Fidel Castro addressing crowd

IN 1985 Cuba had an authoritarian political system that combined a highly restricted structure of policymaking authority in which some 22 individuals participated regularly in setting national policy and a decentralized system of policy implementation that involved substantial popular participation at the local level. After several years of devolving administrative responsibilities to middle-level managers, a 1981 administrative reorganization reconcentrated authority at the highest levels of the system.

Continued poor economic performance caused dissatisfaction with government policy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In response, the government exported many of its opponents during the Mariel exodus of 1980, mobilized its bases of support through the mass organizations, and tightened controls over the judiciary.

Fidel Castro Ruz remained the center of the political system in early 1985. He was the only individual whose name appeared in the 1976 Constitution and was not only the chief of state and the chief of government but also the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba. He also had the authority to assume personal management of any government ministry or other administrative organization. After losing some of his power during the 1970s, he successfully reasserted his personal authority after 1980, removing many officials of the Communist Party of Cuba and packing the highest decisionmaking bodies with his supporters. Much of his power derived from his charisma and the popular view that he embodied the Revolution.

In early 1985 Cuba continued to pursue an activist foreign policy, maintaining a substantial military presence in Angola and Ethiopia, supporting guerrilla movements and leftist governments in Central America and the Caribbean, and seeking to act as a representative for the concerns of the Third World through Castro's role as head of the Nonaligned Movement from 1979 to 1983. Cuba deepened its alliance with the Soviet Union during the early 1980s but also sought to improve its relations with the United States, leading to an agreement on immigration matters.

Constitutional Background

The first constitution of the independent Republic of Cuba was promulgated in 1901 by the island's United States military governor during the first United States occupation. The influence of the United States in the creation of this document was evident in its emphasis on the separation of executive, legislative, and judi-

cial powers; its provisions guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms; and its establishment of an independent judiciary with the power of judicial review.

The most controversial provision of the 1901 constitution was the Platt Amendment, which many Cubans considered an infringement on and derogation of Cuban sovereignty. In this amendment, imposed by the United States as a condition for its acceptance of the constitution, Cuba recognized that "the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independent, [and] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty." Article VII of the amendment also obliged Cuba to "sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States." In effect, this amendment gave the United States the legal authority to regulate the form and content of the actions of the Cuban government, which it did on numerous occasions between 1901 and 1934, when it was abrogated by the United States. The Platt Amendment, together with the 1898 Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States ending the Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Permanent Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 between Cuba and the United States, made Cuba effectively a protectorate of the United States, even though the country became legally independent in 1902 (see United States Occupation and the Platt Amendment, ch. 1).

Following the 1933 revolution, delegates from all the major political forces in the country, including the Moscow-oriented Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP), drafted a new constitution, which was promulgated in 1940. The 1940 constitution retained most of the provisions of the bill of rights from the 1901 constitution but completely changed the structure of the government into a semiparliamentary system with a president, elected by universal suffrage, who was assisted by a cabinet that was led by a prime minister. The cabinet was directly responsible to the Congress, which could remove any minister or the entire cabinet by a vote of no confidence. The Supreme Court had the power to declare law unconstitutional.

The 1940 constitution also required the nation to "employ the resources within its reach to furnish employment to everyone who lacks it" and to assure workers of "the economic conditions necessary to a fitting existence." It also recognized the right of workers to unionize, bargain collectively, and strike. The entire labor code, including minimum wage rules, maximum weekly working hours, maternity leave for women, and workmen's accident insurance, was

incorporated into the document. The state's powers in national development, public administration, and fiscal and monetary matters were greatly enlarged. Although many of its far-reaching provisions were never implemented, the document served as a codification of Cuban aspirations for economic and social development and remained a rallying point for the opposition throughout the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar. Its reenactment was the stated goal of Castro's revolutionary movement and remained the goal of Cuban exiles living in the United States in early 1985 (see The Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

In February 1959 the revolutionary government promulgated the Fundamental Law of the Revolution. This document, which the government claimed was merely a revision of the constitution of 1940, served as the country's basic law until it was superseded by a new constitution in 1976. The Fundamental Law retained most of the sections of the constitution of 1940 concerning social and economic matters but made substantial alterations in the structure of government. Legislative, executive, administrative, and constitutional powers were concentrated in the Council of Ministers, again led by a prime minister. The president of the republic was retained as head of state, but his position was changed into a largely ceremonial one. The Senate and Chamber of Representatives were eliminated, their legislative duties becoming functions of the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Court was made accountable to the council.

The Council of Ministers enjoyed unrestricted authority under the Fundamental Law. It issued laws that were nominally subject to judicial review, but because it also had the power to amend the Fundamental Law by a two-thirds majority vote, it simply did so whenever the judiciary invalidated its actions. This procedure was particularly common in the early years of the Revolution, when the Fundamental Law was modified 19 times between May 1959 and December 1962.

Members of the Council of Ministers were appointed and removed at the discretion of the president (a provision retained from the constitution in 1940). In practice, the president followed the wishes of the prime minister in this matter, making the prime minister the central figure of the government. Castro served as prime minister until the office was eliminated on February 24, 1976.

The constant need to amend the Fundamental Law as the Revolution progressed created a general dissatisfaction with the document on the part of the government. A constitutional commission was established within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) in 1965,

but it failed in its effort to draft a new document. In October 1974 another commission—led by Blas Roca (Francisco Calderío) and consisting of 20 lawyers and representatives of the government, the PCC, and the mass organizations—was appointed, and in February 1975 it submitted a draft constitution. The draft was distributed throughout the country to all the cells of the PCC and the mass organizations for discussion and feedback. Some 5.7 million people participated in these discussions. All comments and suggestions were tabulated in July 1975, and many were incorporated in the draft.

The draft constitution was adopted by the PCC at its First Congress, held in December 1975, and was ratified by 97.7 percent of the voters in a national referendum on February 15, 1976. The new Constitution went into effect on February 24, 1976.

The 1976 Constitution is based largely on the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union. It declares Cuba to be a socialist republic in which "all power belongs to the working people." The doctrines of the "unity of power" and "democratic centralism" are identified as the underpinnings of the state. The former is seen to preclude the separation of powers but not the division of functions among the state organs. Democratic centralism governs the division of legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial functions. Its key principles are election to all organs of state power, accountability of elected officials to their electors, strict control by superior state organs over subordinate bodies, and increased participation by local units in the administration of local affairs. "Socialist legality" is recognized as the judicial and legal foundation of the country, replacing the earlier emphasis on revolutionary fervor under which organizations and individuals commonly exceeded their legal authority.

Among the official functions performed by the state are the "construction of socialism," the defense of the country, the guaranteeing of the liberty and rights of citizens and the "fulfillment of their duties and personality," the "consolidation of a collective ideology by the people," the protection of the nation's property, and the planning and administering of its economy. The state is also responsible for providing employment and access to education, culture, and sports for all, as well as for the care of children and the sick and disabled.

The 1976 Constitution establishes a unicameral, semiparliamentary form of government at both the national and the local levels. The highest state organ is the National Assembly of People's Power, in which the constituent and legislative powers are vested. The Constitution also provides for a Council of State em-

powered to act in the name of the National Assembly when it is not in session, a Council of Ministers to head the executive branch, a People's Supreme Court to direct the judiciary, and assemblies of people's power to govern the provinces and *municipios* (similar to counties).

In contrast with most socialist constitutions, Cuba's does not prevent one from holding administrative and governmental positions simultaneously. This is most pronounced in the articles referring to Castro, who is named as president of the Council of State, president of the Council of Ministers, and commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR). By virtue of these offices, according to Articles 91, he represents the state and government and in that capacity controls the activities of the Council of State as well as the Council of Ministers and all its subordinate agencies. As head of state he receives the credentials of heads of foreign diplomatic missions and signs decree-laws and resolutions issued by the Council of State between the sessions of the National Assembly. He may also, without any constitutional limits, "assume leadership of any ministry or central agency of the administration." Other individuals may also hold several offices simultaneously, but Castro is the only one mentioned specifically in the 1976 Constitution (see National-level Politics, this ch.).

The State Structure

National Assembly of People's Power

The National Assembly is the only national body invested with representative and legislative authority. The 1976 Constitution describes it as the "Supreme Organ of State Power" with the power to declare war and to discuss and approve the state budget, the plans for national economic and social development, monetary and credit policies, and the general outlines of foreign and domestic policy. In addition to its legislative function, the Assembly is responsible for overseeing the actions of the other organs of state power and for electing the membership of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, as well as the president, the vice president, and the judges of the People's Supreme Court. Decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws are the function of the National Assembly, which may also call national referenda for the purpose of amending the Constitution.

The delegates to the National Assembly are elected or appointed to five-year terms by the municipal assemblies, although membership in those assemblies is not required. There is one delegate for every 20,000 citizens or fraction greater than 10,000. During the 1976–81 period the Assembly consisted of 481 delegates, of whom 55.5 percent were elected from municipal assemblies; the rest were government and party officials nominated by the PCC and appointed by the assemblies. The 1981–86 National Assembly consisted of 499 delegates elected and appointed in roughly similar proportions.

The National Assembly determined its own internal organization. In 1983 it was organized into 20 working commissions dealing with such issues as child care and women's rights; culture and art; defense and internal order; constitutional and legal affairs; work, social security, and social welfare; young people and children; construction and construction materials; and complaints and suggestions. These commissions played an active role in the Assembly's deliberations and were charged with examining drafts of legislation and proposing modifications, as well as following and reporting on the particular issues for which they were responsible. Whereas the National Assembly met for only two days in each of two sessions per year, the commissions met periodically throughout the year in various locations around the country to prepare legislation for consideration by the Assembly. In accomplishing their tasks, the commissions, as well as the Assembly as a whole, relied greatly on their "auxiliary apparatus." Made up of career civil servants, the "apparatus" was organized into five divisions: the Department of Work with the Commissions, the channel through which the Assembly's president communicated with the working commissions and vice versa; the Department of Work with the Local Organs of People's Power, the liaison between the national and local assemblies; the Administrative Department, which held a tight check on the expenses of the National Assembly; the Department of International Relations; and the Department of Judicial Affairs, which prepared arguments concerning the constitutionality of laws.

Delegates to the National Assembly served on a part-time basis, retaining their regular employment while serving. The delegates were required to maintain frequent contact with local assemblies and individual citizens within their constituencies to explain state policies and periodically render accounts to them of the results of their activities. They were subject to recall at any time by the municipal assembly that elected them (see Local Government, this ch.).

Although the National Assembly was legally preeminent in the political system, it failed to exercise policymaking authority through 1984. Observers reported that the Assembly spent the bulk of its time ratifying actions that had been taken previously by the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Although the Assembly could initiate legislation, it seldom did, preferring to respond to initiatives from the government. It did not routinely approve all the legislation presented to it, however. Debate was vigorous, ministers were often questioned closely on the performance of their ministries, and on occasion bills were withdrawn following objections by the Assembly. Analysts noted that there was a marked political stratification in the Assembly, those members who also held important government and party positions participating actively in debates and those from local areas tending to react to the views of the elite. Professor Jorge I. Domínguez of Harvard University reported that the National Assembly had "little discernible impact on foreign policy, military policy, or economic planning and budgeting." These areas remained the prerogative of elites in the Council of State, the Political Bureau of the PCC, and the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Other issues were debated in depth, however, provided that the delegates involved had either appropriate organizational rank or recognized expertise. Those who had neither ordinarily played minor roles in the Assembly.

Council of State

The Council of State consisted of 31 members elected by the National Assembly; its president was the head of state and head of government. When that body was not in session, the Council of State exercised almost all of the powers of the National Assembly through decree-laws, which were valid unless rescinded by the Assembly. Moreover, the council exercised the Assembly's power to nullify actions of the organs of national and local government that were deemed contrary to existing laws, and it could replace members of the Council of Ministers. The Council of State could also declare war if the National Assembly "cannot be called to session with the necessary security and urgency." The Assembly's power to amend the constitution did not, however, devolve on the Council of State, nor was the council constitutionally empowered to replace supreme court judges or the attorneys general.

Through 1984 the Council of State was the major decision-making body of the government. Since 1979, decree-laws issued by

the council have been equal in standing and judicial validity with the laws approved by the Assembly, thus making the council coequal with the Assembly in making policy. The fact that the Assembly met only four days per year while the council met frequently, together with the council's power to call the Assembly into session, however, made the council the predominant institution. For example, on January 10, 1980, only a few weeks after the National Assembly had adjourned, the Council of State decreed a major overhaul of the central administrative agencies. Analysts noted that this sweeping reorganization had probably been discussed in the Council of State for some time and could have been introduced into the National Assembly debates of December 1979. The fact that it was not indicated that the Council of State, rather than the National Assembly itself, determined the agenda of the Assembly.

The president of the Council of State, who under the Constitution is also the president of the Council of Ministers, is the chief of state. The major powers of this position derived from the Council of State and not from the Council of Ministers. Thus, in the event of absence, illness, or death of the president, the first vice president of the Council of State—not the first vice president of the Council of Ministers—assumes the president's duties, although this had not occurred through 1984. Analysts noted that Castro, the president of the Council of State, by virtue of his joint authority as head of both bodies, has more constitutional power than any other leader of a socialist state.

The membership of the Council of State in 1984 was elected by the National Assembly and consisted of individuals who were also members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCC. The electoral system did not require that the members of the Council of State also be members of the National Assembly, although most were.

Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers (the government of the republic) was the highest-ranking executive and administrative organ. The Constitution empowers it to issue administrative regulations to implement the laws and to conduct foreign policy. It submits a draft state budget and other bills for consideration by the Council of State and the National Assembly. It is also responsible for "organizing and conducting the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social, and defense activities of the state as outlined by the National Assembly." In carrying out these responsibilities, the Council of

Ministers oversees the functioning of the various ministries, state committees and institutes, and the administrative agencies of the Organs of People's Power (as the municipal, provincial, and national assemblies were collectively known) at all levels.

Sessions of the council required the attendance of more than one-half of its members for a quorum, and decisionmaking was by majority vote. Its members were elected by the National Assembly and could be removed by the president of the Council of State if the Assembly was not in session. In 1984 there was no legal provision for the removal of the entire council by a vote of the National Assembly. The practice was for the Assembly simply to approve the composition of the Council of Ministers at the beginning of its five-year term. Castro, as president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, retained the right to create new ministries.

The central administration under the Council of Ministers consisted of ministries, state committees, and national institutes (see fig. 6). Ministries dealt with the armed forces, internal security, services, and various economic sectors and were responsible for the direction and management of the state's activities in their respective areas. State committees dealt with broader problems involving more than one economic sector and were responsible for coordinating the state's activities across sectors. National institutes were defined as agencies of the central administration, but their presidents were not normally members of the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Central Planning Board and the Academy of Sciences were also considered part of the central administration.

The Council of Ministers was responsible to the National Assembly and the Council of State for its actions in carrying out the policies of those bodies. Real decisionmaking authority, however, resided not in the Council of Ministers as a whole but in its Executive Committee. The Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers consisted of 14 members who were responsible for the activities of ministries and state committees grouped according to function. Thus, ministers who were not members of the Executive Committee answered to the member of the Executive Committee responsible for their area. The Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers was thus the highest decisionmaking organ of the state administration.

In early 1985 Castro was clearly the most powerful member of the Executive Committee. Significantly, his responsibilities within the Executive Committee included the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—MINFAR) and the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio de Interior—MININT), despite the fact that the ministers responsible

for these ministries, Raúl Castro Ruz and Ramiro Valdes Menendez, respectively, were also members of the Executive Committee. Both of these ministries represented potential power bases—the armed forces and the internal security apparatus—from which threats to Castro's position could emerge. The only other member of the Executive Committee who was not the minister or president of at least one of the ministries or state committees for which he was responsible was Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who was responsible for a cluster of ministries dealing with foreign relations and fiscal policies (see National-level Politics, this ch.).

Judicial System

The judiciary was organized into three tiers corresponding to the administrative divisions of the country. At the apex of the system was the People's Supreme Court, which consisted of a president, a vice president, and the members of the court's five chambers: criminal, civil and administrative, labor, crimes against state security, and military. Each chamber consisted of a president, two other professional judges, and two lay judges. When the court sat in plenary session, it was joined by the attorney general *(fiscal general)*, a full voting member of the plenum, and by the minister of justice, who participated in the deliberations of the court but did not have a vote. In addition, the president of the Supreme Court, its vice president, secretary, the presidents of the five chambers, the attorney general, and the minister of justice formed the Governing Council of the People's Supreme Court. The Governing Council ensured uniform interpretation of the law by issuing binding instructions to the lower courts and served as a liaison between the Supreme Court and the Council of Ministers.

Justices of the Supreme Court were elected by the National Assembly. Its president and vice president were nominated by the president of the Council of State and were ratified by the Assembly. The 26 professional judges served two-and-one-half-year terms but could be recalled by the Assembly. The 126 lay judges served for two months per year over the two-and-one-half-year term of the court and retained their regular employment while serving on the court. They served as judges only in cases in which the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction, i.e., they did not participate in the appeals process. In criminal cases they voted on the issue of guilt or innocence but not on the sentence.

The Supreme Court served as the court of final appeal and had original jurisdiction over high state officials and crimes against



Figure 6. Central Administration, 1985.

state security. Its decisions were subject to reversal by the Council of State, however, which could issue binding instructions on the interpretation of law to the judiciary. The 1976 Constitution does not specify the circumstances under which this power of the council can be used.

Directly below the Supreme Court were 14 people's provincial courts corresponding to the country's 14 provinces. Justices of the provincial courts were elected by their respective provincial assemblies after nomination by the Ministry of Justice. They also served two-and-one-half-year terms. The provincial courts were organized into the same five chambers as the Supreme Court; each also had a plenum organized in the same way as the Supreme Court except that the provincial attorney general did not vote. Chambers of the provincial courts consisted of one professional and two lay judges who participated in the same manner as in the Supreme Court. Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the lay judges could outvote the professional on the question of guilt or innocence. Provincial courts had original jurisdiction over offenses defined as "serious" and appellate jurisdiction over other matters.

Below the provincial courts were the 169 municipal courts corresponding to the country's 169 *municipios*. Judges of the municipal courts were elected by their respective municipal assembly after nomination by the Ministry of Justice. Municipal courts were not organized into formal chambers but could be divided into specialized sessions if circumstances warranted it. As in the provincial courts, lay judges outnumbered the professional judges and could only vote on the question of guilt or innocence. Municipal courts were usually the tribunals of first instance; they had no jurisdiction over crimes against state security, however.

At the local level there was also a system of labor courts established in every workplace having more than 25 workers. In workplaces of fewer than 25 employees the workers elected a delegate to the nearest labor court. Members of the courts were elected by workers' assemblies organized in workplaces and served three-year terms but could be recalled at any time (see Confederation of Cuban Workers, this ch.). Labor courts adjudicated disputes between management and individual workers, and their decisions had to be ratified by the workers' assembly. If a labor court decided against management, that decision was sent for action to the municipal assembly, to which management was responsible.

The judicial system was assisted in its operations by the office of the attorney general, which was organized vertically, its municipal and provincial officers subordinate to the national office. Local officers were chosen by the attorney general, who was elected by

the National Assembly on the recommendation of the president of the Council of State. Its constitutional mandate was to "control socialist legality by seeing to it that the law and other provisions are obeyed by state agencies, economic and social institutions, and citizens." The office typically used informal persuasion to correct illegal activity but could bring criminal action against offending organizations and individuals. It also indicted and prosecuted in all cases of criminal actions and intervened as the representative of the public interest in civil, administrative, and other proceedings. It had no independent means of enforcing its decisions, however, relying on the officials within the offending organization and the assemblies for enforcement.

The judicial system was not an independent branch of government. All judges in the system were accountable to their respective assemblies of people's power. Judges were required to submit an annual account of their own work to the assembly that elected them and could be recalled at any time. In addition, the judiciary did not have the power of judicial review; the interpretation of the Constitution was the prerogative of the National Assembly. In practice, the Council of State exercised judicial review and communicated its decision on judicial matters to the Governing Council of the Supreme Court.

Local Government

As a result of actions taken at the First Congress of the PCC in 1975, the country was divided into 14 provinces, replacing the previous six-province structure that had been in existence since 1878. This change also created regions within each province and *municipios* within the regions. Each *municipio* was further divided into no fewer than 30 and no more than 200 circumscriptions, or electoral districts. The regions were later eliminated, but the other local divisions were retained through 1984. Cuba did not have a federal system; the local divisions were subordinate in all matters to the National Assembly. According to the 1976 Constitution, the country is divided into subunits for "politico-administrative purposes." The National Assembly retained the right to change their number, boundaries, and names at any time. In 1984 there were 169 *municipios*, which were responsible to provinces, except the Municipio of the Isle of Youth, which was directly responsible to the central government.

Each province and *municipio* was governed by a local Assembly of People's Power. The 10,743 delegates to the municipal as-

semblies nationwide were elected directly by the citizens of each *municipio.* They in turn elected the delegates to the provincial assemblies—one delegate for every 10,000 citizens and an additional delegate for any fraction greater than 5,000. Delegates to both assemblies served two-and-one-half-year terms unless recalled by the jurisdiction that elected them. Delegates retained their regular employment, for assemblies were only part-time positions.

Both the provincial and the municipal assemblies were the highest state authorities in their jurisdictions and combined both legislative and executive functions. They established commissions responsible for the supervision and control of the productive and service units directly responsible to the *municipio* or province and appointed and recalled judges in provincial and municipal courts. In all, the assemblies spent approximately 20 percent of the state budget, though they lacked independent revenue-raising capabilities. In most matters municipal assemblies were subordinate to their respective provincial assemblies. The exceptions were in electing and recalling delegates to the National Assembly.

Many of the state administration's activities were decentralized as a result of the creation of the Organs of People's Power in 1976. The activities of the Ministry of Education, the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Justice were decentralized. Their activities within the boundaries of a *municipio* fell under the jurisdiction of the local Municipal Assembly; those involving more than one *municipio* fell under the jurisdiction of the appropriate Provincial Assembly. Decentralized units of the state administration had dual accountability; they were responsible both to their superiors within their agency and to the local assembly. In practice, the units of local government sought to ensure that the local administrative units were carrying out the directives of the central government. They also processed citizens' complaints concerning government service.

The most important mechanism for maintaining contact with constituencies was the Assembly for Rendering Accounts. During these public meetings, held in each *municipio* every four months, delegates reported on their activities and those of the assembly and solicited constituents complaints and suggestions that were recorded, submitted to a vote, and presented to the municipal or provincial assembly. At the next public meeting delegates reported back to their constituents on the action taken regarding all issues raised at the previous meeting. Delegates whose performance was unsatisfactory were subject to recall. Observers reported that the right to

recall was exercised fairly frequently. One hundred eight of the 10,725 members of municipal assemblies were recalled between 1976 and 1979, failure to stay in contact with electors being the most frequent grounds for recall, according to Blas Roca. In the 1979 elections 50 percent of municipal delegates were not reelected.

Between sessions of the local assemblies, their functions were performed by executive committees elected from their membership. These local executive committees were accountable both to their assembly and to the executive committee at the next administrative level. Although there were no legal requirements regarding who could be elected to serve on the executive committees, the local organ of the PCC had the right to approve their membership.

Elections

Cuba had three kinds of elections: general elections held every five years to select the deputies of the National Assembly and all the delegates of the provincial and municipal assemblies; partial elections held every two and one-half years to renew the mandate of the delegates; and special elections to cover vacancies occurring during interelectoral periods. The same procedures were followed in all three kinds of elections. Citizens over 16 years of age, including military personnel, were eligible to vote, except those who suffered from mental illness, had committed a crime, or had asked for permission to emigrate. Voting was not mandatory. All eligible voters were also eligible for all public offices (although delegates to the National Assembly had to be 18 years of age).

Elections at the municipal level were direct. *Municipios* were divided into electoral districts, each of which sent one delegate to the municipal assemblies. Electoral districts were further subdivided into neighborhoods, each of which ran one candidate for the delegate seat of its electoral district. Mass meetings of all eligible voters, chaired by a local resident selected at a previous neighborhood meeting, were held in each neighborhood for the purpose of nominating that neighborhood's candidate. Nominations were made from the floor, and any number of people could be nominated as long as there were at least two candidates. Nominees did not have to be residents of the neighborhood or even of the electoral district, and self-nomination was prohibited. Voting was by show of hands. The nominee receiving a simple majority became that neighborhood's candidate for delegate to the Municipal Assembly from that election district.

Biographies and photographs of the nominees were circulated throughout the election district for one month preceding the election. No other form of campaigning was permitted. Elections took place by secret ballot in enclosed voting booths. The winner was determined by a simple majority or, if necessary, by run-off elections.

Participation in elections was high. The first general election took place in 1976, when some 30,000 candidates contested 10,725 municipal assembly seats. Voter turnout was reported to have been 95.2 percent. In the 1979 general election 24,361 candidates contested 10,656 seats. Voter turnout was reported to have been 96.9 percent. In 1981 a reported 6,097,639 citizens (97 percent of the eligible voters) elected 10,735 delegates (out of 22,726 nominees) to the municipal assemblies.

Analysts commented that elections did not serve as vehicles for the proposal of policy alternatives or the participation of an organized opposition. The prohibition on campaigning and the effective control of the nominating process for higher office by the PCC and the mass organizations ensured that only those thought to be politically trustworthy were elected. However, citizens did have a substantial voice in naming their local government officials.

The Communist Party of Cuba

History

The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Communista de Cuba—PCC) did not play a leading role in the seizure of power by Castro and his followers. In fact, the party opposed Castro until the last few months before Batista fled the island in the early hours of January 1, 1959 (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista, ch. 1).

The PCC was first organized in Havana in 1925 by Julio Antonio Mella and 10 other university students. In its early years the party adhered closely to the directives of the Communist International (also known as the Comintern or Third International), which was organized and led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. An underground party through the 1920s, it was staunchly antireformist and antiterrorist and condemned any revolutionary movements that were not aligned with it, opposing the 1933 revolution as "reformist" and also opposing the coup that ended it (see The Machado Dictatorship, ch. 1).

Pioneers, Havana
Photo by Phillips Bourns

In 1937, following the "popular front" strategy announced at the Comintern's Seventh Congress in 1935, the party supported Batista as constitutional president. In exchange for their support, Batista legalized the communists' front party, the Revolutionary Union Party (Partido Unión Revolucionario—PUR), in 1937 and gave it control of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba (Confeder-

ación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC). In 1939 the PCC and the PUR merged to form the Communist Revolutionary Union (Unión Revolucionaria Communista—URC), which ran in coalition with Batista in the 1940 elections, after which two of its leaders, Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, served as ministers without portfolio in Batista's government (see The Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

In 1944 the party's name was changed to the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP) in an effort to broaden its popular base. In the 1944 elections it supported Batista's candidate, Carlos Saladrigas, but switched its support to the winner, Ramón Grau San Martín, which allowed it to retain control of the CTC. The PSP ran on its own in the 1948 elections but received only 7 percent of the vote. Under the administration of Carlos Prío Socorrás (1948–52), the party lost control of the CTC to the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano, commonly known as the Auténticos) and assumed a passive role in domestic affairs.

After his 1952 coup Batista declared the PSP illegal. Most of its leadership was either imprisoned or went into exile, but the party continued to function clandestinely. In the fraudulent 1954 elections the PSP exhorted its members to support Grau and the Auténticos. The PSP condemned Castro's attack on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, as "adventurist" and "putschist." Only in the summer of 1958, when Castro's victory seemed imminent, did the PSP send Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to the Sierra Maestra to make contact with him (see Batista's Dictatorship, ch. 1).

After the fall of Batista in January 1959, the PSP openly supported the new regime. Until the latter part of 1961 it provided key support for the revolutionary government, along with the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio—M–26–7) and the Revolutionary Student Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario—DER). M–26–7 was founded by Castro in July 1955 following his release from prison. The program of M–26–7 was avowedly reformist, ostensibly seeking a return to the constitution of 1940 and the implementation of social reforms. M–26–7 represented those who fought the guerrilla war against Batista and thus was widely supported after 1959. The DER was formed independently of M–26–7 in December 1956, drawing mostly on members of the Federation of University Students (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria—FEU) for its support. Strongly influenced by Roman Catholicism, it articulated democratic and middle-class values and was explicitly anticommunist. Its revolutionary credentials were based on the attack it launched on the presidential palace on March 13,

1957, its resistance to Batista in urban areas, and its having sent a group to fight in the Sierra de Escambray of central Cuba in January 1958 (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista, ch. 1).

In July 1961 the PSP, M-26-7, and the DER were merged to form the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—ORI). The purpose of the ORI was to coordinate the activities of the mass organizations of students, women, workers, and neighborhood committees that were being formed and also to provide a means to bring the PSP into open participation in the government. The government conceived of the ORI as a vehicle for the creation of a mass party and placed Aníbal Escalante of the PSP in charge of organizing that effort. In 1962, after having staffed most of the important positions within the ORI with PSP stalwarts, Escalante was removed from his post at the instigation of Castro, who realized that he was using the ORI as a means of elevating members of the old PSP above members of Castro's M-26-7. Escalante went into exile in Eastern Europe, and the ORI was subsequently dismantled (see Toward a Soviet Model, 1961-62, ch. 1).

Later in 1962 Castro announced the formation of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista—PURS). Cadres personally selected by Castro were sent to work centers throughout the country to recruit membership. Unlike the ORI, the PURS had no discernible influence on government policy. In mid-1963 it concentrated on stimulating productivity and mobilizing work brigades. With the completion of the mass membership drive in October 1965, Castro announced the formation of the new PCC with 50,000 members and candidate members. The 100 members of the Central Committee were selected by Castro personally, as were the eight members of the Political Bureau and the six members of the Secretariat. There were only 15 members of the old PSP on the Central Committee (see National-level Politics, this ch.).

The First Congress of the PCC, attended by 3,116 delegates, was held in December 1975. The Political Bureau was enlarged to include three former PSP leaders (Arnaldo Milian, Blas Roca, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez), a symbolic move that formalized the restoration of the old communists of the PSP into revolutionary legitimacy. The First Congress approved the draft of the 1976 Constitution, the first five-year economic plan, a new system of economic management, the division of the country into 14 provinces, and a temporary party platform. The Second Congress was held in December 1980 and approved the definitive party program outlining objectives and strategies for the "construction of socialism" in

Cuba and the second five-year economic plan. The platform described the PCC's basic goal as guiding the "construction of socialism" and progress toward a communist society. In contrast to its claim in 1968 that Cuba was embarking on the simultaneous construction of socialism and communism, the PCC platform accepted the thesis of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that a four-stage process in the development of communism was necessary: the transition to, and building of, socialism; socialism; constructing communism; and communism. The PCC platform also emphasized that Cuba was still in the first stage of the process. Although its relations with other organizations have been severely strained at times, in 1985 it was the dominant institution in the political system.

