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# OUR HERITAGE

Bulletin of the Department of Postgraduate Training  
and Research, Sanskrit College, Calcutta

Vol. III, Part I

January-June 1953



सत्यमेव जयते

EDITOR

SADANANDA BHADURI

PRINCIPAL, SANSKRIT COLLEGE, CALCUTTA

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## Lights on the Paippalāda Recension of the Atharvaveda

BY DURGAMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA

THE ATHARVAVEDA is mentioned in the Purāṇic literature to have once been preserved in nine Śākhās or Recensions: Paippalāda, Tauda, Mauda, Śaunakīya, Jājala, Jalada, Brahmavada, Vedadarśa and Cāraṇavaidya. The names of these recensions appear in different records in various forms and spellings. The evidence of the Ātharvāṇic *Caranavyūha* (the 49th Pariśiṣṭa of the Atharvaveda) is generally held to be reliable and authoritative in this regard. Out of the nine, only two Saṃhitās believed to have affiliation with the Śākhās of Śaunaka and Paippalāda have come down to us.

The *Śaunakīyasamhitā* published years ago is known as the *Vulgate*<sup>1</sup>, while the *Paippalādasaṃhitā* printed later on from a single birch-bark manuscript discovered in Kashmir is termed Kashmirian Recension. In spite of the appellation Kashmirian, which the recension has received from its accidental association with the region of Kashmir, the Paippalāda Śākhā in ancient times had its adherents in various parts of northern, southern, western and eastern India. If there are still Vaidikas of the Paippalāda School in Kashmir<sup>2</sup>, there are still Paippalāda Brāhmanas also in the district of Midnapur in West Bengal and beyond its border in Orissa. The view that the Paippalāda Śākhā hails from the extreme north, and was popular specially among the residents of the north-western part of India is not very convincing<sup>3</sup>. Verses quoted from the *Mahārṇava* in the *Bhāṣya* of Mahidāsa on Śaunaka's *Caranavyūha* as also in the *Yajurvedavicāra*, a small treatise dealing primarily with the position of the Yajurveda, aver that the spheres of influence of the Paippalāda and the Śaunaka Schools of the Av. were respectively the southern and the northern sides of the river Narmadā<sup>4</sup>:

नर्मदावसिणे भाग आपस्तम्ब्याश्वलायनी ।  
राणायनी पिप्पला च ..... ॥  
माध्यन्दिनी शाङ्खायनी कौथुमी शौनकी तथा ।  
नर्मदोत्तरभागे च ..... ॥

<sup>1</sup>Doubts have however been expressed as to whether the *Vulgate* represents the Śaunakīya School of the Av. See Suryakanta, Introduction to the *Atharvaveda Prāṭisākhya*, pp. 43 ff.

<sup>2</sup>See Kshetresachandra Chattopadhyaya, Presidential Address, Vedic Section, Ninth All India Oriental Conference, Trivandrum, *Proceedings*, p. 128.

<sup>3</sup>Paul Theim advocates the view (*Pāṇini and the Veda*, p. 76) and Subhadra Jha opposes the same (*Studies on the Paippaladi Atharvaveda*, *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, XXXVIII, p. 241).

<sup>4</sup>MS. No. Veda 645 preserved in the Sanskrit College Library, Calcutta.

A manuscript of an anonymous commentary on the *Gopālatāpanī Upaniṣad* begins with the statement that the Paippalāda Recension of the *Av.*, to which the Upaniṣad belongs, is well-known in the countries like Gurjara<sup>5</sup> :

गुर्जरादिदेशप्रसिद्ध-पराशरगोत्रब्राह्मणसम्प्रदाय-प्राप्ताथर्ववेदस्य पितृपलादिशास्त्रापठित-श्री-  
गोपालतापन्यास्या श्रुतिः ।

Vidyābhūṣaṇa's commentary on the same Upaniṣad speaks of the popularity of Paippalāda work among the Ātharvaṇikas of Utkala<sup>6</sup> :

उत्कलादिभिराथर्वणिकैरधीयमाना पिप्लादिशास्त्रान्तःस्थितेयं गोपालोपनिषत् ।

There is some epigraphic evidence of the Pāla and the Sena periods proving convincingly that in ancient Bengal there lived Brāhmaṇas reading the Paippālāda Śākhā :

(i) A copper-plate grant of Vighrahapāla III excavated at Belwa in the district of Dinajpur in West Bengal has the name of the donee as Jayānanda Śarman, who is described as a student of the Paippalāda Śākhā :<sup>7</sup>

पिप्लुशास्त्रिणाऽध्यायने संस्तुताऽऽथर्वणतर्कविदे जयानन्दशर्मणे . . . . . ।

(ii) The donee of the Madhainagar copper-plate grant of Lakṣmaṇasena (12th century A. C.) was the king's Śāntyāgārika named Govinda Śarman. He belonged to the Kauśika Gotra, and was a student of the Paippalāda Atharvaveda<sup>8</sup> :

कौशिकसगोत्राय . . . अथर्ववेदस्यैऽपलादशास्त्राध्यायने शास्त्रागारिक-श्रीगोविन्दशर्मणे . . . ।

The *Paippalāda Samhitā* has a close affinity to the texts of the *Rgveda*<sup>9</sup>, and is 'better than the Śaunakiya'<sup>10</sup>. The school of the Paippalāda is surmised also to have been older than that of the Śaunakiya<sup>11</sup>.

That the Paippalāda had once exercised considerable authority over the Vedic people is shown by the fact that the representative Ātharvaṇic Mantra *śam no devir abhiṣṭaye* etc., which all Brāhmaṇas, owing allegiance even to any other Veda, have to recite in their Brahmajayña or Daily Recitations, happens to be the initial Mantra of the Paippalāda Śākhā.

<sup>5</sup>Chintaharan Chakravarti, *Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Vangiya Sahitya Parishat*, p. ix.

<sup>6</sup>See *Catalogus Catalogorum*, part III, 159.

<sup>7</sup>See Manoranjan Gupta, Two New Pāla Records, *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, 1951, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup>Nani Gopal Majumdar, *Inscriptions of Bengal*, Vol. III, p. 112.

<sup>9</sup>See L. C. Barret, The Contents of the Kashmirian Atharvaveda, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 46, pp. 8-14.

<sup>10</sup>See F. Edgerton, The Philosophical Materials in the Atharvaveda, *Studies in Honour of Maurice Bloomfield*, p. 124.

<sup>11</sup>See Caland, *Ahnencult* referred to by Bloomfield in the *Atharvaveda and the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, p. 12.

It may be mentioned here that the first leaf of the birch-bark manuscript of the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā* having been lost for ever, the first Mantra of the Recension has always been a matter of conjecture. Relying specially upon the statements in the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, scholars have generally agreed to accept *śaṃ no devī* as the probable first Mantra of the *Av.* in the Paippalāda Recension.<sup>12</sup> But still there are others like Paul Theim and A. B. Keith who think that 'the final decision is not within our reach'<sup>13</sup>, and that the stanza is 'commonly believed to be the beginning of the Paippalāda version though without certainty'<sup>14</sup>. Further testimony is however now available which requires us no more to entertain any doubt about the initial stanza of the Paippalāda Recension of the *Av.*

The four initial Mantras of the four Vedas are found prescribed in various Sūtras for everyday recitation in the rite of Brahmajña or Svādhyāya enjoined as an obligatory practice for a dvija. *śaṃ no devī* is cited in this connection as one of the four Mantras. In addition to the traditional evidence already adduced in this respect by Roth, Haug, Bhandarkar and others, the statements in the Gr̥hyasūtras may now be presented for consideration.

Brahmajña, according to the *Vaikhānasa-gr̥hyasūtra* (6, 17), is the daily recitation of either the twelve hymns beginning with the Sāvitrīsūkta or the four initial Mantras of the four Veda Saṃhitās, viz. *agnim ile purohitam, iṣe tv orje tvā, agna āyāhi* and *śaṃ no devīḥ* :

सावित्रीपूर्वद्विदशसूक्तरनन्मिद्धे पुरोहितमिधे त्वोर्जेत्वाग्ना आयाहि शं नो देवीरिति  
चतुर्वेदादिमन्त्रैर्वा स्वाध्यायो ब्रह्मयज्ञः ।

The *Bodhāyanagr̥hyasūtra* and the *Bhāradvāja-gr̥hyasūtra* mention *śaṃ no devī* as the initial stanza of the *Av.* :

वेदादयश्छन्दांसि कुष्माण्डानि चाधीयीत.....शन्नो देवीरभिष्टय इत्यथर्ववेदस्य ।—

*Bodh. Gr.*, 2, 9, 5.

वेदादीन् जपेच्छन्दांसि.....शन्नो देवीरभिष्टय इत्यथर्ववेदस्य—*Bhāradvāja Gr.*, 3, 15.

In the Sūtras quoted above *śaṃ no devī* is testified to be the first Mantra of the *Av.*, but which Recension of the *Av.* it belongs to has not been clearly mentioned by the Sūtrakāras. A clear mention to that effect comes however from another quarter viz. the Vedic commentators of old Bengal.

Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa, the Guru of king Ballālasena, while giving details of Brahmajña assigns the Mantra to Pippalāda<sup>15</sup> :

पिप्पलाद ऋषिर्गयित्रीच्छन्दो वरुणो देवता अथ यज्ञस्य विनियोगः ।

<sup>12</sup>The matter has been fully discussed by Lanman in the *Introduction to the Atharvaveda Saṃhitā*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 7, p. cxvi. Burnell in his *Tanjore Catalogue*, p. 37 had however questioned the genuineness of the Mahābhāṣya statement.

<sup>13</sup>Theim, *Pāṇini and the Veda*, p. 66.

<sup>14</sup>Keith, *Pāṇini and the Veda*, *Indian Culture*, Vol. II, July, 1936, p. 747.

<sup>15</sup>*Pūrdāyitā* (Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad, Calcutta), p. 20.



Guṇaviṣṇu, another scholiast of Bengal flourishing before the 12th century, describes *śaṃ no devī* as the first Mantra of the *Av.* revealed to Pippalāda<sup>16</sup> :

अथर्ववेदादिमन्त्रोऽयं पिप्पलाददृष्टः ।

Rāmanātha Vidyāvācaspati, a later Vedic commentator of Bengal states in his *Dhārmikakarmarahasya*<sup>17</sup> that in the Brahmajajña rite even the Sāmavedins should recite the stanza *śaṃ no devī* with the adoption of the reading *āpo bhavantu* in its second part, instead of the Sāmaveda reading *śaṃ no bhavantu*, because the Mantra revealed to Pippalāda is found at the beginning of the *Atharvaveda* with the former reading<sup>18</sup> :

शं नो देवीति मन्त्रस्य पिप्पलाद ऋषिमंतः ।

गायत्री च्छन्दो वरुणो देवता परिकीर्तितः ।

ब्रह्मयज्ञजपे चास्य विनियोगो मुनेर्मंतः ॥

‘शं नो’ इति मन्त्रे ‘आप’ इति पाठः सामगानामपि तथैवाथर्ववेदादौ पाठात् ।

*Dhārmikakarmarahasya*, fol. 80b.

The statements of the Bengal scholiasts appear to have recorded the genuine Atharvāṇic traditions, showing *śaṃ no devī* as the initial Mantra of the *Pippalāda Saṃhitā*.

There however prevails a different Yajurveda tradition in Bengal which recognises *śaṃ no devī* as the first Mantra of the *Av.*, but ascribes the authorship to Dadhyañc Atharvaṇa.<sup>19</sup> The tradition has certainly derived inspiration from the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Sarvānukramasūtra* of the Vājasaneyya Yajurveda<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>16</sup>*Chāndogyamantrabhāṣya*, Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad, Calcutta, p. 117. For the date of Guṇaviṣṇu See D. Bhattacharyya, *Introduction to Chāndogyamantra-bhāṣya*, pp. XXIV-XXXV. See also ‘A Pre-Sāyana Vedic Commentator of Bengal’, *Our Heritage*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 142.

<sup>17</sup>The *Dhārmikakarmarahasya* of Rāmanātha written under the patronage of a petty king of Bengal is still in manuscript preserved in the Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad, Calcutta. See D. Bhattacharyya, ‘Little known Vedic Commentators of Bengal’, *Our Heritage*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup>The stanza *śaṃ no devī* reads in full

शं नो देवीरभिष्टय आपो भवन्तु पीतये ।

शंयोरभिस्रवन्तु नः ॥

The stanza occurs also in various other Saṃhitās *Rk*, *Sāma*, *Kāthaka* and *Vājasaneyya*, with the variant शं नो भवन्तु in the *Sāmasaṃhitā* for आपो भवन्तु in others.

<sup>19</sup>See Halāyudha's *Brāhmaṇa-sarvasva*, Brahmajajña Section :

अथर्ववेदादिमन्त्रस्य दध्यङ्ङायर्वण ऋषिरापो देवता गायत्रीच्छन्दः स्वाध्याये शान्तिकरणे च विनियोगः ।

<sup>20</sup>*Śatapatha Br.*, 14, 1, 1, 18 :

दध्यङ्ङ ह वा आयर्वण एतं शुक्रमेतं यज्ञं विवांचकार ।

The *Yajusarvānukramasūtra* has the following in regard to the *Vājasaneyya*, 36 in which *śaṃ no devī* occurs :

पञ्चाध्यायीं दध्यङ्ङायर्वणो ववर्श ।

It is interesting that Dadhyañc is also called Āṅgirasa in the *Gopatha Br.*, I, 5, 21.

It may be mentioned here that according to the Rgvedic tradition of the *Sarvānukramāṇī*, the seer of the same *śaṃ no devī* (*Rv.*, 10, 9, 4) was either Tvāṣṭra Trisiras or Āmbariṣa Sindhudvīpa, while according to the *Sāma* tradition, the seer of the Mantra (*Sv.*, I, 33) was Sindhudvīpa or Trita.

The discrepancy in these traditions stands somewhat explained, if we take into consideration the legendary account of Pippalāda's birth as recorded in the *Purāṇas*. It is said in the *Skanda Purāṇa* that Pippalāda was born of the body of Dadhyañc<sup>21</sup>. He is said to have been commissioned to remould the original *Atharvaveda* of one hundred Śākhās and one hundred Kalpas into a simpler Veda of nine Śākhās and five Kalpas<sup>22</sup>. The story hints at the closest relationship between Dadhyañc Ātharvaṇa and Pippalāda, making them almost identical. The facts related in the story also indicate the prominent part which Pippalāda may have played in the moulding of the *Atharvaveda*. Pippalāda was perhaps the most important redactor of the *Av*. The Recension bearing his name also became probably the most popular recension of the same Veda. There is a suggestion that Pāṇini at the time of the composition of his *Sūtras* on Vedic grammar had the readings of the Paippalāda or some other related Recension of the *Av*. in his mind<sup>23</sup>. That the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* considered the Paippalāda Recension as representative of the *Av*. is almost certain<sup>24</sup>.

A Mantra in the *Paippalāda Av*. appears to have been referred to in the *Brahmasūtra*. II, 3, 43 :

अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकित्वादित्वमधीयत एके ।

Śaṅkara has explained the sūtra as referring to a Mantra in an Ātharvaṇa Brahma-sūkta :

एके शाखिनो दाशकित्वादिभावं ब्रह्मण आमनन्त्याथर्वणिका ब्राह्मसूक्ते ।

The Mantra occurs only in the Paippalāda Recension of the *Av*. (8, 9, 10).

Thus Pāṇini and Patañjali, Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara all had evinced their interest in the contents of the Paippalāda *Av*.

Śabarasvāmin has referred to the Paippalādaka at different places of his *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (1, 1, 27 ; 2, 4, 8 etc.). Citations from the Paippalāda Śruti are sometimes met with also in later works. Sāyaṇa, commenting on the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, quotes from the *Praśna Upaniṣad* (5,2) as Paippalāda Śruti :

अतएव पंप्लवादशाखायामधीयते—एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोज्जर इति ।

<sup>21</sup>*Skanda P.*, Māheśvara, Kedāra, Ch. 17, Sl. II :

निर्गतो जठराद् गर्भो दधीचस्य महात्मनः ।  
साक्षाद्ब्रावतारोऽसौ पिप्पलादो महाप्रभः ॥

<sup>22</sup>*Sk. P.*, Nāgara Khaṇḍa, Ch. 174. :

अथर्ववेदो यश्चैव शतशाखो विनिर्मितः ।  
शतकल्पश्च गूढार्थो भूतानां कार्यसिद्धये ।  
शवशास्त्रः तस्यैतन्तुया कार्यः सुखावहः ॥

<sup>23</sup>See Paul Theim, *Pāṇini and the Veda*, p. 76.

<sup>24</sup>See *Ante* for relevant discussions.

Viśvanātha Cakravartin's *Ānandacandrikā*, a commentary on Rūpa Gosvāmin's *Ujvalanīlamani* (Nāyakabheda, śl. 16) has given a passage as occurring in the Paippalāda Śākhā :

पिप्पलादशाखायां पुरुषबोधिनी श्रुतिः ।

Ānandatīrtha's *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya* quotes the authority of a Paippalāda text<sup>25</sup>.

नेन्द्रियाणि नामुमानं वेदा हेतुं वेदयन्ति तस्मादाहुर्वेदा इति पैप्पलादश्रुतिः ।

The *Viṣṇudharmottara* cites the well-known Śrīsūkta by four separate Pratikas representing the Sūkta as contained in the four Vedas. The Pratika of the Ātharvānic Śrīsūkta given in this connection is found as

श्रियं दातुर्मयि घेहि प्रोक्तमायवणे तथा । *Viṣṇudh.*, II, 128, 6.

The Mantra referred to in the Pratika occurs in the Paippalāda Recension and not in the Śaunakīya<sup>26</sup>. The word Ātharvaṇa in the *Viṣṇudharmottara* verse has obviously been used in reference to the Paippalāda alone.

While connecting Pippalāda's authority with the institution of a certain rite or usage, the *Atharva Pariśiṣṭa* always prefixes some honorific words to his name :

एतदेव समाख्यातं पिप्पलादेन धीमता ।—*Ath. P.*, 22, 10, 4.

पिप्पलादेन महता समाख्यातमिदं शुभम् ।—*Ibid.*, 23, 10, 3.

पिप्पलादं महाप्राज्ञमिदमूचुर्महर्षयः ।—*Ibid.*, 39, 1, 1.

<sup>25</sup>This citation has been pointed out by Bhagavadatta in his *Vaidik Vānmay kā Itihās*, III, p. 49.

<sup>26</sup>*Paippalāda Samhitā*, 19, 48, 17 as printed reads thus :

श्रियं धातुर्मयि घेहि श्रियामधिपतिं कृणु ।

यशामीशानो मघवानिन्द्रो मा यशसानुवात् ॥

Apparently, some misreading has crept into the third *pāda* of the printed stanza. L. C. Barret in his *Kashmirian Atharvaveda, Books Nineteen and Twenty* (American Oriental Society, 1940, p. 76) remarks : " *Yaśa meśāno* would be acceptable, *Yaśasa īśāno* would spoil the metre." Raghu Vira in his Edition of the *Paippalāda Samhitā* puts a query mark after यशाम् indicating thereby the possible corruptness of the text. I would give here the Mantra as found with slight variations in the *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* ( 6, 20, 2 ) :

श्रियं धातुर्मयि घेहि श्रियो माऽधिपतिं कुरु ।

विशामीशानो मघवानिन्द्रो (printed मघबेन्द्रो) मा यशसानुवात् ॥

This textual evidence of the *Āp. Sr.* suggests that विशामीशानो (lord of the people) was in all probability the original reading of the Paippalāda, and not यशामीशानो as printed.

The *Atharva Pariśiṣṭa*, known to be a Śaunakiya work, sometimes refers to Mantras which belong to the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā*<sup>27</sup>, and commends priests who are affiliated to the Paippalāda School<sup>28</sup>.

The evidence adduced above clearly shows that the Paippalādas had in ancient times enjoyed wide recognition as a major Vedic School. Having once risen to so much eminence, the Śākhā now survives only in its *Saṃhitā* and a few Upaniṣadic texts<sup>29</sup>. No *Brāhmaṇa* or *Sūtra* so far available has direct association with the Paippalāda School. The *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, *Vaitānasūtra*, *Kausikasūtra* and the *Atharva Pariśiṣṭa*, though rubricating here and there a number of Paippalāda Mantras, are considered essentially to be Śaunakiya works<sup>30</sup>. There are however available certain references to and some details of a few Paippalāda works in later literature.

In the *Anukramaṇī* portion of the *Ṛgarthadīpikā* on *Rgveda*, 8, 1, Venkaṭa Mādhava mentions a *Paippalāda Brāhmaṇa* :

ऐतरेयमस्माकं पप्पलादमथर्वणाम् ।

An anonymous Vedānta treatise speaks of *Mantra* and *Brāhmaṇa* of the Paippalāda School containing respectively twenty Kāndas and eight Adhyāyas<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>27</sup>*Ath. P.*, 8, 2, 1 : धृतावेक्षणमध्यै पप्पलादमन्त्राः ।

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.*, 2, 3, 5 : पप्पलादं गुरुं पुराञ्छ्रीराष्ट्राराज्यवर्धनम् ।

*Ibid.*, 2, 6, 1 : गुरुणा पप्पलादेन वेदमन्त्रविपश्चिता ।

वर्धते घनधान्येन राष्ट्रमेवं न संशयः ॥

<sup>29</sup>Statements in the Upaniṣads like *Prasna*, *Sikhā*, *Brahma*, *Parabrahma*, *Pañcabrahma*, *Śārīraka*, *Śarabha*, *Garbha*, and *Gopālatāpanī* bear testimony to the influence of Paippalādas' views over them.

<sup>30</sup>Garbe, following Roth, was inclined to affiliate the *Vaitānasūtra* with the Paippalāda School. See *Introduction to the Vaitānasūtra*, vii. But Bloomfield, relying on the Vedic traditions, has declared in his *Atharvaveda and the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* (p. 13) : "That the *Vulgate* together with *Kausikasūtra*, *Vaitānasūtra* and *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* belongs to the School of Śaunaka may be regarded as certain".

A statement made by Sāyaṇa in the introductory portion of his *Atharvaveda-bhāṣya* may be taken to imply that the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* and the *Kausikasūtra* are authoritative for the four Śākhās—Śaunaka, Jājala, Jalada and Brahmavada. A tradition to this effect, as has been stated by Bloomfield (*Introduction to the Kausikasūtra*, xvii), finds mention also in Keśava's commentary on the *Kaus.*, according to which "Kausika (*Saṃhitāvidhi*) is the Sūtra of four Śākhās". That a single Sūtra work may serve as many as fifteen Śākhās is known from a remark made by Karka under *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*, 2, 2, 3 :

सूत्रस्य पञ्चदशशाखासाधारण्याद् .त्र दृष्टो विनियोगः सूत्रकृतोपनिबद्धः ।

<sup>31</sup>See *Prapañcahṛdaya*, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, p. 2 :

आथर्वणिके पप्पलादशाखायां मन्त्रो विंशतिकाण्डः . . . तद्ब्राह्मणमष्टाध्यायात्मकम् ।

The same treatise refers also to a Paippalāda *Kalpasūtra* of Agastya in seven chapters<sup>33</sup>. Agastya was probably an authority on Paippalāda rituals. A *Ślokatarpaṇa* of Agastya is said to be still in much use in Kashmir<sup>34</sup>.

Hemādri (12th century) cited in his *Caturvargacintamaṇi* long passages from the *Śrāddhakalpa* of both the Śaunaka and the Paippalāda Schools<sup>35</sup>.

The Vīramitrodaya of Mitrāmīśra has also quoted a number of passages from a *Paippalāda Sūtra*<sup>36</sup>.

A Sūkta of forty-eight stanzas described as belonging to the Paippalāda Śākhā was edited some time back along with Vāsudeva Dviveda's commentary. This hymn beginning with the Mantra यं कल्पयन्ति is called Pratyāṅgirāsūkta.<sup>36</sup>

#### ATHARVAVIDHĀNA

(A Ritual text of the Paippalāda School)

Now is presented a small ritual text entitled *Atharvavidhāna* reconstructed from the Vidhāna chapters of the *Agnipurāṇa* (Ch. 262) and the *Viṣṇudharmottara* (khaṇḍa II, Ch. 127). The Mantra Pratikas quoted in these Purāṇic works are found extremely corrupted, making their reconstruction almost impossible. They have been restored with the help of different Vedic texts. With much of its Mantra material traced only in the *Paippalāda Saṃhitā*, the *Atharvavidhāna* is considered to be a work of the Paippalāda School<sup>37</sup>. The sources of many of the Mantras have been indicated in the foot-notes.

The following abbreviations have been used in the foot-notes of the *Atharvavidhāna* :

Ath. P.—Atharva Pariśiṣṭa edited by Bolling and Negelein.

Kaus.—Kausikasūtra ed. by M. Bloomfield.

Paipp.—Paippalāda Saṃhitā of the Atharvaveda.

Viṣṇudh.—Visnudharmottara (Venkateswar Press, Bombay).

Śaun.—Atharvaveda Saṃhitā of the Śaunakīyas=Vulgate.

<sup>33</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 38 :

वेदि कानुष्ठानविशेषपरं कल्पसूत्रम् । वेत्पलादशाखाप्रयुक्तमाथर्वणिकं सप्तभिरध्यायैरगस्त्येन प्रदर्शितम् ।

These statements contained in the *Prapañcahṛdaya* have been referred to in Bhagavadatta's *Vaidik Vāṇmay kā Itihāsa*, I, p. 223.

<sup>34</sup>See Madhusudan Kaul, Introduction to the *Laugākṣiṣṭhyasūtra*, p. 9.

<sup>35</sup>Caland (*Ahnencult*, pp. 96, 107, 243 ff.) has compiled and reconstructed all the passages of the *Paippalāda Śrāddhakalpa* found in Hemādri's work.

<sup>36</sup>See *Śrāddhaprakāśa*, p. 293, etc.

<sup>37</sup>Edited by Subhadra Jha in the *Sārasvatī Suśamā*, vol. VII, parts 3 and 4. It is to be noted that the Sūktas beginning with यं कल्पयन्ति in *Paipp.* 16, 35 and 'Saun. 10, 1 differ considerably from the Pratyāṅgirāsūkta both in readings and arrangement. The Oriental Institute, Baroda, possesses a manuscript (No. 5595) of the Sūkta with commentary.

<sup>38</sup>Hemādri's *Caturvargacintāmaṇi*, vol. II, Vratākhaṇḍa contains an *Atharvavidhāna* in prose. An *Atharvavidhāna* is also referred to in Ātmānanda's *Asyavāmīyasūkta (vyākhyā)*, a manuscript of which is preserved in Adyar Library, Madras—MS. No. 39G7.

# ATHARVAVIDHĀNAM

## अथर्वविधानम्

आग्नेय-विष्णुः शान्तिः आहृत्य प्रतिसंस्कृतम्

पुष्कर उवाच—

शान्तातीयं(1) गणं हुत्वा शान्तिमाप्नोति मानवः ।  
भैषज्यं(2) च गणं हुत्वा सर्वान् रोगान् व्यपोहति ॥१॥  
त्रिषप्तीयं(3) गणं हुत्वा सर्वपापैः प्रमुच्यते ।  
क्वचिन्नाप्नोति च भयं हुत्वा चैवाभयं(4) गणम् ॥२॥  
न पराजयते राम गणं हुत्वाऽपराजितम्(5) ।  
आयुष्यं(6) च गणं हुत्वा चापमृत्युं व्यपोहति ॥३॥  
स्वस्तिमाप्नोति सर्वत्र हुत्वा स्वस्त्ययनं(7) गणम् ।  
श्रेयसा योगमाप्नोति शर्मवर्मगणं(8) तथा ॥४॥  
वास्तोष्पत्यगणं(9) हुत्वा वास्तुदोषान् व्यपोहति ।  
तथा रौद्रगणं(10) हुत्वा सर्वान् दोषान् व्यपोहति ।  
एतैर्दशगणैर्होमो ह्यष्टादशमु शान्तिषु ॥५॥(11)  
वैष्णवी(12) शान्तिरैन्द्री(13) च ब्राह्मी(14) रौद्री(15) तथैव च ।  
वायव्या(16) वारुणी(17) चैव कोबेरी(18) भार्गवी(19) तथा ॥६॥

(1) *Ath. P.*, 32, 27.

(2) *Ath. P.*, 32, 24 ; *Kaus.*, 36, 33.

(3) *Paipp.*, 1, 6, 1 ; *Saun.*, 1, 1, 1.

(4) *Ath.*, *P.*, 32, 12 ; 32, 29.

(5) *Ath.*, *P.*, 32, 13.

(6) *Ath. P.*, 32, 9.

(7) *Ath.*, *P.*, 32, 11.

(8) *Ath.*, *P.*, 32, 14.

(9) *Ath.*, *P.*, 32, 5.

(10) *Ath.*, *P.*, 32, 17.

(11) In places of Ślokes 4 and 5 *Viṣṇudh* reads :

एते दश गुणाश्चैव होतव्याः स्युर्यथाक्रमम्  
अष्टादशसु धर्मज्ञ दशशान्तिषु भार्गव ॥

(12) Not so designated in *Ath. P.*

(13) *Ath. P.*, 62, 4, 7.

(14) *Ath. P.*, 19b, 4, 4.

(15) *Ath. P.*, 32, 16 ; 17 ; *Kaus.*, 50, 14.

(16) *Ath. P.*, 18, 1, 13.

(17) *Ath. P.*, 18, 1, 13.

(18) The designation does not occur in *Ath. P.*

(19) *Ath. P.*, 46, 2, 3.

प्राजापत्या(1) तथा त्वाष्ट्री(2) कौमारी(3) वह्निदेवता (4) ।  
 मारुद्गणा(5) च गान्धर्वी(6) शान्तिर्नैऋतकी(7) तथा ॥७॥  
 शान्तिराङ्गिरसी(8) याम्या पार्थिवी(9) च भृगूत्तम ।  
 एतास्तु शान्तयः प्रोक्ताः सर्वकर्महिताः सदा ॥८॥  
 यस्त्वा मृत्युरिति(10) हेतज्जप्तं मृत्युविनाशनम् ।  
 हुत्वा च (11)मातृनामानि कामानेवमवाप्नुयात् ॥९॥  
 सुपर्णस्त्वेति(12) हुत्वा च भुजंगेनव बाध्यते ।  
 यस्येदं भूम्यामिति(13) च भूमिकामो जपेत् सदा ॥१०॥  
 पृथिव्यामुत्तमोऽसीति(14) वृत्तं श्रेष्ठप्रदं सदा ।  
 औदुम्बरं यो न इति(15) तथा वीर्यविवर्धनम् ॥११॥  
 इन्द्रेण दत्तमित्येतत्(16) सर्वबाधाविनाशनम् ।  
 हिरण्यवर्णा(17) इति च स्नानं पापहरं भवेत् ॥१२॥  
 असितस्येति(18) सर्वाणि विषघ्नानि भृगूत्तम ।  
 सरस्वतीति (19) मन्त्राश्च विषघ्नान्निर्विशेद् बुधः ॥१३॥  
 शरभादीनि(20) सर्वाणि पिशाचक्षपणानि च ।  
 इमा देवीति(21) मन्त्रश्च सर्वशान्तिकरः परः ॥१४॥

(1) *Ath. P.*, 70b, 13, 1.

(2) *Kaus.*, 124.

(3) No Mantra is designated *Kaumārī* in *Ath. P*

(4) *Ath. P.*, 18, 1, 13.

(5) *Kaus.*, 40, 7 etc.

(6) *Paipp.*, 13, 4 ; *Śaun.*, 4, 37.

(7) *Ath. P.*, 33, 1, 9; 33, 4, 4.

(8) *Ath. P.*, 46, 2, 3.

(9) This technical name is not found in *Ath. P.*

(10) *Paipp.*, 1, 61, 1 ; *Śaun.*, 3, 11, 8.

(11) *Ath. P.*, 3, 2, 4.

(12) *Paipp.*, 5, 6, 3.

(13) *Paipp.*, 7, 5, 10 ; not in *Śaun.*

(14) Not found in any *Saṃhitā*. *Paipp.* has several Mantras beginning with पृथिव्याम् as well as उत्तमोऽसि.

(15) There are in the *Saṃhitās* Mantras beginning with औदुम्बरं (*Paipp.*, 10, 5, 13 ; *Śaun.* 19, 31, 13) as also यो नः (at different places).

(16) *Paipp.*, 19, 36, 15 ; not found in *Śaun.* *Agni P.* reads before it an additional line :— इन्द्रेण दत्तमित्येतत् सर्वकामकरं भवेत् which may refer to *Paipp.*, 1, 13, 1 ; *Śaun.*, 2, 29, 4.

(17) *Paipp.*, 1, 25, 1 ; *Śaun.* 1, 33, 1.

(18) *Paipp.*, 1, 90, 1—4 ; *Śaun.*, 5, 13, 6—11.

(19) *Paipp.*, 20, 26, 10 ; *Śaun.*, 7, 68, 1. *Paipp.*, 19, 13, 4 ; *Śaun.*, 6, 100, 1 are against poison.

(20) *Paipp.*, 16, 97, 10 ; *Śaun.*, 9, 5, 9.

(21) Not found in the *Saṃhitās*.

- देवा मरुत इत्येतत्(1) सर्वकामकरं भवेत्(2) ।  
यमस्य(3) लोकादित्येतद्ःस्वप्नशमनं परम् ॥१५॥  
अग्नेर्व इति(4) चाप्येतत् कथितं मन्युनाशनम् ।  
ऊर्ध्वो(5) भवति विज्ञेयः कृत्वा स्थानकरः परः ॥१६॥  
इन्द्रं वयं बणिजमिति(6) पण्यलाभकरं परम् ।  
कामो मे राज्ञ इत्येतत्(7) स्त्रीणां सौभाग्यवर्धनम् ॥१७॥  
भद्राय कर्णमित्येतत्(8) कर्णप्रस्यन्दने जपेत् ।  
(9)भद्रास्यक्षिरोधे जाता कर्णप्रस्यन्दने तथा ॥१८॥  
(10)तुम्यमेव जरिमन्नायुष्यं तु हुतं भवेत् ।  
आयातु मित्र(11) इत्येतन्मित्रलब्धिकरं हुतम् ॥१९॥  
(12)इन्द्रस्यैवेदं जना(13) मिश्रधान्येन होमयेत् ।  
आधिपत्यमवाप्नोति सर्वत्र मनुजोत्तम ॥२०॥  
अग्ने गोभिर्न(14) इत्येतद् गवां वृद्धिकरं परम् ।  
द्वादशाहं तु जुहुयात् पराकेण विशेषतः ॥२१॥  
शान्तो अग्निरितीत्येतद्(15) ग्रामस्वास्थ्यकरं भवेत् ।  
तस्माद् ग्रामान्मृदा कृत्वा वेदिसाम्यं समश्नुते ॥२२॥  
विष्णस्य सर्वा चित्तानि(16) राष्ट्रस्वीकरणानि तु ।  
त्रिभ्यो रुद्रेभ्य इत्येतद्(17) वास्तोष्पतमुदाहृतम् ॥२३॥  
ध्रुवं ध्रुवेणेति(18) हुतं स्थानलाभकरं भवेत् ।  
(19)अच्युता द्यौस्तथा राम कथितं स्थानलाभदम् ॥२४॥  
पयो देवेष्विति(20) हुतं रायस्पोषकरं परम् ।  
युनक्सीरेति(21) शुना(22) कृषिलाभकरं भवेत् ॥२५॥

(1) *Paipp.*, 17, 26, 7; not in *Saun.*

(2) *Vignudh.* omits the second half of *Śloka* 14 and the first half of *Śloka* 15.

(3) *Paipp.*, 3, 8, 1; *Saun.*, 19, 56, 1.

(4) *Paipp.*, 2, 68, 1; not in *Saun.*

(5) *Paipp.*, 18, 16, 1; *Saun.*, 13, 1, 11.

(6) *Paipp.*, 19, 49, 1; cf. *Saun.*, 3, 15, 1—इन्द्रमहं बणिजम् ।

(7) *Paipp.*, 20, 36, 6; not in *Saun.*

(8) *Paipp.*, 20, 50, 6; *Kaus.*, 58, 1; not in *Saun.*

(9) *Paipp.*, 14, 4, 8; *Saun.*, 19, 6, 49.

(10) *Paipp.*, 1, 12, 1; *Saun.*, 2, 28, 1.

(11) *Paipp.*, 1, 18, 1; *Saun.*, 3, 8, 1.

(12) *Paipp.*, 18, 3, 7; *Saun.*, 14, 1, 28.

(13) Text इदं जनाः—*Paipp.*, 1, 23, 1; *Saun.*, 1, 32, 1; 20, 127,

(14) *Paipp.*, 1, 39, 1; *Taitt.*, 2, 4, 51.

(15) *Paipp.*, 3, 12, 9; *Saun.*, 3, 21, 9.

(16) *Paipp.*, 19, 54, 2; not in *Saun.*

(17) *Paipp.*, 1, 86, 1; cf. वास्तोष्पतीय *Ath. P.*, 32, 1, etc., *Kaus.*, 8, 23, etc.

(18) *Paipp.*, 19, 6, 4; *Saun.*, 6, 87, 3.

(19) The Mantra is mentioned in *Ath. P.*, 11, 1, 1; *Kaus.*, 35, 12; 98, 2. Bloomfield remarks (*Kaus.*, 35, 12) that it "is not found in any known Samhitā." But if अच्युता and द्यौः are taken as representing two Mantras then both will be found in *Paipp.*

(20) *Paipp.*, 1, 91, 1; *Kaus.* 115, 2.

(21) *Paipp.*, 2, 22, 1; *Saun.*, 3, 17, 2.

(22) *Paipp.*, 2, 22, 3; *Saun.*, 3, 17, 7.



अयं ते योनिरित्येतत्(1) पुत्रलाभकरं भवेत् ।  
 शुनं वत्सान्(2) तथा हेतद् गवां वृद्धिकरं हृतम् ॥२६॥  
 .....मेति(3) कथितं सर्वत्र श्रेष्ठप्रकारकम् ।  
 अहं ते भग इत्येतद्(4) भवेत् सौभाग्यवर्धनम् ॥२७॥  
 (5)ये ते पाशास्तथाप्येतद्वन्धनान्मोक्षकारकम्(6) ।  
 यो न स्व(7) इति चाप्येतच्छत्रुनाशकरं परम् ॥२८॥  
 सपत्नहनमिति(8) तथा नात्र कार्या विचारणा ।  
 त्वमुत्तममितीत्येतद् (9) यशसो वर्धनं परम् ॥२९॥  
 यथा मृगो गोपयसि(10) स्त्रीणां सौभाग्यवर्धनम् ।  
 आ नो अग्न(11) इत्येतच्च कथितं पतिलाभदम् ॥३०॥  
 (12)येन वेहृदिष(13) चैव गर्भलाभकरं भवेत् ।  
 इमं तपस्विभिति(14) तथा भवेत् सौभाग्यवर्धनम् ॥३१॥  
 (15)यत् पृथिव्या अनावृत्तं हृतमेतद् यथाविधि ।  
 कृत्वा तु शंसनं ज्ञेयं नात्र कार्या विचारणा ॥३२॥

\* \* \* (16)

(17)शिवः शिवाभिरित्येतद्भ्रुवेच्छ्रेयस्करं परम् ॥३३॥  
 कृत्यादूषण(18) इत्येतत् कृत्यादूषणमुच्यते ।  
 बृहस्पतिः परिपातु(19) पथि स्वस् ययनं भवेत् ॥३४॥

(1) *Paipp.*, 3, 34, 1 ; *Saun.*, 3, 20, 1.

(2) *Paipp.*, 4, 40, 1.

(3) A gap is left in *Viṣṇudh.* while the line is omitted in *Agni.*

(4) *Paipp.*, 1, 15, 1 ; *Saun.*, 1, 14, 1.

(5) *Paipp.*, 5, 32, 1 ; *Saun.*, 4, 16, 6 ; *Agni P.*, ये मे पाशा° ।

(6) *Viṣṇudh.* omits the second half of śloka 27 and the first half of śloka 28.

(7) *Paipp.*, 10, 11, 1 ; 13, 3, 14 ; *Saun.*, 1, 19, 3 ; *Viṣṇudh.* यदग्न इति चाप्येतद्° ।

(8) *Paipp.*, 16, 76, 1 ; *Saun.*, 9, 2, 1 ; *Agni.*, शपत्वहसिति रिपून्ऽ नाशये नोमजाप्यतः ;

*Viṣṇudh.* सवन्नहसिति ।

(9) *Paipp.*, 19, 34, 7 ; *Saun.*, 8, 5, 11.

(10) *Paipp.*, 1, 98, 1 ; *Agni.*, यथा मृगमतीत्येतत् ; *Viṣṇudh.*, यथा वृषिमितीत्येतत् ।

(11) *Paipp.*, 2, 21, 1 ; *Saun.*, 2, 36, 1 ; *Kaṭh.*, 34, 13.

(12) *Paipp.*, 3, 14, 1 ; *Saun.*, 3, 23, 1.

(13) *Paipp.*, 15, 2, 8.

(14) No such Mantra is found in the Saṃhitās. The readings may stand for two Mantras इमं and तपस्व in the Saṃhitās.

(15) *Paipp.*, 15, 17, 4. In the *Atharvavidhāna* included in Hemādri's *Caturvargacintāmaṇi*, Vol., II, Vratākhaṇḍa, Pt. I, p. 282 it is called कल्पमन्त्रः.

(16) The indication of a missing line is given in *Viṣṇudh.*

(17) *Paipp.*, 5, 13, 1.

(18) *Paipp.*, 11, 3, 4 ; *Saun.*, 19, 34, 4.

(19) *Paipp.*, 15, 11, 1 ; *Saun.*, 7, 51, 1.

- (1) मनो न्वेदमभयदं पथि स्वस्त्ययनं भवेत् ।  
 अयं नो अग्निरघ्यक्षो (2) भवेदग्निप्रसादतः ॥३५॥  
 संबत्सरं तु शिरसा धारयेद् यो हूताशनम् ।  
 मन्त्रमेतज्जपेन्नित्यमाग्नेयाशामुखः स्थितः ॥  
 अनग्निज्वलनं कुर्याद् राम संबत्सरे गते ॥३६॥  
 (3) दूष्या दूषिरसीत्येतज्जपेन्मन्त्रमनुत्तमम् ।  
 कुर्यात् प्रतिसराबन्तं सर्वदोषनिबर्हणम् ॥३७॥  
 प्राणसूक्तञ्च (4) कथितं तथा प्राणविवर्धनम् ।  
 मुञ्चामि त्वेति (5) कथितमपमृत्युविमोक्षणम् ॥३८॥  
 (6) अथर्वशिरसोऽध्येता सर्वपापैः प्रमुच्यते ।  
 परमं पावनं तद्धि सर्वकल्मषनाशनम् ॥३९॥

एवमेते शुभा मन्त्राः प्रतिवेदं मया तव ।  
 समासात् कथिता राम समुद्धृत्य प्रधानतः ॥४०॥  
 एकैकस्य च मन्त्रस्य विनियोगः सहस्रशः ।  
 कथिता भृगुशार्दूल पुराणैः सुमहात्मभिः ॥४१॥  
 न ते शक्या महाभाग वक्तुं वर्षशतैरपि ।  
 प्राधान्येन तु मन्त्राणां किञ्चित् कर्म तवेरितम् ॥४२॥  
 होमे यत्र न निर्दिष्टं मया ब्रह्मं पुरा तव ।  
 हवीषि तत्र वक्ष्यामि तानि मे गदतः शृणु ॥४३॥  
 वृक्षाणां यज्ञियानान्तु समिधः प्रथमं हविः ।  
 आज्यञ्च व्रीह्यश्चैव तथा वै गौरसर्षपाः ॥४४॥  
 अक्षतानि तिलाश्चैव दधि क्षीरञ्च भार्गव ।  
 दर्भास्तथैव दूर्वाश्च बिल्वानि कमलानि च ॥४५॥  
 शान्तिपुष्टिकराण्याहुर्द्रव्याप्येतानि भार्गव ।  
 तैलेन्धनानि घर्मज्ञ राजिकां रुधिरं विषम् ।  
 समिधः कण्टकोपेता अभिचारेषु योजयेत् ॥४६॥  
 आर्षं वै देवतं छन्दस्त्वविज्ञाय भृगूत्तम ।  
 मन्त्रस्य तेन मन्त्रेण जप्यहोमौ न कारयेत् ॥४७॥  
 छन्दसि ब्राह्मणे सूक्ते यदव्यक्तं प्रदृश्यते ।  
 विद्वद्भिः सह निश्चित्य तद्यज्ञमवतारयेत् ॥४८॥  
 सम्भारा ये यथा यत्र यानि द्रव्याणि यो विधिः ।  
 शाखां प्रति तथा तत्र तत् प्रमाणमिति स्थितिः ॥४९॥

(1) *Paipp.*, 19, 24, 10.

(2) *Paipp.*, 20, 56, 7; *Vaiṭānasūtra* 4, 21, *Kaus.*, 89, 13; not in *Saun.*

(3) *Paipp.*, 1, 57, 1; *Saun.*, 2, 11, 1.

(4) *Paipp.*, 15, 3; *Saun.*, 19, 44.

(5) *Paipp.*, 1, 62, 12; *Saun.*, 1, 10, 4; 3, 11, 1.

(6) *An Upaniṣad—Ath.P.*, 44, 2, 4; 49, 4, 4.

यः स्वसूत्रमतिक्रम्य परसूत्रेण वर्तते ।  
 अप्रमाणमृषिं कृत्वा सोऽप्यधर्मेण युज्यते ।  
 तस्मात् सर्वप्रयत्नेन स्वसूत्रं न विलङ्घयेत् ॥५०॥  
 प्राक्तन्त्रोत्तरतन्त्रे (1) द्वे स शाखाप्रत्यये द्विज ।  
 सर्वकर्मसु कर्तव्ये मध्ये कर्म विधीयते ॥५१॥  
 आयर्वणोऽयं कथितो विधिस्ते  
 संक्षेपतो भागववंशमुत्स्य ।  
 अतःपरं किं कथयामि तुभ्यं  
 तन्मे वदस्वायत्तलोहिताक्ष ॥५२॥

॥\*॥इति श्रीविष्णुधर्मोत्तरे द्वितीयखण्डे मार्कण्डेयवज्रसंवादे रामं प्रति पुष्करोपाख्यानेऽधर्वविधिकथनं  
 नाम सप्तविंशत्युत्तरशततमोऽध्यायः ॥\*॥

(1) *Ājyatantra* called also *Bṛhat Kūṣāṇḍikā* with its appendix *Uttaratantra* is mentioned by Bloomfield—*Kaus.*, Intro. XV.

# Some Commentators On The Meghadūta

BY DR. S. K. DE

THE GREAT popularity and currency of Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta* is indicated not only by the existence of a large number of original manuscripts in the different libraries of India, Europe and America, but also by the fact that more than fifty Sanskrit commentaries are known to exist, of which about a dozen of the more important ones are available in print.

## *Vallabhadeva*

The earliest known commentary is the *Pañjikā* of Vallabhadeva, which has been critically edited by E. Hultzsch (London 1911). Vallabha was a Kashmirian who described himself as the son of Rājānaka Ānandadeva, father of Candrāditya and grandfather of Kayyāṭa; and he had the surname of Paramārthaciḥna. He is known to have commented upon several standard poetical works, including those of Kālidāsa (*Raghu*<sup>o</sup> and *Kumāra*<sup>o</sup>), Mayūra, Ratnākara and Māgha, as well as upon Rudraṭa's *Kāvya-lamkāra*. As his grandson Kayyāṭa wrote a commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Devī-śataka* in 977-78 A.D. during the reign of Bhīmagupta of Kashmir (977-82 A.D.), Vallabhadeva's probable date would be the first quarter of the 10th century. Durgaprasad and Parab<sup>1</sup> suggest and Hultzsch accepts this date, but K. B. Pathak<sup>2</sup>, not on very cogent grounds, would bring it down to 1100 A.D. This commentator Vallabhadeva should be distinguished from the anthologist Vallabhadeva, also a Kashmirian, who compiled the *Subhāṣitāvalī*, but who belonged probably to the middle of the 12th century<sup>3</sup>. Whatever might have been the exact date of our Vallabhadeva, there cannot be any doubt he is to us the earliest known commentator on the *Meghadūta*; and his commentary, therefore, deserves careful consideration from the point of view of textual study.

Hultzsch's edition of the commentary (as well as the text commented upon) is based on three Śāradā (-Kāśmīrī) and one Devanāgarī manuscript. He is right in holding that this last manuscript is highly conflated and in consequently basing his edition of the Kashmiri text of Vallabhadeva chiefly on his three Kashmiri manuscripts. It is interesting to note that Vallabha's text gives 112 stanzas, but one of these he himself believes to be imitative and spurious; hence 111 stanzas are given by him as genuine<sup>4</sup>. This point is highly important in view of the well-known fact that the popular text of the *Meghadūta* suffered a great

<sup>1</sup>See footnotes to the Kāvya-mālā ed. of *Vakrokti-pancātīkā* and of *Devī-śataka*.

<sup>2</sup>In the introd. to his ed. of the *Meghadūta*, Poona 1916 (2nd ed.).

<sup>3</sup>S. K. De in *JRAS*, 1927, pp. 471-72; Keith's objections in *BSOS*, v, pt. i, p. 27f, and De's rejoinder in *ibid*, v, pt. iii, p. 499f.

<sup>4</sup>The Devanāgarī MS (no. 226/Or. 3352) of Vallabha's commentary in the British Museum gives 113 stanzas, slightly in excess of 112 given in Hultzsch's edition.

deal from interpolation. Vallabhadeva rejects and excludes from his text as many as 19 such interpolated stanzas.

### *Sthiradeva*

The next important commentary is the *Būla-prabodhini* of Sthiradeva, which has been edited (along with its text) from one manuscript existing in the Mandlik collection of the Fergusson College, Poona, by V. J. Paranjpe (Poona 1936). Sthiradeva's date and provenance are not known. He is mentioned by name, along with Vallabhadeva and Asaha or Āsaha (Āṣaḍa)<sup>5</sup>, by the presumably Jaina commentator Janārdana<sup>6</sup> and is found reproduced in extenso by the anonymous, but presumably Jaina, commentary *Sāroddhāriṇī* on the *Meghadūta*. He might have been a Jaina, but manuscripts of his commentary are found today in Poona (Mandlik collection), Baroda (Oriental Institute), Alwar, Tanjore (Sarasvati Mahal) and Mithilā. There is little evidence to show that he is, as his editor presumes, earlier than Vallabhadeva; but since Janārdana's date<sup>7</sup> lies between 1192 and 1385 A.D. he appears to be a fairly old commentator.

Paranjpe's manuscript of the commentary is dated Saṃvat 1521 (=ca. 1465 A.D.). There are two other manuscripts in Baroda Oriental Institute (Acc. no. 1408 and 12266) which we have also examined. They designate the commentary simply as *Ṭikā*. Both the manuscripts are incomplete—the first beginning with comments on the stanza *kartuṃ yac ca prabhavati mahim*, the second with those on the stanza *haste līlā-kamalam*. The date of the first manuscript is illegible, but the second was written in Saṃvat 1630 (=ca. 1574 A.D.). These much later versions of the commentary contain a large number of spurious stanzas, the first admitting 7 and the second 13. Contrary to this later conflated text-tradition, however, Paranjpe's manuscript presents the text as containing only 112 stanzas, of which one is declared spurious by the commentator himself. It, therefore, agrees with the number 111 given as genuine by Vallabhadeva; and on this point its independent testimony is valuable<sup>8</sup>.

## SOUTH INDIAN COMMENTATORS :

### *Dakṣiṇāvarta-nātha*

The commentary of Dakṣiṇāvarta-nātha, entitled *Pradīpa*, was made available in print in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series<sup>9</sup> in 1919. He is referred to by Mallinātha (generally as Nātha; on *Raghu*<sup>o</sup> i.7; *Megha*<sup>o</sup> 4, 65, 98) as a

<sup>5</sup>Āsaḍa, son of Kaṭuka, wrote the *Viveka-mañjarī* in 1192 A.D. (P. K. Gode in *Calcutta Oriental Journal*, ii, p. 199f). But nothing is known of this Jaina writer's comm. on the *Meghadūta*.

<sup>6</sup>Peterson, *Three Reports*, p. 324.

<sup>7</sup>See below on Janārdana and the *Sāroddhāriṇī*.

<sup>8</sup>The Tanjore (Sarasvati Mahal Library) MS (no. 3885) is dated 1600 A.D.; but curiously enough, the number of stanzas it gives appears to be only 106!

<sup>9</sup>Edited from two MSS.

predecessor, as well as by Dinakara<sup>10</sup> and Cāritravardhana<sup>11</sup>. As Dakṣiṇāvarta quotes the authority of the lexicographer Keśava-svāmin<sup>12</sup> of the 12th A.D. and is himself quoted by Arunācala who is also cited by Mallinātha, he probably belonged to the 13th century.

Kshetresh Chattopadhyaya<sup>13</sup> rightly draws attention to some curious interpretations and capricious readings given by Dakṣiṇāvarta; but in spite of these strange vagaries, some of which Mallinātha pointedly disputes, Dakṣiṇāvarta appears to follow a tradition which omits, in agreement with Vallabhadeva and Sthiradeva, all the 19 spurious stanzas, and even the stanza *gatyutkampād* in addition. He thus gives a total of 110 as against 111 genuine stanzas included by Vallabhadeva and Sthiradeva. He thus confirms generally and independently the position of the last two commentators in this respect.

### *Pūrṇa-sarasvatī*

The *Vidyullatā* of Pūrṇa-sarasvatī, pupil of Pūrṇa-jyotiṣ or Pūrṇajyotir-muni was edited from two manuscripts and published by the Vani-vilasa Press, Srirangam, in 1909. The date of this commentary is uncertain; but in the preface to the printed text we are informed, rather vaguely, that the commentator "seems to have lived some three centuries ago in the state of Cochin". Probably he flourished in the second half of the 14th or the first half of the 15th century A.D.<sup>14</sup>

This interesting commentary, like that of Dakṣiṇāvarta, gives a total of only 110 stanzas, and excludes all the stanzas not included in the *Pradīpa*. In his interpretation, however, he is more or less independent.

Pūrṇa-sarasvatī was also the author of *R̥ju-laghvī Mālatī-mādhava-kathā* (ed. N. A. Gore, Poona 1943) and *Hamśa-saṁdeśa* (ed. Trivandrum Skt. Series, 1937). He wrote also a commentary called *Rasa-mañjarī*, on the *Mālatī-mādhava* (ed. K. S. Mahadeva Sastri, Trivandrum Skt. Series, 1953). He appears to have written also a Ṭippanī on *Anargha-rūghava*.

### *Parameśvara*

Another scholiast from Cochin is Parameśvara, whose *Sumanoramaṇī* commentary was edited from three manuscripts and published by the Travancore University Manuscripts Library from Trivandrum in 1946. He was the son of R̥ṣi and Gaurī of the Bhaṭṭatiri family of Malabar, and flourished probably

<sup>10</sup>For Dinakara Miśra, see below.

<sup>11</sup>For Cāritravardhana, see below.

<sup>12</sup>Author of *Nānārthārṇava-saṁkṣepa* (ed. Trivandrum Skt. Ser. 1913). His date is given as end of the 12th or the beginning of the 13th century A.D.

<sup>13</sup>*Kuppusvami Sastri Comm. Volume*, p. 17-23.

<sup>14</sup>On the date of Pūrṇa-sarasvatī see C. Kumhan Raja in *Poona Orientalist*, ix, pp. 142-48. On citations in his commentary see N. A. Gore in the same journal, pp. 133-41. Since he quotes Citsukha by name he should be later than the first half of the 14th century.

between 1400 and 1500 A.D.<sup>15</sup>, about the middle of the 15th century. The commentary exists in a shorter and a longer recension. It shows familiarity with the commentary of Pūrṇa-sarasvatī, and confirms the Malabar tradition, mentioned above, which gives 110 stanzas as the total extent of the poem it comments upon.

