρατεῖν, ἢ δ' εἶπον. This has been adduced as an instance of the ἀναχόλουσον, and it will be well to look closely into it. The case of πραγματεία, according to this supposition, will be owing to a construction intended to be analogous to that of τῇ μὲν ἐ. ὕ. τέχνη—διδοῦς, which construction is lost or changed by reason of the long parenthesis, so that, when this ends, a new construction, ταύτην εἴπωμεν, is substituted. A conclusive answer to all

these subtleties is, that not only the construction is different, but the sense is altogether unlike. For in the first part, if completed, we should expect *if you assign, or you ought to assign, or something which implies a claim for νοῦς*: but in the second part there is a call on Protarchus to declare what he really thinks about νοῦς (ταύτην εἴπωμεν κ. τ. ἐ.). Another objection to the passage as it stands is the awkwardness of διδοῦς ὑπάρχεν κρατεῖν, which means διδοῦς κρατεῖν, and nothing more. All these difficulties are removed by so simple a process that I have not hesitated to introduce it into the text, and to change the punctuation accordingly.

ταύτην εἴπωμεν] This ταύτην refers to δύναμιν, the second to ἐπιστήμην. τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως is not the proposed object of investigation, as the interpolator thought; they are to search out the dialectic art itself.

καὶ νῦν δὲ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες] For καὶ νῦν δὴ I have written καὶ νῦν δέ, as opposed to οὐκ ἐζήτουν πω. There is some corruption in σφόδρα διανοηθέντες, for διανοεῖσθαι cannot be used in the sense of διασκοπεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν, οἶμαι, συγχωρῆσαί τιν' ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐνοήσας τὸ τοιόνδε εἴρηκας ὃ λέγεις νῦν, ὡς αἱ πολλαὶ τέχναι καὶ ὅσοι περὶ ταύτας πεπόνηται, πρῶτον μὲν δόξαις χρῶνται καὶ τὰ περὶ δόξαν ζητοῦσι ξυντεταμένως; εἴτε καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἤγηται τις ζητεῖν, οἷσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπη τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπη πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπη ποιεῖ, ταῦτα ζητεῖ διὰ βίου; φραῖμεν ἂν ταῦτα, ἢ πῶς;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῖν οὐ περὶ τὰ ὄντ' αἰεὶ, περὶ δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα καὶ γεγονότα ἡμῶν ὃ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Τούτιον οὖν τι σαφές ἂν φραῖμεν τῇ ἀκριβεστάτῃ ἀληθείᾳ γίνεσθαι, ὧν μήτ' ἔσχε μηδὲν πώποτε κατὰ ταῦτά μηθ' ἔξει μήτ' εἰς τὸ νῦν παρὸν ἔχει;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Περὶ οὖν τὰ μὴ κεκτημένα βεβαιότητα μηδ' ἠντινοῦν πῶς ἂν ποτε βέβαιον γίνοιθ' ἡμῖν καὶ ὀτιοῦν;

ΠΡΩ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδαμῶς.

πεπόνηται] This word and ξυντεταμένως (Schütz's correction for ξυντεταμένως) explain each other. He is evidently speaking of pursuits which require great assiduity; but what these are it would be difficult to say, if we retained the old reading ὅσαι περὶ ταῦτα πεπόνηται. This has been explained by a reference to the passages in the *Phædo*, where ταῦτα is used of visible things; but this would at least include τὸ περὶ φύσεως ζητεῖν, which is here spoken of as a distinct branch. By means of this change we have the arts mentioned first, because they are the subject; but as the following remark turns on the means employed, it is convenient to mention the persons who follow the arts, to avoid the awkwardness of saying that the arts themselves χρῶνται δόξαις, or ζητοῦσι τὰ περὶ δόξαν.

ἤγεται] If the physicist mistook what

φύσις was, and while supposing that he investigated it was searching out something else, ἤγεται would be appropriate. But nothing more is meant than the usual enquiries of the Ionic Philosophy, and no intimation is given that there is any higher sense of φύσις or of the investigation of it. I therefore propose ἤρηται. For while in the handicrafts above mentioned he speaks of those who labour at them, he speaks of physical investigations as things in which men choose to engage. The tense of ἤρηται is borne out by ἀνήρηται τὸν πόνον. In explanation of this latter phrase I observe that in those well-known combinations πόλεμον — πόνον — κίνδυνον — νεῖκος ἀτρεσῶναι, ἀνατρεῖσθαι may be used in place of the other verb. Some who did not notice this have proposed unnecessary conjectures. Compare *Phædrus* 233 c, 243 c, *Laws* 921 A and B.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη περὶ αὐτά ἐστι τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἔχουσα.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκὼν εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίλιππον χρὴ σιγῆν χαίρειν ἔαν, τότε δὲ διαμαρτύρασθαι τῇ λόγῳ, — C

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ἢ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἔσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον [καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν] καὶ τὸ ἀληθές καὶ ὃ δὴ λέγομεν εἰλικρινές, περὶ τὰ αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα, ἢ [δεύτερος] ἐκείνων ὃ τι μάλιστ' ἐστὶ ξυγγενές· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δευτέρᾳ τε καὶ ὕστερα λεκτέον.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κάλλιστα ἄρ' οὐ τοῖς καλλίστοις δικαιοτάτων ἀπονέμειν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκὼν νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ φρόνησις ἅτι' ἂν τις τιμήσειε D μάλιστ' ὀνόματα;

ΠΡΩ. Ναί.

Οὐδ' ἄρα [νοῦς] οὐδέ τ. ἐ.] We should have expected οὔτε .. οὔτε. But if there is any ἐπιστήμη, however weak or vague, there is some νοῦς, for all ἐπιστήμαι are parts of νοῦς and are discussed as such. The νοῦς of the text is plainly the opposite of that of Anaxagoras, and throws all things into confusion. The scribes were not familiar with the idiom which we meet both in Homer and in the Attic writers, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδέ, οὐδ' ἄρ' οὐδέ. In the 5th Epistle of Synesius our modern texts have οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅμοιος ἣν ἔχοντι; but in my collations I find that the best MSS. have οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅμοιος ἣν ἔχοντι.

Τὸν μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμέ] See note on 20, n. The article here has a depreciating effect. It has, in fact, the force of turning the first and second persons into a third, or more properly still, of abstracting the individual from his personality, and making a mere *somebody* of him.

[καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν] These words are spurious. For βέβαιον cannot be se-

parated from ἀληθές, since the want of truth in physical knowledge has been declared to arise from the instability of the objects. Again καθαρὸν is so nearly the same as εἰλικρινές that it could not occur unless in close proximity to it, and the only place for εἰλικρινές is that which it occupies as a quality deduced from the other two; and as τὰ αἰεὶ—ὡσαύτως answer to βέβαιον and ἀληθές, so does ἀμικτότατα answer to εἰλικρινές.

[δεύτερος] The Zurich Editors have changed this into δευτέρως, which is at least more rational than Stallbaum's defence of it as a parenthetical proverb with πλοῦς understood. It is incredible that Plato should make two δευτέρα to one and the same *first*. It is therefore a waste of time to enquire how δευτερος should be corrected.

ἅττ' ἄν] The common reading is ἅ γ' ἄν. It is evident that this is no place for γε. The confusion between the two readings is of very frequent occurrence.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἐν ταῖς περὶ τὸ ὄν ὄντως ἐννοίαις ἴεσιν ἀπληκριβωμένα ὀρθῶς κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἅ γ' εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐγὼ τότε παρεσχόμην, οὐκ ἄλλ' ἐστὶν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Εἶεν· τὸ μὲν δὴ φρονήσεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πέρι πρὸς
 Ε τὴν ἀλλήλων μῖξιν εἴ τις φαίη καθάπερ εἰ δημιουργοῖς ἡμῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς δεῖ δημιουργεῖν τι, παρακεῖσθαι, καλῶς ἂν τῷ λόγῳ ἀπεικάζοι.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἄρ' οὐ μιν γίνουσι ἐπιχειρητέον;

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάδε προειποῦσι καὶ ἀναμνήσασιν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὀρθότερον ἂν ἔχοι,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὰ ποῖα;

ΣΩ. Ἄ καὶ πρότερον [ἐμνήσθημεν]· εὖ δ' ἡ παροιμία δο-
 60 κεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δις καὶ τρις τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπανα-
 πολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν.

ΠΡΩ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὕτω πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Φίληβός τρισὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι ζώοις γεγονότα καὶ δεῖν πάντα τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰγαθὸν τοῦτ' αὐτὸ εἶναι ξύμπασι, καὶ δὴ ὀνόματα, ἀγαθὸν

Ταῦτ' ἄρ' κ. τ. ε.] Although the reading of this passage has been pronounced to be *verissima*, yet as the authority who states this bids us take ἐστὶ καλεῖσθαι together (he was perhaps thinking of ἐστὶ καλεῖν) and talks strange stuff about ἀπληκριβωμένα and ἐννοιαί, we cannot throw off all suspicion of its unsoundness. If ἀπληκριβωμένα could mean *accurately proved to be* (not *accurately made*) there would be some handle for the infinitive καλεῖσθαι. But as this cannot be, and likewise for other reasons, which good

scholars will readily discern, I am inclined to read ἔστω ἀπληκριβωμένως κείμενα καλεῖσθαι.

ἐξ ὧν ἢ ἐν οἷς] The first is the material, considered as a kind of secondary cause, *out of which* things are produced; the second, the same material considered as the substance *in which* the workman realises his art.

[ἐμνήσθημεν] This is a supplement originating with some one who did not see that the verbs to be understood are εἴπομεν καὶ ἀνεμνήσαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.

καὶ ἡδύ, ἐνί τιν [καὶ φύσει μιᾷ] τούτῳ ὁρθῶς τεθέντ' ἔχειν. Σωκράτης δ' ἐν μὲν οὐ φησι τοῦτ' εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ Β ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τ' ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ ταῦτ' ἔστι τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε;

ΠΡΩ. Σφόδρα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τότε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν ξυνομολογοῖτο,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὴν ἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῆδε τῶν ἄλλων;

ΠΡΩ. Τίτι;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι παρείη τοῦτ' αἰὲ τῶν ζώων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενοῦς ἐτέρου ποτ' ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δ' ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν. οὐχ οὕτως;

ΠΡΩ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τῇ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἐκάτερον ἐκάτερου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἐκάστων, ἄμικτον μὲν ἡδονήν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δ' ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμιζρότατον ἔχουσαν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν D εἶναί τῳ;

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε παρηρέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὅστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὸν ὁρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ιδέας τιθέμενος, καὶ σκοπιῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτ' ἂν οἱ καὶ ὅτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δὴ γ' ἡδονήν, εἴθ' ὡς πλείστην εἴθ' ὡς σφοδροτάτην,

[καὶ φύσει μιᾷ] These words which separate τὸν from τούτῳ and leave ἐνὶ without a noun expressed or implied to lean upon, and say nothing more than what is said in ἐνί τινι τούτῳ, are an evident contribution of some *improver*.

ἐν μὲν οὐ φησι] The scribe has here confounded the ordinal and the cardinal number, both of which are written with

the same compendium. α was taken for πρῶτον, which is in all the Books, but it was meant for ἐν as is plain from the antithesis ἐν μὲν οὐ, δύο δέ.

ἐπειράθημεν—θέντες] *We made the experiment of placing, &c.* Stallbaum compares the expression used above, (21, A) ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασιλεύοντες ταῦτα.

μη ὅτι δὴ γ' ἡδονήν] This formula

εἰ μήτ' ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν, μήτε τὸ παράπαν γινώσκου
 E τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος, μήτ' αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδ'
 ὄντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι. ταῦτά δὲ λέγω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ
 τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτ' ἄν φρόνη-
 σιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον [ἢ μετὰ τινων ἡδονῶν] ἢ πᾶσας ἡδονὰς [χω-
 ρίς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ] μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινός.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἴδει ταῦτά γε
 πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν.

61 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἰρετόν καὶ τὸ παν-
 τάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἄν τούτων εἶη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἦτοι σαφῶς ἢ καὶ τινα τύπον αὐ-
 τοῦ ληπτέον, ἵνα, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὄντι δώσομεν ἔχωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μὲν τιν' ἐπὶ τὰγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Τίνα;

ΣΩ. Καθάπερ εἴ τις τιν' ἀνθρώπων ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν
 B πρῶτον ὀρθῶς, ἵν' οἰκεῖ, πύθοιτ' αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δὴ πού πρὸς
 τὴν εὔρεσιν ἄν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ'
 ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμίκτῳ βίῳ τὰγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ
 μυκτῷ.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἐλπίς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μυκθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητού-
 μενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μύ.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύομεν,

occurs in several Attic writers. Plato and Xenophon sometimes use merely μὴ ὅτι and sometimes add δὴ only. In the cases where γε is added, it is found sometimes before δὴ, sometimes after it. Compare this passage with one in Demosth. *against Conon*, μὴ ὅτι γε δὴ, and with one in *Politicus*, μὴ ὅτι δὴ βραχυλείς γε.

[ἢ μ. τ. ἡδονῶν] I bracket the insertions which make nonsense of a

question put by Plato with the utmost subtlety. In the words given to Protarchus, the part which purports to be the answer is no answer at all; and his objection to the repetition of the question looks like an addition contrived to mask a corrupt sentence. Protarchus' answer ought to be ἔστι ταῦτα, or in other words οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἢ ταῦτά γε.

εἴτε Διώνσος εἶθ' Ἑφραϊστος εἶθ' ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τι- C
μὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγγραφῆς.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἡμῖν καθάπερ οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεσιᾶσι χοῤ-
να, μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς
φρονήσεως νηφαντιλῆν καὶ ἄοιον αὖστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινὸς
ἵδατος· ὡς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμιγνύναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἄρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονή- D
σει μιγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστ' ἐπιτύχοιμεν;

ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀσφαλές· ἢ δ' ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μιγνύοι-
μεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τιν' ἀποφήρασθαι ἂν.

ΠΡΩ. Λέγε τίνα.

ΣΩ. Ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονὴ τε ἴαληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἐτέ-
ρας ἄλλη, καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα;

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἢ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ
γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμεν' ἀποβλέπουσα, ἢ δ' ἐπὶ τὰ μίτε
γιγνόμενα μίτ' ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταῦτα δ' ὡσαύτως ὄντ' αἰεί. E
ταύτην [εἰς τὸ ἀληθές] ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθ' ἐκείνης ἀλη-
θεστέραν εἶναι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν [εἰ] τάληθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρας ἴδωμεν
πρῶτον ξυμιμῆξαντες, ἀρ' ἱκανὰ ταῦτα ξυγκεκραμμένα τὸν ἀγαπη-
τότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἢ τινος ἔτι προσ-
δεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων.

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ δοῦν οὕτως.

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ΣΩ. Ἔστω δὴ τις ἡμῖν φρονῶν ἀνθρωπος αὐτῆς πέρι δι-
καιουσίνης, ἢ τι ἔστι, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν, καὶ

παρεσιᾶσι κρήναι] Winckelmann, in his Preface, observes that this is an allusion to the libations in honour of the Eumenides and other divinities, which consisted of water and honey. Compare *Æsch. Eum.* 107, *Soph. Œd. Col.* 100 and 471, with the Scholiast.

Ἦν ἡμῖν] I leave this passage in a corrupt state. ὡς οἰόμεθα is quite hope-

less, and we have nothing whereby to decide our choice between ἀληθῶς τοιαύτη μᾶλλον or (following the Bodleian which omits μᾶλλον), ἀληθεστέρα ἄλλης ἄλλη.

Οὐκοῦν [εἰ] τάληθέστατα] I have bracketed εἰ and changed ἴδωμεν into ἴδωμεν.

δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἰσαύτως διανοούμενος.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔστω γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος ἰκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει, κέκλου μὲν καὶ σφαιράς αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δ' ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαιραν καὶ τοὺς κέκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, καὶ χρώμενος ἐν οἰκοδομίᾳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως κανόσι καὶ τοῖς κέκλοις;

ΠΡΩ. Γελοῖαν διάθεσιν ἡμῶν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐν ταῖς θείαις οὐσαν μόνον ἐπιστήμῃς λέγομεν.

ΣΩ. Πῶς φῆς; ἢ τοῦ ψευδοῦς κανόνος ἅμα καὶ τοῦ κέκλου τὴν οὐ βέβαιον οὐδὲ καθαρὰν τέχνην ἐμβλητέον κοινῇ καὶ συγγρατέον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον γάρ, εἰ μέλλει τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκάστοι' ἐξευρῆσειν οἴκαδε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μουσικὴν, ἣν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ἔφαμεν, στοχάσεώς τε καὶ μιμίσεως μεστὴν οὐσαν, καθαρότητος ἐνδεῖν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον φαίνεται ἔμοιγε, εἴπερ γ' ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἔσται καὶ ὀπωσοῦν ποτὲ βίος.

ΣΩ. Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος καὶ βιάζόμενος, ἠττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσερεῖν, καὶ μίγνυσθαι ἁμοῦ καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεστέραν;

ΠΡΩ. Οὐκὼν ἔγωγ' οἶδα, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὃ τί τις ἂν βλάπτοιο πάσας λαβὼν τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιστήμας, ἔχων τὰς πρώτας.

ΣΩ. Μεθιδῶ δὴ τὰς ξυμπάσας ῥεῖν εἰς τὴν τῆς Ὀμήρου καὶ μάλα ποιητικῆς μισγαγκείας ὑποδοχῆν;

ΠΡΩ. Πάντε μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μεθεῖνται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν πηγὴν ἰτέον. οἷς γὰρ διανοήθημεν αὐτὰς μιγνύναι πρῶτον, τὰ τῶν

καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως] Many notes have been written in defence and explanation of these words. If they are correct, we must understand by them, using other pattern figures in the same manner as the circles. Compare below, ταύτων καὶ ἀλήθεια, the same as truth. But as it is not the manner of using but the things used, which are here in

question, we might read ὁμοίως, and omit καί: "Using, in building and in other things, patterns like the circles, i.e. divine."

μισγαγκείας] Hom. II. 4. 452, 'Ὡς ὅτε γείμαρροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεσφι ῥέοντες ἔς μισγάγκειαν συμβάλλετον ὄβριμον ὕδωρ.

οἷς γὰρ διανοήθημεν] It is vain to

ἀληθειῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐξεγένεθ' ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιστήμην εἰς ταῦτόν μεθεῖμεν ἀθρόας καὶ πρόσθεν τῶν ἑιδονῶν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὄρα δὴ βουλευέσθαι ἡμῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἑιδονῶν, πό-
τερα καὶ ταύτας πάσας ἀθρόας ἀφετέον ἢ καὶ τοῦτων πρώτας
μεθετέον ἡμῖν ὅσα ἀληθεῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Πολύ τι διαφέρει πρὸς γ' ἀσφάλειαν πρώτας τὰς
ἀληθεῖς ἀφεῖναι.

ΣΩ. Μεθείσθων δὴ. τί δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα; ἄρ' οὐκ εἰ μὲν
τινες ἀναγκαῖαι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ, ξυμμικτέον καὶ ταύτας;

ΠΡΩ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὰς γ' ἀναγκαίας δῆπουθεν· εἰ δέ γε καὶ καθάπερ
τὰς τέχνας πάσας ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἦν ἐπίστασθαι 63
διὰ βίου, καὶ ἡμῖν δὴ ταῦτά λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἑιδονῶν, εἶπερ
πάσας ἑιδονὰς ἦδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον θ' ἡμῖν ἐσὶ καὶ
ἀβλαβές ἅπασι, πάσας ξυγκρατέον.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦτων λέγομεν; καὶ πῶς
ποιῶμεν;

ΣΩ. Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρωταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρὴ, τὰς ἑιδονὰς
δ' αὐτὰς καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις, διαπυρριζομένους τὸ τοιόνδ' ἄλ- B
λήλων πέρι,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὄ φίλοι, εἴθ' ἑιδονὰς ἡμᾶς χρὴ προσαγορεύειν εἴτ'
ἄλλω ὅτι οὖν ὀνόματι, μῶν οὐκ ἂν δέξαισθ' οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρο-

look for any coherence in this passage so long as we retain ὡς γάρ. The sense requires οὗς γάρ. For the parts of the true sciences, with which we first proposed to mingle them, were not sufficient for us. I have also changed the place of πρώτων, which commonly follows μόρια, where it has no meaning.

Τὰς γ' ἀναγκαίας δῆπουθεν] These words are commonly given to Protagoras, but Ficinus had long ago seen that they belong to Socrates. Van Heusde thought them spurious. Stallbaum defends them on the ground that δῆπουθεν in *asseverando haud infrequens*. No doubt; but with an appeal to another for his assent. "Must we

mix the necessary pleasures?" "I see no objection." "I presume you do not, if they are necessary." This way of laughing at the question and answer, as if there could be any question about what was necessary, is quite in Plato's manner. In the following sentence observe the very artistic finish of the antithesis in an *inverted* order. τέχνας πάσας = πάσας ἑιδονὰς, ἀβλαβές τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον = συμφέρον τε καὶ ἀβλαβές, ἐπίστασθαι = ἦδεσθαι. This shows how false is the sagacity of those who smell out an interpolation here. In Protagoras' answer, λέγομεν refers to λέγομεν, and ποιῶμεν τοῦ ξυγκρατέον.

μετὰ φρονήσεως ἢ πάσης] The Books

ρήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς [τοῦ φρονεῖν]; οἴμαι μὲν πρὸς ταῦτα τόδ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν,—

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι, καθάπερ ἔμπροσθεν ἐρρήθη, τὸ μόνον καὶ ἔρημον [εἰλικρινές] εἶναι τι γένος οὔτε πᾶν τι δυνατὸν οὔτ' ὠφέλιμον· πάντων γε μὴν ἡγοῦμεθα γενῶν ἄριστον ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνὸς συνοικεῖν ἡμῖν τὸ τοῦ γινώσκειν τὰλλὰ τε πάντα καὶ αὐτὴν αὖ τὴν ἡμῶν τελέως [εἰς] δύναμιν ἐκάστις.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ καλῶς γ' εἰρήκατε τὰ νῦν, φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως. πάλιν τοῖνυν μετὰ τοῦτο, [τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον]. Ἄρ' ἡδονῶν τι προσδεῖσθ' ἐν τῇ ξυγκράσει; φαῖμεν ἂν αὖ τὸν νοῦν τε καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν ἀνερωτῶντες. Ποῖον, φαῖεν ἂν ἴσως, ἡδονῶν;

ΠΡΩ. Εἰκόσ.

D ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ γ' ἡμέτερος λόγος μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδε. Πρὸς ταῖς ἀληθείαις ἐκείναις ἡδοναῖς, φήσομεν, ἄρ' ἔτι προσδεῖσθ' ἡμῖν τὰς μεγίστας ἡδονὰς ξυνοίκους εἶναι καὶ τὰς σφοδρότατας; Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; φαῖεν ἂν, αἱ γ' ἐμποδίσματά τε μὲν ἡμῖν ἔχουσι, τὰς ψυχὰς ἐν αἷς οἰκοῦμεν ταράττουσαι [διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς], καὶ γίνεσθαι τε ἡμᾶς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐκ
E ἔῴσι τὰ τε γινόμεν' ἡμῶν τέκνα ὡς τὸ πολὺ, δι' ἀμέλειαν λήθην ἐμποιοῦσαι, παντάπασι διαφθείρουσιν; ἄλλας δ' ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς ἄς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νό-

have μ. φ. πάσης ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν. There seems no ground for the omission of μάλλον in an ordinary prose passage, and the attempt at variety in φρονήσεως. τοῦ φρονεῖν, is very poor. Nor is there any fairness in the alternative "either with all or without any". For these reasons I have preferred μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἢ πάσης χωρὶς. In the next paragraph εἰλικρινές is obviously an interpolation.

αὐτὴν αὖ τὴν] The MSS. have some τὴν αὐτὴν, others αὖ τὴν αὐτὴν. The reason for this answer of the Pleasures is that they like that which appreciates the nature of each of themselves. I have therefore written ἐκάστις and cancelled εἰς.

[τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτη-

τέον] The verbal is plainly out of keeping with φαῖμεν ἂν, and both the repetition of νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν, and still more the *would-be* variety in "we must ask", "we shall say, asking", is most clumsy. Another conclusive reason against the genuineness of these words is the position of αὖ; for the opposition commences at πάλιν, and there was nothing to prevent the author writing τὴν φρόνησιν αὖ καὶ τὸν νοῦν. But the simplest argument is, that if Plato had written τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ἀνερωτητέον, he would have had no motive for adding anything whatever to φαῖμεν ἂν.

[διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς] This is no doubt a true explanation; but who would ever dream of saying αἱ ἡδοναὶ ταράττουσιν ἡμᾶς διὰ μανικὰς ἡδονάς?

μιξε, καὶ πρὸς ταύτας τὰς μεθ' ἐγγείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ξυμπύσης ἀρειτῆς, ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαιοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ ξυναζολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς δ' αἰεὶ μετ' ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἐπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μίγνυται τὸν βουλόμενον ὅ τι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μίξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πει- 64 ρᾶσθαι, τί ποτ' ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτόν. ἀρ' οὐκ ἐμφορῶς ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως φατόν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ἐπέφθ' αὐτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὁρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;

ΠΡΩ. Παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γ' ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἂν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδ' ἂν ἔν.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

B

ΣΩ. Ὡς μὴ μίξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τοῦτ' ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδ' ἂν γενόμενον εἴη.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ ἔν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἐπιπροσδεῖ τῇ συγχράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σύ τε καὶ Φίληβος. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθάπερ εἰ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.

ΠΡΩ. Καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδύχθαι.

ταύτας μίγνυ· τὰς] All subsequent Editors have adopted this brilliant conjecture of Van Heusde for ταύτας μιγνύοντας.

καὶ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν] Of the various changes which might be proposed for the removal of the difficulty which this sentence presents, I think the most probable would be καὶ κατὰ τιν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτόν. Compare *Sophist*, 252, A. Ἔσοι κατ' εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα εἶναι φασί. ἐχόντως φατόν] This is a playful allusion to the phrase νοῦν ἐχόντως.

κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων] Socrates speaks of his present argument (ὁ νῦν λόγος), that is the speculation concerning combinations and what admits of them, as concluded; he compares it to

the invisible power which orders the world, because it is capable of regulating man's life. Nothing can be simpler or clearer than this passage, and yet it has been twisted into the most absurd fancies, such as the following: *Descripta est adhuc mixtionis ratio, atque ostensum, quonam ejus elementa esse debeant, ita ut τὸ πέρας, τὸ ἀπειρον, et τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον in mixtione ista jam nunc conspiciantur.* (τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον in mixtione, would imply that τὸ ξυμμισγόμενον is something different from mixtio; if so, it is τὸ ἀπειρον and τὸ πέρας.) And again: *Quippe voluptionis constituant veluti corpus, sapientia vero ψυχὴν.* Of all this metaphysical cobweb not a single thread belongs to Plato.

C ΣΩ. Ἄρα' οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις [καὶ] τῆς οὐκίσεως ἐφροσύνη [τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου] λέγοντες ἴσως ὁρθῶς ἂν τινα τρόπον φαίμεν;

ΠΡΩ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τί δ᾽ ἦτ' ἐν τῇ ξυμμιξεί τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστα αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλέτην τοιαύτην διάθεσιν; τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπισκεψόμεθα, εἴθ' ἴδονῆ εἴτε [τῷ] νῦν προσφρέστερον καὶ οὐκίστερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ ξυμίστηται.

D ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ ξυμφοριώτατον.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ξυμπάσης γε μίξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, δι' ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισοῦν ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Οὐδεὶς πον τοῦτ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.

ΠΡΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι μέτρον καὶ τῆς ξυμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τεχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ξύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τί τε κερανώμενα καὶ πρῶτην αὐτήν. οὐδὲ γὰρ κράσις, ἀλλὰ τις E ἄκρατος ξυμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἢ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἐκάστοι' ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις ξυμφορά.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δὴ καταπέφυγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. μετριότης γὰρ καὶ ξυμμέτρια κάλλος δῆλον καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ξυμβαίνει γίνεσθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γ' ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμῖχθαι.

ΠΡΩ. Πάνν γε.

65 ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμειδ' ἰδέα, τὸ ἀγαθὸν [θρηῦσαι,] σύντρισι λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ ἐμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέ-

[καὶ] By cancelling this word we arrive at the right construction, ἐπὶ τοῖς προθύροις τῆς τἀγαθοῦ οὐκίσεως. τῆς τοῦ τοιούτου seems to have been inserted after this intrusive καὶ had made τῆς οὐκίσεως seem to be without an

owner.

ξυμφορά] Observe the play on the word ξυμπεφορημένη. μετριότης] This answers to ἀρετή, and ξυμμετρία το κάλλος. λαβόντες] This has nothing to do

γωμεν ὡς τοῦτο τοῖον ἐν ὁρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθα [ἂν] τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὃν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγόναι.

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα μὲν οἶν.

ΣΩ. Ἦδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἵκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὅσους οἶν κριτῆς ἰδουῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονίσεως, ἰσώτερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου ξυγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώ- B ποῖς τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀἴθλον μὲν, ὅμως δ' οἶν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεθεῖν βέλτιον.

ΣΩ. Καθ' ἐν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἰδουῆν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρινόμεν. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον [ξυγγε- νές] ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μειριότητος πέρι λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ναί. πρῶτον δέ γ' ἀληθείας λαβοῦν, ὦ Πρώταρχε· καὶ λαβόμενος, βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἰδο- C νήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον, ἀπόκριναι σταντῶ, πότερον ἰδουῆ ξυγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθεία.

with catching, though the scribe who interpolated *ἡρεῦσαι* thought so. The infinitive to be understood is *λαβεῖν*. No *ἰδέαι* can be the instrument for ensnaring or seizing on *τάγαθόν*. We have in fact found it; and we form our notion of it, (compare *ἐπειδὴν λάβης*, 17, c) not by a single but by a triple character. For this reason as *σύν* is quite inappropriate (else we should also read *σύν μιᾷ*), I have written *σύντρισι*, and as the three characters have been repeatedly mentioned, and are soon to be mentioned again, as Beauty or Symmetry, Measure, and Truth, I have changed *συμμετρία* into *ἐμμετρία*. τοῦτο is manifestly *τάγαθόν*, and this they consider the cause τῶν ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει, which is not quite so easy as it looks. For *τάγαθόν* is not spoken of as the cause of the ingredients; and if τὰ ἐν τῇ ξυμμίξει does not mean these, it must be constrained to mean the triple conditions of a good mixture just mentioned. But perhaps this constraint would be no longer felt, if we could find out what is lurking under the cor-

rrupt οἶον ἐν. Indeed it is not so certain that τῶν itself is correct, for the repeated ἂν in *αἰτιασαίμεθ' ἂν*, which I have omitted as intolerable in Attic prose, might make one suspect that *αἰτιασαίμεθ'* αὐτῶν was to be read, and that some word like *παρουσία*; had preceded. The argument is very plain. There is *ἀγαθόν* in *κράσις*, for all prefer the mixed to the unmixed. But μέτρον, κάλλος, ἀλήθεια must be present at all *κράσεις*; therefore we may conclude that these three represent that one, and that *ἀγαθόν* is the cause of their presence in the *κράσις*, and that the *κράσις* is good (*τοιαύτην*) because of the Good that causes it.

