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Headquarters, Department of the Army

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# Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

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*Brigadier General Mark S. Spindler*

## Preserve the Force!

With this column, I close out my tenure as the 47th Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS). During the past 2 years, I have had the privilege and pleasure to serve in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE), and USAMPS with the finest military and civilian people that I have encountered in more than 30 years of service. This includes the wonderful leaders, friends, advocates, and sponsors here in Waynesville and St. Robert, Missouri, who tirelessly work every day to make the quality of life for our Soldiers, civilians, and their Families the very best.

Serving in this position has afforded me the opportunity to see firsthand the extraordinary work, bravery, and selfless service of our military police at an enterprise level. Whether in our posts, camps, or stations—or in war-torn lands—the soldiering skill and policing capabilities of our troops have been invaluable in achieving overwhelming mission success, forging the reputation of professional excellence that our Corps, our Army, and our Nation richly deserve. Our Soldiers simply perform magnificently—in great part because they are magnificently led by officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians with unmatched competence, commitment, and character.

The future of our Corps is bright, and exciting opportunities lie ahead as we continue to build, educate, and shape the force in the fashion necessary to meet the operational needs of our Army and to win tomorrow's fight.

Take care of one another. Be proud of who you are and what you do. It has been an honor to serve with you in the great endeavor that we call soldiering!

Continue to **Assist, Protect, and Defend** and to **Preserve The Force!**

We have been, and we remain **Army Strong!**





# Regimental Command Sergeant Major



## *Command Sergeant Major Richard A. Woodring*

### **Greetings from the U.S. Army Military Police School!**

As I get out and have the opportunity to talk with leaders and Soldiers from across the Regiment, one message that I constantly stress is the importance of keeping up with Army doctrine and initiatives. This is a message that was reinforced during the annual Army Training and Leader Development Conference that I attended. I was very encouraged when I learned about the initiatives that the Army is taking to make Army doctrine more interesting and easier to access.

One of the topics discussed at the Army Training and Leader Development Conference was “living doctrine,” which refers to doctrine that will be relevant, interactive, and accessible at the point of need via Web and mobile technology. This will expand the user’s experience beyond the pages of the traditional publication and across the human senses. Living doctrine will be easier to access and update, and it will allow Soldiers to have Army doctrine right at their fingertips. Now that the Army Training Network can be accessed from any mobile device using a Department of Defense Self-Service Access Center login, Soldiers have ready access to countless Army initiatives and information. This initiative, coupled with two applications (or apps)—LeaderMap and Army Comprehensive Doctrine—provide access to Web-based information and videos that help leaders and Soldiers understand the doctrine and formulate thought-provoking questions for discussion.



Another initiative that will be emerging in the near future is the conversion of Web-based doctrine from portable document format (pdf) to E2Books format. This will allow users to bookmark, pinch zoom in/out, highlight, adjust text and, eventually, make annotations within documents. The E2Books format will work with all forms of operating devices and will be scalable to any device screen.

The recent releases of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World—2020–2040*; and Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leader Development*, provide invaluable insight about the future of our Army. We will be the drivers of change in the Army, so it is important that we know and understand the Army doctrine and initiatives. I often receive compliments from senior leaders regarding the knowledge and professionalism of our junior Soldiers and comments about how they conduct their duties at a higher level than Soldiers of other military occupational specialties and their civilian counterparts. I attribute this to our great leaders who continually teach and mentor our Soldiers to be the very best. I encourage all of you to learn more about living doctrine and the potential it has to increase our ability to access and understand Army doctrine.

Thank you to all of our Soldiers, civilians, and Family members who make up this great Regiment. You truly make a difference to our Army each and every day!

### **Preserve the Force!**

#### **References:**

ADRP 1, *The Army Profession*, 14 June 2015.

FM 6-22, *Leader Development*, 30 June 2015.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World—2020–2040*, 31 October 2014.



# Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

## Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

### The Leadership Balancing Act

About 3 months ago, General David G. Perkins, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, spoke to an audience at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, about leadership and leader development. General Perkins said that, as we develop young leaders, we need to make them understand that good leaders learn to maintain balance in their lives. He referenced an Indian proverb about a house with four rooms. According to the proverb, “. . . everyone is a house with four rooms—a physical, a mental, an emotional, and a spiritual. Most of us tend to live in one room most of the time; but unless we go into every room every day, even if only to keep it aired, we are not a complete person.”<sup>1</sup> As General Perkins was describing the proverb, I realized that the concept could also be applied to the leadership attributes of character, presence, and intellect as outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*. If we were to spend time engaging in the activities that occurred in each of these “rooms,” we could achieve balance and resiliency in our lives while setting the conditions for becoming better leaders and developing better leaders. Military leadership, which differs from other types of leadership, requires constant connectivity to character while performing as a leader of presence and intellect. Soldiers make assumptions about a leader’s knowledge, skill, and ability based upon his or her standing in the organization and application of these attributes in everyday life.



Next, General Perkins referenced a study in which Soldiers were asked about the attributes of a good leader. A large percentage of the responses from junior Soldiers was related to the leadership attribute of presence. Soldiers were motivated more by what a leader *did* rather than what a leader *knew*. Conversely, I believe that senior leaders are more aware of what junior leaders *know* rather than what they *do*. In both cases, assumptions have been made based on the attributes to which individuals are most exposed. Junior Soldiers are primarily exposed to the attributes of character and presence while senior leaders are primarily exposed to the attributes of character and intellect. Therefore, if leaders are to inspire subordinates and gain the confidence of senior leaders, they must strike a balance between these two perspectives throughout their careers. Leaders must constantly strive to ensure that character is involved in every action in which they engage and that presence doesn’t overshadow intellect—or vice versa.

Good leaders are not concerned with their own evaluations, awards, or recognition. They are focused on bringing recognition to the Soldiers who are under their charge. They understand that they must sometimes put themselves at risk to ensure the well-being of their Soldiers. Building a reputation as a good leader is not easy. And that hard-won reputation should be guarded jealously, as it is easily lost. The Army demands that its leaders practice good leadership because its Soldiers deserve it. This takes a lot of hard work, experience, and dedication throughout a military career, but the result is motivated and resilient Soldiers.

## Of the Troops and For the Troops—Preserve the Force

### Endnote:

<sup>1</sup>Rumer Godden, *A House With Four Rooms*, William Morrow and Company, October 1989.

### Reference:

ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership*, 1 August 2012.



# Applying Antiterrorism in the RAF Concept

By Lieutenant Colonel Craig F. Benedict (Retired)

In 2012, the Chief of Staff of the Army addressed how the Army could best serve the Nation. As a fundamental element of his strategy, he introduced the concept of regionally aligned forces (RAFs). Under the concept, designated forces that received cultural training and language familiarization would be assigned to specified regions. The implementation of the concept would lead to a stronger global security environment.<sup>1</sup> However, history indicates that military success depends on more than cultural training and language instruction. Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan unquestionably offer some lessons in regard to a lack of cultural awareness, illustrating the problem and offering solutions. RAFs were designed to build upon lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The first area of responsibility (AOR) to be assigned a RAF was Africa. As full implementation advances, a faster introduction of Army forces in the assigned regions will undoubtedly take place. And although the abstract concept supports improved Army operations around the world, the training and preparation details require considerable thought and development. While much of this planning has already been completed, a closer look may be necessary to ensure appropriate accounting for antiterrorism. The ubiquitous threat of terrorism represents a serious consideration in any overseas deployment. Among other functions, the preparation for RAFs must include planning, coordination, and antiterrorism training.

An example from the distant American past may offer distinct lessons learned and considerations for American forces entering a different environment and suggest some common pitfalls that the Army may confront, even today. Fort Michilimackinac, in what is now northern Michigan, was designed to protect British colonial interests in the area. The fort was manned primarily by British soldiers, French fur traders, and their family members. A British veteran of the French and Indian War had recently been assigned as commander of the fort. In spite of warnings from people who lived in the region, the commander failed to take precautions when

he was invited to observe an Indian celebration just outside the fort. According to the story, “On June 2 [1763], a band of Chippewas playing a game of lacrosse near Fort Michilimackinac threw the ball over the palisades. When they entered the fort, supposedly to retrieve the ball, they pulled out knives and tomahawks and slaughtered most of the occupants . . . .”<sup>2</sup> The commander and Soldiers residing within the fort were clearly unprepared for that type of attack. And although the incident occurred more than 250 years ago, this principle is still true today: Preparation for the unique characteristics of the operational area will improve the unit protection posture and support effective mission execution. What could the forces at Fort Michilimackinac have done differently to improve protection against an attack? The RAF concept provides an answer to the same question facing today’s Army. RAFs involve rigorous preparation for specific AORs, including preparation for possible terrorist attacks.

***“Antiterrorism planning is an integral part of the broad training requirement that, given the emphasis on cultural awareness training, could possibly be overlooked.”***

Preparation before deployment undeniably provides the agility and flexibility necessary for expeditious movement and employment. The RAF concept incorporates “highly trained and culturally savvy forces” developed before deployment and specifies “. . . mandatory cultural, regional expertise (CREL) education and additional specific training dictated by combatant command (CCMD) requirements.”<sup>3</sup> This is broad guidance; the practical application of that guidance demands careful and continuous coordination, AOR-specific training, and exercises that apply to AOR scenarios. Antiterrorism planning is an integral part of the broad training requirement that, given the emphasis on cultural awareness training, could possibly be overlooked. The Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, Phase II, “Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016,” provides for the practical integration of antiterrorism into RAF units. It designates an objective designed to initiate the development of necessary antiterrorism-related preparedness.

Secrecy and deception are fundamental tenets of terrorist operations. A recent admonition from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-sponsored periodical *Dabiq*

exhorts would-be terrorists, stating that “Secrecy should be followed when planning and executing any attack.”<sup>4</sup> In response, RAF attempts to prevent a successful terrorist attack should emphasize—

- Creating awareness throughout the community of the organization.
- Adapting practical operational protective measures based on methods previously used by terrorists.
- Establishing links with organizations that reside within the region.

These areas of emphasis should be fundamental to any organizational planning that takes place today, just as they have been in the past.

The creation of antiterrorism awareness involves more than imparting a knowledge of the terrain and culture of an assigned area. It includes a collective consciousness of the threats and unit and individual protective measures. Department of Defense (DOD) and Army policies require annual individual Level I Antiterrorism Awareness Training and trained antiterrorism officers (ATOs) at all battalion-size units and larger. In addition, this base level of training must be supplemented by AOR-specific training that is aimed at supportive protective measures to be applied immediately upon preparation for deployment. DOD and Army policies further dictate that all Army personnel permanently or temporarily assigned to, transiting through, or performing exercises or training in a geographic combatant command AOR outside the continental United States receive AOR-specific antiterrorism awareness training. The training must be even more focused under the RAF concept. And the additional time that RAF units have to study and coordinate should inevitably lead to a greater inculcation of understanding among individuals and safer and more effective entry into a region.

RAF units must track AOR-specific antiterrorism training for individuals. A link with the appropriate Army service component command (ASCC) is critical in formulating the training required to prepare each Soldier and civilian. Individuals play an important role in the detection of prospective terrorists in any environment. In addition to training for individual protection, targeted AOR training builds the awareness necessary for Soldiers and civilians to support unit collection efforts. A knowledge of the most likely region for employment allows units to prepare holistic antiterrorism systems. Individuals, through threat-oriented training, become an integral part of the unit protection system.

Terrorists rarely telegraph their method of attack. Therefore, much antiterrorism planning involves building protective measures against a variety of possibilities. The number of possibilities can be refined based on historical records of the region, a study of terrorist groups operating in the area, and the mindful application of measures designed to

locate prospective terrorists before they strike. And, once employed, units should have a set of random antiterrorism measures ready to be initiated to ensure that prospective terrorists are not able to establish their own attack planning based on fixed protective measures. Regardless of the RAF mission, protective measures must become an integral part of the planning.

Successful preparation requires a close link between the RAF unit(s) and the ASCC in the AOR. The ASCC knows the AOR to which the RAF unit(s) will deploy—and the AOR provides a wide variety of employment possibilities. The various subregions and countries within an AOR frequently exhibit remarkable differences in infrastructure,

friendly support, and terrorist threats, which provide the basis for planning. ASCC can help narrow the possibilities and provide focus for antiterrorism-related information collection and training. Close links between RAF units and ASCC ATOs can help guide antiterrorism training and awareness expectations, develop supporting intelligence requirements, and partner in assessing the antiterrorism-related readiness of RAF elements at all levels.

Initial on-site visits between RAF antiterrorism personnel and ASCC to establish productive working relationships that can be continued virtually should be considered. As Lieutenant Colonel Jay Morse, with the International and Operational Law Department, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, put it, “RAF success depends on ‘person to person’ engagements.”<sup>5</sup> Clearly, there is no substitute for face-to-face coordination at the beginning stages of RAF assignments. The physical meeting can then support an enduring synchronization based on established understanding and trust. ASCCs often use well-developed information-sharing schemes including Web sites or portals that can be linked with RAFs. RAF units and ASCC should also coordinate through antiterrorism working groups and senior-level antiterrorism executive committees as a routine part of all antiterrorism programs.

Unit ATOs provide the expertise necessary to integrate antiterrorism considerations into operational planning. This is particularly true in RAFs. ASCCs maintain AOR-specific training blocks designed for ATOs who are anticipating assignment in the AOR. Regardless of the size of the deploying unit—from company to corps level—RAF units must coordinate with the ASCC for the necessary training. This ensures that the critical antiterrorism element is appropriately represented in operational planning. The unit depends on a trained and certified antiterrorism expert to integrate necessary terrorist-related aspects into RAF preparations for deployment. Just as every member of the unit must understand the culture and the threats associated with the region of anticipated employment, the ATO must understand how to collect critical information related to the possibility

***“The creation of antiterrorism awareness involves more than imparting a knowledge of the terrain and culture of an assigned area. It includes a collective consciousness of the threats and unit and individual protective measures.”***



of terrorist attacks, integrate antiterrorism instruction into predeployment training, keep the RAF commander informed of combatant command and ASCC antiterrorism expectations, and incorporate appropriate antiterrorism measures into operational planning according to the RAF execute order. Moreover, the ATO must ensure that exercises and rehearsals oriented to the prospective region include the possibility of terrorism.

Assigned RAF ATOs can influence the information collection related to prospective employment in the AOR. Army doctrine and policy require that, in support of operational planning, all units maintain a list of priority information requirements that help focus information collected by a wide variety of sources. Priority information requirements are usually of a wide scope and are, in broad terms, often related to the terrorist threat. ATOs should develop supporting information requirements that supplement priority information requirements. Supporting information requirements filter the larger collection of information related to priority information requirements. Collection sources are informed of terrorism-specific questions that the RAF needs to have answered in order to effectively prepare. The information requirements should be developed in conjunction with the ASCC, and they should support the commander's expected employment considerations. Moreover, once approved by the commander, the information requirements must be appropriately distributed through information and intelligence channels in order to advise the commander on the terrorist-related aspects of the AOR.

To avoid a situation like that at Fort Michilimackinac, commanders must consider the application of antiterrorism protection measures. By using the ATO as an advisor for all terrorism-related issues, commanders can ensure that the antiterrorism element is appropriately integrated in all planning. Moreover, by knowing the intent of the combatant command, unit commanders can apply measures to specific circumstances. Armed with an understanding of the intent, commanders can appropriately account for the doctrinal antiterrorism principles of detect, warn, defend, assess, and recover in planning guidance and ensure that final plans include the requisite antiterrorism protection. ASCCs can assist designated RAF commanders by providing timely updates through ATO channels to sustain an appropriate level of readiness.

The classroom training scenario, absent a specific environment, fails to present all of the potential pitfalls faced in the actual circumstances encountered where the Soldiers or civilians will eventually operate.

Based on his Civil War experience, General Ulysses S. Grant abhorred the application of fixed solutions to unique environments. "No rules will apply to conditions as different as those which exist in Europe and America," he observed, "Consequently, while our generals were working out problems of an ideal character, problems that would have looked well on a blackboard, practical facts were neglected."<sup>6</sup> Under the RAF concept, the intent is to emphasize the "practical

facts" necessary to effectively operate in regions around the world. In its entirety, the RAF concept requires building awareness, developing protective measures, and exercising comprehensive coordination. The sum total of these efforts supports mission execution and provides the protective system that can prevent a successful terrorist attack.

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Raymond T. Odierno, "Regionally Aligned Forces: A New Model for Building Partnerships," *Army Live: The Official Blog of the United States Army*, 22 March 2012, <<http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/>>, accessed on 21 July 2015.

<sup>2</sup>John F. Ross, *War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America's First Frontier*, Bantam Books, New York, 2009, p. 340.

<sup>3</sup>"Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF)" (Information Paper), Department of the Army Military Operations–Strategic Plans and Policy (DAMO-SS), 3 March 2014.

<sup>4</sup>*Dabiq*, Issue 4, 15 October 2014, <[http://www.slideshare.net/Malaysia\\_Politics/dabiq-magazine-issue-4-40329069](http://www.slideshare.net/Malaysia_Politics/dabiq-magazine-issue-4-40329069)>, accessed on 21 July 2015.

<sup>5</sup>Jay Morse, "Regionally Aligned Forces: Less About What It Is, More About What It Can Be," *Small Wars Journal*, 23 January 2015.

<sup>6</sup>Ulysses S. Grant (reported by John Russell), "Unsuccessful Commanders," *United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette of the Regular and Volunteer Forces*, New York, 16 January 1897, p. 350.

#### Reference:

"Burnishing the Steel, 2013–2016," Army Antiterrorism Strategic Plan, Phase III, 14 February 2013.

