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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROVIDENCE, Se.

SUPERIOR COURT

LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY, INC.

C.A. No. 81-4091

MOTIFICATION TO THE COURT, THE DEM. THE DIRECTOR, AND THE TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD THAT LARR HEREBY EXERCISES ITS ENTITLEMENT, PURSUANT TO PAGE 6, PARAGRAPH 13 OF JUDGE ALMEIDA'S COURT ORDER OF JULY 13, 1983, TO STAY OPEN UNTIL APRIL 27, 1985, ON ACCOUNT OF INTERFERENCE WITH THE OPERATION OF LARR AND TRUCKS GOING TO IT

- 1. On July 13, 1983, after a hearing thereon, the Monorable Antonio S. Almeida entered a Court Order in this case. (A copy is attached.)
- 2. Judge Almeida's Court Order superseded all previous orders relating to LARR.
- 3. In their stead, Judge Almeida's Court Order set forth terms and conditions governing the continued operation and eventual closure of LARR.
- 4. Pursuant to Judge Almeida's Court Order, LARR had the right to take whatever tresh it wished, from whoever it liked, and in whatever quantities it wanted, subject only to the one proviso that L&RR comply with the terms and conditions set forth in Judge Almeida's Court Order.
 - 5. The Town, however, decided to defy Judge Almeida.

- The Town decided to do its best to interfere with LARR's operation and make it impossible for LARR to fill up on time.
- 7; The Town did this despite the fact that, as a party to this came, the Town was bound by the terms of the Court Order.
- Nevertheless, the Town entered into a campaign to frustrate and impede the shility of LARR to comply with the Court Order, by interfering with the operation of LARR and preventing certain trucks from going to it.
- 9. Lank had worked out an arrangement by which Truk-Away trucks would rouck all the Circ of Warwick's trush to LARR.
 - 10. This arrangement was crucial to LGRR's ability to fill up on time.
- 11. This arrangement would have provided LARX with a major mapply of trash; would have ensured that LARX could be ready to close on time; would have contributed substantially to LARX's profitability; and would have contributed substantially to LARX's financial ability to undertake the environmental measures required by the Court Order.
 - 12. The Town, however, was not about to let that happen.
- 1). In defiance of Judge Almeide's Court Order, the Town took it upon itself to disrupt and interfers with the operation of LARA and to use its best efforts to prevent trushs carrying Varvick trash from going to LARA, and thereby to cut off a major source of supply.
- 14. Toward that end, the Town enlisted the aid of the DEM and its Director.
 - 15. Together they succeeded.
- They successfully prevented trucks carrying the anticipated
 Warwick trash from going to L&RR.
 - 17. As a result, they made it impossible for LGRR to fill up on time.
- 18. As it turns out, however, Judge Almeida had anticipated and provided for such an eventuality.
- Judga Almeida explicitly conditioned the proposed closing date (January 13, 1985) upon there being no interference with the operation of LaX2 or trucks going to it, in the meantime. (See Court Order, page 6, paragraph 13a.)

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20. Evidently, such interference has occurred.

 In case of interference, Judge Almeida provided that LARR would be "emtilized" to operate past the January 13, 1985 deadline and would be "dillized"; to an extension of time and opace to compensate it for lost time and lost profits and additional costs and fees incerred.

22. On page 6, paragraph 13 of the Court Order, Judge Almeida provided:

"13. The time periods, terms, and conditions set forth herein are explicitly based on the assumption that there will be no interruption of or interference with the continued operation of LARR or trucks going to and from L&RR during that period. LARR will use its best efforts to avoid any such interruption or interference. In the event that any such interruption or interference nevertheless occurs for reasons beyond the control of LoRR, other than weather, earthquake, flood, snow or other Acts of God, then LARR shall be entitled to recoup lost time by operating past the deadline set forth in paragraph 1 above and shall be entitled to recoup lost profits and additional costs and fees incurred, by an extension of time and space." (Emphasis added.)

 LARR hereby notifies the Court, the DDM, the Director, and the Town of Swrth Smithfeld that it hereby-searcless its entitlement under page 6, paragraph 13 of Judge Almeida's Court Order to story open until April 27, 1985, on account of interference with its operation and with trucks going to it.

24. Of course, notice to the Town, the DDM and its Director is superfluous, since they elready are personally aware of these facts.

25. It was, after all, the Town, with the assistance of the DEM and the Director, which instigated the interference with LARR's business, such that page 6, paragraph 13 of the Court Order more comes into play.

26. On or about November 21, 1983, LARK and Truch-hosy presented a proposal-to-the. Nhode Island Solid Waste Nanagement Corporation ("MISHNO") by which all the City of Warvick's trash would be trucked to LARK (instead of to the RISHNO's Central Lendfill) and Truk-hosy would reactive credits to be used at a later date at the Central Lendfill, on a con-for-ten basis.

The RISNMC formally voted on and approved this proposal at its 'December 14, 1983 business secting. (See pp. 4-5 of the minutes of December 14, 1983 RISNMC meeting attached.)

- 28. The vote was unanimous.
- 29. The representative of the City of Varvick voiced no objection.
- 30. The Director of the DEM voted in favor of it.
- 31. The Director described the arrangement as "reasonabla" and said that it "makes sense for the town and state." (See Monsocket Call, Friday, December 16, 1983, p. 4 and Tuesday, December 20, 1983, p. 4, attached.)

