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17 Sep 45

RETURN TO:

Director
Aerospace Studies Inst
ATTN: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

[redacted]

SUBJECT: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment

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Whitehouse Leather Products Company, Inc.
360 FURMAN STREET
BROOKLYN, N. Y.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment

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WAR DEPARTMENT

[redacted]

SUMMARY SHEET

F
R
O
M

TO: WDGS

AC/AS-1

Lt.Colonel Hippert/73430

SUBJECT:
Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment

1. On 1 September 1944, the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. John J. McCloy addressed a memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policy recommending that the War Department General Staff review existing War Department policies regarding the participation of negro troops in the Post-War Military Establishment based upon a study which would include all experiences during World War II.

2. The Advisory Committee approved the memorandum and it was later approved by the Secretary of War.

3. On 23 May 1945, a memorandum from the Director, Special Planning Division was addressed to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces directing that a study be conducted. (See Tab A to Incl. 1)

4. Pursuant to the memorandum referred to in paragraph 3 above there is transmitted herewith the study conducted by the Army Air Forces, conforming to the desired outline. The study indicates:

a. That the policies of the Army Air Forces conformed to War Department policies with respect to training and utilization of negro troops.

b. That in training of personnel:
Negroes were selected for specialist training on the same basis as white troops with the exception of aviation cadets who were accepted with a lower stanine (aptitude) score in order to secure sufficient candidates to meet negro pilot requirements.

c. That in training of pilots, navigators and bombardiers:
(1) More extensive screening was necessary to secure candidates for pilot training among negroes than among whites.
(2) The training time required for negro pilots was the same as for white pilots.
(3) The proficiency attained by graduates compared to whites.
(4) The elimination rate and accident rate was higher for negroes than for white.

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d. That in combat (flying) units
   (1) The training time for negro units was considerably longer than for white units.
   (2) The proficiency of negro combat flying units was below that of white units.
   (3) The intelligence and educational level of negroes was decidedly below whites.

e. That in technical schools

   (1) The training time in technical schools was the same for negroes as for whites.
   (2) The proficiency attained by negro graduates compared to that of white.

f. That in on-the-job training

   (1) The proficiency attained in on-the-job training by negro specialists was below that of white.
   (2) The training time in on-the-job training was longer in the case of negroes.

g. That in combat support units

   (1) The unit proficiency in training of negro support units was below that in white units.
   (2) The training time required for negro support units was longer than for white units.

h. That in performance

   (1) The negro combat flying units performed creditably--limited by lack of initiative on the part of negro pilots and the unsatisfactory maintenance of aircraft.
   (2) The overseas performance of the negro air service group was unsatisfactory.
   (3) The performance of personnel in combat support units was generally satisfactory although less than white. The degree of proficiency was limited by the shortcomings of negro enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and privates. Negro officers were satisfactory but less proficient than white. There are exceptions of superior performance in practically all grades and MOS's.
   (4) The performance of combat support units was generally satisfactory except where the mission involved highly technical skills.

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(5) The performance of individuals in the ZI in Base Units was generally satisfactory--some individuals performing very satisfactorily, satisfactorily and unsatisfactorily in practically all functional fields.

i. That overseas there was very little disorder or irritation arising from racial conflicts, however in the ZI the following are the general reasons for irritation and disorder.

(1) The unwillingness of the northern negro to accept the restraints imposed upon him in southern civilian communities and his reaction to the social segregation which such restraint implies. The majority of complaints have emanated from northern negroes or have been inspired by negroes from northern cities.
(2) The insistence of negro officer personnel for a strict interpretation of paragraph 19 of AR 210-10 relating to the common use of officers' clubs by both white and negro officers.
(3) The sense of negro flyers that the exercise of command function is not an exclusive prerogative of the white officer and that equal opportunity for both command promotion should be vested in the negro officer of demonstrated qualifications.

j. The recommendations with respect to the above are, briefly that:

(1) Negro personnel be trained on the same basis and standards as white.
(2) Qualified negro personnel be obtained for pilot training and for technical specialists by careful screening and selection.
(3) Negroes be utilized in positions consistent with their qualifications in the following manner:

(a) In separate combat flying units not to exceed the size of a Group.
(b) In separate service units not to exceed the size of a Group in support of the flying units.
(c) In other separate established T/O units, not to exceed the size of a battalion, in which negroes performed most satisfactorily in World War II and in such other units as their capabilities warrant.
(d) In base units in jobs requiring the maximum of their capabilities.
(e) In command of negro units to the maximum extent possible.

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(f) In overseas assignments on equal basis with whites.
(g) In ZI assignment in locations favorable to their welfare.
(h) In disciplinary matters there should be no favoritism or discrimination.
(i) Officer and NCO's assigned to negro units should be carefully selected and trained.

(4) Segregation
(a) Negroes should be segregated into administrative units.
(b) Segregation for recreation, messing and social activities be established in accordance with the customs prevailing within the surrounding civilian communities.

(5) Number
The AAF should receive only its proportionate share of negroes in the Army as a whole based on the relative size of the three major forces and the number of negroes in the AAF should not exceed 10 per cent of the total personnel assigned to the Army Air Forces.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

It is recommended that the recommendation in the attached study be approved by the War Department.

1 Incl
Study, "Participation of Negroes in PW Military Establishment with Tabs "A thru U"

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Lt. Colonel Hippert/cal/73430
Written 17 Sept 45

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment

DISCUSSION

1. Reference is made to memorandum from your office dated 23 May 1945, same subject as above, copy of which is attached. (Tab A)

2. The study, as outlined in the above quoted memorandum, follows:

a. A statement of policies followed by the Army Air Forces during World War II with respect to the training and utilization of negro troops.

(1) It is, at present, and has been, a basic personnel policy of the AAF that there will be equal opportunity for training and utilization for all military personnel. (Tab B) This policy conforms to existing War Department policy and regulations. Throughout World War II every effort has been made by the AAF to afford specialist training opportunities leading to officer, non-commissioned and technical ratings for negroes on an equal basis with white personnel, which would lead to assignments utilizing to the maximum extent the capabilities of all personnel whether overseas or within the Zone of Interior. The number of personnel trained has been limited by three considerations:

(a) AGCT Score required for entrance into certain courses.

(b) Consequent limitation on type groups that could be formed from known available personnel with proper AGCT rating.

(c) Military requirements for units.

(2) Training policies of the AAF have been in compliance with both the spirit and intent of War Department policies, as further evidenced below:

(a) General training policies are same for negro as for white personnel.

(b) It has been policy to train negro troops wherever possible in areas where unfavorable impact on civilian communities could be avoided and where the greatest

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opportunity for off-post recreation of the negro existed. Military requirements have precluded application of this policy in all instances. Negroes are trained at the same facilities as white personnel with the exception of three bases which were devoted solely to training negro pilots and combat units.

(c) Negro instructors are employed wherever practicable and available.

(d) Requirements for training negro personnel are the same as for white personnel except for air cadets. In the matter of air cadets in order to meet requirements it was necessary to lower stanine (aptitude) requirements for negroes. The stanine requirement for white pilots is seven (7) whereas it was dropped below this for negroes.

(e) Course lengths and standards of proficiency to satisfactorily complete courses for individual training are identical for white and negro personnel.

(f) Training time of negro units has been, in general, longer in order to meet standards of POM inspection for overseas shipment.

(3) Utilization policies of the AAF have been in strict conformance with War Department policy as evidenced by following policies and actions:

(a) Negro combat, service and service support units have been activated. At the outbreak of the war the combat units were Air Base Security Battalions. These were subsequently discontinued as the war became offensive and subsequent combat units activated were fighter and medium bomb squadrons.

(b) Negro officers have been utilized to command negro units when competent personnel was available. AAF policy has been, while desirable to utilize negro officers, not to endanger effectiveness of a unit and that, in general not to mix white and negro officers. Where this was necessary negro officers replaced white officers as they became available.

(c) Negroes have been afforded equal opportunity for overseas service. (See Chart, Tab C) [redacted]

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(d) Negroes assigned to other than T/O Units are assigned on a quota basis that is computed on workload and is not varied because of race or color.

(e) Negroes were assigned, where military requirements permitted, near communities having a large negro civilian population.

b. A historical report of actual experience in training with reference to degree proficiency attained and length of training time required.

(1) Personnel

(a) Pilots, Navigators and Bombardiers

1. Procurement and Selection

a. The procurement of negroes for pilot training from civilian sources during the war conformed to the procedure followed for white applicants. Generally speaking, it was necessary to accept lower stanine requirements than seems justifiable in order to obtain any number of negro pilot trainees. In some instances it was necessary to accept negro candidates with stanine (aptitude) scores as low as "2" in order to meet the pilot requirements. The highest possible score is "9". Within the Army intensive screening was conducted in all AAF, AGF and ASF installations after December 1944, when it became apparent that sufficient numbers could not otherwise be obtained when civilian sources were eliminated with the closing of air crew procurement in October 1944.

b. By this screening, sufficient volunteers were not obtained, necessitating the retraining as pilots, of surplus bombardiers who were qualified and volunteered. This source was exhausted in July 1945 and the August Pre-flight school fell short of its quota for the first time.

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c. During the period November 1943 to August 1944 - 15.6 per cent negroes qualified and 32.4 per cent white qualified for pilot, navigator, bombardier training on identical standards.

2. Individual Pilot Training

a. In evaluating the following paragraphs it should be borne in mind that negroes have been accepted with lower stanine scores than whites; that until the latter part of the war all negro pilots were required to qualify as fighter pilots inasmuch as there were no twin engine assignments available and they perforce had to be fighter combat calibre.

b. The length of training time required was the same for negro pilots as for white in the several pilot training classes.

c. It was difficult to define an objective scale of flying proficiency but negro pilots graduating from pilot training met the requirements of the applicable standards.

d. The Negro Fighter Training Replacement program which trained at Walterboro, South Carolina, had the highest abortive rates (return prior to accomplishment of training mission) for the period April - June 1945 in the First Air Force. The rate of aborts for this unit due to pilot error was also the highest.

e. During training negroes were checked on the same standards as whites. As an individual, compared with white pilots of the same stanine, the negro attained the same degree of proficiency within the same training time.

f. The accident rate for negro pilots was higher on overall average--but generally only very little higher than that of

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comparable white training bases. At Tuskeegee Army Air Field, the overall accident rate was usually less than that of some other stations. The accident rate of the Negro Combat Crew Training School program at Walterboro in P-40's was about three times as high as the average P-40 rate at Third Air Force bases during the four months period February - May 1945. Twenty-five of Walterboro's thirty-six accidents, or 69% during this period were attributable to pilot error.

g. The elimination rate of negroes was considerably higher than white. The comparative elimination rate for negro and white pilots in twenty-two classes during the period June 1942 to December 1944 was as follows:

	Primary	Basic	Advanced Single Engine	Advanced Twin Engine	Total Advanced
White	25.4%	11.6%	6.6%	2.6%	3.9%
Negro	33.1%	18.4%	13.2%	11.18%	12.7%

From October 1944 to May 1945, inclusive the comparative elimination was as follows:

	PILOTS				BOMBARDIER NAVIGATORS	NAVIGATORS AERIAL
	Primary Pilot	Basic Pilot	Adv.Single Engine	Adv.Twin Engine		
White	37%	13%	4.8%	2.1%	12.2%	21.3%
Negro	54.2%	24.2%	16.5%	11.9%	5.1%	20.4%

h. The Fatality rate for white and negro single engine pilots for the period October 1944 to May 1945, inclusive, was as follows:

	Primary Pilot	Basic Pilot	Adv. Single Engine Pilot
White	.13%	.33%	.45%
Negro	.2%	.24%	.37%

i. In combat crew training schools the attrition rate was higher in the case of negro pilots but at close of war it

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compared favorably to white units. Negro bombardier and navigator attrition compared to whites.

i. The problem of adaptability of negroes is definitely greater than for the white and it is generally an accepted fact that the environmental background of the negro has limited the percentage possessing leadership ability and strong motivation. Experience has shown that only a very limited number of negroes have the proper technical and educational background to make a successful military aviator and still smaller number are interested in flying.

(b) Individual training of specialists other than pilots, navigators and bombardiers

1. General

a. Training opportunities have, on the whole been greater for negroes than for white personnel with similar qualifications.

b. Handicaps of educaional background, lack of specialized ortechnical skill, general lack of quick technical perception, a lesser degree ofadaptability and a lack of developed military leadership are factors that have effected the use of negroes.

c. The negro does not respond readily to academic, theoretical instruction. He learns more readily from visual aids, demonstration and actual performance.

d. The negro has not attained technical positions because of (1) low intelligence, (2) limited education and (3) low mechanical aptitude. For the same reasons the bulk has been assigned to semiskilled and unskilled jobs.

e. The methods and standards for selection of negroes for specialist training were the same as for white. The curricula and standards were the same.

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f. Only a few negroes could qualify for attendance at AAF technical schools because of low AGCT Scores. The low AGCT Score brackets of negroes limit the type of training that can be assimilated. However selected students proved very amenable to instruction and qualified personnel within AAF Specialties and common specialties have been available to meet most requirements and to man tactical and base units.

g. The percentage of negroes having ability to command is appreciably lower than whites. On the whole they are not competent to command troops, in that they lack the desirable traits of initiative, responsibility and impartiality.

h. The number of negroes having ability to instruct has been found to be extremely limited, but that the ability of qualified negroes to instruct compares favorably with whites. Unless eminently qualified it has been found they lack the ability toprepare material for instruction and the power to sustain the continued interest of their students in the subject matter.

i. The percentage of negroes possessing administrative ability is low as compared with the army as a whole. They have been found to be lacking in responsibility and follow-through and require constant superivision and advice. However, negro personnel with backgrounds comparable to white administrative personnel have been found to be as capable.

2. Generally the degree of proficiency attained by negroes in training is less than white personnel (Tab D) but on the wholethe degree of efficiency falls into three divisions; those few negroes performing highly

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skilled jobs do so in a very efficient manner; those who like their duty assignments (mainly cooks, drivers and administrative personnel) also perform in an efficient manner; the remaining, where there is little interest in the job, such as the duty soldier, perform only the minimum amount of work required and no more.

3. Negroes met the same standards as applied to whites in technical schools and those who completed courses and returned to their bases showed an increased interest and devotion to duty in their new fields.

4. One command sent 121 negroes to Technical and officers candidate schools with the following result:

School Assignment	Sent	Eliminated	Reasons for Elimination
Aviation Cadet	7	2	Washed Out
Radio School	6	1	Physical Reasons
Cooks and Bakers	37	0	
OCS			
Infantry	4	1	Washed Out
Ordnance	1	1	Academic Reasons
Meat Conservation	2	0	
Ordnance (Vehicle)	3	0	
Signal	1	1	Academic Reasons
Dehydrated Foods	1	0	
Army Administration	2	0	
Q.M. Refresher	1	0	
Information and Education School	1	0	
Miscellaneous	55	7	Reasons not Stated
	121	13	

Given proper selection of personnel and training, there is no evidence that the negro cannot do a satisfactory specialized job whether administrative or technical. Negro specialists do best in jobs in which they have had previous training or experience.

In the Engineering Field, it is observed that due to lack of civilian training, it is not possible to find among negro troops, sufficient individuals with necessary trade

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experience to intially qualify them for certain MOS assignments on a competitive basis with whites. Negroes cannot keep up with whites and go into the field deficient and they lack the ability to readily make up their deficiency in on-the-job training. Experience in the Engineering field has indicated that negroes are equivalent to whites as welders and Construction Equipment Servicemen but are below whites in their proficiency in the following specialties:

Diesel Mechanic
Auto Equipment Mechanic
Carpenter
Clerk, general
Construction Technician
Draftsman
Electrician
Machinist
Construction Worker
Surveyor
Auto Equipment Operator
Construction Machine Operator
Clerk-Typist

In the chemical field, more selection and closer screening are required to obtain highly specialized technicians in chemical maintenance.

5. TAB E is a graphical representation of the ability, utilization and grades of white and negro soldiers in the Army Air Forces. The bulk of negroes have been found to be in the lower AGCT Score groups while the bulk of white personnel is in the higher groups. (Tab E-2)

6. A survey in a representative command indicates a definite relationship of Mechanical aptitude to AGCT Score. (Tab F)

7. The assignment to types of jobs has conformed generally to AGCT Scores in the Air Forces. (Tab E-5)

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[redacted] [redacted]

8. There was no difference in length of training time in Technical Schools. In on-the-job training, reports range from "same" to three times as long. In a sampling in a command, a number of reports were received from installations. (Tab G) This survey indicates the comparative length of training time required for negroes and whites by AGCT Score grouping in the various functional fields.

In AGCT Group I, out of 44 reports	20	indicated	negroes	required	longer	time
	3	"	whites	"	"	"
	21	"	same			
In AGCT Group II, out of 158 "	70	"	negroes	"	longer	time
	30	"	whites	"	"	"
	58	"	same			
In AGCT GroupIII, out of 250 "	110	Indicated	negroes	required	longer	time
	60	"	whites	"	"	"
	77	"	same			
In AGCT GroupIV, out of 291 "	145	indicated	negroes	required	longer	time
	67	"	whites	"	"	"
	79	"	same			
In AGCT Group V, out of 178 "	80	indicated	negroes	required	longer	time
	31	"	whites	"	"	"
	67	"	same			

(2) Unit Training

(a) Combat (Flying) Units

1. The utilization of negroes in combat units equipped with aircraft has presented a difficult problem. It was necessary to conduct extensive screening and to prolong training which has been more expensive than similar training for white units.

2. Negro pilots attained the minimum requirements imposed by training standards and POM Inspection which were the same as for white units. However, the time required for negro pilots to attain that minimum proficiency was longer than for white pilots. In brief, the training history of these units indicates that they were made up of highly selected personnel as illustrated by the following comparisons of AGCT Scores and educational background of Personnel of the 477th Bombardment Group as against the Air Force and the Army as a whole.

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Enlisted Men

AGCT Grps	WHITE Army Wide	WHITE AAF	NEGRO Army Wide	NEGRO AAF	NEGRO 477 Bomb.Gr.
Group I	7.6%	9.4%	.3%	.4%	1.4%
Group II	32.2	43.8	3.6	6.5	23.0
Group III	32.4	32.2	13.0	14.0	41.0
Group IV	26.3	12.9	62.0	47.4	30.0
Group V	1.5	1.7	21.1	31.7	4.6

The average number of school years of officers in the 477th Group was 15.5 while enlisted men had 10.3.