### *Sarasvatīrtha (Narahari)*

The *Vidvajjanānurañjinī* commentary of Sarasvatīrtha is not yet in print, but manuscripts of it exist in the libraries of the Bhandarkar Institute, Cambridge University and Asiatic Society of Bengal. This Sarasvatīrtha appears to be identical with the Āndhra scholiast Narahari Sarasvatīrtha, who wrote a commentary on the *Kumāra*<sup>o</sup>, as well as one on the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, entitled *Bāla-cittānurañjinī*. This last commentary gives us the information that he was born in Sainvat 1298 (=ca. 1242 A.D.) in Tribhuvanagiri in the Andhra country. He traces his own genealogy from Rāmeśvara of Vatsa-gotra, and describes himself as the son of Mallinātha and Nāgamā and grandson of Narasiṃha, son of Rāmeśvara. When he became an ascetic, he took the name of Sarasvatīrtha and composed his commentaries at Kāśī<sup>16</sup>. He also refers to two works, *Smṛti-darpaṇa* and *Tarka-ratna* (with its *Dīpikā* commentary), written by himself. The colophon describes Sarasvatīrtha as Paramahansa Parivrājakācārya.

Sarasvatīrtha's commentary on the *Meghadūta* is indeed remarkable for its acuteness of exposition, which drew the encomium of K. B. Pathak: but since it admits 12 spurious stanzas (giving a total of 123 stanzas), its text-tradition cannot in this respect be taken as very reliable, nor do its readings always seem authentic. It appears to accept the conflated West Indian text, which differs from that of the Kashmirian and Malabar commentators mentioned above.

### *Mallinātha*

Kolācala Mallinātha Sūri, author of the *Sa ṅjanī* commentary (well-known as a commentator on the standard Mahākāvya of Kālidāsa, Bhāraṇī Bhaṭṭi, Māgha and Śrīharṣa. He was also the author of the *Taralī* commentary on the *Ekvalī* of Vidyādhara. He has been assigned to the latter part or end of the 14th century<sup>17</sup>.

Mallinātha's commentary on the *Meghadūta* is deservedly popular for its learned yet lucid exposition: and in spite of its late date it has been often considered to be authoritative. But it cannot be said that it represents the best text-tradition of the *Meghadūta*. It is true that it omits nine spurious stanzas and

<sup>15</sup> On the identity and date of Paramesvara see Cunhan Raja in *Poona Orientalist*, ix, p. 148 and introd. to the Trivandrum ed. On the two recensions of the commentary see *Orissan Raja Presentation Volume* and *Adyar Library Bulletin* for Feb. 1915.

<sup>16</sup> S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, p. 171.

<sup>17</sup> On Mallinātha's date see S. K. De, *Sanskrit Poetics*, i, p. 228 and references cited therein V. Eaghavan in *NIA*, ii, pp. 442F.

expressly declares the interpolated character (Prakṣipta) of six more; but it admits at the same time four such verses. In the readings of passages also, it cannot be said that Mallinātha always gives us the most authentic forms. And yet, like Nilakaṇṭha's very late commentary on the *Mahābhārata*, the *Samjivani* has practically superseded by its reputation and currency most of the earlier commentaries on the poem. Nevertheless, the critical insight of Mallinātha, as against that of some West Indian Jaina commentators who accept a very much interpolated text, is shown by the fact that if we leave aside the stanzas omitted or declared spurious by himself, the total number of stanzas in his text<sup>18</sup> is not more than 115, which is not very much in excess of that of the Malabar commentators, on the one hand, and Vallabhadeva and Sthiradeva, on the other.

It seems, therefore, that the South Indian text-tradition was not uniform. The commentators of Malabar preserve, as against Sarasvatīrītha and Mallinātha, a text comparatively free from conflation. It should be noted that most Telugu and Grantha manuscripts either include Mallinātha's commentary or generally follow his text.

Mallinātha's commentary has been printed much earlier and more often in India than any other; and for a time it practically standardised the text of Kālidāsa's poem. It was first printed (in lithograph) at Benares in 1849, then at Calcutta (Madan Mohan Tarkalankar) in 1850, at Madras (in Telugu characters) in 1859, and at Bombay (Krishna Shastri Bhatavadekar) in 1866. In 1869 Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar brought out at Calcutta a careful edition of the text with Mallinātha's commentary in Devanāgarī characters. He utilised the Benares, Calcutta and Bombay editions, as well as a manuscript from the Calcutta Sanskrit College, and gave extracts from some Bengal commentaries<sup>19</sup>. His three source-texts and manuscript contained respectively 121, 118, 125 and 116 stanzas; but even with such meagre and uncertain material, it is remarkable that he had the critical acumen to declare that only 110 stanzas were genuine. Other later and noteworthy editions of the text with Mallinātha's commentary are those of V. S. Islampurkar (Bombay 1889), which gives extracts from six commentaries; of G. R. Nandargikar (Bombay 1894), which is valuable for having utilised a large number of manuscripts of the text and commentaries; and of K. B. Pathak (Poona 1894), which gives Jinaseṇa's text.

#### BENGAL COMMENTATORS:

##### *Sanātana Gosvāmin*

Sanātana Gosvāmin was an older contemporary and disciple of Caitanya, the founder of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. His commentary, entitled *Tālpāyā-līpikā*,

<sup>18</sup>In this respect Mallinātha agrees more or less with the total number given by Bengal commentators.

<sup>19</sup>He must have used them in manuscript, for they were not in print. Steuzler's edition (Calcutta 1874) also notes readings from these Bengal commentaries.



was edited from three manuscripts<sup>20</sup> and published by J. B. Chaudhuri (Calcutta 1953-54). Sanātana, son of Kumāra and brother of the equally famous Rūpa Gosvāmin, was originally a high official at the Muhammadan Court of Gauḍa, and lived nearby at Rāmakeli where he met Caitanya for the first time in about 1513 A. D. Soon after this he renounced the world under the Saṁnyāsa name of Sanātana given by Caitanya, and became in subsequent years the centre (along with Rūpa and his nephew Jīva) of the arduous and prolonged theological and literary activity of the Bengal Vaiṣṇava sect at Vṛndāvana. The most flourishing period of Sanātana's literary activity falls between 1533 and 1554 A.D., but it probably began as early as 1495 A. D. His commentary on *Meghadūta*, which contains no Namaskriyā to Caitanya, was written probably in the latter part of the 15th century before he relinquished secular activity and began his theological labours at Vṛndāvana<sup>21</sup>.

The portion of this commentary on stanzas occurring in the Uttara-megha is extremely meagre, because the author, taking them to be easy (*sugamam*), did not care to explain them. As a commentary it is lucid, but hardly distinguished. The total number of stanzas included in the text is 115.

#### *Kalyāṇamalla*

The *Mālatī* commentary of Kalyāṇamalla is not yet printed, but it is available in the comparatively modern Colebrooke manuscript (no. 3774/1584; also in no. 3777/529) existing in the India Office Library and its copy in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, on which H. H. Wilson's *editio princeps* (Calcutta 1813) of the *Meghadūta* was based. Kalyāṇamalla, son of Gajamalla and grandson of Karpūra of Padmabandhu family, appears to have been a local chief of Bhūriśreṣṭha and is styled Rājaraṣi in the colophon. Bhūriśreṣṭha, also mentioned by Kṛṣṇa-Miśra in his *Prabodha-candrodaya*, is now identified with the once flourishing Bhursut Pergunna in the district of Burdwan, Bengal<sup>22</sup>. He was a patron of the well-known scholiast Bharata-mallika, who also commented on the *Meghadūta*; but Kalyāṇamalla's work, perhaps written independently, has no agreement with that of his protégé. It is a briefer and much easier commentary meant perhaps for beginners. The total number of stanzas commented upon is 115.

#### *Bharata-mallika*

The *Subodhā* commentary of Bharata-mallika on the *Meghadūta* was edited by J. B. Chaudhuri from four manuscripts<sup>23</sup> and published at Calcutta in 1951. Bharata-mallika, otherwise Bharata-sena, son of Gaurāṅga-mallika and descended

<sup>20</sup>This edition does not note any variant reading. Two of the MSS are from the India Office (No. 3774/1381A and 3779/1570). The text and the commentary are published in the journal *Prācya vāṇī*, ed. Chaudhuri x, pt. 2 and xi.

<sup>21</sup>See S. K. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement*, Calcutta 1942, pp. 108f.

<sup>22</sup>It is associated with the famous Bengali poet, Bhārat Chandra Rāy (1st half of the 18th century) as his native place.

<sup>23</sup>Three MSS from India Office and one from Calcutta Asiatic Society.

from the family of Vaidya Harihara Khān, was a Bengali Vaidya or physician by caste, who was patronised by Kalyānamalla mentioned above. He was a voluminous scholiast, who composed commentaries also upon *Raghu*°, *Kumāra*°, *Kirāta*°, *Śīśu*°, *Ghaṭakarpara Kāvya* and *Bhaṭṭi* and wrote extensively on grammar and lexicon. The number of his works listed in various catalogues of manuscripts or published is about 17.

The date of his commentary on the *Meghadūta* is uncertain. Its editor would assign<sup>24</sup> it to 1675-76 A.D.; but we are inclined to agree with Colebrooke<sup>25</sup> and Rajendralal Mitra<sup>26</sup> that Bharata-mallika flourished in the middle of the 18th century A.D.

Even if this commentary on *Meghadūta* is comparatively recent in date, it is remarkably full and erudite, though sometimes unnecessarily subtle and pedantic, and shows familiarity with the works of previous commentators. The number of stanzas<sup>27</sup> it comments upon is 114.

#### *Rāmanātha Tarkūlāmkāra*

Rāmanātha's commentary, entitled *Muktāvalī*, yet unprinted, is included in the Colebrooke manuscript of the India Office mentioned above (no. 3774/1584). Nothing is known about the author or his date, but he appears to have been a comparatively modern writer. There is nothing remarkable in his commentary, except his knowledge of rhetoric, lexicon and grammar; but his text gives a total of 116 stanzas.

#### *Haragovinda Vacaṣpati*

Haragovinda, son of Vaṅkavīhārin Gaṅgopādhyāya of Krishnanagar (Bengal), is also a modern commentator, perhaps of still later date. His hardly remarkable commentary is included in the Colebrooke manuscript of the India Office mentioned above, and is not yet printed. Nothing is known of the author; but Keith would identify him with Haragovinda Vācaṣpati, author of *Jñāpakāvalī*, which belongs to the Saṅkṣipta-sāra school of grammar. The name of Haragovinda's commentary on the *Meghadūta* does not appear in the India Office manuscript, but it is given as *Samgatā* in the manuscript which Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar used for his edition. The total number of stanzas it comments upon is 115.

<sup>24</sup>His argument is based chiefly a Vaidyaka work called *Candraprabhā*, ascribed to Bharata mallika and bearing the date (apparently post-colophon) of Śaka 1597 (= 1675 A.D.). The MS is said to have been written by the author himself. But the authenticity of this evidence is open to doubt. Such a work, called *Candraprabhā*, is entered nowhere under the authorship of Bharata-mallika, except in an apocryphal print by a Calcutta Vaidya in 1892, on which alone the editor relies.

<sup>25</sup>Ed. *Amarakoṣa*, p. 6.—Bharata-mallika wrote a *Mugdha-bodhinī* commentary on this lexicon.

<sup>26</sup>In his *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* (vi, p. 145) Mitra writes in 1882 that Bharata-mallika 'lived at Kanchrapara in the Hooghly district about 150 years ago'. Haraprasad Sastri endorses this view and says that he had seen Bharata-mallika's grandson, Lokanātha-mallika (*Catalogue of A. S. B. Manuscripts*, vi, 1931, p. 307).

<sup>27</sup>The India Office MS no. 3775/994b, however, contains 116 stanzas.

*Kaviratna Cakravartin*

No information is available about this commentator. We could not obtain a copy of his *Artha-bodhinī* commentary printed in Bengali characters (with a Bengali translation) at Calcutta in 1850; but we have seen the Calcutta Asiatic Society's manuscript of this commentary (no. 4956/10802) written in Bengali characters, as well as a Bengali manuscript of the same in the Dacca University library. There is nothing striking in this commentary, but its text has a total of 115 stanzas<sup>28</sup>.

It is noteworthy that the number of stanzas in the text commented upon by the Bengal commentators is between 114 and 116, usually 115.

*SOME OTHER EASTERN COMMENTATORS :**Śāśvata*

The only available manuscript of Śāśvata's commentary, entitled *Kavi-priyā* exists in Asiatic Society's library at Calcutta (No. 4953/5646). It is fragmentary and is wanting in many folios. These fragments have been edited by J. B. Chaudhuri (Calcutta 1953), along with his edition of Sanātana's *Tātparyā-dīpikā*. The manuscript bears the date in Nevāri era 540 (=ca. 1330 A.D.). Śāśvata, therefore, must have been a fairly old writer; but the Nevāri script of the manuscripts may be taken as going against the presumption, which is sometimes made, that Śāśvata belonged to Bengal. The second introductory verse of his commentary, quoted by Rajendralal Mitra<sup>29</sup> from a manuscript of the same in Devanāgarī characters, speaks of Vallabha's commentary as weighty and authoritative; and in many cases Śāśvata's readings do not agree with those of Bengal commentators. Even if Śāśvata's exact provenance is not known, it is probable that he belonged to some region in Eastern India. Śāśvata's text contained 115 stanzas.

*Divākara Upādhyāya*

The commentary of Divākara, entitled *Ṭīkā* or *Dyotikā*, noticed in the Mithila catalogue, is available in the India Office manuscript No. 3780/1516. He was a protégé of some king of Mithilā and wrote (according to Nandargikar) his commentary on *Raghu*<sup>0</sup> in 1385 A.D. He commented also upon *Kumāra*<sup>0</sup>. His text of *Meghadūta* contained 125 stanzas.

*Jagaddhara*

Another Maithili scholiast is Jagaddhara, who gives an account of himself and his family in his well-known commentary on the *Mālatī-mādhava*. He traces

<sup>28</sup>Nothing is known of Kavīcandra's *Manoramā* commentary on the *Megha*<sup>0</sup>, a MS of which in Bengali characters is noticed by Rajendralal Mitra (*Notices*, ix, p. 251, no. 3174); nor of the *Ṭīkā* of Ravikara (*ibid* x, p. 112, no. 3371) in Bengali characters, except that this Ravikara may be identical with Ravikara, son of Harihara and commentator on Piṅgala and the *Vṛtta-ratnākara*.

<sup>29</sup>*Notices*, viii, p. 187, no. 2740.

his genealogy to one Caṇḍeśvara, and informs us that he was the son of Ratnadhara and Damayantī and grandson of Vidyādhara. His ancestors were Mīmāṃsakas, except perhaps his father who was a judicial functionary to some local chief. Jagaddhara's commentary on the *Meghadūta* is entitled *Rasa-dīpikā*, as it is known from Rajendralal Mitra's notice (v, p. 287, no. 1966) of a manuscript in Maithili characters; but no manuscript is known to be available now in any library. Jagaddhara commented also upon *Kumāra*<sup>0</sup>, as well as upon *Vāsava-dattā*, *Veṇī-saṃhāra*, *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharana*, *Bhagavad-gītā*, etc. According to R. G. Bhandarkar, "Jagaddhara lived after the fourteenth century, but how long after we have not the means of determining".<sup>30</sup>

#### *Bhagīratha Mīśra*

The exact provenance of the *Tattva-dīpikā* commentary of Bhagīratha Mīśra is not known. He is described as the son of Haṛṣadeva of the Pīṭamuṇḍi family and as having lived under Jagaccandra of Kūrmācala. But the only two known manuscripts of this commentary<sup>31</sup> are found in Bengal and written in Bengali characters. Bhagīratha commented also upon *Raghu*<sup>0</sup>, *Kirāta*<sup>0</sup>, *Śīśupāla*<sup>0</sup> and *Naiṣadha*. His text of the *Meghadūta* contained 114 stanzas.

#### *Dinakara Mīśra*

Of similarly unknown date and provenance is Dinakara Mīśra, son of Dharmāṅgada and Kamalā. He wrote a *Ṭikā* on the *Meghadūta*, of which a manuscript exists in Baroda Oriental Institute (no. 11364). His *Subodhinī* commentary on the *Raghu-vaṃśa* is better known and is utilised by S. P. Pandit and G. R. Nandargikar. A manuscript of this (*Raghu*<sup>0</sup>) commentary in the Bhandarkar Institute (no. 444 of 1887-91) is dated Śaṃvat 1441 (=ca. 1385 A.D.). He commented also on the *Śīśupāla*<sup>0</sup>.

#### *Makaranda Mīśra*

Makaranda Mīśra, who is sometimes taken to be another Bengal commentator, probably lived (like Śāśvata) in a region adjoining Bengal. The only known manuscript of his commentary, entitled *Megha-saudāminī*, in Devanāgarī characters, exists in the library of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta (no. 4955/1076). The total number of stanzas given by his text is 118, which is somewhat in excess of the usual number given by Bengal commentators.

### WEST INDIAN COMMENTATORS :

#### *Cāritravardhana*

Of the West Indian Commentators, who are mostly Jaina writers, Cāritravardhana is perhaps the best known and earliest. He is to be distinguished<sup>31a</sup>

<sup>30</sup>. Preface to his ed. *Mālatī-mādhava*, which contains Jagaddhara's commentary on the drama, p. xxi.

<sup>31</sup>. MS no. 221 in Rajendralal Mitra's *Notices*, i, p. 127, no. 222 and MS no. II.C.23 of the Sanskrit Sahitya Parisad, Calcutta.

<sup>31a</sup> P. K. Gode, *Calcutta Orient Journal*, iii, pp. 32-40.

from Vidyādhara, son of Rāmcandra Bhiṣaj. He was a pupil of Kalyāṇarāja and belonged to the Kharataragaccha. He wrote commentaries also on the *Raghu*<sup>0</sup> and *Kumāra*<sup>0</sup>, as well as on *Śiśupāla*<sup>0</sup>, *Naiṣadha* and *Rāghavapāṇḍarīya*. His commentary on the *Meghadūta* has been published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Benares 1931; reprinted 1953) under the descriptive name *Cāritravardhanī*. In the Calcutta Asiatic Society's manuscript of the commentary (no. 4954/10070), dated Śaṁvat 1643 (=ca. 1587 A.D.), many folios are missing. The only recorded complete manuscript<sup>32</sup> appears to be the Bhandarkar Institute MS no. 345 of 1895-98. The name of the commentary does not appear in these manuscripts, but *Cāritravardhana*'s commentaries on *Raghu*<sup>0</sup> and *Kumāra*<sup>0</sup> are both entitled *Śiśu-hitaiṣiṇī*. *Cāritravardhana* refers to Dakṣiṇāvarta-nātha, but he does not accept the Malabar tradition of the text. G. R. Nandargikar would place him before Divākara Upādhyāya (see above) whose commentary on *Raghu*<sup>0</sup> is dated 1385 A.D. P. K. Gode<sup>33</sup> agrees with Nandargikar's dating, but sets the upper limit at 1172 A.D. A more precise dating is possible by the fact that *Cāritravardhana* wrote his commentary on the Jaina poem *Sindūraprakara* in Śaṁvat 1505 (=1449 A.D.) and on *Naiṣadha* in Śaṁvat 1511 (=1455 A.D.).

The Jaina tradition of the text, embodied in this and the following commentaries, goes even further than that found in the adaptation of Jinasena<sup>34</sup>, who includes nine spurious stanzas, but excludes ten, giving a total number of 120. *Cāritravardhana* admits as many as eleven spurious stanzas, and omits only eight. Thus, the total number of stanzas in his printed text is 122; but the BORI MS gives 118. It would appear that, whatever may be the intrinsic value, the Jaina commentaries followed a faulty tradition of a much interpolated text.

#### *Janārdana*

Janārdana is described as a pupil of Ananta. A manuscript of his *Tikā* on the *Meghadūta* exists in the Baroda Oriental Institute Library (No. 2176). He commented also upon the *Raghu*<sup>0</sup>, as well as on the *Vṛtta-ratnākara* and *Kāvya-prakāśa*. His full name is given as Janārdana Vyāsa; and he may or may not have been a Jaina writer. He refers to three previous commentators by name, Vallabha, Asaha or Āsaha and Sthiradeva,—of whom Āṣaḍa or Āsaha is the only writer known as a Jaina. P. K. Gode<sup>35</sup> approximates Janārdana's date between 1192 and 1385 A.D. His text contained 126 stanzas; and in this numbering he agrees with those of most Jaina commentators.

#### *Kanakakīrti-gaṇi*

Kanakakīrti, pupil of Jayamandira, who was a pupil of Jinacandra Sūri, of Kharataragaccha, wrote an *Avacuri* on the *Meghadūta*. It appears to have

<sup>32</sup> The rarity of manuscripts of this commentary is mentioned in the preface to the Chowkhamba edition which, however, does not utilise the BORI MS., nor give variant readings and any account of its own manuscript material. Aufrecht (iii, 100) records only this MS.

<sup>33</sup> *ABORI*, xv, pp. 109-11.

<sup>34</sup> As in K. B. Pathak's ed. of the *Megha*<sup>0</sup>, Poona 2nd ed. 1916. Jinasena's *Pārvābhūdaya* is also edited independently by Yogiraj Panditacharya (Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay, 1909).

<sup>35</sup> *Calcutta Oriental Journal*, ii, p. 188f.

been printed in lithograph from Benares in 1867. The British Museum manuscript of this commentary (No. 224/Or. 21456) is found dated in 1462 A.D., but the Leipzig University manuscript (No. 416) contains no date. It is thus a fairly old work. The number of stanzas commented upon is 125 (as given by the Leipzig MS).

#### *Lakṣmīnivāsa.*

The *Śiṣya-hitaiṣiṇī* commentary of Lakṣmīnivāsa, son of Śrīraṅga and pupil of Ratnaprabha Sūri of Bṛhad-gaccha, is another early Jaina commentary. The Bhandarkar Institute manuscript (No. 344 of 1895-98) of this commentary was written in Saṁvat 1713 (=ca. 1657 A.D.); but the Berlin Manuscript no. 1545 is dated earlier in Saṁvat 1514 (=ca. 1458 A.D.). It is a commentary of not much intrinsic value, and the total number of stanzas given by its text is 126 (Berlin MS 125).

#### *Megharāja.*

Megharāja-gaṇi or Megharāja-sādhu wrote the *Subodhikā* or *Sukha-bodhikā* commentary, a manuscript of which in the Bhandarkar Institute (no. 390 of 1884-87) is dated in Saṁvat 1460 (=ca. 1404 A.D.). P. K. Gode<sup>36</sup> could place this commentary between 1172 and 1404 A.D. The total number of stanzas it comments upon is 127.

#### *Mahimasimha-gaṇi*

The commentary of Mahimasimha-gaṇi, pupil of Śivanidhāna of Kharatara-gaccha, is also called *Sukha-bodhikā*. It was composed, as the colophon of one of its manuscripts in the Bhandarkar Institute (no. 389 of 1884-87) states, in Saṁvat 1693 (=ca. 1637 A.D.). It is a fairly late commentary and is in no way very remarkable. The number of stanzas in its text is 126.

#### *Samayasundara-gaṇi*

Contemporaneous with Mahimasimha was Samayasundara-gaṇi, pupil of Sakalacandra, who was a pupil of Jinacandra. His commentary on the Meghadūta is simply called *Tīkā*. He wrote commentaries also on the *Raghu*<sup>0</sup> (*Arth-ālāpanikā*), and *Vṛtta-ratnākara* (*Sugamā*). His *Vāgbhaṭālamkāra-vṛtti* was composed in Ahmedabad for one Harirāma in 1636 A.D. The only manuscript of his commentary on the *Meghadūta* exists in the Panjab University library (no. 4513, *Catalogue*, ii, p. 262). Unfortunately the manuscript was not accessible to us.

#### *Sumativijaya*

Sumativijaya, pupil of Vinayameru, wrote about the same time his *Sugamānāyā* commentary, two manuscripts of which exist in the Bhandarkar Institute.<sup>37</sup> P. K. Gode<sup>38</sup> would place Sumativijaya in the latter half of the 17th

<sup>36</sup>Poona *Orientalist*, i, no. 3, p. 50.

<sup>37</sup>No. 549 of 1891-95 and no. 351 of A. 1882-83.

<sup>38</sup>*ABORI*, xiii, pp. 341-43.

century, while K. S. Pathak (*op. cit.*, p. xxi) states that Sumativijaya wrote his commentary at about Saṃvat 1690 (=ca. 1634 A.D.). Sumativijaya composed a commentary also on the *Raghu*<sup>o</sup>, which was completed at Vikramapura. The merit of his *Sugamānvayā* as a commentary is not much; but like Janārdana, Lakṣmīnivāsa and Mahimasimha, he comments on a text of 126 stanzas.

#### *Vijaya-Sūri.*

Vijaya-gaṇi or sūri's *Tīkā* (also called *Sukha-bodhikā*) was composed in Saṃvat 1709 (=ca. 1653 A.D.), as stated in its manuscript in the Bhandarkar Institute (no. 443 of 1887-91). Vijaya Sūri is said to have been a pupil of Rāma-vijaya-gaṇi of Tapāgaccha. He commented also upon the *Raghu*<sup>o</sup> and *Kumāra*<sup>o</sup> (both called *Subodhikā*). Vijaya Sūri's text of the *Meghadūta*, like that of Megharāja, contained 127 stanzas.

#### *Kṣemahaṃsa-gaṇi.*

Kṣemahaṃsa-gaṇi, pupil of Jinabhadra Sūri of Kharatara-gaccha, wrote a *Tīkā* on the *Meghadūta*, the date of which is not given by either of its two manuscripts in the Bhandarkar Institute (nos. 329 of 1884-86 and 346 of 1895-98). He wrote commentaries also on the *Vaughatālumkāra* and *Vṛtta-ratnākara*. His text contained 123 stanzas.

#### *The Sāroddhūriṇī*

This is probably a Jaina commentary, but in its only available manuscript, belonging to the Bhandarkar Institute (no. 157 of 1882-83), the name of the author is missing. The manuscript is dated Saṃvat 1617 (=ca. 1561). P. K. Gode<sup>39</sup> would place this work widely between 1173 and 1561 A.D. K. B. Pathak, however, thinks that this commentary knows that of Mallinātha; if that be so, then the date may be put between 1420 and 1561. In Pathak's opinion this work is "next only to Mallinātha's work in point of merit", but its importance need not on that account be exaggerated from the point of view of the textual study of the poem; for, in common with most Jaina commentators, it accepts a much interpolated text, which gives a total number of 125 stanzas.

#### *The Meghalatā*

This is also a Jaina commentary of unknown date and authorship, which was noticed by Rajendralal Mitra (ix, p. 163, no. 3076) and of which a manuscript exists in the Bhandarkar Institute (no. 160 of 1882-83). It is of the usual Avacūri type and its text gives 126 stanzas.

<sup>39</sup>ABORI, xiv, pp. 130-31.

It will be seen from this brief review that from the time of Jinasena (first quarter of the ninth century) the Jaina tradition, represented by these commentaries, incorporates so many spurious stanzas that their total number fluctuates between 125 and 127, much further than 120 of Jinasena. This is a much more conflated text than those given by Vallabhadeva and Sthiradeva, by the Malabar commentators, by the Bengal and East Indian scholiasts, or by the Tibetan translation and the Sinhalese paraphrase.

It is important, in the case of the *Meghadūta*, to take into account the text given by different groups of commentators. It appears from an examination of manuscripts that the commentaries had already so fixed the different text-tradition that they found themselves reflected in the independent manuscripts of different groups or regions. This peculiar circumstance of text-transmission makes it clear that, not so much the existing manuscripts (which are mostly later in date) as the commentaries should be taken as our chief guide for textual study. Only if some old manuscript, anterior in date to the commentaries, could be found, it might furnish textual evidence unaffected by their influence. <sup>40</sup>

It is not possible within the limits of this short account to discuss the authenticity of readings given by different groups of commentaries; but we can briefly indicate here the comparative extent of the original text given by them. The shortest text, consisting of 110 stanzas, is given by the Malabar commentators, Dakṣiṇāvarta-nātha, Pūrṇasarasvatī and Parameśvara. The Kashmirian Vallabhadeva and Sthiradeva of unknown provenance give a text of 111 stanzas each. Among other South Indian commentators, Mallinātha gives 115 and Sarasvatī-tīrtha 123 stanzas. Among Eastern commentators generally and Bengal commentators in particular, Sanātana Gosvāmin, Śāśvata, Kalyāṇamalla, Kaviratna Cakravartin and Haragovinda Vācaṣpati each gives 115 stanzas; Rāmanātha Tarkālamkāra 116; Makaranda Miśra 118; but Bhagīratha Miśra and Bharatamallika 114 each. The Maithili commentator Divakāra Upādhyāya, however, stands apart and gives 125 stanzas. It should be noted in this connexion that the Tibetan translation <sup>41</sup> gives 117 and the Sinhalese paraphrase <sup>42</sup> 118 stanzas. The longest and most interpolated text is given by the Jaina commentators, thus: Vijaya Sūri and Megharāja, each 127 stanzas; Janārdana, Lakṣmīnivāsa, Sumativijaya, Mahimasimha, the *Meghalatā*, each 126; Kanakakīrti, as well as the two Jaina adaptations *Nemidūta* and *Śiladūta*, and the *Sāroddhārīṇī*, each 125; Kṣemahaṃsa 123; Cāritravardhana 122; and the adaptation of Jinasena

<sup>40</sup> This question has been discussed in detail in the Introduction to our edition of the *Meghadūta*. In the constitution of the text we have made use of most of these commentaries and noted readings from them, as well as from the Tibetan Translation and Sinhalese paraphrase.

<sup>41</sup> *Die tibetische Uebersetzung von Kālidāsa's Meghadūta*, Berlin 1907. (Date about 13th century).

<sup>42</sup> Ed. T. B. Pānabokke, Colombo 1893. (Date unknown).



120. From these facts it is clear that, in spite of diversity, there is a general agreement in the matter of extent between the text of the Malabar commentators, on the one hand, and that of Kashmirian Vallabhadeva, as well as Sthiradeva, on the other. As there is no *prima facie* possibility of mutual contamination, we can take this agreement as original and not secondary; and it is probable that Kālidāsa's text originally contained not more than 110 or 111 stanzas. This number was increased by a process of accretion, through the centuries, differently in different regions, so that some inferior manuscripts are found to contain the maximum of 130 stanzas.

# THE INDIAN CONCEPTS OF KNOWLEDGE AND SELF

(Second instalment)

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines that mental states are short-lived and that two or more such states cannot co-exist were examined in the last section. We arrived at the following conclusions :

(i) There is no possible denial of mental states as emergent and cessant. (ii) Their cessation is due to no foreign cause, they are self-destroying ; and continuation is not incompatible with self-destruction. (iii) Co-existence of two or more mental states is not merely not impossible but often a fact.

In the next section we propose to examine in detail the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *Object*.

## SECTION III

### *The concept of object examined*

#### A. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of Object reiterated*

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has distinguished between object (*viśaya*) and the real (*padārtha*). A real becomes an object when it is *known* ; and as the content of a *possible* (not actual) knowledge, it is a *possible* object. The real is that which as absolutely independent of my present knowledge has only been revealed by it. When it is so revealed (known) there occurs between it and the knowledge a relation which as belonging to the real is called its objectivity (*viśayatā*), but as belonging at the same time to the knowledge it is subjectivity (*viśayitā*) of that knowledge. Objectivity, unless it be only *possible*, is, in other words, an extrinsic relational property accruing to the real when it is known.<sup>1</sup> This concept of objectivity was elucidated in further details in Section I.

In that Section it was also shown that this objectivity is almost a tertiary property, in the sense that though it belongs to the real, and not, as objectivity, to the knowledge of the real, it yet, as a relational property<sup>2</sup>, is constituted by that knowledge.

For a proper understanding of this two questions which were not raised in Section I need here be examined. They are (i) whether the relation cannot be extrinsic in the sense that it is not constituted by either term, and (ii) whether

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<sup>1</sup>Subjectivity, however, is not in this way an extrinsic property of knowledge. We have shown in Sections I and II that, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, every knowledge is necessarily of a *real*. This means that with the very emergence of knowledge it stands as subjective (*viśayin*). We are here describing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of object only.

<sup>2</sup>By 'relational property' here is meant relation itself as the property.

objectivity as a property (relational or not) may not be due to knowledge as an efficient (*nimitta*) cause, not constituted by it.

The reply to the first question would be this :

Relation may often be extrinsic in the sense indicated, but never so in certain cases, particularly where it is between knowledge and the real that is known. Between the world of knowledge and that of reals there is nothing that is not included in either. Hence the relation between an instance of knowledge and the real known must belong to one of these worlds. As a matter of fact, it is found to belong to either alternatively : knowledge is *of the real* and the real is *known*. In the former case the relation belongs to knowledge, in the latter it belongs to the real. The relation between knowledge and the real is not, in other words, a simple affair like that between any two reals.

It may be asked if the dichotomy of the knowledge-world and the thing-world is metaphysically justified. Modern realists have questioned this, and we are told that Nyāya-vaiśeṣika also does not allow this. Is not knowledge known quite as much as other things ?

Knowledge indeed is known like other things. Yet the knowledge that is known is knowledge *of a particular thing*. No other thing is necessarily *of another thing*. So far knowledge is fundamentally different from other things. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only insists that this type of thing is nevertheless revealed as an ordinary thing in another knowledge and, as so revealed, is an object. Knowledge, in other words, as necessarily *of a thing*, is necessarily subjective (*viśayin*), and yet there is no metaphysical clash between this subjectivity and the objectivity (beinghood) of knowledge. Included in the sweeping world of things there are two entirely different types, viz., those which are necessarily subjective and those which are not so. The distinction between the two is more deep-seated than that between a tree and a blade of grass. Neither the tree nor that grass is necessarily subjective.

The second question was whether knowledge to which objectivity is due is not an efficient cause. Our reply is, it is not an efficient cause, it is constitutive. The reason is stated below.

Objectivity, though a property of the real known, is also the relation between that real and the knowledge. It is a relation of the real to that knowledge. As a real belongs to the real, but as a relation *to that knowledge* it is constituted by the knowledge. The real is here the locus (*anuppanna*) of the relation, and knowledge its constitutive determinant (*upādāyini*). There is no mere relation, relation that is without a constitutive determinant<sup>2</sup>. A further peculiarity of the determinant of a relation is that it is never a class, unless the relation is

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Not are they necessarily objective: they are objects in the context of knowledge only. Physically, they are neutral reals.

Though it is necessary that there must be an *anuppanna*, the particular *anuppanna* in a particular case is an empirical accident. Hence the relation cannot be said to be constituted by the particular *anuppanna*. The *potentia*, however, of the relation is constant.

specifically of a thing to a class. Object, from this point of view, may then be defined as that real which has for a property a relation constitutively determined by the knowledge of that real. The *real* here is not constituted by knowledge, because the relation in question is its extrinsic property. But objectivity and, therefore, object also are constituted by knowledge. 'Constituted by knowledge' may not mean that knowledge is an *upādāna kāraṇa*, but there is no denying the fact that objectivity is somehow constituted by knowledge.

The very concept of object as the real that has been known involves reference to knowledge. No effect, on the other hand, involves in the very concept of itself reference to its efficient cause. This also proves that knowledge is not efficient cause (but constitutive of object).

But though objectivity is constituted by knowledge this does not mean that the total knowledge-situation is to be interpreted idealistically. Objectivity belongs also to the real as its property, and this real is independent of the knowledge that reveals it. The reals as such are apprehended in non-judgmental perception (*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*)<sup>1</sup>. This, again, is not the only reason why Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sides with realism. There is another reason more fundamental. The fundamental postulate of knowledge, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contends, is that whatever appears independent of knowledge is truly independent<sup>2</sup>. Objectivity, though constituted by knowledge, appears independent. Hence it is truly independent. The only way to reconcile this independence with its being constituted by knowledge is to hold that the independent is the real as such and objectivity as constituted by knowledge belongs nevertheless to this real.

The postulate is not dogmatic. It is capable of some sort of proof. If O appears independent of knowledge it is either really independent or not. But the negative alternative is untenable. If it were not really independent it was either the knowledge itself or constructed by it. But it cannot be either. To no corrective awareness is it ever felt that way. One cannot also insist that, whether felt or not, it is *inferred* that way. The apparent objectivity of O would go against that inference. No cognition ever appears independent of itself, and no cognitive construction appears independent of the cognition that constructs it. It cannot be said, again, that the independence is an illusion. The independence as such cannot be an illusion. There is no illusory content which, or the like of which, was never presented as real<sup>3</sup>. Object, then, is independent of the knowledge of it.

<sup>1</sup>Non-judgmental perception is, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, no introspectable stage. It is certified by inference only. Introspectable knowledge is in the minimum *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*, and its content is apprehended as a substantive-adjective complex. But the awareness of a complex is impossible unless it was preceded by the awareness of the constitutive simples. This is the same thing as saying that the awareness of object presupposes the awareness of reals as such.

<sup>2</sup>Unless contradicted.

<sup>3</sup>Whether it may not be a primary illusion of the human mind, so that it cannot have an analogue, and whether Advaita and Buddhism are justified or not, and if so, to what extent, will be seen later.

This independence of object is the same thing as the fact that objectivity belongs to the real as a contingent property, which means that object being independent of knowledge does not clash with its being constituted by knowledge. Even if this were not the case, but object or objectivity were understood as itself independent of knowledge, even then there would be no great difficulty. To be constituted by knowledge would then, it is true, contradict the fact that it is independent of knowledge. But where a contradiction is forced upon us, and there is no way out,<sup>1</sup> it has to be submitted to. Such cases, however, ought not to be multiplied for the mere luxury of speculation.

In spite, then, of being constituted by knowledge, object or objectivity is real. But there is yet another difficulty to remove. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has classified reals into seven original groups. But object or objectivity appears to belong to none of them. Forms of objectivity, viz. *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā*, etc., and therefore object also, are neither *dravya* nor *guṇa* nor *karma* nor *sāmānya*, *samavāya*, *viśeṣa* or *abhāva*. If they do not belong to any of these they ought not to be called real. This is the difficulty.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has removed it in two ways<sup>2</sup>. Most objects and therefore also the forms of objectivity involved are the *svarūpa* of reals; and some objects, particularly those which are false, are only to be analysed into real constituents where the form of objectivity is not substantive-adjective *sāmānādhikarānya*, but only *samsarga*. What is meant is that the total object of illusion is only a loose unity.

To explain. An object as the content of knowledge is always a complex unity. The elements of this unity are reals (*padārthas*) which as such are knowable in *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* only, and the relations that are added in *savikalpa* knowledge are, as seen, both knowledge-wise and reality-wise.<sup>3</sup> As reality-wise they are taken as real, and unless contradicted they are also really real. The elements and the relations are thus equally real. If the relations cannot be placed among the

<sup>1</sup>There is no way out, because to be independent of knowledge and to be constituted by it stand equally evident. This means that no defect in either is discovered. Further, of the two awarenesses—one of independence and the other of constitutedness—neither is finally later than the other. It is true that we first apprehended the object as independent, and then later, through analysis, find it to be constituted by knowledge. But the fact remains that even after we have found this the object is apprehended as independent. Hence there is neither *dosadarśana* nor *uttarajñānapakṣāpāta*. To say that analysis as *yukti* is stronger than *pratyakṣa* would be irrelevant here. *Yukti* is stronger either when it leads to the discovery of a defect in the cognition rejected or when the prior cognition is so clearly felt as rejected that its content suddenly disappears or when the point of view is of *prāmānya* (validation of a cognition), not of primary assertion which is just belief or *taking* something to be real. But here neither a defect in the pre-*yukti* cognition is discovered nor its content suddenly disappears nor is the point of view that of *prāmānya*.

<sup>2</sup>Some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers hold that even if objects and forms of objectivity cannot be reduced to the catalogued *padārthas* there is nothing to be ashamed of. They believe that the sevenfold classification of *padārthas* is not final, but only a prescription. They hold that if *perforce* other types of *padārthas* have to be admitted this would not go against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika spirit. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in their opinion, is *aniyata-padārtha-vāda*.

<sup>3</sup>As in Section I, we shall use these two terms, meaning by the former 'constitutively determined by knowledge' and by the latter 'independent of knowledge' or 'belonging as a property to the real'.

catalogued *padārthas*, this is because these relations, though real, are not *additional* realities. If a real A is really related to a real B, this does not necessarily mean that the relation is a *third* real entity. The Buddhists too have admitted this when they hold that *santāna* which is as real as the *kṣaṇikas* is yet not other than these. Many Western thinkers also insist that relations, though really relating, are not other than relata.<sup>1</sup> All the difficulty arises when the reality of relation is misunderstood as its being a third entity. If it is not third, if, in other words, the real relation is exhausted in the catalogued *padārthas*, there remains no difficulty in admitting its reality. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the so-called additional relation we are aware of in *savikalpa-jñāna* has this status only. They are exhausted in, another name of which is that they are the *svarūpa* of, the *padārthas* they relate, not additional realities.

Not that all entities which we call *relation* are of this type. Inherence (*samavāya*) and contact (*samyoga*) are called *relation* and they are additional reals. Similarly when a fact or a series of facts which are normally treated as terms (as opposed to *relation*) act as relation (e.g., between a father and a child) they, even as relation, are additional entities. The additionality of inherence and contact follow from the fact that they are matters of *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*, and that of the facts or the series is immediately evident. Where there is no such special reason or immediate evidence a relation need not be additional. A flower, its red colour and the inherence of the latter in the former are, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, separate reals; yet in the perceptual judgment (*savikalpa-pratyakṣa*) of the form 'this flower is red' where the inherence of the red colour in the flower stands as related to that flower and that colour, this second relation need not, because there is no special reason or immediate evidence, be a separate object. Not that it is therefore a subjective construction only. We have seen why, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it has to be taken as real. It follows that such relations are real and yet not other than the reals they relate. Such relations are the *svarūpa* of the *padārthas* related.

The above is the account of the object of normal *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*. The account of the *false* object (assuming that falsity has been detected) is different. In erroneous *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* the total object is definitely known to be not real. Hence though, like the object of normal *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*, it too is broken up into real elements and a relation, can the relation be taken as the *svarūpa* of the elements, seeing that the total object is not real? Ordinarily we should say 'No'. But Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika prefers to stick to the claim that *vikalpa* relations are the *svarūpa* of the *padārthas* related. They stick to it, only because it has followed from the fundamental postulate that whatever appears as independent is really independent. Object, everywhere, is to be analysed into the constituent reals and the *vikalpa* relations, which latter are everywhere exhausted in those reals. But how, then, could the total object be unreal here? Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies as follows:

<sup>1</sup> The universal as quite real is similarly, for Stout, exhausted in the relevant particulars.

The total object here is no close unity. When the illusion is exposed the elements cannot be said to have been apprehended as related in the way of substantive-adjective identity (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). The unity here is loose, it is of the form 'P is in S', not of the form 'S is P'; and such unity is only nominal, no genuine unity. This, in effect, means that when the illusion is exposed we cannot say there was any genuine close unity of S (*this*) and P (*snake*).

Not that 'P is in S' is never a close unity. Rather, normally it develops into that. 'P is in S' is easily translatable into 'P is *as in S*' = 'S is *with P*' which is a close unity. But such translation is sometimes impossible, particularly when it is known for certain that there is no real 'P as in S'. 'Horns are in the hare' cannot be translated into 'Horns are *as in the hare*'. While a denial of the former is intelligible it is impossible to deny the latter in the form 'Horns *as in hare* are not'. Every judgment, whether affirmative or negative, presupposes that at least the subject-term stands for a reality, but 'horns as in the hare' stands from the beginning as self-condemned. There is no such difficulty, on the other hand, in the judgment 'Horns in the hare are not'. This judgment is only a periphrasis of 'Horns are not in the hare' where the subject does not stand for a wholly non-existent thing. If, now, denial here is intelligible in the only form 'Horns are not in the hare', the corresponding affirmative judgment cannot but be in the form 'Horns are in the hare', not 'Horns are *as in the hare*'. The false object of an illusion corrected has also to be understood in this form. We cannot say 'This is snake' or 'The snake is *as in the locus*', we must say 'The snake is in the locus'. In the case of "hare's horn" or 'this snake' we are compelled to say this, only because stating the situation the other way about would stand self-condemned : we already know that "hare's horn" or 'this snake' is not real.

Denial of substantive-adjective identity does not, however, mean that there is no *vikalpa* relation here. Every *svikalpa-jñāna* must involve *vikalpa* relations that are also asserted as real. But here the *vikalpa* relation is anything but identity. It is *samsarga*, meaning any relation but identity. The 'in' in 'horns in the hare' or 'snake in the locus' is the *vikalpa* relation of *samsarga*. A distinction should be drawn between (a) *ghaṭo nīlaḥ* (the pot is black), (b) *ghaṭe nīlaḥ* (black colour is in the pot) and (c) *ghaṭo nīlatvavān* (the pot is with black colour). In (a) the *vikalpa* relation is substantive-adjective identity (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). In (b) it is *samsarga*. In (c) it is more complicated : there is a turn back to *sāmānādhikaraṇya* through *samsarga*. Normally (b) and (c) coincide. But in cases like "hare's horn" or 'this snake' (b) fails to amount to (c). In the case (b) the content is peculiar. Though there is the *vikalpa* relation of *samsarga* the total object is not a close unity. A pure case of (b) is not indeed a normal occurrence. We have to recognise it only where we are already assured that there is no real total object, as in the case of error<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error will be discussed again in detail later in this essay. Here, and there also, we have discussed the theory which is most consistently Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Different Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers are not always unanimous in their views of error. They often differ in fundamentals even.

### B. *Indian theory of object vis a vis Western theories*

In Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, object (*viśaya*) is neither wholly reducible to knowledge and its phases, and is so far real, nor wholly equated to reality (*padārtha*), though it is the *svarūpa* of that. Object as the *real-that-is-known* is as much real as reality itself, and yet as the *real-that-is-known* it is not entirely that real also. Were it the real itself there would have been no occasion to distinguish between the real and the real-as-known. But, again, even as not entirely the real, it is also exhausted in, *i.e.*, the *svarūpa* of the real. Also objectivity, though not wholly reducible to knowledge and its phases, is yet constituted by knowledge, being unintelligible apart from the fact that the corresponding real is being known. Almost all Indian thinkers accept this view. Those who accept it differ only in further details. But most of the Western thinkers would reject it altogether. Western realists would never admit the intermediate *object*: they hold that knowledge is straight in relation with the real. Idealists and semi-idealists in the West would also, contrarily, deny object, reducing it to knowledge and its phases, and either reject the so-called real thing or admit it as never bodily knowable. A Berkeley would deny the real altogether, and a Kant or a Hegel would go the second way about.

In defence of the intermediate *object* Indian thinkers would argue as follows :

Awareness of a real is either judgmental (*savikalpa*) or pre-judgmental (*nirvikalpa*). When it is *savikalpa* certain relations—forms of judgment—creep in. What is the status of these forms? Are they modes (or functions) of knowledge, or are they real, or both? On the first alternative, realism, at least with regard to the content of *savikalpa* knowledge, is gone. On the third alternative there would indeed be a type of realism, but it would be more Indian than Western. The second alternative would only add difficulties. Are hypothetical and disjunctive forms and forms of inference real in the realistic sense? They evidently involve subjective experiment; and so the contents of hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, and also of inference, embody the experiment: the resulting propositions and the conclusion are in the form 'if—then—', 'either—or—' and 'therefore—'. Attempts to get rid of such embodiment of the experiment have always looked forced. The reduction of the hypothetical proposition to the categorical may be a piece of skilful translation work, but no hypothetical proposition ever means a categorical fact only. It follows that the reduction of the disjunctive proposition to the categorical is equally a failure, for such reduction is possible through another reduction, *viz.*, of the disjunctive to the hypothetical. It is doubtful, again, if even the latter reduction is complete and natural. Even if a disjunctive proposition can be analysed into two or four (or whatever be the number) hypothetical propositions we must not forget that the disjunctive proposition is the *unity* of those hypotheticals, that unity being its specific characteristic. The attempt to get rid of the "therefore" in inference would also be equally abortive, that "therefore" being the very characteristic feature of inference. There is indeed something like "because—



therefore" in the hypothetical proposition also; but it is only *like* that. In "because-therefore" the antecedent stands asserted. But it is not so asserted in "if-then," unless "if-then" be only an apologetic softening of "because-therefore".

What, now, is true of these judgments and inference is true equally of categorical judgments, affirmative or negative. Negation may or may not be real, but it is no good denying that the negative judgment involves subjective experiment. There is such experiment so far at least as the *possibility* (*yogyatā*) of the negatum being related to its locus is concerned. The experiment is also embodied in the content, though not so overtly as before. In hypothetical and disjunctive judgments, and also in inference, the embodiment was evident in the forms of "if-then", "either-or" and "because-therefore"; but *possibility* which is an embodiment of subjective experiment is not stated explicitly in a negative judgment. Yet if the negatum were not understood as a possible real relatable to the locus, there would be no negative judgment at all. "S is not P" necessarily implies, though this implication does not come up to the surface, that *a possible reality P relatable to S* does not stand so related to it. Though negation, whether by way of identity or that of *samsarga*, may be a reality the form of the negative judgment—which form is also inevitably asserted of the content—is not a reality in the realistic sense.

As regards affirmative judgment, one type of it, *viz.*, the universal, cannot have a form that can pass unchallenged as realistically real. Like negation, the universal also may or may not be real as the realist understands it; but in the universal judgment we do not merely assert a universal related to another universal. In the judgment "All men are mortal" we inevitably assert all individual men also (taken in denotation) as related to either mortality or mortal beings. How, now, are all individual men apprehended here? We do not apprehend every man with his particular features, we apprehend him as only a case of the universal humanity. Individual men are, in other words, known *through our knowledge of that universal*. This need not be the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa* of the Naiyāyikas. We may not *perceive* all individual men. Still somehow in the universal judgment we speak about all individual men, and this is possible if only we apprehend all men through our knowledge of the universal humanity. A subjective experiment is thus involved, and the experiment is embodied in the form "all". "All X's" cannot be a purely realistic fact. The Russellian idea of such "all" as an open class is unacceptable. In the judgment "All men are mortal" we do not mean that A, B, C, D, . . . . . *and so on* are mortal. There is no sense of privation here. It does not mean that the men whom you and I have seen *and those whom we have not seen* are mortal. This would be unduly apologetic. What is *positively* meant is that all individual men are mortal. We mean, in other words, a closed class, as much closed and positive as any group of enumerable things, the only difference between the two being that while the number in the latter is finite that in the former is infinite (not negative

infinite, but positive). Russell could at all interpret "all" in his way because he was predisposed to denying the connotative universal. His interpretation would have been legitimate were he able to account for the total meaning of "all" without having recourse to the connotative universal. But in the interest of economy he sacrificed at least an important part of the total meaning. We mean by "all" a positively infinite number of individuals. Such an "all" is not an absurdity as a Russellian would have us believe. A closed class of a positively infinite number of individuals is intelligible if understood through (the presupposed knowledge of) the corresponding connotative universal. Whether or not that connotative universal is itself also meant by "all" is not the point here. It is enough that at least the positively infinite number of individuals are meant.

Likewise the simple categorical form "this S is P" cannot also be taken as real in the realistic sense. In such judgments the predicate as almost always universal is to be understood, in the way of a universal subject, as somehow referring to all individuals, and therefore through a corresponding universal. Where the predicate is not a universal, or supposing that a universal need not be understood in denotation, there is still another reason—and that is more primary—why the form "this S is P" cannot be real in the realistic sense. The relation meant by the copula "is" embodies a subjective experiment, though only covertly. The relation meant is neither inherence nor contact nor any that is a *padārtha* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sense. It is one that relates S, P and that *padārtha*-relation into a unitary object, and is, therefore a *vikalpa*. This *vikalpa* is not consciously felt as experiment. But it must be one such. We have already proved that every *vikalpa* is knowledge-wise, though not for that reason merely subjective. This knowledge-wise-ness is no other than the fact that a mode of knowledge is embodied in the content. Over and above S, P and the *padārtha*-relation a second relation which as unifying the three has to be admitted cannot be real in the realistic sense.<sup>1</sup>

### C. Some clarifications—

There are two questions which should be answered at this stage. It may be asked if this relation also does not require another relation, and so on *ad infinitum*. It may also be asked if the original *padārtha*-relation does at all require the second relation.

To the first question the reply is in the negative. The second relation was required only to relate into a unity three items of reality one of which happened to be a relation. Before that unification there were only three items. But now that they stand unified through the second relation which is a *vikalpa*, there is no task left to relate this second relation again to the three items by further relations.

<sup>1</sup>For detailed analysis of the *vikalpa* relation involved in the categorical judgment see author's "Object Content and Relation"—Chap. II.

The reply to the second question is in the affirmative. The first original relation was not sufficient to have formed the unity that is meant by the judgment 'This S is P'. Often it is no genuine relation, but only a quality or even a substantive—indeed, anything whatever—which is somehow taken as intermediate between S and P. As such it cannot by itself relate S and P and (itself also) into a unity. When a so-called relation is a reality of this kind another relation which is genuinely a relation is requisitioned to do that work. But whatever else there is in the world of reals, this genuine relation is not there till that S, P and the so-called relation stand unified in knowledge. 'Unified in knowledge', we repeat, does not preclude the possibility that they stand unified in the world of reals also. The unsophisticated mind takes them as also forming a real unity, for such is the plain realistic import of the judgment.

The fact that S, P and their so-called relation are unified in knowledge and that yet the unity formed is real may be understood in three ways of which one only is tenable. It may mean that S, P and the so-called relation only *appear to be* really related. Secondly, it may mean that they had been standing as already really related before I had the *savikalpa* knowledge, but that this real unity comes to be revealed only with that *savikalpa* knowledge, almost in the same way in which Vaiśeṣika understands *sāmānya*. Or, thirdly, it may mean that they were not standing as really unified, but become related and unified just when I know them in the *savikalpa* way. Of these, the first alternative is rejected on the plain ground that no appearance can be dismissed as mere appearance or false unless there is a reason, and no such reason is forthcoming here. So long as there is nothing to the contrary a situation is *really* as it appears. It cannot be argued that there is a reason here for the dismissal, *viz.*, that the genuine *vikalpa* relation has come to be known as a mode of *knowledge*. For we cannot overlook the other side, *viz.*, that it is also asserted as real. To show merely that something is A does not prove that its appearance as B is unreal. For that another step is necessary. Either we must point to a clear defect (*doṣu*)<sup>1</sup> in that appearance or at least its being A is to be a matter of inference, it being presumed for the present that inference is a stronger *pramāṇa* than perception. But here the *vikalpa* relation to be a mode of knowledge is not a matter of inference. It is true the knowledgewise-ness of the *vikalpa* relation is not always evident; but for one who has perceived that *because-therefore, either-or, if-then, A as not B* and *all A* are knowledge-wise it is not difficult to perceive that even the simple categorical form is also a mode of knowledge, particularly when it is realised that S, P and their so-called relation cannot unify themselves. Knowledgewise-ness of the categorical form does not merely follow from the impossibility of unification, it comes also to be immediately realised. There is, again, no specifiable defect in our awareness (which is quite

<sup>1</sup>The defect to be pointed out must not be a *deus ex machina*. It has to be a *vera causa*.

One point regarding the function of defect. Some believe that it is no ground for rejection, but rather an explanation as to how illusion did at all occur. But this is untenable. Assuredly in some cases an object is rejected because of a defect discovered in the knowledge of it. If so, why may it not be a ground in some other cases also?

primary) that the genuine relation is fact. Hence the dismissal of it as sheer appearance or false would be unjustified.