32. A few days later, however, at the insistence of the Town of North Smithfield, the Director did his best to sabotage that arrangement.

33. At the Town's insistence, the Town got the Director to get the
RISWRC to delay implementation of the arrangement, while the Director pressed
for a result.

34. At the next meeting of the RISNRC, on January 18, 1984, the DDM official representing the Director made a motion_torwards—the represent_g greetously granted. (See minutes RISNRC meeting, January 18, 1984, pp. 2-4, attache4.)

- 35. What we have here is a curious situation indeed.
- 36. The Director and the DEM were parties to the Court Order.
- 37. Like the Town, they were bound by its terms and conditions.

38. Further, Judge Almeida had specifically ordered the DDM and its Directors to use their "Days_siforss" to "oppose any attempt to interfere, with The terms" of the Order. (See page 6, paragraph 9 of the Court Order.)

39. What we have is a party which sought the Court Order, which benefited by its approval, and which had been ordered by the Court to oppose any interference, severtheless agreeing (at the Town's insistence) to cut off a major source of supply, and thereby sabotage the Court's Order and impede LARFs ability to comply.

40. The DEM and the Director had a choice.

avail.

- 41. They could comply with Judge Almeida, or they could comply with the Town.
- 42. They chose to defy Judge Almeida and to cast their lot with the
- 43. The DEM's motion to rescind was defeated 3 to 2, but that was not the end of the story.
- 44. At that point, as Town Council minutes chronicle, the Town went on a two-promped attack, using both the Director and the City of Warwick.
- a two-promped attack, using both the Director and the City of Warwick.

 43. Efforts by L&ER to ask the Town to stop its campaign were to no
- 46. The Town got the Director once again to persuade the RISUMC to delay implementation of its arrangement with LARR. (See <u>Woonsocket Call</u>, January 31, 1984, p.4, attached.)
- 47. Similteneously, the Town carefully orchestrated a scenario by which the Town would ask the RISHOT to reconsider its vote and then have the City of Varvick object to the arrangement.
- 48. At the instigation and insistence of the Town, the City of Warwick agreed to do just that.
 - 49. This was a reversal of its earlier position,
- 30. It will be recalled that at the December 14, 1983 RISONC meeting at which the arrangement was originally approved, the representative of the City of Varwick voiced no objection.

51. Similarly, at the January 18, 1984 RISUNC meeting at which the DDM moved to rescind the arrangement, the representative of the City refrained from speaking against the arrangement.

52. Now, however, at the insistence of the Town of North Smithfield, the City appeared at the February 8, 1984 secting of the RISMC and voiced an objection:

 Explicitly besing its position on the Town's insistence, the City stated than "in view of Myrth Amithials"s position, Narvice Georgian was its vastation. And disposed of at LIMI in North Smithials." (See minutes, RISMC meeting of Forwary 8, 1984, p. 3.)

54. As a result, the Town was victorious.

35. Despite LERR's best efforts, the Town, with the aid and abetting of the DEM and Director, killed the arrangement.

36. As to the extent of damages inflicted, until now it was impossible reasonably to ascertain the extent of damages suffered by LARA as a result of the Town's actions.

37. At this juncture, LARR is able for the first time to make such an estimate based on its experience to date and its expectations for the next several months.

38. Ead the Town not interfered, Trul-may would have been able to truck all of the City of Warvich's trash to LARK from December 14, 1983 (the date of RIBMC approval) to January 13, 1985 (the date originally contemplated for LARK to Loses).

59. That's a total of 56 weeks.

60. In addition, over that same period of time, Truk-howy planned to make use of the transfer station in Warwick to combine trash from other Truk-howy customers with the Warwick trash and to truck them together in transfer trailers to LASS.

 Without the Warwick trash, however, that arrangement was no longer economically feasible. Because of the distances involved, it was not economical to make separate trips to LARR, without the Verwick trash.

63. The consequence of the Town's actions, therefore, was a loss to LARR of both of the City of Warvick's trash and of the trash of other customers of Trub-hosy which Trub-hosy was going to combine and heal together with the Warvick trash to LARR.

64. Warwick trash averages 797.3 tons per week.

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65. The trash from other customers that Truk-Away was going to combine with it averages 230.7 tons per week.

66. Therefore, the combined loss was 1,028 tons per week.

67. Consequently, LARR's loss, by virtue of the Town's actions, can now be calculated to be 1,028 tons per week x 56 weeks = 57,568 tons.

68. It is now evident that without this tomage, LARR will be unable to reach the dimensions to which it was entitled by the Court Order, by the deadline (January 13, 1985) originally contemplated therein.

 Furthermore, LARR has and will incur additional costs and fees and lost time, the extent of which cannot yet be ascertained.

70. As to the assumt of additional time to which LANK is entitled to recomp lost time and lost profits, LANK currently estimates based on anticipated volume and seasonal effects, that it will be necessary for LANK to stay open until April 27, 1985, to compensate it for the losses incurred because of this interference.

 Under page 6, paragraph 13 of Judge Almeida's Court Order, LSRR is also entitled to an extension of space.

72. LARR reserves the right to exercise that entitlement.

73. LARR, however, does not currently plan to exercise that excitlement unless there is further interference or an attempt to interfere with its business between now and April 27, 1985.

