



**1ST MARINE DIVISION - REPORT TYPE C - DEFENSE OF D DIV SECTOR -
FOLDER 6 OF 6 - 27 JULY 1953 - 31 OCTOBER 1953**

Korean War

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1st Div (Reinf) FM
In the Field
8718001 July 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Long Title: Withdrawal to and Organization of Post Armistice
MBP (SECRET)

Short Title: LMARD-OP-11-53

Map: KOREA, 1:25,000

Task Orgn: Annex ABLE

1. a. Annex BAKER, Current PIR's and Intelligence Summaries.

b. (1) I US Corps ceases fire; outposts most favorable terrain immediately south of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z; withdraws to, org and def Post Armistice Battle Positions; maint readiness for immediate combat; prep for resumption full scale opns; maint order in area of responsibility; carries out applicable terms of the Armistice Agreement; assists in the repatriation of PW; conducts work tasks and recreational activities to insure maint of highest standards of discipline and morale.

(2) 17th FA Bn, 31st FA Bn and "C" Btry 159th FA Bn G/S reinf fires of 11th Marines.

c. Assumptions:

(1) That an armistice will be signed, time and date on which signed will be known as "H" Hour, "D" Day.

(2) That Demilitarized Z of 4,000 meters will be established by each side withdrawing approximately 2,000 meters from a Line of Demarcation.

(3) That the Line of Demarcation and southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z as shown on Annex CHARLIE (Cpn Overlay) are substantially correct.

(4) That a cease fire will be eff within 12 hours after the armistice is signed.

(5) That a period of 72 hours from eff date of the armistice will be used to withdraw all supplies and immediately removable equipment and material from the Demilitarized Z and to locate and list all valuable materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this prescribed time period.

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(Cont'd)

(6) That an additional period of 45 days, after the initial 72 hour period, will be used to complete salvage ops within the Demilitarized Z under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) by unarmed troops or indigenous personnel.

(7) That marking of the Demilitarized Z will be done by personnel from combat units under supervision of the MAC.

2. a. 1st Mar Div (Reinf) ceases fire; outposts most favorable terrain immediately south of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z; establishes a NO-PASS LINE approximately 200 yds S of southern boundary of Demilitarized Z; withdraws to, org and def Post Armistice Battle Positions; prep for resumption full scale ops; maint order in area of responsibility; prep plans for destruction of bridges in sector; carries out applicable terms of Armistice Agreement; assists in repatriation of PW; maint area control MUNSAN-NI area; conducts work tasks and recreational activities to insure maint highest standards of discipline and morale.

3. a. 5th Mar (Reinf)

(1) Subsequent to H/12 and when desired, assume opn ctl one bn 1st Mar, one bn 1st KMC RCT. These two battalions revert to parent ctl on order subsequent to H/72.

(2) Prep on O redispense forces as follows:

(a) One battalion remain in center regimental sector.

(b) One battalion in right regimental sector.

(c) One battalion in left regimental sector.

(3) Prep man NO-PASS LINE all sectors on O.

(4) Establish general outposts on the most favorable terrain immediately S of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z to include strongpoints shown in Annex CHARLIE (Opn Overlay). The general outpost will consist of security, support and res elms.

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(Cont'd)

(a) Security elms will consist of a line of outguards and roving ptls, with the following msn.

1 Manning road blocks on the principal avenues of approach along the NO-PASS LINE.

2 Covering the intervals between road blocks and the area between the NO-PASS LINE and the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z with roving ptls.

3 Observing the Demilitarized Z.

(b) Spt and Res elms will:

1 Prep seize (on Div order only) favorable terrain from which to observe into Demilitarized Z and place fire on enemy forces in the event of an enemy act of aggression in violation of the Armistice Agreement. (In occupying terrain for this purpose, friendly forces will not advance beyond the Demarcation Line).

2 Org and def intermediate pns on key terrain between southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z and the Post Armistice MBP to protect bridges and cover the daylight withdrawal of the general outposts.

3 Conduct a delaying action to allow an orderly withdrawal into the MBP.

(5) Report all enemy movement.

(6) Report any violations of Armistice Agreement.

(7) Apprehend all persons attempting unauthorized crossing of NO-PASS LINE in either direction, and process through normal intelligence channels.

(8) Org search and recovery teams and thoroughly search the Demilitarized Z in Div sector and evacuate all United Nations bodies including KATUSA and KSC to Graves Registration Service Collecting Points.

(9) Carefully mark, destroy or remove demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements and other hazards as directed by the MAC.

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(Cont'd)

(10) Where places of burial are a matter of record and enemy graves actually exist, permit unarmed enemy graves registration personnel (properly identified) to enter Div sector for the purpose of recovery and evacuation of enemy dead, following predesignated routes. These personnel will be kept under close surveillance by US personnel and prohibited from carrying cameras.

b. 1st Mar (Reinf)

(1) On O and when relieved of responsibility for sector by one battalion 5th Marines, commence tactical withdrawal via LIBBY Bridge to designated pens S of IMJIN R. (Annex CHARLIE)

(2) On O assume msn as Div Res Regt.

(3) Prep assist MBP regts in msn.

(4) Org and def Post Armistice Def Pens in accordance with Annex CHARLIE and Annex FOX.

(5) Prep blocking pens ABLE through DOG for def.

(6) Occ blocking pens on O.

(7) Prep occ MBP on O.

(8) Prep catk on O.

c. 1st KMC RCT (-) Reinf

(1) On O and when relieved of responsibility for sector by one battalion 5th Marines, commence tactical withdrawal via FREEDOM Bridge to designated pens S of IMJIN R. (Annex CHARLIE)

(2) Org and def Post Armistice Def Pens in accordance with Annex CHARLIE and Annex FOX.

(3) Maint outposts as required prov security for MBP.

(4) Maint security for FREEDOM Bridge.

(5) Prep destroy FREEDOM Bridge on O. (Annex GEORGE)

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(Cont'd)

d. 1st AmTrac Bn (-) Reinf

(1) Continue occ and def Post Armistice MBP in Z.
(Annex CHARLIE)

(2) On O pass opn ctl one plt Div Ron Co to parent unit.

e. Kimpo Prov Regt

(1) Continue occ and def Post Armistice MBP in Z.
(Annex CHARLIE)

(2) On O pass opn ctl one plt Div Ron Co to parent unit.

f. 11th Marines (Reinf)

(1) Prep spt withdrawal of MLR units.

(2) On O withdraw all units N of IMJIN R to designated area S of IMJIN R. (Annex CHARLIE)

(3) Prep spt def Post Armistice MBP in accordance with Annex DOG.

(a) Prep reinf fires of 1st Armd Amph Bn on O.

(b) Prep spt withdrawal of 5th Marines on O.

(4) Registrations will be so conducted as to ensure against violations of the DZ. A safety zone between the southern boundary of the zone and the impact area will be established and adhered to in all firing.

g. 1st Tank Bn (Reinf) (-)

(1) Prov one Co D/S each MLR Regt.

(2) Spt withdrawal of MLR Regts. Withdraw with Regts S of IMJIN R.

(3) Prep on O revert G/S for Anti-Mecz or CATk msn.

(4) Withdraw Co in spt of 5th Marines on O.

(5) Prep to move tank Cos to new pens on Post Armistice MBP on O.

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(Cont'd)

h. 1st Engr Bn (Reinf) (-)

(1) Prep plans for demolition of bridges in Div sector. (Annex GEORGE) Prep assist MBP regts in destruction of bridges.

(2) Mark Demarcation Line and southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z as directed by and under the supervision of the MAC. (Annex HOW)

(3) Assist 5th Marines mark, destroy or remove demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements and other hazards as directed by MAC.

(4) Prep lay minefields on O.

(5) On O withdraw S of IMJIN R, one company remain D/S 5th Marines.

(6) Exert maximum effort spt Regts in construction MBP.

(7) Maint develop all-weather roads in Div sector.

i. Div Ren Co:

(1) Prep ptl N or S of MBP on O.

(2) Prep execute other mns as directed.

j. 1st Ord Bn

(1) Spt Div as required.

k. HMR-161

(1) Prep lift elms of Div on O.

(2) Spt Div tactical and logistical mns.

(3) Flights over Demilitarized Z and water contiguous thereto prohibited.

l. VMC-6

(1) On O conduct continuous surveillance flights during daylight hours S of southern boundary Line of Demarcation.

(2) Flights over Demilitarized Z and water contiguous thereto prohibited.

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IMARD-OP-11-53

(Cont'd)

m. Ascom City Command

(1) Continue present msn.

n. 7th Marines (Reinf) - Div Reserve:

(1) Prep catk in Div sector N of IMJIN R.

(2) On O occ and def right sector Post Armistice MBP.
(Annex CHARLIE)

(3) Coordinate with Div on right.

(4) Maint outposts as required to prov security for MBP.

(5) Prov security for LIBBY Bridge.

(6) Prep destroy LIBBY Bridge on O. (Annex GEORGE)

x. (1) During the 12 hour period between the signing of an Armistice and the actual "cease fire" which has been ordered through command channels, normal battle opns will continue. Ammunition expenditures will be commensurate with the tactical situation.

(2) Firing weapons to mark the suspension of hostilities is prohibited.

(3) After cease fire all units will maint readiness for immediate combat and be prep resume full scale military opns.

(4) On O carefully read and explain to all troops their obligations under the Armistice Agreement (Annex EASY).

(5) Cease fire as directed in message from this headquarters containing effective date and time.

(6) MLR units within 72 hours after the Armistice becomes eff will:

(a) On O clearly mark and report to this headquarters by overlay (1:25,000) safe lanes through all wire entanglements, minefields known explosives and similar hazards to travel within the southern portion of the Demilitarized Z.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

IMARD-OP-11-53

(Cont'd)

(b) On O initiate tactical withdrawal to area behind NO-PASS LINE.

(c) Establish a NO-PASS LINE approximately 200 yds S of the tentative southern boundary to deny unauthorized entry into or egress from the Demilitarized Z. Only persons specifically authorized by the MAC and military personnel on official business will be allowed entrance to areas lying between the NO-PASS LINE and the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z. The NO-PASS LINE will be drawn on a map, coordinated by commanders concerned and submitted to this headquarters for approval. The NO-PASS LINE will be guarded by outpost personnel on all routes leading N of the Line. Initially mark the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z with air panels to assist aircraft in determining boundary.

(d) On O commence withdrawal all supplies and immediately removable equipment and material from the Demilitarized Z. Locate and list all valuable materials which should be salvaged but cannot be moved during this prescribed time period.

(e) Carry out applicable terms of the Armistice Agreement, establishing local measures and regulations necessary to prevent troops from violating the Armistice Agreement and instructions contained therein.

(7) On O commence tactical withdrawal to MBP S of IMJIN R. (Annex CHARLIE)

(8) Tactical withdrawal will be completed by D/5.

(9) Organize key terrain features on Post Armistice MBP in accordance with Annex FOX.

(10) MBP will be combat ready by D/5.

(11) Battle pns will be manned by approximately one-third of the strength necessary for the full garrison in def. Remainder of troops, less those on outposts and div res, will be located to permit complete occ of the MBP on four (4) hours notice.

(12) In the 45 day period following the initial 72 hour period MBP units will be prep assist the 5th Mar as required to complete salvage opns in the Demilitarized Z. This to be under the supervision of the MAC using unarmed troops or indigenous personnel.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

IMARD-CP-11-53

(Cont'd)

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- (13) Priority of construction; MBP, blocking pens.
 - (14) Maint law and order in assigned areas.
 - (15) Furnish administrative assistance to appropriate civil agencies which will operate under CINCUNC directives in prov aid to authorized civilians returning to or remaining within Div Z and the southern portion of the Demilitarized Z.
 - (16) Assist in repatriation of PW (RAINBOW).
 - (17) Contact L to R.
 - (18) Maint and improve fortifications in Z.
 - (19) Conduct ptls prov security for MBP.
 - (20) Eff for planning on receipt execution on O.

- 4. Admin O 7-53.
- 5. a. Annex ITEM, Signal
- b. Div CP. No Change.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES:

ABLE - Task Orgn
BAKER - Intelligence (to be published)
CHARLIE - Opn Overlay
DOG - Arty (to be published)
EASY - Command Conference
FOX - Orgn Key Terrain Features
GEORGE - Destruction of Bridges (to be published)
HOW - Marking of Demarcation Line and Southern Boundary of DZ
 (to be published)
ITEM - Signal (to be published)
X-RAY - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION:

X -RAY

C-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

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LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-3

1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
In the Field
271600I July 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Annex ABLE to LMARD-OP-11-53

Task Organization

1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF

MAJ GEN PATE

Hq Bn (Reinf) (-)

LTCOL LANDRUM

Hq Bn (-)

Kyonggi - Do Police Bureau

Army Unit 8052

Rad Rel Plat, 1st Sig Cpn Co, FMF

Det 1st ANGLICO FMF

Det 1st Eng Bn (Utilities)

181st CIC Det (-)

340th MIS Plat (-)

TLO Det Dog

Det 1st CSG, SC, FMF (-)

COL MOREAU

1st Med Bn (-)

CDR AYRES

1st MT Bn

LTCOL MC COOK

7th MT Bn (Reinf) (-) FMF

MAJ ANDERSON

7th MT Bn (-)

1st Amph Trk Co (-), FMF

2d Plat Auto Fld Maint Co, Det 1st CSG

1st Svc Bn (Reinf)

LTCOL CHAPMAN

Fumigation and Bath Plat (-), Det 1st CSG

1st Air Del Plat, Det 1st CSG

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SECURITY INFORMATION

103d Regt 101 KSC Div

1st Bn 119 Regt 101 KSC Div

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------|
| a. <u>5th Mar (Reinf)</u> | COL TSCHIRGI |
| 5th Mar | |
| One (1) Plat, 21st AAA AW Bn | |
| b. <u>1st Mar (Reinf)</u> | COL NELSON |
| 1st Mar | |
| One (1) Plat, 21st AAA AW Bn | |
| c. <u>1st KMC RCT (-) Reinf</u> | COL KO |
| 1st KMC RCT (-) | |
| One (1) Plat, 21st AAA AW Bn | |
| d. <u>1st Amph Trac Bn (-) Reinf</u> | MAJ ROSEBUSH |
| 1st Amph Trac Bn (-) | |
| One (1) Plat, 21st AAA AW Bn | |
| One (1) Plat, Recon Co | |
| e. <u>KIMPO Prov Regt</u> | COL PRICE |
| Prov Hq Co | |
| 1st Armd Amph Bn | |
| Det 181st CIC | |
| One (1) Bn, 1st KMC RCT | |
| 13th ROKA Scty Bn (-1 Co) | |
| One (1) Prov Plat, 1st Amph Trac Bn | |
| One (1) Co, 1st SP Bn | |
| One (1) Co, (-), 1st Med Bn | |
| Prov 90mm Gun Btry | |
| One (1) Plat, Rcn Co | |

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f. 11th Mar (Reinf)

COL CURRY

11th Mar

1st KMC Arty Bn

1st 4.5" Rkt Btry FMF

g. 1st Tk Bn (Reinf) (-)

LTCOL MC COY

1st Tk Bn (-)

1st KMC Tk Co

h. 1st Eng Bn (Reinf) (-)

LTCOL WITT

1st Eng Bn (-)

One (1) Co, 1st SP Bn

1st KMC Eng Co

EOD Team, 1st EOD Co, FMF

i. Recon Co

MAJ PERSKIE

j. 1st Ord Bn

MAJ PULLIAM

k. HMR-161

COL CHAMBERS

l. VMC-6

LTCOL ANDERSON

m. Ascom City Comd

COL BARBA

1st SP Bn (-)

Support Co, Det 1st CSG

1st Prov Trk Co, 7th MT Bn

n. 7th Marines (Reinf)

COL FUNK

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

L. W. WALT
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
 Annex X-RAY

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

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1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
In the Field
231200I July 1953

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Annex EASY to LMARD-OP-11-53

1. a. Omitted.
- b. Omitted.
2. a. 1st Mar Div orients troops prior to a Military Armistice in order to explain what the signing of the Military Armistice will mean and the conduct expected after the cease fire.
- b. Boundaries: Omitted.
3. x. (1) Appendix 1 is a command orientation which will be read and explained at a time designated by this headquarters and prior to the time for a cease fire.
- (2) Appendix 1 will not be disseminated below battalion at this time.
- (3) Commanders starting at regiment to the next subordinate echelon of command will read and explain this command orientation.
- (4) The commander in each company and similar unit, as soon as practicable, but not later than 24 hours after receipt, will give the orientation to each assigned and attached member for duty in his command.
- (5) Commanders at all echelons will insure that this orientation is conducted thoroughly and expeditiously, consistent with military operations.
- (6) The conduct of all personnel must be guided by the terms of the armistice.
- (7) Unit commanders will constantly review these terms with their men so that each clearly understands this truce situation and its meaning and no man can plead ignorance as an excuse for the violation of armistice provisions.

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Annex EASY

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- (8) This is a continuing orientation responsibility and will be included in the orientation for replacements.
- (9) Each commander, upon completion of this command conference will accomplish a certificate listing all those who were present. A copy of this certificate will be placed in each individual's Service Record or File Jacket.

4. Omitted.

5. Omitted.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX

1. Command Conference

DISTRIBUTION: Special

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Annex EASY

1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
In the Field
2312001 July 1953

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Appendix 1, to Annex EASX to 1MARD-CP-11-53

1. PURPOSE: This memorandum is required to be read to all troops by their company or similar unit commanders in order to explain what the signing of the Military Armistice Agreement will mean to UN troops in Korea.
2. PROVISIONS: Among the important provisions which will affect all of us are the followings:
 - a. Both sides must cease fire 12 hours after the agreement is signed. You will be notified as to the exact time when we will cease fire.
 - b. Within 72 hours after the provisions of the Armistice Agreement become effective, both sides must withdraw at least 2,000 meters from the Military Demarcation Line. The exact date when this is to be done will be announced. This Military Demarcation Line will be approximately our present line of contact. We will move into new defensive positions which have already been selected.
 - c. This 4,000 meter zone is to be known as the Demilitarized Zone. Only authorized personnel will be allowed entry into this zone. We will establish road blocks and patrols to prevent unauthorized entry into or egress from this zone. To accomplish this, a NO-PASS Line will be established just south of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone and will be marked on the principal routes. Certain personnel will be authorized entry or passage through the Demilitarized Zone in connection with their official duties. These will be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. This Commission and its related agencies are charged with supervising the implementation of the terms of the agreement. All persons with official business in the zone will have some means of identification.
 - d. Both sides are required to remove weapons and other equipment from present positions before they withdraw. We must also mark safe lanes through known minefields and record minefields and other hazards so that they can be removed at a later time. You will receive further instructions on these points.

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APPENDIX 1

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 1, to Annex EASY to
IMARD-OP-11-53 (Cond't)

3. DISCUSSION:

- a. The United Nations Command guarantees that the United Nations troops will abide by these and other provisions of the agreement. We must live up to the spirit as well as the letter of the terms.
- b. We have not achieved a peace. This is simply a cease fire agreement which may be violated by the enemy at any time. The troops are withdrawn to a position of readiness and must be alert to attack from the ground or the air. The only difference from our present situation is the change of position and cessation of active fighting.
- c. There is no occasion for celebration and boisterous conduct. This may result in irresponsible actions by individuals, leading to violations of the Armistice Agreement, for which the United Nations Command would be responsible. Such conduct will not be tolerated.
- d. The meaning of this armistice may be misconstrued by many people at home. We must guide them not to believe sensational press stories that the war is over and our forces can go home. The coming period is one which is as important as combat, in which we can never let down our guard. We are faced with the same enemy, only a short distance away, and must be ready for any move he makes.
- e. Disregard rumors. You will be advised through official channels if an armistice is signed. Anything else can be a trick or ruse to gain an advantage. Listen only to your own commanding officer.

4. SUMMARY:

- a. THERE MUST BE NO FIRING IN THE FORWARD ZONE AFTER THE CEASE FIRE EXCEPT BY A COMMANDER'S ORDER, TO REPEL ATTACK.

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Appendix 1

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Appendix 1, to Annex EASY to
LMARD-OP-11-53 (Cond't)

- b. THERE MUST BE NO CROSSING OF NO-PASS LINE EXCEPT BY THOSE AUTHORIZED TO DO SO.
- c. THERE MUST BE NO RELAXATION OF READINESS FOR COMBAT.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as Annex EASY

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1st Mar Div (Reinf) FIF
In the Field
271600I July 1953

Annex FOX to MARD-OP-11-53

Map: KOREA, 1:50,000

1. Omitted.

2. 1st Mar Div withdraws to Post Armistice MEP and organizes for defense on a wide front.

3. x. (1) Terrain features to be organized within the battle position will be those the enemy must capture prior to a major advance.

(2) All positions will be prepared for all around defense self sustaining and capable of continued resistance even when surrounded or bypassed. Tactical wire (Smith Fence or double apron fence) will be closely coordinated with final protective lines. Positions will be completely enclosed by protective wire.

(3) Each position will be organized in a complete perimeter to meet an attack from any direction with some elements disposed in depth, whenever possible, to provide a second or inner perimeter. Automatic weapons should be disposed in depth to provide continuity to the defense in case of enemy penetration of the outer perimeter.

(4) Troops not engaged by the enemy attack will be used to reinforce or regain a portion of the perimeter.

(5) Communication Trenches:

(a) Will be a minimum of 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ feet deep with frequent turns to decrease vulnerability to enfilade fire.

(b) Will be prepared with overhead cover at intervals along the trench to furnish protection against VT shelling.

(c) Will be used to connect fighting positions within perimeters but normally will not be used to connect separate tactical localities.

(d) Will be of sufficient width to allow a stretcher to pass through.

(6) Individual Fighting Positions:

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ANNEX FOX

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Annex FOX to LMARD-OP-11-53 Cond't)

(a) Will enable an individual to fight and cover a large sector of fire.

(b) Will when possible be built off the main communication trench and not attempt to utilize the main communication trench as a fighting position.

(c) Will give the individual ~~marine~~ maximum protection from enemy grenades and shell fire and still give him maximum field of action for firing his weapon, especially down steep slopes and to flanks, and throwing grenades. Depth will be such as to facilitate firing individual weapons from a standing position.

(7) Crew Served Weapons Emplacements and CP Bunkers:

(a) Will be prepared with provisions for a stove pipe and ventilation for winter occupancy.

(b) Will be covered with a minimum of 4 feet of overhead cover including a bursting layer (rock or other hard material.)

(c) Entrances will be protected from VT fire.

(d) Will be installed in such a manner that after the roof is emplaced with a minimum of four feet of overhead cover, the natural contour will be restored.

(e) Will be equipped with a drainage system.

(8) Tank positions will be dug in to hull defilade in firing positions.

(9) Quad 50 MG's will be provided with overhead cover to protect them from mortar and artillery fire.

(10) Communications:

(a) Supplementary means of communication, in addition to radio and wire, must be planned for because of the great possibility of communications being disrupted. These means include:

- 1 Pyrotechnics
- 2 Infra-red devices
- 3 Visual signals other than pyrotechnics
- 4 Sound
- 5 Messenger

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ANNEX FOX to LMARD-OP-11-53

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Annex FOX to LMARD-OP-11-53 (Cond't)

(b) Wire will be buried, where practicable, forward of battalion CP's, and in the vicinity of all CP's including division.

(11) Sleeping bunkers will not be constructed.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

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Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
Same as LMARD-OP-11-53

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3 Annex FOX to LMARD-OP-11-53

DECLASSIFIED

1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
In the Field
271600I July 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Annex X-RAY (Distribution) to LMARD-OP-11-53

| | | | |
|----------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| CMC | Div MTO | 11th Mar (5) | MTACS-2 |
| CG | Div Den C | Hq Bn (5) | 1st MAW |
| ADC | Hist O | 1st Tk Bn | Chief TAO |
| C/S | Div Surg | 1st Engr Bn | MA SRT-2 |
| G-1 | Postal O | 1st Ord Bn | Sig Co |
| G-2 | Spc Serv O | 1st MT Bn | Ren Co |
| G-3 (4) | Ln O's (2) | 7th MT Bn | FMF PAC |
| G-4 | Div Insp | 1st Svc Bn | Eighth US Army |
| FSCC | Pro Mar | 1st Med Bn | I US Corps (5) |
| NGFO | Div Chaplain | 1st AmTrac Bn | 1st COMWEL Div |
| Sig O | PIO | 1st SP Bn | 1st ROK Inf Div |
| Ord O | 1st Mar (5) | Det, 1st CSG | 7th US Inf Div |
| Eng O | 5th Mar (5) | 1st Armd Amph Bn | 25th US Inf Div |
| Sup O | 7th Mar (5) | Ascom City Comd (2) | File (10) |
| Air O | 1st KMC RCT (5) | HMR-161 | |
| Embark O | KPR (2) | VMC-6 | |

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

~~C-F-F-I-C-I-A-L~~

J. P. Ferrill
J. P. FERRILL
LtCol., USMC
ACofS, G-3

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DECLASSIFIED

1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
 In the Field
 271600I July 1953

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 SECURITY INFORMATION

Modification #1 to
 1MARD-OP-11-53

1. The following modifications to 1MARD-OP-11-53 are effective upon receipt.

a. Para 1. b. (2) Delete entire para add: 25th US Inf Div Arty and 96th FA Bn G/S reinf fires of 11th Marines. 17th FA Bn G/S I US Corps.

b. Para 3. a. (5) add: In no case will NO-PASS LINE be closer than 200 yds S of southern boundary of DZ.

c. Para 3. a. (6) add: "by either side."

d. Para 3. d. add para (3) Est NO-PASS LINE 200 yds S of river.

e. Para 3. e. add para (3) Est NO-PASS LINE 200 yds S of river.

f. Para 3. x. Add para (21) Units make report at H/72 on progress of withdrawal S of southern boundary of DZ.

g. Para 3. x. Add para (22) All working parties in Demilitarized Zone will be under control of an officer.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE:

L. W. WALT
 Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
 Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
 Annex X-RAY

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

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SECURITY INFORMATION

HQ, 1st MarDiv (Reinf) FMF
In the field
272000I July 1953

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

: To Accompany 1 MARD OP ~~1-53~~
NUMBER.....7-53)

Map: Korea, 1:50,000

Ref: (a) 1st MarDiv Admin O 8-53
(b) 1st MarDiv Admin O 11-52

1. General.

- a. Reference (a) is cancelled.
- b. Reference (b) remains in effect except as modified herein.

2. Supply.

a. Class I.

(1) Units displacing to new locations take all rations on hand.

(2) Stock Levels.

(a) Div Sup Pt - 2 D/S "A" or "B", Indigenous; and
2 D/S "C".

(b) Units.

1 2 D/S "A" or "B", 2 D/S Indigenous - In hands
of using troops.

2 1 D/S "C" in Regt or Bn Dp.

3 Food Packet, individual assault - Restricted to
units N of INJIN River unless approved by this Hq. See para 3.b.(5)
Div Memo 352-52.

(3) Water - Canteens filled prior to departure from present
camps. Cans, water, filled in each vehicle. Water trailers -
filled.

(4) 1st Svc Bn submits daily Tg, 96 hours in advance, via
Div Sup O to Army Sup Pt with EIGHTH Army and I Corps info addocs.

b. Class III.

(1) Units displacing to new locations take all Class III
on hand.

(2) Stock Levels.

(a) Div Sup Pt - 5 D/S.

(b) Units - 3 D/S in hands of using units in defense
sector; 1 D/S in hands of other using units.

(3) 1st Svc Bn submit daily Tg, 120 hours in advance, via
Div Sup O to Army Sup Pt with EIGHTH Army and I Corps info addocs.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 7-53

(CONT'D)

~~(4) Drum and 5 gal can conservation. Div Memos 15-53 and 109-53; Div Sup Bul 1-53.~~

(5) Control of POL - Div Memos 264-52, 7-53 and 109-53.

c. Class II and IV

(1) During first 72 hours after "cease fire" becomes effective, MTR units will take following action in connection with removal of materials north of the NO PASS LINE:

(a) General Supply - Remove all items. Extreme care will be taken in removing tentage to insure max later use.

(b) Engineer

1 Remove maximum amount of fortification materials to dumps in rear of NO PASS LINE designated by sector commanders.

2 Remove all buildings, squad tent kits, tent decks, strongbacking and other camp materials to areas south of NO PASS LINE as designated by unit commanders.

3 Remove all other engineer supply items to areas south of NO PASS LINE.

4 Particular care will be exercised in the salvage of screen and electrical supplies to obtain the maximum useable materials for new installations.

(c) Motor Transport - Remove all vehicles and MT spare parts.

(d) Ordnance - Units remove all weapons including sector weapons.

(e) Signal.

1 Units remove all signal equipment, less wire.

2 Recover maximum possible amount of wire.

(f) Medical - Remove all T/L equipment and supplies.

(2) Distribution - No change.

(3) Levels - No change.

d. Class V

(1) All ammunition in hands of using units will be displaced with units.

(2) Div Sup Pt.

(a) All units less KPR.

1 Normal - ASP 63 (CS 0583).

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 7-53

(CONT'D)

2 Emergency only and when directed by this Hq - Div
ASP (CS 1291) (Opens approx 1 Aug 1953).

(b) KPR units draw from ASP 46 (CS 1446).

(3) Stock Levels.

(a) Units less KPR - One (1) "Jamestown Basic Load".
No more than $\frac{1}{2}$ "Jamestown Basic Load" will be in hands of Bns and
below in Regts.

(b) KPR units - One (1) "Jamestown Basic Load" plus
100 rounds HE for each 75mm How.

(c) Div ASP

1 One (1) basic load arty ammo for Div plus 5 basic
loads for 4.5" Rkt Btry.

2 One (1) basic load 90mm ammo for Div.

3 Two (2) basic loads all types for two (2) USMC
Inf Regts.

3. Evacuation and Sanitation.

a. Initial location of Coll and Ctr Cos.

(1) "B" - CS 1098.

(2) "D" - BS 8873.

(3) "E" - CS 0691.

b. Div Hospital - CS 075876.

c. Camp sites being vacated will be inspected by the unit com-
mander or his representative to ensure compliance with Div Memo
69-53.

4. Traffic and Transportation.

a. UNC vehicles have priority on all roads.

b. Transportation requests will be submitted to the Div MTO
as soon in advance of requirements as practicable.

c. Unit commanders will be directly responsible for maximum
economy and utilization of all logistical vehicles supporting them
during their period of assignment.

d. Maximum usage will be made of all cargo trailers.

e. ~~Provost Marshal provide escorts for movement of tracked~~
vehicles, tanks and heavy loads.

5. Service Troops.

a. 1st Svc Bn.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 7-53

(CONT'D)

(1) Continue present mission.

(2) Prepare to displace on order this Hq to new location - Annex ABLE.

b. 1st Engr Bn (Reinf).

(1) Provide support of Div as directed.

(2) Provide one (1) Co D/S 5th Mar.

(3) Assist MTR units in salvage operations and minefield marking.

(4) Remove minefields and clear safe lanes as directed.

(5) Prepare to displace units on order this Hq to new locations - Annex ABLE.

(6) Mark Demarkation Line and Southern boundary of the Demilitarized Z as directed by and under the supervision of the MAC (See Annex HOW INARD-00-8-53).

c. 1st Ord Bn

(1) Continue normal functions in support of Div.

(2) Displace present Div Fwd ASP to new location on order - Annex ABLE.

d. Sig Co, Hq Bn.

(1) Salvage wire in areas of responsibility.

(2) Prepare to displace to new locations on order this Hq - Annex ABLE.

e. 1st Med Bn.

(1) Continue to support Div from present unit locations.

(2) Prepare to displace units to new locations on order this Hq - Annex ABLE.

f. 1st SP Bn (-).

(1) Continue present mission.

g. Ascom City Command.

(1) Continue present mission.

h. Ho Bn.

(1) Provide MP personnel in accordance with para 4.e. above.

(2) Prepare to displace to new location on order this Hq - Annex ABLE.

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ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NUMBER 7-53(CONT'D)

- i. Air Del Plt.
 - (1) Continue present mission.
 - j. HMR-161.
 - (1) Continue present mission.
 - k. Korean Service Corps personnel.
 - (1) Assignments - No change.
 - (2) Prepare to displace elements to new locations on order this Hq - Annex ABLE.
 - l. 1st MT Bn.
 - (1) Support Div as directed.
 - (2) Provide one (1) Truck Co in support each USMC Inf Regt.
 - m. 7th MT Bn.
 - (1) Support Div as directed.
 - (2) Provide one (1) Truck Co D/S Ascot City Cnd.
 - n. All direct hire labor remain with and be moved by using unit.
- 6. Personnel - Annex BAKER.
 - 7. Salvage - Annex CHARLIE.
 - 8. Miscellaneous.
 - a. Utility uniforms and equipment to include shelter halves and two (2) blankets.
 - b. Security will be maintained over all supplies and equipment at all times.
 - c. Special reports - Annex CHARLIE.
 - d. Areas reserved by higher Hq - Annex ABLE

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

ANNEXES: ABLE - Admin Overlay (Post Armistice locations Div
Supply installations)
BAKER - Personnel
CHARLIE - Salvage

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X-RAY to 1 MARD OP 11-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

F. S. Ivey
F. S. IVEY
Colonel, USMC
ACofS, G-4

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Hq 1st MarDiv (Reinf) FEF
In the field
2720001 July 1953

Annex BAKER to Admin O 7-53

PERSONNEL

1. Replacements and Rotation.

a. Present system of providing replacements and of accomplishing routine rotation of personnel will continue in effect.

