Centers of Gravity, Lines of Operations, and the Normandy Campaign

William Betson

The United States has over the last 16 years demonstrated amazing proficiency in winning military campaigns, but failure in securing “a better peace” as Basil Liddell Hart advocated. There is a need for an interagency analysis model, owned by the National Security Council (NSC), that can determine how the different instruments of power (IOP) can contribute to the achievement of the national strategic objectives, including which combination of IOPs is most efficient, but it must also bridge the strategic level of war to the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, this paper proposes an analysis model based on Dr. Joseph L. Strange’s center of gravity (COG) model, Robert Pape’s concept of coercion, and effects-based operations (EBO). The model could create unity of effort in utilization of all national and international IOPs and in securing the necessary linkage among the three levels of war to affect the adversary’s will and his strategy. First, until there is a Goldwater-Nichols Act II that establishes a more permanent strategic-level interagency staff or committee structure under the NSC that can be custodian of the proposed analysis model, the Joint Staff should be the custodian of the proposed model. The Joint Staff will be responsible for updating the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) using the model. Second, the concept of COGs combined with Pape’s concept of coercion provide useful focus points for attacking the adversary’s strategy. Third, Strange’s COG analysis model shows how to affect the adversary’s COGs most efficiently. Fourth, merger of COG analysis and EBO can ensure the linkage among the three levels of war.

A revised version of the previously posted essay, which shifts emphasis somewhat towards modern military history, includes illustrative maps, and explains some additional concepts, such as operating on exterior lines.

The Battle of Britain is one of the most important military events of the Second World War. Different approaches have been used to study it and understand the rationale behind Britain’s and Nazi Germany’s strategy. However, the use of warfare concepts, such as centers of gravity and its contemporary meaning, to scrutinize the planning and prosecution of the battle have not been as prolific. This article aims to contribute to the debate by maintaining that the concept of Centers of Gravity provides an advantageous framework that facilitates the understanding of the mindset and development of the battle in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities required to win.

zyxwvu CENTERS OF GRAVITY, LINES OF OPERATIONS , AND THE NORMAND'Y CAMPAIGN Major William I?.Betson zyxwvuts Armor Schooi of Aavancea Miiitary Sruaies U.S. Army Commana and Generai Staff College Fort Leavenworth. Kansas zyxwvutsrq zyx 4 MAY 1987 hpprovea f o r punlic release; aistribution - 8 7 3026 I S unlimiiea. S c h o o l of Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s Monograph Approval Name o f S t u d e n t : Major William R . Betson T i t l e of Monograph: Centers of G r a v i t y , Lines o f O p e r a t i o n , and t h e Normandy Campaign zy zyxwvut zyxwvu Approved by: Monograph D i r e c t o r I C o l o n e l Ri c h a r d Hart S i n n r e i c h , M.A. PhiLip'J. D i r e c t o r , Graduate Degree Programs .. Brookes, Ph D Accepted t h i s %d d a y D i r e c t o r , School of Advanced M i l l t a r y Studies of 1987 zy APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE: DlSTFUBUTION UNLIMI'IED. ABSTRACT CENTERS OF GRAVITY. LINES OF OPERATION. AND THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN DV Major William R. Betson. USA. 50 pages. (This monograpn IS aeslgnea to De one ot tne cnapters In the forthcoming DOOK ealtea ov Dr. Raoert Epstein on the eVolution of operational art.) The purpose of this paper IS to emplov an historical analvsls of a campaign as a case stuav In oraer to examine the utllltV of militarv tneorv as a gulae to aeClslon maKing ana campaign planning. Speclflcallv. the paper uses the Normanav Campaign to explore the usefulness of two theoretical concepts -- the Clausewltzlan Idea of centers of gravltv. ana the Jomlnlan theory of lines of operations. While It treats the entire campaign. the analvsls focuses in detail upon the campaIgn plans of Doth sloes. ana the maJor operation whIch led to the Allied oreaKout from Normanav and the aefeat of the German army In France. After an Introauctlon tne papers traces In aetall the aevelopment ana aeslgn of the campaign plans of Doth slaes. concentrating especlallv on the terraln-orlentea goals of the Allies ana tne force-orientea OOJectlves of tne Germans. The analVSIS also examines tne aifferlng OutlOOKS tnat tne two maJor AI iles orougnt to tnelr planning process. ana the alVISlon wltnln tne German nlgn commana regaralng the most efficaCIOus methoas of aefense. ThiS section furtner traces. tne constraints limiting the freeaom of action of tne comoatants. HaVIng IntrOduced the reader to the campaign. the paper then goes on to aeflne tne two concepts tnat the paper Will analyze. Because Cnapter One In EpsteIn's oook covers lines of operatIons In some detail ana omits a alSCUSSlon of centers of gravltv. thiS paper must speno a Significant amount of time definIng the Clausewltzlan term. FollOWing each aeflnltlon. the paper applies tneorv to historical experience OV IdentifYing tne centers of graVity ano lines of operation for Doth sloes In the campaign. The paper tnen narrates ano analvzes the campaign In ilgnt ot tne two concepts. it does thIS ov IdentlfVlng and recounting the events of what It loentlfles as tne tnree maJor operations of tne campaign -- tne lanolng. tne expansion of tne foothola. ana the oreaKout. ThiS section attempts to oraw tne reaoers attention to mlsseo tne opportunities ana apparent miStaKes of ootn slaes. The conclUSion explores tne utllltv of the two aadressed tneoretlcal concepts as an alo In campaign planning. it ooes tnls DV first examining how hlnoslgnt suggests that each siae shoulo have plannea ana executed the campaign. it then compares What nlstorv seems to nave suggestea tne proper courses of action should have oeen. WIth what a purelv theoretical analvsls of tne SItuation woulo prescrloe. The paper tlnos that while mliltarv IS an excel lent analvtlcal tool. It IS an uncertain guloe. It can eliminate Inappropriate solutions ano nelp snow tne way to oest plan. out It cannot 00 tne planner's thinKing for him. zyxwvutsrqponmlk Taole of Contents Page 1 . I1 Introduction . The Development and Design of the Aliied Campaign Plan . 111 iV . ............................................. 3 9 .................................... 13 ....................................... VI . Campaign Execution ....................................... The First MaJor Operation ............................ V. ... ................................. German Plans for Defense The Center of Gravity i Lines of Operation ........................... The Third MaJor Operation ............................ V I I . Conclusion ............................................... The Second MaJor Operation 17 19 19 22 25 33 Maps: Map 1: Forecast of Operations ........................ .......................... Counterattack .................... Map 2: Lanalng and Reaction Map 3: Breakout and Sketch: Bases. Lines of Battle. ana Lines of Operations .......................................... Enanotes ....................................................... BiDliography ................................................... i n Normanav zyxw 41 42 43 44 45 49 zyxwv zyxwvu zyxwvu iNTRODUCTION The Aiiiea ianaing on tne coast of France on June 6. !Y44 was an imense acnievement. For tne civilian popuiations o t Great 3ritain bna the ilnitea States tne day assumea tremenaous psychoiogicai importance. 6 wouia forever oe .'D-Day,'' the aay when it iune seemea that tne ena of tne war was in signt. The lanaing itself was an accomplishment of staggering scope. In one aay aliiea ships ana airplanes aeliverea eight aivisians ana three armorea nrigaaes t o a nostie). aefenaea shore -- a type of operation that haa appearea impossinie to many military anaiysts Just a aecaae oefore. Inaeeo. Operation NEPTUNE. whicn was tne coae name given t o the ianaing portion or tne invasion of France. may ciaim t o oe one of the most compiex ana ooio miiitary enaeavors ever attemptea. I t culminatea tnree years o t planning ana preparation cnaracterizea oy often nitter aisagreement oetween tne maJor aiiies over the proper strategy for the aefeat of Germany. Yet tne ianaing itseif marKea only tne oeginning o t m e campaign that the ailies hopea woula gain them a ioagement on the northwest coast o t Europe. zyxwvuts zyxwvutsr Hara fignting remained Defore tne Deachneaa was secure ana tne ioagement aevelopea sufficiently to aiiow furtner operations aimea at tne n e x t of Germany. ki iiea progress in the campaign aeveiopea mucn more siowiy than anticipated. ana recrimination ana controversy raged over its execution 00th a t tne time ana f o r t y years iater. Nevertneiess tne Normanay Campaign achievea mucn more tnan the mere seizing of tne loagement envisionea oy its pianners. It accomplisned tne aefeat of tne German Armv in Trance ana permittea the rapid ana relaciveiy easy arive oy Ailiea forces across France to tne very ooraers of tne Reicn. Tnus. wniie tne ianaing was criticai to eventual Ailiea victory in the West. tne Normanay Campaign was aecisive. zyxwvu zyx Not surprisingly then, much has been written aoout this campaign. ano a iiveiy, contentious nistoriograpnicai aenate continues after forty Years.: ihis paper will attempt to contribute to this aebate oy approacning the suojecc from wnat i oeiieve is a fresn angle -- it wiii use tne campaign to examine tne utility of classical military theory as a guiae to aecision maKing. hpioying two theoreticai constructs. Kari von Clausewitz. ioea of a "center of gravity" in military operations. and Baron ae Jomini's theory of lines of operations, the paper will attempt to analyze and criticize the planning and execution of military operations by Doth siaes. Although it zyxwvutsrq wiil treat tne entire campaign. tne major foci of the analysis wili oe the campaign plans of both siaes ana wnat seems to De the aecisive pnase of the campaign. the DreaKout from Normanay acnievea oy the hiiies in iate JUI'J ana early August, 1944. In order to a0 this. the paper will trace the aeveiopment of tne respective campaign plans of both siaes, go on to aefine tne theoretical concepts that will oe aaarcssea and explain how they apply to the two plans. ana then relate an0 analyze the battles in light of the concepts. it will then finish With some conclusions on the utility of ciassicai military tneory in rne anaiysis of nisroricai campaigns ana the planning of future ones. THE DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF THE ALLIED CAMPAiGN PLAN zyxwvu zyx Tine Ailiea invasion of France in 1944 haa its genesis in the autumn of 1941 when the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Winston Churchili. airectea his military staff to negin planning f o r the invasion of Europe. Thus. despite what some wouia see as British ambivalence towara an invasion of tne continent. Churchill always beiievea that without aefeating H i t i e r s forces on the continent. Britain coula never win the war. 2 Important zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsrq qualifications accompaniea this commitment to a iana campaign. nowever. Scarrea oy their losses in France in the First Woria War tne Britisn wisnea passionately t o avoia a Dlooay proiongea land campaign against the Germans. They envisionea operations in France as the cuimination of a grana strategy aesignea t o exhaust Germany with s t r i k e s aimea at i t s fascist allies ana tne fringes of Hit1er.s empire. These peripheral operations. couplea witn a D m i n g offensive aimed at the Nazi economy ana popular morale. wouia so WeaKen Germany a s to maKe the invasion more of a W D a@ orace tnan a aec i si ve Dat t Ie . 