Social Dynamics
ISSN: 0253-3952 (Print) 1940-7874 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsdy20
Academic freedom, institutional autonomy and
the corporatised university in contemporary South
Africa
Adam Habib , Seán Morrow & Kristina Bentley
To cite this article: Adam Habib , Seán Morrow & Kristina Bentley (2008) Academic freedom,
institutional autonomy and the corporatised university in contemporary South Africa , Social
Dynamics, 34:2, 140-155, DOI: 10.1080/02533950802280022
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02533950802280022
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Date: 22 March 2017, At: 04:32
Social Dynamics
Vol. 34, No. 2, September 2008, 140–155
Academic freedom, institutional autonomy and the corporatised
university in contemporary South Africa1
Adam Habiba*, Seán Morrowb and Kristina Bentleyc
aDepartment of Research, Innovation and Advancement, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg,
South Africa; bDepartment of History, University of Fort Hare, Alice, South Africa; cIndependent
Scholar, South Africa
34
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2008
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This article examines threats from the state, institutional bureaucrats and academics
themselves to academic freedom and to the institutional autonomy of universities in
South Africa, and argues that the situation is more complex than is often perceived.
The generally disappointing post-independence history of academic freedom and
autonomy in Sub-Saharan Africa is drawn upon to illustrate the perils that may
accompany too eager an embrace of the state by intellectuals in South Africa in
confronting persisting racial inequities in institutions of higher learning. The article
suggests that a ‘republican’ approach linked to social accountability may provide a
way forward. To be securely founded, the advancement of academic freedom and
institutional autonomy must be embedded in the prevailing power realities: it must
grow from the contestation of empowered stakeholders. Finally, the article makes a
number of specific recommendations calculated to strengthen the quest for such
freedom and autonomy.
Keywords: academic freedom; institutional autonomy; universities; South Africa
Introduction
The independence of the mind is a condition for the independence of a nation. (Sall 2006)
Several academics have recently departed precipitately from South African institutions of
higher learning. Xolela Mangcu’s departure from the Human Sciences Research Council
(HSRC) and Ashwin Desai’s troubles with the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) have
sparked a debate in South Africa on academic freedom and institutional autonomy
(Haffajee 2005, Macfarlane 2006). Earlier, similar concerns arose from disputes between
Caroline White and Robert Shell with their respective managements at UKZN and Rhodes
University (Magardie 2000, Southall and Cobbing 2001). These cases generated national,
as well as campus, controversy. The concern was whether academic freedom was being
violated by institutional managers or by government involvement in academic and research
institutions.
Four years ago, Jonathan Jansen, University of Pretoria Dean of Education, sparked
another such debate. He accused the Department of Education (DoE) of undermining
academic freedom and autonomy through funding formulae and legislative interventions
(Jansen 2004a, 2004b). Articles and fora followed where opinions were again sharply
polarised (Badsha 2004, CHE 2004, du Toit 2004, 2005, Nongxa 2004, Pandor 2004).
*Corresponding author. Email: ahabib@uj.ac.za
ISSN 0253-3952 print/ISSN 1940-7874 online
© 2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/02533950802280022
http://www.informaworld.com
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Cumulatively, these events motivated the Council on Higher Education (CHE) to invoke
its mandate to investigate issues of national concern in higher education, and it established a task group on the state of institutional autonomy and academic freedom in South
Africa.
Who are the alleged violators of academic freedom? Clearly the debate in contemporary
South Africa is not the same as that under apartheid, or as in parts of the continent and world
where academics are regularly harassed and even killed (Africa Watch 1991, Diouf and
Mamdani 1994). Contemporary South Africa is not confronted with such a threat. Yet
Jansen (2004a, 2004b) and many managers in the once white universities believe the
supposed violator is the state, blaming bureaucrats at the DoE and maybe CHE. For Jansen,
they have invaded institutional autonomy, resulting, he argues, not only in a violation of
university autonomy but also of individual academic freedoms.
Institutional bureaucrats are also perpetrators. Many are concerned about the corporatisation of the university, noting how the new managerialism undermines collegiality
(Southall and Cobbing 2001, du Toit 2004, 2005). This is the essence of Andre du Toit’s
critique of Jansen, who, he argues, conflates institutional autonomy and academic freedom
because he sees the threat as external, following the classic formulation of TB Davie,
University of Cape Town (UCT) Vice-Chancellor from 1948 to 1955. But once recognised
as internal, the conflation becomes dangerous for academic freedom (du Toit 2000b, 2001,
2005), because autonomy could in the end so empower institutional bureaucrats as to
imperil individual academic freedom.
The third set of violators are senior academics themselves, as Desai and Bohmke
(1996) argue. They tracked the writings of leading Marxist scholars in the 1980s and
1990s, arguing that they no longer determined their own research agendas, which are
now determined by those buying their research and writing skills. Academic freedom
was seen as violated by senior academics’ propensity to sell their skills to the highest
bidder.
The intention at this stage is not to contest or support any of these perspectives, but
rather to foreground the stakeholders – to demonstrate that the divide is not as neat as it may
seem and to argue that the debate should be more nuanced.
First, however, we reflect on academic and institutional freedom in the first decades of
independence in Sub-Saharan Africa. As Mamdani (1992) argued over a decade ago, these
experiences seem similar to those of contemporary South Africa. This may enable us to
understand the consequences of the present state of affairs for academic freedom and
institutional autonomy in South Africa, and provide comparative lessons that help reinforce
such freedom and social accountability.