Organization

The highest authority of the PCC was the party congress, which met once every five years to decide "on all of the most important matters of policy, organization and activity of the Party in general." Delegates to the party congress were elected by local party organizations throughout the country.

The party congress elected the members of the Central Committee, which, according to party statutes, was the highest body of the PCC when the party congress was not in session. It was required to meet at least once a year and had the important function of determining the rules by which delegates to the party congress were selected. Until 1980 the Central Committee seldom met and tended to ratify unanimously decisions taken previously by the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. After 1980, however, the Central Committee met every six months and became more of a deliberative body. Reportedly the primary duty of the Central Committee was to act as the principal forum through which the top party leadership established and disseminated PCC policy to the second-level leadership, who, in turn, directed the subnational party apparatus and other political institutions, thus strengthening intra-elite communication and coordination.

Internally, the Central Committee was divided into 22 functionally defined departments charged with monitoring and guiding government activities in those areas (see fig. 7). The Central Committee's membership—145 members and 76 alternates in 1984—was broadly representative, although those occupying principal posts in the PCC bureaucracy or the Union of Young Communists (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC) and those on active duty in

the military were predominant. In 1980 the primary occupations of its members and alternates were politics (21.3 percent); state bureaucracy (17.3 percent); military (27.1 percent); foreign relations (6.2 percent); mass organizations (15.6 percent); education, science, and culture (5.8 percent); and other (6.7 percent).

The highest organ of the PCC when the Central Committee was not in session was the Political Bureau, which consisted of 14 members and 10 alternates in 1985. Professor Juan del Aguila of Emory University in Atlanta described its members as "the elite of the elite" within the political system. The position of alternate was created in 1980 to provide representation within the top party elite for various organizations. Full members of the Political Bureau were generalists occupying positions in both the PCC and the government, and most were also members of the Council of Ministers. The alternates, in contrast, were organizational specialists, none of whom were members of the Council of Ministers in 1980, although five were members of the Council of State.

A third top organ of the PCC was the Secretariat, consisting of 10 members in early 1985 who were nominated by the Political Bureau and elected by the Central Committee. Information concerning its activities was scarce and was seldom disclosed by the government or the Party. However, del Aguila, extrapolating from the activities of commmunist party secretariats in other countries, suggested that the Secretariat was responsible for personnel matters at all levels and that it might have enforcement capabilities, both for disciplining members and for policy guidance. The departments of the Central Committee were divided among its members.

Below these national organs there were 14 provincial committees and 169 municipal committees of the PCC, each headed by an executive committee and each having a secretariat. Acting as the major transmission belt of information, they conveyed policy directives from the top leadership down to the rank and file while keeping the leaders informed of the situation on the ground. They were also responsible for organizing and directing the activities of subordinate party organizations, as well as monitoring the performance of the local assemblies of people's power and the local activities of the decentralized ministries. Performance was an important criterion for promotion at the local level. Five of the 14 provincial first secretaries (who chaired the executive committees of the provincial party committees) were replaced between 1975 and 1980, having been held responsible either for poor political performance or for the low performance of economic units in their provinces.

The base PCC unit was the party cell consisting of eight to 10 members organized at work centers and educational institutions.



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba: A Reference Aid,* Washington, June 1984, 7–18.

Figure 7. Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba, 1985.

The functions of the cells were divided into two categories: membership services and economic oversight. The cells were the principal point of contact with individuals and were primarily responsible for the recruitment of new members and the continuous ideological guidance of both members and nonmembers. Implementing the principle of democratic centralism, they ensured compliance with party directives and disciplined violators. The cells also performed economic oversight functions at the factory level, monitoring the performance of managers and stimulating production by encouraging workers to exceed work norms.

Membership

As a vanguard party the PCC, together with its affiliates, restricted its membership to a small minority of the population. In 1969 it had only 55,000 members, or about 0.7 percent of the population. The next smallest ruling communist party at that time, in Albania, included 3 percent of the population. In 1976, after a decade of rapid expansion, PCC membership had risen to over 200,000 members, or about 2.2 percent of the population. By 1980 the Party claimed 434,143 members, including candidates, or about 4.4 percent of the population.

The PCC cells recruited candidate members who underwent a six-month period of scrutiny during which their ideological commitment, loyalty, and intellectual development were tested. In 1981 it was reported that the legal requirement that all Party members "must have at least eight years of school to improve their professional and cultural level" was still the PCC's "basic goal," thus indicating that problems of competency continued to plague the Party. Full membership in the Party required acceptance by two-thirds of members of a cell and the approval of the secretariat at the next highest level of the PCC.

The most common route for eventual Party membership was through the PCC's youth organizations. The Organization of José Martí Pioneers (Organización de Pioneros José Martí—OPJM) admitted children from ages five to 14. Reportedly modeled on the Boy Scouts of America, it was formed in 1961 to provide recreation and education for children and to teach them the norms of socialism. Originally, membership was selective, but after 1966 it operated as a mass organization, seeking to enroll as many members as possible. In 1983 *Granma*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the PCC, reported that some 4 million children had passed through the ranks of the UPC.

The PCC also operated the UJC as a training ground for prospective Party members aged 14 to 27, after which they became eligible for PCC membership. Its primary activities were social work, instruction in ideology, volunteer labor, military training, scientific and cultural activities, and participation in Party activities. A more restrictive organization than the OPJM, the UJC's membership was reported to be only 422,000 in June 1982. Former members of the UJC were not, however, guaranteed acceptance into the PCC. Between 1972 and 1976, for example, some 33 percent of all applicants from the UJC were rejected as lacking the qualifications for membership.

A second method of recruitment into the Party, selection as an "exemplary worker" by a workers' assembly, was less common. Military officers on active duty tended to be overrepresented in Party membership statistics because of the initial emphasis on the security organizations as the core of the Party. From the early 1970s, however, the Party broadened its base to include all sectors of the society. In 1979 some 44.6 percent of members were workers in material production and services, 26.2 percent were administrative leaders, 13.5 percent were small farmers, and 9.6 percent were administrative, professional, and technical workers. According to figures disclosed by Castro in 1981 some 47 percent of members were workers, and 17.5 percent were women. The government did not release figures concerning the race of Party members. The membership of the Central Committee was less representative of the population or the Party membership as a whole. A majority were high-level government and military officials. Seven members of the Central Committee in 1980 were workers who had been selected as "exemplary"; women accounted for 12.2 percent of the full members of the 1980 Central Committee and for 14.3 percent of its alternates.

Role in Government

The Constitution of 1976 describes the PCC as the "organized Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working class' and as "the highest leading force of the society and the state." The PCC, however, was conceived as an institution that was separate from the state, defined as "the institutional expression of the people." The Party's role, in other words, was to determine the direction in which the society was to move while the state provided the mechanism for moving it in that direction. However, according to Castro, the PCC was not to seek to impose its will on the state. Rather, it was to

guide the state through persuasion and example. The potential conflict between the Party and the state was obviated by the overlap of the Party and the state leaderships at the highest levels: in 1984, all the members of the Council of State were also members of the Central Committee of the PCC.

Critical decisions on national policy, such as the decision to dispatch combat troops to Ethiopia in 1978, were thought to be made by the PCC's Political Bureau. Less urgent but no less important decisions, such as the national economic plan and the state budget, were reviewed by the Political Bureau and then approved by the Central Committee before being taken up by the National Assembly. More routine proposals were reviewed by the Political Bureau, then forwarded directly to the National Assembly for action.

The Party also played a major role in leadership selection at the provincial and municipal levels. Although the members of the provincial and municipal assemblies were popularly elected, their executive committees were selected from a list prepared by a commission presided over by a representative of the Party's local organ and consisting of representatives of the local leadership of the UJC, the CTC, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs), and the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC).

The local organs of the PCC were also charged with ensuring that the local Organs of People's Power functioned effectively, particularly with respect to the provisions regarding the accountability and recall of delegates. However, PCC directives were binding only for Party members, not for non-Party people or for non-Party institutions such as the Organs of People's Power. According to Castro, the PCC could neither "hand down decisions" to state organs nor undertake "any manner of reprisals" against non-Party officials who disagreed with PCC recommendations. Such statements indicated that the Party has at times exceeded its authority in its relations with the Organs of People's Power, prompting Castro to rebuke its members.

Mass Organizations

Cuba had a variety of mass organizations that grouped people on the basis of common characteristics, such as age, occupation, and gender. The largest and most important mass organization in early 1985 were the CDRs, the FMC, the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—

ANAP), and the CTC. These four organizations constituted the most important mechanisms through which the majority of Cubans participated in politics. The mass organizations were specifically recognized in the Constitution as vehicles to "represent the specific interests" of their members and to "incorporate them in the tasks of the construction, consolidation and defense of the socialist society."

During the early years of the Revolution, before the PCC had been organized, the mass organizations performed many of the functions of a party. Through their efforts members were socialized into the norms of the emerging political system, and cultural changes were instituted. They symbolized the revolutionary struggle, rallying the entire population in support of the Revolution while also providing social services for their members. Although they lacked substantial decisionmaking authority, the mass organizations organized the labor force in an ambitious national development effort. By the late 1970s this lack of autonomy led to passivity and frustration among the leadership of the mass organizations, a problem that was partially rectified by the administrative decentralization that accompanied the creation of the Organs of People's Power in 1976.

In 1985 the mass organizations, guided by PCC officials, discussed local affairs, provided volunteer labor, and participated in officially organized mass demonstrations. Party and state officials at the local level were expected to maintain close contacts with the mass organizations in their jurisdictions, and the organizations in turn represented the interests of their members in discussions with delegates to the assemblies and with Party officials. Drafts of important legislation were discussed in the mass organizations at the local level; suggestions for changes were solicited and communicated to the Council of Ministers for use in drawing up the final text of the law. According to Castro, the mass discussions of draft legislation were typically attended by some 60 to 80 percent of the mass organizations' membership.

Mass organizations elected their own leadership autonomously, but their duty was the mobilization of the population in support of the Revolution. Thus, dissident behavior, either by individuals or by organizations, was proscribed. Participation in the activities of the mass organizations was seen as a measure of commitment to the Revolution. Although such participation was high, it was not entirely voluntary. Various social and economic benefits accrued to those having good records of activity in the mass organizations, and nonmembers lived on the margins of social life. A majority of emigrants in the Mariel exodus of 1980 were not members of a

mass organization. Based on interviews with refugees who left the island in 1980, analysts suggested that the marginals consisted overwhelmingly of younger people who had grown up under the Revolution and were dissatisfied with the lack of consumer goods and poor prospects for improvements in their standard of living. In one survey almost 40 percent of those refugees who reported that they had been in prison stated that they were imprisoned because of illegal economic activities (see The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization; Mechanisms for Social Mobility, ch. 2).

Committees for the Defense of the Revolution

The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs) were originally formed in September 1960, when the Revolution was under attack from both internal and external enemies. Organized in neighborhood committees, they were charged with maintaining internal "vigilance" (security), local government, public health, and organizational growth. In 1967 "vigilance" was dropped from the list of functions and was transferred to MINFAR and MININT. In September 1968, however, Castro indicated his extreme displeasure at the change, and shortly thereafter the national office of the CDRs restored "vigilance" as the organization's first duty. There was considerable resistance to this reorientation, and the direct intervention of Minister of the FAR Raúl Castro was required in October 1968 and January 1969 to ensure that the new policies were implemented.

In 1984 the neighborhood committees organized mass discussions of major legislation and organized community health campaigns, such as blood donations, immunization and sanitation drives, pollution control, prenatal care, and health education. They cooperated with teachers, students, parents, and municipal governments in maintaining the schools and organized cultural, sporting, and educational activities. Volunteer work projects were organized under the auspices of the CDRs, as were efforts to police the system for distributing goods and services at the neighborhood level and the transmission of complaints and suggestions to the municipal assemblies.

The activities of the CDRs also served a number of less tangible purposes. Unlike other organizations, there were no prerequisites for joining the CDRs other than support for the Revolution. As a result, they enabled a vast majority of the population to demonstrate their support for the Revolution by helping to provide es-

sential services to their communities. The organizations' goal was to eventually incorporate the entire population. In 1980 the CDRs had 5.4 million members (roughly 80 percent of the population) in 81,000 neighborhood committees. Through their participation, whether voluntary or coerced, members learned the attitudes and habits of self-sacrifice encouraged by the government. In keeping with their internal security function, the CDRs attempted to control deviant behavior or beliefs. Usually, informal mechanisms such as ostracism and public denunciation were used. However, formal reports to MININT's security forces on the activities of neighbors were not uncommon. In 1983 it was reported that the CDRs sent a daily average of 123 such reports.

Federation of Cuban Women

The Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC) was founded in 1960 to integrate women more fully into both the Revolution and the society in general. It provided one of the major supports for the Revolution by mobilizing women to provide voluntary labor for such activities as the literacy campaign of the early 1960s and the 1970 sugar harvest. The FMC provided a number of services for women, including vaccinations and Pap smears, day-care systems for the children of women who worked outside the home, vocational training, and rehabilitation programs for female prisoners.

As a political organization, the FMC sought to broaden the participation of women in all aspects of politics and society. It was not, however, an independent articulator of the demands of all women or of its membership (some 2.3 million in 1980). Rather, it supported those social policies that had an impact on women's lives, while seeking to influence the content of those policies through lobbying tactics and through increasing the weight of women in the decisionmaking process in general.

The FMC had a mixed record of achievement. It succeeded in inserting a plank in the PCC platform that supported the full equality of women and helped write the Family Code that made child rearing and the care of the home the equal responsibility of both men and women. The social impact of these legal strictures was limited, however (see The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization, ch. 2). It was less successful in expanding the number of women in political leadership positions. Women constituted only 6 percent of the national and provincial PCC leadership in 1982 and only 2 percent at the municipal level. Within the

Photo by John Finan

Meeting and headquarters of a local Committee for the Defense of the Revolution
Photo by Donna Rich

CDRs they composed 7 percent of national executive positions, 15 percent of provincial positions, and 24 percent of municipal positions.

Confederation of Cuban Workers

The Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC) was founded in 1938 as an affiliate of the PSP and quickly absorbed the preexisting unions into its ranks. During the early 1940s the PSP and the Auténticos completed for dominance within the CTC, culminating in a split in the organization in 1947. During the presidency of Carlos Prío Socorrás (1948–52) the government favored the Auténticos within the CTC, and the PSP lost influence with the leadership but retained a substantial following among the rank and file. Under Batista the CTC supported the government, in part because the bulk of its membership benefited from the regime and in part because of corruption in its national leadership. It did not play a role in the guerrilla war, although there were sporadic strikes beginning in 1957.

In the early months of 1959 M–26–7 gained control of the CTC, winning elections in 29 of 33 federations. Through 1961 the government encouraged unionization, and the CTC expanded to include over 1 million members (some 60 percent of the labor force). That same year it became the only legal union, incorporating all other unions and functioning under the leadership of the ORI.

During the late 1960s the government de-emphasized the CTC, preferring to create the Advanced Workers Movement, a cadre organization of the most productive workers in each work center that had the sole function of stimulating production. Following the disastrous 1970 sugar harvest, however, the government decided to revitalize the CTC. Elections were held in all work centers, and the organization was rebuilt, culminating in the CTC's Thirteenth Congress in 1973.

The Thirteenth Congress approved a change in the role of the CTC in relation to the government and to management. The role of the union became to approve and help enforce quotas, known as "collective labor commitments," to meet and surpass labor standards, conserve raw materials and energy, contribute voluntary labor, and enforce labor discipline. In 1984 its stated objectives were to support the government, participate in vigilance and defense activities, help to improve managerial efficiency, maintain labor discipline, and raise workers' political consciousness. It was

organized into 18 national federations and incorporated some 97 percent of the labor force in 1978.

There were three kinds of workers' assemblies in each workplace. Production assemblies, encompassing a plant's entire work force, discussed production quotas, individual work norms, overtime, working hours, and voluntary labor mobilizations. The proposals of production assemblies were not binding on management, but rejections of such proposals had to be justified at the next production assembly. Production assemblies were held at least every two months, and observers reported 80 to 100 percent attendance. Management councils were made up of the plant administrator, the administrator's top assistants, elected representatives of the CTC local, representatives of the FMC, and representatives of the PCC. A management council did not have the power to overrule the plant manager, but all administrative matters had to be brought before it for discussion. Work councils (delegations of workers' representatives) handled all labor grievances, and their decisions were not subject to review by the plant management (see Labor, ch. 3).

However, there were problems in the functioning of production assemblies, which were supposed to discuss economic plans. According to Domínguez, 34 percent of all enterprises failed to discuss the 1979 economic plan of the central government with the workers; an additional 58 percent brought the 1979 plan before the workers but paid no attention to suggestions made. Only 8 percent of the enterprises compiled the suggestions of workers and modified the plan as a result. There were improvements in the discussion of the 1980 plan, 58.8 percent of enterprises holding meetings and modifying the plan in response to suggestions from the workers, but the remainder of the enterprises failed to carry out their responsibility to encourage participation.

National Association of Small Farmers

The National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—ANAP) was founded in 1961 to represent the owners of small, private farms and peasants incorporated into cooperatives. ANAP operated as a liaison between its members and state agencies that were charged with agricultural planning, dispensing agricultural credits, technical assistance, seeds, fertilizer, and other agricultural supplies.

Throughout its history ANAP sought to lessen government controls over the economic activities of its members. Early in

1980, in response to the economic crisis, the government legalized the "free peasant market." After commitments to state agencies had been met, all those who raised crops could sell any remaining surplus in the free peasant market at any price that the market would bear. Although ANAP had pressed for this reform for many years, it was generally agreed that it had more to do with food shortages than with ANAP's political influence.

The bulk of ANAP members (some 193,000 in 1983) were independent farmers. In 1982 only about 35 percent of privately held land was owned by cooperatives. Under an agreement reached with the government in 1977, ANAP urged peasants to join cooperatives, but it met with considerable resistance. Although the number of cooperative members increased to some 38,000 by the end of 1981, the 1981–85 economic plan was blunt in criticizing the slow growth in their numbers, citing a lack of "an effective economic, ideological effort to bring this task to the level that is required,"

Mass Media

The mass media were essential channels for mass mobilization and control, as well as the management of local political conflict. Their primary function was the transmission, explanation, and interpretation of the actions of the government to the population. Lengthy verbatim transcripts of Castro's speeches were the common fare, along with government decrees and PCC policy papers. The media not only explained government policy but also justified it, giving considerable attention to social problems and the "success" of the government in dealing with them.

The mass media also played an important role in education. They were the primary instruments for the ideological education of Party workers and disseminated information about technological innovations and managerial techniques by focusing on the experiences of selected workers in agricultural and industrial enterprises. Thus, the media served as both a popular press and a technical journal.

The media also provided the major vehicle for "self-criticism" of the Revolution, although difficulties were experienced in performing this function. Editors, government, and party leaders frequently mentioned the need for more self-criticism, a regular letters-to-the-editor column, and other forms of substantive citizen feedback. In an address to the Fourth Congress of the Union of Cuban Journalists in March 1980, Raúl Castro delivered a strongly

worded speech calling for more press criticism. The monotonous and generally obsequious nature of reporting was strongly criticized at the Second Congress of the PCC in December 1980. The quality of reporting did not improve appreciably through early 1985, however, although there were more frequent publications of citizens' complaints than previously, at least on occasion.

Formal government censorship was rare. Analysts commented that it was unnecessary, because a vast majority of journalists were ideologically aligned with the goals of the government. In 1982 it was estimated that 71 percent of editors and other top media policymakers also held leadership positions in either the PCC or the government. In addition, some 40 percent of all journalists were members of the PCC or the UJC. Finally, all journalists were required to join the Union of Cuban Journalists, which established and enforced standards that governed the behavior of all its members.

The broadcast media were owned and operated by the government. All radio and television stations were administered by the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television, which was directly supervised by the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. In 1980 there were two national and 20 local television channels, as well as 40 radio stations. An estimated 78 percent of Cuban homes had a radio and 56 percent had a television.

The print media were not centrally administered. More than 100 newspapers, magazines, and specialized journals were published by most mass organizations and divisions of the Party or the government. The major newspapers were the daily *Granma*, published by the Central Committee of the PCC with a circulation of 600,000; the daily *Juventud Rebelde*, published by the UJC with a circulation of 200,000; and *Los Trabajadores*, published three times a week by the CTC with a circulation of 300,000. The major magazines were *Verde Olivo*, published by the FAR; *Mujeres*, published by the FMC; and *Bohemia*, a general interest, mass circulation magazine that did not represent any particular government division or social sector and that had a circulation of 300,000. There were also 10 provincial dailies published by provincial committees of the PCC, which had a combined circulation of approximately 122,000.

There were three major vehicles for the international dissemination of news about Cuba. Radio Havana broadcast internationally in eight languages on several shortwave frequencies for approximately 45 hours per week. The *Granma Weekly Review*, which published reprints from the Cuban press, was distributed to approximately 100,000 readers in Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French editions. Prensa Latina, Cuba's world news service, distrib-

uted an estimated 250 to 300 articles of news and analysis daily. It operated 37 offices throughout the world and had access to two satellite communications channels to Moscow.

The Politics of a Consultive Oligarchy

Even though its leadership employed the rhetoric of democracy and encouraged broad participation by citizens, Cuba had an authoritarian political system. Decisionmaking was highly centralized, the structure of political power was stratified and hierarchical, and the mass of the population lacked the means to remove the top and middle leadership of the Party, the state, or the Organs of People's Power. The PCC was the only legal political party, and all mass media were controlled by state and Party organs or by official organizations. Citizen participation, however, was high and was channeled through state-sponsored organizations whose primary function was to ensure the implementation of policies decided at the highest levels rather than to influence the content of those decisions. In setting policy, the tendency was for the top political elite to consult with middle-level leaders, many of whom represented the various constituent organizations of the state. Such consultation, however, carried with it no obligation to adhere to the opinions expressed. Generally, the consultation process produced improvements in policy with respect to details but no modification of the policy itself or changes in the political leadership. Domínguez thus characterized the political system as a "consultive oligarchy."

National-level Politics

Factional Politics

Through early 1985 the government did not publish information concerning policy disagreements and political alignments within the top leadership. Officially, all individuals were united in support of the government and its policies. Some observers, however, analyzed politics within the top leadership in terms of "factions" or tendencies based on prerevolutionary affiliations or based on logical inferences concerning the most likely tendencies of individuals given the organizational and governmental positions they held. Although not definitive, the political alignments within the leadership described by these observers, particularly by Edward



Fidel Castro Ruz
Courtesy Ministry of
Foreign Relations

Gonzalez of the Rand Corporation, were generally accepted among analysts.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the dominant pattern among the political elite was based on personalistic factions. Three factions were identified: *fidelistas*, those who had been under the personal command of Castro during the guerrilla war; *raulistas*, those who had been under the personal command of Raúl Castro during the guerrilla war; and "old communists," those who had been members of the PSP prior to 1959.

The *fidelistas* emphasized guerrilla radicalism throughout the 1960s and, even after the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as the formal ideology of the government, continued to derive their legitimacy from the legacy of the anti-Batista struggle. They emphasized moral over material incentives to raise labor productivity, claimed to be constructing socialism and communism simultaneously, and even claimed that Cuba would attain the stage of "true communism" before the Soviet Union. They also emphasized support for revolutionary movements in other countries, even when those movements were not supported by the communist parties of those

countries, and sought to maintain operational independence from the Soviet Union.

Closely aligned with the *fidelistas* were the *raulistas*, who were thought to be concentrated in the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior. They adopted a position somewhat closer to Soviet Marxist orthodoxy, believing that close relations with the Soviet Union were essential if the Revolution was to survive in the face of hostility from the United States, and were willing to make concessions in ideology and domestic policy in order to retain Soviet support.

The old communists, clearly of secondary importance during the 1960s, supported closer relations with the Soviet Union and looked to the Soviet experience as their basic guide in domestic policy. After the creation of the PCC in 1965, there were no old communists on the Political Bureau and only 22 on the 100-member Central Committee. Their relatively weak position was attributed to their failure to support the guerrilla insurgency until the very end of the war. Doubts concerning their loyalty increased after Escalante returned to Cuba from Eastern Europe and began assembling a network of PSP veterans who were critical of Cuban foreign policy (known as the "microfaction"). He was finally imprisoned in 1968.

During the 1960s Castro was the dominant actor, mobilizing personal support within the elite and keeping the population loyal to him personally through his charisma and his position as leader of the Revolution. Within the elite the relative power positions of individuals were determined by their closeness to Castro or, secondarily, to his brother Raúl; (see Cuba and the Soviet Union, this ch.; Radicalization of the System, 1963–66, ch. 1).

A realignment occurred within the elite after the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest and the subsequent "institutionalization of the Revolution." The system of government was depersonalized, and Castro played a less prominent role in day-to-day political management and policymaking, becoming more of an arbiter among competing tendencies within the elite. The old communists strengthened their position, attaining three seats on the expanded Political Bureau in 1975 and increasing their presence in other positions within the government and the PCC. This was partially offset by a transfer of nine senior-level *fidelista* and *raulista* officers from the MINFAR to positions in the expanded Secretariat of the PCC, in the newly created Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and at the top of several ministries (see Institutionalization and Return to the Soviet Model, 1970–76, ch. 1).

The process of creating stable political institutions, however, led to what analysts described as a more bureaucratic pattern of political alignments in the late 1970s. Five actors were identified: the FAR, the PCC bureaucracy, technocratic economists, the state bureaucracy, and low- and intermediate-level managers of work centers.

The FAR were thought to favor the professionalization of the military and the maintenance of close relations with the Soviet Union and were suspicious of attempts to improve relations with the United States. Some analysts equated their influence with the *raulistas*, noting that Raúl Castro was the minister of the FAR, first vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, second secretary of the PCC, and a member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat. Others, observing that Raúl Castro was subordinate to his brother in all these positions and that the balance between *fidelista* and *raulista* officers within the armed forces was stable, argued that the military's interests lay more in the enhancement of their role in society and foreign policy than in an increase in Raúl Castro's personal influence.

The PCC bureaucracy was thought to favor an increase in its institutional influence, largely at the expense of the armed forces. After the expansion of membership after 1975, the increased attention to the competence of Party cadres, and an emphasis on ideological instruction in Marxism-Leninism in Party schools, some observers suggested that the Party was developing its own institutional views concerning the proper management of the Revolution, despite the dominance of *fidelistas* and *raulistas* at its highest levels.

A technocratic tendency was identified with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. This grouping was composed of a new generation of planning and economic specialists to be found in agencies such as the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation and those concerned with state planning. It was thought to favor the adoption of Soviet planning methods, managerial controls, and labor incentives. Domestically, it emphasized economic production over societal transformation and the reduction of economic inequalities. In foreign policy it favored the resumption of political and economic relations with the states of the Western Hemisphere, including, it was thought, a restoration of economic and trade ties with the United States. It also favored the maintenance of close ties to the Soviet Union, especially the continuation of high levels of Soviet economic and technical assistance. The technocratic grouping was thought to be, numerically, perhaps the smallest of the five actors and to have no mass base of

support. Its primary support was thought to come from the Soviet Union (see Cuba and the Soviet Union, this ch.).

State bureaucrats were closely identified with Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado until his suicide in 1983. Dorticós had long been associated with the state bureaucracy in a number of different posts before and after 1959 and was at least partially responsible for the movement toward codifying administrative procedures as part of the institutionalization of the Revolution. State bureaucrats benefited from institutionalization by becoming more secure in their positions and by having their responsibilities and lines of authority clearly delineated. Consequently, they were thought to favor its continuation, as well as policies of economic rationality, broader ties with Latin America, and some form of rapprochement with the United States as a means of reducing dependence on the Soviet Union.

Finally, some analysts identified a common interest emerging among low- and intermediate-level managers of economic units. In 1982 managers began to meet to discuss management issues, and their views appeared to be represented by officials in charge of implementation within the planning and economic management system. Presumably, they favored enterprise autonomy and economic decentralization.

These two patterns of alignment within the top elite—personal and bureaucratic—appeared to have different effects within the political system. The divisions based on personal factions did not appear to determine political disputes or policy formation. Rather, they appeared to make a major impact on the overall stability of the system. After the intense interfactional rivalries of the 1960s, the top elite was broadened to include all three factions, thus unifying the elite. This elite unity was preserved through the 1970s; all factions were represented in policymaking, and it was thought that this representation, in time, would depoliticize the factions. Incumbency came to be based less on faction than on performance. The factional balance was preserved, however, most probably to prevent renewed politicization.

The bureaucratic pattern of political alignment appeared to have the greatest impact on day-to-day policymaking. Particularly between 1975 and 1979 there was a marked broadening of the top elite, the managerial and technocratic elites ascending to high positions, and a devolution of policymaking authority to middle-level officials in the ministries and the local Organs of People's Power. In this more open system, disagreements over policy were even more manifest than they had been in the past, and bureaucratic interests seemed to make the greatest impact on the policy posi-

tions of the elite. Castro played a balancing role in the system, accommodating the various policy interests as much as possible and at the same time keeping all of them loyal to him. Beginning in late 1979, however, there was a marked reconcentration of policymaking authority. Several of the prominent technocratic and managerial elites were displaced, and veteran *fidelistas* assumed greater control of the Council of Ministers. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the PCC named in 1980 had a far greater concentration of *fidelistas* and *raulistas* than previously.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces as a Political Force

Many analysts, noting the preeminent position of the veterans of the guerrilla war in the highest decisionmaking bodies of the Council of State, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Political Bureau of the PCC—as well as the large number of nondefense duties that the FAR performed since 1959 and the considerable proportion of the population incorporated into organizations performing security functions—considered the military the preeminent institution in the society and the political system. A study by Hugh S. Thomas, Georges A. Fauriol, and Juan Carlos Weiss conducted under the auspices of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded in 1984 that Cuba was a "garrison state" marked by a top leadership made up of military or former military personnel and an increasing militarization of society.

Other analysts, however, while agreeing that the political elite at the highest levels continued to consist primarily of veterans of the guerrilla war and that the FAR played a major nondefense role, argued that the situation was considerably more complex than it seemed if only these aspects of the system were considered. Political scientists William M. LeoGrande, Max Azicri, Archibald R. M. Ritter, and others argued that, particularly during the 1970s, the country experienced a process of demilitarization as the military surrendered many of its nondefense duties to civilians and new political institutions were created that integrated the populace into the political system.