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# Real-World German SRT Support

By Lieutenant Colonel R. Scott Harbison and Captain Joshua K. Frye

**T**housands of people attended the 2012 Fourth of July Hometown Celebration at the historic Tower Barracks Parade Field, U.S. Army Grafenwoehr, Germany. After policing the sprawling installation during a special shift, members of the 615th Military Police Company, Grafenwoehr, and a military police platoon from the 2d Cavalry Regiment (2CR), Vilseck, Germany, were released by Directorate of Emergency Services (DES) personnel. While the revelers returned to their barracks, quarters, and off-post housing, a troubled group of Soldiers sparked

a sequence of events that led to unique and intense law enforcement efforts for the entire area law enforcement community.

Patrol and emergency services were dispatched to a parking lot between two barracks located at Rose Barracks, Vilseck, after the staff duty noncommissioned officer, 3d Squadron, 2CR, reported an assault with injuries. The first patrols to arrive on-scene found that the victim of the assault was bleeding and had severe leg trauma. Witnesses stated that two males had specifically targeted the injured Soldier, attacking him with a baseball bat and what appeared to be a machete attached to the end of a long pole. The victim was taken by German ambulance to the nearby Sulzbach-Rosenberg Hospital. By about 2335, a few minutes after the assault, the balmy July evening gave way to rain and there was no sign of the assailants.

Garrison DES leaders—including the director, much of the operations staff, and the 2CR provost marshal—monitored the situation from the opposite side of the post, where the Fourth of July celebration had come to a close. Meanwhile, the military police investigator who was on call began interviewing witnesses at the scene. Investigators from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly referred to as CID) office, 262d Military Police Detachment, arrived shortly thereafter and were briefed by patrols and the military police investigator. The assailants were quickly identified by witnesses and military leaders who had been called to the scene.

The leveraging of various databases indicated that one of the Soldiers involved in the assault had been accused of other assaults on three separate occasions in the previous 14 months. A consultation with CID personnel further revealed that the subject was a suspect in an ongoing drug distribution investigation. At about that time, key personnel began arriving on the scene and the subjects were flagged in the installation access control system. The crime scene was

***“Witnesses stated that two males had specifically targeted the injured Soldier, attacking him with a baseball bat and what appeared to be a machete attached to the end of a long pole.”***

secured, and witness interviews were continued. Initial reports indicated that the subjects had fled with their weapons into a nearby tree line. Patrols were thoroughly briefed; and a broad, methodical search was initiated on the installation. Known associates, including one of the subject’s ex-girlfriends, were sought to ascertain the whereabouts of the fugitives.

Law enforcement intelligence provided by CID and information gleaned from interviews indicated that the subjects were violent individuals who might have access to other weapons. As the investigation progressed, it became apparent that the subjects may have returned to a friend’s third-story barracks room adjacent to the scene of the assault. A witness who knew the subjects believed that they might have numerous edged weapons, an electroshock weapon, or pepper spray in their possession or in the room.

Several hours passed, and 4 July turned into 5 July. The rain continued to fall, destroying the blood evidence at the exposed crime scene. All who were present became waterlogged, and the hand radio microphones became unusable.

As time passed, investigators assumed that the two assailants had likely retreated to that barracks room and that they were potentially barricaded. At about 0400, military police entered the building, secured the hallways and stairwells, and began to evacuate and account for all the occupants. The unit leaders were asked if they could rule out the possibility that the subjects had access to weapons, including military-issued firearms; and they began a comprehensive inventory of the arms rooms.



Eventually, investigators decided to attempt to establish contact with the occupants of the specific room; however, knocking on the door elicited no response. The Soldier who was assigned to the room arrived at the barracks and entered the stairwell, presumably after a night of drinking. When asked to open the door for a search, he claimed that there was no one inside and he refused to comply. His uncooperative behavior continued, turning violent when he kicked a CID agent. Remaining combative, he resisted apprehension; refused to be searched; and spouted off a string of obscenities to those around him, including garrison DES personnel. The Soldier was transported to the Vilseck military police station, where he continued to be combative. Due to the threat that he had presented to himself and others, he was secured in the detention cell.

The garrison commander was briefed, and an incident command post was established in an adjacent conference room. The assistance of the German *Polizei* (police) was requested, and a patrol was dispatched. The patrol quickly reported that the situation required additional resources. There was probable cause to believe that the subjects were barricaded, and a formal request for special reaction team (SRT) support was made to the German authorities. This triggered a massive *Polizei* response, which is particularly noteworthy since garrisons in Germany are exempt from the regulatory requirement to maintain SRTs and, given the nature of the offense, concurrent jurisdiction existed.<sup>1</sup>

A German security platoon, incident command staff, a hostage negotiation team, special investigators, and technical support staff were dispatched from the *Polizei* directorate in Regensburg, Germany. Members of an elite *Spezialeinsatzkommando* (SEK), a Tier 1 German SRT, simultaneously began to recall and deploy from their bases in northern Bavaria. The decision to employ the SEK was based on agreements between the garrison and the host nation.<sup>2</sup> The nature of dangerous suspect apprehension and precision, high-risk entry for barricaded persons doctrinally calls for the employment of an SRT; and all response requirements were met.<sup>3, 4</sup>

In the command post, plans regarding the best way to make contact with the subjects and, if necessary, how to properly use the SEK were made. Marksmen were employed and directed to specific exterior windows for observation. The SEK began rehearsing in similar barracks rooms that were available nearby. The German security platoon relieved interior and exterior cordon military police, and the forces seamlessly interfaced and established liaisons. Blueprints of the hallway and the room were obtained. CID agents worked with the hostage negotiation team to establish a strategy. Incident command remained with the garrison commander and DES, in close cooperation with the SRT-trained 2CR provost marshal.

While the SEK began moving into the barracks, up the stairwells, and into the hallway on the third floor, German marksmen reported movement in the room, which was visible through the windows. As the SEK, embedded with military police and CID agents, approached the door, the members were informed about the movement and the team attempted to make contact with the subjects. Following a knock on the door and identification as police, one of the occupants opened the door slightly. Without hesitation, the occupant was taken into custody and questioned. Although the door had been closed, the second subject opened it again to look out. Upon seeing the SEK, he attempted to forcefully close the door, but the SEK managed to enter and secure the room.

By 0930 on 5 July, the subjects' identities were confirmed. All host nation elements cleared the scene. Control of the crime sites was then passed from DES to the CID special agent responsible for evidence. The highly complex scene encompassed six different sites, including the tree line where the weapon that was used in the initial attack (a martial arts sword known as a *Kwan Dao*) was recovered. Although the CID investigation initially focused on the assault, it ultimately led to the exposure of a larger, drug-related ring.

The original assault was linked to a dispute regarding a subject's privately owned vehicle and a narcotics operation. The victim had sustained serious lacerations to the thigh, but would recover without permanent injuries. No other injuries or property damage were incurred during the volatile operation, and the overall outcome was optimal.

Media coverage over the following days described details of the cooperation between U.S. military authorities and host nation officials. The German public prosecutor's office in Amberg acknowledged that, while the military police and *Polizei* work together well and closely, incidents involving an SRT are extremely rare.<sup>5</sup> The strategy of mutual support paid off, and standard procedures that had been agreed upon worked as planned.

Agencies do not work in a vacuum. Highly professional *Polizei* forces offer diverse capabilities that exceed those of the garrison. Even before this Independence Day incident occurred, host nation enablers, including SEK, constituted a critical part of the crisis response plan. In the years that followed the incident, additional training exercises beyond routine, full-spectrum, and antiterrorism force protection training were launched. SEK teams frequently train at the garrison, where military police personnel work with them on tactics and procedures. Close relationships between regimental *Polizei* leaders and a dedicated liaison element permanently based at the military police station have paid dividends. The Independence Day incident not only resulted in a positive operational outcome and the validation of confidence between law enforcement communities, but also led

(Continued on page 12)



# Habitual Military Police Relationships with BCTs: The 110th Military Police Company Approach to Integration

*By Captain Robert A. Hamilton*

**E**ach military police company in the 759th Military Police Battalion is aligned with a brigade combat team (BCT). As the commander of the 110th Military Police Company, I am responsible for nurturing a habitual relationship with the 3d Armored BCT, 4th Infantry Division. The 110th Military Police Company recently participated in the brigade mission readiness exercise (MRX), designated Iron Horse Focus, in preparation for National Training Center (NTC) rotation 15-02. Following the MRX, the 110th Military Police Company supported NTC rotation 15-02. This article describes our efforts in fostering a habitual relationship between the 110th Military Police Company and the 3d Armored BCT and summarizes our best practices and lessons learned.

## **Training Preparation**

The first step in preparing for the MRX was to identify training objectives. Several facts and assumptions drove the concept of missions that we might expect to execute. Those missions established the parameters of what could reasonably be accomplished in the time and space allotted. The unit training objectives for the MRX were largely task-based before the start of the exercise. These objectives included—

- Tactics, techniques, and procedures validation.
- Tactical standard operating procedure validation.
- Alert, marshal, and deploy (redeploy) operations.
- Zone reconnaissance.
- Convoy security.
- Corrections.
- Police intelligence operations.

We knew that training would be executed at less than full strength. The lower numbers forced us to continually adjust the task organization to accomplish several disparate missions with fewer resources. Adjusting the task organization in a complex, austere environment required successful mission command predicated upon mutual trust between leaders.

## **Relationship Building**

Before executing the MRX, the supported BCT elected to task-organize the 110th Military Police Company with the brigade engineer battalion (BEB). Through the military decisionmaking process, it was determined that the rear area security mission of the battalion would be composed of the following major mission sets:

- Host nation engagement.
- Route security, including combined arms route clearance.
- Detainee operations and displaced civilian control (internally displaced persons).
- Critical site security.
- Ground response force operations.
- Maneuver sustainment.

The company command team conducted several capabilities briefs with the supported battalion and brigade. We identified potential military police integration courses of action to shape methods of employment. Military police unit leaders studied hybrid threat doctrine to identify potential gaps that could be filled in support of rear area security operations. The primary focus was security along the lines of communication. With the growth of the rear area, the hybrid threat would seize the opportunity to attack the lines of communication using unconventional tactics. The goal was to position combat power to identify and eliminate threats while supporting enablers or conducting security operations. With engagement areas clear of threats, we wanted to transition into reconnaissance and surveillance operations to ensure that key terrain remained clear and to restrict the ability of the enemy to move throughout the rear area.

We knew that we would fight at less than 70 percent strength. Significant factors in the planning process included the speed at which the rear area was expected to grow, the estimated throughput of detainees, and the way in which the security posture would be adjusted to accommodate surges in detainees or internally displaced persons. To provide maximum flexibility, we visualized ourselves as a company of teams that could be shifted between squads or

platoons as necessary. If additional combat power was necessary, we would flex to meet demands.

To posture for potential missions, we task-organized at the platoon level. Choosing a preferred method of employment early allowed us to align specialized platoons against mission sets that nested within our training objectives. The breakdown was as follows:

- A combined arms route clearance platoon.
- A security platoon.
- A detainee operations platoon.

We were prepared to task-organize to the team level to shift combat power as needed. We ensured that our higher headquarters understood our decision points, which were communicated through briefings and after action reports.

### **Mission Command**

Initially, the BEB was reluctant to allow military police leaders to shape the 110th Military Police Company task organization. The BEB staff primarily relied on their own mission analysis and resources, as they felt appropriate. Early in the coordination phase, we provided the BEB battalion commander with a graphic depiction of how we could task-organize and shift resources to meet demand. The graphic, which he carried in his pocket throughout the MRX, was a useful tool. When we felt we could provide additional economy of force, it was easy to justify the request using the graphic. Over time, the BEB battalion commander became comfortable with our recommendations and provided us the latitude to adjust our forces as necessary. The trust we built with the BEB was critical in the expeditionary environment at NTC. The previous training and the MRX fostered trust down to the individual level. Combined arms training allowed us to learn from the engineer and military intelligence elements that we were supporting.

### **Combined Arms Training**

Developing a course of action and briefing it as part of the capability briefing allowed us to quickly progress into combined arms training. Route clearance operations were largely foreign to most of the formation, but convoy security was not. We had approximately 2 weeks to learn engineer tactics, techniques, and procedures. Early and frequent training with the engineers allowed us to cater our security package and tactics to provide favorable conditions for obstacle clearance. We learned much from the engineers and explosive ordnance disposal element. Tying in with those formations made integration with all enablers easier at NTC.

Pre-exercise training also afforded the opportunity to meet other BEB leaders. Key introductions were made with staff points of contact, the military intelligence company commander, and the multifunction team platoon leader. The



**A Soldier from the 110th Military Police Company provides buddy care during NTC rotation 15-02. (Photo by Specialist Ashley Marble)**

relationships we built with the staff were key in learning the battalion commander's expectations for reporting, maintenance, and sustainment support. The introduction to military intelligence elements fostered discussions that led to recommendations concerning the security and employment of sensors throughout the rear area.

The MRX provided an opportunity to demonstrate our flexibility. As orders were published, the command team provided the BEB staff with a bottom-up refinement of planned operations. As we demonstrated additional flexibility, the BEB staff sought our input to ensure economy of force during COA development. The MRX shaped our utilization for NTC. As a company, we demonstrated great flexibility and adaptability, which built trust in the organization and enabled mission command.

### **NTC Rotation 15-02**

#### **Preparation and Deployment**

Based on lessons learned during the MRX, we planned our deployed equipment set and initiated the packing process. The time between the MRX and NTC exercise was truncated, and the Leadership Training Program fell between those two events. The Leadership Training Program provided an additional opportunity to shape employment, introduced the operating environment, and created a better understanding of the threat and the resources needed to succeed. Our mission set was likely to change; therefore, we did not attempt to forecast equipment requirements based on past utilization. We focused on our mission analysis, addressed contingencies, and prepared by bringing the requisite equipment that we could field while maintaining our mobility and flexibility. To ensure that we met all mission demands, we established a rear detachment consisting of a strong operations sergeant, several mechanics, and personnel unable to participate in training (known losses, restrictive profiles).



Training at NTC was largely what we expected. The scenario was complex, and the operational tempo was rapid. Once again, we put our flexibility to the test. The rear area grew quickly; as such, forces were spread over a large area. Due to unreliable FM communication, orders from headquarters were often short and primarily consisted of key tasks, the commander's intent, and the desired end state. Since we did not have constant guidance, we relied heavily upon mission command and the trust that was built during prerotation training. Ultimately, we had a very successful rotation and a smooth integration with the BEB and 3d Armored BCT, 4th Infantry Division.

### Lessons Learned

We learned several lessons during the MTX and NTC rotation:

- Our initial training objectives were nearsighted. There are several ways to conduct zone reconnaissance, but none can be communicated effectively if we cannot conduct troop leading procedures efficiently. Training at NTC demonstrated that additional emphasis should be placed on systems efficacy—not how a task is conducted.
- Flexibility is impossible without mission command, and mission command is impossible without trust. We needed to foster trust with the BEB to have the latitude to operate efficiently. I had to trust my leaders to execute orders with resources that were not organically theirs.
- Bottom-up refinement of the mission is key to ownership. Early and frequent involvement in the planning process made it easy to execute the mission when the final order was produced.
- Learning the language of the supported unit is important. During our rotation, we supported engineer; explosive ordnance disposal; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives reconnaissance; infantry; armor; psychological operations; military intelligence; and civil affairs elements. Doctrine provided a common language, but some common understanding and learning were necessary to bridge the gap between branches.
- Mission analysis allowed the proactive identification of methods of employment. As the fight developed on the ground, we understood where gaps existed and communicated our method of support to higher headquarters.
- Our rear detachment support was inadequate. We should have provided more resources to conduct services and scheduled maintenance while the company was at NTC.

Our experience supporting the 3d Armored BCT, 4th Infantry Division, was overwhelmingly positive. Our Soldiers obtained a better understanding of combined arms maneuver, hybrid threat, and the expeditionary operating environment. The lessons learned through training could not be replicated without the opportunity to train at the BCT level.



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*Captain Hamilton is the commander of the 110th Military Police Company, which deployed in support of the 3d Armored BCT during MRX Iron Horse Focus in August 2014 and NTC rotation 15-02 from October to November 2014.*

*(“Real-World German SRT Support,” continued from page 9)*

to a comprehensive after action review, which was used to refine procedures, training, and equipping.

**Note:** Details of the incident described in this article were obtained by the authors through media reports and interviews with participating military police personnel, CID agents, and *Polizei*. Some portions of the military police report were cleared for release via a Freedom of Information Act request. All information presented in this article complies with the Privacy Act of 1974, and information that was withheld was done so in accordance with Chapter III of Army Regulation (AR) 25-55, *The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program*.



### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>*Operational Law Handbook*, International and Operational Law Department, Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2014, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup>“Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces,” Article VII, NATO, 19 June 1951, <[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_17265.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17265.htm)>, accessed on 23 July 2015.

<sup>3</sup>AR 190-58, *Military Police Personal Security*, 22 March 1989, pp. 6–7.

<sup>4</sup>Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.11, *Military Police Special Reaction Teams*, 26 November 2013.

<sup>5</sup>Steven Beardsley and Marcus Klöckner, “Germany-Based GI Attacks Fellow Soldier With Machete,” *Stars and Stripes*, 9 July 2012, <<http://www.stripes.com/news/germany-based-gi-attacks-fellow-soldier-with-machete-1.182498>>, accessed on 23 July 2015.

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AR 25-55, *The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program*, Chapter III, 1 November 1997.

ATP 3-39.10, *Police Operations*, 26 January 2015.

Public Law 89-487, Freedom of Information Act, 4 July 1966.

Public Law 93-579, Privacy Act of 1974, 31 December 1974.

