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Pt. 2 of 12 pts

ANNEX A
TO
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

PHASES I & II OKINAWA OPERATION

4TH MARINES

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FOURTH MARINES

and

REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 4

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

PHASE I

OKINAWA

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4th Marines
Sixth Marine Division
In the field
1 May 45

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT -- OKINAWA OPERATION

Chapter I: General

1. This Special Action Report covers the events and actions of the 4th Marine Regiment and Regimental Combat Team 4 from the assignment of RCT 4's mission in the seizure of Okinawa Jima while the Regiment was still on Guadalcanal through the completion of the seizure of all of northern Okinawa and the reduction of all organized enemy resistance therein. The period reported on ends 1 May, 1945.

2. RCT 4's mission was to land on Beaches RED 1, 2, and 3 on the west coast of Okinawa at How-hour Love-day and quickly seize O-1 within zone of action, prepared to continue the attack on order, with main effort on the left, to seize O-2 and objective line L plus 3, and to maintain close and continuous contact with the 1st Marine Division on the right. RCT 22 was on the left, and LT 2/4 (less EASY Company was in Division reserve. E/4 was in Regimental reserve. O-1 was on the near edge of Yontan Airfield, 1200 yards inland and uphill from the three small RED beaches.

Chapter II: Task Organization

1. Regimental Combat Team 4, commanded by Colonel Alan Shapley, consisted of the following units:

4th Marines (less 2d Battalion (less E Co))
Company A 6th Engineer Battalion (less 2d Platoon)
Company A 6th Pioneer Battalion (less 2d Platoon)
Company A 6th Transport Battalion (less 2d Platoon)
Company A 6th Medical Battalion (less 1 collecting section)
Detachment, 26th and 33rd Replacement Drafts
1st Platoon, MP Company (less detachments)
1st Platoon Ordnance Company (less detachments)
1st Platoon Service and Supply Company (less PX section and detachments)
Detachment, 58th Naval Construction Battalion
Detachment, 11th Special Naval Construction Battalion
Detachment, 6th Amphibious Truck Company
1st Band Section (less detachments)
1st Shore Fire Control Party 6th JASCO (less detachments)
1st Air Ground Liaison Party 6th JASCO (less detachments)
1st Shore Party Communications Team 6th JASCO (less detachments)
1st Section 3rd Platoon 1st Bomb Disposal Company

Chapter III: Preliminary Planning

1. S-1: In accordance with Division orders the forward administrative group consisted of two echelons. The forward echelon consisted of the Adjutant, Sergeant Major, 3 clerks and three runners. The rear group, which functioned in Division CP, consisted of the Personnel Officer and 2 clerks. Preliminary planning included instruction and individual duties, including use of all forms to be used on the operation and the channels through which each would travel.

2. S-2: When the scene of the operation and the regimental mission became known, all officers authorized by the regimental commander were given every access to all information available. Prior to that, all intelligence personnel had been thoroughly grounded in scouting, mapping, Japanese weapons, Japanese organization and order of battle, OP functioning and other correlated subjects. When the relief maps became available, Division and Regimental boundaries and objectives were placed on them and they were invaluable in planning and briefing.

3. S-3: a. Thanks to the 6th Marine Division policy of disseminating fragmentary information and warning orders, the 4th Marines knew of its mission well before the Division Operation Plan No. 1-45 was received. Since the III Phib Corps had only the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions initially, RCT 29 was taken as its reserve, and consequently, it was learned that Division was taking LT 2/4 as its reserve. Since RCT 4 was an assault regiment landing with only two battalions, it was requested that one company of LT 2/4 be given back to RCT 4 as its regimental reserve. That request was granted and EASY Company became regimental reserve.

b. It was obvious that the assigned regimental zone of action required the landing of two battalions in assault. Beaches RED 1, 2 and 3 were 265, 100 and 250 yards wide respectively, each separated from each other by rocky promontories. The left beach, RED 1, was 800 yards from GREEN 2, the right beach of RCT 22, and 500 yards from the regimental left boundary. RED 3 was adjacent to Beach BLUE 1, the 1st Marine Division's ^{left} right beach. Consequently, it was decided to land LT 3/4 on Beach RED 1 and LT 1/4 on Beaches RED 2 and 3. This involved a difficult maneuver by LT 3/4; i.e., to land on the extreme right side of its zone of action, drive ahead and maintain contact with LT 1/4 and at the same time move left 500 yards to the regimental boundary.

c. Conferences were held with commanders and staffs of both RCT 22 and RCT 7, the combat teams to the left and right of RCT 4, to work out the details of establishing and maintaining contact and to decide on similar regimental objective lines.

4. S-4: a. Preliminary planning in supply and logistics was divided into two main phases: (1) the complete outfitting with supplies and equipment of all units of the regiment; (2) the loading and briefing of all concerned personnel on the supply plan.

b. The supply phase was marked by delays in the obtaining of certain required items which were needed to completely outfit the regiment. Many items were not received until the last part of the preparatory phase and long range planning was therefore made uncertain. However, it is felt that this regiment left for the operation fully and adequately equipped.

c. Loading plans were started early but many subsequent changes were required to be made before the regiment embarked. Meetings were held constantly to iron out the many difficulties encountered when preparing loading plans. Late changes in ship's characteristics and in ships brought about many difficulties at the last part of the planning stages. All ship unloading officers were well briefed on the unloading schedule and prepared to handle their respective jobs.

d. Stress was placed on thorough briefing and coordination of all elements of the Shore Party. Meetings were held to acquaint all officers concerned with the functioning and specific plans of the shore party.

e. All battalion S-4s were thoroughly instructed in the supply system to be used by the regiment and in the reports necessary to be submitted.

5. Communications: The communication plan for the regiment included all normal agencies of communication: wire, radio and messenger. Two radio nets, a tactical command and an administrative command were planned for and used. Stress was laid on the planning of a signal supply system within the regiment. It had been found that the regiment could most easily carry and supply the bulk of the signal supplies in one dump, using units drawing on this dump through the regimental communication officer. This plan was used and found to be effective.

6. Medical: Preliminary planning of the Medical Section was strictly according to the 6th Marine Division Medical Standing Operating Procedure. However, it was realized that adjustments and deviations from it would have to be made in actual operation. The transferring of a number of medical corpsmen to the United States for rotation under the 18-months rotation plan just one month before the regiment embarked for the operation was a big handicap to overcome in the training of medical personnel into a smoothly functioning unit.

Chapter IV: Training Phase and Rehearsals

1. The fighting on Okinawa was going to be against a large force of well-trained, well-equipped troops defending on well-organized terrain which definitely favored the defense. The terrain in the III Phib Corps zone of action (northern Okinawa) was to be very rugged, almost entirely mountainous with short scrub-pine vegetation. In the south end of the island, however, the terrain was more rolling, marred by steep ravines running cross corridor. It was open terrain. The many towns and villages indicated a good deal of street fighting. When these facts became known, training emphasis was placed on the attacks of fortified positions (which included much flamethrower and demolitions training), street fighting, camouflage, problems over available terrain most similar to that of Okinawa, the tank-infantry team in open terrain, the use of supporting arms and elements, mine detection and disposal, organization of ground in a defensive position and other subjects of lesser importance. However, the biggest emphasis, as always practiced in this regiment, was a continuing emphasis on small unit training: the individual, fire team, squad, platoon and company.

2. Regimental and Division problems were conducted over terrain as similar to that of Okinawa as could be found. They were very beneficial, and all units became accustomed to their place in the new 6th Marine Division "team." However, it is felt that officers get most of the benefit from large unit problems, so they should be limited in number.

3. Regimental and Division CPXs successfully served to polish staff procedure and to test unit commanders decisions.

4. Dress rehearsals, held off Gushikuan beaches during the period 1-5 March naturally were beneficial in perfecting the ship-to-shore movement. However, the artificialities in the first two exercises due to an insufficient number of LSTs greatly reduced the benefits of those exercises.

Chapter V: Loading and Embarkation

1. The loading out of CT 4 began with the loading of LSTs 833, 945, 769, 794, 451 and 947 on 19 February, 1944, and APAs 129 (Marvin H. McIntyre), 21 (Adair), 168 (Gage), and the 219 (Noble) on 24 February. The loading of these ships proceeded smoothly with no marked incidents. Final loading after rehearsal of the LSTs was completed on 10-11 March and the APAs on 13-14 March.

2. The unloading of APAs commenced at approximately 1000 on 1 April and all APAs of CT 4 were unloaded by 1900 3 April. The only delays encountered were due to the APAs retiring for the night and on one instance lack of LCV(P)s and LSMs alongside the unloading APA. This latter delay was rectified by requesting LCV(P)s and LSMs from other APAs.

3. Unloading of LCV(P)s and LSMs in the transfer area was slow at first because of the lack of cranes to lift cargo from LCV(P)s and LSMs to LVTs, necessitating this work being done by hand. This tended to slow down the unloading of the APAs inasmuch as their LCV(P)s and LSMs were held at the transfer area for a longer time awaiting their turn to unload. With the arrival of a crane off each beach, the unloading was speeded up. The cargo ticket system worked only fair, insofar as using the tickets to determine what remained to be unloaded. This defect can be easily rectified by proper schooling of hatch captains, prior to commencement of unloading, on how to properly fill out the ticket.

4. Standard rigging and unloading equipment was used by all APAs and no reports were received as to the failure or inadequacy of this equipment.

Chapter VI: Movement to and Arrival at Objective Area

All LSTs carrying assault troops of BCT 4 left the Guadalcanal area on 11 March. The APAs weighed anchor at 0630 15 March. The trip to the staging area, Ulithi Atoll in the western Carolines, was uneventful. All troops were briefed on every phase and detail of the operation as soon as the ships were under way. Enough relief maps were available for one for each APA and each LST, which proved invaluable in briefing troops and acquainting them with terrain features and boundaries. Daily calisthenics were also conducted for all hands. The APAs arrived at Ulithi 1400 21 March and left there for Okinawa at 1400 27 March, preceded by the LSTs by two days. All ships arrived in the transport area at 0530 L-day, 1 April 1945.

Chapter VII: Assault Phase

L-Day, 1 April 1945, dawned cool and clear. The sea was calm. Conditions were ideal for an amphibious landing. The transports arrived in the transport area 17,000 yards from the beach at 0530. Shortly afterward, the LSTs moved into position in the LST area. All assault elements of both the RCT 4 assault landing teams, LT 3/4 and LT 1/4, were embarked in LSTs, to make the trip to the beach in LVTs. Debarkation progressed smoothly and on schedule. The first wave left the Line of Departure (4000 yards from the beach) on schedule at 0800. LCI gunboats, rocket boats and mortar boats preceded the assault waves to the edge of the coral reef, which averaged about 400 yards in width in the regimental zone of action. The first wave consisted of 35 LVT(A)s mounting 75mm howitzers. H-Hour was scheduled for 0830.

The regiment was landing with two battalion landing teams abreast, 3/4 on the left and 1/4 on the right. EASV Company of 2/4 was in regimental reserve. LT 2/4 (less E/4) was in 6th Division reserve since RCT 29 was in III Phib Corps reserve. RCT 22 was on RCT 4's left, on the left flank of the Tenth Army. The 1st Marine Division was on the right of the 6th Marine Division. The two divisions made up the III Phib Corps assault forces. The Tenth Army was landing with Corps abreast, the III Phib Corps on the left and XXIV Corps on the right.

The landing beaches were approximately one third of the way up the Okinawan west coast. RCT 4 was assigned Beaches RED 1, 2 and 3. They were separate beaches, separated by rocky promontories. LT 3/4, landing on RED 1, which was 265 yards wide, was landing with their left flank 500 yards to the right of the regimental boundary and 800 yards from Beach GREEN 2, RCT 22's right beach. Beaches RED 2 and 3, on which LT 1/4 was landing, were 100 and 250 yards wide respectively. Escarpments, varying in height from 4 to 20 feet, lined most beaches and left few favorable exits from the beaches.

Despite the extensive ship-to-shore rehearsals and although RCT 4 beaches were clearly defined by the rocky promontories, wave guides failed to guide the assault waves to the correct beaches. The first wave hit the beach at 0839. LT 3/4 was landed on the right half of Beach GREEN 2 and on the rocky coast line between GREEN 2 and RED 1. LT 1/4 landed on RED 2 and 3 as scheduled. Elements of RCT 7, on RCT 4's right, landed on both Beaches RED 2 and 3. However, these were very small in number and did not disorganize 1/4.

Heavy opposition had been expected on the beaches. RCT 4 was landing on beaches only 1200 yards from the edge of Vontan Airfield, the immediate objective of the landing. The 1200 yards were uphill and were devoid of concealment and almost devoid of cover. A large number of ornate, concrete Okinawan tombs lined the edge of the field and overlooked the landing beaches in the area. Observed, grazing fire could be delivered by the enemy in the entire regimental zone of action.

With the island defended by an estimated 60,000 enemy troops, very stiff opposition was expected and a bloody fight to secure a beachhead was anticipated. It was with utter consternation and bewilderment and with a great deal of relief that the assault waves landed against practically no opposition. Several mortar rounds falling in the vicinity of the beaches and small arms fire from several scattered enemy stragglers, were all that met the assault waves. With but three casualties, 1/4 and 3/4 quickly reorganized, established contact along the line and moved up to the first objective at the edge of the airfield, seizing that high ground at 1030.

There was still no opposition and 1/4 and 3/4 were ordered to resume the advance across the airfield. E/4, the regimental reserve, Wpns Co/4 and the regimental CP were all ashore at this point and the Shore Party was ready for business. The troops advanced across the field standing up. It was a ghost field. All buildings had been stripped and dummy guns were in almost all of the numerous AA positions. Only scattered sniper fire met the rapidly advancing Marines, who were taking advantage of this apparently horrible tactical blunder in permitting the almost unopposed capture of much-prized Vontan Airfield.

The O-2 line on the east side of the airfield was seized at 1300. There was still only light, scattered opposition. Patrols were sent out to the front. There was no contact with RCT 22 on the left, whose front lines were considerably to the rear. The front was broadening, due primarily to the fact that the attack was ~~not~~ heading into hilly, wooded terrain. It was requested that the division reserve, LT 2/4, be returned to RCT 4 in order that attack could be continued and to aid in establishing contact on the left. Since they were just in the progress of landing, this was impossible at that time.

The attack to seize the L / 3 line was ordered resumed at 1330. The advance moved ahead slowly over the increasingly rugged terrain. However, it was apparent that there was too much frontage for two battalions. This might not have been true if the 7th Marines on the right had kept their left flank on the division boundary.

They continued to drift to the right and since RCT 4 was ordered to maintain close and continuous contact with them, the regimental front was broadening rapidly. Consequently, 3/4 and 1/4 were ordered to halt the advance on the most favorable terrain for defense and to commence digging in not later than 1600. At 1503 the remainder of 2/4 reverted to 4th Marines control and were immediately ordered into the line on the left to establish contact with the 22d Marines. E/4 remained in regimental reserve. By 1800 the lines were dug in and contact had been established all along the line. The night was comparatively quiet, with only scattered enemy small arms fire marring the stillness.

The attack was resumed the next morning, 2 April at 0730 to seize the L plus 3 and L plus 5 lines successively. The three battalions were in the same position as the previous evening. The right flank of 1/4 was 700 yards into the 1st Division's zone of action keeping contact, and 3/4 was 400 yards into 1/4's zone of action for the same reason. At 1100, 3/4 encountered strong enemy positions consisting of mutually supporting caves in both sides of a steep ravine. A hail of small arms fire met the platoon which first entered the draw and it was not until four hours later that 12 wounded men were extricated. Every means of painlessly destroying the strongpoint was unsuccessfully tried and it was finally taken by a typical Jap "Banzi" charge with one platoon entering the mouth of the draw and one platoon coming down one side of the two noses which formed the pocket.

Meanwhile, the 7th Marines, who were ahead of 1/4 on the right, were ordered by the 1st Marine Division over to their own left boundary and moved over to it. However, 1/4, behind the 7th Marines, in side-slipping back to its own zone of action, encountered stiff resistance, still in the 7th's zone of action. It was a pocket similar to the one holding up the 3rd Bn and similar tough fighting was required to destroy the position. Approximately 250 Japs were killed in the two strongpoints. The terrain was very hilly and vegetated, with steep ravines and practically no road net. The attack ceased at 1830, 1000 yards ahead of the L plus 3 line. Good contact was established all along the line. There was little enemy activity during the night, only several small groups unsuccessfully attempting to infiltrate the lines.

The attack was resumed at 0715 the following morning, 3 April. Spasmodic but light resistance was encountered throughout the day. The regiment advanced 3500 yards in its zone of action while killing 61 Japs. Again terrain was the biggest obstacle. There were few roads, and supply and evacuation was difficult. Countless caves continued to be dis-

covered, most of them unoccupied. The Regt was 3000 yards from the east coast of Okinawa when the attack ceased at 1630. Airborne attack imminent warning was issued by Division at 2330 but failed to materialize. L/4 was brought back as regimental reserve and E/4 returned to 2d Bn control at 1600. By 1145 the next day, 4 April, the regiment was on the Okinawan east coast, having encountered little more resistance. The terrain had been exceedingly difficult all the way and logistic difficulties hindered the attack almost as much as the enemy opposition. The regiment was on the L plus 15 line on L plus 3.

The 4th Marines were ordered at 1600 to assemble in the general area which it now held, as Division reserve.

The following morning, 5 April, in accordance with Division order, FOX Company, with one platoon of tanks, one dozer tank and 4 M-7 105mm SP howitzers attached, was sent on a reconnaissance patrol up the east coast of the Ishikawan Isthmus, a narrow neck in long, snaky Okinawa, for a distance of 14 miles before returning the same day. This they did, meeting no opposition but being delayed three times by undefended road blocks. This patrol had to pass through the front line units of the 22d Marines, whose zone of action included all of the Isthmus. A good road ran up both the east and west coast of the island and a wild, rugged ridge formed a huge backbone all the way to the north end of Okinawa.

At 1200, 2/4 and 3/4 were ordered to proceed north up the coast road to assembly areas just behind the 22d Marines, prepared to pass through them the next morning. The remainder of the regiment remained in the same area, prepared to move north the following day. The night, like all the previous, was marred by slight activity by small groups of enemy. One group hit the regimental command post at 0400 6 April, killing 5 Marines and wounding 5.

The 4th Marines took over the right half of the 22d Marines' zone of action at 0800 when the 2d Bn 4th passed through their leading elements. The 4th's zone of action was the east half of the long Isthmus. Due to the ruggedness of the terrain and the scarcity of roads, trails or even civilian population off the main road, the regimental plan was to advance up the main road and patrol all trails and roads leading off the main road to their source. The regiment advanced in column of battalions, 2/4, 3/4 and 1/4 in that order, one platoon of tanks following the leading battalion. The advance was rapid and the command element

of the regimental CP took the road in a jeep convoy to maintain communications and control. At 1300, the 2d Battalion had been dissipated in small patrols off the trail and the 3rd Battalion passed through the 2d according to the pre-arranged plan of leap-frogging battalions.

By 1600, the O-E line was reached when the village of Hochiya was seized, an advance of seven miles from the 22d Marines' lines of 0800 that morning. Only scattered enemy stragglers were encountered. Three bridges, bombed out by preliminary air attack, hindered the supply. The regiment was assembled in battalion perimeters off the main road, 3/4, 1/4 and 2/4 in that order. An increasing number of Okinawan civilians evidenced themselves on the road, wandering south. All men of military age, which were few, were detained and sent to the rear for questioning and possible internment. The rest were allowed to go about their business.

The advance was resumed north the following morning, 7 April, with the three battalions in the same order as they were the previous evening. The Weapons Company had been left to the rear pending repair of the bridges. The method of the advance was similar to the previous day. Again the advance was rapid and against negligible opposition. At 1200 the 1st Battalion passed through the 3rd Battalion, whose troops had by that time all been committed to patrols up trails on either side of the road. The road narrowed as the country became wilder and the mountains came down to the beach. At 1700 1/4 had seized the O-F line and were ordered to dig in in perimeter defense on the shores of Ora Wan, a large inlet extending into the mountainous terrain. Wpns Co and the regimental CP were in the town of Ora, just south of the 1st Battalion, and 3/4 and 2/4 were digging in in perimeter defenses at 1000 yard intervals down the road. The regiment had advanced another 7 miles and the troops were very tired, with many cases of blistered and sore feet.

Division was ordered to hold on that line and reduce Motobu Peninsula, which jutted out of the west coast of the island on an east-west line just south of the regimental positions. The 22d Marines were abreast of the 4th Marines on the west side of the island and the 29th Marines had patrolled their way about one-fourth of the way on their mission to seek out and destroy enemy elements on the Peninsula.

In accordance with Division order, the regiment thoroughly patrolled all area within a radius of 3000 yards of the bivouac area for the next five days. All troops not on patrols rehabilitated, and the morale and physical condition of all hands scored.

Division ordered the regiment to send one company north up the east coast 5 miles on 10 April, prepared to continue the advance north. Accordingly, KING Company was dispatched. By 17 April they had patrolled up the coast a distance of 28 miles. Daily supply and evacuation was by LVT over water from the regimental bivouac area. All patrols during this time, including the KING Company patrol, met only enemy stragglers at various intervals, eight enemy troops being the greatest number encountered in one group.

At 0800 13 April, in accordance with Division order, the 3rd Battalion moved out for Kawata to join KING Company. At the same time, the remainder of the Regiment commenced moving by marching to assemble in the vicinity of Yofuke on the west coast of the island, just south of Motobu Peninsula and approximately 10 miles from the present area at Ora. The 2d Bn led off, and while it was still enroute Division ordered that it continue the march to a point out on the southwest corner of Motobu Peninsula. It arrived there at 1700 after a hard march over mountainous roads of over 18 miles. Meanwhile, the 1st Bn had arrived at Yofuke and were digging in when Division ordered, at 1630, that they be moved to the village of Awa on the south coast of Motobu Peninsula. This move was successfully accomplished just prior to darkness by moving the battalion by truck, one company at a time. As darkness fell, then, the 1st and 2d Battalions were in perimeter defense three miles apart on the southwest coast of Motobu, the 3rd Battalion was 20 miles away on the Okinawan east coast, and the Regimental CP and the Weapons Company were in the vicinity of Yofuke, three miles south of the juncture of Motobu Peninsula and the main part of the island.

The 29th Marines had run into trouble on Motobu. It was approximately six by eight miles of exceedingly rugged terrain, some mountains being as much as 1200 feet high. The area had to be covered by strong patrols. The apparent bulk of the estimated 1500 enemy troops on the Peninsula had been suddenly discovered on 12 April by a company of the 3rd Bn 29th on the southwest part of the Peninsula. It had been ambushed and trapped and badly mauled before finally extricating itself. The other two battalions of the 29th were in different sections of the Peninsula.

With the 3rd Bn 29th attached, the 4th Marines were ordered to seize a 700-foot-high ridge the following morning, April 14. This ridge was about 1200 yards inland from the coast and dominated the western coast and coastal road. Intermittent machinegun fire had been received from it, and

it was right behind it where I/29 had been ambushed. The situation was unique in that the direction of attack was east, toward the mainland and almost directly toward friendly artillery. Also, the Regiment was driving toward the remaining two battalions of the 29th, who were working toward the ridge from the central part of the Peninsula about 4 miles away, thus making careful coordination of artillery, naval gunfire and air support a strict necessity.

The attack to seize the ridge jumped off at 0830 with 3/29 on the left and 2/4 on the right. They had moved from their assembly areas to the designated Line of Departure by 0815. 3/4, being 20 miles away on the east coast, was naturally out of the picture temporarily.

Scattered machinegun, mortar and light artillery fire harassed the attack but did not prevent our capture of the ridge by 1115. Meanwhile 1/4 had been ordered up to an assembly area to the right rear of 2/4 front lines to protect the right flank. The left flank was anchored to a very steep slope. At 1100, 1/4 was ordered to send one company to seize dominating high ground about 1000 yards to the right front of the existing front lines and to contact 2/4 at that point.

The attack was resumed at 1200 and resistance sharply increased as the troops headed into the low ground on their way to the next objective, high ground 1000 yards to the front. The terrain was ideally suited to defense, and the Japs made the most of it. Initially their defense consisted of small groups of concealed enemy, each group usually being built around one or two machineguns.

From a concealed position, the Japs would zero in on a portion of a trail probably 300 yards across a draw and let a large number of Marines pass before blasting a good group at a choice time. An entire platoon passed over one portion of a trail uneventfully. When the company commander came along with his headquarters section, a machinegun suddenly opened up, killing the company commander and several others. Officer casualties were unusually high. The Japs were apparently making the most of the terrain in a clever defense. There were obviously many of them facing the Marines, but it was difficult to close with them, since the small groups would often change their position in the heavy vegetation.

When the attack ceased at 1630, 3/29 and 2/4 were digging in on the regimental objective. CHARLIE Company of the 1st Battalion had seized its high ground objective and had now been joined by the remainder of the battalion,

which had been ordered up there earlier in the day. Contact was established all along the line and there were now three battalions on the line, 3/29, 2/4 and 1/4 from left to right. Meanwhile, 3/4 had been relieved in their positions on the east coast and were ordered to a point three miles away on southern Motobu as Division reserve. The Regimental Weapons Company, who were unable to use their heavy weapons because of the terrain, were organized as an infantry company and were used to protect the widening left flank.

