

FOUO

November 17, 2004

ES-1435
04/015592-ES

TO: Peter Rodman
Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Options for Haiti

Steve Herbits gave me a paper on Haiti, which I then gave to either Peter Rodman or Roger Pardo-Maurer. I forget who I gave it to.

I would like it **back**, but I would like to know from whomever I gave it to what their opinion is about it, and whether or not there is anything we could do about it or whether Millennium Challenge would fit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
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.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

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OSD 20178-04
18-11-04 P12:14 OUT

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HAITI

17 Nov 04



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



DEC 14 2004
USDP *[Signature]*
DepSecDef _____
ES-1435

INFO MEMO

1-04-016494-WH

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]* DEC 2004

FROM: Roger Pardo-Maurer, DASD- Western Hemisphere Affairs

SUBJECT: HAITI PROPOSAL EVALUATION (U)

You asked for views on the attached proposal to help Haiti.

Our analysis is immediately under, with a summary. These impressions are based on informal discussions with people at State, AID, and various Haiti experts.

Attachment

Haiti
8 Dec 04
17 Nov 04



OSD 20178-04

Evaluation of Proposal

“An Initiative for the Revitalization of Haiti: an Interdisciplinary Project”

Summary:

The project carries a big price tag, and there is plenty of competition for donor funds.

- On the plus side, it addresses the full spectrum of Haitian governance problems which are a high priority to international donors, and identifies credible experts to be recruited for execution.
- The project would be more competitive if it had a narrower focus (e.g. on a region, or on the connection between security, investment, and the Diaspora).
- A clearer statement of the mission, value-added, and benchmarks for success would also be helpful.
- The interdisciplinary approach which is the basis of the proposal is an appropriate analytical tool, but in terms of implementation there is a risk of overstretch.
- A more narrowly tailored interdisciplinary approach (e.g. public health + economic opportunity, education + sanitation) might be more successful.

Discussion:

1. Relevance. There is increasing urgency in the international community on the need to help the Interim Government of Haiti overcome crippling personnel and policy weaknesses. These weaknesses are jeopardizing every aspect of the country's governance and of international programs to support Haiti, and may derail the disbursement of approximately \$1.2 Billion pledged to support Haiti. This proposal, “An Initiative ~~for~~ the Revitalization of Haiti”, addresses the full spectrum of Haitian governance problems, including problems which are of critical interest to international donors, and identifies credible experts to be recruited for execution.

The proposal needs to be considered in the context of existing efforts to improve conditions in Haiti. The US. and the international community draw on over four

hundred Haiti-focused NGOs, dozens of international donors, dedicated academic programs at various colleges and universities, and international institutional support from the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), and others.

There is little to specifically distinguish this proposal from scores of other projects, both completed and proposed, intended to provide expert advice on Haiti. New proposals, especially of this magnitude (\$4 M budget), are far more likely to find sponsors if they have a clear comparative advantage by offering clear value-added and definite benchmarks for success.

2. Timeliness. This proposal was evidently developed in early 2004 to respond to conditions prevailing under the Aristide regime, and would have to be updated in light of Haiti's current circumstances: including the rebellion, the fall of the Aristide government, the UN intervention forces (MIFH and MINUSTAH), the formation of Haiti's Interim Government, and the continuing lack of legitimate governance in the countryside. While many of Haiti's problems are endemic, and transcend regime change, any successful proposal must respond to current political and economic realities.

3. Value-Added and Benchmarks. The proposal's likelihood of finding a sponsor would probably increase if it had a narrower focus. As examples (drawn from the proposal itself) one could suggest an initiative narrowly centered on:

- *a region*
- *land-titling*
- *integrity in government*
- *the Diaspora*

The interdisciplinary approach which is the basis of the proposal is an appropriate analytical tool, but in terms of implementation runs a risk of overstretch.

A more narrowly tailored interdisciplinary approach might be successful, e.g.:

- *public health + economic opportunity*
- *education + sanitation*
- *security + investment + the Diaspora.*

A clearer statement of the mission, value-added, and benchmarks for success would also be helpful. The proposal should be narrowed to address specific, measurable, programmatic goals. Instead of describing broad challenges to sustainable development — all of which are generally known — a successful

proposal must identify achievable outcomes and the unique qualifications of the project performers to pursue those objectives. *“Featurestell, but benefits sell”*.

Also, this proposal would likely be more competitive if it provided a more compelling methodology for dealing with the myriad practical challenges to a functioning, democratic Haiti. The “Plan Process” (p. 7) and “Task Force Projects” (p. 9) are a start; they need more detail. As outlined, they are menus from which the details of the project and associated methodologies would be determined *after* funding is secured.

4. Sponsorship/Funding. The obvious source of funding for this proposal would be the Millennium Challenge account, which is intended to reward poor countries for attempting good governance. Unfortunately, this is not an option since Haiti does not yet qualify for such funding. The qualification process is a function of measurable steps a country is taking to improve governance. Haiti has yet to get on that treadmill. This in fact, suggests the usefulness of an initiative to advise Haiti on what it needs to do to qualify for Millennium Challenge funding.

Nor in its current form would the project qualify for PEPFAR funding, since it does not focus on delivery of medical services, or other support services. A more narrowly crafted proposal might qualify for such funding.

The goal of the initiative, *“to develop a plan that is comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and of sufficient scale to be implemented for the purpose of revitalizing Haiti,”* is laudable, but far too broad and diffuse either to produce deliverables for identifiable sectors in Haiti or sponsors in the donor community. For the same reason, various experts agreed that without substantial revisions it is unlikely to qualify for U.S. government funding as an unsolicited offer.

An Initiative for the Revitalization of Haiti
An Interdisciplinary Project
(Draft: January 2, 2004)

Contents

Vision

Description of the Current Situation

Short History of Helping Haiti

Goal of the Initiative

Potential Project Sponsors/Co-Sponsors

Guiding Principles

Plan Process

Task Force Projects

Potential Participants

Collateral Benefits

Timeline

Budget

Appendix

References

S. Herbits

Vision

Haiti is a country of vibrant, enthusiastic, optimistic, artistic people.

It is also a nation of profound economic poverty and societal deprivation.

Haiti is a democracy, according to its constitution, but most of its people are only free to subsist.

The world's market democracies, which now encompass hundreds of millions of people possessed of trillions of dollars in wealth, should be able to prompt the creation of one more market democracy – a liberal democracy in Fareed Zakaria's words – in a place that occupies roughly half a Caribbean island and 8 million people.

The incentives, if needed, begin with the humanitarian instinct – the comfortable millions will not abide children in slavery a few hundred miles from their shores. There is also the economic incentive – three centuries of growth around the world have surely taught the lesson that bringing humans into true productivity is the best wealth production engine available to serve all mankind.

What is needed is a compelling strategy – a scheme to achieve what governments cannot order and dollars cannot purchase – to bring about a modern Haiti.

Such a strategy can direct the many interests in preventing Haiti from continuing on its current course because those interests touch every element of the country's life. The achievement should take less than a decade.

The market economy in the new Haiti will not only end the humanitarian horror, best personified by children in slavery, but will create a source of productive manpower for the 21st century that the West will sorely need. While Haiti may be the toughest case today, the lessons of a successful new model of international action will have an impact on comparable challenges in the rest of the world.

Description of the current situation in Haiti

Haiti's political system is frozen.

Large numbers of citizens, protesting the 2002 election have promised not to participate in another election as called for by the Organization of American States unless there are sufficient safeguards to protect them and its accuracy. President Aristede is accused of supporting violence in response to the protesters and promises to remain in office until his term expires in 2006. The stability of the government is in question.

There is both a governmental and an informal system of thuggery that keeps large segments of the population in fear and danger and diminishes the opportunity for democracy.

Corruption is pervasive. Transparency International rates it the 3rd worst in the world, outdone only by Bangladesh and Nigeria. (12)

The health and well-being of Haitians is calamitous – equal to the worst in the world.

Unemployment may be as high as 70% (6)(12)

More than half the population is illiterate (12)

Wages are the equivalent to \$1 a day (6), \$375 per year.

Life expectancy is the shortest in the Western Hemisphere; 45 for males; 49 for females

Infant Mortality is 81 per 1000 births; 125 per thousand for those under 5 years old.

Estimated AIDS cases at 300,000 (6) are the world's highest outside sub-Saharan Africa (12)

There are an estimated 300,000 child slaves in Haiti (3)

Infrastructure and finances are not positioned to help cure Haiti's ills.

Potable water is available to less than half the population

Electricity is available to six percent of the population. (13)

Haitian debt is estimated at \$1.1 billion, approximately 40% of GNP.

The United States retains economic sanctions because of the political situation.

Haiti may be responsible for at least 15% of the \$60 billion in cocaine reaching the US.

History of US and International Efforts to Help Haiti

Haiti is the world's oldest black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.

Since obtaining its independence from the French in 1807, Haiti has undergone continuing political upheaval through to today. The United States military intervened in 1915 and stayed until 1934. Following the dictatorship of the Duvalier family in 1991, a series of provisional governments ruled until a military take-over later that year. The United Nations Security Council authorized a multilateral force. The US-led force entered in September, 1994 and restored civilian government. OAS-led efforts have not overcome the claims of election fraud accompanied by growing violence that exist today. The crises continues to grow. (For a more detailed description, please see Appendix C)

Of note, US AID is widely distrusted in Haiti, with claims that the United States has consistently "pulled rug out from underneath" reconstruction efforts. Specific review of the history of US economic and humanitarian aid, as well as military and political intervention is warranted.

For the purposes of this study, it is valuable to note that President Aristede's first Administration (early 90s) created a series of task forces to study Haiti's problems and make recommendations.

Enormous pressures on Haiti continue: enormous power of US interests and international financial institutions, entrenched prerogatives of the elite and its corruption of the political class, and the rapidly rising expectations of the people and their champions among the intellectuals and NGOs." (6)

For perspective, Haiti's problems are less than 250 years old. As the United States, they need not be entrenched, not endemic. We know how to create economic opportunity and find the people who want it.

Goal of The Haiti Initiative

The goal of this Initiative is to develop a plan that is comprehensive, interdisciplinary and of sufficient scale to be implemented for the purpose of revitalizing Haiti. The plan seeks to incorporate the collaborative efforts of international and multinational organizations, Western Hemisphere governments, and their private sectors, both for-profit and not-for-profit.

Potential Project Sponsors/Co-Sponsors

University of Miami (President Donna Shalala; UofM medical program in Haiti)
Florida International University, Miami (President
(Just signed partnership with Rand for Latin American Studies) (2)
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
Freedom House
Director, Net Assessments, DoD
Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton)

Guiding Principles

The moment in history has arrived when it is time to generate a sustained effort to prompt a new Haiti. The principles of the strategy to be written are informed by an understanding of the opportunity presented by that moment. Consider:

There are no Cold War distractions or competitions. Cuba is nearby and yet irrelevant.

The world's economies are rebounding and the long-term need for human resources in the West is about to mushroom.

The importance of democracy to the world is in sharp relief. Ultimately all the world's people must be free in fact as well as in name. But it is particularly important that our country's first sphere of influence achieve that goal – now.

And now is just when the role of freedom and the rule of law in true, liberal democracy is gaining greater appreciation. Again, freedom will arrive in many places in the world after, in Secretary Rumsfeld's words, "a hard slog." It should be simpler in Haiti

In a brilliantly succinct history of liberal democratic developments since Constantine left Rome in A.D. 324 to create a new capital at the mouth of the Black Sea, Fareed Zakaria catalogues in his 2003 book, *The Future of Freedom*, the necessary elements for success in this venture. First and foremost, the book demonstrates that there must be competing centers of power in the society.

Haiti has a culture that has been burdened by the absence of this competition.

Colonialism was one obstacle to developing a civil society, but so was the military. And even in the years when the Haitian people were nominally free of authoritarians, political instability and unrest produced 32 governments in 70 years. Yet, there are in this island nation a vibrant people proud of a history that has repelled colonial powers, rebelled against slavery, and formed the hemisphere's second independent nation. Akin to the earliest day of European civil societies, there is a strong church, a creative culture and an optimistic outlook.

Today, we believe, a concerted strategy can be developed to introduce a variety of civil institutions among Haitians that can balance each other, competing and cooperating in the development of a free people, a democratic state and a liberal society.

A set of ideas can change a country long before it changes its structure or governance. While this has not happened often in the history of the world, it has happened: See Revolutions, America.

The philosophical underpinning of a strategic plan for Haiti is to achieve long-term freedom, security, prosperity and health by creating mechanisms of opportunity rather than shorter-term treatment of victims and to do so in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve scale of effectiveness.

As Zakaria continues, history teaches that building economic strength with its concomitant benefits to extending liberty provides a much greater likelihood that democracy

itself will succeed. A guiding principle of this plan will be to strengthen the economy of Haiti as the underpinning of its future.

Maximizing private sector participation and minimizing government micromanagement, the model would seek to transform the poor into citizens with access to and ownership of capital, collateralizing opportunities and economic prospects.

Enormous mechanisms of communications, even to and among the poorest, provide an opportunity to empower the bulk of the citizens to help shape their future.

Plan Process

Phase 1. Preparation/Development of the Plan outline (3 months)

Phase one of the Planning Process develops a set of Project Descriptions designed to set in motion each of the projects. Development of each project descriptions would include an overview of the relevant conditions in Haiti and some thoughts about solution topics to be considered. The collection of these Project Descriptions will serve only as a starting point, but no limitation for each Project Task Force.

During this period, members of each Task Force would be recruited.

Phase 2. Task Force Projects (8 months)

Each Task Force will be chaired by an individual selected by the Project Director with the Advice of the Co-Chairs.

Other members of the task force will be recruited as described in the Section on Project Participants.

Each Task Force would be expected to:

- a. conduct a close analysis of the challenges facing Haiti relevant to the work of that Task Force.
- b. an inventory of current efforts addressing each issue
- c. draw up a range of recommendations for addressing those challenges
- d. evaluate those recommendations
- e. cost-out those recommendations
- f. produce a report and set of recommendations, with costs and priorities, for the larger project.

Phase 3. Plan Integration (3 months)

The combination of the Task Force Reports would be melded into a larger Strategic Plan, including the following:

- a. a set of priorities
- b. proposed roles for those implementing the Plan
- c. a timetable for implementation
- d. costs associated with each Project
- e. resources available for funding each Project.

Phase 4. Government reviews (4 months)

Upon completion of the draft Strategic Plan, it would be circulated for comment among a number of government experts covering a broad selection of country and multilateral agencies for further evaluation.

Phase 5. Plan completion (2 months)

The final draft of the plan would be prepared during this period.

Potential project leaders/institutions and sponsors for its implementation would be identified.

A Communication Plan will be developed.

Phase 6. Communication Plan (4 months)

A plan to communicate the results of the completed project to various audiences would be implemented with the goal of recruiting commitments for implementation.

- a. Project Implementers, e.g. corporations, government agencies, not-for-profits, etc.
- b. Publication: informing the media
- c. Presenting at Congressional Hearings, especially if US Government funds are sought

Task Force Projects

Specific projects are identified below. Additional projects may be added.

A Task Force will be assigned to each. Over the eight months, each Task Force will develop a specific plan of action in its designated area, and include delineation of those steps required to implement the plan. The plan for each project must be delineated with sufficient precision to provide evaluators with enough information to assess its potential for being implemented and the identification of resources available for such implementation. In each instance, various sectors will be included where they have a role, e.g. governments, including multilateral organizations (OAS, IMF, World Bank, Inter American Development Bank, UN Agencies), the for-profit sector, and the not-for-profit sector.

1. Private Ownership

- a. Explore the 1815 Property Law and its consequences for individual property ownership
- b. Examine the progress of the Hernando DeSoto private property project in Haiti.
(*The Mystery of Capital*, New York: Basic Books, 2000)
- c. If applicable, describe steps necessary to implement.
- d. Study related capital needs

2. Commerce

- a. Review and update laws and regulations of commerce, including its judicial system, to bring them into line with other OECD nations.
- b. Review and update currency policies
- c. Review and update for foreign investment.
- d. Develop an export promotion program.
- e. Review banking structure, particularly related to new private ownership

3. Infrastructure

- a. Enhance internal commerce by assuring adequate roadways throughout the nation.
- b. Enhance healthcare by assuring potable water to and proper sanitation for all citizens (11). Study rainfall patterns and questions of storage.
- c. Assure power generation throughout most of the country. Study alternative energy sources, including solar, wind, storage, transmission for long-term.
- d. Inventory Housing needs and prepare a plan for adequate housing. Pre-fab (10)

4. Agriculture

- a. Understand what is possible given the range of topography, from desert to mountains, from forest to beach
- b. Consider possibilities given resources, water, education, arable land, consumer behavior, export opportunities
- c. Understand the constraints and opportunities with Haiti's tradition of private ownership of small plots of land.
- d. Study current crises in loss of arable land and deforestation.

5. Education

- a. Develop practical education programs for work-skills
- b. For K-12, develop a plan for implementation of a country-wide, all-student voucher system.
- c. For higher education, develop a plan for creating partnerships with universities in other countries, whose exchange programs of students and faculty will benefit both institutions.
- d. Develop a “virtual” curriculum for students at all levels to both supplement and supplant other education. RADIO, TV, on-line (See India model) (7)
- e. Develop citizenship and “values” elements of curricula, including freedom, prosperity, safety, and individual responsibility.
- f. Develop a system of exchange for K9-12 Diaspora students to return to Haiti to gain a sense of their own history and to contribute a broader perspective for students in Haiti.
- g. Consider plans to prevent brain drain of those most accomplished.

6. Health

- a. Explore a new national model based on creative work now underway for restructuring the US healthcare system. Its fundamental ingredients include minimizing paperwork and administration, preventive education and care, adequate system of distribution for pharmaceutical and medical supplies.
- b. Develop a specific plan for attacking the HIV/AIDS crises, referencing the recent experiences in Africa
- c. Consider resources such as: Project Medishare, U of M. (projectmedishare.org); Haitian Health Foundation, (Jeremie, Haiti) (haitianhealthfoundation.org); Jefferson College of Health Professions (sister city between Cardenas, Cuba and Philadelphia)

7. Security

- a. Screen and retrain a single national police force.
- b. Create a Special Crime Unit to investigate and prosecute instances of physical abuse by government employees or groups associated with the government or political parties
- c. Embargo private weapons importation
- d. Install an effective border police
- e. Examine program of the International Red Cross in non-lethal crime fighting tactics training. (8)
- f. Explore resources such as: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Washington, D.C.; Inter American Court of Human Rights (OAS), Costa Rica; OAS Special Representative, David Lee; UN. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (Afghan); Bureau of International Advocates (BAI) (group of Haitian and international attorneys; assisting the judiciary with human rights cases. Brian Concannon (6)

8. Democracy

- a. Review the recent history of political institutions and the political process.
- a. Make recommendations to rebuild the operation of and confidence in the political process, utilizing outside supervision where necessary.
- c. Establish a program of teaching democracy

9. Integrity in Government/Corruption

- a. The fight against corruption is a necessary element in building an effective economy. Daniel Kaufmann (head of World Bank's anti-corruption drive) claims that research shows that "if a poor country with a high level of corruption manages to reduce corruption to a median level, it will enjoy a 400% improvement in its per capita income." (1)
- b. Consider recent efforts:
 - World Bank (Daniel Kaufmann), Integrity Pacts
 - UN General Assembly's Convention Against Corruption
(12/9-11,2003.Mexico City signing)
 - OECD Convention
 - OAS Convention
 - Council of Europe Convention
 - African Union Convention
- c. Create a Special Investigative Unit and pair it with a special team from the OAS with subpoena power to strengthen the integrity of government officials.
- d. Create a judicial watch and a system to remove judges.
- e. explore expertise: Transparency International(US/Germany)

11. The Arts

- a. Examine the hypothesis that Haiti is among the highest producers of visual and performing art per capita in the Hemisphere.
- b. Examine possibilities of export
- c. Explore the US import of Haitian art teachers for our public schools

12. Foreign Sanctions

- a. Study the impact of the current sanctions to the health and welfare of Haiti versus its achievement in its goals of political change.

Plan Participants

The Plan is designed to capitalize on a broad range of expertise. Starting with a small core -- a director, strategic advisors, administrator, writer, and clerical support -- the project would search out and arrange for small teams to focus on specific projects. The Core would be full or part-time; the experts would be part-time and would be paid stipends for their contributions.

1. Project Management

The Project would be directed by Stephen Herbits.

Bill Roesing will be a consulting strategist.

Bio's attached.

2. Co-Chairs

Three leading Haitian or Haitian-Americans will Chair the project.

Their responsibilities will be to assure that a broad spectrum of views is considered, to facilitate the attraction of expert participants, and to contribute as policy experts.

3. The role of Haiti and its citizens

Central to the project, of course, will be those members of the leadership community in Haiti who wish to participate. It is intended that each specific task force have at least one knowledgeable participant from Haiti.

4. The role of the Haitian Diaspora

The wealth of experience and knowledge among Haitians living in the United States provides another pool for project members.

5. The role of academics

Also participating will be experts from academia and think-tanks.

6. The role of international and regional governments

Each international and regional organization that may have an interest or possible future role in implementation will be asked to participate as advisors to the project.

7. The role of the business community

Individual companies, trade associations and business organizations will be invited to support this project. They may perceive specific business opportunities in a strong Haitian economy or simply believe in the benefit of developing a strategic model for broad-scale national improvement. They will be invited to join as contributors to the planning process itself with a concomitant opportunity to participate in the project work.

8. The role of the not-for-profit community

The not-for-profit community has much to offer any nation, any time. They bring skills, knowledge, personnel and support mechanisms for a wide variety of projects. Their participation in the project development would add value. It is important from the beginning, however, to understand that the strategic model being developed in this plan does not provide for institutionalizing a central role for not-for-profits over the long term.

While there will always be a need for charitable activities; the plan would hope to capitalize on their contributions primarily for transitional purposes, with a draw-down as the economic benefits of the plan begin to become widespread.

Candidate Participants

Eric Behrmann (Kim Green)

M. Bubishi (KG)

Yolly Roberson (Fla. State Rep.) (KG)

Aldy Castor, MD. (KG)

President Human Resource Development Foundation (HRDF.org)

Vice President, Haitian-American Republican Caucus (?)

Mark Rogers (KG)

Director of Development, FAUACA.org

Patrick Prosper (KG)

Ambassador at large for war crimes

Dr. Rudy Moise (KG)

University of Miami

Owns Radio Carnivale

Dr. Laurence Pierre (KG)

Center for Haitian Studies

John Rendon, The Rendon Group (PR) (KG)

Terry Rey

FIU, Professor, Haitian Studies Class

Gepsie M. Metellus, ED

Sant La-Haitian Neighborhood Center

Marleine Bastien

Haitian American Women Foundation

Tom Reeves, former director of the Caribbean Focus Program, professor of history at Roxbury Community College, Boston. Founding Member of the New England Observer delegations to Haiti on democracy.

Jim Obestar (D. Minn. Former?) Peace Corps in Haiti. (NG)

II. Benefits of the Initiative

1. Were there to be a demonstrable improvement in its condition, other nations may be encouraged to take steps to address their own poverty.
2. Haiti has a substantial expatriate community in the United States that can provide an important resource of advice, counsel, and perhaps relationships for future growth.
3. The pervasiveness of poverty in a world that also contains incredible wealth begs for working models that address institutionalized or intractable poverty. It is the compassionate thing to do, because it will ultimately improve the population's economic well-being. It is important for everyone's security, because it will diminish opportunities for radicalism and improve governance.
4. As Haiti is neither white nor non-white Hispanic, a successful model may have application throughout black inner cities in the US and across Africa.
5. Given its presence in the Caribbean, there may be regional entities – such as the Organization of American States – that will take the lead, rather than the United States Government, increasing chances that other regional organizations throughout the world can apply similar efforts.
6. Haiti is of a size that enhances the opportunity to take risks. Most laws are both national and local simultaneously.
7. Haiti's location is an invitation to substantial expert advice from around the Caribbean as well as the United States.
8. A successful plan will reduce illegal emigration efforts and thereby reduce one of the largest illegal immigrant-seeking populations challenging the United States, thus reducing pressure on the US government's inconsistent policy towards Haitians and Cubans.

The USG ties illegal Haitian immigration to terrorism. "If we are going to start to win that aspect of the war on terrorism we call the "war for minds," we should begin at home, with our own behavior, our own justice, our own Justice Department. I fear we are creating the motivation for terrorists; not educating the world of the incompatibility of terrorism and civilization. (4)

9. Modern nation building: a necessary in the 21st century war on terrorism, including the reduction or elimination of ungovernable areas as hosts for terrorist bases and training.
10. US Annual Assessment of the cooperation of major drug producing and transiting countries (2003) says that Haiti had "failed demonstrably" to meet international obligations to fight drugs. (5) It is estimated that 15% of the \$60 billion worth of cocaine reaching the US is handled by Haitian traffickers and that Aristide himself earns from the process. (12)
11. A successful effort will be a model for close-by Jamaica and Cuba.

Plan 1 Summary

| | |
|--|-----------|
| 1. Phase 1 – Preparation/Development of the Plan outline | 3 months |
| 2. Phase 2 – Task Force Projects | 8 months |
| 3. Phase 3 – Plan Integration | 3 months |
| 4. Phase 4 – Government Reviews | 4 months |
| 5. Phase 5 - Plan Completion | 2 months |
| 6. Phase 6 - Plan Communication | 4 months |
| Total time | 24 months |

Plan Budget (24 Mon)

Cash

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Director: | \$600,000 |
| Strategic Advisor | 480,000 |
| Strategic Advisor | 360,000 |
| Administrator: | 120,000 |
| Writer: | 50,000 |
| Clerical: | 44,000 |
| Participant Stipends | |
| Co-Chairs (3) \$2kx21 | 126,000 |
| Task Force Chairs (12) \$6x21 | 852,000 |
| Task Force Members (12x5) \$5x8 | 48,000 |
| Travel | 360,000 |
| Other overhead, payroll taxes, etc. (phone, copier, supplies) | 480,000 |
| Media Advisor (three months) | 90,000 |
| Total Project | \$3,610,000 |

In-Kind

(To be provided by one of the sponsors)

Office suite, including two private offices, a clerical space, and conference room seating up to 12, parking
Access to faculty; stipends to be paid by the project.

Appendix 1: A view towards economic sanctions

- a. Study of the recent history of the role of sanctions towards Haiti by the United States, other governments and international organizations.
- b. Analyze their effectiveness
- c. Study other possible approaches
 1. flooding the nation with currency
 - a. flooding the country with communications, e.g. satellite dishes and radios and programming; cell phones; web access; aid packed with messages.
 - h. ruthless humiliation of leaders – at the UN and its organizations, in public, in communications above, use cell phone information collection; increase investment in intelligence
 4. Embargoing items that support the dictatorship, e.g. weapons importation.
 5. Encourage and support exile participation in their native country.

Appendix 2: A new model of foreign AID.

- a. governmental
- b. best-practices shared
- c. bureaucracy versus evaluation
- d. band-aids or cures

Appendix 3: A Short History of US and International Efforts to Help Haiti

Haiti is the world's oldest black republic and the second oldest republic in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.

“The native Arawak Amerindians - who inhabited the island of Hispaniola when it was discovered by Columbus in 1492 - were virtually annihilated by Spanish settlers within 25 years. In the early 17th century, the French established a presence on Hispaniola, and in 1697, Spain ceded to the French the western third of the island - Haiti. The French colony, based on forestry and sugar-related industries, became one of the wealthiest in the Caribbean, but only through the heavy importation of African slaves and considerable environmental degradation. In the late 18th century, Haiti's nearly half million slaves revolted under Toussaint L'OUVERTURE and after a prolonged struggle, became the first black republic to declare its independence in 1804.” (13)

From 1822 to 1844, Haiti occupied the entire Island until the Dominican Republic was formed. The following is an edited version of the US State Department Background Note on Haiti (14): “With 22 changes of government from 1843 to 1915, Haiti experienced numerous periods of intense political and economic disorder, prompting the United States military intervention of 1915. Following a 19-year occupation, U.S. military forces were withdrawn in 1934, and Haiti regained sovereign rule.

“From 1986--when the 29-year dictatorship of the Duvalier family ended--until 1991, Haiti was ruled by a series of provisional governments. In March 1987, a constitution was ratified that provides for an elected, bicameral parliament; an elected president that serves as head of state; and a prime minister, cabinet, ministers, and supreme court appointed by the

president with parliament's consent. The Haitian Constitution also provides for political decentralization through the election of mayors and administrative bodies responsible for local government.

"In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a charismatic Roman Catholic priest, won 67% of the vote in a presidential election that international observers deemed largely free and fair. Aristide took office on February 7, 1991, but was overthrown that September in a violent coup led by dissatisfied elements of the army and supported by many of the country's economic elite. Following the coup, Aristide began a 3-year exile in the U.S. Several thousand Haitians may have been killed during the de facto military rule. The coup contributed to a large-scale exodus of Haitians by boat. The U.S. Coast Guard rescued a total of 41,342 Haitians at sea during 1991 and 1992, more than the number of rescued boat people from the previous 10 years combined.

"From October 1991 to September 1994 an unconstitutional military de facto regime governed Haiti. Various OAS and UN initiatives to end the political crisis through the peaceful restoration of the constitutionally elected government, including the Governor's Island Agreement of July 1993, failed. The military and de facto authorities couldn't agree on a return to constitutional government, even though the economy was collapsing and the country's infrastructure was deteriorating from neglect.

"On July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council authorized member states to use all necessary means to restore Haiti's constitutionally elected government to power.

"In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force (MNF) to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. In mid-September, with U.S. troops prepared to enter Haiti by force, President Clinton dispatched a negotiating team led by former President Jimmy Carter to persuade the de facto authorities to step aside and allow for the return of constitutional rule. With intervening troops already airborne, Gen. Raoul Cedras and other top leaders agreed to accept the intervention of the MNF. On September 19, 1994, the first contingents of what became a 21,000-member international force touched down in Haiti to oversee the end of military rule and the restoration of the constitutional government. By early October, the three de facto leaders--Cedras, Gen. Philippe Biamhy, and Police Chief Lt. Col. Michel Francois--and their families had departed Haiti. President Aristide and other elected officials in exile returned on October 15.

"Under the watchful eyes of international peacekeepers, restored Haitian authorities organized nationwide local and parliamentary elections in June 1995. A pro-Aristide, multi-party coalition called the Lavalas Political Organization (OPL) swept into power at all levels. With his term ending in February 1996 and barred by the constitution from succeeding himself, President Aristide agreed to step aside and support a presidential election in December 1995. Rene Preval, a prominent Aristide political ally, who had been Aristide's Prime Minister in 1991, took 88% of the vote, and was sworn in to a 5-year term on February 7, 1996, during what was Haiti's first-ever transition between two democratically elected presidents.

"In late 1996, former President Aristide broke from the OPL and created a new political party, the Lavalas Family (FL). Elections in April 1997 indicated victories for FL candidates in most races, but were plagued with allegations of fraud and not certified by most international observers. Partisan resulted in almost total governmental gridlock until early January 1999, when President Preval dismissed legislators whose terms had expired--the entire Chamber of Deputies

and all but nine members of the Senate--and converted local elected officials into state employees. The President and Prime Minister then ruled by decree. Following several delays, the first round of new elections took place on May 21, 2000. The election drew the participation of a multitude of candidates from a wide array of political parties and a voter turnout of more than 60%. Controversy mired the good start. Nonetheless, on August 28, 2000, Haiti's new Parliament, including the contested Senators accorded victory under the flawed vote count, was convened.

"Through a number of diplomatic missions by the OAS, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the United States, the international community had sought to delay Parliament's seating until the electoral problems could be rectified. When these efforts were rebuffed, Haiti's main bilateral donors announced the end of "business as usual." They moved to re-channel their assistance away from the government and announced they would not support or send observers to the November elections. Concurrently, most opposition parties regrouped in an alliance that became the Democratic Convergence. The Convergence asserted that the May elections were so fraudulent that they should be annulled and held again. Elections for President and nine Senators took place on November 26, 2000. All major opposition parties boycotted these elections in which voter participation was estimated at 5%. Jean-Bertrand Aristide emerged as the easy victor of these controversial elections, and the candidates of his FL party swept all contested Senate seats. He was inaugurated on February 7, 2001.

"It did not, however, put an end to the political stalemate. OAS-mediated negotiations began in April 2001 to find a resolution, focusing on the on possible makeup of a new electoral council, a timetable for new elections, security for political parties, and other confidence-building measures. These negotiations made some progress, but were suspended in mid-July without a final agreement. On July 28, 2001, unknown gunmen attacked police facilities in Port-au-Prince and the provinces. A subsequent government crackdown on opposition party members and former soldiers further increased tensions between Lavalas and Convergence. On December 17, 2001, unidentified gunmen attacked the National Palace in Port-au-Prince. Following the assault, pro-government groups attacked the offices and homes of several opposition leaders. One opposition member was killed. Negotiations between FL and Democratic Convergence, already on hold following the July violence, were suspended indefinitely.

"In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 806 on Haiti that called for government action to address the political stalemate, growing violence, and deterioration in respect for human rights. It also authorized OAS establishment of a Special Mission in Haiti to support implementation of steps called for in Resolution 806. The OAS Special Mission began operations in March 2002, working with the government on plans to strengthen Haiti's democratic institutions in security, justice, human rights, and governance. Nevertheless, the climate of security deteriorated and a rapidly weakening economy created risks of a humanitarian disaster. The OAS Permanent Council adopted Resolution 822, September 4, 2002, which set a new course for resolving the crisis by: committing the Haitian government to a series of steps leading to an improved climate of security for free and fair elections in 2003; supporting Haiti's resumption of normal relations with the International Financial Institutions; and strengthening the mandate of the OAS to monitor as well as support GOH efforts to comply with OAS resolutions. It also conferred new mandates related to conduct of elections and disarmament.

"Protest strikes and attacks on opposition demonstrations by government-supported gangs between November 2002 and February 2003 hardened attitudes on both sides. The

opposition issued a public call for Aristide's removal and announced plans for a transitional government. In March, 2003, a high-level joint delegation of the OAS and Caribbean Community (CAFUCOM) presented specific demands to President Aristide to restore public security and create confidence necessary to move toward elections: select new leadership for the Haitian National Police in consultation with the OAS; arrest Amiot Metayer, a notorious gang leader; and disarm the security forces used by government politicians to intimidate opponents. Since then, a new police chief, appointed June 9 in consultation with the OAS, resigned and fled the country June 23 after being ordered to give up his authority over budget and personnel; government-paid thugs violently disrupted a civil society public ceremony July 12 in Cite Soleil; police attacked civil society marches in Cap Haitien August 30 and September 14 and prevented an opposition march scheduled for October 5. Amiot Metayer was murdered September 21 (it is widely believed the government ordered the murder to prevent release of compromising information). The government announced August 13 that it was re-activating a defunct CEP in what many have interpreted as a move toward holding elections outside the framework of OAS Resolution 822 . The OAS and other foreign observers, including the U.S., have denounced these steps. To re-invigorate the process envisioned in Resolution 822, the OAS designated a Special Envoy for Dialogue in Haiti, Terence Todman, a retired U.S. Career Ambassador. Todman, a native of the U.S. Virgin Islands, undertook three negotiating missions to Haiti in September-October 2003. The political stalemate and violence continues." (14)

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5. Reuters, *Bush Troubled by North Korea Drug Trade*, Arshad Mohammed, September 15, 2003
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9. San Francisco Bay View, *How the U.S. Impoverished Haiti*, J. Damu, August 28,2003
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11. Miami Herald, *Haiti's Thirst*, Marika Lynch, May 8,2003
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13. US Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2002. Haiti. See website. www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/gcos/html.
14. US Department of State, Background Note on Haiti, November 2003. See website: www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1982pf.htm

~~FOUO~~

November 17, 2004

ES-1435
04/015592-ES

TO: Peter Rodman
Roger Pardo-Maurer

CC: Doug Feith

SUBJECT: Options for Haiti

Steve Herbits gave me a paper on Haiti, which I then gave to either Peter Rodman or Roger Pardo-Maurer. I forget who I gave it to.

I would like it back, but I would like to know from whomever I gave it to what their opinion is about it, and whether or not there is anything we could do about it or whether Millennium Challenge would fit.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
111704-11

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45891

10-11-04 P12:14 OUT

12/14
11/30

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

10/29

2004 DEC 15 PM 4:16

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: MP Training

J-3 - action
PA.

230

Please dig into this subject David Chu comments on regarding MPs. I guess I want to be persuaded.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/27/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Training of MPs
10/22/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training

DHR:ss
102904-11

353

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

10/29 → TO SecDef

Paul Butler
12/20

S.R.

12/21

Response attached

V/R, Col B

12/20

(29 Oct 04)

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

OSD 20182-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45892



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CH-2236-04
14 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, VCJCS *VR/PRE P. 14 Dec 04*

SUBJECT: Military Police (MP) Training

- **Answer.** In response to your question (TAB A), based on today's missions and force structure, I concur in Dr. Chu's reply that the Services already benefit from joint training of MPs and pursuing further "jointness" in current MP training would likely not yield major benefits. However, we should explore standardization of MP skills across services. To ensure we are maximizing our common skills and training opportunities, we will establish a Joint Integrated Process Team to completely analyze the issue.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: Major General Jack J. Catton, Jr., USAF; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45893

OSD 201 02-04

TAB A

FOUO

10/29
101 873 13 10 16

October 29, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: MP Training

*J-3 - action
ps.
230*

Please **dig into** this subject David Chu comments on regarding MPs. I guess I want to be persuaded.

Thanks.

Attach.

9/27/04 SecDef Memo to USD (P&R) re: Training of MPs

10/22/04 USD (P&R) Memo to SecDef re: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training

DHR:ss
102904-11

.....
Please respond by 11/12/04

FOUO

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45894

OSD 20182-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-4000



INFO MEMO

October 22, 2004 - 6:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DR. DAVID S. C. CHU, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(PERSONNEL AND READINESS)

SUBJECT: Potential Further Consolidation of Military Police Training—
SNOWFLAKE (attached)

* We have already achieved substantial "jointness" in MP training

- Army and Marine Corps train together at Fort Leonard Wood
- Air Force and Navy train together at Lackland Air Force Base
- Guard and Reserve train with their respective service at these joint locations
- Skill sets for Army/Marine Corps differ substantially from Air Force/Navy, since principal responsibility of Air Force and Navy personnel is protection of "places." Curriculum overlap is only about 20 percent.
- Unless it is decided to change the mission of Air Force and Navy personnel, further consolidation would not yield any important benefits (and might engender some unnecessary complications).

RECOMMENDATION: Information Only

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Captain Stephen M. Wellock (b)(6)

| | |
|----------|---------|
| TSA SD | 10/27 |
| SRMA SD | |
| MA SD | 5/21/07 |
| EXEC SEC | M 10/25 |



OSD 16867-04

Tab A

12/15/04

SEP 23 2004

~~FOUO~~

September 27, 2004

TO: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Training of MPs

Should we have a **program** to get all Military Police joint **and** trained all at the same place with the same rules? (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Guard, Reserve?)

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-25

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

FB See Det

Paul Butler
10/27

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

TAB B
COORDINATION PAGE

| Unit | Name | Date |
|------|----------------------|------------------|
| USA | COL John Chappell | 4 November 2004 |
| USN | CAPT Curt Goldacker | 18 November 2004 |
| USAF | Col Shelby Ball | 18 November 2004 |
| USMC | Col Anthony Van Dyke | 10 November 2004 |

December 15, 2004

TO: GEN Leon LaPorte

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Progress

The progress in South Korea is impressive. Congratulations!

DHR:dh
121504-2

.....
Please respond by _____

Korea

15 Dec 04



720
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

001 001 10 10 11: 50

INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WMA for*

SUBJECT Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
 - The Marine Corps has procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
 - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a "developmental item" and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
 - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released for a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
 - We will continue to investigate foreign products, like the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
 - I MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations – 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
 - Attached is an earlier memo from Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.

Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/45899


OSD 20220-04

TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos



December 14,2004

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers

FROM: - John Young 

SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of it's 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick fix application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTRV's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to it rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

cc: Secretary England

11-L-0559/OSD/45901

ACTION MEMO

DepSecDef

USE (P)

I-04/014171-ISP

ES-1171

DEC 15 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ricardel, ASD/ISP (Acting)

DEC 1 2004

SUBJECT: Discussing Operation of Initial Missile Defense System

- You asked Policy to draft a declaratory policy to describe the operation of our initial missile defense capabilities once the current "shakedown period" has been completed.
- Attached at Tab A is a draft declaratory policy which has been coordinated with the Missile Defense Agency, General Counsel, the Joint Staff, NORTHCOM, PACOM, and STRATCOM.
 - o Steve Cambone also offered a number of comments, each of which we incorporated.
 - o The draft declaratory policy is intended to put our missile defense efforts into context, to deter potential adversaries, and to make clear that the U.S. is working with friends and allies.
- You specifically asked us to consider how best to address the possibility of a missile attack under the guise of a pre-announced space launch.
 - o The draft declaratory policy addresses this and other potential circumstances through use of a formulation that is clear, simple, and broad in its coverage:

"The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches."
- In crafting this formulation, we attempted to avoid phrases that could be viewed as overly muscular or mischaracterized as a means of forcibly controlling access to space.
- We expect it will be necessary to update this declaratory policy as we develop greater capabilities, and reach agreements on the circumstances under which other nations would receive protection and their respective contribution.

373.24

1 Dec 04

RECOMMENDATION: Review and approve draft declaratory policy attached at Tab A.
Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: John Rood, DASD Forces Policy (b)(6) 30 November 2004

~~SECRET~~ DECISION:

APPROVED: _____

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: OSD 20228-04

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DRAFT

Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

Introduction

- Today, many nations, including some of the world's least responsible states, possess ballistic missiles of increasing range and complexity.
- To address the growing threat of ballistic missile attack, President Bush directed the development and fielding of an initial set of missile defense capabilities that would begin operating in 2004.

Description of Today's Capability

- The U.S. has begun operating a set of missile defense capabilities.
- The system's capability will be improved continually through additional testing and the insertion of additional or new capabilities as they become available and are needed to meet mission objectives.
- The U.S. will continue a robust research, development, testing, and evaluation program while conducting operations of the missile defense system.
 - Through these continuous efforts and the fielding of additional capabilities, the performance of the initial system and its ability to defend against more complex threats will continue to improve.

Purpose of the System

- The purpose of the missile defense system is to deter and defend against a deliberate missile attack, as well as to counter unauthorized or accidental missile launches.
- The Department of Defense is developing and deploying missile defenses capable of protecting not only the United States, but also our friends and allies, and is pursuing cooperative relationships with a number of countries.
- As the President stated on June 17, 2002, "[b]ecause these threats endanger our allies and friends around the world, it is essential that we work together to defend against them. . ."
- The participation of friends and allies will, over time, extend to them the benefits of missile defense.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/45903

Use of the System

- The missile defense system is available to engage launches that we determine are on a trajectory that threatens the United States or its deployed forces. Such events include deliberate, unauthorized, or accidental launches.
- U.S. missile defenses will be integrated with offensive capabilities to improve the ability to defeat and defend against potential attacks, deter and dissuade potential foes, and assure the American people and allies.
 - Regardless of whether a missile attack is successfully intercepted, the United States will consider the full range of its response options in light of the circumstances surrounding such an event.
- To ensure that peaceful launches are not construed as hostile acts, the United States encourages the public announcement of upcoming launches, as many countries do so today.

Conclusion

- We are fielding an initial missile defense system that will continue to evolve and become increasingly more capable over time.
- We intend to continue to pursue the most promising technologies and basing modes to strengthen this system.
- The message to potential adversaries is clear: We are determined to make the pursuit of ballistic missiles designed to threaten or deter the United States, its deployed forces, or friends and allies an increasingly costly and ineffective proposition.

December 21, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

Please make sure this declaratory policy is staffed out to Policy, Di Rita and Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/1/04 ASD(ISP) memo to SecDef re: Missile Defense Declaratory Policy

DHR:dh
122104-15

.....
Please respond by 1/13/05

373.24

21 Dec 04

1 Dec 04

12/17
1030

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

ACTION MEMO OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef

2004 DEC 16 PM 12:03

USDP (POLICY) ~~12/16/04~~

I-04/014171-ISP DEC 15 2004

ES-1171

Paul Buttle
12/20
Pro

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mira Ric el, ASD/ISP (Acting) *Read for* DEC 1 2004

SUBJECT: Discussing Operation of Initial Missile Defense System

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Attachment: a/s

Prepared by: John Rood, DASD Forces Policy, (b)(6) 30 November 2004

SECDEF DECISION:
APPROVED: _____
DISAPPROVED: _____

| | | | |
|----------|----------|-------|-------|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | SRB | 12/20 |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 12/20 | |
| EXEC SEC | 11/17/04 | | |
| ESR MA | 12V | 12-16 | -04 |

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
11-L-0559/OSD/45906

OTHER: _____
01-12-04 ~~USD 20228-04~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DRAFT

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DRAFT

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~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
DRAFT

11-L-0559/OSD/45908

720
FOUO
TAB A

NOV 10 2004
NOV 8 2004 51

TO: Gen Dick Myers

898

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: War Phases

We need to see that war plans have a zero, as well as a four phase. What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:sa
110804-12

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

381

8 Nov 04

FOUO

Tab A

7201



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Michel Richard
Citronelle
3000 M Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Dear Mr. Richard,

I understand that you participated in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner on December 13th.

Thank you for your role in this special event. It was a fitting recognition of our fine U.S. forces. I do appreciate all the work that must have gone into that evening.

Sincerely,

335 SD

16 Dec 04

3 Dec 04



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Bob Kinkead
Kinkead's
2000 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Kinkead,

Thank you for the work you put into last week's USO
"Holiday for the Troops" Dinner.

You used your talents to make an important contribution
to our service members, and I do appreciate it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.

0 SD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45911



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Darren Jolley
Fat **Punk's** Restaurant
9103 Andrew Drive
Manassas, VA 20111-8248

Dear Mr. Jolley,


Thanks for your efforts in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner. I hear that the troops thoroughly enjoyed the evening.

This event was a great morale builder, and I do appreciate your role in honoring these fine men and women.

Sincerely,

0SD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45912



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Christopher Clime
Ceiba
701 14th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Clime,

I understand that the "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner was a great success.

Thank you for using your talents to brighten the season for these fine men and women. I do appreciate it.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. M. Gates", written in a cursive style.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 16 2004

Mr. Todd Gray
Equinox
818 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Gray,

Thank you for your role in the USO "Holiday for the Troops" Dinner last week.

I understand that the evening was a great success, and I appreciate the work that you put into this event.

Sincerely,

OSD 20232-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45914

December 3, 2004

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Note to Chefs

9

Someone ought to draft a nice note from me to the chefs of each of the restaurants listed on the attached invitation, thanking them for helping out the troops.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/13/04 Invitation to USO Holiday for the Troops Dinner

DHR:ss
120304-7

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

33500

3 Dec 04

We would like to cordially invite you and a guest to join the service members from Walter Reed Army Medical Center and the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda for the

"HOLIDAY FOR THE TROOPS" DINNER

Chefs from:

- Ceiba
- Citronette
- Equinox
- Fat Punk's
- Kinhead's

- Marcel's
- Melrose *Mad One*
- Poste Brasserie
- Rocklands BBQ
- Tosca



Will be cooking a very special dinner on
MONDAY DECEMBER 13TH
6:00-9:00 PM

Mologne House Dining Room
Walter Reed Army Medical Center

Please RSVP to Lisa Marie at 703-696-0717



of Metropolitan Washington



Fax

To: Honorable Donald Rumsfeld and guest

Fax Number: (b)(6)

From: Elaine Rogers ; President, USO of Metropolitan Washington

Number of Pages including Cover Page: 2

Message: We are pleased to invite you to celebrate the holiday season with our wounded service members. Please RSVP no later than December 8, 2004. Thank you!

HAPPY HOLIDAYS

11-L-0559/OSD/45917

720
FOUO

December 9, 2004

I-04/016688

ES-1646

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Indian Air Show

An issue has come up as to what kind of aircraft and what participation the US should have at the Indian air show. We have to do it very fast.

Are you familiar with the issue? If not, please get your head into it.

Thanks.

DAG:ab
120904-13

.....
Please respond by

12/16/04

Sir,
Response attached.

V/R
Lt Col Lengyel

DEC 17 2004

FOUO

OSD 20305-04

10-12-04 09:33 11

11-L-0559/OSD/45918

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Don Haider

Attached is a letter from an excellent person, Don Haider, who is a possibility for the Base Closing Commission.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 Letter from Do Haider to SecDef

DHR:ss
122104-6

.....
Please respond by 11/20/05

323.3

22 Dec 04

3 Dec 04

FOUO



J.L. Kellogg School of Management
Center for Nonprofit Management
Donald P Jacobs Center
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001

Phone 847-491-3416
Fax 847-491-8525
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu

CE
2004 DEC 3 11 30 AM '04



NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY

December 3, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Enjoyed seeing you at the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in August where, once again, you were headed to Afghanistan. I do hope you have the energy and support to see us through this a while longer. We need you.

I enjoyed my brief tenure on your DOD Financial Management Reform Study Team with Stephen Friedman so much that I **am** compelled to volunteer for more. If you have an opening on the Base Closing Commission and you would be so inclined to recommend me, I'll do whatever lifting is required at this end for support. I not only have the passion for this but also, I hope, the credentials.

Best to you, Joyce and family for the holidays. Stay the course.

Sincerely,

Don Haider
Professor of Management

OSD 20355-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45920



J.L. Kellogg School of Management
Center for Nonprofit Management
Donald P. Jacobs Center
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001

Phone 847-491-3416
Fax 847-491-8525
www.kellogg.northwestern.edu



NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY

December 3, 2004

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

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Best to you, Joyce and family for the holidays. Stay the course.

Sincerely,

Don Haider
Professor of Management

OSD 20355-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45921



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 21 2004

323.3

Mr. Don Haider
Professor of Management
J.L. Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208-2001

Dear Don,

Thanks so much for your note. I appreciate it and will feed that into the process.

Best to you and your family for Christmas and the New Year.

21 Dec 04

Warm regards,

3 Dec 04

OSD 20355-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45922

September 7, 2004

SEP 07 2004 09:07:10

TO: Andy Marshall
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Alternative Futures

I was just re-reading your February 24, 2004 memo (attached). Have you gone ahead and attempted to flesh out several alternative futures? If so, I'd like to see them.

Thanks.

Attach.
02/24/04 Memo from Andy Marshall to SecDef re: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

DHR:ss
090704-14

.....
Please respond by 9/10

381

17 Sep 04



DIRECTOR OF
NET ASSESSMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

PH 9/17

R¹

24 February 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith

FROM: Andy Marshall *Am*

SUBJECT: Assumptions for Next Two or Three Years

Here are my thoughts:

1. Major geo-political structure of the world will be as it is now. A possible Economic/banking crisis in China could affect its relative position some. Therefore, the main uncertainties that should be taken account of in DoD planning concern:
 - How the situations in Iraq, Afghanistan, N. Korea play out over the next few years.
 - The fate of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistar, Indonesia, Philippines; where governments could change or internal unrest increase. Some changes could be very favorable and others create major problems.
 - Large casualty terror events in the U.S., Western Europe.
 - Constant high rate of scientific and technological advance leading to some surprises.
2. An effort to flesh out three to four alternative futures could be mounted. A team of people is needed to cover the wide range of knowledge necessary for intelligent speculation.

3



11-L-0559/OSD/45924

W 11- small like class
I-04/012253.
ES-0729

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Military Assistant

14 Sep 04 - 0930


MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)

SUBJECT: Iraqi calls to *Coalition* Countries

Sir,

Request proposed "Way Ahead" for DSD to respond to the attached SD snowflake.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUSPENSE 23 Sep 04

cc: DJS

Vertical handwritten notes on the right margin of the document.

Handwritten note: 18 Sep 04

Handwritten note: 14 Sep 04

Handwritten note: 13 Sep 04

14-09-04 12:16 IN

110420073
scanned

September 13, 2004

2004 09 21 11:10:02

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Iraqi calls to Coalition Countries

We need to find opportunities for the Iraqis to call all the Coalition countries and set up a process whereby we can help them do it. They need to connect and say thank you - it is important.

Thanks . .

DHR:ms
091304-1

.....
Please respond by _____

1/11/04

13 Sep 04

~~FOUO~~

I-04/016419
ES-1598
December 6, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Ireland Result

This is inexcusable that this woman caused \$1.5 million in damage but doesn't have to pay for it. I think we ought to look for some alternative places to stop instead of Ireland.

Thanks.

Attach.
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN Cable O 031613Z DEC 04

DHR:dh
120504-13

.....
Please respond by 12/14/04

~~FOUO~~

05-12-04 19:00 1H
OSD 20464-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45927

720
FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
December 20, 2004

2004 DEC 21 PM 5:10

SUBJECT: Exchange Program

There's an exchange program Ted Stevens is involved in with Jim Billington. It is for young people who are interested in politics. We might want to think about inviting them to the Pentagon sometime and I could talk to them.

DHR:ss
122004-32

000,1

20 DEC 04

FOUO

OSD 204 99-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45928

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

OFFICE OF
SECRETARY

2004 OCT 21 PM 5:10

0001

To Powell Moore
From Paul Butler

Powell -

Could you please see
if you can find out what
Secret is referring to here
Thanks

Paul

04

OSD 20499-04

20 DEC 04

DEC 21 2004

TO: Dina Powell
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Joe Rothenberg

040NASA

Dina,

I don't know this fellow, Rothenberg, but here's a note from Pete Conrad's widow. Pete Conrad was a friend of mine from college and an astronaut, and his wife, Nancy, wrote with this recommendation.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/17/04 Nancy Conrad Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
122004-48

21 Dec 04

Det 12/20

17 December 2004

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

The purpose of this note is to request your assistance. Let me begin by saying I believed in and admired NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, and am saddened by his resignation.

There are several names being discussed for his replacement. Among those being discussed is former Associate NASA Administrator for Space Flight Joe Rothenberg. Joe is an old friend of Pete's, and is currently serving as President of our company Universal SpacenetWORK. I know Pete discussed this company with you and it gives me great pleasure to tell you the company is alive and well and thriving. I know Pete would want me to do everything possible to bring as much to bear on Joe's appointment as possible. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to briefly state why we (Pete and I) endorse the appointment of Joe Rothenberg.

Joe has the right depth and breadth of NASA experience to deal with the Agencies current challenges. He has the skills and capability to ensure that NASA pursues an appropriately balanced scientific, exploration and aeronautics NASA program that is fiscally responsible, consistent with the President's vision and gains support from a broad constituency. He is a consensus builder and has the respect of the Congress as well as the NASA family and would make an outstanding Administrator.

I appreciate your help in bringing Joe Rothenberg to the attention of the proper parties.

Again thank you for your gracious help with Pete's book and have a wonderful holiday season.

Best regards,

Nancy Conrad

Joseph H Rothenberg
President
Universal Space Network
1501 Quail Street, suite 102
Newport Beach, CA 92660
rothenbern@uspacenet.com
Office 949 476 3402
Mobile (b)(6)

Joseph H. Rothenberg's 40-year career spans 21 years in industry and 19 years with NASA. Rothenberg is currently the President and a member of the Board of Directors of Universal Space Network (USN). He was elected to the Board of Directors in 2002 and named President of USN in February 2003. USN is a commercial space operations company that owns and operates global satellite tracking stations for commercial and Government customers. In addition, Rothenberg is an Independent Consultant providing management consulting services to NASA, Universities and Aerospace firms.

Joseph H. Rothenberg retired from NASA in 2001 as the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, a position he held from January 1998. In this position he was responsible for establishing the policies and direction of NASA's space flight and operations programs including the Space Shuttle and International Space Station, space communications, expendable launch services and human exploration of space. In addition, he was responsible for the operation and oversight of NASA's Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, Stennis Space Center and Marshall Spaceflight Center. Under his tenure the International Space Station began orbital assembly and Human operations, a new Space Shuttle upgrade program was initiated, and a Space Exploration Plan and Technology initiative was put in place. He in partnership with the Associate Administrator for Space Science co-directed the development of a NASA Vision and Strategy for NASA's robotic and Human exploration of space in the 21st century which put in place a conceptual foundation for the 2004 Presidential initiative.

Prior to his assignment as Associate Administrator for Space Flight he was Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center. Rothenberg returned to NASA in April of 1995 as Deputy Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center and was appointed the Director in July of 1995. He was responsible for the space systems development, operations and the scientific research program execution for NASA's Earth orbiting science missions. During his tenure at Goddard he developed a new Strategic Plan for the Center and led the restructure of the Center to transform Goddard from an internally focused organization to a customer focused one. Under his leadership significant changes in organization structure, engineering, procurement and management practices which streamlined the way Goddard carried out it's mission were implemented. He directed a number of new mission technology initiatives including the next generation of Earth Science Satellites, and the Next Generation Space Telescope. In addition he established a large number of new outreach activities which leverage NASA's programs to help increase the math and science literacy of America's students.

Prior to joining Goddard in April 1995, Rothenberg served as Executive Vice President of Computer Technology Associates, Inc., Space Systems Division, McLean, Virginia, and a position he held from February of 1994 to April of 1995. In his short tenure at CTA he successfully led the effort to both acquire business and restructure CTA Space Systems to transform it from a low-technology satellite builder into a high-technology satellite developer.

From 1990 to 1994, he was Associate Director of Flight Projects for the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) at Goddard. In this position, he was responsible for directing all aspects of the HST Project. He is widely recognized in the Aerospace and Space Science community for leading the development and execution of the highly successful first HST on-orbit servicing mission which corrected the telescope's flawed optics.

In 1983, Rothenberg joined NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center as Operations Manager for the HST. He led the NASA team responsible for integrating the ground systems and developing the orbital operations of the HST. In April 1987, he was appointed Chief of the Mission Operations Division under the Mission Operations and Data Systems Directorate at Goddard. In September 1989, he was appointed Deputy Director of Mission Operations and Data Systems at Goddard followed by the 1990 appointment as Associate Director for Flight Projects for the HST. In these positions, he was responsible for the development and operations of the ground and space operational systems from NASA's Scientific Satellites.

From 1981 until 1983, Rothenberg was with Computer Technology Associates where he managed all of the ground system test and operations systems engineering projects. These projects included HST, Solar Maximum Repair Mission, and Space Tracking and Data System Architecture projects.

Rothenberg was with Grumman Aerospace from 1964 until 1981 where he held a variety of project engineering and management positions for hardware development, systems engineering, test and operations for spacecraft, aircraft and submersible research vehicles.

Rothenberg holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering Science and a Master of Science degree in Engineering Management from C. W. Post College of the Long Island University. In addition, in 1997 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Engineering from Stevens Institute of Technology and in 1999 an Honorary Doctorate of Science from the C.W Post College. He is a member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and past president of the Long Island Section of the Instrument Society of America. He was recipient of the NASA Exceptional Service Medal in 1990, in 1994 and 2000 he received NASA Distinguished Service Medals, and, in 1996 and 2001 he received the NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, in 1994 and 2000 he received Senior Executive Service Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Awards. In 1997, he received the Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award. Rothenberg has also received the National Aviation Association Collier Trophy, the AIAA Goddard Astronautics Award, the National Space Club's Nelson P. Jackson Award, and was inducted into the Smithsonian's Aviation Week and Space Technology Hall of Fame.

7201
~~FOUO~~

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ambassador Zal Khalilzad
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Art Laffer

Art Laffer was in the other day, and he has certainly offered to be of assistance with economic advice in Afghanistan if you think that would be helpful. He is a brilliant economist who was, of course, the author of *The Laffer Curve*. His contact points are attached.

Let me know if he can be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Contact information

DHR:dh
122104-12

Afghanistan

22 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20509-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45934

DEC 22 2004

TO: Ambassador John Negroponte

CC: Honorable Colin Powell
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Art Laffer

IRAQ

Art Laffer was in the other day, and he is willing to assist in any way possible with economic advice in Iraq. His contact points are attached. He is a brilliant economist and, of course, the well-known author of *The Laffer Curve*.

Let me know if he can be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
Contact information

DHR:dh
122104-10


22 DEC 04

Dr. Art Laffer

POC: Ian McDonough (b)(6)

DEC 22 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: NID

I think that Larry Silberman would be world-class as NID. I don't know if he would do it, but he would be terrific. I believe Studeman is under consideration and is a good man, but Silberman has a background that is broader and deeper.

DHR:ss
122104-5

040

22 Dec 04

OSD 20511-04

72

file

ATTACHMENT

September 13, 2004

SEP 13 01:03:00

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Update on the Jenkins Case

If I am meeting with the President this week, I will need an update on the Jenkins Case.