The FAR was created in October 1959, and veterans of the guerrilla army—many of whom were also leaders of the new regime—were its core. In the face of United States hostility, attacks by exiles, and an anti-Castro guerrilla insurgency in the early 1960s, a strong military was essential, and the FAR became the primary institution of the Revolution. During this period virtually the entire population was mobilized to "defend the Revolution"

through the FAR, the militias, and the CDRs. The consequent militarization of the society was based on the image of the "heroic guerrilla fighter," who shifted between military and civilian duties as circumstances required.

Many guerrilla veterans pursued careers in the state bureaucracy and the mass organizations while retaining their military ranks. During this period of organizational fluidity, some alternated positions in the FAR and in the other organizations or served in more than one post simultaneously; others never returned to active duty with the FAR. Many of those who left the FAR, including many *fidelistas* and followers of Ernesto (Che) Guevara, staffed the state bureaucracy and the mass organizations. They, together with the old communists of the PSP, formed the nucleus of the ORI after its founding in July 1961.

The purge of Escalante and the old communists from the ORI and its subsequent dismantling left the political field dominated by the factions among the guerrilla veterans. Throughout the 1960s the intense ideological disputes among them, resulting in several reorganizations of the state apparatus, shifting economic policies, and a fairly high turnover in officials, decimated both these contending groups and their associated bureaucratic institutions. The FAR alone was shielded from these disputes and from Castro's direct personal intervention in its internal operations because of the unique influence of its commander, Raúl Castro, as well as the undeniable need to maintain the military's fighting capacity. Consequently, the FAR evolved into an institution with a stable and efficient command structure.

As the only organization left intact during this period, the FAR constituted the most efficient and stable available political base. This was reflected in the makeup of the PCC Central Committee in 1965. Forty-six of the 100 members of the Central Committee held posts in MINFAR or MININT. An additional 21 held military rank but had not held a military post since the guerrilla war. Thus, in the institutional political situation in 1965, the FAR was a minority, but it was an organized minority in the midst of a splintered civilian majority—including 15 old communists, 21 non-FAR guerrilla veterans and 18 non-veterans, which was riven by personal factions, varying ideological orientations, and different policy prescriptions.

Nevertheless, FAR influence declined, particularly during 1966, as Guevara became the most important member of the leadership after Castro, and the leadership concentrated on popular mobilization, expanded recruitment into the PCC, and experiments with moral incentives and worker participation in economic man-

agement. In 1967–68, however, the situation was reversed. Guevara left Cuba—and later died—in 1967, the same year that the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in 1970 began. Within a year it was clear that the civilian economic managers had failed in their mobilization drive, and the campaign fell into disarray. The decision was made to give the task to the FAR and, beginning in 1968, FAR officers were placed in command of sugar mills, troops were used to harvest sugar, and the FAR took over the construction of the required economic infrastructure. In all, some 70,000 FAR personnel were diverted to the 1970 harvest.

As the FAR expanded its role from defense to include economic management, the PCC was shattered by the purge of the Escalante microfaction in 1968. Castro relied on the support of the FAR and the non-FAR guerrilla veterans as he systematically purged the PCC bureaucracy of those suspected of disloyalty. In all, 43 persons were arrested, nine persons were expelled from the PCC and imprisoned, 26 others were imprisoned, and two members of the Central Committee resigned under pressure, including the national head of the CDRs.

The failure of the 1970 harvest to reach its goal of 10 million tons caused a major reevaluation of the institutional arrangements of the regime and within two years led to the beginnings of the campaign to institutionalize the Revolution. In the process a marked reallocation of functions between military officers and civilians began. Officers continued to predominate in MINFAR and MININT, but there was a considerable reduction in the number of them serving as officials in other ministries. The Joint Cuba-Soviet Governmental Commission was established in December 1970 to direct the expenditure of Soviet development assistance. The Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN), Cuba's central planning organization, was strengthened, and in July 1972 it joined the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—also known as Comecon). Beginning in 1976 JUCEPLAN and the Soviet Union's State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyy Planovyy Komitet—GOSPLAN) began joint planning. These moves strengthened the technical skills of civilian economic managers as a result of their association with their Soviet counterparts. Because the Soviet Union was now their external ally, their political influence was markedly enhanced as well.

In 1973 the FAR was reorganized under Soviet guidance, emphasizing military professionalism and downplaying their political or economic role. As a result, the use of military symbolism in the production process disappeared, the flow of military officers into civilian posts receded, the use of military methods of economic ad-

ministration was greatly reduced, and the use of regular troops as an agricultural labor reserve was halted. This process of military retraction continued through 1985. The size of the PCC Central Committee increased substantially, especially in 1980, while the total number of FAR representatives, both full and alternate members, remained stable; their proportional representation of the Central Committee declined steadily (see table A).

These data indicate a long-term trend of declining FAR representation on the policymaking bodies of the PCC as well as within the nonmilitary ministries. The decline was also reflected in the makeup of the Organs of People's Power, where officers constituted only seven of the 85 members of provincial assembly executive committees and only 31 of the 499 delegates to the National Assembly in 1984. The declining military share on the PCC Central Committee indicated to some, including LeoGrande, an increase in the weight of civilian PCC cadres, strengthened by the professionalization of the Party bureaucracy. He noted that even among the military representatives on the Central Committee there was a trend toward using FAR political officers, i.e., officers who served under the administrative command of MINFAR's Central Political Directorate, which was responsible for political indoctrination within the FAR. In 1979 there were five more political officers on the Central Committee than there had been in 1975 (see The Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Government, ch. 5).

By the late 1970s a new political situation had certainly developed in which the FAR was increasingly competing with civilians for state positions (thus reducing the opportunities for promotion among FAR officers) and with other interests in the political system over the allocation of resources to military or nonmilitary functions. During the administration of United States president Jimmy Carter, the perceived threat of external attack declined, leading the FAR to seek additional duties that would justify the continuation of its high percentage of the budget and its drafting of the brightest among the population for military service. It also sought to enhance its prestige in the society as a whole and its influence within the government. The deployment of troops to Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977, together with its favorable military performance in both countries, appeared to strengthen the FAR in internal policy debates. It did not, however, arrest its declining share of positions within the PCC and the nonmilitary ministries. The worsening of relations with the United States after the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 seemed to strengthen the FAR by raising concern within the Cuban leadership about the possibility of a United States invasion. By 1984 the apparent result

of this concern, however, was a reemphasis on popular mobilization, a reconcentration of decisionmaking authority, and a strengthening of non-FAR *fidelista* guerrilla veterans.

Political Opening and the Reconcentration of Power

In many respects the process of the "institutionalization of the Revolution" constituted a political opening. The top leadership was broadened to include new managerial and technical elites, bureaucratic organizations were rationalized and stabilized, administrative responsibilities were decentralized, the actions of the government were made subject to "socialist legality," and controls over economic activity were reduced. These trends were reversed, however, after 1979.

Beginning in 1976 the economy registered zero real growth of aggregate product per capita every year. Part of this poor performance was attributable to falling sugar prices in world markets and to several crop diseases that damaged tobacco and citrus production, but much of it was caused by inefficiency and low productivity. Despite official claims to the contrary, it was reported that in 1983 the country actually produced less than it had in 1982. The Soviet Union continued to make up the shortfall. In 1983 the delivery of Soviet goods increased by 19 percent over 1982, and trade with the Soviet Union alone amounted to 70 percent of the country's total trade. Beyond these problems, however, there were persistent reports of declines in the standard of living, shortages of food and housing and, for the first time since 1959, rising unemployment.

The effects of these economic problems were exacerbated in 1979 by a visit to the country by some 100,000 United States residents of Cuban descent. The visits were part of an effort by the government to woo the exile community and to bolster its hard currency reserves. But the visitors' gifts of consumer goods to their relatives and their descriptions of the higher standard of living they enjoyed in the United States created considerable social tensions on the island, leading to widespread discontent over the prolonged economic austerity.

Table A. Military Participation in Major Decisionmaking Bodies, Selected Years, 1965–84 [1]

	1965		1976		1979		1980		1982		1984	
PCC [2]												
Central Committee												
Full members	100		110		111		148		153		145	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR [3]	46	(46.0)	36	(32.7)	32	(28.8)	36	(24.3)	39	(25.5)	40	(27.6)
Alternate members	—		12		13		77		82		76	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	—		3	(25.0)	3	(23.1)	25	(32.5)	25	(30.1)	27	(35.5)
Total membership	100		122		124		225		235		221	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	46	(46.0)	39	(32.0)	35	(28.5)	61	(27.1)	64	(27.2)	67	(30.3)
Political Bureau												
Full members	8		13		13		17		17		15	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	5	(62.5)	2	(15.4)	3	(23.1)	2	(11.8)	2	(11.8)	2	(13.3)
Alternate members	—		—		—		12		12		11	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	—		—		—		2	(16.7)	3	(25.0)	3	(27.3)
Total membership	8		13		13		29		29		26	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	5	(62.5)	2	(15.4)	3	(23.1)	4	(13.8)	5	(17.2)	5	(19.2)
Secretariat												
Members	6		9		10		9		9		10	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	1	(16.7)	2	(22.2)	2	(20.0)	2	(22.2)	2	(22.2)	3	(30.0)
Provincial First Secretaries												
Members	6		14		14		14		14		14	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	0	(0.0)	1	(7.1)	1	(7.1)	2	(14.3)	2	(14.3)	2	(14.3)
Provincial Second Secretaries												
Members	—		n.a.		14		14		14		14	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	—		n.a.		0	(0.0)	1	(7.1)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
Provincial Committes [4]												
Members	n.a.		90		272		453		496		427	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	n.a.		5	(6.0)	10	(3.7)	19	(4.2)	19	(4.2)	17	(4.0)

Table A. Military Participation in Major Decisionmaking Bodies, Selected Years, 1965–84 [1] —Continued

	1965		1976		1979		1980		1982		1984	
STATE												
Council of State												
Members	—		31		31		29		31		31	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	—		5	(16.1)	5	(16.1)	4	(13.8)	4	(12.9)	4	(12.9)
Council of Ministers												
Members	18		34		34		34		31		32	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	4	(22.2)	2	(5.9)	3	(8.8)	3	(8.8)	4	(12.9)	5	(15.9)
Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers												
Members	—		9		10		9		13		15	
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR	—		2	(22.2)	2	(20.0)	2	(22.2)	2	(15.4)	3	(20.0)
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR—in ministries other than MINFAR and MININT (other than minister) [5]	n.a.		n.a.		6		14		17		24	

n.a.—not available.
—means position did not exist at time.
[1] Percentage of total in parenthesis.
[2] Partido Communista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba).
[3] FAR—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces).
[4] Figures for 1976 are estimates.
[5] MINFAR—Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces); MININT—Ministerio de Interior (Ministry of Interior).

In addition to feelings of deprivation, a number of other factors led to the development of an incipient opposition to the government's policies. There were reports of opposition to the continued presence of large numbers of troops in Africa, both among economic managers—who saw their most productive and skilled workers drafted into the military and who found themselves increasingly losing the political battle over scarce resources to the military budget—and among the general populace, whose sons went abroad to serve in the military. There were also reports of opposition to the draft among students. Finally, the incidence of economic crimes was reported to have increased as individuals sought to improve their standard of living through various kinds of "black market" activities. Although these opposition elements were thought to encompass a minority of the population, they were taken very seriously by the government.

The leadership responded to these problems in three ways: a shrinkage of the top elite; an administrative reorganization that reconcentrated decisionmaking authority at the highest levels, reversing the broadening trends of the mid-1970s; and a crackdown on internal opposition. The number of individuals in leadership positions dramatically diminished as a minority assumed multiple posts on both Party and state policymaking bodies. Thus, 11 of the 16 members of the Political Bureau of the PCC were also members of the Council of Ministers; 14 of the members of the Political Bureau also served on the Council of State, where they held a majority. In addition, eight of the 14 members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers were also members of the PCC's Political Bureau, and all 14 were also members of the PCC's Central Committee. All told, the reconcentrated elite in 1980 consisted of 22 people, the overwhelming majority of whom were either *fidelistas* or *raulistas*.

In December 1979 and January 1980 the largest single overhaul in the history of the state apparatus occurred. Ministries and state committees of construction, construction materials, the chemical industry, the electric power industry, mines and geology, and science and technology were abolished as independent agencies and were subordinated to other government structures. Ministers or state committee presidents for foreign trade, labor, transportation, agriculture, the sugar industry, education, light industry, the fishing industry, the iron and steel machinery industry, public health, justice and interior, as well as the attorney general, were replaced. Although some of those dismissed were named to other ministerial posts, most were dropped from the Council of Ministers. Many of the eliminated ministries were consolidated and placed under the

direct control of members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. A total of some 25 percent of all state bodies were eliminated, and some 100 officials were dismissed, appointed to other jobs, or given expanded duties. Significantly, this massive reorganization was ratified by the Council of State and was never submitted to the National Assembly. A similar organizational concentration occurred within the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the PCC.

Furthermore, there was a crackdown on internal dissidence that involved a shake-up of the leadership of agencies dealing with internal order, law, and the courts. In 1978 some 37 percent of criminal cases had been dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence or because the guilty party could not be determined. Beginning in 1979 the courts were criticized for their enforcement of procedural safeguards that set free people accused of crimes. In January 1980 the ministers of the interior and justice, the attorney general, and the president of the Supreme Court were all removed. The CDRs were mobilized to organize "assemblies of repudiation" at which members could express their reproof of neighbors who wished to leave the country, and the University of Havana was made the target of a campaign of "ideological deepening" under which a number of students and faculty were demoted, placed on probation, or dismissed for insufficient ideological zeal.

Much of this opposition was exported in the Mariel exodus of 1980. Between late April and September 1980, some 129,000 people left the island, the bulk of them going to the United States. This represented the third wave of emigration since 1959. The first, between 1960 and 1962, was unrepresentative of the population, composed primarily of white, urban, upper-middle-class and upper-class professional and managerial families. The second, which had begun late in 1965 and lasted into the early 1970s, was more representative, including many skilled industrial workers. The Mariel exodus was even more representative, including for the first time blacks as well as whites in proportions comparable to their numbers in urban Cuba. Analysts noted, however, that the bulk of the migrants came from urban areas. It was unclear whether this reflected a concentration of opposition within urban areas or whether it merely reflected the comparative ease of emigration for urban dwellers in comparison with their rural counterparts (see Cuba in the Late 1970s, ch. 1).

The leadership simultaneously moved to remobilize its support. Beginning in 1981 periodic "Marches of the Combative People" were organized by the CDRs, participants numbering in the millions. The mass organizations exhorted their membership to

demonstrate their support of the Revolution by working harder to accomplish its goals and by increasing their vigilance over suspected "counterrevolutionaries." Reports to the police on the activities of citizens by the CDRs were reported to have increased to some 180,000 between 1977 and 1981.

Both the remobilization drive and the narrowing of the elite strengthened *fidelista* tendencies within the leadership. Beginning in 1981 state policy once again moved in the direction of previously abandoned *fidelista* utopian practices. Antimarket tendencies reappeared in the curtailment of selling commodity surpluses (over planning targets) by private farmers. Individual private farms were converted into agricultural cooperatives at a record pace. In May 1982 Castro asserted that the completion of agricultural collectivization would signal the replacement of the free peasant markets by government-controlled markets. Education officials were again directed to make political and ideological factors important criteria in determining university admissions. Castro also began to question publicly the value of material incentives to raise labor productivity in late 1982, stating that "we have to insure that socialist formulas do not jeopardize Communist consciousness," an ideological position that contradicted current Soviet managerial theory.

Beginning in November 1984, meetings were held throughout the island to reevaluate the decentralized economic decisionmaking system. According to press reports, some planners felt that the economic decentralization had gone too far, making planning difficult and creating shortages. Many low-and middle-level PCC officials, in contrast, were reported to believe that managers still had too little autonomy. The official Cuban press carried complaints concerning economic shortages and the poor quality of goods. In addition, opposition to continued economic austerity appeared to continue, as evidenced by reports that 33 workers had been either jailed or accused of sabotage—including burning crops, work centers, and transportation vehicles, and setting fires in Havana.

The PCC's Third Congress, scheduled for late 1985, was expected to debate vigorously the problems of economic planning. The public aspect of this debate indicated to some analysts that the government had eased up on ideological restrictions after the crackdown of 1981–82. Through 1984, however, there had been no change in the reconcentrated decisionmaking system. In February 1985 there was a shake-up in the PCC leadership. Antonio Pérez Herrero, who had been a member of the PCC Secretariat responsible for education and revolutionary orientation, was removed from that position. He remained a member of the Central Commit-

tee. Several prominent provincial PCC officials were also removed from their posts.

Cuba and the Soviet Union

Beginning in 1959, as relations with the United States worsened, relations with the Soviet Union improved. Observers disagreed over whether Castro was pushed toward the Soviets by a belligerent United States or whether he led Cuba into close relations with the Soviet Union on his own initiative as a means of centralizing his control. Virtually all analysts agreed, however, that the Soviet Union had not played a role in the guerrilla war that brought Castro to power. Further, many argued that the Soviet Union played a largely reactive role in the breakdown of relations with the United States and that Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union were driven and shaped by Cuba-United States hostility.

In the first few years after 1959 the relationship grew gradually, beginning with an April 1959 agreement by the Soviet Union to buy 170,000 tons of sugar and proceeding through a February 1960 agreement by which the Soviet Union provided a US$100 million credit to purchase industrial equipment. Formal diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in May 1960. The Soviet Union moved cautiously with regard to Cuba during this period, hesitating to commit its prestige and resources to support a government whose survival it saw as very much in doubt, given its proximity to a hostile United States and the difficulties posed by Cuba's great distance from the Soviet Union (see The End of Prerevolutionary Institutions, 1959–60, ch. 1).

In July 1960 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev declared that Soviet missiles would defend Cuba "in a figurative sense," and a subsequent agreement between the two countries, although not mentioning nuclear weapons, pledged the Soviet Union to "use all means at its disposal to prevent an armed United States intervention against Cuba." After that date the Soviet military commitment gradually increased until the missile crisis of October 1962. After the resolution of that crisis by agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (without Cuban participation), Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union became strained. Differences concerned the appropriate policy each country should adopt toward communist parties in Latin America, support for guerrilla movements, the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, and Soviet interference in domestic Cuban affairs (see Toward a Soviet Model, 1961–62, ch. 1).

Relations between the two countries improved markedly after 1970. In July 1971 negotiations toward a Cuban-Soviet trade agreement began. Later that fall, after a visit to Havana by Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin, the two governments announced their "complete mutual understanding" on a range of international and domestic Cuban issues. In July 1972 Cuba became linked with the Soviet-dominated Comecon, and in December 1972 a bilateral trade agreement was signed that tied Cuba, both economically and politically, to the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement, the Cuban economy remained dependent on the export of sugar and the import of Soviet petroleum and became dependent on the Soviet Union as its principal market. The Cuban economy was further integrated with the Soviet economy through the efforts of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation and by the provisions of both the 1976–80 and 1981–85 Cuban five-year economic plans. Seventy percent of Cuba's trade was with the Soviet Union in 1984.

The integration of Cuba into the Soviet alliance system resulted in the provision of large amounts of Soviet aid. Although Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, it did send observers to Warsaw Pact military maneuvers. The total value of arms transfers from the Soviet Union to Cuba from 1976 to 1980 was estimated at US$1.1 billion. According to the United States Department of State, the Soviet Union delivered some 60,000 tons of military equipment to Cuba in 1981 (see The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, ch. 5).

The Soviet Union also provided substantial economic aid. Total cumulative economic assistance, including nonrepayable aid and trade subsidies, was estimated at US$29.2 billion from 1961 to 1982. Under a 1972 agreement, Cuban payments on its debt to the Soviet Union incurred from 1961 to 1976 were postponed until after 1986. An economic cooperation agreement signed in late 1984 committed the Soviets to provide an estimated US$4 billion per year in subsidized trade, oil, and cash through 1990.

The Soviet Union derived considerable benefit from its subsidization of Cuba. Militarily, the Soviets used Cuba as a base for refueling reconnaissance aircraft, submarines, and naval flotillas and maintained a large electronic monitoring complex at Lourdes, west of Havana. Most analysts agreed, however, that the primary benefit to the Soviet Union was political. The establishment, successful defense, and consolidation of the first socialist government in the Western Hemisphere (anti-United States and pro-Soviet) were accomplished in one of the countries geographically closest to and historically most influenced by the United States. Thus Cuba

Banners of revolutionary figures at the Plaza of the Revolution, Havana
Photos by John Finan

was constant proof that Soviet-style socialism was viable in Latin America and that a small nation could successfully withstand the hostility of the United States. In addition, Cuba became a principal spokesman for socialism among nonaligned countries, advocating the view that nonalignment did not mean neutrality toward imperialism and that the Soviet Union was the Third World's principal ally.

Soviet influence was limited, however, by the island's geographic distance from the Soviet Union, as well as by the internal dynamics of Cuban politics. The distance from the Soviet Union precluded its use of troops to enforce its will on Cuba, as it did in Eastern Europe. Cuba's proximity to the United States made the large-scale deployment of Soviet troops to the island a difficult prospect that could be expected to elicit a response from the United States. Thus, Soviet influence was subject to the rhythms of Cuban politics. Many members of the political elite were thought to favor limiting Soviet influence. At times Castro moved against members of the elite thought to be too close to the Soviet Union.

Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union gave the latter considerable leverage over the activities of the Cuban government, not only in foreign affairs but also in domestic policy. In 1980 Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union stood at an estimated US$8 billion. In 1976 some 3,000 Soviet civilian advisers and technicians were reported to be in Cuba, overseeing or assisting in various aspects of administration. In addition to direct government-to-government ties, particularly in the area of economic planning, the PCC and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had close official relations. Finally, the FAR depended on the Soviet Union for training and matériel, and the General Directorate of Intelligence within MININT, which had responsibility for overseas intelligence operations, was reported to be controlled by the Soviets.

Soviet influence was exercised via three conduits. In the early years of the Revolution the primary vehicle of Soviet influence was the PSP. The old communists of the PSP, who had spent their careers in service to the Party, favored close relations with the Soviet Union. Their weakness during the 1960s limited Soviet influence, leading the Soviet Union to pressure for their elevation and a general strengthening of the PCC. Some analysts asserted that the decision by Castro to form a mass party was taken largely because of Soviet insistence. These efforts suffered a serious setback after the second fall of Escalante, in 1968. When Cuba protested against the international support that the "microfaction" had received, the Soviet Union slowed down the level of petroleum deliveries to Cuba in answer to Cuban requests for increased amounts. After the

"rehabilitation" of the old communists at the First Congress of the PCC in 1975, Soviet influence increased, limited, however, by the relatively small number of old communists in the top leadership of the Party and the state, as well as by the advanced age of many of them.

Following the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest, Soviet influence was channeled through the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation. Created in December 1970, this commission sought to improve Cuba's economic planning and to coordinate its economy with the Soviet economy. Its efforts led to Cuba's joining Comecon in July 1972. In early 1974 the commission's president, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, announced that beginning with the 1976–80 Five-Year Economic Plan, Cuba's plan would be coordinated with that of the Soviet Union. Since 1976 Cuba's JUCEPLAN and the Soviet Union's GOSPLAN have participated in a joint planning effort. In addition, the Intergovernmental Commission directed the activities of Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba, selected the economic projects that received Soviet aid, and supervised the implementation of the projects.

The final channel of Soviet influence was the FAR. The FAR depended on the Soviet Union for weapons, training, and logistical support. Its most prestigious officers were those who received military training in the Soviet Union. Thus, the continuation of close relations with the Soviet Union was thought to be a primary goal of the FAR. This dependence on, and admiration for, the Soviet Union created another channel of influence for the Soviet Union, although the extent to which it was used in Cuban domestic policy was unknown.

The major goals of the Soviet Union in domestic policy were the strengthening of the PCC, the improvement of the capabilities of the bureaucracy, and the efficient management of the economy. The Soviet Union was known to have pressured the Cubans to form the PCC and to have favored an increased role for it in policy formation. In addition, the Soviet Union supported the "institutionalization of the Revolution" and provided the model of government institutions that the Cubans adopted. Finally, the Soviet Union favored the concentration of the Cuban economy on the production of sugar and opposed economic diversification efforts during the 1960s. It also favored the use of material incentives and the operation of the free peasant markets as means to increase productivity.

Foreign Relations

Beginning in 1959 Cuba pursued an active foreign policy on a worldwide scale, expanding its influence with countries throughout the world to a greater extent than had any other Latin American country. Analysts noted that by 1984 the country's behavior and power influenced virtually all other countries in the international system to some degree.

History and General Principles

From the time it was granted legal sovereignty in 1902 through January 1959, Cuba was a member of the inter-American system and thus an ally of the United States. It was admitted to the Pan American Union in 1902 and was a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947, as well as a founding member of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948.

Beginning in 1959, however, Cuba's relations with its neighbors in the hemisphere deteriorated. As its relations with the Soviet Union improved, its relations with the United States became increasingly acrimonious, leading to open hostility in 1960–61. From January 1959 to February 1960, Cuba's foreign policy was based on an attempt to rally support among its neighbors. To accomplish this end, it sought to encourage like-minded political forces in several neighboring countries by having its diplomatic personnel distribute literature, set up pro-Cuban lobbies, and contact opposition political groups. It also sought to take advantage of what it saw as existing revolutionary situations in some countries by encouraging political exiles who found safe haven in Cuba to plot the overthrow of dictators in their native countries. In particular, Cuba aided exiles in attempts to overthrow the governments of Luis Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua and Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina of the Dominican Republic in 1959. Attempts by exiles to overthrow governments in Haiti and Panama were also launched from Cuba. Cuba sought the aid of the Rómulo Betancourt Gallegos government in Venezuela in these efforts but was unsuccessful, leading to a deterioration in relations with that country.

After Anastas Mikoyan, the first deputy premier of the Soviet Union, visited Cuba in February 1960, Cuban foreign policy underwent a fundamental change. The provision of Soviet aid that resulted from the visit enabled Cuba to embark on a more active attempt to create revolutionary situations in neighboring countries.

To that end it fomented guerrilla wars in Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela, aiding domestic opposition forces and providing limited training in Cuba in guerrilla warfare. Estimates of the size of these efforts varied. During the early 1960s the United States government estimated that between 1,000 and 2,500 radicals trained in Cuba per month. In 1971, however, congressional testimony from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency indicated that only an estimated 2,500 Latin American leftists were trained in Cuba during the entire period from 1961 to 1969. Outside Latin America, beginning in 1960, Cuba provided military and medical supplies to Algeria's National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN) and maintained a military mission in Algeria from independence in 1962 until the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella in 1965. In the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict of 1963, a battalion of Cuban troops fought alongside the Algerians. Cuba also maintained a military mission to Ghana from 1961 until the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. In 1961 Cuba joined the Nonaligned Movement in an attempt to gain the support of other countries in its worsening disputes with the United States.

After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which was resolved by the United States and the Soviet Union without Cuban participation, the Cuban government, believing Soviet support to be problematic, intensified its efforts to bring compatible governments to power in neighboring countries. It therefore increased its aid to guerrilla movements, even when these movements were not supported by the Moscow-oriented communist parties of those countries. This policy not only severely strained relations with the Soviet Union but also caused the breakdown in relations with a number of Latin American countries, leading to a suspension of its participation in the OAS in 1962 and approval of an OAS resolution introduced by Venezuela in 1964 that required member states to sever diplomatic, economic, and transportation links with Cuba.

Between late 1963 and January 1966, Cuba moderated its position on armed struggle and improved its relations with the communist parties of other countries. It also moderated the tone of its rhetoric against the United States, suggesting that, in return for the restoration of trade links, it might be willing to consider compensation for United States companies whose property had been nationalized. In November 1964 it hosted a conference of 22 Latin American communist parties that produced a communiqué not only supporting guerrilla warfare in countries where communist support had not previously been forthcoming, such as Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, Paraguay, and Haiti, but also emphasizing the right of each national communist party to determine its own "correct

line." The so-called Havana Compromise of 1964 effectively restricted Cuban aid to guerrilla warfare in Latin America only to those countries where it was already underway. Nevertheless, the guerrilla strategy remained the cornerstone of Cuban policy. In February 1965 Castro announced that Cuba was ready to send troops abroad to aid liberation movements wherever they were fighting. In April Guevara resigned his posts in the Cuban government and joined Congolese guerrillas fighting the government of Moise Tshombe in Zaïre. In July 1965 Cuba provided 200 fighters for this effort.

In January 1966 Cuba hosted the First Conference of Solidarity of the People of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (known as the Tricontinental Conference). This conference brought together leaders of communist parties and guerrilla movements throughout the world in an attempt to form a worldwide network of revolutionaries. Because the Soviet Union was preoccupied with its growing dispute with China, Cuba dominated the conference. The Tricontinental Conference recognized the necessity of armed struggle, expelled several communist parties, criticized the Soviet Union for not sending aid to Vietnam, and agreed to form a permanent organization, the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS). After the conference Cuba dramatically increased its material support to virtually all guerrilla movements in Latin America. As publicly stated, this policy was designed to come to the aid of Vietnam, then at war with the United States, by creating "many Vietnams" in Latin America, which would severely strain the resources of the United States.

In August 1967 the OLAS held its only meeting in Havana under the slogan "The Duty of a Revolutionary Is to Make Revolution." Two of the resolutions of the conference were significant statements of Cuban foreign policy. The first, which criticized the Communist Party of Venezuela for abandoning revolutionary armed struggle the previous spring, indicated Cuba's abandonment of the Havana Compromise of 1964. The second criticized "certain socialist countries" for maintaining economic relations with "counterrevolutionary" governments in Latin America. In his closing speech, Castro indicated that this resolution was directed at the Soviet Union's moves to reestablish diplomatic and trade relations with Venezuela.

The year 1968 was officially known in Cuba as the "Year of the Heroic Guerrilla Fighter." However, even by the time of the OLAS conference in 1967, it had become clear to many that the guerrilla strategy was a failure. The movements in Peru and Argentina had been defeated, and those in Venezuela, Colombia, and

Guatemala were wracked by internal conflict and were under attack from increasingly strong counterinsurgency forces trained and equipped by the United States. In 1967 Guevara was killed fighting in Bolivia, marking the end of that effort.