[*ξυγγενές*] This word I have put in brackets. If any one wishes to retain it, he must insert ὡς. But although Socrates afterwards uses this figure of speech, —πότερον ἡδονὴ ξυγγενέστερον—it is not wanted, and its absence is fully compensated by the verb *ἀπονεμοῦμεν*. “To which of the two shall we rather declare Measure, Beauty, and Truth to belong?”

ΠΡΩ. Τί δὲ χρόνον δεῖ; πολὺ γάρ, οἶμαι, διαφέρετον. ἰδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τὰ φροδίσια, αἷ δὴ μέγιστα δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιπορεῖν σιγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παιδῶν τῶν ἰδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημέ-
D νων· τοῖς δ' ἦτοι ταῦτόν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιό-
τατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἰδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἰδονῆς πλείω κέ-
τται;

ΠΡΩ. Εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας. οἶ-
μαι γὰρ ἰδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὔρειν ἂν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώ-
τερον οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ποτε.

E ΣΩ. Καλῶς εἴρηκας. ὁμως δ' ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον. νοῦς
ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλείον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἰδονῆς γένος, ὥστ'
εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἰδονῆς, ἢ τοῦναντίον;

ΠΡΩ. Ἀλλ' οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ-
δεὶς πώποτ' οὐδ' ἔπαρ οὐτ' ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὐτ' εἶδεν οὐτ'
ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὐτ' ὄντα οὐτ'
ἐσόμενον.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῶς.

ΠΡΩ. Ἦδονάς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας,
ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἰδόμενον ὄντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ
66 πάντων αἰσχιστὸν ἐπόμενον ὁρῶντες, αὐτοὶ γ' αἰσχυρόμεθα καὶ
ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅ τι μάλιστα, νεκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.

ΣΩ. Πάντη δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπὶ τ' ἀγγέλων
[πέμπων] καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἰδονὴ κτῆμι' οὐκ ἔστι πρῶ-

ἀμετρώτερον .. ἐμμετρώτερον] I have followed the authority of the oldest MS. Buttmann, though disposed to extend the analogy of ἀκροτέρος, σφοδρότερος &c. to compound words, and to consider εὐτεχνιώτερος and such like as licenses taken by the Attic poet in unusual words, is content to await a fuller induction. The presence of these forms in a MS. which has preserved so many

Atticisms is a part and no small part of the kind of proof which he wanted.

'ΑΛΛ' οὖν] Here again the MSS. and Edd. have Ἄρ' οὖν, which is evidently out of place where an admission is made in answer to a previous question, and where the only answer made by the next speaker is Ὅρθῶς.

[πέμπων] ὑπ' ἀγγέλων φράζειν is the same as ἀγγέλους πέμπων φράζειν.

τον οὐδ' αὐ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ ἰὸ μᾶλλον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τοιαῦτα χρὴ νομίζω τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν.

ΠΡΩ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ Β τέλειον καὶ ἰκανὸν καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐ ταύτης ἐστίν.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικε γοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλωις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐκ [οὐ τέταρτα,] ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ τέχνης καὶ δόξας ὁρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτ' εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶ μάλ- C λον τῆς ἡδονῆς ξυγγενῆ;

ΠΡΩ. Τίχ' ἴσ.

ΣΩ. Πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἅς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύτους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμης, τὰς δ' αἰσθήσεων, ἐπομένας;

ΠΡΩ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιτῆ δ' ἐν γενεᾷ, φησὶν Ὀρφεύς, καταπαίσατε νόσμον αἰοιδῆς. ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἐπιτῆ

Comp. Eur. *Alcest.* 737, 738. But ὅπ' ἀγγέλων πέμπων is nothing at all.

τοιαῦτα χρῆ] The MSS. are divided between τοιαῦτα χρῆ and χρῆ τοιαῦτα, the former, which alone makes sense, being supported by the inferior MSS.

τὴν αἰδίων ἡρῆσθαι φύσιν] I have discussed the proper reading and interpretation of this passage in my Introduction. With regard to the expression τὴν αἰδίων φύσιν in place of ἀγαθόν, which he has all along been employing, it is not difficult to see that Plato here, knowing that the mere argument is virtually at an end, breaks loose from dialectic trammels and allows his enthusiasm full play. It is to be noticed that he uses the word αἰδίων which to a common hearer meant only *perpetual* or *eternal*, in a further sense with which his scholars were familiar, of the in-

visible or *undiscoverable*. That for the sake of which all things are the end, and being the end it cannot be explained, as other things are, by that to which it belongs, or of which it is the effect; but its name is also its definition. It is, and there is nothing beyond.

τῆς ἀληθείας] These words are introduced with a certain bye-purpose of shewing that this νοῦς owes its place to the Truth of which it is the realisation.

[οὐ τέταρτα] If τέταρτα is in its right place here, it is of no use lower down; but it seems better placed there than here.

ἐπιστήμης] The MSS. have ἐπιστήμας, τὰς δέ. The scribe was put out by the want of τὰς μὲν, but it is understood in τὰς δέ, according to a common idiom.

D καταπεπαιυμένος εἶναι κρίσει. τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

ΠΡΩ. Οὐλοῦν κρί.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλωμεν.

ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ τὸ τρίτον, ὃ Σώκρατες; ὡς Φίληβος τὰ γαστὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ πάντη; ὡς γὰρ ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.

E ΣΩ. Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκούομεν. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ καιτιδὼν ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διεκίλυσθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλὰκις μυθίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακροῦ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.

ΠΡΩ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ὑποπιτεῖων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλ' εἶναι πολλά, εἶπον ὡς, εἰ φανείη τι τούτων ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῆ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ξυδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερούσοιτο.

67 ΠΡΩ. Εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατον τούτοις οὐδέτερον [ἱκανόν] ἐφάνη.

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μὴ τι τὰ γαστὸν γ' αὐτὸ μιθδέτερον αὐ-

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτήρι] A common proverb for adding the finishing stroke to any performance. The third libation was offered to Ζεὺς Σωτήρ.

Ποῖον δὴ] If the reader will look into any other edition, he will see wherein I have departed from the received text. The reasons for so doing need scarcely be given. Φίληβος κ. τ. ε. in the mouth of Socrates is made to cut Protarchus' question Ποῖον δὴ τὸ τρίτον; in two, making nonsense of both halves, and looking like nonsense itself. I have joined it by ὡς to that part of Protarchus' speech, where it must occur to give sense to Socrates' answer. I have also added γὰρ to the second ὡς,

and for παντελεῖ, which is absurd, put πάντη.

[ἱκανόν] The interpolation of this word is easily accounted for, if we suppose that the reading of the Coislinian πάντων ἱκανώτατα ἐφάνη was founded on some old copy. For in this way there was no predicate to οὐδέτερον. Afterwards the correctors of the copies which, like the Bodleian, retained ἱκανώτατον, on collation with such another copy, adopted the reading, not suspecting that it was invented as a salve to a corruption from which their own text was exempt.

ἀπήλλακτο] This confirms my conjecture on Thucydides 1, 138: where

τοῖν εἶναι, στερόμενον αὐταρχείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;

ΠΡΩ. Ὅρθότατα.

ΣΩ. Φανέντος δέ γ' ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τοῦτοιν ἐκείρου, μῦθῳ αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφρέστερον Β πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ιδέᾳ.

ΠΡΩ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἴν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφράγτο, γίγνεται ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.

ΠΡΩ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον δέ γε, οὐδ' ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τάλλα ξύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὡσπερ μάντις ὄρουσιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἷοντα κριόνες εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον [ἢ τοὺς] τῶν ἐν Μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἐκάστοτε λόγων. C

ΠΡΩ. Ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρησθᾶί σοι νῦν ἤδη φραμὲν ἄπαντες.

ΣΩ. Οὐλοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;

ΠΡΩ. Σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δὴ που σύ γ' ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν. ἵπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.

he says in speaking of the character of Themistocles: κρῖναι δ' ἱκανῶν οὐκ ἀπ' ἄλλακτο. "He did not shut himself up from men capable of judging." For μῆ τι—γε the Books have μῆ τοι—γε, which is a blunder of continual occurrence.

Πρῶτον δέ γε, οὐδ' ἂν] The second class of MSS. and Eusebius have the reading οὐκ ἂν, which, if it be written οὐ, καὶ would be no way inferior to

that in the text.

φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν] They declare it, not by word, but by deed, by following pleasure.

ἐν Μούσῃ] Compare *Laws* 899 E, ἐν τε Μούσαις οὐκ ἐρῶδῶς ὑμνούμεναι; not by the Muses, but in songs inspired by them. I have put ἢ τοὺς in brackets. The same double construction after a comparative is offered by the MSS. in a passage of the *Euthydemus*.

PALÆOGRAPHICAL REMARKS.

TRANSPOSITIONS AND INTERPOLATIONS.

Those who have not paid much attention to the Critical History of our Texts will probably think that they cannot have suffered much from the placing of words out of their proper order, and that consequently we ought not to rely on corrections attempted by means of transposition. But if any one will take the trouble to compare the various readings of the MSS. say of Thucydides or Plato, he will find instances continually recurring in which one copy differs from another in this respect, although in others it presents very few diversities of reading. Again if he will search for those cases where a transposition of two or more words restores the sense of an otherwise hopeless passage, he will soon find that their number accumulates far more rapidly than he had expected. Nor will it be long before he is able to make a considerable muster of sentences in which a word has strayed so far from its place that it is found at the other end of the sentence, or even in another to which it cannot belong. And not only single words or phrases, but whole sentences have thus changed places, as in these parts of Tragedy where the dialogue consists of alternating lines or couplets, and the sense has enabled critics to discover the places to which these originally belonged. These faults of transcription are no more than we should have a right to expect: for in the first place it is nothing unusual that a scribe should leave out one or more words, or that having left them out he should place them where the reader will notice the emission, or that his copyist should in his hurry fail to observe the mark in the text corresponding to another in the margin which shewed where the words were to be inserted; or if the first writer was content to write the words in

the body of the text, with certain letters to shew that two parts of a sentence were to be read in an inverted order, it was no wonder if the transcriber neglected those letters. Some of these transpositions are so strange that one can scarcely figure to oneself the state of the MS. in which the blunder first began.

I give two instances of this; of which the first is from the *Plutus* vv. 119-20.

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὡς ἔμ' εἰ
 πύθοιτ' νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δραῶ;

The first place where I have left a gap is commonly filled up with the words τὰ τούτων μῶρ' and the second with ἄν ἐπιτρίψει. The result is that you are obliged to take τὰ μῶρα for τὴν μωρίαν, that the speaker must be understood to say τούτων of those whom he is addressing, that Jove is represented as likely to punish one person for the folly of two others with whom he has nothing to do, and that we have to digest such an order of words as we can find no match for in all Greek literature. But transpose these, and fill up the first gap with ἄν ἐπιτρίψει, and the second with τουτωμωρε, and you get

Πλ. ὁ Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν οἶδ' ὡς ἄν ἐπιτρίψειέ μ', εἰ
 πύθοιτο τοῦτ'. Χρ. ᾧ μῶρε, νῦν δ' οὐ τοῦτο δραῶ;

In the *Heraclida* of Euripides the following verses (682 foll.) occur.

Θεράπων.

ἥκιστα πρὸς σου μῶρον ἦν εἰπεῖν ἔπος.

Ἰόλαος.

καὶ μὴ μετασχεῖν γ' ἀλκίμου μάχης φίλοις.

Θεράπων.

* * * * *

Ἰόλαος.

τί δ', οὐ θένομι κἄν ἐγὼ δι' ἀσπίδος;

Θεράπων.

θένοις ἄν, ἀλλὰ πρόσθεν αὐτὸς ἄν πέσοις.

Ἰόλαος.

οὐδεὶς ἔμ' ἐχθρῶν προοβλέπων ἀνέξεται.

Θεράπων.

* * * * *

Ἰόλαος.

ἀλλ' οὖν μαχοῦνται γ' ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσοσι.

Θεράπων.

σμικρὸν τὸ σὸν σήκωμα προστίθης φίλοις.

I have written *μαχοῦνται* for *μαχοῦμαι* because Iolans is thinking of his enemies, as we see from his foregoing speech, and his plea is that at least he will help to make up the number on his side. "Our enemies shall at least fight men not fewer in number." If this wanted confirmation, it would be confirmed by the answer *σμικρὸν κ. τ. ἔ.* But how are we to fill up the gaps? Here are two lines for the purpose which I give from the MSS. and Editions; they both begin alike.

1. οὐκ ἔστ' ἐν ὄψει τραῦμα, μὴ δρώσης χερσός.
2. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ τᾶν, ἥτις ἦν ῥώμη σέθεν.

If we ask the merest beginner which answers best in either passage, he will say that nothing can be more appropriate than to remind an old man of his weakness, when he threatens to join the battle, nor more inappropriate than when he counts on his enemies flying from his very look; and that as the proper answer to the last beast would be to tell him, that *looks do not wound*, so the same observation is altogether foreign to the purpose, when the old man has just said, "It is not worthy of me to refuse to share the fight with my friends". Now the Books all agree in the very opposite decision, and assign no. 1. to the first gap and no. 2. to the second; and what is far more wonderful, Elmsley mentions the change, which was first proposed by Musgrave, without giving the slightest hint that he even thinks it probable.

In the *Iphigenia Taurica* v. 513 foll. we find the same error. Iphigenia asks the unknown Orestes whether he will tell her something. Orestes answers that he will. And now that we are on the tiptoe to know what question Iphigenia will ask, because we naturally expect the first unravelling of the plot from the answer thereto, she breaks into a sentimental reflexion.

καὶ μὴν ποθεινός γ' ἦλθες ἐξ Ἄργους μελών.

to which Orestes answers very naturally, "You may be glad to see me here, but I am not so glad to be here": after which interruption the expected questioning and answering begin. But if we take this interrupting couplet out of the way and put it immediately after Iphigenia has learnt that the stranger is from Argos, in this order,

- I. φυγὰς δ' ἀπῆρας πατριδος, ἢ ποία τύχη;
 O. φεύγω τρόπον γε δή τιν' οὐχ ἑκὼν ἑκὼν.
 I. καὶ μὴν ποθεινός γ' ἦλθες ἐξ Ἄργους μολών.
 O. οὔκουν ἔμαντῶ γ', εἰ δὲ σοί, σὺ τοῦθ' ὄρα.
 I. ἄρ' ἂν τί μοι φράσειας ὧν ἐγὼ θέλω;
 O. ὡς γ' ἐν παρέργῳ τῆς ἐμῆς δυσπραξίας.—

we find each verse naturally arising out of that which precedes and introducing to that which follows it.

For the same reason, to such a line as this (*Ion* 1295)

ἔμελλες οἰκεῖν τ᾽ ἄμ', ἐμοῦ βίᾳ λαβών,

the retort

κᾶπειτα τοῦ μέλλειν μ' ἀπέκτεινες φόβῳ;

ought to answer without anything intervening; but that passage would lead me into another topic, that of wilful interpolation, for the four lines *πατρός γε—χθονός* contain nothing but what is said with equal clearness further on.

The same reason does not apply to the passage in the *Euthydemus* (305, c. D) which I have mentioned elsewhere in this Book (p. III), where the following most necessary connexion has been broken by the negligence of some copyist: οἴονται δ' εἶναι πάντων σοφώτατοι ἀνθρώπων, πρὸς δὲ τῶ εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν ἂν πάνυ παρὰ πολλοῖς, | ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίῳις λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἄμφι Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. | ὥστε (τοῦ) παρὰ πᾶσιν εὐδοκιμεῖν ἐμποδῶν σφίσι εἶναι οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἢ τοὺς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθρώπους. It is true that the words which I have here introduced into their proper place, have, where they now occur, been the innocent cause of the silly interpolation, εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, but they were not displaced on purpose to make room for an interpolation, like the verse in the *Ion* quoted above.