2 This approach clashed airectly with tne grana strategy of the Americans. wno favorea a more airect offensive. tradition tne American planners, lea DY Consistent witn w e i r Army Chief of Staff George C. Marsnaii ana Chief of War Pians Dwignt Bisennouer. arguea t o r an invasion ot France ana a aecisive clash witn tire German army as soon as the necessary forces could oe collectea in Englana. Peripheral operations. they Beiievea. wouia leaa to heavier casualties in the long run and r i s k the collapse of zyxw zyxwvu tne Soviet tinion. whicn would be forcea to carry the Drunc of tne effort aione while the Allies tarried. The American approach won out. of course. nut only after an extenaea aeDate: an0 the conaucc of tire two Ailies in tne campaign woula reflect tneir aiffering strategic ouc1oo~s.3 h more suostantive issue. nowever. woula affect the Britisn Army in tne campaign in Normandy than the feeling that they were entering oit too soon. scraping the it a In 1944. after more tnan five years of war. the Britisn were OottOm of their manpower Barrel. Despite a tremenaous effort tnat moDilizea ninety-four percent of Britain's aauit maie population for tne military or inaustry. only cannaoilization of existing units ana wnoiesaie transfer of men into cornoat units trom other Drancnes couia Keep 3 zyxwvut zyxwvutsr zyx tne aritish Army participating in OVERLORD in the fiela. aesperate measures would still Furtner. these leave the Army's manpower situation "precarious."4 Thus. no aritish commanaer coula permit his army to participate in tne Diooay attrition oatties chat chacaccerizea Noria gar I. This approaching manpower crisis remainea unappreciatea in january 1943. however. when preparation for the invasion began in earnest foilowing the Al I lea C o m i n e a Chiefs' of Staff creation of a planning organization for tnac purpose. Unaer aritish Lieutenant Generai Freaerick Morgan. titlea the zyxw Chief of Staff to the Supreme Alliea Commanaer (COSSAC. for short). this new staff iaia the founaation for tne campaign plan for tne invasion phase o t ine re-entry into Europe. now aesignatea OVEZLORD. Crucial t o tne aeveiopment of tne campaign. nowever. was Morgan's aefinition ot O'JERLGZ2.s ooJect. wnicn he aefinea as intenaea t o secure a loagement on tne Continent from wnicn further offensive operations can oe aevelopea. The loagement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six t o tnirty aivisions. an0 enaoie that force t o oe augmentea at-the rate of three to five aivisions per montn.3 ... Two characteristics of M0rgan.s aefinea ooject stana o u t . is its emphasis on logistics. Essentially. OVERLORD'S purpose was t o seize zyxwvutsrqpon a iogistics oase trom wnicn t o conauct furtner operations. oe surprising. put it. First inis snouia not As the future comanaer of lana forces in the campaign wouia " I t must oe rememecea m a t an ampnioious lanaing is funaamentaiiy a supply proJect rather than a tactical maneuver."6 Unless one seizes a aase on a nostiie snore ne cannot go furtner. The second cnaracteristic of M0rgan.s approach is cruciai t o Paper's analysis. The ooJective. as American officers of toaay would 4 this express it, zyxwvuts zyxw zyxw zyxwvut zyxwvut was rerraln rather than force orientea. Destroying the German army in France was not part of the OVERLORD c m a n d e r ' s initial assignment. Simply ariving the Germans out of an area suitabie for the logistical build-up was sufficient. in fact. as I shall now aevelop. there was no expectation that the fighting in Normandy woula or even could leaa to a final deCiSiOn over the German ground forces. C0SSAC.s plans could ae no more than tentative. however. for the plan,s final approval awaitea the appointment of the Supreme C m a n a e r and his principai suaorainates. Eisenhower. who woula hold supreme c m a n a . ana British General Bernard Montganery. the initial CMnnander of lana forces. arrivea in January. 1944. ana to Morgan's creait neither changea much of operational scheme aevelopea Eisennower's primary JOD by COSSAC. the Operating at che strategic level. was co sequence the campaigns leading to m e oefeat of Germany, of which seizing the Norman lodgement was the first. in his memoir Eisenhower outiines his concept for accanplishing Germany,s defeat in four phases: I ) lana on the Norman coast: 2) accumulate sufficient resources and then arealc out of the enemy's encircling positions; 3) pursue t o the Dorders of Germany on a Droad front: ana 4) after an operational pause, accomplish a aouale envelopment of the Ruhr followed by a thrusc into the heart of Germany.7 Interestingly, Eisenhower nowhere mentions how he intenaea t o dl)StrOy the German army. He aiscusses a ianaing. a IOgiStiCaI Duiia-UP. ana the capture of politico-strategic ODjectives, Dut aoes not translate them into a scheme for operational level maneuver. If he anticipatea a aecisive battle. he does not indicate where and when he expectea destruction of the German army, one assumes, way auring the drive into Germany.8 5 WOUlcl it. The aefeat and come somewhere along the zyxw zyxw In fact. none of the contemporary evidence suggests that anyone expectea OVERLORD to achieve anything more than the simple lodgement envisioned by tne COSSAC planners. Even the faDiea airective given to tne Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SRAEF) by the Combined Chiefs suggested that the first tasK of the invasion was securing a lodgement. After the famous statement regarding the undertaking of operations uaimed at the heart of Germany and the aestruction of her armea forces." the directive goes on to say After adequate channei ports have been securea. exploitation will be directed cowards securing an area that will facilitate aoth ground and a i r operations against the enemy.9 Certainly. the lana force comnander never aemonstratea cnat ne unaerstooa that his mission was to accomplish anything more chan the ioagement. In a oriefing given to senior military officers in Aprii. 1944 Eisenhover and Churchill). Montgomery aeclared the ODJeCt of (attendee by OVERLORD LO zyxw 'secure a lodgement from which further operations can oe aevelOPed."lo In fact, apart from increasing the initial lanaing force from three aivisions to five, Montgomery aid nothing to change the Plan of campaign aevelopea by the COSSAC staff. The closest he got t o a aiscussion of a aecisive battle in Normandy seemes t o have oeen a reference in t n i s oriefing to a tank " k n o w about' Detween Caen and Falais. for here was where he expectea to meet the main German COUnteCattdCk. Would merely protect his flank. aestroy them.ll It Such a oattie. nowever. would c h e w o r repel the Germans, not Never prior to the landing did he announce o r propose any scheme to aestroy or aecisively defeat the German Army in Normanay. The COSSAC plan that Montgomery adopted was elegantly simpie ana seemed aesignea to accomplish OVERLORD'S mission with minimum 6 risK. After zyx zyxw zyxwvut zyxwv the initial phase securea a neachheaa. phase two of M0rgan.s scneme caiiea for an expansion of Aliiea holaings. noth to proviae space for airfielas and to gain the aeptn necessary for a arive into tne Cotentin Peninsula to secure Cheroourg. a port necessary to continue the nuiiaup. Once Cheroourg feil the Ailies woula ne confrontea with a choice o t turning ieft to caKe the Channel ports or of going right to seize ports in Brittany. Morgan concluaea that only if the Germans were weak woula an attacK to the left oe pruaent. as German strength woula Block such a move and the Allied flanK woula ne vulneranle. Thus he suggestea that the allies shoula seize Brittany’s vital ports after gaining Chernourg. Once the Brittany ports were secure, the loagement woulo be completea ny expansion of the Aiiiea perimeter t o the Loire River in the south ana the Seine in the east. This maneuver proviaea I ittie chance that significant numners o t Germans ‘couia oe cut off and aestroyea. is shown on Map 1. It IS zyx Montgomery’s tentative timetaole for this operation important to note here that Montgomery viewea tne expansion as aeveioping graauaily. He did not expect the front to staniiize nor a i d ne anticipate a set-piece DreaKout battle. Neither did he expect a German operationai error of such magnituae as to present the Aliies witn an opporrunicy to aestroy significant Nazi forces. Morgan. that Before he coula snift He aia unaerstana. as aid main effort to the rignt to gain tne his Brittany ports, he first must secure his left flank oy seizing the important comunications nun south of Caen and biocKing the quicKest route of German reinforcement. Thus Montgomery,s main effort would first go t o the left to meet ana engage tne mass of German forces there. ana then t o gain the ports.12 7 Shift to the rlclht zyxwvutsrqpo zyxw zyxwvuts zyxw This concept of operations suggestea that four suoorainace armies carry out the aifferent tasks. Secona Britisn Army. ianaing on cne ieft. wouia aavance soutn of Caen t o oiocK the maJor roaa arteries ana engage t h e major German torce. First Unitea States Army wouia lana on the rignc. secure CnerDourg. ana tnen maKe the main effort to ore% In the final phase, the Thira Unitea States Cotentin. out of tne Army wouia lana as a foiiow on force to conauct the arive into Brittany ana protect tne southern flank along the Loire as First and Second Armies drove toward the Seine. Aiso auring tnis phase First Canaaian Army wouia iana t o heip secure cne ieft fianK. The piacement of right the aritisn on tne ieft ana tne Americans on rne nao far-reaching repercussions m a t i inger even toaay.13 nowever. t n e piacement seemeo to At tne rime. m a w sense. Tie American ouiiaup o t forces in Engiana prior to OVERLORD haa taKen piace in the southwest portion of the country. Tnus. tne British were alreaay on tne ieft ana trying to reverse the placement wouia mean that the convoys carrying the invading troops wouia nave t o cross paths in tne Channel in the miaale of and aangerous enterprise. the nignt -- a aifficuit Further. once the Aiiies were estaoiisnea ashore ana in controi of French ports. the easier Britisn lines of coml;nicdtions wouia go througn the cnannei ports to the British forces on tne iett. The ports in arittany ana western France. more convenient to tne forces on cne right. were closer to the Unitea States. sense to piace tne aritisn. with more Finaliy, it made gooa military comoat experience. on tne iefc wnere they were IiKeIy to face heavy German counterattacks more quicKiy. arawnacK to tnis placement was that The only tne scheme of maneuver were t o m a n g e if ana the Allies were to aecide to shift their oreakout effort to cne i e t t . 