Supply and evacuation soon became a difficult problem. The road net was far from adequate and engineers were working feverishly to improve it and to build new roads where needed. However, the rugged terrain prevented them from catching the infantry, and usually the last 500 to 1500 yards of the trip of the chow, ammunition and water from the forward dumps to the front lines could be negotiated by no other means than manpower. For the next three days this was the case. Division sent up as many replacements from the Division pool as could be spared. Battalion Headquarters Companies were used. Support platoons were used. Conversely, the evacuation of wounded men was equally difficult if not more so.

The attack was resumed the next day, 15 April, with the same three battalions abreast. The objective line O-N was an enlargement of the existing "beachhead" and involved a push of about 1000 yards to the next series of high points. By noon the regiment was about half way to its objective. The defense was similar to that of the previous day, only more intense. The 2d Bn 4th again had tough going, as did the 1st battalion in its attempt to capture a high peak dominating the entire right flank. GEORGE Company/4 had 65 casualties during the day, including three company commanders. The advance of 3/29 on the left had been held up by an enemy strongpoint on and in Hill 210 500 yards to their right front, containing well dug in machine guns, mortars, and one 77mm mountain gun, which was dragged out of an L-shaped cave at intervals to fire a few harassing rounds every time they had a chance. For two days naval gunfire, artillery and air strikes using 500 pound bombs and napalm flame bombs had been working over the hill, and every time it was thought reduced, the Japs would pop out of their caves again, doing considerable damage with their artillery piece with direct, observed fire.

When the attack was ordered to cease at 1630, the two right battalions were on their objective and 3/29 was organizing favorable ground slightly short of theirs. The troops

were very tired and the supply situation was more difficult than ever.

It was obvious by this time that the Regiment was attacking a force of at least two companies who were utilizing and had organized the difficult terrain to the best possible advantage. It was also apparent that the direction of attack was the anticipated direction on which the Japs had built their defense. These factors, plus the fact that the advance was still toward our artillery and friendly troops caused a decision to be made to contain and envelope the enemy strongpoint by flanking action from the right, changing the direction of attack from east to north.

The 3rd Bn 4th reverted to regimental control at 0600 the following morning, 16 April, making the 4th temporarily a four-battalion-regiment. Division order called for the seizure of an objective line which was a horseshoe-shaped line involving a juncture of the 4th and 29th Marines and the 1st Bn 22d, which had previously been ordered into position and given the assignment of working toward their assigned portion of the Division objective by thorough patrolling and to contact the 4th on the left and the 29th on the right on the objective line. This would make a continuous line preparatory to a push north toward the closed end of the horseshoe.

Consequently, the 4th's operations order for 16 April called for the following: 3/29, on the left, to seize the high ground 500 yards to its front, including the strongpoint on Hill 210 previously mentioned; 2/4 to remain in its positions on its commanding ground and support the attack of 3/29 and 1/4 by fire; 1/4 to swing its right flank forward to tie in with 3/4 when they got into position; 3/4 to move from its assembly area at 0700 by the most direct route to its place on the Division objective line to establish contact with 1/4 on the left and protect the regimental right flank until 1/22 came abreast of them; and Wpns Co/4, organized as an infantry company, to thoroughly patrol the area to the right rear of 1/4 and 3/4, which included the 7000-square-yard tip of Motobu Peninsula to the left boundary of 1/22.

The attack was resumed at 0900. By 1200, 3/29 had seized their objective, including the strongpoint on Hill 210. The company facing the hill at the jump-off was HOW company, with GEORGE on its left and ITEM on the left flank of the battalion front. The face of the hill was steep and the fire intense. Consequently, HOW Company moved forward and then turned to the right to seize the top of the hill

from the flank. GEORGE remained in position, supporting the attack by fire, as did 2/4 on the right. GEORGE also gradually replaced HOW Company in the center, and when the shooting was over and 147 Japs had been blasted out of their honeycombed cave defenses, 3/29 was on its objective and the positions of GEORGE and HOW Companies had been inverted, GEORGE now being on the right flank firmly holding Hill 210.

By 1200 the 3rd Bn 4th was in position and in contact with the right flank of 1/4, which had swung well forward on the right to form the southwest bend of the horseshoe-shaped line. Consequently, 1/4 and 3/4 were facing north, a right angle from the line of 3/29 and 2/4, who were solidly entrenched on high ground facing east. The attack was resumed at 1230 with 3/29 and 2/4 ordered to remain in position and support the advance by fire of 1/4 and 3/4, who were advancing straight north to seize the next objective, which dominated all terrain in the area. 1/22, on the right was far behind and the 29th was not yet in contact so the regimental right flank was in the air. It was a gamble, but the pocket of enemy resistance had been quite clearly defined by contact and also by questioning several Okinawans who had resided in that area.

Mt Yaetake was a back-breaker, and lay in the 1st Bn's zone of action. ABLE Company was on the left, attacking frontally up one nose, and CHARLIE Company was on the right, working up a draw on the right. The advance was naturally slow but was against only light, scattered small arms fire. Just as the Marines hit the crest, the Japs opened up with a withering fire at very close range, and used many hand grenades and knee-mortars. The Marines withdrew slightly from the crest and employed 60mm mortars and hand grenades, lobbing them over the crest at the Japs just on the reverse side. The Japs were returning the compliment in kind. The fighting was very close and fierce. The 2d Bn here furnished an outstanding example of supporting by fire when they, from their high ground which completely overlooked the reverse (north) side of the big mountain, opened up with a murderous barrage of mortar and machine gun fire. This, plus well-placed mortar fire, kept the Japs down enough for ABLE and CHARLIE Companies to again seize the crest, and this time they stayed.

The position, however, was precariously held. The two companies had taken over 50 casualties in taking the hill and were also practically out of all kinds of ammunition. To make matters worse, the Japs were apparently gathering their remaining strength in the area for a counter

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attack. Artillery fire and the supporting mortar and machinegun fire from 2/4 kept the Japs in check, however, until ammunition could be rushed up the 1200-foot hill on the backs of tired, sweating Marines. All available officers and men were used on the back-breaking job. The same men were used as litter bearers to evacuate the wounded down the steep, rocky slope.

At 1830, an hour after the hill was taken, an estimated 75 Japs launched a strong counterattack, which developed into a Banzai charge. With the help of the supporting fire of artillery and 2/4, the charge was repulsed with almost 100% losses to the enemy, and Mt. Yaetake, commanding the entire area, was now securely held, and the troops dug in for the night.

Due to the critical supply situation, the attack could not be resumed until 1200 the next day, 17 April. The 4th Marines were ordered to seize objective line O-P along the east-west Toguchi-Itomi road. The left flank of the regiment was on the road, but the lines ran perpendicular to it for 2000 yards, and then parallel to it, since the line formed by 1/4 and 3/4 on the right were at right angles to the line formed by 3/29 and 2/4 on the left. In other words, the left two battalions were ordered to defend their lines facing east and support the attack by fire, and the right two battalions were ordered to resume the attack to the north to seize the O-P line. Consequently, their left boundary was the front line formed by the left two battalions.

The advance was rapid, being down hill all the way to the objective. Elaborate cave and communications systems, bivouac areas, Jap materiel of all kinds and many dead enemy troops were discovered, but only scattered and light resistance from isolated enemy stragglers hindered the advance.

It was apparent that the back of the Jap defenses in that area had been broken. A Japanese map captured the same day confirmed this, showing the defense position as the only organized resistance on Motobu Peninsula. The O-P line was seized at 1645 and contact was established with the 29th Marines. Roads in the area were mined and six anti-tank ditches in the Itomi-Toguchi road hindered supply. The Weapons Company had again patrolled the same area as the previous day and again with negative results.

The battle for Motobu Peninsula was over and 541 counted Japs had died in defending their well-chosen positions in their usual tenacious manner.

The 3rd Bn 29th was detached the following morning, 18 April, and reverted to control of their parent regiment, being taken out of their now by-passed positions at 0900 and entrucking for the 29th area. The Regiment remained in position that day, 1/4 and 3/4 conducting security patrolling and 2/4 thoroughly patrolling all area which 1/4 and 3/4 had quickly advanced over the previous day.

In accordance with Division order, the 4th Marines, with the 29th Marines on the right, resumed the advance at 0800 19 April to the northeast to seize high ground on which possible enemy concentrations were suspected. However, with the exception of one pocket of 35 Japs, which was cleaned out by 2/4 by 1600, no indications of organized resistance was found in the 3000 yards advanced by the regiment during the day. 1/4 was advancing on the left, 2/4 on the right, and 3/4 was in reserve. At 1630, the two front line battalions were in perimeter defense on very high ground. The advance to the north coast of the peninsula was resumed the following day by patrolling in the regimental zone of action and following with the remainder of the regiment. The north coast was reached at 1330, 3 Japs having been bagged during the day. The regiment assembled in unit perimeter defenses.

The regiment remained in position April 21st and 22d, conducting partolling to the south 2000 yards inland, with very few individual enemy stragglers contacted. An intelligence patrol sent back to comb Jap bivouac positions in the Mt. Yaetake area encountered 17 enemy troops in a big cave, many of them wounded and bandaged. The enemy greeted the Marines with grenades and were promptly killed.

The 4th Marines commenced moving to its assigned garrison area on northern Okinawa 23 April. The 3rd Bn was moved to Kawata on the northeast coast, the same area from which they came to join the Motobu fight. 2/4 was moved on 24 April to Ora on the east coast, 18 miles south of 3/4, and the Regimental Weapons Company moved to the vicinity of Genke, 5 miles up the west coast from the juncture of the north coast of Motobu Peninsula with the main island. The 1st Bn and H&S Company moved to the same area the following day.

Organized resistance having ceased on all of northern Okinawa, the 4th Marines assumed responsibility of its assigned area and continued patrolling to ferret out and destroy enemy stragglers. Results of patrols were usually negative, with an occasional individual or small group of Japs killed.

On 27 April, a patrol from the 3rd Battalion contacted what was originally estimated to be a group of 200 Japs going

northeast toward the coast in the very rugged northeastern corner of the regimental sector. The patrol remained undetected and proceeded back to the battalion bivouac area, since it was late in the afternoon. The 3rd Battalion was attached to the 22d Marines and moved out the following morning to destroy the big group of Japs, which were now expected to be in the 22d Marines' sector. They returned to their bivouac area at 1800 and reverted back to the 4th Marines control after wiping out 123 poorly equipped Nips. As the period covered by this report ended, the regiment was continuing to defend and patrol its sector in Northern Okinawa.

Part 1. Ship to Shore Movement

1. On LOVE day, 1 April 45, the APAs were in position and had started putting boats over the side by 0515. By 0630, all LSTs were in position and were ready to launch tractors. At this time the Control Boats were also in position, but it is felt that the Control Boats should have been in position at an earlier time as the preliminary bombardment had already begun and essential landmarks on the beach had been obscured by the smoke.

2. The first wave of tractors had been launched and were rendezvousing off the control boat by 0750. At 0800, the first wave crossed the line of departure and events went as planned except as shall be noted. The execution of the crossing of the line of departure left much to be desired. The waves were for the most part two to three hundred yards behind the line of departure at the time of execution of their wave flag in spite of the fact that the flag had been two-blocked for five minutes as a preparatory signal. In some instances, the wave had to be reminded by radio or loud-speaker that their flag had been executed and that it was their signal to cross the line of departure. In one instance, a wave rendezvoused so far from the control boat that a small boat had to be sent for them when they failed to see the execution of their flag. This resulted in the tanks, floating on T-6 devices, being some twenty minutes late in their arrival on the beach.

3. The first wave hit the beach as scheduled at 0830. The wave guides evidently did not have a thorough knowledge of the beach landmarks. Because of this, the elements which should have landed on Beach RED 1 landed on Beach GREEN 2 and some parts of the elements scheduled for Beaches RED 2 and 3, landed on RED 1. The landing proceeded as planned and all scheduled waves were landed as planned. The remaining elements were landed as called for.

Part 2 - Shore Party.

1. Organization of Shore Party. Organization of 4th Regimental Combat Team Shore Party according to GO-28, 6th Marine Division Shore Party SOP, was found entirely satisfactory with one exception; namely, SOP calls for a 250 man service platoon per BLT SP. In this operation only approximately 180 replacement troops per BLT SP were available. It is realized however, that higher authority made every effort to obtain the desired amount which just were not available.

2. Ship to Shore Movement of Shore Party Personnel and Equipment. a. The reconnaissance section of each BLT SP came ashore with the reserve company in each battalion. After the reconnaissance was completed and when the situation permitted, the command section was called ashore. After the command section was ashore and initial organization was established, the service platoon was called ashore. This was the first time the Shore Party has come ashore on call and proved more satisfactory than the old method of coming in by waves.

b. One mixup occurred. There were insufficient boats to embark all Shore Party personnel initially. Hence, the first wave boats, after discharging their troops, went back to the ship to pick up the remaining Shore Party personnel not already embarked; namely, the service platoon. This platoon did not arrive ashore until approximately 1400. The reason was found to be that the wave was unable to contact the control boat.

3. Movement of Supplies and Vehicles Ashore.

a. An initial load of approximately 1000 pounds was in each amphibian tractor with assault troops and was thrown out on the beach. This practice has shown its value in previous operations and was of great value in the present one.

b. Several LCVP's were loaded with ammunition and were initially intended to serve as floating dumps. This practice should be always adhered to as troops tend to use ammo in greater quantities initially.

c. Very few supplies came in the first day, but unloading progressed very satisfactorily starting on L plus 1. It is recommended that steps be taken so that ammunition and water must be put ashore by late afternoon on L-Day.

d. The reef proved quite an obstacle in the unloading of vehicles as LCM's and LCVP's could not come in to the beach even on high tide.

e. The high priority given shore party heavy equipment to facilitate landing of supplies was found definitely essential.

4. Transportation of Supplies Inland to Troops Initially. With the problem of a reef the only answer is to use LVT's. This cuts down the amount of supplies landed, but there is no alternative.

5. Navy Control. Although liaison with Navy beachmasters and control officers was carried out for quite a period prior to landing and frequent conferences were held, troops and supplies were still landed on wrong beaches. In one case a control vessel was found approximately 700 yards north of its correct position. This was rectified immediately. However, Navy cooperation was excellent and mistakes were corrected on the spot.

6. Communication. Shore Party communication as established by 6th JASCO were excellent from the beginning. The only suggestion to be made here is that a SCR 610 or equivalent radio which will carry ten miles be made to the Shore Party. When an organization advances quickly, as in this operation, wire cannot keep up with them, and it is frequently out anyway. This radio set should be controlled by regiment so as to keep Shore Party from interfering with tactical needs.

7. Safeguarding of Supplies. Organizational markings on supplies should be marked plainly, especially medical supplies, and quartermaster personnel for regiments and battalions be on the beach when supplies are unloaded. This was carried out and I believe that almost all regimental supplies landed on the correct beaches and reached proper hands. However, it is known that initially with the confusion that exists, there is bound to be some loss in supplies or at least a temporary loss, because of landing on the wrong beaches. The regimental quartermaster and the Shore Party commander worked hand in glove until the forward movement of the regiment necessitated an advance dump. Then, quarter master personnel still checked back at the beach until all the regiment's gear was unloaded and moved forward.

8. Shore Party Equipment. Shore Party equipment proved satisfactory. Seabee equipment was available, especially heavy equipment which normally would not be used until later. Engineer heavy equipment was also available. Without this equipment egress roads, lateral roads, and digging in of fuel and ammunition dumps would not have been accomplished as fast as desired. Also, the attachment of water distillation units proved of value.

9. General Conclusions.

a. Shore Party organization must be a loosely knit, flexible setup so it can be changed immediately to meet a new situation.

b. Regimental and battalion quartermasters and TQM's should be thoroughly familiar with shore party procedure.

c. The procedure used in this operation was specifically for a reef operation and that must be borne in mind. Other types of landings would change the procedure somewhat.

Part 3 - Naval Gunfire Support.

1. The Shore Fire Control personnel working with the Regimental team and the Battalion teams were well trained prior to the operation. A majority of the men had participated in at least two operations as Shore Fire Control Teams, and, as a result, knew their work thoroughly. The teams working with the Naval Gunfire Spotters were inadequate in number. There were insufficient men to carry radio equipment the long distances that were covered by the companies. A minimum of eight men should be in the Naval Gunfire Spotter team, excluding the officer. The six men in the Regimental and Battalion teams proved to be adequate.

2. a. The Shore Fire Control Parties' primary means of communication, the SCR 694, proved to be excellent; much better than the radio sets used in past operations. Some difficulty was encountered due to distance and terrain. However, at no time were the battalions completely out of communication with their fire support ships.

b. The SCR 300 set with which each Shore Fire Control team was equipped proved effective for the first few days when the distances between units was not so great. Later many of the sets were inoperative and hard to keep in repair. During the last few days of the operation communication between Battalion teams and Regiment, and between Regiment and Division was maintained by tactical wire, which proved to be by far the most effective and dependable.

3. The cargo jeep equipped with an SCR 694 mount and a trailer proved to be of the greatest value. The jeep mounted 694 enabled a one man watch to be maintained during the night, the generator man being eliminated. The jeep and trailer was

used to great advantage by battalions and regiment in transporting men and equipment over the long distances covered.

4. The preparation fires against beach defenses in the Regiment's zone of action was observed to be quite effective by the Second Battalion Naval Gunfire Officer, who observed this fire from an LVT prior to How Hour on Love Day.

5. Approximately fourteen call fires were called on targets of opportunity by the battalion teams. The call fires were called on caves, gun emplacements, and observed troop concentrations. The call fires generally were effective. The Second Battalion Shore Fire Control Teams fired one counter-battery fire target, firing at three field pieces in caves. Two of these were hit by naval gunfire. The area was kept neutralized throughout the day. Over 600 rounds of 5" 38 ammunition were fired on this target.

6. Night harassing fire was fired during the first four nights of the operation. The effect of this fire was unobserved. Interdiction fire was used on the night of L / 1 by the order of a higher echelon. The only effect observed was that the First Battalion was deprived of a ship for night illumination which was needed on that night.

7. Fire with air spot was used quite extensively. The planes observed targets of opportunity and fired the ships on these targets when safety factors permitted.

8. H.C. fire and illumination was quite well coordinated with adjacent units. One morning an exception occurred when the preparation fire of the 29th Regiment fell too close to our own front lines. This preparation was ceased soon after it commenced.

9. Coordination between naval gunfire, artillery and air support was reported to be poor in the battalions as the liaison officers were not situated in the same section of the battalion CP. This error was avoided in the Regimental CP and coordination among these three supporting arms was good.

10. When communications were good, the chain of command from Battalion to Regiment to Division to Corps and Group Commander was effective. When communication was poor, some of the links in the chain of command were omitted.

11. The Shore Fire Control Teams established communication with their firing ships on Love Day as follows:

Regimental Liaison Officer	- 1045
First Battalion	
Naval Officer	- 0945
Spotter	- 0945
Second Battalion	
Naval Officer	- 1800
Spotter	- 1800
Third Battalion	
Naval Officer	- 0900
Spotter	- 0915

12. Each team did not keep its original frequency assignment throughout the operation but worked several different frequencies with the various ships assigned.

13. Recommendations for future employment of Naval Gunfire:

- a. That the ships assigned for night illumination remain on station for the morning jump-off of the troops, in order that preparation fire may be obtained. During this operation, the relief of ships in the morning often prevented the use of any preparation fire as required by the battalions.
- b. That Regimental Naval Gunfire Teams be equipped with a TCS radio jeep as well as an SCR 694 in order to effectively monitor the required nets.
- c. The Naval Gunfire Spotter Team should have a minimum of eight men, exclusive of officers.

Part 4 - Air Support.

1. The pre-arranged air strikes from H-60 through D-Day seemed to cause considerable damage to enemy installations. All towns in the Regimental zones of action were almost completely destroyed by previous air action. Several bridges had been bombed out, which delayed the regiment's advance.

2. Throughout the operation there was very good coordination between artillery and Naval Gun Fire Liaison teams. The Battalions found it harder for all three liaison officers to stay in close contact, because in many instances it was imperative for the Air Liaison officer to be at an Observation Post. Radio communication was very good in the regiment, and in a few instances, Naval Gun Fire and Air Liaison worked their radio sets together. Communications with support air control was at

all times good. At no time were AGL parties out of contact with support air control for more than a few minutes at a time. At no time were the AGL parties in direct contact with the planes.

3. White smoke was used on targets whenever possible. There was a sufficient number of planes available with the exception of one or two days and during the times of Condition Red. In some instances as much as 30 to 45 minutes was expended in locating a target. A large part of the delay was due to the rough terrain encountered, and it was hard for the pilots to pick out a target on the maps. At times the pilots would mistake miscellaneous smoke for a target mark, thus lengthening the time of attack, while more dummy runs were made.

4. It is believed that all strikes close to front lines could be expedited and better results obtained if the ALP was in direct radio contact with the SAD net. Pilots would have a far greater chance to distinguish the target mark from other smoke if they were given mark at the exact time the white smoke was layed. One dummy run would then be sufficient to find the target, and the chance of voice mistakes would be less likely to occur through only one transmission. SAC could still monitor the net and advise where necessary.

5. It is believed that a gridded photo mosaic map would further the target clarification for the pilots, and shorten the time of determining a target.

6. Battalion Commanders of the 4th Marines at the present time are very dubious of air strikes close to our lines unless Air Liaison Teams are in direct radio communication with the flight leader.

Part 5 - Artillery Support.

1. Artillery support showed the results of thorough training and careful planning.

2. The Artillery battalion in direct support of the 4th Marines on L Day, 1/15, was in position and ready to fire supporting missions by H plus five hours. Although resistance was such that Artillery support was not required at that time, the mere fact that it was ready and available at such an early time enabled this Regiment to continue the advance more rapidly than would have been advisable without close artillery support.

3. The Artillery Liaison parties and Forward Observers were found to be thoroughly trained, reliable and cooperative to an outstanding degree.

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4. All supporting fires furnished this Regiment were accurate, effective and timely on every occasion.

5. It is recommended that two forward observers and a liaison party be made SOP for employment with an infantry battalion being supported. This recommended change is a result of the fact proven during this operation that one forward observer cannot handle fire support missions on rough terrain for more than one company of infantry at a time.

Part 6 - Tanks.

1. In the initial landing, 6/6th Tank Battalion was in support of the 4th Marines. The tanks of this company were equipped with T-6 flotation devices and demonstrated their effectiveness for landing on a reef fringed beach when so equipped.

2. There was little opportunity for the employment of tanks during engagements with the enemy due to the highly undulated and wooded terrain. However, in a few instances when they could and were employed, they proved to be a highly effective supporting weapon.

3. It is believed that tank parks and night assembly areas were maintained too far in rear of the front line units and had they been required by any of the assault elements during the early daylight hours it would have been impossible for them to reach an objective in a reasonable length of time.

4. It is recommended that in future operations a tank company supporting a regiment for more than one day bivouac in the vicinity of the regimental CP and have supplies brought up to it daily. This would make them immediately available in any emergency, and would also expedite their early arrival in the morning for the days' operation.

Part 7 - Amphibian Tractors.

1. The Amphibian Tractors, all LVT(4)s, had been preloaded with initial landing supplies and equipment and were loaded aboard the LSTs in such a manner that they could be launched in the order of their landing. For our purpose the LVT(3) would have been a better tractor. More men could be loaded in the LVT(3), and also both a 37mm AT gun and a jeep prime mover could be placed in the LVT(3) whereas this was impossible in the LVT(4).

2. The troops were loaded in the LVTs which were launched as planned. In some instances it was found that early loading of troops had needlessly exposed them to the fumes of the motors with resulting discomfort and sickness. The tractors were

launched from the LSTs by waves and in order of their place from left to right in each wave. They were led in column to the right side of the LD, executed a column left and then a ships right to cross the LD in proper formation. This worked successfully. The landing proceeded without incident although it was found as in previous operations that the drivers were poorly briefed and reacted slowly to orders.

3. Once ashore, the tractors were invaluable as cargo and troop transport in the initial phase. Later they were used to advantage in supply over rough terrain and by water in our advance along the coast. In this phase, improper traffic control of tractors resulted in considerable difficulty. Tractors were allowed to use roads which should have been used by wheeled vehicles only. The width and limited maneuverability of the tractors caused innumerable traffic jams while their tracks badly cut up some roads, particularly the main roads.

Part 8 - Armored Amphibians.

1. The Armored Amphibians, mounting 75mm howitzers, were landed one minute ahead of the first troop wave and would have been invaluable had there been resistance on the beach. The handling of the LVT(A)s in the landing indicated good training and a thorough knowledge of the mission to be executed.

2. Within an hour after landing, the LVT(A)s had two batteries set up for artillery fire and the remainder available for direct support missions. Later in the operation they were used to advantage when tanks were not immediately available and materially aided our advance beyond the MONTAN AIRFIELD. On the MOTOBU PENINSULA the LVT(A)s were sent by water to positions not accessible to artillery and performed efficiently in supporting the infantry by artillery fire.

Part 9 - Infantry Combat.

1. The infantrymen of this regiment demonstrated thorough individual and unit training. Their reduction of the enemy strongpoints and organized resistance encountered showed not only a high state of training, but also individual initiative and an aggressive, fighting spirit.

2. The squad organization of three fire teams and a squad leader again proved its flexibility and its superiority over the old organization. It enabled the squad leader to keep good control of his squad at all times, and the leadership and judgment of many fire team leaders in many cases were outstanding factors in the success of the regiment as a whole. The fact that fire

teams and squads live together in camp is probably a big reason for their teamwork.

