

THE "LARGE POLICY" OF 1898.

by

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Introduction.

The emergence of the United States, at the close of the nineteenth century, as a world power with a colonial empire is a phase of our history that has not been fully developed. If historians have been almost unanimous in their contention that the Spanish-American War could have been avoided why is it that we went to war at all? Several reasons or theories have been advanced -- these usually concern the Spanish treatment of Cubans, the attitude and sensationalism of the American newspapers, the De Lome letter, and the Maine disaster. Perhaps too little has been said of the American expansionists. In fact, many students of American history still hold to the belief that the United States entered the war without foresight of the profound results of that struggle and her position in the world. Charles Hurd described the attitude of these students when he wrote that "students have tried for forty years to learn exactly how and where the Spanish war began," but the plain fact is that our "government embarked on an adventure without definite reason and no preparation, and came out with a foreign policy."^{1.}

1. Charles Hurd, The White House, A Biography of the House, Its Occupants, Its Place in American History, New York, 1940, 211.

However, as one studies the situation more and more it becomes evident that we went into the war to acquire an empire and world power, and not to save Cuba. While many Congressmen who voted for war did not look far ahead there were several

very active Americans who had early perceived the wider implications of a Spanish-American war and had looked beyond with great vision. At least two of them hoped and planned for a war. In fact these two, the scholarly Senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the aggressive and vigorous Theodore Roosevelt, had formulated a "large policy" which they looked to the war to effectuate. This "large policy" aimed at making the United States the indisputably dominant power in the western hemisphere, owner and controller of an Isthmian Canal, holder of naval bases and colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific, possessor of a large navy and a sharer of the commercial and naval supremacy of the Pacific Ocean and the Far East.²

2. Julius Pratt, "The Large Policy of 1898," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1933, 19: 222.

The lead in the formation and interruption of this "large policy" was taken by the Republicans, who as heirs of the Whig and Federalist tradition, could interpret national interest in terms of commercial expansion and enlargement of naval power. The active Americans who formulated and pushed the large policy were men who had premonitions of the gravity of the real situation and of historic opportunities as well. These were men of a younger generation who had tired of hearing about the deeds of their sires. As Roosevelt expressed it to Carl Schurz: "You and those of your generation had your opportunity from 1861 - 1865. Now let us of this have ours."³

3. John Burgess, Reminiscences of an American Scholar, New York, 1934, 315.

These were men who wanted excitement, personal glory and action -- a war that would give to statesman, to patriots, to soldiers and to poets, as Roosevelt said, "their grandest opportunities." These men and their policy represented that element in our national life who dreamed of entering upon some great martial enterprise, who desired a return to Americanism -- the great work of conquest. To continue that inexorable movement in which the United States had been engaged for nearly a century was their ambition.⁴

4. Matthew Josephson, The President Makers, New York, 1940, 28.

That these men and the spirit of their policy influenced and guided America in its quest for a colonial empire and world power will become apparent from this study of the "large policy" of 1898.

Chapter I.

The Genesis of the "Large Policy".

From the Civil War to the close of the 1880's the relations of the United States with the outside world were singularly placid. America was too occupied with its internal development to become interested in a policy of external expansion. The exploitation of natural resources and the building of industries and modern systems of transportation prevented the growth of a latent expansionism. However, through all these years the long arm of manifest destiny kept appearing again and again. One must not regard this period as stale as it bore the beginnings of a magnificent manifest destiny.

The efforts of Seward as Secretary of State and Grant as President to annex the Danish West Indies, Santo Domingo and Haiti failed before a wall of public and political opposition and indifference.^{1.}

1. Theodore C. Smith, "Expansion After the Civil War 1865-1871,"
Political Science Quarterly, 1901, 16: 412-436.

Presidents Grant, Hayes and Arthur agreed in the view that an Isthmian canal should be owned and controlled by the United States but no tangible results followed their insistence. A reciprocal trade treaty with Hawaii, which had failed ratification in 1855 and 1867, was ratified in 1876. A commercial treaty with Samoa secured the use of Pago Pago as a naval base, and the renewal of the Hawaiian treaty in

1894 granted the exclusive use of Pearl Harbor as a naval station to the United States.

However, no concrete proposal, except that of President Grant in the case of Santo Domingo, for annexation of any foreign territory was made by any administration, nor did public opinion seem to demand any such policy. The political and public mind refused to dismiss domestic questions for the remote questions of colonial expansion and aggrandizement. The idea had developed that expansion was contrary to our national policy. Americans were not unaware of foreign occupation of large undeveloped regions of Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Isles but, for the present, were inclined to feel that America was indeed fortunate to have escaped the germs of imperialism.²

2. Julius Pratt, op. cit., 223-224.

An obscure clash of petty officials, naval pugnacity, and commercial interests in the remote Pacific suddenly flared into such an affair that it aroused the attention of the nation. The Samoan crisis with England and Germany during the winter of 1888-1889 was probably the incident that turned American attention to external expansion. The conduct of German representatives at Apia aroused popular resentment in America and created the impression that perhaps America ought to participate in colonial gains before it was too late. The incident called forth some expressions in Congress and the press which give an interesting foretaste of the expansionist talk that was to be heard in the next ten years.

Senator William Frye, of Maine, declared that the Hawaiian and Samoan Islands were the only two resting places left to us in the Pacific and that Pago Pago was destined to be of the most vital importance to the commerce of the United States in the Pacific.^{3.}

3. Congressional Record, 50th Congress, 2nd session, 100, 1374.

Senator Joseph Dolph, of Oregon, drew an alarming picture of European countries gradually absorbing the bases so essential to our trade while we feebly protested and allowed the "Monroe Doctrine to sink into innocuous desuetude."^{4.}

4. Ibid., 1325-1337.

Secretary of State Blaine, although bringing to his office the reputation of a jingo, nevertheless took up the Samoan question, as Secretary Bayard had done, in a conciliatory spirit which was reciprocated by Bismarck. Nature in the form of a tidal wave and a hurricane took the wind out of the participants' sails and the result was a three power treaty of 1899. Blaine had apparently little enthusiasm for Samoa, as it was difficult to substantiate a claim to any vital American interest in Samoa.^{5.}

5. A. F. Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine, Minneapolis, 1927, 351, 359-60.

However, it was a sign of the reawakening of old ambitions which had guided America in its continental manifest destiny.

Interest in Samoa was a straw which showed the way the wind was blowing. America was beginning to realize that her interests were more than continental. They lay beyond the sea. Samoa was a necessary step in America's development as a world power.

Although President Harrison expressed the opinion that the completion of an Isthmian canal was a "matter of the highest concern to the United States," Blaine did not follow up his efforts toward an American controlled canal. He can, however, be credited with participation in two expansionist enterprises which foreshadowed in their purpose the large policy of 1898. These were the attempt to lease from Haiti the harbor of Mole St. Nicholas as a naval station, and the tacit consent to bring about the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States.⁶

6. Ibid., 91-98, 216.

The expansionist policy of the Harrison administration, although barren of results, helped to pave the way for a revival of the continual American onward movement.

By this time thoughtful students of contemporary movements were aware that a new epoch in American history was approaching. Whereas the manifest destiny of the 1840's had been largely a matter of emotion the expansionists of the 1890's were able to cite the lessons of science and history in support of their doctrine. The new manifest destiny developed in the pseudo-scientific writings of John Fiske, Josiah Strong, John Burgess and Alfred Thayer Mahan.

John Fiske, the historian, and Josiah Strong, a Congregational clergyman, led the way. In 1885, Fiske published an article entitled "Manifest Destiny" in Harpers Magazine, and in 1891 Strong published a small volume entitled Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis. These two writers had derived a practical lesson from the premise of Charles Darwin, which had hailed America as the "heir of all the ages" and stressed in their writings the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. Fiske maintained that the United States and England would continue the colonizing work that the English had begun until "four fifths of the human race will trace its pedigree to English forefathers;" and that the Anglo Saxon race would keep the "sovereignty of the sea and commercial supremacy."⁷

7. John Fiske, "Manifest Destiny," Harpers Magazine, March, 1885, 120:578-590.

Strong believed that the Anglo-Saxon race would "move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond."⁸

8. Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis, revised edition, New York, 1891, 208-227.

Although these conceptions are far-fetching generalizations they nevertheless contributed to the intellectual growth of the United States in the decade in which the large policy was inaugurated. Fiske's lectures on "American Political

Ideas," of which that on "Manifest Destiny" was the conclusion, was given orally many times in the United States and was subsequently published in book form. Fiske was, according to a reliable student of his career, "one of the most important intellectual influences in America in the last quarter of the nineteenth century."⁹.

9. J. T. Adams, "John Fiske" Dictionary of American Biography, New York, 1935, 6: 420-423.

Strong's book, had a circulation of 170,000 copies in English.¹⁰

10. National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, New York, 1907, 9: 416-417.

The generalizations and prophecies of Fiske and Strong were strengthened by a distinguished American scholar, John W. Burgess. As a student of history and political science at "Göttingen, Leipzig, and Berlin, Burgess did his principal work under Gustav Droysen, historian of the rise of the Prussian state, and Rudolf von Gneist, profound student of the development of the English constitutional system.¹¹

11. John W. Burgess, Reminiscences of an American Scholar, New York, 1934, 126-127, 131.

Under these men Burgess must have derived his admiration for the political talents of the Teutonic race. In any event, his work Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law includes a chapter in which Burgess virtually

assigned world domination to Germans and Anglo Saxons.^{12.}

12. John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, Boston, 1890, 1: 30-39.

Burgess believed that the Teutons had developed the true national state, which was, in his opinion, "the most modern and the most complete.....political organization which the world has yet produced." The fact that the national state was a Teutonic creation authorized the Teutonic nations, of which he regarded America as one, "to assume the leadership in the establishment and administration of states."^{13.}

13. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1: 38-39.

He concluded that the Teutonic nations were "called to carry the political civilization of the modern world into those parts of the world inhabited by unpolitical and barbaric races; i.e., they must have a colonial policy."^{14.}

14. Ibid., 45.

To Americans, who were reluctant to undertake such a policy, Burgess pointed out that the larger part of the earth was inhabited by uncivilized people, that there was "no human right to the status of barbarism," and that it was the duty and obligation of Teutonic nations not only to answer the "call of the unpolitical populations for aid and direction, but also to force organization upon them by any means necessary, in their honest judgment, to accomplish this result." Although Teu-

tonic Nations should not act with "undue haste in seizing power" they were under no obligation to await invitation from the existing government or the subjects of the uncivilized states. "Teutonic nations must follow the line of this duty as one of their chief political policies." To refuse to undertake such a policy was a "disregard of duty."¹⁵

15. Ibid., 46-48. When the United States embarked upon a war which led directly to the assumption of a portion of the "world duty" which Burgess had held before its eyes, he himself heatedly opposed that course. The Spanish-American War was to him the "first great shock" that he had experienced since the founding of the School of Political Science. The extension of American authority over subject people he regarded as "disastrous to American political civilization" and as a "fatal move...bound to reach farther and finally compromise the liberties of all American citizens." Ibid., 312-316 Any effort to reconcile this attitude and his earlier advocacy of a colonial policy seems hopeless.
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Advocates of a large policy could ask for no more sweeping justification.

Burgess' treatise, besides being published, served as the basis of the lectures and interpretations which he gave at Columbia University for a generation to thousands of students of law and political science. Among these, in his early years of teaching, was, according to Burgess, a very striking and diligent student who addressed Burgess in these words: "I am tremendously interested in the subjects of your lectures, Professor; I hope to devote my life to the investigation and realization of them. My name is Theodore

Roosevelt."^{16.}

16. Burgess, Reminiscences, 374.

However, it remained for someone else to make really attractive the idea of sea power and empire to the expansionists of 1898, who in turn impressed it on the President and Congress. While others had contributed their share it was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, son of a professor at West Point, who became the advance agent of the large policy and did the most to define for the expansionists their role. Mahan, a graduate of Annapolis, after seeing respectable service in the Civil War, had followed an active career in the command branch of the navy. The leisurely life of the navy of that day offered him an excellent opportunity to travel, read and think. In 1883 he wrote, by request, a short history of Civil War naval operation.^{17.}

17. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters, New York, 1883.