Even if the knowledgewise-ness of the categorical *vikalpa* were merely a matter of inference, there is no reason why inference here should be preferred to the immediate knowledge that the *vikalpa* is real. Inference is preferred to immediate knowledge either when it not merely contradicts but definitely sublates (why, we may not say) the content of immediate knowledge, or when it is followed by the perception of a defect in that immediate knowledge, or when our point of view is that of *prāmāṇya*, not of primary assertion which is present as much in inference as in perception. In the present case the inferred knowledgewise-ness of the *vikalpa* does nothing of the sort, and the point of view is *ex-hypothesi* not of *prāmāṇya*.

Inference is sometimes regarded as a stronger *pramāṇa* on the ground that it is supported by many cognitions that are involved in it. But the point of view of corroboration is that of *prāmāṇya*, not of primary assertion. The *prāmāṇya* of a cognition may be extrinsic to that cognition as primary assertion, in which case it is doubtful if *prāmāṇya* has any metaphysical import.<sup>1</sup> Or it may be intrinsic in which case the entire problem of *prāmāṇya* is a little more than explication. Either way the attitude of *prāmāṇya* is not very relevant to primary assertion. It would be useless to argue that when a cognition is confirmed from the point of view of *prāmāṇya* chances of its possible rejection are eliminated. Mere elimination of possible errors does not make a cognition valid unless it were already so taken, though amidst a mass of confusions.<sup>2</sup>

A particular cognition can also be dismissed as erroneous if it is succeeded by one which is its contradictory, the idea being that a cognition is the assertion of a genuine reality till it comes to be contradicted, and that the later contradictory cognition has not yet been contradicted. *Uttarajñānaṣṣapāta* belongs, in this sense, to the very constitution of knowledge. But in the present case there is a strange phenomenon. The knowledge that the *vikalpa* relation is a mode of knowledge may be later than the assertion of that relation as real, yet when that later knowledge occurs the prior one is not sublated. Both continue with unabated primacy.

The reality of this relation, then, cannot be false or sheer appearance.

The second alternative mentioned in page 36 above, *viz.*, that S, P and their so-called relation had already formed a unity and is only revealed in *savikalpa-jñāna*, has also to be rejected. The unity could not have been formed by the so-called relation, and a fresh relation which alone could form it could not

<sup>1</sup>Logical Positivists take *truth* in this sense as without metaphysical import. By "truth" they mean exactly what Indians mean by "*prāmāṇya*".

Even Naiyāyikas who recognise extrinsic truth, *i.e.*, believe that truth = *prāmāṇya* is extrinsic to primary assertion, are not clear on the point whether truth has metaphysical import, except when they say that the inference which establishes the *prāmāṇya* of an assertion is based on its *samarthapravṛtṭijanakatva*.

<sup>2</sup>The problem of *prāmāṇya* will again come up for discussion later.

have been there before the *savikalpajñāna*, because, as already shown, it is knowledge-wise. It has also been shown that the simple categorical form, quite as much as other forms of proposition, embody subjective experiment.

Hence the third alternative alone is left. The *vikalpa* relation and the unity occur as real only when S, P and their so-called relation are known in the *savikalpa* way. This does not mean that the *savikalpajñāna* as an efficient cause has produced something in the reals concerned. What is meant is that the propositional form, though knowledge-wise, comes to be asserted as involved in those reals. Though knowledge-wise, it comes to be asserted as real also ; and as this is not self-contradictory, it can be taken as really real.<sup>1</sup>

But is not a real independent of the knowledge of it, and does this not imply that it existed before that knowledge occurred ? If something appears real only so long as it is known, is it not for that very reason called unreal ?

The answer depends on what is meant by the word "reality". If it means 'that which exists and is independent of the knowledge of it', the *vikalpa* relation and the unity are real, because even though they are constituted by knowledge they are yet asserted as existent and independent of knowledge, and we have seen how to be constituted by knowledge does not clash with this other character. It follows that to have remained prior to knowledge is not necessary for something to be real. Many reals may be so prior, but some need not be.<sup>2</sup>

Or, it may be said that the *vikalpa* and the unity had remained prior to knowledge, but as so prior they were not *existent*. Like subsistent values they had only been *demanding* existence, but were not actually existent. They come to exist only when they are known. As subsistent, *vikalpa* relations remain in their self-contained aloofness, and relate S, P and their so-called relation only when these latter come to be known, and through that knowledge. It is because they yet maintain their Platonic ideality that they refuse to be wholly identified with that knowledge and proclaim themselves as prior to that knowledge ; and it is because they now stand as relating, and therefore adjectival to, the actually real S, P and their so-called relation that they in that function come to be known as actually existent. This is more or less the Kantian view of *vikalpas*. Whichever interpretation is accepted we have to admit grades of metaphysical status. In the first interpretation there would be two kinds of reality, one co-temporal with knowledge and the other transcending its duration; and as this distinction concerns the very existence, not the content, it is a distinction of metaphysical status. The distinction between subsistence (*demand* for existence) and actual existence is obviously a distinction of metaphysical status.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>"Really real" means that it is wholly independent of the knowledge of it.

<sup>2</sup>This is why Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that the cause of *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is not its (total) content, but only the corresponding *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*.

<sup>3</sup>Vide author's "The Business of Philosophy" in the Proceedings of the Indian-Philosophical Congress, 1955, and "Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper" in K.C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume.

#### D. *An aspect of Logical Positivism examined*

The Indian position has been vindicated. It has been shown that over and above reality, though not necessarily separate from it, object has to be admitted. This has been established through an analysis of the metaphysical import of thought-forms. The only conceivable way to get rid of this intermediate entity would be to deny that forms of thought have any metaphysical import. Logical Positivists have attempted this in their systematic campaign against thought. They consider forms of thought as *either* only means to analytical interpretation, the whole interpretation being only linguistic, *or* vicarious, misrepresenting a clever language-construction as pointing to a reality.

But it is difficult to see why thought should be so unceremoniously guillotined. Mass hysteria is no logical justification. These Positivists ought to have seen that no judgment, not even the simple categorical, is either a mere analytical representation of a non-judgmental content—what to speak of non-perceptual judgments which are obviously not so?—or, because of the extra element involved in it, vicarious, for we all believe that the total content of the judgment is real exactly in the form in which it appears in the judgment. We have already seen that in spite of being knowledge-wise the extra element is nevertheless felt as real and that the two aspects do not clash. These Positivists have never explained why among the devils of judgment some, *viz.*, a good number of perceptual judgments, are obedient slaves. We can understand Kant who has excluded a very limited number of judgments, and that on definite grounds. But these Positivists have started with a bias. They have indeed shown extra-ordinary skill in translating non-perceptual judgments into the language of simple perception. But translation always falls short of the original: the original vitality is always missed and there is only vicarious compensation.

Perceptual judgments do not merely analytically represent contents of simple perception. In simple perception there is a bare plurality of S, P and a so-called relation between them, all appearing either discrete or non-distinguished. But the judgment "This S is P" means that S and P, and sometimes their so-called relation also, are distinguished and yet related into a unity.

We have said that in simple perception S, P and their so-called relation are *either* discrete *or* non-distinguished. The former is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view according to which simple perception (*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*) is certified not by introspection but by inference, and the simple elements that are inferred as constituting a substantive-adjective complex perceived have to be inferred as discrete. But one is not compelled to accept the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that simple perception has only to be inferred. One might hold that it is an introspectable stage. In this other view the simple constituents are not found as discrete, but in a sense non-distinguished. Let us explain, how.

If there is any psychological stage, called non-judgmental perception, it is of the form SP (this blue pot—*nīlaghaṭaḥ*) which differs from "this S is P" in that while in the latter S and P are both distinguished and related, the relation standing

as a distinct entity, we do not find this phenomenon in the simple SP. Not that SP is therefore an amorphous homogeneity, as Bradley would have it. If there is at all a psychological stage having the simple content SP, we are aware, at that very stage, of S and P also, the three contents—S, P and SP—alternating indeterminately, each, at the time it is apprehended, standing as absolute. When we are aware of S there is no question of either P or SP, and similarly with P; and when we are aware of SP it is not apprehended as the unity of S and P, but as much an absolute entity as that S or P. A whole, in simple perception, is never known as a whole *of parts*. For that apprehension the parts and the whole require to be related in a judgmental form of awareness. The very words “part” and “whole” are relevant in a judgment context only. If A, B and C are three absolute entities, C is a whole, and A and B are parts, *only when* between C, on the one hand, and A and B, on the other, a certain relation of dependence is asserted, when, *e.g.*, it is known that while A and B are dissociable from C, C is not so dissociable from A and B; and such knowledge cannot be simple perception. Similarly with regard to any other unity. A universal or a substance, *e.g.*, is felt as dissociable from the relevant particulars or attributes, but not the latter from the former. In simple perception, then, S, P and SP are each absolute, and there is no question of a relation between them. But in the judgment “This S is P” S and P (and it may be, their so-called relation also) are related in a specifiable way in the unity SP. The indeterminate alternation of several absolutes is thus, in simple categorical judgment, replaced by determinate relation.

In simple perception S, P and SP are each absolute. SP is not a unity, but as much an absolute entity as S or P. It may indeed be asked—Do not S and P stand involved in SP? How otherwise could it be known as SP? The reply is that in simple perception it is not known as SP, but merely as an absolute entity with a differential quality perceived. It is only retrospectively called SP, called that way from the point of view of the latter *judgment* “S is P.” But, it may be asked again, is not that SP known, at least in this retrospective manner, as identical with the unity known in the judgment “S is P”? We reply—Yes, there is only as much unity as between object and reality.

We thus find that even simple perception is not so simple as Logical Positivists believe. It too involves an extra element, the as yet undefined differential quality. The logical form of the simple categorical judgment may be understood as linguistic definition of this quality. But it is not like definitions elsewhere. In other cases of definitions there is no line, except in the verbal presentation, between the definitum and the definition. Here there is such a line. Yet, however, the linguistic form is asserted as real without any sense of inconsistency. We have also seen that there is no contradiction in a thought (language)-construction here being real.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Vikalpas* are constituted not merely by knowledge (thought) but by language also. Naiyāyikas also say that *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is *śabdānubiddha*. They only insist that the total content of *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is real also.

E. *Concept of relation reviewed*

It may be asked—if in the world of reals there are inherence (*samavāya*), contact (*saṃyoga*), etc., are they not genuine relations relating S and P into a unity, even apart from my knowing them ?

The answer should be prefaced by a more fundamental problem to be raised here and solved. If at a non-judgmental stage we can at all apprehend<sup>1</sup> S, P and SP which are real, is there at that stage any *object* over and above those reals ? The problem, in other words, is if even in non-judgmental perception there is the intermediate entity called *object* ?

We reply—There is. If the reals here are S, P and SP, the object is *these in indeterminate alternation*. In *savikalpajñāna* there are definite *vikalpa* relations binding reals into unities, but here in the place of those definite *vikalpas* there is only indeterminate alternation, and therefore also an indeterminate unity through that alternation. The unity that is effected by alternation is always indeterminate, as is evident in the case of disjunctive judgment. Here, however, in the present case, the alternation itself is indeterminate, and hence the unity effected is unlike one in disjunctive judgment. The unity here is not judgmental: the stage in question is below even simple categorical judgment. But there is still a unity, though at the vanishing point ; and the vanishing unity is here the *object*. The object here is more coincident with reals than in *savikalpajñāna*. The object and the real here are not *definitely* distinguishable.

It may still be asked if even at this stage the real SP is not apprehended as different from S and P, and, if so, whether the distinction can be anything but that this SP is a unity of S and P. The unity may be indeterminate, but is it not a unity still ? If so, has not the unity been effected by some elements in the region of reals, *viz.*, inherence, contact, etc.? But, again, if such unification through inherence, contact, etc., is possible, why was it said before that these are only *so-called* relations, not relations that unify and, therefore, relate reals ? With this we come to the question asked at the beginning of this sub-section.

The answer is that indeterminate unity is qualitatively different from one that is determinate. Indeterminate unity of S and P is little more than their alternation, as we find even in disjunction. When, again, the alternation itself is indeterminate, even SP which is the indeterminate unity of S and P alternates with that S and P. This latter means that though the difference between SP, on the one hand, and S and P, on the other, is now a little more defined the situation still remains indefinite. Indeterminate unity at the non-judgmental level, then, means either that S and P are only alternating with one another or that SP comes to stand with just a differential quality, not further defined. Even where S and P merely alternate they stand each with a differential quality, and the

<sup>1</sup>Throughout the following few pages we assume that *nirvikalpajñāna* is an introspectably detected stage.



quality is such that though it distinguishes S-with-that-emergent-quality from simple S, and P-with-that-emergent-quality from simple P, it is apprehended as somehow also the *same* in both. This vague sameness or identity of the differential quality, as appearing to transcend, on account of this identity, S and P comes to be represented as some sort of unity in the vague form of SP even here.

The unities effected by inherence and contact, and the latter as relations, are to be understood in this light. When S and P in *contact* effect SP what is apprehended at the non-judgmental level is (i) that S and P have each a differential quality which is, only retrospectively from the point of view of a later *savikalpajñāna*, represented as S-in-contact-with-P or P-in-contact-with-S, and (ii) that somehow the contact is also felt as numerically one and the same, so that we also say that S and P *are in contact*, the result being SP. The self-identical contact as standing between S and P is never apprehended as an explicit definite real, what is explicitly felt being only the indeterminate alternation of S-with-that-differential-quality and P-with-that-differential-quality. That this indeterminate alternation is at all felt, however vaguely, as the self-identical contact between S and P is no more than an incipient interpretation of the alternation in terms of *savikalpajñāna* (judgment). Judgment is so much a normal mode of knowing that even when we are aware that there is a non-judgmental mode, we, in spite of all caution, involuntarily smuggle its form, though now in disguise, into the non-judgmental content. Contact is really a differential quality of each term, the contact of P with S being different from and alternating with the contact of S with P. Indian thinkers have always taken contact as qualities of S and P alternating.

Contact includes a host of relations. Parts of a whole, *e.g.*, are in contact with one another : the spatial relation of the parts with one another is, in other words, nothing but a form of contact<sup>1</sup>. The spatial relations of up-down, right-left, *etc.*, are in many cases forms of contact, with, of course, additional differential qualities at the level of non-judgmental perception. The additional differential quality is only retrospectively definable in terms of *dik*. Often, again, this differential quality alone is found, when, *e.g.*, S and P are not in contact. As with spatial relations, so with corresponding temporal relations. Often, again, the contact is with the very principles of space and time. Into further niceties we need not enter.

A host of other relations are represented by *inherence*. The relation, *e.g.*, between a whole and a part, a universal and a particular, a quality and a substance, is inherence. But at the non-judgmental level it is not apprehended as a definite relation relating S and P. At that level it is only a differential quality of SP. SP no doubt alternates with S and P, but stands evident with that differential quality. The differential quality is only retrospectively specifiable as the fact

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<sup>1</sup>The whole and a part, however, are not in contact with one another. What that relation is will be seen very soon.

that from the total situation SP either S or P is dissociable and the other not. At the non-judgmental level there is only a vague sense of this dissociability. A whole or a universal or a substance is only vaguely felt as dissociable from the total situation, and the parts, particulars or qualities are vaguely felt as undissociable. The total situation SP is felt with this differential quality.<sup>1</sup>

Some Western thinkers and the Buddhists have missed the differential quality corresponding to what is called inherence and have accordingly denied the reality of the whole, the universal and the substance. Some of them have committed a further mistake of missing the reality-aspect of *vikalpa* relations, and this has led them to deny all reality to relations and unities. But, as is evident now, both these are exaggeration. The Buddhist position will be examined later.

#### F. *Object-reality distinction evident in correction of illusion*

The distinction between object and the real will also be evident from an analysis of illusion as corrected. Before correction the content of illusion is felt as real object. But after correction it stands as an object *minus* the reality-aspect, so that to the end it is still an object, though of a peculiar type, unconnected, or better, disconnected, with reality. This disconnection is not a normal feature of objects. But the illusory content is an abnormal object, and because illusion is cancelled we are forced to admit such disconnection.

Some believe that the corrected content as over and above reality is no object but subjective. Vijñānavādi Buddhists in India and many thinkers in the West have held this view. The Vijñānavādin's view will be examined later. They have offered arguments, and these will be examined in due course. But the Western thinkers who have passed this as almost self-evident have only confused different issues. That appearance is distinct from reality is one issue, and whether what is distinct from reality is subjective or not is another issue. The distinctness of appearance from reality is no sufficient reason that it is subjective. Further, these Western thinkers have misunderstood object as wholly identified with the real, and have naturally been driven to the conclusion that what is not real is, on that very account, not object, and is therefore subjective. But we have seen that object is neither unqualifiedly real nor unqualifiedly subjective (knowledge-wise).

There is another point to be considered in connection with the thesis that in correction of illusion we realise object as over and above reality. The object here is not necessarily the content of *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*. It includes the content of *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* as well, supposing there is such a stage evident to introspection. The thesis, in effect, means that though in normal perception<sup>2</sup>—judgmental or non-judgmental—object, in spite of being knowledge-wise, is found coincident with the real, it is apprehended as loosened when a perception comes to

<sup>1</sup>The whole (of parts) is not here SP. SP here is the totality of the whole and the parts.

<sup>2</sup>Including illusion as not yet corrected.

be corrected. We have seen that in non-perceptual knowledge *vikalpas* and, therefore, objects are clearly felt as knowledge-wise (experimental), though not for that reason denied reality. But this knowledge-wise-ness, we have also seen, is not so manifest in *savikalpa-perception*, far less in *nirvikalpa*; object in these two cases is not clearly felt as distinct from the real. Our present thesis is that the distinction of the perceptual object—a determinate unity or an indeterminate whole—from the real stands exposed in correction. By implication it is admitted that even non-judgmental simple perception (*nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*) can be erroneous.

We are often told, particularly by Western thinkers, that in non-judgmental simple perception there is no question of falsity, all question of truth or falsity arising only when knowledge is judgmental (*savikalpa*). This is untenable. If the content of non-judgmental perception be S, P and SP alternating, with a differential quality of either S and P or SP, there is no reason why this content should not be as much true or false as the content of judgment : all the difference between the two kinds of knowledge is that while in the latter there is explicit relation there is only a differential quality (or qualities) in the former. There is a kind of vague predication (unification), in the form of differential quality, in non-judgmental perception also. Further, it is difficult to see why truth or falsity should concern predication only. May not a simple content, not known as related with another be true or false ? When it is apprehended is it not asserted as real, and may not such assertion come in certain cases to be sublated later ?

The whole question as to whether the content of non-judgmental perception can or cannot be true or false depends on what is meant by the word "truth" or "falsity". If "truth" means that the content of knowledge *exists*, there is truth-claim in non-judgmental perception, for it too is asserted, *i.e.*, taken as existent. Similarly if "falsity" means that the once-asserted existence of the content is now disbelieved—disbelief being not necessarily judgmental, but at least in some cases the awareness of a differential quality of the content—there is nothing against a non-judgmental cognition being false.

An analysis of the very concept of judgmental rejection would corroborate this. Judgmental rejection=rejective judgment may be perceptive or non-perceptive—in Indian terminology, *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* and *savikalpa-parokṣajñāna*. Where it is perceptive there is in the content *perceived* a differential quality corresponding to the *vikālpa* relation of contradiction, over and above that contradiction itself. It is only when the rejective judgment is non-perceptive (*parokṣa*) that there is no question of that differential quality, and rejection in such cases is either through a categorical or hypothetical inference or through testimony. Thus even perceptual rejective *judgment* is intelligible through a perceived differential quality, corresponding to the relation of contradiction, in the content rejected (though there is in the content the

explicit relation of contradiction also). If so, the differential quality is, at least in some cases, a sufficient ground for the rejection of the content. Why, then, may not the content of non-judgmental cognition be also rejected, when in it too a similar differential quality comes to be perceived ?

Truth, however, and therefore falsity also, may mean something else. Truth may mean that the existence of the content is *explicitly* asserted, as in the judgment 'SP exists', and such assertion is always the *confirmation* of a prior knowledge of the content. Truth, in this sense, is but the confirmedness of that prior cognition, so that the existence of the content has come to be specifically pointed to. Falsity would, from this point of view, be the *untenability* of the prior cognition and, therefore, the explicit rejection of the content. This is the problem of *prāmāṇya* in Indian philosophy, not always clearly distinguished in the West from the simple assertion of the existence or non-existence of a content.

If truth and falsity are understood from this reflective point of view it would be admissible indeed that only judgments can be true or false. But there should be a note of caution at the same time that this is not true of all judgments, so that judgmentality is no *sine qua non* of truth and falsity. Existential judgments and judgments of modality alone can be true or false—judgments, namely, where existence or its near equivalent is stated as the explicit predicate. In other judgments there is no such explicit statement. In the judgment 'S is P,' for example, the copula 'is' represents more an explicit *vikalpa* relation than explicit existence of the content SP. That it appears to stand equally for both is an accident of English language. In Sanskrit we find that '*ghaṭo nīlaḥ*' is a sufficient expression, and the statement '*ghaṭo nīlo bhavati*' is not required. There is logical ground also. Even in English language the existential import can be explicitly distinguished, as in the judgment 'SP exists'; and it is plain logic that if something can be distinguished it, where not distinguished, remains implicit and subordinate. The copula in 'S is P' thus only implicitly and subordinately conveys the existence of SP. Overtly it represents a relation only between S and P.

If it be insisted that after all the existential import is still present, though not explicitly, in the judgment 'S is P,' we reply that it is equally present in non-judgmental perception also. As much in the latter as in the former the total content is known as existent. It has sometimes been urged that even judgments like 'S is P,' as distinguished from the non-judgmental awareness of SP, is against a doubt or challenge that S might not be P, so that as so against the doubt or the challenge it is more reflective than the non-judgmental awareness of SP and, therefore, asserts so far the existence of the content explicitly. But this would be a wrong understanding of the actual situation. 'S is P' is certainly more reflective than SP, and perhaps non-judgmental awareness is not reflective at all. But the reflectiveness of the former does not lie in its being against a doubt or challenge. Here there is neither an actual nor a possible doubt (or challenge).

That there is no actual doubt can hardly be questioned. There is no possible doubt too; for a possible one is no more than that which I in judging that way only anticipate, and it is a fact that I did not anticipate one. Had I anticipated, the judgment would have been of the form 'S is P,' with an emphasis on the existential import; and such judgments would be hardly distinguishable from the existential. The simple judgment 'S is P' is reflective in the sense that it is against the background of a half-distinguished *assumption* of the abstract content 'S as P.' This 'S as P' as half-distinguished is no other than the unity-through-*vikalpa*-relation considered apart from its reality aspect.

Sometimes, again, a third reason is offered why only judgment, and not non-judgmental awareness, can be true or false. It is said that as only judgment involves a sort of spontaneity, either because *vikalpa* relations are considered as *acts* or because a constructed general idea is appended to the subject, the question of the truth of the judgmental knowledge naturally crops up. But this, again, is both a too simple and a uselessly complicated account. Too simple, because whether *vikalpas* be acts or not, and whether a general idea be a construction or not, there is also the undeniable fact that every judgment asserts the reality of the total content. To forget this aspect and to insist on the *vikalpa* relations being subjective would be over-simplification. There is also unnecessary complication in that the *vikalpas* are taken as *acts* or, even by some, as forms of will, and general ideas are taken as mere constructions, whereas the peculiar character of judgment is intelligible even in the absence of any such theory.

So there is no reason why judgments alone should be true or false, and non-judgmental knowledge outside this distinction. Both equally are true or false, if 'truth' means that the content is known as existent, and 'falsity' that it is rejected. Only when truth is understood as the confirmedness of a cognition as against an actual or a possible challenge, and falsity as the corresponding rejection, can ordinary judgments and non-judgmental knowledge be taken as outside the distinction of truth and falsity. But as here we are not using the words 'truth' and 'falsity' in that sense we hold that all cognition can be true or false.

With this we come back to the problem of the exact status of the illusory content, whether in judgment or in non-judgmental knowledge.

### G. *Buddhist theory of ātmakhyāti examined*

Before an illusion is corrected the total content is taken as a real object. But after correction it is known as definitely not real and, therefore, to have been an object *minus* the reality-aspect. This is what is meant by *rejection* of the illusory content. It would be too much to claim, as some Buddhists have done, that even its objectivity is rejected. If they intend that both objectivity and reality are denied this would be unnecessary duplication. Rejection of any one of the two aspects is enough; so the other aspect has to be retained. It is enough for correction that the reality-aspect is rejected; hence objectivity ought to be

retained. But why may it not be interpreted the other way about? May it not be said that the aspect of objectivity is rejected and the reality-aspect retained? The Buddhists under consideration have, as a matter of fact, offered this interpretation. But this would only make the confusion worse confounded. If the content is real and yet not an object, it would be real as only a mode of knowledge. But does the corrective judgment assert this *subjective reality*? Do we find that the illusory snake was not an object but an existent subjective idea<sup>1</sup>?

Correction is either judgmental or non-judgmental. When judgmental, it is of the form 'this is not snake' coupled in a mysterious manner with another form, viz., 'this is rope'. The content 'this as not snake' is a unity, effected through a *vikalpa* relation, of a real *this* and either a real snake (when the *vikalpa* relation is negative) or the absence of snake. The content 'this as rope' is also a real unity of a real *this* and a real rope. In either case there is no escape from the *this*-element which is no subjective idea.

The Buddhists in question have held that the content of correction<sup>2</sup> is 'not this, but snake'. But even if this be allowed there is the other content 'this is rope' inseparably connected with it. In that other content *this*-element is asserted as existent, and it is also evident that this *this* is somehow non-different from the *this* in 'not this, but snake'. It is impossible that in the same correction the same *this* is both asserted as existent and rejected. That in the content 'this is rope' it is asserted as existent is beyond question. It follows that 'not this, but snake' is a mis-representation of the other content. That other content is either 'this, not snake' or 'this and snake, but no predicational identity of the two' or 'this and snake, but the two not consciously distinguished', etc., all of which are representable as 'this is not snake'. The Buddhist theory of *ātmakhyāti* cannot pass unchallenged.

Even if we allow the form 'not this, but snake', it does not follow that the snake-aspect is subjective. That would presuppose that 'this' means *to be now outside me*. But 'this' does not mean that. Even an *idea* which no one can call outside is a *this* to me if it is now. The concept 'this' is highly intriguing and involves either *now* or *here* which are equally intriguing. To interpret it as 'to be now outside me' would only be too facile.

The Vijñānavādin may argue that *snake* would still be subjective even if the content of correction were 'this, not snake'. 'Not snake' means that the snake is

<sup>1</sup>It is true that objectivity without reality is an equally perplexing notion. But the basic problem of error is just to understand this situation in a way that would remove the perplexity. It has been shown in the next few pages how different Indian thinkers, and some Western thinkers also, have struggled with the situation to discover the correct perspective. Except the Sūnyavādin, everybody in India has admitted that though the *total* content of illusion is not real, there is some reality nevertheless. The discussion has brought to the fore further characters of the object here. Some hold that it is a loose unity, some that it is no *cognitive* object and some that it is a new type of cognitive object, called *prātibhāsika*. The Vijñānavādin's contention that the illusory content is a subjective reality is only too hasty.

<sup>2</sup>By 'content of correction' is meant the content of the corrective judgment, not what is corrected.

rejected, and the rejected snake as ousted, on the one hand, from the world of reals and as yet not zero, on the other hand, cannot but be subjective. But this too would be a hasty conclusion. In spite of being false, the snake appeared as object. A theory of error which can retain this objectivity is to be preferred to one which denies it too easily; and considering what has been said so far about the distinction of object from reality, the presumption is against the idealistic theory of the Buddhists.

Correction may also be non-judgmental. But even there, as in all non-judgmental knowledge, the content is a presented rope with the peculiar flavour of a denied presented snake, or an absent snake with the peculiar flavour of its having been nevertheless presented, or a once-presented snake with the flavour of its being ousted by a now-presented rope, the once-presentedness of the snake being, of course, no more than a fringe round the flavour of being ousted. Whichever way the content appears, there is no scope for the particular Buddhist theory. In every case the content is presented as an *object*.

The rejected snake can in no way be taken as subjectively real. Indeed the phrase 'subjectively real' is often a camouflage. In what sense is a subjective idea real? Is it real in the sense of being independent of its knowledge, or is it real in the sense of being just existent?

The Buddhists under consideration hold that in correction the outsideness only of the content is denied, and its reality is retained. But is the subjective reality of the snake its original pre-correction reality? The pre-correction reality of the snake included its having been independent of the knowledge of it, whatever else it might have included. But at least that independence is now denied by those Buddhists. The subjective snake is then real in some other sense.

The reality of subjectivity is qualitatively different from that of a non-subjective content. While the reality of a non-subjective content is distinguishable from that content this is not the case, at least according to the Buddhists in question, with the subjective. The subjective, at least according to them, is self-evident: to be subjective is *ipso-facto* to be real. In 'this flower exists' existence can be imagined as dissociable, as at least a universal *belonging to* this flower, or even as what may lapse. But in 'I am' am-ness is the same thing as I-ness. I=I am. Contrariwise, the *content* of the non-subjective is imaginable apart from existence (or non-existence), but not so the content of the subjective. If the subjective can at all be imagined apart from existence, there is no conceivable way of adding that existence ever to the content. The subjective is either ever a mere content or ever with existence. Whichever way it is understood, it is evident that the reality of the subjective, if at all it is real, is qualitatively different from that of the non-subjective. To say, therefore, that the snake is subjectively real is little more than saying that it is just subjective. The reality with which we contrast the false is the reality of the non-subjective.

And yet these Buddhists persuade themselves that in correction the reality of the snake has been retained, as though it is the same reality which we had before correction.

It is true that there is a natural tendency to take what is not real (in the realistic sense) as merely my imagination and, so far, subjective. But there is no assurance till now that the image, though subjective, does not stand outside. The false snake, detected as false, may have been a subjective image. But I saw it outside, and it is not yet certain whether this outsideness came to be cancelled. It might well be that its reality (existence) alone is cancelled, the snake being understood as a ghostly outside entity, a floating adjective, as it were, of the rope that is real. An image to stand outside is not *prima facie* absurd. In every normal perception where the content is presentative-representative the representative element, though imaginal, stands outside, tied to what is merely presented. If this be allowed, why may not an image, in illusion, stand outside, though unconnected or misconnected with what is presented? That which in normal perception made the image an outside content is not the correctness of the perception, but only there being to that perception a presented content. In illusion too there is a presented content, and so there is no reason why it cannot be outside. The presented content is not, it is true, evident in its full character. But there is no denying the fact that there is a presented content. The represented content, again, is not a real adjective of the presented element. Nevertheless it is an adjective, though false, false in the sense of being really unconnected or misconnected. Alike in normal perception and illusion the image-element is outside. Imagination may be directed to a past thing or a given presentation, or to no thing whatever. When directed to a past thing, the insideness of the image is more evident than its outsideness. The *thing* no doubt is remembered, but as imagination has added nothing to the thing-as-it-was-perceived no special outsideness of the image is evident. What is evident on the other hand is that there are new laws, relations and characteristics of the imagination. As directed to a given presentation, however, the outsideness alone of the image is evident: the image stands tied, it is said, to the presentation. The insideness of the image here has only to be inferred, and it remains ever doubtful if here the dispositions have matured at all into a subjective image. The same thing occurs in illusion; only, here the image is freely or wrongly associated with the given presentation. Where, lastly, the image is not directed to anything—past or present—it is ever on the vanishing point and is kept steady, even as so vanishing, by words. In this case—we may call it idea, as distinct from the two previous types of image—it stands evident as merely inside. The outsideness of the image is complete in the second case only. The complete outsideness in the second case and the much less outsideness in the first are equally due to the reference of the imagination to real things outside. The Buddhists under consideration have been deluded by the theoretical insideness of the image. They have not seen that except in the third case above there is also its outsideness, evident in its fulness as much in perception as presentative-representative as in illusion



The idealistic account of the false content is thus untenable. The false content has to be taken as non-subjective, *i.e.*, an object, though it may not be a real object. All other Indian theories of error and the modern realistic theories of Alexander and other realists agree in this point.

In spite of this general agreement, however, they differ in some fundamentals, each having understood the concepts of object, reality and their relation in a different way. These theories should be examined separately.

#### H. *Some modern realistic theories of error examined*

Some modern realists believe that an object as such is neither real nor unreal and that the reality of a normal object and the unreality of one called illusory are equally unmetaphysical, being only contingent derivative characters.

But this is over-simplification in various ways. Let us see, how.

(1) An object that is rejected may be provisionally granted as subsisting on its own account and having unreality as a contingent derivative character. But the object of a normal cognition<sup>1</sup> is never felt as subsisting aloof from reality. It is felt from the beginning to the end as absolutely coincident with the real—in other words, as unqualifiedly real. It is only where there is no assertion, where a content is *merely entertained* that one may say it *subsists*. But such content is in the face of it an abstraction, and actually felt that way. Even doubt, question and suggestion are more or less assertive. In doubt and question there is still assertion, though it is either midway between or alternation of affirmation and denial, or the assertion here is vague and incomplete. It cannot be said that in doubt and question there is neither affirmation nor denial. Suggestion also is not without all assertion. Suggestion is the mere entertainment of a content-as-asserted. In all other types of cognition, except in error corrected, there is unambiguous affirmation or denial, though in the affirmation of one content there may remain involved (and subordinated) the denial of another content, and *vice versa*. In such cases the content is not felt as dissociated from reality. It would be useless to argue that the fact that the same content can be asserted, suggested, questioned, doubted, merely entertained or even rejected is enough to make one feel that it is at least dissociable, if not dissociate, from reality. The content that is simply entertained is abstract and symbolic, but a content asserted is felt neither as that abstract one *plus* its assertedness nor as symbolic *plus* something else. No concrete can be broken up adequately into (several abstract features or) an abstract feature *and* a dark solid base. A cow is not analysable into cowhood and an indeterminate solid base; that base is itself also a particular *cow*. Had not the base had a definite *svarūpa* the universal cowhood could not be

<sup>1</sup>We are here concentrating on *perception*. It will be shown later, in connection with the Advaita view of object, that in non-perceptual cognition object is felt, to whatever extent, as dissociated from the real. But that in no way affects their complete coincidence (identity) in perception.

connected with it to the preference of any other particular, say, one to which doghood or horsehood belongs. The content asserted is, again, real, and no reality is constituted by a bare symbolic possibility *and* something else. Possibility may at the most be the essence of the real, but even then the real is a *modification* of that possibility, so that between a real and a corresponding possible there is nothing that is explicitly common. If Y be a modification of X, it is X in another form, not X *and* another form, far less, therefore X and a dark ground. The relation of an asserted content C to a C that is merely entertained is true *mutadis mutandis* of its relation to C's that are doubted, questioned and suggested. To all these attitudes there is never the self-same content except in name, and even that *name* C is not the content of simple entertainment. Only the content of correction is absolutely the same as what was asserted. But of that later.

The realists under consideration might still argue that as we ourselves have shown through all these pages that object is different from the real we ought not to take exception to their view. Should not object as distinct from the real be taken as neither existent nor non-existent<sup>1</sup>?

We reply, we hold *also* that object is yet felt as coincident with the real, *i.e.*, as itself the real. We have also shown that there is no reason why one of these two apprehensions is to be preferred and the other rejected. To have preferred their distinction to the extent of rejecting their identity has been the over-simplification No. I of which these realists are guilty<sup>2</sup>. There are other acts of over-simplification also.

(2) They have understood the illusory content too hastily. True, when error is corrected we come to doubt if the content was definitely either existent or non-existent. But this 'not definitely either existent or non-existent' does not amount to 'neither existent nor non-existent'.

There is no evidence yet, nor even a reasonable suggestion, that it was definitely neither. The only case where there is definite absence of either is simple entertainment where the content is admittedly abstract ; but the content of error, even after correction, does not appear to be abstract. No one feels that the content of error should be taken as having been merely supposed or simply entertained. It need not be denied that the content is not felt as definitely either existent or non-existent, but that does not mean that it is definitely neither. It is still *asserted*, though neither as existent nor as non-existent.

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<sup>1</sup>Non-existence is also a form of reality.

<sup>2</sup>If reflectively, or in some specific cases, *e.g.*, in correction and non-perceptual cognition, object is felt as dissociated from the real, this does not affect their complete coincidence (identity) in normal perception. Reflection, as we have seen, does not here reject what is experienced in normal perception. If still one feels preference for reflection or for those specific cases, this is either sheer prejudice or suggests a transcendental standpoint (not logically substantiable) which demands re-orientation of all that we have known through ordinary means of knowledge.

The content corrected is still asserted in the sense that it is known as a sort of appearance of the real that is discovered in correction. After correction it is not felt as floating in the air. It is felt even then as somehow tagged to the real, not a self-subsistent content having nothing to do with the real. The question of unreality of that content at all arises only because there is such tagging : this appearance of the real is not a real appearance.

(3) These modern realists are guilty of yet another over-simplification. By treating object as such as neither real nor unreal and interpreting reality and unreality as equally pragmatic or linguistic or anything else they have missed a notable feature of the *unreal* object. In whatever way reality is interpreted, unreality is not co-ordinate with it. The unreal is that which was once apprehended as real. If it were not understood as 'once apprehended as real, but now rejected,' even abstract contents (including even the *neutral contents* of these realists) would have to be called unreal.

The central problem of error is how a content can be both objective and unreal. If the denial of objectivity, as by the Vijñānavādi Buddhist, has been too easy, so has been the attempt to treat reality and unreality as only extrinsic to the content.

#### I. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error*

The illusory content as both object and unreal could not be a problem at all if object in normal perception were not wholly coincident with the real. Object to be so coincident with the real is not merely what just happens when a perception is not erroneous. It follows, we have seen, from a fundamental postulate of knowledge, at least of perception<sup>1</sup>. The problem, then, is this :—How can the same object be real and unreal at the same time ?

The problem can be formulated in another way. In course of examining the modern realistic theory of error we have shown that the content rejected is, even after correction, *asserted*, though neither definitely as existent nor definitely as non-existent. It is asserted, in other words, as a queer type of appearance of the real. How can the rejected content be yet an appearance of the real ? A can be taken as an appearance of B if between them there runs a bond of identity. But how can there be a bond of identity between the false and the real when the false is definitely rejected as unreal ?

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika solves the problem characteristically in close touch with objective common sense. It holds that though prior to correction there was the awareness of a total object 'this snake' or 'this is snake,' correction of it entails that this awareness was wrong, another name of which is that the total content is unreal. Yet, however, the awareness of it was *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*, which implies that some reals (apprehended in *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*<sup>2</sup>) were related

<sup>1</sup>Most of the Indian thinkers believe that it is a postulate not merely of perception, but of all kinds of knowledge.

<sup>2</sup>Amended in footnote (3) to the next page.

into a unity by *vikalpas* which are knowledge-wise. The reals in the present case were *this* and *snake*, for nothing else could be related into the unity 'this is snake.' The *this* here was but the real rope perceived as mere *this*. Its rope-*svarūpa*<sup>1</sup> was not perceived on account of certain defects in the percipient or outside. We perceived, in other words, just a given substratum, no *svarūpa* of it. The other real was *snake*, but not *this snake* or *that snake*. Not *this snake*, because there was no snake presented. Nor, again, *that snake, i.e.*, a snake of the past remembered in relative fullness as the snake there and then, for *that snake* could not be combined with a *this* substratum. What could be so combined is just *snake* (*sarpamātra*). Some past snake is no doubt remembered, for otherwise there could not be a question of snake at all ; but it is not remembered as *that snake*. Only the snake-*svarūpa* is remembered. As any past snake is real, so is also the snake-*svarūpa* (*sarpamātra*) which is only a part of it. This snake-*svarūpa* came to be combined with a *this* into the *svikalpa* unity 'this is snake' through a peculiar psychological mechanism, viz., that the very memory of the snake-*svarūpa*<sup>2</sup> acted as the contact between the sense and the real substratum. This psychological mechanism does not concern us for the present.

The elements *this* and *snake*<sup>3</sup> are real. The *vikalpa* relation that combined them into a unity is also real ; this follows from the fundamental postulate of knowledge already mentioned. But unlike the elements and the *vikalpa* relation, the unity formed is not real. In correction this unity stands rejected. This last is the intriguing feature of illusion. Normally when the elements and the *vikalpa* relation are real the unity effected stands also as real. The present case is an exception, only because the unity has been rejected in correction. Not that I was not aware of the unity before correction, nor that as an object *then* it was not apprehended as real. But correction contradicts just this prior awareness and therefore sublates this object. It follows that once it is sublated it cannot be taken to have been real even before.

But if it cannot be said to have been real, how can we say that it was yet an object ? Does not the reality of every object follow from the very fundamental postulate of knowledge ? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika reply is that it cannot be said to have been an object even. It was indeed felt as an object, but as a matter of fact it was not an object<sup>4</sup>. Not that it was therefore wholly subjective. This idealistic theory has been already refuted. Moreover, if the elements are real outside their unity cannot be merely subjective. It cannot be said, again, that though the elements are real by themselves they yet *as in the unity* must partake of the nature of that unity. Here there is no question of the elements *in the unity* :

<sup>1</sup>'*Svarūpa*' might have been translated as 'character'. But such translation is risky, as it might suggest that the rope was not apprehended in *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*.

<sup>2</sup>Or the snake-*svarūpa* itself as remembered. Gaṅgeśa, for other reasons, believes that what acts as *sannikarṣa* here is *doṣa*.

<sup>3</sup>The snake-*svarūpa* is not indeed apprehended in *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa*. It is the content of such memory as is due to the maturation of the disposition (*samskāra*) of a prior *nirvikalpapratyakṣa* of snake.

<sup>4</sup>In the sense that there was no object of the form 'this is snake'.

in the unity there are no elements, there is only the unity, and nothing else, the elements being only inferred as having been apprehended in a prior *nirvikalpa* knowledge.

The unity in question is neither merely subjective nor an object coincident with the real. Not that as neither subjective nor such object it is the neutral object of the modern realists. Such neutral objects we have already dismissed. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is forced to conclude that after correction there is no talk of such unitary object. Though prior to correction some such unity appeared, correction is just its sublation. What is meant is this :

After correction we cannot say 'This snake is (was) not'. Such negative judgment is impossible. Every judgment, affirmative or negative, is possible if at least the subject is already known as real. 'A table is not in the room' presupposes that there is a table in the world (though not in the room). But before we are entitled to say '*This snake* is not' we are already assured that *this snake* has been sublated. So there is no occasion to use 'this snake' as the subject of a judgment. It will be no use arguing that though the present *this snake* is sublated there were other *this-snakes* at other times. 'This' refers primarily to one unique particular, one that is presented just here and now, and in comparison with it the use of the word 'this' as characterising other things which were so presented is abstract and symbolic, not a genuine living use. Whatever else may be called *this*, the primary and living use of the word is regarding a very unique particular entity. *This snake* is the very particular unique snake that was here taken as a real object and is now sublated in correction. 'This snake', so understood, cannot be the subject of a judgment, affirmative or negative. The negation of *this snake*, so understood, would be a case of *aprasuktapratishedha*.

If *this snake* cannot be denied now, it cannot also be taken, from the point of view of correction, as what was affirmed before correction. From the point of view of correction, then, *this snake* was not an object.<sup>1</sup>

But do we not yet, even from the point of view of correction, say '*This snake* was not' or '*This snake* was apprehended as object', and do we not mean something by that? Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would claim that this is an unjustified use of language. We do certainly mean something, we mean that *this snake* is sublated. But sublation is not adequately representable in the form of a negative judgment. Sublation may include, imply or entail a negative judgment, but it is more than that. Even the negative judgment that is included, implied or entailed is not of the form '*this snake* is not', it is of the form 'no snake is here (in *this*), where the subject is not *aprasakta*.

It follows<sup>2</sup> that the unity effected out of *this* and *snake* through a *vikalpa* relation is not 'this is snake' or 'this snake', but 'snake is in this' or 'snake in this',

<sup>1</sup>It is not denied, however, that we somehow apprehended it as object. Correction sublates this object.

<sup>2</sup>Vide p. 31 ff.

not even 'snake as in this' (for in the statement 'snake as in this is not' the subject would be equally *aprasakta*). We have remarked earlier<sup>1</sup> that though in normal cases 'P is in S' is translatable as 'P is as in S' this is not possible here. The unity effected here is loose, not a close one like 'this is snake'. It may even be said that this unity is little more than nominal. 'In S' in the judgment 'P is in S' does not characterise and is not, therefore, predicable, in any normal sense of predication, of P<sup>2</sup>. The content 'snake in this' is not a unity except in name. What is apprehended here in *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is the very reals *snake, this* and *inness, and nothing else*. The factual relation is here itself the *vikalpa* relation<sup>3</sup>. Such is also the case with the content "hare's horn" which is rejected in the statement "hare's horn is not". What is negated here is not truly "hare's horn", but 'horn in the hare'. Such interpretation in either case may appear circuitous. But it is inevitable, because otherwise there would be the impossible situation that a content—'this as snake' or "hare's horn"—is both rejected and yet a real object. If only a content is interpreted this way the difficulty would be removed: there would be an easy reconciliation of the rejection of a content with its being a real object<sup>4&5</sup>.

Because there was no genuine unity of the form 'this snake'='this is snake' Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika takes *this*-aspect as belonging to *this rope*, not to that apparent *this snake*. The *snake* that was real was not a *this snake*, it was merely *snake*; the rope alone was *this rope*, or, better, the rope was perceived (barely) as *this*. Many Indian thinkers have not admitted this. They believe that there was a *this*-aspect as much in the false content as in the rope. But they could at all hold this, only because they believed that there was a total false object of the form 'this is snake'. Why they hold this and how far they are justified will be seen in connection with our discussion of the Advaita theory of error later. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for reasons we have seen, cannot subscribe to this view.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the *this*-aspect does not really belong to the apparent content 'this snake'. This does not, however, mean that the business of correction is only to drop the *this*-aspect and retain the mere *snake*. It is only the Vijñānavādi Buddhists who argued that way and concluded that because 'this' means 'to be now outside me' correction presents the illusory content as not so outside, and, therefore, as subjective. The Vijñānavādin's view has been dismissed already. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may add that correction does not drop

<sup>1</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>Normally all relational judgments are also *characterising* judgments—'P is in S' is translatable into 'P is as in S'. So far modern mathematical logicians have scarcely improved on the Aristotelian logic. It is only when an erroneous or a self-contradictory content is sought to be represented in the form of judgment that we have relational judgment proper.

<sup>3</sup>Normally in 'P is in S' there is a secondary *vikalpa* relation, because the proposition can be written also as 'P is as in S'. But this is not true of 'horns in the hare' or 'snake in this'. See p. 31 ff.

<sup>4</sup>As the content 'snake here (*in this*)' is negated the false snake is really the 'snake not here', *i.e.*, the 'snake elsewhere'.

<sup>5</sup>Vācaspati Mīśra did not interpret the false content in this way, and was consequently compelled to admit an additional *vikalpa* relation which, according to him, was not real, *i.e.*, *asat*. But obviously this is not in tune with the realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

*this*-aspect ; it only cancels *sāmānādhikaranyā* of *this* and *snake* and presents the illusory content as 'snake in this'<sup>1</sup>.

### J. Alexander's theory of error examined

Alexander's theory, though largely in tune with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, differs from it in an important respect. Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, and practically on the same ground as theirs, he too holds that *this* and *snake* are each real, and as the snake-as-here ('this snake') is rejected it must be a snake elsewhere. Error lies, according to him, in mis-connecting the elsewhere snake with a sensed *this*. But the main point, *viz.*, about the exact status of the illusory content 'this snake', he left untouched. He draws no distinction between object and the real, except admitting that *this snake* is a false *appearance* of the sensed rope and that the falsity of the appearance is due to the content being a joint appearance of the rope, on the one hand, and the percipient mind (or the physiological organism), on the other. If by this he means that the appearance is of the rope and yet constituted in whatever way by the mind, it would be what we have so long been terming *object*. But probably he does not mean this. He understands it as in line with his 'mere appearance' where the constitutive factors are all physical. His 'mere appearance' is not *object* in our sense ; and in false appearance it is, as appears from what he says, an accident that one of the constitutive factors is the mind. Even as regards his 'real appearance', there is no contribution of the mind. By 'appearance' he only means a selected portion of reality. But in his doctrine of selection he errs in two ways. In the case of real appearance he has shown that the content of a perceptual knowledge is a portion of the reality-continuum, knowledge being nothing but a selective response. But he does not show how 'mere appearance' is a selection. The factors constituting it are admittedly not selected from the reality-continuum, but neither so is the content called 'mere appearance'. The factors, again, are parts of the reality-continuum, though not selected ; but that *content* is not even a part. It would be too much to contend that the oval shape of a round coin is a *part* of the reality. It depends on the position of the percipient's body *vis a vis* the round coin. If it be contended that the round shape too depends on the position of the body, the conclusion should rather be that every appearance—real or mere (and *a fortiori* the unreal also)—depends on the subject and is, therefore, *object* in our sense. There is no ground to overlook this dependence in either case. As a matter of fact, even the real appearance depends on selection by the mind—depends, not for being known, for that would be a truism, *knowledge* meaning selection, but for the content being an appearance at all. This is not to be tabooed immediately as involving ego-centric predicament. We never deny that though the appearance so depends there is nevertheless an independent reality as the background, and we perceive not merely the appearance but also that reality.

<sup>1</sup>We have only *presented* the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, and our purpose was only to show what light this view of error throws on the problem object *vs* reality. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of error will be criticised in connection with the Advaita view treated later.

If Alexander wants to avoid this conclusion the only course left to him would be to hold that there is no appearance at all, but that knowledge as diaphanous directly reveals the real. But, then, there should be no talk of *selection* in the sense in which Alexander understands the term. If reality were a continuum selection would change it into a definite discrete portion, and knowledge would not be diaphanous. If, however, reality were not a continuum, but a series of discretets, knowledge would indeed be diaphanous, and the word 'selection' might be used in the *ordinary* sense of the mind being directly in contact with one specifically of the many discretets. But this would amount to abandoning the entire metaphysical structure which Alexander had built before he turned to epistemological problems. This is his second error.

As for the concept of diaphanous knowledge directly referring to definite discrete reals, we have already seen its defects in Sec. I. Here we may add one more point. If knowledge were diaphanous, directly in contact with definite discrete reals, how would perception, memory, inference, *etc.*, be distinguished from one another? We must say that either these cognitions are qualitatively distinct or their contents have perceivedness in one case, rememberedness in another, inferredness in a third, and so on, these being emergent differential characters of the contents themselves. But on the former alternative knowledge would no longer be diaphanous, and the second alternative would inevitably lead to a distinction between reality and object, that which has perceivedness, rememberedness, *etc.*, being a real, and that reality as with the perceivedness or rememberedness, *etc.*, being objects. If it be contended that the qualitative difference of types of cognition does not militate against being diaphanous—each such type directly referring to the real—we would ask: Does this reference account for our awareness of the real as *object*? Does it not merely prove that *there is a real* (with such and such characters)? From where, then, does the consciousness of that reality as *object* come? It cannot be said that *object* is another name for there being a real. The real was there even before I knew it. Nor can it be said that object is only another name for that real being known, for while the 'real being known' is known in a secondary experience, commonly called introspection, the real is known as *object* even in the primary experience. Knowledge as diaphanous cannot explain this primary knowledge of a real as *object*<sup>1</sup>. The much maligned representationism is in this point a better account than direct realism. The only defect—though that is serious—of representationism is that it has very sharply distinguished object and reality to the extreme point of their separation<sup>2</sup>. They, we

<sup>1</sup>We may also point out that each such type presents the real in different aspects. Perception, *e.g.*, presents it in both *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* aspects or in the *viśeṣa* aspect only; but inference presents it only in the *sāmānya* aspect (it does not present the *sāmānya* aspect only, the definite particular real is presented in that aspect). Now such aspects are not *parts* of the real, so that the concept of appearance (object) is here unavoidable. Or, we might say with the Advaitin that while perception removes both *asattūpādaka-ajñāna* and *abhānūpadaka-ajñāna* inference removes the former only. Here also these *ajñānas* are not *parts* of the real. As for what happens in memory, we need not discuss that here.

<sup>2</sup>Whether such sharp distinction is ultimately a defect or not will be examined later in connection with the Advaita view of object.



have so long been noting, are not separate. Except in erroneous perception<sup>1</sup>, object cannot be dissociated from reality. Objectivity is a character accruing to the real and is itself, on that very account, believed as real. To put the matter more succinctly, object, except in false perception<sup>2</sup> coincides with the real.

#### K. *Prābhākara theory of error examined*

Like the object of any normal perception, the false snake has to be taken as object, though it does not coincide with the real. But this non-coincidence, we have seen, is an anomalous phenomenon. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tried to remove the anomaly by recognising the constituents only of 'this snake' as real. This, snake and the *vikalpa* relation are alone, according to them, real; the total content is not real and, therefore, no unitary object even.

The Prābhākaras have proceeded another way. They stick more closely to the basic doctrine that object (at least in perception) must coincide with reality. Object, everywhere, is nothing but a real as revealed by knowledge, objectivity being only the character of being so revealed. Because this character must belong to a real that is so revealed, there obviously cannot be an object in default of that real. Except in cases where a content is false or self-contradictory, the Naiyāyika has also held this view; he has excepted the false or the self-contradictory only because it has come to be rejected. He has rather been compelled to except it. But the Prābhākaras would argue that there is no such compulsion. There is another alternative: we may deny that the content has at all been rejected. The Prābhākaras would argue as follows:

If once it is established that object is but a real as revealed by cognition it would be senseless to modify the position to the absurd extent that there may be object even though it is not real. The false content is, of course, a challenge to this notion of object: it appears to be rejected in correction. But would it not be better, the Prābhākaras argue, to re-assess the correction-situation to see if that rejection is not only apparent, nothing serious, than abandoning the definition of object already established? The Prābhākaras contend that in correction there is as a matter of fact no rejection. Rejection is always of a content which was *known*, i.e., taken as a *real object*. But as in correction we come to know that the false content was not a real object, this means that it was not a *known* object. What reflection certifies is the true nature of a thing. Correction as reflection certifies that there was no cognitive object. Hence truly there was no cognitive object. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers have also admitted this logic, though only partially. They too have contended that because in correction we come to know that there was no object in the form 'this snake' there really was no such object. But immediately after this, and uncritically enough, they have yet held that somehow they were aware of the object 'this snake' before correction. It

<sup>1</sup>Whether or not in non-perceptual knowledge also, will be seen later.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

is because of this their uncritical faith that they spoke of correction as the rejection (*bādha*) of the content. The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, hold that no content—not even the total content ‘this snake’—is rejected. If at all anything is rejected it is only the knownness, the cognitive character, of the total content, the content remaining untouched. But even this cognitive character is not *rejected*. Rejection of it would imply that before correction the content ‘this snake’ was apprehended as a cognitive object. Correction certifies this much only that there was no cognitive object like ‘this snake’. A cognitive object is *ipso facto* real (*pāramārthika*). Correction certifies only that it was not cognitive, but conative (*vyāvahārika*). Hence even before correction we were aware of it as only a conative unity. *This* and *snake* were, however, cognitive and, therefore, real objects; the question here is not about them, but about the content ‘this snake’ = ‘this is snake’.

But how is it, it may be asked, that when *this* and *snake* were *known* as real objects the total content ‘this is snake’ was not a cognitive object? The Prābhākaras reply that the so-called total situation was, from the cognitive point of view, a sheer privation: we only *did not distinguish* the two cognitions—one of *this* and the other of *snake*; or, better, the two cognitions remained undistinguished, and the so-called unitary content, cognitively speaking, is only their non-distinction. True, we acted according to this so-called total content, we fled when we saw ‘this snake’. Such acts, it is true, could not be prompted by sheer privation, and we have therefore to admit a *positive* unitary content and a positive awareness of it. But the Prābhākaras argue that though such positive unitary content and positive awareness have to be admitted the unity and the awareness are not *cognitive*. ‘This is snake’ is, in other words, no *object*. It is either what is only referred to by conation or a mere verbal unity.