EDUCATIONAL COMPARISON

	White	Negro	477th Off	477thEM
High School Graduate	41%	17%	97.9%	50.7%
High School Non-graduate	29	26	2.1	30.7
Grade School	30	57	0.0	18.6

3. The pilots, navigators, bombardiers and technical specialists come to these units proficient in their specialties but not withstanding the fact that the personnel was individually qualified, the units were below the standards of white units. Although special squadrons of white personnel were used to assist in the operational training, administration, engineering and maintenance of these units, their administrative and maintenance was below that of white units and constant and close supervision was required.

4. The training time required by these units to meet the requirements for POM inspection exceeded the time normally required for white units.

5. The 477th Bombardment Group (m) was activated on 15 January 1944 and had not reached the required proficiency for overseas assignment by the middle of July 1945. However, it is pointed out that the group in June 1945 was reorganized into a composite group and was given a committment date of early fall 1945. The average training time from

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activation to commitment for similar white groups was three to four months. It should be borne in mind that pilots and co-pilots assigned to this group arrived in such small increments at such great intervals that it was necessary to start their training as individuals rather than by blocks or units. The authorized strength of flying officers was reached on November 1944. The group finished transition on 1 March 1945 and then entered the combat crew training phase. From that time on, pilots flew with complete crews and began the completion of minimum standards in accordance with AAF training standards and I Bomber Command Flying Training Guide.

6. The 332nd Fighter Group was committed to overseas assignment after a training period of fourteen months. The average training time for white Fighter Groups was three or four months.

7. Detailed reports are enclosed on the training of the two negro combat flying units, namely, the 332nd Fighter Group and the 477th Bombardment Group (M). (Tab H)-a general report of 1st Air Force on the two flying units; (Tab I) - a report on 477th Bombardment Group; (Tab J) - a report on 332nd Fighter Group.

(b) Combat Support units

1. In general negro units met the requirements of the same minimum training standards as white units but the time required was larger than for white units in comparable duty assignments. One command believes that the efficiency is from 60 to 75% that of white units and the training time is from 50 to 100% longer. Other reports indicate that training time for negro units extend 2 to 7 weeks longer.

2. With a few exceptions it can be generally stated that negro units do not attain the same proficiency in training as white units.

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This lack of proficiency is attributed to the following causes.

a. Great bulk of negroes are in lower AGCT Score Groups, thus retarding those who are qualified.

b. Attrition due to poor health is attributable to ignorance and low intelligence. Time lost from productive work by colored enlisted men because of sickness and sick call is 4.0% compared to 2.78% for white enlisted men. The attached exhibit, (Tab K) reflects comparative venereal disease rates. The number of colored enlisted men discharged under AR 615-368 "Undesirable Habits or Traits of Character" and AR 615-369 "Inaptness, Lack of Adaptability for Military Service or Enuresis" is 1% compared to one-half of 1% for white enlisted men in a representative command. These statistics indicate the degree to which poor health affects the length of the training period.

c. Discipline--A survey of the experience in the Air Technical Service Command indicates that time lost by colored troops as garrison prisoners is greater in proportion than that lost by white troops. Tab L indicates the rate of unauthorized absences for a month's period.

d. Lack of proficiency in MOS--In Engineer Units, it has been observed that due to the facts that colored personnel have not had the civilian training that white troops have had, it is not possible to find among the colored troops sufficient individuals with the necessary experience in the various trades to initially qualify them for certain MOS assignments on a competitive basis with white troops. As the training period is geared to the white troops, colored units go into the field deficient in training and lack ability to readily make up this deficiency in "on the job" training.

e. Lack of education--A high percentage of colored personnel cannot be trained to perform certain assignments such as surveyors,

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machinists, etc., due to lack of basic education.

f. Poor quality of negro noncommissioned officer, partially the result of lack of education, previous supervisory experience, and inherent racial characteristics.

g. Lack of respect on part of colored troops for colored noncommissioned officers.

h. Lack of initiative, ingenuity, accuracy, speed, and pride. Colored troops are much more inclined to laziness, indifference, and unsoldierly qualities than white troops.

i. Attrition--attrition in colored units for various causes is approximately 20 per cent greater than for white.

j. Persecution complex--This tendency impairs efficiency of colored troops. Routine duties are often interpreted as discrimination. Advantage is taken of this tendency by race-conscious malcontents, who are as a rule among the better educated, to encourage insubordination and create trouble.

k. Malassignment of white officers--Lack of understanding of human nature and characteristics and psychology of the negro race on the part of white officers is very detrimental to the morale and the efficient functioning of colored organizations.

l. Lack of sufficient supervisory personnel--Because of racial characteristics, colored troops require much closer supervision than white. Negro troops will not accept responsibility as do white troops.

m. Disregard for care of equipment--Due to a combination of ignorance and irresponsibility, wear and tear on equipment is much greater in colored units.

n. Tendency to become excited at the least provocation.

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o. Poor response to academic, theoretical group instruction. This necessitates a different method of training involving constant repetition, use of visual aids, demonstration, and individual performance.

p. Lack of understanding on the part of the negro soldier as to why this country is at war and why he should take part.

3. The type of negro units giving most satisfactory performance in training are:

Aviation Squadron
Signal Construction Battalion
Air Cargo Resupply Squadron
Base Units (Service Type)

4. The type of negro units giving satisfactory performance in training are:

QM Truck Co.
QM Truck Platoon
Ordnance Ammunition Co.
M.P. Co. Avn
Aviation Engineer Squadron
Chemical Depot Co.
Chemical Maintenance Co.

5. The type of negro units giving unsatisfactory performance in training

Medical Aviation Sq

6. The proficiency attained in administration in negro units is far behind that of the operational training. On some of the more recent engineer aviation battalions "principal difficulty - . . . . . was the shortage of trained clerks for both administrative matters and supply functions."

7. A report of training of Air Cargo Resupply Squadron is inclosed as Tab M.

8. A report of training of Eng. Avn. Units is Tab N.

9. A report of training of Signal Construction Bn. is Tab O.

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c. Historical Report of Performance

(1) Overseas

(a) Combat (flying) units

1. A report of performance of the 99th Fighter Squadron and 332nd Fighter Group overseas indicates the following:

a. That negro units performed more or less creditably. The Twelfth Air Force reports that during the period the two units assigned to it their performance was mediocre. The Fifteenth Air Force reports that the 332nd Group performed creditably in escorting heavy bombers although a general lack of initiative marked combat work.

b. That its ground echelon was below average. Maintenance was poor through most of the combat history of the 332nd Group and reflected on the combat efficiency of the unit.

c. That the effort devoted to making it efficient was far greater than that which went into the training and administration of a single white group.

d. Tab P - Report of AAF MTC on 99th Ftr. Squadron and 332nd Ftr. Group.

e. Tab Q - Special report of A-3, 15th Air Force on 332nd Group.

(b) Combat Support Units and Personnel

1. There follows a resume of the salient features of the reports of overseas Air Force Commanders covering the performance of support (non-combat) units and personnel. This resume is intended to cover the general experience and it is pointed out that there are exceptions, not only to this resume but also to the Air Force reports, which clearly indicate that there have been superior negro officers and men performing most creditably in practically every grade and job in the Air Force and further that some all-negro units have performed "in a thoroughly efficient manner" and have been "considered equal to any similar white unit."

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2. Individual Evaluation

a. Negro officers were of average intelligence, respect, loyalty, ingenuity, and endurance. They were sensitive to race discrimination. Their conduct was in keeping with the officers' code of conduct. They were below average in common sense, practical imagination, resourcefulness, aggressiveness, sense of responsibility, and in their ability to make decisions. They are prone to accept lower standards and to make allowances for misbehaviour. Certain officers were resourceful and aggressive but generally the negro officer was below the white officer in these respects. See Tab R-1 for extracts from overseas Air Force Commanders on this subject.

b. Enlisted men were not as satisfactory as white. Careful officer supervision was necessary; they were not dependable; they were careless about equipment; they were below average and not industrious; they were race conscious and considered "discrimination" as the reason for routine orders and assignment of duties. The feeling of being discriminated against is considered by one Air Force as being the greatest shortcoming of negro soldiers. See Tab R-2 for comments of overseas Air Commanders.

c. Non-commissioned officers are below average; they do not and cannot lead or control their subordinates with whom they are prone to fraternize and they require constant leadership themselves; they do not recognize their responsibilities; they do not exert proper authority and they lack initiative and resourcefulness. Lack of leadership has been expressed as the greatest deficiency in negro units. See Tab R-2.

d. Negro privates have not sufficient respect for their non-commissioned officers, in one theatre they are reported as referring to their noncommissioned officers as "Quislings". See Tab R-2.

[redacted] [redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

a. While the Basic determining factors are AGCT Score, selecting and training, the MOS's in which negroes performed most satisfactorily, satisfactorily and unsatisfactorily are indicated below.

11 Most Satisfactorily

Munition worker
Duty soldier
Cook
Carpenter
Entertainer
(See Tab R-3a for comments of overseas Air Force Commanders)

22 Satisfactory

Auto equipment operator
Baker
Auto mechanic
Painter
Construction worker
Duty NCO
Toxic gas handler
Welder
Cable splicer
M P
Basic Telephone operator
Guard Patrolman
Fire fighter
Lineman
Construction machine operator
(See Tab R-3b)

33 Unsatisfactory

Clerk non-typist
Intelligence clerk
Administration specialist
Classification specialist
Clerk typist
Surveyors
Auto equipment operator (Heavy)
Draftsman
Electrician
Aerial gunner
Ordnance supply technician
Highway construction machine supervisor
Supply clerk
Demolition specialist
Construction foreman
(See Tab R-3c) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

3. Negro units were generally considered below average in their manner of performance.

4. The types of units giving the most satisfactory performance are:

   a. Aviation squadron
      QM Truck Co
      Ordnance Co (Avn)
      Chemical Maintenance Co
      Chemical Depot Co
      Air Cargo Resupply Squadron
      Service Units
      Labor Units
      Engineer units where mission did not require high degree of professional skill, initiative or improvising techniques.
   (See Tab R-4a)

5. The types of units giving the least satisfactory performance are:

   a. AAA Gun Bn.
      Ordnance Depot Co
      Air Service Group
      M P units
   (See Tab R-4b)

6. There was divided opinion in respect to Signal Air Corps Warning Companies and Signal Construction (Heavy) Battalion.

7. One QM Truck Company officered by negroes was considered to be equal to any white unit of similar type. One Signal A/W Company officered by negroes "Functioned in a thoroughly efficient manner", and made a very creditable record in its limited combat experience.

8. The recommendation of the overseas Air Force Commanders as to future organization, command and utilization of negro soldiers is as follows:

   a. The organization should be a small non-combat unit of a size less than a group or battalion.

   b. Negro units should be officered by highly qualified and carefully selected all white or all negro officers and the officer complement should be increased by 50% to provide adequate supervision. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. It was consensus of opinion that low score personnel should be assigned to units having nontechnical missions such as labor units, port battalions and Ordnance Ammunition Companies; that the above average personnel be assigned to mechanical units such as Engine Repair Squadrons, Air Warning Companies, etc.; that high score personnel be used as Noncommissioned officers as in all negro units, as cadres and for training; that negro chaplains and medical officers be used in negro units.

9. Negro units performed creditably in their limited combat experiences.

10. Generally negroes have been properly classified and have been used to maximum of their ability.

11. It was the consensus of opinion that all white officers are most effective in leading negro units; that all negro officers are least effective and that mixed officers are more effective than all negro officers and less effective than all white.

(2) Within the Zone of Interior

(a) Except for training performance which is dealt with elsewhere, the utilization, and hence the performance, of negro troops in the ZI has been greatly limited to Base Units. Base Units furnished personnel for duty in practically all functional fields. The performance of negroes has not been as satisfactory as that of white troops although it has been satisfactory. (See Tab D for the comparative proficiency as found in one Command) Although a few negroes are comparatively intellignet and well educated, the majority have a low degree of intelligence, limited education and low mechanical aptitude. For these reasons the bulk of negro personnel in the ZI have been assigned to semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. There are exceptions which are noteworthy. Some negroes did less than satisfactory work in unskilled tasks while others did highly satisfactory work in highly skilled fields. Negroes who have qualified for and attended technical schools have shown an increased interest and devotion to duty in their new fields. One comment

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on negro mechanics at a training base is worthy of particular note. It was to the effect that all mechanical work at the station was performed by negro mechanics with no assistance or supervision from white mechanics; that there were only two white Engineering Officers on the station and that "there is indication that negro personnel can perform technical work without the necessity for close or constant supervision."

One command expressed the opinion that the degree of efficiency falls mainly into three divisions: those individuals performing highly skilled jobs do so in a very efficient manner; those who like their work (cooks, drivers, administrative personnel, etc.) perform efficiently and the remaining, where there is little interest in the job, such as a duty soldier; perform only the minimum amount of work required. A survey in one command indicating the functional fields in which negroes perform Very Satisfactorily, satisfactorily and unsatisfactorily in various AGCT Score Groups is found in TAB S.

d. A Historical Report of Typical Irritations or Disorders Arising from Racial Conflicts

(1) An analysis of irritations and disorders arising from racial conflicts during the present war indicates a fundamentally different reason for those which occurred within the Continental limits and those which occurred overseas. Therefore, the cases are handled separately in this report.

(2) There is attached as Tab T an analysis of a number of typical cases within the zone of interior. An effort has been made to select cases which cover the recurrent type of complaints. Many of these complaints, upon investigation, have proven to be of an inconsequential nature, submitted either through ignorance or in pique, and in many cases are doubtless fomented by professional agitators either within the military ranks or members of some civilian organization dedicated to keeping alive the racial issue. This is attested by the fact that many of these complaints are supported by newspaper clippings and by the similarity which complaints from widely separated sources sometimes bear to each other.

(3) It is also to be remarked that the majority of these complaints are submitted in complete disregard of prescribed military correspondence channels. Complaints submitted through Congressional sources, of course, are

111. (Col. Parrish)
112. CAF
113. (Training Command)
114. (The Air Inspector)

[redacted]

not included in this category, but communications are constantly addressed directly to the War Department, the White House, the Inspector General, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and to The Air Inspector by personnel in all ranks from private to captain, and the character of these complaints as well as the past consistent volume suggests that they are often inspired by outside sources.

(4) In evaluating the complaints from Negro enlisted personnel, consideration must be given to a wide number of factors. This is derived from the diversity of background to be found in the Negro enlisted groups within the Army Air Forces. These factors include the demonstrated superstitious nature of the negro, educational factors, moral factors, stability and dependability of the negro soldier, effects of newspaper publicity, and the possible political aspects. These factors are more inherently important in relation to the negro enlisted personnel inasmuch as the officer personnel is normally better educated and of a relatively higher type.

(5) Complaints from negro enlisted personnel, based upon their experiences andcontacts with military police, have been suprisingly few. On the whole, the military police functions of the Army Air Forces appear to have been administered effectively and impartially. With few exceptions, investigations of complaints as to discriminatory treatment imposed upon negro military personnel by military police have demonstrated that the complainant is the victim of his own transgressions and that any force which has been used against him by the military police has been necessitated by the attitude of the complainant himself. This does not exonerate the military police from all charges of discrimination inasmuch as there have been uncovered a few instances in which unnecessarily harsh or brutal treatment was administered. In all such cases, however, prompt disciplinary action has been taken against the offender.

(6) It may also be remarked that as a general rule the complaints of negro enlisted personnel relating to base facilities and installations at military stations, as well as alleged discrimination practiced by supervisory military personnel at AAF stations, have demonstrated by investigation that base commanders have endeavored to maintain a fair and impartial attitude toward the negro personnel for whom they are responsible and have endeavored to assure them complete exercise of their Constitutional Rights. The majority of complaints which have been received from negro

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enlisted personnel, and to a lesser extent from negro officer personnel, relate to AAF installations in the southern states. The general attitude of the civilian populace in southern communities toward the negro is well known, although these southern communities have normally demonstrated a desire to assist in providing recreational facilities for the negro military personnel of nearby AAF installations. This cooperative spirit has not served to remove the attitude shared by the majority of southerners toward the social status of the negro. This attitude, of course, has been complicated by the existence of certain state laws such as those requiring segregation on public carriers. This attitude has reacted sharply in the case of the northern negro who is not accustomed to segregation and who is unwilling to accept it. It has been difficult, however, to point out to such personnel that the military does not exercise jurisdiction over civilian activities and that it is only possible for a base commander to assume jurisdiction of the problem within the limits of his military installation.

(7) Probably the greatest single source of complaints from both negro enlisted and negro officer personnel has to do with alleged segregation. Such allegations usually relate to War Department theaters, post exchanges, service clubs, officers' messes and officers' clubs. War Department policy authorizes the designation of theaters or other recreational facilities or parts thereof for the exclusive use of specific units but does not permit the designation of such acitivites on a racial basis. This has resulted in sharp clashes at various installations either through failure of negro personnel to understand the differentiation between unit designation and racal designation or by a wilful desire to ignore the designation on the pretext that it merely serves the purpose of racial discrimination. In other instances investigation has discovered that the base commander has in fact practiced discrimination by setting aside certain facilities for the exclusive use of colored personnel and certain other facilities for the exclusive use of white personnel. This has been jusitified under a variety of pretexts but is not in harmony with War Department policy, andwhere discovered suitable remedial action has been prescribed. In other instances racial segregation has been accomplished by setting aside certain facilities for the exclusive use of base and supervisory personnel and by desigaating other units for the exclusive use of trainee personnel. This has certain logical support in that the separation of instructor and

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student personnel is frequently desirable not only to provide more effective control of the student personnel but to enhance the prestige of the instructors personnel Insofar as this applies to negro trainee personnel, the net effect has been to produce segregation under whatever pretext it may have been accomplished. This has been particularly marked in the case of officers' clubs where the provision of separate and equal facilities for negro officers has been effected by designating them as trainee personnel. This obvious subterfuge lends credibility to the charge of negro officers that it serves merely as a pretext to accomplish social segregation. It is believed that so long as the majority of white officers are unwilling to accept negro officers on a basis of social equality, any policy which compels such acceptance will breed subterfuge and pretext of the type cited.

(8) Another source of friction peculiar to the Army Air Forces derives from an expressed belief by negro pilots that they have not been afforded ample opportunity for promotion and for the exercise of command functions. In the case of the 477th Bombardment Group, for example, concerning which an investigation was conducted at Freeman Field, the preponderant portion of negro officers interviewed stated that they were treated as underlings by the white officers assigned to the Group in a supervisory and instructor capacity and that such assignment, in effect, precluded any possibility of promotion or adequate training by the negro officer personnel. Steps were subsequently taken by this headquarters to relieve all white officers assigned to this Group and to place it in charge of colored officers headed by Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., a Regular Negro officers with overseas experience.