This first attempt at authorship was regarded by the navy and literary critics as a very creditable performance, and in 1884 he received and accepted an offer to teach naval history at the United States War College. Believing that the control of the sea had never been systematically expounded and appreciated he investigated general history and naval history "with a view to demonstrating the influence of the one upon the other" in the preparation of his lectures. Endowed with a strong intellectual courage he arrived at a thesis which he fearlessly held, illustrated and defended through the remain-

der of his active life. This thesis was, in short, that sea power was the "central link" in the greatness of any nation, that sea power was the most potent factor in the making or breaking of nations, that without sea power no people, however gifted had or could attain the fullest measure of well being or of influence and importance in world affairs.^{18.}

18. W. D. Puleston, Mahan, The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S.N., New Haven, 1939, 69-90.

In 1890 Mahan again entered the writing field, and after much difficulty, succeeded in having published his first immortal work, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. This volume, which told the story of the rise of British sea power in the years from 1660 to 1763 was rapidly followed by other volumes on naval history, sea power, and empire.^{19.}

19. Ibid., For a complete bibliography of Mahan's writings see 359-364.

Gradually Mahan emerged as an ardent imperialist and accepted all the postulates, claims and assertions of that system. When he espoused the whole gospel of imperialism he used history, economics and religion to defend and justify his new creed to America. In whatever Mahan wrote he was always the preacher. His one purpose was "to draw from the lessons of history inferences applicable to one's own country and service". His study of the British Empire assured him that the Empire had benefited its subjects and had increased the

general welfare of the world. This convinced him that Americans had a similar aptitude for expansion and could take a larger part in external affairs without risk to their own institutions and with benefit to the world at large. It was his hope and desire to indoctrinate Americans with the gospel of sea power and empire.^{20.}

20. Ibid., 104-105, 129.

The history of sea power, wrote Mahan in 1890, embraces "in all its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea".^{21.}

21. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 Boston, 1890, 1.

Sea power exists chiefly for the sake of commerce; it includes all that goes to make sea borne commerce secure and profitable; a merchant marine, a strong navy and colonies. These things, Mahan believed were essential foundations of national prosperity and greatness. Americans had been too engrossed in developing continental America and had turned their eyes away from the sea. An attitude which, in Mahan's mind, had spelled disaster for France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.^{22.}

22. Ibid., 83.

Mahan, however, was not without hope for the future. In the December issue of the Atlantic Monthly, 1890, he broadened his thesis and addressed his views to a large and influen-

tial group of American readers. In this article we find Mahan issuing a clarion call for expansion. There were signs now, he wrote, that the United States might be forced to the "turning of the eyes outward, instead of inward only, to seek the welfare of the country". While an era of protection had been necessary to establish industries in America's infancy industry in 1890 was sufficiently strong to enter world competition. The growing productivity of American farms would compel a search for foreign markets and induce relations to the world radically distinct from the simple idea of self-sufficiency. The competition for colonies and markets being carried on by the sea powers of Europe might bring these powers into collision with the United States as in the case of Samoa. The internal troubles prevalent in Haiti, Central America, and the Hawaiian Islands would most certainly involve the United States. "Whether they will or no Americans must now begin to look outward", build up their own carrying trade, a merchant marine and a strong navy.^{23.}

23. Mahan, "The United States Looking Outward", Atlantic Monthly December, 1890, 66: 816-824.

Thus Mahan challenged America to secure its own interests in the new world order, and to adopt certain courses of action which he thought would lead her to greater destiny.

The rise of Mahan into international influence was without doubt one of the major happenings of 1890. Although many writers have contended that his influence was greater in foreign countries than in America it is my belief that the

importance of Mahan in directing the new spirit in America has been underestimated. Even if his popularity was greater in England than in America the men who shaped the large policy and guided America in its quest for a colonial empire were thoroughly influenced by the prophet Mahan.

Theodore Roosevelt, at the request of Mahan, lectured in 1886 at the Naval War College and out of this occasion grew a firm and life long friendship.^{24.}

24. Pulveston, op. cit., 86.

In 1890, Roosevelt, then a Civil Service commissioner in Washington, reviewed "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" for the Political Science Quarterly. Hailing it as a "naval classic" he believed that no one had ever written such a history before. He enthusiastically agreed with Mahan that "we must have a great fighting navy....to hold our proper position among the nations of the earth and to do the work to which our destiny points".^{25.}

25. Political Science Quarterly New York, 1894, 9:171-173.

For Roosevelt Mahan's doctrine was a boon. Having little interest and little knowledge of the economic and social questions of his time Roosevelt had been looking around for a career suitable to his impetuous nature. Mahan's power doctrine was exactly what he wanted. It meant building a big navy, looking out for a war, seizing colonies and sea bases, and giving the United States its proper place in the sun. All of which Roosevelt would take an active part in. Among

Roosevelt's friends was another Harvard man, Henry Cabot Lodge, who was also looking around for a gateway to an active career. As a member of the House of Representatives in 1890 he found Mahan's doctrine congenial to his ambitious spirit. Other large policy advocates, as well as Lodge, repeatedly cited the teachings of Mahan in Congress.

Unlike other writers Mahan concerned himself with the immediate problems of the day and addressed himself directly to the American people, who later became ardent supporters of the large policy. He contributed to such periodicals as the Atlantic Monthly, Forum, North American Review, Harper's and McClure's Magazine, with articles on naval preparedness, the annexation of Hawaii, the control of the Caribbean and related policies.^{26.}

26. See the thirteen essays, all published between 1890 and 1893, collected in Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Past, Present and Future, Boston, 1897. Although Mahan was later elected President of the American Historical Association it is not proper to call him an historian. He had no training whatever in historical research, the scrutiny and authentication of documents, or the philosophy of historical composition. He merely used such old works as suited his preconceived purposes, copied extracts from them, tore passages and fragments out of their context, and pieced his notes together without exercising critical acumen as to represent his own image of life, economy, sea power, empire and war. As most of Mahan's readers also had no historical training they characterized him as a profound student of history.

Chapter II.

Hawaii.

The Hawaiian affair of 1893 revealed the forces in America for overseas expansion. A new generation was rising to challenge the old but as yet the real leaders of the new spirit had not found themselves.

A proper understanding of the Hawaiian revolution requires some note of earlier Hawaiian history. In 1874 the ancient royal dynasty became extinct and the Hawaiian legislature, under the influence of an American political party, selected a new king, David Kalakaua, in preference to a candidate upheld by British influence. Until 1874 the American party had the situation in hand. Then control slipped from their grasp as Kalakaua increasingly showed that his sympathies were with the natives. In 1887 the American party regained control and forced Kalakaua to grant a new constitution which placed propertied men at the head of the government.

This was the situation in 1891 when Queen Liliuokalani came to the throne and inaugurated a program looking to the elimination of American influence and the restoration of autocracy. This program, which threatened the position of the powerful American element, caused an inevitable counter offensive. On January 14, 1893 the American element formed a committee of safety and organized a provisional republican government, which included only one native Hawaiian. Seizing the government buildings on January 17 the committee forced the Queen to abdicate and proclaimed a provisional government for

Hawaii. The major part of the whole affair had the support of the American minister, John L. Stevens, and took place in the presence of American troops landed from an American war vessel conveniently near. The commander of the warship acted under the regulations of the Navy Department for 1893, which emphasized the "protection of American life and property" principle. That the success of the bloodless revolution was due to the support of the American minister and American armed forces there can be no doubt.

The provisional government under the direction of Sanford B. Dole immediately rushed its plenipotentiaries to Washington with a treaty of annexation. On February 15, 1893, less than one month after Queen Liliuokalani's downfall, a hastily drawn and hastily signed treaty was submitted to the Senate with a message from President Harrison urging prompt and favorable action and stating that the revolution was in no way promoted by this government. In extreme haste a Republican controlled Committee on Foreign Affairs reported the treaty within two days in the hope of passing the treaty before the new Democratic administration came in. However, March 4th was too near, the Senate itself was not so easy to manage, and the improbability of obtaining a two-thirds vote delayed action until the favorable Harrison administration had gone out.^{1.}

1. Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1893, Baltimore, 1936, 34-124.

Nevertheless, the Hawaiian revolution had received favorable comment in the Senate. Senator William Chandler, of New York, promptly upon receipt of the news of the revolution,

introduced in the Senate a resolution requesting the President to enter into negotiations for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.²

2. Congressional Record, 52d Congress, 2d Session, 929.

Senator Joseph Dolph, of Oregon, declared that it was time "we had a well defined, aggressive foreign policy, in which we must abandon the doctrine that our national boundaries and jurisdiction should be confined to the shores of the continent", and boldly grasp such opportunities as the present one before they were seized by rival powers.³

3. Ibid., 980, 997-999.

A few days after Cleveland took office he withdrew the treaty from the Senate and sent a special agent, James Blount, to Hawaii to investigate the circumstances surrounding the revolution. The report of Blount and other investigations convinced Cleveland that the American ministers and the armed forces of the United States had been partially responsible for the successful revolution.⁴

4. Senate Executive Journal, 29: 410 The findings of the special agent are in Foreign Relations, 1894, Appendix II.

For that and other reasons Cleveland refused to re-submit the treaty to the Senate, declaring that the lawful government of Hawaii had been disrupted through American agency and that

under the circumstances it would be grossly improper for the United States to annex the islands.^{5.}

5. Henry Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, Baltimore, 1933, 152-153.

The Hawaiian question gave American expansionists their first real opportunity to present their case for overseas expansion. It was only natural that the prophet Mahan should lead the way. He accepted the revolution as an opportunity to put his policy to the test. In the March 14 issue of the Forum he contributed an article on "Hawaii and our Future Sea Power". He found the United States compelled to answer a momentous question similar to that required of the Roman Senate when it was invited to occupy Messina and to abandon the traditional policy which had confined Rome to the Italian peninsula. Mahan insisted that the issue could not be dodged, that we must make the decision. He regarded American occupation as natural and hoped that the "opportunity thus thrust upon us may not be viewed narrowly" but as one step in a policy of expansion "fruitful of many acts". The annexation of Hawaii "would be no sporadic effort....but a first fruit and a token that the nation had aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life beyond its present boundaries". "We must learn from England's experience". Step by step, "as opportunities offered" she became the great sea power she is. The sea is the "world's great medium of circulation" and the control of it "is chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations". To gain control of the

seas "it is comperative to take possession, when it can be righteously done, of such maritime positions as contribute to secure command". This principle can be applied to the "present case of Hawaii". The time has now arrived to enter upon a program which will complete the fulness of our national progress.^{6.}

6. Mahan, "Hawaii and our Future World Power," Forum
March, 1893, 12: 1-12.

Mahan immediately expanded this theme in an article for the Atlantic Monthly on "The Isthmus and Sea Power". He considered the control of the Caribbean region of preeminent importance upon the completion of an Isthmian canal. Realizing that the key positions of the Caribbean were then occupied by foreign powers Mahan hoped that "when public opinion is convinced that we need them" we should not "dodge them when flung at our head". The proposed isthian canal and the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands Mahan saw as parts of the same problem. The United States must be ready to defend its own interests and "our navy" should be constructed upon "lines and proportions adequate to the work it may be called upon to do".^{7.}

7. Mahan, "The Isthmus and Sea power," Atlantic Monthly,
September, 1893, 72: 459-472.

While President Cleveland had been struggling with the Hawaiian problem, a Republican Senator, William Chandler of New York, was calling upon the Republican party to lead

American in a policy of expansion. In a letter to the New York Tribune he declared that the "true continental policy of the United States, which will be the policy of the progressive Republican party will contemplate the acquisition of the Sandwich Islands and a reasonable and sufficient number of the West Indies". Such a policy, Chandler maintained, was "a continental not a colonial party, since nature had made these islands a part of the defense system of the continent".^{8.}

8. New York Tribune, November 15, 1893, quoted in Pratt, "The Large Policy of 1898," M. V. H. R., 1933, 19: 2229-230.

The regular meeting of Congress in December, 1893, reopened the Hawaiian debate. Although much of the discussion involved the legal and ethical aspects of the Hawaiian question several Congressmen took the opportunity to speak in favor of an expansionist policy. As Senator Chandler had hoped, the Republican party was taking the initiative in the formulation of a large policy.

