

EL SIGLO, Bogota, Colombia
7 March 1970

SOVIET SPIES IN AMERICA

By Eugene Carbonaro, for El Siglo

(Mexico, March 6) The first editions of El Universal, Excelsior and other important Mexican newspapers devoted from six to eight columns in their 4 March issues to give coverage to the spectacular flight of the Soviet typist, Raya Kiselnikova, who escaped from the embassy of her country and sought political asylum from the Mexican government. Among other things, Miss Kiselnikova confessed to the secret police of that country that four members of the consular section, whose names she revealed in secret, spent only eight hours per week in their job of issuing visas, while they spent the rest of their time in secret operations involving Mexican workers and student organizations.

A couple of weeks earlier, the major presses of the country published in clear form several UPI dispatches in which an account appeared of the Colombian labor leaders Marco Tulio Cuevas and Jose Raquel Mercado, the respective presidents of the important federations, UTC and CTC, having openly denounced the Soviet Embassy in Bogota as a center of subversion and espionage that was spreading its influence in the trade unions, and in the training of several hundred Colombian students at the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

These are two more aspects to add to information coming from Europe, according to which, in the course of the last four years -- from 1966 to 1969 -- one hundred sixty-two diplomats and high officials of Soviet and Bloc embassies were expelled from Western countries to which they were accredited because they were accused of interfering in internal affairs, of subversion and espionage. To merely mention the background of each one of these Communist agents would require a thick volume. To cite an example, in Mexico, it is enough to note the expulsion, in March 1969, of the Russian "tourists" Victor Manikoff and Vladimir Sergev, typical secret agents of the Kremlin. The former had been arrested before, in May 1962, in Asuncion, on being surprised in a blatant attempt to provoke rebellion among local workers; later this dangerous individual also appeared in Buenos Aires, in the middle of several rebellious unions that then existed in Argentina, but he was captured by the police and summarily expelled. Naturally he carried no documents nor papers of any kind and he could only be identified by his finger prints. In July of 1966 Sergev secretly entered Brazilian territory. Expelled from there, he suddenly jumped to Canada where there were indications that he was in effect chief of the Soviet espionage network for all Latin America, notwithstanding his designation as "Chief of the International Section of the Central Council of the Labor Union," a title of many words which is merely an attempt to delude and deceive whoever listens to them.

A well-known and honest newspaperman, Carlos Montiel, in an article published February 21, 1969, in the newspaper La Nación of San José, under the title "Two Russian Agitators Expelled from the Country," said that: "After plotting from Ecuador the disturbances of Cali, Colombia to compensate for the failure in bringing about student disorders in those two countries similar to those they provoked for the same time in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, Sergev and Manikoff arrived in Mexico using tourist visas, in order to appear January 15th at the Mexican Workers' Congress, a task they were not able to complete because, working swiftly and surely, the Secretary of Government expelled them from the country." Given these facts, the Colombian labor leaders, Cuevas and Mercado, were right in alerting the authorities and public opinion to the methods that Soviet secret agents use to disguise themselves as "trade unionists" in order to complete their tasks.

The case of Sergev and Manikoff has been cited here a little extensively with the aim of showing how much reason and truth helped Miss Raya Kiselnikova -- who witnessed so much double-crossing, so much trickery and so much treason in a noble and free country that welcomed them with open arms -- in deciding to abandon her fellow countrymen and to seek political asylum in Mexico. Soviet diplomats, in the literal sense of the word, do not exist. The Soviet diplomat, before all else, is a man who has been trained to spy and to foment disorder anyplace in the world that is not his own country. Sergev travelled with impunity through Mexico, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina, thanks to a tourist visa and to the collaboration that he received in every country from his "diplomatic" countrymen. Now is the time for the Latin American countries to begin thinking about the consequences such cooperation and leniency will unquestionably bring them in the future.

EL SIGLO, Bogota
7 March

Los Espías Soviéticos en América

Por Eugenio Carbonaro, para EL SIGLO

(México marzo 6) — Las primeras planas de "El Universal", "Excelsior" y demás importantes diarios de México, destinaron de 6 a 8 columnas en sus ediciones del cuatro de los corrientes, para dar cuenta de la espectacular fuga de la mecanógrafa soviética Raya Kiselnikova, quien escapó de la embajada de su país y pidió asilo político al gobierno de México.

La señorita Kiselnikova, entre otras cosas, confesó a la policía secreta de este país que cuatro miembros de la sección consular, cuyos nombres reveló en secreto, atendían solo ocho horas por semana sus funciones expidiendo visas, mientras dedicaban el resto de su tiempo a operaciones clandestinas en el seno de los sindicatos obreros y de las organizaciones estudiantiles mexicanas.

Un par de semanas antes, los principales rotativos del país publicaron en forma de taquilla unos despachos de la UPI en los que se daba cuenta de que los líderes obreros colombianos Marco Tulio Cuevas y José Raquel Mercado, presidentes de las importantes federaciones UTC y CTC, habían denunciado abiertamente a la Embajada Soviética de Bogotá como un centro de subversión y espionaje que estaba irradiando su influencia en los sindicatos, y adiestrando a 700 estudiantes colombianos en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba de Moscú.

Estos son dos aspectos más que hay que sumar a las informaciones procedentes de Europa, según las cuales en el curso de los últimos cuatro años de 1966 a 1969, ciento sesenta y dos diplomáticos y altos funcionarios de las embajadas so-

viéticas y de los países de su órbita, fueron expulsados de los países de occidente donde se hallaban acreditados acusados de intervención en asuntos internos, subversión y espionaje. Mencionar apenas ligeramente las historias protagonizadas por cada uno de estos agentes comunistas, demandaría un grueso volumen.

Para citar un ejemplo, en México, basta recordar la expulsión de que fueron objeto en este país, en marzo de 1969, los "turistas" rusos Victor Manikoff y Vladimir Sergev caracterizados agentes secretos del Kremlin. El primero de los nombrados había sido arrestado antes, en mayo de 1962, en Asunción, al ser sorprendido en un descarado intento encaminado a provocar la rebelión de los sindicatos obreros locales; posteriormente, el peligroso individuo

apareció en Buenos Aires también en medio de unas revueltas sindicales que por entonces sacudían a la Argentina, pero fue capturado por la policía y expulsado sin contemplaciones. Naturalmente, no lleva documentos ni papeles de ninguna clase y solo pudo ser identificado por sus huellas dactilares. En julio de 1966, Sergev se introdujo clandestinamente en territorio brasileño; expulsado de allí, saltó de repente al Canadá donde se registraron indicios de su estancia en ese país en calidad de jefe de la red de espionaje soviético para toda América Latina, no obstante su investidura de "Jefe de la Sección Internacional del Consejo Central de la Unión Sindicalista". nombre de muchas palabras con las que se busca deslumbrar y desarmar a quienes los escuchan.

Un conocido y veraz periodista, Carlos Montiel, en artículo publicado el 21 de febrero de 1969 en el diario "La Nación" de San José bajo el título "Dos Agitadores Rusos Fueron Expulsados del País", informó que "después de fraguar desde el Ecuador los disturbios de Cali, Colombia, en compensación por su fracaso para montar en esos dos países desórdenes estudiantiles semejantes a los que agitaron por esas mismas fechas a México, Brasil, Argentina y Uruguay, llegaron a México Sergev y Manikoff usando visas

de turismo, para presentarse el 15 de enero en el "Congreso de Trabajadores Mexicanos" propósito que no pudieron cumplir porque, obrando con acierto y oportunidad, la Secretaría de Gobierno los expulsó del país". Dados estos antecedentes, razón tenían los dirigentes obreros colombianos Cuevas y Mercado cuando alertaron a las autoridades y a la opinión pública de su país, sobre los métodos que utilizan disfrazados de "sindicalistas" los agentes secretos soviéticos para cumplir su cometido.

El caso de Sergev y Manikoff ha sido citado aquí un poco extensamente, con el propósito de demostrar cuanta razón y verdad asiste a la señora Maya Kiseelnikova quien ha llorado de tanta dobléz, de tanta tramposería y de tanta traición a un país noble y franco que los acogió con los brazos abiertos, resolvió abandonar a sus compatriotas y pedir asilo político a México. Diplomáticos soviéticos, en el sentido literal de la expresión, no existen jamás. El diplomático soviético, antes que eso, es un

hombre que ha sido adiestrado para espiar y fomentar el desorden en todo lugar del mundo que no sea su propia patria. Sergev paseó su impunidad por México, Canadá, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brasil y Argentina, gracias al visado turístico y a la colaboración que recibió en todas partes de sus compatriotas "diplomáticos". Ya es hora de que los países Latinoamericanos, se pongan a meditar en las consecuencias que tanta condescendencia y blandura habrá forzosamente de traerles el futuro.

EL TIEMPO, Bogota, Colombia
7 March 1970

The Russian Embassies Are Spy Nests

Mexico City -- Raya Kiselnikova, blonde ex-secretary of the Soviet Embassy here, who asked for asylum from the Mexican government on February 9th, affirmed that "Russia has a complete espionage network in Mexico." Since she was granted asylum, the ex-secretary has been kept in seclusion by the Interior Ministry of Mexico until yesterday (Wednesday, March 5), when she held a press conference to explain the reasons why she defected and sought asylum in Mexico.

The newspaper "El Universal" says that Miss Kiselnikova declared, "Russia is spying in Mexico and is seeking to dominate this hemisphere. The Russian diplomats have two missions: their usual, continuing diplomatic function and espionage work on the side."

She added that "they are interested in the political scene, the relations between parties, the student movement, the relations between the government and the people and whatever is of a military nature."

She mentioned Oleg M. Netchiporenko, second secretary of the embassy, as chief of espionage operations in Mexico.

"When a person leaves Russia, he receives precise instructions not to have any kind of relations or friendship with the Mexicans, who value highly their freedom," Miss Kiselnikova said.

She said that all the embassy telephones, including private phones, have listening devices to record conversations and that diplomats and embassy personnel spy and inform on one another.

This lack of freedom, and the fact that she established a close friendship with a Mexican impelled her to defect, the ex-secretary said.

She told the press that the common man could live happily in Russia, but that intellectuals, especially the writers, poets and creative people, are persecuted, except those who are so famous that the government would get into difficulty if it tried to persecute them.

"Although I know that my life is in danger and I know that I can be kidnapped in order to be returned to Russia, I feel, and I have felt in the last two weeks, more at peace than I ever have before. Now I am ready to begin a new life, to work in freedom and to show that I am worthy of the help that has been given to me. I sincerely hope that they [the Russians] will let me live in peace," Miss Kiselnikova declared.

EL TIEMPO, Bogota
7 March 1970

"Las Embajadas Rusas son Nidos de Espías"

Ciudad de México, 6. — Raya Kiselnikova, rubia ex-secretaria de la embajada soviética aquí, quien el 9 de febrero pasado solicitó asilo al gobierno de México, afirmó que "Rusia tiene una red muy completa de espionaje en México".

La ex-secretaria había sido mantenida aislada por el ministerio del Interior de México desde que se le concedió asilo, hasta ayer (miércoles), cuando convocó a una conferencia de prensa para explicar las razones por las cuales desertó y pidió asilo en México.

"Rusia espía en México y busca dominar este hemisferio. Los diplomáticos rusos tienen dos misiones: su cargo

diplomático común y corriente y labores de espionaje al margen", dice el diario "El Universal", que declaró la señorita Kiselnikova.

Añadió que "están interesados en el panorama político, las relaciones entre los partidos, el movimiento estudiantil, las relaciones del gobierno con el pueblo y cualquier cosa de carácter militar".

Mencionó a Oleg N. Metchiporenko, segundo secretario de la embajada, como jefe de las operaciones de espionaje en México.

"Cuando una persona sale de Rusia, recibe instrucciones precisas de no tener ninguna

clase de relaciones ni amistad con los mexicanos, quienes aprecian altamente su libertad", dijo la señorita Kiselnikova.

Manifestó que todos los teléfonos de la embajada, inclusive los privados, tienen aparatos que graban la conversación, y que los diplomáticos y el personal de la embajada espían e informan entre sí.

Esa falta de libertad, y el hecho de que trabó buena amistad con una persona en México, me impulsaron a desertar, dijo la ex-secretaria.

Manifestó a la prensa que el hombre común podría vivir feliz en Rusia, pero que los pen-

sadores, especialmente los escritores, poetas y gentes creativas, son perseguidos, excepto los que son suficientemente famosos y que al castigarlos podrían poner en dificultades al gobierno.

"Aunque sé que mi vida está en peligro y sé que puedo ser secuestrada para ser devuelta a Rusia, me siento, y me he sentido en las dos últimas semanas, más tranquila que nunca. Ahora estoy lista a iniciar una nueva vida, a trabajar en libertad y demostrar que merezco la ayuda que se me ha dado. Sinceramente deseo que ellos (los rusos) me dejen vivir en paz", declaró la señorita Kiselnikova.

EL HERALDO, Mexico City
4 March 1970

COMPLETE ESPIONAGE NETWORK OF RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO

Ex-translator of Diplomatic Delegation Tells of Subversive Work and Seeks Asylum.

The life of Mexico is watched in all its aspects by Russian embassy personnel who, in addition to their official work, spy on each of the aspects of national life: political, student, the government's relations with the people and relations among political elements, as part of the plan for domination and world influence that the Soviet Union has mapped out.

The one who carries out the principal functions of spying on Mexican life is Yuriy Kupliakov, chief of the consular section of the embassy, who has at his command all the diplomatic personnel working in a complete espionage network to which they devote most of their time, and for which they have special listening devices on all the telephones of the embassy and on those of some important Mexican officials.

This was affirmed yesterday by Miss Raya Kiselnikova, ex-employee of the commercial section of the Russian Embassy, in which she was employed as a translator, during a press conference in a well-known hotel here in order to acquaint the Mexican public with the reality of her situation in the country which was misrepresented some weeks ago by different news media when she asked for political asylum in Mexico.

Amid television cameras, microphones and photographic flash bulbs, and showing great calmness in her words and with great fluency in the Spanish language, Miss Kiselnikova declared to the reporters present that the student disturbances of 1968 were in large part influenced by Russian spies who tried to control the movement, in order to use the existing crisis situation to arouse popular reaction against the system of government.

Before the reporters' questions she declared that she had been in Mexico two years, working as a translator, and that since her arrival in Mexico she had been watched and prohibited from making contact with the Mexican people, a rule that all Russian diplomats must obey. Inside the embassy, the atmosphere is one of uneasiness and watchfulness of one another among the personnel. For her, as a daughter of a man considered in his lifetime as a public enemy, she was watched even more carefully on orders of the chief of the consular section.

Two months ago, when she knew that she was going to be sent to Russia, as punishment for her conduct not being in accord with Soviet political interests, and where reprisals on her and her family could be expected, she was advised by Mexican friends that she should seek asylum in Mexico. She added that her wish to live in an atmosphere of freedom -- the freedom that she has known in Mexico -- made her renounce her family, her past life, her friends in exchange

for the opportunity she has obtained to live with confidence and peacefulness, a right that until a short while ago was forbidden to her.

The real situation in Mexico, that she now knows, is totally opposite from what they led her to believe in her own country when she was preparing for her assignment in this city, and that life in Russia does not have even the least bit of freedom such as she has won. The indoctrination that the Russian people receive from childhood precludes their rising up against the system of life imposed by the government.

EL HERALDO, Mexico City
4 March 1970

Completa red de Espionaje de la Embajada Rusa en México

Ex Traductora de esa Delegación Diplomática Relata la Subversiva Labor y Pide Asilo

La vida de México, se encuentra vigilada en todos sus aspectos por los miembros de la embajada Rusa, que además de contar con una misión oficial, espían cada uno de los aspectos de la vida nacional, lo político, la vida estudiantil, las relaciones del gobierno y el pueblo, las relaciones entre los diversos políticos, como parte del plan de dominio e influencia mundial que se ha trazado la Unión Soviética.

Quien ejerce las principales funciones como espía de la vida de México, es Iouri Koupliakov, jefe de la sección consular de la embajada, quien tiene a sus órdenes a todo el personal diplomático trabajando en una completa red de espionaje a la que dedican la mayor parte del tiempo, y para la que cuentan con instalaciones especiales, vigilancia en todos los teléfonos de las embajadas y en algunos otros de funcionarios mexicanos importantes.

Por ISABEL ZAMORANO

Así lo afirmó ayer la señorita Raya Kiselnikova, ex empleada de la sección comercial de la embajada rusa, en la que desempeñaba el cargo de traductora, durante una conferencia de prensa que ofreció en conocido hotel de esta ciudad para dar a conocer al pueblo mexicano, la realidad de su situación en el país, desvirtuada hace algunas semanas por diversos órganos informativos cuando pidió asilo territorial a México.

Entre cámaras de televisión, micrófonos, y flashes fotográficos, y demostrando una gran serenidad en sus expresiones y un gran dominio del idioma español, la señorita Kiselnikova, lingüista y modelo declaró a los reporteros presentes, que los problemas estudiantiles de 1968, estuvieron influidos en gran parte por los espías rusos que trataron de controlar el movimiento, para aprovechar la situación de crisis

existente en el país y provocar reacciones en el pueblo, contrarias al sistema de gobierno.

Ante las preguntas de los reporteros, declaró que desde hace dos años se encuentra en México, desempeñando el cargo de traductora, desde su llegada a México, ha sido vigilada y se le prohibió entrar en contacto con el pueblo mexicano, regla que deben obedecer todos los diplomáticos rusos. Dentro de la embajada, el clima es de desconfianza y de vigilancia de unos para otros. A ella, por ser hija de un hombre considerado en vida como enemigo público, se le vigilaba en forma más estrecha por órdenes del jefe de la sección consular.

Hace dos meses, cuando supo que iba a ser enviada a Rusia como castigo a su conducta y por no convenir a los intereses de la política soviética y en donde le esperaban represalias a ella y

a su familia, fue aconsejada por amigos mexicanos de que pidiera asilo territorial a México. Agregó, que sus deseos de vivir en un clima de libertad, —la libertad que ha conocido en México— la ha hecho renunciar a su familia, a su pasado histórico, a sus amigos, en cambio, ha obtenido la oportunidad de vivir con confianza y tranquilidad, derecho que hasta hace poco le estaba vedado.

Esta realidad mexicana que hoy conoce, es totalmente opuesta a la que le dieron a conocer en su país cuando se preparaba para desempeñar sus funciones en esta ciudad, y señaló que la vida en Rusia, está exenta hasta en los más mínimos detalles de la libertad que ella ha ganado. El adoctrinamiento que recibe el pueblo ruso desde niño, le impide revelarse contra el sistema de vida impuesto por el gobierno.

EL SIGLO, Bogota, Colombia
2 March 1970

SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

by Eugene Carbonaro

In the space of the last four years, from 1966 to 1969, 162 officials belonging to embassies of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries, besides some authorized personnel, were expelled from the foreign countries in which they were stationed, under accusation of espionage, various subversive activities or simply undue interference in politics and internal affairs.

Almost half of the individuals expelled, or some eighty of them, were Soviet citizens with such varied assignments as ambassadors, ministers, commercial attaches, janitors, drivers, cooks and embassy gardeners. Also there were artists, "journalists" from TASS and NOVOSTI, delegates to youth congresses and workers assemblies, "trade union" leaders, etc., etc. The Venezuelan columnist Lorenzo Fernandez, in a paragraph welcomed by his Colombian colleague Iader Giraldo, said, referring to the relations of his country with the USSR, that "the danger of establishing them would not be the ambassador, a gentleman schooled in Soviet diplomacy, who would hold fine receptions in his home, in order that our high livers could eat the best caviar and drink the best vodka there. Rather -- says the Venezuela journalist -- the dangers lie in the chauffeur, the gardener, the cook and the fourth secretary...."

The preceding anecdote is cleverly phrased, but it contains a mighty truth applicable to all countries in the Soviet orbit. Their contribution to global subversion is apparent in the following figures of persons expelled from the western world, during the same period; 19 Czechs, 7 Cubans, 16 Chinese, 25 East Germans, 9 North Koreans and 6 Poles.

According to the figures published by various periodicals and European magazines, the secret activities of the diplomats and Soviet officials is a growing phenomenon, the increase of which can be seen with perfect clarity in the less developed areas of the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. While in 1968 the figure of those expelled climbed to 30, in 1969 it went to 63.

The European counter-espionage services estimate that disguised Soviet agents, who never are discovered, number far more than those who are caught and over all are more skilful and are the true masters of their craft. According to the rigid code of espionage, whoever allows himself to be caught is stupid and deserves no better fortune. Punishment acquires dramatic proportions when it affects spies or Soviet agents, for the least stupid error

can mean for them a shot in the back of the head or condemnation to forced labor for life.

In spite of such drastic measures and the efforts which they make in order to avoid mistakes, in the year 1969 the following Soviet officials were discovered and expelled from countries where they were operating: Mikhail Novikov, NOVOSTI correspondent in Ethiopia; Victor Kopitin, TASS correspondent in Washington; Mikhail Dogomatikh, Pravda correspondent in Kenya; Alex Komiakov, "press correspondent" in Beirut; Alex Puchov, "OIP" agent in Denmark; Victor Matveyev, TASS correspondent in Ethiopia; Vladimir Sergeyeu, "worker delegate" in Mexico; Eugene Kochegarov, "trade unionist," presumed to be a member of the International Union of Telecommunication Workers with headquarters in Geneva; Victor Mednikov, "trade unionist" in Mexico; Vladimir Vasilev, Commercial Attache in Lebanon; Genadi Federenko, Chief of the Commercial Section of the Soviet Embassy in Vienna; Vladimir Sarayev, interpreter at the Permanent Soviet Exposition in Ethiopia; Victor Yeleseyev, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Kenya; Konstantin Monakov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Italy; Vladimir Tiganov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in West Germany and Igor Andreyev, member of the USSR mission at the United Nations.

These expulsions demonstrate that "peaceful coexistence" as predicated by Moscow, are mere words. Soviet espionage is one of the great dangers of the twentieth century as a powerful and growing element and a serious threat to world peace.

EL SIGLO, Bogota
2 March 1970

El Espionaje Soviético en el Siglo XX

Por EUGENIO CARBONARO

En el lapso de los últimos cuatro años, de 1966 a 1969, 162 funcionarios de las embajadas soviéticas y de otros países socialistas, además de algún personal calificado, fueron expulsados de los países extranjeros en que se encontraban, bajo la acusación de espionaje, actividades subversivas diversas o simplemente por intervención indebida en política y asuntos internos.

Casi la mitad de los individuos expulsados, ochenta, eran ciudadanos soviéticos investidos de cargos tan variados como embajadores, ministros, agregados comerciales, porteros, choferes, cocineros y jardineros de embajada, artistas, "periodistas" de la TASS y de la Agencia Novosti, delegados a congresos juveniles y asambleas obreras, dirigentes "sindicales", etc., etc. El columnista venezolano Lorenzo Fernández, en párrafo acogido por su colega colombiano líder Giral

do, dijo, refiriéndose a las relaciones de su país con la URSS, que "el peligro de entablarlas no sería el embajador propiamente dicho, un señor formado dentro de la diplomacia soviética, que haría magníficas recepciones en su casa, para que nuestra "highlight" comiera allí el mejor caviar y bebiera el mejor vodka. Allí —sentencia el periodista venezolano— los peligros son el chofer, el jardinero, el cocinero o el cuarto secretario..."