Two things non-distinguished are often taken as one unity in the context of an act. It is the act which treats them as though they are unified. Act or will is normally indeed a response to a cognitive unity. But even in every such normal act there are contents which are cognised as non-distinct and yet unified by that act. What is called object of will is primarily the object of the cognition that causes the will; but in every will there is inevitably reference also to the means and a purpose which do not stand cognised as related to that object or to one another. By ‘purpose’ here is meant the actualisation (*bhāvanā*) of the object. The object of will was cognised as only a future reality, but there was no cognition of it as *to be actualised*. Futurity of the object was no doubt cognised, but it means only future actuality, not the dynamic *to be actualised* which is a peculiar unification, through will only, of the object and its futurity. X, Y, Z which are *means* to that actualisation were also cognised, but not *as means*. Their means-hood (*upāyatā*) is another peculiar unification, by will only, of X, Y, Z with that object of will. They might have been cognised as causes, but not as means. Means-hood and purpose-hood are absolutely conative categories. Action alone thus unifies contents which are cognised as non-dis-

tinct, *e.i.*, unrelated to one another, relation necessarily presupposing that *relata* are known as distinct from one another. We have seen that the contents of *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were also known as non-distinct from one another, 'non-distinct' meaning here, as also in the Prābhākara view under discussion, not that the contents are each known with its self-identity<sup>1</sup>, but that they are not known as each being *not another* or each dissociated from another. We have also seen how in *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* these non-distinct contents get related to one another and turn into a unity (though these relations and that unity are not merely subjective). Such unity is *cognitive*. The Prābhākaras only contend that there is also another type of unity which, as described above, is conative. The conative unity is called by them *vyāvahārika*. As in normal will, so also in illusion the unity 'this snake' is *vyāvahārika* only. *This* and *snake* get unified in the context of act only.

There is another possible account of the positive unity of the illusory content, and some Prābhākaras have admitted that. It is that the unity is only *verbal*. In a sense the Naiyāyikas also regard the unity, not only here but even in normal *savikalpa-pratyakṣa*, as verbal. Every *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is, according to them, *śabdānubiddha*. *Vikalpa* relations are necessarily semantic forms of language, forms of language *spoken*, not *heard*, language that is *spoken* being, as spoken, undissociable from *knowledge* as judgment. The language that is dissociated from *knowledge* as judgment is the language which is *heard*, such language as heard being taken as a system of sounds or marks producing in the hearer another judgmental knowledge which, however, is not then spoken by the hearer implicitly or explicitly. The unity, thus, not merely in illusion but in every case of *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is, according to the Naiyāyika, verbal. But the Naiyāika has not refrained from saying that as much in illusion as in every case of *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* it is also real and, therefore, an object. These Prābhākaras, however, here part company. They agree with the Naiyāikas that in normal *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* the unity is an object and would even go farther and hold that there is such unity as object even in *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* where it remains in some latent form. But they would entirely disagree with them so far as the content of erroneous perception<sup>2</sup> is concerned. The unitary content is in this case merely verbal, not real.

Whichever way 'this snake' is interpreted—whether as non-distinction of *this* and *snake* or as a conative or a merely verbal unity of these there is no question of its rejection. What may be said to be rejected is only the positive cognitive character of 'this snake'. But, as already seen, even this is not rejected, we only deny it. Even before correction 'this snake' was not apprehended as a positive cognitive object.

<sup>1</sup>This self-identity is what is called in other systems *viśeṣa*, and in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the very *svarūpa* of the content.

<sup>2</sup>Throughout this section we are considering erroneous *perception*, not error in non-perceptual knowledge.

The Prābhākara view is in perfect consonance with the doctrine that every cognitive object is real. But its weakness also is evident, and the weakness is fundamental.

The Prābhākara contention that even the cognitive character of the object 'this snake' is not rejected, but only negated, does not appear to be a sound account of the business of correction. Whatever be the Prābhākara theory, we do feel that before correction we were aware of 'this snake' as a cognitive object. It is too much to claim that we were aware of it as a conative or only a verbal object or as *this* and *snake* non-distinguished. The Prābhākaras were right in claiming that reflection offers a true account of the nature of the thing reflected on. But this does not mean that even before reflection we were aware of the thing in that correct way. Often the reflective account appears, without any hitch, as contradicting and often, again, as rejecting the unreflective account. There is no good reason why the Prābhākaras should discount the second contingency. Rejection (*bādha*) is often an actual phenomenon, and it is no good fighting shy of it. But once we admit rejection it would mean good-bye to the Prābhākara theory.



# THE SOURCES OF DHARMA

## PART II

By Dr. RAJENDRA CHANDRA HAZRA

The long period which intervened between the compilation of the comparatively early Vedic works and that of the extant treatises on Dharma, was responsible not only for the extinction of a number of Vedic schools which had grown up in different parts of India but also for serious changes in the social and religious life of the people all over the country. The *Atharva-veda* played, and was still playing, its important part in moulding the social and religious life of the Hindus and came to be recognised very widely, though not universally, as the fourth Veda and as one of the primary sources of Dharma ; but there were many rites, customs and usages which could not be traced direct to any of the four Vedas. So, for their own interest and integrity it became absolutely necessary for the followers of the Vedas to recognise some such secondary sources as could serve as the basis of, and also give sanctity and respectability to, these time-honoured rites, customs and usages. It is not our intention here to assert that the recognition of secondary sources of Dharma was a matter of the post-Vedic period. We cannot say with any amount of certainty that at all times during the Vedic period all the rites, customs and usages of the Vedic people could be traced to the Vedas. It is well-known that the Vedic Samhitas were not really meant for recording or dictating Dharma, popular or otherwise ; and the personality and freedom of will of a man even of the Vedic age could not but induce him on occasions, however rare, to step out of the beaten track of his forefathers and put new practices into force. So, it is quite possible that the recognition of at least some of the secondary sources of Dharma had its beginning in the Vedic age. But as we have got no reliable record of such early recognition, we come down to a comparatively late period during which the famous works of Jaimini, Gautama, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and others were compiled. In his *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which is the earliest of the extant works on Mīmāṃsā, Jaimini recognises some secondary source or sources of Dharma, for which he uses the terms 'śabda', 'anumāna' and 'Smṛti'<sup>1</sup>. As the first two terms are vague and generally comprehensive and do not help us in any way understand correctly the nature of the secondary source or sources of Dharma recognised by Jaimini, we naturally turn to the Śābara-bhāṣya for clarification and find that Śābara-svāmin takes these two terms to mean 'Smṛti'. If Śābara-svāmin's interpretation is correct, then we are to admit that Jaimini recognises nothing other than 'Smṛti' as a secondary source of Dharma<sup>1a</sup>. In the *Kauṣītaki-grhya-sūtra* also we find mention of only Śruti and Smṛti of those thoroughly conversant

<sup>1</sup>See *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 1-2 (dharmasya śabda-mūlatvād aśabdān anapekṣaṃ syāt/ api vā karṣ-sāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānam syāt), vi. 8. 23 (udagayana-pūrvapakṣāhaḥ-punyāheṣu daivānismṛti-rūp-ānyārtha-darśanāt), and xii. 4. 43 (smṛter vā syād brāhmaṇānam).

<sup>1a</sup>In commenting on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 15 (anumāna-vyavasthānāt tat-samyuktam pramāṇam syāt) Śābara-svāmin says "anumānāt smṛter ācārānām ca pramāṇyam iṣyate/ etc." and cites Holākā, Āhinaibuka, Udvṛṣabhayajña, etc. as instances of 'Ācāras' prevailing in particular parts of India. It is to be noted that these Ācāras are not such as have not been mentioned in any work recognised as 'Smṛti'. For instance, the Holākā has been mentioned and proscribed in the *Kāṭhaka-grhya-sūtra* (alias *Laugākṣi-grhya-sūtra*, ed. W. Caland, 73.1-rākā holāke). The same is the case with those acts (viz., a student's following his teacher, the digging of tanks, establishment of drinking booths, etc.) which have been mentioned as 'ācāra' (practice) in Śābara's Bhāṣya on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 2 (Poona ed., I, p. 165).

with tradition' (vi. 6.16. . . . . yathāgama-prajñā-śruti-smṛti-vibhavāt. . . . .). But the jurist Gautama goes a step farther and names 'Smṛti' and 'Śīla' as secondary sources, saying :

“vedo dharmā-mūlam/tad-vidāṃ ca smṛti-śīle/”<sup>2</sup>

“The Veda is the source (or root) of Dharma, and (also) the tradition and practice of those who know it (i.e., the Veda)”. Baudhāyana also says :

“upadiṣṭo dharmāḥ prati-vedam/smārto dvitīyaḥ/tṛtīyaḥ śiṣṭāgamaḥ/”<sup>3</sup>

“(The first and foremost kind of) Dharma has been instructed in every Veda. The second (kind of it) is what is declared in Smṛtis ; (and) the third is the practice of the Śiṣṭas.”

According to Āpastamba, the acts of Dharma are those which are evolved from conventions and practices (sāmayācārika), and the authorities on these are the conventions of those who know Dharma, and the Vedas.<sup>4</sup> Vasiṣṭha says :

“śruti-smṛti-vihito dharmāḥ/tad-alābhe śiṣṭācāraḥ pramāṇam/”<sup>5</sup>

“Dharma is prescribed by Śruti and Smṛti. In the absence of these (two) the practice of the Śiṣṭas is the authority.”

It is to be noted that for the term 'śīla' of Gautama, Baudhāyana uses “śiṣṭāgama”<sup>6</sup> and Vasiṣṭha has “śiṣṭācāra”, whereas Āpastamba employs the word “dharmajña-samaya” to mean both “smṛti” and “śiṣṭācāra”. That the word 'śīla' (derived from the root 'śīl' meaning 'to do', 'to practise'), as occurring in Gautama's Sūtra, means śiṣṭāgama or śiṣṭācāra, and not the traits of good conduct (śīla) as enumerated by Hārīta and the *Mahābhārata*<sup>8</sup>, is shown by the immediately following two Sūtras (1. 3-4) of Gautama which run as follows :

<sup>2</sup>Gautama-dharma-sūtra 1. 1-2.

<sup>3</sup>Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra i. 1. 1 and 3-4.

<sup>4</sup>Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra i. 1. 1. 1-3-athātaḥ sūmayācārikān dharmān vyūkhyāsyāmaḥ/dharmajña-samayaḥ pramāṇam/vedās ca/

<sup>5</sup>Vasiṣṭha-smṛti 1. 3-4.

<sup>6</sup>In commenting on *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1.4 Govinda-svāmin explains the word 'śiṣṭāgamaḥ' thus : 'śiṣṭair āgamyata iti śiṣṭāgamaḥ/śiṣṭair ācarita ityarthah/'

<sup>7</sup>The word 'dharmajña' in 'dharmajña-samayaḥ' presupposes a thorough knowledge of the Vedas. So, 'samaya', by which Haradatta and others mean 'paurāṣeyī vyavasthā' (conventions started by men), must be taken to comprise both 'smārta-dharma' and 'śiṣṭācāra'.

<sup>8</sup>The relevant passages of Hārīta and the *Mahābhārata* are the following :

(a) “brahmanyatā deva-pitr-bhaktatā saumyatā aparopatāpitā anasūyatā mṛdatā apāruṣyam maitratā priya-vāditvam kṛtajñatā śraṇyatā kāruṇyam praśāntīś ceti trayodaśa-vidham śīlam”, quoted as from Hārīta in Lakṣmidhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I (Brahmacāri-kāṇḍa), p. 20 (containing an incomplete list), Kullūka-bhaṭṭa's commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* (ed. Bibl., Ind., Calcutta), Vol. II (Vrata-khaṇḍa), Part i, pp. 17-18 (reading 'anasūyatā' for 'anasūyatā'), Caṇḍośvara Thakura's *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 26 (omitting 'kāruṇyam' like the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, and reading 'praṇatīḥ' for 'praśāntīḥ'), and so on.

(b) “adrohaḥ sarva-bhūtānām karmaṇā manasā girā/  
anugrahaś ca dānaḥ ca śīlam etad vidur budhāḥ/”

quoted as from the *Mahābhārata* in *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 20 (v.l. dānaś ca), *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 26 (v. l. 'jñānaḥ' for 'dānaḥ'), and so on.

“dr̥ṣṭo dharmā-vyatikramāḥ sāhasaṃ ca mahatām/avara-daurbalyāt/”<sup>9</sup>

“Transgression of Dharma and (commission of acts of) rashness (on the part) of great (men) are found. (But,) on account of want of strength (of character) of the people of later ages, (these acts must not be taken by them as authorities on Dharma).”

In the first of these two Sūtras, two kinds of unlawful acts of great men have been distinguished, viz., those which make their doers guilty of transgression of Dharma (dharma-vyatikrama) and others which are classed separately as commission of rashness (sāhasa). As all these immoral acts are cited as forming exceptions to ‘śīla’, the latter must be taken in a much wider sense to mean “practice” (ācāra) in general (and not merely ‘brahmaṇyatā’, ‘deva-pitr-bhaktatā’, etc., as enumerated by Hārīta and the *Mahābhārata*). In commenting on these Sūtras Haradatta gives for ‘śīlam’ the synonym ‘anuṣṭhānam’; and Maskari takes this word to mean those practices (samācāra) which, being numerous and also different in different countries, remain unrecorded<sup>10</sup>. The instances of dharma-vyatikrama and sāhasa, as cited by Haradatta, Maskari, Devaṇabhaṭṭa and others<sup>11</sup>, should also be considered in this connection.

Going to explain the significance of the word ‘śiṣṭa’ (meaning ‘cultured’) Baudhayana says :

<sup>9</sup>It should be mentioned here that Haradatta reads the second of these two Sūtras simply as ‘avara-daurbalyāt’, which, consequently, becomes too incomplete and elliptical for his explanation. In the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*, as printed in the *Īnaviṃśati-saṃhitā* (published by the Vaṅgavāsī Press, Calcutta, 1310 B. S.), the *Aṣṭādaśa-smṛti* (published by the Venkat. Press, Bombay), and the *Smṛti-saṃdarbha* (ed. Guru-maṇḍala-grantha-mālā, No. IX, Calcutta, 1953) the reading of this Sūtra has been given as “na tu dr̥ṣṭo'rtho 'vara-daurbalyāt” (see *Īnaviṃśati-saṃhitā*, p. 435, *Aṣṭādaśa-smṛti*, p. 464, and *Smṛti-saṃdarbha*, Vol. IV, p. 1879), whereas in A. F. Stenzler's edition it reads as ‘na tu dr̥ṣṭārthe avara-daurbalyāt’. But Maskari reads it as ‘na tu dr̥ṣṭārthe 'vara-daurbalyāt’, and says that it should not be read as ‘na tu dr̥ṣṭārthe avara-daurbalyāt’ by taking the word ‘dr̥ṣṭārthe’ to be in the dual number to mean ‘dharma-vyatikrama-sāhasa’. Maskari explains this Sūtra saying :

“tu-śabdaḥ pakṣa-nivṛttyarthah/dr̥ṣṭārtho dr̥ṣṭa-prayojanaḥ tasmin dr̥ṣṭa-prayojane śīlam dharmā-mūlaṃ na bhavati/ tathā ca vasiṣṭhaḥ— ‘agrhyamāna-kāraṇo dharmāḥ’ iti/ . . . . . avara-daurbalyāt na varaḥ avaraḥ nikṛṣṭaḥ dveṣādyabhībhūtaḥ aparamārtha-jñāna ityarthah, tasya daurbalyāt dharmādharma-parijñānāsakter ityarthah/ etac cānena jñāpitaṃ bhavati—mahatām api tad-vidāṃ kadācid abhibhavo 'stīti, śarīravataḥ priyāpriya-yaor avāśyambhāvītvāt/ tasmād yāvad eteṣāṃ rāgādi-doṣeṇābhībhavaḥ, tāvat teṣāṃ ācār 'pi na grāhyaḥ/ tathā ca vasiṣṭhaḥ- ‘śiṣṭaḥ punar akāmātmā’ iti/ . . . . . Maskari's explanation shows that he construes this Sūtra thus : ‘na tu dr̥ṣṭārthe (dharma-vyatikrame sāhasa ca śīlam dharmā-mūlaṃ bhavati), avara-daurbalyāt’. He means to say that as, in the immoral acts of great men which are considered as transgression of Dharma (dharma-vyatikrama) and commission of rashness (sāhasa), the motives are visible, their Śīla (practice), so far as these acts are concerned, must not be taken as a source of Dharma, because, being under the temporary impulse of passion, these great men lose, for the time being, their power of distinguishing between Dharma and Adharma and thus come down to the level of ordinary men.

Maskari also suggests an alternative explanation, in which he takes the word ‘avara’ to mean ‘the modern people of the Kali age’ and thus agrees with Haradatta (athavā—avara-śabdenedaniṣṭanāḥ kali-yuga-puruṣā ucyaṅte, teṣāṃ daurbalyāt asāmarthyāt).

<sup>10</sup>śīlam anupanibaddhaḥ samācāraḥ kautuka-maṅgalādiḥ bahutvāt pratideśaṃ bhidyamānatvāc cānupanibaddhaḥ—Maskari-bhāṣya (*Gautama-dharma-sūtra*, ed. L. Srinivasacharya, Mysore).

<sup>11</sup>kataka-bharadvājau vyatyasya bhārye jagmatuḥ/vasiṣṭhaś caṇḍālim akṣamālām/ prajāpatiḥ svām duhitaram/rāmeṇa pitṛ-vacanād avicāreṇa mātuḥ śirāś chinnaṃ ityādi. . . . . —Haradatta.

yathā prajāpatiḥ svām duhitaram abhyadhyāyat, yathendrasyāhalyā-gamanādi, yathā vyāsa-bhīṣmādinām anāśramāvasthānam/—Maskari.



"Verily the Śiṣṭas are those who have their envy and pride gone, who keep corn of the measurement of a Kumbhī<sup>12</sup> (only), who are not greedy, and who are devoid of hypocrisy, arrogance, covetousness, delusion and anger.

"Those (persons, again,) are Śiṣṭas who have learnt the Veda in the prescribed manner together with its supplements, who know the inferences (drawn) from it, and who are (to others) the causes of direct perception of Śruti (i. e., who not only convey to others the instructions of the Veda but also make them appreciate its teachings by assiduously performing the acts prescribed by it<sup>13</sup>). Vasiṣṭha describes a Śiṣṭa thus:

nanu yadi vedavid-ācāraḥ pramāṇaṃ tarhi indra-candrāder ahalyā-tārādi-gamanam api pramāṇaṃ syāt/na ca tathā/ataḥ katham ācāra-prāmāṇyam/tad āha gautamaḥ.-'dṛṣṭo dharmavyatikramah sāhasam ca (teṣāṃ tejo-viśeṣeṇa pratyavāyo na vidyate)' iti/sāhasam paraśurāmāder mātuh śirāś-chedādi/—*Smṛti-candrikā*, I—*Saṃskāra-kāṇḍa*, p. 6.

See also the following :

'vyatikramah' buddhi-pūrvaṃ rāgād ācāraṇam, yathendrasyāhalyā-gamanam/'sāhasam' krodhādīnā avimṛṣya-kāraṇam, yathā vasiṣṭhasya jala-praveśaḥ/—*Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 27 (where Lakṣmīdhara explains *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* ii. 6. 13. 7-9—dṛṣṭo dharmavyatikramah sāhasam caiva pūrveṣāṃ, etc., quoted by him).

vyatikramo buddhi-pūrvakā rāgajā duṣpravṛttir yathendrasyāhalyā-saṅgaḥ/sāhasam krodhādīnāvimṛṣya-pravṛttir yathā vasiṣṭhasya jala-praveśaḥ/—*Kṛtya-ratnākara*, pp. 33-34 (where Caṇḍośvara quotes *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* ii. 6. 13. 7-9).

And so on.

<sup>12</sup>As to the meaning of the word 'kumbhī' scholars are very often found to differ from one another. In commenting on *Manu-smṛti* 4.7 Medhātithi takes this word to mean an 'uṣṭrikā' (an earthen vessel of the shape of a camel) and to indicate a stock of food-grains, etc. which is sufficient for a family for six months; according to Govindarāja it means a quantity sufficient for six days; and in Kullūka-bhaṭṭa's opinion it denotes a quantity on which a family may subsist for a year. Caṇḍośvara, who quotes the said verse of Manu in his *Gṛhasṭha-ratnākara* (Bibl. Ind. ed., p. 417), gives the synonym 'kalaśī' (meaning 'a pitcher') for 'kumbhī' and says (after Govindarāja) that this word (kumbhī) denotes a quantity of corn which is sufficient for six days. Viśvarūpa, on the other hand, takes this word, as occurring in the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (Trivandrum ed., 1.127) to mean a quantity of 'ten Droṇas' and supports his statement by quoting the line

"daśa droṇāḥ smṛtā kumbhī kusūlo dvi-guṇas tataḥ"

which he ascribes to experts on measurement (by quantity and weight). In his *Mitākṣarā* Vijnāneśvara agrees with Medhātithi in taking this word to mean an "uṣṭrikā" but says, following Govindarāja, that it indicates a quantity of corn sufficient for maintaining a family "for six days only". According to Aparārka, a 'kumbhī' denotes a quantity which is less than a "kusūla", and Govinda-sāmin (on *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 5) takes it to mean a quantity sufficient for ten days (kumbhī-dhānyāḥ daśaḥam jīvanaupāyika-dhānyāḥ). It is needless to cite further opinions.

<sup>13</sup>*Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 5-6—

śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigata-matsarā nirahamkārāḥ kumbhī-dhānyā alolupā  
dambha-darpa-lobha-moha-krodha-vivarjitāḥ/

dharmenādihikṛto yeṣāṃ vedaḥ sa-paribrmhaṇaḥ/  
śiṣṭās tad-anumānjñāḥ śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ//

(These lines have been ascribed to Yama in *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 26, and *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, pp. 32-33).

The word 'śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ' may as well be taken to mean 'those to whom Śruti is the direct cause or means (of perception of Dharma)'.—See Aparārka's commentary (on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*), p. 19—śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ śrutiḥ pratyakṣa-hetur yeṣāṃ sammatas te tathoktāḥ; Govinda-svāmin's commentary (on *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1.6)—śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ ca śrutir eva pratyakṣam kāraṇam asya dharmasyeti yeṣāṃ darśanam iti vighrahaḥ; *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 27—śrutir vedaḥ pratyakṣaḥ śravaṇendriya-grāhyo hetur upāyo dharmajñāne yeṣāṃ te tathoktāḥ (= *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 33—v. I. 'dharma-buddhau' for 'dharma-jñāne'); and so on. Medhātithi, on the other hand, takes this word to mean 'those to whom Śruti is perception and all other kinds of knowledge' and explains it saying :

"pratyakṣam hetavaś ca pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ/ hetu-śabdena pratyakṣād anya-pramāṇāny ucyante/ śrutiḥ pratyakṣo hetuś ca yeṣāṃ te śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ/ etad uktam bhavati/ yathā pratyakṣam nirvivādam pramāṇam eva tādrśim śrutim manyante, yāny api hetūtthāni pramāṇāni teṣu viśvasanti, śrutim eva tarkam manyante, hetu-śāstrārāyanena cedam na pramāṇikurvanti//"

“ A Śiṣṭa is one who has got no desire in his mind”<sup>14</sup>, and “Those Brāhmins are known as Śiṣṭas to whom the Veda has come down in succession with its supplements and who are (to others) the causes of direct perception of Śruti<sup>15</sup>”.

Manu agrees with Vasiṣṭha in characterising the Śiṣṭas<sup>16</sup>, and Hārīta takes them to be those who are given to (the practice of) the prescriptions of Śruti and Smṛti<sup>17</sup>.

From the opinions cited above regarding the characteristics of Śiṣṭas it is evident that according to Gautama, Baudhāyana and other earlier authorities, *the study and knowledge of the Vedas* was a necessary condition of ‘Śiṣṭatva’ (culture) and thus formed the basis of Śīla, Śiṣṭāgama or Śiṣṭācāra. It was also universally admitted by the Smṛtikāras<sup>18</sup> and the Mīmāṃsakas<sup>19</sup> that no tradition handed down from generation to generation in the families of persons other than those (Brahmins) who learnt and studied the Vedas and also assiduously performed the acts prescribed by these works, was to be recognised as ‘Smṛti’ which formed a secondary source of Dharma. So, according to Gautama and others, both ‘smṛti’ and ‘śiṣṭācāra’ (or ‘śīla’ or ‘śiṣṭāgama’) had a common basis, viz., the study and knowledge of the Vedas; and this was a very strict limitation imposed upon ‘śiṣṭācāra’, because it is not at all improbable that in the days of Gautama and others when the social and religious life of the people became more complex than in earlier days, there were some widely popular and firmly established traditions and customs<sup>20</sup> which had been started or handed down by persons who, though not learned in the Vedas, belonged to the Vedic fold and were highly respected for their character, conduct and attainments. It is not that Gautama and other comparatively early writers on Dharma were not alive to this fact, otherwise they would not make provisions for the recognition of the peculiar customs or usages of particular countries, towns, villages, castes, guilds, families, associations, etc., as valid and binding for the respective places or bodies, in case these peculiar customs or usages did not go *against* the prescriptions of the Vedas

<sup>14</sup>Vasiṣṭha-smṛti 1.5—śiṣṭaḥ punar akāmātmā/.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 6.39—pāramparyāgato yeśāṃ vedaḥ sa-paribr̥hṇaṇaḥ/  
te śiṣṭā brāhmanā jñeyāḥ śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ//

<sup>16</sup>See *Manu-smṛti* 12. 109 (which is practically the same as *Vasiṣṭha-smṛti* 6. 39 quoted above). In the first half of line 1, the *Manu-smṛti* reads ‘dharmenādhigato yais tu’.

<sup>17</sup>hārītaḥ—śiṣṭāḥ śruti-smṛti-vihitāvasthitāḥ pratipattavyāḥ’ quoted in *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 27, and *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 33.

<sup>18</sup>See, for instance, *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* 1.2 (tad-vidāṃ ca smṛti-śīle) cited above; *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 24 (in which śiṣṭāgama and śiṣṭa-smṛti have been mentioned as norms); *Manu-smṛti* 2. 6 (vedo ‘khilo dharmā-mūlaṃ smṛti-śīle ca tad-vidāṃ/.....) and 12. 95 (yā veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayo yās ca kāś ca kudṛṣṭayaḥ/ sarvās tā niṣphalāḥ pretya tamo-niṣṭhā hi tāḥ smṛtāḥ//.)

<sup>19</sup>See *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 2 (api vā karṣ-sāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānam syāt), and Śabara, Kumārila and others’ comment on it.

<sup>20</sup>Though, as the Mīmāṃsakas rightly say, ‘Smṛti’ (literally meaning ‘recollection’) must be based on cognition caused by the direct study of the Vedas, it is really very difficult to draw, in all cases, a clear line of demarcation between ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Ācāra’. As a matter of fact, the Smṛti-works themselves show that time-honoured[ācāras (customs or usages), based neither on the Veda nor on ‘Smṛti’, came in course of time to be recognised as smṛtis (or traditions to be followed by all) and incorporated in Smṛti works.

and the traditions and customs of the Śiṣṭas. Thus, in the works of Gautama, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and Āśvalāyana we find the following provisions :

“The laws (dharmāḥ) of countries, castes, and families, which are not opposed to the (sacred) records (āmnāya), (have) also authority. Cultivators, traders, herdsman, money-lenders, and artizans (have authority to lay down rules) for their respective classes. Having learned the (state of) affairs from those who (in each class) have authority (to speak he shall give) the legal decision.”<sup>21</sup>

“There is a dispute regarding five (practices) both in the south and in the north. We shall explain those (peculiar) to the south. They are, to eat in the company of an uninitiated person, to eat in the company of one’s wife, to eat stale food, to marry the daughter of a maternal uncle or a paternal aunt. Now (the customs peculiar) to the north are, to deal in wood, to drink in rum, to sell animals that have teeth in the upper and in the lower jaws, to follow trade of arms, to go to sea. He who follows (these practices) in any other country than where they prevail, commits sin. For each (of these customs) the (rule of the) country should be (considered) the authority. Gautama declares that that is false. And one should not take heed of either (set of practices) because they are opposed to the tradition of the Śiṣṭas.”<sup>22</sup>

“He shall regulate his course of action according to the conduct which in all countries is unanimously approved of by men of the three twice-born castes, who have been properly obedient (to their teachers), who are aged, of subdued senses, neither given to avarice, nor hypocrites.”<sup>23</sup>

“By this (discussion) the law of custom (dharma), which is observed in (particular) countries or families, has been disposed of.”<sup>24</sup>

“Various indeed are the customs (prevailing) in countries and villages; one should follow them in marriage. What, however, is common (to all), we shall declare.”<sup>25</sup>

Some of these writers accepted the customs (ācāra), prevalent in Āryāvarta, as authoritative for all<sup>26</sup>. Some, again, went so far as to acknowledge the authority of women and the common run of people (loka) in the matter of certain

<sup>21</sup> *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* 11. 20-22.

<sup>22</sup> *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 17-24.

<sup>23</sup> *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* i. 7. 20. 8, and ii. 11. 29. 15. (According to Haradatta, the words ‘ārya’ and ‘vṛtta’, occurring in these Sūtras, mean ‘śiṣṭa’ and ‘anuṣṭhāna’ or ‘ācāra’ respectively).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 6. 15. 1 (in explaining which Haradatta says ‘śāstra-vipratishedhā mātula-autā-pariṇayanādāyo ’pramāṇam viparītāḥ pramāṇam iti’, and supports his explanation by quoting Gautama’s Sūtra 11. 20—‘deśa-jāti-kula-dharmās cāmnāyair aviruddhāḥ pramāṇam’).

<sup>25</sup> *Āśvalāyana-gṛhya-sūtra* (Ānandāśrama Press ed.) i. 7. 1-2.

In commenting on these two Sūtras Nārāyaṇa takes the word ‘grāma’ to mean ‘nagara’ and says—‘..... janapadādi-dharmāṇām vakṣyamāṇa-dharmāṇām ca virodhe satī vakṣyamāṇam eva dharmāṇāṁ kuryāt na janapadādi-dharmam iti’. Haradatta also says : ‘..... tena janapadādi-dharmasya vakṣyamāṇasya ca virodho vakṣyamāṇam eva bhavati/ tud yathā—keśucid deśesu sadyah samāveśanaṁ dṛṣṭam vakṣyamāṇena trirātram dvādasa-rātram iti brahmācāryeṇa bādhyate/’

<sup>26</sup> See *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 25 and *Vasiṣṭha-smṛti* 1.7-8.

customs and usages, especially those connected with marriage and funeral rites and ceremonies. For instances we may refer to the following passages :

*Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* ii. 6. 15. 9—They (i.e., the persons taking part in the cremation of a dead body) pour out water consecrated in such a manner that the dead will know it (to be given to them). Then they return to the village (grāma) without looking back, and perform those rites for the dead which women declare to be necessary.<sup>27</sup>

*Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* ii. 11. 29. 16—Some declare that the remaining duties (which have not been taught in the *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra*) must be learnt from women and men of all castes.<sup>28</sup>

*Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 5. 112—In (performing) the remaining rites (connected with the dead, one should) conform to (the customs of) the people (lokaḥ).

*Āpastamba-gr̥hya-sūtra* 2. 15—And one should learn from (all including) women what ceremonies (are required by custom in marriage).<sup>29</sup>

*Pāraskara-gr̥hya-sūtra* i. 8. 11-13—And what (the people in) the village tell them, that they should do. For it is said, 'At weddings and funerals he shall enter the village'; (and) because the Śruti says, 'Therefore on these two occasions authority rests with the village'.<sup>30</sup>

*Mānava-gr̥hya-sūtra* (Baroda ed.) i. 4. 6—(There are) other (holidays) according to custom.

From these passages it is evident that Gautama and others attached due importance even to many ancient rites and customs of popular origin; yet they placed the aforesaid limitation on śiṣṭācāra, which they recognised as one of the three sources of Dharma. The reason for this limitation seems to be that, as the

<sup>27</sup>According to Haradatta the observances suggested by women are 'agnyupasarsana', 'gavāmbhana', etc.

<sup>28</sup>In explaining this aphorism Haradatta says : ukta-vyatiriktā ye dharmās te dharmā-śeṣās tān sūtry-ādinām api sakāśāt pratīyād ityeko manyante/ to ca prati-janapadam prati-kulam ca bhinnās tathaiva pratipattavyāḥ/ tatra drāvidāḥ kanyā-meṣasthe savitary āditya-pūjām ācaranti bhūmau maṇḍalam ālikhya, ityādīny udāharaṇāni/

<sup>29</sup>āvṛtas cāstribhyaḥ pratiyeran/

In commenting on this Sūtra Haradatta takes the word 'āvṛtaḥ' to mean 'mantra-rahitaḥ kriyāḥ', but Sudarśanācārya says: 'āvṛtaḥ kriyā vaivāhikyāḥ aviśṣāt samantrakā amantrakāś ca / tāḥ sarvā āstribhyaḥ sarva-varṇebhyaḥ sakāśād avagamyā pratiyeran kurvīran vivo-dhāraḥ/ tatra samantrakāḥ graha-pūjānkurāropana-pratisara-bandhādyā ācāra-siddhāḥ/ amantrakāḥ nāka-bali-yakṣa-balindrāṇi-pūjādayaḥ/tās ca yathā-janapadam yathā-varṇam yathā-kulam yathā-śrī-puṃsam vyavasthitā eva/ na tu sarvāḥ sarvatra samucitāḥ/'

<sup>30</sup>According to Karkopādhyāya, Jayarāma, Harihara, Gadādhara and others, the word 'grāma', occurring in these aphorisms, means 'women', or rather 'old women', of the village, or of one's own family (sva-kula-vṛddhāḥ striyah) as many of these authorities say. Gadādhara informs us that Bhartr̥yajña took the word 'grāma-vacanam' to mean 'loka-vacanam'; and by the word 'ca' in the first Sūtra Gadādhara understands 'deśācāra' (local customs) also.

Harihara takes the word 'vacana' in 'grāma-vacanam' to be 'aṅkurāropana-haridrākṣata-candanādi-dharma-pratipādaka'. According to Gadādhara this word is indicative of the following: 'badhū-varayor maṅgala-sūtram gale mālā-dhāraṇam ubhayor vastrānte granthi-karaṇam kara-grahaṇe nyagrodha-putikā-dhāraṇam varānugamane nāsikā-dhāraṇam vara-ḥḍaye dadhyādi-lāpanādi'.

*Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* indicates,<sup>31</sup> they wanted to distinguish between two kinds of Dharma, viz., superior (parama) and inferior (avara or upadharma, as the later writers call it) and to prescribe the former to the ardent students and followers of the Vedas. As the works of Gautama and other early Sūtra-writers were originally meant for use in the Vedic schools, there was practically no difficulty in making this distinction and prescription. However, they did not like to put any restriction, as regards the performance of the two kinds of Dharma, on the different grades of the Aryan population, except on Śūdras, women, outcastes, and the fallen or naturally disabled members of the Aryan society.

During the few centuries which followed the ages of Baudhāyana and Āpastamba, serious changes came upon the social, religious and political life of the Hindus. India was repeatedly invaded by casteless foreigners who entered this country in hordes and often settled down permanently in its different parts. Buddhism, Jainism and a number of other heretical faiths grew up and attained wide popularity; and there were also the systems of the Pāñcarātras, Pāsupatas, Brāhmas, and others, who, as the *Mahābhārata* and the early Purānas inform us, often held views very different from those of the followers of the Vedas. Like the heretical faiths these systems also spread widely among the people and influenced even those who believed deeply in the Vedic way of life. Thus, according to the *Jayākhya-saṃhitā*, the adherents to the Pāñcarātra system consisted of three groups, the second comprising the Āptas, Anāptas, Ārambhins and Saṃpravartins. The Āptas were those who joined the order wholeheartedly; and the rest have been described in the *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* as follows :

varṇa-dharmam anujjhitya hy āptādiṣṭena karmaṇā /  
 yajanti śraddhayā devam anāptās te prakīrtitāḥ//  
 vinā tenārtha-siddhyartham viśvātmānam yajanti ye/  
 ārambhinaḥ te boddhavyā vaiṣṇavā brāhmaṇādayaḥ//  
 śraddhayā ye pravartante svayaṃ saṃpūjane hareḥ/  
 amārgena tu vipendra viddhi tān saṃpravartinaḥ//<sup>32</sup>

“Those, who do not give up their caste-duties but faithfully worship the god (Viṣṇu) with acts prescribed by the Āptas, are called Anāptas. The Vaiṣṇava Brahmins and others who, without (caring for) these (i. e., the instructions of the Āptas), worship the Soul of the Universe for the attainment of the desired objects, are called Ārambhins. O best of Brahmins, know those people as Saṃpravartins who faithfully devote themselves to worshipping Hari in a wrong way.” To the Pāsupata and other systems also, as the *Mahābhārata* and the Purānas indicate, there must have been adherents of the types of the Āptas, Anāptas, Ārambhins and Saṃpravartins, who were certainly not looked upon as outcastes by those who were faithful to the Varṇāśrama-dharma. There were, again, the

<sup>31</sup>i. 1. 14—What Brāhmaṇas, riding in the chariot of the law (and) wielding the sword of the Veda, propound even in jest, that is declared to be the highest law (dharmaḥ paramaḥ).

<sup>32</sup>*Jayākhya-saṃhitā* (Baroda ed.) 32. 34-37.

upholders of the composite Dharma advocated by the sectarian Purāṇas, which must have begun their activity long before the beginning of the Christian era. On the other hand, the sacrificial religion and the study of the Vedas were growing unpopular under the pressure of the religious faiths mentioned above, so much so that even by the time of Manu a number of extra-Vedic Smṛtis came into existence; and this is indicated by the following verse of the (*Manusmṛti* 12. 95) :

yā veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayo yāś ca kāś ca ku-dṛṣṭayaḥ /  
sarvās tā niṣphalāḥ pretya tamo-niṣṭhā hi tāḥ smṛtāḥ//

“Those Smṛtis which are outside (the pale of) the Veda, and those (others) in which there is bad vision<sup>33</sup>, are all useless after death, because they have been declared as based solely on ignorance”.

The Purāṇas also indicate how the state of society deteriorated with the rise and spread of the heresies (especially Buddhism and Jainism) and the reign of the Nandas, Mauryas and other ‘Śūdra’ monarchs<sup>34</sup>. Under these circumstances it became extremely risky for a conscientious law-giver to be as much strict as Gautama, Baudhāyana and others with regard to the recognition of the secondary sources of Dharma, because such strictness might result in the stagnation and death of the Hindu society. So, like certain authorities, Vyāsa (as quoted by Devaṇabhaṭṭa) found it necessary to accord partial recognition to one more secondary source of Dharma, viz., sādhvācāra (usages of virtuous men), and said:

“dharma-mūlaṃ vedam āhur grantha-rāśim akṛtrimam/  
tadvidāṃ smṛti-śīle ca sādhvācāram manaḥ-priyam//<sup>35</sup>

“(The authorities) declare to be the source of Dharma the Veda which is a nonspurious mass of works, and (also) the tradition and practice of those who know it, and (such) usages of virtuous men (as are) pleasing to (one’s) mind”.

Manu went a step farther and declared :

“vedo ’khilo dharma-mūlaṃ smṛti-śīle ca tad-vidāṃ/  
ācāraś caive sādhuṇām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca//”

(*Manu-smṛti* 2. 6)

“The entire Veda is the source of Dharma; and the tradition and practice of those who know it; and also the usages of virtuous men, and self-satisfaction”.

It will be noticed that besides mentioning the Veda as the first and foremost source of Dharma, <sup>36</sup> Vyāsa and probably also some others named three more sources by imposing limitations on the third, but Manu was liberal enough to

<sup>33</sup>The interpretations of the word ‘ku-dṛṣṭayaḥ’, as given by the different authorities, have been fully discussed in Part III of the present essay.

<sup>34</sup>For an idea of the Pīrāṇic account of the state of society during the Kali age, see R. C. Hazra, *Purāṇic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs*, pp. 206-214.

<sup>35</sup>*Smṛti-candrikā*, Mysore ed., I (Samskāra-kāṇḍa), p. 6.

<sup>36</sup>See also *Manu-smṛti* 2. 7—

yaḥ kaścit kasyacid dharmo manunā parikṛtitaḥ/  
sa sarvo ’bhihito vede sarva-jñānamayo hi saḥ//

2.8—śruti-prāmāṇyato bidvān sva-dharme nivīseta vai//

2.13—dharmaṃ jijñāsamānānāṃ pramāṇaṃ paramaṃ śrutiḥ//

give full recognition to four, viz., (i) 'Smṛti' and (ii) Śīla' of those learned in the Veda, (iii) 'Ācāra' of virtuous men, and (iv) one's 'ātma-tuṣṭi', in which every succeeding one was meant, when necessary, for supplementing the immediately preceding one. That is to say, for the validity of those rites and customs which could not be traced in the Veda, the 'Smṛti' of those learned in the Veda was to be looked into; if this 'Smṛti' was found insufficient for the purpose, the 'Śīla' of those persons (i.e., of those learned in the Veda) was to be referred to; if their 'Śīla' also did not become helpful in meeting the situation successfully, the 'Ācāra' of virtuous men was to be looked into; and in cases where 'Ācāra' also failed to lead the enquirer to a decision, one's own satisfaction was the last resort. Thus Sarvajñanārāyaṇa says:

"vedavidāṃ yā smṛtiḥ vākya-viśeṣa-vivakṣotpādikārtha-viśeṣe viśaya-cintā tat-prabhavatvāt vākyaṃ api smṛtiḥ/ vedo 'nupalabhyamāne sā dharme pramāṇam/tasyā apy anupalambhe yatra vedavidāṃ bahūnāṃ śīlaṃ cittasya svabhāva-pravaṇatā sāpi dharmamūlam/ . . . . . tasyāpy anupalambhe uktam ācāra itī/ . . . . . yatrācāro 'pi nopalabhyato tatrāha ātmana itī"<sup>37</sup>.

In explaining the significance of the term 'Smṛti', Manu said clearly that by 'Smṛti' he meant the 'Dharma-śāstra'<sup>38</sup> which was composed by those learned in the Veda<sup>39</sup> and was quite different from the 'extra-Vedic Smṛtis (veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayah). So, there can be little doubt about the fact that Manu did not look upon the Purāṇas as 'Smṛti' works and as sources of Dharma<sup>40</sup>, although he, like Gautama and others<sup>41</sup>, favoured the study of these works for a thorough knowledge of the Veda and a correct understanding and practice of Dharma. The

<sup>37</sup>See Sarvajñanārāyaṇa's commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6.

<sup>38</sup>śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmasāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ.—*Manu-smṛti* 2.10.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. smṛti-śīlo ca tad-vidāṃ—*Manu-smṛti* 2.6.

<sup>40</sup>Medhātithi also admits that Manu did not recognise the Purāṇas as a source of Dharma. In commenting on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6 Medhātithi says:

"na ca veda-śabda-vācyatāgnihoṭrādi-vākyānāṃ api dharmaprāmāṇye kāraṇam/itihāsa-yurvedayoḥ api veda-vyavahāra-darśanāt 'itihāsa-purāṇam pañcamam vedānām vedam' itī"

"Further (whether a certain Veda is called 'Veda' or not is of no import); when certain passages, e.g., those prescribing the Agnihotra and other sacrifices which all people call 'Veda'—are regarded as authoritative in matters regarding Dharma, they are so accepted, not because they are called by the name of 'Veda'; because the name; 'Veda' is sometimes applied to Itihāsa and the Āyurveda also, when, for instance, it is said that 'Itihāsa and Purāṇa are the fifth Veda' (and yet these are not regarded as authorities on Dharma; . . . . .")

<sup>41</sup>See, for instance, *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* 8.4.6, and 11.19; *Vasiṣṭha-smṛti* 6.39, and 27.6. Also *Manu-smṛti* 3.109.

In his *Dharma-sūtra* Āpastamba quotes from the 'Purāṇa' a number of prose and metrical passages of diverse contents and two more prose lines from a '*Bhaviṣyat-purāṇa*', and some of these quoted passages relate to Dharma; but we cannot say on the strength of these passages that Smṛti-matter had begun to be introduced into the Purāṇas from Āpastamba's time. The fact that some of the Purāṇic verses quoted by Āpastamba were originally popular Gāthās dealing with Smṛti-matter, tends to create in us the impression that in the days of Āpastamba the Purāṇas did not contain any Smṛti-chapter and that stray Gāthās dealing with Dharma were introduced into the 'Purāṇa' in connection with the Pitr̥s, etc. The language and metre of the quoted passages show that the 'Purāṇa' known to Āpastamba was quite different from the later ones that have come down to us.

reason for this attitude of Manu towards the Purāṇas seems to be that Manu was a staunch follower of the Vedas and that the earlier Purāṇas (which, according to the *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, *Chāndogya-upaniṣad*, etc., formed a part of 'Svādhyāya' and with which Manu must have been familiar) did not deal with Smṛti-matter in an appreciable degree and the comparatively late sectarian ones, which might have been known to him in the early course of their development, dealt with a composite Dharma which was looked upon as inferior to the Vedic. However, the high authority and wide popularity of the *Manu-smṛti*, to which Bṛhaspati, Kumārila and others amply testify<sup>42</sup>, encouraged a section of Smṛti-writers to ignore the Purāṇas as a source of Dharma even in much later days when these works came to attain a position of great respect and high authority among the people, literate or illiterate. Thus, Viśvarūpācārya, who flourished as late as between 750 and 1,000 A. D. and drew profusely upon a large number of Smṛti works in his commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, did not quote a single line from, or refer even on a single occasion to, any Purāṇa, although the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, on which he wrote his commentary, named the Purāṇas as one of the sthānas (places of occurrence) of Dharma and was one of the two authorities<sup>43</sup> utilised by the Nibandha-writers for accepting the Purāṇas as a source of Dharma.

As to the works to be included in the 'Dharma-śāstra' Manu said nothing, nor did he, like Yājñavalkya, Śaṅkha-Likhita, Yama, Paiṭhīnasi and others, give any list of the same. We are only told that after compiling this Śāstra Brahmā himself imparted it in its entirety to Manu, who, in his turn, taught it to Marīci and other sages<sup>44</sup>. So, according to the *Manu-smṛti* itself, this work was the original source from which the other writers of Dharma-śāstra drew their materials.

<sup>42</sup>"bṛhaspatiḥ

vedārthopanibandhotvāt prāmānyam tu manoh smṛtam/  
manvartha-viparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na śasyate//"

(quoted in Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 42; Aparārka's commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, p. 628, v. 1. 'prādhānyam tu manu-smṛtau' and 'viparītā yā smṛtiḥ sā na prasasyate'; Kullūka-bhaṭṭa's commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 1.1, v. 1. 'nibandhatvāt prādhānyam hi'; -Mitrāmīśra's *Vīramitrodaya*, ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 27, v. 1. 'prādhānyam'; and so on).

"āṅgirāḥ

yat pūrvam manunā proktaṁ dharma-śāstram anuttamam/  
na hi tat samatikramya vacanam hitam ātmanah//"

(quoted in Devanabhaṭṭa's *Smṛti-candrikā*, Mysore ed., I—Samskāra-kāṇḍa, p. 16).

According to Kumārila, the *Manu-smṛti* has authority over the entire Āryāvarta, whereas the other Smṛti-works have only limited authority.

<sup>43</sup>The other authority is Sumantu (the author of a Dharma-śāstra), from whose work the following Sūtra has been quoted in the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* (I, p. 22), *Kṛtya-ratnākara* (p. 28), and other works :

"veda-vodāṅgetihāsa-purāṇa-tarka-mīmāṃsā-dharmaśāstrāṇi  
kula-gaṇa-deśa-jāti-varṇadharmā-pākhaṇḍāśrama-śrotriya-dharma-vyavasthā-  
pravartakāni."

<sup>44</sup>*Manu-smṛti* 1. 58—

idaṁ śāstram tu kṛtvāsau mām eva svayam āditaḥ/  
vidhivad grāheyāmāsa marīcyādīms tvahaṁ munin//



The word 'śīla' has been taken by Nandana to mean those qualities of one's own self which earn for one honour from good men<sup>45</sup>; Lakṣmīdhara, Kullūka-bhaṭṭa, Hemādri, Caṇḍeśvara, Mitramiśra and others<sup>46</sup> take it to mean the moral qualities (*viz.*, adroha, anugraha, anasūyatā, priyavāditā, kṛtajñatā, etc.) enumerated in the two passages quoted by these Smṛti-writers from Hārīta and the *Mahābhārata*<sup>47</sup>; Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Devanabhaṭṭa and some others, again, take it to mean the abandoning of love, hate, etc. (rāga-dveṣa-prahāṇa, rāga-dveṣa-parityāga, rāga-dveṣādi-varjana)<sup>48</sup>. But none of these explanations seems to be plausible, because most of the moral qualities enumerated by these Smṛti-writers are of human interest and universal appeal and have to be appreciated and practised without any consideration of the persons in whom these may be found. It cannot be that all these qualities deserve appreciation and practice only when they are found in scholars learned in the Veda (cf. smṛti-śīle ca tad-vidām). It is, therefore, more probable that, like Gautama, Manu also used the word 'śīla' to mean 'śiṣṭācāra' (*i.e.*, the practice of those who studied and learnt the Veda and assiduously performed the acts prescribed by it). According to Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, this word means the natural aversion to (and non-performance of) the prohibited acts. He says :

“śīlam smṛti-śruti-pratyakṣa-dṛṣṭa-niṣedha-paripālanaṃ svabhāva-kṛtam 'yat tu bhārata 'adrohaḥ sarva-bhūtānām' ityādi śīla-lakṣaṇaṃ uktam, yacca hārītena 'brahmaṇyatā deva-pitṛ-bhaktatā saumyatā ..... apāruṣyam' ityādy uktam śīlatvena, tatra brahmaṇyatā abrahmaṇyatā-vyāvṛttir ityevaṃ niṣedha-paripālana-param eva/ upalakṣaṇaṃ caitat/niṣedha-vyāvṛtti-mātraṃ śīlam ityeva tattvam/<sup>49</sup>

In his *Ācāra-sāra* Gadādhara also gives the same meaning of the word 'śīla', saying :

“śīlam śruti-smṛti-pratyakṣa-dṛṣṭa-niṣedha-vyatirikta-niṣedha-paripālanaṃ svabhāva-kṛtam/yathā bhojana-vyatirekeṇa mayā udakaṃ na peyam ityādi/ ..... yat tu bhārata 'adrohaḥ sarva-bhūtānām' ityādi śīla-lakṣaṇam, yacca hārītenoktam 'brāhmaṇatā deva-pitṛ-bhaktatā' ityādi, tat sarvam upalakṣaṇam ity avadheyam/<sup>50</sup>”.

<sup>45</sup>sat-sambhāvanīyatā-hetuḥ ātma-guṇa-sampac chilam/—Nandana's commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6.

<sup>46</sup>See *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 20; Kullūka-bhaṭṭa's commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6; *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 26; *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 9; and so on.

See also Rāghavānanda's commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6, in which he takes the word 'śīla' to mean either 'conduct' (vṛttam caritram) or the thirteen moral qualities (brahmaṇyatā pitṛ-deva-bhaktatā, etc.) enumerated by Hārīta.

<sup>47</sup>For these passages see foot-note 8 above.

<sup>48</sup>See Medhātithi and Govindarāja's comments on *Manu-smṛti* 2.6; *Smṛti-candrikā*, *Saṃskāra-kāṇḍa*, p. 5; and so on.

<sup>49</sup>*Nītyācāra-pradīpa* (ed. Bibl. Ind.), I, pp. 16-17.

<sup>50</sup>*Ācāra-sāra* (ed. Bibl. Ind.), p. 12.

However, the reason for Manu's use of this word in the above-mentioned sense seems to be that, like Vyāsa and other authorities referred to by him, Manu wanted to distinguish between two kinds of Ācāra (viz., the Ācāra of the Śiṣṭas, and that of the Sādhus mentioned below), so that the strict followers of the Vedic way of life might not find any difficulty in determining their own duties more correctly in accordance with the prescriptions of the Veda. As a matter of fact, Manu himself wanted people to be careful about purity of Dharma and pointed out to them the right way of discrimination, saying :—

“pratyakṣam cānumānam ca śāstram ca vividhāgamam/  
trayam suviditam kāryam dharmā-śuddhim abhīpsatā//  
ārṣam dharmopadeśam ca veda-śāstrā-virodhiṅ/  
yas tarkeṇ-ānusaṃdhatte sa dharmam veda netaraḥ//”<sup>51</sup>

“Desiring purity (or correct knowledge) of Dharma, one should make the (following) three well-known (to himself)—Perception (i.e., Veda), Inference (i.e., Smṛti), and the Scripture (viz., Mīmāṃsā) that yields various kinds of knowledge (of Dharma).

“He (alone), and none else, knows Dharma, who examines the Veda (which was revealed to sages) and (the Smṛti which embodies) the instructions on Dharma by ratiocination not going against the scripture in the form of the Veda”. Kumārila, Medhātithi, Lakṣmīdhara, Kullūka-bhaṭṭa, Caṇḍeśvara and many others take the words ‘pratyakṣa’ and ‘anumāna,’ occurring in the first verse, to mean ‘perception’ and ‘inference’ respectively, which are two of the several modes of proof. But from the mention of ‘Ārṣa’, etc., in the second verse we feel inclined to take these two words to mean ‘Veda’ and ‘Smṛti’ respectively. According to the Mīmāṃsakas the Veda is ‘pratyakṣa’ and the Smṛti is ‘anumāna’; and going to prescribe the method of effecting purity of Dharma (dharma-śuddhi) Vyāsa says :

“dharmā-śuddhim abhīpsadbhir na vedād anyad iṣyate/  
dharmasya kāraṇam śudham miśram anyat prakīrtitam//  
ataḥ sa paramo dharmo yo vedād avagamyate/  
avaraḥ sa tu vijñeyo yaḥ purāṇādiṣu sthitaḥ//”<sup>52</sup>

“Nothing other than the Veda is wanted by those who desire purity of Dharma. (The Veda) is the pure source of Dharma ; others are called composite.

<sup>51</sup>Manu-smṛti 12. 105-6.

Both these verses have been quoted in Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 32, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, II (Vrata-khaṇḍa), Part i, p. 22, and Caṇḍeśvara's *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 38 ; Kumārila-bhaṭṭa also quotes these verses (except the first line of the second verse) in his *Tantra-vārtikā* (on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 2), Poona ed., p. 167 ; and Aparārka quotes only the second verse in his commentary (on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*), p. 22.

For the word ‘śāstram’ in the first verse Lakṣmīdhara reads ‘śabdam,’ and Kumārila, Hemādri and Caṇḍeśvara read ‘śābdam’. Lakṣmīdhara and Caṇḍeśvara explain these words (śabdam and śābdam) thus : śabdam śabda-jñānād asampnikṛṣṭe ‘rthe vijñānam’ (Lakṣmīdhara), and “śābdam śabda-jñānānantarajam” (Caṇḍeśvara). It is to be noted that these explanations follow Śabara-svāmin's line “śāstram śabda-vijñānād asampnikṛṣṭe ‘rthe vijñānam’” occurring in his *Bhāṣya* on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 1.5 (Poona ed., p. 37).

<sup>52</sup>Ascribed to Vyāsa in Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, pp. 32-33, Aparārka's commentary (on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*), p. 9, Halāyudha's *Brāhmaṇa-sarvasva* (ed. Tejaścandra Vidyānanda, Calcutta, 1331 B. S.), p. 15, Caṇḍeśvara's *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, pp. 38-39, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, Vol. II (Vrata-khaṇḍa), Part i, p. 22, and so on.