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# REDEFINING THE ROLES OF MILITARY POLICE IN THE CORPS FIGHT

*By Major Kevin M. Pelley and Major Robert E. Bonham*

*“A premier integrated military police force recognized as policing, investigations, and corrections professionals who enable the Army’s decisive action in unified land operations in concert with our partners to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic outcomes in unstable and complex worldwide environments.”*

—Vision: Military Police Force Strategy 2020<sup>1</sup>

**T**his article discusses the role of the Provost Marshal Office (PMO), III Corps, and military police units in support of unified land operations/decisive action as executed during Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 15-03, February 2015 at Fort Hood, Texas, and Camp Atterbury, Indiana.

From October 2014 to February 2015, III Corps conducted a series of exercises focused on decisive action as a field headquarters. For the first time since the opening salvos of the Global War on Terror, the mission would focus on the ability of the corps to deploy to an immature theater and operate as a tactical command post with multiple divisions and an operational headquarters with responsibilities as the Coalition Joint Force Land Component Command (CJFLCC). After III Corps returned from a deployment in early 2014, it endured the usual turnover of key personnel throughout the spring and summer of 2014. The institutional knowledge of the corps and the staff that focused on the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism fights in Iraq and Afghanistan was lost. With a new commanding general and staff, the III Corps conducted a series of leader development seminars and command post exercises based on the Mission Command Training Program Caspian Sea scenario. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2015, the III Corps staff erected the corps main command post and conducted a series of major exercises to liberate the fictional country of Atropia from its neighbor, Ariana. The first exercise was a staff exercise with only virtual play from subordinate units. The second exercise was WFX 15-02, wherein III Corps served as the higher command for the 82d Airborne Division and the 38th Infantry Division, Indiana Army National Guard. The third and culminating exercise was WFX 15-03, in which III Corps led a simulated coalition of ground forces, including the 1st Infantry Division and the returning 38th Infantry Division.

These exercises allowed the corps PMO to explore three recent doctrinal and structural changes to the way that military police support unified land operations/decisive action:

- The echelon, type, and number of military police units allocated to brigade combat teams (BCTs), divisions, and corps changed.

- III Corps developed and executed a corps support command post (CSCP) to synchronize and integrate support to decisive action.
- The corps PMO incorporated a U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) criminal intelligence (CRIMINT) analyst, who developed and refined a process to provide detailed criminal and hybrid threat analysis throughout the CJFLCC operational environment.
- Experience compiled from these progressively more complex exercises resulted in significant changes to the way the military police will fight in support of III Corps.

Total Army Analysis 18-22 dramatically changed the way military police enabled maneuver units in support of decisive action. WFX 15-02 provided the first opportunity for III Corps to explore these new rules of allocation. In conjunction with the rules of allocation, the Army ordered the deactivation of the BCT organic military police platoons. Instead, the total Army analysis authorized the allocation of a full combat support military police company to the BCT in support of combat operations. WFX 15-03 was the first major exercise in which III Corps and the 89th Military Police Brigade fought with one combat support military police company attached to each BCT and a military police battalion headquarters in support of each division.

As a result of these exercises and at the recommendation of the III Corps PMO and the 89th Military Police Brigade, the corps commander established habitual training and operational relationships between subordinate BCTs and military police companies from the 89th Military Police Brigade. Having one military police company in direct support of each BCT for collective training, combat training center rotations, and operational deployments provides III Corps BCTs with the capabilities required for assigned missions and future operations. The Corps formalized these relationships in a corps order in March 2015.

Another concept that III Corps tested during the WFXs was the execution of mission command behind the division rear boundaries. III Corps filled the CJFLCC headquarters role for all three exercises. In this role, the corps bridged the

gap between tactical and operational levels of war with one foot forward, commanding the tactical fight, and the other foot to the rear as an operational command. To support the maneuver fight, III Corps detached a portion of the corps staff from the main command post to operate the CSCP, which was commanded by Brigadier Tim Lai (United Kingdom), the Deputy Commanding General for Support. This command post provided the overarching authority for mission command in the combat support area (CSA) and joint security area (JSA). According to Brigadier Lai, “The role of the CSCP was to synchronize and integrate the sustainment, protection, and engagement warfighting functions to most effectively support the overall scheme of maneuver. The CSCP also provides mission command for a wide range of operations across the CSA and JSA. The CSCP improves general officer oversight of functions or activities that traditionally want for attention.”

In addition to focusing on synchronizing warfighting functions in support of decisive action, the CSCP facilitated mission command in the CSA and JSA. According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*, and JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*, if the CJFLCC is responsible for the JSA, it may establish a joint security coordination center. The III Corps CSCP filled many of the roles of a joint security coordination center. With no staff or physical resources authorized by the modified table of organization and equipment to establish a third command post, III Corps relied on support from the separate brigades in the CSA. For WFX 15-03, the CSCP was integrated with the Headquarters, 648th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), Georgia Army National Guard. The inherent capacity of the MEB to conduct mission command of maneuver units, terrain management, air and ground movement control, targeting, clearance of fires, and support area operations supplied the capacities the CSCP required to provide support to decisive action.

With the MEB responsible for execution of terrain management, security, and movement within the CSA and JSA, Brigadier Lai and corps enablers provided the authority and additional resources beyond the capabilities of the MEB. Colonel Ronald T. Cuffee Sr., the III Corps provost marshal, observed, “The CSCP reminds me of the old rear area operations center on steroids due to the robust capability of the MEB, additional corps staff representatives, and the subordinate unit liaison officers led by the Deputy Commanding General for Support.” WFX 15-03 was the first exercise for the CSCP. It operated at the *crawl* phase—its infrastructure and manning were immature. Future exercises may see III Corps staff augment the CSCP with liaison officers and staff from other units (Medical Command, Transportation Command, Theater Sustainment Command, Expeditionary Sustainment Command, and other separate commands or major separate corps units within the JSA and CSA).

Also within the CSA and JSA, the 89th Military Police Brigade worked closely with the 648th MEB and the CSCP to support III Corps. The 89th Military Police Brigade conducted security and mobility support, response force

operations, detention operations, and security force assistance using assessments and partnerships. As the exercise progressed, the division rear boundaries moved forward, extending the CSA. This challenged the MEB and the military police brigade, stretching finite resources over vast distances. The potential need was identified for an additional MEB to enable the CJFLCC to divide responsibilities, assigning one MEB to the CSA and another MEB to the JSA. Also, a corps that is tasked as the ground component commander with responsibility for all detention operations in theater, may deploy multiple military police detention battalions. This may exceed the scope of command of one military police brigade, and the CJFLCC may request a second military police brigade headquarters.

The increase in available military police forces also enables commanders to look beyond the offensive and defensive operations and set conditions early for a successful transition to postconflict stability operations. Preventing a civil security vacuum is crucial to stability operations. In conducting decisive action, offensive and defensive actions cannot be applied in isolation. The application of offensive and defensive actions must be tempered by the obligation to protect the civilian population. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, V Corps planned and executed Phase III operations extremely well. However, by the end of major combat operations, the Iraqi security forces and government infrastructure were decimated and unable to secure local populations. Criminal, terrorist, and insurgent groups flourished in the absence of police and other security forces. The change to the total Army analysis and the elevation of the echelon of military police forces allocated to each commander will enable brigades and divisions to assess local security forces and provide security to the population, while the CJFLCC develops priorities for building partner capacity. A critical enabling component is police intelligence operations.

Early and detailed police intelligence is critical to identifying and resolving primary sources of instability, establishing security, and setting the conditions for the withdrawal of coalition forces.<sup>2</sup> III Corps used WFX 15-03 to develop the CRIMINT collection process. Before WFX 15-03 and at the request of the III Corps provost marshal, the 11th Military Police Battalion (CID) provided a CRIMINT analyst to support the exercise and assist in the development of the corps CRIMINT collection and analysis process. Together, the corps PMO and CRIMINT analyst team developed an internal process for corps-wide significant actions, open source analysis, key leader engagement reports, and military police intelligence reporting from the 89th Military Police Brigade and division provost marshals combined with open source collection and analysis. The night battle captain and battle noncommissioned officer processed and compiled reports, which reduced the analyst’s workload and enabled him to focus on establishing links and associations. By the end of the exercise, III Corps PMO, in coordination with the III Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) and 89th Military Police Brigade, established the groundwork for a corps

*(Continued on page 16)*



# OPMG Visits U.S. Holocaust Museum

By Mr. Raphael G. Peart, Mr. K. Mike Smith Jr.,  
and Mr. Robert J. Yost

On 17 April 2015, as part of the U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) staff professional development program, 32 military members and civilians from across the organization visited the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. The program emphasizes the role of law enforcement officials during times of unrest and their responsibility for making the right choices to prevent events similar to the Holocaust. The museum visit, developed by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Anti-Defamation League over the last decade, examines the history of the Holocaust and its implications for participants' personal and professional responsibilities in our democracy. More than 90,000 law enforcement professionals have attended the session, which is part of the required training for all new Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents.<sup>1</sup>

Organizations that took part in the moving museum experience included the OPMG headquarters staff, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, the Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency, and the U.S. Army Corrections Command. Colonel Dan McElroy, Deputy Provost Marshal General, opened the professional development session with welcome remarks. He asked the participants to think seriously about what they were about to experience and how that experience might better inform and/or shape them as



U.S. Holocaust Museum

members of the OPMG. The session included—

- A welcome briefing and viewing of the film *Path to Nazi Genocide*.
- A guided tour of the permanent exhibition *The Holocaust*.
- Reflections on the exhibition.
- An examination and analysis of historical photographs of law enforcement officials in various roles during the Holocaust.
- A contemporary discussion led by the Anti-Defamation League.


During the reflections on the exhibition portion, which was led by program coordinator Ms. Sarah Campbell, participants shared their thoughts and reactions regarding the exhibits. Many of the participants indicated that one of the most poignant exhibits was a display of victims' shoes. The display itself and the odor emanating from it serve as reminders of the reality of the Holocaust. During the examination and analysis of historic photographs portion, the group became aware of the various ways in which the Nazis used law

*"[W]hen police officers violate their oath, there are, indeed, consequences. The Holocaust is probably the most extreme example of just how horrific and far-reaching those consequences may be. . . . The true power of this training, I think, lies in its call to action."<sup>2</sup>*

—Charles H. Ramsey,  
Chief of Police,  
Metropolitan Police Department,  
Washington, D.C.

enforcement officials to help control and legitimize themselves and their actions with regard to the local populations.

Mr. David Friedman, regional director for the Anti-Defamation League, and Major Charcillea Schaefer of the Plans and Policy Division, OPMG, indicated that strong Army Values are some of the main factors that guide Soldiers in making the right decisions in their professional lives. This belief was echoed by many in attendance, including Mr. Tracy Williams III, Chief of Staff, OPMG, who stated that the Army continually trains its Soldiers—especially its military police professionals—to make decisions based on the Army Values.

Participation in sessions like this one better prepare law enforcement officers by expanding their knowledge of the past, improving their skills and abilities in the present, and promoting professionalism for their future. 

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Jonathan Tamari, “At Holocaust Museum, A day of Learning for Phila. Police Recruits,” *The Inquirer*, 6 August 2014, <[http://www.philly.com/philly/news/year-in-review/20140806\\_\\_It\\_s\\_up\\_to\\_you\\_\\_\\_At\\_Holocaust\\_Museum\\_\\_a\\_day\\_of\\_learning\\_for\\_Philadelphia\\_police\\_recruits.html#jLaPkGFephXyDQ7U.99](http://www.philly.com/philly/news/year-in-review/20140806__It_s_up_to_you___At_Holocaust_Museum__a_day_of_learning_for_Philadelphia_police_recruits.html#jLaPkGFephXyDQ7U.99)>, accessed on 24 July 2015.

<sup>2</sup>Charles H. Ramsey, “Learning the Lessons of the Holocaust to Train Better Police Officers for Today and Tomorrow,” *Metropolitan Police Department, DC.gov*, 12 April 2000, <<http://mpdc.dc.gov/release/learning-lessons-holocaust-train-better-police-officers-today-and-tomorrow>>, accessed on 24 July 2015.

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(“Redefining the Roles . . .,” continued from page 14)

CRIMINT capacity. Further improvements to the process will allow a small section of analysts (potentially from the G-2 office, the military police brigade intelligence cell, and CID) to support the corps PMO with actionable intelligence.

A clear picture of the criminal and insurgent networks, early assessment of local security forces, and close coordination with engagement warfighting assets and other government organizations is fused with tactical intelligence to enable the CJFLCC commander to combine efforts early to defeat a determined and complex hybrid threat to provide security and rule of law (Objective 2.2, Military Police Force Strategy 2020).<sup>3</sup> In a linear battle, coalition forces may be conducting decisive offensive operations at the front, while in the division and corps support areas, forces conduct stability (Phase IV) operations. Simultaneous, rather than sequential, support to unified land operations will prevent strategic problems that plagued previous U.S. operations.

The III Corps planners are incorporating lessons from WFX 15-03 into plans for the next series of WFXs. Work will continue on the development and refinement of the CSCP. For future exercises, a second military police brigade will be added, separating lines of effort—with one brigade focusing on detention operations and the other on security and mobility support and policing operations. Finally, the III Corps PMO and 89th Military Police Brigade will focus on refining the processes, personnel, and products to integrate a CRIMINT analysis capability across the corps. As a result, III Corps is prepared to operate as an adaptive and versatile headquarters, capable of providing military police support to defeat regular, irregular, and criminal enterprises in support of decisive action within unified land operations. 

#### Endnotes:

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<sup>2</sup>Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability*, 31 August 2012.

<sup>3</sup>*Military Police Force Strategy 2020*.

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# The Integration and Employment of Military Police Companies in BCT Rotations at CTCs

*By Captain Michael K. Huber and First Lieutenant Adam J. Berg*

**C**ombat training center (CTC) rotations serve as the premier Army training opportunities for brigade and smaller units. As deployments have drawn down, CTC rotations have become the only measure of unit performance. Military police units continue to participate as attached enablers to brigade combat teams (BCTs). However, after action reviews from the past 2 years of National Training Center (NTC) rotations reveal that military police units have been arriving at NTC, Fort Irwin, California, inexperienced and unprepared to accomplish assigned missions in support of the direct-action fight. This article explains how one military police company addressed this issue by embedding with its BCT partner and how future military police/BCT relationships should be structured to ensure mission success.

## **Overview**

In June 2013, the 549th Military Police Company learned that 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3d Infantry Division, would be attending NTC Rotation 14-09. The 549th Military Police Company began the long process of requesting training attendance through its chain of command (385th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade, U.S. Army Forces Command). The 385th Military Police Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia, began the planning necessary to ensure that the 549th was attached to 1st ABCT for the rotation. The planning—which was conducted while also carrying out the Fort Stewart law enforcement mission; the deployment and redeployment of two companies; and defense chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives force operations—needed to be complete in time for the 549th to plan and execute the training necessary for a successful mission. After much de-confliction and long-range planning, the 549th Military Police Company was allowed a 6-week period (from February through March 2014) for training. While the training time was instrumental in the success of the 549th, it occurred nearly too far in advance—5 months before NTC Rotation 14-09. Due to the summer permanent change of station wave, the company experienced a large turnover following the green cycle. However, based on the battalion operational tempo, this was a tactical risk the command needed to assume in order to maintain all assigned fiscal year 2014 missions. This is the same challenge facing all battalions, which is why commanders must select the right companies for the right missions.

## **Unit Selection and Training**

Military police battalion commanders are faced with the daunting decision of looking across their formations and selecting the right companies to represent the Military Police Corps at the CTC. After completing this process, the 385th Military Police Battalion discovered two major factors leading to the current shortfall at NTC:

- Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units are being improperly selected for NTC rotations as part of their annual training.
- Units are not properly preparing their leaders or Soldiers for the force-on-force fight.

During NTC rotation 14-09, there were two military police units at NTC—the 549th Military Police Company and the 94th Military Police Company, Vermont National Guard. Army National Guard and Army Reserve units should be paired with Regular Army units in order for the brigade commander to use the strengths and weaknesses of the military police assets against the brigade lines of effort. This pairing will also improve the reputation of military police among maneuver commanders.

## **Green Cycle: Training on Military Police Tactical Tasks**

Home station training must be designed to match the demands of NTC. Once the 549th Military Police Company was approved for an NTC rotation, the company immediately began to develop a training plan that would set the conditions for a successful rotation. Because the 549th was also tasked with the installation access control and law enforcement missions, a creative and intelligent plan was necessary. Locating and maximizing white space on the calendar are keys to meeting the NTC training requirements. The scheduled company training consisted of rotational platoon green cycles from January to February while the company was in red and amber cycles, a 6-week company training cycle from February through March, and Raider Focus (a month-long 1st ABCT battalion external evaluation [EXEVAL]) in May. The platoon green cycles were carved out by using every roadworthy military police Soldier, freeing 4 weeks per platoon to concentrate on individual and team training.

The 549th Military Police Company wanted green-cycle training to mirror the expeditionary mind-set and austere environment of NTC or other countries. That mind-set was kept at the forefront as the 549th conducted the mission-





**Soldiers from the 549th Military Police Company participate in an exercise at NTC.**

essential task list (METL) crosswalk and identified key tasks for team and squad certifications. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants were integrated throughout the entire planning process to ensure that the next generation of officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is familiar with how training is planned, conducted, and evaluated. After identifying the key and high-payoff tasks critical to success, the 549th validated its training plan based on the 1st ABCT military decisionmaking process and training strategy to ensure nesting. This process allowed the company to build a relationship with the battalions and brigade; it also allowed the identification of possible mission sets for the employment of the 549th and areas in which training efforts should be focused.