(9) In condensing experience in the manner of treatment of negro personnel, both commissiondd and enlisted, three factors have been particularly remarked:

(a) The unwillingness of the northern negro to accept the restraints imposed upon him in southern civilian communities and his reaction to the social segregation which such restraint implies. The majority of the complaints received from negro personnel have been inspired by negroes from northern cities.

(b) The insistence of negro officer personnel for a strict interpretation of paragraph 19 of AR 210-10 relating to the common use of officers' clubs by both white and negro officers.

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[redacted]

(c) The sense of negro flyers that the exercise of command function is not an exclusive prerogative of the white officer and that equal opportunity for both command and promotion should be vested in the negro officer of demonstrated qualifications.

(10) There is attached as Tab U, several instances of friction occurring in overseas theatres. It is obvious from the type cases reported by overseas AAF Commanders that disturbances flare up from very minor causes and that at no time has there been evidence of organized action because of discrimination or maltreatment.

(11) Throughout theatres it is apparent that considerable effort has been made through orientation talks to familiarize negroes with conditions prevailing in such theatres in order that personnel would know what to expect. In addition recreational facilities have been provided.in the form of athletics, movies, and dances to keep personnel on the post as much as possible.

(12) It was necessary in England, Australia and Italy in particular to constantly survey areas off the post to follow up on reported minor disturbances and determine localities that should be placed off limits. Wherever possible no discrimination as to race was made in such determinations, and disturbances were kept at a minimum by this means.

(13) Summary--The degree to which negroes can be successfully employed in the Post-War Military Establishment largely depends on the success of the Army in maintaining at a minimum the feeling of discrimination and unfdr treatment which basicly are the causes for irritations and disorders. The importance of this problem must be recognized, for whether Universal Military Training is adopted as a peacetime measure or not, in the event of a future emergency the Army will employ a large number of negroes and their contribution in such an emergency will largely depends on the training, treatment and intelligent use of negroes during the intervening years.

It is believed the recommendations made in this report lend themselves to minimize irritations and disorders in which the attitude of civilian population plays such an important part.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that

a. The policy on training negro troops in the Army Air Forces be

(1) That negro personnel and units be trained on the same basis and standards as white personnel and units.

(2) That qualified negroes be obtained for pilot training and technical specialists by the application of careful screening and selection.

b. The policy on ulitlzation of negroes be

(1) That negroes be utilized and assigned to jobs and units consistent with their qualifications and their ability to meet established training standards in the following manner:

(a) In separate combat flying units to the maximum extent to which these units can be manned by qualified negro personnel.

(b) In separate service units to the extent necessary to support the negro combat units.

(c) In other separate established T/O units in which negroes performed most satisfactorily in World War II (Avn. Squadron, QM Tank Company, Ordnance Co (AVn), Chemical Maintenance Company, Chemical Depot Company, Air Cargo Resupply Squadron, Engineer Units where the mission does not require a high degree of professional skill), and in such other units as their capabilities warrant.

(d) In base units on jobs requiring the maximum utilization of their individual abilities.

9(e) To the maximum extent of their capability and availability as instructors for negro units and for on-the-job training.

(f) To command and administer negro units to the maximum extent possible. Where there are not sufficient qualified negro officers white officers, who are thoroughly qualified by training or experience to handle negro troops should be utilized until such time as they can be replaced with qualified negro officers.

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(g) As to location

1. Equal opportunity should be given negro troops for overseas service in all locations except extremely cold climates.

2. Negro units be assigned to localities where large civilian negro population are located to afford adequate off-post recreation. It is desirable, where military requirements permit to avoid subjecting negro soldiers to civil laws not compatible with those they are accumtomed to.

(h) As to size of units.

1. Combat and combat service support units shoudl not exceed that of a group.

2. Combat support units should not exceed that of a battalion.

(i) War Department regulations be applicable to negro personnel in the same manner as to white personnel and where disciplinary action is required, no favoritism or discrimination should be shown. It is essential that negroes be treated and considered as individuals and not as a group.

(j) That care be exercised not only in selection but also in trainin of non-commissioned and officer personnel assigned to negro units. Alert, intelligent leadership whether negro, white, or negro and white, is one of the most important factors in maintaining the balance, proficiency and morale of negro units as well as individuals.

c. Policies with regard to segregration be

(1) That segregration of negroes into administrative units is desirable.

(2) Segregation for recreation, messing, and social activities, on the post as well as off, be established in accordance with the customs prevailing within the surrounding civilian communities.

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d. That negroes in the Army as a whole be prorated among the three major forces in proportion to their respective sizes and in no case shall the number of negroes in the Air Forces exceed 10 per cent of the over-all strength of the Air Forces.

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INDEX TO TABS

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23 May 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, Army Air Forces
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces
Commanding General, Army Service Forces

SUBJECT: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 1 September 1944 from the Assistant Secretary of War to the Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policy, in which certain recommendations were made with respect to participation of Negro troops in the post-war military establishment.

2. In order to carry out the recommendations in the memorandum referred to above, it is desired that studies be conducted in accordance with the following outline:

a. A statement of policies, in addition to overall War Department policies, followed during the current war with respect to Negro troops covering:

(1) Training

(2) Utilization

b. A historical report of actual experience in training with particular reference to degree of proficiency attained and length of training time required.

c. A historical report of performance both within the United States and overseas.

d. A historical report of typical irritations or disorders arising from racial conflicts. This report should cover irritations and disorders within the Army itself and between Negro elements or individuals and civilians, both within the United States and overseas. The report should include a careful appraisal of cause and effect.

e. Recommendations with respect to a, b, c, and d.

3. The War Department has directed theater commanders and major force commanders to obtain pertinent information required for these

TAB A.

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reports with respect to troops serving under their jurisdiction. A copy of this directive is attached. The War Department will make available to the three Forces the material received from theater and major force commanders, but the three Forces may consider it advisable and are authorized to communicate directly with senior officers in the theaters in order to facilitate the preparation of the required reports and should give any special instructions necessary to develop information peculiarly pertinent to their respective Forces. The reports are required from the Forces on 1 October 1945.

4. It should be borne in mind by all concerned in conducting the studies referred to herein and in the preparation of reports based upon such studies that the objective sought is the factual determination of the most effective utilization of Negro troops in the post-war military establishment. A positive approach is required for the accomplishment of this objective.

5. It is desired that studies requested herein be conducted in such a manner as not to disturb existing arrangements for the training and utilization of Negro personnel. All communications on this subject will be classified as secret.

6. Attention is invited to memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff dated 6 March 1945, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces, subject, "Questionnaires Concerning Racial Groups," in which it is stated that the Secretary of War Directs: "No questionnaires be submitted to troop units concerning or bearing upon morale of, or combat relations between, racial groups without his approval in each case." It is understood that this memorandum is intended to prevent the querying of individuals within troop units. It is therefore desired that the information requested herein be obtained without resort to that procedure, although comments from officers of direct operating experience in small units is desired, and type of such smaller units should be indicated.

3 Incls
1. Memo from Asst. S/W 1 Sept 44
2. Memo to theater and major force commanders, 23 May 45
3. Approval of S/W 10 Jan 45

W. E. TOMPKINS
Major General, GSC
Director, Special Planning Division

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WDSSP

Major Bradley D. Nash/pt/74343
Special Planning Division, WDSS

23 May 1945

SUBJECT: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment

TO: Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area
Commanding Generals:
U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas
U. S. Army Forces, Persian Gulf Command
U. S. Army Forces, South Atlantic
U. S. Army Forces, India-Burma Theater
U. S. Army Forces, China Theater
U. S. Army Forces, Africa-Middle East Theater
U. S. Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater
U. S. Forces, European Theater of Operations
Alaskan Department
Northwest Service Command
Caribbean Defense Command

1. In order that plans may be made for the participation of Negro troops in the post-war military establishment the Commanding Generals of the Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces have been directed to conduct studies and to submit reports of experiences with Negro troops in the current war as indicated in the attached copy of memorandum from the Special Planning Division, dated 23 May 1945.

2. Theater and major force commanders will prepare information with respect to Negro troops serving in areas in which they are responsible. In addition to the overall studies and reports of theater commanders, it is desired to receive through usual channels, separate reports and comments from each of the three major types of forces in the theater, Air, Ground, and Service Forces, prepared by senior officers of each type of force, so that they may be examined in the light of the special experience of each type of force. Information required from theaters and each type of force is outlined in paragraph 3 below, but studies and reports should include any additional information deemed pertinent to the objective as stated in paragraph 1. Complete reports are required by the War Department not later than 1 September 1945.

3. Outline of information:

a. What was the maximum number (approximately) of Negro troops in your command? What proportion of these troops were in combat type units and what proportion in service units? Would you rate the overall manner of performance of Negro troops as above average, average, or below

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average? What types of units have given the most satisfactory service? The least satisfactory?

b. What was the AGCT distribution in typical Negro units in your command? To what extent is manner of performance related to the average AGCT scores of a unit? In this connection it would be desirable to cite specific examples.

c. (1) To what extent did Negro units participate in combat?

(2) To what extent is the manner of performance affected by duty in an active combat zone? In this connection how well do they meet emergencies?

(3) Describe in detail one or more typical combat experiences of Negro units.

d. Evaluate the performance of Negro privates and non-commissioned officers:

(1) in combat capacities

(2) in service functions

Information might include such points as pride in self and organizations, care of equipment, dependability, industry, relation between non-commissioned officers and privates.

e. Evaluate the performance of Negro officers.

(1) in combat capacities

(2) in service functions

Information might include such points as resourcefulness, aggressiveness, sense of responsibility, ability to make decisions, observance of officer's code of conduct, racial sensitiveness, conduct under fire.

f. Describe the conduct (1) in combat capacities: (2) in service functions, of Negro units having; (a) white officers only, (b) Negro officers only, (c) officers of both races. How did units in each of these categories compare with white units operating under similar conditions?

g. Do you feel that climate in which Negro troops serve affects their performance to a more marked degree than white troops?

h. Do you consider Negroes arriving in your theater have been

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as well classified for the jobs to which they are assigned as white personnel. In this connection it is particularly desired to know to what extent Negroes are being used to the maximum extent of their ability.

i. (1) To what extent have you maintained segregation beyond the actual unit level, and what is your recommendation on this subject?

(2) If you have employed Negro platoons in the same company with white platoons, what is your opinion of the practicability of this arrangement?

j. Would you say the morale of Negro troops as compared with white troops of similar service was above the average, average, or below average?

k. What is your recommendation on the following points:

(1) Types of units that can best utilize Negroes of low intelligence, education, or skill.

(2) Types of units that can best utilize Negroes in AGCT score classification I, II, III.

(3) Types of units, if any, to which Negroes should not be assigned.

(4) Value of Negro troops as military police:

(a) among white troops

(b) among Negro troops

(5) Types of units to which Negroes have not been assigned, but to which they could be assigned to advantage.

(6) Types of MOS in which Negroes have served:

(a) most satisfactorily

(b) satisfactorily

(c) unsatisfactorily

l. How do the Negro soldiers get along with civilians?

(1) Give typical instance of:

(a) amicable relations

(b) unsatisfactory relations

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[redacted]

(2) What steps were taken to correct unsatisfactory relations and how successful were these steps?

m. Have there been serious instances of friction between Negro and white soldiers?

(1) Give typical instances of tensions and disorders.

(2) (a) What steps were taken to prevent disorders and how successful were these steps?

(b) What program and policy for use of recreation facilities was found most helpful?

n. Do you find it more practicable to use Negroes in small units than in large units? What was the largest Negro unit which you could conveniently employ:

(1) in combat operations

(2) in service activities

o. Do you assign white officers serving with Negro units for a considerable period of time, or are officers rotated in such assignment? If so, how often.

p. Based on your observations and experiences, what are your recommendations as to the (1) organization, (2) command, (3) utilization of Negro soldiers in a future emergency?

4. It should be borne in mind by all concerned in conducting the studies referred to herein and in the preparation of reports based upon such studies that the objective sought is the factual determination of the most effective utilization of Negro troops in the post-war military establishment. A positive approach is required for the accomplishment of this objective.

5. It is desired that the studies requested herein be conducted in such a manner as not to disturb existing arrangements for the training and utilization of Negro personnel and particularly so as not to provoke controversial discussion. All communications on this subject will be classified as secret.

6. Attention is invited to memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Staff dated 6 March 1945, addressed to the Commanding Generals, Army Ground, Air, and Service Forces, subject, "Questionnaires Concerning

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Racial Groups," in which it is stated that the Secretary of War directs: "No questionnaires be submitted to troop units concerning or bearing upon morale of, or combat relations between, racial groups without his approval in each case." It is understood that this memorandum is intended to prevent the querying of individuals within troop units. It is therefore desired that the information requested herein be obtained without resort to that procedure, although comments from officers of direct operating experience in smaller units is desired, and type of such smaller units should be indicated.

1 Incl
Memo for CGs, ASF, AGF, AAF
dated 23 May 1945

J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General

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THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
WASHINGTON

10 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Participation of Negro troops in the post-war military establishment.

By informal action the Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policies has approved the attached memorandum and forwards it for your consideration.

/s/ John J. McCloy

Incl

Approved
/s/ Henry L. Stimson

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1 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL TROOP POLICY:

Subject: Participation of Negro Troops in the postwar military establishment.

The War Department together with other government agencies has begun the study and preparation of plans for the post war period. Within the War Department, the Special Planning Division has already established two basic assumptions: (1) that, after the cessation of hostilities, this country will maintain such temporary military forces as may be necessary to insure the continuation of the peace and (2) that a system of compulsory military training will be enacted by appropriate legislation. A Small professional Army, to be augmented in time of emergency by organized units drawn from a citizen Army reserve, is stated as the basis for our future military organization.

Experience gained during the current war have shown that though over a period of years the General Staff, Army War College, and other military agencies have studied the problem of the inclusion and utilization of Negro soldiers in our Army, in the main the Army was unprepared to deal with the large number of Negroes who entered the service under the provisions of the Selective Service Act. Therefore, policies with respect to the training and use of Negro military personnel developed in response to specific problems. Many sources of racial irritation persisted over considerable periods of time because of this inadequate preparation prior to the period of sudden expansion.

This war has seen a greater proportionate participation of minority racial groups in the Army than at any time in our history. This participation can be expected to continue in the future, particularly in view of the preliminary assumptions that have been developed for our post war military establishment.

To the end that a definite, workable policy, for the inclusion and utilization in the Army of minority racial groups, be developed before final plans for the post war military establishment have become crystalized, I desire to place before the Committee the following proposed recommendation to the Secretary of War:

The Advisory Committee for Special Troop policy is aware that War Department agencies are at present considering plans for the post war military establishment. Past experience has indicated the necessity of considering in advance the question of the participation of minority racial groups. It is, therefore, recommended that the War Department General Staff review existing War Department policies regarding such participation and that this review be based upon a study which will include all our experience during the present war, both in this country and abroad. It is recommended that this study be instituted immediately so that the War Department will be in position to effect any necessary changes in policy which may result from such a study either through the proposal of proper legislation or other means.

/s/ John J. McCloy
JOHN J. MCCLOY
Assistant Secretary of War [redacted]

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COPY [redacted] [redacted] AAFR 35-268

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

11 August 1945

AAF LETTER 35-268

SUBJECT: Equity in Training and Assignment Opportunity

TO: Commanding Generals, Major AAF Commands
Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers, Independent AAF Activities
Commanding Generals and Commanding Officers, Subordinate AAF Commands and AAF Divisions, Wings and Districts
Commanding Officers, AAF Base Units (not included above)

1. It is a basic personnel policy of the AAF that there will be equal training and assignment opportunity for all military personnel. This will be based upon the skill and physical capacity requirements for authorized position vacancies and the ability, mental and physical, of individuals to meet, or to be trained to meet, those requirements.

2. Certain limitations, which are standard throughout the AAF, are placed upon the selection for training or the assignment of individuals when it has been established that minimum intelligence or physical levels are necessary. The application of such standard limitations does not contradict the basic policy since such restrictions apply equally to all personnel.

3. It is desired that commanders at all echelons insure against the imposition of local or unnecessary restrictions. In addition, commanders will take affirmative action to insure that equity in training and assignment opportunity is provided to all personnel.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL ARNOLD:

IRA C. EAKER
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces

OFFICIAL:

H. G. CULTON
Colonel, Air Corps
Air Adjutant General

[redacted]

DISTRIBUTION:
Air Forces and AAF Commands Overseas

TAB B [redacted] 6-1566,AF

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] [redacted]

AAF MILITARY PERSONNEL

(AS OF 28 FEB 1945)

LEGEND

- COMBAT PERSONNEL OVERSEAS (COMBAT UNIT PERSONNEL)
- SERVICE AND OTHER PERSONNEL OVERSEAS
- ZI PERSONNEL

TOTAL



COLORED



WHITE



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	COLORED	WHITE	TOTAL
COMBAT PERSONNEL OVERSEAS (COMBAT UNIT PERSONNEL)	5,432	347,823	353,255
SERVICE AND OTHER PERSONNEL OVERSEAS	61,900	771,076	832,976
ZI PERSONNEL	69,397	1,068,749	1,138,146
TOTAL	136,729	2,187,648	2,324,377

Incl. 1.