The Soviet Union moved to bring Cuba into line with its own foreign policy and prescriptions for economic planning in 1968. In January Castro announced that the Soviet Union "apparently" was not going to meet Cuba's increasing petroleum needs. The reduction in the supply of Soviet oil nearly paralyzed the economy, forcing gas rationing and a loss of critical oil reserves. Castro's initial reaction was to take the offensive. In February, in announcing the existence of the Escalante "microfaction," which was linked to the Soviet Union and several East European countries and had allegedly been plotting his overthrow, Castro moved to purge the Party. By August, however, he signaled a rapprochement with the Soviet Union by publicly supporting the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

After 1968 Cuban policy entered a more moderate phase. The government concentrated on internal problems, such as the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in 1970, followed by the drive to institutionalize the Revolution. In foreign policy Castro paid a state visit to President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile in 1971, and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations with reformist governments in Latin America, including Peru in 1972, Argentina in 1973, Venezuela in 1974, and Colombia in 1975. After the OAS lifted its proscription on member states' interaction with Cuba in 1975, Cuba established diplomatic relations with several newly independent countries in the Caribbean and developed close relations with Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados, as well as with Trinidad and Tobago. Although diplomatic relations were not restored, Cuba established economic links with the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Haiti. Cuba also sought a diplomatic rapprochement with the United States and the reopening of trade links. Throughout this period, however, Cuba continued its activist foreign policy outside the Western Hemisphere. It continued aid to guerrilla movements in Portuguese Africa and sent several hundred advisers to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and Oman in 1973. Reportedly, Cuban troops also fought with Syria during the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War.

After 1975 Cuba increased its activism outside the Western Hemisphere, deploying some 3,500 to 5,000 combat troops in Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) in September. Relations with the Soviet Union were also strength-

ened. That same year Cuba hosted the Conference of Communist Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean at which Castro declared his support for Soviet foreign policy, noting that "those who criticize the Soviet Union are like dogs barking at the moon." Finally, the First Congress of the PCC declared that Cuban foreign policy was subordinate to Soviet foreign policy (see Cuba and the Soviet Union; Proletarian Internationalism, this ch.).

Cuban activism continued through the early 1980s. In 1977 Cuba again deployed troops in Africa, this time in support of Ethiopia, which had been invaded by Somalia. In 1979 Castro became president of the Nonaligned Movement. Beginning in 1978 Cuba also turned its attention again to revolutionary movements in Latin America, arming and training the guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional—FSLN) during their struggle against the government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua. After the FSLN victory, Cuba provided substantial aid to the new government, including a significant number of military advisers and some 4,000 teachers, medical specialists, and agrarian advisers by 1983. Cuba also developed close relations with Grenada following Maurice Bishop's seizure of power in 1979, as well as with Dominica and Saint Lucia in the Windward Islands (see The Cuban Military Abroad, ch. 5).

After the defeat of Jamaican prime minister Michael Manley by Edward Seaga in the 1980 elections, however, relations with Jamaica deteriorated. Jamaica accused the Cuban ambassador of interfering in Jamaica's internal affairs, and diplomatic relations were severed in October 1981. In addition, when Cuban dissidents forcibly entered the grounds of the Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Costa Rican embassies in Havana in April 1980, relations with those countries became strained as Cuba opposed those countries' granting diplomatic asylum to the dissidents. In February 1981 Ecuador recalled its ambassador over the storming of its embassy by Cuban security forces, and in March Colombia broke off diplomatic relations, charging that some 80 guerrillas, captured after landing on the Colombian coast, had been trained and armed in Cuba. Relations with Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela improved, however, when Cuba joined them in supporting Argentina during the South Atlantic War of 1982. As a result, relations with all four countries improved, and a commercial protocol with Argentina was ratified in June 1983, followed by discussions in Buenos Aires on economic cooperation and bilateral trade in August.

Analysts suggested that since 1959 Cuban foreign policy has been guided by a series of basic objectives. The primary objective

Photo by Phillips Bourns

Two billboards that publicize Cuba's foreign policy.
Top—facing United States interest section in Havana
—"Mr. Imperialists: We are absolutely unafraid of you."
Bottom—"Our friendship with the Soviet Union is unbreakable."
Photo by John Finan

was the survival of the Revolution, the pursuit of which led to the alliance with the Soviet Union and the attempts to foster other sympathetic regimes in Latin America. Secondarily, economic development was a basic goal that was made possible by the alliance with the Soviet Union. Below these two goals, Cuba sought to influence other governments but particularly to enhance its position as self-proclaimed leader of Third World revolutionary movements, claiming a unique sensitivity to the problems of developing nations. This effort entailed frequent competition with China, on occasion with the Soviet Union, for influence. To a large extent Cuba succeeded through 1984 in making itself the interlocutor between the Soviet Union and the countries of the Caribbean Basin. Its efforts to become the recognized representative for the developing nations in the so-called North-South dialogue with the developed nations was less successful.

Despite shifts of emphasis and changes of direction, most analysts agreed that the long-term pattern of Cuban foreign policy remained stable through 1984 and that it was motivated more by national self-interest as defined by Castro than it was by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Even the policy of aiding revolutionaries in other countries was seen in this light, most analysts emphasizing the importance of Cuban attempts to end its international isolation by fostering and coming to the aid of sympathetic regimes over ideologically motivated support for world revolution.

Proletarian Internationalism

Almost from the beginning of the Revolution, the government supported revolutionary movements and progressive governments not only rhetorically but also with direct aid. Realizing that the survival of its own Revolution was possible only because of the aid received from the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, commitment to "internationalist solidarity" was a dominant theme in Cuban foreign policy and domestic affairs. Cubans were asked to read, think, and act in ways consistent with the support of revolutionary friends abroad. During the 1960s Cuba expressed internationalist solidarity primarily through support for guerrilla movements in various African and Latin American countries. Beginning in 1970, however, when it sent medical and construction brigades to Peru following an earthquake, Cuban overseas programs also began to provide economic and social development aid as well as military aid. By the late 1980s Cuban overseas programs included the supply of teachers, doctors, construction workers, military ad-

visers, technicians and, in some cases, combat troops. The provision of aid not only furthered the cause of international revolution but it also had the concrete result of winning friends for Cuba in countries that received such aid. Of the countries that had received Cuban aid as of 1978, only three (Cambodia, Chile, and Somalia) had subsequently broken sharply with Cuba.

In the early 1980s Cuba's foreign aid program involved a large number of countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. In 1982 Castro reported that 120,000 service personnel had served outside the country, together with an additional 30,000 doctors, teachers, engineers, and technicians. Three years later he indicated that 200,000 Cubans had served in Angola alone. Foreign analysts suggested that this high figure probably reflected the frequent rotation of the 25,000 to 30,000 Cuban troops estimated to be in that West African nation. In 1979 Cuba provided education and training for 7,200 Africans on the Isla de la Juventud, hundreds more attended trade schools of the Ministry of Construction, and 400 foreign students were in Cuban medical and dental schools, owing to Cuban government scholarships (see table 20, Appendix; The Cuban Military Abroad, ch. 5).

Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

Decisionmaking in foreign policy was the preserve of the members of the Political Bureau of the PCC, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of State. The minister of foreign relations from 1976 through 1984, Isidoro Octavio Malmierca Peoli, although a member of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the PCC, was not included in the membership of any of the top three organs. Likewise, Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, minister of foreign trade from 1980 through 1984, was a member only of the Council of Ministers, both these areas were the responsibility of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who was also a member of the Political Bureau and the Council of State.

Within the top elite, Castro clearly predominated in foreign policy matters. Although advised by his associates in the top decisionmaking bodies, he determined Cuba's foreign policy. There was no public indication of significant opposition to his foreign policy decisions after the purge of the "microfaction" in 1968.

The members of the foreign policy elite were united on the basic goals of Cuban foreign policy, although analysts identified certain "tendencies" within that basic consensus that coincided, to a large extent, with those identified with domestic policymaking.

The "revolutionary political tendency" was associated with Castro himself and backed by *fidelista* veterans. It sought to advance Cuban interests through the promotion of opposition to the United States, particularly among Third World countries. It supported revolutionary movements and what it defined as "progressive governments."

The "military mission tendency" was identified with Raúl Castro and supported by veteran *raulistas* and other high-ranking officers in the MINFAR. It sought to advance Cuban interests via the external role of the armed forces, not only its overseas combat role in Africa during the 1970s and early 1980s but also its maintenance of military missions in countries with which Cuba had diplomatic relations.

The "pragmatic economic tendency" was identified with Rodríguez and supported by a number of specialists in charge of agencies dealing with technical, financial, and economic matters. This tendency was generally supported by old communists. It emphasized economic relations in foreign policy, seeking to promote rapid and sustained economic development through rational planning, cost accounting, and financing at home and through greater trade and technological ties with both socialist and capitalist industrialized countries. In particular, it favored a resumption of trade with the United States in order to reduce Cuban dependency on the Soviet Union and provide the foreign exchange necessary to finance imports from Western countries and pay an estimated US$3.2 billion debt to lenders in capitalist countries.

Relations with the United States

Relations between Cuba and the United States deteriorated rapidly after 1959. On October 19, 1960, the United States instituted an economic blockade, banning all exports from the United States except food and medicines. On November 10 all United States ships were prohibited from carrying cargo to or from Cuba. In January 1961 diplomatic relations were severed, and later in the year the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 20, authorized the president to establish and maintain a complete commercial embargo of Cuba. On December 16 the United States instituted a ban on all remaining exports to Cuba. A complete commercial embargo followed in February 1962. In March 1962 the embargo was extended to cover all products that in whole or in part contained any material originating in Cuba, even if manufactured in another country. In August 1962, urged by the United States, the OAS

Cuba hosting Sixth Summit of the Nonaligned Movement in 1979
Photo by Philip Brenner

passed a resolution asking its member to cease economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba. All members complied, save Mexico. In October 1962 the United States announced that it would refuse assistance to any country that permitted its ships to carry cargo to or from Cuba. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, announced in July 1963, forbade United States citizens to have commercial or financial relations with Cuba (see The End of Prerevolutionary Institutions, 1959–60, ch. 1).

Tensions between the two countries were relaxed somewhat after the beginning of informal government contacts in the early 1970s. An antihijacking agreement was reached in February 1973. In November 1974 informal discussions concerning the trade embargo, compensation for US$1.8 billion in United States property expropriated by Cuba after 1959, release of US$30 million in Cuban assets frozen by the United States, release of political pris-

oners in Cuba, reunion of Cuban families, and the status of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay began. In March 1975 United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger indicated that the United States was prepared to "move in a new direction" in its policy toward Cuba, and the following August the United States relaxed the provisions of the trade embargo. As part of this relaxation, licenses were granted to allow commerce between the subsidiaries of United States firms and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods. Nations whose ships and aircraft carried cargo to Cuba were no longer penalized by the withholding of United States assistance, and such ships and aircraft were allowed to refuel in the United States. Talks between the two governments were suspended, however, after Cuba deployed troops to Angola in 1975. Nevertheless, the United States voted in favor of lifting OAS sanctions against Cuba in 1975.

Beginning in 1976 there was a marked improvement in relations. The United States granted visas to selected Cuban citizens for visits to the United States, lifted the ban on travel to Cuba, permitted the resumption of charter flights between the two countries, cut back reconnaissance flights over the island, and concluded a bilateral agreement on maritime boundaries and fishing rights. Cuba released several United States citizens living in Cuba to depart along with their families. Interest sections opened in Havana and Washington, operating out of the Swiss and Czechoslovak embassies, respectively, in 1977. A dialogue between United States residents of Cuban origin and the Cuban government began, leading to the release of some 3,600 political prisoners in Cuba.

This relaxation of tensions between the two governments ended after Cuba's deployment of troops to Ethiopia in 1977 and the alleged involvement of Cuban troops stationed in Angola in an invasion of Shaba Province in Zaïre by Katangan exiles. Relations deteriorated further after the arrival of Soviet MiG-23s in Cuba and the public disclosure in the United States of the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in 1979. A coup in Grenada in March 1979 and the coming to power of the Cuban-supported Sandinista government in Nicaragua further heightened tensions. The United States renewed reconnaissance flights over Cuba, established a Joint Caribbean Task Force at Key West, and held military maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay and throughout the Caribbean.

Beginning in 1981 the United States, seeking to limit Cuban influence, increased its economic and military aid to countries in the Caribbean Basin. The Joint Caribbean Task Force was upgraded, and a series of large-scale military maneuvers began. The United States moved to tighten the economic embargo, sharply re-

ducing travel between the United States and Cuba and investigating the operations of firms located in other countries suspected of buying United States goods and shipping them to Cuba. The United States blamed Cuba for the turmoil in Central America, accusing it of supplying arms to antigovernment guerrillas in El Salvador. Nevertheless, the United States held at least two informal talks with officials of the Cuban government aimed at resolving regional differences. In November 1981 United States secretary of state Alexander M. Haig met with Cuba's Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in Mexico City. In March 1982 United States ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters met with Castro in Havana. These discussions did not appear to have resolved their disagreements.

In April 1982, during a meeting with 10 United States academics and journalists, Cuban officials reportedly indicated an interest in reducing tensions with the United States. According to professors Seweryn Bialer and Alfred Stepan of Columbia University, who participated in the meeting, Cuban officials indicated that Cuba was prepared to seek a "relative accommodation" and to practice "mutual restraint." Indeed, Cuban officials stated that they had begun to use restraint by refraining from shipping arms to El Salvador during the previous 14 months. They were also willing to enter into broad negotiations with the United States on such multilateral issues as southern Africa and Central America, including the creation of an international peacekeeping force in El Salvador. Finally, according to Bialer and Stepan, Cuba would no longer insist on the lifting of the United States trade embargo as a condition for negotiations.

Soon thereafter, negotiations over immigration matters began, leading to an agreement in December 1984 on the return to Cuba of refugees in the United States found "excludable" under United States immigration law. In early 1985 Castro, in a series of interviews with journalists from the United States, indicated that he was interested in pursuing further negotiations on other matters. The United States remained concerned, however, about Cuban involvement in Central America and the Caribbean, its activities in southern Africa, and its deepening military alliance with the Soviet Union. Further, United States officials indicated that an improvement in relations depended on Cuban deeds rather than on Cuban words. For its part Cuba continued to fear hostile United States military actions, particularly in light of the 1983 United States military intervention in Grenada and the ongoing United States military exercises in Central America.

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Generally, the literature on the Cuban political system suffers from a lack of detailed information concerning political events on the island. The Cuban government is responsible for this, for it does not publish information concerning internal policy debates, but the United States government also shares some of the blame, often restricting travel to the island. Authors thus rely on what official Cuban information is available, supplemented by the observations of those who are able to visit the country, drawing logical inferences concerning what is probably true. Unfortunately, this results in a high degree of polemical writing, both pro and con, about the country than might otherwise be the case.

The best English-language overview of Cuban politics available in early 1985 was Juan M. del Aguila's *Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution*. The best analysis of political developments through the mid-1970s is Jorge I. Domínguez' *Cuba: Order and Revolution.* His "Revolutionary Politics: The New Demands for Orderliness" updates events through 1981 and provides a useful analysis of political stratification. Further information on contemporary events is available in the articles on Cuba contained in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* and the *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record.*

Particular aspects of Cuban politics are discussed in articles in scholarly journals and edited volumes. The best analysis of the 1976 Constitution is William T. D'Zurilla's "Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and the *Fidelista* Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History." Government institutions are analyzed in Max Azicri's "The Institutionalization of the Cuban State: A Political Perspective." Political participation is discussed in Archibald R. M. Ritter's "The Authenticity of Participatory Democracy in Cuba," as well as in "Mass Political Participation in Socialist Cuba" and "Participation in Cuban Municipal Government," both by William M. LeoGrande. Intra-elite politics is analyzed by Edward Gonzalez in "Political Succession in Cuba" and "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies." Further information concerning intra-elite politics is available in the United States Central Intelligence Agency's *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba*.

The literature on Cuba's foreign relations is voluminous. A useful contemporary overview is Carla Anne Robins' *The Cuban Threat.* Scholarly analysis is available in *Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena*, edited by Martin Weinstein and in *Cuba in the World*, edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Cuban policy in

Africa is discussed in *Cuba in Africa*, edited by Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin. The best discussion of Cuba's activities in Central America is Domínguez' "Cuba's Relations with Caribbean and Central American Countries." (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security

Patriots armed in defense of the Revolution

AT THE END OF THE FIRST 26 years following the 1959 victory of the Cuban Revolution, led by Fidel Castro Ruz, Cuban armed forces and national security concerns played a major, if not decisive, role in the functioning of the Cuban state. This pervasive influence was evident in the organization of both the economy and the society.

During the early 1980s, in response to what it perceived as mounting strategic and economic challenges, the Cuban leadership placed renewed emphasis on production, mobilization, and the defense preparedness of the entire society. Labor, especially during sugar harvests, continued to be organized in a military fashion; workers were divided into brigades and assigned production quotas to fulfill. Plans were again laid, as during the early years of the Revolution, for the continuation of the production process in the event of a national crisis. In addition, a new civilian militia and other civilian defense organizations were created in which nearly all Cubans, both young and old, participated to help prepare for national defense in the event of invasion.

In terms of sheer military might, the Cuban armed forces in early 1985 represented the second or third most powerful military force after the United States and, possibly, Brazil, in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba continued to spend more money per capita on its armed forces than any other Latin American nation. The country remained at the forefront of Latin America with respect to military manpower; it had the largest standing army in proportion to its population of any country in the hemisphere. The armed forces were equipped with the most technologically sophisticated weapons that its superpower ally, the Soviet Union, was willing to export, including MiG–23 supersonic fighters and Mi–24 attack helicopters. By 1985 Cuban relations with the Soviet Union were at the highest level of development in the history of the Revolution.

Background and Traditions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

The Colonial Era

Cuba's tradition of violent revolutionary activity long predates the struggle that brought Castro to power in 1959. The earliest recorded guerrilla warfare in the Western Hemisphere was carried out by native Taíno Indians resisting the Spanish colonial forces in Cuba in the early sixteenth century. Under the leadership of an Indian cacique from the neighboring island of Hispaniola, the

Cuban natives resisted colonial domination. Repeated ambushes and attacks on the 300 troops under the conquistador Diego Velásquez, followed by the Indians' quick retreat to the security of the mountains, hindered the speedy conquest of the island anticipated by the Spaniards. Instead, the Spanish forces remained on the defensive at their fort in Baracoa, the first permanent colonial settlement on the island, for nearly three months.

Although the capture and execution of the Indian leader in early 1512 ended this first organized resistance, a second major movement based in the island's eastern mountains, the Sierra Maestra, continued to challenge Spanish dominion between 1529 and 1532. As in other territories conquered in the name of the Spanish crown, the Cuban natives' superior numbers and their familiarity with the terrain proved no match for the superiority of the Spaniards' firepower. By the middle of the sixteenth century the native population had been practically exterminated—through deaths in battle and cruelties imposed by the Spaniards, as well as by disease. In 1557 only approximately 2,000 Indians remained from a population estimated as high as 3 million before the conquest (see Discovery and Occupation; Encomienda and Repartimiento, ch. 1).

Throughout the Spanish colonial era, Cuba served as the operational base for Spanish forces in their conquest and settlement of the New World (see Economic Structures, ch. 1). Although Cuba's lack of mineral wealth made its development less critical than that of regions rich in gold or silver, the island's strategic location in the Caribbean Sea and the protection from hurricanes and pirates offered by Havana's natural harbor contributed to its growing importance. Assigned its own permanent garrison of Spanish troops, Havana was developed as a military port and served as the temporary home port for the 4,000 to 5,000 sailors of the Spanish grand fleet that waited to escort returning ore-laden ships to Spain.

As in other Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere, an independence movement arose in Cuba during the early nineteenth century. Support for Cuban independence was provided by sympathizers in Colombia and Mexico, who viewed the elimination of Spanish rule throughout the hemisphere as inextricably linked with their own independence. The concerns of the Colombians and Mexicans were also based on Cuba's continued use as a Spanish operational base during the independence era, this time for coordinating Spain's efforts to suppress revolts and regain control of its colonies (see The Dawn of Independence, ch. 1).

The decade from 1820 to 1830 marked the beginning of efforts by Cuban-born Spaniards, known as criollos, to achieve inde-

pendence from Spain. Of the many secret organizations and societies created in the early 1820s to support the cause of Cuban independence, the most prominent was led by José Francisco Lemus, a Havana native who attained the rank of colonel in the Colombian Army of Independence before returning to liberate his homeland.

The membership of Lemus' organization, the Suns and Rays of Bolívar (named for South American independence leader Simón Bolívar), was composed mainly of students and poorer creoles and was organized on a cell basis throughout the country by Freemasons. Although each member was required to carry a knife, only a few had pistols; none wore uniforms. Lemus believed he could rely on the colonial militia for his forces' weapons. When the time for insurrection came, he reasoned, group members who had infiltrated the militia would distribute arms and ammunition to rebel supporters. Colombia and Mexico were expected to provide supplies and matériel to the revolutionaries as well. While Lemus prepared various proclamations declaring the establishment of the Republic of Cubanacán, Spanish loyalist spies infiltrated the group. Only days before the planned uprising in 1823, colonial forces seized the organization's leaders, including Lemus, and sent them to prison.

By 1825 the continued activities of other pro-independence groups led to the crown's decision to implement drastic measures to eliminate the revolutionary movement on the island. Among the regulations, which established martial law, were the suppression of civil liberties; the granting of all-embracing authority to the Spanish captain general, who was the commander of the island's colonial forces; and the establishment of the Permanent Executive Military Commission, a military tribunal that superseded the court system and was empowered to detain anyone even suspected of conspiracy. The measures imposed, which were unparalleled in their harshness elsewhere in the hemisphere, remained in effect for the next 50 years. An additional 40,000 colonial troops were sent to police the island.

The years between 1830 and the mid-1860s were marked by agitation for independence or, at the very least, reforms that included limiting the dictatorial powers granted the captain general. Support for the abolition of slavery broadened, yet the wealthy creole planters who depended on the cheap labor for their livelihood refused to support abolition of the institution. The imposition of new taxes by the crown during a severe economic depression and the creoles' own long-frustrated political desires finally provoked the comparatively poor planters of eastern Cuba to rise in rebellion against the Spanish.

The Ten Years' War

The modern Cuban military officially traces its traditions back to the Ten Years' War (1868–78) and the struggle waged by the *mambises*, as the independence fighters were called, to free themselves from Spanish colonial rule. The *mambises* were led by such heroic guerrilla leaders as Antonio Maceo and Máximo Gómez, a former Spanish army commander who trained and fought with the rebels (see The Ten Years' War, La Guerra Chiquita, and the Abolition of Slavery, ch. 1)

On October 10, 1868, the Ten Years' War began when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a creole planter from eastern Cuba, issued the Grito de Yara (Cry of Yara), calling for Cuban independence. Having established himself as general in chief of the patriots, his original force of 147, which included 30 of his own freed slaves, reportedly grew to 4,000 men within two days' time. By the end of October Céspedes' army had more than doubled in size to 9,700; by early November it was 12,000 strong.

A group of seasoned independence fighters arrived from the Dominican Republic and, led by Máximo Gómez, trained the rebels in military strategy and tactics. Through the final two months of 1868, the *mambi* fighters controlled major portions of eastern Cuba, including Bayamo, a city with a population of 10,000 that was the seat of government for the newly proclaimed Republic of Cuba.

Spanish regular forces on the island at the time of the Yara uprising numbered only 7,000, the majority of whom were concentrated in the western, sugar-producing end of the island. By early January 1869, however, the enlistment in the Volunteer Corps—a powerful paramilitary body created to fight the *mambises*—of an additional 20,000 infantrymen and 13,500 cavalry troops helped the Spanish hold sway. One account noted that as many as 73,000 Volunteers enlisted between October 1868 and January 1869 and were armed with some 90,000 Remington rifles purchased by Spain in the United States.

During the three-month period the Volunteer Corps, supported by an uncompromising, conservative captain general, quickly established a ruthless reputation. Even after the January 1869 appointment of a more liberal captain general who implemented long-demanded reforms and dissolved the infamous Military Commission, the corps continued its campaign of terror by imprisoning or shooting suspected rebel sympathizers.

In the ensuing years of the war, as Spanish forces became better organized, the rebels resorted to guerrilla warfare. By divid-

ing themselves into small, mobile, self-sufficient units, they were able to compensate somewhat for their small numbers and poor weapons. In early 1870 the new commander in chief of the rebel forces, General Manuel Quesada, reported that his 61,694 troops were equipped with 13 artillery pieces, 16,000 rifles and guns, 3,558 pistols and revolvers, and 60,075 machetes.

The failure of the rebel army to resolve its equivocal position on the slavery issue, however, doomed the independence movement. Although there was growing realization that the armed support of slaves was needed in order to defeat the Spanish, the planters' refusal to free their slaves and support the abolition of slavery eventually caused a split in the rebel army. The schism dividing the forces between those with vested property interests and poorer Cubans—creoles as well as freed black slaves—persisted through the end of the war.

The Pact of Zanjón, signed in February 1878 and accepted by most of the rebel army's generals, established the formal terms for the cessation of hostilities but provided for neither Cuban independence nor the abolition of slavery. The estimated US$300 million cost of the Ten Years' War, in which some 208,000 Spanish troops and 50,000 Cuban rebels had died, was added to the Cuban debt to Spain.

The War of Independence, 1895-98

The second major war for Cuban independence was incorporated into the official military tradition of the armed forces and became part of what was often referred to as the Cuban "revolutionary myth." Many of the same national heroes who fought in the Ten Years' War fought in the second War of Independence, including Maceo and Gómez. Also associated with the 1895 war was the Cuban patriot and poet José Julian Martí y Pérez, who, after spending 15 years organizing support for the independence movement in the United States, returned to Cuba to fight—and to die—in one of the first battles of the war (see The War of Independence, ch. 1).

By mid-1885, several months after the outbreak of skirmishes in eastern Cuba, the rebel soldiers on the island, numbering only some 6,000 to 8,000, were pitted against a formidable Spanish force of 52,000. In contrast to their slow reaction to the 1868 rebellion, the Spanish were quick to respond to the renewed threat and by early 1896 had imposed an odious policy known as "reconcentration," which placed the populations of entire towns or vil-

lages in concentration camps that were euphemistically called "military areas." After only six months of fighting, however, the rebels had moved far enough west to seize territory that had taken them seven years to capture during the previous war. By the end of the year the ranks of independence fighters had swelled to 25,000 troops.

Influential revolutionary support groups in the United States helped get favorable news articles published and guaranteed the rebels a continuous flow of arms, munitions, and other supplies. Cuban independence rapidly became a national political issue in the United States, and President William McKinley, inaugurated in 1897, was an avowed supporter of the cause of Cuban independence. The February 15 explosion and destruction of the United States battleship U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana harbor—the cause of which was never definitely established—triggered United States intervention in Cuba's War of Independence in April 1898 and transformed that struggle into the Spanish-Cuban-American War (See the Spanish-Cuban-American War, ch. 1).

Cuban independence was not the objective of the United States, which turned its attention to capturing Spain's colonial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean. Cuban troops from the rebels' Army of Liberation who were permitted to join the United States war effort were used only as scouts, messengers, trench diggers, pack carriers, or sentries.

By the end of May the United States had made contact with the rebels, and plans were laid to capture the city of Santiago de Cuba on the southeast coast of the island and blockade its bay. A naval blockade of Santiago de Cuba, where the Spanish fleet was believed to be anchored, was accomplished in May 1898, but because of poor planning and inadequate coordination, the United States was unable to land troops there until the late June arrival of the Fifth Army Corps, composed of 85 officers and some 16,000 troops. Among the officers were colonels Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood, who were at the head of a cavalry regiment known as the Rough Riders. Roosevelt went on to become president of the United States, and Wood served as military governor of Cuba between 1900 and 1902.

The war's only major land battle, the attack on the 800 strong Spanish contingent positioned at San Juan Hill, several kilometers to the east of Santiago de Cuba, came on July 1. This first United States victory in Cuba, however, was costly to the forces on both sides. Some 102 Spanish troops were killed; another 552 were wounded. United States losses included 223 dead, 1,243 wounded, and 79 missing. The small Cuban force allowed to par-

ticipate in the attack lost 10 men. The casualty figures from the successful naval engagement in the Bahía de Santiago two days later were less severe for the United States, which counted only one man dead and two wounded. The Spanish fleet, however, lost 350 of its 2,225-man force, and another 1,670 men were taken prisoner. Deaths from tropical disease, including malaria and dysentery, soon exacted an even heavier toll than deaths in battle.

Although skirmishes continued through the first weeks of July, the final terms for the Spanish surrender—which were negotiated without the participation of the Cuban revolutionaries—were agreed to on July 17, thus bringing an end to the Spanish-Cuban-American War the following month. In spite of the rebels' demand that "by the nature of the intervention" the island should be turned over to the Army of Liberation, the United States, which was still at war with Spain, was not planning to depart.

The 1898 Treaty of Paris formally ended hostilities between the United States and Spain and ratified United States sovereignty over the island. The terms of the treaty placed responsibility on the United States to ensure the protection of life and property not only of its own citizens on the island but also of other foreign citizens there. Such terms forced the dissolution of the Army of Liberation—believed to number only 1,000 at the war's end—which the United States considered a challenge to the authority of the occupation forces on the island.

By early 1899 the Rural Guard—which owed its training, equipment, and loyalty to the occupation forces—was assembled from the remnants of the rebel organization and assigned the mission of protecting properties in the island's interior. Landowners routinely offered part of their own property on which to build a Rural Guard outpost in return for more immediate protection. The enlistment qualifications for the guard included having good moral character and two letters of recommendation from well-known citizens, "preferably property owners." Other requirements, such as literacy and having to pay for one's own uniform and mount, tended to inhibit nonwhite recruitment. Even after the establishment of Cuban independence in 1902, the role of the guard failed to evolve beyond that of a rural police force designed to protect private property holdings.

Cuba and the United States, 1902–33

The departure of the United States occupation force in 1902 created pressures on the new government of Tomás Estrada Palma

to guarantee the security of private property, especially during the so-called dead season between sugar harvests, when idled workers might threaten the maintenance of internal order. In addition to increasing the size of the existing 1,250-man guard, four artillery companies were created to fill the vacuum left by the departing troops. Although the United States supported the strengthening of the guard, it opposed the creation of the artillery corps on the grounds that the United States would provide for Cuba's defense. In accord with the legislation sponsored by Senator Orville Platt and appended to the 1901 Cuban constitution, the United States initially maintained that the guarantee of political stability by United States military intervention meant that the island would have no need for its own standing army or navy (see United States Occupation and the Platt Amendment, ch. 1).

Despite United States opposition, both forces continued to grow. The guard, which numbered some 1,500 men by the following year, had more than 3,000 personnel by 1905. Likewise, the artillery corps had grown to some 700 personnel over the same three-year period. The 1906 uprising by members of the National Liberal Party against Estrada Palma not only resulted in the first United States intervention under the terms of the Platt Amendment but also led to the creation of the first regular Cuban army.