La anterior anécdota es un decir gracioso, pero encierra una verdad de a puño extensible también a todos los países de la órbita soviética. La contribución de éstos a la subversión mundial es patente en las siguientes cifras de personas expulsadas del mundo occidental, en el mismo lapso: checos 19, cubanos 7, chinos 16, alemanes orientales 3, coreanos 9, polacos 6, y alemanes orientales 22.

Segun cifras publicadas por diversos periodicos y revistas europeas, las actividades clandestinas de los diplomáticos y funcionarios soviéticos es un fenómeno en crecimiento, cuya intensificación se observa con perfecta nitidez en los países menos desarrollados del Cercano Oriente, Asia, Africa y America Latina. Mientras

en 1968 la cifra de expulsados ascendió a 30, en 1969 fue ya de 63.

Los servicios de contra-espionaje europeos estiman que los agentes soviéticos camuflados, que nunca llegan a ser descubiertos, son muchísimos más que los que caen en sus redes y sobre todo más hábiles y verdaderos maestros en su oficio. El rígido código de los espías dice, de quien se deja coger con las manos en la masa, que es un estúpido y por lo tanto merecedor de su suerte. La sentencia adquiere proporciones dramáticas cuando afecta a espías o agentes soviéticos, pues la menor estupidez puede significar para ellos un balazo en la nuca o una condena a trabajos forzados de por vida.

A pesar de tan drásticas sanciones y de los esfuerzos que hacen para no fallar en sus empresas, en el año de 1969 fueron descubiertos y expulsados de los países donde se hallaban, los siguientes funcionarios soviéticos: Micaíl Novostikov, corresponsal de "Novosti" en Etiopia; Victor Kopitin, corresponsal de la "Tass" en Washington; Micaíl Dogomatikh, corresponsal del diario "Pravda" en Kenya; Alex Komiakov, "corresponsal de prensa" en Beirut; Alex Puchov,

agente de la "OIP" en Dinamarca; Victor Matveyev, corresponsal de la "Tass" en Etiopia; Vladimir Sergeyeu, "delegado obrero" en Mexico; Eugeny Kochegaroff, "sindicalista", presunto miembro de la Unión Internacional de Trabajadores de Telecomunicaciones con sede en Ginebra; Victor Mednicoff, "sindicalista", en Mexico; Vladimir Vasilev, Ataché Comercial en la República del Líbano; Genadi Federenko, Jefe de la Sección Comercial de la embajada soviética en Viena; Vladimir Sarayev, intérprete de la Exposición Permanente Soviética en Etiopia; Victor Ueliseyev, primer secretario de la embajada soviética en Kenya; Constantin Monakov, primer secretario de la embajada soviética en Italia; Vladimir Tiganov, primer secretario de la embajada soviética en Alemania Federal, e Igor Andreyev, miembro de la misión de la URSS ante las Naciones Unidas.

Estas expulsiones demuestran que la "coexistencia pacífica" predicada por Moscú, son meras palabrerías. El espionaje soviético, es una de las peores lacras del siglo XX como poderoso factor de distensiones y grave amenaza para la paz mundial.

SECRET

100-Year-Old Lenin Claims a new Victim? In the mysterious closed society of the Soviet Union, firings of officials always give rise to a wide range of speculation over whether the dismissals might be the prelude to a large-scale purge. Such was the case with the recent ouster of the Soviet Union's chief propagandist, Vladimir I. Stepakov, and three other highly placed propaganda officials. No one knows for certain why Stepakov was dismissed, but a very credible speculation is that the dullness of his Lenin centennial propaganda and the boredom and cynicism it generated in the Soviet public cost him his job. (See the attached reprints from *Time* magazine, 20 April, and a *New York Times* article of 10 April.) [FYI: The third article attached has been put together by Headquarters from four U.S. Embassy dispatches of "Limited Official Use" classification, and attributed to "Western news correspondents in Moscow." They may be used without restriction.]

Addendum for Lenin. In the attached reprint from *Atlas*, April 1970, is a translation of an article which originally appeared in the newspaper *L'Espresso* of Rome. It was an interview with the British authority on Soviet affairs, Robert Conquest who speculates on what Lenin's reactions would be were he alive today -- would he accept or reject the present Soviet system? Conquest's analysis is highly useful for illustrating the mediocrity of the present Soviet leadership and its detrimental effects on the development of Soviet society. He does this by comparing the present Soviet leaders with Lenin, but at the same time Conquest succeeds in discrediting Lenin as well.

SECRET

NEW YORK TIMES,
10 April 1970

Moscow Drops Criticism Drive; Key Officials Reported Ousted

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 9—The Soviet Union is nearing Lenin's centenary with a sudden shift in the political atmosphere that has stirred an unusual amount of speculation in the Western diplomatic community.

With less than two weeks to go before the anniversary celebrations, the Soviet press has abruptly ended a three-month campaign of criticism of a lagging economy and has apparently embarked on a more positive drive extolling model factories as examples.

Western diplomats have heard that leading propaganda officials have been ousted for having gone too far in the criticism campaign. Others have said that the officials were replaced as part of a consolidation of the entire propaganda apparatus into a single agency.

[According to United Press International, the new propaganda chief will be Stepan V. Chervonenko, ambassador to Czechoslovakia. The news agency said top Soviet officials in radio-television, publishing, and motion pictures had also been replaced.]

No changes have been officially announced, but Soviet sources have acknowledged that the party's propaganda chief, Vladimir I. Stepanov, has been named to fill the long-vacant post of ambassador to Communist China.

The sudden shift in the information media combined with the officially reported illnesses of four members of the party's ruling Politburo, has persuaded some diplomats that something unforeseen has happened. There is speculation that Leonid I. Brezhnev, the party leader, is preparing the way for an imminent change in the make-up of the Politburo.

These diplomats and journalists contend, more on the basis of intuition than hard evidence, that Mr. Brezhnev ordered the change in political atmospherics to prevent any Politburo changes from appearing as desperate acts to salvage the country from economic disaster.

But a majority of diplomats seem to regard the new tone as normal preliminaries for the Lenin centenary on April 22, when the party presumably will stress the achievements of the Soviet Union.

They say that the logic of events makes dramatic changes before the Lenin celebrations doubtful. They further contend that there is no evidence to dispute that Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin, President Nikolai V. Podgorny, Mikhail A. Suslov, and Aleksandr N. Shelepin are genuinely ill and perhaps resting for the celebrations, which will reach a high point on April 21 with a major meeting in Moscow.

These diplomats believe that there will be some political changes this year, probably by the time of the 24th party congress, likely to be held in October. They assert that it is the style of the current leadership to make changes in an orderly fashion, unlike the unpredictability of past leaders, and the party congress is the appropriate place to carry them out.

It is regarded as virtually a foregone conclusion that Arvid Pelshe, at 70 the oldest man on the 11-man politburo, will retire. Since Mr. Kosygin is 66, Mr. Suslov 67, and Mr. Podgorny 66, few diplomats would be surprised if any or all of them chose to turn their jobs over to younger men.

Mr. Brezhnev is 64 but appears dynamic and not looking for a rest.

Any changes in personnel are not expected to alter the basic problems facing the Soviet leadership. The most critical are in the economic sphere—the lack of dynamism in the economy, the slow adaptation of

the system to technological change, manpower problems, and the inadequate supply of consumer goods and services.

The recent press campaign, started at Mr. Brezhnev's apparent initiative last December, underscored these problems anew. But there are signs that the party propagandists went further than Mr. Brezhnev intended.

So many people and institutions were criticized that there were signs of disillusionment developing, some diplomats said. Not only was grumbling increasing, but many intellectuals were spurred by the frankness of the criticism to speak and write about what they regarded as the basic flaws in the system.

Propaganda Aides Shifted

MOSCOW, April 9 (UPI) — Nikolai N. Mesyatsev, former director of Soviet radio and television, has been named ambassador to Australia, diplomatic sources said today.

Mr. Mesyatsev was one of four officials who last week were removed from key information posts.

The chairman of the propaganda Department in the party's ruling committee, Vladimir S. Stepanov, was named ambassador to Peking. Diplomatic sources said he would be replaced by Stepan V. Chervonenko, a former Ukrainian party secretary who is ambassador to Prague.

Another official, Nikolai M. Mikhailov, chairman of the State Committee on Publishing, has retired on pension. He was in effect the country's chief literary and press censor.

A fourth propaganda expert, Aleksei V. Romanov, chairman of the State Committee on Cinematography, was also removed to be appointed to an undisclosed post.

The officials were reported to have been removed because they failed to cope with propaganda connected with the Lenin centenary celebrations.

TIME MAGAZINE,
20 April, 1970

That Puzzling "Politburo Plague"

THE Soviet Union commemorated International Health Day last week, but the timing could hardly have been worse. No fewer than five of the eleven full members of the Politburo were reported to be incapacitated by various ailments.

Confined to hospitals or to their homes were Premier Aleksei Kosygin, President Nikolai Podgorny, Communist Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov, Trade Union Leader Alexander Shelepin and Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyansky. Such widespread contagion within the U.S.S.R.'s ruling body—some spoke of the "Politburo plague"—revived last month's rumors of a Kremlin shake-up (TIME, March 23). It is, of course, medically possible (if statistically implausible) that all are genuinely ill, especially in view of the advanced age of some of the patients: Kosygin, Podgorny and Suslov are all over 65. But many analysts speculated that Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev, lately seen to be fit and cheerful, was consolidating his position, and that some, if not all, of the disabled leaders were suffering from maladies that were more political than physiological.

Several experts in the West theorized that a decision to oust some of the top leaders has already been made, perhaps at a secret Politburo meeting rumored to have been held on or around March 30. After that date the five Politburo members were conspicuously absent from several state occasions and began canceling travel plans. According to this argument, the announcement of the ousters, which must be formally approved by the Central Committee, is being delayed until after next week's mammoth Lenin centennial celebrations. Stories are already circulating in Moscow that a meeting of the committee for this purpose may be imminent.

Under a Blanket. Speculation about important shifts in the Kremlin was reinforced last week by the dismissal of at least four top Soviet officials in charge of ideology, propaganda and culture. Most notable was the demotion of Vladimir Stepanov from head of the powerful Agitation and Propaganda Depart-

ment of the Central Committee to the ambassadorship in Peking.*

Amidst the ideological trumpeting and fanfares preceding the Lenin anniversary, such a purge of the nation's top ideologists sounded a discordant note, to say the least. Some analysts saw a connection between the dismissals and the Politburo illnesses, especially since some of those fired are associated with Shelepin and all come under Suslov's authority. In a biting analogy, British Sovietologist Leopold Labedz observed that "the dogs are fighting under a blanket, but all we can see is the blanket moving. We don't know which dog has his teeth in which other dog." Other specialists point out that such clean sweeps of party and government agencies in the post-Stalin era have always taken place after, not before a change in the top leadership. Still others, however, believe that the propaganda officials were punished for failures, most notably for so overselling the Lenin celebrations that they have become a bore to many Russians.

Signs of trouble in the Kremlin began mounting after Dec. 15, when Brezhnev made a secret speech to the Central Committee about the lagging Soviet economy. Since his predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, was ousted principally because of poor economic performance, Brezhnev took care to blame economic planners and managers for the failures. To many Sovietologists, the postponement of the next Communist Party Congress from this month to an indeterminate date late in 1970 or even 1971 suggested high-level disagreements. Said Yale's Wolfgang Leonhard: "It means either that the leaders can't agree on policies or that there's profound disarray in the Kremlin."

* Another official removed from his post was Aleksei Romanov, chairman of the State Cinematography Committee, better known as the former Soviet intelligence officer who denounced Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1945 and was thus responsible for sending the great novelist to prison and exile for eleven years.

There was some evidence that Brezhnev was trying to shore up his power. He was the only Politburo member to review the massive army maneuvers in Byelorussia last month and was photographed with the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei Grechko, prominently at his side. It seemed that, as party General Secretary, he was asserting his position as first among equals in the Politburo and pointing to the support he personally commands in the Soviet army. Kremlinologists were also struck by the fact that Brezhnev, on his return to Moscow from a three-day trip to Budapest last week, was met at the railway station by Grechko, Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, Commander of the Warsaw Pact forces, and Secret Police Chief Yuri Andropov. Such a turnout, which would ordinarily pass unobserved, seemed to indicate the source of Brezhnev's present strength.

Kremlin Silence. One indication of a possible change in leadership is that the Kremlin has not moved to halt the rumors by denying them. Another way to quash the rumors would be to rouse the sick Politburo members from their beds long enough for them to gather at some official occasion. Just such an occasion was provided last week at a Kremlin party for Soviet cosmonauts. Only one of the ailing leaders felt well enough, in body or spirit, to put in an appearance. He was Shelepin, who looked pale and wan.

There is a possibility that the collective leadership is still intact and that the propaganda apparatus was reorganized because of failures on the part of specific officials rather than as part of a titanic power struggle. In spite of disagreements about who is doing what to whom, however, most specialists in the West agreed that something certainly seemed to be brewing in the Kremlin. They also agreed that a Kremlin shake-up would not mean a drastic change in the present rigid and repressive Soviet policies at home and in Eastern Europe, but simply a more vigorous application of those policies. In other words, even if there are major changes in the cast, the new players are likely to follow roughly the same script.

"MNE OSTOLETILO"

With respect to the overblown and artificial fanfare surrounding the year-long preparations for the Lenin Centenary, Western newspaper correspondents in Moscow have noted the growing boredom of the general populace and the cynicism of the educated Russian public. Some evidence of the apathy of the Soviet public toward the Great Event:

Checking on Soviet press descriptions of huge enthusiastic crowds attending the Moscow Central Exhibit Hall (Manezh) display of 3,000 works by Moscow artists honoring Lenin, reporters have repeatedly found it sparsely attended, and have ventured the guess that by the time the exhibit is over, there will have been more paintings in Manezh than viewers.

* * *

The official Soviet news agency TASS boasted on 18 March this year that there were 1,600 separate lecture series being conducted in Moscow on Lenin themes. Considering the stereotyped, cliché-ridden nature of all verbiage concerning Lenin this year, it is little wonder that on that same 18 March, G.N. Golikov, a leading Party historian, giving a well-advertised lecture at the Central Lecture Hall, drew an audience of ... 12! The only live aspect of the event was the question period at the end of his presentation. (Golikov had made disparaging remarks about books by the eminent British historian E.H. Carr and by former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, George Kennan):

Question: "You mentioned Carr, Kennan, Sukhanov and Milyukov. Are their books published in the USSR?"

Answer: (Hemming and hawing) "Milyukov and Sukhanov were translated at one time into Russian in Berlin. We do not publish them here."

Question: "At the 1957 meeting of Communist Parties there were some references to the applicability of Lenin's theories to the world as a whole. Why were these dropped from the documents of the June 1969 meeting?"

Answer: "I'd have to have both sets of documents in front of me to answer your question."

* * *

On 21 November 1969, Soviet film director Yuri Karasev lectured on his latest film about Lenin. In the course of it, several of the audience got up and walked out and in the question and answer period which followed the lecture

several needling questions were raised:

Question: "In your talk, you mentioned only Lenin's good points. Isn't it true that in fact Lenin was a man like the rest of us, like you and me with strengths and weaknesses?"

Answer: "No! Lenin was not a man like you and me. Lenin had no weak points...." (and he went on until the audience began to laugh at the absurdity of the whole show).

A questioner asked why the fate of members of a political party, the Socialist Revolutionaries, in opposition to Lenin's Bolshevik Party had not been shown in the film. After Karasev answered vaguely, someone shouted: "What happened to [Socialist Revolutionary] Spiridonova?"

Answer: "She was also freed. In 1942 she was shot after being released from prison (laughter in the hall). I don't really know too much about it. Ah-h-h, the Germans shot her."

* * *

There is a Russian expression: "Mne nadoyelo" meaning "I'm fed up." The Russians have now varied this to give expression to their disgust with the Lenin Centenary hoopla: "Mne ostoletilo" [from "sto" = 100 and "let" = years] meaning "I have been centenaried up to the ears."

atlas/APRIL 1970

HAPPY BIRTHDAY, VLADIMIR!

An Assortment of thoughts on the state of the Soviet Union upon the occasion of Lenin's 100th birthday.

WHAT WOULD LENIN THINK OF RUSSIA TODAY?

Translated from L'ESPRESSO, Rome

The Soviet Union will celebrate the centennial of Lenin's birth on April 22. If there is any Westerner with the credentials to speculate on what Lenin's feelings might be today, it is probably Britain's Robert Conquest. He is a former professor of Soviet affairs at Columbia University and the London School of Economics and the author of a multitude of authoritative works, including *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* and *Russia After Khrushchev*. Francesco Russo, London correspondent for Rome's popular weekly *L'Espresso*, talked with Conquest recently, leading off the interview with this tantalizing question:

Q. If Lenin were alive again today, what would he be likely to accept or reject in the present Soviet system?

A. Of all the men who have ruled Soviet Russia, the present leaders are the lowest in caliber. Lenin would recognize the incredible mediocrity and narrowmindedness of the group of men in power—and he certainly would never approve of that, no matter what he might think of everything else.

It is true that in the last year of his life, when he was critically ill, Lenin realized that somewhere a wrong turn had been taken, although he put the blame not on the dictatorship but on the bureaucratization of the system.

But if Lenin were to return today and see that fifty years after the revolution the party had still failed to put down democratic roots, and that it continues to operate as a mechanism whose function is to impose the will of a limited and mediocre group of leaders, then I think he would look at the situation from the Marxist point of view.

It is true that Lenin himself departed from classical Marxism when he seized power because Russia at that point did not have the conditions that Marx had said were necessary for a socialist regime; that is, it had neither a fully developed industry nor a vast and politically educated proletariat. Lenin recognized this and said that he was assuming power in Russia until all Europe became socialist, an event he expected to take place within a year or two. And Europe as a whole had enough industry and a large enough proletariat for a continental socialism, even if it included underdeveloped sectors like Russia.

But Lenin did not relinquish power when he saw that there would be no European revolution; instead, gradually, he conceived the idea of developing industry and the proletariat from above, in that way creating *a posteriori* the conditions that were supposed to have existed to begin with.

Marxist or not, this was a new

development. But today Lenin would have to admit that both industry and proletariat have been in existence for quite a while. Therefore there is no longer any need for this primitive form of government. I don't think he would speak one hundred per cent as a "liberal," but I'm quite sure he would think the Russian proletariat was worthy of some degree of political freedom.

Q. What would Lenin have thought of Dubcek's experiment? Doesn't the Czechoslovak "new course" resemble the type of proletarian democracy that he originally had in mind?

A. I think your question has two aspects. If Lenin had regarded Russia as the leader of the socialist world, he wouldn't have hesitated to bring a rebellious socialist state into line with whatever means was necessary. But there is a possibility that Lenin might have felt that the Soviet model was no longer valid; in this case he certainly would have disapproved of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The question that naturally occurs here is this: was Dubcek acting as a Leninist? I think that Lenin would not have recognized as his own the new type of communism that was developing in Czechoslovakia; we must remember that Lenin thought the communist revolution in the West would be achieved with parties

of the Soviet type in every country, and it was according to this idea that he divided the left all over the world. Therefore he would have concluded that Dubcek's communism was different from his and would have disapproved of Prague as well as of Moscow. However, the degeneration of the Soviet system might have led him to conclude that Dubcek-style reforms were necessary.

Q. What would Lenin have thought of the treatment that Pasternak, Daniel, Sinyavsky, Solzenitsyn and so many other dissenting intellectuals in Russia have suffered? You told me that Lenin thought party literature should be subject to party control.

A. Yes, party literature, but not true and proper literature. When the Soviet leaders quote Lenin to justify the party's control of literature, they are cleverly manipulating a quote out of context. Lenin was talking only about propaganda. He did not want to subject real literature to party control: the doctrine of socialist realism was invented afterwards. It is true that politics had abso-

lute priority for him, but, even so, the arts were given a great deal of freedom and at that time went through a period of tremendous experimentation.


Of course we mustn't forget that Lenin was also capable of falsehood, though always in the party's interest, like a general who spreads lies to win a campaign. When involved in a conflict, he did not always play an honest role; what mattered to him was to win the argument, not to stick to the truth. All this, however, is very different from the suppression of debate on the most important political and social topic in Russia—that is, what happened or could have happened during Stalin's era. I don't think Lenin would have tried to keep secret a question so fundamental to Russian life. Perhaps he would have expelled from the party all those who had compromised themselves with the Stalinist regime and then perhaps founded another party. Not for moral reasons but for intellectual and political ones.

Let us ask this: what responsibility does Lenin bear for the persecution of the intellectuals? In 1918 Rosa Luxemburg told Lenin

he was making a big mistake in suppressing freedom of speech and free elections. She was in favor of these liberties, she said, not for reasons of abstract justice, but because, without the freedom to speak, to publish or to read, "life dies." This, in my opinion, to return to my first point, is why the quality of the Soviet leaders has dropped so much in the last fifty years. They have become mentally paralyzed because of the lack of antagonists able to express themselves freely. Of course Lenin put limits on freedom of expression. But his actions against the formation of new groups date from after the civil war. During the civil war freedom of debate on political questions was allowed within the party, though once a political policy had been approved it had to be accepted. At first dissident groups were tolerated—they were only forbidden afterwards. In any case, it is very hard to deduce from what he did then what he would have done fifty years later. Lenin was an intellectual: today he would realize that something is wrong and that Solzenitsyn is telling the truth. Remember that Lenin was never afraid of dividing the party. When he was sure he was right, he split the party in two even when only ten were on his side and fifty against. I don't think he would recognize the Bolshevik Party in today's Communist Party in Russia. He would think that the bureaucratization of the party which he deplored at the beginning had crystallized into a "new class," to use Djilas' expression.

Q. When the Soviet leaders present themselves as the repository of traditional Leninism, are they consciously betraying Lenin, or are they acting in good faith?

A. It's hard for me to guess what is in the minds and consciences of the Soviet leaders. But I think that, all in all, they are in good faith, which gives us an idea of the level of their intelligence. Their education and training is inadequate in many areas.



From WIR BRUCKENBAUER, Zurich

Q. China, of course, would be a new phenomenon for Lenin.

A. I'd say that China is even less Leninist than Russia. No matter what one says about Russia, the party is the dominant factor, as Lenin intended it to be; even if it is a rusty, inadequate machine, it works in the traditional manner of political power. In China the Cultural Revolution has reduced the state to the personal and charismatic dictatorship of Mao Tsetung, who has in effect neutralized the party mechanism and instead built up his Red Guards (they have nothing in common with a Leninist party, but are more like a youthful militia) and, in particular, the army.

