

New Europe College Yearbook 2007-2008



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CRISTINA CIUCU
MARIAN COMAN
GABRIEL HORAȚIU DECUBLE
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OVIDIU OLAR
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OVIDIU PIETRĂREANU
EMILIA PLOSCEANU
MIHAELA TIMUȘ

New Europe College
Yearbook 2007-2008

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CONTENTS

**NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION
NEW EUROPE COLLEGE**

7

MIREL BĂNICĂ
ENTRE HISTOIRE ET MÉMOIRE :
PLACE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ, BUCAREST

19

CRISTINA CIUCU
THE ANTI-ZIONIST IDEOLOGY OF THE SATMAR (SATU MARE)
HASIDIC COMMUNITY.
ITS MAJOR TENETS AND IMPLICATIONS

57

MARIAN COMAN
EXPERIENCING OTHERNESS.
BERTRANDON DE LA BROQUIÈRE'S PILGRIMAGE
TO JERUSALEM (1432)

85

GABRIEL HORAȚIU DECUBLE
„DIE UNTHEILBARE GEMEINSCHAFT DER HEILIGEN“.
SCHLEIERMACHERS LAODIZEE

121

PETRE RADU GURAN
DOES “POLITICAL THEOLOGY” EXPLAIN THE
FORMATION OF ORTHODOXY?

157

OVIDIU OLAR
ORTHODOXIE ET POLITIQUE.
LE SYNODE DE TÂRGOVIȘTE (JANVIER 1659)

187

CAMIL ALEXANDRU PÂRVU
BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PUBLIC REASON:
ON THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF
DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIONS

217

CĂTĂLIN PAVEL
THE MEMORY OF LYNKEUS –
RECORDING THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATION
Proposal for a system to be used in Romania

241

OVIDIU PIETRĂREANU
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SPACE, SPATIALIZATION OF CONCEPTS
AND METAPHORIZATION OF NAMES OF BODY PARTS IN ARABIC,
HEBREW AND SYRIAC

279

EMILIA PLOSCEANU
L'INTERNATIONALISATION DES SCIENCES ET
TECHNIQUES RÉFORMATRICES LES SAVANTS ROUMAINS ET
LA FONDATION ROCKEFELLER (1918-1940)

317

MIHAELA TIMUȘ
« PENCHER D'UN CÔTÉ VERS L'AUTRE »
Le symbolisme de la balance
(grec *tálanda/zugón* ; moyen perse *tarāzūg*)

347

NEW EUROPE FOUNDATION NEW EUROPE COLLEGE

Institute for Advanced Study

New Europe College (NEC) is an independent Romanian institute for advanced study in the humanities and social sciences founded in 1994 by Professor Andrei Pleșu (philosopher, art historian, writer, Romanian Minister of Culture, 1990–1991, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1997-1999) within the framework of the *New Europe Foundation*, established in 1994 as a private foundation subject to Romanian law.

Its impetus was the *New Europe Prize for Higher Education and Research*, awarded in 1993 to Professor Pleșu by a group of six institutes for advanced study (the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National Humanities Center, Research Triangle Park, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, Wassenaar, the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Uppsala, and the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin).

Since 1994, the NEC community of fellows and *alumni* has enlarged to over 500 members. In 1998 the New Europe College was awarded the prestigious *Hannah Arendt Prize* for its achievements in setting new standards in research and higher education. New Europe College is officially recognized by the Romanian Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation as an institutional structure for postgraduate studies in the humanities and social sciences, at the level of advanced studies.

Focused primarily on research at an advanced level, NEC strives to create an institutional framework with strong international links that offers to the young scholars and academics in the fields of humanities and social sciences from Romania, and to the foreign scholars invited as

fellows working conditions similar to those in the West, and provides a stimulating environment for interdisciplinary dialogue and critical debates. The academic programs NEC coordinates and the events it organizes aim at promoting contacts between Romanian scholars and their peers worldwide, at cultivating the receptivity of academics and researchers in Romania for fields and methods as yet not firmly established here, thus contributing to the development of a core of gifted young academics and scholars, expected to play a significant role in the renewal of research and higher education in Romania.

Academic programs currently organized and coordinated by NEC:

- ***NEC Fellowships (since 1994)***

Each year, up to ten NEC Fellowships for outstanding young Romanian scholars in the humanities and social sciences are publicly announced. The Fellows are chosen by the NEC international Academic Advisory Board for the duration of one academic year (October through July). They gather for weekly seminars to discuss the progress of their research, and participate in all the scientific events organized by NEC. The Fellows receive a monthly stipend for the duration of nine months, and are given the opportunity of a one-month research trip abroad, at a university or research institute of their choice. At the end of the academic year, the Fellows submit papers representing the results of their research, which are published in the New Europe College Yearbooks. This program also includes a number of international fellowships.

- ***Ștefan Odobleja Fellowships (since October 2008)***

The fellowships given in this program are supported by the National Council of Scientific Research in Higher Education, and are meant to complement and enlarge the core fellowship program. The definition of these fellowships is identical with those in the NEC Program, in which the Odobleja Fellows are integrated.

- ***The GE-NEC III Fellowships Program (since October 2009)***

A new program supported by the Getty Foundation started this academic year. It proposes a research on, and a reassessment of Romanian art during the interval 1945 – 2000, that is, since the onset of the Communist regime in Romania up to recent times, through contributions coming from young scholars attached to the New Europe College as Fellows. As in the previous programs supported by the Getty Foundation at the NEC, this program will also include a number of invited guest lecturers, whose presence is meant to ensure a comparative dimension of the program, and to strengthen the methodological underpinnings of the research conducted by the Fellows.

- ***The Black Sea Link (starting in October 2010)***

This Fellowship Program, sponsored by the VolkswagenStiftung, invites young researchers from Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as from other countries within the Black Sea region, for a stay of one or two terms at the New Europe College, during which they will have the opportunity to work on projects of their choice. The program welcomes a wide variety of disciplines in the fields of humanities and social sciences. Besides hosting a number of Fellows, the College will organize within this program workshops and symposia on topics relevant to the history, present, and prospects of this region.

Other fellowship programs organized since the founding of New Europe College:

- ***RELINK Fellowships (1996–2002)***

The RELINK Program targeted highly qualified young Romanian scholars returning from studies or research stays abroad. Ten RELINK Fellows were selected each year through an open competition; in order to facilitate their reintegration in the local scholarly milieu and to improve their working conditions, a support lasting three years was offered, consisting of: funds for acquiring scholarly literature, an annual allowance enabling the recipients to make a one-month research trip

to a foreign institute of their choice in order to sustain existing scholarly contacts and forge new ones, and the use of a laptop computer and printer. Besides their individual research projects, the RELINK fellows of the last series were also required to organize outreach activities involving their universities, for which they received a monthly stipend. NEC published several volumes comprising individual or group research works of the RELINK Fellows.

- ***The NEC–LINK Program (2003 - 2009)***

Drawing on the experience of its NEC and RELINK Programs in connecting with the Romanian academic milieu, NEC initiated in 2003, with support from HESP, a program that aimed to contribute more consistently to the advancement of higher education in major Romanian academic centers (Bucharest, Cluj–Napoca, Iași, Timișoara). Teams consisting of two academics from different universities in Romania, assisted by a PhD student, offered joint courses for the duration of one semester in a discipline within the fields of humanities and social sciences. The program supported innovative courses, conceived so as to meet the needs of the host universities. The grantees participating in the Program received monthly stipends, a substantial support for ordering literature relevant to their courses, as well as funding for inviting guest lecturers from abroad and for organizing local scientific events.

- ***The GE–NEC I and II Programs (2000 – 2004, and 2004 – 2007)***

New Europe College organized and coordinated two cycles in a program financially supported by the Getty Foundation. Its aim was to strengthen research and education in fields related to visual culture, by inviting leading specialists from all over the world to give lectures and hold seminars for the benefit of Romanian undergraduate and graduate students, young academics and researchers. This program also included 10–month fellowships for Romanian scholars, chosen through the same selection procedures as the NEC Fellows (see above). The GE–NEC Fellows were fully integrated in the life of the College, received a monthly stipend,

and were given the opportunity of spending one month abroad on a research trip. At the end of the academic year the Fellows submitted papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the GE–NEC Yearbooks series.

- ***NEC Regional Fellowships (2001 - 2006)***

In 2001 New Europe College introduced a regional dimension to its programs (hitherto dedicated solely to Romanian scholars), by offering fellowships to academics and researchers from South–Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Turkey). This program aimed at integrating into the international academic network scholars from a region whose scientific resources are as yet insufficiently known, and to stimulate and strengthen the intellectual dialogue at a regional level. Regional Fellows received a monthly stipend and were given the opportunity of a one–month research trip abroad. At the end of the grant period, the Fellows were expected to submit papers representing the results of their research, published in the NEC Regional Program Yearbooks series.

- ***The Britannia–NEC Fellowship (2004 - 2007)***

This fellowship (1 opening per academic year) was offered by a private anonymous donor from the U.K. It was in all respects identical to a NEC Fellowship. The contributions of Fellows in this program were included in the NEC Yearbooks.

- ***The Petre Țuțea Fellowships (2006 – 2008, 2009 - 2010)***

In 2006 NEC was offered the opportunity of opening a fellowships program financed the Romanian Government through its Department for Relations with the Romanians Living Abroad. Fellowships are granted to researchers of Romanian descent based abroad, as well as to Romanian researchers, to work on projects that address the cultural heritage of the Romanian *diaspora*. Fellows in this program are fully integrated in the College’s community. At the end of the year they submit papers representing the results of their research, to be published in the bilingual series of the *Petre Țuțea* Program publications.

- ***Europa Fellowships (2006 - 2010)***

This fellowship program, financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, proposes to respond, at a different level, to some of the concerns that had inspired our *Regional Program*. Under the general title *Traditions of the New Europe. A Prehistory of European Integration in South-Eastern Europe*, Fellows work on case studies that attempt to recapture the earlier history of the European integration, as it has been taking shape over the centuries in South–Eastern Europe, thus offering the communitarian Europe some valuable vestiges of its less known past.

- ***Robert Bosch Fellowships (2007 - 2009)***

This fellowship program, funded by the Robert Bosch Foundation, supported young scholars and academics from Western Balkan countries, offering them the opportunity to spend a term at the New Europe College and devote to their research work. Fellows in this program received a monthly stipend, and funds for a one-month study trip to a university/research center in Germany.

New Europe College has been hosting over the years an ongoing series of lectures given by prominent foreign and Romanian scholars, for the benefit of academics, researchers and students, as well as a wider public. The College also organizes international and national events (seminars, workshops, colloquia, symposia, book launches, etc.).

An important component of NEC is its library, consisting of reference works, books and periodicals in the humanities, social and economic sciences. The library holds, in addition, several thousands of books and documents resulting from private donations. It is first and foremost destined to service the fellows, but it is also open to students, academics and researchers from Bucharest and from outside it.

Beside the above–described programs, New Europe Foundation and the College expanded their activities over the last years by administering, or by being involved in the following major projects:

In the past:

- ***The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Religious Studies towards the EU Integration (2001–2005)***

Funding from the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Gesellschaft enabled us to select during this interval a number of associate researchers, whose work focused on the sensitive issue of religion related problems in the Balkans, approached from the viewpoint of the EU integration. Through its activities the institute fostered the dialogue between distinct religious cultures (Christianity, Islam, Judaism), and between different confessions within the same religion, attempting to investigate the sources of antagonisms and to work towards a common ground of tolerance and cooperation. The institute hosted international scholarly events, issued a number of publications, and enlarged its library with publications meant to facilitate informed and up-to-date approaches in this field.

- ***The Septuagint Translation Project (since 2002)***

This project aims at achieving a scientifically reliable translation of the Septuagint into Romanian by a group of very gifted, mostly young, Romanian scholars, attached to the NEC. The financial support is granted by the Romanian foundation *Anonimul*. Seven of the planned nine volumes have already been published by the Polirom Publishing House in Iași.

- ***The Excellency Network Germany – South–Eastern Europe Program (2005 - 2008)***

The aim of this program, financed by the Hertie Foundation, has been to establish and foster contacts between scholars and academics, as well as higher education entities from Germany and South–Eastern Europe, in view of developing a regional scholarly network; it focused preeminently on questions touching upon European integration, such as transnational governance and citizenship. The main activities of the program consisted of hosting at the New Europe College scholars coming from Germany, invited to give lectures at the College and at universities throughout Romania, and organizing international scientific events with German participation.

- ***The ethnoArc Project–Linked European Archives for Ethnomusicological Research***

An European Research Project in the 6th Framework Programme: Information Society Technologies–Access to and Preservation of Cultural and Scientific Resources (2006-2008)

The goal of the *ethnoArc* project (which started in 2005 under the title *From Wax Cylinder to Digital Storage* with funding from the Ernst von Siemens Music Foundation and the Federal Ministry for Education and Research in Germany) was to contribute to the preservation, accessibility, connectedness and exploitation of some of the most prestigious ethno-musicological archives in Europe (Bucharest, Budapest, Berlin, and Geneva), by providing a linked archive for field collections from different sources, thus enabling access to cultural content for various application and research purposes. The project was run by an international network, which included: the “Constantin Brăiloiu” Institute for Ethnography and Folklore, Bucharest; Archives Internationales de Musique Populaire, Geneva; the Ethno-musicological Department of the Ethnologic Museum Berlin (Phonogramm Archiv), Berlin; the Institute of Musicology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest; Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Coordinator), Berlin; New Europe College, Bucharest; FOKUS Fraunhofer Institute for Open Communication Systems, Berlin.

Ongoing projects:

The Medicine of the Mind and Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England: A new Interpretation of Francis Bacon (A project under the aegis of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grants Scheme) – In cooperation with the Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, London (since December 2009)

Business Elites in Romania: Their Social and Educational Determinants and their Impact on Economic Performances. This is the Romanian contribution to a joint project with the University of Sankt Gallen, entitled ***Markets for Executives and Non-Executives in Western and eastern Europe***, and financed by the National Swiss Fund for the Development of Scientific Research (SCOPES) (since December 2009)

Civilization. Identity. Globalism. Social and Human Studies in the Context of European Development (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the Romanian Academy (starting October 2010)

The EURIAS Fellowship Programme, a project initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study), coordinated by the RFIEA (Network of French Institutes for Advanced Study), and co-sponsored by the European Commission's 7th Framework Programme - COFUND action. It is an international researcher mobility programme in collaboration with 14 participating Institutes of Advanced Study in Berlin, Bologna, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Cambridge, Helsinki, Jerusalem, Lyons, Nantes, Paris, Uppsala, Vienna, Wassenaar. The programme will issue its first call in the nearest future.

DOCSOC, Excellency, Innovation and Interdisciplinarity in doctoral and postdoctoral studies in sociology (A project in the Development of Human Resources, under the aegis of the National Council of Scientific Research) – in cooperation with the University of Bucharest (starting July 2010)

Other projects are in the making, often as a result of initiatives coming from fellows and *alumni* of the NEC.

Present Financial Support

The State Secretariat for Education and Research of Switzerland
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Le Ministère Français des Affaires Etrangères – Ambassade de France en Roumanie
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Porticus Düsseldorf, Germany
VolkswagenStiftung, Hanover, Germany
The Getty Foundation, Los Angeles, USA
The Swiss National Science Foundation, Bern, Switzerland
Seventh Framework Programme of the European Communities, ERC Executive Agency

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The Romanian Union of Architects (UAR)

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Stages de recherche au Canada (Université Laval) et France (EHESS)
entre 2004 et 2006

Livres :

Biserică, Stat, Societate în anii 30 (Église, État et Société dans les années trente),
Editions Polirom, Iași, 2007

Locul celuiilalt – ortodoxia în modernitate (Le lieu de l'autre- l'Orthodoxie dans
la modernité), Editions Paideia, Bucarest, 2007

Enervări - sau bucuria de a trăi în România (Enervements- ou la joie de vivre en Roumanie), Editions Polirom, Iasi, 2007, collection littéraire « Ego-prose ».

ENTRE HISTOIRE ET MÉMOIRE : PLACE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ, BUCAREST

Brève histoire et géographie symbolique

Depuis toujours, le point de la ville de Bucarest appelé *Place de l'Université* a eu une signification à part sur la carte. Au XV^{ème} siècle, à son actuel emplacement se trouvait un important carrefour de la ville, point de rencontre entre trois grands faubourgs : Coltea, Enei et Sarindar. Chaque faubourg avait sa propre église ; d'ailleurs, les églises Enei et Coltea ont subsisté jusqu'à nos jours, dans un bon état de conservation. A la fin du XVII^{ème} siècle (plus exactement en 1694), sous le règne du prince Constantin Brâncoveanu (Brancovan) (1654-1714), voit le jour la première école supérieure de la province de Valachie, *Academia Domneasca Sfântul Sava* (Académie princière Saint Sabas). Ses locaux se trouvaient exactement sur l'actuel emplacement de l'Université de Bucarest et les cours étaient fréquentés non seulement par des étudiants roumains, mais également par des jeunes fortunés venus des provinces des Balkans. L'école subsistera jusqu'à la moitié du XIX^{ème} siècle. L'année 1857 marque le début de la construction du bâtiment principal de l'Université de Bucarest, tel que nous le connaissons aujourd'hui. Au début du XX^e siècle, un autre bâtiment universitaire sera construit à côté de l'Université et va définir le caractère de la place. Il s'agit de l'Institut National d'Architecture, construit selon le goût de l'époque, dans le style « national » roumain, rappelant les maisons fortes de boyards de Valachie, les « cules », bâtiments répandus d'ailleurs dans tous les Balkans.

Entre 1877 et 1940, un groupe de quatre imposantes statues sont érigées vis-à-vis du bâtiment de l'Université. Parmi celles-ci, se distingue la statue du prince Michel le Brave (1557-1601) le premier à avoir réussi à réunir, contre les Turcs, le Saint Empire germanique, et contre les Polonais, certes pour une courte période, en 1600, les principautés médiévales de Valachie, Transylvanie et Moldavie, composantes de la

Roumanie moderne (voir la photo no.1). La statue du vaillant prince brandissant sa terrible hache de guerre, deviendra, au fil du temps, un lieu de rassemblement très connu pour les étudiants et tous les mouvements de protestation de la jeunesse. La statue a été réalisée selon les plans du français Albert Ernest Carrier Belleuse et dévoilée le 08 novembre 1870, après des longues controverses concernant son emplacement et ses qualités artistiques¹. Au fil du temps, la statue et ses alentours devient un lieu de rassemblement très prisé par la jeunesse estudiantine et les cérémonies publiques organisées par l'Etat roumain. En novembre 1880, devant cette statue le Roi Charles I organise des cérémonies fastueuses afin de commémorer l'indépendance du pays.*

Le 13 mars 1906, le très jeune historien (à l'époque il avait seulement 35 ans) Nicolae Iorga rassemble devant la statue un grand nombre d'étudiants, défenseurs de la culture dite « nationale », afin de protester contre la représentation d'une pièce de théâtre en langue française. La Police et l'armée interviennent en force, laissant derrière elles des nombreux blessés parmi les jeunes². La statue et ses alentours sont devenus depuis une place pour « rassembler » le peuple, un lien entre le passé « glorieux » incarné dans la personne du prince et la volonté de protester contre tout pouvoir en place, comme c'était le cas en janvier 1940, quand la rébellion légionnaire éclate. Les jeunes légionnaires demandent la mise en place d'un gouvernement de la Garde de Fer, ainsi que de mesures fortes contre leurs adversaires politiques.

Le monument du prince marque l'espace de la Place de l'Université et reste au centre de la vie publique de la ville, y compris pendant la période communiste. Entre octobre et décembre 1949, dans la Place se déroule un grand meeting à l'occasion de la « Journée mondiale de lutte pour la paix » et l'anniversaire de Staline³. Pendant les manifestations de décembre 1989 contre le pouvoir de Nicolae Ceausescu, le drapeau roumain, avec l'enseigne du parti communiste centrale arrachée, a été d'ailleurs hissé sur la statue, une forte réappropriation d'un symbole de résistance.

Vers l'Est, la perspective de la Place de l'Université est complétée par deux bâtiments récents, mais qui auront aussi un rôle à jouer après 1990 dans la construction et le « fonctionnement » de ce *lieu de mémoire*, que nous allons définir plus loin. Il s'agit du massif bâtiment du Théâtre National de Bucarest, inauguré en décembre 1973 et de l'Hôtel

* Les photos présentées dans cet article font partie de l'archive personnelle de l'auteur.



Intercontinental, jusqu'à récemment le plus haut bâtiment de la ville (28 étages). L'Hôtel Intercontinental (appartenant à la chaîne internationale du même nom), a été longtemps un symbole de l'ouverture du régime de Nicolae Ceausescu vers l'Occident dans ses années de gloire et ensuite, ironie de l'Histoire, pendant sa chute, un point d'observation privilégié sur la Place de l'Université pour les observateurs étrangers. L'architecture du théâtre national, tributaire à un style très éclectique, a été l'objet de toutes les contestations, dès le moment de la fondation de cette institution⁴.

Les faits. La construction d'un lieu de mémoire Décembre 1989

Le soir du 21 décembre 1989, vers 18h00, des manifestants anti-Ceausescu venus de tous les coins de la ville ont dressé des barricades improvisées autour de la Place de l'Université. La riposte des forces de l'ordre, notamment celle des troupes de l'ancienne *Securitate* (la police politique de l'Etat) a été très forte. Des véhicules blindés de l'armée de terre ont fait usage de leur armement lourd, les traces des projectiles étant encore visibles sur le mur de l'Institut roumain d'architecture. Les mêmes véhicules blindés ont été lancés, sur l'ordre personnel de Nicolae Ceausescu, dans la masse des manifestants qui avaient réussi à bloquer la grande avenue Magheru, qui traverse la place. À partir de 22 heures, une vague d'arrestations commence, les manifestants sont abattus à bout portant, entassés dans des bus de la police et transportés dans les diverses prisons de Bucarest. Le nombre exact des victimes reste encore inconnu. De nos jours, on soupçonne qu'entre 50 et 100 personnes y ont trouvé la mort.

Le matin du 22 décembre, Place du Palais de Bucarest. Le grand rassemblement populaire voulu par Nicolae Ceausescu afin que le « peuple » condamne la rébellion de Timisoara dégénère vite en peur et chaos généralisé. L'image de celui qui était nommé par toutes les médias de l'époque comme étant le « plus aimé fis du peuple », le visage sculpté par l'indécision et la perplexité devant la foule insoumise, restera l'une des symboles les plus forts de la chute du communisme à l'Est. Après l'envol du couple en hélicoptère à la recherche d'un lieu de refuge, des milliers de bougies en cire blanche brûlent sur le parvis de l'Université où a coulé le sang des manifestants, presque un autel à ciel ouvert. La place de l'Université et ses alentours devient un immense bougeoir à ciel

ouvert. Elle est consacrée ainsi comme un haut lieu de la lutte contre le totalitarisme.

La ville entière porte désormais la trace de la Révolution. Même les pavages sont utilisés pour raconter l'histoire et le déroulement des événements : « Ici, des gens sont morts. Marchez respectueusement. Il y a du sang sur les pavés⁵ ». La fête de Noël de décembre 1989 est investie à son tour d'une double signification : religieuse et civique ; elle devient le synonyme de la liberté retrouvée des Roumains. *De Crăciun, ne-am luat rația de libertate* (De Noël, nous avons pris notre ration de liberté) est le cri qui se trouve sur toutes les lèvres et sur tous les murs de la ville. Des milliers de bougies brûlent à ciel ouvert autour du bâtiment de l'Université, comme on peut le voir sur les photos reproduites dans l'ouvrage intitulé *Cronica însângerată a Bucureștilor în Revoluție* (Chroniques ensanglantées de Bucarest pendant la Révolution⁶). Sur les nombreuses taches de sang coagulé restées après la terrible nuit de 21 décembre 1989 – symbole du sacrifice de la jeunesse – des passants et des gens ordinaires venus se recueillir sur la place, ont déposé des monnaies et des articles découpés des premiers journaux « libres » qui venaient de voir le jour. L'Église Colțea, bordant le flanc sud-est de la Place de l'Université, conserve une pièce exceptionnelle montrant la contribution de la religion orthodoxe dans la construction de ce lieu de mémoire. Le prêtre responsable de cette église a conservé une partie de ces monnaies dans une sorte de « reliquaire » en verre ordinaire, improvisé pour l'occasion. Il a été exposé à l'intérieur de l'Église, où il se trouve encore de nos jours, bien que dans un mauvais état de conservation (voir photo no.2). Il faut dire que le même prêtre n'a pas hésité à faire sonner les cloches de son église pendant la nuit du 21 décembre, en dépit de l'interdiction formelle qu'il avait reçue de la part de ses supérieurs hiérarchiques, afin d'encourager les manifestants rassemblés sur la place de l'Université à résister. Le geste spontané de ce prêtre peut s'interpréter donc comme une « mobilisation de la mémoire », qui fait du souvenir enraciné dans une histoire localisée dans le temps et l'espace le moment fondateur de l'émergence d'une vérité intemporelle et universelle, celle d'un *sacrifice fondateur* nécessaire à la fondation d'un temps nouveau, le temps de la liberté retrouvée. Il faut mentionner aussi le fait que dans les discussions ultérieures que j'ai eues avec le personnel administratif et d'entretien de cette église, en novembre 2007, j'ai appris qu'à plusieurs reprises des hauts fonctionnaires de l'évêché de Bucarest ont demandé que ce pseudo-reliquaire soit retiré de l'Église, sans succès.



Printemps 1990, le temps des protestations

L'année 1990 marque le début d'une période trouble. L'apprentissage de la démocratie après quarante cinq années de régime totalitaire se fait dans une grande confusion. Le potentiel révolutionnaire des bucarestois est extrêmement élevé, le goût retrouvé de la liberté de protester les fait réagir aux poussées autoritaires du nouveau pouvoir en place, ainsi que du président Ion Iliescu, un ancien apparatchik. Un président contesté, qui avait commencé à constituer à la fin des années 80 un réseau clandestin informel de « gorbatchéviens », formé par des cadres du parti communiste mécontents de la dérive suicidaire néostalinienne du régime. Sur le périmètre de la Place de l'Université, plusieurs grandes manifestations se succèdent entre janvier et juin 1990. À partir de la manifestation du 22 avril la place est confisquée, dans le sens propre du terme, par les manifestants, la plupart des étudiants. La circulation, très dense dans cette zone, est bloquée et un village de tentes fait son apparition sur la pelouse du théâtre national voisin.

Chaque jour ont lieu des rassemblements, des discours incendiaires sont prononcés du haut d'un balcon de l'université, surplombant la place, et qui accueillera toutes les personnalités de la société civile naissante. Le « happening » était entretenu par le passage d'orateurs ou des invités divers, parmi lesquels des Français, y compris des hommes politiques⁷ de second rang.

Le soir, des groupes de musique se produisent *live* devant les manifestants, ce qui donne un petit air de « Woodstock » de l'Est à la manifestation et attire des Bucarestois, qui viennent y passer un moment. La place de l'Université devient bientôt un lieu à la mode, surtout pour les jeunes étudiants et l'*intelligentsia* de la ville. Afin de marquer l'unicité et la centralité de la place sur la carte symbolique de la ville, les participants font ériger un petit monument qui rappelle les bornes kilométriques d'usage sur les routes de Roumanie, le *km 0 de la zone libérée du communisme*. Le monument représenté sur la photo numéro quatre est récent. Il est érigé après 1998, la version initiale ayant été détruite après la descente des gueules noires à Bucarest en juin 1990. Le nom et la symbolique du « kilomètre zéro » ont été sans doute inspirés par l'ancien monument dédié au « Kilomètre zéro » des routes roumaines, érigé en 1938, se trouvant à seulement quelques centaines de mètres de la Place, vers le Sud (dans le système topographique de la Roumanie, les distances entre les principales villes du pays et Bucarest sont calculées à partir de ce point précis).

Le monument suggère la centralité du site et entre en résonance avec la « mémoire longue » de la ville, notamment avec celle des années trente, période qui dans l’imaginaire collectif roumain est perçu comme l’âge d’or du pays et également de la ville. Sur la borne est écrit en grands caractères noirs : « Roumanie, Km 0. Bucarest, Place de l’Université. Liberté, Démocratie. Zone libre de néo-communisme ». En quelque sorte, tous les mots clés qui servent encore de nos jours pour décrire la manifestation fleuve du printemps 1990. Sur le socle est peint le drapeau national roumain avec l’enseigne arrachée, un symbole visuel très fort qui hante la mémoire des Roumains.



Le religieux fait aussi son irruption sur la Place. Après presque cinquante années d'interdiction, la religion orthodoxe se manifeste un petit peu partout dans l'espace public du pays. Les principaux journaux reprenaient tous les jours, en manchette, une phrase de l'Évangile. Les longs offices du culte caractéristiques au culte orthodoxe étaient retransmis à la télévision nationale, et même le Président Iliescu, pourtant un athée déclaré, se montrait à la messe télévisée. Tout, ou presque, était prétexte à commémoration religieuse et les membres du clergé orthodoxe répondaient promptement à toutes les demandes. La Place de l'Université a connu pendant les jours de la manifestation une intense activité religieuse. Des offices en plein air sont organisés à la mémoire des « martyrs » de la Révolution. L'explication de cette dénomination ne réside pas dans le fait que leurs cadavres n'ont pas été identifiés, mais dans une appréciation post-mortem de leurs successeurs et le recours à « l'efficacité symbolique de la matérialité du corps⁸ ». Croix et bougeoirs de grandes dimensions font leur apparition autour de murs de l'Université, imprègnent les lieux d'une religiosité diffuse, palpable. Dans son étude *The Political lives of Dead Bodies*, Madame Katherine Verdery⁹ analyse la « politiques des morts » et des commémorations après 1989, mettant l'accent sur la visibilité donnée aux cadavres en contraste avec la non-identité des personnes mortes. Les commémorations sortent de leur cadre religieux et deviennent des célébrations en commun d'un passé retrouvé.

Enfin, le leader des étudiants, Marian Munteanu, cultivait une image particulière, assez ambiguë, rappelant la manière traditionnelle de se comporter et de s'habiller des anciens leaders de la défunte *Garde de Fer*, le mouvement mystique et fasciste de l'entre-deux-guerres roumain. La Place de l'Université pose donc la question de l'imbrication du discours mystico-religieux dans le discours antitotalitaire, ainsi que ses formes d'expression dans l'espace public de l'année 1990, marquée par « l'apprentissage » de la démocratie.

Dans ses prises de position pendant la manifestation, le président Iliescu n'hésite pas à qualifier les participants à la manifestation comme étant des simples « golani »¹⁰ (voyous) et des semeurs de troubles dans la société. Très vite, comme c'est souvent le cas pendant les mouvements populaires, l'insulte devient raison de fierté. Les étudiants sont ravis et ils s'emparent du titre. Désormais, le mot « golan » désigne toute personne luttant contre le système, pour la liberté et la démocratie, des petits rubans avec ce nom écrit dessus sont portés un peu partout dans les grands villes du pays en signe de solidarité avec les manifestants. L'ambassadeur de

Roumanie à Paris, l'un des derniers grands aristocrates du pays, prend aussi le titre symbolique de *golani* et il est aussitôt rappelé¹¹. Même un « hymne des golans » est composé et interprété à volonté par la foule, dans une ambiance généralement bon enfant. La place est surnommée aussi *Golania*, signe de son altérité. Le discours des manifestants est articulé autour de l'idée que la Place de l'Université représente le fer de lance de la lutte contre les « usurpateurs » des idéaux nobles de la Révolution anti-communiste et anti-Ceausescu, mais aussi le seul lieu de l'expression démocratique véritable dans le pays, un lien avec l'Europe démocratique et le reste du monde.

Le balcon de l'Université de Bucarest, sert de tribune aux manifestants. Sur les murs, on peut distinguer deux grandes affiches représentant l'image « icône » du poète national roumain, Mihai Eminescu et des orateurs enflammés harassant la foule. Au bout d'un mois et demi de manifestations, la Place est devenue un ensemble de plusieurs scènes, non institutionnalisées, où sont exposées, justifiées et décidées toute une série d'actions contre le pouvoir. Un véritable *espace public de la protestation*, dans le sens même de la définition « canonique » de Jürgen Habermas, pour qui tout espace public est l'œuvre d'« individus faisant usage de leur raison, s'appropriant la sphère publique contrôlée par l'autorité et la transformant en une sphère où la critique s'exerce contre le pouvoir de l'Etat »¹².

La manifestation prend fin brutalement, après les élections de mai 1990. Le Front de salut national (FSN, Frontul Salvării Naționale) dirigé par Ion Iliescu sort gagnant avec plus de 85% des suffrages. Le matin du 13 juin 1990, des forces de police et des troupes USLA¹³ encerclent les manifestants présents jours et nuit sur la Place. Des heurts très violents ont lieu, mais vers la fin de la matinée, la circulation sur le grand boulevard Magheru est rétablie, le gouvernement se dépêche même de publier un communiqué annonçant la réussite de l'opération.

Mais à partir de midi, la suite des événements devient peu claire et de nos jours on ne connaît pas encore la vérité. Très vite, une nouvelle confrontation directe éclate entre les forces de l'ordre et les manifestants, la plupart des jeunes. Ces derniers, à l'aide de cocktails Molotov, mettent le feu à des bus de la Police, ensuite s'attaquent au siège de la Police de la Capitale, au Ministère de l'Intérieur etc. Des nuages épais de fumée noire signalent l'emplacement de la Place, devenue désormais un symbole de « désobéissance civile ».

Profitant de l'occasion, le président Ion Iliescu fait son apparition sur l'unique chaîne de la télévision nationale, pour faire un appel à « toutes les forces conscientes et raisonnables à se rassembler autour du bâtiment du Gouvernement et du bâtiment de la Télévision, pour défendre la démocratie durement gagnée »¹⁴ [pendant la Révolution de décembre 1990]. L'appel du président ne va pas rester sans échos. Le jour suivant, le 14 juin, trois trains bondés de mineurs de la vallée de Jiu, le plus grand bassin minier du pays, arrivent à Bucarest. Guidés par des membres des services secrets, ils déferlent sur la Place de l'Université et les alentours. Les « gueules noires » se livrent à un processus de « nettoyage » symbolique : le balcon de l'université qui servait de tribune d'expression libre est occupé, les affiches placardées sur ses murs, arrachées. Le village de tentes est détruit et à sa place, on plante des fleurs, « comme avant ». Il s'agit au fond d'une réappropriation d'un espace perçu comme un espace souillé, abandonné aux marginaux, aux exclus de la société.

Mais l'action des mineurs va beaucoup plus loin. L'Université est dévastée, ainsi que les sièges de principaux partis d'opposition. Des nombreux professeurs et étudiants sont battus, et leur leader, Marian Munteanu, est tabassé, puis jeté dans la fontaine artésienne se trouvant au milieu de la place, échappant par miracle à la mort. Tous les passants portant une barbe, habillés de vêtements *trendy* ou hors norme, se trouvant dans le périmètre de la Place de l'Université sont arrêtés et frappés par les gueules noires. Une véritable et incroyable « chasse au faciès », comme l'écrira plus tard l'ambassadeur de France à Bucarest, présent aussi sur les lieux¹⁵. Le lendemain, plusieurs colonnes d'ouvriers des grandes usines de l'industrie lourde entourant à l'époque Bucarest font à leur tour irruption sur la Place. Les slogans scandés à l'occasion par la masse ouvrière constituent, à notre avis, la meilleure preuve de la division régnant à l'époque au sein de la société roumaine. « Noi muncim, nu *gandim* ! » (Nous travaillons, nous ne *pensons* pas ! » et aussi « Moarte intelectualilor » (À mort les intellectuels !). Ces formules si violentes sont un miroir du caractère unique de la Place de l'Université dans la conscience collective roumaine, un reflet de l'opposition entre les « élus » de la Place et les « autres », les gens ordinaires, peu habitués aux formes radicales de contestations.

Le nombre des victimes est encore sujet à controverses. Le chiffre officiel parle de six morts et environs sept cents blessés, mais il est fort possible que le nombre réel de victimes soit plus élevé. Le dossier

de la « *mineriada* »¹⁶ de 1990 se trouve encore en instance à l'heure actuelle.

Les effets de la *mineriada* de juin 1990 sont catastrophiques, sur plusieurs plans. A l'intérieur, la rupture déjà existante entre les classes sociales est renforcée, plusieurs milliers de jeunes préfèrent quitter leur pays immédiatement après les événements. A l'extérieur, l'image de la Roumanie a beaucoup souffert et la vague de sympathie dont elle bénéficiait depuis décembre 1989 s'est rapidement évaporée.

La Place de l'Université est consacrée comme l'un des plus importants lieux de mémoire de la ville. Loin d'être un simple point sur la carte, elle va devenir un véritable site « anthropologique ». Modelée par la mémoire, elle semble depuis être dans un continuel processus de transformation, ce qui montre, comme le dit Svetlana Boym, que les lieux de mémoires « urbains », ne sont ni « pétrifiés, ni stables »¹⁷.

Le moment est venu de définir le concept de « lieu de mémoire », applicable dans notre cas. Il est clair que dans le périmètre de la Place de l'Université, la « conscience de la rupture avec le passé se confond avec le sentiment d'une mémoire déchirée ; mais où le déchirement réveille encore assez de mémoire pour que puisse se poser le problème de son incarnation », selon les dires de Pierre Nora dans sa célèbre préface de la trilogie des « Lieux de mémoire », *La fin de l'Histoire-Mémoire*¹⁸. De ce point de vue, la Place constitue un exemple presque didactique : portant la marque de la révolution et chargée des symboles religieux, elle transmet à la ville entière ce message : *il faut se rappeler !* Mais comment et dans quel cadre mémoriel ?

« Il est clair que sans l'intervention de l'histoire, du temps et du changement, nous nous contenterions tout simplement d'un contour schématique des objets de la mémoire, écrit Pierre Nora. Les lieux dont nous parlons, sont mélangés, hybrides, mutants, reliés intimement avec la mort, avec le temps et l'éternité ; enveloppés dans une bande du collectif et d'individuel, du sacré et du profane, de l'immuable et du mobile. Si nous acceptons que le but le plus fondamental du lieu de mémoire est l'arrêt du temps, le blocage du travail d'oublier, l'établissement d'un état des choses, l'action de rendre immortelle la mort, la matérialisation de l'immatériel. Tout cela afin de capturer un maximum de signification dans quelques signes ; il est également clair que lieux de mémoire existent seulement en raison de leur capacité de métamorphose, d'une réutilisation sans fin de leur signification et d'une prolifération de leur ramification¹⁹ ».

Dans ce sens, les lieux de mémoire de la révolution et du printemps 1990 sont au premier regard dépourvus de signification, l'oubli et l'abandon semblent totaux ; mais, après une analyse plus attentive, ils prennent toute leur importance, par le biais de nombreux signes montrant la « ramification » de la mémoire des événements, comme le dit Pierre Nora.

Après 1990. La guerre des inscriptions

Après le retrait des mineurs et des forces de police, la place est rebaptisée spontanément *Place Tien An Men II*, à cause d'un immense graffiti réalisé pendant la nuit sur le mur de l'Université, à côté des inscriptions déjà peintes²⁰ en décembre 1990 – voir la photo no.4. Plusieurs « objets mémoriels » s'ajoutent au fil du temps : des croix modestes, des bougeoirs improvisés placés autour des murs de l'Université et de l'Institut d'Architecture. La Place devient un témoin du passé, mais aussi de l'extraordinaire tension existante depuis juin 1990 entre l'histoire « officielle » de la Révolution et la mémoire publique, de la rupture entre « nous », les intellectuels antitotalitaires, démocratiques, et les « autres », les puissants qui ont « détourné » les nobles idéaux de décembre 1989 et les gens simples, incapables de comprendre et de pratiquer la démocratie, la ville de Bucarest et le reste du pays...



Désormais, la Place de l'Université évoque également un passé douloureux, fait d'incertitudes et de controverses, qui inquiète et dérange le pouvoir. Le *lieu* en soi émane un irrésistible attrait comme point de rassemblement, de révolte spontanée et de protestation. Au début des années '90, Madame Catherine Durandin, l'historienne la plus réputée de la Roumanie dans l'espace francophone, réalise une description de la Place de l'Université, fort intéressante pour la compréhension de notre sujet²¹ :

« La Place de l'Université est laide, composite. D'une coté, le bâtiment massif et sombre de l'Université, inauguré en 1869 et d'autre coté, l'un de plus grand hôtels de la ville, Intercontinental, ouvert en 1970. Un bâtiment lancé à quatre-vingts mètres, sans charme, un gratte-ciel sans logique... La circulation au long du boulevard Magheru est intense, incohérente et très rapide. Les vieilles voitures qui veulent rouler à des vitesses de pointe contraste avec les traces rappelant le décembre 1989. Dans un coin de la place, celui de l'Université, une croix en bois à la mémoire des victimes des « événements » est collée sur le mur, une croix à moitié cachée du regard par les bouquets de fleurs fanées, pleins de poussière. Au centre de la Place, une petite croix en pierre...de l'autre coté, une autre croix, qui se laisse vite dépassée, afin d'arriver devant un magasin de bijoux où l'or est étalé sur de petits planches blanches. La frénésie de l'or a envahi une ville qui autrefois se plaignait, avec de mots choisis, de la passion de son chef d'état et de sa femme pour ce métal. La Place de l'Université est un lieu de deuil et du triomphe. C'est la place où, en dépit de ses petits croix discrètes commence l'oubli ».

La suite montre bien le désir universel d'effacer la mémoire de l'*autre* perçu comme adversaire, inscrit dans le cadre plus large du mépris envers l'espace public de la ville, existant depuis toujours à Bucarest, ville mobile, fluide, où les changements dans le tissu urbain se décident d'en haut, sans consultation populaire. Dans la nuit du 27 juillet 2001, un véritable commando de nettoyeurs de la Mairie de Bucarest, accompagné par des policiers armés, fait son apparition sur la place. Ils couvrent d'une couche épaisse de peinture blanche *toutes* les inscriptions qui se trouvaient sur les murs définissant le périmètre de la Place. L'explication fournie par les autorités de l'époque (le président Iliescu était alors président) a été « la nécessité de nettoyer les façades des imposants bâtiments historiques de la Place de l'Université ». A l'opposé de l'Europe Occidentale (où les villes prennent en charge leur patrimoine et soignent leur mémoire souvent

mieux que l'Etat), les autorités municipales de Bucarest ne cultivent (presque) pas la mémoire collective de leur ville et sont peu soucieuses de l'identité urbaine et de la préservation de celle-ci.

Une manipulation de la mémoire trop brutale, comme par exemple la destruction de lieux sacrés, ou faite sans intelligence, peut produire l'effet inverse de celui escompté²². Or, les murs de l'Université étaient investis d'une dimension sacrée, ce qui explique en partie la stupeur et les prises de position de l'intelligentsia du pays, mais aussi de l'opinion publique, qui ont suivi. Les médias semblent redevenir conscients de l'importance symbolique de cette place de la ville.

« Dans aucun pays civilisé les signes rappelant le passé ne sont détruits par les autorités. Seuls les communistes ont cette mauvaise habitude, car ils veulent effacer la mémoire collective de tout ce qui les dérange. Plusieurs bâtiments en ruine datant de la deuxième guerre mondiale sont préservés en Allemagne, contrastant avec l'architecture moderne qui les entoure. Le monument du « héros soviétique » s'en sort indemne à Berlin, la liste peut être enrichie avec d'autres exemples provenant de pays de l'Est. Seules les autorités de Bucarest ont choisi de réagir différemment. Elles désirent purement et simplement rayer de la mémoire une partie des événements marquants des années 89-90. Nous ne pouvons pas trouver une autre explication au « nettoyage » de la Place de l'Université ²³ », écrit après l'événement l'un des plus importants quotidiens du pays.

Trois ans plus tard, en décembre 2004, une fois que le changement de pouvoir a eu lieu, des associations non-gouvernementales ayant comme but déclaré la « récupération du souvenir de l'insurrection de 1989 et de la manifestation marathon de 1990 » ont affirmé leur volonté de laver la peinture couvrant les murs et les inscriptions. Jusqu'à maintenant, leur initiative n'a pas été réalisée. Tel que sur un palimpseste, sur les murs de l'Université se sont ajoutés après cette malheureuse initiative des autorités des nouvelles inscriptions, graffitis et « objets » divers montrant que la mémoire trouve souvent des lieux d'expression et de stockage insolites.

À la recherche de la mémoire perdue ?

Aujourd'hui, la Place de l'Université, rebaptisée entre temps « Place du 21 décembre », est un extraordinaire mélange d'objets mémoriels et de « traces » du passé, une véritable étude de cas sur la constitution et la

survivance d'un lieu de mémoire dans l'Europe de l'Est postcommuniste. La recherche sur les lieux de mémoire part du présent, en s'appuyant sur des objets, des images, des souvenirs reconnus comme significatifs pour la mémoire du groupe²⁴.

Nous avons donc choisi d'illustrer son état actuel et d'en tirer une conclusion par le biais de sept photos prises par l'auteur un matin de septembre 2006. Au moment même de leur réalisation, nous avons pu nous rendre compte que photographier un lieu de mémoire tel que cette place impose un double défi, semblable à celui du regard de l'anthropologue sur les cultures : d'une part, il s'agit de se laisser envahir par l'esprit de ce lieu de mémoire, afin de saisir les traces cachées du passé. D'autre part, il faut prendre une certaine distance par rapport à l'objet afin d'avoir la possibilité de l'interpréter. L'*appropriation* et la *distance* nécessaire à la constitution d'une trame figurative constituent donc les mots clés de l'analyse visuelle de cette place.

La première image choisie (photo numéro 5) représente une croix en fer, grossièrement travaillé, plantée au beau milieu de la Place, à coté de la fontaine artésienne du centre, surmontée par une autre croix, plus petite. Érigée en 1995, la croix a survécu à tous les changements opérés depuis dans ce périmètre –observons la petite grille métallique qui l'entoure soigneusement... Sur le bras horizontal, une inscription faite à la main, les mots, naïfs : « *Chers passants, mettez une fleur sur ces lieux, pour apaiser la douleur* ». Sur le bras vertical, une reproduction du « drapeau de la révolution » et aussi une fleur. L'auteur de l'ensemble, Constantin Popescu, signant « peintre (?) », a dédié son travail « *à la mémoire des héros anticommunistes* ». La croix semble être ignorée complètement par les passants et les habitués du lieu, la plupart des étudiants qui attendent entre deux cours.





Tout regard porté sur la Place de l'Université s'écrase contre le mur de l'Institut d'Architecture, sorte de point aveuglant de l'espace et du temps propre à ces lieux (voir photo 6). Comme le montre l'architecte roumaine Ana-Maria Goilav dans un article dédié à la signification du mur dans les cultures de l'Orient chrétien, tout mur construit à d'une part la particularité de « consacrer les lieux [...] et prendre la possession d'un territoire ». D'autre part, le mur « contient un sens très profond de la durée temporelle, ayant la capacité d'animer et domestiquer la place, en lui offrant une nouvelle lecture.²⁵ » Un constat qui revient d'une manière presque obsessionnelle dans tous les ouvrages dédiés à la Révolution roumaine de 1989, car ce mur de la Place de l'Université représente pour certains historiens préoccupés par le phénomène un véritable « œil de la Révolution » (*Revolution's eye*), selon l'heureuse formule trouvée par Raoul Granquist afin de caractériser la symbolique de ce mur²⁶.

Les anciennes traces de balles ayant mordu la pierre en décembre 1989, recouvertes de peinture blanche par la municipalité, sont désormais entourées de petits cercles de peinture noire, plus une petite croix. Dans les rides de l'asphalte, des petites taches blanches sont observables. Il s'agit des restes des anciens bougeoirs en faïence, se trouvant en décembre 1989 à la base de ce mur, incrustés dans le sol. Souvent, à cause de la crise chronique de places de parking dans le centre ville, des voitures sont garées jusqu'au bord du mur, en le touchant même. L'oubli et le manque de respect pour ce lieu semblent totaux.



Mais la « mémoire mutilée refuse souvent de se taire »²⁷ et ce mur continue à attirer l'attention, s'enrichissant continuellement de traces et « signes » de mémoire très hétéroclites. Parmi ceux-ci, se distingue un petit bas-relief en plâtre de la Vierge, peint en bleu et noir, symbole de la douleur et du sacrifice (voir photo 7). Malheureusement, il nous est impossible de savoir quand il a été appliqué sur le mur, mais nous pouvons soupçonner qu'il date d'avant juillet 2001, car des traces de peinture blanche le recouvrent aussi. Tout autour, un graffiti : *La Roumanie et les larmes des Roumains. La pauvre, elle meurt de faim ? Pourquoi ?* Un objet curieux et en quelque sorte insolite si nous tenons compte du fait que dans un pays majoritairement orthodoxe, ce symbole est peu répandu en dehors du cadre strict des églises catholiques.



Un petit ensemble mémoriel *ad hoc* a vu le jour au fil du temps à l'endroit où les manifestants ont bloqué le large boulevard Magheru dans la nuit de 21 décembre 1989 et où sont tombées également le plus grand nombre de victimes (photo 8). Dans ce cas, la superposition, le

« bricolage » et l'improvisation sont très évidents. Des petits drapeaux peints directement sur le mur flanquent une belle plaque commémorative en granit noir. Une croix qui ressemble à celle mentionnée avant est dédiée « à la mémoire des jeunes tombés pour la Révolution ». Deux plaques en marbre blanc font l'éloge de deux jeunes fusillés en décembre 1989 à cet endroit. Sur celle de droite, posée dix ans après les événements par « la famille général Iancu » à la mémoire de leur fille est écrit :

« De nos jours, ils se sont approprié ton sacrifice, mais un jour viendra quand ils devront payer pour ce qu'ils ont fait. Nous savons que vous ne trouverez pas votre repos là-bas, tant que les véritables coupables n'auront pas répondu de leurs actes ».

Enfin, sur la gauche de la photo se distingue l'entrée d'une sordide boîte de nuit bucarestoise, de celles qui ont fleuri le long du boulevard ces derniers temps, en total désaccord avec la signification du lieu.

Dans le tome I des « Lieux de mémoire », l'historien Antoine Prost fait l'analyse des « Monuments aux morts » et de leur place dans la construction des lieux de mémoire. Pour lui, les monuments aux morts « tirent leur signification de leur localisation dans un espace qui n'est pas neutre. On peut toujours donner sens à la localisation du monument²⁸ ». Nous avons choisi cette brève citation pour montrer l'altérité de ces petits ensembles mémoriels *ad-hoc* parsemés sur la Place. L'emplacement est très neutre, mais c'est le monument et non pas l'espace qui le remplit de signification, suite à un geste spontané, dernier bastion devant l'oubli « officiel » des autorités.

Enfin, la photo numéro 9 illustre l'état actuel de la Place et les transformations successives qu'elle a subies. Jusqu'à la fin des années 90, plusieurs bougeoirs comme celui-ci étaient placés contre les murs de l'université. Fabriqués en tôle noire, ordinaire, avec le fond couvert d'une couche épaisse de sable, ce type de bougeoir fait partie de l'inventaire courant des églises orthodoxes du pays. D'habitude, un tel accessoire de culte est placé en *dehors* de l'Eglise et sert à abriter les bougies allumées par les croyants à la mémoire des morts. Les murs bordant la Place de l'Université ont été investis pour un certain nombre d'années (cinq ou six) d'une dimension sacrée, devenant de véritables « murs des lamentations » à la mémoire de victimes, mais aussi symbole de reconnaissance et d'espérance.



Le bougeoir (le seul qui subsiste encore d'un groupe d'une dizaine de pièces, voir photo 9) est dans un état lamentable. Un témoin de l'inéluctable « imbrication de l'oubli dans la mémoire ²⁹ ». Rouillé, tagué et plein de mégots de cigarettes, il a été déplacé vers le bord de la route, comme l'une de « ces coquilles sur le rivage quand se retire la mer de la mémoire vivante ». La formule poétique utilisée par Pierre Nora pour caractériser les lieux de mémoire trouve toute sa signification dans ce cas précis³⁰.

D'une part, par son étrangeté et son état de dégradation, cet objet montre que l'oubli collectif peut être plus facilement attesté que la mémoire collective³¹. D'autre part, cet objet condense en lui seul le mépris des autorités roumaines pour le passé de la ville, ainsi que l'absence de toute politique officielle de mémoire. Et cela en dépit de l'existence d'un florilège d'institutions financées par l'Etat, ayant pour tâche l'étude et la préservation de la mémoire de la Révolution de décembre 1989.

La Place de l'Université est devenue le « cœur psychosocial » de la ville. Témoin d'un passé traumatique, elle est le lieu de prédilection où se mettent en scène, comme sur une grande scène de théâtre, des « investissements affectifs hétérogènes ³² » de groupes sociaux divers, dépourvus d'une identité claire. Les opposants (*Greenpeace* et autres) aux projets gouvernementaux à haut risque pour l'environnement ont pris l'habitude de se rassembler sur la Place de l'Université pour se faire entendre par les médias. Les supporters de l'équipe nationale de football expriment leur joie en cas de victoire au centre de la Place, pour repartir ensuite sur le boulevard Magheru. Et même l'actuel président du pays, Traian Basescu, a pris l'habitude de se montrer sur la place à l'occasion de diverses fêtes populaires, perpétuant ainsi les rites de groupe qui régnaient sur la place pendant l'occupation et les démonstrations prolongées du printemps 1990. [Notice importante : à l'heure à laquelle cet article a été terminé – juillet 2008, le bougeoir n'existe plus. Il a été enlevé pendant les travaux de rénovation et réfection du passage de la Place de l'Université. La photo numéro 9 a été prise en octobre 2007].

La dimension de « lieu de mémoire » de la lutte anti-communiste et antitotalitaire reste pourtant la plus marquée sur les lieux. Ainsi, une publicité géante a été suspendue sur le « célèbre » mur de l'Institut d'Architecture en juillet 2006, à l'occasion de la sortie d'un hors-série du quotidien bucarestois *Ziua*, dédié aux relations entre la Roumanie et la Russie dans le nouveau contexte géopolitique de la Mer Noire³³. Un Vladimir Poutine menaçant regarde la Place du haut du mur, juste

à côté d'une autre bannière, faisant de la publicité pour un guide de loisirs urbains très prisé par les jeunes (photo 10). Suprême ironie due à l'existence d'un espace urbain envahi d'un échange généralisé de signes (où tout devient identique et différent simultanément), en bas de l'affiche est écrit « petrecerea continuă » (la fête continue).



Les survivants et les adeptes de la défunte *Garde de Fer* (ou *La Légion Archange Michel*) le mouvement fasciste roumain de l'entre-deux-guerres, recouvrent souvent les murs et la fontaine du milieu de la place avec des affiches de propagande. Réalisées avec des moyens précaires, la plupart de leurs campagnes d'affichage rappellent des événements importants de la chronologie du mouvement (comme par exemple l'anniversaire de la naissance du « Capitaine » Corneliu Zelea Codreanu) ou annoncent des conférences dédiées aux « massacre de l'élite légionnaire », dans le but de faire connaître leur mouvement aux étudiants (voir photo 11).



Mais l'exemple le plus spectaculaire de l'utilisation de ce « potentiel mémoriel » est à nos yeux la création d'un site Internet, nommé *Piața Universității* : www.piatauniversitatii.com. Le site, au contenu radicalement anticommuniste, est la tribune d'expression d'un « Comité de représentation de victimes du communisme » et de « L'Action pour la délivrance de la Roumanie du communisme ». Pour ses concepteurs, le

site se veut d'une part un espace de protestation contre le communisme, et d'autre part, une « réouverture » de la Place de l'Université, cette fois d'une manière virtuelle. « Nous faisons la réouverture aujourd'hui de la Place de l'Université, cette fois sur Internet. Nous attendons votre participation. Si vous venez nombreux, nous pourrions déclencher ensuite un vrai processus de prise de conscience. Et même si vous n'êtes pas nombreux, par votre intérêt, vous préservez ainsi un brin de vérité, en attendant les futures manifestations »³⁴, est écrit dans une section du site expliquant les raisons qui ont motivé son ouverture.

Ce site montre d'une part qu'un *lieu de mémoire* est une notion abstraite, purement symbolique, destinée à dégager la dimension mémorielle d'objets matériels, mais autant et surtout immatériels³⁵, comme ce désir de « délivrance de la Roumanie » du communisme, seize ans après la chute du régime de Nicolae Ceausescu. D'autre part, il ouvre des nouvelles interrogations sur la mémoire collective du (post-)communisme en relation avec « l'ambivalence patrimoniale »³⁶ d'Internet - une question qui mérite une étude à part.

Et comme pour confirmer cette fluidité de l'espace et du temps dans cet endroit de forte mémoire, sur le côté sud de la Place, vis-à-vis de l'Université, une horloge à égrené les jours et les heures restant jusqu'à l'entrée de la Roumanie dans l'Union Européenne, le 1^{er} janvier 2007 (photo 12). Le symbole de l'aspiration vers l'avenir trouve lui aussi sa place dans le périmètre accueillant, à géométrie variable, du lieu. Il faut mentionner le fait que l'endroit à toujours attiré les œuvres à forte valeur symbolique. En 1904 les autorités érigent ici la statue de l'homme politique libéral Ion C. Bratianu, l'un des fondateurs de la Roumanie moderne, réalisé par le sculpteur français Ernest Dubois ; un des monuments phare de la ville de Bucarest, qui y reste jusqu'en 1948, quand les autorités communistes le font démolir³⁷.

Revenons à notre montre « européenne ». Svetlana Boym remarque l'abondance de ce type de symboles dans les villes de l'Europe de l'Est, ainsi que la dérision et le sarcasme dont ils sont l'objet de la part des médias et des habitants de ces villes³⁸. Rien de tel dans le cas de l'horloge de la Place de l'Université. Le temps qui s'affiche sur les cadrans de cette horloge est le temps de la mémoire et de l'espoir.



Remarques finales

Au terme de cette lecture hybride, mi-historique, mi-anthropologique, de la Place de l'Université de Bucarest, deux conclusions provisoires nous semblent possibles. La première concerne les particularités de la transmission et de la préservation de la mémoire des événements qui ont mené à la chute du régime Ceausescu. La seconde est plutôt une interrogation sur les transformations et la signification de ce lieu de mémoire pour l'avenir.

En premier lieu, comme nous avons tenté de le montrer, l'acte mémoriel qui se produit sur la Place de l'Université et dans ses environs est principalement l'œuvre d'individus isolés ou d'« associations » avec un nombre de membres très réduit, sans moyens matériels pouvant

leur permettre des commémorations à grande échelle. Ils ont produit et amené sur place la plupart des objets destinés à rappeler le souvenir des événements liés à la chute sanglante du régime Ceausescu. Ceux-ci proviennent pour la plupart de l'inventaire symbolique de la religion orthodoxe, majoritaire dans le pays : croix, bougeoirs, « reliquaires » improvisés etc. Disséminés sur l'ensemble de la superficie de la Place de l'Université, leur fonction est non seulement d'assurer une continuité entre le passé et le présent, mais aussi de satisfaire une logique identificatrice au sein de leur groupe, en mobilisant la mémoire de la tradition religieuse orthodoxe contre celle d'un système qui était perçu comme le successeur d'un autre, totalitaire et athée.

La Place de l'Université marque le « naufrage » de la mémoire de la Révolution roumaine de décembre 1990, ainsi que de l'effervescence civile qui a accompagné l'apprentissage de la démocratie dans le pays. Les causes de cet état de choses sont multiples. Contentons-nous de mentionner que les nombreuses questions sans réponse liées à la chute et au déroulement de la Révolution ont conduit à la création d'un passé « inutilisable », qui se reflète comme dans un miroir dans la constitution de ce lieu de mémoire.

La dévalorisation de la classe politique (corruption généralisée) et le manque d'une véritable politique urbaine pour la ville fragilise et détruit les traces du passé (comme par exemple les inscriptions sur les murs) et des autres éléments constitutifs de la Place de l'Université. L'équilibre mémoriel entre la politique officielle de la mémoire et le bricolage complexe et subtil des ressources mémorielles est gravement perturbé dans ce cas. Le souci de mettre sur pied une *culture de la juste mémoire* (Paul Ricœur), entre devoir de mémoire et besoin d'oubli, est complètement inexistant.

En second lieu, une question se pose : quel sera l'avenir de la Place de l'Université en tant que lieu de mémoire ? Ce n'est pas de sa « disparition » dont il faut parler, mais de sa transformation. A la place des autorités qui semblent ignorer totalement sa signification, outre que pour organiser des fêtes populaires, des individus se sont autoproclamés gardiens de la mémoire de « leur » groupe d'affiliation, souvent de tendance nationaliste et avec des crispations anticommunistes (mais en l'absence d'un véritable mouvement communiste dans le pays).

La Place de l'Université continue à exercer aussi un attrait irrésistible sur des groupes sans définition sociale très claire, en leur offrant un statut spécial, celui de *protestataire de la Place de l'Université* dans les médias

du pays. La mémoire est donc dispersée, usée, davantage fragmentée, mais exprimant aussi le dynamisme du corps social. Enfin, l'édification d'une horloge qui compte les jours restants jusqu'à l'entrée du pays dans l'UE représente à nos yeux une volonté forte de se détacher d'un passé traumatique et d'intégrer l'Europe, l'objet du seul consensus national du moment. Dans ces termes, la transition vers l'Europe promise peut être interprétée comme une bataille contre la tyrannie du passé, une sortie de l'anormalité de la mémoire postcommuniste, vers l'avenir.

La présence de cette horloge sur la Place de l'Université représente non seulement le fait que la mémoire est en relation avec le passé et le présent, mais aussi, comme le fait remarquer Agnès Heller³⁹, une ressource de politiques potentielles, de créativité et surtout, d'espoir. Un changement important s'opère à l'Est dans la manière de percevoir le passé communiste. Cette place est un témoin, permettant de comprendre les faits et de prévoir *l'avenir de la mémoire*.

NOTES

- 1 PARUSI, Gheorghe, *Cronologia Bucureștiului* (La Chronologie de Bucarest), 1459-1898, Editions Compania, Bucarest, 2007, p. 349.
- 2 IORGA Nicolae, *O viata de om, asa cum a fost* (Ma vie, comme elle était), Editions Minerva, Bucarest, 1972, p. 89.
- 3 PARUSI, Gheorghe, *op.cit.*, p. 663.
- 4 MIHAILESCU, M., *Vintilă Evoluția geografică a unui oraș – București* (L'Évolution géographique d'une ville - Bucarest), Editions Paideia, 2003, p.185.
- 5 CESEREANU, Ruxandra, *Decembrie 1989, deconstructia unei revoluii* (Décembre 2008, la déconstruction d'une Révolution), Editions Polirom, Iași, 2004, p.14.
- 6 COLLECTIF, *Cronica însângerată a Bucureștilor în Revoluție* (*Chroniques ensanglantées de Bucarest pendant la Révolution*), Editions Tineretul Liber, Bucarest, 1990. La maison d'édition n'existe plus, elle est disparue sans laisser des traces quelques mois après son apparition dans le tourbillon des événements révolutionnaires, comme tant de ses semblables, ce qui dit beaucoup sur la fluidité de la mémoire des années 1990 et aussi sur la « rupture du régime d'historicité » (François Hartog) représentée par la Révolution de 1989 et les années qui l'ont suivie.
- 7 Le BRETON, Jean-Marie, *La fin de Ceausescu, histoire d'une révolution*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1996, p. 148.
- 8 NITULESCU, Ioana, « Piața Universității : comemorările Revoluției între legitimizare și uitare » (La Place de l'Université : la commémoration de la Révolution entre la légitimité et l'oubli), in *Observator Cultural*, Bucarest, no.169, juin 2008. Numéro thématique, *Piața Universității, loc al memoriei*.
- 9 VERDERY, Katherine, *The Political lives of Dead Bodies,,* Columbia University Press 1999. Nous avons utilisé la version roumaine de ce livre, *Viața politică a trupurilor moarte. Reînhumări și schimbări post-socialiste* (La vie politique des corps morts. Réinhumations et changements postsocialistes), Editions Vremea, Bucarest 2006.
- 10 *Golan* c'est un mot très fort en roumain, difficilement transposable en français. Il désigne une personne dépourvue à la fois de moyens financiers nécessaires à la subsistance, mais aussi de caractère, traînant dans la rue.
- 11 Voir *Souvenirs merveilleux d'un ambassadeur des golans – entretiens Alexandre Paléologue avec Marc Semo et Claire Tréan*, Editions Balland, Paris, 1990.
- 12 HABERMAS, Jürgen, *L'espace public*, Editions Payot, Paris, 1978, p. 61.
- 13 Abréviation de « Unité Spéciale de lutte antiterrorisme » - un héritage de l'ancienne police d'Etat, la *Securitate*.

- 14 BERINDEI, Mihnea, COMBES, Ariadna et PLANCHE Anne, *Roumanie, le livre blanc : la réalité d'un pouvoir néo-communiste*, Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1990.
- 15 LE BRETON, Jean-Marie, *op.cit.*p. 154.
- 16 La langue roumaine, langue extrêmement souple, a validé l'entrée dans l'usage courant du mot *mineriada*, désignant les descentes à répétition des mineurs sur Bucarest, mais aussi toute manifestation de rue accompagnée de la violence.
- 17 BOYM, Svetlana, *The future of nostalgia*, Basic Books, New York, 2001, p. 79.
- 18 NORA, Pierre, *Les lieux de mémoire, tome I – La République*, Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1984, p. XVII
- 19 NORA, Pierre, *Idem*, p. XXIX.
- 20 Comme par exemple l'ancien hymne national roumain écrit le soir du 21 décembre par un jeune peintre pour « réveiller les indécis » et les pousser à manifester ou l'extraordinaire inscription *Pour Noël, nous avons pris notre ration de liberté* – une référence directe à la rationalisation draconienne des aliments et la pénurie des dernières années du régime Ceausescu. Source : NICOLAU, Irina (éditeur), *Piata Universitatii*, Editions Nemira, Bucarest, 1997.
- 21 DURANDIN, Catherine, *București. Amintiri și plimbări* (Bucarest. Souvenirs et promenades), Editions Paralela 45, Pitești, 2003, pp.18-19.
- 22 CANDEAU, Joël, *Mémoire et identité*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1998, p. 164.
- 23 Le journal *Cotidianul*, Bucarest, 30 juillet 2001.
- 24 FRIJHOFF, Willem « La ville : lieu de mémoire de l'Europe moderne » ? in Den BOER, Pim (directeur) *Lieu de mémoire et identités nationales*, Amsterdam University Press, 1993, p. 61.
- 25 GOILAV, Ana-Maria, « Non-zidul », in *Arhitect – revistă de arhitectură*, Bucarest, janvier 2001, p. 23.
- 26 GRANQUIST, Raoul, *Revolution's Urban Landscape – Bucarest Culture and Postcommunist Change*, Peter lang, Frankfurt am Main-Berlin, 1999, p. 65.
- 27 BOUCHARA, Traki Zannad, *La ville mémoire. Contributions à une sociologie du vécu*, Paris, Editions Méridiens - Klincksieck, 1994, p. 21.
- 28 PROST Antoine, « Les Monuments aux morts », in *Lieux de mémoire*, Pierre Nora (directeur), tome I, 1984, p. 200.
- 29 RICOEUR, Paul *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*, Seuil, Paris, 2000, p. 553.
- 30 NORA, Pierre, « Entre mémoire et histoire. La problématique des lieux » in *Les Lieux de Mémoire I*, Paris, 1984, p. XXIV.
- 31 CANDEAU, Joël, *Anthropologie de la mémoire*, Armand Colin, 2005, p. 89

- ³² Ricœur, Paul, « Mémoire : approches historiennes, approches philosophiques », in *Le Débat*, Paris, no.122/2002, p. 59.
- ³³ *Axa – noua Românie la Marea Neagra*, revue de géopolitique éditée par le groupe de presse Ziua, Bucarest, et l'association *Civic Media*, juin 2006, Bucarest.
- ³⁴ www.piatauniversitatii.com. Le site a été consulté le 23 novembre 2006. Le site a été ouvert le 21 décembre 2004, date symbolique.
- ³⁵ NORA, Pierre, « La notion de lieu de mémoire est-elle exportable ? » in Pin den Boer, Willem Fridjoff (dir.) *Lieu de mémoire et identités nationales*, Amsterdam University Press, 1993, p. 8.
- ³⁶ HOGG, Emmanuel, « Tout garder ? Les dilemmes de la mémoire à l'âge médiatique », in *Le Débat*, Paris, nr. 125, mai- août 2003, p. 178.
- ³⁷ Source: Auteur anonyme, "Impresii și suveniruri" (Impressions et souvenirs), in *Adevărul literar și artistic*, Bucarest, no. 929, juillet 2008.
- ³⁸ BOYM, Svetlana, *op.cit.* p. 76.
- ³⁹ HELLER, Agnes, *A philosophy of history in fragments*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK, 1993.

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THE ANTI-ZIONIST IDEOLOGY OF THE SATMAR (SATU MARE) HASIDIC COMMUNITY. ITS MAJOR TENETS AND IMPLICATIONS

“The Messianic era will not renew [the order of Creation] [...]; it will solely make us renew ourselves so that there will be no need of signs and miracles, because we will all be saints.”¹

Hasidism, a movement that unsettled the order of traditional East-European Jewish communities at the beginning of the eighteenth century, was the expression of a crisis within the traditional religious universe as well as a provocation addressed to the rabbinic authority. It deeply questioned the existent structures through a mystical and messianic reviviscence and reaffirmed the role played by the community in religious life. This reassessment, which shook the foundations of the century-old framework of Ashkenazi Judaism, both transformed and reinforced rabbinic tradition.² It resettled its heritage on a new basis, a fact that enabled Hasidism to become the major carrier of the traditional form of Judaism in the contemporary world.³

After the second half of the eighteenth century and until the Second World War, in Northern Transylvania and Bucovina, where – similarly to the Austrian Empire, Galicia and Russian Empire – traditional communities were dominant,⁴ Hasidism was a constant presence. Two of the Hasidic communities in these provinces would gain preeminence: the Sadagura Hasidism in Bucovina – one of the places legendarily related to Israel Ba`al Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism,⁵ – and Satmar (Satu Mare) Hasidism in Northern Transylvania.

In an ethnically composite Transylvania, Hungarian-ruled till 1918 and in between 1940-1947, the Jewish community of Satu Mare numbered

6.446 members in 1920 and is reduced to 4.160 around the Second World War.⁶ The founder of the Satmar community (around 1760) is Moses Teitelbaum, a highly charismatic figure and a disciple of the famous *tzadiq*⁷ the Seer of Lublin. Like other celebrated Hasidic figures, Rabbi Moses Teitelbaum, author of an extensive commentary on the Bible,⁸ put at the center of his spiritual quest the messianic idea and its paradoxes. His work, Satmar Hasidic stories and parables speak amply about the expectation of Messiah and about the believers' responsibility in hastening or in indefinitely postponing his coming.⁹

Yet, the personality that gave the movement its present features and made it one of the main representatives of traditional Judaism in contemporary times is Rabbi Yoel Teitelbaum (1887-1979). One of the best-known Hasidic figures of his age, Yoel Teitelbaum took a very clear and uncompromising stand with regard to the newly born Zionist movement, a position that met and continued the views of the Hasidic dynasty in Munkacs.¹⁰ The rise of Zionism coincided, in Transylvania as elsewhere, with a critical period of tension and exposure to riots. Under Romanian rule (from 1918 to 1940), the situation of the Jewish communities was aggravated by their identification with Hungarian oppression¹¹ and after 1940 – under Miklos Horthy collaboration regime and the Arrow-Cross Party anti-Semitic vehemence (1944-1945) – all traditional communities in Hungary were decimated. Escaping Holocaust in a convoy ransomed by the Zionist Organization, the Satmar Rabbi joined the religious community in Jerusalem for a short while, turned down the proposal of becoming its leader and moved on to the United States.

A revered *tzadiq* and a major rabbinic authority, Yoel Teitelbaum shows the path for many contemporary traditional communities¹². Nowadays the second largest Hasidic center in the world, the community he founded in Williamsbourg, *Yetev Lev B`Satmar*, had scarcely a dozen of members in 1948.¹³ A community very faithful to the rabbinic tradition, housing the biggest center of Jewish religious studies (*yeshiva*) in the world,¹⁴ *Yetev Lev B`Satmar* is at the same time the keeper of Hasidic tradition, rituals and social structures. It uses both traditional rabbinic and Hasidic lore in order to legitimize and continue Yoel Teitelbaum's lifelong struggle against what he considered to be "the biggest misfortune in Israel's entire historical existence":¹⁵ political Zionism. Primarily an opposition to a political and national definition of Jewishness, it aims at rebuffing the claims of "the Zionist State" of being representative for the entire Jewish community in the world. Satmar opposition to Zionism is essentially an opposition to

a new definition of identity and to the utilization of ideas and values of Judaism in order to construct and render efficient a nationalist ideology and a political structure which is, in Satmar Rabbi's view, radically opposed to Jewish tradition.

I. The Zionist Idea and its Jewish Opponents

Traditional Judaism and Zionism unquestionably correspond to two opposing definitions of identity. Zionism characterized and continues to characterize itself as both a revolutionary movement and an achievement of century-long aspirations. As a lay political ideology, it aimed at defining Jewishness on a new political and national basis and at constructing an identity similar to that of the newly created nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe. The emergence of these new national identities, following the dismemberment of greater imperial structures at the end of nineteenth century, offers the model and the legitimacy of this new idea. In the attempt to constitute a virtually functional nation-state, the first problem that the inchoate movement had to solve was the finding of practical criteria for designating a 'Jewish nation', that is, the articulation of an efficient and persuasive definition necessary to the construction of a national ideology.

Finding an applicable 'intentional definition' of the Jewish nation, taking as a model the existent or emerging European nation-states, would not be an easy task. In order to functionally define a named human population as a 'nation', some of the following elements – we recur to those proposed by Elie Kedourie¹⁶ – have to be included among the definitional *differentia*: an historic territory, the sharing of common myths (religion) and memories, a common language, a public culture and common laws for all members (elements which are continually reinterpreted in the course of history). Thus, in this particular instance, the cultural and religious/'mythical' dimensions were the only criteria – the only elements common to the entire world Jewish population – which could serve as a specific difference. A fact which would soon enough lead to major inconsistencies, since neither cultural, nor religious criteria were to be the nucleus of Zionist definition. A lay definition of Judaism – and one that could urge to political action – should be based on something politically relevant and effective. One of the main critiques addressed by anti-Zionism and post-Zionism alike concerns this apophatic definition

of Jewishness, a definition that does away with the historical, cultural, religious and moral values having represented Jewish communities throughout the world for nearly two thousand years. In the view of its religious and non-religious antagonists, Zionism asserts the necessity of a State that defines Jewish identity – and it defines it merely because it has been created in order to define it – claiming implicitly that there is no other possible valid definition.

The first attempt to give a definition of the Jewish nation on political grounds is Theodor Hertzl's manifesto of Zionism, *Judestaat*, published in 1896. Throughout this momentous pamphlet, anti-Semitism seems to represent the efficient element in the definition of a community having a common destiny and common interests: "We are a people: our enemies have made us one without our consent."¹⁷ Race and "human resources" available for the construction of a state are also evoked as elements to be taken into account for legitimizing the need of a state. The danger of assimilation, yet another negative element for a functional definition, is spoken of in racial terms as the possibility of "dissolving in surrounding races".¹⁸ With no positive element envisioned except for that of race, and in the need of a more coherent definition, Hertzl resorts to the knotty question of traditional Judaism and Jewish religion. Religion seems necessary as a legitimating element, despite the fact that the announced objective is that of finding a lay definition for a modern, non-religious state. Including traditional Judaism in the general representation is all the more necessary in the given context of the end of the nineteenth century, when the religious communities constitute the overwhelming majority of the Jewish general population. Thus, although the new movement aims at the foundation of a lay modern state, based on European models, Hertzl presents obtaining the support of religious authority as one of the movement's main immediate aims. He expresses his conviction that the rabbis will "feel the need to follow the cause of the State", since the missing element for a coherent definition of the 'Jewish nation' will be eventually provided by religion: "We feel our historic affinity only through the faith of our fathers, for we have long absorbed the languages of different nations to an ineradicable degree."¹⁹ New European nation-states surely offered the image of an association between nationalism and religion, where the state ideology used religious elements as functional political myth or where nationalism tended to become a "political religion".²⁰ But Herzl fails to indicate the concrete elements a proper definition and, although religion is evoked in terms of "affinity" and is thought of as an indispensable support, it cannot

become a defining trait. The negative definition he constructs on social and political grounds misses out both religion-defined communities and non-European groups.

Religious opposition was immediate: from the formation of anti-Zionist religious organizations, like *Ha-Lishkah ha-Shehorah* and *Agudat Israel*, to the absolute refusal of any kind of compromise in the case of religious communities like Munkacs²¹ and Satmar. Opposition to this mode of politically defining Jewishness, separated from its cultural and religious history, was not restricted to religious communities. Herzl's political Zionism had been questioned ever since the first Zionist Congress at Basle, by Ahad Ha'am,²² who continued to oppose it even after the fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 decided to adopt as a defining element *Kultura*, as materialized in general education in national spirit, Hebrew language and history of Israel. Ahad Ha'am, though dissociating Judaism as a religious system from Jewish culture in general, opposed to both a nationalistic definition and to the political exploitation of the Messianic idea. For, even though it was not in cultural terms that the new and vigorous movement would define the community it wanted to create, the messianic idea and its pendant, the (Holy) Land of Israel, were the necessary components of a mobilizing national myth. The political use of traditional religious symbols was overtly advocated by leading Zionist theoreticians, like Aaron David Gordon (1856-1922). In Gordon view, Torah and Jewish religion, though not to be regarded as divine revelations and accepted as such, offer the proper justification for 'a conquest of the Holy Land'.²³

Voices of prominent cultural personalities from the beginning of the twentieth century, like Claude Montefiore,²⁴ drew attention to the fact that the Zionist idea as defined by political Zionism risks to encourage or create anti-Semitism and accused the error of a racial and national definition of Judaism. Jews all over the world form "a religious community" and its spokesmen should be careful in emphasizing the fact that Jews outside Palestine do not form a nation.²⁵ The aperture of Judaism is that towards a "universal religion" and not that aiming at the formation of a national state; a state which, on the one hand, could not house entire world's Jewish population (most of them would refuse to join this state structure) and which, on the other hand, would have unfortunate consequences upon the entire Jewish Diaspora. Declaring that he views "the movement which is to end in the formation of a new Jewish national life and a new Jewish state, with profound anxiety",²⁶ Claude Montefiore is one of the first

Jewish intellectuals to thoroughly discuss the question of Jewish identity as faced with a tremendous challenge.

Despite the vivid controversies it raised within Jewish communities worldwide, Zionism disposed of a symbolic keystone which legitimized its claims for the necessity to found a Jewish State in Palestine and upon which the movement drew its appeal and stamina: the messianic idea. The Land of Israel, inseparable from its messianic component, was the idea that would legitimize the claim for a regained “national home” in Palestine, a ‘chosen Land’ for a ‘chosen People’. A “regulative idea” in Judaism, the King Messiah is a notion shaping and being shaped by the religious, cultural and historical becoming of Judaism. Like the notion of political revolution, messianism implies a new world order, a dramatic change, yet this is only one of the many, and often contradictory, significances it bears. The opposition of the traditional religious communities to the political use of the messianic idea is founded both on its symbolic complexity and on the role it has actually played in Jewish history, a role that, more often than not, has not been that of legitimating national and territorial claims. Since Messiah became the synonym of a State in its nationalistic form, its religious, symbolic and metaphysical significances have been irremediably perverted. According to religious anti-Zionism, whose most outstanding representative is today the Satmar community, nationalist positions – including the extreme right religious nationalism in contemporary Israel, the *Gush Emounim*, – who use the messianic idea as a basis of conquest, expansionism and war²⁷, do not represent the accomplishment of messianic aspirations but their outright betrayal.

