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Statement of

Stanislav Levchenko

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES

Wednesday, July 14, 1982

U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 o'clock a.m., in Room H-405, the Capitol, the Honorable Edward P. Boland (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Boland (presiding), Mazzoli, Mineta, Stump, McClory, Whitehurst and Young.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director; Michael J. O'Neil, Chief Counsel; Patrick G. Long, Associate Counsel; Sharon Leary, Assistant Clerk of the Committee; and Herbert Romerstein, Richard H. Giza, G. Elizabeth Keyes, Annette H. Smiley, and Diane E. La Voy, Professional Staff Members; and Ira H. Goldman, Counsel.

P R O C E E D I N G S

The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

We are delighted to have with us this morning, we welcome, Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB major who defected to the United States in 1979.

Our understanding of Mr. Levchenko's background as supplied by himself and also by those who are with the CIA is that he is one of the most knowledgeable people in the West on Soviet active measures. In fact, only Major Levchenko and Ladislav Bittman, who testified before this Committee in 1980, have had actual experience in running active measures and are available to the Committee and to the Intelligence Community.

For the information of Mr. Levchenko, this Committee is split into a number of subcommittees, one of them being the Subcommittee on Oversight. We held hearings on Soviet use of propaganda and covert action against the United States two years ago; and those hearings concentrated on Soviet propaganda and forgeries which apparently, according to at least one recent press item, seem to be increasing. I am sure that you will have additional knowledge that you can expand on for the Committee.

It is an area that we think is terribly important for the security of the United States, and yesterday we opened these hearings and had Mr. John McMahon, who is the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency, and John Stein, the Deputy Director for Operations. They were accompanied by Martin Portman.

It was the kind of a meeting where we wanted to get some information on the extent of Soviet propaganda all around the world, how effective it is, and how to counteract that kind of propaganda.

I have read most of your statement. I think it is a fine statement, and the clear indication, of course, is that you have considerable knowledge on Soviet propaganda around the world and the kind of infrastructure that is built into this operation by the Soviet Union.

So, we welcome you as a very knowledgeable witness to these hearings, and we are delighted to have you.

Mr. Young?

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I would like also to welcome Major Levchenko to our hearing today. Maybe it is a coincidence, but I think it is appropriate that he be here today to testify on Bastille Day. Bastille Day, of course, is the day that symbolizes the fight for freedom that Major Levchenko continues to wage here in the United States. He has shown great courage in his defection from the KGB. He has been of significant help to our government in our efforts to understand the KGB threat, particularly active measures.

I welcome Major Levchenko to our Committee, also to the fellowship of free men, and hopefully, in the future, as a fellow American.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. We would have held the hearings on your birthday, which will be on July 28, but that is too far away. So we decided on today.

You are a relatively young man at the age of 41. You have had as much experience, I guess, in the field in which you operate as any particular person that we have knowledge of, and that of course gives us great confidence in your ability and in your knowledge.

Are there any other statements by any of the members?

So why don't you proceed as you wish.

Statement of Stanislav Levchenko, Former KGB Major

Mr. Levchenko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have the prepared text of my testimony which I, with your permission, would read. It is typewritten, but I as well have the original of this statement which I would like to be put in the record.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, it is a great honor for me to testify to the representatives of the legislative body of the leading country of the free world. I would like to begin my testimony by first introducing myself with a summary of my life and my career. I would like also to point out the motives which brought me to resentment of the Soviet socialist system.

I will be happy to answer afterwards all of your questions on the matters I personally witnessed during my career within the Soviet hierarchy.

My name is Stanislav Levchenko. I was born on July 28, 1941 in Moscow, USSR. My father was a Major General and Department Chief in one of the Soviet military research institutes. By profession he was a chemical engineer. My mother died when I was three years old. Within a few years my father remarried. My stepmother was a pediatric surgeon.

In 1958 I graduated from the special high school No. 1 of the Sokolniki District of Moscow. Some of the subjects in this school were taught in the English language. That same year I became a student of the Institute of Asia and Africa affiliated with the Moscow University. For six years I studied Japanese language, history, economics and literature.

After graduating from Moscow University, I was assigned to work for the Institute of Maritime Fishery as a junior researcher. In 1965 I was called to the International Department of the Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union, and was proposed to work as a secretary-interpreter for the Moscow correspondent of the Japanese Communist newspaper Akahata. Formally, I was supposed to be on the payroll of the Soviet Red Cross, which according to the directive of the Soviet Communist Party leadership is paying monthly stipends to most foreign Communist newspapers' journalists assigned to Moscow. But, actually, I was to spy on a Japanese Communist journalist and

and to report his activities to the Japanese Sector of the International Department on a daily basis. I did not want that kind of job, and rejected it. I used the excuse that I already was passing exams to become a postgraduate student at the Institute of Peoples of Asia and Africa of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

In November 1965 I was formally admitted to postgraduate study and started to write my Master's degree thesis on the history of the Japanese peace movement. The above-mentioned institute is actually guided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Soviet Union, and provides it with studies of political, economic and military situations in most of the third world countries. I also had to take part in several such studies.

While being a postgraduate student in 1965-67, I was working as a part-time consultant for the Soviet Peace Committee, which is an active tool of the International Department of the Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union, in manipulating one of the major Soviet front organizations: the World Peace Council, WPC. I was assigned to work as an interpreter to most of the delegations of the Japanese peace movement which had visited the USSR during these years. I had to collect information on the current situation in numerous Japanese leftist public organizations and to submit it to the International Department.

In April 1966 I visited Japan for the first time as an interpreter of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation. But actually under orders of the Sector for Japan of the Communist Party Soviet Union's International Department, I had to meet with several leading figures in the Japanese peace movement and to collect information on the latest developments in it and to report this information to the International Department. Since then, and before I was assigned to Japan as a KGB officer, I visited Japan about twelve times as a member of different delegations of the so-called Soviet public organizations, all of which are closely affiliated with the International or other departments of the Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union.

In 1966 I started to work full time for the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which manipulates the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, headquarters located in Cairo, as a referent.

The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, under the close guidance of the International Department, is involved in political, financial and, to an extent, military support of the so-called national liberation movements in the third world countries and

maintains unofficial, sometimes confidential, contacts with the pro-Soviet leaders of the political parties in countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This Committee also organizes worldwide campaigns aimed at the weakening of the influence of the United States and other free world countries in the Third World. I can give the following examples of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee's activities in the 1960s.

Under the directives of the Soviet Politburo, it was a key front organization responsible for running the anti-Vietnam war campaign on a worldwide basis.

The Soviet Vietnam Support Committee, actually a department of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in close cooperation with the KGB, politically exploited deserters from the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam who had been smuggled from Japan into the Soviet Union and finally immigrated to Sweden. The deserters had been forced to give anti-American interviews to the Soviet journalists which afterwards had been replayed in most countries of the world.

KGB and the General Staff of the Soviet Army are accepting soldiers and officers of such terrorist organizations as the PLO for guerrilla-type training in the USSR according to the lists which the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee obtained from the leaders of the PLO.

For many years before the PLO opened its official representation in Moscow, the Soviet Solidarity Committee had been responsible for maintaining relations personally with the PLO leader Yassir Arafat.

In 1966-67, being an Army reserve officer, I underwent three months of training as an intelligence operative-illegal. In the case of development of a pre-world war situation, I was trained for a mission where I was to be brought to the territory of Great Britain to detect and report to the GRU the state of readiness of British nuclear strike forces located in the area of one of their major seaports.

By 1970 I became one of the spokesmen of Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, taking part in the organization of several international conferences of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, including the Cairo Conference in January 1971.

In the same year, I was approached by a senior officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, External Intelligence, and was asked to join the First Chief Directorate as a case officer. In 1972 I graduated from the one-year intelligence

school of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, a very sophisticated training facility where the future intelligence officers are taught the basics of spy tradecraft, structure and methods of operation of the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services, use of electronic eavesdropping devices, as well as a variety of other subjects of the intelligence-gathering profession.

By the fall of 1972, I had been assigned as a case officer to the Japanese Desk of the 7th Department of the First Chief Directorate of KGB. At that time I had a military rank of Senior Lieutenant. I had to handle about 20 files on agents belonging to virtually all strata of the Japanese society, on the Socialist Party of Japan, and on methods of operations of the Japanese intelligence community.

In 1974, after finishing the course of on-job training, I was told that the First Chief Directorate was going to assign me to Japan as a field case officer to collect political intelligence. On the final stage of preparation for this assignment, I was sent to work for almost one year for the Soviet international magazine New Times. I had to improve my journalistic skills -- I had been writing for Radio Moscow while working for the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee -- and to study the mechanism of editorial work and to publish several long articles in the magazine. After arriving in Japan I was supposed to use the position of Tokyo correspondent of New Times as a cover for my intelligence activities. To be able to dissolve into the international journalistic community in Tokyo and in order to hide the real purpose of my assignment to Tokyo from Japanese counterintelligence, I had to have real journalistic experience.

New Times magazine, which is published in Russian, English, Spanish, Arabic, Czech, Polish and German languages, formally belonged to the Soviet Trade Unions, but actually it is a propaganda hand of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union International Department and of the Active Measures Service of the First Chief Directorate, KGB. It is also used by the KGB as a cover for its operatives stationed abroad. When I was going through the on-job training in the New Times, the magazine had 12 foreign correspondents. Ten of them were KGB operatives.