The same thing has happened in Cuba. Castro has the party, but it doesn't do much more than carry out administrative orders. The real mechanism of power lies in Castro himself when he appeals to the masses over television, and in the army and other forces. Here again we have a charismatic dictatorship. There is also something of the sort in the new so-called socialist countries like Algeria and Egypt.

Q. What is your evaluation of Lenin as a politician and as an interpreter of history? To what extent did he contribute to the creation of the world in which we live?

A. I think that Lenin's main contribution was the centralized totalitarian party. This new machine, or an imitation of it, holds power in a great many countries. In the past dictatorships were temporary expedients, and parliamentary democracy was commonly held to be the most highly evolved political system. This is

no longer so. Now the mystique of the one-party state is widespread. It is not just a means of governing the state in a disciplined way, by a single authority; it is a method that claims superiority over the old democracy.

I believe that nowadays Lenin exists in the popular imagination as an alien figure, a man with a rather curious but interesting appearance, with a face that drew attention to itself—but mainly as the romantic and utterly implacable enemy of capitalism. But even here people disagree. There are those who say that capitalism has failed because all that it has produced is a society of consumption; but Lenin considered capitalism a failure because during his lifetime it was unable to provide the worker with a minimum of comfort or convenience. Today the rich young American student who despises capitalism is alienated, hates work, etc. These were not the reasons for which Lenin hated capitalism. The young rebel of today detests institutions—he is an anarchist. But Lenin was the opposite of an anarchist. Of course the young people make the same mistake when they talk about China and Cuba. Cuba has strict social discipline; it is an intensely puritanical country. Drugs are not allowed and, at the University of Havana, not even beards are permitted. But for today's rebellious youth, Lenin is no more than a figurehead and not an object of much thought. This, of course, does not apply to authentic communists or to real intellectuals, but it is true that to many vague enemies of society, Lenin is more of an object of a superstitious cult than a

From AUX ECOUTES, Paris

Ending

genuine political figure—a cult which is more characteristic of the Middle Ages than of the modern world. But no one will take his place—not Mao, Castro or Guevara, and certainly not the grey bureaucrats in Moscow. For he represents an implacable force against what the young people consider to be the enemy of their desires in life. By Francesco Russo

SECRET

Cuba's Failure as a Socialist State. Against the backdrop of Cuba's current all-out effort to harvest ten million tons of sugar, the attached excerpts, with translation, of René Dumont's new book *Is Cuba Socialist?* is of particular interest. (These first appeared in the 31 March issue of *Jeune Afrique*, with a brief introductory comment (also included) by the *Jeune Afrique* economic editor, Gerard de Beaurepaire.) Dumont, who believes in socialism, who was sympathetic to the Cuban revolution in the beginning and who has studied closely the Cuban agricultural situation, has now delivered an indictment of the Cuban regime based on its mismanagement of the economy, its dependence on the military complex as the most effective institution to run the country and the lack of any popular influence on the government. In agriculture especially, the author found that repeated mistakes, inefficient methods and general lack of organization make a ten-million-ton sugar harvest impossible. (According to a Havana Radio broadcast on 11 April, the sugar harvest was then running behind schedule. The six-million-ton mark was to have been reached by 3 April, and by 10 April it was still over 300,000 tons short of that figure.

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SECRET

JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris
31 March 1970

CUBA

est-il socialiste ?

par René Dumont

René Dumont — qui a aujourd'hui soixante-six ans — s'est taillé de par le monde une solide réputation de « critique » et de « pessimiste ». Ses partis pris agacent. Ses conseils exaspèrent. Si sa compétence en agronomie est mondialement reconnue, et respectée, ses suggestions concernant la marche d'une économie socialiste ou l'articulation des structures de décision ont toujours reçu un accueil partagé. Après « L'Afrique noire est mal partie » — publié en 1962 — de nombreux gouvernements africains l'ont déclaré « persona non grata ».

A Cuba, Dumont est également attendu et redouté. Fidel Castro l'a invité personnellement trois fois : en 1960, en 1963 et, la dernière fois, en juin 1969. Sur le point de repartir pour Cuba, Dumont avait l'idée d'intituler son second livre sur l'expérience cubaine : « Cuba ou les quatre périodes d'un socialisme original ». Un mois plus tard, après son étude sur place, il changeait de titre : « Cuba est-il socialiste ? ». René Dumont ne cherche pas à le cacher. Il est revenu déçu, pessimiste, inquiet pour l'avenir. S'il se range toujours dans le camp des fidèles de la révolution cubaine, il n'entend pas que le droit de critiquer ses amis lui soit contesté.

En 1964, René Dumont dédiait « aux Algériens » son premier livre sur Cuba (« Cuba, socialisme et développement »). En 1970, il n'est pas inutile que les Africains, qui cherchent toujours à s'inspirer du modèle cubain, lisent et méditent « Cuba est-il socialiste ? », à paraître ces jours-ci aux éditions du Seuil (collection « Politique » - 248 pages - 5 F). A travers ce livre — où se mêlent d'une manière parfois trop touffue l'anecdote, l'expérience vécue et le jugement de valeur — René Dumont a retracé la tentative de construction du socialisme à Cuba depuis la période

de « la rébellion généreuse et romantique » jusqu'à la période actuelle, celle des « dures réalités » en passant par le stade de « la planification centralisée et bureaucratique » et celui de « la construction du communisme ».

Finalement, à la question qui est au cœur du problème (« Cuba est-il socialiste ? »), René Dumont — que l'on sent partagé tout au long de cette étude entre ses sympathies pour les Cubains et son idéalisme critique qu'il appelle sa conscience professionnelle — répond par des constatations que beaucoup trouvent très sévères : l'économie se militarise chaque jour davantage, le culte de Fidel se transforme en néo-stalinisme, une élite « bienveillante » accumule les privilèges, etc.

De ce livre, « Jeune Afrique » s'est assuré la possibilité d'en publier, le premier, de larges extraits.

■ G. de Beaurepaire

une agriculture qui se militarise

L'échec des plans spéciaux

La ferme d'Etat restait encore une exploitation agricole diversifiée, par bien des traits traditionnelle. Cuba recherche les formules d'exploitation les plus modernes, celles des Etat-Unis, de l'agriculture industrielle à très grande échelle, pouvant utiliser notamment l'aviation (semis, épandages d'engrais, d'herbicides, de pesticides...).

Vers la fin de 1967, il a donc été décidé d'élargir à l'échelle de toute l'île la conception des plans spécialisés, dont nous allons signaler des échecs. Après l'autonomie alimentaire de chaque province, visant à réduire les transports et pertes en route, on cherche à localiser chaque production à côté de son usine de transformation, sinon de son port d'exportation. On vise en somme la généralisation d'un complexe de type « grande plantation de canne liée à sa centrale sucrière ».

Nous avons déjà noté la priorité absolue accordée à la canne à sucre ; viennent, en seconde ligne, la production laitière et les œufs, à côté des plantations pour l'exportation : surtout agrumes, café, ananas. En dernier lieu seulement arrivent les cultures vivrières pour l'alimentation locale, et la production de viande. Sur ce canevas général, esquissé par le bureau politique et précisé par la junte centrale de planification, une carte de répartition des cultures dans toute l'île vient d'être établie, surtout sur la base de l'étude des sols, du relief et de l'eau d'irrigation disponible...

L'histoire de ces « plans Fidel », qui furent tous très coûteux, est plutôt une longue suite d'échecs que de réussites. Le plan horticole de Pinares de Mayari a été établi sur des terres ferrugineuses, trop filtrantes, sujettes à l'érosion, inaptés aux cultures maraîchères, qui sont en voie de latérisation, qu'il ne faut pas toucher : les forêts de pins sont ici mieux à leur place. Le plan café de San Andrés de Caguabo, province de Pinar del Rio, où l'on se proposait de passer tout de suite au communisme, a échoué. J'ai noté à l'est de La Havane, sur des coteaux calcaires non irrigables, des plantations de café qui ne recevaient guère plus d'un mètre de pluie, avec de trop longs mois de sécheresse. En 1969, j'ai retrouvé près de Bayamo des dizaines d'hectares de vignes bien mal en point, car plantées dans ces

argiles noires imperméables, où nous noterons plus loin l'échec des bananes et de la canne à sucre. Près de Sancti Spiritus, des coteaux mieux drainés étaient plantés en vigne, mais lors de mon passage on avait mis près d'un kilo d'engrais à chaque pied, tout concentré contre le cep, ce qui allait le brûler à la première pluie. J'espère qu'on l'a depuis semé à la volée, comme je l'ai conseillé, sur tout le vignoble. En 1965, ce sont d'immenses élevages de chèvres, en 1966, de lapins, qui doivent être ensuite plus ou moins abandonnés. En 1967-1968 on plante à travers toute l'île des pois d'Angole, les *Gandoul*, qui ne donnent pas grand-chose et que le bétail refuse ; les hommes aussi, quand on leur en propose les grains. Le *kudzu* tropical ne donne pas les rendements miracle que l'on avait espéré...

(Chapitre III, pp. 63, 64, 65 à 67.)

Insuffisance et précipitation

L'organisation de l'économie cubaine est telle qu'il est devenu à peu près impossible d'établir des calculs économiques assez valables pour mieux l'orienter, et tenter d'esquisser un ordre de priorité plus rationnel des investissements ; ce qui permettrait de maximiser la croissance de la production. Il me paraît pour cela nécessaire de donner une *autonomie comptable* aux unités de production ; puis d'établir des rapports de prix, intérieurs et extérieurs, qui soient moins arbitraires ; ensuite attribuer un certain taux d'intérêt aux capitaux fournis aux entreprises... Pour la production agricole, nous avons essayé de montrer, en étudiant l'agriculture soviétique, la nécessité économique et sociale, pour éviter trop d'injustices, d'une rente foncière, qui chercherait ainsi à placer dans des situations moins injustes les travailleurs des entreprises ayant reçu des terroirs avec conditions naturelles (sols, climat, eaux...) et économiques (débouchés, infrastructure) fort variables.

Les plans agricoles cubains sont surtout établis en objectifs physiques, en hectares à planter et à semer. Aussi la *qualité du travail* n'a-t-elle pas été, jusqu'à présent, prise suffisamment en considération. Chacun s'affaire à aller vite,

même trop vite, ce qui l'oblige à travailler mal : les coûts de production s'élèvent, dans la mesure où les erreurs s'accumulent, abaissant les rendements. Puisqu'on a refusé, sans justification, la solution de la coopérative de production, personne, en tant que groupe limité, n'est directement intéressé à une meilleure efficacité des entreprises d'Etat ; et cela se voit bien. Même si les grands dirigeants ont généralement une haute conscience de leur responsabilité nationale et révolutionnaire, ils satisfont du même coup leur soif de pouvoir. L'ouvrier, lui, souffre sous le dur soleil et dans son baraquement mal aéré ; surtout quand il reçoit de sa famille des lettres de plaintes, relatant les multiples difficultés de la vie quotidienne ; alors il commence à en avoir assez ; et la production s'en ressent...

Un exemple : l'Oriente. Cette province, qui constitue le tiers de Cuba, devait fournir trois millions de tonnes de sucre, 30 % du total national. De belles plantations y ont été réalisées, mais beaucoup d'autres sont bien inégales, très sales ou mal placées ; de sorte que le rendement moyen y sera inférieur à celui de La Havane. On a planté, malgré l'avis des paysans du lieu, des zones tellement humides que les boutures y sont mortes. Certaines de ces zones d'argile noire semi-marécageuses furent replantées trois fois, avant que l'on renonce devant une coûteuse accumulation d'évidences.

Tout au long de la route centrale, le grand axe de l'île, dans la basse vallée du Cauto, on peut voir, non loin de ces cannes en perdition, de vastes bananeraies en train de mourir, également faute de drainage, en sols argileux. Dès 1926, les premières études de sols faites à Cuba concluaient que ces sols argileux, mal drainés et magnésiens, ne convenaient guère qu'aux pâtures et aux rizières. On est enfin en train de les convertir en rizières, après avoir commis bien des fautes, qui eussent été facilement évitables, en demandant l'avis des vieux agronomes que l'on a mis sur la touche, ou plus simplement des paysans.

Une grande partie des canneraies plantées en plaines plates verraient leur rendement fortement augmenté par un meilleur drainage qui permettrait, en terre moyenne, de passer souvent de 35 à 60 tonnes de cannes par hectare, nous dit Faustino Pérez. Cela coûterait beaucoup moins cher à la tonne que les cannes obtenues à plus grand travail dans les plantations nouvelles ; surtout quand elles ont été établies sur des terres vraiment marginales. Quand le drainage n'a pas été prévu, comme à la Centrale Naranjo, l'érosion a silencieusement ouvert de profonds ravins, qui vont gêner la récolte mécanique. Une partie des cannes n'a pu être désherbée à temps ; le citadin de Bayamo, mobilisé pour les biner, grince des dents, mais ne perd pas le sens de l'humour : « Qu'est-ce qu'il y a comme cannes, dans les mauvaises herbes, cette année », dit-il volontiers à ses amis, quand après une longue queue il peut enfin s'asseoir avec eux au restaurant.

Il y a certes dans cet objectif exaltant quelques résultats positifs. On espère obtenir un effort exceptionnel. La mécanisation de la récolte de canne, le nettoyage par herbicides, progressent ; tout cela permettra bientôt de produire le sucre, en supprimant les durs travaux serviles. Cependant, si cet objectif si ambitieux de 10 millions de tonnes avait été retardé de quelques années, comme nous étions nom-

breux à le préconiser dès 1964, les facteurs de production disponibles auraient pu être plus judicieusement affectés. Nous le montrerons notamment à propos des primeurs d'hiver ; mais les rizières en ont été également affectées. (Chapitre V, pp. 101, 102, 109, 110, 111.)

Une agriculture militarisée

L'agriculture cubaine est de plus en plus militarisée. Dès les débuts de la réforme agraire, l'armée jouait un rôle essentiel. Cette agriculture est désormais dirigée à partir d'un poste de commandement — *puesto de mando* — national, dont j'ai vu le chantier...

Des *puesto de mando* analogues ont été ou vont être établis à l'échelon des provinces, des régions, des Plans. Toute l'agriculture sera en quelque sorte codifiée, et chaque poste commence à recevoir, des unités de production placées sous ses ordres, certains renseignements journaliers, hebdomadaires, mensuels, etc... ; et ceci par diverses voies : téléphone, télex, radio, télégrammes, courrier. On s'inquiète beaucoup, et à juste titre, de savoir quels sont les renseignements qui seront nécessaires à tel ou tel échelon, à quelle cadence, et par quelle voie il conviendra de les transmettre. Problème difficile : si l'on abuse du renseignement, les cadres des unités de production seront noyés dans le papier, comme ceux des *granjas* ; et ils n'auront plus assez de temps pour le travail productif. Si le commandement n'a pas assez d'éléments d'information, ses décisions risquent d'être inadéquates à la situation réelle : or c'est lui qui décide, encore bien loin du champ...

Cette structure militaire, et c'est là sa caractéristique essentielle, ne fait pas assez confiance à la base. Trop de choses sont décidées sur papier, d'en haut ; de sorte que les travailleurs mobilisés, embrigadés, sont devenus *des exécutants*, tout comme de simples soldats. Le chef d'un lot de rizière — le sous-officier — reçoit des instructions sur tout ce qu'il doit faire jour par jour, depuis le jour J, germination de la variété de riz semée, jusqu'au jour J + 110 ou 120, date prévue pour la moisson-battage.

L'agriculture cubaine réalise pourtant un ensemble de tâches infiniment plus complexes que celles d'une armée du temps de paix. Cependant, une telle méthode présente certains avantages : elle permet d'imposer une série d'innovations à tout le pays, d'un seul coup ; sans avoir à obtenir, par une persuasion parfois difficile, l'adhésion volontaire d'une paysannerie comptant de nombreux entrepreneurs, dont tous ne sont pas assez cultivés pour en saisir vite l'intérêt. La dose d'engrais, le matériel, les techniques culturelles, tout est décidé à l'échelon « technocratique », qui est censé être bien au courant des techniques les plus modernes...

On a d'abord éliminé une agriculture capitaliste, qui avait bien des défauts (sous-emploi des terres et des hommes), mais disposait d'une structure assez efficace. L'agriculture socialiste qui lui a succédé, celle des coopératives et des *granjas*, a mobilisé toutes les ressources disponibles, s'est équipée et suréquipée, sans retrouver les mêmes capacités d'organisation du travail. Son échec est implicitement reconnu par la réorientation actuelle, celle des plans spé-

aussi traditionnelle. Mais établir des structures matérielles a d'abord induit la masse à travailler plutôt qu'à moins. Et finalement, la société militaire, le trait le plus original de Cuba, s'est en quelque sorte imposée pour remettre de l'ordre, car l'armée était restée la mieux organisée de toutes les administrations. Devant les velléités de fantaisie de Fidel, seul son frère Raul, qui le connaît bien, est capable de résister efficacement...

Ainsi s'impose peu à peu un certain aspect de cet homme nouveau, qui nous était déjà apparu sur les affiches à l'entrée de l'île des Pins. L'homme nouveau, c'est le soldat modèle, toujours entre les mains de ses chefs, décidé à se sacrifier, acceptant dans la joie toutes les difficultés, toutes les missions. Ses chefs ont toujours raison, « Fidel ne se discute pas. » Changer l'homme, disait le « Che ». Dominer la nature, ajoute l'affiche. Mais ne cherche-t-on pas maintenant à dominer l'homme ; si l'adulte y résiste, le jeune l'accepte plus souvent. Quand le « Che » a commencé à comprendre où cela menait, une telle orientation n'a-t-elle pas contribué à sa décision de partir ?

(Chapitre VII, pp. 181, 182, 183, 184, 185.)

Au départ, le plus socialiste des régimes

Cuba établit, à son départ, le plus socialiste des régimes existants, avec plus d'enthousiasme populaire et de liberté d'expression que dans le reste du camp socialiste. Les choses ont, hélas, bien changé. Certes il existe encore dans ce pays de nombreux éléments qui y favorisent la construction du socialisme. Il a solidement établi son indépendance nationale, en rejetant la dépendance yankee ; cependant il dépend économiquement de l'Union soviétique, ce qui lui facilite une certaine forme de socialisme, mais ne lui permet pas d'envisager n'importe quelle autre structure ; et de se rap-

Approved for Release: 2019/07/03 C02619164 l'idéologie chinoise. L'Etat y possède le pouvoir économique et politique, ce qui lui permet de satisfaire en priorité nombre de besoins collectifs. Certaines réalisations industrielles constituent un progrès très marqué (ciment, électricité, sucre). La pêche progresse, et l'importance donnée par Fidel à l'irrigation est essentielle. L'élevage, les fourrages, les plantations avancent en désordre, mais avancent. Une partie des travailleurs maintient leur enthousiasme, dans des conditions pourtant difficiles. Mais cet Etat est-il vraiment entre les mains du peuple, des travailleurs, des opprimés ? Il paraîtrait excessif de l'affirmer. Un groupe dirigeant s'est peu à peu dégagé, par éliminations successives de certaines fractions, d'autres dirigeants. Depuis 1959 il a à sa tête le même chef, aussi incontesté ; et c'est justement là que le bât peut le blesser le plus. Car un pays, à mon avis, ne peut s'affirmer socialiste, dès que la contestation populaire n'y est plus guère possible. Ce qui est du reste une caractéristique commune, à des degrés divers, à tous les pays qui aujourd'hui se prétendent socialistes. Donc le doute que nous portons sur le caractère socialiste de Cuba s'étend à l'ensemble du camp socialiste : ce qui ne lui fera pas plaisir !

La discipline s'impose, certes, pour assurer la pérennité du développement, laquelle exige une accumulation élargie, d'autres disent d'énormes investissements. Ce qui entraîne une austérité, qui serait plus acceptable si elle était vraiment généralisée : ou alors, ne nous parlez plus de construire en même temps le communisme, si vous vous dites aussi très pragmatiques. Vous estimez nécessaire de récompenser plus les responsables les plus fidèles, ceux qui sont chargés de faire travailler les autres.

Alors n'oubliez pas que les plus humbles travailleurs seraient encore très sensibles, eux aussi, au stade actuel, aux stimulants matériels. Organisés en petits collectifs de tra-

Fidel Castro

Fidel Castro explique souvent qu'un homme tombé dans un puits, s'il fait un petit, un moyen ou même un grand effort, n'en sortira jamais. Il n'y arrivera qu'au prix d'un effort tout à fait extraordinaire. Et c'est justement cet effort-là qu'il demande à son peuple, puis exige de lui, en vue de le sortir vite du puits du sous-développement...

Fidel Castro est une figure historique, un personnage exceptionnel, qui a donné à sa révolution et à son pays une place extraordinaire, hors de proportion avec l'importance géographique de ce dernier. En face de lui, jusqu'ici, deux attitudes sont les plus courantes. Pour les Yankees et

leurs alliés, pour le monde qui se dit trop vite libre, que j'appellerais plutôt le monde riche, et que ses adversaires appellent un peu schématiquement l'impérialisme, Fidel est un ennemi dangereux, un dictateur.

Pour les inconditionnels de Cuba et surtout de l'extérieur, domine un sentiment d'admiration, poussé au point qu'il obnubile généralement tout sens critique...

Fidel Castro n'a finalement confiance qu'en lui, et ne sait pas déléguer entièrement les responsabilités. Il reste le chef unique, il estime qu'il doit tout voir par lui-même, tout rectifier. Certes, il est l'animateur universel, ses objectifs



AFF

incitent à l'effort, ses discours suscitent encore un certain enthousiasme ; surtout auprès de ses plus fidèles, les ouvriers de la canne. Mais, quand il se met à promettre « la lune »,

bien des auditeurs cubains tournent le bouton de la radio, ils n'y croient plus. Il veut tout faire par lui-même, et il a trop d'idées à la fois, tous les jours, à chaque instant, qu'il voudrait mettre à exécution, sans en bien voir toutes les difficultés...

Beaucoup de ces projets avaient une certaine valeur, et les échecs tiennent au fait qu'ils ont été lancés sur un coup de tête du « líder maximo », du grand chef, sans études préalables assez sérieuses, trop vite à trop grande échelle. Fidel croit tout savoir, en bien des domaines, mieux que les autres ; et c'est son orgueil qui risque un jour de le perdre.

ciaux, que nous allons étudier. En parallèle, dans le cadre de l'offensive révolutionnaire, voici que s'esquisse la *militarisation de toute l'économie cubaine*.

Tous les postes importants sont désormais confiés à l'armée ; toutes les entreprises notables ont à leur tête un commandant, un capitaine ou un premier lieutenant. La répétition de cette prise en charge par l'armée semble bien avoir été la mise en œuvre, en octobre 1967, de cette brigade Che Guevara. Près de mille tracteurs à chenilles, bulldozers et tanks, regroupés dans les plaines du Cauto, reçoivent de Castro lui-même, passant en revue, debout dans son command-car, les troupes mécanisées, le signal du départ. Cette brigade va « tailler en pièces » son nouvel ennemi, la nature, jetant par terre indistinctement tout ce qui faisait le charme de l'île, chanté notamment par Christophe Colomb et par A. Humboldt.