8 zyxwvut zyxwv the army least aDle to afford the losses required to fight its way through the heaviest German defenses wouio De the one in the Dest position to 00 so. Before turning to the German campaign plan for tne aefense of France we need to cover one furtner issue. The mador OrawDack to ampnioious operations in the modern era is that the moDility possessed ~y moaern mecnanizea armies usually permits the defenoer to mass forces against any lanaing more qUiCKlY than the invader can place ana sustain them ashore. This fact was a very real concern to Alliea planners and caused the COSSAC staff some early despair at the chances for a successful lodgement. Somehow tne Aliies had to prevent a large n u m e r of German panzer aivisions from counterattacking the Deachheaa in enough strength to eliminate sufficient Aliiea forces C O U I De ~ i t oetore estaDIisnea ashore to resist sucn an onsiaugnt. The Allies oeveloped two schemes to'this end. The first, Operation FORTITUDE. c m r i s e a a massive deception effort to convince the Germans that the Normanay lanaing was a feint an0 the real effort wouia come later at the Pas De Calais. By ail accounts the pioy workeo magnificentiv. The Germans were very slow to c m i t major reserves to the region. ano withhela forces to aefena tne Pas De Calais area until mia-Juiy.14 zyxw zyx The secona effort at aelaying the arrival of German reserves at the nattlefiela consistea of what American officers would recognize tOCiay as "oeep operations." Witn a combination of n m i n g oirectea at cne Frencn railway system, a t t a w s on Key ChOKe points. ana "oattiefiela a i r interaiction" executea in the Normandy area itself. the Aiiies plannea to aeiay ana disrupt the approach of German panzer reserve$ to the front. The results prove0 very effective in aelaying the arrival of the panzers. ana 9 zyxwvutsrqpo zyx zyxwvutsr zyxwv when they finaiiy reacnea the Dattiefield they haa already sustainea serious aamage . 1 5 These were the Key elements in the aevelopment ana aesign of tne Aiiiea plan oevisea to gain a ioagement on tne continent of Europe. ihe grouna scheme of maneuver was based not upon accompiishing the aestruction of the German army. DUt upon gaining sufficient ports t o pursue aecisive operations in the future. I t sought to DlOCK the reinforcements. not aestroy them. arrival of major German The supporting air ana aeception plans aimed at aelaying the commitment of German m0Dile forces to the area as long as PossiDIe. But if the Alliea plan sought mereiy the seizure of a ioagement area. What i f the opportunity tor oestruction o t German torces presentea itself? wouia the kiiies oe aaie t o t a m aavantage of i t 7 Finally, aitnough the Allies haa caretuily piannea tneir campaign of lodgement, tney apparentiy gave little thought to the foliow-on. presumaoiy ciimactic campaign. GERMAN PLANS FOR DEFENSE i f Ailiea views convergea upon an agreea operationai plan, the German nign commana never was of one mina regaraing a proper concept for :he aefense of France. At tne time of the invasion German forces in Yestern Europe unaer commana of OBERKOMMANDO WEST comprised fifty-nine aivisions organizea in four armies (the Aliiea avaiiaDle total was forty). Ot that numDer ten were panzer or panzer-grenadier. which could react s w i f t i y ana Pose a grave threat t o any landing in its eariy stages. The aeaate in the German commana regaraing the proper plan for defense centered arouna the correct use of tnese panzer formations.16 10 zyxw zyxwvut One school of thought. t h a t propounded Dy the Comanaer-in- Chief k'est n i m s e l f . Fiela Marsha; Gera von Runasteat. favored the i n l a n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n of tnese u n i t s so t h a t they c o u l d aescena main Aiiiea ianaing once i t naa neen i a e n t i f i e a . thereoy t o defeat the A l l i e s i n the k i n a of open upon the Von Runasteat nopea mooile o a t t l e f o r which the Germans were . i u s t i y famous. A r r i v i n g i n Novemer., 1943, t o fakc c m a n a of the two German armies aefenaing France's n o r t h e r n coast, F i e l d Marshal Erwin Rome1 championea the a l t e r n a t i v e proposal. With experience against the western Aiiies. the "Desert Fox" haa conciuaea t h a t Alliea a i r s u p e r i o r i t y maae t r a a i t i o n a l German moniie t a c t i c s oosolete. He was convincea t h a t AlIiea fignter-Domoers wouio aestroy the massed panzer tormations as they triea t o approacn the o a r t l e f i e i a . Rome1 n e l i e v e a a l s o t h a t once the zyxwvu zyx Anglo-Americans were e s t a n i i s n e a asnore tneir materiei. s u p e r i o r i t y wouia renaer them too strong for the Germans t o handle. Thus he was convinced tnac t o win the Germans must aefear tne invasion a t tne w a t e r ' s eage. The ,'Desert Fox" arguea t h e r e f o r e f o r the aigpersal of the panzer a i v i s i o n s c l o s e r t o tne coast, contenaing t n a t one d i v i s i o n a t t a w i n g tne ianaings on D-Day woula be worth severai a few days l a c e r . i i R o m e i . s p r e s t i g e and i n f i u e n c e W i t h H i t l e r caused t h e German campaign p i a n t o evoive i n t o a compromise oetween the two p o s i t i o n s . Some of tne panzers were h e l d i n c e n t r a l reserves w n i i e o t n e r s remainea aispersea near tne coast. zyxwv A a a i t i o n a i i y i n accora w i t n 2 o m e I . s views. tne Germans spent the w i n t e r of 1943-1944 f o r t i f y i n g the n o r t h e r n coast of France. 2 o m e l . s a r i v i n g energy imparted a sense of urgency t o these e t f o r t s . ana June the coastal aefenses were q u i t e formiaaole i n places. 11 DY Much of the German effort, however, went to the wrong areas Decause the German military. von Runasteat chief among them. were convincea zyxwv that tne main Allied ianaing wouia come at the ?as De Calais. nere was where the Cnannel was narrowest, ana this coast offerea the most airect route into Germany. Von Runasteat therefore positioned the strongest infantry divisions in that region and give it the priority for engineer construction. Further, more panzer aivisions laaserea close DY for quicK' intervention there than elsewhere. It was not that the Germans neglectea Normandy. out rather that if the Allies haa gone ashore farther to the northeast, the establishment of a ioagement would have proved far more zyxwvut aifficuit ana the German reaction consiaeraoly more prompt. 'ue cannot K~OW. of course. precisely how mucn the Aliiea aeception scheme contriouiea io ihlS German error, but i t must nave helped. Before concluaing a discussion o f the Germanaefensive pians I must cover one more area -- the strength and dispositions of the Luftwaffe in France in the Spring of 1944. The Aliies haa always Delievea tnat ine maintenance of air superiority over the beachnead was a prerequisite for OVERLORD,s success. Troops ana provisions coula not De aelivered ashore in the teeth of German air attack. But the extent of the Aliiea command of the zyxw zyxwvutsrq air in june. 1944, was something that Morgan,s planners couid never have areamea of in early 1943. Operation POINTBLANK. the Aliiea strategic aomoing offensive against Germany. a i d not w i n g tnat country to its Knees as cne aposties o t strategic DOmDaPJment had predicted. I t d i d . however. smash the power of the Luftwaffe. The cornination of losses t a m n unaer the Aiiiea onsiaught ana the requirement to hold the D U I K of Germany,s fighters for the aetense of the ReiCh haa left the Luftwaffe units in France ana the Low Countries 12 in zyxwv zyxw zyxwvutsrqp zyx desperate Against nearly 8,000 COnaitiOn.i8 Al lie0 aircraft avai laole in Britain for OVZRLORD the iuftwaffe coula muster oniy aBout 400 fighters in all of France. The result was that the Germans mounted an insignificant 319 sorties on D-i)ay and the Luftwaffe was irrelevant to the fight at tne I andl ng. 19 The operatlonal consequences of this WeaKness were pernaps more important. The sort of massed panzer counterattacK desirea By von Runasteat coula nor be protected ~y German air, and even inaiviaual panzer formations coula approach the Normandy Battles only at night. Nevertheless, von Runasteat held to his view that a massea panzer counterattack was tne oest way t o counter the impending hiliea invasion. hence in june. 1944. tne Germans nela to the compromise campaign plan. But there was one compiicating factor. By the Spring of 1944 Hitier haa Become ciosely involved in the operatiqnal and tactical direction of German forces in the field. Thus he directed tnat four of the panzer aivisions in France Be withhela under the control of the Armea Forces High Comnana (OBerltommanoo aer Wehrmacht. or OKW). This meant chat he maintained these forces at Berlin. I t seems that the Germans coula not have aesignea controi o t a iess responsive scheme for the control of their vital armorea reserves. Hence we see that in essence the German plan was force orientea. i t envisionea a strong oefense at tne coast to try t o aefeat the hiiiea invaaers at the water line. coupled with a CounterattacK oy armorea reserves shoulo the coasral aefenses De Dreamed. The Aliies. on the other nano, pursue0 a terrain orientea approach. They concernea themselves not with aefeating German forces, DUC with driving them DacK in oraer to form a loagement large enough for a ~ u i t a ~ l logistical e Dase. Were their respective emphases correct? Before we answer tnis question oy tracing the 13 zyxwvu zyxwvu zyxw zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsrqp zy zyxwvu campaign's course. we will turn to a aiscussion of the theoreticai concepts that the paper will examine. THE CENTER OF GRAVITY - .@ecz&x~. tne Gnitea _3. in its new capstone fieia manual. EM 100 States Army defines the concept of centers of gravity as "the key to ail operational design." ana that the attack of an enemy center of gravity "should oe" the focus of all operations. 2o If the Army is correct in this assertion then an analysis of centers of gravity should be the primary theoretical aid t o campaign planning. Further. for tne purposes of this paper. an appreciation of t h e cancept wiii aiso heip us to unaerstana tne campaign's execution. h u t what is a center of gravity? The Army aefines i t as a "source of strength qr oalance', of a force wnose loss "unoaiances tne entire structure. producing a cascaaing deterioration in [the force,sj conesion ana effectiveness.*21 Thus, the Army suggests that the center of gravity of the enemy ought to oe the target of one's efforts, for i f ne aestroys wiil necessarily follow. it victory The great German military theorist, Karl von Ciausewitz. staces tnat a center of gravity is. ":he nu0 of power ana movement. on which everything u.ne In BOOK i of his seminal work. @ further aescrioes the concept oy writing A center of gravity is always found wnere the mass is most concentratea. I t presents tne most effective target for a olow: furthermore. the heaviest low is aiways struck oy the center of gravity.24 What. then, mignt t h e center of gravity of a force De? As cicea aoove, Ciausewitz seems to see i t at as tne paint at wnicn a commanaer 14 zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvutsrq concentrates most of his force. But aaaitionaily one may infer from this that i n some armies the center of gravity might oe the most powerful element of tne force. oecause where n u m e r s ) goes aizo. it goes the mass ot force ( i n power i f not The companion cavairy of Alexander is a gooa example. zyxw Where it went was where A1exanaer.s strength was most concentratea. Clausewitz also implies, however, that this source of strength might ae sanething less suastantive. That source might also emaoay. he states, the personality of the comnanaer, the nation‘s capital, o r popular opinion. In an alliance i t might consist of the community of interest hoiaing the allies together.25 When one consiaers today’s wars of nationai iioeration. or some of the conflicts in tne Midaie Eas: tne iaea o t zucn more ethereal centers seem persuasive. aut in oraer to anaiyze these concepts ana employ tnem in our sway of the campaign. we first must identify the operational ievel centers of gravity of the antagonists. For the Germans this appears easy. the huo of German parer in France was her panzer aivisions. Cieariv For von Runastedt i t was the panzers that woula accomplish tne defeat of tne Aliies. Even unaer Romnel’s approach i t would have neen the panzers positionea cioze to the snore that woula aestroy aliiea forces struggling througn the coastal fortifications. Furthermore. the Allies ciearly aevotea much of tneir planning eftort t o nanaling the expectea panzer counterstroKe. The panzer formations servea the same roie as Alexanaer’s companion