In February 1975, with my family, I arrived in Tokyo and started to work as a case officer for the Tokyo Residency of KGB, line PR, political intelligence.

One or two times a month I sent articles to New Times magazine. Two weeks after I arrived, my predecessor turned a developing contact over to me, a prominent figure in the main opposition party of Japan, the Socialist Party. In several months I started to handle several agents of the KGB's network

in Japan, and during the next four years I had recruited four agents. By 1979 I was handling ten agents and developmental contacts with whom I had from 20 to 25 clandestine meetings a month.

Four of the agents I handled were prominent Japanese journalists. Having high level contacts in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party or contacts with high level government officials, including members of the Cabinet of Ministers, these agents were providing the Soviets secret oral information and documents on the Japanese Government's plans in internal and external politics. One of the agents was a close confidant of the owner of a major Japanese newspaper with daily circulation of more than three million copies. He had been used by the Soviets to implement a variety of active measures through this newspaper.

Shortly before he was turned over to me, he published the so-called "Will of Chou En-lai," which was one of the most successful Soviet forgeries in the 1970s. This will was fabricated by specialists in the Active Measures Service of the KGB's First Chief Directorate and was intended to show that the leadership of the PRC had been deeply divided on the major political issues in the period before the death of Mao Tse-tung. The forged will then was replayed in the mass media of most of the countries in the world.

One of the other agent-journalists had access to confidential documents issued by the Japanese intelligence and had been providing information from them to the KGB.

Another agent is a high-ranking member of the Japanese Socialist Party. He was used mainly for implementing active measures in his party responsive to interests of the Soviet Union, to prevent its shifting to the right or to closer relations with the PRC.

During the years I had been assigned to Japan, the KGB had a network of recruited agents in that country numbering more than 200. They were utilized by political intelligence, external counterintelligence and scientific and technological intelligence of the First Chief Directorate.

Among the most effective agents were a former member of the Cabinet of Ministers; head of a major parliamentary public organization; several senior officials of the Japanese Socialist Party; one of the most prominent scholars on the PRC who had close contacts with government officials; and several members of the Japanese parliament.

More than 50 percent of my time I had to spend on implementing the great variety of Soviet active measures in Japan. The major objectives of Soviet active measures in Japan were:

First, to prevent further deepening of political and military cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Second, to provoke distrust between Japan and the United States in political, economic and military circles.

Third, to prevent further development of relations between Japan and the People's Republic of China, especially in political and economic fields.

Fourth, by any means to eliminate the possibility of the creation of an anti-Soviet so-called triangle, Washington-Beijing-Tokyo.

Fifth, to create a new pro-Soviet lobby among prominent Japanese politicians, first of all, in the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japanese Socialist Party, which would be consistent in its activities of developing close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union.

Sixth, to convince the leaders of the Japanese government of the necessity of drastic broadening of economic ties with the USSR through high-ranking agents of influence, prominent business leaders, mass media.

Seventh, to organize in Japanese political circles the movement for signing the friendship and neighborly relations treaty between Japan and the USSR.

Eighth, to penetrate deeply the main opposition parties, first of all, Japanese Socialist Party, to influence their political platforms in order to prevent the Liberal Democratic Party from creating its political monopoly in the Japanese parliament.

Ninth, at the same time, to discourage the leaders of opposition parties from creating a coalition government, the Soviets need a politically stable Japan.

Tenth, to maintain a high level of activity in implementing operation KORYAK, which Moscow intended as a means of affecting the Japanese perception of Soviet intentions by sending military contingents to the Kuril Islands, by construction of new housing complexes on northern territories, etc., and thus to show the Japanese government the uselessness of disputing Soviet control on these territories.

Let me give you more examples of active measures implemented in Japan while I had been there and in most of which I personally had to take part.

In the 1970s an agent of the KGB who was a high-ranking member of the Liberal Democratic Party and a member of Parliament, under instructions of the Tokyo Residency, organized a Parliamentary Association for Japanese-Soviet Friendship, codenamed by KGB as LOBBY. The Soviets started an intensive exchange of delegations between the LOBBY and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Every chance was used to persuade the Japanese parliamentarians to influence their government to deepen political and economic relations with Moscow. The head of the LOBBY received from the KGB substantial amounts of money to pay the salaries of the staff workers of the LOBBY and for publishing a monthly magazine.

KGB in the 1970s had been able to effectively control the political platform of the Japanese Socialist Party, having recruited more than ten of its high-ranking leaders as agents of influence.

On direct instructions from Moscow, I told an agent with close access to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Italians were thinking of selling a nuclear reactor to the People's Republic of China and that this sale was to remain a secret. The information circulated around the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japanese military attaches in Europe were reportedly asked to check the story. This active measure was considered a success in that it served Soviet policy objectives by providing an irritant to Japanese-Chinese relations.

I had some KGB assets in Japan pass the following story orally to influential Japanese government officials. According to "top secret" information, just before the People's Republic of China attacked Vietnam, there was a meeting which considered the question of whether to attack at all. Hua Guofeng and some others were against it, but Deng Ziaoping was for it and Deng won out. If the attack failed, Deng will fall from power. The objective of this operation was to discourage the Japanese from developing too close ties with China and to make them uneasy over the course of their relations with the PRC government. The operation was considered successful since the KGB believed that it would lead the Japanese leadership to continue to have doubts about the stability of Deng's control.

In support of the worldwide Soviet ban-the-neutron-bomb campaign, the KGB residency in Tokyo was told to get President Carter labelled publicly as "neutron Carter." KGB headquarters

told the residency that its effort was part of a global campaign. They were to go ahead and get the words "neutron Carter" in the Japanese press so that they could be replayed in other free world countries.

The above-mentioned active measures operations in Japan constitute only a part of Soviet operations of this type in Japan. The Tokyo Residency of the KGB receives daily three to five directives on all kinds of active measures. This means that the total number of active measures directives in Japan alone is several hundred a year. It does not mean that the Residency is able to implement all of them, but it would be proper to say that one-third of this number is implemented with various degrees of success.

In early 1979, I was promoted to the military rank of Major and was appointed to the position of the Acting Chief of the Active Measures Group of the Tokyo Residency of the KGB, which consisted of five case officers operating about 25 agents. However, any other asset of the KGB in Japan also could be used for implementing active measures.

My career in the KGB was developing successfully, and it promised to be even better in the future. But my KGB and Party superiors did not know that for many years I was developing dissatisfaction with and finally total resentment of the Soviet socialist system. When I was a university student I had the chance to learn about the nightmarish cruelty and atrocities of the Stalin regime which slaughtered up to 20 million Soviet citizens. After graduating from the university and being transferred from one Central Committee, Communist Party, Soviet Union-affiliated organization to another, I witnessed first hand the fact that the Soviet socialist system was not working for the good of its citizens. I came to the understanding that it is a totally corrupt dictatorship-type regime with rotten moral standards. Most of the slogans put forward by the Kremlin leaders I came to understand are aimed at deceiving peoples of the USSR and of the world. And I clearly understand that Marxism-Leninism is actually a perverted type of religion imposed on millions of people.

I turned to God and secretly started to visit church -- secretly, because if my former colleagues would know about it, I would be persecuted by the Soviet authorities. My career in the Soviet Union was successful not because I believed that it was proper to do what I had been doing. I was working as a high-performance robot, sinking my frustrations in long hours of work. I agreed to become a military reserve officer and then a KGB intelligence officer because that kind of a job at

least was challenging and risky. I thought that this type of activity would serve the interests of my people.

But fairly quickly I understood that the Soviet intelligence community is just another tool in the hands of the Politburo, and that it has all and even more disgusting features than any other part of the Soviet socialist machinery.

I could not, however, fight the Kremlin inside the country as an officer of the KGB. If I had taken such actions, I would have ended up in one of the Siberian concentration camps or, most likely, in a mental asylum for the rest of my life.

So I came to the decision to defect to the leading country of the free world, the United States of America, and fight the agonizing but still very powerful and dangerous Soviet regime from the outside. It was not easy to come to the decision to defect. I had my wife with me in Tokyo and a son who was attending school in Moscow. The decision to defect was not discussed with my wife who at that time did not share all my political views. She also could not make the same decision because of attachment to our son and her relatives in the Soviet Union.

In October 1979 I contacted a United States official in Japan and was immediately granted political asylum. The kind response toward me by the American government will never be forgotten. I felt free for the first time in my life, being then already 38. I have provided the Central Intelligence Agency with the information I had. I hope this information will help the cause of defending the free world against the menace of Soviet expansionism and aggression.

I am proud to say that now I have the absolutely morally satisfying job which gives me excellent chances to use all my talents to fight the Kremlin's policy. It is also an honor for me to meet such highly professional, highly motivated and determined officers whom I have met in the Central Intelligence Agency.

Several month ago I learned that in August 1981 I had been sentenced by the Soviet military tribunal, after a secret trial, to death in absentia. I consider this to be an honor for me because the Soviet leaders showed that they recognize that I am a dangerous enemy of theirs. They are right in this sense. It is my intention to maintain the fight against their system by all available means for the rest of my days. And I am not afraid of the hired assassins whom they possibly will send to try to kill me. Now for the first time in my life I have a God-given chance to do what is proper to do for the cause of freedom of my oppressed people. And it is better for a man to be killed in action rather than hiding in a hole.