This becomes the focus of the article’s second part. In attempting to transcend the
polarities of the present debate, we explain different conceptions of academic freedom,
and, like du Toit (2000a, 2001) conclude by favouring a republican interpretation that
couples it to social accountability. But this on its own cannot realise institutional autonomy
and academic freedom in South Africa, and, learning again from the African experience,
we recognise that they will not necessarily follow from a progressive interpretation of
rights codified in a regulatory framework. Rather we argue that power is the key. Specifically, it is in contestation among empowered stakeholders – state technocrats, university
bureaucrats, academics, students and others – that institutional autonomy and academic
freedom will emerge. How to empower these stakeholders through policy reform and
measures embedded in economic and social realities is the focus of this section. Finally, the
article summarises the argument, with recommendations on advancing institutional
autonomy and academic freedom in South Africa.
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Academic freedom in Africa in comparative historical context
Academic freedom in Africa is inextricably linked to the continent’s colonial inheritance,
in particular to the various nationalisms in whose name African states achieved independence. Colonial governments were highly authoritarian. Space for debate, where it existed,
was confined by generally racially based exclusions and limitations. Over most of British
Africa, the reaction of the educated and politically conscious minority among the majority
population initially tended to be to appeal for the application of liberal principles to all
subjects. This was logical, but politically naïve, given actual power relations. Also, few
Africans were highly educated in the dominant western idiom by independence, and
contestations about academic freedom seemed meaningless in the context of small numbers
trying to establish themselves in a new and unprecedented situation. The overwhelming
priority appeared to be a functioning government and flourishing economy under the new
leadership, not worries about arcane issues of academic freedom.
Around independence many new universities were created on metropolitan models.
Given the paucity of highly educated indigenous people, and their tendency to move into
high governmental and political posts, university staff was initially largely expatriate. From
the beginning, these universities relied almost entirely on state funding, and on foreign
funding mediated by the new states. Though inevitable in the circumstances, this left
universities and their staff vulnerable to governmental pressure, particularly onerous when
single-party regimes became widespread, removing any substantial institutionalised source
of critique and renewal. Since the party ostensibly represented the national will, criticism
became dangerously close to treason.
University dynamics intersected with this broader picture. As nationals of the newly
independent countries began to be trained to higher degree level – almost all at first at
European or North American universities – they returned to an expatriate-dominated
environment. Under slogans like ‘Zambianisation’, ‘Africanisation’ and ‘indigenisation’,
pressures mounted to appoint and promote indigenous academics, and to reduce the expatriate presence. This was abetted by post-colonial donors, who supplemented the salaries of
their nationals in technical and scientific fields more than in the social sciences and humanities, where issues of academic freedom were raised most frequently.
This could be seen as the rough edges around a desirable and inevitable process of
indigenisation. Indeed, there is no inherent reason why state involvement should threaten
academic freedom. Specific circumstances determine whether this happens. From the point
of view of the autonomy and independence of universities and academics, it meant that the
state, already having a formidable presence generally without a vigorous and independent
civil society to restrain it, was further called upon to involve itself in academic affairs.
Invited as a paying passenger, the state ended up in the driving seat, to the discomfiture of
many academics. Thus academics were ever more closely monitored and controlled, an
ironic result of moves to create universities intended to be more representative of the whole
population. This process was complex, however there were left-leaning academics who,
from the beginning, were critical of the new elites and suspicious of tendencies to stifle
independent thinking (see, for example, Ashby 1965, Yesufu 1973, Moja et al. 1996, Zeleza
and Olukoshi 2004a).
What lies behind these trends? Terence Ranger, long identified with an African
nationalist viewpoint, has asked whether nationalist movements were in fact ‘positive
schools of democracy’ (Ranger 2003, p. 1). Scholars have discussed the evident failure of
democracy in newly independent states in Africa, and have suggested explanations, such
as the malign legacy of liberation wars, or the mingling of colonial liberation with the
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Cold War, sometimes leading to arguably inappropriate and authoritarian forms of
Marxism-Leninism in African societies.
It has been suggested that nationalist movements may incubate authoritarianism and
even despotism. John McCracken has argued that ‘nationalism was a genuinely liberating
force … in that it provided a stage on which previously marginalised groups such as women
and peasants could perform. At the same time’, he continues, ‘popular participation did not
equal popular empowerment, nor, more importantly, did it reflect that respect for individual
rights and minority opinions on which democracy must be based’ (McCracken 1998,
p. 249). Indeed in Malawi, McCracken’s case study, nationalist victory in 1964, was quickly
followed by remorseless hounding, in the name of Malawian nationalism, of any expression
of ideas at odds with those of President Banda. The churches were suborned and silenced,
the legal profession was undermined by cowed and easily manipulated traditional courts and
academics considered subversive were summarily expelled if expatriates, or imprisoned if
Malawians. The best Malawian academics tended to leave and work abroad. Banda’s
regime epitomised oppression under the cloak of nationalism and, at the University of
Malawi, academic and intellectual freedom was obliterated in its name.
