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4 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, AFSAC

FROM: CHAIRMAN, AD HOC COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL COMINT

SUBJECT: Interim Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Global COMINT

Attached herewith is an interim report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Global COMINT, submitted in accordance with the decision reached at the 29th meeting of AFSAC. This interim report includes comments and dissenting views of the AFSA member.



J. N. WENGER  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee

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## INTERIM REPORT OF AD HOC COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL COMINT

The Committee has assembled and summarized the data on the existing Global COMINT structure, and currently authorized expansion thereof (including mobilization), as submitted by the Services and AFSA, in the attached TABS as follows:

## TAB 1. Material prepared by the Committee

Appendix A. - Chart showing Existing and Currently Authorized Expansion of COMINT Activities by Areas.

Appendix B. - Chart showing COMINT Activities by Areas at Peak Mobilization.

Appendix C. - Control and Direction of Cryptologic and DF Units - Global COMINT Structure (Typical)

Appendix D. - Flow of Raw Traffic - Global COMINT Structure (Typical)

Appendix E. - Flow of Technical Information - Global COMINT Structure (Typical)

Appendix F. - Flow of COMINT - Global COMINT Structure (Typical)

Appendix G. - Narrative Supplement

## TAB 2. Material submitted by the Services and AFSA.

Appendix A. - Armed Forces Security Agency Global COMINT Structure.

Appendix B. - Department of the Army Global COMINT Structure









Appendix C. - U.S. Naval Global COMINT Structure

Appendix D. - The Air Force Global COMINT Structure

## TAB 3. Dissenting Views of AFSA Member.

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# EXISTING AND CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED EXPANSION OF COMINT ACTIVITIES BY AREAS










**LEGEND:**

- EXISTING
- - - CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED EXPANSION
- ( ) SYMBOLS WITHIN PARENTHESES INDICATE ACTIVITY NOT EXISTING BUT PLANNED AND CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED.
- INT — INTERCEPT
- D/F — DIRECTION FINDING
- PROC — PROCESSING
- D/F NC — DIRECTION FINDING NET CONTROL
- D/F NC ALT — DIRECTION FINDING NET CONTROL ALTERNATE
- INTERP CL PROC — INTERPRETATION AND CLERICAL PROCESSING
- INTEL — INTELLIGENCE
- ADV EXPL — ADVANCED EXPLOITATION



REF ID: A60986  
**COMINT ACTIVITIES BY AREAS AT PEAK MOBILIZATION**




NOTE - MOBILIZATION PLANS ARE BASED ON SERVICE APPROVED MOBILIZATION PLANS.


LEGEND:	
INT	INTERCEPT
PROC	PROCESSING
D/F	DIRECTION FINDING
D/F NC	DIRECTION FINDING NET CONTROL
D/F NC ALT	DIRECTION FINDING NET CONTROL ALTERNATE
INTERP CL PROC	INTERPRETATION, CLERICAL PROCESSING
INTEL	INTELLIGENCE

NOTE: CERTAIN ARMY UNITS WILL DEPLOY OUTSIDE THE U.K. AS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF THEATER "A" OPERATIONS


PREPARED - 1 APRIL 51, AS OF 1 FEB 51



CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRYPTOLOGIC UNITS - GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE (TYPICAL)




FLOW OF RAW TRAFFIC - GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE (TYPICAL)



NOTE:  
 A. ARRANGEMENTS EXIST FOR INTER-SERVICE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE OF TRAFFIC AS EXPLAINED IN TEXT.  
 B. FLOW LINES INDICATE SELECTED RAW TRAFFIC  
 1. CERTAIN ASA FIXED STATIONS UNDER DIRECT COMMAND OF CHIEF, ASA, WHERE NO CHIEF ASA THEATER EXISTS, FURNISH TRAFFIC DIRECTLY TO CHIEF ASA AS REQUIRED.

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FLOW OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION - GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE (TYPICAL)



NOTES:  
 A. Arrangements exist for inter-service and foreign exchange of technical information as explained in text.  
 1. Technical information flows from DIRAFSA to Chief, ASA, for lower ASA echelons. By agreement with Chief, ASA, DIRAFSA provides technical information direct to certain ASA fixed stations.  
 2. Chief, ASA, provides technical information direct to ASA fixed stations not under command of a Chief, ASA Theater.  
 3. To and from DIRAFSA and OP-202 only.


TAB 1

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APPENDIX E

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FLOW OF COMINT - GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE (TYPICAL)



NOTES:

A. Arrangements exist for inter-service and foreign exchange of COMINT, as explained in the text.

B. COMINT as used here refers to either or both COMINT or intelligence derived from COMINT.

1. These recipients may or may not be one and the same person. Normally, the Unified Commander is served primarily by the Special Security Officer of his own Service.

2. Naval Forces Commander may or may not be a Unified Commander.

TAB 1

APPENDIX F

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~~TOP SECRET~~TAB 1 - APPENDIX G

## Narrative Supplement

1. General Discussion. - Processing is carried on by AFSA and the Services in accordance with JCS 2010 and JCS 2010/6. The differing interpretations of AFSA and the Services with regard thereto are expressed in JCS 2010/23, JCS 2010/24, JCS 2010/26, and JCS 2010/27, which are currently before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution. Therefore, this report does not imply agreement or disagreement with any of these differing interpretations. In order to present concisely the US Global COMINT Structure, Appendices A and B (Tab 1) have shown tabulations of activities by Services and general geographic areas, without necessarily conforming to Theater or Unified Command areas, and Appendices C through F (Tab 1) have shown the typical structure insofar as practicable. Certain important exceptions to and amplifications of the "typical" structure are described in the following paragraphs.

2. Remarks Concerning Tab 1, Appendix C. -

a. AFSA.- AFSA control and direction is as set forth in JCS 2010 series.

b. Army.- Operating under the direction and control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USA, Chief, Army Security Agency, commands all Army Security Agency units. These units normally receive administrative and logistic support from other Army commands.

c. Navy.- Military command of U.S. Naval cryptologic activities is exercised by local commanders in the chain of command at the places where located. The Director, Naval Communications, exercises the following control of Naval cryptologic activities:

- (1) Management control of all components which are part of the Naval Shore Establishment.
- (2) Technical control of all components, afloat or ashore.
- (3) Security control as required by USCIB directives.

d. Air Force.- All Air Force cryptologic units are under command of CG USAFSS. These units receive administrative and normal logistic support from Major Air Commands in overseas areas.

3. Remarks Concerning Tab 1, Appendix D.- Agreements exist for exchange of raw traffic. Agreements with foreign agencies are either USCIB-sponsored or coordinated by USCIB at Service request.

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a. Foreign Agreements.

(1) AFSA. AFSA [redacted]

[redacted] exchange raw traffic in accordance with provisions of the [redacted] Agreement. AFSA and [redacted]

[redacted] exchange raw traffic on a request basis, depending upon the tasks being undertaken by each, in accordance with provisions of the [redacted] Agreement.

(2) Army. ASA Europe exchanges selected raw traffic with

[redacted]

(3) Navy. DF bearings taken by Communication Supplementary Activity, Port Lyautey, on a 3-hour-per-week participating basis in the [redacted]

[redacted]

by the Security Branch, Naval Communications Division. All DF bearings taken by Atlantic and Pacific DF nets are

[redacted]

Naval Communications Division. Certain [redacted] [redacted] stations operate as part of the U.S. Navy DF nets and furnish the bearings obtained in the course of net operations directly by radio to the U.S. Navy net controls.

(4) Air Force. Formal provision has been made for lateral

[redacted]

Mobile, Chicksands Priority [redacted]. This provision is not yet fully implemented. Formal provision has been made for lateral exchange of selected raw traffic

[redacted]

the 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska

[redacted] This provision is not yet fully implemented.

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~~TOP SECRET~~b. Inter-Service and AFSA Arrangements.

- (1) AFSA.- AFSA receives copies of all Service-intercepted raw traffic, as forwarding facilities permit. AFSA receives DF bearings (equivalent to raw traffic) from the Services as arranged.
- (2) Army-Navy.- Selected raw traffic from Communication Supplementary Activity, [redacted] is exchanged with Army Security Agency, Pacific, Tokyo. DF bearings are exchanged on request, subject to Service priorities.
- (3) Army-Air Force.- Field Station 8607 AAU, Fairbanks, Alaska (USM 7), provides selected raw traffic to the 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, [redacted] Army Security Agency, Pacific, Tokyo, and 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, Johnson Air Force Base, [redacted] exchange selected raw traffic. DF net of 126th Signal Service Company and 51st Signal Service Detachment, Japan, operates in conjunction with DF net of 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile.
- (4) Navy-Air Force.- Selected raw traffic from Communication Supplementary Activity, [redacted], is exchanged with 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, Johnson AFB, [redacted] [redacted] DF bearings are exchanged on request, subject to Service priorities.

4. Remarks Concerning Tab 1, Appendix E.- "Technical information" as used in this chart is limited to engineering data, and data relating to intercept, DF, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis and related processes. The flows shown are not necessarily indicative of responsibilities for supply of technical support. AFSA is required to supply technical support to the Services in accordance with the JCS 2010 series. Intra-Service responsibilities for technical support are depicted in the appendices to Tab 2. Agreements exist for exchange of technical information as follows:

a. Foreign Agreements.

- (1) AFSA.- AFSA and [redacted] [redacted] exchange technical information in accordance with

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provisions of the [ ] Agreement. AFSA and

[ ]  
 [ ] exchange technical information on a request basis, depending upon the tasks being undertaken by each, in accordance with provisions of the [ ] Agreement.

- (2) Army.- Army Security Agency Europe exchanges technical information with [ ]

- (3) Navy.- Technical information concerning DF operations, equipment, facilities, etc., is exchanged by the

[ ]  
 In addition:

- (a) U.S. Naval procedures are used by [ ] Naval DF stations.
- (b) Coverage assignments for the Atlantic and Pacific DF nets are furnished to the Director of

- [ ]  
 (c) Security Branch, Naval Communications Division, provides technical assistance in DF and intercept matters to the [ ] through [ ] a liaison officer.