2. Discipline, Law and Order.

a. Division Brig located at CS 1087.

b. Curfew period: 2100 hours to 0500 hours daily.

3. Prisoners of War.

a. See I US Corps Annex 11 (ADMINISTRATION) to I-US-OP-9-53.

b. Evacuation in accordance with Div GenO #102.

c. PWE at CS 1087.

4. Burials and Graves Registration.

a. Division Collecting Point vicinity CS 0792.

b. Evac in accordance with Division General Order #101.

c. Enemy Cemeteries:

(1) Cemetery located at Munsan-N1 (CS 0598) closes D/1 at 2400 hours.

(2) Evacuate enemy deceased personnel to Collecting Point TONGDICHON-N1 (CT 296009) and report cases to this Hq by most expeditious means. (This Hq make report to I Corps.)

(3) Report this Hq location of Enemy Graves in Division Area (This Hq make report to I Corps.)

(4) Enemy Graves Registration Activities:

(a) 1st Marine Division ceases fire and implements that portion of the Armistice Agreement pertaining to recovery and evacuation of deceased enemy personnel.

(b) General Considerations:

1 Within a definite time limit after the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, enemy graves registration personnel (GRP) will be permitted to enter the territory of 1st Marine Division to recover and evacuate enemy dead.

2 Exhumation will be permitted only in those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist. Indiscriminate search for enemy dead by enemy GRP will not be permitted.

3 Ingress to, and egress from, known places of burial will be over designated routes and at specific times only. During the movement of enemy GRP such routes will be closed and guarded to prevent entrance thereto by friendly troops and to afford full protection to enemy GRP.

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ANNEX BAKER TO ADMIN O 7-53

(CONT'D)

4 Specific procedures and time limit for performance of this mission will be determined by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC). Details will be promulgated at a later date.

5 Enemy GRP will be unarmed.

(c) Units will:

1 When directed by this Hq provide armed escort teams for enemy GRP. Teams will remain with the enemy GRP and will be supported logistically by units.

2 Provide armed route guards along designated routes within unit areas during periods announced for the entrance and exit of enemy GRP.

3 Furnish guards around established cemeteries for enemy deceased and isolated burial plots for enemy deceased within division area to afford full protection to the operations, persons, and billets of enemy GRP engaged in recovery and evacuation operations.

4 Provide intelligence personnel to insure necessary surveillance of all enemy GRP.

5 Furnish supervisory graves registration personnel and necessary equipment.

6 Furnish current rosters of deceased enemy military personnel showing name, nationality, rank, serial number, and other identifying data, date and cause of death, and place of burial.

(d) Provost Marshal:

1 Provide necessary MP personnel for escort, routing, traffic control and convoy activities.

2 Coordination of convoy movements with commanders of areas in which routing and travel are necessary.

(e) Surgeon:

1 Provide medical personnel to furnish emergency medical support to enemy GRP and escort teams during period of operation.

(f) On orders from I Corps Headquarters, this division will:

1 Permit enemy GRP to proceed to and operate in established cemeteries and/or burial plots for enemy deceased located in the division area.

2 Furnish on order, all available information pertaining to the places of burial of deceased enemy military personnel, including deceased prisoners of war.

3 Furnish logistic support as required for United Nations Command Personnel operating in division area under division control.

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4 Keep enemy GRP under constant surveillance, prohibit their taking photographs, and require them to follow pre-designated routes only.

(g) No logistic, administrative or other support will be furnished enemy GRP unless specifically directed by this headquarters except emergency medical support provided in accordance with paragraph 4.c.(4)(e)1 above.

(h) Known enemy cemeteries, and/or isolated burial plots in the Division area are:

Cemeteries
CS 0598

Isolated Plots
None recorded

(i) Command: Recovery and evacuation of deceased enemy military personnel will be coordinated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, 1st Marine Division.

5. Morale and Personnel Services.

a. Special Services activities will be increased in order to maintain the highest possible level of morale among troops during the post armistice period.

b. All unit commanders will initiate, or augment their sports programs to encourage maximum participation on a voluntary basis.

c. Free motion pictures will be continued for front-line troops as long as possible.

d. USO shows will continue to be scheduled to units.

e. Unit commanders will stimulate organizational marine shows and music programs to provide further entertainment activities.

f. Rest and Recuperation program will be accelerated (details to be published).

g. Marine Corps Exchange service to units will continue as presently established.

6. Civil Affairs - Military Government.

a. Civil Affairs Team and civilian collecting point at CS 0582.

b. Provost Marshal coordinate security and law enforcement agencies relative to LINE STAYBACK, civil curfew, and similar requirements.

c. Civilian employees - See Division General Order #92.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X-Ray to 1 MAFD OP 11-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-I

R. S. IVRY
Colonel, USMC
ACoys, G-4
SECRET

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Annex CHARLIE to Admin O 7-53

SALVAGE

1. EVACUATION OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE

a. Priority: The withdrawal of supplies, equipment and material from the demilitarized zone (DZ) will be accomplished in the following priority:

- (1) C/O&E and other specially authorized combat equipment.
- (2) Ammunition
- (3) Portable or easily movable valuable items from fortifications and positions areas.
- (4) Valuable salvageable materials from fortifications and positions areas.
- (5) All other items of supply and equipment.

b. During the 72 hours following effective date of the Armistice remove as much as possible of the valuable salvageable supplies, equipment, and material from the DZ giving priority as indicated in para 1.a. above.

c. All valuable supplies, equipment and material which should be salvaged but cannot be removed during the initial 72 hours will be documented, for later removal, as shown in Appendix 1. The location of installed communication wire will be shown by tracing the wire route on a 1/25,000 overlay.

d. All minefields, wire entanglements and demolitions will be documented for later removal or destruction as directed. 1/25,000 overlays will be prepared to show the location, trace and other pertinent information concerning such installations and submitted to this Hq (Attn: Div Engineer).

e. The Equipment lists and overlays called for in paragraphs above will be prepared in 6 copies and held in readiness for disposition as indicated by this headquarters. Separate lists for each technical supply service will be prepared. (General Supply, Engineer, Ordnance, Signal, and Motor Transport.)

f. After the initial 72 hours following the effective date of the Armistice, salvage operations in the DZ will be conducted only as directed by and under the supervision of the MAC by unarmed troops or indigenous personnel and on order of this Hq.

2. EXPLOSIVES ORDNANCE DISPOSAL

Upon discovery of unexploded bombs or abandoned allied or enemy ammo, info will be transmitted by most expeditious means to Div Engr O, for instructions as to disposition.

3. EVACUATION OF SERVICEABLE AMMUNITION

Serviceable ammunition in excess of authorized basic loads will be turned in to ASE #63 on property turn-in slip (Form 447), signed by the responsible supply officer.

4. EVACUATION OF UNSERVICEABLE AMMUNITION

~~a. Unserviceable ammunition will be collected in regimental dumps behind the southern boundary of the DZ. Dumps containing unserviceable ammunition will be arranged to facilitate inspections. Upon notification to Division Ordnance Officer by the unit commanders of the dump location, a representative of the 1st Ordnance Battalion will inspect the dump and further grade the ammunition.~~

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ANNEX CHARLIE TO ADMIN O 7-53

(CONT'D)

b. Ammunition too hazardous to be turned in will be disposed of as directed by the Ordnance Inspector. Ammunition to be turned in to ASP #63 will be accompanied by a property turn-in slip (Form 447) signed by the responsible Supply officer, and in addition will include a certificate signed by the Ordnance Inspector as follows: "I certify that I have inspected the ammunition listed hereon and have found no hazards which precluded turn in as grade 3 ammunition under existing regulations."

c. No attempt will be made to reinsert safety pins in rifle grenades or rockets once these safety pins have been removed. This regulation does not apply to mortar ammunition in which safety pins (or substitutes) may be reinserted after removing.

d. Hand grenades with missing, rusted, or defective safety pins should be placed in fiber containers if available. If not available, safety levers will be taped securely to the grenade's body and grenades packed in other suitable containers not to exceed 25 grenades per container. Containers will be tagged to indicate contents.

e. Laid activated anti-tank mines will not be moved. The locations of such mines will be referred to the Division Engineer for disposition.

5. All brass cartridge cases and items listed below will be salvaged and returned to the ASP #63.

a. Wooden containers - 57mm, 75mm, 76mm, 90mm and 4.5". (105mm wooden box containers need not be turned in.)

b. All fiber containers.

c. All metal containers.

d. All grommets.

e. All nose plugs.

6. Salvage components will be given a thorough inspection prior to turn in at ASP to insure that all exploding and unfired items have been removed. An officer will furnish a written certificate to this effect to the ASP salvage officer at the time such items are turned in.

7. For items other than Class V, dumps will be established by Division G-4, in conjunction with CO, 5th Marines for the temporary storage of such items prior to removal to permanent unit dumps behind the post armistice main battle positions.

a. These temporary dumps will be established, where practicable, near or within existing supply installations.

b. These temporary dumps will be south of the southern boundary of the NO PASS LINE and north of the Imjin River.

c. These temporary dumps are designed to accommodate material, equipment and supplies which may be removed from the demilitarized zone during the 72 hour period following the effective time of the armistice. As soon as possible items deposited in these dumps will be evacuated to more permanent unit supply installations behind the Post Armistice MFP.

8. Equipment from permanent installations such as industrial plants, power plants and similar installations will not be cannibalized or removed without written approval from this headquarters.

9. Empty trucks will be utilized to the maximum extent practical for the delivery of salvage to appropriate agencies.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Appendix 1 to Annex CHARLES

UNIT

DATE

(Technical Supply Service)

ITEMS TO BE SALVAGED FROM DZ

| ITEM | UNIT | QUANTITY | LOCATION |
|------|------|----------|----------|
| | | | |

REMARKS:

Signature Inventory Officer

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO ADMIN O 7-53

(CONT'D)

10. Churches and temples will not be used for military purposes. Church owned property and fixtures will not be removed.

11. Excess items will be reported via the appropriate technical branch to the Division Supply Officer for disposition instructions.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PAUL

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

Appendix

1. Form for inventory of Equipment to be salvaged

DISTRIBUTION

See Annex X-Ray to LWARD OP-11-53

T. S. Ivey
T. S. IVEY
Colonel, USMC
ACofS, G-4

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SECURITY INFORMATION

| | |
|--------------|--|
| River bottom | Rock |
| Entrances | Good on west bank None on east bank |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Section 3 | Full tide water depth | 9-15 ft. |
| | Low tide water depth | 8 ft. |
| | Full tide water width | 630 ft. |
| | Low tide water width | 530 ft. |
| | River width | 920 ft. |
| | Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| | River bottom | Sand |

Crossing 4 of Section 3 GT 096012 (LIBBY BRIDGE Site)

X-RAY BRIDGE is a high level, 50 ton, two-way bridge with a concrete pier and steel trestway.

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Full tide water depth | 9-15 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 8 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 630 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 530 ft. |
| River width | 920 ft. |
| Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Sand |
| Entrances | Good on both sides |

Crossing 5 of Section 3 CS 092993

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Full tide water depth | 9 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 7 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 900 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 790 ft. |
| River width | 920 ft. |
| Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Sand |
| Entrances | None |

Crossing 5A of Section 3 CS 089975 (SPOONBILL BRIDGE)

SPOONBILL BRIDGE is a low level, 50 ton, one-way bridge on timber cribs. This is a semi-permanent construction

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Full tide water depth | 25 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 20 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 900 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 790 ft. |
| River width | 1300 ft. |
| Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |

Crossing 6 of Section 4 CS 967956 (HONKER BRIDGE Site)

HONKER BRIDGE is non-existent.

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| Full tide water depth | 22 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 15 ft. |

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SECURITY INFORMATION

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Full tide water width | 970 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 580 ft. |
| River width | 1500 ft. |
| Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |
| Entrances | Good on both banks |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Section 5 | Full tide water depth | 6 ft. |
| | Low tide water depth | 3 ft. |
| | Full tide water width | 450 ft. |
| | Low tide water width | 250 ft. |
| | River width | 800 ft. |
| | Water speed | 3 ft. per sec |
| | River bottom | Rock |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Section 6 | Full tide water depth | 9 ft. |
| | Low tide water depth | 7 ft. |
| | Full tide water width | 780 ft. |
| | Low tide water width | 300 ft. |
| | River width | 1200 ft. |
| | Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| | River bottom | Muddy |

Crossing 6A of Section 6

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Full tide water depth | Not available |
| Low tide water depth | 4.5 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 750 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 300 ft. |
| River width | 1150 ft. |
| Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| River Bottom | Sand and small rock Good trail on east bank, passable to tanks on west bank, provided tanks stay clear of south end of island. |

Crossing 7 of Section 6 CS 016970

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Full tide water depth | 10 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 5 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 1050 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 630 ft. |
| River width | 1450 ft. |
| Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |
| Approaches | Good on both banks |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Section 7 | Full tide water depth | 15 ft. |
| | Low tide water depth | 8 ft. |
| | Full tide water width | 990 ft. |
| | Low tide water width | 600 ft. |
| | Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| | River bottom | Muddy |

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Crossing 8, 9 & 10 of Section 7 (FREEDOM BRIDGE Area)

FREEDOM BRIDGE is a high level, 50 ton, one-way, concrete pier with a wooden deck. This bridge was constructed for a combination of rail and truck traffic.

| | |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| Full tide water depth | 14 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 7 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 1400 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 680 ft. |
| River width | 1600 ft. |
| Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |

Crossing 11 of Section 8 CS 021926

| | |
|-----------------------|---------------|
| Full tide water depth | 22 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 15 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 1350 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 750 ft. |
| River width | 1650 ft. |
| Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |
| Approaches | None |

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Section 9 | Full tide water depth | 18 ft. |
| | Low tide water depth | 10 ft. |
| | Full tide water width | 2000 ft. |
| | Low tide water width | 900 ft. |
| | River width | 2400 ft. |
| | Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| | River bottom | Muddy |

Crossing 9 of Section 9 CS 010910

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Full tide water depth | 25 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 18 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 1500 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 780 ft. |
| River width | 1950 ft. |
| Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |
| Approaches | None on north bank Fair on south bank |

Crossing 13 of Section 9 BS 970902

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Full tide water depth | 24 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 9 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 2880 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 1050 ft. |
| River width | 2950 ft. |
| Water speed | 3.5 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Muddy |

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Approaches

None

4. Width and depths of Imjin as prepared by Corps of Engineers Intelligence May sheets NJ 52-9 and NJ 52-5 are given below for general information.

a. Imjin River Widths and Depths: Ferry Crossings (in meters)

| | |
|----------------|---------------------------------|
| (1) BS 9790 | Depth 6.7m - Width 500m |
| (2) CS 014904 | Depth 6.8m - Width 500m |
| (3) CS 0293 | Depth 5.1m - Width 500m |
| (4) CS 0196 | Depth 6.7m - Width 300m |
| (5) CS 0297 | Depth 7.0m - Width 400m (Ferry) |
| (6) CS 040975 | Depth 4.3m - Width 400m |
| (7) CS 065955 | Depth 6.7m - Width 300m (Ferry) |
| (8) CT 095012 | Depth 2.8m - Width 300m |
| (9) CT 095020 | Depth 2.4m - Width 300m |
| (10) CT 103040 | Depth 2.7m - Width 300m |
| (11) CT 115059 | Depth 2.5m - Width 110m |
| (12) CT 130045 | Depth 3.3m - Width 150m |
| (13) CT 150035 | Depth 4.5m - Width 100m (Ferry) |
| (14) CT 150057 | Depth 3.2m - Width 100m |
| (15) CT 175055 | Depth 3.5m - Width 100m |
| (16) CT 185052 | Depth 4.0m - Width 150m |
| (17) CT 205060 | Depth 3.6m - Width 200m (Ferry) |

5. Supplementary crossings selected for "Recoil" by 1st Marine Division, FMF.

a. Supplementary Bridge Site at CT 110057 is reported as crossing site number 2 of section 1.

b. Supplementary Tank Crossing CT 102035 is reported as crossing site number 3 of section 2.

c. Supplementary Bridge Site CS 067953 is reported as crossing site number 6 of section 4.

6. General remarks:

a. The information presented herein is based on reports developed by the U. S. Corps of Engineers prior to the current war and a river survey conducted by the 1st ROK Engineer Battalion about two (2) years ago. The degree of accuracy in this report will vary with the constantly changing river conditions. Detailed accuracy will depend upon more timely surveys.

Enclosures: (1) Water Levels
(2) Precipitation and Run-Off
(3) Average Monthly Flow

Appendix 2

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Enclosure (1) to Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER

WATER LEVELS AND TIDE RECORDS

| Gauge Station | Map Sheet Reference | Distance above mouth km | Year | Average Monthly LLW m | Average HHW m (Flood Stage) | Tides | | |
|---------------|---------------------|-------------------------|------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|--------------|----------------|
| | | | | | | HH m Springs | HL m Springs | Range m Spring |
| Inhan-nyon | NJ 52-9 | 0.0 | 1919 | 0.2 | 6.9 | 6.4 | 4.5 | 1.9 |
| | | | 1920 | 0.1 | 7.5 | 6.4 | 4.5 | 1.9 |
| | | | 1921 | 0.3 | 7.5 | 6.3 | 4.4 | 1.9 |
| | | | 1922 | 0.4 | 8.0 | 6.4 | 4.6 | 1.8 |
| | | | 1923 | 0.3 | 7.5 | 6.4 | 4.6 | 1.8 |
| Munsan | NJ 52.9 | 12.5 | 1927 | 0.6 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 2.9 | 2.0 |
| Injin-ni | NJ 52.9 | 31.6 | 1927 | 0.3 | 8.8 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| Korang-po | NJ 52.9 | 44.3 | 1919 | 0.3 | 8.1 | 2.1 | 0.5 | 1.6 |
| | | | 1920 | 0.3 | 10.6 | 2.3 | 0.6 | 1.7 |
| | | | 1921 | 0.2 | 7.9 | 2.1 | 0.3 | 1.8 |
| | | | 1922 | 0.5 | 16.7 | 2.3 | 0.9 | 1.4 |
| Yonchon | NJ 52.5 | 79.5 | 1919 | 0.4 | 6.9 | | | |
| | | | 1920 | 0.5 | 4.4 | | | |
| | | | 1921 | 0.3 | 6.2 | | | |
| | | | 1922 | 0.6 | 14.2 | | | |
| | | | 1923 | 0.4 | 10.3 | | | |
| | | | 1924 | 0.3 | 12.5 | | | |
| | | | 1925 | 0.3 | 9.5 | | | |
| | | | 1926 | 0.4 | 7.5 | | | |
| | | | 1927 | 0.4 | 8.9 | | | |
| Ichon | NJ 52-5 | 158.1 | 1923 | 0.5 | 8.7 | | | |
| | | | 1924 | 0.4 | 11.0 | | | |
| | | | 1925 | 0.5 | 7.6 | | | |

Enclosure (1)

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Enclosure (2) to Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER

Precipitation and Run-Off

Waterway No. 3-1, Injin River

| Guage Station | Map Sheet Reference | Distance above mouth km | Year | Covered by readings | Precipitation mm | Run-Off mm | Run-Off mm |
|---------------|---------------------|-------------------------|------|---------------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| Yonchon | NJ 52-5 | 79.5 | 1921 | 366 | 302 | 573 | 72 |
| | | | 1923 | 362 | 1463 | 1059 | 74 |
| | | | 1924 | 371 | 1075 | 918 | 85 |
| | | | 1925 | 366 | 1486 | 1179 | 79 |
| | | | 1926 | 364 | 1400 | 1063 | 76 |
| | | | 1927 | 357 | 1404 | 900 | 60 |

Enclosure (2)

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Enclosure (3) to Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER

Average Monthly Flow, cu.m/sec/

Waterway No. 3-1, Imjim River

| Gauge Station | Map Sheet Reference | Dist(km) above mouth | Year | Average Monthly Flow, cu.m/sec/ | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|------|---------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | | | | JAN | FEB | MAR | APR | MAY | JUN | JUL | AUG | SEP | OCT | NOV | DEC |
| Yonchon | NJ 52-5 | 79.5 | 1919 | 22 | 31 | 28 | 42 | 199 | 91 | 79 | 39 | 271 | 221 | 68 | 36 |
| | | | 1920 | 31 | 25 | 42 | 62 | 33 | 39 | 345 | 397 | 310 | 87 | 70 | 31 |
| | | | 1921 | 26 | 19 | 48 | 43 | 43 | 40 | 323 | 143 | 81 | 59 | 28 | 25 |
| | | | 1922 | 24 | 43 | 29 | 44 | 106 | 55 | 534 | 1749 | 281 | 61 | 35 | 23 |
| | | | 1923 | 12 | 13 | 64 | 97 | 68 | 28 | 411 | 779 | 92 | 30 | 38 | 28 |
| | | | 1924 | 16 | 41 | 19 | 71 | 58 | 33 | 1020 | 108 | 25 | 15 | 15 | 11 |
| | | | 1925 | 8 | 8 | 14 | 33 | 70 | 86 | 815 | 283 | 449 | 42 | 26 | 18 |
| | | | 1926 | 12 | 15 | 18 | 19 | 60 | 21 | 449 | 750 | 154 | 74 | 48 | 24 |
| | | | 1927 | 26 | 26 | 47 | 91 | 114 | 33 | 665 | 238 | 99 | 35 | 25 | 22 |

Enclosure (3)

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1st Mar Div (Reinf), FMF
In the Field
2716001 July 1953

Annex BAKER to ~~LMAD-OP-11-53~~

TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN

Maps: a. KOREA, 1:25,000
b. KOREA, 1:50,000
c. KOREA, 1:250,000

1. PURPOSE:

a. To present an analysis of the terrain as it effects operations in the First Marine Division zone of responsibility.

2. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

a. Due to the unusually broad area covered in the study, the terrain analysis will be divided into five (5) sections coinciding with the regimental defensive sectors set forth in the plan as follows:

- (1) The Right Sector.
- (2) The Central Sector.
- (3) The Left Sector.
- (4) The North Sector.
- (5) The KIMPO Sector.

3. TOPOGRAPHY OF AREA:

a. General:

(1) Generally the First Marine Division area lies in what is referred to as the coastal low-lands. This terrain belt is approximately twenty-five (25) miles in depth from the sea coast inland and extends up the West Coast of KOREA as far as the YALU River. The terrain in this area is characterized by steep hills that rise abruptly out of low cultivated areas which are largely developed into rice paddies. The hills themselves have been cut by erosion into "hog-back" ridges and minor ridges and hills extending like fingers into the low areas. The hills are largely covered with brush of varying degrees of density and scrub pine averaging from two to four feet in height. During the summer, spring and fall; this growth provides good concealment for personnel but generally is inadequate as cover or concealment for vehicles or shelters larger than a pup-tent. During the late fall and winter months, the concealment afforded by the brush decreases at least seventy-five per cent (75%).

The rice paddies form natural obstacles to the movements of tanks and other vehicles. In fact, these paddies canalize the movement of vehicles to

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the road net in the area. The appearance of the large areas of flat, abandoned, dry rice paddies is misleading when considered as suitable maneuver area for tanks. The paddies have been constructed throughout the years to retain water. Although appearing solid, there is usually a wet ooze under the dry crust. In some areas, tanks may negotiate this dry paddy area by moving rapidly and not tracing the path of a previous tank. Tanks may negotiate solidly frozen paddies in the winter time. Flooded paddies are not negotiable at any time except when solidly frozen.

The roads in the area are effected by the same conditions as the paddies. Roads that are built up above the level of the paddies and properly drained have, when based by rock and prepared by the engineers, become good all-weather roads. However, when a combination thaw and rain sets in, all roads rapidly deteriorate and large sections become impassable. The average narrow-road crossing the paddy areas is a fair-weather road constructed to handle bullock carts and once traveled by a few vehicles during a heavy rain, becomes a seemingly bottomless quagmire into which tons of rocks and gravel will disappear as fast as dumped and driven over.

There are three (3) main avenues of approach into the division area from the North. The SAMICHON-River Valley which leads into the division right flank, the CHAN-DANG Corridor which bends around Hill 229 towards the town of CHAN-DANG and the KAESONG-MUNSAN-NI Corridor which is the shortest route between the neutral zone and SEOUL. All of these avenues of approach lead to the IMJIN River which constitutes the major obstacle to a potential attack by an enemy moving from the North towards the First Marine Division area. All of these corridors were used during the CCF offensive in 1951 and still can be considered as the most logical routes of advance to the IMJIN River in any possible future offensive. See Appendix 1, (5th Phase Offensive).

The IMJIN River is generally not considered fordable, although low water and the presence of shifting sand bars and shallows does create places that would enable the enemy to wade or swim across and infiltrate our defensive area. See Appendix 2, (Study of IMJIN River).

If the bridges were destroyed or denied to forces north of the river, such forces in an large number would have to have river crossing equipment available in order to move to the south bank. Certain terrain features constitute definite obstacles to river crossings and are covered in the detailed terrain analysis for each defensive sector. During certain winter months, large areas of the river freeze solidly enough to support the crossing of vehicles.

b. Right Sector:

(1) This sector is fronted by the river line from CT 145034 to CS 087-967. The principal rivers and streams in this sector are the IMJIN River and the NULLO-RI-CHON. The IMJIN River forming the principal terrain obstacles in this sector averages approximately two hundred (200) meters in width at normal water level and is not considered fordable at CT 117059 and CS 092993 where a

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foot and tank crossing could be effected during certain periods of low water. Precipitous cliff areas present one of the most important factors in evaluating likely crossing sites along the river. River bank cliffs of basalt rock extending from CS 092981 north to CT 101030 on the south bank of the river and from CT 101035 to CT 109058 on the north bank form a stretch of approximately 8,000 meters of the 14,000 meter river line which is generally unsuited as river crossing sites except for infiltration tactics. These cliffs average thirty (30) feet in height and form a sheer drop to the water's edge. The most likely river crossing sites in this sector are in the SANGGORANGPO Area (CT 110060), the shallow area at CS 092993, the CHANGPO-RI Area (CS 090970) and the area from the mouth of the SAMI-CH'ON (CT 152067) south to TUJI-RI (CT 150038). This latter area, although lying outside of this sector, has been one of the major river crossing sites in KOREA and as the corridors from this site lead into the division's right flank; it is of major concern to the division defense plans. The SAMI-CH'ON River Area, the SANGGORANGPO Area and the SPOONBILL BRIDGE Area were three (3) major river crossing sites during the CCF offensive in 1951. See Appendix 1, (5th Phase Offensive, 1951). Two (2) of the most important bridges are located in this sector--SPOONBILL at CS 087967 and X-RAY at CT 099012.

The IMJIN River is moderately swift flowing in this sector and during flood periods. The current is difficult to negotiate with amphibious vehicles. See Appendix 2, (Study of IMJIN River). The terrain immediately inland from the river varies from steep hills on the sectors left and right flanks to low rolling hills and rice paddies, stretching inland from the cliffs and sand beaches in the center of the sector. Inland from the forward river area, a cross compartment containing a road presently titled "IX" runs from the southwest at CS 089966 to the northeast at CT 160015 and divides the sector into two (2) definite terrain areas, the forward river defense area and the Hill 496 defense area. The terrain north of this east west road rises to a broken ridgeline averaging a one hundred (100) meters in height with finger ridges and compartments containing paddy areas which stretch north to the beach and cliff areas along the IMJIN. The north and south branches of the NULLORI-CHON cut laterally across this area and join at CS 101995. The two branches of this stream are small and unimportant as obstacles except that they are part of the wet paddy area at CS 100990 which is not generally negotiable to vehicles off the road net. The cliff areas near the junction of the NULLORI-CHON and the IMJIN form an effective obstacle to the movement of both troops and vehicles. The road "IX" and cross compartment are unusually well situated for the defense of the river line in this sector. The broken ridgeline forming the south side of this corridor forms a natural defense line facing towards the river and has been developed as part of the KANSAS LINE. The road itself has been developed into an all-weather road, although constant construction is necessary to keep the road open during spring thaws. During high floods, the road has been partially inundated. This road and cross compartment are unusually well situated as lateral lines of communication behind the river line defense area.

The terrain area south of this road and compartment rises steeply up a number of highly defensible ridges to the crest of Hill 496. This hill mass and the IMJIN River are the two most important terrain features in the entire div-

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ision sector. Hill 496 dominates all other terrain areas in the divisions right and central sectors and provides observation over most of the area north of the INJIN River that lies south of Hills 155, 229, 181, and the HOOK Area near the S.MICHON. The area to the south of Hill 496 slopes down to numerous steep hills and ridges cut by narrow valleys and streams which flow generally north and west to the INJIN.

The principal road net in the right sector in addition to "LX" discussed above is formed by 2Y, 23 and 23B. See appendix 3, (Road Net). These all-weather, two-way dirt roads capable of handling all types of traffic but requiring constant construction and stringent traffic control during the wet weather.

(2) To summarize, the right sector fronts the INJIN River and contains within its area two (2) major river crossing sites, it is flanked on the right (east) boundary by the traditional invasion route to Seoul. This sector contains two (2) important bridges, SPOONBIL, and K-RAY. The terrain favors the defender and rises to Hill 496, the most critical hill mass in the division defense area. A combination of the above factors renders this sector the most important in the division area.

c. Central Sector:

(1) This sector for the purpose of terrain analysis is fronted by the INJIN River Line from CS 006967 to CS 013904. This river area is marked by a bend in the river which causes the greater extent of the terrain to form a peninsula. The INJIN River fronting this sector is free flowing and some what wider than in the right sector, averaging approximately four hundred (400) meters in width. No part of the river is considered fordable in this area but practically all parts of the shore line on both sides of the river are suitable as crossing sites. For hydrographic information, see appendix 2, (Study of INJIN River). A high level bridge presently referred to as FREEDOM BRIDGE is located at CS 010955. This bridge area was one of the major river crossing sites used by the USF during the offensive in 1951. See appendix 1, (5th Phase Offensive, 1951). Once the enemy has control of the north bank of the INJIN River, the conformation of the river bend would provide him with terrain from which he could effectively support his river crossing operations.

The threat of the enfilading position of the terrain in the TONGDOL-RI area (CS 076974) and the CHORNGJIN area (CS 009939) must receive serious consideration in river defense plans for this area. Shifting sand bars and muddy areas in the INJIN River from CS 022921 to CS 002969 create shallows that can cause landing craft to ground a considerable distance from shore. These sand bars were negotiated by river crossing elements during the USF Offensive in 1951. Moving inland from the river bank, the terrain on the peninsula consists of a belt of low rice paddies cut by small streams and drainage dikes that forms a flat area from CS 019940 to CS 040970. This terrain is negotiable to troops but not to vehicles off the road net. The road to FREEDOM BRIDGE is an all-weather dirt road. Other roads are characteristic of rice paddy roads. This entire flat area has been completely inundated during certain flood periods. The terrain inland from this flat area consists of low-rolling hills rising to an average height of sixty (60) meters on the peninsula with Hill 107 (CS 056952) the most dominating terrain feature on the peninsula itself.

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These hills and their compartmentation provide considerable cover and concealment from the enemy observation and fire from positions north of the river. However, enemy prisoners, captured during the Winter of 1952; stated that they could maintain constant daytime checks on vehicle and troop movements in the MUNSAN-NI - FREEDOM BRIDGE Area from enemy observation posts located at that time on Hill 283 (BS 911928).

The terrain to the immediate rear of the neck of the peninsula rises on the north to Hill 151 (CS 066942) and continues low-rolling on the south to the village of MUNSAN-NI. Behind the line, MUNSAN-NI - Hill 151, the terrain drops off into a cross-compartment that cuts the neck of the peninsula from MUNSAN-NI to CS 080956. The terrain inland from the north end of this compartment rises abruptly to the crest of Hill Mass 208 which dominates the entire peninsula area and the TONGP'ON-RI area (CS 070970) north of the INJIN River. Leading south from MUNSAN-NI along the SAN-CH'ON and the RR line is the corridor that provides the shortest route to the city of SEOUL. This corridor will undoubtedly be one of the primary objectives of any enemy offensive in the division defense zone. Fortunately, the junction of the SAN-CH'ON and the INJIN which also forms the mouth of this corridor is not a suitable river crossing site. The river is unusually wide at this point, is flanked by high ground on the south bank of the river and the terrain on opposing sides of the river at this point consist of flat, swampy rice paddy areas. The terrain forming the east and western side of this corridor rises abruptly from the rice paddy areas and consists of hills cut by cross compartments that definitely favor the defense. The primary terrain features dominating the MUNSAN-NI Corridor Area consists of Hill 216 ridge area (CS 073893) and the high ground in the NUNG-DONG Area (CS 035889).

The principal roads in the Central Sector are #1, running north and south from MUNSAN-NI; #2X, running east from MUNSAN-NI; #1B, leading to FREEDOM BRIDGE and #23, running east from PONGJAN-NI (CS 060869). See appendix 3, (Road Net). These roads have, at the time of this writing, all been developed into good all-weather, two-way dirt roads, capable of handling vehicular traffic of all types. Spring thaws and rains require constant road repair and the exercise of strict traffic restrictions to keep the roads negotiable. The terrain off to the sides of the roads consists, for the large part, of flooded rice paddies and are not negotiable to vehicles.