Senator Orville Platt, of Connecticut declared that the United States could not be confined within the narrow limits of the past, and that any territory necessary for defense or commercial development should be taken when that could be done "without injustice to other nations and other people".^{9.}

9. Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 2d Session, 1310.

Senator Henry Teller of Colorado, who in April, 1898, proposed the resolution forbidding American annexation of Cuba, recalled the official Democratic Declaration of 1856 as the "height of wisdom", and chided the Democratic party for hav-

ing abandoned its expansionist policy of pre-Civil War days. "I am", he boldly declared, "in favor of the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands. I am in favor of the annexation of Cuba....I expect to see the American flag floating over the isles of the sea - not only these, but in the Great Gulf and in the West Indian Seas".^{10.}

10. Ibid., 1578.

W. F. Draper of Massachusetts, delivered the most aggressive speech in the House. Undoubtedly a student of Mahan, Draper explained the recent rapid advance of England, France and Germany in the Pacific island groups as a "working out of strategical schemes with definite ends in view." Unfortunately, thought Draper, the "United States has not had the wisdom to acquire territory in localities where the great trade of the future will need guarding and supplying". Thus far our "moral force" had prevented European powers from seizing them but moral force would not long suffice. By taking Hawaii now, we would provide for the safety of our Pacific trade and the protection of our Pacific coast. The trade of the Pacific "is just opening on an era of activity...and this trade belongs to the United States, if we are wise enough to secure it". But trade must have assurances of protection. "Not only Hawaii is needed, but Samoa; a station at the mouth of the canal; and another at the Straits of Magellan". These bases and a large organized fleet will make the Pacific "an American ocean, dominated by American commercial enterprize for all time".^{11.}

 11. Ibid., 1844-1849.

But neither the philosophy nor the rhetoric of the growing expansionist forces could sway the action of Congress. The House of Representatives on February 7, 1894, adopted, by a vote of 177 to 78, the McCreary resolutions, thereby recording its unqualified opposition to either annexation of or protectorate over the Hawaiian Islands. The resolutions condemned the action of Stevens, approved the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of an independent nation, opposed annexation of Hawaii as uncalled for and inexpedient, but declared that "foreign intervention in the political affairs of the island will not be regarded with indifference by the Government of the United States".^{12.}

 12. Edward McPherson, A Handbook of Politics, 1872-1894,
Washington, 1894, 12: 119-122.

The Senate, after a very extensive investigation of the whole affair, adopted the Turpie resolution by a vote of 55 to 0, on May 31. This resolution declared that the Hawaiian people had the right "to establish and maintain their own form of government and domestic policy"; that the United States ought not to "interfere therewith", and that any foreign intervention "in the political affairs of these islands... will be regarded as an act unfriendly to the United States".^{13.}

¹
 13. This resolution and all proceedings concerning it are in the Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 2d session, pp 5499-5500.

The Senate had finally spoken. As far as it was concerned there would be neither restoration of the Queen, nor interference with the Provisional Government, nor - for the time being at least - annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

As long as Cleveland was President annexation of the Hawaiian Islands was impossible. However, by throwing the question into politics Cleveland made Hawaiian annexation and expansion in general a Republican policy. The Republicans gladly and enthusiastically accepted the issue. The temporary set back by no means dampened the enthusiasm and determination of the young Republicans.

The short session of the Fifty Third Congress (December, 1894-March, 1895) took on a new atmosphere and a new spirit. The shrewd, able and forceful Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, took his seat in the Senate and immediately became the leading spokesman for the expansionist forces. Before Lodge had been elected to the Senate his very devoted friend, Theodore Roosevelt, had written to him, on October 27, 1894, that "our foreign policy is....of an importance which is difficult to overestimate...Cleveland's administration 'has betrayed' our interests abroad. I do wish our Republicans would go in avowedly to annex Hawaii and build an oceanic canal with the money of Uncle Sam",^{14.}

14. Henry Cabot Lodge (editor), Selections From The Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 1894-1918, New York, 1925, 1:139.

Lodge wholeheartedly agreed with Roosevelt and on January 22, 1895, outlined a policy in the Senate that he and

Roosevelt were to formulate into a large policy. As Mahan had done he looked to England and spoke of her "conquering and aggressive policy" which had acquired over fifty islands in the last ten years. "I cannot find fault with her", he said, "but with the United States because she has not exhibited the same spirit, the true spirit of our race". The taking of "all outlying territory is necessary to our defense" and "to the protection of an Isthmian Canal". The United States should "take over the networks as we now hold the citadel of American power". In a painful reference to Hawaii he concluded, "I cannot bear to see the American flag pulled down where it has been run up" or "see the American foot go back where it has once been advanced".^{15.}

15. Congressional Record, 53d Congress, 3d Session, 177.

The foundations of the large policy were thus prepared. All outlying territory necessary to our defense was to mean any area which Lodge and Roosevelt felt necessary for that defense. The method of carrying out the policy was well indicated - put our foot down, run the flag up, and then let any one try to move us.

The continued debate over the policy of non-interference in the Hawaiian Islands, and an appropriation for an American cable to Hawaii called forth new avowals of the faith of the expansionists.

Teller of Colorado reaffirmed his belief in the propriety of flying the American flag over Cuba "that great island and over other islands".^{16.}

16. Ibid., 628-629.

Platt of Connecticut visioned the continued westward progress of the white race "carrying civilization and blessing in its march"; and declared his faith that "neither narrow statesmanship nor political prejudice can prevent or long hinder it in its continued progress westward, still westward".^{17.}

17. Ibid., 1829.

Lodge, accused by Senator George Gray, of Delaware, of having embarked upon a "scheme of annexation and colonial empire"^{18.}

18. Ibid., 1172.

again stepped forth to preach the twin gospels of expansion and sea power, and to press the government toward a spirited foreign policy. His oratorical effort came on March 2 in a desperate effort to save the appropriation for the Hawaiian cable. He took the necessary time to speak of a policy. He considered the cable appropriation bill "the most important thing involved in any appropriation bill before Congress", since upon the Hawaiian Islands depended "a great part of the future commercial progress of the United States". Launching upon an exposition of Mahan's doctrine of sea power Lodge declared that sea power has been "one of the controlling forces in history" and that without sea power no nation has been really great". Sea power consists of a "proper navy and a proper fleet". In order "to sustain a navy we must have suitable

posts for naval stations, strong places where a navy can be protected and refurnished".

At this point Lodge stopped to exhibit to the Senate a map of the world, upon which he had marked in red the location of the naval stations of Great Britain, a line of them on the Atlantic coast of North America and in the neighboring islands, others in European, Asiatic and African waters. Indicating the relative naval strength of Great Britain and the United States in the Atlantic and Pacific he pointed to the British stations at Vancouver and in the Falkland and Fiji Islands and remarked that in the triangle marked by these three stations "Great Britain does not hold a naval station. There in the center of that triangle, in the heart of the Pacific...lie the Sandwich Islands. They are the key of the Pacific...." England is our natural commercial rival and we now have the opportunity to strengthen our position against her in the Pacific.

Lodge ironically disclaimed any desire to see the United States "enter on an unlimited career of acquisition of colonial possessions....But, Mr. President,we hold the citadel of our greatness here on this continent within the borders of the United States, but we should not neglect the necessary out-works". The cable appropriation is the "first step...toward the taking of what belongs as of right to the American people in their onward march...It is part of a great policy."¹⁹

19. Ibid., 3082-3084.

Anxious that the American people should become acquainted with the large policy that he and Roosevelt were formulat-

ing Lodge wrote an article entitled "Our Blundering Foreign Policy" which was published in the Forum for March, 1895. Characterizing the foreign policy of the preceding two years as "everywhere a policy of retreat and surrender" Lodge denounced Cleveland's foreign policy as unamerican and then proceeded to state, in strong words, what the foreign policy of the United States ought to be. "In the interests of our commerce and our fullest development we should build the Nicaragua Canal.. control the Hawaii Islands...maintain our influence in Samoa..." and acquire" at least one naval station" in the West Indies. With the completion of an Isthmian Canal Cuba will become necessary to us. "These vast interests which lie just outside our border...ought to be neglected no more...they concern our greatness as a nation and our future as a great people". Our record of "conquest, colonization and expansion was unequalled by any people in the nineteenth century". Other nations are "rapidly absorbing" for their present defense and future expansion "all the waste places of the earth...as one of the great nations of the world, the United States must not fall out of the line of March".^{20.}

20. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy", Forum March, 1895, 19: 8-17.

Thus by March, 1895 the basic principles of the large policy had been expounded by Lodge -- an Isthmian Canal, the Hawaiian Islands, a naval base in the West Indies and a necessary Cuba.

Chapter III.

Cuba.

As Lodge was speaking and writing of a "necessary Cuba" the relentless struggle of the Cubans against Spanish domination was renewed. The island had long been a storm center in Spanish-American relations. Since the days of Jefferson southern expansionists had coveted the island. After the American Civil War Cuban insurrectionists had repeatedly sought the aid of the United States. For ten years from 1868 to 1878 Cuba had been in constant turmoil. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were often strained during this time, the affair of the *Virginus* in 1873 in particular threatening the peace.

This insurrection, although more sanguinary and annoying than that of 1895, had come at a time when America had been occupied with its continental development and had refused territorial expansion or further projection of national influence. An attitude of neutrality had, nevertheless, been maintained with great difficulty. President Grant, an expansionist in his own right, came very close to recognizing Cuban belligerency.¹

1. French Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain, New York, 1909, 273-411.

The insurrection of 1895, which was hastened as in the case of Hawaii by the closing of the free American sugar market, came at a time when a postwar generation was beginning to guide the destinies of the American nation. The

psychological background in America was peculiar. The country was weary and sick of the dragging business depression, accompanied by widespread bankruptcies, unemployment, misery and social disturbances. A new national self consciousness was stirring in the hearts of the American people. The energies and imagination of the nation were expectant for new and adventurous activities.^{2.}

2. Samuel Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, New York, 1938, 434.

Young energetic expansionists were demanding a spirited foreign policy. Sensational journalism was on its way. The insurrection was indeed a wonderful opportunity to take advantage of.

It was only natural that the Cuban insurrection should occupy the attention of certain men in Congress. The popular slogan of "Cuba Libre" had a peculiar effect on the expansionists and others who had been hesitant to accept a large policy. The long session of 1895-1896 was marked by the introduction of a variety of resolutions expressing sympathy for the Cuban rebels and advocating recognition of their status as belligerents. If Lodge had thought of making Cuba a part of an American colonial empire he had changed his mind during the winter of 1895. In debating the resolutions favoring recognition of Cuban belligerency Lodge, on February 25, 1896, in the Senate still expressed the opinion that Cuba would be a great market for the United States "and an excellent opportunity for American capital". However he no longer considered absolute possession essential provided Cuba was in "friendly hands" or "in the hands of its own people".. To impress those who were

reluctant to accept a large policy he emphasized the fact that the "island today is lost to Spain".^{3.}

3. Congressional Record, 54th Congress, 1st Session, 1892.

Representative William Sulzer of New York described Cuba as a "natural part of our geographical domain...a possession rich beyond the dreams of avarice and essential to our control of the Gulf of Mexico, our continental supremacy, and our national destiny".^{4.}

4. Ibid., 2350.

Harry Skinner of North Carolina said the "Cubans look upon the American flag as the emblem of liberty...I would place it over Cuba...I want to see it established in every land and on every sea...over every people...who ask for the blessings of liberty".^{5.}

5. Ibid., 2356.

Sentiment in Congress was favorable to the Cuban cause. The Senate and House, on February 28 and April 6, 1896, respectively, passed a resolution declaring that in the opinion of Congress a state of public war existed in Cuba; that the United States ought to accord belligerent rights impartially to both parties in the conflict; and that the friendly offices of the United States should be offered by the President to the Spanish government for the recognition of the independence of Cuba.^{6.}

6. Ibid., 2256-57, 3627-28.

But while Cleveland may have satisfied the expansionists in his firm stand for the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela affair he was vigorously opposed to American expansion. He regarded the "mission of our nation" as one "to build up and make a greater country out of what we have, instead of annexing islands"; and simply declined to take the action urged in the congressional resolution.^{7.}

7. Allan Nevins (ed.), Letters of Grover Cleveland 1850-1898, New York, 1933, 491-492.

Chapter IV.

