

Date : 2020/02/23 التاريخ :

Ref : 20/306/DDGASD/4 الإشارة :

REGULATORY CIRCULAR (NO. 2020-19)

Subject:

Notice of Amendment to Kuwait Civil Aviation Safety Regulations KCASR (issue 4).

Purpose:

The purpose of this Regulatory Circular No. **2020-19** is to Amend KCASR 6 - OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT - Part SPO - Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) & Guidance Materials (GM) (issue 4) .

This Regulatory Circular No. **2020-19** is based on (NPA) No. 2019-38 dated on 11/Dec/2019.

Revisions:

This amendment will be included in revision (2) of KCASR 6 - OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT - Part SPO - Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) & Guidance Materials (GM).

Regulatory Requirements:

This amendment shall apply to the following Organizations approved by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) or authorized to operate within the State of Kuwait:

1. Approved Maintenance Organizations (AMO) Holders;
2. Air Navigation Service Providers;
3. Air Operator Certificate (AOC) & Private Operator Certificate (POC) Holders;
4. Airport Operators;
5. Ground Handling Service Providers;
6. Flying Training Organizations;
7. All users of KCASRs.

Effective Date:

This new revision will be in effect from (02/ Apr/2020).

Required Action:

All users of KCASR are required to comply with the provisions contained within this amendment from the effective date.

President of Civil Aviation


Eng. Emad F. Al-Jelwi
Deputy Director General For Aviation
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Date : 2020/02/23 التاريخ :

Ref : 20/308/DDGASD/4 الإشارة :

Deputy Director General for Air Navigation Affairs,
Directorate General of Civil Aviation,
Kuwait.

Sub.: Regulatory Circular No. 2020-19.
Revision Number 02 to Kuwait Civil Aviation Safety Regulations - KCASR 6 -
OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT - PART SPO - ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF
COMPLIANCE (AMC) & GUIDANCE MATERIALS (GM)

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed herewith the regulatory circular No. 2020-19 regarding the issuance of *KCASR 6 - Operation of Aircraft - Part SPO - Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) & Guidance Materials (GM)*. This is for your information and distribution to all concerned departments.

Up to date KCASR Parts are published on the DGCA/ASD website (<https://kcasr.dgca.gov.kw>).

If required, the DGCA/Aviation Safety Department personnel are available to answer your questions on the interpretation and intended implementation of the proposed amendments.

KCASR 6 - Operation of Aircraft - Part SPO - Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) & Guidance Materials (GM) will be in effect from the date of issue of the Regulatory Circular.

Yours Sincerely,

Deputy Director General for Aviation Safety
& Air Transport.


Eng. Emad F. Al-Jelwi
Deputy Director General For Aviation
Safety, Air Transport, Civil Aviation
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Cc: President of Civil Aviation.
Director General of Civil Aviation.
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الطيران المدني
Civil Aviation

دولة الكويت - State of Kuwait

Kuwait Civil Aviation Safety Regulations

KCASR 6 – OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT ***PART SPO – ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE*** ***(AMC) & GUIDANCE MATERIALS (GM)***



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Amendment Record

Amendment No	Date of Issue	Remarks
2	June 2018	Name update
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Control of this Document

DC.1 Introduction

DC.1.1 Pursuant to Law No (30) of the year 1960 and subsequent Ministerial Decisions No (3) of the year 1986, No (18) of the year 1990, and No (3) of the year 1996, based upon that Law and as reflected in the Preamble to the Kuwait Civil Aviation Safety Regulations, Issue 4, Rev.2, August 2019, the President of the Kuwait Directorate General of Civil Aviation is empowered to adopt and amend Kuwait Civil Aviation Safety Regulations. In accordance herewith, the following AMC & GM is hereby established for compliance by all persons concerned. This AMC & GM shall be known as KCASR 6 Part SPO Special Operations AMC & GM and any reference to this title shall mean referring to these regulations governing the requirements to be met for the certification of air operations.

DC.2 Authority for this Regulation

DC.2.1 This KCASR 6 Part SPO Special Operations AMC & GM is issued on the authority of the President of the Kuwait Directorate General of Civil Aviation.

DC.3 Applicability

DC.3.1 This KCASR 6 Part SPO Special Operations AMC & GM is applicable to the aviation industry of the State of Kuwait.

DC.4 Scope

DC.4.1 KCASR 6 Air Operations AMC & GM contains the acceptable means of compliance and guidance material for the operation of aircraft regulations of the State of Kuwait, and shows compliance with ICAO Annex 6. The AMC & GM are separated into the following parts with cross references between parts where applicable.

- Part ARO Authority Requirements for Air Operations AMC and GM
- Part ORO Organisation Regulations for Air Operations AMC and GM
- Part DEF Definitions AMC and GM
- Part CAT Commercial Air Transport AMC and GM
- Part SPA Specific Approvals AMC and GM
- **Part SPO Special Operations AMC and GM**
- Part NCC Non Commercial with Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft AMC and GM
- Part NCO Non Commercial other than Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft AMC and GM

DC.5 Definitions

DC.5.1 Terms not defined shall have the meaning given to them in the relevant legal instruments or international legal instruments in which they appear, especially as they appear in the Convention and its Annexes.



KCASR 6 Part SPO Special Operations AMC & GM

AMC1 SPO.GEN.005 Scope

Criteria

The operators should consider the following criteria to determine whether an activity falls within the scope of specialised operations:

- (a) the aircraft is flown close to the surface to fulfil the mission;
- (b) abnormal manoeuvres are performed;
- (c) special equipment is necessary to fulfil the mission and which affects the manoeuvrability of the aircraft;
- (d) substances are released from the aircraft during the flight where these substances are either harmful or affect the manoeuvrability of the aircraft;
- (e) external loads or goods are lifted or towed; or
- (f) persons enter or leave the aircraft during flight.

GM1 SPO.GEN.005 Scope

List of Specialised Operations

- (a) Specialised operations include the following activities:
 - (1) helicopter external loads operations;
 - (2) helicopter survey operations;
 - (3) human external cargo operations;
 - (4) parachute operations and skydiving;
 - (5) agricultural flights;
 - (6) aerial photography flights;
 - (7) glider towing;
 - (8) aerial advertising flights;
 - (9) calibration flights;
 - (10) construction work flights, including stringing power line operations, clearing saw operations;
 - (11) oil spill work;
 - (12) avalanche mining operations;
 - (13) survey operations, including aerial mapping operations, pollution control activity;
 - (14) news media flights, television and movie flights;
 - (15) special events flights, including such as flying display and competition flights;
 - (16) aerobatic flights;
 - (17) animal herding, animal rescue flights and veterinary dropping flights;
 - (18) maritime funeral operations;
 - (19) scientific research flights (other than those under Annex II to KCASR 0, Basic Regulation);
 - (20) cloud seeding; and
 - (21) sensational flights: flights involving extreme aerobatic manoeuvres carried out for the purpose of allowing the persons on board to experience zero gravity, high G-forces or similar sensations.

<i>Kuwait Civil Aviation Safety Regulations</i>		<i>KCASR 6 – Operation of Aircraft</i>
		<i>Part SPO – AMC & GM</i>

- (b) For other operations, the operator can apply the criteria specified in AMC1 SPO.GEN.005 to determine whether an activity falls within the scope of specialised operations.



Subpart A — General requirements

GM1 SPO.GEN.105(e)(2) Crew member responsibilities

General

In accordance with 7.g. of Annex IV to KCASR 0, Basic Regulation, a crew member must not perform duties on board an aircraft when under the influence of psychoactive substances or alcohol or when unfit due to injury, fatigue, medication, sickness or other similar causes. This should be understood as including the following:

- (a) effects of deep water diving and blood donation, and allowing for a certain time period between these activities and returning to flying; and
- (b) without prejudice to more restrictive national regulations, the consumption of alcohol while on duty or less than 8 hours prior to the commencement of duties, and commencing a flight duty period with a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.2 per thousand.

GM1 SPO.GEN.107 Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

General

In accordance with 1.c. of Annex IV to KCASR Basic Regulation, the pilot-in-command is responsible for the operation and safety of the aircraft and for the safety of all crew members, task specialists and cargo on board. This includes the following:

- (a) the safety of all persons and cargo on board, as soon as he/she arrives on board, until he/she leaves the aircraft at the end of the flight; and
- (b) the operation and safety of the aircraft:
 - (1) for aeroplanes, from the moment it is first ready to move for the purpose of flight until the moment it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) used as primary propulsion unit(s) is/are shut down;
 - (2) for helicopters, from the moment the engine(s) are started until the helicopter comes to rest at the end of the flight with the engine(s) shut down and the rotor blades stopped;
 - (3) for sailplanes, from the moment the launch procedure is started until the aircraft comes to rest at the end of the flight; or
 - (4) for balloons, from the moment the inflating of the envelope is started until the envelope is deflated.

GM1 SPO.GEN.107(a)(8) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

Recording Utilisation Data

Where an aircraft conducts a series of flights of short duration — such as a helicopter doing a series of lifts — and the aircraft is operated by the same pilot-in-command, the utilisation data for the series of flights may be recorded in the aircraft technical log or journey log as a single entry.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.107(c) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority

Reporting of Hazardous Flight Conditions

- (a) These reports should include any detail which may be pertinent to the safety of other aircraft.



- (b) Such reports should be made whenever any of the following conditions are encountered or observed:
- (1) severe turbulence;
 - (2) severe icing;
 - (3) severe mountain wave;
 - (4) thunderstorms, with or without hail, that are obscured, embedded, widespread or in squall lines;
 - (5) heavy dust storm or heavy sandstorm;
 - (6) volcanic ash cloud; and
 - (7) unusual and/or increasing volcanic activity or a volcanic eruption.
- (c) When other meteorological conditions not listed above, e.g. wind shear, are encountered that, in the opinion of the pilot-in-command, may affect the safety or the efficiency of other aircraft operations, the pilot-in-command should advise the appropriate air traffic services (ATS) unit as soon as practicable.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.107(e) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority — balloons

Violation Reporting

If required by the State in which the incident occurs, the pilot-in-command should submit a report on any such violation to the appropriate authority of the said State; in that event, the pilot-in-command should also submit a copy of it to the Kuwait DGCA. Such reports should be submitted as soon as possible and normally within 10 days.

GM1 SPO.GEN.108(c) Pilot-in-command responsibilities and authority — balloons

Protective Clothing

Protective clothing includes:

- (a) long sleeves and trousers preferably made out of natural fibres;
- (b) stout footwear; and
- (c) gloves.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.119 Taxiing of aircraft

Procedures for taxiing

Procedures for taxiing should include at least the following:

- (a) application of sterile flight deck crew compartment procedures;
- (b) use of standard radio-telephony (RTF) phraseology;
- (c) use of lights;
- (d) measures to enhance the situational awareness of the pilot-in-command. The following list of typical items should be adapted by the operator to take into account its operational environment:
 - (1) the pilot-in-command should have the necessary aerodrome layout charts available;



- (2) if applicable, the pilot taxiing the aircraft should announce in advance his/her intentions to the pilot monitoring;
- (3) if applicable, all taxi clearances should be heard, and should be understood by the pilot-in-command;
- (4) if applicable, all taxi clearances should be cross-checked against the aerodrome chart and aerodrome surface markings, signs and lights;
- (5) an aircraft taxiing on the manoeuvring area should stop and hold at all lighted stop bars, and may proceed further when an explicit clearance to enter or cross the runway has been issued by the aerodrome control tower, and when the stop bar lights are switched off;
- (6) if the pilot-in-command is unsure of his/her position, he/she should stop the aircraft and contact air traffic control;
- (7) any action, which may disturb the pilot-in-command from the taxi activity, should be avoided or done with the parking brake set.

GM1 SPO.GEN.120 Taxiing of aeroplanes

Safety Critical Activity

- (a) Taxiing should be treated as a safety-critical activity due to the risks related to the movement of the aeroplane and the potential for a catastrophic event on the ground.
- (b) Taxiing is a high-workload phase of flight that requires the full attention of the flight crew.

GM1 SPO.GEN.120(b)(4) Taxiing of aeroplanes

Skills and Knowledge

The person designated by the operator to taxi an aeroplane should possess the following skills and knowledge:

- (a) positioning of the aeroplane to ensure safety when starting engine;
- (b) getting ATIS reports and taxi clearance, where applicable;
- (c) interpretation of airfield markings/lights/signals/indicators;
- (d) interpretation of marshalling signals, where applicable;
- (e) identification of suitable parking area;
- (f) maintaining lookout and right-of-way rules and complying with ATC or marshalling instructions when applicable;
- (g) avoidance of adverse effect of propeller slipstream or jet wash on other aeroplanes, aerodrome facilities and personnel;
- (h) inspection of taxi path when surface conditions are obscured;
- (i) communication with others when controlling an aeroplane on the ground;
- (j) interpretation of operational instructions;
- (k) reporting of any problem that may occur while taxiing an aeroplane; and
- (l) adapting the taxi speed in accordance with prevailing aerodrome, traffic, surface and weather conditions.

GM1 SPO.GEN.125 Rotor engagement

Intent of The Rule

- (a) The following two situations where it is allowed to turn the rotor under power should be distinguished:



- (1) for the purpose of flight, as described in the implementing rule;
 - (2) for maintenance purposes.
- (b) Rotor engagement for the purpose of flight: it should be noted that the pilot should not leave the control when the rotors are turning. For example, the pilot is not allowed to get out of the aircraft in order to welcome persons and adjust their seat belts with the rotors turning.
- (c) Rotor engagement for the purpose of maintenance: the implementing rule, however, should not prevent ground runs being conducted by qualified personnel other than pilots for maintenance purposes.

The following conditions should be applied:

- (1) The operator should ensure that the qualification of personnel, other than pilots, who are authorised to conduct maintenance runs, is described in the appropriate manual.
- (2) Ground runs should not include taxiing the helicopter.
- (3) There should be no other persons on board.
- (4) Maintenance runs should not include collective increase or auto pilot engagement (risk of ground resonance).

GM1 SPO.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

Definitions

- (a) Definition and categories of PEDs

PEDs are any kind of electronic device, typically but not limited to consumer electronics, brought on board the aircraft by crew members, passengers, or as part of the cargo and that are not included in the approved aircraft configuration. All equipment that is able to consume electrical energy falls under this definition. The electrical energy can be provided from internal sources as batteries (chargeable or non-rechargeable) or the devices may also be connected to specific aircraft power sources.

PEDs include the following two categories:

- (1) Non-intentional transmitters can non-intentionally radiate RF transmissions, sometimes referred to as spurious emissions. This category includes, but is not limited to, calculators, cameras, radio receivers, audio and video players, electronic games and toys; when these devices are not equipped with a transmitting function.
- (2) Intentional transmitters radiate RF transmissions on specific frequencies as part of their intended function. In addition, they may radiate non-intentional transmissions like any PED. The term 'transmitting PED' (T-PED) is used to identify the transmitting capability of the PED. Intentional transmitters are transmitting devices such as RF-based remote control equipment, which may include some toys, two-way radios (sometimes referred to as private mobile radio), mobile phones of any type, satellite phones, computers with mobile phone data connection, wireless local area network (WLAN) or Bluetooth capability. After deactivation of the transmitting capability, e.g. by activating the so-called 'flight mode' or 'flight safety mode', the T-PED remains a PED having non-intentional emissions.



(b) Definition of the switched-off status

Many PEDs are not completely disconnected from the internal power source when switched off. The switching function may leave some remaining functionality e.g. data storage, timer, clock, etc. These devices can be considered switched off when in the deactivated status. The same applies for devices having no transmitting capability and are operated by coin cells without further deactivation capability, e.g. wrist watches.

GM2 SPO.GEN.130 Portable electronic devices

General

- (a) PEDs can pose a risk of interference with electronically operated aircraft systems. Those systems could range from the electronic engine control, instruments navigation or communication equipment and autopilots to any other type of avionic equipment on the aircraft. The interference can result in on-board systems malfunctioning or providing misleading information and communication disturbance. These can also lead to an increased workload for the flight crew.
- (b) Interference may be caused by transmitters being part of the PED's functionality or by unintentional transmissions from the PED. Due to the likely proximity of the PED to any electronically operated aircraft system and the generally limited shielding found in small aircraft, the risk of interference is to be considered higher than that for larger aircraft with metal airframes.
- (c) During certification of the aircraft, when qualifying the aircraft functions consideration may only have been made of short-term exposure to a high radiating field, with an acceptable mitigating measure being a return to normal function after removal of the threat. This certification assumption may not be true when operating the transmitting PED on board the aircraft.
- (d) It has been found that compliance with the electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and related European standards is not sufficient to exclude the existence of interference. A well-known interference is the demodulation of the transmitted signal from GSM (global system for mobile communications) mobile phones leading to audio disturbances in other systems. Similar interferences are difficult to predict during the PED design and protecting the aircraft's electronic systems against the full range of potential interferences is practically impossible. Therefore, not operating PEDs on-board aircraft is the safest option, especially as effects may not be identified immediately but under the most inconvenient circumstances.
- (e) Guidance to follow in case of fire caused by PEDs is provided by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, 'Emergency response guidance for aircraft incidents involving dangerous goods', ICAO Doc 9481-AN/928.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — HARDWARE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

In addition to AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a), the following should be considered:

SUITABILITY OF THE HARDWARE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

- (a) Display characteristics



Consideration should be given to the long-term degradation of a display as a result of abrasion and ageing. AMC 25-11 (paragraph 3.16a) may be used as guidance to assess luminance and legibility aspects.

Information displayed on the EFB should be legible to the typical user at the intended viewing distance(s) and under the full range of lighting conditions expected in a flight crew compartment, including direct sunlight.

Users should be able to adjust the screen brightness of an EFB independently of the brightness of other displays in the flight crew compartment. In addition, when incorporating an automatic brightness adjustment, it should operate independently for each EFB in the flight crew compartment. Brightness adjustment using software means may be acceptable provided that this operation does not adversely affect the flight crew workload.

Buttons and labels should have adequate illumination for night use. 'Buttons and labels' refers to hardware controls located on the display itself.

All controls should be properly labelled for their intended function, except if no confusion is possible.

The 90-degree viewing angle on either side of each flight crew member's line of sight may be unacceptable for certain EFB applications if aspects of the display quality are degraded at large viewing angles (e.g. the display colours wash out or the displayed colour contrast is not discernible at the installation viewing angle).

(b) Power source

The design of a portable EFB system should consider the source of electrical power, the independence of the power sources for multiple EFBs, and the potential need for an independent battery source. A non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered includes:

- (1) the possibility to adopt operational procedures to ensure an adequate level of safety (for example, ensure a minimum level of charge before departure);
- (2) the possible redundancy of portable EFBs to reduce the risk of exhausted batteries;
- (3) the availability of backup battery packs to assure an alternative source of power.

Battery-powered EFBs that have aircraft power available for recharging the internal EFB batteries are considered to have a suitable backup power source.

For EFBs that have an internal battery power source and that are used as an alternative for paper documentation that is required by SPO.GEN.140, the operator should either have at least one EFB connected to an aircraft power bus or have established mitigation means and procedures to ensure that sufficient power with acceptable margins will be available during the whole flight.

(c) Environmental testing

Environmental testing, in particular testing for rapid decompression, should be performed when the EFB hosts applications that are required to be used during flight following a rapid decompression and/or when the EFB environmental operational range is potentially insufficient with respect to the foreseeable flight crew compartment operating conditions.

The information from the rapid-decompression test of an EFB is used to establish the procedural requirements for the use of that EFB device in a pressurised aircraft. Rapid-decompression testing should follow the EUROCAE ED-14D/RTCA DO-160D (or later



revisions) guidelines for rapid-decompression testing up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft at which the EFB is to be used.

- (1) Pressurised aircraft: when a portable EFB has successfully completed rapid decompression testing, then no mitigating procedures for depressurisation events need to be developed. When a portable EFB has failed the rapid-decompression testing while turned ON, but successfully completed it when turned OFF, then procedures should ensure that at least one EFB on board the aircraft remains OFF during the applicable flight phases or that it is configured so that no damage will be incurred should rapid decompression occur in flight at an altitude higher than 10 000 ft above mean sea level (AMSL).

If an EFB system has not been tested or it has failed the rapid-decompression test, then alternate procedures or paper backup should be available.

- (2) Non-pressurised aircraft: rapid-decompression testing is not required for an EFB used in a non-pressurised aircraft. The EFB should be demonstrated to reliably operate up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft. If the EFB cannot be operated at the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft, procedures should be established to preclude operation of the EFB above the maximum demonstrated EFB operating altitude while still maintaining availability of any required aeronautical information displayed on the EFB.

The results of testing performed on a specific EFB model configuration (as identified by the EFB hardware manufacturer) may be applied to other aircraft installations and these generic environmental tests may not need to be duplicated. The operator should collect and retain:

- (1) evidence of these tests that have already been accomplished; or
- (2) suitable alternative procedures to deal with the total loss of the EFB system.

Rapid decompression tests do not need to be repeated if the EFB model identification and the battery type do not change.

The testing of operational EFBs should be avoided if possible to preclude the infliction of unknown damage to the unit during testing.

Operators should account for the possible loss or erroneous functioning of the EFB in abnormal environmental conditions.

The safe stowage and the use of the EFB under any foreseeable environmental conditions in the flight crew compartment, including turbulence, should be evaluated.

AMC2 SPO.GEN.131(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — HARDWARE — NON-COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The same considerations as those in AMC1 NCO.GEN.125 should apply in respect of EFB hardware.



AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — SOFTWARE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The same considerations as those in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b), AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) and AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) should apply in respect of EFB software.

AMC2 SPO.GEN.131(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — SOFTWARE — NON-COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The same considerations as those in AMC2 NCO.GEN.125 should apply in respect of EFB software.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

RISK ASSESSMENT — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

(a) General

Prior to the use of any EFB system, the operator should perform a risk assessment for all type B EFB applications and for the related hardware as part of its hazard identification and risk management process.

The operator may make use of a risk assessment established by the software developer. However, the operator should ensure that its specific operational environment is taken into account.

The risk assessment should:

- (1) evaluate the risks associated with the use of an EFB;
- (2) identify potential losses of function or malfunction (with detected and undetected erroneous outputs) and the associated failure scenarios;
- (3) analyse the operational consequences of these failure scenarios;
- (4) establish mitigating measures; and
- (5) ensure that the EFB system (hardware and software) achieves at least the same level of accessibility, usability, and reliability as the means of presentation it replaces.

In considering the accessibility, usability, and reliability of the EFB system, the operator should ensure that the failure of the complete EFB system as well as of individual applications, including corruption or loss of data and erroneously displayed information, has been assessed and that the risks have been mitigated to an acceptable level.

This risk assessment should be defined before the beginning of the trial period and should be amended accordingly, if necessary, at the end of this trial period. The results of the trial should establish the configuration and use of the system.

When the EFB system is intended to be introduced alongside a paper-based system, only the failures that would not be mitigated by the use of the paper-based system need to be addressed.

In all other cases, a complete risk assessment should be performed.



(b) Assessing and mitigating the risks

Some parameters of EFB applications may depend on entries made by flight crew/dispatchers, whereas others may be default parameters from within the system that are subject to an administration process (e.g. the runway line-up allowance in an aircraft performance application). In the first case, mitigation means would mainly concern training and flight crew procedure aspects, whereas in the second case, mitigation means would more likely focus on the EFB administration and data management aspects.

The analysis should be specific to the operator concerned and should address at least the following points:

- (1) The minimisation of undetected erroneous outputs from applications and assessment of the worst-credible scenario;
- (2) Erroneous outputs from the software application including:
 - (i) a description of the corruption scenarios; and
 - (ii) a description of the mitigation means;
- (3) Upstream processes including:
 - (i) the reliability of root data used in applications (e.g. qualified input data, such as databases produced under ED-76/DO-200A 'Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data');
 - (ii) the software application validation and verification checks according to appropriate industry standards, if applicable; and
 - (iii) the independence between application software components, e.g. robust partitioning between EFB applications and other airworthiness certified software applications;
- (4) A description of the mitigation means to be used following the detected failure of an application, or of a detected erroneous output;
- (5) The need for access to an alternate power supply in order to ensure the availability of software applications, especially if they are used as a source of required information.

As part of the mitigation means, the operator should consider establishing a reliable alternative means to provide the information available on the EFB system.

The mitigation means could be, for example, one of, or a combination of, the following:

- (1) the system design (including hardware and software);
- (2) a backup EFB device, possibly supplied from a different power source;
- (3) EFB applications being hosted on more than one platform;
- (4) a paper backup (e.g. quick reference handbook (QRH)); and
- (5) procedural means;

Depending on the outcome of its risk assessment, the operator may also consider performing an operational evaluation test before allowing unrestricted use of its EFB devices and applications.

EFB system design features such as those assuring data integrity and the accuracy of



performance calculations (e.g. a ‘reasonableness’ or ‘range’ check) may be integrated in the risk assessment to be performed by the operator.

(c) Changes

The operator should update its EFB risk assessment based on the planned changes to its EFB system. However, modifications to the operator’s EFB system which:

- (1) do not bring any change to the calculation algorithms and/or to the HMI of a type B EFB application;
- (2) introduce a new type A EFB application or modify an existing one (provided its software classification remains type A);
- (3) do not introduce any additional functionality to an existing type B EFB application;
- (4) update an existing database necessary to use an existing type B EFB application; or
- (5) do not require a change to the flight crew training or operational procedures, may be introduced by the operator without having to update its risk assessment.

These changes should, nevertheless, be controlled and properly tested prior to use in flight.

The modifications in the following non-exhaustive list are considered to meet these criteria:

- (1) operating system updates;
- (2) chart or airport database updates;
- (3) updates to introduce fixes (patches); and
- (4) installation and modification of a type A EFB application.

GM1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

RISK ASSESSMENT— NON-COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The operator of non-complex motor-powered aircraft should at least perform the check before the flight actions described in paragraph (b) of AMC2 NCO.GEN.125.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

EFB ADMINISTRATION — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The operator should ensure:

- (a) that adequate support is provided to the EFB users for all the applications installed;
- (b) that potential security issues associated with the application installed have been checked;
- (c) that hardware and software configuration is appropriately managed and that no unauthorized software is installed.

The operator should ensure that miscellaneous software applications do not adversely impact on the operation of the EFB and should include miscellaneous software applications in the scope of EFB configuration management;



- (d) that only a valid version of the application software and current data packages are installed on the EFB system; and
- (e) the integrity of the data packages used by the applications installed.

AMC2 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

PROCEDURES — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The procedures for the administration or the use of the EFB device and the type B EFB application may be fully or partly integrated in the operations manual.

(a) General

If an EFB system generates information similar to that generated by existing certified systems, procedures should clearly identify which information source will be the primary, which source will be used for backup information, and under which conditions the backup source should be used. Procedures should define the actions to be taken by the flight crew when information provided by an EFB system is not consistent with that from other flight crew compartment sources, or when one EFB system shows different information than the other.

In the case of EFB applications providing information which might be affected by Notice(s) to Airmen (NOTAMS) (e.g. Airport moving map display (AMMD), performance calculation, etc.), the procedure for the use of these applications should include the handling of the relevant NOTAMS before their use.

(b) Flight crew awareness of EFB software/database revisions

The operator should have a process in place to verify that the configuration of the EFB, including software application versions and, where applicable, database versions, are up to date. Flight crew members should have the ability to easily verify the validity of database versions used on the EFB. Nevertheless, flight crew members should not be required to confirm the revision dates for other databases that do not adversely affect flight operations, such as maintenance log forms or a list of airport codes. An example of a date-sensitive revision is that applied to an aeronautical chart database. Procedures should specify what actions should be taken if the software applications or databases loaded on the EFB system are outdated.

(c) Workload mitigation and/or control

The operator should ensure that additional workload created by using an EFB system is adequately mitigated and/or controlled. The operator should ensure that, while the aircraft is in flight or moving on the ground, flight crew members do not become preoccupied with the EFB system at the same time. Workload should be shared between flight crew members to ensure ease of use and continued monitoring of other flight crew functions and aircraft equipment. This should be strictly applied in flight and the operator should specify any times when the flight crew members may not use the specific EFB application.

(d) Dispatch

The operator should establish dispatch criteria for the EFB system, when type B EFB applications that replace paper products are hosted. The operator should ensure that the availability of the EFB system is confirmed by preflight checks. Instructions to the flight crew should clearly define the actions to be taken in the event of any EFB system deficiency.



Mitigation may be in the form of maintenance and/or operational procedures for items such as:

- (1) replacement of batteries at defined intervals as required;
- (2) ensuring that there is a fully charged backup battery on board;
- (3) the flight crew checking the battery charging level before departure; and
- (4) the flight crew switching off the EFB in a timely manner when the aircraft power source is lost.

In the event of a partial or complete failure of the EFB, specific dispatch procedures should be followed. These procedures should be included either in the minimum equipment list (MEL) or in the operations manual and should ensure an acceptable level of safety.

Particular attention should be paid to establishing specific dispatch procedures allowing to obtain operational data (e.g. performance data) in the event of a failure of an EFB that hosts an application providing such calculated data.

When the integrity of data input and output is verified by cross-checking and gross-error checks, the same checking principle should be applied to alternative dispatch procedures to ensure equivalent protection.

(e) Maintenance

Procedures should be established for the routine maintenance of the EFB system and detailing how unserviceability and failures are to be dealt with to ensure that the integrity of the EFB system is preserved. Maintenance procedures should also include the secure handling of updated information and how this information is validated and then promulgated in a timely manner and in a complete format to all users.

As part of the EFB system's maintenance, the operator should ensure that the EFB system batteries are periodically checked and replaced as required.

Should a fault or failure of the system arise, it is essential that such failures are brought to the immediate attention of the flight crew and that the system is isolated until rectification action is taken. In addition to backup procedures, to deal with system failures, a reporting system should be in place so that the necessary action, either to a particular EFB system or to the whole system, is taken in order to prevent the use of erroneous information by flight crew members.

(f) Security

The EFB system (including any means used for updating it) should be secure from unauthorised intervention (e.g. by malicious software). The operator should ensure that the system is adequately protected at the software level and that the hardware is appropriately managed (e.g. the identification of the person to whom the hardware is released, protected storage when the hardware is not in use) throughout the operational lifetime of the EFB system. The operator should ensure that prior to each flight the EFB operational software works as specified and the EFB operational data is complete and accurate. Moreover, a system should be in place to ensure that the EFB does not accept a data load that contains corrupted contents. Adequate measures should be in place for the compilation and secure distribution of data to the aircraft.

Procedures should be transparent and easy to understand, to follow and to oversee that:

- (1) if an EFB is based on consumer electronics (e.g. a laptop) which can be easily removed, manipulated, or replaced by a similar component, that special consideration is given to



the physical security of the hardware;

- (2) portable EFB platforms are subject to allocation tracking to specific aircraft or persons;
- (3) where a system has input ports, and especially if widely known protocols are used through these ports or internet connections are offered, that special consideration is given to the risks associated with these ports;
- (4) where physical media are used to update the EFB system, and especially if widely known types of physical media are used, that the operator uses technologies and/or procedures to assure that unauthorized content cannot enter the EFB system through these media.

The required level of EFB security depends on the criticality of the functions used (e.g. an EFB that only holds a list of fuel prices may require less security than an EFB used for performance calculations).

Beyond the level of security required to assure that the EFB can properly perform its intended functions, the level of security that is ultimately required depends on the capabilities of the EFB.

(g) Electronic signatures

Some applicable requirements may require a signature when issuing or accepting a document

(e.g. load sheet, technical logbook, notification to captain (NOTOC)). In order to be accepted as being equivalent to a handwritten signature, electronic signatures used in EFB applications need, as a minimum, to fulfil the same objectives and should assure the same degree of security as the handwritten or any other form of signature that they are intended to replace. GM1 SPO.POL.115 provides guidance related to the required handwritten signature or its equivalent for mass and balance documentation.

On a general basis, in the case of legally required signatures, an operator should have in place procedures for electronic signatures that guarantee:

- (1) their uniqueness: a signature should identify a specific individual and should be difficult to duplicate;
- (2) their significance: an individual using an electronic signature should take deliberate and recognizable action to affix their signature;
- (3) their scope: the scope of the information being affirmed with an electronic signature should be clear to the signatory and to the subsequent readers of the record, record entry, or document;
- (4) their security: the security of an individual's handwritten signature is maintained by ensuring that it is difficult for another individual to duplicate or alter it;
- (5) their non-repudiation: an electronic signature should prevent a signatory from denying that they affixed a signature to a specific record, record entry, or document; the more difficult it is to duplicate a signature, the more likely it is that the signature was created by the signatory; and
- (6) their traceability: an electronic signature should provide positive traceability to the individual who signed a record, record entry, or any other document.



An electronic signature should retain those qualities of a handwritten signature that guarantee its uniqueness. Systems using either a PIN or a password with limited validity (timewise) may be appropriate in providing positive traceability to the individual who affixed it. Advanced electronic signatures, qualified certificates and secured signature-creation devices needed to create them in the context of the Regulation are typically not required for EFB operations.

AMC3 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

FLIGHT CREW TRAINING — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

Flight crew members should be given specific training on the use of the EFB system before it is operationally used.

Training should at least include the following:

- (a) an overview of the system architecture;
- (b) preflight checks of the system;
- (c) limitations of the system;
- (d) specific training on the use of each application and the conditions under which the EFB may and may not be used;
- (e) restrictions on the use of the system, including cases where the entire system, or some parts of it, are not available;
- (f) procedures for normal operations, including cross-checking of data entry and computed information;
- (g) procedures to handle abnormal situations, such as a late runway change or a diversion to an alternate aerodrome;
- (h) procedures to handle emergency situations;
- (i) phases of the flight when the EFB system may and may not be used;
- (j) human factors considerations, including crew resource management (CRM);
- (k) additional training for new applications or changes to the hardware configuration;
- (l) actions following the failure of component(s) of the EFB, including cases of battery smoke or fire; and
- (m) management of conflicting information.

AMC4 SPO. GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

PERFORMANCE AND MASS AND BALANCE APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

(a) General

Performance and mass and balance applications should be based on existing published data found in the AFM or performance manual and should account for the applicable CAT.POL performance requirements. The applications may use algorithms or data spreadsheets to determine results. They may have the capability to interpolate within the



information contained in the published data for the particular aircraft but should not extrapolate beyond it.

To protect against intentional and unintentional modifications, the integrity of the database files related to performance and mass and balance (the performance database, airport database, etc.) should be checked by the program before performing any calculations. This check can be run once at the start-up of the application.

Each software version should be identified by a unique version number. The performance and The operator should ensure that aircraft performance or mass and balance data provided by the application is correct compared with the data derived from the AFM (e.g. for take-off and landing performance data) or from other reference data sources (e.g. mass and balance manuals or databases, in flight performance manuals or databases) under a representative cross-check of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: take-off and landing performance data on dry, wet, and contaminated runways, with different wind conditions and aerodrome pressure altitudes, etc.).

The operator should define any new roles that the flight crew and, if applicable, the flight dispatcher, may have in creating, reviewing, and using performance calculations supported by EFB systems.

(b) Testing

The verification of compliance of a performance or mass and balance application should include software testing activities performed with the software version candidate for operational use.

The testing can be performed either by the operator or a third party, as long as the testing process is documented and the responsibilities identified.

The testing activities should include reliability testing and accuracy testing.

Reliability testing should show that the application in its operating environment (operating system (OS) and hardware included) is stable and deterministic, i.e. identical answers are generated each time the process is entered with identical parameters.

Accuracy testing should demonstrate that the aircraft performance or mass and balance computations provided by the application are correct in comparison with data derived from the AFM or other reference data sources, under a representative cross section of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: runway state and slope, different wind conditions and pressure altitudes, various aircraft configurations including failures with a performance impact, etc.).

The verification should include a sufficient number of comparison results from representative calculations throughout the entire operating envelope of the aircraft, considering corner points, routine and break points.

Any difference compared to the reference data that is judged significant should be examined.

When differences are due to more conservative calculations or reduced margins that were purposely built into the approved data, this approach should be clearly specified. Compliance with the applicable certification and operational rules needs to be assessed in any case.

The testing method should be described. The testing may be automated when all the required data is available in an appropriate electronic format, but in addition to performing



thorough monitoring of the correct functioning and design of the testing tools and procedures, operators are strongly suggested to perform additional manual verification. It could be based on a few scenarios for each chart or table of the reference data, including both operationally representative scenarios and 'corner-case' scenarios.

The testing of a software revision should, in addition, include non-regression testing and testing of any fix or change.

Furthermore, an operator should perform tests related to its customisation of the applications and to any element pertinent to its operation that was not covered at an earlier stage (e.g. airport database verification).

(c) Procedures

Specific care is needed regarding the crew procedures concerning take-off and landing performance or mass and balance applications. The crew procedures should ensure that:

- (1) calculations are performed independently by each flight crew member before data outputs are accepted for use;
- (2) a formal cross-check is made before data outputs are accepted for use; such cross-checks should utilise the independent calculations described above, together with the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft;
- (3) a gross-error check is performed before data outputs are accepted for use; such gross-error checks may use either a 'rule of thumb' or the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft; and
- (4) in the event of a loss of functionality of an EFB through either the loss of a single application, or the failure of the device hosting the application, an equivalent level of safety can be maintained; consistency with the EFB risk assessment assumptions should be confirmed.

(d) Training

The training should emphasise the importance of executing all take-off and landing performance or mass and balance calculations in accordance with the SOPs to assure fully independent calculations.

Furthermore, due to the optimisation at different levels brought by performance applications, the flight crew members may be confronted with new procedures and different aircraft behaviour (e.g. the use of multiple flap settings for take-off). The training should be designed and provided accordingly.

Where an application allows the computing of both dispatch results (from regulatory and factored calculations) and other results, the training should highlight the specificities of those results. Depending on the representativeness of the calculation, the flight crew should be trained on any operational margins that might be required.

The training should also address the identification and the review of default values, if any, and assumptions about the aircraft status or environmental conditions made by the application.



(e) Specific considerations for mass and balance applications

In addition to the figures, a diagram displaying the mass and its associated centre of gravity (CG) should be provided.

(f) Human-factors-specific considerations

Input data and output data (i.e. results) shall be clearly separated from each other. All the information necessary for a given calculation task should be presented together or be easily accessible.

All input and output data should include correct and unambiguous terms (names), units of measurement (e.g. kg or lb), and, when applicable, an index system and a CG-position declaration (e.g. Arm/%MAC). The units should match the ones from the other flight-crew compartment sources for the same kind of data.

Airspeeds should be provided in a way that is directly useable in the flight crew compartment, unless the unit clearly indicates otherwise (e.g. Knots Calibrated Air Speed (KCAS)). Any difference between the type of airspeed provided by the EFB application and the type provided by the AFM or flight crew operating manual (FCOM) performance charts should be mentioned in the flight crew guides and training material.

If the landing performance application allows the computation of both dispatch results (regulatory, factored) and other results (e.g. in-flight or unfactored), the flight crew members should be made aware of the computation mode used.

(1) Inputs

The application should allow users to clearly distinguish user entries from default values or entries imported from other aircraft systems.

Performance applications should allow the flight crew to check whether a certain obstacle is included in the performance calculation and/or to include new or revised or new obstacle information in the performance calculations.

(2) Outputs

All critical assumptions for performance calculation (e.g. the use of thrust reversers, full or reduced thrust/power rating) should be clearly displayed. The assumptions made about any calculation should be at least as clear to the flight crew members as similar information would be on a tabular chart.

All output data should be available in numbers.

The application should indicate when a set of entries results in an unachievable operation (for instance, a negative stopping margin) with a specific message or colour scheme. This should be done in accordance with the relevant provisions on messages and the use of colours.

In order to allow a smooth workflow and to prevent data entry errors, the layout of the calculation outputs should be such that it is consistent with the data entry interface of the aircraft applications in which the calculation outputs are used (e.g. flight management systems).



(3) Modifications

The user should be able to easily modify performance calculations, especially when making last-minute changes.

The results of calculations and any outdated input fields should be deleted whenever:

- (i) modifications are entered;
- (ii) the EFB is shut down or the performance application is closed; or
- (iii) the EFB or the performance application has been in a standby or 'background' mode for too long, i.e. such that it is likely that when it is used again, the inputs or outputs will be outdated.

AMC5 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

**AIRPORT MOVING MAP DISPLAY (AMMD) APPLICATION WITH OWN-SHIP POSITION —
COMPLEX**

AIRCRAFT

(a) General

An AMMD application should not be used as the primary means of navigation for taxiing and should be only used in conjunction with other materials and procedures identified within the operating concept (see paragraph (e)).

When an AMMD is in use, the primary means of navigation for taxiing remains the use of normal procedures and direct visual observation out of the flight-crew-compartment window.

Thus, as recognised in ETSO-C165a, an AMMD application with a display of own-ship position is considered to have a minor safety effect for malfunctions that cause the incorrect depiction of aircraft position (own-ship), and the failure condition for the loss of function is classified as 'no safety effect'.

(b) Minimum requirements

AMMD software that complies with European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C165a is considered to be acceptable.

In addition, the system should provide the means to display the revision number of the software installed.