74. In closing, one further point should be made.

75. It can be expected that the Town, and for that matter maybe the DDM and Director, will criticize L&RR for exercising its entitlement.

N and Director, will criticise the state of the state of

76. However, they have no one to blame but themselves.

77. As to the Did and Director, they were specifically ordered by Judge-Almsida to use their best afforts to "oppose any attempt to interfere."

78. They chose, however, to disregard his directive.

79. They chose at the Town's insistence to use their best efforts to sabotage the Court Order and to impede LARR's ability to comply with it.

80. What was the state doing? It was supposed to be supporting this arrangement and instead it sabotaged it.

81. That is all the more true of the Town, which instigated the interference with LARR's business.

82. As noted, the Town, as a party to this action, was bound by the terms and conditions set forth by Judge Almeida.

83. Instead, the Town chose to defy him.

84. The Town, moreover, did this intentionally.

. 85. It was fully aware of the provisions of page 6, paragraph 13 of the Court Order.

86. As a party to this action, the Town was necessarily on notice.

87. Further, the attorney for LBRN had forewarmed the Town Council of the consequences of its intended action. (See minutes of Town Council meeting, January 23, 1984 (p. 117) attached.)

88. Nowever, if there is any doubt that the members of the Town Council were aware of the Court Order and its terms, the minutes of the Town Council meetings puts it to rest.

89. The minutes reveal that the Town Council repeatedly discussed the provisions of the Court Order, including page 6, paragraph 13, at successive Town Council meetings. (See minutes of Town Council meetings, December 19, 1983 (p. 104), January 23, 1984 (p. 117) and Tebruary 6, 1984 (p. 118) attached.)

90. Mevertheless, the Town persisted, fully aware of the consequences of its actions.

91. Consequently, the circumstances it finds itself in today are entirely of its own doing.

92. Had the Town not interfered, LSRR would have no right to stay open

93. Instead, because the Town interfered, LARR is entitled to stay open until April 27, 1985.

94. If the Town is unhappy with that prospect, it has no one to blame but itself.

Respectfully,

LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY, INC.

By its Attorneys, Coffey, McGovern, Moel & Meal, Ltd.

Dean W. Tenkin
20 Washington Place
Providence, Rhode Island

1, DAVID J. VILSOW, Vice President of Lendfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. and of Truk-howy of R.I., Inc. have read this document and acknowledge that the statements made therein are true to the best of my knowledge, information and bulist.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this /9= day of September, 1984.

Notary Public Noting Public My Sec. 19 506.

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LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

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CERTIFICATION

I, Desn N. Tenkin, hereby certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the vithin Notification to the offices of the Resemble Stemmin S. Albeida, at Recommendation of the Resemble Stemmin S. Albeida, at Recommendation of the Recommendation of the

Dog N. Tankin

-> Tom Epstin

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROVIDENCE, Sc.

LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY, INC.

C.A. No. 81-4091

SUPERIOR COURT

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND and ROBERT L. BENDICK, JR., in his capacity as Director of the Department of Environmental

in his capacity as Director of the Department of Environmental Management of the State of Rhode Island; TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD, Intervenor

PREHEARING MEMORANDUM

TRAVEL AND FACTS

Though the disagreements between the parties herein are of long duration, for purpose of resolving the instant dispute only those occurrences subsequent to entry of the Court's Order of July 13, 1983 (the Order) are of primary relevance. The parties' present dispute concerns the interpretation to be given certain language in the Order, as well as the appropriate procedure for resolving their differing interpretations.

The Order endorsed a "Consent Order and Agreement" (the Agreement) which was the product of negotiations between Landfill and Resource Recovery, Inc. (L&RR) and the Department of Environmental Management (DEM). It was the intention of both parties, by this method, to resolve all extant contested matters between them, save an inverse condemnation question. The first and most fundamental term of the Agreement provided for the closure of L&RR's landfill facility by a date certain, or when it reached a specified elevation, whichever occurred first (Provision \$1 of the Agreement). Without a finite period of operations, no consent agreement would have been possible.

Truk

Approximately six months after entry of the Order, LERR (or Truk Away, a related corporation) sought permission from the Solid Waste Management Corporation (SWMC) to accept and deposit municipal trash from the City of Warwick and to receive a credit therefor toward future dumping at the SWMC facility. The DEM Director, in his capacity as a Board member of the SWMC, initially supported the request. Subsequently, after discussions with officials of the Town of North Smithfield (where LERR's landfill facility is located), he was persuaded that, on balance, it was not appropriate to give special treatment to LERR (Truk Away)), and that the Town's concerns about increased truck traffic and litter were legitimate. In light of the City of Warwick's expression of opposition to its trash being sent to the LERR facility, the SWMC Board, at its February, 1984 meeting, wetermined that LERR's (Truk Away's) request had become moot.

It was not until September 19, 1984 that L&RR "notified" DEM, the Court and the Town that it considered the denial of L&RR's request to receive Warwick's trash, to receive a credit, and the events leading to that decision, to be in violation of the Order. Said notification, dated September 18, 1984, was not only belated by approximately six months, but is highly unorthodox in that it asserts a right to unilaterally disregard the clear terms of the Order.