3. Experience garnered on Guam in the use of and coordination of supporting arms showed itself in the use of all of them in this operation.

4. Weaknesses were displayed in the use of the compass; not that the troops did not know how to use them, but simply forgot to or were not instructed to use them. In rugged country, they are invaluable for keeping oriented with the direction of attack and for location of present positions.

5. Use of cover and concealment and camouflage were two other weaknesses quite universal in the regiment. This was evident from a Japanese map captured in the Motobu fight, which showed the regimental front lines and a battalion CP plotted very accurately.

Part 10 - Communications.

1. The signal plan in general was entirely adequate. It is suggested that alternate frequencies be assigned or, if that is impossible, that regiments be assigned a block or spare frequencies to use as needed.

The plan was distributed in ample time for thorough study and familiarization by all units concerned.

2. a. An increase in the present TO allowance of communication personnel is recommended. It is recommended that the allowance for an infantry regiment be increased by twenty (20) field linemen (SSN 641) and by fifteen (15) radio operators, general (SSN 776), these to be distributed within the regiment as follows: four (4) wiremen and three (3) radiomen to each battalion, two (2) wiremen and two (2) radiomen to the Regtl Wpns Co and six (6) wiremen and four (4) radiomen to H&S Co.

b. Untrained personnel were assigned to communication duty in this regiment before the operation to bring various communication platoons up to operational strength. Insufficient time was available to properly train these replacements. As battle casualties developed no communication personnel were available as replacements and more untrained personnel had to be assigned to communication duty.

3. a. In general, the present Table of Allowances for signal equipment is adequate. It is recommended that an additional SCR 610, making a total of eleven (11) for an Inf Regt, be included in the allowance. This will allow the regimental command

post be echelon two (2) SCR 610 nets when the command post moves. It is further recommended that the present wire, both W-110 and W-130, allowance be increased by approximately 100%.

b. It is recommended that the TCS radio in the M-7 be replaced with the SCR-528. It has been found that the TCS will not perform satisfactorily under the extreme conditions imposed upon it when installed in a track vehicle. If this change is made, the three (3) TCS radio jeeps presently rated should be replaced with SCR-508 radio jeeps. The installation of 500-series radio equipment will allow easy liaison with tanks and artillery. One (1) TCS radio jeep should be allowed in the Regimental Weapons Company for communications with other echelons. It is recommended that the presently rated SCR-508 jeep be replaced by two (2) SCR-610 radios. It is recommended that the allowance of SCR-536 radios for the Regimental Weapons Company be increased from nine (9) to fifteen (15).

c. Considerable difficulty was encountered in getting replacement transmitter and receiver units for the radio hand set, TS-15-A. Failures in these hand sets reached critical proportions after about two (2) weeks of field operation.

d. It is recommended that back carrying straps be adapted for the units of the SCR-610. The present shoulder strap has been found to be impractical for hand carrying over long distances.

e. The rubberized waterproof bags have been found to be very useful, the roll flap top being more practical than the clip fastener type. The most useful sizes are the BG-159-A and the BG-160-B. The latter has been found to be excellent for the protection and transportation of the SCR-300. It is recommended that one (1) BG-160-B be allowed for each SCR-300 with about 30% over issue. It has been found that the BG-169-L is too small to be practical and it is recommended that it be dropped from the Table of Allowance.

f. It is recommended that waxed, waterproof paper with sealing tape be made available for signal equipment. Small items, such as headsets, earphones and microphones could be wrapped for protection prior to being packed for shipment.

4. a. The supply of signal equipment and expendables to the using organizations worked very well. A signal supply man was kept at the regimental dump and requests for signal supplies were made through the normal channels by the regimental communication officer. He, in turn, when possible delivered to the lower echelons the required supplies.

b. It is recommended that the transportation allowance be increased to allow one (1) $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer and one (1) 1-ton 4X4 truck for the H&S Co communication platoon.

c. It is recommended that additional spare brushes and drive belts be supplied for the power take-off generator in radio vehicles. The present supply has been found to be inadequate.

5. All normal agencies of communication were used. Rapid movement made wire communication difficult which resulted in the overloading of radio channels. Considerable interference between friendly radio nets was encountered due to the proximity of the assigned frequencies. Almost no enemy jamming or interference was encountered, and that which was, was ineffective.

6. a. The cryptographic aids most used were shackle code and the Combined Assault Code CCBP-0130-D3.

b. It is suggested that more effort be placed on the training of officers and command post personnel in general in security measures.

Part 11 - Engineers.

1. Due to the rapid advance, narrow and impassable stretches of roads, lack of roads leading to areas in which operations against the enemy were being conducted, the Engineers were called upon more than any other supporting unit during the operation.

2. Taking into consideration limitations on road and bridge building equipment, and demands of higher and adjacent echelons as well as the demands of this Regiment alone for Engineer support, it can readily be said that the Engineers did an outstanding job in their support of this Regiment.

3. In view of the experience gained in this operation of the continuous demand for Engineers, it is highly recommended that one platoon of Engineers be continuously attached for an entire operation to each infantry regiment, and further that they be equipped with not less than one bulldozer per platoon.

4. Engineers for mine clearing and demolitions missions were seldom available. Since increasing need for Engineers for such missions is foreseen for future operations, it is recommended that a fourth company be organized in the Engineer Battalion whose sole duties would be demolitions, mine detecting and clearing, and mine laying. One platoon of that company should be attached to each Regiment for an operation as well as the regular engineer platoon previously mentioned attached.

Part 12 - Medical.

1. The Medical Personnel of RCT 4 were embarked in a generally distributed manner throughout different ships carrying other personnel of this Regiment. This distribution of Medical Personnel insured their being one Doctor and several corpsmen on each of the various ships. The forward collecting section personnel from Co A, 6th Medical Battalion accompanied the Regimental H & S detachment of corpsmen. Material was likewise divided among the various ships so that loss of shipping would not cripple Medical Supplies.

2. Illness aboard ship was at a minimum throughout the entire trip. Sick call was held twice daily; no contagious disease outbreak occurred on any ship. Sanitary conditions aboard ship were satisfactory, heads were adequate and clean, living quarters were airy and as spacious as could be expected considering the number of troops billeted. The food, its preparation, quality and dispensing was favorably commented on by practically all troops. Inasmuch as this Regiment is heavily seeded with malaria, it is anticipated that in the early phases of the invasion troops would become negligent in taking atabrine; therefore, as a prevention of malaria attacks, the atabrine blood level was boosted by the process of all hands taking two tablets per day for a ten day period prior to debarkation.

3. Personnel debarked with the units with which they serve, company corpsmen with their company and H & S corpsmen of Battalions and Regiment with their groups. Corpsmen were dispersed in landing craft as far as possible so that one or two corpsmen would be present in each boat. Initially, a minimum of battle dressings, plasma, stretchers and corpsmen units were taken ashore by the corpsmen, subsequently, all medical supplies were landed as rapidly as possible, most of it getting ashore within three days. No personnel were lost during the landing; one jeep ambulance was dropped overboard during unloading.

4. Progress of the troops was so rapid and casualties so light during the first day that no aid stations were set up until late afternoon as the Battalions and Regimental C.P.'s set up for the night. These aid stations always stayed set up until the Battalion and Regimental C.P.'s moved. Security about the aid station was provided by the C.P. in which the station was located. From aid stations casualties were transported to the nearest Medical Company.

5. Evacuation was by litter from the scene of casualty to the nearest aid station and thence either to the Regimental collecting section as an intermediary point or directly to the nearest Medical Company by jeep ambulance. When casualties were light

the Battalion corpsmen were able to manage evacuation to their aid station easily. From that point transportation was provided usually by jeep ambulance from Regiment. In the event of heavy casualties, extra corpsmen and bandsmen litter bearers and transportation were forwarded from the Regimental Aid Station to aid with the extra load. This pool of corpsmen and bandsmen at the Regimental Collecting Station were invaluable when heavy casualties occurred. Average time from the occurrence of a casualty to his admission to a Medical Company was usually less than two hours. In some very difficult circumstances over mountainous terrain involving long litter carries, the time for evacuation was increased, the maximum time being six hours.

Casualties treated:	450
Retained:	28
Evacuated:	305
Died:	117

6. Movement was so rapid that disposal of garbage and excretia was done by burying in small holes. Food consisted of K, C and 10 in 1 rations and any food opened was eaten immediately and not kept over between meals. Native food was prohibited. Water was provided by five gallon cans or water trailers, these being filled at approved water points where chlorination was done. Rarely was it necessary to resort to halazone purification.

7. Disposal of the dead was done by the Graves Registration Unit. In some cases it was necessary to bury bodies in shallow graves until they could be removed. Mostly bodies were moved directly.

8. No epidemics or unusual diseases occurred in the troops.

9. Dental service was purely of an emergency nature and provided by the Regimental Dentist who had practically no equipment with him as he had been instructed by Division that Medical Companies would attend to Dental Service. With this Regiment on L / 30, Dental Service had not been provided by the Medical Company serving us because they had lost some of their equipment. The Regimental Dentist acted as a Medical Officer aiding in evacuation and first aid as needed.

10. In this Regiment the Medical Personnel was considered adequate and their distribution throughout the Regiment was efficient. Four corpsmen were killed in action, one M.I.A. and 11 W.I.A. No casualties occurred among Medical Officers. On notification of losses of corpsmen to Division, replacements were prompt.

11. The field medical equipment was generally sufficient in amount and type. Shortages kept occurring in litters and blankets as the Medical Companies could not replenish as rapidly as these items were used at the front. In this Regiment it is considered that the smaller size plasma unit is most practical as the large size seems to run slower and entails a greater loss of plasma. It is suggested that some type of holder for the plasma bottle be installed in the jeep ambulances to aid in administering plasma while in transit. Medical Supplies in amount and types as recommended by Division have been adequate and practical. Resupply has been satisfactory.

12. Evacuation was done by the five Regimental jeep ambulances plus the three jeep ambulances sent forward from the Medical Company. When large numbers of casualties occurred and jeeps were insufficient, the Medical Company provided a field ambulance and a reconnaissance truck. On one occasion when some 75 casualties occurred at once, additional transportation was provided by trucks from the Regimental Weapons Company. The one jeep ambulance that was lost overboard was replaced in about one week from Division. Servicing and repair or rolling stock has been adequate by the Motor Transport Company.

13. Resupply of additional equipment from the Q.M. has been generally satisfactory. One notable lack has been noted in that on L / 28, DDT in oil first became available.

14. Control of flies and mosquitoes has been poor due to lack of insecticides. Malarial incidents have been very low due to use of atabrine and the cold nights have kept the mosquitoes at a minimum.

15. Hospitalization and Medical Resupplies have been excellent. The ability of Division to rapidly move a Medical Company to the proximity of battle activity has been very outstanding and has been an immeasurable help in the rapid, adequate care of casualties. After the assault phase, units have stayed for several days in one location. During this time, prefabricated heads were employed and some units were able to establish galleys providing a general mess line. Water supply continued to be chlorinated at water points. There has been a minimum of illness and no epidemics among the troops of this Regiment.

Part 13 - Supply and Logistics.

1. Supply problems the first day of the operation were at a minimum. The only hold up on the unloading of supplies was caused by the necessary transshipment at the reef's edge from cargo boats to LVTs. Forward dumps were established by all battalions in the Vontan Area the first day and there was no critical

lack of supplies. DUKWs and LVTs were used during this period for supply.

2. As the regiment advanced into the hills beyond Yontan supply became exceedingly difficult. Existing roads were narrow and only Weasels and $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks could be used for supply of the battalions. Water supply was critical and emergency runs were made over exceedingly difficult terrain.

3. The rapid movement forward from our initial landing beaches brought about problems connected with the gathering together and safe keeping of organizational gear and sea bags. This work was efficiently carried out by the Regt Q.M. with a resulting small loss of gear.

4. The two days spent at Ishikawa allowed the Regt QM to establish a dump in that area and consolidate a main organizational dump on the east end of Yontan.

5. The rapid movement of the regiment from Ishikawa to Ora in two days was a strain on the supply line but by making the maximum use of all vehicles on hand all troops were adequately supplied.

6. The stay at ORA from 7 April to 14 April was used to resupply necessary individual equipment and allow the troops a rest. Rations and water supply were adequate at all times. The first 10-in-1 rations were received during this period and were a welcome change from the old C ration and K that were in use during the preceding period.

7. The movement from ORA to MOTOBU Peninsula again marked the lack of transportation in the regiment but the move was accomplished in as efficient a manner as possible. The Regt dump was moved to Yotobu from its location on the east coast. This dump was used for supply of the regiment during the whole Peninsula operation.

8. The operation on the peninsula was characterized by the rough and impassible terrain. The supply route to SAKIMOTOBU was in good condition but further supply to the battalions in the hills was met only by emergency methods. Jeeps and trailers could advance only a short distance initially and further forward supply was by hand carry. This was a strain on the front line troops and shore party personnel were called upon to aid in the supply. The Eng platoon attached at this time worked incessantly and their efficient work pushed the supply route forward the maximum distance.

9. After the breaking of the resistance on Motobu, supply and logistics were normal. The move to the north coast of Motobu and the later move to Genka were accomplished efficiently with few attendant difficulties.

10. During the whole operation, the work of the supporting engineer platoon was marked by efficient and outstanding work. Rapid repair of roads and movement of water points to the forward areas was a decided contribution to the success of the overall operation.

11. Efficient unit distribution by the Division was also a factor contributing greatly to the successful supply part of the operation.

Chapter VIII Enemy Tactics, Organization and Equipment.

In the initial landings, no opposition was encountered. YONTAN AIRFIELD was deserted, and the first opposition encountered came on L/1 from the 2nd Co, 12th Ind Inf Bn which was part of the 62nd Div. The unit was entrenched in a steep valley east of the airfield. This was one of several instances in which the enemy chose to defend positions in deep draws rather than the high ground. Enemy equipment consisted principally of LMGs and rifles. The defense was tenacious and skillful.

The enemy's failure to defend the airfield seems attributable to the fact that the sector was under the command of the 6th AIR ARMY, rather than under island command. Stragglers from the 56th and 44th Airport Bns were captured, and documents revealed that several AAA Bns had at one time been defending the airfield. The enemy's plan of destroying the field was not carried out because the units charged with that responsibility were dissipated by our air attacks. During the pursuit of the enemy north through ISHIGAWA ISTHMUS, only small pockets of resistance were encountered. The troops were disorganized and their resistance ineffectual.

The enemy's defense of MOTOBU PENINSULA was predicated on the assumption that our attacks would come from the TOGUCHI area. Coastal defenses consisted of two 6" Naval rifles, and two 15cm Army guns emplaced in caves. The gun positions were not completed, and it is doubtful whether the guns could have been used effectively. Supporting weapons consisted of at least a battery of 75mm mt guns, a platoon of 37mm AT guns and at least a platoon of 81mm mortars. The HIRAYAMA Unit and the 9th Naval Bun Unit were dug in around MABUYAMA. At least two concrete pillboxes were noted, but for the most part,

caves and holes were employed. Further west on the peninsula, a series of trenches were dug, but their tactical uselessness was evidence that they were for training purposes only. This was confirmed by POW interrogations.

The regiment attacked east from SAKIMOTOBU, then swung north to over run enemy positions in the YAE-TAKE area. The 2nd and 6th companies of the 2nd Inf Bn, 44th IMB were cleaned out of this area. Most of their positions being taken from their left flank. Maps of enemy squad positions showed good tactical employment of the personnel available, but most of the squads were below T/O strength--some having as few as 6 men. The defense was built around 1 LMG and 1 GD per squad. In most cases a squad was forced to cover nearly a platoon front. The enemy fought a skillful delaying action--holding their fire for officers and NCOs, and withdrawing to new concealed positions.

MOTOBU PENINSULA was defended by the IJDO force. This was a heterogeneous unit with a skeleton of regular Japanese army troops and officers, and various OKINAWAN groups filling in the ranks. Their intimate knowledge of the terrain and their fanatical attitude were exploited to the fullest extent. A 70mm barrage mortar may have been employed, and knee mortars and LMGs were used effectively.

Captured enemy maps indicated a desire to defend the high ground throughout the MOTOBU fighting. However, much of the actual fighting took place in steep valleys where the enemy apparently retreated. Small detachments, perhaps outpost units, were often encountered in the heavy wooded areas at the bottom of the draws. The fact that enemy bivouac and supply areas were generally in valleys, probably forced them to defend these areas as they did. Only one real counterattack was mounted by the enemy. This was in the YAE TAKE sector, after the enemy had first conducted a tenacious delaying action.

Outstanding was the enemy's employment of OPs. Every advantage was taken of favorable terrain, and the isolated artillery fire was singularly effective.

Chapter IX: Estimated Results of Operations

1. Area secured: This regiment secured an approximate total of 115 square miles of enemy territory in northern Okinawa up to May 1st. This area includes all ground in the 4th Marines zone of action from the beach across to the Okinawan east coast, then up the east half of the narrow island as far as Arakawa, and area secured on Motobu Peninsula.

2. Enemy casualties:

- a. Killed: 1,077
- b. Captured: 29, including 18 labor troops.

3. Operational material damage to enemy: 1 fighter plane (Zeke), 2 15cm field pieces, 2 6" naval guns, 3 75mm mountain guns, 5 81mm mortars, 18 knee mortars, 13 heavy 7.7mm machine guns, 58 light machine guns, 3 field radar sets, 1 37mm gun, 219 plus rifles, 22 vehicles, 2 heavy full-tracked prime movers, 5 supply dumps and 1 CP (UDO Force) area containing all types of miscellaneous supplies and personal gear.

4. Own losses:

- a. Killed in action: 91
- b. Wounded in action: 365
- c. Missing in action: 4
- d. Total casualties: 460

Chapter X: Comments and RecommendationsS-1

1. Morale has been excellent throughout the operation. It is felt that the following factors are responsible: Improved field rations, augmented by fresh buns, good mail service, and the prompt arrival of most sea bags containing blankets, woolen shirts, extra shoes and other clothing.

2. The card system of reporting casualties has proven to be excellent.

3. The forward and rear administrative groups have expeditiously and efficiently processed casualty reports and have shown decided improvement in this phase of administrative procedure.

S-2

1. It is recommended that the 1:10000 tactical map of the initial beachhead area be furnished in future amphibious operations.

2. The reconnaissance and liaison observers from this regiment who accompanied the Underwater Demolitions Teams secured valuable and timely information of the beaches, and it is recommended that such observers be used in future operations.

3. It is recommended that one (1) 4x4 1-ton truck be furnished the S-2 section in future operations for expeditious transportation of POWs, civilian internees and captured materiel to Division.

4. At least six MPs should be attached to the S-2 section and be retained throughout the operation or as long as needed. Providing MPs on call was not satisfactory.

5. Concentration points for civilians should be more numerous and should be established closer to the front lines. It is suggested that in the early phases of an operation where large numbers of enemy civilians are encountered that a number of small collection points be established by civil affairs rather than a few large ones. In the present operation, a civilian stockade had to be maintained by this regiment and by battalions almost every night.

6. At least one Military Government Team should be attached to each regiment to aid in handling civilians and to act as liaison between the regiment and military government. Many intelligence personnel were taken from their primary duties a large part of the time in handling civilians.

7. It is strongly recommended that in future operations, at least four Nisei or enlisted language men be attached to each battalion in order to satisfactorily handle civilians, sort captured documents and accompany patrols.

8. The present password system is not satisfactory. The passwords are too difficult to remember and they change too often. It is recommended that the password change not oftener than every five days.

9. It is suggested that in future operations leaflets dropped in front of our lines telling civilians not to move at night would prevent civilian casualties. The leaflets should also tell civilians not to wear clothes which resemble Jap Army uniforms. This is particularly necessary since school boys and laborers are accustomed to wearing leggings, khaki caps and other military apparel. It is felt that in most cases the pride inherent in the average Jap soldier would probably keep them from disguising in civilian clothes in great number. However, the policy of interning all male civilians of military age will take care of any that do.

10. Vertical photo coverage of practical scale was obtained prior to the operation, and sufficient prints were received to distribute to battalions and in some cases to companies.

Oblique photo coverage was not sufficient, particularly the coverage of beaches. Good low obliques and surface submarine photos of the beaches are a necessity in preliminary planning.

S-3

1. One fully-equipped platoon of engineers should be attached to each infantry regiment for an entire operation. Their services are constantly required, particularly to expedite supply routes. One engineer demolitions team should also be attached to each regiment to be used in locating and clearing mines and for big demolitions jobs. When they are needed, they are needed immediately, and consequently should be attached to the regiment.
2. It is recommended that the division Target Information Center notify regiments of targets in their zones of action and let them call in the necessary fires. If the Target Information Center does call in fires, it should not be within 2000 yards of the front lines.
3. Too many echelons through which requests for naval gunfire or air strikes had to pass usually caused an undue delay in receiving the necessary fire or a negative on the request. Air ground liaison parties should be in radio communication with the pilots for maximum control and coordination.
4. Artillery, naval gunfire and air-ground liaison parties should be attached to the regiment one month before embarkation for maximum liaison and acquaintance with the regiment and its plans.
5. It is recommended that the grenade unit of fire be changed to one (1) white phosphorous grenade and one and one-half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) fragmentation grenades. This regiment has found that WP grenades are more effective for clearing out caves, covered emplacements, etc. than fragmentation grenades, and has consequently used a great number of them, due to the increasing Jap tendency toward static defenses in caves and dugouts. 81mm mortar illuminating shells are needed.
6. All weapons were very satisfactory, again proving their vast superiority over the Japanese counterparts. No changes are recommended, except that it is felt that all officers should be armed with a pistol or a carbine or both, as they desire.
7. In the landing, the wave guides were not well instructed as to procedure at control boat, landmarks marking beaches, and time of wave landing. Wave guide officers should be provided with low-oblique photos of the beach and be made to memorize every physical feature of them. There is too much dependence

on the compass alone to get them to the right beach. There was absolutely no excuse for missing Beach RED 1 because that beach was very clearly defined by easily recognizable terrain features. Landing the 3rd Battalion on GREEN 2 and out of its zone of action could have been disastrous if the landing had been opposed.

8. It is felt that 0800 is the earliest practicable time to attack. This allows the troops time to get their breakfast and for them to be issued rations, ammunition and water for the day's operation.

9. It is recommended that an infantry battalion being supported be furnished two forward observer parties and one battalion liaison party. The two FO parties furnished by some battalions of the 15th Marines are insufficient. That was demonstrated on several occasions on this operation.

10. Division operations orders were received too late in most instances. It is strongly requested that every effort be made to have the Division operation orders in the regiments' hands by 1500 so that battalion commanders can receive their regimental order and make any necessary reconnaissance and plans before dark. This is particularly necessary with a 0715 or 0730 jump-off time.

11. Division phase lines and boundaries indicate that Division is not familiar with the terrain. It is suggested that the staff conduct more reconnaissance or ask regiments for suggestions on phase lines and boundaries.

12. Four LSTs should be assigned each assault battalion if the troops are to be aboard for longer than a week. Five hundred troops on one LST, as was the case in this operation, is too many for adequate living conditions.

13. Troops were compelled to board their tractors while in the LSTs as much as 30 minutes before debarkation commenced, and the fumes from the running motors in the enclosed tank deck made many men ill, cutting down the combat efficiency of the battalion, regiment and division.

14. Each infantry regiment should have some pioneer tools. Their uses are limitless and need for them is almost constant.

15. It is recommended that the regimental commander should have a Command Car, since that vehicle has room for a radio, a map board, and extra passengers, and is not as likely to get stuck as a jeep.

16. It is suggested and recommended that an operations trailer be designed and constructed. This trailer could have complete and compact equipment needed for efficient S-3 functioning. It would also serve in place of a blackout tent at night.

S-4

1. The "Weasel" cargo carriers proved invaluable in traversing terrain impassable to 6X6 cargo trucks and were also the only prime movers available to move water trailers in this terrain. Each infantry regiment should have a total of 21 Weasels as organizational transportation, to be distributed 6 to each battalion and 3 in regimental headquarters for replacements and emergency use. Their primary use would be to supply the front line companies, although their versatility makes them valuable for many other uses. Their weakness is lack of durability. It is strongly recommended that in future operations adequate spare parts for them be furnished. Maintenance will also be expedited by mechanics thoroughly familiar with them. The Weasels were received just before embarkation on the operation, and mechanics could not be adequately trained.

3. Infantry battalions should have in their organic transportation two 6X6 cargo trucks, both in combat and in garrison. Until this is done, one motor transport platoon should be attached to the regiment during an operation.

4. The following recommendations are made as far as individual clothing and equipment are concerned:

a. The new lightweight ponchos should be adopted. They are much lighter than the present issue poncho and are more water-repellent.

b. If the new poncho is not adopted, it is recommended that the Navy-style water-resistant jackets with attached hoods be adopted. They are not only water proof but are wind-resistant, which is particularly comforting around the neck of the wearer.

c. When operations are in climate similar to the present Okinawan climate or colder, two blankets should be available for each man, one to be carried on his person and the other by regimental or division quartermaster.

d. The Army-style combat boot should replace the combination of field shoes and canvas leggings now issued. A two-buckle gator sewed on to the present field shoe would be comfortable, would keep the trouser legs securely tucked in, could

fit any leg since they would be lower than the standard legging, and, probably the biggest factor, the troops would not lose them or throw them away.