II. Messiah and the State

At the basis of both Zionist and anti-Zionist ideology, messianism cannot be reduced to its Biblical roots, if there are any²⁸. It is an idea unquestionably embodying national aspirations, hopes of redemption and utopic projections and therefore Maimonides established the belief in messianic restoration as one the major (thirteen) principles of faith. Yet divers and contradictory conceptions – like those exposed in the treatise *Sanhedrin* of the Babylonian Talmud (97a-99b) – make it impossible to reduce this ideal to its restorative component. The versatile and often contradictory character of this idea, as well as its lack of roots in Moses’ Torah, made Joseph Albo, the most famous Jewish philosopher of the

fifteenth century, deny its statute of principle (*yqar*) of faith. According to Albo's celebrated *Book of Principles*, messianism is merely a derivative branch (*`anaf*)²⁹ and, although Messiah plays a role which is determinative for the Jewish 'doctrine of faith', this idea cannot lay at the core of this 'doctrine', being in no way a specific difference in defining Jewish religion.

This apparently surprising denial of the status of messianism and of the Land as essential elements in the definition of Jewish identity formed at the end of the nineteenth century the basis for a modern redefinition of Jewish religion. Thus, in 1885, an important branch of the American religious community, Reformed Judaism (the biggest Jewish community in North America)³⁰, decided – in the Pittsburgh Platform – to utterly abandon the messianic idea. This act corresponded to the formal renunciation to define Judaism in national terms: "We consider ourselves no longer a nation, but a religious community. And therefore expect neither return to Palestine, nor a sacrificial worship under the administration of the sons of Aaron, nor the restoration of any of the laws concerning the Jewish State."³¹ The seemingly natural association between messianism and a national definition of Judaism motivates in this case the abandonment of this idea. Possibly determined also by its utilization in the European space, the Pittsburgh Platform represents an attempt to cut the very roots of any political messianism and territorial claims.

For the Reformed community, as well as for many Orthodox and Hasidic Jewish groups, Zionism is exclusively a state,³² without any legitimacy of being founded on Jewish religious, traditional or cultural bases. Though national redemption is one of the most important aspects of the Messianic idea, its concrete embodiment seems to have never been really envisioned by rabbinic thought. As Yeshayahu Leibowitz – one of the most famous contemporary opponents of political Zionism in its Israeli nationalistic form – remarked, the very conception of state does not exist in the *halakha*³³ and in Maimonides' grand legislative code there is no mention whatsoever of a law applying in the Jewish State.³⁴ Gershom Scholem, in his analysis of the messianic idea,³⁵ laid stress upon the tension – co-originating with rabbinic Judaism – between the normative aspect of the *halakha* and the restorative function of messianism. Being in some aspects mutually exclusive, the return to the Land, implying the reenactment of the pristine cult, and the new form of religion and spirituality, based on study, interpretation and prayer, are situated in Judaism on two different (ontological) levels. Judaism does not define itself

as a provisory religion in between the destruction and the restoration of the Temple. And the return to the Land, to the Temple and to its cult is not a question of historical probability.

In the course of their millennial exile, Jewish communities throughout history seem to have avoided establishing in the Land of Israel. During long periods when settlement was not formally prohibited – like the nearly five centuries of the Arab Empire –, after the Spanish expulsion or even at Napoleon’s invitation in 1799 of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine,³⁶ something prevented an entire exiled people from returning to what it considered its original home. There was no proper mass immigration in Palestine before nineteenth century. Among the first settlers, the followers of the Gaon of Vilna,³⁷ marking the beginnings of modern colonization in Israel,³⁸ were cautious not to break an important rabbinic commandment that had been preventing a mass return all through history. Even for some of the religious groups that, influenced by the Zionist ideas, established in the Land of Israel at the end of the nineteenth century (*Hovevei Zion*), living in the Land was far from being an accomplishment of the messianic idea. The leader of the newly established settlers, Rabbi Berlin of Volozhin (1817-1893), head of Jerusalem Ashkenazi community, repeatedly advocated keeping the colonization of the land separated from the idea of redemption.³⁹

A certain mystical idea of the Land, present in the Kabbalah, had never met a political interpretation before Abraham Isaac Kook (the Rav Kook). For this important twentieth century rabbi and mystic, Zionism can be understood by merging mystics and politics and thus fully realizing the means by which redemption can be wrought in history. His alluring legitimization of Zionism on mystical bases derives from a panentheistic conception of an essential non-differentiation between the sacred and the profane. The inherent mystical power of the Holy Land – a power which could be and shall be activated by the State – could make people return to faith and could mark the beginnings of a new era, an era of which the State and nationalism were necessary steps. The State is “the beginning of redemption”.⁴⁰

For many Jewish religious groups, however, the sacredness of the Land was neither something granted nor a support for national political aspirations. For Hasidic groups like Satmar, Munkacs or Lubavitch, it is not only *Shkhina*⁴¹ that dwells in the Land of Israel, but also the devious side, *Sitra Ahra*.⁴² The Land is not only the (virtual) bearer of the divine Presence, of extreme sacredness, but also the (virtual) bearer of evil, of

extreme impurity, and this is not simply the manifestation of the essential ambiguity characterizing any sacred object. The Land of Israel is the greatest of dangers⁴³ because it has the power to lead into the temptation of perpetrating one of the gravest transgressions: that of “forcing the end”. The interdiction of “forcing the end” is enounced in the *Sanhedrin* treatise of the Babylonian Talmud (92b) and it will become an important issue in the medieval mystical tradition. It marks the boundary between belief and projection, expectation and self-affirmation, freedom and obedience. At the core of the argumentation against “forcing the end” – by a return to the Land of Israel and by national and political self-affirmation – are the three oaths that Israel took before God, a tradition stemming from the treatise *Ketuvot* of the Babylonian Talmud (111a):

They shall be carried to Babylon, and there shall they be, until the day I remember them, says the Lord (*Jeremiah* 27:22). And R. Zera? The text referred to tells about the vessels of the priestly function. And Rav Yehuda? Another text says: *I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem, by the gazelles, and by the hinds of the field, [that you awaken not, nor stir up love, until it please] (Song of Songs 2:7)*. And R. Zera? That implies that Israel shall not go up [immigrate] [as if surrounded] by a wall. And Rav Yehuda? Another “I adjure you” (*Song of Songs* 3:5) is written in Scripture. And R. Zera? That text is required for [an exposition] like that of R. Yose, son of R. Hanina, who said: ‘What was the purpose of those three oaths? One, that Israel shall not go up [immigrate] [as if surrounded] by a wall [mass immigration]; the second, that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured Israel that they shall not rebel against the nations of the world; and the third is that whereby the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured the gentile nations that they shall not oppress Israel excessively.

The three oaths take the function of a *halakha* (legislative) item at the end of the Middle Ages, exerting a prescriptive force and preventing mass emigration in decisive moments in Jewish history. The current religious opponents of the anti-Zionist stand argue that the three oaths cannot be considered a *halakha* item; they are merely a matter of *aggada* (non-legislative item of the Talmudic commentary)⁴⁴ and therefore cannot accomplish a prescriptive function. The main argument in this direction is the absence of the three oaths from Maimonides’ momentous legislative compendium, *Mishneh Torah*. Thus, the possibility of legitimating or illegitimating the return to the Land of Israel and a certain interpretation

of the messianic idea within rabbinic Judaism depend upon what seems to be a textual detail.

From sixth century *piyyutim*⁴⁵ to Maimonides, from major Middle Ages` Talmudic and Cabalistic figures to sixteenth century Maharal of Prague,⁴⁶ from eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Hasidism and anti-Sabbatian reactions and up to contemporary religious anti-Zionism, the three oaths have been put forth particularly during periods of messianic fervor or when the return was socially and politically achievable.⁴⁷ And they seem to have been – at least till the end of the nineteenth century – efficient enough. Maimonides, who had not included the three oaths in his systematized summary of Jewish law, *Mishne Torah*, posits them as fundamental in his 1172 letter to the Yemenite community,⁴⁸ which was being shattered by a powerful messianic movement and inflamed by redemptive expectations.

In the mystical tradition, the existent gulf between belief and historical accomplishment is deepened though the projection of the ideas of messianism, Land of Israel and exile on a cosmic and divine scale. In Kabalistic literature, exile and messianic redemption are central theosophical and cosmogonic elements and in Isaac Luria`s mystical school of sixteenth century Safed (in Palestine), they take the form of a recuperation of the divine sparks spread throughout the world, a process which takes place both in history and in the divine world. The most disconcerting of the messianic movements, Sabbataism, which stirred a new wave of immigration and its subsequent opposition, reinforced the paradoxical status of Messiah and of the Land. The impressive number of adherents it gained and the upset following Sabbatai Zvi`s conversion cautioned once more about the perils underlying the messianic idea. The Hasidic movement continued to contemplate these essentially ambiguous subjects, wavering between messianic fervor and profound mistrust in any messianic accomplishment.

III. *Va-Yoel Moshe. The Anti-Zionist Creed*

The Zionist – anti-Zionist conflict within modern Judaism is not only extremely significant socially and politically, it is first and foremost a battle for identity, a battle whose battleground is messianism. In this context, *Va-yoel Moshe*,⁴⁹ Yoel Teitelbaum`s main work and the fundamental reference of the anti-Zionist traditional stand, is essentially a defense of

traditional Judaism as defining Jewish identity. First published in 1959, its argumentation is based on the main sources of Jewish tradition : the rabbinic corpus (*Mishnah*, Talmudic *halakha* and *aggada*, *midrashim* and *Responsa*), Talmudic and Biblical commentators, mystical tradition (the *Book of Zohar*, Ezra of Gerona, Nachmanides, Lurianic Cabbala and Hasidic lore) and philosophy (Sa`adia Gaon, Maimonides, Abraham ibn Ezra). The guiding theme of this vast monument of Jewish lore is represented by the three oaths. They are primarily legitimated as a foundation stone of Jewish tradition and, having been legitimated, they are employed as the main argument in dismantling the Zionist idea. The tremendous importance of the three oaths stems from the fact that they are more than simple commandments; they are the foundation of all the other commandments, since the act of adjuring before God is the original religious act. This is the explanation of the title (alongside with the word pun), based on the treatise *Nedarim* of the Babylonian Talmud (65a) commenting upon the fact that wherever the phrase "Moses consented" (*Va`yoel Moshe*) is found in the Torah, it is the expression of acquiescing to an oath. The fundamental act of the founding figure, Moses, is to pledge his existence and that of his people to God. Being consentient to an oath⁵⁰ is not therefore a mere act of moral loyalty, it is the original act defining Israel's identity as a community in a contractual state with the divinity.

In essence, the three oaths are the bases of the Revelation at Sinai and of the commandments contained in the Torah (both written and oral). Their betrayal is an act of self-destruction: "An oath betrayed consumes that which fire cannot" (*Shavuot* 39a). Breaking the three oaths by an independent action in history, by becoming the agent of redemption and by instituting a government before the advent of the Messianic age is an act of betrayal of the Jewish faith (*kefirah*). It is a graver sin than all those mentioned in the Torah.⁵¹ And this all the more so, since the act of founding a state is an attempt to imitate the nations, making the enactment of Israel's unique destiny impossible and denying divine providence.⁵²

Consequently, not only do the three oaths constitute a matter of *halakha*, but they are the most significant of the *halakhic* rules and it is thus necessary to analyze them as essential for the reassertion of Jewish religious tradition. Like the Maharal of Prague he often quotes, the Satmar Rabbi ranks these three commandments among the fundamental three negative commandments (interdictions), which are to be placed above life (the interdiction of murder, of incestuous relations and of idolatry). The three oaths are reducible to two interdiction which have to be respected with

the risk of losing one's life:⁵³ the interdiction of "climbing the wall" and that of revolting against the nations. The unusual expression "to climb the wall" (*la`a lot `al ha-homah*) may have, according to Rabbi Teitelbaum's analysis, three meanings: (1) to immigrate in large groups; (2) to immigrate in Israel as a majority; (3) to immigrate by faring an illegitimate war against nations living there⁵⁴ – or, according to the interpretation of Rashi,⁵⁵ "together with a strong hand" (*yahad be yad hazaqah*). Mass immigration and violence against local population are not only a contravention to the three oaths, but they are implicitly a defiance of the Torah, which sources like the *Baba Batra* treatise of the Babylonian Talmud (9a) call "the wall". Israel's violent intervention in history, their impatience and their self-assurance constitute thus the major sin of "forcing the end" or, by reference to the *Song of Songs*, of "awakening the beloved".

To break the three oaths or to "force the end" means, on the one hand, to give up hope and belief and consequently to put off redemption⁵⁶, and on the other hand to break the profound rapport between Messiah and the Land of Israel and render both conceptions meaningless. The separation between the holiness of the Land and the Messianic element is advocated in the history of Jewish thought, not without arising vivid reactions and controversies, by mystics like Jacob ben Sheshet⁵⁷ or Nachmanides (the latter's establishment in the Land of Israel during the last years of his life raised opposition among his disciples and fellow mystics). Yet, the sacredness of the Land of Israel is generally considered to be a corollary of the past existence of the Temple. After the destruction of the Temple, the Land is sacred through the possibility of return, through the indefinite expectation of messianic times. Its sacredness is thus a temporal sacredness, not a spatial one.⁵⁸

The analysis of Talmudic passages which seem to oppose to the interdiction of immigration, such as the discussions in the treatise *Gittin* 45a around the Biblical verse of Deuteronomy 23:16 – stating not to expulse a slave escaping into the Land of Israel – lead to the same conclusion: Jerusalem and Israel were sacred due to the Temple.⁵⁹ A slave coming to the Land of Israel could not be expelled because it was the only place free of idolatry and the refuge for those trying to escape idols. It was the uniqueness of its faith, of the Temple and of its worship that made the Holy Land holy. This does not deny the sacredness of the place; rather it defines sacredness as something not embodied in anything concrete. The Land separated from its messianic value is a mere idol. Consequently, the temporal dimension does not only carry the sanctity

of the Land, but it also protects against idolatry. The Promised Land is not an object to be revered or fought for, but the very ideal that gives faith both its steadiness and its dynamics. The return is a belief and it cannot become a political desiderate, since, from a religious point of view, the Land of Israel is inaccessible, impossible: only he who is without sin has the right to go in the Land of Israel.⁶⁰ The two conceptions express therefore two reciprocally exclusive beliefs: “the belief in this (Zionist) state and the belief in the sacred Torah are absolutely opposed and cannot coexist under a single crown.”⁶¹

Alongside with the non-dissociable rapport between messianic times and the Land of Israel, the rapport between the messianic times and exile is another central, non-dissociable aspect shaping Judaism. Rabbi Teitelbaum quotes Nachmanide’s *Ma`amar ha-Geulah* interpreting a remarkable historical fact: Ezra himself gathered around him only a part of those in exile; most of them remained in Babylon despite the fact that the interdiction was to be formulated later on and that the act of return was then a divine commandment.⁶² If the end of exile corresponds to the return of the Divine Presence herself – erring ever since Israel’s first exile (Babylonian Talmud *Yoma* 9a) – this fact transcends historical determination (Israel actual situation). Thus, even if the entire Israel had returned in its Land in the time of Ezra, the Divine Presence (Shekhinah) would have nonetheless remained in exile.⁶³ The exile is as constitutive as the Torah itself. It is an original, founding divine rule. The rapport to the transcendence and the act of belief are also rooted in this fundamental reality. Being just means accepting exile and hoping for redemption.⁶⁴

The theological significance of the exile and the metaphysical, rather than eschatological, charge of the messianic idea make them impossible to reduce to human action in history.⁶⁵ As the indefinite time of transcendence within historical time, as indefinite expectation, messianic time is the divine aperture of history, the very name of God’s longed for, impossible Presence. Thus, true believers will continue to dread the three oaths even after the arrival of Messiah⁶⁶ and – an idea drawn upon Abraham ben David’s⁶⁷ commentary to Mishnah *Edot* 9 – similar to the period following the Egyptian and Babylonian exiles, even after the advent of Messiah, Israel will still err for an indeterminate lapse of time in the desert. They will err until repentance is perfect⁶⁸, because “there is no redemption without repentance” – a phrase insistently repeated throughout the book.⁶⁹ And therefore, the first divine gathering (*kibbutz*) of Israel shall not be in the Land of Israel, but in the desert,⁷⁰ a

place of purification and trial, the traditional dwelling of Samael (Satan) and the site of theophany, a space where Israel's absolute act of belief will mark the leap unto another existential level. The act of repentance is an unconditional, supreme one: the repentance should be perfect and – according to the *Zohar*⁷¹ – it should be done by all “as one”, an absolute act in an absolute moment.

If the coming of Messiah is marked or triggered by the achievement of moral and spiritual perfection, a pious accomplishment, it is not however an empire of the miraculous. The only ‘sign’ Messiah will give will be his power of bringing Israel to a life in Torah.⁷² No other signs or miracles. The transformation he brings is an interior, spiritual one; and if this seems to contradict the miracles Maimonides mentions in his *Mishne Torah*, this is only one of the many seeming contradictions implied in the messianic idea. Correspondingly, the absence of the three oaths in his legislative opus is only the sign of their deeper, more fundamental meaning.⁷³

But the exile is not only constitutive; it is, in itself, redemptive. An idea rooted in the rabbinic literature⁷⁴ and developed in Medieval mystical tradition is that Israel brings salvation to the world through its dispersion. The famous Lurianic⁷⁵ conception of the reintegration of divine fallen sparks is often referred to in supporting the necessity of Israel's presence throughout the world⁷⁶. According to another famous anti-Zionist rabbi, Dov Baer Shneerson, “to free oneself from the burden of the exile is to free oneself from the burden of Torah”.⁷⁷

Despite the complex and contradictory messianic signs and definitions that Maimonides synthesizes in *Mishneh Torah*,⁷⁸ the essence of messianism may be reduced to the idea of religious redemption (belief in the Torah).⁷⁹ But the causal relation is here paradoxical, a paradox defining the very act of belief. Thus, repentance and belief trigger the advent of Messiah, it is not Messiah who brings about salvation as a *deus ex machina* solution.⁸⁰ Moral and religious self-redemption brings about messianic times, which mean, first of all, moral and religious redemption. This circular argument translates both expectation of divine intervention and the effort of creating its moral and religious conditions in history. Human effort is made even with divine intervention.

Other elements of the messianic times – pertaining to an eschatological dimension – are announced as articles of faith, yet they are seemingly out of place within the general religious framework: the return of the prophet Elijah and the mythical war of Gog and Magog,⁸¹ the resurrection of the dead as the last step of the messianic triumph,⁸² the prophecy, which will

return to Israel before the advent of Messiah,⁸³ and, the most problematic of all, the reconstruction of the Temple with its corollary, the restoration of the sacrifice.⁸⁴ Like the Land of Israel, the Temple is not a simple human construction. It is – according to the *aggadot* – descended from heaven or built by men, but sanctified by a celestial model.⁸⁵ Its time of advent is as indeterminate as that of messianic times. According to the *Sanhedrin* treatise of the Babylonian Talmud (98a-b) the end should not be disclosed and no temporal determination whatsoever should be given or searched for, only perfection in moral and religious acts.⁸⁶ The messianic idea, the exile and the restoration of the Temple are “things concealed and sealed and known to the Saint, blessed be He, alone”, they are another name for transcendence “and this is the reason why we ward off so insistently not to take ourselves any action whatsoever regarding redemption, but to worship the Name, blessed be He, and to expect salvation”.⁸⁷

As for the third oath, it is not an interdiction but a promise: that the nations will not oppress Israel beyond endurance. It is here that the argument of the unbelievers (Epicureans) intervenes: if the nations betrayed their oath, so can we. An argument that the Satmar Rabbi deems as the “vanity of vanities”, since the oaths are in no way interdependent. They aim at protecting from the disaster of ‘forcing the end’,⁸⁸ that is, of revolt and idolatry,⁸⁹ of transforming the Messianic idea into a historical idol, a goal in a teleological representation which could legitimate any political action. Messiah is not the goal of history but its transcendence.

IV. Political ideology and “the Zionist State”

Is the new state a ‘miracle’, or ‘a sign’? Is it an instrument of redemption, as religious Zionism, following its leading figure, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, understood it? In the effervescence felt by the Russian religious Zionist group *Hovevei Zion* and by Rav Kook’s followers, political Zionism was understood as a means of historically significant divine intervention. They do not force the end, “the end forces them” (*doheq `otam*). Zionism claims to be a ‘miracle’, that is the expression of divine Will accomplished by means of historical, significant action. One of the main aspects upon which *Wa`yoel Moshe* insists is therefore prudence towards miracles, a fundamental virtue.⁹⁰ An analysis of the Zionist ‘miracle’ is necessary since a part of the Jewish religious community has given in to its appeal.

So far, messianism has been discussed in its religious, moral and metaphysical aspects. The second part of Yoel Teitelbaum's argumentation comes closer to the historical and political realities: the Zionist use of the messianic idea, the actual existence of "the Zionist State" and its repercussions upon Jewish communities, the Holocaust and its political use. In his denunciation of 'Zionist' actions and discourse, lay and religious Zionists are referred to in a non-differentiated manner. Both groups are heretics (*minim*), that is, they are guilty of idolatry but they rest within the confines of Judaism. By describing them as *minim*, the Satmar Rebbe admits that they are still part of the Jewish community. The Zionist government, as "a government of heresy" (*memshalah shel minut*) represents the danger within.⁹¹

The addressees of this message are the religious groups that met Zionism halfway, and the most referred to is Agudat Israel⁹². After 1948, the positions of different religious groups differed: from total, uncompromising rejection to indifference, from ambiguity to compromise or extreme right militant extremism. Most of the traditional religious groups, with the exception of the extreme right wing, determinedly reject the associations of religious practice and symbols with political matters. Accordingly, they see the introduction in the prayer order (*Seder*) of the prayer for the State of Israel written by S.Y. Agnon, *Reshit geulatenu* ("the beginning of our redemption") – a considerable political and symbolical act – as a desecration,⁹³ as mistaking colonization for redemption.

How do a lay legal system and a "democracy" stand for Torah?⁹⁴ The argumentation is not in this case politically coherent: Rabbi Teitelbaum labels the "Zionist State" both as a "democracy" and as a military nationalism dominated and dominating through fear and violence.⁹⁵ The actions of the "State of impurity which they named Israel"⁹⁶ bears direct results upon the rest of the community. The first of these results is the Holocaust. It may seem astonishing that the Satmar Rebbe considers the death of 6 million Jews during the Second World War as being, from both a theological and a political point of view, the result of Zionist actions and propaganda (*ta'amulah*). This weighty accusation is based upon a theodicy scheme, a retributive structure that sees in the Holocaust the punishment for Zionist transgression and idolatry. This tragedy is a divine manifestation in history, the manifestation of the attribute of Stern Judgment (*Din*).⁹⁷ But the explanation is not left solely on the theological level. From a historical and political point of view, it was violent Zionist actions and propaganda that made the nations want to drive them out of

their borders and nurtured anti-Jewish feelings – an idea already expressed before the Second World War by some important rabbinic figures.⁹⁸ This attitude legitimates Zionist claim for the necessity of a State which would be a shelter in an anti-Semite world, yet, he argues, the world has been rendered anti-Semite by their very actions. If there is no place left to go for many dislocated Jewish communities (particularly those in Arab countries), this situation is generated by Zionist pernicious acts.⁹⁹ The hatred is born with and because of Zionist actions. In occurrence, there was no Jewish hatred in the Arab states before Zionism¹⁰⁰ – a discourse which tries to integrate the *mizrahi* (oriental) position.¹⁰¹

If Zionism brings about impurity in the Land (or brings about the impurity of the Land),¹⁰² being in a Land of Israel transformed into a Zionist State and being instrumental to this idol-structure – a structure that is a goal in itself – becomes an idolatrous act. Zionists` only aim is to have “a powerful state” (*medinah hazaqah*), indifferent to its citizens and devoid of other values. Zionist propaganda is that of “love for the land” (*hibat ha-aretz*), which is a trap, an expression of a pure will of domination by showing force towards other peoples.¹⁰³ They allowed the immigration of those necessary to the cause of the State and use the religious factions and parties to “to shut the eyes of the world”¹⁰⁴ and to legitimize themselves as representative for Judaism, in an attempt to create a positive international image.¹⁰⁵

Religious collaboration helps them to “wash away their shame”¹⁰⁶ and it is therefore an act as grave as that of Zionists themselves. Religious collaboration in Israeli political life renders impossible real political actions because of “the corruption of money” and of manipulation. Real politically meaningful action would be the denial of its representative status and the foiling of their legitimacy claims.¹⁰⁷

These mingled arguments (theological, social and political) aim at convincing the other Jewish religious groups that the best political results may be obtained through non-political action or resistance. The best way to fight “the Zionist State” is the refusal to identify with it and to support its legitimating discourse. Only in this way may the heretics (*minim*) become simple idolatrous peoples (*`akum*) and stop menacing the very existence of historical Judaism.

V. Being a Jew/Being Jewish

More than two opposing worldviews, the question of religious opposition to Zionism is that of two opposed conceptions of Jewish identity. The notion of Jewish identity holds indeed today two not only different, but also contradictory meanings.¹⁰⁸ The self-definition of the newly created State as representative for all the Jews triggers an extremely complicated situation. Regarded from this perspective, the discourse of the State of Israel, as that of incipient Zionism, appears as lacking coherence. Thus, “*young Hebrews trying to purge Jewish history of its religious content*”,¹⁰⁹ the myth of “the New Hebrew Man” as opposed to the “primitive” religious population – an anti-Judaism propaganda which dominated Israeli journals in the period following the formation of the state,¹¹⁰–, and all the rhetoric means of legitimating the State despite Jewish religious opposition speak of a Zionist attempt of liberating itself from the intricate and disturbing relationship to traditional Judaism. David Ben Gurion¹¹¹ tagged Judaism as “the historical misfortune of the Jewish people”¹¹² and recent Zionist propagandistic literature bluntly affirms the Biblical essence of Judaism, which has been obscured for nearly two thousand years by the “Rabbinic non-imaginative tradition”.¹¹³ Nevertheless, the State’s need of a representative stand and legitimacy, momentous in its incipient times and still necessary now, make it impossible to cut the cords attaching it to historic Judaism.

For the new State, the question of identity was and remains one of the thorniest and confusing. The wavering and equivocating positions betray the difficulty of finding serviceable criteria of identity, which could serve practical issues like granting citizenship or organizing immigration. In 1947, the representatives of the Jewish Agency to the United Nations` Special Committee on Palestine declared that in order to be considered a Jew “technically and in terms of Palestine legislation, the Jewish religion is essential”, but also that “generally, we accept as Jews all those who say they are Jews”.¹¹⁴ In the Law of Return of 1950 the term ‘Jew’ is not defined, yet Israel turned in 1970 to the *halakhic* (traditional Jewish) definition: a Jew is a person of Jewish religion having a Jewish mother or who is formally converted to Judaism.¹¹⁵

The increasing gap between Zionism and Rabbinic Judaism triggers a repositioning of both Jewish religious communities and Zionist official ideology. While traditional religious groups such as Satmar reproach the fact that identity in Israel, “is not determined through Torah or belief, but

through a signature on a letter",¹¹⁶ Zionist claim for a lay perspective is far from being coherent. Jewish identity is established in Israel on Rabbinic grounds for lack of a better criterion. Yet, an idea advocated by many Israeli intellectuals – among them, the celebrated Israeli writer A.B. Yehoshua – is that a 'normal' lay state should adopt the "citizenship" criterion. Accepting a definition non-related to religion implies admitting citizenship and civic rights for a Christian or a Muslim Jew.¹¹⁷

Yet, for the Jewish state, none of the criteria is really practicable. The anti-Zionist non-religious opposition and the post-Zionism stand both reproach the fact that Zionism has been sharing with anti-Semitism "a nationalist conceptualization of the Jew".¹¹⁸ The impossibility of clarifying this intricate situation may stem from this very nationalist position. As pointed out by Dan Segre¹¹⁹ in a remarkable study, in this particular case, nationalism seems to be inversely proportional to national conscience. Denouncing Zionist messianic scheme as "mythical" and "irrational",¹²⁰ non-religious opposition to Zionism, as well as the post-Zionist opposition to a nationalistic state conception and politics meet, paradoxically enough, the arguments of religious anti-Zionists. Many of the aforementioned Satmar stands coincide with those of representative intellectuals like Hannah Arendt – her lifelong reflection on the problems and paradoxes of a nation-state often led her to discuss the problem of Jewish identity¹²¹ –, Martin Buber and Judah Magnes,¹²² Franz Rozenzweig, Claude Montefiore, Albert Einstein¹²³ or, more recently, Yeshayahu Leibowitz. For these and for many other Jewish intellectuals, whom we could describe, using the expression forged by Isaac Deutscher, as "non-Jewish Jews",¹²⁴ manifesting one's Jewishness means adhering to the traditional definition of Judaism. For the "post-Zionists", the fact of advocating the renunciation to what has been Zionist nationalism in its bellicose and intolerant expression is accompanied by a steady support for a traditional definition of the Jew through Judaism. Assuming one's Jewishness through Judaism is today the expression of a moral and political conscious stand. In Yeshayahu Leibowitz's words:

The danger is that of seeing national identity transforming into state control and will of power, into a national identity in the sense Mussolini gave it [...]. Yet, a part – a minority, but a consistent minority – of the human group considered so far as the Jewish people attaches itself to maintaining alive its historical religious inheritance by rejecting this national identity and its symbols. We thus find ourselves today in the situation where the notion of 'national Jewish identity' possesses two significations, nay, two contradictory significations.¹²⁵

NOTES

- 1 ALKABETZ, Solomon (sixteenth century Kabbalist) quoting a major thirteenth century Cabalist, Joseph Gikatilla, in *Sefer Ayelet Ahavim*, Venice, Daniel Bomberg, 1552, p. 3.
- 2 See : BAUMGARTEN, Jean, *La naissance du Hassidisme. Mystique, rituel, société (XVIIe – XIXe siècle)*, Albin Michel, Paris, 2006.
- 3 SHAROT, Stephen, "Hasidim in Modern Society" in HUNDERT, Gershon David, *Essential Papers on Hasidism. Origins to Present*, New York University Press, 1991, pp. 511-513.
- 4 VITAL, David, *The Origins of Zionism*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p. 29.
- 5 ALFASI, Isaac, *The Hasidism in Romania* (Hebrew), Segula, Tel Aviv, 1973, pp. 14-16.
- 6 FUCHS, Abraham, *The Admor of Satmar* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1980, pp. 17-18.
- 7 "Righteous man", denomination of the leader of the Hasidic community.
- 8 TEITELBAUM, Moshe., *Ysmach Moshe (Moses Rejoiced)*, Lemberg, 1849.
- 9 FUCHS, Abraham, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.
- 10 LAMM, Norman, "The Ideology of the Neturei Karta According to Satmar Version" in *Tradition. A Journal of Orthodox Jewish Thought*, Vol. 13, No. 1/Fall 1971, p. 39.
Also in : RAVITZKY, Eliezer, *The Revealed End and the State of the Jews. Mesianism, Zionism and Religious Radicalism in Israel* (Hebrew), Am Oved, Tel Aviv, 1993, p. 63.
- 11 MENDELSON, Ezra, *The Jews of East Central Europe between the World War*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983, pp. 187-188.
- 12 RABKIN, Yakov, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
- 13 RABKIN, Yakov, *Au Nom de la Tora. Une Histoire de l'opposition juive au Sionisme*, Presses Universitaires de Laval, 2004, p. 18.
- 14 RABINOWIZ, Harry, "Hasidism and the State of Israel" in HUNDERT, Gershon David, *Essential Papers on Hasidism. Origins to Present*, p. 235.
- 15 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *Va-yoel Moshe*, Brooklin, Jerusalem, 1985, Introduction, p. 4.
- 16 KEDOURIE, Elie quoted by SMITH, Anthony D. in *Chosen Peoples*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 24.
- 17 HERZL, Theodor, *The Jewish State. An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question* (first German edition, *Judenstaat* 1896), tr. Sylvie D'Avigdor, M. Newman, Tel Aviv, 1956, p. 61.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 106.
- 20 One of the three forms on modern nationalism in Kedourie`s scheme. In SMITH, Anthony D., *op. cit.*, pp. 13-16.

- 21 Major Hasidic dynasty from Muckachevo, Ukraine, Munkacs keenly opposed Zionism till the death of its revered *tzadiq* Hayyim Elazar Spira in 1937. The contemporary Munkacs community in Brooklyn, New York, is loyal to the anti-Zionist position and has a strong affinity to the Satmar group.
- 22 Ahad Ha'am, Asher Hirsch Ginsberg, (1856 – 1927) is the main promoter of the Cultural Zionism. He saw his conception of Judaism as a cultural heritage which needs to be revived and embodied in the Jewish homeland as being in acute opposition with Herzl's political nationalistic view. For a few of his most important texts on this issue, see : HERTZBERG, Arthur (ed.), *The Zionist Idea. A Historical Analysis and Reader*, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1959, pp. 248-278.
- 23 RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
- 24 Claude Joseph Montefiore (1858-1938), great nephew of Moses Montefiore, was an important Jewish intellectual, lay preacher and theologian, founder of the radical Reform movement in England. He also made a significant contribution to the study of Christian religion.
- 25 MONTEFIORE, Claude, *Race, Nation, Religion and the Jews*, Wordsworth & Co, Keighley, 1918, pp. 26-27.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- 27 TAL, Uriel, "Foundations of a Political Messianic Feud in Israel" in SAPERSTEIN, Marc (ed.), *Essential Papers on Messianic Movements and Personalities in Jewish History*, New York University Press, 1992, pp. 497-499.
- 28 The idea of a messianic personality originates doubtlessly in the inter-testamentary period. The only two occurrences of the word (*moshiab*) in the Hebrew Massoretic texts in a very obscure passage from the later *Book of Daniel* (9:25; 9:26).
- 29 ALBO, Joseph, *Sefer ha-Yqarym*, Soncino, 1485, Ma`amar I, Perek 23.
- 30 <http://reformjudaism.org/>
- 31 BERGER Elmer, "The Messianic Link" in TEKINER, Roselle, ABED RABBO, Samir, MEZVINSKY Norton (eds.), *Anti-Zionism. Analytical Reflections*, Amana Books, Vermont, 1988, pp. 3-4.
- 32 RAVITZKY, Eliezer, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
- 33 The *halakha* is the legislative, prescriptive corpus of Judaism, as opposed to the *aggadah*, non-legal parts of rabbinic literature.
- 34 LEIBOWITZ, Yeshayahu, "The Notion of Zionism – Symposium of the World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem, 1970" in DAVIS, Uri, MEZVINSKY, Norton, *Documents from Israel (1967 – 1973). Readings for a Critique of Zionism*, Ithaca Press, London, 1975, p. 217.
- 35 SCHOLEM, Gershom, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality*, Schocken, New York, 1971.
- 36 RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

- 37 Elijah ben Solomon Zalman of Vilna (1720-1797), one of the most important Rabbinic figures of modernity, Talmudist, Cabalist, astronomer, mathematician and leader of the opposition to Hasidism (*hitnagdut*) in the eighteenth century.
- 38 VITAL, David, *The Origins of Zionism*, p. 7.
- 39 RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
- 40 See : YARON, Zvi, *The Philosophy of Rabbi Kook*, tr. Avner Tomaschoff, World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem, 1991.
- 41 God's presence in the midst of His people. A Rabbinic idea developed on the basis of Bible occurrences (Exodus 40:35; Jeremiah 33:16; Genesis 9:27), which would play a very important role in the Medieval Jewish mystical tradition.
- 42 *Sitra Ahra*, the Other Side (in Aramaic), is a central Cabalistic conception. It represents the left, evil emanation within the divine world or originating in the divine world, a complex representation of the metaphysical evil.
- 43 RAVITZKY Eliezer, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62.
- 44 RAVITZKY, Eliezer, *op. cit.*, p. 279.
- 45 Poetical compositions for liturgical purposes.
- 46 Judah Loew ben Bezalel or the Maharal of Prague (1525-1609), major rabbinic figure, Talmudic commentator, philosopher and mathematician.
- 47 *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.
- 48 For an English translation, see : *Selected Letters of Maimonides*, translated by Abraham Yakov Finkel, Yeshivat Bet Moshe, Scranton, 1994.
- 49 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *Va-yoel Moshe*, Brooklin, Jerusalem, 1985 (First edition: 1959 for the first volume and 1961 for the second).
- 50 *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 24.
- 51 *Ibid.*, ch. 32, p. 64.
- 52 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, Introduction, pp. 7-8; 12-13.
- 53 *Ibid.*, ch. 20, pp. 63-64.
- 54 *Ibid.*, ch. 9, p. 42.
- 55 Solomon ben Isaac (1040-1105) is the most important and widely quoted Bible and Talmud exegete.
- 56 *Ibid.*, ch. 19, p. 52.
- 57 Jacob ben Sheshet Gerondi, mid thirteenth century Cabalist, one of the most important of the Gerona circle.
- 58 *Ibid.*, ch. 5, p. 31.
- 59 *Ibid.*, ch. 6, p. 37.
- 60 *Ibid.*, ch. 8, p. 40.
- 61 *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. 18.
- 62 NACHMANIDES, *Ma`amar ha-Geulah*, Sha`ar I in TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 12, p. 44.
- 63 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 12, p. 42.
- 64 *Ibid.*, ch. 16, p. 58.

- 65 *Ibid.*, ch. 17, p. 60.
- 66 *Ibid.*, ch. 19, p. 62.
- 67 R. Abraham ben David of Posquières (~1125-1198), one of the most important rabbinic authorities and Talmudic commentator of the twelfth century and a founding figure of Kabala.
- 68 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 21, p. 64.
- 69 *Ibid.*, ch. 42, p. 84; ch. 74, p. 174.
- 70 *Ibid.*, ch. 22, p. 64.
- 71 *Midrash ha-Ne'elam* 40a, ed. Muncacs.
- 72 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.* ch. 38, p. 71.
- 73 *Ibid.*, ch. 38, p. 72 *et suiv.*
- 74 See: the treatise *Avodah Zarah* of the Babylonian Talmud (3b).
- 75 Isaac ben Solomon Luria Ashkenazi (Ari) (1534-1572), leading figure of the 16th century Kabala, founder of an innovative and highly complex Kabbalistic school of thought, whose main representatives are : Hayyim Vital, Joseph ibn Tabul, Israel Sarug, Menahem Azriah de Fano, Hayyim Luzzatto and Abraham Cohen de Herrera.
- 76 *Ibid.*, ch. 19, p. 53.
- 77 RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
- 78 MAIMONIDES, *Mishneh Torah*, ed. Frankel, *Hilkhot Melakhim* XI.
- 79 *Ibid.*, ch. 38, p. 71.
- 80 *Ibid.*, ch. 40, p. 75.
- 81 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 49, p. 95.
- 82 *Ibid.*, ch. 56, p. 106.
- 83 *Ibid.*, ch. 170, p. 252.
- 84 *Ibid.*, ch. 60, p. 110 and following.
- 85 *Ibid.*, ch. 61, pp. 110-114.
- 86 *Ibid.*, ch. 70-72, pp. 126-130.
- 87 *Ibid.*, ch. 74, p. 174.
- 88 *Ibid.*, ch. 75, p. 131.
- 89 *Ibid.*, ch. 76, p. 139.
- 90 *Ibid.*, ch. 80, p. 143.
- 91 *Ibid.* ch. 104, pp. 170-173.
- 92 The main Haredi (conservative form of Orthodox Judaism) party, established in 1912.
- 93 KATZ, Jacob, "Israel and the Messiah" in SAPERSTEIN, Marc (ed.), *Essential Papers on Messianic Movements and Personalities in Jewish History*, p. 475.
- 94 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 99-100, pp. 162-164.
- 95 *Ibid.*, ch. 145, p. 227.
- 96 *Ibid.*, ch. 145, p. 227.
- 97 RAVITZKY, Eliezer, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
- 98 RABKIN, Yakov, p. 193 *et suiv.*

- 99 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 110-111, pp. 182-183.
100 *Ibid.*, ch. 110, p. 183.
101 For an example of Jewish Oriental (Mizrahi) anti-Zionist discourse,
see : SHOHAT, Ella, "Mizrahim in Israel : Zionism from the Standpoint
of its Jewish Victims", *Social Text*, 19-20/ Fall 1988, pp. 1-35.
102 *Loc.cit.*
103 *Ibid.*, ch. 144, p. 224.
104 *Ibid.*, ch. 111. p. 187.
105 *Loc.cit.*
106 *Ibid.*, ch. 114, p. 189.
107 *Ibid.*, ch. 117-119, pp. 191-194.
108 LEIBOWITZ, Yeshayahu, *Peuple, Terre, Etat*, trad. Gérard Hadad, Plon,
Paris, 1995, p. 111.
109 KURTZWEILL, Baruch, "La démocratie israélienne" in CHARBIT, Denis, *op.*
cit., p. 681.
110 RABKIN, Yakov, p. 51.
111 David Ben Gurion (1886-1973).
112 RABKIN, Yakov, p. 63.
113 Cf. : ERLICH, Avi, *Ancient Zionism. The Biblical Origins of the National*
Idea, The Free Press, 1995, pp. 16-17.
114 BERGER, Elmer, "The Missing Link" in TEKINER, Roselle, ABED
RABBO, Samir, MEZVINSKY Norton (eds.), *Anti-Zionism. Analytical*
Reflections, Amana Books, Vermont, 1988, p. 14.
115 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
116 TEITELBAUM, Yoel, *op. cit.*, ch. 113, p. 187.
117 YEHOASHUA, Abraham B., "Juif ou Israélien" in CHARBIT, Denis (edit.)
Sionismes. Textes fondamentaux, Albin Michel/Menorah, Paris, 1998, pp.
696-697.
118 RABKIN, Yakov, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
119 SEGRE, Dan V., *A Crisis of Identity. Israel and Judaism*, Oxford
University Press, 1980, p. 134.
120 WEINSTOCK, Nathan, *Zionism : False Messiah*, tr. A. Adler, Links, London,
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121 ARENDT, Hannah, *The Jewish Writings*, Schocken, New York, 2007.
122 SHATZ, Adam (ed), *Prophets Outcast. A Century of Dissent. Jewish Writing*
about Zionism and Israel, Nation Books, New York, 2004, p. 54 and
following.
123 *Ibid.*, pp. 62-64.
124 DEUTSCHER, Isaac, "The Non Jewish Jew and Other Essays" (1968)
in SHATZ, Adam (ed), *op. cit.*
125 LEIBOWITZ, Yeshayahu, *Peuple, Terre, Etat*, p. 111.

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EXPERIENCING OTHERNESS. BERTRANDON DE LA BROQUIÈRE'S PILGRIMAGE TO JERUSALEM (1432)

Understanding the Christian-Muslim interactions in the Middle Ages is a topic that has stirred an intense debate among historians over the past few decades. The core of the controversy is the “orientalizing” nature of Western representations of Islam and the post-colonial reading of Christian-Muslim medieval relations. In this regard, Edward Said’s book on *Orientalism* has been deeply influential in the field of medieval studies.¹ Paradoxically, most medievalists took over Said’s main argument, although they refuted his assertions on the medieval period as inexact, stereotyped and over-generalized.² Nonetheless, following Said’s “orientalizing” thesis, Western medieval texts on Islam began to be interpreted as expressions of an inherent Eurocentric stance, part of a process of imaginative colonialism that strictly delineated the frontier between the Christian Self and the Muslim Other. European descriptions of other cultures were no longer viewed as genuine attempts, even if failed ones,³ to understand otherness; instead they were interpreted as instruments of forging an identity shared by the authors and their audience.⁴ In this process, otherness was nothing but a projection of the self.⁵ This post-colonial interpretation darkens considerably the previous image of medieval Christian-Muslim interactions. If forty years ago Richard Southern viewed the medieval Christian-Muslim relationship as an evolving one, in which the initial antagonism was being gradually replaced by tolerance and mutual knowledge,⁶ nowadays historians are considerably skeptical. Today’s dominant viewpoint is best represented by Jonathan Riley-Smith, who, in an exposé on interfaith medieval relationships, asserts categorically: “any distant vision, we as historians might have, of finding true point of contact, turns out to be a mirage.”⁷

This article aims precisely to approach this mirage and to argue that medieval Christian-Muslim interactions were not simply schematic constructions of otherness, through which each part was enforcing and reassuring its own identity. Instead, I will argue that, some of the Western medieval writers engaged in a genuine effort to understand and translate a different culture into their own.⁸ I will develop my argument around a case-study of a fifteenth-century pilgrim, the Burgundian Bertrandon de la Broquière,⁹ who chose a radical method to get to know the Muslim Other. Bertrandon transgressed the frontier that separated him from the Other by turning Turk. Thus, in order to travel throughout Muslims' lands, he disguised himself as a Turk and, while walking in his Muslim travel companions' shoes, he came to be acquainted with their way of life.

This kind of transgression, even if a pretended and a temporary one as Bertrandon's, is rather unusual in Western medieval sources, especially in pilgrimage narratives. Therefore, in the first part of this article, I will compare Bertrandon's account with some other late medieval pilgrimage texts, by investigating how his mundane experience of otherness came to terms with his spiritual journey. Bertrandon's fascination with the Muslims' way of life seems even less comprehensible if we consider that the author played an important role in fifteenth-century crusading. Bertrandon traveled on the expenses of Philippe the Good, the duke of Burgundy, presumably as spy, gathering information for a future crusade,¹⁰ and he wrote his account at the duke's request. Therefore, in the second part of the article, I will analyze *Voyage d'Outremer* in the larger framework of fifteenth-century Burgundian crusading texts. My contention is that although *Voyage d'Outremer* is both a pilgrimage account and a Burgundian crusading text, it does not fit entirely in either of these genres, because it provides a peculiar, highly unusual, interaction with Muslims. Thus, in the third part of the article, I will look for an explanation of Bertrandon's remarkable interest in grasping the Muslims' way of life, by analyzing the author's cultural background and his auctorial intentions, taking into account the intended audience of the text. In this part of the article, I will also tackle the most extraordinary feature of Bertrandon's pilgrimage, his disguise as a "native", looking for similar adventures in medieval texts. In the last section of this article, I will address the central issue of Bertrandon's tolerance, which I will assess by comparing his views against those of sixteenth-century French travelers in the Ottoman Empire. My argument is that, although Bertrandon foreshadowed the ethnographical curiosity of sixteenth-century travelers, his understanding of the Muslim world was substantially different due to his direct experience of otherness.

1. Late medieval pilgrimage and the discovery of the “others”¹¹

“Nous qui sommes les vrais chrétiens, nous ne sommes pas la vingtième partie du monde” (Guillaume Adam)¹²

Most historical writings on medieval pilgrimage comprise a chapter on the representation of the Other, usually structured around three sections: Muslims, Eastern Christians and Jews. Within each section, historians briefly catalogue the most widespread topoi regarding otherness and, occasionally, provide one or two examples of uncommon tolerance among medieval pilgrims. This rather unsophisticated interpretation seems to correspond accurately to most pilgrims’ narratives who often describe the Other in a simplistic, unoriginal, manner. Nonetheless, although this is the prevailing image in medieval pilgrimage literature, it is not the only one. Acknowledging that Latin Christianity was just a minority, as Guillaume Adam did, was an important step towards questioning its centrality. In other words, it became possible that there were only “others” and, paraphrasing Paul Ricoeur, that Latin Christians were just an Other amongst others.¹³ I will come back to this matter in the last part of the article, where I will argue that Bertrandon de la Broquière is an excellent example of switching roles between the Other and the Self. In this section, my aim is to argue that although there was a generally accepted taxonomy of otherness, some pilgrims eluded it and portrayed a far more complex image of other cultures. Thus, the regular, simply to cope with, triangular image – Latin Christians/Muslims/Eastern Christians – was sometimes replaced by a representation whose structure is both complex and fluid, and, as a result, difficult to grasp. I will focus on one case-study, Bertrandon’s *Voyage*, by comparing his representation of otherness with that shared by most pilgrimage accounts. However, firstly, I will situate *Voyage d’Outremer* in the broader framework of medieval pilgrimage literature.

In order to better understand *Voyage d’Outremer* we must bear in mind that the proliferation of pilgrimage accounts in the late medieval period is in stark contrast to the repetitiveness of their content.¹⁴ So frequent are the similarities that Josephie Brefeld even argued that most of these narratives derived from a single source-text, a pilgrimage guide-book.¹⁵ Even if Brefeld’s argument is, overall, unconvincing,¹⁶ the resemblances among these accounts support the idea of a firmly established textual tradition that influenced directly most authors. In other words, it is not an Ur-text that explains the similarities of these texts, but rather the conventions of a

genre. Although the first known Jerusalem pilgrimage account dates from the fourth century, the genre as such was not firmly established until the twelfth century, when the reasons for making the Jerusalem pilgrimage and afterwards narrating it had been literary conventionalized.¹⁷ In the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, almost all pilgrim authors were well acquainted with pilgrimage literature. When preparing for their voyages to Jerusalem, travelers, such as the Dominican Felix Fabri, would read pilgrimage accounts thoroughly and, once arrived in the Holy Land, would filter their actual experience through their bookish knowledge.¹⁸ In addition, the Jerusalem pilgrimage itself became a standardized voyage after the fall of Acre in 1291.¹⁹ Pilgrims abided by a strict itinerary, followed a clear schedule under a rigorous organization established by Venetians, Franciscans and Mamluk sultans.²⁰ The pilgrims' ships departed twice a year from Venice, in the spring and in the autumn. Once arrived in the Holy Land, the pilgrims were taken over by the Franciscans, who guided them at a fast pace through the holy places, in a tour that only took a few days, and then sent them back to Venice by sea.²¹ This double pressure of standardization, both of the narrative genre and of the pilgrimage itself, might explain the resemblances between most late medieval pilgrimage accounts.

Bertrandon de la Broquière managed to escape both constraints, and, without any doubt, this explains to a large extent the originality of *Voyage d'Outremer*. Firstly, after fulfilling his pilgrimage vow, he decided to split from his companions and to return home alone, by taking a different, far more dangerous, route. Thus, instead of the customary returning sea voyage to Venice, he chose to travel by land, across the Ottoman Empire. Bertrandon's choice, due either to his sudden decision, as he himself asserts, or to a carefully premeditated plan, as his modern editor believes,²² allowed him to see regions lying outside the pilgrims' regular itinerary. Secondly, his relation with the pilgrimage genre is rather ambiguous. I will leave aside for the moment the delicate problem of his knowledge of other pilgrims' narratives, which I will analyze in the third section of the article. Nevertheless, even assuming that he was acquainted with such texts, he still disregarded many of the genre conventions. For instance, the incipit of *Voyage d'Outremer* is highly unusual because it combines two different writing motivations, none of which is typical for a pilgrimage account. Bertrandon dedicates his account both to those noble men who want to see the world, as well as to the Christian kings and princes who want to go to Jerusalem by land and to conquer the city. In this way he combines

curiosity, an incentive specific to non-pilgrims travelogues, and the desire to conquer Jerusalem, a reason typical for a crusade memorandum. Thus, he leaves aside the traditional account of the importance of the Holy Land for a Christian that most pilgrims, if not all, placed at the beginning of their narratives. His mentioning of the desire to see the world, which strongly resembles to the motivation invoked by Marco Polo,²³ is highly unusual for a pilgrim.²⁴ Curiosity was considered the sin that threatened pilgrims the most, and medieval authors were usually very careful to highlight their piety and to denounce *concupiscentia oculorum*.²⁵ Another fifteenth-century pilgrim, the Milanese Santo Brasca, emphasizes that the only legitimate purpose of a pilgrimage is the spiritual one, and not a vain desire to see the world.²⁶ In contrast, Bertrandon explicitly appeals to the curiosity of his audience, and throughout his entire account, he never feels the need to justify his interest for earthly matters.²⁷ The purpose of these brief remarks is not to argue that *Voyage d'Outremer* does not follow the conventions of the genre, and therefore it cannot be considered a pilgrimage account; but rather to suggest that Bertrandon himself placed his narrative, either by choice or ignorance, on the fringes of a firmly established textual tradition. To give another example, he describes in great detail the returning journey, which was usually disregarded or briefly referred to by most pilgrimage narratives.²⁸ In addition, Bertrandon makes a subtle distinction between voyage, which is the means, and pilgrimage, which is the purpose.²⁹ In this way, the voyage itself, although subordinate to the pilgrimage, gains certain autonomy. Nonetheless, by constantly referring to his journey as to a pilgrimage, and by considering Jerusalem the focal point of his voyage, Bertrandon remains within the tradition of the pilgrimage accounts. Therefore, although *Voyage d'Outremer* is a traditional medieval pilgrimage narrative, some of its features foreshadow a new genre of travel literature, the Renaissance travel journal.³⁰

The most striking feature that sets apart *Voyage d'Outremer* from the majority of the fifteenth-century pilgrimage accounts is the representation of the Other, not only the Muslim or the Jew, but also the Eastern Christian and even the Latin one. One should remember that medieval pilgrimages played an important role not only in emphasizing the interfaith frontiers, but also in coining and disseminating ethnic stereotypes within Western Christianity.³¹ Since most pilgrims voyaged in multi-ethnic groups, the Other they had to deal with every day was rather the Christian traveling fellow than the Saracen. Hence, the numerous stories of inter-ethnic disputes and prejudices amongst pilgrims in fifteenth-century narratives,

such as the Franco-German quarrel accounted by Felix Fabri³² or Pietro Casola's astonishment in front of the Germans' eating habits.³³ Not only are such anecdotes absent from *Voyage d'Outremer*, but also Bertrandon comes to ignore the ethnic frontiers within Latin Christianity by embracing the Ottoman vocabulary and by calling all Westerners *Francs*.³⁴ In this way, Bertrandon emphasizes the unity of Western Christianity, which is a recurrent idea in his text, stressing, nonetheless, the French leading role.

Furthermore, once again in contrast to most pilgrims' accounts, Bertrandon blurs the borderline that separates Latin from Eastern Christianity. Usually, Western pilgrims were not at all at ease with the Eastern Christians' diversity, which surprised them especially when arriving at the Church of the Holy Sepulcher that was shared by representatives of different Churches. In many pilgrims' view this diversity led to disharmony, and some of them were even accusing the Saracen authorities of mixing true Christians, schismatics and heretics. A typical attitude, of rebuffing Eastern Christians, is that of Pietro Casola, who compares the Armenians he saw in the Church of the Nativity with a flock of pigs.³⁵ This disharmonic image is conveyed to the reader by the enumeration of different types of Eastern Christians, along with their specific errors, which most of pilgrims simply copied from previous writings.³⁶ For the Western pilgrims, the frontier that separated Latin from Eastern Christianity was a clear-cut one, and had to be preserved as such.³⁷ In contrast, the distinction between heretics and schismatics was continually fluctuating, and not all the pilgrims agreed on which Eastern Christians should be labeled in one way or the other.³⁸ However, along with this widespread image, a different, marginal one, emerged, that overlooked the differences among Christians and underscored the fundamental unity of Christianity. Such is the case of the Anonymous pilgrim from Rennes, who looked beyond this disturbing diversity and contemplated the voices of different Christian Churches harmonizing in a single chorus to glorify God.³⁹

Bertrandon's views on Eastern Christians fit into this second approach. Although the distinction between Latin and Eastern Christians still exists in *Voyage d'Outremer*, it is substantially minimized and, even more important, is no longer judgmental. Bertrandon simply refers to the Eastern Christians as "autres manieres de Crestiens," without mentioning their errors, and, even if he finds their rites strange, he reckons them in a dispassionate way. To my knowledge, Bertrandon is the only fifteenth-century pilgrim who describes Latin Christianity itself as another

“maniere de Crestiens.”⁴⁰ Thus, by playing down the central place of Latin Christianity, Bertrandon escapes the traditional dichotomist image that opposed the Western Church to all Eastern Churches and portrays a Christianity whose diversity does not impede its unity.⁴¹

There is, however, an exception: the Greeks, who are the only Eastern Christians negatively portrayed by Bertrandon. In this regard, *Voyage d’Outremer* seems to share the dominant fifteenth-century, pre-1453, Western view of the Byzantines. However, the similarity is only apparent, because Bertrandon does not use the customary topoi in reproving the Byzantines and he fails to mention even once their religious “errors,” not even when he went to Hagia Sofia in order to see “le service a leur maniere.”⁴² His only charge against the Greeks is entirely secular: their manifested hatred towards Latin Christians. Moreover, he seems to justify their attitude when he explains that it derives from a profound misunderstanding and it is perpetuated by malevolent rumors.⁴³ Bertrandon opposed to Latin Christians only the Greeks, and not the entire Orthodox community, a distinction that some scholars failed to notice.⁴⁴ He clearly differentiates Greeks from other Orthodox people, taking care to underline that, although they were following the Greek rite, Bulgarians, Serbians or Wallachians were much more inclined towards the Latins.⁴⁵ Finally, in *Voyage d’Outremer*, it is being described a third category of Christians following the “loy grecquesque,” those who were living in Prester John’s country.⁴⁶ They represent the ideal model of Orthodox-Catholic alliance, combining both military partnership and ecclesiastic harmony. According to Bertrandon, Christians from Prester John’s country preserved their Greek rite while obeying to the Pope⁴⁷ and they were ready to attack the Turks in alliance with a Western crusade.

Thus, Bertrandon differentiates three categories within the Orthodox Church: (1) those who accepted the Union to Rome; (2) those who were willing to support a future Western crusade; (3) the Greeks who were rejecting both. In this way he combines in a single picture all three directions manifested in fifteenth-century Western attitudes towards orthodox – the desire to reunite the Churches, the hope for a joint crusade and the reproach for having rejected the union - by ascribing them in relation to three different communities.

Bertrandon’s view on Muslims is equally multifaceted in comparison with the usually straightforward description of most pilgrimage accounts. Muslim otherness is usually constructed by inversion, as the reverse of Christianity. For instance, Anselme Adorno, another fifteenth-century

Burgundian pilgrim, explicitly describes Muslims' way of life and their religion as an up-side-down Christianity.⁴⁸ Pilgrims constantly used coined phrases such as "perfidious sect," "Muslim monstrosity," "Saracen cruelty," or "Mahomet the seducer," to give only a few examples,⁴⁹ and their accounts played an important role in perpetuating and disseminating these topoi. In the context of the Turkish expansion in the fifteenth century, humanists added another one: "the barbarian at the gate."⁵⁰ In *Voyage d'Outremer* such anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish stereotypes are almost entirely absent.⁵¹ There are only a few negative descriptions referring to Muslims in general, for Bertrandon very carefully distinguishes between different Muslim peoples.⁵² Significantly enough, all these are placed at the beginning of his travel, prior to the period when he lived amongst them. But even in these cases, Bertrandon uses a different vocabulary, constructing a "soft" alterity and not a radical one. In the most injurious description, he calls Muslims "meschans gens et de petite raison,"⁵³ which, in medieval literature, is a language used rather for portraying a Christian peasant than a Saracen.⁵⁴ Furthermore, thorough the entire text there is no explicit condemnation of Islam, which is even more striking than the valorization, in some contexts, of the Muslims. Thus, it is quite common in pilgrimage literature to provide examples of "good" Muslims in order to contrast them with the behavior of sinful Christians.⁵⁵ However, these are simply narrative strategies, having a clear educational aim, and the author always takes care to underline the undeniable superiority of Christianity. In addition, during the fifteenth century, in humanist writings, it slowly emerged the image of the Turk as a worthy adversary.⁵⁶ Therefore, there is nothing unusual for a fifteenth-century pilgrim, such as Bertrandon, to admire Turks' military discipline, nor to praise some Christian virtues that Muslims display, despite their religion.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, Bertrandon goes a step further by avoiding any explicit denunciation of Islam and by manifesting an incessant curiosity in Muslims' way of live. Grasping this ethnographic dimension of the text is the most difficult task for a historian because it is completely at odds, not only with the genre, but also with the historical context in which Bertrandon was writing. *Voyage d'Outremer* was written under the patronage of the Burgundian duke, Philippe the Good, as an explicit crusading text, and it is the last place where one would expect to find detailed descriptions on Muslims' customs, such as recipes of Turkish cuisine. Therefore, before trying to explain this intriguing feature, I will firstly analyze Bertrandon's narrative in the context of the Burgundian crusading texts.

2. Philip the Good's crusading dreams and Bertrandon de la Broquière⁵⁸

"En quant à la conquête de la Terre Sainte [...] il me semble que la chose n'est pas si legiere à faire" (Bertrandon de la Broquière)⁵⁹

The role played by Bertrandon de la Broquière in Philip the Good's crusading projects is fairly ambiguous. On the one hand, he was one of the crusading 'experts' assembled by the duke of Burgundy at his court. On the other hand, he seemed to be less enthusiastic about embarking on a military expedition and, more importantly, he disagreed on some important points with the rest of the group of 'experts.' Thus, some of his views fit perfectly into the Burgundian crusading discourse, while others directly contradict it. In order to assess the originality of his views in the Burgundian context, one must also take into account Bertrandon's position at the ducal court. In this second part of the article, I aim to do both. My contention is that although Bertrandon's view on Eastern Christianity mirrors a general Burgundian attitude, his representation of Islam is distinctive, actually opposing the 'official' position. From this viewpoint, I will reexamine Bertrandon's crusading involvement, arguing that it contributed substantially to his social status and that pious motivation played, at most, a secondary role.

There are endless discussions in historiography whether Philip the Good's crusading interest was determined by his devotion to the Holy Land, by his knightly dreams, by the desire to avenge his father's disastrous adventure at Nicopolis, by a strategic design to avoid French domination or by the influence of his wife, Isabel of Portugal. Nevertheless, all these interpretations seem to agree on an important point: the duke of Burgundy, who took the cross at the famous Feast of the Pheasant, was genuinely interested in going on a crusade. Although his crusading dream failed to materialize, it produced a significant corpus of Burgundian crusade-related texts, of which Bertrandon's *Voyage* is part. Roughly, these sources could be divided in four main categories.⁶⁰ The first one includes Ghillebert de Lannoy's,⁶¹ Bertrandon de la Broquière's, Jehan de Wavrin's,⁶² and, the now lost, Pedro Vasquez's,⁶³ narratives, which are usually labeled as 'travel accounts,' although not all of them are. The second category consists of military projects for a new crusade, written or translated at the Burgundian court.⁶⁴ The third one comprises sermons, elaborated in a Burgundian milieu, whose purpose was to convince the audience

to take the cross.⁶⁵ The last category includes those texts that provided a theological argument for the crusade, such as Jean Germain's anti-Muslim writings.⁶⁶ All these sources do not represent a heterogeneous assemblage, grouped together by the sole reason that they were written in the fifteenth-century Burgundy. Instead, they form an articulate corpus the coherence of which is given by elements they all share: (1) they are directly linked to crusading; (2) they were written in a relatively short interval (1450-1475)⁶⁷ (3) their authors formed what could be called a group of experts on crusade-related issues at the Burgundian court. One cannot be more surprised to repeatedly find the same several names mentioned in most crusade-related activities that were taking place in mid-fifteenth century at the ducal court. Philip the Good's strategy was to constantly use the same people, obviously for fully benefiting from their experience. Ghillebert de Lannoy, Jean Germain, Bertrandon de la Broquière, Walleran de Wavrin, Geoffroy de Thoisy and Pedro Vasquez are the names most often mentioned in Burgundian crusading activities, which included diplomatic missions, pilgrimages and even a few military expeditions.⁶⁸ Next to them could be placed, in a more humble position, Jean Miélot, a scribe and translator specialized in crusading manuscripts at the ducal court.⁶⁹ Although Anselme Adorno was not part of this group, for he was too young at that time, he was definitely influenced by it and two decades later he attained a similar position at the court of Philip the Good's son and successor, Charles the Bold.⁷⁰ These authors' writings constitute the Burgundian framework in which I will analyze Bertrandon's representation of otherness, trying to assess the originality of his views on Eastern Christians and Muslims.

After the disastrous defeat from Nicopolis, where the future duke of Burgundy, John the Fearless, had been taken prisoner by the sultan, Philip de Mèzieres wrote a letter addressed to the ruling duke, Philip the Bold, in which he was blaming the schismatics for the result of the campaign. According to Philip de Mèzieres, since schismatics had been separated from the true Church for several generations, they had become the 'rotten apples' that had to be removed from the middle of the 'good ones,' otherwise they would cause them to rot.⁷¹ This letter, largely ignored at the ducal court, seems to have played no role in shaping the Burgundian view on Eastern Christians. On the contrary, Burgundians continued to value Eastern Christians as useful allies in a prospective crusade against the Ottomans. In addition, the religious differences between Eastern and Western Christians were significantly underplayed in the Burgundian crusading discourse.⁷²

At a first reading, the absence of the word “schismatic” in the Burgundian sources is striking. In the writings of Ghillebert de Lannoy, Bertrandon de la Broquière, Jehan de Wavrin or Jean Germain, I could find the word only twice, and in both cases the author used it in a reported speech. Its first occurrence is in *Voyage d’Outremer*, in a passage I have already mentioned, when Bertrandon describes Greeks’ hatred of Latins. According to Bertrandon, one of the reasons for their attitude was a rumor that was circulating in Constantinople about a Latin council, where the pope had decreed that the Greeks were *schismatics* and a *race of slaves*.⁷³ My interpretation of this passage is that Bertrandon was not only blaming such false rumors for turning the Greeks against the Latins, but that he was also emphasizing the negative reactions to the word schismatic. Bertrandon himself constantly avoids using it, naming Orthodox as Christians of “loy grecquesque.” This interpretation is fully supported by a short analysis of the second mention of the word ‘schismatic’ in Burgundian crusading sources.

When the chronicler Jehan de Wavrin accounts Geoffrey de Thoisy’s activities in the Black Sea, including his piracy deeds against Christians, he ascribes to the Burgundian knight this bold statement made in front of the Emperor of Trebizond: “I received the order to fight against all Schismatics who do not obey our Saint Lord, the pope.”⁷⁴ This statement, utterly unusual if we compare it with the overall image of Eastern Christians in Jehan de Wavrin’s chronicle,⁷⁵ was not by chance attributed to Geoffroy de Thoisy. Firstly, we must take into account that Jehan de Wavrin inserted in *Anchiennes croniques d’Engleterre* a book on the Burgundian “Saracen adventures” for the sole reason that the expedition was led by his nephew.⁷⁶ Moreover, throughout the entire book he attempts to settle the rivalry between the two leaders of the Burgundian fleet, Waleran de Wavrin and Geoffroy de Thoisy, to his nephew’s advantage. Thus, the chronicler constantly played down Geoffroy’s role in the entire campaign⁷⁷ and he clearly staged his torments in the Black Sea as a ‘humiliating story.’⁷⁸ In this view, rebuffing the schismatics was nothing but a narrative strategy aiming to vilify Geoffroy de Thoisy. Thus, in both contexts, in Geoffroy de Thoisy’s alleged speech and in the Constantinopolitan rumors recorded by Bertrandon, the word ‘schismatic’ carries the same detrimental meaning and Burgundian authors actually criticize those who used it.

There is, undoubtedly, a direct link between the Burgundians’ restraint to use the word ‘schismatic,’ Philip the Good’s concern for the reunification with the Eastern Church,⁷⁹ and the Burgundian hope for a military alliance with Eastern Christians. Thus, Bertrandon regards all Christians living under

the Ottomans' rule, Greeks included, as potential allies who could support a French-led crusade. In his sermon for a new crusade, Jean Germain describes Eastern Christians as ready to rebel against the Ottomans and to join the crusaders in the event of an expedition.⁸⁰ It should also be underlined that Jean Germain, one of the most important clerics of the Dukedom as bishop of Chalon and chancellor of the Golden Fleece, makes no allusion to the schism. On the contrary, when he enumerates all the Christian lands conquered by Muslims, he emphasizes the long history of Christianity in Oriental Europe. Consistent with this position Jean Germain charts in *Mappemonde spirituelle* a world entirely Christianized by the martyrdom of the saints, ascribing no special place to Latin Europe.⁸¹ The Burgundian bishop overlooks the differences between Christians and emphasizes that the main dividing line is that between Christians and non-Christians, in particular Muslims. On this particular point Bertrandon breaks away from the Burgundian crusading discourse, given that his views on Islam are opposed to those of Jean Germain and of the other 'experts' from Philip the Good's court.

In the previous section of this article I underlined the absence of anti-Islamic *topoi* in *Voyage d'Outremer*, and the neutral tone used by Bertrandon when describing Muslims and their religion. I will give here only a few more examples. When he inquires a Latin priest from Damascus on Muhammad and his history, Bertrandon uses a remarkably neutral tone.⁸² Similarly, when he defines "Alkoran," Bertrandon simply says: "C'est la loy que Machommet leur a laisié."⁸³ Furthermore, Bertrandon ascribes to his travel companion, Mahomet, a statement that places both Christians and Muslim on an equal position in front of God: "Dieu faisoit les Chrestiens comme les Sarazins."⁸⁴ Once returned to Burgundy, Bertrandon presented to the duke "l'Alkoran" together with the book written by the priest from Damascus, comprising *Les faits de Mohamet*. This moment was illustrated in one of the three miniatures of Philip the Good's manuscript of *Voyage*.⁸⁵ The duke gave the book to Jean Germain, and Bertrandon notes with regret that "I never heard of them since."⁸⁶ This ironic remark is highly interesting precisely because Jean Germain and Bertrandon place themselves on opposite positions with regard to Islam. Author of several anti-Muslim treaties, Jean Germain was the main advocate of the crusade in the vivid mid-fifteenth century theologians' debate on Christian-Muslim relationships.⁸⁷ In his correspondence with John of Segovia, he sharply refuted the method of conciliation proposed by the Spanish bishop, insisting that the crusade was the only option to cope with Islam.⁸⁸ In

the only extant, unedited, anti-Muslim treaty written by Jean Germain, there is an extremely interesting passage that might suggest some direct criticism of Bertrandon's views on Islam. The Burgundian bishop blames the ignorance of the pilgrims who were returning from Jerusalem with ideas contrary to the Christian faith: "souvent retourment plains de scrupules et mal ediffiez et par default de cognoissance pensent ou dient reproches contre la sancta foy chrestienne."⁸⁹ Although identifying Bertrandon with one of the pilgrims denounced by the bishop is purely speculative, Jean Germain's remark is revealing. Some of the pilgrims to Jerusalem were being 'corrupted' by a direct contact with Muslims. In some cases, and Bertrandon seems to have been one, the unmediated knowledge of the Other fractured the traditionally established frontiers.

There is a possible objection to this interpretation: Bertrandon's crusading involvement. However, this objection can be overcome by a brief analysis of Bertrandon's motivations, which takes into account his status at the ducal court. There are eighteen references to Bertrandon in the registers of the Burgundian court, all of them published by the editor of *Voyage*, Charles Scheffer, which enable us to roughly reconstruct his career. All these references are to sums of money paid to Bertrandon as a reward for different services carried out for the duke. In contrast to Ghillebert de Lannoy, to whom he is often compared, member of one of the most important Burgundian families and one of first knights of the Golden Fleece, Bertrandon's status was considerably modest. Born in Guyenne, in a family of small nobility, Bertrandon was first mentioned in Burgundian sources in 1421, as "escuier tranchant" of the duke. One year later he was sent on a diplomatic mission to the count of Foix, and in 1428 he received the small castellany of Vieil-Chastel. However, in the 1430's, Bertrandon's ascension at Philip the Good's court seems to take off. In 1436, 1438 and 1440 he was entrusted with important diplomatic missions to the court of France, in 1442 he was married by the duke to an important heiress from Artois, and one year later he was entrusted with the important castle of Rupelmonde. A few years after his marriage, Bertrandon is no longer mentioned in the records of the chancellery, probably because he was no longer living at the ducal court. The year of his death, 1459, is mentioned at the end of one of the manuscripts of *Voyage d'Outremer*. The turning years of his career seem to correspond to his pilgrimage (1431-1432) and one might suppose that his triumphal returning, described in Bertrandon's account and illustrated in the manuscript offered to the duke,⁹⁰ significantly enhanced his prestige at

the Burgundian court. This biographical sketch reveals the importance that Philip the Good's favors played in Bertrandon's social ascension and suggests that his knowledge of crusading matters played a significant role in gaining the duke's confidence.

Therefore, it is most surprising that Bertrandon was never actually a crusader. He never took the cross, not even after the Feast of the Pheasant when the duke, along with several hundred Burgundian knights, did. In comparison, Guillebert de Lannoy, Pedro Vasquez and Geoffroy de Thoisy followed Philip's example and took the cross a few days after the Feast.⁹¹ Nonetheless, Bertrandon's position is entirely consistent if we consider the absence of any personal crusading desire in *Voyage d'Outremer*. Throughout the whole account Bertrandon manifests only twice the impulse to fight Muslims, firstly when his honor was injured and secondly when he was scammed by some guides.⁹² These worldly reasons, which opposed Bertrandon to certain individuals and not to Muslims in general, emphasize even more the absence of a crusading motivation. Again, the contrast with Guillebert de Lannoy's attitude is manifest. When he first saw the Turks near Constantinople, de Lannoy's hasty reaction was to approach them: "esperant qu'il y a auroit bataille."⁹³ Bertrandon's unwillingness to participate to a crusade is clearly revealed by his comments on Torzello's crusading project, quoted at the beginning of this chapter. But nothing reveals better Bertrandon's standpoint than his reversal of a crusading common place: the lamentation for Christian rule of the Holy Land. When the Muslims showed him some ruins of an ancient fortress that had once been ruled by the Franks, Bertrandon, instead of deploring that period, was delighted to be reminded of it.⁹⁴ Undoubtedly, for him, the crusader states were a closed chapter of a glorious history and the desire to re-conquer Jerusalem was rather a literary motif than a genuine hope.

In conclusion, I suggest that Bertrandon's ambivalent role in Philip the Good's crusading dream is mainly due to an underlying tension between the duke's objectives and Bertrandon's viewpoint. Thus, by his journey, Bertrandon directly nourished Philip's crusading dreams, without, however, being himself interested in such a quest. This suggestion is fully supported by a close analysis of the narrative structure of *Voyage d'Outremer*.

The text was written at Philip the Good's request and, as a result, it was fashioned both by Bertrandon's standpoint and by what he expected to please the duke. The account was based on the notes taken by Bertrandon during his journey, and its structure closely follows the itinerary, with only two digressions. The first one is the story of Prester John's land, heard by

Bertrandon at Bursa from a Neapolitan merchant, and the second one is a general description of the Ottoman Empire. The story on Prester John is placed in the text according to a chronological order, and not to a geographical one. Bertrandon accounts the story when he describes Bursa, the place where he wrote it down, which suggests that when writing *Voyage d'Outremer* he followed closely the sequence of events as noted down in his travel journal. The second digression was included in the text at the moment when Bertrandon left the Ottoman Empire and it is the only part of the text that breaks down the chronology of the journey. There are several reasons to consider this digression a late addition that was not part of Bertrandon's "petit livret par maniere de memoire." This parenthesis is nothing but a crusading memorandum that starts by a lamentation for the Ottoman-ruled Christians, then describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire, and ends by providing a plan for a successful crusade. The most puzzling aspect is the almost complete absence of any relationship between this description and the rest of the text. Thus, my suggestion is to consider this digression a concession made by Bertrandon to Philip the Good's expectations to receive a crusading text. This leads us to the main question of this analysis: why did not Bertrandon write a crusading travel account of the Holy Land and of the Ottoman Empire, as Philip was probably expecting, and instead he chose to place himself, or rather his disguise as a Turk, at the centre of his narrative?

3. Bertrandon's returning voyage as a chivalric quest

"J'avois oy dire à aucuns que ce seroyt chose impossible à ung Crestien de revenir par terre jusques au reaulme de France[...] Adonc me deliberey à l'aide de Nostre Seigneur et de sa glorieuse Mere, qui oncques ne faillit à nul qui de bon cueur la requeist, de faire ledict chemin par terre depuis Iherusalem jusques au reaulme de France ou de y demeurer." (Bertrandon de Broquière)⁹⁵

The hypothesis I propose is that *Voyage d'Outremer* can be read not only as a pilgrimage account or as a crusading text, but also as a knightly autobiography. The connection between travel and knighthood was already a well established one in the fifteenth century,⁹⁶ and Oriental voyages played an important part in chivalric biographies such as Boucicaut's⁹⁷ and de Lannoy's. However, in most cases, the voyage was just a setting for

chivalric deeds and the Orient they described was vague and indistinct. In contrast, in *Voyage d'Outremer* there seems to be no chivalric prouesse and the description of the voyage has an almost ethnographic precision. Nonetheless, *Voyage* was a self-fashioning exercise and Bertrandon portrayed his decision to return by land in the realm of France using a vocabulary reminding of a chivalric vow.⁹⁸ This hypothesis is supported by Bertrandon's cultural background, as it can be reconstructed from the few literary references in *Voyage d'Outremer*. In addition, Bertrandon's disguise as a Muslim, singular in the medieval pilgrimage accounts, finds its correspondence in chivalric literature.

The evidence for Bertrandon's cultural background is rather scarce, and consists only of a few references in *Voyage d'Outremer*, most of them indirect. Fortunately, due to Georges Doutrepoint's excellent studies on the library of the dukes of Burgundy,⁹⁹ we have a clear image of the books that were being circulated at the ducal court in the fifteenth century. Thus, by using the inventories of the ducal library, I aim to identify Bertrandon's literary references. Such a method has obvious limits, but my purpose here is not to argue that Bertrandon read or listened to precisely this or that book, but rather to find out what kind of literature he had been exposed to.

The cultural references from *Voyage d'Outremer* can be grouped in four categories: Roman history; Alexander the Great, the Trojan cycle, and the history of crusades. There are several allusions to Roman history in Bertrandon's account, some of them general, others mentioning a precise event, such as the battle between Cesar and Pompei.¹⁰⁰ When he heard some stories about the Emperor Trojan from the Greeks he had met in the Balkans, Bertrandon carefully noted them down,¹⁰¹ which shows a certain interest in the subject. The references to Roman history are too general to be traced back to a certain book,¹⁰² but Bertrandon's interest definitely corresponded to a fifteenth-century Burgundian fashion. The inventories of the ducal library document a great number of manuscripts concerning Roman history, including a beautiful illuminated one that contains a French translation of Tite Live.¹⁰³ Philip the Good was directly interested in this topic and, under his patronage, Jean Mansel compiled a history of the Romans, while Jean du Chesne translated Cesar's *Commentaries*.¹⁰⁴

Although there is a single reference in *Voyage d'Outremer*, Bertrandon seems well acquainted with the Alexandrian legend and expects his audience to be as well. Bertrandon refers to Alexander in order to illustrate the marvels that can be found in Prester John's kingdom.¹⁰⁵ This succinct mention implies that the Alexandrian legend was part of the Burgundian

courtly common knowledge, an assumption confirmed by Sandrine Hériché-Pradeau's recent book, *Alexandre le Bourguignon*.¹⁰⁶ A topic that aroused a similar interest at the Burgundian court was the history of Troy, to which Bertrandon directly refers in a passage of *Voyage d'Outremer*.¹⁰⁷ According to the inventory edited by Georges Doutrepont, Philip the Good had acquired more than a few manuscripts on the Trojan cycle.¹⁰⁸ Burgundians' fascination with the Trojan legend transgressed literary curiosity, and the knights that traveled to the Orient attempted to find and to visit the locations of these adventures. Thus, on his way to fight the Ottomans, Walleran de Wavrin stopped for a while to visit "le havre principal de la grand cite Troyenne,"¹⁰⁹ while during his wanderings in the Black Sea Geoffroy de Thoisy searched for the mythical Colchis.¹¹⁰

Bertrandon acted in a very similar way when he imagined himself following in Godefroy de Bouillon's footsteps, the heroic figure of the first crusade, and undoubtedly, the character that fascinated him the most. Bertrandon mentions four times Godefroy's name and, at some point, he even refers to "le livre de Goddeffroy."¹¹¹ In the inventory of the ducal library there are at least three manuscripts under this heading,¹¹² which might include either a version of William of Tyr's chronicle of the first crusade¹¹³ or the first chanson de geste of the crusade, *Le Chevalier au Cygne et Godefroy de Bouillon*. Since this chanson de geste includes a similar episode to the one Bertrandon alludes to in *Voyage*, a forest that Godefroy "eust sy grant peïn a passer," I propose to identify "le livre de Goddeffroy" with *Le Chevalier au Cygne*.¹¹⁴ Besides this reference, there is another mention, a biblical one this time, which could be traced back to another chanson de geste.