The University of Malawi under Banda illustrates intellectual, and at times concretely
physical, oppression. Yet its very ruthlessness led to an emphatic subterranean critique of
power by some Malawian academics, often expressed through poetic metaphors and paradoxes (Mapanje 1981, Nazombe 2003). Even poetic ambiguity was not necessarily enough
to protect intellectuals, as demonstrated when Jack Mapanje, the country’s foremost poet,
was arrested and detained without charge or trial from 1987 to 1991 (Ó Máille 2000, Kerr
and Mapanje 2003).
The Banda dictatorship’s immediate and crude expropriation of Malawian nationalism
inhibited the elaboration of a more subtle discourse of academic freedom. Malawi was not
unique. A case in point is that of Kenyan novelist and literary and social critic, Ngugi wa
Thiong’o. He quickly came in conflict with the emerging regime in Kenya, saying, as early
as 1969, that:
When we, the black intellectuals, the black bourgeoisie, got the power, we never tried to bring
about those policies which would be in harmony with the needs of the peasants and workers. I
think it is time that the African writers also started to talk in the terms of these workers and
peasants. (cited in Wästberg 1968, p. 25)
After a long period of literary silence, Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1977) wrote ‘Petals of
Blood’, implicitly highly critical of the new elite in Kenya. He was arrested after the performance in the same year of his Gikuyu-language, socially critical play, ‘I will Marry When
I Want’, and imprisoned without charge or trial for a year. From 1982, his life threatened,
he lived abroad in exile.
Countries vary – and those in post-independence Africa are no different. For a period in
the 1960s and 1970s, it seemed as if East Africa would demonstrate the way in this regard.
Heightened intellectual activity characterised the campuses of Makerere, Dar es Salaam
and Nairobi. Faculty were shared and came from all three countries and from elsewhere,
curricula transcended narrow national boundaries and promoted pan-Africanism, and an
intellectual renaissance – one that eschewed national chauvinism, yet remained continentally rooted but internationally engaged – defined the universities and led the African
academy (Shivji 1993). Perhaps this pan-African ethos was inspired both by the optimism
of the period and the structure of the predecessor of all three institutions, the University
of East Africa. But it did indicate what was possible. Moreover, it was not an isolated
example. There were other cases, if not of academic freedom, then at least of intellectual
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tolerance. Some intellectuals were tolerated because the state in which they lived was relatively liberal, as in Senegal, home of the late novelist and film-maker Sembene Ousmane,
or because the person concerned was so prominent that silencing them would be embarrassing internationally, as with Nigerian academic, playwright and commentator Wole
Soyinka.
It is important, from a South African perspective, not to treat Africa as an undifferentiated mass of oppression and intolerance. Alas, however, even East Africa succumbed to
the twin pressures of political authoritarianism and structural adjustment (Zeleza and
Olukoshi 2004a). As a result, Ngugi’s case became fairly representative, and it is possible
to recognise continental patterns, perhaps indicating tendencies resulting from common
causes and broadly similar histories. A recent example from a country often considered a
model of democracy, tolerance and due process is that of political scientist Kenneth Good,
expelled in 2005 from Botswana. The immediate reason appears to have been a seminar
paper Good presented at the University of Botswana (Good and Taylor 2006). The text,
though critical, was well within the bounds of what most academics would consider
reasonable comment. The suspicion is that this expulsion related to Good’s history of
critical political analysis, for example of the treatment of the San minority in Botswana
(Taylor 2006).
In this article, the focus is on academic freedom at universities and similar institutions.
This risks an elitism that could be self-defeating in the long run. Intellectual freedom will
not be safe in African universities without similar freedom for trade unions, churches, civil
society organisations, the press and other institutions. Laws protecting workers in general
against arbitrary dismissal are also important guarantees of fair treatment for academics. This
is particularly important in Africa, where, compared with more economically developed
parts of the world, there are few self-sufficient organisations independent of the state.
Trapped by poverty
In the world of ideas, it is tempting to treat ideas as all-determining. For example, when intellectuals conflict with governments, and lose their jobs at universities or research institutes,
this may be ascribed to political or ideological differences. This may often be actually or
ostensibly so. However, material conditions in Africa weigh on academics and intellectuals,
as well as on the mass of the population. Perhaps more insidious than direct oppression,
because it tends to abort critical comment before it is even born, economic necessity weighs
heavily on academic and intellectual freedom and puts academics at the mercy of political
and institutional authority. While academic freedom cannot be reduced to the ability and
opportunity to challenge power freely, it is the purest form that such freedom can take. Even
isolated challenges verging on the eccentric should be taken seriously.
Until the recent growth of small arts colleges, generally church-run, universities in most
African states have been government creations closely linked to nationalist agendas. They
have relied on government and government-mediated funding, and the economic crises of
many African countries have been echoed in the chronic problems of universities: libraries
where new books are rare and where runs of journals ceased years ago, declining real pay
for academics, corrupt administrations and crumbling infrastructure. The result is: strong
tendencies to intellectual isolation and academic stagnation (Lebeau and Ogunsanya 2000).
Such conditions are pertinent to academic freedom. Lecturers neglect their work and, for
example, run bottle-stores, taxis or farms. This leads to rapid deterioration of the university,
and a decline in academic freedom as marginalisation of the whole academic enterprise
means questions of free speech and intellectual endeavour are never posed in the first place.
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Even more insidious is the move from critical research to consultancy. Intellectual work
continues, but changing from relatively free research and, if necessary, criticism, to paid
commissions, which rarely include a brief to examine social questions critically.