cavalry mentionea anove. The Aiiiea operationai center of gravity. on the other hana. is mucn more difficuit t o iaentify. iJnliKe tne Germans, wnose tactical formations aifferea raaically in terms of firepower ana mooiiity. the Ailiea units were ali mooiie and powerful. Witnout a single aominant element in 15 tne force we couia return to the Ciausewitzian suggestion that the center of gravity simply iies where the mass of enemy forces are. The prooiem nere is that for most of the campaign neither the Alliea left nor its right was cieariy the stronger in numoers of troops or firepower. One mignt argue zyxwvu zyxw zyxwvutsrqp tnat the Ailiea main effort Degan in the east ana then shiftea to the west. ana that therefore the center Started leftward and then changea to the right. Unfortunately for this proposition, one has difficulty unaerstanaing why the defeat of the British army on the left was more disastrous to the Allies than the deStrUCti0n of the American one on the right. Both woula have Deen equally fatal to the campaign. Another piausibie center of gravity for tne Allies might have Deen Ailiea airpower. Certainly, tnis was an indispensaoie contrioutor t o AiIiea success. ana surely the invasion was impOsSible without air superiority. Furtnermore, the Allies woula call on their air to assist their grouna forces. as we snall see, whenever they founa their aavance staliea. Alliea air aiso denied the Germans the unrestricted use of tneir own center of gravity. Thus a i r forces seem a IiKely canaiaate. But one can iaentify proDlems with iaentifying airpower alone a3 tne center of gravity in a grouna campaign. Air couia not introauce itseit onto the continent. ground forces haa to seize the land for airfieias. coula heip Diast a hole in the enemy line. but it couid not expioit Air it. r'urther. the closer one approaches the actual points of contact netween enemy forces. the relativeiy less effective airpower gets.26 Air power may be aecisive. DUC it can oniy De so in conJunction with otner eiements. more persuasive case for a center of gravity. one mignt argue, incluaes airpower within a larger entity. 16 A zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvutsrqpo This larger entity that c m p r i s e a the Aliiea center of gravity in the Normandy campaign was the Unitea States air and ground forces. True. the US First Army and the British Secona Army were about the same size in terms of n u m e r s of diViSiOnS ana relative firepower. out the American army possessed the resources to fight sustainea, Dloody fighting while tne British aio not. The British manpower crisis meant that they coula not replace serious losses. Therefore the potential strength of tne American divlsions over a period of time was far greater than that of their ally. Aoditional l y . large numbers of reinforcing American aivisions ana air groups were on their way to the theater. mentionea aoove. if it COOK No more British units were availaole. As costly fighting t o breaK out of a Deacnheaa in oraer to estaolisn a ioagement, only the Americans were capaole o t aoing i t . Thus, having identifiea the respective centers of gravity for ooth siaes in the campaign. we have in the Clausewitzian sense tan0 unaer the zyxw zyx guiaance of EM 100-5) iaentifiea what shoula have Been the operational targets of the respective siaes in the campaign. But nefore we go on t o criticize tire campaign pians of the antagonists we must first go on to examine the secona theoretical concept employe0 that we shall treat in t n i s anai ysis. LINES OF OPERATIONS The theoreticai concept of lines of operations. aeveiopea OV tne other great Nineteenth Century military thinker. the Baron De jomini. is a relatively simple one. After aefining a "zone of operations'' as " a certain fraction of the whole theater of war. which may ne traversed Dy an army in the attainment of its ooject". Jomini goes on to aescrioe iines o t operations as simpiy the route or routes that an army CaKes t o traverse the 17 zyxwvutsrqp zone from its base to its ob~ective.27 Theory ascribes certain aavantages accruing t o operating along aifferent numbers of lines, or along lines in special relation to tne enemy's. For instance. choosing to operate aionq several ratner than a singie iine of operation can proviae aavantages ana ai saavan t ages. The mast common use of this theoretical concept. however, is in its relational sense -- "exterior" But our concern in this paper tnat being the possession of "interior" or I S with a less commoniy zyxwvutsrq employea aspect of Jomini's theory operations. -- his "Fourteenth Maxim" on lines o t The great a r t . then, of properiy airecting iines of operations. is co estaoiisn tnem in reference to the bases ana t o the marcnes of tne enemy as to seize the comunications of tne enemy without imperiling one's own, ana this is the most aifficult problem in strategy.29 An analysis of the situation in Normanay in terms of lines of operations presents us with an interesting situation: upon landinq the Allies wouia assume a position where they couia inaeea threaten tne German lines of communication without imperiling their own. This was so because European geograpny forced tne aefenaers into a position of tneoreiicai aisaavantage. in Jominian terms. the German line of oattie -- or tne east to west iine aiong the coast where they aeployea tneir comoat torces -- r a n paraiiei to their line of operations, wnich aiso proceeaea east t o west from zyxwvutsrqp Germany into Irance. Thus, any envelopment of the German eastern flank wouid immediately threaten the German lines of communications. Further, wnereas i t is often risky to striKe a t the rear of one's enemy (after a i i . once YOU are oehina your enemy, he may also oe Denina you). this parallel arrangement of lines of battle and operations meant t h a t tne Allies couia 18 zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvut zyxwvu maneuver to tnreaten German communications witnout exposing tneir own (see Sketch). Geography. then, seemea to have solvea for the Aliies what Jomini caiiea tne most difficult proDiem in the operationai art. The Allies may not have contemplatea the destruction of tne German army during the Normanoy Campaign. but a tneoreticai analysis of the respective iines of operations itv to a0 so u. To see if the Allies exploited this opportunity let us now turn and trace the course of events of the campaign. CAMPAIGN EXECUTION A.itnougn M0ntgomery.s campaign pian envisionea a graaualiy developing expansion into the loagement area. one may iaentity three maJor operations wnicn comprisea nis scneme. Tney were: 1) iana. gain a secure foothola. ana D ~ O C Kthe counterattacKing German panzer forces somewnere soutn of Caen: 21 expana the foothola ana secure the vital port of CherDourg; ana 3 ) complete the occupation of the loagement area. Except that the third major operation involvea a Dreakout ana a transition into an exploitation, and that there was no tank “knOCk about” near C a m . the campaign progressea according to tnis general sequence. Let us now turn to an examination of the execution of each major operation in turn.30 THE FIRST MAJOR OPERATION: JUNE 6 - JUNE 11 The ODJect of this first phase of the campaign was simple -- to get asnore successfully in enough strength and with enough space to aefeat the expectea violent German reaction. To do this Montgomery Ianaea his cwo armies aDreast aiong a front of approximately eignry miles. Importantly, nis rignt flank effort incluaea a landing on the Cotentin Peninsula. wnicn 19 providea access to Cheroourg. it Each army lanaea with two corps abreast. and zyx zyxwv zyxwvut was the flanK corps of each army which received the most aifficuit and important missions. On the left fianK of Dempsey,s Secona Britisn Army. Lieutenant Generai John Cr0cKer.s I (Br) Corps had three major missions (See Map 2). First he was to secure Caen and the surrounding high grouna in order to Dlock the important CMrrunications routes tnrough the city and to seize the airfield (and ground suitable for the construction of ochers) to the west. Secondly. Montgomery wanted him to gain a midgehead over tne Orne River to facilitate further advances to the southeast. Finaily CrocKer was to protect the ;eft flanK of m e invasion dno niocK wnat :he kiiies expectea t o oe tne main German counterstrow. airoorne divlS1On To accomplish tnis 1st Corps had an wnich wouia seize the Orne oriogeneaa with a D-Day paradrop. two infantry divisions teach reinforcea with an armored origaae) in the first wave. and a third infantry division in the second. On the right flanK of Bradley's r'irst United States Army. the tasK of MaJOr General 2. Lawton Collins, V I i (US) Corps was to gain access co tne Cotentin Peninsula. only oy Complicating Coliins' mission was marshland trafficaoie causeway inland from the oeacnes on whicn he was to iana. To avoia oeing oottied up on the beach. Collins had two airnorne divisions arop to capture the causeway exits so that his three infantry aivisions. iandina in zyxwv zyxwvuts coiumn, couid advance iniand far enough to secure a space from wnich the drive on Cheroourg couid oe launchea.31 The two center corps, MaJOr Generai Leonard T. Ger0w.s V (US) d n a Lieutenant General G.C. Bucknall's XXX t a r ) . essentially haa only to get safely ashore. drive a secure distance inlana. ana move to gain contact With the corps on their flanlts. dna For these purposes Gerow had three infantry 20 zyxwv one armorea divisions, and Bucknail had two infantry and one armored divisions ana one inaepenaent armored brigade. infantry aivision in its initiai wave. Botn corps would iano one ilespite the fact tnat the lanoing itself was tne most compiex portion of the entire campaign. in three of the four corps areas getting ashore proved consiaerably easier than expected. Only in Gerow,s V (US) Corps. at OMAHA beach. was the amphibious operation ever in danger of zyxw failing. The unexpected movement of a strong German "fiela" infantry division to the beachheaa area prior to the lanaing (Weaker "static" infantry units aefenaed the ocher Deaches) complicates Gerow's mission.32 Aooitionaiiy, cne Americans haa not taken fuli aavantage o t the speciaiizea armor developed DY the British to help them fight asnore, and much of the ampnibious armor tnat Gerow the bravery ano Skill aid nave swampea whi ie Nevertheless. of V Corps infantrymen triumphea. and by I 1 June Gerow haa canpiered his missions. In the zone of the other American corps on the rignt flank. Coiiins' ampnibious landing was a "piece of Cake'' ana he suffered about one tentn the casualties that Gerow The airDorne operation was sloppy, as ill-trained transport piiots scattered US paratroopers aii over cne piace. With consiaeraDle elan, however, che smaii numoers of troopers cnac aia iana near tneir arop zones managed missions. LO accompiish Cneir assignea Nevertheless, Collins could not be completely satisfied witn tne achievements of his corps. Decause stiff German resiscance c o m i n e a with tne inexperience of his infantry slowed h i s aavance inland behind schedule. Despite the aeiay. oy June I 1 he was in a strong position to continue towaras Cherbourg and thus his initial obJect was acnieved. 