Among the holy places Bertrandon visited in the Holy Land was Cana of Galilee, where Jesus Christ performed the first miracle at "Archeteclin's wedding."¹¹⁵ Although Cana was a usual halt in pilgrims' itineraries, Bertrandon is the only one who gives in his account the name of the bridegroom, who in the Gospel of John is unnamed. The enigma of Archeteclin is easily solved if we read the corresponding passage in the Vulgate, where "architriclinus" appears twice, designating the "ruler of the feast," as it was translated in King James Bible.¹¹⁶ It is highly unlikely that Bertrandon read the Vulgate himself and misunderstood that passage. His biblical knowledge is scant and, most probably, he did not know any Latin.¹¹⁷ G. Kline's explanation, according to which this passage was frequently misinterpreted in medieval theology, does not find any support either.¹¹⁸ His hypothesis is highly unlikely if we consider that in patristic

literature there has been a debate on the allegorical interpretation of architrclinus, with whom medieval theologians certainly were familiar.¹¹⁹ I suggest a different explanation, taking into account that similar confusions are documented not in medieval theological writings, but in chivalric literature. Two chansons de geste, *Gaydon* and *Guillaume d'Orange*, both well-known at the Burgundian court,¹²⁰ named the bridegroom from Cana Archeteclin. Moreover, *Gaydon* even considered him to be a saint: "As noces fustez le saint Archedeclin/ Quant la fontaine feis devenir vin."¹²¹ Thus, most probably, the source of Bertrandon's misunderstanding had been the distorting account of this biblical episode in chansons de geste.

This conclusion confirms the overall results of this succinct investigation. I suggest that Bertrandon's background, as far as it can be reconstructed from *Voyage d'Outremer*, was composed mainly, if not exclusively, of chivalric literature, either chansons de geste or chivalric romances. Far from representing an exception, this kind of chivalric culture seems to have been a characteristic for most fifteenth-century Burgundian knights.¹²² The absence of any reference to medieval travel literature might surprise, but it helps explaining the differences between *Voyage d'Outremer* and other pilgrimage accounts. Thus, the hypothesis that Bertrandon described his returning journey as a chivalric quest begins to gain ground. Most importantly, Bertrandon's disguise as a Saracen, a deed which has no precedent in pilgrimage literature, fits into the context of chivalric literature.

In medieval Europe, pilgrims had no reason to conceal their status. On the contrary, their position, protected by *lex peregrinorum*, attracted many travelers who, disguised as pilgrims, were hoping for a safer voyage.¹²³ For this reason, in medieval sources, there are few examples of pilgrims hiding their identity. Except for Bertrandon, the only other example I found is Pero Tafur. Tafur, who was more of an errant knight than a pilgrim, dressed himself as a Muslim in order to enter Omar's mosque in Jerusalem. The differences between Tafur's disguise and Bertrandon's are substantial. In contrast to Bertrandon, Pero Tafur pays no attention to the disguise itself, mentioning only that it was a very dangerous thing to do. For Tafur, the disguise, unattractive in itself, is useful because it gives him access to otherwise forbidden places. For Bertrandon, the disguise is far more fascinating, although the end is similar. The difference is best revealed if we compare their attitude towards Saracen clothing. Tafur barely says anything, mentioning only that he had borrowed the clothes from a renegade, without giving other details, while Bertrandon indulges himself in accounting for several pages different pieces of clothing and accessories. Despite this

major difference, it is nonetheless relevant that both Bertrandon and Tafur were pilgrim knights. A further inquiry in chivalric literature reveals some examples of heroic knights pretending to be Muslims, which might have served as a model for Bertrandon's literary account of his disguise.

In medieval French epic there are numerous examples of concealed identity, which usually involved a change of social status or, more often, a hidden lineage. Beside these common examples, there are few, rather less known, cases of knights disguised as Saracens. I will mention here two such examples, both taken from chansons de geste that were well known at the Burgundian court: *Huon de Bordeaux* and *La Prise d'Orenges*.¹²⁴ In *Huon de Bordeaux*, the knight Gériaume, disguised as Saracen in order to enter a Muslim city, pretends that he is emir Yvorin's son, and, to be more convincing, he even publicly displays his hostility against Christians.¹²⁵ Far more elaborate is Guillaume's disguise as Saracen, described in *La Prise d'Orenges*. In this case the disguise, used again by the hero to penetrate a Muslim city, takes an important place in the narrative. The process is meticulously described in the chanson: Guillaume and his friend blackened their skin, knew the language of the enemy, made up Saracen greetings, and invented odd biographies.¹²⁶ Thus, as Catherine M. Jones remarked, the disguise: "contributes to the relationship of complicity between the jongleur and his audience, who share the knowledge that the Saracens are being outwitted."¹²⁷ Outwitting the Saracens is precisely what Bertrandon does in a few episodes of his voyage. Bertrandon recounts how, when arriving in Brusa, he was taken for a Muslim pilgrim returning from Mecca and how the inhabitants kissed his robe. When he had been accused of being a spy, he immediately made up a story to justify his presence in the heart of Muslim territories. Bertrandon's disguise is so accomplished that his true identity is disclosed by somebody else only twice, by an Armenian and by a Greek. In the first case he was discovered due to "sa maniere," and in the second one due to "sa philonomie."¹²⁸ Bertrandon's disguise, although it shares some features with the burlesque model of Guillaume, it is more than just a mockery of Saracens. Firstly, Bertrandon's disguise was approved by the Muslim authority, which reduces considerably the opposition between the Christian knight in disguise and the Saracens. Secondly, in *Prise d'Orenges*, the disguise was just a prelude to the Christian-Muslim battle, a climax that is completely absent from *Voyage d'Outremer*. Thirdly, Bertrandon prolongs his disguise far more than it would have been necessary, and his victims are not only Muslims, but also Christians. Bertrandon was still

wearing Saracen garments in Buda and Vienna, which allowed him to distinguish false friends, as Hungarians, from genuine ones, as Austrians. The last episode of his disguise actually took place in Burgundy, when Bertrandon entered triumphantly in his Turkish clothes at the ducal court.¹²⁹ His appearance seems to have been a total success, considering that his Saracen garments would directly influence the fashion of the ducal court for the next years.¹³⁰ This last episode clearly shows how important the disguise was in Bertrandon's representation of his own travel. Finally, the fourth major difference between Guillaume's literary model and Bertrandon's actual journey is given by their descriptions of the disguising process, and implicitly, by their portrayal of the Saracen. In *Prise d'Orenges* the scene is burlesque; Saracen identity is reduced to a few caricatured features, and the disguise is accomplished in no time. On the contrary, in Bertrandon's case, Saracen identity is far more complex and Bertrandon's camouflage is achieved only through a long and difficult learning process, including that of the language.¹³¹ Thus, while the author of *Prise d'Orenges* played along with the audience's stereotypical image of the Saracen, Bertrandon challenged it, suggesting that there was more to Saracens' way of life than the few well-known clichés.

4. Turning native without turning Turk

"Et là commençay à apprendre à couchier sur la terre et à boire de l'eau sans vin et me seoir à terre les jambes croisiées ce qui me fu un pou dur au commencement. Mais le plus dur me fu le chevalchier aux cours estriers [...] Et apres que je l'eus acoustumé, il me fu plus aisié que nostre maniere." (Bertrandon de la Broquière¹³²)

Up to this last part of the article, I have deliberately left unaddressed the central question a modern reader would ask when reading *Voyage d'Outremer*: is Bertrandon de la Broquière tolerant? Assessing someone's tolerance, especially when that someone lived in the fifteenth century, requires firstly a theoretical framing. Most of the studies of the idea of tolerance begin with the sixteenth century, considering that prior to that, the concept simply did not exist.¹³³ Accordingly, the medieval society is defined as a persecuting society.¹³⁴ Only recently, Cary Nederman convincingly argued that ideas of tolerance existed in medieval period, building his case on writings of medieval theologians, such as John of

Salisbury and Nicholas of Cusa.¹³⁵ To my knowledge, the only one who suggested the existence of a non-theologian concept of tolerance in the Middle Ages was Carlo Ginzburg.¹³⁶ However, his suggestion, based on the fourteenth-century travel account of John Mandeville, seems implausible.¹³⁷ Mandeville, an armchair traveler, and most probable a cleric, aimed to reform Christianity by describing the diversity of religious beliefs throughout the world.¹³⁸ Therefore, his “theoretical tolerance,” as Jean-Pau Rubiés named it, resembles more to that of Nicholas of Cusa’s than to a secular way of thinking. Bertrandon’s statement, ascribed to his Muslim companion, *God made both Christians and Muslims*, conveys the same idea, of a profound unity prevailing over differences, asserted both in Mandeville’s *Travels* and in Nicholas of Cusa’s *De Pace Fidei*. Therefore, Bertrandon’s open-mindedness towards the Muslims shares some common features with fourteenth and fifteenth-century theological ideas of tolerance. For instance, when he praises his Muslim traveling companion, Mahomet, for his love of God and for his good deeds, Bertrandon seems to directly echo Cusa’s ideas.¹³⁹ Nonetheless, as I said, Bertrandon was far from being a theologian and, throughout *Voyage d’Outremer*, he never expands on, and even less conceptualizes, the notion of tolerance. Instead of trying to figure out if Bertrandon could have been tolerant without actually knowing what tolerance means – a problem that resembles the Marxist dilemma whether there can be a class struggle without a class consciousness – I propose to tackle the problem from a different angle.

Tzvetan Todorov, in his typology of the representations of Other, identified three levels of interaction between the Self and the Other: a) axiological, which implies a moral judgment of the Other as inferior/superior or bad/good; b) praxeological, which reflects the distance between the author’s Self and otherness and c) epistemic, which represents the degree of knowledge of the Other.¹⁴⁰ According to Todorov, these three levels, although related to each other, are largely autonomous.¹⁴¹ One might admire the Other, without wishing to assume his identity, and even without actually knowing anything about him. Todorov’s typology was applied to sixteenth-century French travelers’ descriptions of the Ottoman Empire by the historian Frédéric Tinguely.¹⁴² I will summarize here Tinguely’s conclusions. On the epistemic level, French voyageurs were highly interested in knowing the Ottomans; while on the axiological stance, their judgments were often contradictory, sometimes valorizing, sometimes condemning Ottomans’ way of life. The interaction between the French voyageur and the Ottoman Other was most diminished on the praxeological axis. The travelers-authors

did everything to preserve the distance between their own identity and that of the Ottomans. As Tinguely says, Western travelers cannot imagine themselves taking the last step towards the Other and assuming his identity, except in their nightmares of forced conversion and damnation. If we compare Tinguely's conclusions to Bertrandon's standpoint, we notice that his interactions with Muslims, including the Ottomans, largely foreshadowed those of sixteenth-century French travelers. The only exception is on the praxeological level, where Bertrandon acted exactly the opposite. Therefore, the question regarding Bertrandon's tolerance might be reformulated in these terms: why were sixteenth-century travelers so afraid of turning Turk and why was Bertrandon not?

My hypothesis is that Bertrandon felt so much at ease with assuming a Saracen identity, while sixteenth-century travelers never crossed a certain line in the direction of otherness, because he had a different attitude regarding conversion. Certainly, both in the fifteenth and in the sixteenth century, conversion to Islam was a reality that all Christians deplored. Throughout his voyage, Bertrandon referred to this phenomenon and even encountered a few renegades, to whom he freely interacted.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, Bertrandon never expresses any anxiety that he himself might be converted. Moreover, he even underlines that, despite the initial warnings of his pilgrim companions, conversion was the only danger he had never been exposed to.¹⁴⁴ In Bertrandon's view, the danger of conversion, although a genuine one, seemed to have threatened only those Christians living under Muslim rule who could not resist the temptations of the flesh.¹⁴⁵ But the idea of conversion was neither terrifying – not any Christian was exposed to this danger – nor appalling – a renegade was still a person one could relate to. In contrast, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, there was a far more accusatory and terrifying discourse against renegades and, more importantly, a fear of being accused of 'turning Turk.' This, as Daniel J. Vitkus's suggested, was probably an outcome of post-Reformation anxiety, directly linked to the polemics between Catholics and Protestants concerning conversion.¹⁴⁶ Another cause of this anxiety was the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century, in Hungary and in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, the attempt to assume a fake, temporary Saracen identity without actually being converted, as Bertrandon did, was no longer an acceptable game. An English bishop's sermon, from 1627, directly accused those many hundreds that "are Musselmans in Turkie, and Christians at home, doffing their religion, as they doe their clothes, and keeping a conscience

for every Harbor where they shall put in."¹⁴⁷ Moreover, in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the Inquisitors stressed the importance of Turkish clothing and habits for disclosing hidden renegades.¹⁴⁸ In such processes, witnesses were often asked whether they had seen the suspect wearing Saracen garments, implying that this was a clear mark of someone who had denounced Christian faith. Thus, due to an increase fear of conversion, whoever adopted Muslims' clothing or lifestyle was immediately suspected of 'turning Turk.' As a result, in the sixteenth and most of the seventeenth century, travelers avoided including in their accounts any 'adventures in disguise.'¹⁴⁹

This major difference on the praxeological stance between Bertrandon and sixteenth-century travelers had a significant impact on their description of otherness. By looking at the Muslim world from the inside, Bertrandon acted very much like a modern anthropologist who 'turns native' in order to better "grasp the native's point of view," to use Bronislaw Malinowski's words.¹⁵⁰ Undoubtedly, by turning native, Bertrandon was able to provide a detailed description of Turkish everyday life, of "leur maniere de faire, leur façon de vivre."¹⁵¹ But, even most importantly, Bertandon succeeded in accomplishing Malinowski's task and grasping natives' perspective. Thus, while most fifteenth and sixteenth-century travelers transcribed the Arabic alphabet in their accounts,¹⁵² in order to illustrate its strangeness, Bertrandon noticed that, if one simply changed the point of view, the Latin alphabet was just as bizarre.¹⁵³ This, apparently insignificant remark, reveals a complete reversal between the Self and the Other. By 'turning Turk,' and, as a result, by identifying himself with the Other, Bertrandon moved across cultural boundaries, into a different cultural space. Thus, *Voyage d'Outremer* is not only the account of a geographical travel, but also an attempt of cultural translation.

As François Hartog said, any rhetoric of alterity is, unavoidably, a translating process.¹⁵⁴ However, there are good and bad translations. Most of the rhetoric methods commonly used to construct alterity, scrutinized by F. Hartog in his analysis of Herodotus¹⁵⁵ and by Michèle Guéret-Laferté in her study on medieval travelers,¹⁵⁶ share the same implicit premise: an accurate translation is impossible. Otherness cannot be entirely grasped, and all a traveler can do is to provide an approximate description in order to make it possible for his audience to imagine Others' oddness. Hence, the importance of stylistic figures that rather suggest than actually describe, such as inversions, omissions, negations, superlatives and exotic vocabulary. If we consider this long list of stylistic methods and look for

them in *Voyage d'Outremer*, we notice that Bertrandon constantly used only one, comparison: their fields where cotton grows are planted like our vineyards; the Turkish bread is like a round, rolled up, pointed pancake; the yogurt is like curled milk; for shoeing horses they are using a sickle similar to the ones we use to cut vines; their *cadi* are the equivalent of our bishops, they eat on and keep their food in a tablecloth similar to a handbag; Turkomans carry their merchandise on buffaloes, in the same way we use horses, they pray together as we do on Sunday in the parish church, their coats are like ours, except that they have finer links, they wear helmets that look like French *salades*,¹⁵⁷ and the list could go on for several pages. It seems that, in describing Muslims' culture for a Burgundian audience, Bertrandon's implicit assumption was that anything could be faithfully translated. Nonetheless, it is obvious even from the few examples I quoted that Bertrandon did not attempt to translate everything. Mainly, he left aside Muslims' religion, to which he rarely referred throughout *Voyage d'Outremer*. Although he did not incorporate this subject in his account, Bertrandon brought back all necessary information in the two books he gave to the duke, *L'Alkoran* and *Les fais de Mahomet*; which Philip the Good, in his turn, entrusted to Jean Germain. Thus, Bertrandon directly experienced Muslims' behaviors and translated them, while Jean Germain's interpreted Muslims' religion without actually knowing any Muslim. Therefore, the distinction between these two Burgundian translations of Islam is a double one, regarding not only the subject, behaviors/beliefs, but also the perspective, inside/outside.

This inside view of Islam is, undoubtedly, the most original feature of Bertrandon's *Voyage d'Outremer*. Bertrandon's approach, which resembles to the modern anthropological practice of participative observation, allowed him to transgress cultural boundaries in an attempt to understand the Muslim Other. Once he returned to Burgundy, he conveyed his personal experience, at least partially, to a larger group at the ducal court, which represented the audience of his account.¹⁵⁸ Nonetheless, *Voyage d'Outremer* was not primarily a cultural translation endeavor. When he transformed his travel journal into a narrative, Bertrandon had to take into consideration not only the actual experience of the journey, but also the duke's expectations. In addition, writing *Voyage d'Outremer* was, to a large extent, a self-fashioning process. Thus, the result was a narrative placed in between three different genres, pilgrimage accounts, crusading memoranda and chivalric literature, that engaged its audience in a remarkable experience of otherness.

NOTES

- ¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). My focus in this short introduction is exclusively on the interpretation of Western medieval sources. For an interpretation of Muslim sources see Roxanne L. Euben *Journeys to the Other Shore. Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 20-45.
- ² For a Saidian interpretation of travel writing see Mary Campbell, *The Wistness and the Other world: Exotic European Travel Writing, 400-1600* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Although L. Pick and J. Tolan criticize Said's methods, they nevertheless accept his main thesis; see Lucy K. Pick, "Edward Said, Orientalism and the Middle Ages," *Medieval Encounters* 5 (1999): 265-271 and John V. Tolan, *Saracens. Islam in the Medieval European Imagination* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 283.
- ³ Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West. The Making of an Image* (Edinburgh: The University Press, 1960).
- ⁴ Tomaz Mastnak, *Crusading Peace. Christendom, the Muslim World and Western Political Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). One of the few scholars who managed to escape this static, one-way view and to acknowledge the "transformative power of otherness" is Michael Uebel, *Ecstatic transformation: on the uses of alterity in the Middle Ages* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
- ⁵ Jacques Le Goff, "L'Occident médiéval et l'océan Indien: un horizon onirique," 230-298 in *Pour un autre Moyen Age: temps, travail et culture en Occident* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1977).
- ⁶ R. W. Southern, *Western views of Islam in the Middle Age* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962).
- ⁷ Jonathan Riley-Smith's introduction to the special issue of *Medieval Encounters* 13 (2007), entitled *Crusades and Interfaith Relations*.
- ⁸ Joan Pau Rubiés, *Travel and Ethnology in the Renaissance: South India through European Eyes, 1250-1625* (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- ⁹ His narrative, entitled by its modern editor, *Voyage d'Outremer*, is preserved in four manuscripts, three of them kept in Bibliothèque Nationale de France and the fourth in the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal. The standard edition is that by Ch. Schefer, *Le Voyage d'Outremer de Bertrandon de la Broquière* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1892 – henceforth quoted as *Voyage*). There are two full English translations of the text, a nineteenth century one – Thomas Writght, *Early travels in Palestina* (London: Henry Bohn, 1848) – and a twentieth century one – Galen R. Kline, *The Voyage d'Outremer by Bertrandon de la Broquière* (New York: Peter Lang, 1988). The text was also published in the tenth volume of the nineteenth century edition of Richard Hakluyt's collection of travel accounts; *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of The English Nation collected by Richard Hakluyt*, ed.

- Edmund Goldsmid, 16 volumes (*Edinburgh: E. & G. Goldsmid, 1884-1890*).
- 10 Ch. Schefer argues, based on a document according to which Bertrandon received a sum of money in order to travel “certain longain voyaige secret,” that the duke actually ordered him to embark on this voyage, *Voyage*, XVII.
- 11 Jean Richard, *Les récits de voyages et de pèlerinages* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1996), Aryeh Graboïs, *Le pèlerin occidental en Terre sainte au Moyen Âge* (Bruxelles: De Boeck, 1998), Marie-Christine Gomez-Géraud, *Le crépuscule du grand voyage: les récits des pèlerins à Jérusalem (1458-1612)* (Paris: 1999) and Donald R. Howard, *Writers and Pilgrims. Medieval Pilgrimage Narratives and Their Posterity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
- 12 Quoted by J. Richard, *Les récits*, 83.
- 13 Paul Ricoeur, *History and Truth* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 278.
- 14 For an inventory of medieval pilgrimage accounts see A. Graboïs, *Le pèlerin*, 211-214.
- 15 J. Brefeld, *A Guidebook for the Jerusalem Pilgrimage in the Late Middle Ages: A Case for Computer-Aided Textual Criticism* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1994).
- 16 Scott D. Westrem’s review in *Speculum* 72 (1997): 116-119.
- 17 *Voyage, quête, pèlerinage dans la littérature et la civilisation médiévale* (Edition Cueur MA: Aix-En-Provence, 1976), especially the article by Michel Zink, *Pourquoi raconter son voyage?*, 237–254. From the end of the fifteenth century there is a strong tendency to consider that pilgrimage accounts merged into a broader genre of travel literature; see Paul Zumthor, “The Medieval Travel Narrative,” in *New Literary History* 25 (1994): 808-824. See also Joan-Pau Rubiés’s definition of early modern travel literature as a cluster of related narratives, or, as he says, as a “genre of genres” in “Travel writing as a genre: facts, fictions and the invention of a scientific discourse in early modern Europe,” *Journeys* 1 (2000): 5-35.
- 18 Felix Fabri, *The Book of the Wanderings of Brother Felix Fabri*, trad. Aubrey Stewart (London: Palestine Pilgrims’ Text Society, 1896), 49; M. Margaret Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage to Jerusalem in the year 1494* (Manchester: University Press, 1907), especially chapter 12.
- 19 A. Graboïs, *Le pèlerin occidental*, 45-49.
- 20 R. J. Mitchell, *The Spring Voyage* (London: John Murray, 1964).
- 21 I quote from Felix Fabri’s account: “We did not spend more than nine days in the Holy Land, during which we went the round of all the usual holy places in a great hurry, working day and night at the accomplishment of our pilgrimage, so that we were hardly given any time for rest.”
- 22 Nonetheless, if Bertrandon had been sent by the duke as a spy in the Ottoman Empire, I see no reason for him not mentioning this in his *Voyage*, written two decades later at Philip the Good’s request and dedicated to him. In

- contrast, Bertrandon emphasizes that the choice of the returning route was entirely his, *Voyage*, 25.
- 23 *Le deviselement du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1998).
- 24 For a typical incipit see *The Travels of Sir John Mandeville*, trans. C. W. R. D. Moseley (London: Penguin Classics, 1984).
- 25 Christian K. Zacher, *Curiosity and Pilgrimage. The Literature of discovery in fourteenth century England* (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1976).
- 26 Quoted by C. Morris, *The Sepulcher of Christ and the Medieval West: from the beginning to 1600* (Oxford: 2005), 324.
- 27 For a detailed analysis on how fifteenth-century pilgrims manage to cope with the tension between piety and curiosity, see Frédéric Tinguely, "Janus en Terre sainte: la figure du pèlerine curieux à la Renaissance," *Revue des Sciences Humaines* 245 (1997): 51-65. However, in Bertrandon's account, which is not mentioned by Tinguely, this tension is completely absent.
- 28 D. R. Howard, *Writers and pilgrims*, 46-47.
- 29 *Voyage*, 2 and 26.
- 30 In this sense, *Voyage d'Outremer* resembles other fifteenth-century pilgrimage accounts, especially that of Arnold von Harff and, to a lesser extent, that of Anselme Adorno.
- 31 Ludwig Schmuigg, "Über 'nationale' Vorurteile im Mittelalter," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 38 (1982): 439-459.
- 32 F. Fabri, *The Book of the Wanderings*, vol. 1, chapter 1.
- 33 M. M. Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage*, chapter 7.
- 34 *Voyage*, 79.
- 35 M. M. Newett, *Canon Pietro Casola's Pilgrimage*, chapter 12.
- 36 Jean Richard, "Manières de Crestiens: les Chrétiens orientaux dans les relations de pèlerinages aux Lieux-Saints (XIIe-XVI siècles) in *Francs et orientaux dans le monde des croisades* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
- 37 See for instance Felix Fabri's virulent reaction when he found in a village in Cyprus a single parson for both, the Greek and Latin Churches, *The Book of the Wanderings*, vol. 1, 199-200.
- 38 A. Grabois, *Le pèlerin occidental*, 141.
- 39 Jean Richard, "Manières de Crestiens," 110.
- 40 Bertrandon uses the expression "nostre maniere," *Voyage*, 27.
- 41 It is interesting to compare this image with Pius II's dichotomist representation of Christians elaborated in his letter addressed to the Ottoman Sultan, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, *Epistola ad Mahomatem II*, ed. Albert R. Baca (New York: Peter Lang: 1990), 121.
- 42 *Voyage*, 155.
- 43 *Voyage*, 149.
- 44 Michael Angold argues that Bertrandon's depreciative view of Byzantium is mainly due to religious differences. However, in my view, none of his

arguments stands an analysis that takes into consideration the entire account written by Bertrandon. M. Angold underlines Bertrandon's statement that he "would sooner trust himself to the Turks than to the Greeks." However, Bertrandon uses almost the same words to characterize the Hungarians: "I would have more faith in the promises of a Turk than of a Hungarian." Similarly, when he comments upon Bertrandon's remarks that Emperor Sigismund didn't trust the Serbs to guard Belgrad fortress, M. Angold omits to say that, also according to Bertrandon, Sigismund equally distrusted the Hungarians and therefore he assigned German mercenaries to defend this fortress; cf. M. Angold, "The decline of Byzantium seen through the eyes of western travellers," 213-232 in *Travel in the Byzantine World*, ed. Ruth Macrides (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

45 *Voyage*, 224.

46 Bertrandon narrates, somehow skeptically, the story of Prester John's kingdom, as it had been told to him by a merchant in Pera; *Voyage*, 142-148.

47 We should bear in mind that Bertrandon wrote his account a few years after the Council of Florence.

48 *Itinéraire d'Anselme Adorno en Terre Sainte (1470-1471)*, ed. Jacques Heers and Georgette de Groer (Paris: ECNRS, 1978), 66.

49 Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West*, passim and Clarence Dana Rouillard, *The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature (1520-1660)* (Paris: Boivin, 1940), passim.

50 Michael J. Heath, *Crusading Commonplaces: La Noue, Lucinge and Rethoric against the Turks* (Geneve: Librairie Droz), 1986.

51 The only topos I have found refers to the idea of Muslims' bad odor that can be cleansed only by baptism, *Voyage*, 119.

52 Bertrandon mentions among Sarazins eight different 'nations': Turcz, Mores, Turquemans, Arabes, Persiens, Tartres, Mamelus, Barbares.

53 *Voyage*, 33.

54 Emmanuel Filhol, "L'Image de l'autre au Moyen Age. La representation du monde rural dans le guide du pelerin de Saint-Jacques de Compostelle," *Cahiers d'Histoire* 45 (2000): 347-362.

55 See for instance *Traité d'Emmanuel Piloti sur le Passage en Terre Sainte (1420)*, ed. Pierre-Herman Dopp (Louvain: Ed. Nauwelaerts, 1958), 188.

56 Nancy Bisaha, "New Barbarian or Worthy Adversary? Humanist Construct of the Ottoman Turks in fifteenth-century Italy," 185-205 in *Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early Modern Europe. Perception of Other*, ed. Michael Frassetto, David R. Blanks (London: MacMillan, 1999).

57 *Voyage*, 63, 217.

58 From the vast historiography of the Burgundian crusade and I will enumerate here only the works I found relevant for my research: N. Iorga, "Les Aventures sarazines des Français de Bourgogne au XVe siècle," 7-56 in *Mélanges d'Histoire Générale*, ed. C. Marinescu (Cluj: 1927); C. Marinescu, "Philippe le Bon et le croisade. Première partie (1419-1453)," *Actes du*

- 59 *VI Congrès International d'études Byzantine 1948* (1950), vol. 1: 147-168
 and "Deuxième partie (1453-1467)," *Bulletin des études portugais et de*
l'institut français 13 (1949): 3-28; Y. Lacaze, "Politique Méditerranéenne
 et projets de croisade chez Philippe le Bon: de la chute de Byzance à la
 victoire chrétienne de Belgrade," *Annales de Bourgogne* 41 (1969): 5-42
 and 81-132; Jacques Paviot, *Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l'Orient,*
fin XIVe siècle- XVe siècle (Paris: Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne,
 2003). See also Richard Vaughan's monographs *Philip the Bold* (London:
 1962) and *Philip the Good* (The Boydell Press, 2002).
- 60 *Voyage*, 273-274.
- 61 I left aside the literary works, Jean Devaux, "Le Saint Voyage de Turquie:
 croisade et propagande à la cour de Philippe le Bon (1463-1464)" 53-70 in
 "A l'Heure Encore de Mon Ecrire." *Aspects de la littérature de Bourgogne*
sous Philippe le Bon et Charles le Téméraire, ed. Claude Thiry. Special issue
 of *Les Lettre Romanes*, 1997.
- 62 The standard edition is that of Ch. Potvin, Ghillebert de Lannoy, *Oeuvres*
 (Louvain: 1878).
- 63 There are two editions of Jehan de Wavrin's chronicle. The first one,
Anchiennes croniques d'Engleterre was edited by Mlle Dupont (Paris: 1863),
 while the second, *Recueil des croniques et anchiennes istories de la Grant*
Bretaigne, a present nommè Engleterre, was edited by William Hardy and
 Edward L.C.P. Hardy and published in 5 volumes in Rolls Series, vol. 39
 (London: 1864-1891). The references are to the last edition, vol. 5, henceforth
 quoted as Jehan de Wavrin.
- 64 The account, now lost, is mentioned in the inventory of Philip the Good's
 library under the title: *Relation du Voiage messier Pietre Was*, see G.
 Doutrepoint, 265.
- 65 All these military memoranda were elaborated after the famous Feast of the
 Pheasant (17 February 1454). The best known is the so-called *The Hague*
memoir (19 January 1456); see Jules Finot, "Projet d'expédition contre les
 Turcs préparé par les conseillers du duc de Bourgogne Philippe-le-Bon
 (Janvier 1457)" *Mémoires de la Société des Sciences de l'agriculture et des*
Arts de Lille 21 (1895): 161-206. For the correct dating see Yvone Lacaze,
 "Politique méditerranéenne." Simultaneously, Philip the Good asked Jean
 Miélot to translate several other pieces of 'advice' for crusade. Two of
 them were written in the fourteenth century, but the most important for
 this present research is a third one, written by John Torzelo. At Philip the
 Good's request, Torzelo's memorandum was comment on by Bertrandon
 de la Broquière. Both Torzelo's text and Bertrandon's commentary were
 published in Schefer's edition of *Voyage*, 263-274. There are two more
 unsigned memoranda that are attributed on sound arguments to the most
 important leaders of the Burgundian naval expedition (1444-1446): Geoffroy
 de Thoisy and Waleran de Wavrin; Yvonne Lacaze, "Politique," 120-122
 and C. Marinescu, "Philippe le Bon," II, 18.

- 65 The most important is the sermon given by Jean Germain in front of the knights of the Order of the Golden Fleece at Mons in 1451. Jean Germain's sermon is known in a French version, the one sent to Charles VII, edited by Ch. Schefer "Le discours du voyage d'outremer au très victorieux roi Charles VII, prononcé en 1452, par Jean Germain, évêque de Chalon," *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 3 (1895): 303-343 (henceforth quoted as Jean Germain) and in a Latin one included by Jean Germain himself in his work *Liber de virtutibus Philippi*.
- 66 David J. Wrisley, "Situating Islamdon in Jean Germain's Mappemonde Spirituelle (1449)," *Medieval Encounters* 13 (2007): 326-346.
- 67 Ghillebert de Lannoy wrote his account sometimes between 1450 and 1462, Jean Germain delivered his sermon in 1451, Bertrandon de la Broquière annotated Torzelo's memorandum in 1457. The military memoranda have been elaborated in 1456 and 1463-1465, while Jehan de Wavrin wrote the book on the Burgundian expedition in Levant, most probably, between 1471 and 1474. G. Dutrepoint considers that the extant version of *Voyage* dates from 1455-1457, but he speculates that an early version had been written earlier, probably around 1440, see Georges Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 260. In my view, Schefer's conjecture regarding an earlier version is unlikely, considering that Philip the Good became genuinely interested in crusading only after 1453, see J. Paviot, *Les ducs*, 149. Thus all the sources can be dated in an interval of maximum 25 years: 1450-1475.
- 68 During Philip the Good's reign, Burgundians were involved in two crusading actions: the naval crusade in Levant (1443-1445) and Antoine's, the Bastard of Burgundy, crusade (1464). The most impressive Burgundian diplomatic action took place in 1451-1452, when the duke sent Jean Germain's crusading sermon to the most important courts of Europe, see J. Paviot, *Les ducs*, 121-122.
- 69 Georges Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 262.
- 70 For Adorno's diplomatic mission in Persia see J. Heers's introduction to *Itinéraire d'Anselme Adorno*.
- 71 Philippe Contamine, "La Consolation de la desconfiture de Hongrie de Philippe de Mezières (1396)," *Annales de Bourgogne* 68 (1996): 35-47 and Kiril Petkov, "The rotten apple and the good apples. Orthodox, Catholics and Turks in Philippe de Mezières' crusading propaganda," *Journal of Medieval History* 23 (1997): 255-270.
- 72 The necessity of a military alliance does not necessary imply disregarding the differences. During the siege of Belgrade, John Capistrano welcomed the help of Eastern Christians, but placed them among Jews, heretics and pagans; see Norman Housley, "Giovanni da Capistrano and the Crusade of 1456," 94-115 in *Crusading in the Fifteenth Century. Message and Impact*, edited by Norman Housley (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
- 73 *The Voyage d'Outremer*, 95.
- 74 Jehan de Wavrin, 66.

- 75 Jehan de Wavrin never refers to Eastern Christians' schismatic beliefs. For instance, when a dispute started between Wallachians and Burgundians, the chronicler mentions Waleran de Wavrin's sorrow to see such a fight among Christians; Jehan de Wavrin, 85.
- 76 Significantly, Jehan is the only Burgundian chronicler that gives an account of the expedition.
- 77 Fortunately, there is an extraordinary source that allows us to grasp Jehan's attitude towards Geoffrey de Thoisy. Jehan de Wavrin's account of the Burgundians' contribution to the defense of Rhodes is undoubtedly based on a report of Geoffrey de Thoisy's naval expedition in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. If we compare the two accounts, it is obvious that Jehan deliberately eliminated all the mentions to Geoffrey de Thoisy's valiant deeds, which in the report were fairly numerous. The report, attributed by most historians to Geoffrey himself, was firstly published by M. Dupont, *Anchiennes* and afterwards by N. Iorga, „Aventure.” The most recent edition is that of J. Paviot, *Les ducs*, 300-304.
- 78 Richard Vaughan characterized this account as a “humiliating episode,” *Philip the Good*, 272. Similarly, G. Le Brusque considers that this story includes “details that do not honor the Burgundian knight,” but, nevertheless, he thinks that the account is written on a neutral tone, „Des chevaliers bourguignons dans les pays de Levant. L'expédition de Walleran de Wavrin contre les Turcs ottomans (1444-1446) dans les 'Anchiennes Cronicques d'Engleterre' de Jean de Wavrin,” *Le Moyen Age* 106 (2000): 255-276.
- 79 A. G. Jongkees, “Pie II et Philippe le Bon: Deux protagonistes de l'union chrétienne,” *Publication du centre européen d'études burgundo-médianes* 20 (1980): 103-115.
- 80 Jean Germain, 330.
- 81 D. J. Wrisley, “Situating Islamdom,” 329 and 336.
- 82 *Voyage*, 58.
- 83 *Voyage*, 56.
- 84 *Voyage*, 72.
- 85 Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds français MS 9087.
- 86 *Voyage*, 261.
- 87 R. Schwoebel, *The Shadow of the Crescent. The Renaissance Image of the Turk (1453-1517)* (Nieuwkoop, 1967), 107-108; Yvon Lacaze, “Les débuts de Jean Germain,” *Mémoires de la Société d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Chalon-sur-Saône* 39 (1968): 1-24.
- 88 Ana Echevarria, *The Fortress of Faith. The Attitude towards Muslims in Fifteenth Century Spain* (Leinden: Brill, 1999), 37
- 89 The passage is from Jean Germain's *Le livre du crestien et du sarrasin* and is quoted by Ana Echevarria, *The Fortress of Faith*, 62
- 90 For an analysis of this miniature see Judith-Guéret Laferté, “Le livre et la croisade” 107-114 in *Le Banquet du Faisan*, ed. Marie-Thérèse Caron and Denis Clauzel (Artois Presses Université, 1997)

- 91 Marie-Thérèse Caron, *Les voeux du Faisan, noblesse en fête, esprit de croisade* (Brepols: 2003).
- 92 *Voyage*, 33 and 49.
- 93 Ghillebert de Lannoy, *Oeuvres*, 67.
- 94 *Voyage*, 83.
- 95 *Voyage*, 25-26.
- 96 Pero Tafur's prologue in *Travels and Adventures*, ed. Malcolm Letts (London: George Routledge, 1926). For the connection between chivalric literature and medieval and early modern explorations see J. R. Goodman, *Chivalry and Exploration (1298-1630)* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1998).
- 97 D. Lalande, *Le Livre des fais du bon messire Jehan le Maingre, dit Bouciquaut* (Geneva: Droz, 1985).
- 98 As Jennifer Goodman's showed, there are numerous examples of chivalric explorations that fulfilled such vows, see *Chivalry and Exploration*, 54.
- 99 Georges Doutrepoint, *Inventaire de la Librairie de Philippe le Bon 1420* (Geneve: Slatkine Reprints, 1977) and *La Littérature Française à la cour des ducs de Bourgogne* (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1909).
- 100 *Voyage*, 4, 172, 179.
- 101 *Voyage*, 179.
- 102 Nonetheless, from the reference made to the paintings from Caesar's time, one might assume that Bertrandron had seen, at some point, an illuminated manuscript, *Voyage*, 219.
- 103 G. Doutrepoint, *Inventaire*, no. 70, 71, 241, 242.
- 104 G. Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 136-143 and 180.
- 105 *Voyage*, 144.
- 106 Sandrine Hériché-Pradeau, *Alexandre le Bourguignon. Etude du roman Les Faits et les Conquestes d'Alexandre le Grand de Jehan Wauquelin* (Geneve: Ed. Droz, 2008)
- 107 *Voyage*, 173-174.
- 108 During his reign Philip the Good acquired for his Library sixteenth manuscripts on the legend of Troy, G. Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 171.
- 109 Jehan de Wavrin, 38.
- 110 Paul Bonenfant, *Philippe le Bon: sa politique, son action* (Paris: De Boeck Université, 1996), 70.
- 111 *Voyage*, 138.
- 112 G. Doutrepoint, *Inventaire*, no. 85, 117 and 177 and G. Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 20-22.
- 113 G. Doutrepoint identifies one of the books of Godefroy with the History of Heraclius, a French translation of William of Tyr's chronicle.
- 114 *Godefroi de Bouillon*, ed. Jan Boyd Roberts. Vol X. *The old French Crusade cycle* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1996).
- 115 *Voyage*, 45.
- 116 The relevant passage in the Vulgate is John 2:7-10.

- 117 There are only a few biblical episodes mentioned by Bertrandon, as Saint Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus, but he always introduces them by the words "comme l'en dist," *Voyage*, 33. For Bertrandon's ignorance of Latin, see *Voyage*, 261.
- 118 Galen R. Kline, *The Voyage d'Outremer*, 27 footnote 5.
- 119 See Denis Brearley, "The Allegorical Identification of the Architrclinus (Jn 2,9-10) in Early Mediaeval Exegesis," 337-344 in *Papers Presented to the Tenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1987*, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1989)
- 120 For manuscripts of these works in the ducal library see G. Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 113 and 483.
- 121 *Gaydon. Chanson de geste du XIIIe siècle*, ed. Jean Subrenat (Louvain: Peeters, 2007), 1397. See also the editor's endnote from page 712.
- 122 Marie-Thérèse Caron, *La Noblesse dans le duché de Bourgogne 1315-1477* (Lille: Presse Universitaires de Lille, 1987), 283-390.
- 123 Yves Dossat, "Types exceptionnels de pèlerins: l'hérétique, le voyageur déguise, le professionnel, p. 207-225 in *Cahiers de Fanjeaux*, vol. 15.
- 124 For manuscripts containing these chansons de geste attested in the dukes' library see G. Doutrepoint, *La Littérature*, 20 and 483.
- 125 *Huon de Bordeaux*, ed. William W. Kibler and François Suard (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2003), 6294-6302.
- 126 *La Prise d'Orenges*, ed. Blanche Katz (New York: King's Crown Press, 1947), from verse 360 onwards.
- 127 Catherine M. Jones, "Identity and Disguise in a Late French Epic: Hervis de Mes," *Essays in Medieval Studies* 4 (1997): 107-117.
- 128 *Voyage*, 90, 104.
- 129 *Voyage*, 260-261.
- 130 Sophie Jolivet, "Le phénomène de mode à la cour de Bourgogne sous Philippe le Bon: l'exemple des robes de 1430 à 1442," *Revue du Nord* 88 (2006): 331-345.
- 131 Bertrandon asked someone to write for him a small dictionary and, at some point, he even assert that one could easily learn Turkish, *Voyage*, 100-101.
- 132 *Voyage*, 70-71.
- 133 Perez Zagorin, *How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West* (Princeton University Press: 2003).
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„DIE UNTHEILBARE GEMEINSCHAFT DER HEILIGEN“. SCHLEIERMACHERS LAODIZEE

Malitätsbonus Laodizee. Dass es einen relativ engen Zusammenhang zwischen der mit Beginn der Neuzeit in Gang gesetzten Säkularisierung und den spätestens seit Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts gepflegten Rechtfertigungstopoi gibt, hat nicht zuletzt Odo Marquard am Beispiel der Theodizee überzeugend gezeigt: So werde die Moderne stets von einem Kompensationsgedanken begleitet, der „die Welt als zustimmungsfähig begreifen“ will, „um Gott als gut denken zu können: in der Welt sind Übel durch Güter kompensiert.“¹ Nun, Kompensation ist kein unüberbietbares Beispiel für Gerechtigkeit. Als Form des Ausgleichs fordert sie Gleiches heraus. Wie es dann zur „Tribunalisierung“ der Welt (Marquard), d. h., zur Entstehung einer regelrechten Rechtfertigungstopik kommt, die nicht mehr oder nicht nur Gott, sondern gar allen und allem unter der Sonne gewidmet ist, werde ich weiter unten am Beispiel der Laodizee² zu zeigen versuchen.

Dem sei eine triviale Bemerkung vorausgeschickt: Die Menschen spielen gerne Tribunal. Überhaupt ist das menschliche Denken in seiner dialektischen Verfasstheit auf das unaufhörliche Wechselspiel der gegeneinander argumentierenden, ihm innewohnenden „Advokaten“ angewiesen, unabhängig davon, wie man die Finalität dieses Wechselspiels definiert: als geistige Tätigkeit zur Erfahrung der Wahrheit, wie bei Aristoteles, oder bloß „eristisch“, als – allerdings in den Mängeln des menschlichen Wesens anthropologisch fundierte – Gegnerschaft um der Gegnerschaft willen, wie bei Schopenhauer. Schon in der ontologischen Konstitution des argumentativen Diskurses ist beides enthalten: einerseits das Moment der argumentativen *Bejahung* der empirischen Beobachtung oder des tradierten, erlernten Wissens, und andererseits das Moment der verstandesmäßigen *Verneinung*, und sei diese nur Einschränkung

des Eigentümlichen durch Verallgemeinerung bzw. des Allgemeinen durch das Besondere. So gibt es latente, im Menschen tief verborgene und dementsprechend präformierte Diskursstrukturen, die ihn potentiell zum *Ja*- und zugleich zum *Nein*-Sager qualifizieren, je nach Interesse oder emotionalem Zustand. Diese Ambiguität lässt ihm auch im Falle der Rechtfertigungstopik die freie Wahl: zustimmen oder nicht. Oder zögern.

Dem langen Zögern kann nur ein überindividueller, kategorischer Imperativ entgegenwirken, und gerade am Beispiel der Philosophie Immanuel Kants, der ja ganz im Sinne der deistisch geprägten Aufklärung, die er vertrat, der Religion eine Funktion nur innerhalb der Grenzen der Moral einräumte, kann man die Tendenz feststellen, die Theodizee³ auf Grund nachgewiesener kognitiver Defizite als metaphysisch untauglich herabzuwürdigen. Das mindert wohl weder ihr Faszinationspotenzial noch ihre Aktualität, macht aber deutlich, dass sie mit starker Konkurrenz rechnen muss. Wenn sie der Konkurrenz weicht, wie sie es seit Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts üblicherweise tut, so haben ein emphatischer Fortschrittsglaube sowie Emanzipations- und Revolutionsbestrebungen Konjunktur. In allen Fällen lässt der antizipative Charakter dieser Bestrebungen – denn Revolution, Emanzipation und Fortschritt sind, um mit Reinhart Koselleck zu sprechen, genauso viele Erwartungsbegriffe, die auf eine offene Zukunft hinweisen⁴ – einen Horizont der machbaren Geschichte sich auf tun. Ob die „machbare“ Geschichte besser ist? Vielleicht für deren Gewinner.

Für die Mehrheit, die „gerne“ die Verliererrolle spielt, gilt aber: Die industrielle, hochtechnisierte Welt wurde trotz des souverän gedachten menschlichen Eingriffs in die Geschichte, der in der Art einer säkularisierten Pronoia die Zukunft zu lenken glaubt, nicht besser. Oder: sie wurde jedenfalls nicht besser als „die beste aller möglichen Welten“. Diese Wahrnehmung würde Odo Marquard „Übelstandsnostalgie“⁵ nennen. Und Übel, so die jüngsten Erfahrungen, passieren nach wie vor in der Welt. Vielfalt und Rekurrenz der Übel legen nahe, dass nicht nur ihre Zulassung durch Gott, sondern auch ihre Akzeptanz durch die Menschen einer Begründung bedarf. Durch „die Menschen“ ist nicht der Hiob in uns gemeint, sondern jene überindividuelle Instanz, von der Gott sagen kann: „Das ist mein Volk“.

Sobald das *Volk* als ultimative Legitimationsquelle an die Stelle Gottes tritt, muss es – vielleicht sogar um so überzeugender – gerechtfertigt werden. Um einen Titel Hans Blumenbergs umzuformulieren: in der

Laodizee geht es hauptsächlich darum, wie man Geschichte zur „Entlastung des Volkes“⁶ machen kann. Mit dieser Strategie hegt man Hoffnung darauf, jenen Schaden zu begleichen, der durch den postrevolutionären Autoritätsverlust – z. B. verursacht durch den Übergang von einem „Staatsoberhaupt“ zum „Staat überhaupt“⁷ – entstanden war. Die Frage danach, wer wohl hinter dem unpersönlichen Staat stecke, kann nicht bloß mit spitzfindigen Begründungen oder kecken Antworten wie „Seine Beamten!“ pariert werden. Um den Staat anders als Stand⁸ („der Dinge“) zu erklären, muss eine Theorie entwickelt werden, die besagt und erhärtet, dass der Staat seine Legitimität vom Souverän bekommt, das ist, in der Demokratie, das Volk. So wird die Menge, die amorphe Masse als *Volk* „entübelt“ und als transzendente Größe wahrgenommen. Insofern trifft auch Pierre Rosanvillons Äußerung über das Volk, dass es „introuvable“ sei, vollkommen zu; sieht man einmal von der europäischen Tradition ab, wo der Verständnishorizont der Volksproblematik ethnisch „belastet“ ist, so wird die Tatsache, dass das Volk zwar definierbar, aber unlokalisierbar ist, evident. Man denke nur an die amerikanische Demokratie!

Einerseits ist die Vorstellung der Transzendenz des Volks eine Reaktion auf die nach bitteren Enttäuschungen schließlich eingestandene Schwierigkeit, sich es anders als lärmende und gärende Masse auszumalen: Das beispielsweise im Areopag versammelte Volk entsprach einem äußerst limitativen Demokratiebegriff, der bereits im römischen Reich, doch dann vollends in der Moderne unzeitgemäß wurde. Spätestens seit der Formulierung des Anspruchs auf ein universales Wahlrecht wurde dem Volksbegriff eine physische Größe aufgebürdet, die seine Plausibilität erheblich beeinträchtigte. Andererseits ist diese Vorstellung dem Volksbegriff immanent, ja sie wurzelt im generischen Fluchtpunkt der Begriffsdefinition, der das Wunschbild „Gegenwart“ mit der idealen Zukunft verbindet. Vom Volk kann man, um die Begrifflichkeit Max Webers zu verwenden, nur idealtypisch sprechen.⁹ Daher rührt, dass imagologische Attribute ihm so oft anhaften: sie hypostasieren etwas, von dem man weiß, dass es nicht ganz wahr ist. Aber es ist tradiert, und Tradition verpflichtet, nur indem sie von weiteren Generationen gepflegt wird. So ist das Volk niemals als absoluter Zustand erfassbar, sondern immer als Werden, als ein Ort in der Gegenwart und in der Zukunft zugleich. Genauso wie das Land ist auch das Volk immer ein verheißenes.

Das hat seine anthropologischen Gründe. Denn die Laodizee widerspiegelt, um mit Dany-Robert Dufour zu sprechen, jenes konstante

Gerichtetsein des Ichs am Anderen, am „grand d’hommeiteur“ – und wenn man will, am „ganz Anderen“ (R. Otto) –, das die Menschheitsgeschichte schon seit der unvordenklichen Subjektwerdung des Menschen ständig begleitet hat, denn dieser hat den Gottesgedanken „dans sa tête“. ¹⁰ Dufour beschreibt sogar den Wandel dieses Gedankens, indem er geschichtsbedingte Prägungen des allumfassenden Alteritätsbegriffs – vom *Totem*, über die griechische *Physis*, den monotheistischen *Gott*, das *Volk*, bis hin zum *Proletariat* – in einer Reihe nennt. Seit es ein Geschichtsbewusstsein gibt, wurden solche Instanzen zu den „grands sujets“ der Geschichte gerechnet. ¹¹ So rätselhaft und unbeschreibbar es ist, ist das Volk fürs Verstehen sozialpolitischer Vorstellungen unabdingbar; denn dieser jeglicher Demokratie innewohnende Widerspruch lässt der Vernunft keine Alternative, als dass sie ständig zwischen dem geschichtsphilosophischen Prinzip eines einheitlich wirkenden kollektiven Subjekts und dem soziologischen Prinzip einer uneinheitlichen Empirie hin und her gerissen wird.

Was lehrt uns die Empirie? Kann man das Volk zählen oder charakterlich darstellen? Ja, aber die ethnologischen und – im weitesten Sinn dieses Wortes – demoskopischen Verfahren bringen den Volksbegriff um seine sozialpolitische Größe; sie „entzaubern“ ihn, denn sie wollen ihn im festen Boden des *hic et nunc* verankert sehen. So werden die grundlegenden „Schismen“ des sozialen Korpus als Bedingung der Möglichkeit sozialen Zusammenlebens zum Kriterium der positiven Sozialforschung schlechthin. Das soziologische Erkennen kommt ohne die Hervorhebung der tief verwurzelten Widersprüche und Frakturen innerhalb des sozialen Korpus nicht umhin: Frauen vs. Männer, Jugendliche vs. Alte, Rechtsgläubige vs. Anders- bzw. Nichtgläubige, Hetero- vs. Homosexuelle, neuerdings Nichtraucher vs. Raucher usw. Überhaupt besteht das Ermittlungsverfahren soziologischen Erkennens darin, dass man nach Differenzen und Meinungsverschiedenheit sucht. Und gibt es eine Soziologie, so ist das eine aus tiefen gesellschaftlichen Spaltungen und aus manifesten Habitus-Konflikten schöpfende Volk-istot-Soziologie. ¹²

Gewiss kann man auf der Empirie beharren und trotzdem versuchen, all diese Differenzen, nicht selten gewalttätig, zu beseitigen. Das tun jene „Sozialreligionen“ ¹³, die zwar den Erkenntnisfortschritt der modernen Wissenschaften nicht leugnen, den aufklärerisch-demokratischen Legitimitätsglauben indes preisgeben und wähen, auf jegliche transzendenten Begründungen der Souveränität verzichten zu

können. Daraus ergibt sich ein exklusives, auf prädikativer Immanenz fußendes Volksbild: Volk als Arbeiterklasse, als Nation und sogar – ganz unbekümmert für den Pleonasmus – als „Volksgemeinschaft“. Ich meine, gerade das Wesen der Laodizee verfehlen solche Sozialreligionen; denn wesentlich für die Laodizee ist, dass in der Gemeinschaft kein Gesetztes als Fremdes wirkt, sondern das gesetzte Fremde als Erscheinungsform eines Überindividuellen, einer Gesamtheit postuliert wird, an dem alle Individuen teilhaben.

So ist die Laodizee die Entübelung nicht bloß des Anderen, sondern des Anderen als jene (Groß-, Über-, Mehr- und Gesamt-)Zahl, die einen überwältigt¹⁴; die Entübelung des Anderen als des Allgemeinen, das trotz der Gewissheit über seine Existenz nicht erfassbar ist, denn es verharrt im Zustand der Unbegrifflichkeit.¹⁵ Es darf nicht verwundern, dass die mathematisch konnotierte Feststellung „man ist nicht allein“ im Paradoxon mündet, dass man erst dann als Individuum sozial existiert, wenn man sich teilweise schon in der Masse verloren hat. Teilweise! Das lehrt uns auch die goldene Spielregel der Demokratie: meine Stimme hat nur eine Wirkung, wenn sie mit vielen anderen gleichwertigen Stimmen zusammenfällt. Wenn ich aber „exzentrisch“ wähle, bin ich vielleicht noch unverkennbar in meiner Exzentrizität, meine Stimme ist aber wirkungslos. Soviel wusste schon Edgar Allan Poes „Mann der Menge“, dessen Identität erst dann Konturen zugewiesen bekam, wenn sie sich im Schatten der anonymen Gesellschaft verlor.¹⁶ Und es geht dabei gar nicht um die ethnische Substanz einer Gesellschaft, die gleich einem Identitätssurrogat lauter individuelle Frustrationen lindern soll.

Die Rechtfertigung eines bestimmten Volks als solches, als eines gesetzten, darf für die Philosophie uninteressant sein, denn es schlägt unmerklich in einen Ethnonarzismus um, der nationalistische Gefühle subkutan gedeihen lässt. Vielmehr geht es um die Rechtfertigung der Tranzendenz des Volks als Souverän, jener politisch-theologisch definierbaren Interessengemeinschaft überhaupt, die in der modernen Vertragslehre spätestens seit Jean-Jacques Rousseau als ultimative Legitimationsquelle und Träger der so genannten Zivilreligion immer *religiös*, ja theologisch konnotiert ist. Der Grund dafür ist, dass das historisch-genetische Modell der Gemeinschaftsbildung erst in der Religion zu finden ist, nirgendwo anders.¹⁷ Den Ausführungen Georg Simmels zum „einheitlichen Gott“, der einen „metaphysische[n] Zusammenhalt“ darstellt, „von dem aus die empirische Zersplitterung überwunden werden“

soll, bzw. als „Symbol ebenso wie [als] rechtlich wirksame[r] Träger der soziologischen Einheit“¹⁸ fungiert, kann ich insofern nur beipflichten.

Beides, Theodizee und Laodizee, ist Ausdruck der modernen Rechtfertigungstopik, die den gravierenden Verlust an transzendenten Werten durch Entschuldigungsgründen kompensieren will, und zwar so, dass der Einheitsgedanke trotz der sozialen Vielheit tendenziell immer in den Vordergrund gerückt wird. So ist die Laodizee, genauso wie die Theodizee, ursprünglich ein Nebenprodukt der monotheistischen Theologie, nicht der Polymythie¹⁹, denn diese spielt sich im vom Fortschrittsglauben geöffneten Horizont endloser Zeit ab, während jene ein Gemeinschaftsleben, dessen Kohäsion idealiter niemals in Frage gestellt wird, im Horizont befristeter, indes teleologisch verlaufender Zeit voraussetzt, wobei der historische Tod des „politischen Körpers“ nicht auszuschließen ist. Gerade in der Vertragslehre Rousseaus, der Plattform von vielen Überlegungen zur modernen Demokratie, sind die Spuren biblischen Gedankenguts unverkennbar. Zum Teil sind seine Ausdrücke durch den biblischen Wortschatz so tief beeinflusst, dass man sagen könnte, sein ganzes Bemühen sei nur die endgültige Profanisierung der Bibelauslegung: Man vergegenwärtige sich z. B. relativ häufige Ausdrücke wie *corps politique* oder *corps moral et collectif*, die, obwohl Rousseau das Christentum als soziales Modell leugnete, doch in Anlehnung an den als Gemeinschaft aller Gläubigen dogmatisierten Leib Christi formuliert worden sind. Ferner entblößt sich die Zivilreligion als ein Pendant bürgerlichen Inhalts zur wahren Religion: „Il y a donc une profession de foi purement civile“²⁰, während die Äußerung, das Gesetz müsse „ni sur le marbre ni sur l’airain mais dans le cœur des citoyens“²¹ eingraviert werden, nichts anderes als ein halbes Zitat aus dem Propheten Jeremias ist.²²

Der monotheistische Inhalt der Laodizee wird aber in der Vorstellung eindeutig, Gottes Wort (*vox Dei*) könne sich in der Stimme des Volks offenbaren, wobei auch diese schließlich vermöge – sollte sich jenes chronisch verschweigen – für die historische Großtat oder einfach für den politischen Konsens als Bürge einzutreten. Keineswegs erstaunlich darf in diesem Kontext der Befund sein, dass der biblische Ausdruck *Volk Gottes* bzw. *populus electus* oft genug vorkommen, um die Schlussfolgerung zu erlauben, dass das Volk der eigentliche Adressat der göttlichen Botschaft ist. Mehr noch: ein sprechender Gott darf als Mitglied der Sprachgemeinschaft, die er anspricht, angesehen werden, und dieser Gedanke kann unter Umständen zum politisch äußerst folgenreichen Schluss leiten, das Volk selber sei Träger der göttlichen Botschaft, und

zwar in der Art einer überindividuellen Instanz, die gewiss kein Gott ist, Gottes Willen aber immerhin vertreten oder aussprechen darf. Ausführliche Hinweise auf den Ursprung der Wendung *vox populi, vox dei* sollten sich an dieser Stelle erübrigen.²³ Einem ungebührlich langen Exkurs ziehe ich den Hinweis darauf vor, dass diese Gleichung vor allem in der Moderne akut wird, als die „Stimme Gottes“ stets dumpfer wirkt.

Interessant ist jedenfalls der Widerstand, dem dieser Gedanke schon zur Zeit seines ältesten schriftlichen Belegs begegnete, nämlich in einem Alcuin, dem englischen Mönch und zugleich Inspirator der karolingischen Reform, zugeschriebenen Brief. Dieser rät dem Herrscher: „Nec audiendi qui solent dicere: *Vox populi, vox Dei*, cum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit.“²⁴ *Populus* wird also dem *Vulgus* gleichgestellt und für den Inbegriff der Verworrenheit, ja der Tollheit gehalten. Diese Einstellung taucht auch in der Moderne bei den Kritikern des so genannten „politischen Pantheismus“ auf.²⁵ Ohne an dieser Stelle auf den Disput über die Wesensverwandschaft von Demokratie und politischem Pantheismus eingehen zu wollen, möchte ich in diesem Zusammenhang lediglich auf die unbestreitbare Einwirkung von Denkern wie Spinoza, Leibniz oder Rousseau auf Schleiermachers intellektuelle Entwicklung hinweisen, die erklärt, aus welchem Grund der letztere seinerseits auf das Motiv der Laodizee Bezug nahm. Überhaupt stand die sozialpolitische Reflexion zur Zeit Schleiermachers in vieler Hinsicht der Volksrechtfertigung wohlwollend gegenüber. Das bezeugt die begriffsgeschichtliche Analyse des Volksbegriffs für das Ende des 18. Jhs., als eine „Veredelung“ des Begriffs erfolgte. Diese „tritt [...] mit der erschütterung des rationalismus ein: der abkehr von dem stolz auf verstandeskultur u. gebildete dichtung entspricht ein wachsendes interesse für das innere leben des volkes, seine sitte, dichtung u. weisheit (s. volkslied, -märchen), man sieht in dem volke den unbefangenen, kern- und wurzelhaften, den unverbildeten, charakteristischen theil der gesellschaft; das volk wird unter umständen wie ein individuum gedacht, man spricht von volksmund, volksseele, volksbewusstsein, -character, -gedächtnis, -gefühl“ usw.²⁶

Gewiss lässt sich erst am Beispiel mehrerer Autoren feststellen, ob die Laodizee als Begriff *ex post* aus der abendländischen Geschichte des sozialpolitischen Denkens sich herauschälen lässt – nämlich indem man die Versuche, die unterschiedlichsten Gemeinschaftsformen zum Gegenstand systematischen Nachdenkens über die Möglichkeit eines kampflosen sozialen Miteinanders zu machen, auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner bringt. Doch der vorliegende Aufsatz, mag er in die engere

Problematik der Philosophie Schleiermachers auch *ex abrupto* und aus einem in der Forschung gewissermaßen untypischen Gesichtspunkt einführen, darf lediglich als partielle Betretung eines umfangreichen Interessenfeldes angesehen werden. Folglich werde ich nicht so sehr wirkungsgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge erforschen, sondern vielmehr jene Stellen im Werk Schleiermachers hervorheben, die zwar die These des Volks als „grand Sujet“ der Geschichte erhärten, sie aber zugleich in ihren Auswirkungen teilweise einschränken. Meine These lautet mit anderen Worten, dass die Laodizee zwar auch in Schleiermachers Werken zum Ausdruck kommt, indes nicht ohne dass die Begrifflichkeit, die den Gültigkeitsbereich derselben umschreibt, einer dialektischen Analyse unterzogen wird. Eingeschränkt wird vor allem die Wünschbarkeit einer alle Unterschiede nivellierenden Einheit zugunsten einer dialektisch aufgefassten Vielheit.

„Mehr als der einzelne“. Schleiermachers Auffassung vom Überindividuellen. In einem der Manuskripte Friedrich Schleiermachers aus der frühen Berliner Zeit (1796/97) steht ein wahrscheinlich in großer Eile verfasster, denn korrekturbedürftiger *Entwurf zur Abhandlung über die Vertragslehre*²⁷, der aber auf Grund der angedeuteten Absichten schon von der Reichweite seiner wissenschaftlichen Ambitionen zeugt. Im ersten Abschnitt erwähnt Schleiermacher die seinerzeit kursierenden Theorien und referiert Autoren wie Hufland, Mendelssohn oder Schmalz²⁸, doch der *Entwurf* bricht nach dem Titel *Zweiter Abschnitt. Meine Theorie* abrupt ab und lässt somit die drei unbeschriebenen Fünftel der Seite zur leeren Transzendenz werden, deren Offenbarung sich dem Leser versagt.

Zum Glück sind neben dem *Entwurf* auch die *Notizen zur Vertragslehre* erhalten, die als Vorarbeiten desselben schon einen Eindruck darüber vermitteln können, wie die Theorie Schleiermachers wenigstens im Falle bestimmter Aspekte hätte aussehen müssen. Wilhelm Dilthey glaubte im Versuch Schleiermachers, die damals modische Frage nach dem Ursprung des Zwangsrechts zu lösen, ein interpretatives Pattern erkennen zu können: Schleiermacher bediene sich „wieder seines Verfahrens, aus dem Ansatz des Problems und der Kritik der vorhandenen Lösungen seine eigene Antwort zu entwickeln.“²⁹ Zutreffender könnte man in diesem Fall von einer dreistufigen Vorgehensweise sprechen, die Gunter Scholtz sowohl in Schleiermachers Dogmatik als auch am Beispiel seiner Ethik nachweisen konnte: Sie bestünde, frei nach Scholtz, aus einer exegetischen Annäherungsweise, einer historischen Kritik und schließlich einer Wertung

aus dem Gesichtspunkt der Gegenwart.³⁰ Dies heißt aber nicht mehr und nicht minder, als dass Schleiermacher jene Kunst der Kombinatorik beherrschte, die im festen Boden des Tradierten die Saat des Neuen durch Umformungen aufgehen lässt.

Eine Vertragslehre wird Schleiermacher bis zum Tode nicht mehr verfassen, doch das Interesse an einer solchen Problematik ist ihm keineswegs abhanden gekommen, denkt man z. B. an eine thematisch benachbarte Schrift wie die spätere *Staatslehre*. Will man nun die Vertragstheorie Schleiermachers trotz ihrer literarhistorischen Rubrizierung als Versäumtes aus verstreuten Zitaten rekonstruieren, so darf das *a priori* als ein unbesonnenes Unterfangen hingestellt werden. Doch wenn die Kontrafaktur dessen, was Schleiermachers Systemwillen entsprechend hätte vielleicht zu einem kohärenten Gedankengefüge auswachsen können, auch nicht verlockend genug ist, so kann man sich immerhin nach eingehender Auseinandersetzung mit seinem Werk versprechen, die wichtigsten Aspekte einer kontraktualistischen Gesellschaftstheorie wenigstens ansatzweise aus anderweitigen Stellen zu erhellen.

Man darf sich nur nicht irritieren lassen: Diltheys Aussagen zu beiden Fragmentschriften sind oberflächlich und knapp und übersehen viele für die spätere Entwicklung des Denkens Schleiermachers bedeutsame Textstellen. Günther Meckenstock hat am Beispiel der vermeintlichen Rechtfertigung des Zwangsrechts durch Schleiermacher gezeigt, wie vorschnell die Schlussfolgerungen Diltheys waren; vielmehr handele es sich hier um einen frühen hermeneutischen Ansatz, der zu erklären versucht, dass die Verbindlichkeit von Verträgen *Verstehen* voraussetzt. So führe Schleiermacher „das Zwangsrecht und die Verbindlichkeit von Verträgen auf die für menschliche Persönlichkeit elementare Handlungsfreiheit zurück.“³¹ Freiheit aber setzt Unterscheidungsvermögen voraus, d. h., sie wirkt nur in Verbindung mit einem Kode, der erst vorschreibt, was annehmbar ist oder nicht. Schleiermacher fragt sich in diesem Zusammenhang, was „das bindende Moment des Paktums“ denn sei, „nach welchem keine Retraktation mehr möglich ist“, und seine Erklärung „fällt wie die Kantische aus: Die Willenserklärung muß mit der Acceptation verbunden gedacht werden.“³² Meckenstocks Kommentar zu diesem Passus macht deutlich, wie wichtig die Intersubjektivität fürs Bestehen jedes Paktes ist³³ und weist zugleich darauf hin, dass diese ein Problem der Erkenntnis darstellt, denn die Vertragspartner müssen „des wechselseitigen Verstehens ihrer Absichten und Erklärungen völlig gewiss sein können.“³⁴ Daraus entsteht eine besondere Hermeneutik,

deren Grundthese es ist, dass nicht nur die menschliche Persönlichkeit, sondern auch die zwischenmenschliche Interaktion im Allgemeinen als dekodierbares Zeichensystem interpretierbar sind:

„Es fragt sich also: giebt es verständliche und für allgemein anzunehmende Zeichen einer Willensbestimmung? Ich antworte[:] es muß dergleichen geben, weil darauf die Anerkennung der Personalität beruht. [...] die praktische Vernunft postuliert hier also eine ursprüngliche allen übrigen zum Grunde liegende Gesellschaft, nemlich die Gesellschaft der Zeichen.“³⁵

Zeichen sind Zeichen nur kraft ihrer spezifischen Differenz. Ist diese unverträglich, so hat man einen Gegensatz vorhanden, den es zu überwinden gilt um des Fortbestehens der Gesellschaft willen. Natürlichen Bedürfnissen entsprechend finden Individuen in Gemeinschaftsformen zusammen, in denen diese Differenzen halb kaschiert, halb positiv verwertet ungefährlich gemacht werden. Diese nennt Schleiermacher in seiner Ethik „vollkommene ethische Formen“: das sind „Familie“, „Volk“, „Wissenschaft“, „Staat“, „Kirche“ und „freie Geselligkeit“. Die lebenspraktisch relevanten Hinweise auf solche autonomen Lebensbereiche und zugleich fast „vollkommenen“ Assoziierungsformen, deren Aufgabe es ist, die naturgemäßen Gegensätze aufzuheben³⁶, legen nahe, dass das Individuum, soweit es gesellschaftlich besteht, immer auf das Miteinander seines Mitgesetzten angewiesen ist. Mit anderen Worten: Ein Mitgesetztes wirkt mit Notwendigkeit mit, soll das individuelle Tun überhaupt wirksam werden.

Das Mitgesetzte ist aber, ins Lateinische rückübersetzt, als *Com-positum* aufzufassen, als das Element einer mutuellen Beziehung, das in Verbindung mit seinem Korrelat eine notwendige *Komposition* ergibt. Ohne das Ganze gibt es also nichts, und das Ganze ist nicht bloß Hochrechnung aller Individuen, sondern Aufholung der individuellen Struktur ins Unendliche. Umgekehrt ist das Individuum so gut wie undenkbar, wenn es keinen Anteil am Universalen hat. Ja, absolut gesetzt ist nur das Universale als ein Anderes; das Ich ist dagegen fragwürdig. Der Andere, als das Person gewordene Andere, erscheint aus diesem Grund als Kollektivsingular schlechthin. Denn der Andere kann nicht ohne weiteres als Individuum gedacht werden, es sei denn, ihm haften frappante Eigenschaften an, die als Signale der Andersartigkeit negativ ausgearbeitet werden können: Barbarei, Wildnis, Unmündigkeit, Krankheit, körperlicher Defekt usw. Aber auch

dann wird der Kollektivsingular auf Grund der Verallgemeinerung der betreffenden Eigenschaft bald zum Begriff. Zum Feindbegriff. Das muss vermieden werden, will man das „Gebot“ der Mitteilung einhalten.

Da das Individuum nur im Miteinander eines Mitgesetzten ist und sein kann, hat die Leugnung der Komposition, der Gesamtheit keinen Sinn. Im Gegenteil: man muss sich dem Anderen gegenüber öffnen. Die Bereitschaft, selbst mit fremden Geistern ins Gespräch zu kommen und so die von Schleiermacher theoretisierte „freie Geselligkeit“ zu verwirklichen, erinnert ans Schlegelsche³⁷ Programm der so genannten Symphilosophie, das im Athenaeum-Projekt beispielsweise durch die gemeinsam verfassten Aphorismen vom jungen Schleiermacher bereits experimentiert wurde: „Diese Aufgabe“, dass nämlich „auch die fremdesten Gemüther und Verhältnisse befreundet und gleichsam nachbarlich werden“, könne nur durch den „freien Umgang vernünftiger sich unter einander bildender Menschen gelöst“ werden.³⁸

Ob intersubjektiv oder symphilosophisch, je nach Rahmenbegrifflichkeit, stets wird das soziale Miteinander bzw. Nebeneinander durch ein gemeinsames Bemühen um Verständigung *verträglich* gemacht. Insofern lässt sich anmerken, dass Schleiermachers Überlegungen zur Vertragslehre nicht so sehr auf die Natur bzw. die Konsequenzen des Vertrags abzielten, sondern vielmehr auf die Verträglichkeit des sozialen Miteinanders, und zwar so, dass er die Notwendigkeit eines gemeinsamen Kommunikationskodes und der Kommunikation überhaupt für die Entschärfung von Konfliktpotentialen hervorhob. Zu den Prämissen der herkömmlichen kontraktualistischen Staatslehre muss er den logischen, allerdings von ihm nie geäußerten Satz gezählt haben, dass die „Verträglichkeit von Zielen und Interessen“³⁹, um einen Ausdruck Georg Simmels zu verwenden, zuallererst *vertraglich* zu erzielen ist. Vertrag ist aber Mitteilung – ein Schleiermacher liebes Wort. Diese kann nur auf Grund von (Sprach-)Konventionen bestehen, und Träger der Konvention sind immer die sich Mitteilenden, die schließlich zusammenfinden und eine Gemeinschaft bilden.

Gemeinschaft wäre demnach nicht etwa getilgte, erloschene Differenz, sondern Mitteilung innerhalb einer gesetzten „Gesellschaft der Zeichen“, also gerade keine Kommunion – kein Einverleiben der Hostie als Pflichtmenü –, sondern *Kommunikation*. Mitteilung ist Teilung, jedoch nicht Entselbung⁴⁰, wie im mystischen Erlebnis. Die Gestaltung des Unendlichen im Endlichen kraft der Urbestimmung des menschlichen Wesens, das ewige Weltgesetz aus sich selbst zu verwirklichen, kann auch ohne jene

Gottwerdung gelingen, die man aus der negativen Theologie, aus der Mystik z. B. eines Meister Eckhart oder der indischen Religion kennt. Mitgeteilt und dennoch ungeteilt kann das Individuum nur in der Frömmigkeit sein, in der *alles* und *alle* verbindenden Religion, die als psychische Substanz der Menschheit alle Individuen miteinander verknüpft und die Gesellschaft der Zeichen zur Mitteilung bewegt. Somit wird der Begriff Religion auf ein *a priori* reduziert: Was mitteilbar ist, ist an sich schon Ausdruck eines schlechthin Teilbaren, d. h., es hat Anteil am Sein. Die Maxime „sei nie kein Theil von dir selbst“⁴¹ aus dem *Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens* bedeutet etwa soviel wie „sei immer wenigstens ein Teil von dir selbst“, worin man ein hermeneutisches Verfahren, zu dem Schleiermachers Philosophie auch sonst stets ermutigt, erkennen kann: denn das Individuum erscheint in der Mitteilung als Teil eines überlegenen Ganzen, als *pars pro toto*. Der Mensch ist ein Zeichen innerhalb der Zeichengesellschaft, und Zeichen unterscheiden sich auf Grund ihrer spezifischen, jedoch nicht unüberwindlichen Differenz, die erst Verständlichkeit und Semantik erzeugt. Der definitorische hermeneutische Ansatz Schleiermachers setzt darauf, dass die Hermeneutik einen Sinn nur in jenem Dazwischen hat, das weder absolute Vertraulichkeit noch absolute Alterität ist.⁴²

Georg Simmel hat die Auffassung Schleiermachers von diesem ‘Weder-Noch’ des Identitätsverhältnisses vom Unendlichen und Endlichen vortrefflich erklärt: Der Gegensatz von Gott und Ich werde vernichtet, so Simmel,

„gleichviel welche seiner Seiten man zum Opfer bringt. Zu einer *Vereinigung* des individuellen Ich mit Gott kommt es ja auch auf dem Wege der Mystik und Spinozas nicht, weil beide die Individualität aufheben, indem die *deificatio* eintritt. Ihnen genau wie Nietzsche ist das Nicht-Gott-Sein des Individuums so unaushaltbar, daß sie lieber entweder das Individuum oder Gott beseitigen, um nur aus der Qual der Gottferne erlöst zu sein. Nur Schleiermacher hat diesen Zwiespalt überwunden, weil er jene Voraussetzung nicht anerkannte: die Besonderheit und die göttliche Universalität schließen sich so wenig aus, daß umgekehrt jene allein die Form ist, in der diese sich darstellt – nicht so, als wäre sie dahinter und offenbarte sich in ihr, sondern Persönlichkeit, Einzigkeit ist die Art, in der das Universum lebt, ist seine unmittelbare, von dieser Form nicht trennbare Existenz. Darum lebt das ganze Universum, das Göttliche, in jeder Individualität, *als* jede Individualität. Wenn der Zwiespalt nicht besteht, fällt der Grund fort, um seiner Unerträglichkeit willen eine seiner Seiten zu leugnen.“⁴³

Überhaupt hat Georg Simmel den religionswissenschaftlichen Ansatz Schleiermachers am produktivsten und zugleich am treuesten weitergeführt, so sehr er sich damit auch nicht monografisch auseinandergesetzt hat.⁴⁴ In seinen Ausführungen zum Einheitsbegriff, der seiner Ansicht nach jeglicher religionsgemeinschaftlichen Ausgestaltung immanent sei, erhärtete Simmel die Annahme eines „konkurrenzlosen Nebeneinander“ in den religiösen Gemeinschaften, das sich in der „Kampf- und Konkurrenzlosigkeit“ der primitiven Gruppen, sowie in den „jüdischen und in den frühesten christlichen Gemeinden“ gleichermaßen manifestiere. Mehr noch: Simmel betonte fast fortschrittsgläubig die Entwicklung des Bestrebens nach Einheit und Frieden im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte und erinnerte damit an Schleiermachers Vorstellungen von der Individualisierung und somit der Historisierung der einzelnen Religionen, die als notwendige Erscheinungen und eben nicht als bloße Kontingenz betrachtet werden sollen.⁴⁵ Dass diese konkreten Ausprägungen der Religion nur in der „Eine[n] und untheilbaren Gemeinschaft der Heiligen [...] gedeihen können“⁴⁶, schlägt noch keine Brücke zum traditionellen christlichen Verständnis der Kircheneinheit, das sich eher in einer zeitgenössischen Schrift wie Novalis' *Christenheit oder Europa* offenbart. Im Gegenteil: Schleiermacher betont, dass „nichts unchristlicher“ sei, als „Einförmigkeit zu suchen in der Religion.“⁴⁷

In etwaiger Distanzierung von der Symbolik des Abendmahls als Quintessenz der paulinischen Sozialmystik⁴⁸ und bestimmte Affinitäten mit der Sozialpädagogik eines Rousseau aufweisend konnte Schleiermacher die zentrale Rolle der Mitteilung aus dem Gesichtspunkt eines Romantikers nur nicht genug hervorheben, um die Dürre der Pflichtenmoral Immanuel Kants abzumildern, da diese, so der Vorwurf, den Menschen immer nur als „die Menschen“ behandeln würde. Diese Haltung darf aber keineswegs als bedingungsloser Lobgesang des Individualismus missdeutet werden. Man befindet sich nach wie vor in jenem Bereich des 'Weder-Noch', in dem das Individuum für das Universum steht und umgekehrt. Wenn im Sinne der Dialektik Schleiermachers der Grundsatz gilt, dass „kein Gegenstand isoliert“⁴⁹ ist, so kann man sich auch das Individuum nicht als isoliertes Wesen vorstellen. Immer gibt es den Anderen als Mitgesetzten. Darauf beruht das „Gefühl schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit“⁵⁰, das Schleiermacher als Inbegriff der Frömmigkeit und damit als Bedingung der Möglichkeit aller Religion ansieht. Und wenn „in der Begrenzung des Gegenstandes selbst [...] sein Verhältnis zu den anderen“ liegt, so ist in der Begrenztheit des Individuums schon das Verhältnis zu seinen Mitmenschen und zur

Allgemeinheit des Menschen vorhanden. Das gilt nun auch für alle Formen des Menschseins, für die Religion inklusive: „Ist die Religion einmal, so muß sie notwendig auch gesellig sein.“ Und weiter: „in der wahren religiösen Geselligkeit [ist] alle Mittheilung gegenseitig.“⁵¹

Um gegenseitig zu sein, braucht die Mitteilung jenen „wahlverwandschaftlichen Zusammenhang“, auf den Schleiermacher in seinen Ausführungen zum *Begriff des Höchsten Gutes* die Aufhebung aller Sonderung und die Entstehung von „Lebenstypen, Schulen und schließlich Gemeinschaften“, in denen „jeder mit jedem vermittelt ist“, zurückführte.⁵² Ferner verdankt die Mitteilung ihr Gelingen dem *künstlerischen* Ausdruck in allen seinen möglichen Formen, „ohne den auch das geistigste Selbstbewußtsein nicht kann aus sich herauswirken und mitgeteilt werden“, und der „immer abhängig von der Verwandtschaft der Organisation und der Sprache [ist]; und so bleibt, wenn die Kunst in allen ihren Zweigen wesentlich volkstümlich ist, auch die Religion, die sich nur durch die Kunst ausdrückt und mitteilt, mehr oder weniger hierdurch bedingt.“⁵³ Mislingt die Mitteilung, so kann man „in das Chaotische zurück [fallen], wenn die Gemeinschaft nur besteht in dem unendlichen Aggregat der für das Verständnis mannigfaltig, aber unbestimmt gegeneinander abgestuften Familien.“⁵⁴ Mittels der künstlerisch gestalteten Sprache der Mitteilung kann sich das sozial-politische Aggregat, genauso wie bei Rousseau, von der bloß summierenden *volonté de tous* zur vektorialen *volonté generale* erheben, und das erklärt in etwa, weswegen Schleiermacher Religion, Volk und Staat qua autonome Bereiche zum Gegenstand analoger Untersuchungen gemacht hat, wenn er es auch nicht unterlassen hat, dem Judentum ganz im Sinne Spinozas vorzuwerfen, es habe das Moralische, Staatliche und Religiöse unzulässig vermengt.⁵⁵ Rein erkenntnistheoretisch ist die Analogie indes nicht nur erlaubt, sondern auch ertragreich, denn sie deckt den gemeinsamen Kern der Problematik auf: mereologisch gesehen, sind alle diese Bereiche als Systeme oder Gesamtheiten dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie „mehr als [den] einzelne[n]“ darstellen und dennoch ohne den Einzelnen nicht bestehen können, worin übrigens auch Simmel das erste *a priori* jedweder Vergesellschaftungsform identifizierte: nämlich, dass das Subjekt an sich Fragment (sprich: unvollkommen) ist und daher stets sich danach sehnt, vervollständigt zu werden.⁵⁶

Wie schlägt sich nun das Universum, das Unendliche im Endlichen, im Individuum nieder, so dass die Majestät jenes durch das launenhafte Benehmen dieses nicht lächerlich gemacht wird? Fast möchte man sagen, dass dem Gefühl der „schlechthinnigen Abhängigkeit“ eine *ohnehinige*

Religion entspricht, die jenseits aller Gottesvorstellungen steht, und der sich kein Mensch entziehen kann, es sei denn, der Mensch verdrängt jenes Gefühl systematisch. (Und täte er das, würde er nicht mit Notwendigkeit zum „gebildeten Verächter der Religion“?) So aufgefasst ist Religion immer universal, sie drückt sich aber am vortrefflichsten im religiösen Menschen aus, der keine äußerlichen Formen und auch kein Glaubensobjekt braucht, um das Universale an sich selbst zu verwirklichen. Nochmals sei auf Simmel verwiesen, der zwischen der Religion als „Summe von Behauptungen“ oder als „Objektivität der religiösen oder kirchlichen Tatsachen“ und dem „So-Sein“ des religiösen Menschen, der „von sich aus fromm“ ist, zu unterscheiden wusste.⁵⁷

Zweifelsohne war Schleiermacher selbst ein religiöser Mensch und, ohne unbedingt psychanalytisch vorgehen zu wollen, kann man gewisse Berührungspunkte zwischen Biografie und Werk beobachten, die nahe legen, dass er sich geradezu nostalgisch nach einem homogenen Mitteilungsmedium sehnte, pflegte er doch die Freude der Mitteilung mit dem beim Publikum ausgelösten Genuss zu bemessen⁵⁸: Dies sei, so die Annahme, eine Sache des gemeinsamen Geschmacks und des Gemeinnsinns. So schrieb er in einem Brief an die Schwester Charlotte über die von ihm aus dem Englischen übersetzten Predigten von Joseph Fawcett (erschienen 1798) und konnte dabei seine Begeisterung über die vollbrachte Tat kaum vertuschen:

„Mir haben [die Predigten...] sehr behagt, [...] nicht nur als Produkte eines originellen Kopfes, sondern noch mehr als Beweise, wie viel man leisten und um wie viel eindringlicher und gewichtiger man reden kann, wenn man vor einer gleichartigen nicht allzu gemischten Versammlung redet und gewiß weiß, daß jeder der da ist, gewiß nur deswegen da ist, weil er an der Sache Geschmack findet.“⁵⁹

Mitteilung ist dementsprechend nicht nur ein Verhältnis von Sender, Botschaft und Empfänger, sondern braucht immer auch einen spezifischen Kontext. Wenn der Ausdruck „eine nicht allzu gemischte Versammlung“ erwartungsgemäß auf die erwünschte Homogenität des Empfängerkreises hinweist, so betont der letzte Satz des Fragments die Notwendigkeit eines gemeinsamen ästhetischen Interesses im homogenen Medium: die Gemeinschaft als Ästhet. Damit knüpfte Schleiermacher an Luthers Überlegungen zur Eucharistie an, der ja schon seinerzeit „der menschen mund“ mit dem „herzens grund“ wie in einem ad-hoc getroffenen

Binnenreim religiösen Erlebnisses in Verbindung gebracht hatte: „ßo lange du das fulen nicht hast, ßo lange hastu gewißlich gottis wort nicht geschmeckt.“⁶⁰

Was braucht denn eine „Versammlung“, damit sie homogen wirkt, damit sie nicht in unzählige Egoismen zerfällt? Setzen wir den Fall einer Nullpunkt-Aggregation, wo die Versammlung gar keine oder eine „eiskalte“⁶¹ ist, so ist die Alterität dessen, der gegenüber steht, schlagend und lässt sich nur mit „Gastfreiheit“ überwinden, wobei schon die reflexmäßige Bezeichnung des unbekanntenen Anderen als *Gast*, wie man etymologisch auf Grund der Parallele zu lat. *hostis* schließen kann, Feindschaftspotenziale in allen nur denkbaren Formen freisetzt. Für diesen Fall kann Schleiermacher nur das exemplarische christliche Verhalten vorschreiben:

„wenn unser Hauswesen so eingerichtet ist, wie das Wort Gottes verlangt [...], dann ist ein solcher Verein, mehr als der einzelne, auch der vollendetste Mensch es sein kann, ein Tempel Gottes, in welchem der Geist Gottes wohnt; [...] Allein der Mensch soll nicht seinem Bedürfnis nach allein leben; und besonders sind wir Christen auch eben dazu in einem eigenen Sinne ein Volk von Brüdern, daß wir, auch in unsrem häuslichen Leben auf mannigfaltige Weise enger untereinander vereint, jeder auch für das, was er an dem andern getan hat. So wenig also der einzelne, der auch aus diesem Grunde ein Tempel Gottes heißt, sich verschließen soll und sein Licht verbergen, sondern es leuchten lassen, damit der in ihm wohnende Geist Gottes geschaut werden könne und gepriesen.“ Und ferner: „Der Zweck aller Gastfreiheit soll auf geistigen Verkehr und geistigen Genuß gerichtet sein und alles Äußere und Leibliche soll dem nur dienen. [...] Die zweite Regel [...] ist die, daß sich in der Gastfreiheit eine Gegenseitigkeit des geistigen Gebens und Empfangens erzeuge.“⁶² Nicht ganz zufällig hat Schleiermacher diese die Gastfreundschaft als Tugendethik bestimmende Predigt als Kommentar zu Hebr. 13,2 konzipiert, war doch der Jude eines der „beliebtesten“ Feindbilder in der europäischen Tradition überhaupt. Und es darf kaum wundernehmen, dass gerade ein an sich so generöser Ausdruck wie „mehr als der einzelne“ von den totalitären Herrschaftsformen des 20. Jahrhunderts propagandistisch missbraucht wurde⁶³ – ein Hinweis darauf, dass die Laodizee zur degradierenden Schwärmerei entarten kann, sobald die „unbegeistete“ Masse zu ihrem Gegenstand wird.