This whole matter of transposition may be summed up thus. If the misplacing of words is an accident of frequent occurrence in writing, and the correction of such errors is liable to be misunderstood and so to lead to further confusion; if the examples of such confusion are to be found in several places where the nature of metrical dialogue would generally be a safeguard against their occurrence; and if these examples often concern not only single words but even whole verses, it is unreasonable to refuse assent to those conjectural emendations which consist of trans-

position, when by such transposition we obtain sentences of which the grammatical construction and the sense are such as satisfy the reader, because it is most unlikely that good grammar and good sense should be produced by accident, and not be the sense and the grammar intended by the author.

The question of the *a priori* probability of interpolations may be disposed of in a few words; probably no one will deny the likelihood that words appearing in the margin, where they were intended as mere observations, should be mistaken by a copyist for restorations of matter omitted in the text; but some persons may feel reluctant to believe that the scribes would wilfully interpolate words of their own, and endeavour to pass them off as the words of the author, or perhaps they would concede such a possibility only where the text which the copyist had before him was corrupt or unintelligible; but this belief that the writers of our manuscripts were scrupulous and were generally guided by common sense, is altogether contrary to experience. Hundreds of passages may be adduced from all the masters of Attic prose, to shew that the scribes were in the habit of inserting unnecessary words, words which were intended to eke out the construction, and which only serve to confound it, and words which shew that the whole drift of the passage was misunderstood. Too much stress cannot be laid on the last class, for if we find a clause added which either contradicts the rest of the sentence or is utterly irrelevant to it, the scribe is at once convicted of deliberate forgery.

I have already pointed out that in *Laws* 710, A, the words τοῖς δὲ ἐγκρατῶς are an antithesis invented to answer to τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς, and that τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατῶς itself is a corrupt reading, for the speaker is describing that vulgar kind of temperance which is developed even in children and in beasts, to prevent their being unrestrained as to pleasure, ὅπερ εὐθύς παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις, τοῦ μὴ ἀκρατῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, ξύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ. I have also mentioned a passage in the *Phædo*, where the difference between Plato's meaning and that of the interpolator amounts to a contradiction. For while the one bids us, if we are sure of our principle, disregard any seeming contradictions that may arise out of it, (χαίρειν ἐφ' ἧς ἂν τὰ ἀπ' ἐκείνης ὀρμηθέντα) the other

tells us to hold our principle only provisionally, until such a contradiction arises. See *Phædo* 101, D.

In *Laws* 841, B, we read, τὸ δὴ λανθάνειν τούτων δρῶντά τι καλὸν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔστω [νόμιμον] ἔθει καὶ ἀγράφῳ νομισθὲν νόμῳ, τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ μὴ πάντως δρᾶν. If this is correct, the writer asserts that *not* to do the forbidden things is not disgraceful. But so flat a truism never dropped from Plato's pen. Remove τὸ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν αἰσχρὸν, and then we see that it is not τὸ μὴ δρᾶν that is to be the καλὸν of these men of weak virtue, but that they are to be allowed a lower kind of καλόν, namely τὸ λανθάνειν δρῶντα. And so Plato comments on his own words, οὕτω τὸ τε (vulgo τοῦτο) αἰσχρὸν αὖ καὶ καλὸν δευτέρως ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γενόμενον κέιτο.

It is difficult to account for such interpolations as those which I have pointed out in my edition of the *Symposium* (Ep. ad Th. pp. xiv-xvi) and yet they are of continual occurrence in Plato. On the one hand we can hardly conceive how any one who knew the construction well enough to supply ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν (*Laws* 817, C) should fail to see that ἔάσειν had already been provided for the same purpose, or why any one should have thought it necessary for the sense in *Theætetus* 171, C, to add τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ξυγγορήσεται, in order to give construction to what follows, when he had before him ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ γ' ὑπ' ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται.

But the interpolators are not merely intent on helping out the construction by their supplements; sometimes they endeavour to give an additional beauty to the text, as in the following passage of Demosthenes in *Midiam*, which I quote *instar omnium* as a specimen of the manner in which our scribes thought they could add finishing touches to Attic oratory, 546, A. εἰθ' ὑμεῖς τὸν οὕτως ὠμόν, τὸν οὕτως ἀγνώμονα, τὸν τηλικαύτας δίκας λαμβάνοντα, ὃν αὐτὸς ἠδίκησθαι φησι μόνον, (οὐ γὰρ ἠδίκητό γε,) τοῦτον ὑβρίζοντα λαβόντες εἰς τινα τῶν πολιτῶν ἀφήσετε, καὶ μήθ' ἑορτῆς, μήθ' ἱερῶν, μήτε νόμου, μήτ' ἄλλου μηδενὸς πρόνοιαν ποιούμενον οὐ καταψηφισθε; οὐ παράδειγμα ποιήσετε; If ever there was a passage where the rules of Art required that nothing should interrupt the swelling indignation of the speaker till it burst out in one single call to vengeance, it is this one which

our copyists have garnished with ἀφήσετε and οὐ καταψηφιεῖσθε. But luckily for us, this second ornament is fastened on to an accusative ποιούμενον, which refuses to hold it. Perhaps those who believe that all interpolations in Demosthenes are posterior to the MS. Σ, will allow this to be an exception; while they are making up their minds, let me inform the reader of my suspicion that τὸν οὕτως ἀγνώμονα is nothing but a foolish dittographia of τὸν οὕτως ἁμόν, and that μόνον is an addition but no improvement to φησί.

A very common source of interpolation is the attempt to fill up gaps left in the copy, or to complete passages which seem to be defective. In at least two passages of the *Philebus* it is pretty certain that we have supplements of this kind, but we have nothing to guide us to the detection of these, except the hopelessness of the present reading; and as long as there are ingenious men who undertake to explain everything, (Have they not even explained every Chorus in Sæphocles, and that too according to various readings?) it will be difficult to hold one's ground against such adversaries, who offer positive results against a mere οὐ μανθάνω. But the tables are turned when we come to passages, where we can shew the source of the corruption or prove that there is none, as when a marginal note has slipped into the text, and then, being treated as a part of it, has been so supplemented as to bring it into harmony with its surroundings. Cobet supplies me with an instance from the celebrated fragment of the *Cretans*. Euripides had written φοινικογενοῦς τέκνον Εὐρώπης, and a Scholiast had in the Margin explained the first word by τῆς Τυρίας. This was by accident incorporated with the text and considered as a part of it; but then the Anapaestic metre required another syllable. This was seen found; and so from that day to the *Epistola ad Millium*, and from it to our own they write or print, φοινικογενοῦς παῖ τῆς Τυρίας τέκνον Εὐρώπης.

I will give an example of the same kind from the *Iphigenia Taurica*. In γ. 464, Iphigenia prays, δέξαι θυσίας, ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν ἰόμος οὐχ ὀσίας ἀναφαίνει. Some commentator thiinks it worth his while to warn the reader that παρ' ἡμῶν does not mean the Taurians but the Greeks, and this he does by writing one word, Ἑλλησι. When this word comes to be mixed up with the rest, it is found very troublesome to the metre, but an ingenious person

discovers that if it is placed very near the end with a convenient dissyllable of no particular meaning after it, it will give no further trouble at least to the metrical critic. And so we have δέξαι θυ-
σίας, ἃς ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν νόμος οὐχ ὀσίας Ἑλλησι διδούς ἀναφαίνει.

A more striking example is that which I have elsewhere given from the *Medea* vv. 734, foll.

πέποιθα, Περίον δ' ἐχθρός ἐστί μοι δόμος
Κρέων τε· τούτοις δ' ὀρκίοισι μὲν ζυγαῖς
ἄγουσιν οὐ μεθεῖ' ἄν ἐκ γαίας ἐμέ.
λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἄν, κάπικηρκεύμασι
οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο, τὰμὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ,
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστί, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

Elmsley's note on κάπικηρκεύμασι is as follows. "κάπικηρκεύ-
ματα legit Scholiasta. ἐπικηρκεύματα γὰρ εἰσι τὰ διὰ τῶν κη-
ρυγματῶν γιγνόμενα πρὸς φιλίαν. τῇ δὲ εὐθείᾳ ἀντὶ δοτικῆς κέχρη-
ται. Ἔδει γὰρ εἰπεῖν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπικηρκεύμασι οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο. Δί-
δυμος δὲ φησιν ἑλλείπειν τὴν διᾶ. διὰ τὰ ἐπικηρκεύματα. *Paulko
ante legitur; μὴ ὀμόσας δὲ φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ τοῦ ἐπικηρκεύ-
ματος. θέλει εἰπεῖν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπικηρκεύμασι. λείπει δὲ ἡ διᾶ,
Latet hic aliquid quod extricare nequeo.*" Let us take account of
the difficulties in the whole passage. First there is μεθεῖ' ἄν,
which ought to govern the genitive, and although Porson's note
is an excellent one, the question still recurs, "why not ἐμοῦ
after the nearer verb?" For ἀνώμοτος in the best MSS. there
is ἐνώμοτος, but this old Scholium by its μὴ ὀμόσας δὲ supports
the former. Then we have κάπικηρκεύμασι in the text, but the
scholiasts most certainly read either κάπικηρκεύματα, or τὰπι-
κηρκεύματα, or both. Last of all we find in all MSS. and in
the Scholia οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο, which, as Dindorf observes, is the
contrary of what was to be said. For this reason modern edi-
tions have adopted Wytttenbach's τάχ' ἄν πίθοιο. But if we look
at the second Scholium quoted by Elmsley φίλος γένοιο αὐτοῖς διὰ
τοῦ ἐπικηρκεύματος, we observe a new combination, which
proves that τὰπικηρκεύματα must have been so placed that it
could be taken, whether rightly or not, as standing ἀπὸ κοινοῦ
to the two optatives γένοι' ἄν and οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο; but this would
be impossible if the verses ran thus:

φίλος γένοι' ἄν τὰπικηρυκεύματα,
οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο.

Therefore the verses must have been so arranged that while
οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο τὰπικηρυκεύματα
made one line, φίλος γένοι' ἄν followed in such a way as to admit of being construed also with the same word. And this is in fact the key of the enigma. οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο τὰπικηρυκεύματα should have followed immediately on ζυγείς. But it was left out, and afterwards restored at the side or at the foot of the page. From hence the last part was fetched and fitted in immediately after φίλος γένοι' ἄν: after which οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο, which still remained on hand, was admitted into the vacant place. But in the meantime the sense contained in οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο could not wait for all these adjustments; so the corrector made a line *de suo*, and that is the very line which Porson defended. The passage therefore should be restored thus:

πέποιθα· Περίον δ' ἐχθρός ἐστὶ μοι δόμος,
Κρέων τε· τούτοις δ' ὀρκίοισι μὲν ζυγείς
οὐκ ἄν πίθοιο τὰπικηρυκεύματα·
λόγοις δὲ συμβάς, καὶ θεῶν ἀνώμοτος
φίλος γένοι' ἄν, τὰμὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσθενῆ,
τοῖς δ' ὄλβος ἐστὶ, καὶ δόμος τυραννικός.

The construction of the third line is just the same as the Homeric
ἦ ρά νύ μοί τι πίθοιο.

In conclusion I will point out some of the most striking interpolations in another Dialogue of Plato which has fared pretty nearly as ill as the *Philebus*, viz. the *Politicus*. 286, A. μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰ μείζω. 286, B. δυσχερῶς (read ἦπερ). 286, D. δεῖν (read μεμερισθαι and compare 284, E). 287, A. τῶν τοιούτων λόγων. 287, E. καὶ ἐμπύροις καὶ ἀπύροις. (The dialogue is ill distributed, and should be arranged thus. προσφθέγγομεθα.—N. Σ. καὶ μάλα γε συχνὸν εἶδος. E. καὶ τῆ ζ. γε—ἐπιστήμη. N. Σ. πῶς γάρ;) 288, C. προσσαγορευθέν. 293, A. ὀρθή (read οὗ ἄν γίγνηται). 293, B. ἡγούμεθα (comma after ἄρχοντας). 295, A. παχυτέρως. (The structure is: θῆσει τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς προσῆκον, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ τό πως οὕτως. Read ἐν ἐκάστοις τῶν νόμων.) 295, D. παρὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα. 295, D. ποτε νομοθετηθέντα. 297, B. οἷοί τε ὄσι. 298, A. ἀναλώματα. 299, E. ζητεῖν. 303, E. λείπεται.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

I have pointed out several passages in the *Philebus* where the dialogue has found its way into the wrong person's mouth. Similar blunders have been noticed in the *Epistle* prefixed to my *Euthydemus*. I will now bring forward two or three more. *Pol.* 287, E. mentioned above under the head of interpolations. *Pol.* 304, c. N. Σ. Ταύτην ἐκείνων. Ξ. Τὴν δ' εἰ δεῖ μανθάνειν . . . σύ γ' ἡμῖν ἀποφαίνει δεῖν ἄρχειν; *Pol.* 306, A. πάντως γε μὴν ζητέον is a part of the Stranger's speech. *Laws* 811, B. πολυμαθίαν. πῶς οὖν . . . νομοφύλακι; *Κλ.* Τοῦ περὶ λέγεις; *ΑΘ.* Τοῦ πρὸς τί π. . . ἀποκωλύοι. *Κλ.* Λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀπόκνει λέγειν. In Euripides' *Ion* 1356 foll. every one is now agreed that the dialogue should run thus: *Πυ.* λαβῶν νυν αὐτὰ τὴν τεκοῦσαν ἐκπῶναι. *Ιων.* πᾶσαν δ' ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ', Εὐρώπης θ' ὀρούς; *Πυ.* γνώσει τὰδ' αὐτός.—But I quote the passage in order to complete its correction. When the second line stood as part of a continuous speech, it first acquired that δὲ which the MSS. offer us. But in order to bring δὲ in, a transposition was necessary; so the critic changed

Ἀσιάδ' ἐπέλθω πᾶσαν, Εὐρώπης θ' ὀρούς;

into πᾶσαν δ' ἐπελθὼν Ἀσιάδ'. Yet the old reading which he altered is obviously correct. Ἐπελθὼν would mean that he was to look for his mother *after* he had wandered even the world, and not while he was doing so, which would require ἐπιῶν.

FALSE COALITION OF SYLLABLES.

Τὸ τρίτον ἐτέρω and τὸ τρίτον ἐτ' ἐρῶ would be undistinguishable in MSS. where neither accents nor breathings were used. In Dion. Halic. *De Lysia*, 7. the words ὅθεν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἄν δρᾶσαι, τοὺς δὲ παθεῖν, were until Markland's time read, οὐθὲν εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας αἰτοῦσα εἰ ταθείη. A fresh instance of this has just presented itself to me in the *Politicus* 290, D. ἤδη τοίνυν μοι δοκοῦμεν οἶον γειτόνος ἔχνομεν . . . ἐφάπτεσθαι. Such is the reading of the oldest MS.; some others change γείτονος into γέτινος, but no one has yet pointed out that OION GEITONOC is a mere blunder for OIONEI TINOC. Even the youngest scholar will remember Porson's correction of ἐγνώσμεθ' ἐξ ἔσου κἂν ὑστάτοις κακοῖς, and Bentley's of μὴ τινα φάναι τὰ Ἐρικέπειω.

OMISSION OF ΟΥ.

One example among many of the confusion caused by the omission of οὐ is to be found in the Vatican Scholia on Euripides printed at the end of Geel's *Phænissæ*. *Androm.* v. 103 Ἰλίω αἰπεινᾶ: μονωδία ἐστὶ ¹ τὸ δὴ ἐνὸς προσώπου θρηνοῦντος· ὥστε τὸ "Ἀσιατίδος γῆς σχῆμα" ² μονωδία ἐστὶ. τραγωδία γὰρ καὶ ³ οὐκ ἔδει οὔτε τὰ ἐν θεοφορομένη ἀδόμηνα, οὐ θρηνεῖ γὰρ. Read, 1) ἐστὶν ὠδή, 2) οὐ μ. ξ., 3) οὐκ ἔδει. At other times οὐ is intruded into a text by mistake for another word, or from a misunderstanding of the author's drift. Synesius in one of his letters tells his friend that the parcel must by this time have reached him, οὐ γὰρ ἐπεγέγραπτο; a most whimsical inference. But the Bishop wrote σοὶ γὰρ. In Thuc. II, 43, οὐ γὰρ οἱ κακόπραγοῦντες δικαιότερον ἀφειδοῖεν ἂν τοῦ βίου, οἷς ἐλπίς οὐκ ἔστ' ἀγαθοῦ, the negative spoils the whole argument, which is that while the poor have something to hope for, the rich have something to fear, and that therefore the rich ought to value life less than the poor.