Thanks.

Attach.
Jenkins Case with President, 09/07/04

DHR:ss
091304-19

.....
Please respond by 9/14/04

DR 9/13

SIR —

You are not meeting w/ POTUS this week, but we'll include for next one-on-one.

Attached is the latest.

v/r Jim

ATTACHMENT

OSD 20530-04

04 9/13

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef _____
USD(P) _____
I-04/012004-AP

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: Update on SGT Jenkins

- This responds to your September 13 request for an update.
- SGT Jenkins voluntarily surrendered to military control at Camp Zama, Japan on September 11, accompanied by his family and his assigned military defense counsel.
- In-processing is going smoothly.
 - No significant health issues have been noted during initial in-processing.
 - Jenkins and family have been provided temporary lodging on base.
 - Military intelligence officials are available to conduct debriefings.
- Disposition of the charges against SGT Jenkins.
 - Charges against Jenkins for desertion, soliciting other service members to desert, aiding the enemy, and encouraging disloyalty will be referred to trial by court-martial this week. The trial date is unlikely to be before mid-October or early November.
 - Jenkins likely will attempt to negotiate a pre-trial agreement with the court-martial convening authority through his assigned counsel, or choose to contest the charges and stand trial.
- Media interest in SGT Jenkins remains intense, primarily as a human interest story.
 - The public affairs line remains:
 - SGT Jenkins faces serious charges;

- Charges against him will be processed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- SGT Jenkins will be afforded all the benefits, rights, and privileges to which he is entitled.

COORDINATION: OGC (pending)

PDASD/ISA _____

DUSD/AP _____

Prepared by: Suzanne Basalla, OSD/ISA-AP, (b)(6)

December 21, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

cc: GEN John Abizaid
GEN George Casey
Fran Harvey
GEN Pete Schoomaker

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Armored Vehicles

451

I would like a report at least three times a week, in writing, setting out what is being done to see that we don't have U.S. Military personnel driving around in Iraq, outside of protected compounds, with vehicles that are not properly armored and protected. The reports should state what the current situation is, what is being done to get to our goal, progress against the goal, and what help is needed to assure the urgency needed.

We know that our troops are vulnerable in much of the country. That being the case, they need appropriate protection. If at any time, in any place, enough armored vehicles are not available, for whatever reason, it is the responsibility of the Commanders to change their tactics, techniques and procedures to fit the armored vehicles available.

If it looks as if they will need more armored vehicles than are available at a given time, they should anticipate that to the extent possible and consider a variety of options, including:

- 1) Putting together a large team of people -- from Iraq or elsewhere -- to bolt armor plate on every vehicle they will need to take outside a protected compound area.

31 Dec 04

- 2) Mounting a massive "Berlin Airlift"-type effort and move a much greater amount of material by air.
- 3) Hiring many more contractors to convoy in materials that may be needed, etc.
- 4) Reducing the number of locations that need to be supplied until the armored vehicles needed are available.
- 5) If nothing else works or if there is a gap, then sharply changing tactics so that fewer vehicles are needed for that period of time.

I am very uncomfortable with the pace at which this is going. We know that vehicles are vulnerable and we know they are less vulnerable with armor. We have known it for some time. It is the task of commanders to adjust tactics, techniques, and procedures to fit the circumstance they find. It is the job of the Services to meet the Commanders' needs as they arise, as promptly as possible. And it is our job to see that we all do our jobs.

I look forward to receiving the reports. I expect the efforts to be significant and executed urgently. I need a date certain – soon – when no U.S. Forces will be traveling in Iraq, outside of protected compounds, in vehicles without appropriate armor.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
122004-16

.....
Please respond by 12/30/04

720
~~FOUO~~

November 5, 2004

2005 OCT 10 11 5:11

TO: David Chu
C C Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Selective Service for the 21st Century

Please take a good look at what they are doing with Selective **Service**, including general registration, maintenance of specific skill lists, and anything else they **are** doing. As we move forward, we may want to significantly change the approach.

327

Please show me some options, including ending it entirely.

Thanks.

DHR:es
101904-19

.....
Please respond by 12/5/04

~~FOUO~~

5 Nov 04

OSD 20567-05

11-L-0559/OSD/45943

December 21, 2004

TO: ADM Tom Fargo
CC: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Philippine Relief Operations

Your folks have done some good work moving hundreds of thousands of pounds of relief supplies to the Philippines after the tropical storm and associated flooding.

Please pass along my thanks to your team for a job well done.

DHR:dh
122104-20

.....
Please respond by _____

Philippines

21 Dec 04

OSD 20617-04



PERSONNEL AND READINESS

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000

2004 DEC 23 AM 10:41



ACTION MEMO

December 20, 2004, 12:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: *fa* David S. C. Chu Under Secretary of Defense (P&R) *Charles Hill 12-22-04*
(Signature and date)

SUBJECT: Managing Air Force Strength, and Supplemental Funding

- Wanted to offer perspective regarding your October 7 snowflake (Tab A). I believe that a requirement for AF to effect accelerated drawdown would provoke intolerable risk in enlisted accessions (falling from 22K to 12K against a normal 34K intake).
- We are continuing to work with AF to define a range of imaginative programs to balance its force, including needed legislative authority (NDAA'06) to permit shaping of more senior cohorts (years of service 14 plus) approaching retirement.
- Those aberrantly large senior cohorts are a legacy of the way AF executed its early-nineties defense reductions – a strategy that also depressed accessions in favor of careerists -- something we want to avoid in the management of this drawdown.
- I believe that the Department should look for ways to assist the Air Force with financing its end strength in FY 05, to permit a soft yet sure landing at end-FY 05, without further truncating recruiting and generating another legacy of imbalances for the AF of the future.

320.2

20 DEC 04

RECOMMENDATION: Allow me, Tina Jonas, and the Air Force to work on funding to avoid the intolerable risk of shrinking enlisted accessions from 34K to 12K.

Attachment
As stated

Prepared by: Mr. Bill Carr Acting DUSD (Military Personnel Policy), (b)(6)

7 Dec 04

SECDEF DECISION:
APPROVED *JL* DEC. 30 2004
DISAPPROVED _____
OTHER _____

| | | | |
|----------|---------|---------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | 12/29 | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | 12/28 | |
| EXEC SEC | E 12/27 | E 12/30 | |
| ESR MA | E 12/27 | | |



OSD 20653-04

12/27
10/8/09

FOUO

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-12

.....
Please respond by MONTHLY

Paul Butler TO Sec Def
12/28
GWB

FOUO

10/8/04

October 7, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

CC: Gen Dick Myers
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: USAF End Strength

320.2

Please give me a monthly update on your efforts to reduce excess end strength, showing me how you are doing relative to the goals you have set for the months ahead.

It would be helpful for me to see the progress on a regular basis.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
100704-12

.....
Please respond by MONTHLY

7 Dec 04

December 20, 2004

TO: ~~VADM Jim Stavridis~~ LARRY DIRITA
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
 SUBJECT: List of SOM'd Items

The list you gave me as to what we SOM did not include everything. Please get back to be with a complete list of everything we are SOMing, *so* I can decide whether or not I want to do that,

Thanks.

DHR:ss
122004-26

.....
 Please respond by 12/22/04

Exec Sec ^{12/22}

Capt. Marriott ~~←~~

Can you assist? This ~~←~~

Capt. Ramley

DONB
DR

1/13

to Don B

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

December 13, 2004 7:09:12

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Gen Mike Hagee
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles.
Please look into it and **get** me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were
responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh
121364-13

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/45949

OSD 20709-04



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

704 552 87 71 0:10
CH-2248-04
23 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 12/23

SUBJECT: Komatsu (SF 914)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Army (TAB B) and Marine Corps (TAB C) have examined several foreign armored vehicles, to include the Komatsu light armored combat vehicle, for use in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.
- **Analysis.** During the review, the Komatsu vehicle was evaluated as a source for rapid procurement. The Army and Marine Corps concluded that the vehicle was in its initial stages of production and there was insufficient data to make an informed procurement decision. Foreign products will continue to be assessed--including the Komatsu--for rapid procurement in support of USCENTCOM requirements.

COORDINATION: TAB D

Attachments:

As stated

*This is a good issue to put in our J-4's in-basket.
VR Dick*

Prepared By: Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

December 13, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers

CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
GEN Pete Schoomaker
Gen Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Komatsu

Attached is an article on Komatsu. It apparently has small armored vehicles.
Please look into it and get me an answer fast.

I have obviously been laboring under the delusion that the Services were
responsible for organizing, training and equipping the forces.

Thanks.

Attach.
Brown, Peter. "Need Armor Fast?" *Washington Times*

DHR:dh
121304-13

.....

Please respond by 12/16/04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

INFO MEMO

December 22, 2004, 1:00 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter J. Schoomaker, General, Chief of Staff rmy

For Richard Alody 22/12/04

THRU: Richard B. Myers, General, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

- The Army considers all known foreign and domestic sources in satisfying materiel solutions for needed capabilities. To date, we have not found a better alternative than the M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) and Armored Security Vehicle (ASV) for the Convoy Protection Platform (CPP) and other selected roles.
- The following vehicles have been/are being considered by the Army for their related mission essential roles:
 - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. Procured for current operations.
 - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. Procured for current operations.
 - Cobra; Turkey. Evaluated, but not used.
 - VBL; France. Evaluated, but not used.
 - Dingo, Mungo and Husky; Germany. Husky procured for current operations. Information requested on Dingo and Mungo manufacturers.
- Limited information is available on the JGSDF (Japanese Ground Self Defense Force) Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) produced by Komatsu Ltd. The JGSDF LAV is in the early stages of production and its characteristics are unknown. The Army will continue to pursue contacting Komatsu to properly assess the vehicle's capabilities.
- PM Tactical Vehicles published an armor sources sought in the FedBizOps on October 1, 2003.
- Since October 2003, the Army has tested 207 different armor solutions from 40 vendors. The Army evaluated and is producing 12 add-on-armor (AoA) kits for our Light, Medium, and Heavy truck fleet. The 12 kits are in production at six depots and

SUBJECT: Peter Brown Article, "Need Armor Fast?"

five corporate locations. As of December 15, 2004 we have produced 13,845 kits. In addition, the Army projected production of 8,105 UAH vehicles by April 2005 with the current production rate of 450 per month. The recent modification to accelerate production to 550 per month provides additional UAH vehicles beginning in March.

- In addition to armoring solutions, the Army continues to modify tactics, techniques, and procedures to preclude Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks.
- Additional information regarding the other vehicles procured and those evaluated but not procured is provided as follows:
 - Casspir, RG-31, and Meerkat; South Africa. One Casspir and one RG-31 have been purchased and are being evaluated by the Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF). PM Close Combat Systems (PM CCS) is purchasing 148 RG-31s as a medium mine protected vehicle. There are 2 in Iraq, 5 in Afghanistan and 141 systems yet to be produced. PM CCS is purchasing 39 Meerkat vehicles as the Interim Vehicle Mounted Mine Detector (IVMMD). There are 6 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 30 systems yet to be produced.
 - Cougar and Buffalo; Canada. The USMC purchased 16 Cougars. The PM CCS is purchasing 46 of the Buffalo as the Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS Block 0). There are 11 in Iraq, 3 in Afghanistan and 32 systems yet to be produced.
 - Cobra; Turkey. The Cobra was formally evaluated for Special Operations. The vehicle did not meet payload and survivability requirements and was not purchased.
 - VBL; France. The Army evaluated the VBL. The VBL was similar to the HMMWV. The VBL was evaluated but due to human factor issues was not considered for additional analysis.
- Dingo, and Mungo; Germany. The Army has contacted the Dingo and Mungo producers and requested information on these products. Textron, under license from KWI, is going to produce a Dingo2 that they would like the U.S. Army to consider. However, Textron does not yet have the production line up and running. The Mungo is a light armored airborne vehicle that would require additional armor protection for US Army application.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: LTC Jeffrey Voigt, (b)(6)

CF: Secretary of the Army



TAB C

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3000 MARINE CORPS PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-3000

INFORMATION PAPER

16 December 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General M. W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps *WMA for*

SUBJECT: Response to Komatsu Snowflake

- Komatsu Armored vehicle
 - The Marine Corps **has** procured no armored vehicles from Komatsu Defense LTD.
 - However, the Komatsu armored vehicle (at Tab A) was considered twice as a candidate for procurement, once for a Convoy Escort Vehicle and the second time for a Hardened Engineer Vehicle. In both instances the vehicle was identified as a “developmental item” and therefore not considered a viable candidate for urgent requirements that targeted fielding time lines of six months or less.
 - Of note, a third opportunity to evaluate the Komatsu is on going; a Request for Information was released **for** a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle requirement last Friday, 10 Dec. All vendor responses, domestic and foreign, are due NLT 15 Jan 05. Komatsu, along with other foreign vendors, will be made aware of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle RFI.
 - We will continue to investigate foreign products, **like** the Komatsu vehicle, that can be rapidly procured to support OIF requirements.
- Organizing, Training, and Equipping the Forces
 - 1 MEF deployed to Iraq in March 2004 for OIF II. This force was well prepared for operations – 100% of its vehicles had armor protection and each Marine had the best personnel protective equipment available.
 - Attached is an earlier memo **from** Assistant Secretary Young (Tab B) that highlights the successful efforts to equip Marine forces.

Tabs: as stated

Prepared by: Mr. Steven J. Manchester, Director, International Programs, (b)(6)

Tab C

11-L-0559/OSD/45954


TAB (A) – Komatsu Armored Vehicle Photos



Tab C

December 14, 2004

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld / General Myers

FROM: - John Young 

SUBJECT: MARINE CORPS VEHICLE ARMOR

BEFORE the Marine Corps I MEF force crossed the line of departure into Iraq in March, 2004, the Marine Corps had armor for 100% of it's 3000+ vehicles. The armor, a quick ~~to~~ application of 3/16" steel, was installed on 90% of the HMMWV's and MTVR's. The Marine Corps also had 37 up-armored HMMWV's. The Marine Corps acquisition and logistics system assembled over 1,800 sets of the interim 3/16" armor kits within six weeks of receiving the execute order to provide armor for the MEF prior to it rolling across the line of departure. Similarly, all Marine Corps helicopters were equipped with Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) countermeasures for deployment. Finally, every Marine in Iraq has, and has always had, personal protection gear (Outer Tactical Vests, Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) plates, ear plugs, and safety glasses).

The Department next identified additional reprogramming funds and upgraded all vehicle armor kits to Marine depot built 3/8" rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) by September, 2004. We used an effort called Operation Respond, supplemented by the Marine Corps' Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, to identify the urgent needs of the Marines as well as to force the naval enterprise to identify funds. In excess of \$520 million was reprogrammed to meet over 120 requirements for deployed Marines. These initiatives included additional armor kits, IED jamming devices, explosive ordnance, disposal (EOD) robots, dogs for IED detection, gunner's shields, unmanned air and ground vehicles, ballistic goggles, body armor extensions for extremity protection, communications gear, and language translation equipment. Through dedicated leadership and Operation Respond, the naval acquisition team equipped the Marines with every needed, available solution.

cc: Secretary England

Tab C

TAB (8)

11-L-0559/OSD/45956

TAB D
COORDINATION PAGE

| Name | Agency | Date |
|---------------------------------|---------|------------------|
| The Honorable Francis J. Harvey | SECARMY | 16 December 2004 |
| General Schoomaker | CSA | 16 December 2004 |
| General Hagee | CMC | 16 December 2004 |

720

~~FOUO~~

SECRET

December 9, 2004 11:54:40

I-04/016724
ES-1660

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Powell Moore
FROM:
SUBJECT: Congressional ~~Letter~~

Please see if you can find out why Lantos and Shays sent this letter on Jordan to me instead of to Colin Powell.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 Lantos and Shays ltr to SecDef

DHR:dh
120904-24

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

~~FOUO~~

A
DEC 27 2004 5:17

INFO MEMO

I-04/016724
ES-1660

DepSecDef
USDP For Rodman
DEC 27 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PR* 22 DEC 2004

SUBJECT: Letter on Jordan from Congressmen Lantos and Shays

- You asked us why Congressmen Lantos and Shays sent you a letter about additional funding for Jordan border security, instead of sending it to SecState Powell.
- Based on our discussions with Lantos' office and (previous discussions) with the Jordanian Embassy we understand that the letter was sent to you because the Jordanians believe that the most likely source of additional U.S. funding for the integrated border security program they seek (known as C4ISR) is the FY04 \$25B Iraq Supplemental.
- A similar letter may eventually be sent to SecState Powell.
- We have been told by ^{OSD}ExecSec that a response to Congressmen Lantos and Shays is being drafted by ASD Wells' office (Networks and Information Integration).

Prepared by: David Schenker, Levant Director, (b)(6)

DUSD (NES) *[Signature]*

PDASD (ISA) *[Signature]* DEC 22 2004

FOUO

December 9, 2004 11:54

I-04/016724
ES-11660

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Powell Moore
FROM:
SUBJECT: Congressional Letter

Please see if you can find out why Lantos and Shays sent this letter on Jordan to me instead of to Colin Powell.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/3/04 Lantos and Shays ltr to SecDef

12/3/04
12/3/04-24

.....
Please respond by 12/16/04

11-L-0559/OSD/45960

OSD 20786-04
11-12-04 11:54:24

001
12/17/04

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

December 3, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon 20301

Dear Secretary Rumsfeld,

As you know, Jordan is making outstanding contributions to the war on terrorism. Thanks to these efforts — and to its programs of political, economic, and educational reform — Jordan is emerging as a Middle Eastern model in fighting terror root-and- — We, the undersigned, are particularly impressed with Jordan's initiatives to prevent terrorism on both its Iraqi and Israeli borders.

Accordingly, we are deeply disturbed by reports that there has been an increase in arms-smuggling and terrorist infiltration on Jordan's other borders this year and, moreover, that Jordan lacks adequate means to deal with this problem as effectively as possible. Needless to say, terrorist infiltrators into Jordan from these borders pose a serious threat to U.S. interests, whether transiting on their way to Israel or seeking to attack Jordan itself. It would hardly be surprising that Jordan's very achievements in the war on terrorism would make the kingdom a desirable target for destabilization by extremists. The incident last April in which Jordanian security forces interdicted Syria-origin, Zarqawi-affiliated terrorists plotting to attack multiple sites in Jordan, including the U.S. Embassy, is only the best-known example of this problem.

As strong supporters of both Jordan and the war against terrorism, we would like to urge that the United States Government, and you personally, do whatever is possible to assist Jordan in combating this growing scourge. In particular, we suggest that the U.S. help to secure Jordan's borders by supporting a comprehensive security approach, including increased support for an ongoing project to establish the technology-based, integrated border security system known as C4ISR.

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| | CAB | OOD | CA/DC/CI | PLS | |
| C/S | | | | | |

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
December 3, 2004
Page Two

As you prepare to meet King Abdullah next week, we want you to know that you have our encouragement and support to exercise your authority to expend such sums as necessary and appropriate, consistent with U.S. interests, in order to accomplish this goal expeditiously.

Thank you for consideration. We would welcome the opportunity to work with you on this issue.

Sincerely,



CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, MC



TOM LANTOS, MC

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
December 8, 2004
2004 DEC 07 PM 4:01
04/016556
ES-1614

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM:
SUBJECT: Trainers for NATO in Iraq

Iraq

I saw the Secretary General of NATO. He said he wants 10 to 15 trainers for Iraq and have the US supply them. Would you please take a look into it and get back to me?

Thanks.

DHR:db
120804-8

.....
Please respond by 12/21/04

SD SNOWFLAKE
RESPONSE FROM
POLICY
LN ECB - What is
?
OSD 20788-04 *the Tim*

8 Dec 04

03-12-04 A OSB9 20788-04

720
TAB
FOUO

DEC 20 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT Troops and Equipment

I'd like to have you recommend a team ~~we could~~ put together to continuously monitor whether the troops in the field have the equipment they need;

It's the responsibility of the Services to organize, **train** and equip the troops. **They** need to see that it is **done well**.

When ~~the~~ President ~~asked~~ the Combatant Commanders if **they** had everything **they** needed **and** were prepared, they **all** answered that **they** had **everything** they needed and were prepared.

If the ~~circumstances on the ground~~ change **and** they need additional **things**, **they** need to **say so**, the Services **need** to respond, and **you and I need to be** told.

Please let me ~~know what~~ you feel we should do to **see** that that happens.

Thank you.

DHR:as
121304-39

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

FOUO

Tab

OSD 20815-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45964



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OK
7/14

INFO MEMO

December 23, 2004, 7:00 a.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSecDef Action _____

FROM: Francis J. Harvey

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment, 20 December 2004

- Over the course of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army has developed a number of complementary organizations and associated processes to rapidly address the warfighter's critical Operational needs. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) aggressively solicits from deployed/deploying commanders their operational requirements. Field commanders submit these requirements to HQDA and their entire chain-of-command utilizing Operational Needs Statements (ONS).
- On a weekly basis, the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B), composed of Army Staff 3-star principals validates and prioritizes requirements from the field; immediately develops resourcing strategies; and monitors execution. The AR2B has processed 2,598 ONS since October 2002. The peacetime average is less than 12 a year.
- The AR2B also provides the Army's connectivity to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, as this body works to address immediate warfighter needs.
- The Army G-3/5/7 chairs a weekly Secret Video-Teleconference, which brings together HQDA 3-star principals with the leadership of every Army Major Command and Central Command (CENTCOM). This senior leader forum clarifies theater warfighting issues and identifies emerging operational requirements.
- Complementing this effort, HQDA has established liaison teams with deployed/deploying Army Divisions to provide continuous communication with the Army Staff. These teams are responsible to insure the Army addresses unit requirements in a timely and effective manner.
- Over the past several years, the Army has proceeded with a series of initiatives to meet the field's requirements:
 - The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) has the broad charter of rapidly increasing the mission capability of the warfighter while reducing the risk to Soldiers and others. One half of the REF is forward in theater, with teams dispatched to every division in Iraq. They take their operational guidance from the Army G-3/5/7 and report directly to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment, 20 December 2004

- o In October 2003, the Army G-3 established an Army Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force to lead the Army's effort against the IED threat. This Task Force formed the basis for the Joint IED Defeat Task Force. It is heavily engaged in theater and is already providing significant solutions for Joint and Coalition forces.
- o The Army established a Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar (C-RAM) program to develop an integrated solution to this problem and distribute it to the force by the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2005. This solution will be integrated across existing Army, as well as Air Force and Marine, command and control systems.
- o The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) leverages current programs and commercial off-the-shelf technology to provide the Soldier with increased capabilities. The Army has prioritized the RFI equipment list directly from Soldier feedback. Since June 2004, all brigade combat teams and nearly 85% of other units are being fielded RFI equipment at home station 70-80 days prior to deployment.
- a The recently formed Armoring Task Force, led by the Army G-8, has the mission of identifying and anticipating armoring requirements, and then determining ways to accelerate production/installation of armor solutions, to include expanding the supplier base.
- In the last several months, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed a team of HQDA 3-star principals, led by the Army G-3/5/7, to visit all divisions (Active and Reserve) as they prepare to deploy. The purpose of these visits is to ensure the Army Staff shares a common operating picture of what equipment, personnel, and command and control systems these units will receive prior to deployment, and what they will receive once they arrive into theater. Capability gaps identified are addressed immediately with the AR2B process.

RECOMMENDATION Since the Army Requirements and Resourcing Board (AR2B) is the Army's synchronizing body for these multiple efforts that continuously monitor what the Soldier in the field needs, I recommend this board should be the Army element in any joint team that is formed.

COORDINATION: NONE.

Prepared By: LTC Aidis Zunde, (b)(6)

CF: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-2250-04
27 December 2004

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS ~

~

~

~

~

SUBJECT: Troops and Equipment (SF 917)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB), and consistent with your 22 December meeting with Lt Gen McNabb, the Director for Logistics/DJ-4 is forming a Fusion Cell/Engine Room to integrate the efforts of my staff, combatant commanders, Services and Defense agencies to rapidly support urgent warfighting needs.
- **Analysis.** The new cell will achieve mission success by:
 - Integrating all efforts to resource and protect deployed troops.
 - Reporting critical wartime requirements from identification through final resolution.
 - Ensuring a sense of urgency across all production and industrial base capabilities, technology initiatives, acquisition avenues, transportation assets and concepts of operation.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

11-L-0559/OSD/45967

OSD 20815-04

-TAB
FOUO

DEC 20 2004

TO: Gen ~~Dick~~ Myers
CC: Fran Harvey
Gordon England
Jim Roche
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Troops and ~~Equipment~~

I'd like to have you recommend a team we could put together **to continuously** monitor whether the troops in the field **have** the equipment they need.

It's **the** responsibility of the Services **to organize, train** and equip the troops. They need to see **that it is** done well.

When **the** President asked the Combatant Commanders if they had **everything** they needed **and were** prepared, they **all** answered **that** they had everything **they** needed and were **prepared**.

If **the** circumstances on the **ground** change **and they** need additional **things**, they need to **say so**, the Services need to respond, **and you** and I need to be told.

Please let **me know what** you feel we should do **to see that that happens**.

Thank you.

DHR:sp
121304-29

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

FOUO

Tab

31
6230

February 28, 2005

TO: Paul Butler
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Response to the Gavriels

Please have someone draft an appropriate post-Iraqi election letter to the Gavriels, if we have not already done so.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/12/04 Gavriel ltr to SecDef [OSD 20826-04]

DHR:dh
022805-10

.....
Please respond by 3/10/05

293

28 Feb 05

12 Dec 04

Chris & Penelope Gavriel

(b)(6)

December 12, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Parents want to watch their children grow, mature, and create their own legacy. Losing them along the way is almost an alien thought.

In Dimitri, both his Mom and I were blessed to watch a smart, restive boy grow into a man of substance, a disciplined goal-setter, a loving son, a brother, a friend, an accomplished athlete, an occasional prankster, a lover of life and challenges, a poet, a dreamer, an intellectual, an idealist, a leader, a true patriot and now an American hero.

Dimitri was accomplished. From an honor student and stellar athlete in high school, to an Ivy League and Division I wrestling, to the best in Wall Street, and finally *Semper Fidelis*, the honor of the Marines and service to our country, volunteered unselfishly in the midst of two wars, he forged his legacy.

As a first generation American, he wanted to give back to his country for the blessings he and his family received. He became a marine's marine and wanted to validate his courage, honor, and valor. He was affected by the September 11 attack, having lived it in New York City as it was unfolding, losing fraternity brothers in the towers as they collapsed. Great honor was bestowed upon him by our country and all who knew him for he proudly served us all and made the ultimate sacrifice. He was awarded two Purple Hearts. He is now forever in the Marines family and in our hearts; he will be missed.

In this, the darkest time of our lives, we are ever grateful for your overwhelming support, thoughts, and kindness. Your letter provides solace to us for he has touched your heart.

Please, keep Dimitri and all who have sacrificed for our country in your prayers. As parents of a fallen soldier, we look forward to see a Democratic Iraq become a reality, a noble cause worthy of their sacrifice. As he never questioned the war but strongly felt the calling of his country in that mission, we can only hope that it will become "mission accomplished" so that his and so many other souls sacrificed may rest in peace.

Sincerely,



Chris & Penelope Gavriel

11-L-0559/OSD/45970

OSD 20826-04

OSD
2/28

2



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 2004

Mr. and Mrs. Chris Gavriel

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Gavriel,

I am very sorry to learn of the loss of your son. There is nothing anyone can do or say to ease your pain, but please know that you are in my thoughts during this difficult time.

Lance Corporal Dimitrios Gavriel made lasting contributions to the cause of freedom. He served his nation with honor. His devotion and integrity will not be forgotten.

I extend my heartfelt condolences.

With deepest sympathy,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. ...".

OSD 19169-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45971



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 28 2005

Mr. and Mrs. Chris Gavriel

(b)(6)

3355D

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Gavriel,

Senator Kennedy was kind enough to send me a copy of the letter you wrote him about your son, Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel. It is clear from your words that he was a remarkable young man who lived his life with integrity and honor, whether on Wall Street or on the battlefield.

28

His efforts came at a most important moment in our history, reminding us that America is free because so many are willing to serve. I count Lance Corporal Gavriel among the noble ranks of those who fought to preserve and protect that freedom, and join a grateful nation in saluting him.

05

Please know that I continue to keep you and your family in my thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

this
ltr
answers
STAMP

4 Jan 05

OSD 01091-05

Mr. and Mrs. Chris Gavriel

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. & Mrs. Gavriel,

I know that this is a most difficult time for you and your family, and it was so thoughtful of you to send me a letter.

As I said in my earlier correspondence, your son was an honorable man who was dedicated to the cause of freedom. Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel played an important part in helping make it possible for Iraqis to vote in their first free elections in over three decades. Now, their nation is on the road to building a democracy. Your son's service has historic meaning, for with the spread of democracy comes the promise of a safer world. His sacrifice was not made in vain.

Please know that I continue to keep you and your family in my prayers.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely,

*Prep for
Sealed
Signature*

Paul Brown
3/11

** 3 - 11-0559/OSD/45973
... Kennedy ...
... from them to bring ...
... Kennedy ...*

*Paul Brown
3/11*



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 28 2005

335 S/D

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Ted:

I received your note forwarding Chris and Penelope
Gavriel's letter about their son, Lance Corporal Dimitri Gavriel.
Lance Corporal Gavriel was an outstanding young man and
dedicated Marine – truly one of America's finest.

Thank you for sharing it with me.

28

Sincerely,

05

4

5

OSD 01091-05

11-L-0559/OSD/45974

Chris & Penelope Gavriel

(b)(6)

December 12, 2004

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Parents want to watch their children grow, mature, and create their own legacy. Losing them along the way is almost an alien thought.

In Dimitri, both his Mom and I were blessed to watch a smart, restive boy grow into a man of substance, a disciplined goal-setter, a loving son, a brother, a friend, an accomplished athlete, an occasional prankster, a lover of life and challenges, a poet, a dreamer, an intellectual, an idealist, a leader, a true patriot and now an American hero.

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Sincerely,



Chris & Penelope Gavriel

720
~~FOUO~~

DEC 28 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: Richard McCormick

I received this letter from Richard McCormick at CSIS. He is clearly interested in doing something in the Administration - I wouldn't know where, but he seems to feel that you know him.

I'll leave it in your hands.

Thank you.

Attach.

10/04 McCormack Letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
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Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

OK 12/28



The Hon-Donald Rumsfeld

Oct, 2004

Dear Don:

Remembering our trip to China together four years ago, I thought you might be interested in the results of a trip that Herman organized in August involving Newt Gingrich and myself.

I later went to Japan and Taiwan and presented this report at **CSIS**.

With every good wish;

Sincerely:

Richard McCormack

P.S. Thank you also for your past efforts to involve me in the Administration. Don, this will never happen unless it is handled directly at the level of the Vice President. At the lower levels, there are simply too many people protective of the status quo.



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Presentation to CSIS Sept. 28, 2004.

Richard McCormack*

UNCERTAINTIES IN CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE
BROADER PROBLEM OF GLOBAL IMBALANCES.

SUMMARY

China's problems and vulnerabilities cannot be understood unless viewed in a broader economic and political context.

Unsustainable economic imbalances, including those involving **China**, are gradually increasing the dangers to the long-term health of the world economy. Other economic and **political** problems, including rising **oil** prices and America's 700 billion dollar **annual** trade deficit, add to these uncertainties. Wise statesmanship and some important policy changes are needed.

KEY ISSUES INVOLVING CHINA

Earlier **this** spring, there was a lot of discussion in **Washington** about whether China would experience a hard or **soft** landing of its overheated economy. **So** to take a deeper look at this question, I visited **China** in August, with **former** speaker Newt Gingrich, to talk with central **bankers**, members of the Central Committee, **key** officials and investors.

This was my 8th **trip** to China since 1983. To **see** the continual improvement in ordinary peoples' lives **since** those early years is a heartening confirmation of **many** hopes **and** the result of much hard work, both in **Washington** and much more importantly in **China** itself. The large number of **hungry** and ill-dressed children that you earlier saw in every city in China is now largely a thing of the past. **All** involved need to **make** sure it stays that way.

After visiting China in early **August**, I traveled to Japan and **Taiwan** to meet with other senior people **from** the public and private sectors to learn how **China's** prospects looked **from** the perspective of these neighboring locations.

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The bottom line **from** these consultations suggested that China would, in fact, engineer a **soft** landing, with growth falling from its present **9-13** per cent rate, depending on whose numbers **you** believe, to somewhere near **7%** in 2005.

But many of these experts reported an **unusually** large number of downside possibilities that could result in a Chinese economic crash landing. I'm going to list some of these wild cards in the deck for your own evaluation.

There are obvious **strains** in global oil markets. A spike in oil prices would cause serious problems for China. **China has** only **15** days of reserve oil supplies, **as** opposed to **90** days' reserve in the **U.S.** strategic stockpile. Any spike in global oil prices that **was** **sustained** for any length of time would obviously savage global equity markets, including those in the **U.S.**, China's **principal** export market. For an economy so massively driven by foreign trade, the economic health of **China's** overseas markets will have a critical impact on China's economy.

There are serious tensions in China between the experts in the central bank and **finance ministry** and many of the regional political leaders over the pace and direction of the cooling off process. Leaders in the central and western parts of China, where living standards **are** only about **1/10** those of the richer coastal province, resent the pressure **from** Beijing to cancel or delay their own investment and growth plans **as** part of the **national** campaign to prevent overheating and over capacity problems **from** spiraling out of control. The result of this tension **has** been a delay in the **full** implementation of Beijing's overall economic program to address the overheating problem.

China doesn't have the financial instruments of more advanced economies, **such as** deep bond and other financial markets, to fine-tune economic growth. They have to depend upon reserve requirements in banks and credit allocation by category and by geographical area. They **also** have to rely on **compliance** by unruly and sometimes corrupt regional leaders to carry out **the** edicts from the Center. But forbidden steel factories and golf courses are still emerging in China, according to Morgan Stanley's Andy Xie, which **add** up to more credit and monetary creation than China's Central **Bank** would like, generating more overheating **and** excess capacity problems.

Statistics in **China** are not always reliable, although they are better than they were ten years ago, thanks to help from the IMF and **other** experts mobilized by the Central **Bank**. The problem comes not just from bad news that the government considers a crime to report in the **media**, but more pervasively, **from** the distortions that flow **from** reporting **from** the provinces and are collected at the center. Naturally, provincial authorities wishing to **keep** their **jobs**, like to report to Beijing that edicts **and** goals are being fully complied with. **This**, however, is often not true. When you add up the individual inaccuracies and fudging, to produce a national statistic on growth, or even monetary creation, you can get major distortions in your statistical base.

There are 150,000 State owned enterprises in **China**. If you think Enron's **books** were not always models of probity, can you imagine the disparities between the published statistics on **these** companies, and the actual economic health of many of them? **Can you also** imagine what collective distortions appear when you multiply the fudging in **the** reports of individual companies by 150,000? **This** is particularly true of profit and loss statements, asset estimates, company debt and contingent liabilities, pension problems, etc. according to many close observers of the scene. **This has** important implications for **China's** banks, which for decades have **been** providing loans to these state owned enterprises to keep them afloat. These bad loans continue to accumulate inside the Chinese banking **system**. It is not clear that the published statistics dealing with **this** problem are totally candid, nor that the problems involving **China's** overall banking system are going to be improved a year or two from now, notwithstanding Chinese efforts to purge some of the bad loans from certain categories of banks.

IMPORTANT CURRENCY ISSUES

The Chinese currency **has** been pegged to the dollar at a **fixed** rate since 1995. **This** currency peg is favorable to China **as** an export platform, and linked **as** it is to currency regimes elsewhere in Asia, helps undermine the whole purpose of the floating exchange rate system, which was to permit an orderly, **gradual** and automatic adjustment between surplus and deficit countries on trade accounts. By **contrast**, **China's** present **highly** competitive currency **situation** and its impact on other currencies is intensifying the global imbalances and creating **an** ultimately unsustainable situation. In the case of **China**, a dollar-linked currency, -combined with the inexpensive labor, **has** resulted in a massive **annual** increase in exports and foreign and domestic investment. Investment **and** exports **at** this rate are seen by the Chinese **as** critical to **sustain** **China's** over all economic growth and stability. Additional export-linked investment also increases the **already** existing dependence of this huge **national** economy on foreign trade **as** the primary driver of China's growth.

What are the problems with this arrangement?

Because of the central role of **China** **as** the hub and assembly point for much of the East **Asian** economy, neighboring countries like Thailand are forced to intervene massively in the **currency** markets to **maintain** their own de facto dollar **pegs**. In Thailand's case, this is generating excess monetary creation, **and** growing inflation. Thailand is not an isolated example.

Many of the countries of East Asia are thus being pushed into **a** de facto currency bloc, regardless of the local economic circumstances in each of the different countries. **Price** competition in **China's** inter and **intra** regional trade is incredibly fierce, **and** profit margins very narrow. **Those** countries now part of the growing hub and spokes economic system built around China **are** forced to toe the currency line imposed by **China's** standard to keep their products competitive. Even Japan is not immune from **this** pressure and will be more **so** in the **future** **as** **China** produces more **and** more **high** technology products for the global market. China **will** **also** inevitably gradually increase

its share of value added with the products now assembled from regional imports for export market destinations.

The bottom line here is that any currency adjustments in Asia will have to begin with one involving China. Until that happens, mounting pressures may continue to build at a different rate in different parts of this China centered system. The great value of a floating exchange rate is that it allows pressures to be released at a gradual pace. Otherwise you have a pressure cooker with the safety valve stuck, and this is a dangerous utensil, as history has repeatedly demonstrated.

Distortions and monetary policy problems from the current dollar peg also impact China directly. Last year over a 12 month period, intervention by the Bank of China to sustain the dollar peg in the face of market pressures exceeded 200 billion dollars. This eventually drew the wrath of the U.S. Treasury, which became uncomfortable with the vulnerabilities of direct Central Bank intervention on this scale. The Japanese Central Bank adopted similar tactics on a similar scale. In China, however, this massive Central Bank activity, which was not sterilized by contractions elsewhere, had the result of generating excessive monetary creation, with M2 exceeding 25% for a period of time. This was a sure recipe for overheating and potential future inflation. The Central Bank eventually found other market related means to sustain the dollar peg, namely encouraging local insurance companies and others with surplus cash or credit to invest abroad, or purchase such assets as commodities to soak up excess dollars.

This favorable exchange rate has helped allow China to expand her exports by 46%, year on year from June of 2004. This massive compound annual increase in exports has continued at an ever-expanding pace for years. This explosive increase in exports contributes to both economic and political problems for China's main export destination country, namely the U.S. If President Bush loses this presidential election, disaffected, unemployed, and worried manufacturing workers and their families in places like Ohio and Pennsylvania will be an important reason for his defeat. If present relative currency and competitiveness conditions continue, these economic and political pressures are unlikely to ease in the years ahead. That means future problems in Congressional and Presidential elections, and steady increases in the political pressure on Washington to deal with this situation.

There are safeguard provisions in China's WTO access agreement which could allow countries like the U.S. to limit the future pace of export expansion in some situations. Even the articles of the IMF have a balance of payments provision allowing countries with dangerous payments problems to take special measures to correct the situation.

China's overall trade is of course in balance. The problem is that neither China's nor the Asian regional trade nor the rest of the world's trade with America is balanced. This comes partly from the Chinese currency linkage to the dollar that prevents China's competitors and component suppliers from allowing their own currencies to float.

SOARING AMERICAN TRADE DEFICITS

The U.S. current account deficit is now approaching 700 billion dollars per year, nearly 6 % of **our** GNP(See attachment). That means the **U.S. must** attract each and every day two billion dollars in loans and investments to fill the gap in its current accounts. Concern over how much longer a current account deficit of **this** magnitude is sustainable is rapidly rising around the world. **What** will happen to **China's** growth and highly leveraged new export oriented factories if a future Secretary of Treasury repeats what Secretary Baker did in 1985 when he deemed the then 90 billion dollar **U.S. current** accounts problem dangerous for the long term economic and political health of the **united** states.

Long term, massive, current accounts deficits create long term debt to foreigners that must be **serviced**, ultimately by exports of goods and services. President Reagan and Secretary Baker moved vigorously to implement a program to address this problem. They began by **talking** down the dollar and gradually added a number of important but controversial macro and micro economic measures **aimed** strengthening U.S. competitiveness and its current **'accounts'** position. These measures and others, for a time, brought U.S. current accounts into balance. There were **also** unintended consequences **from** part of this major **shift** in policies, which included a linkage between **G-7** monetary policies and relative currency rates that may have contributed to the 1987 stock market crash. During the decade that followed, a **far** worse long term deterioration resumed. After more than a decade of neglecting this problem, America's net debt now **amounts** to **trillions** of dollars. New trade agreements provided little help, notwithstanding all the speeches to the contrary.

Looking at this problem, officials from the Treasury Department **and** those **from** the White House Trade Office sometimes privately point to each other **as being** mainly responsible for America's out of control trade deficits. The one side cites inappropriate macro economic and currency policies. The other points to weakly enforced and poorly crafted trade deals. Many neutral observers believe that America needs both macro and micro economic remedial measures.

At least, on currency ratios, the **status** quo seems very unlikely to continue much longer. Should a future dollar crisis develop, **China** is unlikely to be allowed to retain its current dollar **peg**, forcing **the** full brunt of the adjustment onto the **Euro** and **other** currencies which freely float.

If existing relative competitive conditions continue, including currency ratios and inadequate enforcement of WTO rules, additional investment decisions relocating **U.S. manufacturing** plants and crating new export facilities in **China** and elsewhere will undoubtedly occur. **This** means even more pressure on **U.S. current** accounts and more long term debt. When any eventual **dollar** crisis does come, perhaps triggered by loss of faith in future macro economic policies, or by a sudden economic shock of some **kind**, the adjustment difficulties for all involved could be very great indeed.

FACING THE PROBLEMS

No one should underestimate for a moment the complications and difficulties that could accompany an effort by officials to deal with global economic **imbalances**, including possibly some highly negative unintended consequences. At the very least, adjustment pain **and** transitional impact on **financial** markets **could** be highly unsettling. It **is**, however, unlikely to be any less painful if we wait until the **U.S.** accumulates another trillion or two dollars of net debt through continuation of the **status quo**. It just means that the **U.S.** will have a deeper hole **to dig out of**, and more newly **constructed** export facilities abroad will have to find other markets, or close. Additional production facilities to serve **an** unsustainable export market also makes more likely a final burst of deflation in products with excess capacity. These and other adjustment problems that could **flow** from **an** effort to deal **with** global imbalances and excess debt building up in the United States, may not **fully** unfold, but officials need to be mindful that they easily could.

If policy measures addressing the **U.S.** relative competitive situation are implemented, there will undoubtedly be a new burst of investment in manufacturing in the **U.S.** itself. After the Baker reforms, for example, more **and** more foreign auto makers built **cars** and **car parts** in America, rather **than** importing them. The same presumably would happen **again**.

Other longer-term **U.S.** deficiencies may also need to be addressed if the longer term problems are to be corrected. For example, after the shock of Sputnik in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, the United **States** undertook a number of measures to make its young people more competitive in science and technology, including revamping the entire educational system. The influence of **this** effort was felt in one degree or another in nearly every school in America. The intellectual capital which grew from those early government funded and encouraged efforts not only put a man on the moon in ten years, but **America's** entire economy profited **from** the technological breakthroughs and spin offs that resulted. **This** historical experience should not be altogether forgotten **as** we address our current problems.

If we mobilize ourselves **again** to become more competitive internationally, and devote additional hundreds of billions of dollars in public and private funds to education, research and development, and science and technology, we **will** need to intensify our efforts to capitalize commercially on **this** national effort. **Part** of **this** must involve **more** effective curbing of out of control theft of intellectual property in **many** parts of the world where potential markets exist, including **China**. No matter how much money you spend on research, and how innovative your scientists, if the product of **your** money and work is simply stolen and marketed by others, gradually the incentive for **this** activity will be **drained** away.

The preferred solution to the problem of global economic imbalances by some academic economists is an explosion of new economic growth world-wide. In theory, this new growth could absorb additional production and imports **from** the **U.S.** and elsewhere.

Looking, however, at the all the political and economic obstacles likely to delay **this** wonderful day, causes others to conclude that a new dollar Crisis is far more likely to come long before the rest of the world restructures itself to permit new growth on **the** scale needed. Moreover, today economic growth in many parts of the world is largely export driven, **and** largely at the expense of long term **U.S.** trade deficits and debt. More of this kind of **growth** will only make America's long-term adjustment difficulties even greater.

Increasing oil prices will also serve to push any automatic adjustment in global markets even farther **into** the future. More and more countries will be seeking **additional** export markets to cover their increased oil import costs. They will be looking **first** and foremost at the **U.S.** market to accomplish **this**.

As one reflects upon China's economy, it is important also to remember that while **China's** nominal per capita income is \$1000, the internal purchasing power parity of **this** \$1000 is five times **as** great, namely equal to \$5000 per person. **This** disparity is **caused** by many factors, including uneven conditions in the vast Chinese economy, the low price of services and wages, and some administered prices. Some of **this** results in distorted market pricing signals. China **imports** less and exports more than otherwise would be **the** case. By internal purchasing power calculations, China is already the world's second largest economy.

ENFORCING **THE** WTO AGREEMENTS: THE **PLEASURES** AND **PERILS**

There are other neuralgic elements involving China and her **trading** partners that are likely to put **additional** political pressure on China's current economic **situation**. Secretary of Treasury **Snow** told 500 members of the **Economic** Club of New **York** two weeks ago that **China** had passed the required laws to enter the **WTO**, but was not enforcing many of them, including the intellectual property related items. Enforcement problems worsen the farther you travel in China **from** Beijing. In some provincial cities, Beijing's **writ** on WTO related matters barely exists. **You** can therefore expect increasing pressure from the WTO on China in the **years** ahead to carry out obligations. Failure to succeed in this effort could fatally discredit the WTO itself, and send global trade officials **back** to the drawing boards for other solutions. The other problem is that there are **thousands** of individual violations, ranging **from** Zippo lighter's trademark piracy to far **more** complex issues. The entire WTO and the tiny Chinese legal structure assigned to handle such cases could be consumed for decades without **making** much of a dent in **this** massive pattern of violations

There are also political problems for the Chinese Government in carrying out some of their WTO **commitments**. Some of these WTO obligations, for example, provisions allowing much greater future access of cheap foreign agricultural imports to China, will generate more pressure on the **rural** economy in China, **as** happened with Mexico's **corn** farmers after NAFTA. **This** is likely to accelerate an already serious demographic **shift** in China of surplus people moving **from** the farms to the cities looking for **jobs**.

Providing jobs for tens of millions of displaced former agricultural workers **has** been and will continue to be one of the regime's main preoccupations. Political stability in China hinges in part **upon** their success. But there may be both economic and political **limits** abroad to the degree to which these tens of **millions** of new workers can be deployed in ever more export producing industries. **This** constitutes a serious policy dilemma for **China** and her trading partners.

Coping with **regional** political opposition to other unpopular or inconvenient WTO commitments **will** also not be easy for Beijing.

OTHER POTENTIAL TIME BOMBS

The Communist Party has lost a great deal of **its local** reputation in recent years in part because **of** corruption problems. In some ways, **the** current Chinese system combines the worst evils of both socialism and capitalism: namely, the inherent corruption problems of a vast bureaucratic establishment, plus exploitation of workers in some places on a scale that **has** not been seen **since** the darkest days of the industrial revolution in England. **This** too is potentially explosive.

The over heated Chinese economy **has** also generated shortages of energy, water, port and transportation facilities and environmental systems that already act **as** a brake on future growth. Supply has to catch up with demand. **This** will take time and investment.

Finally, China's leaders have painted themselves into a political corner, whereby if the Taiwanese ever declare full independence, Chinese leaders may have to go to **war** to avoid massive loss of face, and even their positions. Chinese leaders expressed to **Gingrich** and myself their great concern ~~that~~ Taiwan's president would move toward independence later **this** year.

Any conflict between Taiwan and China would be massively destabilizing to the economies of **both** places, **and** a meltdown of China's already **strained** financial system could **easily** be one consequence. Since much of the production is concentrated in China and Taiwan, shortage **of** computer chips **could** also impose real dislocations in the broader global economy, should any conflict over Taiwan get out of hand. There are already discussions in the **U.S.** about the need for more diversification of sources of supply of critical industrial and defense components, because of potential instabilities across the **Straits** of Taiwan. The **just** in time procurement policies of many companies, make **this** potential disruption even more **worrisome** to many thoughtful policy makers in Washington.

Based on **what** I heard from my subsequent visit **to** Taiwan, I doubt **that** present Taiwanese leaders will, **in fact**, go **far** enough in the year or two ahead with their independence aspirations to provoke Beijing into a military response. Today, however, Taiwan is a democracy and **85%** of the people are native Taiwanese, **as** opposed to **only** **15%** **from** the mainland. Many will not willingly allow absorption of Taiwan by China.

Still, Taiwanese investors have placed perhaps **as much as** \$140 billion **dollars** of investment in China. It is **potentially** hostage to Beijing's good will.

Aware of these and other vulnerabilities, Taiwan is no longer the confident little island of ten years **ago**. There is a lot of nervousness **among** investors, those facing competition from China, and the ordinary native Taiwanese who like their present liberty. These conflicting economic and political pressures will have to work their way out in **Taiwan's** robust new democracy. No one can really predict how this tension will eventually end. Much depends upon Hong Kong's subsequent experience with the one **state** two systems situation, and the conclusions that **the** people of Taiwan draw **from** it.

THE UNPREDICTABLE FUTURE


A few weeks before he died, former President Nixon assembled a couple dozen of **Washington's** foreign policy experts at Jackson Place near the White House, to hear his views on Russia. He had **just** completed a trip there. He spoke for more than **an** hour without notes, which was his custom. Later during the question period, he was **asked** about his medium and long-term assessment of the direction **China** would take. He paused for **a** few seconds, and then said: "I **am** generally hopeful about long term trends in **China**, but I have only visited China seven or eight times, and I don't consider myself an expert on China." **This** was Nixon's way of **telling** us that there were huge complexities in China that made predicting the **future** difficult.

I **can** only agree with the former President's assessment

China's economy seems likely to continue its upward long term trend, producing higher living **standards** for the people of the country in the decades **ahead**. Presumably also the Taiwan/China issue **will** ultimately find a peaceful solution, since neither party **has an** interest in economic chaos.

There are, however, a lot of downside local, regional, and global risks at play just now, some political, some economic. Governments are notoriously slow in **dealing with** even obviously dangerous financial problems. **This** is partly because any major change in **the status** quo inevitably inflicts pain on powerful domestic constituencies. For that reason, any major change usually requires sufficient deterioration to generate a crisis of some kind to provide policy makers with **the** needed political **cover**.

Current global imbalances, including **U.S.** fiscal policies, and **the** regional ones involving **China**, pose trends that seem unsustainable to more and more informed people. Before they are corrected, however, we may see once again the **truth** of **that** old Wall Street saying: "The bigger the **boom**, the bigger the bust"



FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004

A Widening Imbalance

The US current account deficit has widened to a record 6.6% of GDP in the third quarter, and is expected to reach 8% by the end of the year.

664 billion dollars annually

ACCOUNT BALANCE
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

The New York Times



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

Ambassador Richard McCormack

Former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Richard McCormack, **is** currently senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of Washington's leading policy research institutes.

Within the past year, Mr. McCormack has carried out projects in Russia, China, Iran, Argentina, Brazil, West Africa, Japan, Israel, Jordan, and Western Europe. These visits involved meetings with Presidents, Central Bank Governors, and other leading financial and political figures from the public and private sectors. Some of the confidential reports from missions of this kind were reviewed at the highest levels of the American Government. He **has** also served as an advisor to the IMF's Managing Director.

During **the** Administration of President George H.W. Bush, Mr. McCormack **served as** Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He was also President Bush's principal "sherpa" coordinator for the President's involvement in the G-7 economic summits, receiving high praise from the former President for **his** contributions. He was awarded the State Department's highest award, the Distinguished Service Award, from Secretary of State James A. Baker;

In President **Reagan's** administrations, Mr. McCormack served as United States Ambassador to **the** Organization of American States, and received the Superior Honor Award for outstanding sustained performance. Prior to that, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Economics and Business.

Earlier in his career, Mr. McCormack was an advisor to a Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee, deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and senior staff on the President's Council on Executive Organization at the White House, with lead responsibilities for developing plans for the Council on International Economic Policy at the White House under President Nixon.

He received **his** PM, Magna cum Laude, from **the** University of Fribourg, Switzerland in 1966, and his BA from Georgetown University **in** 1963. In 1992, as guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington D.C. he delivered a paper in Jerusalem on potential micro economic reforms in the Israeli economy, and wrote a widely quoted paper on the Japanese financial crisis.

In 1975-77 he was a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Until recently, he **was** Counselor at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and a member of the State Department's advisory **commission** on Africa. He **is** a member of the Economic Club of New York.

Mr. McCormack **is** married to Karen Hagstrom, a policy analyst for the Environmental Protection Agency. They live with their three children in McLean, Virginia.



Remarks by Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.

At the Conference on Trade and the Future of American Workers, Washington, D.C.
October 7, 2004

Free Trade: What Do Economists Really Know?

Arguments against Free Trade

If the benefits conferred by international trade are reasonably straightforward, **how** can we explain the apparent ambivalence toward trade picked **up** by recent surveys? Clearly, many people view the benefits of free trade **as** being outweighed by its perceived costs.


One **concern** about **free** trade may **be that it has** given rise to large trade and **current account** deficits, thereby **adding to the nation's** debt and putting future prosperity at **risk**. Now at more **than 5 percent of GDP**, the current account deficit is in record territory, it is growing, and it cannot be sustained indefinitely. We cannot foresee when the deficit will stop **growing** and return to more-sustainable levels, **through** what mechanisms this adjustment will occur, or whether this adjustment will be **smooth** or disruptive for financial markets and the economy more generally. No matter how a correction of the **external** imbalance

proceeds, however, it will involve a range of adjustments to investment, **saving**, and asset **prices**, **both** for the U.S. economy and for our trading partners. Research suggests that past corrections of large external imbalances in industrial countries generally have occurred without crisis.¹² Whether or not **this** will remain the case, I **am** confident that protectionism is not the appropriate response to **our** growing current account deficit. The amount of current account adjustment that would be gained **from a** given tightening of import controls is questionable. Yet, it is **certain** that such actions would impose **costs** on the economy that would persist long after concerns about the deficit dissipated.

Don: This statement is absolutely untrue. The effort the U.S. made to deal with our 90 billion dollar payments deficit in 1985/86 led to the mLouvre Agreement, and various Japanese polash, measures which directly contributed to the 1987 crash and the later disastrous Japanese bubble. McCormack

P.S. our current account problem today is 8 times the size of the 1985 problem that had Baker and Reagan so concerned about the longer term economic and political implications.

US Current account balance
% of GDP




Source: Roubini and Setzer - Stern School of Business 2004

FINANCIAL TIMES WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 13 2004

A Widening Imbalance

The nation's current account deficit has widened to a record level of 6.6 percent of GDP, according to the Commerce Dept. report. The deficit is the largest since 1982, when it was 6.5 percent of GDP.

664 billion dollars annually



ACCOUNT BALANCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

The New York Times

720

~~FOUO~~

November 12, 2004

I-04/015285/16
ES-1378

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: El Salvador and Nicaragua

What can we do for El Salvador and Nicaragua in terms of helping them with their forces?

Thanks.

DHR:sh
111204-7

.....

Please respond by 12/3/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20864-04

FOUO

DEC 29 2004

TO: Lt Gen Duncan McNabb

CC: Gen Dick Myers *GEN John Abizaid*
Gen George Casey

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Steel to Iraq

There has to be a way to push steel into the country faster. Please talk to Gen Casey about the briefing he gave me in the car and the importance of doing that.

Thanks.

DHR:sl
 122704-26

.....
 Please respond by 1/21/05

TERRY

29 Dec 04

FOUO

OSD 20907-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45992

7209
~~FOUO~~

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

Here are the notes Kicklighter gave me in his out-call. You should be sure someone is following up on this.

Thanks.

Attach
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:es
101404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45993

IRAP

15 Oct 04

IRAQ TRAF OW ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kickliehter

Integration of MNF-I and U.S. Mission

- MNF-I / U.S. Embassy cooperation and integration is strong, effective and a model for future operations.
- MNF-I has just completed an organizational reevaluation and is moving the main **headquarters** to co-locate with the U.S. Embassy in the Palace.
- The new MNF-I Campaign Plan is guiding the U.S. team.
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Regional Embassy Offices & State Embedded Teams

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- The Tikrit SET is the model to follow:
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IRMO & PCO Structure Changes

- The State Department decided to **assign** Program Management for reconstruction to IRMO; to accomplish **this**, PCO's Strategic Analysis Office is being transferred to **IRMO**.
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 - Raise the Simplified Acquisition Threshold from \$500,000 to \$1M. Action underway.
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 - DoD & State have established a joint team to oversee the 20 improvement **recommendations**.

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- Inadequate staffing levels are hindering the effectiveness of the strategic **communications** effort and straining team integration.
 - MNF-I staffing level: approximately **50%** of newly approved JMD.
 - State Public Affairs Office (PAO) staffing level: approximately **42%**.
- **Staffing problems are hindering the USG's** ability to assist the Interim Iraqi Government in developing its strategic communication capability.
- **Recommend State's PAO & MNF-I's Stratcom co-locate and integrate staff, as appropriate.**

U.S. Mission

- **Recommend placement of U.S. Advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to include one with the experience and background to be Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.**

Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I)

- MNSTC-I is working hard to improve Iraqi leader selection and training for the Iraqi **Security Forces, National Guard** and local Police forces.
- Staffing level is currently at **47%** of approved JMD with a level of **75%** expected by late Nov. **04**.

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- Accountability of equipment and supplies must be maintained.
 - **Recommend MNF-I's Deputy Chief of Staff for Sustainment partner with PCO and be given oversight responsibility for this huge logistical effort.**
 - A small logistics command may be required to coordinate **this** mission.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

SEC 100
2004 090 2 21 14 25

DEFENSE SUPPORT OFFICE-IRAQ

29 December 2004

TO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *ghb*
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations

Listed are recommendations that LTG Kicklighter presented to you upon his departure. His principal recommendations with brief status updates are as follows:

Recommendation: *Give IRMO responsibility for integration and oversight for Regional Embassy Operations (REO) in Iraq.*

- IRMO now has responsibility for REO integrative task.
- IRMO established a 'Deputy for Operations' to provide integration and oversight over regional programs and is staffing twelve provincial coordination offices. Whether these organizations have real horsepower remains to be seen.

IRMO

Recommendation: *Integrate MNF-I Strategic Communications and Embassy PAO.*

- Embassy and MNF -I Public Affairs Operations have co-located personnel and assets. MNF-I StratComm remains a separate office within MNF-I, but MNF-I and State PAO do hold daily coordination meetings.

Recommendation: *Increase the number of U.S. advisors within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, including one as Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Minister of Defense.*

- Remains an open issue: Only 9 of 22 IRMO MoD advisory positions are currently filled. US provides only two advisors. While willing to convert the position of Minister's Personal Secretary from British to US position, State Department appears to want the Senior Advisor position to remain a UK slot.
- DSO-Iraq suggests considering the merit of a more traditional construct after January elections where DoD assumes from State the responsibility for operating the MoD advisory function and staffing it with DoD personnel and contractors.

29 Dec 04

Recommendation: *Assign responsibility for reconstruction logistics to ensure accountability of equipment and supplies.*

- Remains an open issue: Accountability, integration and sustainability for logistics operations require attention.
- Assistant SecArmy and DSO-Iraq are attempting to define specific requirements for improvements. Formal meeting of all relevant players, including MNF-I and PCO, will be held January 5, 2005 at Logistics Management Institute (LMI).

15 Oct 04

COORDINATION: NONE
Attachments: As Stated

OSD 20910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/45996

FOUO

OCT 15 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Notes from Kicklighter

Here are the notes Kicklighter gave me in his out-call. You should be sure someone is following up on this.

Thanks.