Romantiker und Aufklärer zugleich, konnte Schleiermacher die Masse – dieses Nicht-Ich einer vorstaatlichen Gesellschaftsform – nur nicht energisch genug ablehnen, um in Versunkenheit darüber rätseln zu können, wie „man nur etwas [fände], wodurch aus Nicht-Staat ein Staat wird.“⁶⁴ Seine Antwort auf diese Frage bildet den Gegensatz zu Schlossers Begriff des Interaktionismus⁶⁵, den Schleiermacher zu deskriptiv fand und also wiederum in Gefahr, einem unperspektivischen Faktendogmatismus zu verfallen. Einfallsreicher wäre es schon, diesem Begriff Gefühl entgegenzusetzen, denn dieses kann von sich allein die Dichotomie vom organisierenden (bildenden) und symbolisierenden Handeln aufheben: so spreche sich „in jedem einzelnen Gefühl [...] die ganze Einheit des Lebens aus, dessen Äußerung es ist.“⁶⁶ Erst durch das Gefühl wird man zum Ich, wie Schleiermacher in den „verfichtenden“ Fragmenten über den Gegensatz zwischen Volk und Regierung betont: „In Fichtes politischem Handelsstaat ist die Masse das Nichtich. [...] Je roher noch die Masse ist, um desto mehr muß alles Individualisierende geschützt und geheiligt sein, damit das schon gebildete nicht in rohe Hände komme.“⁶⁷ Sobald der Aufklärer verblasst, und der Romantiker die Oberhand gewinnt, wird der Gedanke eines dem Staat zugrunde liegenden Vertrags verschwiegen. Dann hilft nur noch, den Staat auf einem „auf ganz unbekannte Weise“ wirkenden Prinzip beruhen zu lassen, und Schleiermacher scheut sich tatsächlich nicht davor, improvisatorische Begriffsprägungen zu erarbeiten, welche die Originalität seiner Erklärungen hervorheben sollen. Er meint dann, der Staat sei „gar nicht sittlich bestimmt, sondern er ist ursprünglich entweder ein Unsittliches oder ein Sittliches zwar, aber auf ganz unbekannte Weise.“⁶⁸ – Besser romantisch dunkel, denn bürokratisch hell, könnte man anmerken; aber diese „ganz unbekannte Weise“ des Staatswerdens birgt vieles in sich, das dem Laodizee-Motiv nahe kommt, denn „das Volk“, sagt er ferner, „ist die Totalität der Aufnahme der Idee“⁶⁹, und somit werden Staats- und Volksgenese im Rahmen einer Ethik der Güter mit jener *Begeisterung* in Verbindung gebracht, die in der Schrift *Über den Begriff des höchsten Gutes*⁷⁰ zum Schlüsselbegriff erhoben wird. Erst mittels Begeisterung sind Sein und Bewusstsein der vielen vereint: „das Sein eines Gemeinsamen in vielen, und das Bewußtsein vieler durch ein und dasselbige, wie sich beides in auseinander entspringenden Generationen wiederholt: so gebührt nun auch mit dem Eintreten der Begeisterung entstehenden menschlichen Geschlecht die vollkommenste Gattung zu sein, d. h. das Eine in allen.“⁷¹ Begeisterung sei laut Schleiermacher „naturgewordene Vernunft und Vernunft gewordene Natur“, die darin

zum Ausdruck komme, dass „die Menschen durch eine bestimmtere Gemeinsamkeit des Eigentümlichen in größeren Massen, die wir Völker nennen, vereint sind.“⁷²

Wiewohl die Begriffe *Volk* und *Begeisterung* in der obigen Prägung die Möglichkeit einer positivistischen Beobachtung einschränken, legte Schleiermacher großen Wert auf ihre „Abgeschlossenheit“, auf ihre Konturenschärfe: So bestehe das Volk nicht bloß aus einzelnen Familien, sondern aus der Gemeinschaft der Familien⁷³, die außer der Abgeschlossenheit der einzelnen Familien auch noch durch „freie Geselligkeit“ und ferner durch „Geschäft“ und „Verkehr“ gekennzeichnet ist. In Volk und Familie hat man also „zwei in verschiedenem Maß für sich bestehende Naturganze, in welchen Abgeschlossenheit und Geselligkeit sich gegenseitig bedingen.“⁷⁴

In seinem späten theologischen Werk *Der christliche Glaube* wird Schleiermacher auf den Begriff der Begeisterung verzichten und dahingegen den heiligen Geist als jene Instanz darstellen, die zur Verwirklichung der Einheit innerhalb der religiösen Gemeinschaft wirkt. So gewähre die „vermöge der Einheit des Geistes Allen einwohnende Idee“ die Kohäsion und Homogenität der Gemeinschaft.

„Dieses [das Ineinandergreifen der Kräfte und Tätigkeiten] aber ist auch selbst alsdann wenn das ganze menschliche Geschlecht in die Gemeinschaft der Erlösung aufgenommen ist, keineswegs vollendet, sondern nur in der an sich schon unendlichen wechselseitigen Darstellung des gemeinsamen im eigentümlichen, und des eigentümlichen in dem gemeinsamen, als worin das Leben und Wesen eines Volkes besteht.“⁷⁵

Nicht preisgeben indessen konnte Schleiermacher den Volksbegriff, der aber nunmehr vor dem Hintergrund der Dialektik von Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft verstanden wird. Schleiermacher beschritt somit den Weg von der romantisch anmutenden Staatslehre zur aufgeklärten Theologie.

„Die untheilbare Gemeinschaft der Heiligen“ – der Zweck, der die Mittel heiligt. Dass Schleiermacher feinsinnig genug war, um zwischen Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft – Jahrzehnte vor Ferdinand Tönnies – unterscheiden zu können, braucht hier nicht nachgewiesen zu werden. Er legte den „eigentlichsten Sinn“ der Gesellschaft – als freie Geselligkeit – bereits in seinem Frühwerk, in der so genannten Geselligkeitstheorie dar:

„In jeder durch einen äußern Zweck gebundenen und bestimmten geselligen Verbindung ist den Teilhabern etwas gemein, und diese Verbindungen sind Gemeinschaften, κοινονια; hier ist ihnen eigentlich nichts gemein, sondern alles ist wechselseitig, das heißt eigentlich entgegengesetzt, und dies sind Gesellschaften, συνουσια.“⁷⁶

Den Passus habe ich vollständig zitiert, um ihn so zu sagen aus der Unscheinbarkeit, die Schleiermacher ihm beimisst, in den argumentativen Textfluss emporzuretten: im Original steht er nämlich in einer Fußnote.

Verbindet man nun diese Unterscheidung mit der Forderung zur wechselseitigen Mitteilung, die in den *Reden über die Religion* teils ausdrücklich vorkommt, teils angedeutet wird, doch immer zentral bleibt, so ist Schleiermachers Bevorzugung der *Gesellschaft* evident. Dies mag mehrere Gründe haben: Durchaus plausibel ist einerseits die misstrauische Reaktion auf das Gemeinschaftsleben, das Schleiermacher selbst während seiner Kindheit durchmachen musste.⁷⁷ Andererseits kann man darin den Ausdruck seiner Persönlichkeit oder des Zeitgeistes erahnen, die ihm ein von den Gemeinschaftszwängen beeinträchtigt Leben unerträglich machten. Vor dem Hintergrund der Biografie Schleiermachers scheint beides zuzutreffen. Sicher ist, dass der Duktus der Schriften Schleiermachers oftmals die Anmerkung zulässt, ein „tolle, lege te ipsum!“ sei ihm eigen, ein Drang zur Selbstoffenbarung und Selbstausslegung, der als Übung der Selbsterkenntnis in den *Monologen* gipfeln sollte.⁷⁸ Den Zeitgenossen Schleiermachers konnte dieser Sachverhalt nicht entgehen.⁷⁹ Der oft reflexive Ton der Jugendschriften war schon Friedrich Schlegel auffällig, der ihren kunstreichen Stil lobte und einräumte, „von der Religion [lasse sich] nur mit Religion“ reden.

Die Rhetorik Schleiermachers irritiert den Leser nur allzu oft, soviel steht fest; doch er verteidigte sich gegen den Vorwurf, er rede ständig nur von sich selbst, indem er zum Beispiel ein berühmtes Zitat aus Luthers Rede auf dem Wormser Reichstag 1521 für den eigenen Zweck zurechtschnitt:

„Non possumus facere, quin locum laudatum huc exscribamus. Vergönnet mir, von mir selbst zu reden. Ihr wißt, niemals kann Stolz seyn, was Frömmigkeit sprechen heißt; denn sie ist immer voll Demuth. Frömmigkeit war der mütterliche Leib, in dessem heiligem Dunkel mein junges Leben genährt und auf die ihm noch verschlossene Welt vorbereitet wurde; in ihr athmete mein Geist, ehe er noch sein eigenthümliches Gebiet in Wissenschaft und Lebenserfahrung gefunden hatte; sie half mir, als ich

anfieng, den väterlichen Glauben zu sichten und Gedanken und Gefühle zu reinigen von dem Schutte der Vorwelt; sie blieb mir, als auch der Gott und die Unsterblichkeit der kindlichen Zeit verschwanden; sie leitete mich absichtslos in das thätige Leben; sie zeigte mir, wie ich mich selbst mit meinen Vorzügen und Mängeln in meinem ungetheilten Daseyn heilig halten solle, und nur durch sie habe ich Freundschaft und Liebe gelernt.“⁸⁰

Das Mitteilungsbedürfnis, das Freundschaft und Liebe erntet, scheint also der reinen Frömmigkeit zu entquellen. Doch zwingt die Frömmigkeit, die Schleiermacher weder im Wissen (also in der starken Überzeugung), noch im Tun (also im Antrieb und im Zweck) verankert sehen will, sondern sie als „schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl“ deutet, einen so zur Mitteilung, dass die Gefahr auftaucht, die Wechselwirkung der Geselligkeit zu beeinträchtigen. Wenn keine Wechselwirkung in der Mitteilung stattfindet, erlischt die Frömmigkeit selbst.⁸¹ Deswegen bedarf der Zwang zur Mitteilung einer Rechtfertigung.

Wenn Schleiermachers Rezeption der Theodizee Leibnizens, den er für einen die tiefen Widersprüche des Wissens verkennenden „Moderantisten“ hielt, der Ich und Nichtich, Katholizismus und Protestantismus verschmelzen wolle und die „Billigkeit bis zur Karikatur“ treibe⁸², sich unfruchtbar erwiesen hat – denn er hat ja vermutlich in Anlehnung an Kant die Theodizee eines personalistischen Gottes sowieso als Sackgasse (genauer: als „Advokatschrift in Sachen Gottes“⁸³) abgelehnt –, so heißt das nicht, dass er selber in seinem späteren Werk überhaupt keine Rechtfertigungstopoi gepflegt hätte. Ganz im Gegenteil: Apologetische Haltungen lassen sich in seinen Schriften vielfach belegen. Nun schuf Schleiermacher, indem er die Religion als *gesellig* definierte, den hermeneutischen Rahmen dafür, dass diese als Phänomen der Kommunikation interpretiert wird. Die Religion muss sich mitteilen, also nimmt sie die Form von Kollektivsingularen, das heißt, von symbolischen Homogenitäten wie Gemeinschaft, Kirche, Umma u. ä. Fällt die religiöse Gemeinschaft mit der ethnischen und politischen zusammen, so wird das Individuum vor die Alternative gestellt, das höchste Mitgesetzte, von dem es sich schlechthin abhängig weiß und das sich der Offenbarung lange entzieht, nach dem Maß seiner Vorstellungskraft zurecht zu schneiden, d. h., es der Immanenz näher zu rücken. Tatsächlich ist dieses Denkreflex vielen alttestamentlichen Propheten gemeinsam, die eifrig und trotz aller historischen Umstände über die Gültigkeit des Bundes zwischen Gott

und Volk wachen. Der Bund droht gebrochen zu werden, denn man schwankt allzu oft zwischen Extremen. Die Frömmigkeit kann zwar die Gewissheit eines „ungetheilten Daseyns“ herbeiführen, aber sie ist „durch das Wirken der Welt“⁸⁴ vermittelt, also kann sie auch negative Momente in sich aufnehmen und Krisen auslösen. Als Medium der Kommunikation muss die Welt selbst geheiligt werden. So behandelt Schleiermacher in seinem Kommentar *Ueber Koloss. 1, 15-20.* gerade eine Stelle im Kolosserbrief, die „weder Anfang noch Ende hat“, schrikt jedoch vor dieser „unthunlich scheinenden“ Aufgabe nicht zurück, da er doch aus anderen Anlässen weiß, dass A und O „nicht immer das Wahre und das Höchste“ sind. Zwischen A und O muss jene Mitte ausgemacht werden, die erst der Mitteilung gerecht und gewachsen ist. Denn diese zunächst unscheinbare Mitte ist der Ort, an dem das Ich und der Andere zusammenfinden. Das Mitgesetztsein ist eigentlich keine Exzentrizität in Bezug auf das Selbstbewusstsein, sondern gerade das In-der-Mitte-Sein.

Diese Mitte ist die Welt selbst bzw. erst das In-der-Mitte-Sein der Welt macht sie zum bewohnbaren und verträglichen Ort für das Sein. Aus dem oben angeführten Kommentar geht ein gewisser – man möchte fast sagen: ein optimistischer – Kosmismus hervor, den Schleiermacher exegetisch verankert und gerechtfertigt sehen will: „Zuerst ist ja aber κτίζειν gar nicht das gebräuchlichste Wort für erschaffen; an keiner Stelle in der Schöpfungsgeschichte haben es die Lxx., und in der athenischen Rede bedient sich Paulus für die Schöpfung desselben ποιησαι, womit sich auch jene begnügen. Ja, in allen Stellen der Lxx. [...] ist nirgends von dem ursprünglichen Hervorbringen mit Bezug auf das vorher nicht gewesen seyn die Rede, sondern nur von dem Begründen und Einrichten in Bezug auf das künftige Fortbestehen und Sichfortentwickeln [...] Dasselbe gilt von allen paulinischen Stellen.“⁸⁵ – und verweist in einer Fußnote auf 1 Kor. 11,9. 1 Tim. 4,3. und Kol. 3,10: „wo es auf kosmos bezogen wird, da ist schon um dieses Wortes willen das Begründen einer festen Ordnung und Zusammenstimmung der Hauptbegriff.“ Im Fortbestehen und in der Ordnung der Welt liegt erst ihr Sinn. Luthers Satz vom Glauben aus dem *Kleinen Katechismus* hätte mit Sicherheit auch Schleiermacher wenigstens einmal laut und ohne Arglist aussprechen können: „Ich glaube, dass mich Gott geschaffen hat [...] und noch erhält.“⁸⁶ Die Schöpfung hat nur einen Sinn, wenn sie erhaltbar ist. Damit wird der grundsätzliche Kosmismus des Christentums nochmals unterstrichen, und es steht außer Frage, dass Schleiermacher die Dominium-Terrae-Verheißung des Alten Testaments

niemals zu widerlegen versucht hat. Im Gegenteil: Er hat die gnosisnahe Zurückziehung aus der Welt als „Verwirrung“ abgelehnt.⁸⁷

Und wenn trotzdem „die untheilbare Gemeinschaft der Heiligen“⁸⁸ nicht in dieser Welt zu erringen ist, sondern erst als Idealzustand vorstellbar ist, wie Schleiermacher nahelegt, so bleibt einem frommen Gemüte übrig, auf Erden bereits als eminentes Mitgefühl der „Gesellschaft der Zeichen“ zu handeln. Die freie Geselligkeit, deren Ziel die Wechselwirkung aller Teilhaber, und deren Inhalt „das freie Gedankenspiel“ ist, scheint das beste Mittel dazu zu sein.

Giläubistu in die Moderne? Ih giläubu – Ausblick. Aus vielfachen Gründen kann man die Behauptung aufstellen, Schleiermacher habe den „Moderantismus“, den er Leibniz einmal mit unverhüllter Ironie vorzuwerfen wusste, selber auf bestimmte Weise verkörpert: Dazu hat er sich mehr oder weniger methodisch verpflichtet, indem er in seiner als „Organon aller Wissenschaft“ und als „Identität des höchsten und allgemeinsten Wissens“⁸⁹ begriffenen Dialektik darauf beharrte, dass transzendentes und empirisches Wissen korrespondieren, dass es Wissen „sowohl unter der Form des Begriffs als unter der Form des Urtheils“ gibt, und dass zudem beides nicht getrennt werden kann, „da alles Wissen Eines ist, und auch Begriff und Urtheil ihrer Natur nach durch einander bedingt sind.“ So verstand er es als eine logische Pflicht, (scheinbare) Widersprüche zu tilgen, indem er sie als Natur der Sache auslegte. So kann man in fast allen Schriften Schleiermachers die Tendenz dazu ausmachen, hochkomplexe Probleme dialektisch auseinander zu nehmen. Auf diese Weise entstand jene „Doppelpoligkeit“, die von Friedrich Schlegel im Falle der *Reden über die Religion* treffsicher diagnostiziert wurde. Die oft von verschiedenen Kommentatoren hervorgehobene romantische Grundhaltung Schleiermachers besteht unter anderem auch darin, dass er Widersprüche gerne zusammennähte, um den Zwiespalt zu überwinden. Fast möchte man sagen, Schleiermachers Persönlichkeit sei von einem Prediger und einem Weltmann zugleich bewohnt worden: niemals erlosch das Charisma des einen, ehe es in den Charme des anderen übergeschlagen ist. Eigentlich zeugt die von Schlegel hervorgehobene rhetorische Doppelpoligkeit der *Reden über die Religion*, die Rücksicht nehme auf zweierlei Adressaten – einen „irreligiösen“ und einen „religiösen“ – und von daher diesen in „esoterischem“, jenen in „exoterischem“ Ton anspreche⁹⁰, davon, dass kein Zwiespalt überwunden werden kann, solange die ihn konstituierenden Spanningskräfte nicht

zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Denn erst aus der Manifestation dieser Kräfte entsteht die Mitteilung – soviel kann man schon den Gesetzen der Natur ablesen.

Gewiss ist die grundlegend versöhnliche und nach Harmonie und Frieden strebende Natur Schleiermachers – die durch Pseudonyme wie *Pacificus Sincerus*⁹¹ suggeriert wird, und die er selber hätte vermutlich als Praxis des „Irenisierens“⁹² bezeichnet – nicht in allen seiner Texte nachzuweisen, vor allem in den polemischen nicht, deren Pragmatik eine ganz andere und ganz gezielte ist, doch drängt sich aus der Fülle der Indizien die Feststellung auf, dass wenigstens die theoretischen oder theorieträchtigen Schriften von dieser Grundhaltung Schleiermachers zeugen. Ein Paradebeispiel in diesem Sinne ist die Parteinahme für die im Protestantismus teilweise gering geschätzten Glaubenssymbole und symbolischen Bücher, deren Einführung in das Bildungssystem Schleiermacher befürwortete. Das ist, so möchte man glauben, ein implizites Plädoyer für jene Toleranz, die schon in der Dialektik Schleiermachers wurzelt: Wo das Urteil durch den Begriff widerlegt zu sein scheint, muss man das Urteil nicht allein aus diesem Grund schon preisgeben, sondern als lehrreiche Alternative immer mit berücksichtigen. Dass der Begriff „symbolische Bücher“ teilweise bereits wegen der Pluralform, doch vollends durch den Mangel an Ursprünglichkeit die Buchfrömmigkeit des Protestantismus gefährdet, heißt nicht, diese seien völlig irrelevant für die von Wissensdurst erfüllten frommen Menschen. Damit erinnert die Haltung Schleiermachers an Luthers Interesse für die alttestamentlichen Apokryphen, die zwar, so die friedfertige Erklärung, keinerlei dogmatischen Wert für sich beanspruchen könnten, indes schon eine interessante Lektüre versprechen würden: „Apocrypha, das sind Bücher, so der heiligen Schrift nicht gleich gehalten und doch nützlich und gut zu lesen sind.“⁹³

Ich glaube, in dieser Form von Argumentation ein kulturfrommes, da ethisches Verhalten identifizieren zu können, das darin wurzelt, dass Schleiermachers Ethik im Grunde eine „Güterlehre“ ist, „die expliziert, was in der modernen Welt als vernünftig und sittlich gelten kann.“⁹⁴ Insofern ist sie zugleich auch eine Philosophie der modernen Kultur. Denn die Güter, einschließlich des „höchsten“, die die Ethik systematisch beschreibt, sind alle im Grunde als Formen der Weltmittelbarkeit vermöge des menschlichen Tuns und zugleich als Formen der menschlichen Mitteilung zu verstehen, gehört doch „der Mensch der Welt an, die er machen half.“⁹⁵

Staat, Volk, Kunst, Religion – alle sind Teilbereiche der Kultur, also Güter unter Gütern. Wo man das schon weiß und akzeptiert, so muss man, Schleiermachers Auffassungen entsprechend, die Moderne als einen kontinuierlichen Prozess der Freigabe von autonomen Bereichen ansehen, der vorangetrieben werden muss.⁹⁶ Erst das erklärt, warum die religiöse Deutungskultur der Moderne pluralistisch verfasst ist, warum „ethische, ästhetische, personalistische und politische Frömmigkeitstypen [...] heute weitgehend unverbunden nebeneinander“⁹⁷ bestehen können. Diesem Nebeneinander gegenüber hat Schleiermacher schon jene Toleranz gezeigt, die die heutige pluralistische Gesellschaft kennzeichnet: „Auf alle Weise werde das Universum angeschaut und angebetet.“⁹⁸ Dem Volksbegriff selber hat er jene aufgeklärt-protestantische Semantik hinzugefügt, die ihm paradoxerweise das von vielen anderen Denkern umjubelte Moment einer totalen oder vorwurfsfreien Vergesellschaftungsform wegdichtete. Somit wurde auch die Laodizee um eine semantische Dimension angereichert, die sie jedoch in ihren möglichen Exzessen einschränkt.

NOTES

- ¹ So Odo Marquard, *Einheit und Vielheit*, in: Marquard: 1990, S. 8.
- ² Der vielfachen Subjektzuweisung in der Moderne kann man meines Erachtens nur gerecht werden, wenn man über das erkannte Subjekt qua absolutes Ich hinaus und neben einem sich so vielfältig offenbarenden „ganz Anderen“ (Rudolf Otto) noch ein Drittes annimmt, das wie ein kollektives Ich, eine überindividuelle Instanz seinen Ort im Zwischenraum zwischen Geschichtstranszendenz und -machbarkeit hat. Die Subjektwerdung des Volks in der Moderne – vor dem Hintergrund der Territorialisierung und des gesteigerten Klassenbewusstseins noch ausgeprägter als „Nation“ in die Geschichtsannalen eingegangen – ist ein Prozess, dessen metaphysische Vorbereitung mit Kants kategorischem Imperativ geschah und in Hegels Totalitätsdenken gipfelte. Ferner wurde mir die Begriffsprägung „Laodizee“ durch Hans Blumenberg inspiriert, und zwar in Verbindung mit seinen Ausführungen zum Verhältnis von Säkularisation und Theodizee. Den Begriff habe ich dann in Eugen Rosenstock-Huessys FAZ-Artikel aus dem Jahre 1954, *Laodizee. Wie rechtfertigt sich ein Volk?*, gefunden, er hat mir indessen im dortigen Gebrauch nicht eingeleuchtet. Aus diesem Grund habe ich ihn umzubestimmen versucht, so dass ein Idealtypus mit seiner Hilfe angesprochen werden konnte, der sich zu den einzelnen geschichtlichen Phänomenen paradigmatisch verhält.
- ³ Vgl. Kant, I., *Über das Mißlingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodizee* (1791), in: *Gesammelte Schriften*, hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 8, Berlin 1912.
- ⁴ Vgl. Koselleck: 2006, S. 68ff.
- ⁵ Marquard: 1990, S. 6.
- ⁶ Vgl. Blumenberg: 1996, S. 63-72.
- ⁷ Zu dieser Problematik vgl. die Ausführungen von Reinhart Koselleck: 2006, S. 290ff.
- ⁸ Vgl. die im lateinischen Begriff *status* wurzelnde Homonymie, die in den deutschen Prägungen semasiologisch zerlegt wurde: *Staat* bzw. *Stand*.
- ⁹ M. Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1985, S. 190ff.
- ¹⁰ Dufour: 2007, S. 12.
- ¹¹ Ebd., S. 15.
- ¹² Steht schon die wesentliche Frage „Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?“ im Mittelpunkt der Überlegungen Simmels zur Soziologie, so führt sie von der Feststellung des objektiven Bestehens der Gesellschaft unausweichlich zur (beunruhigenden?) Erkenntnis, dass letztere aus lauter Gegensätzen wächst. Vgl. G. Simmel, *Das Problem der Soziologie*, in: GA 11, S. 13-62; dort insbesondere den *Exkurs über das Problem: Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?*, S. 42-61.

- ¹³ Zu den „Sozialreligionen“ rechnet Hans Albert z. B. den Sozialismus und den Nationalismus. Vgl. Hans Albert, *Die Verfassung der Freiheit. Bedingungen der Möglichkeit sozialer Ordnung*, in: Marquard: 1990, S. 254-276, hier S. 274.
- ¹⁴ Zur Bedeutsamkeit der Zahl in jeder Form von Vergesellschaftung vgl. G. Simmel, *Die quantitative Bestimmtheit der Gruppe*, in: Ders., *Soziologie*, GA 11, S. 63ff.
- ¹⁵ Vgl. Leibnizens *Betrachtungen über die Erkenntnis, die Wahrheit und die Ideen* [Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, 1684, dt. von Buchenau/Cassirer], in: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Philosophische Schriften und Briefe, 1683-1687*, hrsg. von Ursula Goldenbaum, Berlin, 1992, S. 28-36. Zwar räumt Leibniz die Möglichkeit einer begrifflich *deutlichen*, analytisch gesteuerten Erkenntnis ein, wenn „die Zerlegung bis zu Ende ausgeführt worden ist“, wobei er nicht ganz weiß, „ob die Menschen davon ein vollkommenes Beispiel geben können“ (S. 30). Dem komme eventuell die „Erkenntnis der Zahlen“ sehr nah. Doch die Erkenntnis *mittels* Zahlen kann ab einem gewissen Niveau zur reinen Unbegrifflichkeit werden, und Leibniz nennt in diesem Zusammenhang das Beispiel des Tausendecks (vgl. ebd.), das nicht die Natur der Sache wiedergibt, sondern als bloßes Zeichen fungiert, denn der Begriff *Tausendeck* ist schier inkommensurabel, obwohl man seines mathematisch nachweisbaren Bestehens gewiss sein kann. Nicht anders ist es um den Volksbegriff bestellt, der mit der Vorstellung der inkommensurablen Zahl unauflöslich verbunden ist.
- ¹⁶ Vgl. Edgar Allan Poe, *The Man of the Crowd*, in: ders., *The Selected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe*, hrsg. von G. R. Thompson, New York, 2004, S. 236.
- ¹⁷ Der gleichen Meinung ist Hans Albert, wenn er hervorhebt: „Im Rahmen soziokosmischer Anschauungen, wie sie für das Weltbild der meisten Hochkulturen charakteristisch sind, ist die Rechtfertigung sozialer Ordnungen ein religiöses Problem, ein Problem der politischen Theologie in einem weiten Sinne dieses Wortes. Der Glaube an die Legitimität der jeweils bestehenden Ordnung ist in einer Wirklichkeitsauffassung verankert, in der numinose Wesenheiten eine zentrale Rolle spielen.“ Hans Albert, a.a.O., S. 255.
- ¹⁸ G. Simmel, *GA*, Bd. 10, S. 81.
- ¹⁹ Zu diesem Unterschied vgl. z. B. Johann Baptist Metz, *Theologie versus Polymythie oder Kleine Apologie des biblischen Monotheismus*, in: Marquard: 1990, S. 170-186. Im Übrigen antizipiert Metz viel von der hier angegangenen Problematik, indem er die postmoderne Polymythie für die ethische Suspension nachgeschichtlichen Zeiterlebens verantwortlich macht. Diese sei nichts anderes als der Ausdruck einer Entschuldigungsstrategie und zugleich „sublimste Form spätmoderner Anthropodizee“, die besagt, dass es „ihn [den Menschen] als schuldfähiges Subjekt gar nicht gibt“. Ebd., S. 174.
- ²⁰ J.- J. Rousseau, *OC III, Du contrat social*. Livre IV. Chap. VIII, S. 511.

- 21 Ebd., Livre II. Chap. XII, S. 394.
- 22 Vgl. Jer 31,33.
- 23 Zum Ursprung dieser Wedung und zur Entwicklung des Volksbegriffs überhaupt vgl. z. B. Philip P. Wiener (Hg.), *The Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, Bd. 4, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1974, S. 497ff.
- 24 Monumenta Germaniae Historica Ep. 4, *Epistolae Karolini Aevi*, hrsg. von E. Dümmler, Berlin, 1895, Brief Nr. 132, S. 199.
- 25 Es handelt sich natürlich auch um Philosophen wie Nietzsche oder Kierkegaard, die „Herdenmoral“ und „Masse als Lüge“ stets denunzierten, aber vor allem um sozialpolitische Theoretiker wie ein Donoso Cortés oder ein Carl Schmitt, deren Werke oft gegen die viele Gefahren in sich bergende Demokratie haderten.
- 26 *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm*, Bd. 26., bearb. von Rudolf Meisner, Nachdruck: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München, 1984, S. 463ff.
- 27 KGA I.2, S. 73f.
- 28 Die meisten angeführten Theoretiker waren Schleiermacher doch nur mittels der Kurzreferate Hufelands bekannt, so dass man sagen kann, dass Schleiermacher in gewisser Hinsicht die Syntheseleistung desselben sich angeeignet hat. Vgl. G. Meckenstock, *Schleiermachers naturrechtliche Überlegungen zur Vertragslehre*, in: SA I.1, S. 142.
- 29 Dilthey: 1966, Bd. I, 1, S. 222.
- 30 Vgl. Scholtz, S. 129 u. 190ff.
- 31 SA I.1, S. 156.
- 32 KGA I.1, S. 56.
- 33 „Schleiermachers Antwort, die sich an Kants Erklärung in dessen damals druckfrischer Schrift *Metaphysische Anfragsgründe der Rechtslehre* orientiert, legt alles Gewicht auf die Intersubjektivität des Vertrags“, SA I.1, S. 148.
- 34 Ebd.
- 35 KGA I.1, S. 57.
- 36 So z. B. müsse die Ehe als ‚Gründungsakt‘ der Familie den geschlechtsspezifischen Gegensatz von Mann und Frau „extinguieren“; der Staat müsse seinerseits den Gegensatz zwischen Regierenden und Regierten aufheben usw. Vgl. Ethik II, in: WA 2, S. 324.
- 37 Vgl. die *Historische Einführung* des Herausgebers, in: KGA, I.2, S. xxxii.
- 38 Ebd.
- 39 GA 10, S. 226.
- 40 Vgl. die Ausführungen zur als Inbegriff der Transzendenzerfahrung verstandenen, am Beispiel des Damaskus-Erlebnisses des Apostels Paulus nachgewiesenen „Entselbung“ bei R. Otto, *Mystische und gläubige Frömmigkeit*, in: *Commemoration volume: the twenty-fifth anniversary of*

- the foundation of the professorship of science of religion in Tokyo Imperial University*, Tokyo, Herald Press, 1934, S. 144.
- 41 KGA I,2, S. 27.
- 42 Vgl. HK, S. 128. Vgl. auch Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 3. Aufl., Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1972, S. 279, der es zum Prinzip der Hermeneutik erhebt: „In diesem Zwischen [zwischen Fremdheit und Vertrautheit] ist der wahre Ort der Hermeneutik“.
- 43 GA 10, S. 356f.
- 44 Nähere Hinweise auf dieses wirkungsgeschichtliche Verhältnis bei Hartmut Kreß, *Schleiermachers Individualitätsgedanke in seinen Auswirkungen auf die Lebensphilosophie Georg Simmels*, in: SA I,2, S. 1243-1266. Da Kreß den intellektuellen Werdegang Simmels als progressive Entwicklung hin zur Lebensphilosophie beschreibt, legt er erwartungsgemäß einen größeren Wert auf den Telos derselben, auf das Individualitätsprinzip. Mir scheint jedoch, dass der zweite Lebensabschnitt Simmels (um das Werk *Die Religion*, 1905) genauso gut für eine ausgeglichene, unvoreingenommen synthetische Schleiermacher-Rezeption stehen kann, in der das Prinzip Individualität und das Prinzip Gemeinschaft einander so bedingen, dass jenes ohne dieses unvorstellbar ist. Erst in *Das individuelle Gesetz* (1913) bedient sich Simmel der Kritik Schleiermachers am kategorischen Imperativ Kants, um seine Ethik der Individualität zu formulieren.
- 45 Vgl. Burghard Gladigow, Friedrich Schleiermacher, in: Axel Michaels, *Klassiker der Religionswissenschaft. Von Friedrich Schleiermacher bis Mircea Eliade*, München 1997, S. 22.
- 46 RüR, S. 194.
- 47 Ebd., S. 193.
- 48 Vgl. die neutestamentlichen Schlüsselstellen, die den Keim der so genannten „paulinischen Sozialmystik in Christus“ bilden: I Kor 10, 16-17 und I Kor 11, 17ff. Vgl. dazu G. Adam, Art. „Abendmahl“, in: Lachmann, Rainer u.a. (Hgg.), *Theologische Schlüsselbegriffe*, Göttingen, 2004, S. 15. Schleiermacher zeigt sich misstrauisch vor allem gegenüber dem abergläubischen Missbrauch des Abendmahls als Zaubermittel, als Heilmittel gegen allerlei Krankheiten usw. Vgl. Brief 686, *An das Armendirektorium*, in: KGA V, 3, 173. Allerdings ließen sich zum Verhältnis Schleiermachers zu Paulus noch viele weitere Aspekte untersuchen, die ganz im Gegenteil die Affinität des neuzeitlichen Theologen zum Apostel belegen; dieser muss wohl unter allen Aposteln Schleiermacher am nächsten gewesen sein, wie Fr. Lücke mit Recht betonte: „Unter den neutestam[en]t[lichen]. Schriftstellern stand seiner Eigenthümlichkeit keiner näher, als Paulus [...]; und indem er in Paulus mehr sich selbst, als den Paulus in sich sieht, begegnet es ihm, daß er bei allem Scharfsinne und der fast zauberischen Gewalt seiner exegetischen Argumentation und Darstellung, [...] mehr sich auslegt, als

den Apostel.“ (Fr. Lücke, *Erinnerungen*, zitiert nach: Hermann Patsch und Dirk Schmid, *Einleitung des Herausgebers*, in: KGA I/8, xlvii.) Das heißt aber keineswegs, dass Schleiermacher die tradierten paulinischen Schriften nicht kritisch untersucht hätte. Bekannt sind vor allem seine Einwände gegen die Echtheit bestimmter Passus im ersten Timotheus-Brief, in dem er Spuren von Deutero-Paulinismus ausmachen konnte: vgl. Hermann Patsch, *The Fear of Deutero-Paulinism: The Reception of Friedrich Schleiermacher's „Critical Open Letter“ Concerning 1 Timothy*, engl. Übersetzung von Darrell J. Doughy, *Jornal for Higher Critical Studies*, 6/1, 1991, S. 3-31. Über den wissenschaftlichen Ehrgeiz hinaus, der Schleiermacher dazu bewegen konnte, den „echten“ Paulus philologisch zu filtern, muss es aber auch wahlverwandtschaftliche Beweggründe gegeben haben, die in seiner Paulus-Rezeption eine Rolle gespielt haben.

49 KGA II.10, 2, S. 101.

50 KGA I.7, 1, S. 129.

51 RürR, S. 135 u. 142.

52 WA 1, S. 490.

53 WA 1, S. 490.

54 Ebd., S. 488.

55 Vgl. RürR, S. 183.

56 Vgl. GA 11, S. 48: „Wir alle sind Fragmente, nicht nur der Allgemeinheit, sondern auch unser selbst.“

57 GA 15, S. 141 u. 150.

58 Zum Teil erklärt sich die zentrale Rolle der Mitteilung in der Philosophie Schleiermachers auch aus der psychischen Veranlagung des Philosophen heraus. Es kann nicht von ungefähr sein, dass ein beträchtlicher Teil der wichtigsten Werke Schleiermachers als Reden, Vorlesungen, Predigten und Briefe entstanden sind, also als typische Mitteilungsformen, die immer auch ein physisches Gegenüber, einen leibhaftigen Empfänger voraussetzen. Andererseits kann man nicht davon absehen, dass Schleiermacher in einer eminenten Kultur der Mitteilung aufgewaschen ist. Vgl. dazu Thouard, D., *Schleiermacher. Communauté, individualité, communication*, Paris 2007.

59 KGA I.2, S. X.

60 M. Luther, *Von beider Gestalt des Sakraments*, zitiert nach G. Ebeling, *Luther und Schleiermacher*; In: SA, I,1, S. 33.

61 Dass zwischen einem Verhaltenskodex der Kälte und der so genannten Sachlichkeit im Umgang mit dem Anderen tiefe Zusammenhänge bestehen, hat nicht zuletzt Helmut Lethen gezeigt. Vgl. Helmut Lethen, *Verhaltenslehren der Kälte. Lebensversuche zwischen den Kriegen*, Frankfurt am Main 1994. Auch hinter der „Gastfreiheit“, sobald sie ritualisiert erscheint und insofern „sachlich“ zu erledigen ist, verbirgt sich das Risiko des Rückfalls in eine geistlose Kälte. Vielleicht aus diesem Grund riet Simmel von jeglichem sachlichen Gespräch ab, will man, dass Geselligkeit gelinge. Vgl. G. Simmel,

- Soziologie der Geselligkeit*, in: Ders., *Soziologische Ästhetik*, hrsg. von Klaus Lichtblau, Darmstadt 1998, S. 192 u. 200f.
- 62 Schleiermacher, F. E. D., *Predigten über den christlichen Hausstand. VIII. Über die christliche Gastfreundschaft*, in: *Predigten von Friedrich Schleiermacher*, Bd. 1, Berlin 1843, 645-656, hier S. 649 und 651.
- 63 So schrieb der Arzt Heinrich Nelson, um nur ein Beispiel zu geben, im Jahre 1937: „Wir betrachten den Menschen heute nicht mehr als Einzelnen. Mehr als der Einzelne gilt das Ganze, mehr als das persönliche Behagen der Dienst an der Volksgemeinschaft!“ Zitiert nach Rebecca Schwach, „*Volksgesundheit*“ im *Nationalsozialismus*, in: Sigrid Stöckel, Ulla Walter (Hgg.), *Prävention im 20. Jahrhundert. Historische Grundlagen und aktuelle Entwicklungen in Deutschland*, Weinheim 2002, S. 137.
- 64 WA 4, S. 540.
- 65 Vgl. dazu Christian Sinn, *Soziologie der Unbegrifflichkeit: Schleiermacher, Simmel, Luhmann*, in: Almut Todorow/ Ulrike Landfester/ Christian Sinn (Hgg.), *Unbegrifflichkeit: ein Paradigma der Moderne*, 2004, S. 17-32 hier S. 31.
- 66 KGA I/14, S. 299.
- 67 WA 4, S. 613.
- 68 WA 1, S. 452.
- 69 Ebd., S. 616.
- 70 Ebd., S. 445-494.
- 71 Ebd., S. 463.
- 72 Ebd., S. 464.
- 73 Vgl. Ebd., S. 472.
- 74 Ebd., S. 484.
- 75 KGA I/7, 2, S. 192.
- 76 KGA I.2, S. 169.
- 77 Als Zögling der Herrhuter in Niesky muss er sich „ein wenig einsam“ gefühlt haben. Auch war er von der „Tristesse der Landschaft“ bedrückt. Vgl. Nowak: 2002, S. 24ff. Die „Geburtstunde seiner Freiheit“ nannte Schleiermacher seinen Bruch mit den Herrhutern. Vgl. ebd., S. 32.
- 78 Vgl. Otto Wullschlegers Aufsatz *Schleiermacher als Theologe der Selbstliebe*, in: SA I.2, S. 252-261, in dem insbesondere die *Monologen* als eindeutiges Psychogramm behandelt werden.
- 79 Vgl. die ironische Aussage Isaak Rusts, der die *Reden* rezensiert hatte: „Schleiermacherus enim, qui de se ipse loquitur, se ab incunabulis pietate imbutum est, narrat.“, in: KGA I, 10, S. 549.
- 80 So eine Randbemerkung, die Schleiermacher im Buch Rusts, *De nonnullis quae in theologia nostrae aetatis dogmatica desiderantur*, Erlangen 1828, machte.
- 81 Vgl. RÜR, S. 142ff.

- 82 KGA I.2, S. 144.
83 Ebd.
84 KGA I, 10, S. 551.
85 KGA I, 8, S. 204f.
86 *Kleiner Katechismus*, II, 1, in: *Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche* (BSLK), hrsg. im Gedenkjahr der Augsburgischen Konfession 1930, 11. Aufl., Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992.
87 Zur kosmistischen Einstellung Schleiermachers vgl. z. B. Hans-Georg Fritzsche, *Schleiermacher zur biblischen Dominium-Terrae-Verheißung*, in: SA I.2, S. 687-697.
88 RüR, S. 194.
89 KGA II.10.2, S. 7f.
90 Vgl. KGA I, 2, S. Ixviii.
91 Vgl. die polemische Schrift *Über das liturgische Recht evangelischer Landesfürsten*, in: KGA I.9, S. 211ff., die Schleiermacher mit dem völlig unironisch gemeinten Decknamen Pacificus Sincerus unterschreibt. Übrigens ist das Schriftstück nur „ein theologisches Bedenken“ – wie dem Untertitel zu entnehmen ist –, kein politisches Pamphlet. Intentionalpoetisch sind nicht einmal Spuren von Selbstironie auszumachen.
92 Wenn Schleiermacher meint, Leibniz *irenisiere* „schon als Student“ und wolle „Plato und Aristoteles vereinigen“ (KGA, I.2, S. 78), so ist das ein früher Beleg dafür, dass das intellektuelle Reifwerden Schleiermachers zuweilen auch Aneignung des vorher Verneinten bedeutete, und der Gegenstand der Kritik ihm oft zum Vorbild wurde.
93 Zitiert nach Georg Wilhelm Hopf, *Würdigung der Lutherschen Bibelverdeutschung mit Rücksicht auf ältere und neuere Übersetzungen*, von Schrag, Nürnberg, 1847, S. 70.
94 So Scholtz: 1995, S. 10.
95 WA 4, S. 443.
96 Vgl. Scholtz S. 36 f.
97 So Ulrich Barth, *Religion in der Moderne*, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 2003, S. 38.
98 RüR, S. 193.

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DOES “POLITICAL THEOLOGY” EXPLAIN THE FORMATION OF ORTHODOXY?

Political theology

It was largely believed that the perfect blend of Christianity and empire was once and forever offered in the refined recipe of Eusebius of Caesarea for his imperial patron, Constantine.¹ Modern scholarship instead has described the encounter between pagan Rome – or not yet Christian Constantinople – and the religion of Christ as a complex and quite long process,² stretching well over 300 years since the presumed founder of the Christian empire. A major role has been ascribed to imperial agency, and rightly so.

But whose religion did the emperor actually promote? It would be easy game and probably false to denounce the emperor’s, Constantine’s for example, cynical use of Christianity, but we are equally critical of accepting pious stories. Whatever the starting point, empire and Christianity grew together for a long time and imperceptibly, maybe unwillingly, twisted each other.

Inside the broader frame of Christianity it is this twist that called for the term *political theology*. Basically we may infer that it took several generations of Christians in power to work on a blend of Christianity and empire. Eusebius of Caesarea is only one stance; another, opposed stance is that of Ambrose and Gelasius. If some of Eusebius’ ideas were to become common knowledge and belief it is because they might have belonged to a more general sentiment of Christian leadership, as long as direct proof of a wide readership and influence of the *Vita Constantini* is lacking.³

Describing this process we need first to take account of a great juridical-historical debate of the 20th century, that concerning the notion of “political theology”. Carl Schmitt described through this notion the secularization of theological concepts as modern juridical terminology of sovereignty.⁴ Erik Peterson understood the concept of political theology

as any convergence of political theory and religion. Thus, with historical erudition, he tried to respond to Carl Schmitt, by showing that monarchist forms of Christianity, like Arianism, favored the monarchical development of the empire, meanwhile Trinitarian Christianity slowed down the process. Taking Eusebius of Caesarea as starting point, he threw, as a good catholic theologian, the whole responsibility of political theology on non-orthodox Christianity.⁵ In a further stage of the evolution of the concept, Ernst Kantorowicz uncovered how political theology emerged from medieval to early modern times, in his famous *The King's two Bodies*. He described a long historical process by which a medieval system of mystical representations, Christ's double nature, penetrated the legal thought of the early modern State and nourished a whole range of politico-juridical concepts.⁶ Kantorowicz's starting point was an 11th century treaty about the "twinned" or "mixed" nature of Kingship, known as the Norman Anonymous.⁷ Recently, Alain Boureau unveiled the particular intellectual process by which the modern State emerged as a subject of political reflection in the scholastic period (1200-1350). In his subtle analysis he shows that scholastic writers, starting with a reflection on the human condition, on Paradise, sin and redemption, came to postulate the existence of two types of community: one called salvation community, where the intention is to guide the individual soul towards salvation, the other called survival community, where the aim is to assure the continuance of a given community. Each of these communities responded to a particular logic and permitted an organization according to its own goal. The Nation State as we experienced it in the 20th century is a consequence of the emergence of the survival community in the late middle ages. He called that phenomenon *La religion de l'Etat*.⁸

For Boureau the process is specific to late medieval and early modern Western Europe and is the starting point of the secularization of political concepts. Religious thought is thus at the origin of the modern State, *l'Etat républicain*, but the development of this intellectual process steps out of the proper sphere of religion. If Alain Boureau is right, there is no "political theology" possible before scholasticism.

It is common sense to say that pre-modern political organization required a certain degree of religious involvement, anthropologists and historians of religion had been working on such aspects since a century.⁹ But what we have to describe for late antiquity should be then exactly the opposite phenomenon of "political theology". It is not a secularization of political power, but it is its sacralization. Erik Peterson misunderstood

the thought of Carl Schmitt,¹⁰ but asked a good historian's question: did Christianity boost the monarchical development of Rome? What kind of Christianity was it and why? His answer implies precisely the distinction between orthodoxy and heresy.

To attempt an answer to Erik Peterson's question I would like to inquire how much does our view of orthodoxy, heresy and schism owe to the real or ascribed role of imperial agency in the formation of Christianity.

Two major themes in recent scholarship might help us clear up the picture of the opening ages of imperial Christianity.

First is the already introduced concept of "political theology", but only, in my view, to deny its applicability to late antiquity. In fact, we should suppose that recent authors used the concept not by reference to its intellectual origin, but rather to name a general convergence between Christian religion and Roman power.¹¹ In this sense, political theology stands exactly for its opposite, political religion or civil religion, that philosophic and/or religious system which assures the cohesion of society, legitimizes its power and assures the functioning of a governing class. What made Erik Peterson apply "political theology" to the 4th century is the fact that the official religion of the Roman Empire changed, paganism was dropped and Christianity adopted. But here again we will have to weigh how much of pagan thought was abandoned and how much of Christianity was adopted and also to what pace.

Second is the more recent trend to abandon a narrative of the glorious march of Orthodoxy through the threats of heretical and schismatic enemies and to engage into a more neutral account of "orthodoxies/heresies", that is of strongly defended opinions about the true faith.¹²

In this perspective I will try to identify the role of strongly committed communities, instead of considering largely Christianity as an actor. These communities may develop particular features but in an acknowledged connection to the rest of Christianity, or fall into parochialism and antagonistic definition of their faith. For the first case I would refer to, for example, the distinction between Pauline and Johannine communities in the early stages, or for a later period the accepted liturgical differences of local communities (until the *Trullanum*, when such differences became unacceptable, a phenomenon which we will describe later). The antagonistic development would be represented for the fourth century by the Donatist schism in Africa. Another aspect of such layers of Christianity, specific of the 4th century, is the ability of such groups to rise to central

relevance to Christian communities through the interaction with imperial power; they turn eventually into a social stratum of religious identification, as was Arianism, eventually a choice of the Germanic military aristocracy. Our conceptual tool borrows some essence from Peter Brown's "micro-Christendom",¹³ although he applied it to 7th and 8th century politically separated spaces of the once united imperial Christian *oikoumenè*. Another eloquent example which calls for a concept like "micro-Christendom" is the situation in Constantinople itself during most of the 4th century, where communities were formed around several bishops: the bishop Paul, identified by ecclesiastical historians as continuator of the orthodox nicaean community, the bishop Makedonios, and the officially appointed bishops Eusebius of Nicomedia and later Eudoxius and Demophile, the latter celebrating in Saint Irene or Saint Sophia.

Inside the late antique puzzle of Christendoms we may find an "imperial Church", which should not be taken as the institutional reality of the Church within the empire. The imperial Church, situated at the encounter between empire and Christianity, is usually embodied in a group/class of influential bishops, devout aristocrats and their followers, of whom particularly the court clergy, able to interconnect politically and intellectually the world of Christian worship with that of imperial agency. Through their individual authority, their social and political action, those men rose to prominent partners of imperial government and thus controlled for a span of time the imperial stand on Church matters. Such is the case of some Arian bishops (Eusebius of Nicomedia,¹⁴ Eusebius of Caesarea), but also partially of Athanasius, later of the Cappadocian bishops (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianze, Gregory of Nyssa), of Ambrose, of Cyril of Alexandria or of Nestorius of Constantinople. But already Constantine the Great formalized such an imperial Church by his practice to gather bishops at his court, and to entrust them on the one hand with instructing him on divine matters, as stated in the *Vita Constantini*,¹⁵ on the other hand with responding to the appeals of provincial ecclesiastics to his court. These bishops formed eventually a permanent synod (*endemousa*). The ecclesiological canons established in the years of Constantine, responded cautiously to this reality.¹⁶ Athanasius's trial in 335 illustrates the phenomenon: first Athanasius challenged his deposition by the council of Tyre, and applied immediately to imperial justice. In his turn, Constantine gathered the court bishops, who confirmed the deposition of Athanasius by the Tyre council and denounced him for revolt against imperial authority (the alleged threat expressed by Athanasius that he

could stop the export of grain from Alexandria to Constantinople). On such political ground, the emperor extended the canonical judgment to a political trial and sentenced Athanasius to exile.¹⁷

The two themes, civil religion and religious orthodoxy, relate strongly to each other as they allow us finally asking the question whether there is any conscious ideological choice in favor of one or the other variants of Christianity. It amounts to put to test the theory of Erik Peterson, that Arian theology did favor the exaltation of the imperial power?

And if such an alliance between Arianism and cult of the emperor existed, could we follow the ideological struggle down to the first manifestations of Christian art? Is there an anti-Arian and anti-imperial stand in this 4th century art, as Thomas Mathews in his *Clash of Gods* would like to have it?¹⁸ Our questioning could go a step further: may we speak about ideology in the 19th century's sense in the 4th century?

From the “God-Man” to the “Man-God”

The 4th and 5th centuries witness within Christianity the thorough debate first over the divinity of Christ and later over the relation between divinity and humanity in the person of Christ. The “God-Man” formula stands for the first debate, the “Man-God” formula stands for the second debate. In the shift from the “God-Man” to the “Man-God” formulas although the debate concerns the first element of the equation, emphasize falls each time on the second term. The interest of this construction is to integrate theological debate with public perception of Christianity as it is shown by representations of that divinity. In earlier periods of Christianity the incarnation was understood as a God who took human shape to act, moved by compassion, among his worshipers. In later periods the thinking over divino-humanity meant to highlight that humanity was elevated to the dignity of receiving the uncreated God in the created flesh. Divino-humanity, as it is understood by the 4th century Church Fathers, is the common destiny of mankind. Christ was a forerunner of His flock. His human nature clothed divine nature in order to open divinity to the whole of mankind, best expressed by St. Athanasius of Alexandria in the lapidary formula: “For the Son of God became man so that we might become God” (*De inc.*, 54, 3: PG, 192B).

In order to establish the divino-human problematic it was natural chronologically to open first the debate over the divinity of Christ. This

is the period dominated by the “God-Man” equation. Was Christ a God like so many pagan gods who visited the mortals taking the shape of a mortal occasionally? A positive answer to this question means that the humanity of Christ was only an illusion, which is the docetist stand on the problem. The principle of the radically transcendent character of God was saved by this view. But this opinion remained marginal. If the God of the Christians was supposed to be completely transcendent and Christ, His Son, needed to be truly human, then, the Son must have been only an early spiritual creation of the transcendent Father. Such was the conclusion of Arius: Christ as subordinated, lower rank divinity. Arius’s theology of the Sophia, Wisdom of God, answers positively this alternative and thus keeps the line with the Old Testament unknowable God. How did the immediate, experienced reality of Jesus of Nazareth, narrated in the Gospels, relate to God?

A few generations later, when the full and co-eternal divinity of the Son became article of faith for a good part of the Christians (basically after the confirmation of Nicaea at Constantinople in 381), the incarnation rose to a more confusing debate. The full presence of humanity in God was the object of struggle with non-chalcedonian (mono- or miaphysitism, monoenergism, monotheletism) theology until the late 7th century. This follows the “Man-God” equation.

The images of Christ follow closely this theological evolution and make it obvious. In His early images, in the catacombs and on the sarcophagi, two themes are predominant: Christ as philosopher sitting amidst his disciples or as “magician” performing his miracles. These images, without being necessarily produced or sponsored by non-orthodox communities, correspond to the intellectual development of the God-Man phase. As Thomas Mathews put it, the late 3rd and 4th century images of Christ represent him as a “grass-roots god”, ready to teach and to console his followers. Closer he shows himself to mankind, less he seems integrated into divinity.¹⁹

At the end of the 4th and the beginning of the 5th century appear the first representations of Christ on the vault of the apses. The chronological coincidence with the Theodosian restoration of Orthodoxy and the opening of the new Man-God phase of the debate, allow us to postulate an association between the two. The Apse images are clearly dedicated to the other dimension of the Christ, the divinity. The 5th century apse-mosaic at Hosios David in Thessaloniki makes a clear reference to the vision of the glory of God as Christ in the Book of Ezekiel. The other scriptural

sources of inspiration for the emphasis of divinity in Christ are the Heavenly Jerusalem images, like in Santa Pudenziana, and the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor, like in the Sinai monastery. The new concern of Christians was to point to the fact that the incarnated historical figure is precisely the transcendent divinity of the Old Testament made visible in painting as it was made comprehensible through visions to the prophets of the past and to the apostles in the Transfiguration or in the encounters after the resurrection, particularly the scene of the Ascension of Christ.

The sixth century solution was a visual Chalcedon. What we see in the icon is indeed the historical human figure of Jesus of Nazareth. Only in its fleshly apparition divinity dwells completely. "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father" (John 14:9) applies to the early icons as follows: who sees this human form of Christ sees its divine being as part of His unique hypostasis. For a moment of hesitation before the final merger of the Christ Human and Christ God we see the double images of Christ in the mosaics of San Vitale in Ravenna: Christ Emmanuel in the apse and Christ teacher on the vault in front of the apse.²⁰

Christ is mediator not as a subordinate God, but as a man, was the nicaean answer to Arius, as it was formulated by the Antiochene school. The Arian controversy created the necessity of a proper expression of the relation between humanity and divinity in Jesus Christ. Once again several coincidences make it clear that theological debate may enter the domain of artistic expression. In the chapter Thomas Mathews dedicates to the "female" traits of Christ in several of his 4th to 6th century images he concludes on one hand to a continuation of pagan traditions of hermaphrodite gods on the other hand to theological motivation for this sexual indistinctiveness of Christ. Although he does not point in that direction, but prefers to quote Gnostic texts, we may raise the question of the incarnate Wisdom of God, a theological synonym for the Logos. The term belonged to Arius' vocabulary but was skillfully transformed by Athanasius into an instrument against Arius.

"And yet these, whereas God is called and is a Fountain of wisdom, dare to insult Him as barren and void of His proper Wisdom. But their doctrine is false; truth witnessing that God is the eternal Fountain of His proper Wisdom; and, if the Fountain be eternal, the Wisdom also needs be eternal."²¹

And this Wisdom is the Word, and by Him, as John says, "all things were made", and "without Him not one thing was made" (John 1, 3). And this Word is Christ."²²

The identification of the Wisdom with the Word, in Athanasius' Discourses against the Arians, written about 356 to 360, could be the starting point not only of a particular cult of Christ, but also the inspiration for an image of the divinity of Christ.²³ The question is of interest as the Hagia Sophia is obviously the preferred theme of imperial church buildings in Constantinople and Thessaloniki in the 4th and 5th centuries. The fact that the church of the Holy Wisdom in Constantinople, eventually the cathedral of Constantinople, inaugurated in 360, may have received its name in the years after Athanasius' Discourses or maybe later in the fourth century, but certainly not earlier, in vicinity to a church dedicated to the Peace of God, Hagia Eirini, adds some weight to our hypothesis.

The representation of the Theotokos in the sanctuary apses starting with the sixth century also answers this concern for the Incarnation of the Logos. The apse does not reveal anymore an invisible God, made understandable through concepts and in visions, but the origin of His visibility, the birth through a Virgin.

For Dionysius and Maximus, the Incarnation is a model for the union of the soul with God and the liturgy is the ascension of the soul to this unity.²⁴

Christianity as civil religion

Within the religious turmoil of the 4th century, political thinkers like Eusebius of Caesarea, Themistius, Libanius or Synesius built a system, inspired by a variety of sources, neo-platonic predominantly, that best fitted the political challenges of an overextended and complex empire. Out of the four authors, one is Christian, suspected of Arianism, one is a half-hearted Christian and more a highly cultivated roman aristocrat, Synesius, and the other two are pagans. Their writings converge towards an exaltation of imperial power, but they are far from representing something like an official political doctrine. Particularly for Eusebius, whose political theory drew on the Old Testament, and thus best rooted in Christian thought, there is no evidence that his *Vita Constantini* played the role of an official theory. On the contrary, a legendary Constantine, baptized in

Rome at the beginning of his engagement in favor of Christianity, produced in the fifth century, seemed more useful to a Christian empire than the political content of Eusebius's work.

Despite the Hellenistic framework of state-building, the imperial religion within the growing Christian context took a path of strong personalization. We may find emperors whose footprints marked the route, but no coherent construction. It is rather the story of a repeatedly renewed but difficult ceasefire between the worldly empire, so hated by the first Christians, and the Kingdom of God, so constantly distrusted and mocked since Pilate of Pontus.

If there was any strategy in the choice of Christianity by Constantine, the big issue with which he was confronted was the absence of a unified doctrine. The Arian controversy came to prove this. Despite the image created by Eusebius of Caesarea, of Constantine as equal to the Apostles and bishop, the 4th century emperors did not achieve to control the doctrinal evolution of the Church in the 4th century.

Timothy Barnes observed that for the 4th century there are three situations of conciliar gatherings from the point of view of their relation to political power:

- councils convened of the bishops' initiative, where no imperial agenda had influenced the debate on ecclesiastical matters,
- councils convened by the emperor, but without any imperial agenda (Nicaea),
- and councils convened by the emperor in order to respond to an imperial demand (the most obvious example would be the councils of Ariminum (Rimini) and Seleucia convoked simultaneously in 359 to approve of the creed signed by Constantius in Sirmium).²⁵

At Nicaea, Constantine just presided over the opening of the council, assisted at some of the meetings, but did not participate in the debates. Despite several direct interventions of the successors of Constantine, his attitude became an official image for a century: a holding back of the emperor when it came to participate in or to moderate the debate of the bishops. This Constantinian initial attitude was confirmed by the Letter sent to the council of Ephesus in 431 by the absent rulers Theodosius II and Valentinian III, concerning the supervision of comes Candidianus:

“Because it is necessary to provide properly for your most sacred synod's suitable discipline and quiet by supervision, we have not disregarded this, so that by this means calm may be guarded from every quarter. And we

have been persuaded that your Godlinesses need no external aid to provide peace for this and other matters. But not to overlook this also pertains to our harmonious provision concerning piety."²⁶

The emperors explained to the bishops that they had instructed the comes Candidianus to join the

“sacred synod but take no part whatsoever in the inquiries and proposals which would be made there on the subject of the dogmas, (for it is not lawful for a person not belonging to the list of holy bishops to mingle in the discussion of ecclesiastical matters), but by every means to remove from the said city the laics and the monks, both those who have foregathered on this account and those who are about to assemble... and to provide that no discord from antipathy should be extended further.”²⁷

After the council of Chalcedon we meet on the contrary with a long range of imperial legislation on dogmatic matter: the *Enkyklion* of Basiliskos, 476, the *Henotikon* of Zeno, 482, Justinian’s ‘Three Chapters’ and his legislation against the theopaschites and the Origenists; the *Ekthesis* of Heraklios in 638, launching the formula of the “single will” and the *Typos* of Constans II, in 648. The variation of imperial attitude towards the councils has immediate contextual explanation, but the basic concern of the emperor, as it appears to be already the concern of Constantine, depicted by Eusebius, is to pacify and unify the Church on a minimal basis, on a compromise. Such is the primary concern of the imperial Church. Notably, already in Constantine’s edict against heretics, reported by Eusebius, only ancient, resilient and strongly divergent heretical communities are mentioned and outlawed, but recent splinters like Donatists, Meletians and Arians are not. For the Non-Chalcedonians it took more than a century to come to a parallel ecclesiastical organization. And they did it only when they realized that their choice in matter of faith had little chance to become the ruling truth in Constantinople. These contesting but not yet excluded or auto-excluded communities are strata of “micro-Christendoms” which from the emperor’s point of view belong to the Church of the empire.

Theodosius asked Ambrose to teach him the true religion, tells us Theodoret in his *Ecclesiastical History*, and by unveiling the opposition between the Constantinopolitan, i.e. oriental, practice of the emperor

staying in the sanctuary during liturgy on the one hand and the “western” righteousness of Ambrose, who expels the emperor from the sanctuary and explains the difference between priesthood and emperorship, on the other, he announced a recurrent debate on the sacerdotal status of the emperor. How close is the emperor allowed to come to the sanctuary and to the performance of priestly gestures? Was it the Arians who dominated the Churches in Constantinople, who allowed the emperor to sit in the sanctuary? The consecration of Hagia Sophia in 360 by the Arian bishop Eudoxius at the will of Constantius allows us to think so. But with the emperor Theodosius Western orthodoxy prevailed. Why was an emperor ready to give up imperial privileges only to comply with orthodoxy? The lesson learned by Theodosius the Elder was applied by Theodosius the Younger in his novel that forbids the emperor to enter the church accompanied by his retinue.²⁸ As Theodoret’s story goes, Theodosius learned the difference between priesthood and emperorship the hard way, through public confrontation with the orthodox bishop Ambrose.²⁹ In this case the imperial Church had to comply with Ambrose’s “micro Christendom”.

The epoch after the council of Chalcedon inaugurates another imperial attitude towards Christianity, in which the emperor dictates “truth” within the borders of a smaller empire. Justinian illustrates the climax of this new stand on the issue. He believed that it was the emperor’s role to teach God’s laws, to formulate the truth of the Church, as in the Three Chapters. Justinian’s approach to the sphere of ecclesiastic matters follows the path of a central and active role of the emperor within the Christian religion (e.g. Justinian’s Novella nr. 6). It is the moment when the Latin *Acta Silvestri*, translated into Greek merge with the Constantinian legend. Agapetus’ *Advisory Chapters* to the emperor Justinian attest that some simple ideas of Hellenistic monarchy found a Christianized vocabulary. Justinian can easily be credited with initiative in the definition of his religious role. But such overtones Justinian introduces need no theory, but only fine-tuned gestures. Despite the theodosian edict against the presence of the armed retinue of the emperor in the church, Justinian can be seen, in San Vitale in Ravenna, entering the church with his retinue, fully armed soldiers, the *doryphoroi*, as they are mentioned in the Cherubic hymn.³⁰ Nevertheless it was not just a neglect of an old edict; it meant rather for the emperor to assume a new symbolic role within the liturgy, that of living icon of Christ, in which case the soldiers played the role of angelic hosts. But once again, the prominent role Justinian assumed as emperor did not

become a standard. At the end of the seventh century the emperor was supposed to depose his *regalia* and quit his retinue when entering the church (Constantine IV in San Appolinare in Classe). According to the council *in Trullo* the emperor's access to the sanctuary was an exception admitted for the imperial majesty, in that particular case when he was bringing his gifts to the altar (canon 69).

Heraclius's reign is no less prominent in this reformulation of the imperial religion by his assumption of the title *basileus* and the innovations in the coronation ritual.³¹ The most important theological implication in the definition of imperial power that occurred in the reign of Heraclius was the full assimilation of the Christian Roman emperors to the kings of Israel. At times "Christian History" perfectly overlapped with Roman Empire in the most genuine way, as we can read in George of Pisidia or in the Homily on the 626 siege of Constantinople by Theodore Synkellos. But at other times, no less significant, Christians were at odds with imperial Christianity or liked to make us believe that they were so. Such were the answers of Maximus Confessor to his imperial interrogators.³²

The present study also joins in another historiographic debate, concerning the rhythm of change from a pagan to a Christian society. Since the 1970's the study of late antiquity has tended to play down the shock of Christianization and barbarization of the empire and to describe a progressive social, political and cultural transformation from the antique to the medieval forms of society. After the opening of the debate in French historiography by Henri-Irénée Marrou,³³ Peter Brown was considered the champion of this methodological approach to a period that he stretches from Marc Aurelius to Charlemagne.³⁴ His determining contribution was to close the eighteenth century rhetoric of decline and fall (Montesquieu, Gibbon), in which Christianity played the role of interior enemy.³⁵ My contribution to this debate would be to emphasize that Christianity is not directly and genuinely responsible for the political change in the Roman Empire; that the changes we observe from the late third to the sixth century owe as much to the Hellenization of the empire and to the social and political context as to its Christianization. There is in fact no coherent Christian doctrine on Roman imperial monarchy, and the attitudes are bouncing back and forth from one author to the other, from one emperor to the other. There is no linear "progress" within this movement. Christianity in the fourth century is not a starting point for the

monarchical transformation of the empire; the phenomenon becomes visible only by the modern historian's capacity to know the outcome.

It was once considered common knowledge that the monarchic structure of the Later Roman Empire resulted from the blend of Hellenistic political philosophy, Roman legal thought and Christian faith.³⁶ Nevertheless the blending itself was a weary process, with successive layers of the different ingredients. By uncovering the chronology and dynamics of the process which brought into existence the ideal image described by Herbert Hunger as "Reich der neuen Mitte"³⁷ we may discover how much this construction depended on immediate context.

Genuinely Christian acceptance of Roman imperial government lies in those references in Matthew 22, 21 "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's", Romans 13, 1-6 "Every person must submit to the supreme authorities. [...] The authorities are in God's service and to these duties they devote their energies", I Peter 2, 13-17: "Submit yourselves to every human institution for the sake of the Lord, whether to the sovereign as supreme, or to the governor as his deputy for the punishment of criminals and the commendation of those who do right. [...] reverence to God, honour to the sovereign". These texts described a world of submission to temporal powers and in as much as possible harmonious relation to the pagan environment in hope of the timely relief through the Parousia; meanwhile the Apocalypse of John, expressing another type of political experience by Christians, depicts a full-blown conflict with "forces of evil", a straight denunciation of worldly power. These references announce the two extreme positions of the Christians as to power; both came to be strongly expressed in the 4th to 6th centuries.

Erik Peterson answered his question, whether Christianity strengthened the monarchical character of the late Roman world by its doctrinal content, by distinguishing between a heretical Christianity, guilty of political theology, and an orthodox one, which opposed it. But all the dogmatic struggles were won momentarily by imperial support. Usually historians call the outcomes of such struggles with the alternative orthodoxy/heresy, but we may equally see them as a succession of orthodoxies from the point of view of the imperial church. Monarchy in its late antique forms may also find another explanation, which brings back on the stage Themistios and Libanios, emphasizing that Christian thought just followed a trend better rooted in its Hellenistic ground³⁸ and responded to challenges coming from its Eastern borders.³⁹

To Peterson's heresy/orthodoxy distinction we have to add the more classical distinction East/West and raise the following questions: is there a Western appetite for independence of the Church versus an Eastern tendency to submission? Or was it only the mere proximity and solid structure of Roman power in Constantinople that determined the Eastern specificity?

From Constantine to Heraclius, a series of clashes between ecclesiastical authorities and political power, dramatic reconfigurations of the political landscape in late antiquity, such as the fall and loss of the Western half of the empire or later the military and political shock of the war with Persia and the rise of Islam, created a corpus of narratives which eventually turned into doctrinal content. Precedents and traditions built up a fragile but functional "constitutional" thought in Byzantium.⁴⁰ Each historical challenge was the opportunity to rethink the Christian character of imperial power. It is hard to draw the line between an imperial and Constantinopolitan production of Christian political doctrine, Heraclius' assumption of the title *basileia*, for example, and an ongoing Christian attitude of distrust towards power, expressed in fact in peripheral circles, whether geographic (Rome and its sense of independence), or spiritual (the monastic desert) and to say when did one or the other prevail.

Taking another path and a later period than in Peterson's argumentation, we might however reach the conclusion that in Constantinople *any attempt to sacralize power* encounters a renewed concern for orthodoxy. Each Church council of the 5th and 6th centuries, that assumes the task of religious reconciliation, opens and concludes with acclamations of the emperor. Where the theologian legitimately sees at work the hand of the Holy Spirit, the historian sees events and circumstances, for which he has no alternative, as much as counterfactual history is bad history.

It is only at the very end of the seventh century that a text in an official document describes the emperor in his religious role.

Orthodoxy, Orthopraxy and Civil Religion: the *Trullanum* (691-692)

Only ten years after the sixth ecumenical council the emperor Justinian II summoned the bishops of the empire for a new one. This council came to be known as *in Trullo*, the one which took place in the domed hall of the imperial palace in Constantinople, in fact the same hall in which

the sixth ecumenical council also gathered. The name of this council indicates a long dispute over its authority with the Church of Rome and its effectiveness only inside the political borders of the Byzantine Empire. The participant fathers and the emperor claimed that it was the fulfilment of the earlier fifth and sixth ecumenical councils, hence its other name 'Quinisextum'. A significant preamble opens the 102 canons, explaining the necessity and the task of this council, i.e. to produce new regulations for the good order of a community conceived as Church and empire at the same time. The argument put forward by the bishops is namely the lack of such regulations in ecumenical assemblies for the last two centuries. The historian feels intrigued, on the contrary, by their concern for such regulations, the more so as most of them were since long in practice and the matters regarded issues of liturgical practice, social behavior or ecclesiastical organization. The attention given to the purity of the dogmatic definition of faith, orthodoxy, by the previous ecumenical assemblies was replaced by interest in a standardized and unified form of worship, orthopraxy. The initiative was clearly on the emperor's side, who took it as a personal challenge to bring the Church of Rome to agreement. The preamble brings the emperor even more into the scene. It functions almost as a mirror of princes and acknowledges his central role in the community of believers at a time when some Christian communities on the periphery of the new Chalcedonian orthodoxy in the former Eastern provinces of the Empire might have regarded the deliverance from the tyrannical Roman emperors as an act of God's favor.

I intend to interpret the construction of the Trullan canonical collection in the sociological terms of center and periphery.⁴¹ Thus the canons display a system in which society is seen as concentric circles revolving around a religious and political center. The key to this system is given by the 95th canon regulating the integration of heretics into the Church. The canon establishes three types of rituals for the reception into the church of former heretics:

First ritual: profession of orthodox faith, anathematization of the erroneous beliefs and of their authors and finally communion;

Second ritual: profession of faith, anathematization and anointment with the holy chrism;

Third ritual: a new full baptism ritual with exorcisms.

According to these rituals there are three categories of heretics:

Post-Ephesian and Post-Chalcedonian Christological heresies are dealt with the first more simple form of ritual; they are the closest to the orthodox

core of society. Earlier Christological and Trinitarian heresies belong to the second ritual procedure. More radical forms of Anti-Trinitarian beliefs, Gnostic and dualistic heresies are in the last category and to be considered on the same level with pagans. It is noteworthy that Muslims are not mentioned here, and generally are not a subject of concern for this synod, probably they were considered like pagans and Jews completely exterior to Christianity.

The image depicted by the Trullan canons is that of a world of Christianity. Pagans and Jews are not real social groups, but deviating practices in relation to the orthodox core of society. Heretics are put under pressure to integrate the core, but their existence is acknowledged by the simple presence of rules of segregation against them (e.g. prohibition of marriage with heretics, canon 72).⁴²

The distribution of the canons in the corpus displays a tripartite social organization composed in this case of clergy (canons 1-39), monastic order (40-49) and laity (50-102). This religious division of society should receive according to the authors of the canons also a reflection in daily public life through costumes identifying each order. Priests⁴³ and monks are to be recognizable by their garments (27); hermits should quit the cities,⁴⁴ by either joining a monastery, in which they strictly have to obey the regulations of the superior, or by taking refuge in the geographical desert. Similarly, fake madness, thus also the practices of holy fools, so much in fashion in that century, is prohibited. Wandering monks and holy fools are part of that phenomenon called by Peter Brown "the holy man", which supplied local centers of authority to replace the vanishing urban political system of the later Roman empire. Through the Trullanum, in a small empire, with a unified religion, the political center tries to recuperate all authority, the one deriving from religion particularly. Holiness and the sacred are supposed to derive from one center and to reach the society in a regulated manner through hierarchies permanently produced by the higher clergy and the emperor. This trend continued under the iconoclast emperors, who tried altogether to reduce the influence of monasticism and to concentrate religion around public representatives of power.