After my defection, the Soviet authorities, primarily the KGB, had begun to implement savage and revengeful actions against my family. Over the past three years the Soviet authorities are progressively using all ruthless and, even by Soviet law, illegal means to force and blackmail my family to cooperate with them. The main reason for the indescribable torture of my family by the Soviet authorities is that the KGB is obviously under pressure to present the Soviet Politburo with "proof" that the reasons for my defection to the United States was not political. They cannot admit that a Major in Soviet intelligence could possibly be a hidden dissident. It is my hope that I will gain assistance in the noble cause of saving my wife and son from the brutal prosecution by Soviet authorities. I have requested assistance from the State Department in this regard.

I declare, gentlemen, that there are honest people in the Soviet Union belonging to different nationalities who, in spite of persecutions and prosecutions by the Soviet regime, do not accept the devilish character of the system imposed on them and are considering the freedom, of which they are deprived, to be God's blessed gift to the peoples of the free world and to the truly democratic society of the United States of America. And I am happy to be a part of this society.

Thank you for your attention, gentlemen.

The Chairman. Mr. Levchenko, thank you very much for a very moving and a very courageous statement, and I think that reflects the opinion of all the members of this Committee. The statement, of course, shows that you have considerable knowledge on the operations of the active measures that the KGB has been involved in.

Let me ask you, with reference to the Russian Embassy in Tokyo, how large a contingent is there in that embassy of KGB personnel and also the total number of Russian employees in the embassy in Japan?

Mr. Levchenko. Mr. Chairman, the number of the Soviet people with diplomatic rank is somewhere around 50.

The Chairman. Around 50.

Mr. Levchenko. But the Soviet colony overall was quite large in Tokyo.

The Chairman. And you say that the KGB have five active measures agents with some, did you say -- with 25 agents under their jurisdiction?

The Chairman. They are not. But a lot of the journalists use newspaper reporting as cover for their activities if they are KGB.

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, that is right, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. McClory.

Mr. McClory. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You, as a journalist, or posing as a journalist in Tokyo, had many contacts with other journalists, did you not?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. McClory. And then as a person who is securing other assets to work with the KGB, you had contacts with other journalists from other countries than yours?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir.

Mr. McClory. And did any of the other journalists undertake to cooperate with you in the KGB line that you were advancing in Tokyo?

Mr. Levchenko. You mean some other Soviet journalists or foreign journalists?

Mr. McClory. Foreign journalists.

Mr. Levchenko. The foreign journalistic community in any country of the free world is continuously targeted by KGB. In Japan they did have certain successes in recruiting foreign journalists in other countries.

Mr. McClory. Were you personally able to line up other persons to work with you. What agents did you recruit? You mentioned several members of the Japanese parliament.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. McClory. And how about foreign journalists?

Mr. Levchenko. Few of them. I know for sure, for instance, about one Yugoslavian journalist who, although not recruited by 1979, was developed to the point that relations with him were almost operational already. I knew about approaches to certain journalists from the Philippines, and I have knowledge on certain approaches to some British journalists.

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, roughly this number.

The Chairman. Five active measures case officers.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

The Chairman. The KGB has. Is that five the only number of KGB officials in Japan?

Mr. Levchenko. No. Mr. Chairman, in my statement I was mentioning that period of my activities in Japan when I was nominated to be an acting chief of the Active Measures Group in the Residency. It is a part of the political line, so-called Line PR, which is a quite large outfit within the Tokyo Residency. The political intelligence line consists of the Active Measures Group, of the so-called Main Enemy Group (which is United States), and Chinese Group. So the Active Measures Group is just a part, and it consists roughly of five case officers.

But the KGB Residency also consists of a CI Group, which is external counterintelligence, and a very large S&T group, which collects scientific and technological intelligence. So the overall number of officers of the KGB in the Tokyo Residency is probably between 50 and 60 officers.

The Chairman. What kind of cover is assigned to the KGB officers in Japan? Are they all journalists or are other kinds of cover designated for some of the KGB operatives?

Mr. Levchenko. Quite a few of them, Mr. Chairman, are using diplomatic covers. Many of them are using journalistic covers. Some covers are in the trade mission. Some covers are in the Aeroflot representation, which in Tokyo is fairly large. It has about 20 employees. Roughly half of the Aeroflot office are KGB, mainly scientific and technological intelligence officers.

Then there is quite a group of KGB officers who are using so-called short term temporary duty cover. They are visiting Japan to work with certain Japanese private business companies to buy certain equipment and things like that, and they spend sometimes six months over there, one year, but still many of them are KGB officers.

The Chairman. Russian journalists that are assigned outside of Russia to various countries around the world, are all of those journalists KGB officers?

Mr. Levchenko. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McClory. You have made mention of a parliamentary group, the Japanese-Soviet Parliamentary Group.

Mr. Levchenko. Speaking about that Parliamentary Association on Japan-USSR Friendship, we are talking about the public organization within two chambers of the Japanese Diet consisting of about 500 members of Parliament. It does not mean that all of them or even a majority, or even a minority of them are Soviet agents, but several of them are, and they are manipulated by the Soviets.

Mr. McClory. Do you still have your wife and son in the Soviet Union? Do they want to get out?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, they do want to get out, sir.

The Chairman. With respect to the family, let me ask whether or not there are any other known instances of where the Soviet Government has freed the wife and children of people in the same position as you.

Mr. Levchenko. No, there is no such record. The major thing which probably can be done is to show the Soviet authorities that that type of persecution which they are implementing against those two absolutely innocent people is a very terrible and immoral thing.

Speaking about the position of the Soviet Government, sometimes they are very unpredictable and they do change. For instance, the family of the famous chess player, Mr. Korchnoi, chess master, was let out of the Soviet Union. It happened two months ago. This is a sort of precedent.

So, bearing in mind that the Soviet Politburo sometimes really can make any kind of unpredictable movements, you know, hope can exist.

Mr. McClory. If the Chairman will yield, the Helsinki Charter actually covers this, so under the Helsinki Charter, the USSR should release your family if they want to leave the Soviet Union.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right. I have gone through the formality with the Soviet Embassy required for that. I have filled out the affidavits necessary to provide statements of support, to provide an invitation and all of the rest of the requirements which apparently the Soviets have completely disregarded. And the Soviet Embassy in Washington did lie to me, Mr. Chairman, because in the presence of several senior Department of State officials, the Soviets told me that they will deliver

those invitations -- they call those papers invitations -- to my family, which they never did.

The Chairman. Have you felt any harassment at all since 1979, since October of 1979 when you defected or indicated to the United States officials in Japan that you wanted to defect? Has there been any harassment at all from the Soviet Union? Have you felt any pressure from them, have you felt any concern about your own life?

Mr. Levchenko. Mr. Chairman, actually I had three confrontations with Soviet officials in the Department of State. I renounced my Soviet citizenship, and during the third confrontation I told them that I am declaring my personal war against them. So our relations in that field are absolutely clear on both sides. I don't think that they have any doubts left.

The Chairman. Mr. Mazzoli.

Mr. Mazzoli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Levchenko, we appreciate your coming forward today. It is very unusual for us to be in the presence of one who has risen to that high rank in the intelligence agency of a foreign country. The CIA has assured us of your reliability, but I just wonder what one or two things could you tell us today to assure us on this point.

Mr. Levchenko. I just know I trust people myself and I hope to get the same thing back from the Committee. My life is absolutely clear, now, like the open page of a book, so I don't think that anybody can have any false ideas in that field. On top of other things, I underwent thorough checking by the CIA, and this checking proves that I am an honest man.

Mr. Mazzoli. Mr. Chairman, one last question, if I might. Mr. Levchenko, you talked about the LOBBY?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir.

Mr. Mazzoli. And the contact between the Japanese parliamentarians and the Russian parliamentarians --

Mr. Levchenko. Soviet parliamentarians, yes, sir.

Mr. Mazzoli. Soviet parliamentarians, and the way the KGB was able to more or less manipulate a lot of members. Are you aware, to your knowledge, of the extent that the KGB has either infiltrated or has influenced other international parliamentary groups, and if you have any knowledge, can you tell me if such other groups are being influenced?

Mr. Levchenko. You mean, sir, relative to this country?

Mr. Mazzele. Involving U.S. parliamentarians.

Mr. Levchenko. I do not have any knowledge in that field about any cases involving U.S. parliamentarians. But whenever the KGB has a chance to study certain targets, they usually won't lose this chance.

Mr. Mazzele. So that you think that they probably do use interparliamentary meetings as opportunities to gain information?

Mr. Levchenko. The KGB would use such meetings as an opportunity to study people. Whether they can recruit certain individuals or groups of individuals, it depends upon many other things.

Mr. Mazzele. Thank you very much.

Mr. Levchenko. With the Japanese group they were fairly successful, but I don't have any knowledge on the American group.

Mr. Chairman. Mr. Whitehurst.

Mr. Whitehurst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In your testimony you made a reference to the Soviet military occupation of the Kuril Islands and, at the same time, I got the impression that there was an inconsistency on the part of Soviet policy. Here on the one hand Moscow is suggesting to you various moves to bring about friendly relations between Japan and the USSR. On the other hand, the stationing of military forces in the Kurils demonstrates that it is fruitless for Japan to do otherwise but to make an accommodation with the Soviet Union.

It seems to be a peculiarly Russian technique or attitude which flies in the face of logic because the Japanese resent very strongly this action, and it would have seemed to have been more consistent to have extended the full olive branch and not a little bit of an olive branch while at the same time coming in with a mailed fist. Did this inconsistency never appear to your superiors in the KGB?

