

# KOREAN WAR PROJECT

**1ST MARINE DIVISION - SPECIAL ACTION REPORT - OCTOBER 1950 -  
DECEMBER 1950**

**Korean War**

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**Korean War Project Record: USMC-1**

**CD: 01**

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**United States Marine Corps History Division**

**Quantico, Virginia**

**Records: United States Marine Corps**

**Unit Name: 1st Marine Division**

**Depository: National Archives and Records Administration**

**Location: College Park, Maryland**

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**Korean War Project**

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF  
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
FOR THE  
WONSAN - HAMHUNG - CHOSHIN RESERVOIR  
OPERATION  
8 OCTOBER - 15 DECEMBER 1950  
VOLUME ONE

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Headquarters  
1st Marine Division (Reinf)  
Fleet Marine Force  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

41-1/Jeg  
2295  
Ser ODBO-5,  
May 21 1951

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From: Commanding General  
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
Via: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force,  
Pacific

Subj: Special Action Report, 1st Marine Division,  
Phase II (8 October - 15 December 1950), WONSAN -  
HAMHUNG - CHOSHIN RESERVOIR

## 1. INTRODUCTION

(a) Command. The Division remained under operational control of the X U. S. Army Corps with the exception of the normal amphibious command relationships established with ComPhibGru One for outloading at INCHON, movement to and off loading at WONSAN, and outloading again at HUNGAM.

(b) Missions. In view of the many and varied missions assigned the Division by CG X Corps during this phase, missions assigned are covered in section 3, Planning and section 7, Operations. The overall mission of the X Corps during this phase was to advance to the Korean northern border destroying the enemy in its assigned zone. Intervention in strength by JCF in late November and early December caused a withdrawal of United Nations Forces from the HUNGAM area in December.

## 2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. General. Few departures from normal Task Organizations were employed during Phase II. In view of the widely separated locations of the RCT's throughout operations in the WONSAN - HAMHUNG - YUDAM-NI area, self-sustaining RCT Task Organizations were the normal rule rather than the exception. It is believed that the most graphic representation of typical Task Organizations can be provided by presenting the Task Organization of the Division at various stages of this phase of operations. Therefore these detailed Task Organizations are presented in paragraph b. below with accompanying notes. Detailed Task Organizations for each operational period throughout this phase may be found in Division Operation Orders Number 16-50 through 27-50.

### b. Typical Detailed Task Organizations, Phase II

(1) Task Organization for assault landing (later changed to administrative landing) at WONSAN, KOREA (Annex A, Div Op O 16-50, issued 0800, 10 Oct 50 at INCHON):

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1st Mar Div, Reinf	Maj Gen SMITH
Hq Bn, less dets, attached	Lt Col STARR
Civ Asst Team	
GHQ Photo Team	
163d MISD	
441st CIC	
1st Sig Bn, less dets, attached	Lt Col SCHREIER
Carrier Plat, FMFPac	
Det, 4th Sig Bn	
2d Sig Rep Unit	
Det, 205th Sig Rep Co	
GHQ RTT Team	
1st Serv Bn, less dets, attached	Lt Col BANKS
Det 565 QM GR Det	
1st MT Bn, less dets	Lt Col BEALL
1st Ord Bn, attached	Maj WILLIAMS
14th Ord ED Sq	
508th Crd Dem Team	
1st SP Bn, less dets, attached	Lt Col CROWE
SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn	
Det, 1st CSG	
Det, NavBchGrp #1	
1st Med Bn, less dets, attached	Comdr JOHNSON
2d Plat, 560th Med Amb Co	
7th MT Bn	Maj STEPKA
1st CSG, less dets, attached	Col COOK
1st Fum & Bath Plat	
1st Air Del Plat	
Plat, 205th QM Sup Co	
Plat, 506th QM Pet Dis Co	
15th Ord ED Sq	
NavBch Grp #1, less dets	
RCT-1	Col PULLER
1st Mar	
Det 5th KMC Bn (1-50)	
Co C, 1st Engr Bn	
Co C, 1st MT Bn	
Co D, 1st Med Bn	
Surg Team (3-10)	
Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn	
Det, 1st Sig Bn	
Sig Co (0-5)	
ANGLICO	
FO & LnO Secs, 2d Bn, 11th Mar	
Ln Det, 1st Tk Bn	
SP Grp B	
Co B, 1st SP Bn	
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn	
2 SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn	
Det MP Co (1-28)	
Det, 1st CSG (8-203)	

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Det, GR Plat, 1st Serv Bn (O-4)  
Det, NavBchGrp #1

RCT-5 Lt Col MURRAY

5th Mar  
Co A, 1st Engr Bn  
Co D, 1st MT Bn  
Co C, 1st Med Bn  
Surg Team (3-10)  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
ANGLICO  
Sig Co (O-5)  
FO & LNO Sects, 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
Ln Det, 1st Tk Bn  
SP Gp A  
Co A, 1st SP Bn  
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn  
2 SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn  
Det MP Co (1-28)  
Det, GR Plat, 1st Serv Bn (O-4)  
Det, 1st CSG (5-170)  
Det, NavBch Grp #1

RCT-7 Col LITZENBERG

7th Mar  
Det, 3d EMC Bn (1-50)  
Co D, 1st Engr Bn  
Co B, 1st MT Bn  
Co C, 1st Med Bn  
Surg Team (3-10)  
Plat, 1st ArmdAmphBn  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
ANGLICO  
Sig Co (O-5)  
FO & Ln Sects, 3d Ln, 11th Mar  
Ln Det, 1st Tk Bn  
SP Gp C  
Co C, 1st SP Bn  
Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn  
2 SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn  
Det, MP Co (1-28)  
Det Gr Plat, 1st Serv Bn (O-4)  
Det, 1st CSG (9-120)  
Det, NavBch Grp #1

11th Mar, Reinf Col BROWER  
Btry C, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn  
1st AmphTrk Co, FMF

1st Tk Bn Lt Col MILNE

1st Engr Bn, less dets Lt Col PARTRIDGE

3d EMC Bn, less det Maj KIM

5th KMC Bn, less det Lt Col KIM

1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF Lt Col WANN

Recon Co Lt CROSSMAN

VMO-6 Maj GOTTSCHALK

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(2) Subsequent to landing at WONSAN the division was organized to employ one RCT in WONSAN - KOJO area, and two RCT's to the north of HAMHUNG. Task Organization for these operations was established by Op Order 18-50 as follows:

1st Mar Div, Reinf

Hq Bn, less dets  
16th MISD  
441st CIC Det

1st Sig Bn, less dets  
Carrier Plat, FMFPac

1st Serv Bn, less dets

Det, 1st MT Bn

1st Ord Bn

1st Med Bn

1st Amph Trac Bn

Co B, less 1 Plat, 1st Armd Amph Bn

7th MT Bn

1st CSG

1st Amph Trk Co

1st Air Del Plat

1st Fum & Bath Plat

## RCT-1

1st Mar  
2d Bn, 11th Mar  
Co D, 1st Med Bn  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Det, MP Co  
Det, 1st Serv Bn  
Det, 1st Engr Bn  
Co, 5th IMC Bn  
Co C, 1st Tk Bn

## RCT-7

7th Mar  
3d Bn, 11th Mar  
3d FMC Bn  
Recón Co  
Det, 1st Engr Bn  
Co E, 1st Med Bn  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Det MP Co  
Det, 1st Serv Bn  
1st MT Bn less dets

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## RCT-5

5th Mar  
 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 5th KMC Bn, less one Co  
 Co C, 1st Med Bn  
 Det, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 Det, MP Co  
 Det, 1st Serv Bn

## \*BLT - 1/5 (to be activated on order)

1st Bn, 5th Mar  
 Co B, less 1 Plat, 1st Armd Amph Bn  
 FO & Ln Secs, 1st En, 11th Mar  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 Det, 1st Med Bn  
 Det, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, 1st Amph Trac Bn  
 Det, 1st MT Bn  
 SP Team  
 Plat, Co A, 1st SP Bn  
 SP Comm Sec, 1st Sig Bn  
 Traffic Sgd, MP Co  
 Det, 1st Serv Bn  
 Det, 1st Ord Bn  
 Det, Evac Sec, 1st SP Bn

\*Note - required  
 standby for  
 possible amph-  
 ibious operat-  
 ions on NE coast  
 KOREA.

11th Mar, Reinf, less dets  
 Btry C, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn, FMF

1st Tk Bn, Reinf, less dets  
 Tk Plat, 5th Mar  
 Tk Plat, 7th Mar

1st Engr Bn, less dets

## VMO-6

Note: Term "Detachment" was used in many cases under RCT's in order to allow flexibility to RCT's in choice of size and composition of various detachments, required by moving situation, and dictated by motor transport available.

(3) Task Organization of Division, 17 November 1950, at which time RCT-7 was in vicinity HAGARU-RI, RCT-5 protecting MBR to south of HAGARU-RI, and RCT-1 vicinity of CHIGYONG, south of HAMHUNG.

1st Mar Div, Reinf

Hq Bn, reinf, less dets:  
 163d MISD  
 441st CIC Det

1st Sig Bn, less dets:  
 Rad Rel Plat, 1st Sig Opn Co  
 Det, 205th Sig Rep Co  
 Det, 4th Sig Bn  
 2d Sig Rep Unit  
 RTT Team

1st Serv Bn, less dets  
 Co A, 7th MT Bn  
 Auto Maint Co, less 1 Rep Plat, 1st MT Bn  
 Auto Sup Co, 1st MT Bn

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19601st Ord Bn  
Ord ED Sqd1st Med Bn, less dets  
2d Plat, 560th Med Amb Co  
1st Fum & Bath PlatReg Det, 1st Mar Div (at HAGARU-RI)  
1st MT Bn less det  
Det, 1st Serv Bn  
Det, 1st Ord Bn  
Sqd, Traffic Plat, MP Co  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Co, 1st MarRCT-1  
1st Mar, less 1 R Co  
2d Bn, 11th Mar  
Co D, 1st Med Bn  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Traffic Plat, less 1 Sqd, MP Co  
Det, 1st Serv Bn  
Co C, Reinf, 1st Engr Bn  
Co, 7th MT Bn  
Co B, 1st Tk BnRCT-7  
7th Mar less Tk Plat  
3d Bn, reinf, 11th Mar  
Btry K, 4th Bn, 11th Mar  
Co, 1st MT Bn  
Co E, 1st Med Bn  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Traffic Plat, less 1 Sqd, MP Co  
Det, 1st Serv Bn (GR)RCT-5  
5th Mar, less Tk Plat  
1st Bn, reinf, 11th Mar  
Btry K, 4th Bn, 11th Mar (on detachment RCT-7)  
Prov Tk Plat, 1st Tk Bn  
Co C, 1st Med Bn  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Co, 1st MT Bn  
Traffic Plat, less 1 Sqd, MP Co  
Det, 1st Serv Bn (GR)Recon Co  
Det, 1st Sig Bn11th Mar, reinf, less dets  
Btry C, 1st 4.5" Rlt Bn, FMP.1st Tk Bn, reinf, less dets  
Tk Plat, 5th Mar  
Tk Plat, 7th Mar1st Engr Bn, less dets  
1 Rifle Co, 1st Mar (Security X Corps H.)

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(4) Task Organization of Division as set forth by Div Cpn O 25-50, 5 December 1950. At this time RCT's 5 and 7 had reached HAGARU-RI following their withdrawal from YUDAM-RI; and RCT-1 headquarters and 2d Bn, 1st Mar were at KOTO-RI, with 3d Bn, 1st Mar at HAGARU-RI, and 1st Bn, 1st Mar at CHINHUNG-NI. On 29 November CG X Corps passed all U. S. Armed forces in the KOTO-RI - HAGARU-RI area to operational control of 1st Mar Div. Thus various armed forces elements caught at HAGARU-RI and KOTO-RI by reason of enemy road blocks on each side of those two locations, came under operational control of the Division.

1st Mar Div, Reinf

HQ Bn, reinf, less dets  
163d MIBD  
181st CIC  
Civ Asst Team

1st Sig Bn, reinf, less dets  
Rad Rel Plat, less dets

1st Serv Bn, reinf, less dets  
Co A, 7th MT Bn, less dets  
Auto Sup Co, 1st MT Bn  
Auto Maint Co, 1st MT Bn

1st Ord Bn, less dets

1st Med Bn, reinf, less dets  
1st Fum & Bath Plat  
2d Plat, 500th Med Amb Co

1st Amph Trac Bn, reinf  
Co B, 1st Armd Amph Bn

1st CBG, reinf (Op control X Corps)  
7th MT Bn, less dets  
Co A, 1st Amph Trk Co  
1st Air Del Plat

1st SP Bn (under Op control 3d Inf Div)

VMO-6

Note: All of the above units with the exception of 1st SP Bn in WONSAN, were at this time located in the HAMHUNG-HUNGNAM area.

RCT-5 Lt Col MURRAY  
5th Mar, less Tk Plat  
1st Bn, reinf, 11th Mar  
\*Btry D, 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
11th Mar, reinf, less dets  
4th Bn, 11th Mar, 1st Bn  
Det, 96th FA Bn  
\*3d Bn, 1st Mar  
Det, 1st Sig Bn  
Tk Co, 31st Inf USA  
Prov Plat, 1st Tk Bn  
\*Co A, 1st Engr Bn  
Det, 1st Engr Bn  
41 Commando, RM.

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Div Train #2 Lt. Col MILNE  
 Traffic Plat, MP Co  
 Det, 513 Trk Co, USA  
 Det, 1st MT Bn  
 Co D, X Corps Engr, USA  
 Det, 1st Med Bn  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 Det, 515 Trk Co, USA

\* Released to RCT-1 on passage RCT-6 through KOTO-RI.

RCT-7 Col LITZENBERG  
 7th Mar, less Tk Plat  
 3d Bn, 11th Mar  
 Btry L, 4th Bn 11th Mar (to RCT-1 on arrival KOTO-RI)  
 Prov Bn, USA (31st & 32nd Inf)  
 Co D, 1st Tk Bn  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 Co D, reinf, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, 1st Engr Bn

Div Train #1 Lt Col BANKS  
 Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
 Det, Hq, X Corps  
 Det, 1st Serv Bn  
 Det, 1st Ord Bn  
 Det, 7th MT Bn  
 Det, X Corps Ord Co  
 MP Co, less depts  
 1st MT Bn, less depts  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 Det, 581st Rad Rel Co, USA  
 Det, Rad Rel Plat, FMF  
 Det, 4th Sig Bn, USA  
 Air Spt Sec, MTACS-2  
 Det, 1st Med Bn

Note: RCT's 5 and 7 and Div Trains #1 and #2 at HAGARU-RI 5 December 1950.

RCT-1 Col PULLER  
 1st Mar, less 3d Bn and Tk Plat  
 2d Bn, reinf, 31st Inf USA  
 Hq Co, 31st Inf  
 Elms 31st Inf  
 2d Bn, reinf, 11th Mar  
 Btry L, 4th Bn 11th Mar (on arrival KOTO-RI)  
 Co A and B, 7th MT Bn  
 Co C, reinf, 1st MT Bn  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 Det, 1st Serv Bn  
 Det, Hq Bn, 1st Mar Div  
 Det, 1st Ord Bn  
 Co's B and D, 1st Med Bn  
 Recon Co  
 Det, 1st Engr Bn  
 Det, 7th Mar  
 Det, 41 Commando RM. (released to Cdo on passage KOTO-RI by RCT-5)  
 Co B, reinf, 1st Tk Bn  
 \*Misc USA units

Note: RCT-1 at KOTO-RI 5 December 1950, except 1st Bn, reinf, 1st Mar at CHINHUNG-NI.

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\* Following additional units and dets US Army were at KOTO-RI and returned to HAMHUNG with RCT-1 10 December 1950.

Det, 581st Rad Rel Team  
 Det, X Corps MP Co  
 Det, Hq & Serv Corps Arty  
 Det, Hq Co, X Corps  
 Det, 185th Engr Bn  
 Det, 96th FA Bn  
 Det, 57th FA Bn  
 Det, 15th AAA Bn  
 Det, 6th Army Med Depot  
 Det, Hq 5th FA Groups  
 Det, Hq Btry, 31st FA Bn  
 Det, 772nd MP Co  
 Det, 2d Engr Spec Brig  
 Det, 8821st FA Top and Met

(5) Task Organization for outloading 1st Mar Div from HUNGNAM, KOEEA. Attachments terminated on arrival assembly and billeting areas, vicinity MASAN. This movement was non-tactical.

1st Marine Division

Maj Gen SMITH

Forward Echelon  
 Advance Party

Brig Gen CRAIG

RCT-7

Cpl LIT

7th Mar, less Tk Plat  
 3d Bn, 11th Mar  
 Co D, 1st Engr Bn  
 1st CSG, less dets  
 Det, Hq Bn  
 1st Serv Bn  
 Co A, 7th MT Bn  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn  
 1st Med Bn  
 1st Fum & Path Plat

RCT-5

Lt Col MURRAY

5th Mar  
 1st Bn, 11th Mar  
 41 Commando RM  
 Co A, 1st Engr Bn  
 1st Ord Bn  
 1st MT Bn  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn

RCT-1

Col PULLER

1st Mar  
 2d Bn, 11th Mar  
 Co C, 1st Engr Bn  
 1st Tk Bn  
 Tk Plat, 5th Mar  
 Tk Plat, 7th Mar  
 Det, 1st Sig Bn

Hq Bn, reinf, less dets  
 1st Sig Bn, less dets  
 Div Asst Team  
 163d MISD  
 181st CIC

Lt Col STARR

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13th Mar, less dets	Lt Col YOUNGDALE
Btry C, 1st 4.5" Rkt Bn	
Rad Rel Plat, 1st Sig Ogn Co	
1st Engr Bn less dets	
7th MT Bn less dets	
ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn	
1st SP Bn, less dets	Lt Col CROWE
1st Amph Trac Bn	Lt Col WANN
Co A, 1st Amph Trk Bn	
Co B, 1st Armd Amph Bn	
VMO-6, less dets	MAJ GOTTSCHALK

Note: Following dets remained with X Corps elements for evacuation HUNGNAM and reverted to 1st Mar Div on arrival at PUSAN throughout December:

One Co, reinf, 1st SP Bn  
 One (1) TACP  
 Two (2) Regtl NGF Teams  
 Nine (9) Br SFCP's  
 Elms, 1st Amph Trac Bn  
 Elms, 1st Armd Amph Bn

### 3. PLANNING

#### (a) Preliminary Planning.

(1) Planning for operations in northeastern KOREA was initiated on 29 September 1950, when a conference of Division Commanders, G-2's, G-3's, and G-4's was convened at X Corps Headquarters, ASGOM CITY, near INCHON, KOREA. At the time this conference was called, the 1st Marine Division was disposed in and around the city of SEOUL, preparing to move out to blocking positions northwest, north, and east of SEOUL. It was announced on this date that DOG DAY for a landing at WONSAN, KOREA had been set for 15 October and that shipping for lift of the Division would commence arriving at INCHON about 3 October.

(2) The basis of timing for this phase was dependent on passage by 8th Army elements through forward elements of the 1st Marine Division by 3 October, and an unrealistic total outloading time of three (3) days for the reinforced Division. An additional factor to be considered in this rapid outloading was the statement at this time that First Logistical Command would bottom-load all shipping with a 10 day level of classes I, III, and V, prior to arrival at INCHON. None of the preceding factors worked out in practice, and as a result DOG DAY was moved progressively back to a tentative date of 20 October. Lack of maps and intelligence precluded initiation of planning for the WONSAN landing until about 6 October.

#### (b) WONSAN Landing.

(1) At the time the planning for the WONSAN landing was initiated, ROK Army elements moving northward on the east coast of KOREA were well south of WONSAN, meeting only scattered resistance from NKPA forces withdrawing to the north. Thus all planning for the WONSAN landing, up to and including issuance of Division Operation Order

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16-50 on 10 October, was based on an assault landing in the WONSAN area with a follow-up landing by the 7th Infantry Division and other elements of X Corps. This mission was derived from X Corps Operation Order Number 4 dated 4 October. Corresponding orders from naval echelons were COMNAVFE Operation Plan 113-50 dated 10 October, and CJTF-7 Operation Plan 1-50 dated 9 October. By 15 October it was known that ROK Army elements had advanced rapidly to the north, seized and passed through WONSAN enroute to KAMHUNG to the north. It was therefore decided that reconnaissance parties from X Corps, 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing would be flown to WONSAN airfield to make such preliminary preparations as necessary for the landing at WONSAN. Assembly areas for units of the Division in the WONSAN Area were selected by map reconnaissance. Reconnaissance parties representing appropriate units of the Division were flown to WONSAN on 16 and 17 October. On 14 October, X Corps OI No. 11 was issued, changing the mission of the Division from an assault landing for the seizure of a beachhead to an advance overland across LOREA to seize an objective northeast of PYONGYANG, capital of North KOREA, and to effect a juncture with 8th Army advancing on PYONGYANG from the south. Pursuant to this change, Division Operation Order 17-50 dated 15 October was issued, directing units to move to designated assembly areas on landing, prepared to advance to the west along the WONSAN - YONGDOK - PYONGYANG Road.

## (c) Post Landing Operations.

(1) During the period that Division Headquarters was afloat enroute to WONSAN, plans were made to carry out X Corps OI No. 11 subsequent to landing at WONSAN. The objective designated for the Division was approximately 125 miles from WONSAN over tortuous mountain roads, through passes reaching altitudes of 3800 feet. It was planned to advance in a column of RCT's, with a Division command group following the leading RCT; the Division "service area" moving with the last RCT in the column. Assembly areas in the WONSAN Area had been selected with this plan in view. The rapid advance to and seizure of PYONGYANG by the Eighth Army prior to the landing of the X Corps at WONSAN caused CINCPAC to designate a new boundary between 8th Army and X Corps which assigned X Corps a zone of action in northeastern KOREA, in lieu of advancing to the west to effect a juncture with 8th Army. Based on this change, X Corps tentatively assigned the southern portion of its zone to the 1st Marine Division. The northern portion was assigned to the 7th Infantry Division and a line was specified, above which only ROK Army forces were to operate. Based on this directive, Division issued Operation Plan 4-50, assigning sectors of responsibility to each RCT. This operation plan was never executed. Removal of the restriction for operation of UN forces, other than ROK Army, to the north was lifted, and X Corps formulated plans for advancing to the northern border of KOREA in its zone.

(2) In the meantime mine sweeping operations continued in the WONSAN area and plans were made for an administrative landing of the Division upon completion of sweeping operations. G-3 and G-4 reconnoitered unit

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assembly areas ashore and areas were changed to conform to the new plan of moving to the north to the Korean border via HAMHUNG and the CHOSHIN and FUSTIN RESERVOIR Areas. Prior to the landing of the Division on 26 October, instructions were received from X Corps to provide a minimum of one battalion to relieve ROK Army elements at KOJO, 39 miles south of WONSAN in order to provide security for the ROK base of supply until such time as its stockpile could be depleted. This task was assigned to the 1st Marines. On 26 October, X Corps OI No. 13 was received assigning the following missions to the 1st Marine Division:

- a. Land over beaches, WONSAN.
- b. Relieve all elements I ROK Corps in zone.
- c. Protect WONSAN - KOJO - MAJON-NI area, employing not less than one RCT, patrolling all routes to west in zone.
- d. Concentrate not less than one RCT without delay in HAMHUNG - HUNGHAM area.
- e. Advance rapidly in zone to Korean Northern border.
- f. Prepare to land one BLT in CHONGJIN area rapidly on order.
- g. Assist 101st Engineer Group (C) ROK repair YONGHUNG - HAMHUNG Railroad, employing not less than one Engineer Company.

In order to show the problems faced by the Division, attention is invited to some of the distances involved in the execution of the above missions:

WONSAN to KOJO - 39 miles.

WONSAN to MAJON-NI - 26 miles.

WONSAN to HAMHUNG - 78 miles.

HAMHUNG to MAJON-DONG (location of 36th ROK Regt) - 22 miles.

The entire Division zone assigned at this time reached to the northern border of KOREA and measured approximately 300 road miles north and south and approximately 60 road miles east and west at its widest point. The Division plan to accomplish the missions assigned was to employ RCT-1 in the WONSAN - KOJO - MAJON-NI area and move RCT-7 and RCT-5 north in that order to the HAMHUNG area. Division Operation Order 18-50 dated 28 October was issued to implement the above general plan. In order to ensure both the mobility and logistics support of RCT-7, on what initially amounted to an independent operation, it was necessary to attach the entire 1st Motor Transport Battalion less Auto Maintenance and Supply Companies to RCT-7.

(d) Operations HAMHUNG - CHOSHIN RESERVOIR Area.

Once RCT-7 relieved the 26th ROK Regiment south of HAMHUNG and commenced its advance toward the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR, all planning was directed toward the continuing support of RCT-7 and the closing up of the remainder of the Division behind RCT-7. Continued guerrilla activities in the WONSAN area required the presence of RCT-1 there

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until it could be relieved by elements of the 3d Infantry Division. RCT-5 was initially employed in the SIH-HUNG valley north and northeast of HAMHUNG. However as soon as the fulfillment of missions assigned by X Corps would permit, RCT-5 was moved to positions behind RCT-7 on the MSR leading to the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR and RCT-1 was concentrated at CHIGYONG 8 miles south of HAMHUNG. The security of the 56 miles of Division MSR to CHOSHIN RESERVOIR presented a difficult problem for the Division throughout the entire period of operations north of HAMHUNG. When X Corps OI 17 of 22 November required the commitment of RCT-7 west of the Reservoir and RCT-5 east of the reservoir, the movement of RCT-1 to key positions along the MSR was initiated. On receipt of X Corps Operation Order No. 7, requiring a reorientation of the Division direction of attack to the northwest, RCT-1 was employed to protect the MSR from positions at CHINHUNG-NI, KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI. With the exception of HAGARU-RI these positions were in the zone of the 3d Infantry Division. The 3d Infantry Division was committed in a large zone to the south of HAMHUNG and could not provide security for the MSR to the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR. Permission was therefore requested to station elements of RCT-1 at CHINHUNG-NI and KOTO-RI for security of the MSR from HAMHUNG to the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR. The positions of RCT-1 at CHINHUNG-NI, KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI proved to be well chosen. The possession of each of these key locations provided the vital bases for supply and operations from which the successful withdrawal of the Division to the HAMHUNG area was planned and executed early in December. The contemplated plans of the advance of the Division to the northwest to the YALU River closely resembled the plans which had been made for the advance across KOREA to PYONGYANG. Only one axial road was available in the Division zone and it was planned to advance by RCT's in column, the following RCT's to provide security of the long MSR, and the Division command group advancing by bounds as required. The Division rear was to remain at HUNGNAM. In implementation of this plan, the Division command group commenced displacement to HAGARU-RI on 27 November as the advance west from YUDAM-NI began.

When it became apparent that the 8th Army was withdrawing and that CCF were in northern KOREA in force, the Division halted the planned advance to the northwest from YUDAM-NI and commenced operations to reopen the MSR which had been cut from YUDAM-NI to HAGARU-RI. Immediately following this development X Corps issued instructions for a redeployment of forces northwest of HAGARU-RI to the HAGARU-RI area, and shortly thereafter followed with a directive for a complete withdrawal of forces in the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR area to the HAMHUNG area. RCT-5 and RCT-7 planned a joint withdrawal from the YUDAM-NI area to HAGARU-RI by pooling the resources of both RCT's. This movement was executed in accordance with a joint RCT-5 and RCT-7 operation order and the two RCT's fought a coordinated action against stubborn resistance and the determined efforts of the CCF to prevent their redeployment to the HAGARU-RI area. Meanwhile Division plans for the continued withdrawal from HAGARU-RI to the HAMHUNG area were made. By holding

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HAGARU-RI, KOTO-RI and CHINHUNG-NI in sufficient force to prevent their seizure by CCF, the Division had insured itself of "stopping places" at which casualties could be evacuated, supplies received by air drop, and troops rested and sheltered from the arctic-like weather for the continuing fight to the south. Due to the presence of the enemy on all sides of HAGARU-RI, plans for the advance south required tactical dispositions permitting the Division to fight to its front which was the withdrawal direction, protect its flanks and the Division trains, and to fight a rear guard action. Division Operation Order 25-50 issued at HAGARU-RI on 5 December ordered the advance to the south through KOTO-RI and CHINHUNG-NI to HAMHUNG. This order directed RCT-7 to advance to the south commencing at first light 6 December. RCT-5 was ordered to hold the defense perimeter, until the Division elements had cleared. This order divided the vehicles and personnel at HAGARU-RI not attached to either RCT-5 or 7 into two Division Trains, each commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. Only disabled personnel and drivers were permitted to ride on vehicles; all others were required to march on foot to the flanks of the vehicle column, acting as an inner screen for the train. This latter order was issued with three reasons in mind: (a) Reduction of the number of casualties in the event a vehicle was hit, (b) Protection of the vehicle column, and (c) Prevention of frostbite by keeping personnel on their feet and moving.

It was hoped that the sheer weight of the formation would permit a rapid movement of the Division column to KOTO-RI, 11 miles distant. However, enemy resistance to RCT-7 in the lead and many roadblocks slowed the advance during the entire movement to KOTO-RI, requiring RCT-7 to fight for each terrain feature dominating the HAGARU-RI - KOTO-RI Road. The enemy failed to close aggressively with RCT-5 and the rear, after being initially repulsed in the HAGARU-RI area, and Division Train No. 2 and RCT-5 closed KOTO-RI rapidly by taking advantage of the blows dealt the enemy by RCT-7 on 6 and 7 December. Plans for the advance to the south from KOTO-RI included the employment of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines attacking north from CHINHUNG-NI to seize hill 1081, dominating the southern half of the mountain road from CHINHUNG-NI to KOTO-RI; while the attack from KOTO-RI to the south by RCT-7 followed by RCT-5 would seize the terrain dominating the northern half of the road. Possession of these key features would allow a relatively safe passage of the vehicle trains to the south. Pursuant to an earlier request of the Division, elements of the 3d Infantry Division were to relieve 1st Bn, 1st Marines at CHINHUNG-NI, freeing it for employment in conjunction with the southward movement of the Division. In addition the 3d Infantry Division positioned units to protect the MSR south of CHINHUNG-NI to HAMHUNG. RCT-1 was to relieve elements of RCT-5 and 7 on the northern terrain features of the mountain pass and protect the rear of the Division. A Division control point was established at CHINHUNG-NI to control movements of the Division vehicle trains and units to the south of that point. Division rear had set up a guide and reception system north of HAMHUNG to receive and guide incoming units to prepared assembly areas south of HAMHUNG, where

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the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had established temporary camps. The advance of the Division to the south from KOTO-RI to the HAMHUNG area was executed according to these plans.

(e) Movement from HUNGNAM to PUSAN. The embarkation of the Division at HUNGNAM was carried out in such a manner as to exploit the available shipping to the maximum extent. Thus no tactical planning was required. However, the embarkation groups were substantially RCT's and embarkation was carried out expeditiously with individual ships departing for PUSAN as loading was completed. Planning for the movement of the Division from PUSAN to advance areas in the MASAN area was accomplished by an advance command group headed by the Assistant Division Commander who proceeded to PUSAN by air in advance of the Division.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. In view of the rapid outloading of the Division following the INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL operation and movement directly to WONSAN no rehearsals were conducted. Limited training and briefings were conducted aboard ship enroute WONSAN.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. On 29 September certain members of the Division staff attended a conference at X Corps Headquarters. The purpose of this conference was to alert Corps units to the possibility of an assault landing at WONSAN, KOREA. CG, 3d Logistical Command was to be responsible for the overall coordination and loading of corps units through the port of INCHON. For preliminary planning Division was given a "possible" shipping list which contained the same ships from which the INCHON landing was made.

Commander Amphibious Group 3 held daily conferences at his headquarters on the beach regarding the proposed outloading. In usual attendance were the following: Commander Amphibious Group 3; CG 3d Logistical Command; CO, 2d Engineer Special Brigade; representatives of X Corps; and the Division Embarkation Officer as the representative of CG, 1st Marine Division. The following was accomplished at these conferences;

(1) It was determined that 3d Logistical Command's responsibility would end and the Navy's begin at the ramp's edge.

(2) The operation of the tidal basin and one-half of the LST slots was assigned to the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. 1st Shore Party Battalion would operate the remaining LST slots. Naval Beach Group 1 would control the beaching and retracting of LSTs. 3d Logistical Command would; establish telephone communication between embarkation installations within the embarkation area; provide motor transport support in order to make Division trucks available for early outloading; and provide MP support during the embarkation.

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(3) An embarkation control board was established with CG, 2d Engineer Special Brigade as senior officer. Other members were to be representatives of Commander Amphibious Group 3; CG, X Corps; CG, 3d Logistical Command; Commander Naval Beach Group 1; and the Division Embarkation Officer as representative of CG, 1st Marine Division. The mission of the board was to coordinate and control the outloading of the corps units.

During this period the Embarkation Section revised its standby INCHON embarkation plan to fit the proposed embarkation at hand. A main embarkation control office was established at Charlie Pier from which the Division Embarkation Officer would coordinate all Division embarkation activities. A subsidiary control office was established at the tidal basin to coordinate the loading of bulk cargo into landing craft. Unit embarkation officers were alerted and were assigned shipping based upon the "possible" list given Division by X Corps. An assistant embarkation officer flew to TOKYO 3 October in response to a request of Commander Amphibious Group 1 for an embarkation officer to assist with the preliminary planning for the proposed operation. Upon arrival this officer found that Commander Amphibious Group 1 had sailed for INCHON in the USS Mt. Molinley (AGC-7).

X Corps Embarkation Order 2-50 was received 7 October and 1st Marine Division Embarkation Order 2-50 was published and distributed the same day. The troop list totalled approximately 28,000 troops. The shipping consisted of 1 AGC, 8 APAs, 2 APS, 10 AKAs, 5 LSDs, 36 LSTs, 3 LSUs, 1 LSM, and 6 commercial cargo ships.

Organization for embarkation was established as follows:

<u>EMBARKATION GROUP</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL UNITS</u>	<u>SHIPPING</u>
ABLE	HqBn 1st CSG 1st Serv Bn 1st Engr Bn 1st Ord Bn	1 AGC 2 APA 6 AKA 4 LST 1 LSM 3 Commercial cargo
BAKER	1st Marines SP Group Baker	2 APA 11 LST 1 LSU
CHARLIE	5th Marines 11th Marines IMC Regt	3 APA 2 AKA 1 LST 1 LSU 1 Commercial cargo
DOG	7th Marines SP Group Charlie 1st AmphTracBn	2 APA 1 LSD 11 LST 1 LSU

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<u>EMBARKATION GROUP</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL UNITS</u>	<u>SHIPPING</u>
EASY	1st Tank Bn 7th MT Bn	4 LSD
FOX	11th Marines	1 AKA 9 LST
GEORGE	X Corps Troops	1 APA 3 AKA

Nature and man contributed little toward making INCHON a good port to mount out of. It has a maximum tidal range of thirty-one (31) feet and 16-foot mud-banks are exposed at low tide. There are seven (7) slots where LSTs or landing craft can beach during periods of high tide on any day throughout the year. The city begins at the water's edge leaving no nearby open areas for vehicle staging. There were no dock facilities except one small pier which could be used to load vehicles into one LCM at a time during periods of high tide.