Il y a là une véritable *prise de possession* d'une agriculture socialiste plutôt mal en point par l'armée, car celle-ci dirige toute la motorisation. « Ces 50 000 tracteurs plus ou moins

incapables de l'agriculture, quelle merveilleuse école de recrues cela peut nous fournir », aurait dit à peu près un célèbre commandant. Dès mars-avril 1968, les chefs de la *maquinaria* des *granjas* sont remplacés par des lieutenants, et les tractoristes militarisés ont des soldes fixes (donc suppression des heures supplémentaires), des horaires militaires, vingt-cinq jours de travail continu, sans arrêt dominical, et cinq jours de permission par mois... quand le travail le permettra.

Des écoles de tractoristes ou conducteurs d'engins sont créées, qui sont aussi des écoles de jeunes recrues. On laboure en quatrième vitesse à pleins gaz, on cite des records extraordinaires — vingt-quatre heures, puis soixante-douze heures de travail continu ! Les tanks, auxquels ont été enlevés leurs tourelles, unis deux à deux par une lourde chaîne, font tomber tous les arbres, sans prendre garde à ceux qu'il aurait fallu conserver. Mais le spectacle est grandiose, de ces gros arbres tombant comme fétus de paille — à moins que, trop résistants, ils ne fassent caler même les si puissants moteurs des chars soviétiques.

L'agriculture, en plus d'un problème lancinant qu'on espère résoudre, devient ainsi un *magnifique terrain de manœuvre pour l'armée*. La militarisation est avancée pour résoudre la pagaie générale, tout comme la résistance passive de la fraction croissante de travailleurs réticents. La population cubaine est de plus en plus soumise au parti et à l'armée, qui deviennent d'autant plus difficiles à distinguer que l'uniforme les rapproche, qu'ils portent tous revolvers.

(Chapitre V, pp. 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148.)

CUBA

un bilan sévère et pessimiste

L'homme nouveau, c'est le soldat

Alors, ces caractères originaux du socialisme cubain, que j'avais notés avec tant de plaisir en 1960 et en 1963, et que je suis venu rechercher à nouveau avec tant d'intérêt en 1969, même quand je n'étais pas d'accord avec certains d'entre eux, que deviennent-ils ? Justifient-ils encore le premier titre prévu pour ce livre (1) ? Les voici qui se réduisent essentiellement à une société plus militaire, où Raul Castro rappelle souvent le mot d'ordre de l'armée : « Pour quoi que ce soit, où que ce soit et dans n'importe quelles circonstances, commandant en chef, à vos ordres. »...

Viennent ensuite les mobilisations agricoles, par lesquelles Castro semble fier de montrer aux pays de l'Est à quel point, lui, il peut se faire obéir. Puis les non-paiements d'heures supplémentaires ; mais finalement tout cela se rapproche par certains côtés du stalinisme, sans la même terreur, mais avec beaucoup de police. De ce stalinisme, nous retrouvons un autre trait, la simplification de la théorie. La vision, que l'on soupçonne magnifique, mais que l'on imagine malaisément,

(1) Avant le départ, j'avais l'idée de l'intituler *Cuba, ou les Quatre périodes d'un socialisme original*. La poursuite de l'étude m'a amené à en changer le titre, malheureusement.

de l'homme nouveau vivant dans une société fraternelle, il n'y a pas besoin de rester longtemps à Cuba pour la voir s'assombrir...

« Deux mille ans de prédication chrétienne, dis-je à Mgr Zachi, qui représente le Vatican à Cuba et garde les meilleures relations avec Fidel Castro (c'est aussi un bon point pour ce dernier), en vue d'améliorer l'homme, n'ont obtenu cependant que des résultats limités. » « Oh ! combien limités ! », répond Monseigneur. J'ai déjà lu que nous étions passés de l'âge des cavernes à celui des casernes ; et ce dernier triomphe insolemment à Cuba, avec les affiches célébrant l'orgueil du pays, les petits « camillitos » (disciples de Camillo Cienfuegos), les cadets de l'école des futurs officiers, soumis dès l'enfance à une préparation toute spéciale, celle de futurs dirigeants et non pas seulement de futurs combattants.

Une révolution pourrait espérer faire progresser l'homme plus vite que le christianisme, qui est tôt retombé dans le conformisme constantinien : si elle savait garder le meilleur du « Che », faire participer tout le monde, tout en dégageant la majorité des Cubains de leur indolence généralisée, elle

Approved for Release: 2019/07/03 C02619164
vail, en (Approved for Release: 2019/07/03 C02619164, utili-
sanales...) et de distribution, ils auraient un *intérêt personnel*
à les voir prospérer. Un tel socialisme serait bien imparfait,
dites-vous, non sans raisons ; mais il pourrait, lui, garnir
plus vite les tables et les armoires, ce qui importe beaucoup.
Et surtout accepter la critique, la lutte antibureaucratique,
qui pourrait prendre une forme adaptée à ce pays de révo-
lution culturelle.

*Les éléments socialistes nous apparaissent en recul très
marqué à Cuba, surtout depuis que les militaires y ont pris
la direction effective de toute l'économie. La structure des
plans géants n'y permet guère une organisation efficiente
du travail. Les bataillons d'ouvriers et de matériel ne peu-
vent, dans un tel cadre, assurer la qualité du travail, ni le
plein emploi de coûteux équipements. Les cadres sont dé-
bordés, et pas toujours bien informés. Cuba produit de plus
en plus cher, accroît la demande d'effort et de sacrifices, en
même temps que les privations. Il n'arrive pas à remettre en
ordre son économie, malgré de constantes réorganisations.
« Pas de discussion démocratique dans le parti », me disent
à moi, dont on connaît pourtant bien la position, les plus
hauts responsables politiques cubains. Il faut donc que ce
soit terriblement vrai. Les militaires éliminent des postes de
commande beaucoup de vieux communistes, dont je suis
loin d'approuver toutes les thèses, mais qui cherchaient
souvent à freiner un certain nombre de leurs abus. Voici
Fidel Castro, commandant en chef des forces armées révo-
lutionnaires, doté d'un *pouvoir personnel sans contrôle suf-
fisant*. Nous avons vu que cela l'a souvent conduit à des
improvisations hâtives, à des généralisations prématurées, à
des précipitations dangereuses, sinon à des erreurs écono-
miques caractéristiques.*

Le refus d'analyses économiques sérieuses empêche la
détermination d'un meilleur ordre de priorité, trouble l'af-
fectation la plus judicieuse d'une masse énorme d'investis-
sements, rendus de ce fait beaucoup moins efficaces. Et sur-
tout les travailleurs deviennent plus réticents, cherchent à se
reposer, vont jusqu'à noyer les phares des tracteurs : car
beaucoup commencent à désespérer d'en sortir. « Quelle
idée a eu ma mère de me faire naître dans ce fichu pays »,
criait, un soir de l'été 1969, ce jeune désespéré, à la sortie
d'un cinéma de La Havane.

Fidel ne se rend plus compte que d'une partie des diffi-
cultés, car son entourage n'ose plus tout lui rapporter. Il lui
faudrait envisager une certaine limitation de ses pouvoirs,
avant qu'il ne soit trop tard. Cette réorganisation politique,
basée sur un contrôle *effectif* du parti par les travailleurs, du
comité central par le parti, et de Castro par ledit comité,
me paraît le préalable absolu, la condition essentielle du
redressement économique, base nécessaire d'une réelle indé-
pendance cubaine. En donnant tous les pouvoirs à l'armée,
on affaiblit son économie, donc finalement sa capacité de
défense nationale.

Oui, je le sais : tout ceci est facile à écrire à la table d'un
vieux professeur de la vieille Europe, bien difficile à réaliser
par ceux qui ont la responsabilité du pouvoir à La Havane.
Muchisimas gracias, Fidel, pour m'avoir donné la possibilité
d'une étude passionnante.

(Chapitre IX, pp. 233 à 236.)

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JEUNE AFRIQUE, Paris
31 March 1970

Dumont's 'Is Cuba Socialist?' Reviewed

Excerpts from forthcoming book
by Rene Dumont: "Is Cuba Socialist"

René Dumont, who is 66 today, has carved out a solid world-wide reputation for himself as a "critic" and a "pessimist." His prejudices irritate. His advice is exasperating. While his competence in agronomy is recognized all over the world, and respected, his suggestions as to the operation of a socialist economy or the articulation of decision-making structures have consistently met with a mixed reception. Since his "L'Afrique Noire Est Mal Partie" [Black Africa Is Off to a Bad Start] came out in 1962 he has been declared persona non grata by numerous African governments.

In Cuba, Dumont is welcomed with eagerness, mixed with a considerable dose of trepidation. Fidel Castro personally has invited him there three times: in 1960, in 1963, and most recently in June 1969. As he was setting out for Cuba, Dumont had tentatively entitled his second book on Cuba, "Cuba, ou les Quatres Perodes d'un Socialisme Originale" [Cuba, or the Four Phases of a New Socialism.] A month later, after his on-the-spot investigation, he had scrapped that title for "Is Cuba Socialist?" Dumont makes no effort to hide it. He came home disappointed, pessimistic, uneasy over the future. While he is still in the camp of those faithful to the Cuban revolution, he will not hear of anyone's questioning his right to criticize his friends.

In 1964, René Dumont dedicated his first book on Cuba, ("Cuba, Socialisme et Développement") to "the Algerians." In 1970, it may be salutary for the Africans, who are still trying to draw inspiration from the Cuban model, to read and ponder Is Cuba Socialist? Seuil press is bringing it out in the Politique series (248 pages, 5 francs).

In this book, which is a sometimes over-rich blend of anecdote, first-hand experience, and value judgment, Rene Dumont retraces the essay at building socialism in Cuba from the era of "generous and romantic rebellion" to the present period of "tough reality," passing through the stage of "centralized bureaucratic planning" and that of "building communism."

In the end, Rene Dumont has an answer to the question that lies at the heart of the problem: is Cuba socialist? You feel that he is torn throughout the study between his sym-

pathies for the Cubans and the critical idealism he calls his professional conscience, and the answer he comes up with is one that many will find harsh indeed: the economy is growing more militaristic with each passing day, the cult of Fidel is turning into neo-Stalinism, a "well-intentioned" elite is piling up privileges, etc.

Jeune Afrique has acquired the rights to publish the first extensive excerpts of this book.

G. de Beurepaire

Special Plans A Failure

The state farm was still a diversified agricultural operation, and in many ways a traditional one. Cuba is looking for the very latest operating formulas, those of the United States, for very large-scale industrial agriculture, big enough to make use of aircraft for such operations as planting, fertilizing, weed- and pest-killing.

Toward the end of 1967, it was decided that the concept of the specialized plans should be broadened to embrace the entire island. This is the story of their failure. After the drive for making each province capable of feeding itself, designed to cut losses by shortening shipping distances and reducing losses en route, came an effort to grow each crop conveniently near to its processing plant, if not to its port of export. The idea was to generalize the old vertical idea of a "big sugar plantation with its own sugar mill."

We have already spoken of the absolute priority assigned to sugar cane. Right behind it comes milk and egg production, planned around export-crop plantations of citrus fruits, coffee, and pineapple. In the very last place come food crops for local supply and meat production. On the overall canvas, sketched in by the political bureau and with the details filled in by the central planning junta, they have just completed a crop-distribution map covering the whole island. It has been worked out primarily on the basis of a survey of the soil, altitude, and available irrigation water supplies...

The history of these "Fidel Plans," all of which were very expensive, is the story of a long series of failures, rather than successes. The Pinares de Mayari garden plan was located on iron-rich soil that was too permeable and subject to erosion, quite unsuited to truck gardening, which is fast turning into laterite, and which must not be touched: pine forests would do far better here. The San Andres de Caiguanabo in Pinar del Rio province, where the idea was to leap directly into communism, is a failure. To the east of Havana, I saw unirrigable chalk cliffs planted with coffee which received a scant meter of rainfall, doled out over endless months of drouth. In 1969, near Bayamo, I found dozens of hectares of vineyards in very bad condition because they had been planted in those black hardpan clay soils, the same kind, as we shall see further on, as proved inhospitable to bananas and sugar cane. Near Sancti Spiritus there were some better-drained slopes planted to vineyards, but when I went through there they had just got through putting almost a kilo of fertilizer around each vine, but all of it concentrated around the trunk, which meant

that the vines would be badly burnt when the first rain came. I hope that they have done some broadcast sowing of ground cover in the vinyard, as I advised them to do. In 1965 there were starts at raising huge numbers of goats, and in 1966 ~~the things~~ both projects have been more or less abandoned since. In 1967 and 1968 the whole island was planted to Angola peas, or Candelou, which did not turn out to be such, and which the livestock refused to eat. So did the people, when the seed-grain was offered for sale in the market. The tropical Kudzu peas did not produce the miracle yields that were touted for them. (Chapter 3, pp 63, 64, and 65-67.)

Shortages and Rain

The Cuban economy is so organized that it is impossible, or nearly so, to formulate forecasts reliable enough to give it better orientation, or to try to map out a more rational order of investment priority, which would make it possible to boost production to the maximum. It seems to me that in order to do this there must be some kind of bookkeeping independence for each unity of production. Then there must be an established price ratio for the domestic and foreign markets, and it must be less arbitrary than the present system. After that, there should be a ceiling set for interest rates on capital made available to businesses... For farm production, we have tried, by studying the Soviet agricultural economy, to demonstrate the economic and social need for a guaranteed income from farmland, in order to avoid too great injustice. Such a subsidy would seek to make a little less unfair situation for farmers on collectives assigned lands with highly variable natural conditions (such as soil, climate, water) and economic situations (such as market availability and infrastructures).

Cuban agricultural plans are set up chiefly with physical targets such as so many hectares of land to plant and to sow. This means that the quality of the work done has not so far been taken adequately into consideration. Everybody is eager to get it done fast, even too fast, which perforce means doing a sloppy job. The costs of production rise as mistakes pile up and yields drop. Since there is an unjustified refusal to consider the production cooperative solution, nobody in a limited group is directly interested in greater efficiency for the state-run enterprises, and this is all too evident. Even though the top management people are generally highly aware of their responsibility to the nation and to the revolution, they are also satisfying their personal thirst for power. The worker, though, suffers under the hot sun and in his airless barracks, particularly when he gets letters from his family complaining about the manifold difficulties of everyday life. That is when he begins to get sick of it all, and the effect of his disaffection shows in the production figures.

One example is Oriente. This province, which covers a third of Cuba, is supposed to provide three million tons of sugar, or 30 percent of the national total. There are some splendid plantations there, but a great many more are far from that standard, either very dirty or very poorly located. And as a result the yield in Oriente is lower than that in La Habana. Against the advice of the peasants who know the land, they have planted sugar in areas so damp that the seedlings died. Some of these semi-marshy black clay zones were planted three times before the planners gave up in the face of a mounting pile of costly evidence.

All along the central highway that runs the length of the island in the low valley of the Cauto, you can see, not far from the dying cane groves, huge banana plantations that are drowning in undrained hard clay soil. As early as 1926, the first soil surveys taken in Cuba concluded that these black and very clayey soils, with their poor drainage and high magnesium content, were fit only for marginal pastures and rice paddies. Now at last they are getting around to planting rice there, after making a lot of mistakes that could easily have been avoided by asking for advice from the agronomists made available to them, or more simply by just asking the local peasants.

Most of the sugar cane planted on the flat plains would produce far higher yields if there were better drainage, which, on average land, would boost harvests from 35 tons per hectare to as much as 60 tons, Faustino Perez told us. This would cost far less per ton than the cane grown with far more work on the new plantations, particularly those that have been established on really marginal lands. When there has been no provision for drainage, as at the Naranjo Center, erosion has crept in and silently carved deep ravines which are going to cause trouble when they try to use machinery in the harvest. Some of the cane has not been weeded soon enough. A man from Bayamo, mobilized to weed the cane fields, is none too happy about the job, but keeps his sense of humor all the same: "What a lot of cane there is in the weeds this year," he comments to his friends when, after a long wait in line, he finally gets a seat with them in the restaurant.

Of course, there are some good results from this heady objective. They hope to get an all-out effort. Mechanization of cane harvesting and weed control with herbicides are making progress. All this will shortly make it possible to produce sugar without all this backbreaking manual labor. Meanwhile, since this very ambitious target of a 10-million-ton harvest has been delayed for several years, as a great many of us predicted it would be as early as 1964, the available production factors could have been distributed more judiciously. We shall demonstrate this most dramatically in connection with winter vegetable crops, but the rice paddies have also been affected. (Ch. 3, pp 101, 102, 109, 110, 111.)

Militarized Agriculture

Cuban agriculture is becoming more and more militarized. From the very beginning of land reform, the army has played an essential role. Agriculture here is now run from a command post -- puesto de mando -- in the capital, and I have seen it at work...

Similar command posts have been or will shortly be set up for every region, every province, every Plan. All farming will operate under some sort of code, and each command post is beginning to receive from each production unit under its orders certain information on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. The reports come in by telephone, telex, radio, telegram, and courier. There is considerable concern, and rightly so, over what information has to be sent to such and such an echelon, and how that information ought to be sent. This is a tough problem: if there is too much demand for information, the cadres out in the production units will be drowned in paper work like those in the granjas, and they will not have enough time left over for productive work. If

the command post does not get enough data, its decisions may well be unsuited to the real situation: but it is the puesto that makes the decision, and makes it at considerable distance from the field.

This military structure, and that is essentially what it is, does not have enough confidence in the rank and file. Too many decisions are made on paper, from above. Which means that the mobilized workers, put into brigades, have become mere carriers-out of orders, exactly like privates. The boss of a plot in a rice paddy -- the non-com -- gets his orders as to what he is to do day by day, from D-day when the kind of rice he has planted should germinate, to D-day plus 110 or 120, when the rice is to be harvested and threshed.

And yet Cuban agriculture performs a group of tasks far more complex than those of a peacetime army. Nevertheless, such a method has certain advantages. It makes it possible to impose a whole series of innovations on the entire country at the same time, without waiting for sometimes difficult persuasion to achieve the voluntary cooperation of a peasantry with a number of individual farmer-owners, all of whom are not sufficiently educated to grasp the advantage of the innovation at once. The amount of fertilizer, the equipment, the cultivation techniques -- everything is decided on the "technocratic" level, where they are supposed to be thoroughly up-to-date on all the latest techniques...

They began by eliminating capitalist agriculture, which had its faults (including under-use of land and men), but had a fairly efficient structure. The socialist agriculture which has replaced it, the agriculture of the cooperatives and the granjas, has mobilized all available resources, is equipped and over-equipped, but has yet to find the same capacity for organizing the work. Its failure is implicitly admitted by the current reorganization under the special plans, which we shall study shortly. And in parallel with this, within the framework of the revolutionary offensive, we see the formation of militarisation of the entire Cuban economy.

All the important jobs are now held by the army. All the sizeable operations are headed by a major, a captain, or a first lieutenant. The dress rehearsal for this army takeover was apparently staged in October 1967 by the Che Guevara brigade. Almost a thousand tractors, bulldozers, and tanks assembled in the Cauto bottomlands in parade formation, got the go signal from Castro himself as he reviewed them in his jeep. This brigade went out to cut its new enemy, nature, to pieces, indiscriminately rolling over everything that gave the island its charm, all that had enchanted men from Christopher Columbus to Alexander Humboldt.

This was a genuine takeover of a pretty shaky socialist agriculture by the army, because the army controls all the motorized equipment. "What a marvelous training-school for recruits these 50,000 tractors, more or less mistreated by these ignorant agriculture people, would be," a famous commander must have thought one day. Starting in March and April 1968, the bosses of the maquinaria on the granjas were replaced by lieutenants, and the militarized tractor operators now have fixed wages (no more overtime), and work on a military timetable: 25 days straight work, no Sundays off, and 3 days leave per month... when the work load allows it.

Schools have been set up for tractor and machinery operators, which are also schools for young recruits. They plow at full speed in fourth gear. You hear about extraordinary records -- 24 hours, even 72 hours of continuous work! Tanks whose turrets have been removed are linked together two by two with heavy chains, and simply mow down the trees, without a thought as to the trees that should have been spared. But it is a great sight to see those big trees topple like strawstacks -- except when an exceptionally sturdy one rolls over even the mighty Soviet tanks.

Agriculture, in addition to a problem that they hope to solve, thus becomes a magnificent maneuvering ground for the army. Militarization is sold as a solution to the general mess as well as to the passive resistance of a growing proportion of silent workers. The Cuban people are increasingly subject to the party and to the army, and it is increasingly difficult to tell the party men from the army men, since they all carry revolvers. (Ch. 5, pp 141, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148.)

The New Man Is the Soldier

What, then, has become of these original characters in Cuban socialism whom I reported with such pleasure in 1960 and 1963, and whom I came back to see again with such greater expectations in 1969, even though I did not agree with some of them? Do they still justify the title I had tentatively chosen for this book? (Before I left, I had planned to call it "Cuba, ou les Quatre Períodes d'un socialisme original." Pursuit of the study unfortunately led me to change that title.) Here they are, essentially reduced to a more military society, in which Raoul Castro often repeats the army's shibboleth: "For whatever it may be, wherever it may be, and under any circumstances whatever, we await your orders, Commander-in-chief!"

Then came the farm mobilizations, in which Castro seems to use to show the Eastern countries the kind of obedience HE can command. Then came the abolition of overtime pay. And in the last analysis, it is all similar in some ways to Stalinism, without the same kind of terror, but with a lot of police. And we find another trait of Stalinism here in the simplification of theory. You need not stay long in Cuba to see that vision, which you feel is magnificent, though hard to imagine, of the new man living in a fraternal society, blur and grow dim...

"Two thousand years of preaching Christianity," I said to Mgr. Zach, who represents the Vatican in Cuba and maintains cordial relations with Fidel Castro (that, too, is a point for Castro), "all to make men better have produced only limited results." "Oh, how limited!" answered Monsignor. I read somewhere that we had moved from the cave-man era into that of the barracks man. And the barracks man swaggers in triumph in Cuba, where the posters boast of national pride, and the little "camillitos," the disciples of Camillo Cienfuegos, the cadets in the school for future officers, are trained from childhood in very special courses designed to make them the future rulers of their country, not merely future fighting men.

A revolution might hope to make men progress faster than Christianity did, which soon degenerated into Constantinian conformity. If it could keep the best of "che," and make everybody participate as it weaned the majority of

Cubans away from their inborn laziness which is also traditional. But establishing structures without material incentives had as its first result making the masses work less, rather than more. And lastly, the military society, the most striking trait in Cuba, was in a way inevitable in order to restore order, because the army was the best organized of all the administrations. The only man who can put up any effective resistance to Fidel Castro's imaginative whims is his brother Raoul, who knows him well.