Dogmatic and disciplinary religious authority enters also in a system of gradual restrictions, which we may read as a concentric structure: women shouldn't speak at all, and they are supposed to receive illumination through their husbands, by asking their questions in the private sphere of the home (70); layman shouldn't express opinions on theological subjects (63);⁴⁵ priests and bishops should stick to the teachings of the fathers

and refrain from inventing new interpretations of the Scriptures (19).⁴⁶ Orthodoxy emerges through these canons as a given content created in the past in a virtually immutable form and echo the concept of the preamble that orthodoxy needs only to be restored. The duty to survey this continuous process of preservation belongs to the emperor and the assembly of the bishops in the empire.

In liturgical matters the norm is given by Constantinople. The local practices of the periphery, Rome, Armenian Church (56, 99)⁴⁷ or Jerusalem, are rejected. The criticism of Roman practices aims also at the denial of supreme or independent authority to the Roman see.

The leitmotiv of the corpus is given by a sentence contained in the 56th canon: *“it seems good therefore that the whole Church of God which is in all the world should follow one rule”*, and corresponds to the principle of segregation and concentric organization of society enunciated in canon 72: *“it is not fitting to mingle together what should not be mingled, nor is it right that the sheep be joined with the wolf, nor the lot of sinners with the portion of Christ”*.

The composition of the Trullan collection of canons goes far beyond the usual scope of canonical works of earlier periods. Through the tone and the range of matters discussed these canons don't sound anymore as regulations for Christians, but as laws for the empire. As an example we can mention the canons which regulate the behavior and dressing code of law students or that about the prohibition of horse racing during the holy week or the more famous canon against soothsayers and bear-tamers. The process of Christianization, as mirrored in the Trullanum, deals with wider social ranges, reaching far beyond the court circles and urban elites as it still was in the time of Justinian. The scope of the process now is to produce a unified society. The silent argument for this development is a world divided between religious centers of power, Islam on the southern frontier of the empire, paganism on its northern frontier, and a potentially dissident Christianity in the West, Rome, and in the east, Armenia. We find this argument fully developed in a contemporary eschatological text, such as the Vision of Pseudo-Methodius of Patara.

The transformation of the coronation ritual in the 7th century⁴⁸ accompanies the process of full identification of the Roman power with Christianity. It is in this context and in preparation of the Trullanum, that imperial propaganda uses the idea of the emperor as guardian of Orthodoxy. A letter of Justinian II to pope Konon (dated February 17th 687) regarding the acts of the sixth ecumenical council (3rd Constantinople),

describes Justinian himself as representative of God and guardian of orthodoxy. The emperor tells the pope that he assembled patriarchs, papal legates, archbishops, bishops, functionaries, bodyguards, the demes, the excubitors, and representatives of the army, ordered the acts to be read out and asked the assembly to sign them. Afterwards he ordered the acts to be kept in the imperial archive and not in the patriarchal archive as sign of his role of "guardian of orthodoxy".⁴⁹

Last but not least the canons of the Trullanum care to give a definition of imperial power. Kingship is described as follows in the preamble of the Trullan canons:

"As we conduct our lives in great sloth and slumber in the idleness of our thoughts, so that the enemy can come upon us unawares, Christ our Lord, who stirs this greatest of ships, the entire world, has now set you over us, the wise governor, the pious emperor...you who dispense yours words in discernment... *Wisdom bore you in her womb* and nurtured you with her virtues; she brought you up and educated you and filled you with the Spirit of God; she has made you the *eye of universe*, you who brightly illumine your subjects with the pureness and splendor of your mind. To you she has entrusted her Church and has taught you to meditate on her law day and night, for the correction and edification of the people subject to you" (as Phinehas [Num 25, 7-11] the emperor transfixes sin by piety and understanding, the same comparison refers to Cyril of Alexandria in the council of Ephesus),⁵⁰ "and you have chosen to lead your flock away from iniquity and corruption."⁵¹

The emperor steers the ship through the swells of turbulence and transgression. Because the last two ecumenical councils have not established canons

"it follows that the holy nation, the royal priesthood (I Pet. 2, 9), on whose behalf Christ died, is thorn asunder and led astray through the many passions resulting from indiscipline, and is detached little by little and cut off from the divine fold, ... through ignorance and neglect (quotation Heb. 10, 29).

"It was your (the emperor's) great desire therefore, after the example of Christ, the good shepherd (John 10, 1-14), searching for the sheep lost in the mountains, to bring together this holy nation, as a special people, and to return it to the fold and convince it to keep the divine commandments and statutes." [The council's mission is to purify the Church of the remnants of Judaisant and pagan practices].⁵²

The preamble alludes to the fact that assaults of devilish legions at the gates of the Church coincide in a meaningful way with the assaults of huge Arab armies from the East and equally threatening pagan invasions from the North. The defeat of the former opens the possibility of victory over the latter. In order to formulate this political interpretation the text appeals to an eschatological framework, which develops new forms of expression at the end of the seventh century and describes, as we shall see, the Empire as near to the Heavenly Kingdom as the available vocabulary could express it.

In the description of the emperor a series of *topoi* are borrowed from earlier rhetorical texts: the imperial *Christomimesis* already belongs to Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*; the steering of the cosmic ship by Christ and of the earthly Empire by the emperor – to both Eusebius and Agapetus' *Mirror of Princes*. Some parallels with the *Life of Constantine* are more striking, for example the description of the image that represented Constantine and his sons trampling or piercing by a weapon a serpent or dragon, cast into the depths of the sea, while the cross was depicted above their head. It is possible that the *labarum* itself was that weapon.⁵³ Eusebius explains the image by citing Is. 27,1 and Ps. 90,13 (the references are generally attributed to Christ, e.g. the chapel of the archbishop's palace in Ravenna). If in this context the dragon is the devil for Eusebius, in another context it is Licinius, who is called "that dragon".⁵⁴ The eternal enemy of mankind finds particular expressions in historical threats to the Christian empire; this is what the preamble conveys through the juxtaposition of "dragon" and "Assyrian". For the opening of the council of Nicaea, Eusebius presents the emperor walking in the hall "like some heavenly angel of God" and at the Vicennalia celebrations "the palace" "might have been supposed ... an imaginary representation of the Kingdom of Christ".⁵⁵ In the Trullan preamble it is not a palace or a church, or the presence of the emperor that allude to the Kingdom of God, but the Christian community, as holy people and political body of the empire, which has already exchanged servitude for the Kingdom of Heaven. The vocabulary is both Pauline, stressing the moral and individual aspect of the struggle with evil, and political, referring to words like: servitude, kingdom, rebellion, tyranny.

The passages of the *Life of Constantine*, particularly his letter to the provincials of the East,⁵⁶ and of the *Praise of Constantine*, where Eusebius draws the analogy between the cosmos ruled by God and the Empire ruled by Constantine,⁵⁷ display various themes similar with our text: the new

sacrifice, as opposed to the pagan sacrifice; Christ's war on the demons, and the emperor's war against its terrestrial enemies; the friendship between Christ and the emperor, who is thus acting as an interpreter of the Word of God. Nevertheless there is no textual borrowing from Eusebius in the preamble.

Unlike Eusebius's more restricted term by term comparison of God's monarchy over the universe with the empire, built on the idea of imitation or reflection, in the preamble the empire is already an actor of the dramatic development of the last things. The objective of the council itself is to establish canons, as rules of righteousness. If in the first and second parts the preamble emphasizes the religious and political unity, the empire as actor, in its third part the emperor Justinian II assumes the major role. Divine Wisdom "has entrusted her Church (to the emperor) and has taught (the emperor) to meditate on her law day and night, for the correction and edification of the peoples (once again in plural)".⁵⁸ More than a divine attribute, the Wisdom of God in this text seems to be a kind of political manifestation of God. "Wisdom bore you in her womb", as it is said about the emperor, could be visualized as the description of a quite obvious ceremonial image: the emperor crossing Saint Sophia with the holy gifts, penetrating in the sanctuary, rising at the ambo to address the people and to receive the crown under the cosmic dome/womb of Wisdom.

The name *ho Assyrios* given to the devil, as historical enemy of the holy city, inspired by Cyril of Alexandria's *Commentary on Micah*, but possibly also related to the corresponding rhetorical themes of the *Homily* of Theodore Synkellos, presents the Church of the living God typologically as Zion, and mystically as icon of the heavenly Jerusalem. By these references, Constantinople itself becomes a besieged Jerusalem, in which Church and empire merge into an undifferentiated unity. If in Cyril's commentary, following Clement of Alexandria,⁵⁹ the Church is the icon of the heavenly Jerusalem, the preamble extends this function to the empire. The same confusion/identification is operated by Pseudo-Methodius when he applies the reference in Matt. 16, 18 ("the gates of Hades shall never prevail over the Church") to the kingdom of the Christians (i.e. that of the Greeks, i.e. that of the Romans), whose power is justified by the Holy Cross.⁶⁰

The canons 36, 38 and 69 respond to the political scope of the preamble. First, the apparently unnecessary repetition of the canons 3 and 28 of the second and forth ecumenical councils, which equates ecclesiastically Constantinople with Rome, reiterates, very appropriately

in the context of the Trullanum, the role of Constantinople as both political and religious capital.⁶¹ Canon 38 reinforces this intention through invocation of the principle of geographic accommodation of ecclesiastical authority on civil authority, going even further in this logic by replacing the dignity of ecclesiastical centers based on the ancientness of the see with the hierarchical order of cities created by imperial authority.⁶² Canon 36 is thus in fact the very logic consequence of canon 38. Ultimately, canon 69 addresses, albeit in an ambiguous form, the question of the sacred status of the emperor.⁶³ Although this canon is part of the segment of the canonic collection which deals with laity, it creates an exception for the imperial power.

To close the case with Justinian II, we have to add the numismatic evidence: the gold coins of this emperor (*nomismata*) show on the recto the image of Christ *rex regnantium* and on the verso the image of the emperor with the inscription *servus Christi*, thus pointing to the condominium of the emperor with Christ.⁶⁴ The homology Heavenly Kingdom/Earthly Kingdom was put on vertical structure in the Barberini Ivory (first half of the 6th century, probably Justinian)⁶⁵ and on the apse of the domed hall of the Chrysotriklinos in the palace:⁶⁶ Christ above, the emperor below, meanwhile Justinian II choose to emphasize the relation through a double sided image, the coin. The intimacy of the two grew stronger.

Why does Byzantium look so Christian to us? If we interpret Christianity as a means to achieve social cohesion in the empire, and if we accept to define Christianity as a strictly recognizable and controlled form of worship (as the Trullan canons might suggest), in the context of multiple political and religious challenges, then we have to return to the theme of civil religion, and not to political theology. Neither did the empire force Christianity to approve of a political doctrine dedicated to the empire, nor did Christianity shape the political doctrine of the empire, because, as we tried to show in our essay, empire and Christianity were not coherent, willful historical actors. Nevertheless, the motor producing orthodoxy, read at the moment of the late seventh century as orthopraxy, lies within the imperial palace. In this place it looked like if God granted the empire to go on, this was in exchange for its members' commitment to the one true faith in God. Such a belief found a stronger expression with emperors like Justinian, Heraclius or Justinian II, but was shared by all others.

The claims of imperial guardianship of orthodoxy⁶⁷ and the harsh treatment of peripheral groups were not new in fact, but the novelty consisted in their official written form. The canons of the Trullanum compelled the monks to remain in their monastic establishments (canons 34, 41, 42) but already an imperial constitution of Theodosius II ordered the recalcitrant and noisy monks to be held out of the councils' gatherings. This attitude shows early awareness of the subversive power of monasticism. If the palace of the emperor is a dwelling of orthodoxy, as long as the non-Chalcedonians sought refuge in Theodora's palace in Constantinople, they were not yet labeled as heretics. A heresy was not a heresy until it was expelled from the center.

If the abovementioned peripheries were to claim their righteousness or to proclaim their challenge they had to do it in the center.

For the second half of the seventh and the eighth century, the system started functioning the other way round. A severe trial in Constantinople could assure to a religious dissenter his posthumous success. In the seventh century the trial of Maximus Confessor took place in Constantinople and in the eighth century the trial of Saint Stephen the Younger by the iconoclast emperor Constantine V even in the Hippodrome. The initial defeat of the dissenter was eventually turned into triumph when a change of policy occurred in Constantinople. The narrator transforms the castigatory examination in Constantinople in an opportunity to proclaim the truth to the whole world. The official history of Orthodoxy records the later triumphant point of view and expels the discordant view from the sources. If political will seems primordial in establishing orthodoxy, later narrative strategies about orthodox heroes insert coherence into what looks, from a political point of view, as a change of actors and contexts. Creators of Orthodoxy are thus both those who act directly on the battlefield of political action and those who tell the story of the religious conflict.

The conflict around orthodoxy, or the succession of orthodoxies throughout these centuries, accentuates the fact that the emperor held his own version of Christianity. Historians are privileged by the amount of sources produced in the proximity of power in their attempt to retrace the rise and function of the imperial church. What the historian should avoid is to merely take the latter for Christianity.⁶⁸ We have to group carefully the evidence into small temporal units. What makes sense in the fourth century does not in the sixth. What one believes in Palestine is still unknown in Constantinople at the same time.

NOTES

- 1 J. Canning, *A History of Medieval Political Thought 300-1450*, London, Routledge, 1996, p. 4; A. Piganiol, *L'empire chrétien (325-395)*, 2nd. ed., Paris, 1972; T.D. Barnes, *Constantine and Eusebius*, Cambridge, 1981.
- 2 G. Dagron, *Naissance d'une capitale. Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 a 451*, Paris, 1974; Robin Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians in the Mediterranean World from the Second Century AD to the Conversion of Constantine*, New York, 1987.
- 3 Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, Introduction, translation and commentary by Averil Cameron and Stuart G. Hall (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 48-50.
- 4 Carl Schmitt, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*, Berlin, 1922.
- 5 E. Peterson, *Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum*, Leipzig 1935; idem, "Christus als Imperator", *Catholica* 5 (1936), 64-72.
- 6 E. Kantorowicz, *The King's two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton UP, 1957; for the complex intellectual and personal relationship between Schmitt, Peterson and Kantorowicz see the remarkable article by György Geréby, "Carl Schmitt and Erik Peterson on the Problem of Political Theology: A Footnote to Kantorowicz", in Aziz Al-Azmeh, Janos Bak, *Monotheistic Kingship. The Medieval Variants*, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2004, 31-61.
- 7 Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies*, chapter III, Christ-centered Kingship, p. 42.
- 8 A. Boureau, *La religion de l'Etat. La construction de la république étatique dans le discours théologique de l'Occident médiéval (1250-1350)*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2006.
- 9 G. Dagron, *Empereur et Prêtre. Étude sur le 'césaropapisme' byzantin*, Paris, 1996, p. 17.
- 10 Th. Paléologue, *Sous l'œil du Grand Inquisiteur. Carl Schmitt et l'héritage de la théologie politique*, Cerf, Paris, 2004, p. 87-92.
- 11 Pierre Maraval, Introduction, traduction et notes à Eusèbe de Césarée, *La théologie politique de l'Empire chrétien*, Louanges de Constantin, Paris, Cerf, 2001.
- 12 Averil Cameron, *The Byzantines*, (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2006), chapter 6: "An Orthodox society?" p. 96-116.
- 13 Peter Brown, *The Rise of Western Christendom*, chapter 16, p. 355-379, here p. 359: "their own "micro-Christendom" – a local Christendom, that is, which mirrored the majestic certainty of a "true" Christendom, preserved somewhere in distant lands."; p. 364 "Christianity was a patchwork of adjacent, but separate, "micro-Christendoms". No longer bathed,

unconsciously, in an “ecumenical” atmosphere based upon regular inter-regional contacts, each Christian region fell back onto itself. Each needed to feel that it possessed, if in diminished form, the essence of an entire Christian culture. Often singularly ill-informed about their neighbours, or deeply distrustful of them, the leaders of each “micro-Christendom” fastened with fierce loyalty on those features that seemed to reflect in microcosm, in their own land, the imagined, all embracing macrocosm of a world-wide Christianity.”

- 14 Theodoret, *Historia ecclesiastica*, I, 21.
- 15 Eusebius, *Vita Constantini*, chapter 32,
- 16 Gilbert Dagron, *Naissance d'une capitale. Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 à 451*, (PUF, Paris, 1974).
- 17 Athanasius, *Apologia contra Arianos*, 9 and 87, PG 25, col. 264-265 and 405.
- 18 Thomas F. Mathews, *The Clash of Gods. A Reinterpretation of Early Christian Art*, revised and expanded edition, Princeton Univ. Press, 1999, chapter I: The Mistake of the Emperor Mystique, and particularly p. 53.
- 19 Thomas F. Mathews, *The Clash of Gods. A Reinterpretation of Early Christian Art*, revised and expanded edition, Princeton Univ. Press, 1999, p. 92, but for the argument chapters 2 and 3.
- 20 J.-M. Spieser, “The representation of Christ in the Apses of Early Christian Churches”, *Gesta* 37/1, 1998, p. 69. A recent visitor of San Vitale reported an interesting scene; a orthodox monastic delegation was puzzled by the beardless Christ, they called a specialist to ask whether the mosaics are original and left quickly and very disappointed.
- 21 Athanasius, *Four Discourses against the Arians*, Discourse I, VI, 19 (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, IV).
- 22 Athanasius, *Four Discourses against the Arians*, Discourse I, VI, 19 (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, IV).
- 23 John Meyendorff, “Wisdom-Sophia: Contrasting Approaches to a Complex Theme”, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, Vol. 41, Studies on Art and Archeology in Honor of Ernst Kitzinger on His Seventy-Fifth Birthday. (1987), pp. 391-401.
- 24 René Bornert, OSB, *Les commentaires byzantins de la divine liturgie du VII^e au XV^e siècle*, Archives de l'Orient Chrétien 9, Paris, 1966, p. 118, 121.
- 25 Timothy Barnes, “Constantine, Athanasius and the Christian Church”, *Constantine. History, historiography and legend*, eds. Samuel N.C. Lieu and Dominic Montserrat (Routledge, London & New York, 1998) p. 7-20, here p. 10.
- 26 *Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum*, I, I, 1, p. 120, translation in P. R. Coleman Norton, *Roman State and Christian Church* (London SPCK, 1966) vol. 2, p. 662-63.
- 27 *Ibid.*

- 28 “For we, whom always rightly the weapons of military authority surround, and for whom it is not proper to be without bodyguards, when entering God’s temple, abandon our weapons outside, taking off our diadem, and by the appearance of the lessening of our majesty, there is reaped by us all the more awe for the majesty of empire.” Council of Ephesus: *Collectio Vaticana* 137.3, ed Schwartz, ACO 1.4, p 64.8, trans. P. R. Coleman Norton, *Roman State and Christian Church* (London SPCK, 1966) vol. 2, p. 657.
- 29 Theodoret of Cyrhus, *Hist. eccl.*, V, 18, 20-25.
- 30 See the commentary on the hymn of the Cherubim in Rudolf H. W. Stichel, « Die Hagia Sophia Justinians in Konstantinople als Bühne des Kaisers », *Kolloquim 2000-2001. Fachbereich Architektur*, (TU Darmstadt) 10-19.
- 31 P. Guran, “Genesis and Function of the Last Emperor myth in Byzantine Eschatology”, *Bizantinistica* 8 (2006) 292-296.
- 32 Dagron, *Empereur et prêtre* (Paris, 1996) 177-184.
- 33 H.-I. Marrou, *Décadence romaine ou antiquité tardive? IIIe- IVe siècle*, Paris, 1977.
- 34 P. Brown, *The world of late antiquity, AD 150-750*, New York, 1971.
- 35 A. Momigliano, “Christianity and the Decline of the Roman Empire”, in A. Momigliano, ed., *The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century*, (The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963).
- 36 G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, (New Brunswick, 1957).
- 37 Herbert Hunger, *Reich der neuen Mitte. Der christliche Geist der byzantinische Kultur*, (Graz, Koln, Wien, 1965).
- 38 G. Dagron, “L’Empire romain d’Orient au IV^e siècle et les traditions politiques de l’hellénisme, le témoignage de Thémistios”, *Travaux et Mémoires* 3, 1968, 1-242.
- 39 Irfan Shahid, «The Iranian Factor in Byzantium during the Reign of Heraclius,» *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 26 (1972), 295-307.
- 40 H.-G. Beck, “Res publica romana. Vom Staatsdenken der Byzantiner”, *Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte*, 1970, Heft 2, p. 7-41, reprinted in H. Hunger ed., *Das byzantinische Herrscherbild*, Darmstadt 1975, p. 379-414.
- 41 Edward Shills, *Center and periphery: essays in macrosociology* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1975).
- 42 Canon 72: “An orthodox man is not permitted to marry a heretical woman, nor an orthodox woman to be joined to a heretical man. But if anything of this kind appear to have been done by any [we require them] to consider the marriage null, and that the marriage be dissolved. For it is not fitting to mingle together what should not be mingled, nor is it right that the sheep be joined with the wolf, nor the lot of sinners with the portion of Christ. But if any one shall transgress the things which we have decreed let him be cut off. But if any who up to this time are unbelievers and are not yet numbered in the flock of the orthodox have contracted lawful marriage between

themselves, and if then, one choosing the right and coming to the light of truth and the other remaining still detained by the bond of error and not willing to behold with steady eye the divine rays, the unbelieving woman is pleased to cohabit with the believing man, or the unbelieving man with the believing woman, let them not be separated, according to the divine Apostle, «for the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife by her husband.»”

43 Canon 27: None of those who are in the catalogue of the clergy shall wear clothes unsuited to them, either while still living in town or when on a journey: but they shall wear such clothes as are assigned to those who belong to the clergy. And if any one shall violate this canon, he shall be cut off for one week.

44 Canon 42: Those who are called Eremites and are clothed in black robes, and with long hair go about cities and associate with the worldly both men and women and bring odium upon their profession--we decree that if they will receive the habit of other monks and wear their hair cut short, they may be shut up in a monastery and numbered among the brothers; but if they do not choose to do this, they are to be expelled from the cities and forced to live in the desert (eremous) from whence also they derive their name.

45 Canon 63: “it does not befit a layman to dispute or teach publicly, thus claiming for himself authority to teach, but he should yield to the order appointed by the Lord, and to open his ears to those who have received the grace to teach, and be taught by them divine things; for in one Church God has made «different members,» according to the word of the Apostle: and Gregory the Theologian, wisely interpreting this passage, commends the order in vogue with them saying:(1) «This order brethren we revere, this we guard. Let this one be the ear; that one the tongue, the hand or any other member. Let this one teach, but let that one learn.» And a little further on: «Learning in docility and abounding in cheerfulness, and ministering with alacrity, we shall not all be the tongue which is the more active member, not all of us Apostles, not all prophets, nor shall we all interpret.» And again: «Why dost thou make thyself a shepherd when thou art a sheep? Why become the head when thou art a foot? Why dost thou try to be a commander when thou art enrolled in the number of the soldiers?» And elsewhere: «Wisdom orders, Be not swift in words; nor compare thyself with the rich, being poor; nor seek to be wiser than the wise.» But if any one be found weakening the present canon, he is to be cut off for forty days.”

46 Canon 19: Those who preside over the churches in their teaching should “not go beyond the limits now fixed, nor varying from the tradition of the God-bearing fathers. And if any controversy in regard to Scripture shall have been raised, let them not interpret it otherwise than as the lights and doctors of the church in their writings have expounded it, and in those let them

glory rather than in composing things out of their own heads, lest through their lack of skill they may have departed from what was fitting.”

47 Canon 99: “We have further learned that, in the regions of the Armenians, certain persons boil joints of meat within the sanctuary and offer portions to the priests, distributing it after the Jewish fashion. Wherefore, that we may keep the church undefiled, we decree that it is not lawful for any priest to seize the separate portions of flesh meat from those who offer them, but they are to be content with what he that offers pleases to give them; and further we decree that such offering be made outside the church. And if any one does not thus, let him be cut off.”

48 P. Guran, “Genesis and Function of the Last Emperor myth in Byzantine Eschatology”, *Bizantinistica* 8 (2006) 292-96.

49 F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches, 1. Teil, Regesten von 565-1025*, Munich and Berlin, 1924, p. 31, Nr. 254.

50 St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Letters*, vol. II,

51 *The Council in Trullo revisited*, edited by George Nedungatt, Michael Featherstone, (Roma: Pontificio Istituto Orientale, 1995) 49-50.

52 *The Council in Trullo revisited*, 52-53.

53 Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, introduction, translation and commentary by Averil Cameron and Stuart G. Hall, Clarendon Press [Oxford, 1999], III, 3, p. 122 translation, p. 255-256 commentary.

54 The same kind of identification of the Avar kagan with the dragon in Theodoros Synkellos’ homily, *op. cit.*, translation p. 16-17, Greek text, 302-303, (apud L. Sternbach, *Analecta avarica*).

55 Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, III, 10 and 15, p. 125-127, 264-267.

56 Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, II 48-60, p. 111-114.

57 Eusebius, *Tricennialia*, chap. II, Eusebius, *Werke*, Band I, ed. Ivar Heikel, Leipzig, 1902, p. 199-200.

58 *The Council in Trullo revisited*, p. 50.

59 Clement of Alexandria, *Stromatum liber IV*, 8, 18, PG 8, col. 1277B.

60 Pseudo-Methodius, translation P.J. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 42 (f 126v).

61 Canon 36: “Renewing the enactments by the 150 Fathers assembled at the God-protected and imperial city, and those of the 630 who met at Chalcedon; we decree that the see of Constantinople shall have equal privileges with the see of Old Rome, and shall be highly regarded in ecclesiastical matters as that is, and shall be second after it. After Constantinople shall be ranked the See of Alexandria, then that of Antioch, and afterwards the See of Jerusalem”.

62 Canon 38: “the canon which was made by the Fathers we also observe, which thus decreed: If any city be renewed by imperial authority, or shall have been renewed, let the order of things ecclesiastical follow the civil and public models.”

- ⁶³ Canon 69: "it is not permitted to a layman to enter the sanctuary (Holy Altar, Gk.), though, in accordance with a certain ancient tradition, the imperial power and authority is by no means prohibited from this when he wishes to offer his gifts to the Creator."
- ⁶⁴ A. Grabar, *L'iconoclasme byzantin. Dossier archéologique*, Paris, 1957, 37-45 ; C. Morisson, *Catalogue des monnaies byzantines de la Bibliothèque nationale*, Paris, 1970, I, 396-398, pl. LXI, LXIII, LXIV.
- ⁶⁵ Danièle Gaborit-Chopin, in *Byzance, l'art byzantin dans les collections publiques françaises* (catalogue de l'exposition au musée du Louvre, 3 novembre 1992-1^{er} février 1993), Paris, 1993, nr. 20, p. 63-65.
- ⁶⁶ Av. Cameron, "The Artistic Patronage of Justin II", *Byzantion* 50, 1980, p. 62-84.
- ⁶⁷ F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des Oströmischen Reiches, 1. Teil, Regesten von 565-1025*, Munich and Berlin, 1924, p. 31, Nr. 254 in a letter of Justinian II to pope Konon 17 February 687.
- ⁶⁸ Eric Rebillard, *In hora mortis. Evolution de la pastorale chrétienne de la mort au IV^e et V^e siècles* (Rome, 1994), p. 232 draws the attention to the significant changes which allow him to speak of several « christianismes dans l'histoire ». To his view we may add our distinction between simultaneous zones of Christianities, of which one is that which appears in proximity of political power.



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Livres :

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Anastasia, Bucarest 2004
Răzbunare împotriva tiranilor. Teoria politică a protestantismului francez,
Nemira, Bucarest, 2007

ORTHODOXIE ET POLITIQUE. LE SYNODE DE TÂRGOVIȘTE (JANVIER 1659)*

« ... *ista sint Antichristi tempora...* »

[Kyrillos Loukaris à Festus Hommius, le 13 novembre 1627]

« Lisant, vous corrigez vos vies. »

[Étienne de l'Hongrovalachie, préface au
Guide à la Loi (Indreptarea Legii 1652)]

I.

« Un événement on ne peut plus bizarre ». C'est ainsi que M. Andrei Pippidi m'a décrit la convocation par le voïévode valaque Mihnea III Radu d'un synode à Târgoviște. « Voudriez-vous peut-être y faire une recherche de plus près ? », a-t-il ajouté après un moment, donnant à entendre en quelque sorte que des faits dignes de toute attention se seraient passés alors, le 21 janvier de l'an de grâce 1659.

En effet, le geste du « jeune bey » avait de quoi surprendre. Premièrement, parce qu'il ne reflète pas le profil du titulaire, tel qu'il a été transmis par les sources. Bien que charmant et avec beaucoup de qualités – « il était fameux pour ses connaissances de persan et de langue hellénique, reconnu comme calligraphe, poète, homme distingué et érudit », dit le célèbre voyageur ottoman Evliyâ Çelebi dans son *Seyâhatnâme* –, Mihnea reste au fond, au moins pour la majorité des historiens, « quelqu'un qui aime les faits rares et aventureux »¹. Un homme sans scrupules, aux origines inévitablement obscures, assez difficile à imaginer dans la posture d'un pieux héritier des empereurs byzantins ou d'un prophétique « roi promis »².

Bien qu'il ait toujours vécu à la limite, l'éphémère prince est peu crédible également dans le rôle du fou dangereux, « stupide et orgolieux », que le patriarche Dosithée de Jérusalem lui attribue méchamment³, ne

serait-ce que par la simple raison que derrière ses actions se dessine la figure énigmatique et controversée de Païsius Ligaridis. Collaborateur de longue date de la redoutable et célèbre *Congregatio* papale de *Propaganda Fide*, métropolitain orthodoxe de Gaza, futur conseiller de droit canonique du tsar russe, l'opportuniste prélat est un initié dans les secrets de la grande politique européenne de l'époque. La présence de cet habile agent secret de Rome, de Constantinople et de Moscou dans la capitale de la Valachie, en tant que « théologien, prédicateur et confesseur » du prince régnant, confirmait, par conséquent, le soupçon qu'on y tissât quelque chose de sérieux⁴.

La supposition fut confirmée par les sujets abordés : les prélats présents à Târgoviște sont invités à discuter les principaux problèmes avec lesquels se confronte l'Église à ce moment-là. On discute, donc, la légitimité du baptême fait par un laïc en temps de crise, la validité du baptême des Luthériens et des Calvinistes, la légitimité du divorce et du remariage, la punition de la bigamie, du troisième et du quatrième mariage et de la simonie, les conditions de la confession et de la communion, l'éducation des prêtres, la réglementation du statut juridique des monastères, le contrôle de leurs biens et de la vie dans la communauté. Bref, le synode se propose de déclencher une véritable *réforme ecclésiastique générale* (Nicolae Iorga).

La lettre par laquelle Mihnea informait le patriarche œcuménique Parthénios IV sur les décisions prises, la réponse sèche de ce dernier, anticipée par la plume du grand théologien Mélétiou Syrigos, et la réplique dure du prince m'ont donc éveillé l'intérêt. Il me semblait que par le biais de ces documents je pourrais trouver la solution d'un problème difficile. Au milieu du XVII^e siècle, l'Europe confessionnelle est en plein tourbillonnement ; *quel est le sens que les communautés chrétiennes - orthodoxes de l'Est donnent à des termes comme « religion », « hérésie » ou « superstition », et comment essaient-elles de définir leur identité spirituelle ?*

Il reste à voir à quel point cette question était pertinente. Mais il est certain qu'ainsi formulée, elle m'a obligé d'entrer sur un terrain difficile. Et ce parce qu'il est impossible de parler de *continuité* et *progrès*, de *tradition* et *innovation*, d'*Orthodoxie* et de *Réforme* – termes très compliqués et sensibles – au sein de l'Église sans s'arrêter sur Kyrillos Loukaris, « le plus brillant et le plus intéressant du point de vue politique patriarche grec et leader national ('ethnarque') » de son siècle⁵. Or, « le cas Loukaris »

présente un degré significatif de risque, puisqu'il peut à tout moment mettre tout en doute.

Je ne tiens pas à démêler ici le vrai du fausse ; je le ferai avec une autre occasion⁶. Je soulignerai pourtant que les sympathies évidentes de Kyrillos pour le calvinisme ont décisivement contribué au renforcement des suspicions d'autres chefs de l'Église de l'Orient envers tous les essais de renouvellement spirituel et à la qualification comme inappropriées et nuisibles des initiatives « réformatrices », y compris la traduction de la Bible entière dans la langue du peuple. De plus, l'instrumentalisation confessionnelle ou ethnique du « cas » a fait que l'historiographie « moderne » soit souvent tributaire à des jugements de valeur douteux. Il y a, semble-t-il, des territoires culturels, que l'on ne désire pas investiguer d'une manière lucide.

Un *caveat* de plus. Au temps de Loukaris, le Patriarcat devint un joueur important sur la scène politique. « Zum ersten Mal seit dem Fall von Byzans entwickelte ein Ökumenischer Patriarch eine außenpolitische Konzeption ». En première, problèmes confessionnelles assument une dimension politique. Or, ce processus de *politisation de l'Église* peut facilement tromper tous ceux qui l'ignorent⁷.

En essayant d'éviter ce piège, je suis revenu au synode convoqué à Târgoviște par Mihnea. Je vais donc vous raconter ce qui s'était passé au siège princier de la Valachie. Grâce à un splendide manuscrit conservé à Bucarest, dans la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine, je vais vous présenter la tentative d'un ample renouvellement spirituel qui a passé inaperçue à cause de la focalisation de l'attention sur les grandes polémiques. Je décrirai ensuite la manière dont le sulfureux Kyrillos intervient dans l'histoire. Je montrerai comment la copie de la correspondance entre le voïévode et Parthénios IV est arrivée jusqu'en Hollande, à Leyde. Je vais, enfin, essayer d'esquisser quelques gloses sur les rapports entre *orthodoxie* et *politique*, si tortueux et significatifs non seulement durant le tempétueux XVII^e siècle, mais aussi après.

II.

Le « synode » de Târgoviște

Le 21 janvier, en l'an de grâce 1659, le voïévode valaque Mihnea III Radu écrit au patriarche de Constantinople Parthénios IV pour l'informer sur les décisions prises par une assemblée tenue à Târgoviște onze jours auparavant. « Sachant qu'un règne ne peut se consolider que par un bon gouvernement et la bonne situation des églises – montre le prince – nous avons voulu, comme fils aimant du Christ, vu que Dieu très miséricordieux nous a confié le trône de notre père, nous rendre compte de l'état de l'Église et de tout ce qui s'y rapporte ». Observant que « celle-ci est cette belle colombe où la loi n'existe pas », il décide d'agir d'urgence pour corriger les insuffisances flagrantes.

Signalée par le grand érudit grec Spyridon Lambros, l'épître a été immédiatement éditée et traduite par Nicolae Iorga⁸. Nous connaissons donc les problèmes présentés alors « devant les archiérés du pays et d'autres encore qui se trouvaient auprès d'eux, les higoumènes et les boyards de premier et deuxième rang ». Nous savons aussi quelles ont été les solutions trouvées, le nomocanon à l'appui, par ce synode, *véritable assemblée d'États*.

Les premières concernent le mystère du baptême : le baptême fait par les laïcs en temps de crise sera tenu pour valable ; les enfants baptisés selon les canons par un laïc ne devront plus être rebaptisés, à la différence des enfants dont le baptême est incertain ; le baptême des « Luthéro-Calvinistes » sera valide, étant considéré similaire à celui des profanes. D'autres visent le mystère du mariage : le quatrième mariage sera interdit « et celui qui l'aura permis, sera sanctionné » ; « celui qui aura donné la communion à la personne mariée une troisième fois avant que ce ne soit permis » (cinq ans) aura l'interdiction de dire les messes, et celui qui « aura osé donner la communion à celui qui s'est marié une quatrième fois » sera jeté hors de l'Église ; « celui qui aura uni par le mariage un homme et son amante », en trahissant sa femme, sera durement puni, voire déchu pour toujours de ses droits s'il les communique ; les divorces seront permis, selon la loi, mais non pas les remariages.

La plupart des dispositions visent pourtant les déficits enregistrés au milieu des prêtres et des moines. Celui qui a des enfants ne pourra pas devenir higoumène, décide le synode, pour ne pas gaspiller le patrimoine de son monastère ; les trafiquants de fonctions ecclésiastiques ne seront pas pardonnés ; les confesseurs devront être obligatoirement choisis

parmi ceux qui « mènent une bonne vie et ont de l'expérience », alors que ceux qui se confessent ne devront pas communier sans leur accord ; la taxe pour le mariage et pour la consécration d'un prêtre sera fixe et les pauvres en seront exemptés ; ceux qui veulent devenir moines devront passer trois mois d'essai, et ensuite ils ne quitteront pas leur communauté avant leur mort ; les moines ne seront pas chassés « à l'insu du supérieur, et la présence des laïcs et des femmes tsiganes ne devra aucunement être permise dans la cour du monastère, pour éviter tout soupçon » ; l'érudition, l'accord du confesseur et le témoignage de sept prêtres seront obligatoires pour la consécration d'un candidat au titre de prêtre ; les biens des monastères seront contrôlés chaque année par des « fonctionnaires du prince », nécessairement « pieux et hommes de Dieu » ; les ktitors ne pourront pas contrôler leurs fondations, mais s'ils sont pauvres, ils seront aidés « plus que tous les autres » ; les monastères riches aideront les monastères pauvres, tout comme les prélats riches les moins aisés ; les moines, particulièrement les vieux et les malades, mangeront de la viande et boiront du vin, avec mesure, à l'occasion des fêtes princières.

Quelque rapide que la lecture soit, on ne peut ne pas être surpris par la rigueur, la concision et la fermeté de la lettre du prince régnant. Tout un monde s'ouvre devant le lecteur, avec beaucoup de maux mais aussi avec un âpre espoir de salut. A son tour, la fin, dure comme un proverbe ancien, est au niveau d'un programme réformateur tellement ambitieux : « le zèle, dit Mihnea, manquera à un peuple sans éducation, et la richesse n'aura aucune utilité si le peuple est ignorant ».

La réponse du Patriarcat œcuménique et la réplique du voïvode

Des sources dignes de confiance nous font apprendre que le destinataire aussi a été surpris, mais d'une manière désagréable⁹. Sa réponse du 5 mars n'a pas encore été retrouvée. En revanche, la réaction prompte du prince régnant, une lettre écrite seize jours plus tard et publiée par le même Nicolae Iorga, laisse apercevoir ses points forts.

Avant tout, le patriarche conseille *la patience*, considérant que ce sont « les fantasmes du faible (?) jugement qui reflètent les imaginations insupportables et inappropriées de la pensée et les mots secs » qui se trouvent à l'origine des décisions comme la permission pour les moines âgés de manger de la viande et de boire du vin ou l'interdiction des remariages. Il annonce ensuite qu'il a donné comme tâche au « théologien de la Grande Église », le célèbre Georges Koressios, d'analyser les

problèmes en litige, mais il tient à souligner que le baptême des « Luthéro-Calvinistes » ne peut aucunement être accepté comme légitime. Il accuse, enfin, le voïévode qu'il abrite et prête l'oreille à de faux « prêcheurs » qui « innovent » et répandent « des habitudes impropres et empruntées ».

Pour ce qui est de la patience, Mihnea n'en a pas. En outre, il est persuadé que les mesures prises sont correctes. « Nous et ceux qui sont autour de nous, nous nous sommes prononcés, d'une seule voix, à l'unanimité, pour [seules] les traditions anciennes, et pour que les traditions soient respectées », insiste-t-il, « tranchant vite » les deux aspects « qui semblaient être les objets des erreurs ». Le recours à Koressios lui plaît, n'ayant aucun doute qu'il lui donnera raison en ce qui concerne le baptême des protestants ; celui-ci l'avait aussi défendu dans le passé¹⁰. Et après tout, n'y a-t-il pas parmi les canons « du saint synode œcuménique de Constantinople », « chez Théodoret, dans le quatrième discours », dans « l'Histoire ecclésiastique » de Sozomène ou dans la « Synopsis » de Cedrène assez d'arguments dans ce sens ? Quant aux prêcheurs menteurs, Parthénios a été induit en erreur par les ennemis – ce n'est pas à Târgoviște qu'ils se trouvent, mais au bord du Bosphore.

« J'ai écrit tout ceci avec du courage, conclut le prince ; et que Votre Sainteté le reçoive avec de la bonne volonté et avec des sentiments parentaux, parce que c'est écrit sincèrement et sans désir de tromper, en conscience. Et, si nous, comme êtres humains, nous avons fait quelque faute, pardonnez nous, car commettre des erreurs c'est humain et ce n'est que Dieu qui ne fait pas de fautes. »

C'est le discours d'un « empereur réformateur dans son Église et pour 'son peuple inculte', il est vrai, pour sa 'nation ignorante' n'ayant pas assez de prêtres, pas de professeurs instruits, mais avec la prétention d'influencer aussi l'Église universelle », appréciait l'éditeur des épîtres¹¹. Sur ses traces, les exégètes ont parlé – d'une manière plus ou moins nuancée, certes – des « rêves impériaux » de Mihnea, de ses projets fous/poétiques de croisade anti-ottomane pour laquelle le synode de 1659 aurait joué le rôle d'alibi, de la mission de « souverain de la paix », droit et victorieux, qu'il assume dans une tentative d'actualiser la prophétie de Zacharie¹².

Comme il arrive souvent, tous ont raison et tous se trompent. La preuve est une troisième lettre, cette fois-ci inédite. Gardée toujours à Leyde, mais dans un autre manuscrit, elle ne contient pas – comme on le

croyait – la réponse de Parthénios, mais, j’ose dire, quelque chose d’aussi intéressant : *un résumé officieux des discussions eues au Patriarcat sur le sujet du concile valaque.*

Qu’est-ce qui confère autant d’importance à cette lettre ? Tout d’abord, la position de l’auteur – celui qui écrit au voïévode n’est personne d’autre que Mélétiós Syrigos, l’un des plus importants théologiens grecs de son époque.

*Mélétiós Syrigos (1585-1663)*¹³

D’origine crétoise, Marc Syrigos naît en 1585. Il commence vite ses études dans une école de Candia, sa ville natale, mais peu après il part pour Venise et Padoue. Il semble qu’il eût voulu devenir médecin. Mais après la mort brusque de ses parents il se retrouve très pauvre, ce qui le détermine à revêtir l’habit monacal ; Marc devient ainsi Mélétiós.

Il se fait remarquer par son éducation choisie. Toutefois, à cause de ses attaques dures à l’adresse des dogmes catholiques il se fait attirer l’antipathie de la Sérénissime République, attentive à ménager les sensibilités de la curie papale. Il est, dans un premier temps, chassé de la ville, et ensuite condamné à mort. Il se réfugie en Egypte, d’où il se fait appeler à Constantinople par Kyrillos Loukaris, impressionné par la qualité de ses homélies. Installé dans l’église de la « Source d’or » de Galata, l’énergique hieromoine doit combattre, de l’ambon, la violente propagande jésuite. Pleinement content de résultats, le patriarche le convoque aux réunions confidentielles avec le pasteur Antoine Léger et lui confie une mission secrète ; entre 1632 et 1633, Mélétiós se trouve en Moldavie¹⁴.

Malgré la grande confiance que lui accorde la faction Loukaris, l’habile prêtre allait changer de camp. Deux jours à peine après l’exécution du malheureux, il chante les louanges de son successeur soupçonné de crime, ce qui montre que les malentendus étaient de longue date. Deux mois après, il participe au synode anti-calviniste voué à condamner le défunt. Il compose une acide *Réfutation des chapitres calvinistes et des questions de Kyrillos*¹⁵. Il se dresse contre ses disciples, « aiguisant sa langue comme un rasoir contre la vérité ». Il essaie d’obtenir des théologiens réunis dans une « conférence théologique » à Iași en septembre 1642 l’accord que les travaux débutent avec une condamnation officielle du hiérarque égaré.

Syrigos n'obtiendra pas la condamnation. La *Réfutation* attendra cinq décennies avant d'être publié. Néanmoins, le vénérable prêcheur de la Grande Église, le discret curé de la petite église consacrée à la Vierge de l'Espoir à Kumkapı, compte parmi les plus redoutables porte-parole du patriarcat œcuménique. Il répond, en fait, au nom de Païsius le 1^{er}, vers la fin de 1654, aux inquiétudes exprimées par Nikon de la Russie au sujet de la Sainte Liturgie. C'est toujours lui qui écrit, sur l'ordre de Parthénios IV, à Mihnea : les épîtres du voïévode ont été analysées attentivement, mais « il n'y a eu *vraiment personne* dans ce synode qui y appose sa signature pour les confirmer ».

Venue d'un personnage de la taille de Mélétiós, la radiographie vaut toute notre attention. Qu'est-ce qui avait donc rendu mécontents les archiprêtres et les clercs réunis à Constantinople ?

L'ordre des choses

Devinée seulement de la réplique du prince, la raison du mécontentement se dévoile maintenant clairement et manifestement : ignorant les lois sacrées, le prince de la Valachie a osé « changer l'ordre des choses » et se mêler dans des affaires qui ne le concernent pas. En premier lieu, « l'autorité et le pouvoir profane » n'a pas à donner des ordres à l'Église et à lui dire : « c'est ainsi que j'ai considéré et que c'est bien par rapport à ceci ou cela et tu n'as qu'à le confirmer sans le mettre en doute et sans le questionner, pour éviter les scandales » ; *au contraire*, « s'il considère que c'est bien ce que l'Église a proposé, le pouvoir profane n'a qu'à le confirmer ». En deuxième lieu, les décisions prises « ne respectent pas la tradition ancienne » ; par conséquent, même si la novatrice « Église des latins » se montre disposée à accepter certains compromis, « l'Église d'Orient ne les a jamais acceptés et elle ne les acceptera pas ».

Nous sommes, donc, loin du conseil calme à la patience du message officiel. Les allusions deviennent elles aussi inutiles, tout comme l'expertise de Georges Koresios¹⁶. Les discussions n'ont pas de sens, puisque, comme le dira peu de temps après Dosithée de Jérusalem, les lois ecclésiastiques « n'ont pas été fondées dans les montagnes de Valachie, ni par les princes valaques, mais à Constantinople, par des empereurs et synodes »¹⁷. Par exemple, continue Syrigos, le baptême des Calvinistes a été rejeté en 1644. « Comment l'accepter maintenant ? » Ce ne serait point correct, lança-t-il.

En effet, correct, il ne le serait pas. Mais, bien que Mélétiós ne l'admette pas, dans certaines conditions il était possible d'obtenir des dispenses. Arrêtons-nous donc un instant sur le susmentionné événement.

*Le synode de 1644*¹⁸

C'est une lettre envoyée au tsar Mikhaïl Feodorovici le 15 décembre 1644 par l'omniprésent Mélétiós Syrigos qui nous informe sur le synode « endémique » de Constantinople. On en apprend que les travaux avaient déjà commencé vingt deux jours auparavant, sur la demande expresse du voïévode moldave Vasile Lupu, qu'ils continueraient encore longtemps et que les participants avaient refusé d'admettre la légitimité du baptême des Luthériens.

Une deuxième lettre, adressée au tsar le même jour par l'agent Ivan Petrov Varda-Tafrali, apporte des détails intéressants : Lupu était intervenu auprès du patriarche Parthénios II le Jeune, récemment nommé, à la prière du roi polonais qui, à son tour, s'était mobilisé à la sollicitation du roi Christian IV du Danemark.

Le métropolite Petru Movilă de Kiev vient lui aussi à l'aide du souverain danois. Dès le 16 septembre il prie le titulaire du siège œcuménique d'approuver le déplacement à Moscou, pour des négociations, du sage Mélétiós¹⁹.

L'enjeu, on peut s'en douter déjà, était important. Il s'agissait d'une alliance politico-militaire russo-danoise dirigée contre la Suède et l'Empire ottoman. La coopération militaire allait être renforcée par le mariage du prince Valdemar Christian avec la princesse Irina Mikhaïlovna. Mais de forts groupes d'intérêts de Moscou, le patriarche Josèphe à leur tête, contestaient la validité du baptême luthérien, exigeant que le prétendant fût rebaptisé. La dispute entre le prêtre Ivan Nasedka (1570-1660 ; trésorier de la Cathédrale de la Dormition de la Vierge de Kremlin) et Matthäus Velhaber n'a fait qu'augmenter le conflit, surtout parce que le pasteur danois a osé invoquer en sa faveur le « cas » Loukaris. Parthénios le Jeune, surnommé Goliath ou l'Aigu, se fait appeler pour arbitrer le différend²⁰.

Bien qu'il eût été l'élève du philosophe Théophile Corydalée, bien qu'il eût célébré une messe funèbre à la mémoire de Loukaris et qu'il lui préparât même la canonisation, et malgré le fait qu'à Rome on croyait qu'à cause de lui « l'Église grecque deviendrait bientôt partisane de Luther et de Calvin », Parthénios donna une réponse défavorable aux signataires de la pétition. Le refus ferme des participants au synode convoqué pour

admettre la légitimité du baptême luthérien contribue décisivement à l'échec des négociations.

Iași, le 5 février 1645

Il y aura toutefois une noce au printemps de 1645. Donnons la parole à un témoin oculaire, le prince transylvain Ioan Kemény : « La noce eut lieu avec beaucoup de *solennitas*, de la Pologne arrivèrent beaucoup de nobles, envoyés du roi et des autres, avec de beaux vêtements et harnachements, de bons cavaliers, des gens de qualité, et en grand nombre, *circiter* deux mille cavaliers et pédestres ; mais, à vrai dire, ils ne dépassèrent pas du point de vue des vêtements les gens de la cour du voïévode (...); *in summa*, un faste grandiose, beaucoup de gens des deux côtés, sans la barbarie des paysans valaques, mais avec des arrangements chrétiens comme chez les rois. » En tête de la table, continue l'auteur ses souvenirs, était assis l'envoyé du souverain polonais. Venaient après le voïévode, les nobles, le marié et l'archevêque de Kiev et les prêtres de sa suite. „Ce métropolitain était un bonhomme doux, c'est lui qui les a mariés à l'église, comme chez les Valaques, et même pas Radziwiłł n'a eu rien contre, bien qu'il soit évangélique. »²¹

Le marié – Janusz Radziwiłł, l'un des plus riches magnats lituaniens, le palatin de Vilnius et le leader des protestants du grand duché – ne fut pas le seul à ne pas protester ; Parthénios le Jeune lui-même a donné sa bénédiction. S'agissant du mariage de sa fille aînée, Maria, et, implicitement, du premier pas vers la création d'une forte ligue des petits Etats non-catholiques de l'Europe orientale, Vasile Lupu a su imposer, une fois de plus, sa volonté devant l'œcuménisme et obtenir – contre une somme d'argent importante – l'accord du sultan Ibrahim I^{er} le Fou²².

A première vue, le patriarche a subi une défaite, étant obligé de ne pas respecter ses propres principes. D'ailleurs, après avoir rencontré Radziwiłł, récemment marié, Christian Valdemar a essayé de profiter de la brèche créée, de se servir de son exemple comme d'un précédent. Il y a échoué lamentablement. La lettre de Mélétius envers Mihnea III en dévoile la raison principale : la volonté de Parthénios n'avait pas été vaincue ; en réalité, il avait utilisé l'arme la plus terrible et la plus efficace dont il disposait, à côté de l'anathème : l'*oikonomie*, le pouvoir de décider sur l'exception.

Selon la définition la plus simple, l'*oikonomie* est un principe qui permet la violation, à titre exceptionnel, des normes ecclésiastiques en

vigueur afin de sauver une position absolument désespérée. Il *ne touche pas* à des questions de droit divin, peut être appliqué seulement s'il *apporte des bénéfices* consistants à son initiateur et *constitue l'apanage* du Patriarcat œcuménique²³. Concrètement, la noce d'Iași n'apporte à Parthénios que des bénéfices, l'aide financière accordée avec générosité par Vasile Lupu étant vitale²⁴. Par conséquent, il donne son accord sur le mariage, et cela la même année où le métropolite Varlaam de la Moldavie écrit et fait imprimer au monastère Dealu, situé près de Târgoviște, un *Réponse contre le Catéchisme calviniste*²⁵. En revanche, tant dans le cas du prince Valdemar que dans celui du synode de 1659, les coûts finaux du compromis auraient été clairement supérieurs aux profits. Les hésitations risquaient d'être fatales : *l'objectif réel était la définition de l'Orthodoxie*.

Les frontières de la juste foi

L'acharnement avec lequel on discute le problème du statut du baptisé protestant et l'insistance avec laquelle on invoque la première lettre de Saint Basile le Grand à *Amphiloque, sur les canons* (Epître CLXXXVIII) sont des preuves qu'il s'agissait d'établir les frontières de la juste foi.

Expliquons. Comme nous l'avons vu, Mihnea III et ses proches choisissent d'accepter le susmentionné baptême. La raison ? « Les Luthéro-Calvinistes croient dans la Sainte Trinité et sont baptisés au nom de la Sainte Trinité et ils n'en ont point changé le mystère ». Il faut donc que leur baptême – similaire à celui des profanes en temps de crise – soit reconnu, « notamment que Basile le Grand a accepté le baptême des ainsi nommés *cathares* en Asie, d'une certaine manière et avec une certaine indulgence ». Mais les hiérarques réunis à Constantinople contestent la logique de cette démonstration. Les Calvinistes, soulignent-ils, ne connaissent pas la prêtrise. Par conséquent, leur baptême n'est pas du tout similaire au baptême en temps de troubles. De plus, le parallèle entre les cathares et les protestants du XVII^e siècle n'est pas pertinent.

Les différences significatives d'interprétation peuvent s'expliquer si l'on fait appel au texte original²⁶. Suivant les « traditions », Saint Basile y trace une ligne de démarcation très claire entre *parasynagogues* [réunions illégales], *schismes* et *hérésies*. Les premières sont « les partis que forment les prêtres ou les évêques rebelles et les peuples indisciplinés ». Les schismes groupent « ceux qui se sont éloignés pour certains motifs ecclésiastiques ou pour des problèmes que l'on pouvait résoudre dans une

mutuelle entente ». Les hérésies incluent « ceux qui sont complètement séparés et qui sont des étrangers dans la foi ». Les anciens, continue le cappadocien son argumentation, ont décidé « de rejeter absolument le baptême des hérétiques, et d'admettre celui des schismatiques, comme de gens qui sont encore rattachés à l'Église ». Quant à ceux qui sont dans les parasynagogues, conclut-il, on doit les accueillir de nouveau dans l'Église, « lorsqu'ils se sont améliorés par une juste pénitence et un sérieux repentir ».

Voilà donc en quoi consiste la différence fondamentale. Pour le voïévode valaque, les Calvinistes et les Luthériens appartiennent au camp des schismatiques. Le salut ne leur est pas *a priori* refusé. Leur éloignement n'est pas total, puisqu'il y a encore des points qui continuent de les lier aux croyants authentiques. En revanche, pour les théologiens réunis autour du patriarche, les adeptes de Luther et Calvin n'ont plus d'espoir. Complètement déviés de la bonne voie, *ils sont damnés à toujours*.

Il est sous-entendu que dans la vision de Parthénios et de Mélélios c'est tracer la ligne de démarcation entre vérité et mensonge qui constitue *la tâche du patriarcat œcuménique*. Obtenu difficilement, ce privilège méritait d'être défendu à tout prix. Comme d'habitude, des passages de l'Ancien Testament se voient transformés en armes. On rappelle à Mihnea « les paroles que Zacharie et les prêtres qui étaient avec lui ont dit au roi Ozias lorsque celui-là s'est précipité d'encenser : Ce n'est pas donné à toi, Ozias, d'encenser au nom de Dieu ». Les initiatives du voïévode sont ainsi reléguées, selon un modèle longtemps utilisé dans l'Occident latin mais peu caractéristique au monde byzantin, dans la zone crépusculaire de la transgression des lois sacrées, du blasphème et du sacrilège.

La leçon reçue par le voïévode, symboliquement, le *Dimanche de l'Orthodoxie*, est très dure. « Ce n'est pas donné aux souverains laïcs (...) ni de condamner ni d'absoudre les péchés des gens, mais à ceux à qui ce privilège est donné par notre Sauveur Jésus Christ. » Les déviations, ça va de soi, seront durement punies.

Malgré cela, le prince se montre insensible aux avertissements et menaces. Il répond d'une manière polémique, point par point, aux lettres patriarcales. Il y cite largement les Saints Pères. Il y évoque « les exigences du temps et des lieux » et parle de sa bonne conscience. Son comportement, il faut le dire, est inhabituel. Il est donc légitime se demander quelles sont ses motivations.

III.

Il est étonnant à quel point les opinions sur Mihnea III soient partagées et subjectives. Miron Costin, apparenté avec les Cantacuzène persécutés par le prince dans la deuxième moitié de son règne, le considère « homme sans nulle crainte de Dieu, dépourvu de consistance morale, *tyran, vrai phantaste*, confus dans ses pensées ». Dosithée de Jérusalem, qui ne l'aimait pas trop lui non plus, lui reproche de nourrir le plan « de vaincre les Ottomans et d'anéantir lui, *le fou* (ὁ ἄφρων), leur empire et de se faire nommer empereur ». Seul le patriarche arabe Macaire ibn al-Za'īm d'Antioche le considère comme un « homme sincère, vertueux, bon cœur et juste », et ce parce qu'il était l'un de ses proches collaborateurs.

On bâtit difficilement sur de tels sables mouvants. D'où vient Mihnea ? Comment est-il possible qu'un individu élevé des années entières dans l'entourage de Koca Ken'an Pacha se dresse contre la Porte presque immédiatement après son avènement au trône ? Quel est le point commun des faits comme « la promotion de certains projets sur l'union de l'Orient avec le Siège romain »²⁷ et le patronage d'un synode orthodoxe, la participation constante aux messes et le massacre impitoyable des ennemis ? Certes, on ne fera pas ici une analyse détaillée des événements passés en Valachie entre 1658 et 1660²⁸. Néanmoins, quelques précisions sur le synode de Târgoviște s'imposent.

La première concerne l'adaptation des décisions prises aux réalités locales. Nous savons, par le biais des témoignages des nombreux voyageurs étrangers, des documents internes préservés et de la correspondance des hiérarques, que les maux qui rongeaient l'Église de l'époque étaient nombreux et graves. Le mariage était, semble-t-il, plutôt *un contrat naturel* qu'un *Mystère*²⁹. Le divorce était accordé « pour la moindre parole » et contre de l'argent. Bien qu'interdits par la loi, le troisième et le quatrième mariage étaient endémiques. La formation et l'implication des prêtres dans la vie des communautés laissaient elles aussi à désirer ; « leur barbarie est complète », apprécie Matthieu de Myra. Quant aux mœurs monacales, le témoignage de l'évêque missionnaire catholique Petru Bogdan (Pietro Deodato) Bakšić est bien connu :

« Les higoumènes ou leurs starets se promènent en fiacres, habillés en soie, de sorte qu'ils ont l'air des boyards... Dans les monastères, ce sont les tsiganes qui font les travaux : ils labourent, creusent, travaillent et gardent le bétail et font tout ce qui est à faire, on peut y voir même des femmes tsiganes qui travaillent... »³⁰.

Il y a eu toutefois des personnes lucides qui avaient compris la gravité des problèmes. « Tout mon pays est hanté par la faim et la soif, non pas celles du pain et de l'eau, mais, selon le Prophète, de nourriture et de breuvage spirituel », dit en 1635, l'âme pleine de tristesse, le voïévode Matei Basarab. Comme réponse, les métropolitains Théophile (1636-1648) et Étienne (1648-1653 ; 1655-1668) déclenchent un vaste programme de redressement « culturel, religieux et éthique général ». On bâtit de nouvelles *églises* et on rénove les anciennes. *L'enseignement* monastique est réorganisé. Est fondée, sous la direction de Pantéléïmon (Païsius) Ligaridis, une *école* où l'enseignement est en grec et latin. On publie *des livres* destinés au culte, dont plusieurs ont les indications aux prêtres dans la langue du peuple, pour qu'elles soient mieux comprises par les officiants. On traduit en roumain et on publie le monumental code juridique intitulé *Le guide à la Loi*, « pour que le peuple de notre pays corrige ses mœurs »³¹.

On a cru que l'interruption, en 1652, de l'activité éditoriale marquait la fin de cette initiative. Quelques manuscrits des collections de la Bibliothèque de l'Académie Roumaine prouvent le contraire. Illustré d'une manière extrêmement belle, le *ms. rom. 1790* est, par exemple, le fruit de l'intention ferme du susmentionné Étienne « de créer un Grand pontifical [*Slujebnic arhieresc*] ad hoc, qui réunisse les traditions grecque et slave à côté d'une pratique nationale qu'il réformera »³². Loin d'avoir fini, l'action de renouvellement spirituel continue.

La convocation du synode de janvier 1659 s'inscrit parfaitement, selon moi, dans ce profond programme de renouvellement. Elle reflète aussi le fait que la Métropole de Târgoviște s'assume un statut particulier – celui de « mère de toutes les églises »³³. Autrement dit, certaines dispositions du concile tiennent compte également de la situation religieuse des Roumains de la Transylvanie.

Il est possible, par exemple, que l'acceptation de la légitimité du baptême protestant soit due « au phénomène de rebaptême qui avait connu une certaine ampleur » à l'époque de Matei Basarab³⁴. Il est plus probable pourtant que la décision ait été prise afin de regagner les positions perdues par les orthodoxes au delà des montagnes – « pour attirer des gens comme ceux-ci vers l'orthodoxie et pour qu'ils ne perdent pas définitivement la bienveillance de l'Église ». Les arguments en faveur de cette hypothèse ne font pas défaut. D'une part, il y a les tentatives bien connues de Mihnea III d'obtenir la permission de la Porte d'étendre son autorité au moins sur l'Ardeal, sinon sur la Moldavie aussi³⁵. D'autre part, le contexte

culturel effervescent et cosmopolite de la cour princière encourage de tels projets³⁶ ; Ligaridis lui-même écrit là quatre « enseignements » adressés aux « Calvinistes-Luthériens roumains de la Transylvanie »³⁷.

Mais – et on arrive ainsi à la deuxième des précisions annoncées – les lettres expédiées au patriarche ne mentionnent aucun nom de prélat impliqué dans les discussions. Le prince se présente comme unique responsable pour les efforts faits « per introdurre boni costumi nella chiesa loro »³⁸. Un métropolitain comme Étienne, qui n’oubliait jamais d’insister sur le primat du spirituel – voir le portrait votif de l’église de Bălănești-Râmestî, où il plaide la cause de Mihnea devant la Vierge – n’aurait point apprécié cette attitude³⁹. Tout au contraire, des gens comme Païsius Ligaridis étaient plus que contents...

Orthodoxie et politique

Le voïévode écrit à Parthénios IV conseillé et aidé par cet érudit grec de Chio. Il le fait avec dignité, non pas seulement par opportunisme, soif de légitimité ou orgueil démesuré, *mais aussi comme une conséquence naturelle du caractère de son pouvoir*, légué par ses « ancêtres ». ⁴⁰ Il le dit lui-même, dès le début, et la titulature employé le confirme. « Par la grâce et la miséricorde de Dieu », Mihnea est « l’hégémon de toute la Hongrovalachie et archiduc des régions contigües »⁴¹.

À vrai dire, il est fort possible que le terme ἡγεμῶν - ἡγεμον - « hégémon » ne soit pas le synonyme d’ αὐθέντης - « domn » - « seigneur », mais qu’il assume déjà le sens de « protecteur » - « oblăduitor » spécifique aux princes « phanariotes » du XVIII^e siècle⁴². Quoique ce soit, l’usage conscient d’une nouvelle formule de chancellerie confirme l’existence d’un plan : Mihnea n’est ni poète, ni fou, ni mystique.

Il est très probable que les messagers qui avaient la tâche de ramener les lettres du 21 janvier aient eu aussi la mission de tester la réceptivité du patriarche aux projets de révolte ottomane qui se tissaient au nord du Danube inférieur ; en cas contraire, notre document serait resté à usage intérieur, comme ce fut le cas des documents par lesquels le moldave Miron Barnovschi réglementait la vie en communauté des monastères Dragomirna, Sucevița et Hangul⁴³.

Mais à Constantinople le souvenir de l’exécution par pendaison de Parthénios III, pour avoir collaboré avec le tsar russe, est encore très douloureux⁴⁴. En outre, dans le contexte des actions concertées vouées à neutralisées les effets des actions du grand Kyrillos Loukaris, le discours

de la Grande Église s'était radicalisé. Ce n'est que nous qui détenons le monopole de la définition de l'orthodoxie, répètent incessamment des théologiens comme Mélétiou Syrigos ou Dosithée de Jérusalem⁴⁵. Le facteur politique, auquel « le patriarche calviniste » avait largement frayé chemin, ne doit pas se mêler de nos affaires.

Malgré ces mesures fermes, « le mal » a continué de s'étendre. Mihnea est assassiné sans retard, dans des circonstances aussi étranges que la vie qu'il avait menée. Païsiou Ligaridis sauve pourtant sa peau – encore une fois ! Au printemps de 1662 il est déjà à Moscou. Avec érudition et une versatilité bien connue, il continue de soutenir l'idée du souverain *oint du Seigneur* qui a le droit de désigner tant le patriarche que les évêques, selon son gré⁴⁶. Quatre ans plus tard, il dirigeait les travaux du synode réuni sur l'ordre d'Alexeï Mikhaïlovici pour éloigner Nikon. L'immixtion du pouvoir laïc dans les *things ecclesiastical* devient implacable.

Annexe

De Târgoviște par Istanbul à Leyde. Mélétiou Syrigos à Mihnea III Radu (Constantinople, le 28 février 1659).

« A great lover and student of ye Oriental tongues »⁴⁷

Symbole de la lutte pour l'indépendance des Pays Bas, *Universiteit Leiden* est, au milieu du XVII^e siècle, l'une des plus prestigieuses institutions d'enseignement supérieur du vieux continent⁴⁸. De grandes personnalités avaient suivi ses cours. Mais la perle de la couronne restait « la chaire » de langues orientales, dominée par l'immense personnalité de Jacobus Golius/Jacob Gool (1596-1667).

Attirés par la célébrité et par les connaissances du grand professeur, des générations des étudiants s'étaient dirigées en grand nombre, au fil des années, vers la ville où était né le grand Rembrandt Harmensz. van Rijn. Parmi eux, un jeune de Leppe – Levinus Warner.

En 1645, cet allemand devient le représentant diplomatique de la République batave auprès de la Sublime Porte. Les années suivantes, avec de grands efforts, il collectionne plus de mille manuscrits. La plupart sont en *arabe, persan, turc et hébreu*, indice clair des intérêts scientifiques du possesseur.

Mais Warner s'intéresse aussi à l'état des chrétiens de l'Orient. Il ramasse des données, achète des codex, se fait copier des textes normatifs. L'actuel *BPG 60 C* contient *La Confession Orthodoxe* de Petru Movilă dans la traduction grecque de Mélétius Syrigos ; le *BPG 65 A* abrite des copies de la lettre adressée par Nikon de Moscou au Patriarche Païsius le 1^{er}, du commentaire liturgique composé par Syrigos comme réponse et des lettres que Mihnea écrit à Parthénios IV ; le *BPG 73 G* contient la réponse de Mélétius aux dernières, éditée dans les annexes de la présente étude⁴⁹.

La situation lui semble affreuse. « Ce que nous voyons maintenant à Constantinople, écrit-il avec tristesse, c'est un endroit où il n'y a que des cadavres prêts à être lacérés et des corbeaux qui les lacèrent ». Mais malgré cela, il ne perd pas définitivement l'espoir ; si les efforts portent leurs fruits, les Turcs accepteront la vérité de la religion chrétienne et ils s'y convertiront⁵⁰.

A la mort de Levinus, survenue en 1665, la fabuleuse collection ramassée notamment à cette fin entre dans la possession de l'Université de Leyde. Ainsi, en décembre 1668, les trois documents discutés dans la présente étude arrivent dans la belle ville située au bord du vieux Rhin.

Nous ne savons pas où se trouvent les originaux. Ce n'est qu'apparemment que cela constitue un obstacle ; en réalité, par le biais des copies nous comprenons infiniment mieux le climat intellectuel et religieux de l'Europe du XVII^e siècle. Un climat d'intenses échanges culturels.

[Leyde, B.P.G. 73G, ff. 1-10]:

« Chart. (signum chart. : flos ; sim. Heawood 2597 (litterae AS)), an. 1659, 188 x 100, fol. 48 (1 fol. tegumento adglutinatum, 1*, 1-45, 1 fol. tegumentum adglutinatum). IV (1 fol. tegumento adglut., 1*, 1-6) + 4 V (f. 7-45, 1 fol. tegumento adglut.).

Textus 140 x 80/85, lin. 15-16, in foliis rectis tantum scriptus ab eodem librario qui codd. 65A et 76 scripsit.

Tegumentum saec. XVIII (chart.) »⁵¹

F. 1*^{*} Note de Levinus Warner, avril 1659 ; ff. 1-10 lettre de Mélétius Syrigos ; ff. 11-45 vides.

Note : La présente édition n'est pas une édition critique, puisqu'on n'a pas pu voir le manuscrit original, et le microfilm est parfois illisible. Les fautes, dues probablement au copiste, ont été tacitement corrigées. La ponctuation a été adaptée aux règles modernes.

Texte

/1./ Ἐκλαμπρότατε, εὐσεβέστατε, καὶ ἐνδοξότατε | αὐθέντα τὴν ἐκλαμπρο-
 τητά σου δου- λικῶς προσκυνῶ. | Κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τῆς ἐκλαμπρότητάς
 σου | ἐπήγαμεν εἰς τὸ Πατριαρχεῖον νὰ ἰδοῦμεν | τὰ κεφάλαια ὅπου ἔστειλε
 διὰ νὰ ὑπογράψωσι. | Καὶ προκαθημένου τοῦ παναγιω- τάτου ἡμῶν | δεσπ
 ὅτου τοῦ οἰκουμενικοῦ πατριάρχου κυρίου | Παρθενίου καὶ συνεδριαζόντων α
 ὑ- τῶν | τῶν παρευρεθέντων ἀρχιερέων καὶ κληρικῶν, ἀνεγνώσθησαν τὰ γρ
 ἄμματα | τῆς ἐκλαμπρό-τητάς σου καὶ τὰ κεφάλαια αὐτὰ τὰ ιζ.' | Καὶ πολλ
 ῆς ζητήσεως γενομένης περὶ αὐτῶν, | δὲν εὐ-ρήκαμεν τινὰ καθόλου ἀπὸ τὴν
 ἱεράν | ταύτην σύνοδον, συγκατατιθέμενον | νὰ ὑπογράψῃ διὰ νὰ τὰ κυρώσῃ
 . Τὰς δὲ | /2./ αἰτίας, ἐπρόσταξεν ἐμὲ ὁ παναγιώτατος | νὰ ταῖς σημειώσω ε
 ἰς τὴν εὐ- σεβεστάτην σου | αὐθεντείαν. Γράφω τῆς λοιπὸν ἐν συντόμῳ | τὰ τέ
 ως πραχθέντα.

Πρῶτον ἔδοξε | νὰ μὴν εἶναι νόμιμον ἢ κοσμικὴ ἀρχὴ | καὶ ἐξουσία νὰ πρ
 οστάσῃ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν | καὶ νὰ λέγῃ: ἐγὼ οὕτως τὸ ἔκρινα εὐλογον | καὶ
 εἶναι καλὸν καὶ κύρωσον καὶ σὺ ἀναμ|φιβόλως καὶ ἀνεξετάστως, διὰ νὰ
 μὴ | γενοῦσι σκάνδαλα, ἀλλὰ μάλλον τὸ | ἐναντίον, ἂν φανῇ τῆς ἐκκλησίας
 ὡς καλόν, | ὅτι εἶναι ἐκεῖνο τὸ προβαλλόμενον, νὰ τὸ | στέρῃ καὶ κοσμικὴ ἐξ-
 ουσία. Διατί καὶ | αὐτὸς ὁ πρῶτος τῶν χριστιανῶν βασιλεὺς | Κωνσταντῖνο
 ς, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ὀρθό-δοξοὶ | /3./ βασιλεῖς, ὅπου ἐπεριμαζώσασι τὰς συνόδου
 ς, | δὲν ἔλεγασι, οὕτως ἡμεῖς κρίνομεν, | καὶ ἐσεῖς κυρώσατε τὰ δόξαντα ἢ
 μῶν, ἀλλὰ | ἀφίνοντες τὴν κρίσιν εἰς τοὺς συνηγμένους | ἀρχι-
 ερεῖς τοὺς συ- νιστῶντας τὴν σύνοδον. | " Ὑστερον αὐτοὶ ὑποτασσόμενοι εἰς τὰ ἐκεῖνα | δόγμ
 ατα ὑπέγραψον καὶ ἐκύρουν αὐτὰ | ἥδη κριθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων. " Ἀλλ
 ἂ νῦν | ἢ ἐκλαμπρότη σου ἀλλάσσει τὴν τάξιν καὶ γράφει | ὅτι τὰ ἐκύρωσε
 καὶ ὑπέγραψε καὶ ἐσφράγισε | μὲ τὴν βουλάν τηςεἰς μνήμην αἰωνίαν, | διὰ ν
 ἂ στέκωνται ἀπαρασάλευτα, χωρὶς νὰ τὰ | ἐρευνήσῃ ἢ τοῦ οἰκουμενι-
 κοῦ θρο- νου σύνοδος. |

Δεύτερον δὲν εὐρήκασιν ὅλα τὰ κεφάλαια ἐκεῖνα | νὰ ἀκολουθοῦσιν εἰς τ
 ἢν ἀρχαίαν πα- ράδοσιν | /4./ τῆς ἐκκλησίας μας. Διατί τότε ἂν καὶ ἢ | τάξι
 ς ἤλλαξε, πάλιν διὰ συγκατάβασιν, | χαριζόμενοι τῇ εὐσεβείᾳ σου, ἐθέλασιν
 | τὰ ὑπογράψωσιν, μηδὲν παραχαράτοντες | τῆς ἀλήθειας, μῆτε παρεκκλίνοντ
 ες ἀπὸ | τῆς εὐθείας ὁδοῦ τῆς ἀνέκαθεν ἡμῶν ὀρθοδοξίας, | ἀλλὰ εἰς αὐτὰ
 ἐκλαμπρότατε αὐθέντα, | περικρατοῦνται. Καὶ τὸ βάπτισμα τῶν λου|τεροκα
 λβίνων ὅτι ἐστὶ δεκ- τὸν καὶ ἢ ἀπαγόρευσις | τῶν γάμων, τῶν νομίμως χω
 ρισθέντων, | εἰς τὰ ἀνεύθηνα πρόσωπα | καὶ ἢ συνχώρησις τῆς κρεοφαγίας
 τῶν | καλογέρων τὰ ὅποια καὶ τάξιν, ἂν καλὰ | καὶ ἢ ἐκκλη- σία τῶν λατίν

ων τὰ στέργει ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἡ ἀνατολικὴ οὔτε ποτὲ τὰ /5./ ἐδέχθηκεν, οὔτε τὰ θέλει στριβεῖν.

Καὶ μάλιστα |τὸ βάπτισμα τῶν καλβίνων προετέθει|καὶ ἀλλότε εἰς τὴν σύνοδον ταύτην, εἰς τοὺς Ὑάχμδ/ πατριαρχεῦοντος Παρθενίου τοῦ |πρώην ὁ Ἀνδριανουπόλεως, καὶ οὐκ ἐκυρώθη, |ἀλλ' ἀπεδοκιμάσθη. Πῶς οὖν τῶρα νὰ |κυρωθῆ; Ὑελεγον οἱ τῆς συνόδου: Ὑμεῖς |οἱ ἴδιοι ἤμε- θαν ὁποῦ τότε τὸ ἀπεβάλομεν, |καὶ τῶρα νὰ τὸ ἐγκρίνωμεν; Δὲν μᾶς φαί|νεται ἄξιον.

Καὶ ἂν καλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια |νὰ περιέχονται κάποιοι λογαριασμοί, ὁποῦ |ἀγωνί- ζονται νὰ τὸ δείξουσι καλὸν καὶ τελεῖον, |ὡς ἂν καὶ τὸ ἐδικὸν μας ὁποῦ γίνεται ἀπὸ λα|ϊκοὺς καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁποῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τῆς |ἀγίας τριάδος, ἀλλὰ δὲν τοὺς ἐδέχθηκεν ἡ |/6./σύνο- δος καθόλου, λέγουσα ὅτι δὲν εἶναι |ὅμοιον τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων λαϊκῶν |διδόμενον βάπτισμα μετ' ἐκεῖνο ὁποῦ |δίδουσιν οἱ κοσμικοὶ καλβίνοι, οἱ |ἀθετοῦντες τὴν ἱεροσύνην, διότι οἱ |ἡμέτεροικοσμικοὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάγκην ἐκείνην, |ἐπέχουσι τόπον ἱερὸν ἕως καὶ ἀναφέρουσι |τὸ βάπτισμα ὁποῦ δίδουσιν εἰς τὸ βρέφος |εἰς τὴν πίστιν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἡμετέρας, ἀμὴ οἱ |καλβίνοι δὲν ἐπέχουσι τὸ-πον ἱερὸν ὅταν β|απτί|ζουσιν, ἐπειδὴ ἀρνοῦνται τὴν ἱεροσύνην, |ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ βαπτίζουσιν εἰς τὴν ἐδικὴν τους |πίστιν, τὴν πεπληρωμένην αἰρεσιῶν. |Καὶ οἱ ἐδικοὶ μας λαϊκοὶ μετ' τὴν ἐξουσίαν/7./ ὁποῦ τις ἔδωκεν ἡ ἐκκλησία νὰ βαπτίζουσιν |εἰς καιρὸν ἀνάγκης, εἶναι ὡς ἂν ἀπε|σταλμένοι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποστολικῆς καὶ κα|θολικῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰς τὸ βαπτίζειν. Οἱ |δὲ καλβίνοι δὲν πέμπον-ται ἀπὸ ἱε|ρεῖς |τὸ βαπτίζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἐαυτοῦ ἔρχονται εἰς |τοῦτο, ὥστε εἶναι ἀπὸ μοναχοὺς καὶ γυμνοὺς |κοσμικοὺς καὶ ἀνιέρους τὸ βάπτισμα αὐτῶν |καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἄκυρον. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ λεγό- μενον |ὅτι εἰς τὴν ἀγίαν τριάδα βαπτίζονται, ἔ|φέρουσι |τὴν μαρτυρίαν τοῦ Μεγάλου Βασιλείου.