To achieve the total system accuracy requirements of ETSO-C165a, an airworthiness-approved sensor using the global positioning system (GPS) in combination with a medium-accuracy database compliant with EUROCAE ED-99C/RTCA DO-272C, 'User Requirements for Aerodrome

Mapping Information' (or later revisions) is considered one acceptable means.

Alternatively, the use of non-certified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) position sources may be acceptable in accordance with AMC6 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2).



(c) Data provided by the AMMD software application developer

The operator should ensure that the AMMD software application developer provides the appropriate data including:

(1) installation instructions or equivalent as per ETSO-C165a Section 2.2 addressing:

- (i) the identification of each specific EFB system computing platform (including the hardware platform and the operating system version) with which this AMMD software application and database was demonstrated to be compatible;
- (ii) the installation procedures and limitations for each applicable platform (e.g. required memory resources, configuration of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) antenna position);
- (iii) the interface description data including the requirements for external sensors providing data inputs; and
- (iv) means to verify that the AMMD has been installed correctly and is functioning properly;

(2) any AMMD limitations, and known installation, operational, functional, or performance issues of the AMMD.

(d) AMMD software installation in the EFB

The operator should review the documents and the data provided by the AMMD developer, and ensure that the installation requirements of the AMMD software in the specific EFB platform and aircraft are addressed. Operators are required to perform any verification activities proposed by the AMMD software application developer, as well as identify and perform any additional integration activities that needs to be completed;

(e) Operational procedures

Changes to operational procedures of the aircraft (e.g. flight crew procedures) should be documented in the operations manual or user's guide as appropriate. In particular, the documentation should highlight that the AMMD is designed to assist flight crew members in orienting themselves on the airport surface so as to improve the flight crew members' positional awareness during taxiing and that it is not to be used as the basis for ground manoeuvring.

(f) Training requirements

The operator may use flight crew procedures to mitigate some hazards. These should include limitations on the use of the AMMD function or application. As the AMMD could be a compelling display and the procedural restrictions are a key component of the mitigation, training should be provided in support of an AMMD implementation.

All mitigation means that rely on flight crew procedures should be included in the flight crew training. Details of the AMMD training should be included in the operator's overall EFB training.



AMC6 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

COTS position sources may be used for AMMD EFB applications and for EFB applications displaying the own-ship position in flight when the following considerations are complied with:

(a) Characterisation of the receiver:

The position should originate from an airworthiness approved GNSS receiver, or from a COTS GNSS receiver fully characterised in terms of technical specifications and featuring an adequate number of channels (12 or more).

The EFB application should, in addition to position and velocity data, receive a sufficient number of parameters related to the fix quality and integrity to allow compliance with the accuracy requirements (e.g. the number of satellites and constellation geometry parameters such as dilution of position (DOP), 2D/3D fix).

(b) Installation aspects:

COTS position sources are C-PEDs and their installation and use should follow the requirements of SPO.GEN.130.

If the external COTS position source transmits wirelessly, cybersecurity aspects have to be considered.

(c) Practical evaluation:

As variables can be introduced by the placement of the antennas in the aircraft and the characteristics of the aircraft itself (e.g. heated and/or shielded windshield effects), the tests have to take place on the type of aircraft in which the EFB will be operated, with the antenna positioned at the location to be used in service.

(1) COTS used as a position source for AMMD

The test installation should record the data provided by the COTS position source to the AMMD application.

The analysis should use the the recorded parameters to demonstrate that the AMMD requirements are satisfactorily complied with in terms of the total system accuracy (taking into account database errors, latency effects, display errors, and uncompensated antenna offsets) within 50 metres (95 %). The availability should be sufficient to prevent distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.

When demonstrating compliance with the following requirements of DO-257A, the behaviour of the AMMD system should be evaluated in practice:

- (i) indication of degraded position accuracy within 1 second (Section 2.2.4 (22)); and
 - (ii) indication of a loss of positioning data within 5 seconds (Section 2.2.4 (23));
- conditions to consider are both a loss of the GNSS satellite view (e.g. antenna failure) and a loss of communication between the receiver and the EFB.

(2) COTS position source used for applications displaying own-ship position in flight:

Flight trials should demonstrate that the COTS GNSS availability is sufficient to prevent



distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.

AMC7 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

CHART APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The navigation charts that are depicted should contain the information necessary, in an appropriate form, to perform the operation safely. Consideration should be given to the size, resolution and position of the display to ensure legibility whilst retaining the ability to review all information required to maintain adequate situational awareness. The identification of risks associated with the human– machine interface, as part of the operator’s risk assessment, is key to identifying acceptable mitigation means, e.g.:

- (a) to establish procedures to reduce the risk of making errors;
- (b) to control and mitigate the additional workload related to EFB use;
- (c) to ensure the consistency of colour-coding and symbology philosophies between EFB applications and their compatibility with other flight crew compartment applications; and
- (d) to consider aspects of crew resource management (CRM) when using an EFB system.

In the case of chart application displaying own-ship position in flight, AMC9 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) is applicable.

AMC8 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

IN-FLIGHT WEATHER APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

(a) General

An in-flight weather (IFW) application is an EFB function or application enabling the flight crew to access meteorological information. It is designed to increase situational awareness and to support the flight crew when making strategic decisions.

An IFW function or application may be used to access both information required to be on board (e.g. World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) data) and supplemental weather information.

The use of IFW applications should be non-safety-critical and not necessary for the performance of the flight. In order to be non-safety-critical, IFW data should not be used to support tactical decisions and/or as a substitute for certified aircraft systems (e.g. weather radar).

Any current information from the meteorological documentation required to be on board or from aircraft primary systems should always prevail over the information from an IFW application.

The displayed meteorological information may be forecasted and/or observed, and may be updated on the ground and/or in flight. It should be based on data from certified meteorological services providers or other reliable sources evaluated by the operator.

The meteorological information provided to the flight crew should be as far as possible



consistent with the information available to users of ground-based aviation meteorological information (e.g. operations control centre (OCC), dispatchers, etc.) in order to establish common situational awareness and to facilitate collaborative decision-making.

(b) Display

Meteorological information should be presented to the flight crew in a format that is appropriate to the content of the information; coloured graphical depiction is encouraged whenever practicable.

The IFW display should enable the flight crew to:

- (1) distinguish between observed and forecasted weather data;
- (2) identify the currency or age and validity time of the weather data;
- (3) access the interpretation of the weather data (e.g. the legend);
- (4) obtain positive and clear indications of any missing information or data and determine areas of uncertainty when making decisions to avoid hazardous weather; and
- (5) be aware of the data-link means status enabling necessary IFW data exchanges.

Meteorological information in IFW applications may be displayed, for example, as an overlay over navigation charts, over geographical maps, or it may be a stand-alone weather depiction (e.g. radar plots, satellite images, etc.).

If meteorological information is overlaid on navigation charts, special consideration should be given to HMI issues in order to avoid adverse effects on the basic chart functions.

In case of display of own-ship position in flight, AMC9 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) is applicable.

The meteorological information may require reformatting to accommodate, for example, the display size or the depiction technology. However, any reformatting of the meteorological information should preserve both the geo-location and intensity of the meteorological conditions regardless of projection, scaling, or any other types of processing.

(c) Training and procedures

The operator should establish procedures for the use of an IFW application.

The operator should provide adequate training to the flight crew members before using an IFW application. This training should address:

- (1) limitations of the use of an IFW application:
 - (i) acceptable use (strategic planning only);
 - (ii) information required to be on board; and
 - (iii) latency of observed weather information and the hazards associated with utilisation of old information;
- (2) information on the display of weather data:
 - (i) type of displayed information (forecasted, observed);
 - (ii) symbology (symbols, colours); and
 - (iii) interpretation of meteorological information;



- (3) identification of failures and malfunctions (e.g. incomplete uplinks, data-link failures, missing info);
- (4) human factors issues:
 - (i) avoiding fixation; and
 - (ii) managing workload.

AMC9 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

(a) Limitations

The display of own-ship position in flight as an overlay to other EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft.

Except on VFR flights over routes navigated by reference to visual landmark, the display of the own-ship symbol is allowed only in aircraft having a certified navigation display (moving map).

In the specific case of IFW applications, the display of own-ship on such applications is restricted to aircraft equipped with a weather radar.

(b) Position source and accuracy

The display of own-ship position may be based on a certified GNSS or GNSS based (e.g. GPS/IRS) position from certified aircraft equipment or on a portable COTS position source in accordance with AMC6 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2).

The own-ship symbol should be removed and the flight crew notified if:

- (1) the estimated accuracy is not sufficient for the intended operations;
- (2) the position data is reported as invalid by the GNSS receiver; or
- (3) the position data is not received for 5 seconds.

(c) Charting data considerations

The display of own-ship position is only allowed when the underlying map/chart data is designed using a projection system that is suitable for aeronautical use.

If the map involves raster images that have been stitched together into a larger single map, it should be demonstrated that the stitching process does not introduce distortion or map errors that would not correlate properly with a GNSS-based own-ship symbol.

(d) Human machine interface (HMI)

(1) Interface

The flight crew should be able to unambiguously differentiate the EFB function from avionics functions available in the cockpit, and in particular with the navigation display.

A sufficiently legible text label 'AIRCRAFT POSITION NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATION' or equivalent should be continuously displayed by the application if the own-ship position depiction is visible in the current display area over a terminal chart (i.e. SID, STAR, or instrument approach) or a depiction of a terminal procedure.



(2) Display of own-ship symbol

The own-ship symbol should be different from the ones used by certified aircraft systems intended for primary navigation.

If directional data is available, the own-ship symbol may indicate directionality. If direction is not available, the own-ship symbol should not imply directionality.

The colour coding should not be inconsistent with the manufacturer philosophy

(3) Data displayed

The current map orientation should be clearly, continuously and unambiguously indicated (e.g., Track-up vs North-up).

If the software supports more than one directional orientation for the own-ship symbol (e.g., Track-up vs North-up), the current own-ship symbol orientation should be indicated.

The chart display in track-up mode should not create usability or readability issues. In particular, chart data should not be rotated in a manner that affects readability.

The application zoom levels should be appropriate for the function and content being displayed and in the context of providing supplemental position awareness.

The pilot should be able to obtain information about the operational status of the ownship function (e.g. active, deactivated, degraded).

During IFR, day VFR without visual reference or night VFR flights, the following parameters' values should not be displayed:

- (i) Track/heading;
- (ii) Estimated time of arrival (ETA);
- (iii) Altitude;
- (iv) Geographical coordinates of the current location of the aircraft; and
- (v) Aircraft speed.

(4) Controls

If a panning and/or range selection function is available, the EFB application should provide a clear and simple method to return to an own-ship-oriented display.

A means to disable the display of the own-ship position should be provided to the flight crew.

(e) Training and procedures

The procedures and training should emphasise the fact that the display of own-ship position on charts or IFW EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft or as a primary source of weather information.

(1) Procedures:

The following considerations should be addressed in the procedures for the use of charts or IFW EFB application displaying the own-ship position in flight by the flight crew:



- (i) Intended use of the display of own-ship position in flight on charts or IFW EFB applications;
- (ii) Inclusion of the EFB into the regular scan of flight deck systems indications. In particular, systematic cross-check with avionics before being used, whatever the position source; and
- (iii) Actions to be taken in case of the identification of a discrepancy between the EFB and avionics.

(2) Training:

Crew members should be trained on the procedures for the use of the application, including the regular cross-check with avionics and the action in case of discrepancy.

GM1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

IN-FLIGHT WEATHER (IFW) APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

'Reliable sources' of data used by IFW applications are the organisations evaluated by the operator as being able to provide an appropriate level of data assurance in terms of accuracy and integrity. It is recommended that the following aspects be considered during that evaluation:

- (a) The organisation should have a quality assurance system in place that covers the data source selection, acquisition/import, processing, validity period check, and the distribution phase;
- (b) Any meteorological product provided by the organisation that is within the scope of the meteorological information included in the flight documentation should originate only from authoritative sources or certified providers and should not be transformed or altered, except for the purpose of packaging the data in the correct format. The organisation's process should provide assurance that the integrity of those products is preserved in the data for use by the IFW application.

GM2 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE – PRATICAL EVALUATION — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

The tests should consist of a statistically relevant sample of taxiing. It is recommended to include taxiing at airports that are representative of the more complex airports typically accessed by the operator. Taxiing segment samples should include data that is derived from runways and taxiways, and should include numerous turns, in particular of 90 degrees or more, and segments in straight lines at the maximum speed at which the own-ship symbol is displayed. Taxiing segment samples should include parts in areas of high buildings such as terminals. The analysis should include at least 25 inbound and/or outbound taxiing segments between the parking location and the runway. During the tests, any unusual events (such as observing the own-ship symbol in a location on the map that is notably offset compared to the actual position, the own-ship symbol changing to nondirectional when the aircraft is moving,



and times when the own-ship symbol disappears from the map display) should be noted. For the test, the pilot should be instructed to diligently taxi on the centre line.

GM3 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)

APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT

The depiction of a circle around the EFB own-ship symbol may be used to differentiate it from the avionics one.

GM2 SPO.POL.115(b) Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

STAND-ALONE COMPUTERISED MASS AND BALANCE SYSTEM

A stand-alone computerised mass and balance system may be a computer, either as part of an electronic flight bag (EFB) system or solely dedicated to mass and balance purposes, requiring input from the user, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT

- (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications.
- (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aeroplane. Examples may be the following:
 - (1) portable electronic flight bag (EFB);
 - (2) portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists; and
 - (3) non-installed task specialist equipment.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.125(e)(2) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

CHART HOLDER

An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement for complex motor-powered aeroplanes is to display a pre-composed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).



GM1 SPO.IDE.H.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT

- (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications.
- (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the helicopter. Examples may be the following:
- (1) portable electronic flight bag (EFB);
 - (2) portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists; and
 - (3) non-installed task specialists equipment.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.125(f)(2) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

CHART HOLDER

An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement would be to display a precomposed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).

AMC1 SPO.GEN.135 Information on emergency and survival equipment carried

Content of Information

The information, compiled in a list, should include, as applicable:

- (a) the number, colour and type of life rafts and pyrotechnics;
- (b) details of emergency medical supplies and water supplies; and
- (c) the type and frequencies of the emergency portable radio equipment.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.140 Documents, manuals and information to be carried

General

The documents, manuals and information may be available in a form other than on printed paper. An electronic storage medium is acceptable if accessibility, usability and reliability can be assured.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(3) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

Certificate of Airworthiness

The certificate of airworthiness should be a normal certificate of airworthiness, a restricted certificate of airworthiness or a permit to fly issued in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements.



**AMC1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(12) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
Current and Suitable Aeronautical Charts**

- (a) The aeronautical charts carried should contain data appropriate to the applicable air traffic regulations, rules of the air, flight altitudes, area/route and nature of the operation. Due consideration should be given to carriage of textual and graphic representations of:
- (1) aeronautical data including, as appropriate for the nature of the operation:
 - (i) airspace structure;
 - (ii) significant points, navigation aids (navaids) and air traffic services (ATS) routes;
 - (iii) navigation and communication frequencies;
 - (iv) prohibited, restricted and danger areas; and
 - (v) sites of other relevant activities that may hazard the flight, and
 - (2) topographical data, including terrain and obstacle data.
- (b) A combination of different charts and textual data may be used to provide adequate and current data.
- (c) The aeronautical data should be appropriate for the current aeronautical information regulation and control (AIRAC) cycle.
- (d) The topographical data should be reasonably recent, having regard to the nature of the planned operation.

**AMC1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(13) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
Procedures and Visual Signals for Use by Intercepting and Intercepted Aircraft**

The procedures and the visual signals information for use by intercepting and intercepted aircraft should reflect those contained in the International Civil Aviation Organisation's (ICAO) Annex 2. This may be part of the operations manual.

**GM1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(1) Documents, manuals and information to be carried
AFM or Equivalent Document**

'Aircraft flight manual (AFM), or equivalent document' means the flight manual for the aircraft or other documents containing information required for the operation of the aircraft within the terms of its certificate of airworthiness, unless these data are available in the parts of the operations manual carried on board.

GM1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(9) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

Journey or Equivalent

'Journey log or equivalent' means in this context that the required information may be recorded in documentation other than a log book, such as the operational flight plan or the aircraft technical log.

GM1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(14) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

Search and Rescue Information

This information is usually found in the State's aeronautical information publication.



GM1 SPO.GEN.140(a)(20) Documents, manuals and information to be carried

Documents that may be Pertinent to the Flight

Any other documents that may be pertinent to the flight or required by the States concerned with the flight may include, for example, forms to comply with reporting requirements.

State Concerned with the Flight

The States concerned are those is of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the flight.

GM1 SPO.GEN.145(a) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

Removal of Recorders after a Reportable Occurrence

The need for removal of the recorders from the aircraft is determined by the investigating authority-with due regard to the seriousness of an occurrence and the circumstances, including the impact on the operation.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

Operational Checks

Whenever a recorder is required to be carried, the operator should:

- (a) Perform an annual inspection of flight data recorder (FDR) recording and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording, unless one or more of the following applies:
 - (1) Where two solid-state FDRs both fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data share the same acquisition unit, a comprehensive recording inspection need only be performed for one FDR. For the second FDR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each FDR is inspected once every other year.
 - (2) Where the following conditions are met, the FDR recording inspection is not needed:
 - (i) the aircraft flight data are collected in the frame of a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme;
 - (ii) the data acquisition of mandatory flight parameters is the same for the FDR and for the recorder used for the FDM programme;
 - (iii) the integrity of all mandatory flight parameters is verified by the FDM programme; and
 - (iv) the FDR is solid-state and is fitted with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data.
 - (3) Where two solid-state CVRs are fitted both with internal built-in-test equipment sufficient to monitor reception and recording of data, a comprehensive recording inspection need only to be performed for one CVR. For the second CVR, checking its internal built-in-test equipment is sufficient. The inspection should be performed alternately such that each CVR is inspected once every other year.
- (b) Perform every 5 years an inspection of the data link recording.



- (c) Check every 5 years, or in accordance with the recommendations of the sensor manufacturer, that the parameters dedicated to the FDR and not monitored by other means are being recorded within the calibration tolerances and that there is no discrepancy in the engineering conversion routines for these parameters.

GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Preservation, production and use of flight recorder recordings

Inspection of the Flight Recorders Recording

- (a) The inspection of the FDR recording usually consists of the following:
- (1) Making a copy of the complete recording file.
 - (2) Examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters. This could reveal defects or noise in the measuring and processing chains and indicate necessary maintenance actions. The following should be considered:
 - (i) when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for different values of its operational range. For this purpose, some parameters may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and
 - (ii) if the parameter is delivered by a digital data bus and the same data are utilised for the operation of the aircraft, then a reasonableness check may be sufficient; otherwise a correlation check may need to be performed;
 - (A) a reasonableness check is understood in this context as a subjective, qualitative evaluation, requiring technical judgement, of the recordings from a complete flight; and
 - (B) a correlation check is understood in this context as the process of comparing data recorded by the flight data recorder against the corresponding data derived from flight instruments, indicators or the expected values obtained during specified portion(s) of a flight profile or during ground checks that are conducted for that purpose.
 - (3) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording inspection report.
- (b) The inspection of the CVR recording usually consists of:
- (1) checking that the CVR operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording;
 - (2) examining, where practicable and subject to prior approval by the flight crew, a sample of in-flight recording of the CVR for evidence that the signal is acceptable on each channel; and
 - (3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.
- (c) The inspection of the DLR recording usually consists of:
- (1) Checking the consistency of the data link recording with other recordings for example, during a designated flight, the flight crew speaks out a few data link messages sent and received. After the flight, the data link recording and the CVR recording are compared for consistency.
 - (2) Retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording and the corresponding inspection report.



GM1 SPO.GEN.150(a) Transport of dangerous goods

General

- (a) The requirement to transport dangerous goods by air in accordance with the Technical Instructions is irrespective of whether:
- (1) the flight is wholly or partly within or wholly outside the territory of the State of Kuwait; or
 - (2) an approval to carry dangerous goods in accordance with Part- SPA, Subpart DG is held.
- (b) The Technical Instructions provide that in certain circumstances dangerous goods, which are normally forbidden on an aircraft, may be carried. These circumstances include cases of extreme urgency or, when other forms of transport are inappropriate or when full compliance with the prescribed requirements is contrary to the public interest. In these circumstances all the States concerned may grant exemptions from the provisions of the Technical Instructions provided that an overall level of safety that is at least equivalent to that provided by the Technical Instructions is achieved. Although exemptions are most likely to be granted for the carriage of dangerous goods that are not permitted in normal circumstances, they may also be granted in other circumstances, such as when the packaging to be used is not provided for by the appropriate packing method or the quantity in the packaging is greater than that permitted. The Technical Instructions also make provision for some dangerous goods to be carried when an approval has been granted only by the State of Origin and the Kuwait DGCA.
- (c) When an exemption is required, the States concerned are those of origin, transit, overflight and destination of the consignment and that of the operator. For the State of overflight, if none of the criteria for granting an exemption are relevant, an exemption may be granted based solely on whether it is believed that an equivalent level of safety in air transport has been achieved.
- (d) The Technical Instructions provide that exemptions and approvals are granted by the 'appropriate national authority', which is intended to be the authority responsible for the particular aspect against which the exemption or approval is being sought. The operator should ensure that all relevant conditions on an exemption or approval are met.
- (e) The exemption or approval referred to in (b) to (d) is in addition to the approval required by Part-SPA.

AMC1 SPO.GEN.150(e) Transport of dangerous goods

Dangerous Goods Accident and Incident Reporting

- (a) Any type of dangerous goods incident or accident should be reported. For this purpose, the Technical Instructions consider that reporting of undeclared and misdeclared dangerous goods found in cargo also applies to items of operators' stores that are classified as dangerous goods.
- (b) The first report should be dispatched within 72 hours of the event. It may be sent by any means, including e-mail, telephone or fax. This report should include the details that are known at that time, under the headings identified in (c). If necessary, a subsequent report should be made as soon as possible giving all the details that were not known at the time the first report was sent. If a report has been made verbally, written confirmation should be sent as soon as possible.



- (c) The first and any subsequent report should be as precise as possible and contain the following data, where relevant:
- (1) date of the incident or accident or the finding of undeclared or misdeclared dangerous goods;
 - (2) location and flight date;
 - (3) description of the goods;
 - (4) proper shipping name (including the technical name, if appropriate) and United Nations (UN)/identification (ID) number, when known;
 - (5) class or division and any subsidiary risk;
 - (6) type of packaging, and the packaging specification marking on it;
 - (7) quantity;
 - (8) any other relevant details;
 - (9) suspected cause of the incident or accident;
 - (10) action taken;
 - (11) any other reporting action taken; and
 - (12) name, title, address and telephone number of the person making the report.
- (d) Copies of relevant documents and any photographs taken should be attached to the report.
- (e) A dangerous goods accident or incident may also constitute an aircraft accident, serious incident or incident. The criteria for reporting both types of occurrence should be met.
- (f) The following dangerous goods reporting form should be used, but other forms, including electronic transfer of data, may be used provided that at least the minimum information of this AMC is supplied:

DANGEROUS GOODS OCCURRENCE REPORT		DGOR No:
1. Operator:	2. Date of Occurrence:	3. Local time of occurrence:
4. Flight date:	5. Reserved:	
6. Departure aerodrome:	7. Destination aerodrome:	
8. Aircraft type:	9. Aircraft registration:	
10. Location of occurrence:	11. Origin of the goods:	
12. Description of the occurrence, including details of injury, damage, etc. (if necessary continue on the reverse of this form):		



DANGEROUS GOODS OCCURRENCE REPORT			DGOR No:
13. Proper shipping name (including the technical name):			14. UN/ID No (when known):
15. Class/Division (when known):	16. Subsidiary risk(s):	17. Packing group:	18. Category (Class 7 only):
19. Type of packaging:	20. Packaging specification marking:	21. No of packages:	22. Quantity (or transport index, if applicable):
23. Other relevant information (including suspected cause, any action taken):			
24. Name and title of person making report:		25. Telephone No:	
26. Company:		27. Reporters ref:	
28. Address:		29. Signature:	
		30. Date:	
Description of the occurrence (continuation)			

Notes for completion of the form:

1. A dangerous goods accident is as defined in Part DEF. For this purpose serious injury means an injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and which involves one of the following:
 - (a) hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received;
 - (b) a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose);
 - (c) lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage;
 - (d) injury to any internal organ;
 - (e) second or third degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5 % of the body surface;
 - (f) verified exposure to infectious substances or harmful radiation.
2. The initial report should be dispatched unless exceptional circumstances prevent this. This occurrence report form, duly completed, should be sent as soon as possible, even if all the information is not available.
3. Copies of all relevant documents and any photographs should be attached to this report.



4. Any further information, or any information not included in the initial report, should be sent as soon as possible to the authorities identified in SPO.GEN.150 (e).
5. Providing it is safe to do so, all dangerous goods, packaging, documents, etc. relating to the occurrence should be retained until after the initial report has been sent to the authorities identified in SPO.GEN.150(e), and they have indicated whether or not these



Subpart B — Operational procedures

AMC1 SPO.OP.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites

Use of Operating Sites Motor Powered Aircraft

- (a) When defining adequate operating sites for use for the type(s) of aircraft and operation(s) concerned, the operator should take account of the following:
- (1) An adequate site is a site that the operator considers to be satisfactory, taking account of the applicable performance requirements and site characteristics.
 - (2) The operator should have in place a procedure for the survey of operating sites by a competent person. Such a procedure should take account for possible changes to the operating site characteristics that may have taken place since last surveyed.
- (b) Operating sites that are pre-surveyed should be specifically specified in the operations manual. The operations manual should contain diagrams or ground and aerial photographs, depiction (pictorial) and description of:
- (1) the overall dimensions of the operating site;
 - (2) location and height of relevant obstacles to approach and take-off profiles and in the manoeuvring area;
 - (3) approach and take-off flight paths;
 - (4) surface condition (blowing dust/snow/sand);
 - (5) provision of control of third parties on the ground, if applicable;
 - (6) lighting, if applicable;
 - (7) procedure for activating the operating site in accordance with national regulations, if applicable;
 - (8) other useful information, for example details of the appropriate ATS agency and frequency; and
 - (9) site suitability with reference to available aircraft performance.
- (c) Where the operator specifically permits operation from sites that are not pre-surveyed, the pilot-in-command should make, from the air a judgement on the suitability of a site. At least (b)(1) to (b)(6) inclusive and (b)(9) should be considered. Operations to non-pre-surveyed operating sites by night should not be conducted.

GM1 SPO.OP.100 Use of aerodromes and operating sites

Adequate Sites — Balloons

An adequate site is a site that the pilot-in-command considers to be satisfactory, taking account of the applicable performance requirements and site characteristics.

Commercially Available Information

An acceptable method of specifying aerodrome operating minima is through the use of commercially available information.



AMC2 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima – aeroplanes and helicopters

Visual Approach Operations

For a visual approach operation, the runway visual range (RVR) should not be less than 800m.

AMC3 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

General

- (a) The aerodrome operating minima should not be lower than as specified in SPO.OP.111 or AMC4 SPO.OP.110 (c).
- (b) Whenever practical approaches should be flown as stabilised approaches (SAPs). Different procedures may be used for a particular approach to a particular runway.
- (c) Whenever practical, non-precision approaches should be flown using the continuous descent final approach (CDFA) technique. Different procedures may be used for a particular approach to a particular runway.
- (d) For approaches not flown using the CDFA technique: when calculating the minima in accordance with SPO.OP.111, the applicable minimum runway visual range (RVR) should be increased by 200 m for Category A and B aeroplanes and by 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes, provided the resulting RVR/converted meteorological visibility (CMV) value does not exceed 5000 m. SAP or CDFA should be used as soon as facilities are improved to allow these techniques.

AMC4 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Take-Off Operations with Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

- (a) General:
 - (1) Take-off minima should be expressed as visibility (VIS) or RVR limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, should be specified.
 - (2) The pilot-in-command should not commence take-off unless the weather conditions at the aerodrome of departure are equal to or better than applicable minima for landing at that aerodrome, unless a weather- permissible take-off alternate aerodrome is available.
 - (3) When the reported meteorological visibility is below that required for take-off and RVR is not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.
 - (4) When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the RVR/VIS along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.
- (b) Visual reference:
 - (1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure efficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine.
 - (2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles.



(c) Required RVR/visibility:

(1) Aeroplanes:

- (i) For aeroplanes, the take-off minima specified by the operator should be expressed as RVR/VIS values not lower than those specified in Table 1.A.
- (ii) When reported RVR or meteorological visibility is not available, the pilot-in-command should not commence take-off unless he/she can determine that the actual conditions satisfy the applicable take-off minima.

(2) Helicopters:

- (i) For helicopters having a mass where it is possible to reject the take-off and land on the FATO in case of the critical engine failure being recognised at or before the take-off decision point (TDP), the operator should specify a RVR/VIS as take-off minima in accordance with Table 1.H.
- (ii) For all other cases, the pilot-in-command should operate to take-off minima of 800 m RVR/VIS and remain clear of cloud during the take-off manoeuvre until reaching the performance capabilities of (c)(2)(i).
- (iii) Table 1 of AMC9-SPO.OP.110, for converting reported meteorological visibility to RVR, should not be used for calculating take-off minima.

**Table 1.A: Take-off — aeroplanes
(without low visibility take-off (LVTO) approval) — RVR/VIS**

Facilities	RVR/VIS(m)*
Day only: Nil** Day only: Nil**	500
Day: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline markings Night: at least runway edge lights or runway centreline lights and runway end lights	400

*: The reported RVR/VIS value representative of the initial part of the take-off run can be replaced by pilot assessment.

** : The pilot is able to continuously identify the take-off surface and maintain directional control.



**Table 1.H: Take-off — helicopters
(without LVTO approval) — RVR/Visibility**

Onshore aerodromes with instrument flight rules (IFR) departure procedures	RVR/VIS (m)
No light and no markings (day only)	400 or the rejected take- off distance, whichever is the greater
No markings (night)	800
Runway edge/FATO light and centreline marking	400
Runway edge/FATO light, centreline marking and relevant RVR information	400
Offshore helideck *	
Two-pilot operations	400
Single-pilot operations	500

*: The take-off flight path to be free of obstacles.

AMC5 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Take-Off Operations With Other-Than-Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

(a) General:

- (1) Take-off minima should be expressed as VIS or RVR limits, taking into account all relevant factors for each aerodrome planned to be used and aircraft characteristics. Where there is a specific need to see and avoid obstacles on departure and/or for a forced landing, additional conditions, e.g. ceiling, it should be specified.
- (2) When the reported meteorological visibility is below that required for take-off and RVR is not reported, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the visibility along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.
- (3) When no reported meteorological visibility or RVR is available, a take-off should only be commenced if the pilot-in-command can determine that the RVR/VIS along the take-off runway/area is equal to or better than the required minimum.

(b) Visual reference:

- (1) The take-off minima should be selected to ensure sufficient guidance to control the aircraft in the event of both a rejected take-off in adverse circumstances and a continued take-off after failure of the critical engine.
- (2) For night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the runway/final approach and take-off area (FATO) and any obstacles.

AMC6 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Criteria for Establishing RVR/CMV



- (a) In order to qualify for the lowest allowable values of RVR/CMV specified in Table 4.A of AMC7 SPO.OP.110, the instrument approach should meet at least the following facility requirements and associated conditions:
- (1) Instrument approaches with designated vertical profile up to and including 4.5° for Category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for Category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are:
 - (i) instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system
 - (ii) (MLS)/GBAS landing system (GLS)/precision approach radar (PAR)); or
 - (iii) approach procedure with vertical guidance (APV); and where the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for Category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for Category C and D aeroplanes.
 - (2) Instrument approach operations flown using the CDFA technique with a nominal vertical profile, up to and including 4.5° for Category A and B aeroplanes, or 3.77° for Category C and D aeroplanes, where the facilities are non-directional beacon (NDB), NDB/distance measuring equipment (DME), VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR), VOR/DME, localiser (LOC), LOC/DME, VHF direction finder (VDF), surveillance radar approach (SRA) or global navigation satellite system (GNSS)/lateral navigation (LNAV), with a final approach segment of at least 3 NM, which also fulfil the following criteria:
 - (i) the final approach track is offset by not more than 15° for Category A and B aeroplanes or by not more than 5° for Category C and D aeroplanes;
 - (ii) the final approach fix (FAF) or another appropriate fix where descent is initiated is available, or distance to threshold (THR) is available by flight management system (FMS)/area navigation (NDB/DME) or DME; and
 - (iii) the missed approach point (MAPt) is determined by timing, the distance from FAF to THR is ≤ 8 NM.
 - (3) Instrument approaches where the facilities are NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA or GNSS/LNAV, not fulfilling the criteria in (a)(2), or with an minimum descent height (MDH) ≥ 1 200 ft.
- (b) The missed approach operation, after an approach operation has been flown using the CDFA technique, should be executed when reaching the decision height/altitude (DH/A) or the MAPt, whichever occurs first. The lateral part of the missed approach procedure should be flown via the MAPt unless otherwise stated on the approach chart.

AMC7 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS Minima for NPA, APV, CAT I — Aeroplanes

- (a) The minimum RVR/CMV/VIS should be the highest of the values specified in Table 3 and Table 4.A but not greater than the maximum values specified in Table 4.A, where applicable.
- (b) The values in Table 2 should be derived from the formula below:
 required RVR/VIS (m) = [(DH/MDH (ft) x 0.3048) / tan α] — length of approach lights (m);

where α is the calculation angle, being a default value of 3.00° increasing in steps of 0.10° for each line in Table 3 up to 3.77° and then remaining constant.



- (c) If the approach is flown with a level flight segment at or above MDA/H, 200 m should be added for Category A and B aeroplanes and 400 m for Category C and D aeroplanes to the minimum RVR/CMV/VIS value resulting from the application of Table 3 and Table 4.A.
- (d) A RVR of less than 750 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used:
- (1) for CAT I operations to runways with full approach lighting system (FALS), runway touchdown zone lights (RTZL) and runway centreline lights (RCLL);
 - (2) for CAT I operations to runways without RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up guidance landing system (HUDLS), or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach or flight-director-flown approach to a DH. The ILS should not be published as a restricted facility; and
 - (3) for APV operations to runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved head-up display (HUD).
- (e) Lower values than those specified in Table 3 may be used for HUDLS and auto-land operations if approved in accordance with Part-SPA, Subpart E.
- (f) The visual aids should comprise standard runway day markings and approach and runway lights as specified in Table 2.
- (g) For night operations or for any operation where credit for runway and approach lights is required, the lights should be on and serviceable, except as provided for in Table 6 of AMC 10 SPO.OP.110.
- (h) For single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the following additional criteria:
- (1) a RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used for CAT I approaches provided any of the following is used at least down to the applicable DH:
 - (i) a suitable autopilot, coupled to an ILS, MLS or GLS that is not published as restricted; or
 - (ii) an approved HUDLS, including, where appropriate, enhanced vision system (EVS), or equivalent approved system;
 - (2) where RTZL and/or RCLL are not available, the minimum RVR/CMV should not be less than 600 m; and
 - (3) a RVR of less than 800 m as indicated in Table 3 may be used for APV operations to runways with FALS, RTZL and RCLL when using an approved HUDLS, or equivalent approved system, or when conducting a coupled approach to a DH equal to or greater than 250 ft.



Table 2: Approach lighting systems

Class of lighting facility	Length, configuration and intensity of approach lights
FALS	CAT I lighting system (HIALS \geq 720 m) distance coded centreline, Barrette centreline
IALS	Simple approach lighting system (HIALS 420 – 719 m) single source, Barrette
BALS	Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MIALS or ALS 210 – 419 m)
NALS	Any other approach lighting system (HIALS, MIALS or ALS $<$ 210 m) or no approach lights

Note: HIALS: high intensity approach lighting system;

MIALS medium intensity approach lighting system;

ALS: approach lighting system.

Table 3: RVR/CMV vs DH/MDH

DH or MDH	Class of lighting facility			
	FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
	See (d), (e), (h) above for RVR $<$ 750/800 m			
Ft	RVR/CMV (m)			
200 – 210	550	750	1000	1200
211 – 220	550	800	1000	1200
221 – 230	550	800	1000	1200
231 – 240	550	800	1000	1200
241 – 250	550	800	1000	1300
251 – 260	600	800	1100	1300
261 – 280	600	900	1100	1300
281 - 300	650	900	1200	1400
301 - 320	700	1000	1200	1400
321 - 340	800	1100	1300	1500
341 - 360	900	1200	1400	1600
361 - 380	1000	1300	1500	1700
381 - 400	1100	1400	1600	1800
401 - 420	1200	1500	1700	1900
421 - 440	1300	1600	1800	2000
441 - 460	1400	1700	1900	2100
461 - 480	1500	1800	2000	2200
481 - 500	1500	1800	2100	2300



DH or MDH	Class of lighting facility			
	FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
	See (d), (e), (h) above for RVR < 750/800 m			
Ft	RVR/CMV (m)			
501 - 520	1600	1900	2100	2400
521 - 540	1700	2000	2200	2400
541 - 560	1800	2100	2300	2500
561 - 580	1900	2200	2400	2600
581 - 600	2000	2300	2500	2700
601 - 620	2100	2400	2600	2800
621 - 640	2200	2500	2700	2900
641 - 660	2300	2600	2800	3000
661 - 680	2400	2700	2900	3100
681 - 700	2500	2800	3000	3200
701 - 720	2600	2900	3100	3300
721 - 740	2700	3000	3200	3400
741 - 760	2700	3000	3300	3500
761 - 800	2900	3200	3400	3600
801 - 850	3100	3400	3600	3800
851 - 900	3300	3600	3800	4000
901 - 950	3600	3900	4100	4300
951 - 1000	3800	4100	4300	4500
1001 - 1100	4100	4400	4600	4900
1101 - 1200	4600	4900	5000	5000
1201 and above	5000	5000	5000	5000



Table 4.A: CAT I, APV, NPA — aeroplanes

Minimum and maximum applicable RVR/CMV (lower and upper cut-off limits)

Facility/conditions	RVR/CMV (m)	Aeroplane category			
		A	B	C	D
ILS, MLS, GLS, PAR, GNSS/SBAS, GNSS/VNAV	Min	According to Table 3			
	Max	1500	1500	2400,	2400
NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV with a procedure that fulfils the criteria in AMC6 SPO.OP.110 (a)(2).	Min	750	750	750	750
	Max	1500	1500	2400	2400
For NDB, NDB/DME, VOR, VOR/DME, LOC, LOC/DME, VDF, SRA, GNSS/LNAV: - not fulfilling the criteria in AMC6 SPO.OP.110 (a)(2)., - or with a DH or MDH \geq 1 200ft	Min	1000	1000	1200	1200
	Max	According to Table 3, if flown using the CDFA technique, otherwise an add-on of 200/400 m applies to the values in Table 3 but not to result in a value exceeding 5000m			

AMC8 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Determination of RVR/CMV/VIS Minima for NPA, CAT I — Helicopters

- (a) For non-precision approach (NPA) operations, the minima specified in Table 4.1.H should apply:
- (1) where the missed approach point is within $\frac{1}{2}$ NM of the landing threshold, the approach minima specified for FALS may be used regardless of the length of approach lights available. However, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, end lights and FATO/runway markings are still required;
 - (2) for night operations, ground lights should be available to illuminate the FATO/runway and any obstacles; and
 - (3) for single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR is 800 m or the minima in Table 4.2.H, whichever is higher.
- (b) For CAT I operations, the minima specified in Table 4.2.H should apply:
- (1) for night operations, ground light should be available to illuminate the FATO/runway and any obstacles;
 - (2) for single-pilot operations, the minimum RVR/VIS should be calculated in accordance with the following additional criteria:
 - (i) a RVR of less than 800 m should not be used except when using a suitable autopilot coupled to an ILS, MLS or GLS, in which case normal minima apply; and
 - (ii) the DH applied should not be less than 1.25 times the minimum use height for the autopilot.



Table 4.1.H: Onshore NPA minima

MDH (ft) *	Facilities vs. RVR/CMV (m) **, ***			
	FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
250 – 299	600	800	1000	1000
300 – 449	800	1000	1000	1000
450 and above	1000	1000	1000	1000

*: The MDH refers to the initial calculation of MDH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to take account of a rounding up to the nearest 10 ft, which may be done for operational purposes, e.g. conversion to MDA.

**.: The tables are only applicable to conventional approaches with a nominal descent slope of not greater than 4°. Greater descent slopes will usually require that visual glide slope guidance (e.g. precision path approach indicator (PAPI)) is also visible at the MDH.

***.: FALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 720 m or more of high intensity/medium intensity (HI/MI) approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.

IALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 420 – 719 m of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.

BALS comprise FATO/runway markings, < 420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of low intensity (LI) approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.

NALS comprise FATO/runway markings, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, FATO/runway end lights or no lights at all.