Mr. Levchenko. Let me try to answer your question, sir, by stating that Soviet policy appears sometimes inconsistent -- different policies apply to different target audiences.

Mr. Whitehurst. Given the nature of Soviet society, I realize it would be difficult, but did you ever notice among any of your associates, or perhaps even friends, in the KGB, people who shared the same reservations that you did about the Soviet system?

Mr. Levchenko. It is very difficult, sir, to openly find some other person like myself because understandably people like myself and some other people, they would rather be silent.

Mr. Whitehurst. Yes.

Mr. Levchenko. I assume, however, that there is a group of officers in KGB and in GRU who in their personal political attitudes came to practically total resentment of the Soviet system, and I do think that after my defection some other defections will follow. That is probably the only way to know how many people are left over there who thought like I did. And that is one of the reasons why I am trying to fight the Soviet regime in every way I can, and to show that I did not come here to the United States just to live the rest of my life in some nice-looking area. The KGB internal propaganda tries to show that any defector would be punished by death. The Soviets will try to kill me at some point. Before this attempt will be made, however, they will torture families morally, financially, and by other means. They don't publish mistreatment of families in the newspaper, but believe me, all KGB officers and GRU officers know about that thing. So that is why I think that my responsibility is even more than probably can appear from first sight, because I have to think that some other people probably will come here, and I am sure that they will come here in a while if they realize why I defected and how I am living now.

Mr. Whitehurst. How did you know that you were sentenced to death in absentia?

Mr. Levchenko. Through a few messages received from my wife and son and through others who have talked to them. But virtually all the contacts with my family have been cut off by KGB--correspondence, anything. Nothing reaches them, and there is not any correspondence traffic back and forth. The KGB is very vicious in that thing, and they have huge manpower available. They stop everything except they didn't cut off the telephone line. So once in a while, I have had a phone conversation, which, of course, must have been monitored by the KGB.

Mr. Whitehurst. You have been able to call.

Mr. Levchenko. I had the chance to call, and my wife told me that they wanted to subpoena her to appear at the trial because they did have hopes that she would say something derogatory about me. She flatly rejected cooperation with the KGB. But, it is not only the death sentence which I received; the

verdict went further: the confiscation of all her property as well as joint property and my own was ordered. There is supposed to be a certain legal system in the Soviet Union; so by law they had to notify her what happened. And, that is why she has knowledge about the sentence, because they sent her official notice that I am sentenced to death and all property confiscated.

Mr. Whitehurst. What is the KGB opinion of the CIA?

Mr. Levchenko. I think professionally they regard CIA as a very sophisticated and very capable intelligence service.

Mr. Whitehurst. It is not a topic of much discussion among your associates or your superiors?

Mr. Levchenko. No, there have been quite a few discussions. Most of those discussions, sir, were a sort of professional assessment of --

Mr. Whitehurst. Right, that is what I was seeking.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right. The KGB's professional assessment is that they regard the CIA very highly, as a very capable and able intelligence service.

Mr. Whitehurst. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Mr. Mineta?

Mr. Mineta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again I want to thank you for your very fine statement and your appearance here today. In your testimony you talked about the General Staff and KGB training of the PLO terrorists. Do you have knowledge of any other training, or training of any other terrorists by the General Staff or the KGB?

Mr. Levchenko. To my knowledge, when I was working with the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, they provided certain training to some cadres of the late Augustinio Neto's MPLA, the organization for the liberation of Angola, the so-called national liberation movement in Angola, before they took power in that country. As well, they were providing training for certain other so-called national liberation movements. I know that the training was done by the KGB and GRU because one of the facilities, about 20 miles from Moscow, belongs to KGB and is run by KGB. The other facility in the Crimea is about 1000 miles south of Moscow, belongs to the General Staff of the Soviet Army, where they provide guerrilla-type training.

Mr. Mineta. And to whom are the Soviet authorities directing those efforts, or who is being trained, let's say, in the Crimean site?

Mr. Levchenko. Mainly officers and warrant officers, some soldiers of PLO-affiliated organizations and some national liberation movements.

Mr. Mineta. Of which countries?

Mr. Levchenko. I knew for certain about Angola and the PLO.

Mr. Mineta. So it is not only the GRU officers who would become agents in those countries, but also people from those countries who would also be trained, who are being trained in the Crimean or this other site not too far from Moscow.

Mr. Levchenko. Those facilities, sir, are maintained just for training of foreign people.

Mr. Mineta. I see.

Mr. Levchenko. It is not where GRU or KGB officers are also going through training. Those two facilities are special facilities just for that purpose of training foreigners.

Mr. Mineta. I see. Now you mention also in your statement about the deserters from Vietnam who eventually immigrated to Sweden.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. Mineta. And could you tell us in any more detail about what you know about the Soviet exploitation of those U.S. deserters from the Vietnam War?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, sir, by the Vietnam Support Committee, which I stated in the statement was an independent public organization just on paper, but actually it was Department of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. That is really the same committee to which I was assigned to work with all American deserters, except for the first four who deserted from the aircraft carrier. They were handled by the Soviet Peace Committee. All others were handled by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. So I knew all of them, and I had to be with them throughout the whole period of time they spent in the Soviet Union. The main assistance, if you can call it that, which the KGB provided to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee was

the establishing of a route of escape from Japan to the Soviet Union. The KGB hired a couple of Japanese fishing boats and recruited their captains indirectly through a Japanese organization. This organization does not exist anymore now, but in those years it was called the Vietnam Peace Committee. It was a very active organization which consisted of mainly intellectuals, very liberal or very radical minded. The KGB recruited one of the key leaders of that organization, and through him they established that channel -- those fishing boats. The fishing boats would go close to Soviet territorial waters, and then Soviet patrol boats picked up the next group of deserters and smuggled them into the Soviet Union. Then, when on the territory of the Soviet Union, officers from the KGB and GRU routinely questioned them. We are talking about GIs who can provide low-level information, such as who his platoon commander is and his battalion commander and probably brigade commander, and what kind of rifle he was using -- not that much. But the KGB and GRU were extracting even this information, although this collection activity was not the main thing for the KGB or GRU. The Politburo, as the main effort, decided to utilize that chance in active measures, as a propaganda showcase, and that is why the Soviets extracted from all of these GI deserters very long statements or interviews denouncing the role of the United States in the Vietnam War and related issues which the Soviets played and replayed all over the world.

The KGB and GRU did not directly try to recruit them, let's say, because again we are talking about 18, 19 year-old GIs. The main things they wanted to do with those deserters concerned propaganda because they deserted exactly at the very critical moment of the Vietnam War, when the Soviets were already staging a worldwide campaign.

Mr. Mineta. You first visited Japan in April of 1966 as an interpreter of the Soviet Trade Union Delegation.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. Mineta. Were you at that point a referent of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee?

Mr. Levchenko. No, not yet. I was still within post-graduateship, and I was still with the Soviet Peace Committee.

Mr. Mineta. And this is after the time you were in training as an illegal intelligence operative?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir.

Mr. Mineta. And then you were in Cairo, is that correct?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes that is right, in January 1971.

Mr. Mineta. Why would they smuggle them into Japan for transit to the Soviet Union if these were defectors or deserters from Army units in Vietnam?

Mr. Levchenko. All of them --

Mr. Mineta. Would there not be more direct ways to get them into the Soviet Union?

Mr. Levchenko. No, those deserters were trying their best to save their lives and to feel themselves secure, so that is why certain radical lawyers provided them very comprehensive consultation in that matter because if they would desert directly from Vietnam to some third country, they would be court-martialled because it is cowardness on battlefield and things like that. They can end up with very bad, very long, at least, terms in jail. So some smart radical-type lawyers advised them, especially bearing in mind that all of them had been wounded in action and Japan was like a huge hospital at that time, and they were brought to Japan, and following advice of those lawyers, they defected from Japan because it was not a country where the combat was going on.

Mr. Mineta. I see. So these military people had not defected in Vietnam.

Mr. Levchenko. No, not in Vietnam.

Mr. Mineta. They had come back to a base hospital or something of this nature, and then from there they --

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir. Let's put it in this way, that they defected from the Vietnam War but not from the territory of Vietnam.

Mr. Mineta. I see. Now, was your time in Japan mostly as a cover as a journalist.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. Mineta. Now, given the fact that you felt that there were at least, did you say, 50 KGB officers in Tokyo.

Mr. Levchenko. At least. I think probably more than that.

Mr. Mineta. And then there was some reference in answer to Chairman Boland's question to the figure 200. The 200 is in reference to what?

Mr. Levchenko. No, 200, it is the figure from my statement saying about the approximate number, yes, approximate number of Soviet assets recruited, agents in Japan. The Soviet colony in Japan is somewhere around 300 people probably, the Soviet physical presence in Japan. The Embassy relatively is not large. It has about 50 diplomatic officers. I don't count some support officers, technical staff and things like that, 50 diplomats. But the Trade Mission is fairly large. It probably has over 50 people. Aeroflot has about 20 people. The Novosti Press Agency has about six people, or seven now, probably. And the TASS wire agency is another six or seven people. Then so-called short-term TDYers are continuously there. They are from probably 20 to 50 people. So the whole Soviet presence is relatively large over there, and approximately 50 percent of it are either KGB or GRU officers.