Λέγοντος ἐν τῇ β^η ἐπιστολῇ τὴν πρὸς ὙΑμφιλόχιον ἐν κανόνι περὶ [... ...] λέγεται σαν ὅτι εἰς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν καὶ ἄγιον πνεύματος ἐβαπτίστημεν. οἶμε κακῶν [...] τίθεασι /8./ τὸν θεὸν ἐφα-μίλλως τῷ Μαρκίῳ καὶ ἰταῖς λοιπαῖς αἰρέσεσι ταῦτα καὶ ἀλλὰ ὅμοια τούτοις εἶποτες (:), οὐκ ἤβουλήθησαν κυρῶσασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν ἤκουσε ἀπὸ τὰ γράμματα τῆς ἐκλαμπρότητος σου ὅτι ἐσυγχωρήσατε τὰ σφάλματα τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ ἱερέων, μόνον νὰ μὴν τὰ κάμουσι πλέον, ἐξε-φώνησαν πάντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ Ζαχαρίου καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ, ὁποῦ εἶπασιν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ὙΟσίαν, ὅταν ἔπλασε νὰ θυμιάσῃ: οὐ σοι ὙΟσία θυμιάσῃ τῷ Θεῷ: δὲν εἶναι ἴδιον εἰς τοὺς κοσμικοὺς βασιλεῖς [...], τὸ δεσμεῖν καὶ λύειν τὰς των ἀνθρώπων ἁμαρτίας, ἀλλ' οἷς δέδοται ἐκ τοῦ σωτήρου ἡμῶν ὙΙησοῦς Χριστός, φοβούμενοι ἂν τὸ σιωπήσωσι νὰ μὴ ἀθῶσι τὸ /9./τὸ τοῦ ὙΗσαίου ὁ ὁποῖος διατί δὲν ἐσπούδασε νὰ ἐκβληθῆ ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ὁ ὙΟσίας ὡς ἂν ἐλε-πρώθε, δὲν ἤξιωθη τινὸς θεοφανίας, παρὰ τοῦ ἔτους οὗ ἀπόθανε ὙΟσίας ὁ βασιλεύς⁵². Τὰ

δὲ λοιπὰ κεφάλαια ἤγουν τὰ περὶ τριγαμίας, τῶν χειροτονιῶν, τοῦ σιμωνιακοῦ τῶν ἡγουμένων, μοναχῶν καὶ μοναστηρικῶν πραγμάτων ἂν ἡ ἐκλαμπρότης σου δώσῃ τὴν κρίσιν εἰς τὴν σύνοδονταύτην, θέλει τὰ κυρώσει μετ' τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπικρίσεως, ἐπειδὴ εἶναι ἀντὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας παρα-δόσεις τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐκκλησίας. Ταῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἔγιναν τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκείνην, ἧτις ἦν ἡ πρώτη κυριακὴ τῆς ἁγίας τεσσαρακοστῆς ἤγουν ἧτις ὀρθοδοξίας. Καὶ ὁ Θεὸς νῦν /10/ φυλάτῃ τὴν ἐκλαμπρότην σου θεοσεβείαν ἐν εἰρηνῇ διὰ παντὸς εἰς τὸν θρόνον τῆς.

Ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει: Ἀρχθ/φευρουαρίῳ κη/τῆς ἐκλαμπρότητός σου δούλος μικρὸς Μελέτιος Συρίγος ἱερομόναχος.

Traduction

/1./ „Sérénissime, Très-chrétien et Très-glorieux Seigneur, je m’incline humblement devant Votre Grandeur. A la demande de Votre Grandeur, nous sommes allés au Patriarcat voir les chapitres que [V. G.] avait envoyés pour être signés. Et présidant Sa Sainteté notre maître, le Patriarche œcuménique kyr Partenie, et étant réunis en synode les grands prélats et les ecclésiastiques qui étaient là, on a lu les lettres de Votre Grandeur et les dix-sept chapitres. Au bout d’une analyse attentive de ces chapitres, il n’y a eu personne dans ce synode qui y apposât sa signature pour les confirmer. /2./ Sa Sainteté [le Patriarche] m’a chargé d’en informer Votre Seigneurie très-pieuse sur les raisons. Je vous écris donc brièvement sur tout ce qui a été décidé jusqu’à présent.

Premièrement, on a décidé qu’il ne soit pas légal que l’autorité et le pouvoir laïc donne des ordres à l’Église et dise : ‘c’est ainsi que j’ai considéré et que c’est bien par rapport à ceci ou cela et tu n’as qu’à le confirmer sans le mettre en doute et sans le questionner, pour éviter les scandales’, mais *au contraire*, s’il considère que c’est bien ce que l’Église a proposé, le pouvoir profane n’a qu’à le confirmer. Parce que même le premier empereur des chrétiens, Constantin, et les autres empereurs orthodoxes [qui sont venus après lui], /3./ qui ont convoqué des synodes, n’ont pas dit ‘c’est ainsi que nous considérons et vous devez confirmer ce que nous avons décidé’, mais ils ont laissé les archiérés réunis en synode décider. Ensuite, eux-mêmes, en se soumettant aux dogmes de ces derniers, ils signaient et confirmaient ce qui était déjà établi par les Pères. Mais maintenant Votre Grandeur change l’ordre des choses et écrit avoir signé et scellé ceci pour la mémoire éternelle, pour que cela reste ainsi pour toujours, sans que le synode du Siècle œcuménique l’ait analysé.

En deuxième lieu, ils n'ont pas trouvé que tous ces chapitres suivent la tradition ancienne /4./ de notre Église. Parce que même si l'ordre des choses changeait, et par bienveillance envers Votre Grandeur nous désirions signer [les titres demandés], nous ne nous éloignerions pas pour autant de la vérité et de la bonne voie de l'orthodoxie, mais nous continuerions de rester près d'elles. Et qu'il soit acceptable le baptême des Luthéro-Calvinistes, et l'interdiction des mariages légaux entre des personnes irresponsables, et la permission de manger de la viande accordée aux moines, de telles choses, même si l'Église des Latins les accepte, l'Église d'Orient ne les a pourtant /5./ jamais acceptées et elle ne les acceptera pas.

Ce qui plus est, le baptême des Calvinistes a déjà été discuté dans le synode de 1644, à l'époque où le patriarche était Partenie, antérieurement d'Andrinople, et il n'y a pas été confirmé non plus, mais refusé. Comment l'accepter maintenant ? Les membres du synode ont dit : C'est nous qui l'avons refusé, comment le confirmer maintenant ? Cela ne nous semble pas correct !

Et bien que même les chapitres rappelés contiennent certains arguments qui veulent montrer que [le baptême calviniste] est bon, tout comme le nôtre, lorsqu'il est officié par des personnes laïques, au nom de la Sainte Trinité, le synode ne les a point acceptés, /6./ disant que le baptême officié par nos laïcs n'était pas pareil à celui officié par les laïcs calvinistes, qui refusent la prêtrise. Et ce parce que nos laïcs, en période de troubles, remplacent le prêtre et le baptême de l'enfant reflète la croyance de notre Église, alors que les Calvinistes ne remplacent pas le prêtre quand ils baptisent, parce qu'ils rejettent la prêtrise et ils baptisent l'enfant dans leur croyance pleine d'hérésies. Et nos laïcs, /7./ investis du pouvoir que l'Église leur a donné de baptiser en temps de crise, sont comme envoyés de l'Église apostolique et catholique pour baptiser. Au contraire, les Calvinistes ne sont pas envoyés par les prêtres baptiser, mais ils le font de leur propre autorité, de sorte que le baptême officié par eux est fait par de simples laïcs, dépourvus du don de la prêtrise et à cause de cela dépourvus de légitimité. Quant à l'affirmation qu'ils sont baptisés au nom de la Sainte Trinité, ils ont invoqué le témoignage de Basile le Grand de la deuxième épître à Amphiloque. Dans le canon <...> on ne dit pas que nous sommes baptisés au nom du Père, du Fils et du Saint Esprit. Et ceux qui procèdent d'une manière erronée /8./ mettent Dieu en compétition avec Marcion et les autres hérésies.

Ces aspects et d'autres similaires à eux que l'on a discutés, ils n'ont pas voulu les confirmer. Ce qui plus est, lorsque le synode a entendu par les

lettres de Votre Grandeur que vous aviez pardonné les fautes des grands prêtres et des prêtres à la seule condition qu'ils ne les répètent plus, ils ont prononcé tous ensemble les paroles que Zacharie et les prêtres qui étaient avec lui avaient dites au roi Ozias lorsqu'il s'était précipité d'encenser : Ce n'est pas donné à toi, Ozias, d'encenser au nom de Dieu. Ce n'est pas donné aux rois laïcs <...>, ni de condamner ni d'absoudre les péchés des gens, mais à ceux que notre Sauveur Jésus Christ a donné ce privilège. Ayant peur que, s'ils se taisent, il ne leur arrive à eux aussi ce qui était arrivé à Esaïe, /9./ qui [parce qu'il] n'avait pas fait de son mieux pour chasser de la cité Ozias lorsqu'il était tombé malade de lèpre, n'avait plus été digne de voir Dieu avant une année après la mort du roi.

Les autres chapitres, c'est-à-dire ceux sur le troisième mariage, sur les consécérations des prêtres, sur la simonie des higoumènes, des moines et des choses monacales, si Votre Grandeur fait une analyse de ce synode, il les confirmera [pas] après l'analyse convenable, parce qu'ils sont contraires aux traditions anciennes de notre église.

C'est ce qui s'est passé ce jour-là. C'était le premier dimanche du saint jeûne, c'est-à-dire le Dimanche de l'Orthodoxie. Que le Seigneur /10./ ait soin que Votre Grandeur qui honore Dieu reste toujours en paix sur son trône.

Fait à Constantinople, 1659, le 28 février.

L'humble serviteur de Votre Grandeur, Mélétius Syrigos hieromoine.

Abréviations

BPG = Bibliotheca Universitatis Lugduni Batavorum – *Codices Bibliothecae Publicae Graeci* ;

BCIR = *Buletinul Comisiei Istorice a României* ;

RESEE = *Revue des Études du Sud-Est Européennes* ;

AAR. MSI = *Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice* ;

BAR = *Biblioteca Academiei Române* ;

BSHAR = *Bulletin de la Section Historique de l'Académie Roumaine* ;

BOR = *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* ;

SMIM = *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Medie* ;

MMS = *Mitropolia Moldovei și Sucevei* ;

AIIX - AIIX = *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie (și Arheologie) « A. D. Xenopol » Iași.*

NOTES

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- ¹ *Călători străini despre țările române* VI/2, éd. Mustafa Ali Mehmet, Bucarest 1976, p. 467 ; Alexandru Ciorănescu, *Domnia lui Mihnea III (Mihail Radu) 1658-1659* [BCIR 14], Bucarest 1935, p. 50 (Giovanni Ballarino).
- ² Cf. Andrei Pippidi, *Tradiția politică bizantină în țările române în secolele XVI-XVIII*, Bucarest 1983, pp. 211-215.
- ³ Ἱστορία περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἱεροσολύμοις πατριαρχουσάντων, Bucarest 1715, p. 1205.
- ⁴ Pour le personnage, voir Émile Legrand, *Bibliographie hellénique, ou description raisonnée des ouvrages publiés par des Grecs au dix-septième siècle* IV, Paris 1894, pp. 8-61 ; Francisc Pall, « Les relations de Vasile Lupu avec l'Orient orthodoxe et particulièrement avec le Patriarcat de Constantinople, envisagées surtout d'après les lettres de Ligaridis », *Balcania* 8 (1945), pp. 137-139 ; Harry T. Hionides, *Paisius Ligarides*, New York 1972 ; Philip Longworth, « The Strange Career of Paisios Ligarides », *History Today* 45 (1995), 6, pp. 39-45.
- ⁵ *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*. Edited by Frank L. Cross and Elizabeth A. Livingstone, New York 1997³, p. 1001. Excellente présentation chez Gunnar Hering, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat und europäische Politik 1620-1638*, Wiesbaden 1968 [à lire avec les commentaires d'Andrei Pippidi dans RESEE 8 (1970), 4, pp. 715-721].
- ⁶ « La boutique de Théophile. Les relations de Kyrillos Loukaris avec la Réforme et particulièrement avec les théologiens suisses, envisagées surtout d'après les lettres d'Antoine Léger ». À paraître.
- ⁷ Gunnar Hering, *Ökumenisches Patriarchat...*, pp. 322 sq.
- ⁸ Spyridon P. Lambros, « Σταχυολογία ἐκ κωδίκων τοῦ βασιλικοῦ Λουγδούνου », *Νέος Ἑλληνομνήμων* 12 (1915), 4, pp. 415-416 ; Nicolae Iorga, « Două contribuții la istoria bisericească a românilor II. Sinodul de la Târgoviște în 1659 », AAR (II^e série. Tome XXXVIII) MSI, Bucarest 1916, pp. 471-475 (texte) ; 477-481 (traduction).
- ⁹ *Levini Warneri de Rebus Turcicis. Epistolae ineditae*. Edidit G. N. Du Rieu, Lugduni Batavorum [Leiden] 1883, p. 62 (No. LIV – 13 septembre 1659) ;

- Nicolae Iorga, *Studii și documente cu privire la istoria românilor* 23, Bucarest 1913, p. 233-234.
- 10 L'affirmation est surprenante, les attaques du grand théologien à l'adresse des protestants étant bien connues. Je pense, par exemple, à sa dispute avec le pasteur Léger. Voir Samuel Baud-Bovy, « Antoine Léger, pasteur aux vallées du Piémont et son séjour à Constantinople. D'après une correspondance inédite 1622-1631 », *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte/ Revue d'histoire Suisse* 24 (1944), 2, pp. 210 sq. Cf. BAR ms. gr. 490, ff. 1-23 (Ἐπιστολαὶ τοῦ Λεγγήρου καὶ τοῦ Κορεσσίου).
- 11 Nicolae Iorga, « Deux contributions à l'histoire ecclésiastique des Roumains II. Le synode de Târgoviște », BSHAR 3-4 (1916), 4, p. 368.
- 12 Alexandru Elian, « Legăturile Mitropoliei Ungrovlahiei cu Patriarhia de Constantinopol și cu celelalte Biserici Ortodoxe. A. De la întemeiere până la 1800 », BOR 77 (1959), 7-10, pp. 922-923 [= Idem, *Bizanțul, Biserica și cultura românească*, éd. Vasile V. Muntean, Iași 2003, pp. 165-166] ; Alexandru Ciorănescu, *Domnia lui Mihnea III...1659*, p. 109 ; Radu G. Păun, « Pouvoir, Croisade et Jugement Dernier au XVII^e siècle : le vécu et l'invisible », dans *Ius et ritus. Rechtshistorische Abhandlungen über Ritus, Macht und Recht*. Herausgegeben von Ivan Biliarsky, Sofia 2006, pp. 213-283.
- 13 Voir les envois de Vera Tchentsova, « Les documents grecs du XVII^e siècle : pièces authentiques et pièces fausses. 3. Mélétios Syrigos, véritable auteur de la lettre adressée au patriarche de Moscou Nikon par les *zôgraphoi* Jean et Georges », *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 73 (2007), 2, pp. 311-345.
- 14 Il y reviendra les derniers mois de 1635, contribuant pleinement, semble-t-il (parmi d'autres), à la rédaction du fameux code de lois de Vasile Lupu. Cf. Georges Crontz, « Ὁ κρητὸς Μελέτιος Συρίγος ἐν Μολδαβίᾳ κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἤμισυ τοῦ δεκάτου ἑβδόμου αἰῶνος », tiré à part du IV^e volume des travaux concernant le second Congrès international se rapportant à la Crète, Athènes 1968, pp. 146-150. Voir aussi Ștefan Andreescu, « Addenda et corrigenda 5. Meletios Sirigos și Angelo Petricca da Sonnino », SMIM 21 (2003), pp. 382-383.
- 15 Cf. N. A. Gheorghiu, « Richard Simon și „Întâmpinarea” lui Meletie Syrigos », BOR 60 (1942), 9-10, pp. 421 sq.
- 16 D'ailleurs, le fameux théologien était vers la fin de sa vie. Voir Nikos M. Stoupakis, Γεώργιος Κορέσσιος (1570-1659/1660). Ἡ ζωὴ, τὸ ἔργο του καὶ οἱ πνευματικοὶ ἀγῶνες τῆς ἐποχῆς του, Chios 2000.
- 17 « οἱ νόμοι εἰς τὰ τῆς Βλαχίας βουνὰ οὐκ ἐτέθησαν, μήτε παρὰ τῶν αὐθεντῶν ν τῆς Βλαχίας, ἀλλ' ἐν Κωνσταντι-νουπόλει καὶ ὑπὸ Βασιλέων καὶ Συνόδων » – *apud* D. Russo, « Ioan Cariofil și operele lui », dans Idem, *Studii istorice greco-române. Opere postume*, éd. Ariadna Camariano - Nestor Camariano I, Bucarest 1939, p. 187.

- 18 Pour tout cela, voir Wolfram von Scheliha, *Russland und die orthodoxe Universalkirche in der Patriarchatsperiode 1589-1721*, Wiesbaden 2001, *passim*.
- 19 Alexandru Elian, « Contribuția grecească la 'Mărturisirea Ortodoxă' », *Balcania* 5 (1946), 1, pp. 85-86.
- 20 Cf. Vera G. Tchentsova, « Челобитная палеопатрского митрополита Феофана 1645 г. об организации греческо-го книгопечатания и греческой школы в Москве », *Palaeoslavica* 14 (2006), pp. 77-151.
- 21 Ioan Kemény, *Memorii – Scrierea vieții sale (1607-1662)*, éd. Ștefan J. Fay, trad. Pap Francisc, Cluj 2002, pp. 258-259. Pour le rôle joué par l'arhevêque de Kiev, cf. P. P. Panaitescu, « Petru Movilă și românii », dans Idem, *Petru Movilă. Studii*, éd. Ștefan S. Gorovei – Maria Magdalena Székely, Bucarest 1996, pp. 89-95 et Ștefan S. Gorovei, « Petru Movilă. Contribuții », *MMS* 57 (1981), 10-12, *passim*.
- 22 Miron Costin, *Letopisețul Țării Moldovei dela Aron Vodă încoace*, éd. P. P. Panaitescu, Bucarest 1944, p. 111. Voir aussi Aurel Decei, « Relațiile lui Vasile Lupu și Matei Basarab cu Poarta în lumina unor documente inedite », *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie și Arheologie Cluj-Napoca* 15 (1972), p. 64.
- 23 Cf. Hamilcar [Amilkas] S. Alvizatos, *Die Oikonomia : Die Oikonomia nach dem kanonischen Recht der Orthodoxen Kirche*. Herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung von Andréa Belliger, Frankfurt/Main 1998 [1949]. La définition n'est pas unanimement acceptée ; je la trouve pourtant pertinente. Un autre point de vue chez Gilbert Dagron, « Le règle et l'exception. Analyse de la notion d'économie », dans *Religieuse Deviance. Untersuchung zu sozialen, rechtlichen und theologischen Reaktionen auf religiöse Abweichung im westlichen und östlichen Mittelalter*. Herausgegeben von Dieter Simon, Frankfurt/Main 1990, pp. 1-18.
- 24 Voir Nicolae Iorga, « Vasile Lupu ca următor al împăraților de Răsărit în tutelarea patriarhiei de Constantinopole și a Bisericii ortodoxe », *AAR* (II^e série. Tome XXXVI. No. 8). MSI, Bucarest 1913, pp. 207-235 [= « Basile Lupu, prince de Moldavie, comme successeur des empereurs d'Orient dans la tutelle du patriarcat de Constantinople et de l'Église orthodoxe (1640-1653) », *BSHAR* 2 (1914), 1, pp. 88-123]. Voir aussi Maria Magdalena Székely, « Un proiect nerealizat : Mitropolia de la Trei Ierarhi », *AIIX* 31 (1994), pp. 73-76 ; Ștefan Andreescu, « Addenda et corrigenda 1. Vasile vodă Lupu și Muntele Athos », *SMIM* 23 (2005), pp. 309-310.
- 25 Varlaam, *Opere. Răspunsul împotriva Catihismusului calvinesc*, éd. Mirela Teodorescu, Bucarest 1984. Selon I. Ionescu, le concile d'évêques valaques et moldaves censé à discuter la publication du catéchisme calviniste en roumain de 1642 (dont le livre de Dealu était le réponse) s'est rassemblé à Iași, à l'occasion du mariage princier [« Când s-a scris Răspunsul împotriva

- Catihismusului calvinesc ? », *Revista de Istorie și Teorie Literară* 33 (1985), 4, pp. 125 sq.].
- 26 Saint Basile, *Correspondance II. Lettres CI-CCXVIII*. Texte établi et traduit par Yves Courtonne, Paris 2003, pp. 121 sq.
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- 51 Bibliotheca Universitatis Lugduni Batavorum – *Codices manuscripti VIII.*
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 « L'année de la mort du rois Ozias, je vis le Seigneur assis sur un trône
 très élevé » ; il ne parle donc pas d'un an de punition. Par conséquent, il
 semblerait bien que Mélétiós : a) cite par mémoire et se trompe ; b) utilise
 un commentaire à Ésaïe qui atteste la punition ; c) – plus probablement –
 interprète le passage d'une manière qui lui est convenable.



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BETWEEN RHETORIC AND PUBLIC REASON: ON THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIONS

Introduction

This study originates in a puzzle: in recent writings in political theory, the expression “the public use of reason” is widely understood as denoting a radical opposition from rhetoric. An increasingly dominant trend in normative political thought has built upon and sharpened traditional philosophical dichotomies, and is developing a highly rationalistic and moralizing understanding of political normativity. Rhetoric’s place is consequently either marginalized, or decried as profoundly perilous for the rationality and legitimacy of political action. My aim here, then, is to examine the probable causes that led to this state of affairs, and to suggest in what way these developments might be more problematic than mainstream political theorizing is prepared to accept.

In this study I will argue that the deliberative democratic accounts, with their insistence on the mandatory use of a strong version of public reason in political justification, tend to articulate in an increasingly restrictive way the normative dimension of political theorizing. This article tries to convey a critique of this condition, and to suggest that a renewed interest in the *political tradition of rhetoric* and in the *institutional circumstances* that make possible political persuasion, can point to a richer alternative for the reconfiguration of the normative foundations of contemporary political philosophy.

For the purposes of this study, I will refer to some of the recent trends in contemporary analytical political theorizing – yet without pretending or aiming for any kind of exhaustive taxonomy/typology of the main theories of democracy.¹ Pointing out these recent developments in political theory is relevant because these accounts identify and define themselves

in opposition to each other, and because the literature² is rich in cross-references among their proponents. Moreover, the academic landscape in political theory and many of the current debates revolve around the problems and conceptual tools adopted by these accounts.

There are, without doubt, several clear virtues of deliberative democratic political thought: it has contributed to a certain formalization of the research tools in political theory; it brought an important focus on the moral requirements in political interactions, and refined the concern for equality and personal autonomy that many theories share. And, it did bring *discourse* and the normative dimension of *logos* to the heart of legitimation strategies. I will argue, however, that most of the recent developments in this direction have narrowed and reduced the potential *resources for normativity* in political thought, and that, because of the dominant place that deliberative democracy has in current analytical political theory, this has important consequences for the significance of political theory today as a discipline and for its capacity to represent a relevant source of intellectual tools necessary to adequately understand and reform our political environment.

By choosing a narrowly rationalistic and over-moralizing definition of public reason – as the only procedurally adequate discursive means towards political justification – deliberative democrats have, implicitly or explicitly, re-enacted one of the oldest, classical distinctions in political philosophy: that between philosophy and rhetoric. Obtaining impartial political arguments and rational consensus by excluding any rhetorical elements from political discourse constitutes an important part of deliberative democrats' normative ideal, but at the same time, I will argue, the sign of a problematic, skewed conceptualization of the political.

I will explore the comparative normative potential of rhetoric and public reason by examining two issues that represent central concerns for contemporary political theorizing: the problem of political pluralism, and the question of violence or coercion. I argue, also, that by transforming political problems into moral ones, deliberative democrats make a similar error as those theorists that dissolve political interactions into economic self-interested rationality.

My contention is, thus, that the rhetorical tradition may offer a fresher set of conceptual and political tools, which could allow us to grasp more of the complexity of contemporary mass, pluralistic, democratic politics; that it is, furthermore, hazardous to overlook the fact that the nature of the political is distinct from both economy and morality; and that taking

democratic rhetoric seriously allows us to better understand, as well as to reappraise the role and need for political ideology, as facilitator of political decisions based on (however temporary and incomplete) shared political worldviews. Articulating a conception of rhetoric, ideology and institutions remains an open task in contemporary political theorizing – but, I contend, with higher potential than the current dominant focus on public reason and deliberative democracy.

What deliberative democrats seem to crucially ignore, then, is a concern for the political context in which any deliberative form of democracy is, if ever, possible. The thorny truth is that (deliberative) democracy – like any other regime – is not self-sustaining. Its perpetuation is not obvious, and its establishment not a matter of obvious moral choice. It's a dangerous hubris to assume that it is enough to simply postulate the moral superiority of public reason, and that this makes the deliberative version of democracy simply and procedurally better than any other form.

The rhetorical tradition is less inclined to disregard the substantial problems of political persuasion in contemporary democracies, and the delicate circumstances that make persuasion meaningful and valuable. It can – significantly – provide a better account of the substantive differences among different kinds political persuasion, and of how different contexts matter. The effort to preserve such circumstances must be an on-going one, as well as the effort of being acutely aware of both of its rewards and risks. Instead of understanding the problems of political persuasion from deliberative democrats' moral higher ground, and within a discursive universe sharply divided between public reason and pathological demagoguery, this perspective allows for a more subtle and solid understanding of rhetoric's creative political potential, as well of its potentially nefarious consequences.

Defining public reason

Already from the 1970s, the main task of political theory predominantly became that of searching for criteria of distributive justice³, but from a perspective strongly dominated by analytical moral philosophy. In other words, justice is conceived as being primarily an ethical problem, and only indirectly as a political one. At the same time, a widespread predilection for rational choice theory offered the main methodological choices in designing justificatory procedures⁴. When, during the middle of the

1990s, *political legitimacy* recovers its place as the fundamental theme in political philosophy, the analytical moral philosophy's tool-boxes are still dominant in the academic environment.

Political liberalism (as developed in the last works of John Rawls), deliberative democracy (advocated by Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson), as well as various egalitarian theories of justice (proposed by authors such as Brian Barry, Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Scanlon⁵) have offered important tools for thinking, in a normative key, the main interrogations of political philosophy. Aware of the risk of reducing and concentrating too much the arguments within these theories – otherwise quite complex –, and of forcing certain associations that these authors themselves would deny, I venture, though, to affirm the existence of certain common broad elements, that critics from different directions have identified at various times, and which a minimal reconstruction of these theories allows to justify.

Among such defining elements of political liberalism and deliberative democracy, we can identify either *argumentative structures*, of a procedural kind, or a strong *epistemic/cognitive dimension*⁶ of the political justification process. In the words of Joshua Cohen,

“[t]he conception of justification that provides the core of the ideal of deliberative democracy can be captured in an ideal procedure of political deliberation. In such a procedure participants regard one another as equals; they aim to defend and criticize institutions and programs in terms of considerations that others have reason to accept, given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the assumption that those others are reasonable; and they are prepared to cooperate in accordance with the results of such discussion, treating those results as authoritative.

Which considerations count as reasons? [...] In an idealized deliberative setting, it will not do simply to advance reasons that one takes to be true or compelling: such considerations may be rejected by others who are themselves reasonable. One must instead find reasons that are compelling to others, acknowledging those others as equals, aware that they have alternative reasonable commitments, and knowing something about the kinds of commitments that they are likely to have—for example, that they may have moral or religious commitments that impose what they take to be overriding obligations. If a consideration does not meet these tests, that will suffice for rejecting it as a reason. If it does, then it counts as an acceptable political reason.”⁷

“The main idea is that the deliberative conception requires more than that the interests of others be given equal consideration; it demands, too, that we find politically acceptable reasons – reasons that are acceptable to others, given a background of differences of conscientious conviction.”⁸

These theories continue, therefore, the rationalist Enlightenment’s versions of social contract theories, and establish the legitimacy of political authority on the basis of a hypothetical rational consent of political subjects. Collective political decisions, affirm these theories, are legitimate so long as they satisfy the criteria of public, impartial deliberations. Each subject or participant to the political justification process has the duty to produce *public reasons* for his arguments, and to listen to such reasons from the others. The capacity to formulate such arguments is usually placed at the abstract level of rational agents, performing hypothetical moral-political deliberations. These hypothetical deliberations among, for instance, agents placed in a perfect equality and mutual symmetry (fictional entities that represent us, real persons) are constructed either as “ideal speech situations” in Habermas’ accounts⁹, or as the “original position” for John Rawls.¹⁰

This abstract, hypothetical level of deliberation among agents offers the departure point for the political justification – and, at the same time, the criteria of epistemic and normative validity – of the ethical-political principles that should govern us. Real-life bargaining between unequally situated individuals ought not be accepted as such a source for normativity, since they do not correspond to the premise of equality among the subjects of political justification. Existing inequalities of income and wealth, resources, prestige, or education/information would lead to strategic positioning of participants (“strategic action”, in the language of Habermas) such that “negotiations” would end in a “compromise” (which has an invariably *depreciatory* connotation). In other words, present injustices would be transferred, through the incorrectly designed procedure (bargaining), and would determine the illegitimacy of the principles so chosen. For that reason, an adequate procedure of deliberation presupposes not only political equality, but also stronger forms of equality that can usually be achieved only as attributes of a hypothetical choice-situation.

Political legitimacy, therefore, is understood as a concept whose content depends on the manner in which we construct a procedure of rational deliberation and argumentation. But where else could these public deliberations take place, beyond this abstract level? According to John Rawls, public reason should guide the deliberations of the members

of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as of those placed in a position to formulate and interpret the ultimate political principles of a political community. Hence, the level at which these deliberations ought to (and could) take place is one where decisions concern those fundamental political arrangements, values and rights that determine the political identity of a nation. Public reason, then, includes what Rawls identifies as a criterion of *reciprocity*:

“[O]ur exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions. This criterion applies on two levels: one is to the constitutional structure itself, and the other is to particular statutes and laws enacted in accordance with that structure. Political conceptions to be reasonable must justify only constitutions that satisfy this principle. This gives what may be called the liberal principle of legitimacy as it applies to the legitimacy of constitutions and statutes enacted under them.”¹¹

Rawls – as many of his followers – is therefore faithful to a classical liberal distinction between a *higher politics* and a *normal politics*: there is, in other words, a fundamental difference between the kind of deliberation necessary to justify (or modify) the essential elements of a political constitution (the fundamental rights and values of a political community) – and the negotiation influenced by particular interests, prejudice and inequalities, that characterize daily politics, i.e., decisions concerning less fundamental issues. As such, Rawls places the fundamental criteria of deliberations guided by public reason, at the level of constitutional interpretation, while for the common political interactions, this deliberation constitutes a guide and a desideratum, rather than a firm criterion. He invites us to

“note the kinds of questions and forums to which public reason applies – for example, the debates of political parties and those seeking public office *when discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice* – and distinguish them from the many places in the background culture where political matters are discussed, and often from within peoples’ comprehensive doctrines.”¹²

However, for many other authors, such as Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,¹³ this form of public political deliberation has to apply to

many more contexts, and cover a greater number of issues. From this Habermasian perspective, communicative action can be realized in many circumstances, while the deliberative standards can be harmonized with the goal of democratic inclusive participation. Ignoring a little too easily the considerable conceptual difficulty of conciliating political participation with highly moralizing standards of political deliberation, many of the contemporary authors seem to be convinced that a deliberative democratic perspective brings very simple solutions to what have been – up to recently, at least – extremely complex and difficult problems of political legitimacy.

The limits of public reason

The sense in which many deliberative democrats are contributing to what I have called the reducing of the resources of normativity, is manifold. I will explain succinctly several of the problems that arise – building upon arguments put forward, at various times, by authors such as Chantal Mouffe, Jeremy Waldron,¹⁴ Brian Garsten, Benedetto Fontana, or Gary Remer.

There is a certain disconnection between political practice and political theory's normative requirements; more exactly, deliberative democrats appear to ignore the problem of motivation, when proposing criteria of admissibility for citizens' preferences and arguments, criteria that embody high standards of morality and rationality. Similarly, most advocates of public deliberation have seemed to overlook the tension that exists between wider participation and imposing more demanding criteria for admitting individuals' arguments in the justificatory process. Both the problem of motivation and the issue of exclusionary criteria have been raised in recent literature, and I will briefly mention several further critical comments.

One of these important criticisms can be summed up in the following way: deliberative democrats' procedural accounts "can't have it all":¹⁵ political participation, public reason, democratic inclusion, impartiality, motivation, and epistemic validation. Another criticism is that many of the deliberative democratic accounts seem to have settled on a particular formulation of the nature, or essence, of the political: we should engage in politics, according to these accounts, primarily as truth seekers. But this is also far from obvious. The existing answers offered, among others, by Jürgen Habermas, address only partially some of the reasons

for criticism.¹⁶ According to Habermas, a test regarding motivation is already built into the deliberative-justificatory procedure: citizens who consider themselves unable to support a particular norm can simply reject that norm in the deliberation process. Yet, such an answer seems to misunderstand the barrier that deliberative proceduralism itself erects against taking motivation seriously: lack of motivation could simply be assimilated to personal bias and hence excluded from acceptable reasons. But more importantly, Habermas's procedural solution may address the problem of keeping citizens who are *already engaged in the deliberative process*, motivationally involved. Yet it does nothing to explain how and why would citizens adopt and participate to such restrictive deliberative procedures in the first place.

This manner of conceptualizing the political has been powerfully challenged – and many such critical reviews of deliberative democracy concern more than the nuances of some positions: they address the normative presuppositions and fundamental conceptual choices¹⁷ that these theories share. Moreover, the lack of motivational force of political liberalism and deliberative democracy can be determined by that exclusionary aspect of a radically reduced normativity. But it denotes first and foremost a growing risk of irrelevance in and for the polity of these theories,¹⁸ while the exclusionary character reflects mainly a normative theoretical problem. In other words, we can, on the one hand, decry these theories' incapacity to guide, to offer viable intellectual tools for understanding (and perhaps, change) the terms of our political common life; and, on the other hand, criticize the radical conceptual thinning of mainstream political theory's normative resources.

These two manners of formulating the criticisms are able to concentrate many other critical approaches vis-à-vis this dominant style of political theorizing. The lack of motivational force means that this moralizing understanding of the political legitimacy, most of the times, does not inspire, in the sense of determining political actions. With few notable exceptions, as the (in the end, unsuccessful, but to some extent deliberative) Constitutional Convention drafting the European constitutional treaty, these deliberative standards are as often academically proclaimed as they are rarely pursued in political action. This constitutes a cause for mainstream political theory's increasing disconnectedness from political practice and withdrawal in research labs. Furthermore, the discipline seems to avoid breathing the air of the deep, multi-layered dilemmas that our epoch faces.

From the point of view of the second critique, postulating high standards of morality and rationality excludes potential individual contributions that are not, or cannot be, translated into the impartial language of public reason. In other words, the requirement of a strong rational individual autonomy, in its neo-Kantian substance, that political subjects must possess in order to participate in public deliberation, eliminates *a priori* all those who will not, or cannot, satisfy this standard. The participants in the public deliberation process are invited to re-formulate their arguments such that they correspond to public reason, and their premises could be accepted by the other participants as reasonable agents. At the basis of the deliberative process of justification is, then, the need for a common perspective that participants adopt, which is “public”, impartial, reasonable and rational. But those that cannot or will not reformulate their arguments, in this public perspective are, *de jure*, excluded from the deliberative justificatory process, – and thus considered either irrational, or non-reasonable.

The potential for artificial and simplistic polarization becomes obvious when some critics of deliberative democracy and political liberalism oppose rival “radical-participative” theories, identity based, or multicultural accounts, whose main normative desideratum seems to be reduced to postulating a “radical” participation, unfiltered by other criteria – criteria which would necessarily amount to nothing else than expressions of western liberal hegemony and cultural imperialism.¹⁹

My argument is that, from an important political perspective, both imperatives (of public reason, or of unfiltered participation) miss the point. It is un-motivating to participate when participation seems to expire in pre-decisional deliberations, in the same degree as participation for the sake of participation, which does need other justification, and which cannot be distinguished, at the end of the day, from a certain tyranny of the opinion, is normatively shallow. In both cases, deliberation and participation become ideals postulated from the perspective of academism.

Pluralism and violence

Pluralism

The fundamental presupposition of deliberative democrats is that public deliberation, in either of its forms, embodies the crucial *moral* difference between “mere agreement” (or “*modus vivendi*”, or “compromise”) and a rational consensus. To make the case against the aggregative accounts

of democracy²⁰ (which consider citizens' given preferences as legitimate sources for collective decisions), they must show that citizens that justify to each other the main norms of a political community, do so by correcting, or filtering out the personal bias, unequal power and egoism that the aggregative accounts accept. By appealing only to reasons that the others, as reasonable and equals, can accept, they in fact presuppose the possibility of a rational moral consensus.

The potential for adequately conceptualizing political pluralism is consequently drastically reduced. "Pluralism" becomes either simply the "fact of pluralism", or "reasonable pluralism". The former – fact of pluralism – includes all sorts of disagreements and political diversity; reasonable pluralism refers however only to that set of citizens' conceptions that are reasonable, i.e. include reasons that are formulated in terms that others can accept; such citizens accept each other as partners in reasoning justificatory procedures and agree to recognize some "political conception of justice" or other basic account of political principles and fundamental institutions.

My argument is that deliberative theories, of Habermasian or Rawlsian origin, accentuated more than others the destructive potential of pluralism. In a paradoxical way, the more these accounts acknowledge or proclaim the fact of value-pluralism and diversity of opinions, the higher they raise the deliberative standards of political justification, placing thus the pluralism in question under the strict control of public reason.

I will not follow Hannah Arendt's own critique of political philosophy as a discipline, in which she disparages its status of conceptual dependence on the radical oppositions and dichotomies generated by Plato (including the binary relations that placed, for instance, in opposite camps philosophy as metaphysics and rhetoric). I am rather interested in explaining the perplexity toward diversity and pluralism, which characterizes contemporary theories of deliberative legitimacy. Such a perplexity is sourced both in the political philosophy of modernity, and – inevitably – in Plato's constitutive skepticism towards Athens' oft-chaotic and unpredictable democracy.

In a similar vein with Plato, Habermas and Rawls consider pluralism and diversity, fundamentally, as a potential source of chaos and violence. Where Plato pointed out the dangerous potential of orators, capable of flattering and channeling the public's emotions in foolish political projects, or even tyranny, Rawls considers that the main danger for modern political communities is represented by the violent potential of religious rivalries and

revealed truths that cannot relate (public-) deliberatively to one another. This destructive potential of religious pluralism in Rawlsian vision, calling to mind Plato's aversion for the chaotic diversity of opinions, constitute the background intuition, as well as the justification for restraining the legitimation of political action under the imperative of public reason.

As Chantal Mouffe remarked²¹, adopting some of the insights of Claude Lefort,²² we can say that the central problem of political theory in contemporary liberal democracies, understood as political regimes, is indeed the question of pluralism, a problem that signals the end of certainties concerning the moral (and religious) values that should guide our life together. The difference between Chantal Mouffe and John Rawls, however, is that where Mouffe speaks of *agonistic* democracy, that implies a profound transformation of the symbolic order of social relations, Rawls prefers himself to observe that sort of pluralism as a fact, then extracts from it, through the syntagm of "reasonable pluralism", a sort of mini-pluralism – the only pluralism that can have normative resonance within the public deliberative legitimation process.

In other words, instead of celebrating, as Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib²³ and others, that large pluralism, instead of proclaiming the moral and political ideal of pluralism as diversity or difference,²⁴ Rawls elaborates the fundamental distinction between a *de facto* pluralism, which has a destructive potential, and a *reasonable* pluralism, i.e. the diversity of only those opinions and doctrines that can be reformulated according to the public reason requirements. Reasonable, hence, are those doctrines that can advance, in political deliberation, arguments based on public reasons. Controlling normatively this second type of pluralism, narrowed down to reasonable positions, Rawls hopes that the violent potential of (generic-type) pluralism can be avoided.

Thus, the problem of political, value- and religious pluralism is viewed in these contemporary political theories in a very polarized manner, yet the differences among accounts concern not as much the quantitative evaluation of diversity's size, but rather its normative significance. The "quarrel with diversity" that seems to obsess or exhaust many of the contemporary debates does not dispute pluralism's extent, but indicates the fact that it is, fundamentally, seen as a threat by some, and celebrated radically and unconditionally by others.

The political tradition of rhetoric can help us decline, with Aristotle and Cicero, this binary manner of conceiving the problematic of pluralism and diversity of opinion, as either a source of conflict, or exalting unfiltered

opinion in the name of “radical” participation. In opposition with the Rawlsian and Habermasian perplexity towards a pluralism that is viewed as fundamentally dangerous, a perplexity which produces, as I argue below, a retreat towards a public justification normatively anchored in epistemic certifications, a perspective inspired by rhetoric and the political virtues of persuasion could avoid the manichaeist schematization of pluralism (reasonable pluralism, non-reasonable pluralism). In other words, this distinction itself – which assumes the grounding of normativity exclusively on public reason – between a reasonable and a non-reasonable pluralism, is, within that rhetorical tradition, profoundly awkward. If we have a good or bad pluralism, this question only makes sense from a procedural perspective, of an *ex ante* legitimation.

A rhetorical perspective on legitimacy, however, precisely because of the ambiguities and uncertainties that characterize decisions which concern our political future, gives up on focusing upon the mechanism of procedural, *ex ante* legitimation, and concentrates rather on the conditions of possibility of rhetorical persuasion, the context itself where free individuals can engage discursively with one another. In other words legitimacy consists largely in the survival, in time, of the context favorable to meaningful political persuasion.

In the same sense in which, for Karl Popper,²⁵ democratic legitimacy cannot be awarded, *ex ante*, procedurally, to those who govern, but is rather confirmed *ex post*, when their non-violent replacement has been possible – so do republics survive as long as rhetoric and political persuasion make political sense, and disappear when the conceptual (discursive) potential of rhetoric is replaced by coercive dictates.

As Brian Garsten warns,²⁶ the imposition of demanding, rationalistic public deliberation standards makes that individual contributions rarify, dogmatize, and radicalize, escaping, in the end, the control and moderating effect of political persuasion, representation, and mediation of democratic institutions. The effect is thus one of individuals withdrawing from political interactions and becoming impermeable to political persuasion. A rhetorical perspective on pluralism attempts rather to enlarge the basis of legitimacy, to free the persuasive potential of politics, and not to reduce it to a narrow definition of abstract criteria of normative validity.

Political pluralism cannot be reduced, from this perspective of rhetoric, to the multitude of opinions of individuals chained in Plato’s cave, absorbed by the moving shadows. As long as rhetoric’s role is accepted as more than chaos or demagoguery, we can return to a reflection on those

political regimes in which freedom and rhetoric reinforce each other, and attempt to recover the meanings that those political theories which eliminated rhetoric, have lost.

Violence

Hannah Arendt has maintained that the separation between politics and philosophy and the sovereignty of the latter over the former, operated by Plato, corresponds to the institution of a certain concept of truth, rather than the good organization of the city, as the primary aim of political reflection. This has been translated, in recent political theorizing, as the imperative to *validate epistemically* the discursive process that can produce the legitimate political principles; as such, these principles become not only legitimate, but also correct. Truth becomes a goal of politics equal to the good, and by this the philosophers, not the orators, obtain the intellectual entitlement to guide our political thoughts and actions.

Reproducing this move, and opting again for defining legitimacy as elimination of violence *through* the epistemic certification of political principles, the contemporary theories of public deliberation conceive the deliberative process as an instrument to produce compliance, in the sense in which violence and physical coercion is replaced by “the force of the better argument”. This “force” of the better argument, which represents the fundamental logic of public political deliberations, compels our reason, and generates thus compliance, with the same vigor that physical violence would have done it.

The central vision of a Rawlsian political liberalism is accordingly focused on formulating an argumentative procedure that, in order to radically purge violence, appeals to hypothetical-rational situations, such as the original position, in which “agents” situated in a perfect equality and symmetry and deploying only rational-choice judgments (“maximin”), choose as principles of a well-ordered society, the well known Rawlsian principles of justice.²⁷ These principles are self-evident since the only rational, to identical agents, conceived like this by Rawls in order to eliminate any source of violence and inequality that characterize real social and political relations.

Coercion and violence, in the Rawlsian account, are distinct: on the one hand,

“since political power is the coercive power of free and equal citizens as a corporate body, this power should be exercised, when constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice are at stake, only in ways that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of their common human reason.”²⁸

Violence, on the other hand, may characterize unjust settings and – as such – nullify their normative credentials.

“Obligations arise only if certain background conditions are satisfied. Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations. It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void *ab initio*. But similarly, unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind of extortion, even violence, and consent to them does not bind.”²⁹

Establishing political normativity upon an increasingly narrow concept of public reason, where the force of the better arguments ensures the epistemic certification of political principles – is possible precisely because, similar to Habermas’s theory of communicative action, Rawls seems to operate with a very large concept of violence. Rhetorical discourse, strategic defense of one’s own opinions become for Habermas or Rawls, “pathologies of communication”, which threaten the imperative of the deliberative character of citizens’ interactions. Jürgen Habermas, in a recent article, in which he treats the problem of Mass-media independence and of the criteria that it should satisfy in order to serve public deliberations, uses again the syntagm of “pathologies of communication”.³⁰

From the political perspective of rhetoric, however, equating violence with manipulation, flattery, appeal to passion, is not only exaggerated, but also profoundly discomfited. My argument is that to a large concept of violence corresponds a narrow vision of political normativity, dependent on rigid proceduralism and epistemic certification of deliberations.

In the classical, political tradition of rhetoric, rhetorical persuasion is considered not, with Plato, as akin to another form of violence, but on the contrary, as aiming precisely to replace violence. So far as rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and persuasion renders violence useless, the normative interest can move from the proceduralism that ensures epistemic certification of collective choices, to caring for, and perpetuating the context which makes persuasion, and thus rhetoric, possible.

Rhetorical political deliberations, obviously, cannot constitute procedures that could ensure the epistemic certification of results. Yet, despite their procedural epistemic unreliability, from a political point of view, they – crucially – replace violence and make possible political action. Rhetorical communication generates, and nourishes itself from, ambivalence, ambiguity, incertitude, but this is the nature of future itself – at least in its political dimension. Rhetorical deliberations, in the Aristotelian tradition, concern precisely those choices between alternative actions that define the future, choices that are impregnated with various degrees of uncertainty and imprecision. Or, precisely in this context, trust, personal character emotions and passions, become legitimate elements of political persuasion that should ground collective decisions.

My suggestion is, then, that the political tradition of rhetoric can inspire us to use a narrower – but more precise – concept of violence, which does not include rhetorical persuasion or strategic action, as in the Habermasian account. The concern for the normative resources of political actions can thus be less focused on formulating strict procedures of epistemic rational certification, at an abstract level and relying excessively on the conceptual and methodological tools of moral-analytical philosophy, but rather on the institutional instruments that may generate the survival of the political circumstances in which persuasion – i.e. rhetorical deliberations, not only public reason – is possible.

Rhetoric and Its Institutions

In the remainder of this study, I will tentatively explore the normative relevance of the institutional context of rhetoric. That is, I will call attention to the rich and complex relation between forms of persuasion and rhetoric, on the one hand, and the institutional settings that may sustain or undermine them, on the other hand.

In fact, by using such a wide concept of violence and purging rhetoric from normal, but especially from higher politics, and thus by removing it from serious considerations, the theories of public deliberation remain unable to provide crucial guidance as to the normative difference between kinds of violence and their implication on institutions, regimes, and political transformation³¹. By imposing an aseptic, sterilized medium of rational deliberations as the only acceptable context for legitimacy, political theory gives the impression of preferring to stop where politics

actually begins. It looks increasingly blind to the real-life phenomena of contention that express the nature of the political. The opposition *logos* (restricted to a strict conception of reason) vs. violence (including manipulation) is itself wrongly framed: rather, we should view speech as including a larger variety of acts and accept that contentious politics and decision-making is the normal mode of politics; one cannot procedurally eliminate the impact of inequalities and discriminations: democracies presuppose a constant re-negotiation of inclusions and exclusions, and further enfranchisement. Brushing off through procedural schemes the complex and difficult condition of many individuals or groups restricts, in fact, their access to public forums in which to voice their particular claims: their opportunity for expression would be restricted by the requirements of a standardized language of rational deliberation.

Access to a wider range of discursive resources (i.e., rhetorical speech) can offer important tools for political mobilization, a crucial asset for such groups. In most such cases, moreover, the problem is not primarily moral, to be approached through reasoned and principled moral arguments, but rather political, i.e. recognition as actors, stakeholders and political subjects. Struggles for recognition and greater political inclusion may involve 'progress' and 'regress', periods of status-quo and others with intense reshapings of the borders and nature of a political community. Yet various groups' claims can be and remain mutually exclusive and incompatible, the values and goals they advance may continue to be in conflict, and remain in discord however much rational deliberation is involved.

The problem of recent normative political theory is that it decreed that this situation is problematic, and that ultimately, politics should be a morally-grounded, strongly consensualist activity. The presupposition of consensus is central, however explicit or implicit, since the alternative to consensus is conceived as being, ultimately, coercion and violence. Political theory, though, should be able to tell us a lot more about how different kinds of political discourse affect and are shaped by different kinds of institutions, engage dissimilar capacities for mobilizing solidarities and collective identifications, and discriminate between various forms of violence and contention.

There is a long tradition in which violence itself has an affirmative, transformative potential – for instance, for radical, revolutionary social and political change.³² But that is not my argument. Rather, it presses the need for a more refined theoretical apparatus that can explore the

complex relation among institutions, rhetoric, and violence. Even if we would accept a radical distinction between rational deliberation and rhetoric, and prefer institutions that promote deliberation,³³ should for instance, the same institutions seriously attempt to curb rhetoric in political deliberations? In other words, if such a sharp dichotomy would entail it, how would we enact norms and set up institutions designed to limit rhetoric? The cost of eliminating rhetoric isn't, in fact, a substantial kind of violence itself?

There is also an important argument that intense rhetorical moments essentially open the space for later deliberations, more or less restricted by public reasons. To set the agenda, to mobilize, and to motivate a community or key actors, such rhetorical discourses can constitute important turning points in collective self-understandings and common framings of important issues.

"To be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence"³⁴. Hannah Arendt's forceful insight points then to a more subtle understanding of violence and persuasion. A larger concept of deliberation must be at work here, and hence a narrower concept of violence.

Finally, we might say that rhetoric is, in an important sense, "built into" democracy: as Margaret Canovan argues, there is a

"complex and elusive paradox that lies at the heart of modern democracy. [D]emocratic politics does not and cannot make sense to most people it aims to empower. The most inclusive and accessible form of politics ever achieved is also the most opaque. Precisely because it is the most inclusive form of politics, democracy needs the transparency that ideology can supply, and yet the ideology that should communicate politics to the people cannot avoid being systematically misleading."

"The paradox is this: democracy is the most inclusive and popular form of politics, taking politics to ordinary people, giving them political rights and access to multiple channels of influence. But it is for that very reason by far the most complex form of politics, so bafflingly tangled and opaque that the vast majority of its supposed participants can form no clear picture to help them make sense of it. The fundamental paradox of democracy is, in other words, that empowerment undermines transparency."³⁵

Ideologies in this context, understood as necessary "conceptual structures that provide a simplified map of the political world and

motivate their followers³⁶ – or, as Michael Freedman³⁷ would define them, particular decontestations of key political concepts, are directly related to rhetorical persuasion – rather than to public reason deliberations. Rhetoric becomes as a result the fundamental, rich middle ground between reason and demagogy. And “democracy can only develop on this middle ground.”³⁸

Plato, Aristotle or Cicero, but also many others in this tradition, can offer key resources to distinguish between the various uses of rhetoric. Moreover, if we accept that what makes rhetoric valuable or dreadful depends on the substantive outcomes and the context of its use, the task of defining and defending these goals remains open, and it is definitely not exhausted through a proceduralist-deliberative approach. The threat of demagogy is very real, but focusing on public reason in the attempt to insulate political life from rhetoric is even more problematic.

Cicero’s distinction between conversation and oratory is still valid and applies to the present controversy. While conversation is meant to discover truth, oratory is meant to inspire political decision. Much of the current public deliberatory theorizing appears geared up to dissolving the latter into the former. Yet by taking seriously, from a normative perspective, the rhetorical context of political decision-making, we can better relate to the institutional conditions of political rhetoric. Such “circumstances of rhetoric” confer meanings to the orator’s effort of persuasion, as well as to the public’s role in decision-making. In other words, political rhetoric makes sense only in certain particular circumstances, within a particular kind of political community, and supported by certain particular institutions.

The role of political theory is to provide us with the conceptual apparatus and the cognitive instruments to understand, analyze and normatively evaluate the institutions and the core concepts that define our political existence. By focusing recently on the overly-rationalistic and increasingly moralizing dimension of public reason, by aiming to dissolve all substantive conflict and disagreement in procedures, and by disregarding the political and institutional circumstances for meaningful political persuasion and rhetoric, political theory risks failing at this most basic of its tasks.

NOTES

- 1 Jon Elster, "The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory", in Bohman J., and Rehg W., (eds), *Deliberative Democracy*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 3–34.
- 2 Several volumes published in the last decade concentrate a large number of consecrated studies on deliberative democracy. See, for instance, besides the works edited by Jon Elster, James Bohman and William Rehg, and Stephen Macedo; Ackerman, B. and Fishkin, J., *Deliberation Day*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004 and Fishkin, J., *Democracy and Deliberation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- 3 Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, but also Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources", in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1981, pp. 283-345.
- 4 For John Rawls, "[t]he theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most important part, of the theory of rational choice" (*A Theory of Justice*, 1971, p. 15).
- 5 Among the relevant works, see Scanlon, T.M., *What We Owe to Each Other*, Belknap Press, 1999, and Barry, B., *Justice as Impartiality*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- 6 Bohman, J. "Political Communication and the Epistemic Value of Diversity: Deliberation and Legitimation in Media Societies", in *Communication Theory* 17 (2007), pp. 348–355.
- 7 Cohen, J., "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy", in Bohman, J., and Rehg, W., *Deliberative Democracy*, pp. 413-14.
- 8 Ibidem, p. 417.
- 9 See Habermas, J., *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1987.
- 10 Rawls, J., *Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
- 11 *Postscript* to the second edition of *Political Liberalism*: John Rawls, *Political Liberalism, 2nd edn*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996. Republished in Bohman J., and Rehg W., (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 134.
- 12 *Postscript*, in Bohman J., and Rehg, W., (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 136.
- 13 See Gutmann A., Thompson D., *Democracy and disagreement*, Harvard University Press, 1996.
- 14 See Waldron, J., *The Dignity of Legislation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- 15 Gaus, G., "Reason, Justification, and Consensus: Why Democracy Can't Have It All", in Bohman, J., and Rehg,W., (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 205-242.
- 16 See Abizadeh, A., "On the Philosophy/Rhetoric Binaries. Or, is Habermasian Discourse Motivationally Impotent?", in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 445-472.
- 17 Chantal Mouffe, especially in its *Democratic Paradox* (2000).

- 18 See Wendy Brown, *Politics out of History* (2001).
- 19 Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton University Press, 1990.
- 20 See Elster, "The Market and the Forum", 1997.
- 21 See Mouffe, *Democratic Paradox*, 2000.
- 22 Claude Lefort, *L'Invention démocratique*, Paris, Fayard, 1981.
- 23 Benhabib, S., *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton University Press, 1996.
- 24 For a review of the literature on, and controversies about identity and difference, see Camil Alexandru Pârnu, "From Diversity to Difference. Structural Dilemmas of Identity Politics", in *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, vol. VII, no. 2, 2007, pp. 395-422.
- 25 Popper, K., *Lectia Acestui Secol*, Bucuresti: Nemira, 1998.
- 26 Garsten, B., *Saving Persuasion. A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- 27 Rawls, J., *A Theory of Justice*, 1971.
- 28 Rawls, J., *Political Liberalism*, pp. 139-140.
- 29 Rawls, J., *A Theory of Justice*, p. 343.
- 30 Habermas, J., "Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research", in *Communication Theory*, vol. 16 , no. 4, pp. 411-426.
- 31 Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- 32 See Georges Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence*. Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1908. See also the discussion of violence in Keane, J., *Violence and Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- 33 Cass Sunstein, *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- 34 Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 37.
- 35 Margaret Canovan, "Taking Politics to the People. Populism as the Ideology if Democracy", in Meny, Y., and Surel, Y., *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002, pp. 25-44.
- 36 Canovan, *op.cit.*, p. 29.
- 37 Michael Freedon, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*, Oxford University Press, 1996.
- 38 Fontana B., Nederman C. J., Remer G. (eds.), *Talking Democracy: Historical Perspectives on Rhetoric and Democracy*, Penn State Press, 2004, p. 10.

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THE MEMORY OF LYNKEUS – RECORDING THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATION

Proposal for a system to be used in Romania

This article proposes a recording system for archaeological excavations in Romania, where currently every dig is differently, if at all, recorded. By recording system I mean a set of coherent and standardized norms aimed at thoroughly describing the progress of the excavation and at making possible both the understanding of the site's history and its publication. At the core of this system, and analyzed here in detail, is what I call a feature sheet. The pro forma sheets, be they context sheets or feature sheets, are the magic mirror of any recording system and the basic principles underlying the approach to excavation of this or that archaeological institute can quickly be gathered from just a cursory glance at the way the information is structured on this fundamental document.

It is hoped that this project could become, after debate and modifications, the basis for a recording system that is legally required on Romanian digs by the archaeological authorities. This gives the present project a practical value, of having all digs recorded, and recorded in a standardized manner; the proposal also retains a theoretical value, since the system advocated here diverges from other European systems, being feature-oriented and interpretation-based. The article is structured in five sections.

- 1. Why it is necessary to record archaeological excavations*
- 2. A brief history of archaeological recording*
- 3. A philosophical approach to recording between interpretation and description*
- 4. A recording system for Romanian archaeological excavations*
- 5. Final word*

1. Why it is necessary to record archaeological excavations

According to a commonplace cherished in discourses about archaeology, though perhaps less present in the minds of archaeologists at work, excavation is destruction. Archaeology proper cannot be done without removal of soil, and this cannot be done without the irreversible undoing of the macro- and micro- structure of all strata, structure which is in turn the key to the stratigraphic, and thereby historical, sequence of ancient man's life at the site. Archaeology is the only discipline that gathers knowledge by destroying its object of study. It is even worse than that: the object destroyed is non-repeatable and non-renewable, it is retrieved with methods, techniques and scientific aids that will seem primitive in a matter of decades, and the investigation is not carried out in front of the whole scientific community, but under the supervision of a single scholar. How can this be tolerated? The defense of archaeology has three main points.

a. One of these points is very strong, but only applies to rescue archaeology (excavation ahead of development: highways, dams etc.), not to systematic archaeology: the destroyed object of study was threatened anyway. The threat does not come from archaeology itself, the decision has been taken elsewhere and has to do with the needs of the living community and the entailing pressure it puts on its environment where other communities have been archaeologically buried.

When it comes to speaking for the academic excavations, carried out every summer at protected sites, including the most famous prehistoric and ancient cities, two lines of reasoning can be given here, one external, the other internal to archaeology.

b. The first is curiosity, the most serious of all frivolous things. It means that our society, the main sponsor and therefore client of archaeological excavations, needs to know about the past and takes the risk of knowing. Given that much other already gathered data about the past is lost or forgotten, this should be reformulated as follows: the society needs to be constantly involved in the process of knowing, because it is the inquiry, rather than its results, that shapes an attitude towards the past and that eventually provides a way to settle into the present. Let us deem this a social need for archaeology. Besides that, there is the academic need, since the real issue of the academic debate is testing new ideas against new documents. There also are political views of archaeology, running the

gamut from nationalist self assertion to using archaeology as a harbinger of tourism. And last but not least, archaeologists themselves want to earn money, get degrees, or make headlines.

c. The other train of thought has to do with the deontological instrument that archaeology has devised as a guarantee for good practice, and centers on archaeology's most serious claim to legitimacy. This is called recording: that is, giving an exhaustive account of the progress of an excavation at a given site. The argument goes like this: true, after excavation there is nothing left but a hole in the ground and a couple of objects lying nearby – yet the site has not been lost, but has moved on paper. This arduous task, moving a site on paper, has been the subject of a century and a half of tribulations in the world of archaeology; it has not though received its most poignant formulation before the 1970s. A considerable amount of brain and brawn has been dispensed by archaeologists in an attempt to substantiate the claim that it is possible to translate the language of earth in our words without significant loss. At stake indeed is the possibility of reconstructing the site after the excavation is over, of inviting other present and future scholars to ask the site their own, different questions. The British have called this “preservation by record” (Planning Policy Guidance 16, Archaeology and Planning, document of the British Govt. from Nov. 1990). Obviously this is not to say that standing structures and magnificent ruins ought to be demolished because they have been recorded; the point is just that the buried past, of indirect significance to the large public, can be preserved by record, kept open to scientific debate, and somehow maintained present even if, in order to be understood, as we have seen, it had to be physically destroyed. Recording is then what makes the archaeological compromise tenable - or at least when it is performed as thorough and as convincing as the destruction that it is meant to compensate for.

One further point can be made with regard to the preservation by record policy. It will make appear archaeology as constructive as it is destructive. Think about throwing a toy car; let's “preserve it by record”. Presumably you would take a series of nice photographs from all possible angles; thinking of the particular way it rolls, smoothly or not, maybe film would also be a good idea. But should you also consider what it looks like in blue light, or under rain? Or the content of lead chromate of the yellow paint, or the slightly bent axle? Or even the temperature of the coachwork as compared with that of air, or of your hand, and indeed, what about the memories of several persons that have played games with it? Some of this

could be described in a text, some is beyond description, while some is irrelevant. Think of a book, preserve it by record. In some cases you might find it absolutely enough to make a photocopy of it, if it is, say, the railway schedule; but it might also be that the cover graphics and even smell of the book appear to you as constitutive for what that book is.

The point is that any description can be infinite; one can zoom in forever. A complete description is on this account impossible. Description can only be a function of aim. The describer will have to choose the required minimum, according to the goals of her investigation, to her cultural background, character, and technical constraints. Therefore no two descriptions of a given "thing" (quiddity plus haecceity) will be alike. The record will be a selection and, as any selection, will reflect, as stated above, the taste, professional knowledge, mood and acuity of the describer. Insofar as archaeology constructs something that does not exist – the excavator's version of "what" was there, it cannot be only destructive. This paradox has to be accepted and any archaeologist has to be aware of it, and design methods of eliminating the bias or, rather, making this bias clear and profitable as some supplementary meaning. To sum up, recording does not leave us with an objective copy of what was there, but with a meaningful account of what the recorder can make of what was there.

It must also be emphasized that recording is not only designed to satisfy the severe eye of the public opinion. As we have seen, recording is fundamental in keeping the site open for the academic, and even lay, public even after excavation, that is, even after it no longer physically exists. Thus, it preserves a slice of our past for future contemplation and analysis. But this should not obliterate one other fundamental function of recording. Again, we have noted that the ultimate goal of archaeology is to present both the academia and the large public with a reconstruction of part of our past, acquired with narrative and visual means, in publication and perhaps museal/exhibition display. To achieve this goal, to publish the results of his investigation in a given time (2 to 5 years) after the excavation, the archaeologist has to piece up all the evidence retrieved and consider it carefully during the post excavation work; and this would be impossible without an efficient recording system. No memory could accommodate the chaotic wealth of information resulting from months of work, from a sundry of features made up of thousands of stratigraphic units which need to be grouped chronologically and made sense of.

Another aspect, maybe less readily apparent, is worth highlighting: the need to reconsider all the evidence in the light of the newly retrieved data, on the lines of new ideas and analysis; this would again be impossible without recording, since everyone knows how hard it is to remember and reassess data regarded at the time of perception as puny and insignificant – they find little place if any in our normal memory. But recording is here to be our second memory, and it is a memory where dodgy pieces of information, those that do not fit any assumption on the part of the archaeologist, will not be obnubilated as it happens with incongruous evidence in any coherent mind at work.

Recording fulfills two other functions of paramount importance. One deals with data compatibility, the other with good practice.

Compatibility is required because an excavation is only one set of data, which has to be matched by other data, checked against other excavations, and be thereby illuminated, enriched and validated. No single dig can deliver an accurate picture of our past; it yields instead a part of the big jigsaw puzzle. To understand even this small piece, we need to cross-reference it with what we already have, and to make it cross-referenceable with what little we shall soon have from other excavations. This requires that this highly interpretative endeavour of archaeology have a backbone of objective (be it that this only means shared, or intersubjectively verifiable) procedures. This in turn makes the use of a standardized terminology in the description of stratigraphic units (US) compulsory, so that they can trigger in the mind of any archaeologist a picture of that US fairly close to what the describer has seen. It is known for archaeologists to describe as “much charcoal” a percentage lying in the generous limits of 2% (sic) -80%. It is known for them to describe the same Munsell color 5 Y 8/4 (some kind of grayish yellow) both as “olive buff” (?) and as “red” or in terms reminding arcimboldian visual experiences. Finally, they sometimes produce soil description as baroque as they are futile, like “clayish, silty, sandy loam”.

Using pro-forma sheets (pre-printed formularies to be filled in on site) also has the advantage of preventing the archaeologist from forgetting details that should be recorded. Beyond being a mere reminder, the sheet also confronts the archaeologist with his own shenanigans; sometimes unclear situations, relationships, information are not forgotten at all, but subconsciously avoided if the archaeologist fails to understand them. Still the solution is not to postpone this understanding, but to solve it on the spot and fill in the appropriate field with the best guess at the time.

Good practice issues have always been at stake in archaeology, although not in an official way. Where recording plays a part, is in making it possible for others to evaluate your work. Until the seventies, almost no digs left behind more than photos, drawings and trench diaries to substantiate the final report, and many left less. In such a case it was very difficult to reappraise the premises from which the bright, shining published conclusions of the report were drawn. Of course the final report could be analyzed and criticized in terms of internal coherence, plausibility, logic and so on, but none of the facts could really be checked again. That is why final reports tend to exhibit a very persuading, clear-cut picture, where all odds and ends match in a brilliant synthesis, and where the archaeologist cannot fail to appear other than as an inquisitive mind, successful in unraveling all the secrets of a terribly complicated site. If, on the other hand, all the documentation (including the context/feature sheets) is available for perusal, the archaeologist freely exposes herself to criticism and assumes all her conclusions in real transparency. It would not be farfetched to compare the trench documentation to a surgery protocol; they should both describe in truthful detail an operation which was both of utter importance and of an irreversible character. Therefore, if having the documentation for writing the final report tremendously helps writing this report, there also is a deontological rationale for keeping all these records.

If we are to reconstruct a site from the archaeologist's documentation, we must have a good grasp on several things, especially what the archaeologist meant not only by theory-laden terms, representing decision and interpretation made in the field (*culture, occupation layer*, or, to a lesser extent, *cut, pit*), but also by terms as apparently innocuous as *small, red* or *soft*, or if there is a difference between *sandy loam* and *silty clay*.

Secondly, since our goals and methods are permanently changing, we would like to be able to check whether the archaeologist's decisions were correct and ultimately revisit his/her results and find alternative interpretations; for this we need to know how the archaeologist reasoned. So what we need is not only a recording manual of but also a manual for *thinking* archaeological sites.

This said, we have to make sure that we know the drivers of decision that led the archaeologist to a certain way of digging and to certain conclusions. In the aftermath of the post-processual revolution in archaeology, and with Ian Hodder as its spearhead, there is now increasing awareness of the fact that excavation is rather a cultural adventure which

is indeed far from perfunctory reading and writing down of manifest data popping out of the earth; it is rather an interplay between objectivity and subjectivity, a hermeneutic endeavour where interpretation creates data by changing patterns of data retrieval, which change interpretation which change data again (this will be tackled in section 3). Were they given the chance, all archaeologists would excavate differently the sites where they have been working years before, they would collect other data, test other hypotheses, construct other records, add other meaning to and finally suggest another historical reconstruction of the site. The introduction of pro-forma, forms that can be filled in by the archaeologist, while leaving room for interpretation “at the trowel’s edge”, but with the obligation of documenting the train of thought, might mitigate this problem.

2. A brief history of archaeological recording

The gist of this historiographic exercise is to stress the archaeologists’ constant if desultory quest for a recording system during most of the last two centuries. This is actually a history of the archaeological reflection on recording, as it evolved over what I shall call the three main phases of the existence of archaeology as a borderline discipline between sciences and humanities. The three I call object oriented digging, object oriented archaeology and site oriented archaeology.

i. Object oriented digging

One would like to begin this inquiry with the huge *History of Ancient Wiltshire*, published by **Richard Colt Hoare** in 1812. Possessed of a commendable archaeological furor, he excavated 379 barrows (classified in 12 types) all over Wiltshire (SW England), which he tries to describe with what he thinks to be “accuracy and my readers may think with too tedious a minuteness” (Colt Hoare 1852: 254). He occasionally pays attention to stratigraphy (id.:39), but the focus is on the burial and the burial goods. Sometimes (ibid.:54) it may nonplus the modern reader to be given an enormously concise phrase like this one: “on opening it [the barrow] we discovered 7 or 8 skeletons lying in every direction” (no other details follow). The book abounds in beautifully engraved plates with scale. The recurring syntagm *opening a barrow* is relevant for the mentality that archaeologist’s duty is to lift up a lid which automatically lays the secret

bare and conveys all the meaning inside. Daniel (1975: 31) calls Colt Hoare “the father of archaeological excavation in England”, bringing about “a great forward step from antiquarianism to archaeology”.

Giovanni Belzoni is the epitome of the tomb robber, an image his book *Narrative of the operations and recent discoveries within the Pyramids, temples and tombs and excavations in Egypt and Nubia*, London 1821, a book that by the following year had reached the third edition, does not really try to obliterate. He and his kind are however responsible for Egyptian art being exhibited in London and Paris. He mentions occasionally having taken “impressions of the principal fragments in basso rilievo” with a mixture of “wax, resin and fine dust” (Belzoni 1821, vol. 2:17). The reader will consider him, “and with great propriety, guilty of temerity”, as he says, but not for his endeavoring to depict his exploits but for the nonchalance of his archaeological robbing sprees. The term excavations in the title does not apply to anything in the book apart from mere digging to lift spoils from the sand.

Meanwhile in Denmark **Thomsen’s** tripartite classification of prehistory (Stone, Bronze, Iron Age) found its expression in the *Guide book to the National Museum in Copenhagen* (1836; eng. tr. 1848). Moreover he, at the time Curator of Danish Antiquities, together with members of the Royal Society of Northern antiquaries made therein innovative (albeit taxonomically awkward) descriptive classifications in pottery, stone tools and monuments; his successor as a curator, **J.J.A. Worsaae** was to be one of the founders of prehistoric archaeology and has done much for the spread of Thomsen’s three ages system. His book, *The primeval antiquities of Denmark* (1843) is said to have been, together with the *Guide*, the most important archaeological work in the first half of the nineteenth century (Daniel 1975: 45). Worsaae urges the scientific community to standardize its discourse (“antiquaries can scarcely pay too much attention to the introduction of a fixed terminology”). In his chapter on the examination of barrows (followed by an appendix), he makes three fine points: one, that before excavation proceeds, a complete description of the external form should be made; two, that as one digs, “trifling objects are always worth preserving” – advocating a holistic perspective over the archaeological archive; and three, that barrows should better be left unexcavated, because, he says, they impersonate the history of a nation; but one can suspect that he was quite unhappy with the excavation methods of his

contemporaries. Worsaae's seminal book received an English translation London in 1849 by Thoms; the translator enriches the text with notes and an interesting drawing by Rev. W. C. Lukis, 1837, with the stratigraphy inside a cromlech.

Some twenty years later **René Galles** excavates in 1862-1865 some tumuli and dolmens in France; in the case of the Moustoir-Carnac tumulus, Galles sees to it that soils and objects receive some description and even makes use of certain analyses (phosphoric acid in the soil thought to be conclusive prove of a burial). Although an effort is being made to record the main items, candid notes such as "trouvé ça et là plusieurs dents de cheval" are still bound to make clear the limitations of the desire or ability to record archaeological material. It is nevertheless remarkable that he resorts to a specialist to analyze the bones, which is the beginning of the massive "outsourcing" operation that made archaeology today one of the most interdisciplinary disciplines conceivable. Plans and sections are drawn; but the way this is done (on both sides of the Channel) is indicative of the archaeologist's inner conviction that the soil has to be adapted, by means of a symbolic drawing, to a "clear" mental situation corresponding to the message the archaeologist is trying to convey.

Auguste Mariette's importance as Director of the Egyptian Service of Antiquities is summed up by Daniel as follows: "he forbade any excavations in Egypt except those which he himself conducted and thus... he rid Egypt of tomb robbers and art collection touts masquerading as archaeologists,... and prevented the exportation of antiquities to Europe" (Daniel 75, 162). Mariette dug some 30 major sites, sometimes using dynamite to open up way in his pursuit of objects, and many excavations of his were never published. His existing reports (e.g. Mariette 1882, published by Maspero after Mariette's manuscript about his excavations in 1850-1854) have a narrative alertness proper to the journalist, or to the trench diary, for that matter. Recording is object/monument oriented: "nous copierons, nous cataloguerons les monuments découverts" (Mariette 1882, 71); the same goes for the planning of the excavation: "nous marchons en effet de sphinx en sphinx, nous faisons de sondages de 6m en 6 m qui nous font retrouver les sphinx cherchés..." One gets the impression that the Middle East was a playground for obnoxious archaeologists, who got seduced by the copious richness of the sites and forgot that soils are archaeological objects just the way colossal statues are. The Europe of barrows and ditches and prehistoric

villages, with a meager percentage of statues or architecture was generally more conducive to attentive and patient excavation.

Worsaae, who was much ahead of his time, offers the most valuable pages on what recording should be, in this era of romantic excavations. Apprenticeship has been long and expensive; parts of world's crucial sites have been turned upside down without a line published about them – the price to pay for the build-up of a public awareness wherefrom archaeology was to rise.

ii. Object oriented Archaeology

Pompeii had to go through more than a century of more or less irresponsible excavations until the 1860s to deserve an organized large scale excavation with **Giuseppe Fiorelli**. Houses in Pompeii had never been excavated as a functional and cultural whole, while Fiorelli tackled whole insulae in what was already a stratigraphic excavation. This was another step on the way of emphasizing a site as a continuum and organizing the scientific investigation around this fundamental assumption. Fiorelli divided the city into regions and *insulae*, and tried to construe their evolution. His excavation report from 1873 is also remarkable in that it quantifies so much that it anticipates archaeological statistics. Long lists of dimensions and technical parameters of architectural elements are given and made palatable by means of an endless list of numbers standing for the vessels, the bronze objects, terracottas, marbles pieces or bones (*87 scheletri umani, 7 di cavalli* etc.) found in this or that area. The contexts (stratigraphic units) are missing and so are plates with the pottery; also, despite the fact that he pioneered the stratigraphic method, no cross-sections are offered in his *Scavi di Pompei* (1873). Therefore, although Fiorelli dug a city, which was a progress, he rather published its objects.

The late 1880s saw the publication of four vast, lavishly illustrated volumes by General **Pitt Rivers** who, after inheriting the Rivers estate, set off with Colt Hoare's alacrity and Fiorelli's rigor to excavate a wide variety of features on his domain, including camps, villages, cemeteries, barrows and ditches. He did this in what any archaeologist will acknowledge as the most peculiar way, namely "unlimited by considerations of finance, time or labor". The publication comes singularly close to the ideal publication of a

dig. Full and prompt, it was almost an uncalled for breakthrough since no one could achieve the same standard of publication just as no one could excavate so slowly, that is to say, expensively (*contra* Lucas 2001:45). The sheer amount of drawings and woodcuts is overwhelming: dozens of skulls are drawn 1:1, and the reader gets everything, from metacarpal and metatarsal bones of ancient sheep compared to modern sheep to coin tables and distribution charts, from flint typology to such delicacies as fragments of painted plaster and of daub and wattlework; again, it is hardly to be found even in modern reports dog skulls being given the classic ten odd measurement indexes Volume 4 also features photographs, following in this regard the breakthrough achieved by Alexander Conze's publication of his digs from Samothrace, the first archaeological report in existence.

The plans (and a few sections) are militarily precise and make use of drawing conventions. Pitt Rivers was not opening a barrow, he indulged in total excavation, going "down to the undisturbed chalk"; every trench was commented upon in a standardized way (date, place, description, soils, finds, animal and vegetal remains, pottery). Everything found was recorded in terms of position and depth; still, he excavated in spits, without following the stratigraphy, although he understood it. Obsessed with typology, his main interest was rather in sequencing finds (Lucas 2001); he also broke with the tradition of opening barrows and got interested on dwelling places. From that time of amateur archaeologist or plain looters, Pitt Rivers still retains a legendary prestige. For this groundbreaking, if eccentric, character in the history of archaeology, Thompson, *General Pitt Rivers: Evolution and Archaeology in the 19th century*, 1977, Trigger, *A History of Archaeological Thought*, 1989; Bowden, *Pitt Rivers*, 1991. He used to place a "medalet" near the bottom of his excavations after 1880, a token saying "Opened by A. Pitt Rivers".

Schliemann's contribution to archaeology, considered immense at the end of the 19th century, and then questioned by those who charged the discoverer of Troy and Mycene with bulldozing through the sophisticated stratigraphy of these settlements – is now reappraised. His merits are easy to see, once he is placed in his context: he was indeed the first to excavate a tell and coped rather well with identifying (seven) successive occupation layers. Stratigraphy had been understood in the Danish peat bogs, the Jutland barrows, and the prehistoric Swiss lake dwellings, but never on tells. It is also true that this he did especially after 1882, when

Dörpfeld joined him; the architect came from Curtius' excavations in Olympia and brought with him all the method and acumen of German classical archaeologist, as Theodor Wiegand in Didyma and Milet or the aforementioned Alexander Conze in Samothrace and Pergamon. Dörpfeld established nine periods in the evolution of the mound settlement and produced some famous stratigraphic drawings (where obviously things are simplified to be made intelligible). Daniel (1975, 169) gives an overview of Schliemann's work: he "preserved everything he found, realizing the importance of ordinary things in providing a true picture of the past. He recorded carefully the level at which finds were made and he had every important find drawn or photographed as soon as possible, and he was prompt in publishing his results as fully as possible." Nevertheless it was for the American of Cincinnati University, conducted by Carl Blegen who excavated there 1932-1938 to realize that these nine major periods were each composed of two or more phases, the total amounting to 46 phases, thus considerably refining the stratigraphy.

The British archaeologist and Egyptologist **W.M. Flinders Petrie** was the second to carry out a stratigraphical investigation at the Palestinian site Tell-el-hesi in Palestine (in 1890), where he could make sense of the sixty feet occupation debris and, much as Schliemann, think in term of civilizational sequence. Flinders Petrie summarizes in 1904 his method of excavation in *Method and aims in Archaeology*, mainly on the basis of his considerable experience in Egypt. Chapter five of this influential book is called recording in the field (Flinders Petrie 1904: 48-59). Recording is defined as "the absolute dividing line between plundering and scientific work". Now the expression of object oriented archaeology involuntarily crashes past Flinders Petrie's text: "after finding things the first consideration is to record and preserve all the information about them." Incidentally, things prevail here again over soil structure: what if we don't find things (artifacts)? Does not the soil itself tell a story? Should then there be no drawing, no measurement, and no meaning? But Flinders Petrie still offers what appears to be the best (published) discourse on recording up to his time. We eventually learn that the author probably equates things with "discovery": "Every discovery does destroy evidence unless it is intelligently recorded", and upon this the author states buoyantly: "our museums are ghastly charnel houses of murdered evidence." He also draws attention upon the fact that there is no such thing as raw data and the archaeologist must work within a methodological framework:

“in recording the first difficulty is to know what to record. To state every fact about everything found would be useless. It would be like a detective who would photograph and measure every man on London Bridge to search for a criminal. It is absolutely necessary to know how much is already known before setting about recording more.” A last hint that he gives, again in advance of his time: “The record should be presented finally in an intelligible form... much like what might have been written by a contemporary of the times in question.” This is arguably asserting the right of the past to a history upon which the archaeologists does not project their own perspectives. All this said, and despite his excellent intuition, the reality of recording on Petrie’s dig is no match for today’s standards. Basically every sector or area on site, lettered from A to Z, was allotted a page in a notebook, where all the layers were listed and numbered; thus the provenance of finds could be easily ascertained by the conjunction of a letter and a number, plus additional information as depth and coordinates. This system was to be in use throughout most of the pre-context sheet archaeology.

A decade later this more theoretically developed approach to recording is championed by **J.P. Droop**, who devotes one chapter to recording in his book *Archaeological excavation* (1915). It had become clear that recording deserves by now some conceptual debate. The main ideas promoted by Droop are the following: 1. Nothing that is found is without interest and everything should be dealt with (Droop 1915:13). 2. An excavation should be so conducted that it would be possible to build up the site again with every object replaced exactly in its original position (*id.*: 17) 3. Descriptions should be intelligible to another person or to the excavator himself 6 months afterwards 4. Do not introduce theories into your excavation work, “if not absolutely necessary” (*ibid.* 51) and 5. As you dig, do note down everything although the greater number of these observations will in the end prove valueless.