Table 4.2.H: Onshore CAT I minima

DH (ft) *	Facilities vs. RVR/CMV (m) **, ***			
	FALS	IALS	BALS	NALS
200	500	600	700	1000
201 – 250	550	650	750	1000
251 – 300	600	700	800	1000
301 and above	750	800	900	1000

*: The DH refers to the initial calculation of DH. When selecting the associated RVR, there is no need to take account of a rounding up to the nearest 10 ft, which may be done for operational purposes, e.g. conversion to DA.

**.: The table is applicable to conventional approaches with a glide slope up to and including 4°.

***.: FALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 720 m or more of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.

IALS comprise FATO/runway markings, 420 – 719 m of HI/MI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.

BALS comprise FATO/runway markings, < 420 m of HI/MI approach lights, any length of LI approach lights, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights and FATO/runway end lights. Lights to be on.



NALS comprise FATO/runway markings, FATO/runway edge lights, threshold lights, FATO/runway end lights or no lights at all.

AMC9 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Conversion of Reported Meteorological Visibility to RVR/CMV

- (a) A conversion from meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV should not be used:
 - (1) when reported RVR is available;
 - (2) for calculating take-off minima; and
 - (3) for other RVR minima less than 800 m.
- (b) If the RVR is reported as being above the maximum value assessed by the aerodrome operator, e.g. 'RVR more than 1500 m', it should not be considered as a reported value for (a)(1).
- (c) When converting meteorological visibility to RVR in circumstances other than those in (a), the conversion factors specified in Table 5 should be used.

Table 5: Conversion of reported meteorological visibility to RVR/CMV

Light elements in operation	RVR/CMV = reported meteorological visibility x	
	Day	Night
HI approach and runway lights	1.5	2.0
Any type of light installation other than above	1.0	1.5
No lights	1.0	not applicable

AMC10 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Effect on Landing Minima of Temporarily Failed or Downgraded Ground Equipment — Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

- (a) General

These instructions are intended for both pre-flight and in-flight use. It is however not expected that the pilot-in-command would consult such instructions after passing 1000 ft above the aerodrome. If failures of ground aids are announced at such a late stage, the approach could be continued at the pilot-in-command's discretion. If failures are announced before such a late stage in the approach, their effect on the approach should be considered as described in Table 6 and, if considered necessary, the approach should be abandoned.
- (b) Conditions applicable to Table 6:
 - (1) multiple failures of runway/FATO lights other than indicated in Table 6 should not be acceptable;
 - (2) deficiencies of approach and runway/FATO lights are treated separately; and
 - (3) failures other than ILS, MLS affect RVR only and not DH.

Table 6: Failed or downgraded equipment — effect on landing minima



Failed or downgraded equipment	Effect on landing minima	
	CAT I	APV, NPA
ILS/MLS standby transmitter	No effect	
Outer marker	No effect if replaced by height check at 1 000 ft	APV — not applicable NPA with FAF: no effect unless used as FAF If the FAF cannot be identified (e.g. no method available for timing of descent), non-precision operations cannot be conducted
Middle marker	No effect	No effect unless used as MAPt
RVR Assessment Systems	No effect	
Approach lights	Minima as for NALS	
Approach lights except the last 210m	Minima as for BALS	
Approach lights except the last 420m	Minima as for IALS	
Standby power for approach lights	No effect	
Edge lights, threshold lights and runway end lights	Day — no effect Night — not allowed	
Centreline lights	No effect if flight director (F/D), HUDLS or auto-land; otherwise RVR 750 m	No effect
Centreline lights spacing increased to 30 m	No effect	
Touchdown zone lights	No effect if F/D, HUDLS or auto-land; otherwise RVR 750 m	No effect
Taxiway lighting system	No effect	

AMC11 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Effect on Landing Minima of Temporarily Failed or Downgraded Ground Equipment— Other-than-Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

- (a) Non-precision approaches requiring a final approach fix (FAF) and/or MAPt should not be conducted where a method of identifying the appropriate fix is not available.



- (b) A minimum RVR of 750 m should be used for CAT I operations in the absence of centreline lines and/or touchdown zone lights.
- (c) Where approach lighting is partly unavailable, minima should take account of the serviceable length of approach lighting.

GM1 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Aircraft Categories

- (a) Aircraft categories should be based on the indicated airspeed at threshold (V_{AT}), which is equal to the stalling speed (V_{SO}) multiplied by 1.3 or where published 1-g (gravity) stall speed (V_{S1g}) multiplied by 1.23 in the landing configuration at the maximum certified landing mass. If both V_{SO} and V_{S1g} are available, the higher resulting V_{AT} should be used.
- (b) The aircraft categories specified in Table 1 should be used.

Table 1: Aircraft categories corresponding to VAT values

Aircraft category	VAT
A	Less than 91 kt
B	from 91 to 120 kt
C	from 121 to 140 kt
D	from 141 to 165 kt
E	from 166 to 210 kt

GM2 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Continuous Descent Final Approach (CDFA) — Aeroplanes

- (a) Introduction
 - (1) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) is a major hazard in aviation. Most CFIT accidents occur in the final approach segment of non-precision approaches; the use of stabilised-approach criteria on a continuous descent with a constant, predetermined vertical path is seen as a major improvement in safety during the conduct of such approaches. Operators should ensure that the following techniques are adopted as widely as possible, for all approaches.
 - (2) The elimination of level flight segments at MDA close to the ground during approaches, and the avoidance of major changes in attitude and power/thrust close to the runway that can destabilise approaches, are seen as ways to reduce operational risks significantly.
 - (3) The term CDFA has been selected to cover a flight technique for any type of NPA operation.
 - (4) The advantages of CDFA are as follows:
 - (i) the technique enhances safe approach operations by the utilisation of standard operating practices;



- (ii) the technique is similar to that used when flying an ILS approach, including when executing the missed approach and the associated missed approach procedure manoeuvre;
- (iii) the aeroplane attitude may enable better acquisition of visual cues;
- (iv) the technique may reduce pilot workload;
- (v) the approach profile is fuel efficient;
- (vi) the approach profile affords reduced noise levels; and
- (vii) the technique affords procedural integration with APV operations.

(b) CDFA

- (1) Continuous descent final approach is defined in Part DEF.
- (2) An approach is only suitable for application of a CDFA technique when it is flown along a nominal vertical profile; a nominal vertical profile is not forming part of the approach procedure design, but can be flown as a continuous descent. The nominal vertical profile information may be published or displayed on the approach chart to the pilot by depicting the nominal slope or range/distance vs height. Approaches with a nominal vertical profile are considered to be:
 - (i) NDB, NDB/DME;
 - (ii) VOR, VOR/DME;
 - (iii) LOC, LOC/DME;
 - (iv) VDF, SRA; and
 - (v) GNSS/LNAV.
- (3) Stabilised approach (SAp) is defined in Part DEF to the Regulation on Air Operations.
 - (i) The control of the descent path is not the only consideration when using the CDFA technique. Control of the aeroplane's configuration and energy is also vital to the safe conduct of an approach.
 - (ii) The control of the flight path, described above as one of the requirements for conducting a SAp, should not be confused with the path requirements for using the CDFA technique.
 - (iii) The predetermined approach slope requirements for applying the CDFA technique are established by the following:
 - (A) the published 'nominal' slope information when the approach has a nominal vertical profile; and
 - (B) the designated final-approach segment minimum of 3 NM, and maximum, when using timing techniques, of 8 NM.
 - (iv) A SAp will never have any level segment of flight at DA/H or MDA/H, as applicable. This enhances safety by mandating a prompt missed approach procedure manoeuvre at DA/H or MDA/H.
 - (v) An approach using the CDFA technique will always be flown as a SAp, since this is a requirement for applying CDFA. However, a SAp does not have to be flown using the CDFA technique, for example a visual approach.



GM3 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Onshore Aerodrome Departure Procedures — Operations with Non-Complex Helicopters

The cloud base and visibility should be such as to allow the helicopter to be clear of cloud at the take-off decision point (TDP), and for the pilot flying to remain in sight of the surface until reaching the minimum speed for flight in instrument meteorological conditions, as given in the AFM.

GM4 SPO.OP.110 Aerodrome operating minima — aeroplanes and helicopters

Take-Off Minima — Operations With Complex Helicopters

- (a) To ensure sufficient control of the helicopter in IMC, the speed, before entering in IMC, should be above the minimum authorised speed in IMC, V_{mini} . This is a limitation in the AFM. Therefore, the lowest speed before entering in IMC is the highest of V_{toSS} (velocity take-off safety speed) and V_{mini} .
- (b) As example, V_{toSS} is 45 kt and V_{mini} 60 kt. In that case, the take-off minima have to include the distance to accelerate to 60 kt. The take-off distance should be increased accordingly.

GM1 SPO.OP.112 Aerodrome operating minima - circling operations with aeroplanes

Supplemental Information

- (a) The purpose of this Guidance Material is to provide operators with supplemental information regarding the application of aerodrome operating minima in relation to circling approaches.
- (b) Conduct of flight — general:
 - (1) the MDH and obstacle clearance height (OCH) included in the procedure are referenced to aerodrome elevation;
 - (2) the MDA is referenced to mean sea level;
 - (3) for these procedures, the applicable visibility is the meteorological visibility; and
 - (4) operators should provide tabular guidance of the relationship between height above threshold and the in-flight visibility required to obtain and sustain visual contact during the circling manoeuvre.
- (c) Instrument approach followed by visual manoeuvring (circling) without prescribed tracks:
 - (1) When the aeroplane is on the initial instrument approach, before visual reference is stabilised, but not below MDA/H, the aeroplane should follow the corresponding instrument approach procedure until the appropriate instrument MAPt is reached.
 - (3) At the beginning of the level flight phase at or above the MDA/H, the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS should be maintained until the pilot:
 - (i) estimates that, in all probability, visual contact with the runway of intended landing or the runway environment will be maintained during the entire circling procedure;



- (ii) estimates that the aeroplane is within the circling area before commencing circling; and
 - (iii) is able to determine the aeroplane's position in relation to the runway of intended landing with the aid of the appropriate external references.
- (4) When reaching the published instrument MAPt and the conditions stipulated in (c)(2) are unable to be established by the pilot, a missed approach should be carried out in accordance with that instrument approach procedure.
- (5) After the aeroplane has left the track of the initial instrument approach, the flight phase outbound from the runway should be limited to an appropriate distance, which is required to align the aeroplane onto the final approach. Such manoeuvres should be conducted to enable the aeroplane:
- (i) to attain a controlled and stable descent path to the intended landing runway; and
 - (ii) to remain within the circling area and in such way that visual contact with the runway of intended landing or runway environment is maintained at all times.
- (6) Flight manoeuvres should be carried out at an altitude/height that is not less than the circling MDA/H.
- (7) Descent below MDA/H should not be initiated until the threshold of the runway to be used has been appropriately identified. The aeroplane should be in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent and land within the touchdown zone.
- (d) Instrument approach followed by a visual manoeuvring (circling) with prescribed track.
- (1) The aeroplane should remain on the initial instrument approach procedure until one of the following is reached:
- (i) the prescribed divergence point to commence circling on the prescribed track; or
 - (ii) the MAPt.
- (2) The aeroplane should be established on the instrument approach track determined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS in level flight at or above the MDA/H at or by the circling manoeuvre divergence point.
- (3) If the divergence point is reached before the required visual reference is acquired, a missed approach should be initiated not later than the MAPt and completed in accordance with the initial instrument approach procedure.
- (4) When commencing the prescribed circling manoeuvre at the published divergence point, the subsequent manoeuvres should be conducted to comply with the published routing and published heights/altitudes.
- (5) Unless otherwise specified, once the aeroplane is established on the prescribed track(s), the published visual reference does not need to be maintained unless:
- (i) required by the State of the aerodrome; or
 - (ii) the circling MAPt (if published) is reached.
- (6) If the prescribed circling manoeuvre has a published MAPt and the required visual reference has not been obtained by that point, a missed approach should be executed in accordance with (e)(2) and (e)(3).



- (7) Subsequent further descent below MDA/H should only commence when the required visual reference has been obtained.
- (8) Unless otherwise specified in the procedure, final descent should not be commenced from MDA/H until the threshold of the intended landing runway has been identified and the aeroplane is in a position to continue with a normal rate of descent to land within the touchdown zone.
- (e) Missed approach
- (1) Missed approach during the instrument procedure prior to circling:
- (i) if the missed approach procedure is required to be flown when the aeroplane is positioned on the instrument approach track defined by the radio navigation aids, RNAV, RNP, ILS, MLS or GLS, and before commencing the circling manoeuvre, the published missed approach for the instrument approach should be followed; or
 - (ii) if the instrument approach procedure is carried out with the aid of an ILS, MLS or a SAp, the MAPt associated with an ILS or MLS procedure without glide path (GP-out procedure) or the SAp, where applicable, should be used.
- (2) If a prescribed missed approach is published for the circling manoeuvre, this overrides the manoeuvres prescribed below.
- (3) If visual reference is lost while circling to land after the aeroplane has departed from the initial instrument approach track, the missed approach specified for that particular instrument approach should be followed. It is expected that the pilot will make an initial climbing turn toward the intended landing runway to a position overhead of the aerodrome where the pilot will establish the aeroplane in a climb on the instrument missed approach segment.
- (4) The aeroplane should not leave the visual manoeuvring (circling) area, which is obstacle protected, unless:
- (i) established on the appropriate missed approach procedure; or
 - (ii) at minimum sector altitude (MSA).
- (5) All turns should be made in the same direction and the aeroplane should remain within the circling protected area while climbing to either:
- (i) the altitude assigned to any published circling missed approach manoeuvre if applicable;
 - (ii) the altitude assigned to the missed approach of the initial instrument approach;
 - (iii) the MSA;
 - (iv) the minimum holding altitude (MHA) applicable for transition to a holding facility or fix, or continue to climb to an MSA; or
 - (v) as directed by ATS.

When the missed approach procedure is commenced on the 'downwind' leg of the circling manoeuvre, an 'S' turn may be undertaken to align the aeroplane on the initial instrument approach missed approach path, provided the aeroplane remains within the protected circling area.



The pilot-in-command should be responsible for ensuring adequate terrain clearance during the above-stipulated manoeuvres, particularly during the execution of a missed approach initiated by ATS.

- (6) Because the circling manoeuvre may be accomplished in more than one direction, different patterns will be required to establish the aeroplane on the prescribed missed approach course depending on its position at the time visual reference is lost. In particular, all turns are to be in the prescribed direction if this is restricted, e.g. to the west/east (left or right hand) to remain within the protected circling area.
- (7) If a missed approach procedure is published for a particular runway onto which the aeroplane is conducting a circling approach and the aeroplane has commenced a manoeuvre to align with the runway, the missed approach for this direction may be accomplished. The ATS unit should be informed of the intention to fly the published missed approach procedure for that particular runway.
- (8) The pilot-in-command should advise ATS when any missed approach procedure has been commenced, the height/altitude the aeroplane is climbing to and the position the aeroplane is proceeding towards and/or heading the aeroplane is established on.

AMC1 SPO.OP.120 Noise abatement procedures

NADP Design — Operations with Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

- (a) For each aeroplane type two departure procedures should be defined, in accordance with ICAO Doc. 8168 (Procedures for Air Navigation Services, 'PANS- OPS'), Volume I:
 - (1) noise abatement departure procedure one (NADP 1), designed to meet the close-in noise abatement objective; and
 - (2) noise abatement departure procedure two (NADP 2), designed to meet the distant noise abatement objective.
- (b) For each type of NADP (1 and 2), a single climb profile should be specified for use at all aerodromes, which is associated with a single sequence of actions. The NADP 1 and NADP 2 profiles may be identical.

GM1 SPO.OP.120 Noise abatement procedures

Terminology — Operations With Complex Motor-Powered Aeroplanes

- (a) 'Climb profile' means in this context the vertical path of the NADP as it results from the pilot's actions (engine power reduction, acceleration, slats/flaps retraction).
- (b) 'Sequence of actions' means the order in which these pilot's actions are done and their timing.

General

- (c) The rule addresses only the vertical profile of the departure procedure. Lateral track has to comply with the standard instrument departure (SID).

Example

- (d) For a given aeroplane type, when establishing the distant NADP, the operator should choose either to reduce power first and then accelerate, or to accelerate first and then



wait until slats/flaps are retracted before reducing power. The two methods constitute two different sequences of actions.

- (e) For an aeroplane type, each of the two departure climb profiles may be defined by one sequence of actions (one for close-in, one for distant) and two above aerodrome level (AAL) altitudes/heights. These are:
 - (1) the altitude of the first pilot's action (generally power reduction with or without acceleration). This altitude should not be less than 800 ft AAL; or
 - (2) the altitude of the end of the noise abatement procedure. This altitude should usually not be more than 3000 ft AAL.
- (f) These two altitudes may be runway specific when the aeroplane flight management system (FMS) has the relevant function that permits the crew to change thrust reduction and/or acceleration altitude/height. If the aeroplane is not FMS equipped or the FMS is not fitted with the relevant function, two fixed heights should be defined and used for each of the two NADPs.

AMC1 SPO.OP.125 Minimum obstacle clearance altitudes — IFR flights

General

Commercially available information specifying minimum obstacle clearance altitudes may be used.

AMC1 SPO.OP.131(a)(1)(ii) Fuel and oil supply — helicopters

Reduced Reserve Fuel

- (a) The operator should specify in the SOP:
 - (1) the type of activity where such reduced reserve fuel may be used; and
 - (2) methods of reading and calculating the remaining fuel.
- (b) Refuelling facilities should be available at the aerodrome/operating site.

AMC1 SPO.OP.135 Safety briefing

Task Specialist — General

- (a) The purpose of operational briefing is to ensure that task specialists are familiar with all aspects of the operation, including their responsibilities.
- (b) Such briefing should include, as appropriate:
 - (1) behaviour on the ground and in-flight, including emergency procedures;
 - (2) procedures for boarding and disembarking;
 - (3) procedures for loading and unloading the aircraft;
 - (4) use of doors in normal and emergency operations;
 - (5) use of communication equipment and hand signals;
 - (6) precautions in case of a landing on sloping ground; and
 - (7) in addition to the items listed from (b)(1) to (b)(6) before take-off:
 - (i) location of emergency exits;



- (ii) restrictions regarding smoking;
 - (iii) restrictions regarding the use of portable electronic equipment; and
 - (iv) stowage of tools and hand baggage.
- (c) The briefing may be given as a verbal presentation or by issuing the appropriate procedures and instructions in written form. Before commencement of the flight, their understanding should be confirmed.

AMC1 SPO.OP.151 Destination alternate aerodromes — helicopters

Offshore Alternate Aerodromes — Complex Motor-Powered Helicopters

- (a) Weather-permissible offshore alternate aerodromes may be selected and specified subject to the following:
- (1) the offshore alternate aerodrome should only be used after passing a point of no return (PNR). Prior to a PNR, onshore alternate aerodromes should be used;
 - (2) mechanical reliability of critical control systems and critical components should be considered and taken into account when determining the suitability of the alternate aerodrome;
 - (3) one-engine-inoperative (OEI) performance capability should be attainable prior to arrival at the alternate;
 - (4) to the extent possible, deck availability should be guaranteed; and
 - (5) weather information should be reliable and accurate.
- (b) Offshore alternate aerodromes should not be used when it is possible to carry enough fuel to have an onshore alternate aerodrome. Offshore alternate aerodromes should not be used in a hostile environment.
- (c) The landing technique specified in the AFM following control system failure may preclude the nomination of certain helidecks as alternate aerodromes.

AMC1 SPO.OP.155 Refuelling with persons embarking, on board or disembarking

Operational Procedures — Aeroplanes

- (a) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:
- (1) One qualified person should remain at a specified location during fuelling operations with persons on board. This qualified person should be capable of handling emergency procedures concerning fire protection and fire-fighting, handling communications and initiating and directing an evacuation.
 - (2) Two-way communication should be established and should remain available by the aeroplane's inter-communication system or other suitable means between the ground crew supervising the refuelling and the qualified personnel on board the aeroplane; the involved personnel should remain within easy reach of the system of communication.
 - (3) Flight crew members and task specialists should be warned that refuelling will take place.
 - (4) 'Fasten seat belts' signs should be off.
 - (5) 'No smoking' signs should be on, together with interior lighting to enable emergency exits to be identified.



- (6) Task specialists should be instructed to unfasten their seat belts and refrain from smoking.
- (7) If the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the aeroplane, or any other hazard arises during refuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately.
- (8) The ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation and slide deployment areas should be kept clear.
- (9) Provision should be made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

Operational Procedures — Helicopters

- (b) Operational procedures should specify that at least the following precautions are taken:
 - (1) Door(s) on the refuelling side of the helicopter remain closed.
 - (2) Door(s) on the non-refuelling side of the helicopter remain open, weather permitting.
 - (3) Firefighting facilities of the appropriate scale be positioned so as to be immediately available in the event of a fire.;
 - (4) Sufficient qualified personnel are on board and be prepared for an immediate emergency evacuation.
 - (5) If the presence of fuel vapour is detected inside the helicopter, or any other hazard arises during refuelling, fuelling should be stopped immediately.
 - (6) The ground area beneath the exits intended for emergency evacuation be kept clear.
 - (7) Provision should be made for a safe and rapid evacuation.

GM1 SPO.OP.155 Refuelling with persons embarking, on board or disembarking Aircraft Refuelling Provisions and Guidance on Safe Refuelling Practices

Provisions concerning aircraft refuelling are contained in Volume I (Aerodrome Design and Operations) of ICAO Annex 14 (Aerodromes), and guidance on safe refuelling practices is contained in Parts 1 and 8 of the ICAO Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137).

AMC1 SPO.OP.170 Meteorological conditions

Evaluation of Meteorological Conditions

Pilots should carefully evaluate the available meteorological information relevant to the proposed flight, such as applicable surface observations, winds and temperatures aloft, terminal and area forecasts, air meteorological information reports (AIRMETs), significant meteorological information (SIGMET) and pilot reports.

The ultimate decision whether, when, and where to make the flight rests with the pilot-in-command. Pilots should continue to re-evaluate changing weather conditions.

AMC2 SPO.OP.170 Meteorological conditions

Application of Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF & TREND)

Where a terminal area forecast (TAF) or meteorological aerodrome or aeronautical report (METAR) with landing forecast (TREND) is used as forecast, the following criteria should be used:

- (a) From the start of a TAF validity period up to the time of applicability of the first subsequent 'FM...' or 'BECMG' or, if no 'FM' or BECMG' is given, up to the end of the



validity period of the TAF, the prevailing weather conditions forecast in the initial part of the TAF should be applied.

- (b) From the time of observation of a METAR up to the time of applicability of the first subsequent 'FM' or 'BECMG' or, if no 'FM' or 'BECMG' is given, up to the end of the validity period of the TREND, the prevailing weather conditions forecast in the METAR should be applied.
- (c) Following FM (alone) or BECMG AT, any specified change should be applied from the time of the change.
- (d) Following BECMG (alone), BECMG FM, BECMG TL, BECMG FM TL:
 - (1) in the case of deterioration, any specified change should be applied from the start of the change; and
 - (2) in the case of improvement, any specified change should be applied from the end of the change.
- (e) In a period indicated by TEMPO (alone), TEMPO FM, TEMPO TL, TEMPO FM TL, PROB30/40 (alone):
 - (1) deteriorations associated with persistent conditions in connection with e.g. haze, mist, fog, dust/sandstorm, continuous precipitation should be applied;
 - (2) deteriorations associated with transient/showery conditions in connection with short-lived weather phenomena, e.g. thunderstorms, showers may be ignored; and
 - (3) improvements should in all cases be disregarded.
- (f) In a period indicated by PROB30/40 TEMPO:
 - (1) deteriorations may be disregarded; and
 - (2) improvements should be disregarded.

Note: Abbreviations used in the context of this AMC are as follows:

FM: from

BECMG: becoming

AT: at

TL: till

TEMPO: temporarily

PROB: probability

GM1 SPO.OP.170 Meteorological conditions

Continuation of a Flight

In the case of in-flight re-planning, continuation of a flight refers to the point from which a revised flight plan applies.

GM1 SPO.OP.175 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

Terminology

Terms used in the context of de-icing/anti-icing have the meaning defined in the following subparagraphs.

- (a) 'Anti-icing fluid' includes, but is not limited to, the following:



- (1) Type I fluid if heated to minimum 60 °C at the nozzle;
- (2) mixture of water and Type I fluid if heated to minimum 60°C at the nozzle;
- (3) Type II fluid;
- (4) mixture of water and Type II fluid;
- (5) Type III fluid;
- (6) mixture of water and Type III fluid;
- (7) Type IV fluid;
- (8) mixture of water and Type IV fluid.

On uncontaminated aircraft surfaces Type II, III and IV anti-icing fluids are normally applied unheated.

- (b) 'Clear ice': a coating of ice, generally clear and smooth, but with some air pockets. It forms on exposed objects, the temperatures of which are at, below or slightly above the freezing temperature, by the freezing of super-cooled drizzle, droplets or raindrops.
- (c) 'Conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground' (e.g. freezing fog, freezing precipitation, frost, rain or high humidity (on cold soaked wings), snow or mixed rain and snow).
- (d) 'Contamination', in this context, is understood as being all forms of frozen or semi- frozen moisture, such as frost, snow, slush or ice.
- (e) 'Contamination check': a check of aircraft for contamination to establish the need for de-icing.
- (f) 'De-icing fluid': such fluid includes, but is not limited to, the following:
 - (1) heated water;
 - (2) Type I fluid;
 - (3) mixture of water and Type I fluid;
 - (4) Type II fluid;
 - (5) mixture of water and Type II fluid;
 - (6) Type III fluid;
 - (7) mixture of water and Type III fluid;
 - (8) Type IV fluid;
 - (9) mixture of water and Type IV fluid.

De-icing fluid is normally applied heated to ensure maximum efficiency.

- (g) 'De-icing/anti-icing': this is the combination of de-icing and anti-icing performed in either one or two steps.
- (h) 'Ground ice detection system (GIDS)': system used during aircraft ground operations to inform the personnel involved in the operation and/or the flight crew about the presence of frost, ice, snow or slush on the aircraft surfaces.
- (i) 'Lowest operational use temperature (LOUT)': the lowest temperature at which a fluid has been tested and certified as acceptable in accordance with the appropriate aerodynamic acceptance test whilst still maintaining a freezing point buffer of not less than:



- (1) 10 °C for a Type I de-icing/anti-icing fluid; or
 - (2) 7 °C for Type II, III or IV de-icing/anti-icing fluids.
- (j) 'Post-treatment check': an external check of the aircraft after de-icing and/or anti-icing treatment accomplished from suitably elevated observation points (e.g. from the de-icing/anti-icing equipment itself or other elevated equipment) to ensure that the aircraft is free from any frost, ice, snow or slush.
- (k) 'Pre-take-off check': an assessment normally performed by the flight crew, to validate the applied hold-over time (HoT).
- (l) 'Pre-take-off contamination check' a check of the treated surfaces for contamination, performed when the HoT has been exceeded or if any doubt exists regarding the continued effectiveness of the applied anti-icing treatment. It is normally accomplished externally, just before commencement of the take-off run.

Anti-Icing Codes

- (m) The following are examples of anti-icing codes:
- (1) 'Type I' at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a Type I fluid;
 - (2) 'Type II/100' at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with undiluted Type II fluid;
 - (3) 'Type II/75' at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a mixture of 75 % Type II fluid and 25 % water; and
 - (4) 'Type IV/50' at (start time) — to be used if anti-icing treatment has been performed with a mixture of 50 % Type IV fluid and 50 % water.
- (n) When a two-step de-icing/anti-icing operation has been carried out, the anti-icing code should be determined by the second step fluid. Fluid brand names may be included, if desired.

GM2 SPO.OP.175 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

De-Icing/Anti-Icing — Procedures

- (a) De-icing and/or anti-icing procedures should take into account manufacturer's recommendations, including those that are type-specific, and should cover:
- (1) contamination checks, including detection of clear ice and under-wing frost; limits on the thickness/area of contamination published in the AFM or other manufacturers' documentation should be followed;
 - (2) procedures to be followed if de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures are interrupted or unsuccessful;
 - (3) post-treatment checks;
 - (4) pre-take-off checks;
 - (5) pre-take-off contamination checks;
 - (6) the recording of any incidents relating to de-icing and/or anti-icing; and
 - (7) the responsibilities of all personnel involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing.
- (b) The operator's procedures should ensure the following:



- (1) When aircraft surfaces are contaminated by ice, frost, slush or snow, they are de-iced prior to take-off, according to the prevailing conditions. Removal of contaminants may be performed with mechanical tools, fluids (including hot water), infrared heat or forced air, taking account of aircraft type-specific provisions.
- (2) Account is taken of the wing skin temperature versus outside air temperature (OAT), as this may affect:
 - (i) the need to carry out aircraft de-icing and/or anti-icing; and/or
 - (ii) the performance of the de-icing/anti-icing fluids.
- (3) When freezing precipitation occurs or there is a risk of freezing precipitation occurring that would contaminate the surfaces at the time of take-off, aircraft surfaces should be anti-iced. If both de-icing and anti-icing are required, the procedure may be performed in a one or two-step process, depending upon weather conditions, available equipment, available fluids and the desired hold-over time (HoT). One-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out at the same time, using a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. Two-step de-icing/anti-icing means that de-icing and anti-icing are carried out in two separate steps. The aircraft is first de-iced using heated water only or a heated mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water. After completion of the de-icing operation a layer of a mixture of de-icing/anti-icing fluid and water, or of de-icing/anti-icing fluid only, is sprayed over the aircraft surfaces. The second step will be applied before the first-step fluid freezes, typically within three minutes and, if necessary, area by area.
- (4) When an aircraft is anti-iced and a longer HoT is needed/desired, the use of a less diluted Type II or Type IV fluid should be considered.
- (5) All restrictions relative to OAT and fluid application (including, but not necessarily limited to, temperature and pressure) published by the fluid manufacturer and/or aircraft manufacturer, are followed and procedures, limitations and recommendations to prevent the formation of fluid residues are followed.
- (6) During conditions conducive to aircraft icing on the ground or after de-icing and/or anti-icing, an aircraft is not dispatched for departure unless it has been given a contamination check or a post-treatment check by a trained and qualified person. This check should cover all treated surfaces of the aircraft and be performed from points offering sufficient accessibility to these parts. To ensure that there is no clear ice on suspect areas, it may be necessary to make a physical check (e.g. tactile).
- (7) The required entry is made in the technical log.
- (8) The pilot-in-command continually monitors the environmental situation after the performed treatment. Prior to take-off he/she performs a pre-take-off check, which is an assessment of whether the applied HoT is still appropriate. This pre-take-off check includes, but is not limited to, factors such as precipitation, wind and OAT.
- (9) If any doubt exists as to whether a deposit may adversely affect the aircraft's performance and/or controllability characteristics, the pilot-in-command should arrange for a pre-take-off contamination check to be performed in order to verify that the aircraft's surfaces are free of contamination. Special methods and/or equipment may be necessary to perform this check, especially at night time or in extremely adverse weather conditions. If this check cannot be performed just before take-off, re-treatment should be applied.



- (10) When retreatment is necessary, any residue of the previous treatment should be removed and a completely new de-icing/anti-icing treatment should be applied.
- (11) When a ground ice detection system (GIDS) is used to perform an aircraft surfaces check prior to and/or after a treatment, the use of GIDS by suitably trained personnel should be part of the procedure.
- (c) Special operational considerations
- (1) When using thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids, the operator should consider a two-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the first step preferably with hot water and/or un-thickened fluids.
- (2) The use of de-icing/anti-icing fluids should be in accordance with the aircraft manufacturer's documentation. This is particularly important for thickened fluids to assure sufficient flow-off during take-off.
- (3) The operator should comply with any type-specific operational requirement(s), such as an aircraft mass decrease and/or a take-off speed increase associated with a fluid application.
- (4) The operator should take into account any flight handling procedures (stick force, rotation speed and rate, take-off speed, aircraft attitude etc.) laid down by the aircraft manufacturer when associated with a fluid application.
- (5) The limitations or handling procedures resulting from (c)(3) and/or (c)(4) should be part of the flight crew pre-take-off briefing.
- (d) Communications
- (1) Before aircraft treatment. When the aircraft is to be treated with the flight crew on board, the flight and personnel involved in the operation should confirm the fluid to be used, the extent of treatment required and any aircraft type-specific procedure(s) to be used. Any other information needed to apply the HoT tables should be exchanged.
- (2) Anti-icing code. The operator's procedures should include an anti-icing code, which indicates the treatment the aircraft has received. This code provides the flight crew with the minimum details necessary to estimate an HoT and confirms that the aircraft is free of contamination.
- (3) After treatment. Before reconfiguring or moving the aircraft, the flight crew should receive a confirmation from the personnel involved in the operation that all de-icing and/or anti-icing operations are complete and that all personnel and equipment are clear of the aircraft.
- (e) Hold-over protection
- The operator should publish in the operations manual, when required, the HoTs in the form of a table or a diagram, to account for the various types of ground icing conditions and the different types and concentrations of fluids used. However, the times of protection shown in these tables are to be used as guidelines only and are normally used in conjunction with the pre-take-off check.
- (f) Training
- The operator's initial and recurrent de-icing and/or anti-icing training programmes (including communication training) for flight crew and those of its personnel involved in



the operation who are involved in de-icing and/or anti-icing should include additional training if any of the following is introduced:

- (1) a new method, procedure and/or technique;
- (2) a new type of fluid and/or equipment; or
- (3) a new type of aircraft.

(g) Contracting

When the operator contracts training on de-icing/anti-icing, the operator should ensure that the contractor complies with the operator's training/qualification procedures, together with any specific procedures in respect of:

- (1) de-icing and/or anti-icing methods and procedures;
- (2) fluids to be used, including precautions for storage and preparation for use;
- (3) specific aircraft requirements (e.g. no-spray areas, propeller/engine de-icing, auxiliary power unit (APU) operation etc.); and
- (4) checking and communications procedures.

(h) Special maintenance considerations

(1) General

The operator should take proper account of the possible side effects of fluid use. Such effects may include, but are not necessarily limited to, dried and/or re-hydrated residues, corrosion and the removal of lubricants.

(2) Special considerations regarding residues of dried fluids

The operator should establish procedures to prevent or detect and remove residues of dried fluid. If necessary the operator should establish appropriate inspection intervals based on the recommendations of the airframe manufacturers and/or the operator's own experience:

(i) Dried fluid residues

Dried fluid residues could occur when surfaces have been treated and the aircraft has not subsequently been flown and has not been subject to precipitation. The fluid may then have dried on the surfaces.

(ii) Re-hydrated fluid residues

Repetitive application of thickened de-icing/anti-icing fluids may lead to the subsequent formation/build-up of a dried residue in aerodynamically quiet areas, such as cavities and gaps. This residue may re-hydrate if exposed to high humidity conditions, precipitation, washing, etc., and increase to many times its original size/volume. This residue will freeze if exposed to conditions at or below 0°C. This may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, and flap actuating mechanisms to stiffen or jam in-flight. Re-hydrated residues may also form on exterior surfaces, which can reduce lift, increase drag and stall speed. Re-hydrated residues may also collect inside control surface structures and cause clogging of drain holes or imbalances to flight controls. Residues may also collect in hidden areas, such as around flight control hinges, pulleys, grommets, on cables and in gaps.



- (iii) Operators are strongly recommended to obtain information about the fluid dry-out and re-hydration characteristics from the fluid manufacturers and to select products with optimised characteristics.
- (iv) Additional information should be obtained from fluid manufacturers for handling, storage, application and testing of their products.

GM3 SPO.OP.175 Ice and other contaminants — ground procedures

De-icing/Anti-icing — Background Information

Further guidance material on this issue is given in the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations (Doc 9640) (hereinafter referred to as the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations).

(a) General

- (1) Any deposit of frost, ice, snow or slush on the external surfaces of an aircraft may drastically affect its flying qualities because of reduced aerodynamic lift, increased drag, modified stability and control characteristics. Furthermore, freezing deposits may cause moving parts, such as elevators, ailerons, flap actuating mechanism, etc., to jam and create a potentially hazardous condition. Propeller/engine/APU/systems performance may deteriorate due to the presence of frozen contaminants on blades, intakes and components. Also, engine operation may be seriously affected by the ingestion of snow or ice, thereby causing engine stall or compressor damage. In addition, ice/frost may form on certain external surfaces (e.g. wing upper and lower surfaces, etc.) due to the effects of cold fuel/structures, even in ambient temperatures well above 0°C.
- (2) Procedures established by the operator for de-icing and/or anti-icing are intended to ensure that the aircraft is clear of contamination so that degradation of aerodynamic characteristics or mechanical interference will not occur and, following anti-icing, to maintain the airframe in that condition during the appropriate HoT.
- (3) Under certain meteorological conditions, de-icing and/or anti-icing procedures may be ineffective in providing sufficient protection for continued operations. Examples of these conditions are freezing rain, ice pellets and hail, heavy snow, high wind velocity, fast dropping OAT or any time when freezing precipitation with high water content is present. No HoT guidelines exist for these conditions.
- (4) Material for establishing operational procedures can be found, for example, in:
 - (i) ICAO Annex 3, Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation;
 - (ii) ICAO Manual of Aircraft Ground De-icing/Anti-icing Operations;
 - (iii) International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 11075 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing fluids — ISO type I;
 - (iv) ISO 11076 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing methods with fluids;
 - (v) ISO 11077 Aerospace — Self-propelled de-icing/anti-icing vehicles — Functional requirements;
 - (vi) ISO 11078 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing fluids — ISO types II, III and IV;



- (vii) Association of European Airlines (AEA) 'Recommendations for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground';
- (viii) AEA 'Training recommendations and background information for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground';
- (ix) EUROCAE ED-104A Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Ground Ice Detection Systems;
- (x) Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) AS5681 Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Remote On-Ground Ice Detection Systems;
- (xi) SAE ARP4737 Aircraft — De-icing/anti-icing methods;
- (xii) SAE AMS1424 De-icing/anti-icing Fluid, Aircraft, SAE Type I;
- (xiii) SAE AMS1428 Fluid, Aircraft De-icing/anti-icing, Non-Newtonian, (Pseudoplastic), SAE Types II, III, and IV;
- (xiv) SAE ARP1971 Aircraft De-icing Vehicle — Self-Propelled, Large and Small Capacity;
- (xv) SAE ARP5149 Training Programme Guidelines for De-icing/anti-icing of Aircraft on Ground; and
- (xvi) SAE ARP5646 Quality Program Guidelines for De-icing/anti-icing of Aircraft on the Ground.

(b) Fluids

- (1) Type I fluid: Due to its properties, Type I fluid forms a thin, liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied which, under certain weather conditions, gives a very limited HoT. With this type of fluid, increasing the concentration of fluid in the fluid/water mix does not provide any extension in HoT.
- (2) Type II and Type IV fluids contain thickeners that enable the fluid to form a thicker liquid-wetting film on surfaces to which it is applied. Generally, this fluid provides a longer HoT than Type I fluids in similar conditions. With this type of fluid, the HoT can be extended by increasing the ratio of fluid in the fluid/water mix.
- (3) Type III fluid is a thickened fluid especially intended for use on aircraft with low rotation speeds.
- (4) Fluids used for de-icing and/or anti-icing should be acceptable to the operator and the aircraft manufacturer. These fluids normally conform to specifications such as SAE AMS1424, SAE AMS1428 or equivalent. Use of non-conforming fluids is not recommended due to their characteristics being unknown. The anti-icing and aerodynamic properties of thickened fluids may be seriously degraded by, for example, inappropriate storage, treatment, application, application equipment and age.

(c) Hold-over protection

- (1) Hold-over protection is achieved by a layer of anti-icing fluid remaining on and protecting aircraft surfaces for a period of time. With a one-step de-icing/anti-icing procedure, the HoT begins at the commencement of de-icing/anti-icing. With a two-step procedure, the HoT begins at the commencement of the second (anti-icing) step. The hold-over protection runs out:



- (i) at the commencement of the take-off roll (due to aerodynamic shedding of fluid); or
 - (ii) when frozen deposits start to form or accumulate on treated aircraft surfaces, thereby indicating the loss of effectiveness of the fluid.
- (2) The duration of hold-over protection may vary depending on the influence of factors other than those specified in the HoT tables. Guidance should be provided by the operator to take account of such factors, which may include:
- (i) atmospheric conditions, e.g. exact type and rate of precipitation, wind direction and velocity, relative humidity and solar radiation; and
 - (ii) the aircraft and its surroundings, such as aircraft component inclination angle, contour and surface roughness, surface temperature, operation in close proximity to other aircraft (jet or propeller blast) and ground equipment and structures.
- (3) HoTs are not meant to imply that flight is safe in the prevailing conditions if the specified HoT has not been exceeded. Certain meteorological conditions, such as freezing drizzle or freezing rain, may be beyond the certification envelope of the aircraft.
- (4) References to usable HoT tables may be found in the AEA 'Recommendations for de-icing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground'.