And so, little by little, a certain aspect of this new man, whom we had already seen a glimpse of on the posters at the entry to the Isle of Pines, is imposed. The new man is the model soldier, always obedient to his leaders, determined to sacrifice himself, joyfully accepting all difficulties, ready to take on any mission. His leaders are always right. "Fidel is not to be argued about." Change people, said "Che." Dominate nature, adds the poster. But are they not trying now to dominate the man? If the adult puts up some resistance, the child most often accepts it. When "Che" began to understand where all this was leading, might not such a trend have contributed to his decision to leave?
(Chapter 7, pp 181, 182, 183, 184, 185.)

At the Start, the Most Socialist of Regimes

When it began, Cuba set up the most socialist of existing regimes, with more popular enthusiasm and more freedom of expression than in the rest of the socialist camp. But alas, things have changed greatly. Of course there are still a great many factors in this country that favor the building of socialism. It has solidly established its national independence by rejecting its dependance on the Yankoes.. And yet it depends economically on the Soviet Union, which makes a certain form of socialism easy for it, but does not allow it to consider any other structure and to draw closer, for example, to the Chinese ideology. The state here has economic and political power, which enables it to give top priority to satisfying a great many collective needs. Some of its industrial achievements constitute very marked progress (cement, electricity, sugar). Fishing is making progress, and the importance Fidel has given irrigation is essential. Cattle raising, forage crops, and plantations are advancing in disorder, but they are advancing. Some of the workers are still enthusiastic, even under difficult conditions. But is this state really run by the people, the workers, the oppressed? It would seem excessive to say so. Gradually a ruling group has emerged, through successive elimination of certain factions and of other leaders. The same leader has been at the nation's head since 1959, and still nobody has challenged him. And right there is the thing that hurts most. Because, in my opinion, no country can call itself socialist if there is almost no chance for the people to challenge their leader. And this is a trait common in greater or lesser degree to all the countries which call themselves socialist these days. Hence the doubts we feel as to Cuba's socialist character extends to the entire socialist camp. And that is not a thing that will make us happy!

Discipline is necessary, of course, to ensure continued development, which requires increased savings -- some say enormous investments. And this involves austerity, which would be more acceptable if it were truly general: or else stop talking about building communism at the same time, if you also call yourselves very pragmatic. You feel it necessary to give greater rewards to the most loyal leaders, those who are in charge of making others work.

In this case, do not forget that the humblest workers would also be very sensitive, in the present phase, to material incentives. Organized into little working collectives, into production units (agricultural, artisanal...) and distribution units, they would have a personal interest in making them prosper. This kind of socialism would be quite imperfect, you will say, and you would be right. But it could fill the tables and the cupboards a lot faster, and that is very important. And above all accept the standard of the struggle against bureaucracy, which could take a form suitable to this country of cultural revolution.

We see the socialist elements in very marked retreat in Cuba, particularly since the military have taken over effective management of the entire economy. The giant plan structure scarcely permits an effective organization of labor. Battalions of workers and equipment, in such a structure, cannot ensure the quality of work or full use of costly equipment. The cadres are in over their heads, and are not always well informed. Cuba's production costs are going higher and higher, and the demand for effort and sacrifice is rising at the same rate as privation. The country is not managing to put its economy back in order, despite constant reorganization. "No democratic discussion in the party," I was told, despite their knowledge of my position, by the high-ranking Cuban politicians. That means that it must be all too terribly true. The military are ousting many old communists from their jobs. Although I did not approve all their views by a long shot, they often tried to put a brake on some of the military's abuses. Look at Fidel Castro, commander-in-chief of the revolutionary armies, given personal power without sufficient control. We have seen that this has often led him into hasty improvisations, premature generalizations, and dangerous precipitance, if not into typical economic errors.

The rejection of serious economic analysis prevents the establishment of a better order of priorities and hampers the most judicious possible use of an enormous mass of investments, which are thus rendered far less efficient. And most important, the workers are growing sullen, looking for a chance to loaf, even going so far as to break the headlights on the tractors, because many of them are beginning to despair of things ever getting any better. One evening in the summer of 1969, a youngster coming out of a movie in Havana cried, "What a fool my mother was to let me be born in this lousy country!"

Fidel is no longer aware of more than a part of his problems, because those around him do not dare to tell him everything. He must start considering some degree of limitation of his own powers, before it is too late. This political reorganization based on real control of the party by the workers, of the central committee by the party, and of Castro by the committee, seems to me to be the sine qua non, the essential condition for recovery of economic balance, which is the necessary foundation for real Cuban independence. By giving all power to the army, it is weakening its economy, and, in the long run, its capacity for national defense.

Yes, I know: all this is easy for an old professor to sit at a desk in old Europe and write, but it is hard indeed to do for those who have the responsibility for governing in Havana. Muchisimas gracias, Fidel, for giving me a chance to do a fascinating study. (Chapter 9, pp 233-236.)

Fidel Castro


Fidel Castro often says that if a man who has fallen into a well makes a little effort, a medium effort, or even a great effort, he will never get out. He can only get out by means of an utterly extraordinary effort. And it is precisely that sort of effort which he demands of his people and of himself, in order to clamber out of the well of under-development.

Fidel Castro is an historic figure, an exceptional person, who has given his country and his revolution an extraordinary place in history, one quite out of proportion with its geographical importance. There are two common attitudes toward him today. For the Yankees and their allies, for the world that all too glibly calls itself free, and which I should rather call the rich world, and which its enemies a little glibly call imperialism, Fidel is a dangerous enemy, a dictator.

For the unconditional supporters of Cuba, particularly those outside Cuba, the dominant feeling is one of admiration pushed to the point where it generally blunts any critical sense...

In the last analysis, Fidel Castro trusts nobody but himself, and he cannot entirely delegate responsibility. He is still the sole leader. He feels that he must see to everything himself, put everything to rights himself. Of course, he is the universal inspiration. His goals inspire people to work, his speeches still stir a degree of enthusiasm, particularly among those most loyal to him, the sugar-cane workers. But when he begins promising them the moon, many of his Cuban listeners simply turn off the radio. They don't believe it any more. He wants to do everything himself, and he has too many ideas at one time, every day, every minute, all of which he wants implemented right then, without stopping to take a close look at all the difficulties involved.

Many of his projects had a certain value, and the failures failed because they were launched at the whim of the "lider maximo," without adequate prior study, too fast and on too large a scale. Fidel thinks he knows everything in many areas better than anybody else, and it is his pride that may one day prove to go before his fall.



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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Excerpts from:

*Arms
for the Third World*

SOVIET MILITARY
AID DIPLOMACY

WYNFRED JOSHUA AND STEPHEN P. GIBERT

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
BALTIMORE AND LONDON

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PREFACE

Since peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and the western nations has gained prominence, the USSR has sought ways to compete for influence in the Third World. Military assistance to the developing nations has emerged as a key element in Soviet-American rivalry.

Soviet foreign policy has been extensively studied, including efforts to penetrate the Third World through economic aid. Scant attention, however, has been paid to military aid as a major component of Soviet foreign policy. This study, therefore, attempts to round out further our understanding of the instruments of peaceful coexistence and Soviet policy in the Third World.

This book grew out of research we originally undertook between 1964 and 1968 for the Georgetown Research Project of the Atlantic Research Corporation under contract with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. We are grateful to the Atlantic Research Corporation and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research for permission to use some of this material as the basis for further research and analysis.

We alone are responsible for the accuracy of facts and interpretations. The views expressed in this book are our own and do not reflect the opinions of the institutions with which we have been or are now affiliated, nor of those who have so generously given us their assistance and counsel.

WYNFRED JOSHUA
Stanford Research Institute, Washington

STEPHEN P. GIBERT
Georgetown University

Washington, D.C.

APPROACHES AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK

The Soviet military assistance program can only be understood as an integral part of contemporary Soviet global foreign policy. While not neglecting its paramount interest in maintaining preeminence in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin has accorded a much higher priority to extending its influence into the less-developed regions of the world. This objective is pursued by a variety of instruments, a key one of which is the furnishing of military aid to selected countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Dependent upon individual circumstances, aid includes weapons, spare parts, military training, and the construction of military and para-military operational facilities. The program appears designed to promote the image of the Soviet Union as the champion of anti-colonialism and to support those objectives of aid-recipient nations consistent with Soviet foreign policies. Further, Soviet leaders hope to forge or strengthen links between the armed forces of the recipients and the Soviet Union, and to foster diplomatic and military dependency on the USSR. Soviet decision-makers apparently anticipate that accomplishing these aims will strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union at the expense of the United States. It also will prevent Communist China from establishing itself as the champion of and model for the developing countries.

Soviet military aid policy appears to operate within the parameters of two constraints: the necessity not to take actions in furnishing military aid that will bring on nuclear confrontation with the United States; and the requirement that aid programs be consistent with the level of development of the recipients, as well as with the conditions imposed by the nations themselves. Throughout the book an attempt has been made to assess the impact of these constraints on Soviet military aid decisions. For this reason, although the study focuses on Soviet military aid diplomacy, the conditions in the recipient countries and their objectives in requesting military assistance have been discussed where relevant. This approach permits an emphasis upon the international security implications of Soviet arms diplomacy and avoids a mere accounting sheet of weapons transfers. Stated differently, this study analyzes the impact of Soviet military aid to the developing countries on the international diplomatic scene in general, and on the great powers' struggle for influence in the Third World in particular.

The study starts with an analysis of Soviet military aid to the major regions of the developing world. The regional approach has been selected because the impact of Soviet arms deliveries is seldom limited to the particular recipient country. More often, it affects as well the politico-military strategy of the major world powers and lesser states adjacent to or near the recipient. Within each world region the key nations receiving aid, such as Egypt in the Middle East, India and Indonesia in Asia, Somalia in Africa, and Cuba in Latin America, have received special attention.

Subsequently, certain functional topics important to an understanding of Soviet military aid diplomacy are considered. These include the alternatives open to the Soviet Union in pursuing military aid policies, arms aid used to support wars of liberation, and the competitive aspects of Soviet and American military aid programs.

This analysis is concerned only with Soviet military aid diplomacy in the so-called non-aligned or Third World countries of the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. No consideration, accordingly, has been given Soviet aid to East European countries or to other communist countries such as China, North Korea, Mongolia, and North Vietnam. This restriction was necessary because the objective of the book is to assess Soviet arms diplomacy as an instrument of competition for influence among non-European and non-committed nations rather than to consider relationships among communist countries themselves. Also, it is difficult if not impossible to secure reliable estimates of weapons flows among the communist countries. This limitation, however, has been modified to allow the inclusion of Cuba, since its position in international affairs is quite distinct from that of other communist states and because reliable data on Soviet military aid to Cuba is available.

Throughout the study value estimates of Soviet military aid have been given in U.S. dollars. The choice of dollar estimates was arrived at since dollar figures are usually cited in the press. Although the terms of an agreement frequently specify that Soviet arms aid has to be repaid in raw materials or commodities, the use of dollar values permits a ready comparison of the magnitudes of the various arms aid programs.

While Soviet arms diplomacy is referred to throughout the study as "military aid" or "military assistance," in fact the more technically accurate term in most cases would be "military loans." While much American aid has been in grants, almost all Soviet military aid has been in the form of long-term, low-interest loans. Since this is a marked difference between the Soviet and American programs, the technical

distinction between loans and grants has been discussed separately, as have the relationships among military aid, trade, and economic aid.

The terms "Soviet aid" and "Soviet bloc aid" are used interchangeably except where noted otherwise. Nearly all Soviet bloc aid has in fact been aid from the USSR itself. Only Czechoslovakia among the Soviet bloc countries has contributed a measurable amount of military aid. "Soviet bloc" refers to the USSR and the members of the Warsaw Pact. The use of the term "Soviet bloc" is merely a shorthand expression and does not imply monolithic unity among the Warsaw Pact countries. Military aid by Communist China is not included in computing Soviet bloc aid totals.

The history of Soviet military aid is now sufficiently developed to permit an assessment of the program's current usefulness to the Soviet Union and its utility in the foreseeable future. Since present indications are that military aid diplomacy will assume an even greater role in Soviet foreign policy in years to come, an understanding of its impact on the security of nations has become of vital importance.

PATTERNS AND MAGNITUDE OF SOVIET ARMS AID

Between the start of Soviet arms aid in 1955 and the present, sufficient time has elapsed to permit drawing a distinction between the more enduring and the more ephemeral factors and patterns in Soviet arms aid diplomacy. In providing military assistance, Moscow plainly attaches importance to some factors and is willing to overlook others. Most arms aid candidates have to meet certain qualifications, although since 1964-65 the Soviet Union has apparently been prepared to dilute some of the requirements for becoming an aid recipient.

As a rule, the USSR displays little concern for the domestic political orientation of the recipient states. Egypt, like most other Arab recipients, continues to enjoy Soviet military assistance in spite of its measures outlawing or restricting internal communist activities. In only one instance in the history of Soviet arms diplomacy in the Middle East did the Soviet Union halt its aid program to register its protest against the recipient's anti-communist policy at home. This case involved the Baath regime of Iraq, which had ousted General Kassem in February 1963. The Baath leaders, members of a militant Arab nationalist and strongly anti-communist movement, embarked on a violent purge of indigenous communists. Moscow's intense disapproval of Baghdad's domestic course

was expressed in a warning that Iraq's persecution of local communists prejudiced the future of Soviet economic and other aid.¹⁶ Exacerbating Soviet-Iraqi tensions was Iraq's armed offensive against the Kurds, who had started a guerrilla war to win autonomy. The Soviet Union, which sympathized with the Kurds' demands for autonomy, threatened to terminate its aid to Iraq if Baghdad continued its military operations against them.¹⁷ When the Baath leaders refused to stop their actions against Iraqi communists and Kurdish insurgents, the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963 halted its military supplies and training programs for Iraq.¹⁸ A thaw in Soviet-Iraqi relations did not occur until the most extreme Baathist ministers were dismissed in November 1963 and a new government began to relax the repressive measures against domestic communists. In May 1964 Iraq obtained new military aid credits.¹⁹ Although the offensive against the Kurds was resumed with full force a year later, Soviet arms supplies continued to reach Iraq without interruption.

Except for Iraq, the Soviet Union did not use its arms aid instrument to try to effect a change in the recipient's policies toward domestic communism, nor did Russian arms aid imply approval or disapproval of these policies. Military aid transactions reflect Soviet recognition of the value of tolerating the personal attitudes and preferences of leaders who have a national, if not also a regional, following. This explains Soviet forbearance of Nasser's frequently arrogant and scornful attitude toward Soviet ideology and at times even toward the leadership. Similarly, the Russians lionized Ben Bella, notwithstanding his repression of the Algerian Communist Party.

Moreover Nasser and later Ben Bella, because of their anti-western bias and their relentless commitment to wars of liberation, promoted Soviet interests by transferring some of their Russian-made weapons to other militant regimes and to insurgent movements in white-dominated and so-called neo-colonial African states. While Moscow may not have originally intended to supply arms for re-export purposes, the Russian arms carried by the Egyptian army into Yemen served to effectuate Soviet hostility toward Saudi Arabia. The Soviet weapons Egypt and Algeria shipped to the Congolese rebels who fought the Tshombe govern-

¹⁶ *Pravda*, February 20, 1963.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1963.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of State, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations*, 18th Annual Report (Washington, 1966), p. 101.

¹⁹ *Daily Telegraph* (London), May 24, 1964.

ment in 1964-65, helped to enhance Soviet prestige in militant Afro-Arab circles. This tactic of supporting wars of liberation by proxy partly offset Chinese charges that the Soviet Union had betrayed the wars-of-liberation commitment. The re-export device also helped to protect the Russians against risks of escalating a local conflict into a confrontation with the western powers.

Another key factor in the framing of Soviet military aid policy was the importance of the military elites in the Middle East. Soviet military aid strategy could succeed only with the support of the military, which plays a crucial role in the political life of Middle Eastern countries. On the military devolved a large institutional responsibility for sustaining national efforts toward modernization. In several Middle Eastern countries, notably Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, and Turkey, the military establishment provides either the national leaders or the most vital organizational support of the government. In the long run, this ascendancy of the military may appear in Soviet eyes as a negative force in the building of socialism. But in establishing a foothold in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has not hesitated to exploit the military elites' ready perception of the advantage of arms aid, both for the nation and for their own political role.

Table 2-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to the Middle East: 1955 to June 1967 (In Millions of U.S. Dollars)¹

UAR.....	\$1,500
Syria.....	at least 300
Yemen.....	100
Iraq.....	at least 500
Morocco.....	20
Algeria.....	200
Cyprus.....	28
Iran.....	100
Estimated Total: \$2,748	

¹ These figures do not fully convey the true costs of the arms aid. As far as the Russians are concerned, much of the early materiel was obsolete and had lost much of its value for them. As far as the recipients are concerned, occasionally they obtained Soviet arms at a discount rate. The figures, moreover, do not reflect what it would have meant to the recipients had they been required to make repayments in hard currency. Nor can these figures be compared with figures for U.S. arms aid to the Middle East, since the United States made most of its aid available as grants. The problems in assessing the dollar value of Soviet military aid are discussed in Chapter 6. Data presented for the UAR, Cyprus, and Iran are derived from sources documented in previous pages. For the figure for Algeria, see Joseph Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Address, *U.S. Department of State Press Release No. 109* (May 9, 1967), p. 7. The figures for Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Morocco are based on reports on the successive military assistance accords in daily newspapers and journals.

Continuity in Soviet Arms Aid Diplomacy. The persistence of the basic trends in Soviet military aid policy in the Middle East was reflected in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war. Soviet efforts to shore up Egypt's position after the war suggested that Egypt remained the main target of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East. The Russians recognized that Egypt retained the leadership of the militant Arab world, that it offered easy Soviet access into Africa, and, last but not least, that it controlled the Suez Canal, the major route for Soviet ships to the Indian Ocean. As long as Nasser and other Arab leaders appeared to command popular acclaim and mass following, Soviet policymakers were prepared to support them. Ideological considerations assumed at best a secondary role in Soviet arms aid diplomacy, as repeated Russian offers of military assistance to King Hussein of Jordan indicated.

The rearmament campaign permitted Moscow to deepen its penetration of the military establishments of militant Arab states and of Egypt's armed forces in particular. Soviet participation in retraining and reorganizing the defeated Egyptian army and air force provided the Russians with more effective access to Egyptian military elites and with greater opportunities for influencing Egyptian military policies.

Moscow's arms diplomacy and aggressive penetration goals had undergone no change. In fact, the aggressive pattern in Soviet policy evolved more distinctly than ever. Soviet leaders did try to exclude the risk of a direct armed encounter with the United States. At the same time, however, they proceeded to restore the distribution of military power in favor of the militant Arabs, undermining thereby western interests in the preservation of order and stability in the Middle East. The USSR reinforced its military aid presence at the eastern flank of the Middle East along the Red Sea coast in Yemen, in the center of the region in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and at the western gate of the Mediterranean in Algeria.

The growth of the Soviet Union's military presence in the Middle East was further demonstrated by the buildup of its surface task force in the Mediterranean, where only token Russian naval forces had previously operated. By 1968 between forty and fifty Soviet warships were deployed in the Mediterranean.⁴⁴ The Soviet fleet received permission to utilize Syrian, Egyptian, and Algerian ports. France's decision of Oc-

tober 1967 to return to Algeria the large naval base at Mers-el-Kebir in early 1968—ten years ahead of schedule—raised the possibility that a base across from Gibraltar would become available to the Soviet fleet in the near future.

Soviet naval presence in the Middle East did not necessarily imply an intention to acquire formal base rights, which would involve sensitive political issues. It is important to distinguish between base acquisition and base utilization. Rather, the Soviet Union appeared to be developing a capability similar to that of the United States in being able to project its naval power beyond immediate coastal waters without the benefit of fixed overseas bases with fuel, supplies, and repair facilities. The Russians accomplished this by means of a supporting fleet train consisting of oilers, store ships, tenders, and repair ships which could anchor in a harbor or other shallow, sheltered waters. Compliant Arab countries were the likely candidates to supply such harbors and anchorages, especially since the outcome of the June war had driven the militant Arabs closer to the Soviet camp.

The Six-Day War reflected the impact of the nuclear balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States and emphasized thereby the growing importance of the military aid instrument. Because the nuclear balance has dictated a tacit understanding between the two superpowers to try to avoid an armed confrontation between them on behalf of a third party, the Soviet Union did not intervene during the fighting. In fact, both the Soviet Union and the United States deliberately limited their actions once the war had broken out; both were eager to halt the shooting. In the end, they had no choice but to accept the *fait accompli* of Israel's victory. Moscow's unwillingness to come to the aid of the Arabs threatened to result in a serious political setback for the Russians. The one option left to the Soviet Union after the defeat of the Arab states was to resupply them with substantial military aid. This was the only effective response the Russians could take to retrieve their losses in the Middle East, and although undoubtedly expensive, it proved to be a highly successful course.

On the whole, Moscow emerged from the June 1967 crisis with its position in the Middle East greatly enhanced. To the extent that Arab dependence on Soviet military and other support deepened, Moscow's leverage in the Arab world did increase substantially. This does not mean that the Soviet Union achieved full control over Arab leaders, but it is reasonable to conclude that the latter are now unlikely to pursue a policy that would antagonize their principal backer, and certainly not as long as they need Moscow's arms. For the near future, therefore, it is

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, December 31, 1967; *Washington Post*, December 29, 1967.

justifiable to assume that the Soviet Union succeeded in turning the Arab catastrophe of the Six-Day War into a major Soviet victory.

In terms of the more distant future, however, it is possible that the large-scale Soviet arms shipments after the June war may put the Soviet Union in the role of the sorcerer's apprentice. While the chances of a fourth Arab-Israeli war may be presently remote, Nasser or another Arab leader may feel forced to resume hostilities against Israel in order to protect his position at home. Indications are that the Russians did not want the 1967 crisis to escalate into a full-fledged war. It must be remembered, however, that in spite of extensive arms aid, the Soviet Union was unable to prevent Nasser from taking the provocative actions that led to the June fighting. Although after the June war Soviet control over the militant Arabs increased, Moscow may again be unable to restrain its Arab protégés from launching another war against Israel at some future date, thereby drawing the Russians deeper into the Middle East quagmire.

COMMON FACTORS IN SOVIET ARMS AID DIPLOMACY

The Limitations. In terms of dollar value, Soviet military aid to sub-Saharan African states reflected the region's secondary role in Soviet policy toward the developing world. Cumulative arms aid to Africa still totalled under \$100 million by 1967, and with the exception of the credits to Somalia, the various programs were relatively small, as Table 3-1 illustrates.

Table 3-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: 1959 through 1967 (In Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Congo-Brazzaville.....	\$1
Congo-Kinshasa.....	1.5
Ghana.....	10 to 15
Guinea.....	at least 6
Mali.....	at least 3
Nigeria.....	10 to 15
Somalia.....	35
Sudan.....	N.A.
Tanzania.....	5 to 10
Uganda.....	N.A.
Estimated Total:	\$86.5

Sources: Data presented are derived from sources documented in previous pages, except for Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania, where cost of equipment reported in the open press has been listed. Costs were calculated on the basis of approximate costs of comparable U.S. equipment and assumed to include such additional items as support equipment for aircraft, tools, spare parts, and other concomitant equipment.