Alan Shapley
ALAN SHAPLEY
Colonel, USMC
Commanding

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

FIRST BATTALION

FOURTH MARINES

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

PHASE I

OKINAWA

CHAPTER I

THE PURPOSE OF THE REPORT AND MISSION OF THE BATTALION

The purpose of this report is to relate the part played by the First Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment, Sixth Marine Division in the capture of YONTAN Airdrome and the seizure of the Central and Northern portions of the island of OKINAWA. It will include a resume of the preparation of plans for the mission and cover the training period which began on 1 October, 1944. The logistical preparations, the loading and embarkation phases, and the assault landing on 1 April, 1945 will be discussed. It will include a narrative on enemy tactics observed and results of this Battalion's operations until the completion of Phase I on 20 April when the organized resistance in the Northern part of OKINAWA was broken.

The initial mission of the Battalion was to make an assault landing on beaches RED 2 and 3, seize the area in the assigned zone of action which included a large portion of YONTAN airfield, and be prepared to attack on order to seize L plus 3, L plus 5, L plus 15, and other assigned objectives.

CHAPTER II

THE TASK ORGANIZATION

1. BLT 1/4 commanded by Major Bernard W. Green, and Lt. Colonel Fred D. Beans was composed of the following units:

Co A	Capt Clinton B. Eastment
Co B	1stLt Thad N. Dodds.
	2ndLt Charles E. James
Co C	1stLt James G. Washburn
	1stLt William H. Carlson
81mm Mort Plat	1stLt Robert D. Cullison
1st Plat 37mm Regt'l Wpns Company	1stLt James Peck
1st and 2d Sec 1st Plat 105mm SP How Regt'l Wpns Company	1stLt John McLaughry
1st Plat Co A, 6th EngBn	2ndLt Walter Persac
<u>Landing Team Shore Party</u>	1stLt Francis X. Cooney
1stPlat Co A, 6th Pion Bn.	
1st Plat Co A, 6th MT Bn	
Det 26th, 33d Repl Draft	
Det Coll Sec Co A, 6th Med Bn	
Det 1st Plat, 6th MP Co	
Det 1st Plat 6th S&S Co (less PX Sec)	
Shore Party Comm Team 6th JASCO	
Det Co Hqts Co Hqts Co A 6th Pion Bn	

<u>Ships Platoon</u>	NCB	Carp Martin D. Keefe
Det 11th Special	NCB	
Det 58th	NCB	

<u>Battalion Troops</u>	Major Robert V. Allen
Hq Co (less 81mm Mort Plat)	
NGF Party 6th JASCO	
AGL Party 6th JASCO	
FOs and LM Party 1st Battalion, 15th Marines	
Det 1st Band Sec	

CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

S-1 All personnel were indoctrinated with all daily and periodic casualty reports. Personnel cards were prepared containing each man's next of kin, religion, etc. The transport casualty NCO was indoctrinated as to the proper handling of the casualties evacuated to his transport.

S-2 The NCO of the Intelligence Section attended the Sixth Division Intelligence School after which the remaining men of the section were trained daily in the subjects covered at the school. All personnel of the Battalion were indoctrinated with the treatment of civilians and taking of POW's and also the Japanese material of Intelligence value. Unenlisted personnel of this Battalion were given any information of the coming operation until after embarkation.

S-3 After obtaining the Battalion's Commander's estimate of the situation and decision the Operations Officer made orders for both a preferred and an alternate plan of landing. Two plans were thoroughly discussed before all officers. Each officer including those in attached units received a copy of the Battalion Operation Plan complete with annexes. For security reasons the plans were not disseminated to the rest of the command until the Battalion embarked aboard ship (See Chapter VI). At first planning was hampered by inadequate maps, lack of photographs, and rubber or plastic relief maps until two days before sailing. However it is felt that by the time of landing all hands had through knowledge of the Battalion Operation Plan. All artillery, naval gunfire, air ground liaison officers attended all conferences and participated in Battalion problems and CPX's in order to acquaint them with its method of functioning and to acquaint the officers with each other.

S-4 In the preparation and planning for this operation the QM section consulted the following members of this organization to arrange as to what equipment should be taken on the operation and the priority on the equipment; all Company Commanders, Battalion Quartermaster, Battalion Armorer, Battalion Mess Officer, Battalion Sureon, Battalion Communications Officer, Recommendations on equipment and priority on the equipment were submitted to the Commanding Officer of the Battalion. Further recommendations were submitted concerning the repair and replacement of all equipment.

CHAPTER IV

This Battalion's training program started 1 October, 1944 and ended on 15 March, 1945. The program was divided into three training phases and consisted of 40 training hours per week. The Communication, Intelligence and Medical sections training were under supervision of their respective officers and training hours were the same as for the line companies.

During the initial phase of training subjects such as instruction in individual and company weapons, map reading and use of compass, rifle marksmanship, scouting and patrolling, mechanical training and technique of fire of the machine gun and mortars were covered.

As the training period progressed troops were trained in fire team and squad tactics.

Combat ranges were set up to simulate battle conditions and most of these problems were firing problems. The same plan was followed with our platoon and company problems with each problem on combat ranges designated to train the troops in a specific mission. An example of this was the pillbox range where an attack on a fortified position could be made.

Our machine gun and mortar platoons had field firing at least once per week and during platoon and company problems machine gun sections were attached and trained with rifle platoons. These sections remained with platoons during the operation on OKINAWA. The same procedure was followed with our bazooka teams. Flame thrower and demolition teams were also thoroughly trained.

Several Battalion problems were held, some as a reinforced Battalion with tanks and /or Regimental Weapons Company attached. Our Battalion Staff participated in Battalion, Regimental and Division CPX's.

The Division problem held in January was beneficial as conditions were made as nearly identical to those encountered in actual combat.

Prior to embarking for OKINAWA an amphibious training exercise was held. One of our assault companies did not participate because of the lack of shipping.

It is felt that the training program was entirely adequate and that the men were prepared for battle on 1 April.

The following recommendations are suggested for future training periods.

1. Each combat range be set up to accomplish one or more definite missions. A good example of this was the pillbox range on GUADALCANAL for attack against fortified position.
2. The Battalion should train more with attached units especially tanks and Regimental Weapons Company.
3. Two afternoons per week should be set aside for organized athletics under officer supervision. Inter-Divisional contests should be encouraged.
4. It is suggested that during each training phase that the men fire the rifle range once.
5. More time should be allotted to instruction on individual and company weapons. The number of hours set aside for these subjects was inadequate.
6. On Battalion problems, supply section should be present and function as though under actual battle conditions.
7. During the last training period there were a definite shortage of mortar and bazooka ammunition also various types of explosives.
8. All attached units should be assigned to the Battalion at least one month before an operation and participate in Battalion problems.

CHAPTER V

LOADING AND EMBARKATION

S-1 It was the experience of this battalion that the time and place of embarkation was not known until just before embarkation of troops was to take place. At this period all vehicles of the Battalion had been loaded aboard ship and most of the communication system in the camp area had been taken out with the result that it was difficult to contact all units concerned as to the time and place of loading. Some stowaways got aboard the APA MC INTYRE.

S-3 The embarkation was very efficient except for some difficulty in communication. Also because one LST (the 451) was late arriving from LUZON it was necessary for the ships loading officer to do a great amount of work in a short time.

S-4 It is recommended in future operations, during the loading that more care be taken in the handling of vehicles. More precaution should be taken to prevent looting of organizational gear enroute.

CHAPTER VI

MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

On the 12th of March the LST's sailed from GUADALCANAL, B.S.I. This Battalion had three LST's (947, 451, 794) and each rifle company embarked some 125-150 of their men and officers. The number was limited in order to make the trip to ULITHI, C.I. the staging area, as comfortable as possible. The remainder of the Battalion sailed on the APA 129 (U.S.S. MARVIN H. MC INTYRE) and departed GUADALCANAL on 15 March.

The trip to ULITHI was uneventful except for some rather rough weather. Hourly periods were set aside on each of the Battalion's vessels for instruction and training. The S-2 placed a kit containing a quantity of intelligence data aboard each ship. This kit was prepared by the Division Intelligence Section and proved extremely useful. There was sufficient material so that all hands could be thoroughly indoctrinated in the terrain by study of maps and photographs, estimate of the enemy situation, and other information about OKINAWA. Each man knew the Battalion's mission and objectives. Time was also spent in instruction in map reading, small unit tactics, field sanitation, and other subjects. Thirty minutes of each day was set aside for physical drill. Numerous inspections of weapons and individual equipment were held.

ULITHI was reached on 21 March and on the 23d the men embarked aboard the MC INTYRE who were to land in the assault waves of the landing team were transferred to the LST's. There were nearly 420 men on each LST which with the deck load made all ships very much overcrowded. A final conference for all officers was held aboard LST 947 at 1300 25 March. The operation was discussed fully and latest information secured from a Division conference aboard the PANAMINT that morning was disseminated by the Battalion Commander and members of the staff. The LST's sailed that evening. Briefing on the operation continued. On L-1 Corp. Curry of the Battalion 3 section was brought aboard the command LST 947 by breeches buoy. He had accompanied the UDT personnel and gave a complete report on the hydrographic conditions and other information about the Battalion's beaches. This information was sent to the other LST's via an ICI and was a contributing feature to the success of the landing. In the early morning of L day an enemy plane was shot down by the LST convoy as was an OS2U from one of our own supporting vessels. 1 April, L day was bright and clear and the sea was very calm with only a light wind blowing. It was an excellent day for landing.

CHAPTER VII

ASSAULT PHASE

Preceded by a tremendous naval gunfire and air bombardment the two assault companies, A and B landed on Beaches RED 2 and RED 3. The only opposition encountered was a light machine gun on RED 3 which was quickly eliminated. All units were landed on the proper beaches except C Company, the reserve company, which came in on RED 2 instead of RED 3. The Battalion Command Post was established at H plus 10 minutes on RED 2. The O-1 line was reached at 1150 by the assault companies. Contact with the 2nd Battalion, 7th MARINES was made at the beach and contact with the 3rd Battalion, 4th MARINES was made on the O-1 line. 6 tanks from Co. C, 6th Tank Battalion, pontoon equipped, landed as the 6th wave. The pontoons had all been removed by noon and a platoon was sent to each assault company. Permission to advance the attack to seize YONTAN airfield was obtained from the Regimental Commander. The 7th MARINES kept moving to the right and C Company was put into the center of the line in order to allow B Company, the right flank element, to maintain contact with the 7th Regiment. The advance was halted at about 1800 about 300 yards short of the O-2 line. The three companies remained on line with B Company extending into the 1st DIVISION sector. Just after dark a ZUKE plane landed on YONTAN airfield and taxied directly into the Battalion Command Post. The pilot got out of the plane, drew his pistol was riddled by rifle fire and the plane was taken intact. Only a few infiltrating groups of enemy were met during the night. On 2 April the attack was resumed at 0715 to seize the L plus 5 and O-A lines within the Battalion Zone of Action. It was the Battalion Commander's plan to advance A Company on the left, C on the right and to have B Company come back into our sector and become Battalion reserve. Physical contact with the 7th Regiment was broken. A Company, as did L Company on its left began to meet determined enemy resistance at about 0900. The enemy was located east of CHINA in some extremely rugged, wooded ridges and ravines. Tanks and full tracks could not be used as a bridge was out on the only road in the sector. This bridge was not repaired until late afternoon. B and C Companies also began to run into scattered, well armed groups of enemy. B Company drove across cutting C Company off and made contact with A Company. A bitter battle was waged most of the afternoon and 206 Japanese were killed. Our losses, which included the death of Lt. Thad N. Dodds, commanding B Company were fairly heavy as the enemy made good use of automatic weapons from concealed positions which commanded all approaches. C Company was committed on the left to contact the 3rd Battalion and the companies dug in at about 1800. The night was quiet except for occasional small arms fire. On 3 April the attack was resumed to seize the O-A line. With C and

8 Companies on line a rapid advance was made over very rough terrain. Physical contact was again made with the 7th MARINES. Only 8 enemy were seen during the day and all were killed. The O-A line was reached at 1140. The companies were halted at 1700; no enemy were contacted during the night. On 4 April a march to the East China Sea was made and the Battalion bivouaced near the town of ISHIKAWA. The Battalion remained in this area until the 6th when the advance was resumed to the North. The 1st Battalion was in reserve and was not committed. The Battalion marched to KOCHIYA with five trucks aiding the movement by shuttling. On the 7th the advance was resumed to a bivouac area near ORA; no enemy were encountered. On the 8th B Company went out on patrol, took one POW, and found two trucks. The Battalion remained at ORA until the 13th; daily patrols were sent out with negative results. On the 13th the Battalion marched to the West Coast where it was entrucked to AWA. The 2nd Battalion, 15th MARINES had been receiving counter battery fire in this area and had to withdraw. The lines were tied in with the 3rd Battalion, 22nd MARINES.

A B Company security patrol was fired upon early on the morning of the 19th. 8 casualties were suffered before the Japanese were driven back. The 4th REGIMENT began its assault on the enemy force located in the vicinity of MT YAETAKE with the 2nd Battalion, 4th MARINES and the 3rd Battalion, 29th MARINES, in assault and the 1st Battalion, 4th MARINES initially in reserve. The 1st moved up the coastal road and at 1100 G Company was ordered to move inland and seize a ridge above the village of MOMOYAMA. Contact with small groups of the enemy was made at noon. Soon G Company was receiving machine gun and mortar fire. A Company was committed on the left of G Company and the advance was continued. The Battalion was to move along the high ground to the O-N line and protect the Regimental right flank. A and C Company moved out against slight opposition and B Company moved up on the right flank of C Company to protect the right flank. During the afternoon Major Bernard W. Green, the Battalion Commander, was killed by a burst of machine gun fire as he was directing the attack from a forward OP. Lt Col Fred D. Beans, Regimental Executive Officer came up and assumed command of the Battalion. The lines were shifted to the left to attempt to contact G Company which was having a heavy fire fight in the valley to the left. Contact was made with G Company but both A and G withdrew to better ground and dug in for the night.

On 16 April A Company supported by fire from C Company took a ridge directly below MT YAETAKE. B Company was sent to take the high ground on the right and to remain in position until relieved by the 3rd Battalion, 4th MARINES; this relief took place at 1100. A and C Company then launched an attack up MT YAETAKE. It was taken after a very fierce battle. The enemy used grenades, mortars, and machine guns to try to throw back our assault elements but with supporting fire from the 81mm platoons of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, artillery fire, and a frontal assault by A and

C Companies on the right to keep contact with the 3rd Battalion. On 17 April A and C Company took ridges extending forward of their positions. Large numbers of enemy dead were found and a number of machine guns and grenade dischargers were captured. The attack was again launched at 1300 with A on the left and B Company on the right. A large enemy bivouac area was encountered where approximately two companies had been located. However all resistance seemed to have been overcome as only one or two Japanese were found. Some more machine guns, mortars, a 40mm field piece, large quantities of ammunition, food, and clothing were captured or destroyed. The next day the Battalion remained in reserve in a bivouac area near MANNA, and on the 20th moved to an assembly area at the end of MOTOBU PENINSULA. On this date the area was declared secure by the Commanding General SIXTH MARINE DIVISION and phase I of the OKINAWA OPERATION was completed.

(1) Ship-to-shore movement.

The ship-to-shore movement was very smoothly carried out. The wave guides met all tractors as they were launched from the LST's. All waves were on time at the control boat. At the beach the waves landed at the proper time and on the correct beaches except the 4th and 5th waves which landed on Beach RED 2 instead of RED 3. This was the fault of the wave guides.

(3) Naval Gunfire Support

(a) The effectiveness of the Shore Fire Control Personnel.

1. Adequacy of number.

The number of personnel were inadequate to carry ashore in an amphibious operation the necessary communications equipment. The spotter team should have eight men in addition to the officer. The liaison team should have six men plus the officer.

2. State of training.

The training and morale of the teams were of excellent caliber.

(b) The effectiveness of Shore Fire Control Equipment.

1. Communications equipment the SCR-694 and SCR-300
left nothing to be desired in the way of communications.

2. Other Equipment.

Telephones and wire were adequate to the needs.

(c) The effectiveness of gunfire.

1. Preparation against beach defenses.

The preparation against beach defenses were excellent

2. Fires on targets of opportunity.

Very few targets of opportunity became available. Those that did were taken under fire by artillery and mortars. However it was found that the ships took too much time setting up the problem before they were ready to commence fire. Much time was lost in heedless communications. Such as asking for positions of front lines and spotters position. The Shore Fire Control Party can observe front lines and targets of opportunity should be fired immediately.

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3. Counterbattery fire.
No counterbattery fire was needed.

4. Night Harassing and interdiction fires.
Ships should not be used for night harrassing and interdiction fires except for very deep support. A Shore Fire Control Party cannot control this type of fire at night. They should be under control of higher echelons, with all interested parties informed of all plans.

5. Fires Against Coastal targets and caves.
None used.

6. Fires with air spot.
None used but air spot was useful for scouting in front of the lines.

7. Estimated number of call fires.
Five.

(d) The effectiveness of coordination.

Coordination at all times, between adjacent units, artillery, naval gunfire and air support were excellent and coordinated by the Battalion Commander and S-3.

(e) Shore Fire Control Communications.

1. The S.F.C.P. established communications with the firing ship and plane spot ten minutes after landing.

2. The S.F.C.P. did not keep its assigned frequency throughout the operation. It is recommended that an attempt be made that each party keep its frequency as long as is possible.

3. Net discipline was practiced at all times.

4. Losses in men amounted to one slightly wounded. Losses in equipment were nil.

5. Casualty was not replaced.

6. The present naval gunfire plan is adequate, except that more star shell ammunition be available.

(4) Air Support

(a) Adequacy and efficiency of defensive air cover during the assault phase was excellent.

(b) Preliminary heavy strikes against enemy installations appeared to be very effective.

(c) No criticism of air attacks on D-day from H-60 to H-hour.

(e) Communication equipment was very adequate. The nets were good but could be greatly improved by having direct communications between AGI teams and support aircraft.

(f) Air targets were marked by white phosphorus shells from artillery and front lines were marked by panels. Both seemed to be very satisfactory.

(g) Number of aircraft for missions was adequate. The timing of air support missions was very poor, that is, it was never certain when a mission could be expected as there really was no definite average length of time.

(h) The effectiveness of dummy runs to adjust air attack on targets was very good and well worth while.

(i) The AGL team had no direct control of aircraft from the ground.

(j) Close Air-support for a Battalion as used in this operation was ineffective. If the battalion AGL teams could have control of planes while having a strike in their area, the strike would be very effective and thus air would be used more often by battalions in support of their troops. By having control of the planes, needless accidents of hitting our own troops could be avoided and valuable time would be saved in directing planes in on targets.

(6) Tanks

Due to terrain conditions, rapid advances, and general lack of roads in this Battalion's sector, no tanks were employed against the enemy by this organization. The pontoon device was used to land 6 tanks on Beach Red 2 with excellent results. The tanks landed in the 6th wave and could have been readily available had they been needed.

(7) Amphibian tractors

The LVT(4)s were found very satisfactory. No tractors were lost and all made the beach on time. The 1000 lb load of ammunition in each tractor is recommended as SOP for all future operations.

(8) Armored Amphibious Tractors

17 armored amphibious tractors formed the first wave on Beaches Red 2 and 3. They met only negligible opposition and found no targets on the beach. The tractors were used in the Battalion sector for indirect fire.

(9) Infantry Combat.

The present Table of Organization and equipment is adequate to accomplish any normal mission. Certain recommendations have been made in Chapters (V and X). The training for the operation properly trained the man for combat. In the future more NCO school will be held in this Battalion as due to considerable officer casualties it was found that NCO's had to lead platoons for quite some time before replacements could be transferred from the rear areas. No unusual tactics were used by the organization.

(10) Communications.

a. Communication Plan (SOI).

The SOI was found adequate. There were sufficient frequencies. There were sufficient call signs. Liaison in the training phase was accomplished by conference, correspondence and training. The SOI was received in sufficient time. Plan did include preventive measures for prevention of destruction of wire lines. The plan was not successful in initial phases of landing while working with LVTs.

b. Rehearsal

There were no changes made as a result of rehearsals. During rehearsal the cable connection on SCR 610 was found impractical for field use and impossible to correct in the field. Practice landing provided adequate check on all communication agencies.

c. Embarkation and Voyage.

Equipment was loaded according to plan. No major damage was suffered during loading of equipment. Equipment was checked en route. Personnel received the following training aboard ship. Familiarization with communication plan, memorization of call signs and frequencies, briefing on forthcoming operation, and physical exercise. Personnel did not assist ship's communication officer because RET 4 communication officer effected such liaison. Received full cooperation from ship's communication officer. (Communication officers of ISTs). All message center traffic handled by RET 4.

d. Personnel.

T/O inadequate to fulfill communication needs of battalion during operation, however, with 58 men communication platoon found adequate in number. Training of personnel as whole inadequate. Recommend that communication platoon be entirely composed of C.P. personnel with basic communication training in USMC schools and that these men be furnished in sufficient time before operation. No losses of personnel until landing stages of operation completed. Replacements and line troops poor material for communication duties. Two casualties in period following landing stage. C.P. personnel used in extra duties only in emergency local security, stretcher bearing, and ammunition carrying. Battle casualties were replaced by higher echelons. Battalion had TBA during operation.

e. Equipment.

Many incidents of batteries stolen from dumps. One SCR 300 and two RBZs lost during landing stage. Six SCR 536s lost after landing stage. Handset TS-15-A found not of sturdy enough construction to withstand severe field conditions. They were greatest material defect of battalion. Difficulties were found with spring wire in stumps of SCR 300.

e. Equipment (Con't)

Recommend long antenna on SCR 300 be made more flexible for use on the move to contact distant stations. Recommend small test phone be improved for company wire teams. Recommend lighter and more portable field switchboard with at least 12 units. Recommend CE-11 be improved to withstand severe field conditions and made rust proof. 8mm mortar rods found superior to CE-11 for laying wire in field. Rubber bags used for water proffing and with normal care proved adequate. No failures caused by water. Recommend repair equipment for EE-8a be issued and small items of repair equipment appropriate for field repair be issued. Recommend T/A be altered to include three BD-72s in place of three BD-71s. This battalion employed cut-down BD-72 which was found much more satisfactory than standard board. Recommend on SCR 610 some washer device to prevent locking and sticking of screw type antenna mount.

f. Supply.

All equipment landed although often on improper beaches. This did not effect efficient operation. BA-70s and BA-80s and W-130 placed greatest strain on supply. This battalion employed signal supply sergeant in supply dumps and for liaison with higher echelon dumps. Except for first echelon maintenance, all repair done by higher echelons. Only minor repair done by battalion. Equipment spare parts were adequate. Sufficient transportation available through use of cargo jeep and trailer. Recommend trailer be included in communication platoon TBA.

g. Operation.

Most overloaded agency was battalion command net. Extra phones (public) were necessary in battalion C.P. to efficiently and rapidly handle traffic. In light of possible operations on large land masses present normal operation agencies would be adequate. Difficulties in radio operation: Radio operators not used fully due to excessive use of radios by officers and men not properly trained in radio procedure. Recommend voice operation on all regimental nets except when impossible due to distance. Difficulties in wire operation: Lack of cooperation by line troops in caring for wire lines. Defective wire. Destruction of wire lines by vehicles. Excessive distance between battalion C.P. and front line companies. Rapid advance of front line companies.

h. (Does not apply to this unit.)

i. Security.

Following cryptographic aids were used: Shackle numeral cipher, and Combined Assault Code. The CSP 1500 was never used. No enemy attempts at deception or jamming of radio nets were noted. Flash messages were very slow in reaching this battalion. Air warning codes were not published in full in sufficient time for all personnel to become well acquainted with them.

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(12) Medical

The Medical Section embarked with a total strength of forty-one (41) Corpsmen and two (2) Medical Officers. The Medical Officers travelled to the Staging Area and to OKINAWA on LST's. Three (3) LST's carried our troops and since the third LST had an attached Medical Officer all troops had adequate medical care. The Company and Platoon Corpsmen travelled with their respective groups. The Headquarters Corpsmen travelled to the Staging Area aboard the APA 129.

Thirteen (13) Corpsmen transferred to the LST 947 at the Staging Area joining the Battalion Surgeon and the main body of Headquarters Company. Ten (10) Corpsmen joined the Battalion Medical Officer with A Co. aboard the LST 794. One (1) Corpsman became ill aboard ship but rejoined on L day.

Units #1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 were carried by both Medical Sections. In addition to these Units extra battle dressings and plasma were carried. The Company and Platoon Corpsmen carried Unit #3.

The Battalion Ambulance, the remainder of the Medical Unit and additional reserve supplies of Plasma and other Medical Equipment were placed in charge of the Q.M.

The Health of the men aboard ship was very good. Fresh water showers were provided daily for all troops and as the more temperate zone was reached, many of the Fungus Infections so common in the tropics cleared up. The heads were well policed; living quarters were adequate and well ventilated aboard the APA. Conditions were somewhat crowded aboard the LST's but many of the troops erected shelters topside relieving this condition. The troops were fed in chow lines using mess gear. Proper facilities were provided for washing mess gear after chow and dipping gear prior to chow. There were no cases of Food Poisoning. The galley were well equipped and inspected daily. The cooks and messmen were inspected weekly. One (1) Atabrine tablet was given all hands daily until five (5) days prior to reaching target when the dosage was increased to four (4) tablets. Sick Call was held twice daily by the Medical Officer. Foot inspections were held and all cases of Epidermophytosis were treated and healed prior to L day. The health of the troops at the time of debarkation was excellent.