AMC1 SPO.OP.176 Ice and other contaminants — flight procedures

Flight in Expected or Actual Icing Conditions

- (a) The procedures to be established by the operator should take account of the design, the equipment, the configuration of the aircraft and the necessary training. For these reasons, different aircraft types operated by the same company may require the development of different procedures. In every case, the relevant limitations are those that are defined in the AFM and other documents produced by the manufacturer.
- (b) The operator should ensure that the procedures take account of the following:
 - (1) the equipment and instruments that should be serviceable for flight in icing conditions;
 - (2) the limitations on flight in icing conditions for each phase of flight. These limitations may be imposed by the aircraft's de-icing or anti-icing equipment or the necessary performance corrections that have to be made;
 - (3) the criteria the flight crew should use to assess the effect of icing on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft;
 - (4) the means by which the flight crew detects, by visual cues or the use of the aircraft's ice detection system, that the flight is entering icing conditions; and
 - (5) the action to be taken by the flight crew in a deteriorating situation (which may develop rapidly) resulting in an adverse effect on the performance and/or controllability of the aircraft, due to:
 - (i) the failure of the aircraft's anti-icing or de-icing equipment to control a build-up of ice; and/or
 - (ii) ice build-up on unprotected areas.



- (c) Training for dispatch and flight in expected or actual icing conditions. The content of the operations manual should reflect the training, both conversion and recurrent, that flight crew and all other relevant operational personnel require in order to comply with the procedures for dispatch and flight in icing conditions:
- (1) instruction on how to recognise, from weather reports or forecasts that are available before flight commences or during flight, the risks of encountering icing conditions along the planned route and on how to modify, as necessary, the departure and in-flight routes or profiles;
 - (2) instruction on the operational and performance limitations or margins;
 - (3) the use of in-flight ice detection, anti-icing and de-icing systems in both normal and abnormal operation; and
 - (4) instruction on the differing intensities and forms of ice accretion and the consequent action which should be taken.

GM1 SPO.OP.200 Ground proximity detection

Guidance Material for Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) Flight Crew Training Programmes

- (a) Introduction
- (1) This GM contains performance-based training objectives for TAWS flight crew training.
 - (2) The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAWS cautions; response to TAWS warnings.
 - (3) The term 'TAWS' in this GM means a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) enhanced by a forward-looking terrain avoidance function. Alerts include both cautions and warnings.
 - (4) The content of this GM is intended to assist operators who are producing training programmes. The information it contains has not been tailored to any specific aircraft or TAWS equipment, but highlights features that are typically available where such systems are installed. It is the responsibility of the individual operator to determine the applicability of the content of this Guidance Material to each aircraft and TAWS equipment installed and their operation. Operators should refer to the AFM and/or aircraft/flight crew operating manual (A/FCOM), or similar documents, for information applicable to specific configurations. If there should be any conflict between the content of this Guidance Material and that published in the other documents described above, then the information contained in the AFM or A/FCOM will take precedence.
- (b) Scope
- (1) The scope of this GM is designed to identify training objectives in the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation; recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items that are considered essential training items and those that are considered to be desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.
 - (2) No attempt is made to define how the training programme should be implemented. Instead, objectives are established to define the knowledge that



a pilot operating a TAWS is expected to possess and the performance expected from a pilot who has completed TAWS training. However, the guidelines do indicate those areas in which the pilot receiving the training should demonstrate his/her understanding, or performance, using a real-time, interactive training device, i.e. a flight simulator. Where appropriate, notes are included within the performance criteria that amplify or clarify the material addressed by the training objective.

(c) Performance-based training objectives

(1) TAWS academic training

- (i) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or by providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.
- (ii) Theory of operation. The pilot should demonstrate an understanding of TAWS operation and the criteria used for issuing cautions and warnings. This training should address system operation. Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how a TAWS functions. Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:

(A) Surveillance

- (a) The GPWS computer processes data supplied from an air data computer, a radio altimeter, an instrument landing system (ILS)/microwave landing system (MLS)/multi-mode (MM) receiver, a roll attitude sensor, and actual position of the surfaces and of the landing gear.
- (b) The forward-looking terrain avoidance function utilises an accurate source of known aircraft position, such as that which may be provided by a flight management system (FMS) or global positioning system (GPS), or an electronic terrain database. The source and scope of the terrain, obstacle and airport data, and features such as the terrain clearance floor, the runway picker, and geometric altitude (where provided), should all be described.
- (c) Displays required to deliver TAWS outputs include a loudspeaker for voice announcements, visual alerts (typically amber and red lights) and a terrain awareness display (that may be combined with other displays). In addition, means should be provided for indicating the status of the TAWS and any partial or total failures that may occur.

(B) Terrain avoidance

Outputs from the TAWS computer provide visual and audio synthetic voice cautions and warnings to alert the flight crew about potential conflicts with terrain and obstacles.

(C) Alert thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings.



Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and alerts and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including:

- (a) basic GPWS alerting modes specified in the ICAO standard:
 - Mode 1: excessive sink rate;
 - Mode 2: excessive terrain closure rate;
 - Mode 3: descent after take-off or missed approach;
 - Mode 4: unsafe proximity to terrain; and
 - Mode 5: descent below ILS glide slope (caution only);
- (b) an additional, optional alert mode:
 - Mode 6: radio altitude call-out (information only); and
- (c) TAWS cautions and warnings that alert the flight crew to obstacles and terrain ahead of the aircraft in line with or adjacent to its projected flight path (forward-looking terrain avoidance (FLTA) and premature descent alert (PDA) functions).

(D) TAWS limitations

Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the limitations of TAWS.
Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of TAWS limitations identified by the manufacturer for the equipment model installed, such as:

- (a) navigation should not be predicated on the use of the terrain display;
- (b) unless geometric altitude data is provided, use of predictive TAWS functions is prohibited when altimeter subscale settings display 'QFE' (atmospheric pressure at aerodrome elevation/runway threshold);
- (c) nuisance alerts can be issued if the aerodrome of intended landing is not included in the TAWS airport database;
- (d) in cold weather operations, corrective procedures should be implemented by the pilot unless the TAWS has in-built compensation, such as geometric altitude data;
- (e) loss of input data to the TAWS computer could result in partial or total loss of functionality. Where means exist to inform the flight crew that functionality has been degraded, this should be known and the consequences understood;
- (f) radio signals not associated with the intended flight profile (e.g. ILS glide path transmissions from an adjacent runway) may cause false alerts;
- (g) inaccurate or low accuracy aircraft position data could lead to false or non-annunciation of terrain or obstacles ahead of the aircraft; and
- (h) minimum equipment list (MEL) restrictions should be applied in the event of the TAWS becoming partially or completely unserviceable. (It should be noted that basic GPWS has no forward-looking capability.)



(E) TAWS inhibits

Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of a TAWS are inhibited.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge and an understanding of the various TAWS inhibits, including the following means of:

- (a) silencing voice alerts;
- (b) inhibiting ILS glide path signals (as may be required when executing an ILS back beam approach);
- (c) inhibiting flap position sensors (as may be required when executing an approach with the flaps not in a normal position for landing);
- (d) inhibiting the FLTA and PDA functions; and
- (e) selecting or deselecting the display of terrain information, together with appropriate annunciation of the status of each selection.

(2) Operating procedures

The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate TAWS avionics and to interpret the information presented by a TAWS. This training should address the following topics:

(i) Use of controls

Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all TAWS controls and inhibits.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following means by which:

- (A) before flight, any equipment self-test functions can be initiated;
- (B) TAWS information can be selected for display; and
- (C) all TAWS inhibits can be operated and what the consequent annunciations mean with regard to loss of functionality.

(ii) Display interpretation

Objective: to verify that the pilot understands the meaning of all information that can be annunciated or displayed by a TAWS.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information annunciated or displayed by a TAWS, including the following:

- (A) knowledge of all visual and aural indications that may be seen or heard;
- (B) response required on receipt of a caution;
- (C) response required on receipt of a warning; and
- (D) response required on receipt of a notification that partial or total failure of the TAWS has occurred (including annunciation that the present aircraft position is of low accuracy).

(iii) Use of basic GPWS or use of the FLTA function only



Objective: to verify that the pilot understands what functionality will remain following loss of the GPWS or of the FLTA function.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of how to recognise the following:

- (A) un-commanded loss of the GPWS function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) protection (essentially, this is the FLTA function); and
- (B) un-commanded loss of the FLTA function, or how to isolate this function and how to recognise the level of the remaining CFIT protection (essentially, this is the basic GPWS).

(iv) Crew coordination

Objective: to verify that the pilot adequately briefs other flight crew members on how TAWS alerts will be handled.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate that the pre-flight briefing addresses procedures that will be used in preparation for responding to TAWS cautions and warnings, including the following:

- (A) the action to be taken, and by whom, in the event that a TAWS caution and/or warning is issued; and
- (B) how multi-function displays will be used to depict TAWS information at take-off, in the cruise and for the descent, approach, landing (and any missed approach). This will be in accordance with procedures specified by the operator, who will recognise that it may be more desirable that other data is displayed at certain phases of flight and that the terrain display has an automatic 'pop-up' mode in the event that an alert is issued.

(v) Reporting rules

Objective: to verify that the pilot is aware of the rules for reporting alerts to the controller and other authorities.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate knowledge of the following:

- (A) when, following recovery from a TAWS alert or caution, a transmission of information should be made to the appropriate ATC unit; and
- (B) the type of written report that is required, how it is to be compiled and whether any cross-reference should be made in the aircraft technical log and/or voyage report (in accordance with procedures specified by the operator), following a flight in which the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert, or if any part of the equipment appears not to have functioned correctly.

(vi) Alert thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing cautions and warnings.

Criteria: the pilot should be able to demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by a TAWS to issue cautions and warnings and the general criteria for the issuance of these alerts, including awareness of the following:



- (A) modes associated with basic GPWS, including the input data associated with each; and
 - (B) visual and aural annunciations that can be issued by TAWS and how to identify which are cautions and which are warnings.
- (3) TAWS manoeuvre training.

The pilot should demonstrate the knowledge required to respond correctly to TAWS cautions and warnings. This training should address the following topics:

(i) Response to cautions:

- (A) Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to cautions.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the need, without delay:

- (a) to initiate action required to correct the condition that has caused the TAWS to issue the caution and to be prepared to respond to a warning, if this should follow; and
 - (b) if a warning does not follow the caution, to notify the controller of the new position, heading and/or altitude/flight level of the aircraft, and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next.
- (B) The correct response to a caution might require the pilot to:
 - (a) reduce a rate of descent and/or to initiate a climb;
 - (b) regain an ILS glide path from below, or to inhibit a glide path signal if an ILS is not being flown;
 - (c) select more flap, or to inhibit a flap sensor if the landing is being conducted with the intent that the normal flap setting will not be used;
 - (d) select gear down; and/or
 - (e) initiate a turn away from the terrain or obstacle ahead and towards an area free of such obstructions if a forward - looking terrain display indicates that this would be a good solution and the entire manoeuvre can be carried out in clear visual conditions.

(ii) Response to warnings

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to warnings.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate an understanding of the following:

- (A) The need, without delay, to initiate a climb in the manner specified by the operator.
- (B) The need, without delay, to maintain the climb until visual verification can be made that the aircraft will clear the terrain or obstacle ahead or until above the appropriate sector safe altitude (if certain about the location of the aircraft with respect to terrain) even if the TAWS warning stops. If, subsequently, the aircraft climbs up through the sector safe altitude, but the visibility does not allow the flight crew to confirm that the terrain hazard has ended, checks should be made to verify the location of the aircraft and to confirm that the altimeter subscale settings are correct.



- (C) When workload permits that, the flight crew should notify the air traffic controller of the new position and altitude/flight level and what the pilot-in-command intends to do next.
 - (D) That the manner in which the climb is made should reflect the type of aircraft and the method specified by the aircraft manufacturer (which should be reflected in the operations manual) for performing the escape manoeuvre. Essential aspects will include the need for an increase in pitch attitude, selection of maximum thrust, confirmation that external sources of drag (e.g. spoilers/speed brakes) are retracted and respect of the stick shaker or other indication of eroded stall margin.
 - (E) That TAWS warnings should never be ignored. However, the pilot's response may be limited to that which is appropriate for a caution, only if:
 - (f) the aircraft is being operated by day in clear, visual conditions; and
 - (g) it is immediately clear to the pilot that the aircraft is in no danger in respect of its configuration, proximity to terrain or current flight path.
- (4) TAWS initial evaluation:
- (i) The flight crew member's understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test.
 - (ii) The flight crew member's understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a flight simulation training device (FSTD) equipped with TAWS visual and aural displays and inhibit selectors similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft that the pilot will fly. The results should be assessed by a flight simulation training instructor, synthetic flight examiner, type rating instructor or type rating examiner.
 - (iii) The range of scenarios should be designed to give confidence that proper and timely responses to TAWS cautions and warnings will result in the aircraft avoiding a CFIT accident. To achieve this objective, the pilot should demonstrate taking the correct action to prevent a caution developing into a warning and, separately, the escape manoeuvre needed in response to a warning. These demonstrations should take place when the external visibility is zero, though there is much to be learnt if, initially, the training is given in 'mountainous' or 'hilly' terrain with clear visibility. This training should comprise a sequence of scenarios, rather than be included in line orientated flight training (LOFT).
 - (iv) A record should be made, after the pilot has demonstrated competence, of the scenarios that were practised.
- (5) TAWS recurrent training:
- (i) TAWS recurrent training ensures that pilots maintain the appropriate TAWS knowledge and skills. In particular, it reminds pilots of the need to act promptly in response to cautions and warnings and of the unusual attitude associated with flying the escape manoeuvre.
 - (ii) An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator.



Recurrent training should also address changes to TAWS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique TAWS characteristics of which pilots should be aware.

(6) Reporting procedures:

(i) Verbal reports

Verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit:

- (A) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance;
- (B) when, following a manoeuvre that has caused the aircraft to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aircraft has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or
- (C) when an air traffic control unit issues instructions that, if followed, would cause the pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft towards terrain or obstacle or it would appear from the display that a potential CFIT occurrence is likely to result.

(ii) Written reports

Written reports should be submitted in accordance with the operator's occurrence reporting scheme and they should also be recorded in the aircraft technical log:

- (A) whenever the aircraft flight path has been modified in response to a TAWS alert (false, nuisance or genuine);
- (B) whenever a TAWS alert has been issued and is believed to have been false; and/or
- (C) if it is believed that a TAWS alert should have been issued, but was not.

(iii) Within this GM, and with regard to reports:

- (A) the term 'false' means that the TAWS issued an alert that could not possibly be justified by the position of the aircraft in respect to terrain and it is probable that a fault or failure in the system (equipment and/or input data) was the cause;
- (B) the term 'nuisance' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was appropriate, but was not needed because the flight crew could determine by independent means that the flight path was, at that time, safe;
- (C) the term 'genuine' means that the TAWS issued an alert that was both appropriate and necessary;
- (D) the report terms described above are only meant to be assessed after the occurrence is over, to facilitate subsequent analysis, the adequacy of the equipment and the programmes it contains. The intention is not for the flight crew to attempt to classify an alert into any of these three categories when visual and/or aural cautions or warnings are annunciated.



GM1 SPO.OP.205 Airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS)

General

- (a) The ACAS operational procedures and training programmes established by the operator should take into account this Guidance Material. It incorporates advice contained in:
 - (1) ICAO Annex 10, Volume IV;
 - (2) ICAO PANS-OPS, Volume 1;
 - (3) ICAO PANS-ATM; and
 - (4) ICAO guidance material 'ACAS Performance-Based Training Objectives' (published under Attachment E of State Letter AN 7/1.3.7.2-97/77).
- (b) Additional guidance material on ACAS may be referred to, including information available from such sources as EUROCONTROL.

ACAS Flight Crew Training

- (c) During the implementation of ACAS, several operational issues were identified that had been attributed to deficiencies in flight crew training programmes. As a result, the issue of flight crew training has been discussed within the ICAO, which has developed guidelines for operators to use when designing training programmes.
- (d) This Guidance Material contains performance-based training objectives for ACAS II flight crew training. Information contained here related to traffic advisories (TAs) is also applicable to ACAS I and ACAS II users. The training objectives cover five areas: theory of operation; pre-flight operations; general in-flight operations; response to TAs; and response to resolution advisories (RAs).
- (e) The information provided is valid for version 7 and 7.1 (ACAS II). Where differences arise, these are identified.
- (f) The performance-based training objectives are further divided into the areas of: academic training; manoeuvre training; initial evaluation and recurrent qualification. Under each of these four areas, the training material has been separated into those items which are considered essential training items and those which are considered desirable. In each area, objectives and acceptable performance criteria are defined.
- (g) ACAS academic training
 - (1) This training is typically conducted in a classroom environment. The knowledge demonstrations specified in this section may be completed through the successful completion of written tests or through providing correct responses to non-real-time computer-based training (CBT) questions.
 - (2) Essential items
 - (i) Theory of operation. The flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of ACAS II operation and the criteria used for issuing TAs and RAs. This training should address the following topics:
 - (A) System operation
Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of how ACAS functions.
Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the following functions:
 - (a) Surveillance



- (1) ACAS interrogates other transponder-equipped aircraft within a nominal range of 14 NM.
 - (2) ACAS surveillance range can be reduced in geographic areas with a large number of ground interrogators and/or ACAS II-equipped aircraft.
 - (3) If the operator's ACAS implementation provides for the use of the Mode S extended squitter, the normal surveillance range may be increased beyond the nominal 14 NM. However, this information is not used for collision avoidance purposes.
- (b) Collision avoidance
- (1) TAs can be issued against any transponder-equipped aircraft that responds to the ICAO Mode C interrogations, even if the aircraft does not have altitude reporting capability.
 - (2) RAs can be issued only against aircraft that are reporting altitude and in the vertical plane only.
 - (3) RAs issued against an ACAS-equipped intruder are coordinated to ensure complementary RAs are issued.
 - (4) Failure to respond to an RA deprives own aircraft of the collision protection provided by own ACAS.
 - (5) Additionally, in ACAS-ACAS encounters, failure to respond to an RA also restricts the choices available to the other aircraft's ACAS and thus renders the other aircraft's ACAS less effective than if own aircraft were not ACAS equipped.
- (B) Advisory thresholds
- Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.
- Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following:
- (a) ACAS advisories are based on time to closest point of approach (CPA) rather than distance. The time should be short and vertical separation should be small, or projected to be small, before an advisory can be issued. The separation standards provided by ATS are different from the miss distances against which ACAS issues alerts.
 - (b) Thresholds for issuing a TA or an RA vary with altitude. The thresholds are larger at higher altitudes.
 - (c) A TA occurs from 15 to 48 seconds and an RA from 15 to 35 seconds before the projected CPA.



- (d) RAs are chosen to provide the desired vertical miss distance at CPA. As a result, RAs can instruct a climb or descent through the intruder aircraft's altitude.

(C) ACAS limitations

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the limitations of ACAS.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of ACAS limitations, including the following:

- (a) ACAS will neither track nor display non-transponder- equipped aircraft, nor aircraft not responding to ACAS Mode C interrogations.
- (b) ACAS will automatically fail if the input from the aircraft's barometric altimeter, radio altimeter or transponder is lost.
 - (1) In some installations, the loss of information from other on-board systems such as an inertial reference system (IRS) or attitude heading reference system (AHRS) may result in an ACAS failure. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crews are aware of the types of failure which will result in an ACAS failure.
 - (2) ACAS may react in an improper manner when false altitude information is provided to own ACAS or transmitted by another aircraft. Individual operators should ensure that their flight crew are aware of the types of unsafe conditions which can arise. Flight crew members should ensure that when they are advised, if their own aircraft is transmitting false altitude reports, an alternative altitude reporting source is selected, or altitude reporting is switched off.
- (c) Some aeroplanes within 380 ft above ground level (AGL) (nominal value) are deemed to be 'on ground' and will not be displayed. If ACAS is able to determine an aircraft below this altitude is airborne, it will be displayed.
- (d) ACAS may not display all proximate transponder-equipped aircraft in areas of high density traffic.
- (e) The bearing displayed by ACAS is not sufficiently accurate to support the initiation of horizontal manoeuvres based solely on the traffic display.
- (f) ACAS will neither track nor display intruders with a vertical speed in excess of 10000 ft/min. In addition, the design implementation may result in some short-term errors in the tracked vertical speed of an intruder during periods of high vertical acceleration by the intruder.
- (g) Ground proximity warning systems/ground collision avoidance systems (GPWSs/GCASs) warnings and wind shear warnings take precedence over ACAS advisories. When either a GPWS/GCAS or wind shear warning is active, ACAS aural



annunciations will be inhibited and ACAS will automatically switch to the 'TA only' mode of operation.

(D) ACAS inhibits

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the conditions under which certain functions of ACAS are inhibited.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge and understanding of the various ACAS inhibits, including the following:

- (a) 'Increase Descent' RAs are inhibited below 1450 ft AGL.
- (b) 'Descend' RAs are inhibited below 1100 ft AGL.
- (c) All RAs are inhibited below 1000 ft AGL.
- (d) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL.
- (e) Altitude and configuration under which 'Climb' and 'Increase Climb' RAs are inhibited. ACAS can still issue aeroplane's certified ceiling. (In some aircraft types, 'Climb' or 'Increase Climb' RAs are never inhibited.)

(ii) Operating procedures

The flight crew member should demonstrate the knowledge required to operate the ACAS avionics and interpret the information presented by ACAS. This training should address the following:

(A) Use of controls

Objective: to verify that the pilot can properly operate all ACAS and display controls.

Criteria: demonstrate the proper use of controls, including the following:

- (a) Aircraft configuration required to initiate a self-test.
- (b) Steps required to initiate a self-test.
- (c) Recognising when the self-test was successful and when it was unsuccessful. When the self-test is unsuccessful, recognising the reason for the failure and, if possible, correcting the problem.
- (d) Recommended usage of range selection. Low ranges are used in the terminal area and the higher display ranges are used in the en-route environment and in the transition between the terminal and en-route environment.
- (e) Recognising that the configuration of the display does not affect the ACAS surveillance volume.
- (f) Selection of lower ranges when an advisory is issued, to increase display resolution.
- (g) Proper configuration to display the appropriate ACAS information without eliminating the display of other needed information.
- (h) If available, recommended usage of the above/below mode selector. The above mode should be used during climb and the below mode should be used during descent.



- (i) If available, proper selection of the display of absolute or relative altitude and the limitations of using this display if a barometric correction is not provided to ACAS.

(B) Display interpretation

Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands the meaning of all information that can be displayed by ACAS. The wide variety of display implementations require the tailoring of some criteria. When the training programme is developed, these criteria should be expanded to cover details for the operator's specific display implementation.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the ability to properly interpret information displayed by ACAS, including the following:

- (a) Other traffic, i.e. traffic within the selected display range that is not proximate traffic, or causing a TA or RA to be issued.
- (b) Proximate traffic, i.e. traffic that is within 6 NM and ± 1200 ft.
- (c) Non-altitude reporting traffic.
- (d) No bearing TAs and RAs.
- (e) Off-scale TAs and RAs: the selected range should be changed to ensure that all available information on the intruder is displayed.
- (f) TAs: the minimum available display range that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution.
- (g) RAs (traffic display): the minimum available display range of the traffic display that allows the traffic to be displayed should be selected, to provide the maximum display resolution.
- (h) RAs (RA display): flight crew members should demonstrate knowledge of the meaning of the red and green areas or the meaning of pitch or flight path angle cues displayed on the RA display. Flight crew members should also demonstrate an understanding of the RA display limitations, i.e. if a vertical speed tape is used and the range of the tape is less than 2500 ft/min, an increase rate RA cannot be properly displayed.
- (i) If appropriate, awareness that navigation displays oriented on 'Track-Up' may require a flight crew member to make a mental adjustment for drift angle when assessing the bearing of proximate traffic.

(C) Use of the TA only mode

Objective: to verify that a flight crew member understands the appropriate times to select the TA only mode of operation and the limitations associated with using this mode.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:

- (a) Knowledge of the operator's guidance for the use of TA only.



- (b) Reasons for using this mode. If TA only is not selected when an airport is conducting simultaneous operations from parallel runways separated by less than 1200 ft, and to some intersecting runways, RAs can be expected. If, for any these situations, the response should comply with the operator's approved procedures.
- (c) All TA aural annunciations are inhibited below 500 ft AGL. As a result, TAs issued below 500 ft AGL may not be noticed unless the TA display is included in the routine instrument scan.
- (D) Crew coordination
- Objective: to verify that the flight crew member understands how ACAS advisories will be handled.
- Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of the crew procedures that should be used when responding to TAs and RAs, including the following:
- (a) Task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring;
- (b) expected call-outs; and
- (c) communications with ATC.
- (E) Phraseology rules
- Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the controller.
- Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate the following:
- (a) the use of the phraseology contained in ICAO PANS-OPS;
- (b) an understanding of the procedures contained in ICAO PANS-ATM and ICAO Annex 2; and
- (c) the understanding that verbal reports should be made promptly to the appropriate ATC unit:
- (1) whenever any manoeuvre has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance;
- (2) when, subsequent to a manoeuvre that has caused the aeroplane to deviate from an air traffic clearance, the aeroplane has returned to a flight path that complies with the clearance; and/or
- (3) when air traffic issue instructions that, if followed, would cause the crew to manoeuvre the aircraft contrary to an RA with which they are complying.
- (F) Reporting rules
- Objective: to verify that the flight crew member is aware of the rules for reporting RAs to the operator.
- Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate knowledge of where information can be obtained regarding the need for making written reports to various States when an RA is issued. Various States have different reporting rules and the material available to the flight



crew member should be tailored to the operator's operating environment. This responsibility is satisfied by the flight crew member reporting to the operator according to the applicable reporting rules.

(3) Non-essential items: advisory thresholds

Objective: to demonstrate knowledge of the criteria for issuing TAs and RAs.

Criteria: the flight crew member should demonstrate an understanding of the methodology used by ACAS to issue TAs and RAs and the general criteria for the issuance of these advisories, including the following:

- (i) The minimum and maximum altitudes below/above which TAs will not be issued.
- (ii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be less than the ACAS-desired separation, a corrective RA that requires a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 300 ft at low altitude to a maximum of 700 ft at high altitude.
- (iii) When the vertical separation at CPA is projected to be just outside the ACAS-desired separation, a preventive RA that does not require a change to the existing vertical speed will be issued. This separation varies from 600 to 800 ft.
- (iv) RA fixed range thresholds vary between 0.2 and 1.1 NM.

(h) ACAS manoeuvre training

- (1) Demonstration of the flight crew member's ability to use ACAS displayed information to properly respond to TAs and RAs should be carried out in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. If a full flight simulator is utilised, crew resource management (CRM) should be practised during this training.
- (2) Alternatively, the required demonstrations can be carried out by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made. The flight crew member should be informed whether or not the responses made were correct. If the response was incorrect or inappropriate, the CBT should show what the correct response should be.
- (3) The scenarios included in the manoeuvre training should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-aircraft encounters. The consequences of failure to respond correctly should be demonstrated by reference to actual incidents such as those publicised in EUROCONTROL ACAS II Bulletins (available on the EUROCONTROL website).

(i) TA responses

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:

- (A) Proper division of responsibilities between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should fly the aircraft using any type-specific procedures and be prepared to respond to any RA that might



follow. For aircraft without an RA pitch display, the pilot flying should consider the likely magnitude of an appropriate pitch change. The pilot monitoring should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the ACAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder.

- (B) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. Flight crew members should confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its vertical speed direction (trend arrow).
- (C) Other available information should be used to assist in visual acquisition, including ATC 'party-line' information, traffic flow in use, etc.
- (D) Because of the limitations described, the pilot flying should not manoeuvre the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the ACAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flight path in anticipation of what an RA would advise, except that if own aircraft is approaching its cleared level at a high vertical rate with a TA present, vertical rate should be reduced to less than 1500 ft/min.
- (E) When visual acquisition is attained, and as long as no RA is received, normal right of way rules should be used to maintain or attain safe separation. No unnecessary manoeuvres should be initiated. The limitations of making manoeuvres based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or at night, or without a definite horizon should be demonstrated as being understood.

(ii) RA responses

Objective: to verify that the pilot properly interprets and responds to RAs.

Criteria: the pilot should demonstrate the following:

- (A) Proper response to the RA, even if it is in conflict with an ATC instruction and even if the pilot believes that there is no threat present.
- (B) Proper task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring. The pilot flying should respond to a corrective RA with appropriate control inputs. The pilot monitoring should monitor the response to the RA and should provide updates on the traffic location by checking the traffic display. Proper CRM should be used.
- (C) Proper interpretation of the displayed information. The pilot should recognise the intruder causing the RA to be issued (red square on display). The pilot should respond appropriately.
- (D) For corrective RAs, the response should be initiated in the proper direction within 5 seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ g (gravitational acceleration of 9.81 m/sec²).
- (E) Recognition of the initially displayed RA being modified. Response to the modified RA should be properly accomplished, as follows:
 - (a) For increase rate RAs, the vertical speed change should be started within 2½ seconds of the RA being displayed. The



change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ g.

- (b) For RA reversals, the vertical speed reversal should be started within $2\frac{1}{2}$ seconds of the RA being displayed. The change in vertical speed should be accomplished with an acceleration of approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ g.
 - (c) For RA weakenings, the vertical speed should be modified to initiate a return towards the original clearance.
 - (d) An acceleration of approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ g will be achieved if the change in pitch attitude corresponding to a change in vertical speed of 1500 ft/min is accomplished in approximately 5 seconds, and of $\frac{1}{3}$ g if the change is accomplished in approximately 3 seconds. The change in pitch attitude required to establish a rate of climb or descent of 1500 ft/min from level flight will be approximately 6° when the true airspeed (TAS) is 150 kt, 4° at 250 kt, and 2° at 500 kt. (These angles are derived from the formula: 1000 divided by TAS.)
- (C) Recognition of altitude crossing encounters and the proper response to these RAs.
- (D) For preventive RAs, the vertical speed needle or pitch attitude indication should remain outside the red area on the RA display.
- (E) For maintain rate RAs, the vertical speed should not be reduced. Pilots should recognise that a maintain rate RA may result in crossing through the intruder's altitude.
- (F) When the RA weakens, or when the green 'fly to' indicator changes position, the pilot should initiate a return towards the original clearance, and when 'clear of conflict' is annunciated, the pilot should complete the return to the original clearance.
- (G) The controller should be informed of the RA as soon as time and workload permit, using the standard phraseology.
- (H) When possible, an ATC clearance should be complied with while responding to an RA. For example, if the aircraft can level at the assigned altitude while responding to RA (an 'adjust vertical speed' RA (version 7) or 'level off' (version 7.1), it should be done; the horizontal (turn) element of an ATC instruction should be followed.
- (I) Knowledge of the ACAS multi-aircraft logic and its limitations, and that ACAS can optimise separations from two aircraft by climbing or descending towards one of them. For example, ACAS only considers intruders that it considers to be a threat when selecting an RA. As such, it is possible for ACAS to issue an RA against one intruder that results in a manoeuvre towards another intruder that is not classified as a threat. If the second intruder becomes a threat, the RA will be modified to provide separation from that intruder.
- (i) ACAS initial evaluation
- (1) The flight crew member's understanding of the academic training items should be assessed by means of a written test or interactive CBT that records correct and incorrect responses to phrased questions.
 - (2) The flight crew member's understanding of the manoeuvre training items should be assessed in a full flight simulator equipped with an ACAS display



and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the flight crew member will fly, and the results assessed by a qualified instructor, inspector, or check airman. The range of scenarios should include: corrective RAs; initial preventive RAs; maintain rate RAs; altitude crossing RAs; increase rate RAs; RA reversals; weakening RAs; and multi-threat encounters. The scenarios should also include demonstrations of the consequences of not responding to RAs, slow or late responses, and manoeuvring opposite to the direction called for by the displayed RA.

- (3) Alternatively, exposure to these scenarios can be conducted by means of an interactive CBT with an ACAS display and controls similar in appearance and operation to those in the aircraft the pilot will fly. This interactive CBT should depict scenarios in which real-time responses should be made and a record made of whether or not each response was correct.
- (j) ACAS recurrent training
- (1) ACAS recurrent training ensures that flight crew members maintain the appropriate ACAS knowledge and skills. ACAS recurrent training should be integrated into and/or conducted in conjunction with other established recurrent training programmes. An essential item of recurrent training is the discussion of any significant issues and operational concerns that have been identified by the operator. Recurrent training should also address changes to ACAS logic, parameters or procedures and to any unique ACAS characteristics which flight crew members should be made aware of.
 - (2) It is recommended that the operator's recurrent training programmes using full flight simulators include encounters with conflicting traffic when these simulators are equipped with ACAS. The full range of likely scenarios may be spread over a 2 year period. If a full flight simulator, as described above, is not available, use should be made of an interactive CBT that is capable of presenting scenarios to which pilot responses should be made in real-time.

AMC1 SPO.OP.210 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes and helicopters

Landing Distance/FATO Suitability

The in-flight determination of the landing distance/FATO suitability should be based on the latest available meteorological report, or the locally observed conditions where appropriate.

AMC1 SPO.OP.215 Commencement and continuation of approach — aeroplanes and helicopters

Visual References for Instrument Approach Operations

- (a) NPA, APV and CAT I operations

At DH or MDH, at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:

- (1) elements of the approach lighting system;
- (2) the threshold;
- (3) the threshold markings;
- (4) the threshold lights;



- (5) the threshold identification lights;
 - (6) the visual glide slope indicator;
 - (7) the touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings;
 - (8) the touchdown zone lights;
 - (9) FATO/runway edge lights; or
 - (10) other visual references specified in the operations manual.
- (b) Lower than standard category I (LTS CAT I) operations
- At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
- (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them; and
 - (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS usable to at least 150 ft.
- (c) CAT II or other-than standard category II (OTS CAT II) operations
- At DH, the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
- (1) a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them; and
 - (2) this visual reference should include a lateral element of the ground pattern, such as an approach light crossbar or the landing threshold or a barrette of the touchdown zone light unless the operation is conducted utilising an approved HUDLS to touchdown.
- (d) CAT III operations
- (1) For CAT IIIA operations and for CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-passive flight control systems or with the use of an approved HUDLS: at DH, a segment of at least three consecutive lights, being the centreline of the approach lights, or touchdown zone lights, or runway centreline lights, or runway edge lights, or a combination of them is attained and can be maintained by the pilot.
 - (2) For CAT IIIB operations conducted either with fail-operational flight control systems or with a fail-operational hybrid landing system using a DH: at DH, at least one centreline light is attained and can be maintained by the pilot.
 - (3) For CAT IIIB operations with no DH there is no requirement for visual reference with the runway prior to touchdown.
- (e) Approach operations utilising EVS — CAT I operations
- (1) At DH or MDH, the following visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS:
 - (i) elements of the approach light; or
 - (ii) the runway threshold, identified by at least one of the following:
 - (A) the beginning of the runway landing surface,



- (B) the threshold lights, the threshold identification lights; or
 - (C) the touchdown zone, identified by at least one of the following: the runway touchdown zone landing surface, the touchdown zone lights, the touchdown zone markings or the runway lights.
- (2) At 100 ft above runway threshold elevation at least one of the visual references specified below should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS:
- (i) the lights or markings of the threshold; or
 - (ii) the lights or markings of the touchdown zone.
- (f) Approach operations utilising EVS – APV and NPA operations flown with the CDFA technique
- (1) At DH/MDH, visual references should be displayed and identifiable to the pilot on the EVS image as specified under (a).
 - (2) At 200 ft above runway threshold elevation, at least one of the visual references specified under (a) should be distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot without reliance on the EVS.

GM1 SPO.OP.225 Operational limitations — hot-air balloons

Avoidance of Night Landing

The intent of rule is to ensure that when the balloon takes off during night, sufficient fuel is on board for landing under VFR by day.

The risk of collision with overhead lines is considerable and cannot be overstated. The risk is considerably increased during night flights in conditions of failing light and visibility when there is increasing pressure to land. A number of incidents have occurred in the late evening in just such conditions, and may have been avoided had an earlier landing been planned. Night landings should therefore be avoided by taking appropriate measures, including a larger quantity of fuel and/or additional safety equipment.

AMC1 SPO.OP.230 Standard operating procedures

Development of Standard Operating Procedures

- (a) SOPs should be developed to a standard format in accordance with AMC2 SPO.OP.230 (SOP template) and taking into account the results of the risk assessment process.
- (b) SOPs should be based on a systematic risk assessment to ensure that the risks associated with the task are acceptable. The risk assessment should describe the activity in detail, identify the relevant hazards, analyse the causes and consequences of accidental events and establish methods to treat the associated risk.

AMC2 SPO.OP.230 Standard operating procedures

Template

- (a) Nature and complexity of the activity:
 - (1) The nature of the activity and exposure. The nature of the flight and the risk exposure (e.g. low height) should be described.
 - (2) The complexity of the activity. Detail should be provided on how demanding the activity is with regard to the required piloting skills, the crew composition,



the necessary level of experience, the ground support, safety and individual protective equipment that should be provided for persons involved.

- (3) The operational environment and geographical area. The operational environment and geographical area over which the operation takes place should be described:
- (i) congested hostile environment: aircraft performance standard, compliance with rules of the air, mitigation of third party risk;
 - (ii) mountain areas: altitude, performance, the use/non-use of oxygen with mitigating procedures;
 - (iii) sea areas: sea state and temperature, risk of ditching, availability of search and rescue, survivability, carriage of safety equipment;
 - (iv) desert areas: carriage of safety equipment, reporting procedures, search and rescue information; and
 - (v) other areas.
- (4) The application of risk assessment and evaluation. The method of application of (a)(1) to (a)(3) to the particular operation so as to minimise risk should be described. The description should reference the risk assessment and the evaluation on which the procedure is based. The SOPs should:
- (i) contain elements relevant to the operational risk management performed during flight;
 - (ii) contain limitations, where required, such as weather, altitudes, speeds, power margins, masses, landing site size; and
 - (iii) list functions required to monitor the operation. Special monitoring requirements in addition to the normal functions should be described in the SOPs.

(b) Aircraft and equipment:

- (1) The aircraft. The category of aircraft to be used for the activity should be indicated (e.g. helicopter/aeroplane, single/multi-engined, other-than- complex motor-powered/complex motor-powered, classic tail rotor/Fenestron/no tail rotor (NOTAR) equipped). In particular, for helicopters, the necessary level of performance certification (Category A/B) should be specified.
- (2) Equipment. All equipment required for the activity should be listed. This includes installed equipment certified in accordance with Part-21 as well as equipment approved in accordance with other officially recognised standards. A large number of activities require, in addition to the standard radio communication equipment, additional air-to-ground communication equipment. This should be listed and the operational procedure should be defined.

(c) Crew members:

- (1) The crew composition, including the following, should be specified:
- (i) minimum flight crew (according to the appropriate manual); and
 - (ii) additional flight crew.
- (2) In addition, for flight crew members, the following should be specified:



- (i) selection criteria (initial qualification, flight experience, experience of the activity);
- (ii) initial training (volume and content of the training); and
- (iii) recent experience requirement and/or recurrent training (volume and content of the training).

The criteria listed in (c)(2)(i) to (c)(2)(iii) should take into account the operational environment and the complexity of the activity and should be detailed in the training programmes.

(d) Task specialists:

- (1) Whenever a task specialist is required, his/her function on board should be clearly defined. In addition, the following should be specified:

- (i) selection criteria (initial background, experience of the activity);
- (ii) initial training (volume and content of the training); and
- (iii) recent experience requirement and/or recurrent training (volume and content of the training).
- (iv) The criteria listed in (d)(1) should take into account the specialisation of the task specialist and should be detailed in the training programmes.

- (2) There is a large number of activities for which task specialists are required.

This chapter should detail the following for such personnel:

- (i) specialisation;
- (ii) previous experience; and
- (iii) training or briefing.

Briefing or specific training for task specialists referred to in (d)(2) should be detailed in the training programmes.

(e) Performance:

This chapter should detail the specific performance requirements to be applied, in order to ensure an adequate power margin.

(f) Normal procedures:

- (1) Operating procedures. The operating procedures to be applied by the flight crew, including the coordination with task specialists.
- (2) Ground procedures. The procedures to be applied by the task specialists should be described, e.g. loading/unloading, cargo hook operation.

(g) Emergency procedures:

- (1) Operating procedures. The emergency procedures to be applied by the flight crew, the coordination with the task specialist and coordination between the flight crew and task specialists should be described.
- (2) Ground procedures. The emergency procedures to be applied by the task specialists (e.g. in the case of a forced landing) should be specified.

(h) Ground equipment:

This chapter should detail the nature, number and location of ground equipment required for the activity, such as:




- (1) refuelling facilities, dispenser and storage;
 - (2) firefighting equipment;
 - (3) size of the operating site (landing surface, loading/unloading area); and
 - (4) ground markings.
- (i) Records:
- It should be determined which records specific to the flight(s) are to be kept, such as task details, aircraft registration, pilot-in-command, flight times, weather and any remarks, including a record of occurrences affecting flight safety or the safety of persons or property on the ground.