In this regard the International Financial Institutions must bear some responsibility.
Starting from the assumption that Africa was not rich enough to have universities and that
its professionals could be trained more cheaply abroad, they imposed as part of their
structural adjustment programmes a gradual material impoverishment of African universities. University grants were reduced and funds were re-directed to ostensibly more developmental needs. Shivji (1993), Diouf and Mamdani (1994), Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004a,
2004b), Mkandawire (2005) and many other African scholars have demonstrated in
graphic terms how these market-oriented, neo-liberal policies undermined the ability of
African universities in the 1980s and 1990s to fulfil their mission of teaching, research
and service.
Academic freedom was thus menaced not only by oppressive governments, and by an
approach that sees universities as arms of the state, but also by institutional material impoverishment that, while managed by African governments, was nevertheless orchestrated by
the IMF and World Bank. The result was a rapid fall in the prestige of academics over much
of Africa, in stark contrast to earlier times. The universities entered a vicious cycle of
decline, with material impoverishment and the lowering of levels of qualification as the
better equipped left the profession and often the country. This reduced the quality and quantity of intellectual interchange, and devalued the currency of academic freedom.
Academic freedom, in other words, is not something that a country can simply decide to
have. It depends on historical and material preconditions, which may limit the choices of
academics and intellectuals, whatever they might wish. The endowments of western and
even some South African universities give a different level of security to university-based
intellectuals than the meagre, predominantly single-stream and sometimes unreliable
funding of many African universities.
The picture on most of the African continent is, therefore, bleak, with various objective
factors that make academic freedom difficult to achieve. This is clear to intellectuals on the
continent, and has resulted in declarations such as the 1990 Kampala Declaration on Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/
KAMDOK.htm). Such declarations reveal little about the real state of academic freedom
and the power relations that make or inhibit such freedom. They also tend to focus on
universities, and do not dwell on the indivisibility of social freedoms and rights, in an
elitism that may actually increase academic vulnerability.
However, the Kampala Declaration is significant because it marks the disillusion of the
African intelligentsia with the nationalist project and its elite beneficiaries (Diouf and
Mamdani 1994). This disillusion was nothing new in 1990, and indeed a wave of unrest and
political change swept over Africa around that time. The important point is that the governing elites that had founded universities and fostered indigenous academics were now seen
as having abandoned and even turned hostile towards academics, and as having betrayed
academic freedom. Though this may have forced intellectuals back into their proper role of
critiquing power, they were now doing so from such vulnerable positions that their voices
were hardly heard.
Africa and South Africa
Disrupted by apartheid, South Africa has now re-established relations with the rest of the
continent. While the 1930s and 1940s were very different from following decades, and the
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then strong relationships between South Africa and the rest of Africa were within an imperial
framework, under apartheid, intellectual horizons shrank in parallel with the growth of the
laager (originally a defensive circle of ox-wagons), and independent Africa was generally
barred to South African researchers. South Africa lost touch with the rest of the continent.
Now, once more, relations between South Africa and the rest of Africa are fluid and
dynamic. Having looked at the generally negative African experience in the field of
academic freedom, it is important to see where it parallels South Africa, and what lessons
might be learned from it.
South Africa is different in some respects to the rest of Africa because of its history, its
economy and the unusual composition of its population. The possibilities of misunderstanding and resentment on both sides of the Limpopo are many. But South Africa is also an
African country. Therefore, it is legitimate to look at the rest of the continent and to consider
South Africa as subject to many of the same forces that play on societies to the north,
without defaulting to South African exceptionalism, or to facile and near-racist conceptions
of South Africa ‘going the same way’ as the rest of Africa.
A major issue is South Africa’s complexity and relative wealth. In most African
countries, if you lose your university job, perhaps because of political or social criticism,
you may have few alternatives. This was clear even in relatively prosperous Kenya after a
long strike of university lecturers, when union officials, all of whom were dismissed from
their teaching posts, ended up in low-paid or part-time employment, or abroad (Adar 1999).
It is the relatively wide distribution of material resources, at least among the educated elite,
that enables a proportion of the South African intelligentsia the space, if they choose to use
it, to criticise and challenge power. Such a base is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for intellectual freedom.
Even in South Africa, things are not necessarily easy for the dissenting intellectual, and
career alternatives are not plentiful. Nevertheless, there are more niches – in higher education,
civil society, NGOs, journalism and so on – where the intellectual can hope to shelter without
intolerable pressure from erstwhile employers or government. Shell, Mangcu and Desai,
mentioned at the beginning of this article, managed to re-establish themselves in teaching
and/or research environments in South Africa, albeit in some cases with difficulty, after they
were dismissed or felt obliged to resign from posts at universities or research councils.
The specifics of the South African past should be remembered. In the Cape Colony,
political rights and freedoms for educated and sufficiently prosperous males of all races
once prevailed. These, as applied to the black middle-class, were whittled away and finally
abolished in the first half of the twentieth century. Thenceforth, they became the privilege
of those classified white. Nevertheless, this earlier history of responsible citizenship for
some black South Africans, though hedged in by the limitations of its environment and time,
hinted at a pattern to which the country might return.