Due to the character of the Battalion beaches, a cliff separating them, the Headquarters Medical Section was divided. The Battalion Medical Officer and ten (10) Corpsmen equipped with Units #1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 landed on the left beach (Red 2) with a Co. Headquarters in the third assault wave at 0835. The Battalion Surgeon and thirteen Corpsmen landed on the right beach (Red 3) with the Battalion Commander with the fourth Assault Wave, at approximately 0839. This section carried Units #1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and additional Plasma and Dressings.

In the assault each Company and Platoon Corpsman carried a Unit #3 and two (2) activated units of Plasma and one unit of Albumin. Five (5) Officers and NCO's also carried a unit of Activated Plasma insuring an adequate supply in the front lines. The remainder of the Medical Units and Equipment were placed in the care of the Q.M. and landed with later waves. The Battalion Ambulance was available on the afternoon of L plus 1.

After landing since there was little resistance on the beach the Battalion Medical Officer with the ten (10) Corpsmen in his charge joined the Battalion surgeon and the main body of the Battalion C.P. Shortly after landing a Battalion Aid Station was set up.

In combat the Headquarters Medical Section functioned as two (2) units. The Battalion Medical Officer with ten (10) Corpsmen went ahead daily and set up a forward Aid Station close to the lines with the forward elements of the Battalion C.P. In this manner very early Aid Station Treatment was given which better prepared wounded for evacuation over extremely difficult terrain. The Battalion Surgeon and thirteen (13) Corpsmen set up their Aid Station with the rear section of the Battalion C.P.; they gave further treatment and arranged for evacuation to the rear echelons.

During the first phases of combat, around and beyond YONTAN air field, evacuation was facilitated by good roads. On the first day, before ambulances were available evacuation was by LVT's, Ducks and Trucks. Later, on the MOTOBU Peninsula where the terrain was mountainous and difficult and roads were not available, evacuation from front lines and from Aid Stations to roads was effected by stretcher-bearers furnished by the Regimental Band who excellently performed their duties, often carrying wounded for distances of almost two (2) miles over most difficult terrain. Evacuation from Aid Station to rear echelons was effected by jeep ambulances and in many cases when pressed trucks were utilized. It is suggested that more vehicles be provided for evacuation from Aid Stations.

The larger field ambulance would facilitate evacuation where roads are adequate.

The forward and rear Aid Stations observed all rules of cover and concealment. The Forward Aid Station received sniper fire on two occasions, and machine gun fire on one occasion. Due to the cover taken, the fire was ineffective and no casualties were suffered in either Aid Station. Foxholes were dug by all hands and absolute blackout was maintained.

There were a total of two hundred and forty (240) casualties, of these two hundred and nineteen (219) were battle casualties, thirty-five (35) of these were killed outright, one hundred and eighty-four (184) battle casualties were treated at the Aid Station. Of these one hundred and sixty-seven (167) were evacuated and seventeen (17) returned to the lines. One (1) casualty, a fragmentation wound of the head died in the Aid Station. Four (4) casualties were reported to have died in the rear echelons. There were twenty-one (21) non-battle casualties of which four (4) were returned to duty and seventeen (17) evacuated. None were fatal.

Strict FOOD and WATER discipline was maintained and no native foods were consumed. K, C, and 10 in 1 rations were the only foodstuffs utilized. All water was supplied by the Engineers. In some instances troops used enemy blankets and native mats and suffered flea bites. These were immediately taken up and the infested clothes treated with DDT.

Our dead were removed to rear areas by the QM section. Enemy dead were buried.

There were no epidemics amongst our troops and no unusual diseases encountered.

Dental service other than emergency was unavailable during combat.

Three (3) civilians were cared for and evacuated via the Regiment. One (1) prisoner was treated and turned over to the S-2 Section.

The present Medical Organization in the Battalion has proven satisfactory on this operation. Personnel was adequate, replacements were supplied immediately upon request. Two (2) platoon Corpsmen were killed and seven (7) were wounded. Of these five (5) were evacuated. Two (2) of those evacuated have returned to duty. The Corpsmen performed their duties skillfully and courageously throughout combat.

Units #1,3,5,6,7,8,9, and 10 were carried in combat in addition to two (2) extra Unit #5A, Plasma and extra battle dressings.

Units #11A and 11B, 12, 14,15,17, and 19 and extra medications, plasma and dressings were placed in custody of the QM and were brought ashore by that department and left in a rear dump. Of these, Unit #12 (Heating & Lighting), Unit #15 (Blankets, woolen), Unit #17 (Hospital Tent Furniture) and Unit #19 (Field Desk) were stolen. The Units #11A and 11B (Case Sick Call) were also broken into and the alcohol pilfered. Medical supplies for combat were adequate, resupply was excellent.

One ambulance jeep and trailer were provided for the Battalion Medical Department. Ambulance jeeps were available on call from the Regiment.

The only Malaria Control measures possible during combat were Prophylactic Atabrine administration and use of Repellent. There were only three (3) recurrent Malaria cases in the Battalion up to and including L plus 19. During this period only two (2) men were evacuated with Catarrhal Fever and three (3) with acute Tonsillitis. These cases occurred during a rainy period after the troops had been worn down by heavy and difficult fighting.

After the completion of the assault phase the Battalion went into bivouac in rest areas. It was possible to spread the troops out. Rigid Sanitary Rules were observed. Garbage pits were dug and burned and covered daily. Slit trenches were dug at least 50 yards, from the troops and 70 yards from streams. These were inspected daily and properly cared for. ONLY WATER provided by the QM was utilized for drinking and cooking ONLY K, C, 10 in 1 and some B rations were used. Troops were not allowed to use native foods, enemy or native equipment, enter native dwellings nor fraternize with the native population. This was strictly enforced and as a consequence there was only one (1) case of Food poisoning, no flea bites and no verereal diseases while in the rest area. Brush around troops was cleared out and rice paddies and other mosquito breeding sites were drained. Freon bombs were provided.

A Sick Bay tent was provided by the QM and an adequate Sick Bay established. Sick Call was held for troops twice daily. Hospitalization was through the "A" Medical Company. No epidemics arose amongst the troops or the few natives near the area and no exotic diseases were noted.

(13) Supply.

1. Equipment.

A. The following items of equipment were not available prior to embarkation.

1. One $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck.

B. The following major items of equipment were lost during the initial landing phase of the operation.

1. One $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trailer

2. Two Amphib. Trailers.

3. Mess Equipment:

a. One Field Range

b. Twelve Containers food.

c. Three Outfits Cooking Pack.

d. Three G.I. Cans Nested Set.

4. Tentage.

a. Two C.P. Tents.

b. Two Pyramidal Tents.

c. Six 20x 0 Paulins

d. One Storage Tent.

e. Two Communication Tents.

C. The following items of new equipment were used for the first time by us on an operation were:

1. Two (2) Cargo Carriers (Weasels)

The weasels assigned to our BLT proved unsuccessful due to malfunction in rocky, rough terrain with little or no facilities for maintenance. The greatest difficulty encountered was the breaking of the tracks on solid or rocky terrain. This may partially be avoided by proper instruction and schooling on the handling of the vehicle on the part of the driver.

Another minor defect noted during the operation was the bending and breaking of the trailer "hitch". By reinforcing or enlarging of $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton trailer hitches would facilitate pulling of trailers in rough and rocky terrain.

2. "Millies" and "Mollies", classified Top Secret, were used on the front lines twice and both times proved fairly successful. It is recommended that more personnel be designated to handle and operate these weapons at all times.

D. Equipment Maintenance

1. All organic transportation in BLT 1/4 was kept in operation with little maintenance until 1 plus 20. At that time two (2) one-quarter ton trucks required new pistons and rings. For the first phase maintenance was difficult due to the constant movement and extension of supply lines. The rough, mountainous terrain placed great strain on the engines.

2. All organic transportation that was water proofed prior to landing proved highly successful except after the landing the water proofing material interfered with the ignition system causing some difficulty. It is recommended that some soluble solution be given to each vehicle driver for removing the water proofing after landing.

3. Maintenance and repair work on all organic weapons were carried on with little difficulty. The Battalion armorer making a daily inspection can replace or repair all weapons damaged by enemy fire. Two (2) Light Machine Guns damaged by enemy fire were rebuilt and repaired the same day and were returned to the companies in good condition.

E. Equipment Summary

1. The overall equipment for a BLT is sufficient except for a shortage of transportation in the extension of supply lines over a distance of five to ten miles. The repair facilities are sufficient to the first three to five days for minor repairs but there is a definite loss of equipment during that time for all major repair work.

The excessive handling of organizational equipment places a great strain on transportation and personnel as there is a definite lack of both in the Tables of Organization and TBA. It is recommended that all excessive organizational other than rations, water, ammunition be handled by higher echelon until such time as it is needed by the individual BLT and then if possible it should be available.

2. Supply

1. The initial supply was excellent during the landing phase of this operation with the use of IVT's initially, inland to the front line companies facilitated supply until rough, rocky mountainous terrain was encountered. The lack of road network and proper transportation resulted in many difficulties which led to re-routing supply lines sometimes ten miles out of the way.

Supply lines were extended to such a distance that supply was very difficult. In the particular terrain covered by BLT 1/4, carrying parties of 25 to 50 men were largely used. At one time during the operation, 81mm Mortar ammunition although available was at such distance from the combat troops that the supply was completely exhausted. When the organization is in a bivouac area preparation should be made for the availability of class II and class V items as soon as possible.

B. Transportation.

There has been in the past a definite lack of organic transportation in a Infantry Battalion. It has been more noticeable on this operation since our supply lines were extended up to 15 miles. This placed a great strain on our organic transportation. The shortage of transportation has limited our supplies below operational level. Other such demands as; evacuating casualties, movement of troops by truck, and special emergency demands for water ammunition caused many difficulties in the displacement of Battalion Dumps. Several times during the operation we had as many as four to five dumps from five to ten miles apart. Another difficulty encountered on this operation as others in the past is the lack of prime movers for 300 gal. water trailers attached to BLT. Water is always an extreme nec-

essity at all time during an operation and a truck suitable to hauling the heavy 300 gal. water trailer would greatly aid the supply of water to forward units.

Therefore it is recommended that a BLT have two 1 ton Recons as prime movers for 300 gal water trailers and further that a minimum of four 2½ ton 6x6 be attached plus all organic transportation. This would definitely ease the strain of transportation in maintaining all supply lines sufficient for a BLT.

C. Re-Supply.

1. Resupply facilities on the present operations were fair to good. The logistics plan was carried out to some extent on Class I and III items. There has been some unnecessary delay in the movement of supplies from higher to lower echelons, because of a poor network of roads and the unloading of supplies at each echelon causes unnecessary delay in the reaching of the hands of the troops. Re-supply should be a large factor in considering a tactical movement. During the six days fighting encountered by our troops, resupply from the Battalion to the companies was difficult because of the terrain. No preparation had been made to handle the supply situation at that time.

2. A small amount of Class II replenishments were carried forward by the Battalion Quartermaster together with individual equipment and 782 of the KIA and WIA and evacuated, re-issue of that gear was sufficient during the first phase of the operation.

D. Non TBA Items Used.

1. One hand pump for gasoline was used with extreme effectiveness in this organization for the refilling of 5-gal water cans from 300 gal. water trailer and 55 gal drums with little or no waste.

E. Supply Summary.

1. There has been at all times during this operation and adequacy of all type of mounting outsupplies. The new type C ration supplemented with fruits, juices, and coffee etc., is well liked by all troops and is chosen over all other types including Baker rations.

2. There is at the present time an inadequacy of Class II resupply of 782 and individual equipment. Canteen Covers in particular are in frequent need of survey.

The Wilson drums for water is sufficient in quantity but does require too much handling to get to the front line troops. Thus the best type of supply of water came from 5 gal. water cans of with 350 to 400 cans would serve the needs of a BLT.

The overall supply during all phases in this operation has been excellent.

3. Ordnance.

A. Weapons.

1. All weapons are in relatively good shape with several small malfunctions noted on several types:

BAR - Failure to feed and deficient gas ports.

Carbine - Failure to extract.

81mm Mortar Tube - Tube survey after excessive firing.

After six days actual employment of weapons only one BAR was lost by enemy fire and a .30 cal. MG M1919A4 which was repaired and returned to the lines the same day.

B. Misc. Ordnance.

1. Two bazookas were lost during a fire fight, but were recovered and repaired. All Flame Throwers are in excellent conditions and no malfunctions were observed. Several spare parts kits for all types of weapons were lost during the initial landing but have been replaced.

4. Combat Vehicles.

A. This organization has had the following types of vehicles during all phases of the operation.

Seven (7) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks.

One (1) $\frac{1}{4}$ ton TCS

One (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ ton ambulance

Two (2) $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6x6

Two (2) 300 gal. water trailers.

B. During the six day battle employment all vehicles except one $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trailer remained in excellent condition with little maintenance in spite of the rugged terrain.

C. One $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trailer was lost during the initial phase and one $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trailer was lost during the first phase. No recovery has been made as yet.

D. Malfunctions of vehicles are mainly excessive wear on pistons and piston walls. A stronger trailer hitch on the $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks and spring shackles and trailer tongues are needed.

5. Ammunition.

A. This organization expended approximately four (4) units of fire during the six day actual battle employment for all weapons. The 81mm Mortar expended 1500 rounds H.E. and 75 rounds smoke.

B. Supply on ammunition for an infantry battalion can be limited to .30 cal. MG belted, .30 cal. 8 rd clip, .30 cal in 20 rd cartons; 60mm mortar H.E. and Illuminating and 81mm Mortar. The expenditure of these types are much more than other types of ammunition and it is recommended that the 60mm mortar ammunition H.E. be broken down into smaller units to facilitate handling and carrying. There is no carrying bag suitable for carrying bazooka ammunition and would recommend one be made.

C. All ammunition carried by this organization remained in good shape with little or no misfires.

(14) Public Relations.

Two combat correspondents were attached to the 4th Regiment and from time to time came to the Battalion to get material.

(15) Military Government.

When large groups of civilians are expected to be evacuated in an operation Military Government Personnel should operate with the assault battalions to clear civilians who at times become operational hazards. At no time during this phase were any Civil Government personnel seen by members of this organization.

CHAPTER VIII

During the amphibious assault part of Phase I of this operation only a few scattered groups of enemy were encountered. There were never more than eight men in these groups and were easily eliminated once their location was determined. Generally their equipment included at least one automatic weapon. On 2 April a pocket of some 125 enemy troops were encountered in some deep wooded ravines east of the town of CHINA. The enemy were well clothed and equipped. Numerous IMG's, a few HMG's, and several grenade dischargers were encountered. The enemy was dispersed in a bivouac area consisting of shacks and caves built in the bottom of the ravines. Groups of from 12 to 20 would take up positions on the ridge and high ground above their bivouac areas. Their positions were well camouflaged; the individual soldiers used camouflage nets with fresh shrubbery stuck in them. They would tenaciously hold their particular sector until killed by our small arms and mortar fire. The enemy had good observation and with excellent use of cover were able to inflict casualties on our men who were attacking up hill or in some cases down ridges and slopes. By keeping to the high ground the companies were able to keep casualties to a minimum.

In the movement to ORA only scattered, disorganized, ill equipped groups of enemy were encountered.

When the Fourth Marine Regiment was ordered to attack the enemy force on NOTUBU PENINSULA an organized well equipped group of Japanese was contacted. The enemy had withdrawn to the high ground near Mt. YAFUKE. There were no roads leading directly to their position. There were a few trails but the country was extremely rugged consisting of a series of scrub covered ridges with small cultivated valleys between them. On 14 April A & C Companies were advancing towards NOTUYAMA and met small well organized groups of enemy. These groups had automatic weapons which were trained on trails or on open ground. The enemy was well dug in and made excellent use of camouflage. They would hold fire until our troops were within good range. These groups would ordinarily withdraw when they were located and our fire was brought upon them. Some artillery and mortar fire was encountered but caused no casualties. In most cases a single piece would fire from a cave or concealed emplacements, and then cease fire. No heavy concentrations were fired. Two times an artillery piece fired at our lines while our own artillery was firing a concentration. This strategem has been used many times in the past. On 15 April the same enemy tactics were used against our advance and caused quite a number of casualties. Using Hotchkiss machine guns the enemy would often put four or five rounds in a man's body at 500 to 700 yds. Telescope sights were used on some of the guns. On 16 April this Battalion made a frontal assault on Mt YAFUKE. The Japanese were in prepared positions upon its summit and on the adjoining ridges. An intense volume of small arms, knee mortar, and grenade fire was delivered against the Battalion assault companies, A and C. It was later discovered from captured maps that each group of enemy had sketches drawn of their positions

showing emplacement of weapons, sectors of fire, ranges to various terrain features, and names of commanders. After a bitter battle of some three hours the enemy was annihilated. The next few days proved that the resistance had been broken on MOTOBU PENINSULA. The Japanese commander had decided to use his forces as guerrillas, keep constant watch on all our movements by active patrolling and use of OP's and fight to the finish in the positions near Mt YAFUAKE. During the entire time there was almost no fighting during the hours of darkness.

CHAPTER IX

- (1) The First Battalion, Fourth Marines assisted in securing the Central and Northern part of OKINAWA.
- (2) Enemy casualties inflicted by this Battalion were as follows:
 - (a) 513 Killed
 - (b) 20 captured
- (3) Operational material damage to the enemy.
 - 1 ZKE intact
 - 23 machine guns
 - 2 trucks
 - 83 rifles
 - 5 mortars
 - 45 cases mortar ammunition
 - 24 cases grenades
 - 50 cases .303 ammunition
 - 25 grenade dischargers
 - 5 war dogs
 - 1 40 mm gun.
- (4) Our own losses were as follows:
 - (a) 35 Killed in Action
 - (b) 184 Wounded in Action
 - (c) 4 Missing

CHAPTER X

A. In view of the preceding chapters of this report the following recommendations are offered.

1. S-1 It is recommended that the time to submit the daily report should be made later in order that the reports from the companies have a chance to be made up and submitted to the Battalion. Also, the Battalion personnel cards should be kept in the Battalion administrative group and not with Division.
2. S-2
 - (a) Every effort should be made to increase the accuracy and detail of operations maps. The maps of the northern sector of OKINAWA SHIMA were especially lacking in these qualities.
 - (b) It is highly desirable to furnish more low oblique photographs of the landing beaches to BLT's.
 - (c) BLT's should be furnished aerial photos of new sectors without a request being made.
 - (d) At least one more interpreter should be furnished each BLT to aid in the proper disposition of civilians.
3. S-3
 - (a) Due to the extremely crowded conditions encountered aboard ship it is recommended that a minimum of four LST's be assigned to each assault BLT.
 - (b) An illuminating 81 mm mortar shell is needed to adequately illuminate a BLT sector. Naval gunfire illumination is adequate when available but too often is not available.
 - (c) For quick employment of tanks, full tracks, and the early evacuation of casualties, engineers should be made more accessible to assault elements. Engineer reconnaissance should be more closely coordinated with that of the infantry and tanks. Closer engineer liaison should be maintained with infantry assault elements.
 - (d) The time for jumping off should not be less than two hours after dawn in order that adequate preparations for the attack may be made.
 - (e) It is recommended that two F.O. teams and one liaison team from artillery be furnished each assault BLT. Thus each assault Company may be provided with adequate artillery support.
 - (f) The tank reconnaissance teams were excellent. The present procedure should be kept.
 - (g) Liaison personnel should be attached to the organization with which they are going to operate at least a month prior to an operation.
 - (h) The unit of fire of WP grenades should be increased.

4. S-4 (a) Supply

1. It is recommended that all excessive non-combatant organizational equipment be handled by the Regimental QM until such time as it may be needed by the organization.
2. Automatic supplies should be carried in greater quantities by higher echelon and should be on a 24 hour availability basis to assault BLT's.
3. Tentage should be made available to the BLT in the final phase to include a minimum of
 - Three (3) Pyramidal tents
 - Six (6) Paulin 20 x 20.
 - Two (2) Storage tents.
4. Class II items such as clothing, individual equipment should be made available in greater quantity.

(b) Transportation.

1. It is recommended that the below listed vehicles be assigned to each BLT in addition to its organic transportation.
 - Four (4) Trk 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 6 x 6.
 - Three (3) Trk 1 Ton cgo (Primemovers for water trlrs).
 - Three (3) trlrs water 300 gal.

- (c) Wounded in Action personnel returned to duty should be re-equipped immediately on discharge from the hospital. All personnel returning to this organization were completely unequipped having had their equipment removed upon entrance to the hospital.

G. B. Bell
G. B. BELL,
LtCol., USMC.,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS,
SECOND BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
IN THE FIELD.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

CHAPTER I. PURPOSE AND SYNOPSIS OF MISSION.

The purpose of this report is to give a complete and accurate narrative of the preparation for and the execution of the missions assigned the 2d Bn, 4th Marines, Sixth Marine Division in the Okinawa, Ryukyus Islands operation from 1 April, 1945 through 30 April, 1945.

The initial mission of this battalion was to land in division reserve prepared to meet the attack of any unit in the division. After the landing the next mission assigned was to assist in the capture of Yontan Mountain. This was followed by the mission to continue the attack in an assigned zone of action to seize the L plus 10 line. The fourth mission was that of patrolling from the L plus 10 line to Ora Bay. The next mission was to proceed to Sakimotobu, attack in an assigned zone of action and assist in the seizure of Motobu Peninsula. The last mission was to proceed to Ora Bay as garrison troops and patrol an assigned area.

CHAPTER II. THE TASK ORGANIZATION.

The elements of BLT 2/4, (less 1 Co), Div Res, Commanded by Lt. Col. [REDACTED], were as follows:

Co "F"	Capt. HOLMGRAIN
Co "G" (less 1 Platoon)	Capt. WOLFORD
81mm Mortar Platoon	2dLt. WILSON
Bn Trs	Major. BATTERTON
BLT 2/4 Shore Party	1stLt. STANLEY
Bn Res	2dLt. [REDACTED]

CHAPTER III. PRELIMINARY PLANNING.

1. All B-1 personnel were thoroughly instructed as to the use of Casualty cards, weekly and periodic reports in addition to all orders pertaining to the administration in the field. Tech clerk was required to keep a notebook listing any information concerning Second Battalion personnel. Two sets of 3" by 5" personnel cards were made for use in this battalion, in addition to the 4 sets furnished Regiment and Division. One set of cards was carried in an ammunition box by the Sergeant Major and two clerks in the forward echelon. The other set was taken to the B-1 Rear Administrative group at B-1 area by the two clerks sent there to type dispatches and mailgrams. All casualties were logged in a notebook and also on personnel cards in the forward echelon. On debarkation and during the entire operation clerks with records were kept separated at all

times. During the entire operation any one of the S-1 clerks were well enough instructed so as to take over the responsibility of Battalion records in the field, including the two S-1 clerks acting as the Commanding Officers runners.

2. The early planning of this section consisted of the collection and evaluation of all available information of the target area. Dissemination was made only by the Commanding officer. Overlays to accompany the operation orders were made.

3. After the mission of Division Reserve had been assigned this Battalion plans were made for landing on any beach in the Division Z and supporting the attack of the assault units. The decision was made by the Commanding Officer to land in a column of companies regardless of the beach landed upon. The plans of RCT 4 and RCT 22 were studied and separate operation plans for landing in front of each of the two assault Battalions of each RCT were written. A fifth operation order was written to cover the possible mission of landing in reserve and securing the left flank of the division by seizing TAKTA-MISAKI Peninsula. Similar operation plans were written to cover the Division Alternate Plan.

4. The S-4 during this time was collecting, packing, and preparing all necessary equipment for shipment. This Battalion had found that it is necessary to have at least one blackout tent, preferably two, and fifteen tarpolins, especially for use during the assured bivouac stages. Each staff section, sick bay, the communication section, and each company should be assigned one, and the remainder used in the battalion dump. These are invaluable in inclement weather and increase the efficiency of the staff work. At least four typewriters and field desks are necessary. Although this number may seem burdensome, their use has proven essential between phases of the operation. Pioneer chests (containing shovels, axes, sledge hammers and picks) were built for each company. These prevent undue loss of tools and facilitate easier handling and transporting.

The allocation of truck loads was made to best conform to the immediate needs of the attacking Battalion. One notable delay in the actual loading of vehicles was the last minute changes in ammunition available. This caused revision of vehicle loading at the last minute. Prior to embarkation for the target area, there seemed to be a definite lack of knowledge as to the time when certain necessary materials would be available to the smaller units.

Upon receipt of the target information the four sections made a thorough study of supply routes from the beach inland. As the Battalion was uncertain on which beach it would land careful studies were made of all beaches and the terrain inland.

CHAPTER IV. TRAINING PHASE.

In general the training in preparation for the Okinawa operation was adequate. Basic training in elementary subjects such as weapons, compass, scouting and patrolling, and fire group and squad tactics was complete and the results very satisfactory.

The training in tactics of units larger than a squad was adequate for fighting in rough, heavily vegetated terrain as was proven in the accomplishments of the missions assigned this battalion in the seizure of Motobu Peninsula.