Loading of bulk cargo began at 1400, 8 October. The tidal basin was used to outload all bulk cargo for ferrying to ships in the stream. Some vehicles were outloaded from here during the last days of the embarkation. LCVPs and LCMs from AKAs and APAs assigned to lift the Division were used to ferry the bulk cargo. A limited number of LSUs and Japanese barges were also used. The 532d Boat and Shore Regiment of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade furnished Korean stevedores, controlled the boats in the basin, and operated the locks. Cranes and operators were furnished by the 532d Boat and Shore Regiment and 1st Shore Party Battalion. Since the tidal basin also had to be used to offload incoming supplies, cargo assembly area was limited. Division service units were responsible for loading Classes I, III, and V. These supplies were loaded directly into landing craft from assembly areas adjacent to the tidal basin and delivered to the ships in the stream at times arranged with the individual embarkation officers. Most ships were assigned small cargo assembly areas adjacent to the tidal basin for organizational supplies and equipment. Others had to be given space approximately two hundred yards from the basin.

The factor that caused the most delays in loading bulk cargo was the tidal basin itself. All available landing craft and barges entered the tidal basin at high tide and the gates were locked. The boats were loaded and then had to wait on an average of three (3) hours until they could leave the basin and empty boats enter. The Army's policy of searching each outgoing stevedore, and the time required to organize the incoming hordes into crews, totalled approximately two (2) hours for each of the two (2) shifts. During these periods outloading was at a standstill. Control of landing craft in the tidal basin was poor and caused delay. This was especially apparent during the night when incoming boats entered the basin at high tide. The boat crews would evade the control officer, tie up

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in a dark corner of the basin, and go to sleep. It was necessary for Division to keep an NCO on a constant search for such crews.

The lack of open areas near the waterfront made it necessary to stage some vehicles in the streets. Vehicles were waterproofed in group areas and then moved to either team street staging areas or directly to LSTs. Division planned to use LSTs only to shuttle vehicles from the beach to ships in the stream. It was hoped that this shuttle operation would be completed by the time the LSTs had to be combat loaded and sailed, as it was necessary that they depart 24 hours ahead of the transports.

It was not until the fourth day of loading that maximum use was made of the LSTs to shuttle vehicles. The 2d Logistical Command was not able to provide sufficient trucks to take over the movement of division cargo to assembly areas, and thereby release division vehicles for outloading. When it became evident that the LSTs would have to be combat loaded prior to the completion of the vehicle shuttle, plans were formulated to complete the shuttling with LCMs, LSUs, and Japanese barges loading out of the tidal basin. The last LST was combat loaded by high tide on the morning of 15 October.

b. REEMBARKATION AT HUNGNAM

At 2330 9 December, Division received X Corps OI-27 which confirmed verbal instructions for the Division to outload through the port of HUNGNAM for the PUSAN area. All Class II and IV and a basic load of ammunition was to be embarked. 1st Combat Service Group had begun loading the first ship before the Corps OI was received. Speed was the prime requisite.

The Embarkation Section immediately began the preparation of Embarkation Order 3-50. This consisted of revising the HUNGNAM standby plan. Units were assigned vehicle and cargo assembly areas and staging began at once. A Division embarkation control office was already functioning in the dock area. Embarkation Order 3-50 was published 11 December.

An X Corps control officer, who was established in the dock area, was responsible for the overall coordination of the embarkation of all corps units. The 1st Marine Division was given first priority for shipping. As it became available, Corps assigned it to Division who in turn assigned it to a unit or units. In most instances it was possible to assign shipping organizationally; however, because of the limiting characteristics of some ships, it was necessary to load vehicles wherever they would fit.

Since it was impossible to predetermine the type or time of arrival of shipping, Embarkation Order 3-50 did not detail the assignment of units to shipping or attempt to establish a time schedule for loading. It did, however, establish a unit priority of loading. The embarkation group level was not used. The Division

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Embarkation Officer assigned shipping directly to embarkation teams, thereby centralizing control and facilitating the shifting of personnel and cargo to make maximum use of shipping space. Units awaiting shipping were kept on a standby basis, ready to commence loading immediately upon the assignment of space. Embarkation officers loaded their ships by sight, planning their loads as they went along. Not knowing the type ships they would be assigned, it was not possible for the embarkation officers to have carefully planned stowage diagrams ready when the ships arrived.

The 2d Engineer Special Brigade was responsible for the following: operation of the dock facilities; furnishing Japanese stevedores and winch operators; furnishing cargo handling equipment and lunnage; and traffic control in the dock area. One reinforced company from 1st Shore Party Battalion worked the LST and small craft beaches, and controlled the lighterage for ships loading in the stream.

The HUNGNAM docks accommodated seven (7) ships. Beaches were available for loading ten (10) LSTs simultaneously. Most of the Division personnel were loaded into three (3) APs and one (1) APA in the stream from landing craft, LSUs, and LVTs. LSDs were used for LVTs and some of the tanks. The tanks were transported to the LSDs in LSUs.

Corps established a tent city in rear of the LST beaches. Space was available to units waiting to embark their personnel. Although the majority of the Division units moved directly from their bivouac area to the beach, the decreasing availability of transportation, as vehicles were outloaded, made it expedient for some units to move to the tent city while their vehicles were still available.

The Corps OI directed that drivers be embarked with their vehicles. This meant that cargo space had to be used to billet personnel on the commercial ships, which normally have accommodations for twelve (12) troops. Between thirty-five hundred (3500) and forty-five hundred (4500) troops were embarked on each AP and fourteen hundred (1400) on the APA.

The outloading of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) was completed at 1500, 15 December.

The Division was assigned the following shipping for outloading from HUNGNAM:

3 AP	3 LSD
1 APA	7 Commercial Cargo
13 LST	1 APA

The reinforced shore party company which operated the LST and landing craft beaches during the outloading of the Division was retained in HUNGNAM under X Corps control for the outloading of the other Corps units. Also retained were approximately one and one-half (1 1/2) companies (88 LVTs) of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion for tactical use in the final

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withdrawal of X Corps. Five (5) Division officers were also retained to assist in the embarkation of the remaining corps units. These units and personnel departed HUNGNAM 23-24 December in shipping for PUSAN.

#### 6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE

a. Tractor elements of the Attack Force departed INCHON 15 October for WONSAN.

b. Attack Force less Tractor elements, with 1st Marine Division embarked departed INCHON early 17 October, moved around the southern tip of KOREA, and moved northward into the waters off the heavily mined WONSAN area. The Advance Force of JTF-7 had commenced minesweeping operations off WONSAN on 10 October, but on arrival of Attack Force on 20 October, minesweeping operations had not been completed.

c. Division remained aboard ships off the east coast of KOREA from 20 October to 26 October at which time an administrative landing through mineswept channels was initiated.

d. Embarked strength of the Division was 1,119 Marine officers, 20,597 Marine enlisted; 153 Naval officers, and 1,002 Naval enlisted, for a total reinforced Division of 22,871. Attached U. S. Army Troops and Korean Marine Corps units brought the embarked aggregate strength to 1,461 officers and 23,938 enlisted.

#### 7. OPERATIONS SUMMARY

a. The detailed daily combat narrative is contained in Annex CHARLIE.

b. For road distances and major reference points in the zone through which the Division operated, see following Road Chart.

#### c. Chronological sequence of Major Operational Events

26 October - 1st Mar Div commenced landing at WONSAN and 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved to KOJO, relieved elements 22d ROX Regt.

27 October - 1st Bn, 1st Mar at KOJO sustained heavy attack by NKPA.

28 October - Regt1 Command Group and 2d Bn, 1st Mar moved to KOJO to reinforce 1st Bn, 1st Marines. 3d Bn, 1st Marines moved to MAJON-NI and relieved a battalion of POK Army.

29 October - 7th Mar commenced movement by motor to HAMHUNG area.

30 October - 7th Mar continued movement by rail and motor to HAMHUNG area.

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- 1 November - 7th Mar moved 20 miles north of HAMHUNG to vicinity of MAJON-DONG, prepared to relieve 26th ROK Regt. 1st Bn, 5th Mar moved from YONGHUNG to CHIGYONG.
- 2 November - 1st Bn, 1st Mar departed KOJO by LST, arrived WONSAN 1230. 5th Mar less 1st Bn at CHIGYONG closed HAMHUNG Area. 7th Mar relieved 26th ROK Regt south of MAJON-DONG 22 miles north of HAMHUNG and in contact with CCF elements in defensive positions astride the HAMHUNG - CHOSHIN RESERVOIR Road.
- 3 November - 7th Mar continued advance against stiff resistance from CCF and captured SUDONG.
- 4 November - 5th Mar less 1st Bn moved into SINHUNG valley relieving elements of 18 ROK Regt. 7th Mar continued advance against CCF resistance varying from light to heavy to vicinity of CHINHUNG-NI. Div CP opened HUNGHAM.
- 6 November - 1st Mar continued operations against NK remnants in WONSAN - MAJON-NI - MUNCHON Area. 7th Mar continued advance north of CHINHUNG-NI against determined CCF defense.
- 7 November - 1st Bn, 5th Mar reconnoitered in force to HUKSU-RI. Guerrilla attacks along railroad and MSR between MUNCHON and CHINGYONG increased in intensity with attacks at KOWON and YONGHUNG.
- 8 November - 7th Mar advanced to positions approximately halfway between CHINHUNG-NI and KOTO-RI.
- 10 November - 5th Mar initiated movement from SINHUNG Valley to positions on MSR in rear of 7th Mar.
- 11 November - 7th Mar seized KOTO-RI.
- 14 November - 7th Mar seized HAGARU-RI. 5th Mar continued move to forward positions along MSR in rear of 7th Mar.
- 15 November - 1st Mar concentrating at CHIGYONG.
- 22 November - 5th Mar advanced to positions east of CHOSHIN RESERVOIR. 7th Mar advanced toward YUDAM-NI. 1st Mar moving to positions on MSR CHINHUNG-NI - KOTO-RI - HAGARU-RI.

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- 25 November - 7th Mar seized YUDAM-NI. 5th Mar relieved by elements of 7th Infantry Div and commenced movement to YUDAM-NI.
- 27 November - 5th Mar passed through 7th Mar at YUDAM-NI, attacking to the west.
- 28 November - Div CP opened at HAGARU-RI. 5th Mar advance stopped by Div order and 5th Mar ordered to consolidate positions. Heavy enemy attack on HAGARU-RI repulsed by 3d Bn, 1st Mar.
- 29 November - 5th and 7th Mar continued to repulse heavy attack on YUDAM-NI area.
- 30 November - 5th and 7th Mar commenced joint withdrawal to HAGARU-RI.
- 4 December - 5th and 7th Mar closing HAGARU-RI.
- 6 December - Movement south from HAGARU-RI initiated, spearheaded by 7th Mar. Div CP displaced to KOTO-RI.
- 7 December - 5th and 7th Mar closing KOTO-RI.
- 8 December - Attack south from KOTO-RI initiated.
- 10 December - 7th Mar and Div units commenced arriving HUNGKAM area.
- 15 December - Div completed outloading HUNGKAM for PUSA.

d. Summary of Operations 8 October - 15 December 1950.OCTOBER

On conclusion of the INCHON - SEOUL operation 7 October the 1st Marine Division was relieved of its responsibility of maintaining blocking positions around SEOUL by elements of the 8th U. S. Army then passing to the north in pursuit of the NK Peoples Army.

Pursuant to X Corps Operation Order Number 4 dated 4 October, the Division Commander reported to CTF 90 Attack Force as the Landing Force Commander for the projected landing at WONSAN, KOREA. The Division was moved as rapidly as transportation would permit from the SEOUL area to the assembly and staging areas in the port area at INCHON, and commenced outloading in assault shipping immediately. When reports were received that the 3d and Capital Divisions, ROK Army had secured WONSAN and had passed to the north, plans were made to send advance parties from the Division to WONSAN by air; these parties were flown to WONSAN on 16 and 17 October. The Tractor Group, having gotten underway for WONSAN on 15 October, the Transport Group departed INCHON for WONSAN on 17 October with CG, 1st Marine Division embarked in AGC-7 with CTF 90 and CG X Corps. Although shipping arrived off WONSAN on 20 October, extensive minesweeping op-

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erations delayed the landing until 26 October, at which time the Division commenced an administrative landing and moved to predesignated assembly areas in the WONSAN area. The 1st Marines was required to furnish a battalion to secure the ROK base of supply at KOJO, 39 miles south of WONSAN and on 26 October dispatched the 1st Bn, 1st Marines on this mission. ROK elements in the vicinity of MAJON-NI, east of WONSAN were relieved by the 3d Bn, 1st Marines, and the 1st Marines less these two battalions commenced its mission of protecting the WONSAN area. On 27 October landing of RCT-5 and 7 continued and the Division Command Post opened ashore. On 28 October Division Cpn Order 18-50 was issued, directing RCT-1 to protect the WONSAN - KOJO - MAJON-NI area, RCT-7 to move north to HAMHUNG, and RCT-5 to follow RCT-7 to the north. RCT-5 was assigned an interim mission of patrolling to the west between MUNCHON and YONGHUNG, while awaiting transportation. RCT-7 commenced its move to HAMHUNG by both rail and motor on 29 October. At the end of the month RCT-7 had moved to positions north of HAMHUNG and RCT-5 was enroute to HAMHUNG. RCT-1 continued to protect KOJO, WONSAN and MAJON-NI.

NOVEMBER

During the month of November, the Division operated against North Korean guerrilla forces in the WONSAN area and advanced on the HAMHUNG - CHINHUNG-NI - CHOSHIN RESERVOIR axis to YUDAM-NI, west of the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR. The month was characterized by increasingly low temperatures of a dry cold resembling arctic conditions. Temperatures as low as -20° F were experienced. This extreme cold resulted in many physical and mechanical difficulties associated with arctic operations. During the early part of November RCT-1 continued to operate against guerrilla forces in the WONSAN - MAJON-NI - MUNCHON - AMBON area and provided protection of WONSAN. The remainder of the Division was moved to the north of HAMHUNG to initiate operations against the CHOSHIN - FUSEN - RESERVOIR area. On 2 November, RCT-7 relieved the 26th ROK Regiment south of SUDONG and encountered strong CCF immediately. The following six days of heavy fighting by RCT-7 against the CCF, rendered the 124th CCF Division ineffective.

Meanwhile, the Division CP displaced to HUNGNAM on 4 November and RCT-5 moved into the SINHUNG valley, leading towards the FUSEN RESERVOIR. RCT-7 continued its advance to the north over the escarpment leading to the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR plateau and seized KOTO-RI on 11 November. On 10 November RCT-5 initiated movement from the SINHUNG VALLEY to positions along the MSR behind RCT-7. RCT-1 moved from the WONSAN area to the vicinity of CHIGYONG, south of HAMHUNG, during the period 14-16 November. With only sporadic patrol contacts, RCT-7 moved into HAGARU-RI on the south end of CHOSHIN RESERVOIR on 14 November. For the next ten days Division units patrolled aggressively with only occasional light contacts, the enemy apparently falling back into the rugged mountain area north and west of CHOSHIN RESERVOIR.

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On 22 November, X Corps ordered the Division to establish blocking positions to the north, east, and west of the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR with RCT-7 advancing on YUDAM-RI. RCT-1 moved from the CHIGYONG area to positions along the Division MSR between HAMHUNG and KOTO-RI. On 24 November, X Corps ordered elements of the 7th Infantry Division to relieve RCT-5 east of the RESERVOIR, and issued a warning order that the axis of advance would be changed to a northwesterly direction. Except for moderate resistance to the RCT-7 advance on YUDAM-RI, resistance during this period in the reservoir area consisted only of light patrol contacts. Persistent reports from civilians and other sources, however, indicated a build-up of CCF in strength on the open west flank of the Division.

In accordance with orders, RCT-7 secured YUDAM-RI on 25 November. On this same day X Corps Opn Order No. 7 directed the Division to attack at 0800, 27 November, advance to the northwest, sever the enemy's line of communication at MUPHONG-RI and continue the advance to the YALU RIVER in its zone. RCT-5 passed through RCT-7 at YUDAM-RI and jumped off in the attack at 0800, 27 November, meeting light resistance initially. Until this time enemy contacts in the YUDAM-RI area had been light with enemy forces withdrawing rapidly on the contact. Civilian reports however, continued to indicate a CCF build-up to the southwest, west and north, with possible enemy movements to the south in areas west of the MSR. Late on 27 November, elements of both RCT-5 and RCT-7 came under heavy attack from the southwest, west, and northwest. Convoys along the MSR from KOTO-RI to HAGARU-RI began receiving fire at this time, indicating an increase in enemy activity in this area. Motor elements of the Division CP closed HAGARU-RI on 27 November followed by the command group on 28 November in liaison type aircraft and helicopters.

Heavy attacks on RCT-5 and RCT-7 continued throughout the night of 27-28 November. On 28 November it became apparent that the enemy was in control of the MSR between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI, and HAGARU-RI and YUDAM-RI. Attempts to get convoys through on both sides of the roads were turned back by heavy enemy fire. During the afternoon of 28 November, the Division ordered RCT-5 and RCT-7 to hold positions in the vicinity of YUDAM-RI until the situation could be clarified. Attempts by a battalion of 7th Marines to open the MSR from YUDAM-RI to HAGARU-RI were unsuccessful. It became apparent at this time that the enemy would probably hold and attempt to seize HAGARU-RI, then held only by the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, less one company, and various Division Headquarters and Service elements. Accordingly orders were issued to move Task Force DRYSDALE, consisting of the 4th Independent Commando, RM, Co "G", 1st Marines, and Co "A", 1st Infantry, along with Companies "B" and "D", 1st Tank Battalion to HAGARU-RI. (LtCol Drysdale, RM, Commanding Officer, 4th Ind RM Commando).

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On the night of 28-29 November HAGARU-RI came under a heavy attack lasting until daylight 29 November. Enemy pressure on RCT-5 and RCT-7 in YUDAM-RI continued to be heavy. On 29 November, RCT-7 was ordered to clear the MSR between YUDAM-RI and HAGARU-RI employing the entire RCT, while RCT-5 was ordered to hold YUDAM-RI. Company "G", 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, 41st Commandos RM, and Co "D", 1st Tank Battalion reached HAGARU-RI at 2045 on 29 November after being heavily engaged all day en route from KOTO-RI. Co "B", 1st Tank Battalion, remnants of Co "B", 31st Infantry and elements of Division Headquarters which had been cut off from TF DRYSDALE returned to KOTO-RI. On the afternoon of 29 November, Division ordered RCT-5 and RCT-7 to withdraw to HAGARU-RI and approved a joint operation plan submitted by them. X Corps OI #19 was received at 2250 on 29 November by radio. This order placed all elements of the 7th Infantry Division in the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR - KOTO-RI area under operational control of the 1st Marine Division, directed the redeployment of one RCT from YUDAM-RI to HAGARU-RI to gain contact with elements of the 7th Infantry Division east of the Reservoir, and further directed the Division to coordinate all forces in and north of HAGARU-RI in a perimeter defense based on HAGARU-RI, and to open the HAGARU-RI - KOTO-RI MSR. In accordance with their Joint Operations Order #1-50, issued at 0600 on 30 November, RCT-5 and RCT-7 commenced their joint movement from YUDAM-RI to HAGARU-RI, bringing equipment, wounded, and dead. At 1400 on 30 November, X Corps Operation Order #8 was received confirming verbal orders of the previous night, to withdraw elements north and northwest of HAGARU-RI to the HAGARU-RI area and to secure the HAGARU-RI - SUDCIG MSR. On the night of 30 November - 1 December, RCT 31(-) east of the Reservoir came under heavy attack but the attack had been repulsed by daylight, 1 December. During the same night HAGARU-RI came under heavy attack and once again the attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

At the end of November the Division was generally disposed as follows:

## (1) YUDAM-RI AND JUST SOUTH THEREOF.

RCT-5  
RCT-7  
4th Bn, 11th Marines

## (2) HAGARU-RI

Division Command Post  
3d Bn, 1st Marines  
41st Ind Commando, RM  
Elements Division HQ and Service Troops  
Miscellaneous USA Units and Detachments

## (3) EAST OF CHOSHIN RESERVOIR 8 MILES NORTH OF HAGARU-RI

Elms 31st and 32nd Inf and 57th FA Bn under comd of CO, 31st RCT.

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(4) KOTO-RI

RCT-1 less 1st and 3d Battalions  
 2d Bn, 31st Inf (closed 1 December)  
 Recon Co  
 Elements Division Hq and Service Troops  
 Miscellaneous USA Units and Detachments

(5) CHINHJUNG-NI

1st Bn, 1st Marines  
 Division Service Elements  
 Miscellaneous USA Units and Detachments

(6) HUNGNAM AREA

Division Administrative Echelon  
 Elements of Division Hq and Service Troops  
 Combat Service Group, Reinforced

(7) WONSAN

1st Shore Party Battalion (Op control - 3d Infantry Div)

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At 1100 on 1 December, RCT-31 (-) USA, having passed to operational control of the 1st Marine Division the previous day, was ordered to make every effort to secure necessary exits from its position east of the Reservoir, and move south to HAGARU-RI at the earliest. In view of the critical requirement for holding HAGARU-RI, CO, RCT-31 was notified that no actual troop assistance could be furnished, although maximum air support would be immediately available. RCT-31 initiated movement to the south at noon with an air cover of 20 VF, but by midafternoon a combination of roadblocks and heavy CCF attacks had broken the column into separated groups. At 1825 the first group of approximately 125 of these personnel reached the HAGARU-RI perimeter followed by a second group of about 350. Remaining personnel of RCT-31 continued to arrive at HAGARU-RI during the following two days.

RCT-5 and RCT-7 continued their advance to the south to HAGARU-RI against repeated heavy enemy attacks from front, flanks, and rear. On 1 December the C-47 airfield at HAGARU-RI was completed and air evacuation of casualties was initiated immediately. The intensity of the CCF attack against RCT-5 and RCT-7 continued to build up, but both regiments continued to advance on HAGARU-RI, bringing their wounded and their equipment. Heavy close air support continued throughout all daylight hours with night fighters on station during hours of darkness. Leading elements of RCT-7 reached HAGARU-RI at about 1930 on 3 December and all elements of RCT-5 and RCT-7 completed closing HAGARU-RI by the afternoon of 4 December. Casualties were quickly treated at the Collecting Station at HAGARU-RI and evacuated by

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air. Troops of RCT-5 and RCT-7 were fed hot food and rested at HAGARU-RI on 4-5 December. At first light on 6 December, RCT-7 jumped off in the attack to the south to close KOTO-RI. The Division CP displaced from HAGARU-RI to KOTO-RI at 1420, 6 December. By late in the afternoon of 7 December all units from HAGARU-RI had closed KOTO-RI. Extension of the liaison airfield at KOTO-RI to accommodate C-47 aircraft permitted the evacuation of casualties from KOTO-RI. On 8 December, RCT-7 jumped off in the attack to the south to seize key terrain features on the east and west sides of the mountain road leading to CHINHUNG-RI. RCT-5 seized objectives dominating a portion of the road, and the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines attacked north to seize Hill 1081 dominating the southern half of the road to CHINHUNG-RI. RCT-1 less the 1st Battalion continued to hold KOTO-RI as a base of operations for the Division. On 9 December as the advance continued, a vital bridge on the mountain road to the south was constructed by the 1st Engineer Battalion, and Division trains were started to the south for CHINHUNG-RI. Early on 10 December the first elements of the Division began arriving at CHINHUNG-RI and were dispatched to the HUNGKAM Area. The Division CP displaced from KOTO-RI to HUNGKAM at 1030, 10 December. Division units began arriving in the HUNGKAM Area at 1800, 10 December. RCT-1 covering the rear of the Division moved down through the mountain passes on the night of 10-11 December and initiated movement to the HUNGKAM Area.

Following the CINCPAC decision to withdraw X Corps from North Korea, the Division commenced embarkation in assigned shipping at HUNGKAM on 11 December. An advance echelon of the Division headquarters displaced by air to PUSAN at 1400, 12 December and opened the advance CP at MASAN at 1930, 13 December. All units of the Division had arrived in the MASAN area by late afternoon 17 December. Measures were rapidly initiated for rest, rehabilitation, re-equipping and re-supply of the command, pending recommitment of the Division to combat operations at an early date.

8. ENEMYa. General NK Order of Battle

(1) The enemy order of battle picture during the WONSAN-HAMHUNG-CHOSHIN operation ran the gamut from retreating North Korean rifle divisions, attempting to thread their way through the Division zone in order to rejoin the NKPA being reorganized, according to persistent reports, in the KANGSŬE area, to a Chinese Army from which the remnants of an entire battalion surrendered to our forces at HAGARU-RI. Several well organized and skillfully led, though understrength, NK units were encountered, the best being among which were the 2nd, 5th and 15th Divisions.

(2) Strength.

While the strength of these withdrawing units may never be known, frequent agent and civilian reports indicated that the number operating as part of

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organized groups reached as high as 15,000. No attempt can be made to estimate the number of stragglers and deserters, who in civilian clothing appeared, and were usually accepted throughout the area as local citizens or displaced persons returning to their homes.

(3) Equipment.

In general, the equipment of the organized units consisted only of the more mobile weapons and whatever amounts of ammunition could be easily carried. Rifles, burp guns, machine guns and mortars were common. The stragglers and deserters, dressed in civilian clothing, carried no weapons.

(4) Location and movement.

The center of activity during the WONSAN phase of the operation lay along the most favorable escape route to the north, which entered the Division zone in the vicinity of KOJO on the south, continued to the northwest through ANBYON, westward to MAJON-NI and finally north through YONGHUNG, CHIGYONG and HUKSU-RI. Along this route the 2nd, 5th, and 10th NK Divisions, probably under the overall command of a Major General, slowly made their way, striking periodically and with a fair measure of success along the various Division MSRs, eventually clearing the Division zone at HUKSU-RI. At the same time, the 15th NK Division, apparently permanently disposed, and nearer full strength, remained in the general MAJON-NI - POPTONG-NI area in the IMJIN River Valley conducting guerrilla operations against our forces defending the important road junction town of MAJON-NI and the MSR thereto.

b. Specific North Korean Order of Battle.

(1) 15th NK Rifle Division.

The 15th NK Division consisting of the 46th, 48th and 50th Regiments had successfully withdrawn from the PUSAN perimeter following the UN offensive of 15 September 1950, and had moved without serious losses to the MAJON-NI area, where according to PW reports, the Division was to remain until the communists launched their counteroffensive, which would be commenced upon the arrival in KOREA of JCF forces then crossing the YALU River.

(2) 2nd, 5th, and 10th NK Division.

The above units were, according to a PW who claimed to be the driver for a regimental commander, executing the northward movement together, with the 5th Division serving as the point. Elements of this combined force demonstrated its organization and aggressiveness on at least three occasions in the WONSAN area, commencing with the attack on elements of the 1st Marines at KOJO on 27 October, by the 5th NK Division; a second attack on the WONSAN - MAJON-NI MSR, and lastly an attack on US Army units at YONGHUNG. The efficiency

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and aggressiveness with which these attacks were effected may be attributed to the fact that the 2nd and 5th NK Divisions were among the first NK units to invade South KOREA and were largely composed of troops who had previously served with the CCF in CHINA.

c. General Chinese Communist Order of Battle.

The appearance on the Order of Battle scene, in early November, of a full Division of Chinese Communist troops served to divert attention from the withdrawing North Korean Peoples Army. By 27 November 1950, the Chinese Communist Forces facing the Division had swelled from a single division, fighting a delaying action, to several armies staging a vicious, all out counteroffensive. In two days the entire Division, stretching from YUDAM-NI to KOTO-RI, some 21 miles, had been attacked from all sides by a veritable sea of aggressive, well-trained, highly disciplined and skillfully led Chinese Communists whose documented mission was to destroy the 1st Marine Division.

(1) Composition.

These forces included units from the 3rd and 4th CCF Field Armies, veterans of both the fighting against the Japanese during World War II and against the Chinese Nationalists following that war. Well trained, well organized, well equipped and under able leadership, these forces were highly effective, and performed creditably during the CHOSHIN phase of the operation.

The general enemy plan for the employment of his forces within the Division zone was the assignment of one army, the 42nd CCF Army of the 13th Army Group, 4th Field Army to a delaying action south of the CHOSHIN and FUSEK RESERVOIRS, meanwhile bringing up the larger and more effective forces of the 3rd CCF Field Army to launch a counteroffensive. Thus it was, that the 124th Division of the 42nd Army was charged with the mission of delaying the advance of the 7th Marines along the HAMHUNG - HACHARU-RI axis.

Once this delaying action had been completed and the 42nd Army relieved by elements of the 3rd Field Army, the counteroffensive was staged, utilizing the 8th Army Group which probably consisted of the 20th, 24th, 26th, 27th, 30th, 32nd and 33rd Armies. Evidence supports the presence of elements of all but the 33rd CCF Army in the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR - HAMHUNG area prior to the evacuation of HUNGNAM by UN forces on 24 December 1950. Outstanding among the armies committed were the 20th, 26th and 27th, each of which had been, according to PW interrogation, augmented by a division from the 30th CCF Army in April 1950 in the SHANGHAI area. These were the Armies which pushed the determined attack against Division forces in their attempts to annihilate all UN forces in the CHOSHIN - HAMHUNG area. All factors considered, it is believed that at least 10 and probably 12 divisions of three CCF armies saw action during this period.

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The highest command echelon of the forces opposing the Division was the Field Army, which was subdivided into Army Groups, which in turn contained several armies, each consisting ordinarily of 3 divisions, with the exception of the 20th, 26th and probably the 27th Armies which, as previously stated, contained four divisions each. Chinese Communist Divisions are based on the triangular organization with 3 infantry regiments and one artillery battalion. In addition to that artillery usually found in each division, a minimum of one artillery regiment is considered organic to the army, with indications that an artillery division is attached to an army where the situation demands and allows it. One Division and probably more moved into the CHOSHIN area without organic artillery due to the almost prohibitive nature of the terrain.

(3) Strength

The normal strength of the Chinese Communist Division is approximately 10,000. During the period of this report the enemy units opposing the Division were believed to be at virtually full strength. Thus the normal army strength, inclusive of headquarters and supporting units usually totalled around 35,000, and in the case of the reinforced 24th, 26th and 27th Armies probably between 40,000 - 45,000. It is estimated that 100,000 Chinese, or the equivalent of 10 full sized divisions were employed against the Division from the initial enemy attack on 27 November until the final elements of the Division had closed the HAMHUNG area some two weeks later.

(4) Equipment

Ironically enough it was with U.S. weapons that the Chinese troops were, for the most, armed. These included the 60mm and 81mm mortars, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and heavy and light machine guns, most of which had been captured from Chinese Nationalist Forces.

d. Specific Chinese Communist Order of Battle.

(Movement, Location and Disposition)

(1) 124th CCF Division, 42nd Army, 13th ArmyGroup4th Field Army

The 124th Division crossed the YALU River about 20 October, moving southward from the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR into the SUDONG area about 30 October. Composed of the 370th, 371st and 372nd Regiments, this Division had an overall strength of 12,500. Seventy percent of the personnel, according to PW reports, were former members of the Chinese Nationalist Army.

The mission of the 124th Division was to block the movement of the 7th Marines toward the CHOSHIN

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RESERVOIR. The 7th Marines attack began at noon 2 November and by nightfall of 6 November the remnants of a once full strength Division had begun their hasty retreat northward toward HAGARU-RI. The 370th and 371st Regiments had been successively defeated in fierce ground action, and late on the 6th of November the 372nd Regiment, moving up from its reserve position, was virtually annihilated by a heavy artillery barrage which caught it moving into position on a ridge once held, and then vacated by our forces. The enemy broke contact that night and except for stragglers and deserters the Division was not again engaged.

20th CCF Army, 9th Army Group, 3rd FieldArmy

Assigned the mission of seizing YUDAM-RI, and severing the Division MSR at the same time, this army bore the brunt of the massive CCF counteroffensive launched against the Division and two battalions of the 7th Infantry Division in the CHOSHII RESERVOIR area. Consisting of the organic 58th, 59th and 60th Divisions and reinforced by the 89th Division, the 20th Corps had commenced crossing the YALU on 10 November, and marching on foot at night, the 20th Army moved to the YUDAM-RI area and took up positions along the KOTO-RI - YUDAM-RI axis awaiting the signal to attack, while other elements of the 9th Army Group followed them into the CHOSHII area.

The 89th Division, first to be committed, was assigned the mission of blocking the westward movement of the Division from YUDAM-RI. Numerous roadblocks were set up by the enemy, and on 22 November contact with the 7th Marines was effected. Initially light, the resistance of the 89th Division increased as the 7th Marines approached YUDAM-RI. At about 1800 hours, 27 November, the enemy launched his counteroffensive hitting simultaneously both the 7th and 5th Marines, which had reinforced the 7th Marines from the eastern side of the Reservoir. At this time elements of the 26th and 27th CCF Armies were either in the general area or slowly arriving. The dispositions of the Divisions of the 20th and 27th Armies, already arrived in the area, were, on the night of 27 November, generally as follows:

59th Division: All three regiments probably committed against the 5th and 7th Marines at YUDAM-RI on the night of 27 November from out of the southwest, where they had been disposed along the road leading to CHANG-RI. The 59th Division drew back at daylight.

89th Division: Attacked from the west and northwest against both the 7th and 5th Marines along the MUPYONG-RI - YUDAM-RI road, breaking contact after daylight.

79th Division: (A unit of the 27th Army but an integral part of the coordinated attack against Division units) Committed all of its regiments, coming up from the draws and valleys leading out of the high ground north and west of YUDAM-RI. The 79th probably backed up

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by the 81st, showed a tenacity not evidenced in units of the 20th Corps in that it continued its attack against the 5th Marines all night and throughout the following day, maintaining its pressure against our lines until 1 December.

58th Division: Not committed on 27 November, it was disposed along the valley road leading southwest from HAGARU-RI toward SAMDASPYONG, waiting perhaps, or not yet in position to launch a coordinated attack (The remaining 27th Army units were disposed to the east of the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR where elements attacked the 7th Infantry Division).

30th Division: Disposed astride the Division MSR between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI with the mission of severing our supply line. It moved into position on the night of 27 November, and attacked a friendly convoy on the following day.

The 20th Army maintained these same relative positions up through 2 December, with the exception of the 89th Division, which probably began its movement to the southwest toward SACHANG-RI and HUKSU-RI en route to MAJON-DONG for further action against our MSR. It later was identified around 10 December in the SUDONG area.

As our regiments began the withdrawal from YUDAM-RI, pressure against the rear guard was maintained by the 79th Division and perhaps the 81st, while the 59th Division furnished most of the opposition to the forward elements, defending fiercely from prepared high ground positions, heaviest in the 4,000 foot mountain pass locale, and launching almost incessant attacks against the flanks of the two-regiment convoy. Interrogation of prisoners revealed that enemy casualties had been heavy, not only from air and ground action but also as a result of the sub-zero cold. At this same time, the 58th Division had tried on two different occasions to overrun our positions and the air strip at HAGARU-RI, once on the 28th and once on the 30th of November. Both efforts were costly and unsuccessful. Prisoners said artillery fire broke up an attack planned for the night of 29 November. In the meantime, the 60th Division had struck out at our convoys and had cut in many places the MSR between HAGARU-RI and CHINHUNG-RI. It also launched a strong, regimental-sized attack against the 2d Bn, 1st Marines, at KOTO-RI.