- (4) Air Force.- Formal provision has been made for exchange of technical information by [ ]

[ ]  
 with the 10th Radio Squadron, Mobile, at [ ]

[ ] Formal provision has been made for lateral exchange of daily coverage reports between the

[ ] the 3rd Radio Squadron, [ ]

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Exchange between Hq., AFSS and [ ] is carried on through the USCIB Coordinator.

b. Inter-Service Arrangements.-

(1) Army-Navy-Air Force.- Technical information concerning intercept, DF, and processing is exchanged at bi-weekly conferences of representatives of Army Security Agency Pacific, Communication Supplementary Activity, Yokosuka, and 1st Radio Squadron, Mobile, and in addition as required.

(2) Army-Navy.- Liaison in technical matters is authorized between Field Station 8602 AAU, [ ] and Communication Supplementary Activity, [ ] and Field Station 8605 AAU, [ ] and Communication Supplementary Activity, [ ]

(3) Army-Air Force.- Liaison in technical matters is authorized between Field Station 8607 AAU, [ ] and 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska (USA 34); and between Army Security Agency Europe, Frankfurt, and 2nd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Darmstadt (USA 33).

(4) Navy-Air Force.- Liaison in technical matters is authorized between Communication Supplementary Activity, [ ] and 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, Detachment, [ ]

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

5. Remarks Concerning Tab 1, Appendix F.- Dissemination of COMINT and/or intelligence derived from COMINT to non-cryptologic units within the Services is the responsibility of the respective Service intelligence agencies. COMINT is exchanged as shown in the chart among AFSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies. In all cases USCIB security regulations apply. Agreements exist for exchange of COMINT as follows:

a. Foreign Agreements.-

(1) AFSA.- AFSA and Service-produced COMINT available in Washington is made available to [ ] representatives

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[REDACTED]

COMINT selected by these representatives is exchanged by radio. In addition, AFSA and [REDACTED] maintain complete exchange of COMINT by mail, subject to provisions of the [REDACTED] Agreement. Selected COMINT items produced by the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are forwarded through AFSA to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; the Director of Naval Intelligence; and the Director of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force. AFSA and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] exchange COMINT on a request basis as provided in the [REDACTED] Agreement.

- (2) Army.-- Army Security Agency Europe exchanges selected COMINT with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Army Special Security Officer, London, receives, through the Senior U. S. Liaison Officer (USCIB), selected COMINT produced by [REDACTED]

- (3) Navy.-- A representative of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, peruses COMINT items published by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and obtains those he desires through the Senior U.S. Liaison Officer (USCIB) at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DF fixes are furnished by the Security [REDACTED]

- (4) Air Force.-- Formal provision has been made for exchange of COMINT by [REDACTED]

and [REDACTED], with the 10th Radio Squadron, Mobile, [REDACTED] Exchange between Headquarters, AFSS and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is carried on through the USCIB Coordinator.

[REDACTED] through the Senior United States Liaison Officer (USCIB) provides Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Forces, Europe, with selected COMINT.

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PL 86-36/50 USC 3605b. Inter-Service Arrangements.-

- (1) Army-Navy. - DF fixes are exchanged on request between Army Security Agency Pacific, Tokyo, and Communication Supplementary Activity, [REDACTED].
- (2) Army-Air Force. - Selected COMINT is exchanged between Army Security Agency Pacific, Tokyo, and 1st Radio Squadron Mobile, Johnson AFB (USA 33). Det C, 1st Radio Squadron Mobile, Taegu, provides selected COMINT to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 8th U.S. Army, Korea.
- (3) Navy-Air Force. - Selected COMINT is exchanged between Communication Supplementary Activity, [REDACTED], and 1st Radio Squadron Mobile, Johnson AFB (USA 33).

6. Special Arrangements. - Certain special sources of traffic, technical information, and COMINT have not been reflected in this report.

7. Special Weather Intelligence. -

a. In Appendices D, E, and F, lines to and from AFSA Field Weather Processing Unit apply only to Special Weather Intelligence and activities related to the production thereof.

b. Air Force Security Service has an Air Force requirement to produce special weather intelligence of theater or area interest which is supplemental to that produced by AFSA field weather processing units where these latter exist. In areas in which no field weather processing unit is available, the Radio Squadron Mobile concerned will produce all special weather intelligence required.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE (2 April 1951)

1. PURPOSE - To describe the existing and planned global communication intelligence (COMINT) activities required of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA).

2. SCOPE - The global COMINT structure of AFSA includes the organization and facilities required to discharge the responsibilities of AFSA for production of COMINT data from raw intercepts provided by worldwide sources.

3. RESPONSIBILITY - The COMINT responsibilities of AFSA have been assigned by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 2010. Subject to the authority and direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, AFSA is responsible for formulating and implementing plans, policies, and doctrine relating to COMINT for the Armed Forces, and for performing such other functions as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct, including the following:

a. Operational control of all AFSA facilities, units and military personnel; and operational and administrative control of all AFSA civilian personnel.

b. Operational direction of fixed intercept installations manned and administered by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

c. Production of COMINT in accordance with approved plans and policies and conduct of all operations necessary to the production of such intelligence except those operations which are to be conducted by the Army, Navy, or Air Force in accordance with decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Coordination within the Department of Defense of individual Service cryptologic activities with those of AFSA.

e. Provision of technical support of the Army, Navy and Air Force in their conduct of cryptologic activities.

f. Collaboration with foreign COMINT agencies in accordance with United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) policies.

g. Distribution of products of AFSA COMINT activities in accordance with Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC) policies.

4. DISCUSSION - AFSA now fulfills these responsibilities by maintaining the units shown in the appended map (Appendix "A"), in accordance with the principles graphically presented in the appended charts (Appendices "B" through "E").

a. Appendix "A" shows the location of existing and currently planned AFSA units. AFSA operates one main COMINT processing center in the continental United States (at Washington, D.C.). AFSA operates a Field Weather Processing Unit (FWPU) in the Pacific area (at Yokosuka, Japan), and plans a similar unit in the Atlantic area (at Chicksands, Priory, England) for Fiscal Year 1951. After the planned relocation of the AFSA Headquarters continental center, an additional subsidiary unit will be co-located with the seat of government.

b. Appendix "B" shows the AFSA Organization and Command Structure for Support of Operating Forces. AFSA provides Departmental level support for operating forces of all Services. FWPU's provide Special Weather support for operating forces at and below Area or Theater level, as arranged with the Services.

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c. Appendix "C" shows graphically the Assignment of Authority for Operational Direction of COMINT activities.

d. Appendix "D" shows AFSA Responsibilities for the Production of COMINT.

e. Appendix "E" shows Responsibilities for Supply of Technical Support. AFSA supplies technical support to all levels of Service COMINT activity. AFSA FWPUs receive technical support from AFSA, from Air Force Security Service (AFSS) Headquarters and from co-located field units of the Navy and/or the Air Force, whose commanders are primary consumers of Special Weather Intelligence. FWPUs Pacific receives local support from both Navy and Air Force installations. It is anticipated that FWPUs Atlantic will receive the bulk of local support from the 10th Radio Squadron (Mobile), with which it will be co-located, although additional support will be supplied by  activities.

f. Appendix "F" shows the Flow of COMINT and Technical Information in which AFSA participates. AFSA currently distributes COMINT data to USCIB members at the Departmental level, and supplies technical information to all echelons of the Service cryptologic organizations, as arranged with those organizations. AFSA FWPUs disseminate Special Weather Intelligence data to Theater Weather Centers, and receive technical information from co-located Service processing units.

Agreements, respectively. This exchange is carried on under supervision of USCIB and via joint liaison channels operated by the USCIB Coordinator.

h. Appendix "H" shows the AFSA Relationship to Intelligence Centers.

i. In amplification of the methods by which AFSA fulfills its assigned responsibilities, the following additional points are presented:

(1) General targets at which T/A and crypt will be directed at various levels. AFSA Headquarters T/A and crypt will continue to be directed at all foreign targets, regardless of level or Service, in accordance with requirements of the USCIB member agencies. FWPUs T/A and crypt will be directed toward targets which normally carry meteorological information, in accordance with requirements of the commanders served by these units.

(2) Mechanics of distribution of COMINT data. AFSA and AFSA FWPUs distribute COMINT data by physical and electrical means to authorized recipients at appropriate levels.

(3) Methods and levels of evaluation and correlation. Evaluation and correlation are functions of the Service intelligence agencies. In the exceptional cases of exploitation of traffic analysis data and plain-text intercepts, AFSA may perform preliminary evaluation and correlation based upon technical considerations.

(4) Methods of dissemination. AFSA now distributes COMINT data to USCIB member agencies, but the further dissemination of finished intelligence is a function of Service intelligence agencies.

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(5) Methods of security control. Personnel performing COMINT processing operations and handling COMINT data are cleared in accordance with USCIB standards. Internal compartmentation of activities is applied. Electrical transmission of COMINT, COMINT data, and technical information is effected in accordance with AFSA communication security policies, utilizing cryptographic systems reserved for COMINT purposes.

j. Personnel strengths of AFSA COMINT units, authorized and recommended, are as follows:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Increase Re- commanded to Secretary of Defense (JCS 2010/11)</u>	<u>Increase Re- commanded to AFSAC (AFSAC 55/22)</u>	<u>Total Authorized and Recommended</u>
AFSA Headquarters (COMINT Operations)	4759	1500	901	7160
Field Weather Processing Unit (Atlantic)	41	0	0	41
Field Weather Processing Unit (Pacific)	41	0	0	41
TOTALS	<u>4841</u>	<u>1500</u>	<u>901</u>	<u>7242</u>

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# ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY COMINT UNITS OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD

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Date: 12/14/50  
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Washington: 117, published (Rev. 1950) under the Geographic Names  
under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

New Publication: 3045, Jan. 1947

40 EDITION, July 1941

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

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ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
 ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR  
 SUPPORT OF OPERATING FORCES




APPENDIX "B"

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# ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY ASSIGNMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF COMINT ACTIVITIES



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
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— Command & Administrative Control


- - - Operational Direction of Positions Allocated to Perform Missions for AFSA (as now exercised)

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ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE  
PRODUCTION OF COMINT




APPENDIX "D"

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
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# ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SUPPLY OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT



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# ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY FLOW OF COMINT AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION



NOTE 1 BY AGREEMENT WITH CHIEF, ASA, DIRAFSA PROVIDES TECHNICAL INFORMATION DIRECT TO CERTAIN ASA FIELD STATIONS

**LEGEND**

————> Flow of COMINT


- - - -> Flow of Technical Information

APPENDIX "F"

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# ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY RELATIONSHIP TO INTELLIGENCE CENTERS





LEGEND  
—— Liaison and Exchange

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ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR  
FOREIGN COLLABORATION EXCHANGE

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



APPENDIX "G"

THE ARMY

GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE

1. PURPOSE - To present the existing and planned wartime global COMINT structure of the Department of Army.

2. SCOPE - The global COMINT structure of the Army is considered to include the worldwide organization and facilities required to perform intercept mission assignments, intercept control, intercept operations, COMINT processing, exchange of technical information, production of intelligence, dissemination and the determination of policy connected therewith.