21 I f Montgomery could zyxwvuts be satisfied with the progress of the two corps on nis right. ne could not ae so sanguine aDout tne operational outcome of his main effort on the ieft. The start appearea promising as tne tnree ieao infantry divisions ianaea witn iittie aifficuity ana trle airoorne arop gainea a Driageheaa and heia it untii conunanaos affected juncture. zyxwvutsrqpo zyx Traffic prooierns on the beaches, nowever. siowea the move iniana. Tnis impactea especially on the easternmost SWORD beach. where the 3ra Infantry Division ana the 27th Armorea Brigaae moved too siowly to capture Caen Defore t h e German 21st Panzer Division positioned elements to DIOCK the British aavance. I Z S attempts For the next five aays the Secona Army faiiea in aii o t to aisloage the 21st ana reinforcing 12tn SS ?anzers from the:r positions. ana ag the !ltn tne aritish aavance snowea signs o t staiiinc compieteiy. Thus, i4ontgomery.s main effort in his first maJor operation failea to achieve ail of its initiai operational oajectives. His forces were asnore. which was the major operational task. but the campaign would not progress in quite tne same manner as he had piannea. But i f Montgomery couia console nimself witn tne fact tnat h e haa acnievea nis most important tasK. nis counterpart Rommei facea only aisappointment. The German army group commanaer. you will rememoer. viewea tne first maJor operation as aecisive. Once estaolisnea ashore tne superiority of Ailiea materiel would promoly make their armies impossioie to oisioage ana guarantee tnat they couia eventualiy wear aown tne German Army ana aefeat it. Rommei beiievea that he haa to defeat the invasion at the water's edge. but he naa faiiea. The aliies overcame his Deacn aefenses witn minimum ioss ana the commanaer of his nearest panzer aivision ootcnea n i s Lmpor tant counterat tack. 35 22 zyxwv zyxwvu zyxwv zyxwvuts German faiiure on June 6. however, extenaea t o the highest levels of tneir command. Contraaicting his earlier view, von Runasteat pusnea early in the day for a counterattaw against the ianaing witn aii avdiiaoie pdnzer aivisions. interferea. But the cumDersome nature of the German commana structure tiitier ana OKW witneia commitment of the two nearest reserve panzer aivisions until late in the afternoon of D-Day. This aelay. when c m i n e a with the interaictory efforts of A l l i e d a i r . preventea the Germans from making a maJor coorainatea attack against the Allied beachhead. tne Germans couia manage EO Ali aa was to feea their panzer units to Normanay Just in time t o hola Caen ana to slow the Allied aavance inlanacsee Map 31. h e y naa not preventea tne Ailies from estaoiisning tnemseives on tne Fcencn coast. Thus. aitnougn tne Aiiies were in mum oetter snape at tne ena o t the first maJor operation. neither siae couia ne satisfiea witn its outcome. On June 11th both siaes were planning offensive operations designea to regain lost ground. zyxwvutsrq THE SECOND MAJOR OPERATION: JUNE 12 - JLJNE 30 Aiiiea aims for tne secona ma.Jor operation changea iittie from tnose aevelopea oy Montgomery prior to the ianaing oeacnneaa ana capture Cneroourg. 1.e. expana tne Of course in Phase I i tney wouio nave t o ciear up unfinisnea ousiness from Phase I its environs. -- -- zyxwv namely tne capture of Caen a m To tne list of positive goais for the secono part of the campaign, however. the Allies would have t o baa a negative one. Having experiencea the iii-effects of having Deen aottlea up in the knzio oeachneaa in italY.36 the Aiiiea commano was extremeiy anxious t o prevent tne front from '"congeaiing." ilontgomery aesirea a continuousiy expanoina Deacnneaa. 23 zyx zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvut one that wouia avoid the bioody areakout type of Dattie that wouia De requirea snould the Germans achieve the establishment of a coherent, set aefense. ihe British simpiy naa not the manpower to affora the cost of o r e a ~ i n gtnrougn preparea positions. Unfortunately. as tne Britisn Second Army,s aavance toward Caen ground to a halt, it IooKea as if this is what they woula have to do. The Second British Army made two major efforts in June to get their aavance moving again. The first was an attempted double enveiopment of the city oy the I and XXX Corps. German spoiling attaws short-circuited the attack of tne 1st. while the XXX’s effort failea oecause of tne miserabie performance of the 7th Armorea Division. Two w e e w iater ilempsev triea again with tne new V i i i Corps ot one armorea ana tnree infantry aivisions. reinforcea with three separate armorea origades. This powerful effort to punch through German lines west of C a m . caiiea Operation EPSOM. faltered because of poor British tactics. German defensive 3 ~ 1 1 1 .and the aifficult heagerow terrain. The failure of EPSOM meant that the front near Caen haa congeaiea. ana cnat any further aavance Would require a blOOclY. set-piece. DreaKout operation. British failure, however, stood in sharp contrast to American success. After early aifficuities Collins, V I I Corps w r s t across tne Meraeret River and drove to the west coast of the Cotentin, isoiating the German forces aefenaing CherD~urg.~’ Demonstrating that he was aecoming the most effective of the Ailiea corps commanders. Collins tnen turneo nortn ana drove on the vital Norman port. The fight was bloody. Dut aidea Dy the iXtn Tacticai Air Commana whose chief. MaJor General Pete Quesaaa. aeveiopea techniques that greatly increasea the effectiveness of ciose air support. tne VIith capturea Cheroourg on the 27th of June.38 24 Unfor.tunateiy, tnis was zyxw zyxwvut zyxwvut zyxwvutsrqp not oefore tne Germans haa had time to execute massive aemolitions in the harnor tnat Woula renaer the port useiess for some time. Meanwhile to the south aradley orought two more corps. the V I I i ana X i X , to tne continent. These units maae Iimitea attacKs tnat succeeaea in adding to the American casualty lists and introaucing more Americans to tne bloody ways of hedgerow fighting, but aia not get very far. LiKe Dempsey. Bradley found himself unable to prevent the Germans from estaoiishing a strong cohesive aefense in the difficult Norman terrain. Thus as the VII Corps shiftea to the south to participate in the expansion of tne foothola they coula expect tough fighting aneaa. During this pnase of the campaign R o m e 1 ana van Runasteat naa wisnea to iauncn a maJor. coorainarea counteratacu to aefeat tne A I lies oetore they coulcl nring ali of their forces asnore. proven fruitless. however. Their efforts nad I f the Britisn a t t a w s on Caen ana the American pressure in western Normandy gaineo little terrain at great cost. tney aia succeea in forcing the Germans to commit their reinforcements piecemeai as they arrivea to plug gaps. Thus, the Germans were never dole t o mount a coorainarea. massea counterattack. But aespite this failure, tne secona maJor operation haa not gone too badly for the Germans. They haa managea to estaoiisn a conerent aefensive iine ana to nring tne hiiiea aavance to a halt in the aifficult heagerow terrain. This terrain attenuatea tne aliiea aavantages in a i r , armor. and materiel. ana was pernaps tne nest piace t o r the Germans to fignt. Aaaitionaiiy. they had their strongest forces successfuiiy niocking the Alliea aavance against their vulneranle right f l a m . thus overcoming to some aegree the proolem imposea on tnem DY tneir aisaavantageous lines of operations. haa oeen nigh. and it On the other nana. cneir casuaities was unclear now long they could sustain such losses. 25 zyxwvu zyxwvutsrq zyxwvu From the Alliea viewpoint. i f the campaign was not progressing in tne manner Montgomery naa nopea. he oegan to see aavantage in tne way things were aeveloping. The A l l i e d army group commander ha0 wishea to avoid the oiooav DreaKout fight m a t he wouia now nave t o conauc'c. plannea on Shifting his DUt ne nao aiways main effort from the left to the right to complete the loagement ana capture the crucial Britanny ports. a position t o do just that. By June 30 ne was in I f his British army cowla not defeat tne major panzer formations (the enemy center of gravity) south of C a n . it coula pin the enemy those formations in the east. Once t h i s occurred. his own center of gravity. the American forces, couid burst through an area or relative weakness and go on to tne complete the loagement in tne third pnase. On zyxwvutsrqpo July 1 tnis was cieariy nis amenaea campaign plan, ana i t naa the fuii unaerstanaing ana support of nis superiors ana su~orainates.39 THE THI.RD MAJOR OPERATION: JULY 1 - AUGUST 25 But while Montgomery's scheme was simple in concept, execution pcovea exceeaingiy aifficult. aradley's first attempt t o arive tnrougn tne area of "relative wearness" began on July 3, wnen he launched a Droad front attack with tne V I I I . VII. and X I X Corps from right t o ieft in succession. it quickly bogged down in bloody faiiure. This presented Montgomery with a aiiemma. To enaale the Americans to break out. the aritish army woula have to attack to pin the most powerful German torces near Caen. But if it tooK an extenaea perioa for the Americans to arive through the German aefenses, the Britisn would have to maintain their pressure for days or Weeks -- preciseiy tne type of costly, continuous action that the empire Could no ionger affora. 26 zyxwvu zyxwvutsrq The Britisn experimencea with a way K O maintain this pressure at reoucea cost in Operation CHARNWOOD. which Degan on J u l y 7. To save zyxwv infantry losses Montgomery ana Dempsey piannea to employ strategic DomDers to Diast a nole in the German lines through wnich grouna forces couia aavance. This marKea a maJor innovacion in warfare as chat such weapons were usea cactically. it was the first time Unfortunately, the results provea disappointing. Apparently the DCmIblng simply miSSed the maJority of German defensive positions. and the craters and devastatlon blocked the advance of British armor. thus hindering more than helping the offensive. Secono Army zyxwvu at great cost. manage to drive to the Orne ana capture a portion of did. Caen. out m e r e tne aovance hairea. The twin failures in early Juiy usherea in a perioa of recrimination in tne Aiiiea nigh command. Senior a i r officers oDJectea to the apparently fruitless diversion of heavy mmbers from-tneir strategic. role co support taCKiCal atcacm. Other airmen complainea that Montgomery nad faiiea to deliver upon his promise to Capture space for airfielas on tne continent. Some Americans were uneasy that US iosses were running fifty percent higher than Bricish. while Dempsey's army never Seemea K O attacK witn more cnan one corps at a C ~ m e . Everyone ~ ~ fearea that tne campaign mignt aegenerate inKo the static. aKtritiOn style of war reminiscent o t 1916. By the second weeK of July there was uneasiness in the Ailiea Camp. I ana many caiieo for Montgomery's replacement. Chnar Braaley provided the way out of the aiienma. ha0 ay July 10 he aeveiopeo a plan cailea COBRA, wnich envisioned cne use Strategic DOmDers to Dlast a hole through which Collins, reinforced corps, attacKing on a very narrow franc, coula pass. zyxwvu Hopefuliy Khe rupture wouia unhinge tne German line and restore flulaity to the Datrlefiela. 