

ALL NEW!

**Murder
aboard
ship**
page 8



Sentry

For the Navy
Security community
Vol. 1 No. 5 Spring/Summer 1988

**NIMITZ, NIS
host local
police**



inside: New Departments

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From the editor:

Since our last issue, I have received numerous phone calls and letters from people in the fleet, asking, "When are we going to see the next *Sentry*?" As most of you probably already know, budgetary constraints held up this issue. Hopefully, now that the new fiscal year is just around the corner, we will be back on schedule.

You will notice a lot of new departments starting in this edition, such as **Legal Issues, Information & Personnel Security**, and a much requested **Reserve News** section. These new sections are representative of *Sentry's* expanded mission of addressing all aspects of security, rather than just physical security and law enforcement. With this new mission comes a new and larger audience. *Sentry* is now also being mailed to all Security Managers and other personnel who were on the distribution for the *Information and Personnel Security Newsletter*, which was absorbed into *Sentry*.

I would like to thank all of those people in the fleet who have taken the time to submit articles and photographs to *Sentry*. But I would also like to ask a favor. Please send **ACTION** photos, not static, posed shots. Also, black & white prints are preferable to color -- please no Polaroid or other 'instant' photos!

Submit articles and photos to **Sentry Editor, Naval Security & Investigative Command, Code 24J, Washington, DC 20388-5000**. Articles, photos and other material for publication *must* be released by your commanding officer, public affairs officer or other releasing authority.

Sentry, the newspaper of the Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC), is an authorized publication for all Navy and Marine Corps personnel involved in law enforcement and security, issued quarterly from NSIC Headquarters. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the government of the United States, the Department of Defense, nor the Department of the Navy. Reference to regulations, orders and directives is for information only and does not by publication herein constitute authority for action. Original articles, information and photographs may be submitted to *Sentry* Editor, Naval Security & Investigative Command Headquarters, Code 24J, Washington, DC 20388-5000. Autovon: 293-3490; commercial: (301) 763-3490.

Commander, Naval Security & Investigative Command
 Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, USN, JAGC
 Deputy Commander, Naval Security & Investigative Command
 Col. Wayne A. Coomes, USMC
 Director, Naval Investigative Service
 J. Brian McKee
 Director, Law Enforcement & Physical Security Programs
 James A. O'Hara
Sentry Editor
 JO2 John S. Verrico, USN

From the Commander:

Doing more with less

Budgetary constraints are hitting everywhere. Almost everyone of us has begun to feel the effects of having fewer and fewer resources to work with.

Yet our work requirements have not decreased proportionately. On the contrary, they have continued to increase, and we are finding ourselves having to do more with less. That means that we have to find new and better ways of utilizing limited resources.

This doesn't just apply to personnel in managerial positions or those who make command decisions on resource allocation, it applies to every one of us -- every sailor, every Marine and every civilian employee! We all have to tighten our belts and make what we have go further.

You may say, "What can I do to stretch Navy dollars? I'm just an MA2 -- the bottom of my local totem pole. I can't make command decisions?" But you can! What you do can provide the greatest assistance to the overall picture of your command and the Navy. Even such simple things as taking proper care of your leather gear -- making it last. This alone could save valuable dollars in terms of replacement costs.

You can help ensure that proper periodic maintenance is performed on security department vehicles. This will make our cars and trucks last longer and help avoid expensive repairs, not to mention how much it would cost to buy new ones.

There are many things you, as an individual, can do that will help if

you just set your mind to it. Accept the personal responsibility of budgeting resources, and take action. Do your part.

Most of all, don't be afraid to make suggestions. If you have a good idea to help your department save money, speak up. Any practical idea would be welcome.

NSIC, as well as many other commands, is currently undergoing some major reorganization at the headquarters level in an effort to better allocate resources. One small example of this effort is evident in the changes to this newspaper.

A short time ago, the Information and Personnel Security Directorate of the Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC), published a quarterly newsletter for security managers Navy-wide. The *Information and Personnel Security Newsletter* focused primarily on matters of information and personnel security, with some articles on security clearance adjudication. NSIC also put out another publication, *Sentry*, which was issued from the Law Enforcement and Physical Security Programs Directorate. This was primarily a physical security and law enforcement publication and was directed toward security officers, Masters-at-Arms, and other law enforcement and physical security personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Although the many aspects of security are viewed as individual subjects, all of them are closely re-



Rear Adm. John E. Gordon

lated. At times they almost seem interchangeable. Articles on physical security may have information security impact, and could be of use to security managers. On the other hand, personnel security articles can contain information of importance to law enforcement personnel. Seeing this relationship, we decided to provide information from both sides of the house to both audiences. Keeping two separate publications was not cost-effective. So, the *Information and Personnel Security Newsletter*, as a separate entity, no longer exists. But the information that was in it has been incorporated into *Sentry*, and distribution was expanded to include the security manager audience.

By combining these two publications we can get more information out to more people -- and we can do it for less.

That's doing more with less!

Let's all do our share and help conserve the Navy's valuable resources.

NSIC gets new Deputy Commander

Marine Corps Col. Wayne A. Coomes, 51, recently took over as Deputy Commander, Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC). The colonel comes to NSIC from his last assignment as Head, Intelligence Management Branch, Intelligence Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, and brings over 28 years of experience to the command.

A native of Evansville, Indiana, Col. Coomes served two tours in the Republic of Vietnam during the war. His first tour, in 1965, included service as commanding officer of Company "B", 3d Tank Battalion. In 1969, he returned to Vietnam to serve as an Intelligence Analyst with the Military Assistance Command.

Col. Coomes is a 1980 graduate of the Naval War College. He has also completed several other courses, including the Armed Forces Air Intelligence Officer Course.

Among numerous unit and service awards, the colonel's personal decorations include the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V", the Meritorious Service Medal, the Joint Service Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V", and the Combat Action Ribbon. ★



Col. Wayne A. Coomes
Deputy Commander
Naval Security & Investigative Command

Naval Security Force resource management

'38 or .45 -- not both!'

by Lawrence N. Welch
NSIC Physical Security Specialist

Whoever coined that time-worn phrase, "it's not how much you have, but how you use it that really counts," probably was a very successful resource manager.

The new firearms training initiatives have proven to be quite expensive, considering the cost of ammunition and weapons, and, in terms of training manhours.

Through a series of communications, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) issued the policy that Navy Security Force members would qualify with either the .45 caliber pistol or .38 caliber revolver, not both!

By limiting shooters to qualifications with the handgun they would actually be using on duty, analysts

were applying a practical management approach to conserve small arms ammunition, save thousands of training man-hours, and limit wear and tear on weapons.

Conserving valuable resources becomes more critical as the Navy makes painful fiscal readjustments due to budget reductions.

Planners on the CNO and Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC) staffs continue to seek reasonable, more cost-efficient alternatives to the high cost of developing firearms proficiency. Mobile ranges are already becoming a reality in some locales to reduce the exorbitant costs of upgrading permanent facilities, and firearms simulators continue to be examined as long-term money-saving alternatives.

In the meantime, small arms ammunition and the needed dollars to acquire additional supplies are limited.

The Navy Security Force has to make the best use of resources available. That means qualification with the duty weapon only! Either the .45 or the .38 -- not both! ★

Policy documents on NSF Firearms Proficiency

CNO WASHINGTON DC 161901Z DEC 86 (Subj: Navy Security Forces)

CNO WASHINGTON DC 281832Z JAN 87 (Subj: Request for Navy Security Force Information)

CNO WASHINGTON DCLTR SER 09N/266-87 OF 10 JUL 88 (Subj: Navy Security Force Firearms Proficiency)

CNO WASHINGTON DC 192054Z APR 88 (Subj: Navy Security Force Firearms Proficiency)

MA1 convicted of espionage


by JO2 John S. Verrico
NSIC Public Affairs Assistant

On 22 January 1988, a military judge found Master-at-Arms First Class Wildredo Garcia guilty of espionage.

This verdict was the conclusion of a two-year joint investigation by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

In late 1985, NIS and FBI officials received information that a civilian businessman in Vallejo, California was attempting to sell classified Navy documents to representatives of a foreign government. The investigation disclosed that these documents were stolen from the nearby Mare Island Naval Shipyard, and that the civilian had acquired them from a then-unknown source at the shipyard.

An FBI cooperating witness identified Garcia as the Mare Island source.



The documents stolen by Garcia, dealing with submarine activities and classified "CONFIDENTIAL," were sold to the civilian for \$800.00 and a promise of more money after they were resold to a foreign government. Available evidence suggests the final destination of the information could have been an East-Bloc country.

The documents were intercepted and NIS believes that all of them were recovered before they could reach their destination.

Garcia was convicted of nine out of 13 specifications, including two for espionage and one for conspiracy to commit espionage, larceny, conspiracy to commit larceny, sale of government property and violations of military regulations. He was sentenced on the same day to 12 years confinement, reduction to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. ★

**We will never apprehend a worse offender
than one of our own gone bad.**



In the Spotlight...

Ens. Gary L. Caldwell

'Don't sell yourself short'

by JO2 John S. Verrico
NSIC Public Affairs Assistant

Former Chief Master-at-Arms Gary L. Caldwell was commissioned to the rank of ensign on 1 September 1988 while serving as the Master-at-Arms Rating Advisory Assistant at Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC) Headquarters, Washington, DC.

Retired Army Col. Noel E. Craun, Jr., (Caldwell's father-in-law) performed the ceremony commissioning his daughter's husband into the Navy Limited Duty Officer (LDO) community.


Marine Corps Col. Wayne A. Coomes, NSIC's Deputy Commander, provided the opening and closing remarks at the ceremony, reminding all of the attendees that, although the ceremony was indeed a celebration, there was a serious side to the occasion that should be forefront in their minds.

"With trust and confidence..." the colonel quoted from the promotion citation. "This means that we trust this individual with our lives...and that we have the confidence in him, that when our attention is on something else, he will get the job done," he said.

"You don't know real commitment until you're on the battlefield with your friends -- and see them die. You must continue your mission. That's commitment. That's the kind of commitment this young man makes as he takes the oath of commission today," Coomes added.

Caldwell's first assignment as an LDO will be Officer-in-Charge, Security Department, Naval Air Station Keflavik, Iceland. Caldwell will attend LDO/CWO Indoctrination at Naval Air Station Pensacola prior to reporting to Iceland.

One of Caldwell's co-workers took his old uniform out of mothballs to present a special certificate from the Navy Chief Petty Officer community to the new ensign.



Ens. Gary L. Caldwell receives his shoulder boards from wife, Debbie, and father-in-law, Col. Noel E. Craun, Jr. U.S. Army-Ret.. The colonel is formerly a Second Class Boatswain's Mate, who served as a Master-at-Arms aboard the battleship USS NORTH CAROLINA after WWII. (Photo by JO2 John S. Verrico, NSIC)

Retired Master Chief Master-at-Arms Joseph M. Radigan then rendered the first salute to the officer. The certificate cited Caldwell's continuing affiliation with the fraternity of chief petty officers.

"It was a hard decision whether or not to apply for the LDO program," Caldwell said. "I wasn't sure whether or not I wanted to give up being 'the Chief,'" he added glancing at Radigan. Along with Caldwell's commission as ensign, he was concurrently promoted to Senior Chief Petty Officer.

Lt. Paul D. Norris, commanding officer of NSIC's staff enlisted personnel and an LDO himself, affected the promotion to E-8. In 1982, then First Class Master-at-Arms Caldwell worked for then Senior Chief Master-at-Arms Norris aboard USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62). Norris reminisced about the time he had recommended the LDO program to one of his better first class petty officers. Caldwell had told him that his first goal was to make 'chief.'

"Well, he did that," Norris said, adding that he was especially happy to be part of the ceremony.

Caldwell addressed NSIC's staff enlisted personnel toward the end of the ceremony. "When I first came in the Navy...I'd never dreamed of being an ensign. Don't sell yourself short! The first four years (of service) aren't always easy, but they're not all there is. There is always someone there to pick you up, to help you out." ★

July 1988

Selection board results

Congratulations to the following personnel who were selected for conversion to the Master-at-Arms (MA) rating by the July 1988 Conversion Selection Board.

Kevin R. Altman	Richard T. Andreyo	Gaylord Anliker
Greg D. Barrett	Edward E. Bartel	Richard A. Beers
Keith A. Bennett	Sandy F. Berry	Alvin Buckner
William C. Buie	David P. Coughlin	Barbara J. Davis
Charles W. Davis	Leonard Davis	Richard G. Day
Michael N. Dunn	Steven W. Eskridge	Roberto Garcia
Ruth A. Garn	David L. Gilbert	Bruce A. Gonseth
Patti J. Gonzales	Eric L. Gooch	Nathaniel P. Green
Toney E. Griffin	Marvin D. Hanson	Donald L. Hardin
Wendy A. Hare	Karen S. Holley	Ramon Jones
Michael D. Keller	Larry D. Kennedy	Brian M. Kramer
Jamie Kwiatkowski	Russell J. Ledford	Shannon L. Lovejoy
Vickie L. Lucas	Michael W. McCain	Robert W. McMahon
Kurt A. Millbaugh	Donna Morton	Alan L. Murawske
Domingo Ortiz	Louise C. Parker	Glenn E. Semar
Joyce L. Smith	David A. Spain	Christine M. Spence
Michael R. Stanton	Greg A. Stover	Rebecca D. Stowers
Paul J. Sturm	Curtis M. Thompson	McArthur Wallace
Adam G. Zaborowski		

LDO /CWO Selection Board January 1988

Congratulations to the following personnel who were selected to be commissioned as Physical Security (649) Limited Duty Officers (LDOs) by the January 1988 LDO Selection Board.

James Apling	James Covell	Douglas Duplayer
Mark Hammargren	Barbara Kaper	Daniel Kisich
Patricia Loonam	Michael Reid	Richard Robishaw
Thomas Wilkes		

Congratulations to the following personnel who were selected to be commissioned as Physical Security Technicians (749) Chief Warrant Officers (CWOs) by the January 1988 CWO Selection Board.

Enos Brents	John Chase	Michael Clancy
James Fields	Cynthia Frisch	Danny Futrell
James Grimes	William Holmes	John Paul Long

Tips from the sponsor

by MA1 Thil Hurley
Advisory Assistant for MA Programs

Opportunities for conversion to the Master-at-Arms rating are excellent and the long range outlook continues to be good. Competition for selection; however, is becoming more intense. Prospective applicants and rated MAs should keep the following in mind.

Some areas in which candidates are graded include potential, initiative, experience, education and administration.

The two most important indications of a candidate's desire to succeed are the individual's potential, determined by career preparation, and initiative. Substantial points are awarded to candidates who possess these traits. Candidates can show these by completing law enforcement oriented courses, obtaining field experience in MA-related duties, and through formal or in-service training in the law enforcement community.

Education of any type also shows initiative and potential. College study is desirable, particularly in the law enforcement area, and those possessing certificates or degrees will have an edge in this category. Technical training in law enforcement is also valuable.

The application's neatness, completeness, and adherence to OPNAV-INST 1440.1 indicate a candidate's organizational, administrative, and communications skills. These cannot be over-emphasized. Points for administrative abilities can be a determining factor.

Rated MAs in the fleet need to be aware of their obligation to review and screen potential candidates. MA sponsors must take a greater interest in the screening process.

Remember, the candidate you sponsor may one day be your partner. ★

Murder & Robbery aboard ship

What does the Master-at-Arms do?

by JO2 John S. Verrico
NSIC Public Affairs Assistant

On 13 July, a General Court Martial found Electronics Warfare Technician First Class Ruben Colon guilty of felony murder, robbery and kidnapping. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, reduced in rate to E-1, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and awarded a Dishonorable Discharge on 14 July.

The conviction was the result of a Naval Investigative Service (NIS) investigation surrounding the murder of a Navy officer and the robbery of a large amount of cash aboard the USS

JOHN HANCOCK (DD-981).

At about 0745 on 15 March 1988, a Second Class Disbursing Clerk went into his office on the SPRU-ANCE-class destroyer, to begin preparations for the crew's payday.

He found the safe ajar. Nearly \$95,000 of the crew's payroll and more than 2,500 blank U.S. Treasury checks were missing from the ship's safe -- and he could not locate the ship's Disbursing Officer. The Executive Officer was notified and he secured the ship's brow to prevent anyone from leaving or coming aboard.


Within five minutes of the discovery, the command master-at-arms,

Senior Chief Master-at-Arms Larry H. Walton, had secured the Disbursing Office area and posted a duty master-at-arms in front of the door with orders that no one was to enter nor touch the door. Walton mustered the remaining Master-at-Arms Force by 0800, apprised them of the situation and initiated a search throughout the ship for the money and missing officer, instructing them that nothing was to be touched.