It is felt however that had the enemy elected to defend the level, open terrain in the vicinity of Yontan Airfield and the populated localities with their stone walled buildings this battalion might have suffered undue casualties because of the lack of training. The first most important reason for this training deficiency was the lack of suitable ranges in the limited training area assigned and the extreme difficulty in obtaining the use of few existing "open" ranges. The second reason was the lack of time assigned for training in the "Bonagiville" range village. Three days is insufficient time in which to train a battalion in the highly specialized art of street fighting. Lectures were given and moving pictures shown but only generalities can be learned by this method and actual training on the ground is necessary. Though "Bonagiville" range was excellent and the limitations for the construction of a larger village realized, the fact remains that it was too small for training large units and developing the high degree of coordination necessary in that type of warfare. A third reason for the deficiency was the inability to obtain tanks for infantry, tank coordination in street fighting.

The amphibious training and rehearsals were considered adequate.

CHAPTER V. LOADING AND EMBARKATION.

1. 3-1. The troop embarkation was effected smoothly despite the fact the ship would allow only two embarkation stations to be used. Sixty eight Officers and one thousand four hundred sixty five enlisted were embarked, exceeding the billeting capacity by fifty men. These men were required to sleep on the very limited deck space and on cots in the

already overcrowded troop spaces.

3. 3-3. The combat loading of this Battalion was very satisfactory. Troop priorities were assigned so that complete striking power was reached in a minimum length of time after the first wave of the Battalion landed.

3. 3-4. (TCM). The overall picture of loading (both the planning and actual loading) and embarkation of troops was successful. The loading plan was followed. The paper planning phase ironed out existing problems which were numerous. However it is believed that many of the difficulties arose through lack of foresight on the part of higher echelons. In some cases changes were made which completely changed the loading plan, necessitating a complete revision of the plan. At the last minute the u/f for the Battalion was changed, together with an additional assignment of ammunition to the Battalion ship, and the increased tonnage was considerable. During the latter stages when time was valuable such changes caused an unnecessary duplication of work.

Although the ship's TCM had just taken over the job when the ship arrived he very quickly and efficiently realized our problems and did much to assist in stemming them. Much time can be saved when the ship's TCM has accurate measurements of the holds, hatches, and is familiar with the characteristics of the ship. He should further know the proper tonnage distribution on the ship for balance effects.

The actual loading of the ship (APA 91 - ADAIR), was completed in twenty-five hours. Small hatches caused delay, and in the case of fuel this was very notable in that as many as six boats were alongside Hold #6 (fuel) at once. The loading of the boats at the beach was accomplished much faster than the unloading at the ship and in many instances no boats were on the beach for an hour. Since only fuel was being loaded, and all in the same hold, this delay could not be helped. There were no cases of broken booms or improper handling of the cargo aboard the ship. The stowage unit performed efficiently.

The unloading was accomplished in twenty-one hours and could have been completed sooner had the boats been available. It must be strongly emphasized to all ship officers connected with the unloading the importance of unloading necessary items first to directly support the Battalion. This is necessary even if boats must stand idle for a short time by the holds containing the items.

Communications were satisfactory.

CHAPTER VI. TRAINING, BRIEFING THROUGHOUT.

A training schedule was carried out enroute consisting of briefing, weapons instruction, inspections, and physical exercise. In the briefing of the troops the following procedure was used. Instruction was given to the company commanders through lectures by the commanding officer and members of the staff. The lectures were followed by discussions. After study on the part of the company commanders they in turn briefed their junior officers and staff NCO's. The platoon leaders then held school for their men. Subsequent officers meetings and troop schools were held to discuss any points in question and pass on any information received from higher echelons. The relief man was invaluable in briefing to the officers and men.

CHAPTER VII. ARRIVAL PHASE.

The Second Battalion (less one company), 4th Marines, Sixth Marine Division was initially assigned the mission of Division reserve for the OVINIA operation. Company "B", Second Battalion 4th Marines was attached to the 4th Marines as regimental reserve. The entire Battalion was embarked aboard the APA 91 (USS ADAIR), on 14 March, 1945 and got underway for OVINIA on 15 March, 1945.

On 1 April, 1945 this Battalion (less one company), while afloat in small boats, at the LD, was ordered to land in Spt of the 4th Marines. At 1400 the Battalion, (less one company), landed on RED Beach 1 and moved 200yds inland to an assigned area to await further orders. At 1600 orders were received for the Battalion to relieve one company of the Third Battalion, 4th Marines on the night defensive line and that Company "B" would remain in regimental reserve. The relief was accomplished at 1525 with Company "C" on the right tied into Company "B" of the Third Battalion, 4th Marines, and Company "A" on the left tied into the Third Battalion, 22 Marines. On 2 April the Battalion received orders to continue the Atk and Companies "A" and "C" moved out at 0730. Company "B" reverted to Battalion control at 1300. No enemy resistance was encountered and the Battalion went into the night defensive position in the vicinity of OVA31. Three companies were on line and visual contact was established with Third Battalion, 4th Marines on the right and Third Battalion 22 Marines on the left. At 2300 Company "C" killed two of the enemy which were attempting infiltration. Companies continued the Atk on 3 April at 0700 and MOUNTAIN Mountain (O-1 line for 3 April) was seized without enemy contact and the Battalion ordered to continue the Atk to the O-b line. Company "C" continued the Atk on the right, "A" company on the left and "B" company was held in Battalion reserve. Company "C" encountered a pocket of 8 Vins at 8696-W

and suffered two casualties before annihilating the enemy. Front lines for the night defense were 8696 T 4 through 8896 G 4. One platoon from Company "F" was ordered to patrol a draw between the two assault companies and killed two Viet soldiers. Upon reaching the front lines the platoon was attached to Company "E" for the night. There was no enemy activity during the night and on the morning of 4 April (1 plus 3) the attack was continued. This Battalion moved out in a column of companies in the order "C", "E", "D", and "F". The flanks of the column were covered by patrols with visual and patrol contact being kept with adjacent units. At 1230 Company "C" entered ISHIVA and at 1510 the Battalion went into a perimeter defense along the beach and northern side of town. Physical contact was established with the Third Battalion, 4th Marines on the beach. Orders were received that the Battalion would remain in the present position for the night and that the following day one company would make a motorized patrol North along the coast road while the rest of the Battalion remained in bivouac. Company "F" was alerted to make the patrol. At 2330 four Viet soldiers, one of which was a captain, were killed attempting to infiltrate the lines of Company "E". Our casualties were three killed. The first phase of the operation was completed.

On 5 April Company "F" was not able to start on the reconnaissance patrol until 0950 because of the delay in the trucks reporting from Division. At 1300 the Battalion was ordered to move up in rear of the 22nd Marines so that a passage of lines could be made the following day and the 4th Marines continue the patrolling North along the east coast road. The Battalion reached the vicinity of 9601 S at 1700 and established a perimeter defense for the night. Company "F" rejoined the Battalion at that place having been able to patrol no farther than the town of VIM because of the late start and necessity of removing abatis road blocks from several places along the road. No contact with the enemy was made by the patrol and the report was made that the road was passable though repairs to two bridges would be necessary before subjected to heavy traffic. Company "C" killed one Viet soldier while moving into the defense sector and Company "F" killed two during the night. On 6 April the Battalion moved out at 0715 with orders to patrol all side roads leading off of the coast road and after the entire Battalion had been committed to then continue North along the coast road in rear of the other two Battalions of the 4th Marines. The night perimeter was established in the vicinity of IINVA. No enemy contact was made by any of the patrols. Saturday, 7 April the Battalion was again ordered to proceed North along the coast road and patrol all side roads, the only change being that this Battalion would be last in the column and start patrolling after the other two Battalions of the 4th Marines had been committed. No enemy contacts were

made and the Battalion went into a defensive position at 330000. The Battalion remained in that position and patrolled a perimeter of 3,00 yards until 13 April when orders were received to proceed A/A and relieve the Third Battalion 29th Marines. Upon reaching A/A plans were changed and the Battalion ordered to continue along the coast road to 3, KIMOCUBU for night bivouac prepared to Atk the following day in conjunction with the Third Battalion 29th Marines and seize the hill mass approximately 1,000 yards to the North of the town. This Battalion went into night perimeter defense at 1535 at which time a reconnaissance was made and the Battalion Atk order for the following day issued.

On 14 April the Battalion jumped off with Company "G" on the right, Company "E" on the left and Company "F" in reserve. The initial objective was reached by Company "G" at 0936 and the entire hill mass occupied at 1000. Contact with Third Battalion 29th Marines on the left was established by patrol. Orders were received from Regiment to continue the Atk to the next ridge line, 9823 R 3, at 1200. The first strong enemy contact was made by Company "G" at 1350 when they were subjected to rifle, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. The artillery piece was spotted and Naval Gun Fire and Artillery were brought to bear on it. The counter fire silenced the position but did not destroy it. When the enemy fired the noise they brought it out of a cave, fired three or four rounds and then withdrew into the cave where counter battery fire could not reach them. Company "E" received enemy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire at 1355. Company "G" suffered quite a number of casualties so Company "F" (less one platoon which was kept in Battalion reserve) was committed to Sgt "G" Company. By a combined frontal Atk and envelopment from the right the ridge was taken and contact established with the First Battalion, 4th Marines on the right and the Third Battalion 29th Marines on the left. The Battalion dug in for the night on that ridge. At 1910 the Atk orders for the following day were received and preparatory Arty fire and air strikes were arranged for. On 15 April at 1610 the Battalion Atk orders were given to the Companies. Three Companies Atkd on line with Company "E" on the left, then "F" and "G" on the right. One platoon from Company "E" was kept in Battalion reserve. The companies jumped off at 0700 and at 0705 Company "G" was under heavy enemy fire from a ridge directly to their front. The other companies were also receiving fire but not as intense. Company "G" was able to make only small gains and the Battalion reserve was committed to Sgt its Atk. The terrain limited the possibilities and enveloping maneuver and after a days hard fighting Companies "E" and "F" had seized Hill 200 and Company "G" was three quarters of the way up the hill to the immediate right of Hill 200. Company "G" withdrew part way down the hill to a better defensive position and

Company "F" extended right through the draw between the two hills and tied into Company "G". Physical contact with the Third Battalion 29th Marines was made by Company "F" on the left and the 200yd gap between Company "G" and First Battalion 4th Marines on the right was covered by fire. At 1900 the Battalion CP was subjected to 4 direct hits from enemy field Arty pieces suffering 2 KIA and 17 MIA. The CP was moved two hundred yards to the left rear to a better defiladed position. At 0600, 16 April the Battalion received orders to Snt by fire from present position the Atk of the First Battalion 4th Marines and the Third Battalion 29th Marines. Company "G" was ordered back to be in Regimental reserve. From the Battalion position excellent supporting fire was given to the two attacking Battalions and the 81mm Mortar Platoon was very instrumental in helping to break up an enemy Panzer attack at 1700 which was directed against the First Battalion 4th Marines. During the day Company "F" sent a platoon patrol to investigate shape of their position in the draw. Several unoccupied caves were found. Present positions were held for the night. At 0945, 17 April the Regimental operation order and overlay were received and this Battalion was again orders to Snt the Atk from the present positions until fire was masked. Local patrols were made but no enemy contact established. On 18 April at 0945 orders were received for the Battalion to thoroughly patrol the area over which the First and Third Battalions, 4th Marines had advanced the day before. The patrols made no enemy contact but found numerous enemy supplies which were either destroyed or their locations reported to Regiment. The same defensive position was occupied for the night. The orders for 19 April were for this Battalion to pass through First Battalion 4th Marines and seize the high ground in the vicinity of 0027 V by patrol action. A minimum force of one company was ordered to conduct the patrolling and the remainder of the Battalion to move by road and set up a perimeter defense on the high ground. Company "E" was ordered to send out three patrols of a reinforced platoon each. At 1140 the left flank patrol of Company "E" was pinned down by enemy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire from positions in the vicinity of 9926 J. The remainder of Company "E" was able to get into a position to Snt the platoon by fire at 1215. Arty fire was brought on the enemy position and the platoon that had been pinned down was able to withdraw to a better position and wait for assistance before continuing the attack. The remainder of Company "E" was ordered to stay in present position and Snt the Atk by fire while Company "G" enveloped the position from the left. At 1430 Company "G" made contact with the isolated platoon and maneuvered into position to Atk. At 1700 the enemy position had been seized with 38 of the enemy killed, two six inch naval guns, 6 Lewis type machine guns and one mortar captured. Company "G" plus one platoon of Company

organized and defended the high ground in that vicinity and the remainder of the Battalion organized and defended the original days objective for the night. On 20 April the Battalion was ordered to patrol an assigned area from their present position to North Coast of Motobu Peninsula. Company "F" and Company "G" were assigned this mission and the remainder of the Battalion moved by road to the coast. No enemy contacts were made by the patrols and the Battalion went into a defensive bivouac area in the vicinity of 9830 F at 1400. The Battalion remained in that position through 23 April and conducted patrol activity only. The only enemy contacts during the period were on the nights of 23 and 24 April when Company "F" killed three and then two Nins on the respective nights. The enemy were wearing regulation Japanese uniforms with fresh brush camouflage. On 23 April Motobu Peninsula was declared secured.

The Battalion less part of Headquarters Company and Company "F" (less one platoon) moved via motor to the vicinity of ORA as garrison troops. The remainder of the Battalion did not arrive at that position until 1500, 24 April because of an accident in the motor convoy of the previous day which prevented the trucks from making two trips. The Battalion organized and defended the ground in the vicinity of ORA and conducted patrol activity in an assigned area. The enemy contacts for the period 24 April to 30 April were as follows: (1) One man from Company "G" was killed at 1120, 26 April when he and three other men were fired on while gathering drift wood, by ten Nins from the vicinity of 1409 M 3. One of the enemy was killed but a patrol that was immediately dispatched made no contact. The patrol found diving equipment and equipment for the construction of wharves. A patrol in the vicinity the following day, 27 April, again made no enemy contact but did find five enemy suicide boats, four of which had been partially demolished. The patrol completed the destruction of the boat. (2) On 30 April at approximately 1645 a truck 1/4 ton, 4x4, ambulance, was fired on by an ambush in the vicinity of 1112 V and J, on the road from YCPNKE to ORA and the Assistant Battalion Surgeon and one corpsman were wounded. A patrol was dispatched immediately but no enemy contact was made. Five male civilians were apprehended by the patrol and one reported that at 1400 he had seen approximately twenty Japanese Naval personnel, armed with rifles, eating chow in the vicinity of the ambush. The area was well covered by patrols the following day but no enemy contact established.

The other activity, except patrol, of the Battalion while in garrison was on 28 April when Company "F" was detached from this Battalion and sent to relieve Third Battalion, 4th Marines.

The Company reverted to Battalion control upon return on 29 April.

1. Shin-to-Shore Movement. The ship-to-shore movement was not well handled. The wave guide boat officers were not familiar enough with the location of all beaches as they should have been, especially when landing a reserve unit, and it was necessary for the fire command boat to intercept one wave and start it for the correct beach. The transfer at the LD was very slow due to insufficient number of amphibious tractors though it appeared that on some of the beaches tractors were idle. There was a definite lack of control by the control boat and control boat officers apparently did not understand the necessity for landing first waves first. Personnel were transferred haphazardly from boats to tractors, without regard for the wave numbers (which were prominently displayed in each boat). The resultant confusion made necessary a reorganization of the Battalion on the beach. A task which would have been extremely hazardous had the beach been under fire.

The new ramp-type amphibian tractor greatly facilitated the ship-to-shore movement.

2. Naval Gunfire Support. One more radio man is needed and one less extra duty man. Only one radio man was on the team and when it was necessary to transmit over a long period of time the one man had to be relieved by an inexperienced hand. There are five extra duty men and with the Battalion CR wiremen this number of extra duty men are not needed. The personnel was adequately trained for carrying on the duties of the team.

The communications equipment was excellent. The SCR 694 is the most practical and best adapted for our work and it is recommended that it be used in future operations in the same capacity.

It was impossible to fully determine the effectiveness of the beach preparation fire because of the type of landing made and opposition encountered. Counter battery fire on targets of opportunity was called three times. The targets were field pieces in caves in the high mountainous terrain of Motobu Peninsula and it was extremely difficult to obtain direct hits. Two hits were obtained which partially destroyed and definitely neutralized two pieces. Only during one night was harassing fire requested and the results were satisfactory. Night illumination was fired four (4) nights and it was believed to have been adequate and effective. The usual rate of fire was four rounds of star shells per hour.

Excellent results were obtained with plane spot since planes could observe areas obscured from our positions by terrain features.

Coordination was good between the adjoining Battalions and also between artillery and air support within the Battalion. It is definitely necessary to have cooperation between supporting units. The adjoining Battalions cooperated in firing night illumination and each gave preparation support to adjoining Battalions.

It is necessary to work through the chain of command to coordinate front lines and to eliminate the possibility of observers from adjoining units firing on friendly lines.

Communications for shore fire control parties was established about 1930 on L-Day. It is necessary to maintain proper net control to facilitate proper operations of the nets.

Two 300's were lost and as yet have not been replaced. These were lost during the seizure of Motobu Peninsula.

If an officer is to be pre H-hour control the higher echelons should be informed properly to facilitate control of fire if needs for counter battery and for repeating fires on pre-designated targets.

3. Air Support. Communications between the liaison party and the Air Support Control were excellent throughout the entire operation. From L-Day through L plus 10 day the SCR 193 Teletype Radio furnished primary communications. Subsequent to that day the portable SCR 694 was used. No communication was established between the ALP and the aircraft. The radio operators carried out their work very well and the team as a whole coordinated perfectly. Replacements and spareparts were easily accessible although no breakdowns were encountered.

During the period between L-Day and L plus 25, five missions were called from this Battalion. The first, on L plus 2, an air observation mission, was cancelled by 1300 due to artillery fire in the area although none was observed from our CP. The second, on L plus 3, an air strike against probable enemy installations was accepted and the planes were on station when it had to be cancelled due to friendly infantry patrols of adjacent units in the area. The third, on L plus 13, a rocket and strafing mission was called and accepted. When the planes were making their runs, hostile machine gun fire was met and they diverted their fire to this target and successfully neutralized it, however the

cases which were the primary targets were untouched and it was too late in the day for another strike. The fourth on L plus 14 was a bombing, rocket, and strafing pre-jump off strike and was coordinated to start at 0745 just as Artillery and Naval Gunfire were lifted. The strike was successful and 16-500 pound bombs, 56 rockets, and strafing were expended on the target. At 0800 live runs were completed and the planes continued dummy runs until 0820, proving effective. Damage was not ascertained. The fifth, on the afternoon of L plus 14 was a strafing mission on enemy machine gun emplacements on the reverse slope of a hill. Planes were not available and the strike had to be called off. All in all, Close Air Support had very little to do with the success of this Battalion.

For the two missions that were run neither target could be marked due to the lack of WP shells by the mortars (unable to be supplied) and the use of artillery on other important targets. In neither case was this too great a handicap because the planes found their target without much difficulty (4 dummy runs on one and 2 on the other). On the first strike L plus 13 the friendly lines could not be marked due to their rapid advance. The target was far enough ahead not to endanger them. On the pre-jump off strike, L plus 14, the front lines were marked with colored grenades and proved to be very satisfactory from the report received from the pilot. Fortunately the friendly lines were in a valley and there was not much wind to affect the drift of the smoke or this method would have been unsatisfactory. The use of panels in this terrain was impractical due to the heavy vegetation.

In most cases enough planes were available for called missions. The interval between calling the strike and receiving the planes was 45 minutes in the one strike. This is too long and offers no supporting element to fast moving infantry.

Dummy runs are effective for a few runs but the enemy soon realizes when no rounds are being fired.

The effectiveness of control of aircraft from the ground was very poor due to the inability of the ALP to contact the planes directly. By the time the necessary information was relayed, the plane had traveled a good distance and the information was useless.

For Air Support to be of the most value to the attacking infantry it is believed that direct control of the aircraft must be given to the ALP. Because of the long period of

time required for the strike to be executed and the delay in guiding the aircraft on the target, this excellent supporting element is not used to its maximum.

4. Artillery Support. The liaison team controlled fires requested by the assault companies through another FO team assigned to those companies. Artillery request fires initiated by the Battalion artillery liaison between infantry and artillery was maintained by radio and wire. #130 wire was layed whenever the situation permitted, but due to the rugged terrain communication was principally by 610 radio. The 610 radio proved to be an excellent piece of equipment.

Artillery observation was maintained at all times by the establishment of an infantry Battalion OP and forward observation provided by the forward observer with the assault companies.

Artillery missions included harassing fires, defensive fires, preparations, and call missions. When the situation permitted defensive fires were fired each evening. Harassing missions were fired each night. In addition to preparation fires initiated by the Battalion concentrations were fired as requested by Division. Call fires were initiated through the CO of the Battalion or by CO's of the assault companies. Request fires were delivered with an average of 1 to 2 minute delay after the request had cleared the artillery Fire Direction Centers. Due to the very difficult terrain, the scheme of maneuver, and the angle of fire, artillery fires were difficult to control. Consequently an adjustment of fire on a target was slow. This dictated the employment of shell smoke for adjustment rather than the use of shell. H. E. fire for effect was delivered primarily by one battery. Fire for effect was excellent. It is recommended that more high angle fire be used to reach reverse slopes and deep gullies.

Artillery, Air Ground and Naval Gun fire had good coordination between these three supporting arms. It was maintained because: Liaison officers were present at the same OP during the day and were also together in the Battalion OP at night.

Each Liaison or FO team was composed of the following personnel:

- a. One Lt. Observer.
- b. One Scout Sergeant.
- c. One Radio Operator.
- d. One assistant Radio Operator.

- e. Three wiremen.
- f. Three wire carriers.

The personnel was adequately trained and proved in number and efficiency satisfactory for proper liaison functioning.

The equipment proved satisfactory. One 610 radio was destroyed by shrapnel while the Liaison Officer was in the process of directing counter battery fire on an enemy field gun delivering direct hits on the CP.

5. Communications. Within the Battalion, the frequency assigned for Battalion Tactical Command was found to be practically useless during some periods, due to interference from other nets. A large part of this could have been avoided by assigning secondary frequencies to Battalions. For the first phase three (3) SCR-300's were assigned to the 81mm Mortar platoon. They served as an excellent secondary means of communication between observer and guns and were especially useful when troops moved too fast to maintain wire lines. However, this traffic exceedingly overloaded the Battalion Command Frequency. If a channel could be assigned to the mortars or if the Battalion had a secondary channel which could be assigned them, this net would be invaluable in combat.

During the voyage batteries were checked at four (4) day intervals. It was found that BA-70's and BA-80's discharged below the minimum level at a very fast rate. This Battalion had ten (10) SCR-300's, twelve (12) BA-80's, and twelve (12) BA-70's which were taken aboard by radio personnel. Fifty (50) percent of these batteries were checked before embarking and were found to be up to the required level. On L minus 2 twenty five (25) percent or six (6) out of twenty four (24) were found to be at a useable level. After landing, the BA-80's and BA-70's in our supplies were found in many cases to be dead and those supplied by higher echelons likewise. During the voyage the Battalion communication personnel were not used by the ship. The Battalion Communication Officer did stand a coding watch at intervals. During the loading, prior to embarkation, ship-to-shore communication was handled by SCR-300's very successfully.

It is believed that the number of communication personnel allotted to an Infantry Battalion is inadequate. For adequate and efficient wire communication it requires four (4) wiremen for each rifle company. In Headquarters company a minimum of ten (10) men is required for installation and maintenance of the wire system and for the carrying of the required equipment. This makes a total of twenty two (22)

wiremen for each Battalion. The Table of Organization allows a total of eighteen (18) wiremen including team chiefs and wire chief. In the radio and visual section, the equipment carried by the Battalion was: Nine (9) SCR-300's, two (2) SCR-610's, two (2) TRX's. Since each 610 requires two (2) men for carrying and each TRX requires four (4) men, the total radio personnel should be twenty one (21) men including the Radio Chief. Message Center can be operated efficiently with a Message Center Chief, two clerks, and five runners. The 81mm Mortar platoon can operate efficiently with eight (8) men. With this change, the total enlisted strength of the communication platoon would be fifty one (51) men against forty three (43) now allowed by the Table of Organization. This increase is especially desirable when the Battalion operates over terrain prohibiting the use of motor transportation. When a usable road net is available, the transportation allotted to a communication platoon is needed entirely for the transportation of expendable supplies which requires the other equipment be man-handled. Previous to embarkation, the communication personnel were adequately trained. The strength of the section was forty (40) men. Of these all but twelve (12) had previous combat experience. The greatest inadequacy was Non-Commissioned Officers. The Battalion Communication platoon had one (1) Sergeant communications chief, one (1) Corporal wire chief, and three (3) radio Corporals. Although the men did not have the rates they performed their duties with speed and efficiency. There was some confusion in the radio section due to the amount of equipment carried in the section. From 1 April until 15 April the total losses were thirteen (13) men, eight (8) wiremen, including the wire chief, three (3) radio men, the Communication Chief, and the Message Center Chief. Of these men, one radio operator returned to duty. These casualties were replaced by fourteen (14) men: Three (3) radio operators, one (1) message center clerk, seven (7) wire men from JAGCO, plus three (3) untrained volunteers. Of these men two (2) of the wiremen were trained, the other five (5) had two (2) weeks instruction. None of these men could operate a switchboard and none of them knew Battalion Organization. Having only three (3) wiremen in Headquarters who could work efficiently, resulted in a drop of efficiency for this section.