3. RESPONSIBILITY - The operational responsibility for the global COMINT structure of the Army is divided between the Army Security Agency, the Intelligence Division and the SSO Branch of the Office of the Asst Chief of Staff, G-2. The COMINT activities are divided generally as follows:

a. The Army Security Agency is engaged primarily in COMINT collection to include, fixed intercept operations to support AFSA operations; combat COMINT operations to support Army Commanders of major commands and field Army Commanders worldwide to include intercept mission assignment, intercept control, intercept operations, unit and back-up processing, limited production of intelligence and exchange of technical information; and the determination of COMINT policy connected therewith.

b. The Intelligence Division in the COMINT field is engaged primarily in the production of intelligence from COMINT, in the assignment of target priorities for AFSA, and in the security aspects of the product.

c. The SSO Branch is engaged primarily in the activities involving the dissemination of the COMINT product and in the aspects of security required to protect the source.

4. DISCUSSION - a. General - The peacetime or existing global COMINT structure of the Department of Army has been so organized that, in general, it can be expanded to support the wartime Army without change of structure. This concept has been followed in the Department of Army emergency and war planning.



b. Appendix A depicts the ASA existing and planned wartime COMINT structure.

c. Appendix B discusses the existing and planned wartime structure for the production of intelligence from COMINT sources.

d. Appendix C portrays the SSO existing and planned wartime COMINT structure.

APPENDIX A

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

EXISTING AND PLANNED WAR GLOBAL

COMINT STRUCTURE

1. PURPOSE - To depict the existing and planned war global COMINT structure of the Army Security Agency.

2. DISCUSSION - a. The Army Security Agency has been organized to permit expansion of its global COMINT structure, rather than reorganization, to support the mobilizing and later the war strength Army. The basic command and support structure of ASA is presented graphically in TAB "1". This study will treat only with the COMINT structure and activities excluding COMSEC functions.

b. The Army Security Agency combat COMINT support structure is portrayed diagrammatically in TAB "2". For purpose of simplicity this structure will be discussed beginning at Division level, the lowest Army echelon at which ASA operates.

(1) Division Level - The COMINT support provided is that of liaison. In this capacity ASA serves the division commander by advising generally as to those items of the Division Collection Plan which could be accomplished by the Comm Recon Bn., the ASA interest in types of captured material, and other ASA matters as required. Liaison will also be maintained with the Division Signal Officer on matters pertaining to Electronic Countermeasure activities. The Comm Recon La Dets will have direct communications with the Comm Recon Bn.

(2) Corps Level - The Corps is the lowest level at which direct COMINT support is provided the field commander and complete COMINT operations performed. COMINT collection missions are normally obtained from the Corps Collection Plan, Corps Signal Officer (for ECM) and the ASA Group Commander. The Bn Hq will exercise only

general intercept control and will not perform any analysis activities. These activities are performed for the Bn commander by the Comm Recon Co (Intel) which in addition will perform the intercept activities and, to a limited degree, will produce combat intelligence, however, its major product will be COMINT data. Dissemination, with the exception of technical information, will be through the Army SSO system. Technical information will normally be passed only between ASA units. The structure provides that the Bn must keep the Group continually and currently informed as to specific mission assignments and successes attained. Traffic intercepted and successes are passed expeditiously to the Group via technical channels.

- (3) Army Level - The Group Headquarters provides the key intercept control activity within the Army. Although limited in its capability to perform extensive analysis activities it has sufficient facilities to review the Bns COMINT products, coordinate the intercept mission assignment throughout the Army with those of adjacent Armies together with those from higher ASA commands (normally Theater ASA). Concerning its direct support mission, it operates at the Army level in the same manner as the Bn at Corps. However, in addition to accomplishing (through the Bn intercept facilities) the general mission of the Army commander and passing this COMINT to the SSO for dissemination, the Group will also make available for dissemination the results of the Corps and Division missions. The Group Headquarters expedites the movement of intercept traffic and successes of the Group rearward to the next higher ASA echelon together with specific requests for technical back-up.
- (4) Theater Level - The ASA provides at this level a Theater ASA having extensive COMINT facilities and vested with

command of all ASA units within the Theater. While both mobile and fixed type intercept units are commanded by the Chief, ASA Theater, the fixed facilities are operationally directed by DIRAFSA. However, as the situation permits, that COMINT data collected by the fixed facilities of immediate interest to the Theater will be utilized by the Theater ASA. To fulfill its responsibilities the Theater ASA performs extensive combat intercept control and COMINT analysis and produces intelligence from COMINT. These activities are required for two primary reasons, to provide COMINT to the Theater Commander and Army Field Commanders, through the Army SEO system; and to provide the tactical ASA units with the necessary technical COMINT back-up required for efficient field operations. Currently this is the lowest level at which exchange of technical information is made with the [ ] Intercept missions, although performed primarily for the Theater Commander will also be performed on targets of AFSA and [ ]

The Theater ASA expedites the movement of that traffic intercepted for AFSA, other traffic considered to be of interest to AFSA and all Theater successes to Hq, ASA. The Theater ASA makes specific requests on Hq, ASA for technical assistance and backup.

- (5) Department of Army Level - The Chief, ASA will establish a Combat COMINT Branch in Hq, ASA to perform those processing functions required to support the combat COMINT efforts of the ASA field units. This unit will process, only to the extent required, to control, direct, support, improve and intensify the processing being conducted by ASA Theater and tactical (mobile) units. This processing will be performed in coordination with AFSA. Mission assignment and traffic control will be limited in scope

to that required for global coordination. Traffic and successes received from ASA Theater will be made available to AFSA. The primary COMINT products of this unit will be as follows:

(a) Intelligence - Keys, code values, traffic analysis information and other COMINT to support field unit operations. Direction finding analysis and control information for field units and for support of Signal Corps electronic warfare activities on communications operations.


(b) Studies to evaluate and improve field operations. The technical support provided the Army by AFSA will normally be through Hq, ASA.

c. The units shown in Tab 3 compose the existing (FY 51) ASA global COMINT structure as discussed above.

d. In the event of mobilization it is planned that the existing global structure will be expanded, without any major change, to encompass those units indicated in TAB 4. This wartime structure will be reached over a period of 36 months after M-day and as noted is directly tied to the Department of Army Mobilization and War Plans.

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
COMMAND AND SUPPORT STRUCTURE




1. Operationally directed by AFSA.
2. Commanded by ASA Wash. or ASA Theater as situation dictates.
3. Number of stations depend on AFSA requirements.
4. Field Stations provide Theater ASA with COMINT data of interest to the Theater.

~~NOT TO BE RELEASED OUTSIDE THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY~~  
~~IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY~~

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
COMBAT COMINT SUPPORT STRUCTURE



~~SECRET~~

3

~~TOP SECRET~~ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
TY 51 UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE

2,263,000 Man Army

16 Divisions

FORCES SUPPORTEDCONFIDENTIAL U.S.

Hq, AFF  
 First Army  
 Second Army  
 Third Army  
 Fourth Army  
 Fifth Army  
 Sixth Army

General Reserve

V Corps  
 VII Corps  
 ((7) Divisions)  
 ((3) RCTs and/or Regts)  
 ((98) Combat Bns)

ASA SUPPORT ELEMENTSCONFIDENTIAL U.S.

Hq, ASA (Includes processing unit)

Tactical COMINT Units

711 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 851 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 352 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 853 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 854 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 855 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 356 Comm Recon Ln Det

General Reserve

Hq & Hq Co \_\_\_\_\_ Comm Recon Gp  
 Hq & Hq Det 301 Comm Recon Bn  
 Hq & Hq Det 302 Comm Recon Bn  
 Hq & Hq Det \_\_\_\_\_ Comm Recon Bn  
 329 Comm Recon Co (Intel)  
 333 Comm Recon Co (Intel)  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Comm Recon Co (Intel)

Field Stations \*(3)

8601 AAU  
 8602 AAU

Training  
 ASA School

- 1 -

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
FY 51 UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE  
 1,263,000 Man Army      16 Divisions

FORCES SUPPORTEDFECOM

## CINCPAC

Eighth Army

I Corps

IX Corps

X Corps

((6) Divisions)

((3) RCTs and/or Regts)

((40) Combat Bns)

EUROPE

## CINCEUR

Seventh Army

((3) Divisions)

((4) RCTs and/or Regts)

((23) Combat Bns)

## CINCUSAF

((1) RCT /)

## CINC TRUST

((1) RCT)

ASA SUPPORT ELEMENTSFECOM

## Hq ASAPAC

Tactical COMINT Units

Hq &amp; Hq Co 501 Gp

Hq &amp; Hq Det 303 Bn

Hq &amp; Hq Det 304 Bn

326 Comm Recon Co (Intel)

327 Comm Recon Co (Intel)

360 Comm Recon Co (Intel)

Field Stations \* (3)

8603 AAU Okinawa

8609 AAU Philippine Islands

8610 AAU Kyoto, Japan

8612 AAU Chitose, Japan

EUROPE

## Hq ASAE

Tactical COMINT Units

Hq &amp; Hq Co \_\_\_\_\_ Gp

331 Comm Recon Co (Intel)

332 Comm Recon Co (Intel)

Field Stations \* (3)

8606 AAU

8608 AAU

8611 AAU

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
FY 51 UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE

1,263,000 Man Army

16 Divisions

ALASKACINCAL  
CGUSARAL  
(1) BCT/f)PACIFIC

CINCPAC

CARIBBEAN

CGUSARCARIB

WORLDWIDE MISCELLANEOUSALASKA

Hq, ASA Alaska

Tactical COMINT Units  
\_\_\_ Comm Recon Co (Invel)Field Stations \* (3)  
8607 AAUPACIFIC

Hq, ASA Hawaii

Field Stations  
8605 AAUCARIBBEAN

Hq, ASA Caribbean

WORLDWIDE MISCELLANEOUSAsmara  
8604 AAU, Field Station  
Detachment V~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
FY 51 UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE

1,263,000 Man Army

16 Divisions

NOTES:

1. Chart includes only those units engaged in COMINT activities.
2. Units shown include those authorized and requested.
3. Field Station "A asterisks" normally provide certain raw materials, of direct interest to the Theater, to the Theater ASA for use as Theater combat COMINT.