TAB C

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(AFR [illegible])

Source: SC-PS-1

Statistical Control Division
Office of Management Control

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COMPARISON IN THE MANNER OF PERFORMANCE OF NEGROES VERSUS WHITE PERSONNEL AFTER TRAINING

AGCT GROUP	RATING	SUPER	A.P.MAINT	ATH SPEC	AIR CREW	GUNNERY	ARMT	RADIO OP	RADIO MECH	RADAR OP		WIRE COMM	WEPN	CHEM	PHOTO	MED	SUPPLY	UTILITY CONSTR	VEHICLE OP	AUTO MECH	ADM	MUSICIAN	MISC	DUTY	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	TOTAL
I	As Satisfactorily		4				1		2							1	2	1	3	3	5		3	2	27
	Not as satisfactorily		1												1	1	2	1	2	1	3		1		13
II	As Satisfactorily	1	9	1		1	1	2	7							6	14	4	6	3	15		9	7	86
	Not as satisfactorily		6	1	1	1	2	2	1						2	3	3	1	6	3	19	1	3	5	60
III	As Satisfactorily	2	11				2	2	8						4	8	16	5	11	7	17		18	20	131
	Not as satisfactorily		10			1	2	3	5						4	8	6	5	13	3	17	1	5	7	90
IV	As Satisfactorily		7				4	3	7			1			3	10	11	12	18	10	16		29	27	158
	Not as satisfactorily		13					1	2						2	11	13	8	16	5	15	1	5	7	99
V	As Satisfactorily		5				1		2							12	5	4	12	4	2		23	22	92
	Not as satisfactorily		6				1	1							1	7	4	4	13	3	5		8	8	61
	TOTAL	3	72	2	1	3	14	14	34			1			17	67	76	45	100	42	114	3	104	105	817
	TOTAL AS SATISFACTORILY	3	36	1		1	9	7	26			1			7	37	48	26	50	27	55		82	78	
	TOTAL NOT AS SATISFACTORILY	0	36	1	1	2	5	7	8			0			10	30	28	19	50	15	59	3	22	27	

Grand Total as Satisfactorily - 494

Grand Total Not as Satisfactorily - 323

Addition to origional report.
(NOTE: The figures above represent the number of replies received by the command concerned.)

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SC-SS-1425
COPY NO. 20

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A COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NEGRO ENLISTED MEN IN THE ARMY AIR FORCES.....

ABILITY

UTILIZATION

REWARD

Incl 2

TAB E

Office of Statistical Control

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Considering only the comparative grade structure, white enlisted men have higher grades than negro enlisted men. . . . .



However, it is possible to explain, at least in part, this discrepancy as follows. . . . . [redacted]

Incl. 3

TAB E-1 [redacted]

Office of Statistical Control

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FIRST - White enlisted men have a consistently higher AGCT level than negro enlisted men. . . . and this tendency is more pronounced in the AAF than in the entire ARMY. . . .



AGCT GROUPS	WHITE ARMY	WHITE AAF	NEGRO ARMY	NEGRO AAF
I	7 6 %	9 4 %	0 3 %	0 4 %
II	32 2 %	43 8 %	3 6 %	6 5 %
III	32 4 %	32 2 %	13 0 %	14 0 %
IV	26 3 %	12 9 %	62 0 %	47 4 %
V	1 5 %	1 7 %	21 1 %	31 7 %

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TAB E-2

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SECOND - Nearly three/fourths of the white enlisted men have been in the AAF since 1942



while more than half of the negro enlisted men have entered the AAF since January 1943....



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TAB E-3

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Office of Statistical Control

And – The promotion of enlisted men has apparently been dependent more on length of service than on intelligence.



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THIRD - The majority of negro enlisted men have SSN's which do not require specialized training and, therefore, do not call for high grades



65% of white enlisted men have administrative or technical SSN's-- while only -

15% of negro enlisted men have similar SSN's.

Incl 7

TAB E-5

Office of Statistical Control

Besides -

OF THOSE IN AGCT GROUPS I,II, & III

71% of white enlisted men have air crew,technical or administrative SSN's. . . .

WHILE ONLY

49% of negro enlisted men have such SSN's. . . . .



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TAB E-6

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Further -

OF THOSE IN AGCT GROUPS IV & V

29% of white enlisted men have air crew, technical or administrative SSN's. . . .

WHILE ONLY

6% of negro enlisted men have such SSN's. . . . .

PERCENT OF EM IN LOWER TWO AGCT GROUPS WITH HIGHLY SPECIALIZED SSN's



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Nevertheless

White enlisted men with the SAME AGCT score and entering the AAF at the SAME time have advanced further than negro enlisted men.



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TAB E-8

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		M A GROUP					
		I	II	III	IV	V	TOTAL
A	1	17	32	16	12		77
G	2	33	336	516	166	15	1066
C	3	6	220	1087	977	156	2466
T	4		15	560	3358	4232	8165
	5		2	28	611	4899	5520
	TOTAL	56	605	2207	5124	9302	17294

(NOTE: The above survey was made by a representative command of the AAF, and refers only to negroes.)

TAB F

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COMPARISON OF ABILITY OF NEGROES AND WHITES TO ATTAIN SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE RATING BY ON THE JOB TRAINING

AGCT GROUP COMPARISON	1 Super	2 A.C. Maint	3 Avi. Spec	4 Air Crew	5 Chemery	6 Arft	7 Radio Op	8 Radio Mech	9 Radar Op	10	11 Fire comm	12 Mtr	13 Chem	14 Photo	15 Med	16 Supply	17 Utility Countr	18 Vehicle Opr	19 Auto Mech	20 Ord	21 Publican	22 Misc	23 Engy	TOTAL
I Whites Longer		1																		2				3
Negroes Longer		1												1	1	2	1	3	2	6		2	1	20
Same		3				1		2							1	2	1	2	2	4		2	1	21
II Whites Longer		5			1	1		2							2	6		2	1	5		3	2	30
Negroes Longer		5	1	1	1	1	3	1						2	5	7	1	6	3	19	1	7	6	70
Same	1	7	1			1	1	5							2	7	3	4	3	15		4	4	58
III Whites Longer	2	4			1		2	5						2	3	9	3	7	1	9		9	6	63
Negroes Longer	1	12				1	2	4						5	9	8	5	11	4	22	1	10	15	110
Same		5				3	1	6						1	7	8	3	7	6	10		7	13	77
IV Whites Longer		3				1	1	1			1				3	6	10	9	3	8		13	8	67
Negroes Longer		15					1	2						5	14	18	10	22	7	19	1	16	15	145
Same		5				3	2	6							6	4	4	10	7	6		10	16	79
V Whites Longer		2													3		2	6				11	7	31
Negroes Longer		6												1	11	5	5	14	3	4		16	15	80
Same		4				2	1	2							6	3	3	11	4	3		10	18	67

Grand total whites longer - 194
Grand total negroes longer - 425
Grand total same - 302

(NOTE: The figures above are the number of replies received by the command concerned.)

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GENERAL DISCUSSION OF TRAINING OF THE TWO

NEGRO FLYING COMBAT UNITS
(BY THE 1ST AIR FORCE)

1. A study of the Negro Tactical Air Force Units assigned to the First Air Force, reveals that the AGCT Scores of colored enlisted men assigned these organizations, closely parallels the normal curve for the entire Army. A study of the educational background of the officers and enlisted men shows that they rate comparatively high in number of years spent in school. A further study of the civilian background of these troops reveals that their distribution in industrial, technical, social, and other fields approximates an expected norm for Air Corps troops.

2. It must be borne in mind however, that troops assigned to tactical units, referred to above, have been carefully selected, screened, and sent to service schools prior to assignment to their respective units.

3. They represent the cream of their race as available within the Army Air Forces, and they do not represena a cross-section of the Negro personnel of the Army Air Forces.

4. From the above, it may be assumed that lack of intelligence or education cannot be considered as a factor responsible for lack of qualification or failure in performance. In both intelligence and education the personnel assigned to these Tactical Air Force Negro Units are on a par with, or slightly above, a comparable unit composed of White personnel.

5. It would appear that a tactical unit of colored officers and enlisted men, with these qualifications should be able to complete training within the same period of time as White units undergoing the same training.

6. It has been the experience of this headquarters that such is not the case. In reality, with highly selected White officers and enlisted men for Command, Supervision, Instruction, and Inspection, it will normally take from two to three times as long to train Negro enlisted man and officers to do a passable job, as it would take for White enlisted man and officers with an equivalent educational background.

7. No accurate estimate can be made as to the probability of success in these experiments with Negro Air Force Tactical Units, had they been composed of all Negro personnel, and had they been required to complete their training in the normal time allowed for White units, and had they been required to organize and train without the benefit of the highly selected White command, supervisory

TAB N

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and inspection personnel. It can be presumed that the experiments would not have been completed, since the units barely reached minimum standards even with the assistance of white personnel and the extension of the training time to approximately three times that necessary to qualify a white unit.

8. It is believed that this is due to the accumulative effect of several factors which are to be discussed below.

a. Lack of initiative--Colored officers as well as colored enlisted men require continual supervision. They have looked to the white race for generations for guidance and cannot do even routine tasks without supervision.

b. Fear or lack of desire to go to combat--In a recent survey made of the 477th Bombardment Group (M), a unit of this command, during the month of May 1945, 98% of all enlisted men indicated a desire to be relieved from the Army without delay. Approximately 79% of all colored officers in this organization indicated the same desire.

c. Discipline--Discipline is generally poor and extremely hard to maintain. It is practically impossible to obtain testimony from officers or enlisted men against another of their own race. In general, they have no respect for orders or authority and frequently only fear of punishment causes obedience.

d. Venereal Disease Rate--The venereal disease rate among colored troops is extremely high. All normal methods for reducing the rate have no effect. Appeals to their pride are likewise ineffective. This applies to NCO's and officers as well as to basic soldiers.

e. AWOL--The AWOL rate is extremely high. The large number of enlisted men and officers AWOL from one to five days on return from furlough or leave, indicates a lack of an inherent sense of duty attendance and an instinctive interest and pride in their jobs.

f. Inclination to delegate work--There is a decided tendency to delegate work to the next lower echelon without supervision or action to assure compliance. This frequently results in poor and inaccurate work.

g. Lack of respect for property--This is evidenced by the extremely large number of reports of survey, and statements of charges for personal items of property such as items of clothing, flying goggles, weapons, and all classes of flying equipment. There is definite evidence of carelessness in handling paper work on property as well as negligence in the care and safekeeping of property.

h. Tendency to cover up weaknesses and failures with accusations of discrimination against those in authority--This is especially

TAB H

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prevalent among officers. In many cases of AWOL, Failure to Report to Place of Duty, Traffic Violations, and other violations requiring disciplinary action, colored troops are prone to take the attitude that they are being discriminated against.

UNIT TRAINING (Combat)

1. OPERATIONAL TRAINING by negro units and proficiency attained.

a. Unit training of Negro troops in this Command as a combat organization has been restricted to the 477th Bombardment Group (M) and the 332nd Fighter Group. For this reason this report is based on the records of these units, stressing the training of the 477th Bombardment Group (M) as more complete records are available on that organization.

b. The 477th Bombardment Group (M) and the 332nd Fighter Group will be considered separately in this report. Each unit will be considered as follows: First, personnel assigned to the unit; Second, the amount and type of training given to personnel after assignment; and Fourth, a final evaluation containing observations and comparisons of White units, of the receptiveness of Negro personnel to instruction, the length of time taken to train them, a statement of the proficiency of the personnel, and final evaluation of the performance of the unit at the latest possible date.

c. Primarily, it must be kept in mind that the Negro officers and enlisted men of these organizations are a highly selected and carefully screened group. From this it may be assumed that lack of intelligence or education can not be considered a factor in the analysis of the training of these units. In both cases, they are on a par with or slightly above a comparable unit composed of White personnel. It is to be expected, however, that these units have a higher performance rating than other Negro organizations in the AAF, as the personnel are the best Negro troops available in the AAF.

d. Allowing two or three times the training period, a Negro unit may be brought up to equal proficiency with the poorest of White units, but it is necessary to constantly oversee and supervise them in order to maintain that proficiency. The tendency of the 477th Bombardment Group (M) was, upon reaching a satisfactory state of proficiency in most departments, to relax, and to allow maintenance, flying safety and general operational efficiency to backslide. This continued throughout the training of the group. In general, Negro personnel do not have that pride of a "Job Well Done". The technical inspection reports of this unit show that slovenliness is the rule rather than the exception.

TAB H

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REPORT ON TRAINING HISTORY OF 477TH BOMBARDMENT

GROUP (M)
(BY THE 1ST AIR FORCE)

The military occupational or technical training of all personnel prior to assignment to the 477th Bombardment Group (M) has been unusually thorough and complete in the case of the individual. With hardly an exception, it is found that all individuals have been trained in service schools, and were in possession of the basic principles of their SSN or MOS. Lacking only was the familiarization and training with specialized equipment and combat unit procedures. This training is considered later in the report.

Inasmuch as there would be little value in the analysis of the prior service training of all troops other than the air-crew members, it is felt that the above analysis is sufficient. For that reason the emphasis hereafter will be on the training of the air-crew members prior to assignment to the 477th Bombardment Group (M).

In surveying the previous training of the air-crew members of this group, we find a high level of training. The first pilots or airplane commanders, with four exceptions, are all graduates of AAF advanced flying schools, (single engine) plus B-25 transition school. These pilots, on reporting, had an average flying time of around 310:00 hours, approximately 110:00 hours of which were in the B-25 type aircraft, which is the assigned aircraft of the 477th Bombardment Group (M). The average flying time of the first pilots upon reporting is increased by the fact that nine of the first pilots were former fighter pilots and had approximately 200:00 hours in fighter type aircraft before going to B-25 transition school. In addition, all of these pilots had completed the instrument check prescribed by AAF Reg. 50-3, and were in possession of an AAF Form 8 (white instrument card).

The co-pilots of the organization have perhaps had the least training prior to assignment of any of the air-crew members. These were graduated from single engine advanced flying school only.

The Bombardier-Navigators (1035) and the Navigator-Bombardiers (1036) have had the most comprehensive training of all crew members. The Navigator-Bombardiers had attended celestial navigation school, NorNorden bombing school, and flexible gunnery school, giving them the three ratings of Navigator, Bombardier and Gunner. The Bombardier-Navigators have attended Norden bombing school, D-R Navigation school and flexible gunnery school, giving them the two ratings of Bombardier and Gunner. It was found that the average circular error of these officers was approximately 214.9 feet at the time of graduation from the Bombardiers School.

TAB I

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The enlisted air-crew members were screened out of the ground complement of the group after assignment. Upon reporting, these personnel were qualified for ground performance of duty as airplane mechanics, radio operator-mechanics, and armorers. These enlisted men had not attended flexible gunnery school, so all of the personnel carrying the above qualifications were considered as potential air-crew members.

The training of all personnel after assignment to the 477th Bombardment Group (M) consisted of "On-the-Job" training, to be discussed in the next paragraph, and schools which stressed theory, familiarization with specialized equipment and procedures, and additional instruction in the basic principles of their MOS or SSN. Courses for these schools were set up as prescribed in the I Bomber Command "Ground Training Guide" dated 1 March 1944. This guide outlined ground courses for all personnel assigned to the Group by course, hours required, subjects covered, and personnel required to attend it, merely prescribing a minimum number of hours required with no limitation on the amount of instruction which could be given. It was found that, in many cases, a great deal of additional instruction was given to various personnel.

The "On-the-Job" training in the group may be considered as the most important of the ground training. The advantage of this type of instruction is that it is highly practical and much more rapid than school classes. Personnel have the opportunity of actually working on the job under close supervision while in training. As heretofore stated, this type of training received the greatest attention in the 477th Bombardment Group (M). If the supervisor was of the opinion that the student needed further school instruction, he was returned to the ground school for additional classes. As the proficiency of the Individual increased, supervision was gradually taken off, and a spot check inspection system was carried on by supervisors. Gradually, this too was taken off, and all work was done and checked within the unit except that this work was still inspected by an augmented base inspection system. Records on the performance of the individual were maintained within the particular section to which he was assigned for duty, with ratings as unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled. On assignment to the section, the individual had the rating of unskilled unless he had previous qualification.

A general summing-up of training of the group other than air-crew personnel, which will be considered in the following paragraphs, brings out these facts:

1. The personnel were very well trained prior to assignment to the group having been qualified in nearly all the essential MOS or SSN necessary to organizing a bombardment group.

2. The training of the personnel after assignment to the bombardment group consisted of the following:

[redacted]

[redacted]

a. Extensive classes consisting of refresher courses in the MOS or SSN plus specialized instruction dealing with the equipment, forms, etc. that the personnel were working with and would be working with while in the 477th Bombardment Group (M).

b. "On-the-Job" training which may be considered the most successful and important training given in this group. This training proceeded along natural lines of progression, starting with close supervision and instruction by white personnel. This supervision was gradually reduced as the proficiency of the colored personnel increased, until all supervision by white personnel was removed as of 30 June 1945.

Inasmuch as the ultimate aim of the training of a bombardment group is to prepare the air crews for combat, it is felt that a more extensive survey should be made of the combat crew training than of other members of the group. For this reason, a breakdown of the training, air and ground, of each air-crew member will be shown with a discussion thereof.

The group training of the first pilots or airplane commanders and co-pilots must of necessity be broken down into air training and ground training. Ground training will be considered first. The hours and courses listed are the minimum given and do not show additional hours and courses.

Upon reporting for duty, each pilot was given a copy of the "Standard Operating Procedures", the 477th Bombardment Group (M). This guide contained those flying procedures which were constant and reasonably unchanging. As soon as possible, the pilot was assigned to flying and thereafter attended ground school on-half day and flew the other half. The schedule was so arranged that each squadron would have two flights on the line and two flights in ground school at all times.

It will be seen from the courses listed below that the ground instruction of these officers has been unusually thorough. This fact is further emphasized when we consider that the first pilots have completed the B-25 transition school. Many of the courses covered in the ground program of the 477th Bombardment Group (M) were given these pilots at the transition school. This is particularly true in the case of those courses dealing with the construction and operation of the B-25 type aircraft.

The following is the ground training program offered to the pilots and co-pilots of the 477th Bombardment Group (M).
TAB I

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Indoctrination	14 Hours
Engineering	15 Hours
Communications	26 Hours
Intelligence	43 Hours
Bombing	14 Hours
Navigation	23 Hours
Instrument Flying	20 Hours
Gunnery	28 Hours
Armament	12 Hours
Medical	13 Hours
Chemical Warfare	4 Hours
Weather	4 Hours
Physical Training	4 Hours per wk
Emergency Procedures	6 Hours
TOTALS	269 Hours*

*(These totals include trainer time)

Synthetic Training Aids

The flying training of the first pilots and co-pilots remained long in the 1st Phase or transitional period. This was necessary to bring them up to the standards of precision and flying safety comparable with white pilots.

The pilots reported in such small increments, at such great intervals, that it was necessary to start their training as individuals rather than by blocks or units. For this reason, the pilots that were assigned the group soon after activation received many more hours of flying than those that were later assigned. The experience level was in this way improved for the entire group.

During this long training period, before crew training, emphasis was laid upon transition (day and night), instrument flying, pilot navigation, formation and airplane commander responsibility of a military pilot. The final result was that these phases of flying made up approximately 80% of the flying training rather than the normal 60%.