At 0840, the ship's company was called to quarters and the crew was informed of the situation. Because the ship was in its homeport, NIS



USS JOHN HANCOCK (DD-981) -- A crewmember was convicted of murdering the disbursing officer and stealing nearly \$95,000 in cash and more than 2,500 blank U.S. Treasury checks. The shipboard MA played a key role in securing the crime scene areas and organizing a search for the missing money and disbursing officer, before turning the investigation over the Naval Investigative Service agents. (U.S. Navy photo)



Lt. j.g. Ratish Prasad
Murdered disbursing officer

was notified at their local Resident Agency (NISRA) office in Mayport. NIS Special Agents came aboard HANCOCK shortly afterward and assumed the investigation.

A little after 0900, Walton, accompanied by the command master chief and the career counselor, located the missing disbursing officer. He was in the ship's Seabag Locker. His hands and feet were tied, a clove-hitch knot was around his neck, and there was a "large quantity of blood on the deck inside the locker." He secured the area and NIS agents arrived at the locker in less than two minutes. Later, it was determined that the officer had been shot in the head -- a contact gunshot wound.

Lt. j.g. Ratish Prasad, a 24-year-old Navy officer from Park Forest, Ill., had been murdered.

Here it was. A shipboard MA's dreaded nightmare. Major crimes committed aboard a Navy ship. No witnesses. No murder weapon, nor any other evidence.

But Walton, who has since transferred to USS SANTA BARBARA (AE-28), handled the situation well and did just what he was supposed to do. He secured the crime scene areas, notified NIS, and assisted with searches for clues and evidence. With agents already on board, his task was made much easier.

NIS assumed the investigation and immediately began processing the crime scenes and gathering what little evidence they had. They checked for fingerprints at both sites, conducted a blood analysis

and collected the cords that bound the victim and a .38 caliber bullet (which was found lodged in a piece of luggage marking the Seabag Locker as the murder site).

"It was a very successful investigation," said Charles W. Strickland, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of NISRA Mayport, "especially considering that we had so little to work with in the beginning, as far as evidence was concerned."

Agents from NISRA Jacksonville, Orlando, Cecil Field and Kings Bay were called to assist in the investigation and the intensive questioning and interviewing of the destroyer's nearly 350-man crew.

"Everyone was interviewed at least two or three times," a case reviewer at NIS headquarters in Washington, DC, noted.

The investigation continued for nearly a month as the agents produced a list of suspects and began putting the pieces of the puzzle together. More than 40 agents of the NIS were in-

volved in the investigation which included the interviews, evidence processing, aerial surveillance of the suspects and the alerting of local banks.

"(The investigation) was an extraordinary coming together of a lot of people, both inside and outside of the NIS organization," Strickland said. "It was a tremendous effort by everyone involved."

Strickland added that the ship's master-at-arms helped quite a bit in that "he ensured that crime scenes were properly secured and that nothing had been contaminated. He did his job well."

On 12 April 1988, using a federal search warrant based partly on a tip from a local bank official, NIS agents discovered \$87,250.00 and 2,575 blank U.S. Treasury checks in a safe deposit box in nearby Jacksonville, Florida. That safe deposit box was rented to Colon, a 35-year-old HANCOCK crewmember from Vega Baja, Puerto Rico.

Colon, an assistant to HANCOCK's career counselor, was arrested later that day onboard the ship and charged with strangling and fatally shooting the disbursing officer.

The destroyer got underway for the Persian Gulf in early May. A Navy spokesman at Mayport said the captain and crew were keeping their minds on their deployment, rather than reflecting on the murder of their shipmate. "I think it's true for all the people I talked to on the ship. They're hoping to put this behind them as quickly as they can," he said.

David L. Brant, Special Agent in Charge of NISRA Mayport summed up the success of the investigation by saying it was "the result of a lot of hard work by many people." ★

Army and Navy working together

by Lt.j.g. Jim Jolliff
Public Affairs Officer, NAS Fallon

The key to the Navy's physical security/law enforcement programs is intensified training. Recently, the Security Detachment at Naval Air Station Fallon joined forces with the Nevada Army National Guard to accomplish this intense training.

Using the principle that "another set of eyes is helpful in spotting weak areas," members of both services agreed that the joint venture improved their individual readiness in responding to and handling crisis situations.

The 72nd Military Police (MP) Company of the Nevada Army National Guard considered the training exercises to be of great benefit for them. The training did not disrupt the local population and authorities as it had done before the joint training exercises, when the MPs had to train in the public domain.

Army Capt. Ken Miller, Commander of the MP unit, said, "We're

learning and training with our Navy counterparts and it's been very good. Training with the Navy has been a real pleasure and we look forward to exercises planned throughout the remainder of the year."

The program was initiated and is currently headed by Master-At-Arms First Class Meldon L. Mitstifer, NAS Security Detachment's Training Officer. "Enthusiasm and morale is at an all time high during the exercises," he said. "Hands-on training is much more enjoyable than sitting in a classroom."

Chief Boatswain's Mate Douglas Conklin, Operations Division Officer for the Security Detachment, agreed that the training has been a great help for all involved. "Both entities are learning from each other. The National Guard has some good points to put out to our personnel and vice-versa," he said.

During the February 1988 exercises, Guardsmen and Navy security personnel responded to three separate crisis situation scenarios: a felony vehicle stop on a remote road on the

base, a domestic disturbance at the base theater, and a hostage situation in one of the barracks. Members rotated responsibilities from one scenario to another. After each incident, participants were evaluated on their effectiveness in handling the particular situation which was followed by a question and answer period.

The next step in the training plan was to integrate the Auxiliary Security Force with the permanent security force for a simulated Threat Condition (THREATCON) Exercise. The Army National Guard did not participate in this exercise in order to add to the realism of the threat. If an advanced THREATCON was to occur, the National Guard would be mobilized elsewhere, and NAS Fallon's security forces would have to handle the situation on their own. During this part of the training, "unfriendly" forces attempted to get inside the target installation and cause a simulated disruption. The disruption could have been anything from tying a ribbon on an aircraft to placing a flag on an installation building, so the security forces had to really be prepared. The purpose of the exercise was to dig out weak areas where the situation could be handled better.

As a result of the level of cooperation which has been achieved between the different organizations, the Nevada Army National Guard is planning to assist NAS Fallon's Security Detachment with security during the performance of the Navy's precision flying team, Blue Angels, scheduled for October 1988.

The training being accomplished now is better preparing both the Army and Navy for the future. Joint efforts today will ensure better security for everyone tomorrow. ★



Sailors and soldiers train together in a joint exercise felony arrest. (U.S. Navy photo)

NAS Willow Grove

ASF Training Underway

by Joseph K. Heil
Asst. Command Security Officer
NAS Willow Grove

An article appeared in the Summer 1987 edition of *Sentry*, entitled "Auxiliary Security Forces - Who are they?" Well, ask Willow Grove!

Naval Air Station Willow Grove is currently training its own Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) using instructors from the Security Department, Navy Medical Department and the U.S. Army.

Naval Air Station Willow Grove's Commanding Officer, Capt. James Shapard opened the new program by welcoming the selectees and expressing his appreciation for their concern and interest in the program.

A 61-person ASF, consisting of a chief petty officer as the platoon leader and four 15-man squads, has been assigned to Security Operations. This will permit full manning of the vehicle patrols and stationary posts required in Threat Condition DELTA.

Each squad also has a chief assigned as a squad leader. All are volunteers and assigned to ASF as collateral duty.

Some of the training subjects covered included: Security Organization, Radio Communications, Jurisdiction and Authority, Rule of Evidence, Use of Deadly Force, Emergency Medical and Trauma Treatment, Hostage and Barricade Situ-


ations and Bomb Threats. The trainees also received Field training in Civil Disturbances and Crowd/Mob Psychology and Control.

This training was provided by StaffSgt. W. Robert White, U.S. Army Special Forces, attached to the 157th Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) Willow Grove, Pa.

The program will also include firearm proficiency and other training as necessary and required to perform

their assigned duties in a professional manner.

At the conclusion of the training session, the selectees listened to the comments of Cmdr. P.L. Zeimer, the air station's Executive Officer, who also presented certificates to those who satisfactorily completed their training. ★



Members of the NAS Willow Grove Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) undergoing a classroom training session. (Photo by Joseph K. Heil, NAS Willow Grove)

Auxiliary Security Forces -- defined

by Donald B. Cotton
NSIC Anti-Terrorism Doctrine & Tactics Policy Branch

A 15 July 1986 CNO memo stated: "With the exception of Marine Corps Security Forces (MCSF), Navy security forces are inadequate to deter or defeat the known capability of terrorist groups. Augmenting and restructuring each element of the Navy security force is necessary to achieve a force capable of providing day-to-day security and law enforcement, as well as anti-terrorism deterrence and response."

Since that day, security departments Navy-wide have been consolidated and reorganized; handguns and shotguns issued; thousands of rounds of ammunition expended for training; and Marine Cadres, Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teams (FAST) and Auxiliary Security Forces (ASF) have

been established.

A major component in achieving the Navy's goal to deter and defeat the terrorist threat is the ASF. The ASF, described in ALNAV 011/87 and SECNAVINST 5530.4A (Naval Security Forces Ashore and Afloat), is composed of active duty Naval personnel who serve on an additional or collateral duty basis for a minimum of 18 months. Host commands are responsible for organizing, equipping and training the ASF, while tenant commands provide the personnel, as necessary. Many commands have made commendable progress in developing their ASF.

In order to accomplish their mission, security personnel must be given three basic elements:

- * Training to do the job
- * Opportunity to do the job
- * Command support when they do the job

Undoubtedly one of the largest areas of concern has been training. CNO WASHINGTON DC 101847Z DEC 87 prescribed minimum standards for ASF training and divided responsibilities between the Marine Cadres/Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (MCSFBN) Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and security departments.

Marine Cadres, to be assigned to approximately 85 Navy installations, and MCSFBN MTTs to be deployed to installations where no cadre is assigned, provide training in their designated subject areas because of their expertise gained in previous assignments or the intensive six-week training program conducted by MCSFBNs at Norfolk and Mare Island. This group of subjects deals mainly with small arms training, unarmed self-defense, anti-terrorism and physical training. The second part of the training, dealing primarily with the requirements of the Physical Security and Loss Prevention Manual (OPNAVINST 5530.14A) is taught by the security department personnel because of their familiarity with the subject matter and experience.

Numerous questions regarding the various facets of the ASF program have been repeatedly asked. The "Top Ten" questions are listed here. Major claimant security officers should be able to answer any additional questions your command or installation security department may have. ★

ASF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Marine Cadre/MTT will instruct:

Topic	Hours of Instruction
Weapons (pistol/revolver/shotgun) - safety/proficiency	40 hrs
Use of Force	2 hrs
Physical Training	Daily
Unarmed self defense	4 hrs
Security Watchstanding (Interior Guard)	1 hr
Search Techniques	4 hrs
Communications	1 hr
Individual Tactics - cover/concealment/movement	2 hrs
Anti-Terrorism Awareness	3 hrs

Security Department will instruct:

Security Department organization	1 hr
Search & Seizure	1 hr
UCMJ	1 hr
Apprehension and Restraint	1 hr
Crowd Control	1 hr
Basic First Aid	2 hrs
Community Relations	1 hr
Crime Prevention	1 hr
Protection of Crime Scene	1 hr
Disaster & Emergency Plans	2 hrs

(Local assets such as the Naval Investigative Service, Medical, Navy Legal Service Office, Explosive Ordnance Detachment, etc., should be used as appropriate.)

"TOP TEN" QUESTIONS ON THE ASF

(1) **How large should the ASF be?** The size of an installation's ASF is necessarily left to the discretion of the installation commander. The guidelines are to determine the critical assets that must be protected during Threat Condition DELTA and size the ASF to man these posts for five days. The number of personnel should be based on the installation's defense concept, not a percentage of the base population. The installation's mission, location, normal security posture, number of critical assets, political climate, size, and population are all factors that will determine the size of the ASF. It may be 40 or 240.

(2) **When will the Marine Cadre arrive?** Filling cadre slots is an evolution that will take several more months. Pilot sites (Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, Naval Submarine Base New London, Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Fleet Training Center Dam Neck and Naval Air Station Oceana) received their cadres after the first cadre trainer's class graduated in June 1987. All assignments should be completed by the end of 1988.

(3) **What training will the cadre provide and to whom?** The cadre will be assigned to the security department to train the ASF and regular security force in all subject areas previously described, including physical training and small arms proficiency.

(4) **If my installation is not going to have a cadre assigned, how do we schedule the Mobile Training Team?** The MCSFBN MTT Atlantic or Pacific can be requested from the Fleet Commander through the chain of command. Commands not under a Fleet Commander should submit their requests through their major

claimant to CNO (OP-09N/NSIC-24).

(5) **What about assigning medical personnel to the ASF?** This question had some basis in existing Navy Regulations and was posed to the Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG). The JAG recognized the restrictions set forth in Article 0845 of Navy Regs which states that medical personnel "shall be detailed or permitted to perform only such duties...as are related to medical;" and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 which provides that medical personnel are entitled to special privileges only when they are "exclusively engaged in" medical activities. But he also cited Article 0736 of Navy Regs which states that "all commanding officers are required to protect and maintain the security of their command from attack, sabotage, and similar dangers." The JAG said that, although medical personnel are not to be assigned to the ASF to protect combat readiness assets, the bottom line is that "Maintenance of physical security is an integral part of the administration of any medical unit. Providing medical personnel, therefore, to protect a medical facility, its patients and personnel, is permitted under the Geneva Convention and Article 0845, and is consistent with the provisions of Article 0736, U.S. Navy Regulations, 1973."

(6) **What type weapons should be issued to the ASF?** ASF weapons will normally include the .45 caliber pistol or 12 gauge shotgun. A few installations may have a sufficient number of .38 caliber revolvers to arm the ASF, but they are exceptions. The installation's Weapons Allowance List should have been revised to allow 50% of the ASF to be armed with .45

caliber pistols and 20% to be armed with shotguns at any one time.

(7) **What is the ASF mission?** The "Auxiliary Security Force" is a group of active duty Naval personnel from host and tenant commands who are assigned on a collateral duty basis to augment regular security forces during any scheduled or unscheduled event that requires a security augmentation, such as heightened threat conditions, or during an open house or other command function. The ASF is neither a counter-terrorism unit nor a SWAT Team.

(8) **Can civilians be assigned to the ASF?** The interest and willingness of many Navy civilian employees to participate is commendable; however, based on a variety of legal issues "only active duty Navy personnel will be assigned to the ASF." Civilians will not be assigned to the ASF.

(9) **Is there a requirement for follow-on training after initial training is completed?** All armed security personnel will be required to fire quarterly small arms sustainment training courses. Additional refresher training is left to the discretion of the local commander; however, SECNAV-INST 5530.4A requires ASF personnel to train twice-a-month and exercise quarterly.

(10) **How does an installation get a cadre or MTT if the ASF (or security department) is not armed?** The answer is simple -- they don't! If there is a need for a person to be assigned law enforcement or security duties, whether fixed post or mobile patrol, then arming such forces should be considered. ★

LAW ENFORCEMENT

by Carlton A. King
NSIC Administrative Assistant for Crime Prevention Programs

Paperwork is perhaps the least desirable task performed in almost any career field. Law enforcement is no exception to this, but, completing the Incident Complaint Report (ICR), OPNAV Form 5527/1, is one of the most critical tasks that security police officers perform.

The ICR can be used as evidence in a major criminal prosecution or court martial. It can be linked with other reports to provide a criminal history of a person who might otherwise elude police detection. It provides a statistical

basis for staffing and equipment needs of the security department and aids in the analysis of crime patterns and trends. Incomplete or inaccurate reports can hinder any and all of the above.


In a recent review of over 4,000 ICRs, numerous recurring errors were noted that can and should be corrected at the installation level. The guidance for properly completing and submitting ICRs is provided in OPNAV-INST 5580.1, Navy Law Enforcement Manual, Chapter 3 (as well as Appendix A). Some of the problem areas included:

1. **DETAILS OF INCIDENT DO NOT SUPPORT THE OFFENSE CATEGORY** During the review this was one of

Paperwork nightmare Filling out the ICR

Sometimes it may seem as if you're drowning in paper...

...but when it's done right, paperwork can be a breeze.



the most common errors noted. Many property-damage or personal-injury traffic accidents were classified as 7T9 instead of 7T3. Larceny reports were mistakenly classified as burglary and vice versa.