The initial efforts of the newly arrived United States military advisers in 1906 were directed at transforming the undisciplined Rural Guard into a professional force able to maintain domestic order and remain independent of partisan politics. In early 1907 the guard's size was increased to 10,000, and the outpost system—wherein the troops were deployed in small detachments throughout the country—was revamped with the aim of concentrating forces under closer supervision. Training schools were opened in the cities of Havana, Matanzas, Camagüey, and Santiago de Cuba, and new recruits were carefully screened. Nevertheless, the Liberals viewed the guard as discredited and tied to Estrada Palma and called for a regular army to be created in its place. Despite initial opposition, the United States acquiesced in 1908 and approved regulations creating the Permanent Army, consisting of a single infantry brigade. The guard remained intact under separate command, but its size was reduced to 5,180 troops.

After the election of José Miguel Gómez and the subsequent departure of the United States forces in early 1909, the Rural Guard continued to respond to the interests of the large landowners, and officers who had remained loyal to Estrada Palma in 1906 were purged. Liberal loyalists who had no prior military experience were readily rewarded with commissions in both the Rural Guard

and the Permanent Army. The party was divided, however, and these schisms were reflected in both forces, whose supporters were split between President Gómez and his vice president, Alfredo Zayas. In early 1911 Gómez united the command of the Permanent Army and the guard under a trusted officer. By 1912 the army alone was composed of some 12,500 officers and troops.

For the 1912 election Gómez threw his support and that of the military behind the Conservative Republican Party leader, General Mario García Menocal, against Zayas, the contender for the National Liberal Party. Widely distrusted because of his close association with the United States, Menocal ran again for the presidency in 1916 against a reunited National Liberal Party and was reelected amid electoral violence and vote fraud. The Liberals refused to concede and in early 1917 began planning the uprising that became known as La Chambelona (The Lollipop), which was to be a swift, bloodless coup against Menocal. The February coup conspiracy was discovered, however, and widespread arrests of Liberal military officers followed. Still, the Liberal Constitutionalist Army, composed of defectors from the armed forces, managed to take and hold large portions of eastern Cuba (see Fragile Independence and Fragile Republic, ch. 1).

The defections allowed Menocal to consolidate his control over the armed forces. The United States roundly condemned the revolt and shipped the Menocal government several airplanes plus considerable arms and ammunition and, in a show of force, landed some 500 marines at Santiago de Cuba, enabling Conservatives to retake the city.

Upon his election as president in 1924, General Gerardo Machado y Morales—a longtime Liberal supporter and participant in La Chambelona, as well as a former cattle rustler and inspector general of the army—began programs that helped transform the Cuban military into a more modern and effective force. In the process he assured himself of the institution's loyalty, at least that of the officer corps. Through selective (and often extralegal) appointments, promotions, and transfers, he quickly placed his own military supporters in the key commands. An aviation corps was formally created under the army's command. Expenditures on the armed forces rose dramatically despite an economic crisis. An emphasis on improved training programs and better housing facilities for military personnel helped build support. Machado increased the size of the armed forces to almost 12,000, granted himself the right to reorganize the military at will, and placed the armed forces in charge of secondary-school education, adding marching drills and elementary military science to the regular curriculum.

With the firm backing of the armed forces, Machado had the compliant legislature extend his rule for another six-year term in 1928. His opposition, primarily within the alienated middle class and the university community, increasingly advocated violent revolution. As a result, Machado established a virtual military dictatorship. Military officers replaced the municipal police chiefs and civilian government administrators. All members of the armed forces were granted the right to investigate and detain those suspected of subversive activities. Special military authorization was required for meetings of three or more individuals. Upon the creation of a national militia in 1932, all government agencies and bodies, including the judiciary, were officially placed under military control. By early 1933, as antigovernment violence continued unabated, Machado remained in power only through the sheer might of his military supporters and the inaction of the United States, which refused to intervene as was its right under the Platt Amendment (see The Machado Dictatorship, ch. 1).

The appointment of a new United States ambassador, Sumner Welles, in mid-1933 signaled the end of United States tolerance for the dictator's excesses. Although Machado initially responded to the ambassador's warnings with a policy of appeasement that included the release of political prisoners, he later attempted to turn the threat of intervention into a hemispheric issue, calling upon fellow Latin American nations to condemn what appeared to be imminent United States action. The same threat of intervention, however, prompted Machado's military backers to abandon their support of his government. On August 11 the commanders of the aviation corps and Havana's major military installations demanded that the dictator leave; they had already been assured that the civilian opposition would not seek retribution for the armed forces' past actions.

Development of the Cuban Military under Batista

A revolt engineered by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar and other noncommissioned officers (NCOs) broke out in September 1933 in response to the political paralysis evidenced by the civilian government of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada. Apart from its inability to control the competing opposition groups, Céspedes' government had failed to protect the institution of the armed forces. Demands mounted for the prosecution of officers accused of crimes during the Machado dictatorship. At the same time, military authorities were reluctant to enforce order, fearing

that they would aggravate opposition pressures for action against their past excesses. Promotions were stalled, and discontent grew among junior officers. The final blow came with the General Staff's decision to withhold commissions from sergeants completing the officer training program, thereafter reserving commissions only for military academy graduates.

After attempts to seek redress were rebuffed, enlisted men at Havana's Camp Columbia military based organized a group variously referred to as the Columbia Military Union or the Revolutionary Military Union as the vehicle for their demands, which included addressing rumored force reductions and pay cuts for NCOs in addition to revising the policy that restricted sergeants' promotions. Other grievances included poor housing conditions and complaints about the quality of food and uniforms. On September 3 they took over the base; by the following day all of Havana's major military installations were under the control of the NCOs and their enlisted supporters. Up to that point the demands of the movement had focused solely on military issues. The NCO revolt took on political overtones, according to some historians, only after a group of radical university students and their professors allied themselves with the union and joined them at Camp Columbia. On September 4 the pentarchy, a five-man civilian junta supported by the NCOs, who were now led by Batista, installed itself in the Presidential Palace (see the Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

The promotion of Batista to the commissioned rank of colonel and his appointment as army chief of staff, along with the promotions of other NCOs to fill the military's upper ranks, provoked a crisis within the pentarchy, resulting in the emergence of Ramon Gran San Martin as the new national leader in mid-September. In early October a planned revolt by a group of some 300 officers—those who had been forced to surrender their commissions—was quashed by Batista's army, and the Havana hotel in which the officers had lodged themselves was shelled by the Cuban navy's sole cruiser. Nevertheless, civilian support for the new regime failed to materialize. On January 13, 1934, Batista—convinced by the United States ambassador and business groups in Cuba that long-term national interests, including those of the reorganized military institution, were threatened—advised Gran that the armed forces could no longer support his government. In less than a week a new government, led by Carlos Mendieta, was placed in office and was readily recognized by the United States. In return for Batista's support, the new government formally created the Constitutional Army, legitimizing the commissions of the new officer corps.

Through the remainder of the decade the failure of the national governments to establish their legitimacy by mobilizing popular support led to the expansion of Batista's influence and the growth of the military institution, both in size and in involvement in national life. By 1940 the armed forces consisted of some 14,000 personnel, not including the nationalized police and the remnants of the Rural Guard, both of which also came under military jurisdiction. Training programs emphasized marksmanship, enforcement of laws, and maintenance of public order, especially in growing urban areas.

Troops from the Constitutional Army were used as strikebreakers and were regularly employed to prevent the disruption of essential government and commercial services. After a 1934 strike by government workers, soldiers were assigned civilian administrative duties. The strike prompted a declaration of martial law, after which public employees were required to enlist in the army reserve. The reserve, in turn, was used as a labor force by the Cuban private sector, which benefited from its close ties to the military.

In the provinces the expanded reliance on the military for order led to its indirect domination of the civilian political process. In contrast to the Machado era, when both civil and military authority had resided with the local army commander, local and provincial authority was held by civilians who owed their positions to the support of military officials. The unfortunate result of the new role was the growth of corruption and graft within the military, wherein "protection" was provided for a price.

Throughout the 1930s the armed forces came increasingly to represent a "shadow government" headed by Batista. By the end of the decade the Cuban military assumed civilian responsibilities that went beyond its previous roles. It had taken over rural education—by distributing an army teacher corps to the provinces, placing military officers in charge of schools, and supervising adult education programs—in addition to providing information on health and agriculture to rural communities. Rural medical care and other social services were also administered by the armed forces.

The 1940 election of Batista as president only officially affirmed what had been the actual situation over the previous seven years. He obligingly retired from the military with the rank of general, yet retained his effective control over the institution as president. Before relinquishing his command, he had forced into retirement officers of doubtful loyalty and transferred potential competitors; those loyal to him were promoted to key commands.

Batista's tenure in office was distinguished by the return of the armed forces to strictly military duties. Batista lost military support, however, when he attempted to interfere with the lucrative system of graft upon which the armed forces had come to depend. In early 1941 Batista reduced the size of the armed forces and reshuffled its hierarchy after insubordination by the army command had nearly led to his overthrow. Active-duty personnel who had been junior commissioned officers at the time of the September 1933 revolt were rewarded with the command of key posts.

After Batista's departure from office in 1944, civil-military relations remained in a delicate balance in which civilians still had the slight advantage. Almost all officers who had supported the 1933 revolt were retired. An emphasis was placed on formal military education through the service academies, yet promotion opportunities remained available for sergeants and corporals. Although salary raises were granted to enlisted personnel, there was no commensurate rise in military expenditures, which represented fully one-fifth of the national budget.

Public disclosures of high-level corruption and graft in the armed forces, however, proved demoralizing and resulted in an institution divided between formally trained younger officers and older, higher-ranking officers over the issue of professionalism. The indifference shown by the civilian government toward the gangs of private thugs, or "action groups"—which by the early 1950s frequently fought among themselves as well as against the police and army—and the increasing levels of overall crime and political violence were perceived as threatening the institution of the armed forces.

In a March 1952 coup d'état, Batista returned to power as chief of state and supreme commander of the armed forces. After the early morning seizure of Havana's military installations, troops were deployed throughout the capital as roadblocks sealed the city. Public utilities, banking, and communications and transport were placed under military control. In less than 90 minutes Batista's supporters had taken the capital, and the new government was operating from Camp Columbia. By the time Havana's inhabitants woke up, constitutional guarantees had been suspended and the legislative dissolved (see Batista's Dictatorship, ch. 1).

Batista's new government was full of generosity for the armed forces. An across-the-board salary increase was promised to all military personnel. The army's new chief of staff pledged that no longer would military men be used as laborers for private concerns. To enforce law and order, the Havana National Police force was increased by 2,000, and all were promised new firearms and vehi-

cles. Promotions were handed out to loyal supporters and those discovered to have not supported the coup were purged from the armed forces.

United States support was evidenced by the arrival that month of new equipment for the armed forces, provided under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) agreement signed by Batista in which he guaranteed to support United States goals in the Western Hemisphere. The new supreme commander volunteered to send Cuban troops to fight in Korea "if needed." The United States provided Cuba with a wide range of military equipment; the newly established Cuban Army Air Force, created from the old aviation corps, was sent F-47 fighters even before its pilots were trained to fly them.

The long-neglected Cuban navy received an infusion of funds from the Batista regime. New bases and port facilities, as well as a new General Staff headquarters, were constructed. A naval aviation corps was created with an initial force of six airplanes. Improved education programs were implemented for naval personnel, and a naval training center, described as a "model of its type for Latin America," was established with 24 different vocational and technical training programs.

Attention was paid to the provision of services for all armed forces personnel and the improvement of living conditions. New housing was built for officers and enlisted men under the auspices of the newly constituted Armed Forces Economic Housing Organization. The Armed Forces Credit Union and Insurance Exchange was also created to afford military personnel easy access to loans and establish an armed forces insurance fund. Batista's largess for the military, however, was not extended to the civilian population, which increasingly opposed the dictatorship.

The Origins of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

The attack on Santiago de Cuba's Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, led by Fidel Castro, a lawyer and former University of Havana student leader and "action group" member, represented the first organized armed revolt against Batista. It was also the first military action by those who would provide the core leadership for the Rebel Army and, after its victory, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR). Of the approximately 165 rebels who participated in simultaneous attacks on the army's Moncada Barracks—the country's second largest military post—and on the smaller installation in the nearby city of

Bayamo, at least half were killed, most after being captured and often brutally tortured by Cuban troops or members of Batista's feared Military Intelligence Service. Only 48 rebels managed to evade capture. Of the 100 or so believed captured, only Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and 30 others survived long enough to be brought to trial three months later.

After their release from prison on the Isle of Pines in May 1955 under Batista's general political amnesty, many of the attack's participants, plus others affiliated with the university student movement, joined Castro in the reorganization of what came to be called the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio—M-26-7). Two months later many of the same supporters departed with Castro for guerrilla training in Mexico.

When the 82 guerrillas returned to Cuba in December 1956, they were unaware that an insurrection by the urban wing of the M-26-7 in Santiago de Cuba had been put down the month before. The approach of the yacht *Granma*, which transported the new Rebel Army, was detected and followed by Cuban naval patrols and air reconnaissance. After the rebels landed on the eastern end of the island, army units mobilized to repel the invasion and killed all but between 12 and 20 of the rebels, who took refuge in the Sierra Maestra. After regrouping, the guerrillas launched their first offensive action against a Rural Guard outpost in January 1957. Two years later the Rebel Army would triumphantly enter Havana (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Bastista, ch. 1).

Batista's demise was owing as much to his failing support within the armed forces as to the failure of the once powerful military institution effectively to combat the guerrillas. Repression, corruption, and violence characterized political life and led some sectors of the military to withdraw their support from the dictator. At the same time that the rebels found support in rural Cuba and among the disenchanted and victimized urban middle class, Batista's armed forces were crumbling from within. Even before the *Granma* landing, Batista had been confronted with two coup attempts during 1956. The September 5, 1957, revolt at the Cayo Loco naval installation in Cienfuegos by some 400 young officers and sailors allied with members of M-26-7 represented the largest challenge the regime had thus far confronted. Although the uprising was successfully quashed by 2,000 army troops, an estimated 100 survivors fled to the Sierra de Escambray in central Cuba and opened a second front.

Massive assaults waged by army troops against the elusive guerrillas' hit-and-run tactics proved fruitless and harmful to troop morale. During the major campaign begun in May 1958—involving

12,000 to 13,000 troops from all three services against the 500 or so guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra—the military began to show indications that it was losing its will to fight. Paralleling the final days of the Machado dictatorship, the armed forces began to sense not only the absence of popular support for Batista but also growing antimilitary sentiment among the general population. An arms embargo imposed in March 1958 as a symbol of United States disapproval over the use in a civil war of MDAP funds and matériel provided for hemispheric defense contributed to the deterioration of morale.

The Rebel Army carefully disavowed harboring antimilitary sentiments and said so repeatedly in broadcasts over Radio Rebelde, the clandestine radio network. Some troops openly defected to the guerrillas, who were believed to treat their prisoners well, often releasing them after a short detention. Both desertions and defections increased as the war went on. Pilots refused orders to bomb civilian areas in the Sierra Maestra, often dropping their bombs on uninhabited locales; some were arrested for insubordination while others sought asylum in Miami. By autumn 1958 Batista recorded that his officers in the field were surrendering their entire units to the guerrilla forces "with surprising frequency." As the Cuban armed forces lost personnel to the Rebel Army, the guerrillas often gained their weapons as well.

By the end of the year Batista's vain attempt at appeasing the United States by holding elections had failed. The demoralizing impact of the continuing lack of United States support for Batista's war against the guerrillas was finally interpreted by the officer corps as a sign that Batista must go. Had the final battle of Santa Clara, in central Cuba, in December not resulted in the complete collapse of the armed forces fighting structure, Batista would have been overthrown within days or weeks by his own officers, who were already plotting among themselves with the Rebel Army against him. On New Year's Eve 1958 Batista met quietly with his chiefs of staff at Camp Columbia, named his successor—ironically, a general who was conspiring with Castro—and left the country the next day.

After Batista's departure, all pretense of withholding absolute victory from the Rebel Army was soon abandoned. Even though the general named to the national command by Batista resisted surrendering to the guerrillas, army units throughout the country refused to continue fighting after learning the dictator had left. With the end at hand, many top army and police officials looted the treasury and fled the island; others less fortunate, many of whom

had been responsible for the torture and murder of innocent civilians, remained to face revolutionary justice.

In mid-January 1959 the provisional revolutionary government suspended the law regulating the structure of the old military, permitting it legally to reorganize the new armed forces according to its needs. The constitution, which had prohibited capital punishment, was amended to allow for the execution of Batista's collaborators judged guilty of "war crimes." The often televised executions by firing squad of former Batista-era officials were supported by the majority of Cubans, who were eager to avenge the dictatorship's excesses, but the United States government viewed them with alarm and used them as a standard by which it judged the civility of the new government. However, Castro, the de facto leader of the revolutionary government, eventually recognized that the bloodletting could not continue if the leadership wished to end the spasmodic violence that had wracked the country for most of the past decade. After the retributive executions were halted, efforts to consolidate the revolutionary government's power began in earnest.

Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations

Article 64 of the 1976 Constitution of the Republic of Cuba establishes that the defense of the "socialist homeland is the greatest honor and the supreme duty of every Cuban citizen." Military service, incorporated under Article 64, is regulated by law. Treason against the nation is defined as "the most serious of crimes" and, accordingly, is "subject to the most severe of penalties." Also incorporated in the Constitution is the right of all Cuban citizens to "reach any rank of the Revolutionary Armed Forces . . . in keeping with their merits and abilities."

The National Assembly of People's Power, which acts as a national legislative body, bears constitutional responsibility for "declaring a state of war in the event of military aggression and approving peace treaties." The Assembly, however, meets in regular session only four days each year. As a result, Article 88 of the Constitution empowers the Council of State, also a representative body, to "decree general mobilizations whenever the defense of the country makes it necessary and assume the authority to declare war . . . [and] approve peace treaties . . . when the Assembly is in recess and cannot be called to session with the necessary security and urgency." According to the Constitution, "supreme command

of the Revolutionary Armed Forces" is retained by the president of the Council of State.

The Council of Ministers, the nation's highest-ranking executive and administrative organ, is also invested with national defense responsibilities and has the constitutional mandate to maintain domestic order and security in addition to ensuring the protection of lives and property in the event of natural disasters. The council is empowered to "determine the general organization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces." In early 1985 Castro acted as president of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers; he was also commander in chief of the FAR.

The revised Fundamental Law of the Armed Forces, promulgated in December 1976, establishes the legal basis of the FAR. Three other laws passed in November 1976 complement the FAR's legal framework, encompassing the provision of social security for the armed forces, the regulation of the military reserve system, and the reclassification of military ranks.

Between the early years of the Revolution and the mid-1980s, Cuba resisted entering multilateral or bilateral defense pacts and otherwise refused to enter into agreements that might limit its actions in the international arena. As Article 10 of the 1976 Constitution specifically stipulates, the Republic of Cuba "rejects and considers as illegal and null all treaties, pacts and concessions which were signed in conditions of inequality, or which disregard or diminish [Cuban] sovereignty over any part of the national territory."

This position remained consistent with the actions of the Cuban leadership in the early years of the Revolution. In March 1960 Cuba withdrew from the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which provided for collective hemispheric defense against external aggressors. Five months later Castro terminated the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement signed by the Batista government in 1952. Cuban participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) was suspended in January 1962, when member states determined that the Cuban government's Marxist-Leninist ideology was "incompatible with the interests of the hemisphere."

The Castro government resisted participation in any multilateral agreements to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The government also refused to sign the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known as the Tlatelolco Treaty). Cuba refused to sign the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the grounds, as stated by Raúl

Helicopter formation over Havana parade ground
Photo by John Finan

Roa, Cuba's ambassador to the United Nations, that it "would never give up its inalienable right to defend itself using weapons of any kind, despite any international agreement." Cuba did, however, reach an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in May 1980 regarding safeguards for its first nuclear power plant, which was under construction near Cienfuegos, and its nuclear material.

In June 1966 the Castro government ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the wartime use of poisonous gases or bacteriological agents. It also ratified the four international agreements of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of war victims. The 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons Convention was ratified by Cuba in 1976.

Even though the Castro government continued close relations with the Soviet Union and received virtually all its military assist-

ance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Cuba had not joined the Warsaw Pact as of early 1985. Cuban military officials, however, were invited to attend Warsaw Pact maneuvers as observers.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Government

Throughout the first 26 years of the Cuban Revolution, distinguishing the responsibilities of civilian government officials from those of FAR personnel was often difficult. This was especially true during the 1960s as the government attempted to consolidate its power and organize popular support. The term coined by Professor Jorge I. Domínguez of Harvard University—the "civic soldier"—epitomized the nature of civil-military relations. The concept of the civic soldier represented the military men who ruled over large sectors of military and civilian life, who were held up as symbols to be emulated by all Cuban citizens, and who were the bearers of the tradition and ideology of the Revolution. The fusion of civilian and military roles and duties at the national level was embodied in Castro, who, in addition to being the commander in chief of the FAR, was also the head of the nation's top decision-making bodies, including the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC). His brother Raúl, minister of the FAR, held the second highest position in these same bodies.

In the chaotic governmental reorganization efforts of 1959 and the early 1960s, the FAR served as an important repository of leadership and administrative expertise and, as the successor to the Rebel Army, represented the most powerful institutional body that had survived the overthrow of Batista. The involvement of the Cuban military in public administration dated back to the 1920s and served to legitimize the newly created FARs participation in and control over governmental affairs. As the requirements of military specialization increased through the 1970s and as Cuban government officials independently developed expertise in public administration, the distinct responsibilities of the civilian and military sectors became somewhat more pronounced. Nevertheless, through the mid-1980s the highest levels within the Cuban government continued to be filled with former Rebel Army officers, many of whom, although not active-duty FAR officers, were regularly identified in the Cuban media as "commanders of the Revolution," using the honorific rank in addition to their governmental title.

Members of the Cuban armed forces were not only educated to become professionals in civilian and military affairs but were also among the vanguard of the PCC. In late 1970 nearly 70 percent of all military officers belonged to either the PCC or its youth wing, the Union of Young Communists (Unión de Jóvenes Comunista—UJC). Of the PCC members holding military rank at that time, fully 69 percent were commissioned officers. By the time of the delegate selection for the Third Congress of the PCC, to be held in late 1985, however, foreign observers were arguing that civilian party cadre were attempting to reduce the influence of the FAR within the Party organization.

The representation of the military officers on the Central Committee of the PCC continued to reflect their significant influence in Cuba's only political party. Although the proportional representation of the Cuban military officers on the Central Committee declined between 1975 and 1980, their absolute numbers, as either full members or alternates, increased as the size of the Central Committee grew. This increase in the number of Central Committee members holding military rank paralleled an increase in the number of military officers belonging to the PCC during the latter half of the 1970s. In 1980 military officers on the Central Committee—full and alternate—accounted for slightly over 27 percent of the Central Committee's members. By April 1984 their numbers had increased to over 30 percent of the total. The representation of Cuban military officers at this level of the PCC bureaucracy was considerably greater than the representation of either Soviet or Chinese officers in their respective party organizations.

After its founding in 1965, the PCC was organized most quickly, within the armed forces. The PCC was organized at all commands within the FAR. Each of the three services—the army, air force, and navy—had its own political section. Political bureaus were organized at battalion or regimental levels, and political groups functioned at the level of company, "platoon and squad," battery, or squadron. Political units were organized from below, wherein party cell members did not report directly to the PCC but indirectly through higher-level units that ultimately reported to the armed forces' Central Political Directorate (see fig. 8).

Membership in either the PCC or the UJC was considered a decisive factor in promoting an individual within the FAR. The FAR was considered by the PCC leadership to be an excellent agent for the political indoctrination of nonparty members. Instruction in Marxist-Leninist ideology by a PCC political officer who held rank in the FAR was included as a regular component of basic military training.

The responsibilities of the civic soldier also entailed carrying out the economic mission of the armed forces, which included the organization of civilian sectors of the economy along military lines. The economic role of the Cuban armed forces, like its influence in the PCC, was also larger than that of the Soviet or Chinese armed forces. It was not until after 1973, when increasing Soviet influence resulted in an emphasis on military professionalism and specialization, that the direct involvement of the armed forces in the state economy began to decline.

After the 1973 reorganization of the FAR, a number of production-related tasks previously assigned to the armed forces were turned over to civilians. Defense-related work assigned by government ministries to civilians employed in production or in the field of education, however, did not revert to the armed forces. At the same time, all productive labor came to be viewed not only as an economic contribution that enhanced national security but also as a social duty. The result was an increase in the FAR's influence over a civilian population that often found itself working for both nonmilitary and military ends, a situation that prevailed through the mid-1980s.

The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—MINFAR) was created on October 16, 1959, to replace the Batista-era Ministry of Defense. At that time Raúl Castro was appointed minister of the FAR, a post he held into the mid-1980s. After a restructuring of the MINFAR's system of ranks in 1973, Raúl Castro held the rank of general of the army and Fidel Castro, that of commander in chief of the FAR. Also at the top of the MINFAR hierarchy in the mid-1980s were three first vice ministers, all of whom held the rank of division general, and 10 vice ministers.



Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces*, Washington, April 1979, 1-10.

Figure 8. Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba Within the Revolutionary Armed Forces

Between 1959 and the mid-1980s, the MINFAR consisted of three major services: the Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario—ER), the Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force (Defense Antiaérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria—DAAFAR), and the Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria—MGR). In 1972 the DAAFAR and MGR had been established as separate services with their own commands. Various staff directorates augmented the MINFAR's organizational structure (see fig. 9).

The ER was traditionally under the direct control of the chief of the MINFAR General Staff. In early 1985 this position was held by Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, who had been in the post since at least April 1982 and was also a first vice minister of the MINFAR. The DAAFAR was commanded by Division General Julio Casas Regueiro, a vice minister, who had held that command since at least February 1981. During 1984 the command of the MGR passed from Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado—a command he had held since 1972—to Rear Admiral José Cuza Téllez-Girón, who also became a vice minister. Cuza Péllez-Girón was formerly the director of the naval academy.

There were varying estimates of the size of the FAR in early 1985. Data published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies in September 1984 placed the size of the regular armed forces at 153,000, not including the 94,500 conscripts who were then completing their period of conscription, known as General Military Service. The regular ER, which included a proportion of the reserve troops on active duty, was composed of some 125,000 officers and soldiers. In addition, some 75,000 conscripts were assigned to the ER. The DAAFAR force strength was estimated at 16,000, complemented by approximately 11,000 conscripts. The MGR was made up of 12,000 personnel, including 350 naval infantry, plus some 8,500 conscripts.

United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates in early 1985 placed the size of the FAR at 162,000, broken down into 130,000 personnel in the ER, 18,500 in the DAAFAR, and 13,500 in the MGR. These figures did not include members of the combat-ready reserve forces, estimated at 135,000, who could be mobilized on as little as two to four hours notice. Reserve forces were assigned to all three branches of the FAR, yet data regarding the reserves' distribution among them were unavailable.

In 1985 Cuba retained the Western Hemisphere's largest standing army in proportion to its population of 10 million. The size of the professional armed forces did not change dramatically after the time of its restructioning in the early 1970s—when the active-duty armed forces were reduced by some 150,000—and



Source: Based on information from United States Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces,* Washington, April 1979, 1-8 and United States Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba A Reference Aid,* Washington, June 1984, 113.

Figure 9. Organization of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1984

1980. During the mid-1970s the MINFAR had approximately 120,000 regular military personnel. Increases in manpower after 1980 coincided with an increased perception of threats to Cuban security. Whether this growth trend would continue beyond the mid-1980s was uncertain.

Regular military forces were complemented in early 1985 by other organizations with paramilitary duties. The MINFAR's only official paramilitary organization was the Youth Labor Army (Ejército Juvenil de Trabajo—EJT), the size of which was estimated in mid-1984 at 100,000 and whose mission was primarily that of civic action (see Conscription and Military Manpower Resources, this ch.). The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicia de Tropas Territoriales—MTT), created in mid-1980, was made up of some 1.2 million civilians in July 1984, according to Castro. Cuban officials stated that the MTT was established as a deterrent to the threat of a United States invasion (see The Mobilized Population, this ch.). The Civil Defense forces, estimated to be composed of some 100,000 civilians, also complemented the nation's defense organization.

Cuban military expenditures for 1985, as publicly announced by the MINFAR, were estimated at 1.471 billion pesos (roughly equivalent to US$1.765 billion), an increase of almost 26 percent over the 1984 allocation. Military spending also grew at a rate faster than overall government expenditures between 1984 and 1985. Monies allocated to the military sector accounted for 13 percent of the 1985 budget; the comparable figure for 1984 had been only 10.4 percent. These expenditures were consistent with a continual increase in military spending that began in 1965, when defense spending accounted for 8.4 percent of the national budget. Cuban governments have had traditionally high military expenditures, however. In prerevolutionary Cuba it was not uncommon for 15 to 25 percent of the national budget to be spent on the armed forces. This was especially true during Batista's years in power, when military expenditures were used to ensure political support (see Background and Traditions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.).

Additional monies for national defense were obtained through civilian-sponsored fund-raising drives and annual goals set for work centers in order to finance the MTT. Matériel, spare parts, training, and technical assistance provided the Cuban military by the Soviet Union were believed to be furnished free of charge. Although there was no question that at least some of this Soviet military assistance was supplied without cost to the Cuban government, there was discrepancy among analysts as to whether the entire

amount was furnished free of charge (see Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.).

The Revolutionary Army

Troops belonging to the Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario—ER), which represented slightly over 80 percent of the MINFAR's active-duty personnel, were under the direct command of the MINFAR General Staff. The primary mission of Cuban ground forces included the provision of territorial defense against external threats and the maintenance of internal security. A third component of the ground forces' mission—the provision of military assistance, including combat personnel, abroad—was added during the mid-1970s when Cuban troops were sent to fight in Africa. The majority of the forces under the command of the ER was deployed domestically in three independent armies. The Isle of Youth Military Region, established in 1962, was under independent command even though only a single infantry division was stationed there. In early 1985 the MINFAR's two Expeditionary Forces, in Angola and Ethiopia, were treated as separate armies, as were personnel assigned to the foreign Military Assistance Forces (see The Cuban Military Abroad, this ch.).

Although information on the deployment of Cuban personnel was not publicly available, the deployment of units throughout the country was believed to correspond roughly with the geographic distribution of the population. The Western Army, created in late 1970, shared its headquarters with the MINFAR in Havana and commanded troops deployed in the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, and Ciudad de La Habana. As of late 1983 the Western Army was under the command of a division general. The Western Army's armored division, stationed at Managua, near Havana, was considered the premium unit of the MINFAR's ground forces and was the only one of three armored divisions believed to be staffed at full strength. An army corps—composed of three infantry divisions, which at full peacetime establishment consisted of usually only 5,900 troops each—was based at the provincial capital of Pinar del Río. The Western Army also had a single mechanized division, believed to be almost fully manned, that was probably attached to the Havana headquarters. At full strength a mechanized division normally consisted of 8,200 troops.