In spite of this extra training, the airplane commanders failed to display leadership, would not accept the responsibilities of command and had to be watched carefully to insure compliance with procedures.

The 477th Bombardment Group (M) entered 2nd Phase, or combat crew training approximately 1 March 1945. From this time forward the pilots could fly with complete crews and begin the completion of their minimum standards as per AAF Training Standard 20-1 and amendments thereto, and I Bomber Command Flying Training Guide. Emphasis at this time was placed upon bombing, navigation, gunnery (both flexible and fixed), formation and minimum altitude formation. As of 30 June 1945, the average total flying time of the first pilots was

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622:00 hours, of which 312.0 hours had been accumulated since assignment to the group. This time was all B-25 time. The average B-25 time of the first pilots prior to assignment to the group was 110.0 hours. It is obvious that this is the extremely high figure for OTU pilots inasmuch as the average B-25 flying time of the CCTS pilots, White, upon departing for combat in May and June 1945 has been 148.9 hours.

The Table of Organization of a medium bombardment group authorizes both Bombardiers (1035) and Navigator-Bombardiers (1036). Inasmuch as the training of these officers within the Bombardment Group is so very similar, it is not considered necessary, for purposes of this report to treat their training separately. These cases where it is necessary to do so will be appropriately noted.

The 477th Bombardment Group (M) reached authorized strength in flying officers 15 November 1944, the main reason being that twenty-three (23) Navigator-Bombardiers were assigned approximately 15 October 1944, and eighty-four (84) Bombardiers were assigned in November. As the Bombardiers had only been briefly schooled in Navigation, the group made an effort to bring these officers up to proficiency in Pilotage Navigation, Radio Navigation and the use of the astro-compass. Both the Navigator-Bombardiers and Bombardiers were given intensive refresher courses in theory of bombing plus familiarization with bombing and navigational equipment of the B-25 type aircraft. Emphasis was also given the use of trainers such as the C.N.T., A-2 and A-5 bomb trainer, D-R Navi-trainer, and all gunnery trainers. The ground school courses as outlined for these officers is as follows:

	Bombardier	Nav.-Bombardier
Engineering	12 Hours	12 Hours
Communications	25 Hours	25 Hours
Intelligence	43 Hours	43 Hours
Bombing	26 Hours	31 Hours
Navigation	53 Hours	40 Hours
Gunnery	52 Hours	52 Hours
Armament	20 Hours	20 Hours
Medical	13 Hours	13 Hours
Chemical Warfare	4 Hours	4 Hours
Weather	4 Hours	4 Hours
Physical Training	4 Hrs/wk	4 Hrs/wk
Emergency Procedures	6 Hours	6 Hours
TOTAL	306 Hours	298 Hours

(These totals include trainer time)
(Synthetic Training Aids)

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The Navigator-Bombardiers and Bombardiers were assigned to crews and began flying training missions. The air training concentration on bombing navigation, including minimum altitude navigation, and later flexible gunnery. Every attempt was made to weld the whole combat crew, particularly the Pilot and Navigator-Bombardier, into a team and to force the 1st Pilot to assume command of his airplane crew.

In analyzing the group training of the enlisted air-crew members, it must be remembered, that upon assignment to the 477th Bombardment Group (M), no enlisted men were qualified air-crew members. All potential engineer gunners, radio operator-gunners, and armorer-gunners were qualified only for ground performance of their MOS. Training of these enlisted men actually consisted of five separate sections, all of which overlap to some extent. They may be broken down as follows:

1. Ground School Classes--These were classes dealing with all phases of their MOS, training on specialized equipment, thorough familiarization with the B-25 type aircraft, and preparatory course for performing duty as an air-crew member. An outline of courses, and hours will follow at the end of this discussion.

2. "On-the-Job" Training--This has been analyzed previously in this report. Enough to say that the aim of this training was to teach the personnel to perform their duty in as efficient a manner as possible, by having the enlisted men actually do the work, while being instructed and supervised.

3. Pre-Gunnery Training--Anticipating that the enlisted men must eventually go to gunnery school, and desiring to reduce the attrition rate as much as possible, a seventy (70) hour course in weapons and gunnery was devised. The purpose of this course was to give all potential air-gunners of the three classifications a preliminary knowledge that would assist them in successfully completing gunnery school. All of the enlisted air-crew members took this course, which consisted of basic weapons, preventive maintenance, skeet shooting, turret maintenance and turret tracking of a liaison type aircraft. This pre-gunnery course was peculiar to the 477th Bombardment Group (M) and unique in the AAF, but was necessary to insure that a sufficient number of Negro enlisted air-crew members complete gunnery training in the Training Command schools.

4. Gunnery Training--The first contingent of one hundred and eighty (180) enlisted men left for gunnery school on or about 27 November 1944. Approximately four weeks later, another contingent of one hundred and eighty (180) enlisted men also went to gunnery school. Thus, at one time, there were three hundred and

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sixty (360) enlisted gunners of the 477th Bombardment Group (M) in gunnery school. The course pursued there was an eight weeks course of basic aerial gunnery, and, upon successfully completing the course, each enlisted man was rated as an aerial gunner. This rating also automatically changed the MOS of said enlisted men, giving them the MOS of airplane Mechanic Gunner (748), Radio Operator Mechanic Gunner (757), and Armorer Gunner (612). It was found that the disqualification of personnel at the gunnery school for lack of proficiency was extremely low - only approximately eight (8) enlisted men out of a total of three hundred and sixty (360). It is believed that this is due to the extensive training the gunners were given in the Pre-Gunnery course of the group prior to entrance in the Gunnery school.

5. Combat Crew Training (Air Phase)-- Emphasis, in this particular phase of training has been placed on flexible gunnery training, additional duties as members of the air-crew, and continuous ground training in subjects related to air-training, such as aircraft recognition, emergency procedures, ground gunnery, and constant checks on MOS proficiency. Every effort was made to weld these enlisted crew members into a combat team with the commissioned air crew members.

The main ground school courses and hours as offered to the enlisted air crew members of the 477th Bombardment Group (M) after assignment are as follows:

	AMG	ROMG	AG
Engineering	67 Hours	-	-
Communications	4 Hours	75 Hours	4 Hours
Intelligence	43 Hours	43 Hours	43 Hours
Navigation	-	13 Hours	-
Gunnery	60 Hours	52 Hours	92 Hours
Armament	17 Hours	17 Hours	23 Hours
Medical	13 Hours	13 Hours	13 Hours
Chemical Warfare	4 Hours	4 Hours	4 Hours
Physical Training	4 Hrs/wk	4 Hrs/wk	4 Hrs/wk
Emergency Procedures	6 Hours	6 Hours	6 Hours
TOTALS	262 Hours	271 Hours	242 Hours

(Totals include trainer time)
(Synthetic Training Aids)

Receptiveness to Instruction of Negro Personnel

This subject is one which may be said to have widespread

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variations controlled mainly by the type of subject which is being presented. In general, it may be said that Negro personnel lack the intellectual curiosity which is the driving force necessary to obtain mastery of a problem. Providing the enlisted men or officer has the necessary education (which was the case in the 477th Bombardment Group (M) to grasp the basic principles of subject, it has been found that the theory phase is comparatively easy to teach. On the other hand, when an attempt is made to teach Negro personnel the finer points of a particular subject, it is found that the student loses interest and is content with the basic knowledge he has acquired. From this point on, repetition, inspection, constant examination, and continual prodding is necessary in order to insure assimilation of the material.

The most efficient type of instruction for Negro personnel is "On-the-Job" training, because errors can be readily seen, explained and corrected, and it is unnecessary for the student to expend time and thought in research to answer the problems presented.

The main difference between White and Negro personnel in this respect is that the average White officer or enlisted man is curious about the answer to a problem that confronts him, and is willing to expend time and effort, on his own initiative to learn an unfamiliar subject, wheras Negro personnel lack this initiative.

Length of Training Time

The 477th Bombardment Group (M) was activated on 15 January 1944. The main factor which retarded the training of this group was the slowness of the individuals in attaining the minimum standards of proficiency which would permit the organization to enter the final phase of training. As there were no other medium bombardment CTU organizations in the First Air Force, no accurate figures are available on the length of time taken to train an organization made up of white personnel. It has been found, however, that the average training time of other medium bombardment OTU's from date of activation to date of commitment has been approximately three to four months.

Due to past experiences, it was deemed advisable to form a White supervisory squadron to supervise, instruct, and inspect the 477th Bombardment Group (M) which was activated in this command on 15 January 1944.

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This supervisory squadron, the 821st Bombardment Squadron (M) separate, contained administrative sections synonomous to those of the bombardment group headquarters and the bombardment squadrons. These sections were placed in the corresponding sections in the bombardment group for the purpose of inspecting, supervising, and initially establishing the records for the 477th Bombardment Group (M).

At this point, it is desired to point out that the Negro officers and enlisted men assigned to the 477th Bombardment Group were very carefully selected and that on a basis of AGCT scores and education, were above average. In addition to this, overages were selected in each MOS and in the case of certain key positions, such as Sergeant Major, First Sergeants, and Chief Clerks, two persons were actually assigned to the job. Overage officers were also assigned to understudy officers assigned to a Table of Organization position. Thus, it can be seen that, with all other conditions being equal, the way was made clear for an ideal administrative personnel "set-up".

The 477th Bombardment Group (M) was moved from Selfridge Field, Michigan, to Godman Field, Kentucky on 6 May 1944. At this time it was decided to remove the White administrative supervision from the unit. It was found that the colored personnel were not yet qualified to perform the administrative duties of the group, and accordingly, during the month of June 1944, an administrative school was established. Thus it can be seen that six months after activation of the Group, this Group was not yet administratively independent.

At the close of the Administrative school, White supervision was not again placed on all sections, however, inspection by White personnel was increased and a roving White administrative team was created to assist the sections requiring help. In spite of this, maintenance of records continued to be a problem. This is further amplified by a preliminary POM inspection which was made on 15 January 1945.

After one year's training under constant supervision and inspection by White personnel, the 477th Bombardment Group (M) had reached a point where its administration was passable. Another preliminary POM inspection on 30 May 1945, revealed numerous administrative errors and ommissions which indicated slovenly administrative tendancies.

Performance Evaluation

In a White unit, the quality of duty performance will, as a rule, follow the degree of qualification of the personnel of that unit. However, this is not the case with Negro personnel. It has been found, particularly in the case of air-crews, that personnel who are capable of performing an assigned mission, have failed to

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to do so when they are in the air and away from close supervision. General slovenliness in air technique, of capable pilots, has also been noted. It may be said that performance of the 477th Bombardment Group (M) although the personnel are qualified, is below the standards of performance of the poorest comparable white units.

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REPORT ON TRAINING OF THE 99TH FIGHTER SQUADRON

AND 332ND FIGHTER GROUP

1. Under the jurisdiction of this command, Third Air Force, each for a portion of their training, were the 99th Fighter Squadron, and the 332nd Fighter Group with colored officers and enlisted personnel. The former was activated by the AAF Training Command at Tuskegee, Alabama, 9 July 1942. A month later, 8 August 1942, this air force was charged with the responsibility of training and equipping the task force of which this squadron was a part for overseas duty. Although difficulty had been encountered in securing qualified personnel, the late General Walsh stated that as a result of an inspection 1 October 1942 he "found the 99th Squadron in excellent condition and ready for immediate overseas shipment" and recommended that if "at all possible the 99th Fighter Squadron . . . . be dispatched to an overseas station." It was also found that, "its morale is very high and it is believed that it will suffer should its departure be delayed for any lengthy period". Delays occurred, however, and on 15 February 1943 the squadron was reported as follows: "100% T/O strength, training status - good, unit can perform primary mission, completion of training depends on weather". Assurance was given Hq AAF on 22 March 1943 that the squadron was "ready for combat". Port call was received for 4 April 1943 and the unit departed to meet that date.

2. The 332nd Fighter Group was activated at Tuskegee, Alabama, 13 October 1942. This activation had originally been directed in July 1942, and was delayed by station problems and non-availability to this command of qualified personnel. This latter problem caused considerable consternation in this headquarters and at the time it did not "appear that the conditions necessary for the movement of this group will be met before the fall of 1943". The personnel assigned to the group as of January 1943 were "unable to pass the aptitude test required", however, it was stated that "practically all of these men are good mechanics their supervisor advises and he feels that, while they may not pass the test, they can absorb the training". However, the AAF Technical Training Command anticipated the securing and training of sufficient personnel.

3. When the problem of transfer of the group first became a matter of correspondence the plan for furnishing qualified personnel was outlined. Another problem complicating training of the group was the furnishing of replacement pilots to the 99th Fighter Squadron.

4. To facilitate training the group was moved from Tuskegee Army Air Base to Selfridge Field 29 March 1943. May 1943 Hq AAF was advised that "pilot requirements will be satisfactory after October", "Group will be ready by January 31, 1944" or on a separate shipment

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by squadrons readiness dates were "1st Squadron on November 1, 1943; 2nd Squadron on January 1, 1944; 3rd Squadron on February 1, 1944; Group Headquarters on December 1, 1943." At this time it was pointed out "that a great deal of the EM are completely unqualified as technicians." As a consequence of previous difficulties maintenance was a decided problem, but an inspection gave conclusions that "airplane maintenance is not of a high standard but it is improving steadily. It is not inferior when compared with other and similar units." On 23 July 1943, Selfridge Field and this Group passed from the control of this air force to First Air Force. (Above covers the history of the 99th Fighter Squadron and 332nd Fighter Group submitted by the 3rd AF.)

There follows the report by the 1st AF.

1. The analysis of the 332nd Fighter Group must of necessity be much briefer than that of the [foregoing] analysis of the 477th Bombardment Group (M). This is due primarily to the lack of information available on this group, which completed its activation and early phases of training under the command of the 3rd Air Force. The First Air Force took over the command of this group on 23 July 1943.

2. It must be assumed that since this was the first Negro combat group activated in the AAF, that the personnel were even more carefully selected and screened than in the case of the 477th Bombardment Group (M). For this reason it is believed that intelligence and educational levels were equally as high as in a comparable unit composed of white personnel, and therefore cannot be judged as being penalized from the beginning by low intelligence and education levels.

3. After 20 May 1943 all enlisted men assigned to the group were graduates of appropriate service schools and were fully trained in the basic principles of their MOS. The pilots were graduates of advanced flying schools and had received fifteen (15) to (20) hours of fighter transition in the P-40 type aircraft, before assignment to the group.

4. After assignment to the group all enlisted ground personnel were required to attend schools dealing with their particular MOS. All personnel were processed through these schools which consisted of lectures, mock-ups of equipment to be used, practical demonstration, and "On-the-Job" training. All of this instruction was given by personnel of the 403rd Fighter Squadron (Sep.). This unit, made up of white personnel, was organized for the specific purpose of instructing, supervising and assisting the 332nd Fighter Group in its training.

5. Upon reporting to the group, all ground officer personnel were listed as qualified to perform duties connected with their

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particular SSN. For this reason, no formal classes were set up for these officers. Instead, they were given intensive "On-the-Job" training with close supervision by personnel of the 403rd Fighter Squadron (Sep.) throughout the training period of the group.

6. The training of the pilots of the 332nd Fighter Group after assignment can be broken down into ground and air training. It was not possible to obtain records on the ground training of this unit. The following is a resume of the courses that were offered to the pilots, which was obtained by interview with Col. Robert R Selway, Jrl, the commanding officer of the unit from 20 May 1943 until it left for overseas duty:

a. Indoctrination
b. Engineering
c. Communications
d. Intelligence
e. Navigation
f. Instrument flying
g. Gunnery
h. Armament
i. Medical
j. Chemical Warfare
k. Weather
l. Physical Training
m. Emergency Procedures
n. Theater indoctrination
o. Altitude indoctrination

7. The air training of this unit was exceedingly thorough and complete. At the time the unit was activated, the minimum fighter flying training time, before overseas assignment, was 40 hours. Before the 332nd Fighter Group left for overseas duty, this requirement had been increased to eighty (80) hours. An inspection of the flying training records of the 332nd Fighter Group revealed that the average flying time in fighter aircraft per pilot during OTU training was 292.50 hours. This may be broken down into the following categories:

a. Transition
b. Gunnery

1. Ground
2. Camera
3. Aerial

(a) Above and below 20,000 feet.

c. Aerobatics

1. Above and below 20,000 feet.

d. Formation

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1. Above and below 20,000 feet.

e. Individual Combat

1. Above and below 20,000 feet.

f. Navigation

1. Below 500 feet.
2. Above and below 20,000 feet.
3. Night

g. Night flying-other
h. Instruments

1. Combat plane
2. Other plane
3. Link trainer
4. Ascent and descent through overcast

i. Strafing
j. Bombing

1. Skip
2. Dive

8. A comparison of Fighter Air Crew Training of the 332nd Fighter Group with that of White Fighter Air Crews, in training during the same period, reveals that White Fighter Crews were assigned to combat with approximately eighty (80) hours Fighter Air Crew Training Time, whereas the fighter crews of the 332nd Fighter Group were given 292.50 hours of fighter Air Crew Training time in order for them to reach the same qualifications and standards of proficiency.

9. Length of Training Time

The 332nd Fighter Group was activated on 13 Oct 1942 and was committed to overseas assignment on 15 Dec 1943. This was a training period of 14 months. This time was required to bring the group up to the required proficiency to meet minimum standards for overseas duty. The average fighter group composed of white personnel was trained and brought up to proficiency in approximately three to four months.

10. Proficiency of Negro Units

The proficiency of the 332nd Fighter Group may be judged from the fact that it was necessary to supervise the unit in all of their training even to the point of processing through the P.O.E.

White personnel were in the positions of flight leaders during the training of the group. It was found impossible to remove

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this supervision as flying training would steadily decrease from the time it was removed.

A test was made during the POM inspection to determine the effect of white supervision and inspection. The supervision was removed from maintenance, and the "aircraft in-commission" percentage dropped from 70% to 30% in forty-eight (48) hours.

Without the efforts of highly selected white command, supervisory and inspection personnel, it is estimated that the group could not have been organized and trained in less than eighteen (18) months. It is also believed that the group would not have attained proficiency standards equal to the bare minimums of proficiency considered satisfactory in a comparable white unit.

11. Performance Evaluation

The performance of the 332nd Fighter Group during the period of its organization and training was approximately equal to the poorest of a comparable white unit. This, in spite of the long training period and the excessive amount of flying training given.

Performance did not follow the level of qualification because of the lack of leadership, willingness to accept responsibility, and general lack of reliability of the negro personnel.