Also, while it is important not to sanitise the pre-1994 system in South Africa, it was
substantially democratic for a minority, though oligarchic and oppressive seen from outside
that racial magic circle, and hostile to dissenting whites. Radical academics were coerced;
David Webster and Rick Turner were murdered. Nonetheless, though there were evident
limits to the toleration even of white dissent, vestiges of a more liberal society (a parliamentary system, the franchise and free elections and, theoretically at least, a relatively free press
and freedom of speech) applied within the dominant group.
The revolution of the early 1990s did not completely overthrow this dispensation.
The movements representing the mass of the population rather demanded that they be integrated into a greatly extended form of the old system. Thus revolutionary purism mingled
with parliamentarianism, creating a situation where concepts of due process, legality and
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tolerance were strengthened by the incoming regime, and extended to the population as a
whole. Such concepts resonated more in South Africa than in many African countries, with
their historically shallower nationalist movements and their experience of largely undiluted
colonial authoritarianism. It is perhaps not surprising that ideas of academic freedom,
closely linked to parliamentary democracy, press freedom and religious social tolerance,
while frequently challenged, have tended to flourish more in South Africa than in most
countries to its north. This is not by any means to say that academic freedom is in all
circumstances and forever assured in South Africa.
Despite these differences, South Africa experienced a particularly vicious form of
colonial oppression that has left a deep impression on higher education as on other areas.
Universities continue to be disproportionately staffed by white academics, though this does
not mean that all such academics are actively or tacitly conservative. On the other hand, in
tension in some ways with the non-racialism espoused by the ruling African National
Congress (ANC), a tide currently rising strongly emphasises the historical disadvantages of
the majority ‘black African’ population.
At this point, the experiences of other African states and South Africa converge. Many
voices emphasise the injustices and inequities which black and especially ‘black African’
intellectuals have inherited and under which they still labour, and seek the state’s assistance
to remedy these. This recalls the experience, outlined above, of the rest of the continent in
the first decades of post-colonial transition. The suspicion might be that if the assistance of
the state is invoked too eagerly, the miscalculations of compatriots to the north may be
repeated.
Institutional autonomy and academic freedom in South Africa
A key feature defining the post-apartheid university is the increase in managerialism and the
shift of power from faculty to administration (Southall and Cobbing 2001). At the same
time, some academics complain that the state has become increasingly interventionist, and
that there is an ambivalent relationship between the academy and the state, underscored by
the impression that the state does not trust the academy to transform itself to meet the
demands of a democratic society (see Holiday 2004). These internal and external shifts
reflect larger global changes which, though contested and at times held at bay, privilege
neo-liberal values and emphasise skills over knowledge.
State intervention tends to stimulate calls for the academy to be treated as a corporate
entity with rights to non-interference, and to internal self-government. John Higgins even
argues that the ANC seeks greater control of universities than did the apartheid state, and
that we should not mistake one teleological justification for interference for another. That
the post-apartheid state is ‘well-meaning’ is a bad reason to abandon the notion of academic
freedom, understood as institutional autonomy. To do this is to betray the very purpose that
the university serves. He argues that the university is not an instrument of state policy to
deliver on the ‘needs of society’ masquerading as the needs of the economy. It is there as
the one social organisation dedicated to the unalloyed pursuit of truth (Higgins 2000,
pp. 110–116). Jansen (2004a) relates South Africa to the rest of Africa, noting that as states
become more authoritarian, they immediately target universities: ‘If and when that point
arises in the future, on what grounds will the South African university be able to challenge
the post-apartheid state?’ (p. 10).
Not surprisingly, Jansen’s view is challenged by the state in the person of Minister of
Education, Naledi Pandor, who argues that institutional autonomy cannot be unfettered and
must be linked to public accountability. The ‘inequalities and inefficiencies’ of higher
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education, she says, are due to a disregard for this accountability (Pandor 2004). No doubt
some institutions deserve this censure, but Pandor seems to assume that all are complicit
and recalcitrant, and it is therefore necessary to intervene to ensure that the academy
performs its state-conceived role adequately. This reflects a utilitarian conception of
academic freedom, clearly on the other end of the continuum to Higgins and Jansen. Is there
a way to steer between these positions?
The answer may lie in a participatory conception of academic freedom. In du Toit’s
words, the challenge ‘is the necessary and ongoing transformation of the institutional
culture of the university; this is no external threat to academic freedom; on the contrary, it
is needed to secure effective academic freedom itself’ (du Toit 2000a, p. 103). This transformation cannot be externally imposed, but if achieved it may deflect state interference. It
should be recognised that the powers conferred by academic freedom go with the duty to
deracialise and decolonise intellectual spaces. Incompatible with a state-defined agenda,
this rather requires the academic community to set its own house in order. In recognising its
corporate duty to seek and speak the truth, its independence can be asserted, and its critical
social and educational function discharged.
Structural reforms to safeguard institutional autonomy and academic freedom
Thus a route out of the intellectual quagmire in which the South African academy finds
itself can begin with du Toit’s conceptualisation of academic freedom (2000a, 2001). But it
suffers from a methodological weakness often associated with the policy researcher, state
technocrat and institutional bureaucrat. For these, if freedom and autonomy are conceptualised in a progressive way, and codified in a regulatory framework, this will translate into
reality. But African experience shows this is not so. Though nationalist academics called for
governmental intervention in the language of rights and responsibilities, events soon overtook them (Mkandawire 2005) because real contestations are not determined by abstractions
and regulatory frameworks. The state prevailed because it had power.