Attach
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:ms
101404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO

IRAQ TRANSITION FOLLOW-UP ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kicklighter

Integration of MNF-I and U.S. Mission

- MNF-I / U.S. Embassy cooperation and integration is strong, effective and a model for future operations.
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

~~3~~ January 2005 - 11 15 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HOWARD BURRIS, DIRECTOR, DSO-IRAQ

SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations


Sir:

Please see Mr. Patterson's note to you on the attached:

"Howard - Please take a look at this and provide
a memo to the SD/DSD on how these recommendations
will be handled. Thanks, Dave"

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

OSD 20910-04

Suspense: Monday, ~~10~~ January 2005

1246

450005

/5 OCT 04

To Dave Patterson 1/3

From Paul Butler

Take a look at this and
see what we need to do. E'm
sure SecDef will want the
Deputy to get into it first

Thanks

Paul

DSD-Iraq. (David Bais) Paul Butler
Howard — Please take a look at this
and provide a memo to the SD / DSD
on how these recommendations will be
handled. Thanks.

Dave
J. David Patterson
The Special Assistant to
The Deputy Secretary of Defense



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

113

2004 DEC 29 AM 11:35

DEFENSE SUPPORT OFFICE-IRAQ

29 December 2004

TO: *Leahy* SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: Director, Defense Support Office - Iraq *JMB*
SUBJECT: Follow-up on Kicklighter Recommendations

Listed are recommendations that LTG Kicklighter presented to you upon his departure. His principal recommendations with brief status updates are as follows:

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COORDINATION: NONE
Attachments: As Stated

| | | |
|----------|---------|-----------------------------|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | |
| (TSA SD) | SA DSD | 11/23/04 <i>[Signature]</i> |
| EXEC SEC | | 12/29/04 |
| ESR MA | REV | 12-29-04 |

OSD 20910-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46002

FOUO

OCT 15 2004

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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
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Thanks.

Attach
10/7/04 Kicklighter Notes: Iraq Transition Follow-Up Issues

DHR:es
101404-25

.....
Please respond by _____

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/46003

IRAO TRANSITION FOLLOW-UP ISSUES

Notes from LTG(R) Kicklighter

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720

~~FOUO~~

ES-1694

04/016920

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 14, 2004

2004 DEC 29 PM 12:12

TO: Mira Ricardel

SUBJECT: Letter to Buckovski

Shouldn't we write Buckovski of Macedonia a letter congratulating him?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
121404-7

.....
Please respond by 12/22/04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46006

15-12-04 A10:56 IN

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

2004 DEC 29 PM 12:12

December 28, 2004

Reference: 121404-7, Letter to Buckovski

Captain Marriott,

Please find attached a congratulatory letter to Prime Minister Buckovski that Policy/Mira Ricardel submitted separately.

SecDef signed the letter on December 22.



June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

OSD 20914-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46007

720
~~FOUO~~

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 1, 2004 - FGH HC 9/2
0700

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

SUBJECT: Redrafted Memo on USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

384

Don.

I met with the recipients of the attached snowflake and we produced the redraft you requested.

I'm available to discuss it further if you wish.

15ep04

~~FOUO~~

OSD 20954-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46008

~~FOUO~~
DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

SUBJECT: USG Responsibilities for Homeland Security

Situation Today:

Since September 11, 2001, the Administration has made substantial progress to protect America from terrorist attacks. Among other measures, we have established:

- The Department of Homeland Security.
- A National Bio-Defense Strategy and stockpiles of biological vaccines.
- United States Northern Command.
- The Terrorist Threat Integration Center.

As a result of these and other initiatives, America is safer today **than** it was prior to the 9/11 attacks, although we must continue to improve America's homeland security.

Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities:

However, in the event of another major terrorist attack, we will certainly ask ourselves what else we might have done to prevent it or mitigate its consequences. One issue that concerns me is that roles and responsibilities for homeland security are still not as clearly defined **as** they might be. Now that we have almost **two** years of experience with the Department of Homeland Security and the new USG organization for homeland

DRAFT WORKING PAPERS
~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46009

security, it may be an appropriate time to evaluate the assignment of roles and responsibilities for homeland security. We also need to consider how we can better educate the American people about those roles and responsibilities. It is important for the American people to have realistic expectations about the role the U.S. Armed Forces might play in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the United States, as defined both by law and executive policy. I am reminded of the polls taken in the 1990s which showed that Americans believed erroneously that we have a capability to shoot down a ballistic missile targeting the U.S. There is a great deal the U.S. military can do in the event of a terrorist attack, but there are limits on that capability and—as a matter of law and policy—there may be things we should not do.

Across the USG, there have been several major homeland security exercises over the past several years. We could use their results to evaluate where gaps may exist in the USG homeland security concept and determine if changes are warranted with respect to statutes, authorities, policies, missions, resources and training, etc. Evaluations, moreover, could help to identify any legal considerations that might limit the military from providing support to any Lead Federal Agency and that could impede effective command and control.

Homeland security roles and responsibilities are spread among the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, the FBI, the CIA and various other U.S. agencies:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.

- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

DOD does not have primary responsibility for any of those functions. Its traditional role has been largely restricted to the following:

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM).
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - **“Render safe” a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.**
 - Provide support for designated “National Special Security Events,” such as the G-8 Summit, Democratic and Republican Conventions, the Super Bowl, etc., and
 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

Comment:

In the event of a catastrophic nuclear or biological attack on the territory of the United States, the following would likely occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take action, but

technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role. Specifically, **DoD** may be asked to undertake the very responsibilities **DoD** has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore may not have organized, trained or equipped to do, and

- 2) When the dust settles, the American people may well ask why **DoD** did not:
- Prevent the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and it is not **DoD's** assignment;
 - Instantaneously respond to mitigate the attack after it occurs.

Recommendation:

Given this situation, the Administration may wish to undertake a quick review to provide recommendations for the following types of questions:

- What might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies to ensure that the right capabilities and assets will address key problems?
- Should we further organize, train and equip the National Guard and the reserves for homeland defense?
- Has **DoD** allocated sufficient force structure to homeland defense, particularly to prevent or mitigate the consequences of a catastrophic attack?
- What might be done to better **inform** the Members of Congress, the press, and

the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be **reduced**?

TAB A

RL X

August 27, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
Larry Di Rita
Powell Moore
Paul McHale
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*

SUBJECT: DoD Responsibilities Paper

Please take a look at the attached paper. It is a problem that concerns me, and I don't know the answers. If you have thoughts or suggestions on it, let me know.

My thought is to send it to the Vice President, Andy Card, Condi Rice and Fran Townsend to get them thinking about these issues.

Let me know what you think soon.

Thanks.

Attach.
Department of Defense Responsibilities

DEF-04
082604-2 (to computer).doc

.....

Please respond by 9/1/04

August 27, 2004

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense responsibilities for homeland security, prior to September 11, 2001, on 9-11, and today

Homeland Security Assignments and Responsibilities:

DOD never has had, and does not have today, primary U.S. Government responsibility:

- To stop terrorists from coming across our borders.
- To stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports.
- To stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States.
- To seek out or arrest terrorists inside the United States.

Responsibility for those functions rests with the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and the FBI, the Department of State, CIA and various other U.S. agencies.

Not only does DOD not have primary responsibility for any of those functions, DoD is expressly limited by federal law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, from participating in most U.S. law enforcement activities.

DOD's role has been, and is today, restricted to the following:

more than that

- Defend the U.S. homeland against foreign threats and attacks from outside the U.S. (NORTHCOM/NORAD/PACOM)
- Protect U.S. DoD military forces and facilities located within the United States.
- Support designated lead federal agencies, as specifically directed by the President, to include:
 - "Render safe" a nuclear weapon located inside the United States.
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 - Serve as a sector-specific agency for the U.S. defense industrial base in accordance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

overstated

August 27, 2004

Comment:

I am deeply concerned that the September 11th Commission, the press, Members of the U.S. Congress, and many Americans are not aware of the very limited role of the U.S. Armed Forces in dealing with terrorist attacks inside the USA, by law and Executive Order.

However, notwithstanding DoD's limited role and the general misunderstanding about our role, it is clear that, in the event of a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the U.S. from within the U.S., the following would occur, as it did on September 11, 2001:

- 1) The first calls for help will be to DoD to immediately take charge, but technically not in the lead role, only in a supporting role; specifically, DoD will be asked to undertake the very responsibilities DoD has not been assigned or funded to do, and therefore has not organized, trained or equipped to do, and
- 2) When the dust settles, blame will be placed on DoD for:
 - Not preventing the attack, even though that is the legal responsibility of others and is not DoD's assignment.
 - Not instrumentally responding to mitigate the attack after it occurs, even though DoD is not authorized, funded or permitted by law to organize, train, equip or deploy to do so.

This unusual situation raises some questions:

Does the current USG arrangement and allocation of responsibilities still make sense?

If not, what might be done to better organize, allocate and rearrange responsibilities among USG agencies?

In either case, what might be done to better inform the Members of Congress, the press, and the American people of the decided upon allocation of responsibilities, so the current confusion as to roles and responsibilities can be reduced?

FOUO

FOUO

December 29, 2004
2004 12 29 11 6:17

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Principi *DR*

Just to close the loop, I received a call from Tony Principi saying he really didn't think he should have lunch with me and talk, because he's decided to go outside.

DHR:es
122904-2(b)

0000.71 50

29 Dec 04

FOUO

OSD 20958-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46018

FOUO

SECRET December 29, 2004

2004 DEC 30 AM 6:40

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Vehicle Armor

Mr. President,

I listened to your statement after our NSC meeting this morning. You were asked about armor. You responded as indicated on the top of this attached page. I checked with our folks, and have attached more current information. I now have the military committed to not having U.S. Servicemen driving any vehicles in Iraq that do not have the appropriate armor after February 15, except for those vehicles that are used solely within protected military compounds.

451

I'm pushing them to accelerate the February 15 date to January 30.

The way we are doing it is:

- 1) To get ~~more~~ steel and ~~more~~ people in Iraq to bolt the protective armor on the vehicles;
- 2) changing tactics, techniques and procedures, so fewer vehicles have to be out;
- 3) reducing the number of locations that materials have to be dispersed to, and/or hiring more contact drivers.

The long and the short of it is, by February 15, 2005, or sooner, the goal is to not have any U.S. military vehicles in Iraq, outside of a protected military compound, unless they have appropriate armor. I'll keep you posted.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Information Paper on Vehicle Armor

DHR:as
122904-15 (ts)

FOUO

29 Dec 04

OSD 20959-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46019

The statement made by the President at the press conference is factually correct...but the amendment below offers a more complete view.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have looked at the statistics on that, and we have stepped up the production of armored Humvees significantly. The other issue is the rearmament of existing - of vehicles that are now in theater, vehicles that require a different armament structure than that which they initially were manufactured with. And I am told that those vehicles will be armed up by mid-summer of 2005. And what I know is, is that the Defense Department is working expeditiously with private contractors and with our military to get these vehicles armed up.

A MORE COMPLETE STATEMENT

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have looked at the statistics on that, and **SINCE MAY OF 2003** we have stepped up the production of armored Humvees significantly. The other issue is the rearmament of existing - of vehicles that are now in theater, vehicles that require a different armament structure than that which they initially were manufactured with. And I am told that those vehicles **WILL HAVE FACTORY BUILT, INTEGRATED ARMOR AND BALLISTIC GLASS** be armed up by mid-summer of 2005. **IN THE INTERIM, BY 15 FEB 05 OR SOONER, WE WILL ARMOR - WITH BOTH FACTORY BUILT AND LOCALLY INSTALLED ARMOR PLATE - ALL VEHICLES WHICH OPERATE OUTSIDE A PROTECTED COMPOUND.** And what I know is, is that the Defense Department is working expeditiously with private contractors and with our military to get these vehicles armed up.

~~SECRET~~
~~Attachment~~

September 7, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Defense Science Board Summer Project

If you have not seen the Defense Science Board Summer Project, I think you should. (See page 33 of their briefing papers.)

I think we should ask **DIA** to come back to us with a proposal as to how they are going to make better use of open source information.

Thanks.

Attach.
08/31/04 Defense Science Board Summer Project (page 33)

DHR:ss
090704-22

.....
Please respond by 9/17

334058

750904

~~SECRET~~
~~Attachment~~



Transition to and from Hostilities

III.C. Knowledge, Understanding, and Intelligence for the 21st Century



Unclassified

Recommendations: Open Source

- USD(I) designate DIA as Executive Agent for oversight, planning and (most) direct execution
 - Separately budget so that it does not compete with “core business” of the Executive Agent
 - Fund for the central procurement resolution of intellectual property rights
 - Consider “industrial funding” model for open-source-analytic and other value-added products; Executive Agent would qualify the vendors
- Fund demonstrations of linking and e-business paradigms on Intelink TS and S
- Change the lanes in the road so that every single source agency produces two-source integrated product ...e.g., SIGINT and open source, or geo-spatial and open source
- Design the enterprise-wide data architecture to support and exploit linkages provided by open source

Unclassified

Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

33

11-L-0559/OSD/46022

September 7, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Thoughts on Iraq Papers

Here are some papers I have worked on. Please sort through them and, after talking with Larry and Tony, come back to me with a recommendation as to what I should do with them, if anything.

Thanks.

Attach.

- 6/10/04 ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef re: Thoughts on Iraq,
- 06/09/04 Suggested Insert from Dr. Wolfowitz
- 06/21/04 memo from SecDef to Rodman re: Edits on Thoughts on Iraq.

DHR:ss
090704-43

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

Iraq

75 Sep 04

September 10, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Briefing Paper for POTUS

We need to see that the President has a briefing paper before he meets with Prime Minister Koizumi showing what we are doing in Japan, and why the deterrent will not be weakened.

Please read the attached.

Thanks.

Attach.
FBIS Report Re: Koizumi to discuss USFJ Realignment on 9/21

DHR:ss
091004-2

.....
Please respond by _____

Japan

1050904



Text

Japan: Koizumi Expected To Discuss USFJ Realignment With Bush in NY on 21 Sep

JPP20040909000004 Tokyo Nikkei Telecom 21 WWW-Text in English 2056 GMT 08 Sep 04

[Unattributed report: "Koizumi, Bush To Discuss US Base Issue in New York on 21 September"; English version of report attributed to Tokyo Nihon Keizai Shimbun in Japanese 9 Sep 04 Morning Edition]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

TOKYO (Nikkei) -- Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is expected to discuss the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan when he meets with U.S. President George W. Bush in New York on Sept. 21.

Koizumi is scheduled to travel to New York to attend the annual U.N. General Assembly following visits to Brazil and Mexico.

Specifically, Japan will seek to have local interests reflected in these plans through such measures as reducing the burden borne by communities hosting U.S. military installations. In addition, Koizumi will ask that U.S. military forces in Japan maintain their deterrence capabilities.

In bilateral director-general-level discussions with foreign affairs and defense officials at the end of August, Japan expressed its intention to present as early as this year a policy response to the planned U.S. military realignment.

The meeting between Koizumi and Bush is expected to establish a foundation for discussions before the bilateral military realignment talks begin in earnest.

On the expansion of the U.N. Security Council, Koizumi will explain Japan's bid to seek entry into the group without changing the country's war-renouncing Constitution. Koizumi hopes to win Bush's support on the matter.

[Description of Source: Tokyo Nikkei Telecom 21 Text-WWW in English -- on-line database service owned by Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., containing flash news, the main Tokyo newspapers, business, technical, and regional newspapers, weekly magazines, plus various business-oriented databases]

file

September 16, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
Lt. Gen. Lovelace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: General Officer Memos of Reprimand

At the detainee brief, you said there were 13 GO Memos of Reprimand.

I would like more detail on the implications of the memos -- how many will be in service jackets and how those that are not in service jackets will affect the individual's careers.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091604-14

.....
Please respond by 9/23/04

Sir, *DR 9/24*
Response attached.

v/a
LT Col Lengye 9/23

383.6

16 sep 04

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

04 9/24

The Senior Military Assistant

9/23

SIR _____

My Army sources,
including Col Bucci,
tell me these are
essentially all career
terminal.

V/R
Jim



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0200

2004 9/24

INFO MEMO

September 22, 2004, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: R.L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army

Brownlee

SUBJECT: General Officer Memos of Reprimand

- You were informed that Headquarters, Department of the Army, has received reports of 13 administrative reprimands imposed in connection with incidents of detainee abuse. Since that time, we have received reports of two additional administrative reprimands imposed for incidents of detainee abuse. Of these 15 reprimands, seven were imposed by general officers and eight were imposed by other officers. All of these reprimands were filed in local unit files, and may be considered by the recipient's commander when making assignments, promotions, or selections for schooling.
- We have also received reports of two additional reprimands for related misconduct that were imposed by a general officer as nonjudicial punishment under the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Both of these actions will be filed in the Official Military Personnel Files (OMPF) of the recipients, which are maintained by the Department of the Army.
- In addition, six Soldiers have been reprimanded by a general officer for dereliction of supervisory duties and similar neglects in connection with the administration of the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. All of these reprimands were filed in the OMPF of the recipients.

383.6

22 Sep 04

16 Sep 04

COORDINATION: NONE

PREPARED BY: COL William Barto, (b)(6)

September 16, 2004

TO: Gen. Pete Schoomaker
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DRM*
SUBJECT: Note from Newt Gingrich

Here are some interesting e-mails from Newt Gingrich. I would appreciate it if you would talk to him sometime and explain what you are doing. He is interested and knowledgeable. I think it would be helpful.

Thanks.

Attach.
E-mails from Gingrich (6/4, 6/21, 7/9/04)

DHR:ss
091604-11

.....
Please respond by _____

320.2

165094

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

LD's response to
Newt's ad (below)

cc Craddock
Butler

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Sunday, June 20, 2004 5:31 PM
To: 'Thirdwave2@aol.com'; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD; (b)(6) Patterson, Jack D, CIV, OSD
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; Thornhill, Paula, Col, JCS SJS
Subject: RE: the army is too small-newt

could it be that the army is the right size, but too much of it is in the reserves?

that's a much more transformational matter than simply adding bodies.

for years, for all the right reasons at the time (maybe) we have been putting what has become critical capability into the reserves.

it's time to change that.

put another way, adding two new divisions and not fixing the imbalance will not solve the problem.

i'm not stubborn on the point, but you shouldn't be, either. your comments suggest that you have not had the chance to consider the matter as carefully as you might.

-----Original Message-----

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com [mailto:Thirdwave2@aol.com]
Sent: Friday, June 04, 2004 8:27 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
 John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6) jack.patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the army is too small-newt

for secdef, depsecdef
from newt 6/04/04

it is untenable to argue the Army is the right size

it is a direct contradiction of the Secretary's warning at West Point that we are in the early stages of a long war

it is impossible for average Americans to believe that the Army is the right size but we have to rely on reservists and guardsmen on a continuing basis and we now have to extend service involuntarily

I do not care what the studies and higher ups are telling you as an Army brat who went through the Eisenhower reductions in forces in the late 1950s as a child this combination of events is going to weaken the Army

finally, it is impossible to explain to the American people why the Army is the right size when their neighbors are called up and service is involuntarily extended

I cannot defend the current size and when asked I am going to say the Army should be larger

Kerry will win this debate

this is a repetition of the 1960 Nixon mistake of defending America's strength against Kennedy's charge of a missile gap--the country decided Kennedy was right even though he was wrong

for the first time in decades Republicans are now on the weakness side of a defense issue and giving the Democrats an easy way to be on the pro-defense side of more strength.

You should call for a significant increase in Army end strength and a significant increase in the Army budget to cover that cost without eating into the rest of the Army's program

if this is a long war then let's start acting like its a real war and budget accordingly

to repeat: I personally cannot defend the smaller Army position and I would support a substantial increase in both Army strength and the Army budget

this is both a national security and a political issue and the administration is wrong on both

cc: Butler
LTG Craddock

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Monday, June 21, 2004 8:02 PM
To: larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@osd.mil;
 (b)(6) Jack.Patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD..mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: Re: the army is too small-newt

there is a theoretical army in which total manpower including resevres and national guard, mobilization depots, division overhead ,etc all can be converted to a lean fighting army

we are in a war

we are making decisions about troops in Korea and troops in Germany which may effect our long term influence in those regions forever

we have an army which is very strained and in which we do not have enough area specialists with language skills, we do not have enough civill affairs units, we do not have enough information officers with even a minimum level of information strategy skills

in a societal war against an embedded opponent the army will end up being the primary carrier of the war

it is too small

you are being told it is adequate only because we have imposed a budget cap on it

if you asked the combatant commanders and the army to assess a long war strategy and the current tempo they would need a much bigger system

this is not about divisions it is about rotatable units, sustaining the force, developing adequate specialties

in peacetime we can wait until we reform the guard, reserve and overhead

in a war we would insist on adequate troops and then try to reform

which are we in?

newt

LD's response to
Newt's email

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Sent: Tuesday, June 22, 2004 7:09 AM
To: 'Thirdwave2@aol.com'; Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA; (b)(6) CIV, OSD; Craddock, John J, Lt Gen, OSD; (b)(6)
Subject: RE: the army is too small-newt

Because we are in a war we can do things we knew we needed to for a long time but always found a reason not to.

This is not an argument against more end strength, although I am not persuaded that's the right answer and I only have to listen to the chief of staff of the army on that one.

But if we did get an increase in end strength, we would lose some of the impetus to do the very things that we are doing because we never had an impetus until now.

Restructuring in Europe and Korea are good things, and long overdue.

Restructuring the active and reserve balance is overdue, although we probably did not know that until now.

Getting our civil service system redesigned to make it more flexible and less dependent upon activity duty military is a good thing, although we never would have achieved that legislative initiative without the pressure on end strength.

I don't know if we need more end strength or not. If after we have done all these other things, we find we still do, then we should ask for it. But even accepting your argument that simply being in a war demands a larger army, it is not clear to me how we would use it if we had it and I know that if we had it a lot of these other things might not happen.

If your concern is our footprint in Europe and Korea, then we just have a basic difference of views on whether it makes sense for us to continue maintain all those divisions so committed. That is a quite different consideration, it seems to me.

-----Original Message-----

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com [mailto:Thirdwave2@aol.com]

Sent: Monday, June 21, 2004 8:02 PM

To: larry.dirita@osd.pentagon.mil; (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; John.Craddock@osd.mil;

(b)(6); Jack.Patterson@osd.mil

Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; stephen.cambone@OSD.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil

Subject: Re: the army is too small-newt

there is a theoretical army in which total manpower including reserves and national guard, mobilization depots, division overhead, etc all can be converted to a lean fighting army

we are in a war

we are making decisions about troops in Korea and troops in Germany which may effect our long term influence in those regions forever

6/22/2004

11-L-0559/OSD/46033

we have an army which is very strained and in which we do not have enough area specialists with language skills, we do not have enough civil affairs units, we do not have enough information officers with even a minimum level of information strategy skills

in a societal war against an embedded opponent the army will end up being the primary carrier of the war

it is too small

you are being told it is adequate only because we have imposed a budget cap on it

if you asked the combatant commanders and the army to assess a long war strategy and the current tempo they would need a much bigger system

this is not about divisions it is about rotatable units, sustaining the force, developing adequate specialties

in peacetime we can wait until we reform the guard, reserve and overhead

in a war we would insist on adequate troops and then try to reform

which are we in?
newt

Unit

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: Thirdwave2@aol.com
Sent: Friday, July 09, 2004 7:58 AM
To: (b)(6)@osd.pentagon.mil; Larry.DiRita@osd.pentagon.mil;
John.Craddock@OSD.Pentagon.mil; (b)(6)jack.patterson@osd.mil
Cc: peter.pace@js.pentagon.mil; paula.thornhill@js.pentagon.mil
Subject: the army is too small and it is starting to make us look silly

from newt 7/9/04
army size

the contortions we are going through with the Army are going to **be** politically very expensive this **fall**

it is **impossible** to **be** doing all the different things the army is doing to hold itself together and argue that it is not too **small**

involuntarily retaining people, involuntarily calling people back, reaching out to recruit from the other services

everything indicates **we** are in a system that is too small and that is wearing down'

it is like watching a company starting to kite checks to cover cash flow problems

there may be **good** management answers but politically the country is not going to believe the army is big enough

the **sooner we** decide to **expand** the army the **less** it will **cost us** this **fall** in the debates

September 17, 2004

TO: David Chu
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: "Stress on the Force" Memo - Update

I would like to see an update to our "Stress on the Force" Memo very soon. My sense is that we have made some good progress and I am looking forward to hearing the specifics.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-1

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

320, 2

17 Sep 04

720
FOUO

file

September 20, 2004

ES-0826

04/012625-ES

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld **DR**
SUBJECT: Pakistan

What more can we do for Pakistan on getting money for those madrasahs?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-31

Pakistan

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

9/23/04

~~09/28~~ 9/28

→ SD

Paul Butler
9/23

fwb →

I'm working this on two levels.

I'll continue pushing Hadley and Grossman on how best to use current ESF and other accounts for Pak education.

The greater issue is that we (the USG) need billions more from Congress to fight the War on Terrorism on the ideological front. I am working with Tina Jonas and Powell Moore on a plan to brief Congress systematically on our GWOT Strategy and make case for a different approach to funds and authorities. You discussed this with us last Friday at the three-hour session.

Doug Feith

20 SEP 04

FOUO

September 22, 2004

TO: Paul McHale
CC: Jim Haynes
Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
ADM Vern Clark

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Navy - Coast Guard Authorities

384

As we move forward toward creating a Maritime NORAD structure to deal with homeland security on the seas, it makes sense to sort out the specific authorities between the Navy and Coast Guard.

Please do a thorough review of the current relationship, with particular focus on homeland defense, and send up proposals that make the most sense for both departments. We should also look at the larger relationship between the Sea Services across the board - combat coordination, interaction overseas, acquisition, command and control arrangements and so forth.

22 Sep 04

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092204-5

.....
Please respond by 11/30/04

September 23, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Satellite Photo of Iraq

Please get me a copy of a satellite photograph of Iraq before the war and a photo today. I would like to see an image taken at night, so we can see the difference in electricity generation from then to now.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-2

.....
Please respond by 10/7/04

Sir,

The first photo is the average lights during a 1 1/2 month period before the war. The second is a one month average after the war. The third is a one night image that shows the night after the attack on the oil line that closed down the Bayji Power plant. It shows how quickly the majority of power was restored.

VIR, COL B

060

23 Sep 04

September 23, 2004

TO: Ray DuBois
CC: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Overhead Costs for Pentagon Memorial

I am a little worried about overhead costs related to the Pentagon Memorial fundraising effort. I think we better get a very good grip on exactly how much people are being paid to help raise money for the fund.

As you know, there have been problems in New York over this issue, and it has been the case in other instances related to charitable activities.

Once you tell me that, we may want to see if we agree that that is an appropriate percentage or amount. If it is not, we will want to fix it. If it is – it may be that we will want to get one or two people – possibly me – to pay all of the overhead, so we can say that every dollar anyone gives will go directly toward the Memorial, because the overhead has been covered separately.

Let me know what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-6

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

ODD.V

23 Sep 04

file

September 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: List of SASC and HASC Subcommittees

Please give me a copy of the subcommittees of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. I want to look at how they are organized. And maybe privately suggest some different organizations at some point to Duncan Hunter and John Warner.

032

I have a feeling they are organized for the way we used to look at the Department of Defense, instead of the way we ought to be looking at it. Maybe that would help.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-3

.....
Please respond by 9/24/04

DR
AW 9/27

24 Sep 04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

DA 9/27

September 24, 2004 5:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SECDEF Inquiry

- Attached is the information you requested regarding SASC and HASC subcommittees.

032

2 Attachments:

1. SASC Full Committee and Subcommittees
2. HASC Full Committee and Subcommittees

24 Sep 04

24 Sep 04

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

FULL COMMITTEE

Jurisdiction: Defense and defense policy generally; aeronautical and space activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems or military operations; the common defense; the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, military research and development; national security aspects of nuclear energy; naval petroleum reserves, except those in Alaska; pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the Armed Forces, including overseas education of civilian and military dependents; selective service system; and strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense; comprehensive study and review of matters relating to the common defense policy of the United States. The chairman and ranking minority member are non-voting members ex officio of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members

Republicans (13)

John W. Warner, Va. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Pat Roberts, Kan.
Wayne Allard, Colo.
Jeff Sessions, Ala.
Susan Collins, Maine
John Ensign, Nev.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
Lindsey Graham, S.C.
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (12)

Carl Levin, Mich. - *ranking member*
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Robert C. Byrd, W. Va.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.
Jack Reed, R.I.
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Bill Nelson, Fla.
Ben Nelson, Neb.
Mark Dayton, Minn.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

Republican Staff Director: Judith A. Ansley

Democratic Staff Director: Rick DeBobes

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIRLAND

Jurisdiction: All Army and Air Force acquisition programs (except strategic weapons and lift programs, special operations and information technology accounts); all Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, National Guard and Army and Air Force reserve modernization, and ammunition programs.

Republicans (7)

Jeff Sessions, Ala. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Pat Roberts, Kan.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.

Democrats (6)

Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn. - *ranking member*
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Mark Dayton, Minn.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Jurisdiction: Policies and programs to counter emerging threats such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, illegal drugs, and other asymmetric threats, information warfare programs; technology base programs, special operations programs; emerging operational concepts; Foreign Military Sales (FMS); technology export policies; Nunn-Lugar issues; DOE non-proliferation programs; doctrine and R&D supporting non-traditional military operations, including peacekeeping and low-intensity conflict; budget accounts for technology base RDT&E for DOD and DOE counterterrorism and chemical and biological warfare defense; DOD funding for the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program; DOE funding for non-proliferation programs; DOD command and agencies including Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA); Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA); Defense Security Cooperation Agency (SSCA); SOCOM

Republicans (9)

Pat Roberts, Kan. - *chairman*
Wayne Allard, Colo.
Susan Collins, Maine
John Ensign, Nev.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
Lindsey Graham, S.C.
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (8)

Jack Reed, R.I. - *ranking member*
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.
Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii
Bill Nelson, Fla.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL

Jurisdiction: Policies and end strengths for military and civilian personnel; military health care; compensation; force structure; Morale, Welfare and Recreation; Professional Military Education; military nominations; DODDS/Section 6 schools, Civil-military programs; POW/MIA issues; family housing policy; Armed Forces Retirement Home; budget accounts for military personnel; military retirement; Defense Health Care; AAFES

Republicans (4)

Saxby Chambliss, Ga. - *chairman*
Susan Collins, Maine
Elizabeth Dole, N.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (3)

Ben Nelson, Neb. - *ranking member*
Edward M. Kennedy, Mass.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

Jurisdiction: Military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, all military construction, installations and family housing issues, including the base closure process.

Republicans (9)

John Ensign, Nev. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Pat Roberts, Kan.
Wayne Allard, Colo.
Jeff Sessions, Ala.
Jim Talent, Mo.
Saxby Chambliss, Ga.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (8)

Daniel K. Akaka, Hawaii - *ranking member*
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.
Bill Nelson, Fla.
Ben Nelson, Neb.
Mark Dayton, Minn.
Evan Bayh, Ind.
Hillary Rodham Clinton, N.Y.
Mark Pryor, Ark.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

Jurisdiction: Naval and U.S. Marine Corps programs less tactical aviation; strategic lift programs; U.S. Coast Guard; maritime issues; TRANSCOM; budget accounts for USN; USMC procurement and RDT&E less tactical aviation; Army and Air Force strategic lift programs; National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF).

Republicans (4)

Jim Talent, Mo. - *chairman*
John McCain, Ariz.
Susan Collins, Maine
Lindsey Graham, S.C.

Democrats (3)

Edward M. Kennedy, Mass. - *ranking member*
Joseph I. Lieberman, Conn.
Jack Reed, R.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Jurisdiction: All strategic forces (except deep strike systems), space programs, ballistic missile defense and Department of Energy national security programs (except non-proliferation programs).

Republicans (6)

Wayne Allard, Colo. - *chairman*
James M. Inhofe, Okla.
Jeff Sessions, Ala.
John Ensign, Nev.
Lindsey Graham, S.C.
John Cornyn, Texas

Democrats (5)

Bill Nelson, Fla. - *ranking member*
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va.
Jack Reed, R.I.
Ben Nelson, Neb.
Mark Dayton, Minn.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

FULL COMMITTEE

Jurisdiction: Ammunition depots; Army, Navy, and Air Force reservations and establishments; conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves; Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; Merchant Marine Academy, and State Maritime Academies; military applications of nuclear energy; tactical intelligence and DoD intelligence related activities; national security aspects of merchant marine, including financial assistance for the construction and operation of vessels, the maintenance of the U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base, cargo preference and merchant marine officers and seamen as these matters relate to the national security; all benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces; scientific research and development in support of the armed services; selective service; size and composition of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force; soldiers' and sailors' homes.

Republicans (33)

Duncan Hunter, Calif. - *chairman*
Curt Weldon, Pa.
Joel Hefley, Colo.
James Saxton, N.J.
John M. McHugh, N.Y.
Terry Everett, Ala.
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md.
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
John Hostettler, Ind.
Walter B. Jones, N.C.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Jim Gibbons, Nev.
Robin Hayes, N.C.
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.
Ken Calvert, Calif.
Rob Simmons, Conn.
Jo Ann Davis, Va.
Ed Schrock, Va.
Todd Akin, Mo.
J. Randy Forbes, Va.
Jeff Miller, Fla.
Joe Wilson, S.C.
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.
Tom Cole, Okla.
Jeb Bradley, N.H.
Rob Bishop, Utah
Michael R. Turner, Ohio
John Kline, Minn.
Candice S. Miller, Mich.
Phil Gingrey, Ga.
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.
Trent Franks, Ariz.

Democrats (28)

Ike Skelton, Mo. - *ranking member*
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Lane Evans, Ill.
Gene Taylor, Miss.
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Martin T. Meehan, Mass.
Silvestre Reyes, Texas
Vic Snyder, Ark.
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Wash.
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.
Mike McIntyre, N.C.
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Robert A. Brady, Pa.
Baron P. Hill, Ind.
John B. Larson, Conn.
Susan A. Davis, Calif.
Jim Langevin, R.I.
Steve Israel, N.Y.
Rick Larsen, Wash.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.
Jim Marshall, Ga.
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam
Tim Ryan, Ohio
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

Republican Staff Director: Robert S. Rangel
Democratic Counsel: Jim Schweiter

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PROJECTION FORCES

Jurisdiction: Navy and Marine Corps programs (except strategic weapons and space programs, special operations and information technology accounts), deep strike bombers and related systems, strategic lift programs and naval reserve equipment.

Republicans (9)

Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md. - *chairman*
Rob Simmons, Conn.
Jo Ann Davis, Va.
Ed Schrock, Va.
James Saxton, N.J.
John Hostettler, Ind.
Ken Calvert, Calif.
Jeb Bradley, N.H.
John Kline, Minn.

Democrats (7)

Gene Taylor, Miss. - *ranking member*
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Jim Langevin, R.I.
Steve Israel, N.Y.
Jim Marshall, Ga.
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOTAL FORCE

Jurisdiction: Military personnel policy, reserve component integration and employment issues, military health care, military education and POW/MIA issues. In addition, the subcommittee will be responsible for Morale, Welfare and Recreation issues and programs.

Republicans (8)

John M. McHugh, N.Y. - *chairman*
Tom Cole, Okla.
Candice S. Miller, Mich.
Phil Gingrey, Ga.
H. James Saxton, N.J.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Ed Schrock, Va.
Robin Hayes, N.C.

Democrats (6)

Vic Snyder, Ark. - *ranking member*
Martin T. Meehan, Mass.
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Jurisdiction: Military readiness, training, logistics and maintenance issues and programs, all military construction, installations and family housing issues, including the base closure process.

Republicans (16)

Joel Hefley, Colo. - *chairman*
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.
John Hostettler, Ind.
Walter B. Jones, N.C.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Robin Hayes, N.C.
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.
Ken Calvert, Calif.
J. Randy Forbes, Va.
Jeff Miller, Fla.
Tom Cole, Okla.
Rob Bishop, Utah
Candice S. Miller, Mich.
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.
Trent Franks, Ariz.
John M. McHugh, N.Y.

Democrats (14)

Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas - *ranking member*
Lane Evans, Ill.
Gene Taylor, Miss.
Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii
Silvestre Reyes, Texas
Vic Snyder, Ark.
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Robert A. Brady, Pa.
Baron P. Hill, Ind.
John B. Larson, Conn.
Susan A. Davis, Calif.
Rick Larsen, Wash.
Jim Marshall, Ga.
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Jurisdiction: All strategic forces (except deep strike systems), space programs, ballistic missile defense and Department of Energy national security programs (except non-proliferation programs).

Republicans (8)

Terry Everett, Ala. - *chairman*
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
Curt Weldon, Pa.
Heather A. Wilson, N.M.
Rob Bishop, Utah
Michael R. Turner, Ohio
Mike D. Rogers, Ala.
Trent Franks, Ariz.

Democrats (6)

Silvestre Reyes, Texas - *ranking member*
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.
Loretta Sanchez, Calif.
Ellen O. Tauscher, Calif.
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.
Tim Ryan, Ohio

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

Jurisdiction: All Army and Air Force acquisition programs (except strategic weapons and lift programs, special operations and information technology accounts); all Navy and Marine Corps aviation programs, National Guard and Army and Air Force reserve modernization, and ammunition programs.

Republicans (16)

Curt Weldon, Pa. - *chairman*
Jim Gibbons, Nev.
Todd Akin, Mo.
Jeb Bradley, N.H.
Michael R. Turner, Ohio
Phil Gingrey, Ga.
Terry Everett, Ala.
Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, Calif.
Walter B. Jones, N.C.
Jim Ryun, Kan.
Rob Simmons, Conn.
Ed Schrock, Va.
J. Randy Forbes, Va.
Joel Hefley, Colo.
Joe Wilson, S.C.
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.

Democrats (14)

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii - *ranking member*
Ike Skelton, Mo.
John M. Spratt Jr., S.C.
Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas
Lane Evans, Ill.
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Wash.
Mike McIntyre, N.C.
Robert A. Brady, Pa.
John B. Larson, Conn.
Steve Israel, N.Y.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.
Kendrick B. Meek, Fla.
Charles W. Stenholm, Texas

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

Jurisdiction: Defense Department counterproliferation and counter terrorism programs and initiatives; Special Operations Forces, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, information technology policy and programs, force protection policy and oversight, and related intelligence support.

Republicans (12)

H. James Saxton, N.J. - *chairman*
Joe Wilson, S.C.
Frank A. LoBiondo, N.J.
John Kline, Minn.
Jeff Miller, Fla.
Roscoe G. Bartlett, Md.
William M. "Mac" Thornberry, Texas
Jim Gibbons, Nev.
Robin Hayes, N.C.
Jo Ann Davis, Va.
Todd Akin, Mo.
Joel Hefley, Colo.

Democrats (10)

Martin T. Meehan, Mass. - *ranking member*
Jim Turner, Texas
Adam Smith, Wash.
Mike McIntyre, N.C.
Ciro D. Rodriguez, Texas
Baron P. Hill, Ind.
Susan A. Davis, Calif.
Jim Langevin, R.I.
Rick Larsen, Wash.
Jim Cooper, Tenn.

September 27, 2004

TO: Matt Latimer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: P.M. Blair Statement

UK

Here are some interesting words by Tony Blair that are worth keeping – he says it well.

Thanks.

Attach. 7/15/04 Statement on Butler Report

DHR:ss
092704-11

.....
Please respond by _____

27 Sep 04



10 DOWNING STREET

Print this page

Statement on Butler Report

Prime Minister Tony Blair has given his response to the Butler Review in the House of Commons.

- Download the **Butler Report on the Directgov website**

Read the Prime Minister's statement in full below.

[check against delivery]

Lord Butler's Report is comprehensive, thorough; and I thank the members of his Committee and their staff for all their hard work in compiling it. We accept fully the Report's conclusions.

The Report provides an invaluable analysis of the general threat in respect of WMD; of the potential acquisition of WMD by terrorists; and though it devotes much of its analysis to Iraq, it also goes into detail on the WMD threat posed by Iran, Libya, North Korea and A Q Khan. Some of the intelligence disclosed is made available for the first time and gives some insight into the reasons for the judgements I and other Ministers have been making. I hope the House will understand if I deal with it in some detail.

The hallmark of the Report is its balanced judgements.

The Report specifically supports the conclusions of Lord Hutton's inquiry about the good faith of the intelligence services and the Government in compiling the September 2002 dossier.

But it also makes specific findings that the dossier and the intelligence behind it should have been better presented, had more caveats attached to it, and been better validated.

It reports doubts which have recently arisen on the 45 minute intelligence and says in any event it should have been included in the dossier in different terms; but it expressly supports the intelligence on Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Niger in respect of Iraq's nuclear ambitions.

The Report finds that there is little - if any - significant evidence of stockpiles of readily deployable weapons.

But it also concludes that Saddam Hussein did indeed have:

- a. "the strategic intention of resuming the pursuit of prohibited weapons programmes, including if possible its nuclear weapons programme, when United Nations inspection regimes were relaxed and sanctions were eroded or lifted.
- b. In support of that goal, was carrying out illicit research and development, and procurement, activities, to seek to sustain its indigenous capabilities.
- c. Was developing ballistic missiles with a range longer than permitted under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions;"

Throughout the last 18 months, throughout the rage and ferment of the debate over Iraq, there have been two questions.

One is an issue of good faith, of integrity.

This is now the fourth exhaustive inquiry that has dealt with this issue. This report, like the Hutton inquiry, like the report of the ISC before it and of the FAC before that, has found the same thing.

11-L-0559/OSD/46052

BLAIR:

No-one lied. No-one made up the intelligence. No-one inserted things into the dossier against the advice of the intelligence services.

Everyone genuinely tried to do their best in good faith for the country in circumstances of acute difficulty. That issue of good faith should now be at an end.

But there is another issue. We expected, I expected to find actual usable, chemical or biological weapons shortly after we entered Iraq. We even made significant contingency plans in respect of their use against our troops. UN Resolution 1441 in November 2002 was passed unanimously by the whole Security Council, including Syria, on the basis Iraq was a WMD threat. Lord Butler says in his report:

"We believe that it would be a rash person who asserted at this stage that evidence of Iraqi possession of stocks of biological or chemical agents, or even of banned missiles, does not exist or will never be found."

But I have to accept: as the months have passed, it seems increasingly clear that at the time of invasion Saddam did not have stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons ready to deploy.

The second issue is therefore this: even if we acted in perfectly good faith, is it now the case that in the absence of stockpiles of weapons ready to deploy, the threat was misconceived and therefore the war was unjustified?

I have searched my conscience, not in a spirit of obstinacy; but in genuine reconsideration in the light of what we now know, in answer to that question. And my answer would be: that the evidence of Saddam's WMD was indeed less certain, less well-founded than was stated at the time. But I cannot go from there to the opposite extreme. On any basis he retained complete strategic intent on WMD and significant capability; the only reason he ever let the inspectors back into Iraq was that he had 180,000 US and British troops on his doorstep; he had no intention of ever co-operating fully with the inspectors; and he was going to start up again the moment the troops and the inspectors departed; or the sanctions eroded. And I say further: that had we backed down in respect of Saddam, we would never have taken the stand we needed to take on WMD, never have got the progress for example on Libya, that we achieved; and we would have left Saddam in charge of Iraq, with every malign intent and capability still in place and every dictator with the same intent everywhere immeasurably emboldened.

As I shall say later: for any mistakes, made, as the Report finds, in good faith I of course take full responsibility, but I cannot honestly say I believe getting rid of Saddam was a mistake at all. Iraq, the region, the wider world is a better and safer place without Saddam.

The Report begins by an assessment of intelligence and its use in respect of countries other than Iraq. It points out that in respect of Libya, the intelligence has largely turned out to be accurate especially in respect of its nuclear weapons programmes; and those are now being dismantled. In respect of Iran, the Report says Iran is now engaged with the IAEA, though there remain 'clearly outstanding issues about Iran's activities'.

About North Korea, the Report concludes that it 'is now thought to be developing missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons as far away as continental US and Europe'.

The Report goes on at para 99: 'North Korea is a particular cause for concern because of its willingness to sell ballistic missiles to anyone prepared to pay in hard currency'.

The Report also discloses the extent of the network of A Q Khan, the Pakistani former nuclear scientist. This network is now shut down largely through US and UK intelligence work, through Pakistani cooperation and through the dialogue with Libya.

The Report then reveals for the first time the development of the intelligence in respect of the new global terrorism we face. In the early years, for example, in the JIC assessment of October 1994, the view was that the likelihood of terrorists acquiring or using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons was, whilst theoretically possible, highly unlikely.

However, as the name and activities of Usama Bin Laden became better known, the JIC started to change its earlier assessment. In November 1998, it said:

[UBL] has a long-standing interest in the potential terrorist use of CBR materials, and recent intelligence

11-L-0559/OSD/46053

suggest his ideas about using toxic materials are maturing and being developed in more detail. ... There is also secret reporting that he may have obtained some CB material - and that he is interested in nuclear materials.

And in June 1999:

Most of UBL's planned attacks would use conventional terrorist weapons. But he continues to seek chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material and to develop a capability for its terrorist use.

By mid-July 1999 this view hardened still further:

There have been important developments in [Islamist extremist] terrorism. It has become clear that Usama Bin Laden has been seeking CBRN materials The significance of his possession of CB materials is that, in contrast to other terrorists interested in CB, he wishes to target US, British and other interests worldwide.

A series of further assessments to the same effect issued in January 2000, again in August 2000, and in January 2001.

To anyone who wants to know why I have become increasingly focused on the link between terrorism and WMD, I recommend reading this part of the Report and the intelligence assessments received.

It was against this background of what one witness to Lord Butler called the 'creeping tide of proliferation' that the events of September 11th 2001 should be considered. As the Report says, following September 11th, the calculus of the threat changed:

I said in this House on the 14th September 2001:

"We know, that the terrorists would, if they could, go further and use chemical or biological or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We have been warned by the events of 11 September. We should act on the warning."

I took the view then and stand by it now that no Prime Minister faced with this evidence could responsibly afford to ignore it. After September 11th, it was time to take an active as opposed to reactive position on the whole question of WMD. We had to close down the capability of the rogue states - usually highly repressive and unstable - to develop such weapons; and the commercial networks such as those of A Q Khan helping them.

Again my clear view was that the country where we had to take a stand was Iraq. Why?

Iraq was the one country to have used WMD recently. It had developed WMD capability and concealed it. Action by UN inspectors and the IAEA had by the mid to late 1990s reduced this threat significantly; but as the Butler Report shows at paras 180-182, by the time the inspectors were effectively blocked in Iraq (at the end of 1998) the JIC assessments were that some CW stocks remained hidden and that Iraq remained capable of a break-out chemical weapons capability within months; a biological weapons capability, also with probable stockpiles; and could have had ballistic missiles capability in breach of UN Resolutions within a year.

This was the reason for military action, taken without a UN Resolution, in December 1998.

Subsequent to that, the Report shows that we continued to receive the JIC assessments on Iraq's WMD capability. For example, in respect of chemical and biological weapons it said in April 2000:

Our picture is limited.

It is likely that Iraq is continuing to develop its offensive chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) capabilities.

In May 2001, the JIC assessed, in respect of nuclear weapons:

Our knowledge of developments in Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes since Desert Fox air operations in December 1998 is patchy. But intelligence gives grounds for concern and suggests that Iraq is becoming bolder in conducting activities prohibited by UNSCR 687.

There is evidence of increased activity at Iraq's only remaining nuclear facility and a growing number of

11-L-0559/OSD/46054

reports on possible nuclear related procurement.

In February 2002, the JIC said:

Iraq ... if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agent within days. ...

The Report specifically endorses the March 2002 advice to Ministers which states that though containment had been partially successful and intelligence was patchy, Iraq continues to develop WMD:

Iraq has up to 20 650km range missiles left over from the Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme.

The point I would make is simply this. The dossier of September 2002 did not reach any startling or radical conclusion. It said, in effect, what had been said for several years based not just on intelligence but on frequent UN and international reports. It was the same conclusion that led us to military action in 1998; to maintain sanctions; to demand the return of UN Inspectors.

We published the dossier in response to the enormous Parliamentary and press clamour. It was not, as has been described, the case for war. But it was the case for enforcing the UN will.

In retrospect it has achieved a fame it never achieved at the time. As the Report states at para 310:

It is fair to say at the outset that the dossier attracted more attention after the war than it had done before it. When first published, it was regarded as cautious, and even dull. Some of the attention that it eventually received was the product of controversy over the Government's further dossier of February 2003. Some of it arose over subsequent allegations that the intelligence in the September dossier had knowingly been embellished, and hence over the good faith of the Government. Lord Hutton dismissed those allegations. We should record that we, too, have seen no evidence that would support any such allegations.

The Report at para 333 states that in general the statements in the dossier reflected fairly the judgements of past JIC assessments.

The Report, however, goes on to say that with hindsight making public that the authorship of the dossier was by the JIC was a mistake. It meant that more weight was put on the intelligence than it could bear; and put the JIC and its Chairman in a difficult position.

It recommends in future a clear delineation between Government and JIC, perhaps by issuing two separate documents. I think this is wise, though I doubt it would have made much difference to the reception of the intelligence at the time.

The Report also enlarges on the criticisms of the ISC in respect of the greater use of caveats about intelligence both in the dossier and in my foreword and we accept that entirely.

The Report also states that significant parts of the intelligence have now been found by SIS to be in doubt.

The Chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove has told me that SIS accepts all the conclusions and recommendations of Lord Butler's report which concern the Service. SIS will fully address the recommendations which Lord Butler has made about their procedures and about the need for the Service properly to resource them. The Service has played, and will continue to play, a vital role in countering worldwide the tide of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, its successes are evident in Lord Butler's report.

I accept the Report's conclusions in full. Any mistakes made should not be laid at the door of our intelligence and security community. They do a tremendous job for our country.

I accept full personal responsibility for the way the issue was presented and therefore for any errors made.

11-L-0559/OSD/46055

As the Report indicates, there is no doubt that at the time it was genuinely believed by everyone that Saddam had both strategic intent in respect of WMD and actual weapons.

I make this further point. On the sparse, generalised and highly fragmented intelligence about Al Qaida prior to September 11th, it is now widely said policy-makers should have foreseen the attacks that materialised on September 11th 2001 in New York. I only ask: had we ignored the specific intelligence about the threat from Iraq, backed up by a long history of international confrontation over it, and that threat later materialised, how would we have been judged?

I know some will disagree with this. There are those who were opposed to the war, remain so now and will forever be in that position.

I only hope that now, after two detailed Parliamentary Committee reports, a judicial inquiry more exhaustive than any has ever been in examining an allegation of impropriety against Government and now this voluminous report, people will not disrespect the other's point of view but will accept that those that agree and those that disagree with the war in Iraq, hold their views not because they are war-mongers on the one hand or closet supporters of Saddam on the other, but because of a genuine difference of judgement as to the right thing to have done.

There was no conspiracy. There was no impropriety.

The essential judgement and truth, as usual, does not lie in extremes.

We all acknowledge Saddam was evil and his regime depraved. Whether or not actual stockpiles of weapons are found, there wasn't and isn't any doubt Saddam used WMD and retained every strategic intent to carry on developing them. The judgement is this: would it have been better or more practical to have contained him through continuing sanctions and weapons inspections; or was this inevitably going to be at some point a policy that failed? And was removing Saddam a diversion from pursuing the global terrorist threat; or part of it?

I can honestly say I have never had to make a harder judgement. But in the end, my judgement was that after September 11th, we could no longer run the risk; that instead of waiting for the potential threat of terrorism and WMD to come together, we had to get out and get after it. One part was removing the training ground of Al Qaida in Afghanistan. The other was taking a stand on WMD; and the place to take that stand was Iraq, whose regime was the only one ever to have used WMD and was subject to 12 years of UN Resolutions and weapons inspections that turned out to be unsatisfactory.

And though in neither case was the nature of the regime the reason for conflict, it was decisive for me in the judgement as to the balance of risk for action or inaction.

Both countries now face an uncertain struggle for the future. But both at least now have a future. The one country in which you will find an overwhelming majority in favour of the removal of Saddam is Iraq.

I am proud of this country and the part it played and especially our magnificent armed forces, in removing two vile dictatorships and giving people oppressed, almost enslaved, the prospect of democracy and liberty.

This Report will not end the arguments about the war. But in its balance and common sense, it should at least help to set them in a more rational light; and for that we should be grateful.

SEP 28 2004

TO: Ken Krieg
cc: Gen Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
Tina Jonas
Steve Cambone
Ryan Henry
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Paper from Newt Gingrich

381

Attached is a paper from Newt Gingrich on strategic planning for 2004 and beyond. It is interesting and, in thinking about the Quadrennial Defense Review and our upcoming SLRG work, you folks ought to take these thoughts into account.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/13/03 Strategic Planning for 2004 and beyond

DHR:ss
092704-28

.....
Please respond by 10/22/04

2854044

from newt 12/13/03

Strategic Planning for 2004 and beyond

National Security planning should always begin with capabilities rather than intentions.

After more than two years of intense effort there is much we still do not know about our opponents, their resources, their capabilities, and their organizational systems.

We have made a lot of progress from 9/11/01 if measured from where we were.

We have an even longer way to go if measured against the scale of the opposition:

- the still growing Wahhabist-Deobandi movement in Islam,
- the continued spread of terrorism as a system of war,
- the existence of huge ungoverned areas,
- the continued growth of the Gray world of people smuggling, illegal transportation, traditional international crime, narcotics trafficking, and illegal arms dealing,
- the continued efforts of dictatorships to develop capabilities that threaten America and her allies (including North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran),
- the instability of Pakistan with its implications both for Afghanistan and for nuclear weapons proliferation and use,
- the rise of societal warfare in both Iraq and Afghanistan,
- the continuing drift of European popular opinion and a number of European governments away from the US,
- the United Nations Secretariat's reluctance to cooperate with the US
- and the continuing evolution of weapons of mass murder and weapons of mass destruction.

This is a formidable list of challenges and at the historic level of grand national strategy (to use the World War 2 term) it is not clear whether, with all our efforts, we are making progress toward real security or falling further behind the curve of the challenges.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2004

Given the uncertainties, it is necessary to plan for a September-October 2004 which could be either violent and painful or peaceful and triumphant. We have no way of knowing which will happen although the uncertainties after 27 months effort make it more likely it will be violent and painful.

This means we should be prepared to offer "blood, sweat, toil and tears" (in Churchill's phrase) so that people are prepared to endure and prevail.

This would require a much more sober and serious State of the Union outlining the long term scale of the conflict and the possibility that it will take a decade to two generations to fully achieve our goal of a safe, healthy, prosperous and free worlds in which America is relatively safe and secure.

People need to be prepared for the possibility of much more violence and much more disruption over time.

If we are measured against a goal of winning by Labor Day 2004, we will have a very difficult argument to make and be politically and in the news media on the defensive for the entire year.

If we are measured against determination to prevail and an honest acceptance that this is hard and going to remain hard we will be able to put our critics on defense because their strategic vision is incompatible with modern reality.

Put simply, if the American people have to choose between an embattled Eagle (even one that is occasionally wounded) and an Ostrich they will choose the Eagle.

Daily and weekly events in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have to be consistently put in this larger, worldwide, and long term struggle against the forces that would destroy our way of life.

PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR WAR OR PEACE?

One of the principles emerging from this grimmer, longer range view is that both planning and budgeting have to evolve to take these challenges into account.

This war will last for at least a decade. Therefore supplemental budgeting is profoundly misleading.

Planning on a campaign by campaign basis is also an inadequate basis for thinking through needed structures and needed funding.

We desperately need planning for the entire war leading to strategies and structures appropriate to winning the larger, longer conflict.

Budgeting should follow the strategies and structures and force priority setting after the initial thinking has been done. In war time budgeting cannot precede the planning and establish the boundaries of thoughtful planning.

Maintaining a peacetime budgeting process sends the signal to everyone at mid level that it is business as usual despite the hawkish speeches by the political leadership.

Even more dangerously, budgeting within a peacetime framework means that the experts never show the political leadership what is really needed because the budget constraints inhibit planning and establish invisible boundaries of what is politically permissible and therefore what career officials will raise.

We are on the edge of budgeting decisions in defense, intelligence, public information capabilities, and societal assistance that will lengthen the war, weaken our ability to win the war, and increase the risks we are running in the out years. These are peace time rather than war time calculations.

BUDGETING AND AUDITING IN WARTIME

The same peacetime attitudes in budgeting carry over to a system of red tape, auditing and micromanagement which will make victory in Iraq and elsewhere vastly more difficult.

At the battle of Isandlwana in 1879 the Zulus massacred over 1500 British and auxiliary troops because they ran out of ammunition. They ran out of ammunition because the quartermaster would not open the oak boxes in advance because they were afraid bullets would be wasted or lost and they would be audited and punished.

Wars are best won quickly and decisively. Societal wars require substantially different capabilities than professional military wars but the goal of winning as rapidly as possible persists.

A societal war requires a lot of decentralized decisions including spending decisions. A lot of these spending decisions will inevitably be on non-military activities in a societal campaign.

To the degree an isolated, entrenched bureaucracy can focus on process, paperwork, and audit trails it can destroy the decentralization, flexibility and application of localized judgment that is vital to winning a war.

MOVING TO A SOCIETAL WARFARE STRATEGY IN IRAQ

Our strategy in Iraq must shift to an Iraqi-centric strategy and a decentralized implementation system.

Today we have an American-centric strategy and the CPA is trying to micromanage and to be 'fiscally prudent.'

These characteristics could lead to a catastrophic decline in support for the Americans during 2004.

Societal wars have a dynamic which is always dangerous for the dominant force.

The burden of safety is on the dominant force.

The burden of prosperity and convenience is on the dominant force.

The burden of psychological acceptance is on the dominant force.

The insurgent simply has to survive to still potentially win and that victory could come with startling speed.

The 'feel good' briefings on 'progress' are symptoms of sincere people who simply do not understand the historic dynamics of societal warfare.

AFGHANISTAN

The strategy in Afghanistan is essentially right but under resourced.

With adequate resourcing and continuing attention to the cross border sanctuary problem in Pakistan Afghanistan should be able to grow into a success story.

The resourcing issue is important both to offset the damage done by the Taliban and to offset the growing illegal resources available through the increase in heroin production.

The civilizing modernizing forces around Karzai have to have more resources than the warlords can aggregate illegally and have to have enough resources to drown the insurgency in the south.

The strategy In Afghanistan is fine but without more resourcing it could still fail.

A SOCIETAL WARFARE DOCTRINE

Societal warfare is the natural response of a determined enemy who cannot compete in the professional military arena.

The American military focuses so intently on winning high technology, high tempo theater campaigns that it has failed to develop a modern doctrine for societal wars.

Societal warfare is inherently Integrated (see below) and operates at a different rhythm and pattern than professional military warfare.

Developing and implementing a societal warfare doctrine should be one of the highest priorities for 2004.

INTEGRATED OPERATIONS

Integrated operations are those activities which reach beyond the military and involve other governmental and non-governmental actors in a systematic manner.

Integrated operations are a much more explicit, coordinated, and accountable system than the current 'interagency process' which is failing to achieve the energy, drive, and decisiveness needed in winning wars.

Creating an Integrated Doctrine and getting it accepted by all the major players and implemented by them would be a major step forward in American capability to win societal wars.

SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATION VERSUS STABILITY OPERATIONS

The American Goal in many countries is not a 'stability operation'. The American goal is to transform the society.

The President's calls for democracy in the Middle East are calls to transform civil society in every country in the region.

American goals in subSaharan Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and a host of other places are to bring about profound change so people live in safety, health prosperity, and freedom. We need to develop a doctrine and system for 'societal transformation;' to replace the inadequate model of 'stability operations.'

This requires combining the Societal Warfare Doctrine and the Integrated Doctrine with other needed attributes that will be discovered as our efforts progress in this field.

URBAN WARFARE/POLICING

One of the most consistent requirements of the future will be a level of sophisticated urban warfare and urban policing that is currently beyond our reach.

Developing this doctrine and capability for urban warfare/policing should be a major goal of DoD in 2004.

INFORMATION AND PEOPLE TO PEOPLE OPERATIONS

One of our greatest current strategic weaknesses is the inability to communicate our values and concerns to the world at large.

A component of that inability is the absence of the kind of sophisticated people to people relationships which would take

advantage of the extraordinary diversity of American society (51,000 Pashtun speaking Americans even more Iraqi Americas for example).

In the age of the internet, cell phone, videoconference and jet airplane America could do stunningly more to mobilize our capabilities as a people and to communicate with and relate to the world.

America is too powerful to ignore.

If America is not effectively communicating and networking, the world will assume the worst about our goals and intentions.

This is one of the highest value areas which the White House should direct and which should bypass all the current bureaucracies to bring in civilian experts and move to a dynamic, high energy, long term strategy in both information and people to people networking.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland Security remains an underestimated challenge.