As our withdrawal was effected, the 30th Army Divisions moved south simultaneously. Most of the action against our movement by the 20th Army was furnished by the 60th Division, which gradually shifted its strength southward around KOTO-RI and to the high ground overlooking the circuitous road between KOTO-RI and CHINHUNG-RI. Heavy resistance from HAGARU-RI southward was also offered by elements of the newly-arrived 26th Army, probably made up of four divisions.

The 26th Army moved into the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR area along the east side shortly after the 20th Army went into YUDAM-RI.

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Prisoner interrogation revealed that the entire 26th Army moved into the high ground between HAGARU-RI and KOTO-RI around the 1st of December. The 76th and 77th Divisions, the only divisions out of this army identified by prisoners, are known to have been disposed both east and southeast of HAGARU-RI, from which positions they attacked the main and rear elements of our convoy from HAGARU-RI after 5 December. Prisoners from both the 76th and 77th Divisions were captured at KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI on 5 December. In an ATIS Interrogation Report No. 2730, 19 December 1950, a PW from the 228th Regt, 76th Div, 26th Army, gave the following information: "The entire 76th Division arrived at KOTO-RI in early December and deployed in the neighboring mountains. There were many other CCF divisions in this area.

"On the march from the Manchurian border to KOTO-RI, the 76th Division was subjected to air attacks almost daily, and movement was only at night. The number of casualties due to air attacks was small. CCF wounded and stragglers, mostly with trench foot, were observed going back toward the Manchurian border. At KOTO-RI the 76th Division and other CCF units had surrounded the UN units, but due to severe air attacks and artillery, the CCF suffered heavy casualties and did very little fighting." It is thought that the 76th Division was practically annihilated. As a result of the heavy casualties, the PW and about 100 other Chinese surrendered on 5 December. By the time our troops had pulled down to KOTO-RI, the 20th and the 26th Armies had begun to close in the same general area east and west of the MSR. From there the 26th Army took the lead and moved south from KOTO-RI in advance of the 20th Army. The 26th Army was made up of the 76th, 77th, 78th and 98th (?) Divisions, the latter being added in SHANGHAI in early October, according to a PW.

27th Army, 9th Army Group, 3rd Field Army:

Insufficient information is available on this army to present a true picture of its complete order of battle due to adverse operating conditions under which friendly units were fighting when in contact with units of this army. It is thought that the army consisted of four divisions, two of which were committed west of the CHOSHIN RESERVICIR and two on the east side against elements of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. The four divisions were the 79th, 80th, 81st and 90th Divisions.

The 79th Division took part in the counteroffensive that was launched on 27 November at YUDAM-RI when it attacked the northern perimeter against elements of the 5th Marines. The attack continued heavy and close throughout the night and the next day, and was conducted intermittently through 1 December. All three regiments, 235, 236 and 237, were identified. In addition, two questionable identifications were made along the west flank of the 79th Division and northwest of YUDAM-RI. The 5th Marines took prisoners who claimed to be from the 281st Division and the 61st Division. In view of the organization of the 27th Army, it is believed that at least one and probably the remainder of

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these prisoners actually were members of the 81st, thought to be in the same general area with the 79th.

In addition, the rest of the 27th Army is considered to have been committed in the initial attacks against U.S. Army units east of the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR. The 80th Division was identified in that locale and probably a second division participated in part of the action. In the final analysis, prior to the complete withdrawal of UN Forces, the 79th, 80th and 81st Divisions were positively identified in the CHIGYONG-HAMHUNG area. In this case, the fourth division of the 27th--the 90th Division-- is considered to have been held in reserve. This division, as with the 88th and 89th, was originally a part of the 30th Army but was attached to the 27th Army for the purpose of this operation.

e. Enemy Tactics

(1) North Korean Guerrilla Tactics

North Korean guerrilla tactics, in general, envisaged small unit operations, usually of platoon size, highly mobile, inconspicuous, and strong enough to carry out the average guerrilla attack. These attacks were conducted only on such occasions as promised absolute success, at night, and preceded by patrols or espionage agents. A fair measure of success was attained, especially against our MSR where convoys were considered a prime target. In all other respects the North Korean guerrilla tactics were essentially the same as those generally associated with this type warfare, with success due in large measure to the passive attitude of the civilian population toward agents who easily penetrated our lines to determine the strength and disposition of friendly units.

(2) Tactics of the Chinese Communist Forces

(a) General

The basic concept of Chinese Communist tactics visualizes the employment of superior numbers of troops to launch a frontal attack in coordination with strong enveloping tactics designed to fold the flanks of the defending force, to isolate, surround and eventually destroy piecemeal.

(b) Attack

According to a captured Chinese document, one of the primary phases of Chinese offensive doctrines is to "first surround the enemy and cut off their route of supply and retreat." This point is well illustrated in the roadblocking activities conducted between KOTO-RI and HAGARU-RI, and later CHISHUNG-RI and KOTO-RI, where the enemy cut our MSR in coordination with efforts to destroy our forces at YUDAM-RI and HAGARU-RI.

The second step in the enemy's offensive plan is that of the actual attack, which the documents, must be

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in depth and, "using the triangle formation, the force advancing toward the enemy front must not exceed two-thirds of the strength of the total. The forward units must carry all the weapons and grenades possible."

Enemy attacks were characterized by preliminary probings by 8 to 15 man groups whose mission was to feel out our lines, create confusion just prior to the main attack, to draw fire and thus determine our outline and expend our ammunition. Preliminary probings were followed in 5 to 10 minutes by the main attack, with the enemy moving within small arms range in column formation before deploying as skirmishers. The brunt of the attack was aimed at the weakest portions of our lines, direction often being changed when strong points were inadvertently hit. The Chinese usually advanced at a walk, but sometimes at a trot or run, attempting to find a favorable point of entry into our immediate positions. Sharp hill facings were avoided in favor of the gentler slopes. When the approach was channelized, he attacked while still in column. Where terrain was open, a skirmish line was used.

Front line reports indicate that Chinese tactics also include the employment of marching fire, with submachine gun the principal weapon employed. Attacks were almost without exception accompanied by shouting, screaming, blowing of bugles and whistles and the clashing of cymbals. Few attacks were supported by mortars, that weapon apparently reserved for use against supply installations and resupply movement, and command posts. According to the S-2, 5th Marines the Chinese aim was not so much the overrunning of front line positions for the sake of wiping out the defenders, but primarily to gain entrance into secondary and rear areas. In those instances where the Chinese were successful in penetrating our positions, they made no attempt to stop and reorganize, but wildly continued the attack with the ultimate aim of destroying our unit integrity.

Friendly counterattacks invariably caught the enemy by surprise and he was usually routed. The enemy usually broke off contact at daylight, covering his withdrawal with small groups whose mission was to draw fire away from the retreating enemy. Chinese attacks were usually launched during periods of darkness in order to minimize the effectiveness of friendly air and artillery. These attacks were excellently coordinated and well controlled.

While Chinese Communist large scale operations include plans for envelopments simultaneously with frontal attacks, few instances of flanking movements on a small unit scale were reported.

#### (c) Defense

Conventional Chinese Communist defensive tactics envisaged a determined stand against the main attack, in coordination with envelopments of the flanks and rear of advancing forces; this to isolate, prevent escape, reinforcement and resupply, and eventually to destroy piecemeal. Never completely successful,

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the enemy did succeed in slipping behind and between the two advance battalions of the 7th Marines, briefly on 3 November.

Based on the premise that our forces would attack only during daylight and then only along established road nets, the enemy so disposed himself as to cover these routes of approach, as a result of which friendly forces on several occasions, by using covered routes of approach, penetrated enemy positions without detection.

Whenever possible the enemy avoided the crests of ridges or high ground in setting up his defenses, preferring the less vulnerable forward and reverse slopes. These forward slope positions were occupied until rendered untenable, at which time reverse slope positions were assumed by movement around the high ground rather than over the ridges. Counterattacks from reverse slopes at such time as friendly troops had occupied the crests were common.

**(d) Roadblocks and MSR Attacks**

One of the primary features of the delaying action conducted by the Chinese between HAGARURI and YUDAM-RI was the extensive use of roadblocks. These roadblocks were usually constructed of native materials or consisted of demolition cratered roads, and were sited on sharp curves or in defiles, so placed as to be covered by mutually supporting positions on adjacent high ground. These obstacles were habitually and effectively used, Chinese tactical doctrine laying great stress on MSR activities as a defensive as well as an offensive measure.

**(e) Cover and Concealment**

Chinese troops were well disciplined in individual passive air defense. During the period preceding the Chinese counteroffensive, aerial reconnaissance reported only small concentrations in the areas adjacent to our MSR. Actually, there were at least 4 CCF divisions in the area of search at this time. While the enemy, in general, made excellent use of local materials to camouflage his positions, he made little attempt to conceal track activity leading to these positions, a factor of much assistance to the Division photo interpreters in their study of enemy defensive installations.

**9. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS**

a. General. The Division's operations throughout this period varied from combating guerrilla warfare to the successful conduct of a tactical withdrawal against heavy CCF resistance on all sides over a single route, approximately 35 miles in length, and in weather approaching arctic conditions.

b. Specific results of operations are as follows:

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- (1) Administrative landing at WONSAN, KOREA.
- (2) Protection of the WONSAN area from aggressive NK Army guerrilla operations.
- (3) Movement of the Division by rail and road to the HAMHUNG area.
- (4) Successful operations against elements of the 42nd CCF Army, culminating in the seizure of the CHOSHIN RESERVOIR area and advance to YUDAM-RI.
- (5) Conduct of a successful withdrawal from YUDAM-RI to the HAMHUNG area against strong CCF forces. Tactical unity and control were maintained throughout this phase of the operation, in spite of a sub-zero climate, a single road in poor condition, and mountainous terrain and heavy enemy resistance on all sides. This withdrawal was conducted as planned with systematic evacuation of casualties by air and carrying all equipment that could be transported in available transportation.
- (6) The Division benefited greatly from an operational standpoint, in the experience gained in the following operations:

- (a) Conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.
- (b) Tactical and non-tactical movement of elements of the Division over long distances by both motor and rail.
- (c) All types of patrolling, both day and night.
- (d) Movement and successful attack against numerically superior CCF forces.
- (e) Extensive use of close air support for column cover and normal close air support missions.
- (f) Conduct of combat operations and individual survival under weather conditions bordering on arctic (dry) cold.

## PART I

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONSa. Personnel(1) Personnel System(a) Comment

The conclusion reached in the IPCHON-SEOUL operation that the Marine Corps Personnel System is sound and well adapted to combat conditions was substantiated during the WONSAN-CHOSHIN-HUNGNAM operation.

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1950(b) Recommendation

That no change of a major nature be made in the Marine Corps Personnel System.

(2) Training of Personnel to Administer the Personnel System(a) Comment

The comments submitted in the Special Action Report for the IFCHON-SEOUL operation regarding the necessity for more realistic training, both formal and field, in personnel matters was further demonstrated. As more experience was gained during combat, a gradual improvement in personnel management and personnel administration at all echelons has been noted. This increase in administrative efficiency would have been much more rapid if officers and non-commissioned officers had received more adequate training in personnel matters prior to participation in combat.

(b) Recommendations

1. That the instruction in personnel work presented at the Marine Corps Schools for unrestricted officers be analyzed with a view to providing instruction which will develop a better understanding of the operation of the Personnel System during combat.

2. That an intensive three month course in personnel management and personnel administration be established for the training of Limited Duty Officers and Warrant Officers in the specialty of administration, and a small number of unrestricted officers of company grade.

3. That training directives issued at all echelons include more adequate field training in personnel work.

(3) Civil Affairs(a) Comment

So many Military Government (Civil Affairs) problems were encountered during the operation that it was necessary to request that a Civil Affairs Team be assigned by I Corps. Although this team was of some assistance, its small size and lack of knowledge of Marine Corps organization hampered its effectiveness. In operations conducted in populated areas, a Division commander has certain civil affairs responsibilities which cannot be ignored. Personnel must be assigned in such areas to handle civil affairs problems on a full-time basis. Such personnel must be especially trained for the job, and it is desirable that they be Marines.

(b) Recommendation

That a Fleet Marine Force Civil Affairs unit be assigned to each Marine Division engaged in com-

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bat operations in a populated area. That higher headquarters provide essential Civil Affairs personnel, equipment and transportation to Marine Divisions when division operations will be in populated areas.

b. Intelligence

No change from the comments and recommendations contained in Annex EALYR to Special Action Report for the INCHON-SEOUL Operation.

c. Operations

(1) Effectiveness of current doctrines relating to planning. Current planning doctrines are effective and satisfactory. Planning however, requires time, and sufficient time was frequently not allowed by higher directives.

(2) Command Relationships. Practical effectiveness of existing doctrines for command relationship is satisfactory. Variations from doctrines in this phase of the operation were the same as those presented for the INCHON - KIMPO - SEOUL Operation and were discussed in that report.

(3) Effectiveness of ship-to-shore movement was not applicable in this phase, since landing at WONSAN became a "ferrying" operation of an administrative type instead of an assault landing.

(4) Technique of beach assault. Not applicable.

(5) Naval Gunfire Techniques.

a. Comment. During the period covered by this action report, Naval Gunfire was never used under centralized control within this command. However, it was used in isolated instances by separate units of the Division, and by X Corps during the evacuation from HUNGAM. See Annex DOG DOG for detailed comments and recommendations and for detailed account of NCF activities.

During the activities of the 1st Marines in the FOJO-WONSAN Area between 26 October to about 4 November, Naval Gunfire support was supplied by two DD's, USS Hank and USS English. The USS Sperry replaced USS Hank during these activities. Firing during this period consisted of a considerable amount of night illuminating fire, and a small amount of harassing and interdiction fire at night, and neutralization fires on enemy troops during patrol operations.

Two SFCP's at reduced strength were sent to the I Corps - ROE Army commencing 26 October. One of these teams was returned to the Division on 14 November. The other team remained with the ROE forces until they were returned to, and evacuated from HUNGAM.

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Gunfire support was provided to these forces by the USS Lind, and the USS St. Paul. In the northern area where the ROK units were operating, the appearance of a naval vessel off the coast was sufficient to cause the MI forces to withdraw inland beyond range of NGF. The use of NGF contributed greatly to the operations of the ROK forces in the northern area and particularly to the crossing of the ORANGCHOW River at HOKO Station.

On 14 November, 1 SFCP was assigned to the 3d Inf Div, USA by X Corps. On 4 December 1 SFCP was ordered to the 7th Inf Div USA. On 5 December, 1 SFCP and 1 Regt Liaison Team were ordered to the 3d Inf Div, USA. On 11 December, 4 more SFCP and 1 Regt Liaison Team were attached to 3d Inf Div and 1 more SFCP to the I ROK Corps. These teams were used by X Corps in covering the evacuation of the UN forces from HUNGNAM. The last of these teams departed HUNGNAM on 23 December. The evacuation was covered with extensive illumination and H&I fires during the night periods, and neutralization of NGF contributed greatly to the success of the evacuation of that area.

Approximate ammunition expenditures for the WONSAN - HUNGAM beach and the HUNGAM evacuation were as follows:

<u>8 October - 14 December</u>		<u>15 December - 24 December</u>	
8" HC	860 rounds	8" HC	2308 rounds
8" AAP	4 rounds	8" AP	0 rounds
5" AAC	2940 rounds	5" AAC	8391 rounds
Ill	2150 rounds	Ill	2790 rounds
VT	16 rounds	VT	109 rounds
Total	5970	Total	13,598

As illustrated above, the ammunition expenditures during the evacuation phase were nearly three times that of the operational phase preceding the evacuation.

At all times the enemy evidenced a respect for Naval Gunfire and avoided it whenever he could. On occasions the enemy withdrew from an area whenever a naval vessel appeared off-shore.

b. Recommendations. See Annex DOG DOG, Naval Gunfire.

(6) Close Air Support.

a. Comment. An analysis of close air support during this operation is contained in Annex CHARLIE CHARLIE, Air Section. During this phase reliance upon support by Marine and Naval tactical aircraft was stressed more than ever before. This fact was largely the result of the overall nature of the operation which, in the final analysis, was characterized by movement along narrow but widely dispersed fronts, in mountainous terrain with limited opportunity to register and emplace artillery, and out of range of Naval Gunfire support.

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As a result, air support during daylight hours was the predominant supporting arm throughout the period. The degree of precision and timeliness attained might be misleading when viewed in the light of what might be expected in a normal operation. In the opening days of this phase, support aircraft were employed over convoys resupplying units at HOJO and MAJON-NI. By having an OY aircraft patrolling ahead and to the flanks of the column, and support aircraft overhead, it was not uncommon for a target to be destroyed within two minutes after the convoy commander expressed such a request. By constantly patrolling overhead, the support aircraft often had the target in sight before the actual request was made. The practice of having support aircraft working directly with the regimental and battalion tactical air control parties became standard procedure whenever a unit advanced beyond range of the tactical air request net could reasonably be expected to need air support.

As a result of utilizing the same aircraft day after day, and committing them to support of front line units during their time on station, the majority of pilots in the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had the qualifications desired of an airborne tactical air coordinator. These pilots knew the tactical situation through daily contact with it; they knew the position of each unit and could accurately judge those localities where targets were most likely to appear and what type of target it would be. This unity between ground and air elements became nearly ideal during the advance from YUTAM-NI to the south, and it is no exaggeration to state that the successful conclusion of this operation would have been nearly impossible without the amount and quality of close air support that was provided. It was an ideal combat example of the ultimate perfection of the air-ground team needed to defeat an aggressive, determined enemy.

Throughout the operation the technique of close support as set forth in prescribed manuals was followed exclusively. Several mechanical innovations necessary to improve or implement the prescribed technique were resorted to and have been described either in previous action reports or in the Air Section annex of this report. The more important of these are:

1. Utilizing the air support section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two as an integral part of the Division air control organization.
2. Adding the airborne control of support aircraft to the missions of the attached VMO squadron.
3. Employing two forward air controllers per battalion tactical air control party.
4. Emergency employment of an airborne tactical air control unit.

(b) Recommendations. See Annex CHARLIE  
CHARLIE, Air Support.

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1950(7) Detailed Observations of Effectiveness of  
Marine Corps Weapons including Aircraft.

a. Comment. Weapons with which the Marine Corps has been equipped during operations in KOREA have demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness. Particularly effective among the infantry weapons have been the 4.2" Mortar and the 75mm Recoilless Rifle. The latter has been extensively used in its role as an assault gun and has been particularly effective when employed against field fortifications. All small arms and automatic weapons have demonstrated a high degree of effectiveness with the exception of the carbine on which a special study is being conducted. Marine aircraft have been outstandingly successful against all type of targets encountered in this theater, with particular emphasis on the effectiveness of rockets and napalm.

b. Recommendations. None not previously covered.

(8) T/O

a. Comment. The inclusion of an AGLICO organic to the Division does not appear to be the most efficient solution of the problem for provision of TACP and NGF teams. Due to the wide flexibility of air support, it has been the practice in this Division to habitually attach TACPs to Regiments. On the other hand, the limitations of NGF support indicate that only during amphibious or coastal operations can NGF teams be profitably employed. This Division is currently studying the feasibility of a Close Air Support Control Company which would provide all facilities for close air support including TACPs. Under such a system, the air support platoon would be merged with the Close Air Support Control Company. The most economic employment of NGF teams can be realized by provision of naval gunfire personnel to the Division only at such times as NGF support is being employed. Provision of NGF support personnel from a Fleet Marine Force pool to Division as required would appear to represent the most efficient means of employing NGF personnel.

b. Recommendation. No specific recommendation at this time. This subject will be considered in a detailed study at a later date.

(9) Form of T/O

a. Comment. Present form of T/O does not list major items of equipment at the end of the T/O. A brief listing of major ordnance and items of equipment at the end of the T/O would be a great convenience and ready reference.

b. Recommendation. That major armament and major items of equipment including transportation, be listed at the end of each T/O for company and larger sized units.

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(10) Historical Diaries and Action Reports

a. Comment. It has become apparent in the preparation of Historical Diaries and Action Reports that considerable needless duplication exists. For example, a detailed combat narrative is required under the "Operations" paragraph of the Special Action Report. The exact duplication of this is required in the Historical Diary in recording a day by day historical account of the action. The Special Action Report should be more of an objective analysis of the action, rather than a historical account. At present it requires so much detail, appendices and annexes that its preparation is a slow and cumbersome major project that throws a great burden on the preparing agencies during continuing combat operations.

b. Recommendation. That the form and the requirements of a Special Action Report be revised to exclude those portions which are included in a Historical Diary.

(11) Historical Officer

a. Comment. Under current T/O, the Historical Section for a Division is furnished from Force Troops. It is believed that the War T/O for a division should include a Division Historical Officer of field grade. This officer should possess a sound and experienced tactical background as well as writing ability. This officer is needed in the collection, recording, compilation and editing of material for historical reports in addition to recording historical data.

b. Recommendation. That the "K" Series T/O for the Marine Division include a minimum of one officer of field grade for duty as Division Historical Officer, and that provision be made for appropriate clerical assistants.

(12) Patrolling

a. Comment. Operations in KOREA have re-emphasized the importance of patrolling as a security measure and as a means of gathering detailed information. It is believed that patrolling has received insufficient emphasis in unit training programs. There is a growing tendency to place too much reliance on air observation for intelligence information that should be developed in detail by thorough ground reconnaissance.

b. Recommendation. That the conduct of patrolling operations of all types, both day and night including armored patrols be emphasized in unit training programs.

(13) Howitzer, Self-Propelled, 155mm

a. Comment. The self-propelled 155mm howitzer offers substantial advantages over its towed counterpart. The mobility of the mount is equal to that of the tractor prime-mover and has much greater speed. Flexibility of the self-propelled mount for rapidly changing

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sectors of fire is greater than the towed howitzer. If the occasion demands, the self-propelled mount may be used for direct fire in the assault of a fortified position. The only inherent disadvantage of the self-propelled mount lies in the fact that casualty to the motive power of the mount also immobilizes the howitzer. However the advantages outweigh this disadvantage.

b. Recommendation. That the 155mm howitzer battalion of the Marine Artillery Regiment be equipped with 155mm self-propelled howitzers.

(14) Basic Training

a. Comment. The exemplary combat record of the individual Marine, irrespective of his MOS or specialized duty, during the operations of the Division in November and December constituted a reaffirmation of the soundness of the Marine Corps policy of training all personnel to be basic Marines prior to assignment to specialties.

b. Recommendation. That the Marine Corps continue to stress the basic training of all Marines, regardless of specialty, in both recruit and basic training of the individual Marine.

d. Logistics

(1) Planning

a. Time was again out too short for adequate planning and was too limited to issue detailed logistic and embarkation plans. Of necessity the responsibility was again placed on unit commanders to insure that items carried were adequate to execute their respective assigned missions. The success of the operations, despite these difficulties, again proved that the training and doctrine of the Marine Corps was sound.

Recommendation: That ample planning time be allocated for the planning of any amphibious operation.

b. Planning should insure the allocation of time for the procurement of additional items of equipment and supplies required for winterization of vehicles, conversion or substitution of other types of equipment, issuing of cold weather clothing, and a comprehensive training program in its fitting, and a thorough indoctrination of all troops in cold weather operations.

Recommendation: That units scheduled for cold weather operations be allocated a minimum of three to four weeks for winterization of vehicles and equipment, and for training and indoctrination of personnel prior to their employment.

c. Shore Party Operations. The 1st Shore Party Battalion was required in this operation to actually engage in port operations with all the ramifications of dock unloading, berthing of shipping, improvis-

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Hq, 1stMarines, (Reinf),  
1stMarDiv, FMF,  
Yongch'on, KOREA  
15 Jan 1951

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF  
Subj: Special Action Report for Period 7 Oct to 15 Dec 1950  
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16  
(b) Division Memorandum No. 248-50

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to set forth the factual record of events, together with comments and recommendations resulting from the combat operations of this regiment, as an organic part of the 1st Marine Division, in carrying out its assigned mission to land at Wonsan, Korea, to move elements of the regiment to Kojo, Majon-ni, Chigyoung, Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri and cover the advance south of the First Marine Division from Koto-ri to Hamhung.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

1st Marines	Colonel L. B. FULLER
H&SCo, 1stMar.	(Capt F. P. TATUM)
ATCo, 1stMar.	(Capt G. E. PETRO)
4.2 Mortar Co, 1stMar.	(Capt F. J. FAURECK)
a. <u>1stBn, 1stMar.</u>	LtCol D. M. SCHUCK
b. <u>2dBn, 1stMar.</u>	LtCol A. SUTTER
c. <u>3dBn, 1stMar.</u>	LtCol T. L. RIDGE

During the period covered by this report the following division units were attached to this regiment as the tactical situation dictated:

Co C, 1stTkbN	Capt TAYLOR
Co D, 1stMedBn	LtComdr ANDERSON
Co B (Reinf), 1stSPBn	Maj BREZINSKI
1stPlat, 1stArmdAmphBn	Lt ANDERSON
Co C, 1stEngrBn	Capt HARMON
Co C, 1stMTBn	Capt RANDALL
2dBn, 11thMar	LtCol ADELMAN
1stBn, 65thInf, USA	LtCol SICLAIR
Co B, 7thMTBn	Capt JONES
Co B, 1stTkbN	Capt WILLIAMS
RcnCo, 1stMarDiv	Maj GALL
2dBn, 31stInf, USA	LtCol REIDY
185thEngrBn, USA	LtCol MC GAW

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. The preliminary planning for the Wonsan landing consisted of conferences between staff members of regiment and battalions for overall briefing on the aspects of the landing.

b. It was planned to land the regiment over beaches YELLOW 1 and 2 with the 3d Battalion landing on YELLOW 1,

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the 1st Battalion landing on YELLOW 2 and the 2d Battalion in reserve. There were assigned to the assault battalions, five (5) LSTs, preceded with LVTs to carry the assault troops ashore. The reserve battalion and command group were embarked on one APA, and the service elements, regimental weapons, and Marine units aboard a second APA.

c. The beach to be landed over was approximately 900 yards long and 200 yards wide. Directly inland from beach YELLOW 1 and running across the front of YELLOW 2 was a stream approximately thirty (30) feet wide. This was determined from intelligence studies to be unfordable for wheeled or tracked vehicles, except LVTs. It was decided at this time to employ LVTs to lift assault troops inland to the initial objective if such were practicable. The remaining tracked and wheeled vehicles were to proceed along the beach to the airfield site, then turn inland in order to proceed to the initial objective. This route was to be marked by tank reconnaissance teams landing with the assault waves.

d. On the evening prior to sailing of the LSTs, orders were received cancelling the assault landing and ordering an administrative landing over beach RED. This information was received too late to issue necessary orders other than dispatches to the assault battalions, that in lieu of an assault landing over beaches YELLOW, the regiment would land, as scheduled, administratively over Beach RED. The flow of this information to companies in the assault battalions presented a problem due to lack of communications facilities aboard the majority of the LSTs.

e. While underway from Inchon to Wonsan continuous changes were received ordering certain elements of the regiment to remain aboard ship upon arrival at Wonsan due to a shortage of rations ashore. Upon arrival at Wonsan orders were received to move the regiment by motor, in bounds, along the Wonsan-Pyongyang road. This, although never executed, brought to light the number of vehicles required to move a reinforced regiment, in combat readiness, over a great distance. The previous orders were cancelled and new orders were received to send one battalion, immediately upon landing, to Koko, thirty-five (35) miles south of Wonsan. This battalion was ordered to relieve elements of the Korean Marine Corps and provide security for ROK Army supplies located there. There was no planning initiated at regimental or battalion level due to the time element involved.

f. The remainder of the period at Wonsan this regiment was under the operational control of X Corps and, as such, planning was concurrent with the missions assigned by that headquarters.

g. From the time this regiment moved from Wonsan to Chigyoung, then to Chingung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, planning was continuous since many changes in orders, either modifications or cancellations, were involved.

h. Orders were issued and conferences held for the defense of Koto-ri and later the withdrawal from Koto-ri to Hamhung. No planning was initiated for the move from Hamnam by ship to Pusan. The RCT was only notified by the DivEmbo that assigned ships were in and to load vehicles aboard the Montague and troops on the General Collins,

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(Cont'd)4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. No special training or rehearsals were held in preparation for carrying out the assigned missions.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. Loading and embarkation at Inchon was accomplished with little or no difficulty. Delays were experienced due to shipping not being available since the LSTs were initially in use as lighters ferrying vehicles to APs and AKs. Once LSTs became available loading was accomplished efficiently.

b. The shipping allocated to the regiment at Inchon was adequate and provided very good to excellent accommodations for personnel.

c. The shipping assigned at Hwangnam on 13 Dec 50 to this regiment for the lift to Pusan was one AKA and one Army type transport. The AKA was loaded with cargo and vehicles and maximum service personnel. The Army transport, MSTG General Collins, having a capacity of 1785 personnel was loaded with the entire infantry regiment, an artillery regiment minus, and elements of the 7th Motor Transport and 1st Engineer Battalions. The total officers and men aboard was 5200. As a result of this overcrowding there was a serious inadequacy of billeting, messing, and washroom facilities.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA

a. The movement to the objective area was delayed repeatedly due to extensive mine sweeping of the sea approaches to the landing area.

b. The assault shipping arrived at Wonsan on 25 October but due to the limited amount of day-light remaining, landing of troops was delayed until the following day.

7. OPERATIONS

7-14 Oct 1950 - This period was utilized by all organizations of this command in reorganizing, rearming, re-equipping, planning, and outloading the regiment aboard assigned shipping for future operations in conjunction with, and as part of the X Corps. By 2400I on 14 October 1950 all ships were completely loaded and awaiting orders to get underway to the designated target area, by this time identified as Wonsan on the East Coast of Korea. The First and Third Battalions (Reinf), assigned as the assault battalions, were embarked on LSTs with the First having their command post on LST 1138 and the Third on LST 742. Other organizations of the regiment were embarked on the USS NOBLE (APA 219) and the USS OKANOGAN (APA 220) with the 2d Battalion and Regimental Headquarters on the USS NOBLE. Although the tremendous tides at Inchon considerably hampered the outloading by necessitating the scheduling of loading, plus withdrawal of LSTs with the rise and fall of the tide, the outloading was completed with a minimum of confusion.

15. The First and Third Battalions (Reinf), embarked in LSTs sailed from Inchon, Korea at daylight. The remainder of the regiment utilized the day in putting the final touches on the ship-to-shore phase involved in the landing at the

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target area.

16. First and Third Battalions (Reinf) underway. Routine schedule for elements of the regiment embarked on APAs.

17. Regimental Headquarters and 2d Battalion plus attached units sailed from Inchon, Korea at daylight. All organizations of this regiment now underway. Normal staff work plus regular ship-board training carried out by all units.

18 - 25 Entire regiment underway during the period for landing at Wonsan, Korea. D-Day was originally scheduled for 20 Oct 1950 but, due to the heavily mined sea approaches, was delayed until the task of mine-sweeping could be completed at least to the extent of bringing the large convoy of ships in to anchorage with some degree of safety. For five days the convoy cruised up and down the coast making 180° turns at approximately daylight and darkness each day. In the afternoon of the 25th the ships made an anchorage and troops were prepared for landing. However, since it was approximately 1530I by the time everything was in place, orders were received from the Division to delay the landing until first light on 26 Oct. During the period 17-25 Oct normal staff functions and ship-board training was carried out to include numerous briefings on the situation in the prospective target area and discussions of lessons learned during the INCHON - SEOUL campaign just completed.

26. At approximately 0900I assault elements of the First Marines (Reinf), beached at LST slips on the left of Beach YELLOW and commenced unloading. Regimental H&S Company, embarked on the USS NOBLE (APA 218), began boating personnel and vehicles at first light. The 2d Battalion, in Regimental reserve, was ordered to remain on board and land on order. Regimental H&S Company was landed over Beach YELLOW and moved initially into assembly in landing area, moved out on foot to positions in TA 5836 and 5936 where they set up a perimeter of defense. Positions were occupied for the night in this area at 1700I. 1st Battalion, after initial assembly in landing area, moved to a railhead situated on the old strip at Wonsan airfield for further movement to Kojo 35 miles south on the coast. At 0130I the first train of the 1st Battalion departed Wonsan for Kojo. Prior to dusk the Regimental Headquarters and Service Company, with the exception of staff officers handling the move of the 1st Battalion, had moved to the Command Post located in TA 5936E. No opposition was offered to the landing of the First Marines at Wonsan or to the movements carried out on this date.

27. At approximately 0200I, the last train of personnel of the 1st Battalion departed Wonsan for Kojo. A convoy composed of 1st Battalion and attached 7thMT Battalion vehicles, "F" Battery, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, 1st Plat, "C" Company, 1st Engr Battalion, and Detachment, "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, departed Wonsan for Kojo at first light. All supplies and equipment which could not be moved by rail were loaded in the convoy. The 3d Battalion from positions in TA 5836 and 5936 dispatched patrols to the West and Southwest for a distance of 6000 meters with no contacts being made within the area covered. The 1st Battalion at Kojo relieved the ROK unit there and outposted the town and surrounding hills. At approximately 1700I they were attacked by an estimated force of 1000-1200 NKA. (Later identified by POWs as elements of 10th Regt, 5th NK Division and unidentified guerrilla forces). This action continued throughout the

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night. Since the situation in the South seemed to be developing into a major engagement a decision was made to move the 2d Battalion with the remaining elements of the 4.2" Mortar Company and Anti-Tank Company (Aboard the USS OKANOGAN (APA 220) ), together with a command group of Regimental Headquarters, to Kojo to reinforce the 1st Battalion's positions. Orders were dispatched to the USS NOBLE and the USS OKANOGAN to execute the landings at first light on the 28th.

28. The 2d Battalion, and units embarked on the USS OKANOGAN were landed over Beaches YELLOW and RED. The 2d Battalion and Command group of Regimental Headquarters were entrained on two trains and departed Wonsan for Kojo at approximately 1630I, arriving thereat approximately 2230I. The 2d Battalion (-), 11th Marines plus the motor transport section of 2/1 was alerted to move to Kojo in convoy on the morning of the 29th. The 3d Battalion was ordered to move from its present positions to the town of Majon-ni (TA 3830), relieve elements of ROK unit thereat, establish blocking positions at the NORTH-SOUTH and EAST-WEST Road Junction, and destroy any enemy forces encountered within the area. This movement was made without incident and relief of ROK element completed at approximately 1700I. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, was attached to this regiment on this date to strengthen our forces within the immediate vicinity of Wonsan. They were assigned the mission of the security of Wonsan proper, with one company in position on Beach YELLOW alerted for motor move to ANEYON (TA 7222). Disposition of First Marines (Reinf) at this time was as follows:

KOJO (TA 0311)

1stMar (-), Forward Command Group  
1stBn, 1stMar  
2dBn, 1stMar  
F Btry, 2dBn, 11thMar  
1 Platoon, 4.2" Mortar Co  
1 Platoon, Co C, 1stEngrBn  
Det, Co D, 1stMedBn  
2 Platoons, 22d Co, 5th KMC Bn  
75MM RG Platoon, AT Co  
Det, Knglich, 1stSigBn

MAJON-NI (TA 3830)

3dBn, 1stMar  
D Btry, 2dBn, 11thMar  
1 Platoon, 4.2" Mortar Co  
Company C (-), 1stTkBn

TOGWON (TA 5936)

1stMar (-), Rear Command Group  
Co C (-), 1stEngrBn  
1 Platoon, 22d Co, 5th KMC Bn  
Co D (-), 1stMedBn  
AT Co (-)  
4.2" Mortar Co (-)  
1stPlatoon, Co C, 1stTkBn  
Det, MF Platoon, HQBn  
Det, AdmSec, 1stBn, 1stMar  
Det, AdmSec, 2dBn, 1stMar  
Det, AdmSec, 3dBn, 1stMar

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 ANNA PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
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MUNPYONG-NI (TA 5843)  
 2dLn, 11thMar

29. Commanding Officer, 1st Marines directed that the 2d Battalion (-), 11th Marines, be held in the Wonsan area as there was insufficient space in the KOJO area to emplace an artillery battalion in firing position. The one battery in Kojo was set up in firing position on the only available site on the beach North of the town. The 2d Battalion after an extensive air strike on Kojo advanced thru the town without meeting any resistance. The 2d Battalion reported that approximately 60% of the town had been destroyed by air strikes.