THE BALANCE SHEET OF SOVIET ARMS AID TO AFRICA

A crucial element in Soviet arms diplomacy in Africa continues to be the objective of eliminating western and especially American influence. At times Soviet action was a specific response to U.S. military aid policies. The \$35 million Russian arms deal with the Somali Republic, aimed at countering U.S. influence in neighboring Ethiopia, derived at least in part from the \$72.6 million U.S. military assistance program there.⁷⁰ Russian involvement in the 1964-65 Congo rebellion was to some extent a reaction to U.S. military assistance to the Congolese government. But the existence of a U.S. arms aid program was not a necessary condition for the Soviet Union to act. Guinea and Nigeria were specifically turned down by the United States for arms aid before the Soviet Union moved in with military assistance, and American military aid to other west African countries was insignificant. As a rule, Soviet military aid policies were formulated with broader goals in mind than offsetting a nearby U.S. arms aid presence. They were designed to erode in general the western position in Africa. Whenever the climate suggested receptivity to Soviet overtures, Moscow proved ready to offer arms assistance to African governments. In consequence, no ideological restrictions inhibited Moscow in its arms aid ventures.

This flexibility and pragmatism was facilitated by the relatively modest allocation in Soviet resources required to support arms aid to Africans. No African state could be expected to use great quantities of weapons or highly sophisticated arms. Even the operation of standard weapons required training. Thus a relatively small investment could yield substantial political benefits for Moscow. The training programs, furthermore, provided the USSR with an opportunity to attempt to influence African military elites. In light of the growing number of military *coups d'état*, the good will, if not support, of the military could be essential to the success of Soviet policies in Africa. For all these reasons arms aid will remain a vital instrument in Moscow's African policies.

Soviet direct and indirect military assistance to African insurgent groups has shifted in emphasis. Initially supporting dissident factions in both independent black and in white-controlled states, the Russians later rendered aid primarily to the national liberation movements, which wanted to overthrow the white regimes. This aid remained more noted for its political effects than its contribution to the military capability of the freedom fighters. By their support of the freedom fighters, Soviet leaders sought to appeal to militant Africans throughout the continent

⁷⁰The \$72.6 million represents cumulative U.S. military assistance to Ethiopia through FY 1964. U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts* (Washington, May 1966), p. 14.

and to respond to Chinese charges of betraying the national liberation movements.

Efforts to offset Chinese influence were reflected not only in Soviet activities with dissident groups, but also in Russian aid to African governments. To be sure, the prospects of Chinese inroads and the significance of Chinese competition should not be overrated. China's logistic problems and limited support capabilities place Peking at a great disadvantage with respect to Moscow. Nevertheless, rivalry with China is likely to remain an influential motive in Russian arms diplomacy and could trigger Soviet pre-emptive action to provide arms aid. Chinese operations in east Africa helped to focus Soviet attention more closely on this area.

The evolving power vacuum in the Indian Ocean region, owing to the accelerated British withdrawal from the area east of Suez, further portends increased Soviet efforts to penetrate eastern Africa. Within sub-Saharan Africa the Indian Ocean littoral appears to command priority in future Soviet arms diplomacy.

In retrospect, the Soviet Union has not realized any dramatic results from its military aid programs in Africa. In fact, in Ghana and the two Congos Russian arms aid met with failure. These setbacks have not deterred the Russians from embarking upon new military assistance activities, as recent agreements with Nigeria and the Sudan might suggest. Moscow's arms diplomacy in Africa is an integral part of its overall policy of undermining western influence. By 1967 more than one-fourth of the military establishments in sub-Saharan Africa had received Soviet military assistance, whereas ten years earlier external military influence came solely from western sources. Although Soviet arms aid diplomacy has created neither African satellites nor substantial dependency on the USSR, the Russians are now active competitors for influence over the destinies of African states.

THE SCOPE OF SOVIET ARMS DIPLOMACY

The early years of Soviet arms diplomacy in South and Southeast Asia reflected an emphasis on orthodox Soviet objectives. These included encouraging a newly independent state to sever its ties with the former European metropole, countering the defense initiatives of western alliances, preventing "reactionary counterrevolution," and consolidating Soviet influence in the recipient state by reducing the military establish-

ment to single dependency for arms buildup and replacement. While not losing sight of these objectives, around 1960-61 Russian arms aid policy was forced to respond to the growing threat of the establishment of paramount Chinese influence in the area. Soviet arms aid activities intensified, particularly in the wake of the November 1960 Conference of Eighty-One Communist Parties in Moscow, where Russian leaders had failed to compose the developing Sino-Soviet controversy. Soviet military aid increased both in terms of dollar value and in number of commitments. After 1964 the Vietnam war progressively became the focus of Soviet attention in the region and affected Soviet policies. Arms aid to non-aligned recipients decreased and became mainly confined to the Asian subcontinent. Nevertheless, Soviet military aid had reached substantial amounts by the end of 1967, as Table 4-1 illustrates.

The distribution of Soviet military aid in South and Southeast Asia shows that Indonesia, India, and Afghanistan were the countries to which Russian leaders attached the greatest importance. Indonesia received by far the largest share of the Soviet arms aid dollar in the region. While aid to Afghanistan in absolute dollar amounts was relatively limited, in relation to the size of the defense budget of a recipient, Afghanistan had received more aid than any other recipient.⁶⁸ The

Table 4-1. Estimated Soviet Bloc Arms Aid to South and Southeast Asia: 1956 through 1967 (In Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Afghanistan.....	\$260
Pakistan.....	5 to 10
India.....	600 to 700
Indonesia.....	1,200
Laos.....	3 to 5
Cambodia.....	5 to 10
	Estimated Total: \$2,185

Sources: Estimates for Pakistan, India, and Indonesia are derived from sources documented in previous pages. Estimates for Laos and Cambodia are based on costs of equipment reported in the press. Costs were calculated on the basis of approximate costs of comparable U.S. equipment and assumed to include support equipment for aircraft, tools, and spare parts. The estimate for Afghanistan is similarly based on equipment costs and on a comparison of bloc economic aid with total bloc aid to Afghanistan as reported in the *New York Times*, May 28, 1967.

transfer of highly sophisticated weapons systems to these three recipients further underlines their significance in Soviet policy. Each acquired the MiG-21 jet; in fact, Indonesia was the first country outside the bloc to receive the MiG-21. India, although receiving less total aid than Indonesia, appeared to be the most privileged recipient among the three

⁶⁸ In 1965, for example, Afghanistan's defense budget was only \$23 million. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World-Wide Military Expenditures and Related Data*, Research Report 67-6 (Washington, 1967), p. 10.

states, in that India was the only one to obtain a licensing agreement to produce and assemble MiG-21s at home. All three acquired batteries of SA-2 Guideline missiles. Indonesia and India were the only two countries, other than Egypt, which were able to negotiate agreements for submarines.

The record of Soviet military assistance diplomacy in the South and Southeast Asia region shows that between 1956 and 1968 the Soviet Union managed to establish a military aid presence from Afghanistan in the northwest to Indonesia and the Indochina peninsula in the southeast. Receptivity to Moscow's initiatives on the part of recipients who had failed to acquire weapons from western sources greatly facilitated Soviet efforts. The balance sheet of Soviet arms aid policies included both gains and setbacks; the record dictated caution in the Asian subcontinent and the Indochina peninsula.

In Afghanistan, the first recipient in the region, the armed forces depended almost entirely on Soviet weapons aid. It seems doubtful whether they can function for any length of time without Soviet spare parts and fuel.⁷⁸ While the Russians have not tried to turn Afghanistan into a satellite and have generally avoided open interference in the country's internal affairs, it is highly unlikely that Kabul can pursue any foreign policy to which Moscow strongly objected.

Farther east, Moscow has made considerable progress toward replacing western military influence with its own. The Soviet Union has become India's largest source of military supplies and has succeeded in creating limited arms aid ties with Pakistan. Yet Soviet military aid policies in these countries turned out to be extremely vulnerable to pressures caused by actual and potential changes in the political-military power constellation on the Asian subcontinent. The potential threat of China in south Asia and the regional conflict between India and Pakistan circumscribed the Soviet Union's freedom of maneuver in its aid policies. The Russian dilemma resulting from the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962 caused delays and obstacles in Soviet-Indian arms aid discussions. When the negotiations were finally resolved in favor of India, it served as a warning to China to restrain its ambitions in the region.

⁷⁸ See Welles Hangen, "Afghanistan," *Yale Review*, vol. 56, no. 1 (October 1966), p. 66.

The subsequent rise of Chinese influence in Pakistan led the USSR to intensify its efforts to improve relations with Pakistan, a process already under way as part of a broader endeavor to turn the erstwhile northern tier of western defense into an area open to east-west rivalry. Little perhaps was more galling to New Delhi than Moscow's arms aid agreement with Rawalpindi in 1967. The new Soviet military aid relationship with Pakistan, however, posed serious problems for Moscow in view of the danger of antagonizing New Delhi and the attendant risk of India's turning to the west again. Since Indian good will remains an important asset to the Russians, particularly if Chinese influence grows in the Asian subcontinent, a decision to offer additional Soviet arms aid to Pakistan will probably be accompanied by political concessions to India and by compensatory weapons aid.

The history of Soviet aid activities in the states of the Indochina peninsula demonstrates Soviet capability to react promptly to emergency requests. While military aid generally arrived by ship and with a to-be-expected time lag between the agreement and the delivery date, in Laos the Soviet Union in December 1960 responded immediately with an arms airlift to Souvanna Phouma's request. The Russian airdrop of arms to the Viet Cong in early 1961 also attested to Moscow's rapid reaction capability.

Soviet emergency aid to the coalition of Laotian neutralists and communists helped to bring Souvanna Phouma back into power. But the Russians were unable to consolidate whatever influence they had in Laos or with the Viet Cong. Hanoi began to control the flow of arms, including Soviet arms, to the Pathet Lao and the Viet Cong. In fact, formulating policy for the former Indochina states proved most difficult and complex for Soviet leaders, since it also involved Chinese and American relationships. Moreover, as Hanoi's demands increased, the flexibility of Russia's response diminished. To reject an appeal from a communist ally fighting the major power of the capitalist world carried not only the risk of driving North Vietnam into China's arms, but the threat that such a rejection would erode Soviet influence in other states as well. Under these circumstances the Soviet Union stepped up its military aid to North Vietnam. By the end of 1967, except for a modest military assistance program in Cambodia, Hanoi clearly had priority in the allocation of Soviet arms aid resources for Southeast Asia.

In Indonesia, intensive Soviet military aid diplomacy eventually failed to achieve the Soviet objectives of insulating Indonesia from western influences and turning its government into a supporter of Moscow's policies in the Afro-Asian world. Moscow's lavish arms shipments, per-

sistent encouragement of the Irian policy, and somewhat cautious support of the Malaysia confrontation could neither win the allegiance of Indonesia's army leaders nor alter Indonesia's increasingly pro-Peking position in international relations between 1963 and 1965. Indonesia's return to a more impartial foreign policy after the October 1965 coup was prompted by changes in the domestic power structure and not by Soviet persuasion. Its new military regime, in fact, sought to improve relations with the west rather than with the Soviet Union. It may also have been that the persecution of indigenous communists was too brutal and created a climate too hostile for Indonesia to be able to re-establish close relations with a communist power. The prospects are that Indonesia will pursue a more truly neutralist policy, not only concerning the Sino-Soviet quarrel but regarding east-west relations as well. The Soviet Union's marked disinterest in renewing its extensive military assistance program in Indonesia suggests a recognition by Soviet leaders that for the near future few gains are to be made in Indonesia.

Future Alternatives for Soviet Military Aid Policy. There are several theories that could be developed from the failure of the Soviet Union to promote an aggressive military aid program in Latin America. It could be argued that the Soviet Union, as part of its attempted détente with the United States, does not wish to take any action in Latin America which might jeopardize Soviet-American relations. Or, the Soviet Union might be acting upon its own theories about the "peaceful alternatives" to armed revolution in Latin America and therefore concentrating on united front tactics. Finally, one could conclude that the hazardous association with Fidel Castro has discouraged the Soviet Union from considering a possible repetition. Each of these theories contains elements of wishful thinking about Soviet intentions.

First, the Soviet Union is not likely to be restrained from taking any action which it deems advantageous to its interests merely out of consideration for a Soviet-American rapprochement. Russian activities in the Middle East after the June 1967 war are a case in point. It is more likely that the Russians fear that communist penetration of another Latin American country, or even the threat of this, will be met by firm and probably successful U.S. intervention.

Second, the notion that the Soviet Union has renounced the use of force and denied that revolutionary methods could be successful in

Latin America is correct only from a short run point of view. The Russians do feel that the Cuban Revolution is not a good example for the rest of Latin America to follow and that the lack of cohesive leadership and ideological unity among guerrilla movements has for the time being doomed them to failure. Soviet strategists, however, remain convinced of the revolutionary potential of the continent and strongly imply that when "conditions are ripe," a return to subversion and revolution will be feasible.⁵⁵

Finally, it is misleading to conjecture that Soviet disenchantment with Fidel Castro has led them to harbor thoughts of disengagement from that alliance. While Castro's purges of pro-Moscow communists and his continued advocacy of aid to insurgent movements present the Soviet Union with a constant dilemma, "the Soviet Union would presumably rather have these worries . . . and the controversies . . . than have no Castro."⁵⁶ While the Soviet Union does profit from its increased contact with other Latin American governments, the advantages of having an ally in Cuba (even at the \$1 million-a-day price tag) appears to be valued by the USSR highly enough to justify its investment.

Cuba still remains of military significance to the Soviet Union. In spite of past failures and the historical evidence discussed before, it could be argued that Cuba remains a potential missile base. Cuba is also a potential naval base and refueling stop, which would permit Soviet vessels to remain on station longer in the Caribbean. It is even now an invaluable intelligence center for monitoring U.S. missile range activities in Florida and Texas and will shortly be used as a tracking station for Soviet space shots. The use of Cuba as a military diversion is also occasionally mentioned,⁵⁷ although at present Cuban diversionary potential would amount to little more than harassment.

Even though the net benefit that the Soviet Union has received from its association with Castro has been substantial, there are indications that the Soviet Union would not at present be as enthusiastic in its response to a request for military aid if another bourgeois revolution should succeed in Latin America.

⁵⁵ The Russians did sign the agreements arrived at during the January 1966 Tricontinental Conference of Havana, calling for insurrection throughout Latin America.

⁵⁶ Leon Lipson, "Castro and the Cold War," p. 199.

⁵⁷ Baldwin even believes that the United States has had to divert a "sizeable fraction" of its military establishment to what is essentially a static, defensive task on its own doorstep. Baldwin, "A Military Perspective," p. 220.

Cuba is likely to retain for some time its exclusive status as the only Latin American nation receiving Soviet bloc military aid. The sensitivity of the U.S. government and the anti-communist tradition of the Latin American military are major obstacles to new Soviet military aid inroads in the western hemisphere. But if and when any additional Russian arms aid agreements are made in the region, they will be modest and will probably take the form of inter-governmental transactions rather than covert assistance to anti-government groups. Agreements are unlikely to include weapons of a primarily offensive nature but may involve transport and communications equipment. In these categories commercial purchasing practices, rather than political considerations, are apt to guide Latin American governments, leading to possible trade or aid in Soviet military equipment which has a competitive edge in price or quality over similar offerings from western governments.

The Soviet course in the later 1960s, although ambiguous enough to draw substantial criticism from Maoists and Castroites, enables the Soviet Union to pursue a gradualist policy of helping to overturn the U.S. monopoly of influence in the Latin American region. The continuing, if reduced, military assistance program in Cuba, while not imperiling the success of this major policy, may still afford the Soviet Union long-term opportunities for the support of militant revolution in Latin America.

CONCEPTS OF WARS IN SOVIET DOCTRINE

Soviet doctrine distinguishes three basic types of wars: (1) general and strategic war; (2) local-limited war; and (3) wars of liberation. Soviet spokesmen strongly condemn the first two types of wars but emphasize the duty of communists to support wars of liberation. Soviet sources, however, are somewhat ambiguous in distinguishing between the various types and are occasionally even contradictory. While Soviet doctrine is fully developed as regards general and strategic war, other types of war concepts are not fully articulated. Accordingly, Soviet policy toward non-strategic wars, whether local wars or wars of liberation in doctrinal terms, must be interpreted not only from Soviet statements but also through empirical analysis of Soviet behavior toward these conflicts.

In no area of discussion about the use of force to achieve international objectives are Soviet statements more vague and more contradictory than in the case of wars of liberation. It is frequently assumed that these types of wars refer solely to conflict initiated by communists or other revolutionary elements within a society, usually the so-called national bourgeoisie, against a capitalist-colonialist incumbent government. This interpretation, in fact, has been given credence by Khrushchev's extensive review of world politics in a speech before a group of world communist leaders meeting in Moscow in January 1961.¹ Other Soviet statements seem to suggest, however, a much broader definition of wars of liberation.

A 1964 article written by two Soviet army colonels identifies Soviet military aid to incumbent governments in Indonesia, Egypt, and Algeria as aid to "national liberation movements."² Another article justified Soviet military aid to newly independent nations as necessary to assist these nations in their "fight against colonizers."³ This theme, that incumbent governments are also forces of national liberation, was repeated in a 1965 commentary which stated that the Soviet Union grants new nations "long-term credits at favorable terms . . . to strengthen their national-liberation armies and provide them with modern military technology."⁴ The military of the new nation-states are regarded as forces of national liberation in conflict with capitalism and colonialism, whether at home or abroad. Military aid to these incumbent revolutionary-type governments is justified, since the "armed forces of these countries have acquired an anti-imperialist character" and are struggling to free themselves from foreign control.⁵

These statements, coupled with Soviet aid behavior, suggest a broad interpretation of wars of liberation, which includes at least three distinct elements: first, struggles by revolutionary elements, communist or not,

¹ See Charles Burton Marshall (ed.), *Two Communist Manifestoes* (Washington: Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1961), *passim*.

² Lt. Col. G. Eckov and Colonel Prilepskii, "World Socialist System: A Decisive Contemporary Factor, *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Communist of the Armed Forces), no. 22 (November 1964), pp. 34-41.

³ Colonel S. Kukonin, "The Character of our Epoch and the General Line of the World Communist Movement," *ibid.*, no. 21 (November 1964), pp. 15-22.

⁴ "Contemporary Stage of the National Liberation Movement," *ibid.*, no. 6 (March 1965), pp. 67-71.

⁵ Colonel E. Dolgopolov, "Armies of Liberated Africa," *Krasnaia Zvezda* (Red Star), September 25, 1965, p. 3.

within a state against an incumbent capitalist government; second, conflicts of communist states in the less-developed world against capitalist governments; and third, wars by non-communist but left-oriented new states against capitalist nations. All three types of wars of liberation are to be supported and encouraged by the Soviet Union through the provision of military assistance. These wars are "holy wars," "just wars"—legitimate instruments for hastening the day of world communism.

The Soviet government would prefer, of course, to back recipients who have some reasonable chance of winning their wars of liberation. At the same time, Soviet decisions must also take into account the opponents of the wars-of-liberation forces. Thus the Russians might support even a losing side if the other combatant were a western country or strongly oriented toward the west. On the other hand, they would not support a preferred but losing side in a case where neither protagonist was closely linked to the western powers. With these standards in mind, it should be noted that the Soviet Union has not supported indigenous communist movements in wars of liberation against anti-colonialist, nationalist-bourgeois regimes when it appeared that the communist forces could not possibly succeed. Examples of this policy of restraint include Soviet disinclination to aid communists in Egypt and Indonesia against friendly regimes or even Indian communists against the neutralist government of India.

In instances where insurgents faced neutralist regimes not friendly to the USSR, but where the insurgents had little chance of success, the Russians have displayed some ambivalence but generally have opted for the winning side, notably in Iraq. Despite frequent strains in Soviet-Iraqi relations, particularly in the 1960-63 period, the Soviet Union did not materially assist the Kurdish insurgency except by attempting to persuade Iraq to seek a negotiated settlement with the Kurds. In 1964, when Iraqi policy became more favorable to Moscow, Kurdish aspirations were disregarded; both Iraq and Syria received Soviet military aid for almost certain employment against Kurdish wars-of-liberation forces.


In those cases where insurgents, whether communist, leftist, or moderate nationalist-bourgeois, faced regimes clearly hostile to the

USSR, they benefitted from Soviet support, at least on a limited basis, even if they had little probability of success. Hence Soviet arms arrived for Lumumba and his followers in the Congo in their efforts to liberate territory controlled by the Belgians. The chance of success in this conflict was minimal. Illustrative of the same policy would be the limited amounts of weapons supplied to clandestine, sublimated warfare operations in Portuguese Africa.

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NEW YORK TIMES
25 March 1970

Thieu, at Rite Tomorrow, Will Start Land Reform Program Intended to Aid a Million Tenant Farmers

SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 24—Presidential Nguyen Van Thieu is scheduled to promulgate on Thursday a sweeping land reform program designed to make the Government a bigger benefactor of the landless peasant than the Vietcong have been.

The revolutionary program prohibits virtually anyone from owning land he or his family members are not themselves cultivating. It provides for the Government to buy up such land—more than two million acres—and distribute it free to the one million families who have been working it as tenant farmers for absentee landlords.

The land reform, called "Land to the Tiller," is, on paper, one of the most ambitious and progressive land redistribution programs ever promulgated in non-Communist Asia.

However, said one official, who is enthusiastic about the program and who has worked closely with the South Vietnamese to put it into effect, "the administrative capacity and political will of the Government is a moot question."

One high-ranking American pacification official who has investigated some of the Vietnamese officials who will administer the program at the

local levels reported having found them either corrupt or inefficient.

U. S. Action Urged

His recommendation that the United States Embassy take an immediate and firm stand against such appointments, which could doom the program before it has a chance to take hold, has reportedly set off a debate within the embassy.

The strong commitment of President Thieu to the program, which he introduced in a National Assembly bill last July 2, has not been questioned. The President has called it his first major piece of social legislation.

The lower house approved the bill Sept. 9 over the objections of landowners, who denounced it as "an inhuman, immoral, unscientific, Communist policy of proletarianizing the people."

The Senate gave its approval March 9, Thursday, the day President Thieu has set for promulgating the program at a ceremony in Cantho in the Mekong Delta, has been declared a national holiday.

Landlords to Be Paid

The program is designed to give land ownership for the first time to the tenant farmers who now work 60 per cent of the country's ricelands and pay rents of about 30 per cent of

the crop to the landowners.

The Government is to pay absentee landlords a purchase price for their land set at two and a half times the value of the average annual paddy yield. The land will then be given free to the tenants who have been cultivating it. Tenants in the rice-growing Delta are to be given 7.4 acres while those in the more rugged central highlands will get 2.4 acres.