ΓΑΡ ΟΥΝ.

I have asserted that γὰρ οὖν is only admissible, where the speaker concedes what another has affirmed. It is not used in this sense in *Agam.* v. 674, where the Herald after forebodings of Menelaus' shipwreck adds

γένοιτο δ' ὡς ἄριστα· Μενέλεων γὰρ οὖν
πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδόκα μολεῖν.

Anyone may see that the apparent sense of these words is in contradiction to the fears that precede, and to the faintly hoping εἰ δ' οὖν that follows. But the passage is not Greek; for προσδόκα μολεῖν ought to be either προσδόκα μολεῖσθαι or π. μολεῖν ἂν. The emendation is obvious: "Let us hope that some have escaped. Menelaus at least has not the best chance"

Μενέλεων γ' ἂν οὐ
πρῶτόν τε καὶ μάλιστα προσδοκῶ μολεῖν.

A P P E N D I X.

EXTRACTS FROM BÖCKH'S PHILOLAUS.

That such an association as the Pythagorean, which united religious and political aims with science, should insist on silence and should have its secrets, is suited to the nature of the case, but it admits of doubt whether the scientific matter, which from its very nature is withdrawn from the eyes of the multitude without deliberate concealment, can have required to be kept secret by means of severe commands. If need for secrecy existed, it must rather have been in relation to their doctrines concerning the Divine Nature and its relation to the world and to man, at variance as they were with popular belief; and yet these very doctrines, expressed in the Pythagorean form, could have been neither dangerous to the common people nor accessible to them. Nevertheless the ancients agree in the firm belief that the doctrines and books of the Pythagoreans were a secret of the order, and as there were no writings to be procured, either of Pythagoras, or of his older disciples or followers, we must at all events allow that *they* told the world nothing; not perhaps however so much because a law expressly forbade them, as because custom bred in them a certain reserve toward strangers, while for those who had capacity and inclination to receive their doctrines oral teaching within the limits of the society seemed more convenient, and lastly because under these circumstances, there was scarcely any occasion for books, whilst again the old members of the order must have been kept from writing by their political occupations, and their life of seclusion, contemplation and asceticism. Yet, if Porphyry is to be believed, Lysis and Archippus and the few others who by their absence were saved from the ruin of the order, preserved a few

feeble sparks of the doctrine, and fearing lest the name of philosophy should wholly disappear from mankind, and lest they should in consequence incur the hatred of the gods, brought together writings of the older Pythagoreans and from these, together with what they themselves remembered, composed brief memorials, which they bequeathed to their sons, their daughters, and their wives, with the order not to communicate them to any stranger; and so this injunction was handed on from generation to generation. Frequent as is the mention of unrighteous and unfaithful revelation of Pythagorean doctrines, we find little agreement as to details. Thus it is related that of the two sects, the ἀκουσματικοὶ and the μαθηματικοί, the former was recognised by the latter as Pythagorean, but the latter were recognised by the former only as the disciples of Hippasos, the first according to this story to divulge Pythagorean matter in a mathematical treatise, and who in consequence, met with his death by drowning; yet the same Hippasos, according to a more credible account, never wrote anything. And to say nothing of the poets Empedocles and Epicharmus, Lysis, in an evidently spurious letter, reproaches Hiparchus with having tasted of Sicilian luxury and even of philosophising in public, for which offence he is said to have been banished and to have had a gravestone set up for him as for one dead. But the blame of having spread abroad Pythagorean writings applies more especially to Philolaus, although what is said concerning him is no less filled with contradictions than the rest. Neanthes, whom even Plutarch designates as credulous, informs us that until Empedocles and Philolaus abused their trust, as he terms it, the Pythagoreans had been more free in their communications; Diogenes and Iamblichus tell us that before Philolaus, nobody found out the Pythagorean doctrines, but that he first brought out the three celebrated Books which Dion the Syracusan at Plato's instance bought for a hundred minæ, according to Iamblichus, from Philolaus himself, who had fallen into great and urgent poverty, a story which by the bye admirably suits a man who is said to have been put to death for aiming at despotic power. But then again in order, to some extent, to remove the guilt from him, Iamblichus adds that Dion had himself formerly belonged to the Pythagorean connection, and for this reason had been allowed to possess the Books. Among older

authors the first I shall name is Satyrus the Peripatetic, a contemporary of Aristarchus the grammarian. Diogenes follows Satyrus in his account, and tells us on his authority, that Plato wrote to Dion about those Books, and that Dion bought them of Philolaus himself; and he adds, from the same author, that Plato became very rich through the liberality of Dionysius. Indeed one might even suppose that the whole story was invented by the spite of the Peripatetics against Socrates and the Academy, (a subject which Luzac has well treated in his essay *De Dignitate Socratis*,) in order to fix a charge of plagiarism upon Plato, were there not two older witnesses than Satyrus at hand. Hermippus, who was certainly not a more trustworthy man than Neanthes, but yet ancient enough (for he lived under Ptolomy Euergetes) assures us, on the authority of an ancient writer, that Plato when in Sicily bought the Book written by Philolaus from that author's relations in Dionysius' service for forty Alexandrian minæ, and with its contents composed the *Timæus*. Others again make Plato procure the work in return for having prevailed on Dionysius to release a young man, the disciple of Philolaus, from prison. And Timon the sillographer who flourished about the 127th Olympiad, has already a palpable allusion to this story. For Gellius, after mentioning the purchase of the three Books of Philolaus, the money for which Plato is said to have received from Dion, quotes Timon as saying that Plato purchased a little Book for much money and with this as his groundwork wrote his *Timæus*. It is true that Iamblichus, Syncsius and Proclus have referred the passage of Timon to the little Book of Timæus the Locrian, a supposititious work of a very late date and quoted by no ancient writer before Clemens of Alexandria, but Satyrus and especially Hermippus prove conclusively that what Timon said had reference to the writings of Philolaus, and Tzetzes so represents the matter. After attributing the *Timæus* and a great deal besides to the Book purchased of Philolaus through Dion, he represents not Philolaus himself as the seller but certain poor women and widows who sell the Book under a condition that it must not be imparted to any one save a Pythagorean; and I take this opportunity of remarking that Tzetzes makes Dion buy the *Mimes* of Sophron also in the same manner for Plato. However I do not reckon Timon as

the originator of the story, for he so touches upon the matter, that it can be understood only by one who knows of it already, while Hermippus appeals to an author who made a formal narration of it. It is much more likely that the tale was put in circulation by some earlier historian, not perhaps a Sicilian but apparently one of the first Alexandrians, as may be inferred from the Alexandrian minæ. This reckoning according to Alexandrian money is indeed not well adapted to commend the credibility of the tale, since in Plato's time no part of Greece reckoned according to Egyptian money, and Alexandria was not yet in existence; nor is there any great probability that the sum was computed by the narrator according to its value in Alexandrian coin, and that a statement in some other coin, whether Attic or Sicilian, was the basis of this calculation. Lastly, the work could not well have been purchased from Philolaus himself, as he can scarcely have been still alive in the fourth year of the 97th Olympiad, the time of Plato's first Sicilian voyage. We should therefore have to suppose that relations or descendants of his disposed of the work, as is indeed asserted by some writers; their statement evidently resting upon the notion of the keeping secret of Pythagorean writings even after the dissolution of the order, and being at the same time intended to set Philolaus free from the reproach of having divulged them, which others in fact brought against him. But that the secrecy of the Pythagorean doctrine had ceased long before the age of Plato, has already been remarked by Meiners, and one can scarcely see why Philolaus, if he taught in Thebes, could have had any scruple about writing there; in which case Plato may have acquired an early knowledge of his doctrine. My conclusion is that in all these contradictory accounts about a supposed purchase of Books, the substantial basis is simply this,—that Philolaus was in fact the first to publish a Pythagorean work, that Plato had read it and used it according to his manner, that is, intelligently and not as a mere transcriber. The former fact is asserted in so many words by an author who deserves all credit, since the purpose of his Book was critical, that is by Demetrius Magnes, a contemporary of Pompey and Cæsar in his work *περὶ ὁμωνύμων ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων*, quoted by Diogenes: *Τοῦτόν φησι Δημήτριος ἐν Ὀμωνύμοις πρῶτον ἐκδοῦναι τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν περὶ φύσεως.*

After which follows the somewhat strangely worded beginning, as it purports to be, of Philolaus' work, of which we shall have to speak more than once. Now if, assuming for the present the genuineness of the extant fragments, we compare them with Plato, we shall find in the *Phædrus*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus* and *Timæus*, allusions to Philolaus, upon which however I shall advance nothing here, since it is only the consideration of the fragments themselves that can justify my assertion; in the *Gorgias* however it seems to me there is a much more distinct reference to Philolaus' work, and although in this as well as in the *Phædo*, where Philolaus' views as to the unlawfulness of suicide are touched upon, the knowledge of his doctrines is attributed to hearsay only, yet I cannot help observing that in both dialogues this reference to hearsay is put into the mouth of Socrates, who had read very few books, whereas Philolaus' tenets are quoted with such distinctness, and in the *Gorgias*, at least, with such particularity, as is only possible when one has an author before him in writing, seeing that attention is paid even to the expression and the words; so that this contrivance about hearsay is a mere figure of speech, which accords well with Plato's irony and by means of which he attempts to mask his somewhat unceremonious handling of the *divine man*. But at the same time, we cannot fail to perceive that what Plato blames, is not so much the inner substance of Philolaus' view, as the mythical character of his exposition, and more especially the want of clearness and dialectic accuracy in his investigation and the oddity of his expressions, and this is pretty broadly stated in the *Gorgias* as well as in the *Phædo*.

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that a work by Philolaus was quoted in times much earlier than the earliest date of the Pythagorean forgeries, such as those attributed to Ocellus and the Loerian Timæus. He discusses the probable contents of his Book, which he divides on ancient authority into three parts. These he supposes to have been respectively entitled, *περὶ κόσμου*, *περὶ φύσεως*, *περὶ ψυχῆς*. And these he further identifies with the *Bacchæ*, a work attributed by Proclus to Philolaus, after which he continues as follows.]

Our enquiry up to this point, if the result of it is admitted, is more important for forming a judgment about the fragments of

Philolaus, than might at first sight appear: if there was only one work of Philolaus, whether spurious or genuine, nothing remains for us but either to admit all that is offered, or to reject all. Now what we have, is to a great extent so remarkable and contains such peculiar ideas, that no man can possibly be inclined to attribute it to a forger, and at the same time it perfectly coincides with that which, according to Plato, Aristotle, and the universal tradition of antiquity, must be viewed as really Pythagorean.

With the exception therefore of some pieces of Archytas, I hold these fragments and extracts to be the surest remains of the Pythagorean School; indeed Meiners also himself felt compelled to consider some few of them as genuine. Now the spirit of Pythagorism, as it appears according to the most trustworthy data, may be most clearly apprehended in contrast with the Ionic philosophy; since the Hellenic character habitually separates itself into this dualism of Ionic and Doric, and the difference of these races is perceivable in all that concerns life and culture. Pythagorism is the genuine Doric form of philosophy, and the philosophy of a people is nothing else than the peculiar mode of perception of that people, which in the deepest and most distinguished thinkers becomes itself the object of its own thought and explains itself to itself, whereas in the rest it works and creates unconsciously. On this account it is in philosophy on the prose side of literature that the popular character will always present itself most distinctly, as on the poetical side it will appear in lyrical art, because the latter springs forth most immediately from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The sensuousness of the Ionians, their attachment to what is outward, their susceptibility to outward impressions, and their lively activity in this outward world, presents itself in their materialistic view of the origin of things and in the manifold vitality and restlessness of matter, upon which all the Ionic systems rest; they all look for the essence of things in matter, they more or less derive the spiritual from it and neglect the moral element. The want of the sense of unity which is essentially connected with this, was favourable to the atomic view of physical science, and Heraclitus' doctrine, which was built upon strife, clearly expresses the restlessness of the Ionic nature, when it calls repose the death of the soul. The Doric on the contrary presents in comparison the aspect of an inward depth,

from which at the same time powerful action bursts forth, and of a tranquil persistence in established and almost inviolable forms, through which genuine Doric characters were exalted high above the whirl of sensuous impressions, whilst a certain inward consistency was introduced into their lives, which is not found in the same degree among the Ionians. In philosophy, this tendency of their mind displays itself in ethical endeavours, although they never made their way to a complete theory; but it especially appeared in this, that they sought for the essence of things not in a ground which was purely material, but in one that was formal and which gave to things unity and order, just as Pythagoras is said to have been the first to call the world *Kosmos*: and although Anaxagoras makes the order of the world to be produced through Reason, yet this thought, as Socrates has already observed, did not pierce at all deeply into his philosophy. In keeping with the peculiar character of the Dorians and even with their civil life, the outward appearance of the Doric philosophy took the form of a society or order, which was subject to a discipline and rule almost monastic, or at least Meravian, to which there can scarcely be found a more suitable analogy in all antiquity than the Spartan constitution. This organisation is united with depth in religion, symbolism, mysticism and ascetism, and moreover with the practice of music, all which formed essential elements of the Pythagorean mode of life; for which reason indeed so early a writer as Herodotus speaks of Pythagorean *orgies*. But to return to the ground of their speculations, the Ionic philosophers, though they mostly rejected the criterion of the senses, started from matter, which is the object of sensuous cognition, and then sought by reflexion to arrive at some material ground of all things, which ground, it must be confessed, some of them did not hold to be cognizable by the senses. From this sensuous philosophy the bound was too great and violent to the Socratico-Platonic, which sought for the essence of things in pure ideas furnished through the inward intuition, and the Pythagorean view was exactly that which formed the bridge; since the formal ground which they assumed is cognizable through that mathematic intuition, *διάνοια*, which hovers in the midst between the sensuous and the non-sensuous. And yet in its ideas they recognised typical forms of something higher,

though as it seems, they were unable to resolve the sense of these types so as to put them into clear intellectual light. Thus philosophy passed from a thoroughly sensuous beginning, through an intervening grade, to the unsensuous view of Plato, (who indeed had been preceded by the sagacious but one-sided members of the Eleatic school, but who by the power of the Socratic criticism had raised these partial views as well as all former views, through the proper limitation and modification of the one by the other, to the most perfect view of which the Hellenic mind was capable,) and the essence of things was thus sought in an ascending scale, first in matter, then in mathematical forms, and lastly in ideas of the reason.

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2. Περίωντα does not mean *limited* as some have understood it but *limiting*, what Plato in the *Philebus* calls *πέρας limit*. ** It remains for us to consider what the Pythagorean meant by the *limiting* and the *unlimited*. The ancients, very naturally, thought of them from the numerical point of view; and in fact the limiting has been taken to mean unity, parity, and identity, and the unlimited duality, disparity, and diversity, in which sense both Nicomachus and Boethius clearly express themselves and with a distinct reference to Philolaus. ** But this view is nevertheless quite untenable, partly on this account that what is odd is not therefore necessarily to be called indefinite, because, as a determinate magnitude, for example three or five, it derives a limit from unity; and partly because, as we see quite clearly from Aristotle, the Pythagoreans rather compared the *even* number to the indefinite; at least they did so in a certain sense and without reference to the definite magnitude of any such number. In his *Physics* iii. 4, he tells us expressly that some laid down the unlimited, ἀπειρον, as the origin of all things and he says of the Pythagoreans, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἀπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἄρτιον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναπολαμβάνομενον καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιττοῦ περιαινόμενον παρέχει τοῖς οὔσι τὴν ἀπειρίαν, for which also he adduces Pythagorean testimony. ** Shall we then say that Philolaus by the unlimited meant the *even* and by the limiting meant the *odd*? Against this view likewise the same objection as before holds good, because the even also as a definite number is limited by unity, so that if the even is called by the Pythagoreans unlimited, it must have some peculiar circumstantial application.