The "Large Policy" Advances.

While a large policy failed to impress Cleveland, the coming election gave great promise to the advancement of the large policy. Senator Lodge with the policy well set in his mind was very active at the Republican convention in 1896. A familiar and inspiring ring can be noted in the declarations of the party concerning foreign policy. The platform called for a "firm, vigorous, and dignified foreign policy". Three definite principles of the large policy were written into it. They were American control of the Hawaiian Islands, and American built, owned, and operated Isthmian Canal, and American intervention in the Cuban insurrection.^{1.}

1. Kirk Porter, National Party Platforms, New York, 1924, 204-205.

Senator Lodge left the Republican convention happy and full of confidence. The large policy had advanced another step.

The Democrats, without a large policy and a Lodge to push them forward, adopted a platform which had only the slightest reference to foreign affairs. Their platform merely insisted that the "Monroe Doctrine" must at all times be maintained, and extended its sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence.^{2.}

2. Ibid., 186.

Although the Democratic party failed to note the rising new

American spirit the People's Party was fully alive to the situation. "The time has come", its platform stated, "when the United States should recognize that Cuba is, and of right ought to be, a free and independent nation".^{3.}

3. Ibid., 199.

However, the American people were not as yet ready to accept a large policy and the contrast of the foreign policies of the two major parties attracted little attention in the ensuing campaign. The election of 1896 was completely absorbed by two other issues: Bryan and Free Silver and the tariff.^{4.}

4. Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, New York, 1912, 212-217.

Whatever it was the Republican party with William McKinley at the helm rode to victory and with it rode the destiny of the large policy. Soon after McKinley was elected the authors of the large policy decided that Roosevelt, who was bored with local politics, ought to hold a position in the new Republican administration in which he might further the cause of the policy. A position in the naval department was decided upon as an excellent one. Lodge did not wait until McKinley was inaugurated but began to work on him immediately. He planned not only to obtain that position for Roosevelt but also to convert McKinley to a belief in their cause.

A very intimate conversation of two hours between McKinley and Lodge was promptly relayed to Roosevelt. "I

first", wrote Lodge on December 2, 1896, "talked with him about Hawaii, but I did not go into our policy in that respect". We discussed the "very perplexing question of Cuba" and naturally McKinley did not want to go to war as soon as he came in to office but would rather "like the crisis to be settled before he takes up the reins, I was greatly pleased to see how thoroughly he appreciates the momentous character of the question". In regards to you he only said, "'I hope he has no preconceived plan which he would wish to drive through the moment he gets in.' I replied that he need not give the slightest uneasiness on that score...I do ask for Roosevelt as the one personal favor". Lodge emphatically concluded his letter to Roosevelt, "I believe we shall succeed. If he holds to the attitude which he has expressed to me, all will go well".^{4.}

4. Lodge, Selections, 240-242.

Roosevelt immediately replied to this letter and wrote Lodge on December 4 that he was "delighted" about McKinley. "I do hope he will take a strong stand about Hawaii and Cuba... I do not think a war with Spain would be serious to cause much strain on the country, or much interruption to the revival of prosperity; but I certainly wish the matter could be settled this winter".^{5.}

5. Ibid., 243.

When the office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy became vacant, Lodge rallied the forces for his partner and urged his friends and the close friends of McKinley to put in a good word for Roosevelt. Among those who wrote or spoke to

McKinley were Senator Cushman Davis, former Assistant Secretary of the navy William McAdoo, Vice President Garrett Hobart, Cornelius Bliss, Secretary of the Navy John Long, John Hay, Myron Herrick, John Porter, and Speaker of the House Tom Reed.^{6.}

6. Ibid., 253-254.

Roosevelt put in a word of his own and wrote Secretary of the Navy John Long that he wanted him to understand that he would take the position with "his eyes open and work hard at Washington, in any kind of weather". Soberly adding, he wrote "my aim would be only to make McKinley's administration a success".^{7.}

7. Ibid., 262.

If Long had only realized how well Roosevelt meant the "eyes open" phrase, or the type of success Roosevelt had in mind he never would have spoken for his appointment.

However, McKinley still hesitated at appointing Roosevelt for he feared, only too well, that he was a man of action. It was only after Senator Platt, to whom Roosevelt had made a somewhat humiliating visit, informed McKinley that Roosevelt would probably do less harm to the organization as Assistant Secretary of the Navy "than in any other position" that McKinley decided to do so. The appointment was made on April 6, 1897, and confirmed by the Senate two days later. On April 19 Roosevelt assumed the duties of his very important position. At least important to him, Lodge, and the large policy.^{8.}

B. Joseph Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, 2 vols. New York, 1920, 1:72 Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, New York, 1931, 78.

Roosevelt plunged at once into his duties with a martial fervor indicating that the hesitation of McKinley was justified. Entrenched into this new position Roosevelt was now able to add his high pitched voice to the growing chorus of expansionists. It seems that Roosevelt had an extraordinary capacity for experiencing group emotions vicariously for this group. The emotions which he chiefly felt were extraordinarily primitive.⁹

9. Leland Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, New York, 1928, 51.

The moral and historical arguments with which he adorned his purpose strongly resembled those of Brook Evans. In a speech which he delivered at the opening of the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, on June 2, 1897, which was widely praised and commented upon all over the country, he exhorted his fellow Americans to abandon the timid leadership of the rich bankers and industrialists and to turn instead to the example of a Farragut. No nation could hold its place in the world unless it stood ready to "guard its rights with an armed hand". Liberty itself could be preserved only by men willing to fight for an ideal. "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war...no national life is worth having if the nation is not willing...to stake everything on the supreme arbitrament of war, and to pour out its blood, its treasure, and tears like water, rather than submit to the loss of honor

and renown..."^{10.}

10. Matthew Josephson, The President Makers, 27; Henry Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, A Biography, New York, 1931, 172.

It was not merely a matter of acquiring colonies. The purpose was clear, the course was marked. If only America would follow those American aristocrats in their search for the better life.

The Republican party lost no time in pursuing the principles of the large policy and three months after McKinley took office a new Hawaiian annexation treaty was signed by representatives of both governments on June 16, 1897. Annexation was now desired not only for itself but also as a vindication of the party's earlier conduct.^{11.}

11. Henry Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, 163.

The ultimate responsibility and immediate initiative may be accredited to President McKinley.^{12.}

12. Samuel Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 10 vols., New York, 1927-1929, 9:54.

The treaty was presented to the Senate on the same day of negotiation with a report signed by Sherman and a special message by McKinley.^{13.}

13. Senate Report No. 681, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 96-97.

In his letter of transmittal the President pointed out that annexation was the necessary and fitting "consequence of the relation steadfastly maintained with that mid-Pacific domain

for three-quarters of a century."¹⁴.

14. Ibid., 74-76.

The failure of the treaty of 1893 and the four year delay gave the Hawaiian people an opportunity to establish a government, to secure recognition, and to demonstrate their ability "to enter, as a sovereign contractant, upon a conventional union with the United States, thus realizing a purpose held by the Hawaiian people and proclaimed by successive Hawaiian governments through twenty years of their virtual independence upon the benevolent protection of the United States. Under such circumstances annexation is not a change. It is a consumation".¹⁵.

15. Ibid., 65-67.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, headed by Senator Cushman Davis, reported the treaty, on July 17, to the Senate with a resolution consenting to the ratification. However, the treaty never reached a vote. In spite of the pressure applied by the President both in public messages and personal interviews it soon became apparent that the treaty would never pass.¹⁶.

16. James Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 10 vols., Washington, 1911, 8:6263-6264; George Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years, 2 vols., New York, 1903, 2:307-308.

Reluctant Democrats blocked the necessary two-thirds and the debate seemed to drag on endlessly.

Theodore Roosevelt was depressed by the situation and confided to Mahan "his despondency over the situation and the

necessity of persuading men to take action". Both men agreed that such action was "due to the men of a by-gone age having to deal with the facts of the present".^{17.}

17. Pulveston, Mahan, 184.

Even though Roosevelt was disgusted with the Hawaiian affair he was satisfied with McKinley. Then too, he was thinking of bigger game. "The President", he wrote Lodge on August 3, 1897, "has done so much that I don't feel like being discontented, but of course I do feel that it would be everything for us to take firm action on behalf of the wretched Cubans. It would be a splendid thing for the Navy too."^{18.}

18. Lodge, Selections, 1:268.

Though the progress of the large policy was delayed in the Hawaiian affair Roosevelt did not hesitate to advance that policy and make it a success. He was firmly convinced that the time had come for action and was doing everything possible to get the navy into shape. He thought that a Spanish-American war was inevitable and by September, 1896 had developed a comprehensive plan that would end such a war in six weeks. Having looked a great distance to the west Roosevelt had discovered that the Spanish had a valuable colony across the Pacific, the Philippines. He realized that the moment war broke out we would have to strike at Spanish power wherever we could and that in this event there were the Philippines. Whether Roosevelt already considered these islands a potential American colony cannot be definitely stated, but he was con-

vinced that we would have to capture them if the anticipated war materialized.^{19.}

19. H. P. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, a Biography, New York, 1931, 176-178; Foster R. Dulles, America in the Pacific, New York, 1932, 202-203; Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, 1:83.

Capture could mean but one thing. Anyway his military plan contained a new thought - Manila. "I do not believe the affair would present a very great difficulty", wrote Roosevelt to Lodge on September 20.^{20.}

20. Lodge, Selections, 1, 277.

Seven months before war was declared Roosevelt was frequently discussing these ideas with President McKinley and Secretary of the Navy Long, and urging the taking of decisive action. All meetings and progress were duly reported to Lodge. McKinley did not discourage him and Roosevelt considered his action most kind. On September 21 he informed Lodge of a very interesting drive he had with the President.

I dined with him Friday evening and yesterday he sent over and took me out to drive again. I gave him a paper showing exactly where all our ships are, and I also sketched in outline what I thought ought to be done if things looked menacing about Spain, urging the necessity of taking an immediate and prompt initiative if we wished to avoid the chance of some serious trouble, and of the Japs chipping in. If we get Walker with our main fleet on the Cuban coast within 48 hours after war is declared - which we can readily do if just before the declaration we gather the entire fleet at Key West; ...I doubt if the war would last six weeks so far as the acute phase of it was concerned. Meanwhile, our Asiatic squadron should blockade, and if possible take, Manila....However, "he innocently added", I haven't the slightest idea that there will be a war.^{21.}

21. Lodge, Selections, 1:279-279.

The very existence of a Spanish squadron provided a satisfactory opportunity for attacking it, and through it the territory it was supposed to defend. Roosevelt kept his eyes open, as he had promised Long, and when the command of the American Asiatic squadron became vacant in October, 1897 he immediately selected his choice for that vacant position. Roosevelt had taken time to learn the characteristics of his senior officers and on past performances he selected George Dewey for this very important arm of the navy. Here was a man to his liking. Roosevelt believed that Dewey was a man who could "be relied upon to prepare in advance, act promptly, fearlessly, and on his own responsibility when the emergency arose". Although another man was in line for the position Roosevelt was determined to have Dewey. Roosevelt summoned Dewey before him and although Dewey reluctantly refused to use a political pull to obtain that position, Roosevelt did not hesitate to inform Dewey that others were using pressure and that in such a case it was practically a patriotic duty for him to do so. Thereupon Dewey dropped in to visit his friend, Senator Redfield Proctor of Maine. The Senator immediately called on the President, and on October 21 Dewey was selected as commander of the Asiatic squadron. He immediately justified Roosevelt's belief in him by plunging into a study of "all the charts and descriptions of the Philippine Islands" he could procure. On December 8, Dewey, with all available data on waters adjacent to the Philippine Islands, left San Francisco harbor with his squadron

in fighting trim.^{22.}

22. Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Autobiography, New York, 1927, 211; Millis, Martial Spirit, 85-87; Dulles, America in the Pacific, 203-204.