The Central Army was established in 1961, only 13 days before the Bay of Pigs landing at Playa Girón in Matanzas Province. After the departure several years before of Division General

Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich to command the MTT, the Central Army command had, by March 1985, been given to a brigadier general. Provinces included in the Central Army's command were Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Villa Clara, and Sancti Spíritus; its headquarters was in Santa Clara, Villa Clara, which was also the location of the Las Villas Army Corps. The Central Army was composed of a single armored division, stationed at or near Santa Clara, and a mechanized division in addition to the three infantry divisions attached to the army corps.

The headquarters of the Eastern Army, established in April 1961 and located in Santiago de Cuba, was under the command of a division general in March 1984. Conflicting information existed as of late 1985 regarding the structure of the Eastern Army. It was generally accepted among analysts that at least two army corps were under the control of the Eastern Army. Those bodies, the Camagüey Army Corps—encompassing the provinces of Ciego de Ávila and Camagüey—and the Holguín—Army Corps—encompassing the provinces of Las Tunas and Holguín—had headquarters in the capitals of those provinces for which they were named. The Southern Army Corps commanded units deployed in the provinces of Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantánamo. In the early 1980s the Southern Army Corps was believed responsible for the Guantánamo Frontier Brigade, the military complement that guards the perimeter just beyond the no-man's-land surrounding the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Forces attached to the Eastern Army included an armored division assigned to the Santiago de Cuba headquarters, a mechanized division, and as many as nine infantry divisions, provided three divisions were assigned to each army corps, as was usually the case.

Under normal circumstances each of the three armies, plus the Isle of Youth Military Region, reported directly to the MINFAR General Staff. During a crisis, however, the command structures of the armies were designed to operate independently. Each army was to assume full command responsibility for its ground forces as well as all paramilitary forces, official and unofficial, including the EJT, the civilian MTT, and the civilian Civil Defense forces (see Conscription and Military Manpower Resources; The Mobilized Population, this ch.). Whether command and control included the army corps continuing to report to their regional headquarters or to the MINFAR in Havana was not known. Contingency plans reportedly included the breakup of domestic forces into small, independent guerrilla groups that would continue to operate after the destruction of the independent army corps. Rumors abounded that weapons caches and stocks of critical supplies were



Mobile radar unit
Photo by John Finan



Cuban T-62 main battle tank on parade
Photo by Karin Anderson

hidden throughout the island in caves and in the mountains for use in such a contingency.

A number of troop formations were independent of the three regional army commands. Among these were eight independent infantry regiments of approximately 1,000 personnel each and no less than eight independent infantry battalions, each having a total of 365 officers and troops, that were identified as having a static defense role. Three of the independent regiments were believed to be located at or near Havana; the remaining five were in the provincial capitals of Pinar del Río, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Camagüey, and Santiago de Cuba. The independent battalions were believed to be located in the cities of Cienfuegos, Sancti Spíritus, Ciego de Ávila, Victoria de las Tunas, Holguín, Bayamo, and Guantánamo.

ER force structure also included an artillery division, composed of at least three field artillery brigades, that was thought to be in command of all smaller artillery units and directly subordinate to the MINFAR command. The ER's armored divisions were considered the premium units of Cuban ground forces. The General Staff Security Battalion, attached to MINFAR headquarters in Havana, and the Airborne Assault and Landing Brigade, composed of two battalions, were also known to be under the command of the ER.

Commands of the Cuban armed forces generally were not manned at full strength during peacetime. Units were maintained at three distinct levels of combat readiness: those manned at full strength by active-duty troops, those manned partly by active-duty troops and reserve forces, and others manned by only a cadre of regular troops augmented by reserves.

ER infantry troops were armed mainly with 7.62mm Soviet Kalishnikov (AKM and AKMS) assault rifles. Other weapons used regularly by infantry personnel included the general purpose 7.62mm Kalishnikov (PK) machine gun and the 7.62mm Kalishnikov (ORPK) light machine gun. In terms of artillery, the extensive use of mortars and multiple rocket launchers was a reflection of the influence of Soviet military doctrine (see table 21, Appendix). Main battle tanks, which accounted for about 850 of Cuba's armored vehicles in 1984, were also used extensively and included the Soviet-manufactured T-62, T-54, and T-55. ER inventory included some SA-7 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles and possibly some SA-3s, but air defense was primarily the concern of the DAAFAR.

The Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force

The Cuban Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air force (Defensa Antiaérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria—DAAFAR), whose origins date back to the single aircraft that constituted the Rebel Air Force in April 1958, was established as a separate service branch in April 1972 and had a command structure separate from that of the ER. The commander of the DAAFAR in early 1985 was Division General Casas. The second in command, the first deputy chief of the DAAFAR, acted as the chief of troops. His command comprised approximately 12 percent of all MINFAR regular forces. The DAAFAR's formal mission was recognized in the late 1970s as providing national air defense, tactical and airlift

support for ground forces and, on a selective basis, foreign military assistance.

The DAAFAR was believed to be organized into three regional air zones, similar to the ER, and its units were frequently rotated and deployed among them, based on operational requirements. The headquarters of the DAAFAR was located at the Campo Libertad Air Base near Havana. The exact geographic breakdown of the DAAFAR's three air zones was not known. The territory encompassed under the command of the Western Air Brigade, whose honorific name was the Playa Girón Guard Air Brigade, was believed to extend from the westernmost province of Pinar del Río as far east as Matanzas Province. Accordingly, air facilities under the command of the Western Air Brigade included the base at San Julián in the province of Pinar del Río, at San Antonio de los Baños and Güines in La Habana, and Varadero in Matanzas. It was unclear whether the air base at Siguanea on the Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth; formerly Isle of Pines) was commanded by the Western Air Brigade.

The divisions and responsibilities of the remaining two commands were even less clear. Nevertheless, based on the pattern established by the location of the DAAFAR's three main fighter bases at San Antonio de los Baños, Santa Clara, and Camagüey, it was reasonable to assume that the fighter bases distribution represented the rough territorial divisions among the three regional air zones. San Antonio de los Baños was located on Cuba's southern coast, directly south of Havana. Santa Clara was the capital of central Villa Clara Province. Camagüey was the capital of the province by the same name in east-central and eastern commands, in addition to Santa Clara and Camagüey, appeared to include facilities at the cities of Cienfuegos, Sancti Spíritus, Holguín, and Santiago de Cuba.

In mid-1984 the DAAFAR was reported to have between two and four fighter-ground attack squadrons equipped with a minimum of 30 MiG-23s. At least two of the squadrons were believed to be based at San Antonio de los Baños and Santa Clara. Analysts listed the number of interceptor squadrons controlled by the DAAFAR as between six and 16, depending on how certain aircraft were designated. The interceptor squadrons were equipped mainly with MiG-21s. In 1979 the MiG-21 was considered the principal combat aircraft used by the DAAFAR. One source noted that a total of 90 MiG-17s and MiG-19s made up an additional six fighter-bomber squadrons. By the mid-1980s the DAAFAR was reported to be replacing the MiG-17s assigned to the fighter-bomber squadrons with MiG-23s.

At least four interceptor squadrons as well as four fighter-bomber squadrons were understood to be under the central air zone's command. The DAAFAR's four main transport squadrons were equipped with Il-14s, An-2s, An-24s, and An-26s and were based in Havana and San Antonio de los Baños—under the Western Air Brigade's command—and in Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba under the command of the central and eastern air zones, respectively. The three regional commands were each believed to have two helicopter squadrons, equipped mainly with Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters, some of which were reported to be armed. The Mi-24s that made up the single helicopter gunship squadron were thought to be assigned to the eastern air zone. The first Mi-24s arrived in Cuba in early 1982 and were armed with a 57mm cannon, minigun, and rocket pods.

Publicly available figures regarding the organization and size of the DAAFAR's air fleet varied considerably depending on the source consulted (see table 21, Appendix). There was a consensus, however, that the number of Soviet-supplied MiG combat aircraft in the Cuban air force was at least 200 to 250 in mid-1984. In June 1984 Adrian J. English, writing in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, identified three DAAFAR operational commands as the Air Defense Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the Air Transport Command. The Air Transport Command was reportedly able to call on the state-owned commercial aviation company, Cubana de Aviación, for operational support. Cubana reportedly had nine long-range Il-62 and four medium- to long-range Tu-154 transports in 1983. Its aircraft were used by the MINFAR in the late 1970s to airlift troops to Africa (see The Cuban Military Abroad, this ch.).

The Air Defense Command had jurisdiction over 24 surface-to-air missile batteries equipped with SA-2 missiles and 12 batteries equipped with SA-3s and SA-7s. Interceptor units were also under the Air Defense Command. In addition, this command was responsible for the operations of Cuba's electronic air defense and early warning system. The six fighter-bomber and two fighter-ground attack squadrons were under the Tactical Air Command.

The DAAFAR's principal flight training program was carried out at the Military Aviation School at the San Julián Air Base in western Cuba and was commanded by a brigadier general in early 1981 (see Professional Military Training, this ch.). Trainers included approximately two dozen MiG-15UTIs, MiG-21Us, and MiG-23Us. Czechoslovak-manufactured Zlin-326s were used as basic trainers. Several transports, including Il-14s and An-2s, were also used for training. Those completing advanced training programs usually attended flight schools in the Soviet Union.

The Revolutionary Navy

The Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria—MGR), whose manpower represented about 7 percent of active-duty MINFAR troops, was the smallest of the three armed services. In 1979 approximately 75 percent of the MGR's personnel were believed assigned to shore-bound units. The MGR was officially established in August 1963, even though it had been active in the years immediately following the victory of the Revolution. Like the DAAFAR, its autonomous command was established in 1972, and its headquarters was located in Havana. The commander of the MGR in early 1985 was Rear Admiral José Cuza Téllez-Girón. The MGR's missions included coastal defense, provision of escort protection to ships belonging to the merchant marine or fishing fleets, and surveillance of Cuban territorial waters, both to support coastal defense and to prevent the unauthorized exit of Cuban nationals or others from the island. By the mid-1980s the MGR was also hoping to upgrade its limited antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities in order to enhance its defense posture. The MGR worked closely with the MTT and the Border Guard Troops in carrying out its coastal defense mission (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.).

The MGR's forces were divided among three territorial commands, in a deployment pattern similar to the ER and the DAAFAR. The oldest command was that of the Western Naval Flotilla, established at the time of the MGR's creation in 1963. The Western Naval Flotilla was also identified as the Granma Landing Guard Flotilla. Its command included patrol of the territorial waters and coasts corresponding to the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, and Ciudad de La Habana, as well as the Isla de la Juventud. The major naval bases at Mariel and Havana fell under the Western Naval Flotilla's command. The naval academy, once located at Mariel, had been moved by mid-1984 to Punta Santa Ana, between Mariel and Havana.

The Central Naval Flotilla covered territory corresponding to the coasts of Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Villa Clara, and Sancti Spíritus provinces. In addition to the Varadero Naval Base was the facility at Cienfuegos—the site at which the MGR's submarines were based. The MGR's submarine training school was also at the Cienfuegos Naval Base. The construction of the submarine base at Cienfuegos raised United States security concerns in mid-1970 when it was discovered that Soviet personnel were constructing facilities capable of servicing their own ballistic missile-carrying submarines. This was considered a violation of the 1962 United States-Soviet understanding that settled the Cuban missile crisis

and prohibited the emplacement by the Soviet Union of offensive weapons systems on the island. As a result of strong United States objections, the construction of the strategic submarine support facility was abandoned in late 1970.

The Eastern Naval Flotilla included the coasts and waters corresponding to the provinces of Ciego de Ávila, Camagüey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguín, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantánamo. The territory under the command of the Eastern Naval Flotilla represented approximately one-half of the island's 3,735 kilometers of coastline. Major bases controlled by the Eastern Naval Flotilla included facilities at Nuevitas in Camagüey, the Bahía de Nipe in Holguín, and at Santiago de Cuba.

In terms of operational command, the seagoing units of the MGR were divided into separate flotillas (some identified as divisions), which were further subdivided into squadrons. These included a submarine division, a missile boat flotilla, a torpedo boat flotilla, a submarine chaser flotilla, and a minesweeper division. The submarines were the only permanently based vessels. Patrol craft, the largest of which were 60-ton ex-Soviet Zhuk-class fast-attack craft, were also deployed among the regional commands.

The transfer of two former Soviet Foxtrot-class attack submarines delivered in 1979 and 1980 and a third delivered in January 1984 greatly enhanced the MGR's ability to patrol its territorial waters. Among other major vessels transferred to Cuba by the Soviet Union were four Osa-IIs, delivered in late 1982, and a Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boat, delivered in late 1983, bringing the total of Turya-class vessels in the MGR's inventory to eight or nine. The second 1,800-ton Koni-class frigate was delivered in January 1984.

The MGR was also believed to operate a small fleet of shore-based Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters used in surveillance and search-and-rescue operations. A single Whiskey-class submarine was used exclusively for training. The 165-ton Osa-class and 75-ton Komar-class missile attack craft were considered the Cuban fleet's most potent vessels in the early 1980s. The Osa-class vessels—both Osa Is and Osa IIs—were armed with four SS–N–2 surface-to-surface missile launchers in addition to four L65 30mm guns. The Komar-class craft had two SS-N-2 missile launchers and two L80 twin 25mm guns. The range of Styx missiles was approximately 40 kilometers. In the early 1980s the MGR was believed to have in its fleet between eight and 10 Komar-class and 18 Osa-class vessels in fully operational condition (see table 21, Appendix).

Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces

Although formal diplomatic relations were established by Cuba with the Soviet Union in May 1960, the consolidation of Cuban-Soviet amity did not occur until nearly a decade later. Between 1970 and 1985 improved relations between the Cuban and the Soviet governments proved critical in terms of the MINFAR's professionalization and the development of its military capabilities.

One of the first indications of the growing Soviet influence on the Cuban armed forces was the 1973 MINFAR reorganization. Increased emphasis was placed on professionalization and military discipline. The development of the MINFAR's technical capabilities also resulted from the decision to assign greater numbers of regular troops to exclusively military tasks (see The Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Government, this ch.). The system of military ranks—made up of varying grades within the single rank of "commander"—was restructured to conform to more universally accepted standards. The reorganization also resulted in a decrease in the size of the armed forces to some 120,000 personnel.

After 1975 Soviet support included the provision of airlifts and sealifts of Soviet equipment and supplies and Cuban troops to the MINFAR's Expeditionary Forces in Africa (see The Cuban Military Abroad, this ch.) The Soviets undertook an intensive force modernization program that increased both the level and the sophistication of the matériel it provided the MINFAR. During the late 1970s, as United States-Cuban relations again became hostile, the level of sophistication of the military equipment provided by the Soviets increased markedly.

By the early 1980s Cuba was receiving the most advanced military equipment that the Soviet Union was willing to export to any of its allies. This enabled the Cuban FAR to become one of the best educated, equipped, and disciplined of armed forces in the Western Hemisphere. Deliveries of military equipment and supplies increased markedly after 1981, the beginning of a new five-year economic planning cycle. Between 1981 and 1984, according to United States government sources, Cuba received an average of US$750 billion a year in Soviet military assistance. During these four years Soviet merchant ships delivered an estimated 200,000 tons of military equipment in contrast to the 21,000-ton annual average over the previous 10 years. The increased assistance was believed to include light weapons destined for the newly created MTT and equipment for increasing the mechanization, mobility, and armored capacities of the MINFAR ground forces. Soviet military assistance to Cuba traditionally included arms and equipment as well

as technical training and advice with respect to Cuban military operations. Cuba relied on soviet technical personnel for the maintenance and repair of much of the more sophisticated equipment in its inventory and for the petroleum, oil and lubricants they require.

The continuing relations also allowed the Soviet Union to maintain a regular, peacetime presence in Cuba. Through the mid-1980s Soviet naval flotillas and reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft routinely paid visits to Cuba and often carried out joint Soviet-Cuban maneuvers off the coasts of Havana or Cienfuegos. As part of the naval ship visit program begun in 1969, about 24 naval task groups had visited Cuba by the end of 1984. The largest electronic intelligence collection facility located outside the Soviet Union was in operation at Lourdes on Cuba's northern coast near Havana, monitoring the military and civilian communications of the United States as well as of other countries, if desired. There was also considerable concern among United States strategic planners in the mid-1980s that Cuba could be used as a recovery and relaunch platform for the long-range TU-26 strategic bomber. The island was a likely site for the refueling and resupply of nuclear-equipped Soviet submarines.

A Soviet military advisory group on the island, made up of some 2,500 to 2,800 personnel in early 1985, provided technical advice in support of the MINFARs more sophisticated weaponry. Some advisers were also believed attached to Cuban ground units. A separate group, a ground forces brigade, was believed to number between 2,600 to 3,000 troops. It was the "discovery" of this force in August 1979 that raised United States concerns over the possible stationing of Soviet combat forces on the island (see Cuba in the Late 1970s, ch. 1). It was later recognized that the formation had been known to have been on the island since at least 1962 and did not have significant airlift and sealift capabilities that might enable it to engage in combat outside of Cuba. Although the unit was not the combat brigade it was initially believed to be, the administration of President Jimmy Carter subsequently ordered an increase in surveillance of the island and the establishment of the joint United States Forces Caribbean Command at Key West, which in 1981 was upgraded to Commander, United States Forces Caribbean. In 1982 the ground forces brigade consisted of one tank and three motorized rifle battalions as well as various combat and support units. Its likely mission was to provide security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet facilities, such as the Lourdes monitoring complex, and to provide a symbol of Soviet support. Brigade members may also have been involved in training Cuban personnel in the use of sophisticated Soviet equipment, such as the

T-62 main battle tanks, BMP combat carriers, and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns, delivered in the late 1970s.

Most observers agreed that this aid and influence enabled the Soviet Union to exercise some leverage in Cuban military decision-making, not only with respect to the utilization of the equipment provided but also with respect to the deployment of Cuban armed forces. Analysts debated, however, the extent to which the prestige among fellow Third World nations earned by the presence of the Cuban Expeditionary Forces in Angola and Ethiopia had helped provide Cuba a counterbalance to the Soviet leverage. Nevertheless, given the continuing close nature of the two countries' relations between 1970 and 1985 and the levels of sophisticated Soviet-supplied military equipment in the Cuban inventory, it was likely that the MINFAR would continue to rely on and receive military assistance from the Soviet Union through the remainder of the 1980s.

Conscription and Military Manpower Resources

Under the provisions of the 1973 Law of General Military Service, all Cuban males between the ages of 16 and 50 were required to perform a minimum of three years service in the active-duty military, the military reserve, or both. Although compulsory military service had first been instituted by the Castro government in 1963, the 1973 regulation expanded the kinds of military service to be performed by conscripts. General Military Service options included being drafted into either the paramilitary Youth Labor Army (Ejército Juvenil de Trabajo—EJT) or the regular armed forces units or performing alternative civilian social service at places and posts designated by the government. Women were exempt from obligatory service, yet were eligible to enlist in the armed forces after age 16. Those women with special training were eligible to be members of the reserve forces until age 40 (see Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.).

Males were required to register with the local military committee after reaching their sixteenth birthday and were then issued a certificate showing that they had registered. Those between the ages of 16 and 28 who had not completed some form of military service were called prerecruits and were required to undergo military instruction, which included ideological preparation, during evenings and weekends. Vocational training was also provided. Most prerecruits were between the ages of 17 and 20.

Induction calls for General Military Service were held twice annually. Youth were required to pass a physical examination before being accepted for basic training. Most basic training was carried out at camps located closest to the youth's home. Depending on the unit, basic training lasted between 45 and 60 days in the late 1970s. It reportedly included classroom and field instruction held six days a week from 5:00 A.M. to almost 10:00 P.M. On Sunday, their only day off, recruits were reportedly restricted to base. After completion of basic training, recruits took an oath of enlistment and began their three years of military service. Assignments were made based on aptitude shown during basic training. By the late 1970s there was believed to be growing popular dissatisfaction with the requirements of General Military Service that was partly attributed to the demands placed on the Cuban population and the armed forces by the commitment of combat troops in Africa.

Those youth completing their General Military Service with units of the active-duty armed forces were encouraged to enlist in the regular military and permitted to do so at any time during their three-year term of service. Those who did enlist signed an agreement for a minimum of five years of service, which included any previous time served. Pay, uniforms, and privileges were better for members of the regular armed forces than for those completing General Military Service. During the early 1980s slightly under 30,000 youth were accepted each year for service with regular MINFAR troops.

According to the 1973 Law of Social Service, all students attending schools of higher education for technical, scientific, or cultural studies were required to provide up to three years of service to the nation in the field of their expertise and were usually assigned to a government ministry to carry out their service. Deferrals for General Military Service and social service were available on a limited basis for students pursuing higher education. Political pull was reported by some sources as influencing one's chances of obtaining a deferral. Those receiving deferments were still required to complete their active service at a later date, usually by the time they were 28 years old. Upon completion of their education, those who trained in what were considered "necessary" or "essential" fields, such as engineering or medicine, were allowed to perform alternative social service, as stipulated by the social service law, while pursuing their careers. Those students who did choose to enter the armed forces after completing their education usually became commissioned officers working in technical fields.

The Youth Labor Army

Members of the 100,000-strong EJT, which was granted its official paramilitary status after the 1973 reorganization of the armed forces, were formally inducted into either the MINFAR or the Ministry of Interior, the governmental body responsible for internal security (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.). The MINFAR reserved the right to assign EJT inductees to work for other government agencies. Those completing General Military Service who were assigned to the EJT usually had no education beyond the sixth grade or were considered social misfits. The primary missions of the EJT included contributing to the country's economic development, providing for the political indoctrination and education of its personnel, and assisting with territorial defense. After 1977 a system of military ranks separate from that of the regular armed forces was established for the EJT.

The Reserves

MINFAR reserve troops—of whom at least 125,000 could be rapidly mobilized—were divided between first and second reserves. The two reserves were distinguished by the political reliability of their members and their level of readiness. Those belonging to the first reserve had completed their General Military Service. They were divided among those who reportedly could be mobilized within four hours' notice and those who could be mobilized in two to four days; younger reserve members were usually mobilized before those closer to the upper age limit for military service. Those reservists also played a crucial combat role in supporting the regular MINFAR troops in Africa. The second reserve consisted mainly of politically unreliable individuals and even criminals. They also had received less training than first reserve members.

All members of the reserves spent a minimum of 45 days each year on active duty with the regular MINFAR troop units to which they were assigned. The MINFAR also had the right to demand more time of the reservists, if required. Those fulfilling their 45 days of service while serving with full-time regular troops received pay equal to their regular civilian salaries. Those fulfilling their reserve service requirement during the evenings and on weekends did not receive remuneration. Reservists were guaranteed reemployment upon completion of their full-time service requirement.

Most youth became members of the reserve forces after completing their military service requirement. The proportion of reserve troops serving alongside regular forces varied, based on three distinct levels of manning, from units with almost no reserve per-

sonnel to those manned almost entirely by reserve forces (see The Revolutionary Army, this ch.). Reserve ranks were distinguished from regular military ranks only by the addition of the word "reserve." In 1979 the highest-ranking reserve officer was believed to be a colonel.

Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces

Women's Voluntary Military Service was established as a result of efforts by the mass organization representing women, the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC), in mid-1983. Women who volunteered for service were generally between ages 18 and 21 and were active in the FMC or the UJC, or both organizations in some instances. Applications for enlistment in Women's Voluntary Military Service were coordinated by and made directly to the FMC. New volunteers were accepted twice a year and signed up for two-year tours of duty. Training appeared to be carried out at each province's military recruitment center. In late 1984 the female volunteers were organized into a single combat unit, the First Female Regiment of Antiaircraft Artillery, which was created March 8, 1984.

Women belonging to the FAR were eligible to become officers; the woman in command of the female artillery regiment in late 1984 held the rank of major. The only impediment to the upward mobility of female officers through the ranks of the FAR appeared to be that opportunities for professional military education were limited. The only professional education program open to them beyond the pre-university level was sponsored by the Military Technical Institute (see Professional Military Training, this ch.). One account noted that by late 1983 women in the regular FAR accounted for less than 10 percent of its personnel and for only 3 percent of the MINFAR officials. At that time the highest ranking woman was a lieutenant colonel serving as a judge in the Military Justice Department.

The Mobilized Population

The Territorial Troops Militia

The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicia de Tropas Territoriales—MTT) was created by the Cuban government on May 1, 1980, under the command of the MINFAR. The commander of the

MTT in early 1985 was Division General Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich, a MINFAR vice minister, a title also held by the commanders of the FAR's three armed services. The first units of the MTT were established in eastern Cuba at a ceremony led by Castro on January 20, 1981, the same day—as Castro noted in his speech—that United States president Ronald Reagan took his oath of office. Within two years the size of the MTT had grown to 500,000, and in July 1983 Castro announced the decision to increase it to 1 million. By May 1984 the government revealed that this goal had been reached. On July 26, 1984—exactly a year after the decision to increase rapidly the force's size—Castro declared that the MTT, including its reserves, was 1.2 million strong.

The MTT rank and file were composed mainly of men above draft age who were not active members of the MINFAR reserve or Civil Defense forces, young men between ages 16 and 18, and women of all ages. Participation in the MTT was voluntary. Public consideration was given by Cuban officials in late 1984 to possibly lowering the age for MTT youth membership to include 15-year-olds. In late 1982 approximately 25 percent of MTT members were women, according to Castro.

Members of the MTT were identified by their uniform—a blue shirt, olive-drab trousers, and combat boots—which was the traditional uniform of Cuban militia members dating back to the militias first organized in the early 1960s. Those volunteering for the standard five-year term of service with the MTT agreed to undergo at least 40 hours of annual troop training and spend 10 days with their mobilized battalions in the field. Militia members were required to repeat and sign oaths of service before being issued their light arms.

MTT forces were organized from the levels of platoons and companies to those of regiments and divisions. The largest formation was the MTT's single army corps, organized in 1984. A women's battalion was established at the headquarters of each MTT regiment (in provincial capitals), and every municipal battalion had at least one company composed entirely of female militia members. MINFAR officers commanded provincial and municipal MTT formations. The president of all provincial and municipal assemblies of people's power also had a MINFAR officer assigned to them in order to assist in the handling of all matters related to the MTT or to defense in general.

According to Raúl Castro the MTT's wartime mission was to include fighting alongside, and providing replacements for, regular armed forces personnel; protecting strategic defense positions, such as bridges, highways, railroads, factories, and towns; and undertak-

ing any other measures of harassment that might immobilize, wear out, and ultimately destroy an enemy invader. The 336-page *Basic Manual of the Territorial Troops Militia Member* outlined these objectives and described procedures to be followed in the event of an attack. Training of MTT units was usually carried out on weekends or in the evenings after work in order not to interfere with a worker's productivity or a student's studies. In addition to receiving field training in the handling and use of light weaponry, the militia members were taught military discipline. MTT maneuvers were conducted in collaboration with the MINFAR and the Ministry of Interior; militia members were also trained for operations in a chemical and biological warfare environment. More formal instruction was provided at MTT military training centers or MTT schools established in most provinces. The Andrés Voisin MTT Officers' School in Havana provided advanced training for aspiring civilian MTT commanders. MTT educational programs were controlled by the MINFAR's MTT directorate rather than by MINFAR's directorate responsible for professional training programs (see Professional Military Training, this ch.).

Civil Defense

The civilian-based Civil Defense forces, the institutional remnant of the National Revolutionary Militia (Milicia Nacional Revolucionaria—MNR), also had paramilitary responsibilities in the mid-1980s. The latest available estimate regarding the force's size, published in 1979, indicated that some 100,000 civilians constituted the body. The mission of Civil Defense at that time was to provide for local defense and rear-area security during wartime and, in the event of a peacetime disaster, to aid the civilian population and help protect economic centers. These responsibilities overlapped those assigned the MTT after its creation in 1980. In view of this, it was unclear what impact the rapid development of the MTT might have had on Civil Defense.

The origins of Civil Defense dated to the changing perceptions of national defense requirements during the early 1960s. The MNR, like FAR, was organized in October 1959 and was originally conceived of as a vehicle to mobilize rural and urban working-class support for the revolutionary government. It was also designed to support FAR regular troops and to provide for rear-area security. The role played by the MNR in helping defeat the counterrevolutionary guerrilla forces based in the Sierra de Escambray during the early 1960s was reported to be significant.

Militia members
Photo by John Finan

At its peak in 1962 the MNR was composed of some 500,000 citizens. The reorientation of Cuban defense policy in 1963 resulted in the reorganization of the MNR. The body was renamed the Popular Defense Force, was trained and organized into combat units, and was deployed to provide security at government- and state-owned installations. Another policy decision in 1965 led to the disarming and downgrading of the force's status. In mid-1966 the group was officially disbanded, and its personnel were divided between the two newly organized groups of Civil Defense and the FAR reserve forces. The mission of supporting regular military personnel was absorbed by the new reserve troops.

Civil Defense forces were controlled by the MINFAR's Civil Defense National Staff, a body directly subordinate to the minister of the FAR rather than to the MINFAR General Staff. The chief of the National Staff in early 1985 was Brigadier General Guillermo Rodríguez del Pozo, a vice minister of the FAR. Regular MINFAR

officers were in command of Civil Defense at both the national and the provincial levels.

Members of the PCC were reported to hold key positions throughout the organization. Rank-and-file members of Civil Defense in the late 1970s included men and women; units were organized at the workplace as well as at schools. A special school also trained Civil Defense personnel for both combat-related and nonmilitary tasks (see Professional Military Training, this ch.).

Civilian Defense Preparedness

The mid-1983 creation of defense zones throughout Cuba represented the Castro government's renewed commitment to maintaining a high level of civilian defense preparedness. The formation of these zones was designed to help ensure and support Cuban defense, security, and internal order and to provide a deterrent, by "waging a people's war," to any foreign aggression. At the national level civilian combat readiness activities were under the supervision of Civil Defense, although both the government and the PCC coordinated and guided the defense zone activities. Defense councils were responsible for the organization of civilian activities at both the provincial and the municipal levels. Municipalities were subdivided into defense zones, each of which organized a local defense unit around its local Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comité de Defensa de la Revolución—CDR), which was directly subordinate to its particular municipal Defense Council. These defense zone units were to become fully operational in wartime. The mobilization of CDR members, estimated at about 6 million in 1985, was expected to add considerably to Cuba's defensive capabilities in any conventional conflict.

The coordinated activities of the defense zones included the construction of concrete-reinforced underground shelters—supplied with electricity, water, and special areas for children—and other fortifications that would help protect the civilian population from an external attack. Members of the MTT, Civil Defense, and those citizens who were active in other mass and party organizations in addition to the CDRs were believed to play a crucial role in the execution of these activities, which also included providing for the defense of work centers and other economically productive endeavors. The principal members of the defense zone units were women and either the very young or the very old. Members of the MTT and of the military reserves, who regularly participated in defense zone activities, were expected to be called for duty by their respective organizations during wartime. Many of the projects undertaken

by the defense zone units were reportedly modeled on the experience gained by Vietnam's civilian population in facing United States air attacks.