The 2d Battalion completed a check of all buildings in Kojo, and reported that all ROK supplies had been removed from the area prior to the attack on the 1st Battalion, and the railroad siding was still in a usable condition. \*The 22d KMC Company (-) was attached to 2d Battalion and placed in a position blocking the entrance to town with a mission of screening civilians. Patrols operating in areas surrounding Kojo reported no unusual activity. A Helicopter on a reconnaissance mission picked up one Marine from B Company, 1st Battalion, missing from the action the night of the 27th, in TA 0508. He could give no information on other personnel still reported as missing in action from the 1st Battalion. Later in the day this same helicopter picked up three more Marines in TA 0509, part of these reported as missing in action.

The 5th KMC Battalion was detached from the 1st Marines this date and ordered to assembly in Balbyon.

The 3d Battalion patrol in the Majan-ni area reported no contacts and no unusual activity observed in the area covered.

30. F Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines reported back from Anbyan, having been relieved by elements of the 5th KMC Battalion. They were placed in a blocking position Southwest of Wonsan. 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, reported no contacts for the day and no unusual activity observed within the immediate area surrounding Wonsan.

In the Kojo area, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, patrol covered the area where C Company, 1st Battalion, had been engaged in the action of the 27th and recovered three (3) bodies. The equipment of the men had been left untouched by the enemy. This patrol received scattered sniper fire while covering the area but suffered no casualties. They also reported finding approximately ninety (90) enemy dead in the area.

A patrol from the 1st Battalion recovered sixteen (16) bodies with their equipment intact, two (2) 75MM Recoilless Guns w/certs and ammo, and found approximately seventy five (75) enemy dead.

Another patrol entered the town of Tangchon and found that 50% of the town had been destroyed. This patrol received scattered sniper fire upon entering the town. An air strike was run on suspected buildings. The town in general was deserted. On the return route the patrol had a fire fight with an estimated twenty man enemy patrol, killing sixteen. The patrol suffered no casualties.

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LST 883 arrived at Kojo Bay carrying two platoons of tanks from Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, and while attempting to beach ran aground off shore. A dispatch was sent to Wonsan requesting a tug.

No activity reported in the Majon-ni area.

31. The 3d Battalion in Majon-ni received numerous reports from civilish sources of large scale enemy movement throughout the surrounding area.

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, reported no unusual activity and no contacts were made in the Wonsan area.

In the Kojo area, a tug arrived to tow LST 883 from the sand bar.

In view of the enemy situation it was decided that tanks were not required. LST departed at 1300L with bodies of (19) dead marines and seventeen (17) POWs. Patrols from the 2d Battalion reported no contacts made but that civilians were beginning to return to the surrounding villages in large numbers. The 1st Battalion patrols reported no unusual activity in their sector. Also reported all equipment lost to the enemy in the engagement of the night of the 27th recovered except for the following:

- 1 Truck, 1/2 T, Cargo.
- 1 Launcher, Rocket, 3.5".
- 2 Light Machine Guns.
- 6 MG Ammo, Boxes.
- 2 Sights, Indirect Firing 1/75MM RG.
- 1 Truck, 1/2 T, Radio (TCS) - found but burned beyond repair.
- 1 SCR 610 - found but burned.
- 1 SCR 300 - found but burned.
- 1 Telephone, EES - found but burned.

1 Nov 50. Co "C", 1st TkbN, ordered to establish blocking position at RJ in TA 6831S at first light on 2 Nov, to relieve elements of 2d Bn, 5th Mar. No unusual activity reported in Wonsan Area. No report received from 3d Bn at Majon-ni. In Kojo area, KMCs received light attack in village. One enemy killed and remainder withdrew to the hills. Patrols from the 1st and 2d Bns, 1st Mar, reported no enemy contacts. Air spotted elements of 17th ROK south of TONGCHON. LST 973 arrived and beached at 1430, carrying KMC Bn. KMC Bn moved into Kojo relieving 1st Bn, 1st Mar. 1st Bn began to load supplies and equipment for return to Wonsan.

2 Nov 50. 2d Bn, 5th Mar, detached from 1st Marines this date. At 0900L a convoy of supplies bound for 3d Bn, 1st Mar, at Majon-ni and guarded by one Plat (Reinf) of Co "G", 3d Bn, was ambushed at TA 5035 by an undetermined size enemy force. Center surface of road had been dynamited. Convoy turned around under heavy small arms, automatic, and reportedly light mortar fire and returned to Regt CP. Convoy leader reported five (5) trucks and approximately fourteen (14) men unaccounted for. OY flying cover for convoy tried to signal he had spotted road block and for convoy to turn around but his signal was unobserved or not understood. All available personnel of H&S Co and attached Engr Co, plus Arty Liaison elements were mustered and preceded by five tanks (Regt AT Co and 1st Plat, Co "C", 1st TkbN), proceeded to scene

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
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of ambush. This force returned and reported that two VF aircraft had run strikes on the area and the enemy had dispersed to the hills. Some supplies had been broken into but planes had dispersed enemy before much could be taken. The following personnel and equipment was recovered:

Eight (8) KKA

Six (6) (One WIA - five uninjured)

Three (3) Trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T (Damaged but repairable)

Nearly all supplies on above trucks two (2) trucks, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T, were burned beyond salvage. Our total personnel casualties for this action were nine (9) KIA and fifteen (15) WIA. Enemy losses undetermined but light.

At 1030I a motorized patrol (Plat Reinf) from Co H, 3dBn, was ambushed in the vicinity of YOHAE-RI (TA 3723P). At 1130I the remainder of Co "H" was dispatched to extricate this patrol. Vehicles and personnel were extricated and artillery ("D" Btry, 2dBn, 11thMar) registered and fired. Enemy force had set up road block by blasting rock of cliff into road and covering by fire. Our casualties for this action were (5) KIA and sixteen (16) WIA. Vehicle loss undetermined. Loss inflicted on enemy undetermined.

LST 973 departed Kojo at 0700I and arrived Wonsan 1230I carrying the following troop units:

Regt H&SCo (-)

1stBn, 1stMar

75MM RG Plat

1stPlat, Co C, 1stEngrBn

Det, Co D, 1stMedBn

The 1stBn, with all units listed above (except Regt H&SCo (-)), moved into defensive positions in and around Wonsan. (See Overlay) Troops remaining at Kojo are:

2dBn, 1stMar

"F" Btry, 2dBn, 11thMar

4.2" Mortar Plat

2dPlat, Co C, 1stEngrBn

No reports received from 2dBn in Kojo or 3dBn in Majon-ni this date. Only communications with these battalions is through 1stMar Div radio.

3Nov50. 0900I an air drop of supplies was made to 3dBn at Majon-ni with excellent results. At 1030I 1st Marines ordered to send convoy of supplies to 3dBn. Convoy, guarded by Co "A" (Reinf) 1stBn, and Co "C" (-), 1stEngrBn, departed Regt CP at 1430I. Convoy progressed slowly through three road blocks (holes dynamited in road) when OY flying over signaled that enemy forces were ahead. One platoon of Co "A" disembarked from vehicles and preceded the convoy in route march formation when they were fired upon by heavy small arms and burp-gun fire. Fire extremely inaccurate on troops but heavy in volume on lead vehicles. Initial fire from enemy coming parallel with road and then spread along left flank coming from cliff overlooking convoy on left flank and extending the entire length of convoy becoming scattered and dying out near tail end. OY flying over called two VF aircraft on station and Co "A" marked target with white phosphorus from 81MM Mortar. Since this action was taking place at 1700I strafing and napalm runs were not too accurate but did serve to lessen the amount of fire being received to some extent. After the OY was forced to return to base, no communications existed between convoy and Regt. Due to the nature of the terrain in which the convoy was halted, it was determined that no defense could be set up for the night which could protect all vehicles and keep them from being shot up. As darkness settled in, fire from the en-

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(Cont'd)

emy started to increase from the cliff side and spread the length of the convoy. Making the decision to return the convoy to Regt, trucks were turned around under extremely hazardous road conditions as well as enemy fire while infantry troops gave all protection possible, troops were reloaded still under fire, and the convoy returned. One truck loaded with troops went over a thirty foot drop while executing a sharp turn. Official count revealed the following casualties and loss of vehicles:

- 8 WIA
- 16 Injured when truck went over cliff
- 5 Vehicles lost
  - ( 1 Jeep, 1 Pers Carrier)
  - ( 1 Dump trk of "C" Co, 1st Engr Bn)
  - ( and 2-2 1/2 Trucks of 7th MTBn)

Damage inflicted on enemy force undetermined. Convoy returned to Regt CP at 2030I.

1930I Regt CP alerted by civilian report of enemy force in village three miles west on Majon-ni road. All personnel turned out to man perimeter defense. No other reports of enemy activity throughout the day.

4Nov50. At 0230I word was relayed from 1stMar Div that 2dBn on the move from Kojo by rail and motor convoy, had halted and set up perimeter defense, in TA 9819. Also informed by 1stMarDiv that railroad track was blown, extent unknown, in vicinity of ANBYON. At 0730I received message that 2dBn was on the move again for Wonsan with air cover. At 0845I Supply convoy guarded by same troops as on previous day departed Regt CP for another attempt to break through to the 3dBn at Majon-ni. At 1200I train convoy of 2dBn arrived on siding opposite Regt CP (TA 5936E) carrying supplies and H&SCo, 2dBn; two rifle companies, and Wonsa Co. The motor convoy consisting of the other rifle company and D Btry, 2dBn, 11thMar, arrived at the 1stMar CP at 1300I. 2dBn with attached 4.2" Mortar Plat was ordered to positions five miles west on Majon-ni road. Arty battery and Engr Plat returned to parent organization. 1500I convoy arrived at Majon-ni with only minor skirmish with enemy as reported by OY flying cover. Received report from 1stMarDiv that as of 031600I, 3dBn at Majon-ni had made no contact with enemy though persistent civilian sources report enemy movement throughout the surrounding area.

5Nov50. The 3dBn, in the Majon-ni Area, was ordered to send a strong patrol to the Turyu-san mine works (TA 3339-3439) on 6 Nov 1950 to investigate reports that this area was being used as a rallying point for NK forces. X Corps ordered the 1stBn, 65thInf, to report to CO, 1stMar for operational control in the 1stMar zone of responsibility. Representatives of the 65th Inf reported and informed CO, 1stMar, that their troops were still aboard ship. The 1stBn was ordered to move from positions occupied to positions closer to the Wonsan airfield and take up blocking positions there. The 2dBn killed one NK and captured two while on patrol. ROK unit moving North from SEOUL passed through 1stBn positions.

6Nov50. X Corps ordered CO, 1stMar to place 2 companies in a blocking position approximately eight miles NE from 3dBns positions at Majon-ni. Co A, 1stBn, presently at 3dBns position was attached to 3dBn effective 0001 this date. CO, 1stBn, 65thInf, reported to CO, 1stMar, for duty. Ordered to occupy Sector 3.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
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Battalion commenced move into blocking positions TA 5644 - 5645 - 5647 - 5648. Move completed prior to darkness except for rear echelon elements. 1stMar and 1stBn, 65thInf, staff officers conferred coordinated fire plans and communications. 3dBn, 1stMar, reported that patrol returned from Tunya-san at 1700L. No activity reported in area. Natives stated that no NK troops had been in area recently. Patrol believes that Tunyu-san has not been used as a rallying point for NK forces. Patrol picked up approximately 70 prisoners along the road to and from Tunyu-san. Co A ordered to return to Regt CP and 2dBn ordered to send one company (Reinf) to blocking position on Majon-ni Road (TA 4635) at first light on 7 Nov.

7Nov50. Received report that elements of 65thInf, USA had been attacked at Yonghung. Four men of 65th admitted to 1stMar sick bay. 3dBn attacked by undetermined size enemy force at 0500I. Probing action by enemy started at 0130I along approximately two-thirds of battalion perimeter defense. At 0520I 3dBn forced to give up OP when ammunition supply exhausted. Reserve force mustered and retook OP. Air was called and on station at 0715I. At 0820I the attack was repulsed and perimeter restored. Enemy attacked with SA, Burp guns, and hand grenades. Our casualties three (3) WIA. Enemy losses 53 killed, 130 wounded. Evidence that both dead and wounded removed where possible. Co E, 2dBn, in convoy, preceded by Engr Plat, Co G, 1st Engr Bn, was reported under attack at 1245I, 8 miles west of Togwon on the Majon-ni Road. Three M26 tanks of Regt AT Company which had been leading convoy, were some two miles in rear of the convoy at this time having been forced to halt due to road conditions. Enemy fire again consisted of SA, Burp guns, and grenades. A helicopter was requested and dispatched for emergency evacuation. Co F was mounted on trucks and sent forward at 1330I as reinforcement. By the time F Co arrived on the scene, E Co had cleared the ambush and were moving out. Our casualties in the encounter eight (8) KIA and twenty-seven (27) WIA. Enemy losses determined at 40 plus. At 1800I Co E and Co F, 2dBn, were in blocking position TA 4635. At 1830I Co A, 1stBn with elements of Co G, 1st Engr Bn returned to Regt CP from Majon-ni carrying the dead and remainder of the wounded from Co E, 1stBn as well as 550 PWs taken by the 3dBn. Took up positions in 2dBn (Rear) area for the night. At 1900I the vehicles which carried Co's E & F to position returned. At 2300I 3dBn reported small groups probing their position.

8Nov50. X Corps ordered 1stBn, 65thInf, to move to Yonghung area. No dispatch received detaching them from 1st Marines. Reinforced platoon from Co\*, 1stBn, occupied position in vicinity TA 6234. Remainder of company in position TA 7032. At 1650I received report from air that 500 - 1000 enemy were sighted in small craft 10 miles North of WONASN. Received report after dusk that air had taken these under attack. Results undetermined. At 1700I a patrol from H&SGo searched village 2 1/2 miles north of CP to investigate reported enemy. NKs had departed but villagers reported that 33 had come into the village just before dark and cooked their food. These departed to the North. All were armed with small arms. At 1925I X Corps reported that enemy had begun to land in TA 6550. Further reported that NGF had been directed to take the peninsula in this area under fire. All units in area alerted to this situation. At 2400I the TkBn was ordered to send a patrol North along the coast line to determine if any landings were made and to observe the results of air and NGF strike and shelling.

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9 Nov 50. Patrols from TkbN and H&S Co, 1stMar covered area of reported enemy landing and reported that villagers state no landings made in that area. No evidence of NCF shelling or Air Strikes in area were observed. Helicopter patrolled coast line North to #6 grid (1:250,000) and reported negative observations. Delayed report received from 3d Bn at Majon-ni stating enemy had attacked their OP commencing at 091300I Nov. Reinforcements were sent to OP and contained attack. Estimated 250 enemy in attacking force. Their losses 40% killed and wounded. Our casualties one (1) KIA and nine (9) WIA. No other contacts or unusual activity reported throughout area.

10 Nov 50. At 0700I the TkbN again dispatched patrol to cover the peninsula in OJ 65 to determine if there was any evidence of landings having been made or NCF shelling. Patrol reported finding three barges sunk which contained Russian made torpedos or Aerial bombs at TA 6352. Shell holes noted in area but unable to determine if recent. The CO of the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions reported to CO, 1stMar for operational control. 3d KMC Bn attached to 3d Bn, 1stMar, to strengthen position at Majon-ni. The 5th KMC Bn was ordered to occupy positions in Sub-sector 3. At 1500I the 3d KMC Bn, with supplies and Marine replacements for 3d Bn, 1stMar, departed Regt CP for Majon-ni arriving at 1840I. No contacts with enemy made en route. At 1740I air reported running strike on enemy troops observed moving up on the right flank of Co's E and F, 2d Bn, reportedly killing an estimated 30 of the group. 2d Bn made no report of enemy contact.

11 Nov 50. Co, CG (-), 1st Engr Bn, with one platoon of 5th KMC Bn as security was dispatched to the area of Co, E, 1st Bn, encounter with NKs on 7 Nov to recover vehicles lost. Vehicles were salvaged and this group returned to Regt CP at 1600I. At 1500I vehicles which carried 3d KMC Bn to Majon-ni returned carrying 269 prisoners and parachutes which had been used in air drop of supplies to 3d Bn, 1stMar. CO and S-3, 1stMar, attended conference with CG, 3Div (USA) to effect plans for the relief of 1st Marines in this area. At 1900I received orders from 1stMarDiv to assume responsibility for security of RR bridge and added responsibility of setting up road block at Munchon. No enemy contacts made or unusual activity reported throughout the 1st Marines area of responsibility this date.

12 Nov 50. At 0100I the 3d Bn, 1stMar at Majon-ni reported enemy probing their front lines. Enemy estimated as approximately eighty. These withdrew at daylight. Enemy dead ten. Our casualties none. At 0430I the 2d Bn reported approximately eighty enemy attacking FOX Co positions. These dispersed at daylight on a whistle signal. Enemy losses sixteen dead including NK Captain and an estimated 40 - 50 wounded. Our casualties two (2) WIA. FOX Co also captured one LMG, fifteen rifles, and one case of hand grenades. No further activity reported at the end of this report.

13 Nov 50. The 3rd Bn reported that their patrol from the 3rd KMC Bn had made contact with small enemy groups. Captured one NK soldier. There was no activity in the zone of the 2d Bn. At 1200I the 1st Bn was relieved in zone by the 2d Bn, 15th Inf and moved to an assembly area.

14 Nov 50. The 1st Bn 15th Inf relieved the 3rd Bn on position and the 3rd Bn returned to Tagwon. DECLASSIFIED were in assembly area

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## ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT. (Cont'd)

(TA 5939W) by 1900I. The first train of the 1stBn had arrived at Chigyong by 1800I and were establishing defensive positions.

15Nov50. The 2dBn, relieved by 3rdBn 15thInf arrived at Togwon assembly area.

16Nov50. The 3rdBn (-), plus forward echelon of the Regimental Command Group, and 2dBn, 11thMar departed Togwon at 0700I by rail and motor. All elements had closed at Chigyong by 1430I. The advance CP was opened in TA 6312F at 1610I. Personnel were assigned to bivouac area, communications and local security established immediately.

17Nov50. C&B, 1stTKBn reported for duty with this regiment. The remaining elements of the 3rdBn arrived in this area from Togwon. The S-2 and S-3 visited Div Hqs and gathered tactical and intelligence information.

18Nov50. An aerial observer, in an OY, made a reconnaissance of the Chigyong - Hukseu-ri road. Liaison officer gathered information on the activities of the 26th ROK Regt and the Hukseu-ri road on a visit to their CP. G Co 3rdBn departed for Hamhung to relieve C Co, 5thMar as security for X Corps. Elements of 2dBn, D Co 1stMedBn, EngrCo, ATCo arrived Chigyong by rail and motor.

19Nov50. Rear echelon of H&SCo and the remainder of 2dBn departed Togwon at 1000I and arrived at forward positions vicinity of Chigyong at 1800I. A reconnaissance patrol from the 1st Battalion, dispatched to the 26th ROK command post (TA 5119S) to determine the location of their installations which we were ordered to guard, was notified by Major Smith, KMAG, that no installations were to be left behind on their movement to Hukseu-ri. Orders to this regiment to send one battalion to the 26th ROK's location were verbally cancelled. At 1800, a patrol of the 1st Battalion was fired on by a small group of enemy in vicinity TA 6615M. Patrol killed one of group, remainder escaped to the hills. 3d Battalion patrols made no contacts this date.

20Nov50. Vigorous patrolling action was conducted throughout the 1st Marines area with negative results. No unusual activity was observed throughout the area. At 1545I George Company, 3dBn was released from security mission with X Corps Headquarters in HAMHUNG.

21Nov50. Again all patrols reported no contacts or unusual activity in the 1st Marines sector. A special road repair and mapping patrol was dispatched to repair and chart the road west from Chigyong to Hukseu-ri. Results of this patrol were the subject of a special report to CG, 1stMarDiv. Requested classification of the 1st Marines mission as assigned in Division Opn O 22-50. At 2209I received a dispatch from Commanding General to cancel 1stMarDiv Opn O 22-50 and await further orders. At the request of Division the regimental TACP was dispatched to support the 26th ROK Regiment. This party returned at 1830I, after contacting Major Smith, KMAG officer with the 26th ROK, who advised them that the only request they had made was for radio equipment which they themselves would utilize in controlling aircraft. This action was also made the subject of a special dispatch report to the Commanding General.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION  
REPORT (Cont'd)

22Nov50. At 0020I, received dispatch orders from Commanding General 1st Marine Division, to send one company at first light to relieve elements of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, at Chihung-ni. Remainder of battalion to be moved on 23 Nov 50. Mission to guard the Division railhead located at Chihung-ni and guard the MSR. In compliance with these orders, liaison officers from Regiment and the 1st Battalion were dispatched at first light to establish contact with 3/5; Baker Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was entrucked where they were placed in an assembly area by the Executive Officer of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. All units reported no contacts or unusual activity within their respective areas for this date.

23Nov50. At 0900I the 1st Battalion closed their Command Post at Chigyong and departed for Chihung-ni, opening their command post at that location with the forward command group at 1100I. Relief of 3d Battalion 5th Marines, was effectively completed. At 1500I verbal orders were received from G-3, 1st MarDiv, and to move the remainder of the 1st Marines to positions at Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri with Headquarters at the former position. At 1600I 1st MarDiv Opn O 23-50 was received substantiating verbal orders. Baker Company, 1st Tn and Charlie Company, 1st Engineer Battalion were detached this date. Regimental AT Company Tank Platoon was placed under control of 1st Tank Battalion. No patrols operated this date except for local security purposes. All hands were treated to a full course Thanksgiving Day dinner.

24Nov50. At 0720I the first elements of the 2d Battalion departed Chigyong for Koto-ri with the last elements leaving Chigyong at 1100I. All elements of 2d Battalion were in Koto-ri by 1600I. No activity reported by patrols in the Chigyong area. 2d Battalion completed relief of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines at Koto-ri. Preparations made for movement of H&S Company, 1st Marines, "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, and 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, to Koto-ri.

25Nov50. H&S Company, AT Company (minus), and 4.2" Mortar Company (minus), of the 1st Marines plus "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion and 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, commenced movement to Koto-ri at 1900I. Movement completed at approximately 1900I with only minor vehicle difficulties. It was learned that the M39 personnel carriers (with .50 caliber MG mount) would be of no value in operations over icy roads since the vehicle is not heavy enough to force the type of cleat used on the track into the ground. The present cleat serves only as a skate causing the vehicle to skid dangerously when on uneven, icy ground. *cleat*

26Nov50. 1st Battalion received light probing attacks by small enemy groups on the west and north of their defensive perimeter at Chihung-ni during the night. Patrols operated to the north and to the west during the day with no contacts being made. 2d Battalion from defensive positions in Koto-ri dispatched platoon patrols three miles north on MSR and west to Sinjung-ri (TA 4757) with negative results. No activity during the night to Koto-ri sector. 3d Battalion, less "G" Company (Reinf), departed positions in Chigyong in three march units for Hagaru-ri (TA 5171). CP established in TA 5170-A-3 at 2000. How and Item companies immediately set up defensive perimeter. No enemy contacts made.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT. (Cont'd)

27 Nov 50. 1st Battalion conducted extensive daylight patrols vicinity Chinhung-ni with no contacts being made. West perimeter was attacked by estimated platoon of enemy approximately 1900I. Attacks repulsed. Bloody uniform coat, bandages, and US type stretchers found within 100 yards of positions following morning. 2d Battalion at Koto-ri dispatched foot patrol along high ground to the west. No enemy contact made but numerous entrenchments discovered. A motorized patrol of platoon strength departed for Kari-dong (TA 4155). Engaged in fire fight with approximately 25 enemy in vicinity of Sinjung-ri (TA 4757) wounding and capturing two. Patrol continued to vicinity of Sinha-ri (TA 4455-D) where road became impassable to vehicles. Patrol continued west on foot until hit by approximately 200 enemy entrenched in ridge lines (TA 4356-L to R). Patrol suffered two casualties. Patrol returned. Questioning of prisoners revealed they were part of CCF Division located in a mine vicinity of Chungnung-ni. 3d Battalion continued to improve defensive perimeter at Hagaru-ri. No enemy contact made. Fox Co, 2d Bn, 8th Mar passed through 3d Battalions position on way north.

28 Nov 50. 1st Battalion continued to occupy defensive positions at Chinhung-ni. Patrol made light contact with estimated enemy platoon at TA 5448-A. Patrol withdrew. In the Koto-ri sector the 2d Battalion spotted enemy movement on the ridges to the north at 0600I. A patrol from Easy Company was taken under fire in their outpost positions at 0845I. An additional platoon was dispatched to reinforce the outpost position and it also engaged in fight. Enemy was observed moving from the west toward Koto-ri at 0910I and were taken under observed artillery fire with excellent results. Approximately 100 enemy were observed moving south on the west side of the Koto-ri defenses at 1020I. At the same time numerous groups of 25-50 enemy observed moving south on the east perimeter. Enemy mortar positions were observed to the north and taken under artillery fire. An Army OY reported at 1030I that two bridges were out and eight road blocks observed on the Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri road. Air strikes were run on observed enemy groups to the north and northeast at 1055I. Motorized patrol consisting of Dog Company departed Koto-ri at 1330I with mission of opening MSR from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri. Patrol received enemy small arms and mortar fire approximately 1500 yards forward of positions. Two platoons were sent to engage enemy observed entrenched in positions along the ridge lines east of the road. Artillery fires were called down and air strikes run on these positions. Entire Dog Company engaged in heavy fight with well entrenched enemy at 1500I. Estimated strength of enemy force entrenched on northeast ridge line - one battalion. One platoon of Fox Company assisted in evacuating Dog Company casualties. Company unable to route enemy from ridge and ordered to return to defensive perimeter. Perimeter reestablished by darkness. Civilian refugees entering positions from west gave accounts of increasing CCF troops in area. 2d Battalion killed one CCF and captured two attempting to enter positions with civilians. As a result of this an order was issued to prevent any further entry of refugees within the defensive perimeter.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT. (Cont'd)

Further action around Koto-ri sector on this date as follows:

1130I a supply convoy attempting the run to Hagaru-ri was fired on and turned back approximately two miles north of Koto-ri.

1200I air reported one truck and two jeeps abandoned five miles north of Koto-ri. Four bodies observed lying near vehicles.

Our casualties as a result of days engagement 5 KIA and 29 WIA. Estimated enemy casualties as direct result of infantry action - 200. Air and artillery took a tremendous toll as direct strikes were run on groups of 50-100 enemy and artillery was observed to burst directly in the midst of other smaller groups. Enemy was observed working with the aid of flashlights after night fall, presumably evacuating dead and wounded. As a result of the MSR being out between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, convoys began to mass at Koto-ri. By night fall the following convoys were within the Koto-ri perimeter:

HQ, Baker and Charlie Co's, 185th Engr Bn  
 Elements Co E, 1st Med Bn  
 Elements of 31st RCT, USA  
 41st RM (IND) Commandos  
 Elements 1st Mar Div Adv Cnd Group  
 Elements MP Co, 1st Mar Div  
 Co G, 3d Bn, 1st Mar  
 Recon Co, 1st Mar Div

Personnel of the above units were utilized to strengthen the defensive perimeter.

At Hagaru-ri How Company, 3d Battalion, was alerted to move north to assist Fox Co, 2d Bn, 5th Mar. Alert was cancelled at 0830I. At 0900I Item Company dispatched a reinforced platoon west to contact and report enemy strength in positions observed by OX. Patrol spotted enemy (approx 150) entrenched at TA 4970-A-B-C. Artillery and mortar fires were called down and enemy dispersed. Patrol engaged enemy at TA 4869I. Enemy withdrew. A patrol from How Company engaged in fire fight with undetermined number of enemy at TA 5368B. Enemy dispersed. Several road blocks were observed on the MSR to the south. Both patrols returned by 1445I. At 2230I enemy attacked How Company positions. By 2300I the attack had spread to include Item Company. Heavy mortar fire of both HE and WP fell in 3d Battalion lines. At 2320I How Company reported a few enemy had penetrated into their CP area. A portion of the mobile reserve force was committed and assisted How Company in restoring original lines. Initial attack repulsed. Enemy using 81mm mortars and 78mm artillery. Probing action by the enemy continued and developed into another full scale attack which is reported under 29 Nov.

29 Nov 50. 1st Battalion continued to hold defensive positions at Chinhung-ri and patrolled locally around the perimeter during night were contained. 2d Battalion received sniper fire from the ridges to the north and west of Koto-ri sector at first light. Enemy observed dipping in to west in TA 4858K. Attack north was launched by 41st RM (IND) Commandos, George Company, 3d Bn, 1st Mar, and Baker Company, 31st Inf, under the command of Lt Col DRYSDALE, Commanding Officer, 41st RM Commandos, at 0940I. 2d Battalion coordinated preparatory artillery and mortar fires and furnished one platoon with corporals and

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION  
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ambulances to assist in handling casualties. In addition the 2 Battalion TACP officer was attached to the attacking group. Attack advanced with no resistance until reaching the ridge line at TA 5661J where heavily entrenched enemy troops were encountered. Attacking force fought way through ridge mass immediately to north of Koto-ri against stiff enemy resistance at which time contact was lost between them and this regiment. Numerous enemy were observed entrenching to the east and west of Koto-ri sector at approximately 1100I. Sporadic enemy mortar fire fell forward of Easy Company positions throughout day. Air was on station throughout day attacking targets of opportunity. An OY carrying artillery observer was utilized for control of artillery fires. At 1745I six enemy mortar rounds were received in Easy Company positions on the northeast perimeter followed by intensive enemy attack of estimated battalion strength employing at least one company in assault. Penetration of attacking force was contained. Seventeen (17) Chinese Soldiers who succeeded in infiltrating the lines were killed. Approximately 150 to 175 enemy were observed lying dead at the front line positions. A POW later reported that his battalion suffered 450 casualties in this particular attack. The enemy attack completely repulsed by 1000I. Our casualties were 4 KIA and 8 WIA. A predominance of the enemy were armed with US Thompson Sub-Machine guns. The 2d Battalion (2) received four enemy mortar rounds at 1930I. There were no casualties. An air strike was made on the ridge lines to northeast at 2050I. No further enemy activity was observed throughout the night. Other developments in the Koto-ri sector for this date were as follows:

Baker and Do Companies, 1st Tank Bn, arrived from Chinhung-ni at 1100I. Dog Company was designated to precede the elements truck of the Commando, George Co, 3d Bn, 1st Mar, and Baker Company, 31st Inf. Baker Company 31st Inf was assigned the mission of bringing up the rear of the provisional battalion convoy. All other convoy elements proceeded with infantry convoy or mingled with the tank elements.

At 1730I a convoy of six trucks was ambushed about three miles south of Koto-ri at the top of the mountain pass. One truck loaded with 4.2" Mortar amm overturned and abandoned. Efforts to retrieve the ammunition failed.

At 1845I, red and amber flares were observed falling to the west and southeast of our positions. No enemy attack developed, however.

At 1945I, the 1st Bn at Chinhung-ni reported that GCF had captured one truck loaded with 4.2" Mortar Ammo. This truck was one of those in the ambush previously reported.

At 2035I the 2d Plat, B Co, 1st Tk Bn, returned to Koto-ri from the north with four tanks. The Tank platoon commander reported that he had left three tanks and ten trucks further up the road and that 1st Mar Div G-1 had ordered Baker Company Tank Commander to turn around and attempt the return to Koto-ri.

At 2205I word was received from Baker Company Tank Commander that his elements were surrounded by enemy approximately one mile north of Koto-ri and in urgent need of infantry assistance. The road was blocked by stalled vehicles and tanks were unable to bypass. The Tank Company Commander was informed that it was impossible to send infantry support.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT. (Cont'd)

without jeopardizing the entire Koto-ri sector through weakening the defensive perimeter. At this particular time every available man was being utilized in the perimeter including cooks, truck drivers, clerks, etc. However, by using the 3d Plat, B Co, 1st TkbN, command tank for direct communications with the Baker Company Tank Commander it was possible to register artillery fires on either side of the road where the tanks and trucks were trapped. These fires dispersed the enemy forces and at first light the remainder of Baker Company tanks were able to maneuver around the stalled vehicles and make their way to Koto-ri, bringing in several killed and wounded.

At Hagaru-ri a second assault in the How Company sector developed at 0030I. The remainder of the mobile reserve was committed to strengthen this position. At 0105I the south road block came under heavy attack. The attack on How Company sector was repulsed and the reserve force returned to battalion control. At 0210I the southeast sector was overrun by a well coordinated and strong enemy attack. Defenses were hastily reorganized on a line slightly in rear of the original lines. A continuous and violent exchange of small arms fire developed along the entire south front. At 0253I a severe attack was taken on the west and southwest sectors. Item Company, 3d Bn, left flank was attacked at 0300I and again at 0310I. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy enemy losses. Artillery fire of harassing nature received throughout entire area. Well aimed enemy mortar fire, both HE and WP, fell on front line positions the rest of the night. At 0530I the enemy in strong force hit NE sector, but attack was again repulsed. However, the momentum of the enemy attack forced the defenders to withdraw from the ridge line and establish defensive positions at the base of the hill. At 0630I How Company lines were completely restored by local counterattack. At 0700I a portion of the mobile reserve launched an attack and retook the high ground lost on the NE sector. Sporadic small arms fire was received on all fronts. At 0930I air came on station and was utilized by the reserve force in an attack to retake the high ground in NE sector. Sporadic enemy artillery and mortar fires were received throughout the day. At 1700I the attacking reserve force was ordered to halt the attack and dig in for the night. The perimeter was tied in solid for the night. The enemy was still entrenched on the reverse slope of the high ground on NE sector. The convoy from Koto-ri arrived at 1915I with numerous casualties. Royal Marine Commandos had suffered approximately 50% casualties and George Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, in excess of 50 casualties. Friendly troops continued to arrive in small groups throughout the night, having become separated from their units in the dark and fighting through after their vehicles were knocked out.