Droop suggests that one keep notes for every trench: “[t]o take notes at an excavation is in itself an art to be learnt” and “it is impossible to give directions for such notes”; “the vocabulary is full of slang words and nicknames for finds” for which there is no reason to be replaced (*ibid.*, 27 sq.). These notes should comprise all the observation pertaining to the archaeology seen there; mention is also made of an excavation day book where the excavation director should enter on a weekly basis (*sic*) the general trends of the work and the broad conclusions; this requirements,

which add to the difficulties of the job, are auspicious since “writing these notes compels one to understand what has been excavated and clarify ambiguities on the spot”. As one of the fundamental qualities of an archaeologist he interestingly lists the “power over words... writing concisely a rigidly accurate yet lucid report”. (*ibid*: 35)

In the between-the-wars period the excavation reports do not say much about the recording systems used in the field and one can only guess at the underlying recording principles. **Chapouthier** and **Charbonneaux** digging in Crete in the early twenties spice their report with plans, pottery drawings and photos - but there are no sections (Chapouthier 1924). We would like to know more about the test trench strategy successfully employed by the Swedish excavations in Asine (Frödin and Persson 1925) or the stratigraphic know-how of **Persson**’s final report (Frödin and Persson 1938; deemed by Gordon Childe a “model of publication”). The same goes for **Delaporte**’s excavations in Turkey and, from the richness of tiny reports instrumented by the **Service** des Monuments Historiques de l’Algérie, one wonders whether some standardized guidance’s or pro-forma sheets were in use for the different archaeological unit across the country. Finally, the Swiss G. **Jéquier**, digging an Egyptian necropolis emphasizes the differences between the way an archaeologists works and thinks on different sites: “il n’existe pas des règles uniformes et rigides dans le métier du fouilleur, qui n’est guidé que par les circonstances infiniment variables et par le bon sens, tout en tenant compte de ses ressources en matériel, en main d’œuvre et en personnel scientifique... l’archéologue procédera de façons fort différentes suivant le terrain et la nature du monument à attaquer.”(**Jéquier** 1940:101) To adjust the recording system to the respective site seems indeed feasible, perhaps even rewarding, in case of very important, well known and long researched locations. L. **Lerat** publishes his fouilles de Delphes, but the one section drawn is unclear and without a caption, while we only get a tantalizing glimpse of what the *livre de fouille* of Delphi must have looked like (where the author looks up for information at the 1895 entry).

iii. Site oriented Archaeology

Right before the Second World War, a committee bringing together directors of museums in 11 countries (including the British and the Louvre) embarked on publishing a **Manuel de la technique des fouilles**

archéologiques and offered a state of the art in archaeological practice, which was indeed the best book to have been written on this topic by 1939. Very modern are particularly chapters *vi. documentation pendant le cours des travaux* (although this also talks quite malapropos about the transportation of small finds and bones), *x. l'aménagement des champs de fouilles au profit de la recherche et de l'éducation du public*, *xiii. principes d'organisation des services archéologiques*. I shall quote the main statements from this spectacular, largely unknown document: first, the archaeological sites are seen as "archives qui ne sont plus jamais disponibles"; second, "les fouilles stratigraphiques sont désormais universellement adoptées" (Manuel...1939 :57); third, "on ne peut établir des principes généraux convenant à toutes catégories de fouilles" (*id.* :93) and palaeolithic sites and ancient monuments, cemeteries and cities should all be excavated differently; fourth, make sure that by recording everything by means of charts, photo, notes, drawings, maps you will be able to rebuild in detail what has been taken out of the archive of earth; fifth, "les coupes ont généralement la même importance que les plans" (*ibid.* :97), so sections cannot be replaced by plans, nor the other way around; sixth, all the documentation should be done in such a way that any other archaeologist may be able to complete and publish the excavation; seventh, "il serait désirable qu'on put établir un système général, adopté dans tous les pays, en ce qui concerne la stratification ainsi que la terminologie pour les objets dans les catalogues" (*ibid.* 108).

The archaeological record should mean in the first place a "registre obligatoire des objects" as well as a file for pottery, in the field, where the actual work takes place, "rapports consignants la progression journalière des travaux" and notes are also to be devoted to the architecture exposed, the stratigraphy and context of finds. Find boxes should be inscribed with site name, date, number, square, level and type. Photography is largely promoted (both general and detail). From a theoretical point of view, before the context sheet system, the Manuel is a *nec plus ultra*.

This manual gained immediate recognition in France, and **E. Salin** (1946) draws repeatedly upon it in his treatment of funerary archaeology. He recommends "prospection et reconnaissance et sondages" before any kind of dig, given that archaeology is destructive. Moreover, the only way archaeology can achieve legitimacy is by producing a thorough record: "le journal des fouilles... est le document essentiel qui doit permettre de tirer du gîte tous les enseignements qu'il comporte... tout voir et tout

noter immédiatement.” (Salin 1946: 53, 54). To note down, he says, only the burials, the burial goods and their location is “chose nécessaire mais absolument insuffisante”, because one must describe and record in detail “toutes particularités des déblais”, besides precise and complete plans. The pro-forma sheets that he proposes are inspired by **Scheurer** and **Lablotier**'s excavations in Bourogne (sic) and must be filled in with number, nature and orientation, sex and height, burial goods and observations.

During the war, the former director of the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, **Gerhard Bersu**, who had already excavated in Britain at Little Woodbury (1938, 1939), undertook a new Iron Age excavation, this time interned as an enemy alien on the Isle of Man. He excavated with extreme meticulousness, retrieving timber structures and including everyday domestic waste in the finds category, much on the line suggested by Pitt Rivers. His final plans look like those of an open area excavation, without the Wheelerian baulks, in order for him to be able to recognize and understand post hole structures, a thing that had been done since Schuchardt in the 1870s, but afterwards in the rather isolate world of Danish and Dutch archaeology. Yet the plans were made at the end of the dig when, just like Wheeler later on, Bersu would remove all the baulks, making a trench by trench excavation look indeed as if it had been one covering large open surfaces. But his emphasis on plans makes him a pioneer of open area excavation. The Isle of Man excavations resulted in 500m of sections of a naturalistic style being drawn; also the final report includes chapters on method of excavation, which were thought to be either the domain of theoretical works or unavowable principles followed by the excavator which would be superfluous to describe along the results of their application. Bersu has acknowledged in turn the interdependence between site characteristics and methodology involved, highlighting “the sound principle that each site must be examined by the most suitable method and that there is no general working rule that applies in every case” (Bersu, 1977, 26 published after the author manuscript written immediately after the war). His great advance is recognizing houses of which only post holes remained, prehistoric houses that were completely missed in Britain at the time.

A synthesis of most of these advances in archaeological thought and method was accomplished by the best-known British archaeologist of the twentieth century, Sir **Mortimer Wheeler**, and it breathed life into his

excavation before and after WW2. His monographies on *Verulamium* 1936 and particularly on *Maiden Castle* 1943 (where he dug 1934-1937) set a new standard in publication of excavations by using stratification as the key principle of excavation, submitting to the academia a coherent whole making sense of all data gathered during the excavation, projected against the background of general knowledge about the site and period, in order to ultimately fathom the history of the place. As he put it, "we are not excavating artifacts, but people". The report ought – so Wheeler – to take into account all previous exploration/excavation as well as ancient sources on the site, but truly focus the specific of a given site.

The finds are photographed or drawn, described, typologized, from vessels to flints to brooches, from coins to metal to stone implements, seriating everything from sling shots to counters to spindle whorls; his reports come up with excellent photographs of which duly famous are the carbonized iron age loaf, or the skeleton with a spear between vertebra.

Wheeler designed a complex approach to excavation, applying Pitt Rivers' incipient stratigraphic principles and substantiating them with outstanding drawings (plans, sections and also maps ranging from vessel distribution to post hole evidence), outsourcing the analysis of finds to specialists (human and animal bones, timber, grain, mollusca, mosaic stones, pottery temper), bridging science and art history. He said in his *Archaeology from the Earth* (1954) that this discipline was "work which, unrecorded, resolves into destruction". He also replaced workmen with trained volunteers and constantly believed that archaeology needs public support and therefore it should open to the public; in his reports he mentions the team and the sponsors.

He designed a new digging method, the grid (or box) excavation, a permanent pursuit of vertical stratigraphy, with profiles being kept as baulks. Take a site that is 30m x 30m; it consists then of one hundred squares of 9m² each, all of them excavated as to leave a stripe of 1m of solid soil between them (called baulks), which means that in the end one hundred boxes of 2x2m are dug, plus of course the baulks at the end. This method has also been applied by his former student Kathleen Kenyon, who was to become a famous archaeologist by digging in Jericho. Dame Kenyon did much to the good name of Wheelerian stratigraphic archaeology by her careful excavation and, among others, excellent use of photography. For Wheeler and Kenyon, the stratigraphic control can only be exerted by using sections, and hence the profusion of baulks, always at right angle; the idea of controlling the excavation from the top, by using horizontal

stratigraphy, appeared to them as very unsafe, although this is not the case today. The notion of layer (the ancestor of the British “context” or stratigraphic unit) is modeled on the geologic deposits, solid ones, again a conception challenged nowadays when also negative units, like cuts, are considered layers.

Modern recording systems, making thorough use of stratigraphy, have been brought about by the boom of rescue archaeology on deeply stratified sites in the UK in the sixties and seventies. A turning point is the foundation of the archaeological service Winchester Research Unit in 1961 by Martin Biddle. He gives a grim assessment of Wheeler’s method: “the trench pattern is imposed on the site, often to the detriment of the pattern of structures, and once established the trench pattern is fixed. The deeper the squares go, the more difficult it becomes to view and comprehend the structures as a whole. On a site with very complex stratification, correlation of layers from one side of a baulk to the other may be impossible.” (Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle, 1969:211). There was room for improvement then.

Pioneers of open area excavation have also been Brian Hope-Taylor at Yeavinger and Philip Rahtz at Cheddar, but the fundamental expression of open area has been given by the same Biddle and his wife Kjølbye-Biddle in 1967 and 1969. As it happens more often than not, this revolution (for it was a revolution) rested on one important formal change: baulks that might interfere with the features uncovered would be maintained only until a major layer was reached, which was planned, then the baulks would be removed after proper recording (Biddle and Kjølbye-Biddle 1969:212). A new phase in the history of the site is now visible, therefore the baulks could be relocated where most suitable, according to new stratigraphic challenges; this could be repeated from phase to phase. No photo or drawing of a complete profile can be done, but the sections, if not one on top of the other, are still cumulative in that they show the nature of the stratigraphic relationship.

All this had prepared the understanding of complex stratigraphic relations, sometimes between really minute deposits, of all forms and causes, and encouraged the breaking down of stratigraphy into contexts, or stratigraphic units, which were (to quote Westman 1994) “any single action, whether it leaves a positive or negative record within the sequence”; Edward Harris from the Winchester Research Unit gets the credit for this

instrumentalization of stratigraphy which also led to the development of the so-called Harris matrices. Once a site was understood of consisting of contexts of which none was more important than the other, all of them with relevant physical characteristic, all bearers of chronological clues, it was a small step for Harris to advocating describing every context separately, on context sheets, as an individual container of information.

During the 70s were used the first record sheets and a new conceptualization of field work occurred in what can be called a democratization of stratigraphy; the Department of Urban Archaeology (DUA) in London first used such sheets in 1975, a usage later much theoretically propped and popularized by the Museum of London Archaeology Service (MoLAS). Of much help have proven total stations, with which the coordinates could be considerably faster and more accurately recorded, along with the professionalization of archaeology, eventually resulting in excellent horizontal control of stratigraphy and the abandonment of baulks altogether.

3. A philosophical approach to recording between interpretation and description

As I have said, the recording system that I propose is interpretation-based. This arises out of an already long debate among archaeologists about the possibility of totally separating description from interpretation. The traditional view, prolonged into the New Archaeology era, was that description of what is being seen and done during the dig has to be given objectively, followed then, and carefully isolated from, one's own interpretation; this was the recommended, scientific way of doing archaeology, separating facts from theory. This theory has been eventually challenged by many first-rate archaeologists, notably Ian Hodder, Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley, actually so efficiently that to challenge it again now it would be *enforcer des portes ouvertes*. Contemporary archaeology acknowledges that no description is pre-interpretative, and separation between the two is a quite hypocritical, post-factum device of looking scientific and objective in a discipline already proven to share many traits with the boldest of the interpretative humanistic disciplines. How can this be? I propose that we take a quick detour and probe into the epistemological roots of this conundrum, by seeing how the doublets objective/subjective and interpretation / description/ (explanation) have

been reshaped in the past half century. It is worthwhile to stop and ponder over the origins and scope of this turnover.

The 1960s, when Wheeler's methods were already highly disseminated in the archaeological world, witnessed major changes in the field of epistemology, in general, and, if indirectly, in that of archaeological theory.

In this period, science was still conceived as the strong engine behind the unstoppable locomotive of progress. This positivist conception of science was soon to fall under the blows of several philosophers of science, with deep implications for future research. Two major underlying assumptions of this model of science are the reality of the world, and the independence of the truth from what we think. On this line can be listed many other convictions, typical for these days of faith in science: any part of the world has a unique best description; observation is completely separated from theory; science is cumulative; observation and experiments lead to new hypotheses and theories, the latter having a deductive structure.

It is still a debated phenomenon why New Archaeology, which was an attempt to "positivise" archaeology, to turn it into an anthropological inquiry with laws and scientific instruments (perhaps in itself a paradox), took off in an era when the positivist model of science was ever more rejected in the world of science. The decade that witnesses the first and most influential books of New Archaeology, Willey and Phillips's *Method and Theory in American Archeology*, 1958, and Binford's *Archaeology as Anthropology* (1963) and *New Perspectives in Archaeology* (1968) is replete with a renaissance-like confidence in the power of science. When Carl Hempel published his *Aspects of scientific explanation* (1965) and his *Philosophy of natural sciences* (1966), they were to be enthusiastically taken over by the new archaeologists, who now grounded in his hypothetico-deductive (or deductive-nomological) approach of natural science their own quest for finding testable hypotheses and laws of culture and for applying them to the archaeological record. Interestingly, after Hempel's ashlar were hastily built into the new archaeological edifice and at the very moment new archaeologists had the feeling of full legitimacy, the (logical empirical) positivist model of science was actually falling from grace with philosophers; alas, Hempel was not pointing towards the new avenues of epistemology, but rather looking back to a model that was not to survive. There were at least ten years since wonderfully pugnacious books had been published who were to puncture

the majestic balloon of positivism: Popper's *Logic of Scientific Discovery*", London, 1959, "Conjectures and Refutations" , London, 1963, Kuhn, T.S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962 and Feyerabend's *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (1975). By the time of Lakatos's *Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (1978), New Archaeology was something degenerate: the scientific model of archaeology was proving really the same thing with the personal equation of the archaeologist and no non-trivial laws have ever been systematically tested.

Popper (much in the spirit of Hume) was challenging the idea of verifiability of laws, pointing out that, even leaving aside that most of the time the results of testing do not infirm or confirm anything whatsoever, but are quite interpretable, to prove a law right (or rather, to prove that a hypothesis has law status), one has to test it in an infinity of instances, therefore such a law will always remain potential. For Popper, laws can be proven wrong, but never right; they can be falsified, but not verified. The endless testing involved in this process is impossible and even if it were possible, testing and examination can quickly reach a point of diminishing returns. Other scrupulous philosophers have cast a critical eye on the hypothetico-deductive method. For Hilary Putnam, for example, deduction cannot reach the truth since the premises will always be in doubt themselves. Also, in order to test a theory, most of the times auxiliary statements (AS) have to be introduced to make it testable, and then, besides the theory, the AS can be sources of doubt and flaw; in archaeology one cannot test unless one uses AS, so not even falsification can be done!

So much for the dear testing of hypotheses of the positivists and new archaeologists. If I read Thomas Kuhn correctly, then there are as many sciences as there are scientists; science can achieve its ends in different, noncumulative paradigms (which look non-scientific or metaphysical one to the other), and there can be no logical hierarchy between them as long as they all fulfill the ontological need to know. Kuhn and particularly Feyerabend see indeed science as irrational. Observation, and the words expressing it, are always theory-laden and dependent on one's conception of the world. If the language of science is full of metaphors and anthropomorphism, if knowledge is subjective, then what are observed facts, and how to distinguish between theories, facts and values? Science is a social process and knowledge has a constitutive social character. All this holds for science in general, but the poignancy of this criticism is particularly felt in humanities.

Another important contribution to the modern epistemological debate was to cast serious doubts about the possibility of humanities of setting truth as their final goal. Two main arguments have been brought into this discussion. The first is Quine's theory of the indeterminacy of translation (*Word and Object*, 1960, *Ontological Relativity*, 1968). This states that no science can take words as raw data, since words are not a measurable feature of the world. There is, for Quine, no single correct way to objectively interpret a sentence. The analysis of verbal behavior cannot yield the truth. This of course does not make it useless, the problem being what other criteria of worthiness can be used for human research; among others, practical applicability has been proposed. The second argument, put forward by several philosophers, goes as follows: investigating the society influences and changes it, therefore all observation of the world is actually an observation of the world as modified by our own observational engagement. In other words, no judgment over a pre-judgment world can be passed.

How was science to get out of this double predicament? A recourse to Kant was here in order, and he was now used to bridge the gap between Cartesian skepticism and constructivist twists in archaeological theory in the post-Binford era. For Kant, world is not perceived objectively, but constructed by the observer, whose knowledge is conditioned by his social and political context and whose truth remain provisory. All discussion of objectivity can then be suspended and the accent shifted towards meaning. Feeling that something was wrong with the solid positivism, Hempel had already begun to talk about an *open meaning*.

The deductive method in science was meanwhile superseded by a different form of logical reasoning, which was induction. The mere fact that inductive reasoning is ampliative, that is, conclusions comprise more information than the premises, reflects a new bias towards the heuristic role of interpretation and imagination in science. Induction has limits, since any time new empiric evidence can contradict the proposed conclusion, but is a fine instrument in grasping the subtleties of a complex historical reality. Of several types of induction (statistical, analogical etc) one of the most interesting is *inference to the best explanation*, first tackled by some pragmatic philosophers like Peirce and Dewey, and analyzed by Gilbert Harman (*Philosophical Review* 74.1, 1965) and recently by Lipton (1991). Inference to the best explanation is actually a creative process for generating hypotheses. It establishes the truth of a hypothesis from the fact that it best explains all available proof and data.

Once the truth was thus redefined, it remained to be defined what a best explanation is. A list of criteria will follow. The first requirement for a candidate “best explanation” is empirical broadness (Fogelin 2007), that is, to address a great quantity and a wide variety of observations or (empirical) evidence, explain many, be contradicted by none if possible, harness multiple lines of evidence in the final proof and be usable to explain similar situations or phenomena.

This kind of reasoning introduces the notion of foil (Lipton 1991). This is how foil works. A problem with causal explanation is the possibility of infinite regression: why A? because B; why B then? because C, and so on; incidentally, this kind of causal exploration doesn't take into account the fact that at stake here is not the cause, but the meaning of something. To avoid this regression one can particularize the question asked by means of a foil, for example, not ask why there is so much lithic debitage in this part of the site, but why is there much lithic debitage there *and not elsewhere*, or instead of it *being evenly spread*. Thus, the foil serves to focus the explanation, if of course, the foil and the question asked are mutually exclusive (not as in, for example, why is there a basilica on the necropolis hill instead of a forum in the city). The more foils the explanation has and the more explicit they are, the more valuable it is. Quine and Ullian, *The web of belief*, (1978), actually speaking of the plausibility of an hypothesis, also require from an explanation modesty, that is, not to try to explain everything, not to resort to more than needed to account for the nature of the question, conservatism, not to break without a serious reason with what is already (thought to be) known, simplicity, to resort to the minimum number of entities and interactions (Ockham's razor), and refutability, be formulated so that it can be refuted. Fogelin (2007) asks the explanation to offer a way of correcting the possible bias; Hodder (1999) would in turn look for internal and external coherence, fruitfulness, opening up of new perspectives. The once Cambridge, now Stanford based director of Catalhoyuk excavations also introduces in archaeology the philosophical concept of the hermeneutic spiral. This requires an explanation to be offered after a conscious harmonizing of the investigator's context with the context of the investigated, that is, after moving back and forth between identity and alterity with the permanent modification of the whole. This can be termed a case of historic Einfuehlung. Somewhat in the line of Feyerabend on how to defend society against science, one could also add *intersubjective agreement* as a final requirement of an explanation,.

It follows from the above that explanation is not the unique solution to a mathematical equation, obtainable with an algorithm beyond dispute. It is rather a multifaceted, creative process of empathy with past contexts meant to project today a coherent order of events and a consistent line of reasoning of past actors; this is then the new solution of human sciences to the quest for truth, ultimately resulting in a best explanatory narrative. Now there is still the need of understanding the interplay description-interpretation-explanation. For example, can the multiple evidence that must be accommodated by the explanation, be offered in the form of "objective" descriptions? And what are the overtones of interpretations within the sober, if creative, flight of explanation? It is hard not to turn this into a language problem or into a skirmish of vacuous definitions. It will be interesting to remember at this point the founding myth of the new archaeology: *archaeology is anthropology, or it is nothing*. The notorious distinction made by Geertz in his notorious *Interpretation of Cultures* (1973), between *thin description* and *thick description*, is meant to state anthropologically that description proper can only mean going beyond the obvious and the contingent, into the context and culture, and this thick description actually means to Clifford Geertz providing an explanation. Meehan (*Explanation in social science*, 1968) had also grasped this connection from a formal point of view: for him, explanation is a *dynamic description*, involving interrelated sets of variables that express regular connections among phenomena. But it should be clearly stated, because this has striking archaeological implications, that description is not possible in the absence of understanding, or rather that any observer goes through the hermeneutic spiral in a cycle - this time between description and interpretation; the key point is that one cannot describe, unless one has understood, unless one has an explanation. As art scholar Gombrich, (*Norm and form*, 1966) put it, *you cannot describe art without using art criticism*; in this he is somehow following Eugenio d'Ors's *one cannot see unless one understands* (*Tres horas en el museo del Prado*, 1921). Going back to Geertz, this all means that as the matter of fact, describing somebody's wink as a rapid lid movement (thin description) is missing the embedded social code and relevance of a formulary gesture (thick description). But obviously if one does not suspect the social relevance of this gesture, one will never mention it, will not "see" it, or, alternatively, one would have to describe thousands of small involuntary movements of members, fingers and head with the hope that one might

have ritual significance. This means, a wink was seen because it has been understood.

An understanding of the fact that description cannot be separated from interpretation is a prerequisite for a more lucid, and methodologically honest, way of doing archaeology.

4. A recording system for Romanian archaeological excavations

There are three major problems, from the point of view of the present article, with Romanian archaeology. 1. Due to the lack of a standard recording system, among other causes, most archaeological excavations in Romania are flawed by loss of data and their final reports, if published, are biased; therefore they hardly permit a second opinion on that excavation. 2. Archaeological reports from across the country cannot be compared since their terminology is different; the scientific profit of archaeology diminishes thereby considerably and the broad image is jaundiced. 3. The methods and assumptions that led to those results cannot be followed or traced back from those reports, and the theoretical approach to excavation is considered to be self-understood, with the result that even solid results cannot be judged in a methodological framework, so they cannot ultimately be interpreted.

At least partly, these problems are due to 1. the undertaking of excavations despite adequate funding, 2. the insufficient number of archaeology courses taught in universities, even to those pursuing a degree in archaeology 3. the underdevelopment or underrepresentation of rescue excavations as compared to systematic archaeology.

It is true, on the other hand, that efforts are being made on many digs in Romania, and recently at Histria and Adamclissi, to improve the standards of recording to a practically attainable degree of completeness. Nevertheless, no two sites in Romania which are not directed by the same individual have a common system of recording. Two things are needed then: better recording across the country and coherent recording at least on digs of the same major institution/museum, if not on a national level.

It would be of course overconfident to state that a manual of recording techniques and theories, even promoted at a national level, would solve all of these problems overnight; but it could definitely generate change and alleviate the sense of waste and quixotic effort that we are currently experiencing.

The recording system that I am proposing is based on the principles of stratigraphic excavation, recorded context by context, with a good grasp of the interplay between interpretation and description, as outlined above in sections 1, 2 and 3 of the present article. The system is based on pro-forma sheets (fig. 1). This is what recording in Romania misses most; the other components of the documentation (photos, drawings, trench diaries), while perfectible, are generally made good use of. But not using pro-forma sheets (be they context sheets, or, as advocated here, feature sheets) is unfortunately not a mere lapse; it goes hand in hand with a very selective use of stratigraphy, and has overtones of methodological unawareness. If this has been the rule in patriarchal archaeology, it is no more sustainable in a European environment.

The dominant trend in contemporary archaeology, particularly in the UK, but also in Germany or France, is to use pro-forma sheets to the effect that every stratigraphic unit (*context, locus, Befund, Behälter, unité stratigraphique*) receives a context sheet, where the information relevant for that unit must be filled in. Such a system can also be applied in Romania and prove functional. Yet I have doubts that this is the best thing to do. The MoLAS system stems from the milieu of rescue excavation, where it has been primarily devised to cope with the challenges of deeply stratified urban sites; its main advantage is allowing the excavator to reduce the site to a long series of tiny units, groupable in features and phases, even when their understanding is hindered by truncation, erosion, or blurred stratigraphy. This approach has proven best when applied by teams of professional rescue diggers and when its final goal is the phasing of the site with a Harris matrix. In Romania nevertheless, the mechanisms of rescue excavation have not had the time to shape such an approach to sites, trench supervisors are rarely highly trained personnel and the Harris matrix is very rarely used.

However, the kind of pro-forma sheet that I propose for recording is not context oriented for a different reason. I think a feature sheet is more appropriate for an interpretation driven excavation, while also saving time and paperwork. To put it bluntly, instead of filling in a form for every context/stratigraphic unit, there will be forms for every identified feature, with overall interpretation and, obviously, description of all composing contexts, if in somewhat less detail. This advocates a holistic view of the trench, which should facilitate a better grasp of the site personality. This also posits the fact that we understand stratigraphic units as parts of bigger, meaningful features (ditches, banks, pits, postholes, graves, hearths,

walls); why scatter, then, all the related evidence for them on four times as many sheets, making it harder to access and collate them. Feature sheets are an innovation that might be very profitable, because it facilitates the understanding of the site while on site, and because it responds better to the profile of the archaeological elite in Romania, trained to excavate ensembles of units/ artifacts rather than units/artifacts (*complexe inchise/deschise*). A pilot program will show the degree of applicability of this pioneering recording method.

A second novelty is the need to acknowledge the role of interpretation in excavating a site, role long granted, and overtly so, by the recent epistemological thought (as we have seen in section 3), but which has failed until now to find its way into the practicalities of the excavation work. To look at this sheet (fig 1), we will find what else strongly differentiates it from what is now in favor in Western archaeology. This is the shift of accent, or rather of priority, from description to interpretation, in filling in the pro-forma sheets. The context sheets proposed by the Museum of London, one of the most influential archaeological institutions, acting much like a regulator in the arena of archaeological discussion, require that a complex, standardized and objective description is given, which is then followed by the subjective interpretation of the archaeologist, interpretation which, we are to infer, does not affect in any way the dry, down to earth description. As we have seen, interpretation and description are not only interrelated, but recognizing (even seeing) the things to be described, choosing the relevant things to be mentioned, are all a matter of interpretation. It will be for this reason not only a graphic contraption to begin the feature sheet with this statement of understanding, called interpretation. Besides, it is also of great interest to offer the reader an alternative to this interpretation, in case the archaeologist has at one point felt that another way of seeing things was alluring, perhaps also legitimate, but finally rejected it. This room for alternative interpretations can turn out to be a reservoir of excellent, fresh ideas on the true nature of the features.

Apart from this two new traits (feature based sheet, focus on interpretation), the other fields span the expectations and standards of description of some of the best schools of thought in archaeology, shared by most professional and academic diggers today. The project offered here owes much, as any project in this area does, to the work of British archaeologist, beginning with the Winchester unit and the Museum of London up to Oxford Archaeology. Despite the difference in design

between the hundreds of types of such sheets in use across Europe, the variability in entries is not and cannot be significant. All or almost all of them will ask the archaeologist to record the hard core of the data, that cannot be avoided, no matter what the theoretical background the author may have, with some extra details according to the site's profile and the philosophy of the institution digging there. But it should be stressed again that the terminology has to be fixed and be used by everybody using the feature sheets. Terminology is after all a convention, and it is powerful as long as it remains one. It does not quite matter whether we agree to call a very hard soil "apple-pie" on our own Mohr scale for soils, as long as anybody else does this consistently.

There generally is a conflict between the excavator/recorder and the post excavation team (from which most or at least some of the trench supervisors are missing) in designing recording sheets. The more the excavator records, the easier things are for post excavation work, but, on the other hand, too much pressure put on the excavator can result in the sheets being filled in perfunctorily or incompletely or both. This tradeoff between the good of the excavator and the good of the director in post ex has to be settled on a compromise ground; this means retaining only the crucial information and having it recorded.

It is necessary that all those involved in an excavation are well acquainted with the sheets before the dig begins, so that they can have their questions answered and so that everyone fills in the forms in the same manner. There is not much room left for personal variability in this sheet, still the ability of the recorder to eschew the preprinted fields and contribute some personal flight of fantasy must never be underestimated. Among others it should be clear that scales of 1-5 are being used for several parameters, as in the case of compaction (1- very loose, 5 very hard), sortedness (1 – very poorly sorted, 5 – very well sorted) as well as erosion (degree of preservation of a deposit) and reliability (degree of certainty in identifying the deposit as such). I would draw again attention that international maps are available for identifying the percentage of inclusion, the degree of sortedness etc, and the only problem is choosing one and using it everywhere. One example will suffice: Oxford Archaeology recommends that soils be described, in terms of compaction, in only five ways, namely as loose, friable, compact, hard and tenacious. A similar list can also be drawn in Romanian.

Let us look at the letterhead of the sheet. The feature record sheet must be identified by a number. While working everybody draws these

numbers form a generally accessible master register, so that no duplicates appear. Features are also numbered from one to ten thousand, so that no two features, even if they are part of different structures, have the same number. In the corners of the sheet it makes sense to have the name of the museum/company undertaking the excavation preprinted on the sheet, so that the diggers don't have to fill that in for every single sheet; the name of the site (here: Eupolis) can be preprinted especially for academic (as opposed to rescue) excavations, bound to be carried on for decades at a known location, with a fresh supply of pro forma being produced every year. On the other hand, while the museum (NEC, in our case...) may not deem obligatory to have its name printed on the sheet, a rescue archaeology unit (which is also a business, and a brand) may see it appropriate to display their logo.

The number of the trench and the sector of the site have to be filled in scrupulously - they cannot be preprinted; although work in a sector can take a whole campaign, this is subject to many decisions. As with most other fields, after all the sheets are fed into the computer, an immense number of fast queries can be performed by means of search facilities, for example, to list all contexts from sector B, trench 5, list all contexts with sandy clay as physical matrix and shells as inclusions or amber beads as small finds etc. The number of the feature and the name (again standardized!) and number of the structure constitute the real ID of what is being recorded, as in feature: hearth 3, structure: house 10.

It will be noted that, if the record sheet offers a check list of entries that have to be filled in, this will make all descriptions rigorously compatible from a formal point of view. For instance, it is felt as mandatory to record for a sediment or deposit its color (either Munsell or the simpler Basel chart, or even a standardized set of ten colors, with one modifier, like hue), composition (in terms of clay, silt and sand, plus inclusions). There can be added data not pertaining to the very nature of the deposit, such as tools used, weather, hours of work, number of workmen. This is because it can become important to know at a later point in post ex work that deposit 166 has been hacked out with the pick-axes by a group of workmen during one hour of tremendous downpour, or trowelled away gently by two workmen over two days – this gives one a hint as to e.g. retrieval rate of small artifacts. The number of boxes of material recovered is, like other fields, a means of offering some redundancy, because it permits spotting of mistakes in case two different deposits are confusedly numbered, but it is obvious that a thin lime floor cannot yield three buckets of kitchenware.

Dip is a notion contributed by Michael Schiffer and has to do with the orientation of artifacts and inclusions within a deposit, which can be indicative, if ascertainable, of formation processes. Three rows of fields end the description of the stratigraphic unit: one referring to artifacts non-small-finds discovered (pottery, bone, stone etc, all ticked accordingly), small finds (nails, tools, coins etc, filled in with standardized categories), and the samples taken for analysis (for phosphates, for flotation and so on, again, ticked).

Some space for comments must always be retained because variability in the field can never be anticipated.

All stratigraphic relations will be recorded on a partial Harris Matrix in the right low corner, from the newest context, situated on top, to the oldest, at the bottom of the matrix. This is therefore a graphic representations of relations recovered in the field between two contexts with at least one physical border; these relations are of one or two of the types overlain by, abutted by, cut by, filled by, same as, part of, consists of, overlies, butts, cuts, fill of. This will encourage the use of complete matrices for the whole site.

The topographical coordinates of the deposit (extent, thickness) can be easily be recovered from the drawings and so there is no need for the excavator to write them down again.

At the end of the sheet there is a pendant to the alternative interpretation field, which is the abandoned working hypothesis field. This is strictly to document the train of thought of the excavator, has no direct scientific value and is not legally binding in any way, so to speak; when this comes in very useful is when new questions are asked of the site in the view of new discoveries, and then some old intuition, thought to be proven wrong and abandoned, can turn out to be valuable for further research within that feature. A sketch on the back of the sheet will always be very useful.

Many times of course a feature will have more than 4 contexts, which is the most that can be accommodated on an A4 sheet; in this case the work will be continued on another sheet and the new number indicated in the field reserved for this on the bottom of the sheet. The initials of the recorder and of the sector/excavation director, that checks the recording, signs the whole sheet, while the personnel that feeds sheets into the computer will tick every sheet once typed in. At a later stage, during the post ex, conclusions can be added on the sheet, regarding the datation of the feature and its allocation to phases and periods in the history of the site.

Obviously units which are not part of features cannot be left aside. They will also be clustered on such a sheet with a note to the effect that they are a stratigraphic sequence other than feature, and can then be listed one under the other in their succession, as if they were a meaningful block. Generally all blocks are meaningful, since they are successions of events associated either with building activities or with abandonment; they are also understood in their causal development by the archaeologist.

Negative units, like cuts, will also receive a brief description in the space reserved for comments. For a cut, one ought to record the shape in plan, the base, the sides, the width and depth.

Masonry features will be recorded in the excavation diary and described in terms of materials, size of stones, coursing and bonds, form, faces, dimensions. There are of course sites where no masonry is found, as is the case with many, though by no means all, prehistoric sites. Amendments will be here made according to the nature of the site and the variety of features/ structures expected.

A special note has to be made here for another type of structure often encountered that, due to its peculiarities, may receive a separate sheet, and that is the *burial*. Most of the above mentioned information should find its place here as well, but it is very useful to render in a visual way the preservation of the skeleton. The excellent MoLAS sheet can be used here without modifications. A preprinted human skeleton (neonate, subadult, adult, according to the burial) can be colored in to indicate which bones have been actually found by the recorder; separate entries should document the age and sex (as assessed on site). The description includes completeness, condition of bones, posture, orientation, details about the coffin and coffin fittings, and quite often comments are very necessary since many interesting indications cannot really be anticipated. For the coffin itself a context sheet can be designed: for Oxford archaeology, it should be filled in, among others with details about the shape dimensions and distinguishing characteristics of the lid, the head, the base, of associated finds, of the treatment that the coffin underwent, as well as mentions for breastplates, grips, hinges, brackets, fixing nails, and shroud pins.

It is estimated that ten minutes of work are enough to fill in the whole feature sheet (continued, as it may be, on extra sheets).

5. Final word

This article does not aspire to be a clarion call for better archaeology, but an invitation to debate and capitalize on this draft of a recording system. Perhaps debate is what archaeology in Romania needs most at this time; practical tools will necessarily emerge once a critical mass of theoretical reflection and dialogue is achieved. Excellent skills, experience and flair, while advantages for any archaeologist, are not enough if he cannot pass over his results to colleagues and public. I kept thinking, while writing this article, about one person that could have been a great archaeologist, had he been able to share with others what he saw buried in the ground. He was Lynkeus from Messenia, one of the Argonauts, comrade of Jason in the quest for the Golden Fleece, credited by Apollonios of Rhodos with the power of seeing through the earth. Of course, the kind of hero that the Argonautics propose is of a thoroughly anti-Homeric type, resorting to magical attributes, and whose tenets are not glory in battle but perfection in friendship and solidarity. (Archaeology is also team work, just like the work of the Argonauts). If one of this magical powers, of seeing through the earth, can be definitely coveted by the modern day archaeologists, we have to bear in mind that some of them, to be sure, do see through the earth by means of geomagnetic and electrical prospections. Anyone familiar with the motley, cryptical GPR, resistivity or geomagnetic maps is aware of their huge potential in assessing what lies in the earth before beginning to dig, thus considerably increasing the precision and quality of excavation, with the complementary saving of time and money. Now given that Lynkeus has made it from nowadays Greece all the way through Colchis (nowadays Georgia), he will have swept with his pervasive sight many an archaeologically rich spot across the cradle of the classic civilizations. He will have seen an unparalleled amount of artifacts, or, in other words, of history turned into material culture. One cannot stop day-dreaming that he wrote a diary describing everything he saw in great detail, a diary that the sands of Egypt might restitute one day... But until then, we are all responsible with our own Lynkean diaries: this article is a plea for shared memory.

CĂTĂLIN PAVEL

NEC

Feature Record Sheet

EUPOLIS 2008

Sector	Section	Feature	Structure
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<p>Interpretation</p>
<p>Alternatives</p>

Composition clay <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Compaction	Colour	US nr.
mainly silt <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Inclusions		
some sand <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Sorted	Dip	Erosion
Includes Pottery <input type="checkbox"/> Bone <input type="checkbox"/> Stone <input type="checkbox"/> Brick <input type="checkbox"/> Iron <input type="checkbox"/> Glass <input type="checkbox"/> Bronze <input type="checkbox"/> Silex <input type="checkbox"/> Wood <input type="checkbox"/> Leather <input type="checkbox"/>	Foto nr.		
Weather	Workers	Tools	Reliability
Hours of dig		Boxes of material	
Small finds			
Samples Screening <input type="checkbox"/> Flotation <input type="checkbox"/> Phosphat <input type="checkbox"/> Polen <input type="checkbox"/> C14 <input type="checkbox"/> Plan	Section	Film	
Notes			

Compoziție argilă <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Compactare	Culoare	US nr.
ca bază praf <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Incluziuni		
ca adaos nisip <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>	Grad sortare	Orientare particule	Eroziune
Cuprinde Ceramica <input type="checkbox"/> Os <input type="checkbox"/> Piatra <input type="checkbox"/> Caramida <input type="checkbox"/> Fier <input type="checkbox"/> Sticla <input type="checkbox"/> Bronz <input type="checkbox"/> Silex <input type="checkbox"/> Lemn <input type="checkbox"/> Piele <input type="checkbox"/>	Foto nr		
Meteo	Muncitori	Unele	Fiabilitate
Ore sapatura		Cutii material	
Mici obiecte			
Probe luate Tamizaj <input type="checkbox"/> Flotație <input type="checkbox"/> Fosfați <input type="checkbox"/> Polen <input type="checkbox"/> C14 <input type="checkbox"/> Plan	Secțiune	Film	
Observații			

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Observații			

<p>Abandoned working hypothesis</p>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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Continued on sheet Archaeologist Checked In computer
 DATING PHASE PERIOD

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CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SPACE, SPATIALIZATION OF CONCEPTS AND METAPHORIZATION OF NAMES OF BODY PARTS IN ARABIC, HEBREW AND SYRIAC

Our purpose in the present paper is to look into the process of metaphORIZATION of names of body parts in Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac, as it is reflected in various literary sources and lexicographical works, from the viewpoint of their relevance for the mental shaping of different concepts having various degrees of abstractness, ranging from concepts directly related to space to those pertaining to the realm of human emotions. We have adopted as a tool of analysis for this purpose the theory of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson about conceptual metaphor, of which parts that are relevant for our topic will be exposed in the next section.

The three languages involved in this research have been selected not on the basis of some special representativity they would be entitled to claim for the Semitic group as opposed to other languages belonging to it, but mainly because they all have acquired, within the boundaries of their respective cultural areas, the status of classical, literary and liturgical languages, which made them privileged, if not exclusive, tools of expression for a large amount of literary works, unlike some other Semitic languages, dead or alive, much more poorly and sporadically attested. Moreover, these languages also represent, in their written form, something of a temporal and spatial continuum, given that the Hebrew biblical writings, the main source on the basis of which a classical norm for this language was built, seem to have taken shape within the boundaries of the first millennium BC, Syriac flourished during the first half of the first millennium AD and written Arabic began to be heavily attested from the 7th century onwards; as for the areas in which they have developed, they are also contingent,

stretching from the Arabic peninsula to the Fertile Crescent, and at times even overlapping each other.

The corpus we have relied upon in carrying out this research is formed by literary works relevant for the classical period in the development of each language, namely the works of the Arabic writers Ibn al-Muqaffa^c (8th century) – *Al-'Adab al-Kabīr* (henceforth AK), *Al-'Adab aṣ-Ṣaḡīr* (AS), *Risālat aṣ-Ṣaḥābah* (RS) and *Kalīlah wa-Dimnah* (KD), Ibn Ḥazm al-'Andalusī (10th-11th centuries) – *Ṭawq al-Ḥamāmah* (TH), al-Ġāhiz (8th-9th centuries) – *Al-Maḥāsin wa-l-'Aḍḍād* (MA), a selection of *ḥadīṯ*s collected by al-Buḥārī – *Ġawāhir al-Buḥārī* (JB), along with the biblical writings, the Syriac version of the Bible known as the *P^ešīṯṯā*, the *Lexicon Syriacum* of Carl Brockelmann (1928) and the thesaurus-type lexicon of Thomas Awdo (*Sīmtā d^e-Leššānā Suryāyā*, 1985). However, given that many of the books of the *P^ešīṯṯā* Old Testament seem to have been translated directly from Hebrew, we have refrained from adducing samples of material furnished by it unless the names of body parts occurring in them weren't matched by their counterparts in the Hebrew text. As regards the translation into English of the material included in this paper of the aforementioned writings, we have strived to make it as literal as possible, so as to make it reflect to a maximum extent the structure of phrases and expressions as they appear in the original, with a special emphasis on those involving names of body parts. Whenever this wasn't possible, we have included the names in question between round brackets. The translation of the quotations adduced from the Hebrew Bible and the *P^ešīṯṯā*, on the other hand, is largely based on the literal translations of Robert Young (1898) and James Murdoch (1852).

About Metaphor According to Lakoff and Johnson's Theory

The classical and, at the same time, one of the most common visions about metaphor treats it as a figure of speech consisting in a syntactically abridged form of simile: if the simile signals a likeness between two concepts that represent literal meanings for two names based on common yet unspecified features (A is like B), the metaphor goes a step further and identifies the two elements (A is B). The cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson challenge all the assertions of this theory, beginning with metaphor being ascribed the quality of a mere figure of speech:

“metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish – a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language... We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system... is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 3).

The main argument adduced for placing metaphor at the level of thought, and not necessarily or only of language, is the fact that, according to their analysis, a lot of abstract concepts related to matters of our daily life are structured in terms of other concepts, which makes it right to see them as metaphorical. This structuring or mapping is not highlighted by explicit identifications of different concepts with others at the level of discourse (we do not often find outside theoretical meta-discourse statements put forth by Lakoff and Johnson to exemplify such metaphors, like “argument is war” or “life is a journey”, which justifies their claim that these metaphors do not represent figures of speech nor are they a matter of language).¹ However, there are lots of other statements, that are pervasive in every day discourse and we normally don’t pay heed to, that testify for the systematic way in which many basic concepts, like “argument” and “life” cited above, are metaphorically structured and thus are dealt with, in every day life, on the ground of a metaphorically based view. As a way of exemplifying the way in which such metaphorical concepts function at the level of discourse, various statements are brought forth that seem to be grounded in different conceptual metaphors (like, e.g. in the case of the “argument is war” metaphor, “your claims are indefensible”, “I’ve never won an argument with him”, “his criticisms were right on target”, etc.). This is why metaphors appearing at the level of language, while not being discarded altogether, are considered a reflection of conceptual metaphors lying at the level of thought:

“since metaphorical expressions in our language are tied to metaphorical concepts in a systematic way, we can use metaphorical linguistic expressions to study the nature of metaphorical concepts and to gain an understanding of the metaphorical nature of our activities” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 7).

It is also postulated that metaphorical concepts often manifest themselves in a systematic way, given that, if a concept is viewed in terms

of another in a certain culture, people sharing that culture talk about and relate to the first concept in terms of the second. Moreover, if one concept is mapped on more than one other concept, meaning that there are more conceptual metaphors lying at the basis of its understanding, these metaphors have the tendency to form a system based on subcategorization. The example brought forth to illustrate this claim is that of the conceptual metaphors of "time" in Western culture ("time is money", "time is a limited resource" and "time is a valuable commodity") which seem to form a unitary system, "since in our society money is a limited resource and limited resources are valuable commodities" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 9). Another aspect of the systematicity of conceptual metaphors is the function of "highlighting and hiding", as these metaphors give us a partial account of the concepts understood on their basis; thus, if one concept is understood in terms of another, only those aspects will be systematically highlighted in actual statements related to it that are characteristic of that second aspect, while other aspects are usually discarded (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 10-13). On the other hand, conceptual metaphors make use only partially of the concepts upon which they map other concepts: in the "theories are buildings", taken as an example in this case, only the foundation and the outer shell of a building are usually used in statements about theories that can be deemed pertaining to literary speech; if this metaphor is taken beyond its usual frame and names of other parts of a building are used in statements about theories, then we enter the field of figurative and imaginative language, or what other theorists deem "live metaphors", that are, however, no less grounded in the conceptual metaphor "theories are buildings" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 52, 53). A special case of conceptual metaphors is reflected by "idiosyncratic metaphorical expressions that stand alone and are not used systematically in our language or thought", of the type represented by phrases like "the foot of the mountain", that, although they do give an account of an underlying conceptual metaphor (in this case, "a mountain is a person"), are marginal and relatively "uninteresting", as "they do not systematically interact with other metaphorical concepts because so little of them is used". These are the metaphors that deserve to be called "dead" in the two linguists' view, although they do have a "spark of life" that can be extended by activating their unused portions in non-literal speech (Lakoff and Johnson, pp. 54, 55).

Along with structural metaphors of the "argument is war" type that Lakoff and Johnson used in demonstrating how some concepts are

understood in terms of other concepts, they also record other types of conceptual metaphors, one of which is the orientational metaphor, seen not as a relation between two concepts, but as a mapping of a whole system of concepts on another, based on spatial orientation: up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, central-peripheral, etc. These metaphors arise from our physical experiences as beings having bodies functioning in a physical environment, and based on these experiences they give certain concepts spatial orientation: “good is up – bad is down”, “happy is up – sad is down”, “having control or force is up – being subject to control or force is down”, etc. These orientations are not arbitrary, but conditioned by “our physical and cultural experience”, which means that they are at the crossroads of the observation of natural phenomena and some of the culturally conditioned attitudes, or, in Lakoff and Johnson’s terms, they have an experiential basis,² that is moreover ascribed to all types of metaphor: “in actuality we feel that no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 19).

Another type is the ontological metaphor, whereby abstract concepts acquire physical properties that make them suitable to be operated with as with physical objects and substances. Ontological metaphor is grounded in our physical experience in dealing with different kinds of objects and substances, and allows us to relate to the concepts whose understanding is mediated by it as we do to concrete entities that are to be found in nature. The existence of such a kind of conceptual metaphor is motivated in the author’s view by the need of the human being to establish boundaries between things so that he can relate to them as to clearly delineated entities, much to his own likeness:

“when things are not clearly discrete or bounded, we still categorize them as such, e.g., mountains, street corners, hedges, etc...Human purposes typically require us to impose artificial boundaries that make physical phenomena discrete just as they are: entities bounded by a surface” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 25).

The subtypes of ontological metaphor are those labeled as entity (or physical object) and substance metaphors by which different notions are reified as entities and substances subject to different kinds of operations: quantifying – “there is so much hatred in this world”, identifying aspects – “the brutality of war dehumanizes us all”, setting goals – “he went to

New York to seek fame and fortune”, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 26-28), and container metaphors, which project upon abstract concepts and surrounding objects the vision we have of our own: “each of us is a container, with a bounding surface and an in-out orientation”. Another subtype of ontological metaphor is personification, whereby “the physical object is further specified as being a person”, so that it can be conceived of as acting like humans: “life has cheated me”, “inflation has pinned us to the wall”, etc., in a way that helps us to “make sense of phenomena in the world in human terms – terms that we can understand on the basis of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 34).

A special mention deserves to be made about the cultural dimension of conceptual metaphors according to Lakoff and Johnson’s vision, as they emphasize at various stages of the exposition of their theory that many of the conceptual metaphors are deeply grounded in specific types of cultures and subcultures (see chapter “Metaphor and Cultural Coherence, pp. 22-24), and that

“cultural assumptions, values and attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our ‘world’ in such a way that our culture is already present in the very experience itself” (p. 57).

This is what makes a semantic approach of a limited corpus based on this theory a search not for universals of human language and thought, but for conceptual metaphors specific to certain cultural and linguistic areas.

Conceptualization of Space

Before beginning the actual discussion of the material we have gathered from our corpus, it is worth mentioning that we have refrained from distinguishing between “dead” and “live” metaphors in the traditional meaning of the terms, as such a distinction would have entailed a too high degree of subjectivity and would prove to be rather problematic especially in dealing with works written in classical languages centuries or even millennia ago, and also because instances of figurative, non-literal

speech can also be deemed, according to Lakoff and Johnson's theory, as reflecting conceptual metaphors, or, more exactly, parts of the underlying concepts that are not used in literal speech.

The first cases we will focus our attention on are those of passages in which names of body parts appear to take on the meaning of parts of different entities more or less easily identifiable in our physical environment (mountains, gardens, different places), according to the position they occupy within the human body, in a way that makes their metaphorization a means to conceptualize, on one hand, different positions in space taking as a reference point the human body, and, on the other, to conceptualize, at least in part, those entities singled out from our environment in terms of a human body. The concept of "center" is expressed, in corporeal terms, by the names of the heart in all the three languages (Ar. *qalb*, Hebr. *lēb*, Syr. *lebbā*), in addition to the Arabic name for "chest" or "bosom", *ṣadr*, which may be used metonymically for "heart", as we shall see in other cases:

AR: ...*wa-'amara ... 'an tuḥṣā 'aḡwāfuhā... wa-tulbasa wa-tuqaddama 'amāma ṣ-ṣaffi fī l-qalbi*. (KD, p. 14) "and he ordered that their interiors be filled, and that they be dressed up and advanced in front of the row, at the center (heart)".

-*'aḡlasathu fī ṣadri firāsihā...* (MA, p. 145) "she seated him at the forefront (chest) of her bed"

HEBR: ...*qāpē 'û l'ḥōmōt b^e-lēb yām* (Ex, 15: 8) "congealed have been the depths in the heart of the see"

SYR: *saḅ(w) l'kōn b^e-yawmā qad māyā ... lebbawātā d^e-deqlē...* (Lev, 23: 40) "take to yourselves in the first day ... the marrows (hearts) of palms"

...*hākannā nehwe b^erēh d^e-(')nāsā b^e-lebbāh d-ar^eā l'lātā 'īmāmīn wa-l'lātā laylawān* (Mat, 12: 40) "so will the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights"

The front part of an entity can be designated in Arabic by the name *ṣadr* ("chest", "bosom"), but the data provided by our corpus show this metaphor at work in contexts which provide us with some already abstract entities, not allowing us to trace back a complete semantic trajectory from the most concrete to the most abstract, some of the instances lying somewhere in between (in the passages from TH, p.94 and TH, p. 264, for example, the names *risālah* and *ḥikāyah* (here, "treatise" and, respectively,

“story”) suggest an abstract entity represented by a text, whereas in the passage from MA, p. 185 the name *ruqʿah*, which could be translated both as “piece of paper” and as “letter” or “message”, allows us to think both of a text and of a material object), while some other transcend the spatial dimension altogether and move to the temporal one (as in “the beginning of the day”):

-wa-lā yazunna zānnun ʿanna hādā muḥālīfun li-qawlī l-musattari fī ṣadri r-risālati (TH, p. 94) “and let no one think that this is different from that which I have written down at the beginning (chest) of the treatise”

-... ʿid kāna l-laḏī ʿindī minhu qad dahaba bi-n-nahbi fī s-sababi l-laḏī dakartuhu fī ṣadri hādīhi l-ḥikāyati (TH, p. 264) “for what I had from him was gone through plunder for the reason I exposed at the beginning (chest) of this story”

-tarkī d-duʿāʾa fī ṣadri ruqʿatī yunbi ʿu ʿan taqṣīrī (MA, p. 185) “not putting the invocation at the beginning (chest) of my letter would be a sign of my shortcoming”

-inna ṣadra hādā l-yawmi qad waliya... (MA, p. 45) “the dawn (chest) of this day has gone...”

In Hebrew and Syriac, the body part chosen to designate this part of an entity or object, tangible or not, is the head:

HEB: - *ʿel kol rō ʾš derek bānīt rāmātēk...* (Ez, 16:25) “at every head of the way thou hast built thy high place”

-haḥodeš hazzeh lākem rō ʾš ḥō dāšīm ri ʾšōn hū ʾ lākem l-ḥodšē haššānāh (Ex, 12: 2) “this month is to you the chief of months, it is the first to you of the months of the year”

SYR: *n^ešarrē mekkēl b^e-ṭaksā w^e-men rēš maw^eṭīēh qadmāytā* (SLS2, p. 531) “we begin therefore the ritual from the beginning (head) of its first maw^eṭīā”

As for the space stretching in front of an entity, one way of designating it in Arabic is by means of the compound preposition *bayna yaday* (lit. “between the hands of...”), where the name *yad* appears to have past beyond the limit of metaphorization into grammaticalization (or at least a partial one, given that the noun hasn’t completely lost its flexion – see

the plural form used when the preposition governs a noun in the plural, as opposed to the dual form accompanying nouns in the singular):³

-fa-'adina lahu fa-daḥala wa-waqafa bayna yadayhi (KD, p. 23) “and he let him in, and he entered and stood before him (between his hands)”

-wa-la-'in kuntu 'inda maqāmī bayna yadaya l-maliki 'amsaktu 'ani btidā'ihī bi-l-kalāmi (KD, p. 27) “and if I am in my place before (between the hands of) the king, I don't speak to him out of my own initiative”

-wa-l-kalāmu bayna 'aydīkum (KD, p. 172) “and the speech is before you (pl) (between your hands)”, i.e. “you (pl) know the speech”

The name *pānīm* (“face”) in the Hebrew preposition *li-ḵēnē* (“before”), on the other hand, appears to be completely grammaticalized, as this preposition governs names designating all sorts of entities, in both spatial and temporal contexts:

EBR: *-wayyihyū mēšār'tīm li-ḵēnē miškan 'ohel mō'ēd* (1Chr, 6: 17) “and they were ministering before (at the face of) the tabernacle of the tent of meeting...”

-...wayyar' 'et kol kikkar hayyardēn kī kullāh mašqeh li-ḵēnē šaḥēt yhw' 'et sēdōm wē-'et mōrāh (Gen, 13: 10) “and saw that the whole circuit of the Jordan was all a watered country, before (at the face of) God destroying Sodom and Gomorrah”

When the entity serving as the reference point is provided with a front entrance, Arabic and Syriac exhibit also another possibility of rendering this meaning, as it is shown in the following two passages where the name used for this purpose is that of the mouth:

AR: *fa-yulqawna fī nahrin bi-'afwāhi l-ḡannati...* (JB, p. 725) “and they will be thrown into a river at the gates (mouths) of Paradise...”

SYR: *wē-ḵad šema' 'eliyā ... nēḵaq wē-qām bē-ḵumāh da-m'ecartā* (1 Kings, 19: 13) “and when Elijah heard it, he went out and stood at the opening (mouth) of the gate”

The upper part of an object can be designated in Arabic and Hebrew languages by the “head”, based upon an obvious analogy with the position of this organ within the human body:

AR: -...*ka-’annahu* ^c*alamun* ^c*alā ra’sihi nārun* (MA, p. 106) “...as if it were a flag with a fire on its head”

-*wa-tuḡ^calu l-^caṣā fī ra’si rumḥin...* (MA, p. 162) “and the stick is placed at the head of a spear”

-*za^camū ’anna ḥamāmatan kānat tufrīḥu fī ra’si naḥlatin ṭawīlatin dāhibatin fī s-samā’i...* (KD, p. 332) “it has been said that a pigeon was hatching its eggs at the head of a long palmtree that was reaching for the sky”

HEBR: *bā-^{ca}’sîrî b^e-’ehād la-ḥōdeš nir ’û rā ’šê hehārîm* (Gen, 8: 5) “in the tenth month, on the first of the month, appeared the heads of the mountains”

In Syriac, we find similar types of phrases in Thomas Awdo’s *Sîmṭā*: *rêšā d^e-ṭūrā, d-īlānā* (SLS 2, p. 530) “the head of the mountain, of the tree”.

In what appears to be a process of semantic polarization, the names of the head in Arabic and Syriac can also assume the meaning of “end”, “extremity” of an entity, a portion of space or a distance, this time, however, suggesting a conceptual metaphor based not on a vertical, standing body, but on a horizontally stretched one (in such cases, it is actually believed that the source of the metaphor is not the body of humans, but of animals – see Angheliescu, 2000, p. 101):

AR: *kāna^cumarū^calāfarsaḥayni, bal^calā ra’si ṭalātati ’amyālin min makkata...* (MA, p. 192) “‘Umar was at two parasangs’, nay, rather three miles’ distance (at the head of three miles) from Mecca...”

-*ḡufira li-mra’atin mūmisatin marrat bi-kalbin^calā ra’si rakiyyin...* (JB, p. 487) “forgiven was a prostitute that passed by a dog, close to a well (at the head of a well)...”

SYR: *kenšā saggī’ā ṣāḥ (h)wā l^e-^cēdtā d^e-rêšēh ḥaḍ maṭṭī (h)wā wa-ḥrēnā^{ce}dakkēl rahḥīq (h)wā* (SLS 2, p. 530) “a great group of people headed towards the church, one end (head) of which had already got there while the other (head) was still far away”

In one passage of our Arabic corpus, time also appears to be conceived of as a stretching entity, composed of portions having “ends”:

-ba^catahu l-lāhu ^calā ra'si 'arba^cīna sanatan ... wa-tawaffāhu ^calā ra'si sittīna sanatan (JB, p. 631) "God sent him after (at the head of) fourty years... and took him onto Him after (at the head of) sixty years"

For the meaning of "back" or "backside", the Arabic corpus provided us with instances where the name ^caqib ("heel") is used, whose semantic evolution in these contexts can be traced from a concrete spatial meaning to a more abstract one that accounts for a transition from the spatial to the temporal plan involving also a metonymy,⁴ namely the meaning of "offspring":

-wa-^calā dālīka fa-maw^cidukumā ^cinda š-šağarāti l-lawāī^c ^cinda 'a^cqābi l-buyūti (MA, p. 178) "that is why you must meet by the trees, behind (at the heels of) the houses"

-wa-'innahu 'in 'ahṭa'ahu ^cāğilu l-^cuqūbati, lam yuḥṭi'hu l-'āğilu; ḥattā 'innahu yudriku l-'a^cqāba wa-'a^cqāba l-'a^cqābi (KD, p. 264) "and if swift retaliation doesn't reach him, later retaliation won't miss him, so that it will hit his offspring (heels) and the offspring of his offspring"

-fa-'idā huwa qad 'abšara ... faḍla r-ra'yi l-ğāmi^ci l-^cāmmi l-laḍī taşluḥu bihi l-'anfusu wa-l-'a^cqābu... (AS, p.40) ..." and if he realized the advantage of the common opinion by which both oneself and one's progeny (heels) thrive..."

In the case of the Hebrew name ^cāqēb, we have found a similar metaphorical development, restricted however to the spatial realm:

-wayyāśimū hā^cām 'et kol hammaḥ^cneh 'ašer mişşēpōn lā-^cīr w^e-'et ^cāqēbō miyyām lā-^cīr... (Josh, 8: 13) "and they set the people, all the camp which is on the north of the city, and its rear (heel) on the west of the city"

In Syriac, the noun ^ceqbā develops the similar meanings of "end", "extremity", "foot (of a mountain)", "trace", "consequence" (Brockelmann, p. 541), manifesting, like its Arabic counterpart, its capability of transcending the borders between the concrete and the abstract, the spatial and the temporal, as it is also shown by the denominative verb derived from it ^caqqeḥ (verbal name ^cuqqāḥā) – "to follow", "to investigate", "to inquire":

-kulmeddem d^e-mezdabban b^e-maqellōn hwaytōn 'aklīn d^e-lā 'uqqābā meṭṭul tē'riā (1Cor, 10: 25) "whatever is sold in the flesh-market, eat ye, without an inquiry on account of conscience"

A similar disposition is also exhibited by the Arabic name *dubur* ("rear", "rear end", "back"), which, coming to designate the end of a prayer, or, more accurately, of the recitation of a prayer, seems also capable to extend its semantic area into the abstract and temporal field:

... 'anna n-nabiyya ... kāna yaqūlu fī duburi kulli ṣalātin maktūbatin: 'lā 'ilāha 'illā llāhu...' (JB, p. 195) "that the prophet was saying after (at the back of) every prescribed prayer: 'there is no god but Allah...'"

The Hebrew and the Syriac names *yād* and, respectively, *'īdā* ("hand"), having as referent an organ found at the outer limits of the human body, display an extension of their semantic area that covers, inter alia, the meaning of "limit". With this meaning the Hebrew *yād* is included in the compound preposition *'al yaḏ* ("beside", "by the side of"), thus providing us with yet another case of grammaticalization:

w^e-hiškīm 'abšālōm w^e-cāmad 'al yaḏ derek haššā'ar... (2Sam, 15: 2) "And Absalom hath risen early, and by the side (the hand) of the way of the gate..."

The Syriac *'īdā* is can acquire a similar meaning, as it is shown by the following noun phrases: *yaḏ 'urhā* ("side of the road") *yaḏ yammā* ("seashore"), *yaḏ nahrā* ("river bank"), *yaḏ naḥlā* ("side of the valley") *'ar^cā rwaḥtā d-īdayyā* ("vast land", lit. "wide handed land") (SLS1, p. 422).

For the rendition of the meaning of "surface", both Arabic and Hebrew make use of the names *waḡh* and, respectively, *pānīm* ("face"), accounting for the face being the most visible and conspicuous part of the human body:

AR: *-tūmma 'innahā tamāwatat fa-ṭafat 'alā waḡhi l-mā'i...* (KD, p. 126) "then she played dead and floated on the surface (face) of the water"

HEBR: *'ēḏ ya^{ca}leh min hā 'āreṣ w^e-hišqāh 'et kōl p^enē hā 'aḏāmāh* (Gen, 2: 6) "and a mist goeth up from the earth, and hath watered the whole face of the ground"

The Arabic names *baṭn* ("belly", "stomach", "womb") and *zahr* ("back") engage in a relation of antonymity, unequivocally attested by their being used in pair in two of the examples listed below, when acquiring the meanings of "inner side", "interior", "depth" and, respectively, of "outer side", "exterior", even "surface":

-wa-ka-'anna l-'aḥyāra yurīdūna baṭna l-'arḍi (KD, p. 92) "as if the good ones headed for the interior (womb) of the earth"

-wadidtu bi-'anna zahrā l-'arḍi baṭnun / wa-'anna l-baṭna minhā ṣāra zahrā (TH, p. 211) "I wish the exterior (back) of the earth were its interior (womb) and its interior (womb) became its exterior (back)"

-kunnā fī zahrīhā ... wa-l-yawma yağma'unā fī baṭnihā l-kafanu (MA, p. 62) "we were on its (the earth's) back, and today the shroud gathers us in its womb"

-fa-nuḥriḡu lahumu t-ta'āma 'ilā baṭni l-wādī (MA, p. 164) "so we will take the food to them at the bottom (womb) of the valley"

From this antonymic pair, only *baṭn* has a counterpart in the Hebrew *beṭen* for this particular meaning:

-mibbeten še'ōl šiwwa'ti šāma'tā qôlî (Jonah, 2: 3) "from the depth (womb) of Sheol I have cried, Thou hast heard my voice", whereas Brockelmann signals for the Syriac *ḥaṣṣā* ("back"), inter alia, the meaning of "surface" (p. 250).

The names *wağh* and *zahr* seem to be drawn rather close to each other when carrying the meaning of "surface" and, respectively, of "outer side" or "surface"; however, they do not become perfect synonyms, for when examining the sememes corresponding to each of them we can see that the sememes they include are quite different: thus, whereas *wağh* designates a plain surface like that of the water, the examples listed below suggest that the surfaces designated by *zahr* are of a different kind – surfaces of roads, houses, places of worship, cities, dunes, tents, i.e. of places that are one way or another more elevated than their surroundings, which makes us believe the the sememe of *zahr* in these cases includes the seme "elevated place" and even, in the case of the road or the dune, "elongated structure":

-... 'anna sārīqan °alā zahra bayti rağulin mina l-'ağniyā 'i ... (KD, p. 82) "that a thief entered (mounted the back of) the house of a rich man..."

-sarṯun 'ilā zahri ṯ-tarīqi... (TH, p. 182) "quick to hit the road (quick to the back of the road)"

-raqītu ma°a 'abī hurayrata ... °alā zahri l-masğidi... (JB, p. 117) "I went with Abu Hurayrah to the mosque (I mounted with Abu Hurayrah on the back of the mosque)"

-fa-waqafa °alā 'ārāmin bi-zahri l-hīrati ... (MA, p. 42) "and he stopped by some white antelopes by (the back of) the city of al-Hirah"

-hā huwa dāka bi-zahri l-kaṯibi wa-l-ḥaymati (MA, p. 64) "there he is by (the back) of the sandhill and the tent"

-fa-lammā kāna °alā zahri l-kūfati... (MA, p. 74) "and when he reached (the back of) Kufah..."

These facts lead us to believe that, just like in the case of the Arabic *ra's* and Syriac *rēšā* bearing the meaning of "extremity", "end", the model for the conceptual metaphor underlying these statements is not that of the human body, but of the animal body, whose back is located in its uppermost part and is, generally, elongated.

The next case we are dealing with takes us one step closer to the next panel of our inquiry, as it is one of conceptualizing an abstract notion, namely the orientation or the direction taken through space; this is realized, in Arabic as in Hebrew or Syriac, largely by expanding the semantic field of the names having "face" as a primary meaning, in a process that could best be described as a metonymic rather than a metaphorical transfer, given that the body part which is the most obviously used in turning towards a direction is used for the direction itself. This process is also reflected in the lexical derivational process based on the root of the Arabic *wağh*, whereby the denominative verbs *wağğaha* ("to turn", "to direct", "to guide") – as in the passage from AS, p. 52 – and its reflexive form, *tawağğaha* ("to head", "to turn") – as in AS, p. 63 – have emerged:

-min 'abwābi t-taraḥfuqi wa-t-tawfiqi fi t-ta'limi 'an yakūna wağhu r-rağuli l-laḍī yatawağğahu fihi mina l-°ilmi wa-l-'adabi fi-mā yuwāfiqu ṯā°atan wa-yakūnu lahu °indahu maḥmalun wa-qabūlun... (AS, p. 63) "one of the means of achieving subtlety and success in teaching is that people take a direction (face) in science and education that can acquire them obedience and acceptance"

-*wa-yataḥaffazu min 'an yuwaḡiha 'aḥadan waḡhan lā yaḡtāḡu fīhi 'ilā murū'atīn* (AS, p. 52) “and he refrains from leading anyone in a direction (face) in which he needs no virtue”

-...*'innamā l-mālu yaḡlubuhu ṣāḡhibuhu wa-yaḡma'uhu min kulli waḡhin li-baqā'i ḡālihi ... wa-ṣarafi manzilatīhi fī 'a'yuni n-nāsi, wa-stiḡnā'īhi 'ammā fī 'ayḡīhim, wa-ṣarfihi fī waḡhihi* (KD, p. 74) “one looks for money and gathers it from all side (face) in order to preserve his situation, secure an honorable status among people, avoid needing their money and spend his for its (right) purpose (face)”

-*za'amū 'annahu kāna bi-'arḡi kadā tāḡirun fa-'arāda l-ḡurūḡa 'ilā ba'ḡi l-wuḡūhi li-btiḡā'i r-rizqi...* *wa-daḡaba fī waḡhihi* (KD, p. 156) “it has been said that there was a merchant in a certain land, and he wanted to travel some place (in a certain direction / face) to acquire wealth, and he went his way (face)”

-*wa-'anā kaḡīru l-maḡāhibi wa-'arḡū 'allā 'aḡhaba waḡhan 'illā 'aṣabtu fīhi mā yuḡnīnī; fa-'inna ḡilālan ḡamsan man tazawwadahunna kaḡaynahu fī kulli waḡhin...* (KD, p. 270) “and I have many ways, and I don't want to follow one direction (face) unless I achieve what suffices me, for there are five features that help their possessor in the pursuit of any goal (face)”

The Hebrew *pānīm* (“face”) appears to convey a similar meaning in the verbal locution *śām pānīm* (“to turn”, lit. “to set face”):

HEBR: ...*wayya^{ca}bōr 'et hannāhār wayyāšem 'et pānāw har haggil^cād* (Gen, 31: 21) “and passed over the river, and set his face towards the mount of Gilead”

This meaning is also attested for the Syriac *'appē* (“face”) - *b-appayk hallek* (SLS2, p. 157) “go your way (face)” – that subsequently undergoes a process of grammaticalization in the compound preposition *l-appay* (“towards (the face of)”), both in the spatial and temporal realms:

-...*wa-l^elaw 'armenōn z^{ec}ōrā l^e-rūḡā d^e-nāšbā w^e-rādēn (h)waw l-appay yaḡšā* (Act, 27: 40) “and (they) hoisted a small sail to the breeze, and made way towards the land”

-*w^e-l-appay t^eša^c šācⁱⁿ q^{ec}ā yešū^c b^e-qālā rāmā...* (Mat, 27: 46) “and about (towards) the ninth hour, Jesus cried with a loud voice”

As in Arabic, this semantic development is reflected both in Hebrew and Syriac by verbs sharing their root with the name *pānīm* (Hebr. *pānāh*, Syr. *p^enā*) and bearing the meaning of “heading”, “turning”:⁵

HEBR: *wayyipnū miššām hā^anāšīm wayyēlkū s^edōmāh* (Gen, 18: 22) “and the men turned from thence, and went towards Sodom”

SYR: *barnabba’ w^e-šā’ōl p^enaw men ’ōrišlem l-anṭiyōkī* (Act, p. 12: 25) “Barnaba and Saul turned back from Jerusalem to Antioch”

We have registered so far textual attestations of names of body parts acquiring metaphorical meanings that seem to reflect the conceptualization of concrete, spacially circumscribable entities in terms of the human body, with a few notable exceptions where the conceptual metaphors seem to be built upon the image of the animal, horizontally stretched body (see Ar. *ra’s* and *zahr*, Syr. *rēšā*), and also excepting the case of the names of the “face” acquiring, through metonymy, the meaning of “direction”, a concept linked to space though not definable as a spatial entity. We could see how different entities of the most diverse nature are conceptualized as (generally human) bodies: beds have chests, sees and trees have hearts; flags, spears, palmtrees, mountains, gatherings have heads; houses and camps have heels; roads, sees and valleys have hands; the earth has a face, a womb and a back; all this means, in the terms of Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, that each of these statements is based on a conceptual metaphor that can be formulated as “a bed (or a see, a tree, a mountain, a camp, the earth, etc.) is a (human) body”. All these conceptual metaphors, however, fall in the category of what Lakoff and Johnson describe as “idiosyncratic, unsystematic and isolated” conceptual metaphors, that are reflected by only one or a few metaphorical expressions (actually, based on our corpus, all conceptual metaphors have singular attestations, with the exception of those involving as target domains the house – which has heels and a back – and the earth – which has a face, a womb and a back). Given the obviously limited character of our corpus, these statistics cannot be deemed totally representative of the general situation from this viewpoint, but they are remarkably relevant in the light of an important point in Lakoff and Johnson’s theory, that has to do with determining the concepts, or the conceptual domains, that are most likely to be defined through metaphor, as they state that the target domains, i.e. those that are metaphorically understood, are “basic domains of experience like

love, time and argument". As for the source domains, they are "other basic domains of experience" that are "structured clearly enough and with enough kind of internal structure to do the job of defining other concepts" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 117, 118). Now, if we compare the concepts that we have dealt with so far with those that are, according to this theory, understood through conceptual metaphors, we can easily see that the fundamental difference between them is that the former are abstract concepts with a high degree of complexity, whereas the latter have as referents material objects whose qualities can be ascertained by sheer observation with no great need of conceptualizing them outside their natural environment. Even so, their conceptualization does abide by the aforementioned rule, as it involves one of the few, if not the only conceptual domain closer to our experience than physical objects found in our environment, and thus, capable of contributing to their understanding, our own body.

Some of the names of body parts involved in this section have their semantic areas stretching beyond the limits of the purely spatial concepts into the field of abstract ones, thus contributing to the conceptualization in terms of the human body of treatises, letters, stories, months, periods in one's lifetime, prayers, which makes their cases seem as accounting for spatialization of concepts rather than conceptualization of space. We have, however, chosen to include them in this section, for with the exception of the treatise, the letter and the story, that, as we have already pointed out, lie at the boundaries between the abstract and the concrete and allow us to view them as both material objects and texts, all these notions (including the prayer, which stretches over a period of time when recited) are related to time, and the names of body parts involved in their metaphorical understanding have their semantic field stretched in the process over areas that are mere continuations of space-related metaphorical meanings. These facts justify, in our view, the treatment of space and time, and, subsequently, of space- and time-related concepts, in a unitary fashion, as time seems, based on the present material, to be conceived of as a projection of space beyond the realm of the concrete.⁶

Based on the material we have viewed so far, we can say that the concepts related to space (and time) to whose understanding contribute conceptual metaphors involving body parts lie at the very fringes of the conceptual domain that is, according to Lakoff and Johnson's theory, the most prone to be metaphorically defined and understood, and are therefore conceptualized through metaphor in an unsystematic way.

Spatialization of Concepts

We continue our inquiry with cases of metaphorical expressions involving names of body parts whose underlying conceptual metaphors have as target domains abstract concepts unrelated to time, that are understood, related to and operated with by their means as spatially definable objects. We begin by looking at the situations that are the closest to those investigated in the precedent section, namely those in which the target concepts are partially conceived of as human bodies. The concepts found in this situation fall into two categories, the first one being represented by groups of humans of different sorts whose leaders are spoken of as “heads”, which implies, as in the precedent cases, the unsystematic conceptual metaphor “human groups are bodies”:

AR: *-wa-’aḥūhu huwa ra’su l-mu^ctazilati bi-l-’andalusi* (TH, p.131) “and his brother is the head of the mu^ctazili sect in Andalusia”

-ḏakara fihā s-sababa l-laḏī min ’aḡlihi ^camila baydabā l-faylasūfu l-hindiyyu ra’su l-barāhimati li-dabshalīma maliki l-hindi kitābahu (KD, p. 11) “in it he mentioned the reason why the philosopher Bidpay, the head of the Brahmins, made his book for Dabshalim, the king of India”

...wa-’idā kāna l-ḥufātu l-^curātu ru’ūsa n-nāsi fa-ḏāka min ’ašrāṭihā... (JB, p. 561) “...and when the bare footed and the naked become the leaders (heads) of mankind, this will be one of the signs (of the final hour)”

HEBR: *wayyō ’mer š^emu’ēl h^a-lō’ ’im qāṭōn ’attāh b^e-^cēnēkā rō ’š šibtê yiśrā ’ēl ’attāh...* (1Sam, 15: 17) “Art not thou, if thou art little in thine own eyes, head of the tribes of Israel?”

...’ēlleh rā’šē ^aḥōṭ hal^ewiyyīm l^e-mišp^eḥōtām (Ex, 6: 25) “these are heads of the fathers of the levites, as to their families”

SYR: *’āp men rēšē dēn saggī’ē haymen(w) bēh ’ellā meṭṭul p^erīšē lā mawdēn (h)waw* (John, 12: 42) “And of the chiefs also, many believed in him, but on account of the Pharisees they did not confess”

-w^e-malkē d-ar^cā w^e-rawr^eḥānē w^e-rēšay ’alpē ... ṭaššīw nāpš^ehōn ba-m^{ec}arrē (Apoc, 6: 15) “And the kings of the earth, and the nobles, and the captains (heads) of thousands... hid themselves in caves”

The second category is that of abstract notions such as facts, knowledge, manners, qualities, states of mind, the “head” of which designates either their most important part or, as in the case of the Hebrew *šimḥāh* (“joy”),

their most intense manifestation, in a way that entails, like in the precedent cases, their being partially viewed as human bodies:

AR: *wa-kāna ra'su mā 'a'zamahu c'indī ṣiğara d-dunyā ft c'aynihi* (AK, p.186) "and the most important thing (the head) of what made him look great to me was that the world looked insignificant to him"

...*'alima 'annahu 'aṣlu kulli 'adabin wa-ra'su kulli c'ilmin ...* (KD, p. 46) "he realized that it is the origin of all good manners and the beginning (head) of all science"

-wa-wağadtu l-fağra ra'sa kulli balā'in... (KD, p. 196) "and I found out that poverty is the origin (the head) of all torment"

...*wa-ra'su l-kulli l-ḥazmu wa-ra'su l-ḥazmi li-l-maliki ma'rifatu 'aṣḥābihi...* (KD, p. 280) "and the pinnacle (the head) of everything is judiciousness, and judiciousness for the king means knowing his companions"

HEBR: *tiḏbaq l'šōnī l'ḥikkī 'im lō' 'ezk'rēkī 'im lō' 'a'alah 'et y'rūšālayim c'al rō'š šimḥātī* (Ps, 137: 6) "let my tongue cleave to my palate, if I do not remember thee, if I do not exalt Jerusalem above my chief joy (the head of my joy)"

Besides the conceptual metaphor directly related to the expressions involving the names of body parts, these two categories of statements can also be explained on the basis of an orientational metaphor that arranges concepts on an UP-DOWN oriented axis, and that can be further refined into more detailed metaphors: the first category, where groups of humans are corporealized, can be interpreted as reflecting the metaphors "having control or force is up; being subject to control or force is down" or "high status is up; low status is down" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 15, 16), thus explaining why the leaders occupy the position of the head within the body; for the second category, one may assume the existence of two underlying orientational metaphors, one of which is an extension into the domain of abstract concepts of the same metaphors accounting for the leader being the head, and the other, underlying the metaphorical expression *rō'š šimḥāh*, is the "more is up; less is down" metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 15).

The next set of passages can be interpreted as reflecting, unlike the two precedent sets, a solely orientational metaphor, also having an UP-DOWN axis, and serving to conceptualize the idea of possession and/or authority, whereby something or someone being under someone's possession or

authority is viewed as being under his hand. The underlying orientational metaphors can be deemed to be the same as those mentioned earlier. The absence of an ontological metaphor correlated with the orientational ones entails another difference, namely that the concept of possession or authority is not reified, in this case, but rather understood as the spatial relation itself:

AR: *qāla l-’arnabu: al-maskanu lī, wa-taḥta yadī, wa-’anta mudda^cin lahu* (KD, p. 217) “the rabbit said: the abode is mine, and I own it (it is under my hand), and you only pretend its ownership”

-’iḥwānukum ḥawalukum, ḡa^calahumu llāhu taḥta ’aydīkum, fa-man kāna ’aḥūhu taḥta yadihi fa-l-yu^timhu mim mā ya ’kulu (JB, p. 59) “your servants are your brothers that God has placed under your authority (under your hands), and whoever has his brother under his authority (under his hand) should feed him from what he eats”

HEBR: *w^e-’ēn yeš pōh taḥat yādīkā ḥ^anīṯ ’ō ḥāreḥ*...(1Sam, 21: 9) “and is there not here under thy hand spear or sword?”