In June 1984 the Cuban government announced publicly its decision to require all citizens to undergo compulsory military training one Sunday each month. As a result, civilians dedicated that day, designated Red Sunday, to learning how to handle firearms and dig trenches in order to prepare for national defense.

On the weekends of Red Sunday, military defense exercises—in which the vast majority of the civilian population participated—began to be held at different locations throughout the island. These exercises, in addition to the routine firearms practice and trench digging, included evacuation drills, first-aid training, firefighting, and the implementation of plans for agitation and propaganda dissemination designed to hamper consolidation efforts by an occupying force. They were carried out in response to simulated land or air attacks and were reviewed by FAR and, often, PCC officials who judged the participants' level of combat readiness.

The renewed mobilization of the society at large was reminiscent of efforts carried out in the early 1960s when components of the MNR and the CDRs helped repel the United States-Cuban exile coordinated assault in April 1961 (see Toward a Soviet Model, 1961–62, ch. 1). This high state of popular mobilization appeared to have been relaxed after 1965—after the defeat of the counterrevolutionaries in the Sierra de Escambray and the decline in attacks by Miami-based Cuban exiles on the island—and had reached a low point during the mid-1970s.

Professional Military Training

Cuba's system of professional military education was under the control of the MINFAR's Directorate of Military Training Centers and Noncombat Training, an entity directly subordinate to the General Staff. The programs of the upper-level military educational institutions were granted university status as a result of raised enrollment standards in the last half of the 1970s. In mid-1982 the director for all military education held the rank of brigadier general.

The MINFAR's senior service school, the General Máximo Gómez Revolutionary Armed Forces Academy, was founded in July 1963, and after December 1976 it was located in western La Habana Province. The academy provided the highest level of military education available in Cuba to middle- and upper-level officers

from the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops and to officers from all three of the MINFAR's services (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.). By the mid-1980s attendance at the school had become a requisite for officers hoping to be assigned to the MINFAR General Staff. Programs offered at the academy were said to be similar to those offered at middle- and senior-level United States advanced officer training schools, such as the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. A chemical troops program was reportedly included in the school's curriculum along with other more standard courses dealing with national security issues and resource management. Extension courses were provided through the academy, enabling qualified active-duty officers under the age of 40 to further their professional training.

The General Antonio Maceo Interservice School was located in Ceiba del Agua, a short distance southeast of the capital, and was founded in February 1963. Programs of instruction were designed primarily for members of armored and mechanized infantry units and for engineering and logistics personnel. The school's three- and four-year programs emphasized training of tactical and technical command officers. Courses were also provided for chemical troops and communications and transport specialists. A special program was offered for training the MINFAR's political officers, those with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of ideological integrity within the armed forces. The requirements for admission stipulated only that those in attendance have a minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between the ages of 15 and 21.

The Comandante Camilo Cienfuegos Artillery School was founded in 1963 at La Cabaña Fortress in Havana harbor. All field and antiaircraft artillery officers underwent advanced training at the school, receiving a degree in science or engineering upon completion of their studies. A five-year course trained military engineers in munitions, armaments, and antiaircraft electronic systems. Those admitted to the engineering programs were required to have graduated from a university preparatory school, technical institute, or high school and to be between the ages of 17 and 21. The four-year courses prepared officers who would assume command of field and antiaircraft artillery, reconnaissance, and radio-technical units. In addition, courses were provided for political officers assigned to field and artillery units. Requirements for the four-year course were identical to those for the five-year engineering course.

The Military Technical Institute, located in Havana and founded in 1966, offered the most sophisticated technical training programs available in Cuba to MINFAR personnel. By 1979 over

1,000 technical officers had completed the school's four- and five-year programs. All three services were believed eligible to send personnel there for training; it was the only advanced military school that accepted women in the early 1980s. Those enrolled in the five-year program received instruction in field artillery, infantry weapons, tanks, and transport, becoming qualified mechanical engineers upon graduation. A five-year program was available for construction engineers and was open to both military and civilian personnel in the late 1970s. Requirements for admission to the five-year programs included graduation from a university preparatory school and being between the ages of 17 and 21.

Two less advanced four-year programs were offered. The first provided training for those who would graduate as electromechanical technicians and mechanical technicians. Electromechanical technicians' work focused primarily on antiaircraft artillery weapons. General mechanical technicians received training related to field artillery, infantry armaments, tanks, and transports. Admission standards to the four-year programs were less stringent than those for the longer courses, requiring only that applicants have a minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between 16 and 21 years of age. Political loyalty, although not an outright requirement, was considered to be a factor in determining a student's qualifications for admission to either the four-year or the five-year program. The school's faculty reportedly was composed of Soviet instructors and Cuban nationals trained in the Soviet Union.

The General José Maceo y Grajales Interservice School, located in Santiago de Cuba and founded in 1980, trained personnel from armored, motorized infantry, artillery, and engineering units. In late 1984 the school reportedly had a role in training civilian MTT commanders and political officers (see The Mobilized Population, this ch.). Advanced training for artillery officers was offered at the General Carlos Roloff Communications and Chemical Troops School at San José de las Lajas in La Habana Province. Those completing a four- to five-year course of study graduated as operational engineers.

Eleven Camilo Cienfuegos Military Vocational Schools had been established in various provinces by mid-1984, two of which were controlled by the navy, another by the DAAFAR, and a fourth by the EJT. The remaining seven schools were controlled by the army. The first Camilo Cienfuegos school was opened in 1966 in Matanzas Province to provide a preuniversity education for youth—male and female—between the ages of 11 and 17. The schools' first graduates completed their studies in 1971.

The general curriculum paralleled that offered by civilian schools; additional introductory courses provided the students with a basic knowledge of military tactics, handling of light weapons, topography, chemical defense, and engineering. Military discipline and drills were also part of the schools' curriculum. Most students admitted had been active in the youth affiliates of the PCC—either the UJC or the Organization of José Martí Pioneers. Many gained admittance, in part, at least, by virtue of their parents membership in the FAR and PCC. Party loyalty was a definite criterion in the allocation of the schools' cadetships. Furthermore, preference was given to Camilo Cienfuegos School graduates in obtaining admission to more advanced military schools. It was anticipated by the MINFAR in the early 1980s that the next generation of FAR officers would be almost entirely composed of graduates from these preuniversity institutions.

Each branch of the armed forces had its own schools and service academies. Included among these schools were the Naval Academy, at Punta Santa Ana near Havana, which trained both MGR personnel and those from the merchant marine; the DAA-FAR's Military Aviation School, located at San Julián in Pinar del Río Province, and the Technical School of Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force. The Antonio Maceo Interservice School acted as the ER's service academy.

MINFAR officers also received training in the Soviet Union; those pursuing strictly professional careers often completed postgraduate studies at the F.V. Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. By the late 1970s hundreds of MINFAR personnel were believed to undergo training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe each year. Most enlisted troops were trained by the units to which they were assigned. Soviet military advisers were assigned to many Cuban units and assisted in training (see Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.).

Rank Insignia and Uniforms

The MINFAR's system of military ranks underwent a second major revision in late 1976, creating a system that corresponded closely with that used by most Western armed forces (see fig. 10). A minor revision to the MINFAR's regulations was made in mid-1978 when stars replaced chevrons on the rank insignia for junior officers and a new rank was created within the warrant officer class of all three services.

In early 1959 the only military ranks that existed were those inherited from the Rebel Army, consisting of lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major. Fidel Castro held the rank of commander in chief. In the latter part of 1959 the rank of second lieutenant was added to the military echelons. Between 1963 and 1973 the ranks of first captain, division commander, corps commander, and army commander were established; only that of first captain was actually conferred, however. The rank of second captain was created in 1970.

A December 1973 law recognized the rank of commander in chief as that representing the highest echelon of the FAR. Also established, in descending order, were the ranks of army commander, corps commander, division commander, and brigade commander; among first-class officers, the ranks of first commander, commander, and major; and among junior officers, captain, first lieutenant, lieutenant, and second lieutenant.

Law No. 1315, issued in November 1976, and the minor change in regulations made on July 28, 1976, established the system of ranks that remained in place in early 1985. These ranks were held by personnel assigned to infantry, artillery, armor, engineering, communications, the air force, and the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.). In the case of officers who were specialists, their field of specialty was added after their rank. Reserve personnel used the same means of identification, although "reserve" was added to their rank. A separate system of ranks was created for personnel belonging to the EJT (see Conscription and Military Manpower Resources, this ch.). Fidel Castro retained the rank of commander in chief, and Raúl Castro held the rank of general of the army. Other senior officer ranks included army corps general, division general, and brigadier general (*general de brigada*). First-class officer ranks were composed of, in descending order, colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major; junior officers' ranks included captain, first lieutenant, lieutenant, and second lieutenant. The warrant officer class was composed of the ranks of chief warrant officer, established in 1978, and warrant officer. Sergeants were divided into first through third classes, and privates were divided into private first class and private.

The MGR's senior officer corps was composed of the ranks of admiral, vice admiral, and rear admiral. First-class officers served in the ranks of ship captain, frigate captain, and corvette captain, and junior officers served in the ranks of ship lieutenant, frigate lieutenant, corvette lieutenant, and ensign. As with ground and air personnel, the warrant officer class was divided into the ranks of

ARMY AND AIR FORCE[1]	Subteniente	Teniente / Primer Teniente	Capitán	Mayor	Teniente Coronel	Coronel	General de Brigada	General de División	General de Cuerpo	General de Ejército	Comandante en Jefe
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant	Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	Commander in Chief[2]
NAVY	Alférez	Teniente de Corbeta / Teniente de Fragata	Teniente de Navio	Capitán de Corbeta	Capitán de Fragata	Capitán de Navio	Contra Almirante	Vice Almirante	Almirante	[3]	
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Ensign	Lieutenant Junior Grade	Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain	Rear Admiral (Lower Half)	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral	Admiral	

[1] Army and air force officers at the rank of colonel and below are distinguished by red piping and light blue piping, respectively, on their rank insignia. Insignia for army and air force officers at the rank of brigadier general and above are the same for both services.

[2] The rank of commander in chief over all three services was held by Fidel Castro.

[3] No rank.

NOTE—United States equivalents represent ranks of relatively comparable authority and are not necessarily the corresponding ranks for protocol purposes.

Figure 10. Rank Insignia of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Officer Corps and United States Equivalents, 1985

chief warrant officer and warrant officer. Sergeants serving with the MGR were divided into three classes; seamen were divided into seaman first class and seaman.

The olive-drab fatigues made famous by Castro continued to be the standard field uniform for the FAR's ground and air forces' enlisted personnel in early 1985. Enlisted personnel were also issued ceremonial parade, parade, and service uniforms. Enlisted personnel in the MGR were issued a parade uniform, a summer service uniform, a winter service off-duty uniform, a summer service off-duty uniform, and two kinds of work uniforms. There was a special marine parade uniform for the small complement attached to the MGR.

The uniforms issued to the ER's officer corps included a ceremonial parade uniform, parade uniform, various styles of service uniforms, and field uniforms. Air force officers were provided a parade, service, and field uniform. Male members of the MGR officer corps were issued two styles of winter service uniforms and a summer work uniform. Female naval officers were provided two parade uniforms—one for summer and one for winter—and two service uniforms, one for each of the two seasons.

Special uniforms were issued to ground and air forces, including a paratrooper uniform, a chemical warfare uniform, and a tanker uniform. Three kinds of pilot uniforms were used: the conventional uniform, the antigravity uniform, and a special pressurized uniform.

The Cuban Military Abroad

Cuban military forces on active duty outside the country were divided into two groups: the Expeditionary Forces, which included personnel assigned to combat duty, and the Military Assistance Forces, which included personnel assigned to train and advise foreign military personnel. In early 1985 the two Cuban Expeditionary Forces retained the status of independent armies and were assigned to Angola and Ethiopia. Should the Expeditionary Force be withdrawn from either of those locations, it is likely that its status as an army would be downgraded. In late 1984 one estimate placed the total number of Cuban military personnel abroad—including members of the Expeditionary Forces and the Military Assistance Forces—at some 70,000 officers and troops. By early 1985 there appeared to be no reason to assume that this figure, if correct, would decrease substantially.

The Expeditionary Force in Angola

The deployment of the first Cuban combat forces to Angola in 1975 marked the beginning of a new mission for the MINFAR, that of providing official foreign combat support to fellow Third World nations. In early 1985, almost 10 years later, the size of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Angola was estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000.

The level of Cuban involvement and the point at which the Cuban government decided to send troops to fight in Angola continued to be debated in the mid-1980s. Some sources noted that up to 300 Cuban military advisers may have been in Angola as early as May or June 1975, supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA), then led by Agostinho Neto. Cuban relations with the socialist MPLA dated back to at least mid-1965, when approximately 100 Cuban military advisers provided aid and training.

The Cuban government maintained that it had sent combat personnel only after South African forces intervened—shortly before Angola was scheduled to become independent in November 1975. Foreign military support was also provided to the two other domestic contenders for national control, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertaço de Angola—FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para la Independência Total de Angola—UNITA). Under the terms of the Alvor Agreement, worked out with the Portuguese colonial government in April 1974, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA would enter into a power-sharing arrangement after independence was granted on November 11, 1975.

As tensions in Angola increased, MPLA leader Neto requested additional Cuban support, possibly in early May. Analysts agreed that Cuba first provided increased amounts of arms and military advisers to the MPLA before sending in combat personnel. It was believed that the Cuban government initially decided sometime in mid-August 1975 to commit a force of up to 3,000 combat personnel. The level of Cuban involvement, however, escalated rapidly. United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger first announced the presence of Cuban combat troops in Angola in an official statement issued on November 24, 1975. The original United States estimate of 15,000 personnel was revised down to 12,000 a few weeks later. The decision to build the Cuban forces up to a level of 20,000 to 30,000 however, had most probably been made in late October or early November.

The 650-man battalion of the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops airlifted to Angola in "Operation Carlota" in early Novem-

ber played a key role in ensuring the victory of the MPLA. According to the Cuban government, the first sealift of Cuban combat personnel was also begun at that time; however, the first of these troops reached Angola only on November 27. Military equipment and supplies were also provided by the Soviet Union and were believed to have first been airlifted in October 1975 via Brazzaville and after Angolan independence, to Luanda, its capital. Most of the Soviet material was shipped by sea. The Soviet Union helped transport Cuban combat troops in airlifts and sealifts.

The most intense period of fighting of the Angolan war came in December 1975, when the major clashes between South African forces and Cuban troops occurred. By early December the Cubans were reported to have been reassessing their continued presence in the country, after having been defeated by highly trained South Africans in several confrontations. The Battle of Bridge 14, from December 9 to 12, was a severe defeat for the Cubans. In late December, however, the United States Congress cut off funding for continued United States Central Intelligence Agency covert operations in Angola and opted to embargo all United States arms shipments to the South African government. The South Africans then began their disengagement from the conflict, and the MPLA consolidated its control over the country as the de facto national power, excluding UNITA and the FNLA. At the peak of the war the Cuban military presence in Angola reached a total of 36,000 troops; of these possibly as many as 80 percent were members of the reserves.

After Neto's death in 1979, the People's Republic of Angola was led by President José Eduardo dos Santos and continued to receive Cuban military assistance as the Expeditionary Force remained in the country to repel attacks launched from abroad by the South Africans or the rebels. Cuban advisers remained in the country for training purposes as well, and Angola was reported to serve as a training site for other African liberation movements. Among such groups was the South West Africa People's Organization, which fought against South African forces occupying Namibia-the territory between Angola and South Africa—which had been recognized as a nation independent from South African rule by the United Nations (UN).

The Cuban government did not release casualty figures, but by the mid-1980s it was believed that several thousand Cubans had died in combat in Angola. The bodies of those who died in action were not returned to Cuba, however, thus complicating the assessment of actual combat deaths. Though denied by Castro, it was believed that domestic opposition to Cuba's involvement in Angola was growing. Cuban military assistance to Angola prior to

1977 was provided without cost to the MPLA; however, some analysts asserted that the remuneration received after 1977 had been a contributing factor to Cuba's ongoing presence in Angola into the 1980s. The Cuban government continued to maintain that the sole mission of the Expeditionary Force in Angola was to help safeguard the country's borders and that after the borders were secure, or could be secured by Angolan army troops—estimated at 30,000—the Expeditionary Force would leave.

By early 1985 Cuba predicated its departure from Angola on four concrete developments: South African recognition of Namibia's independence, an end to South African aggression against Angola, an end to South African assistance to UNITA rebels, and "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal" of South African forces occupying southern Angola. Plans for a phased withdrawal over a three-year period of some 20,000 Cuban troops, based on South Africa's adherence to these four provisions, were presented to the UN in November 1984 by the dos Santos government.

The Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia

By early 1985 Castro stated that the size of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia had fallen to a "symbolic" level. Although Castro refused to elaborate on the size of the force, United States officials estimated it at 5,000. At the peak of the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1978, United States intelligence officials estimated that as many as 17,000 Cuban combat personnel were assigned there. In 1979 Castro stated that the figure was only some 12,000. While the United States had underestimated the level of Cuban involvement in Angola, it had overestimated its presence in Ethiopia, according to the Cuban leader.

Castro maintained that Cuba intervened in Ethiopia only after the invading forces from Somalia threatened to destroy the country. In May 1977 only a small group of some 50 Cuban military personnel were providing advice to the newly formed Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam on the country's defense organization and in the use of Soviet-supplied equipment. In July the Ethiopian leader was faced with separatist activities led by rebels seeking to force the secession of the eastern Ogaden desert to Somalia and requested that Cuba send at least 300 tank specialists.

As the conflict escalated in late 1977 and early 1978 with regular incursions into Ethiopian territory by Somali forces, Cuban troops arrived by air from Havana and Angola and by sea aboard Soviet ships that also transported military equipment and supplies. In March 1978, after at least US$850 million of arms—including

400 tanks and 50 MiGs—were reportedly provided Ethiopian and Cuban troops by the Soviets, Somalia stopped fighting and returned to its side of the border. The main role of the Cuban Expeditionary Force was played by the MINFAR's mechanized brigades, using T-54 and T-55 tanks, which were supported by BM-21 rocket launchers in addition to air cover by MiGs. Soviet advisers were reported to have planned and commanded the counteroffensive against Somalia.

By August 1979 the level of Cuban combat personnel in Ethiopia was believed to have fallen by several thousand. Some sources stated that they had been transferred to Angola. Division General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sánchez, the former commander of the Expeditionary Force in Angola, was eventually sent to supervise Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua after leaving his command of the Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia. A majority of those assigned to the Expeditionary Force remaining in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s were engineers and other advisory and support personnel. In April 1984 Castro stated his belief that Ethiopia then needed Cuba's help less urgently than did Angola.

The Military Assistance Forces

The provision of military assistance—in terms of both training and the supply of matériel—to other Third World nations and revolutionary movements had been a feature of Cuba's foreign military policy since shortly after the 1959 revolutionary victory. The main justification for the presence of a Cuban military advisory mission in a given country was "internationalist solidarity." Much conflicting information existed with respect to the size of Cuba's foreign military involvement. To complicate matters further, in the mid-1980s the Cuban government was unwilling to discuss the activities of its foreign assistance missions beyond the tacit recognition that they provided military equipment and training.

One example of the kind and scale of possible involvement of Cuban military assistance personnel in a foreign country was cited in an account of the activities of the Cuban mission in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) in the late 1970s. After the attack in early 1979 by South Yemen on the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) in a dispute over their mutual border, Cuban military personnel reportedly provided some artillery backup in addition to logistics and communications support. Cuban personnel were not believed to have crossed into North Yemen after the invading South Yemeni troops, however. By the end of the border war in mid-March 1979, Cuban pilots in MiG

jets were reported to have been flying daily patrols over the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Almost all reports of Cuban military assistance personnel participating in foreign combat stated that those personnel involved were small in number and that they saw only limited combat. In the early 1960s some 400 Cuban tank troops were reportedly sent to Algeria to aid in its border conflict with Morocco. Small numbers of Cuban personnel were reportedly involved in guerrilla fighting in territory encompassing present-day Zaïre, Tanzania, and Guinea-Bissau. In late 1973 some 500 Cuban tank and air troops were sent to support Syria after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. Cuban military personnel were believed to have supported guerrillas operating out of bases in Mozambique in the late 1970s. The number of these personnel that belonged to military assistance missions, however, was unclear.

The United States government in the mid-1980s supported accounts that Cuban military assistance personnel were not only using Nicaragua to channel covert military assistance to Central American revolutionaries, including rebels belonging to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional—FMLN), which was fighting the United States-supported government in El Salvador. Castro had provided arms to the FMLN rebels. At the same time, he said such aid had ceased. The Cuban government subsequently denied United States government assertions that Cuba continued to channel substantial amounts of arms and military supplies to the Salvadoran rebels through Nicaragua into the mid-1980s. At that time most accounts of Cuban activities in Nicaragua agreed that the Cuban Military Assistance Force was involved in advising the Nicaraguan armed forces' General Staff and helping train recruits to fight against the United States-backed forces—often identified as the counterrevolutionaries, or the *contras*—who sought to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

The level and activities of Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua remained a hotly contested issue in late 1984 and early 1985. The International Institute for Strategic Studies placed the number of Cuban military and security personnel at 3,000 in *The Military Balance, 1984–1985,* a 2,000-man increase over what it had reported the previous year. The more recent figure coincided with the 2,500, to 3,500 estimate often used by the United States government in early 1985. In mid-March 1985 Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega stated that there were exactly 786 Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua and that the total size of the Cuban presence, including civilian advisers, was below 1,500.

In March 1984 Cuba announced that it had reduced the number of military advisers in Nicaragua while increasing the military training given the civilian advisers, known as "internationalists" (see History and General Principles; Proletarian Internationalism, ch. 4). These internationalists were civilian volunteers in the fields of health, education, and construction, who, as part of the government-sponsored development assistance program, had received a minimum of a month's rudimentary military training that emphasized defensive tactics and included the handling of light weapons. It was believed that civilian internationalists sent abroad after training were routinely issued light arms for their defense. By 1985 as many as 5,000 civilian internationalists were believed to be working in Nicaragua.

Between 1984 and 1985 the Cuban government affirmed its willingness to withdraw all military and security personnel from Nicaragua in accord with the peace proposal drawn up by the so-called Contadora Group—composed of representatives from the governments of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia—as part of its efforts to remove all foreign forces from Central America. In March 1985 the Cuban government announced it would withdraw 100 of its military advisers from Nicaragua in May. The Cuban government also noted, however, that it might send them back with reinforcements if, after May, the United States continued to support efforts to forcibly change the Nicaraguan government's leadership.

The Cuban presence in Grenada was established shortly after the 1979 takeover by the New Jewel Movement (NJM) led by Maurice Bishop. At that time Cuba began to supply the revolutionary government with light arms and military advisers who helped organize and train the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army. The initially limited assistance expanded through the early 1980s and included the participation of Cuban civilian internationalists. At the time of the United States invasion in October 1983 these internationalists—believed to have then totaled 784—included the "armed construction workers" helping to build Grenada's new international airport who fought against the invading United States troops.

The conduct of Cuban army engineer Colonel Pedro Tortoló Comas—who had arrived in Grenada to take command of the civilian internationalists only two days before the United States invasion—led to his court-martial, demotion to private, and assignment to duty in Angola in mid-1984. Tortoló, a former chief of staff of the MINFAR's Central Army, was reported to have abandoned his command to take refuge in the Soviet embassy, leaving the Cuban

civilians to fend for themselves. Some 42 other Cuban military officers said to have been on the island at the time of the invasion were given similar punishment for their cowardice. Twenty-four civilian internationalists were reported killed during the invasion.

In the days immediately following the invasion by United States military forces, the Cuban government judiciously refrained from escalating its cost by not sending the MINFAR's air or ground forces to Grenada, even though it was operationally capable of doing so. The deterrent of major United States retaliation was undoubtedly a consideration in the Cuban government's decision not to send in military personnel. Another factor was that Bishop, the leader of the NJM and a close friend of the Cuban government, had been killed a few days before the invasion by a faction of his government believed closely aligned with the Soviet Union.

The Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior (Ministerio del Interior—MININT), created in June 1961, was the primary government body charged with maintaining Cuba's internal security and had responsibilities that ranged from counterintelligence to firefighting. In early 1985 the MININT was headed by Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, a veteran of the Rebel Army. Valdés had reassumed control of the ministry in December 1979 in what appeared to be a government crackdown on internal security that affected various sectors of the state bureaucracy. Sergio del Valle Jiménez, a physician who had headed the MININT throughout the 1970s, returned to the post of minister of public health, a position he had held during the 1960s when Valdés had first been the minister of interior. Valdés was also a member of the PCC Political Bureau.

In early 1985 the MININT had one first vice minister and four vice ministers, all of whom held military rank and were either full or alternate members of the Central Committee of the PCC. Individuals holding military rank were in key positions through the MININT, including heading its vice ministries and general directorates. Division General José Abrahantes Fernández, the first vice minister of the MININT, had commanded the Vice Ministry for Security since 1972; Division General Pascual Martínez Gil, a vice minister of the MININT, had headed the Vice Ministry for Internal Order and Crime Prevention since 1980. By 1985 Division General José Joaquín Méndez Cominches, the vice minister in charge of the General Directorate of Intelligence (Dirección General de Inteligencia—DGI) since 1981, was believed to have been replaced.

The chief of the General Directorate of Identification and Information, Colonel Haydée Díaz Ortega, held a vice ministerial post and was the only individual among the hierarchy of the MININT who was neither a full nor an alternate member of the PCC Central Committee. Little information was available about the fourth vice minister, Brigadier General Angel Mariano Mártir Carrión, other than that in April 1984 he was an alternate Central Committee member, indicating that his vice ministerial responsibilities may have been substantial.

In late 1975 a separate Technical Vice Ministry was reported to exist within the MININT, and under it was the command of the DGI, among other directorates and departments. It was unclear in early 1985 whether this vice ministry still existed within the MININT hierarchy. Other important entities that were administered directly by the MININT and incorporated under the control of the two identified vice ministries were the Department of State Security, the General Directorate of the National Revolutionary Police, the General Directorate of Penal Establishments, the General Directorate of Immigration and Naturalization, and the General Directorate of Fire Prevention and Firefighting, among others. Security for foreign diplomatic missions in Cuba was controlled by the MININT.

Two organizations with more strictly military functions included those forces attached to the General Directorate of Border Guard Troops (Tropas de Guarda Fronteras—TGF) and those attached to the General Directorate of Special Operations, who were called the Special Troops. Although organizationally part of the MININT, each of these bodies came under the jurisdiction of the MINFAR, which was responsible for their operational organization, weapons, combat training, and deployment. There was some speculation that Fidel Castro was in direct control of the two battalions of Special Troops, which together were composed of some 1,200 highly trained and politically reliable personnel. The role of the Special Troops, which were established in the mid-1960s, came to international attention a decade later when one of their battalions was deployed in Angola (see The Cuban Military Abroad, this ch.). Their specific mission was reportedly to serve as a highly mobile shock force capable of providing protection to high-ranking officials, to help support other internal security requirements, and to provide training to selected foreign forces. Their training prepared them to act as a commando-style unit; most were both parachute- and scuba-qualified as well as trained in hand-to-hand combat. The Special Troops were considered the elite of Cuban armed forces.

The TGF were composed of some 3,000 personnel in early 1985 and were supported by two civilian auxiliary units, the Sea Watchers Detachment and the Border Militia. They were first created within the MININT in March 1963 and were originally known as the Department of Coastal and Port Vigilance and, later, as the Fight Against the Pirates. It was not until after the reorganization of the MININT in the 1970s that the TGF assumed the form they retained in the mid-1980s. While the TGF fell under MININT control, they provided support to the MGR and were expected to come under the full operational control of naval forces during a crisis. The TGF received support from the MGR and the DAAFAR in carrying out their mission of coastal surveillance. Their responsibilities included the detection and interdiction of individuals or groups attempting to enter or leave the island without legal authorization and the monitoring of all maritime activities close to shore. They were equipped with at least 20 small patrol boats for their maritime duties and with motorcycles for guarding the Cuban coastline. Dogs were reportedly used by the TGF for tracking.

The MININT's Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado—DSE) and the DGI were the Cuban government's primary intelligence organizations. The DSE was the primary domestic intelligence agency and had responsibilities similar to such agencies in many other countries, including the identification and apprehension of individuals or groups that constituted threats to the central government. The DSE had been a part of the MININT since its creation in 1961. In 1979 it was believed composed of between 10,000 and 15,000 individuals, some of them covert agents operating domestically. Ideological control was a responsibility of the DSE. Those Cuban citizens who refused to live by the ideals of the Revolution—such as antigovernment activities, arsonists, saboteurs, or spies—were considered counterrevolutionary and subject to apprehension, detention and, according to some, sentencing by the DSE. The United States Department of State human rights report for 1984 said that the DSE, which it called "the secret police," was the Cuban security organization responsible for numerous unexplained disappearances of Cuban citizens as well as naturalized United States citizens who returned to visit the island. The DSE received support from the National Revolutionary Police (Policía Nacional Revolucionaria—PNR) and the CDRs in identifying individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. The size of the PNR, the uniformed law enforcement body established in January 5, 1959, was estimated at approximately 10,000 in mid-1984. CDR membership was estimated at about 6 million.

DSE personnel were deployed throughout the island, and their activities were coordinated by the provincial MININT headquarters. All members of the DSE underwent military training, and many were reportedly skilled in the use of electronic surveillance devices and other monitoring techniques. DSE operations were expected to provide support to the MINFAR during a national emergency; in wartime it was believed that the DSE would take charge of interrogating captured prisoners.

The DGI was also created in 1961 as a result of the Castro government's concerns regarding threats against it from abroad. The DGI acted as the Cuban government's primary foreign intelligence service in the mid–1980s. Agents were given "covers" and were often assigned to the embassies in foreign countries. In the mid-1970s the DGI was believed to have been under only nominal MININT control and to have reported directly to Fidel Castro. By the 1980s the DGI had benefited from the Cuban government's close relations with the Soviet Union. Many of its personnel were trained abroad by personnel from the Soviet Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti—KGB), foreign intelligence gained by either organization was occasionally shared. Such intelligence coordination was said to have contributed to Castro's success in eluding numerous foreign assassination attempts against him.