GM1 SPO.OP.230 Standard operating procedures

Template Forms

Figure 1 — Development of a SOP based on a risk assessment





Template Form A — Risk assessment (RA)

Date: RA of Responsible:
Purpose:
Type of operation and brief description:
Participants, working group:
Preconditions, assumptions and simplifications:
Data used:
Description of the analysis method:
External context:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulatory requirements • Approvals • Environmental conditions (visibility, wind, turbulence, contrast, light, elevation, etc. unless evident from the SOPs) • Stakeholders and their potential interest
Internal context:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type(s) of aircraft • Personnel and qualifications • Combination/similarity with other operations/SOPs • Other RA used/considered/plugged in
Existing barriers and emergency preparedness:
Monitoring and follow up:
Description of the risk:
Risk evaluation:
Conclusions:

Template Form B — Hazard identification (HI)

Date:..... HI ofResponsible:.....

Phase of operation	Hazard ref	Hazard	Causes	Existing controls	Controls ref	Comments

Note: Haz ref: A unique number for hazards, e.g. for use in a database
Controls ref: A unique number for the existing controls

Template Form C — Mitigating measures

Date:.....RA ofResponsible:.....

Phase of operation	Hazard ref	Consequence	Existing mitigation actions	Mitigation ref	L	S	Further mitigation required

Note:
Haz ref: A unique number for hazards, e.g. for use in a database
Mitigation ref: A unique number for the mitigation actions
L: Likelihood
S: Severity

Template register A — risk register

Ref	Operation / Procedure	Ref	Hazard	Ref	Consequences	Mitigation actions	L	S	Monitoring



Note:

L: Likelihood

S: Severity



Subpart C — Aircraft performance and operating limitations

AMC1 SPO.POL.100 Operating Limitations — all aircraft

Appropriate Manual

The appropriate manual containing operating limitations may be the AFM or an equivalent document, or the operations manual, if more restrictive.

GM1 SPO.POL.105 Mass and balance

General — Operations with other than -Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

- (a) New aircraft that have been weighed at the factory may be placed into operation without reweighing if the mass records and, except for balloons, balance records have been adjusted for alterations or modifications to the aircraft. Aircraft transferred from one State of Kuwait operator to another State of Kuwait operator do not have to be weighed prior to use by the receiving operator unless the mass and balance cannot be accurately established by calculation.
- (b) For aircraft other than balloons, the mass and the centre of gravity (CG) position of an aircraft should be revised whenever the cumulative changes to the dry operating mass exceed ± 0.5 % of the maximum landing mass or for aeroplanes the cumulative change in CG position exceeds 0.5 % of the mean aerodynamic chord. This may be done by weighing the aircraft or by calculation. If the AFM requires to record changes to mass and CG position below these thresholds, or to record changes in any case, and make them known to the pilot-in-command, mass and CG position should be revised accordingly and made known to the pilot-in- command
- (c) The initial empty mass for a balloon is the balloon empty mass determined by a weighing performed by the manufacturer of the balloon before the initial entry into service
- (d) The mass of a balloon should be revised whenever the cumulative changes to the balloon empty mass due to modifications or repairs exceed ± 10 % of the initial empty mass. This may be done by weighing the balloon or by calculation.

AMC1 SPO.POL.105(b) Mass and balance

Weighing of an Aircraft — Operations with Complex Motor Powered Aircraft

- (a) New aircraft that have been weighed at the factory may be placed into operation without reweighing if the mass and balance records have been adjusted for alterations or modifications to the aircraft. Aircraft transferred from one State of Kuwait operator to another State of Kuwait operator do not have to be weighed prior to use by the receiving operator unless the mass and balance cannot be accurately established by calculation.
- (b) The mass and centre of gravity (CG) position of an aircraft should be revised whenever the cumulative changes to the dry operating mass exceed ± 0.5 % of the maximum landing mass or for aeroplanes the cumulative change in CG position exceeds 0.5 % of the mean aerodynamic chord. This should be done either by weighing the aircraft or by calculation.
- (c) When weighing an aircraft, normal precautions should be taken, which are consistent with good practices such as:



- (1) checking for completeness of the aircraft and equipment;
 - (2) determining that fluids are properly accounted for;
 - (3) ensuring that the aircraft is clean; and
 - (4) ensuring that weighing is accomplished in an enclosed building.
- (d) Any equipment used for weighing should be properly calibrated, zeroed and used in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Each scale should be calibrated either by the manufacturer, by a civil department of weights and measures or by an appropriately authorised organisation within 2 years or within a time period defined by the manufacturer of the weighing equipment, whichever is less. The equipment should enable the mass of the aircraft to be established accurately. One single accuracy criterion for weighing equipment cannot be given. However, the weighing accuracy is considered satisfactory if the accuracy criteria in Table 1 are met by the individual scales/cells of the weighing equipment used:

Table 1: Accuracy criteria for weighing equipment

For a scale/cell load	An accuracy of
below 2000 kg	± 1 %
from 2000 kg to 20000 kg	± 20 kg
above 20000 kg	± 0.1 %

CG Limits— Operational CG Envelope and In-Flight CG

In the Certificate Limitations section of the AFM, forward and aft CG limits are specified. These limits ensure that the certification stability and control criteria are met throughout the whole flight and allow the proper trim setting for take-off. The operator should ensure that these limits are respected by:

- (a) defining and applying operational margins to the certified CG envelope in order to compensate for the following deviations and errors:
 - (1) deviations of actual CG at empty or operating mass from published values due, for example, to weighing errors, unaccounted modifications and/or equipment variations.
 - (2) Deviations in fuel distribution in tanks from the applicable schedule.
 - (3) Deviations in the distribution of cargo in the various compartments as compared with the assumed load distribution as well as inaccuracies in the actual mass of cargo.
 - (4) Deviations of the actual CG of cargo load within individual cargo compartments or cabin sections from the normally assumed mid position.
 - (5) Deviations of the CG caused by gear and flap positions and by application of the prescribed fuel usage procedure, unless already covered by the certified limits.
 - (6) Deviations caused by in-flight movement of crew members and task specialist.
- (b) Defining and applying operational procedures in order to:
 - (1) take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by persons movement; and



- (2) take into account any significant CG travel during flight caused by fuel consumption/transfer.

AMC1 SPO.POL.110(a)(1) Mass and balance system — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Dry Operating Mass

The dry operating mass should include:

- (a) crew and equipment, and
- (b) removable task specialist equipment, if applicable.

GM1 SPO.POL.110(a)(2) Mass and balance system — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Traffic Load

Traffic load includes task specialists.

AMC1 SPO.POL.110(a)(3) Mass and balance system — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Fuel Load

The mass of the fuel load should be determined by using its actual relative density or a standard relative density.

GM1 SPO.POL.110(a)(3) Mass and balance system — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Fuel Density

- (a) If the actual fuel density is not known, the operator may use standard fuel density values for determining the mass of the fuel load. Such standard values should be based on current fuel density measurements for the airports or areas concerned.
- (b) Typical fuel density values are:
 - (1) Gasoline (piston engine fuel) – 0.71 ;
 - (2) JET A1 (Jet fuel JP 1) – 0.79 ;
 - (3) JET B (Jet fuel JP 4) – 0.76 ;
 - (4) Oil – 0.88.

AMC1 SPO.POL.110(a)(4) Mass and balance system — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Loading – Structural Limits



The loading should take into account additional structural limits such as the floor strength limitations, the maximum load per running metre, the maximum mass per cargo compartment, and/or the maximum seating limits as well as in-flight changes in loading.

GM1 SPO.POL.110(b) Mass and balance system — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

General

The mass and balance computation may be available in flight planning documents or separate systems and may include standard load profiles.

AMC1 SPO.POL.115 Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

General

- (a) The mass and balance documentation should:
 - (1) enable the pilot-in-command to determine that the load and its distribution are within the mass and balance limits of the aircraft; and
 - (2) include advice to the pilot-in-command whenever a non-standard method has been used for determining the mass of the load.
- (b) The information above may be available in flight planning documents or mass and balance systems.
- (c) Any last minute change should be brought to the attention of the pilot-in-command and entered in the flight planning documents containing the mass and balance information and mass and balance systems.
- (d) Where mass and balance documentation is generated by a computerised mass and balance system, the operator should verify the integrity of the output data at intervals not exceeding six months.
- (e) A copy of the final mass and balance documentation may be sent to aircraft via data link or may be made available to the pilot-in-command by other means for its acceptance.
- (f) The person supervising the loading of the aircraft should confirm by hand signature or equivalent that the load and its distribution are in accordance with the mass and balance documentation given to the pilot in command. The pilot-in-command should indicate his acceptance by hand signature or equivalent.

GM1 SPO.POL.115 Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Signature or Equivalent

Where a signature by hand is impracticable or it is desirable to arrange the equivalent verification by electronic means, as referred to in AMC1 SPO.POL.115 (f), the following conditions should be applied in order to make an electronic signature the equivalent of a conventional hand-written signature:

- (a) electronic 'signing' by entering a personal identification number (PIN) code with appropriate security, etc.;
- (b) entering the PIN code generates a print-out of the individual's name and professional capacity on the relevant document(s) in such a way that it is evident, to anyone having a need for that information, who has signed the document;



- (c) the computer system logs information to indicate when and where each PIN code has been entered;
- (d) the use of the PIN code is, from a legal and responsibility point of view, considered to be fully equivalent to signature by hand;
- (e) the requirements for record keeping remain unchanged; and
- (f) all personnel concerned are made aware of the conditions associated with electronic signature and this is documented.

AMC1 SPO.POL.115(b) Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Integrity

The operator should verify the integrity of mass and balance data and documentation generated by a computerised mass and balance system, at intervals not exceeding six months. The operator should establish a system to check that amendments of its input data are incorporated properly in the system and that the system is operating correctly on a continuous basis.

AMC2 SPO.POL.115(b) Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Mass and Balance Documentation Sent Via Data Link

Whenever the mass and balance documentation is sent to the aircraft via data link, a copy of the final mass and balance documentation as accepted by the pilot-in-command should be available on the ground.

GM1 SPO.POL.115(b) Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

On Board Integrated Mass and Balance Computer System

An on-board integrated mass and balance computer system may be an aircraft installed system capable of receiving input data either from other aircraft systems or from a mass and balance system on ground, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output.

GM2 SPO.POL.115(b) Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft

Stand-Alone Computerised Mass and Balance System

A stand-alone computerised mass and balance system may be a computer, either as part of an electronic flight bag (EFB) system or solely dedicated to mass and balance purposes, requiring input from the user, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output.

AMC1 SPO.POL.130(a) Take-off — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

Take-Off Mass

The following should be considered for determining the maximum take-off mass:



- (a) the pressure altitude at the aerodrome;
- (b) the ambient temperature at the aerodrome;
- (c) the runway surface condition and the type of runway surface;
- (d) the runway slope in the direction of take-off;
- (e) not more than 50 % of the reported head-wind component or not less than 150 % of the reported tailwind component; and
- (f) the loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aeroplane prior to take-off.

AMC1 SPO.POL.130(a)(4) Take-off — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

Contaminated Runway Performance Data

Wet and contaminated runway performance data, if made available by the manufacturer, should be taken into account. If such data is not made available, the operator should account for wet and contaminated runway conditions by using the best information available.

GM1 SPO.POL.130(a)(4) Take-off — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

Runway Surface Condition

Operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow or ice implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant drag and therefore to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane during take-off or landing, since the actual conditions may not completely match the assumptions on which the performance information is based. In the case of a contaminated runway, the first option for the pilot-in-command is to wait until the runway is cleared. If this is impracticable, he/she may consider a take-off or landing, provided that he/she has applied the applicable performance adjustments, and any further safety measures he/she considers justified under the prevailing conditions. The excess runway length available including the criticality of the overrun area should also be considered.

AMC1 SPO.POL.130(b)(2) Take-off — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

Adequate Margin

The adequate margin should be defined in the operations manual.

GM1 SPO.POL.130(b)(2) Take-off — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

Adequate Margin

'An adequate margin' is illustrated by the appropriate examples included in Attachment C to ICAO Annex 6, Part I.

AMC1 SPO.POL.140 Landing — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

General

The following should be considered to ensure that an aeroplane is able to land and stop, or a seaplane to come to a satisfactorily low speed, within the landing distance available:

- (a) the pressure altitude at the aerodrome;
- (b) the runway surface condition and the type of runway surface;
- (c) the runway slope in the direction of landing;



- (d) not more than 50 % of the reported head-wind component or not less than 150 % of the reported tailwind component;
- (e) use of the most favourable runway, in still air; and
- (f) use of the runway most likely to be assigned considering the probable wind speed and direction and the ground handling characteristics of the aeroplane, and considering other conditions such as landing aids and terrain.

AMC2 SPO.POL.140 Landing — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

Allowances

Allowances should be stated in the operations manual.

AMC1 SPO.POL.145(a) and (b) Performance and operating criteria — aeroplanes, and AMC1 SPO.POL.146(b)(1) and (2) Performance and operating criteria — helicopters

Operational Procedures and Training Programme

- (a) The operational procedures should be based on the manufacturer's recommended procedures where they exist.
- (b) The crew member training programme should include briefing, demonstration or practice, as appropriate, of the operational procedures necessary to minimise the consequences of an engine failure.

AMC1 SPO.POL.146(c) Performance and operating criteria — helicopters

Maximum Specified Masses

- (a) The operator should establish a procedure to determine maximum specified masses for HIGE and HOGE before each flight or series of flights.
- (b) This procedure should take into account ambient temperature at the aerodrome or operating site, pressure altitude and wind conditions data available.

GM1 SPO.POL.146(c) Performance and operating criteria — helicopters

General

- (a) Even when the surface allows a hover in ground effect (HIGE), the likelihood of, for example, dust or blowing snow may necessitate hover out of ground effect (HOGE) performance.
- (b) Wind conditions on some sites (particularly in mountainous areas and including downdraft) may require a reduction in the helicopter mass in order to ensure that an out of ground effect hover can be achieved at the operational site in the conditions prevailing.



Subpart D — Instruments, data and equipment

Section 1 — Aeroplanes

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

Applicable Airworthiness Requirements

The applicable airworthiness requirements for approval of instruments and equipment required by this Part are the following:

- (a) Part 21 for aeroplanes registered in a State that adopt the EASA Part 21 requirements; and
- (b) Airworthiness requirements of the State of registry for aeroplanes registered outside the State of Kuwait or those aeroplanes who do not adopt the EASA Part 21 requirements.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

Required Instruments and Equipment that do not need to be Approved in Accordance with the Applicable Airworthiness Requirements

The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in SPO.IDE.A.100 (b), should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

Not Required Instruments and Equipment That do not need to be Approved in Accordance with The Applicable Airworthiness Requirements, but are Carried on a Flight

- (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable airworthiness codes.
- (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aeroplane. Examples may be the following:
 - (1) portable electronic flight bag (EFB);
 - (2) portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists; and
 - (3) non-installed task specialist equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.100(d) Instruments and equipment — general

Positioning of Instruments

This requirement implies that whenever a single instrument is required in an aeroplane operated in a multi-crew environment, the instrument needs to be visible from each flight crew station.



GM1 SPO.IDE.A.110 Spare electrical fuses

Fuses

A spare electrical fuse means a replaceable fuse in the flight crew compartment, not an automatic circuit breaker or circuit breakers in the electric compartments.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120 & SPO.IDE.A.125 Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Integrated Instruments

- (a) Individual equipment requirements may be met by combinations of instruments, by integrated flight systems or by a combination of parameters on electronic displays. The information so available to each required pilot should not be less than that required in the applicable operational requirements, and the equivalent safety of the installation should be approved during type certification of the aeroplane for the intended type of operation.
- (b) The means of measuring and indicating turn and slip, aeroplane attitude and stabilised aeroplane heading may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight director systems, provided that the safeguards against total failure, inherent in the three separate instruments, are retained.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.A.120 Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Local Flights

For flights that do not exceed 60 minutes' duration, that take off and land at the same aerodrome, and that remain within 50 NM of that aerodrome, an equivalent means of complying with SPO.IDE.A.120 (b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(ii) may be:

- (a) a turn and slip indicator;
- (b) a turn co-ordinator; or
- (c) both an attitude indicator and a slip indicator.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.120 Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Slip Indication

Non-complex motor-powered aeroplanes should be equipped with a means of measuring and displaying slip.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.125 Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Alternate Source of Static Pressure

Aeroplanes should be equipped with an alternate source of static pressure.



AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120(a)(1) & SPO.IDE.A.125(a)(1) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Measuring and Displaying Magnetic Heading

The means of measuring and displaying magnetic direction should be a magnetic compass or equivalent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120(a)(2) & SPO.IDE.A.125(a)(2) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Measuring and Displaying The Time — Complex Motor - Powered Aircraft

An acceptable means of compliance is a clock displaying hours, minutes and seconds, with a sweep-second pointer or digital presentation.

Means of Measuring and Displaying The Time — Other than- Complex Motor- Powered Aircraft

An acceptable means of measuring and displaying the time in hours, minutes and seconds may be a wrist watch capable of the same functions.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120(a)(3) & SPO.IDE.A.125(a)(3) Operations under VFR operations & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Calibration of The means of Measuring and Displaying Pressure Altitude

The instrument measuring and displaying pressure altitude should be of a sensitive type calibrated in feet (ft), with a sub-scale setting, calibrated in hectopascals/millibars, adjustable for any barometric pressure likely to be set during flight.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.125(a)(3) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Altimeters

Altimeters with counter drum-pointer or equivalent presentation are considered to be less susceptible to misinterpretation for aeroplanes operating above 10000 ft.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120(a)(4) & SPO.IDE.A.125(a)(4) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Calibration of the Instrument Indicating Airspeed

- (a) The instrument indicating airspeed should be calibrated in knots (kts).
- (b) In the case of aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) below 2000 kg, calibration in kilometres per hour (kph) or in miles per hour (mph) is acceptable when such units are used in the AFM.



AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120(e) & SPO.IDE.A.125(c) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Multi-Pilot Operations — Duplicate Instruments

Duplicate instruments include separate displays for each pilot and separate selectors or other associated equipment where appropriate.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.125(a)(9) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Displaying Outside Air Temperature

- (a) The means of displaying outside air temperature should be calibrated in degrees Celsius.
- (b) In the case of aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) below 2000 kg, calibration in degrees Fahrenheit is acceptable, when such unit is used in the AFM.
- (c) The means of displaying outside air temperature may be an air temperature indicator that provides indications that are convertible to outside air temperature.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.120(c) & SPO.IDE.A.125(d) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Preventing Malfunction due to Condensation or Icing

The means of preventing malfunction due to either condensation or icing of the airspeed indicating system should be a heated pitot tube or equivalent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.125(e)(2) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Chart Holder

An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement for complex motor-powered aeroplanes is to display a pre-composed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.130 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)

Excessive Downwards Glideslope Deviation Warning for Class a Taws

The requirement for a Class A TAWS to provide a warning to the flight crew for excessive downwards glideslope deviation should apply to all final approach glideslopes with angular vertical navigation (VNAV) guidance, whether provided by the instrument landing system (ILS), microwave landing system (MLS), satellite-based augmentation system approach procedure with vertical guidance (SBAS APV (localiser performance with vertical guidance approach LPV)), ground-based augmentation system (GBAS (GPS landing system, GLS)) or any other systems providing similar guidance. The same requirement should not apply to systems providing vertical guidance based on barometric VNAV.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.130 Terrain awareness warning system (TAWS)

Acceptable Standard for TAWS

An acceptable standard for Class A and Class B TAWS may be the applicable European Technical Standards Order (ETSO) or equivalent.



AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.132 Airborne weather detecting equipment — complex motor-powered aeroplanes

General

The airborne weather detecting equipment should be an airborne weather radar. However, for propeller-driven pressurised aeroplanes with a MCTOM not more than 5700 kg and an maximum certified seating configuration of not more than nine, other equipment capable of detecting thunderstorms and other potentially hazardous weather conditions, regarded as detectable with airborne weather radar equipment, are also acceptable.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.135 Flight crew interphone system

Type of Flight Crew Interphone

The flight crew interphone system should not be of a handheld type.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.140 Cockpit voice recorder

General

The operational performance requirements for cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) should be those laid down in the European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments No 1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.145 Flight data recorder

Operational Performance Requirements

- (a) The operational performance requirements for flight data recorders (FDRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including amendments No 1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.
- (b) The flight data recorder should record, with reference to a timescale, the list of parameters in Table 1 and Table 2, as applicable.
- (c) The parameters to be recorded should meet the performance specifications (designated ranges, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and minimum resolution in read-out) as defined in the relevant tables of EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments No 1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

Table 1: All Aeroplanes

No*	Parameter
1a	Time; or
1b	Relative time count
1c	Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) time synchronization
2	Pressure altitude



No*	Parameter
3	Indicated airspeed; or calibrated airspeed
4	Heading (primary flight crew reference) — when true or magnetic heading can be selected, the primary heading reference, a discrete indicating selection, should be recorded
5	Normal acceleration
6	Pitch attitude
7	Roll attitude
8	Manual radio transmission keying and CVR/FDR synchronization reference.
9	Engine thrust/power
9a	Parameters required to determine propulsive thrust/power on each engine
9b	Flight crew compartment thrust/power lever position for aeroplanes with no mechanical link between engine and flight crew compartment))
14	Total or outside air temperature
16	Longitudinal acceleration (body axis)
17	Lateral acceleration
18	Primary flight control surface and primary flight control pilot input (for multiple or split surfaces, a suitable combination of inputs is acceptable instead of recording each surface separately. For aeroplanes that have a flight control break-away capability that allows either pilot to operate the controls independently, record both inputs):
18a	Pitch axis
18b	Roll axis
18c	Yaw axis
19	Pitch trim surface position
23	Marker beacon passage
24	Warnings - in addition to the master warning each 'red' warning (including smoke warnings from other compartments) should be recorded when the warning condition cannot be determined from other parameters or from the CVR.
No*	Parameter
25	Each navigation receiver frequency selection
27	Air - ground status and a sensor of each landing gear if installed
75	All flight control input forces (for fly-by-wire flight control systems, where control surface position is a function of the displacement of the control input device only, it is not necessary to record this parameter):
75a	Control wheel
75b	Control column
75c	Rudder pedal



* The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

Table 2: Aeroplanes for which the data source for the parameter is either used by aeroplane systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the aeroplane

No*	Parameter
10	Flaps
10a	Trailing edge flap position
10b	Flight crew compartment control selection
11	Slats
11a	Leading edge flap (slat) position
11b	Flight crew compartment control selection
12	Thrust reverse status
13	Ground spoiler and speed brake:
13a	Ground spoiler position
13b	Ground spoiler selection
13c	Speed brake position
13d	Speed brake selection
15	Autopilot, autothrottle, automatic flight control system (AFCS) mode and engagement status
20	Radio altitude. For autoland/Category III operations, each radio altimeter should be recorded.
21	Vertical deviation - the approach aid in use should be recorded. For autoland/ Category III operations, each system should be recorded.
21a	ILS/GPS/GLS glide path
21b	MLS elevation
21c	GNSS approach path/integrated area navigation (IRNAV) vertical deviation
22	Horizontal deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded. For autoland/CAT III operations, each system should be recorded. It is acceptable to arrange them so that at least one is recorded every second).
22a	ILS/GPS/GLS localiser
22b	MLS azimuth
22c	GNSS approach path/IRNAV lateral deviation
26	Distance measuring equipment (DME) 1 and 2 distances
26a	Distance to runway threshold(GLS)
26b	Distance to missed approach point (IRNAV/IAN)
28	Ground proximity warning system (GPWS)/TAWS/ground collision avoidance system (GCAS) status:
28a	Selection of terrain display mode, including pop-up display status
28b	Terrain alerts, including cautions and warnings and advisories
28c	On/off switch position



No*	Parameter
29	Angle of attack
30	Low pressure warning (each system):
30a	Hydraulic pressure
30b	Pneumatic pressure
31	Ground speed
32	Landing gear:
32a	Landing gear
32b	Gear selector position
33	Navigation data:
33a	Drift angle
33b	Wind speed
33c	Wind direction
33d	Latitude
33e	Longitude
33f	GNSS augmentation in use
34	Brakes:
34a	Left and right brake pressure
34b	Left and right brake pedal position
35	Additional engine parameters (if not already recorded in parameter 9 of Table 1 of AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.145 and if the aeroplane is equipped with a suitable data source):
35a	Engine pressure ratio (EPR)
35b	N1
35c	Indicated vibration level
35d	N2
35e	Exhaust gas temperature (EGT)
35f	Fuel flow
35g	Fuel cut-off lever position
35h	N3
36	Traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS)/ACAS - a suitable combination of discrete should be recorded to determine the status of the system:
36a	Combined control
36b	Vertical control
36c	Up advisory
36d	Down advisory
36e	Sensitivity level
37	Wind shear warning



No*	Parameter
38	Selected barometric setting
38a	Pilot
38b	Co-pilot
39	Selected altitude (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically
40	Selected speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically
41	Selected Mach (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically
42	Selected vertical speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically
43	Selected heading (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the aeroplane where the parameter is displayed electronically

* The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.150 Data link recording

General

- (a) As a means of compliance with SPO.IDE.A.150 (a) the recorder on which the data link messages are recorded may be:
- (1) the CVR;
 - (2) the FDR;
 - (3) a combination recorder when SPO.IDE.A.155 is applicable; or
 - (4) a dedicated flight recorder. In that case, the operational performance requirements for this recorder should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments No^o1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.
- (b) As a means of compliance with SPO.IDE.A.150 (a)(2) the operator should enable correlation by providing information that allows an accident investigator to understand what data was provided to the aircraft and, when the provider identification is contained in the message, by which provider.
- (c) The timing information associated with the data link communications messages required to be recorded by SPO.IDE.A.150 (a)(3) should be capable of being determined from the airborne-based recordings. This timing information should include at least the following:
- (1) the time each message was generated;
 - (2) the time any message was available to be displayed by the flight crew;
 - (3) the time each message was actually displayed or recalled from a queue; and
 - (4) the time of each status change.



- (d) The message priority should be recorded when it is defined by the protocol of the data link communication message being recorded.
- (e) The expression 'taking into account the system's architecture', in SPO.IDE.A.150 (a)(3), means that the recording of the specified information may be omitted if the existing source systems involved would require a major upgrade. The following should be considered:
 - (1) the extent of the modification required;
 - (2) the down-time period; and
 - (3) equipment software development.
- (f) Data link communications messages that support the applications in Table 1 below should be recorded.
- (g) Further details on the recording requirements can be found in the recording requirement matrix in Appendix D.2 of EUROCAE Document ED-93 (Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification for CNS/ATM Recorder Systems), dated November 1998.

Table 1: Data link recording

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.150 Data link recording

General

- (a) The letters and expressions in Table 1 of AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.150 have the following meaning:
 - (1) C: complete contents recorded.
 - (2) M: information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane.
 - (3) *: applications that are to be recorded only as far as is practicable, given the architecture of the system.
 - (4) F1: graphics applications may be considered as AOC messages when they are part of a data link communications application service run on an individual basis by the operator itself in the framework of the operational control.
 - (5) F2: where parametric data sent by the aeroplane, such as Mode S, is reported within the message, it should be recorded unless data from the same source is recorded on the FDR.
- (b) The definitions of the applications type in Table 1 of AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.150 are described in Table 1 below.



Table 1: Definitions of the applications type

Item No	Application Type	Messages	Comments
1	CM		CM is an ATN service
2	AFN		AFN is a FANS 1/A service
3	CPDLC		All implemented up and downlink messages to be recorded
4	ADS-C	ADS-C reports Position reports	All contract requests and reports recorded Only used within FANS 1/A. Mainly used in oceanic and remote areas.
5	ADS-B	Surveillance data	Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane.
6	D-FIS		D-FIS is an ATN service. All implemented up and downlink messages to be recorded
7	TWIP	TWIP messages	Terminal weather information for pilots
8	D-ATIS	ATIS messages	Refer to EUROCAE ED-89A, dated December 2003: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for the 'ATIS' data link service
9	OCL	OCL messages	Refer to EUROCAE ED-106A, dated March 2004: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for 'Oceanic Clearance' (OCL) data link service
10	DCL	DCL messages	Refer to EUROCAE ED-85A, dated December 2005: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for 'Departure Clearance' data link service
11	Graphics	Weather maps & other graphics	Graphics exchanged in the framework of procedures within the operational control, as specified in Part-ORO. Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane.
12	AOC	Aeronautical operational control messages	Messages exchanged in the framework of procedures within the operational control, as specified in Part-ORO. Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the aeroplane. Definition in EUROCAE ED-112, dated March 2003.
13	Surveillance	Downlinked aircraft parameters (DAP)	As defined in ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV (Surveillance systems and ACAS).

AAC aeronautical administrative communications

ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast



ADS-C	automatic dependent surveillance — contract
AFN	aircraft flight notification
AOC	aeronautical operational control
ATIS	automatic terminal information service
ATSC	air traffic service communication
CAP	controller access parameters
CPDLC	controller pilot data link communications
CM	configuration/context management
D-ATIS	digital ATIS
D-FIS	data link flight information service
D-METAR	data link meteorological airport report
DCL	departure clearance
FANS	Future Air Navigation System
FLIPCY	flight plan consistency
OCL	oceanic clearance
SAP	system access parameters
TWIP	terminal weather information for pilots

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.155 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder

General

When two flight data and cockpit voice combination recorders are installed, one should be located near the flight crew compartment in order to minimise the risk of data loss due to a failure of the wiring that gathers data to the recorder. The other should be located at the rear section of the aeroplane, in order to minimise the risk of data loss due to recorder damage in the case of a crash.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.155 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder

General

- (a) A flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder is a flight recorder that records:
- (1) all voice communications and the aural environment required by SPO.IDE.A.140; and
 - (2) all parameters and specifications required by SPO.IDE.A.145, with the same specifications required by SPO.IDE.A.140 and SPO.IDE.A.145.
- (b) In addition a flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder may record data link communication messages and related information required by SPO.IDE.A.150.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.160 Seats, seat safety belts and restraint systems

Upper Torso Restraint System

The following systems are deemed to be compliant with the requirement for an upper torso restraint system:



- (a) For other-than-complex aeroplanes, a seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap;
- (b) For all aeroplanes, a restraint system having a seat belt and two shoulder straps that may be used independently; and
- (c) For all aeroplanes, a restraint system having a seat belt, two shoulder straps and additional straps that may be used independently.

Seat Belt

A seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for a seat belt (two anchorage points).

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.165 First-aid kit

Content of First-Aid Kits — Other Than Complex Motor-Powered Aeroplanes

- (a) First-aid kits (FAKs) should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of passengers, etc.).
- (b) The following should be included in the FAKs:
 - (1) bandages (assorted sizes),
 - (2) burns dressings (large and small),
 - (3) wound dressings (large and small),
 - (4) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes),
 - (5) antiseptic wound cleaner,
 - (6) safety scissors, and
 - (7) disposable gloves.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.A.165 First-aid kit

Content of First-Aid Kits — Complex Motor-Powered Aeroplanes

- (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of persons on board etc.).
- (b) The following should be included in the FAKs:
 - (1) Equipment:
 - (i) bandages (assorted sizes);
 - (ii) burns dressings (unspecified);
 - (iii) wound dressings (large and small);
 - (iv) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes);
 - (v) adhesive tape;
 - (vi) adhesive wound closures;
 - (vii) safety pins;



- (viii) safety scissors;
 - (ix) antiseptic wound cleaner;
 - (x) disposable resuscitation aid;
 - (xi) disposable gloves;
 - (xii) tweezers: splinter; and
 - (xiii) thermometers (non-mercury).
- (2) Medications:
- (i) simple analgesic (may include liquid form);
 - (ii) antiemetic;
 - (iii) nasal decongestant;
 - (iv) gastrointestinal antacid, in the case of aeroplanes carrying more than nine persons;
 - (v) anti-diarrhoeal medication, in the case of aeroplanes carrying more than nine persons; and
 - (vi) antihistamine.
- (3) Other:
- (i) a list of contents in at least two languages (English and one other). This should include information on the effects and side effects of medications carried;
 - (ii) first-aid handbook, current edition;
 - (iii) medical incident report form; and
 - (iv) biohazard disposal bags.
- (4) An eye irrigator, although not required to be carried in the FAK, should, where possible, be available for use on the ground.

AMC3 SPO.IDE.A.165 First-aid kit

Maintenance of First-Aid Kit

To be kept up to date, the first-aid kit should be:

- (a) inspected periodically to confirm, to the extent possible, that contents are maintained in the condition necessary for their intended use;
- (b) replenished at regular intervals, in accordance with instructions contained on their labels, or as circumstances warrant; and
- (c) replenished after use in-flight at the first opportunity where replacement items are available.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.170 Supplemental oxygen — pressurised aeroplanes

Determination of Oxygen

- (a) In the determination of oxygen for the routes to be flown, it is assumed that the aeroplane will descend in accordance with the emergency procedures specified in the AFM, without exceeding its operating limitations, to a flight altitude that will allow the flight to be completed safely (i.e. flight altitudes ensuring adequate terrain clearance, navigational accuracy, hazardous weather avoidance, etc.).



- (b) The amount of oxygen should be determined on the basis of cabin pressure altitude, flight duration and on the assumption that a cabin pressurisation failure will occur at the pressure altitude or point of flight that is most critical from the standpoint of oxygen need.
- (c) Following a cabin pressurisation failure, the cabin pressure altitude should be considered to be the same as the aeroplane pressure altitude unless it can be demonstrated to the Kuwait DGCA that no probable failure of the cabin or pressurisation system will result in a cabin pressure altitude equal to the aeroplane pressure altitude. Under these circumstances, the demonstrated maximum cabin pressure altitude may be used as a basis for determination of oxygen supply.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.170(c)(2) Supplemental oxygen — pressurised aeroplanes

Quick Donning Masks

A quick donning mask is a type of mask that:

- (a) can be placed on the face from its ready position, properly secured, sealed and supplying oxygen upon demand, with one hand and within 5 seconds and will thereafter remain in position, both hands being free;
- (b) can be donned without disturbing eye glasses and without delaying the flight crew member from proceeding with assigned emergency duties;
- (c) once donned, does not prevent immediate communication between the flight crew members and other crew members over the aircraft intercommunication system; and
- (d) does not inhibit radio communications.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.175 Supplemental oxygen — non-pressurised aeroplanes

Determination of Oxygen

- (a) In the determination of oxygen for the routes to be flown, it is assumed that the aeroplane will descend in accordance with the emergency procedures specified in the AFM, without exceeding its operating limitations, to a flight altitude that will allow the flight to be completed safely (i.e. flight altitudes ensuring adequate terrain clearance, navigational accuracy, hazardous weather avoidance etc.).
- (b) The amount of oxygen should be determined on the basis of cabin pressure altitude and flight duration.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.180 Hand fire extinguishers

Number, Location and Type

- (a) The number and location of hand fire extinguishers should be such as to provide adequate availability for use, account being taken of the number and size of the cabin compartments, the need to minimise the hazard of toxic gas concentrations and the location of toilets, galleys, etc. These considerations may result in the number of fire extinguishers being greater than the minimum required.
- (b) There should be at least one hand fire extinguisher installed in the flight crew compartment and this should be suitable for fighting both flammable fluid and electrical equipment fires. Additional hand fire extinguishers may be required for the protection of other compartments accessible to the flight crew or task specialist in flight. Dry chemical fire extinguishers should not be used in the flight crew compartment, or in any compartment not separated by a partition from the flight crew compartment, because of



the adverse effect on vision during discharge and, if conductive, interference with electrical contacts by the chemical residues.

- (c) Where only one hand fire extinguisher is required in the cabin compartments, it should be located near the task specialist's station, where provided.
- (d) Where two or more hand fire extinguishers are required in the cabin compartments and their location is not otherwise dictated by consideration of (a), an extinguisher should be located near each end of the cabin with the remainder distributed throughout the cabin as evenly as is practicable.
- (e) Unless an extinguisher is clearly visible, its location should be indicated by a placard or sign. Appropriate symbols may also be used to supplement such a placard or sign.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.185 Marking of break-in points

Colour and Corners' Marking

- (a) The colour of the markings should be red or yellow and, if necessary, should be outlined in white to contrast with the background.
- (b) If the corner markings are more than 2 m apart, intermediate lines 9 cm x 3 cm should be inserted so that there is no more than 2 m between adjacent markings.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Batteries

- (a) All batteries used in ELTs or PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or in the following cases:
 - (1) Batteries specifically designed for use in ELTs and having an airworthiness release certificate (EASA Form 1 or equivalent) should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) before the end of their useful life in accordance with the maintenance instructions applicable to the ELT.
 - (2) Standard batteries manufactured in accordance with an industry standard and not having an airworthiness release certificate (EASA Form 1 or equivalent), when used in ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.
 - (3) All batteries used in PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.
 - (4) The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) criteria in (1),(2) and (3) do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals.
- (b) The new expiry date for a replaced (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.A.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Types of ELT and General Technical Specifications

- (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following:



- (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid search and rescue (SAR) teams in locating the crash site.
 - (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s).
 - (3) Automatic deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and that is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.
 - (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor.
- (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash.
- (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC3 SPO.IDE.A.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

PLB Technical Specifications

- (a) A personal locator beacon (PLB) should have a built-in GNSS receiver with a Kosmi Cheskaya Sistema Poiska Avarilnykh Sudov — search and rescue satellite- aided tracking (COSPAS-SARSAT) type approval number. However, devices with a COSPAS-SARSAT with a number belonging to series 700 are excluded as this series of numbers identifies the special-use beacons not meeting all the technical requirements and all the tests specified by COSPAS-SARSAT.
- (b) Any PLB carried should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC4 SPO.IDE.A.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Briefing on PLB Use

When a PLB is carried by a task specialist, he/she should be briefed on its characteristics and use by the pilot-in-command before the flight.



GM1 SPO.IDE.A.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Terminology

- (a) An ELT is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually activated.
- (b) A PLB is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.

GM2 SPO.IDE.A.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Maximum Certified Seating Configuration

The maximum certified seating configuration does not include flight crew seats.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.195 Flight over water

Accessibility of Life-Jackets

The life-jacket, if not worn, should be accessible from the seat or station of the person for whose use it is provided, with a safety belt or a restraint system fastened.

Means of Illumination for Life-Jackets

The means of electric illumination should be a survivor locator light as defined in the applicable ETSO issued by Kuwait DGCA or equivalent.

Risk Assessment

- (a) When conducting the risk assessment, the pilot-in-command should base his/her decision, as far as is practicable, on the Regulations and AMCs applicable to the operation of the aeroplane.
- (b) The pilot-in-command should, for determining the risk, take the following operating environment and conditions into account:
 - (1) sea state;
 - (2) sea and air temperatures;
 - (3) the distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing; and
 - (4) the availability of search and rescue facilities.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.A.195 Flight over water

Life Rafts and Equipment for Making Distress Signals

- (a) The following should be readily available with each life-raft:
 - (1) means for maintaining buoyancy;
 - (2) a sea anchor;
 - (3) life-lines and means of attaching one life-raft to another;
 - (4) paddles for life-rafts with a capacity of six or less;
 - (5) means of protecting the occupants from the elements;



- (6) a water-resistant torch;
- (7) signalling equipment to make the pyrotechnic distress signals described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air;
- (8) 100 g of glucose tablets for each four, or fraction of four, persons that the life-raft is designed to carry:
- (9) at least 2 litres of drinkable water provided in durable containers or means of making sea water drinkable or a combination of both; and
- (10) first-aid equipment.

(b) As far as practicable, items listed in (a) should be contained in a pack.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.195 Flight over water

Seat Cushions

Seat cushions are not considered to be flotation devices.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.200 Survival equipment

Additional Survival Equipment

- (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required:
 - (1) 500 ml of water for each four, or fraction of four, persons on board;
 - (2) one knife;
 - (3) first-aid equipment; and
 - (4) one set of air/ground codes.
- (b) In addition, when polar conditions are expected, the following should be carried:
 - (1) a means of melting snow;
 - (2) one snow shovel and one ice saw;
 - (3) sleeping bags for use by 1/3 of all persons on board and space blankets for the remainder or space blankets for all persons on board; and
 - (4) one arctic/polar suit for each crew member
- (c) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the aircraft in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.200(a)(2) Survival equipment

Survival ELT

An ELT(AP) may be used to replace one required ELT(S) provided that it meets the ELT(S) requirements. A water-activated ELT(S) is not an ELT(AP).

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.200(b)(2) Survival equipment

Applicable Airworthiness Standard

The applicable airworthiness standard should be CS-25 or equivalent.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.200 Survival equipment

Signalling Equipment



The signalling equipment for making distress signals is described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.