Thus the Philippine Islands were brought under the orbit of the large policy.

The authors of the large policy were rapidly getting ready for the most important blow. On February 9, 1898, Roosevelt was writing to F. C. Moore expressing his views of the American Foreign policy. "I should", he wrote, "myself like to shape our foreign policy with a purpose ultimately of driving off the continent every European country. I would begin with Spain...."^{23.}

23. Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, 1:79.

As if in a deliberate attempt to prepare the American people for a large policy a group of able writers let loose upon America, at this time, a flood of expansionist propaganda. That this literature influenced America cannot be denied. That infatigable Mahan, who could feel the growing spirit, again led the way. In the September and October, 1897 issues of Harpers Magazine Mahan published two articles entitled, respectively, "A Twentieth Century Outlook" and "Strategic Features of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico".

In the first article Mahan predicted for the twentieth century a colossal struggle of European and American civilization and religion against Asiatic civilization and religion. "We stand at the opening", he wrote, "of a period when the ques-

tion is to be settled decisively, though the issue may be long delayed, whether Eastern or Western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and control its future." While European armies hold the land frontier, American sea power would be the natural defender on the Pacific side. However to function effectively American sea power must hold securely the Isthmian canal, its Caribbean approaches, and its western outpost, the Hawaiian Islands. The outward impulse is already in the majority of the nation and although retarded by those who "resent extension of our national influence beyond our own borders" it will continue to grow if we do not forget that no nation, as no man can live to itself or die to itself."²⁴.

24. Mahan, "A Twentieth Century Outlook", Harpers Magazine, (1897) 95:521-533.

The second article was an analysis of the relative strategic value of the various naval strongholds upon the eastern approaches to the isthmus. It reached conclusions highly favorable to Cuba. As Mahan had previously demonstrated that control of the Caribbean was essential to the preservation of Western civilization, his scientific analysis of how that area could be controlled led to practical conclusions which any intelligent American could not miss.²⁵.

25. Mahan, "Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea", Harpers Magazine (1897), 95:680-691.

One of the most enthusiastic civilian expansionists was Albert Shaw, editor of the Review of Reviews. From May, 1897 through February, 1898 the editorial pages of the Review fre-

quently played upon the importance of annexing the Hawaiian Islands, constructing an Isthmian Canal, and acquiring or controlling the key islands in the Caribbean. All as means toward the eventual domination of the Pacific which, Shaw considered, was to be the "theater of great events" in the coming twentieth century.^{26.}

26. Review of Reviews, (February, 1898), 16:143-144; (May, 1897), 15:528; (August, 1897), 16:135; (January, 1898), 17:13.

Murat Halstead in the September, 1897 issue of the Forum denounced the failure to annex the Hawaiian Islands and predicted that Spain would soon lose Cuba. Then, he asserted, the "United States must accept the duties of destiny". We must formulate a colonial policy. We should have a two ocean navy. "Shall we not go on where the honors and the glories await us" or "Shall we retreat, when our colors stream and shine in the zenith of the arch under which is our planets path".^{27.}

27. Murat Halstead, "American Annexation and Armament", Forum (Sept., 1897 - Feb., 1898) 24:80-86.

Theodore Roosevelt was not the only man thinking of the Philippines. At the same time John Barrett was writing in the September, 1897 issue of the North American Review of a new land, and unknown land far away. "The Philippines", he considered, "the most resourceful of the East Indies" and "deserving of more attention than they now receive".^{28.}

28. John Barrett, "The Cuba of the Far East", North American Review, Sept. 1897, 173.

The greatest impulse that came from a literary source to help the young expansionists arouse the American people was a new type of sensational journalism. This lurid and colorful journalism, which was irresponsible and self interested, greatly helped to prepare America psychologically and must naturally bear its large burden of responsibility for the Spanish-American war. The sensational papers of the day had discovered an abundance of thrilling stories in the Cuban revolution. William Randolph Hearst of the New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer of the New York World were particularly effective in spreading tales of Spanish atrocities. These tales were evidently exaggerated and in some instances merely the product of a reporter's imagination. A large part of the American newspaper ferocity toward Spain was due to the accidental circumstance that Hearst and Pulitzer were at the time locked in the famous gigantic struggle for supremacy in the field of sensational journalism. The sufferings of the Cubans merely chanced to furnish some of the most convenient ammunition. Whenever one side sprang a sensation the normal reply was of course for the other to spring a better one. In any manner the popular frenzy whipped up by the yellow press played into the hands of the young expansionists who were doing their utmost to push their large policy forward. The sensational newspapers provided the psychological setting for the climax to the demand of the expansionists.^{29.}

29. The role of the American press in promoting the Spanish-American war is well set forth in J. E. Wilson, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press (1895-1898), New York, 1934, and M. M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish American War, a Study in War Propaganda, Baton Rouge, 1932.

They made the people want action and making the people want it made Congress want it. That was all the young expansionists were asking for - action.

Chapter V.

The Spanish-American War.

As the year 1898 dawned on America a new spirit of self-assertiveness was arousing the American people. The elements that would produce a new and greater America were present, but as in the case of certain chemical reactions, heat was necessary to precipitate the new combination - in this instance, the heat of war.^{1.}

1. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 224-225.

On January 24, the American battleship Maine was ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to proceed to Havana on a supposedly friendly visit. Who was responsible for sending the Maine to Havana cannot be definitely ascertained. However, we can be sure that the Maine was a necessary spark in promoting the heat.

Strangely enough, seven days later Senator Lodge was writing to Henry White, Secretary to the American Ambassador in London that "there may be an explosion any day in Cuba which would settle a great many things. We have a battleship in the harbor of Havana and our fleet which overmatches anything the Spaniards have, is masked at Dry Tortugas."^{2.}

2. Allan Nevins, Henry White, Thirty Years of Diplomacy, New York, 1930, 130.

Though this later proved to be a startling prediction there can be little doubt that the explosion Lodge had in mind was presumably political. Yet the last sentence tends to prove

that the young expansionists were merely waiting for an incident or an excuse to move in and take over.

The explosion of the Maine on February 15 with the loss of 260 men provided the young expansionists and the sensational newspapers with their incident. This disaster furnished an abundance of material for the press and for every demagogue orator in Congress and throughout the country. The sensational newspapers played up the Maine explosion without restraint and left the American public reeling from a bombardment of half-truths, misstatement of facts, rumors and false dispatches. The public hastily held Spain responsible for the destruction of the American battleship.

Theodore Roosevelt's anger was especially aroused over the whole incident and he was one of the first to hold the Spaniards responsible before any official communication. "I would give anything", he wrote to R. Diblee on February 16, "if President McKinley would order the fleet to Havana tomorrow....The Maine was sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards".^{3.}

3. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, 177.

However, McKinley was not in the same mood. "I don't propose", he said, "to be swept off my feet by the catastrophe....The administration will not be plunged into war until it is ready for it."^{4.}

4. Charles Olcott, Life of William McKinley, New York, 1916, 2:12-13.

Even though McKinley hesitated for awhile the Maine disaster rapidly pushed the "large policy" ahead. The authors of the policy were thoroughly convinced that the time had finally arrived. Fate provided them with a favorable moment. The Secretary of the Navy, John Long, greatly disturbed by the events and exhausted by the strain of trying to stave off a war, which Roosevelt was doing everything to promote, decided a day of rest was necessary. He selected February 24th as the day and advising Roosevelt "not to take any step affecting the policy of the administration without consulting the President or me" he left the office in the hands of Roosevelt.^{5.}

5. Joseph Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, 1:86. Lawrence Mayo, America of Yesterday, Boston, 1923, 168-170.

It was no mere coincidence that Lodge happened to drop in the navy office that same day. The time was ripe for action. Soon the wires were clicking, the authors of the large policy had started fighting. Roosevelt cabled orders to Dewey in Hong Kong directing him to keep his squadron "full of Coal" and in the event of war "to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast" and to begin "offensive operations in the Philippine Islands."^{6.}

6. Roosevelt, Autobiography, 213-214; George Dewey, Autobiography, New York, 1916, 179.

Another step in the "large policy" and in the destiny of a nation had been taken.

While McKinley may have hoped for peace the first move he made was in preparation for war. On the evening of March 6

he sent for Representative Joe Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. "Cannon", he said, "I must have money to get ready for war. I am doing everything possible to prevent war, but it must come and we are not prepared for it. Who knows where this war will lead; it may be more than a war with Spain. How can I get this money for these extraordinary expenditures?" Cannon suggested a message to Congress but McKinley did not care to be accused of double dealing by Europe. Finally Cannon agreed to introduce a bill if McKinley would prepare it. McKinley merely took a telegram blank and wrote on it, "For National Defense fifty million dollars". Yet it was sufficient, Cannon pocketed it, walked out, retired at once to his hotel and prepared the bill".^{7.}

7. L. W. Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, New York, 1927, 187-190. Cannon opposed war but believed, however, that the pressure of public sentiment and that common sense demanded that preparation be furthered before the jingoes got completely out of hand. Ibid., 186.

The introduction of the bill in the House on March 7 was made amid scenes of more enthusiasm, more harmony and more unanimity than Cannon had ever seen or was ever to see again. The Democrats hurried to get on the band wagon and many were willing to double the appropriation. However, they were not ready to accept expansion. Alexander Dockery of Missouri expressed the Democratic attitude when he said "the time for action has arrived....party lines fade away, and we are ready on this side of the chamber to join the other side in full support of all proper measures to protect the country and to uphold the national dignity and the national honor".^{8.}

8. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, 2602-2603.

After enduring no less than seventy-three speeches in its favor, the House passed the bill on March 8 by a vote of 313 to 0.^{9.}

9. Ibid., 2620.

The Senate, omitting the oratory, passed it with equal unanimity by 76 to 0 and the bill was signed immediately.^{10.}

10. Ibid., 2632.

War enthusiasm continued to grow in Congress while emotion was steadily rising throughout the country. In the Senate on March 17, Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont described from his own observation the horrors seen everywhere in Cuban cities and the mass starvation in the reconcentrados.^{11.}

11. Ibid., 2916-2919.

Although Proctor was, according to Roosevelt, "very ardent for war", he was not identified in the public mind with the young expansionists and his opinions and honesty were respected.^{12.}

12. Millis, The Martial Spirit, 123-124.

His speech was a terrific indictment of Spain's responsibility for the appalling state of affairs on the island. It was one of those utterances which helped shape the public mind.

Finally, on March 29th the American report on the destruction of the Maine was made public. The report found that the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine,

which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines." The court was "unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons."¹³.

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13. Chadwick, Relations of the United States and Spain, 561, note 1; The complete report of the court is in Senate Document no. 207, 55th Congress, 2d Session.

However, in the eyes of the American people Spain was convicted, if not of destruction, at least of gross negligence, and under the circumstances did not make much difference.¹⁴

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14. Whether or not the findings of the court of inquiry were correct has never been established for the destruction of the Maine remains to this day a mystery. In 1911 the Maine was uncovered by coffer-dam operations. This revealed that the court of inquiry had been mistaken in its picture of the conditions of affairs under water. This investigation reported that the forward part of the battleship had been destroyed, with decks and sides blown up and out, whereas the original report had indicated that the ship's bottom plates were radically thrust up and in. Wisely the report of 1911 did not attempt to fix the cause of the explosion, and the investigators towed the ship out to sea and sank it where further study of it is impossible. The most probable explanation seems to be that the Maine destroyed herself without the aid of an outside agency. See "Final Report on Removing Wreck of Battleship Maine from Harbor of Havana, Cuba", 63d Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives Document no. 480.