(2) To summarize, the Central Sector defends one of the principal river crossing sites located on a peninsula whose terrain can be dominated by the attacker once he is firmly established on the north side of the river. Back of the peninsula, the terrain definitely favors the defender and can greatly assist in countering attempted river crossings. Hills 208 and 151 are the principal terrain features dominating the peninsula and much of the terrain on the north side of the river. The village of MUNSAN-NI forms the gateway to one of the most important invasion routes to SEOUL which would be the primary objective of any enemy attack against the division sector. The terrain commanding the MUNSAN-NI Corridor, consisting primarily of the Hill 216 and NUNG-DONG Area, favors the defense of this corridor. The lines of communications in this sector are well developed as the result of this area containing a large number of military installations and the well developed road net facilitates the rapid movement of support and reserve units in both offensive and defensive operations.

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in the sector.

d. Left Sector

(1) This sector for the purpose of terrain analysis is fronted by the Imjin River Line from CS 014904 to BS 965810. This river area is marked by a bend in the river approximately ninety degrees (90°) forming an inverted "L". Each leg of the "L" is approximately seven thousand (7,000) meters in length. The Imjin River fronting this sector is free flowing and is strongly affected by the tide. See Appendix 2, (Study of Imjin River). The section of river that runs east and west averages seven hundred (700) meters in width, while the section running north and south averages twenty-one hundred (2100) meters in width. No part of the river is considered fordable in this area but practically all parts of the shore line on both sides are suitable for crossing sites. Extending from the south bank of the river is a mud flat that runs along the entire length of the river in this sector. This mud flat varies in width from two hundred (200) meters to eight hundred (800) meters; however, this mud flat is constantly shifting and will vary in width from year to year, and is considered very dangerous. In March 1953, three (3) Marines became mired in this mud and despite every effort to free them by employing helicopters, winches, shovels and timbers; they drowned in the incoming tide. Due to the effect of the tide, the current of the river is of such strength that a boat cannot be rowed against it. Normally, there is a twenty minute period at low tide and just before the tide starts coming in that the current is very weak. Although there are two (2) known enemy agent crossings in this sector (from BS 939875 to BS 962861 and from BS 957896 to BS 968892), there are no records of any large scale troop crossing in the sector.

Moving inland from the river bank, the terrain consists of a belt of low rice paddies cut by numerous small streams and dikes forming a flat area, providing poor cover and favoring grazing fires from CS 014904 to BS 958837 and from BS 960823 to BS 965810. The area from BS 958837 to BS 960823 contains two (2) hills rising sharply from the level of the river to a height of one hundred and eighteen (118) meters. The terrain inland from the flat area consists of rolling hills, rising to an average height of one hundred (100) meters. These rolling hills, surrounded by rice paddies, extend inland for some five thousand (5,000) meters where they join with dominant terrain features of this sector, a mass of hills in the T'ANHYON - MYON Area, vicinity of CS 020850. This hill mass rises to a height of over two hundred (200) feet, is very rugged and is covered by numerous large rocks and scrub trees which offer excellent cover and concealment.

On the extreme left flank of this sector is the KONGNUNG-CH'ON River which runs from BS 965806 inland to CS 045817. This river contains sufficient shallows to be considered fordable. The river and the adjoining paddy areas are not negotiable to vehicles. The rice paddies are cut by numerous streams and dikes.

The principal road in the Left Sector is #1D, running south from BS 020897 to BS 999822 then east to CS 040812, where it joins road #1X. This road has been developed into a good all-weather, two-way dirt road, capable of handling vehicular traffic of all types. Constant road repair is required during Spring thaws and rains. There are numerous minor dirt roads in the sector and for all practicable purposes, they allow only one-way traffic and quickly deteriorate when wet. The terrain off to the sides of the roads consists for the larger part of flooded

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Rice paddies which are not negotiable to vehicles.

(2) To summarize, the Left Sector favors the defenders. The river line is dominated by high ground rising out of paddy areas which favors the employment of flat trajectory weapons. The entire shoreline of the sector can be considered suitable as a crossing site as far as the characteristics of the shoreline itself is concerned. However, the mud flats, tide conditions and strong currents make this sector of the IMJIN River generally undesirable as a crossing site for large scale operations.

e. North Sector:

(1) This sector includes all of the area in the division zone of responsibility that lies north of the IMJIN River. The limits of this sector are formed by the SAMICHON River on the east, the present Truce Zone on the north and west and the IMJIN River to the rear. However, for terrain analysis purpose, the limits of this area must of necessity, be considered as the trace of the old MLR which included the terrain features, Hill 155 (BS 985977), Hill 229 (CT 015015), Hill 181 (CT 046043), Hill 163 (CT 093106). Hill 163 was forward of the old MLR which actually ended at the HOOK. However, the precarious situation of the HOOK was brought about by the enemy's seizure of Hill 163 during the Fall of 1952. Therefore, Hill 163 must be considered as one of the critical hill masses. There is more dominating terrain lying north of these hills. However, the occupation of Hills 155, 229, 181, 126, and 163 is considered as a minimum to enable a force to retain a defensive position for a protracted period of time north of the river in this sector. These hill masses so completely dominate the approaches to the IMJIN, the crossing sites, and the bridges; that it has long been realized that should the enemy seize them, any force between them and the IMJIN would have to reoccupy these key terrain features or withdraw south of the river. This sector contains three (3) of the most important corridors of approach to the IMJIN River in the division defense zone. These consist of the SAMICHON River Valley, (The ancient invasion route to SEOUL), The KAESONG-MUNSAN-NI Corridor, (the shortest route from enemy occupied territory to SEOUL) and the CHAN-DANG Corridor which leads through the 229 - 181 hill masses at CT 030045 and bonds around behind Hill 229--the most critical terrain feature in the North Sector.

The terrain between Hills 155, 229, 181, 126, 163 and the IMJIN River is characterized by low-rolling hills rising abruptly out of rice paddy areas. The paddy areas have been denied to the native farmers since late spring in 1952 and have taken on the characteristics of dried grass fields. However, due to the nature of their construction, they still retain considerable water after rains and are not generally negotiable to heavy vehicles except when solidly frozen during the winter months. Where the paddies are completely dry, they can be negotiated by tanks if the vehicles do not move in trace and break through dry crust.

If the previously mentioned critical terrain masses are held by friendly forces, the cover and concealment between these hills and the river is adequate for the movement of large units, including convoys of vehicles and the establishment of considerable supporting installations. See Appendix 5, (Areas of Enemy Observation). If these high hills were held by the enemy, movement in force, north of the IMJIN would be precarious although the compartmentation still would

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provide considerable cover and concealment from direct observation for friendly forces moving in the areas between the IMJIN and this line on high hills. Movement in this area under the circumstances of occupancy of these critical terrain features by the enemy would be restricted to the hours of darkness.

The terrain in the North Sector contained the old MLR, alternate positions in depth, supporting installations, therefore, the road net in the sector have been quite extensively developed. The defensive positions in depth were situated and constructed on the assumption that the enemy had seized the old MLR and friendly forces were either fighting a delaying action back to the IMJIN or were occupying counterattack positions in preparation for restoring MLR positions. Therefore, it can be assumed that these positions, commensurate with their state of repair, are particularly well-suited for any contemplated operations in the North Sector. See Sppendix 4, (KANSAS and WYOMING LINES) and Appendix 3, (Road Net).

To summarize: The North Sector consists of a river head north of the IMJIN which to be effective for sustained full-scale operations must include the Hill masses 155, 229, 181, 126, and 163 within the river head perimeter. The location of the IMJIN River to the rear of the sector and the vulnerability of its bridges and crossing sites to sabotage and enemy fire is only too apparent and are factors that must be seriously considered in any plans for operations in this sector. The prepared positions of the KANSAS and WYOMING LINES and the road net are well situated for operations in this sector.

f. KIMPO Sector:

(1) The HAN River, flowing on the north and east sides of the KIMPO Peninsula, has a width varying from 1,450 meters to 2,490 meters. On the west are the Straits of YOM-HA, whose width varies from 250 meters to 1,300 meters. The depth of these waters ranges from 33 feet to 1½ feet at low tide. The HAN has a mud bottom, which has formed several mud banks and flats, separated by channels. The current depends on the width of the channel, and varies from an average of 3 knots to 7 knots in narrow places. The current over mud banks is slower than in the channels. The most decisive hydrographic element is the extreme range and violence of the river tides. Mean high water spring tides average 28 feet; mean high water neaps at about 21 feet, and mean tide levels at about 15 feet. There are two periods of slack water, at dead high and at dead low. These periods of slack water, last only about 20 minutes to half an hour before the current reverses. Local civilians stated that river ferries made routine crossings at high tide during the interval immediately preceding and following slack water before the outgoing tide attained full force. The duration of this period is approximately one hour. Because of natural river flow, outgoing currents are stronger than incoming. This will be especially noticeable after heavy rains. During the period April through June there are several minus tides, low tides of lower than normal water depths.

The critical terrain feature in the northern sector of the KIMPO Peninsula is Hill 376 (BS 8479), which is superior in elevation to all other peaks on the peninsula as far south as Hill 395 (BS 9858). Other important peaks are Hills 167 (BS 8778) and 180 (BS 8474). In general, the hills along the south bank of the HAN estuary command observation far into the interior of the north side of the estuary, and, at the same time, mask rear areas to the south from

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observation from the north. See Appendix 5A, (Enemy Visibility Diagram). Two corridors (BS 86080 and BS 8980) lead into the peninsula from the river up to a depth of 3 kilometers. The width of these corridors varies from a maximum of 1,500 meters to a minimum of 400 meters, and a road runs lengthwise on the east side of each. Two minor corridors lead south from the river on either side of Hill 376. Approaches to all corridors lie across mud flats exposed at low tide, varying in width from 100 to 1,100 meters. These mud flats can support the weight of a man, but must be considered non-trafficable for all vehicles.

The weather is most adverse to military operations during the summer rainy season, which usually begins in the latter part of June and lasts until late in August. This rain will raise the level of the HAN and increase the speed of the speed of the outgoing tide. The lowlands in this sector are for the most part rice-cultivated and present formidable barriers when artificially flooded, and they are highly susceptible to seasonal floods. Extensively irrigated areas connected by numerous canals, ditches, and dikes are obstacles to movement. Artificial obstacles in the form of a few mine fields, tactical wire, and fortifications are found along the river bank. Road trafficability deteriorates during July and August, with impassable fords, bridge washouts, and slides existing in many places. However, road conditions improve rapidly during September. During the winter, surface soils freeze to a depth of six to twelve inches, which removes many of these obstacles to cross-country and road trafficability. See Appendix 3A (Road Net). However, even during the most severe winters, the HAN estuary rarely, if ever, freezes completely because of the swift currents and salinity of the water. During the maximum freeze which occurs at low tide, ice may form along the banks of the river or on sand bars; however, it will not be of sufficient thickness to support foot troops. Concealment is poor on lowlands and cultivated fields, but is fair in most hilly regions. Cover is sparse in the valley floors, with little vegetation other than rice fields, while scrub growth and grass are found on the steeper uncultivated slopes.

(2) To summarize, the KIMPO Sector favors the defenders. The steep sloped hills rising from the rice paddies afford excellent cover and concealment and favors the employment of flat trajectory weapons. The terrain is ideal for defensive positions in depth. The shoreline of this sector can be considered suitable as a crossing site as far as the characteristics of the shoreline

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itself are concerned. However, the mud flats, tide conditions and strong currents make the area generally undesirable as a crossing site for large scale operations. There is no record of a large scale crossing in the KIMPO Sector during this present war.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL PATE

L. W. WALT
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff

APPENDICES:

- 1 - 5th Phase Offensive Overlay
- 2 - Study of the IMJIN River (w/overlay)
- 3 - Principal Roads Overlays (Road Nets)
- 4 - KANSAS and WYOMING LINES
- 5 - Enemy Visibility Diagrams
- 6 - Enemy Visibility Diagram (Assumption that the enemy occupies certain terrain in the 1st Mar Div Sector)

DISTRIBUTION: Annex X-RAY to 1MARD-OP-11-53

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

J. E. Mills
J. E. MILLS
Colonel, USMC
ACofS, G-2

Annex BAKER

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1st Mar Div (Reinf), FMF
In The Field
2716001 July 1953

*orig
d. Signal*

Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER

Study of the Imjin River, prepared by the S-2 Section, 1st Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division, FMF

1. Purpose

a. The purpose of this study is to collect all of the available information on possible crossing sites of the Imjin River and to provide general information regarding the river.

2. General

a. Description: The river rises in the mountains of central Korea, flows generally southwest through foothills into the broad coastal plains along the mouth of the Han River, and empties into the Han River in its tidal reaches southeast of Kaesong. The Imjin River is approximately 159 miles long.

b. Importance: Except for a 44km tidal reach (27.5 miles) the Imjin River is more important for irrigation than as a navigable waterway, carrying only small native craft. At one time small ocean going vessels were able to proceed upstream to CT 119058, however, at the present time such passage would be impossible because of channel restrictions.

c. Terrain Traversed: Upper and middle reaches lie in mountainous terrain, steep hills dominate the valley for a great distance with frequent gorge like defiles. Lower reaches lie in coastal plain.

d. Drainage area is 8,117.53 square kilometers (approx 3,173 square miles).

e. Flood plain is of no significance in upper and middle reaches. Floods in lower reaches inundate the coastal plain, causing damage of varying degree. See Enclosure (1) for flood levels.

f. Precipitation and run off: See Enclosure (2).

g. Seasonal variations in flow: See Enclosure (3).

h. Tidal effects: See Enclosure (1).

i. Navigability: Not considered navigable for any but the smallest craft at present.

j. Structures: Such flood control and bank stabilization works as have been accomplished are of minor importance and are inadequate.

k. Maintenance and improvement:

(1) Up to the start of this war were of minor importance only. Since the war no maintenance has been performed.

(2) Planned development: Stabilization works and channel improvements have been planned. Negligible degree accomplished to date.

Appendix 2

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1. Bed and banks: Generally low steep banks with occasional flat places. Sandy bottom in upper and middle reaches; muddy bottom in lower reaches. Numerous dikes along banks.

3. Possible crossing sites:

a. In order to simplify the study of the river, it has been divided into nine sections where the river has nearly constant characteristics.

| | | |
|-----------|-----------------------|---------------|
| Section 1 | Full tide water depth | 11 ft. |
| | Low tide water depth | 9 ft. |
| | Full tide water width | 400 ft. |
| | Low tide water width | 360 ft. |
| | River width | 920 ft. |
| | Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| | River bottom | Rock |

Crossing 1 of Section 1 CT 117059

| | |
|--------------|-----------------|
| Water depth | 4 ft. |
| Water width | 490 ft. |
| River width | 1050 ft. |
| Water speed | 3 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Rock |
| Entrances | Good both banks |

Crossing 2 of Section 1 CT 110052

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Full tide water depth | 9 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 8 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 300 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 240 ft. |
| River width | 780 ft. |
| Water speed | 2 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Rock |
| Entrances | Fair entrance north bank Good entrance south bank |

Section 2

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Full tide water depth | 9 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 7 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 360 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 290 ft. |
| River width | 840 ft. |
| Water speed | 1.5 ft. per sec |
| River bottom | Rock |

Crossing 3 of Section 2 CT 101034

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Full tide water depth | 6 ft. |
| Low tide water depth | 4 ft. |
| Full tide water width | 310 ft. |
| Low tide water width | 250 ft. |
| River width | 900 ft. |
| Water speed | 2.5 ft. per sec |

SECRET

Headquarters
 1st Motor Transport Battalion
 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

JJS/hat
 A16
 Ser: 004-54

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
 (Attn: G-3)
 Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps, report of
 Ref: (a) CG 1stMarDiv ltr ser 002541 of 5Nov53

1. During the period 27 July to 31 October 1953, 1st Motor Transport Battalion was engaged in salvage hauling in addition to the regular assigned mission. Because the salvage operations were carried on in conjunction with normal operations, it is difficult to determine the exact tonnage of salvage material hauled during the period. A definite marked increase in tonnage hauled is noted however, when the period during which salvage operations were conducted is compared to the period immediately preceding salvage operations and the period after salvage was completed.
2. The average working hours of the individual driver also showed a slight increase which undoubtedly was due to the salvage operation.
3. The following figures represent the total tonnage hauled by this Battalion during the months in discussion.

| MONTH | TOTAL TONNAGE HAULED | AVERAGE DRIVER WORKING HOURS |
|-----------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| June | 9948 | 10.8 |
| July | 15245 | 11.3 |
| August | 14423 | 11.4 |
| September | 30722 | 10.3 |
| October | 27728 | 10.1 |
| November | 19487 | 10.1 |

4. As it can be seen in the above listing, the tonnage hauled in September and October greatly exceeded the other months. The slight decrease in August as compared with the previous month was undoubtedly due to the work necessary to dismantle bunker material prior to removing it from the DMZ.

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JJS/hat
A16
Ser: 004-54

5. During salvage operations a few mechanical and structural weaknesses were noted in the 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 6X6 M211. Weak cab longer support brackets, weak tail gate posts and the limited capacity of the front winch were some of the outstanding deficiencies that were noticeable. Some failures were due to road conditions with capacity loads and others could be traced to construction weaknesses. However, all deficiencies noted have been wholly or partially corrected by directives authorizing modifications or by stressing vehicle capabilities.

6. All salvaged material that was hauled by this Battalion was accomplished while in a direct support basis to the individual regiments. No salvage material was obtained or issued for use to this organization.



J. F. MC COLLUM

SECRET

7th Motor Transport Battalion
Service Command, FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/mbw
Ser: 004-54
9 Feb 1954

35B

SECRET

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), Fleet Marine Force (Attn ACofS G-3)
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps
Ref: (a) CG ltr ser 002541 of 5 Nov 1953
Encl: (1) Analysis of the operations of this battalion
1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.


R. S. ANDERSON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

During the period covered by this report, 27 July to 31 October 1953 the primary mission of the 7th Motor Transport Battalion continued to be that of providing logistical support to units of the 1st Marine Division. Following the cessation of hostilities transportation which was formerly assigned to the hauling of ammunition was now allocated for the purpose of transporting field fortifications that were forward of the demilitarization zone to rear areas and hauling fuel, personnel and engineer supplies.

During the period 29 July through 31 July 1953 the battalion in accordance with 1 MARD-00-8-53 assisted in the displacement of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) to the rear of the "Kansas Line". The average daily commitment for this period was approximately 98% of the vehicles available.

With the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division personnel and equipment to new battle positions, the 7th Motor Transport Battalion on 17 August 1953 closed its old Command Post at CSO81916, Korea, 1:50,000 Sheet 5527I AMS Series L751 and opened new Command Post CSO84806, Korea, 1:25,000 Sheet 6527II, AMS Series L851. This move was made while the battalion was 100% committed to the support of the 1st Marine Division.

From 6 September 1953 to 18 September 1953 the battalion furnished a total of two hundred thirty-two (232) trucks to the KMC's for the purpose of hauling field fortifications and transporting troops to and from the Kimpo Peninsula.

Due to the lack of rail facilities this battalion from 17 October to 31 October 1953 committed twenty-two (22) trucks per day for the transportation of 6,132 fifty-five (55) gallon drums of diesel fuel from Incheon to the Division fuel supply point.

For "Operation Big Switch" this battalion had three (3) vehicles TAD to that command. During the period covered by this report approximately nine hundred fifty (950) trucks were used in hauling field fortifications and salvage for construction of main battle positions.

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ENCLOSURE (1)


Headquarters
1st Tank Battalion
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CWM/ljg
A16
Ser 00134
14 December 1953

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
(Attn: ACofS G-3)
Subj: Activities 1st Tank Battalion, period 27 July 1953 through
31 October 1953; report of
Ref: (a) CG, 1stMarDiv ltr serial 002541, dtd 5Nov53

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), activities of this battalion during the period 27 July 1953 through 31 October 1953, as enumerated in the table of contents, is herewith submitted.


C. W. M. Ljg
COY

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- Enclosure (3) Map, Korea, 1/25000 Showing Tank Firing Positions
in Support of Division Sector.
- Enclosure (4) Map, Korea, 1/25000 Showing Tank Support of Div-
ision Counterattack Plans.

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SECTION I

OPERATIONS DURING FIRST 72 HOURS FOLLOWING ARMISTICE

Disposition of Tank Elements

On 27 July 1953 elements of the 1st Tank Battalion (Reinforced) were located and assigned as shown below:

Able Company (Reinf), D/S 5th Marines, CT 013005

Baker Company, Rear Reserve Tank Company, CS 090928

Charlie Company (Reinf), D/S 1st Marines, CT 091048

Dog Company, Forward Reserve Tank Company, CT 082999

1st KMC Tank Company, D/S 1st KMC RCT, CS 016971

Flame Platoon (-), D/S 1st Amphibian Tractor Bn, BS 973852

1st Tank Bn (-), CS 088925

1st Provisional Tank Platoon, Attached to 1st Provisional Partisan

Regt (WOLFPACK) KANGWHA-DO, BS 780880

Able Company (Reinf)

On 27 July 1953 Able Company had operational control of tank platoon 5th Marines, and was in D/S of the 5th Marines with thirteen (13) tanks in firing positions on the MLR. Balance of the company was located at the company command post at CT 013055. (See enclosure (1)). At 280900I July all tanks were withdrawn from the MLR to the company command post and tank platoon 5th Marines was released to parent control.

At 010730I Aug the command post at CT 013005 was closed and the company displaced rearward to CT 055005 and opened a temporary command post. (See enclosure (1)). Able Company remained in D/S of the 5th Marines during the 72 hours following the armistice and at 171330I Aug displaced to CS 069973 where a permanent command post was established. See enclosure (1).

Charlie Company (Reinf)

On 27 July 1953 Charlie Company had operational control of tank platoons

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of the 1st and 7th Marines and was in D/S of the 1st Marines with twelve (12) tanks in tank firing positions on the MLR. See enclosure (1). Balance of the company was located at the company command post, CT 091048.

Tanks remained on the MLR covering withdrawal of the 1st Marines until 291100I July when they displaced to the company command post.

At 291400I July the company was released from D/S of the 1st Marines, operational control of tank platoons 1st and 7th Marines was relinquished, and the command post at CT 091048 was closed. The Company displaced to CS 088926 and became an element of the division tank reserve. See enclosure (1).

1st KMC Tank Company

On 27 July 1953 the 1st KMC Tank Company was located at CS 016971 in D/S of the 1st KMC RCT. At this time no tanks occupied MLR firing positions. All tanks were located in platoon assembly areas in rear of the MLR.

At 010730I Aug the company closed the command post at CS 016971 and displaced to CS 092921 where a new command post was established and became an element of the division tank reserve under operational control of the 1st Tank Battalion.

Dog Company

On 27 July 1953 Dog Company was located at CT 082999 as the division forward reserve tank company. At 290900I July the command post at CT 082999 was closed and the company displaced to CS 146974 where a new command post was opened and became an element of the division tank reserve.

Baker Company

On 27 July 1953 Baker Company was located at CS 090928 as the division rear reserve tank company. No change was made in the location of this company, however, its mission was changed and it became an element of the division tank reserve.

1st Tank Bn (-) (Reinf)

On 27 July 1953 the battalion command post was located at CS 088925. Inasmuch as this location was contiguous to an excellent road net, centrally located within the division sector and of a sufficient distance from the demarcation line the command post remained at this location. See enclosure (1).

1st Provisional Tank Platoon

On 27 July 1953 this platoon was located at BS 780880 on the Island of KANGHA-DO, attached to the 1st Partisan Regiment (WOLFPACK).

Location of this unit remained unchanged until 101400I Aug at which time it moved by water and rail arriving at the Tank Bn CP on 12 August 1953.

This platoon was disbanded on 14 August 1953 with personnel and equipment reassigned within the battalion.

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Flame Platoon (-)

On 27 July 1953 the Flame Platoon (-) (6 tanks) was located at BS 973852 in D/S of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. At 141000I Sep the platoon closed the command post at BS 973852 and joined its parent organization at the Tank Bn CP.

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Salvage of Equipment and Material

During the first 72 hours subsequent to the armistice the 1st Tank Battalion was presented with the tremendous task of removing from vicinity of the MLR large quantities of ammunition (206 tons or 82 truck loads); fuel oil and grease (19 tons or 9 truck loads); fortification material (15 tons or 6 truck loads); and the camp equipment and organizational property of three (3) MLR tank companies (approximately 35 tons or 14 truck loads). See enclosure (1) for tank unit disposition on 27 July 1953.

The most difficult of logistical problems confronting this battalion during the 72 hour period was preparation and movement of class III and V supplies and in particular class V. Ammunition was stored in 35 MLR on-position dumps extending across the entire frontage of the division sector as well as on one (1) combat outpost where tanks were positioned near PANMUNJOM. A small ammunition dump and a sizeable fuel dump was maintained at each of the three (3) committed tank company command posts. In addition, the battalion maintained a large class III and V dump north of the IMJIN River in vicinity of the battalion forward command post (see enclosure (1)). To make the problem even more difficult, additional vehicles and personnel could not be obtained from division; the battalion was operating with only twenty-four (24) of its authorized thirty-four (34) cargo trucks; it was necessary to retain thirty (30) percent of the tanks and crews on the MLR for security purposes during sixty (60) of the available seventy-two (72) hours; and, the necessity for completing the withdrawal behind the southern boundary of the DMZ within seventy-two (72) hours.

Since all of the ammunition in the MLR on-position dumps was unpackaged and in a ready-for-use status, and since no ammunition handlers or technicians were authorized or available to prepare it for safe movement, it was necessary to establish an "around the clock" schedule for all hands to meet the terms of the armistice. Members of the battalion worked "around the clock" until 311200I July at which time the task was completed.

During the period 271000I July to 311200I July the following types and quantities of material, ammunition, fuel and equipment was recovered from the forward areas and transported to rear area dumps and command posts:

- 2240 Grenades, all types (2 tons)
- 855 rds 76mm ammunition (15 tons)
- 2944 rds 90mm ammunition (95 tons)
- 1332 rds 105mm ammunition (38 tons)
- 100,750 rds Cal. .50 ammunition (19 tons)

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850,000 rds Cal. .30 ammunition (32 tons)
2062 Empty shell cases, 76mm, 90mm and 105mm
1150 Drive stakes (6 tons)
14000 Sandbags (reclaimed) (2 tons)
1 Bunker, 12'x20' (7½ tons)
1700 gals, oils (6 tons)
3370 gals, gasoline (12 tons)
Camp and maintenance equipment (35 tons)
Greases (1 ton)
TOTAL TONS - 275
TOTAL 2½ TON TRUCK LOADS - 111

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Immediate Effects of Cease Fire on Personnel

In anticipation of the armistice, company commanders were directed to avail themselves of every opportunity for troop indoctrination and to explain to all hands the meaning of the term "cease fire", stressing that it was not to be considered a permanent peace. The importance of maintaining combat readiness and our new mission was explained. Consequently, when the cease fire went into effect all hands were relatively well prepared psychologically. Little or no change in attitude was noticed with the exception that there was a general lessening of tension. Significantly, there were no "celebrations", but rather a serious attitude of interest and watchful waiting.

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SECTION IISHOW OF FORCE FOR NON-REPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR

On 2 September 1953 the 1st Tank Battalion received instruction from the G-3, 1st Marine Division to assist in the planning for a Show of Force to be conducted for non-repatriated PW's that were to be transported daily by rail through MUNSAN-NI to the non-repat PW Holding Camp north of FREEDOM Bridge during the period 10-23 September 1953.

The Division Plans Officer and S-3 of the 1st Tank Battalion conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the area between MUNSAN-NI and the PW Holding Camp with the purpose of selecting sites on which to locate participating units. Two (2) batteries of the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion were already located (points Baker and Charlie of enclosure (2)) so that both areas could be easily observed by non-repat PW's from their passing railway troop coaches. It was decided that these two units would be assigned a role in the Show of Force to conduct artillery gun drill as non-repat PW trains passed.

Two (2) Tank Company positions were selected (points Dog and Easy of enclosure (2)) which passing PW's could observe. One (1) marine tank company, with one (1) flame thrower tank attached, could be placed on each of these positions and normal preventive maintenance and gun drill would be conducted during the passing of PW trains. Flame throwing tanks could fire in both areas and it was planned that several seconds of flame would be fired during the passing of each train.

The area east of the north end of FREEDOM Bridge possessed excellent beach conditions for the operation of LVT's. It was planned to place a platoon of LVT's at this location (point Fox enclosure (2)). At the time of PW trains crossing FREEDOM Bridge the LVT's would be waterborne conducting formation driving.

The hill located west of the north end of FREEDOM Bridge enjoyed excellent observation from the bridge and a decision was made to place the 5th AT Tank Platoon at this location (point George enclosure (2)). Like the two (2) tank companies, the 5th AT Tank Platoon would conduct maintenance and gun drill during the passing of trains.

No other suitable sites remained for the placement of other units and it was concluded that the units listed below would constitute the Show of Force:

Two (2) Artillery Batteries, 1st KMC Arty Bn.

One (1) LVT Platoon, 1st Amtrac Bn.

Two (2) Tank Companies, 1st Tank Bn.

One (1) Tank Platoon, 5th Marine Regt.

Two (2) Flame Tanks, 1st Tank Bn.

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On 5 September 1953 this battalion received IMARD-00-12-53 delegating responsibility to the 1st Tank Battalion for over-all coordination of the demonstrations and the establishment of communications to all participating units. The details of coordination and communications were completed and an observation post (point Able of enclosure (a)) from which a sentry could observe the arrival of PW trains was established. From the observation post a telephone line was laid to all Show of Force units (point Baker through George).

At 091930 September 1953 BAKER and CHARLIE Companies, 1st Tank Battalion, displaced from the battalion command post area and established temporary tank parks at points Dog and Easy, respectively. During the night of 9-10 September tanks were positioned and shelters erected for security personnel.

At 100600 September 1953 all participating units were in position as shown by enclosure (2) and the first PW train arrived at point Able at 0710 hours. The sentry on duty at point Able warned all units of the arrival of the PW train. All units prepared to execute their assigned mission.

When the PW train passed positions Baker and Charlie the 1st KMC artillery crewmen could be observed conducting gun drill. At points Dog and Easy tank crewmen were working on tanks and the tank flame thrower fired long bursts of flame. As the train arrived at FREEDOM Bridge the PW's could observe the LVT's maneuvering in the river to the east (point Fox) and the 5th AT Tank Platoon conducting tank drill to the west (point George). An average of five (5) PW trains passed Show of Force units daily and a demonstration was conducted for each train.

At 230900 September 1953 the last PW train crossed FREEDOM Bridge concluding the movement of non-repatriated PW's. By 1600 the same date all Show of Force participating units had been released by division to control of parent organizations.

It may be concluded that non-repat prisoners of war displayed intense interest in the Show of Force, as it was noted without exception that prisoners seated on the far side of troop coaches habitually crowded to the near side of coaches in order to gain a better view of each demonstration along their route.

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SECTION III

TANK BATTALION MISSIONS

Tank Employment in Support of Counterattack Plans

During the period from 20 August 1953 to 6 September 1953 members of the battalion staff and staff officers of the reserve regiment (1st Marines) conducted extensive reconnaissance with the purpose of planning counterattacks on objectives designated by 1-MARD-00-10-53. See enclosure (4).

In planning the tank support required for counterattack plans it was evident that the nature of the terrain eliminated the desire for large scale tank movement with the infantry while assaulting objectives; however, limited tank movement onto objectives was planned to support plans Baker, Charlie, Dog and Easy in all cases where terrain and road net permitted. See enclosure (4).

It was determined in this situation that overhead supporting tank fire delivered from close-in base of fire positions constituted the most advantageous method for providing maximum tank support.

Construction of tank roads to selected supporting positions commenced on 24 August 1953 and was completed by 20 September 1953. It was possible to utilize existing MBP tank firing positions to support counterattack plan Baker. See enclosure (4).

Disposition of the division tank reserve is tactically sound. Time and space factors and all-weather road nets were the governing factors in disposition of this unit. Three (3) tank companies were centrally disposed within the division sector, contiguous to an excellent road net. The fourth reserve tank company was located at CS 146974 to permit immediate displacement of armor to the extreme right flank of the division, which is vulnerable to an excellent route of approach and IMJIN River fording sites for enemy armor.

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Antimechanized Defense

The antimechanized mission of this battalion was given strong consideration during planning for redistribution of units of the battalion subsequent to the Armistice. With exception of strengthening the division's right flank with one company of tanks, it was considered that the area in and adjacent to the existing battalion CP (see enclosure (3)) was most desirable for early execution of both the counterattack mission and the antimechanized mission. Early and timely displacement in depth over an excellent road net to attack, blocking, counterattack, and main battle supporting positions were primary factors during planning. See enclosure (3).

On 5 August 1953, G-3 assigned this organization the task of preparing the Division Antimechanized Plan. On 6 August 1953 representatives of all supporting arms met at tank battalion headquarters to coordinate and establish planning principles and to assign work tasks. During the period 7 August through 13 August extensive reconnaissance was conducted and rough plans completed and submitted to the Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion.