Under terms of the legislation, landlords who farm their own land will not be allowed to keep more than 37 acres. Exempt from the redistribution program are small plots set aside for ancestor worship, land owned by religious organizations, industrial crop-and-orchard land, industrial building

sites, salt fields, land designated for urban planning and some other minor categories.

Expropriated land, in cases where there are no tenants, will be given to families of war victims, soldiers and displaced refugees—in that order—who file applications.

To prevent a new cycle of absentee ownership and tenancy, sale of redistributed land is prohibited for 15 years—a provision that some experts consider too sweeping in view of the need to create farms of more economical size. But that prohibition can be revised in forthcoming legislation.

The landowners forced to sell will be paid 20 per cent in cash and the remainder in eight-year guaranteed government bonds bearing 10 per cent interest.

after pacification, the landowners driven out by the communists would be restored. And as long as the communists could tell the peasants in areas they controlled that the landlords would follow the South Vietnamese army, they had a powerful propaganda weapon. But now pacification need hold no terrors for the peasant made a proprietor by the Vietcong. He will be allowed to go on farming his land. It will take him a year to establish legal tenancy, after which he can claim ownership. There is no automatic confirmation of ownership, and the delay may give rise to counter-claims or intimidation. But there is security of tenure, and a clear statement of principle.

The reforms will not be easy to apply. Money to compensate landlords will come from the Americans, through their general programme of budgetary support. The total runs to more than 46 billion piastres (between \$100 million and \$400 million, at the official or the prevailing black market rate). The issue of government bonds will help to spread payment over several years.

But insecurity and lack of confidence are the biggest problems. So long as villagers cannot sleep soundly at night it is unlikely that they will place much value on a piece of paper giving them legal title to their land. More than a thousand civilians and village officials have been murdered by communist terrorists so far this year.

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 11, 1970

Land to the tiller

Now that President Thieu has signed the "land to the tillers" bill, the government of South Vietnam can get under way with its ambitious new programme of land reform. As many as 800,000 tenant farmers may be given free title to their fields.

The new law provides for the transfer of up to 2½ million acres now held by big landowners. If it works, it will create a whole new class of small peasant proprietors with a stake in the country and—the government hopes—a personal commitment to the anti-communist cause. From this angle, it may be the most intelligent political move that has so far been made in South Vietnam.

Land reform has been tried before, with little success. President Diem broke up some of the big estates and bought

up the French plantations. But his reforms were limited in scope and founded on official corruption and the landowners' stratagems. Since 1968, the present government has been handing out land more quickly and has offered credit facilities for peasants wanting to buy their plots. These measures naturally had little appeal for those who had been given, or promised, land by the Vietcong.

The new law goes beyond these rather grudging concessions. Any farmer tilling rented or vacated land can lay claim to 2½ acres in the central regions, and up to 7½ acres in the Mekong delta—enough for a comfortable living. Landowners are allowed to keep about 37 acres, providing that they work on their own estates. The government will pay compensation for confiscated land.

The most enlightened feature of the new law is the prescribed method of dealing with Vietcong land grants. The government's position used to be simple:

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

May 1970

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

May 8	Europe	25th anniversary of end of World War II in Europe (VE Day).
May 9	Czechoslovakia	25th anniversary of "liberation" by the Red Army.
May 7-10	Beirut	World Conference of Christians on Palestine, supported by the (Communist) World Council of Peace. A publicity-seeking effort...but it is expected to have only limited impact. (Avoid publicizing.)
June	Ulan Bator, Mongolia	Soviet-sponsored World Buddhist Conference.
June 27-29	Rome	Conference on Portuguese Colonies sponsored by the (Communist) World Council of Peace and the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization.

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THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(21 March - 17 April 1970)

1. Oddities about Soviet Liberation Anniversaries

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the end of World War II, which the Soviets are utilizing to remind their European Satellites of the Soviet "liberating" role and their claim to continuing hegemony over their Satellites. The instances of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are especially interesting, because of odd aspects of Soviet behavior in respect to the anniversaries, and because both countries had to be "re-liberated" by invading Soviet troops: Hungary in October 1956 and Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The celebration in Hungary of the liberation anniversary took place on 3 April; the anniversary in Czechoslovakia is to take place 9 May.

a. Hungary

The most important personage among the mixed bag of Satellite big-wigs attending the Hungarian ceremony was CPSU Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev. On arrival he took the unusual step of granting an interview to a Budapest newspaper in which he expounded at great length on how well the Soviet Union was doing domestically. As the attached New York Times article points out, this seemed odd considering the international nature of the occasion. The explanation undoubtedly lies in the increasing international awareness that the Soviet Union is actually in trouble in many domestic sectors, most notably its economy, which is marked by stagnation resulting from the conservatism of the Soviet leaders. It seems quite clear that Brezhnev, first among the conservatives, has become alarmed at the low opinion in which the USSR is currently held. Thus, Brezhnev took this occasion, as he will undoubtedly take many other occasions, to try to polish up the drab image.

The Hungarian occasion was being watched keenly to see what sort of attitude Brezhnev would register concerning the slightly off-center, unorthodox approach to economic management and intellectual freedom exercised in Hungary. The Hungarians have carefully experimented with decentralizing the economy and giving their intellectuals freer rein. This behavior clashes with the tight centralization of the economy and the stringent control of intellectuals in the USSR. To the Hungarians' surprise and relief, Brezhnev publicly professed himself pleased with the way things are run in Hungary. Nevertheless, Brezhnev also reiterated his doctrine of limited sovereignty according to which the international interests of Socialism [read: Soviet national interests] take precedence over mere national interests. Thus, it is safe to assume that while Brezhnev may be concerned with signs of unorthodoxy in Hungary, his main concern is that boss Kadar not boast about his experiments, that he keep reform within bounds, and that above all there be no anti-Soviet noises that might cause Brezhnev to invoke his doctrine after the manner of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

b. Czechoslovakia

To the Czechoslovak people, the Brezhnev Doctrine is no theoretical idea. It was invented and invoked as a justification for the Soviet invasion of 1968, a second "liberation" from "counterrevolutionaries" and "imperialist enemies." The date of the first liberation, from Nazi Germany, is fixed as 9 May 1945, and festivities of some sort are planned for 9 May this year. The curious thing is that while a new Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is to be formally signed (it has already been initialed by the contracting parties) as the highlight of the occasion, the text of the treaty is being kept secret! And it is not even certain it will be made public after the signing!

There is a ready, logical explanation of this odd reticence, though there is no guarantee of its accuracy. Like the 20 British Members of Parliament who wrote an advance protest to the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, one might surmise that the treaty contains provision for the permanent or indefinite stationing of troops in Czechoslovakia. If this be the case, it is only natural that the Soviets would not want to advertise it, particularly since the Czechs so fervently hope that the treaty will contain some indication of withdrawal. What seems more likely is that the treaty will contain a reiteration, in veiled form, of the Brezhnev Doctrine and a reaffirmation of the platitudes on international solidarity codified in the June 1969 World Communist Conference, with no reference to troops.

Presumably the treaty will eventually be made public, possibly with protocols concerning Soviet troops being kept secret! The original Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty was signed in 1943, and was renewed for another 20 years in 1963. There clarity ends -- why was it not continued to the end of its span?

2. French CP vs Yugoslavia over L'Affaire Garaudy

Roger Garaudy, dissident French Communist leader and theoretician who was purged from his positions of leadership in the Party last February, is famous among the growing corps of his fellow Communist dissenters for putting his finger most accurately and eloquently on the reasons for breaking with the Soviet Union. In the Czech invasion, Garaudy saw the imperialist quality of the Brezhnev Doctrine, but cast his criticism of the Soviet Union less on the Doctrine than on an important ramification of it, i.e. the fact that the Soviet Union cannot tolerate in any Communist party, least of all in Eastern Europe, any essential departure from its own practice of Marxism-Leninism. Garaudy is a prominent exponent of the belief that Communism can succeed only if every Communist party and Communist country can follow its own road and not be forced to imitate the Soviet model on Soviet terms. This same belief is precisely what caused Tito to break Yugoslavia away from Stalin's bear-hug in 1948, and it has remained Yugoslavia's fundamental belief ever since. It is quite natural therefore, that the Yugoslavs would support Garaudy in his quarrel with the French Communist Party (PCF). It is for this reason that last September, they published in their most prestigious journal, Komunist, an interview with Garaudy in which he freely expounded his "heretical" views. Now, expressions of support for Garaudy in less well-known Yugoslav periodicals have caught the eyes of PCF watchdogs and have prompted them to

accuse Yugoslavia of "crudely interfering in the PCF's internal affairs in the name of 'anti-Stalinism' and 'anti-dogmatism.'" (See attached L'Humanité attack and Le Monde account of the Yugoslav articles.)

3. What Do Dissenting Comrades Complain About?

Attached is a collection of complaints by members of what might be called the Dissenting Communist Community. They have been arranged in three groupings: a) the Brezhnev Doctrine and National Roads to Socialism, b) the Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia, and c) Democracy and Democratic Centralism. While they have been grouped under three headings, it is recognized that they are all very closely inter-related. Even this partial selection gives some notion of the common interests, despite geographic remoteness, of the Dissenting Communist Community.

WASHINGTON POST
4 April 1970

Brezhnev Says Russia Confident About Future

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUDAPEST, April 3—Soviet Party leader Brezhnev indirectly refuted reports of grave economic and political trouble in Moscow in a rare newspaper interview printed here today.

"The situation of the Soviet Union is firm," he said. "The Soviet people look with self-assurance into the future and are firmly resolved to realize the plan set: The creation of the material and technical basis of Communism."

The publishing of the interview in the Hungarian daily Nepszabadsag on the morning after his arrival in Budapest to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Red Army, was unusual.

Given the "international" nature of the state and party occasion, his decision to answer at some length a question on the internal situation in the Soviet Union was, seen by Hungarian sources as even more significant.

Plans Fulfilled

He said that the plans set by the 23d Soviet Communist Party Congress were being fulfilled "with success," in "all branches of economic and cultural construction."

The party leader dealt only generally with the Soviet economy, criticism of which he himself initiated in December with a speech to a party plenum and which is now continuing at the factory level all over the Soviet Union.

He said only that it was a principal task "to make our economy more intensive" by introducing scientific and technical advances and by "raising the efficiency of the direction of the people's economy."

Most observers did not see Brezhnev's performance here

as that of a man in a particularly weak position within his own party.

He rephrased the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist nations in a speech before the Hungarian parliament in the afternoon when he declared that no national interests of a socialist country should be enforced at the expense of the international interests of socialism.

This statement, in a city where Soviet tanks crushed the 1956 uprising, was taken as a reaffirmation of the Soviet leader's line of consolidating the East European bloc.

At the same time he made a strong new pitch for a European security conference which he said should be approached in a "sober and realistic" way rather than by "spectacular actions in the political sphere."

But he warned that the situation "is made more complicated by the fact that American imperialism has entered more and more vigorously into the key industries of Western Europe's economic life, attempting to stem the progress of progressive forces in Europe."

Some interpreters of trends in the Kremlin have suggested that the economic self-criticism unleashed by Brezhnev in December could mean a period of more economic orthodoxy and centralized discipline, which could put the brake on reforms being initiated in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

However, Brezhnev said in his interview that he favored the "further improvement of socialist democracy," and at the political level "expansion of the contact of the party with the masses, the development of the creative spirit and

strength of initiative of the Soviet workers . . ."

Hungarian Regime

These are trends already being fostered by the Hungarian regime of Janos Kadar.

Hungarian sources this week viewed the attendance of Brezhnev here as an achievement for the Budapest regime, and a confirmation of Soviet approval for its cautious reform course.

For several years, Hungary has been slowly implementing a "new economic mechanism." Prices have been freed in some sectors of the economy, the private sphere has been enlarged and foreign investment is being encouraged. This week, the AP revealed from Hungarian sources that the country's foreign trade balance broke out of the red in 1969 for the first time, with a surplus of \$60 million.

In a speech to the Hungarian National Assembly this afternoon, Brezhnev was glowing in praise of Kadar, whom he described as a "distinguished son of his country and a true friend of the Soviet Union."

Hungarian Revolt

Though Saturday's military parade and festivities will be to commemorate the Soviet liberation—an event recalled in photographs in dozens of downtown shop windows this week—many here still remember 1956 when Russian tanks crushed the Hungarian revolt.

Kadar, in his speech in Parliament, referred to the "sectarian mistakes which had caused the crisis and led to the 1956 counter-revolutionary uprising, which was overcome with the support of true Communists in the country, and with the support of the Soviet Union."

LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 April 1970

Hongrie

Différence de ton entre MM. Kadar et Brejnev sur l'intérêt national des pays socialistes

Budapest (A.F.P., A.P.). — Les Hongrois célèbrent avec faste le 25^e anniversaire de la libération de leur pays. En effet, le 4 avril 1945, les dernières unités allemandes quittaient le territoire hongrois (voir le Monde des 24-25, 26 et 27 août 1969, F. Fetjő : « Il y a vingt-cinq ans à l'Est. »).

Au cours d'une séance solennelle au Parlement, M. Brejnev a prononcé un long discours dans lequel il a notamment dit qu'en dépit des aspirations ou des velléités de certains pays l'U.R.S.S. entendait demeurer le chef incontesté du camp socialiste.

M. Brejnev a déclaré que « tous les pays frères luttent pour l'établissement de la division socialiste du travail et pour le développement de l'intégration socialiste. Les intérêts nationaux et internationaux des pays socialistes, de même que leurs intérêts politiques et économiques, sont imbriqués au sein d'un ensemble étroitement uni. Les pays socialistes ne doivent pas chercher à défendre leur intérêt national au détriment des intérêts internationaux du socialisme ».

Cette déclaration a été faite

par M. Brejnev après avoir entendu M. Kadar affirmer que « la question décisive en ce qui concerne la construction du socialisme réside dans la coordination entre les lois fondamentales applicables à l'échelon international et les données nationales spécifiques ».

Sans tenir compte de l'opinion du dirigeant hongrois, qu'il a qualifié de « grand communiste, bon fils du peuple hongrois et ami fidèle de l'U.R.S.S. », M. Brejnev n'a pas hésité à dire : « Nous partageons entièrement le point de vue qu'a exprimé souvent le camarade Kadar et selon lequel il convient que les pays socialistes ne cherchent pas à défendre leur intérêt national au détriment des intérêts internationaux du socialisme. »

Evoquant les problèmes internationaux, M. Brejnev a constaté qu'on ne « pouvait pas nier que des signes d'amélioration se sont fait jour ces derniers temps dans l'évolution du climat politique en Europe ». Il a affirmé néanmoins que la situation demeurerait « tendue et incertaine »,

en raison d'une « infiltration toujours croissante de l'impérialisme américain dans les principaux secteurs économiques de l'Europe ».

Le problème de la paix en Europe

En ce qui concerne le problème de la paix en Europe, il a rappelé la proposition des pays du pacte de Varsovie d'une conférence sur la sécurité européenne.

« Nous comprenons bien, a-t-il dit, que la solution des problèmes de la sécurité européenne est difficile et exige du temps. On ne pourra pas réussir en une seule conférence. Mais il est important de commencer, de trouver une approche acceptable par tous et de dégager les aspects sur lesquels les points de vue se rapprochent le plus. Cette façon de faire serait réaliste.

» Une condition indispensable à tout règlement durable sur le continent européen est la reconnaissance des frontières existantes,

résultant de la seconde guerre mondiale et des événements ultérieurs. Ces réalités et d'autres doivent être reconnues, y compris le respect de la souveraineté nationale de la République démocratique allemande », a-t-il ajouté.

De son côté, M. Walter Ulbricht a dit notamment : « Ces questions ne peuvent être négligées. La rencontre d'Erfurt, une initiative de la République démocratique allemande, a donné l'occasion au gouvernement Brandt de s'engager sur la route conduisant à la paix. Mais M. Brandt a éludé des questions fondamentales à Erfurt. Il s'est retranché derrière les accords de Paris de 1954 qui — c'est un fait bien connu — ont scellé la division de la nation allemande. »

Le chef du parti communiste est-allemand considère que la pierre de touche pour connaître les intentions réelles du nouveau gouvernement d'Allemagne occidentale est de savoir s'il reconnaîtra inconditionnellement les frontières européennes existantes et renoncera à ses « revendications illégales sur Berlin-Ouest ».

LE MONDE, Paris
5-6 April 1970

(Excerpts Only Translated)

"A Difference of Tone as Mr. Kadar and Mr. Brezhnev Discuss the National Interests of Socialist Countries"

It was with pageantry that the Hungarians celebrated the 25th anniversary of the liberation of their country. It was on 4 April 1945 that the last German units departed the territory of Hungary....

During a solemn session of Parliament Mr. Brezhnev made a lengthy address, during the course of which he particularly noted that in spite of the aspirations or the whims of certain countries, the U.S.S.R. intends to continue as the uncontested head of the Socialist camp.

Mr. Brezhnev declared that "all fraternal countries struggle to establish the division of socialist labor and for the development of socialist integration. The national and international interests of socialist states, the same as their political and economic interests, are intertwined in close unity. The socialist states should not seek to defend their national interests to the detriment of international socialism."

This declaration was made by Mr. Brezhnev after he had listened to Mr. Kadar affirm that "the decisive question concerning the development of socialism rests in the coordination of the fundamental laws applicable at the international level with specific national characteristics."

Without taking into account the opinions of the Hungarian head of state (whom he described as a "great communist, son of the Hungarian people, and true friend of the USSR"), Mr. Brezhnev did not hesitate to say: "We completely share the view often expressed by Comrade Kadar according to which socialist states do not endeavor to defend their national interests to the detriment of international socialism...."

DAGENS NYHETER, Stockholm
Thursday, 26 March 1970

Ryssarna blir kvar i Prag

PRAG, onsdag

De sovjetiska soldaterna har kommit till Tjeckoslovakien för att stanna. Den tillfälliga stationeringen av ryska trupper har nu blivit permanent.

Det framgår av det tjeckoslovakisk-sovjetiska vänskaps- och samarbetsavtal som undertecknades förra veckan i Prag, omtalar AFP. En artikel i den tjeckoslovakiska partitidskriften Tvorba på onsdagen tolkar avtalet så.

När sovjetiska trupper ingrep i Tjeckoslovakien i augusti 1968 skedde det med motiveringen att det var socialistländernas plikt att skydda socialismens landvinningar. Den tillfälliga stationeringen av trupper i Tjeckoslovakien skulle upphöra när en "inre konsolidering" inträtt.

Det nya fördraget innebär att stationeringen blivit permanent, med syfte att försvara socialistvärldens västgräns, menar Tvorba, som också tillägger att det nya fördraget säkert kommer att förstås av antisocialistiska krafter i Tjeckoslovakien och av deras pådrivare utomlands.

THE RUSSIANS STAY ON IN PRAGUE

Prague, Wednesday

The Soviet soldiers have come to Czechoslovakia to stay. The temporary stationing of Russian troops has now become permanent.

This is made clear by the Czech-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which was signed [sic] last week in Prague, reports AFP. An article in the Czech party newspaper Tvorba Wednesday interprets the treaty that way.

When the Soviet troops came into Czechoslovakia in August 1968, they came under the justification that it was the duty of the socialist countries to protect their territorial gains. The temporary stationing of troops in Czechoslovakia would end when an "internal consolidation" took place.

This new treaty means that the stationing has become permanent in order to defend the western border of the socialist world, comments Tvorba, which also adds that the new treaty surely will be criticized by anti-socialist powers in Czechoslovakia and by their instigators abroad.

LE MONDE, Paris
2 April 1970

Des philosophes yougoslaves témoignent leur solidarité à M. Roger Garaudy

(Correspondance particulière.)

Zagreb. — Le « cas » de M. Roger Garaudy a été suivi avec beaucoup d'attention en Yougoslavie. La presse a soigneusement enregistré chaque critique et chaque justification des points de vue du philosophe français. Ainsi, avant même que le Grand tournant du socialisme ne paraisse en librairie, il avait été publié presque intégralement en feuilletons par différents quotidiens, tels que le Politika de Belgrade ou le Vjesnik de Zagreb.

Mais en dépit de l'attitude de la presse et de la sympathie évidente qui perceait à travers les informations fournies, les milieux officiels ont réussi à éviter toute prise de position ou commentaire. Cette discrétion s'explique sans doute par la volonté des autorités yougoslaves de ne pas envenimer davantage leurs rapports — gravement endommagés après août 1968 — avec les partis communistes des pays de l'Est.

Cette prudence officielle vient d'être largement compensée par une manifestation de solidarité des philosophes yougoslaves avec M. Roger Garaudy. Ainsi, M. Predrag Vranitzki, auteur d'une monumentale Histoire du marxisme et membre du comité de rédaction de Praxis, revue philosophique connue pour son non-conformisme, a récemment exprimé son opinion sur la condamnation des thèses de M. Garaudy par le XIX^e congrès du P.C.F.

Dans une interview à Nin, hebdomadaire belgradois, il écrivait : « Pendant de longues années Garaudy a pratiqué lui-même une variante stalinisée du marxisme, tout comme ceux qui le critiquent à présent dans la Pravda, Konstantinov et les autres. A cette différence près que, chez lui, l'esprit créateur et autocritique l'a emporté d'une manière décisive sur un dogmatisme qu'il a su reconnaître et dont il a pu prendre conscience. Mais ceci ne serait pas suffisant pour permettre de jeter l'anathème sur lui. (...) »

« Roger Garaudy a été bouleversé par les événements de ces dernières années et surtout par le fait que, si tant de choses ont changé dans le monde, la politique des partis communistes est restée, elle, la même. Ainsi, la place de la classe ouvrière et des intellectuels dans les pays deve-

loppés est de nos jours bien différente de celle qu'ils occupaient dans le passé. Des tendances nouvelles se font jour au sein de la gauche en général. Nous avons été les témoins d'un mouvement profond chez les étudiants. Sous nos yeux, des peuples parviennent à leur libération. Les attaques contre la Yougoslavie se sont montrées sans fondement. (...) La Tchécoslovaquie a choisi elle aussi sa propre voie.

La chance historique ralée en France

» Et, malgré tout cela, le mouvement communiste a raté une chance historique en France pendant la grève générale, les attaques contre la Yougoslavie ont repris en raison de son désir d'indépendance et de sa tentative d'approfondir la démocratie socialiste par l'autogestion, les forces armées de pays socialistes ont empêché les communistes tchécoslovaques de choisir leur modèle de socialisme (...). En outre, les partis communistes réunis à Moscou n'ont pas eu le courage d'engager une discussion ouverte et critique sur l'acte qui avait discrédité l'idée du communisme plus que ne seraient parvenues à le faire des dizaines ou des centaines de théoriciens.