Also, in September, 1984, L&RR advised DEM that it intended to pile trash at its facilitytoa height greater than the 370 feet maximum elevation specified in provision #3 of the Order.

In reaction to both these stated intentions by L&RR, DEM filed a Petition to Adjudge in Contempt and for the Appointment of a Master. L&RR has recently filed a Response to DEM's Petition. While it is unclear whether L&RR's "Notification" constitutes a pleading requiring any sort of response, DEM generally denies the factual allegations contained in the Notification and specifically denies that there has been any interference or interruption of L&RR's continued operations, within the meaning of the Agreement and Order.

ARGUMENT AND LAW

I. PROCEDURE

The matter at hearing is in an unusual posture. Rather than moving to amend that term of the Order establishing a final closure date, based on an allegation that another term of the Order had been violated, L&RR chose, rather, to file a "Notification" that it intended to unilaterally extend the date of closure to a date which it, alone, had selected. L&RR now in its Response to DEM's Petition, seeks to reverse its burden of proving its allegation that the "no interference" term had been violated by asserting that DEM somehow bears the burden of alleging and proving the "absence of interference."

This would appear to be an obvious attempt to avoid the normal procedures for moving to amend a Court Order, pursuant to R.C.P. 60, and to shift the heavy burden which such a movant would bear in seeking to modify a final Order. Posquozzi v. Posquozzi, 119 R.I. 554 (1977).

In the ordinary case, the rule is that a Consent Order cannot be changed without the assent of both parties or in the absence of one of the R.C.P. 60(b) factors such as fraud, mutual mistake, or changed circumstances justifying relief. Douglas Construction v. Wholesale Center, 119 R.I. 449, 452, 379 A.2d 917 (1977). DEM acknowledges that the Order herein provided an opportunity for L&RR to seek relief from its terms if there were "interruption of or interference with the continued operation of L&RR." It is submitted, however, that

as in any other situation where relief from a Court Order is sought, it is the obligation of the party seeking relief to allege, and carry the burden of persuasion, that the applicable standard has been met. DEM, theh, denies that there has been any interference or interruption within the meaning of the Order, and submitsthat it is L&RR's burden to prove otherwise.

It is not unreasonable to conclude that LERR has invented and utilized the "Notification" document, not only in an attempt to shift the burden of proof, but also to avoid the requirement of R.C.P. 60(b) that a motion for relief "be made within a reasonable time, and not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." It is clear that had LERR delayed bringing a motion for relief until September 19, 1984 it would have been barred by the one year time limit in R.C.P. 60(b). But even were the one year period not a bar, LERR has unreasonably delayed seeking relief. It was not until November 13, 1984, when it filed a "cross petition" as a part of its Response, that it asked the Court for relief. Thus, LERR did nothing for eight months after the last occurrence of which it complains, the February decision by the SWMC, to seek relief. Such a delay is unreasonable and LERR ought to be equitably barred and denied any relief for having failed to comply with R.C.P. 60(b).

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF THE ORDER

One of the substantive disputes in this proceeding concerns whether certain occurrences qualify as an "interruption of or interference with the continued operation of LSRR or trucks going to and from LSRR," language found in provision 13 of the Court Order. More specifically, the question at issue is whether the denial by the Solid Waste Management Corporation of LSRR's request that it be permitted to accept Warwick trash violated said provision. A resolution of the dispute depends on the interpretation or construction to be given to the terms "interruption," "interference" and "continued operation." It is the position of DEM that the events cited by LSRR do not fall within the constraints of the above-quoted phrase.

The Court need look no further than the Court Order itself to determine what the parties intended in using these terms. It should be noted, preliminarily, that the language in the Court Order is that which DEM and LaRR agreed to, and which the Judge effectuated by entering an Order in conformity with the parties' agreement.

It is fundamental that a Court first look to the written instrument, itself, to determine the intention of the parties, and in doing so, to give words their ordinary meaning. Mestinghouse Broadcasting v. Dial Media, 410 A.2d 988, 991 (R.I. 1980). Applying this principle, the Court will note that the phrase "continue to operate its solid waste disposal facility" appears in the very first line of the Consent Order and Agreement, and that the phrase "Continued operations at the landfill" appears in the first line of provision \$2 of said document. In addition, the Court will note that the term "operation," or some variant, appears elsewhere in the document, and in thoses exhibits incorporated therein (e.g. "operating hours").

CORRECTION

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It is in the context of these other uses that the language in provision \$13 should be interpreted. It is obvious, when so read, that the term "operations" refers to the mechanical and physical activities and processes which are in furtherance of landfilling at the LSRR site. LSRR would have the Court read the term "operation" to include business relationships, not only existing, but prospective. The use of the term in the Consent Order and Agreement is clearly not so broad. It refers to "continued operations at the landfill," to operating "its solid waste disposal facility," and is used in sequence with other physical tasks. ("final operation/closure, capping and methane recovery and removal" - provision 2a).

The interpretation advocated by DEM is consistent with Webster's preferred definition, "performance of a practical work or of something involving the practical application of principles or processes."

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979. L&RR has not, and cannot contend, that there has been any "interference" or "interruption" of the activities or processes at the landfill.

Furthermore, even were "operations" to be read so broadly as to include business relationships, no relationship which existed at the time of the entry of the Order, or which came into being subsequently, has been affected. The term "interrupt" implies a pre-existing situation or status quo. It is defined by Webster as "to stop or hinder by breaking in" and "to break the uniformity or continuity of -: to break in upon an action." Ibid.