2. ASSUMED BY NIS? Simply because NIS was notified does not mean that they assumed the investigation. This problem is especially sensitive since NIS investigations are entered into the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) separately. If block #17 of the ICR indicates that the investigation was assumed by NIS, the ICR received from the security department will not be entered into DCII in order to prevent duplicate investigation files. But if NIS did not actually assume the case, the incident may not get entered at all. After contact has been made with NIS, Base Investigations or any other entity noted in block #20 of the ICR, that appropriate block should be checked. In all cases, the name of the agent, investigator or other person who was contacted and the date and time of the notification should be noted in the narrative, block #17. Remember mere notification does not mean that the incident will be investigated by NIS. Block #11 should be checked "yes" only when the SAC or duty agent affirms that NIS will conduct a follow-up investigation.

3. DO WE USE FIRST PERSON VICE THIRD PERSON IN THE NARRATIVE? This question has been asked numerous times and, from an official written policy standpoint, there is no stated preference. Some security departments require third person narratives, i.e. "This patrol unit responded to barracks 1423 on a disturbance complaint. Upon arrival, this patrol unit observed..." Others require first person narratives, i.e. "I responded to barracks 1423 on a disturbance complaint. Upon arrival, I observed..." Both illustrations are correct and the Security Officer or Chief of Police should dictate local policy on first or third person narratives. In many cases, both may have to be used in order to clarify subjects named in the investigation. In a forthcoming revision to the Navy Law Enforcement Manual, the Naval Security and Investigative Command will standardize report writing procedures to require the third-person method.

4. WHERE, ON THE FIRST PAGE OF THE ICR, DO YOU RECORD THE DATE AND TIME OF THE ACTUAL EVENT? Blocks #12 and #13 are often used, due to their proximity to "Assumed by NIS", to record the time and date that NIS was contacted. This is incorrect. Appendix A to OPNAVINST 5580.1 directs you to use these blocks to indicate the time and date of the event being investigated.

5. USE OF REPORT FORMS OTHER THAN THE APPROVED INCIDENT COMPLAINT REPORT (OPNAVFORM 5527/1) - Admittedly, there may be some report forms that appear to be superior to the Navy's ICR. Different state, county and municipal jurisdictions' forms may be appealing but they are not authorized for Navy use. There are several Navy security police departments using civilian police or locally designed complaint and accident reports. This results in reports being received that are not compatible with the Navy's Uniform Crime Reporting System (UCRS).

6. TYPED NAME, RANK, TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL It is readily apparent that this section, Block 23, is one of the most overlooked areas of the ICR. Of the 4,000 reports reviewed, only two activities were noted as submitting superior quality reports. They were most notable because there was an obvious review process by the approving authority. SUBASE New London and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba should be recognized for the quality and professionalism displayed in their reports.

The Assistant Director for Law Enforcement, Naval Security and Investigative Command, made the following recommendations for security departments to enhance their crime reporting system.

— *Every security police department should exercise supervisory oversight for Incident Complaint Reports (ICRs) that leave the department.*

— *The department should develop a lesson plan for report writing and every member of the department should undergo initial training and, if needed, remedial training on the proper use of the incident complaint report and the accident report.*

— *The security officer, chief of police or a qualified designee should be tasked with the responsibility for conducting periodic (preferred weekly) inspection of reports.*

Although report writing may appear to be a burdensome task, it is an integral part of law enforcement. Reports not only relate what happened in a particular incident but, collectively, they reflect the quality and professionalism of the individual and the department submitting them. No matter how qualified and thorough a law enforcement officer may be, if he or she cannot effectively and accurately portray his or her investigative findings on an Incident Complaint Report the officer's efforts will be unnoticed and incomplete. ★

Police roles in fire safety

by Daniel J. Benny, M.A., C.P.P.
Director of Police, U.S. Navy Ships Parts Control Center
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

The role of the police officer is to protect both people and property in their community. While some departments may look at this as only providing protection against criminal activities, most progressive departments utilize police personnel as part of their total crime and loss prevention program. This may include fire safety responsibilities.



Fire safety duties may include assisting in evacuations and actual fire fighting during structure or vehicle fires. Unfortunately, sufficient fire safety training is not always provided. Training is usually limited to an oral review of evacuation procedures and a brief explanation of how fire equipment should be operated.

For the police officer to perform effectively in an emergency situation, this type of training is insufficient. In addition to an initial orientation, hands-on training should be conducted.

EVACUATION OF STRUCTURES

Some responsibilities of police officers during a fire emergency is to assist in the evacuation of the structure and securing the outer perimeter and fire line.

The best method for police officers to learn what is expected of them during an evacuation is to participate in



Training in the proper use of various types of firefighting equipment should be provided to all police officers, with an emphasis on firefighting safety.

fire drills conducted by local fire parties or departments. This not only gives valuable, practical experience to the officer should an emergency occur, but is an excellent tool in building community confidence in the police department.

FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT

Hands-on training in the use of all types of fire fighting equipment utilized in the community is essential. Through the cooperation of local fire departments or fire academics, police personnel can be given the opportunity to use various types of extinguishers and small diameter hoses, such as those that would be found on standpipes within or near buildings, to put out actual fires.

The police officer's role is only to contain the fire, if possible, until professional fire fighters arrive. Training must emphasize this fact and stress safety factors.

If a security or police department decides to use its personnel for these duties, it is their responsibility to provide adequate professional training which will allow the officers to perform their duties in a safe and effective manner. By using police officers as part of the total protection program, both lives and property can be saved when such an emergency occurs. ★

EVIDENCE SYSTEM

*It can
make your case
or break it*

by MAJ William J. Moriarity
LEPS Assistance Team, Pacific

Is the evidence custodian in your security department doing his job correctly?
Is the evidence custodian designated in writing?
Is evidence properly safeguarded?
Are the appropriate logs, forms and files being used and properly documented and maintained?

If you can answer "NO" to any of these questions, the evidence system at your command is not being properly maintained. This means that evidence could be ruled as inadmissible and if that happens, you might as well "Kiss your case good-bye."

So take a look at your evidence system to ensure that the requirements set forth in OPNAVINST 5580.1 (DON Law Enforcement Manual) are being met. If not, identify the problem areas and implement corrective actions needed to meet those requirements. Take the necessary steps to ensure that those standards are maintained.

IT'S IMPORTANT!

While conducting assist visits to various security departments, the Law Enforcement and Physical Security (LEPS) Assistance Team, Pacific, observed several major discrepancies in command evidence systems. The problem areas ranged from the lack of letters of designation to the use of non-approved evidence disposal methods. The following list includes several of the most common discrepancies that were noticed:



"I'm sorry, Joan. The evidence was ruled inadmissible. There was said to be a problem in the evidence system."

(a) *Primary/Alternate Evidence Custodians are not designated in writing by the commanding officer.*

(b) *Evidence/Property Custody Documents (OPNAV Form 5527/22) are not being properly filled out.*

(c) *Evidence Lockers/Rooms do not meet the minimum requirements for safeguarding evidence.*

(d) *Evidence is being improperly tagged, packaged and marked.*

(e) *Evidence Log and Evidence Files are not being properly recorded and maintained.*

(f) *Evidence Lockers/Rooms contain items not pertaining to the evidence system.*

(g) *Inventories of evidence are not being conducted and documented.*

(h) *Proper evidence disposal procedures are not being conducted and documented accordingly.*

These discrepancies are easy to correct if the guidelines set forth in OPNAVINST 5580.1, Chapter 17, Evidence Custody Procedures are followed.

Evidence is an important part of the job of law enforcement. Take a look at your evidence system and make sure you are collecting, documenting, storing, inventorying and disposing of evidence properly. Remember, evidence is important, "It can make or break your case." ★

Classification review going well

The Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) has issued the 1987 annual report to the President.

In the report, the ISOO director noted that military operations and exercises have significant effects on the classification of official information. In particular, Navy operations in the Persian Gulf have caused a significant increase in the number of reported Department of Defense (DoD) classification actions.

Reviews of information and personnel security programs and classified documents at DoD and Department of the Navy (DON) facilities yielded the following results:

- The document classification, downgrading and declassification program is working well. Some areas of concern, however, are the overuse of the indefinite duration of classification (OADR) and related overclassification.

- Agencies conducted 27,522 self-inspections, a marginal increase

over FY 1986. However, there was a 44% increase in the number of security discrepancies reported. Some of this increase can be attributed to heightened security awareness.

- The number of original classification authorities in the Executive Branch continued to decline to a record low of 6,721. The Navy, however, showed a slight increase. CNO(OP-09N) is now conducting a review of DoN original classification authorities to determine their need to have that authority.

- Among all executive branch agencies, DoD accounted for more than 70% of all classification decisions, with the CIA accounting for 22%.

- One percent of all original classification actions were at the TOP SECRET level, 51% at the Secret level and the remaining 48% at the Confidential level. (This statistic seems to indicate that we are not overclassifying at the TS level.)

ISOO produced an informa-

tion security program video which won the American Society for Industrial Security Distinguished Achievement Award for video competition. Information on obtaining copies is available at (800) 382-0080. Arrangements for reproducing this video locally can be made by calling the ISOO staff at Commercial: (202) 535-7251.



RANKIN Update

What is RANKIN? The Retrieval and Analysis of Navy Classified Information (RANKIN) project is an automated data base of security classification guides. A major overhaul of this data base was started in March 1987 and is still underway. Meanwhile, several new and revised directives relating to the RANKIN program have been completed or are nearing completion. The new Department of the Navy (DON) Space Programs security classification guide series (OPNAVINST 5513.14) has been approved by CNO (OP-09N) and has been distributed. The series contains guidance on Space-Based Radar (SBR) and the Navy Remote Ocean Sensing System (NROSS).

Revision "C" to OPNAVINST 5513.4 series, DON security classification guidance for General Intelligence, Cover and Deception, Security and Investigative Programs, has been signed and will soon be distributed.

Notable additions to the series include guidance for the Department of Defense (DoD) Counterintelligence Program and the DoD Locks, Safes, Vaults, Containers, and Seals Program.

Additional copies of DoD 5200.1-I, the DoD Index of Security Classification Guides, are available. This index is useful to program managers to determine whether guidance exists that may be relevant and adaptable to their classification programs, plans, and projects and, if such guidance exists, where to find it. Use of the Index is helpful to avoid divergent security classification determinations between components over like information.

If you need assistance regarding DON classification guidance, or would like a copy of the DoD Index, contact the RANKIN Program Manager, Ron Marshall, at Commercial: (301) 427-5951, or AV: 291-5951. ★

Soviet studies



SOVIET SEAPOWER PROGRAMS

The Soviet Seapower programs are highly polished presentations that are designed to help heighten awareness of the Soviet Union. A five-member instruction team will come to local commands and set up a classified or unclassified multimedia presentation, complete with Russian music, military flags, naval warfare crests, and authentic Soviet navy uniforms. The Soviet Seapower team is assigned to the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC), Dam Neck, Virginia.

The May 1987 issue of ALL HANDS provided an in-depth look at the people and props that are part of the Soviet Seapower program team.

The SECRET-level classified version, called the Soviet Seapower Education Program, is usually an all-day function lasting from 0800 to 1500 (with a built-in lunch break). The minimum size audience is 250 persons.

The Soviet Seapower Awareness Program is the unclassified version and is a two and one half hour presentation.

For more information, contact:

NMITC, Bldg 420, Attn: SSEP, Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, VA 23461-5575; or call AV 433-8190/8202. ★

SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL BRIEFING TEAM

The Soviet Technological Briefing Team provides a one-hour unclassified briefing on the Soviet military attitude toward America and American technology -- an unusual way to start a conference or security awareness seminar.

Two active duty military members provide the aviation/technology oriented briefing. The Soviet Technological Briefing Team has appeared before civic groups, ROTC, college conferences and veterans organizations. The requesting organization is usually responsible for the travel expenses of the two-man team. For additional information and to schedule an appearance call Master Sgt. Hodson at AV 787-5120, or Commercial: (513) 257-5120, or write to: FTD/PA, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433-6508. ★

PERIODIC REINVESTIGATION

The security clearance periodic reinvestigation (PR) program has been accelerated by increased quotas from Defense Investigative Service (DIS).

PRs should be requested now for all personnel whose Background Investigation or Special Background Investigation (BI/SBI) was completed more than 5 years ago and have a Top Secret clearance, Limited Access Authorization (LAAs), are in special access programs, or are civilians assigned to critical sensitive positions.

PRs for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) must be submitted 4 years and 6 months from the date the last SBI was completed. The Personnel Security Questionnaire (DD Form 398) prepared for a PR must be reviewed by the subject's immediate supervisor and a supervisory evaluation statement is required in the "Remarks" section as per OPNAVNOTE 5510 of 4 December 1985.

Abbreviated or "No Change" Questionnaires are not acceptable in accordance with OPNAVNOTE 5510 of September 1986. Detailed procedures for submission of a PR are contained in Chapter 21 of OPNAVINST 5510.1H, which was signed 29 April 1988. This revision will be distributed in the near future.

SHAPING UP FOR SHIPPING OUT

The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office provides the following reminders to all activity Security Managers.

"With the final year of the present administration, many activities will experience some turnover in personnel, including senior officials who have had significant access to classified information. In order to ensure the continuing integrity of classified information, it is important that commands establish debriefing and termination procedures to ensure that departing personnel are aware that classified information is not among personal property and may not be removed from government control, and that the individuals have a continuing responsibility to protect classified information.

"Command security assistants, document custodians, and other command personnel having document security responsibilities should be reminded to ensure the command's retention of all classified information that may now be in the possession of departing officials."

SECURITY AWARENESS WEEK "FOLLOW THE RULES"

"Internal Security is to be taken seriously," said Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, Commander, Naval Security and Investigative Command, on 14 March 1988, in the opening speech of the Security Awareness Week seminar held at Naval Air Station Patuxent River.

"Since the Walker-Whitworth spy case the Navy has become more aware of the need for internal security," he said.

The Navy has seen a 37% decrease in granted security clearances and the Navy Security Manual has been rewritten. These changes came about due to the Navy's heightened concern of espionage matters since the Walker-Whitworth spy ring was uncovered.

The admiral also mentioned the NSIC 24-hour Hotline for information on alleged, suspected or actual espionage. **On the HOTLINE, (800) 445-7343, personal interviews can be arranged and confidentiality will be assured.** He asked that all personnel be alert to security problems around them.


"The reasons for espionage have changed," Gordon said. "Thirty years ago, personal beliefs motivated most spies. Today, money is the primary reason for entering into espionage. Foreign government agents look for persons who have access to classified materials and are in financial difficulty. Regulations, when followed, keep employees from falling into a trap.

"You must follow the rules because the rules are made to protect our national secrets, and those secrets could be, in some future battle, the difference between victory and defeat. ★

INFORMATION AND PERSONNEL SECURITY

REGIONAL ASSISTANCE

As part of a continuing effort to improve security in the Navy, an experienced Information and Personnel Security specialist has been assigned to the Naval Investigative Service Regional Offices (NISRO) at London, Norfolk and Pearl Harbor. These security specialists will work with commands to improve the safeguarding of classified information and the professionalism of security personnel. Assistance will be in the form of consultations on security problems, program evaluations and training. More information will be provided to local commanders as the security specialists report aboard the NISROs. ★



SECURITY ACTION LINE

The Security Action Line, Autovon 291-5971 or Commercial (301) 427-5971, is available for immediate assistance on INFORMATION AND PERSONNEL security problems.

During duty hours, you will be referred to the member of our staff who can best answer your particular questions. After duty hours, your message will be recorded and answered the next working day.


How to Be a Spy in Six Easy Lessons. . .



1 Join a group and pretend you belong there. Be unobtrusive or bold, as the occasion demands. Nice guys assume that everyone else is a nice guy and -- here's a laugh -- won't challenge your "need to know" for fear of hurting your feelings.



2 Watch for sensitive or classified material left unattended. Lunch periods and coffee breaks are times of good hunting.





3 Check wastepaper baskets for pay dirt. Scribbled notes and frazzled carbons are just as good as "smooth copy."



4 Find employees with more classified material in their possession than they really need. This is the pack rat type. They have only a general idea of what documents they have so if some of them disappear...

5 Remember, not all sensitive or classified material is printed. A few microfiche or a dozen slides can be a bonanza.




6 Keep a sharp eye for classified material that has not been properly logged, because this plays right into your hands. When you snatch it you are home free. You've left no trail, only a dead end. (Better yet, use a copy machine. That's the best way to get classified information without leaving any trail. *Details on this procedure next issue.*)

...lessons which also help us to detect and prevent espionage.