From 1 April to 20 April the following equipment was lost: One (1) 610 antenna (ground operation) shattered by shrapnel, one (1) jeep antenna shattered by shrapnel, one 72 demolished by enemy artillery. Generator trouble with 822-A's, three (3) of which the Battalion repaired, the other five were repaired by Regiment. Six (6) SCR-300's handsets were repaired by Regiment. Three (3) SCR-300's

long and two (2) short antennas were broken. The TCS broke down three (3) times, twice the voice TX circuit, and once the entire TX became inoperable. Out of a total of twenty four (24) SCR-536's in this Battalion seven (7) were working on L plus 3. This set has an inestimable value to company control, but the set is apparently too fragile to take the handling it receives in rifle platoons. The SCR-610 was used in this operation by the Battalion for the first time. The overall performance was very satisfactory. Possibly the only improvement would be an increase in range. All equipment was landed on the beach, however, due to the rapid advance of troops a very large part of this equipment was left on the beach and not regained until about 29 April. During the day in this Battalion the minimum number of lines into the switchboard total nine. They are Regimental trunk, three company lines, 81mm Mortar line, the 6 line, a partyed 2&3 line, a partyed 1&4 line, and a 4 line. During the night the 1, 2, 3, and 4 lines are not partyed and also a 10 phone and radio section phone are installed. This raises the lines to twelve and two PD-71's can be installed in a parallel within the time allotted. However during the day the installation must be made so rapidly that a PD-72 would be much more efficient. Since the T/A allows 3 PD-71's per Battalion, a change to two PD-72's would be more in keeping with present needs.

During the operation, the supply of BA-80's BA-70's, and wire V-130 taxed the communication platoon's transportation. In the case of combat wire this was especially noted when the wire was supplied by higher echelons. The wire from these organizations was DR-8's in one fourth (1/4) mile lengths. If this wire were placed upon DR-8's in one half (1/2) mile lengths it would ease supply and also the laying of wire lines. It was made SOP in this Battalion that signal supplies were sent down to companies at the same time food, water, and ammunition were sent. A daily report was made to Regiment on supplies on hand and those needed for the following day. This system worked very satisfactorily. The Battalion had no repair facilities. It is recommended that the Battalion carry an O.T. and some spare radio and telephone parts so that they can effect minor repairs themselves thus saving time and over taxing the facilities in higher echelons. It was noted in this Battalion that in most cases equipment repaired by higher units was not thoroughly checked before returning to the Battalion. This required equipment be sent back again for further repairs. It is believed that the TCS-Jeen should be driven by a radio operator or maintenance man, for the following reasons: He will know how to handle the equipment to prevent damage and

he may be able to effect minor repairs. Also a wireman should drive the wire jeep. Communication Personnel have a better understanding of the technical language and equipment than a motor transport driver and in many cases could prevent errors in replenishing supplies. Also the T33 Jeep and wire jeep should be under the direct control of the Communication Officer to be used by him only. The use of this transportation by other sections often results in serious delays that could be avoided.

The radio nets were used almost to the exclusion of the wire system. While emphasis was placed upon the advantages of wire during training there is apparently a tendency to use the radio most of the time. There were periods when troops moved so fast and in such a manner that wire communications was impossible. During these periods radio was the only means available and over taxing was expected. In spite of all attempts to remedy this over use of radio, it continued. However, during the night all Battalion command radios were secured unless wire lines went out at which time it was SOP for affected parties to come up on radios. On the night of 14 April because of the loss of personnel it was necessary for the Battalion communication officer to stand a watch on SCR-610 Regimental net. East of YONTAN airfield our Battalion captured a Radar station. Regiment was notified immediately. Next day an enemy radio transmitter was captured in operating order together with organization charts which were immediately turned over to Regiment.

The Amphibious Assault Code was used several times from Regiment to this Battalion for sending of the days password. This Battalion did not use any cryptographic aids on outgoing traffic. Use of the shackle grid for authentication proved effective. The shackle itself was widely used in this Battalion.

Several cases of enemy interference were noted but these were sporadic and ineffective. Deception was noted once when an unknown station called Headquarters ship using this Battalions call sign. The radio operator immediately notified Headquarters ship that this Battalion was not calling them and that some other station was attempting to use our call sign.

6. Medical. Six hospital corpsmen with duties as company aid men embarked with their respective companies, "A", "B", and "C". The remaining twenty-one hospital corpsmen embarked with headquarters company. Two medical officers embarked with headquarters section.

All medical field units were broken down and reworked to conform with needs found in previous operations. The supplies were divided into three sections. The majority of supplies not actually needed in the landing were handled by the Quartermaster section. Extra supplies such as plasma, albumin, stretchers, combat dressings and a sick call unit not needed immediately after the landing were loaded on the jeep ambulance. Supplies to be carried ashore by the corns-men consisted of the following:

Litters, Straight	14
Plasma, Units	64
Albumin, Units	20
Unit 5A	3
Unit 7	1
Unit 10	1
Solint, Leg	1
Solint, Arm	1

Each hospital cornsman and Doctor carried complete individual medical units. Plasma units were carried in officer type packs to facilitate transportation.

Sickness was handled by Battalion Medical officer in the Ship's Sick Bay. The ship furnished supplies for the sick call.

Heads, living quarters, messes, galleys, cooks and messmen were inspected daily and were found up to Navy Standards. One week before debarkation each man was required to take two streptococcal tablets daily. Prior to embarkation all Battalion personnel were immunized against smallpox, tetanus, typhoid, cholera, malaria, typhus and yellow fever.

Company hospital cornsmen were landed with the waves of their respective company. Headquarters medical personnel were divided into three groups. Thirteen bandsmen were joined to the medical section at this time to serve as litter-bearers, and were also divided into three groups with the hospital cornsmen. Material was carried ashore on the landing by hospital cornsmen and bandsmen. Additional material was brought ashore later by the Quartermaster. No personnel were lost in landing. The jeep ambulance with its supplies was lost in landing when the AmTrac overturned on the coral reef. The Quartermaster section lost one medical unit 11B.

The Battalion aid station was set up immediately near a beach road in a defiladed position. There were no other medical installations set up. Due to the tactical situation there were no critical points within our immediate proximity.

Due to flat terrain there were no natural lines of drift for walking wounded.

Local security was maintained by headquarters company and proper steps taken for cover and concealment. The station being temporary, shelters and dugouts were not constructed. When the tactical situation warranted later on in the operation two-man foxholes were dug for protection of medical personnel and casualties.

Evacuation was carried out by Medical companies of the Sixth Medical Battalion nearest our positions. Until the Regimental aid station was established casualties were evacuated to shore parties. Evacuation of casualties was satisfactory until the Battalion moved into high, hilly areas which could not be reached by motor vehicles. However, voluntary litter parties and bandsmen managed to carry casualties great distances to the nearest roads where the patients were placed in jeep ambulances and evacuated to Regiment or Medical companies.

Casualties treated:

Number	187
Retained	8
Evacuated	149
Died	30

Each bivouac area was policed upon arrival and departure. Each section was responsible for slit trenches and garbage pits under the supervision of the Medical department.

Disposal of dead was carried out by the Division Grave Registration. Enemy dead were cared for by Regiment and Division. Due to rapid advance disposal of enemy dead was handled by echelons in the rear.

Twenty-three civilian casualties were given first aid in the Battalion aid station and were evacuated to the Regiment. Because of the difficulty of evacuating Marine casualties the added burden of evacuating civilian casualties greatly hampered and tied up our own transportation.

The diseases present in civilian population consisted of Tuberculosis, Leptosy, Heart Disease, Filariasis, and numerous skin diseases.

No prisoners of war were treated in the Battalion aid station.

The medical personnel in general was adequate. One corpsman killed in action was replaced in four days. One Medical

Officer was evacuated sick on L plus 6 and was not replaced until L plus 21. Training of corpsmen was adequate for field work. No hospital corpsmen with technical training other than Medical Field Indoctrination were needed.

Approximately fifty percent of field medical equipment was carried in the field by corpsmen and Quartermaster, the remainder being moved by rear dumps from which gear could be drawn as needed. Equipment seemed adequate and suitable for this type of operation. Repacked medical units proved more satisfactory than standard allowances. It was found difficult to obtain certain medical supplies in sufficient time to allow for stowage. Resupply in the field was found adequate except for certain items such as adhesive tape, benzoin, neo-synphrin and opium tablets.

One jeep ambulance was carried and lost in the landing. It was replaced on L plus 6. The vehicle is maintained by the Motor Transport section of the Battalion and is utilized to carry both casualties and supplies. Experience in this operation has established the fact that one jeep ambulance is insufficient and it is suggested that a Battalion have either two jeep ambulances, or one jeep ambulance with trailer at the least.

No provisions were made for Malaria control for this operation. DDT powder for personal use and for spraying galleys and heads was extremely difficult to obtain. No spraying equipment was allotted to the Battalions.

It was found that in the mountainous terrain during periods when casualties were heavy, stretchers and plasma could not be gotten to the companies in sufficient time. This has been alleviated by allocating to each rifle company three or more stretchers and extra units of plasma to be carried at all times. Units of plasma are also carried in each vehicle of the Battalion.

7. Supply. During the assault phases the moving of supplies worked well considering the great speed with which the units moved. Special attention should be given to the speed with which water points were established. As to other items of class I, the Battalion was well supplied, with particular references to fruit juices and coffee.

The Battalion was quite fortunate with respect to its transportation. Proper maintenance and care of vehicles kept them going, while the speed with which they were received from aboard ship greatly aided the rapid advance of the

Battalion. One vehicle, a truck 1/4 ton ambulance, and a trailer 1/4 ton 2 wheel cargo, were lost in landing.

There was never an acute fuel shortage within the Battalion during any phase of the operation.

Such special equipment as barbed wire, sand bags etc, were never used by the Battalion in the assault phases. Demolitions, however, were used extensively in blowing caves and clearing enemy mine fields along roads. There was a lack of such articles as tetratol, fifteen second delay fuzes, and trip switches. There was no definite information given this Battalion as to what type and amount of ammunition to be received. It is necessary for lower echelons to receive this information so that proper preparations may be made. The ammunition received by this Battalion proved to be of the highest quality.

It is urgently recommended by this Battalion that large amounts of illuminating hand grenades be kept on hand at all times as they have proved to be invaluable on this operation. Resupply was excellent considering the mountainous terrain, limited road net, and the speed with which the units moved. There was no occasion when necessary supplies could not be drawn from higher echelons. The main difficulty lay in transporting these supplies to troops on the line.

During the very early days of the operation when the service of supply was directly from beach dumps, the efficiency of supply was good considering the fact that the supplies of this Battalion were intermingled with those of the First Battalion, 4th Marines. Later, however, there was an apparent let down as to the dissemination of the equipment of the two Battalions, irrespective of the fact that the gear of this Battalion was well marked. Seemingly no effort was made to provide care or protection for the equipment.

CHAPTER VIII. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.

For the sake of simplicity in the explanation of the 2-Section information of this operation the report has been divided into four (4) periods. They are:

- Period I (April 1-5; Beach Red 1 to ISHIVA A).
- Period II (April 6-12; ISHIVA A to STCHUDA).
- Period III (April 12-24; STCHUDA to SAVINICTORU to KUSHTIKIN).
- Period IV (April 24-30; KUSHTIKIN to CR).

Period I (April 1-5; Beach Red 1 to ISHIVA A). The enemy encountered (74 8696 W, 8 killed), during this period were

disorganized stragglers armed with rifles and machine guns. There were unoccupied trenches, rifle pits, and caves, (some used for supply storage), a great number of which were camouflaged. Along the roads were huge niches or dugouts used as supply dumps and shelter for vehicles.

Period II (April 6-12; ISHIVATA to SEGUNDA). During this period the Battalion moved from ISHIVATA to SEGUNDA encountering negligible resistance. The notable feature occurring during the movement was the trouble occasioned by the movement of civilians through, within and around our lines. Some, in moving at night, were mistaken for the enemy and shot. Two were soldiers in civilian clothes. An abundance of caves were found in this area of operation. From SEGUNDA, at which five days were spent, extended patrols were sent out with negative results. Most of the caves are believed to have been civilian air raid shelters because of their small size and location near fields.

Period III (April 12-24; SEGUNDA to BAYINOTORU to YUSHIKIN). During this period the Battalion encountered a small part of the UTO force which fought a delaying action, defending ravines, spurs and ridges by employing small groups of well armed men (small arms, machine guns and mortars), whose fires were mutually supporting. For overall support they utilized mortars and mountain guns. The terrain in this zone of action was extremely rugged; composed of criss-crossing, odd-shaped ridges, winding valleys, ravines of all sizes, and natural caves. In addition, the heavy vegetation was of great help to the enemy. Three mortars and several machine guns were knocked out by this Battalion. The enemy's banzai charge on the night of the 16th against an adjacent Battalion (TA-9922 T), resulted in his almost complete annihilation. Mortar and machine gun fire of this Battalion exacted a great toll on the enemy.

The second encounter this Battalion had with the enemy during this period was during the patrol movement to the North side of the Peninsula. Here the enemy utilized road blocks by blasting out the narrow mountain roads in three different places, notably on the curves where the repair work was made even more difficult than usual. A force of thirty eight (38) enemy was killed, two (2) six (6) inch coastal defense guns, six (6) Lewis guns, and one (1) mortar were destroyed, (TA-9926 A). In addition optical equipment, medical gear, and large supplies of ammunition and food were captured or destroyed.

In review of this period it is noted that the UTO force was well supplied and equipped, collectively and individually. The enemy soldier himself had all the equipment necessary for his comfort and professional efficiency. As a unit they had

demolitions, mines, ammunition in great quantities (for all of their weapons), food, medical equipment, communication equipment, new type gas masks, fuel and clothes.

During the few days spent at KUSHIKIN, (TA 9803 F), five of the enemy were killed. They were armed with rifles, grenades and demolitions, and were killed at night while trying to move eastward along the North beach of MOTOBU Peninsula. It is possible that they were trying to reach the small native fishing craft within our lines with which they could paddle to the North part of the mainland or to one of the small islands in the area.

Period IV (April 24-30; KUSHIKIN to ORA). This period covers the Battalion bivouac at ORA, (TA 1312 E). A few prisoners of war, clothed as civilians, were picked up trying to move southward with the hundreds of civilians moving along the coast road to KIM. Two enemy contacts were made. The first when five (5) enemy suicide boats were discovered beached and burning near a camouflaged pier, (TA 1409 M). The boats contained two large picric acid explosive charges each. Ten enemy were encountered at this time. The second contact with the enemy in the ORA area was made when an enemy group of approximately twenty (20) ambushed vehicles along the cross-island road, (TA 111 D 1). This group was armed with rifles and grenades. These last two encounters reveal the enemy to be wandering in small groups fighting guerilla fashion.

In review, the highlights of the enemy tactics, technique and equipment were:

Small groups of stragglers, usually well armed, slowed the advance slightly, and attacked the lines at night. In these attacks they used rifles, pistols, grenades, demolitions, machine guns and mortars.

The larger force on MOTOBU Peninsula fought a well organized delaying action as far as their main point of resistance from which they launched the suicidal banzai. In this last stand they used land mines, (ball mines and aerial bombs) on the roads, road blocks (felled trees and blasted holes), mountain and coastal defense guns, mortars, machine guns, rifles, grenades, demolitions and shrapnel bamboo poles. The enemy defense of MOTOBU Peninsula showed they had a high knowledge of terrain appreciation. All likely avenues of approach were well covered with machine gun, mortar, rifle and artillery fire. In addition he used his old tactic of defending the reverse slopes.

CHAPTER IX. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION.

1. Enemy casualties were:

a. Killed	152.
b. Captured	8.
Total	160.

2. Our own losses were:

a. Killed	27.
b. Wounded	120.
c. Died of Wounds	4.
d. Injured & Evac	18.
e. Sick & Evac	46.
Total	215

CHAPTER X. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. S-1. The Casualty Card system seemed to be an improvement over previous systems; however, in cases of high daily casualties, it was impossible to have individual cards and Daily Reports ready for delivery to S-1 by 0700. It is believed if a system could be established whereby dispatches and mailgrams be sent on wounded that require hospitalization or evacuation from this island, it would save unnecessary grief and anxiety to the next of kin. In a few of our cases men received very minor wounds or shocks and were evacuated from our area for treatment only or just for safety where a diagnosis could be determined. This requiring a casualty card from the Battalion; but possibly, the man returned to duty the following day. It was impossible to stop the preparation of dispatches. It is felt that if a possible prognosis of each wounded case could be obtained from higher medical units, this default may be corrected.

During the operation there was no transportation furnished for S-1 equipment, it was left at a Division Dump and was unattainable when needed. If one desk and typewriter could be kept at Battalion dump with one clerk to type change sheets and miscellaneous orders and memorandums this problem could be solved. The change sheet put out by Division did not carry Company or Battalion designations and did not show complete information concerning the burial and evacuation of personnel. Thereby necessitating a change sheet to be typed for forwarding to rear-echelon for Muster Roll and Payroll information. It is believed Graves Registration should be commended for their excellent manner of speed in the handling of men killed.

2. S-2. Types of maps and photos furnished before the operation were:

a. Aerial Photo and Target Grid of Ryukyu-Rotto
1:25,000.

- b. Aerial Photo and Target Grid of Ryukyu-Retto 1:10,000.
- c. Target Map of Yontan Area 1:25,000.
- d. Photomaps of Yontan Area 1:10,000.
- e. Topographical study of Ryukyu-Retto 1:50,000.
- f. Index map of Okinawa-Shima 1:25,000.
- g. Road map of Okinawa-Shima 1:25,000.
- h. Relief Model of Yontan Area 1:5,000.
- i. Aerial Photos: 1:5,000-7,000; 1:10,000; 1:16,000.

The target grid maps of all scales were to an extent inaccurate as to contour lines. The photomaps 1:10,000 and 1:25,000, were of little use due to cloud effects, poor printing and heights at which taken.

The relief model of the Yontan Area was considered accurate, and was extremely valuable in briefing the Battalion before the operation. Recently taken aerial photos were good, however, the area which they covered was quickly over-run. Photos of the area in which the Battalion operated immediately afterward would have been of great use.

Types of maps furnished during the operation were same as mentioned above, except for one reproduced Japanese Map. The helpfulness of these maps would increase tremendously if geographical names were translated into English and not left in the original.

Timeliness, effectiveness, sufficiency of intelligence disseminated by higher headquarters on the whole was excellent. Only on one occasion did higher headquarters fail to pass down valuable information. This was regarding the presence and position of an enemy mountain gun on MOTOBU Peninsula TA 9923 B and G.

The proposed system of handling civilians never materialized. The combat troops were continually burdened with civilians. The military government section which should have handled them in their movement to the rear areas never operated even at the late stage of the operation when this Battalion was in garrison.

Regarding the handling of prisoners. Unlisted liaison teams should operate with each Battalion in order to handle all prisoners. In this operation collecting team men were used to escort prisoners to the rear areas, thus decreasing the teams efficiency as a collecting team. For the interrogation of prisoners and civilians, at least two interpreters are necessary in each Battalion.

The effectiveness of procedure set up for the recovery of captured enemy documents and material is good but the means are grossly inadequate. The effectiveness of the present procedure would be increased tremendously if the collecting team were increased in size from five to at least ten men. One of the men should be a demolitions man who could destroy equipment on the spot without wasting the time of others. A five-man group is not large enough to handle the jobs assigned. In addition the added men are required for the teams own security. It is continually on the move-front to rear, and vice-versa, and from one flank to another. Requesting protection for them from the rifle companies is detrimental to the rifle company's operating efficiency.

The effectiveness and qualifications of Japanese language personnel were outstandingly excellent. The temporarily attached enlisted interpreter who operated with this Battalion proved to be highly qualified and outstandingly efficient. Examples are:

a. A civilian (14 years) was interrogated at ISHIKAWA on 4 April. He reported about 300 of the enemy being on the northern end of the island, and that they often went to MOTOBU PENINSULA. This force subsequently turned out to be part of the UFG force.

b. On MOTOBU PENINSULA: a native revealed the presence of a group of the enemy and the location of two (2) six inch guns. This proved correct.

c. At OBA; A native identified a group of the enemy as part of the Special Naval Landing Force. This coincided with, and confirmed, other information on hand concerning this group.

d. The daily procedure of inspecting civilians as they pass through our lines to the South (Normally a Military Government function). Three Prisoners of War were detected by the interpreter. In addition he worked almost incessantly to do the work of many.

3. 9-3.

e. All weapons functioned properly and all ammunition was in good condition.

The new type ammunition case for 81mm Mortar ammunition is especially suited for this climate. Out of 2000 rounds fired no misfires or short rounds were experienced. For night firing a flashlight device to fit on the 81mm sight was improvised and it proved to be the best method ever used by the mortar platoon of this Battalion. The organic transportation of an infantry Battalion is not sufficient to furnish the 81mm mortar platoon sufficient

vehicles. In a very fast moving situation such as was experienced on this operation it is impossible to displace the mortars forward fast enough. It is recommended that additional trucks, 1/4 ton 4x4, be supplied the Battalion so that two may be permanently assigned the mortar platoon.

The portable flame thrower is too heavy to be carried continuously, day after day, over mountainous terrain. The terrain over which this Battalion operated was not suitable for the use of tanks. However, on the roads travelled two types of road blocks were encountered which would have denied the use of the road to tanks until repairs had been made. One type of road block was the abatis, well placed where the road ran through narrow cuts in cliffs and steep hills. The other type was the anti-tank ditch constructed where the road was narrow, and bordered on one side with a steep cliff and on the other by a deep ravine.

War Dogs were used by this Battalion in patrol work only. For the period covered by this report enemy contacts made by patrols were very few and no contacts made by patrols using dogs.

The only new enemy tactic encountered was attempted infiltration by using civilian disguise. The enemy's use of the terrain for defensive positions was better than previously encountered.

Wire communications within this Battalion was inadequate in respect to sound-power telephones. It is strongly recommended that each Battalion be furnished twenty-one (21) sound-power phones. The break down of this number is: Six (6) per line company and three (3) for the 81mm Mortar Platoon. The use of sound-power phones in a defensive position, especially at night is of inestimable value.

4. S-4. There is a lack of transportation designated in the table of organization for an infantry Battalion. The addition of a trailer for every vehicle plus an addition of two trucks, 1 ton, 4x4 per Battalion would alleviate the situation to a real extent. It is also noted that there is a marked inadequacy of resupply on trucks 1/4 ton 4x4 as well as trailers 1/4 ton 2 wheel cargo. The cargo carrier M29C (Jeep) worked out quite well for this Battalion. The primary use for these vehicles was to haul the 300 gallon water carriers which cannot be satisfactorily hauled by the jeep. The collection of these two vehicles by higher echelon greatly impeded the work of this

Battalion S-4 section during the bivouac period. These cargo carriers should be carefully checked at all times by the operators, but with proper care have worked out well for the Battalion. Trucks 1 ton 4x4 would however, be of greater value. The assignment of 2, 2 1/2 ton trucks per Battalion aided immeasurably in the transportation of bulky equipment from place to place. Maintenance facilities for vehicles has been excellent, with quick and efficient work by members of motor transport units.

The most notable observation to be made concerning supply on this operation is the failure of proper reconnaissance by higher echelon on the road systems of this island. On numerous occasions, roads supposedly passable for vehicles have dwindled into foot trails with no apparent effort to make them passable. There also appeared to be a lack of road coordination for the passage of foot troops and vehicles, often causing uncalled for traffic congestion. It may be suggested that roads be marked and military police posted to clear this congestion when necessary.

R. H. Hayden
R. H. HAYDEN
Lt. Col. USMC
Commanding.

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SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES

SIXTH MARINE DIVISION

PHASE I

OKINAWA



HEADQUARTERS, THIRD BATTALION, FOURTH MARINES,
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
IN THE FIELD.

1 May, 1945.

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

CHAPTER I

A General.

The following report covers the period of preparation, planning and training prior to amphibious landings and includes the assault, defense and garrison phases of action on OKINAWA by this Orgn up to this date.

CHAPTER II

A The Task Orgn.

Units and names of Commanding Officers operating within this Orgn are;

1. BLT 3/4 LtCol B.A. HOCHMUTH
2. 1/15 Arty Fwd Obsr and Pty Lt BRAHM
3. AGL and Pty Lt C.E. WILSON
4. NGL and Pty Lt B.K. TITWELL
5. Co A 9th Amph Trac Bn Capt LEGGE
6. Co A Pion Bn Shore Pty Lt KELLOGG
7. 6th Jasco Shore Pty Comm Team Lt J.D. KOCH
8. Co C 6th Tk. Bn Capt H. CORRIGAN
9. Co - 1st Armd Bn Capt CARLSON

CHAPTER III

A Plans and Operations.

This Orgn on return from GUAM began an extensive training schedule beginning with basic training as a refresher for veterans and instruction for replacements. The program included the mechanical and tactical aspects of training from the simple to more advanced employment of Sqds, Plats, Co's and Bn's up to larger Orgns.

B Intelligence.

The early training by the Bn-2 Sec, started with routine schooling in Jap Wons, uniforms, etc., scouting patrolling and associated subjects. Once the operation was permitted to be told to enlisted personnel this Sec made detailed studies of the defensive installations and planned their job accordingly.

C Quartermaster.

The Bn-4 Sec participated in a minimum of six CPX's. N.C.O.'s were instructed in the establishment, maintenance, and movement of all type of dumps, i.e. chow, water, fuel, Ammo etc.

The major function of the Bn-4 planning was in the equipment phase. Bns were not responsible for replenishment but the Bn did carry some of its own gear such as soap, tools, gun oil, and some spare parts for Wons and vehicles.