On 15 August the recommended antimechanized plan for the division was delivered by the battalion S-3 to G-3 for approval and reproduction. On 21 August 1953 G-3 approved and published the antimechanized plan as Annex KING to 1-MAHD-00-10-53.

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Selection and Preparation of Tank Firing
Positions in Defense of Div Sector

With the post-armistice disposition of tank companies completed on 3112001 July 1953 the primary task then facing the battalion was selection and preparation of tank firing positions to: support main battle positions; support general outpost line; support counterattack plans; and to cover by fire probable enemy fording sites across the IMJIN River. In considering the task it was obvious that many positions could be located to fulfill more than one purpose. Wherever possible this would be done, but, it was immediately and firmly established, where a choice existed between one less-suitable two-purpose location and two more-suitable single-purpose locations, the latter would be selected. Also, in order to enable a logical sequence of construction, it was apparent that a priority as to types of tank firing positions would have to be established. Accordingly, it was decided to prepare MBP and general outpost supporting positions first, and then, counter-attack support positions, and positions covering enemy potential river crossing sites. Wherever possible old firing positions which had been previously prepared to support lines WYOMING and KANSAS were to be utilized.

With the above considerations in mind reconnaissances of the general outpost sector, MBP's and the river line were planned and executed jointly by the S-3 and company commanders. Firing positions in the general outpost area were primarily selected to cover likely avenues of enemy approach into that sector and only secondary consideration was given to placing tank positions within areas occupied by infantry troops (see enclosure (3)). The tank company in direct support of the North Regiment, "A" Company, was assigned responsibility for preparing positions as well as access roads to these positions.

Tank firing positions in the right regimental sector were selected and coordinated with the 7th Marines (right regiment) to assure their integration into the over-all defense plans of that sector. Preparation of tank firing positions was then assigned "D" Company, the reserve tank company located in the division right sector.

In the center regimental sector, where the 1st KMC RCT was positioned, responsibility for preparing tank firing positions was assigned the KMC Tank Company under operational control of the 1st Tank Battalion. Here again they were integrated into the over-all defensive plan.

The Flame Platoon at this time was located in the left regimental sector (old WHISKER area) where tactical disposition remained essentially unchanged. Consequently, this sector was well provided with old firing positions leaving little work other than addition of a few supplementary tank firing positions.

Thus, a total of two hundred four (204) tank firing positions as shown in enclosure (3) were prepared by this battalion throughout the division sector. Positions N1 through N16 were placed to cover likely avenues of

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approach into the general outpost area. In a few instances they support infantry positions and in addition, cover critical avenues of enemy approach. Firing positions in depth was stressed. Such positions as R4, RL2, C4, and L3 support the MBP's as do others. In addition to many of the firing positions within MBP's which overwatch possible river crossing sites such as R4, other positions, such as R3, 5, 7 and C2 and 5, were prepared specifically to overwatch the river at critical points. Certain other positions, such as C1, were located to support counterattack Plan DOG as well as support a MBP. Others, such as R3, cover a river crossing site as well as support counterattack Plan ABLIS. See enclosure (4), Counterattack Plans.

During preparation of tank firing positions an entirely new capability became obvious. From the numerous positions over-looking the river it was apparent that tanks could provide considerable direct fire support to the North Regiment during withdrawal and river crossing actions. With this in mind a study was made of the fields of fire with results as shown in enclosure (3). Though limited in some areas, it is believed that over-all, a substantial amount of shallow and deep direct fire tank support can be provided the North Regiment from tanks in position south of the river.

In accomplishment of this task only organic equipment, consisting of tank dozers and one TD 18 bulldozer, was used. On several occasions when dozers were not available, tank firing positions were dug by hand. It is interesting to note that a total of eleven (11) miles of tank road were constructed in gaining access to the firing positions.

Headquarters
 7th Marines (Reinf)
 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
 c/o Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California

28 January 1954

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DEFENSE OF "D" DIVISION SECTOR, I U.S. CORPS

1. Operations during first 72 hours following armistice:

a. Although the Regiment was in division reserve the hour the truce went into effect (272200I July 1953), the 1st Battalion and elements of the 2nd Battalion were occupying positions on the Main Line of Resistance under operational control of the 1st Marines. In regards to salvage during this period, these units on line directed their efforts primarily to the removal of ammunition and unused bunker materials. Lack of time and necessary equipment prohibited any large scale dismantling and removal of fortifications, although some of the smaller bunkers were torn down, their sandbags emptied in the trench lines and salvaged.

b. The immediate reaction of personnel to the truce was one of disbelief and caution. Extensive movements of the enemy during the night of 27 July only bolstered the feeling of wariness and suspicion. Only after dawn broke on 28 July; without any shots being fired, did the realism of the truce become apparent, followed by a widespread sensation of relief. Morale was never higher among fighting troops nor was an enemy ever more **distrusted**.

c. Withdrawal from DMZ and occupation of new MBP positions:

"D" and "E" companies rejoined the 2nd Battalion on the morning of 28 July. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines remained under operational control of the 1st Marines, and didn't return to parent control until 30 July. They had to move fast when released by the 1st Marines, in order to avoid violation of the agreement to evacuate the DMZ within 72 hours.

H&S Company, 7th Marines, moved into the old reserve regiment camp site (CS 106961). The 1st Battalion, which was to be responsible for organization the Hill 495 terrain mass, went into the camp called the Rock Pile (CS 121981). The 2nd Battalion moved into camp Mathews, then called Camp No Name (CS 102973). The 3rd Battalion, which first moved into the Rock Pile, shifted over into the center of the right forward hill mass which they were to organize for defense (CT 146023). The 3rd Battalion had no tentage and had to wait until 2/11 moved out of the area before setting up **their** permanent camp. No serious problems developed as a result of the move back from the DMZ and into the current right regimental sector.

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2. Conduct of Salvage Operations (1 August to 15 September)

a. Methods used:

(1) The initial directive concerning salvage operations was received via message by the Regiment on 5 August 1953. The Regiment was assigned the sector between the demarkation line and the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone, in the area occupied by the Regiment at 201200I July. The regimental sector was divided into three approximately equal size areas and each battalion was assigned an area of salvage responsibility. The positions formerly occupied by the 4.2" Mortar Company and the Anti-Tank Company were assigned to those respective units for salvage. Coordination was required with the 5th Marines Regiment on exact boundaries between the regiments, because certain defensive positions occupied by the Regiment were just inside the 5th Marine sector, but could be more economically salvaged by this Regiment.

Initially each battalion was directed to furnish a working party and the 4.2" Mortar Company and the Anti-Tank Company were to jointly furnish one working party. These working parties were to consist of a minimum of 1 officer and 20 enlisted men plus one truck and were to be increased as trucks and salvage conditions permitted. Korean Service Corps personnel were to be used to the greatest practicable extent in order that the maximum number of marines could continue development of Main Battle Positions.

To insure compliance with directives concerning entrance into the Demilitarized Zone, the Regimental S-4 Office acted as the central agency for obtaining all passes required for working parties to enter the zone for salvage purpose.

As the salvage operations proceeded and additional logistic and engineering support was made available, units of the Regiment increased the number of salvage operations until the major effort of the Regiment was devoted to this work. During the final week of salvage operations, additional troops were made available to the Regiment from the reserve regiment, 1st Marines, and the artillery regiment, 11th Marines. During that week approximately 90% of the Korean Service Corps personnel assigned to the Regiment were being utilized in salvage operations.

It was deemed advisable to establish a priority of materials for salvage taking into account the requirements of the new MBP's.

Priority of salvage was established as follows:

- (a) bunker timber
- (b) ammunition
- (c) individual equipment
- (d) barb wire
- (e) pickets
- (f) sand bags

(2) Communication salvage operations were conducted separately by communications personnel working under direction of the Regimental Communications Officer. These operations consisted primarily of the recovery of telephone poles and stakes, and terminal strips, TM-184. It was originally estimated that there were 2,000 miles of telephone wire in what had recently been the 7th Marines zone of action. This wire, poles and equipment had been placed in the area by wire teams and patrols of various organizations while running the Main Line of Resistance. Much of the wire in the south-

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ern portion of the Demilitarized Zone had been shot up by artillery fire. However, it was estimated that approximately 40% could be rehabilitated and reused. Communication salvage operations were divided into two phases:

First Phase (I) was the area within the southern portion of the Demilitarized Zone and was limited by the terms of the truce to a terminal date of 13 September 1953.

Second Phase (II) was the salvage of the area south of the southern boundary of the Demilitarized Zone south to the Injin River, until completed. (By 31 October 1953 phase II was approximately 80% completed)

Trucks, 2½ ton, and trailers were used to transport the personnel and salvaged material. Reel units RI-31 and reels, DR-4 and DR-5 were used wherever practicable. When working in the DMZ, the great majority of the salvaged telephone wire recovered was "figure eight" coiled, and all cable was left bound and tied into coils. (All wire recovered during the second phase was rehabilitated as recovered.) Originally one large crew was sent out daily, leaving the CP at 0700 under the command of an officer who split the crew into sections and assigned them areas to work. Korean Service Corps troops were used to augment the marine wiremen but this was discontinued after three days.

b. Stockpiling:

(1) Coordinating with the 5th Marine Regiment, the 7th Marines established a salvage dump in the former's sector. Regimental Units were directed to evacuate salvage material to that dump for segregation and further distribution to MBP's. Units were permitted to take salvage items direct to their camps on the last truck run each day in order that needed items could be used by them in the MBP development.

Bunker timbers were unloaded and piled by sizes in the salvage dump. Unloading zones were established for concertina wire, long pickets, short pickets, ammunition, individual equipment and other types of material that were expected to be salvaged in quantity. A non-commissioned officer was assigned to be in charge of the dump to supervise the stockpiling and control issues from the dump. Salvage material was not issued from the dumps without the approval of the Regimental S-4. Engineer personnel were assigned to the dump daily to assist in segregating the bunker materials and selecting timbers to be used in construction of new bunkers. As the tempo of the salvage operations increased, working parties were assigned to the dump to speed up the unloading of the trucks and the segregation of the materials.

(2) All telephone wire recovered from the DMZ was turned over to the 11th Marines who rehabilitated and stored it for issue. All wire salvaged south of the DMZ was rehabilitated and stored by the unit recovering it. Poles and barbed wire stakes were stockpiled at the Regimental CP and used where necessary in the Main Battle Positions.

c. Accountability:

In compliance with Division directives, units were required to submit telephonic reports by 1800 daily as to the percentage of salvage completed to date of the following items:

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- (1) Ammunition
- (2) Equipment
- (3) Sandbags
- (4) Timber
- (5) Pickets
- (6) Barbed Wire
- (7) Communication Wire

Percentages were consolidated by the Regimental S-4 and a report was made to Division G-4 by 0900 daily. Weekly conferences with units S-4's reported the quantities of salvage material that were evacuated direct to unit camps rather than to the dump. As indicated above, salvage material was available from the dumps only after approval by the Regimental S-4. Efforts were made to allocate the most critical items to units highest operational priority for IEP development.

d. Amount of material salvaged:

Salvage operations in this Regiment's sector of responsibility were completed on 12 Sept 53. It was estimated that 98% of all salvageable material had been cleared from the Demilitarized Zone. Barbed wire entanglements in known or hazardous locations were not salvaged. Those hazardous areas were marked by the use of white tape and red metal triangles. It was estimated that 144 miles of barbed wire was not recovered, because of dangers involved. Estimated amounts of materials salvaged during the period were as follows:

| | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| General Supply Items | 9½ tons |
| Signal Items | |
| (1) Equipment | None |
| (2) Communication Wire | 2120 Miles; 5316 tons |
| Ordnance Material | 59 tons |
| Bunker Timbers | 414,212 board ft. |
| | 750 tons |
| Barbed Wire | 1830 rolls |
| Concertina | 810 rolls |
| Sandbags | 270,000 |
| Long Barbed Wire Stakes | 18,550 |
| Short Barbed Wire Stakes | 10,500 |
| Culverts | |
| (1) 12" | 280 sections |
| (2) 18" | 225 sections |
| (3) 24" | 152 sections |
| (4) 30" | 55 sections |
| (5) 36" | 276 sections |
| (6) 40" | 350 sections |
| Chicken Wire | 120 rolls |
| Camouflage nets | 35 each |

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| Motor Transport Items | none |
| Telephone Poles | 37 "Hasty type"; 12 "Black-jack type" |
| Telephone Stakes | 250 |

c. Problems encountered:

(1) The first problem encountered was that of establishing a priority for the salvage operation. The regiment was engaged in constructing Main Battle Positions and the conflict between operational requirements required resolution. Early directives from higher authorities did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage operations. Truck

availability was limited initially by redeployment of Divisional units and other such factors beyond the control of this Regiment. As the salvage operations began to receive higher priority during the latter part of August, trucks and engineer support were furnished in adequate amounts. However, salvage operations could have proceeded much more rapidly in the first three weeks if the priority pattern had been more clearly defined.

(2) The dismantling and evacuation of bunkers was the biggest problem encountered in actual salvage work. Many of the bunkers were old and of different type construction than the newer ones. A number of bunkers had been installed by Army units and were held together by large spikes and steel drift-pins. Since mechanical equipment could not be driven to the bunker site, it became a problem of sheer manpower to dismantle these bunkers. Crowbars, hydraulic jacks from the trucks, sledge hammers and chain rigs were the only available means of dismantling the bunkers and these tools were very difficult to obtain at the outset. Since trucks could be driven to only a few bunker sites, bunker materials had to be man-carried distances of 500-600 yards to a collection point for vehicle loading. Each 12'x12' timber required a minimum of four men for a carrying team and a tremendous number of man-hours was required in this effort.

(3) The Demarcation Line presented a problem to the communications recovery plan in that hundreds of miles of telephone wire had been used by patrols in front of the IIR. Extreme care had to be taken in recovering this wire. Constant vigil had to be maintained for mines and duds. In one case two land grenades were discovered tied by the rings to a telephone line. These grenades were pulled almost to the feet of the lineman before being discovered. The custom of installing lines by the most direct route rather than following a road or trail made recovery difficult. Vines, grass and branches had become entwined with the wire. This necessitated the men cutting their way into the thicket, and cutting the line loose. This was particularly true in the case of lines that had been laid during the winter months when the terrain was comparatively barren. In some cases, especially true in the "76 Alley" area, the lines had been repeatedly cut by enemy fire. Instead of the linemen being able to stand in one place and pull the lines to him in long spans, the route of the line had to be walked and each section either tied together or coiled separately.

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(4) As a result of the summer rains and the complete absence of road maintenance in the Demilitarized Zone immediately following the cease fire, truck utilization was seriously hampered during the first three weeks of the salvage operations. As engineer personnel and equipment became available, access roads were improved and evacuation of salvage was speeded up accordingly.

After the priority of salvage operations had been firmly established and specific directives received as to clearance of the salvage area, personnel and logistic support were available in the quantities required and the Regiment completed the salvage operations in its zone of responsibility on the afternoon of 12 Sept 53.

3. Organization of defensive positions:

a. General concept of defense:

By order of higher authority, the Right Regimental Sector was organized on the Wide Front Defensive concept; i.e., a series of battalion strength defensive perimeters, organized for all-around defense, and so equipped and supplied that they could continue to fight even though bypassed or surrounded. The terrain in the sector is particularly well adapted to this defensive concept. The regimental commander was instructed by higher authority where to place his battalions. The initial placement of a battalion on the ground in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion included the platoon strength outpost positions at CT 122013 and CS 116992 as part of the battalion MBP. Detailed examination of the ground in the regimental sector and from vantage points to the northwest across the INJIN River demonstrated that to permit rifle companies to organize on the two small hills as part of the battalion MBP would be tactically unsound. They are readily enfiladed by observation and fire from across the river to the Northwest, and there is much better observation of the area they command provided in both the 2/7 and Hill 495 sectors. Accordingly, it was recommended to Division that the positions at CT 122013 and CS 116992 be occupied by squad sized outposts only during hours of reduced visibility, and that the battalion perimeter be pulled in, and moved to the rear, so that the high ground in the area could be included in the MBP.

b. Organization of ground:

(1) MAP, Scale 1:25,000. AMS-L851 Sheets I NW, SW, NE, SE

(a) Company areas, outposts of smaller size: (See enclosure 2)
Each battalion is required to provide outposts and patrols to its front in order to provide the security necessary for its own MBP as well as for the Regimental Sector.

(b) Battalion boundaries: (See enclosure 2)

(c) CPs including company: (See enclosure 2)

(d) Most likely avenues of approach

(1) Routes of approach into the right regimental sector are limited by the river crossing sites available to the enemy and by the terrain and limited road net. The SAMI-CH'ON River Valley provided a route of approach to one of the major river crossing sites used by invading CCF Armies. Although this route of approach, and the river crossing site are not within the regimental sector, the corridors from this area lead into

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the regimental right flank. The road running south past UN'GOK (CT062075) presents another route of approach into the regimental sector. This road joins 2Z and 1Y (CT059034) and thence leads to several of the major river crossing sites. The CHANGMAN corridor, which bends around hill 229 and leads into the town of CHANGDAM (CT026005) is another traditional invasion route. Although this route of approach provides access to the road net leading to river crossing sites in the right regimental sector, the direct route leads to crossing the IMJIN River to the west of this sector.

On the south side of the IMJIN River, routes of approach within the regimental sector conform generally to the road net, routes 23, 23A and 23B and to the valleys leading south to hill masses 270 and 495. All routes of approach over the major river crossing sites (with the exception of the one at SPOONBILL Bridge site) lead eventually to the wide cross compartment which contains the NULJORI-CH'ON.

Tracked and wheeled vehicles will be confined to the road nets on the routes of approach because of the extensive rice paddies in the low areas and the rugged nature of the terrain in the hilly areas. During certain periods in the winter, however, when the ground is frozen, the rice paddies can be traversed by armor.

(c) Fire Plan for regimental weapons. (See enclosure 3)

Two things were taken into consideration in the placement of AT Company tanks within the MBP: first, the terrain, and second, the planned availability of "D" Tank Company, 1st Tank Battalion. By virtue of the available road net and general rugged nature of the terrain, it was at once apparent that tanks could be used only in the 2nd and 3rd Battalion areas, and of these the 2nd Battalion was the closest to the already available camp location of the AT Company. Thus it was decided that the tank platoon of AT Company would be placed in direct support of the 2nd Battalion, and that "D" Tanks would support the 3rd Battalion. Though "D" Tanks are not in direct support of the regiment, their planned use is in the Right Regimental Sector, and thus they were directed by the Tank Battalion to reconnoiter the 3rd Battalion sector, advise the battalion commander on employment of tanks in his sector, and work on the construction of tank firing slots. (See enclosure 3)

Recoilless 75mm Rifles were split between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, in order that they might be utilized in the area most likely to be approached by enemy armor.

Rather than dissipate initially the possibility of massed 4.2" Mortar fire wherever available within the sector, all tubes were kept in general support, but with priority of fires of one platoon each to 2/7 and 3/7. Distances involved made it impossible for the 4.2" Company to be employed as an entity and support the entire sector. Initially, one platoon each was placed in the sector of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and later, some six weeks after the cease fire, when four additional mortars became available as sector weapons, a provisional platoon was formed within the company. This platoon was emplaced in the Regimental CP vicinity, from where it could support not only the battalion on Hill 495, but also reinforce the fires of the platoon in the 2nd Battalion sector in certain areas as well. From the supplementary positions provided on the right flank, and some three thousand yards to the rear of 3/7, close in fires could be provided 3/7 (an impossibility for the platoon in its own sector), and in addition the front of hill 495.

As a result of lessons learned during the MLR period of fighting, when the platoon and company commanders were overburdened by

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the coordination of fire plans among the various supporting weapons for support of their patrols, it was decided to incorporate into one central fire plan the concentrations for all weapons. Such concentrations were given but one designation, and either the battalion concerned, or the regiment if the situation required, would coordinate the fires as to the weapon available, the most suitable for the type of target, or the ability to fire the concentration at all. (See enclosure 4)

(2) Factors considered in organizing defense:

Since the Battalion MBPs were assigned by higher headquarters, Regimental attention was directed first to the location of CPs. The AT and 4.2" Companies remained in the camp they occupied at the beginning of the truce. 2/7 and 3/7 CPs provided no tactical problems; both were located almost in the center of the terrain they were assigned to defend. 1/7 was placed in an area called the Rock Pile. Higher authority assigned the Regimental CP area. The defensive concept was one of each battalion constructing an all around perimeter, providing mutually supporting fires where possible. The primary direction of fire was towards the present location of the enemy but with the knowledge that an attack could be expected against any portion of the perimeters. (For detailed discussions concerning the tactical organization of defense, see the reports of the Battalions).

It was at once recognized that the road net within the Regimental Sector would have to be improved and enlarged. There was need for a covered route of motor withdrawal for the motor transport of 1/7 from the Rock Pile; some sort of supply road or means would have to be provided Hill 495; 2/7 needed a road into the heart of its positions which the enemy could not observe; and 3/7 needed several roads within its extensive perimeter for supply and evacuation of the company sectors. Such roads posed only the problem of waiting for engineer support. But above normal engineer assistance was required to provide the aerial tramway which enables supply and evacuation of the Northernmost finger on the 495 hill mass.

(3) Advantages and disadvantages of organization:

In the interests of economy and a realistic appreciation of the political situation, it was decided not to move the AT and 4.2" Companies. Their old camps, which had been used for a year or more by the AT and 4.2" Companies of the reserve regiment during the MLR Fighting, provided the initial advantages of being prepared. They were also in an excellent area for training and recreation. The tactical disadvantages of the location were discounted, particularly in view of the obvious need for parcelling out the 75mm Recoilless, and because it was recognized at once that the Tank Platoon would be deployed, in the event of reopening of hostilities, within the 2nd Battalion area. It is quite true that on the last day of the MLR fighting the enemy had dropped two or three rounds of artillery into the area of the 4.2"-AT Camp. All of the rounds were duds but it at least gave notice the enemy knew the location of the camp. Inasmuch as the enemy was forced by the provisions of the cease fire to move his artillery back, and because of the general outpost, the calculated risk of leaving the camp where it was provided little cause of concern. As a matter of caution, the tanks were deployed in slots provided in a

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defiladed draw near the camp.

2/7 and 3/7 camps were ideally situated in the hub of their respective perimeters. The Rock Pile, the camp into which the 1st Battalion moved, had the advantage of being prepared for occupation. It too had been one of the camps employed by the Battalions of the reserve regiment during the MLR period. However, there were serious disadvantages. The Rock Pile was in a poor location tactically being right in front of Hill 495; there was but one road leading into the camp, and that from the direction of the enemy; finally, it was at an inconvenient distance from the ground the 1st Battalion was to organize. The disadvantages had to be accepted, however. There was no area available into which to move the 1st Battalion. As a partial offset to the disadvantage of its poor tactical location, an evacuation and destruction plan for the camp was prepared. The battalion itself, of course, would move into its positions on the hill once the shooting started.

As was previously stated, the Regimental CP was assigned by higher authority. Even though the obvious disadvantage of its proximity to the MBPs was admitted, requests to have it located farther south were refused.

The Right Regimental Sector comprises the strongest tactical ground—from a defensive standpoint—in the entire Corps Area. The enemy, due to the observation afforded by Hill 495, conceivably would be forced to devote a very large part of his attacking force to seizure of that hill. By virtue of its contiguous location, the 2nd Bn provides a formidable obstacle to any enemy force attempting capture of the 495 hill mass. The three battalions are placed on the critical terrain features. Their location makes the organization of the ground as strong as possible with the strength available. T/E strength of the regiment is much enhanced by the addition of sector weapons. It is to be noted that sector weapons furnished were supplied with understanding that they be manned by T/O personnel. Additional detail with reference to sector weapons is furnished in the reports of the battalions.

By organizing on the wide front concept the regiment has been able to provide depth to positions, an all important advantage that did not accrue on the MLR positions.

It is a disadvantage of the organization that battalions, with the exception of the help 2/7 can receive from Hill 495, cannot be mutually supporting. From a standpoint of covering ground, it would no doubt be better if the battalions extended farther down the fingers. To do so, however, would be greatly to weaken the several fire plans, and to deprive the positions the benefit of depth and tight-knit fire coordination. Dangers of distance between the battalion positions are more apparent than real. With the observation provided within the perimeters themselves, plus the advantages that accrue from the outposts and planned patrols, there is little doubt the tremendous amount of artillery fire support available will bolster the position to the extent that it can readily withstand the onslaught of at least two enemy divisions, and this latter statement is not to take into consideration the counter-attack support envisioned in the Division Operation Order.

(4) The construction & supply in regards to the Main Battle Positions are covered in detail in each of the separate battalion reports.

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(5) Manning of MBP rehearsals:

Held frequently at all levels, and presented no problems. With each rehearsal the speed of manning increased. The regiment can man the MBP day or night in well under the 4 hour period required by the Division Operation Order.

(6) Control of personnel under terms of armistice:

Presented no problem to this regiment. All hands were indoctrinated in the provisions of Annex Easy to the Division Operation Order within 5 days after the cease fire, and certification to that effect made by entries in each individual's record book. This certification was attested to by signature of the individual concerned. Subsequent to the initial indoctrination, as each replacement joined the command it became part of his official administrative indoctrination to attest that he thoroughly understood the terms of the armistice.

(7) Changes in Planning:

A combination of two events--scheduled Marlex training for the regiment, and a serious turn in the South Korean political situation brought about the relief of 1/7 on Hill 495 on 12 October by the 1st Bn, 1st KMC Regt. When the relief was completed, 1/7 came down off the hill and began Marlex training in their camp in the Rock Pile.

Division SOP for relief of units on the MBP was not followed, the shortness of time made it impossible to do so. 1/7 withdrew into the Rock Pile in good order, after turning over each company and platoon area, and all plans, orders, and material including sector weapons, to the KMC Battalion.

During the Marlexes conducted by this regiment and the 5th Marines, the 1st battalion, 7th Marines was utilized in turn, to relieve 2/7, 3/7, 3/5, and 1/5 from their MBP and Outpost positions in order that those units could have maximum participation in the landing exercises. Following the completion of the 1st Bn, 5th Marines Marlex, 1/7 returned to their camp at the Rock Pile and assumed the mission of Regimental Reserve.

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ORIGINAL

WHD/ms
25 January 1954

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 1st Bn secret ltr 0051 dtd 10 Dec 53

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps

1. Forwarded

W. H. Duplantier
W. H. DUPLANTIER



SECRET

0058854

Headquarters
1st Battalion., 7th Marines
1st Marine Division FMF., c/o FPO
San Francisco, California

Ser: 0051

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

10 December 1953


From: Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps

Ref: (a) CG1stMarDivSecrltr, Ser 002541 of 5 Nov 53

Encl: (1) Report of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines.
(2) Fire plan "Lighter".
(3) Fire plan "Winecock".
(4) Operational Overlay.
(5) Manning of the MRP, with attached appendices.

1. In accordance with instructions contained in reference (a), enclosures (1) through (5) are herewith submitted.



H. R. THORPE

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SECURITY INFORMATION

REPORT OF 1st BATTALION, 7th MARINES.

1. Operations during first 72 hours following armistice.

a. On 27 July 1953 the 1st Battalion 7th Marines was under operational control of the 1st Marines and occupied the left battalion sector of the 1st Marines regimental sector of the MLR. The immediate effect of the cease fire on battalion personnel was one of caution and one hundred per cent vigilance during the remaining seventy-two hours on the MLR. This caution existed not only because of issued orders and past false truces, but also because during the first night of the truce, enemy forces moved in around the two outposts, THORNE and HAWTHORNE, and commenced digging in. These enemy forces withdrew around 280300 July and did not return again. Aside from nightly propaganda broadcasts the remainder of the first 72 hour period was uneventful.

b. In regards to salvage during this period, the battalion directed its efforts mainly to the removal of ammunition and T/E equipment from the DMZ. A minimum amount of destruction of fortifications was accomplished. This was due mainly to the lack of proper tools and the short period of time allotted. To accomplish the maximum amount of salvage, this battalion worked around the clock. KSC's, under Marine supervision, were utilized during the day and the remainder of the Marine personnel were employed during the hours of darkness.

c. Concurrently during this period, reconnaissance of the new MBP was commenced. The battalion began its tactical withdrawal to its new camp on the last day of the 72 hour period, completing same within the required time and without incident.

2. Conduct of salvage operations.

The Battalion area of responsibility for salvage operations extended from CT 045055 to CT 066067 inclusive and from the MLR to the MSR 2Z.

a. Methods for salvaging.

(1) Due to distances from the roads, manpower was the main method used for salvaging. Trucks and other mechanized means of salvage could not be utilized in a large portion of the area because of the rugged terrain. The men pried bunkers apart using available engineering tools and iron stakes and timbers salvaged from other bunkers. All salvaged materials were hand carried to designated supply points along the roads.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

(2) Hydraulic jacks used for tire changing were a great help in prying roofing timbers from side supports of bunkers. With the use of spare timbers the jacks were raised the required height to the roofing beam and the hydraulic action of the jacks was of sufficient power to remove the timber and its 24 inch spike. Because of constant use it was necessary periodically to replenish the hydraulic fluid in the jacks.

(3) On several occasions winches on 2 1/2 ton trucks were used to loosen the 12X12 bunker timbers from the main braces. Final separation of these timbers was accomplished by crowbar and manpower. Main corner posts, which often were sunk into the ground a depth of 3 feet could also be removed by the use of winches and improvised chain pulleys.

(4) Hand tools, shovels and picks, or a dozer with angle blade were used to dig out culverts for road drainage. Initially, explosives were used for cratering down to the culverts, as some of them were 6 feet deep in hard packed soil, but damage to the culverts by this method made their use impractical.

(5) Short and long stakes used in barbed wire entanglements were pried out of the ground by use of a chain attached to a 2X4 timber or crow bar. The chain was wrapped around the lowest part of the stake to be removed. Then by using the 2X4 or crowbar as a lever the stake was raised out of the ground. The stakes themselves were useful in prying apart bunkers and in carrying the larger timbers.

(6) Sand bags were salvaged by untying or cutting the cord and emptying the sand into the trench line or bunker pits. The bags were flattened out and tied in bundles of 200 for accounting and handling.

(7) In most cases, communications wire was salvaged by hand and wound on reels. Occasionally, winches were used to pull the heavier cables out onto roads.

(8) Barbed wire was either coiled or wrapped around metal stakes by hand.

(9) Salvaged ammunition was hand carried from trench lines and positions to initial supply points where it was picked up by trucks and carried to the regimental dump.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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b. Stockpiling

(1) Stockpiling was accomplished at two places, one in the DMZ and the other at the regimental salvage dump. Locations were designated along the roads in the DMZ as initial supply points. Separate piles of bunker timbers, native logs, sand bags, barbed wire and metal stakes were established at these points. Ammunition was segregated at this time and piled according to type. Trucks allocated to the battalion would then transport the material to the regimental dump where it was further segregated by members of the Engineer battalion and working parties from the regiment.

c. Accountability

(1) Due to the extensive area covered and the number of men working, accurate records could not be kept as to the exact quantity of material salvaged. At the close of each working day the Officer-in-Charge of each working party would submit to the Salvage Officer (S-4) an estimate of sand bags, bunker timbers, stakes, ammunition and native logs removed. This list was consolidated and recorded by the Salvage Officer. At the close of salvage operations a final consolidated report was submitted to the Regimental S-4.

d. Amount of material salvaged.

(1) From 20 August 1953 to 10 September 1953 inclusive, the following materials were salvaged by this battalion from the DMZ:

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Gov't equipment (packs, ponchos, clothing, entrenching tools) | 2 tons |
| Bunker timbers | 175 tons |
| Native logs | 30 tons |
| Ammunition | 3.5 tons |
| Barbed wire | 12000 yards |
| Wire (communications) | 10 miles |
| Sand bags | 132,000 |
| Metal stakes | 53,500 |
| Culverts | 290 pieces |

Salvage operations for barbed wire and stakes were restricted because of known and suspected mined areas in the battalion sector. Approximately 210 bunkers were dismantled, 3200 meters of trench line filled in, and four 81mm mortar positions destroyed.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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e. Problems encountered.

(1) The transporting of timbers from bunker positions to initial supply points was a major problem. Due to the rugged terrain and the shortage of time, plus rice paddies and mined areas it was impractical to bulldoze roads to the outlying regions and positions. This absence of roads necessitated the hand carrying of many 12X12 timbers weighing 200 or more pounds, a distance of 500 to 600 yards.

(2) In most cases, bunkers in this sector were constructed with 2 1/2" spikes. Shortage of proper engineering tools to remove these long spikes presented great difficulty. Initially, crow bars were used to pry the stakes out. An average time of 15 to 20 minutes was spent on removal of each timber with this method. Hydraulic jacks were used when available and reduced the time of removal per timber to approximately 5 minutes. In a few cases, truck winches were used to separate timbers.

(3) Periodically, messages would be received stressing certain items of salvage as critical. This required revision of working schedules and shifting of men to other jobs. It is believed that if all salvageable material had been designated as critical at the commencement of salvage operations, the work could have been completed more expeditiously and with less confusion.