30 Nov 50. The 1st Battalion continued to occupy a defensive position at Chihung-ni. A strong combat patrol consisting of a reinforced rifle company was dispatched to the west with the mission of destroying enemy forces reported in the vicinity of TA 5149-GR. This patrol engaged a strong enemy outpost position at TA 5448A and from there developed the main enemy position. The attack continued with the completed route of the enemy force estimated as one battalion. The enemy were identified as GCF troops who were well clothed, having green & white reversible overcoats, and armed with numerous demolition kits. An estimated 56 of the enemy were killed and the remainder fled into the hills.

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The railroad trestle and tunnel at TA 5944 were blown up at 0500I by an estimated enemy force of 150. Information on this force was furnished by a civilian apprehended at the south roadblock. The civilian had been previously taken as hostage by the CCF and forced to guide them to the railroad. This action cut the rail supply line from Hamhung to Chinhung-ni.

At Koto-ri, air strikes were run throughout the day, and mortar and artillery fires continued to pound observed groups of enemy. Heavy enemy troop movements were observed to the north, east, west, northeast, and southeast. Stragglers from the previous days' convoy to Hagaru-ri returned throughout the day. Occasional enemy mortar rounds fell into the area but no casualties were suffered. All reported seeing numerous groups of CCF troops. It is noted here that only 1 officer and 69 men of Baker Co, 31st Inf managed to make their way back to Koto-ri; remainder of company unaccounted for.

Sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire was received on southwest perimeter throughout the night. Enemy was observed moving a mortar into position on ridge to southwest. The location was immediately taken under fire by Regimental 4.2" Mortars with excellent results. The enemy were observed to withdraw carrying dead and/or wounded.

A report was received that 2d Battalion, 31st Inf, USA, was attempting to break through from Chinhung-ni to Koto-ri.

At Hagaru-ri the 3d Battalion broke up an attempted enemy attack from the west with mortar fire before the full force of the attack could reach the M.R. George Company launched an attack to regain high ground lost on NE sector. It met stiff resistance from enemy force armed with small arms, machine guns, and hand grenades. The attack was successful and the high ground secured and positions consolidated by the time darkness fell. Intermittent enemy mortar fire was received throughout the area during the day.

At 1700I elements of the command group, 31st RCT, USA, arrived at Hagaru-ri from the NE. They reported that the remainder of unit would probably arrive during the night.

At 2015I Item Company heard three distinct bugle calls to west and at 2130I a green flare was observed to their front. At 2330I Item Company engaged small groups of enemy and by 2345I this action developed into a full scale attack. At 2353I a large enemy force assaulted the NE sector of perimeter. All supporting arms were brought to bear and the attack was broken up. Enemy attack was supported by mortar and light artillery fire. Enemy artillery rounds fell in 3d Battalion CP area causing several casualties.

1 Dec 50. 1st Battalion at Chinhung-ni made no contact with enemy forces this date.

At Koto-ri the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, USA, began arriving and were placed in defensive positions on the southern sector of the perimeter. An airstrip paralleling the narrow gauge RR track was constructed within the perimeter on the northeast to aid in evacuation of wounded from this area. The former light plane strip was under constant

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## ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT. (Cont'd)

AW and sniper fire. Airstrikes were run on observed enemy groups to the west and southwest throughout the afternoon. Enemy troops were observed around the entire Koto-ri perimeter. Throughout the night flashlights were again observed on the high ridges surrounding the area. Presumably the enemy were removing their dead and wounded. H&I fires had been fired intermittently each night commencing 28 Nov 60, and were known to have caused many casualties among the enemy.

Two armored personnel carriers with two squads of army infantrymen and supported by a section of Baker Co Tanks were dispatched at first light to the south to assist the rear elements of 2/31 train in reaching the Koto-ri perimeter. Approximately 400 men and several vehicles of 2/31 train had failed to arrive with 2/31 infantry elements. At first light the stragglers began to work their way in to Koto-ri, the majority suffering from exposure and several wounded. By 1200I all elements were accounted for, but indications were that casualties were heavy. No actual report of casualties was received from this unit.

At Nagaru-ri the attack on the 3d Battalion continued and spread to include the NW sector. The perimeter defense on the north was forced to withdraw slightly, but reinforcements were committed and the line held. At 0800I the fight continued in the western sector and increased in intensity on the northeast. At 0810I the enemy broke through the northeast perimeter by sheer numerical weight of numbers and commenced moving down the slope within the perimeter. All supporting weapons fired on the enemy coming through gap. The remainder of George Company held their assigned sector and reorganized to close the gap. All available reserve forces were dispatched to reinforce George Company. At 0830I the south roadblock was attacked but attack repulsed. By 0400I George Company, with the aid of reinforcements, was closing the gap in the lines. Enemy artillery and mortar fires fell throughout the entire area. The west and north sectors were still engaged. Another small reserve was reconstituted and sent to aid George Company. By 0410I the attack on the NE sector had diminished but heavy barrages of mortar shells continued to fall in the west sector lines. By 0500I enemy fire had been reduced to sporadic small arms on northeast. West and north sectors were quiet. Tanks fired on enemy observed moving to the SE. By 0800I George Company had succeeded in retaking all ground lost earlier but was still receiving small arms fire. The perimeter was once again intact. Lines were reorganized and consolidated. Enemy mortar fire continued and commenced punning strikes on targets of opportunity. Engineers began work of relaxing mines (AP) and beebie traps on all fronts. Defenses were being constantly improved. At 1305I an air drop of supplies commenced. At 1800I George Company again came under artillery and small arms fire.

At 1930I approximately 260 troops of 1st RCT, USA, arrived in Nagaru-ri from the NE. There were many walking wounded in this group.

Enemy artillery and mortar fire of harassing nature continued to come into the area throughout the night.

29 Dec 60. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines continued to hold its defensive positions at Chinnung-ni. Three reconnaissance

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 ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION  
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patrols were dispatched to the north and west. Patrol number one consisting of six men, patrolled in the vicinity of TA 5349. Five enemy were observed using civilians and oxcarts to move equipment. Patrol number two, consisting of one rifle platoon, moved north along the railroad to TA 5654. No enemy were encountered. Patrol number three, consisting of one squad of infantry with an artillery FO team attached, proceeded north on the MSR to TA 5455 to determine strength and disposition of enemy force blocking the MSR. Enemy were located at TA 5456 MST, 5356T, and 5355EJ. Enemy were observed moving freely around positions. They appeared to be well dug-in and still working to improve their positions with excellent results. Enemy casualties were estimated at 70-80 killed and wounded. Patrol withdrew on order of regiment and returned to Chinhung-ni at 1530I.

At 1600I two Quad .50 Cal AAA vehicles reported in to 1st Battalion as advance elements of 50th AAA Battalion, USA.

At Koto-ri, the 2d Battalion observed three enemy road blocks approximately 500 yards outside the defensive perimeter on the MSR to the north. Three other road blocks were observed on the road running west from Koto-ri. One rifle platoon of Dog Company, supported by tanks, proceeded north at 1030I to destroy roadblocks in that area. Approximately fifteen 81mm mortar shells were found emplaced as improvised mines in road blocks. Curiously enough, the fuse safety wires had not been pulled. Also, numerous enemy hand grenades were found booby trapped and placed amid the brush. Roadblocks in the main consisted of light trees and underbrush piled about four feet high, completely blocking the road. All roadblocks to north were removed but those to west left untouched since that road was not being used by friendly units. Dog Company received light enemy small arms fire from the north throughout the day. Enemy lights were again observed on the ridges surrounding the Koto-ri perimeter after darkness, and were again subjected to harassing fires.

Other activities at Koto-ri this date were:

At 0010I night hecklers ran rocket and strafing missions on Hill 1276 (TA 5760). Artillery marked target with WP rounds.

At 0740I the 2d Battalion took under long range MG fire enemy observed moving toward perimeter from hill 1276 (TA 5760).

At 2347I 1st Marines received a "Flash RED" from Division. "Flash WHITE" came at 0020I. No enemy planes were heard or observed, in the Koto-ri area.

At Hagaru-ri the 3d Battalion began receiving an air drop of supplies at 0800I. Companies continued to improve defensive positions Aircraft on station throughout the day ran strikes on targets of opportunity. Sniper fire was received by George Company on NE sector. At 1515I a transport plane loaded with wounded crashed on take-off 1200 yds south of the perimeter. All wounded and plane crew were rescued and returned to area. Plane was totally destroyed by artillery fire.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
(Cont'd).

3Dec50. 1st Battalion continued to occupy defensive positions at Chinhung-ni. At approximately 0930I OinG TRP #5, 50th AAA Bn took one Quad .50 caliber vehicle, and with an Army Engineer Officer, commenced a reconnaissance of the MSR to the north. This action was taken without the knowledge or authority of the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion. The vehicle came under enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire at TA 5654R. Two US Army personnel were KIA and the vehicle was damaged and abandoned to the enemy. The personnel of this reconnaissance element returned to Chinhung-ni on foot several hours later. The main body of the 50th AAA Battalion arrived in the 1st Battalion positions at 1600I.

At Koto-ri the 2d Battalion received six rounds of enemy mortar fire in Fox Company position on the west perimeter. Light enemy small arms fire was received from the north throughout the day. Eight successful air drops were received. Gas masks were evacuated by OY and helicopter throughout the day. Flashing lights were again observed in the hills surrounding the perimeter throughout the night. An OY accurately reported numerous enemy positions, entrenchments, and movement of troops around the entire Koto-ri perimeter. Several friendly POWs who had escaped reported results of the interrogations of these men to G-2, Division. Air on station throughout the day worked over targets of opportunity. At 1300I Fox Company, 2/31, supported by Marine Aircraft and Easy Btry 2/11 launched an attack to the SW to secure the ridge line commanding part of the southern perimeter. The attack was successful against an estimated enemy company entrenched on the hill. Fox Company, 2/31, suffered 5 KIA and 10 WIA in this particular action. The estimated loss inflicted on the enemy - 200. H & I fires of artillery and mortars were continued throughout the night. Night heckler aircraft reported on station at 1900. No contacts were developed throughout the night.

At Hagaru-ri the 3d Battalion received small arms fire throughout the night in the NE sector commencing at 0005I. At 0300I George Company successfully used night infiltration tactics to secure additional portions of the high ground in their sector. George Company received light enemy mortar fire resulting in three casualties. At 0815I, Marine air on station and began taking under fire targets of opportunity. At 1300I mortars and air concentrated on enemy groups observed on the north sector. Friendly troops moving toward Hagaru-ri from the north, advanced against reported moderate enemy resistance. At 1600I all friendly air was dispatched to these units to give all possible assistance. At 1700I, 3d Battalion dispatched a patrol of tanks and infantry in an attempt to make contact with units approaching from the north. No contact was made and patrol recalled at 1800I. At 1830I a green flare was observed in NE sector. At 1950I lead elements of friendly forces moving to this area reached the north roadblock. All mess halls fed maximum number of men and shelter was provided for arriving friendly troops. Mortars fired on observed enemy movement in west sector. No enemy attacks were received throughout the night. Friendly troops continued to arrive in the Hagaru-ri area throughout the night.

4Dec50. 1st Battalion continued to improve defensive position at Chinhung-ni. The transfer to Hamhung of equipment and supplies not deemed essential for defense of the area was begun. No enemy contacts developed this date.

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At Koto-ri ten escaped friendly POWs entered the position of 2d Battalion from the north at 1230I. These men reported leaving twenty friendly wounded in a house at village located TA 5564A. An OY sent to search area reported no activity. Long range small arms fire of relatively light intensity was received intermittently from the north. Air worked over all targets of opportunity. Received nine air drops of supplies. It was noted that technique of G-119 pilots improved as they began heeding instructions of ground controller. The first few air drops wrecked many tents, tore out fire control communications, killed one marine, and seriously injured 4 others. Strong protests were made to X Corps Commander. OYs continued to evacuate casualties. Other developments at Koto-ri were:

At 0940I an AD-1 made an emergency landing forward of Easy Company lines. Pilot entered defensive perimeter. Plane destroyed by friendly fire.

At 1020I received "Flash RED" from Division. "Flash WHITE" passed at 1050I. No enemy aircraft were observed in the Koto-ri area.

Natives were sent to attempt rescue of friendly wounded reported previously. They were turned back by GCF troops within 1500 yards of north roadblock.

At 1450I General ALMOND, X Corps Commander, arrived at Koto-ri by plane and decorated certain individuals. Colonel L. B. FULLER, Regimental Commander, 1st Marines received a Distinguished Service Cross, and 8 other officers and men of the Regiment were awarded Silver Star Medals.

2d Battalion TAGP officer controlled air strikes from an OY on all observed enemy troops around area with reported good results.

Two (2) 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, soldiers were wounded by small arms fire from the ridge overlooking the SE perimeter. Mortars fired on the general location. H&I fires were called down throughout the night.

At Hagaru-ri, friendly aircraft appeared on station at 0700I and continued making strikes on targets of opportunity throughout the day. Friendly troops continued to arrive from the north and were fed and cared for by 3d Battalion, 1st Marines and other units located there. All casualties were evacuated by air after treatment by local facilities available. At 1430I one platoon of Dog Co Tanks with the remainder of the 41st Royal Marine Commando moved north with the mission of retrieving or destroying certain artillery pieces reportedly abandoned on the road at TA 4873. The position was reached at 1630I, but the patrol commander reported it impossible to retrieve any of the pieces. Four guns (155mm) had already been destroyed. Four others of like caliber were destroyed by this patrol. Patrol began to return to the Hagaru-ri area and were joined by A & B Companies 1st Bn, 7th Mar. All friendly units were reported within Hagaru-ri perimeter by 041300I. The roadblock was closed and all defenses tied in. Sporadic firing received on NE, south and west sectors until midnight. Sporadic enemy mortar fire fell in area throughout the night. Night hecker aircraft reported on station.

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5Dec50. At Chinhung-ni the 1st Battalion continued to improve its defenses. Patrols outside the general vicinity of the defensive perimeter made no contact with enemy forces. H&I fires were called throughout the night.

At Koto-ri, the 2d Battalion received light enemy small arms fire throughout the day. "Flash RED" was received from Division at 2223I with "Flash WHITE" following at 2230I. No enemy aircraft were observed in the Koto-ri area. Air drops of vital supplies continued throughout the day as did air evacuation of wounded. All patients in Dog Co, 1stMedBn, and Regimental Air Station, 1st Marines were evacuated this date. Fighter aircraft were on station running strikes on observed small enemy troop concentrations.

At Hagaru-ri a probing action by the enemy on the west perimeter at 0100I was repulsed by the 3d Battalion. At 0600I air was on station working over area to the north and along the MSR to the south. 1200I the 5th Marines assumed control of the Hagaru-ri defenses. George Company, 3/1, moved from NE to NW sector relieving elements of Division HQBn and H&SCo, 3/1. Resupply of all units in the area was accomplished. Artillery and mortars fired H&I fires throughout the night with primary targets to south bracketing MSR. Enemy flares were observed during the night but no attacks developed.

6Dec50. At Chinhung-ni the advance elements of Task Force DOG reported in to the 1st Battalion at 0820I. They reported being fired on at the village of Sudong (TA 5245). At 0830I the 1stPlt, C Co, 1stEngrBn, reported that they were under attack at their CP location in Sudong. The 1st Battalion dispatched a reinforced platoon at 1030I to aid the engineers. The 1stBn patrol made initial contact with the enemy at TA 5747N and dispersed them, using only small arms fire. The enemy attempted destruction of the bridge at TA 5846Q but were unsuccessful. The patrol covered the withdrawal of the engineer platoon from Sudong to Chinhung-ni. All engineer equipment which was capable of being moved was taken to Chinhung-ni. A convoy of 14 trucks returning to Chinhung-ni from Hamhung was ambushed at TA 5845. No trucks were recovered and at least 14 men were reported missing.

At Koto-ri, Easy Company, 2d Battalion, established an OP some 2000 yards to the east on Hill 1422 (TA 57590) at first light. Intermittent enemy small arms fire was received by Dog and Easy Companies from the north. No enemy activity during the night. The air drop of supplies continued, between 60% and 70% being recovered. The remainder, depending on its nature, was damaged beyond repair. Arrangements were made for the arrival of the 7th Marines reportedly due in Koto-ri sometime during the night. H&I fires were laid down throughout the night. All available aircraft were assisting the advance of 7th Marines from Hagaru-ri.

At 1430I Major General O. P. Smith and a small number of personnel of 1stMarDiv staff arrived at Koto-ri by helicopter from Hagaru-ri to coordinate further operations.

At Hagaru-ri, the 7th Marines moved out at 0600I in their push to Koto-ri. Air arrived on station at 0700I and took under fire all observed targets. At 2230I a relatively small

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scale attack on NE sector was repulsed by 5th Marines. No further activity was noted throughout the night.

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At CHINHUNG-NI one CCF soldier surrendered to the 1st Battalion at 0700I. Prisoner stated his unit was moving toward TA 5754. Air conducted a search and attack mission on the area. A patrol from 1stBn was dispatched south on MSR to SUDONG. The patrol did not develop contact with the enemy.

At KOTO-RI, the 2dBn, 7th Marines, entered the defensive perimeter at 0430I. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, fed and sheltered this unit. Friendly units continued to enter this area throughout the day. X Corps G-3 reported that 3d Battalion 7th Infantry would reach CHINHUNG-NI and relieve 1/1 by 1600I this date and that they would have a battalion of 155mm self propelled artillery in support.

At 0500I composite elements of 31st Infantry began arriving from HAGARU-RI and were placed under control of CO, 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, for food and shelter and for coordination in further movement to HANHUNG area.

At 0635I Colonel LITZENBERG, Commanding 7th Marines arrived in KOTO-RI and was directed to the temporary Division CP.

At approximately 1600I the first elements of 5th Marines began arriving in KOTO-RI. By 2300I all friendly forces from HAGARU-RI, were within the KOTO-RI perimeter, including 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. All were fed and given shelter insofar as possible. Warming tents were set up and used on a rotation basis with priority on all tentage, except essential office and medical tents, going to newly arrived units.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines entered the KOTO-RI perimeter about 1715I, having brought all organic equipment in addition to equipment abandoned by army units.

8Dec1950

At 0515, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, launched an attack from CHINHUNG-NI on Objective EASY (Hill 1081 - TA 5653). The action began by movement north along the MSR. Charlie Company established a position at TA 5552M at 0920I. Baker Company continued attack along MSR from this point while Able Company moved toward the crest of Hill 1081. Baker Company occupied its initial objective at TA 55530 after knocking out enemy machine gun positions supported by at least one platoon of infantry. Able Company encountered practically all of them. A strong counterattack was repulsed by Able Company at approximately 1530I. Several enemy were killed close in to 1st Battalion CP after trying to attack with hand grenades. All elements were forced to dig in for the night slightly short of Hill 1081. This entire action was fought in a blinding snowstorm in which visibility was reduced to approximately 6 feet.

At KOTO-RI the 7th Marines began advancing on assigned Division Objectives. The 5th Marines began advancing on Division Objective DOG of the 5th Marines with one battalion. One battalion extended the defensive perimeter on the south of 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry, positions, and another battalion of the 5th Marines (approximately 300 officers and men) reinforced the north sector of perimeter between Dog and Easy.

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 ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
 (Cont'd)

Companies of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. How and Item Companies of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines relieved elements of 185th Engineers and Q Co, 1st Engineers in defensive perimeter. Engineers commenced preparation for blowing ammunition and other supplies which could not be carried in available transportation as well as the movement of bridging material to the power station. Approximately 3000 terror filled civilian refugees were now massing at north roadblock. Bugle calls and some chattering by the enemy was heard throughout the night but no attacks developed. H&I fires were increased during the hours of darkness.

9Dec1950

Baker Company of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, moved two platoons upon the ridges overlooking the MSR (TA 5653) to gain better observation. After running an air strike and calling down an artillery preparation, Able Company continued the attack toward the crest of Hill 1081. The enemy defended stubbornly from well prepared positions and bunkers constructed of dirt filled rice bags and logs. The crest of the hill was secured at approximately 1500I with an estimated 530 enemy killed in the assault by Able Company with the support of air and artillery. Our own casualties were heavy.

At KOTO-RI, the work of destroying all organic equipment which could not be transported was begun. A "Flash RED" was received about 0327I but no enemy aircraft appeared in the area. The Royal Marine Com andos relieved the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, in the line as the first step in the 1st Marines withdrawal from KOTO-RI.

Civilian refugees at this point numbered about 3500 at north roadblock and were driven back by gunfire. Easy Company of 2/1 received heavy enemy small arms fire from the northeast but nothing developed. There was no activity in 2/1 sector throughout night. 3/1 was alerted at 1300I to move to relieve elements of 7th Marines on Division Objectives ABLE and BAKER. 3/1 departed KOTO-RI at 1530I and accomplished mission at approximately 1800I. Increased enemy activity was observed to the north, east, and west including some mortars being placed in position. Air increased its operations and took all observed enemy troops and emplacements under fire. Artillery fired direct fire in several instances on close-in enemy groups.

10Dec1950

The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, continued to consolidate their positions on Objective EASY. Baker Company patrol destroyed two enemy machine gun positions along the railway to north of Hill 1081. Able Company called artillery and mortar fire down on observed groups of enemy with devastating results. No activity around Hill 1081 during the night.

At 0445I, George Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, came under attack on Division Objective ABLE. The strength of the attacking force was estimated 350. This attack repulsed prior to daylight. How Company moved to Division Objective Charlie without incident. At first light the remainder of the 5th Marines commenced its move to the south.

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
(Cont'd)

At 0850I, Dog Co, 2/1, manning the roadblock on the north of the KOTO-RI defenses reported receiving small arms fire. At 1000I the vehicle convoy consisting of all non-tactical vehicles of units at KOTO-RI started movement south on MSR. Movement was extremely slow due to road condition and congestion further south. At 1500I H&SCo, 1st Marines, commenced displacement south followed by the following units in order:

Easy Battery, 11th Marines; 2d Battalion, 1st Marines; rear echelon 185th EngrBn; 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry; Baker and Dog Companies, 1st TkbN; and Reconnaissance Company, 1st MarDiv. All units passed through the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, which furnished security to the moving column from Objectives ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE to the top of the pass. At the top of the pass the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, relieved elements of 5th Marines on Objective DCG. The 5th Marines then continued toward CHINHUNG-NI at approximately 1800I.

Since no activity had been encountered at Objective Dog it was decided that, in order to keep the movement south progressing as rapidly as possible, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, could safely be withdrawn from Objective Dog and move south. This was rapidly accomplished with the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines; 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry; and H&SCo, 1st Marines, following in that order. At 2100 the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, arrived at the top of the pass from Objectives ABLE and BAKER; How Company withdrew from Objective CHARLIE, and the battalion started its movement south.

At 2300I the 1st Tank Bn (-) commenced its withdrawal screened by ReconCo, 1st MarDiv. Approximately 3 miles south of the top of the pass the tail end of the column became engaged in a fire fight, resulting in 3 KIA and 10 WIA from the ReconCo and 4 WIA from the TankBn. In addition the Tank Bn was forced to abandon seven tanks, due to their being overrun by GCF soldiers traveling with civilian refugees. These were destroyed by air the following morning. Upon passage of the last elements of the ReconCo the engineers blew the bridge at TA 5455R.

11Dec1950

1st Battalion, 1st Marines, after passage of the last elements of ReconCo through their positions on objective EASY commenced movement toward CHINHUNG-NI at approximately 0700I arriving at 0930I. Movement was made with only scattered small arms fire being received as they withdrew from Objective EASY.

The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, arrived at CHINHUNG-NI at 0430I. All infantry elements were on foot. The assistant Division Chief of Staff ordered 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to continue advance south on MSR to MAJON-DONG (TA 3960) where trucks would be awaiting them for transport to assembly area between HAMHUNG and CHIGYONG. The last elements boarded trucks at MAJON-DONG at 1130I. These troops had marched continuously for about 20 hours covering a distance of approximately 22 miles equipped with packs, individual weapons, sleeping bags, and wearing heavy winter clothing. Despite this, the physical condition of the men at this point was considered excellent and the morale of the troops was outstanding.

Meanwhile at 0030I the Regimental train proceeding to HAMHUNG

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**DECLASSIFIED**ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
(Cont'd)

after an unexplained delay of several hours at CHINHUNG-NI was ambushed by an undetermined size enemy force of CCF at SUDONG. This action resulted in the loss of nine 7thMTBn vehicles, one armored personnel carriers, 8 KIA, and 21 WIA. This was particularly bitter loss as it was understood that Task Force DOG 3dInf had secured the MSR south from CHINHUNG-NE to HAMHUNG. Elements of 65thInf were known to be in position less than 800 yards from the ambush site.

At 1000I, 3/1, 2/11, Regt H&S Co, and 1/1 departed CHINHUNG-NI for MAJON-DONG. 1/1 received scattered sniper fire while passing through SUDONG. Some two miles north of MAJON-DONG all foot troops were picked up by X Corps vehicles and transported to an assembly area between HAMHUNG and CHJGYONG (TA 6813). Heated tents had been erected for our arrival by Division rear echelon units stationed in HAMHUNG area, and hot food was immediately available.

12 Dec 1950**DECLASSIFIED**  
**/DOD DIR 5200.10**

At 0900 1/1 departed bivouac area for the transient camp near Green Beach #2 at HUNGNAM. H&S Co, 41mm Mortar Co, and AT Company departed at 1300I for Green Beach #2 HUNGNAM. At 2100I loading of regimental vehicles on the US<sup>MC</sup> MONTAGUE (AKA 98) commenced and continued throughout the night. The 2d and 3d Battalions remained in the assembly area west of HAMHUNG.

13 Dec 1950

At 1300I the 2d and 3d Battalions arrived Green Beach #2 at HUNG-NAM. At 1800I all units of this regiment commenced embarking in LCVPs and LUMs for transportation to the MSTG General COLLINS. At 2300I, the 2d Bn, 11th Marines, arrived Green Beach #2 and were boated for transportation to the General COLLINS.

14 Dec 1950

By 0600I, all elements of the 1st Marines were on board the General COLLINS. Other units embarked with the 1st Marines included the following:

11thMar, less 1st and 3d Bns and 4.5 Rkt Btry  
1st EngrBn, less ABLE and PAKER Companies  
7thMTBn (-)  
Elements of 5th and 7thMar (stragglers)

At 1400I the General COLLINS got underway for PUSAN.

15 Dec 1950

Arrived in PUSAN harbor and anchored at 1000I. At 1200I the General COLLINS moved up to the dock. At 2000I commenced to unload vehicles.

**8. ENEMY**

a. Tactics encountered at Wonsan, Kojo, Majon-ni, Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, and Hagaru-ri were those varying from full scale attacks to guerrilla action and ambushes.

b. The first enemy contact during the period was made at

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
(Cont'd)

Kojo by the First Battalion. This enemy force, estimated as a reinforced battalion, attacked at night using automatic weapons and hand grenades. It was determined that this force consisted of regrouped elements of the bypassed 10th North Korean Division. This force was well clothed and armed.

c. The enemy executed well coordinated and planned ambushes on the MSR from Togwon to Majon-ni. These forces, varying in size from 50-300, took advantage of narrow mountain roads and extremely rugged terrain to accomplish ambushes. Obstacles in the form of blown out bridges, landslides, and large boulders were used to block the road at critical points. All ambushes were characterized by the enemy permitting lead elements of the convoys to enter the ambush site before suddenly opening fire from front and flanks with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. No attempts were made by the enemy to exploit his advantage and overrun convoys. The best tactic evolved to combat this situation was to rapidly bring the heaviest available fire to bear on the ridges overlooking the road, and in addition to push an aggressive flanking attack or envelopment against the enemy positions causing them to abandon their positions, even though the attacking force was frequently numerically inferior.

d. Night attacks were experienced at Majon-ni with the enemy commencing probing of defensive lines during the early hours of morning followed by full scale attacks. The enemy was definitely discouraged in continuing these attacks by the extensive use of defensive materials, i.e., trip flares, AP mines, and barbed wire. These forces were well equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades but had no heavy supporting weapons other than an occasional mortar.

e. The first contact with the Chinese Communist Forces was at Hagaru-ri. This enemy was found to be far superior to the North Koreans in all respects, but greatly inferior to our troops.

f. CCF Troops were adept in night fighting and commenced their attacks by probing the lines to determine the location of our automatic weapons and sectors of fire. After these patrols had been driven off or had withdrawn, white phosphorous mortar shells were then dropped in the area to inflict as many casualties as possible. This permitted the enemy to observe the movement caused by these shells and firmly establish our front line positions. When the front lines or flanks were located, infantry crawled forward as closely as possible, sometimes to within 25 yards, and at a given signal, (bugle or whistle) would rush our positions.

g. When attacking convoys, as was experienced on the road both north and south of Koto-ri, the enemy utilized the ridges and deriles to their best advantage. Their tactics were identical to those of the North Koreans in that they permitted leading elements to get well into the trap before opening up with automatic weapons and mortars from the flanks and rear. In every instance their concealment and camouflage was excellent.

h. It was noted that the enemy utilized observation posts to the best advantage. When the positions at Koto-ri were surrounded, the enemy maintained many points of observation on

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(Cont'd)

the surrounding high ground. Enemy personnel would establish themselves on the forward slopes of hills and completely expose themselves in order to obtain a better post of observation. They relied on their uniforms blending in with the natural back-ground for camouflage. It was noted that air, artillery, or mortars failed to budge the enemy from these observation posts. In several instances they appeared oblivious to Rocket and Napalm strikes, withdrawing from their positions only when forced to.

1. The defensive tactics of the Chinese Communist Forces were very well organized. All defensive positions had all-around security. Fox holes and weapons were all positioned so as to be mutually supporting. Care was taken to protect troops from air by tunnelling back under the surface of the ground and by avoiding ridge lines and valley bottoms during movement. Once we had determined from prisoners of war that the bulk of CCF troops and all their officers moved into villages during each night, constant H and I fires from artillery, heavy mortars, and "night hecklers" exacted heavy toll from them. The majority of POWs taken were in pitiful condition being severely frost-bitten and usually extremely hungry.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

a. After the administrative landing at Wonsan, this regiment occupied various positions in that area and was successful in preventing any enemy penetration in force, while protecting the MSR within the sector of responsibility assigned.

b. Again, upon commitment of this regiment in the Chosen Reservoir Area, the mission assigned was that of protecting the MSR and preventing the enemy from making any penetrations in force within the regimental zone of action. The unexpected entry of Communist China into the Korean conflict, with its seemingly inexhaustible supply of manpower, made the successful accomplishment of this mission impossible. When orders were received that the X Corps would be withdrawn from present positions south to the vicinity of Hamhung, this regiment was assigned the mission of covering the withdrawal of all X Corps forces operating in the Chosen Reservoir Area from Koto-ni to Chinhung-ni. This mission was accomplished with utmost success and a minimum loss of men and equipment. It is not worthy to mention that this regiment, despite the sub-zero weather, snow, and enemy activity, arrived at Hamhung with better than 95% of its equipment and supplies. Nearly all vehicles lost were as a direct result of enemy ambushes. Morale of the troops in this regiment, in spite of the knowledge that they were surrounded, was at all times excellent.

c. For exact losses inflicted on enemy forces refer to Appendix 5.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. To further clarify the data in previous paragraphs this paragraph is broken down into certain phases of the operation worthy of further comment:

(1) PLANNING

(a) It is believed that current doctrines relating to planning are sound but a deviation from doctrine resulted in insufficient time to plan, prepare, and issue orders.

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
(Cont'd)

(b) Sufficient planning time is necessary to execute a motor march.

(c) A minimum of Eighty-Seven trucks,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton, in addition to organic transportation are required to lift an infantry battalion during cold weather.

(d) The use of advance parties decreases the confusion when a unit moves into a new location.

(e) Recommendations regarding the planning phase are follows:

(1) That when the tactical situation permits, orders from higher echelon be issued in sufficient time to enable adequate planning.

(2) That an extensive course of instructions be initiated at MCS on motor marches.

(2) COMMUNICATIONS

(a) The Communications within the regiment were considered to be adequate except for a few instances.

(b) This regiment was broken down into three sections with two battalions each at a distance of 10 miles from this headquarters. This presented a definite problem in telephone communications.

(c) It was found that the carrier platoon provided excellent telephone communications between the regiment, battalions, and division.

(d) The SCR 300 provided good communications providing the set and batteries were kept at above freezing temperatures.

(3) SUPPORTING ARMS

(a) AIR - The air support received by ground forces was excellent. The control and procedures prescribed by existing doctrines effectively covered the employment of this arm. Initial air drops of supplies by C-119s of the Combat Cargo Command resulted in considerable damage to installations and loss of life at Koto-ri. Pilots would not, at first pay heed to the Marine Ground Controller and dropped several loads, the chutes of which streamed, into the CP area, damaging tents, vehicles, communication installations, and killing one man, seriously injuring several others.

(b) ARTILLERY - Artillery support was uniformly excellent but it is firmly believed that provisions should be made to include a battery of 155MM howitzers (preferably self-propelled) with the RCT in missions of this nature. These howitzers would be employed for illumination purposes and for deep support. Corrective action is necessary in the matter of cold weather recoil cylinder liquids. Considerable difficulty was experienced in howitzers being slow to return to battery although the pieces had been winterized.

(c) TANKS - The employment of tanks was limited to providing close-in security within defensive perimeters. It was

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discovered, however, that during cold weather, and when in a defense perimeter such as existed at Koto-ri, they presented a definite logistics problem.

(d) 4.2 MORTARS - Considerable difficulty was experienced with ammunition in cold weather. This problem was partially solved by keeping ammunition in a heated tent, however, many lot numbers were found to be defective. Separate correspondence has been written in this matter.

(e) 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE - There were no difficulties experienced with this weapon during cold weather operations.

(f) 3.5 ROCKET LAUNCHER - Same as (e).

(4) ORGANIC WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT - The effectiveness of weapons organic to the regiment with the exception of the carbine, .30 cal., M-2 was found to be satisfactory. It was found, however, that all weapons had to be kept free of oil during the extreme cold in order to permit proper mechanical functioning. An all-weather lubricant is considered essential.

(5) EFFECT OF COLD WEATHER - Personnel could only be required to stand watch for a short time. It was necessary that warming tents be available to prevent frost-bite or freezing.

(a) The cold weather clothing, except for footwear and mittens, proved to be adequate for the temperatures encountered. However, when a man was clothed in the gear provided it prevented freedom of movement and became a burden on the march.

(b) The shoe-pac is very unsatisfactory in temperatures approximating zero degrees fahrenheit. Even the frequent changing of insoles and socks did not prevent feet from becoming soft and consequently freezing. Feet tended to perspire just from normal activity and when combined with the individuals duty of occupying a position on the line became extremely uncomfortable and frequently resulted in frostbite. A better type of footwear is required for wear in cold weather and should have an arch support built in.

(6) SHORE PARTY OPERATIONS - Although this regiment had attached to it, for the landing, a Shore Party Group it had no opportunity to study the effectiveness of their technique or use of their equipment.

(7) EVACUATION TECHNIQUE - During this phase of operations the use of air for evacuation was exploited to the utmost. In order that full advantage could be taken of air evacuation, air strips were constructed forward of the front lines and from first light until dusk casualties were flown out. It is noteworthy to mention that fields constructed for small craft were used by large craft, including C-47s and TBMs. Upon the withdrawal from Koto-ri, not one casualty remained to be evacuated.