The large policy steadily gained more advocates. Many Congressmen were beginning to realize that a war with Spain meant more than upholding national dignity and national honor. Senator John Thurston of Nebraska predicted that "war with Spain Stimulate every branch of industry and domestic commerce".¹⁵

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15. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, 3165.
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Representative George Foss of Illinois stated that the right settlement of the Cuban and Hawaiian questions "is closely connected with the extension of our foreign commerce and the future commercial policy of the nation."¹⁶.

16. Ibid., 3222.

Edmund Driggs of New York declared that the "absolute supremacy of the commercial world will come to be held by America and that America will take her place in the world as the brightest star in the firmament of nations."¹⁷.

17. Ibid., 3672-3673.

William Sulzer of New York demanded that the "Spaniard must go and the Spanish flag must be hauled down in the western hemisphere. Spanish rule on this side of the Atlantic is at an end." Deploring the hesitancy of McKinley he asked for "one day of an Andrew Jackson in the White House with his courage, his back bone, his nerve and his patriotism."¹⁸.

18. Ibid., 3672-3673.

Although the growing expansionist sentiment may have satisfied Roosevelt, he could not understand why some direct action had not been taken. When it was rumored that the Spanish torpedo flotilla had left the Canary Islands for Porto Rico, he went at once to McKinley, denounced it as an act of hostility and expressed his desire to have a fleet sent to intercept it. But McKinley was not yet ready for action and his attitude was both discouraging and oppressing

to Roosevelt. In a blistering mood he expressed his feelings to Brook Evans. "We should have", he wrote, "interfered in Cuba two years ago, a year ago, last April and again last December....the Maine calls....for the full measure of atonement which can come only by driving the Spaniard from the New World."¹⁹.

19. Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, 1:96-97.

A week later he wrote to White that he was "a strong advocate of immediate action against Spain" and did not think that "half measures will avail anything, - nothing short of recognition of independence, accompanied by armed intervention on our part" will completely settle the issue.²⁰.

20. Ibid., 2:87.

The diplomatic relations between the two governments were now reaching a climax. After weeks of tiresome negotiations the State Department instructed Minister Woodford in Madrid on March 27 to ascertain if Spain would consent to the following: (1) granting of an armistice to the insurgents until October 1; (2) immediate revocation of the reconcentrado order, and, (3) the United States was to act as final arbiter between the Spanish and the insurgents.²¹.

21. Foreign Relations, March 27, 1898, 712.

Upon these terms McKinley was apparently willing to remain at peace. Yet one is led to believe that he was merely stalling for time because he considered our armed forces unprepared for

war.^{22.}

22. Olcott, Life of William McKinley, 2:3-4; H. H. Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding, New York, 1923 67.

The Spanish minister had to work slowly as he realized that an unconditional surrender would meet with indignation at home. The feeling in Spain was apparently as tense as that in the United States. While both governments may have desired to avert war neither felt strong enough to stand out vigorously against public opinion. However, Woodford, who earnestly believed he could prevent war, cabled McKinley on April 3 that the Spaniards desired peace and if "you can give me time and reasonable liberty of action I will get for you the peace you desire so much and for which you have labored so hard."^{23.}

23. Foreign Relations, 1898, April 3, 727.

But unfortunately McKinley could not wait any longer and had already decided that war must come. Woodford was cabled on April 4 that the President would deliver his message to Congress the following day.^{24.}

24. Ibid., April 4, 729.

Roosevelt jubilantly dashed off a letter to his friend, Elihu Root. "Thank heaven", he wrote, "this morning it looks as if the Administration had made up its mind to lead the movement...."^{25.}

25. Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, 1:90.

However, McKinley changed his mind and on April 6 Woodford received a cablegram which stated that the President's message had been postponed until April 11, supposedly to give the Consul General at Havana the time he needed to insure safe departure of Americans. In this last breathing spell the Spanish Government, in the face of a disastrous war, decided to grant an armistice in Cuba and yield to the terms of the March 27 ultimatum. The proposals of the Spanish covered everything upon which McKinley had insisted; the reconcentration orders had already been revoked, suspension of hostilities, the United States was to indicate the nature and duration of an armistice, the future of Cuba would be left to an autonomist government in the island, which had been set up in accordance with our views, and questions of fact concerning the Maine would readily be submitted to arbitration. Woodford thought he had averted war and sent a special cablegram to McKinley on April 10 expressing his desire to see McKinley secure "permanent peace in Cuba by negotiations" in the belief that it could be settled before August 1 with a free independent Cuba or its cession to the United States. "The present Government", he added, "is going and is loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it can...you will win the fight on your own lines."²⁶.

26. Ibid., April 10, 1898, 747.

McKinley's reply to Woodford was that he must decline to offer any further suggestions than those already made but on submitting the question to Congress on the 11th he would acquaint that body with this latest communication.²⁷.

27. Ibid., 749.

Woodford then realized that his services were at an end and that all his work had been politely shoved aside. McKinley had already decided that war must come and that we were now prepared to do battle. Although the April 10 proposals of the Spanish were a virtual concession of the American demands of March 27 McKinley now realized that there was more to be settled than merely the Cuban question.

McKinley's message was transmitted to Congress on Monday, April 11. At the end of a terse review of the whole situation in Cuba he asked for the use of the army and navy to establish a stable Cuba, declaring that intervention was justified for the sake of humanity, for protection of United States citizens in Cuba, because of injury to American commerce and because of the menace to the peace of the United States caused by conditions in Cuba.^{28.}

28. Richardson, (editor), Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 8: 6281-6292.

Then, at the end of nine closely printed pages written on the assumption that she had not he mentioned the Spanish capitulation in two brief sentences. By this time practically all of the Congressmen had already made up their minds.

"Yesterday," he said, "official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen regent of Spain directed General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me. The fact will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention."^{29.}

29. Ibid., 8:6292.

Two days later the House Foreign Relations Committee simply authorized the President to "intervene" in Cuba, secure peace and establish a "stable and independent government there."³⁰.

30. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 3810.

Nothing was said of the existing government in Cuba. The House refused to consider it.

Roosevelt was duly alarmed by this peaceful resolution and dashed off a message to Lodge expressing his hope that the same resolution would not be passed by the Senate as that resolution allowed the use of diplomacy and did not require immediate use of the army and navy when direct action was needed. "Stick", he wrote "to your own resolution" and "have no part" in the House resolution.³¹

31. Lodge, Selections, 1:297.

The spirit of the large policy seemed to have taken possession of the Senate and on April 16 it adopted its minority report which not only directed the use of military force, but also recognized the existing Cuban republic. The famous Teller amendment was added just before the vote (67-21) and on Monday, April 18, the Senate resolution was sent to the House.³²

32. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 3093. The proposal of this amendment by Senator Teller of Colorado and its approval by Congress is still a matter of dispute. Julius Pratt in his book, Expansionists of 1898, 230, note 1 writes that he considers it curious that Teller should have proposed it. He considers the account

of its origin given in Horatio Rubens, Liberty, the Story of Cuba, New York, 1932, 339-341, very plausible. Mr. Rubens, an American business man and formerly attorney for the Cuban Junta in New York asserts that Teller asked him if there was anything he could do to aid the Cubans in their struggle for independence. According to Rubens he suggested the amendment to Teller because the Cuban revolutionary leaders did not want to lose the fruits of a long sacrifice and wanted the United States to recognize their independence. Then too, if the United States did not declare its purposes and should take the island from Spain she would have to assume the debts impressed on Cuba by Spanish dominion.

Whatever the origin of the Teller amendment, it appears to have been proposed and passed in order to obtain complete support of Congress and the American people. Congress, especially those ambitious expansionists, did not want the American people to think that they were going to war to acquire Cuba. They wanted them to believe that they were going to fight for a free Cuba. They made sure the amendment would apply only to Cuba, not other territories.

Early on Monday the House received the Senate resolution and immediately struck out the clause recognizing the Republic. All that day the resolutions passed from House to conference room, to Senate and back again. Amid feverish surroundings Congress labored on into the night. Finally, about three o'clock Tuesday morning agreement was reached and a joint resolution emerged. With the Teller amendment preserved, the Senate finally consented to the striking out of the recognition clause, and so passed the war resolution by the rather narrow vote of 42 to 35.^{33.}

33. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, 4040-4041. The small ye vote in the Senate is explained by the fact that numerous Senators refused to vote for the resolution unless it recognized the existing Cuban republic. Teller voted against the resolution; Lodge, apparently impatient for action, voted for it.

The House concurred by 311 to 6.^{34.}

34. Ibid., 4063-4064.

The resolution was divided into four parts: (1) declared Cuba independent, (2) demanded that Spain withdraw from the island, (3) directed and empowered the President to use the entire army and navy forces to put the resolutions into effect, (4) disclaimed any disposition or intention on the part of the United States to annex Cuba.

The President signed the resolution on Wednesday, April 20, and although the formal declaration was not issued until the 25th, we were at war. That it was more than a war to liberate Cuba was well understood by several Congressmen. Senator Allen of Nebraska was well aware that a large policy was in existence. "I pray God" he said in the Senate on March 20, "it may come in the next thirty days, Spain driven from every foot of the Western Hemisphere. I think we ought to drive her from the Philippine Islands, from Cuba and from Porto Rico."³⁵

35. Ibid., 4107.

Senator Teller, in his speech on April 15, while asking for a free Cuba had declared that if war came he would "make it so severe that the flag of Spain would be driven from every holding of hers on the face of the earth except the little country she occupies in Europe."³⁶

36. Ibid., 3879.

Senator Beveridge of Indiana, calling out for a greater and

expanding America, announced at a banquet of the Middlesex Club on April 27 that the "trade of the world must and shall be ours....that our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of commerce...and that if this means our flag over an Isthmian Canal....over Hawaii...over Cuba and the Seven Seas... then let us....make the meaning."³⁷.

37. Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, Cambridge, 1932, 69-70.

The war that Roosevelt and Lodge had desired was finally under way and Roosevelt resigned his office to take an active part in it "for to fight in such a cause and with such an enemy was merely to carry out the doctrines" that he and Lodge had "preached for many years".³⁸.

38. Theodore Roosevelt, Rough Riders, New York, 1899, 11.

Lodge stayed at the home front to promote the best interests of the "large policy".

Dewey's quick and decisive victory over the antiquated Spanish fleet at Manila Bay was overwhelmingly received by "large policy" advocates. From the very day Lodge was informed of Dewey's victory he was nervous lest the United States should give up the Philippines or at least part of them. He immediately attempted to influence everyone he could reach for the retention of the Islands. Four days after the victory he was writing to Henry White that "We must on no account let the islands go....they must be ours under the treaty of peace.... the American flag is up and must stay...We hold the other side

of the Pacific and the value to this country is almost beyond imagination."³⁹.

39. Allan Nevins, Henry White, 136.

James Eustis, former Senator from New York, upon hearing of Dewey's victory, cried out that "Dewey has settled the question ... has conquered foreign territory, and...has given Uncle Sam a damn big appetite for that particular article of food".⁴⁰.

40. Millis, The Martial Spirit, 198.

Walter Hines Page wrote to James Bryce, on May 9, that the victory at Manila "has brought a new problem to Americans.... We already see the beginnings of an Imperial party here.... I do not see how we are going to get rid of these islands...., there can be little doubt but a wider looking policy has come into our political life to remain."⁴¹.

41. B. J. Hendrick, The Training of an American: The Earlier Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, New York, 1928, 265-266.

Roosevelt, in training at San Antonio, Texas, kept in touch with Lodge. On May 19 he expressed his attitude in a letter to Lodge. "Do not make peace" he wrote, "until we get Porto Rico, while Cuba is made independent and the Philippines at any rate taken from the Spaniards."⁴².