Training began at the individual and team levels. Platoons were each allowed 4 weeks during January and March to hone their standard operating procedures and combat systems. There were no hard sites in which to hide or forward operating bases in which to relax, so this was accomplished by teaching leaders and Soldiers how to fight out of their rucksacks. Leaders established patrol bases, and Soldiers lived out of their rucksacks, M1151 enhanced armament carriers, and fighting positions for weeks at a time. Squads and platoons were required to refamiliarize themselves with troop-leading procedures while simultaneously handling priorities of work, establishing mission execution matrices, and conducting life support operations.

Training during the company green cycle was designed to mirror the deployed environment. Platoon leaders worked with squad leaders to plan missions, but lieutenants owned and briefed the orders. Team leaders and platoon sergeants focused on preparing vehicles and equipment and accounting for logistical needs before and after each mission. Lieutenants were put through rigorous academic sessions, where they were trained on tasks such as passages of lines, straggler control, screen lines, breach operations, and platoon

attacks. This allowed the young leaders to dive into manuals and to learn. It also established them as leaders within their platoons because they were the subject matter experts in the areas of training and knowledge. Multiple training exercises without troops caused the platoon leaders to become confident in their abilities when talking with peers and commanders from maneuver units. The biggest challenge that the company faced was breaking leaders and Soldiers out of the Iraq/Afghanistan mind-set, teaching leaders how to fight a conventional force. Soldiers have not been required to consider air; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; anti-armor, or cyber threats in the last 10 years. Once leaders began to use lessons learned from previous combat experience and embrace the 3-D fight, they truly became lethal in force-on-force operations.

The key to a successful operation is establishing mission command and certifying the systems as soon as possible. The 549th Military Police Company established the tactical operations center (TOC) for all training events, forcing the operations NCOs to streamline the TOC itself. Units became too comfortable with large, cumbersome TOCs with unlimited connectivity in Iraq and Afghanistan. The key tasks assigned to operations personnel were jumping the TOC and reestablishing it within hours while also maintaining mission command throughout the process. This paid huge dividends for the company during reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and force-on-force operations at NTC. The 549th TOC was the first one established within the brigade, and it was already battle tracking training and life support needs before entering “The Box.” This continued throughout the rotation, allowing continuous, uninterrupted military police support throughout all phases of the operation.

### ***Raider Focus: Training in Support of Decisive Action***

In May 2014, 1st ABCT conducted the Raider Focus EXEVAL to prepare the brigade for the NTC rotation. The EXEVAL took place while the 549th Military Police Company was assigned the task of installation security. The company juggled the security commitments in order to free platoons to participate in the EXEVAL. The platoons inserted themselves into each of the maneuver battalion military decisionmaking processes and solidified themselves as enablers to the maneuver commanders. The platoon leaders attended military decisionmaking process sessions and linked up with maneuver platoon leaders and commanders.

It is difficult for junior military police leaders in military police battalions to find the time and opportunities to train with maneuver units in decisive-action scenarios. Doing so during Raider Focus allowed the squads and platoons of the 549th to familiarize themselves with how to support decisive-action engagements. Up to this point, the highest echelon of training conducted by the company was at the

company level. The EXEVAL provided the platoons with the opportunity to immerse themselves into maneuver battalion operations. Military police platoons were on forward objectives, providing local support by fire for dismounted infantry platoons as they maneuvered through villages without M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, which were too large and cumbersome for the situation. This instilled in the battalions and the brigade the importance of military police to the force-on-force fight. The training also gave military police Soldiers a chance to prove their battlefield worth to maneuver units before the NTC rotation.

### **Integration and Synchronization of Support**

Upon notification of NTC attendance, the 549th Military Police Company immediately connected with battalion and brigade representatives. The company developed key relationships with 1st ABCT, which was collocated at Fort Stewart. This ensured the timely flow of information. The brigade required massive amounts of information for planning and resourcing. The ability of the company executive officer to attend meetings and to ensure that the best interests of the company were represented while the brigade intent was met was invaluable. This resulted in the flawless deployment and redeployment of personnel and equipment.

The strong relationship between the 549th Military Police Company and its parent organization, 1st ABCT, 3d Infantry Division Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB), payed off at NTC. For example, during situational training exercise (STX) lanes at NTC, the military police were located in the remote Pioneer Valley region, about 40 kilometers from the BSTB. When issues regarding the resupply of the maneuver support units at Pioneer Valley arose, the 549th became the go-to unit for the BSTB. The BSTB knew that the company was capable, which allowed the company to continue to build trust and credibility with the BSTB and the brigade throughout the rotation.

The success of the 549th Military Police Company at NTC was due to the pushing of headquarters personnel into their respective battalion and brigade staff sections and integrating their capabilities into the unit. Making sure that the areas of “move, shoot, and communicate” were working smoothly was vital.

### **NTC Rotation**

BCT commanders and staffs generally have a vague idea about how to use military police companies before they deploy to NTC. However, once at NTC, BCT commanders want military police to perform a wide variety of missions. No one understands military police capabilities better than a military police unit. The commander of the 549th Military Police Company developed a capabilities briefing to ensure that the parent unit knew what capabilities a combat support military police company could bring to the fight. The briefing described the types of mission sets that the company could conduct to best support the BCT commander’s vision. Providing the BCT commander with a capabilities briefing

before departing for NTC allowed the company to initiate dialogue and establish credibility to ensure the relevance of military police on the battlefield.

Although preparation and training for NTC span several months, the actual training at NTC lasts only 14 days. NTC preparation, deployment, and redeployment also constitute training, but it is imperative that the unit make the most of each of those 14 actual NTC training days. Under the current NTC rotation structure, the first 6 days of training are devoted to STX lanes, which are influenced by the unit commander’s training objectives and the observer-controllers. During STX lanes, military police units have the ability to refine their battle drills in preparation for force-on-force fights. Some of the most valuable military police-specific training occurs during STX lanes due to the fact that commanders and observer-controllers are working hand in hand to improve the Regiment. Providing an honest unit assessment and identifying its shortcomings before an NTC rotation is the key to correcting deficiencies and enjoying success during force-on-force fights.

### **The Way Ahead**

As the Military Police Corps moves forward, we must synchronize the way in which maneuver commanders will be supported—and the method of support must be consistent across the Regiment. Individual military police companies should not be aligned with individual BCTs. Although BCTs would like to have their own military police companies, military police battalions cannot sustain that arrangement. To ensure that the best and brightest of the Military Police Corps are there to support the BCT commander during career-defining exercises, military police battalion commanders must be able to select which companies attend CTC rotations. This will ensure that brigade commanders can trust that the Military Police Corps is there to support them as they move through the hierarchy of the Army. For the future of the Military Police Corps, the best military police companies must support maneuver brigades whenever necessary.



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# SWAT SWAPPING

By Captain Lisa H. Beum

In the distance, he hears a man shout, "Officer down!" Immediately, he is triggered into action. His heart pumps faster, adrenaline kicks in, and muscle memory takes over as he returns fire and runs to the officer's aid. Once the commotion is over, an instructor provides feedback on his ability to complete all requirements with skill, precision, and timeliness.

The annual North Carolina Tactical Officers Association Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Competition, held at the North Carolina Justice Academy in Salemburg, North Carolina, tests SWAT teams on their tactical proficiency and mental toughness over a 4-day period.

According to Department of the Army police lieutenant, Blair Rockwell, the officer in charge of the Fort Bragg Special Reaction Team (SRT), 16th Military Police Brigade,



the competition brings SWAT teams together to compete against each other for the top spot. It is an opportunity to foster fellowship and exchange tactics and ideas among the teams. The 16th Military Police Brigade was the only team with military members at the competition.

The SRT, established in 1976, is a specialized law enforcement team designed to decisively approach high-risk incidents on military installations with discipline and precision. This year, the SRT competed for the fourth time against 12 other teams, taking second place for the third year in a row.

Competitions like these afford police officers a chance to build good relationships with one another and develop interoperability that they normally would not experience on national and international levels. Corporal Lewis Sargeant, 156th Provost Company, Royal Military Police, British Army, spent an afternoon watching the SWAT competition with his comrades. They compared similarities and differences in techniques so that they might be able to take lessons learned and incorporate them into their







**Soldiers participate in various events during the annual North Carolina Tactical Officers Association SWAT competition.**



own training programs. Sargeant believes that training with other countries is beneficial—enabling possible future joint operations to work more fluently.

On several occasions, the SRT has hosted SWAT team training on Fort Bragg, where civilian teams use resources and facilities that they would otherwise be unable to access. The teams train together, and they observe and exchange tactics to improve their skills.

“We’re a brotherhood,” said Staff Sergeant Brandon Wolf, SRT noncommissioned officer-in-charge, as he described what he liked most about the SRT. “We are on call 24/7, 365 days a year, so we don’t train for *if* it happens. We train for *when* it happens. The SRT is not a first responder. We are the last responder.”

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# Introduction of Forensic Evidence Into the National Security Court of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

*By Lieutenant Colonel George B. Brown III, Ph.D.*

**D**uring Operation Desert Storm in 1991, if your combat vehicle set off a mine, no one thought to collect evidence from the event. In fact, the collection of evidence was one of the furthest things from my mind at the time. Under the rules of war, those fighting for their country have the authority to kill the enemy. But at the conclusion of any official war, killing the enemy is no longer authorized; therefore, any killings or attempted killings are, in essence, crimes.

After major Operation Iraqi Freedom combat operations ended in May 2003, the U.S. military sent teams to Iraq to improve methods for countering and defeating improvised explosive devices. During this process, it was discovered that fingerprints on and in improvised explosive devices could be identified. Although initially unrelated, fingerprints were being collected digitally throughout Iraq to document prisoners and employment and for general identification. Linking these two programs resulted in the birth of expeditionary forensics.<sup>1</sup>

Expeditionary forensics refers to the use of forensics to establish facts that the combatant commander can use to determine sources of insurgent arms, ammunition, and explosives; drive intelligence analysis and subsequent targeting for combat operations; change force protection measures; identify human remains; and prosecute detainees in a court of law. Intelligence operations benefit from the rapid forensic exploitation of information, items, and sensitive sites. This enables U.S. and coalition forces to eliminate threats and to target, capture, kill, or prosecute enemies. Overseas contingency operations and associated military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced an operational need to expand the use of forensics beyond historical judicial, intelligence, and medical capabilities.

The first battlefield forensics laboratory was an enterprise spearheaded by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service to support the U.S. Marine Corps in Al Anbar Province, Iraq. The very first Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility (JEFF) was stood up during Operation Iraqi Freedom near Fallujah, Iraq, in March 2006. The JEFF program in Afghanistan was originally requested in July 2009. Each JEFF had a U.S. Army military police major; a sergeant first class; and a JEFF director, who was a senior major or lieutenant colonel. The manning of the JEFF examiners was done by U.S. contractors under a \$175,000,000 contract.<sup>2</sup>

In early 2011, I was 3 years removed from a 15-month combat deployment in Iraq and overdue for another deployment. (The Army used a “two for one” recovery time, which equated to having 2 months of recovery time for each month of deployment.) I volunteered and was selected for an assignment with the JEFF. I requested this mission because a colleague had recently returned from a similar assignment and had expressed a fondness for the unique challenges and rewards associated with this relatively new program.

When I first arrived in Afghanistan in early June 2011, I was instantly impressed with the highly technical capabilities of the three JEFFs under my charge and with the ability of the military to effectively collect evidence and track down and capture insurgents. Although the JEFFs were located throughout Afghanistan, the primary office was located in Bagram, next to the main confinement facility, which was operated by the U.S. military and the Afghan courts where the prisoners from the confinement facility were tried. Considering the effort, money, and lives expended in capturing insurgents using forensics, I was surprised at how little forensic evidence was being used in the Afghan court system. I discovered that after the 2001 Bonn Agreement, the Afghan judicial system transitioned to the British adversarial system.<sup>3</sup> This system is quite different from the inquisitorial system historically used. In the adversarial system, the accused benefits from an assumption of innocence and has the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present during questioning. The adversarial system naturally gravitates toward the use of forensic evidence since the prosecutor must prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused has the right to decline taking the stand.

With the demonstrated success of the initial JEFF forensic training program came the idea of a national forensic academy to expand the program to regions across Afghanistan. Funding for the trainers and the new building was acquired through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and equipment was harvested from the mission being drawn down in Iraq. The new Afghan Criminal Techniques Academy (ACTA) and Laboratory was located in the Justice Center in Parwan, at the far corner of Bagram Air Base. This location was already supported with Afghanistan logistics, and it is within meters of the Afghan national courts and judges. The ACTA opened for the training of Afghan forensic examiners in November 2011. In conjunction with the


Ministry of Interior and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization training mission, the academy and laboratory provide training and mentorship and process evidence for the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior Criminal Techniques Directorate in support of Afghanistan's national justice sector strategy.

Initially, ACTA instructors were from the United States; however, the long-range plan called for Afghan trainees to work as assistant instructors and eventually take the lead in instruction. During the first ACTA session, 16 Afghan National Police students were trained for new regional and national forensic laboratories. The training is conducted 6 days a week for 2 months and covers the disciplines of latent prints, firearms and tool marks, forensic photography, and document and digital exploitation. A mentorship program was also arranged so that the support of the Afghan forensic examiners could continue after graduation from the ACTA. The ACTA is also capable of processing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and training students in that area. The initial training was scheduled for 2 years, and four Afghans, all with science-based Ph.Ds., were chosen as the first DNA students.

The primary missions of the ACTA program include building, equipping, and supplying Afghan forensic facilities; training and mentoring examiners for Afghan regional forensic laboratories and the Afghan central laboratory; and developing Afghan forensic instructors for the ACTA. These missions provided a great opportunity to build a path to reliable and enduring Afghan forensics capabilities. Forensic evidence in the courtroom can represent the scientific truth regardless of the sex, age, or social status of the defendant. Forensics can be used to identify the guilty and, perhaps more importantly, to exonerate the innocent and serve as a deterrent to potential criminals.

Before 2010, many Afghan judges considered forensic evidence to be voodoo magic. Forensic science can be confusing and difficult, making it a complicated subject to present to an audience with no background in the science.<sup>4</sup> It was expected that the judges' unfamiliarity with forensic evidence would tremendously impact the comprehension. The solution for overcoming the confusion associated with forensic evidence was educating Afghan experts on how to clearly express technical scientific information to presiding judges. In addition, the integration of the science to the new Afghan legal system needed to be addressed.

The training of Afghan forensic examiners and professionals in the Afghan justice system resulted in a dramatic turn in the use of forensic evidence at the Justice Center in Parwan. When establishing training for Afghan judges, a



**Evidence collection room**

great deal of care was taken to ensure that the program was led by Afghans, demonstrations were performed by Afghans, and the training was conducted in or near the ACTA (which was advertised as a fully functioning forensic facility). The Afghan forensic examiners started each training period with quotes from the Koran. For example, the Koran (75:4) relates a story in which Allah brings a man back to life after death using just the unique tip of the man's finger.

In the United States, scientific evidence generally depends on the judge's determination of the type of forensic evidence used and on the expert's qualifications. These standards are not valid in Afghanistan because there has been little historical use of forensic evidence in the legal system.<sup>5</sup> There, forensic evidence is typically fully admitted or fully excluded based on the training, experience, and opinion of the Afghan judge. Some Afghan judges may be comfortable with the science of forensic evidence and accept it without prejudice; others are frustrated with the science and refuse to accept it altogether.<sup>6</sup> Both extremes need to be addressed as the educational process of introducing forensic evidence to the entire country of Afghanistan continues. Although the initial findings are positive, long-term research conducted over the next several years and decades will provide a better idea about the overall success of the program and its effect on the national rule of law.

Afghan judges in the Parwan District are now demanding forensic evidence. Results of logistic regression analysis, with verdict as the criterion, indicate that, when forensic evidence is presented, a conviction is more than twice as likely and sentences are typically much longer compared to cases without forensic evidence. It is clear that the introduction





**DNA training room**

and use of forensic evidence is making an impact. The key point is that the terrorists whom Soldiers and police risk their lives to detain are being placed behind bars and kept there because of forensic evidence. In a region that often measures success in centuries, this is nothing short of remarkable.

Data from the research included adult and juvenile defendants; exact ages were not recorded by the Afghan courts. Although not directly connected to forensic evidence, a comparison of these two groups seemed logical. The results were interesting. Juveniles were charged the same as adults for most common articles—Article 19, Membership in Terrorist Organization; Article 14, Use of Explosives and Other Lethal Devices. In fact, there was only one juvenile case in which another article was considered. The processed data indicated that adults were nearly three times more likely to be convicted than juveniles, and cases involving adults resulted in sentences twice as long as those involving juveniles. In a proper rule of law system, one would expect all groups to be treated equally. This research indicated an inequality between adult defendants and juvenile defendants that cannot be clearly explained. It could be surmised that this inequality is a result of regional cultural beliefs that juveniles are not fully responsible agents and, therefore, should be treated with leniency. Further research would be required to validate this hypothesis.

The enduring success of the forensic evidence program in Afghanistan is uncertain at best. As with any democratic law enforcement system, the success lies in the trust of the population. If 5 percent of the processed forensic evidence from the new Afghan forensic laboratory is unreliable, then the percentage might as well be 100. As in the United

States, the deplorable actions of just one or two people in a law enforcement agency can bring down the reputation of a whole department. All possible precautions should be taken to avoid this risk. With this program in its infancy, minor errors can become fatal. The goal of the program is not just to introduce forensics to Afghanistan; it is to prevail with enduring and dependable capabilities. This is the area where forensic mentors are required.