A solution must thus be constructed beyond this formalistic perspective, built on a social
science tradition that recognises that structures, and in particular power between social actors,
determine their choices (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Thus, while a republican conception of
freedom is useful, it is necessary to go beyond it and to reform higher education by dispersing
power. This is because power relations are the shifting foundations upon which universities,
like all institutions, are built. And it is precisely in the contestation of empowered stakeholders – state technocrats, institutional bureaucrats, academics, students and a variety of other
collectives – that institutional autonomy and academic freedom is constructed.
Four such reforms are identified below, two facilitating institutional autonomy and two
bearing directly on academic freedom. Without institutional autonomy, academic freedom
is not possible. The problem, therefore, is to propose an approach creating maximum space
for academic freedom, while recognising the realities of power and political and economic
influence. Firstly, all stakeholders, not defined by racial category alone, though by this also,
must be represented in the higher education system. Given the university’s mission to
generate knowledge, it must reflect a multiplicity of voices, including those of intellectual
dissenters. This is necessary for the production of knowledge itself, since ideological
pluralism promotes the critical engagement and reflective discourse necessary for testing
ideas and sharpening conclusions.
But demographic and ideological pluralism is also institutionally strategic, giving
social legitimacy to universities. This is essential, especially in a country with a history of
exclusion, where material backlogs create numerous competing demands on the public
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purse. Legitimacy, an important source of power, occurs when citizens recognise the
university as reflecting their concerns, hopes and aspirations.
This is one of the most important lessons from the African experience. Over most of the
continent, the political elite were able to erode university autonomy and academic freedom
on the grounds that these did not represent the interests of the wider society. This is the
essence of Kwame Nkrumah’s celebrated attack on the universities:
We do not intend to sit idly by and see these institutions which are supported by millions of
pounds produced out of the sweat and toil of common people continue to be centres of antigovernment activities. We want the university college to cease being an alien institution and to
take on the character of a Ghanaian University, loyally serving the interest of the nation and
the well-being of our people. If reforms do not come from within, we intend to impose them
from outside, and no resort to the cry of academic freedom (for academic freedom does not
mean irresponsibility) is going to restrain us from seeing that our university is a healthy university devoted to Ghanaian interest. (cited Mkandawire 2005, p. 22)
Such attacks were possible because these institutions did not possess social legitimacy.
To avoid this experience, South Africa’s universities must transform in demographic and
intellectual terms. Only this will legitimise the higher education system. How this relates to
educational and research quality, in which many South African universities are deficient, is
too complex to explore here. However, we would argue that social legitimacy is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for such quality and the national and international academic
legitimacy that this implies (Habib and Morrow 2006).
Secondly, higher education must be supported by diverse income streams. Presently, it
relies on declining state funding, while student fees form an increasing proportion of total
income. State financing of higher education enhances the power of state bureaucrats and
political elites. While public funding will inevitably comprise a sizeable component of the
university system, it is important that managers tap other income streams (apart from
student fees) to support their institutions and that this be seen as providing opportunities,
where necessary, to speak with an independent voice. This means accessing resources – as
some already do successfully – from the private sector, individual benefactors and domestic
and foreign foundations.
While difficult to generalise because of the disparate nature of South African higher education institutions and the recent remodelling of the complete system, it seems that 40–50%
of the income of most universities, even less in some cases according to Nico Cloete, was
generated from state subsidies in 2003, with student fees making up an additional 23–25%
(N. Cloete personal communication, May 2006, De Villiers and Steyns 2006). The balance
consists of third-stream revenues of different kinds. It needs to be noted that South African
universities receive a declining proportion of their revenue from the state, lower than the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average and than the contribution
in most African countries. It is notable that critical independence tends to be greatest where
third stream income is highest, though this is a striking correspondence, rather than direct
proof of a connection.
Another area requiring research is the disaggregation of third stream income. This is a
disparate category, divided by the CHE into philanthropic, entrepreneurial and earmarked
research funding, with a proportion coming indirectly from government through such
institutions as the National Research Foundation (CHE 2006, pp. 72–81). While diversity
of sources is helpful, there are differences between their effects, with some aid tied to particular corporate, charitable or governmental agendas. Even here, the overall effect may be to
set up different poles of influence, with the possibility of creating areas of intellectual
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contest in the spaces between these separate and possibly competing influences. However,
the data available to the authors on the nature of third stream income and its relationship to
intellectual trends are insufficient to allow firm statements on the matter.
Despite the lack of data, some general conclusions are possible. Perhaps the most important is that more could be done to generate third stream income. South Africa has been in
the midst of a democratic transition and various stakeholders have made resources available
for reconstruction or for legitimising themselves with a new political elite (Habib and
Maharaj 2008). Official Development Assistance has increased dramatically over the last
decade (Ewing and Guliwe 2008), as have corporate social responsibility initiatives
(Rockey 2000, Russel and Swilling 2001). Higher education should take these opportunities, though not uncritically, and interpret them not only as financial benefits, but as creating
space for academic freedom.