42. Lodge, Selections From Correspondence, 1:299.

Lodge redoubled his efforts after hearing from his partner. Joyfully, on May 24, he wrote Roosevelt that he thought it safe to say "in absolute certainty, that unless he was utterly and profoundly mistaken, the administration was now fully committed to the large policy that we both desire".^{43.}

43. Ibid., 300.

Roosevelt immediately wrote back from Texas on May 25 and repeated his attitude toward Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines.^{44.}

44. Ibid., 301.

Lodge replied on May 31. Roosevelt was now in Florida. "The Administration," he wrote, "I believe to be doing very well and to be carrying out a large policy....I am in strong hopes that the President will act without Congress concerning the Hawaiians."^{45.}

45. Ibid., 302.

Lodge continued to bestow his scholarly approbation upon McKinley and Day. The President and Secretary of State Day were undecided as to the Philippines but Lodge impressed upon the two the relation of the Philippines to American interests in the Far East, and the importance of the annexation of Hawaii. By June 3, a month after Dewey's victory, we note that McKinley's policy was falling into line. On that day, Secretary of State Day cabled Ambassador Hay in London that the President speaking for himself may be inclined to grant Spain terms of peace

which would provide for the cession of Porto Rico and an island in the Ladronez, together with a port and necessary appurtenances in the Philippines which the United States would itself select.^{46.}

46. Alfred Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906 New York, 1928, 99.

Lodge informed Roosevelt, on June 15, of his progress.

"I consider," he wrote, "the Hawaiian business as practically settled. The whole policy of annexation is growing rapidly under the irresistible pressure of events....you may judge a little of the change when I tell you that Judge Day said to me two or three days ago - 'There is of course, no question about Porto Rico....the only question for us to consider is how much we should do in the Philippines'".^{47.}

47. Lodge, Selections, 1:311.

A few days later Lodge dined with the Secretary of State and Captain Mahan, who was determined to do all he could to obtain Spanish possessions in the West Indies and the Pacific. What transpired was reported to Roosevelt by Lodge. "Mahan and I talked the Philippines with him for two hours. The feeling of the country is overwhelming against giving the Philippines back to Spain. The Republican conventions are all declaring that where the flag once goes up it must never come down."^{48.}

48. Ibid., 313.

While the followers of a large policy were exerting their best efforts to bring about the annexation of the Spanish Islands the large policy achieved its first triumph. A joint resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States

passed the House on June 15, the Senate on July 6, and received the President's signature on July 7.

Immediately after McKinley was inaugurated he had turned his attention to Hawaii, negotiated a new treaty of annexation and sent it to the Senate on the same day it was signed (June 16, 1897). In the Senate there were enough reluctant Democrats and anti-imperialist Republicans to endanger a two-thirds majority for the treaty. When the treaty lagged there the President decided to resort to the precedent of Texas and urged annexation by a joint resolution of Congress, which required only a majority vote in the Senate, and the House. Yet this joint resolution introduced in the Senate for the Administration on March 16⁴⁹.

49. Senate Report No 681, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 225.

languished there for months. On May 17 a similar resolution was reported back to the House with the endorsement of a majority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.⁵⁰

50. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 4999.

It was known that the resolution would easily pass the House if it could be brought to a vote. The one obstacle was Speaker Reed, implacable opponent of annexation, who as chairman of the Committee on Rules could prevent the consideration of the resolution. Finally, after three weeks he gave into the wishes of his party and gave his consent to tactics which would bring the resolution before the House without a special rule.⁵¹

51. William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian, New York, 1930, 366-367; Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, 1:290-291.

On June 15, by a vote of 209-91, divided for the most part on party lines, the resolution passed the House.^{52.}

52. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 2d Session, 6019.

The fight now shifted to the Senate. The joint resolution from the House was introduced in the Senate on June 16 and referred to the committee on Foreign Relations, which reported it without amendment on the following day.^{53.}

53. Ibid., 6022, 6062.

In the debate, which opened on June 20 and continued until July 6, when the vote was taken, the friends of annexation, for the most part, remained silent, giving to the opposition Senators ample time in which to state their objections.^{54.}

54. Ibid., 6141-6708.

Despite numerous and serious speeches against annexation the joint resolution was passed by a vote of 42 to 21.^{55.}

55. Ibid., 6712; T. A. Bailey, The United States and Hawaii. During the Spanish American War, "American Historical Review, April, 1931, 36:552:560, after a careful study of the situation in Washington and Honolulu in the spring of 1898 concludes that if "war had not come when it did and if Dewey had not fought successfully at Manila, Hawaii would not have been annexed for some years to come if ever".

Lodge informed Roosevelt on July 12 that:

"we succeeded in passing the Hawaiian annexation very handsomely, it is a very great victory and very important". He was however, worried about the rest of the policy. "I believe," he continued, "that he (McKinley) is all right in his conception of our policy..."

but...I cannot help feeling very anxious... I am very much afraid that he might settle on terms which we should all reject...he is worrying over the Philippines..he wants to hold them evidently but is a little timid about it.... I, however, impressed the single point that I have made with him and everybody else is whatever happens we cannot return to Spain the people we have set free."⁵⁶.

56. Lodge, Selections, 1:323-324.

The "irresistible pressure of events" that Lodge had found to be influencing the Administration came more strongly to the assistance of the large policy. On July 23 Lodge wrote Roosevelt that:

"he had a long talk with the President before leaving Washington and he was very clear and strong about both Cuba and Porto Rico. He is not giving consideration to the Philippines but the question in his mind is how much he will take there....I think he grasps the situation fully....He did everything to secure the annexation of Hawaii and speaks of it as a step in a policy."⁵⁷.

57. Ibid., 1:530.

The effect of an American colonial empire which would possibly include an Asiatic colony had a strange effect on America. Scarcely had the smoke cleared on American victories than businessmen and churchmen began to take an interest in American colonies, especially the Philippines.

The missionary minded religious people in America were as eager to use foreign outlets as were the commercial people. This spirit had its obvious bearing upon the Cuban situation and later upon the question of retaining the Philippines. From

the evidence acquired by Julius Pratt it would seem that almost the only Christian denominations that were genuinely and thoroughly opposed to the war were the Friends and Unitarians. These two religious bodies were also the only two groups that offered any serious opposition to expansion. Had not the United States a moral and religious responsibility in Cuba? And might not the Philippines be a portal to religious activity, as well as to trade, in Asia? We may conclude that the great preponderance of vocal religious sentiment, in the summer and fall of 1898, was in favor of retaining the Philippines and the other Spanish islands which had yielded to American arms. The President was neither unaware of this sentiment nor indifferent to it.^{58.}

58. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 282-314.

Business men, before the war, generally considered the program of colonial expansion urged by the "large policy" advocates as one form of dangerous jingoism. If any believed, prior to the war, that foreign markets were to be secured through the acquisition of colonies they were strongly silent about it. However, Dewey's victory at Manila seemed to place in American hands unexpectedly except to a few the key to the trade of the Orient. Then at last, business men began to join the imperialists in their acclaim of imperial conquests. It would seem that the conversion of business opinion was accomplished by the combination of a European threat against the freedom of the American market in China with the coup of the American fleet in Manila Bay so near the Chinese coast. American

business had yielded reluctantly to the war with Spain but it had gladly accepted the result, and long before the conclusion of peace with Spain, it was building high hopes upon the supposed opportunities for trade and exploitation in a string of colonies stretching from Porto Rico to the Philippines.^{59.}

59. Ibid., 253-273 .

Chapter VI.
Peace Negotiations.

The rapid successes of the American forces in the Caribbean region and the imminence of the fall of Manila caused the Spanish government to ask President McKinley, through J. Cambon, the French Ambassador to the United States, "upon what basis might be terminated the strife."¹

1. Foreign Relations, July 22, 1898, 809-820.

The American fleet was still besieging Manila and it was fourteen days before the American troops were to enter the city, but the President, definitely under the influence of the large policy, insisted upon the following terms: (1) The relinquishment of Cuba by Spain, (2) The cession of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies to the United States, (3) The occupation of the city, bay and harbor of Manila by the United States pending a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.²

2. Ibid., July 30, 821.

The terms were despatched to Spain on July 30. McKinley was adamant in requiring acceptance of the specified conditions before consenting to an armistice. It seems as though the third term was left purposely ambiguous to see what could be done with it at Paris.

The Spanish Minister of State telegraphed, through J. Cambon, Secretary of State Day, acceptance of the conditions

but emphatically stated that "Manila still holds its own,... that the whole Philippine archipelago is under the sovereignty of Spain" and that the Spanish government does "not renounce the sovereignty over the archipelago."³.

3. Ibid., August 7, 923.

The peace protocol was signed on August 12 and it embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in the note of July 30. It also arranged for a peace commission composed of five American and five Spanish members to meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898 to negotiate a final peace.⁴

4. Ibid., August 12, 924-925.

Lodge summed up the situation in a letter to Roosevelt on August 15. He realized that McKinley was wary of taking the radical step and he himself had backed down a little.

"The war is over," he wrote, "and as far as the West Indies is concerned all is right. The Administration seems to be hesitating about the Philippines, but I hope they will at least keep Manila, which is the great prize, and the thing which will give us the Eastern trade. Everything will depend upon the character of the peace commission....if Davis goes, as reported this morning, all will be well...."⁵.

5. Lodge, Selections, 1:337-338.

McKinley did not disappoint the authors of the large policy for he appointed a peace commission on August 26 not wholly against the principles of the "large policy". William R. Day resigned as Secretary of State to head the commission.

Senator Cushman Davis of Minnesota, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators William Frye of Maine, George Gray of Delaware, members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York Tribune, comprised the rest of the commission.^{6.}

6. Millis, The Martial Spirit, 373; Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 331-332.

Of the five Reid, a forceful personality, was fully committed to the "large policy". He was convinced that the Philippines were ours by conquest, and that they gave us a commercial advantage in the Pacific we had no right to throw away. He was for the retention of the entire archipelago.^{7.}

7. Royal Cortissoz, Life of Whitelaw Reid, 2 vols., New York, 1921, 2:246-47.

Davis and Frye desired to retain only the northern islands and give or trade the other islands to some European power like Holland. Day was against the retention of anything in the Philippines except a coaling station. Gray was the only representative of the anti-imperialist viewpoint and was against any American holding in the Philippines.^{8.}

8. Millis, The Martial Spirit, 373-74.

The selection of this peace commission seems to infer that by the end of August McKinley had already begun to make up his mind about the Philippines.

Roosevelt had now returned to help carry out the completion of the "large policy". On September 8, Lodge instructed

him to use his political aspirations to further the policy.

"When it becomes certain," he wrote, "that you are to be nominated for governor I hope you will insist that the platform on which you are to stand takes good ground on our foreign policy. I do not mean that it will necessarily incorporate a demand that we take all the Philippines, but I think it ought to leave the door open for that if necessary, and certainly take guard against returning to Spain any people whom we have freed, or Manila which was the prize of Dewey's great victory. This should be very important in its effect on national opinion and on the action of the peace commission...I shall try a similar declaration here."⁹.

9. Lodge, Selections, 1:343.

However, McKinley needed no further urging. On September 16 he informed the peace delegation that the American government required of Spain the terms embodied in the note of July 30, and added:

"That the Philippines stand upon a different basis...the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we cannot disregard...Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent...the United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon plus equal rights in all Philippine ports."¹⁰.

10. Foreign Relations, Sep. 16, 1898, 907-908.

McKinley had, as Lodge suggested, left the way open for the cession of the whole archipelago.

Upon the sailing of the peace delegation on September 17, Lodge wrote to Henry White, United States Ambassador in London, urging him to use his influence on the peace commissioners.

"I hope", he wrote, "you will put in a strong word with any of

the commissioners for the retention of Manila and Luzon". The delegation passed through London on its way to Paris and White chatted with all the members.^{11.}

11. Nevins, Henry White, 137-140.

Senator Beveridge was again extolling a large policy. At a Republican campaign meeting of September 17 he launched into his famous "March of the Flag" speech. He flayed the opposition for saying that the Spanish colonies were not contiguous with America, and declared that:

"....the ocean does not separate us from the lands of our duty and desire - the ocean joins us,...Steam joins us, electricity joins us - the very elements are in league with our destiny. Cuba not contiguous, Porto Rico not contiguous. Our navy will make them contiguousAmerican speed, American guns, American heart and brain and nerve will keep them contiguous forever."^{12.}

12. Bowers, Beveridge, 68-69.

The peace delegation arrived in Paris on September 26. Although the question of the Cuban debt absorbed the energies of the commissioners for almost a month the American delegation was continually reminded of the Philippines.