Adapted from "Security Awareness Month Communique" issued by Defense Investigative Service. Artwork by Graphics Division, Defense General Supply Center, Richmond, Va.



"All that remains for me to add is that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible.

For upon secrecy, success depends in most enterprises of the kind, and for want of it they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising."

*--Gen. George Washington
July 26, 1777*

The secret to protecting Classified Information

Get involved

by M. D. Bruggeman
NIS Special Agent
Counterintelligence Directorate

“Excuse me, sir. We are investigating Mr. John Doe to determine his suitability for access to classified material within the Department of Defense. We understand he is an associate of yours. Do you have any information, or know of any reason why Mr. Doe would not be suitable for the position?”

“Who, John? No. He’s a great guy. No problems.”

Now Mr. Doe is suspected of espionage. Had the person being questioned about Mr. Doe told the investigators everything he knew about John, some potentially very significant damage to our nation’s defense would have been prevented. Why didn’t he?

Many of us have been interviewed as part of a background investigation conducted on a co-worker or friend. The easiest and quickest way to get this time-consuming procedure over with is to report that there are no

problems regarding the individual and that we believe they are suitable for a position of trust with the government. Unfortunately, there have been several instances where friends or co-workers were aware of significant information -- but failed to report it. Reasoning behind this seems to range from simply not wanting to get involved to fear of reprisal. But each of us have a responsibility to be truthful and accurate when providing information for background investigations. These investigations are conducted to protect every one of us and are part of the first step in the Navy’s efforts to protect classified information.

Americans have been alarmed by the number of espionage cases that have been uncovered in the past several years. The damage to our nation’s security and the cost to our country, in terms of money needed to overcome the damage, have been significant. If there is any consolation to be found in these cases, it is that in several of them it was the alertness of co-workers, and their willingness to accept their responsibility to report suspicious activity, that uncovered the espionage.

Department of the Navy (DON) efforts to protect classified information are broken down into four areas. These are personnel security, security regulations, security awareness and investigations. Each area cannot stand alone and each involves the active participation of all DON members. They are all interrelated and every DON member must understand his or her role in maintaining the integrity of the system.

The first part of the system is personnel security. It is the responsibility of the DON to carefully select

and screen the personnel that will have access to classified information. Part of this process is to conduct background investigations on individuals selected for access to classified material. It is also necessary to ensure that these background checks are periodically updated and that the adjudication process is properly exercised with clearances being denied to those who do not satisfy the basic requirements.

The second part of the system concerns security regulations. Every person who comes in contact with classified information must be knowledgeable of the DON regulations for handling classified material. These regulations are established to provide a uniform method for handling and providing protection to classified material. At times these regulations are inconvenient and may seem to hamper operational efficiency. It may appear that not following the regulations does no great harm and gets the job done more quickly; however, this action leaves us open to disciplinary actions and worse, we contribute to a work environment that could allow a person committing espionage to work freely. Violations of security regulations should be promptly reported. The regulations are for all DON personnel and we all have a responsibility, not only to follow the regulations, but to report violations.

The third part of the system is called security awareness. As stated earlier, some of our recent espionage cases were discovered because of the alertness of co-workers and their willingness to report suspicious activity. The prompt reporting of suspicious behavior and security violations allows investigative personnel to evalu-

"If you would keep a
secret
from your enemy...
tell it not to a friend."

--*Benjamin Franklin*



ate the situation and determine if espionage is occurring or likely to occur. We do not live in a vacuum. Activities by our co-workers that reflect on their suitability to have access to classified material must be reported. We must be aware that espionage is a very serious threat to the security of our country, be willing to get involved and be sensitive to security problems in our work place.

The final part of the system is investigation. This occurs when a problem has been identified. A professional investigation protects the rights of those involved and allows legal or administrative action to be taken if appropriate. The investigation of espionage or significant security problems also gives the responsible commander a report of the deficiencies that allowed the problem to occur. It helps the commander to determine if security procedures need better enforcement or to change ineffective procedures. Investigations do not stand alone. To be effective, they rely on the other parts of the system.

Many of the investigations conducted by the Naval Investigative Service are initiated as the result of reports by DON personnel. Counterintelligence investigations are a complex undertaking with many legal guidelines, but each investigation must start from a report of suspicious activity or known security violation. Without the help of all DON personnel, very few investigations would be initiated and our security would be greatly diminished.

We, as DON members, comprise the first line of defense in protecting our nation's security. We have the responsibility to properly protect the classified material we come into contact with and to report circumstances we observe that could result in the improper handling of classified material or information. Even from "insignificant" security violations, activities which threatened our nation's security have been uncovered and stopped. ***We all must be involved.*** It is our best defense in countering the espionage threat. ★

USS NIMITZ (CVN-68)

Carrier hosts Open House for law enforcement officials

by Special Agent Mitchell L. Anderson, MA1 James Head, and MA1 Randy Railey
photos by AN Evan E. Schultz and PHAN Peter Silver
USS NIMITZ (CVN-68)

One morning, the command judge advocate and the NIS Special Agent Afloat were having their usual cup of coffee onboard the aircraft carrier USS NIMITZ (CVN-68), when an idea was born.

Since NIMITZ arrived in her new homeport of Bremerton, Washington in July 1987, the command has been assisted by the efforts of the men and women in the local, state, and federal law enforcement communities.

It was proposed to the commanding officer that a day be set aside to thank those law enforcement officials who helped the ship in transition to her new home, and made her feel like a welcomed addition to the Puget Sound community. The proposal was enthusiastically supported and the wheels were set in motion to plan the first "Law Enforcement Appreciation Day."

Captain Brent M. Bennett, NIMITZ's commanding officer, sent out invitations for January 30, 1988 to

the heads of various local, state, and federal agencies in the Bremerton and Seattle areas.

Tour routes were established and tour guides were recruited from the Master-at-Arms Division, the legal offices, and the brig staff, as well as from the local NIS Office in Bremerton. Upon hearing of the event, various volunteers from different departments onboard NIMITZ came forth to offer their assistance in the endeavor and the ship's Supply Department provided refreshments and opened the ship's stores so the guests could purchase souvenirs.

At first it was expected that 200-250 people would respond to the invitations. However, the planners underestimated the interest of the community. Within a short period of time, 400 confirmed reservations were received. True to the 'NIMITZ teamwork-tradition,' more volunteers came forward to serve as tour guides.

The event was scheduled to begin at 0900, but at 0840, a frantic call was received from the pier sentry who declared that the visitors had arrived!

Coffee cups were stowed, donuts inhaled, and Law Enforcement Appreciation Day was underway! At one point there were more than 200 eager visitors assembled in the hanger bay.



Several Bremerton-area law enforcement officials and their families watch and listen intently as a NIMITZ sailor describes the functions of the aircraft carrier's helm.

Visitors were greeted at the ship's afterbrow, asked to sign a visitor's log, and were treated to the movie "Air Power at Sea."

Then it was off to tour the ship. The route consisted of the hanger bay, forecastle, carrier air traffic control center, navigation bridge, flight deck, mess decks, and the ship's stores. In each of the locations the visitors received an overview of the function and mission of that particular work center.

Many were surprised to learn that there was also a Marine detachment on board the aircraft carrier. The Marines provided a static display of the latest weapons employed in their role of providing physical security for the ship. Just to prove that some things never change, one young Marine kept Marine Corps tradition alive by field-stripping his .45 caliber pistol at least 50 times.

With the tour behind them, each individual had a better appreciation of life aboard the world's largest warship. Back in the hanger bay, visitors had an opportunity to enjoy some refreshments, converse with old friends and make new ones.

As was evident by the departing



A Marine demonstrates the workings of several types of small arms from the ship's armory to some of NIMITZ's fascinated guests.

visitors, the most popular stop on the tour had to have been the ship's stores, for almost everyone was sporting a NIMITZ ball cap, and lighting cigarettes with their new NIMITZ lighters.

When the cake platters were empty and the clean up process had begun, the final count was in: more than 30 law enforcement and judicial agencies were represented and over 800 visitors had attended "NIMITZ

Law Enforcement Appreciation Day." The youngest visitor was only a few weeks old, and the oldest guest was 82.

If evident by the favorable comments by the departing visitors and the numerous letters of thanks and appreciation that were received, one can only conclude that Law Enforcement Appreciation Day was a day well spent. ★

USS NIMITZ LAW ENFORCEMENT APPRECIATION DAY


OPEN HOUSE

-TOURS
-FILMS
-SOUVENIRS
-FAMILIES
WELCOME



CAF Director receives SECDEF's highest civilian award

by Gary M. Comerford, NSIC Public Affairs Officer



Dan Jacobsen, Director of the Central Adjudication Facility (CAF), was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, the highest civilian award given by the Secretary of Defense, in July.

Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, Commander NSIC, presented the award to Jacobsen in a ceremony held at Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC) Headquarters.

Jacobsen received the award for his work on the Department of Defense Polygraph Program. He was assigned to the staff of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security as the Assistant for Personnel Security from November 1985 to January 1988 (when he reported to NSIC). During this period he instituted a number of programs, including the DoD polygraph program for which he received his award. ★

Dan Jacobsen, shown with wife Jackie and children, Heather, 6, and Scott, 4, wears his medal with pride. (Photo by Gary M. Comerford, NSIC Public Affairs Officer)

Anti-terrorism pamphlet for your command

Master copy you can reproduce

How to use
these pages

Pages 29 and 30 are the
Anti-Terrorism Residential
Security Measures pamphlet.

Just copy both pages
(front and back) of the
pamphlet -- make as many
copies as you need...




FIGURE (1)

Fold as indicated in Figure (1)
and you're ready to give them
out at your command!

The next two pages are designed as an Anti-Terrorism/Crime Prevention brochure.

Just photo-copy front and back of the following two pages, fold where indicated and you have an instant supply of pamphlets to support Crime Prevention efforts. Make as many copies as you need and store the original in a safe place for future use.

In this issue, we are addressing residential security measures which can help people protect their homes from crime and reduce opportunities for terrorist activity. This pamphlet was originally produced by the Naval Investigative Service.

We will try to keep you "stocked" with a variety of brochures and pamphlets to support Crime Prevention and other programs. Look for more Crime Prevention and other topics in future issues of *Sentry*.

Any questions regarding this pamphlet or suggestions on subject matter and possible topics, should be referred to Editor, *Sentry*, Naval Security & Investigative Command, Code 24J, Washington, D.C. 20388-5400 or call JO2 John Verrico at AV: 293-3490 or Comm: (301) 763-3490. ★

This pamphlet was prepared by the Naval Security and Investigative Command to inform and caution Department of the Navy (DON) personnel and their dependents about terrorism and measures that can be taken to enhance their residential security. Although this pamphlet is directed towards those DON personnel serving outside the continental limits of the United States (OCONUS), the security precautions described are equally applicable to daily routines in CONUS and will help combat criminal and/or terrorist threats against DON personnel. You and your dependents are encouraged to review the pamphlet prior to any permanent change of station (PCS), and discuss all pertinent aspects. If you have any further questions, please contact your local Naval Investigative Service (NIS) Resident Agency.

Terrorist acts at personal residences, while rare, can possibly be thwarted by taking a few common sense precautions. Individual alertness, awareness of the threat, and taking basic protective measures have proven to be deterrents against the terrorist threat. This pamphlet contains basic protective measures that, if understood and followed, will significantly reduce vulnerability to terrorism.

Site Selection

If you are selecting your own residence, the following suggestions should be taken into consideration:

- A well designed and well managed apartment is more secure than a separate house.
- The next most secure dwelling is a cooperative compound, which is a number of separate houses clustered in the same general area. Look for areas where other DON or diplomatic residences are located. These compounds are common in many areas, and may include a fenced perimeter, guards, lighting and/or alarm systems.
- A separate residence in a suburban area, or in an isolated environment can be adequately secured. Even so, this type of residence is more vulnerable to intrusion than those already mentioned.
- The least secure residence is one which is located in a crowded neighborhood in an urban environment. This type of residence should be avoided if possible.

Site selection should include attention to the flavor of the neighborhood. Identification of high crime neighborhoods can be obtained from your command security officer or the local NIS office. Become familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the local police. Acquaint yourself with the prospective neighborhood by walking or driving through the area. The following factors should also be considered:

- Reliability of utilities (disruption of electricity or telephone services would facilitate intruders gaining access to your area.)
- Easy access to main roads.
- Off street secured parking (preferably a lockable garage).
- Adequate exterior lighting.

If possible, have your residence surveyed by a professional security officer. Request guidance from your local security officer on what residential security standards should apply for your area and make an informal survey of your own residence.

Physical Security

Physical security measures that you can practice at home vary and should be evaluated in accordance with the threat in your local area. The following areas will have an impact on the ease of intruders entering your home: fencing, outside lighting, landscaping (large shrubs near entrances provide cover for possible intruders), animals, guards and an alarm system.

Do not post your name/rank so as to identify your residence.

Any access to your residence is a potential entrance for an intruder. Measures should be effected to strengthen/secure doors, windows, vents, or air conditioning openings.

Make it a family practice to habitually keep outside doors and the garage closed and locked. When necessary change the door locks.

Ensure that you have a substantial door (solid core) with a substantial locking system, such as a deadbolt, that can not be easily kicked in. Keep all accessible windows and doors locked.

Housekeys are an item that both terrorists and thieves like to get their hands on. Keep them separate from car keys and maintain accountability for them by all family members.

Check to see if there are adequate smoke/fire alarms with a back up energy source. Consider the use of an intrusion detection system (IDS).

A dog is still one of the best alarm systems.

Again, for further guidance and specific requirements for physical security for your residence, such as specific types of locks, alarm systems and hardening techniques,

please contact your security officer or your local NIS office.

Precautions for the Family

It is important to make sure that family members receive appropriate briefings and that they are aware of the security threat in your area. The safety of your family is dependent upon the involvement of all family members in proper security measures. The following suggestions will enhance the safety of all your family.

Have family members memorize telephone numbers for emergency situations. Make sure all family members, particularly children, know how to use the phone. In OCONUS areas make sure they know how to use the local phone system. Post emergency numbers near the phone. If your residence is equipped with a portable radio or duress device for emergencies, ensure that all family and staff members know how to operate it.

Warn family members against revealing information about travel or other family plans.

Be wary of telephone surveys in which you are asked for names and ages of your children. Do not divulge pertinent family information to any unknown person over the phone.

Keep close control on information pertaining to your address, itineraries and family.

We suggest you develop a family biography, to be kept in a safe location, containing identification information on each family member that would assist the authorities in the event that an emergency should occur, including medical records, photos and a set of fingerprints.

It is absolutely vital that the doors never be opened to unscheduled repairmen or strangers. Ensure that your door has a peephole. Repairmen's identities should always be verified when you do not recognize them.

In OCONUS areas, instruct family members and domestic help not to accept any unsolicited packages. Mail should be routed through the office.

Be alert for persons disguised as public utility crews, workers, vendors, etc., who may be conducting a surveillance. Report any unusual or suspicious activity in the vicinity of your residence.

In OCONUS situations make sure that all family members know enough of the local language to seek help, police and medical assistance.

They serve throughout the Navy - protecting our resources, fighting the war against drugs, answering bomb threats and acting as an ever vigilant partner to our Masters-at-Arms. And they do all that for no pay except food, shelter and companionship. They are our Navy's military working dogs.

Basic training for the dogs and technical training for dog handlers is conducted as an all-service effort at the Air Force Security Police Academy, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Dogs and students are taught separately in the areas of patrol and drug detection, while explosive detector dog training is conducted simultaneously with their human counterparts. The Naval Technical Training Center Detachment, commanded by Lt. Michael P. Bryce, has 19 personnel assigned - 13 dedicated to the training of the dogs and 6 who instruct the students in handling those dogs.

The 52 multi-service dog trainers assigned to the Dog Training Section, under the guidance of Chief Master-at-Arms Lisa Albuquerque, have the unique job of training the patrol and drug detection dogs. "The Dog Training Section is the foundation of the military working dog program in any service or agency. The quality and quantity of dogs that we produce determines the future of the program," Albuquerque said.

Most of the dogs are purchased in Europe by the Department of Defense Dog Center and are delivered to the Dog Training Section for their initial conditioning. The dogs must show a high level of aggression to meet the purchasing standards. That ensures a challenging time for the trainer who is tasked with controlling, focusing and directing that aggression. It is the trainer's job to take an indiscriminately aggressive dog and create a reliable, motivated patrol partner for the law enforcement officer.