While the term "interfere" is perhaps more vague, it must be remembered that it is used here with the word "continued," which means "lasting or extending without interruption." <u>Ibid</u>. The latter word precludes consideration of prospective relationships or expectancies.

At the time the Order was entered, L4RR was not receiving Warwick trash. And at no time subsequent to the entry of the ORder did it ever receive Warwick trash. It is difficult to conceive of how such a situation could ever be considered to be "continuing."

However, even assuming arquendo that any ambiguity as to the words "interfere," "interrupt" or "continued operation" remain after looking at the Order and Agreement as a whole, and giving them there ordinary meaning, it is submitted that it was not the parties' intent that m inability of LERR to obtain and deposit Warwick trash and to receive a credit would relieve LERR from the most fundamental provision of the Court Order, the date for closure.

The meaning to be given to the word "interfere" depends upon the understanding of the parties, determined not only from the words of the contract, but also from the circumstances surrounding the choice

of words, including representations made in the course of negotiations. U.S. v. Attick, 649 Fed.2d 61(), U.S. v. Carr 608 Fed.2d 886(), Hill v. M.S. Alper & Son, Inc., 166 R.I. 38, 47 256 A.2d 10, 15 (1969). As the evidence at hearing will show, there was no discussion of the circumstances of which L&RR presently complains, or ones even remotely similar. Rather, discussions concerned the implications of acts of civil disobedience such as blocking the road into the facility, labor strikes or the institution of legal proceedings by the Town or others, which would have the effect of preventing the landfill facility from operating for a time. There was clearly no discussion relating to the business relationships or commercial activities of L&RR.

Another rule of construction/interpretation instructs that terms of art should be applied so as to give effect to their legal meaning.

Greenwood v. Stevenson, 88 FRD 225 (USDCRI, 1980). The word "operations" (as well as "operator") is such a term of art in the solid waste management field. It refers to the mechanical and physical process of conducting solid waste management activities. For example, the State law pursuant to which LERR conducts its activities, provides the following definition.

"The term 'solid waste management facility' means any plant, structure, equipment, real and personal property, except mobile equipment or incinerators with a capacity of less than (1,00) pounds per hour, <u>operated</u> for the purpose of processing, treating, or disposing of solid waste but not segregated solid waste." (emphasis added) R.I.G.L. 823-18.9-7(3)

The authority for DEM to issue licenses uses the same verb,

"No person shall operate any solid waste management facility unless a license therefor is obtained from the director. The director shall have full power to make all rules and regulations establishing standards to be met for the issuance of such licenses." (emphasis added) R.I.G.L. \$23-18.9-8.

See also, R.I.G.L. 823-18.9-10 which imposes a penalty on "any person who operates such a facility without obtaining a license."

DEM's implementing regulations are replete with the term "operate" in its various forms. Rule 6.08 of the Rules and Regulations for Solid Waste Management Facilities (of which the Court is requested to take judicial notice) December 1, 1982 requires an applicant for a license to submit an "Operating Plan," which contains detailed information concerning twenty-five, or so, subjects among which are "operating hours," "winter operations," "salvaging operations," and "leachate treatment operations."

Fully ten pages, almost one third of the regulations, deal specifically with "Operating Regulations." Rules 9.00 - 9.15 apply to

"General Operating Standards," while Rules 10.00 - 10.17 govern
"Sanitary landfill Operating Standards." It is clear from even a
cursory examination of these standards that the term "operate" and
its derivative forms are used throughout in a technical sense. They
refer to those physical and mechanical activities conducted at a
solid waste management facility for the proper disposition of refuse.

Lerr cannot contend that its mechanical or physical activities have been either interrupted or interfered with.

Moreover, even if the word "operations" is read in a broader sense to include LeRR's business activities, the noun is modified by the adjective "continued." When read together, the phrase "continued operations" connotes a base line situation at the time of entry of the Order against which to assess whether there have been an interference. At that time of the Order, LeRR was receiving and depositing approximately 17,000 to 18,000 cubic yards of trash per week. At the time that it served its "Notification" it had doubled the amount of refuse which it was receiving and depositing to approximately 36,000 to 37,000 cubic yards per week. It would be a strange interpretation of the words "interference" or "interruption" and a "continued operation" where a doubling of one's activities, with presumably a commensurate increase in income, had occurred.

Furthermore, at the time that the Order was entered, LERR had no right, nor even an expectancy, that it would be receiving Warwick trash. State law creates a presumption that all municipal solid waste which cannot be disposed of within a municipality's boundaries, will be disposed of at the Central Landfill operated by the SWMC. R.I.G.L. 823-19-13. Under Rhode Island Law, LERR certainly had no protectible interest in what can only be reasonably termed the merest of expect-

ancies when it sought a credit from the SWMC. Rhode Island has not recognized a tort for interference with a prospective contractual relationship. <u>Federal Auto Body Works v. Aetna Casualty and Surety</u>,

R.I. , 447 A.2d 377, 379. It is suggested that Rhode Island tore law is instructive, by analogy, in resolving the dispute herein. Moreover, even if Rhode Island law did protect prespective business relationships, a party has no right to recover if the alleged interferring party has acted to protect its own legitimate interests. <u>Ibid</u> at 380, citing <u>Restatement</u> 2d) <u>Torts</u> \$769 at pg. 44. Here, the Town had a legitimate interest in protecting its citizenry from an increase in truck traffic, and the consequent increase in air and noise pollution, and possibility of vehicle accidents, and from the inevitable increase in litter.