The administration of colored Units of this Command has, almost without exception, been closely supervised and inspected by white enlisted men and officers

The 403rd Fighter Squadron (Sep) was activated for the sole purpose of supervising the training of the 332nd Fighter Group (Cld). This unit continued to supervise, inspect, and in some cases actually did the administrative work for the 332nd Fighter Group. This supervision was gradually decreased as the personnel of the group became more experienced.

Shortly before the departure of the group, and before its final POM inspection was to be made, Administrative teams, comprised of base personnel were formed. These teams took all records and made necessary corrections, deletions, and additions in order that they would be acceptable to the POM inspectors.

At no time during the training of this Group did it reach a state of self sufficiency from an administrative standpoint.

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VENEREAL DISEASE AAF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

CONTINENTAL COMMANDS

WEEK ENDING 29 JUNE 1945



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UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES AAF ENLISTED PERSONNEL
CONTINENTAL U.S.
MONTH OF JUNE
1945



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REPORT ON TRAINING OF AIR CARGO RESUPPLY

SQUADRONS

It was anticipated that personnel assigned to Air Cargo Resupply Squadrons would be in AGCT Groups I and II, owing to the complex nature of the duties involved. In actual practice, however, the bulk of the personnel has been in AGCT Group IV, as the following table indicates:

Total number of Personnel	AGCT GROUP						
	Total	I	II	III	IV	V	Unknown
	950	7	107	268	470	95	3
Per Cent of Total Assigned in each AGCT Group	100	0.7	11.3	28.2	49.5	10.0	0.3

A wide variation in levels of skill existed among enlisted personnel assigned to the five Air Cargo Resupply Squadrons. Some were exceptionally well trained in usuable specialties, while others had only potential MOS's. The educational level of the enlisted personnel ranged from illiteracy to the highest academic degrees.

Curriculum

The curriculum, which had been designed for white troops, was used as originally outlined. With one exception, however, training time for the various specialties was considerably reduced. This reduction in time did not represent a simplification of the curriculum, nor a lowering of standards for the proficiency of the individuals or squadron. The emphasis was placed upon demonstration and actual operation, rather than on theory and classroom work. While little training material was distributed to students, visual aids, mock-ups and demonstrations were relied upon extensively to increase the effectiveness of training. In July 1945, it was anticipated that the maximum period for training could be reduced to approximately 50 % of the original maximum of 32 weeks. Up to that time all instructors were white enlisted men, but the use of colored personnel was contemplated.

Proficiency in Training

The attrition rate in training was approximately twenty per cent. This attrition rate resulted from such factors as physical

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disability for overseas duty, death, overage, psycho-neurosis, venereal disease, AWOL, and inability to qualify in MOS during the training period.

Written examinations were not effective training devices in Air Cargo Resupply Squadrons, even in the case of relatively well-educated individuals. Performance tests proved to be "the most effective method of testing individual proficiency". The accident rate during training--another measure of proficiency - was surprisingly low, only one case being reported during the first half of 1945.

All A ir Cargo Resupply Squadrons met POM requirements for overseas duty within the allotted training time.

Negro Personnel has been able to absorbe the technical training necessary to perform the Air Cargo Resupply missions, and learns specialized jobs most easily and effectively through demonstration methods and on-the-job training.

Proficiency in Administration

Some difficulty was experienced with First Sergeants. Three of the eight assigned to Air Cargo Resupply Squadrons had to be replaced during the training period as a result of deficiencies in handling records and men.

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REPORT ON TRAINING OF ENGINEER AVIATION UNITS

During the period since January 1942, 37 Engineer Aviation Battalions were trained, of which 34 came from the Third Air Force and 3 from the Fouth. In addition, three Engineer Aviation Depot Companies and four Engineer Aviation Composite Companies have been produced by the Second and Third Air Forces.

In the Third Air Force, the average AGCT Score for negroes trained was 65, placing it in Class V. The Fourth Air Force, late in 1944, tested approximately 2,500 negro enlisted men assigned to that command, and found that 13.3% fell in Classes I, II and III, with 55.3% in Class IV of AGCT Scores. The Second Air Force, making a test of all negro personnel assigned to the Command in June 1945, found also that 13.3% were in the upper three AGCT classes, with 54.2% in Class IV. Personnel of the 1963d Engineer Depot Company (Aviation) trained in that Command, was found to be distributed as follows;

Classes I, II, III	3%
Class IV	43%
Class V	54%

The 1963d had 49% of Class IV personnel, and 47% of Class V.

Curriculum

The curriculum of Engineer Aviation Battalions is based on War Department directives, which apply to white and negro units alike. The course of training of Engineer Aviation Composite Companies is not specified in detail, but is guided by AAF Training Regulations, which do not distinguish between white and negro trainees. The Depot Companies trained under the Second Air Force received the same training as that given white personnel, while in the Third Air Force an unsuccessful attempt was made to shorten the normal training course.

The training in the Third Air Force, which includes the greater part of the colored Engineer Aviation Units, utilized white officer instructor personnel and colored enlisted teachers. No information is available as to the composition of the instructional staff for other Air Forces.

In the Third Air Force, a measure of the teaching staff is afforded by studies made for February and again for June-July 1944. Among officer instructors, the formal education declined from a median of three years of college training in February to

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two years on the June-July rosters. The number of officer instructors who had only a high school education rose from 21.4% in February to 33.3% in June-July. A similar trend is to be found among the enlisted instructors, where the educational median fell from four years of high school in February to three years in June-July. At the same time the median AGCT ratings of enlisted instructors declined from midway between Classes III and IV to Class IV.

Instruction followed the usual procedures of lecture, demonstration, actual work, conferences, and training films. Because of the nature of the assignment and equipment, the lecture method was at a minimum, and heavy use was made of "on-the-job" training. "Teaching should be done by demonstration, rather than lecture, and must be done over and over. Endeavor to get the men to demonstrate, and above all you must be patient."

After 5 July 1943, the Third Air Force found that only three of the Engineer Aviation Battalions trained reached the readiness date with unsatisfactory POM ratings, and these were able to correct their deficiencies in time to meet their commitment dates. Of 34 Engineer Aviation Battalions shipped overseas from the Third Air Force since January 1942, time from activation to departure varied from eight to fourteen months, with an average of eleven months. Of the lasttwelve Battalions in the Command, six, authorized for shipment by the War Department less unit and combined training, departed for overseas four to five months after activation. The experience in the Fourth Air Force was comparable with that in the Third. One unit, activated 1 January 1943, departed for overseas in mid-October 1943. Another unit, activated 1 April 1943, departed for overseas in March 1944. In the Second Air Force, an Engineer Aviation Regiment (the 929th), activated on 10 April 1943, passed its POM inspection on 18 December 1943. By comparison a white Regiment (the 930th), activated on the same day as the last named unit, passed its POM inspection in November 1943.

The 1964th Engineer Depot Company (Aviation) trained in the Third Air Force, was activated 6 August 1943; and after two failures of POM inspection departed for overseas on 2 January 1944. The difficulties experienced by this specialized unit were increased when the usual depot training course was shortened. In the Second Air Force, two Depot companies had similar histories. The 1962d, activated on 10 April 1943, failed its POM inspection in July of that year, but was sent overseas regardless, owing to combat necessities. The 1963d, activated that same date, also failed the July POM inspection and did not pass it until January 1944. Four Engineer Aviation Composite Companies, trained in the Third Air Force, were activated on 9 August 1944, and passed their POM inspections in November 1944.

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There is little concrete evidence of the attrition rate among Engineer Aviation units, except in the Third Air Force. The clearest evidence of student failure or achievement was displayed by a survey covering May and June 1944. The heaviest mortality occurred in the Electrician's School and in Platoon Leader instruction. Least Mortality was noticeable in the Blacksmith and Welder courses. In some courses, such as tractor operator and diesel mechanic schools, the courses were broken into sections for bright and slow students.

Most of the indication of the success or failure of colored Engineer Aviation Units comes from the POM Inspection reports and from field tests. In 3AF scho ls, examinations most often followed the lines of "showing by doing", in the practical types of training given in the specialist schools. Various types of written examinations were used to test general theory, mathematical calculations, and details of operation and maintenance which lend themselves to written descriptions. Included in written examinations were such forms of testing as "objective" examination, and the "essay" kind.

Proficiency in Administration

For this particular kind of colored unit, officer personnel, with the exception of chaplins, are white. In at least one battalion - the 855th Engineer Aviation Battalion, trained in the Fourth Air Force - the medical and dental officers were colored.

Evidence of the competence or lack of competence of negro NCO's is obtainable from POM inspection reports. In the Third Air Force, it was found that "the proficiency attained in administration in the units on which inspection records are available (colored enlisted personnel only) is far behind that of the operational training as attested to by AAF POM Inspection Reports . . . in which even the best trained units had large numbers of minor administrative deficiencies.

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REPORT ON TRAINING OF SIGNAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS

(AVIATION)

Information concerning Signal Construction Battalions (Aviation) is based on the training of one unit in the Second Air Force and four in the Fourth Air Force. No quantitative statement can be made about the general level of education and intelligence of units of this kind. The POM inspection teams, after examining the 445th and 460th Battalions in the Fourth Air Force however, "remarked on the high average GCT (AGCT) score of the personnel of the Battalions, an average which was equivalent to that of white troops."

Curriculum

Scanty information about the curriculum indicates that Negro and white trainees were given the same courses of training. In the Fourth Air Force, negro enlisted men "were contained in the 476d AAF Base Unit, (Signal Aviation Training) only as members of Training Squadrons, in attached, unassigned status. In the squadrons they were either under training in specialist schools, or while awaiting assignment to other operations, were formed as a flight to train and perform signal construction in the field."

Instruction

It may be assumed that the Negro Signal Construction Battalions (Aviation) were taught by the same instructors as those used for teaching white battalions, and that the methods of instruction were the same.

Proficiency in Training

There appears to be a wide variation in the length of time required to train Signal Construction Battalions (Aviation), caused, no doubt, by a variety of interrupting factors. There is equally wide variation of opinion among training officers as to the minimum time that would be required for proper training. The 449th Battalion, Second Air Force, was activated in October 1942 and was sent overseas in January 1944, without having passed a POM inspection and regardless of two previous failures to meet POM standards. In the Fourth Air Force, the 460th Battalion, activated 1 September 1942, was found deficient in minor items in a pre-POM inspection on 19 July 1944. Training apparently was interrupted by a period of line construction and field wire work.

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Likewise, the 449th Battalion, mentioned above, was delayed by diversion to numbrous labor jobs not connected with training. In the opinion of Fourth WSAUTC, "the proficiency of negro troops assigned to WSAUTC and the length of time required for training compared favorably with that for white troops." On the other hand in the Second Air Force, the 440th Battalion (white), which was activated in March 1942, departed for overseas in June of that same year.

No quantitative measure of attrition for any of these units is available. In the Fourth Air Force training, there was elimination of unsuitable personnel both in the "A" (initial processing) stage and at an unspecified later date in the training period. Fourth Air Force states that "this selective process was not unusual, and was the procedure for white units whenever time and circumstances permitted."

No information is available on the type of examination given these battalions in specialist courses. Indications, however, point to the use of common tests and measurements for white and colored, since both were trained in the same specialist schools, apparently by the same instructors.

Proficiency in Administration

Apart from the exceptions noted, where negro chaplains and some negro medical and dental corps personnel were assigned, these troops were officered by white men. Non-commissioned officers, however, apparently were negroes in all MOS's. The same confusion of opinion with regard to the proficiency of negro NCO's exists in administration as in technical training. The Chief of Troops Branch, Engineer Section, Second Air Force, "states that non-commissioned officers developed very satisfactorily in supervision of labor details in warehouses, but that in administrative duties the units still remained behind the average white unit." On the other hand, an Air Inspector for WSAITC expressed the opinion that "the paper work handled by the clerical personnel of the 445th and 460th Signal Construction Battalions (Aviation) compared with that of white battalions very favorably, and reached a very high standard of proficiency. The explanation lay in the education of the negro clerks, many of whom were college graduates."

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REPORT OF AAF/MTO ON 99TH FIGHTER SQUADRON

AND 332D FIGHTER GROUP

The 99th Fighter Squadron was assigned to the Twelfth Air Force in the Spring of 1943 and engaged in combat to some extent. In February 1944, the 99th Fighter Squadron was absorbed into the 332d Fighter Group. After some combat experience the Group was transferred to the Fifteenth Air Force late in May 1944. The Group has remained assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force since that time. The function of the 332d Fighter Group with the Fifteenth Air Force was primarily that of escorting bombers. However, the Group also received other types of assignments appropriate to fighter units. Generally speaking, the Negro Fighter units assigned to AAF/MTO participated in combat during the period of such assignment in the same manner as similar white Fighter units assigned to AAF/MTO.

The outstanding deficiency of negro fighter pilots who participated in combat was a general lack of initiative. Negro fighter pilots are below average, as compared to white fighter pilots, in meeting emergencies under combat conditions.

The following is a description of a typical successful mission of the 332d Fighter Group, submitted by the Commanding General, Fifteenth Air Force.

> On 27 July 1944 the 332d Fighter Group was assigned the task of providing penetration, target and withdrawal cover for the 47th Bomb Wing to the MANFRED WEISS Armament Works at BUDAPEST, HUNGARY.
>
> 52 P-51's took off from RAMITELLI A/D at 0714 hours. 7 Aircraft returned early (2 mechanical, 2 spares, 1 cockpit and 2 escort). 45 P-51's made rendezvous over Lake BALATON (4653N-1727E) at 24,000 feet as briefed. The bombers were 15 minutes late. The fighters continued on over the target with the bombers and returned to base at 1100 hours.
>
> 7 P-51's encountered 25 plus aggressive Me 109's and FW 190's north of Lake MALATON. The enemy aircraft were attacking the bomber formation in pair from all around the clock. In the ensuing fight 8 enemy aircraft were destroyed and 2 were damaged. 1 P-51 was not seen after this encounter. At 1010 hours as the

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ALLEGED SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
NEGRO SOLDIERS AT LAS VEGAS AAF, NEVADA

The investigation was based upon a complaint addressed to the President and signed by 47 members of the 370th Aviation Squadron, complaining that they were improperly housed; were subjected to segregation, and were compelled to perform menial duties in the local mess halls and to serve enlisted gunnery students and officers.

The investigation indicated that the barracks occupied by negro soldiers at Las Vegas Army Air Field were theater of operation type, of recent construction similar to that in use at posts and stations throughout the United States. The basis for the complaint appeared to be that the other barracks on the Base were of permanent type construction whereas the theater of operation type was the only type authorized in the newly constructed section designated for the use of negro personnel. It was discovered that segregation was enforced in the motion picture theater on the Base and that negro personnel were not permitted the use of the white soldiers' swimming pool. Negro personnel were assigned to kitchen police duty in enlisted white mess halls as a military duty without compensation and were also detailed to work in the officers mess and the bachelor officers quarters for which additional compensation was paid them. The evidence was strong that the complaint had been initiated by professional agitators, this being cited inasmuch as many complaints coming to the attention of The Air Inspector follow a similar pattern. This investigation adduced additional evidence that one of the basic troubles in the handling of negro enlisted personnel is the lack of competent white leadership. In the instant case the low morale, which was found to exist at the Base would have been largely eliminated by strong and able leadership.

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ALLEGED MISTREATMENT OF COLORED SOLDIERS,
GREENVILLE AAF, GREENVILLE, MISSISSIPPI

By letter dated 19 April 1944, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People complained to the War Department of certain "atrocities against colored soldiers", listing ten instances, giving names, dates, injuries from beatings and abusive language.

The investigation revealed that out of the ten instances where mistreatment was alleged, all but two were without factual foundation. In most cases the colored soldiers were drunk and disordily, used violent, abusive language or were in the act of being apprehended for the theft and sale of Government property. In the two instances in which there was evidence of an undue use of force, one was by a civilian policeman while arresting a colored soldier who was speeding and driving a Government car in a wreckless manner; and the other was by a military police.

The investigation resulted in court-martial of the military policeman and his acquittal of the charges.

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ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE OF
CAPTAIN CHAUNCEY L. ANDERSON TOWARD NEGRO TROOPS UNDER HIS COMMAND
AT
VENICE ARMY AIR FIELD, FLORIDA

This complaint was submitted by means of an anonymous letter addressed to the Honorable Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., M.C., which attributed to Captain Chauncey L. Anderson, a belligerent attitude toward the negro enlisted personnel of his Service Group and the use of the words "dirty nigger" in addressing individuals of his Command. Captain Anderson, in the course of the investigation denied the use of the precise words attributed to him but admitted that he had addressed his men in words which were subject to misunderstanding. The evidence indicated that Captain Anderson was an able and conscientious officer but that he was not qualified for the command of negro troops and that through his lack of leadership his organization was characterized by low morale and lack of discipline.

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ALLEGED DISCRIMINATIONS AGAINST NEGRO SOLDIERS,
PAMPA ARMY AIR FIELD, TEXAS

The complaint in this matter was made to Mrs. Roosevelt, and included three letters from Pvt. William H. Johnson and Pvt. Isaac W. Wade, Jr., as well as an anonymous letter directed to the Secretary of War, alleging mistreatment, lack of proper medical treatment, unfair treatment, and an assertion that the camp was run like a "prison camp and a slave unit" and that the "whipping up of fellows" was common.

There was also an allegation that negro soldiers were being subjected to brutality at the hands of military police and white civilians of the neighboring community of Pampa; that segregation of negro personnel was regularly practiced and encouraged not only in the recreational facilities but in the civilian busses operated between Pampa and the Air Base.

This case has been cited because it is typical of many complaints received from negro soldiers stationed in the south and coming into conflict with the law and customs prevailing in southern communities. The principal difficulty in this instance, as in numerous others, may be attributed to the inadequacy of recreational facilities in the nearby civilian community. Every effort was made to provide adequate recreational facilities on the Base itself, and no segregation or discrimination in the use of such post facilities was permitted. It was further shown that in the Base hospital, colored and white alike, received equal treatment without any discrimination whatsoever. Facilities for the recreation of negro personnel in the nearby civilian community, however, were very inadequate. The colored section of the City of Pampa is approximately five blocks long and is in a squalid and unpaved area. The local colored residents appeared to resent the intrusion of military personnel. Because of this attitude and the limited number of negro residents, there were few negro girls with whom the soldiers could associate. There are no motion pictures in Pampa for negroes. In the colored section of the community there is only one grocery store and one cafe. There is one colored taxicab company operated by the proprietor of the colored hotel. The rate from Pampa to the Air Field was found to be $2.50. The Commanding Officer of the Base, therefore, arranged on numerous occasions, for bus transportation and appropriate chaperons to bring girls from Amarillo and other neighboring cities to enable attendance at dances at the colored service clubs on the Post.