3. Organization of the MBP.

a. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was assigned Hill Mass 495 located at CS 133969 to organize as a MBP. After an initial map study was completed a helicopter was ordered and the staff, company commanders, and the majority of the platoon leaders were flown over the position. This enabled the unit commanders and staff to become better acquainted with the terrain before physically moving onto it, and it enabled the reconnaissance party to select routes of approach and plan the physical reconnaissance in more detail. Following the fly-over reconnaissance, the staff and company commanders moved onto the position for a period of two days and nights. During this period the company boundaries and positions were selected. This was followed by a two day reconnaissance of company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders for the selection of platoon and squad boundaries and positions. Thus a total of five days was spent on reconnaissance before the troops were moved onto the position. This five day period was not considered too extensive and in many respects was not long enough for the organization of this position due to ruggedness of the terrain and dense cover of undergrowth.

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There was also found to be a large amount of rock on position, which would make digging very difficult, therefore, a minimum amount of shifting was deemed necessary. As movement on the position proved to be very difficult, due to the steepness of slopes and the dense undergrowth, the initial priority of work was the cutting of trails and steps so movement could be more easily effected. Simultaneously with the cutting of trails the construction of helicopter landing strips was commenced, and a total of ten (10) were built for the supply of the MEF. As Hill Mass 495 was considered key terrain within the 1st Marine Division defensive sector, a high priority was assigned for its development. It was determined that the most efficient method of supply would be by helicopter. The average carrying party time was approximately 2 hours one-way, while the helicopter could complete its one-way flight in approximately 4 minutes. During the period from 8 Aug 53 to 10 Oct 53 a total of 1,173,844 pounds were airlifted to the MEF. Personnel were not airlifted to the MEF at any time. Rations were airlifted for a period of about twenty (20) days but the priority for field fortification materials, ammunition, demolitions and water necessitated carrying parties for rations during the remainder of the period.

The general concept of the defense was that of a all-around perimeter on the high ground which was to be held at all costs. One of the most difficult problems encountered was that of determining the elevation for the trace of the perimeter. The best fields of fire were at the base of the hill in the paddies. However, if organized in this manner, the battalion would have a frontage of some 12,000 meters. It was therefore determined to organize a tightly knit perimeter on the high ground, sacrificing grazing fields of fire, but taking advantage of the rugged, steep terrain that would prove an obstacle to the attacking enemy. To overcome the disadvantage of not having interlocking grazing bands of fire the heavy machine guns were banked in two positions, one on each flank, of three guns each. Four .50 Caliber machine guns were banked on the high ground in the center of the position. A fire plan was then made up of machine gun concentrations, see enclosure (2). These guns would be Battalion controlled through SAC. Company machine guns and other assigned sector guns were positioned and assigned a principal direction of fire and traverse and search patterns on adjacent ridges to provide effective mutual support, see enclosure (4).

The artillery and mortar support fire plan was devised as follows. Each company submitted an overlay with desired concentrations. These overlays were consolidated at battalion and additional concentrations were added from the battalion point of view. This overlay was then turned over to the supporting artillery battalion and reproduced with the other infantry battalion overlays into the "Winecock Fire Plan". When the "Winecock Fire Plan" was returned to this battalion with its assigned concentration numbers, a color system was devised and 4.2 mortars and 81mm mortars were added to the same fire plan on the concentrations they could fire, see enclosure (3).

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This in effect gave the battalion the same assigned concentration numbers for 4.2 mortars, 81mm mortars, and artillery. It was believed that this system would enable the battalion to more effectively mass fires, avoid duplication, and to better effect control.

The wire plan consisted mainly of protective wire, as the longest grazing fire that could be obtained was not over one hundred yards, and this was only from one gun position. It was planned to completely wire-in all positions, with the strongest wire barriers in the draws. The ridges would mainly be covered by automatic weapons fire while the draws mainly would be covered by mortars, artillery, grenades, and rifle fire. Drums of napalm were to be positioned at strategic locations to be dropped into the draws. These drums were to be ignited by white phosphorous grenades with attached lanyards.

A serious disadvantage of the position, while fighting, would be that of supply and evacuation. Air supply would be extremely hazardous while under fire. To overcome this disadvantage it was planned to stockpile larger than usual amounts of ammunition and rations on the MBP. A total of four springs were discovered within the perimeter. These springs were to be developed and were considered sufficient to satisfy the battalion's water requirements. With regards to the evacuation difficulties, one road was constructed, two more roads were planned, and a system of connecting cableways was under consideration. In addition, three aid bunkers were to be constructed.

Another serious disadvantage was the location of the battalion's camp in reference to its MBP. The camp was located on the forward side of the MBP at the base of the hill mass. In order to man the MBP in event of a "Hustle", movement would have to be made up the forward side of the position. However, covered approaches were available for a limited distance. Detailed plans were made for the manning of the MBP and the evacuation and destruction of the camp, see enclosure (5).

All materials used in the construction of the MBP, except for three (3) bunkers, had to be air-lifted to strips by helicopter and then hand carried to positions. The three bunker positions were the only ones in the entire MBP that were accessible by road and truck transportation.

Because of other helicopter commitments and bad weather, only forty eight (48) days of the sixty-four (64) day period were utilized for airlifting.

Materials airlifted for the construction of defensive positions were as follows:

| | |
|----------------|----------------|
| Bunker timbers | 350,000 pounds |
| Bunker spikes | 2,500 " |

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| | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------|
| Barbed wire | 30,000 | pounds |
| Concertina wire | 60,000 | " |
| Chicken wire | 5,000 | " |
| Engineering tools | 5,000 | " |
| Metal stakes | 270,000 | " |
| Sand bags | 40,000 | " |
| Tar paper | 3,000 | " |
| Camouflage material | 3,000 | " |
| Demolitions | 15,000 | " |
| TOTAL | 783,500 | pounds |

Approximately 20% of the bunker timbers, metal stakes, sand bags and various types of wire utilized were salvage materials taken from the DMZ.

In addition, 220,344 pounds of water, rations, and miscellaneous materials were airlifted to support the construction of the MBP, 170,000 pounds of ammunition were airlifted and placed on position for the defense of the MBP.

The employment of personnel on the position was so scheduled as to keep two-thirds on the MBP at all times. This two-thirds was to be a tactical two-thirds of the letter and weapons companies. The other one-third would be in camp. A rotation was effected every two days. Thus a man would spend four days on the MBP and two days in camp. The four days on the MBP was to be spent on its construction. The two-day period in camp was spent on camp construction and maintenance, care and cleaning of individual clothing and equipment, camp security, and out of camp working party commitments. During the hot weather working months, it was found that the most efficient daily working schedule was from 0830 to 1130 and from 1400 to 1800. The schedule of four days on position and two days in camp proved very satisfactory and enabled the battalion to keep the maximum number of men on the MBP for its construction, consistent with other battalion commitments.

Due to the large amount of rock found in the ground on the MBP, the digging in of positions was very difficult. Demolitions between the period of 27 July 53 and 8 Oct 53 were used in the following amounts:

| | |
|-----------------------------|------------|
| Caps blasting, non-electric | 1,340 ea |
| Caps blasting, electric | 215 ea |
| Fuse, blasting time | 1,870 feet |
| Lighters, fuse | 260 ea |
| Cord, detonation | 4,600 feet |
| Explosive, TNT | 1,450 lbs |

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| | |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| Powder, black | 1,250 lbs |
| Tetrytol | 954 lbs |
| Explosive, C3 | 438 lbs |
| Explosive, crater, 40 lb | 1 ea |
| Charge, shape, 15 lb | 41 ea |
| Charge, shape, 40 lb | 7 ea |
| Charge, explosive, burster | 40 ea |

More demolitions could have been utilized during this period but were not, due to the following reasons:

- (1) A lack of qualified demolition personnel within the battalion.
- (2) No more than two demolition teams could be furnished by supporting engineers.
- (3) There was no demolition school quota available during this period.
- (4) There could be no blasting accomplished during heli-copter air-lifts.

A total of five (5) demolition teams were utilized by this battalion, but this number was considered insufficient. A minimum recommended number of teams would be one (1) per platoon sector.

Bunkers were planned on the MBP in the following numbers and for the following purposes:

- 37 automatic weapons positions
- 5 infantry observation posts
- 3 artillery observation posts
- 2 FDC's, one for each 81mm position
- 2 FDC's, one for each HMG, Cal .30 bank
- 1 FDC for HMG, Cal .50 bank
- 16 Command posts (1 battalion, 3 companies, 9 rifle platoons, and 3 60mm mortar positions.)
- 26 Ammunition bunkers
- 2 Communication bunkers
- 3 Aid bunkers
- 1 Administrative bunker

Note: Rifle platoon CPs and OPs were combined in one (1) bunker.

Both the HMG Cal.30 banks and the HMG Cal.50 bank were left un-bunkered in order to obtain maximum sectors of fire.

For protective and tactical wire, automatic weapons positions, location of bunkered positions, command posts, observation posts, and boundaries, see enclosure (4).

This battalion was relieved on the MBP by the 1st Battalion, 1st LMC Regiment on 12 October 1953. The only problem encountered during the relief was the language barrier. Interpreters provided were insufficient in number.

The Battalion assumed the mission of Regimental reserve on 12 October 1953, and commenced training for MARLEX II.

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1st Battalion
7th Marines (Reinf)
1st Mar Div (Reinf)
In the Field
150800I Sept 1953

Annex FOX to 1st Bn CO-48-53 (Manning of MBP)

Maps: KOREA, 1:10,000

1. Assumptions:

a. That CCF forces have initiated hostile actions and are mounting an offensive in this sector.

b. The tactical situation requires that this organization man the MBP.

2. Destruction and evacuation of this camp will be done in four (4) phases to be identified by conditions I, II, III, IV as follows:

CONDITION I

a. Troops will secure all personal gear and make up packs for move to MBP.

b. Rations, flak jackets and ammunition will be distributed to the men.

c. All staff sections will prepare classified material for destruction in accordance with Bn. O 2-53.

d. All material not to be carried to the MBP will be prep for evacuation to the rear.

e. If condition is declared during darkness Company area security will be doubled.

CONDITION II

a. Covering force and (1) plt (Reinf) "B" Company will move into assigned pns and prep hasty defense (Appendix I).

b. All material not to be destroyed or carried to the MBP will be dispatched to the rear. For priority of evacuation of Material (Appendix II).

c. All units will be prep to move to MBP on O.

CONDITION III

a. All units will destroy material not to be carried to the MBP. (Appendix II).

ENCLOSURE (5)

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- b. Units report to S-4 when destruction is complete.
- c. Forward echelon of CP group moves out.

CONDITION IV

a. Units will move to the MBP via routes designated (Appendix I) in the following manner.

(1) "A" Co (Reinf) Accompanied by Ronson 1 and Gimm mort plt will move out immediately using the left approach (Appendix I).

(2) "C" Co (Reinf) Accompanied by Ronson 2 and Rickey will move out simultaneously using the right approach (Appendix I).

(3) H&S Co will move up left approach as prescribed for CP displacement on O.

(4) Wpns Co (-) will move up left approach on O.

(5) "B" Co (Reinf) minus covering force, will make certain that destruction of the camp is complete, report to CP, and move out on O., using left approach.

(6) The ESC's will be formed into a train, loaded with rations, water, and ammo, and dispatched to the MBP under supervision of Bn interpreters and S-4 Personnel.

(7) The covering force will withdraw on O, using left approach.

3. All letter companies will receive normal attach units before departing camp.

4. All units will report in at check points (Appendix I) during mvt to MBP.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL THORPE

L. F. SNODDY JR.
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

APPENDICES

- 1. Covering Force and Approach Rts to MBP.
- 2. Priority of Evacuation and Destruction of Material

DISTR: "C"
O-1-A-L

David H. Lewis
DAVID H. LEWIS
Major, USMC

S-3

ENCLOSURE (5)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

1st Battalion
7th Marines (Reinf)
1st Mar Div (Reinf)
In the Field
150800I Sept 1953

Appendix 2 to Annex FOX to 1st Bn. 00-48-53 (Priority of Evacuation and Destruction of Material)

1. Priority of Evacuation of Material as follows:

- a. Ordnance Items
- b. Pyrotechnics
- c. Ammunition
- d. Demolitions
- e. Motor transports parts and supplies
- f. Personal effects (Sea Bags only)
- g. General supplies (Battalion dump)
- h. General supplies (Company dumps)
- i. Mess equipment
- j. Rations
- k. Tentage
- l. Prefabricated shelters
- m. Fuel
- n. Vehicles

2. Destruction of material will be undertaken, only when, in the judgment of the unit commander concerned, such action is necessary.

a. Priority of destruction of material would be the same as priority of evacuation except that vehicles would have priority immediately after ammunition if destruction of all material is necessary.

BY ORDER OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL THORPE

L. F. SNODDY JR.
Major, U. S. Marine Corps
Executive Officer

DISTR: "C"

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

David H. Lewis

DAVID H. LEWIS
Major, USMC
S-3

ENCLOSURE (5)

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SECRET

ORIGINAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 2d En secret ltr ser 00844 dtd 15 Dec 53

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FIF
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps

1. Forwarded

W. H. Duplantis
W. H. DUPLANTIS

SECRET

005602-1
Ser. 00844-1

Headquarters
2d Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

15 December 1958

SECRET


From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps

Ref: (a) CG ltr ser 002541 dtd 5 Nov 53

Encl: (1) Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps
(2) Wire and Bunker overlay, 2d Bn, 7th Marines
(3) Boundaries and A.W. overlay, 2d Bn, 7th Marines

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1),(2) and (3) are submitted herewith.


R. A. CHURLEY

Headquarters
 2d Battalion, 7th Marines
 1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF
 c/o Fleet Post Office
 San Francisco, California

15 December 1953

SECRET

Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps, Report

1. Operations during first 72 hours following Armistice.

a. Initial Salvage of ammunition and material.

(1) At the hour the Armistice went into effect (272200Z July 1953) 2d Battalion, 7th Marines was acting as Regimental Reserve. However, "D" Company and "E" Company were committed, under operational control of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, on Boulder City and in the vicinity of hill 126. Elements of Weapons Company were attached to "E" and "D" Companies. Salvage of ammunition and material began immediately by evacuating easily moved equipment and material to supply dumps in the rear of the individual company positions. From these company dumps material was further evacuated to battalion and regimental dumps. During this period formal accountability was not enforced because of the urgency of the operation. Personal effects of the troops and certain company equipment had been transported to the rear several days in advance of the Armistice. Considerable loss and damage to these personal effects and government equipment resulted because of the several rehandlings that occurred prior to the time individuals and responsible persons could reclaim their items. During this period both friendly and enemy were evacuating their dead.

b. Immediate effects of cease fire on personnel.

(1) The immediate reaction of the troops to the Armistice was one of happy relief mixed with a definite distrust of the enemy. The following morning (28 July 1953) the reality of the cease fire was felt and the curiosity of the troops caused them to roam the area inspecting it in a new light. In one case in "D" Company casualties to both enemy personnel and our troops were sustained by careless handling by one marine of an old AT grenade. It was necessary for the Company Commander of "D" Company to arrange with the CPV local leader for a temporary demarkation line because of the proximity of the opposing forces on Boulder City. Both sides observed the temporary line in accomplishing their first salvage and evacuation operations.

Enclosure (1)

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c. Withdrawal from DMZ and occupation of new MBP

(1) "E" Company with attached elements of Weapons Company left the MLR approximately at 280500I July 1953 and entrucked for the 2d Battalion camp area. "D" Company with attached elements of Weapons Company left the MLR at 281100I July 1953 and entrucked for the 2d Battalion camp area. After about 24 hours of rest and reorganization in the battalion's camp area, companies were assigned MBP defense areas and moved to occupy them. Initially the battalion was directed to occupy an area generally along the old Kansas line. While the localities assigned the companies generally offered good fields of fire for automatic weapons, weaknesses were considered to be: (a) a lack of mutual support among the companies, (b) exposure to enfilade fire from dominant terrain features across the Imjin River, (c) over-extension in that a perimeter of some 8000 meters caused the battalion defense to be weakened, (d) lack of all-around defense, (e) hinderance to logistic support by the low and broken nature of the terrain.

(2) Representation of the problem was made to higher command and the area was reassigned with the battalion being assigned present defensive sector. Companies were shifted to their present localities and construction began thereon.

2. Conduct of Salvage Operation (1 Aug to 13 Sept)

a. Initial emphasis within this battalion was placed on construction of the MBP. On 7 August 1953 salvage operations were stepped up. Two twenty man teams under the supervision of two officers were organized and truck was assigned to each team. The poor condition of the roads made the passage of motor vehicles virtually impossible in some areas. With the aid of a bull-dozer this handicap was eliminated. The dozer was further utilized in the construction of temporary roads into areas previously under enemy observation and fire. Although these temporary roads facilitated the removal of bunker timbers, the distance from the bunker sites to the furthest point of advance of the trucks slowed progress considerably. Because of this time consuming distance and the fact that the timbers had to be man-handled over the few narrow paths that were free of duds and mines, the initial salvage detail was increased to one hundred men. A small portion of each team was employed in dismantling the bunkers, using vehicle jacks and crow bars. The remainder of the team carried the timbers to the truck sites. As the work progressed rather slowly it was reasoned that a tractor with a forward winch would facilitate the dismantling of the larger bunkers in which large spikes were used. The employment of the tractor saved many man hours in accomplishing this mission by lessening the digging necessary to uproot the timbers.

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Enclosure (1)

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On about 1 September priority was given to salvage operations and the working detail was increased to six officers and three hundred and forty men. With the increase of personnel approximately 15 trucks were used to transport the salvaged materials to the Regimental Salvage Dump. As the demilitarization called for by the Armistice agreement progressed, more and more salvage became available.

As demilitarization was completed in each area unservicable sandbags were destroyed and thrown in the trench line which was then completely filled in by the bull-dozer. In this manner the general police of the MLR was accomplished.

When demilitarization and salvage was completed the bull-dozer and tractor with forward winch worked their way south, out of the Demilitarized Zone. The bull-dozer uncovered the culverts used in the road system in the battalions' area of responsibility and the tractor with forward winch pulled up these culverts.

b. On 12 September it was reported that the salvage operation in the 2d Battalions' area of responsibility was 100% complete. Although no formal itemized system of salvage accountability was enforced on the battalion level, it was estimated that during the period approximately 175 tons of bunker timber, $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons of ammunition, 2 tons of equipment, 100,000 sand bags, and 2000-2500 miles of communication wire (about 80% of the existing wire) was salvaged.

3. Organization of MBP defensive position

a. Tactical organization of the MBP

(1) Once the battalion sector was firmly designated it was decided to organize tactical localities as reinforced platoon areas. The high ground but not the skyline was concluded to offer possibilities for strongest defense. Platoons were directed to plan mutual fire support within their area and with adjacent platoons in order to cover all dangerous avenues of approach. Each tactical locality was to be tactically wired in. As much depth of defense as possible was incorporated into the battalion defense plan. A two platoon reserve was designated and assigned a minor counterattack mission within the battalion perimeter. Automatic weapons positioned on the high ground did not generally have grazing fire and were therefore positioned to give maximum plunging fire to dangerous avenues of approach. Primary automatic weapons positions were bunkered. Each automatic weapon would have other unbunkered firing positions.

Enclosure (1)

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The critical terrain, hill 270 (Dallas - CI 10959685) was appreciated to be the heartland of the battalion defensive sector. The hill masses of Fargo-Flint, El Paso-El Centro-El Dorado were of next importance. The battalion was disposed to occupy these critical terrain features. The main threat to the battalion is considered to be from the North and West. Heaviest fire is planned in that direction. However, the other directions are not ignored. Four outposts, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and Wake, were considered necessary and were organized in squad strength. Alaska covering the southwest approaches, Hawaii covering the west and the Imjin River, and Guam and Wake covering the northern approaches.

b. Construction of the MBP

The greater portion of the material used in the construction of the battalion MBP was salvaged from the old MLR in the DMZ. Bunker material was reissued to fit needs of each position and to give the strongest protection possible. Where salvage material was not sufficient new material was furnished. At no time was work curtailed because of fortification material shortage. Each company was responsible for its own construction. Logistical and engineering assistance was given where needed and when available.

Because of the lack of roads and the height of the hill masses, great logistical use was made of helicopters. As roads were constructed the logistical problem became easier but this did not eliminate the helicopter requirement altogether. Much material had to be hand carried, especially within the platoon and company area. The work was tedious and extremely slow. Shortage of engineering hand tools existed. Rocky soil made demolitions mandatory.

Feeding problems on the MBP were solved by feeding hot "B" rations at morning and evening meals in camp, and assault rations or "C" rations on the MBP at noon.

c. Manning the MBP

Manning the MBP presented no serious problems. Troops were capable of manning their positions in all types of weather and visibility. By daily use of prescribed routes to and from the MBP, troops became completely familiar with the routes.

d. Control of personnel under terms of Armistice.

This battalion experienced no problems in controlling personnel under the terms of the Armistice agreement. Each man was schooled in the requirements of the agreement and its provisions were respected.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on 3rd Bn secret ltr dtd 19 Dec 53

ORIGINAL

From: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMT
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps

1. Forwarded

W. E. DuPlantis
W. E. DUPLANTIS

SECRET

Headquarters
3d Battalion, 7th Marines
1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif

19 December 1953

~~SECRET~~

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Mar Div (Reinf) FMF
Via: Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps

Ref: (a) CG ltr ser 002541 dtd 5 Nov 53

Encl: (1) Chronological report of activities from 27 July 1953 to
31 October 1953
(2) Overlay No. 1, Automatic Weapons Fire Plan
(3) Overlay No. 2, Location of Bunkers, CP's, OP's, Protective
and Tactical Wire

1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are
submitted herewith.

S. J. Nelson
S. J. NELSON

~~SECRET~~

Headquarters
 3d Battalion, 7th Marines
 1st Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF
 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif

SECRET

19 December 1953

CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FROM 27 JULY 1953 to 31 OCTOBER 1953

1. OPERATIONS DURING FIRST 72 HOURS FOLLOWING ARMISTICE:

a. On 27 July 1953, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines was performing the mission of regimental reserve. The Battalion was located at Camp Pinguia CS 120983. "I" Company (Reinf), 7th Marines reverted to parent control at 0300 28 July, having been in action under the operational control of 3d Battalion 1st Marines since 26 July when 3d Battalion, 7th Marines was relieved from the line. 27 and 28 July were devoted to Company Commander's time. On 29 July, the Battalion displaced to a new campsite located in the vicinity of CT 149021 where it remained until 31 July. Due to the nature of its assignments, the Battalion conducted no salvage operations during this period.

b. There was a widespread feeling of relief upon hearing the news of the signing of the truce agreement. There was, however, no let-down of watchfulness and preparedness on the part of the troops. Units went immediately to work with a will on the new jobs which were assigned.

c. On the afternoon of 31 July the Battalion moved to the camp formerly occupied by the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. The new Battalion CP was opened at CT 146023 at 1700.

2. CONDUCT OF SALVAGE OPERATIONS (1 Aug - 13 Sept)

a. Methods used.

(1) At the beginning of salvage operations two teams of twenty enlisted and one officer and one team of twenty Korean Service Corp personnel were given designated sectors of the MLR to salvage, using picks, shovels, sledge hammers and crow bars. The men were given a priority of bunker material first, then barbed wire, barbed wire stakes, ammunition, equipment, and miscellaneous. The salvaging proceeded slowly because of the great distance that the salvaged material had to be hand carried to routes accessible to vehicles. Considerable time was required to empty and salvage sandbags. More men were added to the program until a maximum effort was being put forth late in August. A bulldozer was called in for destruction of non-salvageable bunkers and also to aid in salvage of culvert material from the roads. In salvaging the culverts, explosives were also necessary.

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Enclosure (1) (cont'd)
b. Stockpiling.

(1) The salvaged material was taken by truck from the DMZ either to a central Regimental salvage dump or, if the material could be used immediately in preparing the new MBP, it was hauled directly to the Battalion defensive position.

c. Accountability

(1) The salvaged material upon being taken to the Regimental salvage dump was put under control of the 1st Engineer Battalion. A weekly report of material salvaged was required by the Regimental S-4 and an overall report at the completion of salvage operations.

d. Amount of material salvaged

(1) The following amounts of material were salvaged:

- (a) Timber 310 tons
- (b) Sandbags 75,000
- (c) Ammunition 15 tons
- (d) Barbed Wire
 - 1' Rolls 1500
 - 2' Concertina 1000 rolls
- (e) Barbed Wire stakes 15,000
- (f) Individual equipment 1 ton
- (g) Miscellaneous 10 tons

e. Problems encountered.

(1) The major problem was lack of an adequate amount of proper equipment in the early part of the operation, ie. picks, shovels, pinch bars and a bulldozer. This was overcome in the last stages of salvage but it is believed that had more equipment been available earlier the use of so many men would have been unnecessary. Getting the material from the old MLR positions, far removed from roads accessible by trucks, was also a major problem. The processing of extra passes for entrance to the DMZ, in emergency cases, caused considerable delay. Rainy days made it most difficult and often impossible to negotiate the roads with trucks for the hauling of salvaged material to the appropriate dumps.

3. ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

a. The general concept of defense is based on the theory of a wide front defense. The battalion Main Battle Position is organized, taking advantage of key terrain features in order to control critical tactical localities, with emphasis on the principal of all-around defense.

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Enclosure (1) (cont'd)

b. Organization of the Ground

- (1) See map Korea sheets "G", "H", "I", 5-N, Scale 1:10,000 and enclosures (2) and (3).
- (2) Factors considered in organizing the defense.

(a) Terrain: The relief of the Battalion area of responsibility may be considered in two parts; the perimeter of the MBP and the low lying land to the west. The critical terrain features occupied by the MBP are the hill masses at CT 137019 on the west and south, the ridge line running generally east from Hill 149 at CT 138026 to CT 146026, and the hill mass at CT 154026. These hills will form the critical perimeter in the event of attack. Each hill mass is occupied by one rifle company. Outposts have been established on the ridges, which finger out to the low ground, to give early warning of enemy approach (See Map). The larger area of lower ground in the western sector contains many low hills divided by paddies. This area would provide excellent cover for enemy infiltration.

(b) Observation and Fields of Fire: There is excellent observation to the north and east, but observation to the west is restricted by the hill masses directly bordering the Imjin River. Close in observation is restricted and there is no single point from which the entire battalion area can be observed. Observation from individual positions is, in most cases, restricted to the front of the position. Observation of the western lowland sector is limited to the eastern slopes of some of the hills and is poor from the MBP, particularly in view of the amount of vegetation which would provide excellent concealment for the enemy. Fields of fire for automatic weapons are plunging, narrow, and restricted in all areas of the Battalion sector.

(c) Obstacles: The main obstacles in the area are the Imjin River and the mined paddies west and south of the MBP. Location of crossing sites and previous experience indicates that the Imjin could not be counted upon to seriously disrupt an enemy advance.

(d) Cover and concealment: Cover is afforded by the broken nature of the terrain within the MBP. Concealment is afforded primarily by second growth scrub.

(e) Avenues of Approach: The main avenues of approach are those dependent upon the crossing sites of the Imjin River which lead into terrain compartments of the MBP. These crossing sites are located in the area of CHALIP'0 119063 and between SOKKYO 145045 and WONDONG 150067.

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Enclosure (1) (cont'd)

c. Advantages and Disadvantages.

(1) Advantages:

(a) The Imjin River, with the exception of the crossing sites mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, would present an obstacle to the enemy in an attack on a large scale. The south bank of the river is steep in many places and the river is not fordable except after freezing. There are few roads, almost all of poor quality, leading to the south in this area.

(b) The terrain on which the MBP is located dominates the area north of the river while the hill masses to the east and south-west are occupied by friendly forces.

(c) Organization of fires of supporting weapons provides coverage by automatic weapons, anti-tank weapons, mortars, tanks and artillery so planned as to provide support completely around the battalion perimeter. In addition, concentrations and alternate positions are provided within the perimeter to limit penetration and support counterattack plans. Artillery and mortar fires are coordinated with all other weapons and are concentrated on all critical localities including the avenues of approach. The sector assigned to the battalion contains several minefields located generally in the southern and northwestern areas. In addition the location of other fields has been designated by higher Headquarters and provisions made to establish these fields on order. Reinforcing tanks and AAA AW SP weapons positions are located at critical points on the perimeter, to be occupied by available weapons. Most of these positions are capable of observation to the limit of their most effective range.

(d) Protective and Tactical wire has been employed to enclose the perimeter.

(e) The terrain is very precipitous and would be an obstacle to the enemy forced to move through and over it.

(2) Disadvantages:

(a) The Imjin River crossing sites give entrance to the two most logical avenues of approach (located on each flank of the MBP). The river freezes to an average depth of 9 inches during the winter.

(b) Extensive fields of grazing fire are unobtainable. Most positions prohibit grazing fire to the extent desired.

Enclosure (1)

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Enclosure (1) (cont'd)

(c) Observation of the entire battalion sector is impossible from any one observation post. Two or more observation posts are required to obtain observation of the entire area.

(d) The area occupied by the MBP (the location of which is dictated by the nature of the terrain) is extremely large for an infantry battalion.

(e) Tactical wire, in many cases, can be covered only by plunging fire.

4. CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

a. Materials used: Initially there was no fortification material available. As salvage operations progressed on assigned sectors of the old MLR, materials were made available and used in the construction of the MBP. Priority was given to digging automatic weapons positions and individual fighting positions. Wherever practicable, portions of the old Kansas Line were incorporated into the new defensive scheme.

(1) As the work progressed and materials salvaged from the demilitarized zone were made available, actual construction on bunkers was commenced with priority placed on the construction of automatic weapons positions.

b. The personnel of the Battalion were employed in several capacities at this time. It was necessary to maintain salvage parties, working parties at the camp area and at Regiment and Division as directed, to furnish personnel for the other attendant functions of prolonged encampment, and proceed with all haste on the construction of the MBP. This necessitated close supervision and maximum efficiency in manpower utilization.

(1) To facilitate the fulfillment of those commitments, plans of the day were initiated wherein work on the MBP commenced at 0600 and ceased at 1200. Following the noon meal the men were turned to engaging in organizing and improving company areas. The intense afternoon heat was also a factor in assigning working hours. Sundays were considered a working day, however, the men were permitted and encouraged to attend religious services.

(2) Salvage working parties, and those working parties within the Battalion, were kept to a minimum in size and were composed of details drawn equally from each unit.

c. The main difficulties encountered in construction were lack of equipment (ie, - shovels, picks, fortification materials), road nets, and the extreme heat. Equipment was obtained and work proceeded rapidly on excavation of trench-lines and bunker holes. It was necessary to blast many individual fighting holes, bunker holes and trench-lines.

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Enclosure (1) (cont'd)

A maximum amount of support was received from the division engineers. The engineers also supervised the construction of the bunkers. Due to the absence of adequate roads, difficulty arose when movement of heavy bunker materials to the positions was commenced. Numerous helicopter strips were constructed within the area and movement of the bulk of the materials in the initial stages of construction was effected by helicopter. Upon completion of an area road system by the engineers, delivery of the remaining material was effected by truck to platoon supply points where it was then hand carried to positions.

d. Original planning called for the following bunkered positions:

| <u>TYPE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|--------------------------|---------------|
| Automatic Weapons | 83 |
| Observation Posts | |
| Infantry | 10 |
| Arty (including Mortars) | 12 |
| Command Posts | 20 |
| Ammunition Bunkers | 34 |
| Aid Bunkers | 9 |
| Communication Bunkers | 3 |
| Recoilless Rifle | 6 |
| 3.5" Rocket Launcher | 17 |

5. SUPPLY PROBLEMS

a. Getting ammunition and rations to positions.

(1) The road net was not sufficient to supply all positions with ammunition and rations when the positions were first occupied. Most of these items were man carried to the positions over very difficult terrain.

(2) Rations on MBP (in Battalion supply dump)

- (a) One day "Able" ration
- (b) Two days emergency rations

(3) Ammunition on MBP (distributed to Platoon dumps)

- (a) One Jamestown Basic Load

b. Construction materials.

(1) When construction was first begun there was a shortage of all types of material, primarily bunker material and sandbags. The salvage program alleviated this shortage somewhat but it was not until the beginning of October that materials were acquired in the necessary quantities.

Enclosure (1)

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Enclosure (1) (cont'd)

6. EVACUATION PROBLEMS

a. The main evacuation problem was the distance required to be covered before a man could be brought to the Battalion Aid Station. When the positions were first occupied the road net was totally inadequate for vehicular evacuation, and air evacuation was limited. The road net is improved now to the point where it is possible to reach almost every platoon CP in all companies. From battalion aid it is believed that armored personnel carriers would be necessary because of the possibility of the enemy interdicting the evacuation routes to the rear with artillery fire.

7. MANNING OF MBP REHEARSALS

a. Rehearsals of the manning of the MBP are conducted upon order of higher authority and at least once each month in accordance with standing operating procedures. Based on the assumptions that hostilities have resumed, and the Armistice is no longer in effect, all units of the Battalion cease non-tactical work and proceed along prescribed routes to their sectors of the MBP with full combat equipment. Experience has shown that the entire MBP can be manned in approximately 35 minutes in daylight and in 56 minutes at night, both without prior warning.

8. CONTROL OF PERSONNEL UNDER TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE

a. All troops were instructed on the contents of Appendix I to Annex EASY to 1st MarDiv-00-11-53. All troops were further instructed as to their conduct in the Demilitarized zone during salvage operations. Two men of this organization were captured by Chinese Communist Forces DMZ Police on 31 August 1953 and were released on 5 September 1953. These men were tried and acquitted by General Court Martial for violation of the Armistice Agreement.