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
 WAR UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE  
 IN SUPPORT OF ARMY WAR PLANS  
 FULL MOBILIZATION

FORCES SUPPORTEDContinental U.S.

Eg, APT

First Army Area  
 Second Army Area  
 Third Army Area  
 Fourth Army Area  
 Fifth Army Area  
 Sixth Army Area

ASA SUPPORTING ELEMENTSContinental U.S.

Hq ASA (including processing unit)

Tactical COMINT Units  
 711 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 851 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 852 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 853 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 854 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 855 Comm Recon Ln Det  
 856 Comm Recon Ln Det

Field Stations

8601 AAU  
 8602 AAU

Training

ASA School  
 8622 AAU - ASA Training Center

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
WAR UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE  
IN SUPPORT OF ARMY WAR PLANS  
FULL MOBILIZATION

FORCES SUPPORTED

FECOM  
CINCPAC  
 (1) Army

\*EUROPE  
CINCEUR  
 Seventh Army  
 (3) Division /

ASA SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

FECOM  
 Hq. ASAPAC  
Tactical COMINT Units  
 (1) Hq & Hq Co Comm Recon Gp  
 (2) Hq & Hq Det Comm Recon Bn  
 (3) Comm Recon Co (Intel)

Field Stations  
 8603 AAU Okinawa  
 3CO AAU Philippine Islands  
 8610 AAU Kyoto, Japan  
 8612 AAU Chitose, Japan

\*EUROPE  
 Hq P&AE  
Tactical COMINT Units  
 (1) Hq & Hq Comm Recon Bn  
 (2) Comm Recon Cos (Intel)

Field Stations  
 8606 AAU  
 8608 AAU  
 8611 AAU

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
WAR UNIT COMINT STRUCTURE  
IN SUPPORT OF ARMY WAR PLANS  
FULL MOBILIZATION

FORCES SUPPORTED\*\* THEATER "A"

CINC Theater "A"  
 (4) Armies  
 (14) Corps  
 (57) Divisions

\*\*\* THEATER "B"

CINC Theater "B"  
 (2) Armies  
 (4) Corps  
 (15) Divisions

ALASKA

CINCAL  
CGUSARAL  
 (1) RCT /

ASA SUPPORTING ELEMENTS\*\* THEATER "A"

Hq ASA Theater "A"  
Tactical COMINT Units  
 (4) Hq & Hq Co Comm Recon Gp  
 (14) Hq & Hq Dets, Comm Recon Bn  
 (14) Comm Recon Co (Intel)

\*\*\* THEATER "B"

Hq ASA Theater "B"  
Tactical COMINT Units  
 (2) Hq & Hq Co Comm Recon Gp  
 (4) Hq & Hq Det Comm Recon Bn  
 (5) Comm Recon Co (Intel)

ALASKA

Hq ASA Alaska  
Tactical COMINT Units  
 (1) Comm Recon Co (Intel)

Field Stations  
 8607 AAU

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
AN UNIT COMPT STRUCTURE  
IN SUPPORT OF ARMY WAR PLANS  
FULL MOBILIZATION

FORCES SUPPORTED

PACIFIC  
 CINCPAC

CARIBBEAN  
 CGUSARCARTB

WORLDWIDE MISCELLANEOUSNOTES.

1. \* Current Army plan (being reconsidered) indicates 60 day holding action then units are written off as fighting units.
2. \*\* Theater "A" - build-up after 1/12; expands to include forces of Theater B on or about 4/26.
3. \*\*\* Theater "B"; immediate build-up.

ASA SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

PACIFIC  
 Hq ASA Hawaii

Field Stations  
 8605 AAU

CARIBBEAN  
 Hq ASA Caribbean

WORLDWIDE MISCELLANEOUS

AAU's  
 8604 AAU, Field Station

Detachment 4

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Army Existing and Planned Wartime Global Structure  
for the Production of Intelligence from COMINT

1. Purpose

To depict the Army existing and planned wartime global structure for the production of intelligence from COMINT.

2. Discussion

a. Existing Structure

Special Research Branch, Intelligence Division, G-2, is responsible, within the Army, for the production of intelligence from COMINT, for disseminating such intelligence (through the Army SSO system where appropriate), and for establishing intelligence priorities for the guidance of COMINT producing agencies, such priorities being based on the requirements of all Army COMINT recipients. Special Research Branch has a present personnel strength of 55.

b. Proposed Wartime Structure

(1) In the event of war it is expected that the Branch will expand eventually to an estimated strength of 250 persons, to permit the processing of the increased quantity of COMINT anticipated as a result of AFSA and ASA wartime activities, and to insure expeditious handling of operational intelligence vital to the field. No major changes in the Branch organizational structure or procedures are contemplated.

(2) SSO teams in the field would probably be augmented by research personnel to assist the Theater G-2 to produce as complete and accurate intelligence as possible from COMINT. Procurement and training of such personnel could be effected under the existing SSO system, using Detachments "F" and "M".

(3) The Theater G-2's would probably desire eventually to establish COMINT processing units under the operational control of the Theater G-2's but conforming to security measures prescribed by the SSO. The research personnel attached to the SSO teams at the time of the formation of the processing units would then be transferred to the respective units as trained nuclei.

(4) In the event that a Joint and/or Combined COMINT processing center were later established in a Theater, the research personnel of the units described in par 2 b (3) above could provide at least a portion of the Army contribution.



Present and Proposed Special Security Officer System for the  
Dissemination of COMINT throughout the Department of the Army

1. Purpose

To depict the Army existing and planned wartime global structure for the dissemination of intelligence from COMINT. EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2. Discussion

The Army concept of COMINT dissemination is based on centralized control, by AC/S, G-2, over the channels and mechanics of dissemination between the producing agencies and the ultimate recipients of COMINT. In order to implement this concept the AC/S, G-2, established the Special Security Officer system which provides a detachment of officer and enlisted personnel who are attached to the various headquarters authorized to receive COMINT. These detachments operate the COMINT communication channels and represent the AC/S, G-2, D/A, in matters concerning the security and dissemination of COMINT within the headquarters to which attached.

In accomplishing its mission the SSO system receives COMINT (both evaluated and unevaluated) from all available sources for dissemination to ultimate recipients. The SSO in the recipient headquarters assures physical and cryptographic security of COMINT and maintains physical custody of all COMINT material. The evaluation, correlation, integration of COMINT is performed by Command G-2, under security supervision of the SSO.

The current operation of the SSO at HQ, CINCEUR, Heidelberg, Germany, is typical of the existing and contemplated SSO service. The SSO Heidelberg receives COMINT (both evaluated and raw traffic) from the following sources:

Special Research Branch, ID  
ASA Europe

Secure facilities are provided under security supervision of the SSO where cleared personnel of the Theater G-2 Section perform such evaluation, correlation and integration of COMINT as is desired by the Theater. The personnel of the SSO office assist in the Theater evaluation effort in such manner as desired by the Theater G-2. The processed material is then disseminated to authorized recipients by the SSO office. All COMINT material remains in the custody of the SSO at all times.

The current disposition of the SSO system (Det "M", OAC/S, G-2) together with the headquarters served is as follows:


<u>SSO Station</u>	<u>Principal Headquarters Served</u>
Fort Richardson, Alaska	Alaskan Command
Quarry Heights, C. Z.	Caribbean Command
Fort Jay, New York	U. S. Del. UN Mil. Staff Comm.
Fort Shafter, T. H.	HQ USARPAC
Tokyo, Japan	GHQ, FEC (includes EUSAK)
London, England	U.S. Ambassador to England
Paris, France	SHAPE and U.S. Ambassador
Frankfurt, Germany	HICOG
Bonn, Germany	HICOG
Heidelberg, Germany	CINCEUR
Salzburg, Austria	USFA and HICOA
Vienna, Austria	USFA and HICOA
Trieste, F. T. T.	TRUST

In addition to the above Army stations, the following U.S. Air Forces stations (staffed by USAF personnel) are serviced through communications channels of the Army SSO system:

<u>Station</u>	<u>HQ Served</u>
Mitchell AFB, New York	Air Defense Command
Dayton, Ohio	Air Materiel Command
Omaha, Nebraska	Strategic Air Command
Wiesbaden, Germany	U.S. Air Forces, Europe

In addition to the existing stations, mobilization plans call for the activation of the following SSO teams:

2 ea Teams Type "A"	(Theater Headquarters)
14 ea Teams Type "B"	(Army or Army Group HQ)
7 ea Teams Type "C"	(Independent Army Corps or fixed installation)


~~TOP SECRET~~DUAL NATURE OF ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
COMINT SUPPORT MISSION

15 February 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

Chart Showing Flow of COMINT and Technical Support, Relationship to Intelligence Centers, and Other Pertinent Items



Note  
 "SRB" indicates Special Research Branch.  
 "SSO" means Special Security Officer.  
 "SSR" means Senior Security Representative.  
 The "SSO Theater" is likely to be the "SSR in the Area."  
 COMINT as used here refers to either or both information or intelligence derived from COMINT activities.