SYR: *’āp ’enā ^cabḏā (’)nā ^rḥēṯ ’īdā* (SLS1, p. 423) “I am also a slave under (someone’s) authority (under the hand)”

One of the most productive means of spatializing concepts in relation with metaphors of names of body parts has proved to be the metaphorical conceptualizing of internal organs, and mainly of the heart, as containers for different kinds of feelings, emotions, knowledge, information, as the understanding of an organ as a container entails the understanding of the aforementioned abstract concepts as objects or substances that can find a place inside the organ, which makes them ultimately be conceived of as spatially definable entities, having a volume of their own and other specific properties. In Arabic, the organ assuming this role is predominantly the heart (named mostly *qalb* and, sometimes, *fu’ād*), that can sometimes be metonymically replaced by the chest (*ṣadr*), whereas all the attestations that our corpus furnished us with for the other two languages involve the heart (Hebr. *lēb*, *lēbāb*, Syr. *lebbā*). The overwhelming presence of the heart in these conceptual metaphors is by no means surprising, as it is perceived in many cultures as the seat of emotions and also as an agent engaging in different kinds of relations with them.⁷ In the next examples, we can see how the heart is shown to contain different abstract concepts like feelings, commitments, experience, God’s law:

AR: ... *wa-^calā kulli ḥālin fa-’inna dālika kullahu yašhadu ^calā mā fī l-qulūbi* (KD, p. 242) “and all of this testifies in any case for what lies in the hearts”

-...*ka-’anna lahu fī qalbihi rībatan turā...* (TH, p. 144) “...as if he had a visible suspicion in his heart”

-*laka ^cindī wa-’in tanāsayta ^cahdun / fī šamīmi l-fu’ādi ġayru nakīlī* (TH, p. 262) “there is an unbroken commitment for you in the bottom of my heart, even though you pretend not to remember”

HEBR: ...*hōlik^ekā yhwh ’elōhēkā zeh ’arbā’im šānāh bammidbār ... lā-^da’at ’et ^ašer bi-l-^bābkā...* (Deut, 8: 2) “yhwh thy God hath caused thee to go for fourty years in the wilderness ... to know that which is in thy heart”

-*tōrat ^elōhāw b-^elibbō...* (Ps, 37: 31) “the law of his God is in his heart”

As a development of the basic metaphor “the heart is a container”, abstract concepts appear not just to be inside it, but to have a place of their own within it, in a way that further enhances and explicitates, at the level of linguistic expression, their spatialization:

AR: *salīqatu l-^caqli maknūnatun fī maġrizihā mina l-qalbi...* (AS, p.22) “the property of reason is concealed in the place where it has been planted within the heart”

-*lām ’anna l-’ahqāda lahā fī l-qulūbi mawāqī’u mukammanatun mūġī’atun. Fa-l-’alsunu lā tašduqu fī ḥabarihā ^cani l-qulūbi wa-l-qalbu ’^cdalū šahādatan mina l-lisāni ^calā l-qalbi* (KD, p. 265) “be aware that resentments have hidden and painful places in the hearts; tongues do not speak the truth about hearts, and these give a more accurate testimony about themselves than tongues”

A situation consistent with the “the heart is a container” metaphor is that in which the heart is viewed as filled, occupied by a certain feeling, emotion or quality, in a way that involves their conceptualization as substances that can fill a container to its capacity or, on the contrary, be poured out of it and leave it empty:

AR: *wa-^calayka bi-l-ḥadari fī ’amrika wa-l-ġarā’ati fī qalbika ḥattā tamla’ a qalbaka ġarā’atan...* (AK, p. 163-164) “you must be cautious and brave at heart, so that you fill your heart with bravery”

-*ḥāḡatī ... 'an ya'mura l-maliku wazīrahu...wa-yuqsima 'alayhi 'an yu'mila fikrahu ... wa-yufriḡa qalbahū fī naẓmi ta'līfī kalāmin...* (KD, p. 57) "my need is that the king command his vizier and decree upon him to put his mind to work... and pour out his heart in the composition of a speech..."

-*wa-s-suluwwu ... yanqasimu 'ilā qismayni: suluwwin ṭabṛīyyin, wa-huwa l-musammā bi-n-nisyāni, yaḥlū bihi l-qalbu wa-yafriḡu bihi l-bālu...* (TH, p. 243) "solace comes in two types: natural solace, which is named oblivion, through which the heart is emptied and the mind is voided"

-*fī kanafi llāhi wa-fī sitrihī / man laysa yaḥlū l-qalbu min dīkrihī* (MA, p. 72) "under God's protection and guard is he whose heart isn't void of His remembrance"

HEBR: *lēḥ b^enē hā'ādām mālē' rā'* (Koh, 9: 3) "the heart of the sons of man is full of evil"

-*biḥḥū bō b^e-kol c^et^eām šipkū l^e-pānāw l^ebabkem* (Ps, 62: 9) "trust in Him at all times, oh people, pour forth before Him your heart"

When more than one reified concept finds its place inside the heart, we may assume with a fairly high degree of certainty that the ontological metaphor found at work in their conceptualization has them reified as physical objects occupying certain volumes of space inside the container, rather than liquid or fluid substances, as in the precedent cases:

AR: ...*fa-yaḡma^ca dālīka kullahu fī ṣadriḥi 'aw fī kitābin* (AS, p. 43-44) "...so that he may gather all this in his mind (litt. "a chest") or in a book"

-*li-yaḡtami^c fī qalbīka l-iftiqāru 'ilā n-nāsi wa-l-istiḡnā'u c^anhum...* (AK, p. 177-178) "let the need for people and the ability to dispense with them reunite in your heart"

-*'innahu lā yaḡtami^cu š-ṣuḥḥu wa-l-'imānu fī qalbi c^abdin ṣāliḥin 'abadan* (MA, p. 50) "avarice and faith have never reunited in a righteous man's heart"

One of the properties of a container is that of hiding its contents from view, of making them invisible to the ones looking from the outside; in this case, the quality of the contents is less easy to establish than in the two precedent cases, but they are no less materialized as entities perceivable with human senses, since their placement inside a container prevents their being seen from the outside:

AR: ...*ḥattā ya^clama sirra nafsihi wa-mā yuḍmiruhu qalbuhu* (KD, p. 49) "... so that he may know his secret and what his heart conceals"

-*katamtu hawākumu fī ṣ-ṣadri minnī / ^calā 'anna d-dumū^ca ^calayya nammat* (MA, p. 111) "I have hidden my passion for you in my heart (chest), although the tears have betrayed me"

HEBR: *ṣiḏqātī lō' kissīti b^e-tōk libbī...* (Ps, 40: 11) "Thy righteousness I have not concealed in the midst of my heart"

-...*kī hū' yōḏēa^c ta^clumōt lēḥ* (Ps, 44: 22) "for He knoweth the secrets of the heart"

Among the most evidently spatializing and materializing effects of, or rather complementary phenomena to the conceptualization of internal organs as containers is the quantification of their contents, whereby the abstract concepts contained therein, be they qualities or feelings, become measurable in terms of quantity and, as such, may be compared with material entities found in the physical environment like, in this case, barleycorns or dinars:

AR: *yā laylā hal baqiya fī qalbiki min ḥubbi tawbata fatā l-fityāni ṣay'un* (MA, p. 108) "oh Layla, is there anything left in your heart of your love for Tawbah, the hero of heroes?"

-*yaḥruḡu mina n-nāri man qāla 'laa 'ilāha 'illaa llāhu' wa-fī qalbihi waznu ṣa^cīratin min ḥayrin...* (JB, p. 303) "he who sais 'there is no God but Allah' having in his heart an amount of good weighing even as little as a barleycorn will step out of the Fire"

-*idhabū fa-man waḡadtum fī qalbihi mitqāla dīnārin min 'īmānin fa- 'aḥriḡūhu...* (JB, p. 725) "go and take out those in whose hearts you will find faith in the weight of a dinar"

A container has a limited capacity, and, as such, can hold what may be placed inside only it to a limited extent; this is why, in various circumstances, we see how the heart is or is not capable of holding or containing feelings, worries, pieces of information, secrets, entailing, as in the other cases, complementary conceptual metaphors whereby abstract concepts become spatialized as entities that have a certain volume that can or cannot fit the capacity of the container, be they solid entities or fluid substances:

AR: ...*mā lam tattasi^c 'asmā^cuhum li-stimā^cihi wa-lā qulūbuhum li-fahmihi* (RS, p. 199) "...that which nor their ears were large enough to hear nor their hearts to comprehend"

-*laysa fī l-qalbi mawḍi^cun li-ḥabībayni* (TH, p. 95) "there is no place for two loved ones in the heart"

-*wa-'inna l-humūma 'idā tarādafat fī l-qalbi ḍāqa bihā* (TH, p. 138) "if worries pile up inside the heart it cannot contain them"

-*sami^cathu 'uḍunāya wa-wa^cāhu qalbī wa-'abṣarat-hu^caynāya ḥīna takallama bihi...* (JB, p. 511) "my ears heard it, my heart contained it and my eyes saw it when he said it"

-*mā ḍāqat ṣudūru r-riḡāli^can ṣay'in kamā taḍīqu^cani s-sirri* (MA, p. 22) "people find it most difficult to keep a secret (people's chests have a hard time containing nothing as they have containing a secret)"

Among the physical experiential bases of the way we relate to our environment is the comfort we generally feel in wide spaces, and the stress that narrow spaces usually inflicts upon us, whence the conceptual metaphor that underlines the passages listed below, and that could be formulated as "wide is good; narrow is bad", being also coherent with the more general metaphors "bigger is better; smaller is worse" and "more is better; less is worse". In connection with the understanding of internal organs as containers, the first panel of this metaphor – "wide is good" – is put to work in conceptualizing different positively valued qualities, like generosity, forbearance, acceptance, knowledge:

AR: *wa-'innī la-'a^clamu man kāna 'aḥsana n-nāsi zannan ... wa-'aṣaddahumu ḥtimālan wa-'arḥabahum ṣadran* (TH, p. 81) "I know someone that was the best thought of, most enduring and magnanimous (wide chested) of all people"

-...*'an yahaba llāhu li-l-'insāni ṣaḍīqan muḥliṣan ... raḥba ḍ-dirā^ci wāsi^ca ṣ-ṣadri* (TH, p. 138) "...that God may give man a sincere, resilient and magnanimous (wide armed and vast chested) friend"

-*wa-hiya ḥiṭṭatun lā yuṭīquhā 'illā ḡaldun qawīyyun wāsi^cu ṣ-ṣadri...* (TH, p. 195) "this is a design that caoont be pursued but by someone resilient, strong and forbearing (wide chested)"

-*ra'aytuka raḥba ṣ-ṣadri tarḍā bi-mā 'atā...* (TH, p. 235) "I've seen you are open-hearted (wide chested), at peace with what has come"

-fa-rtāḥa l-mawbaḏānu 'ilayhā wa-šaraḥa ṣadrahu li-muḏāğā'atihā... (MA, p. 151) "and the mobed felt comfortable with her and laid his heart (chest) open for sleeping with her"

HEBR: *wayyittēn 'lōhīm ḥokmāh li-šēlōmōh ū-ʿbūnāh harbēh mē'ōd wē-rōḥ ab lēḥ ka-ḥōl 'ašer 'al šēpaṭ hayyām* (1 Kings, 5:9) "and God gave wisdom to Solomon, and very much understanding, and breadth of heart (knowledge), as the sand that is on the edge of the sea"

As for the second pannel of the aforementioned metaphor – "narrow is bad" – it naturally plays a role in conceptualizing negatively valued qualities or states, like downcastness and unforbearance:

AR: *wa-qad ġama'ta n-nağdata wa-l-līna fa-lā tūğadu ġabānan 'inda l-liqā'i wa-lā ḏayyiqa ṣ-ṣadri 'inda mā yanūbuka mina l-'ašyā'i* (KD, p. 335) "you have reunited courage and suppleness, so that you are not found to be coward in confrontation, nor downcast (narrow chested) when hardship befalls you"

... 'ilā 'an ḏāqa ṣadruhu wa-bāḥa bi-mā nuqila 'ilayhi (TH, p. 147) "...until he couldn't stand it anymore (his chest narrowed) and revealed what he had been told"

It is also worth noticing that the passage from TH, p. 147, in which the narrowing of one's chest leads to his revealing of information entrusted to him, bears an obvious relation with the metaphorical statements previously listed that are built upon the idea of the limited capacity of a container, that can be sometimes exceeded by its contents and thus reveal them by pouring them out. The overlapping of conceptual metaphors in this case is a natural occurrence, since the contact between the concepts of wideness or narrowness and that of container does have as a result the emergence of the concept of (limited) capacity.

When an entity is conceptualized as a container, it is also implicitly understood as having an in-out orientation, which enables it to engage with other entities in spatial relations that are specific to this orientation, in that these other entities can be either inside or outside the container, and they can also be seen as moving or being moved so as to enter it or get out of it. Thus, alongside the understanding of a range of concepts as entities spatially related in one way or another to a container, their capacity of moving or being moved enhances their reification and marks

the transition from understanding “what they are” (in this case, objects or substances) to defining “what they do”. When the objects appear to enter the container themselves, with no mention of an exterior agent, they are shown as falling, entering, penetrating:

AR: *'iyyāka 'an yaqā'a fī qalbika ta'attubun 'alā l-wālī 'awi stizrā'un lahu; fa-'in 'ānasta 'an yaqā'a fī qalbika badā fī wağhika 'in kunta ḥalīman, wa-badā fī lisānika 'in kunta safīhan* (AK, p. 126) “beware of having blame and disdain for your superior falling into your heart, for if you let it fall into your heart it will appear on your face if you are mild-tempered, and in your speech if you are foolish”

-wa-qad qālati l-ḥukamā 'u 'idā daḥala qalba ṣ-ṣadīqi min ṣadīqihi rībatun... (KD, p. 242) “the wisemen have said that, if suspicion enters someone’s heart about his friend...”

-wa-'ammā 'an yakūna ... mutamakkinan min ṣamīmi l-fu 'ādi nāfidan fī ḥiğābi l-qalbi fa-mā 'uqaddiru dālīka (TH, p. 93) “as for (love) taking possession of the innermost part of the heart and penetrate it’s cover, I don’t think this holds true”

When they go into the container as a result of an exterior agent, the passages recollected from our corpus show them as being thrown, brought or put inside the container:

AR: *'inna ṣ-ṣayṭāna yabluḡu mina l-'insāni mablaḡa d-dami, wa-'innī ḥaṣītu 'an yaqdīfa fī qulūbikumā ṣay'an* (JB, p. 281) “Satan is as close to man as his own blood, and I feared lest he should throw something in your hearts”

HEBR: ...*w^e-hēḥē 'ī mōreḳ bi-l^eḥāḥām b^e-'arṣōt 'ōy^eḥēhem...* (Lev, 26: 36) “I have also brought a faintness into their heart in the lands of their enemies”

-...w^e- 'et yir 'ātī 'ettēn bi-l^eḥāḥām ... (Jer, 32: 40) “and My fear I put in their heart”

We now part completely with the conceptualization of internal organs as containers and focus solely on their understanding as physical objects engaging with emotions and other concepts in relations based on motion and different kinds of spatial reports that do not imply the organs having cavities in which objects can find their place. In these cases, both the organs and the abstract concepts with which they are seen as coming

in contact are conceptualized as physical, most probably solid objects forming couples of which one part is the stable element, and the other the element in motion or adopting a certain position towards the other. The closest situation to those registered in the previous sets of passages is that where the stable element is represented by the organ, while the notion conceptualized as the other element enters with it in one of the aforementioned relations. In the following examples we can see how the heart can be reached by remembrance, ideas, sharp words or whatever might present itself to the human mind from the outside world, or, on the contrary, can be broken away from:

AR: *°alā l-°āqili 'an yaḏkura l-mawta fī kulli yawmin wa-laylatin mirāran ḏikran yubāšīru l-qulūba wa-yaqḏa°u t-ṭimāḥa* (AS, p.43) "intelligent people must remember death every day and night many times, in a way that touches the hearts and hinders ambition"

- 'a°dadtu li-°ibādī ṣ-ṣāliḥīna mā lā °aynun ra'at wa-lā 'uḏnun samī°at wa-lā ḥaṭara °alā qalbi bašarin... (JB, p. 481) "I have prepared for my righteous servants something no eye has seen, no ear has heard and has never come / occurred to the mind (heart) of a human"

-wa-l-lisānu lā yandamilu ḡurḥuhu wa-lā tu'sā maqāṭī°uhu ... wa-'ašbāhu n-našli mina l-kalāmi 'idā wašalat 'ilā l-qalbi lam tunza° wa-lam tustahraḡ (KD, p. 219) "wounds inflicted with the tongue don't cicatrize and its cuts don't heal, and words that resemble blades can't be pulled out or extracted once they have reached the heart"

-...wa-staḏkirū l-qur'āna fa-'innahu 'ašaddu tafasšīyan min ṣudūri r-riḡāli mina n-na°ami (JB, p. 583) "memorize the Qur'an, for it is faster than livestock at breaking away from men's hearts (chests)"

SYR: *saggī'ē šīṭē d-īteḥ(w) °al kursyā d°-malkūtā wa-d°-lā sālqīn (h)waw °al lebbā l°beš(w) l°būšā d-īqārā* (Sir, 11: 5) "many despised men sat on the throne of royalty, and those that nobody was thinking about (that didn't come up on (anyone's) heart) were clad in clothes of majesty"

As for love, it can also stick to the heart or, as it is shown in the next passages, to other internal organs:

AR: *wa-kaṭīran mā yakūnu luṣūqu l-h}ubbi bi-l-qalbi min naḡratin wāḥīdatin* (TH, p. 89) "and love often sticks to the heart after one single look"

-wa-hādā yadullu °alā luṣūqi l-ḥubbi bi- 'akbādi 'ahli hādīhi ṣ-ṣifati (TH, p. 92) “and this shows that love sticks to the livers of those endowed with this feature”

-wa-mā laṣīqa bi- 'aḥšā'ī ḥubbun qaṭṭu 'illā ma°a z-zamāni t-tawīli ... (TH, p. 93) “love never stuck to my entrails but after a long time”

In some cases, the concept in question can assume towards the organ a position relevant to its importance, like in the following biblical verset, where God’s commandments are supposed to be on the heart, which suggests the possibility of there being also a partially systematic orientational metaphor structured on an UP-DOWN axis reflected in this statement:

HEBR: *w°-hāyū hadd°ḥārīm hā'ēlleh 'ašer 'ānōkī m°saww°kā hayyôm °al l°ḥāḥekā* (Deut, 6: 6) “let these words, which I am commanding you today, be on thine heart”

Organs can also be reached as a result of another agent, as it appears in this verse, where the remembrance of a fact is depicted as a physical action (in this case, the turning back of the fact unto the heart) performed by the human subject himself:

HEBR: *w°-yādā°tā hayyôm wa-h°šēbōtā 'el l°ḥāḥkā kī yhw hū' hā'elōhīm...* (Deut, 4: 39) “and know today, and turn back unto thy heart, that yhw is God”

The alternative kind of spatial relation established between organs and concepts, whereby the organ represents the mobile element and the concept in question the stable one, is also represented by a number of passages from our corpus, among which we find, as in the precedent case, instances where the organ acts of its own, without receiving an apparent stimulus from the subject or some other, exterior factor. In these instances the heart appears to stand firm upon, incline towards, or turn onto something:

AR: *fa-'idā kāna hādā l-xalqu... qad qadara °alā t-taḥalluṣi min marābiṭi l-halakati... bi-mawaddatihi wa-ḥulūṣihā wa-tābāti qalbihi °alayhā...* (KD,

p. 206) “and if these creatures ... were able to escape places of perdition ... through pure affection and their heart’s firmness upon it...”

-*‘ağibti li-qalbī kayfa yaşbū ‘ilaykum / ‘alā ‘uzmi mā yalqā wa-laysa lahu şabrū* (MA, p. 115) “you wonder at my heart, how it inclines towards you and has no patience, despite the hardships it endures”

HEBR: *‘al yēšē ‘el d^erākêhā libb^ekā...* (Prov, 7: 25) “let thy heart not turn unto her ways”

The heart does not engage in spatial relations only with abstract concepts, but also with entities of the material environment, such as another person or mosques, which has as an effect the understanding of the abstract concept involved (in this case, love or (emotional) attachment) not as a physical object but as the spatial relation itself, on the basis of a conceptual metaphor that could be formulated as “physical attachment is emotional attachment”:

AR: *fa-qultu ‘inna l-latī qalbī bihā ‘aliqun / qabbaltuhā qublata yawman ‘alā ḥaṭarī* (TH, p. 158) “and I said: she to whom my heart is attached received from me one kiss one day, despite the peril I exposed myself to”

-...*fa-mā ra ‘aytu ‘ašadda tabağğuhan ... min muḥibbin ‘ayqana ‘anna qalba maḥbūbihi ‘indahu...* (TH, p. 181) “I’ve never seen anyone being more conceited than a lover who knows for sure that the heart of his beloved is with him”

-...*wa-rağulun qalbuḥu mu‘allaqun bi-l-masğidi ‘idā ḥarağa minhu ḥattā ya‘ūda ‘ilayhi* (TH, p. 307) “...and a man whose heart is attached (suspended) to the mosque when he leaves it, until he returns to it”

-...*qalbī kulla yawmin wa-laylatin / ‘ilayka bi-mā tuḥfi l-qulūbu mu‘allaqū* (MA, p. 142) “day and night my heart is attached to you by that which hearts conceal”

The types of movements and positions of the heart attested in the presence of another agent, be it the human subject or something else, are quite similar to those encountered in the absence of such agent: hearts are either attached, inclined, made to stay firm or moved. As for the concepts with which hearts come in contact this way, they also seem to be generally reified as physical object, with the notable exception of *hawā* (“passion”) in the passage from MA, p. 69, that is apparently understood as a domain, almost as a container, inside which the heart can be moved:

AR: ...*fa-`inna man lam yu^calliq qalbahu bi-l-ġāyāti qallat ḥasratuhu ^cinda mufāraqatihā* (KD, p. 67) “for he who hasn’t attached his heart to different ends faces little affliction when parting with them”

-*’aḥaduhā mā quṣida fīhi ’ilā waḏ^cihi ^calā ’alsinati l-bahā’imi ... fa-tustamāla qulūbuhum* (KD, p. 76) “one of them is that which was designed to be shown as though it were the speech of animals... so that their hearts be won (inclined)”

-*yā muqalliba l-qulūbi ṭabbit qalbī^calā dīnika* (JB, p. 751) “oh He who makes hearts turn, make my heart stay firm on your religion”

-*naqqil fu’ādaka ḥaytu šī’ā mina l-hawā / mā l-ḥubbu ’illā li-l-ḥabībi l-’awwalī* (MA, p. 69) “move your heart anywhere you want in the realm of passion, love is only for the first loved one”

-...*’alimat ’anna qulūba r-riġāli lā tustamālu ’illā bi-l-mu’ātāti...* (MA, p. 144) “she knew that men’s hearts can only be won (made to incline) through benevolent behaviour”

In this last section of our paper we have tried to trace patterns followed by the conceptualization of some abstract notions through their spatialization, realized in its turn in close connection with the metaphorization of names of body parts. We began by investigating a type of conceptual metaphors similar to those that we saw at work in the precedent section, whereby human groups, facts, knowledge, manners, qualities, emotions are partially understood as bodies and thus acquire some vague spatial dimensions as physical entities, the only differentiating factor between the two types being that the former contributes to the conceptualization of concrete physical entities and the latter to that of abstract concepts. Another case that presented itself to our attention was that of internal organs, and especially the heart, being conceived of as containers for different abstract concepts like feelings, emotions, information, etc., which triggers the assumption that these concepts are in their turn understood as different kinds of entities engaging in various spatial relations with the container. We saw how these reified concepts can have places of their own inside the heart, how more concepts can find themselves inside it at the same time, in which cases it is to be assumed that they are understood as solid objects. Some passages provided us with instances where the heart, as a container, is filled with emotions or feelings in a way that suggests their conceptualization as liquid substances. A considerable number of passages exhibit some specific features of the heart seen as a container, that help

emphasize in their turn particular characteristics of the objects it comes in contact with: the heart has a certain limited capacity and in some conditions it can or cannot hold whatever is found inside it, meaning that the concepts in question are reified as objects having volumes; similarly, the objects found inside it are quantified by different means, thus acquiring also a weight of their own. Finally, the heart has, like other containers, the capability to conceal the things it contains, which means that these things have their own visibility that they, as other physical objects, may lose in certain conditions, the conclusion being that, in contact with the heart conceptualized as a container, concepts become entities seen either as substances, or as physical and spatially identifiable objects, endowed with volume, weight and visibility. Another means that has proved to be effective in this conceptualization process is that of seeing both the internal organ and the concept in question as two physical objects engaging in spatial, either motional or static, relations: we could thus see how they can form a couple in which either the heart assumes a stable position while the concept, receiving an external stimulus or not, enters in certain spatial relations with it, or the heart engages in such relations with the concept seen this time as a stable element. A pattern of conceptualization in relation to names of body parts more scarcely reflected in our corpus is that by which concepts are understood as mere spatial relations or features, with no reification or corporealization involved: possession or authority is seen as something or someone being under the hand, positive qualities like generosity, forbearance or knowledge are seen as wideness of the heart or chest, the heart's attachment to something is seen as love or affection.

As far as the types of conceptual metaphors found throughout this inquiry are concerned, it was only too natural and predictable to find that, being linked to space and spatialization, they fall within the categories of ontological and orientational metaphors, their vast majority belonging to the ontological type, along with some orientational metaphors and some cases of overlapping between the two.

One of the most interesting conclusions that can be drawn, however, is that names of different body parts interact differently with the metaphorical understanding of concrete or abstract concepts, and that the referents of these names are relevant to the part they play in this process. Thus, names of external organs appear in metaphorical expressions that reflect conceptual metaphors directly contributing to the understanding of various concepts: the phrases "the head of the tree" or "the head of the group"

are underlied by the metaphors “a tree is a human body” and “a group is a human body”, that give us a partial account of the understanding of the concepts “tree” and “group”. Names of internal organs, on the other hand, when included in metaphorical expressions like those registered in this paper, reflect not only single conceptual metaphors, but pairs of complementary metaphors, for the interaction between these organs and abstract concepts seems to make it necessary that the organs themselves be metaphorically conceptualized: in an expression like “to fill one’s heart with bravery”, for example, the heart is understood as a container and bravery as a substance; in an expression like “love sticks to the heart”, both love and the heart are seen as solid objects, the heart being the stable element and love being the mobile one that stiks to it.

Given the limited character of the data basis that could be included in this paper and the focusing of our attention on a very specific topic, these are but partial observations about the way parts of the human body interact with the mapping of various concepts in some of the languages belonging to the Semitic group. We have also deliberately concentrated mainly upon the cases of convergence between the three languages, which doesn’t imply our denying or ignoring that each of them has also other means, that do not bear any relation with the metaphORIZATION of names of body parts, of expressing the ideas and concepts that were the object of our scrutiny. We do hope, however, that this case study sheds some light upon different aspects of the part played by the human body and its components in the process of metaphorical conceptualization as it is reflected by Arabic, Hebrew and Syriac.

NOTES

- 1 This kind of conceptual metaphors is often reflected at the level of language and discourse by metaphors qualified by rhetoricians and metaphor theorists as “dead”, i.e. metaphors that do technically qualify as such, having words used with obviously non-literal meanings, but in a manner that has become quite common and void of any stylistic value; see, e.g., some of John R. Searle’s remarks about the use of the adjective “cold” to describe an unemotional person: “there is some evidence, incidentally, that this metaphor works across several different cultures: it is not confined to English speakers... Moreover, it is even becoming, or has become, a dead metaphor. Some dictionaries... list the lack of emotion as one of the meanings of ‘cold’” (“Metaphor” in *Metaphor and Thought*, 1994, pp. 82-111)
- 2 The experiential basis of metaphor is further discussed by Lakoff in his book about categorization, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (1987), pp. 276-278.
- 3 As it happens, our corpus only provided us with sentences in which prep. *bayna yaday* exhibits yet another symptom of the partial grammaticalization of the noun *yad*, namely its governing only names of human beings. This sentence appearing in a qur’anic verse, however, offers us an alternative view: *lan nu’mina bi-hādā l-qur’āni wa-lā bi-l-laḏī bayna yadayhi* (XXXIV, 31) “we shall neither believe in this scripture nor in any that came before it”; in it not only does the preposition govern the name of an inanimate object, but it also bears a temporal meaning.
- 4 Metonymic concepts, while being distinguished from the metaphorical ones, are reckoned with by Lakoff and Johnson as lying, like them, at the basis of our conceptual system and as being “grounded in our experience” even more obviously than metaphorical concepts, as they emerge from “direct physical or causal associations” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, pp. 35-40).
- 5 The Syriac vocabulary (and also that of other Aramaic idioms) misses, however, a name meaning “face” and sharing its root with the Hebrew *pānīm*, as the name bearing this meaning, *‘appē*, a plurale tantum, seems to have acquired it through metonymy (or, more exactly, *pars pro toto*) from the original meaning of “nose” (as it is attested by the names of the nose in Arabic and Hebrew – *‘anf* and, respectively, *‘ap̄*, that share with *‘appē* the consonantal root *‘.n.p.*).
- 6 This fact is also stated by Lakoff and Johnson in relation to their own data basis: “the experience of time is a natural kind of experience that is understood almost entirely in metaphorical terms (via the spatialization of time and the TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME IS MONEY metaphors)” (1980, p. 118); “time is metaphorically conceptualized in terms of space” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 126).

- ⁷ In discussing the concept of romantic love in the English speaking world, Kövecses states that “in addition to the body, the heart can also serve as a container for this purpose (i.e. the containment of emotions)...or, indeed, it may well be that the HEART metaphor is in a sense more basic than the BODY AS A CONTAINER metaphor... in the sense that the physiological effect of increased heart rate is one of the most important bodily responses associated with love, and also with many other emotions” (Kövecses, 1986, p. 83).

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L'INTERNATIONALISATION DES SCIENCES ET TECHNIQUES RÉFORMATRICES LES SAVANTS ROUMAINS ET LA FONDATION ROCKEFELLER (1918-1940)

Conjonctures, convergences, jonctions

La guerre n'est pas encore finie, mais elle est presque gagnée en mars 1918, quand à Iasi, ville de refuge pour l'intelligentsia et la *society* bucarestoises depuis l'invasion de la capitale par l'armée allemande, une société savante ayant au centre la réforme par la science voit le jour, la première en son genre en Roumanie. Elle a pour nom *Association d'étude pour la réforme sociale* et comme initiateur Dimitrie Gusti, formé d'abord à la philosophie avec W. Wundt au tournant du siècle à Leipzig et reconverti par la suite à la sociologie empirique.

Très ouvert à l'international, Dimitrie Gusti constate la part importante que la science joue dans l'organisation des sociétés européennes développées. Il se donne pour mission de faire fonctionner ce mécanisme en Roumanie, d'autant plus que la conjoncture est favorable aux réformateurs, ne fût-ce que par la nécessité d'unifier le système administratif et juridique sur le territoire élargi de la Roumanie. Mais comme personne n'est réformateur avant de l'être, rassembler les personnalités des domaines les plus diversifiées afin d'orienter leurs compétences vers l'action sociale, voilà le premier geste de Dimitrie Gusti après décembre 1918. De l'Université de Iasi, où il est doyen, il se fait rapidement transférer à Bucarest (1919) et ouvre ici la première chaire de sociologie en même temps qu'il lance l'organe de *l'Association d'études pour la réforme sociale : Archives pour la science et la réforme sociale*¹. Le groupe d'étudiants d'un côté, celui de spécialistes de l'autre,

la bataille est menée sur un double front. Les uns et les autres se rencontreront à partir de 1925 sur le terrain – les villages – pour former des équipes monographiques. La méthode monographique devient ainsi la marque de l' « école de sociologie roumaine ».

Or, force est de constater que cette méthode d'enquête, dont il est vrai que l'application par Dimitrie Gusti et ses collaborateurs a connu le plus large succès dans l'entre-deux-guerres et continue de connaître aujourd'hui dans certains milieux académiques, était déjà mise à profit depuis son lancement par Frédéric Le Play² un demi-siècle auparavant, en Europe de l'Ouest et aux Etats-Unis avec des variations et des variantes³. D'ailleurs, en 1925 justement la méthode monographique vient d'être redécouverte à l'occasion du premier Congrès International de Sociologie : Albert Thomas, président de ce Congrès, comme du Bureau International de Travail depuis 1919, donne pour tâche à ses collaborateurs de réaliser des enquêtes monographiques selon la méthode de Le Play⁴. C'est dans l'émergence d'organisations bureaucratiques comme la Société des Nations qu'on a vu, notamment en France, la fin des réformateurs⁵. Cela ne nous empêche pas d'admettre que, pour ce qui est de la Roumanie des années 1920, la réforme et la monographie ont encore cet aspect « nébuleux »⁶ des choses en train de se faire, des énergies en train de se rassembler, des enthousiasmes et des espoirs, car ceux qui en sont concernés sont alors indifférents quant à la fin de l'histoire. En effet, les étudiants de Gusti ont vécu la monographie comme l'aventure de leur jeunesse, parfois comme une « utopie » scientifique et un terrain de rivalités professionnelles, mais le plus souvent comme une expérience exotique et ludique, dans cette deuxième partie des années 1920⁷. Mais à cette époque, ils sont encore des étudiants, alors que les spécialistes réclamés par Gusti sont des personnes déjà affirmées professionnellement, ce sont pour la plupart des académiciens comme lui qui veulent bien voir leurs travaux valorisés en dehors de la sphère universitaire et en plus, de par leur contacts avec leurs homologues internationaux, ils ont la conscience des « problèmes » devant lesquels l'indifférence serait un véritable crime éthique.

L'une des voix qui se font ainsi entendre est celle de Victor Babes⁸, épidémiologiste consacré dont l'activisme réformateur est connu depuis plus d'une décennie⁹. Il est le principal promoteur d'une campagne sanitaire totale. Voilà comme il s'adresse dans les pages de la revue *Archives de la science et la réforme sociale* :

« N'attendons point pour prendre cette voie, car la Roumanie nouvelle a une mission civilisatrice urgente à accomplir, non seulement de par la tâche que les grandes puissances lui ont donnée, et qui attendent de nous le redressement de la santé publique compromise et la défense de l'Europe contre les épidémies de l'Orient, mais surtout l'intérêt suprême de l'Etat roumain, pour la régénération et le bonheur de notre nation. »¹⁰

A Victor Babes vont faire écho d'autres épidémiologistes, dont Iuliu Moldovan, venu de Cluj. Autour de lui, les rangs des spécialistes en santé publique se resserrent, car dans cette ville de l'ancien empire Autriche-hongrois, l'intelligentsia est imprégnée de volonté politique dans la tradition du mouvement national¹¹. L'unification de 1918 leur a beaucoup promis et leur a peu donné, du moins sont-ils perpétuellement sur la liste d'attente. Tout dépend des alliances que leurs protecteurs sauront conclure¹².

Ainsi le début de la trajectoire professionnelle du démographe Sabin Manuila se révèle-t-il particulièrement édifiant de cette situation d'expectative stratégique des Transylvains. Sa montée à Bucarest est difficile mais assurée, et l'on peut voir de sa correspondance familiale¹³ antérieure à 1928 combien son projet scientifique est orienté par le projet politique des autres. En effet, bien que sympathisant de Vasile Goldis (président du Parti National de Transylvanie, l'aile régionaliste), il n'hésitera pas de suivre son chef et maître, Iuliu Moldovan, lorsque celui-ci optera, en 1926, pour soutenir Iuliu Maniu (président de l'autre Parti National de Transylvanie favorable aux coalitions)¹⁴. Lorsque Maniu prendra la tête du gouvernement en 1928, Moldovan prendra, lui, la tête du Ministère de la Santé. Quant à Sabin Manuila, il sera chargé d'en organiser le Bureau statistique du même Ministère. Il sera le premier des *Rockefeller men*, car sa réussite à Bucarest a passé par un stage de spécialisation aux Etats-Unis avec le soutien de la Fondation Rockefeller. Séduit dès le début par le style de vie américain, il est tenté pour un instant de rester faire sa propre vie aux Etats-Unis. Mais, par un calcul minutieux de ses chances là-bas, décide fermement pour le retour en Roumanie, où un rôle-clé dans la politique sanitaire lui est promis¹⁵. Ses compétences ainsi acquises et le fait de passer pour le premier à avoir articulé, en Roumanie, santé publique et statistiques, c'est-à-dire être le premier démographe, mais aussi les alliances américaines qu'il a su construire lui ont valu une stabilité qui a résisté à tous les gouvernements jusqu'en 1947, et lui a servi ensuite dans sa vie d'« exilé » aux Etats-Unis.

Des « questions » aux « problèmes » : le regroupement des réformateurs roumains à la fin des années 1920

À la différence d'autres intellectuels roumains du début du XXe siècle¹⁶, dogmatiques et politisés, absorbés par de grandes *questions* (nationale, paysanne), on peut dire que D. Gusti entend se distinguer en adoptant dès le début une posture interstitielle. Universitaire non engagé politiquement, il sera le guide et le médiateur des gouvernants et des spécialistes : il veillera à ce que les principes d'une bonne gouvernance coïncident avec le fait de se rendre aux conseils des spécialistes. Les spécialistes seront ceux qui savent trouver et énoncer les *problèmes*. La santé publique devient le terrain principal de l'action réformatrice : les plus graves problèmes émanent de là, disent-ils d'une voix.

Certes, si Gusti a bien pu trouver ses collaborateurs, les réformateurs, tous ont su trouver ensuite les leurs. À la fin des années 1920, se seront exprimés dans la revue *Archives pour la science et la réformes sociale* et auront participé à des campagnes monographiques, des spécialistes des domaines suivants : droit, médecine, agriculture, économie, philosophie, etc. Du fait des contacts diplomatiques sur des questions sanitaires et des intérêts professionnels, la santé publique est parvenue à s'imposer devant tous comme *le* problème de la Roumanie. La preuve est fournie par les premières statistiques sanitaires élaborées et comparées à celles des autres pays d'Europe : la mortalité infantile et les épidémies auraient le taux le plus élevé en Roumanie. La mission de civilisateurs des divers spécialistes sera ainsi étroitement liée aux campagnes sanitaires. Avec les épidémiologistes au ministère en 1928, ils ont obtenu un gage de collaboration durable.

Il s'agit d'une deuxième conjoncture, favorable cette fois-ci au regroupement des savants et réformateurs. Alors que l'arrivée de Carol II en 1930 risque de faire nager tout le monde dans des eaux troubles, paradoxalement, ce sera tout l'inverse pour les réformateurs. Les contacts qu'ils sont parvenu à établir avec la Fondation Rockefeller avec laquelle ils ont entraîné l'Etat dans plusieurs projets de développement, leur vaudra une reconnaissance auprès des gouvernants qu'ils exploiteront au maximum jusqu'à investir eux-mêmes certains ministères.

L'abondance du matériel que nous avons eu l'occasion d'étudier au Centre des Archives de la Fondation Rockefeller vient compenser le silence des sources roumaines quand à ce véritable agent de liaison entre différents domaines du savoir et de leur reconfiguration au long des

années 1930 en Roumanie, comme dans d'autres pays d'Europe. Cela permet de jeter une lumière plus crue sur l'interdépendance entre science et diplomatie, entre science et politique (administrative ou culturelle) dans différentes périodes de l'histoire contemporaine.

Le modèle réformateur philanthropique : la Fondation Rockefeller en Europe

Entrée sur la scène européenne pendant la première guerre mondiale et de manière indirecte par l'intermédiaire de la Commission Hoover pour le soutien des Alliés (1917-1918), la Fondation Rockefeller agit en Europe depuis son bureau parisien établi en 1917 avec une Commission contre la tuberculose¹⁷. Elle émet une estimation négative sur l'état sanitaire dans la majorité des pays de l'Europe et juge urgent d'intervenir avec des mesures de prévention contre les épidémies venues de l'Orient via la Russie. Dans leurs tout premiers *surveys*, les commissaires Rockefeller parlent de combat épidémique et de « cordons sanitaires » pour ce qui est des pays du Centre et l'Est. Certes, ce dernier syntagme peut se prêter aisément à une interprétation par la théorie du complot selon laquelle le capitalisme américain se devait de protéger l'Ouest contre le communisme et l'impérialisme allemand¹⁸. Mais son usage dans ce contexte semble tout technique, résidu de la médecine militaire de l'empire Autriche-hongrois, utilisé pour désigner les frontières du monde « civilisé » situées dans une zone-tampon de l'Adriatique à la Valachie¹⁹. Chez les spécialistes de la Fondation Rockefeller de l'après-guerre, il est donc employé indistinctement pour désigner la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Hongrie²⁰ ou bien la Roumanie²¹. D'ailleurs, leur premier projet européen ne sera pas à l'Est, mais en France, ce qui correspond avec la manière générale de procéder de la Fondation, qui est plus pragmatique et assez influencée semble-t-il par les différents individus chargés de l'une ou l'autre de ses divisions²², mais qui veut aussi montrer aux Français leur supériorité dans la gestion des malheurs de l'humanité. Avant de suivre leur arrivée en Roumanie, considérée par certains historiens trop tardive et donc un échec total²³, il faudra d'abord faire une présentation de la présence de la Fondation Rockefeller en Europe de manière plus générale. Nous essayerons de nuancer cet aspect.

La technique du don

La création de la Fondation Rockefeller s'inscrit dans une logique philanthropique de compensation sociale à l'époque des critiques multiples des *union trades* aux grands *trusts* américains. Depuis 1913, la Fondation Rockefeller se donne pour objectif d'œuvrer au bien-être de l'humanité selon une méthode scientifique du don théorisée par le conseiller de John D. Rockefeller et premier directeur des philanthropies de ce dernier, le pasteur Frederik Gates.

La médecine

Puisque la maladie est considérée la sources principale des problèmes de l'humanité, la science pour la réformation de cette humanité sera la médecine, mais une médecine toute nouvelle, qui fait la jonction entre le principe curatif et le principe de prévention : elle a donc un objectif autant strictement médical qu'éducationnel au sens plus large. Ceci, avec la transmission du savoir scientifique doivent être les moteurs du progrès moral, politique et économique. Progressivement vont s'ajouter à cet objectif premier d'éradication des épidémies, la formation technique du personnel spécialisé et le développement institutionnel à travers des laboratoires, des centres de démonstration sanitaires et des instituts de santé publique, mais aussi la recherche en biologie²⁴. Chargée d'administrer les problèmes sanitaires concrets, l'International Health Division voit le jour après plusieurs campagnes antiépidémiques en Amérique du Sud et en Asie. En Europe, elle arrivera en 1917. En étroite liaison avec cette division est une autre, concernée avec l'encouragement de la recherche scientifique, l'International Education Board, et plus tard une autre plus focalisée Natural Sciences and Agriculture.

Les sciences sociales

Un champ moins investi au début est celui des sciences sociales, ou humanités. C'est un champ d'activité qui sera organisé à part, dans le cadre du Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, créé en 1919 par John D. Rockefeller à la mémoire de sa femme et orienté à l'origine vers des problèmes liés à la condition des femmes et des enfants. En 1929, lorsque la Fondation est restructurée, une fusion est opérée entre le discret Social

Science Research Council, fondé en 1923, et Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Les sciences sociales acquièrent un statut et un objectif défini : veiller à l'équilibre de l'humanité²⁵. Dans les années 1930, de Chatham House londonienne, à l'Institut Social Roumain, en passant par l'Institut de Coopération Intellectuelle de Genève, les sciences sociales travailleront à travers l'Europe à la coopération *inter*-nationale pour la paix.

Formes de financement et technique d'intervention en Europe

A la lumière des multiples études consacrées à l'activité de la Fondation Rockefeller en Europe que nous avons eu l'occasion de consulter, et à la suite de notre propre enquête dans les archives de la fondation concernant la Roumanie, on s'aperçoit qu'il n'a jamais existé un plan d'intervention unitaire en Europe établi d'avance, et que les commissaires se référaient à leurs activités en termes de *projects* ou *developments*, au pluriel.

Un projet désignait un ensemble de décisions prises à la suite d'une ou de plusieurs enquêtes de terrain et après d'amples négociations avec les autorités du pays concerné. Un projet s'inscrit dans le concret des possibilités de « développement constructif ». Les indicateurs des possibilités de « développement constructif » dans un pays donné sont à cette époque : la stabilité politique, l'existence d'institutions scientifiques et des spécialistes intéressés, l'accord de collaboration du gouvernement aux dépenses du projet proposé. Les termes de la négociation fixent les conditions de collaboration avec tel gouvernement de manière à ce que celui-ci prenne en charge, après le retrait de la Fondation, les dépenses de l'institution ainsi créée. L'objectif était donc de stimuler, d'orienter et de faire voler de ses propres ailes.

À part le financement de grands projets, qui consistaient dans la construction d'institutions scientifiques, plusieurs catégories de subventions dans des bourses d'études, aides diverses à l'entretien du personnel et du matériel de telle institution, allocations pour l'œuvre locale de tel individu ou pour des activités intellectuelles plus événementielles (conférences internationales, échanges d'expérience, programmes de collaboration régionale).

Officers, surveys, dairies

Le personnel des différentes divisions de la Fondation, est composé de spécialistes qui, tout en ayant chacun leurs attributions précises, observent une technique de travail unitaire. Ils ont la charge d'aller sur le terrain et faire des enquêtes, ensuite de rédiger des rapports qui puissent rendre compte de la situation générale, des conditions et des possibilités de développement et, enfin, de faire des recommandations concernant la forme d'intervention. Ils sont les principaux intermédiaires dans les négociations des projets entre la Fondation et les institutions locales. Tous leurs gestes sont scrupuleusement consignés dans un journal individuel dont ils échangent à l'occasion des passages qui puissent concerner le travail d'un collègue. Afin d'émettre une estimation concernant un projet ou une subvention dans un pays donné, ils n'oublient jamais de consulter leurs expériences, ou celles de leurs collègues dans d'autres pays visités précédemment. Parfois ils parviennent à nouer des relations plus intimes avec un *fellow* qui agit localement dans le cadre d'un projet de coopération, mais sans jamais dépasser les frontières professionnelles. S'il faut reprendre leur paroles pour synthétiser, ils procèdent inductivement : *by doing and seeing* .

Fellows

Ce sont des jeunes spécialistes, ayant obtenu leur doctorat et ayant débuté dans la carrière académique ou intégrés un organisme d'expertise, et qui jouissent du soutien d'une personnalité du domaine capable de garantir pour eux l'encadrement dans une institution locale. Ce n'est pas sûr jusqu'à quel point ils ont pu « américaniser »²⁶ la société roumaine, mais il n'y a pas de doute qu'ils ont joué un rôle de passeurs dans le flux de la transmission des savoirs au niveau transatlantique et transnational.

Le dernier « cordon sanitaire » européen : la Fondation Rockefeller en Roumanie

Si l'on vient de souligner que le syntagme « cordon sanitaire » ne nous aide pas trop à avancer dans l'analyse, on a aussi suggéré qu'il pourrait bien dire quelque chose dans l'économie rhétorique des surveys. En effet, il semble orienter la perception globale que les commissaires

nourrissent par rapport aux pays de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est, tout en permettant des emplois plus différenciés. Ainsi la Roumanie est-elle, puisque dernier à être enquêté, le dernier « cordon sanitaire », ce qui veut dire, si l'on tient compte des procédures d'intervention, le pays qui présente les moindres conditions de possibilités au « développement constructif ».

Rapports d'enquêtes et négociations

Le premier contact de la Fondation avec les Roumains a lieu indirectement pendant la guerre. Entre 1916-1918 la Hoover Commission, l'association Young Men Christian Association et la Croix Rouge agissent ensemble pour aider les Alliés : parmi les fonds qu'ils distribuent il y en a qui proviennent de la Fondation Rockefeller. Ainsi la Roumanie reçoit-elle par cette voie 30.000 roubles en 1917 ; l'opération est réglée en même temps pour la Pologne, qui reçoit 20.000 roubles²⁷.

Ce sont les infirmières britanniques et canadiennes de la Croix Rouge qui, attentives aux conditions de distribution des soins aux blessés, serviront ensuite de trait d'union entre la Rockefeller et les Roumains et feront venir la première enquêtrice de la Fondation en Roumanie. D'origine canadienne, mariée à un amiral roumain, Ethel Pantazzi avait travaillé avec la Croix Rouge sur le front roumain et avait retenu un groupe d'infirmières canadiennes en Roumanie après la guerre dont l'une est allée rejoindre en 1921 la Mission Rockefeller en France auprès du Comité national de défense contre la tuberculose. Par celle-ci, ensuite dans la correspondance engagée entre 1922 et 1923 avec Miss Elisabeth F. Crowell (responsable sur la question du *nursing* en Europe), Ethel Pantazzi envoie des signaux d'alarme sur la gravité des réalités sanitaires en Roumanie. D'ailleurs, elle a appris qu'un projet de construction d'écoles d'infirmières vient d'être lancé en Europe et plaide la cause de la Roumanie dans ce projet²⁸. Ainsi, à l'occasion du lancement d'un « mouvement pour la protection de l'enfant »²⁹ sous le haut patronage de la reine Marie de Roumanie, Ethel Pantazzi invite Elisabeth F. Crowell qui accepte ne fût-ce que pour étouffer la rumeur sur le projet mentionné, car une telle rumeur semble nuire à l'œuvre de la Fondation en Europe en général. Mais elle est prête à regarder ces réalités sanitaires de près.

Dans le rapport suivant son enquête de février-mars 1923³⁰, elle pointe du doigt les manques dans les institutions médicales roumaines de même

que le faible « esprit d'organisation » et surtout l'absence presque totale de formation chez le personnel auxiliaire. En effet, les infirmières n'ont pas encore un statut reconnu. Il n'y a pas pour l'instant, conclut-elle, de possibilité d'amélioration : que les Roumains expérimentent eux-mêmes d'abord, qu'ils témoignent leurs capacités de réaliser des choses eux-mêmes ! Elle sera heureuse de servir de conseiller aux organisatrices de ce champ d'activité avant de faire sa deuxième visite en 1927³¹.

Mais, les épidémiologistes Victor Babes et Ion Cantacuzène s'étaient mobilisés aussi. Depuis 1921, soutenus par leurs relations dans le monde académique français et par certains diplomates dont le prince Valentin Bibesco, ils sont en correspondance avec les responsables du programme d'aide aux pays européens affectés par la guerre. Ainsi Dr. Henry O. Eversole³² arrive-il quelques mois après Elisabeth Crowell. Son objectif est d'étudier la situation de l'enseignement médical dans les principales villes de Roumanie. S'il partage les visions générales de sa collègue concernant les Roumains, il parvient à brosser un paysage plus vif, après avoir élargi son champ d'observation avec une visite dans la ville de Cluj. Ses recommandations permettent l'introduction du principe des *fellowships* pour la Roumanie (en 1924) et les premières subvention accordées aux laboratoires des facultés de médecine de Bucarest, Cluj et Iasi. Un comité consultatif est organisé, le Comité pour l'amélioration et l'avancement de l'éducation médicale en Roumanie, composé des représentants des facultés de médecine des trois villes, et chargé de distribuer l'aide de \$5, 000 accordée en novembre 1923 en relation avec l'Emergency Aid Programme³³.

L'enquête suivante est effectuée en 1925 au sujet de la santé publique. Répondant à une invitation déjà ancienne (datée du 31 octobre 1922) et signée par I. Angelescu, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique. Le déplacement des *officers* Selskar Gunn et Leland Mitchell en Roumanie survient en 1925. Une fois de plus, la situation semble déplorable, malgré quelques signes qui laissent l'avenir ouvert aux négociations. Pendant leur séjours, ils sont approchés par le ministre de l'Assistance Sociale en fonction, Dr. Titu Gane, l'un des promoteurs de la réforme sanitaire en Roumanie. Dans la lettre qu'il adresse aux deux enquêteurs américains, parmi les multiples propositions, il ouvre la question de la construction d'un institut d'hygiène à Bucarest. Pourtant, la bonne volonté du ministre ne garantit point l'engagement ferme du gouvernement roumain, et l'affaire n'a pas de suite. Pas encore³⁴.

Entre l'enquête de 1923 et le début du premier projet de développement en 1930, il y a explorations, tâtonnements, ignorance réciproque et les hésitations des *officers* qui s'accumulent quant aux investissements plus amples en Roumanie. En revanche, ils sont favorables aux petites interventions et entrevoient certaines possibilités pour l'avenir, pourvu que la situation politique devienne plus stable. Avec leur « expérience du terrain », conjuguée aux observations de la manière dont est portée l'unification, parsemé de troubles nationalistes et antisémites, de même qu'aux avertissements qui arrivent par le truchement de certains jeunes *fellows* critiquant le système académique ou la politique libérale. Ces critiques, faites vers la fin de la décennie, prophétisent sur un changement gouvernemental³⁵. C'est ce qui arrive en 1928.

Toutefois, pour mettre en œuvre des projets plus amples, la conjoncture politique ne suffit pas s'il n'y a pas des hommes.

Les fellows

Le principe des bourses pour études et visites est introduit en Roumanie en 1924. Les *fellows*, ce sont donc ces personnes qui, après une spécialisation dans un centre académique européen ou/et américain qui leur a permis d'intégrer un certain nombre de compétences, théoriques autant que pratiques, sont censées servir d'interface entre la Fondation Rockefeller et les autorités et réalités locales de façon plus large. En même temps, ceux qui seront considérés capables d'agir eux-mêmes sont encouragés à investir ces postes d'autorité. Pour être prêts à cette tâche, ils sont envoyés pour des visites d'échange dans les pays de la région afin de mieux se familiariser avec la manière de travailler de la Fondation et pour tirer des enseignements utiles aux projets roumains. Ainsi, entre 13 et 27 janvier 1927, Sabin Manuila, qui a déjà fait ses preuves comme boursier à l'Université John Hopkins de Baltimore (1925-1926), accompagne les *officers* Strode et Mitchell pendant leur visite d'inspection en Hongrie et en Yougoslavie³⁶ où la Fondation a déjà commencé des projets³⁷; la deuxième visite de Manuila en Yougoslavie est faite avec les étudiants de la première promotion de l'École de santé publique de Bucarest³⁸, parmi lesquels les responsables de différentes services sanitaires à travers le pays.

Plusieurs programmes des trois divisions principales ont accordé des bourses pour études et visites de terrain à des Roumains depuis 1924,

l'année de l'introduction du principe et de la création du comité consultatif pour la Roumanie, et 1940, lorsque les dernières allocations approuvées seront suspendues à cause de la guerre.

International Education Board s'occupe des sciences exactes et encourage la recherche de laboratoire. Entre 1925 et 1929, 10 bourses sont accordées à 9 personnes masculines, dont l'une bénéficie d'un renouvellement. Les disciplines qui font l'objet du déplacement sont : la physique, la chimie, la biologie, l'anatomie, les mathématiques. Le déplacement se fait vers des institutions académiques européennes (Angleterre, Suède, Allemagne, France, Suisse) ou états-unienues, et l'on peut observer une distribution différenciée des endroits pour les personnes de la même discipline³⁹.

Un deuxième programme concerne les *Humanities and Social Sciences*. Il recouvre une variété de spécialisations du domaine de la sociologie et de l'économie où la recherche et l'action vont de pair : assistance sociale, sociologie commerciale, statistique, jurisprudence, économie agricole, psychologie, sciences politiques, droit public international, relations internationales. Dans l'intervalle 1926-1939, 17 bourses sont octroyées à 17 individus dont deux femmes (Christina Galitzi et Xenia Costaforu, pour sociologie et *social work*). La même dispersion peut être observée dans les déplacements des boursiers ayant des disciplines identiques, et dans 13 cas sur 17 le déplacement se fait vers les Etats-Unis⁴⁰.

Mais le gros lot revient aux boursiers des programmes de l'*International Health Division*. Ainsi, les bourses les plus nombreuses concernent une ramification de spécialités médicales qui vont de la recherche de laboratoire (médecine expérimentale, épidémiologie, immunologie, sérums, etc.) aux activités plus appliquées (*nursing*, administration sanitaire), voire plus techniques (statistiques, démographie, génie sanitaire, médecine industrielle). Une place à part occupe les bourses, peu nombreuses, accordées sous cette division pour les sciences naturelles dont participent la biologie, la chimie, la physique et la mathématiques. Bref, dans l'intervalle 1924 et 1940, 71 individus bénéficient de 78 bourses, dont 4 ne seront pas consommées. Du total de 78, 19 reviennent à des femmes, toutes impliquées dans l'organisation du champ du *nursing*⁴¹.

Total des bourses accordées entre 1924 et 1940 en Roumanie

Division	Fellowships
International Health Board	78
Humanities and Social Sciences	17
International Education Board	10

Investissements et collaboration au développement constructif

Rappelons le mécanisme de cette collaboration. La notion de collaboration désigne, dans le vocabulaire des *surveys*, *dairies* et *minutes*, l'engagement de l'Etat dans un projet avec la Fondation Rockefeller censé se dérouler pendant une période fixe. L'Etat roumain est censé ainsi donner des gages qu'il pourra et voudra contribuer avec un certain pourcentage aux dépenses estimées nécessaires pour le déroulement d'un projet, de façon à ce que dans l'étape initiale la contribution de la Fondation soit supérieure et que, graduellement chaque année, l'Etat augmente ses contributions alors que la Fondation diminue les siennes jusqu'à une étape finale quand l'Etat reste seul contributeur. Entre 1924 et 1940, la Fondation Rockefeller a investi au total approximativement \$455.131, 21 en Roumanie pour plusieurs types de projets.

Dans la période 1923-1930, diverses subventions ont été dirigées vers les institutions d'enseignement et de recherche médicale sans qu'il y ait contribution de la part de l'Etat totalisant la somme de \$15.275⁴². On a déjà mentionné, dans le cadre du programme pour l'aide aux pays affectés par la guerre et la somme de \$5.000 octroyée aux facultés de médecine de Bucarest, Cluj et Iasi, cette somme est dépensée de 1923 à 1927 pour nécessités diverses. Ensuite, deux autres subventions font l'objet d'un programme lié aux sciences médicales : l'Institut de sérologie de Bucarest (Dr. I. Cantacuzène) reçoit \$7.275 en 1925 pour l'acquisition de matériel didactique et d'équipement technique⁴³ ; l'Institut de médecine expérimentale de Bucarest reçoit \$3.000 pour 1931⁴⁴.

Les projets en collaboration avec l'Etat roumain se déroulent dans la période 1930-1940. Les plus significatifs concernent le domaine de la santé publique géré par la Division of Public Health.

Le premier projet est entamé à Cluj, où la faculté de médecine et l'institut d'hygiène sont jugés dignes des standards de l'Europe de l'Ouest, ce qui signifie qu'ils sont prêts pour un « développement constructif ».

Par conséquent, une somme de \$6.110 lui est accordée pour la construction d'une annexe au bâtiment principal et pour l'acquisition de matériel didactique de laboratoire⁴⁵. En étroite liaison avec cette faculté, un Centre de démonstration sanitaire est organisé dans le département de Gilau, près de Cluj, dans laquelle est investie la somme de \$15.310 entre 1931-1936. Situé dans une région rurale, les fonctions de ce centre de démonstrations sont multiples : laboratoire de recherche pour les spécialistes de la faculté de médecine de Cluj, terrain pratique pour étudiants, infirmières et agents sanitaires, mais aussi unité de contrôle médical pour la population locale⁴⁶.

Le projet le plus ample est développé à Bucarest. La construction d'un immeuble indépendant pour l'Institut d'hygiène et son équipement, objectifs pour lesquels la somme de \$110.000 est dépensée dans l'intervalle 1934-1938, avec une prolongation jusqu'en 1940⁴⁷. En 1939, lorsque les *officers* se sont retirés et les fonds ont été coupés, l'immeuble sera terminé. Selon une logique similaire à celle de Cluj, à Bucarest aussi fut financée l'installation d'un centre de démonstrations sanitaire afin de gérer le contrôle sanitaire de la population rurale dans la région de la capitale et servir également de terrain de recherche médicale et de pratique étudiante et professionnelle. La somme allouée pour l'activité de ce centre a été de \$15.000⁴⁸.

En relation avec les programmes pour la santé publique, des projets de collaboration ont été engagés autour du développement de l'activité des infirmières. Le terme *nursing*, que nous avons déjà employé en anglais en original, nous le conserveront comme tel : il indique tout un champ d'activités appartenant au réformisme britannique, canadien et américain. Lorsque l'on essaya d'introduire ce domaine en Roumanie à titre de profession spécialisée au début des années 1920, les difficultés auxquels on se heurta n'étaient pas seulement liées à l'inexpérience et à l'ignorance des quelques volontaires (les grandes dames et les épidémiologistes de Cluj et de Bucarest), mais aussi à la résistance des possibles candidates comme des médecins pratiquants. En effet, le statut professionnel et social précaire des infirmières à l'époque était bien loin du modèle anglo-saxon lancé par Florence Nightingale, qui après son expérience pendant la guerre de Crimée en 1854, en fit un domaine spécial de la pratique médicale où les vertus de *care* et les techniques de *caring* allaient être libérées à travers un enseignement élaboré dans des écoles spéciales recrutant seulement des filles éduquées et moralement distinguées. Il semble en fait que l'école de nursing représentait entre-

les-deux-guerres une sorte de luxe des pays « civilisés », et les commissaires Rockefeller, Elisabeth Crowell la première, jugent la Roumanie comme l'un des pays où les infirmières sont le plus mal loties, si elles existent. Leurs propos ne sont pas sans contradictions. A Cluj, il existe une école fondée sous l'administration hongroise avant 1918, et qui ne pose pas des problèmes du point de l'organisation, de l'équipement ou du recrutement, mais progressivement dans le contexte institutionnel conflictuel des années 1920, elle sera investie pour d'autres activités desservant la faculté de médecine, ce qui ne plaît pas bien évidemment à Elisabeth Crowell. A Cluj aussi il faut tout recommencer, conclu-t-elle. Il est pour cela urgent de former les organisatrices, car de la disponibilité d'un corps d'infirmières bien entraînées dépend en bonne partie la réussite de tout projet de santé publique. Cette situation n'est pas constatée sans infléchir sur les négociations.

Entre 1927 et 1930, sont envoyées avec des bourses de *nursing* en Europe et aux Etats-Unis 7 personnes : infirmières instructrices de l'école de Cluj et les directrices des services sanitaires de Timisoara, Sibiu et Cluj. Entre 1930 et 1939, alors que la collaboration est poursuivie à Cluj, elle va se concentrer à Bucarest. Sur 10 bourses de voyage données dans cet intervalle, 7 sont pour des organisatrices de Bucarest, 2 vont à Iasi et une seule à Cluj⁴⁹.

En effet, pour ce qui est du *nursing*, c'est toujours à Cluj que sont données les premières aides. Dans l'intervalle 1929-1933, \$10.000 seront dépensés pour la rénovation, la modernisation et équipement de l'école d'infirmières visiteuses⁵⁰.

A Bucarest en revanche, en même temps que la construction de l'institut d'hygiène et du centre de démonstration sanitaire, est négociée également la construction d'une école d'infirmières, décidée bien après 1930. En fait, si l'on suit la chronologie des négociations, c'est le premier projet envisagé et le dernier à être réalisé. Enfin, la Fondation investit dans ce projet \$85.000, distribués dans l'intervalle 1934-1938, avec une prolongation jusqu'en 1940. L'école d'infirmières « Regina Maria » ouvre ainsi ses portes, en 1939, à 100 élèves. D'autres subventions supplémentaires seront accordées en relation avec ce projet : \$12.000 pour les salaires des enseignants et l'organisation des activités de terrain ; \$500, pour l'acquisition de matériel didactique. Ce projet sera terminé de la même manière en 1940⁵¹.

Quelques conclusions peuvent être provisoirement dégagées au sujet des du développement du *nursing* en Roumanie, à la lumière aussi des notes de journal d'Elisabeth Crowell concernant les inspections systématiques en Roumanie, de même que de sa correspondance avec les différentes infirmières en charge de l'organisation. Premièrement, la professionnalisation des infirmières en Roumanie s'est réalisée au croisement des projets de redressement de la santé publique en contexte transnational. Deuxièmement, le succès de cette professionnalisation a été calculé et performé en relation avec l'investissement prestigieux des écoles d'infirmières locales par une personne représentant la Fondation Rockefeller et, inversement, avec l'investissement de ces écoles par des spécialistes locales formées dans des centres consacrés de l'espace anglo-saxon. Sans doute, l'école de la sollicitude en Roumanie fait-elle figure d'enseignement à *distance*.

À la différence de la santé publique, les sciences sociales semblent jouir d'une grande estime dans les yeux des officiers Rockefeller, mais les projets revêtent ici un aspect différent, dans la mesure où l'accent est déplacé du « développement constructif » sur la « coopération internationale », d'autant plus que la collaboration est engagée dans les années 1930, à l'exception des bourses de voyages qui sont accordées depuis le début des négociations en Roumanie. La fondation met à la disposition des institutions roumaines de sciences sociales un fonds général de \$52.000 pour être utilisé entre 1932 et 1940.

Le principal bénéficiaire est bien évidemment l'Institut Social Roumain de Dimitrie Gusti pour le budget duquel la somme de \$22.500 est déduite du total de \$52.000 entre 1932 et 1934. Malgré la persévérance de Dimitrie Gusti auprès des représentants de la division pour faire approuver la construction d'un immeuble pour son Institut, ceux-ci ont déjà décidé de mettre une fin au programme de soutien aux recherches universitaires en sciences sociales. Mais, avant de terminer ce programme, l'Institut Social Roumain n'est pas oublié : \$9.000 reviennent ainsi à l'Institut Social Roumain dans l'intervalle 1936-1937. Quatre volumes des *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociale*, contenant surtout les résultats des campagnes monographiques dans les villages, seront publiés avec l'argent de ce fonds. Pour ce qui est du programme d'études consacré à la paix internationale ('*Peaceful Change*') en relation avec l'Institut des Etudes Internationales, l'Institut Social Roumain reçoit une subvention spéciale de \$1.200 qui doit servir au paiement des salaires des assistants chargés, avec leurs collègues des autres pays de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est, du

projet d' « Etudes danubiennes ». D'ailleurs, l'intérêt est généralisé pour les questions balkaniques à l'époque encourage la Fondation de soutenir le projet d'un Département d' Etudes Internationales dans le cadre de l'Institut Social Roumain⁵².

Une autre partie de ce total, moins significative, est donnée à l'Institut de Psychologie de Cluj dans le cadre du programme 'Romanian Personalities', dont l'objectif est l'encouragement des recherches dirigées dans leur institutions d'origine par certains *fellows* dont les travaux se sont distingués dans la communauté scientifique internationale. C'est ici le cas de Nicolae Margineanu, qui avait fait son voyage d'étude entre 1932-1934 aux Etats-Unis, en Angleterre, et en France. L'aide financière qu'il reçoit ainsi en son nom est destiné en fait à être investi dans le laboratoire qu'il dirige, pour subvenir aux salaires du personnel assistant et aux besoins d'équipement⁵³.

Au carrefour entre le domaine de la santé publique et celui des sciences sociales, se situe le domaine de la démographie. Traiter la démographie séparément est une manière d'indiquer le fait qu'elle dépasse les frontières d'une discipline ou d'une autre pour entrer d'emblée dans la technique administrative. En effet, elle se présente comme *la* technique d'organisation et de contrôle à l'usage des réformes – sociales, médicales, politiques –, l'instrument de la connaissance et de l'action de l'époque. Elle sera donc partout dans les années 1930 et 1940. En Roumanie, son succès est lancé par une campagne inédite, qui est celle du premier recensement de la population sur le territoire élargi. En fait, cette campagne, dont l'image officielle qu'on diffusera acquière les proportions d'un événement national, fera entrer le chiffre dans l'arène des luttes politiques.

On pourrait dire que la démographie n'existait pas en Roumanie avant Sabin Manuila, et bien évidemment pas avant l'arrivée de la Fondation Rockefeller. Appartenant à la première génération de *fellows* (1925-1926, Etats-Unis et Angleterre), Sabin Manuila commence sa carrière avec un doctorat de médecine de l'Université de Budapest obtenu en 1918. Ultérieurement, il sera premier assistant à l'Institut d'Hygiène de Cluj sous la direction de Iuliu Moldovan. Détaché à Bucarest à son retour des Etats-Unis, il sera nommé directeur du Service statistique auprès du Ministère de la Santé en 1930, ensuite organisateur et directeur de l'Institut de démographie et du recensement qui deviendra par la suite l'Institut Central de Statistique. Tous les fonds investis par la Fondation Rockefeller dans la démographie en Roumanie sont destinés à accompagner le travail

de Sabin Manuila dans l'intervalle 1930-1940. Ainsi la Fondation lui octroie-t-elle un total de \$29.255 pour la réorganisation du Bureau de Statistique Démographique de Bucarest, avec le même trajet que pour les autres instituts mentionnés (salaires du personnel, équipement technique), et pour servir à la campagne de recensement général de la population de 1930.⁵⁴ En connexion avec l'Institut Social Roumain et l'Institut International pour la Coopération Intellectuelle, Sabin Manuila, qui agit comme expert dans le groupe d'études danubiennes, reçoit plusieurs subventions afin d'étudier sur le terrain le mouvement de la population dans le Sud-est européen⁵⁵.

A l'occasion de la restructuration de la Fondation de 1930, une direction nouvelle est envisagée, due en partie aux critiques de l'échec par rapport à l'objectif initial d'éradiquer les épidémies et sauver l'humanité. La Division of Natural Sciences and Agriculture sera consacrée aux recherches de haut niveau en sciences de la vie⁵⁶. L'investissement dans ce domaine en Roumanie ne peut pas être une affaire de longue durée et n'a jamais été une priorité. Car, pour une telle recherche, le sérieux, la complexité des connaissances, la capacité intellectuelle d'un individu ne lui servent à rien sans un milieu académique stimulant et délivré des contraintes matérielles. Ce sont les conclusions qu'ils tirent à la suite d'une expérience avec un jeune assistant du Laboratoire d'anatomie et embryologie de Iasi, Gregor Popa, dont les hautes recommandations venues de Cambridge ne seront jamais suffisantes pour lui valoir l'appui de la Fondation, qui reconnaît malgré tout son projet comme original. Mais il y a d'autres tentatives d'aide aux anciens boursiers, comme celles concernant les recherches de Nicolae Gavrilescu et d'Eugen Chirnoaga à l'Institut de Physiologie de l'Université de Bucarest remontant à \$500 pour le dernier et à \$2.731 pour le premier⁵⁷. Ces subventions semblent avoir plutôt une valeur symbolique et ne s'inscrivent en aucun projet suivi. D'ailleurs, les demandes de support à la recherche envoyées par des professeurs des universités de deux centres urbains régionaux intégrés à la Roumanie après 1918, Cernauti et Chisinau, ne retiennent point l'attention des officiers.

Nous avons laissé à la fin les deux campagnes de recherche épidémique réalisées dans la région de Iasi avec le support de la Fondation Rockefeller dans le cadre du programme 'Research Project on the Control and Investigations of Specific Diseases'. La première (1931-1932) est menée par les professeurs de Iasi avec la collaboration financière et technique de la Fondation en vue de l'installation d'un centre pour l'Etude

du Paludisme auprès de l'Hôpital Socola : pour ce projet, sont expédiés \$7.800⁵⁸.

La deuxième, dirigée par un chercheur américain (Dr. Gordon entre 1935-1939), ensuite par un britannique (Dr. Jeanny, 1939-1940) et avec l'assistance d'une équipe de médecins et techniciens de Iasi, son objectif est premièrement scientifique : faire une étude comparée sur la fièvre jaune entre l'Amérique et l'Europe. Le choix du terrain d'observation aux environs de la ville de Iasi a été justifié par la diversité des manifestations de la maladie rapportées dans la région. Pour la partie des travaux dirigés par Dr. Gordon, sont dépensés \$20.000, et pour la deuxième sont prévus \$21.000, dont la distribution est interrompue en 1940 avec le retrait de Dr. Jeanny. De l'équipement utilisé pendant cette campagne, estimé à \$3.939, la Fondation a fait un don à l'Etat roumain, avant de se retirer complètement de la Roumanie⁵⁹.

C'est en ce sens que l'on peut dire, en épuisant la métaphore, que la Roumanie a été le dernier « cordon sanitaire » de l'Europe, alors qu'aucun des protagonistes ne s'y réfère plus depuis longtemps déjà en ces termes.

Le total des fonds dépensés par la Fondation Rockefeller en Roumanie dans l'intervalle 1923-1940

DOMAINE	INTERVALLE	FONDS
Public Health	1931-1940	\$146.420
Nursing	1929-1940	\$107.500
Social Sciences	1932-1940	\$52.200
Demographics	1930-1940	\$31.855
Medical Sciences	1923-1931	\$15.275,21
Epidemics	1931-1940	\$98.600
Natural Sciences	1930	\$3.281
TOTAL	1923-1940	\$455.131,21

L'emprise du national : formaliser, solidifier, traduire

La guerre n'a pas encore commencé en 1939, quand à Bucarest, Dimitrie Gusti surveille les dernières préparations pour le 20^e Congrès de Sociologie qui doit se tenir dans la capitale roumaine. Mais cela n'arrivera pas. Pour D. Gusti, c'est la gloire de son école et de sa méthode qui s'évanouissent, avec tout le travail réformateur de deux décennies qui ne seront plus jamais si près de la consécration internationale. L'une des preuves de l'engagement réformateur de Gusti et de ses collaborateurs, ce sont les quatre tomes de *l'Encyclopédie de la Nation*, publiés entre 1938-1940 à l'initiative de l'Institut Social Roumain, et censés témoigner du travail collectif d'une « nation » à sa propre « civilisation ».

On peut se demander si, dans l'économie des actions civilisatrices, la « nation » de Gusti n'est au fond ce groupement de réformateurs dont on a esquissé précédemment quelques traits, parfois élargie pour faire place aux enseignants et aux étudiants, ensuite un roi et une population rurale plutôt exotisée. Mais Gusti a lié son nom à de nombreuses institutions scientifiques et culturelles, à une « Loi du Service Social » (1939) et à l'Exposition de 1939 de New York en tant que commissaire du pavillon roumain. Il a été en fait le savant organisateur que la Fondation Rockefeller promouvait.

Mais le temps des réformateurs n'est plus : les réformes seront elles-mêmes réformées par les régimes politiques qui se succèderont. Ce sera le temps de la nationalisation des réformes : les réformateurs seront engagés dans un véritable travail de « traduction ». D. Gusti est le seul savant roumain que la Fondation Rockefeller a inscrit sur la liste du Refugee Scholar Program en lui offrant en 1941 un poste à New School for Sociology de New York et une aide pour le déplacement de \$5.000. Il n'en bénéficiera qu'en 1946-1947. Mais la guerre aura balayé tout ce qui faisait du système de Gusti un système tenant ensemble le réformisme à la roumaine. La Fondation ne lui offrira plus cette fois-ci qu'un *lecture tour* dans quatre des plus prestigieuses universités américaines (Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Wisconsin). Mesure de compensation et symbole d'une collaboration passée⁶⁰. Peu après son retour en Roumanie, il sera assigné au domicile obligatoire.

La Fondation Rockefeller se trouve sous contrôle fédéral depuis le début de la guerre. Ses relations avec les Roumains ne seront jamais reprises. Elle sera l'un des acteurs d'une entreprise toute différente pour

ce qui est des relations politiques et culturelles transatlantiques post 1945, le Plan Marshall, dont la Roumanie ne bénéficiera pas.

Si Gusti a été le théoricien des réformes et celui qui a su regrouper les réformateurs, Sabin Manuila en a été le technicien. Sa trajectoire est également instructive pour l'épilogue de cette période de grands projets. Il continuera son travail à l'Institut Central de Statistique et organisera une deuxième campagne de recensement de la population en 1941⁶¹. En 1946, il est dans le Secrétariat d'Etat chargé de l'organisation des statistiques. Vite écarté de ce poste, il parvient à s'échapper clandestinement vers les Etats-Unis. Il travaillera comme collaborateur auprès du Census Bureau à Washington sur des projets concernant les pays de l'Est et sera actif dans les ainsi-dites organisations d'exile⁶².

S'il est légitime de soulever la question de ce qui a été « construit » dans cette période de négociations-collaborations avec la Fondation Rockefeller, il est tout aussi légitime de soulever le doute quant à la possibilité d'y répondre par un raisonnement *input/output*. Nous pouvons, en revanche, suggérer une réponse partielle. Il n'y a pas de doute que les réformateurs ont réussi à solidifier, à normaliser, à traduire⁶³ des entités de la réalité à travers des théories scientifiques, des techniques réformatrices et des méthodes civilisatrices. Il n'y a pas de doute qu'une fois vidées du contenu provisoire, le durcissement, la normalisation et la traduction se sont poursuivies de plus belle, et se poursuivent encore. Mais, afin de rendre compte de ce processus, il faudra pousser l'enquête encore plus loin.

NOTES

- 1 La revue *Archives pour la science et la réforme sociale* paraît régulièrement entre 1919 et 1943, avec un intervalle d'interruption de 1939 à 1943.
- 2 Frédéric Le Play (1806-1882) est un sociologue français d'orientation catholique connu pour avoir construit la méthode monographique dans le cadre d'un vaste projet d'étude auprès des ouvriers européens : de l'Espagne à la Russie, de Norvège en Bulgarie en passant par l'Allemagne, l'Autriche et la Hongrie, 12 pays sont à la base des *Ouvriers européens*, ouvrage publié en 1855 où 36 familles ouvrières se trouvent analysées. Françoise ARNAULT, *Frédéric Le Play. De la métallurgie à la science sociale*, Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1993.
- 3 Aux Etats-Unis, entre 1903-1930, c'est l'ère progressiste des *reformers* et des *muckrakers*, la monographie est appliquée dans des *social surveys* des grandes villes ; en Angleterre, c'est le mouvement des *university settlements* ; et en France, les enquêteurs du Musée social. Antoine SAVOYE, *Les débuts de la sociologie empirique : études socio-historiques, 1830-1930*, Paris, Méridiens Klincksieck, 1994.
- 4 Bernard KALAORA et Antoine SAVOYE, *Les inventeurs oubliés. Le Play et ses continuateurs aux origines des sciences sociales*, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 1989.
- 5 Christian TOPALOV (dir.), *Les laboratoires du nouveau siècle : la nébuleuse réformatrice et ses réseaux en France, 1880-1914*, Paris EHESS, 1999.
- 6 Christian TOPALOV, *op cit.*
- 7 Zoltan ROSTAS, *Sala luminoasa. Primii monografisti ai scolii gustiene*, Bucarest, Paideia, 2003 ; *Monografia ca utopie. Interviuuri cu Henri H. Stahl*, Bucarest, Paideia, 2000.
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- 13 DANIC, 614 Sabin MANUILA, I. Corespondenta personala.
- 14 « Viata politica, 1919-1940 », Keith HICHINS, *op.cit.*
- 15 DANIC, 614 Sabin MANUILA, I. Corespondenta personala, Sabin Manuila à Veturia Manuila, 1926.
- 16 « Modele de dezvoltare », Keith HICHINS, *Romania, 1866-1947, op. cit.*

- 17 Lion MURARD, Patrick ZYLBERMAN, « La Mission Rockefeller en France et la création du Comité National de Défense contre la Tuberculose (1917-1932) », *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, XXIV, avril-juin, 1987, pp. 257-281 ; 'Seeds for French Care : Did the Rockefeller Foundation plant the Seeds between the Two World Wars ?', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, 31, 3, 2000, pp. 463-475.
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- 22 John FARLEY, *To Cast Out Disease. A History of the International Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913-1951)*, Oxford University Press, 2004.
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- 24 Ilana LOWY, Patrick ZYLBERMAN, 'Medicine as a Social Instrument : Rockefeller Foundation, 1913-45', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, 31, 3, 2000, pp. 365-379.
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