Lakṣmīdhara reads ‘dravya-śuddhim’ (for ‘dharma-śuddhim’) in the first line ; Aparārka reads ‘adhigamyate’ (for ‘avagamyate’ in line 3) and ‘smṛtaḥ’ (for ‘sthitaḥ’ in line 4) ; Caṇḍeśvara reads ‘abhīpsubhiḥ’ (for ‘abhīpsadbhiḥ’ in line 1) ; and so on.

“ So, the Dharma, which is known from the Veda, is the best ; but that (Dharma), which is contained in the Purāṇas, etc., is to be known as inferior.”

According to Kullūka-bhaṭṭa the word ‘śāstram’ (occurring in the first of the two verses of Manu quoted above) means ‘Smṛti, etc., which are based on the Veda’ (śāstram ca veda-mūlam smṛtyādikam) ; Rāma-candra understands by it such works as ‘Smṛti, Purāṇa, Itihāsa, etc.’ (śāstram ca punaḥ vividhāgamam smṛti-purāṇetihā-ādīni . . . . .) ; but Sarvajñanārāyaṇa and Rāghavānanda take it to mean the Veda (śāstram veda-rūpam śāstram śabdajam—Sarvajñanārāyaṇa ; śāstram hitopadeṣṭi vedākhyam—Rāghavānanda).

The word ‘vividhāgamam’ has been interpreted by different authorities thus :

“śāstre vividha-vidhi-pratiṣedhāt tasya vividho ’nekaprakāra āgamo yatr-āgamyate sa āgamaḥ/ bahu-śākhavād vedasya śruti-smṛti-bhedena ca vividhatvam uktam ” (Medhātithi) ;

“vividhaḥ śruti-smṛtītihāsa-purāṇa-rūpa āgamo yasya jñānasya karaṇam tad vividhāgamam/” (Lakṣmīdhara) ;

“vividha āgamaḥ śruti-smṛtyādi-rūpaḥ karaṇatayā yasya” (Caṇḍeśvara) ;

“āgacchanti jāyanta ity āgamāḥ smṛti-purāṇārthāḥ, tair nānā-vidhaiḥ sahitam . . . . .” (Sarvajñanārāyaṇa) ;

“vividhāgamam śabdātāvācchinnaṃ bauddha-vākyetara-purāṇādayo vividhāgamāḥ . . . . .” (Rāghavānanda) ;

“vividhāgamam bahu-kartṛkam” (Nandana) ;

and so on.

In the second verse Medhātithi takes ‘ārṣam’ to be an adjective to ‘dharmopadeśam’, totally ignoring the word ‘ca’, and explains these terms thus : “ṛṣir vedas tatra bhava ārṣaḥ/ dharmopadeśo yo vaidikaḥ”. Like Medhātithi, Lakṣmīdhara also takes ‘ārṣam’ to mean ‘vaidikam’ ; but Aparārka gives ‘smṛti-purāṇādi’ and ‘vedaḥ’ as equivalents for ‘ārṣam’ and ‘upadeśaḥ’ respectively. Caṇḍeśvara seems to follow Aparārka, when he gives ‘ṛṣi-praṇītam’ as the synonym for ‘ārṣam’. Sarvajñanārāyaṇa agrees with Caṇḍeśvara in taking ‘ārṣam’, to mean ‘ṛṣi-praṇītam smṛty-ādi’ (Smṛti, etc. compiled by sages) ; but unlike Medhātithi, he takes the word ‘dharmopadeśam’ to be an adjective (meaning ‘containing instructions on Dharma’) to ‘ārṣam’ (and not *vice versa*). Although Kullūka-bhaṭṭa is more logical in his interpretation of the terms ‘ārṣam’ and ‘dharmopadeśam’ (which he explains thus : ṛṣi-dṛṣṭavād ārṣam vedam, dharmopadeśam ca tan-mūla-smṛtyādikam) he cannot be said to be perfectly right in taking ‘dharmopadeśam’ to mean ‘Smṛti, etc.’ We have already seen that Manu did not recognise the Purāṇas (including the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*) as sources of Dharma ; nor can the word ‘upadeśa’ (which is suggestive of written texts) be taken to mean ‘śīla’ (practice), ‘ācāra’ (usages) and ‘ātma-tuṣṭi’ (self-satisfaction), which have been mentioned by Manu as sources of unrecorded (anibaddha) Dharma. So, the word ‘dharmopadeśa’ should be taken to mean ‘Smṛti’ only (and not ‘Smṛti, etc.’

as said by Kullūka-bhaṭṭa). Rāghavānanda and Nandana take the words 'ārṣam' and 'dharmopadeśam' to mean 'the Veda' and 'the Dharma-śāstra' respectively ('ṛṣir mantra-draṣṭā munis tad-ukto vedah/ dharmopadeśam dharmā-śāstram manv-ādi/'—Rāghavānanda; 'ārṣam vedam ṛṣibhiḥ stutavāt/ .... dharmopadeśam dharmā-śāstram .... —Nandana).

The word 'sādhu', as occurring in the verses "vedo 'khilo dharmā-mūlam'" and "dharmā-mūlam vedam āhuḥ" of Manu and Vyāsa respectively<sup>53</sup>, has been taken by Devanabhaṭṭa to mean the Śiṣṭas (sādhavaḥ śiṣṭāḥ)<sup>54</sup>. According to Medhātithi, Govindarāja, Lakṣmīdhara and others also, who quote the former verse only, this word has the same meaning. But from the mention in Vyāsa's verse, referred to above, that only those usages of Sādhus which please one's mind (sādhvācāram manah-priyam) are to be regarded as one of the secondary sources of Dharma, it is sure that according to Vyāsa and others the Sādhus were different from the Śiṣṭas, who, as we have already seen, were such persons as learnt and studied the Veda and assiduously performed the acts proscribed by it and whose traditions and practices, being thus taken to be rooted in the Veda, were regarded as authorities on Dharma. In commenting on the expression 'ācāras caiva sādhnām' occurring in the verse of the *Manusmṛti* (2.6) Sarvajñanārāyaṇa takes the word 'sādhu' to mean persons engaged in the performance of acts in accordance with the Veda and regards the Ācāra (practice) of such persons to be inferior to 'Śīla' on account of the possibility of suspicion about the correctness of the tradition on which this Ācāra is based<sup>55</sup>. Mitramiśra also suggests an alternative explanation in which he differs from Lakṣmīdhara<sup>56</sup>. (whom he follows in his first explanation), takes the word 'ācārah' with 'sādhnām', and says that if these two words are taken together, then the practice (ācāra) of those persons who are *not learned* in the Veda but are free from (moral) taint, becomes an authority on Dharma, and consequently the practice of virtuous Śūdras and others (sacchūdrādyācārah) becomes an authoritative source of knowledge of Dharma to their sons and other descendants<sup>57</sup>. This meaning of the word 'sādhu', as suggested by Sarvajñanārāyaṇa and Mitramiśra, finds strong support in the verse of Vyāsa referred to above and agrees remarkably with the state of the contemporary Hindu society and cannot, therefore, be rejected as

<sup>53</sup>These two verses of Manu and Vyāsa have been quoted on p. 71 above.

<sup>54</sup>See *Smṛti-candrikā*, I (Samskāra-kāṇḍa), pp. 5-6.

<sup>55</sup>sādhavo vedārtha-sādhana-pravṛttāḥ teṣām ācārah sva-sva-pūrva-kālina-sādhv-anuṣṭhitasya pratīsamdhānam anuṣṭhānam tac ca pramāṇam dharme labdha-śīlād anya-prayuktatva-saṅkā-rahitānirbhārita-mūlam mithyāprasiddha-mūlatāsaṅkā-kaluṣitam iṣat-pratyavaram iti kramārthaḥ

<sup>56</sup>Lakṣmīdhara connects both 'smṛti-śīle' and 'ācārah' with tad-vidām', and 'ātmanas tuṣṭih' with 'sādhnām', and says, following Medhātithi, that 'ācāra' means such practices as the tying of a bracelet during marriage, etc. (ācāro vivāhādaḥ kaṅkaṇa-bandhanādy-anuṣṭhānam—*Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 20).

<sup>57</sup>athavā ācāras caiva sādhnām iti cchedaḥ/  
evam cāvedavidām api kṣiṇā-doṣa-puruṣāṇām ācārah pramāṇam/  
tathā ca sacchūdrādyācāras tat-putrādīn prati bhavati pramāṇam/

implausible. As a matter of fact, Manu distinguished more clearly than Vyāsa between two classes of reliable members of the Vedic fold, viz., those who studied and learnt the Veda and zealously performed the acts prescribed by it, and others who, though lacking knowledge of the Veda (*avedavit*), were faultless (*kṣīṇa-doṣa*) in respect of their character, conduct, attainments, and high regard for everything Vedic. We have already said how the changes in the social, religious and political history of India prior to the days of Manu created a situation in which there was a remarkable increase in the number of the latter class of members of the Vedic fold. So, in spite of his decided inclination for the Veda, Manu could not reject the unauthorised but ancient and widely popular customs and usages (*ācāra*) of this class of people as unlawful and thereby create disruption in the Hindu society to the advantage of the anti-Vedic religionists. However, in making this distinction between the followers of the Veda, Manu had also to distinguish between their peculiar but widely accepted practices (*ācāra*) of long standing and to set up two different standards for judging their acceptability. The reason for making this distinction appears to have been as follows. The peculiar but widely accepted customs and usages (*ācāra*) of those who studied and learnt the Veda and also habitually followed its prescriptions, could be presumed to have been derived from some Veda or *Smṛti*, even though these were not traceable in any existing Vedic or *Smṛti* work. But the faultless persons lacking knowledge of the Veda but belonging wholeheartedly to the Vedic fold could have no 'smṛti' (recollection) of their own due to their want of direct perception of the Veda; they were dependent on the traditions and practices of the *Śiṣṭas* for the authority of those of their own. So, their peculiar but widely popular practices, for which no basis could be found even in those of the *Śiṣṭas*, were distant from 'Śiṣṭa-smṛti' or 'Śiṣṭācāra' by one step more and were consequently weaker than the peculiar customs and usages of the latter. It was due to this distinction between the two classes of *Ācāra* that Manu praised only 'Śruty-ukta' and 'Smārta' *Ācāra* as 'Parama Dharma' in the following verse :

ācāraḥ paramo dharmāḥ śruty-uktaḥ smārta eva ca/  
tasmād asmin sadā yukto nityaṃ syād ātmavān dvijaḥ // <sup>58</sup>

"It is the practices declared in the Śruti and *also those having their origin (direct) from Smṛti (recollection)*<sup>59</sup> which are transcendental law; therefore, a twice-born man, desiring his own welfare (*ātmavān*)<sup>60</sup>, should always be engaged in (following) these."

<sup>58</sup>*Manu-smṛti* 1-108. Note the emphasis given by the word 'eva' on 'Śruty-ukta' and 'Smārta' *Ācāra*.

<sup>59</sup>Note the use of the word 'smārtaḥ' and not of 'smṛty-uktaḥ' (like 'śruty-uktaḥ'). We cannot be sure that the word 'smārtaḥ' is not different in meaning, as in form, from 'smṛty-uktaḥ'.

It has already been said that the practices (*ācāra*) of the faultless persons lacking knowledge of the Veda but belonging wholeheartedly to the Vedic fold, were dependent on those of the *Śiṣṭas* and not direct on *Smṛti*. So, these practically had their origin from *Śiṣṭācāra*.

<sup>60</sup>The word 'ātmavān' may also be taken to mean one 'who has his own Self (under control)', i.e. 'who is not swayed by passion'. In commenting on *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* 9-62 (*yac cātmavanto vṛddhāḥ samyag vinitāḥ*, etc.) Haradatta and Maskari take the word 'ātmavantaḥ' to mean 'jitendriyāḥ' and 'jñāna-karma-samuccaya-niṣṭhāḥ' respectively. According to Govindarāja, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa and Rāghavānanda, the word 'ātmavān', as occurring in the *Manu-smṛti*, means 'praśastātmā', (of excellent disposition), 'dhr̥timān' (endowed with firmness) and 'pāralaukikāstitva-jñānavān' (i.e., believing in a life after death) respectively.

It should be mentioned here that being connected with persons having first-hand knowledge of the Veda, 'Śīla' (or 'śiṣṭācāra') also is to be included in 'Smārta Ācāra'. The Śiṣṭas are such persons as have studied and learnt the Veda and assiduously perform the acts prescribed by it. So, even those of their practices which cannot be traced to any available Veda or Smṛti, must be presumed to have been based on some Vedic passage now lost sight of. Thus, Medhātithi says :

"śiṣṭānām ya ācāraḥ so 'pi dharme mūlam/ācāro vyavahāraḥ anuṣṭhānam/yatra śruti-smṛti-vākyāni na santi śiṣṭās ca dharma-buddhyā anuṣṭhanti tad api vaidikam eva pūrvavat pratipattavyam/yathā vivāhārau kaṅkaṇa-bandhanādi māṅgalikatvena yat kriyate, yā ca kanyāyās tad ahar vivāhayiṣyamāṇāyāḥ prakhyāta-vṛkṣa-yakṣa-catuṣpathādi-pūjā deśa-bhedena, tathā cūḍā-saṅkhyā-deśa-bhedas ca, yā cātithyādīnām gurvādīnām cānuvṛttiḥ priya-hita-vacanābhivādanābhyutthānādi-rūpā, tathā pṛṣni-sūktam tṛṇa-pāṇayo 'dhīyate aśvamedham aśvam yathā samarpayantaḥ / idṛśa ācāraḥ /"<sup>61</sup>

"The 'practice of cultured men' also is 'source of Dharma'. 'Practice' means 'conduct, behaviour'. When, in regard to any action, there are no Vedic or Smṛti statements, but cultured men are found to regard it as 'Dharma' and do it,—then that act also should be accepted as 'enjoined by the Veda' just like the act prescribed in the Smṛti. To this category belong such acts as the following—(a) the tying of the bracelet and such other auspicious rites performed during marriage, etc., (b) the worshipping of famous trees, Yakṣas, road-crossings and such things, varying in various countries, done by the girl on her day of marriage, (c) the number of hair-locks kept on the head, varying with different countries; (d) the exact manner of attending on guests, teachers and other respectable persons, consisting in addressing of sweet and agreeable words, saluting, rising to receive and so forth; for instance, it is customary with some people to recite the Pṛṣni-sūkta with grass in hand, when handing over the horse consecrated for the Aśvamedha sacrifice. It is such customs that are meant by 'Practice' here."

The above-mentioned verse of Manu has been translated by Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane in a considerably different way. His rendering of this verse is as follows :

"ācāra (customs and usages) are transcendental law, and so are the practices declared in the Veda and the Smṛti; therefore a twice-born person desirous of his own welfare should always make efforts to follow it".

Dr. Kane further says : "This has been the basic text in modern decisions that recognise the binding nature of customs. It is therefore necessary to understand the exact meaning of this verse. Two constructions are possible ; (1) that the word ācāra is qualified by the words 'śrutyukta' and 'smārta' and that the first

<sup>61</sup>Manu-smṛti (Bibl. Ind. ed.), Vol. I, p. 68.

half declares that usages declared in the Veda or Smṛti are transcendental law (this is the meaning given by most commentators of Manu); (2) that ācāra by itself and other rules of conduct declared in the śruti or smṛti are transcendental (i.e. here in the first half of the verse there is a reference to three kinds of ācāras, as Govindarāja and Nandana explain). If we look to the preceding verse and the following verses (that eulogise ācāra), the 2nd construction looks more natural and has been accepted by the decided cases when they lay down that immemorial usage is transcendental law (Sir William Jones' translation of Manu 1. 108) and that "under the Hindu system of law clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law." The Anuśāsana (141·65) and Śānti 354·6 expressly state that dharma is threefold, viz., that declared in the Veda, that declared in the Smṛtis and the third is what is practised by Śiṣṭas. Sumantu emphatically declares that family usage should be preferred to the prescriptions of śāstra. The *Kūrmapurāṇa* (Uttarārdha 15·19) appears to support the 2nd interpretation when it says, 'one should observe that ācāra which is declared by the śruti and smṛti and which is rightly followed by the good'.<sup>62</sup>

Against the above translation of Dr. P. V. Kane and the statements made by him in support of it the following points may be put forward for careful consideration :

(i) Among the verses praising Ācāra in Chapter 4 of the *Manu-smṛti*, there is one (4·155) which runs as follows :

śruti-smṛty-uditaṃ samyañ nibaddhaṃ sveṣu karmasu /  
dharma-mūlaṃ niṣeveta sadācāram atandritaḥ //

"Let him, untired, follow the conduct of good men, connected with his occupations, which has been fully declared in the revealed texts and in the sacred tradition (smṛti) and is the root of the sacred law."

In this verse it is only 'Ācāra of good men' 'declared in the Śruti and the Smṛti' which has been said to be 'the root (or cause) of Dharma.' With this verse may be considered three others, viz., *Manu-smṛti* 2·9 (in which the practice of 'śruti-smṛty-udita dharma', and not of 'ācāra', has been praised)<sup>63</sup>, 2·10 (in which the Śruti and the Smṛti have been said to be the two unquestionable sources from which Dharma came out *in its entirety*)<sup>64</sup>, and 2·11 (which decries one who disregards the two sources of Dharma, viz., Śruti and Smṛti)<sup>65</sup>. It is to be noted that although Ācāra (of virtuous men) has been recognised in *Manu-smṛti* 2·6 and 12 as one of the sources of Dharma, it has not been given the same

<sup>62</sup>Kane, *History of Dharma-śāstra*, Vol. III, p. 875.

<sup>63</sup>śruti-smṛty-uditaṃ dharmam anutiṣṭhan hi mānavaḥ/ iha kīrtim avāpnoti pretya eānuttamaṃ sukham //

Note the word 'udita' (declared), which overlooks unrecorded 'ācāra-mūlaka dharma' even though it may be followed by good men.

<sup>64</sup>śruti tu vedo vijñeyo dharma-śāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ/ te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsy e tābhyāṃ dharmo hi nīrababhau //

<sup>65</sup>yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetu-śāstrāśrayād dvijaḥ/ sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo nāsti-ko veda-nindakaḥ.//

importance as the Śruti and the Smṛti in the three verses referred to above. So, it is more reasonable to hold that in *Manu-smṛti* 1·108 'śrutyukta' and 'smārta' Ācāra only have been praised as 'Parama Dharma'.

(ii) In the verse preceding *Manu-smṛti* 1·108 (ācāraḥ paramo dharmah etc.) quoted above, Dharma and eternal Ācāra (presumably comprising Śrutyukta, Smārta, and ordinary Ācāra coming down from time immemorial) have been mentioned separately as treated of in the *Manu-smṛti*<sup>66</sup>; and in the two verses following verse 108, Ācāra has been praised generally. So, there is nothing in these verses which may indicate that in verse 108 three kinds of Ācāra have been praised as Parama Dharma. On the other hand, the general mention of 'śāsvata ācāra' in verse 107 without any specification of it, tends to show that in verse 108 Śrutyukta and Smārta Ācāra have been distinguished from ordinary Ācāra of immemorably long standing.

(iii) Neither Govindarāja nor Nandana takes verse 108 to mean three kinds of Ācāra. The former regards Śrutyukta and Smārta Ācāra as Parama Dharma and distinguishes them from Śrauta and Smārta Dharma.<sup>67</sup> The latter, on the other hand, comments on this verse, saying :

“dharma eva niḥśreyasa-sādhanaṃ tasmāt sa eva vaktavyaḥ kim ācāreṇeti ced atrāha ācāra iti / śrutyukto 'gni-hotra-homādih, smārto 'ṣṭakādih / asmiṃs traye ”<sup>68</sup> (Nandana's commentary, as given in Jolly's *Manu-ṭikā-saṃgraha*, adds 'śrauta-smārtācāraṇām' after 'traye').

From Nandana's words it is evident that he does not distinguish between three kinds of Ācāra but takes the words 'śrutyukta' and 'smārta' to mean Śrauta and Smārta Dharma respectively. So, according to him, it is the Śrutyukta-dharma, Smārta-dharma and Ācāra which are to be regarded as Parama Dharma. This view of Nandana is also evident from his comment on *Manu-smṛti* 4·155, in which he says:

“sveṣu karmasu nibaddhaṃ svāni karmāṇi varṇāśrama-prayuktāni kurvan dharma-mūlaṃ dharmasya mūlam / dharma-mūlatvaṃ ca 'ācāra prabhavo dharmah śrutyuktaḥ smārta eva ca' ity atra pratipāditam /.”<sup>69</sup>

<sup>66</sup> asmin dharmo 'khilenokto guṇa-doṣau ca karmaṇām / caturṇām api varṇānām ācāras caiva śāsvataḥ//

<sup>67</sup>yaḥ śrutyuktaḥ ācāraḥ puruṣa-sādhāraṇa-prādhānya-khyāpanārthaṃ ca dharmā-khyaḥ yaś ca smārtaḥ sa parama(h) prakṛṣṭo dharmo paramo jyotiṣṭomāṣṭakādibhyaḥ śrauta-smārta-dharmebhyaḥ yataḥ tasmāt yo nityaṃ prasastātmā ācāre sarva-kāle yukto yatnavān syāt /

This is the text of Govindarāja's commentary as given in V. N. Mandlik's edition of the same. Jolly, on the other hand, gives it as follows :

yaḥ śrutyukta ācāraḥ puruṣa-dharmākhyo yaś ca smārtaḥ sa paramaḥ prakṛṣṭo dharmo jyotiṣṭomāṣṭakādibhyaḥ śrauta-smārta-dharmebhyo, etc. (the rest being the same as in Mandlik's ed.). See J. Jolly, *Manu-ṭikā-saṃgraha*, ed. Bibl. Ind.

<sup>68-69.</sup> See V. N. Mandlik's ed. of the *Manu-smṛti* with six commentaries (viz. those of Medhātithi, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, Kullūka-bhaṭṭa, Rāghavānanda, Nandana, Rāmacandra).



(iv) The recognition given to Śiṣṭācāra as a kind of Dharma in Anuśāsana-parvan 141.65<sup>70</sup> is nothing new or striking, nor does it prove that Śrauta and Smārta Dharma are to be deemed weaker than Śiṣṭācāra. We have already seen that Baudhāyana also recognised Śiṣṭāgama (i.e. Śiṣṭācāra) as a kind of Dharma but gave it the third place.

(v) The line

'sadācāraḥ smṛtir vedas trividhaṃ dharma-lakṣaṇam'<sup>71</sup> of the Śānti-parvan (259-3) does not say anything new, because in the *Manu-smṛti* (2-12) also we find the following verse—

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ/  
etac caturvidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣād dharmasya lakṣaṇam//

(vi) It is true that in the verse

tasmin kula-kramāyātam ācāraṃ tv ācared budhaḥ/  
sa garīyān mahābāho sarva-śāstroditād api//<sup>72</sup>

Sumantu is found to be in favour of regarding family usage as more powerful than the prescriptions of Śāstras, but we must not forget that Sumantu (especially the author of the metrical Dharma-śāstra) was a comparatively late Smṛti-writer.<sup>73</sup> His comparatively late origin is shown by the facts that his name occurs neither in the lists of Smṛti-writers given by Yājñavalkya<sup>74</sup> and Parāśara<sup>75</sup> nor in those ascribed to Yama, Aṅgiras, Śaṅkha-Likhita and others in the Smṛti-nibandhas,<sup>76</sup> and that among the early Smṛti-writers it is only Yājñavalkya and Sumantu who are found to recognise the Purāṇas as records of Dharma (dharmasya sthānāni,

<sup>70</sup> vedoktaḥ paramo dharmāḥ smṛti-śāstra-gato 'paraḥ/  
śiṣṭācāraḥ paraḥ proktas trayo dharmāḥ sanātanaḥ //

<sup>71</sup>This line (with the readings 'śiṣṭācāraḥ' for 'sadācāraḥ', and 'vedaḥ' for 'vedaḥ') has been ascribed to Manu in *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 6.

<sup>72</sup>Quoted as from Sumantu in Vaidyanātha's *Smṛti-muktāphala* (ed. J. R. Gharpure), I (Varṇāśrama-dharma), p. 7.

<sup>73</sup>According to P. V. Kane, even the prose work on Dharma by Sumantu 'was not a very ancient one'. See Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, I, p. 130.

<sup>74</sup>*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1-4-5.

<sup>75</sup>*Parāśara-smṛti* 1-12-15.

<sup>76</sup>For Yama's list (which is a closed one) see *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 23, and *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 29.

For the closed list (of 16 names) ascribed to Aṅgiras see *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 27. This list (with two names more) was derived anonymously from *Prayoga-pārijāta* and *Madana-satna* in *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 18.

For Śaṅkha-Likhita's open list see *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 23; *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 28; *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 16. This list has been ascribed to Śaṅkha in *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 2, and to Gautama in Aparārka's commentary (on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*), p. 20.

For other anonymous lists excluding the name of Sumantu see Aparārka's commentary, p. 7 (giving 36 names from 'smṛty-antara'), *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 18 (giving 18 names from the *Prayoga-pārijāta*); and so on.

It is only the list (of 36 writers on Dharma) ascribed to Paiṭhīnasi in the *Smṛti-candrikā* (I, pp. 1-2), *Vīramitrodaya* (Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 15-16), etc. which includes the name of Sumantu. In his *Vīramitrodaya* (Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 18) Mitrāmīśra gives from the *Prayoga-pārijāta* another anonymous list of 21 Smṛti-writers including Sumantu.

dharmavivasthā-pravartakāni).<sup>77</sup> We have already seen that in none of the extant works on Dharma down to the *Manu-smṛti*, the Purāṇas were recognised as a source of Dharma. Moreover, the Ācāras came to be recognised as more powerful than the prescriptions of the Śruti and the Smṛti only in comparatively late days when many of the customs and usages enjoined in the Vedas and the earlier Smṛtis went out of vogue. For instances of such customs and usages we may refer to the system of levirate (niyoga), the acceptance of a Śūdrā wife by a Brahmin, and so on, and especially to the Kali-varjyas mentioned in different works.

(vii) The verse of the *Kūrma-purāṇa* (ii. 15. 19)—

śruti-smṛty-uditaḥ samyak sādhubhir yaś ca sevitaḥ/  
tam ācāraṃ niṣeveta nehetānyatra karhicit//

recommends the careful practice of three kinds of Ācāra (viz., Śrutyudita, Smṛtyudita and Sādhu-sevita) and advises people not to strive for the practice of those Ācāras which do not fall under these categories, and in these respects there is complete agreement between the *Kūrma-purāṇa* and the *Manu-smṛti*. But we find nothing in the above-mentioned verse of the *Kūrma-purāṇa* which may indicate that these three kinds of Ācāras are to be regarded as transcendental law (Parama Dharma).

From what has been said above it is evident that Manu was not in favour of giving equal importance to all kinds of Ācāra prevailing among the followers of the Veda but made a distinction between them in accordance with the nature of acquaintance of these followers with the Veda, and this attitude of Manu towards the different kinds of Ācāra is perfectly in agreement with his attitude towards the *Atharva-veda* as shown above (in Part I of the present essay).

As regards self-satisfaction (ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ), which has been mentioned by Manu as the fifth source of Dharma, it may be said that it relates to both the classes of the Vedic people mentioned above, viz., those who studied and learnt the Veda and assiduously performed the acts prescribed by it, and others who, though lacking knowledge of the Veda, belonged wholeheartedly to the Vedic society. Thus, in case of doubt about the acceptability either of a particular rite, custom or usage of long standing which found no support in the authorities on Dharma prescribed by Manu for the different classes of people mentioned above or of any of the two or more alternative provisions made in the Veda or Smṛti on a particular matter, these people were to follow the dictation of their own mind so long as it was not influenced by any feeling of love, hatred, etc.

<sup>77</sup>See *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1.3 quoted below, and Sumantu's Sūtra quoted in foot-note 43 above.

The enumeration of the five sources of Dharma, as found in *Manu-smṛti* 2. 6 (vedo 'khilo dharma-mūlaṃ etc.), must not be taken to be in disagreement with Manu's mention of the fourfold 'dharma-lakṣaṇa' in the following verse of the *Manu-smṛti* (2. 12) :

vedaḥ smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ/  
etac catur-vidhaṃ prāhuḥ sākṣād dharmasya lakṣaṇam//

"The Veda, Smṛti, practice of good men, and what is agreeable to one's ownself—these constitute the fourfold direct means of knowing Dharma".

This latter verse embodies a general statement of Manu, in which no provision has been made by the author from a practical point of view for distinction between the different grades of usages (ācāra) prevailing in the Aryan society and consequently the word 'sat' has been used to mean both the Śiṣṭas and the Sādhus who had high regard for the Veda.

Manu's recognition of the different sources of Dharma, as explained above, shows how, in spite of his remarkable inclination for the Veda, he took the problems of the different classes of members of the Vedic society into consideration and made provisions for them with an eye to the tendencies of the age in which he lived and wrote. Although Manu's sincere regard for the Veda did not allow him to be as much liberal in his outlook as his age required of him, it must be admitted that his contribution to the life and growth of the Hindu society against the onslaughts of the anti-Vedic religionists was considerable and paved the way to the further growth and expansion of the Hindu society and the Smṛti literature. But unfortunately most of the commentators of Manu's work as well as the Nibandha-writers appear to have misunderstood his views and to have interpreted his statements according to their own ideas and mode of thinking. Thus, in explaining the verse "vedo' khilo dharma-mūlaṃ, etc." of the *Manu-smṛti* (2.6) Medhātithi takes the terms 'smṛti' and 'śīla' as interrelated and the word 'tadvidāṃ' as an adjective to 'sādḥūnām', connects the latter word (sādḥūnām) with 'smṛti-śīle', 'ācāraḥ' and 'ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ', and puts forth the view that the persons whose recollection (smṛti), practice (ācāra) and self-satisfaction (ātma-tuṣṭi) are to be regarded as roots of Dharma, must have all the three following characteristic features :

- (a) they must be versed in the Veda (tadvidāṃ),
- (b) they must have Śīla (i.e. freedom from love and hatred—rāga-dveṣa-prahāṇa), and
- (c) they must be righteous and be habitually engaged in carrying out the injunctions of the Veda (sādhu).

So, according to Medhātithi, none other than those who are learned in the Veda and assiduously perform the acts prescribed by it, deserves any consideration in the matter of recognition of the roots of Dharma other than the Vedas. Thus, Medhātithi puts forward a very strict view which follows that of Gautama and other early authorities and, in consideration of the time in which he lived, can

rightly be said to be regressive, rather than progressive. Medhātithi was followed more or less by many of his successors, of whom Govindarāja, Lakṣmīdhara, Kullūka-bhaṭṭa, Hemādri, Caṇḍeśvara, Rāghavānanda, Nandana, Mitrāmīśra and several others deserve special mention. These Smṛti-writers connect the word 'tadvidām' with 'smṛti-śīle' as well as 'ācāraḥ', and 'sādhūnām' with 'ātmanas tuṣṭih'<sup>78</sup> and thus recognise as a source of Dharma the Ācāra of only those who are learned in the Veda. But we should not overlook the four verses of the *Manu-smṛti* (2.17-20) in which Manu says :

"The region lying between the divine rivers Sarasvatī and Dṛṣadvatī which has been created by the gods,—they call 'Brahmāvarta'.

"That practice (ācāra), which has come down through an unbroken line of tradition among the several castes and sub-castes in that country, is called the 'practice of good men' (sadācāra).

"Next to Brahmāvarta is the Brahmarṣideśa comprising the regions of Kurukṣetra, Matsyas, Pāñcālas and Śūrasenakas.

"All men on the earth should learn their respective duties from the Brahmins born in these countries".

It may be mentioned here that neither all the members of all the Aryan castes and sub-castes in Brahmāvarta nor all the Brahmins of Brahmarṣideśa could be expected to be versed in the Veda, yet Manu recognised their hereditary practice as an authority on Dharma.<sup>79</sup>

Similar statements have been made by other Smṛti-writers also, of whom Baudhāyana says :

"(The country, lying) to the east of (the place of) disappearance (of the river Sarasvatī), to the west of Kālakavana, to the south of the Himavat, and to the north of the Pāriyātra (mountain), is Āryāvarta. The practice (prevailing) there, is an authority.

"Some (say) that (Āryāvarta is the tract of land lying) between the (rivers) Gaṅgā and Yamunā."<sup>80</sup>

<sup>78</sup>See Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 20, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* II.i, p. 18, Caṇḍeśvara's *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 26, and Mitrāmīśra's *Vitrāmīśra-daya*, Paribhāṣa-prakāśa, pp. 8-9.

According to Lakṣmīdhara, Hemādri, Caṇḍeśvara and Mitrāmīśra the word 'sādhūnām' means 'vaidika-saṃskāra-vāsītāntaḥkaraṇānām' (v.l. 'vāsītātmanām'—Caṇḍeśvara); Govindarāja, Kullūka-bhaṭṭa and others take it to mean 'dhārmikānām'; and Rāghavānanda interpretes it as 'amatsarāṇām'.

<sup>79</sup>See *Manu-smṛti* 2.12.

<sup>80</sup>*Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i.1.25-26—prāg adarśanāt pratyak kālakavanād dakṣiṇeṇa himavantam udak pāriyātram etad āryāvartam tasmin ya ācāraḥ sa pramāṇam // gaṅgā-yamunayor antaram ity eke //

Vasiṣṭha also says :

“Āryāvarta (lies) to the east of the Ādarśa (mountain), to the west of Kālakavana, to the north of the Pāriyātra (mountain, and) to the south of the Himavat.

“(According to others, it lies) to the north of the Vindhya (range).

“Those duties and customs which (prevail) in that country, are to be recognised (as authoritative) everywhere,

“but not the other duties which are almost like those going against the descending order of castes (?).

“(People) call this (country) Āryāvarta.

“And some (declare it to be situated) between the (rivers) Gaṅgā and Yamunā.”<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup>*Vasiṣṭha-smṛti* 1. 7-11—Āryāvartaḥ prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālakavanād udak pāriyātrād dakṣiṇena himavata uttaraṇa ca vindhyasya// tasmin deśe ye dharmā ye cācārā te sarvatra pratyetyāḥ// na tv anye pratilomakalpa-dharmāḥ// etad āryāvataḥ ity ācakṣate// gaṅgā-yamunayor antare 'py eke//

# On the Gāthās, Yajñagāthās and Ślokas in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa

BY VIMAN CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

The orthodox view is indubitably in favour of the opinion that all the Ṛgveda-verses are composed with a view to their being applied to a particular ceremony ; or, in other words, they have not only ceremonial uses but also ceremonious origin. The Brāhmaṇa texts virtually start with this view and devote themselves to the justification of the Ṛgveda-verses in their ritual frames. For this justification of the liturgical employment of the Ṛgveda-verses, the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* has some stock devices of which two—the Gāthā-device and the Śloka-device, generally introduced with expressions like *tad yad ado gāthā bhavati, tad apy eṣaḥ śloko. 'bhīgītaḥ* and *tad eṣā'bhi yajñagāthā gīyate*, deserve special attention as they have an important and indispensable bearing on any research to be conducted in the field of framing an accurate statistic of ṛk-verses of genuinely ritual origin. By having recourse to these devices the author of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* testifies to the prevalence of a ritual or the practice of citing a mantra in a particular ritual even in an age far anterior to that of his.

A study of these devices is made in the following lines.

## A. Br. XIV. 5.

The characteristic feature of Agniṣṭoma is that it begins with Prāyaṇīya and ends in Udayanīya in both of which *Caru* is offered to Āditya. Thus both the introductory and the concluding rites in Agniṣṭoma have a likeness regarding the *dravya* (namely, *caru*) as well as the deity (namely, Āditya)(1) and in support of this likeness a Gāthā is quoted here. It can be regarded as an instance of justification of the characteristic feature of a ritual by applying the Gāthā-device. It should be noted that the Gāthā quoted here is very general in character and possesses no such word as can be regarded as a convincing ground in declaring that it speaks of or is originally composed with an eye to this particular feature of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice which our text wants to affirm. In other words, it can be taken as speaking with an equal degree of probability, of any likeness between any two things or of like features of one and the same thing(2).

## A. Br. XXV. 5.

The point of dispute that the text discusses here is whether the Agnihotra offering should be made before sunrise or after it. From the references already

(1) Comp. *tat tasminn agniṣṭomasadyantayoh prāyaṇīyodayanīyayor eva viṣaye..... ādityaḥ prāyaṇīyaś carur āditya udayanīyaś carur iti dravyadevatayor ubhayatraikavidhatvāt tayor ekatvopacārah*—Sāy. on A. Br. XIV 5.

(2) Comp. *Ś. Br. 3.2.4.16.*

made (*A. Br.* XXV. 4.) to the protests of Vṛṣasūṣma and Kumārī Gandharvagṛhītā against the practice of offering Agnihotra before sunrise—a practice which seems to be widely followed by the time of our text(3) it is clear that the old practice was to offer Agnihotra after sunrise. That the *A. Br.* sides with the old practice and takes the protests of Vṛṣasūṣma and Kumārī Gandharvagṛhītā with which it opens the topic, as sufficiently fortifying its position is clear from its assertion *tasmād udite hotavyam* immediately after the reference is made. Yet it gives, by way of justifying its stand, other two explanations of the merits that accrue by having recourse to the old practice and asserts each time, with the same emphasis as before, *tasmād udite hotavyam*(4).

The text also quotes two Gāthās(5) as additional supports to its view. The first one categorically speaks of the practice of offering after sunrise, while the second one only denounces the reverse practice. In any case, both contain words that prove that they are composed with an eye on this particular practice and are not of general character.

In contrast with the aforesaid Gāthās, the text introduces a third one with the expression *tad yad ado gāthā bhavati*. It is interesting to note that while the first two are called Yajñagāthā(6), this third one is simply called Gāthā and this difference in their denominations is hardly fortuitous. Our text supports the practice of Agnihotra offering after sunrise (*uditahoma*) the deity of which is Āditya. It states that Āditya is the lonely guest (*ekātithi*) and he lives among the offerers(7). The intention behind this statement is that one offering after sunrise is easily able to have the advantage of the presence of the deity (namely, Āditya) to whom the offering is made. The Gāthā in question is quoted by our text in support of its statement regarding Āditya as (*ekātithi*)(8) and thus can be regarded as only justifying the deity and thereby indirectly showing the appropriateness of the practice of offering after sunrise. It has no direct bearing on a ritual or any part thereof just as the two previous Yajñagāthās have and herein lies the difference of the two denominations.

There is yet another side of the situation. Even the most critical examination of this Gāthā-text fails to provide us with the slightest ground to conjecture that the term *ekātithiṃ* occurring in it refers in any way to Āditya, not to speak of the ritual of which he is the deity. Sāyaṇa, too, explains this Gāthā very generally without making any reference to Āditya or any ritual of which he is the deity and only secondarily suggests an alternative explanation which even

(3) Comp. *tad etar hi huyate*—*A. Br.* XXV. 4.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) *Ibid.*, XXV. V.

(6) Introduced with the expression *tad eṣā 'bhi yajñagāthā gīyate*.

(7) *sa vā eṣa ekātithiṃ sa eṣa juhatsu vasati*—*A. Br.* XXV. V.

(8) See note 7.

can hardly reconcile the Gāthā with our text, inasmuch as, it does not expressly state that *ekātithiṃ* refers to Āditya(9).

It may be argued that the Gāthā cannot stand accused of the vagueness of the import of the term *ekātithi* so long as it is not examined with reference to the context in which it originally occurs. Or, in other words, the vagueness is only apparent and is due to the fact that it is torn out of the original context and considered singly(10). Such argument definitely takes us to another field of investigation into the original context of every single gāthā-citation after which alone we are entitled to dogmatize regarding the scope of the Gāthās as instruments of justification and our success is bound to be limited to the extent to which we are able to trace a Gāthā back to its original place of occurrence.

There is also another serious incongruity. Our text wants to justify the practice of offering after sunrise (*uditahoma*) when, it thinks on the basis of this Gāthā, the Āditya resides with the offerers. But the Gāthā text *ekātithim apa sāyaṃ ruṇaddhi* speaks of Āditya as *ekātithi* in the evening and not in the morning which is the desideratum of our text. To bring the Gāthā to any service to our text the obvious emendation suggested therefore, is the reading *ekātithim apa prātā ruṇaddhi* in place of *ekātithim apa sāyaṃ ruṇaddhi*.

A. Br. XXV. 6.

Towards the concluding portion, the text quotes another Yajñagāthā to extol the practice of *uditahoma* which not only categorically denounces the reverse practice but also points out the discrepancy of the offering mantra *sūryo jyotir jyotiḥ sūryaḥ svāhā* in the context of *anuditahoma* (11).

A. Br. XXIX. 8.

The text introduces a Yajñagāthā here in support of its view that even a man who has no wife should offer Agnihotra.<sup>12</sup> Though it directly enjoins the

(9) Comp. *Yad vā agnihotrārthaṃ sāyaṃ samāgatam ekātithiṃ devam uparuṇaddhi honarāhityena nirākuryāt*—Sāy. on the gāthā-text in A. Br. XXV. V.

(10) Comp. Keith's remark on this point: 'The stanza was partly intelligible to Sāyaṇa, as he makes it said as an oath by one accused of stealing lotus fibres. The verse is clearly cited from a story of which we have divergent versions in the *Mahābhārata* (2 accounts; XIII. 4396-4546 and 4547-4600) and in the *Jātaka* No. 488, and in which the Ṛṣis in order to release themselves of the accusation of being guilty of the theft of lotus fibres swore frightful oaths, one of which is here recorded but which has no parallel in the *Mahābhārata* or the *Jātaka*'—*H. O. S.*, Vol. 25, p. 254. f.n.1.

(11) Keith renders the Gāthā thus:—

Every morning they tell falsehood.

Who offer the Agnihotra before sunrise,

Declaring what is to be declared by day on what is not day.

"Sūrya is the light"; There is not then light for them.

The import of the Gāthā is this: the mantra *sūryo jyotir jyotiḥ sūryaḥ svāhā* is to be uttered by those only who offer Agnihotra after sunrise, because then and then alone they can speak of the Sun as the light. But those offering Agnihotra before sunrise and yet uttering the mantra therein definitely tell a lie for, there is not then the sun for them and, therefore, not the light. Sāy. quotes this very text as an example of Gāthā on A. Ar. II.3.6,

(12) Comp. *tasmād apatnīko 'py agnihotram āharet*.



performance of Sautrāmani by one who has no wife and only *a fortiori* the Agni-hotra, it can be taken as summarizing a sacrificial usage and, therefore, to be of ritual origin.

A. Br. XXIX. 7

Of somewhat interesting character is this Yajñagāthā that simply tells us that at Āsandivant, King Janamejaya performed horse-sacrifice. Judged in the light of character of the previous Yajñagāthās each of which expressly summarizes a particular sacrificial usage, this one presents a quite different character. While the object of the previous Yajñagāthās is to extol or denounce a particular sacrificial usage, the object of this one is to extol King Janamejaya as a performer of horse-sacrifice and not the horse-sacrifice itself. By virtue of this character it comes to identify itself with a Nārāśaṃsī verse which is usually a laudation of human beings and which is regarded as different from a Gāthā in a R̥gveda verse(13). In the *T. Br.* 1. 3. 2. 6, Gāthā is qualified as *nārāśaṃsī* while Sāyaṇa in *Śat. Br.* 11. 5. 6. 8 seems to hesitate between identifying the two and distinguishing them. The later literature, however, takes Gāthā as distinguished from Nārāśaṃsī(14).

Another term that the *A. Br.* has in its stock for such verses is *śloka* and it quotes several with expressions *tad apy eṣa śloka 'bhigītaḥ*(15) *tad apy ete ślokā abhigītaḥ*(16). An examination of these (eleven) verses that the Brāhmaṇa labels as *śloka* shows that ten(17) of them are eulogies of generous royal donors and are therefore, *Dānastuti* in character, while only one(18) being a laudation of King Marutta may be classed as a *Nārāśaṃsī*. Assuming that our text is not particular in maintaining a strict difference between a *Nārāśaṃsī* and a *Dānastuti*—and, in fact, no absolute and uniform distinction between the two seems to be maintained throughout the later liturgical texts—it may not be a hasty verdict to declare, that our text designates those verses as *śloka*(19) which are *Dānastuti* (laudation of gifts) in character and as gifts were usually made to

(13) *Rv.*X.8.6.5. In *Av.*X.10.20 and XV.6, 4 and in *T.A.*II.10, Gāthā is regarded as distinct from Nārāśaṃsī. Comp. 'Gāthā in R̥gveda usually means only "song", "verse" like Gātu. In one passage, however, it already has a more special sense as it is classed with Nārāśaṃsī and Raivṛyī, a collection repeatedly found later. The commentators identify the three terms with certain verses of the Atharvaveda, but Oldenberg has shown that this identification is incorrect for the R̥gveda'—*Vedic Index*, Gāthā.

(14) *TS.* VII.5.11.2; *A.Br.* XXX.6; *T.A.* II.10, *K.Br.* XXX. 5, etc. Comp. "It is hardly probable that the two were absolutely distinct for the *Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa* has the phrase 'a Gāthā celebrating men (nārāśaṃsī)'—*Vedic Index*, Nārāśaṃsī.

(15) *A. Br.* XXXIX. 7 (one verse).

(16) *Ibid.* XXXIX. 8 (5 verses) and XXXIX. 9 (5 verses).

(17) Referred to in note (16).

(18) Referred to in note (15).

(19) Comp. *Nighaṇṭu* 1.11. where Śloka is only synonym of Vāc. Śloka is the name of a distinct kind of literary composition in *Sat. Br.* 1. 4. 6. 10. 6. For examples of *śloka* see *Sat. Br.* 1. 4. 7. 2. 10—13.

priests as sacrificial fees (*dakṣiṇā*), this class of verses is also indirectly connected with sacrifice just as the Gāthās are(20).

The thirty-third chapter of the *A. Br.* contains thirty-one verses quoted in connection with story of Śunaḥśepa<sup>21</sup>. It is interesting to note that the text does not class them under any of the three categories(22). Nevertheless, its recognition of them as Gāthās is implicit in the textual version *sa ekayā prṣṭo daśabhiḥ partyuvāca*(23) (being asked in one verse he replied in ten) with which Nārada's reply to Hariścandra in ten short verses are introduced. In fact, *ekayā* can be satisfactorily explained there only as a numeral adjective to *gāthayā* to be supplied(24). Other verses in this chapter are quoted with verbs like *ākhyāya*, *uvāca*, *anumantrayāmāsa*, *tuṣṭāva*, etc., preceding or following according to the context in which they occur. A critical acumen applied to the study of these Gāthās reveal that they are neither laudations of gifts (*dānastuti*) nor laudations of human beings (*nārāśamsi*), nor they summarize, even indirectly, a sacrificial usage. In the light of these facts, the view that a Gāthā has always an indirect bearing on a sacrificial usage—a view which we are tempted to form after an analysis of the verse expressly stated as Gāthā in *A. Br.* XXV.V—seems no longer tenable. Moreover, the reply of Nārada to Hariścandra in ten short verses or Indra's sayings to Rohita in five verses are so general in character that they are hardly passable as being originally composed with an eye to this story of Śunaḥśepa(25).

The word *gāthā* occurs in the Ṛgveda several times. Sāyaṇa generally takes the term as equivalent to *Stuti*, *Stotra* and *Vāc*(26). Once the word *gāthinah*(27)

(20) In fact, a rigid distinction between a *Nārāśamsi* and a *Dānastuti* verse is not always possible and one often overlaps the other. A *Nārāśamsi* verse is primarily the praise of a man for a particular deed he has done, while a *Dānastuti* verse primarily praises the gifts of a generous donor. Yet when gifts are praised, the giver is not lost sight of though, only apparently, he occupies a place of secondary importance to one who praises. Judged from this aspect, *Dānastutis* cover, but are not co-extensive with, the *Nārāśamsis*. The Gāthās quoted in *Śat. Br.* XIII. 4.2.8. are clearly *Dānastutis* in character just as the *Nārāśamsi* verses are said to be in the *Bṛhaddevatā* III. 154.

(21) Comp. *tad etat pararṣatagāthāṃ śaunaḥśepam ākhyānam—A. Br.* XXXIII. 6.

(22) Namely, Yajñagāthā, Gāthā and Śloka.

(23) *A. Br.* XXXIII. 1.

(24) Comp. *sa nārada ekayā gāthaya prṣṭaḥ san daśabhir gāthābhiḥ pratyuttaram uktaṅvān—Sāy.* on the above text.

(25) Comp. "The verses in Chapters 13 and 15 are quite different from those in chapters 17 and 18, which are full of references to an individual and clear action, while those in the first two chapters are general in the extreme. Indeed, so inappropriate is the exhortation to the king to obtain a son in chapter 13 that it is addressed to Brāhmaṇas. There can therefore be only one logical conclusion, that the verses are not chosen out of a narrative made up apropos of Hariścandra but are mere general maxims fitted into such a story. The same remark applies to verses in chapter 15 on the benefits of energy, with the solitary exception that Rohita appears in one verse"—Keith, *H. O. S.*, Vol. 25, p. 65.

(26) *gāthapatim* in *Rv.* 1. 43, 4a (*stutipālakam—Sāy.*), *gāthābhiḥ* in *Rv.* VIII. 71, 14b (*gātheti vānāma mantrarūpābhir vāgbhiḥ—Sāy.*), *gāthayā* in *Rv.* VIII. 32, 1b (*vācā—Sāy.*), *gāthayā* in *Rv.* VIII. 98, 9 (*stotreṇa—Sāy.*), *gāthāśravasam* in *Rv.* VIII. 2. 38a (*gātavyayasasam—Sāy.*), *gāyadgātham* in *Rv.* 1. 167. 6 (*gātavyaṇ stotram . . . . . gāyati—Sāy.*).

(27) *Rv.* 1. 7. 1a.

is taken by Sāyana as referring to the Udgātṛ priests engaged in singing *sāmans*(28). Elsewhere, a Gāthā is called *purāṇī*(29) and this is of immense interest for us as it reveals the fact that even before the time of the Ṛgveda there was a floating mass of anonymous literary composition known by the appellation of Gāthā. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* mentions Gāthā as one of the different literatures(30) existing since before it. Regarding *Rv.* 1. 105. 6, Yāska says that in the hymn (*Rv.* 1. 105) where the verse occurs, the *brahma* is mixed with *itihāsha*, Ṛk and gāthā(31) and Durgācārya says there—that Gāthā is a distinct kind of Ṛk. In a passage of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (III. 6, 4), Gāthā is classed with Ṛk and Kumbyā. It therefore seems probable that Gāthā as a distinct kind of literary composition is contemporaneous with, if not anterior to, the Ṛgveda period when, to all probability, it was regarded as sacred and sacrosanct as the Ṛgveda verses. The later liturgical literature also bears testimony to this fact by not infrequently mentioning them as Ṛks(32). The *A. Br.* designates a group of verses called *Indragāthā* to be recited in rituals(33) where Sāyana says that they are five in number and takes them as equivalent to Ṛks(34). Yet a definite aversion to the Gāthās is palpably visible in the Brāhmaṇa literature and the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* asseverates that the Gāthās are the refuse of the Ṛks(35) and condemns the acceptance of gifts from one reciting Gāthā(36). The *A. Br.* clearly distinguishes a Gāthā from a Ṛk and pulls down the former from the level of the latter by saying that a Ṛk is divine while a Gāthā is human(37). It is possible that a steady and continual addition to the stock of the Gāthā literature was going on(38) till the later period when verses of even the latest origin incorporated in the body of the Gāthā literature began to claim a position by the side of their ancient predecessors—a privilege that was, very probably, denied to them by the Brāhmaṇa literature by exhibiting a settled aversion to them. It is not of little interest to see that the *A. Br.* (XXV. 2 and XXXII. 2), while

(28) Comp. *gāthino gīyamānasāmayuktā udgātārah. . . . .gāthā eṣām santī ti gāthinaḥ—Sāy.*),

(29) *gāthayā purāṇyā* in *Rv.* IX. 99. 4a being explained by Sāy, as *purā kṛtayā gāthayā*.

(30) *Śat. Br.* XI. 5. 6. 8; XIV. 6. 10. 6.

(31) *N.* IV. 6.

(32) Comp. *gāthāśabdena brāhmaṇagatā iva ucyante—Nārāyaṇa on Āś.Śr.Śu.* V. 6; *gāthā nāma ṛgviśeṣāḥ* on *Āś. Gr. Śu.* III 3. 1. See also *Kāṭhaka Gr. Śu.* XXV. 23.

(33) *indragāthāḥ śāṃsati—A.Br.* XXX. 6.

(34) *yad indrādo daśarājña ity ādyāḥ pañcarca indragāthābhīdhāḥ samset.*

(35) *yad brahmaṇaḥ samalam āsīt sā gāthā nārāśāṃsya abhavat—T.Br.,* 1. 3. 2. 6.

(36) *tasmād gāyatas ca mattasya ca na pratigṛhyam—ibid.,* 1. 3. 2. 7.

(37) *om ity iva pratigara evaṃ tatheti gāthāyā, om iti vai daivaṃ tatheti mānuṣam—A.Br.* XXXIII. 6; comp. *om ity iva pratigaras tatheti gāthānām—KĀ. Śr. Śu.* XV. 156; *nārāśāṃsyaḥ pauruṣeḃyo yajñagāthāḥ. . . . .puruṣakṛtā eva gāthā ity anye—Viśvarūpa on Yājñavalkyaśmṛti,* 1. 45. In fact, speech (*Vāc*) is regarded as consisting of both truth and untruth—*vāco vāva tau stanau satyānrte vāva te—A. Br.* XVI. 1. Once, on *Rv.* 1. 164. 49. Sāyana explains the word *stana* as *laukikavaidikaśabdārūpaḥ stanāḥ*. It is possible that Gāthās being popular compositions came to be regarded as “untruth” as opposed to the divine Vedic verses which were regarded as “truth” and, indeed, this is suggested by the passage *ko’rhati manusaḥ sarvaṃ satyaṃ vaditum, satya-saṃhitā vai devā anṛtasamhitā manuṣyāḥ—A. Br.* 1. 6. Comp. also, *satyaṃ eva devā anṛtaṃ manuṣyāḥ—Śat. Br.* 1. 1. 1. 4.

(38) Comp. (*gāthāḥ*) *paramparāgatāḥ ślokāḥ—Medhātithi on Manusamhitā* IX. 42.

laying down expiations for errors in the Agnihotra, prescribes three verses which are really Gāthās in character and yet, on that ground, are not denied a place in ritual by the side of the Vedic verses. This shows that by the time of the text Gāthās are already incorporated in the body of the ritual mantras and have gained so much sacrosanctity that even the growing brāhmanic aversion to the Gāthā literature as a whole is not able to pull them down from their settled position obviously for fear of sacrilege.

It seems that Gāthā is a distinct kind of metrical literature, expressive of popular faiths and beliefs and having as its contents various subjects, thoughts and abstract ideas. It dates back to as early a period as that of the Ṛgveda verses but is clearly distinct from them in language, composed as they are not by the social intellectuals but by the common people in popular dialect. As in every age there remains a possibility of different literatures cropping up in different strata of the society, it is not unlikely that the Gāthā literature grew up by the side of the Ṛgveda verses with only a dialectical difference from the latter(39). In *Rv* X. 71, we find the seer speaking of a number of people who cannot perceive the meaning of the Ṛgveda verses (*uta tvaḥ paśyan na dadarśa vācam uta tvaḥ śṛṇvan na śṛṇoty enām—Rv. X. 71. 4*) and thus referring to only a limited few who could understand the same (*uta tvasmai tanvaṃ vi sasre—Rv. X. 71. 4c*). In such a state of society an admixture of the popular versicles with the verses composed by the Vedic seers often takes place(40) and the Vedic seers often have to fan out the foreign elements from their own compositions by carving out the Ṛgveda hymns just as barley dust (*saktu*) is purified through a filter (*titaau*)(41).