Mr. Mineta. So of the, let's say, the KGB in Japan was receiving three to five directives on active measures a day?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. Mineta. And if that kind of effort is being directed in Tokyo, would you have any idea of what kind of activity along that line would be directed in a place like Washington, D.C.?

Mr. Levchenko. I want to remind you, sir, that we were talking about the cable traffic, so there were from three to five incoming directives on active measures. It does not mean that every cable was dealing with one active measure. Some of them were follow-up cables, some of them were back-up cables, but the overall number of actions probably ran up to 100. I mean actions which had been taken one way or other with different degrees of success. That figure -- for a year. In a year that figure will be true. Some active measures are of large scale. Some of them are small things. They will ask some agent to go to some member of Parliament and tell him just some small thing, but still this will help the Soviets to achieve certain goals or will hurt feelings of a certain group in the Liberal Democratic Party on certain political issues, things like that.

Japan is considered by the KGB to be the easiest country in which to run active measures operations because of the legal situation and because of very easy contacts by Soviets with Japanese journalists, who are very friendly. The Japanese are

very sincere, open people, and sometimes, you know, the KGB is very tricky and misleads serious people by talking them into serving Soviet ends sometimes, while their contacts even don't understand whom they are doing the thing for.

The same thing I would say even is true even with many people in the Japanese Diet. Some are very easily accessible, and the Soviets are very active there. They are continuously targeting many of them and continuously pushing all kinds of ideas. Some ideas they push not only through their trusted agents. They just go to some member of the Diet. They will start certain political conversation, and they will insert in this conversation certain idea which they want to push through, and in many cases even that type of semi-overt operation will work.

So, the number of the active measures actions in Japan, I think, is probably the largest in the world because it goes relatively easy. It is hard for me to say how many operations they run in the United States. I assume that in the United States, it is my personal opinion, that the Soviets would rather prefer to be involved in semi-overt type of activities, visiting different figures in U.S. academic world, some people on Capitol Hill, some other political figures, and trying to have certain discussions, and insert in those discussions ideas which they want to push through which, for a professional intelligence officer in that field, basically it is not that difficult a thing to do.

Mr. Mineta. Besides the Embassy in Tokyo, how many other consulates or other kinds of offices do the Soviets have in Japan?

Mr. Levchenko. They have the Embassy in Tokyo and a very large trade mission. We already discussed Aeroflot and other outfits. They have consulates, fairly large consulates -- in Sapporo on Hokkaido and an even larger newly built consulate in Osaka.

Mr. Mineta. Do they come under any kind of travel restrictions as we might place on Soviet diplomats here in the United States?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir. People with diplomatic covers, Soviet with diplomatic covers, they are restricted in traveling around the country.

Speaking about journalists, journalists--Soviet journalists-- can travel in any part of Japan without any notification to the press department, the press bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office.

I personally had the experience of visiting Okinawa, which is fairly far away from Tokyo. Twice, I have been to northern Japan, and was never stopped -- there is no such regulation to notify anybody about press travel. That is why the journalistic cover is liked so much by KGB, not only in Japan but elsewhere.

For some diplomat, sometimes it is rather difficult to walk into the office of a member of the Japanese Diet because it already puts this meeting sort of in a very formal way, because it is a foreign diplomat and a member of Parliament. Sometimes it can lead to sad happenings, but it is very positive that Japanese parliamentarians very much like journalists, and they are very easy to gain access to. If you call any Japanese member of Parliament, you will get an appointment let's say two or three days after the phone call. Sometimes it would be the next day, sometimes it would be the same day. And they are very open and sincere with foreign journalists. So they don't feel themselves under stress or whatever, which naturally people feel while talking to official representatives of the Embassy.

So, the number of topics for free, easygoing discussion for journalists is basically enormous, and the point is that if a professional intelligence officer who is using journalism as a cover for his main activities takes part in a conversation, sometimes he can influence certain politicians by utilizing different techniques. Sometimes he can take his subject on an ego trip, sometimes encourage arrogance, sometimes encourage dissatisfaction with the policy of the government. For example: as you know, when Japan and China had signed their treaty for peace and friendship, many politicians, especially very conservative politicians, were against the treaty. They were very unhappy. And some of them during that period of time, basically in an overt way, disclosed a lot to the Soviets. They had been outraged. They wanted to hurt that treaty. The Soviets had many chances, basically through journalists, to insert into the minds of those gentlemen some ideas which were prefabricated by Service A of the First Chief Directorate, which is professionally very smart in creating a small story that will be exciting and which some member of parliament won't forget. He will go to his friends, or even to the leadership of his party, and he will convey this story. I simplify the process, but that is how it works.

Mr. Mineta. You say roughly six KGB officers were journalists under cover?

Mr. Levchenko. In the Tokyo Residency?

Mr. Mineta. In Tokyo with the New Times. You were a journalist with the New Times.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right.

Mr. Mineta. And you just mentioned the figure six journalists in Japan as part of the colony?

Mr. Levchenko. No, no. I mentioned just six working for Novosti Press Agency, another six working for TASS telegraph agency, which makes twelve overall. Then there are so-called independent journalists, if you can call Soviet journalists independent: radio, television, New Times, Pravda, Izvestiya, and Trud (the labor union newspaper) represented in Japan, and some others, so the overall number would be I think 18 Soviet journalists that were working there.

Mr. Mineta. But in 1975 you say only two were not KGB.

Mr. Levchenko. I was saying, sir, that about New Times magazine on the whole, irrelevant to Japan.

New Times magazine that year had 12 foreign correspondents. Now if I am not mistaken, they have 14. That year they had 12 correspondents scattered all over the world, but ten of them were KGB officers, and two of them were so-called clean. But those two so-called clean journalists, at least one of them was a very active person doing quite a variety of things for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

Mr. Mineta. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Levchenko.

The Chairman. Mr. Stump?

Mr. Stump. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Levchenko, let me commend you for your courage. To what extent was there any public statement made of your defection?

Mr. Levchenko. When I came to the United States there was no public statement other than that I was granted political asylum by the United States.

Mr. Stump. Was there ever any acknowledgement, particularly in the Soviet Union, of your defection?

Mr. Levchenko. After I came here, in probably two days New York Times published a very tiny item with very tiny photo of mine saying that New Times magazine Tokyo correspondent Levchenko, age 38, defected to the United States; nothing else.

I myself started to make some public statements when I started to know what the KGB was doing with my family over there. I published one article in the Russian language newspaper which is published in New York. A very fine newspaper that is published by émigrés. My article was called "I Declare the War," in which I reminded the Soviets about my confrontation with them in the Department of State and I sort of invited them to look into this problem really, to take this problem seriously, that it was not just words, that I am going to fight them seriously. It was a long article.

Then another article was published in one of the major West European newspapers, also basically saying the same thing.

Speaking about the Soviet Union, they have a problem because my file in the KGB does not allow them to find anything bad about me because there is nothing -- it is impossible for them. It is against the Soviet-Communist nature to admit that a KGB major defected for political reasons. It just cannot happen by their ideas -- they know that it can, but they cannot tell that to the Politburo or the Russian people. The KGB also probably doctored the damage report because they probably didn't want to show the Politburo the extent of what I knew.

Then for quite a period of time they were trying to dig up anything bad on me because that's the only way they can make the story public. They started to interrogate my wife and my son on a weekly basis for more than two years. They couldn't extract anything from them, and they wanted to -- they tried to force her to make a TV appearance or an interview for some Soviet newspaper denouncing me. They couldn't force her to do this thing.

So that's why they are silent. And finally they arranged the secret trial.

Mr. Stump. What were these so-called confrontations that you had? Where and how did they happen?

Mr. Levchenko. They were organized in a very professional way by officers of the Department of State. From five to eight Department of State officers were present on one side of the table. I sat with the State Department officials: On the other side, the opposite side of the table, two or three high-ranking Soviet Embassy officials sat.

Mr. Stump. That was here.

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, yes. They made a transcript of the whole thing, and I could leave at any moment because at times like that graciousness carries nobody. The last time I did leave because the Soviets started to try to embarrass me, so I just left that meeting.

Mr. Stump. What means did you use, or what was your most successful tool in your recruitment of agents? Was it monetary compensation, or one of philosophy, or what when you approached these people?

Mr. Levchenko. You mean --

Mr. Stump. When you recruited --

Mr. Levchenko. The methods of the KGB or my personal methods?

Mr. Stump. Well, both.

Mr. Levchenko. The ideological method of recruitment gradually loses its priority now because even in many countries with fairly powerful Communist Parties, still people don't like the Soviet Union for one reason or other reason, things like that. So there are only a few really devoted, absolutely pro-Soviet Communists or Marxists and people of that sort in the free world. But the KGB uses an ideological basis in a little bit different way. For instance, the way they recruit many politicians, they are looking for politicians who are very upset about the present government or about a certain issue (an internal or external issue) in the government which makes them unhappy to the point that they want to fight against this thing by all their means, and usually they need some sort of good advice, outlet, at least, for their outrage and things like that. And sometimes that outlet can happen to be a Soviet journalist or, you know, a neatly dressed, nice looking Soviet diplomat who will understand everything and who, being a professional intelligence officer, will never forget in a very suave way to ask quite a few sympathetic follow-up questions.