The rise of weapons of mass murder (largely biological) and the continuing spread of weapons of mass destruction (largely nuclear) makes it imperative that the intensity and drive for Homeland Security match that of combat operations overseas.

It is a fact that we would be hit at home at any time.

It is a fact that the weapons could be biological or nuclear and the casualty rates could be two or three orders of magnitude greater than 9/11 or even higher.

That means America could face losing hundreds of thousands or even millions of people in the very near future.

There is no sense of urgency comparable to that threat.

There are two areas in particular that need dramatic upgrading: responding to a nuclear event and responding to a biological event. Each should have its own focus and its own metrics for success.

In addition the Department of Homeland Security should be developing a much more high technology visa and visitation-work card system Secretary Ridge is absolutely on the right track but needs reinforcement to communicate urgency and very high standards of change to the bureaucracies he has now assembled into one agency.

NUCLEAR REACTION AND RECOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES

Some major decisions need to be made about the scale of a potential nuclear event or series of events and the standards of response and recovery we want to establish. There is a direct correlation between rigorous, grim realism before the event and the opportunity to save lives and accelerate the recovery.

The most likely lead agency in this process is a restructured National Guard and Reserve force that has some forces dedicated to homeland security and some forces available for overseas use.

The Defense Department is clearly trying to avoid this responsibility.

If the President prefers to create new civilian capabilities reporting directly to Homeland Security that would be an acceptable solution.

If the National Guard and Reserve are reshaped to ensure they can meet the crisis of one or more nuclear events that is an acceptable solution.

Everyone should be uncomfortable about the current limited understanding of the amount of engineering, policing and medical resources that would be absorbed in nuclear events here at home.

Lack of clarity in preparation, responsibility and developing the necessary forces will lead to many more American deaths if a nuclear event occurs.

Every day that we fail to clarify this is a day Americans are at risk.

BIOLOGICAL THREATS

Biological threats are the greatest threats America faces.

An engineered flu could potentially kill tens of millions of Americans. The 1918 flu epidemic killed more people than the First World War.

There must be three major steps toward surviving a biological threat:

1. the health system including veterinarians and retired doctors and nurses must be connected into an information system in an investment modeled on Eisenhower's National Defense Interstate Highway system (but radically smaller in expense). This investment will dramatically help with every day health requirements and will both improve healthcare and lower costs. Far more important, this investment will make it possible to detect a biological attack at the earliest moment, analyze it in the shortest time, educate the nation's health personnel in virtually real time and minimize the loss of American life;
2. There are currently two or three paths toward accelerating vaccine development and production. All should be invested in at the highest rate the research system can absorb the resources. A breakthrough in any of these areas would save a tremendous number of lives if an engineered virus were unleashed in the United States.
3. There is a potential within a decade to develop a nanomaterial approach to vaccine production that would enable the United States to respond literally overnight to an attack by mass producing a vaccine in a manner now impossible. Because of the number of lives potentially at risk this should receive the highest possible funding priority and should be monitored at the highest levels in a manner reminiscent of the Manhattan Project (although with far fewer resources).

October 1, 2004

TO: John Rood
cc: Mira Ricardel
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Progress in Missile Defense

We've been seeing a great deal of progress in Missile Defense over the past few months. The policy side of the work is moving along, especially with the working relationship you have established with the new Commander at STRATCOM.

We're clearly on the cusp of doing some important things, and your work has been an important part of that - thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-5

.....
Please respond by _____

373.24

1 OCT 04

~~FOUO~~

DEC 30 2004

DEC 30 2004

312

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Draft Memo

Condi,

Thanks for sending me the draft memo. Please hold up on it until I get back to you. I want to think through the implications of it, and how I would respond.

Thanks.

DHR:as
122904-17 (2)

~~FOUO~~

30 Dec 04

7201

~~FOUO~~

November 11, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld ^{DR}
SUBJECT: Letter

Someone may want to write this person Brendan McCluskey at Convent Station a letter. It is nice.

Thanks.

Attach: 1021/04 Star Ledger (LIN Co Ltd, NEW JERSEY?)

DR: DR
11/11/04-20

.....
Please respond by 11/26/04

33551

12/1
Capt Marriott
Mr Di Rita asked that
we get this to Carrie
See for action. Thx.
George Rhynders

CSC
Forsc
M

11 Nov 04

20996-04

A looking battle

It's reported that many Soviet Missions have declared a goal to get hold of all American armed forces. Among the nations they will use, we have already seen, are Indonesia, Cambodia and North Vietnam. This event couldn't be any more far for our forces in Iraq.

All along, it seems we've been fighting a looking battle in Iraq. Major portions of the economy are not under allied control. There are growing American casualties. There is rampant unemployment. Terrorists can strike at will. Iraqis don't believe the United States is getting their economy and their administration in a quarterly as to how to conduct the "peace."

Republicans in what have called President Bush and members of the administration turned around the country proclaiming the situation is easy! Surely what source is he reading to make him believe the war is proceeding smoothly?

Even now, Republican senators are questioning the president's competence. The choice in the election comes down to which candidate is competent. The way the Iraq war is being handled is a sure sign of the incompetence of the administration.

Clayton days, far gone

On Oct. 6, 1999 parents demanded the firing of Bushman. For the very High School to try to get an explanation of why their school's safety response program was found on a computer CD in Iraq. Parents were assured there was no terrorist involvement, but then why the bomb-squid dogs, subsequent increase in police presence and review of years of police records? Since Major Ridgecroft, then in Bushman, I would have paid the \$100 he is charging for the records to see them filed in front of parents and tell them there was nothing to worry about. And if only the United States hadn't entered Iraq we would never have found their school's data anyway. Then again, this was a public school and "working class" Bruce would never send his kids there.

Pat? No, but the world isn't fair. Otherwise it would allow each of us to have two minutes in neighboring towns with high-tech security details. Espionage can spread to hospitals thousands from the electricity we have to have every day, and then he talks about the right of the "common man" and charges \$100 a night. Clayton days far gone, but for whom? — Ken Robinson, Queens, Tennessee

Row out with regrets

It was not such a choice. For in the Navy and has just returned from Iraq. He is stationed on the USS George Washington, an aircraft carrier. Leonard Pilla Jr.'s Oct. 11 column "A measure of success in the draft bill", Michael Moore's movie and John Edwards' comments — along the lines of "would you let your kid die in Iraq?" and "what if it was your kid?" — do little to help our servicemen and women. This is a volunteer military. When my son will not be recruited to join the Navy, I asked him why and he said, "Dad, you did it. Now it's my turn to serve." It's people like my son who make it possible for the heroes of the world to have freedom of speech. Could you imagine what would have happened if Moore's article prevailed during the second election period? It was my son's choice to join, and I am so very proud of him. I pray for him and all other servicemen and women now in harm's way during this very necessary war on terror.

NEVER NOTION

Use of more than 1000 down. The United States must not be content with the international community to the war. It must try to resolve perceived security threats from abroad.

Performance Objective: Westfield
One of my biggest mistakes
Answer to definition

Your editorial "Have we passed it- sure?" Top" suggests that President George W. Bush should not have the "right" to be elected "again" without the "check and balance" system. When speaking of the upcoming election in Iraq that "Michael's point is in, we just have an election that's not quite perfect. It is better than not having an election. You see."



WESTFIELD

This was the reply President Abraham Lincoln made to the sides who urged him to postpone the elections of 1864. This day- long the Civil War, when there was every expectation that he would lose. If you are going to resign nominations for the general, I suggest you editorial writer be put in consultation.

— President McKinley, Cleveland, Ohio and Stanton

Right to serve

It was not such a choice. For in the Navy and has just returned from Iraq. He is stationed on the USS George Washington, an aircraft carrier. Leonard Pilla Jr.'s Oct. 11 column "A measure of success in the draft bill", Michael Moore's movie and John Edwards' comments — along the lines of "would you let your kid die in Iraq?" and "what if it was your kid?" — do little to help our servicemen and women. This is a volunteer military. When my son will not be recruited to join the Navy, I asked him why and he said, "Dad, you did it. Now it's my turn to serve." It's people like my son who make it possible for the heroes of the world to have freedom of speech. Could you imagine what would have happened if Moore's article prevailed during the second election period? It was my son's choice to join, and I am so very proud of him. I pray for him and all other servicemen and women now in harm's way during this very necessary war on terror.

State Letter of 10/15/00

But the subject that the war would pay for itself with Iraq's oil reserves. Americans might find the subject that it was "mission accomplished" more than a year ago on that aircraft carrier. How well did all these politicians speak out?

I feel like we've moved from politics into the world of science fiction. It's like we've stepped into the land of Tom Cruise movie. "Military Report" is what the able American people for whom they haven't completed but is sure they will consent in the future.

— Stanley Kadish, Bloomfield

War powers

I have just reread Article 2 of the Constitution. Would you, John Kerry or whatever Richard Bush's phone number is, the action that requires the president to consult with our allies before going to war?

— Arthur F. Clarke Jr., Astoria

Backwards strategy

Reader Article Belmont's Sept. 28 suggestion that we had to invade Iraq to keep Saddam Hussein out of the race for nuclear weapons with Iran is the ultimate backwards, non-sensical, non-sustainable Republican strategy.

If Iran was not in the more immediate nuclear threat, why didn't we neutralize the nuclear threat in Iran and thereby contain the entire Middle East that we were not going to allow any proliferation in the region? Unfortunately, both Bushes let the Saudis play both sides of the fence and diverted U.S. attention to Iraq. Didn't the Saudis notice that most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis?

— William F. Fiderick, Clara

Salute sacrifices

We cannot begin to explain our disappointment when we opened your Oct. 10 edition to look for coverage of the "Salute the Troops" deployment ceremony that took place the previous day in Trenholm. As we turned page after page until we reached the 41st page, we wondered: Does anyone care about the 4,000 men and women embarking on a dangerous mission to Iraq? If the placement of the article is any indication of just how much people care, we are deeply saddened.

Our son, Owen, is one of the citizens soldiers who will risk his life in the name of liberty. He is a captain in the 480th Aviation Support Battalion, which has fought six other battles to serve the 43rd (Aviation) Infantry Division. The division is made up entirely of National Guardsmen and women and will be the first of his kind deployed to Iraq. It represents

mental
X Police
I Credit
4 Unsub
X study
nature of
will not
halt bus
"it lead

John Smith

From Mission
NS - for wages
e mailed Polydore 12/14

(b)(6)

John Bernd - 12/15

electronic signature

12/15

verizon

SUPERPAGES.COM

Español

HOME PAGE

MY DIRECTORY

YELLOW PAGES

PEOPLE PAGES

CITY PAGES

CONSUMER CENTER

AD

People Pages

Home → People Paaes → Search Results



Results 1 Matching Listing


Search Again

Convert State

Brendan S. McCluskey (More Info)

(b)(6)

map
driving directions
save
update or remove



Print-Friendly Version

Search Again

data by **ACXION** Copyright © 2004 Acxion.

Software Guide

- Main Menu
- Accounting
- Databases
- Backup
- CRM
- Graphics



Send Free Postcards!

Send Free Postcards!

English / Español



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 30 2004

Mr. Brendan McCluskey

(b)(6)

Dear Mr. McCluskey,

I saw your article in *The Star-Ledger*. It was top notch – thank you! Keep it up.

Sincerely,

33551D

30 Dec 04

11 Dec 04

OSD 20996-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46072

720

Feith

May 17, 2004

Handwritten scribble

Scal down

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Future of the ISG

DR

General Dayton raised an interesting issue when we were in Baghdad. He asked what the future is of the ISG.

TRAP

When Duelfer leaves and it ends, could it be converted to something else? Is it a model that ought to be patterned for the future? Are there other problems he could turn his attention to? Will it belong to the multi-national force? That needs to be thought through.

Please get with the right group and tell me what you think.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
051704-17

.....

Please respond by 6/4/04

Done

17 May 04

7209

212
0830

FEBRUARY 2
January 29, 2004

326

TO: David Chu
cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Statistics on Reserves

I didn't want to take the paper at the breakfast meeting this morning because it is so complicated, and so poorly presented in terms of its utility and usability, that I didn't want to try to plow my way through it.

Could you please take it and re-present it with just the key 6, 8, 10 or 12 points on a single piece of paper with bullet points — not on your letterhead, not with sentences, but just the key things we ought to know.

I would also like you to do the same thing with the rebalancing the forces paper just produced by the DASD for Reserve Affairs, Readiness, Training and Mobilization. There ought to be a way to take one or two pages and just have hullet points, so that it is usable in a hearing or a speech.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
012904-12

.....

Please respond by 2/2/04

2 Feb 04

OSD 21022-05

720



POLICY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



INFO MEMO

04/017598

DepSecDef
USD(P) *(Signature)*

DEC 14 2004

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *(Signature)* DEC 14 2004

SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board Members' Term Expiration Dates

- As you consider the list of Defense Policy Board members, I have attached their term expiration dates for your information (Tab A).

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Ann Hansen, Defense Policy Board (b)(6)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



Policy Info Memo Template

11-L-0559/OSD/46075

OSD 21034-04

| | DPB Member | Board Term Expiration |
|----|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 | Dr. Kenneth Adelman | Mav-05 |
| 2 | Hon Richard Allen | May-05 |
| 3 | Dr. Martin Anderson | July-05 |
| 4 | Dr. Garv Becker | |
| 5 | Dr. Barry Blechman | November-05 |
| 6 | Dr. Harold Brown | July-05 |
| 7 | Ms. Victoria Clarke | June-06 |
| 8 | Dr. Eliot Cohen | January-06 |
| 9 | Ms. Devon Cross | January-06 |
| 10 | Gen (Ret) Ronald Fogleman | November-05 |
| 11 | Honorable Thomas Foley | January-06 |
| 12 | Honorable Tillie Fowler | Mav-05 |
| 13 | Honorable Newt Ginarich | January-06 |
| 14 | Gen (Ret) Chuck Horner | November-05 |
| 15 | Dr. Fred Ikle | November-05 |
| 16 | ADM (Ret) David Jeremiah | November-05 |
| 17 | GEN (Ret) John M. Keane | February-06 |
| 18 | Dr. Henry Kissinger | November-05 |
| 19 | Former VP Dan Quavle | Mav-05 |
| 20 | Dr. James Schlesinaer | July-05 |
| 21 | Dr. Kiron Skinner | May-05 |
| 22 | Dr. Hal Sonnenfeldt | November-05 |
| | | |
| 24 | Mr. Chris Williams | June-05 |
| 25 | Honorable Pete Wilson | Mav-05 |
| 26 | Hon R. James Woolsev | November-05 |

ES-1644
04/016678

~~FOUO~~

December 9, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Defense Policy Board

Please send me the complete list of Defense Policy Board members. I want to make some changes.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
120904-33

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

FOUO

Local X304

1415
11
24

November 24, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Edits to Division of Labor Paper

Please fax your edits to the Division of Labor document to me this week.

Thanks.

Attach.
Division of Labor Paper

DHR:ss
112404-11

.....
Please respond by _____

See attached

*I'm not sure what you have in mind
by separating PA+E from all the stuff
in the right-hand column.*

Paul W.

02050

honover

OSD 21054-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46078

FOUO

DIVISION OF LABOR - SECDEF & DEPSECDEF

| SECDEF | BOTH | DEPSECDEF |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| Iraq / Afghanistan | Sr Civilian Personnel | Procurement |
| SLRG | Sr Military Personnel | Inspector General |
| Contingency | Planning | Budget/Acquisition - Are you sure about this one? |
| POTUS Interaction | Pentagon Renovation | Medical Affairs |
| COCOM Interaction | Global Posture | Defense Agencies |
| SRO | Legislative Affairs | Reserve Affairs |
| Deployment Orders | Public Affairs | Missile Defense |
| Special Operations | NSC Process | Defense Business Board |
| Intelligence | General Counsel | Defense Science Board |
| PA&E ? | OMB | DACOWITS |
| Service Secretary Interaction | Outreach Meetings | AT&L |
| | Defense Policy Board | Comptroller |
| | Homeland Defense | Military Commissions |

DRAFT

September 21, 2003
7:10 AM

| Order | Secretary | Deputy | Both/Spilt |
|-------|---|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | CJCS/VCJCS/ Combatant Commanders | Homeland Defense | General Counsel |
| 2 | End Strength | AT&L | Iraq |
| 3 | Contingency Plans | Comptroller | Public Affairs |
| 4 | SRO | PA & E | Legislative Affairs |
| 5 | Deployment Orders/ Force/Rotation/Morale | Air Force/NRO | SLRG |
| 6 | Army | Navy / Marines | Outreach Meetings |
| 7 | Special Ops/SOLIC | Medical Affairs | Defense Policy Board |
| 8 | Footprint | NI2 | Personnel |
| 9 | Intel -- Steve Cambone | SROC | OMB |
| 10 | PC with Doug Feith as +1 | Military Commissions | Defense Science Board |
| 11 | Defense Business Council | Detainees | Afghanistan |
| 12 | | Inspector General | |

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

08 Jun 2004-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR USD(P)


Subject: MEK

Sir,

The Deputy request that Dr. Luti take him through the briefings that have been provided on the MEK. Please call Stephanie to schedule a time for today.

Thank You.

Very Respectfully



Stephen T. Ganyard
Colonel, USMC
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Suspense: COB 8 Jun 04

cc: DJS
VCJCS EA

OSD 21139-05

383.6

S Ganyard

8 Jun-04
Scanned

June 7, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz

CC: Gen. Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: MEK

Let's get hot on the MEK and figure out what to do. My instinct is to get them passed over to the Iraqis.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
060704-1

.....
Please respond by 6/18/04

720



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

His Excellency General Thammarak
Isarakun na Ayutthaya
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Bangkok, Thailand

293

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Thai** soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

25 Jan 04

U21497 / 03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- WASHINGTON

JAN 2 2004

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia
3 Diakon Ignatii St

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the **Bulgarian** soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They **are** in our thoughts during **this** difficult **time** and we wish those who were injured a speedy recovery.

We are grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in the global war on terror and to the reconstruction efforts in **Iraq**.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

U21497 /03

**His Excellency General Thammarak
Isarakun na Ayutthaya
Minister of Defence
Ministry of Defence
Bangkok, Thailand**

Dear Minister Thammarak:

I offer my condolences on the deaths of the Thai soldiers killed in Karbala. We were saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of the victims.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,

We are grateful for the continued commitment Thailand is making in the global war on terror, and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

*TSA:
Thai letter
for final review.
v/R Slim*

11-L-0559/OSD/46085
112

(3)
50M



EF-7934
I-03/017528

December 27, 2003

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*
SUBJECT: Letter to Bulgarian Mo

*TSA,
Proposed Bulgaria
letter v/r Stim*

*JEM
12/27/03
1/2*

If we lost some Bulgarians in Iraq, I ought to get a letter off to the Minister of Defense of Bulgaria.

Thanks.

DIR:dh
123703-10 (to computer)

*SD
Snowflake*

.....
Please respond by 12/30/03

Policy ExecSec's Note

December 31, 2003

CDR Nosenzo,

- The attached letter was forwarded electronically to Bill Marriott and Monica Generous on 30 Dec 03 in response to this SecDef note.

C. L. O'Connor

Colonel C. L. O'Connor, USMC
Director, Policy Executive Secretariat

29-12-03 13:49 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/46086

Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD

From: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:57 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Lohse, John A, CIV, OSD
Subject: FW: Bulgarian condolence

John or Monica or Carrie Sue, please turn this into a good condolence letter-perUSD(P) for Mr D's approval...thx, m

-----Original Message-----

From: Haber, Lauren, CIV, OSD-POLICY
Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2003 5:52 PM
To: Generous, Monica, CIV, OSD; Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: Bulgarian condolence



The Honorable
Nikolay Svinarov...

The Honorable Nikolay Svinarov
Minister of Defense
Ministry of Defense
Bulgaria 1000 Sofia
3 Diakon Ignatii St

Dear Minister Svinarov:

I ~~offer~~ my condolences on the deaths of the Bulgarian soldiers killed in Karbala. We are saddened by the tragic loss in these recent terrorist attacks.

Please convey my sympathies to the families of those lost. They are in our thoughts during ~~this~~ difficult time and we wish ~~those~~ who were injured a speedy recovery.

We ~~are~~ grateful for the continued commitment Bulgaria is making in ~~the~~ global war on ~~terror~~ and to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

With deepest sympathy,

Sincerely,



CNN.com

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Karbala attacks kill 12, wound dozens

Bulgarians, Thais suffer first deaths

BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- Insurgents struck three targets in the holy city of Karbala in Iraq on Saturday, killing four Bulgarian soldiers, two Thai army engineers and six civilians, and wounding dozens of troop and civilians, coalition authorities said.

At least 37 troops, including five U.S. soldiers, were hurt in attacks that targeted a police station, the town's city hall and Karbala University, where the six killed soldiers were living in barracks. More than 100 civilians were injured in the closely coordinated strikes, coalition authorities said.

The Bulgarian and Thai troops, the first from those countries to be killed in the Iraqi war, were part of a Polish-led multinational coalition force patrolling south-central Iraq.

In Sofia, the Bulgarian Defense Ministry reported the four Bulgarian deaths and said several other soldiers were wounded. In Bangkok, a Thai military spokesman told CNN that two army engineers were killed. Thailand has a noncombatant force in Iraq.

In Iraq, a Polish military spokesman said the attackers used four suicide car bombs, machine guns and mortars. The strikes hit two coalition compounds and the provincial governor's office.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, deputy chief of operations for U.S. forces, said the insurgency responsible for such attacks appears to be small, loosely coordinated cells throughout the country.


"It takes a very few number of people in the country to create the kind of damage we are seeing," said Kimmitt.

Local police and witnesses said they saw a booby-trapped truck carrying gasoline slamming into a Karbala University building at 12:30 p.m. local time. There were many casualties, the Polish military headquarters in Karbala said.

Police and witnesses said that 15 minutes later, rockets were fired at the provincial governor's office, also referred to as city hall. It was packed with people on what is a regular business day in Iraq. Casualties were numerous, a witness told CNN.

The city south of Baghdad had suffered under Saddam Hussein, who oppressed the Shiite community

720



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

248.7

The Honorable Jim Ramstad
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 205 15-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

6 Jan 04

U21538 /03



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 6 2004

The Honorable Dennis Moore
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. M. Moore".

U21538 /03

December 11, 2003

TO: ~~Jaymie Dunham~~ Larry Di Rita

CC: Paul Wolfowitz
David Chu
Powell Moore

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Expenses for Soldiers to Get Home

At the President's Congressional Ball, one of these two Congressmen handed me the attached "Dear Colleague" letter on soldiers still paying their own way home.

Would you please read it, develop an appropriate answer, tell me if you think we ought to fix the law and then let's get back to them in an appropriate way.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/8/03 Congressional "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Ramstad and Moore

12/12/03 letter to SecDef

DHR:dh
121103-16

.....
Please respond by 1/9, 04

12/15

12/12

Carrie Lee - Please draft response to just report what the policy is and say Dr. Chu is available for additional info.

xxxx Sec Def - Please get the wife on this.

*DR
LARRY DI RITA
12/22*

Larry Di Rita

11-L-0559/OSD/46092

U21545 ^{12/16} 03

Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD

From: Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2003 1:26 PM
To: Marriott, William P, CAPT, OSD
Subject: FW: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

Sir,
Below is an update on the R&R travel snowflake from SD to Mr. DiRita. I'm still awaiting for a response on the policy memo that Mr. Abell will sign. More information to follow.

v/r
Rich

Richard A. Harrison
CPT, USA
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat
Comm: (b)(6) DSN (b)(6)
Room 3D853

-----Original Message-----

From: Loo, Bradford G, CIV, OSD-P&R
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2003 5:09 PM
To: Harrison, Richard A, CPT, OSD
cc: Ellison, Lisa, CIV, OSD-P&R; Mack, Paris OOL Army G1; Pendleton, Chris L, CDR, OSD-P&R; Darden-Ogbonnah, Chenetta Dr., CIV, OSD-P&R
Subject: snowflake: expenses for soldiers to get home

cpt harrison, because my office has policy for leave and liberty, lisa ellison passed me the snowflake for action for payment r&r travel.

the short answer is the department of defense, iaw p.l. 108-106, will start paying service members air fare from the aerial port of debarkation (apod) to the airport nearest the service member's leave destination. the policy memorandum will be sent today or tomorrow to mr abell, pdusd (p&r) for approval.

the army is executive agent for the centcom r&r leave program and to date, has not set the date for implementation -- but it will be sooner than later.

if you need something more let me know.

brad
Acting Director, OEPM
Room 28265, the Pentagon
(V) (b)(6)
(F) (b)(6)
(E) Bradford.Loo@osd.mil

12-8-03

Mr. President -
If you could make
this happen, it would
be a wonderful gift
to our military
personnel!!
Merry Christmas!
Dennis Moore

Soldiers Are Still Paying their Own Way Home!

December 8, 2003

Dear Colleague:

We are sure you are as concerned as we are to find out that our soldiers are still paying their own way home from Iraq and Afghanistan. This is especially concerning after Congress amended the FY 2004 Iraqi supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106) to include \$55 million in funding to reimburse soldiers who qualify for rest and recuperation (R&R) leave for their U.S. domestic travel.

According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS) our "language is not law, and is permissive and not mandatory in nature." But it does allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide assistance for travel-related expenses (such as emergency hotel accommodation for service members or travel to their homes) not otherwise specifically authorized in law.

In a letter regarding R&R domestic travel Rep. Moore received November 4, 2003, from Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management at DOD, "the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million." CRS, however, quoted an unnamed defense official as saying the R&R program total cost would be \$1 billion.


We need to make our intentions very clear to the Defense Department that we want our soldiers to be reimbursed for their domestic travel while on R&R. Please join us in sending the attached letter to Secretary Rumsfeld, respectfully requesting that our soldiers be reimbursed.

This is not a Democratic idea or a Republican idea; it is just the right thing to do for the men and women of the Armed Forces who put their lives on the line for our country and our freedom.

Very truly yours,



JIM RAMSTAD
Member of Congress



DENNIS MOORE
Member of Congress

Please join us -
for our troops!
PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

U.S. House of Representatives

December 12, 2003

THE HONORABLE DONALD H. RUMSFELD
SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-0001

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are writing today to clarify Congress' intent with regard to funding domestic travel for soldiers returning to the U.S. on rest and recuperation (R&R) leave from Iraq or Afghanistan.

The intent of our recommendations in the FY 2004 Iraqi appropriations supplemental (P.L. 108-106) is to reimburse soldiers who qualify for R&R leave for their domestic travel. This R&R reimbursement should also include those soldiers who have already taken qualified R&R leave. The reimbursement includes air travel, bus, train, ferry, and vehicle rental expenses incurred in getting to and from the port-of-entry (Baltimore, Atlanta, Dallas, Frankfurt, or Los Angeles) to the soldier's choice of home-of-record or current military base of residence (*i.e.*, wherever his or her spouse resides at this time). In addition, personal vehicle mileage may be paid for the distance between an airport, or a train or bus depot, and that home. If travel distance is longer than 50 miles and extends over meal times, reasonable per diem expenses should be reimbursed. If travel is overnight and requires a hotel stay, that should be reimbursed.

Given that all the forms, procedures, and staff are already in place to reimburse soldiers, we see no reason that this policy cannot be made effective immediately, and retroactive to October 1st. If the Department of Defense (DOD) wishes to create a procedure for directly buying plane tickets in the future, that is understandable.

We appreciate that the DOD may have concerns about this program due to its significant change in leave policy, but we feel that our troops should not have to bear any more burdens – financial or otherwise – than their extended service to our country already demands. It is our intention that the federal government covers all travel and transportation costs necessary to return military personnel to their homes and families. In a letter received on November 4, 2003, Bradford Loo, Acting Director for Officer and Enlisted Personnel Management wrote, “the unprogrammed additional cost to the Army would be \$16 million.” Congress has provided \$55 million to assist soldiers in covering domestic travel expenses. We respectfully request that you to use those funds as we intended.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

cc: General Richard Meyer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
cc: Army Chief of Staff
cc: Admiral Vernon E. Clark, Chief of Naval Operations
cc: John P. Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff
cc: General Michael W. Hagee, Marine Corps Commandant

11-L-0559/OSD/46095



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-4000



DEC 19 2003

PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

SUBJECT: Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program

References: (a) Congressional Conference Report 108-337, 30 October 2003, "Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes."

(b) USD (P&R) Memorandum, 29 September 2003, subject: Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program for USCENTCOM

As recommended in reference (a), the R&R destination for a military member on active duty (Active and Reserve Components) serving in a contingency location providing support to Operations ENDURING or IRAQI FREEDOM is changed to the Aerial Port of Debarkation and then onward to the airport nearest the member's R&R leave destination. This change will also apply to a civilian authorized R&R leave in accordance with reference (b).

In accordance with reference (b), as Executive Agent, the Army is responsible for managing implementation in coordination with the DoD Comptroller, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), and the Joint Staff.


Charles S. Abell
Principal Deputy





**Force Management
Policy**

**THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(Personnel and Readiness)
4000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-4000**

Facsimile Cover Sheet

| | |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| From: <i>CPT Albrycht</i> | To: <i>Mr. Lohse</i> |
| Office: OUSD(P&R) | Office: <i>ERIC SC</i> |
| Phone: (b)(6) | Phone: (b)(6) |
| Fax: | Fax: |

Number of Pages with Cover: _____

Comments:

*As requested. Sorry for the
delay.*

1/2
1/30

C&D
SMOOTH & SON

Mr D: SAM
FOR REVIEW
M 1/2
Purman
1/5

The Honorable Jim Ramstad
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abel is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail of you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dennis Moore
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore:

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter concerning the rest and recuperation leave program for U.S. forces serving in Iraq.

You may know that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

Mr. Abell is available to brief you or your staff in greater detail if you desire.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

2 ITRS
- Ramstad
- Moore

The Honorable Jim Ramstad
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-2303

Dear Representative Ramstad,

concerning the rest and recuperation program for US forces serving in & .
Thanks for the copy of your recent letter on P.L. 108-106. ~~It is a pleasure for me to~~
~~I am happy to report that~~ ^{You may know that} Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for
Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding
Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of
December.

~~If you would like additional information in the month of December, Mr. Shell would be available to brief you on your staff's greatest detail if you desire.~~
I appreciate your strong support of our troops.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



Larry Di Rita
12/30

Note: ITR from JCS asks this to be
retroactive to 1 Oct. - it appears
this did not happen.

The Honorable Dennis Moore
United States House of Representatives
Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-1603

Dear Representative Moore,

Thanks for the copy of your recent letter on P.L. 108-106.

I am happy to report that Charles Abell, Principal Deputy for Personnel and Readiness, signed the Memorandum on Funding Onward Transportation for Rest and Recuperation Leave on the 19th of December.

I appreciate your strong support of our troops.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1525-04

17 February 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 2/14

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

- **Question.** "Do you feel we are pursuing these 'getting joint' items I mention in the attached memo? We have to figure a way to get joint earlier, to get responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command, to develop initiatives and suggestions, and to instruct the Service Secretaries." (TAB A)
- **Answer.** We have made significant progress in each of these areas, and are pursuing meaningful, relevant answers. "Getting joint" is the focus of on-going actions and initiatives in the Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. Specific details concerning on-going actions are contained in the information paper at TAB B.

COORDINATION: TAB C

Attachments
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director J-3; (b)(6)

322

17 Feb 04

11-L-0559/OSD/46102

U22138 / 03

July 30, 2002 7:05 AM

Handwritten signature and initials in black ink. The signature appears to be 'J. B. ...' and the initials below it are 'M. ...'. There is a large 'A' at the end of the signature.

SUBJECT: Getting Joint

We have to figure out a way to get joint earlier.

Some thoughts:

- 1. Get the joint responsibilities from the Joint Staff down to Joint Forces Command.**
- 2. Instruct the Service Secretaries.**
- 3. The best joint service is with the CINC, rather than the Joint Staff.**
- 4. Ask Cebrowski for initiatives.**
- 5. Ask Buck Kernan to give us a series of suggestions.**

DHR:dh
073002-1

Tab A

28 January 2004

TAB B
INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Getting Joint

1. Purpose. To provide additional information the SecDef's questions concerning "gettingjoint."

2. Key Points

- SecDef memo dated 30 July 2002 articulated a need to "figure out a way to get joint earlier," and articulated several thoughts along those lines.
- Pursuing meaningful, relevant answers to the "gettingjoint" items listed by the SecDef is the focus of related, on-going projects/actions in the Secretariat, Service headquarters, selected combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. They include:
 - US Strategic Command: Unified Command Plan (UCP) assumption of responsibility for Global Strike, C4ISR, integrated missile defense, and DOD Information Operations.
 - US Special Operations Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility as the supported combatant commander for planning selected global war on terrorism missions and for exercising command and control of missions in support of selected campaigns if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
 - US Transportation Command: When approved, UCP assumption of responsibility for global patient movement, redeployment, terminal management and joint distribution process ownership.
 - US Joint Forces Command:
 - Developing a capability to monitor and report to OSD the status of Operational Availability capability packages in support of providing immediate response, focused and conclusive campaign forces to the combatant commanders. This initiative directly supports the CJCS efforts on Global Force Management/Joint Force Manager.

Tab B

11-L-0559/OSD/46104

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters. To improve combatant command joint warfighting capabilities, USJFCOM is fielding the Standing Joint Force Headquarters prototype to the five regional combatant commands by FY05, to include enabling prototypes for joint command and control that push jointness to operational level and below.
- Developing the Joint Manpower Exchange Program, a Permanent Change of Station exchange of officers and senior enlisted personnel among USJFCOM Service component operational headquarters (e.g., Marine Expeditionary Forces, Army Corps, Navy Fleets and numbered Air Forces), designed to improve joint expertise in training, planning, and operations, as well as provide a “jump start” in response to potential tasking to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters.
- To further improve joint warfighting at the combatant command and lower levels, USJFCOM is undertaking a concerted effort to collect, assess and disseminate joint lessons learned from on-going operations. Once validated, joint lessons learned are utilized to improve concept development, training, integration, and deployment.
- USJFCOM UCP designation as:
 - Lead joint force integrator, including responsibility for:
 - Supporting the development and integration of fully interoperable C4ISR systems and capabilities for joint warfighting.
 - Serving as the DOD executive agent for Joint Concept Development & Experimentation, including development and integration of Joint Operating Concepts and associated Joint Integrating Concepts that improve future joint warfighting and coordinate the joint experimentation efforts of the combatant commands and Services.
 - Serving as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, responsible for maintaining the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection, including collaborative efforts to improve joint, multinational and interagency deployment operations. This initiative effectively moves responsibility for joint deployment from the Joint Staff to USJFCOM.
 - The lead agent for joint force training, including combatant command battlestaffs, JTF headquarters, JTF functional component

commands and their staffs, as well as interoperability training of forces that are to operate as part of joint/combined task forces (including interagency and multinational participation in current and future training). In 2004, USJFCOM will establish the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) by linking previously independent Service ranges together in a network that can be used for joint training and experimentation.

- Joint force provider of assigned CONUS-based forces, responsible for deploying trained and ready joint forces in response to supported combatant command requirements.
- CJCS with Joint Chiefs
 - Developing the Global Force Management (GFM) process that integrates apportionment, assignment, and allocation methodologies to better align planning and defense strategy requirements.
 - Working the GFM-related effort to designate an organization as the single Joint Force Manager responsible for executing the GFM process.
 - Developing force allocation processes based on articulating capabilities desired to achieve effects and outcomes rather than requests for troops or platforms. As these processes are developed, they will be codified through development of the *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* and CJCS Instruction 3170.01C.
 - Developing and implementing changes in how we educate and train the joint force. This includes enhancements to Joint Professional Military Education, to include programs designed to foster an understanding of joint warfighting earlier in a Service member's career as well as programs to increase the number of senior officers skilled in joint operational art and campaign planning through the establishment of a Joint Advanced Warfighting School. Senior general/flag officer courses are also in development. Changes in joint force training include, in conjunction with USJFCOM, establishing the JNTC in FY04.
 - Maintaining a robust Chairman's Exercise Program that directly supports combatant command joint exercises, and promotes joint, interagency, and--where possible--multilateral participation.

- Secretariat
 - OSD(P&R): Developing the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to establish a capabilities-based, adaptive, near real-time readiness reporting system. DRRS will have an initial operating capability in FY04, and full operating capability in FY07.
- Services
 - Developing modular force design concepts that describe the Service capabilities required to drive modular design at appropriate levels within each Service and develop options for implementation and integration.
- Pursuing answers and developing implementation plans for these multiple, crosscutting initiatives will inevitably create seams and friction points among the multiple stakeholders that are responsible for these actions. The Joint Chiefs are committed to minimizing these points of friction.
- Full implementation of selected long-term solutions to these “getting joint” items may require statutory changes, regulatory changes, or delegation of Secretarial authority.

TAB A

December 27, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Getting Joint

Do you feel we are pursuing these "gettingjoint" items I mention in the attached memo?

Thanks.

Attach.
7/30/02 SecDefMFR [073002-1]

DHR:dh
122703-35 (to computer)

.....
Please respond by 1/31/04

720
~~FOUO~~



December 31, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *Donald Rumsfeld*
SUBJECT: Article by Victor Davis Hanson

Mr. President,

Attached is an article I hesitated to send to you, but when we talked on the phone yesterday, this subject came up. Fortunately, there are thoughtful folks who agree with what we are doing and are willing to put it down on paper with some historical context.

I believe you read some of Victor Davis Hanson's books.

Happy New Year.

Respectfully,

Attach.
12/23/04. *National Review* article by Victor Davis Hanson

DHR:as
123004-15 (rs)

ITR


31 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

USD 00001-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46109

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Victor Davis Hanson

NRO Contributor



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December 23, 2004, 8:21 a.m.

Leave Rumsfeld Be

He is not to blame for our difficulties.

The *Washington Post* recently warned that doctors are urging interested parties of all types to get their flu shots before the "scarce" vaccine is thrown out. But how is such a surfeit possible when our national media scared us to death just a few months ago with the specter of a national flu epidemic, corporate malfeasance, and Bush laxity? That perfect storm of incompetence and skullduggery purportedly combined to leave us vulnerable to mass viral attack. So how can the *Post* now characterize something as "scarce" that is soon to be discarded for a want of takers? Was there too much or too little vaccine?

The answer, of course, is the usual media-inspired flight from reason that overwhelms this country at various times — hype playing on our fears and groupthink to create a sudden story when there really is none. And now with the renewed attack on Donald Rumsfeld we are back to more of the flu-shot hysteria that has been so common in this war. Remember the pseudo-crises of the past four years — the quagmire in week three in Afghanistan or the sandstorm bog-down in Iraq?

Let us not forget either all the Orwellian logic: Clinton's past deleterious military slashes that nevertheless explained the present win in Afghanistan, or his former appeasement of bin Laden that now accounts for the successful doctrine of fighting terror. Or recall the harebrained schemes we should have adopted — the uninvited automatic airlifting of an entire division into the high peaks of Islamic, nuclear Pakistan to cut off the tribal fugitives from Tora Bora? Or have we put out of our memories

How did the U.S. attain its current international preeminence? Where will its unmatched influence lead?

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FROM THE AUTHOR

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[Leave Rumsfeld Be](#)
 12/23

[Cracked Icons](#) 12/17

[Gay Old Times?](#)
 12/16

[The Error of Europe](#)
 12/10

[Previous Articles](#)

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 are not just the
 of history. Read
 latest.

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NR TODAY

[Dennis: Holiday](#)
[\(Thanks\)giving](#)
 12/23 12:57 p.m.

A38-3

the brilliant trial balloons of a Taliban coalition government and the all Islamic post-Taliban occupation forces?

So it is with the latest feeding-frenzy over Donald Rumsfeld. His recent spur-of-the-moment — but historically plausible — remarks to the effect that one goes to war with the army one has rather than the army one wishes for angered even conservatives. The demands for his head are to be laughed off from an unserious Maureen Dowd — ranting on spec about the shadowy neocon triad of Wolfowitz, Feith, and Perle — but taken seriously from a livid Bill Kristol or Trent Lott. Rumsfeld is, of course, a blunt and proud man, and thus can say things off the cuff that in studied retrospect seem strikingly callous rather than forthright. No doubt he has chewed out officers who deserved better. And perhaps his quip to the scripted, not-so-impromptu question was not his best moment. *But his resignation would be a grave mistake for this country at war, for a variety of reasons.*

First, according to reports, the unit in question had 784 of its 804 vehicles up-armored. Humvees are transportation and support assets that traditionally have never been so protected. That the fluid lines in Iraq are different not just from those in World War II or Korea, but even Vietnam, Gulf War I, Mogadishu, and Afghanistan became clear only over months. Yet it also in fact explains why we are seeing 80 to 90 percent of these neo-Jeeps already retrofitted. In an army replete with Bradleys and Abramses, no one could have known before Iraq that Hummers would need to become armored vehicles as well. Nevertheless all of them will be in a fleet of many thousands in less than 18 months. Would that World War II Sherman tanks after three years in the field had enough armor to stop a single *Panzerfaust*. At war's end German teenagers with cheap proto-RPGs were still incinerating Americans in their "Ronson Lighters."

Second, being unprepared in war is, tragically, nothing new. It now seems near criminal that Americans fought in North Africa with medium Stuart tanks, whose 37-millimeter cannons ("pea-shooters" or "squirrel guns") and thin skins ensured the deaths of hundreds of GIs. Climbing into *Devastator* torpedo bombers was tantamount to a death sentence in 1942; when fully armed and flown into a headwind, these airborne relics were lucky to make 100 knots — not quite as bad as sending fabric Brewster *Buffaloes* up against *Zeros*. Yet FDR and George Marshall, both responsible for U.S. military preparedness, had plenty of time to see what Japan and Germany were doing in the late 1930s. Under the present logic of retrospective perfection, both had years to ensure our boys adequate planes and tanks — and thus should have resigned when the death toll of tankers and pilots soared.

Even by 1945 both the Germans and the Russians still had better armor than the Americans. In the first months of Korea, our early

Robbins: You Have to Believe
12/23 12:33 p.m.

Novak: The Power of Christmas
12/23 11:43 a.m.

Woodlief: My Christmas Story
12/23 11:39 a.m.

Kaza: Kaza: A Merry Corporate Christmas 12/23 11:09 a.m.

Levin: RE: Mark R. Levin, A Great But Misguided American 12/23 10:41 a.m.

Derbyshire: 2004 Sing Along 12/23 10:33 a.m.

Q&A: Good Stuff 12/23 9:57 a.m.

Norman: A Christmas Brew! 12/23 9:54 a.m.

Loconte: They All Want Him... 12/23 9:51 a.m.

Basham: All Secure at Christmas 12/23 9:45 a.m.

Campbell: What Child Is This? 12/23 9:42 a.m.

Goldberg: Down With the French! 12/23 9:38 a.m.

Tammy: The Savings-Rate Myth 12/23 9:33 a.m.

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squadrons of F-80s were no match for superior Mig-15s. Early-model M-16 rifles jammed with tragic frequency in Vietnam. The point is not to excuse the military naiveté and ill-preparedness that unnecessarily take lives, but to accept that the onslaught of war is sometimes unforeseen and its unfolding course persistently unpredictable. Ask the Israelis about the opening days of the Yom Kippur War, when their armor was devastated by hand-held Soviet-made anti-tank guns and their vaunted American-supplied air force almost neutralized by SAMs — laxity on the part of then perhaps the world's best military a mere six years after a previous run-in with Soviet-armed Arab enemies.

Third, the demand for Rumsfeld's scalp is also predicated on supposedly too few troops in the theater. But here too the picture is far more complicated. Vietnam was no more secure with 530,000 American soldiers in 1968 than it was with 24,000 in 1972. How troops are used, rather than their sheer numbers, is the key to the proper force deployment — explaining why Alexander the Great could take a Persian empire of 2 million square miles with an army less than 50,000, while earlier Xerxes with 500,000 on land and sea could not subdue tiny Greece, one-fortieth of Persia's size.

Offensive action, not troop numbers alone, creates deterrence; mere patrolling and garrison duty will always create an insatiable demand for ever more men and an enormously visible American military bureaucracy — and a perennial Iraqi dependency on someone else to protect the nascent democracy. Thus if the argument can be made that Rumsfeld was responsible for either disbanding the Iraqi army or the April stand-down from Fallujah — the latter being the worst American military decision since Mogadishu — then he deserves our blame. But so far, from what we know, the near-fatal decision to pull-back from Fallujah was made from either above Rumsfeld (e.g., the election-eve White House) or below him (Paul Bremmer and the Iraqi provisional government).

In truth, the real troop problem transcends Iraq. Our shortages are caused by a military that was slashed after the Cold War and still hasn't properly recouped to meet the global demands of the war against Islamic fascism — resulting in rotation nightmares, National Guard emergencies, and stop-order controversies. The amazing victories in Afghanistan and Iraq not only set up unrealistic expectations about the ease of implementing post-bellum democracy among tribal Islamic societies, but also allowed the public, the Congress, and the president not to mobilize to confront the strategic challenges facing the United States that now pose a more serious threat than did the 1980s Soviet Union.

We are left with an unhinged nuclear dictatorship in North Korea



A38-5

threatening an increasingly appeasing and pacifistic South. Taiwan could be swallowed up in days or destroyed in hours by a bullying, resource-hungry China staking out a new co-prosperity sphere in the Pacific, one every bit as ambitious as imperial Japan's. Iran's nukes will soon be able to hit a triangulating Europe, and Islamists seek our destruction at home while we implement liberal governments in Iraq and Afghanistan.


All this peril came on us suddenly and without warning — at a time of recession and following the vast arms cuts of the 1990s, a trillion in lost commerce and outright damage from 9/11, oil spikes, huge trade deficits, increased entitlements, and tax cuts. If Mr. Rumsfeld is responsible for all that, perhaps then we can ask him to step aside as culpable for our present absence of enough soldiers in the U.S. military.

In reality, he has carefully allotted troops in Iraq because he has few to spare elsewhere — and all for reasons beyond his control. If Senator Lott or kindred pundits first show us exactly where the money is to come from to enlarge the military (tax hikes, cuts in new Medicare entitlements, or budgetary freezes?), and, second, that Mr. Rumsfeld opposes expanding our defense budget — "No, President Bush, I don't need any more money, since the Clinton formula was about right for our present responsibilities" — then he should be held responsible. So far that has not happened.


Fourth, we hear of purportedly misplaced allocations of resources. Thus inadequate Humvees are now the focus of our slurs — our boys die while we are wasting money on pie-in-the-sky ABMs. But next month the writs may be about our current obsession with tactical minutiae — if Iran shoots off a test missile with a simultaneous announcement of nuclear acquisition. So then expect, "Why did Rumsfeld rush to spend billions on Humvee armor, when millions of Americans were left vulnerable to Iran's nukes without a viable ABM system come to full completion?"

Fifth, have we forgotten what Mr. Rumsfeld did right? Not just plenty, but plenty of things that almost anyone else would *not* have done. Does anyone think the now-defunct Crusader artillery platform would have saved lives in Iraq or helped to lower our profile in the streets of Baghdad? How did it happen that our forces in Iraq are the first army in our history to wear practicable body armor? And why are over 95 percent of our wounded suddenly surviving — at miraculous rates that far exceeded even those in the first Gulf War? If the secretary of Defense is to be blamed for renegade roguery at Abu Ghraib or delays in up-arming Humvees, is he to be praised for the system of getting a mangled Marine to Waller Reed in 36 hours?

RIGHT
BRITISH
CRUISE 2
BUCKLEY
O'BRIEN
JOHNSON
MOONARD
PRYCE-JE
NORDLIN
 LONDON • EMB
 WATERFORD • B
 DUBLIN • LIVER
 DORSET • SWIN



Thorn
Burge
 Your little
 will prize it
 click



And who pushed to re-deploy thousands of troops out of Europe, and to re-station others in Korea? Or were we to keep ossified bases in perpetuity in the logic of the Cold War while triangulating allies grew ever-more appeasing to our enemies and more gnarly to us, their complacent protectors?

The blame with this war falls not with Donald Rumsfeld. We are more often the problem — our mercurial mood swings and demands for instant perfection devoid of historical perspective about the tragic nature of god-awful war. Our military has waged two brilliant campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. There has been an even more inspired postwar success in Afghanistan where elections were held in a country deemed a hopeless Dark-Age relic. A thousand brave Americans gave their lives in combat to ensure that the most wicked nation in the Middle East might soon be the best, and the odds are that those remarkable dead, not the columnists in New York, will be proven right — no thanks to post-facto harping from thousands of American academics and insiders in chorus with that continent of appeasement Europe.

Out of the ashes of September 11, a workable war exegesis emerged because of students of war like Don Rumsfeld: Terrorists do not operate alone, but only through the aid of rogue states; Islamicists hate us for who we are, not the alleged grievances outlined in successive and always-metamorphosing loony fatwas; the temper of bin Laden's infomercials hinges only on how bad he is doing; and multilateralism is not necessarily moral, but often an amoral excuse either to do nothing or to do bad — ask the U.N. that watched Rwanda and the Balkans die or the dozens of profiteering nations who in concert robbed Iraq and enriched Saddam.

Donald Rumsfeld is no Les Aspin or William Cohen, but a rare sort of secretary of the caliber of George Marshall. I wish he were more media-savvy and could ape Bill Clinton's lip-biting and furrowed brow. He should, but, alas, cannot. Nevertheless, we will regret it immediately if we drive this proud and honest-speaking visionary out of office, even as his hard work and insight are bringing us ever closer to victory.

— *Victor Davis Hanson is a military historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His website is victorhanson.com.*

• • •

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A38-7

December 31, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
CC: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Possibilities for the Team

I got a call from Antonio Martino, the MOD of Italy. He said he's got a retired three star who has been in Iraq, speaks perfect English, who is excellent, and he'd like to put him on the team. He also has a brigadier general who does not speak English, but is very good. He is Carabinieri and he's very good on the mafia aspect of it, and he thought maybe he should send both of them. Why don't you talk to Gary Luck and see what they think?

Italy

I
DHR:ms
123104-9 (b)

.....
Please respond by _____

31 Dec 04

SUSAN M. COLLINS
MAINE

172 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1904
(202) 224-2523
(202) 224-2893 (FAX)

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1904

COMMITTEES:
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, CHAIRMAN
ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON AGING
JOINT ECONOMIC

December 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary,


During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 2, 2004, I expressed repeated concerns to Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee about the shortages of body armor and fortified Humvees for military personnel in Iraq. While Mr. Brownlee asserted that progress had been made, I remain concerned that, more than eight months later, the Department of Defense still has been unable to ensure that our troops have the equipment they need to perform their mission as safely as possible.

In his testimony, Acting Secretary Brownlee stated, "The requirement for up-armored Humvees proportionally had never been that great, because their performance is somewhat degraded by the heavy weight of the armor. So there wasn't a feeling that all Humvees should be up-armored." He continued saying the operational environment shifted and the Army realized all soldiers were potentially exposed to IED attacks, particularly against convoys. Mr. Brownlee admitted the operational environment required a much higher demand for Humvees than initially planned. After this admission, I am very concerned that it appears the Pentagon failed to do everything in its power to increase production of up-armored Humvees.

During the town-hall style meeting with deployed troops in Kuwait last week, your response to a soldier's question about the lack of armor was troubling. You stated the Army is moving to produce as many armored Humvees as possible, yet apparently only after the soldier's complaint did the Army request Armor Holdings in Jacksonville to produce an additional 100 Humvees a month. Thus far, the Pentagon has received only 5,910 of the 8,105 of factory-armored Humvees commanders say they need. Why was this request not placed earlier to increase fully armored Humvee production from 450 to 550 a month at a time when many of us brought to the Pentagon's attention the shortages relayed to us by our constituent-troops and their families?

Additionally, a company finishing a \$30 million contract with the Pentagon this month to make 1,500 armor kits for Humvees is only working at 50 percent capacity and recently made the Pentagon aware it could produce much more.

OSD 00039-05

 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/46116

Given that so American soldiers have died or been seriously injured in Iraq as a result of improvised explosive devices or in ambushes from rocket-propelled grenades, the urgent requirement for armor protection remains. Armored and up-armored vehicles, as well as body armor, are critical in protecting our men and women in uniform while serving in this hostile environment. I look forward to hearing from you regarding the need for additional armored vehicles in Iraq.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Susan Collins". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'S'.

Susan M. Collins
United States Senator



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 2005

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

I received your letter regarding the status of armor and protective equipment for troops deployed to Iraq. As you know, this is a matter the Department has addressed with a sense of urgency for more than a year. Senior officials in the Department have provided updates in the matter regularly to those in Congress who have inquired. I have enclosed a DoD fact sheet on the issues, as well as a transcript of a briefing offered by Senior Army planners.

I have forwarded your letter to Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, and asked him to provide any additional information and respond to your specific questions on procurement as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

OSD 00039-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46118

451

4 JAN 05

15 DEC 04

210
1600



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 FEB -3 AM 9:56

ACTION MEMO
DEF SEC DEF
HAS SEEN
APPROVED - w/
FEB 19 2005
Changes

Nyfa

January 24, 2005, 10:00 am.

451

7
Pub

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 07 FEB 2005 Dep Sec Action _____

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor

- Senator Collins expressed concern over the production of Up-Armored HMMWVs, Armor Kits and Body Armor.
- The proposed response at TAB A identifies the Army's efforts to increase production? and where goals have been met.
- Proposed response advises that the Army is adapting to meet the needs of four Soldiers serving in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.
- Incoming letter from Senator Collins at TAB B.
- TAB D IS INTERIM RESPONSE FROM 4 JAN

24 JAN 05

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the draft response to Senator Collins at TAB A by initialing: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

COORDINATION: ~~Name~~ Tab C

Attachments:
As stated

*Sir -
Army is asking for your
approval @ TAB A... See
Harvey will sign name.*

DEP SEC DEF DECISION:

APPROVED: With changes PW el/d/as

DISAPPROVED: _____

OTHER: _____

Prepared By: Paul Shigeta, SALL-CID (b)(6)

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| ESR MA | <i>2/8</i> | | |

15 DEC 04

OSD 00039-05

160
ORIGINAL

**SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON**

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

ZED FEB -8 AM 9:56

January 24, 2005, 10:00 am.



FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dep Sec Action _____

07 FEB 2005

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor

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COORDINATION: ~~None~~ Tab C

P. W. handle

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Paul Shigeta, SALL-CID, (b)(6)

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ORIGINAL

OSD 00039-05

A45-2

2/10 - negated. orig cannot be located. JMS

DRAFT

January 4

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to reply to follow up on his reply to of December 15

Thank you for your letter regarding Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Armor kit production and body armor. Force protection is one of our top priorities and the Army has aggressively worked to provide the highest level of protection to our Soldiers as rapidly as possible.

The Army remains committed to expediting the required force protection equipment to our Soldiers in the field. In fact the Army has gone to great lengths to speed acquisition of the necessary equipment. Up-armor is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. The Army is aggressively integrating a **host** of capabilities and measures in **an** effort to better **protect** Soldiers and Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Units in theater have successfully employed IED countermeasures to reduce their vulnerability to IEDs. Units in theater are adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy IED tactics. All Army units conduct live, virtual and constructive **predeployment** training at home station and at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided by units currently operating in theater. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely **on** armor protection, but **also** realize that force protection requires the integration **of** a host of different capabilities.

to pg 2

In the area of Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAH), **more** than 6,400 **of** the required 8,275 UAHs have now been delivered to theater. In May 2003, the UAH production rate was 30 per month. As requirements were identified, validated, and funded, the Army pressed, in October 2003, for a rapid increase in UAH production. Initial estimates from O'Gara Hess (OGW) (**now** owned by Armor Holdings) were that given sufficient lead time (3-4 months) they could increase the production rate by 50 vehicles each month over four months to achieve a maximum rate of 230 vehicles per month. After additional negotiations, in **early** February 2004, OGH and American Motors General (AM General) concluded that 450 vehicles was the maximum achievable production rate. AM General and OGH **proceeded** to achieve a production rate of 450 vehicles per month by September 2004, one month ahead of schedule.

In mid-November 2004, the Army was made aware that Armor Holdings could increase their production capacity by another 100 **vehicles** per month. Secretary of the Army Harvey directed, on December 10, 2004, that the Armor Holdings' contract **be** modified, accordingly. Armor Holdings advised the Army that increased production to 550 vehicles per month will be achieved in March 2005.

Regarding your question on Armor kits, Armor Works was contracted, on May 3, 2004, to produce 1,490 troop carrier kits and on September 27, 2004, an additional 150 kits for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, which was the total validated requirement for that specific kit. The final delivery of those kits will occur in February 2005. No additional purchase of that kit is planned at this time since the entire requirement will have been satisfied.

Finally, in the area of Body Armor, on April 29, 2004, Coalition Forces Land Component Command reported that 100 percent of the requirement for Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) in both the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters had been achieved. A set of Interceptor **Body** Armor (IBA) consists of an Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and a set of ballistic **inserts**, often times referred to as Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). An additional 10,000 plus sets of IBA are maintained in theater to support **any** contingency requirements.

As of November 30, 2004, the Army has fielded 599,633 OTVs and 453,874 **SAPI** sets across the Army. The Army has provided **over** 18,000 OTVs and SAPI sets to joint and interagency organizations in **support** of the Global War on Terrorism. The current Army Procurement Objective (APO) is 840,000 sets of IBA. Production increased to 25,000 sets of IBA per month starting in December 2003, employing eight vendors, and has remained at that level ever since.

the lives of service men and women
The Army **is** rapidly adapting to protect American ~~lives and equipment~~ engaged in Operation **Enduring Freedom** and Operation **Iraqi Freedom**. Force protection of our troops in **the** field remains a top priority for the Army. **Thank you** for your continued interest in **our** Soldiers as the Army fights the Global War on Terrorism.

Sincerely,

DRAFT

from pg. 1

348
1600-



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

UPDATED HOLD
AS OF 2/16/05
1870 - JL

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

2005 FEB -8 AM 9:56

January 24, 2005, 10:00 am.

Pub
7

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 07 FEB 2005

Dep Sec Action _____

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor

- Senator Collins expressed concern over the production of Up-Armored HMMWVs, Armor Kits and Body Armor.
- The proposed response at TAB A identifies the Army's efforts to increase production, and where goals have been met.
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- Incoming letter from Senator Collins at TAB B.
- TAB D IS INTERIM RESPONSE FROM 4 JAN

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the draft response to Senator Collins at TAB A by initialing: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

COORDINATION: ~~None~~ Tab C

Attachments:
As stated

DEPSECDEF DECISION

APPROVED: _____

~~DEFERRED~~

OTHER: _____

Prepared By: Paul Shigeta, SALL-CID, (b)(6)

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| EXEC SEC | M 2/8 | | |
| ESR MA | J 2/8 | | |

OSD 00039-05

ORIGINAL

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ZNS FEB -8 AM 9:56

ACTION MEMO

January 24, 2005, 10:00 am.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dep Sec Action _____

07 FEB 2005

FROM: Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor

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- TAB D IS INTERIM RESPONSE FROM 4 Jan

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the draft response to Senator Collins at TAB A by initialing: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

COORDINATION: None - Tab C

Attachments:
As stated

R. W. Handley

Prepared By: Paul Shigeta, SALL-CID, (b)(6)

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| ESR MA | 248 | | |

11-L-0559/OSD/46124

OSD 00039-05

A45-

2/10 - negated. orig cannot be located. JPM

A

DRAFT

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

Thank you for your letter regarding Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Armor kit production and body armor. Force protection is one of our top priorities and the Army has aggressively worked to provide the highest level of protection to our Soldiers as rapidly as possible.

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The Army is rapidly adapting to protect American lives and equipment engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Force protection of our troops in the field remains a top priority for the Army. Thank you for your continued interest in our Soldiers as the Army fights the Global War on Terrorism.

Sincerely,

DRAFT

B

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 January 10, 2005

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Collins

Please get me a **copy** of the letter ~~from~~ Susan Collins complaining about armor. I want to approve the answer to her.

Thanks.

DHR:as
011005-12

.....
Please respond by 1/14/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/46129

OSD 00039-05

SUSAN M. COLLINS

NAME

173 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1804
(202) 224-2923
(202) 224-2883 (FAX)

COMMITTEES:
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Chairman
ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL COMMITTEE
ON AGING
JOINT ECONOMIC

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1804

December 15, 2004

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary,

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 2, 2004, I expressed repeated concerns to Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee about the shortages of body armor and fortified Humvees for military personnel in Iraq. While Mr. Brownlee asserted that progress had been made, I remain concerned that, more than eight months later, the Department of Defense still has been unable to ensure that our troops have the equipment they need to perform their mission as safely as possible.