Enclosure (1)

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Headquarters
7th Marines (Reinf)
1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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28 January 1954

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps
Ref: (a) CG, 1st Mar Div ltr ser 002541 dtd 5 Nov 53
Encl: (1) Report of 7th Marines
(2) Operation Overlay
(3) 4.2" Mortar, Tank and 75RR Positions Overlay
(4) 4.2" Mortar Fire Plan Overlay

1. In accordance with instructions contained in reference (a), enclosure (1), (2), (3) and (4) are herewith submitted.

W. H. Duplantis
W. H. DUPLANTIS

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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST MARINES
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10 February 1954

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From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF, (Attn: G-3)

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps

Ref: (a) CG, 1st MarDiv ltr to Dist Ser 002541 of 5 Nov 1953

Encl: (1) Discussion of 11th Marines planning and activities from 27 July to 31 October 1953.
 (2) Map: Korea 1:25000 showing fire plans and position areas (map w/orig only; all other copies overlay)
 (3) Overlay of the fifteen (15) originally selected position areas for artillery units.

1. The enclosures are submitted herewith in compliance with reference (a).
2. Enclosure (1) is a discussion of the planning for and the redeployment of artillery units in "D" Division Sector following the armistice agreement.
3. Enclosure (2) is a map showing the fire plans for support of the GOP and MBP and the position areas for the displacement of certain units in order to support the MBP.
4. Enclosure (3) is an overlay of the fifteen (15) position areas originally selected for the placement of artillery units following the armistice agreement.

Lewis J. Fields
 LEWIS J. FIELDS

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DEFENSE OF "D" DIVISION SECTOR, I US CORPS

11TH MARINES REPORT

When the armistice became effective in Korea in July 1953, a major redeployment of the 1st Marine Division's forces resulted due to the adoption of a different tactical concept. The adoption of the concept of a strong point defense of a wide front, and the decision to establish a General outpost consisting of one infantry regiment in the approximate area of the old battle position, posed difficult problems for the artillery.

The initial planning for the artillery support of the 1st Marine Division in case of an armistice was based on the assumption that I Corps would supplement the divisional artillery with one 155 howitzer battalion, and one 8" howitzer battalion. The total artillery in the sector would then be four 105mm howitzer battalions, two 155 mm howitzer battalions, one 8" howitzer battalion, and one 4.5" rocket battery. It was assumed that the reinforcing army division artillery in the sector at the time would be assigned elsewhere.

It was apparent that the width and depth of the division sector were such that the artillery available could not adequately support both the GOP and the MBP without displacing some of the artillery as the action developed. To conduct the decisive phase of the battle, i.e. the defense of the MBP, it was obviously necessary for the artillery to be deployed behind the MBP. However, to give effective support to the General Outpost it would be necessary to deploy some of the artillery well forward initially. To facilitate artillery planning, the delaying action of the General Outpost was considered as Phase I and the defense of the MBP as Phase II.

The support of the General Outpost (an infantry regiment) ^{by one} direct support artillery battalion was considered inadequate because of the extremely wide front of the outpost sector. Two plans were submitted which would provide the additional artillery support desired. One plan provided for a 105mm howitzer battalion in direct support of each battalion of the outpost regiment. This would provide the additional artillery needed. However, there were two disadvantages in this plan: FIRST, there was insufficient artillery in the sector to provide for this type of support without weakening the artillery support for the MBP; and SECOND, it would present additional problems of coordination for the infantry regimental commander. The second plan was to assign each of the remaining 105mm battalions of the 11th Marines a Phase I mission of general support of the 1st Marine Division reinforcing the 1st Battalion, the direct support artillery battalion for the General Outpost. The disadvantage of this plan was that each of the reinforcing light battalions would have to shift to direct support of its normal infantry regiment during Phase II. Phase I, the outpost phase, was expected to be of relatively short duration, therefore, the primary consideration in the selection of firing battery positions was support of the MBP and not the GOP. Positions of the firing batteries were located so that the probable river crossing sites could be covered. Additional positions were to be selected for one battery of each of the reinforcing light battalions to provide additional support for the outpost. These positions would have to be well forward. This latter plan was adopted.

The Marine artillery battalion placed in direct support of the outpost regiment would, in effect, act as an artillery group headquarters, directing the fires of a total of four light battalions. The medium battalion of the 11th Marines together with the Corps medium and heavy battalions and the 4.5"

rocket battery would be retained under control of the 11th Marine Regiment. Positions selected for these units would be primarily for support of the MBP. Again, forward positions for one battery from each of these battalions would be selected in order to provide long range interdiction and counterbattery fire. The 11th Marines headquarters would maintain close liaison with the 1st Battalion, and would be prepared to reinforce the fires of the direct support battalion, or take over full control as necessary, but would confine itself in Phase I mainly to the supervision of counter-battery fire and long range interdiction fires. When the outpost regiment was withdrawn south of the river the direct support battalion would be ordered to displace to a selected rear position, and assume a general support mission. At this time the reinforcing light battalions would assume their Phase II missions of direct support of their respective infantry regiments.

In essence the artillery plan provided for two-thirds of the artillery in the sector to be in position to support MBP, with the remainder well forward to support the GOP. Subsequent events reveal the changes that had to be made to the basic concept.

Before going into detail as to how the artillery plan was to be executed, it is necessary to briefly review the tactical situation that existed prior to the armistice, and to then show in general how the infantry planned to change from the "linear" to the "strong point" type defense. On the 26th day of July 1953 the 1st Marine Division had three regiments in position north of the Imjin River. The 1st Marines were in position on the right, the 5th Marines in the center, and the 1st KMC Regiment on the left. The artillery disposition to support the division was as follows:

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Type</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Mission</u> |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| 11th Mar (Reinf) | | | |
| 1st Bn | 105mmHow | CT 072018 | G/S 1stMarDiv/Reinf 2-11 |
| 2nd Bn | -do- | CT 148024 | D/S 1st Marines |
| 3rd Bn | -do- | CS 049989 | D/S 5th Marines |
| 1st KMC Arty Bn | -do- | CS 022989 | D/S KMC Regt |
| 4th Bn | 155mmHow | CS 078993 | G/S 1st MarDiv |
| 1st 4.5" Rkt Btry | 4.5" Rkts | CT 069030 | G/S 1st MarDiv |
| 25th Div Arty | | | |
| 8th FA Bn | 105mmHow | CT 121012 | G/S I Corps Reinf 2-11 |
| 64th FA Bn | -do- | CS 036985 | G/S I Corps Reinf KMC Arty Bn |
| 69th FA Bn | -do- | CS 015889 | G/S -do- |
| 90th FA Bn | 155mmHow | CT 134014 | G/S I Corps Reinf 11th Mhrs |
| TAFCPA Bn | 105mmHow | CT 050017 | G/S I Corps Reinf 3-11 |
| 629th FA Bn | 155mmHow | CS 062993 | Training Status |
| I Corps Units | | | |
| "A" Btry 204 FA Bn | 155mmGun | CT 154062 | Opn Control 11th Mar |
| 96th FA Bn | 155mmHow | CS 136957 | -do- |
| "C" Btry 17th FA Bn | 8" How | CT 110028 | G/S I Corps |
| "C" Btry 159th FABn | 240mmHow | CS 109959 | -do- |

During the redeployment phase the 5th Marines, the general outpost regiment, would accept responsibility for the entire division sector north of the Imjin River, relieving each of the other two MLR regiments with one infantry battalion. The 1st Marines would then withdraw south of the river,

pass to division reserve, and assume responsibility for organizing the blocking positions. The 1st KMC Regiment would withdraw south of the river and organize the central sector of the MBP. The 7th Marines, who were in reserve, were to organize the right sector of the MBP. The left sector of the MBP was to be organized by the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion.

It was considered that the tasks confronting the 11th Marines during this period would be: (1) withdrawal from the demilitarized zone; (2) artillery support for the withdrawal of the MIR units; (3) artillery support for the redeployment of the 5th Marines; (4) artillery support for the GOP; (5) artillery support for the MBP; (6) responsibility for the coordination of the movement of all artillery units in the sector.

By the 25th of July 1953 the artillery positions had been selected and approved by division. Details of the plan had been completed, and, on order, the artillery was prepared to execute their plan as described below. Immediately after the signing of the armistice agreement, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, would establish liaison with the 5th Marines, on order, and prior to the assumption of sector responsibility by the 5th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, would be ordered to displace to position 11 (see enclosure 3 for planned position areas). This centrally located position would be favorable for control as well as range capabilities for the support of most of the outpost sector. The battalion was given a Phase I mission of direct support of the 5th Marines and a phase II mission of general support of the 1st Marine Division. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, which was in direct support of the 1st Marines would retain that mission until the 5th Marines relieved the 1st Marines of sector responsibility. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, would then be ordered to displace two batteries to position 4, from where it could support the right sector of the MBP. One battery would remain in its present position in order to provide support for the outpost regiment. The 2nd Battalion was assigned a Phase I mission of general support, reinforcing the 1st Battalion and a Phase II mission of direct support of the 7th Marines. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, would retain their direct support mission of the 5th Marines until relieved by the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. When relieved of their direct support mission, 3-11 would be ordered to displace south of the river. One battery would go to position 13 for support of the general outpost, and the other two batteries to position 14 for support of the left sector of the MBP. The 3rd Battalion was assigned a Phase I mission of general support, reinforcing the 1st Battalion, and a Phase II mission of general support of the 1st Marine Division. In addition 3-11 was to be prepared to assume the mission of direct support of the reserve infantry regiment on order. The 1st KMC Artillery Battalion, which was in direct support of the 1st KMC Regiment, would retain that mission until the 5th Marines relieved the 1st KMC Regiment of sector responsibility. At that time the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion would be ordered to displace one battery to position 12 for support of the outpost, and the two remaining batteries to position 9 from which they would be able to support the center sector of the MBP. The 1st KMC Artillery Battalion was assigned a Phase I mission of general support, reinforcing the 1st Battalion, and a Phase II mission of direct support of the 1st KMC Regiment. The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, would displace on order to position 10. The mission of the 4th Battalion for both Phase I and Phase II would be general support. Primary sector of fire to cover the center and left of the division sector was selected. A forward battery position was to be selected in both the center and left sector to support the general outpost. The 1st 4.5" Rocket Battery was to displace on order to the vicinity of 105960. As the rocket battery is very mobile, the main consideration in its location was a suitable road net. It was planned

to keep the rockets north of the river until the redeployment of the 5th Marines was complete. The rocket battery was assigned a mission of general support of the 1st Marine Division sector for both phases.

I Corps had designated position 5 for the 96th FA Bn. It was recommended that this 155 mm howitzer battalion be positioned so as to be able to cover the center and right portion of the division sector. Since the location of this battalion was well forward, rear positions were recommended in case displacement proved necessary. Position 8 had been selected by I Corps for the 8" howitzer battalion. From this position, the battery could cover the MBP. A request was made to I Corps that forward positions be selected to gain sufficient range for counterbattery fires and to provide additional support for the general outpost line.

On the afternoon of the 26th of July, the 11th Marines were informed by I Corps Artillery that all of the artillery in the sector at the time the armistice agreement was signed would probably remain in the sector, at least temporarily. This meant that an additional seven battalions - four 105mm howitzer, two 155mm howitzer, and one AAA-AW - would be located in the sector. In addition, "C" Battery of the 159th FA Bn (240mm howitzer) which was located in one of the rear positions of the 2nd battalion, 11th Marines, would remain in the sector for about two weeks. Since three of the artillery battalions mentioned above were located north of the Injin, three additional battalion positions had to be selected south of the River. The remnants of the 21st AAA-AW Battalion that were located north of the river were also brought south of the river.

It was not only necessary to select three new artillery positions, but to review the missions and disposition of all the artillery in the sector. With the concurrence of the 25th Division Artillery Commander, it was decided to displace the 64th FA Battalion to position 3. This would enable the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, to displace all three firing batteries to position 14, and would provide additional support for the left sector of the GOP. The TAFC FA Battalion would displace to position 4, from where it would provide additional support for the probable river crossing sites in the right sector. The 629th FA Battalion would be ordered to displace to position 2. This battalion was in a training status and was not assigned a mission, although the battalion was given a sector of fire to cover the Samichon River valley, and would be used there if necessary. The remaining units of the 25th Division Artillery which were located south of the river would, at least temporarily, remain in their present locations. Rear positions for the support of the MBP would be selected for these units.

The 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines, would remain in their present positions, being prepared to move on order to either position 3 or position 6. It was not planned to move the 2nd Battalion to rear positions until the status of the 25th Division Artillery was firmly established.

In essence the artillery plan now provided for a light battalion to be in position to support each sector of the MBP, with the remaining light battalions forward to support the GOP. The medium and heavy artillery, and the 4.5" rocket battery were placed to support the MBP from rear positions, with designated forward positions to support the GOP.

Based on the number of battalions to be moved and their missions, Annex B,aker (Withdrawal Schedule) to 11th Marines Operation Order 7-53 was promulgated.

ENCLOSURE (1)

However, prior to execution, the 11th Marines were informed that a higher priority existed for position 14. Therefore, the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, would not be permitted to occupy that area. It was also necessary to obtain clearance to destroy crops in the area before the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion could occupy position 9. The 11th Marines were also informed by the 25th Division Artillery that the 64th FA Battalion would not remain in the sector. Based on this information it was decided to place the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, in position 13 and the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion in position 12. The missions of these units were not changed. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to reconnoiter for a new position from which they could support the left sector of the MBP.

At 0800 on the 29th of July the movement of the artillery battalions commenced. The movement was in accordance with the schedule, with the exception of the 4.5" rocket battery. Their position north of the river required them to move one day ahead of schedule. Although the 629th FA Battalion displaced to position 2 as scheduled, they departed the division sector at 1300 on the 30th of July as directed by I Corps Artillery.

By the evening of the 31st of July all artillery units were in position south of the Injin River with the exception of 3-11 which was not scheduled to move until the 1st of August. The artillery in the division sector now consisted of seven light (105mm) battalions, three medium (155mm) battalions, one 8" howitzer battery, one 240mm howitzer battery, and one 4.5" rocket battery. The 11th Marines were now in position and ready to support both the GOP and the MBP. Reconnaissance for new artillery positions to support the MBP was to be continuous. Artillery would be displaced as needed to repel an attack from any direction upon the MBP. The 11th Marines Operation Order 7-53 covers the missions and plan of employment for the artillery units in support of the 1st Marine Division. Subsequent changes reflect the adjustments that were made after the 31st of July 1953.

The Kimpo Provisional Regiment was virtually unaffected by the armistice agreement. However, the Provisional 90mm gun battery, which had been in support of the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, was disbanded on the 1st of August and its pieces were returned to their parent unit, the 10th Anti-Aircraft Group.

Redeployment of the artillery in the 1st Marine Division Sector was completed during August. As previously indicated, part of the artillery was placed in forward positions to support the GOP. These units would withdraw to other locations to participate in the defense of the MBP. Locations and missions of units for the GOP and MBP phases are shown on the chart on the following page.

ENCLOSURE (1)

-5-

| Unit | GOP PHASE | | | MBP PHASE | | |
|--------------------------|-----------|----------|-----|--|---------------|------------------|
| | Type | Location | Z/F | Mission | Location | Mission |
| 11th Marines | | | | | | |
| 1/11 | 105 | 068946 | CTR | D/S GOP REGT | 115870 123907 | G/S |
| 2/11 | 105 | 115955 | R | G/S | 115955 | D/S Right Regt |
| 3/11 | 105 | 039937 | L | G/S, Reinf 1/11 | 053843 065885 | G/S |
| 4/11 | 155H | 078896 | L | G/S | 076896 | G/S |
| 1st 4.5" RktBtry | | 106978 | | G/S | 100920 | G/S |
| KMC | 105 | 040948 | L | G/S | 040948 | D/S Center Regt. |
| 25th Inf Div Arty | | | | | | |
| 8th TABn | 105 | 135014 | R | G/S, Reinf 1/11 | 123933 | G/S |
| TAFG A Bn | 105 | 146969 | CTR | G/S, Reinf 1/11 | 146969 | G/S |
| 69th FA Bn | 105 | 989862 | L | G/S | 989862 060835 | D/S Left Regt |
| 90th FA Bn | 155H | 129940 | CTR | G/S | 129940 | G/S |
| I Corps Artillery | | | | | | |
| 90th FA Bn | 155H | 127955 | R | G/S | 127955 | G/S |
| 17th FA Bn | 8" H | 160003 | CTR | G/S | 135905 | G/S |
| Kimpo Prov Regt | | | | | | |
| 1st Amph Amph Bn | 75 PH | | | Attached to Kimpo Prov Regt | | |
| AAA AW | | | | | | |
| 21st AAA AW Bn | | | | Defense of Liberty and Freedom bridges | | |

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On the 21st of August, 1953 the 7th Infantry Division Artillery relieved the 25th Division Artillery:

| <u>Old Unit</u> | <u>Relieving Unit</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------------|
| 8th FA Bn | 48th FA Bn |
| TAFB ABn | 57th FA Bn |
| 69th FA Bn | 49th FA Bn |
| 90th FA Bn | 31st FA Bn |
| 21st AAA-AW Bn | 15th AAA-AWBn |

Relieving units occupied the positions vacated by the 25th Infantry Division Artillery. Anti-aircraft defense of Liberty and Freedom Bridges was assumed by the 1st Provisional AAA-AW platoon of the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines. Authority was obtained from I Corps to place one platoon from the 15th AAA-AW Bn under the operational control of the outpost regiment. One platoon would be available to the right regiment and another available to the center regiment when defense of the MBP became imminent. These would be dispatched on Corps order. On request I Corps directed that one Army light battalion (69th or 49th FA Bn) would assume a direct support mission of the left regiment during the MBP phase. Six searchlights were to become available to the 11th Marines for the defense of the MBP. However, these lights were not permitted north of the Imjin River.

Priority of effort by artillery organizations during August and the first of September was devoted to the completion of position areas and perfecting of fire direction procedures. The Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, directed that all units under his command would complete construction of forward positions by 28 August 1953. All battalions met this deadline. Serious difficulties arose in preparing rear position areas for support of the MBP. When the forward elements of the infantry moved southward in accordance with the truce agreement, there was no corresponding move by support and service units or by civilians. Consequently, there was a severe shortage of available positions. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, and the 69th (49th) FA Battalion rear positions were within the area of ASP #63. A directive from 8th Army prohibited construction of artillery positions within the area of ASP #63. Another 8th Army directive precluded any construction of rear positions by the 17th FA Battalion. Locations considered for the 3rd Battalion and the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion main battle position areas were under heavy cultivation by Korean farmers. Permission was requested from division to condemn the land. The rear position of the 3rd (48th) FA Bn was also being farmed, but old gun pits were available in the area. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines was assigned two possible rear areas which would be occupied according to the direction of the enemy's main attack. Both areas were occupied by service elements. A large number of other position areas were reconnoitered for possible use. A catalogue was made showing the characteristics of each location, routes of access, and relative quality compared with other areas.

A series of command post exercises were instituted to integrate the fire direction techniques of Marine and Army artillery units in the division sector. It was decided to test the outpost procedure first. Radio was designated as the primary mode of communications. Because of communication

ENCLOSURE (1)

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considerations and range capabilities, three sector nets were established; left, center and right. These sectors corresponded to the three battalions of the outpost regiment. Missions were transmitted by 1st Battalion forward observers to the 1st Battalion FDC. Other battalions on the sector net copied the observer's request, prepared firing data, and were able to shoot shortly after assignment of the mission to the particular battalion by the 1st Battalion FDC. In order to save time, the 1st Battalion was authorized to send fire missions direct to the general support battalions. The general support battalion assigned the mission was responsible for securing permission from the 11th Marines FDC prior to firing.

An I Corps directive permitted Corps Artillery units to maintain only one-third of each unit in position in the 1st Marine Division Sector. The remainder were ordered into camp areas close enough to permit complete occupation of the MBP within four hours. As a result of this directive, the 17th FA Battalion and the 96th FA Battalion left only one battery in the division area. Both the 25th and 7th Division Artilleries contemplated the exercise of this authority, but the plan was never executed.

Plans for the mobile employment of the 1st 4.5" Rocket Battery were developed as well as three fire plans for artillery support of the division. The "Duck" fire plan was designed for the defense of the GOP. The concentrations for this plan are shown on enclosure 2. The "Timber" plan was designed for the defense of the MBP and is also shown on enclosure 2. In both fire plan "Duck" and fire plan "Timber", concentrations were to be fired on call. Defensive fire plan "Woodchopper" assigned selected concentrations from plan "Duck" to be fired on a time schedule in the event poor visibility prevented reliance on call fires. Coordination of supporting fires was effected with the 1st Commonwealth Division and with I Corps Artillery.

On 13 September, the 1st Artillery Battalion, 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team, conducted gun drill as part of the 1st Marine Division show of force along the route taken by the nonrepatriated prisoners of war on their way to camps in the demilitarized zone. This show of force continued until all the prisoners had been moved into the zone.

On 9 October, with the exchanging of positions between the 1st KMC Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Marines, the 1st KMC Artillery Battalion and the 49th FA Bn exchanged positions. The 1st KMC Artillery Battalion assumed the mission of direct support of the 2nd KMC Regiment.

The 1st Provisional Anti-aircraft Automatic Weapons Platoon, which had been attached to the 4th Battalion, 11th Marines disbanded on 23 October. At approximately the same time, the 11th Marines were directed to pass operational control of the 15th AAA-AW Bn to the 1st Marine Division.

In September, work had begun on the new Regimental Command Post for the 11th Marines. On 17 October, the Regimental Command Post at CS 115955 was closed and the new Command Post at CS 128872 was opened at 1400I.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Headquarters
Kimpo Provisional Regiment
First Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

JTQ/jak
Ser: 00-18-54
9 Feb 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps, Kimpo
Provisional Regiment's, report of
Ref: (a) CG 1st Mar Div ltr ser 002541 of 5 Nov 1953
Encl: (1) Report of Kimpo Provisional Regiment's Defense of "D"
Division Sector, I U. S. Corps (20 copies)

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is hereby
submitted.


J. B. HELES

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REPORT OF KIMPO PROVISIONAL REGIMENT'S
DEFENSE OF "D" DIVISION SECTOR, I U. S. CORPS

The first seventy-two hours following the Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 had little effect upon the tactical and logistical concepts of the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Since the terms of the Armistice did not necessitate this unit's withdrawal from the MBP, salvage efforts were consistent with routine procedures then being employed. The cease fire had no apparent immediate effect upon the personnel. Because of the Han River separating our positions from those of the enemy; these troops, though having been subjected to hostile shelling, had experienced no physical contact with the enemy.

Enclosure (1) shows the organization of the regimental defensive positions. Enclosure (2) shows the detailed organization of the MBP. Having, throughout the period of the fighting, manned a front of approximately nine (9) miles with but one KMC Battalion, the unit's defenses had been organized consistent with the principles of a wide-front defense. Blocking positions and a mobile reserve provided for depth of defense. Seven prepared LVT(A) platoon positions provided for the artillery support of the sector. As presently situated, the defense commands the most likely avenues of approach and the road network. Tanks, recoilless weapons, and 4.2 mortars are not now available for employment in the defense of this sector.

The organization of the defense of this sector takes advantage of the high ground and covers the routes of approach. It utilizes to the greatest extent the natural obstacle formed by the Han River and the Yom Straits. Mobility of supporting weapons is provided by the LVT(A)'s. Organic engineer support is furnished by the 1st Shore Party Bn (-).

The defense of this sector is handicapped primarily by the size of the sector of responsibility. The approximate nine (9) mile front seriously limits coordination of effort by the defensive positions of the MBP. Little support from adjacent units can be expected. The road network supporting the MBP is for the most part under direct observation and fire of the enemy. Supporting weapons lack the range and power of those available to the enemy.

Improvement of defenses continued after the cessation of hostilities. Planning provided for a total of 628 individual fighting positions, 46 bunkered AW positions, 84 unbunkered AW positions, 15 OP bunkers, 34 ammunition bunkers, 20 CP bunkers, 30,318 yards of tactical and protective wire, and 12,556 yards of trench line. A new program for the improvement and construction of roads was initiated. This unit now has fifty-nine (59) miles of road responsibility. All such work was accomplished under the technical supervision of the 1st Shore Party Group Companies.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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The greatly varied sub-soils encountered in this sector at times impeded the digging of trenches and positions. The necessity of man-handling materiel to some positions also caused a slowness of such efforts. However, no major construction problems were experienced.

MBP rehearsals have been conducted on the battalion and regimental levels. In the absence of an outpost system in front of the regimental sector, the seven KMC platoon positions on the MBP are fully and continuously manned.

The control of personnel under the terms of the Armistice Agreement has been conducted in accordance with Annex Easy of 1 MARC 00-10-53. Replacements are indoctrinated with the provisions of Annex Easy. There have been no known violations of the Armistice Agreement within this regiment's sector of responsibility.

The southern boundary of the DMZ is marked by ninety-six (96) signs. Because of the natural barrier created by the Han River the erection of a barbed wire fence along this boundary was not deemed necessary. Daily patrols are conducted to insure the proper maintenance of the signs denoting the southern boundary of the DMZ.

At the time of the cease fire agreement, the task organization of KPR was as follows:

- Kimpo Prov Regt
 - Prov Hdqs Co (-)
 - Det 1st Sig Bn
 - Radio Relay Team
 - Sig Rep Team
 - "B" Co, 1st SP Bn
 - "D" Co, 1st Med Bn
 - Det 181st CIC
 - Spec Trng Sect
 - 3d KMC Bn, 1st KMC RCT
 - 13th ROK Scty Bn (-)
 - 1st Armd Amph Bn (Reinf) (Regt Arty)
 - Det 61st Eng Slt Co
 - Prov 90mm AAA Gun Battery
 - Prov 4.2 Mortar Plat
 - Prov Plat, 1st AmTrack Bn
 - KPR Reserve
 - Plat Div Recon Co
 - Prov Tk Plat

While it is understood that the dates concerned in this report are 27 July 1953 to 29 October 1953, it is felt that for clarification of this report, activities until 20 November must be included.

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The inclusion of the later date will be consistent with the current situation. By this date the task organization of KPR was as follows:

Kimpo Prov Regt
1st SP Bn (-)
5th KMC Bn, 2d KMC Regt
1st Armd Amph Bn (-)
"D" Co (-), 1st Med Bn
Det 181st CIC
Regt Res
"C" Co, 1st SP Bn (-)

On 20 November, with the change of our southern boundary, operational control of the 13th ROK Security Bn (-) passed to 8th Army. Although the boundary change lessened this unit's sector of responsibility, the loss of the above Battalion created a serious shortage of infantry personnel available to this Regiment. A comparison of the two task organizations will show the loss of supporting arms.

ENCLOSURES: (1) Overlay, Organization of Ground (Regiment)
(2) Overlay, Organization of Ground (Battalion)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Headquarters
 1st MHC Regiment
 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
 c/o APO, San Francisco, California 7 April 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer, 1st MHC Regiment
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
 (Attn: AOS 7-3)

Subj: Defense of Center Regimental "D" Division Sector U. S. I Corps

Ref: (a) CG 1st MARDIV ser: 002541 of 5Nov53

Encl: (1) Overprinted Map Center Regt "D" Division Sector, Korea, 1:25,000
 w/24 overlays
 (2) Overprinted Map Left Battalion, Center Regimental "D" Division
 Sector Korea, 1:10,000 w/24 overlays
 (3) Overprinted Map Right Battalion, Center Regimental "D" Division
 Sector, Korea, 1:10,000 w/24 overlays

1. Operations during the first seventy two (72) hours following armistice:

a. Initial salvage of a munition and material.

(1) All ammunition and fortification material that was on hand at the close of hostilities was moved back to dumps in the new area. This proved to be an extremely difficult task because of the shortage of transportation. No Division Motor Transport being available, the troops had to march back to the new positions. Much of the ammunition and other equipment had to be carried back by the troops. All material and equipment was moved back to the new positions during the first seventy two (72) hour period.

b. Immediate effects of cease fire on personnel.

(1) There was generally no strong reaction to the cease fire on the part of the officers and men of this organization. Many of the officers and men were relieved to see the fighting cease; others, particularly among the officers, would rather have seen the fighting continue until the country could be united. However, the officers and men accepted the cease fire as a military order and acted accordingly.

c. Withdrawal from DMZ and occupation of the new MBP.

(1) The withdrawal posed many problems. The main two (2) were; first, the shortage of transportation and secondly, the crowded condition of FREEDOM BRIDGE, the only exit from the area. The shortage of transportation resulted in the troops being marched to their new positions carrying on their backs much of the stock of ammunition and other material. The transportation available in the RCF was used continually until the remainder of the equipment and

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Defense of Center Regimental "D" Division Sector (Cont'd)

material were moved to the new positions. The problem of congestion on FREEDOM BRIDGE was somewhat alleviated by moving the left battalion, 1st Battalion across the river in LVT's. This plan proved highly successful.

(2) The withdrawal from the MBR was made as a tactical move. The left and right battalions (the 1st and 5th respectively) moved back tactically while the reserve battalion formed a perimeter defense around FREEDOM BRIDGE. The 2d Battalion was attached to the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines until that unit could occupy the sector. The 2d Battalion was attached to the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines until that unit could occupy the sector. The 2d Battalion moved on foot to their new positions on 1 August 1953; (For positions see overlay of organization of defensive positions)

2. Conduct of Salvage Operations. (1 August to 13 September 1953)

a. During this period the 1st KMC RCT was assigned a sector South of DMZ for salvage operations. The salvage material was subsequently used in the new Main Battle Positions.

b. Below listed material was salvaged during the period:

1. Lumber - 12,789 Pieces
2. Sandbags - 119,550
3. Stakes, long 1,500
4. Stakes, short 2,400

3. Organization of defensive positions.

(a) The organization of the new defensive positions presented many problems. One of the main problems was the change of the type of defense from the linear type which all hands were familiar. Very few of the officer personnel were acquainted with the principles in the defense of a wide front. Manuals were used for reference and lectures with the use of diagrams were held at all levels. Lectures were given at Regimental level to key officers. The initial layout of the battalion defensive positions were closely supervised by the Regimental S-3 Section. These positive methods produced an excellent defensive setup for the regiment.

(b) Organization of ground.

1. MBP, scale 1:25,000 (Enclosure (1))
2. Factors considered in organizing defense

a. Battalion areas of responsibility, particularly the Left Battalion Sector, were extremely large.

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Defense of Center Regimental "D" Division Sector (Cont'd)

b. To provide for all around security, units were set up within a perimeter defense and the weapons were placed accordingly.

c. The IHJIN serves as a definite obstacle to the front. Therefore, as appropriate, the wide front defense in some places such as in the Left Battalion Area was modified to include the advantages of a river front defense.

d. Every effort was made to present a defense should the enemy attack immediately. Temporary fox holes and automatic weapons were dug so that almost from the first day this organization was in a position to defend its assigned sector.

3. Advantages and Disadvantages of organization.

The only disadvantage of the organization is apparent in the center battalion position. This could not be remedied at this level. The battalion was set in a salient because of the "U" that the river makes in the FREEDOM BRIDGE area. This could mean that if the enemy reached the river they could deliver fire on the center battalion from three (3) sides. Also to the left of the center battalion the enemy could advance in defilade and by pass that position. These two (2) points were the main weakness in the Regiment's sector.

The main advantages of the position are the wideness of the river and the mudflats in front of the left battalion and the height of the positions of the right battalion.

4. Construction of defensive positions.

a. Bunkers were constructed entirely with salvaged material.

b. This regiment utilized all personnel as effectively as possible. All troops were actually bivouaced on position so that a minimum of time would be spent in traveling back and forth. All hands were turned to on the construction.

c. A time schedule for construction was set up which was rigidly adhered to. Schools were held on setting up a perimeter defense, building bunkers, etc..

d. Plans were made for the construction of the following type bunkers:

- (1) Auto Wpns (machine guns) - 184 (includes act wpsns)
- (2) OP's (inf) - 25
- (3) OP's (arty) - 2
- (4) CP's - 5
- (5) Auto Bunkers - 101

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Defense of Center Regimental "D" Division Sector (Cont'd)

a. Main construction problems arose from the rocky condition of the soil and the scarcity of demolitions.

5. The manning the NEP rehearsals conducted by this regiment were outstanding. This regiment was continually the first unit in the "DOG" Division sector to report all troops on position. The reason being that this unit actually located all troops in the immediate vicinity of the positions they were working on. It therefore took just a few minutes for all troops to physically man their positions. Regimental and Battalion rehearsals were held prior to any rehearsals from Division or Corps level, so that all hands were familiar with their Battalion stations and routes thereto.


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Headquarters
 2nd KMC Regiment
 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
 c/o FPO San Francisco, California

3/6/cmf
 Ser: 005
 18 Jan 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer, 2d KMC Regiment
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
 (Attn: ACS G-3)

Subj: Defense of Left Regimental "D" Division Sector U. S. I Corps

Ref: (a) CG 1stMARDIV ser 002541 as of 5 Nov 1953

Encl: (1) Overprinted Map Left Regt "D" Division Sector, Korea, 1:25,000
 w/24 overlays
 (2) Overprinted Map Left Battalion, Left Regimental "D" Division
 Sector, Korea, 1:10,000 w/24 overlays
 (3) Overprinted Map Right Bn, Left Sector "D" Division Sector,
 Korea, 1:10,000 w/24 overlays.