GM2 SPO.IDE.A.200 Survival equipment

Areas in which Search and Rescue would be Especially Difficult

The expression 'areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult' should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning:

- (a) areas so designated by the authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or
- (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where:
 - (1) the authority referred to in (a) not published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and
 - (2) the authority referred to in (a) does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.205 Individual protective equipment

Types Of Individual Protective Equipment

Personal protective equipment should include, but is not limited to: flying suits, gloves, helmets, protective shoes, etc.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.210 Headset

General

- (a) A headset consists of a communication device that includes two earphones to receive and a microphone to transmit audio signals to the aeroplane's communication system. To comply with the minimum performance requirements, the earphones and microphone should match the communication system's characteristics and the flight crew compartment environment. The headset should be adequately adjustable in order to fit the flight crew's head. Headset boom microphones should be of the noise cancelling type.
- (b) If the intention is to utilise noise cancelling earphones, the operator should ensure that the earphones do not attenuate any aural warnings or sounds necessary for alerting the flight crew on matters related to the safe operation of the aeroplane.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.210 Headset

General

The term 'headset' includes any aviation helmet incorporating headphones and microphone worn by a flight crew member.

GM1 SPO.IDE.A.215 Radio communication equipment

Applicable Airspace Requirements

For aeroplanes being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.220 Navigation equipment

Navigation With Visual Reference To Landmarks — Other-than-Complex Aeroplanes

Where other-than-complex aeroplanes, with the surface in sight, can proceed according to the ATS flight plan by navigation with visual reference to landmarks, no additional equipment is needed to comply with SPO.IDE.A.220 (a)(1).



AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.225 Transponder

General

- (a) The secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transponders of aeroplanes being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control should comply with applicable State of Kuwait legislation.
- (b) If the State of Kuwait legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.

Section 2 — Helicopters

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

Applicable Airworthiness Requirements

The applicable airworthiness requirements for approval of instruments and equipment required by this Part are the following:

- (a) Part 21 for helicopters registered in the State of Kuwait; and
- (b) Airworthiness requirements of the state of registry for helicopters registered outside the State of Kuwait.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

Required Instruments and Equipment that do not Need to be Approved in Accordance with the Applicable Airworthiness Requirements

The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in SPO.IDE.H.100 (b), should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

Not Required instruments and equipment that do not need to be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements, but are carried on a flight

- (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable airworthiness codes.
- (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the helicopter. Examples may be the following:
 - (1) portable electronic flight bag (EFB);
 - (2) portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists; and
 - (3) non-installed task specialists equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.100(d) Instruments and equipment — general

Positioning of Instruments



This requirement implies that whenever a single instrument is required in a helicopter operated in a multi-crew environment, the instrument needs to be visible from each flight crew station.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.115 Operating lights

Landing Light

The landing light should be trainable, at least in the vertical plane, or optionally be an additional fixed light or lights positioned to give a wide spread of illumination.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120 & SPO.IDE.H.125 Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Integrated Instruments

- (a) Individual equipment requirements may be met by combinations of instruments, by integrated flight systems or by a combination of parameters on electronic displays. The information so available to each required pilot should not be less than that required in the applicable operational requirements, and the equivalent safety of the installation should be approved during type certification of the helicopter for the intended type of operation.
- (b) The means of measuring and indicating turn and slip, helicopter attitude and stabilised helicopter heading may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight director systems, provided that the safeguards against total failure, inherent in the three separate instruments, are retained.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(a)(1) & SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(1) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Measuring and Displaying Magnetic Heading

The means of measuring and displaying magnetic direction should be a magnetic compass or equivalent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(a)(2) & SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(2) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Measuring and Displaying The Time — Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

An acceptable means of compliance is a clock displaying hours, minutes and seconds, with a sweep-second pointer or digital presentation.

Means of Measuring and Displaying The Time — Other-Than-Complex Motor-Powered Aircraft

An acceptable means of measuring and displaying the time in hours, minutes and seconds may be a wrist watch capable of the same functions.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(a)(3) & SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(3) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Calibration of The Means Of Measuring And Displaying Pressure Altitude



The instrument measuring and displaying pressure altitude should be of a sensitive type calibrated in feet (ft), with a sub-scale setting, calibrated in hectopascals/millibars, adjustable for any barometric pressure likely to be set during flight.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(3) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Altimeters

Altimeters with counter drum-pointer or equivalent presentation are considered to be less susceptible to misinterpretation for helicopters operating above 10000 ft.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(a)(4) & SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(4) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Calibration of The Instrument Indicating Airspeed

- (a) The instrument indicating airspeed should be calibrated in knots (kt).
- (b) In the case of helicopters with an MCTOM below 2000 kg, calibration in kilometres (km) per hour or in miles per hour (mph) is acceptable when such units are used in the AFM.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(a)(5) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

SLIP

For other-than-complex helicopters the means of measuring and displaying slip may be a slip string for operations under VFR.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(9) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Displaying Outside Air Temperature

- (a) The means of displaying outside air temperature should be calibrated in degrees Celsius.
- (b) In the case of helicopters with a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) below 2000kg, calibration in degrees Fahrenheit is acceptable, when such unit is used in the AFM.
- (c) The means of displaying outside air temperature may be an air temperature indicator that provides indications that are convertible to outside air temperature.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(d) & SPO.IDE.H.125(c) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Multi-Pilot Operations — Duplicate Instruments

Duplicate instruments include separate displays for each pilot and separate selectors or other associated equipment where appropriate.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(b)(1)(iii) & SPO.IDE.H.125(a)(8) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Stabilised Heading



Stabilised direction should be achieved for VFR flights by a gyroscopic direction indicator, whereas for IFR flights, this should be achieved through a magnetic gyroscopic direction indicator.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.120(b)(3) & SPO.IDE.H.125(d) Operations under VFR & operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Preventing Malfunction due to Condensation or Icing

The means of preventing malfunction due to either condensation or icing of the airspeed indicating system should be a heated pitot tube or equivalent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.125(f)(2) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Chart Holder

An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement would be to display a pre-composed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.132 Airborne weather detecting equipment — complex motor-powered helicopters

General

The airborne weather detecting equipment should be an airborne weather radar.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.135 Flight crew interphone system

Type of Flight Crew Interphone

The flight crew interphone system should not be of a handheld type.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.140 Cockpit voice recorder

General

The operational performance requirements for CVRs should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments No^o1 and No 2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.145 Flight data recorder

Operational Performance Requirements

- (a) The operational performance requirements for flight data recorders (FDRs) should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, including amendments No^o1 and No^o2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.
- (b) The FDR should record, with reference to a timescale, the list of parameters in Table 1 and Table 2, as applicable.



- (c) The parameters recorded by the FDR should meet, as far as practicable, the performance specifications (designated ranges, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and minimum resolution in read-out) defined in EUROCAE ED-112, including amendments No°1 and No°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.
- (d) FDR systems for which some recorded parameters do not meet the performance specifications of EUROCAE Document ED-112 may be acceptable to the Kuwait DGCA.

Table 1: FDR parameters — All helicopters

No*	Parameter
1	Time or relative time count
2	Pressure altitude
3	Indicated airspeed
4	Heading
5	Normal acceleration
6	Pitch attitude
7	Roll attitude
8	Manual radio transmission keying CVR/FDR synchronisation reference
9	Power on each engine
9a	Free power turbine speed (NF)
9b	Engine torque
9c	Engine gas generator speed (NG)
9d	Cockpit power control position
9e	Other parameters to enable engine power to be determined
10a	Main rotor speed
10b	Rotor brake (if installed)
11	Primary flight controls — Pilot input and/or control output position (if applicable)
11a	Collective pitch
11b	Longitudinal cyclic pitch
11c	Lateral cyclic pitch
11d	Tail rotor pedal
11e	Controllable stabilator (if applicable)
11f	Hydraulic selection



No*	Parameter
12	Hydraulics low pressure (each system should be recorded.)
13	Outside air temperature
18	Yaw rate or yaw acceleration
20	Longitudinal acceleration (body axis)
21	Lateral acceleration
25	Marker beacon passage
26	Warnings — a discrete should be recorded for the master warning, gearbox low oil pressure and as failure. Other 'red' warnings should be recorded where the warning condition cannot be determined from other parameters or from the cockpit voice recorder.
27	Each navigation receiver frequency selection
37	Engine control modes

* The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

Table 2: FDR parameters — Helicopters for which the data source for the parameter is either used by helicopter systems or is available on the instrument panel for use by the flight crew to operate the helicopter.

No*	Parameter
14	AFCS mode and engagement status
15	Stability augmentation system engagement (each system should be recorded)
16	Main gear box oil pressure
17	Gear box oil temperature
17a	Main gear box oil temperature Intermediate gear box oil temperature Tail rotor gear box
17b	oil temperature
17c	
19	Indicated sling load force (if signals readily available)
22	Radio altitude
23	Vertical deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded. ILS glide path
23a	MLS elevation
23b	GNSS approach path
23c	
24	Horizontal deviation — the approach aid in use should be recorded.
24a	ILS localiser
24b	MLS azimuth
24c	GNSS approach path



No*	Parameter
28	DME 1 & 2 distances
29	Navigation data
29a	Drift angle
29b	Wind speed
29c	Wind direction
29d	Latitude
29e	Longitude
29f	Ground speed
30	Landing gear or gear selector position
31	Engine exhaust gas temperature (T4)
32	Turbine inlet temperature (TIT/ITT)
33	Fuel contents
34	Altitude rate (vertical speed) — only necessary when available from cockpit instruments
35	Ice detection
36	Helicopter health and usage monitor system (HUMS)
36a	Engine data
36b	Chip detector
36c	Track timing
36d	Exceedance discretetes
36e	Broadband average engine vibration
38	Selected barometric setting — to be recorded for helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically
38a	Pilot
38b	Co-pilot
39	Selected altitude (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically
40	Selected speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically
41	Not used (selected Mach)
42	Selected vertical speed (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically
43	Selected heading (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically
44	Selected flight path (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically



No*	Parameter
45	Selected decision height (all pilot selectable modes of operation) — to be recorded for the helicopters where the parameter is displayed electronically
46	EFIS display format
47	Multi-function/engine/alerts display format
48	Event marker

* The number in the left hand column reflects the serial number depicted in EUROCAE ED-112.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.150 Data link recording

General

- (a) As a means of compliance with SPO.IDE.H.150, the recorder on which the data link messages are recorded should be:
- (1) the CVR;
 - (2) the FDR;
 - (3) a combination recorder when SPO.IDE.H.155 is applicable; or
 - (4) a dedicated flight recorder. In such case, the operational performance requirements for this recorder should be those laid down in EUROCAE Document ED-112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash Protected Airborne Recorder Systems), dated March 2003, including amendments No°1 and No°2, or any later equivalent standard produced by EUROCAE.
- (b) As a means of compliance with SPO.IDE.H.150 (a)(2), the operator should enable correlation by providing information that allows an accident investigator to understand what data was provided to the aircraft and, when the provider identification is contained in the message, by which provider.
- (c) The timing information associated with the data link communications messages required to be recorded by SPO.IDE.H.150 (a)(3) should be capable of being determined from the airborne-based recordings. This timing information should include at least the following:
- (1) the time each message was generated;
 - (2) the time any message was available to be displayed by the flight crew;
 - (3) the time each message was actually displayed or recalled from a queue; and
 - (4) the time of each status change.
- (d) The message priority should be recorded when it is defined by the protocol of the data link communication message being recorded.
- (e) The expression 'taking into account the system's architecture', in SPO.IDE.H.150 (a)(3), means that the recording of the specified information may be omitted if the existing source systems involved would require a major upgrade. The following should be considered:
- (1) the extent of the modification required;



- (2) the down-time period; and
- (3) equipment software development.
- (f) Data link communications messages that support the applications in Table 1 should be recorded.
- (g) Further details on the recording requirements can be found in the recording requirement matrix in Appendix D.2 of EUROCAE Document ED-93 (Minimum Aviation System Performance Specification for CNS/ATM Recorder Systems), dated November 1998.

Table 1: Data link recording

Item No	Application Type	Application Description	Required Recording Content
1	Data link initiation	This includes any application used to log on to, or initiate, a data link service. In future air navigation system (FANS)-1/A and air traffic navigation (ATN), these are ATS facilities notification (AFN) and context management (CM), respectively.	C
2	Controller/pilot communication	This includes any application used to exchange requests, clearances, instructions and reports between the flight crew and controllers on the ground. In FANS-1/A and ATN, this includes the controller pilot data link communications (CPDLC) application. It also includes applications used for the exchange of oceanic clearances (OCL) and departure clearances (DCL), as well as data link delivery of taxi clearances.	C
3	Addressed surveillance	This includes any surveillance application in which the ground sets up contracts for delivery of surveillance data. In FANS-1/A and ATN, this includes the automatic dependent surveillance-contract (ADS-C) application.	C, F2
4	Flight information	This includes any application used for delivery of flight information data to specific aeroplanes. This includes for example data link-automatic terminal information service (D-ATIS), data link-operational terminal information service (D-OTIS), digital weather information services (D-METAR or TWIP), data link-flight information service (D-FIS) and Notice to Airmen (electronic NOTAM) delivery.	C
5	Broadcast surveillance	This includes elementary and enhanced surveillance systems, as well as automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) output data.	M*, F2
6	AOC data	This includes any application transmitting or receiving data used for AOC purposes (in accordance with the ICAO definition of AOC). Such systems may also process AAC messages, but there is no requirement to record AAC messages	M*
7	Graphics	This includes any application receiving graphical data to be used for operational purposes (i.e. excluding applications that are receiving such things as updates to manuals).	M* F1



GM1 SPO.IDE.H.150 Data link recording

General

- (a) The letters and expressions in Table 1 of AMC1-SPO.IDE.H.150 have the following meaning:
- (1) C: complete contents recorded.
 - (2) M: information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter.
 - (3) *: applications that are to be recorded only as far as is practicable, given the architecture of the system.
 - (4) F1: graphics applications may be considered as AOC messages when they are part of a data link communications application service run on an individual basis by the operator itself in the framework of the operational control.
 - (5) F2: where parametric data sent by the helicopter, such as Mode S, is reported within the message, it should be recorded unless data from the same source is recorded on the FDR.
- (b) The definitions of the applications type in Table 1 of AMC2 SPO.IDE.H.150 are described in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Definitions of the applications type

Item No	Application Type	Messages	Comments
1	CM		CM is an ATN service
2	AFN		AFN is a FANS 1/A service
3	CPDLC		All implemented up and downlink messages to be recorded
4	ADS-C	ADS-C reports Position reports	All contract requests and reports recorded Only used within FANS 1/A. Mainly used in oceanic and remote areas.
5	ADS-B	Surveillance data	Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter.
6	D-FIS		D-FIS is an ATN service. All implemented up and downlink messages to be recorded
7	TWIP	TWIP messages	Terminal weather information for pilots
8	D ATIS	ATIS messages	Refer to EUROCAE ED-89A, dated December 2003: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for the 'ATIS' data link service
9	OCL	OCL messages	Refer to EUROCAE ED-106A, dated March 2004: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for 'Oceanic Clearance' (OCL) data link service



Item No	Application Type	Messages	Comments
10	DCL	DCL messages	Refer to EUROCAE ED-85A, dated March 2003: Data Link Application System Document (DLASD) for 'Departure Clearance' data link service
11	Graphics	Weather maps & other graphics	Graphics exchanged in the framework of procedures within the operational control, as specified in Part-ORO. Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter.
12	AOC	Aeronautical operational control messages	Messages exchanged in the framework of procedures within the operational control, as specified in Part-ORO. Information that enables correlation with any associated records stored separately from the helicopter. Definition in EUROCAE ED-112, dated March 2003.
13	Surveillance	Downlinked Aircraft Parameters (DAP)	As defined in ICAO Annex 10 Volume IV (Surveillance systems and ACAS).

AAC	aeronautical administrative communications
ADS-B	automatic dependent surveillance — broadcast
ADS-C	automatic dependent surveillance — contract
AFN	aircraft flight notification
AOC	aeronautical operational control
ATIS	automatic terminal information service
ATSC	air traffic service communication
CAP	controller access parameters
CPDLC	controller pilot data link communications
CM	configuration/context management
D-ATIS	digital ATIS
D-FIS	data link flight information service
D-METAR	data link meteorological airport report
DCL	departure clearance
FANS	Future Air Navigation System
FLIPCY	flight plan consistency
OCL	oceanic clearance
SAP	system access parameters
TWIP	terminal weather information for pilots



GM1 SPO.IDE.H.155 Flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder

Combination Recorders

- (a) A flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder is a flight recorder that records:
- (1) all voice communications and the aural environment required by SPO.IDE.H.140; and
 - (2) all parameters and specifications required by SPO.IDE.H.145, with the same specifications required by SPO.IDE.H.140 and SPO.IDE.H.145.
- (b) In addition, a flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder may record data link communication messages and related information required by SPO.IDE.H.150.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.H.160 Seats, seat safety belts and restraint systems

Upper Torso Restraint System

The following systems are deemed to be compliant with the requirement for an upper torso restraint system:

- (a) For other-than-complex helicopters, a seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap;
- (b) For all helicopters, a restraint system having a seat belt and two shoulder straps that may be used independently.
- (c) For all helicopters, a restraint system having a seat belt, two shoulder straps and additional straps that may be used independently.

Seat Belt

A seat belt with a diagonal shoulder strap (three anchorage points) is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for a seat belt (two anchorage points).

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.165 First-aid kit

Content of First-Aid Kits — Other-Than-Complex Motor-Powered Helicopters

- (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of persons on board, etc.).
- (b) The following should be included in the FAKs:
 - (1) bandages (assorted sizes),
 - (2) burns dressings (large and small),
 - (3) wound dressings (large and small),
 - (4) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes),
 - (5) antiseptic wound cleaner,
 - (6) safety scissors, and
 - (7) disposable gloves.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.H.165 First-aid kit

Content of First-Aid Kit — Complex Motor-Powered Helicopters



- (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of persons on board etc.).
- (b) The following should be included in the FAKs:
- (1) Equipment:
 - (i) bandages (assorted sizes);
 - (ii) burns dressings (unspecified);
 - (iii) wound dressings (large and small);
 - (iv) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes);
 - (v) adhesive tape;
 - (vi) adhesive wound closures;
 - (vii) safety pins;
 - (viii) safety scissors;
 - (ix) antiseptic wound cleaner;
 - (x) disposable resuscitation aid;
 - (xi) disposable gloves;
 - (xii) tweezers: splinter; and
 - (xiii) thermometers (non-mercury).
 - (2) Medications:
 - (i) simple analgesic (may include liquid form);
 - (ii) antiemetic;
 - (iii) nasal decongestant;
 - (iv) gastrointestinal antacid, in the case of helicopters carrying more than nine persons;
 - (v) anti-diarrhoeal medication in the case of helicopters carrying more than nine persons; and
 - (vi) antihistamine.
 - (3) Other:
 - (i) a list of contents in at least two languages (English and one other). This should include information on the effects and side effects of medications carried;
 - (ii) first-aid handbook;
 - (iii) medical incident report form; and
 - (iv) biohazard disposal bags.
 - (4) An eye irrigator, although not required to be carried in the FAK, should, where possible, be available for use on the ground.



AMC3 SPO.IDE.H.165 First-aid kit

Maintenance of First-Aid Kit

To be kept up to date, the first-aid kit should be:

- (a) inspected periodically to confirm, to the extent possible, that contents are maintained in the condition necessary for their intended use;
- (b) replenished at regular intervals, in accordance with instructions contained on their labels, or as circumstances warrant; and
- (c) replenished after use in-flight at the first opportunity where replacement items are available.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.175 Supplemental oxygen — non-pressurised helicopters

Determination of Oxygen

The amount of oxygen should be determined on the basis of cabin pressure altitude and flight duration, consistent with the operating procedures, including emergency, procedures, established for each operation and the routes to be flown as specified in the AFM.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.180 Hand fire extinguishers

Number, Location and Type

- (a) The number and location of hand fire extinguishers should be such as to provide adequate availability for use, account being taken of the number and size of the cabin compartments, the need to minimise the hazard of toxic gas concentrations and the location of toilets, galleys, etc. These considerations may result in the number of fire extinguishers being greater than the minimum required.
- (b) There should be at least one hand fire extinguisher installed in the flight crew compartment and this should be suitable for fighting both flammable fluid and electrical equipment fires. Additional hand fire extinguishers may be required for the protection of other compartments accessible to the flight crew or task specialist in flight. Dry chemical fire extinguishers should not be used in the flight crew compartment, or in any compartment not separated by a partition from the flight crew compartment, because of the adverse effect on vision during discharge and, if conductive, interference with electrical contacts by the chemical residues.
- (c) Where only one hand fire extinguisher is required in the cabin compartments, it should be located near the task specialist's station, where provided.
- (d) Where two or more hand fire extinguishers are required in the cabin compartments and their location is not otherwise dictated by consideration of (a), an extinguisher should be located near each end of the cabin with the remainder distributed throughout the cabin as evenly as is practicable.
- (e) Unless an extinguisher is clearly visible, its location should be indicated by a placard or sign. Appropriate symbols may also be used to supplement such a placard or sign.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.185 Marking of break-in points

Colour and Corners' Marking

- (a) The colour of the markings should be red or yellow and, if necessary, should be outlined in white to contrast with the background.



- (b) If the corner markings are more than 2 m apart, intermediate lines 9 cm x 3 cm should be inserted so that there is no more than 2 m between adjacent markings.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Batteries

- (a) All batteries used in ELTs or PLBs should be replaced (or recharged if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or in the following cases:
- (1) Batteries specifically designed for use in ELTs and having an airworthiness release certificate (Kuwait DGCA Form 1 or equivalent) should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) before the end of their useful life in accordance with the maintenance instructions applicable to the ELT.
 - (2) Standard batteries manufactured in accordance with an industry standard and not having an airworthiness release certificate (Kuwait DGCA Form 1 or equivalent), when used in ELTs should be replaced (or recharged if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.
 - (3) All batteries used in PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.
 - (4) The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) criteria in (1),(2) and (3) do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals.
- (b) The new expiry date for a replaced (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.H.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Types of ELT and General Technical Specifications

- (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following:
- (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.
 - (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s).
 - (3) Automatic deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and that is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.



- (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency, and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor.
- (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash.
- (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC3 SPO.IDE.H.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

PLB Technical Specifications

- (a) A personal locator beacon (PLB) should have a built-in GNSS receiver with a *cosmicheskaya sistyema poiska aviarynich sudov* — search and rescue satellite-aided tracking (COSPAS-SARSAT) type approval number. However, devices with a COSPAS-SARSAT with a number belonging to series 700 are excluded as this series of numbers identifies the special-use beacons not meeting all the technical requirements and all the tests specified by COSPAS-SARSAT.
- (b) Any PLB carried should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC4 SPO.IDE.H.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Briefing on PLB Use

When a PLB is carried by a task specialist, he/she should be briefed on its characteristics and use by the pilot-in-command before the flight.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Terminology

- (a) An ELT is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually activated.
- (b) A PLB is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.

GM2 SPO.IDE.H.190 Emergency locator transmitter (ELT)

Maximum Certified Seating Configuration

The maximum certified seating configuration does not include flight crew seats.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.195 Flight over water — other-than-complex motor-powered helicopters

Accessibility of Life-Jackets



The life-jacket, if not worn, should be accessible from the seat or station of the person for whose use it is provided, with a safety belt or a restraint system fastened.

Means of Illumination for Life-Jackets

The means of electric illumination should be a survivor locator light as defined in the applicable ETSO issued by Kuwait DGCA or equivalent.

Risk Assessment

- (a) When conducting the risk assessment, the pilot-in-command should base his/her decision, as far as is practicable, on the regulations and AMCs applicable to the operation of the helicopter.
- (b) The pilot-in-command should, for determining the risk, take the following operating environment and conditions into account:
 - (1) sea state;
 - (2) sea and air temperatures;
 - (3) the distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing; and
 - (4) the availability of search and rescue facilities.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.195 Flight over water — other-than-complex motor-powered helicopters

Seat Cushions

Seat cushions are not considered to be flotation devices.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.197 Life-jackets — complex motor-powered helicopters

Accessibility of Life-Jackets

The life-jacket, if not worn, should be accessible from the seat or station of the person for whose use it is provided, with a safety belt or a restraint system fastened.

Means of Illumination For Life-Jackets

The means of electric illumination should be a survivor locator light as defined in the applicable ETSO issued by Kuwait DGCA or equivalent.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.197 Life-jackets – complex motor-powered helicopters

Seat Cushions

Seat cushions are not considered to be flotation devices.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.198 Survival suits — complex motor-powered helicopters

Estimating Survival Time

- (a) Introduction
 - (1) A person accidentally immersed in cold seas (typically offshore Northern Europe) will have a better chance of survival if he/she is wearing an effective survival suit in addition to a life-jacket. By wearing the survival suit, he/she can slow down the rate which his/her body temperature falls and, consequently,




protect himself/herself from the greater risk of drowning brought about by incapacitation due to hypothermia.

- (2) The complete survival suit system – suit, life-jacket and clothes worn under the suit – should be able to keep the wearer alive long enough for the rescue services to find and recover him/her. In practice the limit is about 3 hours. If a group of persons in the water cannot be rescued within this time they are likely to have become so scattered and separated that location will be extremely difficult, especially in the rough water typical of Northern European sea areas. If it is expected that in water protection could be required for periods greater than 3 hours, improvements should, rather, be sought in the search and rescue procedures than in the immersion suit protection.

(b) Survival times

- (1) The aim should be to ensure that a person in the water can survive long enough to be rescued, i.e. the survival time should be greater than the likely rescue time. The factors affecting both times are shown in Figure 1. The figure emphasises that survival time is influenced by many factors, physical and human. Some of the factors are relevant to survival in cold water and some are relevant in water at any temperature.

Figure 1: The survival equation



(2) Broad estimates of likely survival times for the thin individual offshore are given in Table 1 below. As survival time is significantly affected by the prevailing weather conditions at the time of immersion, the Beaufort wind scale has been used as an indicator of these surface conditions.



Table 1: Timescale within which the most vulnerable individuals are likely to succumb to the prevailing conditions

Clothing assembly	Beaufort wind force	Times within which the most vulnerable individuals are likely to drown	
		(water temp 5°C)	(water temp 13°C)
Working clothes (no immersion suit)	0 – 2	Within ¾ hour	Within 1¼ hours
	3 – 4	Within ½ hour	Within ½ hour
	5 and above	Significantly less than ½ hour	Significantly less than ½ hour
Immersion suit worn over	0 -2	May well exceed 3 hours	May well exceed 3 hours
Working clothes (with leakage inside suit)	3 – 4	Within 2 ¾ hours	May well exceed 3 hours
	5 and above	Significantly less than 2¾ hours. May well exceed 1 hour	May well exceed 3 hours

- (3) Consideration should also be given to escaping from the helicopter itself should it submerge or invert in the water. In this case escape time is limited to the length of time the occupants can hold their breath. The breath holding time can be greatly reduced by the effect of cold shock. Cold shock is caused by the sudden drop in skin temperature on immersion, and is characterised by a gasp reflex and uncontrolled breathing. The urge to breath rapidly becomes overwhelming and, if still submerged, the individual will inhale water resulting in drowning. Delaying the onset of cold shock by wearing an immersion suit will extend the available escape time from a submerged helicopter.
- (4) The effects of water leakage and hydrostatic compression on the insulation quality of clothing are well recognised. In a nominally dry system the insulation is provided by still air trapped within the clothing fibres and between the layers of suit and clothes. It has been observed that many systems lose some of their insulating capacity either because the clothes under the 'waterproof' survival suit get wet to some extent or because of hydrostatic compression of the whole assembly. As a result of water leakage and compression, survival times will be shortened. The wearing of warm clothing under the suit is recommended.
- (5) Whatever type of survival suit and other clothing is provided, it should not be forgotten that significant heat loss can occur from the head.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.199 Life-rafts, survival ELTs and survival equipment on extended overwater flights – complex motor-powered helicopters

Life–Rafts and Equipment for Making Distress Signals

- (a) Each required life-raft should conform to the following specifications:
 - (1) be of an approved design and stowed so as to facilitate their ready use in an emergency;
 - (2) be radar conspicuous to standard airborne radar equipment;



- (3) when carrying more than one life-raft on board, at least 50% of the rafts should be able to be deployed by the crew while seated at their normal station, where necessary by remote control; and
 - (4) life-rafts that are not deployable by remote control or by the crew should be of such weight as to permit handling by one person. 40 kg should be considered a maximum weight.
- (b) Each required life-raft should contain at least the following:
- (1) One approved survivor locator light;
 - (2) one approved visual signalling device;
 - (3) one canopy (for use as a sail, sunshade or rain catcher) or other mean to protect occupants from the elements;
 - (4) one radar reflector;
 - (5) one 20 m retaining line designed to hold the life-raft near the helicopter but to release it if the helicopter becomes totally submerged;
 - (6) one sea anchor; and
 - (7) one survival kit, appropriately equipped for the route to be flown, which should contain at least the following:
 - (i) one life-raft repair kit;
 - (ii) one bailing bucket;
 - (iii) one signalling mirror;
 - (iv) one police whistle;
 - (v) one buoyant raft knife;
 - (vi) one supplementary means of inflation;
 - (vii) sea sickness tablets;
 - (viii) one first-aid kit;
 - (ix) one portable means of illumination;
 - (x) 500 ml of pure water and one sea water desalting kit; and
 - (xi) one comprehensive illustrated survival booklet in an appropriate language.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.200 Survival equipment

Additional Survival Equipment

- (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required:
- (1) 500 ml of water for each four, or fraction of four, persons on board;
 - (2) one knife;
 - (3) first-aid equipment; and
 - (4) one set of air/ground codes.
- (b) In addition, when polar conditions are expected, the following should be carried:
- (1) a means of melting snow;



- (2) one snow shovel and one ice saw;
 - (3) sleeping bags for use by 1/3 of all persons on board and space blankets for the remainder or space blankets for all persons on board; and
 - (4) one arctic/polar suit for each crew member.
- (c) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the aircraft in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.200(b) Survival equipment

Survival ELT

An ELT(AP) may be used to replace one required ELT(S) provided that it meets the ELT(S) requirements. A water-activated ELT(S) is not an ELT(AP).

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.200 Survival equipment

Signalling Equipment

The signalling equipment for making distress signals is described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.

GM2 SPO.IDE.H.200 Survival equipment

Areas in which Search and Rescue Would Be Especially Difficult

The expression 'areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult' should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning:

- (a) areas so designated by the authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or
- (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where:
 - (1) the authority referred to in (a) has not published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and
 - (2) the authority referred to in (a) does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.201 Additional requirements for helicopters conducting offshore operations in a hostile sea area — complex motor-powered helicopters

Installation of The Life Raft

- (a) Projections on the exterior surface of the helicopter, that are located in a zone delineated by boundaries that are 1.22 m (4 ft) above and 0.61 m (2 ft) below the established static water line could cause damage to a deployed life-raft. Examples of projections which need to be considered are aerials, overboard vents, unprotected split-pin tails, guttering and any projection sharper than a three dimensional right angled corner.
- (b) While the boundaries specified in (1) are intended as a guide, the total area that should be considered should also take into account the likely behaviour of the life-raft after deployment in all sea states up to the maximum in which the helicopter is capable of remaining upright.
- (c) Wherever a modification or alteration is made to a helicopter within the boundaries specified, the need to prevent the modification or alteration from causing damage to a deployed life-raft should be taken into account in the design.
- (d) Particular care should also be taken during routine maintenance to ensure that additional hazards are not introduced by, for example, leaving inspection panels with sharp corners proud of the surrounding fuselage surface, or allowing door sills to deteriorate to a point where sharp edges become a hazard.



GM1 SPO.IDE.H.202 Helicopters certificated for operating on water — miscellaneous equipment

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are those that were published by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 1972.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.203 All helicopters on flights over water — ditching

Emergency Flotation Equipment

The same considerations of AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.201 should apply in respect of emergency flotation equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.205 Individual protective equipment

Types of Individual Protective Equipment

Personal protective equipment should include, but is not limited to: flying suits, gloves, helmets, protective shoes, etc.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.210 Headset

General

- (a) A headset consists of a communication device that includes two earphones to receive and a microphone to transmit audio signals to the helicopter's communication system. To comply with the minimum performance requirements, the earphones and microphone should match the communication system's characteristics and the flight crew compartment environment. The headset should be adequately adjustable in order to fit the flight crew's head. Headset boom microphones should be of the noise cancelling type.
- (b) If the intention is to utilise noise cancelling earphones, the operator should ensure that the earphones do not attenuate any aural warnings or sounds necessary for alerting the flight crew on matters related to the safe operation of the helicopter.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.210 Headset

General

The term 'headset' includes any aviation helmet incorporating headphones and microphone worn by a flight crew member.

GM1 SPO.IDE.H.215 Radio communication equipment

Applicable Airspace Requirements

For helicopters being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.220 Navigation equipment

Navigation With Visual Reference to Landmarks — Other-Than-Complex Helicopters

Where other-than-complex helicopters, with the surface in sight, can proceed according to the ATS flight plan by navigation with visual reference to landmarks, no additional equipment is needed to comply with SPO.IDE.H.220 (a)(1).

AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.225 Transponder

General

- (a) The SSR transponders of helicopters being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control should comply with any applicable legislation.
- (b) If the legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.



Section 3 — Sailplanes

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

Applicable Airworthiness Requirements

The applicable airworthiness requirements for approval of instruments and equipment required by this Part are the following:

- (a) Part 21 for sailplanes registered in the State of Kuwait; and
- (b) Airworthiness requirements of the state of registry for sailplanes registered outside the State of Kuwait.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

Required instruments and equipment that do not need to be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements

The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in SPO.IDE.S.100(b), should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

Not required instruments and equipment that do not need to be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements, but are carried on a flight

- (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable airworthiness codes.
- (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the sailplane. Examples may be portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.115 & SPO.IDE.S.120 Operations under VFR & Cloud flying — flight and navigational instruments

Integrated Instruments

- (a) Individual equipment requirements may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight systems or by a combination of parameters on electronic displays. The information so available to each required pilot should not be less than that required in the applicable operational requirements, and the equivalent safety of the installation should be approved during type certification of the sailplane for the intended type of operation.
- (b) The means of measuring and indicating turn and slip and sailplane attitude may be met by combinations of instruments or by integrated flight director systems, provided that the safeguards against total failure, inherent in the three separate instruments, are retained.



AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.115(a)(1) & SPO.IDE.S.120(a) Operations under VFR & Cloud flying — flight and navigational instruments

Means of Measuring and Displaying Magnetic Heading

The means of measuring and displaying magnetic direction should be a magnetic compass or equivalent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.115(a)(2) & SPO.IDE.S.120(b) Operations under VFR & Cloud flying — flight and navigational instruments

Means of Measuring and Displaying The Time

A means of measuring and displaying the time in hours, minutes and seconds may be a wrist watch capable of the same functions.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.115(a)(3) & SPO.IDE.S.120(c) Operations under VFR & Cloud flying — flight and navigational instruments

Calibration of The Means for Measuring and Displaying Pressure Altitude

- (a) The instrument measuring and displaying pressure altitude should be of a sensitive type calibrated in feet (ft), with a sub-scale setting, calibrated in hectopascals/millibars, adjustable for any barometric pressure likely to be set during flight.
- (b) Calibration in metres (m) is also acceptable.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.115(a)(4) & SPO.IDE.S.120(d) Operations under VFR & Cloud flying — flight and navigational instruments

Calibration of The Instrument Indicating Airspeed

- (a) The instrument indicating airspeed should be calibrated in knots (kt).
- (b) Calibration in kilometres per hour (kph) or in miles per hour (mph) is also acceptable.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.115(b)(2) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments

SLIP Indication

The means of measuring and displaying slip may be a yaw string for operations under VFR.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.115(b) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments

Conditions where the Sailplane cannot be maintained in a desired attitude without reference to one or more additional instruments

Sailplanes operating in conditions where the sailplane cannot be maintained in a desired attitude without reference to one or more additional instruments means a condition that is still under VFR (under VMC) though where there is no external reference such as the natural horizon or a coastline, that would allow the attitude to be maintained. Such conditions may occur over water, a desert or snow-covered areas where the colour of the surface cannot be distinguished from the colour of the sky and therefore no external reference is available. Cloud flying is not considered to be one of these conditions.



AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.125 Seats and restraint systems

Upper Torso Restraint System

- (a) A seat belt with upper torso restraint system should have four anchorage points and should include shoulder straps (two anchorage points) and a seat belt (two anchorage points), which may be used independently.
- (b) A restraint system having five anchorage points is deemed to be compliant with the requirement for seat belt with upper torso restraint system with four anchorage points.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.135 Flight over water

Means of Illumination for Life-Jackets

Each life-jacket or equivalent individual flotation device should be equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose of facilitating the location of persons.

Risk Assessment

- (a) When conducting the risk assessment, the pilot-in-command should base his/her decision, as far as is practicable, on the Regulations and AMCs applicable to the operation of the sailplane.
- (b) The pilot-in-command should, for determining the risk, take the following operating environment and conditions into account:
 - (1) sea state;
 - (2) sea and air temperatures;
 - (3) the distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing; and
 - (4) the availability of search and rescue facilities.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.135(a) Flight over water

Seat Cushions

Seat cushions are not considered to be flotation devices.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.135(b) Flight over water

Batteries

- (a) All batteries used in ELTs or PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or in the following cases:
 - (1) Batteries specifically designed for use in ELTs and having an airworthiness release certificate (Kuwait DGCA Form 1 or equivalent) should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) before the end of their useful life in accordance with the maintenance instructions applicable to the ELT.
 - (2) Standard batteries manufactured in accordance with an industry standard and not having an airworthiness release certificate (Kuwait DGCA Form 1 or equivalent), when used in ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.



- (3) All batteries used in PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.
 - (4) The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) criteria in (1),(2) and (3) do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals.
- (b) The new expiry date for a replaced (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.S.135(b) Flight over water

Types of ELT and General Technical Specifications

- (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following:
- (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.
 - (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s).
 - (3) Automatic Deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and that is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.
 - (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor.
- (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash.
- (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC3 SPO.IDE.S.135(b) Flight over water

PLB Technical Specifications

- (a) A personal locator beacon (PLB) should have a built-in GNSS receiver with a Kosmi Cheskaya Sistema Poiska Avarilnykh Sudov — search and rescue satellite- aided tracking (COSPAS-SARSAT) type approval number. However, devices with a COSPAS-SARSAT with a number belonging to series 700 are excluded as this series of numbers identifies the special-use beacons not meeting all the technical requirements and all the tests specified by COSPAS-SARSAT.



- (b) Any PLB carried should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC4 SPO.IDE.S.135(b) Flight over water.

Briefing on PLB Use

When a PLB is carried by a task specialist, he/she should be briefed on its characteristics and use by the pilot-in-command before the flight.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.135(b) Flight over water

Terminology

- (a) An ELT is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually activated.
- (b) A PLB is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.140 Survival equipment

General

Sailplanes operated across land areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult should be equipped with the following:

- (a) signalling equipment to make the distress signals;
- (b) at least one ELT(S) or a PLB; and
- (c) additional survival equipment for the route to be flown taking account of the number of persons on board.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.S.140 Survival equipment

Additional Survival Equipment

- (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required:
- (1) 500 ml of water;
 - (2) one knife;
 - (3) first-aid equipment; and
 - (4) one set of air/ground codes.
- (b) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the sailplane in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.140 Survival equipment

Signalling Equipment

The signalling equipment for making distress signals is described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.



GM2 SPO.IDE.S.140 Survival equipment

Areas in which Search and Rescue would be especially difficult

The expression 'areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult' should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning:

- (a) areas so designated by the authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or
- (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where:
 - (1) the authority referred to in (a) published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and
 - (2) the authority referred to in (a). does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

GM1 SPO.IDE.S.150 Navigation equipment

Applicable Airspace Requirements

For sailplanes being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.S.155 Transponder

General

- (a) The SSR transponders of sailplanes being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control should comply with any applicable legislation.
- (b) If the legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.



Section 4 - Balloons

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.100(a) Instruments and equipment — general

Applicable Airworthiness Requirements

The applicable airworthiness requirements for approval of instruments and equipment required by this Part are the following:

- (a) Part 21 for balloons registered in the State of Kuwait; and
- (b) Airworthiness requirements of the state of registry for balloons registered outside the State of Kuwait.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.100(b) Instruments and equipment — general

Required instruments and equipment that do not need to be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements

The functionality of non-installed instruments and equipment required by this Subpart and that do not need an equipment approval, as listed in SPO.IDE.B.100 (b), should be checked against recognised industry standards appropriate to the intended purpose. The operator is responsible for ensuring the maintenance of these instruments and equipment.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general

Not required instruments and equipment that do not need to be approved in accordance with the applicable airworthiness requirements, but are carried on a flight

- (a) The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable airworthiness codes.
- (b) The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the balloon. Examples may be portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.110 Operating lights

Anti-Collision Lights

An acceptable means of compliance is the anti-collision light required for free manned balloons certified for VFR at night in accordance with CS-31HB/GB.