Crime and Punishment

Crime in Cuba

From the perspective of the Cuban government in early 1985, criminal activity was generally attributed to an individual's lack of education. After the first 26 years of the Revolution the Cuban government proudly asserted that prostitution, drug trafficking, and gambling had been eliminated. United States allegations during the 1980s regarding Cuba's involvement in the international drug trade and the indictment of four Cuban officials by a Miami grand jury in 1984, were reported to have angered the Cuban leadership. The topics of Cuban crime, punishment, and political prisoners remained exceptionally volatile emotional issues for both the Cuban and the United States governments in 1985.

Cuba was noted as having one of the world's lowest crime rates, especially in crimes against the person. Homicides that occurred in Cuba usually resulted from family disputes. Crimes in-

volving theft, graft, and corruption, referred to as "economic crimes," reportedly were on the increase during the early 1980s. One novel kind of crime was referred to as "crimes of style"—thefts committed by individuals trying to keep up with the latest fashions. The increase in economic crimes prompted the creation of a system of automatic punishment—believed separate from the 1979 Penal Code—in which penalties were imposed even if the victim decided against filing charges. For these economic crimes penalties were automatic, even if the victim decided against filing charges. Stealing from a foreigner, for example, brought an automatic prison term of no less than 16 years.

The Penal Code

On November 1, 1979, a new Cuban penal code became effective that deleted some acts previously considered criminal, including prostitution and the accidental landing of foreign vessels or aircraft on the island. The new code reduced the length of sentences for many common crimes, especially those committed by persons under age 20, and introduced fines for punishment for noncriminal offenses that "slightly harm law and order, general safety, the orderliness of population supplements, health, and property." It also established a two- to six-year prison term for public employees who interfered in any way with the distribution of consumer goods, including the forging of ration-book coupons used for the acquisition of government-controlled items at subsidized prices.

In late 1982 a special code became effective for dealing with minors under age 16 accused of crimes. Such cases were reported to have been removed from criminal courts to a special agency of the educational system that offered a number of sentencing options for young offenders. Among these options were internment or compulsory attendance at a disciplinary school controlled by the Ministry of Education or at a reeducation center controlled by the MININT; compulsory internment at a clinic controlled by the Ministry of Public Health; compulsory outpatient treatment; and vigilance and supervision by the MININT.

The provisions set forth under the new juvenile code reflected the attitude of the government toward crime in general. Antisocial behavior was embodied in the rejection of values "supported and defended" by the Cuban working class and was viewed as an ideological problem. The strategy adopted by the Cuban penal system was to reinstill these values and thus fight crime at its roots.

Sentencing and Appeals

The national policy of criminal rehabilitation was aimed at enabling criminals to rejoin society. The Cuban government did, however, acknowledge that some members of society were incorrigible. Three options guided sentencing for adults convicted of minor crimes. These ranged from prison terms to making periodic reports to the court to having one's work center or a mass organization assume responsibility for the individual's conduct.

All individuals found guilty of a crime were legally permitted to file an appeal to the next higher court, stating the reasons for disagreement with the lower court's decision. Time limits for response by provincial courts required that an initial hearing be held within 20 days from receipt of an appeal. Legal representation was required at provincial-level hearings, and an individual was reportedly able to choose his or her own counsel or have the court appoint it. Free legal representation was provided Cuban citizens as a service of the state. Appeals to the highest level of the judiciary, the People's Supreme Court, were reported to take from two to three months to process in early 1983.

In meting out punishment for crimes, the Cuban penal system's policy was to allow an individual to make amends, in most cases, or to be rehabilitated. The prison system was reported to guarantee a job for all individuals upon their release. For those who had proved themselves a menace to society, however, the policy was to make the full weight of justice felt. The maximum prison term in Cuba was 30 years. Capital punishment remained legal in the mid-1980s. The method of execution was reported to be by firing squad. A Cuban-based human rights organization cited in the United States Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984* maintained that 37 persons were executed between October 1983 and May 1984 and that another 131 individuals had been sentenced to death during the same period.

Political Prisoners

Charges were also made by human rights organizations that individuals jailed for political crimes were often kept under detention long after their prison sentences had been completed. Such prisoners, according to the Department of State human rights report for 1984, were also subject to physical and psychological torture in addition to inhuman treatment. The Boniato prison in eastern Cuba was believed to be among the worst prisons in the

country. Cuban government officials maintained in 1983 that there was an ongoing effort to improve prison conditions.

The most difficult conditions while under detention were reportedly endured by the political prisoners known as the *plantados* (literally, the planted ones), who refused to be rehabilitated, participate in any prison-sponsored activities, including wage labor, or even wear prison garb. Cuban prisons required that all inmates work for a wage that was reported to be comparable to that earned outside the prison. The rationale expressed by the Cuban government for its treatment of the *plantados* was that those who refused to work could not expect to be accorded the same rights as those who did.

Estimates of the number of political detainees in Cuba varied widely—ranging from 250 to 10,000, depending on the human rights organization consulted. The same Cuban human rights organization that accumulated information on the executions asserted that as of May 1984 there were 390 prisoners of conscience and another 800 persons held under the "law of dangerousness." This law, incorporated into the 1979 Penal Code, permitted the preventive detention of individuals believed likely—based on "observed conduct"—to commit crimes against the interests of "socialist coexistence." In early 1985 Fidel Castro maintained there were no more than 1,000 political prisoners under detention.

An estimated 3,600 political prisoners were released from detention in 1979 as a result of a dialogue between the Cuban government and the Cuban exile community in the United States. The negotiated release also included the Cuban government's promise to grant exit visas for the prisoners' departure from Cuba. Of the prisoners released, some 1,500 remained on the island as of late 1983, unable to leave because the issuance of United States emigration visas was suspended for Cuban nationals in the wake of the mid-1980 Mariel exodus. Upon intervention by the Reverend Jesse Jackson in mid-1984, Cuban exit and United States entry visas were secured for 27 political detainees who had relatives in the United States along with 22 imprisoned United States citizens who arrived in the United States in July. Under the terms of an agreement signed between the United States and Cuba in December 1984, the United States agreed to accept up to 20,000 Cuban emigrants during 1985, including up to 3,000 released political prisoners and the relatives of those Cubans already in the United States in July 1984.

* * *

Resources for information on the FAR were limited. The best analytical work on the Cuban military was prepared by Professor Jorge I. Domínguez of Harvard University, the author of a number of materials dealing with the FAR as well as with Cuba in general. The chapter entitled "The Civic Soldier" in his 1978 text, *Cuba: Order and Revolution,* reflected the best combination of factual and analytical information. However, given the rapid evolution of the armed forces institution, a considerable amount of the factual data, and even some of the analysis, was becoming dated by early 1985. Other excellent sources of factual information were the United States Defense Intelligence Agency's *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces,* published in April 1979, and an article prepared by Adrian J. English entitled "The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces," which was published in *Jane's Defence Weekly* in June 1984. The Central Intelligence Agency's annual *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba: A Reference Aid* was the most comprehensive source available listing personnel assigned to the MINFAR and the MININT, members of the upper levels of the PCC, and other government officials. Such a listing was helpful in determining the organization of the ministries and the relative influence of those in command positions. It was not, however, as accurate or as up-to-date as one might have wished. Historical information on the armed forces was primarily based on accounts published by Louis A. Pérez, Jr., and Hugh S. Thomas.

Other sources consulted included a number of articles from the *New York Times,* the *Washington Post,* and the *Miami Herald,* most of which were reprinted by the Information Service for Latin America (ISLA) during 1983 and 1984. Also consulted were the weekly English edition of *Granma Weekly Review* and *Verde Olivo,* the official magazine of the FAR. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Joint Publications Research Service bulletins for Latin America were also consulted for materials dating from the latter half of the 1970s. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

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APPENDIX

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Estimated Population and Population Density, 1982

Area	Area per Square Kilometer	Population (in thousands)	Density
Provinces			
Camagüey	14,158	675.2	47.0
Ciego de Ávila	6,321	325.9	52.0
Cienfuegos	4,177	330.3	79.0
Ciundad de La Habana	727	1,942.3	2,672.0
Granma	8,362	743.3	89.0
Guantánamo	6,184	468.3	76.0
Holguín	9,295	918.0	99.0
La Habana	5,691	592.1	104.0
Las Tunas	6,584	441.7	67.0
Matanzas	11,739	562.9	48.0
Pinar del Rio	10,861	646.5	59.0
Sancti Spíritus	6,732	402.5	60.0
Santiago de Cuba	6,170	915.5	148.0
Villa Clara	7,944	770.2	97.0
Islands			
Isla de la Juventud	2,200	59.8	27.0
Other	3,715	n.a.	n.a.
TOTAL	110,860	9,794.5	88.4

n.a.—not available

Source: Based on information from Cuba, Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, *Anuario estadístico de Cuba, 1982,* Havana, n.d., 29.

Table 3. Enrollment in the School System, School Year 1980–81

Level	Students	Percentage
Preschool	123,741	3.8
Primary education	1,468,538	44.8
High school	1,177,813	35.9
Adult education	227,003	8.5
Youth education	n.a.	0.0
Special education	28,568	0.9
Higher education	202,000	6.2
TOTAL	3,277,663	100.0*

n.a.—not available.

Figures may not add up to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from José Ángel Pescador Osuna, "Una approximación a la experiencia educativa en Cuba," *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Educativos*, Mexico City, 12, No. 2, 1982, 98.

*Table 4. Estimated Income Distribution, 1978**

(in percentage)

Population Decile (percentage of total)	Estimate "A"		Estimate "B"	
	Percentage of National Income	Cumulative Percentage of Income	Percentage of National Income	Cumulative Percentage of Income
0–10	3.4	3.4	5.1	5.1
11–20	4.4	7.8	5.9	11.0
21–30	5.3	13.1	6.5	17.5
31–40	7.1	20.2	7.3	24.8
41–50	9.3	29.5	8.0	32.8
51–60	10.4	39.9	8.5	41.3
61–70	12.6	52.5	9.9	51.2
71–80	14.1	66.6	12.8	64.0
81–90	15.3	81.9	14.9	78.9
91–100	18.1	100.0	21.1	100.0

*Owing to the unavailability of reliable figures on Cuban income distribution, the figures used in this table were based on two different hypothetical situations (estimates A and B). The actual income distribution in 1978 was likely to have been between these two figures.

Source: Based on information from Claes Brundenius, *Economic Growth, Basic Needs, and Income Distribution in Revolutionary Cuba*, Lund, Sweden, 1981, 151.

*Table 5. Global Social Product, 1981–83**

(in millions of United States dollars)

	1981	1982	1983
Material product			
Agriculture			
Sugar	1,464	1,278	1,223
Nonsugar	1,158	1,062	976
Livestock	1,811	1,672	1,714
Services	45	42	41
Total agriculture	4,478	4,054	3,954
Forestry	102	101	122
Fishing	271	292	292
Industry			
Electric energy	578	587	585
Mining	313	300	319
Manufacturing	11,075	10,739	10,900
Total industry	11,966	11,626	11,804
Construction	2,301	2,161	2,320
Total material product	19,119	18,234	18,492
Nonmaterial product			
Transportation	2,077	1,934	1,940
Communication	220	229	237
Commerce	6,953	5,893	7,133
Other	128	131	144
Total nonmaterial product	9,378	9,187	9,454
GLOBAL SOCIAL PRODUCT	28,497	27,421	27,947

*In constant 1981 prices.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 7.

Table 6. Labor Force, 1980–83

(in thousands)

Sector	1980	1981	1982	1983
Civilian				
State				
Productive				
Agriculture	624	619	616	594
Forestry	20	21	21	27
Industry	548	576	690	627
Construction	273	266	261	285
Transportation	171	181	180	185
Communication	22	23	24	25
Commerce	302	311	324	344
Other	10	11	13	14
Total productive	1,970	2,008	2,129	2,101
Nonproductive	766	817	845	870*
Total state	2,736	2,825	2,974	2,971
Private	213	186	178	176
Total civilian	2,949	3,011	3,152	3,147
Military	319	300	300	300
Unemployed	261	200	180	160
TOTAL	3,529	3,511	3,632	3,607

*Estimated.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 27; and Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates. *A Description of the Cuban Economic Analysis and Forecasting System (CEAFS) with Projections for the Cuban Economy to 1985*, Philadelphia, August 1983, 11.

Table 7. Production of Minerals, 1980–83

(in thousands of tons)

Mineral	1980	1981	1982[1]	1983[2]
Hydraulic cement	2,831	3,292	3,163	3,400
Chromite	29	21	27	32
Cobalt	1,613	1,715	1,500	1,650
Copper	3,305	2,908	2,645	3,000
Gypsum	122	130	127	130
Iron and crude steel	304	330	301	353
Lime	146	140	145	145
Nickel	38,207	40,260	37,600	39,000

[1]Preliminary.
[2]Estimated.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *The Mineral Industry of the Islands of the Caribbean*, Washington, 1983, 2.

Table 8. Indicators of Manufacturing Material Product 1980–83

(index 1975=100)

Product	1980	1981	1982	1983*
Nondurable goods				
Food (excluding sugar)	120.2	137.4	142.2	156.4
Sugar and sugar products	121.6	141.1	145.7	143.2
Beverages and tobacco	117.0	142.6	161.9	157.7
Clothing	143.1	171.7	165.9	192.0
Printed matter	129.3	153.7	119.2	124.7
Average nondurable goods	122.3	141.0	149.1	153.0
Intermediate goods				
Textiles	101.0	113.7	113.8	128.4
Chemicals	100.1	124.9	103.5	113.0
Fuels	96.7	100.3	102.0	104.5
Construction materials	117.7	133.3	122.8	127.0
Average intermediate goods	102.4	116.8	107.8	114.3
Consumer durables and capital goods				
Construction of nonelectrical machinery	172.2	215.8	234.9	268.9
Electrotechnical and electronic goods	93.6	123.9	110.6	137.1
Metal products	130.9	150.2	185.3	187.7
Average consumer durables and capital goods	143.2	177.7	189.2	218.0
Other manufactured goods	116.4	142.9	144.8	153.5
Average manufacturing sector	118.2	138.4	142.2	149.0

*Preliminary.

Based on information from United Nations, Comisíon Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 12.

Table 9. Production of Selected Agricultural Products, 1980–83

(in thousands of tons)

Product	1980	1981	1982	1983*
Rice	478	461	520	518
Corn	23	23	22	30
Dry beans	9	8	12	13
Tomatoes	207	312	227	151
Onions	10	17	15	10
Peppers	45	34	34	23
Potatoes	239	272	258	207
Sweet potatoes	228	200	177	201
Taro root	161	99	48	45
Citrus fruits				
Oranges	298	257	339	399
Lemons	25	30	41	30
Grapefruit	84	146	128	166
Other	37	38	22	36
Total citrus fruits	444	471	530	631
Bananas	233	260	272	315
Mangoes	59	58	52	39
Guava	46	43	43	50
Tobacco	8	53	45	30
Coffee	19	22	29	26
Sugar	6,600	7,300	8,210	7,100

*Preliminary.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983,* Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 8.

Table 10. Fiscal Budget of the State, 1980–83

(in millions of United States dollars)

	1980	1981	1982	1983
Revenues				
State sector	n.a.	n.a.	11,825	13,018
Nonstate sector	n.a.	n.a.	27	27
Taxes	n.a.	n.a.	132	159
Total revenues	13,200	13,824	11,985*	13,205*
Expenditures				
Productive sector	6,419	7,332	4,587	4,880
Housing and community services	550	598	568	663
Education and public health	2,501	2,568	2,516	2,637
Other social, cultural, and scientific activities	1,863	1,794	1,710	1,907
Public administration	645	764	744	751
Defense and internal security	1,067	1,191	1,331	1,299
Other	513	568	652	618
Total expenditures	13,558	14,816*	12,108	12,758*
BALANCE	−358	−992	−123	447

n.a.—not available.
*Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 35.

Table 11. Value of Exports by Major Commodity, 1980–83[1]

(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982	1983[2]
Sugar				
Raw and refined	4,624	4,225	4,526	4,717
Molasses	53	44	34	13
Total sugar	4,677	4,269	4,560	4,730
Minerals				
Nickel	260	400	339	352
Other	10	9	8	8
Total minerals	270	409	347	360
Tobacco				
Raw	8	24	54	37
Manufactured	43	48	70	82
Total tobacco	51	72	124	119
Foodstuffs and beverages				
Fish and shellfish	124	126	117	122
Citrus fruits	58	99	118	137
Other	73	76	77	113
Total foodstuffs and beverages	255	301	312	372
Other	340	355	585	835
TOTAL	5,593	5,406	5,928	6,416

[1]Exports or free on board.
[2]Preliminary.

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 31.

Table 12. Volume of Imports by Major Commodity, 1980–82

(in thousands of tons, unless otherwise indicated)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982
Foodstuffs			
Rice (milled)	230	199	201
Wheat	873	984	1,023
Wheat flour	299	263	177
Corn	711	523	367
Fruits and legumes	182	176	190
Lard	89	83	84
Canned milk	21	23	21
Raw materials and intermediate goods			
Raw cotton	37	41	39
Crude vegetable oil	75	78	66
Wood pulp	48	42	45
Rubber	17	14	6
Sulfur	148	168	170
Caustic soda	49	41	49
Cast iron	149	162	164
Tin plate	56	64	46
Coke	53	59	60
Fertilizer	1,186	1,256	1,241
Cotton cloth (millions of square meters)	75	64	59
Fuel			
Crude oil	6,025	6,355	6,247
Gasoline	250	203	263
Fuel oil	2,820	2,954	3,438
Diesel oil	952	1,134	1,298
Transportation equipment (units)			
Locomotives	12	4	4
Automobiles	8,594	11,440	12,941
Trucks	7,777	6,271	8,744
Buses	2,199	2,740	505
Tractors	9,988	10,562	10,058

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intellience. *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 34.

Table 13. Foreign Trade by Major Area, 1980–83

(in millions of United States dollars)

Area	1980	1981	1982	1983[1]
Exports (f.o.b.)[2]				
Communist countries				
Soviet Union	3,177	3,018	3,956	4,494
Eastern Europe	569	730	666	746
Far East	176	315	386	281
Total communist countries	3,922	4,063	5,008	5,521
Noncommunist countries	1,671	1,343	920	895
Total exports	5,593	5,406	5,928	6,416
Imports (c.i.f.)[3]				
Communist countries				
Soviet Union	3,989	4,139	4,507	4,926
Eastern Europe	826	918	1,082	1,120
Far East	168	203	297	209
Total communist countries	4,983	5,260	5,886	6,255
Noncommunist countries	1,426	1,286	759	964
Total imports	6,409	6,546	6,645	7,219
Trade balance				
Communist countries				
Soviet Union	−812	−1,121	−551	−432
Eastern Europe	−257	−188	−416	−374
Far East	8	112	89	72
Total communist countries	−1,061	−1,197	−878	−734
Noncommunist countries	245	57	161	69
Total trade balance	−816	−1,140	−717	−803

[1]Preliminary.
[2]f.o.b. (free on board).
[3]c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight).

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 25.

Table 14. Sugar Exports to Communist Countries, 1980–83

(in thousands of tons)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983
Soviet Union	2,726	3,204	4,426	3,315
Eastern Europe				
Albania	17	12	16	16
Bulgaria	234	250	278	331
Czechoslovakia	99	100	135	145
East Germany	210	255	213	281
Hungary	34	76	73	0
Poland	63	70	0	0
Romania	47	139	90	221
Total Eastern Europe	704	902	805	994
Far East				
China	512	573	915	772
Mongolia	5	5	5	5
North Korea	11	28	17	22
Vietnam	42	103	24	77
Total Far East	570	709	961	876
TOTAL	4,000	4,815	6,192	5,185

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*. Washington, June 1984, 35.

Table 15. Sugar Exports to Noncommunist Countries, 1980–83

(in thousands of tons)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983
Algeria	207	253	208	99
Angola	67	58	52	41
Britain	0	0	0	0
Canada	264	376	160	190
Egypt	138	162	190	230
Ethiopia	0	0	0	0
Finland	78	173	39	65
Indonesia	39	14	14	0
Iran	0	0	0	0
Iraq	278	178	134	158
Japan	267	355	295	355
Malaysia	25	108	26	48
Mexico	401	138	140	63
Morocco	0	0	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	16	0
Portugal	131	155	71	15
Spain	0	23	22	0
Sweden	0	25	0	5
Syria	134	109	109	109
United States	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia	0	10	0	9
Other	162	119	66	157
TOTAL	2,191	2,256	1,542	1,606

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 36.

Table 16. Value of Trade with Selected Noncommunist Countries 1980–83

(in millions of United States dollars)

	1980	1981	1982	1983
Exports				
Belgium/Luxembourg	3.3	0.6	0.8	1.1
Britain	5.1	2.8	2.6	1.8
Canada	11.2	13.8	6.4	3.8
Finland	4.4	4.1	2.1	1.2
France	5.6	4.8	4.7	4.8
Italy	4.0	3.2	3.6	3.1
Japan	16.0	12.5	9.3	7.6
Netherlands	6.0	2.3	3.9	7.5
Portugal	1.9	4.7	3.6	0.5
Spain	7.5	5.2	9.2	7.8
Switzerland	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5
West Germany	4.7	2.3	2.7	2.5
Imports				
Belgium/Luxembourg	2.3	2.8	1.3	1.2
Britain	6.8	4.6	9.5	5.8
Canada	29.9	31.8	21.9	24.5
France	22.3	12.4	4.7	8.3
Ireland	1.7	1.3	2.1	2.2
Italy	4.5	3.7	3.2	2.5
Japan	20.0	22.0	10.5	8.7
Netherlands	3.8	3.2	4.8	3.3
Spain	15.7	14.5	8.9	7.5
Sweden	4.3	4.9	1.6	1.4
Switzerland	2.3	2.6	1.5	2.2
West Germany	9.1	7.7	5.4	5.4

Table 17. Estimated Energy Consumption, 1980–82

(barrels per day of oil equivalent)

	1980	1981	1982
Energy consumption			
Oil	214,405	220,085	210,865
Nonoil	61,161	63,343	69,181
Total energy consumption	275,566	283,428	280,046
Domestic production			
Oil	5,491	5,085	10,865
Hydroelectricity	1,200	1,200	1,200
Natural gas	310	232	250
Ethyl alcohol	700	700	700
Bagasse	51,621	53,571	59,391
Fuelwood and charcoal	5,740	5,740	5,740
Total domestic production	65,062	66,528	78,146
Energy imports			
Oil	127,201	125,000	125,000
Oil products	81,403	90,000	75,000
Coal	1,900	1,900	1,900
Total energy imports	210,504	216,900	201,900

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 11.

Table 18. Soviet and East European Aid to Cuba, 1980–83

(in millions of United States dollars)

Economic Aid	1980	1981	1982	1983
Soviet aid				
Development aid	830	1,415	975	1,000
Trade subsidies				
Sugar	1,165	1,366	2,580	2,800
Petroleum	1,480	1,657	1,006	300
Nickel	−12	122	107	100
Total trade subsidies	2,633	3,145	3,693	3,200
Total Soviet aid	3,463	4,560	4,668	4,200
East European aid				
Sugar subsidy	−10	222	311	370
Trade financing	257	188	416	374
Total East European aid	247	410	727	744
TOTAL	3,710	4,970	5,395	4,944

*Figures for Soviet Union are preliminary; figures for Eastern Europe are estimated.

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 41.

Table 19. Soviet Hard Currency Flows to Cuba, 1980–83

(in millions of United States dollars)

Economic Aid	1980	1981	1982	1983
Soviet sugar purchases	0	168	291	16
Grain and flour exports	234	319	266	250
Other	141	216	216	571
TOTAL	375	703	773	837

*Preliminary.

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 41.

Table 20. Cuban International Aid Programs, Selected Years, 1976–83

	1983 1976–	77		1978		1981	
Africa							
Algeria	n.a.		15	(m)	15	(m)	170 (m–c)
Angola	24,000	(m)	20,000	(m)	19,000	(m)	25,000 (m)
	n.a.		5,000	(c)	n.a.		7,000 (c)
Benin	20	(m)	20	(m)	10	(m)*	n.a.
Equatorial Guinea	150	(m)	150	(m)	200	(m)*	n.a.
Ethiopia	400	(m)	15,000	(m)	13,000	(m)	10,500 (m)
	300	(c)	500	(c)	n.a.		500 (c)
Guinea—Bissau	300	(m)	140	(m)	50	(m)	100 (m)
	n.a.		60	(c)	n.a.		50 (c)
Libya	125	(m)	200	(m)	200	(m)*	3,000 (m–c)
	n.a.		400	(c)	n.a.		n.a.
Madagascar	30	(m)	n.a.	n.a.	50	(m)	
Mozambique	600	(m)	800	(m)	215	(m)	750 (m)
	n.a.		150	(c)	n.a.		150 (c)
Sierra Leone	25	(m)	100	(m)	100	(m)*	n.a.
Somalia	1,500	(m)	0	(m)	0	(m)	0 (m)
Tanzania	500	(m)	50	(m)	n.a.		n.a.
	n.a.		20	(c)	n.a.		n.a.
Zaïre	1,000	(m)	400	(m)	500	(m)	750 (m)
Zambia	n.a.		60	(m)	100	(m)*	n.a.
	n.a.		20	(c)	n.a.		n.a.
Middle East							
Iraq	150	(m)	150	(m)	n.a.		2,200 (m)
	n.a.		400	(c)	n.a.		n.a.
South Yemen	n.a.		100	(c)	n.a.		n.a.
Latin America							
Grenada	n.a.		150	(m)	100	(m)	900 (m–c)
	n.a.		350	(c)	1,000	(c)	n.a.
Guyana	n.a.		10	(m)	5	(m)*	n.a.
	n.a.		65	(c)	n.a.		n.a.
Jamaica	n.a.		450	(c)	600	(c)	n.a.
Nicaragua	n.a.		n.a.		200	(m)	2,000 (m)
	n.a.		n.a.		1,700	(c)	8,000 (c)
Panama	n.a.		n.a.		30	(m)*	n.a.

n.a.—not available.
*Estimated.
NOTE—(m)—military personnel; (c)—civilian personnel; (m–c)—military and civilian personnel.

Table 21. Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

Equipment	Estimated Number in Inventory
Revolutionary Army	
Armored fighting vehicles	
T-34 main battle tanks	350
T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks	350
T-62 main battle tanks	150
PT-76 light tanks	40
BRDM-1 and BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles	150
BMP mechanized infantry combat vehicles	100
BTR-40, BTR-60, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers	400
Artillery (estimated at 1,200 guns and howitzers)	
76mm and 85mm M1942 field guns	n.a.
122mm SU-100 self-propelled assault guns	100
130mm M-46 field guns	n.a.
152mm D-1 gun-howitzers	n.a.
152mm D-20 gun-howitzers	n.a.
152mm ML-20 gun-howitzers	n.a.
122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers	n.a.
140mm BM-14 multiple rocket launchers	n.a.
240mm BM-24 multiple rocket launchers	n.a.
FROG-4 and FROG-7 surface-to-surface missiles	65
Antitank weapons	
57mm M1943 antitank guns	n.a.
57mm CH-26 antitank guns	n.a.
AT-3 Sapper and AT-1 Sapper antitank guided weapons	n.a.
Air defense weapons (estimated at 1,500)	
23mm ZU-23 light antiaircraft guns (towed)	n.a.
23mm ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns	n.a.
57mm ZSU-57 self-propelled antiaircraft guns	n.a.
SA-7 Grail and SA-9 Gaskin surface-to-air missile	n.a.
Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force	
Combat aircraft	
MiG-17 Fresco interceptors	15
MiG-21 Fishbed interceptor/ground attack aircraft	184
Mi-23 Flogger interceptor/ground attack aircraft	51
Transport aircraft	
Il-14 Crate short-range transports	16
AN-2 Colt short-range transports	35
AN-24 Coke short-range transports	3
An-26 Curl	22
Yak-40	4

Table 21. Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces— **Continued**

Equipment	Estimated Number in Inventory
Helicopters	
Mi-4	60
Mi-8[1]	40
Mi-24 Hind D helicopter gunships	18
Trainers	
Mi-21U	10
Mi-23U	2
An-2	n.a.
Zlin-326[2]	30
L-39	n.a.
Air-to-air missiles	
AA-1 Alkali	n.a.
AA-2 Atoll	n.a.
AA-8 Aphid	n.a.
Surface-to-air missiles	
SA-2 Guideline	60
SA-3 Goa	140
SA-6 Gainful	12
Revolutionary Navy	
Submarines	
Foxtrot-class, diesel-powered	3
Whiskey-class, diesel-powered (used for training)	1
Frigates	
Koni-class	2
Large patrol craft	
SO-1	9
Kronshtadt-class	2
Fast attack craft	
Armed with Styx surface-to-surface missiles	
Osa-I class	5
Osa-II class	13
Komar-class	8
Armed with torpedoes	
Turya-class hydrofoils	8
P-6	6
P-4	12
Used for patrols	
Zhuk-class	22
Minesweepers	
Sonya-class	2
Yevgenya-class	10

Table 21. Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces—**Continued**

Equipment	Estimated Number in Inventory
Coastal defense	
122mm M1931/37 corps guns	n.a.
152mm M1937 gun-howitzers	n.a.
130mm SM-4-1 coastal guns	n.a.
SSC-2b Samlet surface-to-surface missiles	50

n.a.—not available.
[1]One-half Mi-8s believed to be armed.
[2]Manufactured in Czechoslovakia.

NOTE—The Soviet Union is almost the exclusive supplier of Cuban military equipment.
Source: Based on information from "Cuba," *The Military Balance, 1984–1985*, London, 1984, 119–20.

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Glossary

Club of Paris—An informal organization of countries that considers and coordinates rescheduling of offical debt to creditor governments. The French minister of the treasury acts as the unofficial chairman for the member countries.

Comecon—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An economic organization of the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic, Vietnam, and Cuba that is headquartered in Moscow. Cuba became a member in 1972. Purpose is to further economic cooperation among member countries. Sometimes abbreviated as CEMA or CMEA.

Global social product (GSP)—The most often used measure of economic growth. Includes the output values of the material and nonmaterial product and excludes consumption.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. In 1984 the IMF had 148 members.

peso—The national currency, consisting of 100 centavos. Between 1914 and 1971 the peso was exchanged at parity with the United States dollar. Since the early 1960s the peso has not been freely exchanged in the international market. The peso was tied to the ruble—the Soviet Union's currency. In tandem with the gradual devaluation of the dollar after 1970, the value of the peso was artificially raised. There are no estimates for a real dollar/peso exchange rate. Consequently, the offical exchange rate of the peso in relation to the dollar was highly overvalued. The official exchange rate was arbitrarily fixed at US$1.40 per peso in 1980; US$1.28 in 1981; US$1.20 in 1982; US$1.16 in 1983; and US$1.13 in 1984.

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