School for dogs

Professionalism begins at Lackland

After the dog successfully completes patrol dog training, it undergoes a series of tests to determine its aptitude to be trained as either a drug or explosives detector. These tests, like all of the training procedures, are the work of Dr. Dan Craig, who applies years of experience in experimental psychology to the program.

Following final certification in the Dog Training Section, the dog is either prepared for shipment to a field unit or is placed in one of the handler courses at Lackland to act as a "training aid" for the student who is learning the techniques of dog handling. The patrol dog course teaches the basic uses of the military working dog including the areas of obedience, controlled aggression and intruder apprehension in buildings and outdoors. Navy students attending this six week course often receive a follow-on course in either the four-week drug or nine-week explosives detector handler course in order that they can meet the needs of individual commands. The explosives detector course, unique in its training of the handler and dog together, is especially ardu-

ous and requires a high level of proficiency of the "team" prior to graduation.

Duty at Lackland is physically and mentally demanding requiring courage, dedication to duty and fast reflexes. The rewards are the satisfaction of seeing an untrained dog or student become a reliable member of a law enforcement team with the potential to save lives or fight in the war against drugs and terrorism. The trainers and instructors also learn valuable skills that ultimately benefit Navy kennels. And most importantly, they are part of a small but proud profession that is a vital link in the military working dog program.

For more information on the military working dog program, see OPNAVINST 5585.2. The program sponsor is the Naval Security and Investigative Command (OP-09N) and information on schools is available in the Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CANTRAC). ★

Reported by MAC Lisa Albuquerque
NTTC Detachment, Lackland AFB

Navy names

The Navy's "best" Military Working Dog (MWD) Teams were recently selected as a result of the 1987 MWD Program Manager's Annual Assessment.

The selections were based on criteria established by the Law Enforcement and Physical Security (LEPS) Assistance Teams Atlantic and Pacific.

To determine who was best, MWD teams were evaluated on obedience (on- and off-leash), expertise on a

confidence course, degree of detector proficiency above basic requirements, and controlled aggression. Handlers and kennelmasters were also evaluated on leadership qualities, military bearing and appearance. MWDs were evaluated on grooming. The best and most improved kennels were determined by additions or changes which improved operational effectiveness, appearance and sanitation of kennel structures and administrative spaces,

BEST DRUG DETECTION TEAM

PACFLT

MA2 Robin L. Hopkins & Beau
Naval Air Station North Island

LANTFLT

MA1 Ronald L. Jacobs & Lucy
Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Norfolk

BEST PATROL/EXPLOSIVE TEAM

PACFLT

Mr. Ku Sok Pak & Rex
Fleet Activities Chinhae, Korea

LANTFLT

EO1 Kent Davis & Mark
Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico

BEST PATROL TEAM

PACFLT

Officer Donald C. Adams & Renna
Naval Station San Diego

LANTFLT

IC2 Terry L. Dunn & Cora
Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia

top dog teams

organization and neatness of documents and reference material, and the maintenance and availability of equipment.

According to both LEPS teams, competition was intense and final selections were made after careful consideration of all aspects of dog and handler abilities, and kennel operation. The top teams each demonstrated progress well beyond basic requirements and proficiency levels.

The MWD Program Manager advises that "hopeful candidates for next year's competition should bear in mind that perfecting basic fundamentals is not enough. They should develop new and advanced methods that will make their teams and kennels more operationally effective." ★

BEST SMALL BREED TEAM

PACFLT

MA1 Bryan K. Fischer & Sam
Naval Submarine Base Bangor, Washington

LANTFLT

MAC Patrick B. Jaworski & Kadee
Naval Station Charleston

BEST KENNEL

PACFLT

Naval Submarine Base Bangor


LANTFLT

Naval Submarine Base New London

MOST IMPROVED KENNEL

PACFLT

U.S. Facility Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines



U.S. Facility Subic Bay, Philippines

From grim to glorious

Navy's biggest MWD program getting better all the time

by MAC Michael Isley
Assistant Kennelmaster/Trainer
Subic Bay, Philippines

“Awesome” is just an adjective, but it is the only one that accurately describes how it feels to work as a Military Working Dog (MWD) handler at the largest Navy MWD facility in the world. Stop wondering where the top MWD kennel is located--it's in Subic Bay, Philippines.

Part of the U.S. Facility Security Department (FSD) at Subic Bay, the MWD facility is located at the Naval Air Station Cubi Point, about seven miles from FSD's main headquarters.

Kennelmaster, Senior Chief Master-at-Arms Donald Huffman, has been on board since October 1985. He directly supervises about 16 U.S. military handlers, 16 Filipino supervisors (these include shift lieutenants, desk sergeants and training NCO's), two DOD narcotic dog handlers, two veterinarians, three kennel support personnel and 75 Filipino patrol dog handlers. He also controls the assignment and use of about 100 military working dogs of all breeds which are capable of performing tasks like ex-

plosive/narcotics detection and intruder interdiction.


The Republic of the Philippines is a unique country consisting of approximately 7,100 islands. (Subic Bay is located on one of the three major islands, Luzon, which is considered the rice bowl of the country.) Over the centuries, a tremendous number of cultural intermarriages from Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Spain, Great Britain and the United States, has produced an unparalleled heritage in the Philippines. A 350-year Spanish occupation influenced the islands greatly and left a telling mark on the Philippine culture, customs and religion.

There are approximately 29,000 Filipino workers at the U.S. Facility which consists of over 60 commands in a 15,000 acre area. The combined U.S. facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base, 45 miles north of Subic, are the second largest employers of Filipinos -- second only to the government of the Philippines. People come from all around the country to find work here. Wages, which are established by an annual survey of 200 local companies, are generally much higher than for the

rest of the nation.

Working in this atmosphere can prove to be very interesting. There are eight major dialects and 87 sub-dialects spoken by Filipinos, although English is one of three major languages and is spoken by more than 40% of the population. Although the Filipinos learn formal English throughout their high school years, Americans are more inclined to use slang terms and euphemisms. The resulting disparities in the language make for some hilarious, as well as frustrating, moments during the course of a workday, and give new meaning to the phrase “communication gap.”

A major consideration during our training phase is the weather. The average daily temperature is in the 90s, with 86% humidity. During the rainy season of June through October, the average rainfall is over 150 inches, and we have an average of five or six tropical cyclones during the season. So, weather does play an important role in our training cycle. The hotter it gets, the more we have to rest our dogs or re-arrange the work schedule so that training can be held during the cooler hours.



Subic Bay's MWD Program is the largest in the Navy. Shown here is only about one third of the facility's MWD force.

We try to vary our training techniques as much as possible. We emphasize training in patrol work (paying particular attention to intruder detection) and explosive detection. The killings of three Americans and a Filipino at Clark AFB on 28 October 1987 have made us more aware of the terrorist threat and our vulnerabilities to attack. Training anti-terrorist dogs and patrol dogs to operate under automatic weapons fire, and, the training of tracker dogs are part of programs currently in operation or under consideration.

We also conduct training with our FSD street patrols so they can fully appreciate the abilities of a K-9 unit. This joint cooperative venture shows the patrolmen what the MWD can do for them, and how to best use a dog team for law enforcement. Although our primary objective is quality, realistic training, we also have our demonstration teams for different commands or groups who are interested in what we do. We conduct several demonstrations annually for these groups and visiting schools. In a spirit of cordial cooperation with our host allies, we demonstrate for local police units the MWD capabilities. We be-

lieve that our training is limited only by our imagination, and believe me, one's imagination can run wild here in the Philippines.

One aspect of our operation is the transportation of our MWD teams. We have to make sure we can get to our posts to relieve other teams, in addition to maintaining mobile patrols. This is an everyday headache and you can appreciate the importance of having a good and reliable maintenance program for all vehicles.

We designed cages to fit on the back of mobile patrol units which allow for visibility and easy exit for the dog should the handler need him. Since sedans are limited, we use pickup trucks. This is the most productive and realistic way of using a patrol dog with the mobile patrol.

As a military working dog handler in the Philippines, motivation to maintain proficiency and professionalism is easy to generate. The ever-present threat of terrorism, not just here-- but everywhere Americans are stationed, demands constant training and the necessity to be ever-alert. It is one thing to read about terrorism and quite something else to witness it first-

hand or fall victim to it. Hopefully, our vigilant stance will prevent that from happening to any of us here at Subic Bay.

Every conceivable challenge to a military working dog handler is within your grasp -- right here in Subic. Professional development can be, and is, achieved here at a level quite unlike any other facility in the world. Loyalty, integrity, professional conduct and responsibility may be buzzwords to some people, but it's a way of life for us at Subic. We want hard-chargers and those willing to put in 150%. Those who think the MWD field is a skate job need not apply. ★

.....
•U.S. Facility Subic Bay's
•MWD program was selected
•as the Most Improved Ken-
•nel for 1987.
.....

The President's dogs

by MA1 Robert Quesada and Charles R. Dykes
NAS Point Mugu

The Military Working Dog (MWD) Section of Pacific Missile Test Center/Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, consists of four MWDs: A patrol/explosive dog, a drug detector dog and two patrol dogs. They provide twenty-four hour security against terrorists, bombings, illegal drugs and unauthorized intruders such as fence jumpers and suspects in buildings. These are special MWDs -- they are the President's dogs, providing protection and support to the President of the United States and other dignitaries travelling to and from the West Coast White House.

ment and foreign dignitaries, the complex became eminent. Thus, the air station expanded from one-dog to a four-dog kennel. A primary function of the Military Working Dog Section at Point Mugu is to provide security for the arrival and departure of the President, Vice President, First Lady, as well as other top government officials such as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and other dignitaries. These operations are conducted in conjunction with White House Staff and Secret Service personnel. Upon departure of these VIPs, the Military Working Dog Section resumes its normal duties of keeping the station secure.

Due to day and night utilization of the drug detector dog, drug activities and abuse on board the station have

been curtailed. Drug lectures, featuring the capabilities of the drug dog, have enhanced the deterrent effect. Demonstrations by Military Working Dogs at the Naval Air Station, other military installations and at clubs such as the Elks Club, the Rotary Club, etc., have made the public aware of the Military Working Dog Program as an effective asset to the security of installations throughout the Navy.

The Military Working Dog Program at Point Mugu is still expanding, both in size and expertise. MWD Handlers have one thing in mind, "Be ready



Initially, only one dog was assigned to Point Mugu. That first MWD was a drug detector dog. As the Naval Air Station developed into its present day complex, coupled with the arrival and departure of the President, top govern-

for any situation!"

"We are ready! Our dogs are ready!" ★

Computer 'BUGS'

by JO2 John S. Verrico
NSIC Public Affairs Assistant

Lehigh University recently reported that data recorded on computer diskettes in their computer laboratory was suddenly becoming unrecoverable. The data could no longer be accessed or reproduced. The laboratory had been infected with a computer virus.

The electronic mail system for the IBM regional office in Tampa, Florida was infected with a similar virus.

The Hebrew University in Jerusalem was infected with a software time bomb which was set to begin destroying files on May 13.

There have also been reported viruses at the University of Delaware, Georgetown University, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Martin Marietta Facility. Over the past several months there have been numerous incidents of computer viruses destroying data on disks, irretrievably wiping out data, and modifying operating system programs in the commercial automated data processing (ADP) industry.

The computer virus is a very small piece of a program code that is self-propagating and may be triggered by some designated action or specified time. These viral infections are designed to spread automatically from one computer to another and from disk to disk. Many of these viruses are intended as jokes and generally dis-

play a very innocuous greeting. Others, however, are malicious and will modify and erase files.

The virus will generally reside in the computer's memory file and infect a good command (*.COM) file. When the command file utilizes standard resident commands such as COPY, DIR (Directory), ERASE, TYPE, VERIFY, MKDIR (Make Directory), RMDIR (Remove Directory) or CHDIR (Change Directory), the virus spreads to the command files on another disk or networked computer. The cycle then repeats itself and ultimately wipes out numerous files. For example, the Lehigh virus was designed to destroy the root directory, Boot program and File Allocation Table (FAT) in order to make the information stored on a disk unrecoverable. This was accomplished by "writing" zeros onto the first 32 sectors of a disk. This is the portion of the disk on which all of the directory and addressing information is stored.

These viruses can be prevented, but only through good data management techniques. Operational machines can be kept from infection by following these basic guidelines:

* Use only software that comes in sealed containers from respected dealers.

* Use only standard application programs obtained through ordinary supply channels; i.e.

programs issued from Naval Security and Investigative Command Headquarters to Naval Investigative Service offices.

* Do not download executable programs from electronic bulletin boards onto operational machines.


* Do not use copied or pirated software.

* Use a "Write-Protect" tab on disks containing a COMMAND.COM file.

* Do not use shareware programs.

In short, practice safe computing with your operational computers.

If you suspect a virus, worm, time bomb or other ADP security problem, notify the NSIC ADP Security Officer, Special Agent Michael M. Houghton at (202) 763-3775 or Autovon 293-3775. ★



This article was produced with information and guidance provided by Mr. Jerry T. Oney, Assistant Director, Information Systems Department, Naval Security and Investigative Command.

Improving Computer Security

(Part 2 of 2)

by R.M. Lewis
LEPS Assistance Team San Diego

A variety of aspects contribute to making an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) system secure, and a number of characteristics make certain commands particularly vulnerable. If any one of these are neglected, a security loophole is formed.

Each command should be on the lookout for warning signs that their ADP security requirements are not in compliance with the requirements set forth in the following instructions:

a. OPNAVINST 5530.14A (DON Physical Security and Loss Prevention Manual)

b. OPNAVINST 5239.1A (DON Automatic Data Processing Security Program)

c. OPNAVINST 5510.1H (U.S. Navy Information and Personnel Program Regulations)

d. CSP 1A (S) (Cryptographic Security Policy and Procedures Manual)

The following is a list of the prevalent areas of ADP security shortcomings. The directives listed above are the references where guidance can be found for each of these areas.

1. Access and Movement Control --

(a) Identification and control of personnel are not in effect and are not included in the Physical Security Plan (*ref. (a), chapter 5, and ref. (b), para. J.2.lg*).

2. Security of ADP Media --

(a) Activities maintain working copy media in excess of 180 working days (*ref. (b), para. C.2e*).

(b) Inventories of tapes, disks and other ADP media classified as Secret or above, are not maintained. These items are not controlled as completed documents, maintained on appropriate control logs, nor given permanently-assigned identification numbers (*ref. (b), para. C.2e*).

(c) Hard-copy reports are not marked at the top and bottom of each page with the appropriate classification or the word "UNCLASSIFIED" (*ref. (b), para. C.3e*).

(d) Activities are not placing required classification markings on containers where punched or aperture cards are stored. Additionally, each tape, cassette, or disk is not marked with removable external markings that depict the overall security classification, special category (if appropriate) and are not assigned permanent identification numbers (*ref. (b) para.s C.3a and C.3b*).

(e) Computers are not marked to the highest level of classified material authorized for processing on that unit (*ref. (b), para. C.3g*).

(f) Activities do not have a viable ADP security training program (*ref. (b), chapter 10 and appendix D*).

(g) ADP areas are not designated in writing as exclusive, limited, or controlled as necessary (*ref. (a), para. 0305a*).

(h) Restricted-area access points are not properly

ADP Security Guidance and where to find it

posted (*ref. (a), para. 0307*).

(i) Lock and key control officers are not designated in writing (*ref. (a), para. 0308a*).

(j) Lock and key control systems do not reflect positive lock and key accountability (*ref. (a), para. 0308f*).

(k) Security containers, vaults, and strongrooms do not conform to minimum standards (*ref. (c), para. 14-2*).

(l) Central processing units data-linked into data encryption systems (Black Unit) for transmittal, are non-TEMPEST certified (Red Unit). The simultaneous transmission of Red to Black creates the potential for compromise of encryption codes (*ref. (d)*).

(m) Personnel possessing lower security classification levels have the potential for access to material with higher security classification (*ref. (a), para. 0408, and ref. (b), page A-10, para. (b)*).

(n) ADP Security Officers are not designated in writing (*ref. (b), para. 2.2.a.2*).

(o) When the activity procured or acquired ADP resources (e.g., equipment, maintenance, software, services, etc.) from a contractor, the commanding officer or his designee did not coordinate with the ADP Security Officer for assistance with security requirements in preparing security specifications (*ref. (b), para. 2.2.e*).

(p) Activities have not developed a comprehensive Activity ADP Security Plan (AADPSP) which would provide adequate security to their ADP activities, including the integrity of the data being handled (*ref. (b), para. 2.2a.1*).

(q) The activity does not have interim authority to operate if not currently accredited (*ref. (b), para. 3.1.b*).

(r) Contingency plans for the overall ADP Security Program have not been developed (*ref. (b), chapter 7*).