III. REMEDY

LERR's recent response contends that a contempt proceeding is inappropriate because the eighteen month operational period has not yet expired. It is DEM's position that to wait until LERR's stated intention ripens into reality would create an untenable situation. From an environmental perspective, it is necessary that deposition of trash and the placement of cover material during the approximately two month period prior to closure occur in a manner that prevents the collection of rainwater and consequent generation of leachate to the groundwater. Were DEM required to wait until LERR continued its operations beyond the closure date, it is quite conceivable, that in order to minimize pollution of the groundwater, it would be compelled to support continued operations to properly configure the landfill.

The law has recognized a party's right to seek relief in anticipation of a threatened or predictable breach. In contract law, the doctrine of "anticipatory breach" or "anticipatory repudiation" gives an aggrieved party an immediate cause of action. Restatement, Contracts \$318. The doctrine recognizes the unfairness of requiring a party to wait if the other party has made clear that it has no intention to perform its obligations under the contract.

The Courts have recognized a similar unfairness, and approved a civil contempt remedy, when the threatened violation is of a Court Order as well. In commenting on a contention similar to that asserted by LERR, herein, the U.S. Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, observed,

'Appellant's final argument is that no violation of the 1965 order was proved. Apparently its premise is that the court should have waited until appellant actually sold the large quantity of unlicensed tetracycline it had already arranged to import and sell. We think that on these facts its position is incorrect. In the face of appellant's actions and its threats to Pfizer, there was no reason for Judge Ryan to wait until the last step was not past-Edwards has not yet been required to pay any fine, although it has been adjudged in civil contempt, it is on notice that if it proceeds with its improper plans to ignore the consent judgment, it will be liable to a fine of \$5,000 for each violation. This disposition of the matter makes good sense. See Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Cox. 252 F.24 d 67 (Zd Cir. 1958). "Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Davis Edwards Pharmacal Corp., (1967) 385 F.24 533, 537-38.

DEM has requested that the Court appoint a master to oversee the operation of LeRR's landfill, and to order LeRR to pay the costs of same. The Court clearly has the authority to do so, pursuant to R.C.P. 870 and R.C.P. 853, and R.I.G.L. 89-14-26. <u>Lincoln, Town of v. Cournoyer</u>, 110 R.I. 101, 106(). See also, Moore's, <u>Federal Practice</u>, 870.02, and cases cited therein and Wright and Miller,

83022, pg. 78, and cases cited therein regarding the analogous authority under Federal Rule of Procedure 870. Given L&RR's stated intention to extend its operations and the critical importance of the activities on site immediately prior to closure, it is submitted that appointment of a person to oversee the daily activities is warranted.

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT and ROBERT L. BENDICK, JR.

By their attorney,

Charles C. MeKinley Chief Legal Counsel Dept. of Environmental Management 83 Park Street Providence, Rhode Island 02903 401/277-2771

Filed 1/18/85 (CPS)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

PROVIDENCE, Sc.

SUPERIOR COURT

LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY, INC.

. .

C.A. No. 81-4091

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND ROBERT L. BENDICK, JR.
in nis capacity as Director of
the Department of Environmental
Management of the State of Rhode
Island; TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD,
Intervenor

DECISION

GIBNEY, J. This matter is before the Court on the Department of Environmental Management's ("DEM") petition to adjudge Landfill and Resource Recovery, Inc. ("LERR") in contempt, and for the appointment of a Master. LERR has filed a cross petition for declaratory relief.

This present action stems from a consent order and agreement signed by L&RR and DEM on July 13, 1983. The agreement allowed L&RR to continue operations at its dump for

0202U (CPS)

eighteen months, or until the dump reached a certain height, whichever came first.

LERR later arranged for Truk-Away, a trash nauling firm, to dump Warwick's Municipal trash at LERR. The LERR dump is located in North Smithfield. Truk-Away sought approval for this arrangement with the Solid Waste Management Corporation ("SWMC"). The SWMC denied approval after strong public protest from the Town of North Smithfield. LERR then notified the DEM that the denial constituted "interference", and that pursuant to the consent agreement, LERR's dump would stay open until April 27, 1985. The parties then filed their respective petitions.

The issue presented by these petitions is whether the DEM and the Town or North Smithfield interfered, within the meaning of the consent order and agreement, with LSRR's plan to process warwick Municipal trash.

LERR blames intense lobbying by the DEM and North Smithfield for Truk-Away's failure to obtain SWaC approval for dumping Warwick trasn at LERR. LERR claims that the lobbying constituted "interference" within the meaning of the agreement.

SWMC approval is needed for the dumping of municipal trash at out-of-town sites. R.I.G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) \$23-19-13. It is the policy of this state for the SWMC to act for the benefit of the people and municipalities.

0202U(CPS)

R.I.G.L. 1956 (1979 Reenactment) § 23-19-3. This means that the SWMC must take into account the views of a town when it reviews plans to dump another city's trash in that town. North Smithfield and the DEM were both acting through appropriate regulatory channels when they made their negative views known to the SWMC. It is the Court's opinion, however, that they were not interfering with L&RR's operations.