And then that's how he will start to study that individual. And if that individual will show any other kind of vulnerability, the KGB will try to recruit him. If, while studying him, they

will find out that he just bought a townhouse or some other piece of property elsewhere, and he wanted it very much, but he didn't think that much about his financial situation, and he now finds himself in deep trouble; if he has such vulnerability, the KGB will try to give him money.

So it is a sort of diversified approach.

Sometimes, you won't believe it, but you know, sometimes the KGB will recruit agents on a personal basis, on the basis of personal friendship because Soviets sometimes are very patient in the recruitment process. Sometimes they will spend weeks or even months just on nice discussions of certain problems. They won't be even that nosy, because they are professionals. They are studying. They know how to read the person, plus they utilize that time as a time out for checking that individual through other assets or through other means available. And only in the long run when they understand all the target's vulnerabilities, how they can cope with the person, will they recruit him.

At the same time, I want to say, sir, that in the 1950s, the KGB was involved in that Stalinist goofy type of recruitment, professionally goofy type of thing: when they know that somebody can be blackmailed, he is ripe for recruitment. Whether he is an ideological friend or whatever, the KGB then produces, in some restaurant while drinking coffee or whatever, a piece of paper, and they will tell that poor individual to write them a sworn statement that from now on he conscientiously will work as a secret agent of the KGB.

Today they don't use this method often because only a few individuals will sign a statement like that and will be able to sleep nights thereafter.

Many of the Soviet agents abroad, of KGB agents abroad, do not know that they are working for the KGB, because KGB officers are developing all kinds of covers or professionally speaking "flags." They will, for instance -- I can tell you a personal example: one of the agents whom I recruited assumed that he was working for the New Times magazine; I told him that New Times was very influential, that it published a confidential newsletter for the top Soviet leaders, where names of the sources were not quoted, so everything is secure, and on top of other things, money is paid for writing articles. So that person was working for something which never existed, ever. But he couldn't check it because it is confidential.

So many of the Soviet agents are working for the Soviet Union, but for all kinds of weird things which don't really exist, because the KGB understands that psychologically many people like prominent journalists or politicians or whoever want a fig leaf. If somebody would rudely tell them that from now on you will be on the payroll of KGB, I bet with most of them it would be the last conversation. That person will never, ever meet the KGB officer again. That is why they create all kinds of cover stories.

I would term these tactics as highly professional but devious tactics for recruitment of agents. Some agents they will just buy. It depends.

Mr. Stump. Thank you.

The Chairman. I am going to yield the remainder of the time to Mr. Young, who has evinced considerable concern over the worldwide propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union, and particularly some of the peace organizations and the activities of the International Department and the International Information Department of the CPSU, on the kind of propaganda and the effectiveness of that propaganda throughout the world, and we will wind this up at five minutes to 12:00.

Is that satisfactory to you, Bill? You have the remaining time.

Mr. Young. Yes, that is fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Levchenko, as the member of this Committee who had requested these hearings, I would like to ask several questions before I get into the general subject.

Are you here willingly?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes. I was looking forward for this day for, let's see, three years almost.

Mr. Young. And you are under no duress of any kind to be here.

Mr. Levchenko. Not at all.

Mr. Young. As you presented your oral statement, I followed it with a handwritten statement, and I show that to you. Is that your handwriting?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, that is my handwriting.

Mr. Young. In the preparation of that statement, did you do this on your own or did someone dictate it to you?

Mr. Levchenko. Not at all.

Mr. Young. It is totally your product.

Mr. Levchenko. Absolutely. It was written in my house personally by myself, sir.

Mr. Young. Well, frankly, I can read your handwriting easier than I can read my own. But I wanted to establish that fact, that you are here as Stanislav Levchenko because you have a mission, as you stated in your own statement, your own personal war that you have declared against the Soviets.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir.

Mr. Young. If nothing else comes of this hearing, it appears to me, then, that this statement, which is your statement, has to be considered a valuable tool for us because it certainly establishes the fact that the Soviets are doing and will continue to do certain types of things that some naive people here in our country refuse to recognize.

In a meeting that you and I had some time ago, we discussed the question of some folks being a little naive on this subject. I wonder if you would have any comments about your experience in finding people who really don't believe that the Soviets would do something like this.

Mr. Levchenko. I didn't have that many experiences in that field, but once in a while, I do lecture to certain audiences, and one of them is a military audience, and I just love that kind of audience because people ask you any kind of question, sir, and your mind is working and you feel yourself happy because it is creative. And quite a few questions are -- I won't call them exactly naive, but I would say they show the lack of knowledge of why the Soviet Union is really dangerous, to that extent, why it is using so-called active measures actions and operations as a totally offensive political weapon against the free world. That kind of experience I did have. Usually you have to spend quite a lot of time to explain to people what this whole thing is about.

But I consider it a great honor for me to proceed with those lecturing activities and things like that, to talk to people and to explain to them details of Soviet active measures.

Mr. Young. I want to go to page 4 of your handwritten statement, and I acknowledge that the page numbers don't coincide with your typed statement, but on page 4 of the handwritten statement you say the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, under the close guidance of the International Department Central Committee, Communist Party Soviet Union, is involved in political, financial, and to an extent military support of the so-called National Liberation movements in the Third World countries and maintains unofficial, sometimes confidential contacts with the pro-Soviet leaders of the political parties in countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

This Soviet committee also organizes worldwide campaigns aimed at the weakening of the influence of the United States and other free world countries in the Third World. That is quite an objective for this Soviet committee.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir.

Mr. Young. And the Communist Party, Soviet Union. How much detail can you provide us on financial support that is provided by the Soviet Union either through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee or through the KGB or any of the other organizations that they operate? How much detail can you give us on their financial support of these various efforts throughout the world?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, sir. If you don't mind, let me give you, sir, one example. You know some radical elements in this country still are wearing a sort of ski hat, sort of a flat ski hat, woolen, knit. That hat created a fashion which came to the United States because exactly those type of hats had been worn by the MPLA guerrillas in Angola, and all of them were Soviet made and provided en masse, just like 100,000 of them. Clothing, uniforms, it is not just directly money, but products like the hats which cost money which adds up because you are talking about providing things like uniforms to sometimes tens of thousands of people.

Then, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, through the International Department, makes arrangements with the General Staff of the Soviet Army to provide such so-called national liberation movements with arms, including tanks and other heavy weapons.

So that is why I have said what I have in my statement. For instance, weaponry is not shipped directly from the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, but the Committee takes a very active part in these negotiations. It would be Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization officers which would get the list of all needs of those so-called national liberation movements, then provide it to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Secretariat or Politburo would then make a decision, for instance, that they are going to spend \$20 million, \$30 million, \$50 million on some project, and then action would be taken. And, if it is weaponry, then the Soviet Army will provide the weaponry.

In the Soviet Union, all organizations like the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which is affiliated to the International Department, all of them are co-related, and they are coordinating their activity on literally a daily basis.

Another way of providing financial support by the CPSU can be seen when, for example, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee organizes lots of congresses on the territory of the Soviet Union or abroad. All the expenses, including air tickets, for those conferences are paid for by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, and the cynicism of this situation is that the money in rubles, in Soviet currency, basically does not come directly from the Soviet Government; so, if some gentleman like Mr. Arbatov will say that the Government has nothing to do with it, in a way it would be true, because the CPSU has the so-called peace fund, the peace foundation, which is again a type of public organization. But the Peace Fund too comes under the guidance again of the International Department, which ensures that the Soviet Peace Fund spends its money for the right causes. Every member of the Soviet society is like a soldier, especially if you are a Party member.

So the Party, for example, will tell you, you have got the Nobel prize, like two Soviet academicians who got them, and the funds granted with those Nobel prizes the Party forces the recipient to give away to the Soviet Peace Fund. Then, take the case of Soviet football teams, which are fairly good, because they are professionals while they are saying that they are amateurs. The Party says to them that proceeds from today's game will go to the Peace Fund.

Then, in huge factories some workers will spend a full working day in which they "donate" their wages to the Peace Fund. They are working for free, so that that money will go into the Soviet Peace Fund.

And then all this type of money -- again I repeat the name of the organization, it is the Soviet Peace Fund -- is utilized by the World Peace Council, which talks about peace, and by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which provides everything including the military uniforms and arms to the so-called national liberation movements.

Mr. Young. They do make an effort to cover their tracks so that it can't be traced directly back to the official Soviet Government.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir, but in certain cases they even do this thing openly.

Mr. Young. This Mr. Arbatov you mentioned, is he the gentleman associated with the Canada-USA Institute?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right. He is Director, to my knowledge, of that research institute.

Mr. Young. Well, again, back to that part of your statement that I read when you said that the Committee organizes campaigns aimed at the weakening of the influence of the United States and other free world countries, etc., of course, here we are talking about the active measures, here we are talking about the propaganda, we are talking about the forgeries which we are seeing more and more of all the time.

What other types of things are you talking about that they would use in that campaign?

Mr. Levchenko. Are you talking, sir, about the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee?

Mr. Young. Yes

Mr. Levchenko. No, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee is not involved in forgeries or in professional-type KGB-type active measures. They are involved in active measures of the International Department type. Most of them are overt.

What do they do anyway. There is a Presidential Council of the People's Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization which has its headquarters in Cairo. All of the members, almost all of -- it would be wrong to say all -- the majority of these members of the presiding council of the Solidarity Organization with headquarters in Cairo are continuously used, influenced or manipulated by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee for which you can read "International Department of the Central Committee." Whatever conference they have on whatever topic, you know, freedom to people in Fiji Islands or whatever (sometimes they have very unpredictable conferences and congresses)-- the Soviets know the results, the outcome of this congress or that congress beforehand because everything is prepared ahead of time, all papers, and everybody is prepared. The Soviet managers already had very lengthy discussions with potential speakers, and things like that.