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Additionally, a company finishing a \$30 million contract with the Pentagon this month to make 1,500 armor kits for Humvees is only working at 50 percent capacity and recently made the Pentagon aware it could produce much more.

OSD 00039-05

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

11-L-0559/OSD/46130

Given that so American soldiers have died or been seriously injured in Iraq as a result of improvised explosive devices or in ambushes from rocket-propelled grenades, the urgent requirement for armor protection remains. Armored and up-armored vehicles, as well as body armor, are critical in protecting our men and women in uniform while serving in this hostile environment. I look forward to hearing from you regarding the need for additional armored vehicles in Iraq.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Susan Collins". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "S".

Susan M. Collins
United States Senator

C

Coordination Page

OSD-LA



Mr. Dan Stanley, January 25, 2005



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2/16/05
1230

2005 FEB 16 05 12
MCM 0008-05

INFO MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, Director, Joint Staff
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

NASchwartz

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor

- **Answer.** In response to your request (TAB A), the Director, J-4, and I have reviewed Secretary Harvey's response to Senator Collins.
- **Analysis.** The Joint Staff confirms that the Army's draft letter to Senator Collins (TAB B) is factually correct.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Duucan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

Follow up 2/16

| | | | |
|----------|---------------|--------------------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | <i>[Signature]</i> | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | <i>[Signature]</i> | |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M/2/16</i> | | |
| ESR MA | | | |

OSD 00039-05

TAB A



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

2/12

Get DJS - J-4 cond
quickly.

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/46136

2/16

BACK
1230
2/16

TAB A

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant

14 February 2005 - 1035 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPTAIN MARRIOTT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor


Sir:

Please take action to obtain coordination requested by Mr. Patterson,
per his snowflake which reads:

“Get DJS / J-4 Coordination – QUICKLY.”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:

OSD 00039-05

Suspense: Wednesday, 16 February 2005

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/46137

TAB B

TAB B

DRAFT

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

Thank you for your letter regarding Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Armor kit production and body armor. Force protection is one of our top priorities and the Army has aggressively worked to provide the highest level of protection to our Soldiers as rapidly as possible.

The Army remains committed to expediting the required force protection equipment to our Soldiers in the field. In fact the Army has gone to great lengths to speed up the acquisition of the necessary equipment. Up-armor is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (IED) threat. The Army is aggressively integrating a host of capabilities and measures in an effort to better protect Soldiers and Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Units in theater have successfully employed IED countermeasures to reduce their vulnerability to IEDs. Units in theater are adapting and evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy IED tactics. All Army units conduct live, virtual and constructive predeployment training at home station and at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided by units currently operating in theater. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely on armor protection, but also realize that force protection requires the integration of a host of different capabilities.

In the area of Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAH), more than 6,400 of the required 8,275 UAHs have now been delivered to theater. In May 2003, the UAH production rate was 30 per month. As requirements were identified, validated, and funded, the Army pressed, in October 2003, for a rapid increase in UAH production. Initial estimates from O'Gara Hess (OGH) (now owned by Armor Holdings) were that given sufficient lead time (3-4 months) they could increase the production rate by 50 vehicles each month over four months to achieve a maximum rate of 230 vehicles per month. After additional negotiations, in early February 2004, OGH and American Motors General (AM General) concluded that 450 vehicles was *the* maximum achievable production rate. AM General and OGH proceeded to achieve a production rate of 450 vehicles per month by September 2004, one month ahead of schedule.

Tab B

In mid-November 2004, the Army was made aware that Armor Holdings could increase their production capacity by another 100 vehicles per month. Secretary of the Army Harvey directed, on December 10, 2004, that the Armor Holdings' contract be modified, accordingly. Armor Holdings advised the Army that increased production to 550 vehicles per month will be achieved in March 2005.

Regarding your question on Armor kits, Armor Works was contracted, on May 3, 2004, to produce 1,490 troop carrier kits and on September 27, 2004, an additional 150 kits for the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, which was the total validated requirement for that specific kit. The final delivery of those kits will occur in February 2005. No additional purchase of that kit is planned at this time since the entire requirement will have been satisfied.

Finally, in the area of Body Armor, on April 29, 2004, Coalition Forces Land Component Command reported that 100 percent of the requirement for Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) in both the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters had been achieved. A set of Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of an Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) and a set of ballistic inserts, often times referred to as Small Arms Protective Inserts (SAPI). An additional 10,000 plus sets of IBA are maintained in theater to support any contingency requirements.

As of November 30, 2004 the Army has fielded 599,633 OTVs and 453,874 SAPI sets across the Army. The Army has provided over 18,000 OTVs and SAPI sets to joint and interagency organizations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The current Army Procurement Objective (APO) is 840,000 sets of IBA. Production increased to 25,000 sets of IBA per month starting in December 2003, employing eight vendors, and has remained at that level ever since.

The Army is rapidly adapting to protect American lives and equipment engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. *Force* protection of our troops in the field remains a top priority for the Army. Thank you for your continued interest in our Soldiers as the Army fights the Global War on Terrorism.

Sincerely,

DRAFT

Tab B

D



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 2005

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

I received your letter regarding the status of armor and protective equipment for troops deployed to Iraq. As you know, this is a matter the Department has addressed with a sense of urgency for more than a year. Senior officials in the Department have provided updates in the matter regularly to those in Congress who have inquired. I have enclosed a DoD fact sheet on the issues, as well as a transcript of a briefing offered by Senior Army planners.

I have forwarded your letter to Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, and asked him to provide any additional information and respond to your specific questions on procurement **as soon as possible**.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

OSD 00039-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46142

4 1

4 JAN 05

15 DEC 04

TAB A

**OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Military Assistant**

14 February 2005 - 1035 Hours

MEMORANDUM FOR: CAPTAIN MARRIOTT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor


Sir:

Please take action to obtain coordination requested by Mr. Patterson,
per his snowflake which reads:

“Get DJS / J-4 Coordination - QUICKLY.”

Thank you.

Very respectfully,



Sean E. O'Connor
Captain, USN
Military Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Attachment:
OSD 00039-05

Suspense: Wednesday, 16 February 2005

451

14 Feb 05

15 Dec 04

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/46143

1 Sgt Blanco
00039-05

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ACTION REPORT

(CCD) WHS Room 3A948. Suspense Desk: (b)(6) FAX Number (b)(6) Action Agency SA
 (b)(6) Email: suspense_desk@osd.pentagon.mil Suspense Date 11/24/2005

- a. ACTION HAS BEEN COMPLETED (Copy attached)
- b. REQUEST EXTENSION OF SUSPENSE DATE TO [] (Justify below)
- c. INTERIM REPLY HAS BEEN SENT (Copy attached) EXTEND SUSPENSE TO **4 FEB 05** (Justify below)
- d. REQUEST CANCELLATION (Justify below)
- e. REQUEST TRANSFER TO [] (Justify below include POC Name & Phone Number)
- f. REQUEST DOWNGRADE TO [] (Justify below)

2. JUSTIFICATION

Response has been pending coordination with ASD LA since 14 Jan 05. Per OSD guidance, response must be approved by Secretary of Defense prior to being signed. Request extension to route thru Secretary of the Army to Secretary of Defense and back to Army for signature of final response.

50 100206

3. REPORTING AGENCY

a. ACTION AGENCY: SALL-CID-SPA

b. NAME OF ACTION OFFICER: Paul Stigela

e. APPROVING AUTHORITY (Service Secretary/Under Secretary/ASD/Military Executive Assistant Level)
 Signature: *Wally Clark*
 Date Signed: 25 JAN 05
WALLY CLARK, LTC, GS, DDEC

c. TELEPHONE NO: (b)(6)

d. DATE: 01/21/2005

4. CCD CONTROL #: OSD 00039-05

5. ACTION TAKEN (For EXSEC/ Correspondence Control Division Use Only)

| | | |
|---------------------|--|--------------------------------------|
| a. EXT | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| b. CANX | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| c. DWNGRD | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| d. TRANSFER | <input type="checkbox"/> Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> Disapproved |
| e. OTHER (Specify): | | |

Signature: *[Signature]* Date Signed: 16/05

SD FORM 391, JAN 2000

POC 1st EXT

FOUO

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

205 January 10, 2005

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Collins

Please get me a copy of the letter from Susan Collins complaining about armor. I want to approve the answer to her.

Thanks.

DHR:as
011005-12

.....
Please respond by 1/14/05

Tab A

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/46145

OSD 00039-05

451
10 Jan 05
15 Dec 04



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

MCM 0008-05 12
16 Feb 05

INFO MEMO

FOR: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Lt Gen Norton A. Schwartz, Director, Joint Staff
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

NASchwartz

SUBJECT: Up-Armored HMMWVs and Body Armor

- **Answer.** In response to your request (TAB A), the Director, J-4, and I have reviewed Secretary Harvey's response to Senator Collins.
- **Analysis.** The Joint Staff confirms that the Army's draft letter to Senator Collins (TAB B) is factually correct.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen Duncan J. McNabb, USAF; Director, J-4; (b)(6)

16 Feb 05

15 Dec 04



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1800 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

January 24, 2005

451

The Honorable Susan Collins
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-1904

Dear Senator Collins:

Thank you for your letter to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, concerning the armoring of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles for our Soldiers serving in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Your concerns on this very important subject are being reviewed. Once all pertinent information has been considered, a final response will be sent to your office. If you have any questions while this matter is pending, please have your staff call me at (b)(6)

Sincerely,

Paul A. Shigeta
Congressional Coordinator
Special Actions Branch

(15 DEC 04)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY
103 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0103
02 MAR 2005

2005 MAR -3 AM 11:20

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Collins:

Secretary Rumsfeld asked me to follow up on his January 4, 2005, reply to your letter of December 15, 2004, regarding Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles, Armor kit production and body armor. Force protection is one of our top priorities **and** the Army **has** aggressively worked to provide the highest level of protection to our Soldiers **as** rapidly as possible.

The Army remains committed to expediting the required force protection equipment to our Soldiers in the field. In fact, the Army has gone to great lengths to speed **up** the acquisition of the necessary equipment.

In the area of Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (**UAH**), more than 6,400 of the required 8,275 **UAHs** have now been delivered to theater. In May 2003, the **UAH** production rate was 30 per month. **As** requirements were identified, validated, and funded, the Army pressed, in October 2003, **for** a rapid increase in **UAH** production. Initial estimates from O'Gara **Hess** (**OGH**) (now owned by Armor Holdings) if given sufficient lead time (3-4 months) they could increase the production rate **by** 50 vehicles each month, over four months, to achieve a maximum rate of 230 vehicles per month. After additional negotiations, in early February 2004, **OGH** and American Motors General (**AM** General) concluded that 450 vehicles was the maximum achievable production rate. **AM** General **and** **OGH** proceeded to achieve a production rate of 450 vehicles per month by September 2004, one month ahead of schedule.

In mid-November 2004, the Army **was** made aware that Armor Holdings could **increase** their production capacity by another 100 **vehicles** per month. **The** Secretary of the Army directed, on December 10, 2004, that the Armor Holdings' contract be modified, accordingly. Armor Holdings advised the Army that increased production to 550 vehicles per month will be achieved in March 2005.

Regarding your question on Armor kits, Armor Works **was** contracted, on May 3, 2004, to produce 1,490 troop carrier kits and on September 27, 2004, an additional **150 kits** were ordered, which were the total validated requirement for that specific kit. The final **delivery** of the remaining **kits will occur** in March 2005. No additional purchase of the troop carrier **kits is** planned at this time.

11-L-0559/OSD/46148

R 00039-05

451

(15 DEC 04)

Finally, in the area of **Body Armor**, on April 29, 2004, Coalition Forces Land Component Command reported that 100 percent of the requirement for Interceptor Body Armor (**IBA**) in **both** the Iraqi and **Afghanistan theaters** had **been achieved**. A set of Interceptor Body Armor (**IBA**) consists of an Outer Tactical Vest (**OTV**) and a set of ballistic inserts, often times referred to as Small Arms Protective Inserts (**SAPI**). An additional 10,000 plus **sets** of **IBA** is maintained in theater to support any contingency requirements.

As of November 30, 2004, the Army has fielded 599,633 **OTVs** and 453,874 **SAPI sets** across the Army. The Army has **provided** over 18,000 **OTVs** and **SAPI sets** to joint and interagency organizations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The current Army Procurement Objective (**APO**) is 840,000 **sets** of **IBA**. Production increased to 25,000 **sets** of **IBA** per month starting in December 2003, employing eight vendors, and has remained at that level ever since.

Up-armorng is not the only solution to protect Soldiers from the improvised explosive device (**IED**) threat. The Army is aggressively integrating a host of capabilities and measures in an effort to better protect Soldiers and Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Units in theater **have** successfully employed **IED** countermeasures to reduce their vulnerability to **IEDs**. Units in theater are adapting **and** evolving their tactics, techniques and procedures to counter enemy **IED** tactics. **All** Army units conduct live, virtual and constructive predeployment training at home station **and** at our training centers using the most current lessons learned provided **by** units currently operating in theater. Our commanders and Soldiers in theater not only rely on armor protection, but also realize that force protection requires the integration of a host of different capabilities.

The Army **is** rapidly adapting to protect the lives of American service men and women and equipment engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom **and** Operation Iraqi Freedom. Force protection of our troops **in** the field remains a top priority for the Army. Thank you for your continued interest in our **Soldiers** as the Army fights the **Global War on Terrorism**.

Sincerely,


Claude M. Bolton, Jr.

Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

ACTION MEMO

CM-2259-05

3 January 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM/JS*

SUBJECT: Joint CONOPS (SF 905)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), I agree on the importance of Joint CONOPS; however, I am convinced that they have not "fallen flat on their face." At your request, we developed the joint operations concepts (JOpsC), which you approved in November 2003. JOpsC resulted in the joint community (Joint Staff, USJFCOM, combatant commands, the Services and your staff) collaboratively producing four joint operating concepts, five joint functional concepts and five joint integrating concepts. To improve quality, I recently consolidated all joint concepts under the Joint Staff/J-7. J-7 subsequently produced a Joint Concepts Development and Revision Plan that provides clear guidance on purpose, scope, content and timing of the joint concepts for the entire concept development community. The latest concept, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, recently received accolades from the JCS as an example of how far joint CONOPS have progressed.
- **Analysis.** The Joint Staff supports your vision to enact the capabilities-based approach needed for the future joint force. An update on the progress of Joint CONOPS and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System can be provided to you at the next Combatant Commanders Conference.

RECOMMENDATION: Joint Staff to provide an update on the progress of Joint CONOPS and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System at the next Combatant Commanders Conference.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Major General J. Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

381

3 JAN 05

24 NOV 04

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

November 24, 2004

905

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint CONOPs

I'm deeply concerned that, for more than two years now, Joint CONOPs has fallen flat on its face. **I'm** convinced it is needed, that it's the right thing. I'd like you to come up with several options as to how we might move it into the hands of people who will get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
112404-2

.....
Please respond by 15 Dec 04

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46151

Tab A

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|-----------------|
| D(OFT) | Dr. Thomas Hone | 8 December 2004 |
| OSD(P) | Mr. Mark Gunzinger | 9 December 2004 |

January 5, 2005

TO: COL Steve Bucci

CC: Cathy Mainardi

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint CONOPS Memo and Phone Call to ADM Giambastiani

381

Please fax this memo to **ADM** Giambastiani and then arrange a phone call for me with him to discuss Joint CONOPS .

Thank you.

Attach.
 01/03/05 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Joint CONOPS

DHR:ss
 010505-13

57905

.....
 Please respond by _____

24 Nov 04

OSD 00052-05

TAB A
~~FOUO~~

November 24, 2004

905

TO: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint CONOPs

I'm deeply concerned that, for more than two years now, Joint CONOPs has fallen flat on its face. **I'm** convinced it is needed, that it's the right thing. I'd like you to come up with several options as to how we might move it into the hands of people **who will** get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
112404-2

.....
Please respond by 15 Dec 04

Sir,
Response attached.

vr
Lt Col Langyel

1 JAN 04 2005

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46154

OSD 00052-05

Tab A



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

37 done from 12/24

ACTION MEMO

CM-2259-05
3 January 2005

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Joint CONOPS (SF 905)

- Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), I agree on the importance of Joint CONOPS; however, I am convinced that they have not "fallen flat on their face." At your request, we developed the joint operations concepts (JOpsC), which you approved in November **2003**. JOpsC resulted in the joint community (Joint Staff, USJFCOM, combatant commands, the Services and your staff) collaboratively producing four joint operating concepts, five joint functional concepts and five joint integrating concepts. To improve quality, I recently consolidated all joint concepts under the Joint Staff/J-7. J-7 subsequently produced a Joint Concepts Development and Revision Plan that provides clear guidance on purpose, scope, content and timing of the joint concepts for the entire concept development community. The latest concept, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, recently received accolades from the JCS as an example of how far joint CONOPS have progressed.
- Analysis.** The Joint Staff supports your vision to enact the capabilities-based approach needed for the future joint force. An update on the progress of Joint CONOPS and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System can be provided to you at the next Combatant Commanders Conference.

RECOMMENDATION: Joint Staff to provide an update on the progress of Joint CONOPS and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System at the next Combatant Commanders Conference.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Other _____

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Major General J. Catton, USAF; Director, J-7; (b)(6)

| | | | |
|----------|------------|------------|--|
| MA SD | SMA DSD | <i>F/4</i> | |
| TSA SD | SA DSD | | |
| EXEC SEC | <i>M/4</i> | | |
| ESR MA | <i>TSA</i> | | |

11-L-0559/OSD/46155

OSD 00052-05

TAB B
COORDINATION PAGE

| | | |
|--------|--------------------|-----------------|
| D(OFT) | Dr. Thomas Hone | 8 December 2004 |
| OSD(P) | Mr. Mark Gunzinger | 9 December 2004 |

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

November 24, 2004

905

TO: Gen **Dick** Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Joint CONOPs

I'm deeply concerned that, for more than two years now, Joint **CONOPs** has fallen flat on its face. **I'm** convinced it is needed, that it's the right thing. I'd **like** you to come up with several options as to how we might move it into the **hands** of people **who** will get it done.

Thanks.

DHR:sa
112404-2

.....
Please respond by 15 Dec 04

381

24 Nov 04

OSD 000 52-05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46157

Tab A

FOUO

DEC 28 2004

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis
CC: PAUL BUTLER
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*
SUBJECT: Art Cebrowski

020 FTD

Please draft a note to Art Cebrowski, then return this letter to me and let's talk about it at Roundtable some morning, how we ought to move forward.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/22/04 Letter from A.K. Cebrowski to SecDef

DHR:ss
122704-11

.....
Please respond by 1/7/04


28 Dec 04

SIR —

Draft letter
at tab. I'll
tickle the topic
for personnel meeting
FOUO + roundtable.

22 Dec 04

OSD 00054-05

SIR 

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)

Director, Office of Force Transformation

Address

OLL

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on 31 January 2005.

You can be justifiably proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation, and your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead, and thank you for a job well done.



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

QW 12/27

FORCE TRANSFORMATION
OFFICE

December 22, 2004

020 FYD

Dear Mr. Secretary,

This letter is to request that I be relieved of my duties as Director, Force Transformation as of 31 January, 2005.

Working under your dedicated leadership in pursuing the President's transformation objectives has been rewarding and professionally satisfying. However, I must step aside due to personal commitments and health issues.

The Office of Force Transformation is successful for several important reasons. First, without your personal strong commitment to leadership of transformation the task would be impossible. Second, we report directly to you and the Deputy, and you allow us to work outside the normal course in an organizational arrangement that protects powerful ideas from bureaucratic tyranny. Finally, we have assembled a small, but talented inter-disciplinary team, both uniformed and civilian. And we have built a virtual team of vast dimensions. While there is much to be done, the accomplishments of the office are what we had hoped from the beginning. For example:

- Transformation is now integral to national strategy and DoD corporate strategy.
- Network-Centric Warfare has emerged across the Department as the theory of war for the information-age and well supported by rigorous analysis.
- The culture is changing. Transformational leadership chairs and research projects have been established across the WAC colleges and service academies

OSD 00054-05

22 DEC 04


11-L-0559/OSD/46160

- Powerful new concepts are in prototype or experimentation, including a new business model for space, Sense and Respond Logistics, controlling engagement timelines in urban combat, high speed distributed capabilities for naval forces, redirected energy for both lethal and non-lethal applications, and many others.

Our latest assessment of the Transformation Roadmaps is encouraging. I will provide you with an overall strategic transformation appraisal soon.

My interest in advancing national security policy and **the** President's transformation agenda is enduring. I hope **to** be able **to** continue to contribute in some capacity.

Sincerely,



A. K. Cebrowski

Director, Force Transformation

cc:
Deputy Secretary of Defense



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 3 2005

020 FTD

Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret)
Director, Office of Force Transformation
Room 3A287
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Art,

With both regret for your departure and admiration for your accomplishments, I accept your request to be relieved of duties as Director of Force Transformation on January 31, 2005.

You can justifiably be proud of all you have done for the Department and the Nation. Your work to embed the idea of transformation into the Department's efforts will endure – especially your vision of Network-Centric Warfare.

I wish you the very best in the time ahead. Thank you for a job well done.

Sincerely,

3 JAN 05

OSD 00054-05

22 DEC 04

~~FOUO~~

11-05/007828-ES

ES-3456

~~SECRET~~

June 7, 2005

092.3

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Senior DoD Rep in Each Country

I continue to think we need to develop some way to stop the bickering as to who we think the senior DoD person is in a country - whether it is the Defense Attache, the Combatant Commander's representative, or the MAG Mission, or what have you.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

OSD 00068-06

DFR:so
060703-18 (TS)

.....
Please respond by 6/26/05

OSD Exec Sec:

Attached Briefed to SecDef on 7 Jul 05 by
USDP / JQ Roberts.

Please & + ~~H~~ -
Paul Hulley

8485 1349

MJUN05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00068-06

~~SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

06-07-05 16:17 IN

11-L-0559/OSD/46163

~~FOUO~~

December 26, 2005

TO: Ryan Henry
Larry DiRita

I-05/016965
ES-4993

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*

SUBJECT: Briefing for Intellectuals and Academics on the QDR

I think we ought to think about getting a big group of intellectuals and academics in, and tell them what we are doing on the QDR.

DIR.ss
122605-20

.....
Please Respond By 01/24/06

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46164

OSD 00185-06

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

INFO MEMO

1 2 22

DSD
USD(P) U JAN 05 2006
I-05/016905-ES
ES-4993

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, PD Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

[Handwritten signature]

JAN 04 2006

SUBJECT Briefing for Intellectuals and Academics on the QDR

- o In your recent memo, you suggested we get a group of intellectuals and academics in and tell them what we are doing on the QDR.
- I think that's an excellent idea. On Friday, 6 January, I will brief 23 members of the Defense Policy, Science and Business Boards in response to your suggestion.
- o TAB A lists the Board members who will attend the briefing here in the Pentagon.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared by: Reed Grabowski, Col USMCR, Military Assistant for PDUSD P, (b)(6)

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DSD 00185-06

11-L-0559/OSD/46165

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Mr. Michael Bayer

At the request of Mr. Henry
MG Bob Scales

January 5, 2005

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Note from Ed Wren

451

Ed Wren is a PR person who used to work for Dick Cheney and me. Please take a look at his letter and the clippings and see if we ought to do anything.

Thanks.

Attach.
SecDef reply to Ed Wren
12/17/04 Ed Wren letter to SecDef

DHR:ss
010505-18

.....
Please respond by _____

5Jan05



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Ed Wren
President
Wren & Associates
1240 East Missouri Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85014

Dear Ed,

Thanks so much for your note and the clippings.
I've asked Larry Di Rita to take a look at them and see
what might be done, if anything.

I look forward to seeing you at the Inauguration.

With my appreciation and best wishes for the New
Year,

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large loop and a long, sweeping stroke.

Wren & Associates

Government and Public Relations

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1240 East Missouri Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
(602) 264-5081
Fax (602) 230-7519

JAN -4 AM 9:08

December 17, 2004

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary

Thanks for your recent letter. There is something that happened here that really bothered me. Former Congressman Matt Salmon, who I supported significantly during his campaign for the Governorship which he barely lost to Janet Napolitano, is scheduled to be the new state Republican Chairman as Bob Fannin has decided to step down. But the enclosed set of newspaper clippings, in my opinion, cast doubt on Matt's loyalty to the Bush Administration.

As you will note, he represents a local company which has a contract with your Department to supply armament for equipment in the war. While that is all well and good, I have told him that in my opinion while he obviously has the right to his opinion, his remarks about the war in general, not necessarily related to his client or the incident with the soldier, were not in keeping with someone who should be supporting the war effort.

Again, I wanted you to have this information. I look forward to seeing you at the Inauguration and at the Vice President's home, if he has a reception the day after the swearing in ceremony as he did last year.

Sincerely,



Ed Wren
Wren & Associates

11-L-0559/OSD/46169

OSD 00190-05

U.S. heeds G's plea to boost armor production

By Mark Mazzetti
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — The Army moved Friday to boost production of armored Humvees for American troops in Iraq by 100 a month, abandoning recent assertions by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that soldiers could not be supplied with safer vehicles because Pentagon officials could not produce them any faster.

Steps to increase production came two days after Rumsfeld bluntly told troops being sent to combat that assembly lines installing armor on the vehicles were already operating at maximum capacity.

The developments could further embarrass the Bush administration, which has struggled for more than a year to provide equipment to protect U.S. troops from a deadly Iraqi insurgency that war planners failed to anticipate.

Pentagon officials confirmed that the Army had en-

See ARMOR Page A21

ARMOR Production upped for Humvees needed in Iraq

From Page A1

tered negotiations to secure more armored Humvees but that they did not explain why officials didn't realize before Friday that production could be increased.

The military has about 5,900 armored Humvees in Iraq, but U.S. commanders have told Pentagon officials that they need 2,000 more.

Meeting with troops in Kuwait on Wednesday, Rumsfeld was asked by Tennessee National Guard Spc. Thomas Wilson why troops were forced to rummage through scrap yards to find metal to protect their vehicles.

Rumsfeld told the soldier that "a matter of physics" prevented U.S. plants from stepping up production of armored Humvees.

It was later reported that a Chattanooga, Tenn., newspaper reporter traveling with Wilson's unit helped Wilson craft the question about the armor.

On Friday evening, Armor Holdings Inc., a Jacksonville, Fla.-based company that produces and installs armor for Humvees, said it had been contacted by the Army and would boost production to about 550 armored Humvees per month, up from the 450 now being pro-

duced. The company's statement came at the end of negotiations that began when Army Secretary Francis Harvey telephoned Armor Holdings President Robert Schiller on Friday morning.

Additionally, *The Arizona Republic* reported Friday that a Valley firm capable of providing armor for military vehicles is operating at only half-capacity, according to former U.S. Rep. Matt Salmon, a consultant for ArmorWorks of Tempe.

He said the firm is producing about 300 armor kits a month but easily can ship twice that many.

The \$30 million contract the Pentagon awarded ArmorWorks in September called for the Tempe factory to produce 1,500 armor kits by January. Salmon said 1,200 already have been shipped, but ArmorWorks hasn't been told whether it will be offered a new contract.

News about the increased production capacity Friday contradicted what Rumsfeld and top military commanders told the troops on Wednesday and then re-emphasized at a news briefing Thursday.

"It isn't a matter of money," Rumsfeld told the troops. "It isn't a matter on the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of

production and capability of doing it."

The next day, the top U.S. commander in Kuwait echoed Rumsfeld's remarks about production constraints.

Even with the boost in production of armored Humvees, the Pentagon still faces critical shortages of armor for its medium- and heavy-weight trucks that ferry food, fuel and supplies to troops in Iraq.

According to the House Armed Services Committee, only 10 percent of the 4,814 medium-weight transport trucks and 15 percent of 4,314 heavy trucks are outfitted with bullet-resistant armor.

In lieu of Pentagon-supplied armor, some troops in Iraq have jury-rigged their trucks with sand bags and even plywood to protect themselves from gunfire and explosions.

In Iraq, the lack of armor on the heavy trucks has caused friction between troops and commanders.

In October, a logistics company of Army reservists refused an order to carry out a resupply mission to a base in northern Iraq, saying that driving large unarmored vehicles on Iraq's deadly highways amounted to a "suicide mission."

Staff contributed to this article.

HIS DAD'S HEADED FOR IRAQ



John Waltz Jr., 2, of Manchester, Pa., holds the hand of his father, Staff Sgt. 1st Class John Waltz, as troops from New York form up for a bus trip to Fort Dix, N.J., where they will be trained before heading to Iraq.

STAYING IN IRAQ

Debate rages on policy extending military duty

By Dennis Wagner
The Arizona Republic

The U.S. Army says its stop-loss program is vital to ensuring that the United States always has trained, experienced soldiers on duty in war zones.

But critics say the practice of forcing soldiers to remain deployed after they are supposed to be out of the service is not only unlawful but atrocious policy for the Pentagon.

Thanks to a federal lawsuit

filed by eight soldiers Monday, those arguments likely are to be addressed by a District Court judge in Washington, D.C., if not the U.S. Supreme Court.

In the meantime, however, the involuntary "service" of soldiers has become grist for Starbucks discussion among troops, their families and the rest of America.

Should soldiers who have completed their military obli-

See **DUTY** Page A4

Valley company disputes Rumsfeld's armor claims

Tempe-based ArmorWorks, which provides armor for military vehicles in Iraq, disputes claims by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and says it can provide the armor that soldiers need. **A4**

Also inside

■ The wife of an Arizona GI who is suing over military extensions speaks out. **A5**

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DUTY Debate aplenty on military program

From Page A1

gations be forced to remain in combat zones as a patriotic duty? Or is the government abusing those who have given most for America?

"Our country is at war right now," answers Steve Scha, a Phoenix police lieutenant and former sergeant in the Marine Corps Reserve. "Incompetence and changes in plans are a fact of life. They need to suck it up and go to work."

Scha speaks from experience. His Special Operations Training Group was deployed to Afghanistan for a year when his wife was seven months pregnant. And it was sent to Iraq not long after his son was born.

Scha said enlistment contracts are absolutely clear in telling personnel that service may be extended during war. Troops who need to come home for hardship reasons have an appeal process headed "But I think bringing a lawsuit is embarrassing," he said. "Your country has called"

Stoughton Lynd, an attorney in the federal lawsuit, is among those who say the stop-loss policy violates recruitment contracts and constitutes fraud because soldiers don't realize they are subject to involuntary extensions.

His clients include an Arizona National Guard soldier from Chandler whose wife claims recruiters were deceptive in their sign-up spiel.

When her husband identified as John Doe in the court complaint, inquired about the Army's "Try One" program, she said. "They told him there's no obligation. If you don't like it, you're done."

"He was happy to be in the military. But then he said, 'OK, my time is done now.'"

Li Col. Bryan Hilfery, an Army spokesman in Virginia, said stop-loss is currently used only in the Afghanistan-Iraq conflict area, and only to ensure that Army units aren't shuffling new, inexperienced personnel to key positions. "In Iraq, do we really want a platoon leader

to leave four months in, and another guy to take his place?"

Hilfery pointed out that soldiers sign papers and acknowledge in several places that they may be held over or recalled to duty with an enlistment. One example: "In the event of a 12-month enlistment in the armed forces, the enlistment is terminated after the war ends unless it is discontinued by the president."

Because of such caveats, many military law experts say the federal suit has little chance of success.

But, legalists like Lynd said the Pentagon is sticking itself in the foot when it reneges on deals with patriotic Americans. Although stop-loss may have short-term operational advantages, he said, it erodes the Pentagon's ability to recruit and enlist other soldiers who may fear similar treatment.

A recent Associated Press review found that, nationwide, National Guard sign-ups were 12 percent short of the military's goal. But Hilfery dis-

puted those findings. He said recruiting and retention numbers for fiscal 2003-04, which ended in September, were at 107 percent of goals.

"The Army on its own is that stop-loss will actively affect recruiting," he added. "But it doesn't."

The Army's policy derives from a federal statute that says: "(T)he President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national health, safety or interest."

It is in a civil suit says that language does not address soldiers who enlist via the "Try One" program, which signs up Army National Guard members for a 12-month trial program. Three of the eight plaintiffs, including the Arizona soldier, are in that category.

Lynd acknowledged that courts may lean toward presidential power during times of military action. "Obviously,

there's an elephant in the kitchen, which is the tendency of judges to say, 'Well, there's a war going on.'"

However, he said, courts and the public may also see stop-loss as unfair and counterproductive because it sabotages the esprit de corps of troops.

"If you're going to have a volunteer service," Lynd said, "you have to play straight with the people. We're getting e-mails from all over the world saying, 'Morale in my units at rock bottom.'"

Hilfery, the Army spokesman, said that's hardly news: "If a soldier's not (complaining), he's not happy."

John C. Spelman, a spokesman for the National Guard Association of the United States, said both sides of the stop-loss debate have merit.

"When it happens to you it's like, 'Ugh! That wasn't part of my plan.' But we all raved our hands and took an oath," Geheen said.

"We don't like it. But we certainly understand it."

Re-enlistment language
The U.S. Army says soldiers are given full notice in enlistment contracts that they may have to serve involuntarily when their expected discharge date during the enlistment is extended to 12 months.
"An enlistment in the ready reserve may be required to perform active duty or active duty training without my consent."
"When determined by the president that it is necessary to support any operations mission, I may be ordered to active duty as prescribed by law if I'm a member of the selective reserve."
"In the event of war, my enlistment in the armed forces continues six months after the war ends unless it is discontinued by the president."
"Obviously,

Valley firm disputes Rumsfeld, is ready to supply Army armor

By Joseph A. Reaves
The Arizona Republic

A Valley firm that provides critical armor for military vehicles in Iraq is operating at only half capacity despite complaints from soldiers who say they are being sent into combat without adequate protection.

"We've been telling the Pentagon for months that we have the capacity to double our production," said former U.S. Rep. Matt Salmon, a consultant for Armorworks of Tempe. "We're ready, and we haven't heard a thing."

The issue of adequate armor protection for military vehicles in Iraq became front-page news this week when a National Guard soldier from Tennessee stood up at a town hall meeting in Kuwait and confronted Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

"Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to armor our vehicles, and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?" Army Spc. Thomas Wilson asked the secretary.

Wilson's surprisingly blunt question drew applause from fellow soldiers, who are preparing to ship out from Kuwait to Iraq.

Rumsfeld said he spoke with a general at the Pentagon before traveling to Kuwait and was told the military was doing its best to provide troops the resources they need.

"It's essentially a matter of physics," he said. "It isn't a matter of money. It isn't a matter of the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it."

Salmon said that simply isn't

true, at least in the case of Armorworks, which has a \$30-million contract to provide composite armor kits that are fitted onto Humvee vehicles in three hours by soldiers in the field.

"The Pentagon right now, in its post-hoc spin, is trying to convince everyone that contractors are operating at peak capacity," Salmon told The Arizona Republic. "In our case it's flat-out not accurate."

Salmon, a conservative Republican who narrowly lost the 2002 governor's race, has been a paid consultant for Armorworks for more than a year.

He said the firm is producing about 300 armor kits a month but easily can ship twice that many.

The \$30 million contract the Pentagon awarded Armorworks in September called for the Tempe factory to produce 1,500 armor kits by January

Salmon said 1,200 already have been shipped, but Armorworks hasn't been told whether it will be offered a new contract.

"We haven't been told anything about what's going on," he said.

"I think a lot of this is the right hand doesn't know what the left is doing."

The Department of Defense issued several news releases on its Web site Thursday in the wake of Rumsfeld's remarks and the criticism from the soldiers in Kuwait.

"The issue Specialist Wilson raised at the town hall meeting in Kuwait is important," one release read. "This department takes the matter seriously and is addressing it aggressively."

Another release said the military is "producing roughly 450 up-armored Humvees every month and sending them to units in Iraq."

Eric Kuff, a Defense Department spokesman, said all but about 4,000 of the 19,000 Humvees being used by the U.S. Central Command in Iraq are "up-armored or have been modified at the unit level with additional armor kits" like the ones produced by Armorworks.

Those that aren't armored yet are confined to use inside military compounds, according to the Pentagon.

Salmon, however, pointed out that just six weeks ago, members of an Army Reserve quartermaster company refused to go on a supply mission, because they said their equipment was inadequate.

The kits that Armorworks provides for the military are made of composite ceramic rather than steel, which has been the traditional protective plating for military vehicles since World War I.

"The steel weighs two-thirds more than our stuff," Salmon said. "It exceeds the payload capacity on the vehicles. The vehicles end up breaking down or losing their maneuverability."

In addition, soldiers have noted the ceramic composite tends to absorb shrapnel or deflect it, while steel armor often creates even more deadly metal shards.

Salmon said he joined Armorworks amid an earlier controversy when family members of soldiers in Iraq were coming to the company to buy personal body armor because the military wasn't able to provide adequate supplies.

"Unfortunately, this is deja vu all over again, isn't it," Salmon said.

Reach the reporter at joseph.reaves@arizona-republic.com or (602) 444-8125

THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2004

azcentral.com

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11-L-0559/OSD/46174



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

NOV 18 2004

335 SD

Mr. Ed Wren
President
Wren & Associates
1240 East Missouri Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85014

Dear Ed,

How thoughtful you were to write before the election. I remember, with great pleasure, our work together so many years ago.

Since you wrote, the President and our mutual friend, the Vice President, have had a fine victory.

I appreciate your kind thoughts, your words of **support** and your friendship.

Warm regards,

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OSD 18284-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46175

Wren & Associates

Government and Public Relations

1240 East Missouri Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
(602) 264-5081
Fax (602) 230-7519

NOV 01 10 11 AM '04

November 1, 2004

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1000

Dear **Mr.** Secretary:

It is one day before the election and, despite the media onslaughts, I believe that the Bush/Cheney ticket will again emerge as the winner.

This despite the opposition, which includes not only the obvious — Kerry and Edwards and the Democratic hierarchy, but the clearly non-objective media, Hollywood stars and starlets, traveling rock bands and movies. I have never seen anything like it during **my** many years in politics. And, I have also never seen a presidential campaign where people are not voting for Kerry, but are voting against the President.

By the time you get this the election, hopefully, will be over. I just wanted to take this opportunity and tell you that it was a privilege to work for you more than 30 years ago. You have done an exemplary job in a difficult position. Keep up the good work and I hope to see you at the January inaugural.

Sincerely,



Ed Wren

OSD 18284-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46176

Wren & Associates

Government and Public Relations

OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JAN -4 AM 9: 08

1240 East Missouri Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85014
(602)264-5081
Fax (602)230-7519

December 17, 2004

Mr. Donald Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1000

Dear Mr. Secretary

Thanks for your recent letter. There is something that happened here that really bothered me. Former Congressman Matt Salmon, who I supported significantly during his campaign for the Governorship which he barely lost to Janet Napolitano, is scheduled to be the new state Republican Chairman as Bob Fannin has decided to step down. But the enclosed set of newspaper clippings, in my opinion, cast doubt on Matt's loyalty to the Bush Administration.

As you will note, he represents a local company which has a contract with your Department to supply armament for equipment in the war. While that is all well and good, I have told him that in my opinion while he obviously has the right to his opinion, his remarks about the war in general, not necessarily related to his client or the incident with the soldier, were not in keeping with someone who should be supporting the war effort.

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Sincerely,



Ed Wren
Wren & Associates

11-L-0559/OSD/46177

OSD 00190-05

HIS DAD'S HEADED FOR IRAQ



John Pavoncello/New York Dispatch

John Waltz Jr., 2, of Manchester, Pa., holds the hand of his father, Staff Sgt. 1st Class John Waltz, as troops from New York form up for a bus trip to Fort Dix, N.J., where they will be trained before heading to Iraq.

STAYING IN IRAQ

Debate rages on policy extending military duty

By Dennis Wagner
The Arizona Republic

The U.S. Army says its stop-loss program is vital to ensuring that the United States always has trained, experienced soldiers on duty in war zones.

But critics say the practice of forcing soldiers to remain deployed after they are supposed to be out of the service is not only unlawful but atrocious policy for the Pentagon.

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filed by eight soldiers Monday, those arguments likely are to be addressed by a District Court judge in Washington, D.C., if not the U.S. Supreme Court.

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See DUTY Page A4

Valley company disputes Rumsfeld's armor claims

Tempe-based ArmorWorks, which provides armor for military vehicles in Iraq, disputes claims by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and says it can provide the armor that soldiers need. A4

Also inside

■ The wife of an Arizona GI who is suing over military extensions speaks out. A5

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FRIDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2004

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THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC

U.S. heeds GIs' plea to boost armor production

By Mark Mazzetti
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — The Army moved Friday to boost production of armored Humvees for American troops in Iraq by 100 a month, abandoning recent assertions by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that soldiers could not be supplied with safer vehicles because Pentagon officials could not procure them any faster.

Steps to increase production came two days after Rumsfeld bluntly told troops being sent to combat that assembly lines installing armor on the vehicles were already operating at maximum capacity.

The developments could further embarrass the Bush administration, which has struggled for more than a year to provide equipment to protect U.S. troops from a deadly Iraqi insurgency that war planners failed to anticipate.

Pentagon officials confirmed that the Army had en-

See ARMOR Page A21

+

ARMOR Production upped +for Humvees needed in Iraq

From Page A1

tered negotiations to secure more armored Humvees but that they did not explain why officials didn't realize before Friday that production could be increased.

The military has about 5,900 armored Humvees in Iraq, but U.S. commanders have told Pentagon officials that they need 2,000 more.

Meeting with troops in Kuwait on Wednesday, Rumsfeld was asked by Tennessee National Guard Spc. Thomas Wilson why troops were forced to rummage through scrap yards to find metal to protect their vehicles.

Rumsfeld told the soldier that "a matter of physics" prevented U.S. plants from stepping up production of armored Humvees.

It was later reported that a Chattanooga, Tenn., newspaper reporter traveling with Wilson's unit helped Wilson craft the question about the armor.

On Friday evening, Armor Holdings Inc., a Jacksonville, Fla.-based company that produces and installs armor for Humvees, said it had been contacted by the Army and would boost production to about 550 armored Humvees per month, up from the 450 now being pro-

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Additionally, *The Arizona Republic* reported Friday that a Valley firm capable of providing armor for military vehicles is operating at only half-capacity, according to former U.S. Rep. Matt Salmon, a consultant for Armorworks of Tempe.

He said the firm is producing about 300 armor kits a month but easily can ship twice that many.

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News about the increased production capacity Friday contradicted what Rumsfeld and top military commanders told the troops on Wednesday and then re-emphasized at a news briefing Thursday.

"It isn't a matter of money," Rumsfeld told the troops. "It isn't a matter on the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of

production and capability of doing it."

The next day, the top U.S. commander in Kuwait echoed Rumsfeld's remarks about production constraints.

Even with the boost in production of armored Humvees, the Pentagon still faces critical shortages of armor for its medium- and heavy-weight trucks that ferry food, fuel and supplies to troops in Iraq.

According to the House Armed Services Committee, only 10 percent of the 4,814 medium-weight transport trucks and 15 percent of 4,314 heavy trucks are outfitted with bullet-resistant armor.

In lieu of Pentagon-supplied armor, some troops in Iraq have jury-rigged their trucks with sand bags and even plywood to protect themselves from gunfire and explosions.

In Iraq, the lack of armor on the heavy trucks has caused friction between troops and commanders.

In October, a logistics company of Army reservists refused an order to carry out a resupply mission to a base in northern Iraq, saying that driving large unarmored vehicles on Iraq's deadly highways amounted to a "suicide mission."

Staff contributed to this article.

+ DUTY Debate aplenty on military program

From Page A1

gations be forced to remain in combat zones as a patriotic duty? Or is the government abusing those who have given most for America?

"Our country is at war right now," answers Steve Soha, a Phoenix police lieutenant and gunnery sergeant in the Marine Corps Reserves. "Inconvenience and changes in plans are a fact of life. They need to suck it up and go to work."

Soha speaks from experience. His Special Operations Training Group was deployed to Afghanistan for a year when his wife was seven months pregnant. And it was sent to Iraq not long after his son was born.

Soha said enlistment contracts are absolutely clear in telling personnel that service may be extended during war. Troops who need to come home for hardship reasons have an appeal process, he added. "But I think bringing a lawsuit is embarrassing," he said. "Your country has called."

Staughton Lynd, an attorney in the federal lawsuit, is among those who say the stop-loss policy violates recruitment contracts and constitutes fraud because soldiers don't realize they are subject to involuntary extensions.

His clients include an Arizona National Guard soldier from Chandler whose wife claims recruiters were deceptive in their sign-up spiel.

When her husband, identified as John Doe 1 in the court complaint, inquired about the Army's "Try One" program, she said, "They told him there's no obligation. If you don't like it, you're done."

"He was happy to be in the military. But then he said, 'OK, my time is done now.'"

1st. Col. Bryan Hilferty, an Army spokesman in Virginia, said stop-loss is currently used only in the Afghanistan-Iraq conflict area, and only to ensure that Army units aren't shuffling new, inexperienced personnel into key positions. "In Iraq, do we really want a platoon leader

to leave four months in, and another guy to take his place?"

Hilferty pointed out that soldiers sign papers acknowledging in several places that they may be held over or recalled to duty without consent. One example: "In the event of war, my enlistment in the armed forces continues six months after the war ends unless it is discontinued by the president."

Because of such caveats, many military law experts say the federal suit has little chance of success.

But, legalities aside, Lynd said the Pentagon is shooting itself in the foot when it reneges on deals with patriotic Americans. Although stop-loss may have short-term operational advantages, Lynd said, it erodes the Pentagon's ability to recruit and enlist other soldiers who may fear similar treatment.

A recent Associated Press review found that, nationwide, National Guard sign-ups were 12 percent short of the military's goal. But Hilferty dis-

puted those findings. He said recruiting and retention numbers for fiscal 2003-04, which ended in September, were at 107 percent of goals.

"The conventional wisdom is that stop-loss will (negatively) affect recruiting," he added. "But it doesn't."

The Army's policy derives from a federal statute that says: "(T)he President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of the United States."

Plaintiffs in the civil suit say that language does not address soldiers who enlist via the "Try One" program, which signs up Army National Guard members for a 12-month trial program. Three of the eight plaintiffs, including the Arizona soldier, are in that category.

Lynd acknowledged that courts may lean toward presidential power during times of military action. "Obviously,

there's an elephant in the kitchen, which is the tendency of judges to say, 'Well, there's a war going on.'"

However, he said, courts and the public may also see stop-loss as unfair and counterproductive because it sabotages the esprit de corps of troops.

"If you're going to have a volunteer service," Lynd said, "you have to play straight with the people. ... We're getting e-mails from all over the world saying, 'Morale in my unit is at rock bottom.'"

Hilferty, the Army spokesman, said that's hardly news: "If a soldier's not (complaining), he's not happy."

John Goheen, a spokesman for the National Guard Association of the United States, said both sides of the stop-loss debate have merit.

"When it happens to you it's like, 'Uggh! This wasn't part of my plan.' But we all raised our hands and took an oath," Goheen said.

"We don't like it. But we certainly understand it."

Re-enlistment language

The U.S. Army says soldiers are given full notice in re-enlistment contracts that they may have to serve involuntarily after their expected discharge date. Among the notes in a "Partial Statement of Existing U.S. Laws":

■ "As a member of the ready reserve I may be required to perform active duty or active duty training without my consent."

■ "When determined by the president that it is necessary to support any operations mission, I may be ordered to active duty as prescribed by law if I'm a member of the selective reserve."

■ "In the event of war, my enlistment in the armed forces continues six months after the war ends unless it is discontinued by the president."

Valley firm disputes Rumsfeld, is ready to supply Army armor

By Joseph A. Reeves
The Arizona Republic

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"Why do we soldiers have to dig through local landfills for pieces of scrap metal and compromised ballistic glass to up-armor our vehicles, and why don't we have those resources readily available to us?" Army Spc. Thomas Wilson asked the secretary.

Wilson's surprisingly blunt question drew applause from fellow soldiers, who are preparing to ship out from Kuwait to Iraq.

Rumsfeld said he spoke with a general at the Pentagon before traveling to Kuwait and was told the military was doing its best to provide troops the resources they need.

"It's essentially a matter of physics," he said. "It isn't a matter of money. It isn't a matter of the part of the Army of desire. It's a matter of production and capability of doing it."

Salmon said that simply isn't

true, at least in the case of ArmorWorks, which has a \$30 million contract to provide composite armor kits that are fitted onto Humvee vehicles in three hours by soldiers in the field.

"The Pentagon right now, in its postdebacle spin, is trying to convince everyone that contractors are operating at peak capacity," Salmon told The Arizona Republic. "In our case it's flat-out not accurate."

Salmon, a conservative Republican who narrowly lost the 2002 governor's race, has been a paid consultant for ArmorWorks for more than a year.

He said the firm is producing about 300 armor kits a month but easily can ship twice that many.

The \$30 million contract the Pentagon awarded ArmorWorks in September called for the Tempe factory to produce 1,500 armor kits by January.

Salmon said 1,200 already have been shipped, but ArmorWorks hasn't been told whether it will be offered a new contract.

"We haven't been told anything about what's going on," he said.

"I think a lot of this is the right hand doesn't know what the left is doing."

The Department of Defense issued several news releases on its Web site Thursday in the wake of Rumsfeld's remarks and the criticism from the soldiers in Kuwait.

"The issue Specialist Wilson raised at the town hall meeting in Kuwait is important," one release read. "This department takes the matter seriously and is addressing it aggressively."

Another release said the military is "producing roughly 450 up-armored Humvees every month and sending them to units in Iraq."

Eric Ruff, a Defense Department spokesman, said all but about 4,000 of the 19,000 Humvees being used by the U.S. Central Command in Iraq are "up-armored or have been modified at the units level with add-on armor kits" like the ones produced by ArmorWorks.

Those that aren't armored yet are confined to use inside military compounds, according to the Pentagon.

Salmon, however, pointed out that just six weeks ago, members of an Army Reserve quartermaster company refused to go on a supply mission because they said their equipment was inadequate.

The kits that ArmorWorks provides for the military are made of composite ceramic rather than steel, which has been the traditional protective plating for military vehicles since World War I.

"The steel weighs two-thirds more than our stuff," Salmon said. "It exceeds the payload capacity on the vehicles. The vehicles end up breaking down or losing their maneuverability."

In addition, soldiers have noted the ceramic composite tends to absorb shrapnel or deflect it, while steel armor often creates even more deadly metal shards.

Salmon said he joined ArmorWorks amid an earlier controversy when family members of soldiers in Iraq were coming to the company to buy personal body armor because the military wasn't able to provide adequate supplies.

"Unfortunately, this is déjà vu all over again, isn't it?" Salmon said.

Reach the reporter at
joseph.reeves@arizona
republic.com or (602) 444-8125.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 7 2005

451

Mr. Ed Wren
President
Wren & Associates
1240 East Missouri Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85014

Dear Ed,

Thanks so much for your note and the clippings.
I've asked Larry Di Rita to take a look at them and see
what might be done, if anything.

I look forward to seeing you at the Inauguration.

With my appreciation and best wishes for the New
Year,

Sincerely,

7 JAN 05

OSD 00190-05

12 DEC 04

11-L-0559/OSD/46181



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

ACTION MEMO

12/19/2004 3:04 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Letter to Senator McCain Regarding Changes to Joint Ethics Regulation

- Attached for your signature is a letter to Senator McCain describing the recent changes to the Joint Ethics Regulation to strengthen our programs to prevent violations of conflicts of interest statutes by personnel who are leaving public service for employment by private enterprise.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter

COORDINATION: Legislative Affairs

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DECISION:

JAN 5 2005
Approve and sign letter

___ Disapprove

Prepared by Steve Epstein (b)(6)

*Sir,
I recommend Larry D. Reta have an opportunity to provide his views on the letter.
WJ Haynes*

2520

19 Dec 04

17 Dec 04

OSD 00202-05





SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to prevent violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise. *As is*

On October 25, 2004, the ~~Deputy Secretary of Defense~~ *Department* implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), **18 U.S.C. 208** (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and **41 U.S.C. 423** (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

The second change modifies the requirements for annual ethics training: adding a new requirement to expand the training on post-Government service employment restrictions included in all annual ethics training, regardless of other topics presented in that training.

The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Encl: As stated



11-L-0559/OSD/46183

ANNUAL CERTIFICATION

As a member of the Department of Defense who files a public financial disclosure report (SF 278), DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), requires you to certify each year that you are aware of the restrictions that three statutes place on you during your Federal service when you are negotiating employment and after you leave Federal service. You are also required to certify that you have not violated these statutes.

The statutes, with brief definitions of terms, are summarized below. If you have any questions, please contact your ethics counselor.

18 U.S.C. 208: Restrictions On Negotiating Employment:

Federal employees are prohibited from participating personally and substantially in an official capacity in any particular matter in which, to their knowledge, they, or any person or organization with whom they are negotiating or have any arrangement concerning prospective employment, have a financial interest, if the particular matter will have a direct and predictable effect on that interest.

“Particular Matter” - matters that involve deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on the interests of specific persons or a discrete and identifiable class of persons. These matters may include a contract, claim, application, judicial or other proceeding, request for a ruling or other determination, controversy, investigation, or charge. A “particular matter” could even include legislation or policy-making that is narrowly focused on the interests of a discrete and identifiable group of parties or organizations, *e.g.*, DoD policy affecting only military aircraft manufacturers.

“Personal and Substantial” Participation – To participate “personally” means to participate directly. It also includes the direct and active supervision of the participation of a subordinate. Participation is substantial if it is of significance to the matter, and may occur through decision, approval, recommendation, investigation, or advice. One act, such as approving a critical step, may be substantial, but an entire series of peripheral acts may not be.

“Direct and Predictable Effect” - a close, causal link between **any** action taken on the matter and **any** expected effect of the matter on the potential employer’s financial interest. An effect may be direct even though it does not occur immediately, although effects on the general economy are not direct. There must also be a real, not speculative, possibility that the matter will affect the financial interest, but the size of the gain or loss is not relevant.

“Negotiating” - any discussion or communications with the organization or **an** agent, with the mutual view of reaching an agreement regarding possible employment. It is not limited to just discussing specific terms and conditions of employment in a specific position.

Please note that regulations place similar restrictions when you are seeking employment. Please also note that your disqualification remains in effect until it may be withdrawn or your participation is authorized by appropriate authority.

41 U.S.C. 423: Restrictions On Seeking Employment:

DoD personnel may not participate personally and substantially in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000 when seeking employment with a bidder or offeror. The rules require that personnel file written disqualification statements with the contracting officer, source selection authority, and immediate supervisor. They must identify the procurement, describe the nature and specific dates of participation in the procurement, and identify the bidder or offeror and describe its interest.

DoD personnel must promptly report, in writing, to their supervisors and ethics officials, any employment contact with a bidder or offeror in a DoD procurement valued at more than \$100,000, even when they promptly reject the employment contact.

“Seeking employment” - includes inquiries regarding potential future employment, including negotiations, and responses, other than immediate and clear rejections, to unsolicited communications regarding possible employment. It does not include requesting a job application, but does include a 2-month period after forwarding a resume unless the possibility of employment is rejected prior to that time.

“DoD Procurement Valued at More Than \$100,000” - DoD acquisition, using competitive procedures and appropriated funds, for a contract in excess of the simplified acquisition threshold, currently \$100,000.

“Personal and Substantial Participation” - active and significant involvement in any of the following activities directly related to the procurement:

- drafting, reviewing, or approving the specification or statement of work;
- preparing or developing the solicitation;
- evaluating bids or proposals;
- selecting a source;
- negotiating price or terms and conditions; or
- reviewing and approving the award.

Unless and until you have received written authorization from the Head of the Contracting Authority, you will remain disqualified.

18 U.S.C. 207: Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions:

Senior Officials -

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not make any communications or appearances on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of the agency or agencies in which they served within 1 year prior to leaving the senior position, with the intent to influence in connection with any matter on which official action is sought by the other person.

For 1 year after leaving a senior position, they may not aid, advise, or represent a foreign government or foreign political party with the intent to influence any officer or employee of any Federal department or agency, or Member of Congress.

"Senior Officials" - flag and general officers, and civilian personnel whose basic rate of pay is at or above 86.5% of the basic rate for Executive Schedule Level II (at or above \$136,757 in 2004).

"Agency" -

For Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed appointees: all of DoD, including the Military Departments and DoD Agencies.

For general and flag officers and all other covered civilian personnel: their component within DoD: the Military Departments, DISA, DIA, DLA, NGA, NRO, DTRA, and NSA. For flag and general officers assigned outside of their Military Department, their agency will include their Military Department in addition to other components in which they served during the last year of service.

Very Senior Official (Secretary of Defense) - additional 1-year ban on communications or appearances before all employees in positions on the Executive Schedule in all agencies of the executive branch.

All Personnel -

Forever after terminating Federal service, they may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter in which they personally and substantially participated, which involved a specific party at the time of the participation and representation, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Specific Parties" - identifiable parties other than the Federal Government.

For 2 years after terminating Government service, Government officers and employees may not make a communication or appearance on behalf of any other person before any officer or employee of any Federal agency or court with the intent to influence in connection with a particular matter which they reasonably should have known was actually pending under their official responsibility within 1 year before they left Government service, which involved a specific party at that time, and in which the U.S. is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.

"Official Responsibility" - direct administrative or operating authority to approve, disapprove, or otherwise direct, Government actions. It includes a supervisor at any level having responsibility for the actions of a subordinate employee who actually participates in a matter.

For 1 year after terminating Government service, they may not represent, aid, or advise someone else on the basis of covered information concerning any ongoing trade or treaty negotiation in which they participated personally **and** substantially in their last year of Government service.

“Trade Negotiations” - those undertaken pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (19 U.S.C. 2902).

“Treaties” - international agreements that require the advice and consent of the Senate.

“Covered Information” - agency records accessible to the employee but exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

There are exceptions to the restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207.

41 U.S.C. 423 Post-Government Service Employment Restrictions :

For 1 year after a designated date, covered DoD personnel may not accept compensation from the prime contractor on a DoD contract valued in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Designated Date for Covered Personnel” – Date of selection or award of contract for service by procuring contracting officers, source selection authorities, members of source selection evaluation boards, and chiefs of financial or technical evaluation teams;

Last date of service on the contract for program managers, deputy program managers, and administrative contracting officers;

Date of decision for officials who personally made any of the following decisions:

- 1) to award contracts, subcontracts, or modifications of contracts or subcontracts, or task or delivery orders in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 2) to establish overhead or other rates valued in excess of \$10,000,000,
- 3) to approve issuance of a contract payment in excess of \$10,000,000, or
- 4) to pay or settle a claim in excess of \$10,000,000.

“Valued in Excess of \$10,000,000” -

contract, including all options: value or estimated value at the time of award

indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity or requirements contract: total estimated value of all orders at the time of award

any multiple award schedule contract: estimate, unless contracting officer documents a lower estimate

Basic Ordering Agreement: value of delivery order, task order or order

claims: amount paid or to be paid in settlement

negotiated overhead or other rates: estimated monetary value, when applied to the Government portion of the applicable allocation base.

They may accept compensation from any division or affiliate of the contractor that does not produce the same or similar products or services as the entity responsible for the contract.

“Same or Similar” - a product or service must be “dissimilar enough” from that under the contract to warrant use of the exception.

“Same or Similar” - a product or service must be “dissimilar enough” from that under the contract to warrant use of the exception.

I certify that I am aware of the restrictions set forth above. I further certify that I have not knowingly violated those statutes that apply to Federal personnel while they are in Federal service.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Printed Name


Signature

Dec. 10, 2004
Date

g://socgc/1-gail/Annual Certification/doc
Rev: 12/6/2004 4:40 PM

DEFENSE

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Dec. 20, 2004

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Updated: 20 Dec 2004

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U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release**On the Web:**

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>
Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>
or +1 (703) 428-0711

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No. 1309-04
December 20, 2004

Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.

According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."

The modified regulation is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/

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 **Email A Copy**

11-L-0559/OSD/46189

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11-L-0559/OSD/46190

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

12/20/2004

INFORMATION FOR PRESS RELEASE ON RECENT CHANGE TO DOD
REGULATION INVOLVING POST-GOVERNMENT SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
RESTRICTIONS

POC: Steve Epstein, DoD Standards of Conduct Office, (b)(6)
epsteins@dodac.osd.mil

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Rev: 12/10/2004 10:26 AM



DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

OCT 25 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE **MILITARY** DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM **ANALYSIS** AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR, FORCE TRANSFORMATION
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

SUBJECT: Prevention of Violations of Post-Government Service Employment
Restrictions

This directive-type memorandum establishes additional procedures to ensure that DoD personnel are aware of and comply with statutes and regulations that apply to their transition from Federal service to private employment.