27 Upon nearing Braa1ey.s zyxwv zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvuts scheme 00th Elsennowet and Montgomery quickly approvea it, but they recognizea tnat the aritisn army must ao something ~ u s tbefore araaiey Jumped otf :o attract ana p i n German reserves in the east. aeveiopea a compiementary operation cooe-namea GOOiS'OOD. Montgomery tnus wnicn involvea m e a t t a w of a corps of tnree armorea aivisions through tne Orne oriageneaa to penetrate the German lines near Bourquebus Riage. A major a t t a w ~y scracegic DOmDet-s would preceea this attack also. Thus, the operational scheme for the breakout from Normanay developed. I t was a brilliant concept involving right hoOK. a l e f t jab foilowea ny a The Jab, aimea at the enemy's most vulnerable point. couia not fail to noia his center of gravity in position. The hOOK. comprising t n e kiiiea center of gravity concentratea as never oefore in terms o t space. time, a m coordination of air ana lana power. woula achieve the OreaKthrougn by stricing where the enemy was weak. zyxwvutsrqp Interestingly, the Jab. Operation GOODWOOD, has oeen the s w j e c t of ConSiaeraDie controversy. For Montgomery ana the Britisn apparently haa hoped that the great effort would not Just pin the German panzers. Dut oreaK tnrougn the i ine as we1 i .41 The contemporary puol icity surrounaing the offensive impliea that such was the aim of tne a t t a w twhetner or not t h i s was intentional deception remains unKnown). Thus wnen the aritisn a t t a w scal ieo in front of aourgueous Riage ana Montgomery cancel iea 'tne a t t a w earlier than scheauiea, the army group comanaer's detractors seizea upon t n i s as more evidence of his failure. But the critics were ana are untair. There was a aifference between what Montgomery hoped the attack acnieve ana What it to achieve. i t aia accompiish its primary Keeping the maJority of the panzer divisions near Caen. s e t tne stage f o r the main effort to foiiow.42 28 tdsK of Thus GOODWOOD aia zyxwvutsr zyxwvu zyx zyx The tactics employea by Collins in the main effort haa operational consequence and Dear inciusion in t h i s narrative. The.VIIth Corps hda six divisions for the attack and Collins arrayea them in a two echeion formation. The ieaa echelon of three infantry aivizions attawing along a front of only five miles would punch into tne hole hopefully createa strategic DOmDerS ana affect the rupture. by the Then at the right moment Coliins WoUlcl c m l t his Second echelon of one mOtOriZed infantry and two armored aivisions LO exploit the success. The massing of six aivisions on such a narrow front was something the Americans had not tried Defore tana something they would not ao again in this war on As in most accoraing to plan. SUCh scale). The tactics workea. military operations. however, things aia not go exactly Aithougn aevastating. the aeriai DomDarament aia not totally destroy tne German positions and the lead divisions feil D e n i m schedule on the first But the aggressive Coliins rose to the occasion, oraered his infantry to continue the a t t a m into the night. ana c m i t t e a his second echelon Before his first had penetrated to the aeptn of tne enemy aefense. This maneuver Durst the front wiae open. ana it rnarlteo an occasion where a c m a n a e r made a tactical level decision with operational consequence. I t was the aecisive moment in the Normanay Campaign. as the brealcout presentea born sides witn new decisions to maKe. Their respective choices are instructive. The AlIiea campaign plan, it will point for the insertion of the Thira US De Army. rememoerea. called at this under Lieutenant Generai zyxw George S. Patton. into the line to capture the Brittany Peninsula ana arive south to the ioire protecting the flank of the other Ailiea armies. The Alliea plan. however, aesumea a graaual expansion of the Deachneaa, witn iittie o r no opportunity for envelopment of maJor German forces. 29 But events zyxwv zyxwvutsrq zyxw zyxw aia not transpire in thac manner, ana upon its activation tne Thira Army If founa itself plunging almost unopposed deep into tne enemy's rear. insteaa of turning risnt into arittany. Patton shouia go ieft towara tne Seine. the opportunity for the enveiopment and destruction of the DUIk of German forces in France seemea to present itseif. Classical military theory suggests that Paccon snouia have turnea ieft: for i f tne enemy's center of gravity is the proper target for miiitary operations, a thrust into Brlttany took US forces away from its target. Braaiey chose, however, to stay with the pian. As Patt0n.s leaa Corps reacnea tne end of the narrow Avaranches corriaor (See Map 3 ) . araaley turnea it 'to the rignt. theoretical aictates. Thus tne Ai~iescnose to act contrariiy t o The reasons f o r 3raaiey.s decision are the same as those that arove the design of the campaign pian. The strategic o w e c t of the Normanoy campaign was terrain and not force oriented. The Allies wantea first to gain a suitanie loagement to permit further operations. A part of the ioagement was the logistical base necessary to support t h e number of aivisions that the Aliies intenaea to w i n g ashore. in iace iuiy tne Aiiies were sumisting off the supplies t h a t could oe aelivered over the Normanay oeacnes. pius those that couia ne Drougnt through cne aamagea port oi Cheroourg. At zyxwvutsr the time logistical planners estimated that aeliveraoie tonnage was Dareiy enougn to Keep the forces then ashore suppliea ana that no more couia De sustainea. Complicating the issue was the tact that as faii ano winter approached the tonnage coming over the shore wouia aimost certainly drop significantly. Future operations seemea to require that Braaiey go first f o r the ports ratner than gambie on the possiole aestruction of the German forces in So i t seems that we must 30 zyxwvut Judge Braaley,s decision as the prudent, i f conservative cnoice. As i t was, Braaley's chosen o p t i o n was a moot one, f o r even a f t e r the A i l i e s turnea f i r s t i n t o B r i t t a n y . t h e i r enemy's decisions presented them once again w i t h tne opportunity to aestroy the DUIK of German forces i n the west. A t the end of June the the German h i g h COtmand i n France assessea the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n i n Normanay as presenting them w i t h two unacceptaale options. Unsure.of t h e i r a ~ i l i t yt o win a b a t t l e o f maneuver i n c e n t r a l France aecause o f A l l i e a a i r s u p e r i o r i t y . they hesitaced t o g i v e up t h e i r aefenses i n the heagerows. But a f t e r analyzing t h e i r experiences i n p o s i t i o n a l o a t t l e s close t o the coast they concluaea t h a t the a t t r i t i o n a l f i g h t i n g there woulo soon exhaust t h e i r armies (They apparently were unaware o f tne B r i t i s n manpower c r i s i s ) . Choosing tne u n c e r t a i n t y of an open o a t t i e over tne c e r t a i n t y of gradual a e s t r u c t i o n i n the heagerows. even Rommel hacl electea by ZUIY to witnaraw away from the coast.45 H i t l e r , however. was zyx zyxwvuts zy oetermined to f i g h t and win t h e B a t t l e f o r France i n Normanay ana a i r e c t e a t h a t the German f o r c e s h o l d on close t o t h e coast. couia not aissuaae nim from t h i s course. Even the A l l i e a DredKOUt The a t t i t u a e o f tire German E!J.wLC wouio a i c t a t e che German response to the American DreaKOUt. The A l i i e a orealtout seemea t o present the Germans options. With two The most orthoaox cal lea f o r a r e t r e a t t o the Some ana the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a new l i n e of aefense along t h a t ODstacle. T i e secona. ana more r a d i c a l cnoice was a CounterattacK to the west aesignea to penetrate t o tne Cnannei n o r t h of Avaranches and c u t o f f the US T h i r a Army a t tne narrow necK througn which i t had traveled. Theory was an amoiguous guiae i n h e i p i n g the Germans make t h e i r choice. The T h i r a Army,s I ine of communications through the narrow Avaranches c o r r i d o r appearea vulneraole. so the Germans seemeo to nave an opportunity to s t r i l t e a t tne A i i i e a center 31 zyx zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvutsr zyxwvutsrq On cne otner hand. their iines of communications aisaavantage of gravity. maae snifting of their own center of gravity to the ieft very dangerous. the i i i t i e r , s aecision t o iauncn the famous Mortain CounteratcacK was intluencea. of course. oy issues in aaaition t o these theoreticai precepts. tie must nave reaiizea ny tnis stage of the war tnat oniy ooia acrion cou:a save Germany from tne overwhelming might of the powers arrayed against ner. Adoirkonally. Army officers naa recently maae an attempt on his iife. ana Army aavlce wnich counseled wicharawal was instancly suspect. Further, similar bold countersrrokes had proven famiously successfui against the Russians. Hitier aid oraer the counrerattack. ana i t negan on 7 August. ;cs failure aemonscracea cne wisacm of 2cmmei.s eariier ana!vsis of tne utility of ,'normal' mooiie warfare against an enemy wirn aasciu:e lYorning fog on su?eriori:y. initial success. -- it aay of tne artacu neipeo t o proviae some aut wnen the sun came out the power of Ailiea air Drougnt the a t t a w to a swift as weii the air The failure of the attacu aia sometning eise proviaea the Aiiies with an opportunity t o accompiisn sometning nor proviaea tor in their planning German army in France. -- the aestruction of tne For oy counterattactcing at Mortain tne Germans piacea their panzers aeep into a deveioping pocrec.cSee Map 3 ) Astonisningiy. tne Aiiies faiiea t o t a w fuii aavantage or tn:s opportunity. as they aia not close tne pincers at Faiaise oefore t h e imporcanc caares upon wnicn shacterea German aivisions couia renuiia naa escapeo. The reasons for Aliiea failure are weil Known. pernaps aistracted DY Tirst Eisenhower. concurrent arguments with Churchili over the invasion of Southern France. taiiea t o proviae the necessary control over togetner of nis two army groups -- the coming Braaley having oeen raisea t o army group commana after the activation of Thira US Army. Seconaiy Hontgomery. stili zyx zyxwv zyxwvuts zyxwvut overseeing the land n a t t l e f o r Eisenhower. overestimated the a D i l i t Y of Canaaian ana P o i i s n troops under h i s c m a n a to DreaK tnrougn German aefenses ana placed the inter-army group Dounaary too t a r to t h e south. F i n a l l y araaiey. f e a r i n g overextension of h i s forces i n the face of aesperately r e t r e a t i n g Germans. refused t o cross t h a t nounaary. o r even t o request t h a t it ne changed. But these reasons notwithstanding, one cannot h e l p concluding t h a t there e x i s t e d another dynamic here as well. Perhaps the terrain-minaeaness of the A l l i e a commanders, or t h e i r preoccupdtion w i t h g a i n i n g a loagement, iea them to f a i l t o grasp an o p p o r t u n i t y co aestroy the enemy force. A oriving amoition t o OestroY the German army was not present anywnere i n tne A i i i e a commana. ?resentea w i t h repeatea o p p o r t u n i t i e s to aestroy tne German force. the A l l i e s choose the more conservative, t e r r i t o r y g a i n i n g o p t i o n s every time. They gainea t h e i r loagement. n u t they aia not aesrroy tne zyxwvut enemy. Thus. the Normandy Campaign ended on a somewhat d i s a p p o i n t i n g note for the A i l i e s as they let s l i p a golaen opporcunity t o aestroy tne German Army i n the west. Nevertheless Normanay. i f not a c l i m a c t i c v i c t o r y f o r B r i t a i n ana America. was a a e c i s i v e one. army naa oeen Oefeatea, ana the Although not aestroyea. tne German Alliea advance across the Seine and tne remainaer of France c o n s t i t u t e d more of a p u r s u i t man a resisteo d r i v e . The Germans c o u l a not offer coherent r e s i s t a n c e to the A l l i e a aavance snort of her ooraers. The campaign. then, gainea mucn more than tne piannea iodgemcnt ana the A l l i e s i n r e t r o s p e c t c o u l d w e l l ne pleasea w i t n t h e i r accompiishments. Let us now t u r n t o draw sane general conclusion^ anout tne campaign's conduct, ana aoout the u t i l i t y of m i l i t a r y theory as an aia t o r its a n a l y s i s . 