A team of forensic specialists designs and guides programs that put foreign laboratories on the path to international accreditation under standards issued by the International Organization for Standardization. This helps ensure the reliability and compatibility of forensic evidence. Achieving international accreditation is a long process that requires solid management skills (such as strategic planning, budgeting, and the administration of a professional quality assurance program). The requirement includes senior forensic advisors who are experienced laboratory managers. They mentor Afghan examiners in all aspects of laboratory management and through all phases of the accreditation process. The quality and reliability of Afghan examiners are the keys to spreading the forensic training to the regional Afghan judges.

### **Recommendations**

With the proper introduction and training, forensic evidence was accepted in one small district in Afghanistan. The use of forensic evidence significantly affected all major outcome and criterion variables. Therefore, justice rule of law was improved and the specific forensics program was a success.

It may be inferred that because the effort to introduce forensic evidence to support the creation of a new legal ethic in the country was supported, this project may serve as a model for other courts throughout Afghanistan. The result may be the development of a modern, consistently applied system of scientific forensics that may be duplicated in other districts across postconflict Afghanistan to improve security in Afghanistan and other countries in the Middle East with developing rule of law judicial systems. Around the world, struggling rule of law systems (Ethiopia, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, Nigeria, Venezuela)


may see some advantages in the approach taken in this district in Afghanistan.

However, the acceptance of the forensic evidence may be to a fault. Although existing testimony may be sufficient to sustain a conviction, Afghan judges may be disappointed when forensic evidence is not presented at trial. Therefore, judges may be more likely to acquit the defendant when little or no scientific evidence is presented. In one case, a subject was apprehended by U.S. Soldiers during a firefight. Several Soldiers observed the subject shooting at them. The subject was captured due to injuries he received during return fire. The witnesses never lost sight of his actions leading up to his arrest. During the trial, prosecutors explained why there was no forensic evidence; however, the Afghan judges did not understand why forensic evidence was not collected, processed, and presented. Additional research should be conducted to understand this potentially unintended result of introducing forensics to Afghan judges.

These cases came from the Afghan Parwan District courts in Afghanistan. There are other court systems in Afghanistan; it is possible that there are regional differences in how the introduction of forensic evidence affects verdicts and sentence length. Therefore, the extent to which these results apply across the entire country of Afghanistan is uncertain. In addition, although cases rising to the level of the specific charges are typically resolved in the district court system in Afghanistan, this may not be the case in all instances; therefore, the extent to which the results from this study could be extrapolated to court cases at other levels in Afghanistan is unknown. In addition, only cases from Afghanistan were examined; therefore, the extent to which the results apply to court cases in other countries is uncertain. However, the success of this program indicates that the effort to introduce forensic evidence in judicial systems that previously did not use forensic evidence will likely improve the rule of law within the region.

The full value of the introduction of forensic evidence to the Afghanistan judicial system may still be unknown. However, a method that can be used to introduce forensics in Afghanistan has been identified and proof of relatively quick judicial acceptance has been gathered. Future success in introducing forensics in Afghanistan may advance the process of addressing crimes from incident to final disposition by improving forensic evidence collection by the police, developing reliable databases of forensic and biometric data, using trained examiners, improving processing, and educating members of the judicial system. This new rule of law foundation is a significant improvement from the old Afghan legal system where guilt and innocence were sometimes based on social standing verses actual evidence. Trust in the national rule of law may also result in improvements in crime reporting by average citizens and the willingness of witnesses to testify. Expanding this program is warranted; however, further studies to monitor progress are recommend to determine if the positive momentum can be maintained.

## Conclusion

The use of forensic evidence for criminal cases is relatively unique to many developing countries, including Afghanistan. Because of Afghanistan's historical use of a judicial system based almost entirely on testimonial evidence, it is essential for Afghan judges and prosecutors to learn and accept the use of forensics in conjunction with testimony. The ability of the people to trust the mechanisms of the rule of law to resolve conflicts in an organized and fair manner, without resorting to hostility and vigilantism, is essential in reducing the lingering tension among people who harbor significant, often historical, grievances. Forensic evidence does not favor one group over another; therefore, previously marginalized groups (women, youth, minorities, the poor) should see a more equal and fair judicial system. Accepting forensic evidence to secure convictions or acquittals may support a more just rule of law for all of Afghanistan. 

### Endnotes:

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# PROTECTING THE FORCE IN LIBERIA IN LIBERIA

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian D. Heverly, Captain Jimmy Hannabass,  
and Master Sergeant Lonnie J. Norris

In late September 2014, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) learned of its next rendezvous with destiny. This time it would not be in the mountains of Afghanistan with violent extremists or improvised explosive device-planting terrorists lurking in the streets of Fallujah. This mission would be in western Africa, conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations to counter the Ebola virus. An appeal from Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to President Barack Obama led to the rapid selection and deployment of the 101st Airborne Division to lead Joint Forces Command–United Assistance (JFC-UA) in direct support of the lead federal agency, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Once again, the Military Police Corps rapidly responded to *Assist*, *Protect*, and *Defend* outside of our national borders in support of our Nation's defense.

A task force of 2,600 Department of Defense (DOD) personnel faced new challenges in an expeditionary deployment to build Ebola treatment units, train health care workers, and establish DOD laboratories to test blood samples. The task force also sustained those efforts, provided overarching mission command, and shared their expertise with international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Upon completion of those key tasks, the JFC-UA transitioned those responsibilities and capabilities to USAID, host nation agencies, United Nations-supported agencies, and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations.

Major General Gary Volesky, commander of JFC-UA and the 101st Airborne Division, stated that his No. 1 priority was force protection/force health protection. To the 194th Military Police Company, 716th Military Police Battalion, deployed in support of the 101st Airborne Division, this meant that an entirely different set of tactics, techniques, procedures, and skill sets were required in the permissive environment than those honed during the past 13 years of rotating between combat and garrison law enforcement missions.

This article examines how the humanitarian assistance mission and the realities on the ground forced the military police to tailor their interaction with the Liberian National Police (LNP). It illustrates how a different type of threat resulted in an initially uncomfortable force protection posture. It discusses special training required for the execution of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) certification of re-deploying personnel and equipment. And finally, it explains

how the integration of different division staff sections created a force protection/force health protection team that used assessments as a tool for commanders to keep their formations safe from more than just external physical threats.

Before deployment, the task force studied lessons learned from Operation Unified Response, which was undertaken in the aftermath of the earthquake that devastated Haiti in 2010. While those lessons provided an overarching direction and tactics, techniques, and procedures for working with other governmental agencies, there were many differences that reduced their usefulness with regard to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Liberia. The DOD was the lead federal agency in Haiti; the Army set priorities and determined policy. In Liberia, the DOD operated in support of USAID and its Disaster Assistance Relief Team. The USAID, in coordination with the U.S. ambassador, set priorities and the overall way ahead for all U.S. government agency efforts. Additionally, more than 500,000 people were killed or wounded during the earthquake in Haiti, and 1.5 million people were displaced.<sup>1</sup> In Liberia, which has a population of just 4 million, the Ebola virus infected more than 8,400 and killed more than 3,600 since the first case in December of 2013.<sup>2</sup> So while the physical devastation was more apparent in the case of Haiti, the sense of urgency and desperation was similar. It was estimated that 1.4 million people could be infected with the Ebola virus by January 2015 and that Liberia could cease to exist as a nation.<sup>3</sup> The Haitian government, overwhelmed by the casualties and collapsed infrastructure, was unable to care for its people or organize a response. In contrast, the Liberian government remained in overall control of the response, with the Centers for Disease Control, USAID, and other nongovernmental organizations working through a National Ebola Operations Center to execute the bulk of the activities. The Armed Forces of Liberia assisted in the completion of four Ebola treatment units, and the LNP maintained order through a national election in December 2014. These differences resulted in a different environment than that of Haiti. The JFC-UA needed to understand that to immediately and successfully conduct operations.

The LNP is a professional police force capable of executing its duties and responsibilities. While not a completely modern police force, it does receive support and training from the U.S. embassy and the United Nations police. The LNP runs a national training academy that produces 400 police officers per class, and the LNP leaders are internationally



trained. They continue to build their profession with modern training and techniques, using mainly analog equipment. The LNP continually conducts effective community policing and traffic control operations. The administrative record keeping is hand-written, but very effective. The LNP—including specialized riot, special weapons and tactics, and protection units—receives direct support from the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of State.

For day-to-day support during the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, the LNP (located adjacent to DOD nodes) quickly responded to requests for assistance with everything from attempted thefts to convoy escorts. It was also key in communicating with the local populace as decisions were made about Ebola treatment units and mobile laboratory locations. Military police deployed as the only security force for JFC-UA. With little information available before the rapid deployment, the military police quickly identified and built relationships with local leaders. Providing basic policing classes and technical expertise to the LNP was not needed; in fact, host nation security force training is severely limited by laws and regulations in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. Overall, the LNP far exceeded expectations based on previous deployment engagements with host nation police. It was more than adequate to counter criminal threats.

Choosing military police as the JFC-UA security force provided the commander with a level of flexibility that no other force is trained or equipped to provide. Criminal threats dominated the threat assessments that were available before the deployment and those that were quickly conducted upon arrival. The actual environment was far different from previous combat deployments, allowing the JFC-UA to reduce the force protection level and adjust to some tactics, techniques, and procedures that were not initially comfortable for the formation. Military police who were accustomed to carrying weapons in full kit when deployed had to learn to be effective and comfortable with more traditional law enforcement tools in a deployed environment.

There were different circumstances for each individual node that the DOD occupied. Across five nodes, security forces were augmented by personnel from the United Nations, host nation security forces, and airport security. It

was important not to militarize nodes or disrupt patterns of life developed by the local population before the JFC-UA arrived. One node had a well as a source of drinking water, and another node had a bypass route to a market. As the JFC-UA deployed mobile laboratories to remote locations (collocating with hospitals, other smaller clinics, and even a house in the middle of a village), small teams of military police provided small-unit or site security for each one, working closely with the local LNP. Host nation forces played a large role and took greater responsibility for the security of DOD personnel; at the Barclay National Training Center, JFC-UA Headquarters, the Armed Forces of Liberia provided external security. The JFC-UA provided assistance in personnel accountability for DOD personnel. Liberian forces took great pride in providing security and increased their own force protection posture due to our presence. This kept the force from direct contact with the population (see Figure 1).




Figure 1.

The military police were assigned the additional mission of executing the USDA certification of redeploying personnel and equipment—a task that required training and facilities that differed from those of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol inspections. Although this mission easily falls within military police competencies, it had not been largely executed in the last 13 years. The military police received certifications from U.S. European Command instructors. This mission received great emphasis and scrutiny due to the equipment that was returning after use in combating the Ebola virus outbreak. Because of the lack of sterile areas, the vehicles were cleaned continuously before vessel movement—right up to the point of loading. For similar reasons, container contents were inspected and sealed weeks before movement

to the seaport of embarkation. Military police developed methods of tracking and accountability, mitigating the risk of tampering and ensuring that only equipment meeting USDA standards was shipped back to the United States. The lack of a Customs and Border Patrol-approved facility prevented personnel preclearance to applicable standards, so JFC-UA General Order 1 and USDA standards were used to mitigate the transport of contraband to home station.


At the JFC-UA level, the division provost marshal's office conducted doctrinal tasks (such as oversight for force protection), working closely with a supporting criminal investigation division team, area security, and customs support. The division provost marshal's office interacted and coordinated closely with the LNP and liaised with the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Section of the U.S. Department of State. The division provost marshal's office established the JFC-UA quick-reaction force with the 194th Military Police Company. Once established, the joint operations officer took over employment authority of the quick-reaction force, and the JFC-UA headquarters and headquarters battalion provided daily supervision. The provost marshal's office combined with the division chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear section and provided planning, oversight, and direction to the protection cell that grew to become the force protection/force health protection cell. The cell included division surgeon, engineer, chaplain, behavioral health, equal opportunity, Sexual Harassment and Prevention Response Program, safety, staff judge advocate, and operations security personnel, led by the division provost marshal.

This expanded cell was created based on Major General Volesky's No. 1 priority of force protection/force health protection. His intent was that no member of the JFC-UA become sick with malaria, dengue fever, typhoid or, more importantly, the Ebola virus or fall victim to internal threats, safety issues, discrimination, or sexual assault. The first task was to create a small team from the cell and conduct initial assessments based on preliminary U.S. Army Africa surveys. This team consisted of a military police Soldier who focused on antiterrorism/force protection; an engineer who looked at the physical layout of nodes and provided subject matter expert guidance on force protection-related construction; a division safety officer who ensured hazards of loss of life, limb, or eyesight were mitigated; and a preventive medical officer who addressed vector, water, and food-borne vulnerabilities.

This team conducted initial assessments of each node, sharing its findings and recommendations with the node leadership and tracking the progress made against each vulnerability or issue. Joint intelligence staff cell members were a nontraditional addition to the team. The use of Naval Criminal Investigative Service agents proved invaluable in staying in contact with local LNP and communicating information on the local operational environment. When it was time to reassess the sites, the scope of the assessment team grew to encompass other internal threats to the force that chaplain, equal opportunity, Sexual Harassment and Prevention Response Program, operations security, and staff

judge advocate representatives could address. These additional staff sections were extremely valuable in allowing commanders to tackle Soldier concerns before they became momentum-sapping problems.

Military police played a significant role in keeping the JFC-UA Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen safe in a very unfamiliar environment. The JFC-UA collective protection mission was successful not only because of the use of key lessons learned, but also due to the adaptability of the military police Soldier and supporting Soldiers within our Corps. This was evident while executing small-team security operations for mobile army laboratories and DOD Ebola training teams, interacting with the LNP, executing missions as the JFC-UA quick-reaction force, and conducting USDA inspections of redeploying equipment. The military police of the 194th Military Police Company and JFC-UA would not have been successful without the cooperation of numerous Liberian law enforcement agencies (LNP, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, National Security Agency, Liberian Drug Enforcement Agency, and Armed Forces of Liberia). These agencies proved to be willing and extremely capable allies in keeping the JFC-UA safe throughout the country.

The 194th Military Police Company proved as adaptable and flexible countering the criminal element in the permissive environment as they have been against violent extremists during the past 13 years of combat deployments. 

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# From a Drug Reaction Team to a Drug Suppression Team

## Introducing Nontraditional Proactive Measures

*By Captain Stephen M. Moore, Chief Warrant Officer Two Curtis E. Sparling,  
and Chief Warrant Officer Two Jennifer M. Acevedo*

*“Nothing can be more hurtful to the Service, than the neglect of discipline; for that discipline, more than numbers, gives one army the superiority over another.”*

—George Washington<sup>1</sup>

Since its inception, Soldiers in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps have been charged with enforcing discipline in the ranks to safeguard the fighting force for senior mission commanders. Enforcement in the past focused on the repression of marauding and looting of private property, the preservation of order, and the suppression of gambling houses and other establishments disruptive to discipline. Although the Army has evolved during the past 239 years, the enforcement of Soldier discipline has remained a significant focus of the Military Police Corps. Illicit and prescription drugs are emerging threats to Soldier discipline today. According to a National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence report, the number of troops diagnosed with substance abuse disorders each year spiked 50 percent (to nearly 40,000 Soldiers) from 2005 to 2009. Hospitalizations for substance abuse increased from 100 Soldiers per month in 2003 to more than 250 per month in 2009.<sup>2</sup>

As the increase in drug abuse negatively affects Soldier discipline, reductions in the Department of Defense budget and the military force structure severely compound the problem. Ironically, the smallest component of the Military Police Corps—the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly referred to as CID)—is charged with suppressing this dramatic increase in drug abuse. Meeting this mission with finite assets can test the mettle of an organization, especially as political pressure simultaneously increases the focus and frequency of sexual assault investigations. However, leaders at the CID office, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington, (specifically, the assistant special agent in charge and the chief of the drug suppression team [DST]), understand that nontraditional, proactive measures are needed to suppress drug activity within the JBLM military community. Without an understanding of the importance of supporting senior mission commanders and fostering positive relationships, the DST would not get the additional manpower needed and would have to operate in a reactive, rather than proactive mode.

During 2013, the JBLM CID office conducted more than 879 felony investigations, including investigations of homicides, fraud, child abuse, narcotics, rape, and other sexual assaults. Although nearly 78 percent of those investigations were drug-related, only seven of the 45 CID Soldiers (15 percent) conducted drug investigations. Due to the current resizing of the Army, CID offices are filled to only 80 percent of their authorizations, further exacerbating the workload disparity.

The greatest challenge to the manpower structure of the JBLM CID office comes from a revision of Army Regulation 600-85, *The Army Substance Abuse Program*,<sup>3</sup> which requires CID to investigate all drug-related offenses. This resulted in a 73-percent increase in the CID drug-related investigations. Furthermore, as state officials legalize the recreational use of marijuana, the accessibility of drugs prohibited by the Department of Defense and the number of drug-related investigations will increase. The question becomes: How does CID evolve to handle the rapidly increasing workload amid the decreasing Army force structure?

Adopting techniques employed by psychological operations Soldiers, CID leaders appealed to the objective reasoning of the JBLM commanders who would determine the acquisition of additional CID assets. Over 3 months, the leaders tasked the agency criminal intelligence analyst to compile a report that compared statistics from the preceding year to the current year, showed the planned locations of recreational marijuana dispensaries, and compared drug use across the installation brigade combat teams. The statistics showed how CID proactively suppressed drug use across the installation before the revision to the Army regulation and how it could address future drug threats if the office were augmented with additional resources. This “engagement package” of information was delivered during every meeting in which senior mission commanders were present.