Annual Certification: Starting immediately, DoD personnel who file Public Financial Disclosure **Reports** (SF 278) shall certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 and 208, and 41 U.S.C. 423, and that they have not violated those restrictions.

Annual Ethics Briefing: DoD Components shall include training on relevant Federal and DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in Annual Ethics Briefings.

Guidance for All Departing DoD Personnel: DoD Components shall provide guidance on relevant Federal and DoD post-Government service employment restrictions, as part of out-processing procedures, to all DoD personnel who are leaving Federal service.

This memorandum is effective immediately. Changes to DoDD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation (JER), incorporating the substance of this memorandum, shall be issued within 180 days. **Terms used** in this memorandum are defined in the JER.

Attachments
cc: Directive Division, C&D, WHS



OSD 15517-04

11-L-0559/OSD/46193

- a. Civil Penalties. Individual violators may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed \$100,000. Violators, other than individuals, may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed \$1 million.
- b. Administrative Sanctions. See subsection 10-300 through 10-304 of this Regulation.

SECTION 4. Annual Certification

8-400. Annual Certification. DoD employees who file the Public Financial Disclosure Report (SF 278) shall certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 and 208, and 41 U.S.C. 423 (references (b) and (c)), and that they have not violated those restrictions.

SECTION 5. DoD GUIDANCE

8-500. Appearances. DoD employees shall:

- a. Ensure that the prospect of employment does not affect the performance or non-performance of their official duties;
- b. Ensure that they do not communicate inside information to a prospective employer; and
- c. Avoid any activity that would affect the public's confidence in the integrity of the Federal Government, even if it is not an actual violation of the law.

8-501. Written Guidance. DoD employees may obtain counseling and written advice concerning restrictions on seeking other employment from their Ethics Counselor:

a. Although the counseling and advice are given by DoD attorneys and involve the interpretation of law and regulation and rendering of legal opinion, no attorney-client or other confidential relationship is created. Communications made to an Ethics Counselor in seeking such advice are not privileged.

b. This counseling and advice is personal to the current or former DoD employee. It does not extend to the individual's business, employer, or prospective employer.

SECTION 6. REFERENCES

8-600. References

- (a) Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2635, "Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch," current edition
- (b) Title 18, United States Code, Sections 207 and 208
- (c) Title 41, United States Code, Section 423
- (d) Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 3.104, current edition

Communications made to an Ethics Counselor in **seeking** such advice are not privileged.

b. Ethics counseling **and** advice are personal to the current **or** former DoD employee. They **do not extend** to anyone else, including **his** business, employer, or prospective employer.

9-501. Delegation of Authority. The DoD Component **DAEO** may specifically delegate authority **in writing** for Ethics Counselors within **the** DoD Component to provide **written** advice under **41 U.S.C. 423** (reference (e)). In any case where the local Ethics Counselor does not have the authority **by** written delegation, he **shall** provide the counseling and **obtain** the request for advice and necessary supporting information **from** the DoD employee and forward it **to** the DoD Component **DAEO** or designee who **has** been specifically delegated the authority **in writing** to issue the written advice.

9-502. Guidance for Departing DoD Employees: DoD Components shall provide guidance on relevant Federal and DoD post-Government service employment restrictions, as part of out-processing procedures, to DoD employees who are leaving Federal service.

SECTION 6. RESTRICTIONS RESULTING FROM PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES

9-600. 41 U.S.C. 423 (reference (e))

a. **Restrictions.** This **statute restricts** a former DoD employee **who was** a procurement official with respect to a particular procurement from knowingly:

(1) Each DoD Component is encouraged to provide 1 hour of official duty time to review a Written AEB and to supplement the written AEB, including but not limited to, verbal briefings, in person or by telecommunications, computer-based methods, or recorded means, and ethics ~~related~~ articles in command communications, newsletters, and ethics electronic bulletin board systems.

(2) An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for a written AEB for the same *calendar year* in which given.

(3) For DoD Components that verbally brief all of their other covered employees during 1 year of a consecutive 3-year **period**, 1997 shall be the first year of such briefings. Thereafter, verbal briefings shall follow in 3-year increments; e.g., 2000, 2003, 2006; etc.

(4) The following exceptions to verbal AEBs may apply:

(a) The DoD Component DAEO, or designee, may make a written determination that it is impractical to provide a verbal AEB once every 3 *calendar years*, under **section 2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(A)** of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above, An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for this exception for the same *calendar year* in which given.

(b) DoD employees who are special Government employees, who are officers in the uniformed services who serve on active duty for 30 or fewer consecutive days, or who are designated employees (subsections **2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(B)**, **2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(C)**, and **2638.704(d)(3)(iii)(D)** of reference (a)), in subsection 11-100., above, may be given written AEBs, in accordance with section **2638.704(d)(3)(i)** of reference (a). An IEO described in subsection 11-300.f., above, may satisfy the requirement for this exception for the *same* calendar year in which given.

c. Each DoD Component shall maintain records to track that the requirements of section 2638 of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above, including the method of training provided to covered employees, have been met.

d. DoD Components shall include training on relevant Federal and DoD disqualification and employment restrictions in Annual Ethics Briefings.

11-302. **Annual Ethics Training Plans.** Each DoD Agency (see definition of "Agency" in subsection 1-201., above) shall develop a written plan for annual ethics training for a calendar year by the beginning of that year, in compliance with section 2638.702(c) of reference (a) in subsection 11-100., above. The DoD Components that are not Agencies shall submit annual ethics training plans to DoD SOCO by December 31st of the prior year for approval and inclusion in SOCO's ethics training plan.

FOUO

December 17, 2004

07
705 111-0 1111 #5

TO: VADM Jim Stavridis

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Status of Items

Please **find** out the status of these items Jim Haynes owes me.

Thanks.

Attach.
12/9/04 MFR

DHR:ss
121704-7

.....
Please respond by _____

250

17 Dec 04

FOUO

December 9, 2004

SUBJECT: Ethics

I am due from Jim Haynes the following:

- o **My ethics certification to sign.**
- **A statement from Larry Di Rita that has been released to the press about the changes made in our ethics procedures.**
- **A letter from me to John McCain enclosing the statement on changes in the ethics rules.**

DHR:dh
12090442



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 5 2005

The Honorable John McCain
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

I am writing to apprise you of recent changes the Department of Defense has undertaken to strengthen our programs to avoid violation of conflicts of interest statutes, particularly those dealing with the transition of DoD personnel from public service to private enterprise.

On October 25, 2004, the Department implemented changes to three sections of DoD Directive 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. The first change requires all senior DoD personnel (civilian and military) who file the public financial disclosure report (SF 278) to certify annually that they are aware of the disqualification and employment restrictions of 18 U.S.C. 207 (which bars certain activities after leaving public service), 18 U.S.C. 208 (which bars Federal personnel from participating in official actions that involve a private enterprise in which that employee is negotiating employment), and 41 U.S.C. 423 (the Procurement Integrity Act.) This certification, which is already in effect, also requires senior DoD officials to attest that they have not violated the above statutes.

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The third change mandates that all DoD personnel, when leaving Federal service, receive guidance on post-Government service employment restrictions. Although many DoD commands and other organizations currently provide this guidance as part of their out-processing, this change in the Joint Ethics Regulation will require such guidance.

I am enclosing a copy of the change to our regulation along with a copy of a recent press release discussing these initiatives.

Sincerely,

Attachment
cc: Honorable John Warner
Honorable Carl Levin

250
5
Jan 05
17 Dec 04

OSD 00202-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46200

DRAFT

Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

FY 2006/FY 2007 Biennial Budget Estimates
Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide
President's Budget Submission Guidance

1. This guidance applies to the Operation & Maintenance, Defense-Wide (O&M,D-W) agencies.
 - a. It supplements the OUSD(C) Program/Budget memorandum, December 2, 2004, Updates of the Procurement, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), Construction, Operation and Maintenance (O&M), and Military Personnel Databases for the FY 2006/2007 President's Budget.
 - b. The submission date for O&M,D-W agency exhibits, **JANUARY 19, 2005**, is earlier than submission dates for other entities, to allow the O&M,D-W team time to review and compile the submission books for the total appropriation. This is in contrast to Army, Navy, and Air Force O&M appropriations, which prepare their consolidated books before submitting them to their OSD analysts.
 - c. The O&M,D-W analysts at OSD will review, mark and return the exhibits to you for editing by February 4. Fully revised, FINAL version of all exhibits is due by February 11. The OSD team will assemble and send to the printer by February 18, to meet the required March 1 delivery date to Congress.

2. Use the four-year format (FY 2004 is prior year; FY 2005 is current year; FY 2006 is budget year; FY 2007 is budget year plus one).
 - a. Include FY 2004 Supplemental in FY 2004 actuals.
 - b. Include approved PBD actions (to include FY 2005 transfers identified in PBDs).
 - c. Ensure transfers in and out are each identified on a separate transfer line. Do NOT show transfers as a program change.

Volume I exhibits (PBA-19, OP-5, OP-32, PB-31D, PB-31R), as detailed below, are due to your analyst by close of business **January 19**. These are required for the OSD staff to prepare the appropriation summary and overview data.

- Submit each exhibit as a separate Microsoft Word file, labeled as *Agencyacronym FY 2006 Exhibitname.doc* (e.g. DISA FY 2006 PBA-19.doc).
- In the event that exhibits must be revised after initial submission, add a *version number* after the *Exhibitname* (e.g. DISA FY 2006 PBA-19 v2.doc).
- Your submissions should be printer-ready.
 - a. Obtain security clearance for the submission. Please scan in the clearance document and provide it electronically along with the exhibits.
 - b. Please examine exhibits for line and page breaks, proper headers and footers, and alignments (left-align all text; right align all dollar amounts within columns).
 - c. Delete all "POC" notations. There should be no individual's name, no phone number on any exhibit.
 - d. Use CourierNew 12 throughout all documents (with exceptions for use of CourierNew 10 when absolutely necessary to fit all columns on the page).

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- e. Center your agency's acronym (e.g., DISA) in the bottom margin. The O&M,D-W team will add the page numbers.
- a. **PBA-19 Appropriation Highlights:**
 - i. This introductory statement should highlight key programmatic or thematic changes that warrant attention. Note that increases/decreases *per se* are shown on the OP-5 rather than on the PBA-19.
 - ii. The goal is one page that begins and ends with a "take-away" message emphasizing the role or value the agency contributes to national defense.
 - iii. Footnote the amount of Supplemental funds received in FY 2004 and anticipated in FY 2005 at the bottom of the PBA-19 table.
 - iv. Include Title IX Supplemental funds and approved FY 2005 Supplemental requests in FY 2005 column on the PBA-19.
- b. **OP-5 Detail by Subactivity Group:**
 1. Prepare a single OP-5 for each agency. Now that each agency reports its entire program in a single Budget Activity, your OP-5 should reflect all the subactivities your agency previously reported in separate OP-5's.
 - ii. Integrate and incorporate the same level of detail that has been presented in multiple OP-5s in previous years.
 - iii. Section I. Description of Operations Financed: Include a summary of the key changes after the general paragraph. Group the changes if that will lead to a better understanding of what the proposed changes will accomplish.
 - iv. Section III. Financial Summary part A. Subactivity Group
 1. Ensure this section includes all the specific programs that have been presented in previous years, and fully accounts for your budget authority/request in all years. If there is a significant change in program funding between years, the change should be highlighted and explained in Section I. Description of Operations Financed.
 2. For clarity, it may be useful to create "groups" that correspond to the breakouts presented in previous budget exhibits (e.g., DLA's OP-5, Section III, Financial Summary part A. Subactivity Group list could be divided into Other Logistics Services, Other Logistics Programs, and Warstoppers. Each division has a complete list of subactivities within the division. For other agencies, there may be a Training division that corresponds to the old BA-3 OP-5, and an Operations and Administration division that corresponds to BA-4. Division titles are discretionary.)
 - V. Section III. Financial Summary part C. Reconciliation of Increases and Decreases
 1. Ensure that the trail includes, for each change, the previous year's baseline amount. This is a **mandatory congressional requirement**.
 2. Identify Supp funding separately for each change.
 3. Ensure that descriptions are communicative rather than cryptic. Spell out acronyms. One-liners are seldom satisfactory. Where possible, indicate the related OP-32 line number.

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Subject to changes based on P/B FY 2006 President's Budget Guidance Memo

- vi. Be sure to identify program transfers and show them in the correct section. If transfers are included in the program increases/decreases section, Congressional staffers may incorrectly interpret them as program growth and make them targets for reduction.
- vii. Provide a measurable metric for each performance criteria described in the Performance Criteria and Evaluation Summary. Provide analysis to indicate whether performance as measured is good, bad, improving, etc.
- viii. Since OMB expects that each agency has a strategic plan from which goals and objectives flow, make reference to your agency's strategic plan as often as appropriate.

c. OP-32 Appropriation Summary of Price/Program Growth:

- i. Consult OMB Circular A-11 for general guidance:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/04toc.html>
- ii. Consult PBDs 604,606 and 426 for DoD-approved inflation, pay, and WCF rates. A table of approved rates will be provided separately for your convenience.
- iii. Consult OMB Circular A-11 regarding use of object classes.
- iv. Pay close attention to the definitions of subsets within object class 25 Other Contractual Services and crosswalk your contracts appropriately to the OP-32 lines.
 - 1. OC 25.1 is also known as Contract Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS) (OP-32 Lines 931 Contract Consultants, 932 Management & Professional Support Services, 933 Studies, Analysis, & Evaluation, and 934 Engineering & Technical Services).
 - a. Include:
 - i. Management and professional support services,
 - ii. Studies, analyses, and evaluation, and
 - iii. Engineering and technical services.
 - b. EXCLUDE contracts for:
 - i. Financial statement audits (OC 25.2),
 - ii. Information technology consulting services that focus on large scale systems acquisition and integration or large scale software development (OC 31.0),
 - iii. Personnel appointment and advisory committees (OC 11.3),
 - iv. Operation and maintenance of information technology and telecommunication services (OC 25.7),
 - v. Architectural and engineering services as defined in the FAR,
 - vi. Research on theoretical mathematics and basic medical, biological, physical, social, psychological, or other phenomena (OC 25.5),
 - vii. Services classified in OC 25.2 Other contractual Services with non-Federal sources or 25.3 Other purchases of goods and services from Government accounts.
 - 2. Object Class 25 Other contractual Services also includes:
 - i. OC 25.2 Other Services includes contractual services with non-Federal sources that are *not otherwise classified* in OC 25, such as financial

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- statement audits performed by independent public auditors (OP-32 lines 926,989,991, and 998). Agencies that report more than 15% of their total OC 25 budget under OC 25.2 must, per 10U.S.C. §2212, **submit an itemized list of contracts** with justification as backup material to the OUSD(C) O&M,D-W team. This input will be used in explanations to congressional staffers;
- ii. OC 25.3 Other purchases of goods and services from Government accounts for purchases that are not otherwise classified (OP-32 lines 600-699, 701-770,901,902, 987). Do not use this object class if a more specific object class applies;
 - iii. OC 25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities when done by contract with the private sector or another federal account (OP-32 line 923);
 - iv. OC 25.5 Research and development contracts for conduct of basic and applied research and development (OP-32 line 989);
 - v. OC 25.6 Medical care for payments to contractors for medical care (OP-32 line 989);
 - vi. OC 25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment when done by contract with the private sector or another federal agency (OP-32 lines 922 and 927-930);
 - vii. OC 25.8 Subsistence and support of persons for board, lodging, and care of persons (OP-32 line 998).
- v. If applicable to your agency, show the foreign currency impact in a separate column.
 - vi. Prepare a detailed listing that documents specifics of growth in 998 Other Costs and 989 Other Contracts lines.
- d. **PB-31R Personnel Summary:** follow guidance provided by Operations & Personnel point of contact (b)(6) Jan Soares, x (b) for civilian personnel or Kevin Lannon, x (b) for military personnel). Note that there is a new CIS Report, R19 Civilian FTE and Cost Display, that lists the direct-funded and reimbursable-funded FTEs, the personnel compensation object class amounts, and then derives average costs for direct-funded and reimbursable-funded FTEs.
- e. **PB-31D Summary of Funding Increases and Decreases:** where possible, identify the related program line shown in the OP-5 Section III. Financial Summary **part A**. Subactivity Group for each increase or decrease.
- f. **0-1 Operation & Maintenance Funding by Budget Activity** will be submitted electronically IAW guidance provided by Program & Financial Control (POCs are Manju Goel and Paul White, (b)(6))
4. **Contact your analyst** for additional information or explanation (table follows).

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| | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| Marcia Case | <u>Marcia.Case@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| AFIS | American Forces Information Service | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DFAS | Defense Finance & Accounting Service | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DHRA | Defense Human Resources Activity | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DLSA | Defense Legal Services Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| DPMO | Defense POW/MIA Office | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| SOCOM | Special Operations Command | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |
| | Classified Agencies | 0100 0100 0100 | Marcia Case |

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---|----------------|-------------------|
| Gretchen Anderson | <u>Gretchen.Anderson@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| CMP | Civil Military Programs | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DAU | Defense Acquisition University | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DCAA | Defense Contract Audit Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DCMA | Defense Contract Management Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DISA | Defense Information Systems Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DLA | Defense Logistics Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DSCA | Defense Security Cooperation Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| DoDDE | DoD Dependents' Education | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| NDU | National Defense University | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| OEA | Office of Economic Adjustment | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| TJS | Joint Chiefs of Staff | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| COURT | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| OIG | Office of the Inspector General | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |
| CD/CN | Counternarcotics | 0100 0100 0100 | Gretchen Anderson |

| | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Keith Anderson | <u>Keith.Anderson@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| DSS | Defense Security Service | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| DTRA | Defense Threat Reduction Agency | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| DTSA | Defense Technology Security Admin | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| WHS | Washington Headquarters Services | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |
| CTR | Conventional Threat Reduction | 0100 0100 0100 | Keith Anderson |

| | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|------------------|
| Cara Abercrombie | <u>Cara.Abercrombie@osd.mil</u> | | (b)(6) |
| Volume II | Data Book Exhibits | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-31Q | Manpower Changes in FTEs | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-22 | Major DoD Headquarters Activities | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-55 | International Military Headquarters | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-24 | Professional Military Education | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-15 | Advisory and Assistance Services | | Cara Abercrombie |
| OP-34 | Appropriated Fund Support for MWR Activities | | Cara Abercrombie |
| Env-30A-C | Defense Environmental Restoration Program | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-28/28A | Summary of Budgeted Environmental Projects | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-34A | Revenue from Leasing out DoD Assets | | Cara Abercrombie |
| PB-34B | Proceeds from Transfer or Disposal of DoD Real Property | | Cara Abercrombie |



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Release

On the Web:

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?>

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Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/faq/comment.html>

or +1 (703) 428-0711

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 1309-04

December 20, 2004

Post-Government Service Employment Restriction Changes Announced

The Department of Defense recently modified its ethics regulation to ensure DoD personnel, when leaving federal service, do not inadvertently violate federal "revolving door" statutes.

In a memorandum dated Oct 25, 2004, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz directed three changes to the departmental ethics regulation, DoD Directive 5500.7-R.

The first change requires senior personnel, including admirals, generals, and senior civilian officials, to certify annually that they are aware of the requirements of three statutes, and have not violated them. The three statutes bar conflicts of interests by procurement officials, all federal employees when negotiating for employment, and all federal employees after they leave the department.

The second change mandates that information on these post-government employment restrictions be included in the annual ethics training program for DoD personnel. This amplifies the current requirements for annual training.

The third element establishes a requirement that all DoD personnel who are leaving federal service receive guidance on the restrictions that will affect them during and after their transition. Many DoD organizations already provide this information as part of the personnel checkout process and briefings.


According to William J. Haynes II, the general counsel and chief ethics officer of the department, "These changes should further strengthen our program of ethics education to help DoD personnel know and appreciate how our ethics laws apply to them."

The modified regulation is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics/

<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20041220-1882.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/46206

January 4, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ignatius Op-Ed on General Abizaid

Mr. President—

In case you have not seen this op-ed by David Ignatius on John Abizaid, I thought you might like to read it.

Respectfully,

Attach.
Ignatius, David. "Achieving Real Victory Could Take Decades," *Washington Post*, December 26, 2004, p. B1.

DHR:dh
010305-52

000.7

4 Jan 05

(b)(6)

CIV, OSD

From: Rhynedance, George, COL, OASD-PA
Sent: Thursday, December 30, 2004 7:00 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
cc: Di Rita, Larry, CIV, OSD-OASD-PA
Subject: Ignatius Article

(b)(6)

We received a snowflake asking for a copy of the Dave Ignatius article. I have copied it below in case you haven't seen it yet.

GR

Washington Post
December 26, 2004
Pg. B1

Achieving Real Victory Could Take Decades

By David Ignatius

Gen. John Abizaid probably commands the most potent military force in history. The troops of his Central Command are arrayed across the jagged crescent of the Middle East, from Egypt to Pakistan, in an overwhelming projection of U.S. power. He travels with his own mini-government: a top State Department officer to manage diplomacy; a senior CIA officer to oversee intelligence; a retinue of generals and admirals to supervise operations and logistics. If there is a modern Imperium Americanum, Abizaid is its field general.

I traveled this month with Abizaid as he visited Iraq and other areas of his command. Over several days, I heard him discuss his strategy for what he calls the "Long War" to contain Islamic extremism in Centcom's turbulent theater of operations. We talked about the current front in Iraq, and the longer-term process of change in the Middle East, which Abizaid views as the ultimate strategic challenge.

"We control the air, the sea and the ground militarily," Abizaid told one audience, and in conventional terms, he's unquestionably right. From its headquarters near the huge new U.S. airbase in Qatar, Centcom's military reach stretches in every direction: To the west, the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet has its base in Bahrain; to the north, the aircraft carrier USS Harry Truman and its task force are steaming on patrol in the Persian Gulf; to the east, more than 17,000 troops are working to stabilize postwar Afghanistan; to the south, about 1,000 troops are keeping a lid on the Horn of Africa. And to the northwest lies the bloody battlefield of Iraq, where nearly 150,000 of Abizaid's soldiers are fighting a determined insurgency.

For all of America's military might, the Long War that has begun in the Middle East poses some tough strategic questions. What is the nature of the enemy? If the United States is so powerful, why is it having such difficulty in Iraq? What will victory look like, in Iraq and elsewhere in the Islamic world? And how long will the conflict take?

The costs of war came home for America this past week. On Monday, President Bush conceded that the Iraq insurgents "are having an effect," and that U.S. efforts to train Iraqi security forces have had only "mixed" success. On Tuesday, a suicide bomber savaged a mess hall in Mosul in the deadliest single attack since the war began 21 months ago. On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tried to fend off calls for his resignation because of setbacks in Iraq.

It was a week that focused attention on gut-level issues, reminiscent of the Vietnam War more than 30 years ago: Why are we in Iraq? What kind of conflict is the United States fighting there? How can we win it? Abizaid offers the best answers to these questions I've heard from any official in the U.S. government. In addition to being the military's top commander in the Middle East, he has an intellectual and emotional feel for the region. He's of Arab ancestry -- his forebears came to the United States from Lebanon in the 1870s -- and he learned to speak Arabic during a stint in Jordan 25 years ago. Like many of the best U.S. Army officers for generations, he's a well-read man who analyzes contemporary issues against the background of history.

Abizaid believes that the Long War is only in its early stages. Victory will be hard to measure, he says, because the enemy won't wave a white flag and surrender one day. Success will instead be an incremental process of modernization of the Islamic world, which will gradually find its own accommodation with the global economy and open political systems.

America's enemies in this Long War, he argues, are what he calls "Salafistjihadists." That's his term for the Muslim fundamentalists who use violent tactics to try to re-create what they imagine was the pure and perfect Islamic government of the era of the prophet Muhammad, who is sometimes called the "Salaf." Osama bin Laden is the best known of the Salafist extremists, but Abizaid argues that the movement is much broader and more diffuse than al Qaeda. It's a loose network of like-minded individuals who use 21st century-technology to spread their vision of a 7th-century paradise.

Salafist preachers see themselves as part of a vanguard whose mission is to radicalize other Muslims to overthrow their leaders. Abizaid likens them to Lenin, Trotsky and the other Bolshevik leaders. During a gathering of foreign-policy experts in Washington last October, he posed a haunting question: What would you have done in 1890 if you had known the ruin this Bolshevik vanguard would bring? At another point, he urged the audience to think of today's Islamic world, wracked by waves of violence, as akin to Europe in the revolutionary year of 1848. The Arab world's spasms of anarchy and terror, like those in Europe 150 years ago, are part of a process of social change -- in which an old order is crumbling, and a new one is struggling to be born.

Abizaid's historical analogies are helpful because they stretch our thinking. People tend to see current problems as unique and overwhelming, and that has been especially true for America in the traumatic years since Sept. 11, 2001. But through the long lens of history, contemporary problems come into better focus. The wealthy Saudi jihadist bin Laden begins to seem a bit like 19th-century anarchist Prince Peter Kropotkin, who similarly wanted to use revolutionary violence to purge what he viewed as a corrupt order. On this broad canvas of historical change, the time horizon isn't years, but decades.

Abizaid didn't draw for me any specific lessons from this history, but several conclusions seem obvious: If the United States is fighting an ideological vanguard similar to the Bolsheviks -- whose leaders will never surrender or negotiate -- then it will have to capture or kill them. That suggests a dirty, drawn-out conflict in which each side tests the other's will and staying power. It's not the sort of war that democracies are usually good at fighting, but among Abizaid's team of advisers, you hear the same phrase repeated over and over: "A lot of bad guys are going to have to die."

Yet because the battlefield is society itself, the United States cannot think of the struggle in purely military terms. Centcom's 1,000 troops who are digging wells and performing other reconstruction tasks in the Horn of Africa may be a better model for success than the 150,000 soldiers hunkered down in Iraq. And because it is a war of transformation, comparable to Europe's hundred-year process of modernization in the 19th century, the United States must above all be patient.

Abizaid argues that this enemy is especially dangerous because it has fused an atavistic Salafist ideology with the most modern tools of technology. "The enemy has a virtual connectivity we haven't seen before with guerrilla groups," he says. "They use the Internet to pass along techniques, tactics, procedures, advice." He believes the jihadists have been clever in using the global media -- both to spread their message among

followers and to intimidate adversaries. Indeed, the media are their best weapon.

The Salafist vanguard seeks victory through what Abizaid calls "weapons of mass effect" -- the 9/11 attacks, the suicide bombings in Baghdad, the gruesome beheadings in Fallujah -- which seek to destabilize the United States and its allies through the media. "We have nothing to fear from this enemy other than its ability to create panic," he argues. "This enemy is like water -- it seeks an unguarded path. They'll go for the place they can use a weapon of mass effect -- and gain a media victory."

Given the importance of the media front, Abizaid is frustrated that Arab journalists haven't provided a more critical picture of life in places where Islamic insurgents have gained control, such as Fallujah. He's convinced that if ordinary Arabs could see the cruelty and repression of these Taliban-style jihadists, they would reject them. Indeed, at several stops during our trip, he urged his listeners to push Arab media to report more about the insurgents' brutal tactics.

"They are the most despicable enemy I've ever seen," he told European and Arab leaders who gathered in Bahrain to talk about Persian Gulf security. "They operate from mosques, they behead people, they have killed far more Muslims than non-Muslims."

Abizaid believes the winning strategy, in Iraq and across the Islamic world, is to isolate the Salafist vanguard from ordinary Muslims who want the better, freer life that prosperity and connectedness can bring. That means breaching the gaps between rich nations and poor ones, and preventing terrorists from establishing bases of operations, in the way bin Laden did in Afghanistan. "The clear military lesson of Afghanistan is that we cannot allow the enemy to establish a safe haven anywhere," he says.

One of Abizaid's top deputies, Vice Adm. David Nichols, summarizes the nature of the Salafist threat. Nichols, who commands the 5th Fleet, asserts that the enemy is mounting "a cultural, not just a physical attack." For enemy leaders, the clash of civilizations is the organizing principle of life, Nichols argues. They tell Muslims that there are only two camps, and that "peaceful coexistence is not possible." The goal of America and its allies, says Nichols, must be to convince the average Muslim that the jihadists are wrong. It's not "us" vs. "them," but a connected world in which everyone will gain by isolating and destroying the extremist fringe.

This strategy of isolating the religious extremists has been embraced by Iraq's interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi -- to the point of making contact with Baathists who were part of Saddam Hussein's regime and are now on the fringes of the insurgency. It reflects a judgment by Allawi -- one that Abizaid would certainly share -- that the Baathists in the long run will make an accommodation with America and the modern world. The Salafist extremists, in contrast, will never do so.

My travels with Abizaid ended with a stop in Mosul, at the same camp hit by a suicide bomber last week. Mosul is a case study in what America is facing in Iraq, and in the Long War. Over the past year, the city has gone from a model of stability to a new Fallujah, where insurgents have used terror tactics to halt collaboration with U.S. forces. The measure of success here will be the return of normal life. "It won't ever be over completely, where you wake up one morning and the enemy has surrendered," says Abizaid. "But one day you'll wake up and there will be more food, more security, more stability."

That's what victory would look like in Abizaid's Long War, too. In the broad arc of the world where Centcom operates, life would feel modern, connected, free, relaxed, ordinary. It would feel like a hand that is no longer clenched in a fist. It's a fight where the Muslims masses would win, without the United States losing. But this past week, those images of connectedness and success seemed a long, long way off.

David Ignatius is a columnist for The Post,

January 4, 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid

CC: Gen Dick Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ignatius Piece

I saw the piece by Ignatius. I thought you did a very good job with him.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
010305-53

.....
Please respond by _____

000.7

4 Jan 05

JAN 4 2005

TO: ADM Tom Fargo

cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Tsunami Relief Efforts

From everything I can see back here, you and your folks are doing fine work in responding to the massive humanitarian crisis around the littoral of the Indian Ocean.

Your briefing here for me was particularly helpful, and it is clear PACOM is helping tens of thousands of people in desperate need – well done.

Thanks for all you are doing.

DIIR:dh
010305-23

.....
Please respond by _____

000.92

4 Jan 05

January 4, 2005

TO: Ambassador Evan G. Galbraith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Capitalizing NATO

Van—

Thanks for your note about capitalizing NATO. It is interesting. I'll noodle it.

Best wishes to you for the New Year!

DHR:dh
010305-36


NATO 092

45 Jan 05

January 4, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Summary of Kaplan Talk

Mr. President—

Attached is a piece about a talk Robert Kaplan gave that is quite interesting. I know you've read some books by him.

Respectfully,

Attach.

Foreign Policy Research Institute, "Robert Kaplan on the New Middle East," December 17, 2004

DHR:dh
010305-54

Middle East

4 Jan 05

Bucci, Steven, COL, OSD

From: Nesheiwat, Julia [JNN@WMD.GOV]
Sent: Monday, December 20, 2004 12:36 PM
Subject: Robert Kaplan on The New Middle East

Kaplan once again lays out a very interesting and intriguing view of the Middle East below. As a compliment to this article, another very enlightening paper done by the 1st Marine Division G2 last May, titled "Marines are from Mars, Iraqis are from Venus".

R/ Julia

Foreign Policy Research Institute
A Catalyst for Ideas
www.fpri.org

ROBERT KAPLAN ON THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
December 17, 2004

Robert D. Kaplan is contributing editor to the Atlantic Monthly and a long-time FPRI Associate. His books include *Warrior Politics* (2001); *Eastward to Tartary: Travels in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus* (2000); *Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (first published in 1990, republished in 2001 with a new introduction); and *Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea* (first published in 1988; republished in paperback in 2003). He is writing a series of books about the American military.

Kaplan delivered this talk as the keynote in FPRI's two-day History Institute for Teachers on the Middle East held October 16-17, 2004. Other speakers included Beth Baron, City University of New York; Eric Davis, Rutgers University; Michael S. Doran, Princeton University; Najib Ghadbian, University of Arkansas; Bernard Munk, FPRI; and Harvey Sicherman, FPRI. Dr. Paul Dickler, a Senior Fellow of FPRI's Marvin Wachman Fund for International Education and a history teacher at Neshaminy High School, provided "tips for teachers." Videofiles of selected lectures will be posted on www.fpri.org. The conference was supported by grants from Mason Crest Publishers, Mr. and Mrs. Robert A. Fox, and the Annenberg Foundation.

ROBERT KAPLAN ON THE NEW MIDDLE EAST
Summary by Trudy Kuehner

Mr. Kaplan addressed the challenges that the U.S. military is facing in the greater Middle East and elsewhere, basing his comments on his experience over the past eighteen months as an embedded journalist with U.S. Army Special Forces, the Marines, and other military units in Iraq and Afghanistan, Colombia, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and other areas.

The sad tactical truth, he observed, is that the war on terrorism after 9/11 began too soon. The American military was not far enough along at that time in its transition from an industrial-age beast suited to fighting big world wars with mass infantry invasions, to a light and lethal force suited to dealing with unconventional insurgencies and hunting down small clusters of combatants. The age of mass infantry warfare is coming to a close. Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 merely shaped the battlefield for the real war, which began afterward. The diplomatic and

political requirements of invading a country with over 100,000 troops in an age of global mass media is now so great that it will happen less and less as time goes on.

INDIAN COUNTRY

In essence, he said, the U.S. military is back to the days of fighting the Indians. In the second half of the 19th century, the **U.S. Army** had to fight large numbers of Indian groups -- from different tribes and with different languages and cultures -- of which there were almost as many as there were ethnic groups around the world. It had the job of hunting them down and fighting them in small numbers and unconventional conditions. Success was wrought by people who knew the language and understood the culture: the pathfinders and mountain men.

The pathfinders and mountain men, Kaplan noted, proved that before you could defeat an enemy, you had to understand them and their culture and speak their language. The **U.S. Army** never really learned how to defeat the Indians this way, by making itself a light and lethal force, but won thanks to the railroads and other factors. Its large groups of horse-drawn cavalry were the equivalent of Humvees today, bristling with weaponry that were easily immobilized by small clusters of Indians on foot, or just one lone bicycle bomber in the case of Iraq. Around the world today we face not uniform conventional armies, but small clusters of combatants hiding out in big third-world cities, jungles, and deserts who no longer require an economy of scale to produce and deploy a WMD. Combating these adversaries involves intelligence and linguistic work, among other things.

"Indian country" is a term our armed forces use a lot, and very specifically, Kaplan noted. They not only mean no disrespect to Native Americans, but greatly admire them, hence their radio call signs such as "Black Hawk," "Comanche," "Apache," "Red Cloud," and "Sitting Bull." "Indian country" is set to expand, because as dictators pass from the scene, particularly in the Middle East, what are left are weak, neither/nor democracies. In the Middle East, the emerging generation of leaders will not have the luxury of ruling as autocratically as the passing generation, after fifty years of tremendous economic, social, and demographic change. In the 1940s and '50s, the Middle East was largely a rural desert society. Today, its mega-cities -- Cairo, Tunis, Casablanca, Damascus -- have many millions of people and sprawling suburbs.

Urbanization is inseparable from the rise of extremism, Kaplan noted. As large numbers of people migrated into these cities in the 1960s, '70s and '80s, their sons in particular suddenly faced all the challenges of urban environments that lacked police, street lighting, sewage, and water. There were ample incentives for juvenile delinquency, and yet the Muslim Middle East remained nonviolent in terms of common random crime. This was because the society adapted by intensifying to a more austere, ideological religiosity designed to deal with an impersonal urban environment. This alas had the unintended consequence of creating a fertile breeding-ground for the emergence of terrorist groups.

Over the years, various "enlightened dictators" kept a lid on this boiling pot. But, as modern middle classes emerge, the greater Middle East is on the brink of epic political change, which has not kept up with all the economic and social change. Most countries are ruled by the same systems they've had since the 1950s. Egypt, for instance, is still governed by the emergency law passed in 1954, when Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power. Political change has to catch up, and it will do so very dramatically and tumultuously.

That will lead initially to an upsurge in terrorism. When a system collapses, there is an initial security vacuum. In the Muslim part of Southeast Asia--the Indonesian archipelago, the southern half of the Philippines, the island of Borneo in Malaysia--the passing of military regimes such as Marcos and Suharto has led to the emergence of terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyya and Abu Sayyif that have taken advantage of the security vacuum created by the passing of these regimes.

Counterintuitive as it might seem, then, Kaplan predicted that the initial liberalization of the Middle East will lead to more terrorism rather than less, until these newly emerging systems gather the institutional strength that the passing dictatorships had. In Russia and South Africa, where oppressive systems collapsed, for the first 5-8 years there was a tremendous upsurge in violent crime. In the Middle East, the collapse provides new oxygen for the terrorist groups. There's no easy path to liberalization. And so "Indian country" as the U.S. military defines it is going to intensify and enlarge.

GLOBAL MEDIA

The insurgency in Iraq signifies political and military failure on Washington's part, Kaplan said, but in this day and age, there's something else that also signifies political and military failure, which is the arrival of the global media. Because the aim of the **US**. military around the world--particularly in Colombia, the Philippines, the horn of Africa--is to deal with problems before they get onto page 1 of the newspapers. As soon as something becomes a page-1 problem, the "rules of engagement" are restricted under the klieg light of the global media.

Kaplan spent last spring in Fallujah with the Marines. Last April, the Marines were given the order to assault and take the city, after four American contractors were brutally killed. However, about six days later, after the Marines were inside the city about only a day or so away from taking it, a ceasefire was announced. The administration called a halt just as the Marines were about to be victorious. This was policy incoherence at the highest level, and it shows the effect the global media had on Fallujah. Everything had unraveled exactly as planned, with the Marines taking the city street by street, picking their shots. Because the Marines were so professional, the level of civilian casualties was extremely low. But the few civilian casualties were exactly what the global media put all their focus on. This put political pressure on the Iraqi authorities, so that the administration had to pull the plug

on the operation.

Could the administration have foreseen this? Yes. But the point is that the elements of the global media such as Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera that concentrated on, even exaggerated, the civilian casualties are products of the liberalization of the Middle East. When countries begin to liberalize and get independent television and radio stations, these independent news organizations cannot be expected to think the way we do. Their prejudices, passions, and insecurities will emerge out of their own historical and geographical experience. Just as we could all argue about what the prejudices of Fox News or CNN are, the Middle East's television stations reflect the conspiracy theories, hopes, dreams, and exaggerations of their respective societies. The irony is that the more liberal the Middle East becomes or the less dictatorial, the more restricted the **U.S.** military is in how it can behave.

This change is inevitable. It can't be stopped or put on a different course. Therefore, Kaplan said, the **U.S.** military increasingly must win without firing a shot, by the time-tested rule used by the British, French, Romans, and others, which is to operate indirectly. You train the indigenous army and let them do the work. You're right behind them, crediting them for any successes. You stay in the background. Their own militaries gain legitimacy, which helps the state arise, which helps the newly emerging democratic state gain legitimacy.

FORMING SOCIAL BONDS

One of the many things that went wrong in Iraq was that soon after the occupation, much of the training of the new Iraqi security forces was put in the hands of private defense contractors, who trained them in an impersonal way in large camps, then put them on buses and sent them out to the villages, where they promptly deserted whenever there was a hint of trouble. Months ago, we went back to the time-tested Green Beret/ Marine way of training, which is to embrace your Indian brothers. You train with them all day, watch videos with them at night, go out with them, and sleep in the same hooch for months. This bonding is why the Iraqi special forces performed **so** well in Ramadi in October. Ramadi was the first specific sign we had that there are Iraqi security forces coming off line who really can fight, be disciplined, go into sensitive situations like mosques without killing civilians, and accomplish their mission. This is one positive narrative occurring in Iraq.

Based on his own observations, Kaplan said that the smaller the **U.S.** military deployment, the more successful it tends to be. The smaller the number of troops and the size of the unit, the more low-profile, the more we tend to get done, from Mongolia to Somalia and Colombia to the southern Philippines. The 10,000 troops in Afghanistan have treaded water very well, and finally we have a success with the presidential elections. In Iraq, 138,000 have not prevented a deteriorating situation.

That is because the **U.S.** military as a whole **is** still organized for fighting an industrial-age war. The deployment

11-L-0559/OSD/46218

12/20/2004

constellation of bases around Iraq is better suited for Korea or World War II, while the adversary that we're fighting has been fighting like the Indians or the Viet Cong. In the future, we're going to have to operate in the Middle East the way we've been operating in the horn of Africa, which is more like Lewis & Clark in the French-Indian Wars than it is like World Wars I and II and Desert Storm combined. You send out small groups of highly trained officers to go into small villages here and there and just explore. Find out what the citizenry wants, needs, and fears, any foreigners who have been taking up residence, you drum up intelligence even as you draw up plans for humanitarian aid projects.

The best, most actionable intelligence is generally obtained when some form of humanitarian assistance is involved, Kaplan remarked. People will tell a lot to someone who is treating their children for malaria, scabies, and other diseases and establishing a positive social relationship with them. The main point is that you use small units, forward deployed, making decisions on their own, finding things out, totally immersed in the local environment, because the enemy is no longer ten thousand troops with tanks.

This means that the State Department and the Defense Department will have to effectively collapse into each other. The tasks they face break down the barriers between what the State Department does and what the Pentagon does. The biggest enemy Washington has is its rigid bureaucratic divisions. We cannot afford a Defense Secretary's riding roughshod over a Secretary of State or vice versa. The two really have to work in tandem at all levels.

PROSPECTS

Mr. Kaplan concluded by addressing how he sees Iraq influencing Iran and other places. Iraq, he said, may have been the bridge too far in America's post-Cold War, imperial democratic progress. We started off in Central Europe after the Berlin Wall fell and easily democratized nations such as Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Those nations were heir to the Habsburg and German enlightenments and had large industrial bases and significant middle classes prior to the ravages of Nazism and communism. With high literacy rates and low birth rates, the only problem those countries had was that the Red Army was deployed on their soil.

The Balkans were more troublesome, because they were not heir to any enlightenment. They were run by the poor, chaotic Ottoman/Turkish empire, which on the eve of World War I had feeble, small middle classes, vast peasantries, and little industrial development. Even their communist regimes were more oppressive, less developed bureaucratically, and more corrupt than the communist regimes in north-central Europe. So it made sense that the Balkans' transition to democracy would be more troublesome than Central Europe's. Yugoslavia collapsed, and Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria all had difficult transitions bordering on anarchy at times. The outlook now is better but for some fifteen years it was touch and go.

In Iraq, we've taken on the poorest portion of the former Ottoman empire, an area that's even more geographically and historically challenging. The Balkans were next door to Central Europe, a logical place for the expansion of NATO and the EU; Iraq is surrounded by Iran, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the poorest part of Turkey.

In the most troublesome third of the country, the Sunni Triangle, in early October, we saw one big city, Samara, retaken by mainly Iraqi special forces, with a very low casualty rate. It was the easiest city to retake, but it was a starting point. We have begun to divide the resistance in Fallujah, because the more that Shiites come together to form political parties for elections, the more pressure there is on the Sunnis in the Triangle to do the same, or else they're going to lose out.

But already, the northern third of Iraq, Kurdistan, is no longer in the news, because it's a success story. The southern third, the Shiite south, is less and less in the news, because we're succeeding there. The work that the Army and Marines did in Shiite cities such as Najav and Karbala recently has been astounding. They created a military situation that forced one group of Shiites to take the other Shiites in hand. **So** that the Shiites are forming political parties, they're getting ready for elections. This is a narrative that is palpable, it's developing, and yet the media has not reported it and Washington hasn't laid it out. **All** the public sees is the car bombs. Beyond the static of specific incidents of violence, they're not seeing any positive picture emerge.

Iran is the big elephant in the Middle East for the next few years. Iran is not a regime that you topple with an invasion. It's a whole developed system with different centers of power. Iraq has 23 million people, Iran 69 million. It's much more urbanized. Iran may be one of the only countries in the world where student demonstrations are implicitly pro-American. Almost any political change in Iran would be positive for us. The Iranian regime is not unlike the Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Chernenko: it's old, calcified, out of touch with its population, and narrowly based. There will be political evolution in Iran, and the best way we can fast-forward that is by concentrating on consolidating Iraq. The principal job of the next administration is going to be to consolidate Iraq. Then a *lot* of other situations will improve. The better Iraq **looks**, the better change is going to look in countries such as Syria, Iran, and Egypt.

When the shah fell, Iran was a very centralized state, and his regime was replaced by another centralized state. The Shiite clerisy was finely developed and had an impressive bureaucratic structure. But this may be the last really strong, centralized Iranian state. Whatever ultimately replaces it is likely to be much more decentralized, and that will let the genie out of the bottle for the 26 million Azeris in northwestern Iran to realize their ethnic identity, for Turkomans to do the same; the evolution of all the Muslim lands of Central Asia will be affected.

Central Asia is still in a Soviet phase. Its rulers are ex-Brezhnev-era central committeemen who have reinvented themselves as independent khans. But these are still very repressive, Soviet-style states. When you're in Central Asia, the closest truly sophisticated, aesthetic urban area is Iran, which holds a powerful cultural attraction for these people. But the current political system in Iran repels Central Asians. As the system begins to change, we're starting to enter a period of epic movements.

As to whether history will judge the invasion of Iraq as having been the right or wrong thing to do, Kaplan noted that a close reading of the Duelfer Report convinces one that we should have invaded, while a partial reading suggests otherwise. Ultimately, the invasion will be judged positively or negatively based on how it affects change in the larger and more important Iran. If Iraq can be semi-stabilized and that that stabilization leads to internal change in Iran, the invasion of Iraq is going to look very good historically.

In north Africa, Kaplan noted, Algeria is improving and Morocco is evolving. Tunisia has lagged behind, but it has a large middle-class and no ethnic disputes, so when the Tunisian government opens up, impressive change should be seen there. Of course, this more open society is leading to a greater terrorist threat in the Sahara region: the opening of societies throughout the African Sahel, the Sahara and north Africa is creating new oxygen systems for terrorists.

Kaplan concluded by noting that in its activities throughout the Middle East and all over the world, the U.S. military has been given one of most thankless tasks of any military in history: providing the security armature for an emerging global civil society. The more it succeeds, the less respected and acknowledged it will be by the very society it has created. If it weren't for the military's backing up America's security guarantee, none of the liberalization in places like Qatar and other Gulf sheikdoms that allowed for the creation of Al Jazeera in the first place would have happened. So the job of the American military empire--using the word "empire" because the only historical comparisons are with great powers in the past who had global responsibility--isto seek its own obsolescence. The closer it gets to that, the less appreciated it is going to be by people around the world, particularly in the Middle East.

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TAB A

~~FOUO~~

SECRET
CJCS
NOV 22 2004

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

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Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Manilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/22/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DWR:es
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

22 NOV 04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/46223

OSD 00278-05



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20316-9999

CM-2263-05

4 January 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

RBM 1/4

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

- **Answer.** In response to your request (TAB A), I reviewed the subject document. The paper correctly addresses communications shortcomings, but its solution is too conservative. The Heritage paper proposes a RAND-like, private-sector company to do necessary analysis. The long-term answer is a new agency that has the responsibility, clout and resources to attack larger communications issues. It should include robust, well-trained career public diplomacy professionals deployed worldwide to tell the US story in the local dialect and analyze the feedback. Recommend the agency's leader hold a position on the National Security Council and have an independent voice to the President.
- **Analysis.** Currently, there is an NSC advisor for communications who has his hands full doing interagency work. The proposed senior agency group is unlikely to make any difference, as two already exist: PCC for Strategic Communications and the Muslim World Outreach PCC. The private sector currently spends more than \$6 billion a year on overseas marketing; the USG spends about \$5 million on opinion surveys. This is far too little, and without definitive evidence, it is a guess as to what the US message should be. Information paper at TAB B provides more details.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared By: Mr. Paul Hanley, OCJCS, Director of Strategic Communications,

(b)(6)

TAB A

~~FOUO~~

CSIS
SECRET

November 22, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen Dick Myers
Larry Di Rita
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Strategic Communications Paper

Attached is a paper that was prepared at my request. It resulted from a dinner I had with the three authors, Joe Duffey, Ed Feulner and Lew Meilow. Please read it and let me know what you think.

Thanks.

Attach.
11/2/04 Private Report to the Secretary of Defense

DHR:ss
112204-5

.....
Please respond by 12/10/04

~~FOUO~~

Tab A

11-L-0559/OSD/46225

OSD 00278-05

14 December 2004

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Review of "Private Report to the Secretary of Defense" on Strategic Communications

1. Purpose. To provide comments and recommendations on subject document.
2. The report's fundamental premise is that the United States Government (USG) must do a better job of assessing foreign public opinion and using that data in message development. The report makes two primary recommendations:
 - Establish a corporation for foreign opinion analysis that "listen, ask questions and analyze foreign public opinion as well as test the effectiveness of various USG messages."
 - Prepare the government bureaucracy to apply information by providing senior policy makers "with immediate input so they are aware of the effect an impending policy action or statement will have on foreign public opinion."
3. To implement the second recommendation, the report recommends creating a new staff position on the National Security Council (NSC) to coordinate the USG overall communications strategy. It also recommends creating a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) that brings the NSC with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; representatives from the United States Agency for International Development and other relevant members to encourage closer cooperation and to help implement the USG long-term communications strategy.
4. Policy comments:
 - General: Concur in the report's premise that the challenge of shaping the opinions and behaviors of foreign publics is a vital and central component to the WOT—and that this challenge "lies at the very core of America's own vital national interest." The USG should greatly increase the amount of resources applied to strategic communication activities, to include foreign opinion polling. It is critical that the JSG must view the dialog between America and the rest of the world as a long-term commitment and respond with strength of purpose equal to the information efforts of the Cold War.

- Corporation for Foreign Opinion Analysis. While any new organization that focuses on solving America's image problem is better than none at all, the recommended Defense Science Board (DSB) Center for Strategic Communications (CSC) is a better concept than the Center for Foreign Opinion Analysis (CFOA) recommended in this report. The CSC is much broader in scope, while the CFOA is focused primarily on foreign public opinion polling—something that could be achieved by increasing the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) polling budget and scope of work. The CFOA, like the CSC, would be a nonprofit, bipartisan, federally-funded independent organization similar to RAND Corporation. However, the DSB report recommends the CSC conduct polling, analysis and assessment and also develop mandated self-initiated plans, themes, products and programs (such as children's TV series and video games). The CSC would also work closely with the private sector and nongovernment organizations, foster cross-cultural exchanges, mobilize nongovernment initiatives, recruit private sector experts for short-term assignments and deploy temporary communications teams. The solution to improve America's image abroad must be matched to the magnitude of the problem—a robust CSC is the best option.
- Senior Interagency Group. Establishing the SIG as recommended in this report is appropriate. There is great need for such a group that has authority to speak for its organizations, set strategic communications objectives and priorities, commit resources and quickly adjudicate new proposals for programs and products.
- NSC Communications Staff Position. In November 2003, the NSC created a new position for the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications. Therefore, the position recommended in the report already exists. However, the duties of this individual must be more focused on strategic, international issues, not with tactical or domestic political issues to be effective in the areas described in the report.

FOUO

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2005-11-01 13:34 NOV 1 0 2005

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ensign Amendment

Please read **the** attached Ensign Amendment and tell me **where you think**, and where we **ought** to be **standing** on it.

Thanks.

Attach: 11/8/05 ASD LA memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
110905-11

.....
Please Respond By November 22, 2005

370.61

10 11/05

FOUO

11-L-0559/OSD/46228

OSD 00309-06

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO MEMO

November 08, 2005 7:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Daniel R. Stanley, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Legislative Affairs

SUBJECT: National Defense Authorization Act Amendments

- You asked to see the amendments pending consideration in the Senate. The agreed list is divided 12 Majority and 12 Minority. Submitted or potential amendments are listed below.
- We have not received the language of all amendments. Those underlined **are** tabbed.

Majority:

- o Train and Equip: to build the Partnership Security Capacity of Foreign military and Security forces; agreed on by voice vote - Inhofe (R-OK) (TAB-8)
- o To establish Retirement Benefits for workers at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site; a pension issue unrelated to DoD; defeated 38-53 - Allard (R-CO) (TAB-1)
- o To create uniform standards for interrogations and prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading detainee treatment; agreed on by voice vote - McCain (R-AZ) (TAB-2)
- o To mandate reporting on the use of riot control agents by the Armed Forces - Ensign (R-NV) (TAB-3)
- o To require Secretary of Defense to transfer property, located at BRAC'd military installations, at no consideration; defeated 36-62 - Snowe (R-ME) (TAB-9)
- o To reduce retired pay eligibility age for formerly mobilized Reserve veterans - Chambliss (R-GA) (TAB-10)
- o To direct Secretary of Defense to submit procedures for Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards to determine GTMO detainees' status - Graham (R-SC) (TAB-4)

Prepared by: CAPT J.M. Cathey, Director Senate Affairs (b)(6)

11-L-0559/OSD/46229

OSD 21996-05

- o 2nd Demeo to TAB-13 Harkin Amendment, Sense of the Senate, allowing Secretary of Defense to establish an Ombudsman position and to commend the Armed Forces Radio Network **Dassed 55-43-Inhofe (R-OK) (TAB-14)**

Minority:

- o Medical Isotopes – Schumer (D-NY)
- o To transfer Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) funds to the DC Army National Guard - Kennedy (D-MA) (TAB-12)
- o Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – Salazar (D-CO)
- o To ensure Federal employees taking leave without pay to serve will not receive an overall cut in pay – Durbin (D-IL) (TAB-11)
- o To provide concurrent receipt for veterans with service-connected disabilities – Reid (D-NV)
- o To repeal reduction of Survivor Benefit Plan annuities by Dependency and Indemnity Compensation; **Dassed 93-5** – Nelson (D-FL) (TAB-5)
- o To establish a Detainee Commission: **defeated 43-55** – Levin @-MI) (T A W
- o Increase the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and decrease Missile Defense funding; **defeated 37-60-** Reed (D-RI) (TAB-7)
- o To require balanced American Forces Network political programming and to establish an Ombudsman position; **defeated 44-54-Harkin** (D-IA) (TAB-13)
- o To authorize a feasibility study on the creation of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management to oversee spending and financial management at the Defense Department; **passed 97-0-Byrd** (D-WV) (TAB-15)

Attachments:

1. Allard Amendment #2423
2. McCain Amendment #2425
3. Ensign Amendment unnumbered
4. Graham Draft Amendment unnumbered
5. Nelson Amendment #2424
6. Levin Amendment #2430
7. Reed Amendment #2427
8. Inhofe Amendment #2432
9. Snowe Amendment #2436
10. Chambliss Amendment #2433
11. Durbin Amendment #1571
12. Kennedy Amendment #1415
13. Harkin Amendment #2438
14. Inhofe Amendment #2439
15. Byrd Amendment #2442
16. Reid Amendment #2441

ENSIGN REV-1

AMENDMENT NO.

Calendar No.

Purpose: To authorize additional uses of riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2006 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. ENSIGN

Viz:

- 1 On page 286, between lines 7 and 8, insert the fol-
- 2 lowing:
- 3 **SEC. 1073. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.**
- 4 (a) **RESTATEMENT OF POLICY.**—It is the policy of
- 5 the United States, as provided in Executive Order 11850
- 6 (40 Fed. Reg. 16187) and affirmed by the Senate in the
- 7 resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons (on-

1 vention, that riot control agents are not chemical weapons
2 but are legitimate, legal, and non-lethal alternatives to the
3 use of lethal force that may be employed by members of
4 the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes to
5 save lives, including for illustrative purposes cited in Exec-
6 utive Order 11850.

7 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
10 President, shall submit to Congress a report on the
11 use of riot control agents by members of the Armed
12 Forces.

13 (2) CONTENT.—The report required by para-
14 graph (1) shall include—

15 (A) a description of all regulations, doc-
16 trines, training materials, and any other infor-
17 mation related to the use of riot control agents
18 by members of the Armed Forces;

19 (B) a description of the doctrinal publica-
20 tions, training, and other resources provided or
21 available to members of the Armed Forces on
22 an annual basis with regard to the tactical em-
23 ployment of riot control agents;

24 (C) a description of how the material de-
25 scribed in subparagraphs (A) *and* (E) is con-

1 sistent with United States policy on the use of
2 riot control agents;

3 (D) a description of the availability of riot
4 control agents, and the means to employ them,
5 to members of the Armed Forces deployed in
6 Iraq and Afghanistan;

7 (E) a description of the frequency of use of
8 riot control agents since January 1, 1992, and
9 a summary of views held by military com-
10 manders about the utility of the employing riot
11 control agents by members of the Armed
12 Forces;

13 (F) a general description of steps taken or
14 to be taken by the Department of Defense to
15 clarify the circumstances under which riot con-
16 trol agents may be used by members of the
17 Armed Forces; and

18 (G) an assessment of the legality of Execu-
19 tive Order 11850, including an explanation why
20 Executive Order 11850 remains valid under
21 United States law.

22 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph
23 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
24 include a classified annex.

+

1 (c) AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL USES OF RIOT
2 CONTROL AGENTS.—

3 (1) AUTHORITY.—The President or the Sec-
4 retary of Defense may, for purposes of saving inno-
5 cent lives or the lives of members of the Armed
6 Forces, authorize members of the Armed Forces to
7 use riot control agents as follows:

8 (A) In war in modes other than defensive
9 military modes.

10 (B) In operations other than war—

11 (i) in defensive military modes; and

12 (ii) in modes other than defensive
13 military modes.

14 (2) CONSTRUCTION.—The authority in para-
15 graph (1) to use riot control agents is in addition to
16 any other authority to use riot control agents under
17 law, including authority under Executive Order
18 11850.

19 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

20 (1) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The
21 term “Chemical Weapons Convention” means the
22 Convention on the Prohibitions of Development, Pro-
23 duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
24 and on Their Destruction, with annexes, done at

1 Paris, January 13, 1993, and entered into force
2 April 29, 1997 (T. Doc. 103-21).

3 (2) RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION OF THE
4 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION.—The term “res-
5 olution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Con-
6 vention” means S. Res. 75, 105th Congress, agreed
7 to April 24, 1997, advising and consenting to the
8 ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

AG
PENDING

AS MODIFIED

AMENDMENT NO. 2432

Calendar No. _____

Purpose: Relating to the partnership security capacity of foreign military and security forces and security and stabilization assistance.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

To i **AMENDMENT No. 2432**

By Inhofe

To: S. 1042

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Page(s)

GPO: 2004 07-280246-0

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

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AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. INHOFE

vi:

p. 296

1 At the end of title XII, add the following:

2 SEC. __. **BUILDING THE PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPAC-**
3 **ITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY AND SECURITY**
4 **FORCES.**

5 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The President may authorize
6 building the capacity of partner nations' military or secu-
7 rity forces to disrupt or destroy terrorist networks, close

1 safe havens, or participate in or support United States.
2 coalition, or international military or stability operations.

3 (b) TYPES OF PARTNERSHIP SECURITY CAPACITY
4 BUILDING.—The partnership security capacity building
5 authorized under subsection (a) may include the provision
6 of equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding.

7 (c) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of De-
8 fense may, at the request of the Secretary of State, sup-
9 port partnership security capacity building as **authorized**
10 under subsection (a) by transferring funds available to the
11 Department of Defense to the Department of State. **Any**
12 funds so transferred shall remain available until expended.
13 The amount of such partnership security capacity building
14 support provided by the Department of Defense under **this**
15 section may not exceed \$750,000,000 in any fiscal year.

16 (d) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Before build-
17 **ing** partnership security capacity under **this** section, the
18 Secretaries of State and Defense shall submit to their **con-**
19 gressional oversight committees a notification of the na-
20 tions designated by the President ~~with~~ which partnership
21 security capacity will be built under this section and the
22 nature and amounts of security capacity building to occur.
23 **Any** such notification shall be submitted not less than 15
24 days before the provision of such partnership security ca-
25 pacity building.

1 (e) **COMPLEMENTARY AUTHORITY.**—The authority to
2 support partnership security capacity building under this
3 section is in addition to any other authority of the Depart-
4 ment of Defense to provide assistance to a foreign country.

5 (f) **APPLICABLE LAW.**—The authorities and limita-
6 tions in the Foreign Assistance Act of **1961** and the For-
7 eign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
8 Appropriations Act, 2006 shall be applicable to assistance
9 provided and funds transferred under the authority of this
10 section.

11 (g) **MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES DEFINED.**—
12 In this section, the term “military and security forces”
13 includes armies, guard, border security, civil defense, in-
14 frastructure protection, and police forces.

15 (h) **EXPIRATION.**—The authority in this section shall
16 expire on September **30, 2007**.