Being varied in its contents the Gāthā as a wider term covers, but is not co-extensive with, the *Nārāsaṃsī* and *Dānastuti*. When the *A. Br.* draws upon a Gāthā that summarizes a sacrificial usage, it calls it *Yajñagāthā* (just as a Gāthā is sometimes qualified as *nārāsaṃsī*) when it happens to be a laudation of a human being(42), when it is *Dānastuti* (praise of gifts) in character, the *A. Br.* labels it as *śloka* and when it is neither of the two, it is simply called Gāthā. The Gāthās in *Śat. Br.* XIII.5.4 are plainly *dānastutis* in character, while verses of the same character quoted in *A. Br.* XXXIX. 8 and 9 are designated by it as *śloka*. It is interesting to note that the very verse(43) which the *A. Br.* (XXXIX. 7) calls

(39) Comp. "It appears that the 'gāthā' and the 'gātha' were hymns (though the word 'gāthā' appears to be employed in the sense of a verse at *Rv.* VIII. 71.14), which were in use from very ancient times for their sacrificial importance (IX. 99.4) and efficacy (VIII. 98.9). There does not appear to be anything 'non-Vedic' about them as suggested by some scholars, apparently on the basis of their association with the Avesta. If it were so, Indra, Agni and Rudra could not have been applied epithets based on 'gāthā' : (at *Rv.* I. 43. 4 ; V. 44. 5 and VIII. 2. 38) and the poets would not have been referred to proudly as *gāthinaḥ* as is done at *Rv.* I. 7.1."—K. R. Potdar, *Sacrifice in the Rgveda*, p. 29.

(40) Regarding *Rv.* I. 105.8 Yāska says that in the hymn (*Rv.* I. 105) where the verse occurs the *brahma* is mixed with *īihasa*, *ṛk* and *gāthā* ; *tatra brahmetihāsamiśram ṛmiśram gāthāmiśram bhavati—Nirukta*, IV. 6.

(41) *Rv.* X. 71.2 ab.

(42) *T. Br.* I. 3. 2. 6. According to Oldenberg, *Nārāsaṃsī* and *Gāthā* are not identical in the *Rgveda* (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 42, 238) while Bloomfield is inclined to accept the identification even for the *Rgveda* (*Hymns of the Atharvaveda*, 689 et. seq). In *T. Ar.* II. 10 and *Av.* X. 10, 20 ; XV. 6. 4, *Gāthā* is plainly distinct from *Nārāsaṃsī*.

Yajñagāthā is called simply Gāthā in the *Śat. Br.* XIII. 5.4.2. The *A. Br.* (XXXIX. 7) introduces a Gāthā(44) with the expression *bhūmir ha jagau* (the Earth sang) which is clearly a statement regarding self(45) and that the text does not consider it either as a Gāthā or as a Śloka is obvious from its mode of introducing it with quite a different kind of expression not met with for a second time throughout the whole text. Interesting it is to see that the same verse occurs in *Śat. Br.* XIII. 7.1.15 with considerable modifications(46) and is characterised there as śloka(47). The *Śat. Br.* (XIV.7.2.13,14) quotes two verses, one with slight modification, from the *Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā*(48) and calls them Śloka. The above discussion shows that a discrimination regarding the use of the three designations—Gāthā, Yajñagāthā and Śloka—is utterly lacking throughout the later liturgical texts though the *A. Br.* very cautiously follows a definite principle in labelling a verse as this or that. Even when the *A. Br.* does not class a verse under a particular category(49) it is of immense significance as by doing so, it only extends a separate recognition to those Gāthās that are statements of the speaker regarding self(50).

Now in the light of our discussion of the nature, scope and contents of the Gāthā as a distinct kind of literature, we may fairly assume that the Gāthā-device cannot be strictly regarded as on a par with the other devices for justification, for, while the other devices are mainly employed in the *A. Br.* to show the propriety of particular ritual or a particular mantra, a resort to the Gāthā-device serves the purpose of showing a long-standing tradition behind a ritual or a liturgical practice advocated by it. The length of this stretch of tradition is always subject to variation according as the Gāthā employed in a particular case can be located at a particular phase in the process of steady stabilization of the structure of the entire body of the Gāthā literature. The Gāthās in the thirty-third chapter are not all justificatory in character. They are quoted because they save the trouble of the author of a long narration in prose, proving, at the same time, that the narrative has been coming down over a stretch of time and is not a new invention of the text. The real difficulty lies with those verses which are general maxims in character—just as the verses in *A. Br.* XXXIII. 1 and 3 are and there is hardly any conclusive proof that can enable us to declare them as originally belonging to the context in which they are fitted.

(43) The Verse is this :

*āsandivati dhānyādaṃ rukmiṇaṃ haritasrajam|  
asvaṃ babandha sārāṅgaṃ devebhyo jaramejayaḥ||*

(44) *na mā martyaḥ kaścana dātum arhati viśvakarman bhauvana māṃ didāsitthal nimanṅkṣye 'haṃ salilasya madhye moghas ta eṣa kaśyapāyāsa saṃgare.||*

(45) Comp. *gāthā ātmavādaślokāḥ*—Viśvarūpa on *Yājñavalkyaśmṛti* 1, 45; *ātmāśritā gāthāḥ*—*Bhāgavata*, IV. 16. 26.

(46) The verse runs thus: *na mā martyaḥ kaścana dātum arhati viśvakarman bhauvana manda āsitha/upamaṅkṣyati syā salilasya madhye mṛṣaiṣa te saṃgareḥ kaśyapāya ||* It also occurs in *Sāñ. Sr. Su.* XVI. 16.3 that has the fourth pāda as in *Śat. Br.* and *upamaṅkṣye* but otherwise agrees with *A. Br.*

(47) Comp. *tad api bhūmiḥ ślokāñ jagau.*

(48) *V.S.* XL. 3 and 9.

(49) *A. Br.* XXXIX. 7 (See note 44).

(50) See note 45.

# THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION

## SECTION III

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### *Perception Defined from the Point of View of Object*

IN THE last issue of this Bulletin we discussed the definition of perception from the point of view of its intrinsic character and means. But is it not possible that perception can also be defined from the point of view of the peculiarity of the object perceived? May not the definition, in other words, be that of the *perceivedness* of the object? The word *pratyakṣa* often means *perceived*, as when we say 'the object is *pratyakṣa*'. The definition of *pratyakṣatva* from this point of view is but the definition of perceivedness. Some modern thinkers in the West<sup>1</sup> have also understood perception in this sense of perceivedness. Perceivedness of the object is defined from this point of view as the peculiar clarity (*vaiśadya* or *prākāṭya*), or the speciality (*viśeṣa*) of the object.

Perception as a mode of knowledge may, again, from this point of view, be defined as that type of awareness the object of which has this peculiar clarity or speciality. According to Yoga-bhāṣya, e.g., perception (as a type of knowledge) is that *vṛtti* which relates to the object considered in its speciality<sup>2</sup>. Perception is that function of the internal organ<sup>3</sup> which has the external thing for its object and which has as its principal concern the ascertainment of a certain specific aspect of the object, such functioning of the inner organ arising when it is affected by the external object through the pathway of the senseorgans<sup>4</sup>. In other words, when the generic (universal) and also the specific (particular) character of an object are reflected through the function of the internal organ this is regarded as perception.

A view like this is not uncommon in Indian and Western systems. The Advaita view of *viśayaḡata pratyakṣa* as developed in Vedānta paribhāṣā will be discussed later separately.

As a rule, the Naiyāyika will not accept this view that perception is that knowledge the object of which stands with a peculiar clarity or speciality. The ideas behind this view are that (1) the peculiar clarity is an intrinsic character of the object independent of whether it is perceived or not, perception being only a later awareness of this clear object, and (2) that the awareness of the object in its bare generic character is never perception. But the Naiyāyika will object to both the ideas. His criticism of the idea (1) is straight and simple and perhaps irrefutable, except perhaps from the Advaita standpoint which we shall examine later. His criticism is that the peculiar clarity is not prior to, but really due to, perception as a mode of knowledge. Or, better, it is the same fact as that the object is

<sup>1</sup>Bertrand Russell in his 'Analysis of Mind'.

<sup>2</sup>Of course generality is also apprehended.

<sup>3</sup>Internal organ-*antahkaraṇa*, and the function of the internal organ is but *vṛtti*.

<sup>4</sup>Indian thought—G. Jha, Vol. V, p. 328 and Yoga Sūtra—7.

perceived. To posit clarity as a character of the object, irrespective of whether it is perceived or not, is bad hypostatisation. Even Kumārila who admits *prākatya* as a character of the object understands it as due to the perception of that object. So far with the Naiyāyika's criticism of the idea (1). His criticism of the idea (2) is, however, not so easy. There are very plausible counter-criticisms also, and the Naiyāyika will have to meet these. Let us see how the Naiyāyika would proceed.

The Naiyāyika believes in *pratyakṣa* through *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*, i.e., perceiving an object through only a generic character. When we perceive a man, say Ram, through the normal sense-object contact he is known as a very definite specific individual, this Ram (standing before me). But when I perceive this Ram I also perceive the generic feature-universal manhood (*naratva*). Now, the Naiyāyika believes that when I perceive this manhood I also perceive through this manhood perceived, or through this perception of manhood, all particular men, but perceive them as only particular cases of manhood. None of these men are perceived in their speciality. Each is perceived as only 'any man'. This is *pratyakṣa* through *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*.

It is obvious that in this type of perception the object is known in the bare generic aspect, so that to the Naiyāyika the theory that in perception the object must be known in the aspect of specificity is unacceptable. Thus he holds that there can be no definition of perception from the angle of vision of the object.

To this view of the Naiyāyikas, however, the Mīmāṃsakas will raise serious objection. They hold that *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa* is an impossibility. Introspection never guarantees that there is such perception. What is the necessity, in the absence of introspective certificate, of admitting such perception ?

The Naiyāyika, however, replies that not only is this *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa* certified by introspection, there is a necessity also of inferring it. For otherwise, as he claims, inference is impossible. Unless we know that all cases of smoke (i.e., any case) are (is) associated with fire, we cannot from a perceived case of smoke infer fire. This means that we must somehow have perceived all cases of smoke. Such perception, according to him, is possible only through *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyāsatti*.

The Mīmāṃsakas, however, would reject this account. They hold that universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) is perceived even though there need be no *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*. They do not believe in the Naiyāyika's transcendent (but inherent) universals. The universal, according to them, is not transcendent at all. It is nothing but the *ākāra* (generic character) which is a part and parcel of *this particular*. The character of a thing is wholly immanent in it. But yet a generic character, though so immanent, goes beyond the thing also. This going beyond is not transcendence in the Nyāya sense. The generic character, in other words, is not immanent-transcendent, but immanent-transitive. This in essence

is their doctrine of *bhedābheda* of the universal and the particular. By taking recourse to this transitive *ākāra* perceived in the perceived particular object they extend their knowledge from the perceived particular cases to those which are not perceived. Thus from the accompaniment of a single case of smoke and a single case of fire, they argue, we pass, through the generic shapes of smoke and fire, to the concomitance of any other case of smoke with fire. Thus, in the perceived particular both *bheda* and *abheda* between the known and the unknown co-exist. That is how the *ākāra* operates transitively. At the same time the generic shape being a *shape* is a part and parcel of the perceived particular. Thus through this transitive *ākāra* the Mīmāṃsakas foresee all the possibilities, and on the strength of this *ākāra* they reject the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*, i.e., knowledge based on a common identical feature, of the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas, it is true, have also admitted *ākāra*, but their difference from the Mīmāṃsakas is two-fold. First, to the Naiyāyika the *ākāra* is only the *vyāñjaka* of the transcendent universal, whereas for the Mīmāṃsakas it is the very essence of the universal; and secondly, while to the Naiyāyikas the *ākāra* is wholly resident in the particular, never extending beyond it, the Mīmāṃsakas take it as generic, i.e., transitive. The Mīmāṃsaka will argue that when we sketch the head of an ox in general the figure that we actually draw is no doubt the figure of a particular ox, but, undoubtedly, we treat it also as being the figure of all oxen. Thus it appears that though *ākāra* belongs to a particular object yet at the same time it is generic in character, i.e., belongs to all the members of the class and therefore represents the whole class. So it can be regarded as a prototype of the whole class. As Kumārila has pointed out, the generic character is common to many individuals and at the same time as a particular character it is peculiar to one individual. The ground of shifting from the particular to the general is in similarity. Thus on the assumption that similarity exists among all particulars (of a class) the generic *ākāra* extends beyond the particular object perceived.

The Naiyāyikas, however, will not accept this account. They will refute the generic *ākāra* of the Mīmāṃsakas. They point out that in developing the account the Mīmāṃsakas have taken shelter under *bhedābheda*. *Bhedābheda* is their master key which they have used here as elsewhere. But for both *bheda* and *abheda* to co-exist in a particular instance obviously involves self-contradiction. It cannot be argued, as the Mīmāṃsakas have done, that a particular case is particular and also at the same time general. If it is particular, it cannot be general. For the Naiyāyika each particular is an individual in itself, and it may even be said that this is why the Naiyāyikas have accepted a separate category, called *viśeṣa*, i.e., uniqueness. Whether we accept such a category or not, we must admit that every particular is unique. Raghunātha who has rejected *viśeṣa* yet admits that any particular is by its very nature unique<sup>1</sup>. A particular, thus,

<sup>1</sup>Viśeṣo'pi ca na padārthāntaram mānābhāvāt. Vināpi vyāvartakaṃ dharmam pareṣāṃ viśeṣānāmiva nityānāṃ dravyānāmapi svata eva vyāvartakatvāt'. padārthatattvanirūpaṇam p.30.



as unique by its very nature can never itself be a generality. *Bhedābheda* is out of question here.

The Naiyāyikas will also refute the Mīmāṃsā theory of *ākāra*. Every particular is endowed with a peculiar shape or form (*ākāra*) which cannot as such belong also to another. It is always *vyaktiniṣṭha*, i.e., belonging to a definite particular, and cannot therefore be taken as also extending beyond that particular. The two *ākāras* may be similar, but there is no question of one of them being identical with the other. Every *ākāra*, as belonging to a particular and constituting its essence, is itself also particular and cannot, therefore, be a generality also.

Moreover, it is meaningless to argue for the existence of the generic *ākāra*. *Jāti*, i.e., the class-concept is abstract<sup>1</sup> in nature, not concrete. *Jāti*, the identity as the ground of similarity, being thus abstract in nature, there is no question of replacing it by generic *ākāra* which is always concrete.

Except for the fact that Nyāya admits abstract reality, *Jāti* (class-concept) might even be taken as only an abstract idea in the mind. Considered in this wise it would be totally internal in character and should not have the least possibility of maintaining an external status. To maintain that an internal thing possesses an external status would only be paradoxical. Quite a number of Western philosophers would agree in the matter when they regard *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* (which, according to them, is judgment) as possessing thought-elements, including names and classes<sup>2</sup>. Even Uddyotakara's statement that the *nirvikalpaka* type of cognition is devoid of name, class, etc., might, in a certain way (though this would not be the Nyāya view proper) be taken to mean that class, etc., are only *vikalpas* (creations of the mind). Even Bhāmaha, the old rhetorician, following the footsteps of Dīpnāga, has included the elements like *nāma* and *jāti* in the *vikalpa* and so treats them as creations of the mind<sup>3</sup>. All this, however, is idle speculation, not to the point here.

Though the Naiyāyika thus rejects the Mīmāṃsā view of *ākāra* and treats it as strictly *vyaktiniṣṭha*, believing that no two things in the world are exactly identical, there would still be an objection from the Mīmāṃsā side. It might be asked—how then, is the class concept formed? Or, to use the Nyāya terminology, how can we recognise a particular as *jātyavacchinna*, i.e., the particular as a case of the universal? Mīmāṃsā may offer an easy answer to this question by the notion of *ākāra* as immanent-yet-transitive. So far as the *ākāra* is immanent we perceive the particular, and so far as it is also transitive we apprehend the particular as a case of the corresponding universal. But how will Nyāya answer the question? Mīmāṃsā, in other words, treats the similar *ākāra* as itself also the identical *ākāra*. But Nyāya does not admit this. Two similar *ākāras* are, in Nyāya, mutually exclusive. How then would the two be at all felt as similar, if the similars are not themselves also identical?

<sup>1</sup>Abstract here does not mean that *jāti* is a mere name. It is an abstract, i.e., transcendent, reality.

<sup>2</sup>Bradley, Bosanquet, Stout and Ward have traced a 'thought-element' in perception. Some of them regarded perception as a 'perceptual judgment'. The concept of 'judgment' of course, means more than this, but in that aspect of the concept we are not interested here.

<sup>3</sup>Pratyakṣam Kalpanāpodham tatō'rthāditi kecana kalpanām nāmajātyādi Yojanām pratijānate'kāvyālamkāra 5/6 by Bhāmaha.

The Nyāya replies that two mutually exclusive *ākāras*, each a separate particular, are yet similar only because in each is inherent an identical element which alone is the universal<sup>1</sup>. What Nyāya means is quite clear. Two *ākāras* as two concrete entities cannot obviously be identical. If, therefore, they are also similar this must be due to a third identical something which somehow is present in each, and the third something is the universal. *Ākāra*, however, is the *vyuñjaka* of that identity-universal. In other words, we perceive the universal only where the *ākāra* is present. Nyāya, thus, does justice to both *ākāra* and universal.

It cannot be argued against Nyāya that it unnecessarily admits two entities, viz. *ākāra* and universal, whereas Mīmāṃsā explains everything by one only, viz. *ākāra*. But the Nyāya reply to this is simple. Mīmāṃsā may explain everything by *ākāra*, but it cannot explain this *ākāra* itself. For, are the *ākāras* of *this cow* and *that cow* identical or similar? If identical, it is the same thing as the Naiyāyika's *jāti*; and if similar, there must be, as we have just seen, a self-identical *jāti* to account for the similarity.

Thus the whole Mīmāṃsaka criticism is refuted and the Naiyāyika's refusal of *viśayagata-pratyakṣatva*, i.e., perceivedness of object, is established.

There are many Western philosophers, with Russell among them, who defined perception from the point of view of object. Russell, for example, says—"We may define perception of an object as the appearance of the object from a place where there is a brain with sense-organs and nerves forming part of the intervening medium"<sup>2</sup>. Russell and the Mīmāṃsakas just dismissed thus agree so far. The important point in which they disagree should also, in this connection, be emphasised before we turn to the criticism of Russell's view. Though the Mīmāṃsakas understand perception as the knowledge of the object which has a peculiar clarity or specificity they are yet not content with this clarity or specificity, they yet admit that there is nevertheless the subject side, viz., awareness which, though not revealed in introspection, is yet inferred. But Russell will not agree to this. He will not admit this awareness side at all. In his opinion, as we may guess, in every knowledge-situation there are simply the object at one end and the *human organism* at the other. In the vicinity of the human body perceivedness, according to him, appears to emerge in the object.

Nyāya will oppose the Bhāṭṭa and the Russellian view with equal vehemence. We have already seen how the Bhāṭṭa notion of perception from the point of view of object is dismissed. As against the inferredness of the subjective awareness it would argue as follows: in every inference the *sādhyā*, i.e., the thing to be established, must be that which or the like of which has already been perceived

<sup>1</sup>The definition of similarity as *tadgatabhūyodharmavattvam* applies only to complex similar entities. Obviously it does not apply to simple (unanalysable) entities, like two red colours (of the same shade), where the only definition of similarity would be the one given above.

<sup>2</sup>Analysis of Mind—page—131.

somewhere in some form. Now, if the subjective awareness which is here going to be inferred has already been perceived somewhere in some form, it would be self-contradiction to hold that it is *only* inferred, never perceived.

The Bhāṭṭas may indeed argue that the Naiyāyikas themselves have admitted *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*, where previous perception of the *sādhya* is not essential, where indeed the *sādhya* is, by nature, unperceivable. But the Naiyāyika will immediately reply that in *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* we simply infer a cause from an effect. So far, indeed, as the Bhāṭṭas regard the *prākāṣya* of the object as an effect and infer the cause of it, they are at liberty to employ *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*. But how could they be assured that the cause is the subjective awareness, and not an object among objects? A cause of an object is found, as a matter of fact, to be a like object. What, then, guaranteed the Bhāṭṭas having regarded the cause of the *prākāṣya* to be no object at all, but subjective awareness? Thus we see that the Bhāṭṭa idea of merely inferring subjective cognition is not tenable.

To turn now to the view of Russell: in the opinion of Russell perceivedness appears to be the character of an object and as such, perception is not subjective but purely objective. It is true that the denial of subjectivity proves the other. But wherefrom comes this denial? There must be logical ground for denying something. If we deny something even in the absence of any *pratibandhaka* this would be no rational procedure. What is the *pratibandhaka* on account of which Russell denies the subjectivity of knowledge? In the absence of a *pratibandhaka* the Russellian refusal would rather prove the opposite. To assert the absence of X necessarily presupposes the earlier knowledge of the presence of that X. Hence if there is no reason for rejecting X *altogether* its denial in a certain context presupposes its existence elsewhere<sup>1</sup>. If we apply this logic to Russell's case, we must say that as he denies subjective knowing without offering any reason for that he is bound to admit its existence also. There is a point in Russell's method, however, which requires special examination here. Russell argues that it is always more parsimonious to admit one entity, when by that alone a situation can be explained, than admitting more than one. This is his 'Occam's Razor' corresponding to the Indian principle of *lāghava*. Applying this principle to the case under consideration, he argues that as knowledge situation can be well explained by objective knownness, i.e., some objective character—call it knownness or some relation between the object and a physical organism—it is useless to admit over and above it another phenomenon, viz., subjective knowing.

But here also Russell is wrong. He fails to see that parsimony (*lāghava*) is applicable only when two *theories* compete with each other, not where there are two perceived *facts*. In the field of perception there are as many facts as are perceived, unless there is reason for the rejection of some. Now, subjective knowing is a fact in the perceptual field, it is revealed to mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*) as a fact. Hence the principle of parsimony cannot dismiss it.

<sup>1</sup>The concept of *prasaktapratishedha* does, of course, mean more than this. But in that aspect of this concept we are not interested here.

Again, even granting that the principle of parsimony applies here, we may, with the Naiyāyika, ask—why prefer objective knownness to subjective knowing? If at all the principle is allowed to operate here, the naiyāyika would rather prefer subjective knowing. For, this, according to him, is simpler and more original than objective knownness. Objective knownness is no original property of the thing. Even at the time it is known we are assured that it was prior to that moment unknown. Prior to its being known, it was in itself. The knownness, if at all it is a property of a thing, is contingent, i.e., due to something. That something is subjective knowing. Not merely that, the so called knownness is nothing but the fact that the object stands in a certain relation to the subjective knowing. It is thus the knownness which comes to be dismissed through the principle of parsimony.

Russell might still argue that the Nyāya position, as described above, might have been allowed if only subjective knowing could be revealed, but as a matter of fact it is never revealed. Russell argues that we never catch the subjective directly. But against him we say that we have already refuted this Russellian-Bhāṭṭa contention. We have maintained that subjective knowing is directly revealed in *mānasa-pratyakṣa*.

A central point of the Russellian theory need be refuted in this connection. Russell believes that the so-called revolution of the object is nothing but the fact that the object stands before a physical organism. Or, if 'nothing but' be too strong and if Russell would not object to accept Holt's notion, he would say that object is a cross section of things determined by their relation to a physical organism. This, in other words, is a view that those things coming into certain relation with the physical organism, acquire the property of knownness. In short, an object is known only when it comes into a certain relation with the physical organism.

Our point against Russell and those Russellians is that either the exact nature of this relation has to be specified which is impossible unless the physical organism is replaced by subjective knowing; or it is not specified, when the relation is no more than compresence, but, then, mere compresence does not always make the object 'known'.

A physical organism does at the most physiologically react to the object (and even that not always). But this physiological reaction is not knowledge, nor is the object known whenever there is such physiological reaction. The first condition for a physiological reaction to be cognitive is that the organism has to be 'mine'. For when another organism so reacts I do not say, 'I know this object. Nor can it be said against us that in that case not 'I' but 'he' knows the object; for his knowing is here only a matter of inference, and the datum from which *his knowing* is inferred is *my knowing*. Unless, in other words, there is *my knowing*, there is no question of *his knowing*. *My knowing*, now, in the Russellian language, would be the reaction of *my* physiological organism. This mineness of the organism cannot be understood except by admitting subjective knowing.

If this is not admitted, if, in other words, there is no specific relation between a physiological organism and object, the relation would be mere compresence. But such mere compresence may not produce knowledge or knowmness. As Nyāya has argued, there may be *upekṣā*, not necessarily *hāna* or *upādāna*<sup>1</sup>. Even Pāṇini while dealing with the fourth case-ending in connection with the root 'man', has included the idea of *anūlara* or *upekṣā*<sup>2</sup>. The point in both the cases is that we often do not take notice, as while moving on the road we do not care for the grasses lying beneath our feet. Thus it is meaningless to argue that even if my physical organism with brain and sense organs is compresent with objects lying around I necessarily perceive the object. That is why the views of Russell will not appear to be too sound to the Naiyāyikas.

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<sup>1</sup>'Yadā sannikarṣastadā jñānaṃ pramitiḥ, yadā jñānaṃ tadā hānopādānopekṣābuddhayaḥ phalaṃ' Nyāyadarśanabhāṣya on 3rd Nyāya Sūtra, page 74 Ed by Phanilūṣaṇ Tarkabāgīś.

<sup>2</sup>'Manyakormaṇyanādore bibhāṣāprāṇiṣu' Pāṇini 2, 3, 17 Sūtras.

# THE CONCEPT OF FALSITY

(The Vivaraṇa view considered)

BY NIROD BARAN CHAKRABORTY

THE ADVAITA view of the non-duality of the Spirit as the ultimate reality can be established only when the world can be proved to be false. So the concept of falsity is an important concept in Advaita literature. Different Śaṅkarites defined falsity in different ways. We may consider them as alternative definitions of falsity. All of them are equally correct and none is superior to the others. In this paper we shall discuss the Vivaraṇa definition of falsity and try to defend it from the attacks of the dualistic Mādhvas. Our discussion is mainly based on Advaitasidhi of Madhusūdana Saraswati, a famous Advaitin of the Post-Śaṅkara period.

The author of Vivaraṇa holds 'the false is that which is contradicted by knowledge' (*jñānanivarttyatvam*). As falsity can be taken in this sense so the text like 'wise men free themselves from the world of name and form' and 'one who knows the self can alone overcome miseries' are significant and intelligible. The world is contradicted with the realisation of Brahman, the ultimate reality, and so the world is false.

Now the question is—what are we to mean by the word 'contradiction'? If contradiction means destruction, the false will be that which is destroyed by knowledge. Now, it often happens that the knowledge of 'pot' is replaced by the knowledge of 'table' and then 'the former is destroyed by the latter'. But for this, the knowledge of 'pot' cannot be false. So, the definition becomes too wide. In another way it may be shown that the definition is also too narrow. The Advaitins recognise the pot as false. But it is not destroyed by knowledge, it may be destroyed with a stroke of hammer. So, the definition of falsity does not cover all the cases.

Even if contradiction by knowledge means contradiction by knowledge *as knowledge*, the definition remains too narrow. In this case also the pot cannot be false when it is destroyed with a blow of hammer. The superimposed silver is not also *destroyed* by the knowledge of nacre as *knowledge*, for it is destroyed merely by the occurrence of that later knowledge. So the superimposed silver cannot be taken as an example of falsity, which the Advaitins generally do. The cognition of Brahman also (*as cognition*) cannot be the cause of the destruction of the world, for this very destruction also is a part of the world

and yet is not destroyed by that knowledge, and as this destruction is not destroyed by that knowledge, the Upanisadic text "everything other than this is destroyed" becomes meaningless.

Even if the above definition of falsity be interpreted in another way, viz., to mean the sublation of anything by a knowledge *qua* some type of knowledge (*jñānatva-vyūpya-dharmapuraskāreṇa jñānanivarttyatva*), there is no escape from the fallacy "too wide". For consider the following cases.

**Samskāra** or unconscious trace is responsible for memory. With the rise of memory the relevant unconscious trace is destroyed. But for this that trace can never be regarded as false. Again, the non-existence of a knowledge prior to its rise is definitely destroyed with the rise of that knowledge. But this non-existence also, on that account, is never false. Therefore it is urged that falsity cannot be understood as that which is destroyed by knowledge.

To all these objections the Advaita reply is as follows :—

The Advaitins contend that the critics have misunderstood the implication of this definition. It is to be interpreted in the following way:—The negatum of the eternal negation of the gross and subtle forms of an object due to knowledge is false. Both the gross and subtle forms of an object are mentioned in the definition. In the case of the destruction of a pot with a stroke of hammer, though the pot in its gross form is destroyed by the hammer, it in its subtle form is not destroyed in this way, the subtle form is destroyed only by the knowledge of Brahman. The total sublation of the pot is thus possible only through the knowledge of Brahman. Hence the definition does apply to this case.

Here an objection may be raised to the effect that though the subtle form of the pot is sublated by knowledge, its gross form can be destroyed only with a stroke of hammer. The Advaitins, of course, can easily meet this charge. They believe in the identity of the subtle as cause and the gross form as its effect\*.

The definition cannot be too wide also. Though a posterior knowledge destroys the prior knowledge, the unconscious trace of the former still remains, and as this trace as the subtle form is identical with the gross knowledge which is said to be destroyed, there is really no final destruction of that knowledge.

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\*The Advaitins in general and the Sāṅkhists believe in Satkāryavāda. According to them the effect potentially remains in the cause. The cause and the effect are not really different from one another. The cause is the effect unmanifested and the effect is the cause manifested.

The Bauddhas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers will differ from these philosophers on this point. Unlike the Advaitins and the Sāṅkhists, they are the advocates of Asatkāryavāda or Ārambhavāda. According to them, the effect does not remain in the cause before the effectuation. They have based their thesis on the following grounds :—

If the effect already remains in the cause, then there is no point in saying that the effect is produced out of the cause. Secondly, the different names assigned to the cause and the effect definitely show that they are different from one another. Thirdly, if the effect were already there in the cause, the effort on the part of the efficient cause in order to produce the effect would have been unnecessary. But we all know that the effect like a table cannot be produced out of wood without the efforts of a carpenter who is the efficient cause.

This disposes of another possible objection also. It may be said that the world cannot be false simply because it is destroyed by the knowledge of Brahman, for, though every just preceding knowledge is destroyed by a just posterior knowledge, the former is not taken as false on that account. But the Advaitin argues that this objection cannot be raised at all. The just preceding knowledge in its subtle form is not destroyed by the just posterior knowledge. But the knowledge of Brahman negates the world both in its subtle and gross forms. So, the world is definitely false whereas the prior knowledge is not.

The negatum of the destruction of the gross and the subtle forms of an object due to knowledge, may thus be regarded as false ; and in this case the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition cannot arise at all, for here the destruction of both the gross and the subtle forms of an object has been taken into consideration.

The expression 'due to knowledge' finds a place in the definition in order to exclude inconceivable objects like 'hare's horn'. The eternal negation of the subtle and the gross forms is present in the case of 'hare's horn'. But it is not false like the world, because this eternal negation is not due to knowledge.

It cannot also be objected that the definition does not apply to the case of nacre appearing as the silver (the traditional Vedāntic example of false appearance). The silver-appearance is definitely destroyed by knowledge of the nacre as contradicting the knowledge of that silver. To explain :—The silver superimposed on the nacre is definitely perceived by the man under illusion. The perception again cannot be objectless. So, we shall have to admit the existence of the appearance-silver in order to explain the perception of the silver superimposed on the nacre. Now this silver is definitely destroyed by the knowledge of nacre which is its locus. So, the silver which is superimposed on the nacre is false.

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The Sāṅkhists repudiated this theory on the following considerations:—(a) If the effect does not remain in the cause, then no amount of force can press out the effect from the cause. No one can produce curd out of wood, as curd is non-existent in wood. (b) We see that any cause cannot produce any effect. Milk cannot produce a cloth and threads a table. (c) If we think that an effect is produced from a cause which did not contain the effect, we are landed in the absurdity—something comes out of nothing. We should never forget the dictum '*ex nihilo nihil fit*'. The Vedāntins also join issue with the Sāṅkhists. They also think that the effect is existent in the cause before its production. As regards further details of this view, the Sāṅkhists and the Rāmānuja Vedāntins part company with the followers of Śaṅkara Vedānta.

The Sāṅkhists and the Rāmānujites are in favour of Parināmavāda as a further specification of the theory of Satkāryavāda. According to them, the effect no doubt potentially remains in the cause, but at the time of effectuation the cause is really transformed into the effect. The Advaita Vedāntins, however, hold that the transformation of the cause into the effect is only apparent and not real. The effect is the *vivarta* of the cause and not the *pariṇāma* of it. The Advaita theory of causation is generally known as Vivartavāda. Here it may be observed that a consistent Satkāryavādin should be an advocate of Vivartavāda and not of Parināmavāda. If the cause really changes into the effect, then the cause and the effect become two things and there can be no identity between the two. The Category of Identity can alone be applied to one particular thing, as two things can never be identical in every respect. The Leibnitzian theory of the Identity of the Indiscernibles cannot be easily repudiated. It is indeed a fact that no two leaves of the same tree are identical. So, if the cause and the effect are at bottom identical we must admit that the effect is only the appearance or *vivarta* of the cause. The cause alone is real, the effect is only an appearance of the cause.



Vivaraṇācārya defines sublation as the eternal negation of nescience with its present and past, gross and subtle effects. This definition of sublation tallies well with that of falsity considered just now. The author of Vārttika also admits this interpretation of sublation. He holds that with the attainment of proper intellect due to the understanding of the texts like 'Tattvamasi', nescience with its effect becomes eternally negated. The word 'effect' here comprises the past, the present, the subtle and the gross effects.

The negation of 'hare's horn' is not due to knowledge. But on this analogy we cannot think that the negation of the silver on the nacre (when the silver is superimposed on it) also is not caused by knowledge. The perception of the silver on the nacre is the same thing as that false silver itself and this false silver is a product of *ajñāna* (nescience) as referring to the nacre. Hence knowledge (*jñāna*) alone of the nacre can destroy the silver. The absence of silver on the nacre can thus be known only when the nacre is cognised. The 'hare's horn' is not caused by *ajñāna*, so the question of its negation by *jñāna* or knowledge cannot arise at all. Nescience is not one, but it is many in number. The nescience attached to nacre is destroyed by the proper knowledge of that nacre. So, the silver superimposed on the nacre may very well be taken as an example of falsity.

Some others again believe in only one nescience. From their standpoint, the negation of silver in nacre by the knowledge of nacre is to be understood by means of the following inference—

'The silver superimposed on nacre is sublated by knowledge, because it is the object of cognition with some defect, just like the snake which is imposed on rope.'

The negation of the snake on rope is to be established with the help of another inference. But this will not lead us to the fallacy of indefinite regress as there is no such fallacy in the case of the relation between the seed and the sprout.

With the stroke of the hammer the pot is destroyed. So we may very well think that with the knowledge of the locus the nescience which covers it and projects something other than itself upon it is removed. As the nacre is cognised, the nescience covering the nacre and the silver due to this nescience are destroyed all at once. So, we are to admit that the nescience and its effect are eternally negated with the rise of the knowledge of the locus.

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Western logicians often equate cause with effect from the standpoint of quantity. They hold that the cause is quantitatively equal to the effect. Modern scientists also with the principles of the conservation of matter and energy subscribe to the same view. They hold that the total quantity of matter and energy found in the effect is equal to that of the cause. So, they also think that in a sense there is an identity between the cause and the effect. These thinkers, of course, are not bold enough to follow the logical consequences of this theory. We have already seen that the identity between the cause and the effect can be established only when we are ready to regard the effect as the *appearance* of the cause. Śaṅkara does so. But the Westerners are not so strong as to come to this revolutionary conclusion. They, like Rāmānuja and others, will say that the cause is really transformed into the effect.

The definition that the false is that which is sublated by knowledge *qua any form of knowledge* is not also defective. For when it was pointed out that a posterior knowledge destroys the just prior knowledge without having branded it as necessarily false it was not the destroyer *qua a form of knowledge*. The prior knowledge is there destroyed as a particular attribute of the self. If the destruction of the prior knowledge were understood as effected by the posterior *qua a form of knowledge*, the desire that arises after knowledge and the effort which follows the desire cannot be taken as capable of destroying the knowledge and the desire respectively, which, however, is a fact. This is why the prior knowledge destroyed by the posterior knowledge is not necessarily false on that account. Therefore, the definition cannot be tabooed as too wide.

Memory, the opponents think, destroys the unconscious trace of the past percept and memory does this *as a form of knowledge* and not merely as an attribute of the self; for had it, as an attribute of the self, destroyed the trace then even a desire also that happens to arise after the unconscious trace would, as an attribute of the self, destroy the trace, which however, is not the fact. Hence, the opponents continue, it must be said that memory destroys the unconscious trace *as a form of knowledge*; and so the definition having applied to this case, the unconscious trace has to be taken as false and the definition becomes too wide.

The Advaitins, however, do not believe that memory *qua* memory can destroy the unconscious trace of the past percept, as there is no evidence for it.

Memory is caused by a past percept. The unconscious trace is the intermediate link between the memory and the past percept. The percept leaves the unconscious trace behind it and this in turn causes memory. Now, the opponents urge that the intermediate link ceases to exist when its purpose (connection between two extreme terms) is served. *Adṛṣṭa*, the unconscious repository of the merits and the demerits of actions, which is the intermediate link between actions and its results dies out with the achievement of the results of the actions. So, in analogy it is held by the opponent that the unconscious trace which is the link between the percept and memory should lapse with the rise of memory.

Here the Advaitins contend that the result does not always destroy the intermediate link. Perception is said to be the result of the sense-object-contact. Now with perception, the sense-object-contact does not cease to exist. If it did so, recurrent perception would have been an impossibility. So the Advaita thesis that memory does not destroy the unconscious trace of the past percept is proved.

The repeated recollection of a thing rather makes unconscious trace of it stronger and stronger. If memory had destroyed the unconscious trace, this would not have been possible at all. This is an additional reason why we are to submit that memory does not destroy the unconscious trace. So, the definition of falsity under consideration cannot be too wide.

The opponent may raise here a subtle objection. It is this:—If every recollection strengthens the trace what can this 'strength' mean? The only possible meaning is that every next recollection will be better in the sense of being easier and speedier. But this, again, means that every next recollection as better is *qualitatively different* (*vilakṣaṇa*) from every prior one. \*It follows that because the same trace cannot cause two qualitatively different recollections the trace as causing the prior one must have been destroyed to allow the other trace to operate, for otherwise a qualitatively new recollection of the same object cannot occur.

But the Advaitins reply that the charge is untenable. The traces of the recollections are undoubtedly many. But, as for the traces, it must not be forgotten that they are all *about the same object*, i.e., that they are traces of the cognitions of the same object and are therefore basically of the same stuff. As against the contention that then there would be several recollections each qualitatively the same, they reply as follows :—

The unconscious trace alone, the Advaitins hold, cannot arouse memory. There must be something other (*udbodhaka*) than the unconscious traces, to cause it. Though there are many unconscious traces in every case the third principle which arouses the memory (*udbodhaka*) is not present. So, a series of recollections qualitatively the same will not arise even when there are many unconscious traces.

It might be further objected that the third principle which arouses memory in one case may cause it in every other case also. But the Advaitins think that the third principle is to be conceived according to the results. If the results are many, the third principle also must be many. So, the contingency of the series of memory cannot arise at all.

Even if for argument's sake, it is taken for granted that memory cancels the unconscious trace out of which it originates, the Advaitins fall in no difficulty. In that case they will interpret their definition of falsity in another way. Falsity, then, will mean the cancellation of anything by the direct and immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāratvena jñānanivarttyatva*). So even when memory negates the unconscious trace, the negation does not make the unconscious trace in any way false, as memory is not a direct and immediate cognition. The prior knowledge which is negated by the posterior knowledge cannot also be false as it is not cancelled by knowledge characterised by immediacy. Thus the Vivaraṇa view of falsity proves to be faultless.

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\*Indian philosophers do not as a rule admit degree as a category. 'A as better than B' does not mean that in both there is the same universal goodness in different degrees. It means that in A there is *one type* of goodness and in B there is *another*, and that the two goodness—universals are one the *vyāpaka* of the other.

# কয়েকটি বৈদিক আখ্যানের ক্রমপারগতি

## শ্রীজগন্নাথ মুখোপাধ্যায়, বেদতীর্থ

ইতিহাস এবং পুরাণ বিষয়ে জ্ঞান না থাকিলে অনেক বৈদিক মন্ত্রের ব্যাখ্যান সঙ্গত হয় না। অস্পষ্ট ব্যক্তির নিকট বহু বৈদিক মন্ত্র অসঙ্গত বলিয়া মনে হয়। সুতরাং বেদার্থ সম্যক্রূপে জানিতে হইলে বৈদিক ইতিহাসগুলির সবিশেষ আলোচনা করা কর্তব্য। নির্দেশ আছে, ইতিহাস ও পুরাণের দ্বারা বেদকে সম্যক্রূপে উপবংহণ করিবে—“ইতিহাস পুরাণাভ্যাং বেদং সমদুবংহয়েৎ”। (১) ইতিহাস ও পুরাণের উপাখ্যানগুলির বর্ণনা দ্বারা বেদপ্রোক্ত বিষয়েরই বিস্তৃত আলোচনা হইয়াছে। (২) ‘ঋগর্থদীপিকা’ নামক ঋগ্ভাষ্যের প্রারম্ভে শ্রীবেৎকটমাধবও বলিয়াছেন—

“বিনিয়োগপরিজ্ঞানাদ্ যজ্ঞমামর্থানশচয়ঃ।

ইতিহাসৈঋগর্থানাং বহুব্রাহ্মণদর্শিতৈঃ॥”

অর্থাৎ বিনিয়োগ জানা থাকিলে ঋগ্ভাষ্যের অর্থনির্ণয় করা যায়, আর বিভিন্ন ব্রাহ্মণে যে সকল ইতিহাস উল্লিখিত আছে সেই সকল ইতিহাসের পর্যালোচনায় ঋগর্থ পরিষ্ফুট হয়।

বৈদিক ইতিহাসগুলি বৈদিক সাহিত্যের বিভিন্ন গ্রন্থের মধ্যে ছড়াইয়া আছে। ঋগ্‌সংহিতার প্রারম্ভ কাল হইতে পরবর্তীকালীন ব্রাহ্মণ, সূত্র, নিরুক্ত, বৃহস্পদবতা, সর্বানুক্রমণী, সায়ণভাষ্য, মহাভারত, রামায়ণ ও পুরাণ প্রভৃতি বিভিন্ন বৈদিক ও পৌরাণিক সাহিত্যের মাধ্যমে ঐসকল ইতিহাসের ধারা এখনও চলিয়া আসিতেছে। অবশ্য ক্রমশই ঐগুলি কোন কোন ক্ষেত্রে বহুল পরিমাণে পরিবর্তিত ও বর্ধিত হইয়া বিভিন্নরূপে রূপায়িত হইয়াছে। ঐরূপ কয়েকটি বৈদিক ইতিহাস পরবর্তী কালে কিরূপে পরিবর্তিত হইয়াছে ও তাহার ফলে সেই সকল ইতিহাস কিরূপ আকার লাভ করিয়াছে, তাহাই এই প্রবন্ধের মূল আলোচ্য বিষয়।

বেদ সংহিতার মধ্যে কৃষ্বজুর্বেদ ও ঋগ্বেদে উপাখ্যানের আধিক্য দেখা যায়। কিন্তু ঋগ্বেদের উপাখ্যানগুলি অভ্যস্ত সংক্ষিপ্ত। উহার দ্বারা আমরা কেবলমাত্র ইতিহাসের ইঙ্গিত বা মূলসূত্রটি জানিতে পারি। ইহার পর ব্রাহ্মণগ্রন্থে ঐসকল ইতিহাসের সুবিস্তৃত আলোচনা দেখিতে পাই। তন্মধ্যে ঐতরেয়, তৈত্তিরীয় এবং শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণেই অধিকাংশ আখ্যায়িকা স্থান পাইয়াছে। মন্ত্রদ্রষ্টা ঋষিগণের নিকট যেরূপে এবং যে অবস্থায় মন্ত্রাবিশেষ প্রথম প্রতিভাত হইয়াছিল, অধিকাংশ স্থলে তাহার বিবরণই ব্রাহ্মণোক্ত ইতিহাস বা আখ্যায়িকাসমূহের বিষয়বস্তু।

যাস্ক তাহার নিরুক্তগ্রন্থে প্রায় ৩৬টি আখ্যায়িকার উল্লেখ করিয়া সংক্ষিপ্তাকারে আলোচনা করিয়াছেন এবং বিভিন্ন মতবাদের উল্লেখ করিয়া বহু স্থলে ‘ইত্যাখ্যানাবদঃ’, ‘ইতৌতিহাসিকাঃ’, ‘ইত্যাখ্যানসময়ঃ’ এইরূপে ঐতিহাসিকগণের অভিমত দেখাইয়াছেন। তাহার এই উক্তির দ্বারা স্পষ্টই প্রতীয়মান হয় যে, যাস্কের সময় একটি ঐতিহাসিক সম্প্রদায় বিদ্যমান ছিল। তাহার স্বীয় অভিমত এই যে, বৈদিক উপাখ্যানগুলি কেবলমাত্র ঋষির প্রীতির জন্যই। “ইত্যবেদদ্রষ্টার্থস্য প্রীতিভবতীত্যাখ্যানসংযুক্তা॥” (নিঃ—১০।১০ ; ১০।৪৬)

(১) মহাভারত, আদিপর্ব, ১।২৬৫।

(২) ইতিহাসপুরাণাভ্যামপাখ্যানাদিবর্ণনেন বৈদিক এবার্থঃ প্রামেণ প্রত্যন্যতে ॥ ন্যায়মঞ্জরী।

শৌনককৃত “বৃহস্পদবতা” একটি অতি প্রয়োজনীয় লক্ষণ গ্রন্থ। ইহাতে প্রধানতঃ ঋগ্বেদের দেবতাসম্বন্ধে বিশদ বিবরণ পাওয়া যায় এবং প্রসঙ্গক্রমে অন্যান্য বিষয়ও অন্তর্ভুক্ত করা হইয়াছে। ইহার ১২০০ শত শ্লোকের মধ্যে ৩০০ শত শ্লোক ঋষিদিগের মন্ত্রদর্শনের আখ্যায়িকা লইয়া রচিত। ইহাতে ৪০টি আখ্যায়িকা স্থান পাইয়াছে। বৃহস্পদবতা বৈদিক আখ্যায়িকার একখানি অতি প্রাচীন গ্রন্থ বলা যায়।

কাত্যায়নকৃত “সর্বানুক্রমণী” ঋগ্বেদের একটি পরিপূর্ণ বিস্তৃত সূচী। ইহা গদ্যময়। ইহাতে সর্গসংক্রমে সূত্রাকারে সূক্তসমূহের ঋষি, দেবতা, ছন্দ প্রভৃতির সূচী এবং তাহারই মধ্যে সূক্তসংশ্লিষ্ট উপাখ্যানের আভাস গ্রন্থকার দেখাইয়াছেন। ইহার টীকাকার ষড়্-গুরুদ্বিষা তাহার বেদার্থদীপিকা নামক টীকায় ২৩টি উপাখ্যানের উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন। তন্মধ্যে কয়েকটি উপাখ্যানকে শৌনকের ন্যায় বিশদরূপে রূপায়িত করিয়া ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন।

সায়ণের ঋগ্ভাষ্যও আখ্যায়িকার নির্দেশদানে আমাদিগকে সাহায্য করে। ইহাতে তিনি বহু উপাখ্যানের বর্ণনা দিয়াছেন।

দ্যাবিবেদ কৃত “নীতিমঞ্জরী” গ্রন্থে প্রায় ১৬৬টি নীতিমূলক শ্লোকে নানারূপ ইতিহাসের উল্লেখ দোঁখতে পাই। বিশেষ বিশেষ নীতির সমর্থনে উদ্ধৃত উদাহরণগুলি বৈদিক গ্রন্থ হইতে গ্রহণ করা হইয়াছে।

মহাভারত ও রামায়ণে বৈদিক সাহিত্যের বহু উপাখ্যানের উল্লেখ পাওয়া যায়। পৌরাণিক গ্রন্থেও বহু বৈদিক আখ্যায়িকা স্থান পাইয়াছে।

‘ইতিহাস’ এই শব্দটি প্রাচীনকালে নানা গ্রন্থে বিভিন্ন অর্থে ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে। অথর্ববেদ সাংহিতায় রাতোর মহিমা বর্ণনাপ্রসঙ্গে ইতিহাস শব্দটি উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে— “তমিতিহাসশ্চ পুরাণশ্চ গাথাশ্চ নারাশংসীশ্চান্দ্রব্যচলন্। ইতিহাসস্য চ বৈ স পুরাণস্য চ গাথানাশ্চ নারাশংসীনাশ্চ প্রিয়ং ধাম ভবতি য এবং বেদ” (১৫।৬।১১-১২)। ইহার পর ব্রাহ্মণ, আরণ্যক, উপনিষদ্ প্রভৃতিতে বহু ‘ইতিহাস’ ও ‘পুরাণ’ শব্দের উল্লেখ আছে। আখ্যান, উপাখ্যান, ইতিহাস প্রভৃতি শব্দগুলি সমার্থবোধক হইলেও কোন কোন স্থলে ভিন্ন ভিন্ন অর্থে ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে। তৈত্তিরীয় ব্রাহ্মণে আছে—“ইতিহাসপুরাণশ্চ” (৩।১২।৮;)। এখানে সায়ণ ইতিহাস অর্থে মহাভারত এবং পুরাণ অর্থে ব্রহ্ম, পশু প্রভৃতি পুরাণকে লক্ষ্য করিয়াছেন। কিন্তু তিনি অন্যত্র উক্ত শব্দের অন্যপ্রকার অর্থও করিয়াছেন। সেকথা যথাস্থানে উল্লেখ করিব। শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণে, অধ্বর্ষুকর্তৃক নিয়োজিত হইয়া হোতা মৎস্য এবং মৎস্য-হন্তৃগণকে ইতিহাস উপদেশ করিবে, এইরূপ নির্দেশ আছে।—“.....মৎস্যশ্চ মৎস্যহনশ্চ উপসমেতা ভবন্তি, তান্দুপদিশতীতিহাসো বেদঃ সোহয়মিতি কিণ্ডিদিতিহাসমাচক্ষীত এবমেবাবধ্বর্ষুঃ সম্প্রষ্যতি.....।।” (শঃ ব্রাঃ ১০।৩।১।২;)।

শাংখ্যায়ন ও আশ্বলায়ন শ্রোতসূত্রেও অনুরূপ উল্লেখ আছে (১৬।২।৩৬; উঃ ৪।৭)। শাংখ্যায়নের টীকাকার ‘বরদত্তসূত আনন্তীয়’ ইতিহাসবেদকে পৃথকরূপে গ্রহণ করিয়াছেন। উপনিষদ্ প্রভৃতিতে ইতিহাসবেদ পদটি পৃথক্ হওয়ায়ই তিনি ঐরূপ বলিয়াছেন—“ইতিহাস-বেদস্য পৃথগ্ভাবেন দর্শনাৎ” (১৬।২।২৪)।

আরণ্যকে ইতিহাস শব্দটির অনেকস্থানেই প্রয়োগ আছে। “যম্ব্রাহ্মণানীতিহাসান্ পুরাণানি কম্পান্ গাথা নারাশংসী.....ইত্যাদি” (তৈঃ আঃ ২।১৯)। ভাষ্যকার ভট্টভাস্কর বলিয়াছেন,

ব্রাহ্মণগুলি কস্মের প্রেরক, তদাতিরিক্ত ভাগ অর্থবাদ। নিন্দা, প্রশংসা, পরকৃতি ও পুরাকল্প ব্রাহ্মণেরই অন্তর্গত। ইনি মহাভারতকে ইতিহাস এবং ব্রহ্ম, পশ্ম প্রভৃতিকে পুরাণ বলিয়া অভিহিত করিয়া বিকল্পে পরকৃতিকে ইতিহাস ও পুরাণগুলিকে পুরাকল্প বলিয়াছেন— “ব্রাহ্মণানি কস্মচোদনা তচ্ছেষ্টার্থবাদঃ। নিন্দা প্রশংসা পরকৃতিঃ পুরাকল্পশ্চ ব্রাহ্মণগ্রহণেন গৃহ্যন্তে। ইতিহাসা মহাভারতাদয়ঃ পুরাণানি ব্রহ্মাণ্ডাদীনি। যদ্বা ইতিহাসাঃ পরকৃতয়ঃ, পুরাণানি পুরাকল্পাঃ ॥” (তৈঃ আঃ ২।৯) এইস্থানে সায়ণও বিকল্পপক্ষে বলিয়াছেন—“দেবাসুদ্রাঃ সংযত্যা আসন্নিত্যাদয় ইতিহাসাঃ, আত্মা বা ইদমেক এবাগ্র আসীদিত্যাদীনি সৃষ্টাদিপ্রতিপাদকানি পুরাণানি।”

উপনিষদের বহুস্থানে ইতিহাস-পুরাণের উল্লেখ আমরা দেখিতে পাই। ইহাতে ইতিহাস-পুরাণকে পশ্চমবেদরূপে স্বীকার করা হইয়াছে। (১) ছান্দোগ্যে আত্মতত্ত্ববিৎ সনৎকুমার নারদকে উপদেশপ্রদানে সম্মত হইলে নারদ বলিলেন, “ভগবন্! আমি ঋক্, যজুঃ, সাম ও অথর্ববেদ এবং পশ্চমবেদ ইতিহাস পুরাণ প্রভৃতি অধ্যয়ন করিয়াছি।” (২) এই উপনিষদেরই একস্থানে ইতিহাস পুরাণকে রূপক করিয়া উচ্চ মর্যাদা দান করা হইয়াছে এবং বলা হইয়াছে, মধুচক্রস্বরূপ সূর্যের যে উত্তরদিগগত রশ্মিসকল তাহারাই ঐ দিকের মধুনাড়ী, অথর্ববেদোক্ত মন্ত্রসকল ভ্রমরস্বরূপ, ইতিহাসপুরাণ পুষ্পস্থানীয়। (“.....অথর্বান্ধিরস এব মধুকৃত ইতিহাসপুরাণং পুষ্পম্” ॥ ৩।৪।১১)

বৃহদারণ্যকে মৈত্রেয়ী-যাজ্ঞবল্ক্য সংলাপটি স্মৃতি প্রসিদ্ধ। ইহাতে যাজ্ঞবল্ক্য মৈত্রেয়ীকে বলিয়াছেন, “.....অরেহস্য মহতো ভূতস্য নিঃস্বাসিতমেতদ্ যদৃশ্বেদো যজুর্বেদঃ সামবেদো-হথর্বান্ধিরস ইতিহাসঃ পুরাণং বিদ্যা.....সর্বাণি নিঃস্বাসিতানি” (২।৪।১০)। এস্থানে ইতিহাস এবং পুরাণকে পৃথকরূপে নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। ইহাতে মনে হয় উক্ত ইতিহাস ও পুরাণ মহাভারত বা ব্রহ্মাণ্ডাদি পুরাণগ্রন্থ নহে। সায়ণও এইগুলির উদাহরণসঙ্গে বেদান্তর্গত বিভিন্ন অংশ উদ্ধৃত করিয়া বলিয়াছেন, “ইতিহাস উর্বশীপদ্রুরবসোঃ সংবাদাদিরূপঃ। পুরাণম্ অসদ্বা ইদমগ্র আসীদিত্যাদয়ঃ।” সায়ণের এই উক্তির দ্বারা ইতিহাস ও সংবাদ একার্থবোধক বলিয়া বৃদ্ধিতে পারা যায়।

মহর্ষি জৈর্মানিপ্ত্রোক্ত ব্রাহ্মণ লক্ষণে শবরস্বামী (৩) ব্রাহ্মণের দশটি বিভাগ উল্লেখ করিয়া ইতিহাসকে তাহুরই অন্তর্গতরূপে বর্ণিত করিয়াছেন—