1 February 1951

NUMBER AND PERSONNEL OF ASA-OPERATIONALLY-CONTROLLED  
UNITS OF COMINT INTEREST, BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

	Hq ASA (a)		School		Training Center		Liaison Detachment		Theater Hq		Hq & Hq Co C Recon Gp		Hq & Hq Det. Com Recon Bn		Comm Recon Co (Intel)	
	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel	No. of Units	Personnel
Z/I																
Existing (Auth.)	1	1224	1	742	1	14	1	2			1	103	3	69	2	672
Planned & Auth.	1	1224	1	742	1	14	7	49			1	103	3	69	3	1008
Peak Mobilization	1	3083	1	818	1	483	7	49			0	0	0	0	0	0
CARIBBEAN																
Existing (Auth.)									1	25						
Planned & Auth.									1	34						
Peak Mobilization									1	34						
ALASKA																
Existing (Auth.)							1	4	0	0					0	0
Planned & Auth.							0	0	1	34					1	336
Peak Mobilization							0	0	1	34					1	336
HAWAII																
Existing (Auth.)									1	34						
Planned & Auth.									1	34						
Peak Mobilization									1	34						
FAR EAST																
Existing (Auth.)									1	380	0	0	1	23	4 <sup>(b)</sup>	816
Planned & Auth.									1	380	1	103	2	46	3	1008
Peak Mobilization									1	397	1	103	2	46	3	1008
EUROPE																
Existing (Auth.)									1	289	0	0	0	0	2 <sup>(c)</sup>	514
Planned & Auth.									1	289	1	103	0	0	2	672
Peak Mobilization (d)									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AFRICA																
Existing (Auth.)																
Planned & Auth.																
Peak Mobilization																
THEATER A																
Existing (Auth.)									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Planned & Auth.									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peak Mobilization									1	546	4	417	14	322	14	4704
THEATER B																
Existing (Auth.)									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Planned & Auth.									0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peak Mobilization									1	190	2	206	4	92	5	1680
TOTAL																
Existing (Auth.)	1	1224	1	742	1	14	2	6	4	728	1	103	4	92	8	2002
Planned & Auth.	1	1224	1	742	1	14	7	49	5	771	3	309	5	115	9	3024
Peak Mobilization	1	3083	1	818	1	483	7	49	6	1235	7	721	20	460	23	7728

NOTE. Figures for "Planned and Authorized" are totals, not increments, and are based on 1,263,000-man Army. Figures for Peak Mobilization are totals after units are redeployed to their designated areas. Both sets of figures are subject to re-adjustments based on changes in troop strengths.

- (a) Includes Army personnel assigned to AFSA; excludes Arlington Hall Station personnel not assigned to AFSA or Hq, ASA.
- (b) These are the 111th, 126th and 60th Signal Service Companies, which will be reconstituted as Comm Rec Co (Intel) and the 51st Signal Service Detachment, which will become a Comm Recon Co. (Security) but is now engaged in COMINT.
- (c) These are the 114th and 116th Signal Service Companies which will be reconstituted as Comm Rec Co (Intel).
- (d) For planning purposes, units stationed in Europe on 14-Day will be dropped from D/A rosters on 14/2 months.

15 February 1951.

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~~SECRET~~

## ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

Tabulation Showing: INTERCEPT AND D/F POSITIONS OF ASA-CONTROLLED  
UNITS OF COMINT INTEREST, BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS

NOTE: Figures for "Planned  
and Authorized" and "Peak  
Mobilization" are totals  
and not increments.

Z/I	Communication Reconnaissance Companies (Intel.)	
	Intercept Positions (all types except D/F)	D/F Positions
Existing (Auth.)	60	8
Planned & Authorized	90	12
Peak Mobilization	0	0
CARIBBEAN		
Existing (Auth.)		
Planned & Authorized		
Peak Mobilization		
ALASKA		
Existing (Auth.)	0	0
Planned & Authorized	30	4
Peak Mobilization	30	4
HAWAII		
Existing (Auth.)		
Planned & Authorized		
Peak Mobilization		
FAR EAST		
Existing (Auth.)	60	18*
Planned & Authorized	90	12
Peak Mobilization	90	12
EUROPE		
Existing (Auth.)	40	8
Planned & Authorized	60	8
Peak Mobilization	0	0
AFRICA		
Existing (Auth.)		
Planned & Authorized		
Peak Mobilization		
THEATER A		
Existing (Auth.)	0	0
Planned & Authorized	0	0
Peak Mobilization	420	56
THEATER B		
Existing (Auth.)	0	0
Planned & Authorized	0	0
Peak Mobilization	150	20
TOTAL		
Existing (Auth.)	160	34*
Planned & Authorized	270	36
Peak Mobilization	690	92

\*10 of these are of a small d/f type for vehicular (3/4 ton) mounting.  
("Finch Loop Amplifier and Loop Rotator Model F115-A").

15 February 1951

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Tabulation Showing TOTAL PERSONNEL AND INTERCEPT POSITIONS OF AAFS  
UNITS UNDER OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF AFSA

	PERSONNEL	P O S I T I O N S							
		Manual Morse	Auto Morse	Sim- plex(a)	Multiplex		Voice	RFP(b)	D/F(b)
					2 ch.	Other			
<b>Z/T</b>									
<u>8601 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	375	30	36	12	0	4	1	1	1
JCS 2010/20	412	30(c)	36	12	2	6	1(c)	1	1
<u>8602 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	272	20	15	8	2	6	1	0	0
JCS 2010/20	363	20	15	8	4	6	1(c)	0	1
<b>CARIBBEAN (None)</b>									
<b>ALASKA</b>									
<u>8607 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	87	6	3	3	0	1	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	350	16	18	9	2	5	0	0	1
<b>HAWAII</b>									
<u>8605 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	172	17	0	8	3	6	2	0	0
JCS 2010/20	280	17	0	8	3	6	2(c)	0	1
<b>FAR EAST</b>									
<u>8609 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	223	19	12	10	0	3	1	1	1
JCS 2010/20	342	19	18	10	2	5	1	1	1
<u>8603 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	661	57(d)	18	9	8	7	1	0	1
<u>8610 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	258	30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>8612 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	275	30	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
<b>EUROPE</b>									
<u>8606 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	208	19	33	13	2	9	1	1	1
JCS 2010/20	729	30	33	42	12	16	2	1	1
<u>8608 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	340	37(e)	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
<u>8611 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	283	30	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
<b>AFRICA</b>									
<u>8604 AAU</u>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	275	8	28	4	0	1	0	0	1
JCS 2010/20	538	16	56	10	4	6	0	0	1
<b>SPECIAL ACTIVITIES</b>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	56	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
JCS 2010/20	80	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>GRAND TOTALS</b>									
Pre JCS 2010/20	1668	136	127	58	7	30	7	3	4
JCS 2010/20	4911	351	194	108	37	57	16(c)	3(b)	8(b)

NOTE: Figures for JCS 2010/20 are existing authorized. Breakdown of JCS 2010/20 requirements by positions is shown in accordance with AFSAC 60/12. Proposed breakdown of requirements of JCS 2010/31 (if approved) was not available in final form at ASA on 15 Feb. 51.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

- (a) Includes "Non RU" simplex.  
 (b) JCS 2010/20 shows no requirements for RFP or D/F. Requirements in this column are estimated.  
 (c) 10 existing manual morse positions and one voice at 8601 AAU, one voice at 8602 AAU, and two voice positions at 8605 AAU, are in excess of JCS 2010/20 requirements.  
 (d) Includes 30 manual morse positions from USM 36.  
 (e) Includes  and Det A and B.

15 February 51

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## ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

## RECAPITULATION OF PERSONNEL FIGURES

	Total Personnel of ASA Operationally- Controlled Units of COMINT Interest	Total Personnel of ASA Units Under Operational Direc- tion of AFSA	Total all Other ASA Personnel	Grand Total ASA Personnel
Existing (Authorized)	4911	4911 (a)	1529	11,351
Planned and Authorized	6187 (b)	4911 (a)	1937 (b)	13,035
Agency Peak Mobilization (c)	14,366 (b)	5542 (d)	4358 (b)	24,266

- (a) JCS 2010/20 is used as basis for both "Existing (Authorized)" and "Planned and Authorized" in this column.
- (b) These figures are subject to readjustments based on changes in planned troop strengths.
- (c) Peak mobilization for the Agency as a whole will occur at W/24. All ASA units will not be at their respective peaks simultaneously however
- (d) Best estimate as of 31 October 1950 when figure was prepared for ASA mobilization plan. This total is subject to revision.

15 February 1951.

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
ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

CHART SHOWING ASA OPERATIONALLY CONTROLLED D/F NETS IN EUROPE.

LEGEND:


- ★ Hq, ASA Europe.
- ⊙ D/F net control and D/F.
- ▲ D/F

NOTES Missions for D/F net of 114th Signal Service Co. (1)(2)(3) and D/F net of 116th Signal Service Co. (4)(5)(6) are assigned by ASAE (7).



ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

CHART SHOWING A CIA-OPERATIONALLY-CONTROLLED  
D/F NETS IN FAR EAST, AND THEIR RELATION-  
SHIP WITH THE AFSS D/F NET THERE.



## LEGEND

- ★ Hq, ASA Pacific
- ⊙ D/f net control and D/F (ASA Unit)
- ▲ D/F (ASA Unit)
- ⊙ D/F net control and D/F (AFSS Unit)
- D/F (AFSS)

## NOTES

D/F Net of 60th S S Co (1)(2)(3)(4) operates independently of others.  
D/F net of 126th S. S. Co. (6)(7) and 51st S. S. Det (8), operates in  
conjunction with AFSS net of 1st Hdo Sqdn Mobile (10)(11)(12).  
Control of net may be by either net control of 126th S.S. Co. (6) or  
net control of 1st hdo Sqdn Mobile (10) through conference teletype  
facilities.  
ASAPAC (5) directs d/f of 111th S. S. Co. (9), in conjunction with  
operations of the above nets where desired.

1 Feb 51


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ARMY SECURITY AGENCY UNITS OF COMINT INTEREST  
EXISTING(AUTHORIZED)+INCREMENT PLANNED AND AUTHORIZED  
OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD

No.1262b  
Price 30 cents



**LEGEND**

—	EXISTING AUTHORIZED	—	INCREMENT PLANNED & AUTHORIZED
HQ ASA	—	HQ	—
ASA TNC CENTER	—	TC	—
HQ THEATER ASA	—	★	—
INTERCEPT	—	●	—
INTERCEPT CONTROL	—	⊙	—
D/F	—	▲	—
PROCESSING	—	■	—

**EXPLANATION OF ACTIVITIES**

- ★ HQ THEATER ASA WITH INTERCEPT CONTROL ACTIVITIES
- ★ HQ THEATER ASA WITH INTERCEPT CONTROL AND PROCESSING ACTIVITIES
- COMM RECON ORP
- COMM RECON BN
- COMM RECON CO (INT) OR SIG SVC CO WHERE APPLICABLE
- ALONE IS FIELD STATION AFSA DIRECTED
- FIELD STATION D/F AFSA DIRECTED
- ALONE IS SIG SVC DET (FOR D/F)

— NUMBERS OPPOSITE SYMBOLS INDICATE NUMBER OF UNITS WHERE MORE THAN ONE IS AUTHORIZED.

1 FEB 1950

NOTE  
The boundaries shown upon this chart are approximate only and should not be regarded as having official significance.