Moreover, higher education’s financial health can be greatly strengthened by transforming research from an institutional cost to an income stream. Universities host a range of
knowledge workers whose skills are increasingly marketable in a world where intellectual
property is valued. These skills can be deployed in the service of multiple stakeholders in
society. The South African transition has meant that policies are under review, and
academic skills are required by the state for monitoring, evaluation and policy development. Sections of South African academia have long served civil society, enhancing
democracy and advancing the interests of marginalised communities. The trick, of course,
is to undertake these initiatives while generating income; this is easier with the state and
corporates than civic actors. Herein lies the danger: these institutions could end up simply
servicing elite interests in society. However, if managed carefully, the university could
remain loyal to its community outreach and service mandate, while generating resources
through services to resource-endowed stakeholders.
Universities in South Africa are recognising this potential for income diversification. A
number are experimenting with providing a research service to corporates and the state.
Lessons need to be learnt from these experiences and generalised across the higher education system. But care must be taken not to become complacent. There are dangers inherent
in this process, the biggest of which is that the state or business corporations demand that
the university compromise its research ethics. Already this has become a problem in some
universities in the USA. A number of cases have emerged there where, for instance,
academic research has been compromised by institutions’ relationships with business corporations, violating the academic enterprise (Horton 2004). The solution, paradoxically, is to
increase such engagements so that the university does not become overly dependent on any
one client. Multiple funding streams for higher education can only enhance university
power vis-à-vis the DoE.
There are, of course, many who would argue that universities and academics should not
be obliged to establish their power and thereby their autonomy and freedom on a declining
financial contribution from the state. Rather, they hold that the state, as in the French case,
should be willing to contribute greater resources to the university without expecting the
latter to be beholden to it. This is the implicit assumption in Higgins (2000), Southall and
Cobbing (2001), Holiday (2004), Jansen (2004a, 2004b) and even Shivji (1993), Diouf and
Mamdani (1994), Zeleza and Olukoshi (2004a, 2004b) and Mkandawire (2005). But is this
realistic, given the market-oriented character of South African society and the utilitarian
conception of the university held by its political elites (Erwin et al. 2005)? Obviously, we
support struggles for a political economy that would enable such a scenario. But, in the
meantime, we believe multiple funding streams for universities enhance their autonomy and
academic freedom in the current market-oriented context.
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However, as recognised earlier, transforming universities and multiplying income
streams enhance institutional autonomy, but not necessarily academic freedom. It cannot be
assumed that the former will lead to the latter. For academic freedom to be realised, reforms
would be required that not only enhance the power of the academic administrator vis-à-vis
the state bureaucrat, but also empower the individual academic in relation to the institutional
manager. This suggests two additional reforms directed to the latter goal.
An institutional culture rewarding scholarship and intellectual productivity needs be built
into higher education if academic freedom is to be realised. Currently, a relatively egalitarian
tradition in the academy, reflected in equitable remuneration within hierarchical bands,
undermines incentives that may inspire research and innovation. The problem is further
aggravated by the embarrassingly low remuneration of academics. The effect is a race to the
bottom, especially in financial terms. The brightest minds thus tend to gravitate away from
the academy with dire consequences, not only for higher education, but also for South African
economic development. Where they remain, they are prompted to abandon the academy in
favour of academic management and administration, because the architecture of university
remuneration ensures that administration receives far higher financial rewards than the core
teaching and research functions. The message embodied in this system is that management
is more important and prized than the academy itself (Habib and Morrow 2006).
A systematic reform of remuneration is required if intellectual productivity and scholarship are to be prioritised and realised. The remuneration system needs to be transformed
in favour of the academy. Highly prized professors should earn on a par with, or even
higher than, senior management. This is not unheard of elsewhere. Such a reform would
indicate clearly that the highest achieving academics are valued and can expect
corresponding rewards. Moreover, better remuneration for productive academics, and
better financial support for research by public and private stakeholders would contribute
greatly towards reforming the system of incentives in the universities. Importantly, in
addition to attracting the most capable and creative minds to the academy, it would also
enhance their power vis-à-vis institutional bureaucrats, who would be obliged to recognise
the value of productive academics, because their academic stature and intellectual output
would be the key to enhancing resource flows to the university. In short, academic freedom
flourishes when it falls within the territory of self-confident and assertive academics
patently valued by the system.
Finally, academic entrepreneurialism needs to be encouraged, valued and marketed
outside academia. Such active promotion of the academy is necessary to relate its work to
the interests of a variety of stakeholders, including marginalised sections of society. This is
often not understood by those who advocate academic entrepreneurialism or their critics.
Entrepreneurialism implies not simply making money, but the engagement of the academy
with the immediate concerns of the society within which it is located. Of course there is a
long tradition of such behaviour. The academy has always hosted public intellectuals who
engage with other social actors and each other on policy, or even on the direction of social
evolution. Such entrepreneurial behaviour not only brings credibility to higher education,
but at times translates into increased resource flows through the professorate’s research and
other involvement, or through the enhanced reputation of the university which their
engagement engenders. It is precisely academic involvement in the generation of these
benefits for the university and involvement with the interests and concerns of the wider
society that enhances their power vis-à-vis institutional bureaucrats and enables the defence
of academic freedom from a position of strength.
Linked to the question of such social engagement is that of academic unions. This
deserves further investigation from the perspective of academic freedom. The early 1990s,
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a period of intellectual and political ferment when academics were arguably at their most
vociferous and influential, was also when academic unionisation was at its height, with the
Union of Democratic University Staff Associations an influential participant in policy
debates. Academic unionism has now fractured, with numerous staff associations and the
incorporation of some academics into general unions. This may have had a damaging effect,
not only on the payment and conditions of service of academics, but also on their roles in
practising and defending freedom of speech.