But this supposition is unnecessary, since according to Philolaus himself, the unlimited has no number in it, for which reason also, since, according to him, it is only through number that we understand, nothing would be intelligible if everything were unlimited. On the other hand the following explanation seems to me perfectly satisfactory. As, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held *one* to be both odd and even, and thus to contain both opposites, so Philolaus too set up above both these opposites a higher unity in which both have their roots. ** In the same way Plato in his *Philebus* sets up above the limit and the unlimited, out of which two the limited comes to be, the Cause as God. But how do the two elements proceed therefrom?—for proceed they must as from the Beginning of all things. I cannot conceive this otherwise than as follows. The highest Unity, simple Unity, what the later Pythagoreans and Platonists called the Monad, is merely One: but Unity is also conceivable as endlessly divisible, as the same authorities likewise remark. Through an opposition between the One and the Many or Indefinite, which opposition resides even in Unity itself, there is produced out of the highest Unity, which has no opposite, the twofold nature of the One and the Many, of the Limit and the Unlimited; and here we come at once to that which Philolaus means by limit and unlimited. By the former he meant the One or, as the ancients express it, the Same, by the latter the Many or the Different. And of these two the former has the more affinity with the highest Unity. These opposites are the constituents of all that is produced, τὸ γιγνόμενον, while the highest Unity, as being that which is not produced, is exalted above it. For, according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans held that Number is the essence of things, and things themselves, no less as Matter, than as the properties of Matter, or in other words Form. But the same author allows that the Pythagoreans expressly named the numbers which compose the essence of things, ἓν and ἄπειρον, out of which two the πεπερασμένον is produced. (Aristotle *Metaph.* i. 5.) These same elements are also called Unity and the Indefinite Duality (ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς). Under the latter the conception of diversity or plurality simply is represented, and the definite number Two only accrues to it by a limitation bestowed by Unity. **

[After this Böckh proceeds to shew that the next step in Philolaus' work must have been to describe the evolution of the world out of the two opposite elements, and he quotes a passage given below (*Καὶ πάντα γὰ μὲν κ. τ. ξ.*) in which the elements are divided in the same manner as numbers. He supposes that he must have then proceeded from the combination of odd or even to that of harmony, because all the chief ratios of harmony [1 : 2, 2 : 3, 3 : 4, 8 : 9, 243 : 256] consist of an even and an odd number; and he supposes that Philolaus meant by harmony the result of reconciled opposites, and attributes to him the following passage in Nicomachus, ἔστι γὰρ ἁρμονία πολυμιγέων ἕνωσις καὶ διχᾶ φρονεόντων σύμφρασις (of the Doric nature of which passage I entertain strong doubts).

The last extract which will be given is of great importance for the understanding of more than one passage in Plato and is the beginning of a very learned disquisition upon the music of the ancients.]

In the immediate sequel of the former passage [he refers to the passage given below, beginning *Περὶ δὲ φύσιος*—] which sequel we shall presently quote, one is surprised by the phenomenon, that Philolaus' harmony is nothing else than the octave, but there is no objection on the side of usage to this interpretation, since the ancients called the octave "harmony", as Aristotle does (see Plutarch's treatise on Music: but it is precisely in this that we find the explanation of the Pythagorean view of the harmony of the Universe in general, and especially of the mode in which the composition of the world was conceived to have been effected out of the opposite elements of the limit and the unlimited; for Unity as we have seen is limit, while the Unlimited is the indefinite duality, which becomes definite duality when the measure of Unity has been twice introduced into it. Thus then the limitation is given through the measuring of duality by means of Unity, that is by laying down the ratio of 1 : 2 which is the mathematical ratio of the octave. The octave therefore is harmony itself, through which the opposite elements are reconciled; and every reasonable man must confess that there is a deep perception contained in this, since the unity of the One and of the Diverse (*ἕτερον*) or Many (*πολλά*), which Plato in his Doctrine of Ideas has presented

in a dialectic form, and the conception of which was one of the chief problems of Greek philosophy, is here expressed by mathematical symbolism. ** The magnitude of harmony, says Philolaus, is συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὄξειᾶν. Συλλαβὴ is the old name of the Fourth, because it is the first combination of concordant tones, πρώτη σύλληψις φθόγγων συμφώνων. Δι' ὄξειᾶν is the Fifth, because it comes after the Fourth in the ascending scale. Now as a fourth and a fifth comprise the octave, since $3 : 4$ with $2 : 3 = 1 : 2$, as we see from these numbers 2 . 3 . 4, Philolaus says that συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὄξειᾶν is the magnitude of harmony, because $2 : 4$ is harmony, $2 : 3$ is δι' ὄξειᾶν, and $3 : 4$ is συλλαβὰ. But the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the interval of a tone which is $8 : 9$, as the following numbers shew, 6 . 8 . 9. For $6 : 8$ is the Fourth, $6 : 9$ is the Fifth, and the difference is $8 : 9$ or the tone. And now to prove the truth that the Fifth is greater than the Fourth by the tone, he states the position of the Fourth and Fifth in the octave, for in the ascending scale, there is from the ὑπάτη to the μέση a Fourth, but from the μέση to the νήτη a Fifth. (See the fragment beginning Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος.)

Φιλολάου. Stob. Ecl. Phys. i. 1, 2.

Θεωρεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἔσσιαν τῷ ἀριθμῷ κατὰν δύναμιν ἃ τις ἐντὶν ἐν τῇ δεκάδι. Μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντελής καὶ παντοεργός, καὶ θείω καὶ οὐρανίω βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνω ἀρχὰ καὶ ἀγεμῶν κοινωνοῦσα . . . δύναμις καὶ τῆς δεκάδος. "Ἄνευ δὲ ταύτας πάντ' ἄπειρα καὶ ἄδηλα καὶ ἀφανῆ. Γνωμονικὰ γὰρ ἅ φύσις ἅ τῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τῷ ἀπορομένω παντὸς καὶ ἀγνωσμένου παντί. Οὐ γὰρ κα ἧς δῆλον οὐδενὶ οὐδὲν τῶν πραγμάτων οὔτε αὐτῶν ποθ' αὐτά, οὔτε ἄλλω ποτ' ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ ἧς ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἅ τούτω ἔσσια. Νῦν δὲ οὗτος, κατὰν ψυχὰν ἀρμόσδων αἰσθήσει πάντα, γνωστά καὶ ποτάγορα ἀλλάοις κατὰ γνώμονος φύσιν ἀπεργάζεται, ψωμάτων καὶ σχίζων τοὺς λόγους χωρὶς ἐκάστους τῶν πραγμάτων, τῶν τὲ ἀπίρων καὶ τῶν περαινόντων. "Ἴδοις δὲ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἰσχύουσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντῶ, καὶ κατὰ τὰς δαμιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας, καὶ κατὰ τὰν

μουσικάν. Ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδὲν δέχεται ἢ τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσις, οὐδὲ ἀρμονία· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἰκείον αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ. Τῆς γὰρ ἀπείρω καὶ ἀνοήτω καὶ ἀλόγῳ φύσις τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶ. Ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδαμῶς ἐς ἀριθμὸν ἐπιπνεῖ, πολέμιον γὰρ καὶ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φύσει τὸ ψεῦδος, ἢ δ' ἀλάθεια οἰκείον καὶ σύμφυτον τῷ ἀριθμῷ γενεᾷ.

Φιλολάου Πυθαγορείου ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Ψυχῆς. Stob.
Ecl. Phys. i. 20, 2.

Παρ' ὃ καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ ἀκαταπόνατος διαμένει τὸν ἄπειρον αἰῶνα. Οὐτε γὰρ ἔντοσθεν ἄλλα τις αἰτία δυναμικωτέρα αὐτῆς εὐρεθήσεται, οὐτ' ἔκτοσθεν, φθειραὶ αὐτὸν δυναμένα. Ἄλλ' ἢν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἰς ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τῷ συγγενέω καὶ κρατίστῳ καὶ ἀνυπερθέτῳ κυβερνώμενος. Ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὰν ἀρχὰν τῆς κινᾶσιός τε καὶ μεταβολᾶς ὁ κόσμος εἰς ἐόν, καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ φύσει διαπνεόμενος καὶ περιεγόμενος ἐξ ἰσχυριδίου. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλατον αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἐστὶ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβολον ἀπὸ τῆς τῷ ὅλον περιεχούσας ψυχᾶς μέχρι σελάνας περαιούται, τὸ δὲ μεταβάλλον ἀπὸ τῆς σελάνας μέχρι τῆς γᾶς. Ἐπεὶ δὲ γε καὶ τὸ κινεόν ἐξ αἰῶνος εἰς αἰῶνα περιπολεῖ, τὸ δὲ κινεόμενον ὡς τὸ κινεόν ἄγει, οὕτω* διατίθεσθαι ἀνάγκα τὸ μὲν ἀεικίνατον τὸ δὲ ἀειπαθὲς εἶμεν, καὶ τὸ μὲν νῶ καὶ ψυχᾶς ἀνάκωμα πᾶν, τὸ δὲ γενέσιος καὶ μεταβολᾶς· καὶ τὸ μὲν πρᾶτον τῷ δυνάμει καὶ ὑπερέχον, τὸ δ' ὕστερον καὶ καθυπερεχόμενον. Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν αἰεὶ θέοντος θείου, τοῦ δὲ αἰεὶ μεταβάλλοντος γεννατοῦ, κόσμος. Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν κόσμον ἡμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀίδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος κατὰ συνακολουθίαν τῆς μεταβλατικᾶς φύσιος· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐς αἰεὶ διαμένει κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα πολλά. Καὶ τὰ μὲν φθορᾷ ὄντα καὶ φύσει κατὰ μορφᾶς σώζεται, τῷ γονῷ πάλιν τὰν αὐτὰν μορφὰν ἀποκαθίσταντα τῷ γεννήσαντι πατέρι καὶ δημιουργῷ.

Ἐκ τῶν Φιλολάου Περὶ Κόσμον. Stob. *Ecl. Phys. i. 21, 7.*

Ἀνάγκα τὰ ζόντα εἶμεν πάντα ἢ περαινόντα, ἢ ἄπειρα, ἢ περαινόντά τε καὶ ἄπειρα· ἄπειρα δὲ μόνον οὐ καὶ εἶη. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν φαίνεται οὐτ' ἐκ περαινόντων πάντων ζόντα, οὐτ' ἐξ ἀπείρων πάντων, δηλὸν ἐντ' ἄρα ὅτι ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων ὃ τε κόσμος καὶ

* i.e. ὁμολογεῖν.

τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ συναρμόχθη. Ἀηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκ περαινόντων, περαινόντα, τὰ δ' ἐκ περαινόντων τε καὶ ἀπείρων περαινόντά τε καὶ οὐ περαινόντα, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀπείρων ἀπειρα φανέονται.

Καὶ πάντα γὰρ μὰν τὰ γινωσκόμενα ἀριθμὸν ἔχοντι. οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε οὐδὲν οὔτε νοηθῆμεν οὔτε γνωσθῆμεν ἄνευ τούτου. Ὅ γὰρ μὰν ἀριθμὸς ἔχει δύο μὲν ἴδια εἶδη, περισσὸν καὶ ἄρτιον, τρίτον δὲ ἀπ' ἀμφοτέρων μιχθέντων, ἀρτιοπέρισσον. Ἐκατέρω δὲ τῷ εἶδος πολλὰ μορφαί, ἃς ἕκαστον αὐταυτο ἴδημαίνει. Περὶ δὲ φύσιος καὶ ἀρμονίας ὡδε ἔχει· ἅ μὲν ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀίδιος ἔσσα καὶ αὐτὰ μόνα, φύσιος θεία ἐντὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίναν ἐνδέχεται γνῶσιν, πλάν γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἦς οὐθενὶ τῶν ἐόντων καὶ γινωσκομένων ὑφ' ἀμῶν γε-γενῆσθαι, μὴ ὑπαρχούσας τᾶς ἐστοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξ ὧν συνέστα ὁ κόσμος, καὶ τῶν περαινόντων καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταὶ ἀρχαὶ ὑπάρχον οὐχ ὅμοια οὐδ' ὁμόφυλοι ἔσσαι, ἤδη ἀδύνατον ἦς κα αὐτοῖς κοσμηθῆμεν, αἰ μὴ ἀρμονία ἐπεγένετο, ᾧ τινι ἄρα τρόπον ἐγένετο. Τὰ μὲν ὧν ὅμοια καὶ ὁμόφυλα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μὴδὲ ὁμόφυλα μὴδὲ ἴσοτελῆ ἀνάγκα τᾶ τοιαύτα ἀρμονία συγκεκλιῆσθαι, αἰ μέλλοντι ἐν κόσμῳ κατέχεσθαι.

Ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθός ἐντι συλλαβὰ καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν. Τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν μείζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδόω. Ἐντὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐς μέσον συλλαβὰ, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσας ποτὶ νεάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν συλλαβὰ, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν. Τὸ δὲ ἐν μέσῳ μέσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον. Ἄ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον, τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασαῶν δὲ δίπλοον. Οὕτως ἀρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσεις, δι' ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρι' ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δυ' ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις.—

Platonis *Timæus*, 35 A.

Τῆς ἀμεριστοῦ καὶ αἰετὰ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας, καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς δὲ ταύτου φύσεως αὐτῆς περὶ καὶ τῆς θατέρου* κατὰ ταυτά. Καὶ ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ. Καὶ τρία λαβῶν ὄντα αὐτὰ συνε-

* Commonly θατέρου. Καὶ ταυτὰ ταυ-
τα. I have altered the text according
to the evident requirement of the sense.
The passage itself has been appended
as serving to illustrate the πέρας in the

Philebus. The soul of the world is the
πέρας of the whole and of all its parts;
and we here see that this soul partakes
of the opposite ἀρχαί, τὸ ἐν καὶ ταυτῶν
and τὸ ἀπειρον καὶ θατέρου.

κεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσει δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτὸν ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ.

Ἐκ τοῦ Ἀρχύτου περὶ Ἀρχῶν. Stob. Ecl. i. 35, 2.

Ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο ἀρχὰς ἤμεν τῶν ὄντων, μίαν μὲν τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν τεταγμένων καὶ ὀριστῶν, ἐτέραν δὲ τὰν συστοιχίαν ἔχοισαν τῶν ἀτάκτων καὶ ἀοριστων. Καὶ τὰν μὲν δητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχοισαν καὶ τὰ ἕντα ὁμοίως συνέχειν, καὶ τὰ μὴ ἕντα ὀρίζειν καὶ συντάσσειν· πλατιάζουσαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς γινομένοις εὐλόγως καὶ εὐρυθμῶς ἀνάγειν ταῦτα καὶ τῷ καθ' ὄλω οὐσίας τε καὶ ἰδέας μεταδίδομεν· τὰν δ' ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ τὰ συντεταγμένα λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἐς γένεσιν δὲ καὶ ὥσιαν παραγινόμενα διαλύειν, πλατιάζουσαν γὰρ ἀεὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἕξομοιοῦν αὐταῦτα. Ἄλλ' ἐπέπερ ἀρχαὶ δύο κατὰ γένος ἀντιδιαιρούμεναι τὰ πράγματα τυγχάνουσι, τῷ τὰν μὲν ἀγαθοποιὸν τὰν δ' ἤμεν κακοποιόν, ἀνάγκα καὶ δύο λόγους ἤμεν, τὸν μὲν ἕνα τᾶς ἀγαθοποιῶ φύσιος, τὸν δ' ἕνα τᾶς κακοποιῶ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ τέχνη καὶ τὰ φύσει γιγνόμενα δεῖ τούτων πρῶτον μετεληφέν, τᾶς τε μορφῶς καὶ τᾶς οὐσίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν μορφῶ ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία τοῦ τόδε τι ἤμεν· ἡ δὲ ὥσις τὸ ὑποκειμένον, παραδεχόμενον τὰν μορφῶ. Οὔτε δὲ τᾶ ὥσις οἶόν τε ἔστι μορφᾶς μετεῖμεν αὐτᾶ ἕξ αὐτᾶς, οὔτε μὰν τὰν μορφῶ γενέσθαι περὶ τὰν ὥσιαν, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ἐτέραν τινα ἤμεν αἰτίαν τὰν κινάσοισαν τὰν ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφῶ, ταύταν δὲ τὰν πρᾶταν τᾶ δύναμει καὶ καθυπερτάταν ἤμεν τὰν ἄλλᾶν· ὀνομάζεσθαι δ' αὐτὰν ποθάνει θεόν· ὥστε τρεῖς ἀρχὰς ἤμεν ἤδη, τὸν τε θεόν, καὶ τὰν ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφῶ. Καὶ τὸν μὲν θεόν τεχνίταν καὶ τὸν κινέοντα, τὰν δ' ἔστω τὰν ὕλαν καὶ τὸ κινέομενον, τὰν δὲ μορφῶ τὰν τέχνην καὶ ποθ' ἂν κινέται ὑπὸ τῷ κινέοντος ἡ ἔστω. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ κινέομενον ἐναντίας ἐαντῶ δυνάμιας ἴσχει τᾶς τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, τὰ δ' ἐναντία συναρμογᾶς τινος δεῖται καὶ ἐνώσιος, ἀνάγκα ἀριθμῶν δυνάμιας καὶ ἀναλογίας καὶ τὰ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ γεωμετρικοῖς δεικνύμενα παραλαμβάνειν, ἃ καὶ συναρμόσαι καὶ ἐνώσαι τὰν ἐναντιότατα δυνασεῖται ἐν τᾶ ἔστοι τῶν πραγμάτων ποττὰν μορφῶ. Καθ' αὐτὰν μὲν γὰρ ἔσσα ἡ ἔστω ἄμορφός ἔστι, κινθεῖσα δὲ ποττὰν μορφῶ ἕμμορφος γίνεται καὶ λόγον ἔχοισα τὸν τᾶς συντάξιος. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ δι' ὃ κινέται τὸ κινέομενόν ἔστι τὸ πρᾶτως κινέον· ὥστ' ἀνάγκα τρεῖς ἤμεν τᾶς ἀρχὰς, τὰν τε ἔστω τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ τὰν μορφῶ, καὶ τὸ ἕξ αὐτῷ κιναιτικὸν καὶ πρᾶτον τᾶ δύναμει. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ νόον μόνον ἤμεν δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ νόον

τι κρέσσον. Νόω δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶν ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεόν. "Ὅθεν φανερόν ὡς ὁ μὲν τῷ ἴσῳ λόγος περὶ τὰν ζητὰν καὶ λόγον ἔχουσιν φύσιν ἐστίν· ὁ δὲ τῷ ἀνίσῳ περὶ τὰν ἄλογον καὶ ἄρρητον· αὐτὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἄεστώ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γένεσις καὶ φθορὰ γίνεται περὶ ταύταν, καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ ταύτας.

Kant's *Anthropology*, Book II. § 59.

We may also explain these feelings by the effect which the sensation of our state produces upon the mind. That which directly (through sense) urges me to quit my state (to come out of it), is unpleasant to me, it pains me. That which in like manner urges me to maintain it (to remain in it), is agreeable to me, it gives me pleasure. But we are irresistibly carried along in the stream of Time, and through all the changes of sensations involved in the fact. Now, though the quitting of one moment of time and the entrance into another is one and the same act (that of change), yet in our thought and in the consciousness of this change there is a *succession*, such as belongs to the connection of cause and effect. The question then is, whether it is the consciousness of quitting the present state, or the prospect of the entrance into a future one, that excites in us the sensation of pleasure? In the former case, the delight is nothing else than the removal of pain, something negative; in the latter it would be an anticipation of something agreeable; consequently, an expansion of a condition of pleasure, and hence something positive. But we may already infer, *a priori*, that the former alone can take place. For time carries us from the present to the future, and not contrariwise; and the fact that we are compelled first of all to quit the present, uncertain into what other we are about to enter, only that it *is another*, can alone be the cause of pleasurable feeling. Pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it. But life (animal life) is, as the physicians themselves have remarked, a continual play of the antagonism of the two.

Consequently, every pleasure must be preceded by pain; pain is always the first. For what else would ensue upon a continual advancement of vital power (which, however, cannot mount beyond a certain degree), but a speedy death for joy?

Moreover, no pleasure can follow immediately upon another; but between the one and the other pain must have place. It is the slight intermissions of vitality, with intervening expansions of it, that together make up the healthy condition, which we erroneously take for a continuously-felt state of well-being; whereas in fact this condition consists only of a succession of pleasurable feelings, following each other with alternations,—that is, after continually intervening pain.

Pain is the stimulus of activity, and in activity we first become conscious of life: without it an inanimate state would ensue.

A D D E N D A.

My friend Mr E. R. HORTON, who has most kindly undertaken the laborious task of superintending the edition of this work, has sent me some important suggestions as to the text of the first sheet. In the passage (12, Δ) he is inclined to read * *τοῦναντίου*. I have more than once had the same suspicion, but suppressed it through fear of being taxed with the love of unnecessary changes. But I am now convinced that the construction of the sentence imperatively requires the alteration proposed. The *contrary* intended is not a contrary to the main part of the sentence, *κύριος ἂν εἴης*, but only to the subordinate phrase *τῆς π. Σ. ὁμολογίας*. The alternative is not between being *κύριος*, and not being *κύριος*, but between being *κύριος* of the agreement and *κύριος* of the disagreement.

p. 13, B. Mr HORTON reminds me of Dr W. H. THOMPSON'S conjecture *ἐνορῶν* in place of *ἐνόν*. But my note will shew why I cannot assent to this conjecture. Protarchus is not, and cannot

* [My later view of the expression ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον is that it is a troublesome interpolation. In order that the argument may proceed, there must be an *ὁμολογία* between Soerates and Protarchus. Cf. *διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε. ταῦτ' οὕτως ὁμολογαύμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;* (11, D, E and also 20, C). *τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἐτι μᾶλλον δι' ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.* (14, C). The question is how far Protarchus may go to meet Soerates, since the conduct of the discussion belongs to the latter. But this question is one for himself, not Philebus, to decide. Yet Philebus by his profession of unalterable faith in his goddess, not for the present only but for the future also, *δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει* (for so the MSS. read), is endeavouring to prejudice him, even whilst in the same breath he acknowledges his freedom of judgment, *αὐτὸς γινώσκει*. With this implied interference Protarchus accordingly twits him. "Now that you have resigned your brief to me, your rights of dictation are over."—St. Paul's expression in 2 Cor. i, 24; *οὐχ ὅτι κυριεύομεν ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως* is closely analogous. The word *ὁμολογία* itself may be illustrated from the same Epistle (ix, 13). *δοξάζοντες τὸν Θεὸν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑποταγῇ τῆς ὁμολογίας ὑμῶν εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ.*
E. R. II.]

be, asked to shew why he calls *all pleasures good*, for Socrates assumes already that he looks upon some as bad; but he is challenged to point out any further ground of likeness between them beyond that indicated by their common name of *ἡδοναί*. As this is the only question which can be asked him without clashing with the rest of the argument, *ἀγαθὸν εἶναι* is a manifest interpolation. But if we omit *ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*, *προσαγορεύεις* is necessarily to be construed with *τί ταῦτόν ἐνόν*: else it would be without any government at all. For I do not suppose that any person will have recourse to such an intolerable ellipsis as the following: *τί ταῦτόν ἐνορῶν, π. ἦ. (τοῦτο) προσαγορεύεις*; Apart from this I very much doubt whether a good Greek prose writer would say, *ἐνορῶ ἔν σοι τοῦτο*, without adding some participle.

p. 14, D. Read: *ἐπεὶ μηδὲ [τὰ τοιαύδε,] ὅταν τις κ. τ. εἴ.*

p. 17, D. *ἐνόντα πάθη γιγνόμενα*. "Is not one of these *de trop*?" E. R. H.

Most assuredly, and I thank my friend for this fresh instance of what I have before pointed out as a peculiar feature in these supplements. The word *ἐνεῖναι* under various forms has occurred several times in this sense, and it is therefore no wonder that some sciolist should insert *ἐνόντα* without troubling himself to look further on, where he would have found *γιγνόμενα*. Or perhaps he merely meant it as a note and had no intention of disturbing the text; but if so, and if this is to be the explanation of the many similar passages, this would shew the extent to which the copyists must have gone in blindly copying what they found in the Margin, as if it had been accidentally omitted in the body of the text, and afterwards supplied in the blank space.

M^r HORROX also mentions two conjectures made by English scholars on this passage. I will briefly state my objections to each of them. It is proposed to read *μάθης* for *πάθη*. Now we do not want a verb, for *λάβης* may be easily conceived to run through the whole passage; and if we wanted one, it could not be *μάθης*, for *μανθάνω ταῦτα γιγνόμενα* is not such a construction as one will find in any good prose author. But we do want *πάθη*, because otherwise *τοιαῦτα* would imply *διαστήματα*, a word not applicable to rhythm and metre. Indeed there is no word so applicable, and for that very reason Plato employs the more general term *πάθη*.

It is also proposed to read *ἐννοῆς*, but to this there are two very strong objections. In the first place *ὅταν λάβῃς . . . καὶ ἄμα*—would certainly need *ἐννοήσης*, and in the next place the alteration runs counter to the whole arrangement of the sentence, and cannot be reconciled with *γάρ*, which can stand where it now is only on the condition that it belongs to the clause immediately following the parenthesis; whereas this change would make the parenthesis end at *ἐπονομάζειν*. Indeed the true balance of the sentence is lost by any such change; for whereas Plato might have arranged his clauses thus: The men of old have taught us (A) the power of number in Music and Rhythm, and have directed us (B) to look for the same power in all *ἄπειρα*, and so whenever you learn A, (*λάβῃς*), or detect B, (*ἔλῃς*), *σοφὸς ἐγένου*—, he thought fit to introduce the first part of this sentence in a kind of running parenthesis alongside of the second. By reading *ἐννοῆς* you destroy the antithesis between what the ancients taught (*καὶ ἄμα ἐννοεῖν κ. τ. ἐ.*) and what we are counselled to do in order to get *σοφία*, (*ὅταν τ' ἄλλο*—*ἔλῃς*), and you put a tautology in its place.

The reader will observe that the contrast between *λάβῃς* and *ἔλῃς* is a real one, but that between *σοφὸς ἐγένου* and *ἔμφρων γέγονας* is a very paltry verbal variation, where no real contrast can take place; for while there is a difference between the man who is taught and the man who discovers, there is none in the method or in its result.

As here we have a foolish variation between *ἐγένου* and *γέγονας*, so in *Euthyd.* 287, B, we have a verbal antithesis between the present, which is correct, and the future, which is quite inappropriate. *Οὕτω Κρόνος εἶ, ὥστε ἂ τὸ πρῶτον εἶπομεν νῦν ἀναμυμνήσκει, καὶ εἴ τι πέρυσιν εἶπον [· νῦν ἀναμνησθήσει]*. I referred to this passage in my *Letter* (page III), but inadvertently put the branch of spuriousness upon the wrong part of it.

But before I leave the *Euthydemus*, I would fain point out some other false supplements which have occurred to me quite recently in lecturing upon that Dialogue.

274, D. [*τὴν δύναμιν τῆς σοφίας*].

276, B. Read *ἐθορούβησαν* for *ἀνεθορούβησαν*.

277, D. [*καταβαλῶν*].

281, A. [*τῶν ἀγαθῶν*] and [*τὸ ὀρθῶς πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χρῆσθαι*] The genitives *πλούτου* etc. are governed by *ἡγουμένη*.

281, c. [μᾶλλον].

282, A and B. This is one of the places where from not perceiving the interpolation I was led into a wrong mode of restoring the syntax. Read: *Καὶ παρὰ πατρός γε δήπου τοῦτ' οἰόμενον δεῖν μεταλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα, καὶ παρ' ἐπιτρόπων καὶ φίλων, τῶν τ' ἄλλων καὶ τῶν φασκόντων ἐραστῶν εἶναι, καὶ ξένων καὶ πολιτῶν, δεόμενον καὶ ἰκετεύοντα σοφίας μεταδιδόναι οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν οὐδὲ νεμέσητον ὅτιοῦν ὑπηρετεῖν τῶν καλῶν ὑπηρετημάτων, προθυμούμενον σοφὸν γενέσθαι.* This is as elegant a sentence as any in Plato, and a model of symmetry without formality. The foolish writer who supplied ἐθέλοντα has not only destroyed the construction, but has caused another to bolster it up with the clumsy contrivance of *ἔνεκα τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἐραστῇ καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.*

282, D. Read: *οἶον ἐπιθυμῶ τὸν προτρεπτικὸν λόγον εἶναι.*

But the most impudent attempt at improving the text occurs in 284, B. The Sophist wishes to prove ὅτι οὐδεὶς λέγει τὰ μὴ ὄντα, and this he does by bringing Ctesippus to admit the following propositions. 1. τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν. 2. τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐδεὶς ἂν ποιήσειεν. 3. οἱ λέγοντες πράττουσιν τι. 4. οἱ πράττοντες ποιοῦσιν. 5. οἱ λέγοντες ποιοῦσιν. 6. οἱ λέγοντες τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ποιοῖεν ἂν τὰ μὴ ὄντα, τοῦτο δὲ ὠμολόγηται ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

From this it follows that the words *Ἄλλο τι οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τὰ γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἔστιν; Οὐδαμοῦ.* are quite foreign to the argument, and were probably invented to give some force to ἐν τῷ δήμῳ: and likewise that Euthydemus' question is simply this: *Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως τὰ μὴ ὄντα ποιήσειεν ἂν καὶ ὅστισοῦν;*

This quite throws into the shade such minor invasions as 297, c, ἀφιγμένῳ, 298, D, βοιδίων or κωβίων, 302, B, ἐφευγόν τε, 290, B, τοῦτο ὃ ἂν θηρεύωνται, and τούτοις ἂ ἐθήρυσαν, (for πόλιν θηρεύωνται read either χειρώσονται or θηράσονται.) 278, D, οἶον αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, and a score of others, in which I cannot with certainty include 302, D, σοὶ [θεοί], as this may arise from a two-fold reading COI and ΘOI, but in 303, B, the words ὥσθ' ὁμολογεῖν—σοφούς, are so manifestly a false interpretation of οὕτω διετέθη, and so completely spoil what immediately follows, that they can be nothing but a deliberate forgery.

There are others which are yet upon their trial, such as the following, 307, A, ὥστ' οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως προτρέπω τὸ μειράκιον ἐπὶ

φιλοσοφίαν. Crito's faith in philosophy is already shaken by Isocrates' sneer, and by his own impressions about these ἐριστικοί. Otherwise Socrates' exhortation not to care about the men, but to look into the thing itself, is altogether idle. His embarrassment is ὅποι προτρέπη τὸ μειράκιον, πότερον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα.