# REF ID: A60986 ARMY SECURITY AGENCY UNITS OF COMINT INTEREST JUST PRIOR TO ASA PEAK MOBILIZATION\* OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD



**LEGEND**

- HQ ASA ----- HQ
- ASA TNG CENTER ----- TC
- HQ THEATER ASA ----- ☆
- INTERCEPT ----- ○
- INTERCEPT CONTROL ----- ⊙
- D/F ----- △
- PROCESSING ----- □

**EXPLANATION OF ACTIVITIES**

- ⊙ ☆ ----- HQ THEATER ASA WITH INTERCEPT CONTROL ACTIVITIES
- ⊙ ☆ □ ----- HQ THEATER ASA WITH INTERCEPT CONTROL AND PROCESSING ACTIVITIES
- ⊙ ----- COMM RECON GRP
- ⊙ ----- COMM RECON BN
- ⊙ ----- COMM RECON CO (INT) (OR SIG SVC CO WHERE APPLICABLE)
- ----- ALONE IS FIELD STATION AFSA DIRECTED
- △ ----- FIELD STATION, D/F AFSA DIRECTED
- △ ----- ALONE IS SIG SVC DET (D/F)

NUMBERS OPPOSITE SYMBOLS INDICATE NUMBER OF UNITS WHERE MORE THAN ONE IS PLANNED

NOTE: The boundaries shown upon this chart are approximate only and should not be regarded as having official significance.

\* FULLEST EMPLOYMENT OF UNITS OCCURS BEFORE MOVE OF THEATER B UNITS INTO THEATER A, JUST PRIOR TO M+24 MONTHS (ASA PEAK MOBILIZATION)

1 March 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM

From: Captain L.S. Howeth (OP-202)  
To: Captain J.N. Wenger, USN, Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee  
considering AFSAC 73/3

Subj: U.S. Naval Global COMINT Structure; papers relating to

Ref: (a) Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee Memorandum of 26 Jan 1951

Encl: (1) Chart showing geographical locations of principal  
facilities  
(2) Tabular presentation of principal facilities  
(3) 1 set of charts (7 charts) showing relationships  
within Naval Global COMINT structure  
(4) Narrative exposition of Naval Global COMINT structure

1. The enclosures prepared in accordance with reference (a)  
are forwarded herewith.



L.S. HOWETH

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




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# OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD



NOTE  
The boundaries shown upon this chart are approximately only and should not be regarded as having official significance.

**U.S. NAVAL GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE FACILITIES**

						<b>EXISTING</b>
						<b>CURRENTLY PLANNED &amp; APPROVED</b>
						<b>PLANNED FOR MOBILIZATION</b>
						<b>A AREA EXPLOITATION UNIT</b>

Small reproductions from various sources. Price 30 cents. No. 1262b

Washington, D.C. published Jan. 1957 at the Hydrographic Office under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

New Publication: 3655 Jan. 1957

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Price 30 cents  
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ENCLOSURE (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

U. S. NAVAL GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE  
FACILITIES  
TABULAR PRESENTATION

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Enclosure (2)







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
U. S. NAVAL  
GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE

- Chart 1 Organizational and Command Structure
- Chart 2 Assignment of Authority
- Chart 3 Responsibilities for Production of COMINT
- Chart 4 Responsibilities for Supply of Technical Support
- Chart 5 Flow of COMINT and Technical Information
- Chart 6 Arrangement for Foreign Collaboration and Exchange
- Chart 7 Relationship to Intelligence Centers

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
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Organization of Command Detachments for  
Special Support of Operations Forces



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REF ID: A60986

Assignment of Authority for Operational Direction of COMINT Activities

----- By AFSA - Navy agreement


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
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responsibilities for supply of technical support

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


----- when Co-located




Flow of COMINT and Technical Information

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Note:  
COMINT and technical data exchange  
between USN Area Exploitation Units  
and corresponding foreign units  
contemplated.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605




—— D/F Net Collaboration  
- - - Air-Sea Rescue D/F Collaboration

Arrangements for Foreign Collaboration and Exchange

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—— Existing  
- - - - Contemplated

Relationship to Intelligence Centers

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U. S. NAVAL  
GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE

NARRATIVE EXPOSITION

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CLOSURE (4)

1. SCOPL The Naval Global Communication Intelligence (COMINT) structure is considered to include the organization, personnel, and facilities required to perform on a global scale
  - a. intercept of all types of wireless communications of enemy or potential enemy agencies or military forces
  - b. obtaining and plotting HFDF bearings and fixes
  - c. intercept coverage control
  - d. COMINT processing (including traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, translation, and information correlation) required for combat intelligence and to carry out b. and c. above, except as requirements are met by AUSA
  - e. technical information exchange
  - f. COMINT dissemination and exchange
  - g. intelligence correlation and evaluation
  - h. intelligence dissemination
  - i. security control
  - j. development of procedures and techniques for above processes and the determination of policies connected therewith.
  
2. FACILITIES The functional components of the U.S. Naval Global COMINT structure are
  - a. Naval Security Group (under cognizance of Director, Naval Communications)
    - (1) Intercept Stations
    - (2) HF DF Stations and Nets
    - (3) Area Exploitation Units
    - (4) Advanced Exploitation Units
    - (5) Detachments afloat
    - (6) Interpretive Units
  - b. Under cognizance of Director of Naval Intelligence (Op-32)
    - (1) Operational Intelligence Section, Division of Naval Intelligence
    - (2) Fleet Intelligence Officers
    - (3) Area Naval Force Intelligence Officers
    - (4) Numbered Fleet Intelligence Officers
    - (5) Task Force, Group, Element and Unit Intelligence Officers

3. MISSION To furnish the U.S. Naval operating forces with complete and timely combat, current, and strategic intelligence; to respond to the special operational needs of the operating forces as requested from time to time; to furnish the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) with COMINT support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The specific mission of certain functional components of the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) is as follows:

a. Area Exploitation Unit: To engage in communication intelligence processing including traffic analysis, limited cryptanalysis, decryption, translation, information correlation, and dissemination to meet the combat intelligence requirements of a major naval commander within the area in which his forces are operating, and which can better be accomplished within the area because of timeliness, quick response to operational needs or for other reasons; to provide technical support for other Communication Supplementary Activities in the area.

b. Advanced Exploitation Unit: To engage in communication intelligence processing at the point of intercept to provide timely combat intelligence to the naval forces in the vicinity or under the command of a local commander.

c. Detachments Afloat: To intercept and process such communications as are within its capacity to provide communication intelligence of tactical importance to the commander of the fleet, task force, task group, or unit at sea to which assigned.

d. Interpretive Unit To receive communications intelligence from processing centers and exploitation units, and to assemble and interpret it for use by the intelligence officer of the command to which the unit is assigned.

4. RESPONSIBILITY. The operational responsibility for the Naval global COMINT structure is divided between the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRP) and the Division of Naval Intelligence. The COMINT functions of each are generally as follows:

a. The NAVSECGRP is engaged primarily in COMINT collection, including AF DE operations, to support AFSA and meet Naval combat intelligence requirements.

b. The Division of Naval Intelligence engages in the COMINT field primarily in the correlation and evaluation of intelligence, dissemination of intelligence, determination and assignment of target priorities for the NAVSECGRP and AFSA, and in the security control of the product.

5. TARGETS at which T/A and Cryptanalysis will be directed at various levels

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

[Redacted]

Naval	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Naval Air	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Police	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Merchant Shipping	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis

[Redacted]

Naval	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Naval Air	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Police	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Merchant Shipping	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis

[Redacted]

Naval	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Naval Air	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Police	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis
Merchant Shipping	T/A	Minor System Cryptanalysis

Other Nations and other types of traffic as U.S. Naval operations may require.

6. COMINT DISTRIBUTION MECHANICS. Chart #5 depicts the general COMINT distribution flow lines.

a. Raw intercept traffic moves by secure mail or wire and wireless means from the intercept stations to AFSA, the local Advanced Exploitation Unit, and the appropriate Area Exploitation Unit with mail back-up to AFSA.

b. The COMINT product of advanced Exploitation Units is transmitted by secure wire or wireless means to the intelligence division of the appropriate AREA NAVAL FORCE COMMAND, to the appropriate Area Exploitation Unit, to AFSA and to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

c. The COMINT product of Area Exploitation Units is transmitted by hand, secure wire or wireless means to the intelligence division of the appropriate FLEET COMMAND and AREA NAVAL FORCE COMMAND, to AFSA and to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

d. The COMINT product of Detachments Afloat is delivered by hand or orally to the intelligence officer of the COMMAND to which the detachment is assigned.

e. The COMINT product of AFSA is transmitted by hand or secure wire to the Division of Naval Intelligence.

f. The COMINT product of the DF Nets is furnished to AFSA by the DIVSECGRP Headquarters, Washington and that portion of the product relative to anti-submarine warfare ~~or air-sea rescue~~ is passed by wire or wireless means to the appropriate FLEET, AREA NAVAL FORCE, or SEA FRONTIER COMMANDS.

g. It is assured that AFSA will transmit by secure wire or wireless means such COMINT information to each Area Exploitation and advanced Exploitation Unit as is appropriate to the mutual support of current problems.

h. In general, all despatches embodying COMINT information are encrypted in special crypto channels expressly provided for such material and addressed in such a manner as to effect delivery to all interested parties without reencipherment and with the minimum number of communication relays.

## 7. EVALUATION AND CORRELATION METHODS AND LEVELS

a. Area Exploitation Units, Advanced Exploitation Units and detachments afloat correlate their COMINT products locally with such collateral information as is available and other COMINT. Each item of COMINT is prepared showing the source as either "Traffic Intelligence" or "Decryption Intelligence" which automatically establishes the basic degree of credibility or evaluation of the

b. The operational Intelligence Section, Division of Naval Intelligence, and intelligence officers at the headquarters of commands correlate the COMINT furnished them with other intelligence of all kinds and evaluate individual COMINT items after due consideration of source, agreement or non-agreement with collateral information, and intangibles that may apply such as military or political precedents, national psychological bias, established eccentricities of individual political and military leaders, and other factors of such nature. Intelligence studies and situation estimates stem from the correlation of all intelligence (including COMINT) available on particular subjects, and the evaluation of the individual items used affects the weight of such items in determining the conclusions.

c. In order to save time and improve coordination, intelligence units may be employed in the immediate spaces where COMINT is produced, for example:

(1) Op-322Y1 in AFSA

(2) Unit of Joint Intelligence Center or Staff Intelligence Division in an Area Exploitation Unit.

(3) Intelligence Unit of the command served in an Advanced Exploitation Unit.