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332d was leaving the target area a B-24 Group which was starting its bomb run, was attacked by 12 FW 190's. The P-51's engaged the enemy aircraft and drove them off. Flak was IAH at BUDAPEST and SIM at VESPRAM.

100/115 enemy aircraft were encountered in the days operations by fighters and bombers of which 31 were destroyed, 17 probable and 9 damaged. Fighters accounted for 14-0-4 of these claims.

No bombers of the 47th Wing were known to have been lost from enemy aircraft. From other Wings 5 bombers were lost to enemy aircraft and two were missing. Three fighters were missing. (AAF Mediterranean Theater of Operations).

The Negro fighter pilots assigned to AAF/MTO performed creditably in escorting heavy bombers, although a general lack of initiative marked their combat work. The ratio of victories in air combat in relation to combat losses shows that the negro fighter pilots, while assigned to the Fifteenth Air Force, were considerably below average as compared to the white fighter pilots in the same Wing. The combined white Groups recorded an average of approximately two and one-quarter victories per aircraft lost in combat. The record of the 332d Group shows only two-thirds of one victory per aircraft lost in combat.

Negro officers are generally considerably below average as compared to white officers in similar type units. Negro officers as a rule command less respect from negro troops than do white officers. In resourcefulness, aggressiveness, sense of responsibility, and ability to make decisions, the average negro officer fails to meet the standards of the average white officer. Although observance of officer's code of conduct is developed by many negro officers to a degree comparable to that of white officers, and in some cases superior thereto, there have been instances of unsatisfactory conduct in this respect on the part of negro officers. Generally speaking, negro officers are subject to racial sensitiveness.

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REPORT OF NEGRO COMBAT TROOPS IN THE FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

- Report by A-3 Representative -

1. The experience of the Fifteenth Air Force with negro combat troops represents a very specialized example. This Air Force had one colored combat unit, the 332nd Fighter Group, made up of four fighter squadrons composed entirely of negro officers and men. The group was under the command of Colonel Davis, a colored officer of superior qualifications. Whatever success the 332nd Group had resulted almost entirely from his abilities and efforts.

2. The pilots of the 332nd Group were the cream of the colored pilots in America. In addition to being hand picked, these men received twice the training that any white combat pilots received. However, the colored group lacked men of long flying background in key positions. Most white groups were commanded by men of at least ten years' flying experience, while Colonel Davis, the most experienced pilot of the colored group, had but four years of flying time.

3. In this theater, the function of the 332nd Fighter Group was primarily that of escorting the bombers. It can be said of them that they did a good job in this capacity. However, other comments on their performance of combat duty must be made.

a. Most colored combat work was characterized by a lack of initiative. Part of their success in the role of escort may be attributed to their unwillingness to leave the bomber stream in search of air combat.

b. Throughout their entire combat history, the negro pilots never became engaged in a so-called "knockdown and drag-out" fight, even though this group was on operations during a time when other groups were encountering as many as 100 enemy fighters on a single mission. This experience held throughout the campaign, despite the fact that the group received in its turn assignments which should have resulted in the all-out air battles which other groups fought.

c. Most of the losses of the negro groups were from flak and mechanical failure than from enemy air opposition.

d. A comparison of the ratio of victories in air combat in relation to combat losses reveals the 332nd Group to be considerably below the average of the three white groups in the same wing. The ratio for each group follows:

31st Ftr Gp	2.49	victories	per	aircraft	lost	in	combat
52nd Ftr Gp	2.08	"	"	"	"	"	"
325th Ftr Gp	2.22	"	"	"	"	"	"
332nd Ftr Gp	.66	"	"	"	"	"	"

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4. The work of the ground echelon in the 332nd Group was definitely below average. The maintenance was very poor throughout its combat history. The following specific indictments support this conclusion.

a. Other groups in the wing were forced to give up some of their equipment to replace equipment in the colored group which had been made useless by careless handling.

b. The wing engineering officer was forced to devote most of his time to the engineering problems of the 332nd.

c. Most of the energies of technical representatives sent into the theater were expended on the colored group. Technical representatives were continually discouraged by the lack of success which their efforts had. They frequently reported that up to half of the personnel listening to a lecture would fall asleep, and of those who were apparently paying attention, few, in their subsequent conduct, gave any evidence of having heard.

d. This inefficiency of the ground echelon was reflected in the group's combat performance. On one morning, five aircraft of the group cracked up on take off. The colored group had an excess of trouble with their gun camera film. Continual failure to bring home pictures in their cameras made it difficult to evaluate the combat effectiveness of the pilots.

5. At no time did discrimination enter the picture with this particular unit, although the wing staff believes this to have been the direct result of the treatment of the problem by Colonel Davis. The relation between colored pilots and white air crew members was quite normal, there being several examples of crews of crippled bombers, after being escorted home by the colored pilots, seeking them out to thank them.

6. In summarizing the experiences of this Air Force with this colored fighter group, three conclusions may be stated:

a. The units did perform in a creditable fashion as escort to heavy bombers.

b. Much of the success of this unit was due solely to the efforts and unusual capabilities of its commanding officer.

c. The colored group was not as efficient as the other three white groups in the same wing doing the same work, even though the effort devoted to making it as efficient was far greater than that which went into the training and administration of a single white group.

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INDEX TO TAB "R"

Excerpts from:

Reports of Air Force Commanders in Overseas Theatres covering:

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EVALUATION OF NEGRO OFFICERS IN NON-COMBAT FUNCTIONS

AAFMTO: Negro officers are generally considered below average as compared to white officers in similar type units. Negro officers as a rule command less respect from negro troops than do white officers. In resourcefulness aggressiveness, sense of responsibility and ability to make decisions, the average negro officer fails to meet the standards of the average white officer. Although observance of officer's code of conduct is developed by many negro officers to a degree comparable to that of white officers, and in some cases superior thereto, there have been instances of unsatisfactory conduct in this respect on the part of negro officers. Generally speaking, negro officers are subject to racial sensitiveness.

USSTAF: Negro officers have been found to be possessed with average intelligence, respect, loyalty to superiors, observance of officers' code of conduct, energy, endurance and personal cleanliness. They are below average in common sense, practical imagination or resourcefulness, sense of responsibility, ability to make decisions and organize their work. Of one group of forty negro officers twenty were given to race consciousness although they got along well with white officers, two were outstanding in all respects, three others were nearly as good but somewhat erratic. The balance possessed in varying degrees all the virtues and shortcomings listed above. The principal weakness of negro officers is their poor control over their men and a marked tendency to accept low standards of performance. They are inclined to make allowances for misbehaviour and are satisfied with indifferent or mediocre performance of a task.

FEAF: Certain of the Negro officers have shown themselves to be resourceful, aggressive, responsible, able to make decisions, and to observe the officers' code of conduct, but the average negro officer is below the white average in these things. On the whole, negro officers are few more sensitive to racial differences than are white officers.

AAF IB: As of March 1945, there was the maximum of twenty-seven negro officers and four negro warrant officers in this command. ****the following report is quoted from a report by the Commanding Officer of a unit in actual combat: "The three negro officers in his organization were the Medical officers and Dentist. They did a superior job and are believed deserving of the credit for the low venereal rate in the outfit. The Battalion had no cases of venereal diseases for at least four consecutive months and kept a low rate consistently. This contributed to the pride of the men. These officers were intelligent and broadminded as to racial differences and got along extremely well with the white officers with the battalion and group. One warrant officer was in an administrative position, the other was Motor Transportation Officer. They too, did a fine job." Medical Officers and Administrative Officers were found to be more satisfactory than Chaplains who were neither resourceful nor aggressive. They had a satisfactory sense of responsibility but were reluctant to make decisions. All possessed a trace of racial sensibility. The Medical Officers were resourceful, aggressive, felt their responsibility and made professional decisions.

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Most of the officers preserved in a satisfactory degree the Officers' Code of Conduct.

AAFPOA: Negro officers are not considered aggressive or resourceful, taken as a whole. Their general attitude may be described by saying that they desire the commissioned rank but not the responsibilities of an officer. In general they lack initiative and force. Their conduct, in most cases is in keeping with the Officers' Code of Conduct. They are sensitive because of their color, and they seem to look for an opportunity to complain of discrimination against their race. In general, it is believed that they are inferior to white officers of the same grade and experience and do not lead troops well. Negro Medical Officers, Chaplains and Warrant Officers have proved very satisfactory for their missions.

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some of the officers promoted to a satisfactory degree the intended role of them.

[illegible] Large difficulties are not such based integrity or reasonable, taken as a whole. Their general attitude may be described by saying that they believe the government real but not the immediate vicinity of an officer. In short, they lack initiative and drive. Their morale, in such cases, is in keeping with the different general morale. They are basically based on of their duties, and they mean to look for an opportunity to promotion or discontinuation against their grade. In general, it is believed that they are inferior to units of officers of the same grade and experience and to non-land-troops units. The Medical Corps, machine and various citizens have proved more satisfactory for their strength.

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EVALUATION OF NEGRO ENLISTED MEN IN SERVICE (NON-COMBAT) FUNCTIONS

AAFMTO: ***the performance of negro privates and noncommissioned officers is generally below average in comparison with white troops of like units working under comparable assignments and conditions. There are very few superior negro noncommissioned officers. Under reasonably favorably circumstances, the negro enlisted men's pride in self and organization may be considered as average. In the care of equipment, negro enlisted men are decidedly below average. Negro enlisted men are below average in dependability and industry. ****The relationship between negro noncommissioned officers and privates is not satisfactory from a military standpoint. In the majority of cases the privates do not have sufficient respect for the status of the noncommissioned officers. As a result, the latter are unable to effeciently control the troops under them. This lack of proper leadership among negro noncommissioned officers is perhaps the greatest deficiency in negro units.

USSTAF: Negro privates, if provided superior leadership and constant supervision will perform creditably. In almost all cases, both noncommissioned officers and privates are inferior to white troops of the same grade and performing the same functions. Noncommissioned officers, in general, refuse to recognize their responsbbilities and do not exert their authority properly. Noncommissioned officers lack initiative, resourcefulness, and aggressiveness. Instructions to noncommissioned officers must be detailed, pertaining to the work immediately at hand and must be followed up by close supervision. Pride in self and organization can be cultivated to a creditable degree provided the negro enlisted personnel have respect for their commissioned officers. Tolerance of unsatisfactory conditions by their officers or the relaxation of discipline, completely defeats such pride. Dependability is very nearly non-existent. As a group they do not possess pride of ownership and are below average in care and maintenance of clothing and equipment. Records of Negro QM Truck Companies constantly show a higher rate of deadline that similar white units, reflecting a definite lack of ability to care for equipment. They have a tendency to struggle in long convoys which definitely impaired operating dependability and very few long convoys could be depended upon to return intact.

FEAF: On the whole negro privates and noncommissioned officers do not perform as satisfactorily as white. Pride in self and organization are satisfactory. In the QM Truck Companies the drivers are harder on their equipment but the maintenance crews manage to keep the equipment running. There is a tendency on the part of the drivers to dress up their trucks, and to keep them in good condition where it shows, but to neglect batteries, and greasing only those other parts that are not on display. Under careless supervision, pilfering is common, equipment is damaged and material is not moved on schedule. Under good supervision the drivers frequently work 16 to 18 hours a day, when the work requires it, and take pride in the fact that they can keep going. The noncommissioned officers tend to fraternize with the men more than do whites, and this tends to lessen discipline.

AAF IB: ****it has been found that as a general rule most non-commissioned officers have to be told and shown how to do a job and [redacted]

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constant leadership has to be exerted in order to obtain fair results; laziness is common. It is believed that negro troops are better fitted for labor assignments, but even in these jobs they do not measure upto the white soldier. Although some negro soldiers possess pride in their organization, for the most part this feeling is absent. They feel that they are discriminated against. This is probably the greatest single cause of the shortcomings of the negro soldier. ****Noncommissioned officers as well as privates are not resourceful and in general are unsatisfactory. They do not assume the responsibility that goes with their rank, are undependable, are not industrious, and there is little respect shown by privates toward noncommissioned officers and they have been known to clash. Privates refer to them as "Quislings" even when they perform the duties normally expected of a noncommissioned officers.

AAFPOA: The greatest single difficulty has been the lack of capable noncommissioned officers. Rarely does a negro NCO exhibit real leadership. He may be an excellent worker himself, but he cannot lead the private soldier. The average negro NCO also lacks aggressiveness and initiative. The negro soldier is industrious if well led by his officers. Although he lacks pride in himself, this pride can be developed, to some extent, through proper leadership. He is usually not dependable and extremely careless in the care of equipment. Very careful officer supervision is needed to insure that the negro soldier maintains his equipment to the minimum standards.

Eleventh AF: The performance of negro privates and noncommissioned officers is below average. Too much familiarity exists between the privates and NCO's. This cannot be remedied due to lack of qualified personnel to fill the noncommissioned ranks. Lack of pride is evident. Only on a few occasions has organizational pride been evident. They are irresponsible in the care of personal equipment and cannot be depended upon to carry out assignments except when under constant supervision of officers. Only a few have shown signs of being industrious or of having initiative.

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MOSs IN WHICH NEGROES PERFORMED MOST SATISFACTORILY

AAFMTO: Negro personnel have served in AAF/MTO most satisfactorily in the following types of MOS; Cook, Entertainer, Truck Driver, Carpenter, Painter, etc.

USSTAF: Cook, Basic Duty Soldier, Munitions Worker

FEAF: Negroes have been both satisfactory and unsatisfactory in practically every type of MOS. ****The determining factor is not whether the man is negro or white, but whether he has a high enough AGCT Score, and has been adequately selected and trained.

AAF IB: Munitions Worker, Duty Soldier, Cook, Carpenter, and construction Worker (Laborer)

AAFPOA: Carpenter, Cook, Duty Soldier, Munitions Worker

Eleventh AF: Carpenter, Cook, Duty Soldier, Construction Worker

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MOSs IN WHICH NEGROES PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY

AAF/MTO: Negro personnel have served in AAF/MTO satisfactorily in the following types of MOS: Basic Duty, NCO, Rear Area Guard, Telephone Operator, Firefighter, Automotive Mechanic, Lineman, Cable Splicer, Automotive Equipment Operators, Military Police, etc.

USSTAF: Satisfactorily; Automotive Equipment Operator, Carpenter, Guard Patrolman.

FEAF: See comment under Tab R-3a

AAF IB: Automotive Equipment Operator(light), Baker, Auto Mechanic, and Clerk-Non-typist.

AAFPOA: Satisfactorily: Automotive Equipment Operator, Painter, Construction Worker, Welder Combination, Auto Equipment Operator, Duty NCO, Toxic Gas Handler

Eleventh AF: Satisfactorily; Automotive Equipment Operator, Painter, Construction Worker

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MOSs IN WHICH NEGROES PERFORMED UNSATISFACTORILY

AAF/MTO: Negro personnel have served in AAF/MTO unsatisfactorily in the following types of MOS: Draftsman, Surveyor, Clerks, Typists, Airplane Mechanics, Aircraft Specialists, Ordnance Supply Technician, Construction Foreman, Highway Construction Machine Supervisor, etc.

USSTAF: Unsatisfactorily: Clerk-typist, Clerk non-typist, Administrative Specialist, Automotive Equipment Mechanics, Supply Clerk.

FEAF: See comment under Tab R-3a

AAF IB: Intelligence Clerk, Administrative and Classification Specialist, Clerk Typists, Surveyors, Automotive Equipment Operators (Heavy), Draftsmen and Electricians

AAFPOA: Unsatisfactorily: Clerk non-typists, Clerk Typist, Aerial Gunners, and all MOS's requiring concentration, skill and technical abilities.

Eleventh AF: Unsatisfactorily: Construction Technician, Draftsman, Electrician and Demolition Technician

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TYPES OF UNITS IN WHICH NEGROES PERFORMED MOST SATISFACTORILY

AAFMTO: QM Truck Companies, Ordnance Ammunition Companies (Avn), Signal Heavy Construction Battalions, and Engineer Aviation Battalions.

USSTAF: Ordnance Ammunition Companies.

FEAF: The types of units that have been most and least satisfactory cannot be stated by function or arm or service. The best type is that for which the officers and men were carefully selected and trained, irrespective of the assignment.

The one Signal Construction Company has been unsatisfactory. They are capable of setting poles and stringing wires but they cannot do satisfactory lead cable splicing, trouble shooting or maintenance. **.

On the other hand, the Signal Air Craft Warning Company is an efficient unit. Under the command of negro officers, it operates and maintains a radar set in a thoroughly efficient manner. This represents a type of responsibility beyond the usual assignment of negro officers and men. It requires the thorough training of intelligent personnel. It is very significant that both officers and men have been found who are capable of being trained to function on this level.

Both the chemcial Maintenance Company and Chemical Depot Company are giving satisfactory service.

The majority of negro QM Truck Companies function satisfactorily, but on a lower level of efficiency than the white company. One in the Fifth Air Force under a negro officer is considered to be the equivalent of any white company.

Engineer Aviation Utility Companies, Air Cargo Resupply Squadrons and Aviation Squadrons have varied greatly in effectiveness with very much the same reasons for variation as is true of The QM Truck Companies.

AAF IB: The type of units which have given the most satisfactory service are Aviation Squadrons, QM Truck Companies and to a lesser degree, Engineer Aviation Battalions. This latter type unit requires operators and mechanics for complex heavy equipment and is less satisfactory than aviation squadrons and truck companies for negro units.

AAF POA (Later USASTAF(ADMIN)(MIDPAC): Service Units and Labor Battalions have given the most satisfactory service. **better than average results were obtained in Engineer Units where the mission did not require a high degree of professional skill. The Aviation Battalions have given better service than the Regiment since the high degree of skill required in a regimental headquarters is not to be found among negro enlisted personnel.

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TYPES OF UNITS IN WHICH NEGROES PERFORMED LEAST SATISFACTORILY

AAFMTC: The types of negro units which have given the least satisfactory service have been Ordnance Depot Companies (Avn) and Air Service Groups. In some cases negro military police units have been very unsatisfactory.

USSTAF: The least satisfactory service has been in QM Truck Companies.