“হেতুর্নির্বাচনং নিন্দা প্রশংসাসংশয়ো বিধিঃ।

পরিক্রমা পুরাকল্পো ব্যবধারণকল্পনা ॥

উপমানং দর্শেতে তু বিধয়ো ব্রাহ্মণস্য তু।

এতর্থে সর্ববেদেষু নিয়তং বিধিলক্ষণম্ ॥”

তন্ত্রবাস্তবিককার কুমারিলভট্ট উল্লিখিত পরিক্রমা ও পুরাকল্পকেই উপাখ্যান বা ইতিহাসরূপে স্বীকার করিয়াছেন। তিনি বলিয়াছেন, “একপদ্রুশকর্তৃকমুপাখ্যানং পরকৃতিঃ, বহুকর্তৃক

(১) ছান্দোগ্য, ৭।১।৪; ৭।২।১; ইত্যাদি।

(২) “স হোবাচগেদং ভগবোহধ্যোমি যজুর্বেদং সামবেদমার্থবং চতুর্ধমিতিহাসপুরাণং পশ্চমং বেদানাং... ইত্যাদি ॥” ৭।১।২। এখানে আচার্য্য শঙ্কর বলিয়াছেন—“বেদশব্দস্য প্রকৃত্য ইতিহাসপুরাণং পশ্চমং বেদ বেদানাং ভারতপঞ্চমানাং..... ॥”

(৩) শেষে ব্রাহ্মণশব্দঃ। (বী. দর্শন ২।১।৩৩)।

পদ্যাকম্পঃ” (তন্ত্রঃ বাঃ ২।১।৩৩)। শবরস্বামী যে দশটি বিখিলক্ষণ উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন, তাহা তিনি নিজে অব্যাভিচারী লক্ষণ বলিয়া স্বীকার করেন না, কারণ তিনিই পদ্যঃ বলিয়াছেন— “এতদপি প্রায়িকম্” (২।১।৩৩)। নিরুক্ত ভাষ্যকার স্কন্দস্বামী ও দূর্গাচার্য উভয়েই ইতিহাস শব্দের এইরূপ ব্যুৎপত্তি করিয়াছেন—“নিদানভূতম্ ইতি হ এবমাসীতিদি যঃ কথ্যতে স ইতিহাসঃ” (নিঃ ২।১০)। অবশ্য স্কন্দস্বামী মন্ত্রগত ঐসকল ইতিহাসকে ঔপচারিক বলিয়া স্বীকার করিয়াছেন (নিঃ ২।১০)। ইহার মতে পদ্যবৃত্তও ইতিহাস। কারণ, ‘ইতিহাসমিশ্রং’ এই পদটির ব্যাখ্যাসময়ে বলিয়াছেন—“পদ্যবৃত্তমিতিহাসস্তেন মিশ্রম্ ॥” (নিঃ ৪।৬;)। বৃহদ্ভেদভা গ্রন্থে শৌনক ঊনবিংশতি প্রকার মন্ত্রের ভেদ দেখাইয়া ‘আখ্যানকে’ ইতিহাসরূপে স্বীকার করিলেও ‘সংলাপকে’ অন্যরূপে স্বীকার করিয়াছেন। যেমন, ‘সংলাপ ঋগুপোপ মে। আখ্যানস্তু হয়ে জায়ে.....” (১।৫২-৫৩)। পদ্যঃ সংবাদ এবং ইতিহাসের ভেদ প্রদর্শন করিয়া উর্বশী-পদ্যরবার উপাখ্যানপ্রসঙ্গে বলিয়াছেন—

“আহ্বানং প্রতি চাখ্যানমিতরেতমোরিদম্ ।

সংবাদং মন্যতে ষাস্ক ইতিহাসস্তু শৌনকঃ ॥” (৭।১৫৩)।

কিন্তু বাস্কীয় নিরুক্তগ্রন্থে যে সকল স্থানে উর্বশী-পদ্যরবার প্রসঙ্গ উত্থাপিত হইয়াছে সেই সকল স্থানে তাহার কোনও মন্তব্য আমরা দেখিতে পাই না। (১) শৌনকের মতে ইতিহাস এবং পদ্যবৃত্ত পৃথক্ বলিয়া মনে হয়, কারণ তিনি উক্ত শব্দ দুইটিকে পৃথক্ রূপেই উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন—“ইতিহাসঃ পদ্যবৃত্ত ঋষিভিঃ পরিকীর্ততে” (৪।৪৬)। খ্রীষ্টপূর্ব চতুর্থ শতকে কোটিল্য তাহার অর্থশাস্ত্রে ‘ইতিহাস’ শব্দটি রাজার কর্মবিভাগপ্রসঙ্গে উল্লেখ করিয়া বলিয়াছেন, রাজা দিনের পূর্বভাগে অর্থাৎ পূর্বে হস্তী, অশ্ব, রথ এবং আয়ুর্ধবিদ্যার শিক্ষা গ্রহণ করিবেন, আর পশ্চিমভাগে অর্থাৎ অপরাহ্নে ইতিহাস শ্রবণ করিবেন। (অর্থশাস্ত্র ১।৫)। (২) তিনি ইতিহাস অর্থে পুরাণ, ইতিবৃত্ত, আখ্যায়িকা, উদাহরণ, ধর্মশাস্ত্র এবং অর্থশাস্ত্র গ্রহণ করিয়াছেন (অর্থশাস্ত্র ১।৫)। তিনি আরও বলিয়াছেন—“সামর্গ্যজুর্বেদাঃ সয়ন্ত্রয়ী। অথর্ববেদ ইতিহাস-বেদৌ চ বেদাঃ” (১।৩)। মহাভারতের লক্ষণ অনুসারে বাহাতে ধর্মার্থকামমোক্শের উপদেশ সহ পূর্ববৃত্তান্ত কথিত হইয়াছে তাহাই ইতিহাস। (৩) মহাভারতের মধ্যেই উক্ত গ্রন্থকে কখনও ইতিহাস, কখনও পুরাণ, কখনও বা আখ্যান বলা হইয়াছে। ব্রহ্মপুরাণে ইতিহাসের উৎপত্তি সম্বন্ধে বলা হইয়াছে—

“ইতিহাসপুরাণানি যদন্যচ্ছব্দগোচরম্ ।

স্বভো মূখে মম প্রায়াদভূচ্ছ স্মৃতিগোচরম্ ॥” ১৬।১।২৭।

যাজ্ঞবল্ক্যস্মৃতি ও ব্যাসস্মৃতিতে ইতিহাস এবং পুরাণপাঠের প্রশংসা করা হইয়াছে, কিন্তু ইতিহাস শব্দের কোন সদুৎপত্তি সংজ্ঞার্থ প্রদত্ত হয় নাই।

(১) ৫।১৩; ১০।৪৬; ৪৭; ১১।৩৬; দ্রষ্টব্য।

(২) ধর্মশাস্ত্রেও অনুরূপ বিধি দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়।

“ইতিহাসপুরাণাদ্যোঃ ষষ্ঠক সপ্তমং নয়েৎ ॥” দক্ষ সং ২।৫২ (যজ্ঞবাসী শং)

(৩) “ধর্মার্থকামমোক্শানামুপদেশসম্নিতম্ ।

পূর্ববৃত্তকথাযুক্তমিতিহাসং প্রচক্ষতে ॥” মহা-আদি।

“বাকোবাক্যং পুরাণশ্চ নারাশংসীশ্চ গাথিকাঃ।

ইতিহাসাংস্তথা বিদ্যাং যোহধীতে শক্তিতোহম্বহম্ ॥” যাঃ স্মঃ—১।৪৫।

বেদবেদাঙ্গশাস্ত্রাণি সৌতহাসানি চাভাসেৎ।

অধ্যাপয়েচ্চ তচ্ছিষ্যান্ সন্ধিপ্ৰাংশ্চ দ্বিজোক্তমঃ ॥

ইতিহাসপুরাণানাং বেদোপনিষদাং দ্বিজঃ।

শক্ত্যা সম্যক্ পঠেন্নিত্যমম্পমপ্যাসমাপনাৎ ॥ ব্যাসস্মঃ ১ম অধ্যায়।

শ্রীধর স্বামীর মতে ঋষিপ্রোক্ত বহুবিধ আখ্যান, দেবতা ও ঋষিচরিত এবং ভবিষ্যৎ অঙ্কুত ধর্মকথাদি যাহাতে আছে তাহাই ইতিহাস।

“আযর্দ্দেদি বহুধাখ্যানং দেবর্ষিচরিতাশ্রয়ম্।

ইতিহাসমিতি প্রোক্তং ভবিষ্যাম্ভুতধর্মর্ষদক্ ॥ বিষ্ণুপুঃ ৩।৪।১০।

প্রাচীন শাস্ত্র এবং শাস্ত্রকারগণ প্রত্যেকেই ইতিহাসকে একটি আলোচ্য বিষয়রূপে স্বীকার করিয়াছেন। শ্রাদ্ধাতিতেও ইতিহাস পাঠের বিধি আছে। মহর্ষি মনু বলিয়াছেন—

“স্বাধ্যায়ং শ্রাবয়েৎ পিত্র্যে ধর্মশাস্ত্রাণি চৈব হি।

আখ্যানানীতিহাসাংশ্চ পুরাণানি খিলানি চ ॥” ৩।২৩২।

কিন্তু এই ইতিহাসের স্বরূপ সম্পর্কে মতভেদ আছে। কারণ টীকাকার মেধাতিথি ও কুল্লুক উভয়েই মহাভারতকে ইতিহাস বলিয়াছেন। অথচ সর্বশ্রু নারায়ণ ইহা স্বীকার করেন নাই। তিনি বলিয়াছেন—

“ব্রাহ্মণভাগস্থাঃ কথা ইতিহাসাঃ” ॥

এই ব্রাহ্মণভাগে উদ্দিষ্ট এবং নিরুক্ত, বৃহদ্দেবতা, সর্বানুক্রমণী প্রভৃতি গ্রন্থে বিবৃত কয়েকটি বৈদিক ইতিহাস বা আখ্যানের আলোচনা করিয়া কাহিনীগুলির ক্রমপরিণতি প্রদর্শন করিব।

(১) নাভানেদিষ্ট—

ঋগ্বেদান্তর্গত ১০ম মন্ডলের বিশ্বদেবদেবত সূক্তধ্বয়ের ঋষি নাভানেদিষ্ট। (১) মূল সংহিতায় ঋষির কয়েকটি উক্তি সূক্তোক্ত বিষয়বস্তু সম্পর্কে একটু ইতিবৃত্তের আভাস পাওয়া যায় মাত্র। যেমন—আমার পিতা ও মাতা এবং অপরাপর ভাগকারী ভ্রাতাগণ আমাকে বিষয়ের ভাগ না দিয়া রুদ্রের স্তুতি করিতে বলেন, আমি রুদ্রের শ্রব উচ্চারণ করিতে উদ্যত হইয়া অঙ্গিরাদিগের যজ্ঞানুষ্ঠানের নিকট উপস্থিত হইলাম এবং গবাময়ন যজ্ঞের ষষ্ঠাহে তাঁহারা যাহা বিস্মৃত হইয়াছিলেন তাহা সপ্ত হোতাকে বলিয়া দিয়া যজ্ঞ সমাপ্ত করাইলাম (১০।৬১।১)। আরও কয়েকটি ঋকে বলিতেছেন, “হে সূর্য! আমি নাভানেদিষ্ট, তোমার শ্রব করিতেছি। আমার কামনা এই যে, আমি গাভী লাভ করিব। সেই দ্যুলোক আমাদের শ্রেষ্ঠ উৎপত্তিস্থান এবং সূর্যেরও অধিষ্ঠানভূত। সেই সূর্য হইতে কয় পুরুষই বা আমার অন্তর (২) (১০।৬১।১৮)। হে মিত্র ও বরুণ! গাভীর কামনায় অঙ্গিরাগণ যজ্ঞ করিতেছিলেন!.....আমি সেই শ্রব বলিয়া দিয়া যজ্ঞ সম্পন্ন করাইলাম। সেজন্য আমি তাঁহাদিগের অত্যন্ত প্রিয় হইলাম (১০।৬১।২০)। .....হে মেধাবিগণ! আমি মনুর পুত্র (মানব), আমাকে তোমরা যজ্ঞ সম্পাদনের জন্য নিযুক্ত

(১) ১০।৬১-৬২ সূক্ত।

(২) প্রায় সকল পুরাণেই বলা হইয়াছে যে, সূর্যের পুত্র মনু এবং মনুর পুত্র নাভানেদিষ্ট।



কর (১০।৬২।১-৪)। ঋষির এই উক্তি দ্বারা স্পষ্টই বৃদ্ধিতে পারা যায় যে, তিনি অঙ্গিরা-  
দিগের যজ্ঞে সাহায্য করিয়াছিলেন এবং তাঁহারাও সম্ভূর্তীচন্দ্রে ঋষিকে বহু সম্পত্তি দান  
করিয়াছিলেন। ঋগ্বেদে নাভানোদিষ্ঠ সম্বন্ধে এইটুকুই জানিতে পারা যায়। তৈত্তিরীয় সংহিতায়  
সংস্রব হোম বিধানের স্থলে তিনটি গাথায় উল্লিখিত বিষয়টি লিপিবদ্ধ দেখা যায়।—“মনুঃ  
পদ্রেভ্যো দায়ং ব্যভজৎ, স নাভানোদিষ্ঠং ব্রহ্মচর্যং বসন্তং নিরভজৎ স আগচ্ছৎ, সোহব্রবীৎ কথা  
মা নিরভার্গতি। ন স্বা নিরভাক্ষমিত্যব্রবীদঙ্গিরস ইমে সপ্রমাসতে তে স্দুবর্গং লোকং ন প্রজানন্তি  
তেভ্য ইদং ব্রাহ্মণং ব্রূহি। তে স্দুবর্গং লোকং যন্তো য এষাং পশব স্তাং স্তে দাস্যন্তীতি। তদেভ্যো  
হব্রবীন্তে স্দুবর্গং লোকং যন্তো য এষাং পশব আসন্তানস্মা অদদুস্তং পশুভিশ্চরন্তং যজ্ঞবাস্তৌ রুদ্র  
আগচ্ছৎ। সোহব্রবীন্মম বা ইমে পশব ইত্যদুর্বে মহ্যমিমানিত্যব্রবীন্ম বৈ তস্য ত ঈশত  
ইতাব্রবীৎ। যজ্ঞবাস্তৌ হীয়তে মম বৈ তদিতি তস্মাদ্ যজ্ঞবাস্তু নাভ্যবেত্যং সোহব্রবীদ্ যজ্ঞে  
মাহভজাথ তে পশুমাভি মংস্য ইতি তস্মা এতং মন্থিনঃ সংপ্রাবমজুহোস্ততো বৈ তস্য রুদ্রঃ  
পশুমাভ্যমন্যত। যত্রৈতমেবং বিদ্বান্ মন্থিনঃ সংপ্রাবং জুহোতি ন তত্র রুদ্রঃ পশুনাভিমন্যতে॥”  
ঐতঃ সং ৩।১।৯।৪-৬। অন্যান্য বেদসংহিতায় উক্ত ঋষির উল্লেখ নাই। ঋগ্বেদোক্ত সূক্ত  
দুইটির বিষয় অবলম্বন করিয়া ব্রাহ্মণাদি গ্রন্থে একটি ইতিহাস কথিত হইয়াছে। প্রথমতঃ,  
ঐতরেয় ব্রাহ্মণে ইহা বিস্তৃতরূপে বলা হইয়াছে। “মনুর পুত্র নাভানোদিষ্ঠ যখন ব্রহ্মচর্যে বাস  
করিতেছিলেন, তখন তাঁহার ভ্রাতাগণ তাঁহাকে পিতৃধনের ভাগ দেন নাই। তিনি তাঁহাদিগকে  
জিজ্ঞাসা করিলেন—তোমরা আমাকে কি ভাগ দিয়াছ? তাঁহারা পিতা মনুকে দেখাইয়া দিলেন।  
তিনি পিতাকে বলিলেন, ‘তোমার নিকট আমার ভাগ আছে’; তদন্তরে পিতা জানাইলেন,  
‘তোমার ভ্রাতাগণ আমার নিকট কোন ভাগ রাখে নাই। তুমি অঙ্গিরাদিগের যজ্ঞে (যষ্ঠাহে) দুইটি  
সূক্ত পাঠ করাও। তাঁহাদের উহা স্মরণ নাই। তাহা হইলেই তাঁহারা যজ্ঞাবশিষ্ট সকল ধন  
তোমাকেই দিবেন। এইরূপ পিতৃব্যাক্য শ্রবণ করিয়া তিনি অঙ্গিরাগণের যজ্ঞে উপস্থিত হইয়া সূক্ত  
দুইটি (১০।৬১,৬২) পাঠ করাইলেন। যজ্ঞশেষে তাঁহারা বলিলেন, ‘হে ব্রাহ্মণ! এই সহস্রধন (১)  
তোমারই রহিল’। ঋষি উক্ত ধন গ্রহণ করিতে উদ্যত হইলে এক কৃষ্ণবর্ণবস্ত্রপরিহিত পুরুষ (২)  
ঋষিকে বলিলেন—‘যজ্ঞবাস্তুতে পরিত্যক্ত এই ধন আমার, অঙ্গিরাগণ এই ধন আমাকেই দিয়াছেন।  
তবে এই বিষয়ে তোমার পিতাকেই জিজ্ঞাসা করা হউক।’ তখন তাঁহারা পিতৃসমীপে গমন  
করিলে মনু নাভানোদিষ্ঠকে জিজ্ঞাসা করিলেন—‘বৎস! অঙ্গিরাগণ তোমাকে কি দিয়াছেন?’  
তিনি উক্ত পুরুষের বস্তব্য বিষয়টি পিতাকে জানাইলেন এবং পিতাও তাহা স্বীকার করিয়া  
বলিলেন—‘ঐ ধন তাঁহারই বটে, কিন্তু তিনি সেই ধন তোমাকেই দিবেন’। নাভানোদিষ্ঠ সেই পুরুষকে  
বলিলেন—‘ভগবন্! ইহা তোমারই বটে’। ইহাতে তিনি সম্মুখ হইয়া সকল ধন নাভানোদিষ্ঠকে  
প্রদান করিলেন। ইহাই আখ্যায়িকাটির সারাংশ॥” ঐতঃ ব্রাঃ ৫।২২।৯। তৈত্তিরীয় সংহিতার  
সংহিত ইহার পার্শ্বক্য এই যে, তৈত্তিরীয়ে আছে মনু স্বয়ংই পুত্রদিগকে দায় বিভাগ করিয়া  
দিয়াছিলেন। ব্রাহ্মণের ইতিহাস দেখিলে মনে হয়, মনুর পুত্রগণ নিজেরাই পৈতৃক সম্পত্তি ভাগ  
করিয়াছিলেন।

(১) সহস্রধন অর্থাৎ সহস্রগাভী (সায়ণ)। ঋগ্বেদে একটি ঋকে ঋষি নিজের ইহা বলিয়াছেন—“সহস্রং বে  
দদতো অষ্টকর্ণ্যঃ শ্রবো দেবেযুক্তত।” ১০।৬২।৭

(২) উক্ত পুরুষকে তৈত্তিরীয় সংহিতায় রুদ্র বলা হইয়াছে—“তং পশুভিশ্চরন্তং যজ্ঞবাস্তৌ রুদ্র আগচ্ছৎ॥”  
৩।১।৯।৬। সত্যব্রত সামশ্রবীর মতে ইনি কৃষ্ণবর্ণ, ভয়ানকাকৃতি, শবখাদক কোন এক অনার্য পুরুষ। ঐ-শ্রা ৫।২২।৯।

শাংখায়ন ব্রাহ্মণে ইতিহাসটি সংক্ষিপ্তভাবে বলা হইয়াছে এবং ইহাতে ইতিহাসটির বিশেষ কোন পরিবর্তন হয় নাই। (১) তান্দ্যমহাব্রাহ্মণে ইতিহাসটির উল্লেখ না থাকিলেও উক্ত সূক্ত দুইটি পাঠের বিধি আছে। (২) ঐতরেয় ব্রাহ্মণোক্ত ইতিহাস হইতে আমরা ইহা বদ্বিভিতে পারি যে, বৈদিক যুগে আৰ্যপরিবারে সম্পত্তির ভাগকর্তা ছিলেন একমাত্র পিতা। পুত্রগণও একমাত্র পিতাকেই ভাগকর্তা বলিয়া জানিত। “তস্মাদ্ভ্যাপ্যেত্যাহঁ পিতরং পুত্রা নিষ্ঠাবোহববদিতা (৩) ইত্যেবাচক্ষতে ॥” (৫।২২।৯)।

ভাগবত ভিন্ন অন্য কোন পুরাণে বা মহাভারত রামায়ণ প্রভৃতিতে এই ইতিহাসটি বলা হয় নাই। কিন্তু সর্বত্রই মনুর নয়টি পুত্র ছিল এবং তন্মধ্যে নাভানেদিষ্ঠ অন্যতম ইহা স্বীকার করা হইয়াছে। (৪) অবশ্য ‘নাভানেদিষ্ঠ’ এই নামটির অশুভ পরিবর্তন ঘটিয়াছে। যেমন, বিষ্ণু-পুরাণে মনুবংশ কীর্তনে বলা হইয়াছে—“.....বিবস্বতো মনুর্মনোরিক্ণাকুনুগধ্ষ্টশর্ষাতি নরিষ্যস্তপ্রাংশনানাভাগনেদিষ্ঠকরুষপৃষ্প্ধাখ্যাঃ পুত্রাঃ বভূবুঃ। নাভাগো নেদিষ্ঠপুত্রস্থ বৈশ্যতামগমৎ ॥” (৪।১।৫, ১৫)। মার্কণ্ডেয়ে দিষ্ট এবং নাভাগ পৃথক্ ব্যক্তি—“দিষ্টপুত্রস্থ নাভাগঃ স্থিতঃ প্রথমযৌবনে ॥” (১১৩।২)। একটি স্থানে নাভাগ এবং রিষ্ট এইরূপ আছে—ইক্ষ্বাকুনাভাগো রিষ্টো মহাবলপরাক্রমাঃ ॥” (১১১।৪-৫)। হরিবংশে মনুর নয়টি পুত্রের মধ্যে নাভাগ ও নাভাগরিষ্টের উল্লেখ আছে। “ইক্ষ্বাকুশ্চেব নাভাগো ধৃষ্ণুঃ শর্ষাতিরেব চ। নরিষ্য-প্রাংশদৃষ্টাস্তে নাভাগরিষ্টসপ্তমাঃ ॥” (১০।১৩)। ভাগবতে মনুপুত্র নাভানেদিষ্ঠের পরিবর্তে মনুপুত্র নভগ এবং তাঁহার পুত্র নাভাগ এইরূপ বলা হইয়াছে। ইহাতে যে ইতিহাসটি দেখিতে পাই তাহাতে এই নাভাগই যে শ্রুতান্ত নাভানেদিষ্ঠ, এ বিষয়ে কোন সন্দেহই থাকে না। যেমন—

“নাভাগো নভগাপত্যং যং ততং দ্রাতরঃ কবিম্।  
যবিষ্ঠং ব্যভজন্ দায়ং ব্রহ্মচারিণমাগতম্ ॥ ১  
দ্রাতরোহভাঙ্ক্ত কিং মহ্যং ভজাম পিতরং তব।  
ত্বাং মমার্যাস্ততাভাঙ্ক্তুর্মা পুত্রক তদাদৃথাঃ ॥ ২  
ইমেহঁঙ্গরসঃ সপ্তমাসতেহদ্য সন্মেধসঃ।  
ষষ্ঠং ষষ্ঠমুপেত্যাহঃ কবে মূহাস্তি কস্মিণি ॥ ৩  
তাং স্তবং সংশয় সূক্তে বে বৈশ্বদেবে মহাত্মনঃ।  
তে স্বর্ষস্তু ধনং সপ্তপরিশেষিতমাখ্যনঃ ॥ ৪  
দাস্যাস্তি তেহথ তানর্ছ তথা স কৃতবান্ যথা।  
তস্মৈ দত্ত্বা যযুঃ স্বর্গং তে সপ্তপরিশেষণম্ ॥ ৫  
তং কশিচৎ স্বীকরিষ্যস্তং পুত্রুষঃ কৃষ্ণদর্শনঃ।  
উবাচোত্তরতোহভ্যোভ্য মমেদং বাসুকং বসু ॥ ৬

(১) ২৮।৪;

(২) ২০।৯।২।

(৩) সায়ণ ‘অববদিতা’ শব্দের এইরূপ অর্থ করিয়াছেন—অসৈ্যতাবদিত্যবচ্ছিদ্য বদিতা চেতি। যিনি নির্দেশ দেন যে, ইহার এই পরিমাণ ধন তিনিই অববদিতা অর্থাৎ ভাগকর্তা।

(৪) বিভিন্ন পুরাণে নাভাগ নামে একজন ঋষির পরিচয় পাওয়া যায়, ইহাই নাভানেদিষ্ঠের নাম বলিয়া মনে হয়।

ব্রহ্ম-৭।২৪; বিষ্ণু-৪।২।২; ব্রহ্মাণ্ড-৩।৬৩।৫; অগ্নি-২৭।৩।৩০; বাসু-৮।৮।৫-৭; শংস-১২।২০-২১; লিঙ্ক-১।৬।৬।৫০-১; গরুড়-১।১৩।১৫-১৬; ভাগবত-৯।৪।১।

মমেদমৃষিভিদ'স্তমিতি তর্হি স্ম মানবঃ।  
 স্যাম্রো তে পিতরি প্রশ্নঃ পৃষ্টবান্ পিতরং যথা ॥ ৭  
 যজ্ঞবাস্তুগতং সর্বমুচ্ছিন্তমৃষয়ঃ ক্বচিৎ।  
 চকৃর্হি ভাগং রুদ্রায় স দেবঃ সর্বমর্হীতি ॥ ৮  
 নাভাগস্তং প্রণম্যাহ তবেশ কিল বাস্তুকম্।  
 ইত্যাহ মে পিতা ব্রহ্মন্ শিরসা হুং প্রসাদয়ে ॥ ৯  
 যন্তে পিতাদদধর্মং হুগ্ণ সত্যং প্রভাষসে।  
 দদামি তে মন্ত্রদশো জ্ঞানং ব্রহ্ম সনাতনম্ ॥ ১০  
 গৃহাণ দ্রবিণং দত্তং মৎসত্রপারিণেযিতম্।  
 ইতুক্তব্রাহ্মিহীতো রুদ্রো ভগবান্ ধর্মবৎসলঃ ॥ ১১”

(বঙ্গবাসী সং ১।৪)।

নীতিমঞ্জরীকার এই ইতিহাসটি সম্বন্ধে বলিয়াছেন—

“পিতা বাদি স্তুতো দদ্যাৎ পদ্ব্রেণাপি সদৃস্পদঃ।

নাভানৈদিষ্ট (ষ্ট) পদ্বায় সত্রে প্রীতো মনুর্দদৌ ॥ ১৫২

ইহার টীকায় গ্রন্থকার বলিয়াছেন—প্রনুং জায়তামিতি চতসৃভির্ঋষিভঃ স্তুতঃ পিতা তস্মৈ শোভনানি ধনানি দদৌ। ততো নাভানৈদিষ্টো মনুং তুষ্টিব হ্রিষ্টভা। এখানে মনে হয় “ধনানি দদৌ” ইহার অভিপ্রায় এই যে, অর্থপ্রাপ্তির সংপৃথ্বা উপদেশ করিয়াছিলেন। কারণ, মনু কোন যজ্ঞ করিয়াছিলেন এবং তাহাতে নাভানৈদিষ্ট পৌরোহিত্য করিয়াছিলেন এরূপ কোন উক্তি দেখা যায় না। সায়ণও বলিয়াছেন, “উত্তরাভিঃচতসৃভিরস্মৈ মানবায়র্ষয়ে সাবর্গিনা যন্দত্তং তং প্রশস্যতে ॥” (১০।৬২।৮)। বৃহদ্বেদতায় নাভানৈদিষ্ট সম্বন্ধীয় কোন আখ্যায়িকার উল্লেখ নাই। একটি স্থানে বলা হইয়াছে—“স্তোতি প্রনুনিমিত্যদাঃ সাবর্গস্য মনোঃ স্তুতিঃ ॥” (৭।১০৩)। পরবর্তী-কালীন স্মার্তগণ দায়বিভাগে এই ইতিহাসটিকে দৃষ্টান্তস্বরূপ গ্রহণ করিয়াছেন। সম ও বিষম দই প্রকার দায়ভাগের উল্লেখ স্মৃতিতে পাওয়া যায়। যথা বৌধায়ন—“মনুঃ পদ্ব্রেভ্যো দায়ং ব্যভজাদিতি শ্রুতিঃ। সমোহংশং সর্বেষামবিশেষাৎ। বরং বা রূপমদ্বক্রেজ্যেষ্ঠঃ। তস্মাজ্যেষ্ঠং পদ্বত্রং ধনেন নিরবসায়ন্তীতি শ্রুতিঃ (১) ॥” আপস্তম্ব—“মনুঃ পদ্ব্রেভ্যো দায়ং ব্যভজাদিত্যবিশেষেণ শ্রুয়তে। তথাপি তস্মাৎ জ্যেষ্ঠং.....একবচ্ছ্রুয়তে ॥ (২) বিজ্ঞানেশ্বরকৃত মিতাক্ষর—“মনুঃ পদ্ব্রেভ্যো.....শ্রুয়তে ইতি। তস্মাদ্বিযমো বিভাগঃ শাস্ত্রদৃষ্টোহপি লোকবিরোধাচ্ছ্রুতি-বিরোধাত্চ নানুষ্ঠেয় ইতি সমসেব বিভজেরন্ ইতি নিয়ম্যতে ॥” (৩) এইরূপ আরও অনেক স্মার্ত এই ইতিহাসটির উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন। (৪)

(১) বৌধায়নধর্মসূত্র-২।২।২।৩-৫।

(২) আপস্তম্বধর্মসূত্র (চৌখাষ) ২।৬।১৪।১১-২; এখানে টীকাবাহ হনুস্ত বলিয়াছেন—জ্যেষ্ঠং পুত্রমিত্যাদিক-মপ্যবিধিরিতি ন্যায়বিদ আহুঃ। ন কেবলময়মেবানুবাদঃ কিং তহি ননুঃ পুত্রো ইত্যয়মপ্যনুবাদ এব (উজ্জ্বলা টীকা)।

(৩) ব্যবহারাধায় (নির্ণয়সাগর), p. 203.

(৪) সরস্বতীবিলাস--(Government Or. Library Series, Mysore) p. 354.

বিবাদেরত্বাকর--(Asiatic Society) p. 469.

স্মৃতিচন্দ্রিকা, Part II (Mysore), p. 608.

মদনসিংহদেব বিরচিত মদনরত্নপ্রদীপ --(P. V. Kane's ed) p. 328.

(২) দ্বিত—

ঋগ্বেদের কয়েকটি সূক্তের দৃষ্টা ঋষি দ্বিত। প্রথম মণ্ডলের ১০৫ সূক্তটিতে তাহার সম্বন্ধে কিছু ঐতিহাসিক ইঙ্গিত আছে। ইহার ১৯টি ঋক্ ঋষির উক্তি। উক্ত সূক্তের কয়েকটি ঋক্ দ্বারা আমরা ইহাই জানিতে পারি যে, কোন এক সময় দ্বিত একটি অরুণবর্ণ ব্যায় কৰ্তৃক (১) আক্রান্ত হইয়া কূপমধ্যে পতিত হন এবং সেইস্থানে হইতে নিৰ্গত হইবার জন্য স্তুতি করেন। ঋক্ সংহিতায় আরও কয়েকটি স্থলে দ্বিতের উল্লেখ আছে, কিন্তু তাহার দ্বারা এইরূপ ইতিহাসের কোন ইঙ্গিত আমরা পাই না। ঐসকলস্থলে দ্বিতকে কখন আপ্তের পুত্র কখনও বা বিভূবসের পুত্র বলা হইয়াছে। (২)

বাক্সনেনয় সংহিতায় কেবলমাত্র দ্বিত প্রভৃতির নাম উল্লেখ আছে। কিন্তু ভাষ্যকার উবট সেই সূত্র ধরিয়াই ইতিহাসটির অবতারণা করিয়া বলিয়াছেন—“তত আপ্ত্যাঃ সংবভূব্দস্মিতো দ্বিতো একত ইতেবমাদিরিতহাসোসহয়মবগন্তব্যঃ ॥” (১।২০)।

ব্রাহ্মণগ্রন্থে এই ইতিহাস সম্পর্কে সেরূপ কোন বিশেষ বিবরণ পাওয়া যায় না। কেবলমাত্র শতপথে দ্বিত, দ্বিত ও একতের জল হইতে উৎপত্তি এবং সেজন্য ইহাদিগকে আপ্ত্য বলা হয়, ইহাই কথিত হইয়াছে। (৩)

বৃহন্দেবতায় ইতিহাসটির এরূপ পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে যে, একমাত্র দ্বিতের কূপে পতনের বিষয়টি ভিন্ন অন্য কোন অংশে অন্যান্য গ্রন্থোক্ত ইতিহাসের সহিত সাদৃশ্য নাই বলিলেই হয়। ইহাতে শৌনক যাহা বলিয়াছেন তাহার সংক্ষিপ্ত ভাব এই যে, কোন এক সময় দ্বিত গাভী চরাইতেছিলেন। সেই সময় কতকগুলি কুর নেকড়ে বাঘ (কুরাঃ সালাবুকীসুতাঃ) (৪) তাহাকে কূপমধ্যে প্রক্ষেপ করতঃ গাভীগর্ভটিকে লইয়া পলায়ন করে। তখন দ্বিত সেইস্থানেই দেবগণের স্তব করেন এবং বৃহস্পতি তাহা শ্রবণ করিয়া সকল দেবগণসমেত দ্বিতের নিকট গমন করিলেন এবং দ্বিতের সেই যজ্ঞে অংশ গ্রহণ করিলেন (বৃঃ দেঃ ৩।১৩২-১৩৬ দৃষ্টব্য)। কাত্যায়ন তাহার সর্বানুক্রমণী নামক গ্রন্থে এই সূক্ত সম্বন্ধে বিকল্প ঋষির নির্দেশ দিয়া বলিয়াছেন—“আপ্ত্যাস্মিতো বা” (১।১০৫)। এখানে টীকাকার ষড়্‌গুরুশিষ্য উক্ত ‘বা’ শব্দের দ্বারাই কুৎসের অনুমান করিয়াছেন। তিনি বলেন, “বেতু্যস্তেঃ কুৎসেন বিকল্পো ভবতি ॥” কিন্তু কুৎস সম্বন্ধে এইরূপ উপাখ্যান কোনস্থানে দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না। ঋগ্বেদানুক্রমণী গ্রন্থে (৫) মাধব বলিয়াছেন—“কুৎসাস্মিতশ্চ পতিতো কূপে তুষ্টবতুশ্চ তো ॥” (৫।৩।৪)। ইহার মতে, কুৎস এবং দ্বিত

(১) ঋগ্বেদ ১।১০৫।৮। এই মন্ত্রটির ব্যাখ্যাকালে যাস্ক ‘মাসকুৎ’ ও ‘বৃক’ শব্দ দুইটির অন্যপ্রকার অর্থ করিয়াছেন। “মাসকুৎ মাসানাম্ অর্দ্ধমাসানাঞ্চ কৰ্তা ভবতি। বৃকশ্চন্দ্রনা ভবতি। বিবৃতজ্যোতিষ্কে বা বিকৃতজ্যোতিষ্কে বা বিক্রান্তজ্যোতিষ্কে বা ॥” (নিঃ ৫।২০) সাধারণ বিকল্পপক্ষে যাস্কের ন্যায়ই ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন এবং উক্ত ঋক্টিতে যে ইতিহাসের বীজ নিহিত আছে ইহাও বলিয়াছেন “তত্র ব্রহ্মেতিহাসমিশ্রম্ . . . . .” ৫।২০।

(২) ১০।৪৬।৩ দ্রষ্টব্য।

(৩) শ-ব্রা, ১।২।১।১০।  
অন্ত্যো জাতম্বাচ তেষাম্ আপ্ত্য ইতি সংজ্ঞা (সায়ণ)।

(৪) ঋগ্বেদে যে অরুণবর্ণ ব্যাঘ্রের কথা বলা হইয়াছে, এখানে তাহাকেই ‘কুরাঃ সালাবুকীসুতাঃ’ বা কুর নেকড়ে বাঘ বলিয়া উল্লেখ করা হইয়াছে মনে হয় এবং ইহাতে একত বা দ্বিতের কোন উল্লেখ নাই।

(৫) Ed. C. Kunhan Raja, 1932.

উভয়েই কূপে পতিত হইয়াছিলেন (১)। এইরূপ উক্তি অন্য কুর্দাপি দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না এবং এই উক্তির মূল কারণ যে কি তাহা এই গ্রন্থে স্পষ্টীকৃত হয় নাই।

১।১০৫।১৭ ঋক্টিতে সায়ণ শাট্যায়নব্রাহ্মণোক্ত যে ইতিহাসটির উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন তাহার সহিত অন্য কোন উপাখ্যানের কোনপ্রকার সাদৃশ্য নাই। ইহাতে উপাখ্যানটির যে কিরূপ পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে, তাহা ইতিহাসটি দেখিলেই বৃদ্ধিতে পারা যায়।

“পূরাকালে একত, দ্বিত ও ত্রিত নামে তিনজন ঋষি ছিলেন। একদা তাঁহারা মরুভূমিতে গিয়া অরণ্যে অবস্থানকালে (মরুভূমাবরণ্যে বর্তমানাঃ) তৃষ্ণার্ত হন এবং একটি কূপের নিকট গমন করেন। তথায় ত্রিত জলপান করিবার জন্য কূপমধ্যে প্রবেশ করেন এবং নিজে সেই জল পান করিয়া তাঁহাদিগকেও জলদান করেন। তাঁহারা (একত, দ্বিত) সেই জল পান করিয়া ত্রিতকে কূপে নিক্ষেপ করেন এবং রথচক্রের স্ভারা কূপটি আবৃত করিয়া তাঁহার সকল ধনসম্পত্তি অপহরণ করেন। ত্রিত সেই কূপ হইতে উঠিতে না পারিয়া এই সূক্ত দ্বারা দেবগণকে স্মরণ করিলেন।”

১।১০৫ সূক্তটির ঋষি সম্বন্ধে সায়ণও বিকল্পমত পোষণ করেন। সূক্তারম্ভে তিনি বলিয়াছেন, ইহা কূপে পতিত ত্রিত অথবা কৃৎসের উক্তি—“অপাং পূরস্য ত্রিতস্য কূপে পতিতস্য কৃৎসস্য বার্বং” ॥ ১।৫২।৫ (২) ঋকের ভাষ্যে সায়ণ তৈত্তিরীয় সংহিতা হইতে ত্রিত প্রভৃতির উৎপত্তি সম্বন্ধে একটি ইতিহাস উদ্ধৃত করিয়া বলিয়াছেন—“তথাচ তৈত্তিরীয়ৈঃ সমাম্নাতং সোহঙ্গারাগ্যভাপাতয়ৎ। তত একতোহজায়ত। স দ্বিতীয়মভাপাতয়ৎ, ততো দ্বিতোহজায়ত। স তৃতীয়মভাপাতয়ৎ ততস্মিতোহজায়ত ॥” ইনি বিভিন্ন ব্রাহ্মণোক্ত ইতিহাসের উল্লেখ করিলেও স্বকীয় ভাষ্যে যেরূপ অর্থ করিয়াছেন তাহাতে উল্লিখিত ব্রাহ্মণগুলির সহিত যথেষ্ট পার্থক্য রহিয়াছে। তিনি বলিয়াছেন—ত্রিত জলপানের জন্য কূপে প্রবেশ করেন। অসুদ্রগণ তাঁহাকে প্রতিরোধ করিবার জন্য সেই কূপ আচ্ছাদিত করে—“তত্র উদকপানার্থং প্রবৃত্তস্য কূপে পতিতস্য প্রতিরোধায়াসুদ্রৈঃ পরিধয়ঃ স্থাপিতাঃ। তান্ যথা স অভিনন্দৎ ॥” (ঋগ্বেদ—১।৫২।৫)। সায়ণ এস্থানে একত বা দ্বিতের কোন উল্লেখই করেন নাই এবং ‘অসুদ্র’ শব্দটি অধ্যাহার করিয়াছেন। তিনি “যেন ত্রিতোহর্গবান্নিবভূব” তৈত্তিরীয় আরণ্যকোক্ত এই বাক্যটির ব্যাখ্যাকালে ত্রিতকে একজন সাধারণ পূরুষ বলিয়া অভিহিত করিয়াছেন (তৈঃ আরঃ ২।৩।১)। ভট্টভাস্কর এস্থানে অন্যরূপ অর্থ করিয়াছেন। তাঁহার মতে ত্রিত একটি অগ্নির নাম। “ত্রিতঃ তৃতীয়ান্ভিপাতজন্মা অগ্নিবিশেষঃ” ॥ (তৈঃ আরঃ ২।৩।১)। নীতিমঞ্জরী গ্রন্থে ত্রিত প্রভৃতিতে সহোদর ভ্রাতা বলা হইয়াছে। দ্যাবিবেদের মতে ভ্রাতৃগণ কর্তৃকই ত্রিত কূপে নিক্ষেপ হইয়াছিলেন।

“অন্যঃ সুহৃজ্জনো ভ্রাতা শত্রুভ্রাতা সহোদরঃ।

অশ্বিভ্যাং তারিতো ভূজ্যাস্মিতঃ কূপে নিপাতিতঃ ॥” ২৮

মহাভারতের শল্যপর্বে ত্রিতের উপাখ্যানটি অনেক পরিবর্তন সহকারে কথিত হইয়াছে। তাহার ফলে ইহা সম্পূর্ণ অন্য আকার লাভ করিয়াছে। অবশ্য, ইহার কয়েকটি স্থল অনেকাংশে

(১) ঋগ্বেদীপিকা নামক ঋগ্বেদভাষ্যে (১।১০৫।১৭) মাধব বৃহদেবতা হইতে তিনটি শ্লোক ৩।১৩২-৩, ১৩৩ উদ্ধৃত করিয়া পরে বলিয়াছেন—

“কৃৎসচ্চ কূপে পতিতস্তেনবেহানধাবতি। সূক্তেন ত্রিতদৃষ্টেন স্বয়ং বা দৃষ্টবানিদম্ ॥  
ত্রিত এবাথবা ত্রষ্টা ননু কৃৎসস্য দর্শনে। বিরূধ্যতেহরুগো যেতি মা শব্দস্তত্র কা গতিঃ ॥  
উচ্যতে পদকারস্য ত্রিতস্যার্থনিদং মতম্। অন্যথাপি পদচ্ছেদস্তত্র যাস্কেন দশিতঃ ॥

(২) ইন্দ্রো যমজী ধৃশনাণো অহুসা ভিনম্বলস্য পরিখীরিব ত্রিতঃ ॥

বৃহশ্বেদবতার সহিত একরূপ বলিয়া মনে হয়। ইতিহাসটিতে বলা হইয়াছে যে, একসময় একত ও দ্বিত উভয়ে যজ্ঞানুষ্ঠান ও ধনলাভের জন্য চিন্তাশ্রিত হইয়া পরামর্শ করিলেন যে, আমরা দ্বিতকে অগ্রে করিয়া যজ্ঞমানদিগের নিকট বিবিধ পশু প্রাতিগ্রহণ করিব এবং তদ্বারা যজ্ঞানুষ্ঠান-পূর্বক সানন্দে সোমরস পান করিব। এইরূপ সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়া দ্বিতকে অগ্রবর্তীকরতঃ যজ্ঞমানদিগের নিকট উপস্থিত হইলেন এবং যজ্ঞ সমাধান করিয়া বহু গাভী লইয়া পূর্বদিকে যাত্রা করিলেন। দ্বিত সানন্দে সকলের অগ্রে যাইতে লাগিলেন এবং একত ও দ্বিত গাভী সঞ্চালন-করতঃ তাঁহার পশ্চাৎ আগমন করিতে লাগিলেন। ক্রমে রজনী সমুপস্থিত হইল। তখন একত ও দ্বিত এতাদৃশ গাভী দর্শনে লোভপরবশ হইয়া, কিরূপে এইসকল গাভী আমরা উভয়ে পাইব, ইহাই চিন্তা করিতে লাগিলেন। পরিশেষে সেই পাপপরায়ণ ভ্রাতৃদ্বয় ইহাই স্থির করিলেন যে, দ্বিত যজ্ঞকুশল ও বেদপারগ, অতএব সে আমাদের অগ্রে বহু গাভী লাভ করিবে। সেই হেতু এই গাভীগুলি লইয়া প্রস্থান করি, দ্বিত যথেষ্ট গমন করুক। এইরূপে তাঁহার তিনজনে গমন করিতেছেন এমন সময় একটি বৃক (নেকড়ে বাঘ) তাঁহাদিগের সম্মুখে উপস্থিত হইল। তাঁহারা যে পথে গমন করিতোছিলেন তাহার অন্যতরে সরস্বতীতটে একটি বৃহৎ কূপ ছিল। দ্বিত পথিমধ্যে বৃকদর্শনে ভীত হইয়া পলায়নকরতঃ সেই ঘোরতর কূপে নিপতিত হইলেন। তথায় একত ও দ্বিত তাঁহার আত্নাদ শ্রবণ করিয়াও বৃকভয় ও পশুলোভে তাঁহাকে পরিত্যাগ করিয়া প্রস্থান করিলেন। মহর্ষি দ্বিত ভ্রাতৃগণ কর্তৃক পরিত্যক্ত হইয়া মনে মনে চিন্তা করিলেন, আমি এই কূপে অবস্থান করিয়া কিরূপে সোমরস পান করিব। ইতিমধ্যে তিনি সেই কূপমধ্যে একটি লম্বমান লতাকে দেখিলেন ও ক্ষণকাল ধ্যান করিয়া ধূলিসমাবৃত সেই কূপ খনন করিয়া জল উত্তোলন ও বাহুস্থাপন করিলেন এবং নিজেকে হোতা, লতাটিকে সোম, প্রস্থরখণ্ডকে শর্করা এবং জলকে আজ্য কল্পনা করিয়া ঋক্, যজুস্ ও সামবেদ চিন্তা-পূর্বক যজ্ঞানুষ্ঠানে প্রবৃত্ত হইলেন। দ্বিতের তুমুল যজ্ঞধ্বনি স্বর্গমধ্যে প্রবেশ করিল, কিন্তু দেবগণ তাহার কোন কারণ জানিতে পারিলেন না। তখন বৃহস্পতি তাঁহাদিগকে বলিলেন, তপস্বী দ্বিত যজ্ঞ করিতেছেন, অতএব আমাদের অগ্রে গমন করিতে হইবে। সকল দেবগণ সেই যজ্ঞস্থলে গমন করিয়া দ্বিতকে বলিলেন, মহাভাগ! আমরা যজ্ঞভাগ গ্রহণের নিমিত্ত উপস্থিত হইয়াছি। কূপে পতিত ঋষি দ্বিত দেবগণকে যথাবিধি মন্ত্রপূত ভাগ প্রদান করিলেন এবং তাঁহারাও সমুচ্চীচক্রে দ্বিতকে বরপ্রদানে উদ্যত হইলে দ্বিত বলিলেন, আমাকে এই কূপ হইতে উদ্ধার করুন। দেবগণও তাহাই করিলেন। দ্বিত গৃহে প্রত্যাবর্তন করিয়া একত ও দ্বিতকে অবলোকন করিলেন এবং রোষাবিচ্ছীচক্রে অভিশাপ প্রদান করিলেন। (মহা-শল্য, ৩৬।১৪-৪৬, ৫০।৫১—বঙ্গবাসী সং)। মহাভারতের অন্যত্রও দ্বিতের উল্লেখ আছে, তবে সেস্থানে এই উপাখ্যানের কোন ইঙ্গিত নাই। অন্যান্য পুরাণে দ্বিত সম্বন্ধে এইরূপ ইতিহাস নাই। একমাত্র ভাগবতের একটি স্থানে একতকে ব্রহ্মার পুত্র বলা হইয়াছে। তিনি স্যামস্তপণ্ডকে শ্রীকৃষ্ণকে দেখিতে গিয়াছিলেন। (ভাগ—১০।৮৪।৫—কুস্বকোণ সং)। স্কন্দস্বামী এই উপাখ্যানটির একটি অর্থ নিতাপক্ষে করিয়াছেন। তাহা এই যে, দ্বিত অর্থাৎ শূক্ৰ (পুণ্য) শব্দ-লক্ষণময়, কর্মপাশের দ্বারা স্বর্গ, নরক ও মর্ত্যলোকে বদ্ধ কোন ক্ষেত্রস্ত কর্ম ও জ্ঞানের উপযুক্ত সম্বন্ধের অভাবে মোক্ষলাভ করিতে না পারিয়া নরকে ঘটীচক্রস্বরূপ সংসারে ইতস্ততঃ বিভ্রান্ত হইয়া বিলাপ করিতোছিল (নিঃ ৪।৬)।

ঋগ্বেদ সংহিতায় দ্বিতের পরিচয় সূক্তদ্রষ্টা ঋষিরূপেই আমরা পাইয়াছি। কিন্তু ব্রাহ্মণ-গ্রন্থে দ্বিতকে দেবতারূপে বর্ণনা করা হইয়াছে। অবশ্য সেস্থলে দ্বিত, দ্বিত ও একত এইরূপ

শব্দের প্রয়োগ নাই, কিন্তু 'আপ্য' এই পদটির দ্বারা উক্ত ত্রিত প্রভৃতিরই বোধ হইয়া থাকে। কারণ বহুস্থানেই ত্রিতকে আপ্য ত্রিত বলা হইয়াছে। ঐতরেয় ব্রাহ্মণে (ঐন্দ্র মহাভিষেকে আসন্দী আরোহণকালে) আপ্যদেবের উল্লেখ করিয়া বলা হইয়াছে—

“সাধ্যাশ্চ দ্বাহপ্ত্যাশ্চ (১) দেবাঃ পাংছেন চ্ছন্দসা ত্রিণবেন স্তোমেন শাকুরেণ সাম্নাহরোহন্তু।  
তান্ বা আরোহামি রাজ্যায়॥”

(ঐঃ ব্রাঃ ৮।৩৮।১)।

এস্থলে 'আপ্য' এই পদটির দ্বারা ইতিহাসোক্ত ত্রিত প্রভৃতিই যে লক্ষিত হয় তাহা পূর্বোল্লিখিত শতপথোক্ত ত্রিতের উৎপত্তির বিবরণ হইতে বৃদ্ধিতে পারা যায়। শতপথযজুর্বেদের ভাষ্যকার মহীধরের উক্তি দ্বারা ইহা আরও পরিষ্কৃত হয়। তিনি বলিয়াছেন,—“ত্রিতায় ত্রিতনাম্নে দেবায়। পূর্বং কুতিশ্চিক্তোঃ ভীতোহগ্নিরপঃ প্রাবিশং, ততো দেবাস্তং স্ত্রাঘা জগহুস্তদাগ্নিনা বীৰ্যমপ্সু মন্তং তত আপ্য উৎপন্নাস্ত্রিতাঋতকতসংস্রাস্তে দেবৈঃ সহ চরন্তো যশ্চে পাত্রীপ্রক্ষালনজললক্ষণং ভাগং লোভিরে॥” (১।২০) (২)।

(৩) নমুচি—

বেদ সংহিতায় একজন অজ্ঞাচারী দাস বা অসুদূররূপে নমুচির উল্লেখ পাওয়া যায়। ইন্দ্র জলের ফেনা দ্বারা মস্তক ছিন্ন ও চূর্ণ করিয়া তাহাকে বধ করেন, এইটুকু সংক্ষিপ্ত পরিচয় আমরা পাইয়া থাকি॥ (৩) ঋগ্বেদের ১।৫৩।৭ মন্ত্রে বজ্রের দ্বারা দূরদেশে নমুচি নামক মাস্যাবী অসুদূরকে হত্যার উল্লেখ আছে। “নম্যা যদিন্দ্র সখ্যা পরাবতি নির্বহয়ো নমুচিং নাম মায়িনম্”। ঋগ্বেদসংহিতায়ও নমুচি বধের কথা বলা হইয়াছে, তবে উহাতে অশ্বিনয় ও সরস্বতীর কথাটি সন্নিবেশিত হওয়ায় উহা অনেকটা ব্রাহ্মণের (৪) ন্যায় হইয়াছে। যেমন—

“অশ্বিনা নমুচেঃ সূতং সোমং শূত্রং পরিস্রুতা।

সরস্বতী তমাভরং বহির্বেন্দ্রায় পাতবে॥” (২০।৫৯)।

অশ্বিনয় পরিস্রুত সুদূর সহিত অভিযুত পবিত্র সোম নমুচির নিকট হইতে আহরণ করিয়াছিলেন। সরস্বতীও ইন্দ্রের পানের জন্য তাহা আহরণ করেন।

“অশ্বিনা হবির্গিন্দ্রিয়ং নমুচে ধিষা সরস্বতী।

আশুক্ৰমাসুদূরাবসু মধামিন্দ্রায় জপ্রিরে॥” (২০।৬৭)।

অশ্বিনয় এবং সরস্বতী বৃদ্ধিপূর্বক নমুচির নিকট হইতে ইন্দ্রের জন্য হবি, বীৰ্য এবং প্রভূত ঋন আহরণ করিয়াছিলেন।

“অশ্বিনা সরস্বতী হবিষেন্দ্রমবধয়ন্।

স বিভেদ বলং মঘং নমুচাবাসুদুরে সচা॥” (২০।৬৮)।

অশ্বিনী ও সরস্বতী হবিদ্বারা যে ইন্দ্রকে বর্ধিত করিয়াছিলেন, সেই ইন্দ্র নমুচির সহিত বলকেও বিদীর্ণ করিয়াছিলেন। (এখানে ভাষ্যকার মহীধর নমুচি অর্থে মেঘকে লক্ষ্য করিয়াছেন)।

(১) সায়ণ এখানে বলিয়াছেন—আপ্য ইত্যনেনাপি বস্বাদিশব্দবৎ কশ্চিৎ দেবগণবিশেষ উচ্যতে॥

(২) শতপথে ইহাই অন্যরূপে বলা হইয়াছে (১।২।১।১)।

(৩) ঋগ্বেদ ৮।১৪।১৩ (অথর্ববেদ ২০।২৯।৩), ৫।৩০।৭-৮, ৬।২০।৬।

(৪) শতপথ-ব্রাহ্মণ ১২।৭।৩।১-৪; ১২।৭।১।১০-১৩; ৩৪।১।

“যুবং সুরামমশ্বিনা নমুচাবাসুরে সচা।

বিপিপানাঃ সরস্বতীন্দ্রং কস্মস্বাবত॥” (২০।৭৬; অ-২০।১২৫।৪)।

হে অশ্বিনয়! হে সরস্বতী! তোমরা নমুচি অসুরের সুরাপাত্র একসঙ্গে পর্যাপ্তরূপে পান করিয়া আমাদের কস্ম রক্ষা কর।