(s) Current emergency notification rosters for all personnel involved in disaster recovery are not maintained (*ref. (b), para. 7.7.d*).

(t) Security incident reports are not processed properly (*ref. (b), para. 8.9*).

(u) The ADP Security Officer, who is responsible to the security manager for the protection of classified information being processed in the automated system, is not cleared to the level of the material being processed (*ref. (c), para. 2-12*). ★

When can you testify?

A look at Navy policy governing testimony and the release of information by Navy personnel

What would you do if . . .
. . . a neighbor asks you to testify as a character witness in juvenile court where she and her husband are seeking to adopt their foster child?

. . . you receive a subpoena to give testimony in a slander suit between two civilian employees? You were the investigator in a theft allegation the defendant falsely lodged against the plaintiff.

. . . a prosecutor in a New York murder case wants you to testify about the admission the suspect made to you when he was on active duty and you, an MAC, were the head of base security in the Philippines?

. . . the victim of an on-base car theft asks for a copy of the NIS report?

. . . the executor of a murder victim's estate wants you to take her to the on-base quarters where the victim was killed?

What do these cases have in common? All are governed by SECNAVINST 5820.8, Subj: Release of Official Information for Litigation Purposes and Testimony by Department of the Navy Personnel.

On 23 July 1985, the Department of Defense issued a directive which fosters the disclosure of official information and the appearance of DoD personnel as witnesses in federal, state and foreign courts -- but only after DoD has been advised and

concur. Basically, what that means is that the department wants to know when its employees are testifying in court on job-related matters and also to control the release of official information.

Specific procedures to seek DoD approval are outlined in the directive. These procedures would apply to all of the aforementioned examples, except the first one, which would be exempt because the testimony would be clearly not job-related.

The Navy implemented the DoD directive by issuing SECNAVINST 5820.8, but inadvertently omitted a critical section which cites another exemption to the procedure of securing prior approval.

The procedure does *not* apply to disclosures "...to federal, state and local prosecuting and law enforcement authorities in conjunction with an investigation conducted by a DoD criminal investigative organization". The SECNAVINST is currently being amended to include this information.

Other situations or cases where the procedures are not required include:

-- Courts-martial and administrative proceedings (such as Courts of Inquiry, administrative discharge boards);

-- Administrative proceedings conducted by or on behalf of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-

sion, Merit Systems Protection Board, Federal Labor Relations Authority or as provided by a negotiated grievance or collective bargaining procedure;

-- When the requester is an attorney for the federal government who represents the United States.

-- Those cases relating to DoD Directive 5220.6, "Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Program";

-- Testimony before a grand jury;

-- Releases under the Privacy Act or Freedom of Information Act;

-- Releases of information and comments, interviews, etc. not related to litigation (however, check with your Public Affairs Officer for guidance on this);

-- Releases by DON personnel to counsel retained by them for litigation unless the information is classified, privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure;

-- In cases involving garnishment orders for child support and/or alimony under SECNAVINST 7200.16.

If you have any questions on disclosures or testimony, contact your local command legal office. ★

Reported by S/A Judy Schevtchuk
Deputy Special Assistant for Legislative
& Judicial Affairs

Seizure or pursuit?

A recent Supreme Court decision delineates between the two

Suppose you are a Master-at-Arms on patrol in your vehicle and you see someone turn and run when he notices your approach. You follow him to see where he is going, but make no attempt to apprehend him. While you are following him, you witness him discard something. You stop, pick it up, discover illegal drugs and arrest the suspect for possession of narcotics.

The defense may argue that your act of following the suspect constituted a "seizure," which was not justified, and that the subsequent arrest was therefore unlawful. Can the case be dismissed on this basis?

These were the circumstances of a case earlier this year and according to a 13 June 1988 Supreme Court decision the actions were lawful.

At a preliminary hearing the defense moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the suspect had been unlawfully "seized" during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the

packets. The defense referred to the act of following the suspect as a "seizure" and claimed it was unlawful since no probable cause existed to justify it.

The magistrate ruled in favor of the suspect.

The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court who declared that what the defense referred to as a "seizure," was, in fact, "investigatory pursuit," and was justified.

In overturning the lower court decision, the Supreme Court stated that the test to determine whether a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is that "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." The Court stated that "the police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon the suspect's freedom of movement."


The police did not activate a siren or flashers; they did not command the suspect to halt, or display any weapons; they also did not operate the car in an aggressive manner to block the suspect's course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement. Noting that while the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, the court stated that this kind of police presence does not, in itself, constitute a seizure and the suspect could reasonably have believed that he was free to disregard the police presence and go about his business.

In that light, the Court concluded that the suspect was not "seized" by the police before he discarded the packets containing the controlled substance, and that the act of following the suspect was considered "investigatory pursuit." ★

Reported by Lt. Robert C. Wyda
NSIC Assistant Staff Judge Advocate

The Lighter Side

Armed Forces Information Service



Free Stuff!

No-cost law enforcement equipment

Research through the Naval Supply Depot, Technical Section, Yokosuka, Japan, recently revealed that several pieces of police personnel equipment can be ordered at no-cost to the ordering command. Thanks to the Supply Petty Officer from USS MIDWAY's Legal Department who initiated the research last winter and discovered the secret to ordering the following equipment:

Belt, Law Enforcement, black leather, male
NSN: 8465-01-033-1736 (Note: each belt size has a different stock number -- check your microfiche)

Keyring holder, Leather black
NSN: 8465-00-003-1203

Holder, flashlight
NSN: 8465-00-107-8223 ★

POTENTIAL FOR COMPROMISE

SILVER RECOVERY PROGRAM

The Silver Recovery Program requires that all excess photographic materials be turned in to a Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO). This program salvages the small quantities of the precious metal that are produced in the photographic developing process and provides an additional source of revenue for the government.

One problem with this procedure has arisen that may lead to a compromise of classified information. During a recent inspection at a DRMO, some material marked "CONFIDENTIAL" was discovered in an open container. This material was old and may have become declassified many years ago; nevertheless, proper preventative action taken by submitting commands can ensure that classified material does not get into the wrong hands. All potentially classified photographic materials should be shredded prior to shipping and transfer to DRMOs. Questions regarding this program should be directed to Michael F. Brown, Classification Management Division, Information and Personnel Security Directorate, Naval Security and Investigative Command at AV: 291-5901. ★

Where are they now?

MACM Lynn L. Chapman

'Small Child' keeps growing

by Judy Lazarus
Staff Writer, Great Lakes Bulletin
RTC Great Lakes

As one of 57 of the original 486 Masters-at-Arms still on active duty, Master Chief Master-at-Arms Lynn L. Chapman has observed changes and growth within the MA rating.

"Before the rating was established in 1973," Chapman reflected, "there was no specific rating for law enforcement and security. There were not many shore billets for sea-intensive ratings such as Hull Technicians and Machinist's Mates, so they did the work via on-the-job training."

"When our rating started it was almost like a small child," Chapman observed. "There was no form to it. The job depended on what command you were at and how that particular command wanted to run the rating. There was no standardization from base to base."

Over the years the rating has grown in professionalism.

"Now there are law enforcement manuals, training guidelines, and standard forms used throughout the Navy. And the rating is accepted," Chapman added. "At first, there was resistance and resentment. It was the old idea of saying, 'We don't have a problem.'"

In building the new rating, various aspects had to be considered.

Where does the emphasis have to be? What are commands looking for? Different types of duty assignments also had to be taken into consideration. "MAs might be part of the major security force at shore commands," she explained, "but on a ship, they maybe on independent duty where they are the lone ranger."

Since its inception, the rating has continued to grow. There have been changes in duties and in the type of investigations MAs conduct.

Chapman stressed the new training requirements and higher caliber of people in the rating, and the credibility the MA rating now enjoys.

Chapman was selected for conversion to the MA rating while serving as a Photographer's Mate (PH) in Spain where she worked with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS).

"PHs did a lot of work on crime scenes with NIS, especially overseas," Chapman explained. She'd heard about the new MA rating, put in her application, and was selected.

As an MA, Chapman has worked in investigations and patrol work but seems to have a preference for patrol (or street work) because "you're out, moving around, making contact with people."



MACM Lynn Chapman at her desk at NACU, Great Lakes. (Photo by Judy Lazarus)

She is currently serving as Chief Petty Officer-in-Charge of the Navy Absentee Collection Unit (NACU), Great Lakes. "It is my first tour back up in the cold country," said Chapman, a native of Wisconsin. "I have been on the east and west coasts and served in Spain and Italy."

Working at NACU for the past two years "is totally different from anything I've ever done," the Master Chief noted. "I'm an administrator, responsible for the entire unit, for locating and returning absentees." Her people work hard, she said and added, "I'm a cog in the wheel to ensure that we get the job accomplished."

When NACUs came into existence in 1980, there were 9,000 Navy deserters. At last reading there were 3,500.

"I enjoy the MA rating," Chapman said. "I've seen two interesting sides of it -- photography and law enforcement and I consider myself very fortunate." ★

The Navy Physical

by Jon H. Lynch
Physical Security Specialist
LEPS Assistance Team, San Diego


There seems to be considerable confusion concerning the Physical Security Program. During the past three years security programs have improved, but not as rapidly as possible. In many cases this is caused by a lack of understanding of the DON Physical Security Program process.

The concept of the process is quite simple. If you think of the physical security program as the face of a clock and the steps in the process as the hours, it will help put the concept into perspective.

The Physical Security and Loss Prevention Plan appears at the top of the clock because the plan sets the guidelines and tone of the security program. The plan has to be written in the context of who will do what, by

when. In other words, it can not be just a regurgitation of SECNAV or OPNAV policy. It must assign specific tasks to competent individuals to be accomplished at or by a certain time. The plan must be all inclusive and complement whatever host/tenant relationship we may be in as well as any formal Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) or Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA).

The annual Physical Security





Security Program Clock

Survey is at the one o'clock position because it tells us our current security posture and identifies weaknesses to overcome in order to get to an improved level of security. The results of the survey are used to drive the hand of the clock to position 2 through 12.

At the 2 o'clock position The Physical Security Review Committee (PSRC) or Physical Security Review Board (PSRB) (as appropriate) staffs the results of the physical security survey and makes recommendations to the commanding officer. Good staffing should result in possible courses of action, alternatives, options and recommendations.

Three o'clock is when the commanding officer establishes his priorities. These priorities are based on the results of the survey, recommendations of the staff and the concept as outlined by the command's Physical Security and Loss Prevention Plan.

Four o'clock and it's time for in house fixes. This is when security deficiencies are corrected through better management and administration of the security program. This may include revision and update to the Physical Security and Loss Prevention Plan, better key security and lock control program, etc. These are no-cost fixes that enhance our security posture.

OPTAR funded projects come along at five o'clock. These are usually low cost projects that the CO has identified as having top priority. In some cases, local purchase and self-

help can be used to enhance cost reduction. Usually these projects can be accomplished in a relatively short time.

Six o'clock is our chance at mid-year budget review monies. The chance to get these monies may come with no notice and little time to respond. By having completed a thorough survey, staffed the results, established command priorities and fixed what we could, we can rapidly respond to the mid-year budget review. This is an excellent opportunity to get money for the security projects that are high priority, but not within the command OPTAR.

The seven o'clock position is the time to submit requests up the chain of command for waivers and exceptions. Remember, whether you are requesting an original waiver, extension of a waiver or an exception, you must include compensatory measures that are realistic and sustainable. Waivers are requested for deficiencies we plan to fix when money and manpower become available. Exceptions are requested for deficiencies we can't fix due to physical considerations or Status of Forces Agreements with host nations, etc.

At eight o'clock we use the Navy Physical Security POM Baseline Assessment Memoranda (BAM) to request funding for security construction projects, security equipment and military and civilian security personnel ceiling points. The POM package must get down to the activity level because the lowest echelon OIC best


knows what he needs to upgrade his security posture.

Review and update of the MOU and/or ISSA comes along at nine o'clock. Sometimes MOUs and ISSAs are good for two or more years. However, an annual review is necessary because situations change based on the needs and capabilities of all parties concerned.

Ten o'clock brings us to the NIS Threat Assessment. This is put out at least annually. It is a tool the CO and Security Officer can use in the continued updating of the command's security posture and plan.



Last, but certainly not least, is the security education and training program. This program actually goes on year round. It includes physical security and loss prevention, personnel security, information security, automated data processing (ADP) security and security force training.

Undoubtedly, there are several other items you can reasonably argue and should be included in the physical security process. However, the truth of the matter is that many individuals assigned security responsibilities, both military and civilian, don't understand the process and how each item builds on the other to give us a viable program. By understanding the program and following the process you can make your job easier and increase the security posture of your command.



The Navy Lock Program

Protecting the fleet...



There is more to buying a lock than just going down to the local hardware store. It takes a lot of research and testing to determine which locks are considered low, medium or high security, and to decide which ones will be used where.

Regulations governing the protection of Navy assets (both classified and unclassified) are promulgated by the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD Lock Program is often taken for granted at the local level, but there is more to this much overlooked program than meets the eye, and a lot of people have their hands in it.



The Navy has been the program manager for the DoD Lock Program since January 1985. Commander, Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC) currently sets the policy for the program as part of his role as Special Assistant for Naval Investigative Matters and Security (OP-09N). Lock Program policies, procedures and products are coordinated through the Tri-Service Requirements Working Group (TSRWG). Program direction and funding functions have been delegated to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. The Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (NCEL), Port Hueneme, California, provides technical guidance.

For an example of how this breaks down, let's take a look at the typical procedure involved. DoD

determines an asset needs protection with a new piece of security equipment -- for example a padlock for a door. NSIC coordinates Tri-Service input for the degree of protection required and dictates security policy for this protection, and tasks the Naval Facilities Engineering Command with determining research and funding guidelines. NCEL is then tasked with the actual research and development of the new lock. This may involve setting design specifications or reviewing proposed specifications, testing padlocks already on the market, or possibly even designing a new padlock.

In most cases, the equipment required to meet the specified security objectives for these assets are described in terms of performance characteristics, such as the lock's strength, ease of operation, tamper-resistance, etc. These characteristics are further broken down and defined in military specifications, military standards and federal specifications. Since much of this equipment is also used by other government agencies, coordination is initiated through the TSWWG and the Interagency Advisory Committee on Security Equipment.

In the development of lock specifications there are times when a design flaw or other problem with the lock is not discovered until after production and shipment. Security per-



...Providing direction for DoD

sonnel, through operational insight and alertness, have discovered many of these vulnerabilities with locking systems. Input on locks and locking devices is encouraged from the field. If any problems are noted concerning locks or security containers, NCEL is the point of contact for direct technical support to the fleet. The Technical Manager, Bob Leek, can be contacted at AV: 360-5927 or Commercial: (805) 982-5927; or by writing to: Commanding Officer, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Code L56, Port Hueneme, Ca. 93403; Attn: Bob Leek.

Quite often a need arises for service and repair of locks and security containers, some of which cannot be


serviced locally. For example, as you may know, Medeco keyways and blank keys are protected by strict controls to prevent unauthorized key duplication. There is a support program established to service the Medeco high security key system. The Navy has a key and lock repair facility in Indiana, which is responsible for repair of the Navy's high security locking systems. The use of this facility allows the Navy to service high security locks at roughly half the cost of contractor support. Any support needed can be addressed directly to Commanding Officer, Naval Weapons Support Center, Code 208, Crane, In. 47522; Attn: Lock Repair Facility;

or you can call AV: 482-1879/1882 or Commercial: (812) 854-1879/1882.


One thing to keep in mind...current technology used for the design and manufacture of locks, safes, vaults and seals is over 30 years old. However, the technology used to defeat these security systems has improved significantly in recent years.

The DoD Lock Program is essential to ensure adequate protection for the DoD's classified and high value assets. ★

Reported by Kevin Kenworthy
NSIC Physical Security Specialist



"Are you the guy who ordered the burglar-proof locks?"





Physical Security Review Committee

A valuable advisory source

by Richard A. Pollack
NAVEUR Security Office

One of the most important advisory sources available to a command security officer is the Physical Security Review Committee (PSRC). This committee, designated in writing by the Commanding Officer, is composed of primarily non-security personnel, and is generally tasked to advise and assist in applying the standards of and implementing the Physical Security and Loss Prevention Program. OPNAV Instruction 5530.14A provides guidance on specific responsibilities of the PSRC.

Among its assigned tasks, the Committee assists in determining security requirements and evaluates security programs implemented at the command and its tenant activities, including advising on the establishment of restricted areas.