Larr also claims that without the Warwick trash, its dump could not "fill up on time", and that this interfered with its operations. Lark argues that the consent agreement gave L&RR eighteen months to reach a certain capacity. The Court disagrees. Provision number 1 of the Agreement states that the dump can operate for eighteen months or until a certain neight is reached, whichever occurs first. This provision is in the disjunctive. Therefore, the lapse of eighteen months alone is enough to close the dump, regardless of the amount of trash deposited in it.

The Court finds that the DEM and Town of North Smithfield have not interfered with L&RR's operation. petition is granted. The Court finds, however, that plaintiff, while technically not in compliance with the Order and Agreement of July 13, 1983, has not demonstrated any wilful intention to disobey said Order and Agreement. L&RR shall, nowever, forthwith commence closing of its landfill and forthwith cease disposing of trash at the North Smithfield site.

L&RR's petition is denied.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND PROVIDENCE, SC.

SUPREME COURT

LANDFILL AND RESOURCE

RECOVERY, INC.

CA#84-0260, CA#85-0028, and

CA#85-0153

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND and ROBERT L. BENDICK, JR., in his capacity : as Director of the Department : of Environmental Management of: the State of Rhode Island; TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD Intervenor

STIPULATION

WALTER 6

Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. and David J. William Resource the Department of Environmental Management of the State of Model Island and Robert L. Bendick, Jr. in his capacity as Diractor of the Department of Environmental Management of the State of Rhode Island and the Town of North Smithfield hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

- The appeal filed by Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. and David J. Wilson in CA #85-0028 and 85-0153 be and hereby is withdrawn and dismissed with prejudice.
- 2. The appeal filed by the Town of North Smithfield in Cl. 884-0260 be and hereby is withdrawn and dismissed with prejudice.
- 3. Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. hereby waives forever 3. Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. hereby waives forever its right to dispose of waste on any of its property located within the Town of North Smithfield. The parties hereto agree that the waiver by Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. set forth in the preceding sentence shall not affect nor shall it be introduced or used in any way in the proceedings pending before the Rhode Island Superior Court for Providence County under the name and style of Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, et al. CA 884-2467, including but not limited to as evidence in such proceedings.
- 4. It is acknowledged that the appeal filed by the Department of Environmental Management and Robert L. Bendick, Jr. in CA \$84-0367 from the decision and order of Mr. Justice Almeida dated on or about May 8, 1984, which appeal was filed in this Court on or about May 9, 1984, remains viable.

Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. and David J. Wilson

by Jean N. Temkin, Esq. Willey & LeRoy, Ltd. 10 Dorrance Street Providence, RI 02903

ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

1

TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD

Faul P. Baillargeon Town Solicitor 800 Providence Street Providence, RI 02895

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND AND ROBERT L. BENDICK, JR., in his capacity as Director of the Department of Environmental Management of the State of Rhode Island

charles McKinley, Esq. chief Counsel Department of Environmental Management 33 Park Street Providence, RI 02903

FRMS/L

March 1978 - R. S. Department of Enveronmental Management WEM, began accepting manifests for neighbours possessed from hearfill and lessure seconery (LIRR). May 10,1978 - Convergmental links list served into law

May 10, 1978 - Environmental lights Act segued into law by severnow Gerrady

· Dec 1,1919 - I fund of Burrillville and No. Smithfeld petitional life for sid water the Confirmmental higher let to stage the disposal of hazardyna whate at of the and Gretten and one search.

· January 1979 - No. Smithfield teur, government first notified by RT. DEM elect Regardons waste was being accepted at Fill.

Fek 12,1979 - Request by towns of No. Smithfield and Burnellold (100.1,1978) & Att. Staneral is office denied frequency of the initiation of and will met surprise the initiation of legal action appearst Heitern Landaud bravel slanders any statisticy in Common lawindex any statisticy in Common lawprinciple. In power not mentional in
their denied.

Fet 1979 - No Smithpeld town Souncilman Kanett Granchi requested a federal investigation of the 2 local Regardone title In a meeting with David Nuter environmental engineer, paid waste office implementation division of EPA, Washington office.

April 24, 1979 - Western Sand and Gravel Closed by SER. april 24, 1979 - EPA fact finding mission regarding · May 1979 - Nagan Bill gereel. Hagan till bone the degrad of hearthwarter breggly.

Nagan till netted by Gor Garrady.

Nagan till paced into law, Gor Garrady with over overredden.

May 1979 - No Smithfell building injector seried order directing tollto stap hazarbusineste diegosal belowe it was an illegal expansion of a non-confirming wee.

June 18,1979 - No. Smithfuld town council passed an ordinance banning Asyardow water degreed above sendingsbund water supplies - aguifu zoning.

Sept 6,1979 - Hagan Bill imelemented by DEM. Hill prohibited from accepting Ragardone waste

Sept. 24, 1979 - R.D. Superior Court denied JARR petition & continue accepting hazardown waste.

" Oct. 17, 1979 - Town of No. Smithfull released that recentle done by Collo Rabinature of Cambridge Mach showing Contamination of off- wie wells at Loke.

Oct. 19, 1979 - Test well off-site at Lel mepteriously destroyed.