At the beginning of fiscal year 2014, the JBLM CID office received 19 additional military police. These Soldiers were permanently assigned to CID rather than being temporarily



attached, which is the traditional means of augmenting CID offices. The common challenge with attached Soldiers is that by the time they develop into an effective team, their temporary attachment expires. As a result, many CID offices struggle with the certification process and are unable to devote prolonged time to quality training. Therefore, the permanent assignment of new Soldiers enabled the JBLM CID office to invest in a team that could be molded and effectively used to suppress drug activity in support of commanders.

Following their assignment to CID, the Soldiers underwent an extensive 8-week, battalion-approved certification in which they were trained to conduct investigations, use contingency limitation funds (money used for emergency and unusual expenses incurred during investigations and crime prevention), and execute covert drug suppression operations. Although the time requirement for the certification process is taxing, the long-term benefits have outweighed the short-term discomfort. One benefit is the creation of depth within the team. In the traditional model of limited time and personnel, DSTs could be crippled by reassignments, mandatory career-enhancing training, or routine and emergency leave. Due to the newly robust size of the JBLM DST, the temporary loss of a few Soldiers is not a catastrophic event. However, the most rewarding benefit of the increased size of the team is the ability to task-organize members into subteams. Within the larger DST, four smaller subteams are each aligned to separate brigade combat teams and are capable of autonomously conducting overt and covert drug suppression operations. This alignment not only provides senior mission commanders with a single point of contact for drug suppression activity within their units; it also provides the right allocation for proactive operations and results.

The JBLM CID office shifted from a reactive to a proactive approach when the DST certification was complete. In traditional CID practice, proactive efforts are measured by the quantity of target analysis files developed, the amount of contingency limitation funds expended, and the quantity of controlled drugs seized from distributors. The key to the proactive focus is the development of target analysis files (known as target packets in the operational Army). The data in three objective areas before and after the addition of personnel plainly shows the effectiveness of the DST. In all of calendar year 2013, the team developed 35 target analysis files, expended \$2,345 in contingency limitation funds, and seized 1,693 dosage units<sup>4</sup> of controlled substances. In contrast, during just the third quarter of calendar year 2014, the DST developed 30 target analysis files, expended \$13,518 in contingency limitation funds, and seized 14,989 dosage units of controlled substances. In just one quarter, the enhanced DST increased its proactive effectiveness by nearly 476 percent.

In conclusion, to emulate the success of the only DST rated as exceptional, the understanding of proactive operations must be redefined. Greater emphasis on improving communication and relationships with senior mission commanders is the key to gaining additional personnel, especially in a time of dwindling resources. By appealing to the objective

reasoning of senior mission commanders, through intelligence-driven, statistically-supported engagements, DST elements shape their decisive operations. Failure to adopt this concept will hinder the ability of DSTs to move beyond the burdensome administrative requirements of drug-related cases and address them with traditional proactive measures.

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<sup>3</sup>Army Regulation 600-85, *The Army Substance Abuse Program*, 28 December 2012.

<sup>4</sup>This use of dosage units refers to pills, ounces, grams, or milliliters of illegal substances seized.


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# ANTITERRORISM TIPS FOR SMALL-UNIT DEPLOYMENTS— A SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVE

*By Captain Patrick D. Snyder (Retired)*

**I**n small-unit deployments, the lives of our most precious assets—the Soldiers under our command—are at risk. To protect them, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has, over the years, developed a robust antiterrorism program for austere, permissive, and semipermissive operational environments. The antiterrorism processes, procedures, equipment, and training that are already in place to protect Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can also be used to protect general-purpose units that may be deployed to the same types of operational environments.

As the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, small-unit deployments will become more frequent. Large military formations, such as brigades and divisions, have an inherent level of protection and survival ability based on their size. Smaller units—such as independently operating teams, detachments, and companies—do not enjoy this advantage. The situation becomes even more difficult when they operate in remote locations without any other U.S. armed forces to provide support or reinforcement. USASOC units face this protection and survival challenge in well over 90 percent of their deployments.

***“Often, ARSOF Soldiers are the only U.S. military presence in the country, working with and through partner nations to support mutual goals and objectives to counter threats and achieve regional peace and stability.”***

On a typical day, USASOC executes 130 missions in 65 countries with small teams and detachments. Often, ARSOF Soldiers are the only U.S. military presence in the country, working with and through partner nations to support mutual goals and objectives to counter threats and achieve regional peace and stability. The protection and antiterrorism challenges involved in the small-unit, worldwide mission environment require a significant staff support structure and access to diverse, nonstandard training and specialized equipment. The antiterrorism program at USASOC is based on more than 50 years of experience and is kept current by using lessons learned collected from the

teams and detachments. As a consequence, ARSOF has developed practices and procedures that will be valuable to other organizations as deployments continue to morph into smaller operations in more diverse locations.

The antiterrorism staff support for deploying teams begins at USASOC Headquarters, where the Soldier or civilian responsible for issuing the deployment order has graduated from the Antiterrorism Officer Basic Course—Level II. This ensures that appropriate antiterrorism guidance is factored into every phase of the operation and included in all deployment orders. At each level of command—brigade, regiment, and group—there is a full-time Soldier or civilian. This allows the supporting antiterrorism officer (ATO) to develop the particular expertise to fully support the deploying teams. The ATO develops intimate knowledge of the unit area of responsibility, including contacts in the theater special operations commands and on various U.S. embassy staffs. This facilitates gathering threat information and tailoring predeployment training.

The requirement for the full-time ATO is driven by the operational tempo. Regardless of size, every time a unit is deployed, it has to complete the same administrative actions. The task set is the same when deploying groups of four, 12, or 500 Soldiers. ARSOF battalions routinely deploy multiple teams to various countries to conduct specialized missions on separate schedules. There, they will encounter threats unique to those particular operational environments. The workload generated by this deployment schedule would quickly overwhelm a single noncommissioned officer on additional duty orders as the ATO—which is the normal practice for general-purpose forces.

One particularly valuable, but often overlooked, resource is open-source information—current events information from local news media. Classified information about terrorist threats is important; however, the threats that are more relevant to a deploying team may include criminals, civil unrest, or disruptions of the local infrastructure. A riot caused by a clash between striking workers and police can be as deadly as a terrorist bomb. USASOC subscribes to a commercial Web-based service; international, no-cost news services; and U.S. government sources to provide up-to-the-minute information to the units.<sup>1, 2, 3</sup> Based on our experience, the



news services have rapid reporting, but may lack accuracy. Commercial services are usually updated within 24 hours, and the accuracy of their reports is very good. The U.S. government services are the most accurate; however, it can take 5 to 7 days for a significant event to be posted on the government sites. Many low-profile local events will make it to the news and commercial services, but not be posted on the government sites.

According to a USASOC directive, every deploying unit, regardless of size, has an ATO Basic Course–Level II ATO. During the predeployment site survey, the ATO conducts multiple force protection assessments. There is an assessment for every location where the unit will reside or train in the partner nation, all primary and alternate routes to and from the mission locations, and the routes and any lay-over locations between the home station and the partner nation. During these deployments, the unit is totally dependent on the partner nation for support and reinforcement. Consequently, an integral factor in these assessments is the ability of the partner nation to provide security for ARSOF Soldiers.


As a force protection standard, all ARSOF teams deploy with their weapons and ammunition. Rules of engagement are coordinated between the partner nation and the U.S. ambassador before the deployment and are part of the predeployment training.

Deploying ARSOF units must meet all of the Army and theater commander predeployment training requirements. In addition, units must be trained to address potential vulnerabilities that were identified through mission analysis or by the predeployment site survey team. To meet many of these training requirements, the unit must rely on internal expertise or nonstandard contracted training. Nonstandard training includes military mobile force protection; surveillance, countersurveillance, and detection; evasive driving skills; and protection of high-risk personnel—plus many other subjects based on the mission, threat, and location. To be effective, nonstandard training is oriented to the culture and terrain of the partner nation.

In every generation, the Army orients training to a specific region—Vietnam, Germany, the Fulda Gap and, most recently, Iraq and Afghanistan. As the mission orientation changes from a specific region to a worldwide mission, the requirement for Soldiers to interact with the partner nation's culture remains a critical skill. For example, the behaviors demonstrated by the local population and other cultural clues that indicate pending violence in Brazil are not the same as in Afghanistan or here in the United States. The ability to detect the small, nonverbal indicators of pending violence is a critical protection skill for the individual Soldier and requires nonstandard training by subject matter experts.

Based on the mission and the threat, ARSOF units are equipped with force protection kits. The equipment in these kits can range from a simple doorstop alarm that can be purchased at a local hardware store to sophisticated

detection and alarm systems that include fully integrated, closed-circuit television and sensor arrays. The detection and alarm systems will fit into one or two large suitcases, depending on their configuration. These systems can manage a combination of up to 24 separate, closed-circuit televisions or sensors analyzing user-defined heuristics, recording and providing a local alarm or notifications, and monitoring via cellular phone or across a network. Most of the areas where ARSOF teams and detachments deploy lack modern communications, and satellite radios and other military communication methods may not be available or practical because of mission constraints or incompatibility with partner nation equipment. In those cases, the unit deploys with satellite telephones to provide communications back to the U.S. embassy and to any other location with a working telephone.

ARSOF units are provided with robust staff support, intelligence, force protection surveys, training, and equipment to increase the team's situational awareness and response capability when it deploys; but it is the professionalism of the Soldiers, their recognition of the threats, their acceptance of the risks, and their willingness to apply the tools and act accordingly that allow them to accomplish their mission. 

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<sup>3</sup>Overseas Security Advisory Council Web Site, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State, <<https://www.osac.gov/Pages/Home.aspx>>, accessed on 6 July 2015.

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# MILITARY POLICE CORPS LEADS THE WAY FOR INTEGRATION OF WOMEN INTO COMBAT

By Captain Jessica L. Rovero

There is a long history—dating back to the Revolutionary War—of women serving in some capacity in the U.S. armed forces. The more formal Women's Army Corps was established during World War II; and since then, the U.S. armed forces have come a long way in integrating women into their ranks. The 2013 announcement that women are no longer banned from serving in ground combat units is the final step in that integration process.

This decision, which was made by politicians, is still largely debated. There is significant concern about whether women are capable of filling roles in ground combat units. Questions about whether women are physically capable, how they should be integrated, and how sexual harassment and assault incidents will be prevented are at the forefront of leaders' minds. However, one branch of the Army—the Military Police Corps—has been changing with the needs of the Army and has already been extremely successful in integrating women into its organization.

The military police specialty is categorized as an operations field—not a ground combat field. However, military police units have often provided the closest jobs to ground combat for which women have been authorized to serve. When thinking of a military police officer, the image that comes to mind is not that of a Soldier wielding an M4 carbine rifle while charging up a mountain toward the enemy, but the image of a gate guard allowing access to installations or a patrolman or -woman issuing traffic tickets. However, these are only a few of the duties required of military police.

The acronym *MP* could be used to refer to *multipurpose*, rather than *military police*. Military police deploy to combat environments and serve in many roles. They served throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, conducting mounted and dismounted area patrols. With only logistical support from U.S. troops, squads and platoons integrated with local national security agencies, living and training with them for months at a time. They also integrated with ground combat units supporting infantry missions. And women were there every step of the way.

But such has not always been the case for women in the Military Police Corps. Although women began serving as military police as early as 1941, it wasn't until 1943 that they received any type of formal training. The training included judo and familiarization with handguns; however, women were not authorized to carry firearms. Female military police had the same jurisdiction over military personnel as male military police. They regularly policed training centers and women's detachments. For locations where males

and females were stationed together, mixed male and female patrols patrolled the towns and posts and enforced regulations. Some female military police performed foot and jeep patrols, pulled gate duty, directed traffic, checked nightclubs and bars in nearby towns, and arrested those who violated military regulations. However, many other female military police were detailed to administrative positions.

During the Korean War, while most women were assigned to stateside administrative jobs, some female military police began to be integrated into male units in Japan. In 1953, female military police candidates were required to be 21 years of age and more than 5 feet, 4 inches tall. They were assigned to jobs in criminal investigations, traffic control, gate duty, crime laboratories, and on-post police patrols and were still not authorized to carry firearms. After the reduction of the Women's Army Corps in 1953, there were 20 female officers and 50 female enlisted Soldiers serving as military police.

It wasn't until the 1970s that the U.S. government began making great strides in integrating women into the Army. The number of Women's Army Corps personnel increased during that time, leading to an increase in the number of female military police. On 1 May 1971, the Army established the first formal military police training at Fort Gordon, Georgia. Five female officers—along with 57 male officers—attended the school from August to October 1972. Lieutenant Laura Lynn Livingston was among the first women to attend the school; and following her graduation, she became the platoon leader of an all-male military police platoon in the 504th Military Police Battalion. Twenty-four women were selected for the advanced individual training pilot program, which began 27 November 1972; 21 of these women graduated on 26 January 1973.

In 1974, women were finally authorized to carry firearms; however, instead of the standard issue, .45-caliber handguns the men carried, they were issued the smaller, .38-caliber revolver. In 1975, women began being assigned to organic military police units; and in 1977, female military police served in North Atlantic Treaty Organization Return of Forces to Germany (Reforger) exercises. Effective 20 October 1978, the Women's Army Corps was disestablished as a separate entity and women were finally integrated into the armed forces. Consequently, the number of female commanders increased. One example of a female commander is Captain Linda Norman, who commanded the 108th Military Police Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina—a mostly male unit.

Female military police officers had the most significant role of all women during Operation Just Cause in 1989.

In addition, many women served in Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sabre from 1990 to 1991. In 1994, women were finally allowed to serve with ground combat troops; and they have been doing so ever since. The first death of a military policewoman on duty occurred on 26 October 2003; since then, many more women have lost their lives serving their country.

Today, women make up about 25 percent of the Military Police Corps. They are required to meet the same basic training and advanced individual training standards as men—with the exception of the Army physical fitness test, for which there are separate standards. They serve as drivers and gunners, maintaining and carrying their own basic loads for their assigned weapons. They are assigned M2s, M4s, M9s, M249s, M240Bs, and MK19s; and they must maintain qualifications every 6 months. They are required to execute the duties of their positions just as any male Soldier would be. And in the field, they share living quarters with male Soldiers.


The integration has not been easy. Many of the women who have been successful in the Military Police Corps have surely had their fair share of negative experiences as they made their way through the ranks. It is fair to assume that this integration was as largely unpopular in its infancy as the integration of women into ground combat units has been recently. To this day, some male officers and enlisted Soldiers, regardless of military occupational specialty, do not believe that women belong in the military at all. In general, women must consistently try harder than men to receive the same level of respect within their own military occupational specialties.

Despite the challenges faced by women in the military, many women have demonstrated the capability to serve in ground combat roles—and many of them have been from the Military Police Corps. For example, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester, 617th Military Police Company, received the Silver Star Medal for her actions during an ambush by anti-Iraqi fighters while on a supply convoy in 2005. And Specialist Cristine Gallagher, 64th Military Police Company, was assigned to a military police squad that supported an infantry company on Combat Outpost Fortress, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, from 2010 to 2011. There, she participated in numerous dismounted missions, including Operation Enterprise and Operations Strong Eagle I, II, and III (most notably, the infamous Hornet's Nest), and kept up with the best of them. She earned so much respect from her squad and the infantrymen with whom she fought that the infantry officers and senior noncommissioned officers nominated her for the Combat Infantryman Badge.

This does not mean that all women should serve in ground combat units; many should not. The Army should back away from its stance of generally allowing women to serve in ground combat units to instead allowing women who can meet the current physical and mental standards to serve in ground combat units. With the rise in popularity of modern exercise programs, it is entirely possible that there

are women in the military who have the physical ability to hang with the men and meet those standards; they just need to be motivated to do so.

In many cases, the “equal opportunity Army” does not really provide equal opportunity for women. Women don't always receive the same level of respect as men when working with personnel from all-male units. The Army must work on changing the mind-set of men in the ground combat field. Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention training often exacerbates tenuous relationships by adding the incident fear factor. It's not that these programs are invalid; however, good programs can sometimes also have negative consequences. This just reinforces the idea that women who attempt to fill these billets must be exceptional, and they must be willing to prove themselves over and over again.

It has taken more than 70 years for the Army and the Military Police Corps to integrate women to the point that they are accepted and have a significant potential for success. But there is still work to be done. Whether there is agreement with the policy (or not) and whether there is belief in the capability of women in ground combat roles (or not), the time is coming for women to fill those roles. Perhaps, by following the lead of the Military Police Corps, the ground combat branches of the military will take less time to accept and integrate women into their ranks. 

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*At the time this article was written, Captain Rovero was the commander of the 977th Military Police Company, 97th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas. She is now attending the Public Affairs Qualification Course, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, with a follow-on assignment as an observer-controller-trainer, 3d Battalion, 337th Regiment (Combat Support / Combat Service Support), Fort Knox, Kentucky. She holds a bachelor's degree in early childhood education from the University of Vermont.*





# After the Brigade Special Troops Battalion: Integrating Military Police Operations at the National Training Center

*By First Lieutenant Natalia P. Brooks*

**T**he relationship between brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the military police changed significantly with the transition from brigade special troops battalions (BSTBs) to brigade engineer battalions (BEBs). Although Soldiers are now better able to enhance their knowledge of the military police disciplines in organic battalions, the working relationship with the BCT suffered to some degree. Joint training at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, highlights the advantages and disadvantages of being inorganic to the BCT. This article discusses the experiences of the 410th Military Police Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas, during its NTC rotation supporting the 2d Armored BCT, 1st Cavalry Division.