D Personnel.

The Bn-1 Sec carried out its regular duties efficiently making every effort to increase Tr's morale and combat efficiency.

CHAPTER IV

A Training Phase and Rehearsals.

Specific training was undertaken to prepare this Orgn for the accomplishment of the mission assigned. A training phase was prepared that was felt would correspond to the tactical situation found on the actual operation.

Extensive instruction was given on the prevention and control of tropical and social diseases which were known to exist on OKINAWA SHIMA. Trs were given several periods of instruction on village and street fighting, Tk and Inf coordination, demolitions and explosives, river crossings and coordination with various attached units in the final phase of training.

In final preparation for the operation, two division problems were held as rehearsals on terrain comparable to that known to exist on OKINAWA SHIMA.

The dress rehearsal was held under actual combat conditions as far as possible. Trs were landed in operational assault craft, on beaches comparable to the beaches on OKINAWA.

CHAPTER V

A Loading and Embarkation.

The Tr embarkation went very smoothly as there had been previously prepared a schedule of embarkation. Loading N.C.O.'s on the ship facilitated matters and at no time was there any congestion or disorganization.

The 3d Bn, 4th Mar, and Atchd units embarked about 700 tons of cargo aboard the U.S.S. GAGE, APA 168. The following is an approximate breakdown of this gear.

Vehicles	300 Tons
Rations (K,C)	40
Ammo (HE)	35
Ammo (SA)	25
Eng and Pion Equip	50
Med Equip	25
Baggage	20
Oil and petroleum	10
Gasoline	8
Water	8
Camp Equip	10
Ord Gear	9
Mess Equip	5
Office Equip	3
Pyrotechnics	2
Org and Misc	30

Loading was accomplished from two beaches over a period of three days. Actual loading time was about twenty hours. LST's embarked initial combat Equip and a small reserve. Regt loaded some of our low priority gear.

CHAPTER VI

A Movement to and Arrival at Objective Area.

Arriving at ULITHI area assault Trs were transferred to LST's. All personnel were thoroughly briefed on the operation, and were given Int circulars, bulletins, maps and booklets concerning enemy activity on OKINAWA to study. Trs were instructed on the part that each unit was to play in the operation. Training aboard ship consisted chiefly in brief daily periods of calisthenics, to keep Trs in physical condition.

CHAPTER VII

A Narrative of Events on OKINAWA.

War Diary of the OKINAWAN Operation, in narrative form, as participated in by the 3d Bn, 4th Marines, for the period April 1 to May 1, 1945. This period terminated at KAWADA where the Bn bivouacked for a short period of reorganization.

Early on Easter morning, LOVE-day of the OKINAWAN operation, GQ was sounded as a few enemy aircraft came over the convoy. Trs were awakened and fed the usual operational day breakfast of beans.

At 0700 LVT's left the ramp of the assault LST's to maneuver for position in the starting line-up. A very heavy concentration of gunfire was being laid on the beach by every type of naval vessel. An amazingly large air umbrella overhead tended to give the Trs a more hopeful outlook. All in all, the airships overhead, the battle-wagons and cruisers belching out sheets of flame, the multitude of small craft dotting the placid water, tended to give the operation an air of a Navy-day pageant rather than of a battle.

The first wave of armored LVT's hit the beach at 0840 followed closely by the assault Co's LOVE and KING. The beach was undefended and the only casualty was from a piece of ricocheting shrapnel. LOVE Co started immediately in the direction of TOYA penetrating the hilly terrain 100 Yds before the CP landed with ITEM, reserve Co.

By 0900 KING Co, contacted ABLE Co on the right flank and it was discovered that the Bn had landed on beach GREEN II rather than the planned RED I. Immediately Col HOCHMUTH ordered the Bn to pull into their proper zone of action sending ITEM Co to the vicinity of TOYA and requesting the Tks to come in on beach RED I for supporting action in case they were needed.

LOVE Co guiding on KING Co passed the B-1 and the O-1 lines without resistance, moving on the R-1 line, while ITEM Co sent one Platoon to reconnoiter TOYA. By noon both assault Co's had crossed the YONTAN AIRBORNE discovering vacated AA Gun positions but not contacting the enemy.

Not until Trs reached the O-2 line was resistance encountered. Mortars were put into action immediately and registered on the enemy positions.

Intentions were to secure the L-3 line if possible as it commanded a good defensive ridge position, but Jap resistance in the numerous caves dotting the hilly terrain prevented rapid adv. Tks were brought up to support lines laying shell after shell directly into the caves.

By 1600 a fairly good ridge position was secured east of YONTAN AIRBORNE and a defensive line was set up for the night having contact on the right with the 1st Bn, 4th Mar and on the left with the 22nd. No Japs were sighted on the first day but scattered small arms fire was received from caves and ravines. Two men were killed and buried on the spot, services being conducted by Chaplain BOYD who was with the front line Trs throughout the day.

No enemy activity was encountered the first night and Co's jumped off early to the Atk. One prisoner taken, when questioned, reported that Japs in this area had moved South. Terrain was exceedingly rough and it was impossible

to continue in a skirmish line.

A few Rds of Nip Arty were received in the Co area. 1st Bn reported fire from same approximate position and an observer was sent out to check coordinates. Wiremen tracing the Regtl Comm line reported sniper fire but no casualties resulted from either incident. During the morning several civilians were interrogated, all old men and sent immediately to Regt. Gen SHEPPLAD visited the CP during the morning and gave orders to keep shoving.

At noon LOVE Co met the first organized resistance. The operations O went out to review the situation and see what possible aid they might need. Capt DALE, LOVE Co Commander was badly wounded but could not be evacuated due to position. The 2nd Plat LOVE Co under Lt BREWSTER was moving down a draw and pinned down by fire from cave positions. ITEM Co was immediately drawn from the line, relieved by EASY Co, and brought around to right flank in an attempt to aid LOVE Co and to maintain contact with 1st Bn. The 1st and 3rd Plats of LOVE Co commanded the high ground around the 2nd Plat and were able to prevent an Atk by the enemy but were unable to reach the 2nd Plat where Capt DALE lay wounded.

ITEM Co flanked position on left, 1st Bn on the right. M7's were ordered up by Col SHAPLEY who remained in the CP during the afternoon but they proved ineffective.

Desperate to get DALE out and to relieve the 2nd Plat Lt PERSKIE, LOVE Co Exec O., took a Plat and despite a few faint cries of "Banzai" emanating from the Jap positions, yelled a defiant "Banzai, hell!" and led a charge into the ravine wiping out remaining Nip positions and making possible the evacuation of DALE and 20 casualties suffered by the Plat during the aft. Wounded were evacuated through 1st Bn area by LVT's. Japs estimated killed during the afternoon by LOVE Co were between 250 and 275.

During the afternoon the Regtl flag was raised on hill 100, North of CHINA, by Lt WILSON and LT HENSLEY, with Col SHAPLEYS' permission.

On the 3d day of the operation the 3d Bn crossed the O-A line spotting Trs 5000 Yds to right flank which were identified as friendly. Col HOCHMUTH and Fwd CP moved during the aft with the K Co front lines. Orders previously given to burn out brush was proving very effective. One Nip running from fire, 20 Yds to rear, killed and searched. He was in very poor condition, thin and with much Opium on his person. A diary was discovered in his clothing and turned over to Int.

Weather has remained very warm. Due to rapid Adv Trs were unable to get water and had a rough trip over the serrated mountains. At times using ropes to get up and down ravines, the Co's made no attempt to clear out the very thickly wooded gulleys as contact was impossible.

KING and ITEM Co's lines tied in just short of the C-B line for the night with LOVE Co 1000 Yds to rear, in reserve, Regtl.

Caves in vicinity of the Bn CP were found to be occupied by civilians and were ordered by interpreter to remain during the night. The QM convoy with water and food coming through the 15 Marines lines, on the right, were fired upon by what they thought to be 20mm. They also reported some sniper fire. Estimated enemy killed during the day, 50. Civilians encountered 35.

The next morning the caves proved to be occupied by a few soldiers, they were dispatched with demolitions. Friendly Artv fire fell in ITEM Co lines killing 2 and wounding 4 others. Trs were given what little supplies could be carried in, but were unable to get packs. Weather has been warm and clear but with chilly nights and heavy moisture.

Co's moved in column along ridges to the C-B line. Flats to front proved to be occupied by friendly Trs with numerous vehicles. By 1300 the 3d Bn arrived at ISHICHA on the L-15 line. Trs were allowed to bathe and all available transportation was turned to, in order to bring up supplies and packs. The 3d Bn was then put into Div reserve.

The following afternoon the 3d Bn began marching to SUKKU. The first night was passed in IJA, the second day the Bn arrived at the destination. The Bn stayed encamped at SUKKU until APRIL 13. During this period 10 in 1 rations were issued along with fruit juices and candy. Security patrols were sent out daily.

KING Co was dispatched by Regt as a Co patrol to secure the North end of the island. The first night out KING Co passed in ABU. The second at ATSO MURU. One POW and one appendicitis case were evacuated by LVT. On the third day KING Co reported in at TENNIYA with one Nip killed.

On April 13 the rest of the 3d Bn began marching from SUKKU, leaving packs for the LVT's to bring up, to support KING Co if the need should arise. The Bn marched to KAWADA, 20 miles up the coast and set in there for the night.

On the following morning, despite sore feet, the Bn less KING Co, who were about 5 miles farther North, abandoned the Northern push and started hiking South by West for the MOTUBU PENINSULA. Picked up by Trks after 2 miles of walking they were driven across the island in order to support the 29th Marines on the Penninsula. Trks were sent as far North as possible to expedite KING Co's rapid delivery back to the Bn. The 1st Bn, 22nd Marines, took up the original 3d Bn 4th's Northern push.

Arriving at AWA in Div reserve, KING Co was again dispatched from the 3d Bn on a reconnaissance on the Western tip of the MOTOBU PENN.

Explosives were found under the BAILEY Bridge outside of AWA by the Int Sec. They were immediately reported and disposed of. ITEM Co had 2 men killed the following day on a Plat patrol by sniper fire but because of heavy brush and steep slopes were unable to evacuate the bodies.

On April 16, reverting to Regt control the 3d Bn moved out in a Bn column to make contact with the first Bn and Atk resistance on the MOTOBU PENN. In the afternoon scattered sniper fire and a few Mort shells were received but the Bn met no Org enemy resistance in any great strength.

KING Co coming up from the rear in the late afternoon to revert to Bn control took out 1st Bn wounded who were treated by the 3d Bn Med Sec and on their return trip carried in much needed water and Ammo. During the day the Bn had 9 casualties among them LT FLANNERY of LOVE Co. Lt FLANNERY later died and services were held for him on the 1st of May 1945.

During the day no Nips were killed but three of them set off illuminating flares at night and were killed by MG fire.

The following day on the Fwd ridge several Nips were found dressed in black civilian clothing with military gear strewn about. Also found were 9 soldiers killed evidently by 81mm fire. Four of them were officers. With them were found one NAMBU, one Kni Mort and several rifles.

East of HANA SAKI 4500 Yds, LOVE Co located an Org area. Caves of Equip, among them two Prime Movers and heavy field pieces were found and reported.

Upon reaching the rd in the valley near MANNA, it was found to be mined and supplies could not be brought up. The Bn reversed direction and moving back into the hills tied in with the 1st Bn perimeter for the night and the following day. During that day 56 Nips were disposed of with no casualties to the Bn.

The Bn stayed encamped on the following day, but patrols were sent out in all sectors. A KING Co patrol with Int personnel was sent back to further investigate the caves discovered on the previous day by LOVE Co. Two Nips were killed by the patrol which definitely established the position as a Jap Hq. The 1st Plat patrol returned at noon while Capt McMASTERS with a patrol from his Co escorted Gen GEIGER through the same area.

On April 19 the Bn again moved out in column to move into the foothills beyond MANNA. At the Rd Jc to immediate front two bodies of Marines were found, identified as belonging to the 29th Regt they were buried by Chaplain BOYD. Arriving at area it was found that KING Co had killed 5 Nips. Other patrols gave a

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negative report.

ITEM company led off the next morning with Capt DEVORE, Int O, leading the way. Under a small foot bridge he found a box of explosives but as no detonators were in position it was reported and let alone. Small flanking patrols of team and Sq strength scouted out the numerous caves along the gully trail. Many temporary shelters of brush were in evidence and fresh human spoor was seen on the slopes. Two people believed to be soldiers were fired upon but not hit. One large group of civilians were found huddled in a small ravine but were left alone. On a ridge 600 Yds short of the ocean on North side of MOTOBU PENN an elaborate system of trenches were found but with no evidences of recent occupation. At bivouac area on the beach, many natives were found. One child dressed in khaki was mistaken for a soldier and shot. His father buried him in a cave before shoving off with the rest of the natives.

The Bn stayed encamped until the 23 when Trks carried personnel to a proposed 4 week bivouac area, at KAWADA. From there local patrols were sent out daily but no enemy activity was encountered until April 27 when a column of Nips were seen estimated at between 200 and 500. KING Co was shifted to the North side of the perimeter to strengthen that area for the night.

Early the next morning the Bn moved out in strength to try to intercept the Nips. An LOVE Co patrol tasted first blood by shooting one Nip and driving two more into a house where they committed Hari Kari with Grs. KING Co met the first Org resistance and LOVE Co was immediately started on a flanking movement. ITEM Co was used for evacuation and for trail security. During the ensuing scrap, KING Co killed 81 and LOVE Co got 28 more. An estimated 50 more brought the total to 159 as compared to our own 9 casualties, one killed. One nurse was with the soldiers and shares their "honorable" grave. The Bn returned to KAWADA for the night.

B Ship-to-Shore.

Ship-to-Shore movement was carried out in LVT's. 33 of these LVT's were used to carry Trs and priority cargo ashore. The landing was affected on time but on GREEN II rather than RED I. This was due to the poor visibility and improper placement of control craft.

C Shore Pty.

Upon securing RED I the shore Pty was set up and the carrying of supplies from the ships was carried out with the minimum of confusion.

D Naval Gunfire Spt.

Naval Gunfire worked very efficiently with the Bn. It was always on call when needed and proved beneficial in SPT missions.

E Air Spt.

Air Spt was well coordinated in initial phases and coverage was excellent on prearranged missions. Direct air Spt was available at all times.

F Arty Spt.

Although the terrain and Comm lines were very difficult to traverse, Arty was available on call at all times, after landing, with a minimum of delay. Actual Spt was excellent.

G Tks.

Due to the rugged terrain the use of Tks in Spt of Inf was negligible. Tks were available, had the terrain been permissible for their tactical use with Inf.

H Amph Trac.

Amph Tracs expedited ship-to-shore movement efficiently and their use inland as prime movers & supply vehicles was always well coordinated. They proved to be of great value on numerous occasions.

I Arm Amph.

Arm Amph covered the landing effectively. Due to nature of narrow beach there was some congestion between the Arm Amph and the Amph Tracs but this was soon overcome. The Arm Amph were prepared to and performed direct Spt firing missions immediately upon landing, and were prepared to fire indirect Spt Arty missions within 45 minutes of actual landings.

J Comm.

Comm, despite poor axis of Sig Comm available and mountainous terrain, was on the whole excellent. At no time was the Bn out of Comm with units either higher or lower.

K Eng.

What Eng work that was called upon to be done was done immediately.

L Med.

Bn aid stations operated at all times close to the front lines and expedited the movement of wounded to the rear. They assisted not only in taking care of their own wounded but on two occasions performed medical functions for Adj Bns, whose Med stations were unable to reach casualties. Throughout the operation the Med work was outstanding.

M Supply and Logistics.

Despite the adverse condition of terrain and shortage of Trks, supplies were on hand whenever possible.

N Public Relations.

Public relations in general were carried out by Div. Correspondents and Photographers were available at all times to cover various situations.

O Military Govt.

Recommend that Bn's be equipped with more facilities to handle civil affairs. Suggest further, that more language personnel be given to Bn's, giving at least one per Co.

P Special Reconnaissance Missions.

KING Co of the 3d Bn went on special Reconnaissance to the North end of the island but were recalled within 10 miles of it, at TAKEE, and were then sent to the Western tip of the MOTOBU PENN for Reconnaissance work there. They were recalled again to support the Bn in its' drive across the PENN.

CHAPTER VIII

A The Enemy.

On two occasions on this Opn we have encountered Org enemy resistance. On the MOTOBU PENN the enemy reverted to what could be termed Guerrilla tactics, falling back on difficult terrain while harrassing our advance.

The enemy Inf was supported chiefly by MG fire and we encountered a negligible amount of Mort and arty fire.

CHAPTER IX

A Area

The area secured by this Bn includes that from beach RED I across YONTAN AIRDROME to ISHICHA, then Northward up the coast to YETTO. The Bn also secured that area from AVA on the right flank of the 1st Bn across the MOTOBU PENN to the North coast.

B Enemy casualties.

1. KIA 302
Estimated additional 200.
Total 502
2. Between 750 and 1200 civilians interrogated or squared away and sent back to Regt.

C Enemy Operational Damage.

3d Bn has captured the following;

4 LMG	2 15cm CD	1 37mm
3 HMG	3 Prime movers	2 Radio sets, switch-boards, etc.
2 50mm Gr D	2 Trks	
1 13mm AA	1 75mm	

D Own Casualties.

1. KIA 24
2. MIA 49
3. MIA None

CHAPTER X

A Bn-1.

The G-1 Weekly report is unduly complicated. A more simplified weekly report modified after the Daily Report would clarify the figures to be presented.

B Bn-2.

The main recommendations are that additional language personnel be assigned to assault Bns, to take care of the large number of civilians encountered. It is a full time assignment for one man to check documents and question military prisoners captured. He does not have time to handle civilians.

C Bn-3.

Bn-3 (Cont)

1. All Co's be furnished with one vehicle for use on rough terrain comparable to the Weasel.
2. All vehicles including the ambulance jeep be supplied with a trailer.

D Bn-4.

1. a Inf Bns be furnished one Trk, 1 ton 4x4 as a prime mover for water trailers.
- b 3 Trks, 2 1/2 Ton, be Organic Equip for Bn.
- c One ton trailer be Atchd to weasels.
- d Emergency rations include one Pt of fruit or fruit juice per man per day.
- e Higher Ech convoy larger replenishments of Tons, accessories, spare parts, Essential items such as BAR's, patches and oil have been non-existent.

BY ORDER OF LTCOL B. A. HOCHMUTH

CARL E. CONRON
Major USMCR
Exec O

OFFICIAL

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RADE ENICH
Major USMCR
Bn-3

REGIMENTAL WEAPONS COMPANY, FOURTH MARINES
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION
IN THE FIELD

6 May, 1945

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

I Recommendations for changes and improvements in training and Table of Basic Allowances of Weapons Company, Infantry Regiment.

A. 105MM PLATOON.

1. Replace 4X4, 1 ton, ammo carriers with short-coupled 6X6, 2½ ton, M-5's to serve as ammo, fuel and camouflage gear carriers. Assign one per M-7.
2. Replace Cal .50 Machine Gun in "pulpit" mount with Cal .30 Light Machine Gun, thus allowing more freedom of movement for fire direction by the track commanders.
3. Mount an additional Cal .30 Light Machine Gun aft on the left armored bulwerk. This gun would have the same function as described in Pp 2.
4. More extensive training with infantry down to the individual rifle platoon.
5. Light road and bridge repair equipment attached to Battalions, if their use is anticipated prior to a movement. This would not only aid the battalion in maintenance of supply, but would make the heavy supporting weapons more quickly available. In several instances thus far during this operation, the employment of Regimental Weapons was restricted, whereas one small bulldozer would have solved the problem. This suggestion of course, applies only if minor repair is needed, such as tank traps, cross cut road blocks, etc.
6. Arming the M-7 tank drivers with Cal .45 automatic pistols in place of the TSMG. The drivers compartment is extremely limited for movement and the TSMG has proven unwieldy for firing out of the driving port.
7. The use of the M-7s to support tanks by providing a second echelon with greater observation has been discussed between the Fourth Marine Weapons Company Commander and the "A" Company, Sixth Tank Battalion, Company Commander and it appears to have favorable possibilities. Definite tactical plans await approval of the next higher echelon.
8. Heavy maintenance equipment should be made available to the Weapons Company to facilitate repair work, both

in training areas and in the field. The desirable solution would be attaching directly to each Weapons Company a more complete maintenance and repair section with the necessary tools and spare parts. Present conditions require an excess of improvising and field expedients, thus restricting the efficiency and dependability of valuable equipment.

9. This company, before another operation, will require either replacement of the M-7 by the improved model M-7B1, or four new 9 cylinder radial aircraft type engines.

10. Communications to be improved as described in communications annex.

B. 37MM ANTI-TANK PLATOONS.

1. Increased training hours in infantry tactics to operate as rifle or reconnaissance platoon. The 37mm platoon can serve in secondary missions for patrol work as has been proven in the first phase of the present operation, however more extensive training in squad and platoon tactics will be necessary for any replacement troops. This is strongly recommended and can be accomplished under Unit Commanders time during future training periods.

2. Increase allowance of Cal .30 M-1 rifles from thirty three (33) as prescribed in Weapons Company Table of Organization, F-7, to forty-five (45). There should be at least one per 37mm gun squad. An allowance of one (1) BAR per 37mm gun squad is also recommended. The need for these weapons has been evident during the current and previous operations, to be used, not only in support or defense of the 37mm gun position, but in conjunction with the employment of the platoon as described in Pp. (1).

3. An increased tool and spare parts allowance.

4. Communications improvements as described in communications annex.

C. WEAPONS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS.

1. Increase machine gun personnel from six (6) corporals and twelve (12) Privates first class to ten (10) corporals and twenty (20) Privates first class.

At present, it is necessary, due to lack of personnel, to employ the Cal. .50 machine guns in support or in supplement of the 37mm gun in order that the 37mm gun squad can provide ammo personnel to assist in manning the .50 Cal. There are instances in which the support of the 37mm by the .50 Cal. is tactically desirable, however the .50 Cal. is in itself a highly efficient anti-tank or anti-boat weapon and if personnel were provided by the Table of Organization to properly service these ten (10) machine guns, it would, in effect, provide the regiment with ten (10) more anti-tank weapons that could be employed either in conjunction with the 37mm guns or separately.

2. The motor transport of this Company has played an important part in maintenance of supply, evacuation of casualties and troop carrying during this operation. Two (2) men who have been self-trained as mechanics in this Company and who are not even rated on the "TO" are almost entirely responsible for the twenty-two (22) 4x4 1-ton trucks being available. Had it not been for these men, the regiment would have had a greater transportation problem. A motor transport maintenance and repair section, should be a primary consideration in the forming of any unit which has thirty (30) vehicles, yet the Weapons Company is expected to rely on an ill-equipped regimental motor transport section that is already hard pressed in keeping battalion and Headquarters and Service company vehicles operating, for maintenance.

3. In general, the "TO" and "TBA" of the Weapons Company, Infantry Regiment, provides a formidable amount of weapons, fire power and transportation and is in dire need of a proportionate amount of personnel and repair equipment to efficiently man and maintain the gear. Regardless of the care and preventative maintenance, this condition creates a constant threat to the combat efficiency of a company that has much to offer the battalions when weapons support is needed.

4. Communications improvements as described in communications annex.

II COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX FOR WEAPONS COMPANY.

A. EQUIPMENT

1. It is recommended that the TCS radio in the M-7 be replaced with the SCR-528. It has been found that

the TCS will not perform satisfactorily under extreme conditions imposed on it when installed in a tracked vehicle. If this change is made, the three (3) TCS radio jeeps will have to be replaced with SCR-508 radio jeeps. One TCS radio jeep should be retained in the company for communications with other echelons.

2. It is also recommended that the SCR-608 radio jeep be replaced by two (2) SCR-610 radios. The present allowance of SCR-300s is sufficient.

3. The SCR-536 radios, under proper conditions, performed satisfactorily; however, they are too fragile to be dependable. If they are used in future operations, each 37mm platoon should have five (5) instead of the present number of three (3). When deployed, the distance between guns is such that some method of communication is necessary; usually the conditions are such that a wire circuit is impracticable. One SCR-536 per gun would correct this situation. The total amount of radio equipment required under these changes is as follows:

- 4 - SCR-528 (M-7 installed)
- 3 - SCR-508 radio jeeps
- 1 - TCS radio jeep
- 2 - SCR-610
- 9 - SCR-300
- 15 - SCR-536 (three (3) different channels).

4. The present allotment of telephone equipment proved ample and no change is necessary in the present Table of Basic Allowances.

B. TRAINING.

1. The training period allotted was sufficient. All phases of communication were thoroughly covered, and personnel had ample time to review.

C. PERSONNEL.

1. It is recommended that the present number of communication personnel be increased. In the past operation, the lack of trained men in proportion to the equipment used in this company, has caused inefficiency, especially in the operation of radios.

2. The minimum amount of communication personnel required for this organization is twenty-two (22) as shown below:

- 1 - StfSgt - Comm Chief
- 1 - Sgt, repair-
- 1 - Corp, Rdo- Radio Chief
- 2 - Corp - Radio operator
- 1 - Corp - Wire Chief
- 7 - PFCs - Radio operators
- 9 - PFCs - Wiremen

D. GENERAL

1. As a whole the communications during the past operation were satisfactory. It is believed, however, that if the above changes in personnel and equipment are made, it will insure excellent communications during future operations.

Raymond L. Luckel
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