17 **SEC. ____ . SECURITY AND STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE**

18 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Notwithstanding any other provi-
19 sion of law, upon a request from the Secretary of State,
20 with the agreement of the Secretary of Defense and upon
21 a determination by the President that **an** unforeseen emer-
22 gency exists that requires immediate reconstruction, secu-
23 rity, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country for
24 the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security
25 in that country, and that the provision of such assistance

1 is in the national security interests of the United States.
2 the Secretary of Defense may authorize the use or transfer
3 of defense articles, services, training or other support, in-
4 cluding support acquired by contract or otherwise, to pro-
5 vide such assistance.

6 (b) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Subject to subsection
7 (a), the Secretary of Defense may transfer funds available
8 to the Department of Defense to the Department of ~~State~~
9 or to any other Federal agency to carry out the purposes
10 of this section, and funds so transferred shall remain
11 available until expended.

12 (c) LIMITATION.—The aggregate value of assistance
13 provided or funds transferred under the authority of this
14 section may not exceed \$200,000,000.

15 (d) COMPLEMENTARY AUTHORITY.—The authority
16 to provide assistance under this section is in addition to
17 any other authority of the Department of Defense to pro-
18 vide assistance to a foreign country.

19 (e) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—Before the ex-
20 ercise of the authority in this section, the President shall
21 notify Congress of the exercise of such authority in accord-
22 ance with the procedures set forth in section 652 of the
23 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2411).

24 (f) APPLICABLE LAW.—(1) The authorities and limi-
25 tations in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the

1 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Pro-
2 grams Appropriations Act. **2006** shall be applicable to as-
3 sistance provided and funds transferred under the author-
4 ity of this section.

5 (2) Any authority available to the President to waive
6 a provision of law referred to in paragraph (1) may be
7 exercised by the President in a written document executed
8 pursuant to subsection (a).

9 (g) ~~EXPIRATION.~~—The authority in this section shall
10 ~~expire~~ on September 30, 2007.

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Tom Harkin

PENDING

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: Relating to the American Forces Network.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

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| To | AMENDMENT No. 2438 | military |
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Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. HARKIN (for himself and Mr. DORGAN)

Viz:

- 1 At the end of subtitle A of title IX, add the following:
- 2 **SEC. 903. AMERICAN FORCES NETWORK.**
- 3 (E) **MISSION.**—The American Forces Network (AFN)
- 4 shall provide members of the Armed Forces, civilian em-
- 5 ployees of the Department of Defense, and their families
- 6 stationed outside the continental United States and at sea
- 7 with the same type and quality of American radio and tele-
- 8 vision news, information, sports, and entertainment as is
- 9 available in the continental United States.

1 (b) POLITICAL PROGRAMMING.—

2 (1) FAIRNESS AND BALANCE.—All political pro-
3 gramming of the American Forces Network shall be
4 characterized by its fairness and balance.

5 (2) FREE FLOW OF PROGRAMMING.—The
6 American Forces Network shall provide in its pro-
7 gramming a free flow of political programming from
8 United States commercial and public radio and tele-
9 vision stations.

10 (c) OMBUDSMAN OF THE AMERICAN FORCES NET-
11 WORK.—

12 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is hereby estab-
13 lished the Office of the Ombudsman of the American
14 Forces Network.

15 (2) HEAD OF OFFICE.—

16 (A) OMBUDSMAN.—The head of the Office
17 of the Ombudsman of the American Forces
18 Network shall be the Ombudsman of the Amer-
19 ican Forces Network (in this subsection re-
20 ferred to as the "Ombudsman"), who shall be
21 appointed by the Secretary of Defense.

22 (B) QUALIFICATIONS.—Any individual
23 nominated for appointment to the position of
24 Ombudsman shall have recognized expertise in

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1 the field of mass communications, print media,
2 or broadcast media.

3 (C) PART-TIME STATUS.—The position of
4 Ombudsman shall be a part-time position.

5 (D) TERM.—The term of office of the Om-
6 budsman shall be five years.

7 (E) REMOVAL.—The Ombudsman may be
8 removed from office by the Secretary only for
9 malfeasance.

10 (3) DUTIES.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Ombudsman shall
12 ensure that the American Forces Network ad-
13 heres to the standards and practices of the Net-
14 work in its programming.

15 (B) PARTICULAR DUTIES.—In carrying out
16 the duties of the Ombudsman under this para-
17 graph, the Ombudsman &&—

18 (i) initiate and conduct, with ss fre-
19 quency as the Ombudsman considers ap-
20 propriate, reviews of the integrity, fairness,
21 and balance of the programming of the
22 American Forces Network;

23 (ii) initiate and conduct, upon the re-
24 quest of Congress or members of the a d -

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ence of the American Forces Network, re-
view of the programming of the Network:

(iii) identify, pursuant to reviews
under clause (i) or (ii) or otherwise, cir-
cumstances in which the American Forces
Network has not adhered to the standards
and practices of the Network in its pro-
gramming, including circumstances in
which the programming of the Network
lacked integrity, fairness, or balance; and

(iv) make recommendations to the
American Forces Network on means of
correcting the lack of adherence identified
pursuant to clause (iii).

(C) LIMITATION.—In carrying out the du-
ties of the Ombudsman under this paragraph,
the Ombudsman may not engage in any pre-
broadcast censorship or pre-broadcast review of
the programming of the American Forces Net-
work.

(4) RESOURCES.—The Secretary of Defense
shall provide the Office of the Ombudsman of the
American Forces Network such personnel and other
resources as the Secretary and the Ombudsman
jointly determine appropriate to permit the Ombuds-

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1 man to carry out the duties of the Ombudsman
2 under paragraph (3).

3 (5) INDEPENDENCE.—The Secretary shall take
4 appropriate actions to ensure the complete independ-
5 ence of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Om-
6 budsman of the American Forces Network within
7 the Department of Defense.

8 (6) ANNUAL REPORTS.—

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Ombudsman shall
10 submit to the Secretary of Defense and the con-
11 gressional defense committees each year a re-
12 port on the activities of the Office of the Om-
13 budsman of the American Forces Network dur-
14 ing the preceding year.

15 (B) AVAILABILITY TO PUBLIC.—The Om-
16 budsman shall make available to the public each
17 report submitted under subparagraph (A)
18 through the Internet website of the Office of
19 the Ombudsman of the American Forces Net-
20 work and by such other means as the Ombuds-
21 man considers appropriate.

AS MODIFIED

H.R. 2,3 (Instruction line only)

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[Signature]

AMENDMENT NO.

Calendar No.

Purpose: To propose a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

Warner for AMENDMENT No. 2439

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|----|----|-----|-------------------------------|-------|-------|
| To | ai | By | <u>Inhofe</u> | _____ | itary |
| | | | | | itary |
| | | To: | Amendment No. 2438 | _____ | part- |
| | | | <u>S. 1042</u> | _____ | : for |
| | | | <u>6</u> | _____ | other |

Page(s)

GPO: 2004 97-290(Misc)

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. INHOFE to
the amendment (No. ~~2438~~) proposed by Mr. HARKIN

2438

Viz:

1 At the end of subtitle A of title IX,
~~In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted,~~ insert

2 the following:

3 SEC. __. AMERICAN FORCES NETWORK.

4 (a) FINDINGS.—The Senate makes the following
5 findings:

6 (1) The mission of the American Forces Radio
7 and Television Service (AFRTS) and its American
8 Forces Network (AFN), a worldwide radio and tele-

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p. 246

1 vision broadcast network, is to deliver command in-
2 formation by providing United States **military** com-
3 manders overseas and at sea with a broadcast media
4 that effectively communicates information to per-
5 sonnel under their commands, including information
6 from the Department of Defense, information **from**
7 the Armed Forces, and information unique to the
8 theater and localities in which **such** personnel are
9 stationed or deployed.

10 (2) The American Forces Radio and Television
11 Service and the American Forces Network provide a
12 “touch of home” to members of the **Armed** Forces,
13 civilian employees of the Department of Defense,
14 and their families stationed at bases and at embas-
15 sies and consulates in more than 179 countries, as
16 well as Navy, Coast Guard, and Military Sealift
17 Command ships at sea, by providing the same type
18 and quality of radio and television programming (in-
19 cluding news, information, sports, and entertain-
20 ment) that would be available in the continental
21 United States. Additionally, the American Forces
22 Network plays an important role in enabling military
23 commanders to disseminate official information to
24 members of the Armed Forces and their families,
25 ~~A~~ thus making popularity and acceptance key factors

1 in ensuring effective communication, ~~and other related~~

2 ~~_____~~

3 (3) It is American Forces Radio and Television
4 Service and American Forces Network policy that,
5 except for the Pentagon Channel service, program-
6 ming is acquired from distributors of the most pop-
7 ular television program airing in the continental
8 United States. Much of the programming is provided
9 at no cost to the United States Government. The re-
10 mainder of the programming is provided at less-
11 than-market rates to cover distributors' costs and
12 obligations. Depending on the audience segment or
13 demographic targeted, programs that perform well
14 are acquired and scheduled to maximize audiences
15 for internal and command information exposure.

16 (4) American Forces Radio and Television
17 Service and American Forces Network select pro-
18 gramming that represents a cross-section of popular
19 American radio and television, tailored toward the
20 worldwide audience of the American Forces Radio
21 and Television Service and the American Forces
22 Network. Schedules emulate programming practices
23 in the United States, and programs are aired in ac-
24 cordance with network broadcast standards. Specifi-
25 cally, policy on programming seeks —

1 (A) to provide balance and diversity;
2 (B) to deliver a cross-section of popular
3 programming;
4 (C) to target appropriate demographics;
5 and
6 (D) to maintain network broadcast stand-
7 ards.

8 (5) The "Voice Channel", or radio program-
9 ming, of the American Forces Radio and Television
10 Service and American Forces Network is chosen to
11 address requirements specified by the military
12 broadcasting services and the detachment com-
13 manders of their affiliate radio stations. American
14 Forces Network Radio makes a best faith effort to
15 obtain the top-rated program of its sort at the time
16 of selection, at no cost to the United States Govern-
17 ment. American Forces Network Radio usually re-
18 tains a scheduled program until it is no longer pro-
19 duced, too few American Forces Network affiliates
20 choose to schedule the program locally, or a similar
21 program so thoroughly dominates its audience in the
22 United States that the American Forces Radio and
23 Television Service switches to this program to offer
24 the higher rated show to the overseas audience.

1 (6) American Forces Network Radio personnel
2 review the major trade publications to monitor an-
3 nouncements of new programs, follow the ratings of
4 established programs, and keep aware of program-
5 ming trends. When a program addressing a need
6 identified by a Military Broadcasting Service or an
7 American Forces Network affiliate becomes available
8 to the American Forces Network, or a program
9 seems especially worthy of consideration, American
10 Forces Network Radio informs the affiliates and
11 supplies samples to gauge affiliate interest. If affi-
12 lates commit to broadcasting the new show, Amer-
13 ican Forces Network Radio seeks to schedule it.

14 (7) The managers of the American Forces
15 Radio and Television Service continually update
16 their programming options and, in November 2005,
17 decided to include additional programs that meet the
18 criteria that American Forces Radio and Television
19 Service managers apply to such decisions, and that,
20 consistent with American Forces Radio and Tele-
21 vision Service and American Forces Network proce-
22 dures, local programmers at 33 locations around the
23 globe decide which programs actually are broadcast.
24 American Forces Radio and Television Service have

1 consistently sought to provide a broad, high quality
2 range of choices for local station managers.

3 (b) **SENSE OF SENATE.**—It is the sense of the Senate
4 that—

5 (1) the men and women of the American Forces
6 Radio and Television Service and the Armed Forces
7 Network should be commended for providing a vital
8 service to the military community worldwide; and

9 (2) the programming mission, themes, and
10 practices of the Department of Defense with respect
11 to its television and radio programming have fairly
12 and responsively fulfilled their mission of providing
13 a “touch of home” to members of the Armed Forces
14 and their families around the world and have con-
15 tributed immeasurably to high morale and quality of
16 life in the Armed Forces.

17 (c) **AUTHORITY TO APPOINT OMBUDSMAN AS INTER-**
18 **MEDIARY.**—The Secretary of Defense may appoint an in-
19 dividual to serve as ombudsman of the American Forces
20 Network. Any ombudsman so appointed shall act as an
21 intermediary between the staff of the American Forces
22 Network and the Department of Defense, military com-
23 manders, and listeners to the programming of the Amer-
24 ican Forces Network.

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PENDING

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: To establish the position of Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

To **AMENDMENT No. 2042** - military
 By Byrd - Otter - military
 To S. 1042 - Department
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 Page(s)

Referred to the Committee on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. BYRD (for himself, Mr. Akaka, and Mr. Lautenberg)

Viz:

- 1 At the end of subtitle A of title IX, add the following:
- 2 SEC. ____ DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANAGE-
- 3 MENT.
- 4 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—
- 5 (1) POSITION AND DUTIES.—
- 6 (A) Chapter 4 of title 10, United States
- 7 Code, is amended—

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1 (i) in section 131(b), by striking para-
2 graph (1) and inserting the following new
3 paragraph:

4 "(1) Two Deputy Secretaries of Defense, as fol-
5 lows:

6 "(A) The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

7 "(B) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for
8 Management."; and

9 ~~(ii)~~ inserting after section 132 the
10 following new section 132a:

11 "§ 132a. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management

12 "(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—(1) There is a Deputy Sea-
13 retary of Defense for Management, appointed from civilian
14 life by the President, by and with the advice and consent
15 of the Senate, from among persons who have—

16 "(A) extensive executive level experience in
17 leadership and management in the public or private
18 sector;

19 "(B) substantial experience in the reform of ac-
20 counting or financial management systems in large
21 organizations;

22 "(C) a demonstrated ability to manage large
23 and complex organizations; and

24 "(D) a record of achieving positive operational
25 results.

October 31, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/46254

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1 “(2) A person may not be appointed as Deputy Sec-
2 retary of Defense for Management within 10 years after
3 relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a reg-
4 ular component of an armed force.

5 “(3) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
6 ment shall serve for a term of seven years.

7 “(b) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—(1) The Deputy Sec-
8 retary of Defense for Management—

9 “(A) serves as the Chief Management Officer of
10 the Department of Defense;

11 “(B) is the principal adviser to the Secretary of
12 Defense on matters relating to the management of
13 the Department of Defense, including defense busi-
14 ness activities, to ensure departmentwide capability
15 to carry out the strategic plan of the Department of
16 Defense in support of national security objectives;
17 and

18 “(C) performs such additional duties and exer-
19 cises such other powers as the Secretary may pre-
20 scribe.

21 “(2) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
22 ment takes precedence in the Department of Defense im-
23 mediately after the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

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1 “(3)(A) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Man-
2 agement shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Sec-
3 retary of Defense when—

4 “(i) the Secretary is disabled or there is no Sec-
5 retary of Defense; and

6 “(ii) the Deputy Secretary of Defense is dis-
7 abled or there is no Deputy Secretary of Defense.

8 “(B) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
9 ment shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Deputy
10 Secretary of Defense when the Deputy Secretary is dis-
11 abled or there is no Deputy Secretary of Defense.

12 “(c) **MANAGEMENT DUTIES.**—To support *the* eco-
13 nomical, efficient, and effective execution of the national
14 defense objectives, policies, and plans of the Department
15 of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
16 ment shall be responsible to *the* Secretary of Defense for
17 the development, approval, implementation, integration,
18 and oversight of policies, procedures, processes, and sys-
19 tems for the *management* of the Department of Defense
20 that relate to performance of the following functions:

21 “(1) Planning and budgeting, including per-
22 formance measurement.

23 “(2) Acquisition.

24 “(3) Logistics.

25 “(4) Facilities, installations, and environment.

October 31, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/46256

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1 “(5) Financial management.

2 “(6) Human resources and personnel.

3 “(7) Management of information resources, in-
4 cluding information technology, networks, and tele-
5 communications functions.

6 “(d) DEFENSE BUSINESS REFORM.—For the func-
7 tions specified in subsection (c), the Deputy Secretary of
8 Defense for Management shall—

9 “(1) develop and maintain a departmentwide
10 management strategic plan for business reform, and
11 identify key initiatives to be undertaken by the De-
12 partment and its components, together with related
13 resource needs;

14 “(2) establish performance goals and measures
15 for improving and evaluating overall economy, effi-
16 ciency, and effectiveness;

17 “(3) monitor and measure the progress of the
18 Department of Defense and its components in meet-
19 ing established performance goals for improving
20 economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and

21 “(4) review and approve plans and budgets for
22 business reform, including any proposed changes to
23 policies, procedures, processes, and systems, to en-
24 sure the compatibility of those plans and budgets
25 with—

October 31, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/46257

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1 “(A) the overall strategic plan and budget
2 of the Department of Defense;

3 “(B) the strategic plan for business reform
4 of the Department of Defense; and

5 “(C) achievement of the integration of
6 business activities throughout the Department
7 of Defense.

8 “(e) DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEMS.—(1) In carrying
9 out the duties of the position under this section, the Dep-
10 uty Secretary of Defense for Management shall oversee
11 the implementation of a defense business systems mod-
12 ernization program including the execution of any funds
13 appropriated for maintaining legacy systems and for mod-
14 ernizing defense business systems.

15 “(2) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
16 ment shall—

17 “(A) oversee the development of, and shall re-
18 view and approve, all budget requests for defense
19 business systems, including the information to be
20 submitted to Congress under section 2222(h) of this
21 title; and

22 “(B) subject to the authority, direction, and
23 control of the Secretary of Defense, perform the re-
24 sponsibilities of the Secretary under section 2222 of
25 this title.

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1 “(3) In this subsection, the terms ‘defense business
2 system’ and ‘defense business system modernization’ have
3 the meanings given to those terms in section 2222(j) of
4 this title.

5 “(f) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DEFENSE OFFI-
6 CIALS.—(1) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
7 ment exercises the authority of the Secretary of Defense
8 in the performance of the duties of the Deputy Secretary
9 under this section, subject to the authority, direction, and
10 control of the Secretary.

11 “(2) The Secretaries of the military departments and
12 the heads of the other elements of the Department of De-
13 fense are subject to the authority, direction, and control
14 of the Deputy Secretary in the performance of their duties
15 with respect to matters within the authority of the Deputy
16 Secretary, and the exercise of that authority by the Dep-
17 uty Secretary is binding on the military departments and
18 such other elements.

19 “(g) CONSULTATION WITH OTHER OFFICIALS.—In
20 carrying out the duties of the position under this section,
21 the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management shall
22 consult on a continuing basis with the Deputy Secretary
23 of Defense, the Secretaries of the military departments,
24 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

October 31, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/46259

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1 “(1) to support economical, efficient, and effec-
2 tive performance of the missions of the Department
3 of Defense; and

4 “(2) to support each of those officials—

5 “(A) in the implementation of the national
6 defense strategy and the strategic plan of the
7 Department of Defense; and

8 “(B) in the administration of related pro-
9 grams, plans, operations, and activities.

10 “(h) PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION.—(1) The
11 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management shall enter
12 into an annual performance agreement with the Secretary
13 of Defense each year. The agreement shall set forth meas-
14 urable individual and organizational goals that are con-
15 sistent with the goals and measures established under sub-
16 section (d) of this section. The agreement shall be avail-
17 able for public disclosure.

18 “(2) The Secretary of Defense shall evaluate the per-
19 formance of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
20 ment each year and shall determine as part of each such
21 evaluation whether the Deputy Secretary has made satis-
22 factory progress toward achieving the goals set out in the
23 performance agreement for that year under paragraph
24 (1).”

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1 (B) The table of sections at the beginning
2 of such chapter is amended by inserting after
3 the item relating to section 132 the following
4 new item:

"132a. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management."

5 (2) EXECUTIVE LEVEL II.—Section 5313 of
6 title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting
7 after "Deputy Secretary of Defense" the following:
8 "Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
9 ment."

10 (b) MEMBERSHIP OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF DE-
11 FENSE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES.—

12 (1) FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MODERNIZATION
13 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.—Section 185(a) of title 10,
14 United States Code, is amended—

15 (A) in paragraph (2)—

16 (i) by redesignating subparagraphs
17 (A), (B), (C), (D), and (E) as subpara-
18 graphs (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F), respec-
19 tively;

20 (ii) by inserting after "composed of
21 the following:" the following new subpara-
22 graph (A):

23 "(A) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for
24 Management, who shall be the chairman of the com-
25 mittee."; and

October 31, 2006

11-L-0559/OSD/46261

O:\ARM\ARM05N32.LC

S.L.C.

10

1 (ii) in subparagraph (B), as redesignig-
2 nated by clause (i), by striking “, who shall
3 be the chairman of the committee”; and

4 (B) in paragraph (3), by inserting “the
5 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management,”
6 after “the Deputy Secretary of Defense,”.

7 (2) **DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT**
8 **COMMITTEE.**—Section 186 of such title is amended
9 by striking “Deputy Secretary of Defense” each
10 place it appears in subsections (a)(1) and (b) and in-
11 serring “Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
12 ment”.

13 (c) **ADJUSTMENTS TO DUTIES AND PRECEDENCE OF**
14 **OTHER OFFICIALS.**—

15 (1) **UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POL-**
16 **ICY.**—Section 134 of title 10, United States Code, is
17 amended—

18 (A) in subsection (b)(2), by striking “Sec-
19 retary of Defense—” and inserting “Secretary
20 of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of
21 Defense—”; and

22 (B) in subsection (c), by inserting “the
23 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management,”
24 after “the Deputy Secretary of Defense,”.

October 31, 2005

11-L-0559/OSD/46262

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S.L.C.

1 (2) UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AC-
2 QUISSION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS.—Section
3 133(a) of such title is amended—

4 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking “and the
5 Deputy Secretary of Defense” and inserting “,
6 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Dep-
7 uty Secretary of Defense for Management”; and

8 (B) in paragraph (2), by inserting “the
9 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management,”
10 after “the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”

11 (3) DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
12 FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS.—Sec-
13 tion 133b(c)(2) of such title is amended by inserting
14 “the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management,”
15 after “the Deputy Secretary of Defense.”

16 (4) DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL TEST AND
17 EVALUATION.—Section 139 of such title is
18 amended—

19 (A) in subsection (b)—

20 (i) in paragraph (2), by striking “and
21 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acqui-
22 sition, Technology, and Logistics” and in-
23 serting “the Deputy Secretary of De-
24 fense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense for
25 Management, the Under Secretary of De-

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S.L.C.

1 fense for Acquisition, Technology, and Lo-
2 gistics,"; and

3 (ii) in paragraph (5), by inserting "
4 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the
5 Deputy Secretary of Defense for Manage-
6 ment" after "the Secretary of Defense";
7 and

8 (B) in subsection (e), by striking "and the
9 Deputy Secretary of Defense" in the first sen-
10 tence and inserting ", the Deputy Secretary of
11 Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
12 for Management".

AS MODIFIED

(P. 246)

Viz: At the end of subtitle A of title IX, add the following:

Amendment intended to be proposed by Mr. Byrd (for himself, Mr. Warner, Mr. Ensign, and Mr. Akaka)

and Mr. Lautenberg

Sec ____ . Report on Establishment of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management.

*Pending
Y x N*

(a) Not later than 15 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall select two Federally Funded Research and Development Centers to conduct independent studies of the feasibility and advisability of establishing a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management . Each study under this section shall be delivered to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees not later than March 15, 2006.

(b) Content of Studies. - Each study required by this section shall address -
(1) the extent to which the establishment of a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management would:

- (A) improve the management of the Department of Defense;
- (B) expedite the process of management reform in the Department; and
- (C) enhance the implementation of business systems ~~modernization in~~ **modernization** the Department;

- (2) the appropriate relationship of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management to other Department of Defense officials;
- (3) the appropriate term of service for a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management; and
- (4) the experience of any other federal agencies that have instituted similar management positions.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Management is an official who -
(1) serves as the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense;

(2) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the management of the Department of Defense, including

AMENDMENT No. 2442

*By Byrd - 10/10/05
To 51042 (5 Acc)*

defense business activities, to ensure department-wide capability to carry out the strategic plan of *the* Department of Defense in support of national security objectives; and
(3) takes precedence in the ~~Department~~ of Defense immediately *after* the ~~Deputy~~ Secretary of Defense.

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Yuenfai
Calendar No. _____
Calendar No. _____

AMENDMENT NO _____

Purpose: To provide that veterans with service-connected disabilities rated as *total* by virtue of *unemployability* shall be covered by the termination of *the* phase-in of *concurrent* receipt of retired pay and veterans disability compensation for military *retirees*.

PENDING
A

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. _____

To **AMENDMENT No. 2441** military
By *Reid* military
To: *S 1042* Departments for
other

Page(s) *2*

SP2-2004 07-200404

Referred to the *Committee* on _____
and ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. **REID**

Viz:

- 1 At the appropriate place in title VI, add *the* following:

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S.L.C.

1 SEC. ____, INCLUSION OF VETERANS WITH SERVICE-CON-
 2 NECTED DISABILITIES RATED AS TOTAL BY
 3 REASON OF UNEMPLOYABILITY UNDER TER-
 4 MINATION OF PHASE-IN OF CONCURRENT RE-
 5 CEIPT OF RETIRED PAY AND VETERANS' DIS-
 6 ABILITY COMPENSATION.

7 (a) INCLUSION OF VETERANS.—Section 1414(a)(1)
 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting
 9 “or a qualified retiree receiving veterans' disability com-
 10 pensation for a disability rated as total (within the mean-
 11 ing of subsection (e)(3)(B))” after “rated as 100 percent”.

12 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
 13 subsection (a) shall take effect on December 31, 2004.

C



~~FOUO~~

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

1: 34

January 4, 2005, 9:00 **Ah4**

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Ensign Amendment on Riot Control Agents (RCAs)

- You asked (Tab A) for views on the Ensign amendment, which is in the National Defense Authorization Act as passed by Congress (Tab B).
- The amendment roughly restates U.S. policy under Executive Order (E.O.) 11850 (1975) (Tab C) and consistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), that RCAs may be employed by members of the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes to save lives, including the illustrative purposes stated in E.O. 11850.
- Thus, the amendment does not change applicable law (CWC) or policy (E.O. 11850) regarding authorized use of RCAs.
 - In commenting on the amendment, Senators Warner, Lugar and Biden noted that it conforms to E.O. 11850 and the CWC. Senator Warner specifically conditioned his vote on that understanding (Tab D).
 - An earlier version of the amendment contained language that would have permitted authorization of use of RCAs in war in offensive modes. This would have been in conflict with U.S. obligations under the CWC.
- The amendment requires within 180 days of enactment a report on RCA use, including “a general description of steps taken or to be taken by the Department of Defense to clarify the circumstances under which riot control agents may be used by members of the Armed Forces.”
- Policy (ISP) is working with the Joint Staff (J-5) to gather information from the Combatant Commanders and to determine what steps, if any, need be taken to ensure clear guidance is provided to the field on permissible uses of RCAs.

~~FOUO~~



OSD 00309-06

11-L-0559/OSD/46269

(b)(6)

~~FOUO~~

... NOV 10 2005

To: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Ensign Amendment

Please read ~~the~~ attached Ensign Amendment and ~~tell me~~ where you think, and where we ought to be standing on it.

Thanks.

Attach: 11/8/05 ASD LA memo to SecDef

DHR_{ss}
110905-11

.....
Please Respond By November 22, 2005

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H.R.1815

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Engrossed
Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)

SEC. 1080. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.

(a) *Restatement of Policy-* *It is the policy of the United States that riot control agents are not chemical weapons and that the president may authorize their use as legitimate, legal, and non-lethal alternatives to the use of force that, as provided in Executive Order 11850 (40 Fed. Reg. 16187) and consistent with the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons convention, may be employed by members of the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes to save lives, including the illustrative purposes cited in Executive Order 11850.*

(b) *Report Required-*

(1) *IN GENERAL-* *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the use of riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces.*

(2) *CONTENT-* *The report required by paragraph (1) shall include--*

(A) *a description of all regulations, doctrines, training materials, and any other information related to the use of riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces;*

(B) *a description of the doctrinal publications, training, and other resources provided or available to members of the Armed Forces on an annual basis with regard to the tactical employment of riot control agents;*

(C) *a description of how the material described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) is consistent with United States policy on the use of riot control agents;*

(D) *a description of the availability of riot control agents, and the means*

to employ them, to members of the Armed Forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan;

(E) a description of the frequency of use of riot control agents since January 1, 1992, and a summary of views held by military commanders about the utility of the employing riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces;

(F) a general description of steps taken or to be taken by the Department of Defense to clarify the circumstances under which riot control agents may be used by members of the Armed Forces; and

(G) an assessment of the legality of Executive Order 11850, including an explanation why Executive Order 11850 remains valid under United States law.

(3) FORM- The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Definitions- In this section:

(1) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION- The term 'Chemical Weapons Convention' means the Convention on the Prohibitions of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, with annexes, done at Paris, January 13, 1993, and entered into force April 29, 1997 (T. Doc. 103-21).

(2) RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION- The term 'resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention' means S. Res. 75, 105th Congress, agreed to April 24, 1997, advising and consenting to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

SEC. 1081. DRUG TRAFFICKING DETERRENCE.

(a) Findings-

(1) According to the Department of State, drug trafficking organizations shipped approximately nine tons of cocaine to the United States through the Dominican Republic in 2004, and are increasingly using small, high-speed watercraft.

(2) Drug traffickers use the Caribbean corridor to smuggle narcotics to the United States via Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. This route is ideal for drug trafficking because of its geographic expanse, numerous law enforcement jurisdictions and fragmented investigative efforts.

(3) The tethered aerostat system in Lajas, Puerto Rico contributes to deterring and detecting smugglers moving illicit drugs into Puerto Rico. The aerostat's range and operational capabilities allow it to provide surveillance coverage of

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Wednesday, January 4, 2006

Executive Order 11850--Renunciation of certain uses in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents

Source: The provisions of Executive Order 11850 of Apr. 8, 1975, appear at 40 FR 16187, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 980, unless otherwise noted.

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use **of** herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within US. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

- (a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct US. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.
- (b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
- (c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
- (d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and **observance** of such national policy.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

Page URL: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11850.html>

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11-L-0559/OSD/46273



GENERAL COUNSEL

~~FOUO~~

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1600

INFO MEMO

11:34

January 4, 2005, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

From: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Ensign Amendment on Riot Control Agents (RCAs)

- You asked (Tab A) for views on the Ensign amendment, which is in the National Defense Authorization Act as passed by Congress (Tab B).
- The amendment roughly restates U.S. policy under Executive Order (E.O.) 11850 (1975) (Tab C) and consistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), that RCAs may be employed by members of the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes to save lives, including the illustrative purposes stated in E.O. 11850.
- Thus, the amendment does not change applicable law (CWC) or policy (E.O. 11850) regarding authorized use of RCAs.
 - In commenting on the amendment, Senators Warner, Lugar and Biden noted that it conforms to E.O. 11850 and the CWC. Senator Warner specifically conditioned his vote on that understanding (Tab D).
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- Policy (ISP) is working with the Joint Staff (J-5) to gather information from the Combatant Commanders and to determine what steps, if any, need be taken to ensure clear guidance is provided to the field on permissible uses of RCAs.

~~FOUO~~




OSD 00309-06

11-L-0559/OSD/46274

~~FOUO~~

NOV 10 2005

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: *Ensign Amendment*

Please read the attached ~~Ensign~~ Amendment and *tell me* where you think, and where we ought to be standing on it.

Thanks.

Attach: 11/8/05 ASD LA memo to SecDef

DHR-ss
110905-11



Please Respond By November 22, 2005

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H.R.1815

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)

SEC. 1080. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.

(a) *Restatement of Policy-* It is the policy of the United States that riot control agents are not chemical weapons and that the president may authorize their use as legitimate, legal, and non-lethal alternatives to the use of force that, as provided in Executive Order 11850 (40 Fed. Reg. 16187) and consistent with the resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons convention, may be employed by members of the Armed Forces in war in defensive military modes to save lives, including the illustrative purposes cited in Executive Order 11850.

(b) *Report Required-*

(1) *IN GENERAL-* Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the use of riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces.

(2) *CONTENT-* The report required by paragraph (1) shall include –

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(B) a description of the doctrinal publications, training, and other resources provided or available to members of the Armed Forces on an annual basis with regard to the tactical employment of riot control agents;

(C) a description of how the material described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) is consistent with United States policy on the use of riot control agents;

(D) a description of the availability of riot control agents, and the means

to employ them, to members of the Armed Forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan;

(E) a description of the frequency of use of riot control agents since January 1, 1992, and a summary of views held by military commanders about the utility of the employing riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces;

(F) a general description of steps taken or to be taken by the Department of Defense to clarify the circumstances under which riot control agents may be used by members of the Armed Forces; and

(G) an assessment of the legality of Executive Order 11850, including an explanation why Executive Order 11850 remains valid under United States law.

(3) FORM- The report required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(c) Definitions- In this section:

(1) CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION- The term 'Chemical Weapons Convention' means the Convention on the Prohibitions of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, with annexes, done at Paris, January 13, 1993, and entered into force April 29, 1997 (T. Doc. 103-21).

(2) RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION- The term 'resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention' means S. Res. 75, 105th Congress, agreed to April 24, 1997, advising and consenting to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

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Wednesday, January 4, 2006

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- (b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.
- (c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.
- (d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

Page URL: <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/11850.html>

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Stabenow

Stevens

Sununu

Talent

Thomas

Thune

Vitter

Voinovich

Warner

Wyden

NOT VOTING--1

Corzine

The amendment (No. **2440**), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. **DODD**. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion *to* lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is my understanding that we have a second **vote** as ordered.

AMENDMENT NO. **2443**

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The next question **is** on the Ensign amendment.

There are **2** minutes equally divided. Who yields time?

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, I ask that Senator **Allard** be added as cosponsor **to** my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. ENSIGN. Mr. President, very simply, this amendment seeks to clarify what the

policy of the United States has been since 1975, that our military would be able to use riot control agents--in this case tear gas--for defensive purposes. That has been the policy of the United States. But because of some interpretations, our military is not able to use tear gas. They do not take it with them, they do not train with it, and in many cases tear gas--just as police forces use it all over the world--would save civilian lives as well as lives of the members of our military.

This is absolutely a critical amendment to save lives of Americans and for those civilians who, when our military kills them--and unfortunately these things happen--it makes us look bad as a country.

This is a critical amendment that we need to adopt.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wish to indicate to my colleagues that I have carefully studied this. I support the Ensign amendment. I defer to my colleague, Senator **Levin**.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Nevada has assured the Senate that this amendment does not seek, in any way, to change current policy, including Executive Order 11850, relative to the use of riot control agents. I note that the President has provided the Presidential approval required by that Executive order for use of riot control agents in Iraq. We look forward to consulting with the administration. The amendment of the Senator from Nevada is an appropriate amendment. It could be very helpful, and we support the amendment.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, as I stated on the floor yesterday, I am able to support Senator **Ensign's** amendment because it now includes several important modifications that were requested by the administration. As a result of those modifications, the amendment more accurately reflects current U.S. policy and law regarding the use of riot control agents by members of the Armed Forces. I thank Senator **ENSIGN** for agreeing to those modifications. I will take into account the views and recommendations of the administration as we continue our work on this issue and the bill in conference.

The resolution of ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC, passed by this body contained a condition requiring the President to certify that the United States is not restricted by the CWC in its use of riot control agents in certain specified circumstances. In addition, the condition required the President not to eliminate or alter Executive Order 11850, which prohibits the use of riot control agents in war "except in defensive military modes to save lives."

In response to questions from myself and Senator **Levin** on the floor yesterday and today, Senator **Ensign** confirmed that he does not seek through this amendment to amend, expand or reinterpret Executive Order 11850 in any way. It is on that understanding that I can support his amendment.

The Senator from Nevada has raised the question of whether the U.S. Armed Forces currently have sufficiently clear authority with respect to riot control agents. I have looked into this matter and consulted with representatives of the Department of Defense, including representatives of our commanders in the field.

They have informed me and my staff that, in their view, the use of riot control agents is a very complex matter. It is not clear that commanders in the field want to use

11-L-0559/OSD/46280

\` RCAs" widely. However, there are a number of cases where RCAs could be very useful to avoid unnecessary loss of life. I have been assured that, consistent with the Executive Order, U.S. Armed Forces have authority to use riot control agents. Furthermore, I am informed that DoD will examine whether any confusion exists about RCA use, and will take all steps necessary to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the clear guidance that they need and deserve.

I am confident that the DoD and the administration will ensure that our men and women in uniform have every tool available to them consistent with U.S. and international law.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to share my views on the amendment offered by Senator Ensign regarding the use of riot control agents, RCAs, by members of our Armed Forces in war. As one of the principal proponents of Senate ratification of the CWC, along with my ranking member, Senator Biden, I feel it important to provide my views in relation to this amendment.

I will vote in favor this amendment, and I do so because I believe that it in no way modifies, changes, reinterprets, or otherwise revises the laws of the United States regarding the use of RCAs in war to save lives, nor in any way affects U.S. compliance with our international obligations. This amendment creates no new law, and changes no U.S. policy.

When the Senate approved a resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction--The Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC in 1997, it made the conditional on maintaining U.S. law in effect at that time. Condition 26(B) of that resolution of ratification stated:

The President shall take no measure, and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.

Senator Ensign's amendment mentions both this Executive order and the Senate-approved condition.

Senator Ensign's amendment cannot modify that condition, and because it merely restates authority the President already has regarding the use of RCAs in war, I believe that voting for the amendment will not harm U.S. leadership in preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons nor will it reverse the will of the Senate at the time it approved the CWC. I look forward to working with Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, and the administration as this provision is considered in conference with the House, and in efforts to improve it in that conference.

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I will vote in favor of the Ensign amendment to this bill, relating to the use of riot control agents, and I want to make clear to my colleagues why a steadfast supporter of the Chemical Weapons Convention can do so in good conscience. Senator Ensign is concerned that current interpretation of U.S. policy and of U.S. obligations under international law might be hampering U.S. forces in Iraq. I gather that not everybody shares that belief, but I do not doubt that some people have this concern, and I appreciate Senator Ensign's desire to make sure that people in the

[Page: S12578] GPO's PDF

military fully understand what they can and cannot do when it comes to using riot control agents in Iraq.

What is important about the Ensign amendment, in my view, is that it will in no way modify either U.S. policy or U.S. international obligations regarding the use of riot control agents. The statement, in subsection (a) of the amendment that "riot control agents are not chemical weapons" is fully consistent with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in which "riot control agent" is defined as a chemical, not listed in any of the Convention's three lists of chemical weapons or their precursors, "which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure." That definition is quite different from the definition of a "toxic chemical" in a chemical weapon, "which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals." So the Ensign amendment is correct in that a riot control agent, as defined in the Chemical Weapons Convention, would not be a chemical weapon as defined in that convention.

Similarly, the Ensign amendment now before this body accurately reflects U.S. policy as established by President Gerald Ford in Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975. That Executive order, signed by a Republican President and implemented by six subsequent Presidents of both parties over the last 30 years, states: "The United States renounces, as a matter of national policyfirst use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives....." It goes on to give four examples of such defensive military modes, only two of which relate to combat zones:

"(b)in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided"; and

"(c)in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners."

Executive Order 11850 then orders implementation, as follows:

"Sec. 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States."

As far as I can tell, Senator **Ensign** does not intend that anything in Executive Order 11850 be changed, nor that there be any change in the U.S. policy and obligation to fully obey the Chemical Weapons Convention, which binds each state party "not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare." It is standing U.S. policy that if somebody is using human shields, as occurred in Somalia in the early 1990s, our Armed Forces may use riot control agents "in defensive military modes to save lives" without violating our obligations as state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r1093 :/temp/~r109egEARS:e150117>:

In light of my view that the Ensign amendment will not change U.S. policy and will not call into question the requirement to comply with our international obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, I see no reason to oppose this amendment. I do urge, however, that the limited nature of this amendment be made more explicit in conference.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded. The question is on agreeing to the amendment. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. DURBIN. I announce that the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. **CORZINE**) is necessarily absent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber desiring to vote?

The result was announced--yeas 98, nays 1, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 313 Leg.]
YEAS--98

Akaka

Alexander

Allard

Allen

Baucus

Bayh

Bennett

Biden

Bingaman

Bond

Boxer

Brownback

Bunning

Burns

Burr

~~FOUO~~

DEC 07 2005

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
CC: David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Call ~~Newt~~ Gingrich on your Walter Reed Response

Please give Newt Gingrich a call, and walk him through your response on Walter Reed. His phone number is:

Thanks.

DHR:ss
120605-23

.....
Please Respond By 12/20/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46284

OSD 00315-06



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1200

1 2:50

WEALTH AFFAIRS

INFO MEMO

JAN 5 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: *William Winkenwerder, Jr.*
William Winkenwerder, Jr. (MD), ASD (Health Affairs)

SUBJECT: Medical Ideas from Newt Gingrich

- You asked me to call Newt Gingrich and discuss my response to his inquiry about the use of Walter Reed Army Medical Center as a reserve hospital during pandemic or terrorist attacks. (TAB A).
- I spoke with him on December 13, 2005. We had a good conversation and he agreed with my suggestions. He was especially interested in the discussion regarding the Departments of Health & Human Services and Homeland Security pursuing initiatives to create temporary deployable facilities to maintain required beds and trained staff.
- My earlier info memo to you on this subject is included at TAB B.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *Walter L. Brown 1 Jan 06*

Attachments:
As stated

Prepared by: Lt Col Tilson, OASD (HA) (b)(6) DOCS Open 96956,98414

TAB

A

~~FOUO~~

0:50

DEC 07 2005

TO: Bill Winkenwerder
C C David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DM*
SUBJECT: Call Newt Gingrich on your Walter Reed Response

Please give ~~Newt~~ Gingrich a call, and walk him through your response on ~~Walter~~
~~Reed~~. His phone number is:

Thanks.

DHR_{ss}
120605-23

.....
Please Respond By 12/20/05

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46287

OSD 00315-06

TAB

B



THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1200 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1200

INFO MEMO

HEALTH AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DEC 2 2005

FROM: William Winkenwerder, Jr., MD, ASD (Health Affairs) *WJW*

SUBJECT: Suggestion from Newt Gingrich Concerning Retaining Walter Reed Army Medical Center

- You asked for my thoughts regarding using Walter Reed Army Medical Center as a reserve hospital that could be expanded during a pandemic or terrorist attack as suggested by Mr. Gingrich (TAB A).
- Although at initial glance, **this** would appear to be a good idea, it is probably not for the following reasons:
 - Extraordinary resources would be needed to maintain Walter Reed Army Medical Center in acceptable condition, as well **as** staff to operate the facility.
 - There are more effective and affordable alternatives. The Departments of Health & Human Services **and** Homeland Security are leading initiatives to create temporary deployable facilities, and they are working with private sector hospitals to maintain required beds and trained staff.
 - DoD could, if needed, support these efforts with deployment of **our** own field hospitals.
- The most important effort now to prepare for and manage a pandemic should be to develop and procure needed medical countermeasures (antivirals, vaccines, etc), and to have the capability to rapidly distribute these materials. These efforts, **now** ongoing, are far more critical than having a standing hospital to care for the sick.
- Finally, according to BRAC rules, if DoD has no specific use for the Walter Reed site, it could be then turned over to another government agency, the District of Columbia, **or** the private sector. I expect others will be working hard **to** pursue their vision for how to use **this** potentially very **valuable** piece of real estate.

COORDINATION: USD (P&R) *Handwritten signature*

Attachment:
As stated

Prepared by: Clayton Beonecke, OCFO, (b)(6) DOCS Open 95561,96587

FOUO

NOV 09 2005

TO: **Bill** Winkenwerder

CC: David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gingrich Suggestion

Please take a look at this note from Newt Gingrich on Walter Reed. **Any** thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach: 11/7/05 E-Mail from Newt Gingrich

DHR.ss
110805-13

.....
Please *Respond By* 12/01/05.

FOUO

From: NEWT G

(b)(6) CIV, OSD

From: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Sent: Monday, November 07, 2005 3:11 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV, OSD
Subject: Fw: A Hospital Plan for Pandemics

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

-----Original Message-----

From: Thirdwave2 <thirdwave2@speakingingrich.com>
To: ahubbard@who.eop.gov <ahubbard@who.eop.gov>; mol@hhs.gov <mol@hhs.gov>;
jbolten@omb.eop.gov <jbolten@omb.eop.gov>
CC: mmcclellanoa@cms.hhs.gov <mmcclellanoa@cms.hhs.gov>; jyg2@cdc.gov <jyg2@cdc.gov>;
cclancy@ahrq.gov <cclancy@ahrq.gov>; crngrath@ovp.eop.gov <cmgrath@ovp.eop.gov>
Sent: Sun Nov 06 07:06:53 2005
Subject: FW: A Hospital Plan for Pandemics

It may be worth asking an outside panel if walter reed should be transferred to the public health service and maintained as a reserve hospital that could be expanded during a pandemic or a terrorist attack

I am not advocating this but the contrast between saying we are worried about a pandemic with too few hospital beds while closing a major hospital is striking

newt

From: Terry Balderson [mailto:tbalders@tampabay.rr.com]
Sent: Sunday, November 06, 2005 5:57 AM
To: Thirdwave2
Cc: Robert Egge
Subject: A Hospital Plan for Pandemics

A Hospital Plan for Pandemics
Don't Close Walter Reed and Other 'Obsolete' Facilities

By Phillip Longman The Washington Post Sunday, November 6, 2005: B07

Got your Tamiflu yet? How about a home respirator and a live-in nurse? If expert predictions of a coming flu pandemic prove right, there's little chance you'll be able to find a hospital bed in which to

recovery

Here in Washington, for example, after a long series of hospital closures, there are only 4,346 hospital beds left -- a number that will soon go lower with the closing of Walter Reed Army Medical Center's main facilities. Yet projections show that even a moderately severe strain of a pandemic flu virus would require some 5,000 people to be hospitalized in the District alone. Even if we discharged every patient in Washington's hospitals -- including all the mental patients in St. Elizabeths, all the frail elderly in Hadley Memorial's long-term acute care facility and all the veterans in Veterans Affairs Medical Center -- there still would not be enough hospital beds available to care for, or even to quarantine, highly infectious flu patients.

The same is true nationally. Since 1980 the number of hospital beds available per U.S. resident has declined by roughly 40 percent. Today the United States has only about 965,000 staffed hospital beds. Yet Trust for America's Health, a nonprofit group committed to promoting public health, estimates that the emergence of a pandemic flu virus like the one of 1918 would require hospitalization of 2.3 million people in this country.

There are many sound reasons why the number of hospital beds has been declining. New technology allows for much greater use of outpatient facilities. Galloping medical inflation demands more cost-effective care. But the result is a health care system that is perpetually running at or above 100 percent capacity, and that will be overwhelmed by a pandemic, major terrorism attack or natural disaster.

Fortunately, there is a way to help solve this problem and many others that plague our health care system.

Let's start with the example of Walter Reed. Located just 5 1/2 miles from the White House, 6 1/2 miles from the Capitol and six miles from the Washington Convention Center, its facilities, including a hospital built in 1972, are an integral component of the District's emergency preparedness plan. In the event of a mass casualty terrorist attack or other public health emergency, the plan calls for Walter Reed to discharge its noncritical patients and begin treating civilian victims within as little as three hours. Walter Reed is particularly well equipped and well situated to treat not only victims of a flu pandemic but also those wounded by a nuclear or biological attack in downtown Washington. But maintaining this capacity is expensive, and right now Congress is poised to accept the recommendation of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission that the main hospital and most other buildings on the 113-acre campus be razed.

It may well be appropriate for the military to reorganize and rationalize the way it delivers care in the Washington area and many other parts of the country, just as it is for the private sector. Across the Northeast and Midwest, for example, many VA hospitals have lost their patient base because so many aging veterans have retired elsewhere. The Department of Veterans Affairs has announced that it is closing hospitals in Pittsburgh and in Brecksville, Ohio, and it is threatening to close facilities in Brooklyn and Manhattan. But rather than abandon these and other "obsolete" hospitals -- including many shuttered public hospitals such as D.C. General -- we should turn at least some of them into facilities that will stand ready to serve the public in the event of disasters and that between disasters will serve the uninsured and those on Medicaid.

Private health care providers are under such enormous pressures to contain costs that they cannot begin to afford to keep wards open that aren't filled nearly every day. This makes it the proper role of government to ensure we have surge capacity that the private sector cannot deliver. Literally every American, including those with gold-plated health insurance plans, stands to benefit from a health care system built to handle such increasing risks as a flu pandemic, another Katrina, a major

earthquake or a terrorist attack.

Such a plan would also go a long way toward both rationalizing the U.S. health care system and making it more equitable. Study after study has shown that Veterans Affairs, by making extensive use of electronic medical records, information technology and provider incentives, is providing health care of far higher quality, and at less cost, than that received by most insured Americans, let alone the uninsured. At the same time, hospitals in the District of Columbia spend nearly 7 percent of their revenue on the uninsured, and the total cost to the local health care system is much higher. Meanwhile, nearly a quarter of all patients in Washington hospitals are on Medicaid, and to hear the hospitals tell it, they lose money on every one.

Message to Congress and local decision makers: Why not turn Walter Reed and facilities like it across the country into pilot projects that can point the way toward true reform and improvement of our beleaguered health care system?

The writer *is* a senior fellow at the New America Foundation.

January 3, 2005

TO: (b)(6)
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Note to Tom Delay

7

If I've not sent a thank you note to Tom Delay, let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
123104-20 (ts)

.....
Please respond by _____

Sir,

I will double check when we return, but I don't believe we sent a thank you note to Tom Delay, if you'd like to dictate one.

Thank you.

V/r,

(b)(6)

33551D

5 gms



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 5 2005

The Honorable Tom DeLay
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Tom,

I just want you to know how much I appreciate all your help last year, and I look forward to working with you in 2005.

With my best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,

3355D

5 Jan 5

3 Jan

OSD 00324-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46295

December 16, 2004
6:15pm

Mr. Secretary—

Legislative affairs called to say that they learned from a staffer that Mr. DeLay is calling to offer you his support.

VIR,

(b)(6)

December 16, 2004
5:15pm

*For US in Gibson
My word - blood
Anything can do.*

Mr. Secretary —

House Majority Leader Tom DeLay called and would like to speak with you.

(home: (b)(6) cell: (b)(6))

VIR,

(b)(6)

*I have notified LA
and they are checking
to see if it is in reference
to something in particular.*


7/14/04

July 13, 2004

TO: David Chu

CC: Gen. Dick Myers Jim Roche
 Paul Wolfowitz Gen. Pete Schoomaker
 Gen. Pete Pace ADM Vern Clark
 Les Brownlee Gen. John Jumper
 Gordon England Gen. Mike Hagee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: 2004 Voting

Prior to the Congressional recess at the end of next week, I would like to be briefed on the range of activities involving the military absentee voter program.

D14.35

As I recall, the Department conducted a study at Secretary Cohen's direction after the last election that revealed some shortfalls in our processes.


I would like to know what progress has been made and what more needs to be done to ensure we are discharging our responsibilities in this area.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
071304-1



.....
Please respond by 7/20/04



7/20/04

July 23, 2004

Friday

July 2004

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August 2004

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| 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| 29 | 30 | 31 | | | | |

Ms. McGinn on Leave
DR. CHU - VACATION

7^{am}

8⁰⁰

8:15am-8:45am P&R Update (3E752)

9⁰⁰

9:20am-9:50am SD Military Voting - UCS, Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries

10⁰⁰

10:00am-10:45am SD Future OIF Rotations

10:00am-10:45am SD Future OIF Rotations

11⁰⁰

12^{pm}

Lunch

1⁰⁰

Hold

2⁰⁰

Car to Hill (Marvin)

3⁰⁰

SASC/SGAC Staff NSPS Briefing (SR-228 Library)

4⁰⁰

Car to Pentagon (Marvin)

PDUSD Wrap-up

5⁰⁰

Leave for the day - Anniversary Dinner in Fairfax

6⁰⁰

12/9 1700



August 27, 1004

file

TO: Pveil Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Senate Briefings

Do you have any record of who attended the briefings I have given in the Senate Intel Room. Have Kerry or Edwards attended? I cannot remember seeing them, although I do recall that Kerry attended on meeting at a Pentagon briefing

Please look at both the ones we conducted at the Pentagon in a the ones we conducted in S-407 and let me know.

Thanks.

DHR:ah
082604-1 IS computer doc

Please respond by 9/10/04

gc
To SecDef *DR 12/14*

Paul Butler
12/13

M L 12/14

350.09

27 Aug 04

OSD 00326-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46300

NOV 23 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Attendance at Op-Intel Briefings

Did we ever figure out how many of our Op-Intel briefings Edwards and Kerry attended?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
112204-27

.....
Please respond by 12/3/04



LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1300

DA 12/14

December 9, 2004 3:00 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of Defense
For Legislative Affairs (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to your questions about Senators Kerry and Edwards

- The information we previously gave you about participation of Senators Kerry and Edwards in ops/intel briefings is correct. We do have, however, records indicating that Senator Kerry came to the Pentagon for two meetings with you.
- On Monday morning, September 24, 2001 at 7:45 a.m. you had a one-on-one breakfast with Senator Kerry in your office. To the best of my recollection, I was the only other attendee. The meeting must have materialized at the last minute because we have nothing in our archives to indicate that a "read ahead" was prepared for you.
- He was also one of 56 Senators who came to the Pentagon in late summer and early fall of 2002. Our records indicate he was here on September 5. As you recall, we conducted a series of breakfast meetings for members of the House and the Senate on weapons of mass destruction leading up to the vote on the Iraq resolution in October of 2002. Senator Edwards received two invitations to these briefings and he did not accept either.

350.09

9 Dec 04

Attachments:

- SECDEF Snowflake 082604-1
- SECDEF Snowflake 112204-27

27 Aug 04

September 1, 2004

TO: Col Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *P.*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Ray DuBois re: Corridors

Please arrange a meeting for me with Ray DuBois to discuss corridors. I think there should be one for women, one for Hispanics, and one for Secretaries of Defense. I would like to talk to him about how we fix them; reduce the duplications.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-9

.....
Please respond by 9/17/04

630
1 Sept 04



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1950 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

D

INFO MEMO

ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action _____

FROM: Raymond F. DuBois, Director Administration and Management

Ray DuBois

SUBJECT: Naming and Dedication of Pentagon Corridors

I spoke w/ Powell Moore. Sen. Warner spoke against re-naming; see attached

• The following is provided in response to your request for information regarding dedicated corridors and exhibits in the Pentagon.

9 Presidents Corridor – Contains a picture and brief history panel of each U.S. President, including the current one. Location: 3A10-3C 10.

9 Corridors and exhibits dedicated to military leaders.

Arnold Corridor - Dedication date unknown. Location: 4E8.

Bradley Corridor – Dedicated June 1972. Location: 2E8.

Eisenhower Corridor – Dedicated May 1970. Rededicated in June 1985. Location: 3E8-9.

*%
↑*

MacArthur Corridor – Dedication date unknown (1980s). Location: 3A4-5.

Marshall Corridor – Dedicated April 1976. Location: 3E4.5-5.

9 Corridors/Exhibits dedicated to groups, organizations, and other individuals.

Kruzel Exhibit - Dedicated in January 1996. Joseph J. Kruzel was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy who died in an accident while traveling outside Sarajevo in Aug 1995. Location: 4D7-8.

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| African Americans in Defense of Our Nation | Location: 3A2 - 3E2 |
| ANZUS | Location: 2A2-3 |
| Buffalo Soldiers | Location: 2A5 |
| Chiefs of Staff of the Army | Location: 3A5-3E5 |
| Civil Servants | Location: 2A2-3 |
| Correspondents | Location: 2E5-6 |



| | |
|---|---|
| Hall of Heroes/Medal of Honor | Location: Pentagon Concourse |
| Joint Chiefs of Staff | Location: 2A8-2E8 |
| Marine Corps Commandants | Location: 4A-E5 |
| Military Women | Location: In Storage |
| Native Americans in Defense of Our Nation | Location: 2A1 |
| NATO | Location: 2A9-10 |
| POW/MIA | Location: 4E7-8 |
| Secretaries of the Army | Location: 3A5-3E5 |
| Secretaries of Defense | Location: 2A8-9 |
| Secretaries of the Navy | Location: 4A5-4E5 |
| Secretaries of War | Location: 2A4-5 |
| Soldiers and Signers of the Constitution | Location: 2A4-2E4 |
| USO | Location: Corridor 2, Ramp to Concourse |
| 9-11 Memorial Quilts | Location: 4th Corridor, 1st floor |

- The Federal government already has recognized President Ronald Reagan in a number of ways.
 - There are two major facilities in the Washington D.C. area: The Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., dedicated in 1998, and the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, renamed in 1998.
 - The Department of Defense has named the aircraft carrier **USS Ronald Reagan**, commissioned 2003, and Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, Marshall Islands, dedicated 2000, after the President.] ★

COORDINATION: None

Attachments: None

Prepared by: Ralph Newton, (b)(6)

Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL

From: Snow, Howard, CIV, OSD-LA
Sent: Thursday, June 10, 2004 7:34 AM
To: Armstrong, Brett, COL, OSD-ATL
Subject: Warner wishes to keep "bi-partisan nature" of name for Pentagon

DEFENSE**Warner Weighs in Against Frist's Proposal to Rename the Pentagon After Reagan**

BY JOSEPH C. ANSELMO, CQ STAFF WRITER

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee cautioned Wednesday that renaming the Pentagon for former President Ronald Reagan might not be the best way to honor his memory.

Sen. John W. Warner, R-Va., took to the Senate floor to emphasize the importance of retaining the "bipartisan nature" of the headquarters of the U.S. armed forces.

His comments appeared aimed at heading off a proposal by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., to rename the Pentagon the "Ronald Reagan National Defense Building."

On June 7, Frist submitted amend-

ments to the fiscal 2005 defense authorization bill (S 2400 — S Rcpt 108-260) that would rename the Pentagon and the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency in Reagan's honor.

Warner diplomatically did not directly mention Frist's amendments, but noted the rejection of a proposal to rename the building in honor of former president and five-star Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower after he died in 1969. One of the main reasons, Warner said, "is that that building stands as a symbol of the bipartisanship that must be present as we work with the men and women of the armed forces."

Warner said Congress needed to honor Reagan, but cautioned that lawmakers

"have got to give a lot of careful thought and be mindful of how we've recognized other commanders in chief . . . in terms of their contributions to the defense of the country. But we'll come up with an idea."

Warner declined to comment further after his remarks.

Frist's aides also moved to play down the amendments, saying they were filed only to put ideas on the table. An aide said the majority leader was forming a group of senators to review a wide variety of proposals to honor Reagan.

Republican lawmakers also have floated various proposals to put Reagan's likeness on the clime, the \$10 bill or the \$20 bill. ♦

Howard Snow

September 1, 2004

TO: David Chu
Ray DuBois

cc: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Naval Nuclear Propulsion Director

210 Navy (344)

Attached is some material on the Director of Naval Nuclear propulsion. My instinct is that eight years is too long. I would like to get it changed so it is four years with the possibility of adding one, two, three or four years.

Please come back to me with a proposal.

Thanks.

Attach.
6/14/04 GC memo to SecDef re: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

DHR:dh
090104-18

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

1 Ser...



GENERAL COUNSEL

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, O. C. 20301-1600

DW/17

INFO MEMO

June 14, 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DEPSEC _____

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, 695-3341 *WJ Haynes*

SUBJECT: Position of Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

- o At your earlier direction, Dan Dell'Orto met with the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to obtain their views about the grade (O-10) and term of appointment (8 years) of this position.
- The Secretary of the Navy believes that any proposed change in either the grade level or term of appointment is sensitive.
 - o The grade level is significant because of the Navy's outstanding nuclear safety record.
 - o Were the grade level reduced, any subsequent safety problems likely would be attributed to that reduction.
 - o An 8-year term is unduly long and permits the incumbent to outlast at least one Administration, and possibly two.
- o The Chief of Naval Operations agreed that any proposed change in either grade level or term of appointment would be controversial and possibly particularly difficult in an election year because the submarine community would mobilize to oppose any change.
- Having a 4-star officer (although it does not have to be a submariner, it historically has been) in this position provides the submarine community with an edge over both the surface and aviation community neither of which has a Navy uniformed advocate above the two-star level.
- Interestingly, ADM Clark does not believe that either the Department of Energy or the Senate would oppose a change in this position unless the submarine community sways them.