1. On 22 September 1953 the 2d KMC Regiment (-) relieved the 1st ArtTracBn on position in the left Regimental "D" Division Sector with the 6th KMC Battalion occupying MBP position and the 7th KMC Battalion occupying and being charged with the responsibility for development of the "DOG" Blocking Position. On 12 October 1953 the 7th KMC Battalion relieved the 1st KMC Battalion, taking up the positions already partially developed by that unit.
2. It was found that due to the 6th Battalion having relieved a separate battalion of lesser strength, it was able to maintain a company as a battalion reserve, this being peculiar to this time of defense.
3. While a large percentage of the positions of the MBP were fully organized, many of the bunkers required repair or replacement or reconstruction. A survey was made in conjunction with the supporting engineer element and about eighty (80) per cent of the bunkers were condemned, as they did not meet specifications as laid down by Annex FOX 1MARD-00-10-53. Minor adjustments in squad and platoon positions were necessary in view of better utilization of available man power and the fact that the 2d KMC Regiment did not inherit the usual sector weapons, under the reimburseable method of supply.
4. It should be noted that while the INJIN River with its swift current and large expanses of mud flats at low tide provides an excellent natural barrier across the entire front of the Sector, it also constitutes quite a hindrance in the defense of the area as the low lands are completely inundated during the flood season and even during the dry season, the low dikes and canals provide but little security for the defending force. However, the distance from the Bunker Positions on the other side of the INJIN tends to alleviate this factor while the higher elevation of the MBP Positions afford excellent observation should an amphibious attack be launched.

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 2KMC Ltr Ser. 0005 dated 18Jan54 Cont'd:

5. Two (2) main avenues of approach could be considered as possible enemy attack routes. One would be a canalized approach through the center of the regiment; the other on the extreme right flank through a large open paddy, opening onto the IMJIN, which is also the boundary between the 2d KMC and the unit on its right.

6. It has been noted in preceding paragraphs that the 7th Battalion had little time to develop "DOG" Blocking Positions before it relieved the 1st KMC Battalion. This was remedied by organizing a Provisional Battalion consisting of four (4) companies of KMC recruits and ordering the development of the "DOG" Blocking Positions added to their training as practical field work. This work is only partially completed as the natural ruggedness of the terrain will require the extensive use of demolitions by adequately trained engineer personnel.

7. Several major problems presented themselves when work was begun on the development of the MBP. It was found that close supervision was required by qualified engineer personnel for the construction or rebuilding of bunkers; that no excess or condemned material was available at this time and the lack of an adequate road system in the 7th Battalion Area necessitated delay in getting bunker material to the MBP Positions after it became available.

8. In addition to the above and due to the fact that the Regiment was organized after the cessation of hostilities, supplies were delayed due to time requirements in shipping. The Regiment did not have the problem of excess ammunition, weapons or field fortification materials to deal with; however, the lack of organic and available motor transportation in the beginning complicated the logistic problem a great deal.

9. There are no major problems encountered in rehearsals for manning the MBP. Since all MBP units live right on position, there is little delay in manning the positions.

10. No problems have been encountered in control of personnel of 2d KMC Regiment under the terms of the armistice. All civilian personnel have been removed from the area forward of the "STAY BACK" line.

11. The DMZ Southern Boundary was marked and completed prior to the assumption of sector control by this unit. There have been no problems encountered concerning this boundary.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL KIM

DIST: Special

O-F-F-I-C-I-A-L

Min Young Saks
 MIN YONG SAK
 Major ROKMC

S-3

PAK NAM PYO
 Lieutenant Colonel, ROKMC
 Executive Officer

APPROVED:

A. M. FRANKER
 Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.
 Senior Advisor.

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35-E

HEADQUARTERS
1ST SERVICE BATTALION
1st Marine, Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

RCM:jjd
Ser: 0013-54
8 Feb 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division (Reinf), Fleet Marine Force
Subj: Report of missions and problems incident to the Armistice Agreement during the period 27 July 1953 to 31 October 1953
Ref: (a) CG 1stMarDiv ltr ser 002541 dtd 5 Nov 1953

1. Reference (a) requested that units submit a comprehensive report of missions assigned and problems arising as a result of the armistice agreement of 27 July 1953. Accordingly, the following report is submitted for this unit.
2. The implementation of the armistice agreement of 27 July 1953 had no immediate effect on this battalion. The Service Battalion continued to perform its assigned mission of service and support to the division. Not being a tactical unit, this battalion was not involved in withdrawal from the demilitarized zone, construction of main battle positions or tactical organization thereof. There were, however, certain problems arising as a result of the physical location of certain agencies or units adjacent to this unit. These will be covered in succeeding paragraphs.
3. This unit was located at CS 077928 on 27 July 1953, with units of its Supply Company at Ascom City (CS 304152) and the division Class III dump at Musan-ni (CS 055916). Upon implementation of the armistice agreement, the Service Battalion was assigned the requirement of displacing to the rear, (vicinity CS 109850). Construction of the new camp was started in September of 1953. Construction of the new camp site was delayed because of tactical requirements for engineer support which had priority, and the requirement that the battalion continue to perform its assigned missions while undertaking the camp construction. On 4 November 1953, the battalion opened its new command post at CS 109850. The Division Bakery, Division Class III (POL) Dump, the Division Class I Dump and Beverage Warehouse remained at their old locations. On 4 December 1953, the Division Bakery moved to CS 107847. On 21 December 1953, the Beverage Warehouse moved to CS 106845 and on 2 January 1954, the Division Class I Dump moved to CS 107847. The Division Class III (POL) Dump remained at CS 055916 (Musani).

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4. Operation of the Division General Supply (Class II) Salvage Dump was normal during the period. Salvaged material for July 1953 was 123 tons; for August, 118 tons; for September, 100 tons and for October, 300 tons.

5. Operations of the Graves Registration Platoon continued upon implementation of the Armistice Agreement. In close liaison with Headquarters, Eighth Army; graves registration teams were sent on search and recovery missions into the demilitarized zone. The search and recoveries consisted of known and probable locations of KIA's. Due to the tactical situation and locations of the remains, the Graves Registration Platoon was unable to search the area (where they were believed to be) before the signing of the truce. Directly after the signing of the truce, search and recovery cases were reported by different commands throughout the First Marine Division area. A Graves Team was sent to investigate every search and recovery case that was reported. This type of work is now largely completed, but is being carried on in a small scale by the Graves Registration Platoon. During this period, a total of sixty one (61) remains were recovered. The break down of the remains is as follows:

| <u>BELIEVED TO BE:</u> | <u>USMC</u> | <u>KATUSA</u> | <u>KSC</u> | <u>TAF</u> | <u>USA</u> | <u>BRITISH</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------------|-------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|--------------|
| 28 Oct 53 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| 31 Oct 53 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 1 Nov 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 3 Nov 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 5 Nov 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 6 Nov 53 | 19 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| 7 Nov 53 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | <u>23</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>30</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>61</u> |

6. The Ration Platoon of this unit experienced considerable difficulty during the period from 27 July 1953 to 31 October 1953. With the influx of numerous agencies into the division area, the class I dump was at one time issuing rations to more than 45,000 men. During the same period, the unit was reduced down to T/O strength, and shortly thereafter, Korean Service Corps labor was removed. The situation became critical, and it was

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RCM:jjd
Ser: 0013-54
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decided that U. S. Army elements would establish a Class I dump at Musan-ni, to issue to U. S. Army units in the area. In the interim, a platoon of U. S. Army personnel was assigned to the Ration Platoon to assist in the operation of the Class I dump. When the U. S. Army Class I dump at Musan-ni commenced operations, the Ration Platoon reverted to its assigned mission of providing rations for the First Marine Division only.

7. After the implementation of the armistice agreement, the operations of the Division Class III (POL) Dumps were increased considerably. The arrival of numerous units and agencies within the area, combined with the planned reduction of personnel and the loss of Korean Service Corps Labor, necessitated the use of U. S. Army personnel and Army Korean Service Corps laborers. At one time, issues of diesel fuel to the U. N. Forces completely exhausted the supply of diesel fuel on hand. To prevent a recurrence of this, a reserve dump was hurriedly constructed at CS-109850. During operation "Big Switch", all rail transportation of POL supplies was stopped, creating considerable difficulty which, however, was finally overcome with the extensive use of U. S. Army Truck Transportation.


PAUL JONES

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
1ST SERVICE BATTALION
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

RCM:jjd
Ser: 0013-54
8 Feb 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division (Reinf), Fleet Marine Force
Subj: Report of missions and problems incident to the Armistice Agreement during the period 27 July 1953 to 31 October 1953
Ref: (a) CG 1stMarDiv ltr ser 002541 dtd 5 Nov 1953

1. Reference (a) requested that units submit a comprehensive report of missions assigned and problems arising as a result of the armistice agreement of 27 July 1953. Accordingly, the following report is submitted for this unit.
2. The implementation of the armistice agreement of 27 July 1953 had no immediate effect on this battalion. The Service Battalion continued to perform its assigned mission of service and support to the division. Not being a tactical unit, this battalion was not involved in withdrawal from the demilitarized zone, construction of main battle positions or tactical organization thereof. There were, however, certain problems arising as a result of the physical location of certain agencies or units adjacent to this unit. These will be covered in succeeding paragraphs.
3. This unit was located at CS 077928 on 27 July 1953, with units of its Supply Company at Ascom City (CS 304152) and the division Class III dump at Musan-ni (CS 055916). Upon implementation of the armistice agreement, the Service Battalion was assigned the requirement of displacing to the rear, (vicinity CS 109850). Construction of the new camp was started in September of 1953. Construction of the new camp site was delayed because of tactical requirements for engineer support which had priority, and the requirement that the battalion continue to perform its assigned missions while undertaking the camp construction. On 4 November 1953, the battalion opened its new command post at CS 109850. The Division Bakery, Division Class III (POL) Dump, the Division Class I Dump and Beverage Warehouse remained at their old locations. On 4 December 1953, the Division Bakery moved to CS 107847. On 21 December 1953, the Beverage Warehouse moved to CS 106845 and on 2 January 1954, the Division Class I Dump moved to CS 107847. The Division Class III (POL) Dump remained at CS 055916 (Musan-ni).

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4. Operation of the Division (General Supply (Class II) Salvage Dump was normal during the period. Salvaged material for July 1953 was 123 tons; for August, 118 tons; for September, 100 tons and for October, 300 tons.

5. Operations of the Graves Registration Platoon continued upon implementation of the Armistice Agreement. In close liaison with Headquarters, Eighth Army; graves registration teams were sent on search and recovery missions into the demilitarized zone. The search and recoveries consisted of known and probable locations of KIA's. Due to the tactical situation and locations of the remains, the Graves Registration Platoon was unable to search the area (where they were believed to be) before the signing of the truce. Directly after the signing of the truce, search and recovery cases were reported by different commands throughout the First Marine Division area. A Graves Team was sent to investigate every search and recovery case that was reported. This type of work is now largely completed, but is being carried on in a small scale by the Graves Registration Platoon. During this period, a total of sixty one (61) remains were recovered. The break down of the remains is as follows:

| <u>BELIEVED TO BE:</u> | <u>USMC</u> | <u>KATUSA</u> | <u>KSC</u> | <u>TAF</u> | <u>USA</u> | <u>BRITISH</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------------|-------------|---------------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|--------------|
| 28 Oct 53 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 | 2 | 0 | 20 |
| 31 Oct 53 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| 1 Nov 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 3 Nov 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 5 Nov 53 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 6 Nov 53 | 19 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| 7 Nov 53 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | 23 | 1 | 4 | 30 | 2 | 1 | 61 |

6. The Ration Platoon of this unit experienced considerable difficulty during the period from 27 July 1953 to 31 October 1953. With the influx of numerous agencies into the division area, the class I dump was at one time issuing rations to more than 45,000 men. During the same period, the unit was reduced down to 1/0 strength, and shortly thereafter, Korean Service Corps labor was removed. The situation became critical, and it was

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decided that U. S. Army elements would establish a Class I dump at Musan-ni, to issue to U. S. Army units in the area. In the interim, a platoon of U. S. Army personnel was assigned to the Ration Platoon to assist in the operation of the Class I dump. When the U. S. Army Class I dump at Musan-ni commenced operations, the Ration Platoon reverted to its assigned mission of providing rations for the First Marine Division only.

7. After the implementation of the armistice agreement, the operations of the Division Class III (POL) Dumps were increased considerably. The arrival of numerous units and agencies within the area, combined with the planned reduction of personnel and the loss of Korean Service Corps labor, necessitated the use of U. S. Army personnel and Army Korean Service Corps laborers. At one time, issues of diesel fuel to the U. N. Forces completely exhausted the supply of diesel fuel on hand. To prevent a recurrence of this, a reserve dump was hurriedly constructed at CS-109850. During operation "Big Switch", all rail transportation of POL supplies was stopped, creating considerable difficulty which, however, was finally overcome with the extensive use of U. S. Army Truck Transportation.

PAUL JONES

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST SERVICE BATTALION
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMP
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

RCM:jjd
Ser: 0013-54
8 Feb 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division (Reinf), Fleet Marine Force
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Ref: (a) CG 1stMarDiv ltr ser 002541 dtd 5 Nov 1953

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| 6 Nov 53 | 19 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| 7 Nov 53 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
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PAUL JONES



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DECLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

3/mgw
A9-8
Ser: 00363
21 January 1954

SECRET~~SECURITY~~ INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
(G-3)


Subj: Post Armistice Activities; report of

Ref: (a) CG's ltr ser 002541 of 5Nov53

Encl: (1) Post Armistice activities report, with overlays

1. In compliance with reference (a), enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.

2. On 22 September 1953, this organization was relieved by elements of the 2nd Regiment, Korean Marine Corps. At this time all up to date overlays and maps of the sector were turned over to the organization assuming control of the sector. The overlays accompanying enclosure (1) cannot be considered as completely accurate.


M. J. SISUL

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HEADQUARTERS
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Fleet Marine Force
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

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SECURITY INFORMATION

POST ARMISTICE ACTIVITIES REPORT

"A" Company

1. On 27 July 1953, "A" Company CP was located on WOLMI-DO (BS 974491), INCHON Harbor. This company in no way participated in the activities of manning the main battle positions.

2. Its' mission during the post armistice period was to train in amphibian tractor tactics and to maintain a state of readiness through out the post armistice period.

"B" Company

1. From 27 July 1953 to 22 September 1953, "B" Company CP was located at BS 973852 in the KUMCHON Area. The company was assigned the task of defending an area of approximately 6000 yards in length, from BS 955821 to BS 968873. From 28 July 1953 to 22 September 1953, the company commenced construction on the NO PASS FENCE LINE located approximately 500 yards forward of and along the entire company front. Difficulty was encountered due to the heavy mud and shifting tides. During the period additional bunkers were constructed while previously constructed bunkers were kept in a state of constant repair. Original trenches were maintained and additional trenches were dug, however much difficulty was encountered due to rock masses which required blasting to complete the project. Insufficient bunker material hampered the efforts of crews constructing these projects. On 22 September 1953, the company CP was displaced from (BS 973852) when the 5th Company of the 2nd KMC Regiment relieved the company and assumed control of the company area. Baker Company minus the third and fourth platoons moved to SPOONBILL (CS 087971) where the company CP is located at the present time. The third platoon was located at FREEDOM BRIDGE (CS 008956), while the fourth platoon was located at LIBBY BRIDGE (CS 097011). From 22 September 1953 to 31 October 1953 the company engaged in the construction of a new CP. Protective wire was erected surrounding the SPOONBILL and LIBBY BRIDGE camp sites, while revetments were constructed for the LVTs in these areas. Construction of ammunition and communication bunkers were initiated at the company CP, fuel slots were also constructed. A new landing site was in the planning stage for the south bank of the IMJIN RIVER, opposite the company CP. Difficulty was encountered in the selection of suitable sites for the LVT revetments and fuel slots due to the land formation in the area. However the task was completed prior to 31 October 1953, at which time "B" Company continued in its' mission of being in direct support of the northern regiment.

Enclosure (1)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

"C" Company

1. From 27 July 1953 the "C" Company CP was located at HANSAN-NI (CS 013885) with three (3) platoons deployed along the IMJIN RIVER from (CS 037901) to (BS 955885) and one platoon at the company CP. At 2200 on 27 July 1953 the cease fire order was issued and preparation were begun to carry out the administrative and tactical provisions of the armistice agreement. The company continued to man five (5) listening posts and conducted three (3) rear area patrols. On 30 July 1953 the construction of a two-strand wire fence was begun to mark the NO PASS LINE. This project presented many difficult problems due to the location and the terrain. It was necessary to carry wire, stakes and signs manually for distances as great as 2500 yards over swamp and rice paddies. The difficulties of such a task cannot be minimized. Also on 30 July 1953, 842 personnel of the 1st KMC Regiment were carried across the IMJIN RIVER by LVTs to their newly assigned location on our right flank. Plans were made to develop the company area on a perimeter type defense. On 8 August 1953 elements of the 1st KMC Regiment assumed responsibility of this company's right platoon area and part of the center platoon area while this company assumed responsibility for half of "B" Company's right platoon area. On 14 August 1953 the company CP at HANSAN-NI (CS 013885) was closed at 1200 and reopened at KUMSAN-NI (BS 982964) at the same time. New rear area defense positions were designated and the reserve platoon commenced development of these new positions. Work was slow and difficult due to the rocky formation of the ground and the extreme hot weather. Positions along the IMJIN RIVER were further developed to assure mutual support of automatic fire within the perimeter. Patrols, listening posts and ambushes were continued to assure security of the area and prevent unauthorized persons from entering the area. Concurrent with the tactical work, administrative details were performed to assure observance of the armistice agreement. At 1415 on 22 September 1953 responsibility for the company sector was passed to the 3rd Company 2nd KMC Regiment and the company CP at KUMSAN-NI (BS 982964) was closed and reopened at ASCOM CITY. During the period 22 September 1953 to 17 October 1953 this unit constructed a new company area at ASCOM CITY and held training in general military subjects. From 18 October 1953 to 31 October 1953 training in LVT driving, maintenance and operation was conducted at WOLMI-DO, INCHON in preparation for the forthcoming landing exercises.

H&S Company

1. On 27 July 1953 to 22 September 1953, H&S Company was located at the Battalion CP vicinity (CS 033824). Its' mission in the post armistice period was to support the battalion administratively and logistically and in those capacities deemed feasible by the commanding officer. On 22 September 1953, H&S Company along with the battalion CP was displaced to ASCOM CITY in preparation for the forthcoming landing exercises..

Enclosure (1)

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
HEADQUARTERS
1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINF), FMF
c/o MILITARY POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

3/jnf
A-9
Ser: 0028
19 April 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF (Attn: G-3)
Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U.S. Corps
Ref: (a) CG ltr ser: 002541 dtd 5 Nov 1953
Encl: (1) 1st Engr Bn Operations, Comprehensive report of

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a) Enclosure (1) is herewith submitted.



H. G. BIRMINGHAM
Acting

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Comprehensive report of 1st Engr Bn's
Operations period 27 July to 31 Oct 1953

Prior to the signing of the armistice, the 1st Engineer Battalion was engaged in supporting the 1st Marine Division and its supporting elements in combat operations. Three letter companies from the Engineer Battalion were in direct support of the three Infantry Regiments with one letter company and the Engineer Battalion Headquarters in general support of the Division. At that time the Battalion was engaged primarily in maintaining the road net, constructing fortifications, mine laying and clearing operations, and other normal engineer support missions. Before the armistice, the Engineer Battalion was approximately at TO strength in personnel, with a KSC Battalion of approximately 1300 men attached.

With the advent of the truce, the work load for the engineers increased considerably. In addition, the increase in work load was accompanied by a decrease in personnel. The Engineer Battalion lost almost one third of its personnel through rotation, and the KSC Battalion was detached. The scope of Engineer operations changed from one of support of a division in combat to one of support under conditions of an uneasy truce.

Many important and difficult assignments were given the 1st Engineer Battalion. Under certain terms of the truce agreement, it was necessary to survey and mark the Military Demarkation Line and Southern boundary of the DMZ. The Engineer Battalion was assigned the task of surveying and marking certain sections of the line under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission.

Since the tactical situation dictated that certain elements of the 1st Marine Division be withdrawn south of the Imjin River, it was necessary to construct a new defensive line and new campsites for almost every unit of the Division. An integral part of the withdrawal was the destruction of fortifications in the old MLR and the salvaging of bunker material. The Engineers participated in these salvage operations to a great extent.

Another addition to the relocation of the Division, which made the engineers mission even more difficult, was the necessity of moving the letter companies of the Engineer Battalion to new locations.

Certain terms of the Armistice agreement called for the exchange of prisoners between the two sides. The Engineer Battalion participated by constructing facilities for the U.N. Personnel and Medical Processing Center, commonly known as Freedom Village, for the processing of repatriated United Nations prisoners of war.

At the time the truce was signed, the 1st Engineer Battalion was given the mission of surveying and marking the Military Demarkation Line. One platoon of engineers, a survey team, a four man mine team, and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team surveyed the line under the direct supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. The survey party established points along the Demarkation Line and the mine team cleared lanes between the points

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determined by the surveyors. The survey party would then move through the cleared lane to the pre-determined points, and the process would be repeated. All duds which were discovered, and all mines disarmed and removed by the mine team, were destroyed by the EOD personnel.

As the demarkation line was cleared and surveyed, the line and positions for Demarkation Line signs were marked on 1:50,000 and 1:25,000 maps. The remainder of the platoon followed the survey party and erected signs at intervals of not more than 500 meters, and more frequently where required for intervisibility. Each sign had to be visible from adjacent signs.

The U.N. and Chinese were responsible for surveying alternate sectors of the Demarkation Line across the Eighth Army front. After the sector assigned the Engineer Battalion had been marked, the line, as marked on the maps, was submitted to the Military Armistice Commission. Certain members of the Engineer Battalion team assisted in checking the sector in front of the British Commonwealth Division which had been marked by the Chinese, and members of the Chinese survey teams checked the line marked by the 1st Engineer Battalion surveyors. Each side felt that some signs had been incorrectly placed by the other side. These differences were submitted to the Military Armistice Commission who negotiated with both sides as to the correct position of the Demarkation Line. Some signs placed by each side were moved to new locations as specified by the Military Armistice Commission. More than 260 signs with "Military Demarkation Line" painted on them in three languages, were placed on the 18 mile sector of line by personnel of the Engineer Battalion. A majority of the signs had to be hand carried to their positions because of the positions being inaccessible to vehicles.

A continuous double strand barbed wire fence, with appropriate marking signs, was erected along the southern boundary of the DMZ by infantry units. Supervisory and mine clearance personnel were furnished by "C" Company of the Engineer Battalion to assist in the erection of this boundary fence. Sentry booths and barriers were also erected by engineer personnel at points of entry, where roads and trails cross the boundary into the DMZ.

A six man mine team was furnished by the engineers to assist a crew running an 8th Army telephone cable into Panmunjom. Many mine fields were crossed and partially cleared with no casualties being suffered.

Terms of the truce directed that all fortifications within the DMZ be destroyed and that all salvage operations were to be concluded within a specified time limit. For this reason, destruction of fortifications, and salvage of usable materials was begun immediately after the truce. Salvage operations were designed to produce the maximum material in the allotted time. Infantry units were responsible for this destruction and salvage within assigned sectors, with engineer assistance and supervision. Engineer equipment was used extensively to destroy trenches and emplacements, and in connection with the salvage operations. Mine teams were utilized to check paths so that salvaged material could be removed by the most expeditious means and most direct

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route possible. Salvaged materials were hauled to salvage dumps located in the rear. These soon contained an enormous amount of bunker timbers which had been salvaged from bunkers from along the MLR. It was decided to utilize the salvaged materials to the maximum extent in the construction of bunkers for the new Main Battle Positions. The bunkers recovered were, in a large part, not standard Marine Corps bunkers, and many timbers from them were of odd sizes or damaged or deteriorated to the extent that they were not usable again as they were.

In order to make them usable it was necessary to cut many timbers into appropriate sizes, so a portable sawmill was set up at one of the salvage dumps. Since a good proportion of the timbers contained drift pins, spikes, or shrapnel, it was necessary to use a mine detector to check for embedded metal before sawing. This precaution was taken to protect the saw blade, and to prevent injury to personnel from flying saw teeth and metal.

The engineers were called upon to produce as many bunkers as possible from these enormous piles of material, so a systematic search for standard bunker components was begun. After the maximum number of standard bunkers had been salvaged, a new bunker was designed to use the remaining material with a minimum of cutting.

Within the 5th Marine area the burden of the salvage operations was carried at the smaller unit level. Since it was necessary to commence fortification construction concurrent with the salvage operations, each subordinate unit of the 5th Marines cleared out its old fortifications, moved the material to its new location, and began installation. Except for a central Battalion dump, all dumps were located on a company level, or lower. Engineer advise, supervisory and equipment were furnished each Battalion by its supporting engineer platoon. Timbers were stacked in new areas, complete bunkers were segregated, and the remaining timbers were sawed to size to produce additional smaller bunkers.

One of the more perplexing problems of salvage was to dismantle the 12x20 bunkers in which all the caps were secured to the columns with 24 inch drift pins. The battalions wanted these bunkers dismantled by the most expeditious means possible, so three methods were attempted and the most successful was the least technical. These three methods were tried.

1. Jacking the timbers apart proved unsatisfactory and time consuming.
2. Prying the timbers apart with crow bars and pinch-bars was successful to a limited degree.
3. Winching the bunkers out of their positions and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the most successful and the quickest method.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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In the 1st Marines area, one of the main tasks involved the cutting of a pioneer road to Hill 119 to facilitate the destruction and salvage operations. Bulldozers were employed extensively for closing trench lines and in salvaging bunkers. One method employed was to site the dozer on the uphill side of the bunker and "snake" the bunker up and out of its hole with a cable.

Considerable difficulty was encountered on Hill 119 due to the large number of duds in the areas. EOD teams were employed to clear the area facilitating the safe movement of men and equipment.

During these salvage operations, over 500 bunkers were reclaimed and installed from salvaged materials. Over 3600 feet of usable culvert and some tactical bridging material were salvaged from the IMZ by the Engineer Battalion.

As a result of the change in tactical disposition of element of the Division because of the pull back from the DMZ, the 5th Marines became the only regiment remaining North of the Imjin River. In order to provide general outposts across the entire front, it was necessary to relocate practically all elements of the 5th Marines so as to cover all the area bounded by the DMZ, the Imjin River and the Sami-Chon river. A few of the Command Posts of units of the 5th Marines remained in their former areas, or moved to prepared areas formerly occupied by other units. However all of the subordinate companies, and the 2/5 Command Post moved into virgin areas, or into only partially developed bivouac areas. In every case the tactical situation took precedence over the desirability of the area. The most serious problems encountered in establishing new living areas was the need for the rapid shifting of bulldozers from one area to another. This problem was eliminated by assigning a dozer to each Battalion sector, and setting up the work on a priority basis. A dozer was moved centrally to each of the three sectors, and as one job was completed in a sector, the dozer was "walked" to the next job according to priority. By this method, a maximum out put was obtained with a minimum loss of efficiency and economy.

The 1st Marines had been deployed on the MCR, but after the truce, under the new defensive alignment, they were required to withdraw from the DMZ within 120 hours, so new campsites in the rear had to be selected as hastily as possible. Since the new areas were in civilian populated areas south of the no-pass line, it was necessary to secure real estate clearance before they could be occupied or improved for camps. Clearance was obtained on 29 July, and the engineers immediately began work on a 24 hour basis, using all available engineer equipment and dump trucks, on five separate campsites for elements of the regiment. Roads across rice paddies or soft cultivated fields had to be constructed for access to rock for the areas, which were completely undeveloped.

In the work on these camps the engineers had to work under the most trying circumstances. On the first evening, near midnight, convoys of troops and supplies began to arrive at the campsites. At about the same time it began to rain very hard. The rain and vehicles caused the areas to become virtual

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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quagmires. Many vehicles became bogged down, and had to be pulled out by tractors. The work of the engineers was greatly hampered by weather conditions and the presence of the vehicles and personnel in the area, and the job took considerably longer to accomplish than it would have under normal conditions.

Construction work at Freedom Village was also carried on at this time. This work consisted of grading operations, wiring and installation of lights, construction of partitions in the main reception building, and construction of tent kits and heads for the camp. The urgency of completing this job again necessitated a 24 hour work schedule in order to have the base ready for the scheduled exchange of prisoners.

Relocation of the 7th Motor Transport Battalion Command Post was started by the Engineer Battalion on 9 August 1953. Heavy equipment was used to level areas and to build new roads within the campsite. An unusual problem encountered on this project were the numerous graves located in the area of the proposed site. The Korean people objected to the destruction of their ancestral graves, but after a meeting with them, it was decided that the Koreans would remove the remains and rebury them at a new location. After this incident, work continued without difficulty.

On 12 August 1953, camp construction and development at the new 7th Marines Command Post began. One quonset hut and five tropical shells were moved and re-erected for messing facilities and chapel. The disassembly and moving of these structures resulted in several parts being mutilated or lost. Most of the damaged parts were repaired and used. Missing parts were requisitioned through supply channels, and in cases where parts were unobtainable, they were manufactured by the Engineer Battalion and installed. Several culverts were installed throughout the CP and utility buildings were constructed and erected as required.

Camp construction for "B" Medical Company was started on 13 August 1953. Equipment was employed to cut tent shelves, level areas, and build roads. On occasions, solid rock had to be blasted to permit the heavy equipment to continue operations. After the tent shelves were cut, several underground springs appeared, causing the area to become wet. This necessitated the placing of additional culvert and ditches to carry off the spring water. Three tropical shells and two "Jamway" huts were disassembled, moved to the new location, and re-erected.

On 17 August 1953, construction work began on the 1st Marine Division Command Post project. The first work involved was the widening of 350 yards of access road across a rice paddy. In order to get good fill material, a rock pit was opened, and this material was laid across the paddy with good results.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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A 35 foot timber bridge was also constructed in order to gain access to the CP area, along with approximately 3 miles of interior roads. Tent shelves were cut, and large amounts of fill were placed where necessary. Some difficulty was encountered in building roads and tent shelves due to limited area, steep hills and rock outcroppings.

Construction started on a new campsite for "E" Medical Company. One squad with heavy equipment was assigned to prepare the site. During the first two weeks, over 350 loads of fill were hauled, in addition to the cover work accomplished. Tropical shells and quonset huts were erected, concrete decks were poured, connecting passageways constructed, and areas levelled. An interesting problem encountered was the disassembly and reerection of a 20x40 aid bunker. The bunker was not of a standard Marine Corps type and the odd length members would have made it difficult for the crew to reassemble it due to the unfamiliar sizes. Measurements were taken in and around the bunker and a complete set of working drawings were made of the bunker. This enabled the personnel moving the bunker to disassemble and reerect it with a minimum of difficulty.

The Battalion was assigned the project of moving the Division Dental Clinic, and work started on 24 August. This consisted of dismantling and re-constructing two tropical shells and building five tent decks with strongbacking. Work on the campsite was completed and the entire unit moved by 12 September 1953.

On 10 October 1953, the Battalion began breaking ground for the new "A" Medical Company Command Post. An estimated 5000 cubic yards of earth was excavated and either spoiled or moved by truck. A mound of decomposed granite formed a blind curve at the entrance to the CP. This mound was cut away, and the DG hauled about 200 yards and dumped in a low spot by a stream bed. This eliminated the blind curve and created an area for a laundry and shower unit. A one week deadline was set for the erection of 243 feet of tropical shell building. Due to heavy rains during the initial days of construction a large vein of comparatively soft clay was discovered within the building area. A concrete deck was poured for 207 feet of the building, 40 feet of which rested on the vein of clay. To counteract this soft base, gravel was placed over the clay with a four inch layer of sand covering it. Barbed wire packets were then laid on this base and four inch concrete poured over it. To date, no cracks have developed in this section. The campsite was 40% complete as of 31 October 1953.

Construction of a new Service Battalion Command Post was begun on 6 October 1953. By 31 October, 20 culverts had been installed, 735 bags of cement poured and 1200 loads of fill hauled into the area. Seven tropical shells had been constructed, 4 quonset huts erected, and roads, tent shelves, living areas, and fuel revetments cut. The major problems in connection with the construction of this camp were caused by much of the area being in low areas requiring considerable rock fill, and the poor condition of component parts of pre-fabricated buildings after they were disassembled and reassembled.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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The construction of new Main Battle Positions was one of the more important missions assigned the 1st Engineer Battalion. The main effort extended by the engineers consisted of cutting bunker timbers, supervision of the installation of bunkers, cutting and blasting trench lines and cutting pioneer roads to positions.

The Engineer Battalion assisted the 1st Amtrack Battalion in the construction of bunkers and trenches by blasting rock and obstacles. Slots were cut for tractors, and roads and emplacements were constructed with no difficulty.