Collectively, these reforms can disperse power to academics and their institutional
managers, thus contributing to the establishment of empowered stakeholders. As argued
earlier, it is precisely in the process of contestation that academic freedom and institutional
autonomy can be constructed. Reflecting on this recommendation in an interview, Jansen
raised the concern that equality of empowered stakeholders risked an alignment among
some of them against those who had a direct and permanent stake in the academic enterprise. Thus, he insisted that academics and universities as institutions be prioritised in the
empowerment agenda. But is this not what the recommended reforms, directly targeted at
empowering academics and institutional managers, both long term actors in the academic
enterprise, are intended to achieve? Indeed, while managers and academics will tend to be
united on institutional autonomy, tensions will often remain between them on questions of
academic freedom. Where academics are able to create positions of power for themselves,
they should have firmer ground on which to stand in defending academic freedom within
their institutions and in society as a whole.
The recommendation advanced in this article is different from those emerging implicitly
in the existing literature. In this literature, there is either hope for some distant institutional
revolution to create the macroeconomic fundamentals for a better resourced or even free
higher education system, or incessant hand-wringing about the neo-liberal character of our
world. The recommendation advanced here is that institutional autonomy and academic
freedom need to be constructed through the contestation of empowered stakeholders, itself
a product of the messy process of higher education reform and entrepreneurial academic
practice.
Conclusion
Threats to academic freedom in contemporary South Africa must be understood within the
context of perils facing post-independence Africa as a whole. By an over-eager embrace of
the nationalist elite, African intellectuals abandoned the defence of their freedoms and
opened themselves to marginalisation and impotence from which they now try to disentangle. The structural context that enabled this outcome is the poverty that gave African
institutions of higher education few defences against their capricious paymaster, the state.
The South African experience, while different in some respects, has many parallels with the
rest of Africa. Its academy should therefore be aware of, and learn from, African precedents.
A central lesson of the African experience is the need for the academy to build social
legitimacy. This requires the adoption and implementation of a ‘republican’ conception of
academic freedom; one that recognises the social responsibilities of the academy, not least
the responsibility to reform itself, while proposing that it is the exercise of these responsibilities that will enable the articulation of a robust and unapologetic defence of academic
freedom. Another lesson is that any proposal to defend and enlarge academic freedom must
put prevailing political and economic power and its transformation at its centre. On the basis
of this conceptual foundation, four recommendations are advanced to strengthen institutional
autonomy and academic freedom. Diversity of stakeholders and third stream income enhance
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the former, while academic remuneration reform and academic entrepreneurialism go
beyond institutional autonomy and bolster academic freedom by strengthening the weight
and significance of academic and intellectual pursuits.
While some of these reforms may make progressive academics uncomfortable, it should
be noted that they are directed towards transforming the prevailing distribution of power
among social actors in the higher education sector. This is the necessary precondition for
enhancing institutional and academic freedom in contemporary South Africa. The recommendations and the definition of academic freedom are thus grounded in contemporary
realities, take objective constraints into account and escape unreal expectations, whether
based on conservative nostalgia for a romanticised past that will never return, or chiliastic
anticipation of a revolutionary future based more on faith than rationality.
Note
1. This article is based on a report commissioned and published by the Council for Higher Education
for its Task Group on Academic Freedom in South Africa.
Notes on contributors
Adam Habib is Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research, Innovation and Advancement) at the University
of Johannesburg, and previously Professor and Director, Centre for Civil Society, at the University
of KwaZulu-Natal and Executive Director, Democracy and Governance, at the Human Sciences
Research Council, South Africa. He has published on democratic transitions, political economy,
institutional transformation, higher education reform and state–civil society relations.
Seán Morrow, a historian, has worked at schools, universities and research councils in Ireland,
Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and South Africa. He has published on aspects of the religious, cultural,
intellectual and liberation history of southern Africa. He is currently researching the lives of the
anthropologists Monica and Godfrey Wilson.
Kristina Bentley is an independent researcher, specialising in human rights and justice. She holds a
PhD in Political Theory from the University of Manchester, and was formerly a Chief Research
Specialist with the Democracy and Governance Programme of the Human Sciences Research Council, South Africa.
Interviews
Professor Ahmed Bawa/Seán Morrow, Pietermaritzburg, UKZN, 2 June 2006.
Professor Cheryl de la Rey/Kristina Bentley, UCT, 25 April 2006.
Dr. Ashwin Desai/Seán Morrow, Durban, UKZN, 2 June 2006.
Professor André du Toit/Kristina Bentley, UCT, 24 April 2006.
Professor Paula Ensor/Kristina Bentley, UCT, 4 May 2006.
Professor Jonathan Jansen/Adam Habib, Pretoria, 18 May 2006.
Dr. Xolela Mangcu/Adam Habib, Johannesburg, 17 May 2006.
Professor Loyiso Nongxa/Adam Habib, University of Witwatersrand, 5 June 2006.
Professor Vishnu Padayachee/Seán Morrow, Durban, 2 June 2006.
Mr. Richard Pithouse/Seán Morrow, Durban, UKZN, 2 June 2006.
Professor Robert Shell/Kristina Bentley, Cape Town, 1 May 2006.
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