11-L-0559/OSD/46308

11872-04

- The position as currently structured is an anachronism during a period of transition from a threat- to a capabilities-based defense and a platform centric system to an information centric system.
- Consideration should be given to a Senior Executive Service person for this position, as the Executive Order contemplates, as this would remove the position from the operations role and the submarine advocacy role.
- ADM Clark was very complimentary toward ADM Skip Bowman, the incumbent, who has handled himself as well as anyone could in this position.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: Daniel J. Dell'Orto (b)(6)

11/10
1000

~~FOUO~~

September 1, 2004

I-04/01745

ES-0622

TO: Doug Feith
FROM:
SUBJECT: Salah Shakir Letter

Please have someone respond to the attached letter from Salah Shalur

Thanks.

Attach.
6/23/04 Letter from Salah Shakir

DHR:ss
090104-8

.....
Please respond by 9/10/04

Close this
out
PWB

Paul Butler
11/10

Policy Executive Secretariat Note

November 9, 2004

Captain Marriott,

ASD/ISA, Peter Rodman, responded to Mr. Shakir on October 21, 2004. A copy of the letter is attached for your records.

U
June Bartlett
June Bartlett
Deputy Director
Policy Executive Secretariat

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2300

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AFFAIRS

21 OCT 2004

Mr. Salah Shakir
Vice President of Information Technology/Student Services
Rend Lake College
Ina, IL 62846

Dear Mr. Shakir:

Thank you for your letter on how the United States can take the offensive to "diminish and weaken the al-Qaeda tenor." Your suggestions are very helpful.

We know that al Qaeda's rationalization for terrorism is a distortion of Islam. This point carries the *most* weight coming from authorities within the Muslim world, some of whom you mention. I hope that thoughtful adherents of Islam will **speak** out more forcefully against the hijacking of this great faith by ideological extremists. Moderates like yourself are on the front lines in this struggle.

Once again, thank you for your advice and comments. I encourage you to take your message to the broader Muslim community.

Sincerely,

Peter W. Rodman



11-L-0559/OSD/46311

6/23/2004



By: Salah Shakir
Vice President of Information Technology/Student Services
Rend Lake College
Ina, IL 62846
Salahs@rlc.edu
(618) 437-5321

I am an American/Iraqi who is working in southern Illinois. I got frustrated with being on the defensive with **war** against **terror**. I would like *to* see the **US** on the offensive side. Want to help and **this** is **my** way.

Diminish and Weaken Al-Qaeda Terror

The basis of the Al-Qaeda group's recruitment of new members - getting bigger and stronger - is based purely on religious motivation. The religious motivation is: "If you kill an infidel, you will go to Heaven? Killing infidels (non-believers) is part of a Jihad (holy **war**). Though most of Al-Qaeda's targets are infidels, many of their attacks have caused death to believers. The justification used for **killing** believers is that the believers also will *go to* Heaven **for** their cause. **Most** of their recruits are **young** in age and in **an** early stage of **their** knowledge of the Islam religion. The way to stop the growth of this group **and** to diminish **and** weaken their organization and its causes is **through** the use of religious motivation **and** reasoning.

A little background on the Islam religion - it is based on five pillars:

- The Profession of Faith
- The Five Daily Prayers
- Almsgiving
- Fasting
- Pilgrimage to Mecca

However, some followers have added Jihad **as** a sixth pillar. Quran is the holy book of Islam. The **Quran** is a record of the exact words revealed by God through the angel Gabriel to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Not one word of its 114 chapters (suras) **has** been changed over **the** centuries, *so* the **Quran** **is** in **every** detail the unique and miraculous text which was revealed to Muhammad (PBUH). When it comes **to** the Halal (permissible) and **Haraam** (forbidden) aspects of life, Muslims depend first on the **Quran** and secondly on the Hadith (saying) **of** the prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

Unfortunately, **some** Muslims such **as** the Al Qaeda group took the **Quran** as a literal explanation and followed it. The fact is that the Quran has a literal explanation but also is

dependent on the time in which it was written. **All Muslim Shariah (Islamic laws) are written** on the most basic of life's issues. When an issue without a relevant Shariah arises in Muslim life in **any** country, the top Sheik (Muslim cleric) in that city, country **or** community will make a Fatwa (legal opinion concerning Islamic law) about the matter. On certain major issues, a group **of** Sheiks or Muslim organizations - and there are many of them - will make the Fatwa.

To diminish and weaken Al-Qaeda, there must be a Fatwa from one **or** more of the well-recognized Islamic organizations proclaiming that Al-Qaeda and its actions are against what Islam stands for. **This** Fatwa should be well publicized in the Middle East countries. **This** will discourage young Muslims from joining Al-Qaeda or any similar groups, and it will place considerable doubt in new recruits. This might sound simple, but I believe this is a way of fighting religion with religion.

Here are some well-known Islamic groups:

Iraq - City of Al-Najaf: Shiai majority which will put Iran in agreement
Egypt- Alazhar Mosque
Saudi Arabia- Should come from the Saudi government

Here are some Islamic organizations that may **help** in the process:

Council **on** American-Islamic Relations
1050 **17th** St. NW, Suite **490**
Washington, DC **20036**
Tel: (202) 659-CAIR (2247)
Fax: (202) 659-2254
Email: cairl@ix.netcom.com
URL: www.cair-net.org

Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA)

Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)

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file

September 1, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Phoenix Speech

I'd like a tape of the Phoenix speech – I have not received one yet.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-3

.....
Please respond by 9/3/04

PH 9/1

SIR,

THERE WAS NOT A TAPE FROM
PHOENIX. I HAVE ATTACHED
A TRANSCRIPT.

v/r,

(b)(6)

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11-L-0559/OSD/46314



U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

News Transcript

On the Web:

[http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?](http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?secdef1262.html)
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040826-secdef1262.html>

Media contact: +1 (703) 697-5131

Public contact:

<http://www.dod.mil/fao/comment.html>
or +1 (703) 428-0711

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld

Thursday, August 26, 2004

Secretary Rumsfeld Speech to The Greater Phoenix Leadership, Biltmore Hotel, Phoenix, AZ

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you very much. I thank you very much. I'm not a poet. [Laughter] I'm not even close to a poet. There's some character who took my press briefings and tried to turn them into poetry and failed. [Laughter] Thank you, folks. It's very nice to be with you. We're in an August afternoon in Phoenix and I'm delighted to see so many folks here. And I thank each of you for coming. I appreciate your being here. Bill, thank you for those words, and Mr. Mayor, a pleasure to see you. Mr. President, Mr. Speaker and my friends from Congress here. It's always good to see you, and Congressman Flake and Congressman Heintz and Mrs. Heintz. I also was pleased to see Mrs. Stump. I don't know where she's sitting, but – there you are. Good to see you. And so many distinguished guests and public officials and members of the armed services.

I thought what I'd do is to take a few minutes to talk about some of the issues we've been hearing about and reading about and then comment on the global war on terror and then respond to questions, which I look forward to.

Last week, the president announced that we are making progress in our efforts to reposition U.S. military forces and capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The world has certainly changed markedly since the end of the Soviet Union. But military deployments and arrangements really have not changed very much. They've been reduced, but they're pretty much in place where they were when the Cold War ended.

During the Cold War, it was assumed that our forces stationed abroad would defend from static positions. This, of course, is no longer the case, and we know that. Today the enemies we face are fighting from small cells located in almost every corner of the world. And the task today is to stay on the offensive against them. We cannot know precisely where our forces may have to operate. We used to be looking for a tank invasion from the Soviet Union across the North German plain and that's why we had so many forces in Northern Europe. So our forces today have to be flexible and they have to be agile and they have to be light and they have to be rapidly deployable, usable, not fixed, and capable of going almost anywhere in the world on short notice.

If you think about it for a number of years now or even before September 11th the DoD has been working on concepts to guide our security presence around the world. And we know that adjusting our footprint or our force posture is an essential component of our strategy. These proposed changes are designed to allow us to deploy capable forces rapidly anywhere in the world on short notice, to push more military capability forward while shifting some 60,000 to 70,000 service members and roughly 100,000 of their dependants from foreign bases to U.S. bases, creating a lighter footprint abroad, which allows us to focus on speed, precision and technically advanced capabilities, rather than simply on mass and sheer numbers, which are really increasingly formulations of the last century.

It's awfully hard for people to change and adjust to that. We've developed over my lifetime the idea that more is better and so we talk about numbers of things, ships, guns, tanks, planes, people – ignoring the reality that if you have, for example, a 10 dumb bombs and you have a smart bomb that can do what 10 dumbs can do and you reduce from 10 dumb bombs to five smart bombs, you have not reduced your capability. In fact, you've dramatically increased your capabilities. But getting people to think that way is not an easy thing. We've also, looking at our posture to help us build new relationships in the world, we've developed a number of new relationships, if you think about it, since 9/11 – Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Yemen – so many countries that we have been working with, this global coalition against terror is now something like 85 or 90 nations, probably the largest coalition in the history of mankind. And our adjustments should make it easier for the United States to work with our allies and friends on military operations to train, to operate, exercise together to complement doctrine and tactics and to exploit the new technologies with them. Our new arrangements also have the added advantage of improving the lives of U.S. military families. Deployments in a number of cases will be shorter and they'll be rotational for training and exercises often lasting weeks or months, rather than years. Military families will find somewhat more stability, fewer permanent changes of station, and as a result, less disruption in the lives of spouses and children in schools.

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<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/...> 9/1/2004

In a political year, I suppose it's inevitable that these important proposals which we've been working on for some three years now, would lead to a discussion and that's a good thing. Some of the concerns expressed, no doubt, are well intentioned and useful. We've spent the last two years talking to our friends and allies and to members of Congress and working through these issues, proposals of such magnitude deserve examination and they deserve debate and discussion. And let there be no doubt, these are significant changes and they will affect our country's force posture for many decades to come.

At the same time, I think most reasonable observers recognize that our existing force arrangements are relics of a time long passed. We still have two heavy divisions in Germany to defend against a Soviet tank attack. Those two divisions did not help prevent September 11th. They did not prevent the hijackers from organizing and planning their attacks in Hamburg, Germany, for that matter. We've stationed thousands of U.S. troops on the border with North Korea to defend South Korea. South Korea today is a nation that is no longer impoverished. After 50 years, they are not defenseless and thanks, in major part, to the stability our alliance has provided, South Korea today is a thriving nation with a robust democracy with a vibrant economy and a modern army of some 600,000. Our commitment to that country and to peace on that peninsula remains as strong as ever and it will be going forward. In fact, our relationship with Korea is, I think, an excellent example of what changes to our global posture really can accomplish.

For some time now, we've been investing in substantial sums, taxpayers' dollars, billions of dollars in improved military capabilities that are appropriate for the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We're increasing our naval and airpower in the region and we're moving more precision weapons and increased firepower to South Korea. At the same time, we would be relocating our forces away from the demilitarized zone and where they were located in very vulnerable garrisons and cities near that zone and we'll be shifting them southward into two hubs – an air hub and a sea hub – well beyond the range of North Korean artillery.

Today we have the means and the intent to strengthen our deterrent power and our defensive capability while decreasing our overall footprint, and we're doing so, and it would be unwise not to do so. While current arrangements may be comfortable for people and familiar, both in our country and in foreign countries, our current arrangements are -- let's face it, they're obsolete. And we need to deal with the world as it is, not the way it used to be, or even the way we'd like it to be. We have to deal with it as it is. Changes have to be made. They will not be made precipitously, but they will be made. And indeed, it's a plan that will be rolled out over probably as many as four, five, six, seven, eight years. We're in a fortunate position that we don't have to be a supplicant. You can go to these countries and work our arrangements and make sure that we have the right Status of Forces Agreements and access and cross-servicing agreement, and that the neighboring countries are willing to adjust to our needs to move our forces as required by the United States. As we visit with countries, we'll determine which is best by way of new arrangements, and then proceed to work out those details. As a result, there'll be no major announcement beyond what the president has announced. Rather, there will be a series of announcements that evolve as each piece of this is worked out. And we are certainly continuing to consult with Congress and with our friends and allies, as we move forward to meet our responsibility to serve the American people.

Let me make a couple of comments about missile defense. Meeting the new reality of this century also drives our approach to missile defense. In the past few weeks, up in Alaska, the first interceptor was put into the ground. By the end of this year, we expect to have a limited operational capability against incoming ballistic missiles. This represents, in my view, a victory for hope and vision over skepticism. More than 20 years ago, I was in the White House when President Reagan gathered a group of individuals and made his announcement and gave his vision for a missile defense system. Now that's long time ago. And today, roughly two dozen countries, including some of the world's most dangerous regimes, possess ballistic missiles and they are energetically working to increase the range and destructive capability of those missiles. A number of these states are estimated by the U.S. intelligence community to have nuclear, biological and chemical programs.

North Korea, for example, is working to develop and deploy missiles capable of reaching not just their neighbors, such as Japan, but our country as well. The same can be said of Iran. More countries are developing and sharing information, and I think it is notable to think what just recently happened with respect to Libya where they made an admission that dramatically demonstrated this point. Fortunately, their announcement was that they wish to just discontinue those programs and have been working with the United States and the United Kingdom to do so.

History has taught us that weakness is provocative. And the longer the delays in deploying even a limited defense against these kinds of facts, the greater the likelihood of an attempted or threatened strike. Additionally, without any defense against missiles, terrorists and rogue regimes could use the threat of an attack to try to intimidate America and/or our allies. As enemies continue to adapt and evolve, so must our capabilities. That's why the president directed us to pursue an innovative approach to the development and the deployment of missile defenses. Rather than waiting years, sometimes decades for a fixed and final architecture, as has been the norm with the many weapons systems, we will be deploying an initial set of capabilities that will evolve over time as technologies evolve over time.

The way ahead will have its share of ups and downs – we know that. Any development of a new technology, leading-edge technologies, has ups and downs, successes and what people call failures. I was in the pharmaceutical business and invested heavily in research and development. And folks did not just simply get up one morning to discover an important new therapy for people. They went out and they tried things that worked and that didn't work. And each thing that

didn't work was part of that learning process and so, too, in weapons and defense systems capabilities. All cutting-edge endeavors include trial and error, but we will continue to benefit from leadership that combines vision with resolve and to simply learn from each of the so-called failures.

Let me also say a word or two about the national debate taking place with respect to the so-called reforms of the intelligence community. The 9/11 Commission has provided a useful service in my view, by surfacing some important issues and challenges and some problems. These are the decisions that the United States Congress and the executive branch, the president, are ultimately going to have to decide. Indeed, the president has already implemented a number of the commission's recommendations. And I spent Monday with him where he spent the better part of the day reviewing a number of additional thoughts and suggestions that have come up. It seems to me that this is the proper approach. Whether it's a government and a bureaucracy as large as ours and with the ramifications of change so enormous. It is true, you can carefully think about these issues and think them through carefully before implementing things. We are at war, and we need to get it right. We need to make the changes we need to make, but the old saying is the truth and that is that, to he who tears down what is falls the responsibility of putting in place something better. And it isn't the kind of thing that we want to be making many mistakes about.

Last, let me make a comment a bit on Iraq and Afghanistan. I recently returned from Afghanistan a couple weeks ago. I must say that each time I go there, I am just struck by the changes, by the improvements, by the energy you see in the streets, the activities. And I know there are some folks there's some folks here who've spent some time in Iraq and Afghanistan and the thank-you needless to say, for being willing to do that. But if you drive through portions of Afghanistan, you'll see construction is well along on the major highways which connect the major cities of that country, and which are so critically important to their economy.

The Afghan security forces are being trained and equipped and have and have acquitted themselves quite well and in several recent activities. I visited an election center on this last trip and saw a room not quite this big filled with computers and young folks, Afghans, busily working on the election and the registration process. Here's a country that has suffered terribly under Soviet occupation, has had years of drought, had a ghastly civil war and had suffered under the repression of the Taliban regime and has no real experience with democracy as such, as we think of it. And people were estimating they might get three or four million people to register for this first election, which is coming up. In fact, there are now over 10 million that have registered. And I'm told that something in excess of 40 percent of them are women. And needless to say, the Taliban didn't even let women walk around unaccompanied by men, and they didn't let them go out uncovered and they didn't let them wear colored shoes and they didn't let any of them fly kites and the idea of getting women to – willing to go out and register to vote is a striking accomplishment. The Afghans are clearly enthusiastic about these first early steps towards democracy. In Iraq, the economy is growing, the currency has been reasonably steady. We all know that people are being killed and wounded and many, many are Iraqis are being killed every week. The stock market is open, however. They fielded an Olympic soccer team. We've gone from zero to something like 220,000 Iraqi security forces of which 110,000 are properly trained and equipped and functioning. I've spent some time on the phone this morning with Gen. Casey and Gen. Abizaid, our senior military commanders there and they are impressed that they have a reasonably large number of experienced Iraqi forces that are in the Najaf area and are attempting to sort through that difficult situation with the holy shrines of the Shia faith.

Now most of the media attention this week has been on the fighting in Najaf, but it's interesting that this month we also had the Constituent Assembly council, a group conference that met elected people to serve. And in the words of at least one newspaper, it is putting Iraq on the road to a constitutional democracy. Progress is mixed. It's good with the bad. And we all recognize that. People have been killed and wounded. And it isn't easy to build a free country when terrorists are determined to try to attack every sign of success – every activity. They systematically try and assassinate a government leader or a mayor, city council members, police chiefs. They are attempting to dissuade people from joining the Iraqi Security forces, that the Iraqi security forces have people standing in line to become policemen, national guard, and regular army, border patrol, site protection and facilities protections people.

Everyone that looks at it and sees this mixture of what's taking place to do it. And clearly, the difficult and the bad is struck by just how hard it is to go from where they were – a vicious dictatorship – to something approximating a freer economic system, a free political system. And Afghanistan and Iraq are becoming free nations that differ in almost every respect from the terror regimes that they replaced. They are countries that will be assisting in the global war on terror. And to serve as examples to discredit, it gives credit to extremist ideology. And I would think to the extent they're successful, and I believe that each of those countries has a terrific crack at being successful. The effect on that region will be enormous. It is a region that needs models, it needs examples. And for all the enemies' cunning and ruthlessness, I think that those of us in this country and in the case of Afghanistan, some 26 other nations that are helping -- in the case of Iraq, some 32 countries that are offering assistance – we have an enormous advantage and that is that the great sweep of human desire is for freedom. And that is on our side, let there be no doubt. So we pray for their success and for the success of our soldiers and men and women, volunteers all, who are risking their lives to help those folks. Fifty million people between the two countries, have a crack at being free people. And their noble work of people in uniform will bring a more peaceful planet and a more secure nation for those of us here at home. And with that, I thank you and will be happy to respond to questions.

[Applause]

Now, do you have microphones? Look at that. Why does somebody stick their hand up and the mic will start

11-L-0559/OSD/46317

wandering over and then we won't have to – look at this – see all kinds of hands. Terrific. Yes, sir.

Q: Can you comment on the stability of the government of Pakistan?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes, sir. We are – those of us in the world engaged in the global struggle against extremists are so fortunate that President Musharraf and his team are in power in Pakistan. He has, without question, one of the most difficult tasks of any governmental leader that I can think of. And he lives in a tough part of the world. He has an element within his country that obviously has tried to assassinate him on several occasions recently.

He's a courageous leader and a thoughtful leader and he is a superb partner in this global war on terror. He had troubles along his borders with Afghanistan. The Pakistan government has been aggressive in helping us deal with the al Qaeda and put pressure on them. He has tribal areas that run along that border and just as we have in our country special rules in tribal areas. So, too, there the pattern has been that the Pakistani military stayed out. And of course, it was being used as a haven for both the Taliban and the al Qaeda. And he has changed fast. He's moved forces in there and he has been working the problem. And I just am so – all of us in the United States government are so grateful that he's there and he is being successful in putting pressure on the terrorists. The more pressure that is put on the terrorists in countries like Afghanistan and others, the more difficult it is for them to recruit, the more difficult it's going to be for them to raise money, the more difficult it is for them to move money, the more difficult it is to move from place to place, to communicate with each other. Everything's harder if we have the countries that are willing to step up, and it does require people to step up. It requires physical courage and political courage. He's got large numbers of people in Pakistan who don't like what he's doing and are against it. And sometimes in our country – and Mr. Mayor, you know that – president of the senate -- when someone's against you, they run against you, they vote against you or they talk against you – that's one thing. In that part of the world, they don't just do that; they go after you. And it is a different circumstance. So I have a lot of confidence in him and the work they're doing and, as one citizen of this country and I'm grateful that he's a part of the coalition. Question.

Q: What are we doing in our country to protect our borders along Mexico and Canada where most of the terrorists have come through? I travel across the southern part of this state and into Texas. I mean, it's scary to see what I see as I'm out there and about, visiting and traveling, how easy it is to come into this country without being checked you know.

SEC. RUMSFELD: It's true all over the world that borders are a problem. They're porous – we have trouble in our country. We know that all of us can see our borders are relatively porous, not just north and south but so, too, from the oceans. And the Department of Defense is not involved in the subject of this – border guards. Now that is the Department of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard are the ones responsible for that. So I'm not an expert. I am an expert about the problems of borders – the Syrian borders of Iraq and the Iranian border of Iraq. And I know a lot about that -- a lot more than I do about your borders here. And so, too, in Afghanistan, they border with Pakistan and the border with Iran. And everyone – our country and what we're doing in those two countries – we have to do a cost-benefit ratio. To try to seal a border is a monumental task. It's a terribly expensive task. It has – and you are constantly asking yourself are you better off trying to do that or something else? And so those calculations are made by the Department of Homeland Security and by the state and local government in states that have borders. And of course, they're also made by the Department of Defense with respect to our situations around the world.

The terrorists are smart. They're not dumb. They're clever. And they prefer to stay alive, although there are certainly suicide bombers who don't prefer to stay alive. But to the extent we are successful, and go to school on them and arrange ourselves to put maximum pressure on them, they then go to school on us. And it's a dynamic constantly changing situation. And to the extent you do a better job on borders, you raise the price, raised the cost of them and then you deal with that. On the other hand, they then turn to another direction and take advantage because the terrorists can attack any place, using any technique, and it's physically impossible to defend everywhere at every moment against every technique.

I was President Reagan's Middle East envoy back in the early '80s after the Marines were killed – 241 of them in the Beirut Barracks. And of course, it was a truck bomb going into the barracks and killing all the Marines. And very soon, you began to see these barricades, the concrete barriers like it's around all buildings. Fair enough, so the terrorists saw that and they saw they couldn't get a truck through, so they're started lobbing rocket-propelled-grenades at buildings over the barriers. So the next thing, you go down to Corniche in Beirut and you look and they draped wire mesh over buildings to bounce these rocket-propelled grenades off. So the terrorists saw that and what did they do? They started hitting soft targets. People going to and from work, people at home. And those asymmetrical attacks have an infinite number of opportunities and places that they can attack or times they can attack or techniques they getting used to attack. So defense really becomes a vastly – a more expensive way to do it and less certain way to do it than offense. And that is why you simply have to find those terrorist networks and root them out where they are and deal with the countries that provide the haven for the terrorists. And that is the only way that we can have success. The second part of that equation is that you have to do defense, to be sure, or else it's easy for them. But we have to do the offense.

And the other thing we have to do is we have to look at the intake. What's going on in this world that people are successfully training other people to believe that it's in their interest to go out and kill innocent men, women and children. How do we develop a confidence in ourselves that to be sure, we're defending the American people, which is our job and we've got to do that, and then take every step to do that, and particularly, as these weapons get more powerful. But we also have to reach out and engage the world on this subject and see that we get people within countries like Pakistan, within countries like Saudi Arabia, trying to squeeze down the finances that are going into the training schools and training camps.

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And try to reduce the attractiveness of the people to come into that business of killing innocent men, women and children. It isn't enough simply to be successful in rooting them out because more come in. And so our task is big. This is not something that's going to be over in a year or two or three. This is a lot more like the Cold War that took 40 or 50 years than it is the World War II, where there'll be some final signing ceremony on the U.S.S. Missouri. This is a tough, tough task that we have got ahead of us, but we can do it. Questions, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I just want to thank you for the work you're doing and the commitment that you have made public service. We really appreciate you being here. [Applause] Thank you. Two quick questions. Would you talk a little bit about North Korea and China and the impact that China potentially has on this whole equation, and also talk a little bit about Iran and some of the comments that we've read recently about what's going on there? Thank you.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Yes, sir. North Korea is a – it's a tragedy. If you think about it, here's a country the same size as South Korea, same people and 50 years after the war, South Korea is booming. It's an economic miracle, it's successful. The people are free. And in North Korea, the – above the demilitarized zone, if you look down from a satellite at night, it's black, with a pinprick of light in Pyongyang, the capital, and south of the DMZ, it's just brilliant light.

They've just lowered their – within the last year or two, they lowered the height to get in the North Korean military down to the 4'10" for adults because of starvation. Under 100 pounds and you get in the North Korean military now. They've got concentration camps with tens of thousands of people from several locations. People that have tried to get out are killed. Not unlike East Germany and when we see people trying to get across the wall in Berlin.

The government is busy as probably the principal proliferator of ballistic missile technology. They're good at it. They have developed long-range ballistic missiles and they've been helping a lot of other countries develop them. They're on the terrorist list. They've engaged in terrorist acts. They are involved with the drug trade, basically the prescription drug trade – illegal. They're involved with counterfeiting. All in all, not your first choice as a neighbor. The people are terribly repressed. They're a danger. They're a danger in two ways. They're a danger to the South Koreans and they're also a danger as a proliferator. I do not know of certain knowledge what their nuclear capability is, or their chemical or biological capability. We know they've announced – they claim they have nuclear weapons. We know our intelligence community has assessed that they probably have two or three nuclear weapons. And they are now – they change their story periodically and therefore are not really reliable as a gauge as to what they've got in mind. We are trying – the United States with Russia and Japan, South Korea and China – attempting to engage in talks with them to see if it might not be possible for them to adjust their behavior. And begin behaving in a way that is less threatening to the rest of the world. How that will work remains to be seen.

I will say this – the partnership between the United States and South Korea is solid. The military capability of our combined countries in that part of the world is healthy. This program that we have in place under a superb commander, Gen. Leon LaPorte has been looked at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's been looked at by the former combatant commanders in charge of Korea and to a person, they are convinced that what we are doing is a good thing and it will not weaken the deterrent. It will not create an instability and, indeed, it will in fact, improve our military capabilities to deal with any conceivable threats in that part of the world.

Iran – I just can't believe. When you think of that country – intelligent people, educated people, an interesting history and they're being governed by a small handful of clerics in a manner that is notably different from all their neighbors – most of their neighbors anyway – and they know it. It isn't like North Korea where they control every single thing. People in Iran see television and they hear radio. People can go off the borders and come in. People from our country go into Iran and see these people. They know that they're being denied the opportunity for that country, because of its behavior with respect to nuclear development, they are being denied interaction with the rest of the world to their detriment. And when one thinks of how fast that country switched from the Shah of Iran to the Ayatollahs, one has to think that at some point in the future it might switch again. And I don't know what their behavior is going to be with respect to the International Atomic Energy Commission [sic], but it's been uneven and bumpy thus far. And you have to hope that the international community will behave in a responsible way and create sufficient pressure on that government. Again, a terrorist state that's actively involved with funding and assisting terrorists, there are al Qaeda leadership in Iran today. Iran is a country that is a principal sponsor of Hezbollah, along with Syria, where they send weapons and terrorists down through Damascus into Beirut and then into Israel. So it's a country that is off to the side with the international community and the hope is that the international community will behave in a way that will persuade them that that is not in their interest.

The one thing we know is that the problem of proliferation is a serious one. In fact, every month that goes by, as these weapons get more lethal, more dangerous, it is a more serious problem. We also know that there isn't any way in the world that one country can do much about proliferation. It is one of those things that, by definition, requires the cooperation of a lot of countries to work together to see that we behave in this planet in a rational way so that we create lots of disincentives for people can engage in those kinds of trafficking of weapons of mass destruction or missile technology. Lots of disincentives, and a lot of incentives for those countries to behave in a way that they are a part of the civilized world. It is – I am hopeful about Iran. And you might see – particularly the young people and women – whose behavior is particularly restricted in Iran, serve as a force over time to help put that country on a path that makes more sense to the civilized world. Question – way in back. I'm getting the hook. [Laughter] We'll make it the next to the last question.

Q: Thank you. In an environment, where every imperfection in the war on terror and the war against Iraq is a major

11-L-0559/OSD/46319

story, in an election environment particularly and in the world's greatest democracy, how do you sustain a long-term political will necessary to fight the kind of war on terror that you're talking about where the good news is rarely heard. The progress that you've spoken of only comes out in forums like this? How do we do that long-term?

SEC. RUMSFELD: Well, that is just a critical central core question for our society. There is absolutely no way in the world that we can be militarily defeated in Afghanistan or Iraq, or even in the global war on terror, and I say militarily defeated. The only conceivable way that we could lose and [inaudible] think of who wins -- is because of a calculation over time that the cost and the pain in dollars and in human lives is too great and it's not worth it. And if that balance shifted to that point, it would say to the world that there isn't a willingness to sustain that level of effort. [inaudible] you [inaudible] terrorism, were we to do that.

<Audio Gap>

Vietnam war, 58,000 dead. Those are large numbers and they're heartbreaking and anyone who goes out to the field in Iraq to Afghanistan, or goes to Walter Reid Hospital and Bethesda Hospital as I do. You just cannot help but think of the lives not lived, think of the wounded whose lives will be lived totally differently and not ask yourself about the cost. And then if you look down from a satellite on Korea and see what's happening today, the cost in human life today in North Korea, and the energy and the vitality and the success and the opportunities of the people in South Korea, make it worthwhile. And your question goes to democracy -- in a dictatorship, the leadership can do what they want. In a democracy, you have to lead not by command, but by persuasion. And we simply have to find the words to make sure that the people in our country and the people in our coalition and those countries understand that it is worth it, that freedom is important and that it is true that each generation needs to make that sacrifice that we talk about on Memorial Day and that time -- over time and when one looks back, you nod and say, well, my goodness, yes, that was worth it. Of course, it was. But at the time, when you see, as you point out, day after day after day, the drumbeat of negative stories about this and Afghanistan, that in Iraq and the impressions people have which are not balanced. And no historical context. When you think of what went on in Japan, how many years that took to build a democracy that became a bulwark for freedom in the Cold War. In Germany, to turn that fascist regime into a democracy -- amazing accomplishments.

Thomas Jefferson, I think, said about our country, trying to struggle from where we were to a democratic system and it took us how many years? We didn't have a constitution between 1778 and 1789, I guess. And he said, "One ought not expect to be transported towards democracy on a featherbed." And that's true. It is tough. And what's going on in Iraq and Afghanistan today is tough. And it's a bumpy road and it is not a smooth path. And what we need is -- and where do I come out in your question? I come out with we're going to make it. And why do I say that? I say it because our system works. The American people have a good center of gravity. They've got some kind of an inner gyroscope that resets itself. They can be blown by the wind and all overwhelming amount of bad news and be swayed. But down deep inside, the people of this country get it. They know that there are things that are worth fighting for. They know that the values they believe in are worth defending. And they are smart enough and wise enough over time to have the will to sustain that effort. I've got a lot of confidence in them myself. We'll make this the last question. Yes, sir.

Q: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, my name is Barry Wong. I just wanted you to know my brother's served in the Navy Seabees in Iraq from San Diego. But I just want to make a statement, Mr. Secretary, that...

SEC. RUMSFELD: No, no. This is for questions.

Q: Oh, questions. OK. It's a question, then.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Just put a question mark there.

Q: QK. I'll put a question mark there. I'm a lawyer. I can do that. But I want to applaud you for the realignment and I work with the Luke Air Force Base Fifth and the Sixth fighter wing and I just want to let you know that Luke Air Force Base is important to this community, that as you go through the base realignments that you keep the Luke Air Force Base in mind, because we love them. The business community loves them, and we want to keep Luke Air Force Base. And we want to add another mission to the joint strike fighter. We would love to have him here.

SEC. RUMSFELD: Give him the hook! [Laughter]

Q: And Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that you're interested in base realignment and interested in saving bases like Luke Air Force Base? [Laughter] [Applause]

SEC. RUMSFELD: Thank you. [Laughter] Folks, if you see somebody, you know, at an airport, or a restaurant or somewhere walking around in uniform, tell them "Thank you." [Applause]

UNKNOWN: Thank you all for being here. Thank you.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040826-secdef1262.html>

11-L-0559/OSD/46320

<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi?http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/...> 9/1/2004

FOUO

file

September 1, 2004

TO: Gen Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Numbers

847

I'd like to start getting a report for everything since September 11 that combines the number who have died - killed in action, as well as non-combat deaths - and the number who have been wounded. Please show it by country (or area), and add it up. I think it is already over 1100, including Afghanistan.

It seems to me we ought to start using that number, which is more accurate.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090104-2

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Please respond by 9/10

VCJCS/EA DP/9

Closed at
RT on
10 Sep

Dave, FYI Also flowing
up via JSAP

DR
Paul

104 SEP 1 2004

FOUO

OSD 00331-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46321

September 3, 2004

TO: Dr. David Chu
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Tour Lengths

I think we need to do something about tour lengths.

I am convinced one of the problems in this department -- why mistakes are made and why antiquated systems are not modernized -- is because people serve in their positions too short a time. They simply never get their arms around the challenges, problems and tasks that need to be done.

Please get back to me with some ideas as to how this can be fixed.

Be bold.

Thanks,


DHR:ss
090304-9

.....
Please respond by _____

2004

3 Sep 04

September 7, 2004

TO: Les Brownlee
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Schoomaker
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Investigations

I understand that the Army will brief me soon on its investigation of two detainee deaths in Bagam.

I know you share my dissatisfaction that it has taken almost two years to get to this point.

When you brief me on this latest investigation, I'd like, at a minimum, to learn such information as:

- What units were involved, and their training history?
- The leadership at Bagram at the time.
- The relevant reporting relationships.
- What other units were present in the area?
- Regarding detention facilities in Afghanistan, what policies for detention and interrogation were in place then, and what are they now?
- A history of the investigation
- What corrective actions have been initiated?

In addition, I look forward to your recommendations on how to fix the seemingly profound systemic problems in the Army identified in the Kern and Mikolashek reports.

Thanks.

DHR:dh
090304-10

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Please respond by 10/1/04

FOUO

OSD 00333-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46323

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756104

September 7, 2004

TO: Col. Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.*
SUBJECT: Meeting with David Chu

Please arrange a meeting with David Chu regarding longer tours and longer service – time and position, particularly. I also want to discuss Standing Joint Task Forces.

I am convinced this is part of the problem we are having in redeployment, Joint Staff, Abu Ghraib and management of prisons, as well as in intelligence – people are simply not in their jobs long enough.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090704-5

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Please respond by 9/17/04

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05 11 0000

September 8, 2004

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Peter Pace
Lt. Gen. Skip Sharp
Col. Will Grimsley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Force Brief

We delivered the Iraqi Security Force brief to the President today. I know your team worked hard over the past several weeks to sharpen and improve the material. It will be a very useful instrument as we go forward.

Thanks for the good work – now let's focus on monitoring and delivering what we promised.

DHR:ss
090804-2

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Please respond by _____

IRIS

6 SEP 04

FOUO

inspected, and ...

November 30, 2005

I-05/014241

ES-4542

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

D.R.

SUBJECT: Memo on Mongolian Exercise

This memo seems not to answer my question as to what we ought to be doing to help Mongolia to have a successful exercise. Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach: 10125105 SecDef memo to ASD ISA, 11/28/05 ASD ISA Memo to SecDef

DHR:ss
112905-10

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Please Respond By 12/14/05

FOUO

2005-11-30 11:11:11

~~FOUO~~

2005 OCT 25 10:06

OCT 25 2005
I-05/014241
ES-4542

TO: Peter Rodman
CC: Eric Edelman
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Mongolian Exercise

We ought to think of countries we'd like to get involved in that Mongolian conquest exercise.

Thanks.

DHR Jh
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Please respond by November 17, 2005

~~FOUO~~

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25-11-05 10:35 AM

11-L-0559/OSD/46327

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2005 NOV 19 06

INFO MEMO

A/DSD
USDB *W* NOV 23 2005
PD *W* NOV 22 2005
1-05/015134-AP
OS/014241
ES-4542
NOV 21 2005
JMC

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

(b)(6)

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef Question on How to Attain Participation of Other Countries in the Mongolian Multi-lateral Exercise KHAAN QUEST 2006

- (U) **You** asked which countries we would like to see participate in KHAAN QUEST 2006 (next under).
- (U) Mongolia will host KHAAN QUEST 2006 in August. **The** 2006 exercise will be the first held under the auspices of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).
 - o (U) PACOM has invited Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Thailand, Fiji, Tonga, and Australia.
 - o (U) We anticipate Mongolia will request their neighbors, Russia and China, attend the exercise as observers.
 - o (U) Mongolia will have 500 infantry soldiers take part in the exercise. KHAAN QUEST 2006 is designed to support up to 1,000 participants.
- (U) Increasing the number of participating countries **will** help Mongolia to become a hub for regional peacekeeping training and is critical to maintaining troop skills and interoperability.

COORDINATION:

Ms. Mary Beth Long, PDASD/ISA *MFL 11/17*
 Mr. Richard Lawless, DUSD/AP *Has Seen*
 BGen John Allen, PD/AP *JAS*
 ASD/SOLIC: Mr. Quentin Hodgson, 11/15/05
 Joint Staff NEA/SEA: COL Little, 11/16/05
 PACOM J5: CAPT Skinner, 11/15/05
 State PM & EAP: Ms. Rachel Featherstone & Mr. Michael Goldman, 11/15/05

Prepared by: Ms. Suzanne Ross, OSD/ISA/AP, (b)(6)

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OSD 23059-05

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COORDINATION:

Principal Deputy, Asst. Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs: MBC 12/28
(Ms. Mary Beth Long, (b)(6))

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Asian & Pacific Affairs: H/j/r RPL
(Mr. Richard Lawless, (b)(6))

2/9 Principal Director, Asian & Pacific Affairs: H 29 Dec 05
(BGen John Allen, USMC, (b)(6))

Asst. Secretary of Defense, Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict: 12/23/05
(Mr. Quentin Hodgson, (b)(6))

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller: Information Provided, 12/22/05

Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 12/28/05
(Lt Col Phil Hezeltine, (b)(6))

Joint Staff 12/28/05
(Lt Col Kyle Garland, J5 Southeast Asia Division, (b)(6))

PACOM: 12/28/05
(LTC Tim Dunne, PACOM 57, (b)(6))

Department of State: 12/28/05
(Ms. Rachel Featherstone, Pol/Mil Bureau, (b)(6))

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11-L-0559/OSD/46329

10:30

INFO MEMO

A/DSD
USDP *YH* JAN 09 2006
I-05/014241

ES-4542

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs

(b)(6)*WR*
1/5/06

SUBJECT: Memo on Mongolian Exercise

- (U) You asked what the U.S. can do to assist Mongolia in having a successful KHAAN QUEST in 2006 (next under).
- (U) Based on the December 2005 Initial Planning Conference (IPC), planning for this event is proceeding at a good pace:
 - (U) During the IPC, personnel from the Mongolian Armed Forces, PACOM, and ROK National Defense University's Peacekeeping Operations Center developed the scenario of a large-scale humanitarian disaster for the staff-training exercise.
 - (U) Personnel from USARPAC, Alaska National Guard, and Oregon National Guard, and the Mongolian Armed Forces scripted out the scenarios for the field-training exercise.
- (U) One focus of our effort now is to engage additional international partners:
 - (U) Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Fiji, and Tonga, have expressed interest in participating in KHAAN QUEST 2006. We are contacting Canada now.
 - (U) We will work with State, PACOM, and Mongolia to provide suggestions to these nations as to how they might participate. Some initial ideas include:
 - (U) providing strategic lift to bring selected countries to the exercise;
 - (U) funding the upgrade of the Five Hills Training Center in Mongolia where KHAAN QUEST will be held; and,
 - (U) resourcing the observation and participation of international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, in the exercise.

UNCLASSIFIED

Way Ahead:


- (U) To make future GPOI capstone exercises better, we will work with Combatant Commanders to encourage their factoring GPOI activities into their requests for Theater Security Cooperation funding.
 - (U) Although PACOM did budget for KHAAN QUEST 2006, the new requirements to make the exercise a GPOI capstone peacekeeping exercise have resulted in PACOM's having to pull from its O&M funds to support its role in KHAAN QUEST 2006.
- (U) We will suggest defined roles for international partners early on in the planning process for GPOI capstone peacekeeping exercises.

UNCLASSIFIED

11-L-0559/OSD/46331

September 8, 2004

TO: Pete Geren
Gen. Mike Maples

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Thank You

In preparing for my press conference yesterday, the Geren-Maples group produced an excellent information package, which included some very sharp Q & A and a well-organized summary up front. It was very helpful – please pass along my thanks to the folks who worked on it.

As a general comment, the work of your team has been indispensable to helping the Department of Defense through some significant challenges over the past months – well done.

DHR:ss
090804-4

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Please respond by _____

33204

8 SEP 04

September 8, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Arabs in Chechnya

RUSCIA

Please do all you can to find ground truth on the media reports that there were some number of Arab militants among the Chechen forces that took hostages in Beslan.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
090804-5

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Please respond by 9/17/04

8 00 12

September 8, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Myers
Gen. Pace
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Our Korean Allies

We should all be looking for ~~on-the-record~~ places to thank the Koreans for their contributions in Iraq, particularly as they are about to become the third largest contributor of troops after the U.S. and U.K.

Thanks.


DHR:ss
090804-7

.....
Please respond by _____

KOREA

8 SEP 04

September 10, 2004

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Meeting with Chris Cox

Please talk to Chris Cox. He is going to be very involved with the Intel process and he would very much like to talk to you. I told him I would set it up. The sooner, the better because once we end up with a bill we are restricted, now we are not. And, I think your advice would be helpful to him.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091004-7

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Please respond by _____

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10 SEP 2004

OSD 00341-05

September 15, 2004

TO: Gen. Schoomaker
Secretary Brownlee

CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Gen. Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Army Restructuring

As you work to restructure our Army around the Brigade Combat Team concept, I understand we are creating light and heavy BCTs from our light and heavy divisions. Have we given thought to the interchangeability and interoperability of the units so created?

I would be interested to know how you intend to tackle this task – it is clearly central to our efforts to reshape the military in the 21st century.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091504-1

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Please respond by 10/10/04

OSD 00342-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46336

020400

15 SEP 04



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

INFO MEMO

September 23, 2004, 9:30 AM

322

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Mr. R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Army
GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, Army

Brownlee

S

SUBJECT: SNOWFLAKE - Army Restructuring

- Interchangeability and **interoperability** were **fundamental** factors in developing our Infantry and **Heavy Modular** Brigade Combat Teams.
- **Standardized designs for Infantry**, Heavy and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams allow for rapid **reconfiguration** to support Combatant **Commander missions** across the entire **spectrum** of operations - they are **scaleable and tailorable**.
- **Each Brigade** Combat **Team** is inherently combined arms and **has numerous** capabilities (**Signal, Field Artillery, Military Police, Engineer and Sustainment**) to enable **full spectrum** operations. These **Brigade** Combat Teams are standing combined arms **organizations** that require **minimal** augmentation, if **any**.
- **Infantry, Heavy and Stryker** Brigade Combat Teams include receptacles for joint plugs to leverage **capabilities from our** sister services (e.g., joint fires) **which** enhances joint interdependency - central **to our** efforts in reshaping the military for **the 21st** century.

COORDINATION: U.S. Army **Training** and **Doctrine** Command

Prepared By: COL Wesley McClellan (b)(6)

23 Sep 04

15 Sep 04

OSD 00342-05

September 16, 2004

TO: Gen. Schoomaker

c c : Les Brownlee

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Army Tour Lengths

When we talked about your changes we also discussed the length of current Army tours – 12 months in Iraq. I believe you were going to come back to me with a proposal to shorten it to six or nine months. I would be curious to hear what your thinking is.

When you do come back, be sure you include the effect it will have upon rotations over the coming period.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091604-19

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Please respond by _____

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FOUO

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, DC 20310



OCT 1 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Army Rotation Lengths

In response to your September 16, 2004, memo, while the Army would prefer to reduce deployment durations to six or nine months, the increased deployment tempo generated by shorter rotation lengths would have a negative impact on the force at this time.

Army studies and operational experience have shown that in a perfect world, six months is the optimal deployment length, allowing the Army to balance its operational requirements to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders against the stresses separation generates on our volunteer force. However:

- There is insufficient depth within the Army's Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities to reduce rotation lengths below 12 months without producing significant dwell time and remobilization violations.
- Shorter rotation lengths would affect the Army's ability to meet CENTCOM's total requirements for combat forces as well. For instance, at current commitment levels, reducing the Army's combat unit deployment length to nine months could generate a 21 brigade combat team shortfall over the next two years. This problem would only be exacerbated by shortening unit rotations to six months in duration.

Even under the current 12-month rotation policy, meeting CENTCOM's requirements for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 04-06 will require the remobilization of 18 Reserve Component units and the premature redeployment of 61 Active Component units - measures which will impact approximately 4,000 Soldiers. This number is projected to increase to approximately 10,000 Soldiers for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 05-07.

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, US Army
Chief of Staff

R. L. Brownlee
Acting Secretary of the Army

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OSD 00344-05
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11-L-0559/OSD/46339

2004

1 Oct 04

16 Sep 04

September 17, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Afghanistan and Counter-Narcotics Activity

Please get back to me on what we need to do legally to get the Department of Justice and everyone in the U.S. Government aboard on the counter-narcotics activity in Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
091704-3

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Please respond by 10/4/04

Handwritten vertical text on the right margin, partially obscured.

17 SEP 04

September 20, 2004

TO: Larry Di Rita
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Wall Street Journal Editorial

With regards to Friday's Wall Street Journal editorial -- I don't recall ever saying we have to wait until more Iraqi troops are trained. In fact, I said just the opposite.

Gen Myers said it at a press briefing where I was present. Please check to see if that's right .

Attach.
9/17/04 Wall Street Journal Editorial re: The Enemy in Iraq

DHR:ss
092004-14

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Please respond by 9/23/04

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September 20, 2004

TO: Jim Roche
Gen John Jumper

c c : Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
Mike Wynne
Ken Krieg
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Predator and other UAV Production

Please get back to me very soon with a plan to increase production of the Predator and other UAVs, consistent with an understanding of limiting factors (industrial capacity, C2, training of operators, etc.)

Clearly, the Combatant Commanders, especially General Abizaid, can fully utilize more of them.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092004-16

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Please respond by 10/15/04

4528

092004-16

September 24, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Rep. Thaddeus McCotter

Let's have Thaddeus McCotter in sometime with a group of Congressmen. He's impressive.

Thanks.

Attach.
9/23/04 Memo from SecDef re: Congressman in Briefing
Bio for Thaddeus McCotter

DHR:ss
092404-2

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Please respond by _____

023

24 09 04

September 23, 2004

TO: COL Steve Bucci
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Congressman in Yesterday's Briefing

Please give me the name of the congressman who spoke about anarchy in yesterday's House briefing. Please give me his background sheet. He seemed like a smart guy.

Please pass his name to Powell Moore.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092304-8

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Please respond by _____

Sir,

The individual's name is Thaddeus G. McCotter, Rep, 11th Dist of Mich. Legislative Affairs is getting a full Bio.

VIR, COL B

→ ATTACHED

Thaddeus McCotter
R-MICHIGAN



Hometown: Livonia
Born: August 22, 1965;
 Detroit, Mich.
Religion: Roman Catholic
Family: Wife, Rita
 McCotter; three children
Education: U. of Detroit,
 B.A. 1987 (political
 science), J.D. 1990
Military Service: None
Career: Lawyer
Elected: 2002 (First Term)


| Important Issues | Support | Oppose |
|--|---------|--------|
| Iraq use of force (10/11/02) | | |
| Iraq Supplemental (10/17/03) | X | |
| Iraq Supp: Grant Vs Loan (10/16/03) | X | |

| GWOT Travel | Trips | Date |
|-------------|-------|----------|
| Iraq | 1 | 10-11/03 |
| Afghanistan | | |
| GTMO | | |

| Bases / Major Defense Industry |
|--------------------------------|
| None |

Issues and Concerns

- Met with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz in Spring 2004. He has many Caldeans in his District and suggested that they be used as translators.
- Wants the intelligence panels to have more authority over how intelligence is gathered: "Intelligence information is only as credible as the sources. If you have greater access to some of the methods and sources for the intelligence, you could make better assessments." (7/04)
- Co-sponsored - *HR 2797*, to improve the readiness of State defense forces and to increase military coordination for homeland security between the States and the Department of Defense. (8/18/03)
- A self-described conservationist.
- Major Industry in district is auto manufacturing.
- *Assistant Majority Whip.
- Committees: Budget, International Relations, Small Business.
- Won election in 2002 with 57.2% of the vote.



[Home](#)

About Thaddeus

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A life-long resident of southeast Michigan, U.S. Representative Thaddeus McCotter was elected to the 108th Congress in 2002 to represent the citizens of Western Oakland and Western Wayne Counties.

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Despite his status as a Freshman member, Congressman McCotter received a waiver from the Speaker of the House to serve on three key committees: the Budget Committee; the International Relations Committee; and the Small Business Committee. He was also named an Assistant Majority Whip.

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Congressman McCotter has focused on preserving and promoting manufacturing and small businesses, because he knows they form the back bone of our community's economy. He has steadfastly supported Winning the War on Terror and increasing our homeland security; tirelessly fought to reduce taxes and the size and scope of government; and, most importantly, Congressman McCotter has dedicated every effort to listen to and serve his constituents.

Washington, DC

415 Cannon House
Office Building
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20515
202.225.8171 tel
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District


17197 N. Laurel
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Livonia, MI 48152
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Congressman McCotter is a graduate of Catholic Central High School; the University of Detroit; and the University of Detroit Law School. He is a bar admitted attorney by profession. Thaddeus and Rita McCotter, a registered nurse, have three young children, George, Timothy, and Emilia. The McCotter family lives in his home town of Livonia. Congressman McCotter travels to and from our nation's capital every week to serve our community.

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11-L-0559/OSD/46347

September 24, 2004

TO: Powell Moore
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Ops-Intel Session and Testimony

We had a good couple of days on the Hill. The ops-intel session provided a good opportunity to get our message out, and the Global Posture Testimony – while covering a variety of topics – was likewise an excellent forum for the Department.

We all know how hard you and the LA team worked to put together over ten hours of time in front of Congress – thanks for all you do.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-5

.....
Please respond by _____

September 24, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Iraqi Borders

I would like you to put together a team of people to think about what we can do about the borders. I am convinced that if we did a curfew, UAVs or some kind of focus and imposed a penalty on people who are breaking through the borders there would be a deterrent effect.

Let's get some folks thinking about it.

Thanks.

DHR:gs
092404-8

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

IRAN
24 Sep 04

September 24, 2004

TO: Jim Haynes
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Legal Authorities in Afghanistan

Please get back to me with the answer on this legal authorities question in Afghanistan if we need to go after drug labs.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-9

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

Afghanistan

24 SEP 04

September 24, 2004

TO: David Chu
Charlie Abell

cc: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Tapping the Beer Keg

It is very important that we lay out, in a clear and systematic way, how we can “lower the spigot” on the various Service “beer kegs” – in other words, how can we fully tap into our available manpower to use it most efficiently.

We should be able to show where the spigot is located today and how we can lower it over what period of time, using metrics to show the progress we have made already.

We need to know the points of friction that will tend to impede our progress and the steps we need to take to accelerate this process for each of the Services.

I would like to see this brief in about 30 days. Use outside help if you think it useful.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092404-12

.....
Please respond by 24 OCT 04

September 27, 2004

TO: Gen Dick Myers
Gen Pete Pace
David Chu

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Manning for Staffs in Iraq

I would like to see us re-do the charts in the Strategic Overview that show the status of manning the staffs in Iraq. They are somewhat misleading and should be fixed.

Also, we need to make sure that decisions about the level and timing of manning those staffs is managed from here in DC, not by the Services.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-1

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

September 27, 2004

TO: COL Bucci
CC: (b)(6)
Cathy Mainardi
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Dates for the Calendar

Please put the following key dates on my calendar:

- Oct. 9: Afghan Elections
- Oct 9: Australia Elections
- Oct. 31: Ukraine Elections
- Jan. 2005: Iraq Elections

It would be helpful for me to have a list of these, and any other important international election dates.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-16

.....
Please respond by 10/1/04

September 27, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Salafist Network

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, it is interesting that I have never had a briefing by anyone in the interagency process in a PC or an NSC on what the USG battle plans are to go against those centers of gravity.

The Department of Treasury has the finances, and State should have the spiritual networks.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-23

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

10/11
1145

FOUO

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 27, 2004

quest To Sec Def

TO: Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Salafist Network

310.1

If the center of gravity of the global struggle against extremists is the Salafist financial network and the Salafist spiritual network, it is interesting that I have ** 1* never had a briefing by anyone in the interagency process in a PC or an NSC on what the USG battle plans are to go against those centers of gravity.

The Department of Treasury has the finances, and State should have the spiritual ** 2* networks.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092704-23

OSD 00361-05

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

10/1/04

DR 11/11

1 OCT 04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS
THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES

→ SD

Re: ** 1*

Re: ** 2*


On Sept 23 I sent the attached memo to Hadley. He will organize the briefings.

This is why we drafted for you the ^{attached} memo you sent to the President on creating task forces to counter ideological support for terrorism. The President hasn't yet responded to your July 30 memo. Yesterday I pushed Hadley yet again on getting going on it and I think that this time he may be able to get action. OSD 00361-05

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NOFORN~~
Doug Feith

11-L-0559/OSD/46355

September 28, 2004

TO: Doug Feith
CC: Ryan Henry
Andrew Hoehn
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Global Posture Execution

How do you think we ought to execute the Global Posture changes? Should we try to get a retired four-star and make him a deputy assistant secretary to work the problems?

Thanks.

DHR:ss
092804-15

.....
Please respond by 10/8/04

September 29, 2004

TO: Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Security Service Training

Please see attached memo.

What do you think?

Thanks.

Attach.
Memo "Security Service Training for Other Countries"

DHR:ss
092804-19

.....
Please respond by 10/15/04

353

2700-10

~~FOUO~~

September 20, 2004

SUBJECT: Security Service Training for Other Countries

The U.S. Military needs to organize -- to provide security service training for other countries.

The Marine Corps ought to step up and take that role -- but we need a major effort on it -- to get funded and organized to do it.

DHR:ss
092004-32

~~FOUO~~

11-L-0559/OSD/46358

September 30, 2004

TO: David Chu
Powell Moore

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Absentee Ballots

Immediately following the election, please start the process of redirecting the absentee ballot responsibility (The Federal Voting Assistance Program or FVAP), for everyone except the military, to the Department of State.

DoD should handle just the military, since the military is less than half the total. People think of the embassies as the logical place to be helpful on this matter.

Thanks.

DHR:ss
093004-18

.....
Please respond by 10/29/04

01633

01633

205/013876
ES-4462

~~FOUO~~

October 18, 2005

Mexico

TO: Eric Edelman
CC: Peter Rodman
Roger Pardo-Maurer
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*
SUBJECT: Mexico as Major Non-NATO Ally

We need to develop a position on what we *think* of the idea of Mexico as a major non-NATO ally.

DHR bp
101705-28

.....
Please Respond By 11/1705

18 Oct 05


~~FOUO~~

OSD 00386-06

11-L-0559/OSD/46360

~~FOUO~~

January 3, 2005

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 
SUBJECT: Global War on Terrorism Paper

Newt Gingrich looked over your Global War on Terrorism paper and said he thought it was a good start. You may want to talk to him and get some suggestions.

DHR:ss
123104-22 (ts)

.....
Please respond by 1/27/05

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00460-05

11-L-0559/OSD/46361

TAB A
FOUO

11:26

TO: ADM Ed Giambastiani
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Comparison of Defense Expenditures

I looked at this paper you sent on US and Foreign Defense Expenditures. My impression is that the numbers you have for Greece, for example, as a 2.8 percentage of GDP is not correct. There may be other errors as well.

You might want to have someone check it over.

Thanks.

Attach.

VCJCS memo to SD re: Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Defense Expenditures (OSD 22784-05)

DHR:dh
122905-22 (18).doc

Please respond by January 19, 2006

FOUO

Tab A

OSD 00480-06



THE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0000

2015

NOV 23 2005

39
JLH
PPH

21 November 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Comparison of U.S. and Foreign Defense Expenditures

1. A common comparison of defense spending cited in the press is that, in absolute terms, the U.S. spends more than the next "X" countries combined. According to the most recent International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) "Military Balance" report (October 2005), U.S. defense spending totaled \$455.9 billion in 2004, compared with \$454.3 billion for the next fifteen largest spenders combined. Attachment 1 is a list of the top fifty countries from the IISS defense expenditure data (actual outlays where available, vice budget authority).
2. When compared by defense expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the U.S. was tied for 29th in 2004 (up from 47th in 2002). Attachment 2 is a bar chart showing the top fifty countries ranked by 2004 defense spending as a percentage of GDP.

Very respectfully,

E. P. GIAMBASTIANI
vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Analytic

Attachments:

1. Defense Expenditures, Top 50 countries, 2004.
2. Defense Expenditures as a Percent of GDP, Top 50 Countries, 2004.

Copy to: CJCS

Tab A

OSD 22784-05

Defense Expenditures, Top 50 Countries, 2004
Source: IBS, "The Military Balance, 2005 - 2006"

| | | | |
|----------------|----|---------|-------|
| United States | 1 | 455,900 | 3.8% |
| China (PRC) | 2 | 62,530 | 3.7% |
| Russia | 3 | 61,900 | 4.3% |
| France | 4 | 51,000 | 2.5% |
| United Kingdom | 5 | 48,810 | 2.3% |
| Japan | 6 | 45,181 | 1.0% |
| Germany | 7 | 37,700 | 1.4% |
| Italy | 8 | 30,537 | 1.8% |
| Saudi Arabia | 9 | 29,910 | 8.8% |
| India | 10 | 19,047 | 3.8% |
| South Korea | 11 | 16,300 | 2.4% |
| Australia | 12 | 14,310 | 2.3% |
| Spain | 13 | 12,500 | 1.2% |
| Canada | 14 | 11,410 | 1.1% |
| Turkey | 15 | 10,115 | 3.3% |
| Israel | 16 | 8,882 | 8.2% |
| Netherlands | 17 | 8,867 | 1.6% |
| Brazil | 18 | 8,232 | 1.6% |
| Indonesia | 19 | 7,933 | 2.9% |
| Taiwan | 20 | 7,519 | 2.4% |
| Norway | 21 | 6,230 | 0.8% |
| Ukraine | 22 | 5,000 | 1.9% |
| Greece | 23 | 5,000 | 2.8% |
| North Korea | 24 | 5,000 | 23.0% |
| Sweden | 25 | 5,307 | 1.5% |
| Singapore | 26 | 5,042 | 4.7% |
| Poland | 27 | 4,806 | 1.9% |
| Norway | 28 | 4,431 | 1.5% |
| Belgium | 29 | 4,301 | 1.2% |
| Iran | 30 | 4,102 | 2.7% |
| Kuwait | 31 | 3,000 | 7.8% |
| Switzerland | 32 | 3,000 | 1.0% |
| Colombia | 33 | 3,000 | 4.0% |
| Denmark | 34 | 3,500 | 1.4% |
| Egypt | 35 | 3,636 | 4.6% |
| Pakistan | 36 | 3,337 | 3.6% |
| Vietnam | 37 | 3,177 | 6.9% |
| South Africa | 38 | 3,170 | 1.4% |
| Chile | 39 | 3,100 | 3.0% |
| Algeria | 40 | 2,844 | 3.0% |
| Portugal | 41 | 2,830 | 1.0% |
| Mexico | 42 | 2,771 | 0.4% |
| Malaysia | 43 | 2,741 | 2.3% |
| Belarus | 44 | 2,700 | 3.9% |
| UAE | 45 | 2,600 | 2.8% |
| Oman | 46 | 2,503 | 10.0% |
| Finland | 47 | 2,403 | 1.3% |
| Uzbekistan | 48 | 2,400 | 4.9% |
| Austria | 49 | 2,222 | 0.5% |
| Qatar | 50 | 2,000 | 7.2% |

Tab A


Attachment 1

Defense Expenditures as a % of GDP

Top 50 Countries, 2004

Source: IISS, "The Military Balance, 2005-2006"

Dark Blue = Countries also in Top 20 by Absolute Spending



← 29th

Tab A
Attachment 2