« C'est là, très sommairement, qu'il faut rechercher les raisons véritables du conflit autour de la personne de Roger Garaudy. Je tiens à ajouter aussi que ce règlement se fait selon un pontif bien connu : le prétendu travail de sape contre la conception léniniste du parti révolutionnaire, la prétendue mise en cause des positions fondamentales du marxisme, l'antisoviétisme, etc. Il faudra pourtant que les théoriciens du marxisme soviétique comprennent une fois pour toutes que critiquer des structures staliniennes n'est pas faire preuve d'antisoviétisme ! »

D'autre part, l'hebdomadaire culturel Telegram vient de consacrer en entier son supplément Spektar à l'œuvre de M. Roger Garaudy et à l'examen de l'évolution de sa pensée. « Il faut espérer, écrit l'éditorialiste de la publication zagréboise en évoquant le cas de M. Garaudy, qu'il s'agit d'une crise qui aura pour dernière conséquence une issue positive, car on n'a que trop vu d'usurpations dogmatiques, de confusions, de mystifications voulues ou inconscientes ».

PREDRAG MATVEJEVITCH.

YUGOSLAV PHILOSOPHERS DECLARE
THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH MR. ROGER
GARAUDY

By Predrag Matvejevitch

Zagreb. The Roger Garaudy "case" has been followed with much attention in Yugoslavia. The press has carefully recorded each criticism and each justification of the points of view of this French philosopher. In this manner, even before Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme (Socialism's Great Turning Point) appears for sale, it has been published almost entirely in serialized installments by various daily papers, such as the Belgrade Politika or the Zagreb Vjesnik.

But despite the attitude of the press and the obvious sympathy which can be glimpsed in the information given, official circles have succeeded in avoiding having any position taken or commentary made. This discretion is undoubtedly explained by the desire of the Yugoslav authorities not to embitter any further their relations -- which were seriously damaged after August 1968 -- with Communist parties of the countries of the East.

This official prudence has just been greatly counterbalanced by a demonstration of solidarity of Yugoslav philosophers with Roger Garaudy. Mr. Predrag Vranitzki, author of a monumental Histoire du Marxisme (History of Marxism), and member of the editorial board of Praxis, a philosophical journal known for its non-conformism, recently expressed his position on the condemnation of Mr. Garaudy's opinions by the 19th Congress of the PCF [Parti Communiste Français; French Communist Party].

In an interview with Nin, a Belgrade weekly, he wrote: "For many years Garaudy himself practiced a Stalinized variant of Marxism, just like those who are now criticizing him in Pravda, Konstantinov and the others. With just this difference, that for Garaudy, the creative spirit and the spirit of self-criticism decisively overcame a dogmatism which he learned to recognize and of which he became aware. But this would not be enough to have him denounced...."

"Roger Garaudy was distressed by events of recent years and especially by the fact that, while so many things have changed in the world, the policy of Communist parties has remained the same. For the place of the working class and of intellectuals in developed countries in our times is quite different from the place they held in the past. New trends are appearing within the left in general. We have been witnesses of a profound movement among students. Under our eyes, peoples are achieving their liberation. The attacks against Yugoslavia have been shown to be without basis.... Czechoslovakia has also chosen for itself its own course."

Historic Opportunity Missed in France

"And, despite all that, the Communist movement missed an historic opportunity in France during the general strike, the attacks on Yugoslavia have resumed because of its desire for independence and its attempt to deepen socialist democracy by self-management, the armed forces of the socialist countries prevented the Czechoslovakian Communists from choosing their model of socialism.... In addition, the Communist parties that met in Moscow did not have the courage to begin an open and critical discussion of the act which had discredited the idea of Communism more than tens or hundreds of theoreticians could have done."

"It is there, very briefly, that must be sought the true reasons for the conflict surrounding the person of Roger Garaudy. I want to add also that this settlement is being made according to a well known cliché: the alleged undermining of the Leninist conception of the revolutionary party, the so-called questioning of basic positions of Marxism, anti-Sovietism, etc. However, the theoreticians of Soviet Marxism will have to understand once and for all that criticizing Stalinist structures is not a proof of anti-Sovietism!"

In addition, the cultural weekly Telegram has just dedicated its entire supplement Spektar to the work of Roger Garaudy and to an examination of the evolution of his thought. "We must hope," writes the editorialist of the Zagreb publication in discussing the case of Mr. Garaudy, "that this is a crisis which will have as its final consequence a positive result, for we have seen only too many dogmatic usurpations, confusions, and either voluntary or unconscious mystifications."

L'Humanité, Paris
3 April 1970

A propos de deux articles de la presse yougoslave sur l'activité de Garaudy

DEUX hebdomadaires yougoslaves ont cru devoir exprimer leur solidarité avec Roger Garaudy.

Les citations données dans la presse française à ce propos montrent sans équivoque qu'il s'agit en fait d'une attaque en règle contre le Parti Communiste Français.

C'est ainsi que P. Vranitzki, dans le journal « Nin » de Belgrade, prétend que « des tendances nouvelles se font jour au sein de la gauche en général », mais qu'en mai-juin 1968 « le mouvement communiste a raté une chance historique en France ».

Autrement dit, s'il n'a pas été possible d'en finir à ce moment avec le pouvoir des monopoles et de leur substituer un régime démocratique avancé, la faute n'en est pas — selon P. Vranitzki — à ceux des partis de gauche qui ont refusé l'entente que leur proposait notre Parti en ce sens, mais... à notre Parti lui-même ! C'est, certes, le droit de quiconque, y compris d'un journal d'un pays socialiste, de porter une appréciation critique sur tel ou tel aspect de notre action. Mais c'est aussi notre droit de relever les calomnies. Il faut vraiment être aveugle ou irresponsable pour ne pas comprendre qu'en l'absence d'une union solide des forces ouvrières et démocratiques — union refusée par la gauche non communiste — la grande bour-

geoisie réactionnaire, aurait pu jeter la fraction la plus avancée de la classe ouvrière dans un bain de sang, briser pour longtemps le mouvement ouvrier révolutionnaire et instaurer une dictature militaire.

La réaction le souhaitait. Notre Parti a déjoué le calcul de l'adversaire de classe. Parce qu'il est conscient de ses responsabilités devant la classe ouvrière. On ne peut pas en dire autant de P. Vranitzki.

Celui-ci suggère par ailleurs que le Parti Communiste Français utiliserait avec Garaudy des méthodes « stalinienne ». P. Vranitzki cache soigneusement à ses lecteurs que les thèses et l'activité de Garaudy ont fait l'objet d'un large débat dans tout le Parti, que ce débat s'est déroulé publiquement, qu'il ne s'est trouvé que huit cellules sur 19.250 pour soutenir telle ou telle des positions de Garaudy et qu'au terme de cette longue et libre discussion, le XIX^e Congrès a été unanime à rejeter ces positions. Notre Parti a ainsi fait preuve d'un démocratisme profond, authentiquement léniniste. Les nombreuses délégations de partis frères présentes à notre congrès, y compris la délégation de la Ligue des Communistes Yougoslaves, ont pu s'en rendre compte. Mais P. Vranitzki sait-il ce qu'est la démocratie prolétarienne, lén-

niste ? A le suivre, il aurait fallu que tout le Parti se soumette aux idées d'un seul homme... Curieuse démarche de pensée pour quelqu'un qui se veut aussi farouchement « antistalinien » !

Quant à l'autre hebdomadaire, le « Spektar », de Zagreb, évoquant le cas de Garaudy, il place ses espoirs dans ce qu'il appelle une « issue positive » mettant fin aux « usurpations dogmatiques ». Qu'est-ce à dire, sinon qu'on en appelle ainsi à la lutte oppositionnelle au sein de notre Parti ? Le « Spektar » ne devrait pas fonder d'espoir là-dessus. Au lendemain du XIX^e Congrès, notre Parti est plus uni que jamais. Plus uni dans le refus des thèses opportunistes et dogmatiques de tous bords, plus uni dans l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre d'une politique créatrice et novatrice.

Cela dit, il est curieux qu'au nom de l'« antistalinisme » et de l'« antidogmatisme », le journal de Zagreb se permette une ingérence aussi grossière dans les affaires de notre Parti. Le Parti Communiste Français se fait, quant à lui, une règle de ne pas s'immiscer dans les affaires de la Ligue des Communistes Yougoslaves. Il ne manquera pas de réclamer le respect de cette règle par autrui chaque fois qu'il sera nécessaire.

WITH REFERENCE TO TWO ARTICLES IN THE YUGOSLAV PRESS ON GARAUDY'S ACTIVITIES

Two Yugoslav weekly periodicals considered it their duty to express their solidarity with Roger Garaudy.

The excerpts published by the French press in connection with this indubitably show that a regular attack against the French Communist Party (PCF) has been launched.

P. Vranitzki, for example, asserts in the Belgrade paper NIN that "new trends are appearing within the left in general," but that in May-June 1968 "The communist movement missed a historic chance in France."

In other words, if it was not possible at that moment to liquidate monopoly power and replace it with an advanced democratic regime, it was not the fault, P. Vranitzki says, of the leftwing parties which declined the alliance that our party proposed to them with a view of achieving this aim. It was the fault of our party! Obviously everyone, including a paper published in a socialist country, is entitled to judge critically certain aspects of our activities. But we have the right to refute slanders. Indeed one has to be either blind or irresponsible not to understand that without a powerful alliance of workers and democratic

forces, an alliance which had been rejected by the noncommunist left, the reactionary high bourgeoisie would have been able to subject the most advanced faction of the working class to a bloodbath, crush for a long time the revolutionary workers movement, and establish a military dictatorship.

The reactionary forces wanted this to happen. Our party frustrated the class enemy's design because it was conscious of its responsibilities toward the working class. This cannot be said of P. Vranitzki.

P. Vranitzki also suggests that the PCF has used "Stalinist" methods with respect to Garaudy. The author has been careful to conceal from his readers the fact that Garaudy's theses and activities were the subject of a wide-ranging discussion within the entire party, that this discussion was public, that only eight cells out of 19,250 supported some of Garaudy's views, and that at the conclusion of this long and free discussion the 19th congress unanimously rejected these views. Thus our party showed that it is profoundly democratic and truly Leninist. The numerous fraternal party delegations, including the League of Communists of Yugoslavia delegation, which were present at our congress were able to ascertain this. But does P. Vranitzki know what proletarian and Leninist democracy means? If one were to pursue his way of reasoning the entire party would have to submit to the ideas of one man...a strange way of thinking for someone who pretends to be so fiercely "anti-Stalinist!"

As for the other weekly periodical, the Zagreb SPEKTAR, when mentioning the Garaudy case it pins its hopes on what it calls a "Positive conclusion" which would bring "dogmatic usurpations" to an end. What is this but an incitement to an opposition struggle within our party? SPEKTAR should not base its hopes on this. Following the 19th congress our party is more united than ever before. It is more united in its rejection of any opportunist and dogmatic theses and in the formulation and implementation of a creative and innovatory policy.

This having been said, it is strange that the Zagreb paper should venture to interfere in such a crude manner in our party's affairs in the name of "anti-Stalinism" and "antidogmatism. For its part the PCF follows the rule of non-interference in the affairs of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. It will not hesitate to demand that this rule should be respected by others every time this proves necessary.

What Do the Dissenting Comrades Complain About?

Brezhnev doctrine and national roads to socialism

"The doctrine of limited sovereignty or socialist community was not invented either by Western propaganda or the so-called revisionists, but by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries whose troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The article we mentioned in Soviet Russia clearly confirms this. It says, among other things, that the sovereignty of a state not only says, among other things, that the sovereignty of a state not only is a concept of international law but it also has class character. This reference to class character actually represents the arrogation by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every socialist country which, but its criteria, is building socialism in accordance with its own specific conditions and not on the basis of foreign models.

"According to the paper [Soviet army Red Star], varying models of socialism are not acceptable and deserve only to be condemned because the Soviet experience has allegedly shown that there is only one road to socialism.

"These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia rejects them as dangerous for the unity of socialist countries and the Communist and workers movement. It is all the same to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country is part of the doctrine of limited sovereignty or whatever other name this doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but the essence of the policy."

Milika Sundic (Yugoslavia) Zagreb Radio
31 January 1970

"As it happens, the current Soviet leaders are opposed not only to changes which have become necessary in the Soviet Union but to all attempts by Communist parties (especially in the socialist nations) to develop models of socialism corresponding to their social structures and national histories."

Roger Garaudy (France) in The Great Turning Point of Socialism, 1969

"This campaign has assumed such proportions that in order to insure their hegemony based on dogma of the single model the Soviet leaders, like the Chinese leaders, became involved in a decisive policy at the international level, not hesitating to require in each country a purge of those who opposed this principle and to bring about deliberately a split in the communist parties where this opposition was too strong....

"... 'Stalinism', that is to say that specific form of dogmatism which consists in presenting as a universal and single model the form of socialism which history imposed in Russia, in a country where there was conflict between the problems of building socialism and those of fighting underdevelopment with all that implies by way of economic centralization to the n-th degree and of limitations on democracy."

Roger Garaudy (France) in The Whole Truth, 1970

"The new economic development and the problem of the transition to socialist democracy from the undemocratic Stalinist system represent a complex of two problems and one of them cannot be solved without the other. It is a fateful international consequence of the Stalinist development that the cause of the development of socialism in Russia lost the power of a common cause among European movements in relation to socialism. It is not true that the Frenchmen or the Italians are socialists because they would like to live as workers in the Soviet Union live. They would not want to live like that. If they are true socialists, they want a socialist life and they do not consider the life of a worker or a collective farm member in the Soviet Union a socialist life."

Gyorgy Lukacs (Hungary) interview for Borba, Belgrade
1, 2 January 1970

"The Moscow leadership considers the order prevailing in the Soviet Union as being the generally valid, obligatory model of socialism, and it reserves itself the sole right of deciding what is socialist, communist, and Marxist-Leninist, and what is not. The Moscow leadership sent its troops into Czechoslovakia, there to 'save' socialism -- because the Czechoslovak communists had dared to propose another model of socialism, and even to begin implementing it. The Moscow leadership undertook its 'rescue mission' automatically and unasked, without consideration of the principles of national self-determination and sovereignty; the fact alone that it was able to do so already gives reason to seriously doubt its socialist character."

Tagebuch Zeitschrift fuer Kultur und Politik (Austrian Communist)
May 1969

"Soviet Neoimperialism. In the light of Marxism, everything would indicate that if contradictions are more antagonistic in the east than in the west, war, rebellion and national liberation movements will be greater where there are more contradictions. War between the USSR and China can be nearer, be more probable than between China and America or between America and the Soviets. But there are some whose ideologies will not let them see the realities of our times, when it is a matter of applying Marxist dialectics to the resolution of contradictions in the east, where there is state capitalism and not socialism."

Accion Montevideo, Arapey (Uruguay)
1 September 1969

"Identifying the USSR with socialism is a dangerous expedient.... But it is even more inadequate to establish an identity between socialism and the leadership of the CPSU. Historical experience should teach us to be very cautious on that topic since the political changes which have occurred in the USSR are, among other things, characterized by the fact that each new leadership team denies and almost absolutely denounces the preceding team. Once upon a time, socialism supposedly was Stalin, then Malenkov, then Khrushchev, and now Brezhnev. But, if the incarnation of socialism comes down to being what each one of these leaders says about his predecessor, then socialism would be a very poor thing indeed."

Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem, 1969.

Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia

"We assert that the [1968] Czechoslovak CP firmly but with a clear spirit of tolerance and with a broadminded approach confronted the conspiratorial manipulations of its conservative wing. It prevented vengeance and retaliation and, with undeniable feeling for democracy and socialism, it effected the necessary changes in terms of personnel in the government and party apparatus, without resorting to the police methods of the past.

"We assert that the lack of understanding on the part of the current leadership group in the USSR was the principal factor for instability in Czechoslovakia. The conduct of the Soviet government aggravated the contradictions, stimulated negative or chauvinist positions, and enabled the counterrevolution to conceal itself behind the banners of the defense of the fatherland.

"Why did the USSR deliberately risk its prestige in so disastrous an adventure? In the final analysis, this represents the ultimate argument of those who believe that the intervention was right or necessary. If the Soviets did this, then there must have been some extremely powerful reasons to do so since people as responsible as they cannot deliberately perpetrate such stupidity. This is reason based on faith, the reason that springs from blind confidence in the USSR; this represents the remnant of a simple and naive past in which the word of the USSR was the sacred word of the fatherland of socialism, of the heirs of Lenin, of the heroic builders of socialism.

"Fortunately -- or unfortunately, depending upon the individual's viewpoint, that past has been smashed to bits. One cannot go on being a communist and a Catholic at the same time. Right now, is it more difficult to be a communist."

Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia - Socialism as a Problem, 1969

A Japanese Party leader denounced the invasion and occupation as "an unwarranted armed intervention, trampling underfoot Czechoslovak sovereignty and independence."

Tetsuzo Fuwa (Japan) Akahata, 21 September 1969

Moscow was accused with the intervention in Czechoslovakia "to have betrayed the confidence of the peoples of the world," and the party organ condemned the intervention as "disgraceful and unequalled episode in the history of the international communist movement." On the occasion of the anniversary of the invasion, the party organ referred to the self-immolation of Jan Palach and to the demonstrations of the Czechoslovak people, and declared, "Open criticism of the intolerable violation of the sovereignty of the country has been banned under the pretense of 'normalization' of the situation." Once again it was demanded that foreign troops be immediately withdrawn from Czechoslovakia.

Arnold Kuenzli, Frankfurter Rundschau
writing about the Japanese Communist Party
27, 30 December, 2 January 1970

The awesome, iron consistency of the Soviet moves in the CSSR since August no longer leaves any room for illusions. The Czechoslovak experiment has been terminated; this does not mean that it was unsuccessful. An experiment must be called unsuccessful if it does not provide any new insight. The Czechoslovak experiment brought more than one new insight. First -- in the seven months of the "Prague spring" -- the realization that socialist democracy is not an utopian idea but a realistic possibility; and in connection therewith a whole series of concrete insights into the nature of the means and ways, and into the methods and forms which permit in the age of the scientific-technical revolution to realize the initial ideas of the founders of scientific socialism; and finally, insights into the true nature of the results of 50 years of development after the first successful proletarian revolution in the concrete reality of history. We know incomparably more today about what socialism can be than we knew prior to the Czechoslovak experiment; and we also know why Czechoslovakia was not allowed to complete the experiment at a time when it just began to show the most promising success.

Tagebuch Zeitschrift fuer Kultur und Politik
(Austrian Communist) May-June 1969

"The undersigned believe that the condemnation of the occupation of Czechoslovakia expressed in August 1968 by a significant segment of the communist movement constituted an act of positive value at that time.

"Still, if the workers' hope for the advent of a genuinely socialist society is to be kept alive in the long run, that condemnation -- lest it seem a mere inconsequential and platonic gesture designed to impress the other leftist parties and public opinion -- should be followed by the condemnation in our country of a so-called 'normalization' imposed by a foreign army on a nation 87 percent of whose people had approved of its political orientation towards a 'humanist' socialism.

"Approving the essential decisions of January 1968 which tended broadly to enlighten the working masses, to recognize their real aspirations, and to train them for the task of managing a socialist state, the undersigned condemn the present attempts to mask, minimize or cause France to forget the effects of the Soviet military intervention against socialist Czechoslovakia. Thus they reaffirm their solidarity with those who tried to create a socialist society in which political power would be transferred from the hands of the bureaucrats to those of the workers."

Declaration by French Communist militants, Le Monde, 16 January 1970

"We must really sit up and take notice as we see that, in the new situation estimates, which we learned about in connection with this problem from the publications of the Czechoslovak party assemblies, there is not a single element pointing to a concrete preparation of a counterrevolution which allegedly might have endangered socialism in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. More than that: arguments which were brought up in the past (about suspected weapons caches and the like) are not even being mentioned anymore now. Today, the discussion is concentrated on whether the policy and the methods, applied by the Czechoslovak party on a number of issues, were correct. The issue now revolves around internal party questions, around problems of relationships with other forces in the National Front, around forms of managing the press organs, etc. The fact that things shifted to this area can only strengthen us in our conviction that there can only be a political solution for this kind of problem."

Article by Spanish CP, Wiener Tagebuch, January-February 1970

"In 1948, Yugoslavia having been the first socialist nation to confront authoritarian dogmatism and seek its own approach to the construction of socialism, its leaders were denounced as counterrevolutionary agents, spies, murderers, and fascists. These accusations were again levelled 20 years later, in the name of the same postulates and even more brutally, when on 21 August 1968 Soviet tanks crushed the attempts by Czech communists to develop a "model" of socialism corresponding to the requirements of a highly developed society. Brezhnev thus went beyond the limits of Stalinism; at least Stalin did not invade Yugoslavia!"

Roger Garaudy (French) The Great Turning Point of Socialism, 1969

Democracy and Democratic Centralism

An underground letter, now circulating in Moscow, purportedly by well known Soviet citizens, urges major changes in Soviet society including "anti-democratic traditions and norms ... which appeared during the Stalin era and have not been completely liquidated."

From Washington Post, 3 April 1970

"The occupation of Czechoslovakia has crushed a unique chance socialism had in Europe. Nevertheless, the nonviolent democratic revolution in Czechoslovakia has made it clear unforgettably how great the possibilities of socialism are in a no longer capitalist society. It is to be hoped that the realization will prevail in the Soviet Union -- someday -- that the competition with the capitalist world cannot be won without democracy, that a gigantic power, which more than 50 years after the victorious revolution trembles every time somebody drops a leaflet, that such a gigantic power throttles the development of its own creative forces."

Ernst Fischer (Austria) Wiener Tagebuch, January-February 1970

"I think that around this revolves the problem of "socialist democracy" (in fact, I believe there can be no socialist democracy without democracy within the party and without a leadership function of the party understood in Lenin's terms.) Also around this problem revolves that of the "national road." It seems to me beyond question that the clash between the Soviet and Czechoslovak comrades was about this, and not about the "national road."

The Soviet comrades continue to hold a concept of the leadership function of the party in which the party as the center of everything, becomes identified with all of society and does not recognize any independent power center except as a "transmission belt."

Francesco Malfatti, (Italian) Rinascita, 26 December 1969

"Because of its very own status, because of its level of awareness, because of its Marxist upbringing, because of its cultural education and because of the availability of information, this intelligentsia, as a prior condition for its development, demands socialist democratization on an urgent basis.

The [Soviet] bureaucracy, which feels that this socialist democratization means the progressive diminution of its power and its privileges, forcefully opposes this and punishes its most apparent manifestation, the intellectual rebellion, with a strictness that claims to be a warning and that, as far as we can see now, only stimulates the call for democratization."

Teodoro Petkoff (Venezuela) Czechoslovakia -- Socialism as a Problem, 1969

"The speech of the secretary-general of the Spanish CP, Mr. Santiago Carrillo, at this same Moscow conference backed the statements of the Italian delegate. Roger Garaudy quotes it under the heading "Socialism Has No Mecca."

"We would like to stress," Mr. Carrillo said, "that contrary to what occurs in our parties, the international communist movement is not guided according to the principle of democratic centralism. Problems of principle cannot be solved here either by ballot or by majority rule."

Review of The Whole Truth by Roger Garaudy in Le Figaro, 24 February 1970