L. B. PULLER

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ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
(Cont'd)

APPENDICES:

- 1 - Situation Overlay
- 2 - Situation Overlay
- 3 - Situation Overlay
- 4 - S-1 and Adjutants Report
- 5 - S-2 Report
- 6 - S-4 Report
- 7 - Communications Officer Report
- 8 - Medical Officers Report
- 9 - Chaplains Report
- 10 - AT Co Report
- 11 - 4.2 Mortar Co Report

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ANNEX PETER PETER OF 1STMARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

Adjutants Section  
1st Marines, 1stMarDiv, FMF  
IN THE FIELD.  
25 January, 1951.

From: Regimental Adjutant, 1st Marines.  
To: Commanding Officer, 1st Marines

Subj: Special Action Report of the Wangan - Hamhung- Chosin  
Operation ( Period 7Oct50 to 15Dec50)

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The purpose of this report is to discuss the duties performed and problems encountered during the period covered.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. The Adjutants Section was composed as follows:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>
Adjutants Section	1	4
Asst S-1 & Pers Clfn & AssignO	1	1
Casualty Reporting Section (1)#	1	1
Graves Registration Section	1	1#
Rear Echelon	1	3
	<u>4</u>	<u>10</u>

# Indicates duties performed by same officer

# Supplemented by 5 Graves Registration Personnel from  
1st Service Battalion.

b. It is to be noted that the T/O requirement was exceeded by one (1) officer. This additional officer was advantageously utilized as the Graves Registration officer.

3. Equipment Utilized by the Adjutants Section in the Field

a. The Adjutants Section used the following items of equipment in the field:

1 Desk, field  
2 Chests, files  
1 Typewriter, portable  
1 Chest, f/casualty reporting cards.

b. The foregoing equipment was considered and found adequate for the functioning of the Adjutants Section under field conditions. In the interest of mobility it was necessary to keep office equipment at a bare minimum in order to displace quickly.

c. The Desk, field was actually too bulky and awkward to handle and it is believed that a more efficient type field desk could be designed and manufactured.

d. It was found that the typewriter contained in the small typewriter chest did not stand up under field conditions. Continued loading and unloading due to CP displacement in nearly every instance resulted on typewriter break down. A portable typewriter was substituted and the section able to accomplish most of its work with little difficulty.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT  
Cont'd4. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. The initial period spent in the Assembly Area was utilized in clearing up pending correspondence. Much time was devoted to group meetings with the Adjutant and Administrative personnel of each battalion and company in order to discuss and clarify the method of Personnel Accounting and Casualty Reporting.

5. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT THE OBJECTIVE AREA

a. The movement of the Adjutants Section proceeded without incident and the intervening periods between displacement were spent performing routine duties.

6. OPERATIONS

a. The duties of this section were of routine nature, with exception of the order regarding twice wounded personnel. Most of personnel falling in this category who were wounded twice in Korea were processed without excessive delay. However, personnel wounded during World War II had to be processed individually in order to obtain as much information as possible relative to date, place, and hospitalization for wounds received. Verification of such data, in most instances, was impossible. Considerable delay was involved as this regiment was widely displaced over considerable distances, and in one instance their was little or no contact with one battalion for several days.

b. Many problems which confronted this section during the previous operation in relation to submission of the Personnel Daily Summary and Casualty Reporting were gradually straightened out.

c. During the period 25 November to 10 December 1950 the submission of the Personnel Daily Summary and Casualty Reports was extremely difficult due to the tactical situation. Their was little or no contact with two battalions and as a result reports could only be submitted regarding personnel in the Koto-ri area.

d. Casualty reporting in particular was extremely difficult. Though casualties occurring in the Koto-ri area were promptly reported and cards forwarded to Division via helicopter, the casualty section was unable to confirm Division requests for information concerning casualties of the other two battalions.

e. Upon receipt of information that the 1st Marine Rear and the majority of records had burned, it was realized that the Casualty Card File was the only personnel file and locator system for the unit. In view of the critical tactical situation it was deemed necessary to have the Casualty Cards flown to the rear prior to our departure from Koto-ri.

f. The period 10 - 15 December was spent in displacing and embarkation aboard ship at Hungnam.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the personnel daily summary be adopted as a standard method of war time personnel accounting, and that the method become an integral part of GPY's and maneuvers.

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(Cont'd)

2. That a unified system of Casualty Reporting be adopted incorporated in the Marine Corps Manual and that it be a study requirement for all personnel in the administration field. It is also recommended that a standard form similar to the Unit Diary, carrying standard Unit Diary information, plus information concerning types of wound, location where wounded and disposition, be adopted for the use of subordinate units reporting casualties to the Regimental Casualty Section. This procedure would standardize casualty reporting throughout the Marine Corps.

3. That the exchange system of casualty cards be abolished. This recommendation is made in view of the fact that on many occasions cards submitted were not returned. It is felt that the submission of one casualty card from the unit to Division will be more efficient than maintaining two files of casualty cards, i. e. one file for reported casualties and one file of duplicate cards.

4. It is recommended that a lighter and more durable type field desk be assigned.

5. It is recommended that the war time T/O be modified to include a Casualty Reporting Section.

*D. M. Cox*  
D. M. COX

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**DECLASSIFIED**Appendix 5 to Annex PETER, PETER to 1st Marine Division Special  
Action ReportS-2, 1st Marines,  
1stMarDiv, FMF,  
IN THE FIELD  
8 January, 1951From: S-2 Section, First Marines  
To: Commanding Officer, First MarinesSubj: Special Action Report for period 8 October to 15 December,  
1950.

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the activities of the Intelligence Section, First Marines, during the period of operations 8 October 1950 to 15 December, 1950 in Korea. The mission assigned was the collection, recording, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of intelligence to all concerned. The designation of the next higher echelon was the G-2 Section, First Marine Division.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

S-2	Capt S. W. QUILLIAN
Ass't S-2	1stLt A. V. AMASON
Ass't S-2	-----
Intell Chief	TSgt F. V. CUTTING
Chief Scout Obsv	-----
Photo Interpreter	SSgt J. J. ABER
Scout Obsv	Sgt G. F. MORAN
Intell Man	Sgt J. N. STENT
Topo Draftsman	Cpl P. KOROMOS
Scout Obsv	Cpl B. F. KELLEY
Scout Obsv	Cpl W. D. OLSON
Scout Obsv	Cpl R. L. SQUIERS
Intell Man	Cpl G. A. EDUCK
Intell Man	-----
Clerk Typist	Pfc J. K. NORRIS
Scout Obsv	Cpl W. F. HARRIS
Scout Obsv	Pfc J. G. GEVATOSKY
Scout Obsv	Pfc R. W. KACHEL
Scout Obsv	Pfc J. A. GORE
Scout Obsv	-----

Regimental Interpreters:

1stLt E. J. STONE USMCR  
Paul Y. KIM (South KOREAN)  
Lt C. K. HAHM (ROKA)

Note: Each Battalion had four (4) interpreters either civilian or (ROKA).

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Intelligence information on Wonsan area was sufficient for planning purposes, however; the landing at Wonsan was administrative.

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Appendix B to Annex PETER PETER to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report (Cont'd)

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSING

Not applicable.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Not applicable.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

Not applicable.

7. OPERATIONS

8 Oct 50 - 25 Oct 1950

No enemy contact.

26 Oct 50

Landed at Wonsan, Korea. 1/1 traveled South by RR to Kojo.

No enemy contact.

27 Oct 50

Enemy started probing action against our positions in Kojo area. This action culminated in a severe night attack by a reinforced NK Bn. The enemy was repulsed after severe hand to hand fighting.

KIA  
253WIA  
300POW  
10

23 Oct 50

1/1 moved to stronger positions overlooking Kojo. No enemy contact. 28330 2/1 landing with Regimental Command Group at 1/1 positions in Kojo.

KIA  
0WIA  
0POW  
0

29 Oct 50

2/1 and 1/1 patrols to West, South, and North made no enemy contact.

KIA  
0WIA  
0POW  
13

30 Oct 50

1/1 patrol in small fire fight South of Kojo. KMC Company landed and took up positions around Kojo RR station.

KIA  
16WIA  
4POW  
10

31 Oct 50

1/1 and 2/1 patrols to South and West made no enemy contact. KMC Company repulsed small attack 312100.

KIA  
1WIA  
7POW  
5

1 Nov 50

3/1 arrived at Majon-ni west of Wonsan. 1/1 left Kojo for Wonsan. No enemy contact. 3/1 took 570 POWs in Majon-ni area.

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Appendix 5 to Annex PETER PETER to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	570

2Nov50

Convoy to Majon-ni ambushed and forced back. 3/1 motor patrol was ambushed Yohn-ni TA 3723 P.Y.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
38	72	0

3Nov50

1/1 Able Company ambushed on Road to Majon-ni.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
52	100	0

4Nov50

No enemy contact

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	13

5Nov50

No enemy contact

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	13

6Nov50

No enemy contact

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	11

7Nov50

Enemy attacked 3/1 with two Bns 070130. Attack driven off with heavy enemy casualties. 2/1 East Co ambushed on Road to Majon-ni

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
160	Unk	550

8Nov50

No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	3

9Nov50

No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	10

10Nov50

No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	1

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Action Report11 Nov 50  
No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	7

12 Nov 50  
3/1 repulsed small attack. 2/1 elements attacked by  
approximately 60 NFPA. Enemy withdrew upon receipt of 4.2 WP  
fire.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
43	19	13

13 Nov 50  
No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	43

14 Nov 50  
No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	149

15 Nov 50  
No enemy contact. Moved to assembly area at Chigyong,  
West of Hamhung.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	0

16 Nov 50 -- 24 Nov 50  
No enemy contact Chigyong area.25 Nov 50  
2/1 and Regimental Headquarters went to Koto-ri. No enemy  
contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	0

26 Nov 50  
No enemy contact.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	0

27 Nov 50  
2/1 patrol engaged 50 enemy West of Koto-ri.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
25	15	3 (2 CCF, 1 NK)

28 Nov 50  
280900 2/1 patrol engaged in heavy fire fight just North of  
Koto-ri. 281130 convoy 5 miles North of Koto-ri stopped by blown  
out bridge and enemy fire. 281310 Dog Company attacked by 500  
enemy. 282230 3/1 George Co. attacked by 3 CCF Regts. at Hageru-  
ri. Attack lasted until 290650.

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Month 3.

KIA	MIA	POW
1838	5752	10 (CCF)

29Nov50  
1/1 lines probed by enemy in early morning. 291045 2/1 East  
Company attacked. 291500 truck convoy to Hagaru-ri ambushed by  
3 CCF Regts. 291700 convoy 3 miles South of Koto-ri ambushed by  
300 CCF. 291800 2/1 East Company attacked by 300 CCF. This  
attack lasted until 292020. 3/1 received probing action during  
period.

KIA	MIA	POW
631	133	3 (CCF)

30Nov50  
100247 1/1 combat patrol contacted enemy TA 5244. Ambush  
of truck convoy at 291800 North of Koto-ri lasted until 300830.

KIA	MIA	POW
272	29	0

KIAs undetermined in ambush of truck convoy.

1Dec50  
3/1 received enemy probing action during early morning. 3/1  
received heavy attack from 302230 to 010900. Attack by 3 CCF  
Regts supported by artillery and mortars. 011300 friendly patrol  
engaged enemy 2 miles south of Koto-ri.

KIA	MIA	POW
1697	2523	30 (CCF)

2Dec50  
3/1 was engaged by enemy from 011930 to 020600. 1/1 patrol  
engaged enemy on road to Koto-ri.

KIA	MIA	POW
233	510	5 (CCF)

3Dec50  
1/1 patrol observed enemy troops in vicinity of the bridge  
at TA 5554P. 1835, 3/1 perimeter at Hagaru-ri receiving sporadic  
small arms fire. Perimeter at Koto-ri extended to the South.  
Friendly troops engaged one Bn CCF.

KIA	MIA	POW
611*	27*	30 (CCF)

\*450 KIAs reported by POWs.

4Dec50  
1130 1/1 reported enemy dug in at TA 5459 supported by high  
velocity guns. 3/1 received sporadic small arms fire.

KIA	MIA	POW
415	332	8 (CCF)

5Dec50  
2/1 received scattered small arms fire during period.

KIA	MIA	POW
311	Unk	0

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(cont'd)

6Dec50

Charlie Company, Engineers, engaged one Company CCF 031100  
near Sudong. 1/L Patrol drove enemy off, relieving the Engineers.  
1 George Company engaged by 250 CCF.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
236	99	21 (CCF)

7Dec50

5th and 7th Marines and 3/L arrived Koto-ri from the North.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
153	77	3 (CCF)

8Dec50

1200-1320 1/L Baker Company engaged with CCF at TA 5553 SI.  
1 Able Company engaged enemy 400 yards in front of their objective.  
1 reconnaissance indicated well prepared enemy positions along  
edge TA 5553 CI - TA 5554R.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
53	9	3

9Dec50

1600 1/L Able Company overran a reinforced CCF Company in  
obtaining their objective.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
435	235	3

10Dec50

1000 CCF observed 700 yards North of 1/L Able positions. 1400  
1 Baker Company in fire fight in TA 5654M. 3/L engaged CCF of  
1 size in holding action South of Koto-ri.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
673	1332	2 (CCF)

11Dec50

0100 Truck convoy ambushed at Sudong. Fight lasted until 0530.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
252	53	0

12Dec50

No enemy contact. Arrived assembly area west of Hamhung.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	0

13Dec50

No enemy contact. Arrived assembly area Hungnam.

<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
0	0	0

14Dec -15Dec50

Aboard Gen. E. T. COLLINS.

. ENEMY (Tactics, organization, strength, deployment, probable  
order of battle, and equipment.)

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Appendix 5 to Annex PETER PETER to 1stMarDiv Special Action Report  
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/DOD DIR 5200.10

a. An analysis of the enemy for this period should be divided into two general classifications as the enemy, over a period, engaged in two types of operations -- guerrilla attacks and concentrated, organized infantry attacks. Prior to our contact with the CGF, our forces were engaged with organized guerrilla bands of varying size, composed of elements or by-passed NKPA forces.

(1) NKPA -- As the NKPA encountered during this period were passed elements of NK Divisions, their primary mission was to proceed North until such time as they should arrive at an assembly area where they could be reorganized and re-equipped. In the Won area our forces occupied blocking positions, inhibiting the movement of the enemy to the North. The result was that the enemy employed guerrilla tactics to contain and hinder our forces in carrying out their mission.

In their guerrilla operations the NKPA demonstrated their ability to execute well planned and organized surprise attacks against our forces in the Won area. Their tactics in these attacks were good; however, they never realized the potentialities of enlarging their sphere of operations. Due to the wide dispersal of our forces, the enemy had adequate opportunity to conduct guerrilla operations over a large area; however, we confined his activities to the areas in close proximity to his route of egress to the North.

The guerrilla attacks carried out by the enemy were well executed. These attacks were directed at either convoys or outposts of varying strength.

The NKPA usually attacked convoys in mountainous regions where terrain features were a decided advantage to the attacking force. On the road from Wonsan to Majon-ni where a number of ambushes occurred, the enemy deployed on both sides of the road where the road passed through a defile. In addition to this the ambush was layed, conditions permitting, at a horse shoe bend in the road. Machine guns and M rifles were placed at both ends of the curve and also at strategic positions along the curve. Enemy soldiers took up positions in support of these weapons in places where they were concealed and in grenade throwing range of the road. On the end of the curve toward which the convoy was proceeding some form of road block was constructed, i. e., demolition created landside impassible holes in the road, or a previously destroyed vehicle placed in a blocking position. The enemy usually started his attack when the first vehicles in the convoy had stopped to investigate the road block, at which time grenades were thrown at the trucks while the throwers were covered by automatic weapons and small arms fire.

In his attacks on outposts or prepared positions, the NKPA used tactics similar to those employed in his ambushes. Automatic weapons were placed to provide support for troops infiltrating w/ grenades and submachine guns. Most of these attacks were conducted during the hours prior to dawn. The NKPA forces engaged in these operations were well equipped with grenades and "Burr Guns" and well organized and disciplined.

(2) CGF--The CGF used similar tactics to those of the NKPA. The great difference between the two was their strength. The CGF were organized into much larger units, i.e., Divisions, Corps.

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Appendix 5 to Annex PETER PETER to 1stMarDiv Special Action Report  
(Cont'd)

and Armies, and their mission was an offensive one. The tactics employed by the GCF in their attacks were usually as follows: (1) Mortar and Artillery preparatory shelling, (2) Automatic Weapon placed in support of attacking infantry, (3) Infantry infiltration within grenade range, and (4) general infantry attack in waves. All of the enemy infantry were well equipped with grenades and sub-machine guns which they employed with great effect at close range. Bugle calls and whistle blasts were used by the enemy troops as pre-designated signals prior and during their attacks.

#### b. EQUIPMENT

(1) NKPA - The equipment used by the NKPA was predominantly Russian. Their small arms and auto-matic weapons were of Russian manufacture supplemented occasionally with captured Japanese and American weapons. Communication equipment was mostly Russian with some old Japanese radio parts, sets, etc. While the NKPA was conducting guerrilla warfare in the Wonsan area a number of concealed ammunition dumps were unearthed. In several instances farmers and civilians reported the locations of such caches to our forces. It was from such dumps that the NKPA replenished their supply of ammunition.

(2) GCF - Chinese equipment consisted for the most part of material captured from the Chinese Nationalists. It was comprised mainly of American and Japanese weapons, including a large number of U. S. Thompson sub-machine guns, 60mm and 81mm mortars. The winter clothing used by the GCF was excellent. They wore thick quilted cotton clothing with green and white reversible parkas. The only apparent defect in their clothing was their shoes which were made of canvas (similar to our tennis shoes). The GCF transported their supplies by coolies and horses; however, their logistical problem was not as great as ours for their soldiers carried their own rice and ammunition. There was some evidence that previous stores of ammunition had been hidden in the enemy's zone of action. POW interrogation revealed that communication in the lower echelon was done by messengers and runners; however, in the higher echelon radio contact was maintained with Manchuria.

#### c. ORDER OF BATTLE

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25 Oct 1950 to 15 Nov 1950

DOD DIR 5200.10

##### DIVISIONS

1. 3d Div
2. 4th Div
3. 5th Div
4. 8th Div
5. 15th Div
6. 19th Div
7. 24th Div
8. 32d Div
9. 42d Div
10. 46th Div
11. 86th Div

##### MISCELLANEOUS

1. 894th NK Marine Regt
2. 651st Bn
3. Training Bn
4. Signal Bn

##### REGIMENTS

1. 20th Regt
2. 6th Regt
3. 7th Regt
4. 9th Regt
5. 10th Regt
6. 94th Regt
7. 106th Regt
8. 107th Regt
9. 108th Regt
10. 112th Regt
11. 117th Regt
12. 120th Regt
13. 239th Regt
14. 249th Regt
15. 253d Regt
16. 320th Regt
17. 361st Regt
18. 384th Regt
19. 487th Regt

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Appendix 6 to Annex PETER PETER to 1stMarDiv Special Action Report  
(Cont'd)

- 20. 498th Regt
- 21. 503d Regt
- 22. 508th Regt
- 23. 509th Regt
- 24. 513th Regt
- 25. 526th Regt
- 26. 524th Regt
- 27. 524th Regt
- 28. 540th Regt
- 29. 542d Regt
- 30. 561st Regt
- 31. 575th Regt
- 32. 578th Regt
- 33. 579th Regt
- 34. 560th Regt
- 35. 588th Regt
- 36. 590th Regt
- 37. 594th Regt
- 38. 609th Regt
- 39. 679th Regt
- 40. 687th Regt
- 41. 694th Regt
- 42. 918th Regt
- 43. 957th Regt
- 44. 989th Regt

27 Nov to 3 Dec 1950

- CORPS
- 1. 30th Corps
- REGIMENTS
- 1. 106th Regt
  - 2. 132d Regt
  - 3. 173d Regt
  - 4. 173d Regt
  - 025174th Regt

- DIVISIONS
- 1. 9th Div
  - 2. 10th Div
  - 3. 30th Div
  - 4. 58th Div

3 Dec to 10 Dec 1950

- CORPS
- 1. 30th Corps
  - 2. 30th Corps
- DIVISIONS
- 1. 4th Div
  - 2. 10th Div
  - 3. 60th Div

- REGIMENTS
- 1. 106th Regt
  - 2. 178th Regt
  - 3. 179th Regt
  - 4. 180th Regt
  - 5. 569th Regt

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

a. Enemy casualties

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>POW</u>
7332	9871	1485

b. Enemy equipment captured and/or destroyed.

(1) Ammunition:

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Appendix 5 to Annex PETER PETER to 1st MarDiv Special Action Report  
Cont'd)

209 Sea Mines

238,000 lbs of assorted munitions including 7.62mm rifle and pistol ammunition, 45mm AT Shells, 120mm Mortar shells, 11 types of grenades, and anti-tank mines (new type) Russian manufacture).

(2) Machine Guns.

538 including 7.62mm M1910 "Maxim" BMG  
7.62mm "Degyarev" DP LMG, U. S. .30 HMG  
U. S. .30 LMG

(3) Sub - machine guns

3442 including 7.62mm PPSH M1941, 7.62mm "SUDASU" PPS 1943, and U. S. Thompsons (The CGF used Thompsons almost exclusively. They had very few Russian SMGs)

(4) Rifles.

7769 including 7.62mm "MOSSIN-NAGANT" M1891/30, 6.5mm "Meiji" M1905, 7.7mm M1939, 6.5mm "Meiji" carbine, 7.62mm "Mossin-Nagant" M1924/?? Carbine; 3mm Mauser (Chinese Manufacture) U. S. .30 Enfield, U. S. .30 M1903 Springfield, U. S. .30 M1 Carbine, U. S. .30 M1. (The CGF were armed mainly with captured U. S. and Japanese Rifles).

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) EQUIPMENT

Strongly recommend that all S-2 equipment be designed so that it can be hand carried. This recommendation is made due to the mountainous terrain and long distances over which our forces conducted their operations during the period.

(b) INTERPRETERS

Once our Regiment made contact with the CGF, POW interrogation was extremely difficult due to the lack of Chinese speaking interpreters. There was only one capable Chinese interpreter in the Regiment while we were operating in the reservoir area.

(c) COMMUNICATIONS

Since all intelligence information from the lower echelons had to be transmitted by the Regimental Tactical Net, the information relayed was delayed considerably.

(d) MAPS

The 1/50,000 tactical map proved to be unsatisfactory, terrain features were difficult to distinguish due to the black and white print, small towns and villages were indicated in Japanese and not in English, and terrain features were occasionally inaccurate.

(e) CGF OB, TO, AND TE.

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Appendix 5 to Annex DETERMINATION to 1st Marine Div Special Action Report  
(Cont'd)

Little or no information was available, of enemy OB, TD, or TE prior to our contact with the GCP. Some information was received; however, it was neither complete nor accurate.

*S. W. Quillian*  
S. W. QUILLIAN

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Hq., 1st Marines,  
1st MarDiv., FMF,  
In the Field,  
1 February 1951

Appendix 6 to Annex PETER PETER to 1st Marine Division Special  
Action Report.

From: S-4, First Marines  
To: Commanding Officer, First Marines  
Subj: Special Action Report for period 7 October 1950 to 15  
December 1950.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

a. The purpose of this report is to summarize the activities of the S-4 section and related activities during the period 7 October 1950 to 15 December 1950.

### 2. TASK ORGANIZATION

- a. See Annex PETER PETER  
b. The Service Bstation was organized as follows:

Headquarters Section

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Headquarters Section	2-17	2-2
Ordnance Section	1-4	1-4
Commissary Section	0-6	0-4
Motor Transport Section	1-13	1-13
Supply Section	1-33	1-24
TOTAL	5-73	5-47

### 3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Much of the preliminary logistic planning normally accomplished by the Embarkation Group was accomplished by the division staff for this operation. Otherwise preliminary planning was normal except that, as at Kobe, it was necessary to load ships before tactical plans had been completed. Plans were made for a floating dump consisting of 10 LCVP's to be loaded from the USS Noble.

### 4. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL

None.

### 5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

Eleven LST's and two APA's were assigned to Embarkation Group BAKER. With the attachment of Company 'C', 1st Motor Transport Battalion to the regiment, it was possible to preload on trucks supplies and equipment that would be needed for the first few days following the landing. The preloading of organic equipment on trucks made possible the almost complete recovery of organic equipment on D day. As at Kobe, the regiment was unable to draw rations for all elements of the Embarkation Group to load aboard ship. Since only two days 'C' rations were available to be loaded by the Embarkation Group and since it was considered vital that at least one-half of these ration rations be preloaded in trucks, it was important that rations be loaded aboard ship for all elements of Embarkation Group BAKER. In order to insure that rations were loaded for all hands, it was, under the distribution system established by division, necessary to require each unit of the division to turn into the First Marine supply dump rations for subordinate elements attached to Embarkation Group BAKER. In this instance a great deal of confusion would have been avoided by allowing

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Appendix 6 to Annex PETER PETER to 1stMarDiv. Special Action Report  
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the regimental supply officer to draw and load aboard ship rations for the entire Embarkation Group. Furthermore, after both APA's of the Embarkation Group had embarked their troops, one assault packet per man became available and had to be loaded for issue prior to D day. Under division's policy i.e., that units would draw rations only for organic units, it would have been virtually impossible to insure that rations were loaded aboard ship for all elements of the Embarkation Group. For example, several units would have had to deliver by small boat rations to each of the APA's. Fortunately, it was possible to convince the Service Battalion that the distribution system was unworkable and the regimental supply officer was able to draw and distribute to each ship assigned to Embarkation Group BAKER, the correct number of assault packets required. Although the tremendous tides at Inchon considerably hampered the unloading by necessitating the scheduling of loading and withdrawal of LSTs with the rise and fall of the tide, all ships were loaded and awaiting orders to sail by 2400L on 14 October 1950.

#### 6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

##### a. Routine

b. Prior to the completion of loading, the designated target area, by now identified as Wonsan, was seized by ROK troops. As a result an advance party for the division, including the regimental S-4 and a representative from the S-3, was flown to Wonsan to select assembly area and to make such preparations as were possible to facilitate landing the division.

#### 7. OPERATIONS

##### 26-28 October

On 26 October the regiment, less the 2d Battalion reinforced, landed administratively over beaches in the vicinity of the Wonsan airfield. During the period the regimental command post and supply dump were established in TA 5936E approximately seven miles from the division supply installations located at the airfield. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines were attached to the regiment; The 1st and 2d Battalions, 1st Marines, plus a regimental command group moved to Kojo approximately 35 miles south of Wonsan. Due to the shortage of supply personnel and the numerous widespread units which the regiment was supplying, neither a representative of the S-4 nor any supply personnel were sent to Kojo. This proved to be a mistake in that one officer and a clerk could have coordinated the activities of the supply sections of the two battalions and avoided some confusion. On 28 October the 3d Battalion moved to Mejon-ni approximately 25 miles west of Wonsan. By the end of the period all regimental supplies and equipment had been unloaded and moved from the beach. However, a rear echelon of the Service Platoon remained at the division's dumps, now operated by the Combat Service Group, in order to expedite the delivery of supplies to units in Kojo and to units stationed in Wonsan proper.

##### 29 October-4 November

During this period, the regimental service troops were busy transporting troops to and from Anbyon and supplying elements of the RCT located in six different locations. Helicopters and LST's were used to support the troops at Kojo while other units were supplied by trucks. Commencing 2 November truck convoys carrying supplies to

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 Appendix 6 to Annex PETER PETER to 1stMarDiv. Special Action Report  
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the 3d Battalion at Majon-ni were repeatedly ambushed and the bulk of the supplies thereafter were delivered to the 3d Battalion by air drop, which proved to be satisfactory. By the end of the period, elements of the RCT at Kojo had returned to the vicinity of Wonsan and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines had been detached from the regiment thereby temporarily reducing the supply problems for the regiment.

5-9 November

This period is characterized by the efforts expended in moving troops and supplies over the road to Majon-ni. Every truck in the RCT except artillery prime movers were used to accomplish these movements. One reinforced rifle company was moved to and from Majon-ni and at the same time two thirds of a reinforced infantry battalion was moved to a position approximately seven miles east of Majon-ni. Three truck convoys were ambushed resulting in the loss of vehicles and drivers. As a result, supplies continued to be delivered to the 3d Battalion by air drop. These supplies included ammunition, fuel, fortification materials, cold weather clothing, rations and spare parts. Helicopters and observation planes were used for evacuation of wounded and the delivery of small items of supply such as medical supplies and signal equipment. During this period the 1st Battalion, 55th Infantry, was attached to and supplied by the regiment for two days. On the detachment of this battalion the regiment arranged for trains for its movement north and aided in the loading of the battalion.

10-13 November

During this period the 3d and 5th KMC Battalions were attached to and supplied by the regiment. These battalions, on attachment to the regiment, were not adequately clothed for the cold weather at Wonsan. Efforts were made to obtain clothing for them with negative results. Preparations for moving the RCT to Chigwong were commenced during this period.

During the regiment's stay at Wonsan it drew all supplies for the RCT from the Combat Service Group approximately seven miles away. Since the regiment had no supply or motor transport troops attached, the task of supplying attached units, which normally included two and sometimes three additional battalions, greatly overburdened the regiment, particularly in view of the vast area over which elements of the RCT were spread. In addition the regiment experienced great difficulty in drawing class II supplies. When the division departed for Hamhung, many of the smaller units attached to the regiment had not been issued many items, including tents and stoves, by their parent units. Since most of the items involved were in short supply or had been shipped north by the Combat Service Group, the regiment was forced to issue part of its organic equipment to attached units.

14-18 November

The RCT was relieved by the 15th Infantry, USA, and moved to Chigwong. On moving from Wonsan both KMC battalions were detached and C Company 'B', 7th Motor Transport Battalion was attached to form a normal RCT for the first time since landing at Wonsan. The move to Chigwong was accomplished only after a great deal of confusion as to the transportation to be provided. The 1st Battalion moved as planned on two trains and one platoon of trucks. The remainder of the RCT moved piecemeal by organic trucks, by riding on trains loaded with X Corps supplies and by rail cars as they could be made available. On 18 November the last units arrived at Chigwong.

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19-22 November

During the regiment's stay in Chigyoung, all supplies were drawn from division service units. Additional clothing, tents and stoves were drawn and issued to all units of the RCT in preparation for its move further north. On 22 November, B Company moved to Chihung-ni.

23 November

Remainder of 1st Battalion moved to Shihung-ni by truck.

24 November

2d Battalion moved to Koto-ri, but due to insufficient number of trucks was forced to leave approximately eight truck loads of ammunition and tentage with the regimental supply section.

25 November

Regimental H&S Company moved to Koto-ri. However, due to insufficient trucks, it was impossible to move approximately ten truckloads of supplies and personnel. In view of the tactical situation at the time, it was decided that tentage and stoves were more important than ammunition. Consequently, the Assistant S-4, Ordnance Section and regimental ammunition were left in Chigyoung.

26 November

3d Battalion minus G Company moved to Hageru-ri. One days rations and fuel were drawn from Chihung-ni for troops at Koto-ri. 2d 7th Motor Transport trucks returned to Shigyoung to pick up remainder of RCT.

27 November

Five regimental trucks returned to Chigyoung to pick up remainder of RCT. One days fuel and rations were drawn from Hageru-ri.

28 November

During the night of 27-28 November, the road to Hageru-ri was cut by Chinese troops. Elements of the 2d Battalion unsuccessfully attempted to open the road. As a result of the fire fight, the 2d Battalion requested small arms ammunition but none was available in the regimental dump since the rear echelon had not arrived with the regiments ammunition. As a result, it was necessary to obtain ammunition from other units in the area for issue to the battalion. Later in the day, supply convoys enroute to Hageru-ri arrived with ammunition, rations and fuel which were unloaded by the regiment. Company G reinforced. Company B, 7th Motor Transport and the Service Platoon rear echelon arrived late in the afternoon with a good supply of 81MM and 60MM mortar ammunition. However, this supply was almost completely depleted by issues to Royal Marine Commandos and BAKER Company, 1st Infantry, which with G Company, were to push through with supply convoys to Hageru-ri on 29 November.

29 November

There was practically no field fortification materials in Koto-ri since none had been brought forward by the Regiment and there had not been sufficient trucks or time available to haul them from Hageru-ri before the road was closed. It was learned that no fortification materials were available at Chihung-ni but that division would deliver them by truck.

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from Hamhung on 30 November. These trucks never arrived at Koto-ri. A telephone call to Chinhung-ni requesting the delivery of ammunition and rations revealed that no trucks were available to deliver the supplies but that a few might be available later in the day. An air drop of ammunition was requested at 1445. Nineteen trucks were dispatched to Chinhung-ni to pick up ammunition, a supply convoy enroute from Hamhung to Hageru-ri arrived with mortar ammunition and 'C' rations which were unloaded, 1000 rounds of 105MM howitzer ammunition were unloaded from an army convoy enroute to 7th Division elements east of the Chosin reservoir. POL products were also unloaded from other convoys which were unable to get brought to Hageru-ri. Three trucks hauling ammunition from Chinhung-ni were ambushed enroute. Fortunately the one truck to get through was loaded with the much needed 60MM mortar ammunition. Several truck loads of 4.2 inch mortar ammunition were located among the numerous trucks now at Koto-ri which had been unable to get through to Hageru-ri. Another request was sent to division for an air drop of ammunition.

### 30 November

During the morning, it was learned that B Company, 31st Infantry and personnel from division headquarters had been unsuccessful in their attempt to get through to Hageru-ri and were making their way back to Koto-ri. Survivors from these troops straggled into the perimeter throughout the day. When the first survivors arrived, an air drop of sleeping bags and socks was requested for that day. This drop was successfully made on the old OY airstrip at 1630. In order to clothe the survivors, clothing in the hands of the attached Service Battalion shower unit and in the hands of the Service Company, 31st Infantry was taken over and issued as necessary. B Company, 31st Infantry lost practically all its arms and equipment. Rifles and carbines were issued from the regimental supply dump to the 2 officers and 69 enlisted men remaining. The 19 trucks sent to Chinhung-ni on 29 November attempted to bring supplies back to Koto-ri by following the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry. These trucks were forced to return to Chinhung-ni on the night of 30 November when the battalion ran into enemy resistance and was unable to break through that day. An air drop of ammunition and two storage tents was requested for 1 December.

### 1 December

At approximately 0430, the advanced elements of the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry began entering the perimeter. It was learned from their assistant S-3 that they would need rations and ammunition. At 0502 division was notified that it was imperative that supplies previously requested be air dropped on this date. Weather conditions during the morning precluded an air drop. At 1400 one C-119 airplane dropped supplies into the hands of the enemy. Pilot stated that he would return with another load which he failed to do. Supplies dropped were repalmed by our planes in order to prevent their use by the enemy. Due to the shortage of fuel, it was necessary to stop issues until a ration system could be worked out. Five sound tents with frames were taken over from the X Corps advance CP detail and erected for use by the regimental sick bay and Medical Company. In order to provide stoves for these tents, it was necessary to make stovepipe out of 81MM mortar containers. The remainder of the 2d Battalion, 31st Infantry straggled in during the day. Air drops of ammunition, medical supplies, candles, flashlights, rations and automotive spare parts were requested for 2 December.