The Committee reviews physical security and loss prevention plan

drafts and recommends required changes, and reviews reports of significant losses and security breaches, and based on analysis of such instances, recommends improvements to the Physical Security and Loss Prevention Program.

A properly designated, functioning and dedicated PSRC can greatly assist the Security Officer to plan, implement, enforce and supervise the required programs.

Unfortunately, visits by the Law Enforcement and Physical Security (LEPS) Assistance Teams to numerous naval commands have disclosed that this ideal situation is the exception instead of the rule. Visits revealed that Security Officers were basically on their own when it came to managing the command security programs. In some cases, Security Officers were unaware of the need for a PSRC and the valuable counsel such a committee could provide. These factors usually resulted in the failure of the Security Officer to implement,

manage and execute an effective Physical Security and Loss Prevention Program.

Commanding Officers who advocate the importance of security must make real commitments to it by designating an active and viable PSRC to advise and assist the command Security Officer. This action would indicate a positive and real commitment to fully support Physical Security and Loss Prevention Programs.

★

Standardizing Security Communications

by Michael J. Peebles
Senior DES/Trunking Project Engineer

Until recently, communications for law enforcement and physical security within the Navy has been a neglected area. Very little guidance was available concerning the equipment to be used and the system structure for security communications. Predictably, there is no standard system, and next to no logistic supportability for the myriad of communications systems to be found at Navy installations world-wide.

The Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC) is taking steps to alleviate this problem by developing a standard security communications system which will be phased in over the next several years.

Actual development of this communications system has been assigned to the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center (NAVELEXCEN) Charleston by NSIC.

NAVELEXCEN was first formed from several elements of the Charleston Naval Shipyard in November 1961. This activity was named Shore Electronics Department. In August 1966, the command became a field activity of the newly formed Naval Electronic Systems Command, now the Space and Warfare Systems Command (SPAWARSYSCOM), and was designated as Southeast Division. In January 1974, the activity was renamed and given its present title to recognize increased engineering and shipboard electronic installation efforts.

Today, NAVELEXCEN Charleston serves the Navy by providing engineering services for ship and shore communities, and follow-on technical support. Major systems responsibilities include Air Traffic Control Systems, Naval Reserve Electronics Program, Stand Alone Message Preparation Devices, AN/SLO-17 Electronic Warfare System, ELF Communication System, Submarine Communication Improvement Program equipment, Electronic Security System Program, Radiac Acquisition and Engineering Program, Engineering Agent for the Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Shore Facilities Program, Naval Ordnance Communications (NAVORDCOMM), Senior Officers Security, and Acquisition Engineering Agent (AEA)/In-Service Engineering Agent (ISEA) for Data Encryption System (DES) communications.

The last three functional areas have provided NAVELEXCEN invaluable experience in the type of land-mobile communications system used for security.

-- The NAVORDCOMM System was developed specifically for the security of special weapons during

storage and logistic movement at multiple sites world-wide. This system was the first in the world to use DES to provide protected voice communications.

-- The Senior Officers Security Communications System was developed by NAVELEXCEN Charleston in direct reponse to the kidnapping of General Dozier by the Red Brigades in Italy. This was the first communications system specifically designed for the protection of senior officers and civilians during high terrorist threat conditions. Four of these DES communications systems have been installed in overseas locations.

-- The AEA/ISEA assignment established NAVELEXCEN Charleston as the Navy's primary point of contact for all DES communications -- including security. The center has provided engineering and procurement assistance to many shore activities world-wide. They have also recently purchased more than \$5 million worth of DES equipment for the Navy Security Force, and undertook DES communications tasks in the Persian Gulf and Central America.

NAVELEXCEN Charleston has a wealth of experience in security-related communications systems. They can use this experience to develop a standard security communications system which, when fully deployed, will allow security personnel to concentrate on the task at hand, instead of whether or not his or her radio is operating properly. Standard security communications will also provide for more efficient and effective use of equipment, improved equipment maintenance and other logistic support elements, and provide a means to standardize training for communications. ★

[NAVELEXCEN Charleston will continue this series of articles on security communications in an effort to provide security personnel a better understanding of land-mobile communications. Future articles will address common terms, DES, equipment capabilities, frequency allocation and assignment, and other aspects in the development of a security communications system. The center welcomes comments, questions or suggestions regarding these articles. Write to: Commanding Officer, NAVELEXCEN Charleston, Code 231, 4600 Marriott Drive, North Charleston, South Carolina 29418-6504.]

RESERVE NEWS

Our Qualified Reserve Force



These Reservists have 80 years of police experience between them. Pictured here with Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, Commander, Naval Security and Investigative Command, are: (from left) MA1 Tommy L. Keheley (Captain, Cobb County Georgia Police Department), IS2 Bradley L. Pope (Chief of Police, Canton, Ga.), MA1 Gregory L. Owen (Special Agent in Charge, Georgia Bureau of Investigations), MA1 Terry L. Crowell (Special Agent, GBI) and IS1 Sharon E. Moody (Captain, Cobb County Ga. PD). (Photo by JO2 John S. Verrico, NSIC)

by JO2 John S. Verrico
NSIC Public Affairs Assistant

Today's Naval Reserve is better and more qualified than ever. Reservists bring their many years of experience to the Navy. Many of our Reserve Masters-at-Arms (MAs) are working as policemen or detectives in police departments around the country.

Recently five reservists completed their two-week Active Duty for Training at Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC) Headquarters in Washington DC, and it was readily apparent that these sailors were highly qualified.

Master-at-Arms First Class Gregory L. Owen is the Special Agent-in-Charge of the Georgia Bureau of Investigations (GBI) and is currently

in charge of the Metropolitan Drug and Vice Force in Atlanta. He has 13 years of experience in law enforcement and holds a degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Georgia.

Master-at-Arms First Class Terry L. Crowell, with nearly 20 years of law enforcement experience, has been serving as a special agent with the GBI for the past 12 years. Prior to that he worked for the Los Angeles Police Department for six years and served nearly two years as the Chief of Police in Eastman, Georgia. Crowell is a certified law enforcement instructor and holds a Criminal Justice degree from Moorpark Junior College in California. He is currently serving as the leading petty officer of the security force for his reserve unit at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Fla.

Intelligence Specialist First Class Sharon E. Moody, who is currently considering conversion to Master-at-Arms, is a captain with the Cobb County Georgia Police Department (one of the top police departments in the country), and is the commanding officer for the Crimes Against Children Unit. While in Washington DC, Capt. Moody presented training seminars to NIS Special Agents at NSIC on child abuse investigations. Moody, a 1970 graduate of the University of Georgia and a 1973 graduate of the Georgia Police Academy, has had 15 years of police experience, 14 years of which as a detective with the Crimes Against Children Unit. Moody is assigned to the FIRSTEURLANT 0967 Reserve Unit at NAS Atlanta.

Master-at-Arms First Class Tommy L. Keheley, another Cobb County Police Department captain, has had over 18 years of law enforcement experience, 8 1/2 years of which was in investigations including narcotics and intelligence. He is currently in charge of the department's Special Activities Section, which is made up of five specialized units. Keheley has 26 specialized schools to his credit, including the FBI National Academy and U.S. Secret Service schools, and holds degrees from the Universities of Virginia and Georgia, and the Southern Technical Institute.

Intelligence Specialist Second Class Bradley L. Pope, formerly Captain of the Intelligence Division of the Cobb County Georgia Police Department, is currently serving as the Chief of Police in Canton, Georgia. A graduate of the FBI National Academy, Pope has more than 13 years of law enforcement experience and is currently enrolled in Kennesaw College in Marietta, Georgia.

Between them, these five individuals bring eighty years of police experience to the Navy's reserve law enforcement contingent. ★

NAVTELCOM reservist first to earn new NEC

Reserve First Class Master-at-Arms Rodney E. Owens, became the first reservist to be awarded the MA-2002 Military Investigator NEC in April 1988. A criminal investigator for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for over 10 years, Owen has been affiliated with the Naval Reserve since May 1986 and is currently assigned as Security Director with Naval Telecommunications Command Headquarters 0306, Washington DC.

Owens, 35, brings several years of diversified civilian and military law enforcement experience to the Naval Reserve. After release from active duty in the U.S. Air Force, he served as a Security Police Law Enforcement Specialist Supervisor in the Air Force Reserve, and as a

Special Agent with a reserve unit of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command. Since transferring to the Naval Reserve, Owens has served with the Master-at-Arms Force at Philadelphia Naval Base and USS ESTOCIN (FFG-15).

In the civilian world he has held positions as Nuclear Security Officer and Police Officer with two police departments.

Owens is a certified protection officer and holds professional certification through the International Academy of Criminology. He is also a certified locksmith and security systems specialist. ★

NISRO-RU 0602 (New York)

Reservists aid in major exercise

by Lt. Jay S. Caputo
Public Affairs Officer, NISRO RU 0602

Five members of the Naval Investigative Service Regional Office Reserve Unit 0602 (NISRO RU 0602), New York, responded to a short notice request for reserve officers with law enforcement/physical security backgrounds. These officers were requested by Commander, Naval Base Norfolk, Va. to assist with the planning, preparation and execution of Physical Security Exercise (PSX) 87, an exercise involving Norfolk's resident commands. This exercise was run concurrently and intertwined with a major fleet exercise, Solid Shield 87.

Cmdr. Mike Homan, Lt. Cmdr.'s Charles Johnson and William Clifford, and Lt.'s Jay Caputo and William Siedenstein, all credentialed NIS Reserve Agents, represented NISRO RU 0602 during this exercise.

These officers controlled a simulated gate protest, a sniper scenario, aircraft hijacking, hostage situation, attempted assassination of flag officers, several flightline penetrations, and several "Zulu-Five-Oscars" (bomb threats). At the conclusion of this eventful Active Duty Training (ACDUTRA) the general feeling among the participants was that the exercise was a rather successful learning experience, not only for those whose security was tested, but also for the officers and enlisted reservists who took part in PSX-87. The members of NISRO RU 0602 and other experienced reservists who took part in PSX-87 brought a vast expanse of knowledge to the exercise and greatly enhanced its credibility. The fact that these individuals were fortunate enough to be on hand to observe the events of PSX-87 enhances not only their own individual readiness, but that of their unit as well. ★



RESERVE

MA1 Alejandro Patino

Meet a modern Matt Dillon

by JOI Joann Hellmann
Naval Air Station, Barber's Point, Hawaii

“Hey pardner, meet a modern day Matt Dillon.” First Class Master-at-Arms Alejandro Patino is a Naval Reservist who stands out by virtue of his unique occupation -- he's a Deputy U.S. Marshal.

Patino got involved in law enforcement during his last two years on active duty with the Navy. He was stationed at Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in the Master-at-Arms/Shore Patrol Department. Since his discharge from active duty in August 1981, Patino has been attached to numerous units of the Reserve community. His most recent affiliation is as the Chief Master-at-Arms and Command Security Force Supervisor for the Naval Reserve Unit at Naval Air Station Barber's Point, Hawaii.

“I became very interested in the field and decided to apply to the Honolulu Police Department after my discharge. I was accepted in February 1982, and took advantage of the training and opportunities that were offered,” says Patino.

The training included a 32-

week stint at the police academy -- a program that covered every aspect of police work from arrest procedures to search warrants.

As interesting as his job as a police officer was, a year later Patino set his sights on an even more challenging career.

“I realized the federal law enforcement system offered greater opportunities,” he explained. “I applied for, and was hired by, the Border Patrol.

“During the same time, I was being processed for the Marshal's Service. I was interviewed, selected, and on the job within two weeks. Plus, I was allowed to fill a vacancy here in the Hawaii office.”

Since 1984, Patino has attended the Criminal Investigator and U.S. Marshal's recruit schools, firearms instructor school, and the advanced U.S. Marshal and protective service schools, all located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. He has also attended numerous law enforcement seminars and conferences.

Since Patino joined the Justice Department's U.S. Marshal Service,

he has been promoted to criminal investigator, and has been involved in the kind of international exploits the rest of us read about in magazines or watch on the evening news.

For example, Patino was assigned to a protective detail in Jacksonville, Florida. During an ongoing trial, many witnesses testified against Colombian Carlos Lehder-Rivas. Lehder-Rivas was extradited about a year ago, and was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine. He was a known member of the *Medellin Cartel*, an organization alleged to be responsible for over 80 percent of the cocaine that enters the United States.

Early in 1986, Patino was assigned to San Diego as part of the Fugitive Investigative Strike Team (FIST) which made over 3,600 arrests. The operation lasted about eight weeks, and covered major cities along the U.S./Mexico border.

“We used ruses, like having a marshal dress up as a mailman and deliver packages to the fugitive's last known address. Or we'd deliver letters offering bogus prizes or tax refunds,” Patino pointed out.


Other specialty areas that Marshals handle (besides court security, witness protection, fugitive investigations, and organized crime and drug enforcement) are seizure and forfeitures, threat analysis, and working with Interpol, the international police organization.

In a Marshal's line of work, there's lots of travel, danger and adventure, and according to Patino, there's no such thing as a typical day. “In the course of a day, I may be providing court security in the morning, pursuing and arresting a fugitive by midday, assist another justice

agency in processing cash that has been seized during the early afternoon, then be instructed to pack my bags and catch a flight to the mainland for another assignment," Patino elaborated.

"The amount of travelling that I do varies from month to month; but I have logged no less than 100,000 miles a year going to the mainland, Guam, American Samoa, and inter-island travel. The majority of the travelling that I do involves prisoner transportation," he added.

The job certainly has its share of danger, but Patino says his training helps him to always be physically and mentally prepared and, to an extent, able to instinctively react when threatened. And, he says, he's got his trusty six-shooter. ★



MAI Al Patino completed a two-week ACDUTRA at NSIC Headquarters in July 1988. During this period, Patino assisted NSIC personnel in reviewing and coordinating lesson plans for a Basic Naval Reserve MA Law Enforcement Course, and provided reference material. He developed a comprehensive list of directives and other reference materials pertinent to Naval Reserve Security Units, to be used as a distribution guide. Patino also is coordinating the establishment of a Naval Reserve Security Unit in Hawaii. It was a busy ACDUTRA for the Deputy Marshal who also represented NSIC at the National Defense University 19-21 July, in the Low Intensity Conflict Gaming Systems Wargame exercise. (Photo by JO2 John S. Verrico, NSIC)

U.S. Marshal tradition stems back before the 'old west'

As a Deputy Marshal, Al Patino is part of a law enforcement tradition that goes back much farther than the days of the wild west we see in movies like "*High Noon*" and "*Gunfight at the OK Corral*."

While marshals and their deputies were prominent in the taming of the Frontier, they actually got their start in 1789 when President George Washington appointed the original 13 of them.

Western expansion in the late 1800's were trying times for U.S. Marshals. They were undermanned, and forced to meet the most grueling of hardships. In that newly chartered territory, they made their imprint as custodians of the law by tracking down the bad guys.

Today they are among the best fugitive hunters in the world.

FLEET KUDOS

USS SAIPAN (LHA-2)

Entire MAA Force gets ESWS qualified



by J03 Michael Massung , USS SAIPAN (LHA-2)

The Master-at-Arms Force in USS SAIPAN (LHA-2) recently reached a milestone as all eight members of the force became Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialists (ESWS).

The eight (from left) are: MAC (SW) Robert G. Ruger, MA1 (SW) Raymond S. Jahnke, MA1 (SW) Kenneth W. Roadman, IC1 (SW) Howard Middleton, ABH1 (SW) Patrick McHale, MA1 (SW) Michael H. Meussling, MA1 (SW) Clinton S. Johnson, and OS2 (SW) Richard W. Saunders (not shown).

As Chief Master-at-Arms, Ruger instills in his personnel a desire to achieve. He set requirements that all his personnel must be Master-at-Arms PQS qualified within two months after reporting for duty and should be ESWS qualified as soon as possible.

Jahnke, one of the rated MAs, said of the accomplishment, "Because we are in general looked upon by everyone as 4.0 sailors, having the ESWS pin is icing on the cake."

McHale, an Aviation Boatswain's Mate Aircraft Handler, said, "I think that it shows the versatility of the Master-at-Arms training program...that even in a relatively short period of time aviation personnel are able to get their (surface warfare qualification)."

The chief and all of SAIPAN's Masters-at-Arms encourage all MAs to go for the silver cutlasses because two points can mean an advancement in YOUR CAREER! "GO FOR IT!" (Photo by PH3 Donald Kolb) ★

USS BRUMBY (FF-1044)

MAC gets 3 awards in 3 months



by Lt. j.g. David S. Shea, USNR
Public Affairs Officer, USS BRUMBY (FF-1044)

Theodore Roosevelt once said, "Do what you can, with what you have, where you are." Chief Master-at-Arms (SW) Michael R. Schwartz (left) is certainly making the most of his sea tour aboard the Charleston-based frigate USS BRUMBY (FF-1044). In a less than three month period, he received his Enlisted Surface Warfare pin and two medals.