33 zyxw zyxwvutsrqpo zyxwv CONCLUSION In retrospect it seems that of ali the Germans that Rome1 grasped most clearly wnat the appropriate campaign plan for the aefenaers snouia nave t e e n in France in 1944. As the fate of the Mortain counterattack clearly oemonstrateo, what von Rundsteat viewea as "normai" moDiie cactics would not work against the western Allies possessing overwhelming material superiority and dominating the air totally. seems to have been GO The best hope for the Germans defeat the Allies at the water's edge. Strong COaStal fortificacions coupiea with the early availability of paozer reserves to counterattack iandings appears t o have m e n the best way of accomplishing tnis. i f it proved impossioie to arive tne Aiiies into the sea. t h e Germans couia nope not De t o pin the invaders into an area so smail tnat maJor forces couia introaucea asnore. Then, perhaps, Germany possessed cne strength to Dottie up the Allies inaefinicely. zyxw Given Allied success in the first maJor operation. the Chances for eventuai German victory became very slim. Thelr only hope lay in making the cost of victory f o r the Allies so great that they would evencuaily t i r e of the effort. As mentioned, Alliea casualties in Normanay aia cause strains to aeveiop within che A l l i e d camp. A n extended defense of the hedgerow terrain seems an iaeal operational scheme for this strategic goal. In the hedgerows the Allies lost much of the Denefit of their aerlai an0 material aavantages. tiere tlitier's incultive juagment to hoia fast in Normanay appears vinaicateo. But Hitler certainly erred in his aecision to launch tne Mortain counterattacx. As his fiela commanaers weli appreciateo. the German forces in France were simpiy incapanle of such an eftort in the lace summer of 34 zyxwvutsr zyxwvutsr zyxwvut 1944. Had the Germans DY some circumstance driven to the channel. i t i s aouDtfui that they could have heid such a salient. After the success of COBRA made the Norman terrain no longer tena~le. a stuboorn withdrawal to the rough terrain near the German Doraer seems t o nave Deen in order. Here the Germans could have made the price of A l l i e d advance very steep indeea. as they dia in the Huertgen Forest. It might aisa have Deen here, as Dad weather mitigated the effects of Allied air and long supply lines iessenea their materiel superiority. that the Germans might have been able to pursue zyxwvutsrqpo some iimlted offensive action. If. with the Denefit of hindsight these courses of action are the correct ones, tney may help us aetermine tne u t i l i t y of miiitary theory as an a i a in aecision maKing. ?or i f military theory i s a usefui tooi for maKing proper miiitary cnoices. a German theoreticai anaiysis of their situation in 1944 should have at least pointea them in the airection of the aDOVe soiutions. Let us now examine the two theoretical concepts treated in this paper to see if they would have done so. A German analysis of lines of operations. as mentionea. woula nave suggested to them that Normanay was not an advantageous place to fight, for their iines of communications would always be vulnerable. I f for compelling reasons, however. they had to fight in Normandy, then lines of operations zyxwv anaiysis would have toia them tndt their right must oe their strongest point. and that any withdrawal from Normandy must pivot m o u t that fianK. Such analysis wouia aiso unaerscore the aanger of a counterattack launched from the left flank. As Jmini said. most attempts to f a l l on the enemy's line of communications imperils one's own. When one's line of oattie IS parallel to his line of operations. this i s doubly true. O~viously thlS reason mitigates strongly against the Mortain attempt. 35 Thus lines of operations analysis WOulO have been useful to the Germans in analyzing their 1944 problem. The utilty of center of gravity analysis is more aifficuit to assess. nowever. as it ooviously depenas upon correct idenCifiCaCion of an enemy's "huo of power". I f one accepts the aoove argument that the Ailied center of gravity was tne overwheiming materiel ana manpower superiority of American ground and air forces, then from the theoretical perspective it zyxw zyxwvu seem's that RommeI's approach was the correct one. I f allowed to establish itself ashore and aevelop to its fu.11 potential. this Aliiea center of gravity would Decome too powerful for the Germans to overthrow. I t seems clear then that the rignt theoreticai formuia for German success was t o aefeat tne invasion Detore it nao time to estaoiisn itself. inus we nave the nappy coinciaence of agreement netween what a theoreticai analysis suggests should have' Deen the proper course, and that which seems most efficacious in light of the historical record. zyxwvutsr zyxwvuts But such analysis provides only half the answer. Once tne Aiiies were ashore could theory have stiii proviaea guiaance for the Germans? answer appears to De yes. The i f througn anaiysis one conciuaes that h e cannot cnallenge enemy power directly. some indirect means of overthrowing it must oe founa. From the Secona Punic gar to the American Revoiution to Vietnam strategies of exhaustion have provea effective in this regara. Runasredt,s aamonirion to the German commana to "MaKe peace, you I f von foois!" was not an acceptable option. a campaign plan aeSigned to wear down the enemy in hopes of gaining a negotiated settiement seems logical. S t u m o r n resistance in the hedgerows followed oy a witharawal to and aefense of the rougn German Doraer terrain might accompiish that. Again history ana tneory agree. 36 zyxwvutsrq zyxwv But the Normanay campaign a i s o shows us t h a t tneory can misleaa as well. One c o u l d j u s t i f y the Mortain counterattack ~y arguing t h a t t h i s offensive. which attemptea t o c u t o f f and aestroy tne American forces m a t haa Drolten out o f Argentan. c o n s t i t u t e a an a t t a m on tne A i i i e a center of gravity. Thus one might c i a i m t h a t H i t l e r was t n e o r e t i c a i i y c o r r e c t i n This view both f o r g e t s t h a t such a maneuver piaced o r a e r i n g i t s execution. tne Germans i n aanger of oeing surrounded. and f a i l s t o appreciate the a i r and ground c o r r e l a t i o n o f forces i n Normanay a t the time. Theoretical anaiysis. t o be sure, can never replace gooa Juagment. This f i n a l caveat notwithstanaing, when one analyzes Normanay i n cne i i g n t of tneory from tne German perspective. i t seems cnat cneory can ae zyxw zyxwvuts an e f f e c t i v e guiae i n cne planning ana execution o t campaigns. t u r n t o c n e - A i i i e a experience t o see whether or not ic Let us now contirms c n i s conciusion. Any c r i t i q u e of the A l l i e d campaign plan in Normanay musc s t a r t w i t h the ObSerVation t h a t Eisenhower ana Montgomery oia more than s i m P i Y accomplish t h e i r mission. They not oniy gained a ioagement i n Europe, they a l s o a e c i s i v e i y aefeaceo the German army i n France. Hence u n i i u e tne German case. the c r i t i c o f the A l l i e a campaign is reduced t o aiscussing whether or not tne mission couid nave oeen accomplisnea i n o e t t a r fasnion. more q u i c k l y . or a t less cost. little OOUDt I n the case o f Normanay. however. there remains t h a t A l l i e a performance could have Deen improvea upon. For although the A l l i e s aefeatea the German army, they unquestionaoiy missea a chance t o aestroy i t . Braaley may nave haa gooa reasons for t u r n i n g i n t o B r i t t a n y . out there can ae no douDt t h a t Falaise was a missea opportuniry. A a a i t i o n a i i y . one mignt aslc whether or not the Dloody heagerow f i g h t i n g couia have Deen avoided and the DUtCher’S o i l 1 f o r tne campaign reducea. 37 zyxwvutsrqpo zyxwvu zyxw zyxwvutsr 7inaiiy. one rememners that the campaign plan aescrinea no desired en0 state oeyona tne vague iaea of an occupation of a ioagement area: ana tnat the pian proviaea Iittie guiaance as to now the Allies intenaea to aefeat or aestroy tne German army eitner nefore or after eSCaDliShing tne ioagemenr. ihese weamesses in the planning ana conauct of the Alliea campaign proviae us with an interesting opportunity to evaluate the utiiity of theory. For usefui theory might have helped the Allies avoid these errors. At first glance, theory seems to provide a way arouna aii of tne Ailiea mistakes. When one comoines the concepts of centers of gravity an0 iines of operations. tne theoretically correct campaign plan for the Aiiies seems clear. in oraer to exploit the German aisaavantage in iines ot operations. i n e A i i i e s snouia have piacea tneir center o t gravity. ;ne American forces. on m e iei: in tne vicinity of Caen. iauncnea a arive soutnwara paraiiei LO iney tnen snouia nave tne west oanK of tne Seine and pi.aceo tnemselves astriae German comunications. Sucn a maneuver woula nave overtnrarn the German center of gravity, her panzers. ny cutting i t oft from its nase. Aaaitionaily. oy driving througn the more open area arouna Caen tney migni nave avoiaea cne niooaiest neagerow comoat. Furtner. tne enc state for the campaign was clear -- aestroyea. not merely aefeatea. A n expioitation into Germany was the German army woula nave oeen att tnat neeaea t o follow 8ucn a campaign. This soiution is so not attempt t o -- a0 i t . ODVIOUS tnat one must a% why the Aliies aia zyxw One must assume tnat cney consiaerea Such an approacn althougn a aiscussion of this option does not appear in COSSAC’s f!nai report.46 i h e answer i s tnat nere tneory proves an uncertain guiae. aireaay examinea tne iogis:icai We n a v e reasons for putting tne 8r:tisn on t n e ier:. 38 ana these aione may nave oeen a e c i s i v e . proolem. zyxwv To these we might dad a p o l i t i c a l The r e i e g a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h t o so oovious1y a seconaary r o l e mignt nave oeen nara f o r them t o accept p o i i t i c a i l y : e s p e c i a i i y s i n c e p o l i t i c s aemanaea t h a t the grouna component commanaer oe a r i t i s h . But the nest reasons f o r r e j e c t i n g t h i s approach are n e i t h e r l o g i s t i c a l nor p a l i t i c a l , but o p e r a t i o n a l . The f i r s t proDlem is t h a t there is a h i g h p r o m b i l i t y t h a t such a maneuver woula have f a i l e d . COSSAC planners correctly a n t i c l p a t e a t n a t the Germans woula r e a l i z e t h e i r l i n e o f operations v u l n e r a b i l i t y ana piace t h e i r strongest f o r c e s on the i e f t . Thus, unaer t h i s scneme tne A i i i e a center of g r a v i t y wouia have oeen opposea by the German "hub of power." The A i l i e s . men. woulo nave conunittea t n e i r s t r e n g t n against tne enemy's s t r e n g t n . Morse. since tnis b y a e f i n i t i o n wouia occur p r i o r t o the s e i z u r e of Channel p o r t s . the A i i i e s woula not have haa the i o g i s t i c a i wherewitnal t o aeveiop the American forces t o t h e i r f u l l p o t e n t i a l b e f o r e hazarding them i n o a t t i e . When one aaas t o t h i s the experience a i f f e r e n t i a l Detween the Americans an0 the Germans. i t seems a o u b t f u i t n a t the Americans c o u i a nave maintained a r a t e o f aavance i n excess o f t h a t achievea Dy the B r i t i s h have aavancea a t a l l . -- if tney couia Furthermore. t h i s scheme places the B r i t i s h i n the neagerow t e r r a i n . which aemanaea iarge amounts of i n f a n t r y f o r operations i n f a n t r y t h a t B r i t a i n a i a not possess. -- Thus. a slow aavance soutn from Caen and through tne Docage wouia f o r f e i t the supposea D e n e f i t o f t n i s course o t a c t i o n . as the Germans c o u i a withdraw w h i l e p i v o t i n g on t h e i r r i g n t i n order t o a v o i d Deing cut o f f from t h e i r base. zyx Perhaps most i m p o r t a n t l y . gdmDIing on tne u n i i k e l y event t n a t t n i s p l a n c o u i a c u t o f f ana oestroy the German army f o r g e t s the mission o t OVERLORD. The planners haa t o Keep f i r s t t h i n g s f i r s t . ana tne tirst 39 zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsrq miiitary ana poiiticai imperative of the operation was the securing of a ioagement. A loagement neeas ports, ana this pian ieaves the capture of ports untii last. i f only for its neglect of ports, a top priority ooJective. this scneme is unacceptaoie. zyx zyxwvuts aut aii of this does not mean that theory was a useiess guide tor Aiiiea planners in tnis operation. As we have seen, theory explains weii Montgomery’s excellent pian for breaking out of Normanay. He expioitea the enemy lines of operations disaavantage to draw the enemy center of gravity t o the left while his own powerful mass nurst through on the rignt. Aaaitionaliy, wniie recognizing that in tnis speciai case the estabiisnment of tne ioagement was tne priority aim of tne operation. a recognition tnat aescrwtion or the enemy center o t gravity snouia have oeen tne secono godi mignt nave nelpea tne Ailies avoid some mistaltes. w i t h tnis secona priori:y firmiy in mina they mignt not nave missea tneir opportunity co aestroy tne German forces. Thus theory aoes have utility in this case. So in tne end wnat aoes aii of this teii us of tne u t i l i t y miiitary theory? I t seems if that we may conciuae that at least these two tneoreticai tenets can De of great ana oecision maKing. zyxw utility as an aio in But theory is an uncertain guiae. soiaier weea out inappropriate courses of action, out it campaign planning It can help tne cannot select tne correct one. That still requires Juagement. Theory can help, out ao cne pianner,s tninKing for nim. 40 i t cannot MAP zyxwvuts zyxw : FORECAST OF OPERATIONS 41 .. N n 4 a r. zyxwvu zyxwvutsr - --_. .... zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvut zyx SLETCH: BASES. LIKES OF BATTLE, AND LiNES OF O P E R A T I O N I N NORMANDY L 0 I N P El N 0 L I N E OF BATTLE LINE OF 8 A N a I A FRANCE 44 zyxw zyxwv I" R zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvuts zy zyxwvutsrqpo zyxwvuts zyxw ENDNOTES IThe iist of WOrkS on the suoject is long (see biliography). interestingly two new works on Normanay have excitea renewed interest. They are: Cario D'Este. w o n in blcrmanav (New YOrk. 1983). and Max Hastings, m D : 0-Oav. June 6. 