Illumination for Instruments and Equipment

A means to provide adequate illumination to instruments and equipment essential to the safe operation of the balloon may be an independent portable light.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.115(a) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Displaying Drift Direction



The drift direction may be determined by using a map and reference to visual landmarks.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.115(b)(1) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Measuring and Displaying the Time

A means of measuring and displaying the time in hours, minutes and seconds may be a wrist watch capable of the same functions.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.115(b)(2) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments

Means of Measuring and Displaying Vertical Speed

The necessity of a vertical speed indicator depends on the balloon design. Some envelope shapes have a high drag and will therefore not develop a high ascent/descent speed. Such balloons usually do not require a vertical speed indicator. More slender envelope shapes such as special shape balloons may have a significantly lower drag. Their ascent/descent speed is usually limited to a certain value so that controllability of the balloon is maintained. To be able to stay within this limitation of the AFM, a vertical speed indicator is required for such balloons.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.115(b)(3) Operations under VFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment

Means of Measuring and Displaying Pressure Altitude

A means of measuring and displaying pressure altitude is needed when required by ATC, or when altitude needs to be checked for flights where oxygen is used, or the limitations in the AFM require to limit altitude and/or rate of climb/descent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.120 First-aid kit

Content of First-Aid Kits

- (a) First-aid kits should be equipped with appropriate and sufficient medications and instrumentation. However, these kits should be amended by the operator according to the characteristics of the operation (scope of operation, flight duration, number and demographics of passengers, etc.).
- (b) The following should be included in the FAKs:
 - (1) bandages (assorted sizes),
 - (2) burns dressings (large and small),
 - (3) wound dressings (large and small),
 - (4) adhesive dressings (assorted sizes),
 - (5) antiseptic wound cleaner,
 - (6) safety scissors, and
 - (7) disposable gloves.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.B.120 First-aid kit

Maintenance of First-Aid Kit



To be kept up to date, first-aid kits should be:

- (a) inspected periodically to confirm, to the extent possible, that contents are maintained in the condition necessary for their intended use;
- (b) replenished at regular intervals, in accordance with instructions contained on their labels, or as circumstances warrant; and
- (c) replenished after use in-flight at the first opportunity where replacement items are available.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.125 Hand fire extinguishers

Certification Specifications

The applicable certification specification for hot-air balloons should be CS-31HB or equivalent.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.130 Flight over water

Risk Assessment

- (a) When conducting the risk assessment, the pilot-in-command should base his/her decision, as far as is practicable, on the regulations and AMCs applicable to the operation of the balloon.
- (b) The pilot-in-command should, for determining the risk, take the following operating environment and conditions into account:
 - (1) sea state;
 - (2) sea and air temperatures;
 - (3) the distance from land suitable for making an emergency landing; and
 - (4) the availability of search and rescue facilities.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.130(a) Flight over water

Means of Illumination for Life-Jackets

Each life-jacket or equivalent individual flotation device should be equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose of facilitating the location of persons.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

Batteries

- (a) All batteries used in ELTs or PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when the equipment has been in use for more than 1 cumulative hour or in the following cases:
 - (1) Batteries specifically designed for use in ELTs and having an airworthiness release certificate (Kuwait DGCA Form 1 or equivalent) should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) before the end of their useful life in accordance with the maintenance instructions applicable to the ELT.
 - (2) Standard batteries manufactured in accordance with an industry standard and not having an airworthiness release certificate (Kuwait DGCA Form 1 or equivalent), when used in ELTs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of



their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.

- (3) All batteries used in PLBs should be replaced (or recharged, if the battery is rechargeable) when 50 % of their useful life (or for rechargeable, 50 % of their useful life of charge), as established by the battery manufacturer, has expired.
 - (4) The battery useful life (or useful life of charge) criteria in (1),(2) and (3) do not apply to batteries (such as water-activated batteries) that are essentially unaffected during probable storage intervals.
- (b) The new expiry date for a replaced (or recharged) battery should be legibly marked on the outside of the equipment.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

Types of ELT and General Technical Specifications

- (a) The ELT required by this provision should be one of the following:
- (1) Automatic fixed (ELT(AF)). An automatically activated ELT that is permanently attached to an aircraft and is designed to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.
 - (2) Automatic portable (ELT(AP)). An automatically activated ELT that is rigidly attached to an aircraft before a crash, but is readily removable from the aircraft after a crash. It functions as an ELT during the crash sequence. If the ELT does not employ an integral antenna, the aircraft-mounted antenna may be disconnected and an auxiliary antenna (stored on the ELT case) attached to the ELT. The ELT can be tethered to a survivor or a life-raft. This type of ELT is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site or survivor(s).
 - (3) Automatic deployable (ELT(AD)). An ELT that is rigidly attached to the aircraft before the crash and which is automatically ejected, deployed and activated by an impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided. This type of ELT should float in water and is intended to aid SAR teams in locating the crash site.
 - (4) Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT that is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency and manually activated by a survivor. An ELT(S) may be activated manually or automatically (e.g. by water activation). It should be designed to be tethered to a life-raft or a survivor.
- (b) To minimise the possibility of damage in the event of crash impact, the automatic ELT should be rigidly fixed to the aircraft structure, as far aft as is practicable, with its antenna and connections arranged so as to maximise the probability of the signal being transmitted after a crash.
- (c) Any ELT carried should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 10, Volume III and should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC3 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

PLB Technical Specifications

- (a) A personal locator beacon (PLB) should have a built-in GNSS receiver with a Kosmi Cheskaya Sistema Poiska Avarilnykh Sudov — search and rescue satellite- aided tracking (COSPAS-SARSAT) type approval number. However, devices with a COSPAS-SARSAT with a number belonging to series 700 are excluded as this series of numbers



identifies the special-use beacons not meeting all the technical requirements and all the tests specified by COSPAS-SARSAT.

- (b) Any PLB carried should be registered with the national agency responsible for initiating search and rescue or other nominated agency.

AMC4 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

Briefing on PLB Use

When a PLB is carried by a task specialist, he/she should be briefed on its characteristics and use by the pilot-in-command before the flight.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.130(b) Flight over water

Terminology

- (a) An ELT is a generic term describing equipment that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be activated by impact or may be manually activated.
- (b) A PLB is an emergency beacon other than an ELT that broadcasts distinctive signals on designated frequencies, is standalone, portable and is manually activated by the survivors.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.130(c) Flight over water

Signalling Equipment

The signalling equipment for making distress signals is described in ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.135 Survival equipment

General

Balloons operated across land areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult should be equipped with the following:

- (a) signalling equipment to make the distress signals;
- (b) at least one ELT(S) or a PLB; and
- (c) additional survival equipment for the route to be flown taking account of the number of persons on board.

AMC2 SPO.IDE.B.135 Survival equipment

Additional Survival Equipment

- (a) The following additional survival equipment should be carried when required:
 - (1) 500 ml of water for each four, or fraction of four, persons on board;
 - (2) one knife;
 - (3) first-aid equipment; and
 - (4) one set of air/ground codes.



- (b) If any item of equipment contained in the above list is already carried on board the balloon in accordance with another requirement, there is no need for this to be duplicated.

GM2 SPO.IDE.B.135 Survival equipment

Areas in which Search And Rescue would be especially difficult

The expression 'areas in which search and rescue would be especially difficult' should be interpreted, in this context, as meaning:

- (a) areas so designated by the authority responsible for managing search and rescue; or
- (b) areas that are largely uninhabited and where:
- (1) the authority referred to in (a) has not published any information to confirm whether search and rescue would be or would not be especially difficult; and
 - (2) the authority referred to in (a) does not, as a matter of policy, designate areas as being especially difficult for search and rescue.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.140(a)(3) Miscellaneous equipment

Fire Blanket

A fire blanket should comply with EN 1869 or equivalent. The size should be at least 1.5 m x 2 m. Smaller sizes are not recommended as they cannot sufficiently cover the source of developing propane fire.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.140 (b)(1) Miscellaneous equipment

Knife

The knife, hook knife or equivalent, should be capable of cutting any control line or handling rope that is accessible to the pilot-in-command or a crew member from the basket.

GM1 SPO.IDE.B.145 Radio communication equipment

Applicable Airspace Requirements

For balloons being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control, the applicable airspace requirements.

AMC1 SPO.IDE.B.150 Transponder

General

- (a) The SSR transponders of balloons being operated under State of Kuwait air traffic control should comply with any applicable legislation.
- (b) If the legislation is not applicable, the SSR transponders should operate in accordance with the relevant provisions of Volume IV of ICAO Annex 10.



Subpart E — Specific requirements

Section 1 — Helicopter external sling load operations (HESLO)

AMC1 SPO.SPEC.HESLO.100 Standard operating procedures

Standard Operating Procedures

(a) Before conducting any HESLO, the operator should develop its SOPs taking into account the elements below.

(b) Nature and complexity of the activity

(1) Nature of the activity and exposure:

Helicopter flights for the purpose of transporting external loads by different means, e.g. under slung, external pods or racks. These operations are usually performed as low level flights.

(2) Complexity of the activity:

The complexity of the activity varies with the size and the shape of the load, the length of the rope and characteristics of the pick-up and drop-off zones, the time per load cycle, etc.

Table 1: HESLO types

HESLO 1:	short line, 20 metres (m) or less
HESLO 2:	long line, more than 20 m
HESLO 3:	Logging
HESLO 4:	construction, wire stringing, cable laying
HESLO 5:	heavy lift (mass of external load 1 500 kg or above)

(3) Operational environment and geographical area:

HESLO may be performed over any geographical area. Special attention should be given to:

- (i) hostile and congested;
- (ii) mountains;
- (iii) sea;
- (iv) jungle;
- (v) desert; and
- (vi) polar;
- (vii) lakes and river canyons; and
- (viii) environmentally sensitive areas (e.g. national parks, noise sensitive areas).

(c) Equipment

(1) The helicopter may be equipped with:

- (i) additional mirror(s);



- (ii) a bubble window;
 - (iii) supplementary hook(s) or multi-hook device(s); and
 - (iv) load data recorder (lifts, weights, torques, power, forces, shocks and electrical activities).
- (2) Non-assisted vertical reference operations may require additional engine monitoring in the pilot line of vision or an audio warning system.
- (3) All additional equipment used, e.g. ropes, cables, mechanical hooks, swivel hooks, nets, buckets, chainsaws, baskets, containers, should be manufactured according to applicable rules or recognised standards. The operator should be responsible for maintaining the serviceability of this equipment.
- (4) Adequate radio communication equipment (e.g. VHF, UHF, FM) should be installed and serviceable in the helicopter for co-ordination with the task specialists involved in the operation.
- (5) Task specialists involved in the operation should be equipped with hand-held communication equipment, protective helmets with integrated earphones and microphones.
- (d) Crew members
- (1) Crew composition:
- (i) The minimum flight crew as stated in the approved AFM. For operational or training purposes, an additional crew member may assist the pilot-in-command (PIC) in a single-pilot operation.
 - (ii) For safety and/or operational purposes, task specialists should be instructed by the operator to fulfil specified tasks (e.g. to establish vertical reference).
- (2) Pilot initial training
- Before acting as PIC, the pilot should demonstrate to the operator that he/she has the required skills and knowledge.
- (i) Theoretical knowledge:
 - (A) content of the operations manual (OM) including the relevant SOP;
 - (B) AFM (limitations, emergencies, etc.);
 - (C) procedures for certain operations (short line, long line, construction, wire stringing or cable laying flying techniques, as required for the operation);
 - (D) load and site preparation including load rigging techniques and external load procedures;
 - (E) special equipment used in the operation;
 - (F) training in human factor principles; and
 - (G) hazards and dangers.
- (3) Pilot experience
- (i) For operations with a maximum external load mass of less than 1500 kg, the PIC should have at least the following experience: Prior to commencing training:



- (A) 300 hours helicopter flight experience as PIC, which should be increased to 500 hours experience as PIC for mountain operations; and
- (B) 10 hours flight experience on the helicopter type; Before acting as PIC:
- (C) 30 hours on the helicopter type, performing HESLO 1 and 2 operations. Where a pilot has accomplished 50 hours in HESLO 1 and 2 operations, the 30 hours experience on the helicopter type may be reduced to 15 hours.
- (ii) For operations with a maximum external load mass of 1500 kg and above, the pilot-in-command should have at least the following experience:
Prior to commencing training:
 - (A) 1000 hours helicopter flight experience as PIC, which should be increased to 1500 hours experience as PIC for mountain operations;
 - (B) 10 hours flight experience on the helicopter type;Before acting as PIC:
 - (C) 30 hours on the helicopter type, performing HESLO 1 and 2 operations. Where a pilot has accomplished 50 hours in HESLO 1 and 2 operations, the 30 hours experience on the helicopter type may be reduced to 15 hours.
 - (D) At least 20 hours gained in an operational environment similar to environment of intended operation (desert, sea, jungle, etc.).
- (iii) For HESLO 3 only, additionally to experience (i) or (ii):
Prior to commencing training:
 - (A) At least qualified as PIC for HESLO 1 type;
 - (B) Minimum 500 HESLO cycles.
- (iv) For HESLO 4 only, additionally to (i) or (ii):
Prior to commencing training:
 - (A) At least qualified as PIC for HESLO 2 or HESLO 3;
 - (B) Minimum 1000 flight hours on helicopters; and
 - (C) Minimum 3000 HESLO cycles.
- (4) Pilot recurrent training and checking at least every two years:
 - (i) review of the load rigging techniques;
 - (ii) external load procedures;
 - (iii) review of the applicable flying techniques; and
 - (iv) review of human factor principles.
 - (v) A pilot who has performed 20 hours of relevant HESLO within the past 12 months may not need any further flight training other than in accordance with Part-FCL.
- (e) Task specialists



Before acting as task specialist, he/she should demonstrate to the operator that he/she has been trained appropriately and has the required skill and knowledge.

(1) Initial training

(i) The initial training of task specialists should include at least:

- (A) behaviour in a rotor turning environment and training in ground safety and emergency procedures;
- (B) procedures including load rigging, usage and conservation (replacement) of LLD;
- (C) helicopter marshalling signals;
- (D) radio communication;
- (E) selection and preparation of pick-up and drop-off sites, dangers on working places (downwash, loose goods, third people);
- (F) handling and safety of third party;
- (G) relevant training for the helicopter type;
- (H) duties and responsibilities as described in the appropriate manual;
- (I) perception and classification of flight obstacles (none, critical, danger), measures for safety; and
- (J) human factor principles.

(ii) The individual safety equipment appropriate to the operational environment and complexity of the activity should be described in the appropriate manual.

(2) Recurrent training

- (i) The annual recurrent training should include the items listed in the initial training as described in (e)(1) above.
- (ii) The operator should establish a formal qualification list for each individual task specialist.
- (iii) The operator should establish a system of record keeping that allows adequate storage and reliable traceability of:
 - (A) the initial and recurrent training;
 - (B) Qualifications (qualification list).

(3) Briefing of task specialists

Briefings on the organisation and coordination between flight crew and task specialists involved in the operation should take place prior to each operation. These briefings should include at least the following:

- (i) location and size of pick-up and drop-off site, operating altitude;
- (ii) location of refuelling site and procedures to be applied; and
- (iii) load sequence, danger areas, performance and limitations, emergency procedures.

(4) Responsibility of task specialists operating on the ground:

- (i) Task specialists operating on the ground are responsible for the safe organisation of the ground operation, including:



- (A) adequate selection and preparation of the pick-up and drop-off points and load rigging;
 - (B) appropriate communication and assistance to the flight crew and other task specialists; and
 - (C) access restriction on the pick-up and drop-off site.
- (ii) If more than one task specialist is required for a task, one should be nominated as leading the activities. He/she should act as main link between flight crew and other task specialist(s) involved in the operation and is responsible for:
- (A) task specialist co-ordination and activities on the ground; and
 - (B) the safety of the working area (loading and fuelling).
- (f) HESLO instructor
- The HESLO instructor should be assigned by the operator on the basis of the following:
- (1) the HESLO instructor for pilots should be suitably qualified as determined by the operator and have a minimum experience of 500 hours HESLO operations in the appropriate HESLO level on which instruction is to be provided as well as experience in instructing according to the flight instructor or type rating instructor training;
 - (2) the HESLO instructor for task specialists should be suitably qualified as determined by the operator and have at least 2 years of experience in HESLO operations.
- (g) Performance
- (1) Power margins for HESLO operations:
 - (i) HESLO 1 and 2

The mass of the helicopter should not exceed the maximum mass specified in accordance with SPO.POL.146(c)(1) at the pick-up or drop-off site, whichever is higher, as stated in the appropriate manual.
 - (ii) HESLO 3, 4 and 5
- The mass of the helicopter should not exceed the maximum mass specified in accordance with SPO.POL.146(c)(1) at the pick-up or drop-off site, whichever is higher, as stated in the appropriate manual, and in case of construction (montage) operations, reduced by 10% of the mass of the sling load capacity.
- (h) Normal procedures
- (1) Operating procedures:

HESLO should be performed in accordance with the appropriate manual and appropriate operating procedures. These procedures should include, for each type of operation:

 - (i) crew individual safety equipment (e.g. helmet, fire retardant suits);
 - (ii) crew responsibilities;
 - (iii) crew coordination and communication;
 - (iv) selection and size of pick-up and drop-off sites;



- (v) selection of flight routes;
- (vi) fuel management in the air and on the ground;
- (vii) task management; and
- (viii) third party risk management.

(2) Ground procedures:

The operator should specify appropriate procedures, including:

- (i) use of ground equipment;
- (ii) load rigging;
- (iii) size and weight assessment of loads;
- (iv) attachment of suitably prepared loads to the helicopter;
- (v) two-way radio communication procedures;
- (vi) selection of suitable pick-up and drop-off sites;
- (vii) safety instructions for task specialists operating on the ground;
- (viii) helicopter performances information;
- (ix) fuel management on the ground;
- (x) responsibility, organisation and task management of other personnel on the ground involved in the operation;
- (xi) third party risk management; and
- (xii) environmental protection.

(i) Emergency procedures

(1) Operating procedures for the flight crew:

In addition to the emergency procedures published in the AFM or OM, the operator should ensure that the flight crew:

- (i) is familiar with the appropriate emergency procedures;
- (ii) has appropriate knowledge of the emergency procedures for personnel on the ground involved in the operation; and
- (iii) reports emergencies as specified in the AFM or OM.

(2) Ground procedures:

The operator should ensure that the task specialist on the ground involved in the operation:

- (i) is familiar with the appropriate emergency procedures;
- (ii) has appropriate knowledge of the flight crew emergency procedures;
- (iii) reports emergencies as specified in the AFM or OM; and
- (iv) prevents, as far as possible, environmental pollution.

(j) Ground equipment

The operator should specify the use of ground equipment, such as fuel trucks, cables, strops etc. in the AFM or OM, including at least:

- (1) minimum size of the operating site;



- (2) surface condition;
- (3) positioning of ground equipment on the operating site;
- (4) fuel handling;
- (5) environment protection plan; and
- (6) location and use of fire suppression equipment.

GM1 SPO.SPEC.HESLO.100 Standard operating procedures

Pilot Initial Training

The table below specifies minimum standards before starting the practical instructions.

Table 1: Training minimum standards

HESLO 1	CPL(H) or ATPL(H) PPL(H) only for non-commercial operations Minimum 300 hours PIC (H) Minimum 10 hours PIC on type Type rating completed HESLO ground instruction completed Task specialist syllabus reviewed
HESLO 2	CPL(H) or ATPL(H) PPL(H) only for non-commercial operations HESLO level 1 completed Type rating completed Minimum 10 hours PIC on type HESLO 2 ground instruction completed Task specialist syllabus reviewed Minimum 500 HESLO1 cycles
HESLO 2 Conversion	CPL(H) or ATPL(H) PPL(H) only for non-commercial operations HESLO level 3 completed Type rating completed Minimum 10 hours PIC on type HESLO 2 ground instruction completed Task specialist syllabus reviewed
HESLO 3	CPL(H) or ATPL(H) PPL(H) only for non-commercial operations HESLO level 1 completed to 20m Min. 500 HESLO cycles Type rating completed Minimum 10 hours PIC on type HESLO 3 ground instruction completed



		Task specialist syllabus reviewed
		Practical Task specialist training for logging
HESLO Conversion	3	CPL(H) or ATPL(H) PPL(H) only for non-commercial operations HESLO level 2 completed Minimum 500 HESLO cycles Type rating completed Minimum 10 hours PIC on type HESLO 3 ground instruction completed Task specialist syllabus reviewed Practical Task specialist training for logging
HESLO 4		CPL(H) or ATPL(H) PPL(H) only for non-commercial operations Minimum 1 000 hours (H) HESLO level 2 or 3 completed Minimum 3 000 HESLO cycles Type rating completed Minimum 10 hours PIC on type HESLO 4 ground instruction completed Practical load preparation training
HESLO 5		CPL(H) or ATPL(H) 1 000 h PIC (H)/ 1 500 h PIC (H) for mountain operations Type rating completed Appropriate HESLO level completed HESLO 5 ground instruction completed Task specialist syllabus reviewed Practical load preparation training completed



Section 2 — Human external cargo operations (HEC)

AMC1 SPO.SPEC.HEC.100 Standard operating procedures

Standard Operating Procedures

- (a) Before conducting any HEC operations, the operator should develop its SOPs taking into account the elements below.
- (b) Nature and complexity of the activity
 - (1) Nature of the activity and exposure:
 - (i) Helicopter operations for the purpose of transporting humans as external loads from/to aerodromes and/or operating sites. The operations are performed as low level flights.
 - (ii) The operator should only carry task specialists to a site if the level of danger would be too high for them to go there with another mean of transport or where no other means of transport exists. HEC flights should always be conducted with the minimum time of exposure for the task specialists.
 - (2) Complexity of the activity:
 - (i) The complexity of the activity varies with the length of the rope and characteristics of the pick-up and drop-off zones, etc.

Table 1: HEC levels

- (3) Operational environment and geographical area:

HEC may be performed over any geographical area. Special attention should not be given to:

 - (i) hostile congested and non-congested environment;
 - (ii) mountains;
 - (iii) sea;
 - (iv) jungle;
 - (v) desert;
 - (vi) artic;
 - (vii) lakes and river canyons; and
 - (viii) environmentally sensitive areas (e.g. national parks, noise sensitive areas).
- (c) Equipment
 - (1) The helicopter may be equipped with:
 - (i) additional mirror(s);
 - (ii) a bubble window;
 - (iii) supplementary hook(s) or multi-hook device(s); and
 - (iv) load data recorder (lifts, weights, torques, power, forces, shocks and electrical activities).
 - (2) Non-assisted vertical reference operations should require additional engine monitoring in the pilot line of vision or an audio warning system.



- (3) All additional equipment used, e.g. ropes, cables, mechanical hooks, swivel hooks, nets, buckets, baskets, containers, should be manufactured according to officially recognised standards. The operator is responsible for maintaining the serviceability of this equipment.
 - (4) Adequate radio communication equipment (e.g. VHF, UHF, FM) should be installed in the helicopter for co-ordination with the task specialist involved in the operation.
 - (5) Task specialists involved in the operation should be equipped with hand-held communication equipment, protective helmets with integrated earphones and microphones as well as personal protective equipment.
- (d) Crew members
- (1) Crew composition:
 - (i) The minimum flight crew is stated in the approved AFM. For operational or training purposes, an additional qualified crew member may assist the PIC in a single-pilot operation.
 - (ii) For safety and/or operational purposes, a task specialist may be required by the operator to fulfil the task (e.g. to establish vertical reference or to operate the release safety device for the belly rope).
 - (2) Pilot initial training:

Before acting as PIC, the pilot should demonstrate to the operator that he/she has the required skills and knowledge, as follows:

 - (i) Theoretical knowledge:
 - (A) load rigging techniques;
 - (B) external load procedures;
 - (C) site organisation and safety measures;
 - (D) short line, long line, construction, wire stringing or cable laying flying techniques, as required for the operation.
 - (ii) Pilot experience prior to commencing the training:
 - (A) 1000 hours helicopter flight experience as PIC, of which 500h should be gained in mountainous areas for training in mountain operations;
 - (B) 10 hours flight experience on the helicopter type;
 - (C) type rating completed;
 - (D) HESLO type 1 or 2 completed;
 - (E) relevant experience in the field of operation;
 - (F) training in human factor principles; and
 - (G) ground instruction completed (marshaller syllabus).
 - (3) Pilot recurrent training and checking at least every two years:
 - (i) review of the sling technique;
 - (ii) external load procedures;
 - (iii) training in human factor principles; and
 - (iv) review of the applicable flying techniques.
 - (4) Conditions of HEC instruction:
 - (i) Maximum sling length according to the level applicable:



- (A) 1 task specialist (with radio) at pickup point;
- (B) 1 task specialist (with radio) at drop off point/on the line;
- (C) helicopter fitted with cargo mirror/bubble window;
- (D) flight instruction DC/: Cycles DC/minimum 10 cycles which of 5 Human Cargo Sling; and
- (E) flight instruction solo with onsite supervision/Cycles solo/minimum 10 cycles.

(ii) HEC instructor:

The HEC instructor should be assigned by the operator on the basis of the following:

- (A) the HEC instructor for pilots should hold or have held flight instructor rating and should have a minimum experience of 100 cycles in HEC operations in the appropriate HEC level on which instruction is to be provided;
- (B) the HEC instructor for task specialists should be suitably qualified as determined by the operator and have at least 2 years of experience in HEC operations as a task specialist.

(e) Task specialists

Before acting as task specialists, they should demonstrate to the operator that they have been appropriately trained and have the required skills and knowledge including training on human factor principles.

(1) Task specialists should be trained to operate the system including:

- (i) montage and removal of system; and
- (ii) normal procedure.

(2) Briefings

Briefings on the organisation and coordination between flight crew and task specialist involved in the operation should take place prior to each operation. These briefings should include at least the following:

- (i) location and size of pick-up and drop-off site, operating altitude;
- (ii) location of refuelling site and procedures to be applied; and
- (iii) load sequence, danger areas, performance and limitations, emergency procedures.

(3) Recurrent training

- (i) The annual recurrent training should include the items listed in the initial training as described in (e)(1) above.
- (ii) The operator should establish a formal qualification list for each individual task specialist.
- (iii) The operator should establish a system of record keeping that allows adequate storage and reliable traceability of:
 - (A) the initial and recurrent training;
 - (B) qualifications (qualification list).

(f) Performance



HEC should be performed with the following power margins: the mass of the helicopter should not exceed the maximum mass specified in accordance with SPO.POL.146 (c)(1).

(g) Normal procedures

(1) Operating procedures:

HEC should be performed in accordance with the AFM. Operating procedures should include, for each type of operation:

- (i) Crew individual safety equipment (e.g. helmet, fire retardant suits);
- (ii) crew responsibilities;
- (iii) crew coordination and communication;
- (iv) selection and size of pick-up and drop-off sites;
- (v) selection of flight routes;
- (vi) fuel management in the air and on the ground;
- (vii) task management; and
- (viii) third party risk management.

(2) Ground procedures:

The operator should specify appropriate procedures, including:

- (i) use of ground equipment;
- (ii) load rigging;
- (iii) size and weight assessment of loads;
- (iv) attachment of suitably prepared loads to the helicopter;
- (v) two-way radio communication procedures;
- (vi) selection of suitable pick-up and drop-off sites;
- (vii) safety instructions for ground task specialists or other persons required for the safe conduct of the operation;
- (viii) helicopter performances information;
- (ix) fuel management on the ground;
- (x) responsibility and organisation of the personnel on the ground involved in the operation;
- (xi) task management of personnel on the ground involved in the operation;
- (xii) third party risk management; and
- (xiii) environmental protection.

(h) Emergency procedures

(1) Operating procedures:

In addition to the emergency procedures published in the AFM or OM, the operator should ensure that the flight crew:

- (i) is familiar with the appropriate emergency procedures;
- (ii) has appropriate knowledge of the emergency procedures for personnel on the ground involved in the operation; and
- (iii) reports emergencies as specified in the AFM or OM.

(2) Ground procedures:



The operator should ensure that the task specialist on the ground involved in the operation:

- (i) is familiar with the appropriate emergency procedures;
- (ii) has appropriate knowledge of the emergency procedures for personnel on the ground involved in the operation;
- (iii) reports emergencies as specified in the AFM or OM; and

AMC1 SPO.SPEC.HEC.105(b) Specific HEC equipment

Airworthiness Approval for HEC Equipment

- (a) Hoist or cargo hook installations that have been certificated according to any of the following standards should be considered to satisfy the airworthiness criteria for HEC operations:
 - (1) CS 27.865 or CS 29.865;
 - (2) JAR 27 Amendment 2 (27.865) or JAR 29 Amendment 2 (29.865) or later;
 - (3) FAR 27 Amendment 36 (27.865) or later — including compliance with CS 27.865(c)(6); or
 - (4) FAR 29 Amendment 43 (29.865) or later.
- (b) Hoist or cargo hook installations that have been certified prior to the issuance of the airworthiness criteria for HEC as defined in (a) may be considered as eligible for HEC provided that following a risk assessment either:
 - (1) the service history of the hoist or cargo hook installation is found satisfactory to Kuwait DGCA; or
 - (i) Information concerning the inspection intervals and retirement life of the hoist or cargo hook cable should be provided in the instructions for continued airworthiness.

END

Affected Pages from Last Update

#	Page	Para # in Source	Reference Section/Article	Amendmant
1.	12	311		[TABLE] Feb 2020-2019 NPA 2019 – 38 (EFB)
2.	20	552	(a)(e)	AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
3.	20	553	(a)(e)	ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — HARDWARE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
4.	20	554	(a)(e)	In addition to AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(a), the following should be considered:
5.	20	555	(a)(e)	SUITABILITY OF THE HARDWARE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
6.	20	556	(a)(a)	Display characteristics
7.	21	557	(a)(a)	Consideration should be given to the long-term degradation of a display as a result of abrasion and ageing. AMC 25-11 (paragraph 3.16a) may be used as guidance to assess luminance and legibility aspects.
8.	21	558	(a)(a)	Information displayed on the EFB should be legible to the typical user at the intended viewing distance(s) and under the full range of lighting conditions expected in a flight crew
9.	21	559	(a)(a)	compartment, including direct sunlight.
10.	21	560	(a)(a)	Users should be able to adjust the screen brightness of an EFB independently of the brightness of other displays in the flight crew compartment. In addition, when incorporating an automatic brightness adjustment, it should operate independently for each EFB in the flight crew compartment. Brightness adjustment using software means may be acceptable provided that this operation does not adversely affect the flight crew workload.
11.	21	561	(a)(a)	Buttons and labels should have adequate illumination for night use. 'Buttons and labels' refers to hardware controls located on the display itself.
12.	21	562	(a)(a)	All controls should be properly labelled for their intended function, except if no confusion is possible.
13.	21	563	(a)(a)	The 90-degree viewing angle on either side of each flight crew member's line of sight may be unacceptable for certain EFB applications if aspects of the display quality are degraded at large viewing angles (e.g. the display colours wash out or the displayed colour contrast is not discernible at the installation viewing angle).
14.	21	564	(a)(b)	Power source
15.	21	565	(a)(b)	The design of a portable EFB system should consider the source of electrical power, the
16.	21	566	(a)(b)	independence of the power sources for multiple EFBs, and the potential need for an
17.	21	567	(a)(b)	independent battery source. A non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered includes:
18.	21	568	(a)(b)	(1) the possibility to adopt operational procedures to ensure an adequate level of safety (for example, ensure a minimum level of charge before departure);
19.	21	569	(a)	(2) the possible redundancy of portable EFBs to reduce the risk of exhausted batteries;
20.	21	570	(a)	(3) the availability of backup battery packs to assure an alternative source of power.
21.	21	571	(a)	Battery-powered EFBs that have aircraft power available for recharging the internal EFB batteries are considered to have a suitable backup power source.
22.	21	572		For EFBs that have an internal battery power source and that are used as an alternative for paper documentation that is required by SPO.GEN.140, the operator should either have at least one EFB connected to an aircraft power bus or have established mitigation means and procedures to ensure that

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				sufficient power with acceptable margins will be available during the whole flight.
23.	21	573	(c)	Environmental testing
24.	21	574	(c)	Environmental testing, in particular testing for rapid decompression, should be performed when the EFB hosts applications that are required to be used during flight following a rapid
25.	21	575	(c)	decompression and/or when the EFB environmental operational range is potentially insufficient with respect to the foreseeable flight crew compartment operating conditions.
26.	21	576	(c)	The information from the rapid-decompression test of an EFB is used to establish the procedural requirements for the use of that EFB device in a pressurised aircraft. Rapid-decompression testing should follow the EUROCAE ED-14D/RTCA DO-160D (or later revisions) guidelines for rapid-decompression testing up to the maximum operating altitude of the aircraft at which the EFB is to be used.
27.	22	577	(c)	(1) Pressurised aircraft: when a portable EFB has successfully completed rapid decompression testing, then no mitigating procedures for depressurisation events need to be developed. When a portable EFB has failed the rapid-decompression testing while turned ON, but successfully completed it when turned OFF, then procedures should
28.	22	578	(c)	ensure that at least one EFB on board the aircraft remains OFF during the applicable flight
29.	22	579	(c)	phases or that it is configured so that no damage will be incurred should rapid
30.	22	580	(c)	decompression occur in flight at an altitude higher than 10 000 ft above mean sea level
31.	22	581	(c)	(AMSL).
32.	22	582	(c)	If an EFB system has not been tested or it has failed the rapid-decompression test, then
33.	22	583	(c)	alternate procedures or paper backup should be available.
34.	22	584	(c)	(2) Non-pressurised aircraft: rapid-decompression testing is not required for an EFB used in
35.	22	585	(c)	a non-pressurised aircraft. The EFB should be demonstrated to reliably operate up to the
36.	22	586	(c)	maximum operating altitude of the aircraft. If the EFB cannot be operated at the
37.	22	587	(c)	maximum operating altitude of the aircraft, procedures should be established to preclude
38.	22	588	(c)	operation of the EFB above the maximum demonstrated EFB operating altitude while still
39.	22	589	(c)	maintaining availability of any required aeronautical information displayed on the EFB.
40.	22	590	(c)	The results of testing performed on a specific EFB model configuration (as identified by the EFB hardware manufacturer) may be applied to other aircraft installations and these generic environmental tests may not need to be duplicated. The operator should collect and retain:
41.	22	591	(c)	(1) evidence of these tests that have already been accomplished; or
42.	22	592	(c)	(2) suitable alternative procedures to deal with the total loss of the EFB system.
43.	22	593	(c)	Rapid decompression tests do not need to be repeated if the EFB model identification and the battery type do not change.
44.	22	594	(c)	The testing of operational EFBs should be avoided if possible to preclude the infliction of

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45.	22	595	(c)	unknown damage to the unit during testing.
46.	22	596	(c)	Operators should account for the possible loss or erroneous functioning of the EFB in abnormal environmental conditions.
47.	22	597	(c)	The safe stowage and the use of the EFB under any foreseeable environmental conditions in the flight crew compartment, including turbulence, should be evaluated.
48.	22	599	(c)	AMC2 SPO.GEN.131(a) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
49.	22	600	(c)	ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — HARDWARE — NON-COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
50.	22	601	(c)	The same considerations as those in AMC1 NCO.GEN.125 should apply in respect of EFB hardware.
51.	23	604	(c)	AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
52.	23	605	(c)	ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — SOFTWARE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
53.	23	606	(c)	The same considerations as those in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b), AMC2 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) and AMC3 CAT.GEN.MPA.141(b) should apply in respect of EFB software.
54.	23	608	(c)	AMC2 SPO.GEN.131(b) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
55.	23	609	(c)	ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFBS) — SOFTWARE — NON-COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
56.	23	610	(c)	The same considerations as those in AMC2 NCO.GEN.125 should apply in respect of EFB software.
57.	23	612	(c)	AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
58.	23	613	(c)	RISK ASSESSMENT — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
59.	23	614	(a)	General
60.	23	615	(a)	Prior to the use of any EFB system, the operator should perform a risk assessment for all type B EFB applications and for the related hardware as part of its hazard identification and risk management process.
61.	23	616	(a)	The operator may make use of a risk assessment established by the software developer.
62.	23	617	(a)	However, the operator should ensure that its specific operational environment is taken into
63.	23	618	(a)	account.
64.	23	619	(a)	The risk assessment should:
65.	23	620	(a)	(1) evaluate the risks associated with the use of an EFB;
66.	23	621	(a)	(2) identify potential losses of function or malfunction (with detected and undetected
67.	23	622	(a)	erroneous outputs) and the associated failure scenarios;
68.	23	623	(a)	(3) analyse the operational consequences of these failure scenarios;
69.	23	624	(a)	(4) establish mitigating measures; and
70.	23	625	(a)	(5) ensure that the EFB system (hardware and software) achieves at least the same level of accessibility, usability, and reliability as the means of presentation it replaces.
71.	23	626		In considering the accessibility, usability, and reliability of the EFB system, the operator should ensure that the failure of the complete EFB system as well as of individual applications, including corruption or loss of data and erroneously

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				displayed information, has been assessed and that the risks have been mitigated to an acceptable level.
72.	23	627		This risk assessment should be defined before the beginning of the trial period and should be amended accordingly, if necessary, at the end of this trial period. The results of the trial should establish the configuration and use of the system.
73.	23	628		When the EFB system is intended to be introduced alongside a paper-based system, only the failures that would not be mitigated by the use of the paper-based system need to be addressed.
74.	23	629		In all other cases, a complete risk assessment should be performed.
75.	24	631	(b)	Assessing and mitigating the risks
76.	24	632	(b)	Some parameters of EFB applications may depend on entries made by flight crew/dispatchers, whereas others may be default parameters from within the system that are subject to an administration process (e.g. the runway line-up allowance in an aircraft performance application). In the first case, mitigation means would mainly concern training and flight crew procedure aspects, whereas in the second case, mitigation means would more likely focus on the EFB administration and data management aspects.
77.	24	633	(b)	The analysis should be specific to the operator concerned and should address at least the
78.	24	634	(b)	following points:
79.	24	635	(b)	(1) The minimisation of undetected erroneous outputs from applications and assessment of the worst-credible scenario;
80.	24	636	(b)	(2) Erroneous outputs from the software application including:
81.	24	637	(i)	a description of the corruption scenarios; and
82.	24	638	(i)(ii)	a description of the mitigation means;
83.	24	639	(i)(ii)	(3) Upstream processes including:
84.	24	640	(i)	the reliability of root data used in applications (e.g. qualified input data, such as
85.	24	641	(i)	databases produced under ED-76/DO-200A 'Standards for Processing Aeronautical
86.	24	642	(i)	Data');
87.	24	643	(i)(ii)	the software application validation and verification checks according to appropriate
88.	24	644	(i)(ii)	industry standards, if applicable; and
89.	24	645	(i)(iii)	the independence between application software components, e.g. robust
90.	24	646	(i)(iii)	partitioning between EFB applications and other airworthiness certified software
91.	24	647	(i)(iii)	applications;
92.	24	648	(i)	(4) A description of the mitigation means to be used following the detected failure of an
93.	24	649	(i)	application, or of a detected erroneous output;
94.	24	650	(i)	(5) The need for access to an alternate power supply in order to ensure the availability of
95.	24	651	(i)	software applications, especially if they are used as a source of required information.
96.	24	652	(i)	As part of the mitigation means, the operator should consider establishing a reliable alternative means to provide the information available on the EFB system.