Mr. Young. So there is no question as to the outcome?

Mr. Levchenko. Sure, because you know, sir, you know, it is sort of instinctive, it is in the blood of the Soviet leaders, rubber stamp voting, and they cannot afford to have a mistake in any kind of international conferences or congresses.

Sometimes they do have minor troubles because sometimes certain individuals will go out of control. We are not saying that everybody, 100 percent, is manipulated, but the majority is. There is no question about that, sir.

Mr. Young. Well, I am going to stick to this line of questioning dealing with the attempt to weaken the influence of the United States, and related to all of these committees, and including the KGB, and that is where you were specifically involved.

When they -- and this is any of them -- when they do whatever it is they are going to do to try to weaken the influence of the U.S. or whatever else their objectives might be, what kind of restrictions do they operate under? For example, let me give you an example of what I am asking.

The subject of the use of journalism as a cover, as a front, has been throughout the whole hearing this morning. If the CIA were to attempt to use journalists as cover, there would be such an outcry from certain areas in the United States that we would really have more political problems that we could handle. That would be somewhat of a restriction on the way that our intelligence community functions.

What about the KGB? Are there any restrictions at all as to who the KGB is allowed to recruit or to work with or to use as agents of influence or planting propaganda or forgeries or anything like that?

Mr. Levchenko. Sir, speaking about the way the KGB uses all kinds of covers for their officers, they have the whole variety, but you mentioned journalism. Practically every Soviet newspaper or magazine has some KGB officers using that certain publication as a cover. New Times magazine is really, I would say, an astonishing example because we are talking about 12 foreign correspondents, ten of which are KGB officers.

Novosti Press Agency usually in large countries has up to six journalists stationed. They have bureaus in large countries. You can be sure that out of the six, three will be KGB and one or two will be GRU.

So in some countries, the Novosti Press Agency bureau has only one so-called clean person who usually will be Chief of the Bureau, a very hard-working person because all the other crowd doesn't bother itself to do something for that poor Novosti Press Agency; all of them are working in the intelligence field.

The TASS wire agency, telegraph agency, which is the official Soviet telegraph agency: the same thing. In Japan, for instance, they had, yes, six I think, three of them KGB and one GRU, two clean.

New Times magazine we have already discussed.

Then Komsomolskaya Pravda, which is the Young Communist League publication, its daily newspaper with a large circulation in the Russian language -- their correspondent in Tokyo is also an officer of the KGB political line, political intelligence, and as he told me, in most of other countries, Komsomolskaya Pravda journalists are also in fact KGB operatives.

Izvestiya in some countries has KGB operatives using its cover but not in every country.

The only newspaper with which KGB has certain difficulties to use as a cover is Pravda, because it is the official Communist Party newspaper, but I know for sure of one example. One Pravda correspondent of the four of them here in the United States (two I think in Washington and two in New York) -- one of them until he left recently was a high-ranking KGB officer. So even Pravda sometimes has KGB officers as their correspondents.

Mr. Young. What about the academic community? Are there any restrictions on the KGB preventing them from using academics, the academic community, professors, students?

Mr. Levchenko. Sir, there is an Academy of Sciences in the Soviet Union, and its executive body is the so-called Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and they have Bureau or Department of International Relations in that executive body, which is responsible for the whole exchange of Soviet scientists and foreign scientists, who are going here and there. The First Deputy Chief of this department in the Academy of Sciences is a KGB Colonel. So none of the Soviet more-or-less high-ranking researchers or members of the Academy of Sciences can go abroad without the knowledge of that KGB Colonel.

This does not mean that every Soviet academician is spying wherever he goes, not all of them, you know. Some of them, sure, are going for a real exchange in some certain scientific research field or whatever. But again, we are talking about the Soviet system, where potentially the KGB can recruit practically anybody they want. And it is very hard to answer this question, for instance, how many Soviet scientists are cooperating or so-called co-optees of the KGB? Many of them are. Many of them are KGB co-optees on a regular basis. Many of them are not on regular basis, but they are approached by a very high-ranking KGB official, who will ask them just to do one thing at a time, and probably he will never ask them again, but one way or another, a majority of Soviet scientists can be used by KGB for gathering intelligence information. But speaking about the using such institutes as a cover, the KGB does use such institutes as a cover, but we are talking about not that many KGB officers working there, because if you are going to pretend to be a professor, you have got to be a professor. But this is a technicality.

Mr. Young. But the point is, with the Soviet system there are no restrictions against who they can recruit or who they can use, right?

Mr. Levchenko. Not at all except for former Soviet illegals and former KGB officers after they are retired.

Mr. Young. I see.

Mr. Levchenko. That is the only group of people whom they cannot rehire.

Mr. Young. As a KGB officer, were you aware of many of the restrictions that your U.S. counterparts had to work under?

Mr. Levchenko. I did have knowledge, but not comprehensive, because the United States was never my specialty, sir.

Mr. Young. Well, I understand that, but I just wondered if it was one of the little jokes that --

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, I knew, and there have been certain jokes. For instance, in Tokyo there is the largest foreign journalistic community in the world, about 1000 foreign journalists are continuously residing in Tokyo, and the KGB knew for sure that none of the American journalists belonged to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Young. As the KGB prepares its officers, are the training facilities extensive or adequate or inadequate? How would you describe the training facilities?

Mr. Levchenko. Training facilities are very adequate. The KGB has nice, spacious buildings with gymnasiums, with swimming pools and everything, good cafeterias, auditoriums are fairly modernly equipped.

Mr. Young. Is there enough of the equipment, for example? Is there a shortage of equipment or do they have whatever they need?

Mr. Levchenko. They never experience any shortage of equipment because usually in the Soviet budget system, the KGB and the military have the highest priority in getting whatever money they want.

There could be some very temporary shortage in something like, for instance, instead of 100 chairs in the auditorium they get only 70; so it would take them a couple of weeks to write letters and to buy them, but not serious things.

Mr. Young. But they don't have to make do with someone's leftovers or improvise something to be something other than what it was intended to be. They have basically what they need for these training programs.

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, the KGB has what it needs for training purposes, sir.

Mr. Young. We talked earlier about Mr. Arbatov. There is a gentleman named Radomir Bagdanov who also works with Arbatov -- how do you say his name -- Arbatov. Do you know anything about him, or did you while you were in the KGB know Bagdanov?

Mr. Levchenko. That name is familiar to me, sir, and I did know that he is one of the deputies of Mr. Arbatov. I knew that one of his deputies is a high-ranking KGB colonel. I personally suspected Mr. Bagdanov to be the KGB colonel.

Mr. Young. As the Soviets pursue their objective of weakening the influence of the United States and expanding the influence of the Soviet Union, they use a lot of organizations, and we have talked about many of them. Can you comment on the role of some of the international Soviet fronts in the active measures program?

Mr. Levchenko. First of all, sir, I will say again that primary are the Soviet Peace Committee and the World Peace Council. The World Peace Council probably is the most active in that field. It exists since 1949, and the Soviets developed the whole machinery. They have a lot of expertise in that field. They know how to manipulate other countries' movements and things like that.

Then I would say the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee goes high up on the list, with all its experience in active measures around the Vietnam War time.

The Soviet Women's Committee is also very active abroad. They send all kinds of delegations and organizations abroad. The Soviets have lawyers organizations, they have organizations of international "democratic" journalists and quite many fronts like that, and all of them are doing their thing under directives of the International Department. There is a section in that department which deals with so-called international public organizations. So they guide them, and if, for instance, they are after one major goal, all of those fronts are doing basically the same thing but from different angles. That is why unfortunately sometimes when they are involved in certain global type actions, the Soviets can mobilize really large crowds of people.

Mr. Young. Is it the International Department that provides guidance for all these international fronts, or is there some other organization in the Soviet system that also fills that role?

Mr. Levchenko. The Soviet Politburo, sir, first of all, because the Soviet Politburo develops long-range plans. For instance, they would say that we want an anti-neutron bomb campaign. Members of the Politburo, sure, many of them do not know how to run the actual campaign. Then specialist will write appropriate papers and things like that, and then the campaign would be implemented by a directive, which is a Party directive, which is the same as a law in the Soviet Union. And those directives will go to Soviet Peace Committee, Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Women's Committee, and then these committees will start guiding the so-called international front organizations related to those committees.

Mr. Young. Are you familiar with an organization called the African National Congress?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes, I've heard about this organization, sir.

Mr. Young. Do you know whether the Soviet provided any support of any type for this organization?

Mr. Levchenko. I don't have information on that, sir, but years before when I was working for the Soviet Peace Committee and Soviet Afro-Asian Committee, I do know that a few leaders of this organization -- and if I am not mistaken, the name of one of them is John Marks -- have been visiting the Soviet Union on a very regular basis and have been involved in very confidential conversations of a political nature.

But personally because I was specializing on Far Eastern problems, I personally did not take part in those meetings, so I was not a witness in detail of that.

Mr. Young. Sure, I understand that. In the area where you were assigned, what can you tell us about Soviet subsidies to organizations in Japan?