1944 (New YorK. 1984). - 2For a aiscussion of Churchiil,s early c m i t m e n t see O'Este. p. 21. For a gooa treatment of British grana strategy see I.S.O. Playfair. ?he Baiter-, Volume (Lonaon, 1954). PP. 1-5. (Washington, 3See Kent Rooerst Greenfield, ed., DC.1958). pp. 173-199. 255-287. 383-401: Gordon A . Harrison. (Washington, DC. 1 9 5 1 ) , pp. 1-128; David Eisenhower, -r: At Kar. 2943- 19qg (New Yam. 1986). ~ ~ B B ~and I I ;D'Este, pp.23-25. 4For aiscussion see O'Este, pp. 251-254. and Russel F. Weigley, t s Volume 1 (Bloomington. IN. 19811, PP. 74-75. 5Harrison. p. 450. 6Bernara Law Montgomery, sof F i AI(New YOrK. 1958). pp. 227-228. W tne Viscount Monrqomerv of (New YorK. 1948). pp.228-229. 7Dvight D. Eisenhower, 81n his memoir (see aoove citation) Eisenhower mentions a "decisive aattle" to DreaK out of the German "encircling positions'' arouna Normanay. The memoir is, of course, n t and does not track with pre-invasion planning. as a graaual aavance was envisioned ana a aecisive clash to ore.% out was not mentionea. Thus this allusion to a decisive Dattle to oreat out of Normanay aoes not creaioly suggest a force orientation in iKe,s early p 1 anning. 9Directive reproauced i n Harrison, pp. 457-458. 10D,Este. p.75. llAlong with D'Este's above account this may also De found in Omar Braaley, &Soiaier,s Story (New YOrK* 1951), p.241. d n a Hasrings. p. 56. 12Al I of the postwar controversy notwithstanding. this was always n i s scheme. See especially Omar Braaley d n a Clay Blair. -ai.s Lite: An aohv of w a l of -t Braalu (New YOrK. 1 9 8 3 ) . pp.216-244. 13The deployment of US ana British forces in NATO toady may oe tracea airectly to tneir positions in the invasion. 14in support of FORTITUDE dumy units created fake radio traffic. the famous American General Patton publicaily commanaea a Sham army group In East Angiia. ana the preliminary a i r and SaDOtage effort in France was 45 zyxwv zyxwv zyxwvutsrqp conducted all over the country. not Just in the Normanay region, so as not to give the game away. 15The plan for air support of OVERLORD was very controversial at the time. Strategic airmen resisted oeing usea for operational levei missions. and the tactical air forces coula not decide whether t o go tor tne French railway system in generai (cailea the Transportatlon elan) or t o concentrace on ChOKe points. They DOth were attempted and the latter was apparently the more successful. See Weigley. pp.88-99. 161nterestingly, the German forces in France were much stronger in 1944 than they haa been a year previously. British efforts at elaying the cross-cnannel invasion i n hopes of f inaing a weakened German army in the fiela thus backfired. See Walter Scott Dunn, Now -- 1943 (Montgomery AL. 1980) for an excellent aiscussion of German Army strength. 17See Hastings. pp.58-68, ana Harrison, pp. 231-267 for the DeSt oiscussions of the German aefensive plans. zyxwvutsrqp l*Hast i ngs. p .42. l9iplZL. ana tiarrison. 0.266. The Germans iost 5547 aircrat: in :ne tirst three montns of 1944. in contrast t o the German availaoie total O f 400. the A l l i e s lost 656 aircraft in acciaents alone in May. 20Deparrment of t h e Army. L O O-~ .. ~ ~ e r a t i .(Wasnington, oos DC, 1986). p. 179. 211pLa,pp, 10 ana 179. 22u, pp.179-180. 23Cari von Clausewitz, 241pLp,, 2 5 (Princeton. NJ, 1976). p.485. p. 75. ~ p.596. . 26Airpower is less effective against troops dispersed ana aug in. as tney are near tne front. i t is much more effective against enemy units On roaas in column formation approaching the Dattlefieia. haaitionaliy. wnen SrriKing near tne front one always r i s k s hitting one's own troops. 27Baron ile Jomini, Art of %ee Chapter One in this of operations. War: (Philaaelphia, PA. 1862) p.91. D O ~ Kfor a more complete treatment of lines 29Jomini, D . 109. 30The narration of events in the campaign is taKen mainly from D,Este. ilastings. David Eisennower. W i g h t Eisennower, ana Omar Braaley ana Ciair Blair. 46 zyxw zyx zyxwvutsrq zy 31The US airoorne aivisions aiso had the mission of gaining a ariageneao over the Meraeret River. 32interestingiy enough, Ai I led interceptions of German radio traff ic (tne famous ULTRA intercepts) Apparentiy gave the Aiiies warning or tne move of the German 352a fieia infantry aivision t o the Deacn area. Since nothing couia oe aone anout i t , Braaiey ana Eisenhower aecioea not t o teii Gerow. so as not t o aad t o his worries. D'Este. p.113 ana Braaley ana Blair, p . 250. 33The Britisn 79th Armorea Division containea speciai izd t a m s for minesweeping. crossing aitches. traversing soft sana, aestroying piilooxes. swimming ashore. and for flamethraring. US units aisaainea the use of all but tne ones capaole of swin'uning ashore. Aaaitionaily. Germ's corps ianaea on a much wiaer front that the others. perhaps contributing t o its troubles. 34D'Este, p.115. 35The 21st Panzer Division. basea near Caen. never maae a coorainatea a t t a m on D-Day. iiaa i t aone so, i t couia nave seriously tnreatenea one o t tne aritish oeacnes. 36in January. 1944. the Aiiies haa ianaea a t Anzio. :caiy. in an attempt to turn tne German positions near Cassino. h e Germans reactea swiftly an0 pinnea tne Allies in a smaii oeacnneao for six months. 37~ftermoving off UTAH beach the 4th Infantry Division maae s i o w progress. The 90tn infantry Division faiiea compieteiy in its first attempts t o drive across the Meraeret. in tnese oacties. Both units showea tneir inexperience 38The IX Tactical Air Conmana. unaer the US 9tn Air Force. supportea tne 1st US Army. iipon the creation of 3ro Army tne XIX Tacticai Air Commano was created t o support i t . . Struoaie ror -curoDp (New j9Many. see especiaiiy Chester Wilmot. YorK. 1952), pp.336-341. argue that Eisenhower never unaerstooa Montgomery,s scneme. The latest eviaence is tndt iKe ana Braaiey unaerstooa and approvea. See Davio Eisennower. pp.341-342. ana Braaiey ano 3iair. pp.264-268. zyxwvut 40A visit t o tne front oy tne US Secretary of the Army Stimson reinforce0 tne American concerns at this time. Stimson oirectea m a t a i l Y Army Group oe formea as soon as possioie. Aaaitionaliy. Churcniil was concerned over possioie iiS reaction regaroina tne hianer US casuaities. See Savia Eisennower. pp.360-361. 4 1 ~ 0 the~ expectations of oreakout heia in tne aritisn army a t this see Aiexanaer ticiiee. : Anvil of Victort (New k'OTK. 1984). pp.246-282. time 42The eariy cancei iation of GOODWOOD causea great uproar a t S M E F a t tne time. for i t coinciaea witn a aelay in COBRA. Lisennower tearea rnat :he Germans wouia De able t o transfer reserves t o nait Braaiev. i n fact. 47 zyxwvu zyxwvutsrqp zyxw zyxwvutsrq the Germans were able to move some units. This cancellation reinforces that Montgomery remainea very concernea aoout casualties. See David Eisennower. pp. 372-380. 43Because the A l l led Domoers flew perpenaicular rather than para1 lel to the front. snort oomoing causea hundreas of American casualties. inciuaing the aedth of tne Chief of US Ground Forces, LTG Leslie J. McNair. This unquestionaoly contributed to the slow aavance on tne first aay. 44Braaley and Blair. pp. 275-276. 45D8Este. pp.250-251. 4% stalwart defense conauctea oy the 30th US Infantry Divislon also helped. ULTRA.s role in the defeat of the German counterattack has apparently been overestimated, as I ittle information regarding the German plans reacnea Braaiey in time for him to act. See Braaley and Blair. pp. 291-294* 48 zyxwvu zyxw zyx zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsr zyxwvutsr zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvu zyx BIBLIOGRAPHY BppI(s Amorose. Stepnen E., w w e r : Solaier. Generai of the hunr, w i d a n t elecL. New YorK: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1983. - _-----_--~ ~ L I I ~ y W ~ ~ a ~ Bennett, Raiph. IlLT&8 in the West: The l j o r m a n n v a n ot 1944-45. New YOrk: Charles Scrianer's Sons, 1979. Biummson, Martin, BreaKour ano P m . Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1961. m. New YOrk: Time-Life BooKs, Inc., 1978. ---------_,.sVol. IL. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company. __-__-__-1974. l .- Botting, Douglas E., New YorK: Time-Life BOOKS. Inc.. 1978. Braaley. m a r N.. ana Clay Blair. s Life New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.. 1983 ________-_ ey' A Sojdler.s stort. New YorK: Rana McNai l y and Company. . I 1951. . . Coi~ins. J. iawton. -a Joe: An A u w i o a r a q y aaton Rouge. LA: Louisiana State University Press. 1979. . -ihe :nar ' Chandler. Aifreo, ea.. ?doers of iniutlt Davia -over. Years. Vols iJJ ana I V. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hoplcins Universiry Press. 1970. the Boston: Houghton M i f f i i n Churchiil. Sir Winston S . . - a Company. 1951. .~ Clausewitz, Carl von. edited ana translatea Dy Michael Howara ana Peter Paret, Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. 1976. 3'Este. Carlo, w o n in No-. New YorK: E.P. Dutton. Inc.. 1983. Dunn. Walter Scott J r . . -Front Now 949. Montgomery A t : University of Alabama Press, 1980. Eisennower. David. w w e r : A t War. 1943-1945. New YorK: Ranaom House. I 986. Eisenhower. hilt D. w e in Eurpeg. Garden City, NY: DouDleoay and Company. Inc.. 1948. Greenfieia. Kent Rooerts, ed.. Decisiong. Wasnington. DC: US Government Printing Office. 1958. Hamiiron. Nisei. I 942-I9'tfl. New York: McGraw-Hili BOOK Canpany. 1983. iiarrison. Gordon A . . ieA t t u Washington. DC: US Government Printing Office. 1951. Hasrings. Max. Dveriora : D-Dav ana the Battle for NDrmanav . 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Forrest C., -reme C ~ m m p ~Washington. , DC: US Government Printing Office. 1954. Ruge. Friedrich. -1 in Novato. CA: Presidio Press.- 1979. Weigley. Russell F.. -er's na-ueiL of crance p ~ l p v. 1944 1 9 G . Bloomington, IN:. Indiana University Press, 1981. Wilmot. Chester, for EuroDi. New Yaw: Harper and Brothers Pualishers, 1952. - w.. -. - w Fieid Manual 100-5. P p e r a t i m . Washington, DC: HPS Department of the Army, 1986. 50

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