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97	24	653	(i)	The mitigation means could be, for example, one of, or a combination of, the following:
98	24	654	(i)	(1) the system design (including hardware and software);
99	24	655	(i)	(2) a backup EFB device, possibly supplied from a different power source;
100	24	656	(i)	(3) EFB applications being hosted on more than one platform;
101	24	657	(i)	(4) a paper backup (e.g. quick reference handbook (QRH)); and
101	24	658	(i)	(5) procedural means;
101	24	659		Depending on the outcome of its risk assessment, the operator may also consider performing an operational evaluation test before allowing unrestricted use of its EFB devices and applications.
101	24	660		EFB system design features such as those assuring data integrity and the accuracy of
101	25	661		performance calculations (e.g. a 'reasonableness' or 'range' check) may be integrated in the risk assessment to be performed by the operator.
101	25	662	(c)	Changes
101	25	663	(c)	The operator should update its EFB risk assessment based on the planned changes to its EFB system. However, modifications to the operator's EFB system which:
101	25	664	(c)	(1) do not bring any change to the calculation algorithms and/or to the HMI of a type B EFB application;
101	25	665	(c)	(2) introduce a new type A EFB application or modify an existing one (provided its software classification remains type A);
111	25	666		(3) do not introduce any additional functionality to an existing type B EFB application;
111	25	667		(4) update an existing database necessary to use an existing type B EFB application; or
111	25	668		(5) do not require a change to the flight crew training or operational procedures,
111	25	669		may be introduced by the operator without having to update its risk assessment.
111	25	670		These changes should, nevertheless, be controlled and properly tested prior to use in flight.
111	25	671		The modifications in the following non-exhaustive list are considered to meet these criteria:
111	25	672		(1) operating system updates;
111	25	673		(2) chart or airport database updates;
111	25	674		(3) updates to introduce fixes (patches); and
111	25	675		(4) installation and modification of a type A EFB application.
121	25	677		GM1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(1) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
121	25	678		RISK ASSESSMENT— NON-COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
121	25	679		The operator of non-complex motor-powered aircraft should at least perform the check before the flight actions described in paragraph (b) of AMC2 NCO.GEN.125.
121	25	681		AMC1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
121	25	682		EFB ADMINISTRATION — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
121	25	683		The operator should ensure:
121	25	684	(a)	that adequate support is provided to the EFB users for all the applications installed;

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12	25	685	(b)	that potential security issues associated with the application installed have been checked;
12	25	686	(c)	that hardware and software configuration is appropriately managed and that no unauthorized software is installed.
12	25	687	(c)	The operator should ensure that miscellaneous software applications do not adversely impact on the operation of the EFB and should include miscellaneous software applications in the scope of EFB configuration management;
13	26	688	(d)	that only a valid version of the application software and current data packages are installed on the EFB system; and
13	26	689	(e)	the integrity of the data packages used by the applications installed.
13	26	691	(e)	AMC2 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
13	26	692	(e)	PROCEDURES — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
13	26	693	(e)	The procedures for the administration or the use of the EFB device and the type B EFB application may be fully or partly integrated in the operations manual.
13	26	694	(a)	General
13	26	695	(a)	If an EFB system generates information similar to that generated by existing certified systems, procedures should clearly identify which information source will be the primary, which source will be used for backup information, and under which conditions the backup source should be used. Procedures should define the actions to be taken by the flight crew when information provided by an EFB system is not consistent with that from other flight crew compartment sources, or when one EFB system shows different information than the other.
13	26	696	(a)	In the case of EFB applications providing information which might be affected by Notice(s) to Airmen (NOTAMS) (e.g. Airport moving map display (AMMD), performance calculation, etc.), the procedure for the use of these applications should include the handling of the relevant NOTAMS before their use.
13	26	697	(b)	Flight crew awareness of EFB software/database revisions
13	26	698	(b)	The operator should have a process in place to verify that the configuration of the EFB, including software application versions and, where applicable, database versions, are up to date. Flight crew members should have the ability to easily verify the validity of database versions used on the EFB. Nevertheless, flight crew members should not be required to confirm the revision dates for other databases that do not adversely affect flight operations, such as maintenance log forms or a list of airport codes. An example of a date-sensitive revision is that applied to an aeronautical chart database. Procedures should specify what actions should be taken if the software applications or databases loaded on the EFB system are outdated.
14	26	699	(c)	Workload mitigation and/or control
14	26	700	(c)	The operator should ensure that additional workload created by using an EFB system is
14	26	701	(c)	adequately mitigated and/or controlled. The operator should ensure that, while the aircraft is in flight or moving on the ground, flight crew members do not become preoccupied with the EFB system at the same time. Workload should be shared between flight crew members to ensure ease of use and continued monitoring of other flight crew functions and aircraft equipment. This should be strictly applied in flight and the operator should specify any times when the flight crew members may not use the specific EFB application.
14	26	702	(d)	Dispatch
14	26	703	(d)	The operator should establish dispatch criteria for the EFB system, when type B EFB applications that replace paper products are hosted. The operator should ensure that the availability of the EFB system is confirmed by preflight checks.

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				Instructions to the flight crew should clearly define the actions to be taken in the event of any EFB system deficiency.
14	27	704	(d)	Mitigation may be in the form of maintenance and/or operational procedures for items such as:
14	27	705	(d)	(1) replacement of batteries at defined intervals as required;
14	27	706	(d)	(2) ensuring that there is a fully charged backup battery on board;
14	27	707	(d)	(3) the flight crew checking the battery charging level before departure; and
14	27	708	(d)	(4) the flight crew switching off the EFB in a timely manner when the aircraft power source is lost.
15	27	709		In the event of a partial or complete failure of the EFB, specific dispatch procedures should be followed. These procedures should be included either in the minimum equipment list (MEL) or in the operations manual and should ensure an acceptable level of safety.
15	27	710		Particular attention should be paid to establishing specific dispatch procedures allowing to
15	27	711		obtain operational data (e.g. performance data) in the event of a failure of an EFB that hosts an application providing such calculated data.
15	27	712		When the integrity of data input and output is verified by cross-checking and gross-error checks, the same checking principle should be applied to alternative dispatch procedures to ensure equivalent protection.
15	27	713	(e)	Maintenance
15	27	714	(e)	Procedures should be established for the routine maintenance of the EFB system and detailing how unserviceability and failures are to be dealt with to ensure that the integrity of the EFB system is preserved. Maintenance procedures should also include the secure handling of updated information and how this information is validated and then promulgated in a timely manner and in a complete format to all users.
15	27	715	(e)	As part of the EFB system's maintenance , the operator should ensure that the EFB system
15	27	716	(e)	batteries are periodically checked and replaced as required.
15	27	717	(e)	Should a fault or failure of the system arise, it is essential that such failures are brought to the immediate attention of the flight crew and that the system is isolated until rectification action is taken. In addition to backup procedures, to deal with system failures, a reporting system should be in place so that the necessary action, either to a particular EFB system or to the whole system, is taken in order to prevent the use of erroneous information by flight crew members.
15	27	718	(f)	Security
16	27	719	(f)	The EFB system (including any means used for updating it) should be secure from unauthorised intervention (e.g. by malicious software). The operator should ensure that the system is adequately protected at the software level and that the hardware is appropriately managed (e.g. the identification of the person to whom the hardware is released, protected storage when the hardware is not in use) throughout the operational lifetime of the EFB system. The operator should ensure that prior to each flight the EFB operational software works as specified and the EFB operational data is complete and accurate. Moreover, a system should be in place to ensure that the EFB does not accept a data load that contains corrupted contents. Adequate measures should be in place for the compilation and secure distribution of data to the aircraft.
16	27	720	(f)	Procedures should be transparent and easy to understand, to follow and to oversee that:

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16	27	721	(f)	<u>(1) if an EFB is based on consumer electronics (e.g. a laptop) which can be easily removed,</u>
16	27	722	(f)	<u>manipulated, or replaced by a similar component, that special consideration is given to</u>
16	28	723	(f)	<u>the physical security of the hardware;</u>
16	28	724	(f)	<u>(2) portable EFB platforms are subject to allocation tracking to specific aircraft or persons;</u>
16	28	725	(f)	<u>(3) where a system has input ports, and especially if widely known protocols are used through these ports or internet connections are offered, that special consideration is given to the risks associated with these ports;</u>
16	28	726	(f)	<u>(4) where physical media are used to update the EFB system, and especially if widely known types of physical media are used, that the operator uses technologies and/or procedures to assure that unauthorized content cannot enter the EFB system through these media.</u>
16	28	727		<u>The required level of EFB security depends on the criticality of the functions used (e.g. an EFB that only holds a list of fuel prices may require less security than an EFB used for performance calculations).</u>
16	28	728		<u>Beyond the level of security required to assure that the EFB can properly perform its intended functions, the level of security that is ultimately required depends on the capabilities of the EFB.</u>
17	28	729	(g)	<u>Electronic signatures</u>
17	28	730	(g)	<u>Some applicable requirements may require a signature when issuing or accepting a document</u>
17	28	731	(g)	<u>(e.g. load sheet, technical logbook, notification to captain (NOTOC)). In order to be accepted as being equivalent to a handwritten signature, electronic signatures used in EFB applications need, as a minimum, to fulfil the same objectives and should assure the same degree of security as the handwritten or any other form of signature that they are intended to replace. GM1 SPO.POL.115 provides guidance related to the required handwritten signature or its equivalent for mass and balance documentation.</u>
17	28	732	(g)	<u>On a general basis, in the case of legally required signatures, an operator should have in place procedures for electronic signatures that guarantee:</u>
17	28	733	(g)	<u>(1) their uniqueness: a signature should identify a specific individual and should be difficult</u>
17	28	734	(g)	<u>to duplicate;</u>
17	28	735	(g)	<u>(2) their significance: an individual using an electronic signature should take deliberate and</u>
17	28	736	(g)	<u>recognizable action to affix their signature;</u>
17	28	737	(g)	<u>(3) their scope: the scope of the information being affirmed with an electronic signature</u>
17	28	738	(g)	<u>should be clear to the signatory and to the subsequent readers of the record, record entry, or document;</u>
18	28	739		<u>(4) their security: the security of an individual's handwritten signature is maintained by</u>
18	28	740		<u>ensuring that it is difficult for another individual to duplicate or alter it;</u>
18	28	741		<u>(5) their non-repudiation: an electronic signature should prevent a signatory from denying</u>
18	28	742		<u>that they affixed a signature to a specific record, record entry, or document; the more</u>

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18	28	743		difficult it is to duplicate a signature, the more likely it is that the signature was created
18	28	744		by the signatory; and
18	28	745		(6) their traceability: an electronic signature should provide positive traceability to the
18	28	746		individual who signed a record, record entry, or any other document.
18	29	747		An electronic signature should retain those qualities of a handwritten signature that guarantee its uniqueness. Systems using either a PIN or a password with limited validity (timewise) may be appropriate in providing positive traceability to the individual who affixed it. Advanced electronic signatures, qualified certificates and secured signature-creation devices needed to create them in the context of the Regulation are typically not required for EFB operations.
18	29	749		AMC3 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
19	29	750		FLIGHT CREW TRAINING — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
19	29	751		Flight crew members should be given specific training on the use of the EFB system before it is operationally used.
19	29	752		Training should at least include the following:
19	29	753	(a)	an overview of the system architecture;
19	29	754	(b)	preflight checks of the system;
19	29	755	(c)	limitations of the system;
19	29	756	(d)	specific training on the use of each application and the conditions under which the EFB may and may not be used;
19	29	757	(e)	restrictions on the use of the system, including cases where the entire system, or some parts of it, are not available;
19	29	758	(f)	procedures for normal operations, including cross-checking of data entry and computed
19	29	759	(f)	information;
20	29	760	(g)	procedures to handle abnormal situations, such as a late runway change or a diversion to an alternate aerodrome;
20	29	761	(h)	procedures to handle emergency situations;
20	29	762	(i)	phases of the flight when the EFB system may and may not be used;
20	29	763	(j)	human factors considerations, including crew resource management (CRM);
20	29	764	(k)	additional training for new applications or changes to the hardware configuration;
20	29	765	(l)	actions following the failure of component(s) of the EFB, including cases of battery smoke or fire; and
20	29	766	(m)	management of conflicting information.
20	29	768	(m)	AMC4 SPO. GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
20	29	769	(m)	PERFORMANCE AND MASS AND BALANCE APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
20	29	770	(a)	General
21	29	771	(a)	Performance and mass and balance applications should be based on existing published data found in the AFM or performance manual and should account for the applicable CAT.POL performance requirements. The applications may use algorithms or data spreadsheets to determine results. They may have the capability to interpolate within the information contained in the published data for the particular aircraft but should not extrapolate beyond it.

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21	30	772	(a)	To protect against intentional and unintentional modifications, the integrity of the database files related to performance and mass and balance (the performance database, airport database, etc.) should be checked by the program before performing any calculations. This check can be run once at the start-up of the application.
21	30	773	(a)	Each software version should be identified by a unique version number. The performance and The operator should ensure that aircraft performance or mass and balance data provided by the application is correct compared with the data derived from the AFM (e.g. for take-off and landing performance data) or from other reference data sources (e.g. mass and balance manuals or databases, in flight performance manuals or databases) under a representative cross-check of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: take-off and landing performance data on dry, wet, and contaminated runways, with different wind conditions and aerodrome pressure altitudes, etc.).
21	30	774	(a)	The operator should define any new roles that the flight crew and, if applicable, the flight
21	30	775	(a)	dispatcher, may have in creating, reviewing, and using performance calculations supported by EFB systems.
21	30	776	(b)	Testing
21	30	777	(b)	The verification of compliance of a performance or mass and balance application should include software testing activities performed with the software version candidate for operational use.
21	30	778	(b)	The testing can be performed either by the operator or a third party, as long as the testing
21	30	779	(b)	process is documented and the responsibilities identified.
21	30	780	(b)	The testing activities should include reliability testing and accuracy testing.
22	30	781	(b)	Reliability testing should show that the application in its operating environment (operating
22	30	782	(b)	system (OS) and hardware included) is stable and deterministic, i.e. identical answers are
22	30	783	(b)	generated each time the process is entered with identical parameters.
22	30	784	(b)	Accuracy testing should demonstrate that the aircraft performance or mass and balance
22	30	785	(b)	computations provided by the application are correct in comparison with data derived from the AFM or other reference data sources, under a representative cross section of conditions (e.g. for take-off and landing performance applications: runway state and slope, different wind conditions and pressure altitudes, various aircraft configurations including failures with a performance impact, etc.).
22	30	786	(b)	The verification should include a sufficient number of comparison results from representative
22	30	787	(b)	calculations throughout the entire operating envelope of the aircraft, considering corner points, routine and break points.
22	30	788	(b)	Any difference compared to the reference data that is judged significant should be examined.
22	30	789	(b)	When differences are due to more conservative calculations or reduced margins that were
22	30	790	(b)	purposely built into the approved data, this approach should be clearly specified. Compliance with the applicable certification and operational rules needs to be assessed in any case.

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23	30	791	(b)	<u>The testing method should be described. The testing may be automated when all the required data is available in an appropriate electronic format, but in addition to performing thorough monitoring of the correct functioning and design of the testing tools and procedures, operators are strongly suggested to perform additional manual verification. It could be based on a few scenarios for each chart or table of the reference data, including both operationally representative scenarios and 'corner-case' scenarios.</u>
23	31	792	(b)	<u>The testing of a software revision should, in addition, include non-regression testing and testing of any fix or change.</u>
23	31	793	(b)	<u>Furthermore, an operator should perform tests related to its customisation of the applications</u>
23	31	794	(b)	<u>and to any element pertinent to its operation that was not covered at an earlier stage (e.g.</u>
23	31	795	(b)	<u>airport database verification).</u>
23	31	796	(c)	<u>Procedures</u>
23	31	797	(c)	<u>Specific care is needed regarding the crew procedures concerning take-off and landing</u>
23	31	798	(c)	<u>performance or mass and balance applications. The crew procedures should ensure that:</u>
23	31	799	(c)	<u>(1) calculations are performed independently by each flight crew member before data</u>
23	31	800	(c)	<u>outputs are accepted for use;</u>
24	31	801	(c)	<u>(2) a formal cross-check is made before data outputs are accepted for use; such cross-checks should utilise the independent calculations described above, together with the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft;</u>
24	31	802	(c)	<u>(3) a gross-error check is performed before data outputs are accepted for use; such grosserror checks may use either a 'rule of thumb' or the output of the same data from other sources on the aircraft; and</u>
24	31	803	(c)	<u>(4) in the event of a loss of functionality of an EFB through either the loss of a single</u>
24	31	804	(c)	<u>application, or the failure of the device hosting the application, an equivalent level of</u>
24	31	805	(c)	<u>safety can be maintained; consistency with the EFB risk assessment assumptions should be confirmed.</u>
24	31	806	(d)	<u>Training</u>
24	31	807	(d)	<u>The training should emphasise the importance of executing all take-off and landing performance or mass and balance calculations in accordance with the SOPs to assure fully independent calculations.</u>
24	31	808	(d)	<u>Furthermore, due to the optimisation at different levels brought by performance applications,</u>
24	31	809	(d)	<u>the flight crew members may be confronted with new procedures and different aircraft</u>
24	31	810	(d)	<u>behaviour (e.g. the use of multiple flap settings for take-off). The training should be designed</u>
25	31	811	(d)	<u>and provided accordingly.</u>
25	31	812	(d)	<u>Where an application allows the computing of both dispatch results (from regulatory and</u>
25	31	813	(d)	<u>factored calculations) and other results, the training should highlight the specificities of those</u>

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25	31	814	(d)	results. Depending on the representativeness of the calculation, the flight crew should be
25	31	815	(d)	trained on any operational margins that might be required.
25	31	816	(d)	The training should also address the identification and the review of default values, if any, and assumptions about the aircraft status or environmental conditions made by the application.
25	32	818	(e)	Specific considerations for mass and balance applications
25	32	819	(e)	In addition to the figures, a diagram displaying the mass and its associated centre of gravity (CG) should be provided.
25	32	820	(f)	Human-factors-specific considerations
25	32	821	(f)	Input data and output data (i.e. results) shall be clearly separated from each other. All the
26	32	822	(f)	information necessary for a given calculation task should be presented together or be easily
26	32	823	(f)	accessible.
26	32	824	(f)	All input and output data should include correct and unambiguous terms (names), units of
26	32	825	(f)	measurement (e.g. kg or lb), and, when applicable, an index system and a CG-position
26	32	826	(f)	declaration (e.g. Arm/%MAC). The units should match the ones from the other flight-crew compartment sources for the same kind of data.
26	32	827	(f)	Airspeeds should be provided in a way that is directly useable in the flight crew compartment,
26	32	828	(f)	unless the unit clearly indicates otherwise (e.g. Knots Calibrated Air Speed (KCAS)). Any
26	32	829	(f)	difference between the type of airspeed provided by the EFB application and the type provided by the AFM or flight crew operating manual (FCOM) performance charts should be mentioned in the flight crew guides and training material.
26	32	830	(f)	If the landing performance application allows the computation of both dispatch results
26	32	831	(f)	(regulatory, factored) and other results (e.g. in-flight or unfactored), the flight crew members
27	32	832	(f)	should be made aware of the computation mode used.
27	32	833	(f)	(1) Inputs
27	32	834	(f)	The application should allow users to clearly distinguish user entries from default values
27	32	835	(f)	or entries imported from other aircraft systems.
27	32	836	(f)	Performance applications should allow the flight crew to check whether a certain obstacle is included in the performance calculation and/or to include new or revised or new obstacle information in the performance calculations.
27	32	837	(f)	(2) Outputs
27	32	838	(f)	All critical assumptions for performance calculation (e.g. the use of thrust reversers, full
27	32	839	(f)	or reduced thrust/power rating) should be clearly displayed. The assumptions made about any calculation should be at least as clear to the flight crew members as similar
27	32	840	(f)	information would be on a tabular chart.

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27	32	841	(f)	All output data should be available in numbers.
28	32	842	(f)	The application should indicate when a set of entries results in an unachievable operation (for instance, a negative stopping margin) with a specific message or colour scheme. This should be done in accordance with the relevant provisions on messages and the use of colours.
28	32	843		In order to allow a smooth workflow and to prevent data entry errors, the layout of the
28	32	844		calculation outputs should be such that it is consistent with the data entry interface of the
28	32	845		aircraft applications in which the calculation outputs are used (e.g. flight management
28	32	846		systems).
28	33	847		(3) Modifications
28	33	848		The user should be able to easily modify performance calculations, especially when
28	33	849		making last-minute changes.
28	33	850		The results of calculations and any outdated input fields should be deleted whenever:
28	33	851	(i)	modifications are entered;
29	33	852	(i)(ii)	the EFB is shut down or the performance application is closed; or
29	33	853	(i)(iii)	the EFB or the performance application has been in a standby or 'background'
29	33	854	(i)(iii)	mode for too long, i.e. such that it is likely that when it is used again, the inputs or
29	33	855	(i)(iii)	outputs will be outdated.
29	33	857	(i)(iii)	AMC5 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
29	33	858	(i)(iii)	AIRPORT MOVING MAP DISPLAY (AMMD) APPLICATION WITH OWN-SHIP POSITION — COMPLEX
29	33	859	(i)(iii)	AIRCRAFT
29	33	860	(a)	General
29	33	861	(a)	An AMMD application should not be used as the primary means of navigation for taxiing and
29	33	862	(a)	should be only used in conjunction with other materials and procedures identified within the
30	33	863	(a)	operating concept (see paragraph (e).
30	33	864	(a)	When an AMMD is in use, the primary means of navigation for taxiing remains the use of normal procedures and direct visual observation out of the flight-crew-compartment window.
30	33	865	(a)	Thus, as recognised in ETSO-C165a, an AMMD application with a display of own-ship position is considered to have a minor safety effect for malfunctions that cause the incorrect depiction of aircraft position (own-ship), and the failure condition for the loss of function is classified as 'no safety effect'.
30	33	866	(b)	Minimum requirements
30	33	867	(b)	AMMD software that complies with European Technical Standard Order ETSO-C165a is
30	33	868	(b)	considered to be acceptable.
30	33	869	(b)	In addition, the system should provide the means to display the revision number of the software installed.

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30	33	870	(b)	To achieve the total system accuracy requirements of ETSO-C165a, an airworthiness-approved sensor using the global positioning system (GPS) in combination with a medium-accuracy database compliant with EUROCAE ED-99C/RTCA DO-272C, 'User Requirements for Aerodrome
30	33	871	(b)	Mapping Information' (or later revisions) is considered one acceptable means.
30	33	872	(b)	Alternatively, the use of non-certified commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) position sources may be acceptable in accordance with AMC6 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2).
31	34	875	(c)	Data provided by the AMMD software application developer
31	34	876	(c)	The operator should ensure that the AMMD software application developer provides the
31	34	877	(c)	appropriate data including:
31	34	878	(c)	(1) installation instructions or equivalent as per ETSO-C165a Section 2.2 addressing:
31	34	879	(i)	the identification of each specific EFB system computing platform (including the
31	34	880	(i)	hardware platform and the operating system version) with which this AMMD
31	34	881	(i)	software application and database was demonstrated to be compatible;
31	34	882	(i)(ii)	the installation procedures and limitations for each applicable platform (e.g.
31	34	883	(i)(ii)	required memory resources, configuration of Global Navigation Satellite System
31	34	884	(i)(ii)	(GNSS) antenna position);
32	34	885	(i)(iii)	the interface description data including the requirements for external sensors
32	34	886	(i)(iii)	providing data inputs; and
32	34	887	(i)(iv)	means to verify that the AMMD has been installed correctly and is functioning
32	34	888	(i)(iv)	properly;
32	34	889	(i)	(2) any AMMD limitations, and known installation, operational, functional, or performance
32	34	890	(i)	issues of the AMMD.
32	34	891	(d)	AMMD software installation in the EFB
32	34	892	(d)	The operator should review the documents and the data provided by the AMMD developer, and ensure that the installation requirements of the AMMD software in the specific EFB platform and aircraft are addressed. Operators are required to perform any verification activities proposed by the AMMD software application developer, as well as identify and perform any additional integration activities that needs to be completed;
32	34	893	(e)	Operational procedures
32	34	894	(e)	Changes to operational procedures of the aircraft (e.g. flight crew procedures) should be
33	34	895	(e)	documented in the operations manual or user's guide as appropriate. In particular, the
33	34	896	(e)	documentation should highlight that the AMMD is designed to assist flight crew members in
33	34	897	(e)	orienting themselves on the airport surface so as to improve the flight crew members' positional awareness during taxiing and that it is not to be used as the basis for ground manoeuvring.
33	34	898	(f)	Training requirements
33	34	899	(f)	The operator may use flight crew procedures to mitigate some hazards. These should include limitations on the use of the AMMD function or application. As the AMMD could be a compelling display and the procedural restrictions are a

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				key component of the mitigation, training should be provided in support of an AMMD implementation.
33	34	900	(f)	All mitigation means that rely on flight crew procedures should be included in the flight crew
33	34	901	(f)	training. Details of the AMMD training should be included in the operator's overall EFB training.
33	35	904	(f)	AMC6 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
33	35	905	(f)	USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
33	35	906	(f)	COTS position sources may be used for AMMD EFB applications and for EFB applications displaying the own-ship position in flight when the following considerations are complied with:
34	35	907	(a)	Characterisation of the receiver:
34	35	908	(a)	The position should originate from an airworthiness approved GNSS receiver, or from a COTS GNSS receiver fully characterised in terms of technical specifications and featuring an adequate number of channels (12 or more).
34	35	909	(a)	The EFB application should, in addition to position and velocity data, receive a sufficient number of parameters related to the fix quality and integrity to allow compliance with the accuracy requirements (e.g. the number of satellites and constellation geometry parameters such as dilution of position (DOP), 2D/3D fix).
34	35	910	(b)	Installation aspects:
34	35	911	(b)	COTS position sources are C-PEDs and their installation and use should follow the requirements of SPO.GEN.130.
34	35	912	(b)	If the external COTS position source transmits wirelessly, cybersecurity aspects have to be
34	35	913	(b)	considered.
34	35	914	(c)	Practical evaluation:
34	35	915	(c)	As variables can be introduced by the placement of the antennas in the aircraft and the
34	35	916	(c)	characteristics of the aircraft itself (e.g. heated and/or shielded windshield effects), the tests
35	35	917	(c)	have to take place on the type of aircraft in which the EFB will be operated, with the antenna
35	35	918	(c)	positioned at the location to be used in service.
35	35	919	(c)	(1) COTS used as a position source for AMMD
35	35	920	(c)	The test installation should record the data provided by the COTS position source to the AMMD application.
35	35	921	(c)	The analysis should use the the recorded parameters to demonstrate that the AMMD
35	35	922	(c)	requirements are satisfactorily complied with in terms of the total system accuracy (taking into account database errors, latency effects, display errors, and uncompensated antenna offsets) within 50 metres (95 %). The availability should be sufficient to prevent distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.
35	35	923	(c)	When demonstrating compliance with the following requirements of DO-257A, the
35	35	924	(c)	behaviour of the AMMD system should be evaluated in practice:

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35	35	925	(i)	indication of degraded position accuracy within 1 second (Section 2.2.4 (22)); and
35	35	926	(i)(ii)	indication of a loss of positioning data within 5 seconds (Section 2.2.4 (23));
36	35	927	(i)(ii)	conditions to consider are both a loss of the GNSS satellite view (e.g. antenna
36	35	928	(i)(ii)	failure) and a loss of communication between the receiver and the EFB.
36	35	929	(i)	(2) COTS position source used for applications displaying own-ship position in flight:
36	35	930	(i)	Flight trials should demonstrate that the COTS GNSS availability is sufficient to prevent
36	36	931	(i)	distraction or increased workload due to frequent loss of position.
36	36	933	(i)	AMC7 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
36	36	934	(i)	CHART APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
36	36	935	(i)	The navigation charts that are depicted should contain the information necessary, in an appropriate form, to perform the operation safely. Consideration should be given to the size, resolution and position of the display to ensure legibility whilst retaining the ability to review all information required to maintain adequate situational awareness. The identification of risks associated with the human– machine interface, as part of the operator’s risk assessment, is key to identifying acceptable mitigation means, e.g.:
36	36	936	(a)	to establish procedures to reduce the risk of making errors;
36	36	937	(b)	to control and mitigate the additional workload related to EFB use;
37	36	938	(c)	to ensure the consistency of colour-coding and symbology philosophies between EFB
37	36	939	(c)	applications and their compatibility with other flight crew compartment applications; and
37	36	940	(d)	to consider aspects of crew resource management (CRM) when using an EFB system.
37	36	941		In the case of chart application displaying own-ship position in flight, AMC9 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) is applicable.
37	36	943		AMC8 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
37	36	944		IN-FLIGHT WEATHER APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
37	36	945	(a)	General
37	36	946	(a)	An in-flight weather (IFW) application is an EFB function or application enabling the flight crew to access meteorological information. It is designed to increase situational awareness and to support the flight crew when making strategic decisions.
37	36	947	(a)	An IFW function or application may be used to access both information required to be on board (e.g. World Area Forecast Centre (WAFC) data) and supplemental weather information.
37	36	948	(a)	The use of IFW applications should be non-safety-critical and not necessary for the performance of the flight. In order to be non-safety-critical, IFW data should not be used to support tactical decisions and/or as a substitute for certified aircraft systems (e.g. weather radar).
38	36	949	(a)	Any current information from the meteorological documentation required to be on board or
38	36	950	(a)	from aircraft primary systems should always prevail over the information from an IFW
38	36	951	(a)	application.

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38	36	952	(a)	<u>The displayed meteorological information may be forecasted and/or observed, and may be</u>
38	36	953	(a)	<u>updated on the ground and/or in flight. It should be based on data from certified meteorological services providers or other reliable sources evaluated by the operator.</u>
38	36	954	(a)	<u>The meteorological information provided to the flight crew should be as far as possible</u>
38	37	955	(a)	<u>consistent with the information available to users of ground-based aviation meteorological</u>
38	37	956	(a)	<u>information (e.g. operations control centre (OCC), dispatchers, etc.) in order to establish</u>
38	37	957	(a)	<u>common situational awareness and to facilitate collaborative decision-making.</u>
38	37	958	(b)	<u>Display</u>
39	37	959	(b)	<u>Meteorological information should be presented to the flight crew in a format that is</u>
39	37	960	(b)	<u>appropriate to the content of the information; coloured graphical depiction is encouraged</u>
39	37	961	(b)	<u>whenever practicable.</u>
39	37	962	(b)	<u>The IFW display should enable the flight crew to:</u>
39	37	963	(b)	<u>(1) distinguish between observed and forecasted weather data;</u>
39	37	964	(b)	<u>(2) identify the currency or age and validity time of the weather data;</u>
39	37	965	(b)	<u>(3) access the interpretation of the weather data (e.g. the legend);</u>
39	37	966	(b)	<u>(4) obtain positive and clear indications of any missing information or data and determine</u>
39	37	967	(b)	<u>areas of uncertainty when making decisions to avoid hazardous weather; and</u>
39	37	968	(b)	<u>(5) be aware of the data-link means status enabling necessary IFW data exchanges.</u>
40	37	969		<u>Meteorological information in IFW applications may be displayed, for example, as an overlay</u>
40	37	970		<u>over navigation charts, over geographical maps, or it may be a stand-alone weather depiction (e.g. radar plots, satellite images, etc.).</u>
40	37	971		<u>If meteorological information is overlaid on navigation charts, special consideration should be given to HMI issues in order to avoid adverse effects on the basic chart functions.</u>
40	37	972		<u>In case of display of own-ship position in flight, AMC9 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) is applicable.</u>
40	37	973		<u>The meteorological information may require reformatting to accommodate, for example, the</u>
40	37	974		<u>display size or the depiction technology. However, any reformatting of the meteorological</u>
40	37	975		<u>information should preserve both the geo-location and intensity of the meteorological</u>
40	37	976		<u>conditions regardless of projection, scaling, or any other types of processing.</u>
40	37	977	(c)	<u>Training and procedures</u>
40	37	978	(c)	<u>The operator should establish procedures for the use of an IFW application.</u>
41	37	979	(c)	<u>The operator should provide adequate training to the flight crew members before using an IFW application. This training should address:</u>

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41	37	980	(c)	(1) limitations of the use of an IFW application:
41	37	981	(i)	acceptable use (strategic planning only);
41	37	982	(i)(ii)	information required to be on board; and
41	37	983	(i)(iii)	latency of observed weather information and the hazards associated with
41	37	984	(i)(iii)	utilisation of old information;
41	37	985	(i)(iii)	(2) information on the display of weather data:
41	37	986	(i)	type of displayed information (forecasted, observed);
41	37	987	(i)(ii)	symbology (symbols, colours); and
41	37	988	(i)(iii)	interpretation of meteorological information;
42	38	989	(i)	(3) identification of failures and malfunctions (e.g. incomplete uplinks, data-link failures,
42	38	990	(i)	missing info);
42	38	991	(i)	(4) human factors issues:
42	38	992	(i)	avoiding fixation; and
42	38	993	(i)(ii)	managing workload.
42	38	995	(i)	AMC9 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
42	38	996	(i)	APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
42	38	997	(a)	Limitations
42	38	998	(a)	The display of own-ship position in flight as an overlay to other EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft.
42	38	999	(a)	Except on VFR flights over routes navigated by reference to visual landmark, the display of the own-ship symbol is allowed only in aircraft having a certified navigation display (moving map).
43	38	1000	(a)	In the specific case of IFW applications, the display of own-ship on such applications is restricted to aircraft equipped with a weather radar.
43	38	1001	(b)	Position source and accuracy
43	38	1002	(b)	The display of own-ship position may be based on a certified GNSS or GNSS based (e.g. GPS/IRS) position from certified aircraft equipment or on a portable COTS position source in accordance with AMC6 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2).
43	38	1003	(b)	The own-ship symbol should be removed and the flight crew notified if:
43	38	1004	(b)	(1) the estimated accuracy is not sufficient for the intended operations;
43	38	1005	(b)	(2) the position data is reported as invalid by the GNSS receiver; or
43	38	1006	(b)	(3) the position data is not received for 5 seconds.
43	38	1007	(c)	Charting data considerations
43	38	1008	(c)	The display of own-ship position is only allowed when the underlying map/chart data is designed using a projection system that is suitable for aeronautical use.
43	38	1009	(c)	If the map involves raster images that have been stitched together into a larger single map, it should be demonstrated that the stitching process does not introduce distortion or map errors that would not correlate properly with a GNSS-based own-ship symbol.
44	38	1010	(d)	Human machine interface (HMI)
44	38	1011	(d)	(1) Interface

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44	38	1012	(d)	The flight crew should be able to unambiguously differentiate the EFB function from
44	38	1013	(d)	avionics functions available in the cockpit, and in particular with the navigation display.
44	38	1014	(d)	A sufficiently legible text label 'AIRCRAFT POSITION NOT TO BE USED FOR NAVIGATION' or equivalent should be continuously displayed by the application if the own-ship position depiction is visible in the current display area over a terminal chart (i.e. SID, STAR, or instrument approach) or a depiction of a terminal procedure.
44	39	1016	(d)	(2) Display of own-ship symbol
44	39	1017	(d)	The own-ship symbol should be different from the ones used by certified aircraft systems
44	39	1018	(d)	intended for primary navigation.
44	39	1019	(d)	If directional data is available, the own-ship symbol may indicate directionality. If direction
44	39	1020	(d)	is not available, the own-ship symbol should not imply directionality.
45	39	1021	(d)	The colour coding should not be inconsistent with the manufacturer philosophy
45	39	1022	(d)	(3) Data displayed
45	39	1023	(d)	The current map orientation should be clearly, continuously and unambiguously indicated
45	39	1024	(d)	(e.g., Track-up vs North-up).
45	39	1025	(d)	If the software supports more than one directional orientation for the own-ship symbol
45	39	1026	(d)	(e.g., Track-up vs North-up), the current own-ship symbol orientation should be indicated.
45	39	1027	(d)	The chart display in track-up mode should not create usability or readability issues. In
45	39	1028	(d)	particular, chart data should not be rotated in a manner that affects readability.
45	39	1029	(d)	The application zoom levels should be appropriate for the function and content being
45	39	1030	(d)	displayed and in the context of providing supplemental position awareness.
46	39	1031	(d)	The pilot should be able to obtain information about the operational status of the ownship
46	39	1032	(d)	function (e.g. active, deactivated, degraded).
46	39	1033	(d)	During IFR, day VFR without visual reference or night VFR flights, the following
46	39	1034	(d)	parameters' values should not be displayed:
46	39	1035	(i)	Track/heading;
46	39	1036	(i)(ii)	Estimated time of arrival (ETA);
46	39	1037	(i)(iii)	Altitude;
46	39	1038	(i)(iv)	Geographical coordinates of the current location of the aircraft; and
46	39	1039	(v)	Aircraft speed.
46	39	1040	(v)	(4) Controls
47	39	1041	(v)	If a panning and/or range selection function is available, the EFB application should
47	39	1042	(v)	provide a clear and simple method to return to an own-ship-oriented display.

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47	39	1043	(v)	A means to disable the display of the own-ship position should be provided to the flight
47	39	1044	(v)	crew.
47	39	1045	(e)	Training and procedures
47	39	1046	(e)	The procedures and training should emphasise the fact that the display of own-ship position on charts or IFW EFB applications should not be used as a primary source of information to fly or navigate the aircraft or as a primary source of weather information.
47	39	1047	(e)	(1) Procedures:
47	39	1048	(e)	The following considerations should be addressed in the procedures for the use of charts
47	39	1049	(e)	or IFW EFB application displaying the own-ship position in flight by the flight crew:
47	40	1050	(i)	Intended use of the display of own-ship position in flight on charts or IFW EFB
48	40	1051	(i)	applications:
48	40	1052	(i)(ii)	Inclusion of the EFB into the regular scan of flight deck systems indications. In
48	40	1053	(i)(ii)	particular, systematic cross-check with avionics before being used, whatever the
48	40	1054	(i)(ii)	position source; and
48	40	1055	(i)(iii)	Actions to be taken in case of the identification of a discrepancy between the EFB
48	40	1056	(i)(iii)	and avionics.
48	40	1057	(i)(iii)	(2) Training:
48	40	1058	(i)(iii)	Crew members should be trained on the procedures for the use of the application,
48	40	1059	(i)(iii)	including the regular cross-check with avionics and the action in case of discrepancy.
48	40	1061	(i)(iii)	GM1 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
49	40	1062	(i)(iii)	IN-FLIGHT WEATHER (IFW) APPLICATIONS — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT
49	40	1063	(i)(iii)	‘Reliable sources’ of data used by IFW applications are the organisations evaluated by the operator as being able to provide an appropriate level of data assurance in terms of accuracy and integrity. It is recommended that the following aspects be considered during that evaluation:
49	40	1064	(a)	The organisation should have a quality assurance system in place that covers the data source selection, acquisition/import, processing, validity period check, and the distribution phase;
49	40	1065	(b)	Any meteorological product provided by the organisation that is within the scope of the
49	40	1066	(b)	meteorological information included in the flight documentation should originate only from authoritative sources or certified providers and should not be transformed or altered, except for the purpose of packaging the data in the correct format. The organisation’s process should provide assurance that the integrity of those products is preserved in the data for use by the IFW application.
49	40	1068	(b)	GM2 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
49	40	1069	(b)	USE OF COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF (COTS) POSITION SOURCE – PRATICAL EVALUATION — COMPLEX AIRCRAFT

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49	40	1070	(b)	The tests should consist of a statistically relevant sample of taxiing. It is recommended to include taxiing at airports that are representative of the more complex airports typically accessed by the operator. Taxiing segment samples should include data that is derived from runways and taxiways, and should include numerous turns, in particular of 90 degrees or more, and segments in straight lines at the maximum speed at which the own-ship symbol is displayed. Taxiing segment samples should include parts in areas of high buildings such as terminals. The analysis should include at least 25 inbound and/or outbound taxiing segments between the parking location and the runway During the tests, any unusual events (such as observing the own-ship symbol in a location on the map that is notably offset compared to the actual position, the own-ship symbol changing to nondirectional when the aircraft is moving, and times when the own-ship symbol disappears from the map display) should be noted. For the test, the pilot should be instructed to diligently taxi on the centre line.
49	41	1072	(b)	GM3 SPO.GEN.131(b)(2) Use of electronic flight bags (EFBs)
49	41	1073	(b)	APPLICATIONS DISPLAYING OWN-SHIP POSITION IN FLIGHT
50	41	1074	(b)	The depiction of a circle around the EFB own-ship symbol may be used to differentiate it from the avionics one.
50	41	1076	(b)	GM2 SPO.POL.115(b) Mass and balance data and documentation — commercial operations with aeroplanes and helicopters and non-commercial operations with complex motor-powered aircraft
50	41	1077	(b)	STAND-ALONE COMPUTERISED MASS AND BALANCE SYSTEM
50	41	1078	(b)	A stand-alone computerised mass and balance system may be a computer, either as part of an electronic flight bag (EFB) system or solely dedicated to mass and balance purposes, requiring input from the user, in order to generate mass and balance data as an output
50	41	1080	(b)	GM1 SPO.IDE.A.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general
50	41	1081	(b)	NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT
50	41	1082	(a)	The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications.
50	41	1083	(b)	The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the aeroplane. Examples may be the following:
50	41	1084	(b)	(1) portable electronic flight bag (EFB);
50	41	1085	(b)	(2) portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists; and
51	41	1086	(b)	(3) non-installed task specialist equipment.
51	41	1088	(b)	AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.125(e)(2) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
51	41	1089	(b)	CHART HOLDER
51	41	1090	(b)	An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement for complex motor-powered aeroplanes is to display a pre-composed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).
51	42	1092	(b)	GM1 SPO.IDE.H.100(c) Instruments and equipment — general
51	42	1093	(b)	NOT REQUIRED INSTRUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT THAT DO NOT NEED TO BE APPROVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE AIRWORTHINESS REQUIREMENTS, BUT ARE CARRIED ON A FLIGHT

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51	42	1094	(a)	The provision of this paragraph does not exempt any installed instrument or item of equipment from complying with the applicable airworthiness requirements. In this case, the installation should be approved as required in the applicable airworthiness requirements and should comply with the applicable Certification Specifications.
51	42	1095	(b)	The failure of additional non-installed instruments or equipment not required by this Part or by the applicable airworthiness requirements or any applicable airspace requirements should not adversely affect the airworthiness and/or the safe operation of the helicopter. Examples may be the following:
51	42	1096	(b)	(1) portable electronic flight bag (EFB);
51	42	1097	(b)	(2) portable electronic devices carried by crew members or task specialists; and
52	42	1098	(b)	(3) non-installed task specialists equipment.
52	42	1100	(b)	AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.125(f)(2) Operations under IFR — flight and navigational instruments and associated equipment
52	42	1101	(b)	CHART HOLDER
52	42	1102	(b)	An acceptable means of compliance with the chart holder requirement would be to display a precomposed chart on an electronic flight bag (EFB).