On 15 December 1987, Schwartz was designated an Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist, receiving his crossed cutlasses after his first appearance before the ship's ESWS board. Cmdr. J. R. Wall, BRUMBY's Commanding Officer, presented Schwartz with the ESWS pin and congratulated him on his fine performance before the board.

In January 1988, Schwartz received a Navy Achievement Medal for his superior performance as BRUMBY's Chief Master-at-Arms and his outstanding community service. Schwartz was active in community affairs in the Portland, Maine area where BRUMBY was undergoing overhaul.

In February, he was awarded his third Good Conduct Medal.

"Chief Schwartz's performance has been outstanding," said the frigate's Executive Officer, Lt. Cmdr. J. T. McComb. "He's a hard charger -- a real asset to the ship and the Master-at-Arms community." (U.S. Navy photo) ★

USS HUNLEY (AS-31)

MA1 named Sailor of the Year

First Class Master-at-Arms Frederick W. Turner was named Sailor of the Year aboard the submarine tender USS HUNLEY (AS-31). Turner attributes his selection to his involvement with the crew where he has worked to implement a one-on-one relationship with shipmates.

"I'm working to provide a customer service to support the crew," Turner said. He said there should be an open-door policy in the Master-at-Arms (MAA) Office for anyone who has a problem. He stressed the problem doesn't even have to be UCMJ related.

He also attributes his success to his desire to excel in the Navy, characterized by his application for the Limited Duty Officer (LDO) Program to work as a physical security officer. "I feel I can be more beneficial to the Navy as an officer," he said. "I feel making Sailor of the Year should help me in my LDO efforts," he concluded.

Turner strongly urges his shipmates to give the most possible to the Navy. He stresses that HUNLEY is a good command and one that does its best to help the crew excel.

While working in the MAA office he has implemented many changes. Turner had asked his detailer for a challenging billet and was sent to the HUNLEY. This was his first shipboard command where men and women served onboard. He began making improvements to the MAA system almost immediately. His first

change was the initiation of a minor offense program. There was also a problem with the early chow line system at the time, so he began a program to ensure eligible crewmembers would receive early chow privileges.

His biggest challenge however, was changing the image of HUNLEY's MAA force. Crewmembers serving on the force had been regarding themselves as cops rather than as people providing a service for the crew. Turner undertook the task of ensuring this attitude went away and that all members of the force were properly trained. Since then, he has seen many changes in the ship's attitude toward the MAA force and now he continuously receives applications from crewmembers who want to join.

His own abilities aside, Turner credits his Chief Master-at-Arms for his selection. "The CMAA has supported me and she helped me become Sailor of the Year," he said and added that her "selling" really boosted his chances. "I think all (sailors) should be lucky enough to have a good chief to (support them and) sell them to their chain of command," Turner noted. ★

Reported by JO3 Merrilee Greer, USS HUNLEY (AS-31)

USS MIDWAY (CV-41)

MA's qualify as Air Warfare Specialists



Master-at-Arms First Class William A. Pitard (I.) and Chief Master-at-Arms Ygnacio V. Flores completed qualifications as Air Warfare Specialists in November 1987 and were awarded their AW pins. Flores is the Patrols Supervisor and Pitard is the Physical Security Petty Officer aboard the aircraft carrier USS MIDWAY (CV-41), homeported in Yokosuka, Japan. (Photo by PHAN W. W. French) ★



by JO2 John S. Verrico
NSIC Public Affairs Assistant

On 28 June 1988, Capt. William E. Nordeen, Defense and Naval Attache to Athens, Greece, was assassinated. A remote-controlled car bomb, planted on the street near his home in Athens, was detonated as he drove past. The Greek terrorist group, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, took 'credit' for the assassination.

Could terrorist incidents like this latest one be prevented? There is no way to be 100% sure, but certain steps can be taken to reduce the vulnerability of Americans abroad.

While traveling between locations, control over personal security becomes limited. People are most vulnerable traveling from place to place, and especially to and from work because of the predictability. Some basic precautions can help prevent you from becoming predictable and help reduce your vulnerability.

Varying your daily pattern as much as possible, such as leaving and returning at different times and using alternate routes, can be your greatest asset. Consider traveling with escorts such as driving with a neighbor or carpooling with co-workers.

Park your vehicle in a safe, well-lit area, off street if possible, and always lock it, no matter where it is located. Keep the trunk locked, too.

Before entering a vehicle, examine it for any foreign objects inside or underneath, and check the exterior for any evidence of attempted entry.

When you have to park in public areas, don't leave uniforms, government parking passes, or other items which indicate government affiliation, exposed in the car.

Surveillance is the key to successful terrorist operations. Terrorism has a success rate of over 90% in terms of accomplishing the intended tasks. Statistics show that if the surveillance stage is fruitful, the opera-

Defending against terrorism

Reducing American vulnerability

Part 5 in a series

Personal security measures for traveling

Steps you can take to protect yourself while in transit, and to reduce risk of surveillance

tion itself will also be successful. However, the plots are most vulnerable during this stage. If surveillance is discovered, intended victims can take measures to protect themselves, and the plan can be ruined.

Make a practice of visually scanning the street before you depart any building, checking the area for parked cars with passengers and be alert for surveillance. If possible, use different doors or gates when departing and entering your home or office. You should be constantly alert to road conditions and surroundings, and be alert for possible surveillance by car, motorcycle or even bicycle. Prior to exiting your vehicle, check the surrounding area for suspicious individuals. When in doubt, drive away.

When driving, always fasten your seat belt, keep your doors locked and do not open the windows more than a few inches. Never pick up hitchhikers and be cautious when assisting other motorists who appear to be in distress.

Select well-traveled streets as much as possible, and avoid trips to

remote areas.

Know your route and be alert to your location even if you are a passenger. You should be familiar with the location of police stations, hospitals, and military, government and other public facilities along the route and be aware of "safe areas" that may be used in an emergency.

Normally the existence of surveillance means that you are not in immediate danger of being attacked. If you believe you are being followed, take the following actions.

First of all, do not reveal to those following you that you suspect them. Avoid stopping or taking other actions that may force a confrontation. If you have communications in your vehicle, notify authorities that you are under surveillance and try to observe any identifying data without drawing undue attention.

If you feel you are in danger, immediately drive to the nearest "safe area." **Do not drive home.** If you cannot locate a suitable "safe area" and still feel endangered, take evasive driving actions.

Bypass suspicious road blockades by driving on the shoulder or through a ditch. Be alert for, and give wide berth to, cars or trucks parked along the road, particularly if there are several people nearby, and be alert for slow-moving vehicles. They could be attempts to slow your car. Maintain adequate distance between your car and other vehicles preceding you to avoid being blocked, and never pull all the way up to the car in front of you at a traffic light or stop sign.

Another step you can take is continuously honking your horn, as this may be an occasion where you may want to draw attention to yourself.

Most important of all is to be sure to report all suspected surveillances immediately to appropriate security officials.

Some other things to keep in mind include keeping your vehicle in a high state of maintenance at all times. You should keep the gas tank at least half-full. Install appropriate mirrors, locks and other devices on vehicles to enhance security and safety. Separate your ignition key from all other keys. If it is necessary to leave keys with parking attendants, leave the ignition

key only and do not permit entry to the trunk unless you are present.

Keep a low profile. Drive vehicles that are common to the locale to avoid undue attention.

You can guard against the establishment of traveling routines by varying modes of travel as well as routes and times. If possible, use public transportation as an additional method of varying your routine, but keep the following precautionary techniques in mind.

If you are a frequent taxi user, do not always patronize the same stand. If you are suspicious of any taxi driver, wave him off and hail another. Whenever possible, select the route to your destination and do not permit the driver to deviate from your choice.

Travel on commercial vehicles with a companion whenever possible. If you take a bus or subway, board from a well illuminated and busy stop and sit in a crowded section of the vehicle.

For air travel, arrive at the airport early and, if possible, pick up your tickets there. Avoid loitering in public sections of the airport as most terrorist incidents occur in public waiting areas of airports. Proceed quickly


through security checkpoints to secure areas to await your flight. Use military flights when practical.

For those who like to walk or jog for recreation, the following suggestions are made. Do not walk or jog alone -- go with people you know and trust. Vary your routes and routines. Wear clothing similar to that worn by the local populace, avoiding those marked "USA", "US NAVY", or with any other design that would identify you as American. In some countries jogging identifies you as an American, and is discouraged.

When staying at private hotels, do not use your rank or title. Don't see unfamiliar visitors in a hotel room or private suite. Do not accept visitors except by appointment, and know the nature of their business prior to seeing them.

Avoid sidewalk cafes. In restaurants, request a table away from the entrance and windows, and preferably near a wall to limit directions of potential attack.

By taking some of these basic precautions, you can make yourself a difficult 'target' for terrorists, and most-likely, they will move on to find someone more predictable. ★



This car-bomb killed an American sailor and four Italian nationals, wounded 17 other Italians, and destroyed the USO, a popular liberty "hang-out" for fleet sailors in Naples, Italy, on 14 April 1988. The bomb was detonated on the street in front of the USO.. (U.S. Navy photo)

Sailor sentenced to 1 year for DUI manslaughter

When USS SARATOGA neared her homeport of Naval Station Mayport last November, Chief Petty Officer Joseph E. Stuckey was flown aboard to join the crew for the final few days of their cruise.

But instead of wearing his Navy khakis, Stuckey wore prison grays.

He wasn't going aboard to order subordinates around, he was going to be an example of what can happen to sailors who drink and drive.

On 9 November 1987, Stuckey pleaded guilty to vehicular manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and DUI resulting in serious injury. The charges stemmed from a 6 June 1987 accident in which Stuckey ran into the rear of a jeep, killing 26-year-old Deborah P. Norman and injuring her 1 1/2-year-old daughter, Christina. Both were thrown from their jeep. Mrs. Norman died instantly and Christina suffered injuries, including a broken jaw, but she has recovered.

A Circuit Judge sentenced Stuckey to one year in prison, to be followed by 15 years of a unique probation. Stuckey, who is currently serving his sentence on the work-release program, will serve 250 community

service hours for the Navy, trying to save the lives of his fellow sailors. He will meet incoming ships and talk about what drinking and driving has done to his life.

"The most dangerous time for a sailor right now is not in the Persian Gulf," said Assistant State Attorney (Florida) Wayne Ellis. "It's the two weeks after the ship docks."

Chief Warrant Officer Marcus Garrett, director of the Navy Alcohol and Drug Safety Program, said that each time a major ship docks in Mayport, an average of two to three sailors die in alcohol-related traffic accidents. According to Garrett, the last six times that SARATOGA returned from lengthy deployments, at least one crewman has been killed.

Normally, when ships come in from a deployment, Florida Highway Patrol personnel go aboard and lecture on drunken driving. Stuckey believes he might succeed where the policemen have failed.

"You have to remember that when you've been at sea for six to eight months, your mind is not with the (police), it's back at home with your family," said Stuckey, who has a wife and daughter. When sailors see one of their own in a prison uniform talking

about how his life was ruined by drunken driving, it will have a more profound effect, he said.

The Navy has agreed to retain Stuckey on active duty as a chief petty officer until he completes 20 years. He was lucky. At the time of his arrest, he happened to fit a profile the State Attorney was trying to fill. Ellis was looking for several types of articulate professionals, busted for DUI, who would be willing to talk to other people about what happened to them. One of the profiles was a sailor who had been successful in the Navy. Ellis wanted a sailor who could talk to other sailors about the perils of drunken driving. Stuckey fit the bill.

As an additional part of his sentence, Stuckey will also be responsible for Christina's financial well-being until she is 18. He will pay \$400.00 per month for child support and take out a \$10,000.00 life insurance policy on himself, naming her as the beneficiary. ★

Parts of this article were paraphrased from an article by Derek L. Kinner, Staff Writer, *The Florida Times-Union*, Jacksonville, Florida, November 10, 1987.

Tips for prospective LDOs and CWOs

by Lt. Cmdr. Jerry LoPorto
Physical Security and Law Enforcement Officer, CINCPACFLT

First of all let me take the opportunity to personally congratulate and welcome into our community those people that were selected for Limited Duty Officer (LDO) and Chief Warrant Officer (CWO). Sitting on the selection board was quite an experience. After reviewing so many applications, I was both *impressed* and *depressed*.

On the positive side, many records were very impressive. Both the applicant and the command had taken the time to properly document and prepare good packages. These records were enjoyable to review. Sustained superior performance, coupled with vast experience, superlative comments from the commanding officer and well-written appraiser comments said a lot.

On the other hand, some individuals had no business submitting applications. They wasted their time, their command's time, the interviewers' time, and the selection board's time. Many applicants submitted poorly documented packages, had very little or no security or law enforcement experience, had poor performance marks, weak endorsements from the command and no indications from the appraisers that the individual was really ready to become an LDO or CWO. These individuals should not have applied.

This article is an effort to explain to future applicants, security officers, interviewers and commanding officers some major factors to consider when submitting packages for LDO or CWO. Actual board procedures can not be discussed but the following suggestions are offered.

The Application: Don't wait until the last moment to start putting your package together. 'Thick' applications get no extra points. Organize the extra material. Do not include what is on your microfiche, unless it is specifically required. Go the extra distance. All special qualifications such as ESWS, CDO, Criminal Investigator, Instructor, etc. are considered. If your GCT/ARI is below average, you can counter them with education. Low scores combined with no off-duty education are not favorable. Paragraph 12 lets you talk to the board. Use it to explain unusual entries in your record, broken service, bad evaluation, past medical problem, etc. But don't ramble; use bullets and facts. Ensure your package is neat, accurate, complete and in proper order.

Interview Board and Appraisal Sheets: Present a positive image at your interview board. This includes grooming and uniform appearance. Stay abreast on current military, Navy and professional issues. Interviewers' comments which are weak or average don't go far. Inter-

viewers should tell it like it is. If a candidate is ready for selection then say so, if not, equally say so. Phrases like "I think" or "I believe with a little time..." are not positive. Rank and designator of interview board members must be entered on the interview form. LDO/CWO members are required, or the CO must state why they are not available in the endorsement.

Commanding Officer's endorsement: The CO's endorsement is critical and must contain specifics as to why applicant is better than the competition. If the CO doesn't want the candidate selected, then the application should not be submitted. Comments such as "sharpest chief petty officer I have come across in twenty five years" or "candidate is the number one chief out of 20 at this command," are very helpful. The CO should read the interview sheets before writing the endorsement and the two should be in agreement. Finally, the CO's endorsement should not be signed 'by direction' or 'acting.'


List of past duty stations and assignments: Take the time and effort to detail and describe your duties fully. Use the horizontal format. A variety of types of duty and assignments, e.g., sea, shore, staff, security, law enforcement, are important for a well-rounded career pattern.

Education and Correspondence courses: All off-duty education certainly helps, including formal colleges and schools, and correspondence courses. In addition to professional courses relating to security and law enforcement, other Navy courses are helpful. Don't concentrate only on law enforcement, security or other "job related" courses. Courses from other services are also good. Be consistent in submitting correspondence courses, don't cram at the last minute. Off-duty education should be within reasonable limits. Continuous full-time schooling raises doubts about your ability to do your Navy job.

Extra-curricular activities: Participate in something job-related, e.g., neighborhood crime watch or crime prevention programs for the community are good. Active membership in professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, are good and show a desire to stay abreast with our community.

Finally, review your microfiche, double check your records for neatness and accuracy, and don't give up. Continue to strive for perfection. Don't accept being second best. Get involved in writing security plans and directives, prove to your command that you are "Head and Shoulders" ahead of your contemporaries.

I will be happy to discuss the LDO/CWO security program with anyone in our community. Feel free to give me a call at Autovon: 474-6785 or Commercial: (808) 474-6785/6790. "Good Luck" ★



SECURITY

Defense Mapping Agency
SEPT. 1986



ANNOUNCING THE

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Submit original ideas and/or artwork to:
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 Security Awareness Poster Contest
 8621 Georgia Ave.
 Silver Spring, Md 20910
 Deadline: 31 December 1988

Posters will become property of the Department of the Navy and, when published, will become public domain. Participants will get some small recognition and will be helping the Department of the Navy Security Awareness Program.

Refer questions about the contest to Jim McElroy
 at AV: 291-5969 or Comm: (301) 427-5969.

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