The construction of new battle positions for the 7th Marines has been a continuous operation. Personnel were furnished by the Engineer Battalion to all units to supervise and inspect the construction of bunkers. On many positions solid rock formations required the use of explosives and demolition teams were furnished to blast the rock to prepare holes for the installation of bunkers. A shortage of the proper type of explosives often resulted in substitutions, occasionally supplementary artillery charges were used in this operation. Construction of positions in the sector occupied by the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was hampered due to the inability of the 1st Battalion to get supplies to their locations on Hill 495. Helicopters were used to transport materials when weather permitted. This problem was eventually rectified by constructing a road up hill 495 and installing an aerial tramway to the top of the hill. Personnel were also furnished to blast out trench lines and field fortification emplacements when ground conditions made it impossible to dig.

The 5th Marine Regiment was supported and assisted by the Engineer Battalion in the construction of their Main Battle Positions. Units had been notified that all the salvaged materials were to be used before requesting new materials, and the line was in before all the salvaged timber had been used. Approximately 400 bunkers of all type were cut from these materials by the Battalion. Slight difficulty was encountered by the 5th Marines when each piece of salvaged bunker material did not conform to the bunker blue print. This was corrected by designing a bunker at the site with material at hand, using the approved fundamentals of bunker construction. Trench lines were blasted by demolition crews furnished by the engineers and mine clearance was also necessary for some new positions. Dozers were utilized for digging tank slots and "Quad 50" positions in all Battalion sectors.

Construction of bunkers at the blocking positions (positions to the rear of and between gaps in the main defensive line) has been supervised by personnel from the Engineer Battalion and this work has been continuous.

The construction of Main Battle Positions necessitated the cutting of new bunker timbers to augment the amount of bunker material salvaged from the MLR. Timbers for a total of 401 bunkers were cut by the Engineer Battalion sawmill. The urgency required to complete the Main Battle Positions in the least possible time made a 24 hour a day work schedule necessary. Bunker material was always available for the Infantry Regiments as needed.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

The 1st Engineer Battalion is responsible for the improvement and maintenance of 217.4 miles of Main Supply Routes and connecting laterals, in addition it is also responsible for constructing and giving limited Maintenance to tactical roads and the interior roads at the various Command Posts. During the period 27 July to 31 October, road maintenance was a continuous operation in the assigned sector of road responsibility. Road maintenance consisted in the greater part, of grading, ditching, filling washouts, resurfacing roads with rock and decomposed granite, and the installation of culverts. Along with the regular road maintenance, the Engineer Battalion was concerned with building tactical roads to the Main Battle Positions. A total of approximately 31 miles of tactical roads were built during the period with ditches and culverts placed where necessary. In some instances, it was necessary to blast right of ways through solid rock formations and to pipe off water from uncovered underground springs.

Another major project during the July through October period was the winterization program for the Division. The greater portion of the Engineer participation consisted of cutting and constructing tent decks, strongbacking and sand boxes for tent stoves. A total of 2285 tent decks and 2285 winterized squad tent strongbacking were built, and 5204 sand boxes for tent stoves were constructed from one inch material cut off the ends of over length tent decking. Supervisory personnel were furnished by the Engineer Battalion for the erection and installation of the tent decks and strongbacking, and for the concrete decks poured in mess halls and galleys of the various units. Supervisory personnel and erection crews were also furnished for the erection of quonset huts and tropical shells. In many cases it was necessary to fill or level areas for erection sites for these buildings.

During the period, engineers were concerned with projects other than the ones described above. One of these was the construction of a standard two lane, two span, eighty foot, fifty ton bridge on route 1X (CS-126000) which was completed on 11 August 1953. During this operation, equipment was employed to drive piling, for general excavation and handling of heavy timbers, and for the installation of floor beams. While driving the piling for the abutments, the piling struck rock at approximately three feet causing them to slide toward the center of the stream bed. This was corrected by securing a chain around the piling and to the pile driver lead, thus holding the pile in a sturdy vertical position during the driving operation. Pilings that were out of position after being driven were winched into position and tied off to dead men. This was the only difficulty encountered during the bridging operation.

The construction of a 1700 foot aerial tramway from the military crest of Hill 495 to the summit of Hill 449, extending the supply line to the unit occupying Hill 449, started on 15 October 1953. Many problems were encountered on this operation. Equipment was used to excavate a base location, and due to the solid rock formations encountered, explosives were used to blast prior to donor operations. Explosives were also used to blast for the installations at the upper location. The main problem encountered was getting 1700 feet of main track cable weighing approximately 3000 pounds from the base location to the upper location. It was impractical to use helicopters and impossible to get heavy equipment to the top location, making it necessary to use manpower to lay the

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the main track cable which was pulled up the hill by hand, the extreme steepness of the hill made it impossible to continue laying the cable in this manner. A running block and tackle, having a mechanical advantage of three to one, with approximately 800 feet of one inch Manila rope, was anchored at the upper location, and extended down the hill to the track cable. The cable was pulled up the hill to the upper location and anchored. Then the haul and carry back cables were laid. The main track cable was anchored to the winch of a TD 24 dozer at the lower site and pulled tight. The heavy timbers for the upper tower were hauled up with the block and tackle over the main track cable and the upper tower was erected as the lower anchorage was put in. The tack line was then anchored off with the proper amount of tension and the tramway was ready for operation.

Other duties for the Engineer Battalion included mine clearance, sawmill operation, carpenter work, utility and water supply service, heavy equipment maintenance, and motor transport support.

Mine clearance was and is, a continuous operation in the Division area. Mine clearance work began on 16 September to clear counterattack lanes through several minefields. The areas to be cleared of mines were densely covered with grass and high weeds, bushes, and other types of vegetation. Several drums of napalm were in the lanes to be cleared. The barbed wire fence was breached and a passage made through the vegetation with bengal motorpedoes. Demolitions were used to blast the drums of napalm and after the mines were cleared, a dozer was employed to clear the shrubbery and remaining vegetation. In some areas it was possible to set fire to the vegetation in an area to be cleared by using flame throwers. This was a safer and faster way to clear the vegetation due to the fact that no personnel had to go into the minefield before the vegetation was cleared. Minefield marking fences have been erected and marking signs placed throughout all lanes that have been cleared.

In addition to constructing tent decks and sand boxes, the Engineer Battalion has cut timber for bridges, dry net training mock ups and other large structures and has painted numerous signs and helmet liners. Constructing fueling, sentry booths, pot shacks, and heads have been the major items of work for the construction section along with numerous other miscellaneous projects.

Light and day work by the Utilities Platoon enabled them to keep the lights on in the Division area. A shortage of trained personnel made the task more difficult and worn out equipment kept crews on the road at all hours. The station installed approximately 75,000 feet of wire and repaired and operated approximately 13 generators in the Division. The work load had not decreased as of this date.

Supplying water for units in the Division area is another mission of the Engineer Battalion. During the three month period, 10 water points were kept in operation and water was available for 24 hours a day. Over 14,510,420 gallons of potable water was produced and issued from 27 July to 31 October and 874 gallons of distilled water was produced for use in batteries. Motor Transport support for the Battalion is a major job for the Motor Transport Platoon of Service Company. Aside from furnishing transportation, repair and

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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maintenance is also part of their mission. From 27 July through 31 October, the Motor Transport Platoon completed 150-1000 mile checks, 65-6000 mile checks, greased 533 vehicles, repaired 547 vehicles, and changed 1790 tires.

The enormous responsibility of keeping up the flow of supplies necessary for the Battalion to carry out its assigned missions rests with the supply section of Service Company. During the period 27 July through 31 October, the supply section received 7,136 tons of material and shipped 8,942 tons of material.

The Maintenance Platoon maintains and repairs all of the heavy equipment in the 1st Division. In addition to all of the heavy equipment belonging to the Engineer Battalion, tractors and equipment from the Artillery Regiment, the LVT Tractor Battalion, Service Battalion and other units of the Division was maintained and repaired. During the period, the Maintenance Platoon received 43 pieces of deadlined equipment and repaired 38 pieces of equipment. A shortage of critical spare parts made their operations very difficult although the supply of spare parts improved somewhat toward the end of October.

The 1st Engineer Battalion completed its assigned tasks after the truce with skill and dispatch. The work load assigned was one more suited to a Force Engineer Battalion because of their greater capacity. The 1st Engineers were understrength, and after a long period of giving maximum support to the Division in combat, its equipment was practically worn out. The tactical situation after the truce demanded the greatest amount of construction in the least possible time, and this difficulty was added to by continuous requests for "stateside" type campsites and buildings. Almost all projects were on a high priority basis and called for around the clock schedules. However despite every obstacle, the 1st Engineer Battalion was able to complete its assigned mission according to schedule, and with high standards.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

Headquarters
1st Medical Battalion
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

GD/bec
A9-4
Ser: 00-5-PE-54
9 January 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(Attn: Division Historical Officer)

Subj: Activities of 1st Medical Battalion, 27Jul53 to 31Oct53,
report of

Ref: (a) CG 1st Marine Division ser 002541 dtd 5Nov53

Encl: (1) Twenty five (25) copies of subject report

1. In compliance with instructions contained in reference (a)
enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.


GEORGE DONABEDIAN *gk.*

SECRET

Headquarters
1st Medical Battalion
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

GD/hec
A9-4
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Headquarters
1st Medical Battalion
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

GD/bec
A9-4
Ser: 00-5-PE-54
9 January 1954

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
(Attn: Division Historical Officer)

Subj: Activities of 1st Medical Battalion, 27Jul53 to 31Oct53,
report of

Ref: (a) CG 1st Marine Division ser 002541 dtd 5Nov53

Encl: (1) Twenty five (25) copies of subject report

1. In compliance with instructions contained in reference (a)
enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

GEORGE DONABEDIAN

SECRET

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF ~~THE~~ COMPANY
FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY 1953 TO 31 OCTOBER 1953.

SECRET

At the time of the Armistice Agreement, Companies "A", "B" and "E" of this Battalion were busily engaged in treating casualties resulting from the engagement of the days just prior to 27 July. ("C" Company was in an inactive status and "D" Company was on Kimp'o peninsula supporting the Kimp'o Provisional Regiment) These patients were evacuated rapidly to the hospital ships. Soon it was learned that both hospital ships had to be cleared of patients, so many of the slightly wounded marines were returned to the companies for eventual return to duty.

On 5 August, return of United Nations prisoners of war commenced. Personnel of this battalion participated in this activity known as "Operation Big Switch." Some of our personnel working with Army personnel were stationed at Panmunjom to supervise the actual exchange of prisoners. At "Freedom Village", located at Munsan-ni, officers and men of the 1st Medical Battalion greeted all returnees and did a rapid Medical evaluation to determine if the man was physically fit to continue the routine processing. This operation continued until 6 September.

Command of the battalion passed from Commander W. W. Ayres, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy to Commander George Donabedian, Medical Corps, U. S. Navy on 14 August in an impressive ceremony.

In accordance with terms of the Armistice Agreement, it was necessary for all forward elements of this battalion, including Headquarters and Service Company, to displace rearward. One company at a time was moved leaving the other two companies to handle routine Medical problems as well as being ready to cope with any unexpected influx of casualties. Since each company moved into an entirely new area, there was much engineering and construction work involved. It was necessary to remove everything from the old sites, including air-raid bunkers, and set up at the new sites with many permanent type buildings. So, at the terminal date of this report, all companies are prepared to care for the sick and wounded but much work remains to improve the camp sites.

/s/ D. J. Williams
D. J. WILLIAMS
LCDR MC USN

SECRET

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF "A" COMPANY
FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY 1953 TO 31 OCTOBER 1953.

SECRET

With the beginning of the post war period on July 27, 1953, "A" Medical Co. continued the treatment and evacuation of casualties which occurred during the heavy fighting of the last days of the war. Necessary medical re-supplying was accomplished.

Operation Big Switch began 5 August. Personnel of this company served both at Panmunjom with the forward echelon of the repatriation terms and at Freedom Village in nearby Munsan-ni assisting in the preliminary medical examination of returning prisoners.

On 1 September Lt. H. G. LOVE, MC USNR, departed and was replaced by Lt. S. R. COURTER, MC USNR as Company Commander.

With the completion of Operation Big Switch on 6 September, planning began for the displacement of this company to a new area. Following the rice harvest, work at the new area actually started 11 October, when the first bulldozing began. The hospital was closed on 11 October with all patients transferred to "B" Company and "E" Company. All buildings at the old area were dismantled and subsequently erected in the new area. All personnel were engaged in construction for the remainder of October, with no medical care dispensed during this period.

The first patient was received at the new hospital on 31 October marking the actual re-opening of this hospital at its new location.

/s/ S. R. Courter
S. R. COURTER
LT. MC USNR

SECRET

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF "B" COMPANY
FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY 1953 TO 31 OCTOBER 1953

SECRET

Following the signing of the truce the remaining battle casualties at "B" Medical Company were evacuated to "A" Medical Company the hospital ship or discharged to duty. The medical company was occupied with routine sick call in support of the 7th Marine regiment and participated in the repatriation of U. N. prisoners of war at "Freedom Village".

Lieutenant George O. Halsted relieved Lieutenant Arthur L. Gore on 15 September 1953, as company commander.

On 5 September 1953, "B" Medical Company moved from the old site on route IX to the present site on route 23. For two months following this move the staff of "B" Medical Company was occupied with construction of our camp site and routine sick call in support of the 7th Marine regiment, portions of the 5th Marine regiment, the 155th Field Artillery Battalion and the 1st Korean Marine Corps regiment. In addition a hospital section for Korean civilians from the surrounding country side was set up.

/s/ G. O. HALSTED
G. O. HALSTED
LT MC USNR

SECRET

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF "D" COMPANY
FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY 1953 TO 31 OCTOBER 1953.

SECRET

When the truce came in July, little effect was noted at "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion. For some time prior to the truce, the company was devoting a large percentage of its time to Korean civilians. After the truce, even greater numbers of civilians were treated. In the out-patient department, the daily sick call approached some seventy patients daily. On the Korean ward the in-patients averaged thirty. The treatment received by these patients included general medicine, general surgery, particularly abdominal and gynecological procedures, pediatrics, dental and obstetrical.

Patients from as far as Fusan came for treatment, including a large number of discharged South Korean veterans.

A tuberculosis survey, including tuberculosis skin testing and chest x-rays, was completed. In all, over 450 children were examined.

During this time the company has remained ever ready to receive casualties, and programs of instruction and training have been carried out.

The following doctors have served in this company during this interval: Drs W.F. STENBORG, A.R. COINCELL, Sam BRUNI, J.J. CHARLES, M.J. MC CARTHY, A.L. CORE and R.E. HAYNES.

/s/R. R. Austin
R. R. AUSTIN
LT MC USNR

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SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF "E" COMPANY
 FIRST MEDICAL BATTALION, FIRST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
 DURING THE PERIOD 27 JULY 1953 TO 31 OCTOBER 1953

SECRET

With the cessation of hostilities all hands engaged in clearing out battle casualties of the last days of fighting, the heaviest for several months. After evacuating the last of the casualties to hospital ships, replenishing supplies, re-sterilizing surgical packs, and readying for future action personnel of "E" Company were assigned duties in operation "Big Switch". Approximately one-third of "E" Company personnel participated in "Big Switch" until its completion. "E" Company, located in close proximity to both "Freedom Village" and the Mung-an-ni Provisional Command provided sick call and hospitalization to personnel of both units.

On completion of "Big Switch", as part of a general plan of moving to new positions as required by the truce agreement, a site was chosen for "E" Company in support of the 5th Marine Regiment. Work to prepare the new site was begun August 20. On September 1 an advance detachment of 20 men was sent to the new site, tents were set up and as transportation was available materials were moved to the new site. On September 9 all remaining patients were evacuated to "A" Company and on September 11 "E" Company officially moved to its new location. By this time all living tents and some of the hospital buildings were set up. Midway during construction of the hospital buildings a windfall in the form of 4 new Quonset huts was received. All previous plans for a hospital layout had to be scrapped and new plans made with the Quonsets as the basic buildings for the hospital. All efforts were directed towards completing the Quonsets and this work had progressed sufficiently by September 14 for "E" Company to re-open and receive patients, although all work was not completed until about two weeks later.

All lumber, decking, electrical poles, wire and fittings, were salvaged from the old location, no new supplies other than those furnished with the Quonset kits being available. By 30 September the new camp was well established, and fully operational.

Early in October, in preparation for the re-location of "A" Hospital Company, patients and special departments of "A" Company were moved to "E" Company. Facilities were arranged for the Eye Clinic, the Ear, Nose and Throat Clinic, the Dermatology Clinic, and the Psychiatric Clinic to operate at "E" Company until "A" Company could be re-established. These departments have operated smoothly and efficiently and are at "E" Company as of 31 October.


"E" Company is now in normal operative status in support of the 5th Marine Regiment. Because of proximity to several U. S. Army units in the new location, many U. S. Army personnel use the sick call and hospitalization facilities.

/s/ G. G. GRAHAM
 G. G. GRAHAM
 LT MC USNR

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ask that it be routed to
Maj. Jefferson.

G-3

ORIG. + 2 Rec'd

Headquarters
1st Ordnance Battalion
1st Marine Division, FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

JGF/mmj
A9
Ser: 0021-54
16 Feb 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
(Attn: G-3)

Subj: Mission (period 27 July, 1953 to 31 October, 1953),
report of

Ref: (a) CG 1stMarDiv ltr ser 002541 of 5 Nov 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a), which requests a summary of work accomplished by this organization during the period 27 July, 1953 to 31 October, 1953, the following report is submitted.

2. Ammunition Transactions:

| | Receipts | | Issues | |
|-----------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | Arty Ammo Tons | Inf Ammo Tons | Arty Ammo Tons | Inf Ammo Tons |
| August | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| September | 75.9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| October | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

b. Returned to ASP #63 as grade three for renovation:

| | Arty Ammo | Inf Ammo | Totals |
|-----------|-------------|---------------|----------------------|
| August | 142 | 9934 | 10076 rounds |
| September | 920 | 23696 | 24616 rounds |
| October | <u>1267</u> | <u>494812</u> | <u>496079</u> rounds |
| Total | 2329 | 528442 | 530771 rounds |

c. The forward ASP was moved from CS 0679 to CS 1290. One and one half basic loads of ammunition for artillery, mortars and rockets are stored and maintained at this ASP.

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JGF/immj
 A9
 Ser: 0021-54
 16 Feb 1954

3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Transactions:

a. All items of explosive ordnance were destroyed at Division Ordnance Disposal area:

| | |
|-----------|---------------------|
| August | 15,443 Items |
| September | 15,030 Items |
| October | <u>12,217 Items</u> |
| Total | 42,690 Items |

4. Maintenance Transactions:

a. Small Arms Repairs:

| | |
|-----------|-------------|
| August | 2827 |
| September | 3931 |
| October | <u>2893</u> |
| Total | 9651 |

b. Instrument Repairs:

| | |
|-----------|------------|
| August | 533 |
| September | 330 |
| October | <u>861</u> |
| Total | 1724 |

c. Artillery Repairs:

| | |
|-----------|-----------|
| August | 20 |
| September | 22 |
| October | <u>16</u> |
| Total | 58 |

d. Tank Repairs:

| | |
|-----------|----------|
| August | 13 |
| September | 3 |
| October | <u>8</u> |
| Total | 24 |

SECRET

JGF/mmj
A9
Ser: 0021-54
16 Feb 1954

5. Supply Transactions:

| | Receipts | Issues |
|-----------|-------------------|---------------------|
| August | \$1,930,526.78 | \$1,409,250.56 |
| September | 939,614.53 | 950,934.60 |
| October | <u>755,263.41</u> | <u>1,118,924.75</u> |
| Total | \$3,625,404.72 | \$3,479,109.91 |

WR Barnes
W. R. BARNES

MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161
FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
CALIFORNIA

ACG:bgw
A9
Ser: 0044

5 FEB 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF (Attn:
G-3)

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps

Ref: (a) Your ltr ser 0025541 of 5Nov53
(b) Your msg 2616401 of Jan54

Encl: (1) Squadron Flight Operations from 1Jul53 through 30Sep53

1. As requested in references (a) and (b), the following information is submitted.
2. With the exception of OPERATIONS BIG SWITCH, THE INDIAN LIFT, and the increase in fortification materials air lifted to battle positions, the missions of the squadron during the subject period were similar to those performed prior to 28 July 1953..
3. The total flight time and total number of flights increased during the subject period, and to provide sufficient aircraft for these commitments it was necessary to conduct the preventive maintenance checks, and other maintenance work during the hours of darkness when aircraft were not fully committed.


H. J. MITCHENER

SECRET

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| | JULY 1953 | AUG 53 | SEPT 53 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|
| Aircraft Combat Time (Hours) | 72.5 | NONE | NONE |
| Aircraft Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 874.4 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Total Aircraft Time (Hours) | 946.9 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Pilots Combat Time (Hours) | 114.3 | NONE | NONE |
| Pilots Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 1528.3 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Total Pilot Time (Hours) | 1672.6 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Number of Combat Flights | 68 | NONE | NONE |
| Number of Non-Combat Flights | 965 | 1,526 | 848 |
| Total Number of Flights | 1,033 | 1,526 | 848 |
| Total Weight of Cargo Lifted (Pounds) | 294,059 | 780,552 | 840,554 |
| Total Number of Personnel Lifted | 2,132 | 2,018 | 2,563 |
| Total Number of Persons Evacuated | 279 | 51 | 45 |

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161
 FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE
 c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
 CALIFORNIA

ACC: bgw

A9

Ser: 0044

5th FEB 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, First Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF (Attn: C-3)

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps

Ref: (a) Your ltr ser 0025541 of 5 Nov 53
 (b) Your msg 2616401 of Jan 54

Encl: (1) Squadron flight operations from 1 Jul 53 through 3 Sep 53

1. As requested in references (a) and (b), the following information is submitted.

2. With the exception of OPERATIONS TIC SWITCH, THE INDIAN LINE, and the increase in fortification materials air lifted to battle positions, the missions of the squadron during the subject period were similar to those performed prior to 28 July 1953.

3. The total flight time and total number of flights increased during the subject period, and to provide sufficient aircraft for these commitments it was necessary to conduct the preventive maintenance checks, and other maintenance work during the hours of darkness when aircraft were not fully committed.

R. J. MITCHNER

SECRET

SECRET

| | JULY 1953 | AUG 53 | SEPT 53 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|
| Aircraft Combat Time (Hours) | 72.5 | NONE | NONE |
| Aircraft Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 874.4 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Total Aircraft Time (Hours) | 946.9 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Pilots Combat Time (Hours) | 144.3 | NONE | NONE |
| Pilots Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 1528.3 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Total Pilot Time (Hours) | 1672.6 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Number of Combat Flights | 68 | NONE | NONE |
| Number of Non-Combat Flights | 965 | 1,526 | 848 |
| Total Number of Flights | 1,033 | 1,526 | 848 |
| Total Weight of Cargo Lifted (Pounds) | 294,059 | 780,552 | 840,554 |
| Total Number of Personnel Lifted | 2,132 | 2,018 | 2,563 |
| Total Number of Persons Evacuated | 279 | 51 | 45 |

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161
FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
CALIFORNIA

ACC: bgw

A9

Ser: 0044

5th FEB 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division, (Reinf) FMF (Attn: c-3)

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps

Ref: (a) your ltr ser 0025541 of 5Nov53
(b) your msg 2616401 of Jan54

Encl: (1) Squadron flight operations from 1Jul53 through 30Sep53

1. As requested in references (a) and (b), the following information is submitted.

2. With the exception of OPERATIONS BIG SWITCH, THE INDIAN LIFT, and the increase in fortification materials air lifted to battle positions, the missions of the squadron during the subject period were similar to those performed prior to 28 July 1953.

3. The total flight time and total number of flights increased during the subject period, and to provide sufficient aircraft for these commitments it was necessary to conduct the preventive maintenance checks, and other maintenance work during the hours of darkness when aircraft were not fully committed.

H. J. MITCHEMER

SECRET

SECRET

| | JULY 1953 | AUG 53 | SEPT 53 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|
| Aircraft Combat Time (Hours) | 72.5 | NONE | NONE |
| Aircraft Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 874.4 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Total Aircraft Time (Hours) | 946.9 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Pilots Combat Time (Hours) | 144.3 | NONE | NONE |
| Pilots Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 1528.3 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Total Pilot Time (Hours) | 1672.6 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Number of Combat Flights | 68 | NONE | NONE |
| Number of Non-Combat Flights | 965 | 1,526 | 818 |
| Total number of flights | 1,033 | 1,526 | 818 |
| Total weight of cargo lifted (pounds) | 294,959 | 780,552 | 810,554 |
| Total number of Personnel lifted | 2,132 | 2,018 | 2,563 |
| Total number of Persons Evacuated | 279 | 51 | 45 |

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

MARINE HELICOPTER TRANSPORT SQUADRON 161
 FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE
 C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
 CALIFORNIA

ACG:bw

A9

Ser: 0044

5 FEB 1954

SECRET

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, First Marine Division, (Reinf) FWP (Attn: C-3)

Subj: Defense of "D" Division Sector, I U. S. Corps

Ref: (a) Your ltr ser 0025541 of 5Nov53
 (b) Your msg 2616401 of Jan54

Encl: (1) Squadron Flight Operations from 1Jul53 through 30Sep53

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3. The total flight time and total number of flights increased during the subject period, and to provide sufficient aircraft for these commitments it was necessary to conduct the preventive maintenance checks, and other maintenance work during the hours of darkness when aircraft were not fully committed.

W. J. MITCHNER

SECRET

SECRET

| | JULY 1953 | AUG 53 | SEPT 53 |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|
| Aircraft Combat Time (Hours) | 72.5 | NONE | NONE |
| Aircraft Non-Combat Time (Hours) | 874.4 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Total Aircraft Time (Hours) | 946.9 | 995.7 | 1,098.5 |
| Pilots Combat Time (Hours) | 144.3 | NONE | NONE |
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| Total Pilot Time (Hours) | 1672.6 | 1,647.4 | 1,852.1 |
| Number of Combat Flights | 68 | NONE | NONE |
| Number of Non-Combat Flights | 965 | 1,526 | 848 |
| Total Number of Flights | 1,033 | 1,526 | 848 |
| Total Weight of Cargo Lifted (Pounds) | 294,059 | 780,552 | 840,554 |
| Total Number of Personnel Lifted | 2,132 | 2,018 | 2,563 |
| Total Number of Persons Evacuated | 279 | 51 | 45 |




Enclosure (1)

SECRET

UNIT HISTORY

27 JULY - 31 OCTOBER '53



RECON
COMPANY
HQ BN 1ST MARDIV FMF

DECLASSIFIED

Reconnaissance Company
Headquarters Battalion
1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

15 February 1954

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf), FMF
Subj: Role of Division Reconnaissance Company in Defense of "D" Division
Sector, I U.S. Corps, history of
Ref: (a) CG ltr ser: 002541 dtd 5 Nov 1953
Encl: (1) Unit history
(2) Overlay: Recon Co. CP 27 July 1953
(3) Overlay: 1st Plt. Position 9 Oct - 31 Oct 1953
(4) Overlay: Freedom Gate Bridge - MUNSAN-NI Rail Line Area

1. In accordance with reference (a) a unit history of Division Reconnaissance Company from 27 July to 31 October 1953, both dates inclusive, is hereby submitted.


WALTER V. WALSH

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

-1-

Upon cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953, the Division Reconnaissance Company was deployed in three separate locations. The first Platoon was stationed with the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, the Second with the First Armored Amtrack Battalion and the Third at the Company Command Post (CS 071936). Three days later, the platoons were reunited at the CP and oriented for the company's new security mission, to guard the rail-road along which the epoch-making prisoner exchange, "Operation Big Switch", was to take place.

While line regiments were engaged in evacuation and salvage work, Recon, "the eyes and ears of the division", was already undertaking a key portion of Division Operations Order 11-53. In the days immediately following the armistice, the Kaesong-Munsan-ni Railroad was one of the most vital communication links in Korea. The attention of the world was focused on this length of track as prisoners were transported north and south along its rails. Danger of sabotage was omni-present, and it was essential that this thoroughfare be kept open.

Given the sector of track from (CS 055906), exclusive of the road junction south of Munsan-ni, to the northern edge of the unloading site (BS 983967), the company also reconnoitered the rail line from the road crossing at (CS 055906 (inclusive) south of Munsan-ni to the I Corps rear boundary (CS 150601) in order to prepare security measures to be effected upon order. Recon was also assigned, in First Marine Division Operations Order 11-53, the mission of providing security for construction materials of the MUNSAN-NI Provisional Command in the vicinity of points (CS 051937) and (BS 993959).

A guard of sixteen walking posts was established along the track to insure continuous security of the rail line. The task was made more difficult by the numerous tunnels and bridges along this portion of the line, the destruction of any one of which could have jeopardized prisoner exchange. The communications system for the guard, employing primarily EE-8 phones and PRC 6 radios, was so constituted that the officer of the day and a reserve force could be on hand at any post in a matter of minutes. To facilitate such relief, a guard hut was maintained at MUNSAN-NI, while the portion of the company not actually on guard could remain at the company base camp a few miles northeast.

Exercising the greatest possible economy of manpower without detracting from its security mission, Recon maintained a training schedule at its base camp. Emphasizing those facets of training which are dictated by its primary organic mission, the training schedule included combat swimming, night patrols, small boat techniques, and fundamental infantry tactics. A KMC Reconnaissance Platoon participated in the training with great vigor, gaining much from its specialized recon orientation.

Encl:(1)

SECRET

-2-

SECURITY INFORMATION

During the railroad security detail described above, the sentries of Reconnaissance Company apprehended a number of unauthorized persons in their sector, turning these potential saboteurs over to the CIC. While Recon stood guard, the prisoner exchange moved over the rails from the DMZ to MUNSAN-NI without a single delaying incident.

Its mission successfully completed, Recon returned to its camp on 28 September, leaving a small detail to guard unexpended UNC-MAC construction materials for three days.

The first of October saw Recon moving from its camp on a three day tank-infantry problem with the Anti-Tank Company of the First Marines. Its destination was Kumchon. At the termination of the operation the men from Recon concluded the problem by hiking the sixteen miles from Kumchon to their base camp.




On 6 October 1953, Recon was called from a routine amphibious training program to lay tactical wire in a tight perimeter along the high ground north and on the plains immediately south of Freedom Gate Bridge (CS 008954). On 9 October, in order to better carry out the mission set forth in First Marine Division Operations Order 13-53, the company moved from its base camp to Freedom Gate Bridge perimeter to provide security for the evacuation of Non-repatriate POW's and the CFI, to defend Freedom Gate Bridge from possible attacks from the south by South Korean irregulars or from the north in the event of a resumption of hostilities, and to maintain a constant vigil against sabotage of the bridge. While two platoons carried out the above mission at Freedom Gate, the first platoon was encamped at Libby Bridge with a similar mission. Thus, Recon was given the task of guarding the only two permanent spans linking the North Regiment across the Imjin with the remainder of the Division to the south.

In the Freedom Gate perimeter, the Reconnaissance Company commander was given a task force with which to carry out his mission. Two platoons of tanks: one from the Anti-Tank Company of the Fifth Marines; the other, the Flame Platoon from the First Tank Battalion, were under his command, as was an Army searchlight and loudspeaker unit. The Libby Bridge element was also buttressed by armor, under the command of the Third Battalion, Fifth Marines.

While a part of the company maintained a constant guard, the remainder was engaged in improving defensive positions, carrying on the limited training and frequent rehearsals to sharpen preparedness for any contingency. This schedule was maintained for the duration of the period. Whatever might happen - sabotage, indigenous insurgence, or war - Recon would be ready.

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LEGEND

- ==== DIRT ROAD
- BOUNDARY




MAP - KOREA 1:10,000 (E)

RECON. COMPANY C.P. AS of 27 July 1953

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ENCLOSURE (2)

SECRET



MAP KOREA 1:10,000 (G)


1st PIT RCN. COMPANY
AS of 9 October 1953

- Legend**
- BRIDGE
 - TENT
 - SENTRY Booth
 - DIRT ROAD

ENCLOSURE (3)

SECRET

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MAP KOREA 1:10,000 (#3)


FREEDOM Gate Bridge - MUNSAN-NI Rail Line
(RECON. Co. C. P. AS OF 9 OCTOBER 1953)

- LEGEND
- △ OBSERVATION POST
 - ▨ DEFENSIVE POSITION
 - - - DIRT ROAD
 - ▨ BRIDGE
 - ++++ SINGLE RAILROAD TRACK
 - SENTRY BOOTH
 - xxxxx BARB WIRE

SECRET

ENCLOSURE (4)

SECRET



06




94

MAP KOREA 1:10,000 (B)





Recon Company CP
as of 27 July 1953

Enclosure (2)

SECRET



Legend

-  Bridge
-  Road
-  Path
-  Stream

M.P. KONA 1:10,000 (G)

1st Plt Recon Company
as of 9 October 1953

Enclosure (3)


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SECRET

02

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







MAP KOREA 1:10,000 (#3)

FREEDOM GATE BRIDGE - MUNSAN-NI Rail Line
(Recon Co OP as of 9 October 1953)

Enclosure (4)

Legend

-  Observation Post
-  Defensive Position
-  Dirt Road
-  Bridge
-  Single Railroad Track
-  Barb Wire
- 

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