The 410th Military Police Company was selected to provide support for the 2d Armored BCT decisive action rotation about 6 months before execution and immediately began to work with the brigade headquarters to create a parallel training plan. Although efforts were made to conduct joint training before deploying to NTC, BCT training requirements (including 6 weeks of stabilized gunnery and unit certifications) severely limited its scope. Despite this setback, the company worked closely with the BCT for as much planning and sustainment as possible. This relationship only grew stronger with the conclusion of the leadership training program, as the 8th Brigade Engineer Battalion (BEB) was assigned administrative control of the company. By aligning with a battalion rather than directly under the brigade headquarters, information flow, planning, and sustainment drastically improved for the 410th Military Police Company and paved the way for successful integration at NTC.

Even though the 410th Military Police Company tied in with the BCT and identified communication issues early, many of those problems remained unresolved throughout reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; during situational training exercise (STX) lanes; and into force-on-force (FOF) operations. Most of these complications arose because different brigades use different equipment or receive upgrades on the same equipment at different times, making communication between adjacent units difficult. Although the issues were identified during train-up, failure to conduct a full communications rehearsal with the BCT resulted in overconfidence in system integration. As a result, the communications plan for the company was severely

limited when working with BCT assets since the different Blue Force tracking platforms could not communicate.

## **Situational Training Exercise**

Although FOF training is arguably the most exciting type of training for maneuver units, support and maneuver support companies gain far more during STX lanes when they are able to focus on items from their mission-essential task lists. Working with the senior military police observer-controller and the 8th Brigade Engineer Battalion, the 410th Military Police Company established a separate assembly area and training plan for the STX that best suited the needs of the unit. During the course of 6 days, the company was certified on the following tasks:

- React to indirect fire.
- React to contact.
- Perform company headquarters functions.
- Operate a detainee collection point.
- Conduct operational area security.
- Conduct mobility support operations.
- Conduct sustainment operations for all classes of supply.
- Execute mission planning.

Although this training opportunity was invaluable, it came with some distinct disadvantages that directly impacted military police actions in FOF operations.

## **FOF Operations**

While isolation allowed the military police Soldiers to train largely unfettered, it also kept them largely unaware and uninvolved in planning and movement for FOF operations even in military police areas of expertise, such as the construction of the detainee collection point. When they moved to the BEB tactical assembly area at the conclusion of the STX, they found that the detainee collection point was too close to the BEB tactical operations center and lacked nearby latrines. In addition, the amount of berming and the employment of concertina wire created dead space that increased the number of personnel required to safely secure the detainee collection point. If the 410th Military Police Company had been present earlier, leaders would have been better able to shape the plan ahead of time, as they did when the company later jumped to the second tactical assembly area.



As the unit began FOF operations, it became obvious that detainee collection point construction was only one area that lacked proper direction and momentum. There was clear misunderstanding and misuse of military police capabilities and limitations in regard to weapons platforms, unit size, detainee confinement, and doctrinal mission. For most of the FOF operations, the company was asked to provide stationary brigade tactical operations center security, personal security details, retransmission site security, convoy escort, and on-call detainee operational support. While military police Soldiers can execute all of these tasks, the number of requirements severely hampered the company ability to execute the main FOF missions—detainee operations and wide area security.

Although the BCT struggled to maximize military police capabilities for the first two phases of FOF operations, the last phase showed marked improvement and innovation. During the tactical breach, military police platoons linked with engineer platoons and conducted joint patrols along main supply routes to provide rear area security. They cleared mine fields, conducted traffic control points, and maintained a constant presence that kept the main supply routes open for the combined arms battalions to maneuver freely across the operational environment. These joint operations strengthened the relationship between the engineers and military police and served as an innovative example of combined arms providing mobility support and area security operations.

### Lessons Learned

NTC rotations are critical opportunities for military police units to showcase doctrinal capabilities to maneuver units in a post-BSTB Army. Even though the BSTB military police platoon could provide only limited tactical advantages, the continued exposure to military police Soldiers and doctrine made integration smoother. Although military police companies offer more capabilities than BSTB platoons ever could, issues with unit integration severely limit their scope. The 410th Military Police Company learned that BCTs in the post-BSTB Army lack critical exposure to the Military Police Corps. Companies identified to support rotational units at NTC must execute joint training as early as possible to build confidence in the unit and the doctrinal capabilities of the military police.

The transition from BSTBs increased the importance of the brigade provost marshal as the only organic military police expert. Although the provost marshal provides tactical expertise and credibility, a liaison from the military police company should assist at the brigade level to offer organizational information that the provost marshal may not be able to provide. The liaison could also be on hand to shape brigade level planning along with the provost marshal while the company commander executes a similar role at the battalion level. The 410th Military Police Company could have better shaped military police operations during FOF operations if it had been more involved in planning at the brigade and battalion echelons. Although the provost

marshal is on staff to provide doctrinal knowledge during the military decisionmaking process, company commanders need to simultaneously communicate military police capabilities to the battalion commander. This allows the battalion commander to shape operations directly within the battalion area of operations or indirectly with the brigade commander, if necessary.



**Soldiers from the 410th Military Police Company discuss a training mission during an NTC rotation.**

### Conclusion

The 410th Military Police Company NTC rotation was a valuable opportunity for exposure and learning with the 2d Armored BCT. Joint training allowed the unit to identify friction points with adjacent units in a realistic training environment. Although the BCT struggled to maximize 410th Military Police Company doctrinal capabilities, the company should have been more involved in the planning process during the STX to offer expertise in shaping FOF operations. A liaison at the brigade level would have helped the brigade provost marshal advertise military police capabilities with additional organizational knowledge. The execution of joint military police-engineer patrols in support of mobility support and area security operations was an innovative example of military police integration into the BCT. Overall, the NTC rotation was a stressful training experience that exposed weaknesses in the relationship between BCTs and the Military Police Corps and emphasized the need for habitual relationship training. As experts in military police doctrine, we have a responsibility to get intimately involved with maneuver commanders in all phases to educate them on our capabilities and limitations and to shape operations in the best possible manner.



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*First Lieutenant Brooks is the executive officer of the 410th Military Police Company. Previously she was the military police platoon leader for the BSTB, 3d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division. She holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy—West Point, New York. She is also a graduate of the U.S. Army Air Assault School and the Military Police Basic Officer Leadership Course.*

# My First 100 Days as a Platoon Leader

*By First Lieutenant Keslie N. Carrión*

“What do you mean we have to stay out here for four more days?” I could hear the disgruntled mutterings of my platoon all the way down to the quietest Soldier.

We had spent more than 20 days in “The Box,” where we had been attached to the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, during our Joint Readiness Training Center rotation at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This meant a strict meals-ready-to-eat (MRE) diet, no showers, and a lot of lost sleep. Now, 3 weeks into our training, we were told that our stay would be extended until a night vision device that had been lost by another battalion was recovered. Searching for the night vision device meant a lot of police calls up and down the drop zone under the scorching Louisiana sun.

Could I keep my platoon members motivated through this unnecessary hardship for which they were not responsible? As difficult as this was, it was far from the biggest challenge that I had faced so far. I had joined the platoon at a very unique point for a lieutenant. I had graduated from the Military Police Basic Officer Leader Course, jumped straight into the Basic Airborne Course, and then spent about a week inprocessing at Fort Bragg, North Carolina—after which, I was appointed the new platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 21st Military Police Company (Airborne). A few short weeks later, I found myself leading the platoon through a simulated combat environment during a joint operations access exercise with the 2d Brigade Combat Team.


How was I, a fresh second lieutenant with absolutely no deployments, supposed to lead veterans and instruct them in how to accomplish their missions? Clearly, they were the ones who had the real-life experience. Furthermore, our company commander had tasked us with a brigade essential mission. 2d Platoon was charged with establishing and operating an evacuation control center to transport displaced civilians from a war-torn country to safety. I soon learned that trusting my noncommissioned officers (NCOs) would lead to our success. What I lacked in experience, they made up for with their input and suggestions. As I received guidance from higher echelons, I leaned on my platoon sergeant and squad leaders to formulate a plan and identify any shortcomings or obstacles that we might encounter.

Of course, there were hiccups. I had not seen my platoon as a whole unit before the joint operations access exercise, so matching faces to names was impossible. It’s a good thing the Army uses name tapes! In addition, giving in to time constraints and briefing condensed operations orders were new to me. Throughout my training, the orders that were briefed were lengthy and detailed; however, they served to

keep every Soldier informed of all the minute details that could potentially be critical to success. Stubbornly, I wanted to maintain responsibility for conducting these briefs because I knew this was where I could shine. What I lacked in tactical proficiency, I knew I could make up for with my strong briefing skills. But the mission tempo didn’t allow for that. Not only was I required to accept the fact that hurried operations orders highlighting critical information would have to suffice, but I also realized that I needed to trust my NCOs to fill in the gaps.

In time, I learned all of the platoon members’ names. I found out who had a baby on the way and who actually liked the pork sausage and gravy MREs. I observed who could function on just 2 hours of sleep and who was incoherent for 15 minutes after being awakened. I was starting to understand my purpose as a new platoon leader.

I can still recall the moment when it finally dawned on me that I was an essential member of the team. I was briefing my squad leaders on how we would be conducting a route reconnaissance mission in only half an hour. I knew that, while listening to me, they were already thinking about the dozens of priorities they would need to accomplish before the mission. Nevertheless, they were as attentive as could be. I saw my spoken words transformed into written notes in their field books. After releasing them to begin their preparation, I watched as they made every effort to meet the timeline that I had set.

Now, flashing forward to that blazing day in The Box after three demanding weeks in the field: We are hopelessly searching for a night vision device, and I can’t help but smile. Yes, we are miserable. But I have sweated, lost sleep, and fought (notionally) alongside these paratroopers. We have built a connection, and I finally feel that I can call myself a competent platoon leader. I still have a lot to learn, but I feel more confident about my skills every day. I’m fortunate that I have a great group of NCOs who support the mission and keep the welfare of Soldiers a priority. If I’m lucky, I will get to serve a full 18 months as a platoon leader. I could not have asked for a better team with which to do that. 

First from Above!

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*First Lieutenant Carrión is the platoon leader, 2d Platoon, 21st Military Police Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. She holds a bachelor’s degree in international studies and political science—with a minor in writing—from the Virginia Military Institute.*





# Sustaining BCT Military Police Interoperability After the Removal of Military Police Platoons


*By Major Maurice Green*

For each military police leader who professes that removing military police platoons from brigade combat teams (BCTs) is a bad idea, another military police leader argues that placing military police platoons in BCTs was a bad idea in the first place. Regardless of your position in this debate, given the extremely high demand for military police support during the past decade of sustained conflict (arguably one of the highest in Military Police Corps history), the ability of military police Soldiers to enable BCTs is more evident than ever. During the past decade, the military police force structure has increased at percentages unmatched by any other branch. The aim of this article is not to defend or proclaim the relevance of military police Soldiers, but to highlight the facts that illustrate the significance of the support which military police Soldiers provide to the BCT. Military Police Corps leaders have the inherent responsibility to ensure that they foster relationships within BCTs on their installations. This enables the Military Police Corps to sustain and increase interoperability among the BCTs.

For most senior military police leaders, simply recognizing the need to foster relationships with BCTs on the installation is not the challenge. The challenge resides with their ability to establish and maintain an operational tempo that allows them to sustain interoperability with the BCT. This responsibility is tied to their commitment to establishing meaningful relationships within the BCTs on their installations. However, there are some external friction points that can only be resolved by the actions of the most senior Military Police Corps leaders and leaders of the U.S. Army Forces Command.

To clarify: Up to this point, there has been no successful effort by leaders to synchronize the operational tempo or deployments of military police units within BCTs on their installations. This lack of effort directly contributes to the inability of military police battalions to establish a habitual relationship between the combat support military police companies and BCTs on their installations. Instead, ad hoc

relationships are created to support specific training events, such as combat training center rotations or culminating training events at home stations. Such ad hoc relationships are undeniably effective to some degree; after all, that is how military police unit deployments were managed throughout the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and continue to be managed today. However, I believe that the decrease in the operational tempo, coupled with the removal of military police platoons from the BCTs, presents a unique opportunity—even a mandate—for leaders to act.

Leaders must synchronize military police unit deployments and the operational tempo with those of the BCTs on their installations. Moreover, leaders must commit to interoperability between military police units and BCTs. The initial step in forging such a commitment is to establish habitual command relationships with each military police combat support company and BCT as well as military police combat support battalions and Regular Army divisions. For example, if the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) were assigned a mission that required a military police battalion or military combat support company, the 91st Military Police Battalion or one of its assigned units would deploy in support of that mission. Such a commitment not only sustains the interoperability gained between the Military Police Corps and the BCT over the past decade, it also allows the filling of the voids left by military police platoons with military police combat support companies. This remains the preferred course of action for many, especially those military police leaders who opposed placing military police platoons in the BCT. 

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*Major Green is the operations officer for the 91st Military Police Battalion, Fort Drum, New York. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from South Carolina State University and master's degrees in business and organizational security management from Webster University; human resource management from Phoenix University, Phoenix, Arizona; and public administration from the University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.*





## Headquarters and Headquarters Company 40th Military Police Battalion



### Lineage and Honors

Constituted 11 June 1945 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 40th Military Police Service Battalion.

Activated 6 July 1945 in China.

Inactivated 31 March 1946 in China

Activated 16 February 1948 in Korea.

Inactivated 25 January 1949 in Japan.

Activated 1 June 1949 on Okinawa.

Allotted 25 October 1951 to the Regular Army.

Inactivated 19 March 1953 on Okinawa.

Redesignated 30 September 1966 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 40th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 25 November 1966 at Fort Riley, Kansas.

Inactivated 30 December 1970 in Thailand.

Headquarters transferred 16 September 1986 to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and activated at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

Headquarters inactivated 31 December 1990 at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and withdrawn from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 40th Military Police Battalion, activated 16 October 2009 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

### Campaign Participation Credit

#### *World War II*

Asiatic-Pacific Theater, Streamer without inscription

#### *War on Terrorism*

Iraq—New Dawn

### Decorations

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered PACIFIC THEATER

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 2011–2012

# Following the Path to Certified, Marketable Military Police Skills

By Lieutenant Colonel Forrest A. Woolley (Retired)

No matter how long their Army careers last, there are two things that Soldiers should do: prepare for the future and improve for the present. Continual growth and development are crucial in any profession, especially in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps. Military police Soldiers have marketable skills, but it is difficult to get the civilian community to recognize them. One way to get recognition is by successfully completing the Peace Officer Standards and Training test through the state of Missouri. The test allows state and local governments to recognize that military police Soldiers have the necessary proficiencies, talents, and training required of civilian peace officers. The recognition increases opportunities for Soldiers and helps them prepare for their transition into the civilian world. It helps them obtain a Missouri Class A Peace Officer license that is valid for 5 years, allows them to seek employment as peace officers (or reserve peace officers) anywhere in the state, improves their understanding of police operations, and provides the growth and development needed to remain relevant in the Military Police Corps.

It takes dedication and patience to get to the testing phase. To start, applicants submit their military police training records, certificates, a criminal background check, fingerprints, and other paperwork for the peace officer license application. The listed training, experience, and education are assessed by a state official and a military representative at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Successful applicants are notified that they are eligible to take the state examination. For complete details of the application process, go to <http://dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/post/forms.php> and click "Missouri Peace Officer License Application for Veteran Peace Officers." The Web site provides other useful information and points of contact for questions about the process and testing.

The test is divided into the following main areas:

- Legal studies, including topics such as constitutional law, Missouri statutory law, and traffic law.
- Interpersonal perspectives, dealing with ethics and professionalism, domestic violence, and human behavior.
- Operations, such as patrol, jail population management, traffic accidents, criminal investigation, offense investigation, report writing, juvenile justice, and first aid.
- Skill development, including defensive tactics, use of firearms, and driver training.

Preparation is key for success on the test. One good study source is the *Missouri Criminal Code Handbook*<sup>1</sup> (available from various online sources), which outlines many of the topics covered on the test. The test is offered regularly in Jefferson City, Missouri.

Passing the test qualifies applicants for a Class A Peace Officer license that is valid for 5 years and can be used to apply for law enforcement jobs throughout the state. Those who complete the program are more competent in their profession, with a broader, more in-depth understanding of law enforcement activities. Taking the Peace Officer Standards and Training test is not an easy path; but the only way the Military Police Corps can remain professional, relevant, and competitive is through the constant growth and development of its Soldiers.

#### Endnote:

<sup>1</sup>*Missouri Criminal Code Handbook*, University of Missouri–Columbia School of Law, Columbia, Missouri, 1979.

*Lieutenant Colonel Woolley (Retired) is an assistant professor in the Faculty and Staff Division, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees in criminal justice, and a master's degree in adult education. He also serves as a reserve deputy in the patrol division of his local sheriff's department.*



# The Need for a Separate Law Enforcement MOS Within the Military Police Corps

*By First Lieutenant Bradley A. Zobal*

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps needs a change. The U.S. Army needs more experienced military police personnel who provide law enforcement on installations. When law enforcement duties are rotated between units, individual Soldiers do not obtain the experience and confidence needed to be fully successful law enforcement agents. I believe that creating separate military occupational specialties (MOSs) for law enforcement military police and combat military police (much like the separate MOSs 31B and 31E for military police and internment/resettlement specialists) would improve military police professionalism.

Proficiency in law enforcement requires a great deal of experience. Military police personnel conducting law enforcement duties make life-changing, split-second decisions; they need to know when to pull their weapons and when to fire. Any hesitation can be life threatening, but it is easy for military police to become complacent when providing law enforcement, as opposed to working down range. They are not under the constant threat of improvised explosive devices or ambushes, but they can also face threats when least expected—for example, when confronted by an unstable person who is determined to cause injury or take a life. Experienced individuals are required for these situations. More experience as law enforcement officers ensures that military police are less likely to become complacent and are ready to handle difficult situations. This can save their lives.