8. INTELLIGENCE DISSEMINATION METHODS. Within the U.S. Naval COMINT structure, COMINT is divided into two categories, (a) Special Intelligence and (b) Traffic Intelligence. Each is designated by a code word which is employed together with the appropriate standard security classification.

COMINT is disseminated only by the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence - Op-322Y) and such other commands as are specifically authorized by the CNO as operations may require. The principle of dissemination is based on "the need to know". Each item of COMINT is made known only to those individuals who require it in the performance of their duties and who have been appropriately indoctrinated.

COMINT recipients are designated specifically in each case by the CNO. Recipient authorizations are made and withdrawn as operations may require.

COMINT is transmitted to recipients by despatch encrypted in special cryptographic channels expressly provided for that material and in no other, and by officer messenger mail over routes specifically approved by the CWO.

To save time, arrangements may be made at the discretion of a major commander to have a processing unit or DF plotting center disseminate certain types of COMINT directly to the operating forces, usually in the name of the commander concerned; more often however, the same result as well as better correlation is achieved by having an intelligence unit of the command carry on evaluation, correlation and dissemination all within the same building as is used for COMINT processing.

9. SECURITY CONTROL METHODS The senior intelligence officer on the staff of each command authorized to receive COMINT is designated by the commander concerned as the "Special Security Officer" (SSO). As these designations are made and when changes occur, the CWO (DNI - Op-322Y) is so informed. The duties and responsibilities of the SSO includes:

- a. The maintenance of security of COMINT within the command to which he is attached.
- b. Indoctrination of recipients of COMINT including administration of the appropriate secrecy oath to individuals.
- c. Supervision and implementation of all security measures prescribed for internal handling, transmission and exchange of COMINT.
- d. Maintenance and destruction of COMINT files.
- e. Administration of reception and opening of all mail marked "To be opened by SSO only".
- f. Reporting of all infractions of the regulations to his Commanding Officer as soon as detected.

Within each command authorized by the CWO to receive COMINT, each individual recipient must execute the appropriate secrecy oath. Further, he must execute the appropriate secrecy oath upon termination of his status as a recipient of COMINT.

Permanent files of COMINT are retained by the CWO only. Major fleet and area commands may retain such COMINT files as are

necessary to the mission and the continuing intelligence needs of the individual command; such files being held to a minimum and subjected to regular review with this objective in mind. All other recipients will destroy documents designated by the COMINT code words as soon as action has been taken on them and in all cases within 30 days from date of receipt. However, extracts of data or paraphrased information from COMINT sources may be retained in the COMINT files as long as necessary.

All personnel, except officers with more than ten years continuous active commissioned naval service, will be investigated by the DNI prior to clearance by their respective commanders to handle and receive COMINT. It is expected that commissioned officers only will handle COMINT for those commands which receive only evaluated COMINT. On the staffs of commanders who evaluate, synthesize and disseminate intelligence, it is expected that certain enlisted and civilian personnel will be required. In all cases these enlisted and civilian personnel will be kept to the minimum required for handling the work involved.

Commissioned officers with ten or more years continuous active commissioned service need not be subjected to the complete formal investigation prior to indoctrination. However, records available in the Washington area must be scrutinized to the extent determined necessary by the DNI prior to indoctrination.



~~TOP SECRET~~DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, AD HOC COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: ~~(Top Secret)~~ Ad Hoc Committee Data Relating to the  
Global COMINT Structure

1. Forwarded for consideration by the Ad Hoc Committee is the material requested in committee meeting of 23 January 1951.
2. Paragraph 4b of the Armed Forces Security Agency memorandum, subject as above, dated 26 January 1951, has been complied with at an earlier date.

1 Incl  
AF Global Comint  
Structure w/Appendix  
A-B-C/s/ Emmett F. Yost  
EMMETT F. YOST  
Colonel, USAF  
Chief, Supplemental Research Branch  
Collection Division  
Directorate of Intelligence~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~THE AIR FORCE GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE

1. **PURPOSE:** To present the existing, currently planned and approved, and the planned wartime mobilization global Comint structure of the Department of the Air Force.

2. **SCOPE:** The global Comint structure of the Air Force is considered to include the world-wide organization and facilities required to perform intercept mission assignments, intercept control, intercept operations, Comint processing, exchange of technical information, production of information for intelligence purposes, dissemination, and the determination of policy connected therewith. The aim of the Air Force Comint effort is to produce combat information affecting enemy air defenses or hostile air operations which could have an immediate impact on our own defensive and retaliatory air operations. The mission of AFSS and its RSI's is to produce such information on an "immediate use" basis within the level of RSM capabilities.

3. **RESPONSIBILITY:** The operational responsibility for the Comint activity of the Air Force is assigned to the Air Force Security Service (AFSS). The Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, is responsible for supervision of the Air Force Comint effort for the Chief of Staff, USAF.

4. **DISCUSSION:**

a. **General** - The peacetime or existing global Comint structure of the Department of the Air Force has been so organized that, in general, it can be expanded to support the wartime Air Force without change of structure. This concept has been followed in the Department of the Air Force emergency and war planning.

b. Appendix A depicts in chart form:

- (1) - Organization and command structure for Comint support of operating forces.
- (2) - Assignment of authority for operational direction of Comint activities.
- (3) - Responsibility for production of Comint.
- (4) - Responsibility for supply of technical support.
- (5) - Levels of Air Force Processing.
- (6) - Arrangements for foreign collaboration and exchange.
- (7) - Relationship to intelligence centers.


c. Appendix B depicts in narrative form:

- (1) - General targets to which T/A and Crypt will be directed at various levels.
- (2) - Mechanics of distribution of Comint data in the Air Force.
- (3) - Methods and levels of evaluation and correlation in the Air Force.
- (4) - Methods of Air Force dissemination.
- (5) - Methods of security control.

d. Appendix C - Definitions.

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
# 1

~~SECRET~~ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR COMINT AND SUPPORT OF OPERATIONAL FORCES~~SECRET~~

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ASSIGNMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

.COMINT ACTIVITIES




- — — — — OPERATIONAL COMMAND & DIRECTION, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND SPECIALIZED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
- - - - - LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL (DISCIPLINARY MATTER) AND NON-SPECIALIZED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
- OVERALL COORDINATION, PLUS OPERATION DIRECTION OF A PREDETERMINED NUMBER OF FACILITIES

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#3

## FLOW CHART INDICATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRODUCTION OF COMINT



DET

DET



COLLATED PROCESSED AREA TRAFFIC BEARING ON INTER-CONTINENTAL OR INTER-HEMISPHERIC OPERATIONS AND PROCESSED SELECTED GLOBAL TRAFFIC



PROCESSED AREA TRAFFIC



SELECTED RAW TRAFFIC BASED ON AFSA REQUIREMENTS

SELECTED RAW TRAFFIC BASED ON AIR FORCE GLOBAL REQUIREMENTS




PROCESSED GLOBAL TRAFFIC

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FLOW CHART INDICATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR TECHNICAL SUPPORT



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
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UNIT

PROCESSING LEVEL

FOR

FOR COMINT

1. The AFSS processing unit synthesizes and correlates the information obtained by the RSM from:

- a. The externals of enciphered or coded traffic.
- b. The translations of plain text or voice traffic.
- c. Such low-level cryptanalysis as can be performed in the field with field equipment.
- d. Such low-level cryptanalysis as can be performed in the field with "keys" furnished by AFSA.

for the purpose of producing timely (minute by minute) information required by global missions of major air commands; and to collate the RSM analysis of the above material for all air commands.

2. The RSM processing unit analyzes and collates the information obtained by intercept under its direct control from:

- a. The externals of enciphered or coded traffic.
- b. The translations of plain text or voice traffic.
- c. Such low-level cryptanalysis as can be performed in the field with field equipment.
- d. Such low-level cryptanalysis as can be performed in the field with "keys" furnished by AFSA.

for the purpose of producing timely (minute by minute) information required by the area mission of major air commands and to transmit to AFSS and/or AFSA information required on a particular, specified, communications target.

3. The detachment collects and identifies radio communications traffic as directed and transmits certain select items on a minute by minute basis to the RSM. In addition, the detachment may be required to operate D/F equipment as well as other specialized equipments not normal to their regular assigned mission.


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#6

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR FOREIGN COLLABORATION AND EXCHANGE

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



— FORMAL COLLABORATION AND EXCHANGE  
 - - - COORDINATION AND WORKING LEVEL COLLABORATION AND EXCHANGE


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RELATIONSHIP TO INTELLIGENCE CENTER

#7



COMINT ONLY - LIAISON LINE

INTEL FROM COMINT - SSO LINE

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~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX B

1. General targets at which T/A and crypt will be directed at various levels. The objective of Air Force processing for COMINT information is to produce information which will be immediately exploitable by Air Force combat commands. The general targets at which Air Force cryptologic agencies will aim are the air to air, air to ground, and point to point nets of (1) - VLR Air Forces which have the capability of operating globally or inter-continentially; (2) - the foreign air defenses which have the capability of countering our global or inter-continental air operations; (3) tactical and/or strategic foreign Air Forces which operate in limited areas. All Air Force commands will be served from one level of Air Force cryptologic activity-that of the RSM. The products of RSM's will be collated and correlated at AFSS to the extent necessary to meet Air Force requirements for global or inter-continental combat Comint. In addition, certain limited portions of the raw traffic affecting the global mission of the Air Force combat command will be processed at AFSS on a continuing basis.

2. Mechanics of distribution of Comint data in the Air Force. The lowest echelon within the AFSS Comint structure is the RSM Detachment. This unit intercepts foreign radio communications by direction of the RSM to which it is attached. It has no Comint analysis function. The Comint data is passed to the RSM by electrical and/or courier means where it is processed and collated with material intercepted by other detachments of the RSM. The RSM has an inherent capability of processing an estimated 90% of the Comint data intercepted into usable Comint information. The larger part of the 10% represents specific select raw traffic desired by AFSA; the remainder of the estimated 10% of Comint data intercepted represents raw traffic which is beyond the capability of the RSM to properly tie in with the communications targets under their surveillance. The RSM processed traffic normally reflects the collection requirements on an area basis but may also reflect requirements of a global nature. All data is disseminated to the intelligence consumers in the form of information. This same information is passed by electrical means to AFSS for further collation and correlation. At the same time certain select traffic from the processed traffic is passed directly to AFSS as required by it. All traffic is passed to AFSA as requested. AFSS passes the Comint information to AFSA in the form of summaries. There is no contemplated change to be made in these processes in event of mobilization.