### 2 December

An air drop of sleeping bags for the 31st Infantry was requested. Rationing of diesel fuel was put into effect. It was no

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longer considered safe to use the old OY airstrip for air drops. Consequently, the river bed south of Koto-ri was selected as the new drop area. At 1015 oneplane load of supplies consisting mainly of tentage was dropped. A second plane load of supplies was dropped at 1400. Supplies and equipment that had been previously requested were again requested for air drop on the following day. Two more air drops were made at 1800, almost dark, with the aid of flares. One drop was perfect, the other landed on a hillside 1000 yards away.

### 3 December

C-119 aircraft began dropping supplies at 0805. A total of 11 plane loads were dropped during the day. Planes would not follow instructions of TACP. As a result many air drops were made on the camp site. Due either to excessive speed of plane or containers not adequately secured, many supplies fell as free drops seriously injuring three men, one later died, and wrecking communications and many tents. A new OY field became operational at 1445. Ammunition, rations and 1000 sleeping bags were recovered from air drops. An air drop of ammunition, and litter on 4 December was requested.

### 4 December

Began planning for withdrawal from Koto-ri. 15 C-119 aircraft dropped supplies during day. A 100 man working party was required to recover supplies delivered by air. An air drop of diesel fuel, ammunition, crew served weapons for 31st Infantry, and rations was requested for 5 December.

### 5 December

A 200 man working party was required to recover supplies dropped by air on 4 and 5 December. Ammunition and rations were delivered by air. The division operation order directing the advance to Hamhung was received.

### 6 December

A 500 man working party was required to recover rations, fuel and ammunition air dropped on 5 and 6 December. Division CP was established at Koto-ri. Beginning this date requests for supplies were submitted by division and the regiment began operating what amounted to a division dump.

### 7 December

Advanced elements of RCT-7 began entering Koto-ri at 0600. The remainder of RCT-7, Division Trains 1 and 2, RCT-5 and the 3d Battalion arrived at Koto-ri. All classes of supply were issued to these units. Four sections of Bailey bridge were air dropped for use in erecting a bridge across a blown-out section of road at the powerhouse south of the pass. Socks, rations, and gasoline were air dropped during day.

### 8 December

Division engineer units augmented by 185th Engineer Battalion, USA moved to powerhouse to erect bridge. Gasoline and diesel fuel was dropped by air for division units.

### 9 December

Division commenced movement from Koto-ri. RCT-1 units were directed to begin destroying, by means other than burning, all organic equipment which could not be transported.

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10 December

Regiment began movement from Koto-ri. All RCT-1 vehicles except minimum number of combat vehicles moved in the RCT train immediately following RCT-5 train. The movement of vehicles out of Koto-ri was initially very slow. Upon investigation, it was learned that the delay was caused by failure of army units to abandon and destroy inoperable vehicles. After these vehicles were pushed off the road, traffic began to move steadily. Regimental train arrived at Chinhung-ni at approximately 20151 where it was stopped because of a reported road block at Sudong. The trip from Koto-ri to Chinhung-ni was made without incident except that it became necessary to abandon one M39 tracked utility vehicle enroute. At approximately 24001, the Division Motor Transport Officer ordered the regimental train to proceed to Hamhung.

11 December

At approximately 00301, the RCT train was ambushed at Sudong. All trucks loaded with regimental supplies and equipment including the supply officer's records were destroyed. After a fire fight of approximately three hours, the enemy withdrew into the hills and the convoy proceeded to Hamhung. The Service Platoon lost nine men killed, five wounded and one missing. The regiment arrived at Chinhung-ni during the morning and continued by foot and motor to a camp erected by the Amphibian Tractor Battalion south of Hamhung.

12-15 December

The regiment moved by motor to Hungnam where it embarked aboard the USS Montague and the USNS General Collins and sailed for Pusan.

8. ENEMY

Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

It is believed that adequate logistical support was furnished the regiment considering the difficulties imposed by guerrillas, extreme cold weather, and the long distance that the regiment was separated from the division and its organic units. It is noted that the logistical support furnished this organization by the 1st Combat Service Group was not up to the standard set by division supply agencies.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. It has been the experience of this regiment that as the major units of a separate RCT, it must furnish all classes of supply to attached units even though the attached units may not have adequate class II and IV equipment when they join the RCT. It is recommended that the divisions supply agencies be made aware of this fact in order to simplify the supply of an RCT.

b. An RCT operating separately from the division should have division supply, maintenance and motor transport units attached.

c. This regiment experienced great difficulty in obtaining all types of spare parts during the period covered by this report. As a result many major items of equipment became inoperative. It is, therefore, recommended that an RCT be authorized to carry an adequate stock of spare parts, particularly for field ranges, Coleman lanterns, weapons, and motor transport.



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d. On several occasions KNC units were attached to this organization. On all occasions the supply of these units presented a difficult problem in that they invariably came to the regiment ill-equipped and ill-clothed. Furthermore, it was difficult to obtain food for the Koreans and impossible to obtain equipment. It is recommended that a clear cut policy on supply for attached Korean units be established. This policy should include what supplies and equipment U.S. units are authorized to draw and issue to Koreans and the source of supply for other supplies and equipment required by Korean units.

e. The regiment was unable on both moves north to move in complete tactical units due to inadequate transportation. Furthermore, on both moves, the regiment did not know what transportation was to be provided until after the moves were completed.

f. The extreme cold under which this regiment operated at Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri caused many problems heretofore unencountered. Some believed worthy of comment follow:

(1) The ground was frozen to a depth of as much as nineteen (19) inches. This made it extremely difficult to dig foxholes without the aid of engineering tools which were almost non-existent. Furthermore, it was impossible to drive wooden tent pins into the ground. It is, therefore, recommended that additional engineering tools and some type expendable metal tent pins be issued to units for cold weather operations. A sharpened steel stake is recommended.

(2) Weapons, even those completely free of oil, tended to freeze. This was prevented by actually firing them at frequent intervals. The carbine was most effected by the cold and was unanimously considered unreliable and unsatisfactory. Rifles, machine guns, and BAR's would function properly after being warmed up but would frequently have to be operated manually for the first few rounds. The development of a satisfactory all-weather lubricant for weapons is essential.

(3) The cold weather clothing issued including the mountain sleeping bag, was not designed for use in the sub zero temperatures experienced. Consequently, it was not satisfactory, especially the shoe-pac and mittens, and resulted in many cases of frostbite.

(4) A great deal of difficulty was experienced in cooking BAKER rations due to following:

(a) Impossibility of keeping water from freezing.  
(b) Increased amount of time required to boil water.  
(c) All water and food had to be thawed before it could be used.

(d) Due to short days, lack of lights and increased time required to prepare meals, only two hot meals a day could be served.

(e) Absolute inefficiency of the Mallon Range.

(5) Operational type rations proved satisfactory so long as men were able to heat them on tent stoves. They were unsatisfactory on other occasions as it was impossible to eat the frozen meat component.

(6) Considerable difficulty was experienced in

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starting vehicles, particularly in the morning, unless vehicles engine were run periodically during the night. Some difficulty was experienced with frozen brake drums on vehicles which were forced to ford water deeper than the axle of the vehicle.

g. The <sup>air</sup> delivery of supplies to this organization varied from excellent to unsatisfactory. Unsatisfactory drops were caused by pilots not following instructions of ground controller, planes flying too low and too fast, and air delivery containers not being securely fastened to the parachutes. Supplies which were most susceptible to damage by air drop were 5 gallon cans of gasoline. It is estimated that approximately 40% of supplies - classes III and V particularly, were damaged beyond salvage as a result of poor drops.

*T. T. Grady*  
T. T. GRADY  
Major, USMC  
S-4

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Action Report

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Headquarters and Service Company, First Marines, First Marine  
Division

From: Regimental Communication Officer  
To: Commanding Officer, First Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for Period 8 October 1950 to 15 Dec-  
ember 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 10

### 1. INTRODUCTION

- The purpose of this report is to make comments and recommendations on the existing communications within an infantry regiment with a view toward the improvement of such facilities and equipment.
- The mission assigned was to provide continuous communications within the regiment, and to attached, adjacent, and higher units.
- The next higher echelon is 1st Marine Division.

### 2. TASK ORGANIZATION

Organic and Attached Units	Strength Off Enl	ComMO or NCO in C
RCA-1 Comm Plat	2 66	Captain Holt
Det 1st Sig Bn	0 7	SSgt. Ferris
1st Bn, 1st Mar, Comm Plat	1 50	Lt. Vnencak
2d Bn, 1st Mar, Comm Plat	1 50	Lt. Stevens
3d Bn, 1st Mar, Comm Plat	1 50	Lt. Foyle
4.2 Mortar Co, Comm Sect	0 78	MSGT. Kownow
AT Co, Comm Sect	0 9	Sgt. Yarlett

### 3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

- Upon receipt of the 1st Mar Div Op Order for the Wonsan, Chigyoung, and Lots-ri, Korea, operations the Signal Annex thereto for each operation was studied. The Signal Annex to the RCL-1 Op Order was prepared and distributed for each respective operation to all organic and attached units of the regiment.
- As changes were received to 1st Mar Div SOT during the period covered by this report, school was held for communication personnel on the changes in Radio Call Signs, Telephone Directory Names, etc. Copies were reproduced of the new Radio Call Signs and Telephone Directory Names and distributed to Staff Officers and communication personnel as required.
- Personnel replacements were received on 12 November 1950, which filled the regiment up to T/O strength on communication personnel. These replacements were assigned to infantry battalions and the regimental companies to bring the battalions up to T/O strength.

### 4. TRAINING AND REHEARSING

- No scheduled training or rehearsals took place during this period. Replacement personnel were given only combat training in their assigned duties by experienced personnel who were members of the Regimental Communication Platoon during the Inchon and Seoul, Korea, operations.

### 5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

- Loading and embarkation at Inchon, Korea, was accomplished satisfactorily. Regimental and battalion tactical nets were established for ship-to-shore use of TQM's and Loading Officers.
- Communication equipment was combat loaded for the scheduled landing at Wonsan, Korea. Initial portable equipment was troop space loaded for use in the assault landing.

### 6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

- During the movement to the objective area equipment was tested and checked, and necessary repairs made thereto. Wonsan was in friendly hands prior to this regiment's arrival at the objective area. Plans were made for an administrative landing.
- The Regimental Tactical Net and the Division Tactical, Logistical Control, and Command Nets were established for the landing.

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Appendix 7 to Annual Report to 1st Marine Division Special  
Action Report (cont'd)

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## 7. OPERATIONS

a. After the Regimental Command Post was established on the outskirts of Wonsan, wire communications were established with Division. A three (3) man Radio-Relay Carrier team, with the jeep and trailer type carrier AN/TRC-6 was attached to this regiment by Division and carrier communications was established with Division. Carrier communications worked in an excellent manner and was a very valuable asset to the communication system. The Division Command Net was maintained on CW with Division - all other Division radio nets were secured. Teletype communications were attempted with Division, but due to the many equipment failures of the Teletype Unit and the lack of a replacement set, teletype communications were never satisfactory. The Regimental Command Net on CW was established on D Day and the Regimental Auxiliary Tactical Net was established between the Regimental Command Post and the Supply Dump on the beach for the use of the Regimental S-4. The Regimental Tactical Net was used very little except during the initial landing due to the great distances between the Regimental Command Post and the Infantry battalions. A Radio SCR-193 and a four (4) man team was attached to this regiment by Division on 26 October 1950, to furnish communications between 1st Bn, 1st Marines, at Kojo, Korea, and the Regimental Command Post at Wonsan, Korea. This was a distance of forty (40) air miles. It was impossible to establish communications between 1st Bn and the Regimental C P with the Radio AN/MRC-6 on hand in this regiment. 1st Bn established communications with Division on the Division Command net, and traffic to and from the 1st Bn was relayed through Division. This resulted in excessive delay in receiving and sending messages due to the fact that the Division Command Net was already overloaded. Also, due to the mountainous terrain between Wonsan and Kojo, communications between Division and 1st Bn was at times non-existent and, at best, it was unreliable. A Radio SCR-399 was requested for use of the 1st Bn at Kojo but none was available for this purpose at Division. Also, a Radio SCR-399 was requested from Division at this time and it was received from X Corps and issued to this regiment. This radio was in an inoperable condition when received and it was never possible to repair it sufficiently to be in an operable condition. It had very apparently been worn out by X Corps prior to turning it over to Division. It had been planned to use this radio on the Regimental Command Net in an effort to establish communications with our battalions on our own radio net. The 3d Bn, 1st Mar, was located at this time at Hagong, Korea, a distance of about twenty eight air miles from Wonsan. Communications were eventually established with the 3d Bn on the Regimental Command Net on CW by using the Radio AN/MRC-6 with a Parabolic antenna. Due to the distance and mountainous terrain between Wonsan and Hagong this radio net was out of operation frequently and was not a reliable means of communications. During this period of time many messages to the 1st and 3d Bns were delivered by helicopter.

b. The events discussed in paragraph 7. a. above are some examples of why it is believed mandatory that one (1) Radio SCR-399 be added to the T/E for an infantry regiment, and that all radios AN/MRC-6 presently rated within the infantry regiment be replaced by Radios SCR-193.

c. At Chigyoung, Korea, the Regimental Command Post and the Battalion Command Posts were located with three (3) miles of each other and normal communications - primarily wire - were easily maintained with all units.

d. At Koto-ri, Korea, radio communications were established with Division at Hagaru-ri, Korea, on the Division Command Net on CW and with all battalions of this regiment on the Regimental Command Net on CW. Also wire communications were established and maintained with all battalions and Division until the Regimental C P was surrounded by enemy forces and wire communications were broken. At this time Division Radio Carrier Relay Station located at Koto-ri was able to establish a radio carrier circuit between Division and this Regiment. Again this means of communications proved valuable and was a great asset to the communication system. Reliable radio communications on "voice" were never established while at Koto-ri between Division and this Regiment, or between this Regiment and our battalions.

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Again it is the opinion of the undersigned that reliable voice radio communications could have been established as desired if the infantry regiment rated one (1) Radio SCR-399, mounted in Truck, 2 1/2 Ton, 3 X 8, and all Radios AN/MRC-6 within the infantry regiment were replaced by Radio SCR-193.

9. ENEMY

a. No enemy communication equipment was captured during the period covered by this report.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

a. It is believed these operations proved definitely that the present T/E is not adequate in all respects for extended land operations of this type. This is especially true with the radio equipment - specific comments and recommendations on this equipment are made in Paragraph 10 of this Appendix. It is believed the most valuable lessons learned were: (1) The inadequacy of the radio equipment presently used by the infantry regiment on the T/E; and, (2) That Radio Relay Carrier Equipment is one of the most practical and valuable means of communications available with the Marine Division, and that radio carrier communications should be established between Division and Infantry Regiments, and between Infantry Regiments and Infantry Battalions.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Table of organization:

(1) See Appendix 7 to Annex PETER PETER to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 1 September to 6 October 1950.

(2) In addition to the recommended changes to the present T/O which were made in the above mentioned Appendix 7, it is recommended that one (1) Sergeant, Signal Stockman, 3021, be added to the T/O for H&S Co, Infantry Regiment. This Sergeant, acting in the capacity of Regimental Signal Supply Man and under the supervision of the Assistant Regimental Communication Officer, would be in charge of the Regimental Signal Supply Dump. He would be responsible for requisitioning and issuing signal supplies, submitting expenditure reports and unserviceable equipment reports, delivering signal supplies to units of the regiment, keeping records of signal supplies and equipment, etc.

b. Table of Equipment:

(1) See Appendix 7 to Annex PETER PETER to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 1 September to 6 October 1950.

(2) It is worthy of note that at this time this infantry regiment has been equipped with Radio SCR-619 with dry battery BA source of power supply. This radio has performed well in the limited tests which have been made with it to date.

(3) The recommendations made in the above mentioned Appendix 7, Paragraph 10. b. (2) with reference to vehicular radios rated 1 the infantry regiment is modified as follows:

a. It is recommended that one (1) Radio SCR-399 be added to the T/E for H&S Co, Infantry Regiment, and that for extended land operations the two (2) Radio AN/MRC-6 rated in H&S Co, Infantry Regiment, and the one (1) Radio AN/MRC-6 rated by each Infantry Battalion, be replaced by Radio SCR-193. Further that one (1) additional Radio SCR-193 be added to the T/E for H&S Co, Infantry Regiment, to be used as an "on-the-spot" replacement for any radios of this type which become inoperative and have to be replaced for repairs. This would be a total of one (1) Radio SCR-3 and six (6) Radio SCR-193 of the "AM" type rated by the entire infantry regiment. It is believed that reliable radio communication can be maintained with the above equipment. As discussed in Paragraph 7 above, for land operations the distances over which radio communications must be maintained between Division and Regiment, and Regiment and Battalions, is too great for the equipment presently rated.

(4) It is strongly recommended that Radio Relay Carrier Equipment, and operating personnel, be added to the T/E and T/O respectively, for H&S Co, Infantry Regiment, which would provide two (2) voice channels to Division and one (1) voice channel to each Infantry Battalion. And that Radio Relay Carrier Units AN/T J of the Jeep and Trailer Types and operating personnel, be added to the T/E and T/O respectively, for each Infantry Battalion.

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Appendix 7 to Annex PETER PETER to 1st Marine Division Special  
Action Report (Cont'd)

Carrier communications were used extensively between this Regiment  
and Division and was a very valuable asset in maintaining comman-  
dations.

(5) It is recommended that the two (2) Teletypewriter Sets  
EE-97 presently furnished the Infantry Regiment be replaced as soon  
as possible by the Teletypewriter Set AN/PGC-1 which is presently  
used on the T/E. The Teletypewriter Set EE-97 is too large,  
unreliable, and heavy to transport and set up in the field at the  
regimental level. Also the extreme shortage of tools to adjust  
this equipment make it most difficult to keep in operation.

*William R. Holt*  
WILLIAM R. HOLT

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

MEDICAL SECTION,  
1st Mar, 1st Mar Div,  
YONGDONG-NI, KOREA  
5 Jan 1951

From: Regimental Surgeon, First Marines  
To: Commanding Officer, First Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for Period 7 Oct 1950 to 15 Dec 1950

Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION:

The special action report of the medical section, 1st Marine Regiment, is submitted in accordance with paragraph 11401 MCM.

The purpose of the report is to supplement the historical records of the Marine Corps and provide recent information on experiences in the field.

The mission of the medical section was that of receiving and transporting casualties from the forward area to "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, giving life saving first aid treatment, supplying battalions with medical supplies, equipment, and replacement personnel, providing preventative medical treatment, and discharging routine medical department duties.

The next higher echelon for the purpose of administration, discipline, and tactical operations was the 1st Marine Regiment.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

On 7 Oct 1950, the medical section consisted of the regimental surgeon, F. H. MC CULLOUGH, LTJG MC USN; one assistant regimental surgeon R. E. FOX, LTJG MC USNR; one regimental dental officer C. W. FAYN JR, LTJG DC USNR; twenty enlisted hospital corps personnel, two enlisted marine corps personnel as ambulance drivers, and an attached collecting unit of nine hospital corpsmen.

However, on 28 Oct 1950, the following changes were effected: F. H. MC CULLOUGH, LTJG MC USN, regimental surgeon, was admitted to the sick list aboard the USS NOBLE (APA-218); M. E. SMITH, LTJG MC USNR, was transferred from the 2d Battalion to the regiment to act as regimental surgeon; R. E. FOX, LTJG MC USNR, was transferred from the regiment to the 2d Battalion to take LT SMITH's former position as battalion surgeon; the collecting unit was returned to its parent command, "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion.

On 21 Nov 1950, the regimental surgeon, M. E. SMITH, LTJG MC USN, was detached leaving the regiment without a medical officer. This condition existed for the remainder of the period covered by this report.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

Preliminary planning, planning schedules, logistic planning, and operation planning were included in the general operation orders of the division.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSING

The only new course of training for this operation consisted of cold weather lectures by Army cold weather teams.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

One hospital corpsman embarked aboard the LST Q036 with a jeep ambulance on 14 Oct 1950. The remaining medical section personnel, supplies, and equipment embarked aboard the USS NOBLE (APA-218) on 10 Oct 1950.

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ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

The USF NOBLE (APA 218) departed Inchon, Korea, on 17 Oct 1950 and arrived at Wonsan, Korea, on 26 Oct 1950. The LST 0036 departed Inchon, Korea, on 11 Oct 1950 and arrived at Wonsan on 18 Oct 1950. The medical section disembarked on the 26th of Oct and marched seven miles to the bivouac area, a deserted school building.

OPERATIONS

## a. Assault Phase

The assault landing at Wonsan was made administratively against no opposition. Landing craft were unable to beach so all personnel were forced to wade ashore. Vehicles were towed ashore by track-laying tractors.

## b. Exploitation Phase

The period from 7 Oct 1950 to 11 Oct 1950 was taken up with replenishing medical supplies and equipment, resting, reassigning personnel, and general preparations for embarkation. From 11 Oct 1950 to 26 Oct 1950, the medical section, aboard the USS NOBLE (APA 218), held routine medical and dental sick calls. After debarkation and arrival at bivouac area, a regimental aid station was put into operation. Routine duties such as inspection of messing facilities, supervision of construction of heads and urinals; application of DDT insecticide powder and Diesel oil around areas which might be insect infested, and the supervision of general good housekeeping procedures were performed. All hands were given cowpox vaccinations at this area. Individual cans of DDT dusting insecticide powder were distributed with instructions as to its use.

"D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, was assigned to the regiment and set up their collecting and clearing station in the same building with the regiment. They cared for all casualties and provided means of evacuation for those requiring further treatment of hospitalization.

On 28 Oct 1950, the regimental surgeon, regimental dental officer, and 11 hospital corpsmen departed by train, with two jeep ambulances, medical supplies and equipment, to augment the 1st Battalion at Koje, Korea. From this date to 2 Nov 1950, corpsmen from the regiment at Wonsan and corpsmen at Koje with the 1st Battalion went on all patrols and, in some instances, voluntarily manned defensive machine guns. On 2 Nov 1950 the personnel sent to augment the 1st Battalion returned to Wonsan.

The dental officer, C. W. FAIN JR, LTJG DC USNR, flew by helicopter to Majon-ni, Korea, on 8 Nov 1950 and rendered emergency dental treatment to members of the 3d Battalion. He returned to Wonsan by motor convoy on 11 Nov 1950. On this date thirty three corpsmen were received from the 2d Replacement Draft. They were assigned to battalions as the need existed.

On 16 Nov 1950, the forward party moved by truck convoy to Chigyong, Korea, and set up the regimental aid station. The advance and rear parties moved up together on 19 Nov 1950. At Chigyong, as at Wonsan, routine medical department duties were carried out, and again "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion, was assigned to the regiment and cared for all casualties.

The regimental surgeon, M. E. SMITH, LT MC USNR, was detached on 21 Nov 1950. No replacement surgeon was received.

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

On 24 Nov 1950, two regimental hospital corpsmen were assigned to the administrative rear echelon.

On 25 Nov 1950, the regiment departed for and arrived at Koto-ri, Korea. From this date to 11 Dec 1950, the regimental medical section discharged routine duties, held sick calls, and operated a seven tent hospital in conjunction with "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion. Regimental corpsmen went on all H&S Co patrols, assisted in the evacuation of patients from convoys under fire from the enemy, cared for and evacuated approximately 450 patients, put up tents, and provided for the comfort and well being of patients.

The services of an Army physician, Tom WHALEN, CAPT MC USA, were utilized for a period of time.

Although the regiment was supposed to evacuate casualties to "D" Co, 1st Med Bn, it was necessary, because of the large number of patients, to reverse this procedure. Evacuation by air. A rough, makeshift air strip was hewed out of a "cow-pasture". Planes were able to land and take off from this "cow-pasture" airstrip. By the evening of the 9th of Dec all patients had been evacuated.

On 10 Dec 1950, the regiment departed Koto-ri. All medical department supplies and equipment, except one tent, were brought out. The ambulances were left open in order to pick up casualties if the need arose. Five casualties were picked up. "D" Co, 1st Med Bn, received these and evacuated them to the hospital.

Upon arrival at Chigyoung on 11 Dec 1950, it was found that a doctor and corpsmen were there to provide temporary relief for the regimental personnel. All hands turned in for a much needed rest.

On 12 Dec 1950, the regiment proceeded to Hungnam, Korea, via motor convoy. On 14 Dec 1950, the medical section, except the drivers of the ambulances, embarked aboard the MSTC GENERAL E. T. COLLINS. The drivers stayed with the vehicles and embarked aboard the USS MONTAGUE (AKA 98).

The regiment departed Hungnam on 15 Dec 1950.

8. ENEMY

Does not apply.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATION

The result of the operation of the medical section was gratifying. Casualties were handled promptly and effectively throughout the operation. The climatic conditions increased the number of casualties, however the mortality rate of personnel wounded in action was minimal.

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The experience gained in the previous operation fitted the personnel admirably to perform their duties with greater facility and efficiency in this operation. They cannot be commended too highly on the way they carried out their part of the Koto-ri campaign. All hands of the H&S Company, 1st Marines, were more than helpful in assisting the medical section.

The pilots who flew the patients out of Koto-ri from the makeshift airstrip deserve credit for a job well done.

Recommendations:

A relief regimental surgeon should be furnished before the regular assigned surgeon is detached.

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APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL  
ACTION REPORT (Cont'd)

Box type of ambulances should be used instead of jeep  
ambulances, consistent with terrain.

Litter bearers should be assigned as such. They should  
be attached to the medical section and responsible to the medical  
officer.

M. E. SMITH  
Regimental Surgeon

By: C. W. FAIN JR.  
Regimental Dental Officer.

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APPENDIX U TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORTH&SCo, 1st Marines,  
1stMarDiv, FMPF,  
YONGCHON, KOREA  
17 Jan 1951

From: Chaplain, First Marines  
 To: Commanding Officer, First Marines

Subj: Special Action Report for 8 October - 15 December 1950;  
 the WONSAN-HAMHUNG-CHOSIN RESERVOIR Operation

Ref: (a) Division Memorandum No. 248-50

1. INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this report is to record the activities of chaplains during the WONSAN-HAMHUNG-CHOSIN RESERVOIR Operation and to set forth certain comments and recommendations based upon the experience gained from said operation. The activities of the chaplains were in keeping with the primary mission of chaplains serving with Marines in combat, namely: to serve as spiritual ministers to men of all faiths and to act as staff advisors to Commanding Officers on matters relative to morale and spiritual welfare of troops. In combat this mission finds expression in counselling, ministering to the sick and wounded and dying, conducting Divine Services and grave-side services and writing letters, particularly letters of condolence to the next-of-kin of deceased personnel.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION: On 8 October 1950 the chaplain roster and duty assignment were as follows:

- 1/1 - LCDR Glyn JONES, 135097/4100 (Regimental Chaplain)  
 American Baptist
- 2/1 - LTJG Kevin J. KEANEY, 512985/4100  
 Roman Catholic
- 3/1 - LT James W. LEWIS, 426683/4100  
 Lutheran

The chaplains, although regimental chaplains, were assigned to individual battalions on verbal orders. On 2 November, 1950, Chaplain JONES was relieved as Regimental Chaplain by LCDR William Nelson LYONS, 213253/4105. Chaplain KEANEY, wounded on 29 November, 1950, was relieved on 5 December 1950 by LTJG Patrick A. KILLEEN, 512963/4100. The task organization on 15 December 1950 was as follows:

- 1/1 - LCDR William Nelson LYONS, 213253/4105 (Regimental Chaplain)  
 American Baptist
- 2/1 - LTJG Patrick A. KILLEEN, 512963/4100  
 Roman Catholic
- 3/1 - LT James W. LEWIS, 426683/4100  
 Lutheran

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING: Since this phase of the WONSAN-HAMHUNG-CHOSIN RESERVOIR Operation coincided with the wind-up of the INCHON-KIMPO-STOUL Operation most of it was spent by chaplains in preparing letters of condolence to next-of-kin. The Office of the Division Chaplain made available as rapidly as possible needed information and all chaplains, recognizing the tremendous importance of speedy disposition of such work, began their letters prior to embarkation at Inchon. Also needed ecclesiastical

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## APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

gear was restocked mainly through the Division Chaplain's Office with some assistance being given by the Office of the Corps Chaplain, Tenth Army Corps.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSING: No specific activity was regarded as needed. All chaplains being experienced in the INCHON-KIMPO-SEOUL Operation.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION: Embarkation began at Inchon, Korea, during which the chaplains put forth every effort to prepare spiritually their respective commands. Protestant and Catholic services were held and distribution was made of New Testaments, prayer books, missals, rosary beads and medals.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA: Enroute around Korea from Inchon to Wonsan special services were held for all hands aboard the ships. Chaplains assisted in providing needed recreation for relaxation. Every opportunity was taken to visit with the men.

7. OPERATIONS: On 25 October 1950 at Wonsan, Korea, the chaplains debarked with their respective battalions. During the entire operation, when in actual contact with the enemy, chaplains worked closely and cooperatively with battalion aid stations and when in defensive positions chaplains either remained with aid stations or were assigned tents to make possible private consultation with the men. At Koko, Majon-ri, Koto-ri, and Hagaru-ri chaplains were busy ministering to the wounded and dying.

In spite of frequent and rapid movements Divine Services were held as occasions arose. Often throughout the operation it was necessary to conduct several services in order to assure adequate coverage for all hands. This was particularly true in defensive positions when companies and often platoons were located too far apart to make feasible one or two services only.

Another phase of the chaplains' work which proved to be time consuming was services rendered in transmitting Red Cross dispatches, often involving the death or serious illness of a relative in the States. Relatives becoming concerned about sons or husbands would ask the Red Cross to ascertain a health and welfare report. The number of these increased tremendously as the operation progressed and as it was reported in newspapers and on the radio.

The work of writing letters of condolence, which began before the embarkation at Inchon, continued whenever possible. Other correspondence made necessary by letters from families was carried on.

On 29 November 1950 during the Chosin Reservoir phase of the operation Chaplain KEANEY, assigned to 2/1 proceeded in convoy from Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri for the purpose of saying Mass at 3/1. During the attack on the convoy Chaplain KEANEY was wounded in the arm, ankle, and buttox and was evacuated by air from Hagaru-ri.

On 14 December 1950 Chaplain KILLEEN participated in a dedicational service for the First Marine Division at the United Nations Cemetery at Hungnam, Korea.

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APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT

(Cont'd)

On the night of 14-15 December 1950 the chaplains with their respective battalions embarked aboard ship as part of the preliminary steps in the evacuation of Hungnam.

8. ENEMY: No comment.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS: The chaplains under difficulties caused by combat and excessively extreme cold carried on in their work with determination and with excellent cooperation from Commanding Officers.

10. OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: (See Special Action Report on the INCHON-KUMHO-SOUL Operation).

a. In cold weather, which makes out-door services difficult, it is recommended that whenever possible a squad tent be provided for Divine Services.

WILLIAM NELSON LYONS  
LCDR, USMC, USNR

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DECLASSIFIEDAPPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1st MARINE  
DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORTAnti-tank company  
1stMars, 1stMarDiv, FMF  
Yongdong-ni, Korea  
30 Dec 1950

From: Commanding Officer  
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF  
 Subj: Special Action Report for period 8Oct50-15  
 Dec50

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to describe the employment of the anti-tank company in the support of front line infantry units.

The mission of the Anti-Tank Company during the period was the local protection of troops and command posts against mechanized attack and the reinforcement of the anti-tank defense of the front line infantry units in the regimental zone of action.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION:

The Anti-Tank Company consists of a Company Headquarters Platoon, a 75mm recoilless gun platoon of two sections, with 4 recoilless rifles and a tank platoon of five (5) M-26 tanks.

During the period of this report each section of the 75mm recoilless gun platoon were attached to infantry battalions for tactical control.

The tank platoon was under company control whenever the terrain permitted their employment in the regimental zone of action. During the operations in the Koto-ri area the tank platoon remained under control of the division tank battalion in the vicinity of Oro-ri.

The company headquarters platoon was attached to the regimental command post during the entire period of this report.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING:

All preliminary planning was in accordance with directives issued by the regiment.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS:

There was no time for training as the company was aboard ship enroute to the Wonsan target area and upon arrival there was committed to action. No rehearsals were conducted.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION:

The company embarked in assault shipping at Inchon Korea. Company Headquarters Platoon embarked USS NOBLE on 11 October, 1950. The 2nd section, 75mm recoilless gun platoon was attached to the 3rd battalion, 1st Marines for tactical control and embarked LST #914 on 12 October, 1950. The 1st section, 75mm recoilless gun platoon was attached to the 1st battalion, 1st Marines and embarked Japanese LST #0036 on 14 October, 1950. The tank platoon was embarked on LST #1138 on 13 October, 1950. Organic equipment and vehicles were embarked with the respective platoons.

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**DECLASSIFIED**APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1st MARINE  
DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)**6. MOVEMENT AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA:**

LST'S with the 75mm recoilless gun sections and the tank platoon sailed from Incheon, Korea on 15 October, 1950. Company Headquarters aboard USS NOBLE sailed on 17 October, 1950. Arrived at objective area, Wonsan, Korea on 25 October, 1950 and disembarked non-tactically on 26 October, 1950.

**7. OPERATIONS:**8 Oct 50 - 10 Oct 50:

This period was spent in the division assembly area at Incheon, Korea, reequipping and reorganizing for the next operation. Company headquarters embarked aboard assault shipping as indicated in paragraph (5). The 1st section 75mm recoilless gun platoon was attached to the 1st battalion, 1st Marines and the 2nd section was attached to the 3rd battalion, 1st Marines for tactical control and remained in the assembly area. The Tank Platoon moved to the embarkation area.

11 Oct 50 - 16 Oct 50:

During this period the company with units detached as indicated in paragraph (5), made preparations for and embarked aboard assigned shipping.

17 Oct 50 - 24 Oct 50:

This period was spent at sea enroute to the objective area. During and while at sea some instructions were conducted relative to terrain conditions and weather to be expected in this sector of North Korea.

25 Oct 50:

Arrived at objective area and spent the night aboard ship in preparation for disembarking.

26 Oct 50:

The company disembarked over beaches adjacent to the Wonsan airfield. Both 75mm gun sections were attached to the 1st battalion and entrained at Wonsan Korea for Kojok Korea arriving there at the same date. Company headquarters attached to the regimental headquarters section marched to the vicinity of Togwon and established a command post. The tank platoon moved over the beaches and was attached to the 1st Tank battalion. One of the M-26 tanks was damaged beyond repair when it slid off of the LST ramp while disembarking.

27 Oct 50:

The company headquarters platoon remained at the regimental command post and the tank platoon remained at the 1st Tank Battalion assembly area. The 2nd 75mm gun section attached

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DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)27Oct50(cont'd):

to the 1st battalion and assigned to "B" company in the Kojp area, was ambushed by enemy forces in undetermined strength at approximately 0220. The enemy employing anti-tank weapons, grenades, and automatic weapons succeeded in forcing the abandonment of two of the sections 75mm guns, a jeep, a 3.5" rocket launcher and ammo for these weapons which were rendered inoperative before the section withdrew, with elements of "B" company. The sights for the 75mm guns were destroyed. The section suffered two (2) killed and one wounded in this action. The 1st Section 75mm gun platoon was in reserve at the 1st battalion C.P. and did not encounter any enemy. The company commander proceeded via air to the area and returned on 28Oct50.