Mr. Levchenko. The Communist Party of Japan is not subsidized by the Soviet Union because it has a rather profound financial basis itself. It is a large and strong party. The Socialist Party, which is the main opposition party in Japan, indirectly is supported by the Soviets.

Mr. Young. When you say indirectly, what is the route by which that indirect support occurs?

Mr. Levchenko. It means, sir, that money is not directly brought into the headquarters of the Party in cash. It means that Soviets are providing that kind of support through so-called friendly trading organizations. By friendly trading organizations they mean medium or small-sized businesses which are mostly involved in trade with the Soviet Union, and usually they have secret or confidential, whatever you call it, clause in the agreement with the Soviet trading organization. Sometimes it will be written, sometimes it would be oral, but that secret clause will say that that company is supposed to give, let's say 15 or 20 percent of the net profit to a certain group or faction of the Socialist Party of Japan, and there are quite a few companies like that. So that is why, sir, I called it sort of indirect. It does not mean that Soviets generally are bringing the money directly.

But the Soviets are supporting directly one group, at least one group in Japan. It is a small, splinter Communist Party guided by a very old man, Shiga Yoshio. His party was about 2000 or 3000 members, and the Soviet International Department through KGB officers delivers directly to him money in cash.

Mr. Young. Is that rubles or is that yen?

Mr. Levchenko. It would be yen, but the Soviets basically don't have trouble in choosing the foreign currencies.

Mr. Young. So this is a direct -- the Shiga group is directly funded then by the Soviets.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir.

Mr. Young. Do the Soviets also direct the group in its activities?

Mr. Levchenko. Excuse me, sir, the Shiga group is not directed by the Soviets now, because their influence is practically zero. And that is the major issue in relations of the Soviet Communist Party with the large Miyamoto Communist Party of Japan, but since Suslov's times, the Soviets have assumed a sort of moral responsibility for that old man Yoshio Shiga, and they don't want just to leave him alone, and they are paying him money.

But on the territory of Japan, I witnessed personally, it was the years when I was there that the Soviets were delivering money, again, International Department using KGB officers, was delivering money to the illegal Communist Party of Philippines in bags with two bottoms, everything just like in spy movies.

Mr. Young. Let me make sure I understand now, who delivers this money in this case? Does the KGB provide the delivery?

Mr. Levchenko. Yes. People in -- officers in International Department are not intelligence officers, and they do not undergo professional spy tradecraft-type training, so that is why the KGB is used. The International Department is the hand of the Politburo and KGB is also just another hand of the Politburo. and if Politburo wants to deliver money to somebody, they will use a specialist. I am talking about this business, sir, because I personally witnessed how it works. I had to go to the Communist Party Headquarters in Moscow, and there was an accountant who brought a sack with money, and it was put in a special suitcase, and I had to give him a receipt, and then this money went to Japan, was special couriered, and in Japan, a KGB officer who knows all those things in spy tradecraft technique went to another city of that country and delivered that money to Mr. Yoshio Shiga.

Mr. Young. Does this happen in other countries as well as Japan, or is it just limited strictly to Japan?

Mr. Levchenko. I cannot give you many examples of that, sir, but I am sure that it is a fairly routinely typical procedure which they utilize for cases like that.

Mr. Young. And in the case of Japan you personally have witnessed this.

Mr. Levchenko. That is right, sir. I personally was receiving that money and then I knew the officer who went to Osaka to deliver this money.

Mr. Young. Can you tell us anything about the Communist Party of the Philippines?

Mr. Levchenko. Unfortunately, sir, I don't know anything about the Communist Party of the Philippines except that their messenger visited Tokyo during those years, was visiting Tokyo on a more-or-less regular basis to get money from the KGB, through the KGB, let's put it this way. I witnessed this personally. I had to help that KGB case officer to clear his way, if we may use professional terminology, to be sure that Japanese counterintelligence was not surveilling the whole operation. So, I was driving the car to a hotel, and that KGB case officer disappeared from the car with a heavy bag of money and went back without anything in his hands.

Mr. Young. Are you familiar with a publication that purported to identify CIA assets in the world media and was distributed from Switzerland?

Mr. Levchenko. That is right. I am familiar with it.

Mr. Young. Can you tell us something about that?

Mr. Levchenko. I read that public brochure while being with the Tokyo Residency of KGB, and to my knowledge it is a product of the CI, counterintelligence service, of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, with the help of the Service Active Measures of the KGB, and according to my knowledge, even the KGB at that time was not that happy about the product because, for instance, when officers in the Tokyo Residency looked through the list of Japanese names they didn't like it at all because at least one of them was targeted by the Tokyo Residency and had nothing to do with the American intelligence service. So some parts of the KGB didn't consider that publication to be a big success.

Mr. Young. A copy of the publication referred to -- "CIA Insider" -- is available.

I want to go back to a subject that all of us have talked to you about today, and I have already and I want to again dealing with media, journalists, publishers. Do you know anything about Soviet funding of western press, media, publishers, etc.?

Mr. Levchenko. I do not have knowledge of direct involvement of KGB in this field, not because I know that they are not involved in that kind of activity except I was not involved, so I did not witness this thing.

My logic says that yes, they do support quite a few publications. As a matter of fact, sir, we were talking earlier today about the parliamentarian group on Japan-USSR friendship in Japanese parliament. They publish a magazine. You can say that that magazine is published 100 percent by Soviet money. That I know for sure.

Mr. Young. Did you by any chance deliver the money?

Mr. Levchenko. No, I did not. I had the personal experience of helping one KGB agent to start his publication which appeared to be more or less stillborn thing. I delivered -- I don't remember, I'm sorry, exactly, either 1 million or million and a half yen to that Japanese politician, as well later I had to help him with money for an election campaign.

Mr. Young. Obviously we are all curious about the media and publications and journalists because they certainly get to a lot of people and they are oftentimes very influential.

Mr. Levchenko. That is true, sir.

Mr. Young. You mentioned that it was somewhat of a joke, but at least it was commonly known in Japan with the group that you worked with and your fellow KGB officers that U.S. journalists there in Japan would not be assets of or agents of the CIA. You just knew that.

Mr. Levchenko. I knew that, yes, sir, that American journalists stationed in Tokyo are not working for CIA.

Mr. Young. Yes. Now, my follow-up question on that is did you or are you aware of any other KGB officers who might have approached and attempted to recruit or successfully recruited an American journalist in Japan?

Mr. Levchenko. I know about several approaches, sir. I knew about two cases, and in both cases the American journalists appeared to be honest people and obviously they reported to somebody about this approach, possibly to the security officer in the Embassy. Anyway, they reported to some government official definitely because the next meeting after the first approach they started to ask the KGB case officer lots of questions about his background and things like that, which shows that they were already prepared by some counterintelligence officer on how to handle that.

Mr. Young. On the subject of age and when a person gets to the point that he is really no longer, because of advanced age, is no longer useful in ongoing projects, what does the KGB do? Do they retire him, take him off the books?

Mr. Levchenko. The KGB is very ruthless towards their agents, and they don't have anything like, you know, retirement pay for agents who have been working for them for many years. To begin with, usually they sort of underpay their agents. Their agents are not paid much at all except for kinds of real important agents who are bought literally. That type of person gets a lot of money.

But when some agent loses his source of information, and if he is not old yet and he is still in working condition, the first thing they will try to do is either to use him as a support agent to check addresses, directories, to put some forgeries in mailboxes and things like that. Or, some of them would be rerecruited by that terrible Department V for possible sabotage activities because I know -- and I witnessed that thing -- that before you give to archives any case, any file on any agent, you cannot do this before this transfer to archives would be approved by a high-ranking representative of Department V. So they are trying to think of utilizing them anyway. But if the agent really becomes sort of elderly, advanced age, disabled, the KGB just forgets about him, and that's it.

Mr. Young. What is this Department V? Now, this is the first time we've heard that mentioned today.

Mr. Levchenko. Department V is an outfit now belonging to the Illegal Service of the First Chief Directorate of KGB. Previously, it was an independent department in the First Chief Directorate. Its main activity is recruiting foreigners as agents for sabotage, assassinations and all kinds of things like that, primarily in case of very serious aggravation of the international situation. This department also sends its own illegals abroad to sit and wait and recruit some mobster-type individuals who would be ready to blow up a certain bridge or telecommunications system and things like that.

Mr. Young. Unfortunately we are out of time.

Do you have any closing statement that you would like to make before we recess the morning hearing, any summary of what we talked about and anything left out or forgot to ask you?

Mr. Levchenko. I wanted, sir, to repeat that it was a great honor for me to be here and I was looking forward to this day for the last three years, basically since the first day I came here. It was a great honor for me to answer questions of such distinguished Representatives of the U.S. Congress, and I just want to assure you that all my activity here from now on will be devoted to the noble task of mine which means to fight Soviets in the most clever, smart, calculated way which my talents permit me, and I would like to be helpful to the Government of this country for the rest of my life.

Mr. Young. Well, I would like to thank you very much for those comments. Certainly that is -- I think my greatest motivation is the security of the way of life that we enjoy in the United States, and I want to thank you very much for being willing to be here today, for your very frank statement and your willingness to respond very openly to every question that was asked of you.

And on behalf of the Committee, I want to thank you.

At this point, the Committee will be in recess until 2:00 o'clock this afternoon when our witnesses will be from the FBI.

Mr. Levchenko. Thank you very much, sir.

(Whereupon, at 11:56 o'clock a.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock p.m. the same day.)