Dec. 1979 - No. Smithfull town Council request of EPA acrial infra-red photos of XXR

Dec. 21, 1979 - U-2 Slight for infra-red photoe took

3.

March, 1980 - Goning hearings against Loke conclude March 12, 1980 - DEN, EPA, and ERCO faboratories for the town of the smithpield and the sampled hew Bar cad well installed up the Hell site by the plate DEM. Oct. 1980 - No Smithfield town government hired the ger hydrological firm of Whitman and Haward of Welley, Marso to conduct a survey of Joke. Nov. 1980 - No. Smithfull town Council request that & F. M. reget the Box De 125 relicencing of arch. DEM hearings regarding the relicensing of LARR. FIT Project Report released.

(Field Drivetly actions of Micontrolled Majardone Trick Little gregories by Coology and Eurocomment, Sec. for EIR Region I F1-8/03.03) Fet. 1981 - Boldberg, Joins and as Inc. letter indicating the two Bar cal wells installed by K.J. DEM in Feb 1990 installed by K.J. DEM in Feb 1990 april 9, 1981 were damlaged before the first March 1900) EPA Region I - Specontrolled Hazardous Hade Dio. Conducted that for prisorty polletante on all wells for and off the John property well have surface to the John property . May 1981 including surface water simples (FIT Mayer)

March, 1980 - EPA began removal of lequid climical waste at Feter Land pravel

· August 1981 - Publication of Presults of May 1991 tests by EPA (FIT Project FI-8107-03)

Oct 31, 1911 - Si M descriver on relicencing of Jekl. Lette morterly section (plusby stave portion) ordered closed. Environmental sefeguarde ordered installed and monitoring required. Dermeasin to be granted to open houthulf section if pringle environmental perfequent implemental.

. Nov. 1981 - J. KR requested a stay of DE Morder y Oct 31, 1967

· Dec. 1981 - X+RR granted stayin L.I. Superist Court.

Dec. 1981 - DEM again closed LARR bacel on Nov. 1981 text results submitted & DEM by XARR. Then text results plowed contamination LAR refued to close,

· Jan. 1982 - Lokk brought contempt of court suit against & Ele and W. Edward Wood, director.

· Jan. 1982 - R.J. Superior Court found DEM in Contempt of Court. DEM withdrew order to Close L+RR.

LAW OFFICES PAUL P. BAILLARGEON INC. Union Square 800 PROVIDENCE STREET WOONSOCRET, RHODE ISLAND 02895

(401) 762-0434

MEMORANDUM

RE: LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY, INC. AND: THE TOWN OF NORTH SMITHFIELD

The following documents are submitted as a chronological summary of the Landfill facility overlying a stratified drift aquifer as defined by the United States Geological Survey and subsequent testing reports taken both on and off the site as well as several summaries prepared by consultants to the Town of North Smithfield.

Letter to Daniel Prentiss from Herbert E. Johnston Erco Test Results Erco Test Results Erco Test Results Erco Test Results Decision of Frank P. Geremia, Adjudication Hearing Officer of the Department of Environmental Management Report of Mintema & Noward Environmental Impact Assessment - Groundwater Integrity as affected by Heazardous Solid Waste Land Disposal Site FIT Project - Task Report to the Environmental Protection Agency Report of Whitman & Howard 8/27/79 10/16/79 3/26/80 4/17/80 10/5/80

10/29/80 5/81

8/31/81

10/14/81

United States Geological Survey - Availability of Ground Water in the Blackstone River Area, Rhode Island and Massachusetts

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

1

ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING NOTICE


Notice is hereby given that administrative hearings will be held by the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management at 9:30 AM in Room 313 of the State House on 27 November 1979 and 29 November 1979 concerning Landfill & Resource Recovery, Inc. (L. & R. R.) of North Smithfield, Rhode Island. These hearings will be open to the public and will be conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 42-35 of the Rhode Island General Laws.


On 27 November 1979 a hearing will be conducted on the question whether


L. & R. R., by accepting for disposal wastes other than those identified in its
notification to the Department of Environmental Management dated 15 March 1978,
violated Rule 4.02 of the Hazardous Waste Disposal Facility Rules And Regulations,
effective 21 December 1978, and Rule 33.06 of the Hazardous Waste Management
Facility Operating Permit Rules And Regulations - Landfills, effective 10 September 19

In addition, a hearing will be conducted on 27 November 1979 on the question whether the facility of L. & R. R. should be directed by the Department of Environmental Management to permanently cease the acceptance and disposal of hazardous wastes, including septic wastes for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Town Solicitor of the Town of North Smithfield and pursuant to Section 23-46.2-10.1 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, as amended.

On 29 November 1979, pursuant to an Order of the Superior Court issued on 12 October 1979, the Director of the Department of Environmental Management will conduct a hearing to afford the Town of North Smithfield the opportunity to demonstrate through evidentiary presentation whether any activity which has been conducted at the facility of L. & R. R. has been in violation of an environmental quality standard, as that term is used in Chapter 10-20 of the General Laws of Rhode Island, as amended, and whether such standard should be enforced by the











being filmed

PS Form 3800, Apr. 1976





L&R 002

LANDFILL & RESOURCE RECOVERY
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

NOTICE: if the film image is less clear than this notice, it is due to the quality of the document being filmed