28Oct50:

Company headquarters remained at the regimental command post, Togwon, and the Tank platoon arrived thereat from the 1st Tank Battalion assembly area.

The 1st 75mm gun section engaged an estimated fifteen (15) enemy seen entering a native building, firing four (4) HE shells and 4 WP shells destroying the building and inflicting an undetermined number of casualties. The 2nd 75mm gun section was detached from "B" company and rejoined the platoon. The entire 75mm gun platoon was attached to Weapons Company, and displaced to hill #115 and set up defensive positions.

29Oct50:

Company headquarters and Tank platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon, Korea. The 75mm recoilless gun platoon remained in defensive positions on hill #115 while attached to Weapons Company, 1st battalion, 1st Marines. No enemy action encountered.

30Oct50:

Company headquarters and Tank platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon, Korea. The 75mm recoilless gun platoon remained in defensive positions on hill #115 at Kojp. One (1) 75mm recoilless gun was recovered by other elements of the 1st battalion while on a patrol. No enemy encountered.

31Oct50:

Company headquarters and Tank platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. The 75mm recoilless gun platoon remained in defensive positions on hill #115 at Kojp. The other 75mm recoilless gun along with the jeep and 3.5" launcher were recovered by other elements of the battalion. Two (2) rounds of 75mm ammo were not accounted for. No enemy activity was encountered.

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DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)1Nov50:

Company headquarters and tank platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. The 75mm recoilless gun platoon displaced from its positions with weapons company, 1st battalion and embarked aboard LST 90-36 at approximately 1700 and sailed for Wonsen. No enemy action reported.

2Nov50:

Company headquarters and tank platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. One (1) section of the tank platoon was sent west on the Togwon-Majon-ni road to support a regimental convoy that was ambushed by enemy forces. Due to the distance involved and the condition of the road the tanks arrived after the enemy had withdrawing. However the tanks destroyed 2 abandoned 47mm AT guns, 2 ammo dumps, and killed or wounded an estimated 15 enemy who were still in sight on a distant hill. The 75mm recoilless gun platoon arrived at Wonsen aboard LST 90-36, disembarked, and arrived at company headquarters located at Togwon.

3Nov50:

Company headquarters and tank platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. The 75mm recoilless gun platoon was attached to "A" company for the purpose of giving protection to a regimental supply column going to the 3rd battalion at Majon-ni. The column was ambushed by the enemy approximately 12 miles from its destination and was forced to return to the regimental command post at Togwon, arriving there at 2215.

4Nov50:

Company headquarters and tank platoon attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. The 1st section of the 75mm recoilless gun platoon was again attached to "A" company, 1st battalion for the purpose of providing protection to the regimental convoy enroute to Majon-ni. The convoy succeeded in reaching Majon-ni and the section did not have any casualties. The 2nd section of 75mm platoon remained at Togwon.

5Nov-6Nov50:

Company headquarters, tank platoon and 2nd section 75mm gun platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. The 1st section, 75mm gun platoon was attached to weapons company, 3rd battalion at Majon-ni for tactical control.

7Nov50:

Company headquarters and 2nd section 75mm recoilless gun platoon, remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. Three (3) tanks of the tank platoon were sent up the Togwon-Majon-ni road to meet

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEA PETER PETER TO 1st MARINE  
DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

7Nov50 (cont'd):

"I" Company which was returning by convoy to the regimental command post. The convoy was ambushed but due to conditions of the road and distance involved the tanks arrived after the enemy had withdrawn and escorted the convoy the rest of the way to the regimental command post at Togwon. The 1st section attached to 3rd battalion at Majon-ni was attacked by the enemy at approximately 0500. The enemy was driven off with no casualties to the section. Section was detached from Weapons Company and attached to "I" company, 3rd battalion.

8Nov50-13Nov50:

Company Headquarters and Tank platoon and 2nd 75mm gun section remained at regimental CP, Togwon. The 1st section, 75mm gun platoon was placed in the perimeter at Majon-ni with guns detached to various parts of the perimeter. No enemy action was reported. Replacements were received and the company was brought up to T/O strength. Company commander with personnel from platoon headquarters was placed in charge of a convoy consisting of a ROK battalion and supplies to Majon-ni. Returned the next day, only "light" enemy action. Tank threw track between Majon-ni and company commander, and section of tanks went to aid of the vehicle and remained over night thereat. Enemy action consisted of patrol action only.

14Nov50:

The 1st section 75mm gun platoon returned by convoy to Togwon where it rejoined the company at the regimental headquarters. No enemy action was reported.

15Nov50:

The company remained attached to the regiment. No enemy action encountered.

16Nov50:

The company remained at regimental headquarters, Togwon. Four (4) M-39 armored Utility Vehicles were assigned to the company, and the necessary rifle reorganization was accomplished to provide crews for the vehicles.

17Nov50:

The company (less Tank platoon) remained at regimental headquarters. The Tank platoon was moved to the beach area, Wonsan, and attached to 1st Tank Battalion, awaiting embarkation. No enemy action reported.

18Nov50:

Company headquarters remained attached to regimental headquarters, Togwon area. One section of M-39 vehicles was sent in convoy of regimental vehicles to Chigyoung. No enemy action reported.

19Nov50:

Company headquarters with the remaining M-39's and the 75mm gun platoon displaced to Chigyoung, and established a command post with regimental headquarters. No enemy action reported.

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DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)20Nov-23Nov50:

The company remained in the Chizyong area, and did not report any enemy activity. On 22Nov50 the tank platoon embarked aboard LST #914 at Wonsan and arrived at Hungnam on the 23Nov50. It remained attached to 1st Tank BN and moved to 1st Tank battalion tank park in the vicinity of Oro-ri.

24Nov50:

Company headquarters remained at Chizyong. The 1st 75mm gun section was attached to the 3rd battalion for tactical control and the 2nd 75mm section was attached to the 1st battalion for tactical control, and displaced with them to Chinhung-ri. M-39 platoon remained with company headquarters.

25Nov50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon, displaced from Chizyong to Koto-ri arriving at the latter location at 1730. The M-39 vehicles experienced a great deal of difficulty in traversing the slippery, narrow, and winding road through the mountains, however all vehicles succeeded in reaching Koto-ri.

26Nov50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained at Koto-ri with the regimental Headquarters. One section of M-39 was sent out to the west of Koto-ri on a reconnaissance but did not make contact with any enemy forces. 1st section, 75mm gun platoon attached to 3rd battalion. 2nd section, 75mm gun platoon attached to 1st battalion.

27Nov50:

Company headquarters and M-39's attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. One section of M-39's was sent on reconnaissance with infantry elements of 2nd battalion. This patrol went about 8 miles to the west of Koto-ri and engaged an enemy force (Chinese Communist) estimated at 25 men. After a brief fire fight in which 2 prisoners were captured, the patrol withdrew to Koto-ri. The 1st section, 75mm gun platoon moved from Chizyong to Hagaru-ri with the 3rd battalion. 1st Marines, with no enemy contact reported enroute.

28Nov50:

Company headquarters attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. M-39 platoon with elements of the 2nd battalion, 1st Marines on a patrol were engaged by enemy forces after proceeding about 800 yards north of Koto-ri. The enemy was brought under fire from the M-39's and accompanying infantry. During the fire fight the M-39 vehicles were used to evacuate the wounded. The 1st 75mm section attached to the 3rd battalion, 1st Marines at Hagaru-ri did not make contact with the enemy. 2nd section, 75mm attached to 1st battalion, 1st Marines did not have enemy contact.

29Nov50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained attached to 3rd battalion, 1st Marines at approximately 1030 fired 11 rounds of 75mm at a concentration of enemy killing an estimated 30. At 1130 assisted in repulsing an

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APPENDIX 19 TO PETER PETER TO 1st MARINE  
DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

29Nov50: (cont'd)  
enemy attack. At 2030 assisted in repulsing another enemy attack, firing 4 rounds of 75mm at an enemy machine gun. Fired 25 rounds of 75mm while at north road block at concentration of enemy with no estimate of enemy casualties possible. 2nd 75mm gun section attached to 1st battalion at Chinhung-ni reported no enemy action.

30Nov50:  
Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. 1st 75mm gun section attached to 3rd battalion, 1st Marines assisted in repulsing an enemy attack at 0200. One (1) gun on the north road block, fired three (3) rounds of 75mm at enemy machine gun, knocking out the emplacement. 2nd 75mm gun section attached to 1st battalion, 1st Marines at Chinhung-ni.

1Dec50:  
Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. 1st 75mm gun section attached to 3rd battalion, 1st Marines at Hageru-ri fired 10 rounds 75mm at enemy occupied houses. Assisted in repulsing enemy attacks which commenced at 2330 and continued until daylight 2Dec50. 2nd 75mm gun section attached to 1st battalion at Chinhung-ni.

2Dec50:  
Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. One section of the M-39 platoon was sent about 2 1/2 miles south of Koto-ri to the spot in which the 2nd battalion, 31st Infantry U.S. Army was ambushed in the early hours of the morning. The section succeeded in picking up a number of wounded and engaged the enemy overlooking the area, with the vehicle mounted weapons, killing an estimated 5 of them. The 1st 75mm gun section attached to the 3rd battalion 1st Marines, at Hageru-ri fired seven (7) rounds at enemy occupied buildings destroying them and inflicting an unknown number of enemy. The 2nd 75mm section attached to the 1st battalion at Chinhung-ni reported no enemy activity.

3Dec50:  
Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. The 1st 75mm gun section fired nine (9) rounds of 75mm at enemy concentrations with no estimate enemy casualties. The 2nd 75mm gun section attached to the 1st battalion at Chinhung-ni reported no enemy activity.

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DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)4 Dec 50:

Company headquarters remained attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. The first 75mm gun section attached to 3rd battalion, 1st Marines at Hagaru-ri fired 12 rounds of 75mm at enemy concentrations and three (3) rounds at enemy occupied buildings with no estimate of enemy killed. The 2nd 75mm gun section attached to the 1st battalion, 1st Marines at Chinhung-ni reported no enemy action.

5 Dec 50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. The 1st 75mm gun section did not encounter any enemy at Hagaru-ri while attached to the 3rd battalion, 1st Marines. The 2nd 75mm gun section attached to the 1st battalion at Chinhung-ni encountered no enemy.

6 Dec 50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. The 1st 75mm gun section attached to the 3rd battalion 1st Marines fired eighteen (18) rounds of 75mm at enemy concentrations. At 1800 the section was attached to Weapons Company, 3rd battalion in preparation to move to Koto-ri.

7 Dec 50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. The 1st 75mm gun section departed Hagaru-ri in convoy at daybreak and arrived at Koto-ri at 1800. The 2nd 75mm gun section remained at Chinhung-ni attached to the 1st battalion, 1st Marines and reported no enemy action.

8 Dec 50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon and 1st 75mm gun section attached to regimental headquarters at Koto-ri. The 2nd 75mm gun section attached to 1st battalion, 1st Marines, went into position on hill #1061 to cover the withdrawal of division from Koto-ri.

9 Dec 50:

Company headquarters and M-39 platoon remained in Koto-ri attached to regimental headquarters. The 1st 75mm gun section attached to Weapons Company, 3rd battalion, moved south of Koto-ri about 2,000 yards and took up positions for the night. No enemy action was encountered. The 2nd 75mm gun section remained in position on hill #1061, with 3rd battalion, 1st Marines.

10 Dec 50:

Company headquarters platoon and the M-39

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DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)10Dec50 cont'd:

platoon commenced the movement from Koto-ri to Hamhung as part of the regimental column. The column departed Koto-ri at approximately 1300 and proceeded down the mountain pass, receiving occasional sniper fire. One of the M-39 armored utility vehicles, #9153091, was destroyed by the driver because of defective brakes. Due to the nature of the move, darkness, and the conditions and grade of the road, it was not possible for the driver to repair the vehicle. This vehicle was run off the precipice alongside the road and totally demolished. Halfway down the hill the 1st 75mm gun section which had become separated from the 3rd battalion, joined the column. The column continued to move after dark and was doing very well until 2330, at which time the lead vehicles in the column were hit by a strong enemy force who had set up an ambush at the village of Sudong-ni. The enemy, using grenades, mortars, automatic weapons and rifles succeeded in setting fire to several of the lead vehicles loaded with supplies and ammunition and forced the column to halt. The lead M-39 armored utility vehicle however, successfully ran the roadblock by ramming a truck the enemy had placed in the road. The second vehicle in the column, another M-39 was halted when a Chinese soldier hurled a grenade into the well of the vehicle, killing one of the passengers and severely wounding the driver. In the ensuing fire fight, one (1) of the 75mm recoilless rifles was brought forward where it fired 2 rounds and knocked down several native buildings housing enemy. The fire fight lasted until daybreak at which time the enemy withdrew after suffering approximately 50 of casualties. The convoy lost twelve (12) men killed and twenty-one (21) men wounded in this action. The 2nd 75mm gun section remained in position with the 1st battalion 1st Marines on hill #1061, covering the withdrawal of the Division.

11Dec50:

The company headquarters, 1st 75mm gun section and the M-39 platoon resumed the move to Hamhung as part of the regimental column and arrived in Hamhung without further incident. The 2nd 75mm gun section, remained with the 1st battalion, 1st Marines, marching to Majon-dong where the section was provided with trucks for the remainder of the trip.

12Dec50:

The company moved from assembly area at Hamhung to the staging area at Hungnam in preparation for embarkation.

13Dec50:

The company embarked aboard the USNS General E.T. COLLINS.

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEX PETER PETER TO 1st MARINE  
DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

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Sailed from Hungnam aboard the USNS General E.T. COLLINS.

15 Dec 50:

At sea, aboard the USNS General E.T. COLLINS.

8. ENEMY:  
Not applicable
9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:  
Not applicable
10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Reference my last report: It is restated that a 75mm recoilless gun platoon be organic to the Infantry battalion. It is an excellent assault gun.

During the period covered by this report it should be noted that four (4) M-39 armored utility vehicles were assigned to and operated as a part of this company. These vehicles were needed and placed to good use by the infantry battalions of this regiment; however, maintenance again became a major problem as it has been with the M-26 tanks in the past. Only minor maintenance facilities exist on the Anti-Tank Company level. The higher level maintenance is usually difficult to accomplish; or as the with the M-39 parts are not available.

Again reference my last report: It was stated that there is a need for a tank organization within the Anti-Tank Company, or on the regimental level, of two (2) platoons of M-26 tanks, a bulldozer and a retriever. After experience with the M-39, realizing its value, yet its limited capability, it is recommended that in addition to the above mentioned tank organization, an additional platoon of light tanks suitable for reconnaissance work be added. It should be noted that in this operation during motorized patrol work, armored vehicles of any type or description were sorely needed. A light reconnaissance tank is the answer for this type of work. It saves lives.

It is realized that recommendations are being made for what appears to be an organization with missions beyond that of anti-mechanized protection to the regiment. That this would result in a tank company and a 75mm recoilless gun platoon being in the regimental anti-tank company. It is not the intention of the report to convey that thought. Rather to convey what appears to be the needs of regiment for future operations and these needs appear to be as follows:

1. A Tank company, available to the regimental commander at all times for offensive or defensive action with elements of this company also suited for mechanized patrol action for battalion use.
2. A recoilless gun company of the highest caliber gun available which would be used primarily for anti-tank defense of the regimental zone of action and always coordinate with elements of the regimental tank company, for a powerful anti-

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APPENDIX 10 TO ANNEA PETER PETER TO 1st MARINE  
DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT (CONT'D)

10. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONT'D:  
mechanized defense.

In conclusion, experience has dictated that the above recommendations are sound and are being made with full realization that the Marine Corps is "Amphibious" and should travel as "Light" as possible.

*George E. Petro*  
GEORGE E. PETRO

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APPENDIX 11 to ANNEX Peter/Peter to 1st Marine Division  
Special Action Report

4.2" Mortar Company,  
1st Marines, 1st Mar Div,  
FMF  
IN THE FIELD  
2 February, 1951

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Commanding General, 1st Marines  
Subj: Special Action Report for period 8 October - 15 December 1950, WONSAN-HANHUNG-CHOSHIM Reservoir Operation  
Ref: (a) Division General Order No. 16

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The purpose of this report is to show the effectiveness of employment of a Regimental Mortar Company. This company, 4.2" Mortar Company, was assigned the mission of furnishing general support to the Regiment, and during the operation covered by this report furnished direct support to the First and Second Battalions of the Regiment by attachment to each of a mortar platoon reinforced by personnel from company headquarters.

2. TASK ORGANIZATION

a. This company is composed of two (2) mortar platoons, each consisting of one (1) officer and forty-one (41) enlisted; and a headquarters platoon of three (3) officers and fifty-five enlisted of which eighteen (18) enlisted are communications personnel. The strength of the company, however, at the time of departure from Inchon was five (5) officers and 132 enlisted, having lost five (5) enlisted by reason of transfer and evacuation.

3. PRELIMINARY PLANNING

a. All preliminary planning was in accordance with directives issued by the First Marine Regiment.

4. TRAINING AND REHEARSALS

a. There were no training nor rehearsals. During the few days spent in the assembly area at Inchon, the time was utilized to re-equip individuals; to repair and draw ordnance and communication gear.

5. LOADING AND EMBARKATION

a. This company arrived at the Regimental Assembly Area, Inchon, Korea, on 5 October, 1950. On 9 October, three (3) officers and two (2) noncommissioned officers embarked aboard the USS OKANOGAN to prepare for the out-loading of this company and other elements of this Regiment.

Two trucks loaded with company ammunition and equipment plus four jeeps with trailers were loaded aboard the USS OKANOGAN. Two other trucks loaded with ammunition and galley equipment were loaded aboard the USS NOBLE.

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On 11 October 1950 the two other company officers and one hundred and twenty-seven (127) enlisted embarked aboard the USS OKANOGAN. Two enlisted embarked aboard the LST 799 on 13 October 1950 to serve as forward observer and radio operator with the First Battalion of this Regiment. Two other enlisted embarked aboard LST 914 on 14 October, 1950 to service as forward observer and radio operator with the Third Battalion of this Regiment. One enlisted embarked aboard the USS NOBLE on 11 October 1950 as motor transport representative of this company.

6. MOVEMENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OBJECTIVE AREA

a. The company remained aboard ship in the harbor at Inchon, Korea until 17 October 1950 at which time it sailed therefrom, arriving at Wonsan, Korea, in the evening of 25 October.

7. OPERATIONS

a. From 8 October to 15 October 1950, this company was located at Inchon, Korea, with elements out-loading during the period 9-15 October.

From 15 to 26 October 1950 this company was engaged in embarking in assigned shipping and underway for an amphibious landing at Wonsan, Korea.

On 26 October, the Second Platoon with elements of company headquarters disembarked at Wonsan, Korea, from the USS OKANOGAN. The remainder of the company remained aboard ship until 29 October acting as ship's platoon.

26 October 1950

The Second Platoon, reinforced by personnel of company headquarters, was attached to the First Battalion, 1st Marines, and landed administratively at Wonsan, Korea, at 1300. The platoon proceeded from Wonsan to Kojo, Korea, by rail and set up in TA 0112T. No fires were conducted.

27 October 1950

The Second Platoon finding a more suitable firing position to the rear displaced to TA 0212G. Base point registration was conducted. Fires requested by Commanding Officer, Baker Company, from 0300 to 0430 on enemy troops in village (TA 0309 and 0310) were effectively delivered. Enemy action was halted and the fires of the platoon were credited with preserving the integrity of Baker Company's frontlines. Fires were delivered within fifty yards of the frontlines. Rounds expended: 31 High Explosive and 5 white phosphorous.

28 October 1950

The Second displaced to TA 0212Y at 1400. At 1700, the platoon was organized into 2 sections of 2 guns each, due to the large frontage requiring fires. Base points and various check points were registered in the most probable enemy avenues of approach. Under orders from the Commanding Officer, First Battalion, harrassing fires were delivered upon enemy troops from 2230 this date until 0600, 29 October 1950. Rounds expended: 374 high explosive and 26 white phosphorous.

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The First Platoon, with the balance of company headquarters personnel, disembarked from the USS OKANOGAN at Wonsan, Korea, and moved in convoy to the Regimental C.P. of the First Marines. Mortars were not employed.

The Second Platoon established four new check points for the Second section. Upon request of Executive Officer, Weapons Company, delivered fires on enemy signalling from housing project (TA 0211G) at 2310. Buildings were demolished and enemy action ceased. Harrassing fires were conducted on all base points and check points continuously until 0600, 30 October. Total rounds expended: 186 high explosive and 40 white phosphorous.

30 October 1950

The First Platoon moved to target area 6832V and implaced guns to support Second Battalion, 5th Marines who were occupying a defensive position. No registration fires due to friendly situation.

The Second Platoon fired on new concentration upon request of First Battalion. Fired three new concentrations upon request of Second Battalion, making a total of eleven concentrations assigned to the first section. Three concentrations were removed from the firing orders of the second section, leaving a total of four. Harrassing fires were conducted from 2000 this date and continued until 0600, 31 October. Total rounds expended: 129 high explosive and 35 white phosphorous.

31 October 1950

The First Platoon has no firing due to friendly patrol action.

The Second Platoon conducted harrassing fires on base and check points established on 30 October, upon request of Regiment, the First and Second Battalions from 1900 this date until 0545, 1 November. Total rounds expended: 18 high explosive and 4 white phosphorous.

1 November 1950

The First Platoon when the Second Battalion, 5th Marines departed, went in support of the First Battalion, First Marines. The Platoon remained in same position but shifted guns so that 2 guns covered each of two approaches into friendly positions.

The Second Platoon being detached from the First Battalion was attached to the Second Battalion. Received orders from the Second Battalion to be prepared to deliver fires upon call. None were called for this date.

2 November 1950

The First Battalion reorganized defense and assigned the First Platoon to occupy TA 6831A. Guns emplaced and reassigned same approaches previously covered. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon conducted no firing missions.

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The First Platoon had registration firing only. Platoon Defensive sector strengthened with trip flare and concertina wire. Total rounds expended: 10 high explosive.

The Second Platoon conducted no firing missions. Departed from Kojo, Korea at 1700 by truck convoy, moving nine miles to the North along the coastal road. At 1810 arrived at Kishi-ri. Guns were emplaced but no fires were requested during the night.

4 November 1950

The First Platoon conducted no firing.

The Second Platoon entrained at 1000, proceeded to Wonsan, Korea. Upon arrival, boarded trucks and proceeded to TA 573101 in Wonsan - Bukpu area. Conducted no firing in compliance with the Tenth Corps directive prohibiting all but emergency fires.

5 November 1950

First Battalion moved to new defensive positions. The First platoon was assigned a position in TA 6833J. Registration firing only. Total rounds expended: 12 high explosive.

The Second Platoon established base point (TA 5538Q2). All missions were on call. None were requested. Total rounds expended: 3 high explosive and 1 white phosphorous.

6 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon moved by truck convoy approximately eighteen miles to the northwest, setting up in the Turyu-san area (TA 4635N5). No missions were called for. No rounds were expended.

7 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon remained in same position. No missions were called for. Emplacements were improved. No rounds were expended.

8 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon remained in same position. No missions were called for. Emplacements were improved. No rounds were expended.

9 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

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9 November 1950 (Cont'd)

The Second Platoon established base points at following TA's: 4635P3, 4535Y4, 4735Q3, 4735A5, 4635X4. Check points were established at the following TA's: 4635K2, 4635A3, 4735P1, 4735P4, 4735N5. The Platoon was split into two gun sections of two guns each in order that a greater frontage be covered. Total rounds expended: 12 high explosive and 11 white phosphorous.

10 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon delivered fire on houses containing enemy troops at TA 4635L2. Houses were destroyed and approximately thirty enemy killed. Total rounds expended: 16 high explosive and 45 white phosphorous.

11 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon delivered harrasing fires on TA 4634G3 at 0900. Established additional base point at TA 4634L1. Total rounds expended: 10 high explosive and 20 white phosphorous.

12 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in same position. No firing conducted.

The Second Platoon delivered fire upon enemy troops attacking Fox Company in TA 4734G3 from 0400 until 0445, with the results that the attack was repelled with approximately 40 enemy being killed. Harrasing fires were delivered from 0745 to 0800. Total rounds expended: 14 high explosive and 30 white phosphorous.

13 November 1950

First Platoon and First Battalion relieved by elements of Fifteenth Army Regiment. One platoon of Army 4.2" Mortars went in the same positions occupied by the First Platoon. The First Platoon moved to First Battalion assembly area and prepared to board trains the next day.

The Second Platoon delivered harrasing fire in TA 4634G4 from 0900 until 0930. Total rounds expended: 3 high explosive and 6 white phosphorous.

14 November 1950

The First Platoon entrained at Wonsan Air Strip at 0730. Disembarked Chig-yung 2030. The First Platoon plus elements of the First Battalion set up defense around the train.

The Second Platoon had no missions requested this date. No rounds were expended.

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15 November 1950

The First Platoon entrucked and proceeded to TA 6613B2. Guns divided into sections and registration firing completed at 1500. Total rounds expended: 15 high explosive and 3 white phosphorous.

The Second Platoon moved by truck convoy at 1600, proceeded to Wonsan, Korea, and occupied assembly area with Second Battalion. The situation being non-tactical, mortars were not emplaced.

16 November 1950

The First Platoon re-registered guns 1 and 2. Total rounds expended: 5 high explosive.

The Second Platoon occupied assembly area, making preparations for further combat operations.

17 - 18 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in defensive positions. No missions fired.

The Second Platoon occupied assembly area, making preparations for further combat operations.

19 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in defensive position. No missions fired.

The Second Platoon departed from Wonsan, Korea, at 1100 by motor convoy in administrative movement with the Second Battalion. Arrived at Ohig-yung, Korea, at 1600 and reverted to company control. Camped at TA 6312B5 with Regimental Command Post.

20-21-22 November 1950

The First Platoon remained in defensive position. No missions fired.

The Second Platoon mortars were emplaced with mission of protecting the Regimental Command Post encampment. No fires were conducted. Preparations were made for further combat operations.

23 November 1950

The First Platoon loaded aboard trucks and moved by convoy to Chin-hung-ni, arrived 1400. No registration due to poor visibility. Mortars emplaced TA 5449X.

The Second Platoon Mortars remained in same positions with mission remaining the same.

24 November 1950

At 0925, the First Platoon commenced registration firing. Fired base point and three check points. Total rounds expended: 69 high explosive.

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The Second Platoon moved by motor convoy attached to the Second Battalion to Koto-r1, approximately 51 miles to the northwest. No missions were requested.

25 November 1950

The First Platoon fired no missions.

The Second Platoon displaced 800 yards to a more favorable position at TA 5659M1, no missions were requested. No rounds were expended.

26 November 1950

The First Platoon at 1524 was requested to fire on concentration No. 101 by the First Battalion. At 1528 ceased fire, end of mission. Later informed this firing was a test to see how fast fire could be delivered. 4.2" mortars fired before other supporting weapons. 2200 commenced harassing and interdiction fire; fired 8 rounds per hour until 0600. One white phosphorous misfired as result of broken cartridge container. Total rounds expended: 48 high explosive and 15 white phosphorous.

The Second Platoon conducted no fires.

27 November 1950

At 1803, the forward observer reported enemy action in Baker Company zone and requested fire from the First Platoon. At 2019 ceased fire, end of mission. Reports next day gave evidence of enemy having been wounded in area fired on. Fired harassing and interdiction missions all night. Total rounds expended: 167 high explosive and 13 white phosphorous. Nine misfires due to broken cartridge containers.

The Second platoon established two sections of mortars. Base points were fired at TA's 5460T4 and 5460A as well as check points at TA's 5561P1 and 5460V4. Total rounds expended: 7 high explosive and 13 white phosphorous.

28 November 1950

The First Platoon re-registered at 1400 moving concentrations closer to front lines. Fired harassing and interdiction fire entire night. Total rounds expended: 96 high explosive.

The Second Platoon fired check points on following TA's: 5360Y1, 5359M5, 5459K3, 5459X3, 5358A1, 5458R3 and 5358S2. Conducted harassing fires from 2200 until 0630, 29 November. Total rounds expended: 105 high explosive and 52 white phosphorous.

29 November 1950

The First Platoon discovered base plate cup on number 3 mortar was cracked. It is believed it was cracked due to extreme cold and fact that ground was frozen forcing base plate to absorb almost all recoil. Conducted harassing fire missions from 2230 to 0230. Total rounds fired: 71 high explosive. Fired No. 3 on harassing missions found it did not crack further. No rounds were fired with it over 17 charges.

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The Second Platoon delivered preparation fires from 1000 to 1030 in support of attacking units north to Hagaru-ri. Established additional check points at following TA's: 5558A2, 5458D5, 5661X1, and 5660I1. Total rounds expended: 105 high explosive and 52 white phosphorous.

30 November 1950

The First Platoon at 1050 started firing in support of Able Company Patrol, continued fire in direct support until 1630. Targets consisted of a Chinese Battalion with supporting arms consisting of mortars and light artillery. An undetermined number of enemy were killed or wounded. 226 rounds were expended in support of patrol. Base plate cup of No. 3 mortar was repaired by welding. Fired harrassing fires all night. Total rounds expended: 326 high explosive and 44 white phosphorous.

The Second Platoon upon the request of Regimental Operations Officer established check point at TA 5558G4. At 0700, fired on and dispersed an enemy troop concentration at TA 5558G4. Established check points at TA's 5558F5 and 5358T5. At 1445, fired on and inflicted heavy casualties among enemy troops in TA 5558F5. At 1800, fired on and destroyed enemy mortars at TA 5460G1. At 1830, delivered fire on enemy troops in TA 5661X1 with the result that the enemy was routed. At 2215 scored direct hits on enemy mortars in TA 5358T5. Total rounds expended: 341 high explosive and 26 white phosphorous.

1 December 1950

First Platoon conducted harrassing fires all night. Total rounds expended: 20 high explosive and 40 white phosphorous.

Second Platoon fired six harrassing missions upon request from 0001 until 0400. Dispersed enemy troop concentrations grouping to attack by these fires. Total rounds expended: 50 high explosive and 7 white phosphorous.

2 December 1950

The First Platoon conducted harrassing fires all night. Total rounds expended: 40 high explosive and 45 white phosphorous. Guns were inspected by Captain Williams of First Ordnance Battalion. A report was made of the cartridge containers breaking and remaining in the barrel.

The Second Platoon final protective barrage was called for and delivered at 0900. Total rounds expended: 6 high explosive.

3 December 1950

The First Platoon shifted two guns to cover draw to North, other guns remained on same azimuth. Registered guns 1 and 2 on new azimuth. Fired harrassing missions all night. Total rounds expended: 31 high explosive and 9 white phosphorous. One misfire, high explosive.

The Second Platoon established concentrations in following TA's: 5459I3, 5459T5, and 5359Q5. Total rounds expended: 18 high explosive.



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The First Platoon registered guns 1 and 2 on new concentrations to the north. Fired harrasing missions all night. Total rounds expended: 121 high explosive and 9 white phosphorous. One round failed to explode during registration firing.

The Second Platoon at 1400, conducted fires of attached Army Heavy Mortar Platoon, 31st Regiment, resulting in the knocking out of enemy mortar positions. Delivered harrasing fires from 2200 until 0800, 5 December. Total rounds expended: 164 high explosive and 2 white phosphorous.

5 December 1950

The First Platoon registered concentrations to north moving them closer to front lines. Fired harrasing missions all night. Total rounds expended: 77 high explosive and 18 white phosphorous.

The Second Platoon at 1000 conducted fires of attached Army Heavy Mortar Platoon with the results that approximately thirty enemy troops were dispersed. Delivered harrasing fires from 2000 until 0800, 6 December. Total rounds expended: 74 high explosive.

6 December 1950

The First Platoon at 1800 fired an unobserved mission on a reported gathering of Chinese Communist forces. No surveillance report. Fired harrasing missions all night. Started a fire in village to north with white phosphorous which was visible for over a mile. Total rounds expended: 115 high explosive and 19 white phosphorous. Difficulties encountered with cannisters freezing to shells.

The Second Platoon conducted harrasing fires from 2115 until 0800, 7 December. Total rounds expended: 44 high explosive.

7 December 1950

The First Platoon fired harrasing fires all night. Total rounds expended: 63 high explosive. Total concentrations plotted at this position numbered 29.

The Second Platoon registered concentrations in following TA's: 5562X3, 5561J4, 5662G4, 5662V1, 5661H5, 5661H5. Conducted harrasing fires from 2115 until 0800, 8 December. Total rounds expended: 355 high explosive.

8 December 1950

The First Platoon at 0800 was relieved on position by an Army Heavy Mortar Platoon of the 31st Infantry Regiment. Loaded mortars and ammunition on two 2 1/2 ton trucks, moved northward. 1400 arrived TA 5552M and emplaced mortars to support First Battalion. Due to poor visibility caused by snowstorm, the observer was unable to complete registration firing. Fired harrasing missions from map data. Total rounds expended: 50 high explosive and 10 white phosphorous. One man wounded by a stray enemy mortar shell landing in position.

The Second Platoon conducted harrasing fires from 2000 until 0600, 9 December. Total rounds expended: 356 high explosive and 21 white phosphorous.

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The First Platoon conducted registration of two sections of mortars. Fired missions for forward observer in support of Able Company. Reported good results inflicting unknown number of casualties. Fired harassing missions all night. Total rounds expended: 200 high explosive and 20 white phosphorous.

The Second Platoon delivered fire on enemy troops in TA 535905. Conducted harassing fires from 2100 until 0600, 10 December. Total rounds expended: 187 high explosive and 47 white phosphorous.

10 December 1950

The First Platoon fired harassing missions all day. The base plate cup on No. 3 mortar broke off completely. Received another base plate from the 4.2" Mortar Company, 5th Marines, who were passing position. Standard on No. 1 mortar damaged, would not maintain desired elevation, believed to be caused by oil in recoil mechanism freezing. Fired harassing missions all night. The three remaining mortars placed on same azimuth. Total rounds expended: 350 high explosive. No white phosphorous fired due to breaking of cartridge containers on every round fired.

The Second Platoon departed from Koto-ri on foot at 1540.

11 December 1950

The First Platoon at 0230 went out of action. Loaded mortars and ammunition on two 2 1/2 ton trucks. At 0330 started march down mountain. At 1600 arrived at truck point, entrucked. 1730 arrived Hamhung area and returned to company control.

The Second Platoon arrived at 1200. Entrucked immediately, proceeded to Regimental assembly area near Hamhung, Korea.

12 December 1950

The Company proceeded by truck to Division staging area, Hungnam, Korea.

13 December 1950

The Company made preparations to outload on assigned shipping.

14 December 1950

The Company boarded the USNS GENERAL E. T. COLLINS at 0430.

15 December 1950

The Company under way and arrived at Pusan, Korea.

8. ENEMY

a. Not applicable.

9. ESTIMATED RESULTS OF OPERATIONS

a. This heavy mortar company fired four thousand, six hundred and ninety-two (4,692) rounds of high explosive and seven