I will end this digression *vineta mea cadendo*. To make the question tally with the answer in 304, E, I formerly edited ἀπεφαινόντο, but this is applicable only to γνώμας, and by no means the right word to use of the displays of the Sophists. But the question is rightly given in the received text: τί οὖν ἐφαινόντό σοι, "well, what did you think of them"? The answer however is corrupt, and interpolated after its corruption. I believe the true reading to be: Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἢ ὅτι περ ἀεὶ δὴ τις τῶν τοιούτων, ληρούντων καὶ περὶ οὐδέενος ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων; "What else should they look like but what every one of the men of their class at all times looks like, a class of triflers etc."

p. 16, E. τότε δὴ δεῖν] For τότε δ' ἦδη, the reading of most MSS., the Bodl. gives τότε δὴ δεῖ. For the Bodl. δεῖ, δεῖν has been substituted in the text.

p. 17, E. ἐλλόγιμον] The meaning of ἐλλόγιμον and that of ἐνάριζμον are so nearly the same, that one is tempted to suspect either that the former word is a later addition, or that Plato must have justified the twofold expression by a twofold reason; namely, by writing, ἄτ' οὐκ εἰς λόγον, οὐδ' εἰς ἀριζμόν οὐδένα . . . ἀπιδόντα. But, as the importance of πέραις is uppermost in the writer's mind, any addition to ἀριζμός weakens the effect which he wishes to produce. For this reason I look upon the words καὶ οὐκ ἐλλόγιμον with some suspicion. It may be said, in answer to this, that λόγος and ἀριζμός are by no means equivalent, and that Shakspeare illustrates the difference when he says that certain offences "*stand more for number than account*", and that the Tragic ἀριζμός ἄλλως and the Horatian '*Nos numerus sumus*' shew that ἀριζμός is rather the antithesis of λόγος than its equivalent. But in this passage who can doubt that the idea which ἐνάριζμος presents is identical with that presented by ἐλλόγιμος? Then why was it introduced?

p. 18, A. τοῦτον, ὡς ἔφαμεν] The Books read φαμεν. But Socrates is comparing a past observation with a present one, and for this reason uses λάβοι with the former, and ἀναγκασθῆ with the latter, according to the common rule as to the optative and subjunctive moods.

p. 18, A. ἔδει] I have substituted this for the δεῖ of the MSS., to accord with λάβοι and ἔφαμεν.

p. 18, n. μη ἐπὶ κ. τ. ἐ.] I have placed the absurd supplement μη ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν κ. τ. ἐ. in brackets, but there is still something amiss, and any body trying to correct it must be guided by the illustration presently offered in the discovery of the Alphabet. We want δεῖ or some equivalent to accompany κατανοεῖν, and we require that πληθὺς should have number, i.e. be definite, and not that number should have πληθὺς, which every number above one has in any case. It is not improbable that Plato wrote ἀριθμὸν αὐτὰ τινὰ πληθὺς ἕκαστον ἔχον κατανοεῖν ΔΕΙ.

p. 18, v. Ἐπειδὴ [φωνὴν ἄ. κ.] Unless we reject the words φ. ἄ. κ. as a supplement of the next expounder, we have a mass of words without any construction, and furthermore a statement which Plato could not have made. The word κατανοεῖν implies that the discovery has already begun, but there is no act τοῦ κατανοεῖν in acknowledging the existence of φωνή, nor indeed of any object while still in its indefinite state; so that φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατανοεῖν is a contradiction in terms. The first stage of discovery is κατανοεῖν τὰ φωνήεντα.

p. 18, n. λέγων, πρῶτος] I retract my former conjecture of λέγω ὡς, and hold ὄς, the reading of most MSS., and ὡς, that of the Bodl., to be mere grammatical attempts to give coherence to that which the above named supplement had thrown out of gear. ὁ λόγος λέγει is perfectly good Greek, but the passage from the *Republic* 360, D, affords no example of it. We ought there to read ὁ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων, "*the advocate of this view.*" For πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα, read πρῶτα τ. φ. i.e. "*first the Vowels, then the Mutes, after that the Liquids.*"

[p. 19, D. τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς [ἄ. ἦ. γ']] The interpolation here is similar to that in 11, v.

p. 22, D. αἰτιώμεθ' ἂν] αἴτιον and εἶναι have been put in brackets, the sense and construction being complete without them.

p. 23, D. πρὸς τοῖς τρισίν] Here as well as below in 26, E, the article has been inserted without the authority of the MSS.

p. 24, C. ἀνέμνησάς μ'] The pronoun με is wanting in the MSS.

p. 27, E. [τὴν αἰτίαν,] ὡς ἰκ. ἕτερον ὄν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here bracketed, as being an obvious marginal gloss. Nine lines above, γιγνόμενον has been dealt with in the same way and for the same reason.

p. 44, A. εἴπερ χωρίς] The Editor has omitted to state his reasons for bracketing τοῦ μη λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ χαίρειν. He has evidently regarded the clause as a gloss on ἑκατέρου. An alternative correction of the sentence might be proposed, viz. to retain the bracketed words and cancel ἑκατέρου.

E. R. H.]

p. 14, D. ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα] I have tried to make excuses for this phrase, and to explain the whole passage as it stands. But I cannot reconcile myself to the text for many reasons. (1) Though we may say συγχωρῶ μὴ δεῖν ἄπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων, we cannot say ταῦτα συγχωρεῖται μὴ δεῖν ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν, and still less ἄπτεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων. (2) συγκεχωρημένα ἐστὶ is not the same as ἐμολογεῖται, and cannot mean that we admit *something concerning* certain things, but that the things themselves have been *given up, admitted to be true*, because we wish to get rid of them and their propounders. (3) The words μὴ δεῖν τ. τ. ἄπτεσθαι sever ὑπὸ πάντων from the rest of the clause and from the participle ὑπολαμβάνοντων, which is a great offence against elegance. (4) ὑπολαμβάνοντων needs an accusative, such as αὐτὰ or some equivalent. (5) ἐπεὶ μὴδὲ is only appropriate when a preceding assertion is upheld *a fortiori* on the ground of a statement which follows. But Socrates' instance is neither weaker nor stronger than those of Protarchus, but a mere addition of something akin to the foregoing. (6) There is no good defence to be made of μὴδέ, unless we read τῶν τοιούτων, and even then the sentence is rendered very clumsy by the intervening παιδαριώδη κ. τ. ἐ., which separate μὴ δεῖν from μὴδέ. These grounds lead me to the conclusion that the passage is interpolated by some one, who not understanding the artificial turn of the sentence, supposed it to be suffering from some omission. If we leave out μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἄπτεσθαι and ἐπεὶ μὴδέ, τὰ τοιαῦτα becomes the accusative to ὑπολαμβάνοντων γίνεσθαι, and gives a kind of unexpected addition to Socrates' speech. This contrivance was adopted in order to introduce an additional example of ἓν καὶ πολλά, without resorting to a tedious and formal introduction of new matter.

p. 24, n. In my former edition I left ἀνέμνησας, as I found it, without an object. But it may be doubted whether we should read, Ἄλλ' εὖ γε, or Ἄλλ' εὖ τε. Εὖ γε as a mere exclamation is well known; but here εὖ is an adverb joined with two verbs, and it does not begin the sentence. I am decidedly in favour of εὖ τε.

p. 27, n. I am responsible for τὴν αἰτίαν appearing in brackets. The reason of this is obvious; but it is not quite so obvious why I have preferred λέγωμεν, according to which reading δεδηλωμένων should have been followed by a mark of interrogation, to λέγομεν which is the reading of the Bodleian. The passage as I have printed it is far from satisfactory; and I have great misgivings about this double question and answer, and fear that this λέγωμεν, or λέγομεν, is a mere Will o' the wisp, which has led me into a false conjecture. For if this word is a gloss, we see at once why the oldest MS. has *nothing to correspond to it in the answer*, whereas the revisor of some later copy would see that it must have an answer, and so one gloss would beget another. If we continue the structure of the preceding speech Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν γινόμενα καὶ ἐξ ὧν γίνεται πάντα τὰ τρία παρέσχετο ἡμῖν γένη—the natural sequel would be Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα δημιουργοῦν τὸ τέταρτον (sc. παρέχεται ἡμῖν γένος) ὡς ἕτερον κ. τ. ἐ. To this Protarchus needs only to answer with the Bodleian, Ἔτερον γὰρ οὐκ.—Ὡστε ὑπὸ σοφίας ἐλαῶν οὐδὲν εἰπῶν.

p. 62, E. εἰ δέ γε καὶ—καὶ νῦν δὴ] νῦν only admits of one καί, and the other is a mere repetition occasioned by the interrupting sentence. But if the

second καὶ is superfluous, δὴ is something worse, for whether we join it to νῦν or to εἰ, it changes the sense of either, so as to make it quite unsuitable to this passage.

p. 63, B. ἀλλήλων πέρι] That is ἑκατέρας τῶν ἐτέρων πέρι. But this is a very slovenly substitute, and moreover we have a most suspicious stranger in φρονήσεις. The plural is used for *thoughts, intentions* and *dispositions*. But here we want only the equivalent to νοῦς, and therefore the singular noun. When Plato introduces plurality to match with the plural ἡδοναί, he speaks of ἐπιστήμαι, μαθήματα or τέχνη. Again αὐτάς ought to belong to φρονήσεις as well as to ἡδονάς, but its place renders this impossible. As the address first proposed is made to pleasures only, there can be no doubt that καὶ τὰς φρονήσεις and ἀλλήλων πέρι are as unnecessary as they are incorrect. I should therefore now not scruple to edit the text thus: Οὐχ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρωταρχε, διερωτᾶν χρεὶ, τὰς ἡδονάς δέ, διακυνθανομένους τὸ ταύτονδε. Further on I can propose something better than what I offered in my note, namely, this: μῶν οὐκ ἂν δεξαιοῦσε οἰκεῖν μετὰ φρονήσεως πάσης [ἢ χωρὶς τοῦ φρονεῖν]; "Would you refuse to dwell with *any intellect whatever*?" In the answer to this question, it now appears to me that τελῶς εἰς δύναμιν "as *thoroughly as possible*" is added, to imply that the clearer the consciousness, the fuller justice is done to pleasure. But τὰλλά τε πάντα (or rather τὰ τ' ἄλλα πάντα) requires αὐτῶν τῆμῶν in the opposite clause. Perhaps we should read, καὶ αὐτῶν τιν' τῆμῶν τελῶς εἰς δύναμιν ἑκάστην. "Any one of us, each to the utmost possible degree of completeness." This use of τις followed by ἕκαστος can be supported by examples.

p. 63, E. Expel θεοῦ. καθάπερ ὁπαδοὶ should be taken together. The structure is: ὅποσα γιγνόμενα καθάπερ ὁπαδοὶ τῆς συμπαθῆς ἀρετῆς, ξυνακολουθοῦσιν αὐτῇ πάντη. But in the text I think that αὐτῇ is either misplaced or altogether foreign. As to τίν' ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ποτε μαντευτέον, nothing more seems wanting than the article; τίνα τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτῆν. He adds αὐτὴν to contrast the Idea itself, or the absolute Good, with the forementioned (relative) Good ἐν τ' ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ παντί.

p. 64, C. Read προσφεύστερον ὄν.

p. 64, D. As ἤτισοῦν and πᾶσα cannot both be retained, which is the intruder? Certainly ἤτισοῦν, which the scribes have repeated from above; for it so separates τυχοῦσα from ὅπωσοῦν that they cannot be taken together, so that the adverb is left to itself. Read, τυχοῦσα ὅπωσοῦν ξ. πᾶσα.

p. 64, E. It is strange that such expressions as μετριότης ἀρετῆ γίγνεται or ξυμμετρία κάλλος γίγνεται should have passed so long unchallenged. Moderation cannot become Moral καλόν or ἀρετῆ, nor Symmetry Physical κάλλος, else they would cease to be Moderation and Symmetry. Read, μετριότητι καὶ ξυμμετρίᾳ.

Ibid. αὐτοῖς] with what? If with τῷ μετρίῳ καὶ τῷ ξυμμέτρῳ, the author should have said τούτοις. But the Bodleian has ἑαυτοῖς, a word often confounded with ἑκάστοις, which would yield a good sense. See 64, n.

p. 65, A. Protarchus should have answered to λέγωμεν: but ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν is an answer to one of two dependent clauses ὀρθότατ' ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθα. This fact renders λέγωμεν ὡς very suspicious, but I question whether αἰτιασθαι can govern αὐτὴν γεγόνεαι.

p. 65, n. Δῆλον μὲν is not only indirect, but also bald, and quite contrary to Plato's practice. But ὅμως δ' οὖν certainly belongs to the same speaker as ἤδη τοίνυν κ. τ. ε. Besides, the colour of the phrase βέλτιον τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεῖσθαι is suited to the person conducting the dispute, and to no other. But whoever says this, must certainly have said something more; such as, that it is better to continue the argument in *its several particulars*. Now, if we add καὶ ἔν ἑκαστον το βέλτιον, we not only gain this improvement, but we are also able to remove the objection, which all must feel, to χρῶμεν *without a case*. Repeat ἑκαστον, and all difficulty ceases. Read: ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ Π., ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτ' ἂν ὅστισούν κριτῆς καὶ ἑτοῖς. ὅμως δ' οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελεῖσθαι βέλτιον καὶ ἔν ἑκαστον. ἑκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν—.

p. 66, D. Read διαμαρτυρούμενοι. I must ask the reader to take no notice of my proposed change of the passage beginning Ποῖον δὴ—and ending at δεῖν λόγον. The received text is correct in everything except παντελῆ for which I read πάντη. It should therefore have been printed thus: ΠΡΩ. Ποῖον δὴ; ΣΩ. Φίληβος πᾶσαν καὶ πάντη. ΠΡΩ. Τὸ τρίτον, . . . ὡς ἔοικας κ. τ. ε. The apparent abruptness of Socrates' answer is explained by what follows: Ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτ' ἀκούωμεν. Everything in this part of the dialogue is intended to shew that Socrates is *in haste* to sum up and conclude. The meaning of Protarchus' answer is; "Then, when you spoke of repeating a third time, it was the old argument that you meant us to repeat." But although this passage is nearly correct as the MSS. present it, the same cannot be said of what follows: ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλακίς μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς κ. τ. ε. It is quite foreign to Plato's intention to represent Socrates as discerning from the first the nature of the argument which he is to pursue. He follows the λόγος whithersoever it leads him; and therefore even if ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα meant the general argument, κατιδὼν cannot be applied to it. The most that he admits afterwards is a *suspicion* that there might be other claimants to the name of Good (ὑποπτεύων καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλά). And now we see why the oldest Manuscript has ἄπερ νῦν δὴ δυσχεράνας διελέλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας—. Here we find the confusion, caused by some ancient misplacement of δυσχεράνας, in its undisguised condition. But if we try to conceive what must have been the appearance of the text before this displacement arose, the most probable supposition is that δυσχεράνας occurred where κατιδὼν was afterwards contrived to fill up the place of the missing participle. For these reasons I propose, ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ δυσχεράνας ἄπερ νῦν δὴ διελέλυθα, τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλακίς μυρίων κ. τ. ε. "For I as you know (δὴ) disliking the saying which I have just repeated (Φίληβος τάγαθὸν ἐτίθετο κ. τ. ε.) which is the saying not of Philebus alone but of many thousand others &c."

p. 67, A. Remove the brackets from ἱκανόν, and read with the *inferior* MSS. ἱκανώτατα. I was misled by the Zurich editors, who in spite of common sense invariably adhere to the Bodleian MS. The play on ἱκανόν ἱκανώτατα is quite in the manner of the author.

CORRIGENDUM.

Page 115; Line 8 (of notes). For *quonam* read *quænam*.

C O R R I G E N D A.

(See also Page XXVI.)

Page Line	
III, 5.	<i>For nonsense read nonsense.</i>
„ 16.	<i>For ἐφ. δ. μεμερίσθαι, read ἐφ. [δεῖν] μεμερίσθαι. See p. 130.</i>
„ last.	<i>Correct from p. 151.</i>
V, last.	<i>For substitution read insertion [the Editor's original word]. ἀρειοτατε (ἀρ = ἀνήρ, ἀρος = ἀνδρός) is changed into ἀχρειώτατε by the insertion of χ.</i>
1 4	<i>For 1. read ΣΩ.</i>
4 12 (of notes)	<i>For 'sonree' read 'sources'.</i>
8 16	<i>For ἀνδρώπους read ἀνδρώποις.</i>
„ 10 (of notes)	<i>For ἐκάτεροι read ἐκάτερος.</i>
34 last but 2 (of notes)	<i>For ποσόν read ποσόν.</i>
71 5 (of notes)	<i>For καὶ τις read καὶ τις.</i>
75 1 (of notes)	<i>For Appendix read Addenda.</i>
92 last but 5 (of notes)	<i>For ἐλιχρινές read τὸ σφόδρα.</i>

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