General Merritt, Commander of the American Army, on October 6, presented to the delegation the opinions of the naval and military officers in the Philippine Islands. Dewey thought we ought to retain Luzon. However, Merritt wanted to go farther. He thought it would be an advantage to change our policy and keep the islands, that the islands were a source of trade and cheap labor, that they would be easier to protect as a

whole and that "our humanity was not bound by geographical lines." Commander Bradford of the Navy personally testified that all the islands were "very valuable and even expressed the firm conviction that the "Pelews, Carolines and Ladronez should all be acquired if we are to possess any territory near the China Sea." In conclusion he assured the commissioners that the United States has incurred a moral obligation to take all the islands, "govern them, civilize the natives, and do the best we can with them."¹³.

13. Foreign Relations, October 6, 1898, 921.

On October 14, a telegram from Admiral Dewey to the Secretary of the Navy was forwarded to the delegation. Dewey urged rapid settlement of the Philippine Islands question as "general anarchy" prevailed outside Manila city limits and it was probable that the islands to the south would fall into the same state soon.¹⁴.

14. Annex To Protocol No. 9, Senate Document 62, 55th Cong., 3d Session, 77.

Meanwhile the President had taken the opportunity to swing around the midwestern circle on a speaking tour. Delicately feeling out the sentiment of the problem of the Philippines, he soon saw that the crowds who listened to him desired to retain the territory where the American flag had been planted. He returned to Washington duly impressed by the enthusiasm of the untrammled west for the flag and Dewey's victory. It seemed as though they wanted them all.¹⁵.

15. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, 1:279.

Joe Cannon later summed it up. "He returned to Washington convinced that....he would have to take over the Philippines."¹⁶.

16. Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, 194.

McKinley, On October 24, dispatched a cable to the delegation asking their views and remarking that there was a very general feeling in the United States whatever it might prefer as to the Philippines it cannot let them go.¹⁷

17. Foreign Relations, October 24, 1898, 933.

The delegation sent back the different views of the commissioners. Reid was determined to have the whole archipelago and exerted his influence on David and Frye. The last two wrote out their own views but after talking it over with Reid signed his reply. Their dispatch to McKinley stated that they were convinced "that it would be a naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago." Day was unable to agree that we should "preemptorily demand the entire Philippine group." Gray thought it unwise "to take the Philippines in whole or in part."¹⁸.

18. Ibid., October 25, 934-935, Cortissoz, Life of Reid, 1:249.

Secretary of State John Hay dispatched the President's reply on October 26. "The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the

former must therefore be required."¹⁹.

19. Foreign Relations, October 26, 1898, 935.

Two days later another dispatch reached Paris. It was the final order. "...the President can see but one plain path of duty - the acceptance of the archipelago."²⁰.

20. Ibid., October 28, 937.

The American peace commission presented the whole archipelago demand on October 31 to the Spanish commission. However the Spaniards were not in a giving mood and using the occasion for an argumentative protest against such a perversion of the August protocol peremptorily rejected the demand the next day. The Spanish commissioners intended to hold on to the Philippines asserting that Manila had been taken after the peace protocol had been signed. The situation grew tense and it looked like the conference might be ruined. When suddenly, Senator Frye received an inspiration and cabled the President "...might not we agree to pay Spain from \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000 if such a treaty could be secured?"²¹.

21. Ibid., 939.

Hay notified Frye, on November 1, that the President would give cheerful concurrence if the peace commission decided that a reasonable sum of money would improve peace negotiations."²².

22. Ibid., 945.

The Spanish delegation formally rejected the demand for the Philippines on November 4. Their resistance so impressed the American commissioners that they cabled Hay for further instructions and included their views. Reid still insisted on the whole archipelago and an island in the Carolines but would be willing to pay \$12,000,000 to \$15,000,000 for them. Davis was for all of the Philippines and the presentation of an ultimatum, not money, to the Spanish. Frye favored paying for the whole group. Day wanted to settle the issue in a hurry and would allow Spain to keep the islands of Mindanao and Sulu. Gray felt that "reasonable concessions" should be made rather than renewal of war and taking of islands by force; he preferred taking the islands by a treaty.²³

23. Ibid., 946-948.

Hay instructed Day on November 13 "to insist upon cession of the whole archipelago and if necessary to pay \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000" and added "if you can get a cession for naval and telegraph station in the Carolines offer more."²⁴

24. Ibid., 950.

An immediate reply from Day on November 15 informed Hay that a proposition, which included the payment of \$20,000,000 for the Philippine archipelago and an island in the Carolines, would be offered to the Spanish if approved.²⁵

25. Ibid., 950.

Hay notified Day the following day that the proposed course was acceptable to the Administration.^{26.}

26. Ibid., 951.

But the Spanish refused to give in and on November 25 Secretary Moore of the Commission notified Hay that Spain had countered with three of its own proposals: (1) The entire archipelago for \$100,000,000. (2) All except Mindanao and Sulu with a Caroline island for \$50,000,000. (3) All except Mindanao and Sulu plus settlement of colonial debts and obligations by an arbitral tribunal. Day, Reid, and Davis still agreed on the November 15 proposal. Frye was willing to let Mindanao and Sulu go. Gray preferred the third proposal.^{27.}

27. Ibid., 959.

Hay notified Day that on November 25 "the President had considered the three proposals" but "finds no reason for departing from his last instruction."^{28.}

28. Ibid., 960.

A majority of the Spanish delegation still opposed the terms but upon the instruction of their minister of State, who realized the American proposition was the only means of avoiding subsequent complications and even greater evils, accepted the terms on November 29. Day finally notified Hay that "the Spanish commission presented a final acceptance of our last proposition except for an island in the Carolines." The various details of the treaty were adjusted and the conference ended on

December 8. The treaty was signed and sealed on December 10, but it still faced a tough battle for it had to be accepted by the American Senate.^{29.}

29. Ibid., 961; Cortissoz, Reid; 252.

The greatest obstacle to the attainment of a successful "large policy" stood before the politicians of imperialism. There was little doubt that a majority of the Senate was with them, but to ratify a treaty requires a two-thirds vote. The horrid truth was facing them at last -- that one-third plus one vote in the Senate would defeat the treaty and bring down in ruins the whole edifice which Roosevelt and Lodge had so carefully erected. As early as December 7, Lodge had written Roosevelt of angry fears:

"We are going to have trouble over the treaty. How serious I do not know, but I confess I cannot think calmly of the rejection of that treaty by a little more than one-third of the Senate. It would be a repudiation of the President and humiliation of the whole country in the eyes of the world, and would show we are unfit to enter into great questions of foreign policy. I cannot believe that the opposition, which is of course composed of Southern Democrats, can succeed."^{30.}

30. Lodge, Selection of Letters, 1: 368.

Roosevelt answered in a very shocked alarm: "It seems impossible that men of ordinary patriotism can contemplate such an outrage upon the country."^{31.}

31. Ibid.

Yet it was Senator Hoar, Lodge's own colleague from Massachusetts, who was to be a leader in the outrageous attempt. The opposition was by no means composed entirely of "Southern Democrats."

The treaty of peace was sent to the Senate on January 4, 1899 and debated in executive session until February 6. After it was in the hands of the Senate its passage appeared improbable to contemporary observers. For a short time the imperialists left the speech making to the opposition while they gathered the votes. Behind the scenes Lodge was doing the heavy work but found the going rather tough. On the 14th he wrote Roosevelt that the "fight that is being made on the treaty is disheartening" and not very easy to bear."³².

32. Ibid., 385.

In the open sessions of the Senate where several sets of resolutions relative to the acquisition of territory were introduced and discussed Senator Platt of Connecticut, who although against the Philippines stood by the President, attempted almost single handed to stem the flood of opposition oratory. The right to acquire territory, said Platt, is a sovereign right, belonging to the United States by virtue of its natural sovereignty. It is not confined to the treaty making power or to the war power. And the right to acquire embraces the right to govern, to establish such government as the condition of the territory and the character of its population may require.³³.

33. Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3d Session, 287-297.

However, did not the spirit of the Teller Resolution of the preceding April bind the United States in principle not to impose its government upon the Filipinos against their will. No one should have been better able than its author to interpret the resolution. In principle, said Teller, it was applicable to the other Spanish Islands as well as Cuba. However, the resolution could not be applied unconditionally. For the present we could do nothing but assume the government of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Eventually, they would become either independent nations or integral parts of the United States, with all the rights implied by that status. Teller suggested no time limit for the probationary period.³⁴

34. Ibid., 325-330.

Finally, on the 24th Lodge came forth with the first public defense of the treaty to which the statesman had condescended. "I want," he said, "to get this country out of war and back to peace....I want to enter upon a policy which shall enable us to give peace and self-government to the natives of these islands. The rejection of the treaty makes all these things impossible."³⁵

35. Ibid., 958-960.

Roosevelt thought this short argument "splendid".

Thus the debate on the various resolutions dragged on until February 4. Meanwhile various forms of pressure and persuasion had been at work to secure the Democratic and Populist votes necessary for ratification. The whole weight of the

Republican organization was exerted to this end.^{36.}

36. Dunn, From Harrison to Harding, 279-283; Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, 171-173.

Then an unexpected factor suddenly appeared upon the scene. It was that astonishing politician William Jennings Bryan. Bryan had arrived in Washington filled with a strategic inspiration. Although formally against the treaty he now proceeded to induce his surprised supporters in the Senate to vote for ratification. He did not think the Democratic party could win the new Presidential election upon the silver issue, and that they must therefore preserve the imperialism issue for use in 1900. Therefore it was necessary that we be in possession of the islands and their troubles when the election came around. Incensed staunch Democrats chased him back to Omaha but not before he had lined up enough votes to make defeat impossible. When the Senate rose on February 4, Lodge and Aldrich, the imperialist leaders, had 58 sure votes in line but needed sixty. However, there were four doubtful men to work on and they felt confident they could get at least two of them. The Senate recessed until Monday, when the vote was to be taken.^{37.}

37. Holt, Treaties Defeated By The Senate, 173-177; Millis, The Martial Spirit, 400-401; Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 357.

Action followed in the Philippines the next day. The war of conquest which was to flicker on for several years broke out between Aguinaldo's insurgents and the American troops at Manila. When the Senate met again on Monday, February 6, the news of the Manila outbreak reached that body in time to in-

fluence the vote in favor of ratification. However, the "line of opposition," according to Lodge, "stood absolutely firm, to my great astonishment. I thought the news from Manila would have shattered it, but it did not, marvelous as it may seem."³⁸.

38. Lodge, Selections, 1:391-392.

However, by half past two one of the doubtfuls of Saturday had been won over; at five minutes before the second came over. Then to make it sure, another joined the large policy ranks during the roll call. The vote was 57 to 27, one vote above the two-thirds majority.³⁹.

39. Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, 55th Congress, 1894, Quoted in Pratt, Expansionists of 1898, 358.

The last obstacle had been surmounted. The chief provisions of the treaty called for Spanish cession of Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States in lieu of war indemnity, and of the Philippines on payment of \$20,000,000. Cuba was transferred to the United States for temporary occupation preliminary to insular independence. The civil and political rights of the native inhabitants of the ceded islands were to be determined by Congress.⁴⁰.

40. U. S. Statutes at Large, XXX, 1754ff.

The United States emerged from the Spanish-American War a world power with island possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Our navy had been tested and had emerged with colors flying. We had earned the regard of Englishmen. The

European powers began to consider the potentialities of America. The United States, for the first time, became a colonial power in the New World, and through the acquisition of islands in the Pacific, it became an Asiatic power as well. The nation took under its wing nearly a million subjects of Spanish and Negro blood in Puerto Rico. It assumed responsibilities in regard to Cuba. It was master and protector of seven and a half million people in the Philippines, ranging from the civilized Tagalogs of Manila to the primitive Moors of the Sulu Peninsula and the head-hunting Igorots of northern Luzon. The United States had at last, like the Great Powers of Europe, chosen the path of empire. Whatever might happen now, the nation was irrevocably committed to the "large policy".

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