3. Methods and levels of evaluation and correlation in the Air Force. Final evaluation of Comint data for the production of intelligence needed by combat commanders is the function of the intelligence staff sections of the combat commanders involved. However, limited evaluation and correlation will take place within RSM's and at AFSS, as indicated in paragraph 1 above. The methods of evaluation and correlation will be traffic analysis, and such cryptanalysis as is within the capability of RSM analysis personnel (using such "keys" as are furnished by AFSA or recovered by RSM's.) As also indicated above, the level of evaluation and correlation will be that required to furnish Air Force world-wide and area combat commands with such information bearing upon their respective essential elements of information as can be produced by RSM's, and by correlation and collation of RSM products at AFSS.

4. Methods of Air Force dissemination. In general, the Air Force method of dissemination of Comint is patterned after the existing Army SSO system. The basic difference between the two organizations is that the Air Force SSO is assigned to the Hq being serviced as a special staff member normally under the Director of Intelligence of that Headquarters. He acts in the capacity of a top secret Comint control officer. Complementary to the SSO system is the Air Force RSM liaison office which acts as the link between Air Force headquarters in the theater and the RSM in the same general area. The liaison office transmits collection requirements to the RSM and receives and delivers through the SSO, Comint information from the RSM as a result of these requirements.

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5. Methods of security control. The Air Force method of security control is patterned after the Army and follows as applicable the basic security directives embodied in the [ ] and USCTB directives. In addition, the Director of Intelligence, Air Force, has provided for a world-wide inspection unit to insure uniform and standard application of the Comint security directives.

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~~TOP SECRET~~APPENDIX CEO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605DEFINITIONS:

Definition of GLOBAL and AREA Missions as it relates to the requirement for COMINT support of the Major Air Commands.

A. GLOBAL

(1) By "global" is meant:

- a. The Air Force's defensive mission against inter-hemispherical air operations of the USSR.
- b. The Air Force's major strategic mission requiring inter-continental air operations against the USSR.

(2) "Global Air Force Commands" are those which are concerned either with the entire [redacted] or with the entire [redacted]

B. AREA

(1) By "area" is meant a limited geographic area, usually coinciding with the area of a theater command, to which an air command will confine its efforts. These efforts may be strategic or tactical or both.

(2) "Area Air Force Commands" are those which are concerned only with segments of the [redacted] or with segments of the [redacted] effort, or with segments of both which may be operating in an "area."

C. COMBAT COMINT

By "Combat Comint" is meant information which can be produced by an Air Force cryptologic unit and which is immediately exploitable by Air Force combat commanders, or which bears immediately on their mission.

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OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD



USAP SECURITY SERVICE DEPLOYMENT PLAN

1st PHASE

- Processing (Squadron Level)
- Intercept Facility
- D/F Facility

2nd PHASE

- Processing (Squadron Level)
- Intercept Facility
- D/F Facility

NOTE: The boundaries shown upon this chart are approximate only and should not be regarded as having official significance.

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~~TOP SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS  
USAF SECURITY SERVICE  
Brooks Air Force Base, Texas~~TOP SECRET~~  
AL B CS USAFDEPLOYMENT PLAN

PHASE I		21 February 1951		
ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	AGGREGATE
Field Processing Unit	Brooks AFB, Texas	100	585	685
1st Radio Squadron, Mobile	Johnson AFB, Japan	33	524	557
Detachment 11	Misawa			
Detachment 12	Ashiya			
Detachment 13	Korea			
2d Radio Squadron, Mobile	Darmstadt, Germany	33	544	577
Detachment 21	Darmstadt			
Detachment 22	Schlissheim			
Detachment 23	Berlin			
3d Radio Squadron, Mobile	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska	33	544	577
Detachment 31	Adak			
Detachment 32	Nome			
Detachment 33	-			
8th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Brooks AFB, Texas	33	512	545
10th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Chicksands Priory	34	545	579
Detachment 101	Chicksands Priory			
Detachment 102	Hull			
Detachment 103	Eastbourne			
	Sub-Total	266	3,234	3,500
PHASE II				
12th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany	33	540	573
Detachment 121	Oberpfaffenhofen			
Detachment 122	Horsching			
Detachment 123	Vienna			
14th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Ankara, Turkey	34	601	635
15th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Johnson AFB, Japan	33	524	557
Detachment 151	Ashiya			
Detachment 152	Okinawa			
Detachment 153	Okinawa			
26th Radio Squadron, Mobile	United States	33	610	643
29th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Clark AFB, Philippines	33	524	557
34th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Tripoli, Africa	33	524	557
Detachment 341	Tripoli			
Detachment 342	Tobruk			
Detachment 343	Tobruk			
37th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Edinburgh, United Kingdom	33	512	545
Detachment 371	Edinburgh			
Detachment 372	Fick			
Detachment 373	South Shields			
41st Radio Squadron, Mobile	Bremen Enclave	33	540	573
Detachment 411	-			
Detachment 412	-			
Detachment 413	-			
	Sub-Total	265	4,375	4,640
	Total Phases I and II	531	7,609	8,140

Note 1 No additional squadrons will be activated in Phase III, however, certain squadrons will be augmented by additional detachments

Note 2 Redeployment of certain RSM's will be necessary and this redeployment has been indicated on the map for Phase III. Only areas in general have been indicated for the location of RSM's in Phase III for obvious reasons

Note 3 It is believed that the USAF requirement for interior coverage of the area of interest can best be satisfied by the deployment of RSM's in depth along the 40°, 70°, 90°, and 120° meridians of longitude. Therefore, it is planned in the near future to request the authorization for an additional four (4) RSM's

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# OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD



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Ely~~TOP SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS  
USAF SECURITY SERVICE  
Brooks Air Force Base, TexasDEPLOYMENT PLAN

PHASE III		21 February 1951			
ORGANIZATION	LOCATION	OFFICERS	AIRMEN	AGGREGATE	
Field Processing Unit	Brooks AFB, Texas	108	632	740	
1st Radio Squadron, Mobile	Far East	33	524	557	
Detachment 11					
Detachment 12					
Detachment 13					
2d Radio Squadron, Mobile	Northwest Mediterranean	37	672	709	
Detachment 21					
Detachment 22					
Detachment 23					
Detachment 24					
Detachment 25					
3d Radio Squadron, Mobile	Alaska	35	602	637	
Detachment 31					
Detachment 32					
Detachment 33					
Detachment 34					
8th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Brooks AFB, Texas	33	512	545	
10th Radio Squadron, Mobile	United Kingdom	34	545	579	
Detachment 101					
Detachment 102					
Detachment 103					
12th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Middle East	35	598	633	
Detachment 121					
Detachment 122					
Detachment 123					
Detachment 124					
14th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Middle East	48	729	777	
Detachment 141					
Detachment 142					
Detachment 143					
Detachment 144					
Detachment 145					
15th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Far East	33	524	557	
Detachment 151					
Detachment 152					
Detachment 153					
26th Radio Squadron, Mobile	United States	33	610	643	
29th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Far East	33	524	557	
Detachment 291					
Detachment 292					
Detachment 293					
34th Radio Squadron, Mobile	Northwest Mediterranean	35	582	617	
Detachment 341					
Detachment 342					
Detachment 343					
Detachment 344					
37th Radio Squadron, Mobile	United Kingdom	33	512	545	
Detachment 371					
Detachment 372					
Detachment 373					
41st Radio Squadron, Mobile	Scandinavia Peninsula	37	668	705	
Detachment 411					
Detachment 412					
Detachment 413					
Detachment 414					
Detachment 415					
	Sub-Total	567	8,234	8,801	
	Attrition Rate 4.25%		Monthly	354	

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~~TOP SECRET~~COMMENT AND VIEWS OF AFSAC MEMBER

3 April 1951

The AFSAC representative has concurred in the report of the ad hoc committee, subject to the following comments:

1. In the opinion of the AFSAC member, the report is an interim composite statement outlining what each cryptologic agency conceives to be its position, relationships, and responsibilities in a global COMINT structure, in accordance with the recommendation contained in AFSAC: 73/3, as modified and approved by AFSAC, and with the decision of AFSAC at its 29th meeting. As such, the report does not necessarily represent an agreed concept of what the U.S. global structure should be.


2. The overall situation with respect to Unified Commands is clearly delineated in J.C.S. 1259/27 ("The Unified Command Plan") and J.C.S. 1885/6 ("Meaning of the Term 'Executive Agent'"). It is believed that this situation is more accurately depicted in the arrangement shown in the Appendix to this Tab than in the charts contained in the Appendices to Tab 1. The charts in Appendices C, D, E, and F to Tab 1 do not reflect any clear-cut responsibility for COMINT support of Unified Commands. While it is generally the practice for a Chief of Staff to utilize the personnel and facilities of his Department to assist him in the discharge of his responsibilities as an Executive Agent, there is no basis for assuming that such an arrangement is always required. In this connection, it should be noted that J.C.S. 2010/6 limits COMINT exploitation by each Service "to material of operational interest to that Service." Therefore, it is questionable whether any one Service can or should assume full responsibility for COMINT support of a Unified Commander, especially where his command includes large component forces of more than one Service.

3. In Appendices C, D, E, and F to Tab 1, "Processing" notation at Headquarters, Air Force Security Service accurately describes the existing practice; however, the "limited processing" notation at Headquarters, ASA, does not accurately describe the existing practice. Whether or not these notations are valid depends upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff decision on J.C.S. 2010/23

4. In addition to the foregoing, it is noted that:

a. COMINT support or dissemination arrangements shown in this report make no provision for SHAPE or other similar commands.

b. The Director, AFSAC, and AFSAC have certain responsibilities for coordination of Service cryptologic activities and those of AFSAC which are not shown in the report.




J. N. WENGER  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee

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4 April 1951

U.S. GLOBAL COMINT STRUCTURE (IN PRINCIPLE)  
(Dissemination not shown)



- Operational Direction or Control
- - - Coordination
- ..... COMINT Requirements
- ..... COMINT Processing Support
- ..... Technical Support
- . - Foreign Collaboration
- ▨ COMINT Elements

- Notes:
1. In accordance with AFSAC Charter.
  2. Or direct to field activities, as required.
  3. Within field of Service responsibility
  4. As specifically authorized.

Note 5 - AFSA to receive requirements from and give support to unified commanders as required

Note 2

Note 3

Note 4