Many military police units currently rotate law enforcement duties. A Soldier fresh out of one station unit training might arrive at a military police unit during the red or amber cycle and not work law enforcement for another 6 to 9 months. Even then, he or she might only work the road for 3 months, never gaining the experience and confidence needed when making critical decisions. This experience is critical for law enforcement officers. The designation of a military police MOS that only works law enforcement would ensure that those Soldiers gain the experience and confidence that civilian law enforcement officers have.

With the creation of a separate law enforcement MOS, more rigorous training like that of civilian police academies would be possible. A thorough background check should be conducted to assess the character of the individual wishing

to become an Army law enforcement agent. Civilian law enforcement officers go through a very extensive background check, and so should Army law enforcement Soldiers. A more extensive background check would reduce the possibility of misconduct within the Military Police Corps.

Even if a separate MOS were not created, the Military Police Corps could take steps to make itself a more professional law enforcement agency. Each installation could assign one military police detachment to exclusively perform law enforcement operations. Therefore, the Soldiers in that unit would have time to gain much-needed experience. These detachments could consist of hand-selected, mature individuals who have shown good conduct.

Another way that the Military Police Corps could improve professionalism, and perhaps separate itself from other branches, is to change the uniform worn by military police Soldiers performing law enforcement functions. Conducting law enforcement activities without displaying rank would separate rank from authority. This would prevent a young military police officer from being disrespected by higher-ranking Soldiers who might confuse rank with authority. Civilian officers working on the installation do not encounter this problem; they are viewed as authority figures because of their uniforms. Patrols consist of a watch commander, a patrol supervisor, and patrol officers and, for the most part, rank does not play a part. Military police performing law enforcement duties could wear military police insignia on their chests and patrol caps, or they could simply wear exterior black vests and black caps or other distinguishable headgear.

With deployments winding down, the Military Police Corps needs to find its place within the Army. The Corps will be focusing more on law enforcement, but it will need to continue training for the down-range mission. By separating into different MOSs, I believe that the Military Police Corps will have a better chance of becoming more proficient in the law enforcement mission and the combat support role. 

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*First Lieutenant Zobal is a platoon leader with the 116th Military Police Company, 97th Military Police Battalion, Fort Riley, Kansas. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Western Michigan University.*





# The International Patrol



By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired)

At the end of hostilities in Europe in 1945, the occupied areas of Germany and Austria were divided into areas of occupation that were controlled by the Allied countries of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Russia. Likewise, the capitals of Berlin and Vienna were subdivided into occupier areas of responsibility.

In Vienna, the first district (which was also called the “inner city”) was placed under quadripartite control, with the chairmanship changing every month. The fundamental thinking behind this four-power control was that the most important governmental authorities and administrative bodies were located in the inner city. If the inner city were controlled by only one of the Allied powers, that particular power could have exerted pressure on the Austrian government and public authorities.

In 1948, a reporter for *The New Yorker* wrote, “Vienna must be the most patrolled city on earth. Besides the city’s police force and the routine military police maintained by each of the four occupying powers, there are several more or less secret police outfits, such as Russia *Ministvo Vnutrennykh Del*, or MVD, and the American Army’s Criminal Investigations Division, or CID. The most unusual of Vienna’s police forces is the International Patrol. It was organized by the former American provost marshal in Vienna, [Colonel William] B. Yarborough.”<sup>21</sup>

When duties began on 5 August 1945, the patrols

consisted of three soldiers—one military police officer from each of the three Allied powers of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia. On 27 September 1945, French military police officers joined as fourth men. At first, the patrols used American jeeps as patrol vehicles but they proved too small for the four-man patrols; so larger command cars were then used. In later years, American and Russian sedans were used as patrol vehicles. The U.S. contingent was from Company C, 796th Military Police Battalion, and the British force consisted of members of the 105th Provost Company. Attempts to identify the Russian and French units met with

no response from their respective embassies. The patrol members wore the uniforms of their own nations. In addition, each member wore a distinctive metal badge on his arm, midway between his shoulder and elbow. American, Russian, and French members wore their insignia on their left sleeves; British members wore theirs on their right sleeves.

Between 1300 and 0100 daily, five patrols were operating—one each in the American, British, Russian, and French sectors and a standby at the International Patrol Headquarters. Between 0100 and 0700, only three patrols were operating—one for the American and French sectors, one for the British and Russian sectors, and a standby. The patrols were constantly on the alert for traffic violations involving Allied vehicles and incidents involving personnel from any two different



powers. Patrol members on the 1300–1900 shift ate their evening meals in the 796th Military Police Battalion mess.<sup>2</sup>


One narrative regarding the functions of the International Patrol comes from the British Royal Military Police:

*There is a great temptation for each of us to feel that the problems of our own particular stations are, at least at times, unique in the field of provost experience; but when it is considered that the Royal Military Police in Vienna work day in and day out with the Americans, the French, and the Russians and that there is no hour of the day or night when you cannot find a [Royal Military Police] lance corporal sitting next to a Russian military policeman on patrol somewhere in the city, there is perhaps some justification. We conduct our business in four languages and have to get to know a fifth quadripartite, that peculiar hybrid in which Inter-Allied Command in Vienna, the Four Powers, decisions expressed in the form of protocol.<sup>3</sup>*

A member of the 796th Military Police Battalion relates this story:

*I was patrolling a street in the 10th Bezirk (Russian Zone), when suddenly the Russian member of the patrol noticed a vehicle ahead of us and told me to force the truck to the curb. Twice, I tried to force the vehicle to stop; but both times, the driver ignored the warnings and proceeded. Finally, the Russian member sitting next to me drew his pistol and fired at the truck, which continued on its course. After using his supply of ammunition, the Russian member borrowed the French member's pistol. Only after the Frenchman's ammunition had been exhausted did the truck halt. The driver was taken into custody, and the vehicle was driven to the Russian Kommandatura. The remarkable fact about this incident was that, although both pistols were fired, neither the driver nor the vehicle were seriously harmed.<sup>4</sup>*

Another incident involving the Russian contingent was related by Ernest Holden of the Royal Military Police. He was on patrol when a Russian military policeman arrested a Russian man on the streets of Vienna. He wanted to take the man to the Russian *Kommandatura*; but the American driver refused, insisting that they take him to the International Patrol Headquarters. The Russian military police soldier drew his pistol, held it to the American driver's head, and told him to go to the Russian *Kommandatura*. Holden, in turn, drew his pistol, held it to the Russian's head, and



told the American to do what standing orders said—go to the International Patrol Headquarters. So that's what they did, and the stand-off was resolved. Neither Holden nor the American Soldiers ever heard what happened to the Russian member of that patrol, but they never saw him on patrol again.

Corporal Edwin L. Luck, a patrolman from Amsterdam, New York, relates the following incident:

*I received a message to proceed to the Astoria Hotel, a British hotel in the 1st Bezirk. When the other members of the patrol and I arrived, we learned that somebody had been dropping empty wine bottles from a window of the hotel onto the sidewalk on Kärntnerstrasse, endangering the pedestrians. It was around midnight and extremely dark. At intervals, bottles continued to fall from an upper-story window but it was difficult to determine which window they were coming from. The British member of the patrol asked the assistance of the members, and a search of all the rooms was begun. After approximately an hour, two intoxicated men were found in a room on the top floor. When they were questioned, it was learned that they had been drinking and, after finishing a bottle, disposed of it by the easiest means—tossing it out of the window. The remarkable fact about this incident is not the amount of wine drunk by the men, but how none of the people passing below the window had been injured.<sup>5</sup>*

Another excerpt from the *105th Journal* states:


*Lance Corporal Levi came close to death whilst on patrol. The patrol had stopped to check a Russian soldier who, taking exception as to how he was being spoken to, opened fire on the patrol, killing one patrolman and severely injuring another, the driver taking off. The gunman then approached [Lance Corporal] Levi (who could not drive), telling him to drive him to*



America. Levi drove instead to the International Patrol Headquarters; and seeing American [military police], the Russian exclaimed, "I'm in America," and surrendered.<sup>6</sup>

During the making of a film, *The Third Man*, which was set in Allied-occupied Vienna after World War II and starred Orson Wells and Trevor Howard, Howard was arrested by a British member of the patrol for impersonating an officer. The assistant director Guy Hamilton and the continuity assistant Angela Allen teamed up to describe what it was like to film in the Vienna sewers and to explain how a drunk Trevor Howard was arrested for impersonating a British officer while still in costume as the sober Major Calloway.

Due to an international agreement, the International Patrol ceased to exist on 14 September 1955, when all Allied armies left Austria.

**Acknowledgement:** I am deeply indebted to former Lance Corporal Brian Chamings, Royal Military Police, and Mr. Phil Holden, whose father was a British member of the patrol, for the documents and photographs they provided in researching this story. It was Holden's father, Ernest Holden, who detained actor Trevor Howard for impersonating an officer during the filming of the movie *The Third Man*. 

#### Endnotes:

<sup>1</sup>Cameron et al., "A Reporter in Vienna," *The New Yorker*, 6 March 1948, p. 61, <<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1948/03/06/cameron-lewis-laborde-gorodnistov>>, accessed on 2 June 2015.

<sup>2</sup>"786th Military Police Battalion," <[http://usarmygermany.com/Sont\\_2.htm?http&&usarmygermany.com/Units/USFA%20Units/USFA\\_796th%20MP%20Bn.htm](http://usarmygermany.com/Sont_2.htm?http&&usarmygermany.com/Units/USFA%20Units/USFA_796th%20MP%20Bn.htm)>, accessed on 8 June 2015.

<sup>3</sup>Major George Denis Pillitz, "Inter-Allied Command in Vienna," *105th Journal*, Spring 2014.

<sup>4</sup>"796th Military Police Battalion: Vienna Command," <[http://usarmygermany.com/Sont\\_2.htm?http&&usarmygermany.com/Units/USFA%20Units/USFA\\_796th%20MP%20Bn.htm](http://usarmygermany.com/Sont_2.htm?http&&usarmygermany.com/Units/USFA%20Units/USFA_796th%20MP%20Bn.htm)>, accessed on 12 June 2015.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>*105th Journal*, Winter 2010, pp. 6–7.

#### Reference:

Carol Reed, director, *The Third Man*, British Lion Films, 2 September 1949.

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*Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.*

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**MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS**

<b>COMMANDER</b>	<b>CSM/SGM</b>	<b>CWO</b>	<b>UNIT</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>
Mark Inch	Timothy Fitzgerald		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
Mark Inch	Crystal Wallace	John Welch	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Mark Spindler	Richard Woodring	Leroy Shamburger	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Mark Inch	Timothy Fitzgerald		Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Burton Francisco	Jerome Wren		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Michael Hoban	NA		USARC PM	Ft Bragg, NC
Phillip Churn	Craig Owens	Mary Hostetler	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Duane Miller	Angelia Flournoy		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Eddie Jacobsen	Winsome Laos		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Bryan Patridge	David Tookmanian		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Erica Nelson	Steven Raines		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Alexander Conyers	Jeffrey Maddox		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Zane Jones	James Breckinridge		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
David Chase	Jon Matthews		42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Alex Reina	Joseph Klostermann		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Peter Cross	Joseph Menard Jr.		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Ross Guieb	Bradley Cross		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Phillip Burton	Jon Sawyer		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Malcom McMullen	John Schiffl		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Richard Giles	Abbe Mulholland		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Keith Nadig	Andrew Lombardo		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Roger Hedgepeth	Tara Wheadon	Edgar Collins	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Ignatius Dolata Jr.	Arthur Williams	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Thomas Denzler	Clyde Wallace	Celia Gallo	701st MP Gp (CID)	Quantico, VA
David Heath	Edwin Garris		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

**MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS**

Kevin Hanrahan	Peter Harrington	Anderson Wagner	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Gerald Mapp	Chad Aldridge	Billy Higgason	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Lawrence Stewart	Mathew Walters	Phillip Curran	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Larry Dewey	Gordon Lawitzke	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Christine Whitmer	James Sanguins	Joel Fitz	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Marcus Matthews	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Phillip Lenz	Bryan Schoenhofer		40th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jason Turner	Kevin Pickrel		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Michelle Goyette	Russell Erickson		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Chad Goyette	Brian Flom		92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Jeremy Willingham	Daniel O'Brien		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Brian Carlson	Lee Sodic		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Marc Hale	Freddy Trejo		96th MP Bn (C/D)	San Diego, CA
Alexander Murray	Kevin Rogers		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael Fowler	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (C/D)	Auburn, NY
Craig Maceri	Scott Smilinich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Steven Jackan	Alpheus Haswell		105th MP Bn (C/D)	Asheville, NC
Robert Watras	Darrell Masterson		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Mary Staab	Aarion Franklin		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
John Gobel	Fowler L. Goodowens II		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Kenneth Niles	Robert Wall		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Haymet Llovet	Francisco Ramos		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Norberto Flores II	Roger Flores		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Dawn Bolyard	James Summers		151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
John Dunn	Gregory Derosier	David Knudson	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
William Allen	Daniel Williams		160th MP Bn (C/D)	Tallahassee, FL
Jennifer Steed	Victor Watson		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Erik Anderson	Callie Leaver		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Larry Crowder	Vacant		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

**MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)**

<b>COMMANDER</b>	<b>CSM/SGM</b>	<b>CWO</b>	<b>UNIT</b>	<b>LOCATION</b>
Robert Paoletti	Andraus Williams		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Boyd Dunbar		192d MP Bn (C/D)	Niantic, CT
Isaac Martinez	Richard Yohn		193d MP Bn (C/D)	Denver, CO
Timothy Starke	Michael Rowan		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
John Whitmire	Nathan Deese		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Lance Shaffer	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Kenneth Dilg	Ed Williams		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
James Blake	James Sartori		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Michael Treadwell	Theodore Skibyak		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James Lake	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Timothy Winks	Ben Adams		304th MP Bn (C/D)	Nashville, TN
James Rogelio	Joseph Mitchell		310th MP Bn (C/D)	Uniondale, NY
Charles Seifert	Vacant		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Christine Borognoni	Paul Shaw		324th MP Bn (C/D)	Fresno, CA
Richard Vanbuskirk	Kyle Jenkins		327th MP Bn (C/D)	Arlington Heights, IL
David Heflin	Joseph Rigby		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Karen Connick	Keith Magee		340th MP Bn (C/D)	Ashley, PA
Alexander Shaw	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
Vance Kuhner	Brett Goldstein		382d MP Bn	Westover AFB, MA
Kelly Jones	William Henderson		384th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Wayne, IN
William Rodgers	Michael Robledo		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
Steven Gavin	Howard Anderson		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Vacant	Michael Poll		391st MP Bn (C/D)	Columbus, OH
Victor Bakkila	Ann Vega	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Cheryl Clement	Shelita Taylor		400th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Meade, MD
Eric Hunsberger	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Susan Kusan	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Timothy Macdonald	James Stillman	Mauro Orcesi	502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
Caroline Horton	Mark Hennessey		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Robert Arnold Jr.	Lisa Piette-Edwards		504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Jonathan Doyle	Jeffrey Cereghino		508th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lewis, WA
Jon Myers	Clayton Sneed		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
John Fivian	Janet Harris		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Richard Millette	Mark Bell		530th MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Laura Steele	Milton Hardy		535th MP Bn (C/D)	Cary, NC
Kevin Smith	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Christopher Wills	Thomas Gray		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Rebecca Hazelett	James Lea		705th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Matthew Gragg	Michael Weatherholt		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Leevaine Williams Jr.	John Vicars		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Karst Brandsma	Darren Boruff		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
James Eisenhart	Robert Eichler		724th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Omar Lomas	James Tyler		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Kenneth Powell	Vacant	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Forest Park, GA
Stacy Garrity	Rodney Ervin		744th MP Bn (C/D)	Easton, PA
Jason Marquiss	Scott Anderson		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	Shawn McLeod		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Mark Howard	Todd Marchand		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Kenneth Richards	Richard Weider		785th MP Bn (C/D)	Fraser, MI
Jeffrey Bergman	Teresa Duncan		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Kirt Boston	Bryan Lynch		793d MP Bn	Ft Richardson, AK
Mark McNeil	Eric Vogt		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Lonnie Branum Jr.	Scott Flint		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Sylvester Wegwu	Cole Pierce	Martin Eaves	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Dewey Haines	David Astorga	Lane Clooper	Washington CID Bn	Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA
Michael Thompson	Keith Ford	Gerald De Hoyos	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA

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# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
<b>Current Publications</b>			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	26 Aug 13	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	28 Apr 14	A manual that addresses detention operations across the range of military operations and provides detention operations guidance for commanders and staffs. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and military police Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATTP 3-39.20 (will be ATP 3-39.20)	Police Intelligence Operations	06 Apr 15	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. <b>Status:</b> Current.

# DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. <b>Status:</b> Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. <b>Status:</b> Current.
FM 3-19.4 (will be TC 3-39.30)	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	2 Aug 02	A manual that addresses military police maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment/resettlement, law and order, and police intelligence operations across the full spectrum of Army operations. It primarily focuses on the principles of platoon operations and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) necessary. <b>Status:</b> Under revision; projected for publication 1st quarter, FY 16.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. <b>Status:</b> Current.
<b>Note:</b> Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at < <a href="http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/">http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/</a> >. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to < <a href="mailto:usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddcodmpdoc@mail.mil">usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddcodmpdoc@mail.mil</a> >.			

*“Doctrine is indispensable to an Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”*

—General George H. Decker,  
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962





**PIN: 105310**