FEAF: See comments under Tab R-4a

AAF IB: The type units which have proven least satisfactory are Combat Support Units such as Ordnance Depot and Ordnance Ammunition Companies.

AAFPOA: The Aviation Battalions have given better service than the Regiment since the high degree of skill required in a Regimental Headquarters is not to be found among negro enlisted personnel. Furthermore, the negro NCO's in a Regimental Headquarters are not capable of dealing with white officers of other agencies, hence, full and effective regimental operations are hampered to a considerable degree. In the opinion of the Air Quartermaster, negro troops should not be utilized in truck companies as they have been found to be inapt in handling of material and personnel transportation equipment.

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RECOMMENDATIONS OF OVERSEAS AIR FORCE COMMANDERS AS TO UTILIZATION

OF NEGROES IN FUTURE EMERGENCY

AAF/ETO: It is recommended that, in a future emergency, negro soldiers assigned to the Army Air Forces be utilized primarily in service type units requiring relatively low intelligence, education, and skill on the part of the majority of troops assigned. Negro troops of higher qualifications can be best utilized by assignment to those units in those capacities which require a higher degree of intelligence, education or skill. Care should be exercised not to classify negro personnel in categories higher than those consistent with their AGCT scores. The assignment of negro troops to AAF combat units involved in highly specialized of technical work should be kept to a minimum.

USSTAF: If great care is employed in the selection of personnel, organization and training of negro units, it is believed that they can be effectively utilized in static labor and service organizations.

FEAF: Assignment of least capable men should be made to labor units of the Aviation Squadron type; of the above average men to trained mechanic units, such as Engine Repair Squadrons; and of highly capable men to units requiring scientific backgrounds, such as Signal Aircraft Warning Companies.

AAF IB: Negroes should be assigned to small non-combat labor and service units. Individuals with high AGCT scores should be used as non-commissioned officers, cadre personnel or training personnel.

AAFPOA: Utilization in a future emergency in service organizations such as Port Battalions, Engineer Aviation Battalions, Stevedore Units, Aviation Squadrons, Ordnance Ammunition Companies and any other unit whose mission is primarily that of a labor-service nature.

ELEVENTH AF: Service type units.

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RATING OF PERFORMANCE OF NEGROES BY FUNCTIONAL FIELD

(AAF LTR 35-229, 1 May 45)

DIVIDED INTO ARMY GENERAL CLASSIFICATION TEST GROUPS

AGCT GROUPS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	TOTAL
I - - -	VS		5				1		2								3		2	1	11		7	4	36
	S							1	1						1				1	1	1			1	7
	U		1													1	1	1	1	1			1	1	8
II- - -	VS	1	14	2			2	3	9					1	2	11	12	3	8	2	21	2	12	14	119
	S		8	2			1	2	1			1			2	1	8		5	5	11		6	7	60
	U		1													1	1	1	2	1	2		1	1	11
III - -	VS	1	10	1			2	3	8					1	5	14	20	5	12	13	18	1	13	18	145
	S	3	16	1			3	2	8						2	9	11	4	14	4	13		12	26	128
	U		2					1	2						1	3	1	1	3	3	2		1	1	21
IV- - -	VS		10				1	2	6			1		1	6	13	15	13	13	8	13	2	11	15	130
	S		18				4	2	3						1	15	15	7	21	10	15		16	32	159
	U		4					1	4						1	3	4	1	5	4	5		2	2	30
V - - -	VS		5				1		1						1	9	2	6	9	4	4		11	13	66
	S		12				1	1							1	15	5	10	21	8	4	1	15	30	124
	U		4				1	1	2						1	4	3	3	7	3	5		3	6	43
TOTAL	VS	2	44	3			7	8	26			1		3	14	47	52	27	44	28	67	5	54	64	496
	S	3	54	3			9	8	13			1		0	7	40	39	21	62	28	44	1	49	96	478
	U	0	12	0			1	3	8			0		0	3	12	10	7	18	12	14	0	8	11	119

GRAND TOTAL Very Satisfactory - 496
Satisfactory - - - 478
Unsatisfactory - 119

(NOTE: The figures above refer to the number of replies to the command concerned)

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ALLEGED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AT FREEMAN FIELD, INDIANA.

This incident occurred in the spring of 1945 and was precipitated by the action of the Base Commander in designating separate officer club facilities for white and negro personnel under the pretext of providing separate facilities for trainee personnel as distinguished from permanent party personnel. Agitation among the negro officers of the Base culminated in an attempt to force the issue by entering the club for white officers despite an order from the Base Commander to the contrary. In this process physical violence was used against a provost marshal officer. Three negro officers who were responsible for this use of violence were subsequently tried. Two were acquitted and the third was convicted under one charge and fined. Growing out of the original club incident there was mass disobedience by 101 negro officers of an order from the Base Commander that a certain Base regulation was to be read by all officers and certification of such reading was to be made in writing. The 101 offenders were placed under arrest but were subsequently released and given an administrative reprimand because of an existing doubt that they had understood the implications of their action.

The basic cause of this complaint probably derived from the resentment harbored by the negro officers against the white supervisory personnel of the 577th Heavy Bombardment Group to which the negro officers were assigned for training. The white supervisory personnel occupied the key positions and colored officers considered that their opportunities for promotion and advancement were denied as a result. Additionally, the question of the separate club facilities appears to have been agitated for considerable time prior to the precipitation of the incident. In this connection a constant source of agitation among negro officers as well as enlisted men has been the negro press which appears to have enjoyed wide circulation among negro military personnel. The effect of the incident cited above was to cause a revision of War Department Regulations so as to prohibit the designation of separate club facilities for negro officers. Also, all white officers were removed from the 577th Heavy Bombardment Squadron which was placed in command of a negro officer with overseas experience.

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ALLEGED MUTINOUS CONDUCT OF NEGRO ENLISTED PERSONNEL
AT HERBERT SMART AIRPORT, MACON, GEORGIA

Identical anonymous letters directed to the Secretary of War and General Arnold, complained of deplorable conditions in the 457th Aviation Squadron. The record reveals that there was strong reason to believe that the mutiny in this Squadron was the result of a conspiracy to avoid overseas duty. The actual mutiny occurred on 11 November 1944 and consisted of mass disobedience of the entire Squadron to the orders of the Squadron Commander to proceed with the days training. This action followed the relief of the First Sergeant by the Squadron Commander. In discussions which took place between the Squadron Commander, the Base Commander and members of the Squadron, the spokesman for the Squadron asserted that if the First Sergeant were transferred from the Squadron they did not want their officers. The investigation further revealed that personnel of the Squadron had been in units which had previously been activated for overseas duty and through the medium of mutiny and mass disturbance had caused the organization to be removed from the "Alert" list. Further contributing to the mutiny was the lack of age, experience, and ability of the Commanding Officer and Adjutant of the Squadron who were totally unable to cope with the situation. The mutiny existed from early morning until the Squadron presented itself at a mass meeting in the Base Theater conducted by the Base Commander. The Base Commander lost control of the meeting and it was not until another officer took command of the meeting that discipline was restored.

This case is illustrative of a contributing cause to racial difficulties in that junior, inexperienced, and less efficient officers are frequently assigned to colored Squadrons resulting generally in low morale and a lack of discipline through poor leadership.

The result of the investigation was the transfer of the Squadron officers and the Base Commander. No disciplinary action was taken against the mutinous Squadron.

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COMPLAINT INVOLVING SEPARATE MESS AND CLUB
FACILITIES AT MATHER FIELD, CALIFORNIA

In March 1944, Major Omar B. Roberts, C.M.P., reported that discrimination against negro officers existed at Mather Field through the provision of separate messing and club facilities. An investigation substantiated the allegation in that negro trainee officers at Mather Field were assigned the use of a separate club on the ground that they were not members of the permanent party but were trainee officers. Separate tables were also provided for these negro officers at the officers' mess. There was allegedly no discrimination on a racial basis although in the minds of the negro officers there was unquestionably the belief that the assignment of separate facilities served merely as a pretext by which racial discrimination was accomplished. The separation of club facilities for trainee officers as distinguished from members of the permanent party was widely practiced in the AAF Training Command and applied to white student officers as well as to negro student officers. The theory behind this policy was predicated upon a desire to maintain closer and more unified supervision over student groups, to regulate their hours to better advantage, and to enhance the prestige of the supervisory and instructor personnel by setting them apart from the student officers.

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ALLEGED RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AT AMARILLO
ARMY AIR FIELD

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People complained to the Secretary of War alleging segregation in the Post Theater at Amarillo Army Air Field and enclosed two unsigned letters from negro enlisted men who complained that negro men were not considered as soldiers; that no service clubs were available for the use of negroes but a beautiful one provided for white soldiers; that a few rows of seats were set aside for negro soldiers; and that when these seats were filled, the negro soldiers were required to wait; that all the menial tasks at Amarillo Army Air Field were given the negro soldier to do.

No witness interviewed alleged that the negro was not considered as a soldier. Negro personnel were prohibited from utilizing the facilities of the service club at the Field due to the fact that this Field was located in the deep south; it was alleged that employees of the service club refused to wait on negro personnel and that the presence of negro soldiers in the service club would prevent the local white girls from entering the service club.

A block of seats was set aside at the Post Theater for each Squadron on the basis of Squadron strength, which is not in conflict with War Department policy. The allegation that all the menial work was given the negro soldier was unfounded. There was no evidence that the problem of the negro soldier at Amarillo Army Air Field was any more serious than that at other military installations in the south.

This case presents further evidence of the agitation by the colored press and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and reflects the manner in which they encourage the soldier to serve as a pipeline of complaint, thereby violating normal military correspondence channels through which any proper complaint can be processed.

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DISORDER OCCURRING AT BROOKLEY FIELD,
ALABAMA.

On 24 May 1944 certain negro personnel at Brookley Field engaged in a riotous disturbance in the general area of the barracks. No white soldiers were involved. The gun room of the 347th Aviation Squadron was broken into and approximately 80 weapons and 2,000 rounds of ammunition were removed and distributed among the participating personnel. Only one soldier was seriously wounded. The military police on duty were all negroes but did nothing to quell the disturbance. The Commanding Officer of the 347th Aviation Squadron was fired upon with deadly intent. The firing was haphazard and after continuing intermittently for about an hour, was stopped by the action of white officers who arrived upon the scene, restored order and recovered the weapons. The definite cause of the disturbance was not established but appears to have been due to a desire to remove the Unit from the "Alert" list for overseas service. The disorder in this instance is not in the category of racial conflict but demonstrated conclusively the lack of competent leadership by the white officer personnel of the Base. Nine negro enlisted men were tried and convicted and given appropriate sentences and one white officer was court-martialled for lack of duty.

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ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF COLORED OFFICERS
AND AVIATION CADETS AT TYNDALL FIELD, FLORIDA

Eight colored second lieutenants, aviation cadets, complained by letter, directed to the Inspector General, of conditions at Tyndall Field, Florida, alleging improper and inadequate quarters, improper and poor mess, and asked that this unjustified discrimination be corrected.

The investigation revealed that the quarters assigned colored aviation cadets were of permanent concrete construction and identical with those occupied by white students at Tyndall Field. The mess provided the colored aviation students was identical with that provided white personnel and all messes were operated on a Field ration. The investigation did disclose an item not included in the complaint of these officers in that segregation existed with regard to the latrines in several buildings used by the student gunners. The original complaints were found to be entirely unsubstantiated and the one instance of segregation disclosed by the investigation was ordered corrected.

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Although no credible evidence was found that negro enlisted men had been abused or maltreated by local residents or local police, it is, nevertheless true that the white civilians of the city of Pampa share the social prejudices of this section of the country against the negro race.

The allegation that negro enlisted personnel were subjected to abuse at the hands of military police were not sustained. The charge was made by an enlisted man who became drunk and disordily so that the military police were compelled to use force to subdue him. This incident was seized upon to agitate the racial question.

Segregation exists on all civilian buses operated between Pampa and the Air Base. This segregation, however, is provided by the State laws of Texas and there is no jurisdiction which the military can exercise in the premises.

With the exception of minor discrepancies, the racial situation at Pampa Army Air Base is not dissimilar from that existing at many other southern Posts and stations. The evidence in this and numerous other investigations suggests that negro troops are easily influenced by rumors alleging mistreatment or discrimination because of race or color and that these rumors are initiated and encouraged by professional agitators both within the military ranks and on the outside. Many of these troops are far from home, in strange surroundings, and have found it difficult to adjust themselves to their new environment. Their homesickness and discontent offers a fertile field for agitators.

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TREATMENT OF COLORED PRISONERS, SPOKANE AAF,
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON

The names of nine colored prisoners were typewritten on a letter addressed "To Whom It May Concern" alleging that they were the victims of unfair treatment from the prison officers such as beating; not allowing them to go on sick call; insufficient food and clothing; that justice is not administered to the colored soldier and that it is useless to appeal to higher authorities on the Post.

The investigation revealed that no attempt had been made to appeal to the Base Commander or other authorities on the Post; that colored prisoners were allowed to go on sick call at stated times in the morning but that irregular attendance to sick call was prohibited due to malingering on the part of the prisoners; that the colored prisoners have at all times had plenty of food to eat although such food was not always to their liking; that they have had sufficient clothes to wear. In connection with the allegation concerning beating, there was evidence that on several occasions certain of the colored soldiers had been struck by guards. In no case was the blow administered sufficient to cause a serious injury or to require medical attention. In certain instances the blow was provoked by the abusive and threatening attitude of the prisoners toward the guard. Particularly was this true in the case of prisoner Pvt. Andrew A. L. McGee, who possessed a civilian criminal record and repeatedly threatened the guards with bodily harm, cursed them, and refused to work.

There was no evidence of racial discrimination. The police and prison officer was reported to have done a splendid job and to have insisted that the prisoners work and maintain proper guardhouse discipline. The prisoners resented his business--like manner and the insistance that they work and behave themselves and their resentment found release in their effort to embarrass this officer. The guards who struck prisoners were relieved from their assignment as guards and disciplined, and the Commander of the guard was given an administrative reprimand for his failure to relieve the guards from duty and properly discipline them.

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ALLEGED SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATION AT
DANIEL FIELD, AUGUSTA, GEORGIA

Complaint was made in March 1944 by 2nd Lt. Leonard D. Nelson and six other negro officers, in a telegram to the Inspector General, alleging that discrimination and segregation existed at Daniel Field, and was accomplished with the approval of the Commanding Officer. Lt. Nelson submitted a subsequent and corollary complaint to the Commanding General, Fourth Service Command, alleging that his rights as a citizen had been abridged by the discrimination to which he had been subjected. Specifically, it was alleged that segregation between white and negro enlisted personnel as well as between white and negro officers was practiced with respect to all local Base facilities including the War Department theater, post exchanges, the clubs and messes.

The investigation determined that the Base Commander had established a basic policy of "separate but equal facilities" for white and colored personnel. Separate theaters were designated for the use of white and colored troops, separate post exchanges were provided, and separate messes and officers club facilities were set up. Colored personnel was not permitted access to facilities designated for white personnel and similarly white personnel was denied the use of facilities set apart for colored troops. The facilities were found to be equal in all respects and identical articles were sold at the post exchanges. The action of the Commanding Officer was predicated upon his behalf that a serious conflict between white and colored personnel would result if a common use of all facilities were permitted. His conclusions appear to be based upon statements of white enlisted men as well as by the white civilian employees of the Base. The problem was complicated by the lack of separate suitable carriers for white and colored troops at the station and this was aggravated by an increase in the assignment of both white and colored troops which caused the respective areas to become overcrowded and in some cases to overlap. Negro officers resented the allocation of separate club facilities but it appears that the white officers vehemently protested a proposal to permit negro officers to share the white officers club. Resentment on the part of the colored officers was exemplified by their openly boycotting the recreational and mess facilities designated for their use and it appears that they further resented the use of signs

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throughout the Post designating certain areas for facilities as "For Colored Only" or "For White Only." The Commanding Officer took cognizance of these complaints by removing the signs, but refused to alter his previous order for the segregation of facilities for white and colored personnel. In this he appears to have had the support of the majority of white officers at the Base. This segregation was made in conflict with War Department Policy. Appropriate remedial action was taken in the premises.

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SEVERAL INSTANCES OF FRICTION IN OVERSEAS THEATRES

1 Report of Typical Disturbances Between Negro and White Troops in England

A serious incident involving white and negro soldiers occurred at Ilcester, England between white paratroopers of the 82d Airborne Division and negro soldiers of the 1514th Quartermaster Battalion Mobile (vn). The paratroopers were very tense, it being immediately prior to D Day, and were in a very truculent and provocative frame of mind. When they saw negro soldiers escorting white women to clubs, and to dances, they made remarks which grew increasingly bitter as time went on, culminating in mass fights and finally a riot which resulted in the death of a white military police of the 82d Airborne Division. Further trouble was avoided by the transfer of the Battalion from this vicinity.

2 Report on Disturbances Between Negro Troops and Civilians in Italy

On one occasion a truckload of negro soldiers driven by a negro soldier became involved in an accident, apparently due to faulty brakes on the vehicle, which resulted in the immediate death of an Italian child. Upon being threatened by Italian civilians, the negro soldiers fled in several directions. One negro soldier was caught by Italian civilians and stabbed to death. It is believed that no violence would have occurred if the group of negro soldiers had stood their ground instead of fleeing in the excitement.

3. Report of Effect of Axis Propaganda (Fifteenth Air Force)

In this connection, it should be stated that Axis propaganda was successful in building up resentment among Italian nationals against the use of negro troops in Italy. The propagandists stressed the indignity of subjecting white peoples to control by an inferior race and emphasized the point by describing our alleged discriminatory practices both here and at home. Propaganda to a large extent was believed. It is thought by the counter intelligence service that this propaganda was one factor responsible for the development of certain Fascist subversive groups who used it as one of their arguments in gaining recruits. At this point, an instance should be mentioned of a dance given for colored American troops in a community where there were no white troops, which resulted in poor troop and civilian relationships. Italian girls attended this dance, and the following day various walls and spaces throughout the city carried Fascist signs and slogans, one characteristic statement being, "We want no half-breed Italian children." Later, in this same community, the civilians did associate with negroes.

4. Report of Discriminations in Far East Air Force

In one instance a letter was sent to the President of the United States complaining against the exclusion of three negroes from a moving picture show held at a white unit. The Air Inspector's report indicated that the theater was a small one, barely adequate for the men assigned to the unit, that all outside troops, both negro and white, were actually refused admission and that no discrimination had been made. This illustrates, however, the case with which minor flare-ups come [redacted]

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