বিভিন্ন সংহিতায় নমুচি সম্বন্ধে যে পরিচয় আমরা পাইয়াছি, বিভিন্ন ব্রাহ্মণে তাহাই সন্দেহ ও সন্দেহিত ইতিহাসে পরিণত হইয়াছে। প্রথমে আমরা শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণে দেখিতে পাই যে, কোন এক সময় নমুচি ইন্দ্রের ইন্দ্রিয়, অম্বের রস ও সোমের সোমত্ব হরণ করিয়াছিল। তখন ইন্দ্র অশ্বিনয় ও সরস্বতীর নিকট যাইয়া বলিলেন, আমি নমুচিকে বধ করিবার জন্য প্রতিজ্ঞাপূর্বক বলিয়াছি—“আমি তোমাকে দিবাকালে বা রাত্রে এবং দন্ত, ধনু, চপেটাঘাত, কিল অথবা শব্দ ও আর্দ্র কোন প্রকার অস্ত্রের দ্বারাই বধ করিব না।” ইহা শ্রবণ করিয়া অশ্বিনয় ও সরস্বতী তাঁহাকে জলের ফেনা দ্বারা বজ্র প্রস্তুত করিয়া দিলেন এবং ইন্দ্রও স্বীয় প্রতিজ্ঞা রক্ষাপূর্বক নমুচির মস্তক ছেদন করিলেন (শ-ব্রা ১২।৭।৩।১, ৩-৪)। উক্ত ব্রাহ্মণেই সৌত্রামণী যাগ প্রসঙ্গে নমুচি সম্বন্ধে বলা হইয়াছে, “নমুচিনৈবাসুরেণ সহ চচার স ঐক্ষত নমুচির-পুনর্বা অয়মভুক্তাস্যোন্দ্রিয়ং বীৰ্যং সোমপীথমন্নাদ্যং হরাণীতি। তস্মৈতয়ৈব সুরয়ৈন্দ্রিয়ং বীৰ্যং সোমপীথমন্নাদ্যমহরং। স হ ন্যর্গঃ শিশ্যো তং দেবা উপসংজ্ঞাম্বরে শ্রেষ্ঠো বৈ নোহয়ম-ভুক্তিমং পাম্প্রাবিদন্ধস্তেমং ভিষজ্যামোতি। তেহশ্বিনাবব্রুবন্—যুবং বৈ ব্রহ্মাণো ভিষজো স্ত্বো যুবম্মিৎ ভিষজ্যত্মিতি। ভাবব্রুভামস্তু নো ভাগ ইতি তেহব্রুবন্ য এষো হজঃ স বাং ভাগ ইতি।.....তাবশ্বিনো চ সরস্বতী চ। ইন্দ্রিয়ং বীৰ্যং নমুচেরাহত্য তদস্মিন্ পুনরদধুঃ” (১২।৭।১।১০-১৩)। তাণ্ড্যমহাব্রাহ্মণে হরিবর্ণসামের নিধনের প্রশংসা করিতে গিয়া এই ইতিহাসটি সংক্ষেপে উল্লেখ করিয়া বলা হইয়াছে যে, ইন্দ্র এবং নমুচির মধ্যে এইরূপ একটি চুক্তি হইয়াছিল—কেহ দিবা বা রাত্রে শব্দ বা আর্দ্র কোন প্রকার অস্ত্রের দ্বারাই কাহাকেও হত্যা করিবে না। কিন্তু ইন্দ্র জলের ফেনার সাহায্যে অস্ত্র প্রস্তুত করিয়া সুর্যোদয়ের পূর্বেই নমুচিকে হত্যা করেন। এই হত্যাজনিত পাপ ইন্দ্রকে আশ্রয় করিলে তিনি ঋক্, সাম বা কোন-প্রকার মন্ত্রের দ্বারা ইহাকে দূরীভূত করিতে না পারিয়া হরিবর্ণ সামের নিধনের দ্বারাই উক্ত পাপকে দূর করিতে সমর্থ হন (তা-ব্রা-১২।৬।৮)। তৈত্তিরীয় ব্রাহ্মণে ইহার কিঞ্চিৎ পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে। ইহাতে বলা হইয়াছে যে, ইন্দ্র ব্রহ্মকে হত্যা করিয়া এবং সকল অসুরগণকে জয় করিয়া অধিকবলশালী নমুচিকে বল পূর্বক গ্রহণ করিয়াছিলেন, কিন্তু নমুচি ইন্দ্র অপেক্ষা বলবন্ত হওয়ায় নমুচিই ইন্দ্রকে পরাজিত করে এবং এই বলিয়া সন্ধি করে যে—আমি তোমাকে ছাড়িতে পারি, যদি তুমি আমাকে দিবা বা রাত্রে শব্দ অথবা আর্দ্র অস্ত্রের দ্বারা হত্যা না কর। ইন্দ্রও ঐরূপ প্রতিজ্ঞা করেন। পরে তিনি (ইন্দ্র) তাহার শপথ রক্ষাপূর্বক জলের ফেনা দ্বারা নমুচিকে বধ করেন। বধজনিত পাপ ইন্দ্রকে আশ্রয় করিলে তিনি অপামার্গ সৃষ্টি করিয়া তাহার দ্বারা বজ্র করতঃ সেই পাপ দূর করিলেন (তৈ-ব্রা-১।৭।১।৬-৮)। তাণ্ড্য এবং তৈত্তিরীয় ব্রাহ্মণে যে বলা হইয়াছে ‘নমুচির মস্তক ইন্দ্রের পশ্চাদ্ধাবন করিয়াছিল’ তাহা একমাত্র মহাভারত ব্যতীত অন্য কোন গ্রন্থে পরিলাক্ষিত হয় না।

ঐতরেয় আরণ্যক ও শাংখায়ন শ্রোতসূত্রে ঋগ্বেদের (৮।১৪) সূক্তটির উল্লেখ থাকিলেও উক্ত ইতিহাসটি সেন্দ্বলে বলা হয় নাই। (১) বিভিন্ন পুরাণ আলোচনা করিলে আমরা দেখিতে পাই যে ইতিহাসটির বহুপ্রকার পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে।

(১) যদিলাহঃ যথা ঋমিতি পঞ্চদশ ইতি মহাব্রুতে ॥ ঐ-আর ৫।২।১;  
যদিলাহঃ যথা ঋমিতি পঞ্চদশর্চে ॥ শাং-শ্রৌ-সু-১৮।১৩।৫।



ইন্দ্র নম্‌র্চিকে বধ করিয়াছিলেন, বৈদিক গ্রন্থের মধ্যে আমরা ইহাই পাইয়াছি। কিন্তু রামায়ণে ইন্দ্র স্থলে বিষ্ণু হইয়াছেন নম্‌র্চিহস্তা এবং জলের ফেনা বা ব্রহ্মহত্যা ইত্যাদি কিছুই উল্লেখ নাই। ইহাতে বলা হইয়াছে, দেবগণ বিষ্ণুর নিকট অসুর্দাদিগের বধের জন্য প্রার্থনা করিলে তিনি তাহাদিগকে বধ করেন। নম্‌র্চি সেই অসুর্দাদিগের মধ্যে অন্যতম।

“হরাদবাপ্য তে মন্ত্রং কামারিমাভিবাদ্য চ।

নারায়ণালয়ং প্রাপ্য তস্মৈ সর্বং নাবেদয়ন্ ॥৩১।

ততো নারায়ণেনোক্তা দেবা ইন্দ্রপদুরোগমাঃ।

সুর্দারীংস্তান্ হনিষ্যামি সুর্দা ভবত নির্ভয়াঃ ॥৩২।

হিরণ্যকর্শিপোর্মতুরনোষাণ্ড সুর্দাধ্বাম্।

নম্‌র্চিঃ কালনেমিষ্ট সংহ্রাদো বীরসন্তমঃ ॥” ৩৪।

(উত্তর—৬ সর্গ)

মহাভারতে অরুণাতীর্থের প্রশংসাকালে এই ইতিহাসটি বিশদরূপে বলা হইয়াছে। কিন্তু ‘নম্‌র্চির ছিন্ন মস্তক স্বর্গলোক প্রাপ্ত হইয়াছিল’ এই উক্তিটি বৈদিক সাহিত্যে বা পৌরাণিক অন্য কোন গ্রন্থেই পাওয়া যায় না। ইতিহাসটি এইরূপ বলা হইয়াছে যে, জনমেজয় বৈশম্পায়নকে প্রশ্ন করেন, ইন্দ্র কি জন্য ব্রহ্মহত্যার পাপভাগী হন এবং কিরূপে অরুণা তীর্থে স্নান করিয়া পবিত্র হইয়াছিলেন। বৈশম্পায়ন বলিলেন, একদা নম্‌র্চি ইন্দ্র হইতে ভীত হইয়া সূর্য্যারশ্মিতে প্রবেশ করে। ইন্দ্র নম্‌র্চিকে বলিলেন—আমি তোমাকে আর্দ্র বা শূন্য কোনপ্রকার অস্ত্রের দ্বারা দিবা বা রাত্ৰিকালে হত্যা করিব না ইহাই আমার সিদ্ধান্ত। ইহার পর এক সময় নীহার দেখিয়া জলের ফেনা দ্বারা ইন্দ্র নম্‌র্চিকে শিরশ্ছেদ পূর্বক বধ করেন। তখন তাহার সেই ছিন্ন মস্তক ইন্দ্রের পশ্চাদ্ধাবন করিতে করিতে বলিতে লাগিল, তুমি মিত্রহত্যাকারী, পাপী। ইন্দ্র ব্রহ্মার নিকট সকল বস্তান্ত জ্ঞাপন করিলে তিনি বলিলেন—অরুণা এবং সঙ্গমতীর্থের পূর্বাঙ্গলে স্নানান্তে তথায় পূজা ও দানাদি অনুষ্ঠান সম্পন্ন করিলে তুমি উক্ত পাপ হইতে মুক্ত হইবে। ইন্দ্র ঐরূপ করিয়া উক্ত পাপ হইতে মুক্ত হইলেন এবং নম্‌র্চির সেই ছিন্ন মস্তকও তথায় স্নান করিয়া অক্ষয় স্বর্গলোক প্রাপ্ত হইল। (শল্য-৪৩।৩১-৪২; ৪৪-৪৫; বঙ্গবাসী-সং)। মহাভারতের অন্যান্য বহুস্থলেই নম্‌র্চির উল্লেখ আছে, তন্মধ্যে একটি স্থলে নম্‌র্চিকে দনুর পুত্র বলা হইয়াছে (আদি-৬৫।২১-২২)। ইহাতে ‘ব্রহ্মবধ’ ও ‘নম্‌র্চি বধের’ ইতিহাসটি একই প্রকার। ইন্দ্র যেরূপে নম্‌র্চিকে বধ করেন বিষ্ণুও ঠিক সেইরূপে ব্রহ্মকে বধ করিয়াছিলেন (উদ্যোগ-১০ম অধ্যায়)। মহাভারতের শাস্তিপর্বে একটি ইন্দ্র-নম্‌র্চি সংবাদ দেখা যায়। ইহাতে নম্‌র্চি বধের উল্লেখ নাই, বরং নম্‌র্চিই ইন্দ্রকে বহু সারণর্ভ উপদেশ প্রদান করিয়াছেন (শাস্তি ২৩৩।২)।

দেবী ভাগবতে ইন্দ্র কর্তৃক ব্রহ্মহত্যার যে উপাখ্যানটি আমরা দেখিতে পাই তাহার দ্বারা অনুমান করা যায় যে, উক্ত ব্রহ্ম এবং নম্‌র্চি একই ব্যক্তি। (১) দেবীর মাহাত্ম্য বর্ণন প্রসঙ্গে ইতিহাসটি বলা হইয়াছে এবং উহা অনেকটা ব্রাহ্মগান্ধারূপ। যেমন—ব্রহ্ম ব্রহ্মার নিকট বর প্রার্থনা করিল যে, হে প্রভু! লৌহ, কাষ্ঠ, শূন্য, আর্দ্র এবং বংশখণ্ড ও অন্যান্য শস্ত্রসমূহ

(১) তৈত্তিরীয় ব্রাহ্মণের উক্তিতে স্পষ্টই বৃষ্ণিতে পারা যায় যে, বৃষ্ণ এবং নম্‌র্চি সম্পূর্ণ পৃথক ব্যক্তি (তৈ-ব্রা-১।৭।১।৬-৮)। তৈত্তিরীয়ের সহিত পুরাণকাহিনীর এইখানে বিরোধ।

দ্বারা যেন আমার মৃত্যু না হয় এবং যুদ্ধে যেন আমার শক্তি বৃদ্ধি হয়। তাহার দ্বারা আমি সকলের অজেয় হইব। (১)

তখন মৃনীগণ ইন্দ্র ও বৃহের মধ্যে কপট বন্ধুত্ব স্থাপন করিবার জন্য বৃহের অভিমত জিজ্ঞাসা করিলে সে বলিল, ইন্দ্র যদি সকল দেবগণের সহিত শদ্বক বা আর্দ্র বস্তুর দ্বারা অথবা কাষ্ঠ, পশুর ও বজ্রের দ্বারা দিবা বা রাত্রে আমাকে বধ না করেন, তবেই আমি তাহার সহিত সন্ধি স্থাপন করিতে পারি অন্যথা নহে (৩।৪।৩৩-৩৪)। এইরূপ সন্ধি স্থাপনের পর ইন্দ্র তাহাকে বধ করিবার জন্য ছিদ্রান্বেষণ করিতে লাগিলেন। একদা সন্ধ্যাকালে মহাসদুর বৃহকে দেখিয়া 'ইহাকে এখনই বধ করা কর্তব্য' এইরূপ স্থির করিলেন এবং সম্মুখে সাগরে পর্বত প্রমাণ ফেনা দেখিলেন। তিনি উহা গ্রহণ করিয়া দেবীকে স্মরণ করিলেন। ভগবতী স্বীয় অংশ ফেনা মধ্যে সংস্থাপন করিলেন এবং নারায়ণার্থিত্ত বজ্রও সেই ফেনাপিণ্ড দ্বারা আবৃত হইল। ইন্দ্র সেই বজ্র বৃহের প্রতি নিক্ষেপ করিলেন এবং তৎক্ষণাৎ বৃহ বজ্রাহত হইয়া নিপতিত হইল। (দেবী-ভা- ৬।৪।৩৩-৩৪ ; ৪৯-৫৩ ; ৫৬-৫৯ ; ৬৭)। এইরূপে ইতিহাসটিকে দেবীর সহিত সম্পৃক্ত করা হইয়াছে, এবং দেবীর সাহায্যে বৃহবধ হইয়াছে বলিয়া তাহাকে 'বৃহনিন্দ্রী' বলা হইয়াছে (৬।৪।৬৮)।

বামন পুরাণেও তীর্থের প্রশংসাকালে এই ইতিহাসটি বলা হইয়াছে। মহাভারতের সহিত ইহার যথেষ্ট পার্থক্য দেখিতে পাই। মহাভারতে বলা হইয়াছে—দনুর চঙ্কির্শাট পদ্র, তন্মধ্যে প্রথম বিপ্রার্চিত্ত, দ্বিতীয় শম্বর ও তৃতীয় নমুচি। কিন্তু বামনপুরাণের মতে ইন্দ্রাপেক্ষা বলশালী দনুর তিনটি পদ্র হইয়াছিল। জ্যেষ্ঠ শদ্ব, মধ্যম নিশদ্ব ও কনিষ্ঠ নমুচি। ইহারা তিন ভ্রাতাই অসদুর ছিল। অন্যান্য আখ্যায়িকার সহিত ইহার বিশেষ পার্থক্য এই যে, বিষ্ণু তাহাকে বধ করিতে উদ্যত হইলে নমুচি ভীত হইয়া সূর্যের রথমধ্যে প্রবেশ করে (২)। সেজন্য তখন তিনি নমুচিকে বধ করিতে পারিলেন না। সেই সময় তাহাকে বিষ্ণু অমর বর প্রদান করেন এবং তাহাতে নমুচি নিশ্চিন্ত হইয়া পাতালে গমন করতঃ জল মধ্যে সামুদ্রিক ফেনা দেখিয়া তাহাতে লুকাইবার জন্য প্রবেশ করিল। সেই ফেনা দ্বারা স্বকীয় মূখকর্ণাদি পরিপূরিত হইলে ইন্দ্র তাহাতে গুপ্ত বজ্র সৃষ্টি করিলেন। ইহাতে নমুচির মূখ ও নাসিকা রুদ্ধ হইল এবং সে মৃত্যুমুখে পতিত হইল। (৩) ইহাই বামন পুরাণোক্ত নমুচি বধের সংক্ষিপ্ত ইতিহাস। ইহাতে 'নমুচির পাতাল গমন ও স্বয়ং ফেনা মধ্যে প্রবেশ করিয়া তাহাতেই প্রাণত্যাগ' এই অংশটি অন্যান্য আখ্যায়িকা অপেক্ষা নূতনরূপে সন্নিবেশিত হইয়াছে।

ভাগবতের মধ্যে আমরা এই ইতিহাসটির বহু পরিবর্তন দেখিতে পাই। ইহাতে নমুচি বধের জন্য ইন্দ্রের কোন প্রতিজ্ঞা বা বধজন্য ব্রহ্মহত্যা পাপের উল্লেখ করা হয় নাই। ইহাতে আরও একটি নূতন বিষয় দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় যে, ইন্দ্র এবং নমুচির যুদ্ধের সময় একটি অশরীরী বাক্ (৪) ইন্দ্রকে বলিল—এই অসুরের কোন প্রকারেই মৃত্যু হইবে না, কারণ আমি ইহাকে বর দিয়াছি যে, কোনরূপ আর্দ্র বা শদ্বক অস্ত্রে তোমার মৃত্যু হইবে না। অতএব হে

- (১) মৃত্যুশ্চ না ভবতু মে কিল লৌহ কাষ্ঠশুষ্কার্জ বংশনিচয়েরপঠৈশ্চ শষ্টৈঃ।  
বৃদ্ধিং প্রমাতু মম বীর্যমতীব যুদ্ধে, যশাদ্ ভবামি সকলৈরমরৈরজেমঃ॥ দেবী-ভা-৬।৪।৬৮।
- (২) মহাভারতে যে সূর্যরশ্মির উল্লেখ আছে, এখানে উহা সূর্যের রথে পরিণত হইয়াছে।
- (৩) বা-পূ (বজ্রবালী সং) ৫৫।১-৮।
- (৪) অশরীরী বাকের কথা একমাত্র ভাগবত ভিন্ন অন্য কোন গ্রন্থে দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না।

ইন্দ্র! ইহার বধের নিমিত্ত অন্য কোন উপায় অবলম্বন কর। তখন ইন্দ্র জলের ফেনার দ্বারা নম্ৰাচিকে বধ করেন (ভাগ-৮।১১।৩৭-৪০; বঙ্গবাসী সং)।

ভাগবতের এক স্থলে নম্ৰাচিকে বৃত্রের সহচর বলা হইয়াছে। দেবাসুর সংগ্রামে পলায়মান সহচরদিগকে বৃত্র যে আহ্বান করিয়াছেন তাহাতে নম্ৰাচির উল্লেখ আছে (ভাগ-৬।১০।১৯)।

মৎস্য পু্রাণে নম্ৰাচির পরিচয় পাই হিরণ্যকশিপুের ভাগিনেয় রূপে। ইহাতে নম্ৰাচির কোন ইতিহাস নাই (৬।২৬-২৭; আনন্দাশ্রম সং)।

সায়ণাচার্য্য তাণ্ড্য মহাব্রাহ্মণের ভাষ্যে তৈত্তিরীয় ব্রাহ্মণোল্লিখিত ইতিহাসটিই সংক্ষিপ্তরূপে উদ্ধৃত করিয়াছেন। ইহা ভিন্ন বিশেষ কিছু তিনি বলেন নাই (তা-মহা-ব্রা-১২।৬।৮)। দ্যাবিবেদ বলিয়াছেন—

“তৃণং বজ্রায়তে নৃগামধর্মে ধীর্ষদা ভবেৎ।

ফেনেনাপি দৃঢ়ং শক্রশিচ্ছেদ নম্ৰাচোঃ শিরঃ॥” (নীতি-১১৭)।

মনুষ্যের যদি অধর্মে মতি হয়, তাহা হইলে তৃণও বজ্রের ন্যায় কার্য করে। যেমন ইন্দ্র জলের ফেনার দ্বারাই নম্ৰাচিকে বধ করেন। নম্ৰাচির বিভিন্ন ইতিহাস পর্যালোচনায় আমরা দেখিতে পাই যে, বৈদিক যুগের সংক্ষিপ্ত আখ্যান পৌরাণিক যুগে বিশেষ পরিবর্তিত হইয়াছে।

#### (৪) দেবাপি—

দেবাপি ও শস্তনু সম্বন্ধে ঋগ্বেদে কয়েকটি ঋক্ (১) আমরা দেখিতে পাই এবং তাহার দ্বারা মোটামুটি ইহাই বুঝিতে পারি যে, দেবাপি নামে কোন এক ঋষি শস্তনুর রাজ্যে বর্ষা-কামনায় যজ্ঞের পুরোহিত হন এবং তাহার দ্বারা শস্তনুর রাজ্যে বৃষ্টি হয়। এই বিষয়টিই উত্তরকালীন বিভিন্ন গ্রন্থের মাধ্যমে নানারূপে রূপান্তরিত হইয়া বিচিত্র আখ্যানিকায় পরিণত হইয়াছে।

উল্লিখিত ঋক্গুলির মধ্যে একটিতে বলা হইয়াছে, যখন শস্তনুর পুরোহিত দেবাপি যজ্ঞ করিবার জন্য বৃত হইয়া দেবগণের প্রিয় এবং বর্ষা আনয়নে সমর্থ বৃহস্পতিকে স্মরণ করিলেন, তখন বৃহস্পতি সন্তুষ্ট হইয়া দেবাপিকে সেই স্তুতিবাক্য উচ্চারণের শক্তি প্রদান করিলেন (১০।৯৮।৭)।

১০।৯৮ সূক্তটির প্রথমেই ঋষি বৃহস্পতির নিকট প্রার্থনা করিয়াছেন, হে বৃহস্পতি! তুমি আমার জন্য প্রত্যেক দেবতার নিকট গমন কর। তুমি মিত্র, বরুণ বা পৃষাই হও, অথবা আদিত্য ও বসুদগনসহ ইন্দ্রই হও, তুমি রাজা শস্তনুর জন্য মেঘকে বারিবর্ষণ করাও।

ব্রাহ্মণে দেবাপি সম্বন্ধীয় কোন ইতিহাস দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না। কেবলমাত্র শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণে কুরুবংশীয় প্রতীপের পুত্র ‘বল্হিক’ নামে একজন রাজার উল্লেখ আছে—“তদ্ বল্হিকঃ প্রাতিপীয়ঃ শত্ৰুশ্রাব। কৌরব্যো রাজা যো হ বা অয়ম্”.....ইত্যাদি। (১২।৯।৩।৩)। উক্ত বল্হিকই বোধ হয় পু্রাণে ও মহাভারতে বাল্হিক নামে খ্যাত হইয়াছেন। বৈদিক

সংহিতায় ‘শান্তনু’ এইরূপ নাম কোনস্থানে ব্যবহৃত হয় নাই। মহাভারত ও বিভিন্ন পুরাণেই ‘শান্তনু’ নাম পাওয়া যায়। বৃহদ্দেবতা, নিরুক্ত, নীতিমঞ্জরী গ্রন্থে সর্বত্র শান্তনুর উল্লেখ আছে।

বৃহদ্দেবতায় আমরা দেখিতে পাই যে, কুরুবংশশোভব ঋষিষ্টবেণের দুই পুত্র। তন্মধ্যে জ্যেষ্ঠ দেবাপি এবং কনিষ্ঠ শান্তনু। দেবাপি চর্ম্মরোগগ্রস্ত ছিলেন বলিয়া তিনি নিজেই শান্তনুকে রাজ্য হইবার অনুমতি প্রদান করিয়া বনে গমন করেন। তাহার পর শান্তনুর রাজ্যে দ্বাদশবর্ষ বৃষ্টি না হওয়ায় শান্তনু দেবাপিকে রাজ্য গ্রহণ করিতে অনুরোধ করিলে তিনি বলেন—আমি ত্বগ্দোষী বিকলেন্দ্রিয়। সেজন্য রাজ্যগ্রহণে অক্ষম, বরং আমি বৃষ্টি কামনায় তোমার যজ্ঞ করিব। তদনন্তর সেই যজ্ঞ করিয়া শান্তনুর রাজ্যে বর্ষা হয়। (বৃ-দে-৭।১৫৬-৭; ৮।১-৬)।

শৌনক এবং যাস্ক দেবাপির কনিষ্ঠ ভ্রাতা বাল্হীকের উল্লেখ করেন নাই। নিরুক্তে যাস্ক যে আখ্যায়িকাটি উদ্ধৃত করিয়াছেন তাহা অনেকটা বৃহদ্দেবতার ন্যায়। নিরুক্তে একটি নূতন বিষয় আমরা পাই। তাহা এই যে, শান্তনুর রাজ্যে বর্ষা না হওয়ায় ব্রাহ্মণগণ তাঁহাকে বলিলেন, তুমি জ্যেষ্ঠ ভ্রাতাকে রাজ্য প্রদান না করিয়া নিজেই উহা ভোগ করিতেছ, সেই অধর্ম্মের জন্য তোমার রাজ্যে বর্ষা হইতেছে না। (১) যাস্ক এই ইতিহাসটি সমুদ্র শব্দের নির্বচন প্রসঙ্গে উত্থাপন করিয়া আর্ষিষ্টবেণো হোত্রমৃষি.....ইত্যাদি (১০।১৮।৫) ঋক্টি উদ্ধৃত করিয়াছেন। “অত্রোতিহাসমাচক্ষতে—দেবাঃপিষ্চাৰ্ষিষ্টবেণঃ শান্তনুশ্চ কোরব্যো (২) ভ্রাতরৌ বভূবতুঃ। স শান্তনুঃ কনীয়ানভিষেচয়াণ্ডক্রে। দেবাঃপিস্তপঃ প্রতিপেদে। ততঃ শন্তনো রাজ্যে দ্বাদশবর্ষাণি দেবো ন ববর্ষ। তম্ভু ব্রাহ্মণা অধর্ম্মস্তুরাচারিতো জ্যেষ্ঠং ভ্রাতরমন্তরিত্য্যভিষে- চিতম্। তস্মান্তে দেবো ন বর্ষতীতি। স শান্তনুর্দেবাপিং শিশিক্ষ রাজ্যেন। তম্ভুবাচ দেবাঃপঃ পুরোহিতস্তেহসানি যাজয়ানি চ ত্বেতি। তস্মৈতদ্বর্ষকামসুস্তং তস্মৈষা ভবতি।” (২।১০) নিরুক্তভাষ্যকার দুর্গাচার্য যাস্কান্ত অধর্ম্মটির ব্যাখ্যা করিয়া বলিয়াছেন—“মন্ত্রনিদানদ্বাৰেণ ধর্ম্মোহয়মত্র দর্শিতঃ। জ্যেষ্ঠে তিষ্ঠতি কনীয়সো রাজ্যপ্রাপ্তবর্ষম্মতিক্রমঃ। ধর্ম্মাতিক্রমে চ দেবো ন বর্ষতীতি।” এই স্থানে “যদ্দেবাপিঃ.....ইত্যাদি” (১০।১৮।৭) ঋক্টির অর্থও নিরুক্তপক্ষে এইরূপ করিয়াছেন—ঋষিষ্টবেণ মধ্যমগ্নি, তাহার পুত্র অগ্নিদেবাপি। শান্তনু অর্থাৎ সকল যজমান। “ঋষিষ্টবেণো মধ্যমস্তদপত্যময়মগ্নিঃ পার্থিব আর্ষিষ্টবেণো দেবাঃপঃ, শান্তনবে সর্বস্মৈ যজমানায় ইতি যোজ্যম্।” (২।১২)। স্কন্দস্বামীও এইস্থানে নিতাপক্ষ ও যজমান পক্ষে দুই প্রকার অর্থ করিয়াছেন—“মধ্যমপ্রভবস্বাদেবাপির্বিদ্যৎ, শান্তনুরদকং বৃষ্টিলক্ষণং, যৎ যদা দেবাপির্বেদ্যতঃ শান্তনবে বৃষ্টিলক্ষণস্যোদকস্যার্থায়, পুরোহিতঃ পূর্বং হি বিদ্যোততে পশ্চাদ্দকম্। নিতাপক্ষে—ঋষ্যস্যান্যদর্থযোজনা। আর্ষিষ্টবেণঃ ঋষিষ্টবেণো মধ্যমং, তত্র ভবস্বাচার্ষিষ্টবেণো বৈদ্যতঃ। তস্য পার্থিবাত্মাৰ্বাস্তুতস্য হোতৃস্বেন দেবাঃপিস্তম্।” (নিঃ-২।১২)।

মূল বৈদিক গ্রন্থ অপেক্ষা মহাভারত ও বিভিন্ন পুরাণে দেবাপির ইতিহাসটি স্দৃবিস্তৃতরূপে কথিত হইয়াছে। “প্রতীপের তিনটি পুত্র। তন্মধ্যে জ্যেষ্ঠ দেবাপি, মধ্যম শান্তনু ও কনিষ্ঠ বাল্হীক। দেবাপি ধর্ম্মকার্যের জন্য বনে গমন করেন এবং মধ্যম ও কনিষ্ঠ রাজ্য লাভ করেন”—

(১) বিষ্ণুপুরাণে (৪।২০।৪-৯) ইহাই প্রকারান্তরে বলা হইয়াছে।

(২) এখানে স্কন্দস্বামী কোরব্যো এই শব্দটির দ্বারা দেবাপি ও শান্তনুকে ভীমসেনের পুত্র বলিয়া অভিহিত করিয়াছেন। তিনি বলিয়াছেন “কুরুবংশপ্রভবো ভীমসেনপুত্রৌ।” এইরূপ অস্মৃত অর্থ অন্য কেহ করেন নাই।

এই মূল বিষয়টি প্রায় সকল পুরাণেই বলা হইয়াছে। (১) অন্যান্য অংশগুলির কিঞ্চিৎ পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে। মহাভারতে আর্ষ্ট্ষেণের উল্লেখ নাই। ইহাতে একটি স্থানে অপর একজন দেবাপির উল্লেখ আছে এবং এস্থানে আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ দেবাপি ও দেবাপি পৃথক্ বলিয়া অভিহিত হইয়াছেন (শল্য-৪০।১-২)।

উক্ত দেবাপি সম্বন্ধে কোন পরিচয় ইহাতে বলা হয় নাই। বিভিন্ন পুরাণেও শলের পুত্র আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ নামে এক ঋষির উল্লেখ পাওয়া যায়। (২) ইহার দ্বারা অনুমান করা যায় যে উক্ত আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ এবং দেবাপি আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ পৃথক্ ব্যক্তি। কারণ ইতিহাসোক্ত দেবাপি প্রতীপের পুত্র। ইহাকে যে আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ বলা হইয়াছে তাহার অর্থ এই যে, ইনি ঋষিষ্ণেণবংশোদ্ভূত। বোধায়ন শ্রোতসূত্রে (৩) প্রবরাধ্যায়ে আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ গোত্রের উল্লেখ আছে।

শ্রীমদ্ভাগবতে ও বিষ্ণু পুরাণে বাল্‌হীকের রাজ্যপ্রাপ্তির কথা বলা হয় নাই। বিষ্ণু পুরাণে ইতিহাসটির অস্মৃত পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে। ইহাতে বলা হইয়াছে, শান্তনুর রাজ্যে বর্ষা না হওয়ায় তিনি ব্রাহ্মণদিগকে জিজ্ঞাসা করিলে তাঁহারা বলিলেন, “জ্যেষ্ঠ ভ্রাতার প্রাপ্য রাজ্য তুমি ভোগ করিতেছ। সেজন্য তুমি পরিবেত্তা। অতএব দেবাপি যতদিন পর্যন্ত পতিত (নিকৃষ্ট, বেদবিহিত) না হইতেছেন, ততদিন এই রাজ্য তাঁহারই প্রাপ্য।” তখন শান্তনুর মন্ত্রী অশ্বসারী সেই অরণ্যে দেবাপির নিকট কয়েকজন বেদবিরোধী ব্যক্তিকে প্রেরণ করিয়া তাঁহাকে দ্রষ্ট করিলেন। তদনন্তর শান্তনু দেবাপিকে রাজ্য দিবার জন্য বহু অনুনয় করিলে ব্রাহ্মণগণ বলিলেন, “হে রাজন! ইঁহাকে অধিক কিছু বলা নিষ্প্রয়োজন, কারণ ইনি পতিত। অতএব জ্যেষ্ঠ যদি পতিত হয় তাহা হইলে কনিষ্ঠ রাজ্য গ্রহণ করিলে পরিবেত্তা হয় না।” তখন শান্তনু রাজ্য করিতে লাগিলেন এবং তাঁহার রাজ্যে বৃষ্টি হইল। (৪) ইহাতে দেবাপির চর্মরোগ বা দেবাপি কর্তৃক শান্তনুর যজ্ঞের কোন উল্লেখই নাই, অধিকন্তু অশ্বসারীর বিষয়টি ইহাতে সংযোজিত হওয়ায় ইতিহাসটির কিরূপ পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে তাহা বদ্বা যায়।

ভাগবতে ইতিহাসটি সংক্ষেপে বলা হইয়াছে। তাহাতেও দেবাপিকে দ্রষ্ট করিবার জন্য শান্তনু-মন্ত্রিকর্তৃক অরণ্যে বেদবিরোধী ব্যক্তি প্রেরণের উল্লেখ আছে, কিন্তু অশ্বসারীর নামটি বলা হয় নাই। (ভাগবত, বৃষ্ণবাসী সং, ৯।২২।১২-১৭)।

ব্রহ্মপুরাণে দুইজন দেবাপির উল্লেখ আছে। তন্মধ্যে একজন এই আখ্যায়িকার দেবাপি। (৫) অবশ্য এই দেবাপি প্রসঙ্গে ইতিহাসটি বিস্তৃতরূপে বলা হয় নাই। আর একজন দেবাপি সম্বন্ধে অন্যরূপ একটি ইতিহাস বলা হইয়াছে। তাহা এই যে, আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ নামে এক রাজা

(১) মহা-আদি-৯৪।৬১, ৬২; বায়ু-৯৯।২৩৪, ২৩৬; মৎস্য-৫০।৩৮, ৩৯; ভাগবত-৯।২২।১২-১৭; ব্রহ্ম-১৩।১১৪, ১১৭, ১১৮;

(২) বায়ু-৯২।৩; ৫-৬; ব্রহ্মাণ্ড ৩।৬৭।৬; (বেঙ্কটেশ্বর ষ্ট্রিম প্রেস) হরিবংশ ২৯ অধ্যায়। ব্রহ্ম-১১।৩৪; (আনন্দাশ্রম)। ব্রহ্মপুরাণে আর্ষ্ট্ষেণ নামে এক রাজার নাম দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়, তাহা পরে উল্লেখ করিব। (ব্রহ্ম ১২৭ অধ্যায়)।

(৩) Bibliotheca Indica, Ed., p. 421.

(৪) বিষ্ণু-৪।২০।৪-৯ (বিহারীলাল সরকার সং ১২৯৪)।

(৫) পুতীপো ভীমসেনাঙ্কু পুতীপস্য তু শান্তনুঃ। দেবাপির্দেবাপিঃ ত্রয় এব মহারথঃ ॥ ১৩।১১৪।  
উপাধ্যায়স্ত দেবানাং দেবাপিরভবনুনিঃ। শান্তনুভুব্রাজা কৌরবাণাং ধুরভরঃ ॥ ১৩।১১৭-১১৮।

ছিলেন। তাঁহার স্ত্রী জয়া এবং পুত্র ভর। রাজা পুত্রের উপর রাজ্যভার অর্পণ করিয়া সরস্বতীতীরে হয়মেধ যজ্ঞের ব্যবস্থা করেন। যজ্ঞকালে মিথু নামে এক দৈত্য সেই যজ্ঞ ধ্বংস করিয়া রাজা, রাণী ও তাঁহার পুরোহিতকে লইয়া পাতালে চলিয়া যায়। সেই সময় রাজার পুরোহিতপুত্র দেবাপি ঐ অবস্থা দেখিয়া তাঁহাদের জন্য দুঃখ করিতে লাগিলেন এবং দেবগণের স্তুতি করিতে লাগিলেন। দেবতাগণ তাঁহার স্তবে সন্তুষ্ট হইয়া সকলকে উদ্ধার করিয়া দেন। (১) ইনি আর্ষিষ্টাষেণের পুত্র নহেন। ইঁহার পিতার নাম উপমন্দু। (২)

দ্যাবিবেদ বলিয়াছেন—“সদ্বন্ধং শশ্বদং ভ্রাতা নৃপং কৃষা বনং যযৌ”। (নীতি-১৪৯)। ঋগ্বেদের (১০।৯৮) সূক্তে দেবাপি কতৃক শশ্বদুর বৃষ্টি কামনায় যজ্ঞ করার কথা আছে বলিয়া ঋগ্বেদে এই সূক্তটি বর্ষা কামনায় প্রযোজিত হইয়াছে। “বৃষ্টিকামো যতাহারঃ প্রপদ্যত বৃহস্পতিম্। পায়সেনোপহারেণ হোমেন চ সমম্বিতঃ। বৃহস্পতে প্রতীত্যেতদ্ বৃষ্টিকামঃ প্রযোজয়েৎ। পর্জন্যশ্চ নমস্কৃত্য বৃষ্টিং বিন্দতি শোভনাম্। (ঋগ্বে- ৪।৪-৫)।

(৫) নচিকেতা—

উপনিষদে বর্ণিত নচিকেতার উপাখ্যানটি অতি প্রসিদ্ধ। (১) ইহাতে উক্ত ইতিহাসের অবতারণা পূর্বক ব্রহ্মবিদ্যার উপদেশ প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে। এখানে নচিকেতা প্রশ্নকর্তা, আর স্বয়ং যমরাজ উত্তরদাতা। নচিকেতার প্রধান প্রণব্যা বিষয়—মৃত্যুর পর এই স্থূলদেহ বিনষ্ট হইলেও আত্মার অস্তিত্ব থাকে কিনা? উপাখ্যানটি এইরূপ—

নচিকেতার পিতা উদ্দালক একটি বিশ্ববিজ্ঞ যজ্ঞে দক্ষিণার জন্য কতকগুলি অদেয় গাভী দান করিতে প্রস্তুত হইলে শিশু নচিকেতার মনে অত্যন্ত দুঃখ হইল যে, পিতা একি কার্য করিতেছেন। আমি পুত্র, আমার প্রতিকার করা কর্তব্য। তিনি পিতাকে বলিলেন—পিতঃ! আপনি সমস্ত সম্পত্তিই দান করিতেছেন, আমিও আপনার একটি সম্পত্তি অতএব আমাকে কাহার উদ্দেশ্যে দান করিবেন? বারংবার প্রত্যাখ্যাত হইয়াও যখন নচিকেতা নিবৃত্ত না হইয়া আত্মদানার্থ পিতাকে নিবন্ধাতিশয় জ্ঞাপন করিতে লাগিলেন, তখন পিতা ক্রোধাক্ত হইয়া পুত্রকে বলিলেন, তোমাকে যমের উদ্দেশ্যে দান করিলাম। ইহাতে কিছুমাত্র বিচলিত না হইয়া নচিকেতা পিতৃ-আদেশ শিরোধার্য পূর্বক যমালয়াভিমুখে গমন করিয়া তথায় যমের আগমন প্রতীক্ষায় দ্বিরাত্র অনশনে বাস করিলেন। যমরাজ যথাকালে প্রত্যাগত হইয়া নচিকেতার সংবাদ অবগত হইলেন এবং তাঁহাকে বলিলেন, হে ব্রাহ্মণ! তুমি মদগৃহে উপবাস করিয়া অবস্থান করিতেছ ইহাতে আমার অপরাধ হইয়াছে। সেই অপরাধ দূরীকরণের জন্য তিনটি বর প্রদান করিব। তুমি অভীষ্ট বর প্রার্থনা কর। নচিকেতা প্রথম পিতৃভক্তির নিদর্শনস্বরূপ পিতার মানসিক শান্তি প্রার্থনা করিলেন। দ্বিতীয় অগ্নিবিদ্যা প্রার্থনা করিলেন।

“স হুর্মান্নং স্বর্গমধ্যোষি মৃত্যোঃ প্রবৃহি তং শ্রদ্ধধানায় মহ্যম্।

স্বর্গলোকা অমৃতং ভজন্ত এতন্মিতীয়েন বৃণে বরণে॥” (কঠ-১।১০)

তৃতীয় প্রার্থনা করিলেন যে, কেহ বলেন, মরণের পর জীবের আত্মা পরলোকে গমন করে। আবার কেহ বলেন গমন করে না। এই যে সংশয়, আপনার নিকট ইহার প্রকৃত তত্ত্ব জানিতে

(১) ব্রহ্মপুরাণ (আনন্দাশ্রম সং), ১২৭ অধ্যায়।

(২) পিতা ভবাণ্যপন্যস্তলে তিষ্ঠন্ত্যরোগিণঃ।  
বরদানান্নহেশস্য মিথুং হৃষা চ রাক্ষসম্॥ ১২৭।৪৬।

(৩) কঠ-১।১-৩ বর্ষী।

ইচ্ছা করি। যম তাঁহাকে প্রভূত ভোগৈশ্বর্যের প্রলোভন দেখাইলেন, কিন্তু যখন কোন প্রকারেই নীচকেতা তাহাতে আকৃষ্ট হইলেন না, তখন তিনি সন্তুষ্ট হইয়া তাঁহার প্রশ্নের উত্তর দিলেন। ইহাতে আরও একটি বর প্রদানের উল্লেখ আছে। তাহা এই যে, যম নীচকেতাকে উপযুক্ত শিষ্য দেখিয়া বলিলেন, আমি তোমাকে আরও একটি বর দিতেছি। তোমাকে যে অগ্নিবিদ্যা বলিলাম সেই অগ্নি তোমার নামেই প্রসিদ্ধি লাভ করবে।

“তমব্রবীৎ প্রীয়মাণো মহাত্মা, বরং তবেহাদ্য দদামি ভূয়ঃ।

তবৈব নাম্না ভবিতায়মগ্নিঃ স্কাণ্ডে মামনেকরূপাং গৃহাণ ॥” (১)

ঋগ্বেদের দশম মণ্ডলের ১৩৫ সূক্তটির ঋষি যমগোত্র সম্পন্নকুমার। এই সূক্তটিতে নীচকেতার কোন উল্লেখ না থাকিলেও উপনিষদ্, ব্রাহ্মণ প্রভৃতিতে বর্ণিত ইতিহাসের সহিত যেটুকু সাদৃশ্য দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়, তাহার দ্বারাই অনুমান করা যায় যে ইহা (১০।১৩৫) নীচকেতা সম্বন্ধীয়। মূল সংহিতায় সাতটি মন্ত্রের দ্বারা নীচকেতার যমালয় গমনের বিষয়টি পরিস্ফুট হইয়াছে। তন্মধ্যে কয়েকটি দেখিলেই বুদ্ধিতে পারা যায়। যেমন—

“যস্মিন্ বৃক্ষে সদুপলাশে দেবৈঃ সংপিবতে যমঃ।

অত্রা নো বিশ্পতিঃ পিতা পুরাণামনুবেনতি ॥” (১০।১৩৫।১)

চমৎকার পত্রের দ্বারা শোভিত যে বৃক্ষের উপরে যমরাজ দেবগণের সহিত একত্রে পান করেন। প্রজাপালক আমার পিতা ইচ্ছা করিয়াছেন যে, আমি সেই বৃক্ষে গমন করিয়া পূর্বপুরুষদিগের সঙ্গী হই।

“পুরাণামনুবেনস্তং চরস্তং পাপয়ামদ্রা।

অসুয়ন্নভাচ্যাকশং তস্মা অস্পহয়ং পুনঃ ॥ (১০।১৩৫।২)

পিতা আমার প্রতি নির্দয় হইয়া ‘পূর্বপুরুষদিগের সঙ্গী হও’ এইরূপ আদেশ করায় আমি তাঁহার প্রতি বিরক্তিসূচক দৃষ্টিপাত করিয়াছিলাম, পরে সেই বিরাগ ত্যাগ করিয়া পুনঃ অনুরক্ত হইয়াছি। সূক্তের অন্তিম ঋক্ দ্বারা ঋষি যমালয়ের কিঞ্চিৎ বর্ণনা দিয়া বলিয়াছেন—

“ইয়ং যমস্য সাদনং দেবমানং যদুচ্যতে।

ইয়মস্য ধম্মাতে নাড়ীরয়ং গীর্ভিঃ পরিস্কৃতঃ ॥” (১০।১৩৫।৩)

এই দেখিতেছি যমালয় লোকে বলিয়া থাকে যে ইহা দেবানির্মিত। দেখিতেছি ইহার সর্বান্তে শিরা নির্গত হইয়াছে। (অথবা এখানে বাদ্যবিশেষ শুনিতোঁছি।) লোকে ইহাকে স্তব করিতেছে।

এই অংশটুকুই পরবর্তীকালীন গ্রন্থসমূহে বিস্তৃত আখ্যায়িকারূপে স্থান পাইয়াছে এবং কোন কোন স্থানে এই আখ্যায়িকাটির বহু পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে। তৈত্তিরীয় ব্রাহ্মণে বলা হইয়াছে, বাজশ্রবস ঋষির পুত্র নীচকেতা। (২) একদা ঋষি একটি যজ্ঞের অনুষ্ঠান করেন। নীচকেতা পিতৃসমীপে উপস্থিত হইয়া বলিলেন, আমাকে কাহার উদ্দেশ্যে দান করিবেন? পুনঃ পুনঃ এইরূপ জিজ্ঞাসা করিলে পিতা বলিলেন, তোমাকে মৃত্যুর উদ্দেশ্যে দিলাম। তৈত্তিরীয়ের একটি নূতনত্ব হইল এই যে, নীচকেতাকে পিতা এইরূপ বলিলে তৎক্ষণাৎ এক দৈবী

(১) উক্ত নীচকেতাগির কথাটি ব্রাহ্মণেও বলা হইয়াছে।—এবং বৃণানাম তস্মৈ নীচকেতসে পনর্ভৃত্যজয়-  
শেন তসেব বিবিধং নীচকেতাগ্নিসুজ্জ্বান্ ॥ তৈ-ব্রা-৩।১১।৮।৫ (সাগণ)।

(২) বাজশ্রবসেরই অপর নাম উদ্ধালক।

বাক্ নচিকেতাকে উপদেশ দিয়া বলিয়াছেন—তুমি যমগৃহে গমন করিয়া তিন দিন অভুক্ত অবস্থায় অবস্থান করিবে। যম যদি জিজ্ঞাসা করেন যে, তুমি এখানে কয়দিন আছ এবং প্রতিরাতে কি ভক্ষণ করিয়াছ; তবে উত্তরে বলিবে, আমি এইস্থানে দ্বিরাত্রি বাস করিতেছি এবং তোমার প্রজা, পশু ও পুণ্যের অংশ ভক্ষণ করিয়াছি। এইরূপ শ্রবণ করিয়া নচিকেতা যমগৃহে উপস্থিত হইয়া উক্ত বাক্ যাহা বলিয়াছিলেন তাহাই করিলেন। অনন্তর যমরাজ সন্তুষ্ট হইয়া তাহাকে তিনটি বর প্রদান করিলেন। (তৈ-ব্রা-৩।১১।৮।১-৫)।

মহাভারতে এই উপাখ্যানটির অত্যধিক পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে। ইহাতে কেবলমাত্র নচিকেতার যমালয়ে গমন' এই বিষয়টির সহিত পূর্বোক্ত ইতিহাসগুলির সাদৃশ্য রহিয়াছে। এস্থানে ভীষ্মদেব নচিকেতার উপাখ্যান কীর্তন ছলে গো-মহিমা কীর্তন করিয়াছেন। তিনি বলিয়াছেন, আমি একটি প্রাচীন ইতিহাস বলিতেছি শ্রবণ কর। পূর্বে মহর্ষি উদ্দালকি নদীতীরে এক নিয়মানুষ্ঠান করিয়াছিলেন। সেই নিয়ম সমাপ্ত হইলে তিনি স্বকীয় পুত্র নচিকেতাকে বলিলেন, বৎস! আমি স্নাননিবৃষ্টিচক্রে ও বেদপাঠে আসক্ত হইয়া নদীতীরে কাষ্ঠ, কুশ, পদ্মপ, কলস ও ভোজনদ্রব্য সমৃদয় বিস্মৃত হইয়া আসিয়াছি। তুমি সত্ত্ব তথায় গমন করিয়া ঐসকল দ্রব্য আনয়ন কর। নচিকেতা অবিলম্বে তথায় গমন করিয়া দেখিলেন যে, পিতৃদ্রব্য সকল নদী স্রোতে ভাসিয়া গিয়াছে। তিনি পিতাকে এই কথা নিবেদন করিলে মহর্ষি উদ্দালকি একান্ত পরিশ্রান্ত ও ক্ষুধাপিপাসায় নিতান্ত ক্লান্ত হওয়ার দরুণ পুত্রের সেই বাক্য শ্রবণে অতিমাত্র রুদ্ধ হইয়া তাহাকে অভিসম্পাত করিলেন যে, তোমার অচিরাৎ যম দর্শন হউক। নচিকেতাও তৎক্ষণাৎ গতায়ুঃ হইয়া ভূতলে নিপতিত হইলেন। পুত্রের এইরূপ অবস্থা দেখিয়া উদ্দালকি বহু পরিভ্রমণ করিতে লাগিলেন। ক্রমে রাত্রি অতিবাহিত হইল। প্রভাতে পিতার অবিরল নিপতিত অশ্রুদ্বারা অভিষিক্ত হইয়া নচিকেতা পুনর্জীবন লাভ করিলেন। পরে সকলের সম্মুখে যমালয়ের বর্ণনা করিয়াছিলেন। (মহা-অনু-৭১ অ; বঙ্গবাসী সং)।

বরাহ পুত্রাণে ইতিহাসটি বিস্তৃতরূপেই বলা হইয়াছে। বিশেষ কোন পার্থক্য দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না (১৯৩-২০৫ অ)। বৃহস্পতি, নীতিমঞ্জরী প্রভৃতি গ্রন্থে উক্ত উপাখ্যানের কোন উল্লেখ নাই। ঋগ্বেদের ১০।১৩৫ সূক্তটির ঋষি যামায়ন (১)। ষড়গুরুশিষ্য বলিয়াছেন, “কুমারো নাম যমগোত্রঃ”। সায়ণও সূক্ত প্রারম্ভে বলিয়াছেন ‘যমগোত্রস্য কুমারস্যার্ষম্’। এই কুমারই যে নচিকেতা সে বিষয়ে সায়ণের বোধ হয় কিঞ্চিৎ সংশয় ছিল। কারণ, তিনি প্রত্যেকটি ঋকের দুইপ্রকার অর্থ করিয়াছেন, একটি কুমারপক্ষে ও অপরটি নচিকেতা পক্ষে।

#### (৬) দধীচ (দধ্যাণ্ বা দধীচ)—

দধীচ ঋষি সম্পর্কে ঋগ্বেদের প্রথম মণ্ডলে ইতিহাসাত্মক কয়েকটি ঋক্ দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। উক্ত মূল মন্ত্র কয়েকটিকে অবলম্বন করিয়া পরবর্তী কালে বেশ একটি ইতিহাস রচিত হইয়াছে। মূল সংহিতায় দধীচের কোন বিস্তৃত আখ্যায়িকা যদিও বলা হয় নাই তথাপি অশ্বিনয়ের স্মৃতিরূপে যে কয়টি ঋক্ আমরা দেখিতে পাই তাহার দ্বারা মোটামুটি ইহা স্পষ্টই বোধিতে পারি যে, দধীচ নামে একজন ঋষি অশ্বমস্তুক ধারণ করিয়া অশ্বিনয়কে মধুবিদ্যা প্রদান করিয়াছিলেন (ঋগ্বেদ ১।১১৬।১২, ১১৭।২২, ১১৯।১)।

(১) যসিন্ কুমারো যামায়নো যাময়ানুভূজ্ হি ॥ সর্বানুক্রমণী, ১০।১৩৫।



একটি ঋকে বলা হইয়াছে, অশ্বিনয় অথর্ব ঋষির পুত্র দধীচের স্কন্ধে অশ্বমস্তুক যোজনা করিয়াছিলেন। এবং তিনিও সত্যপালনপূর্বক ইন্দ্রলক্ক মধুবিদ্যা তোমাদিগকে শিখাইয়াছিলেন (১।১১৭।২২)।

ব্রাহ্মণে এই ইতিহাসটি বর্ণনাকালে মধুবিদ্যার কথা স্পষ্টই উল্লেখ আছে। শতপথে (১) আছে, অথর্বের পুত্র দধ্যঙ্ নামে ঋষি এই মন্ত্রটি উপলব্ধি করিয়া অশ্বিনয়কে বলিয়াছিলেন “মেঘাস্তিত শব্দ যেমন মেঘাস্তবর্তমান জলকে সর্বত্র প্রকাশিত করে সেইরূপ, হে নেতৃস্থানীয় অশ্বিনয়, তোমাদের ধনলাভ নিমিত্ত এই প্রসিদ্ধ কৰ্ম প্রকট করিতেছি যে, অথর্বের পুত্র দধীচ অশ্বমস্তুক ধারণকরতঃ তোমাদিগকে এই মধুবিদ্যা প্রদান করিয়াছিলেন। ইহাই মধুবিদ্যা।” (ব্রাহ্মণে এইকাণ্ডে মধুবিদ্যার উল্লেখ থাকার ইহার নাম মধুকান্ড বা মধুব্রাহ্মণ।)

বৃহদ্দেবতা গ্রন্থে এই আখ্যায়িকাটি বৈদিক গ্রন্থগুলি অপেক্ষা অধিক বিস্তৃতিলাভ করিয়াছে। তাহাতে বলা হইয়াছে যে, ইন্দ্র সঙ্ঘট হইয়া অথর্বপুত্র দধীচকে মধুবিদ্যা প্রদান করিয়া বলিলেন, এই বিদ্যা অন্য কাহাকেও প্রদান করিবে না, করিলে তোমাকে জীবন্ত হত্যা করিব। তদনন্তর অশ্বিনয় উক্ত ঋষির নিকট মধুবিদ্যা প্রার্থনা করিলে তিনি ইন্দ্রের উক্তি অন্বয়ী তাহা প্রদান করিতে অসম্মতি জ্ঞাপন করিলে তাঁহারা বলিলেন, আপনি এই মস্তুক পরিত্যাগ করিয়া অশ্বমস্তুক ধারণ করিয়া শীঘ্র এই বিদ্যা প্রদান করুন, তাহা হইলে ইন্দ্র আপনাকে বধ করিবেন না। দধীচ তাঁহাদের কথামত সেইরূপ করিলেন। ইন্দ্র তাহা জানিতে পারিয়া দধীচের সেই অশ্বমস্তুক বজ্রের দ্বারা কাটিয়া ফেলিলেন। সেই মস্তুকটি শর্বাণবৎ পর্বতে সরোবর মধ্যে পতিত হইয়াছিল (বৃ-দে-৩।১৮-২৩)। বৃহদ্দেবতায় এই উপাখ্যানটি যেভাবে বলা হইয়াছে, সেভাবে অন্য কোন গ্রন্থে দেখিতে পাই না। সর্বানুক্রমণীতে এই বিষয়ে বিশেষ কিছু উল্লেখ করা হয় নাই।

সায়ণ ১।১১৬।১২ ঋকৃটিতে এই ইতিহাসটির উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন। তিনি এইস্থানে প্রবর্ণা ও মধু এই দুইটি বিদ্যার উল্লেখ করিয়া যে আখ্যায়িকা বলিয়াছেন তাহা এইরূপ—ইন্দ্র দধীচ ঋষিকে প্রবর্ণাবিদ্যা এবং মধুবিদ্যা উপদেশ দিয়া বলিয়াছিলেন, এই বিদ্যা অন্য কাহাকেও বলিলে তোমার মস্তুক কতন করিব। অশ্বিনয় অশ্বমস্তুক কাটিয়া তাঁহার মস্তুক অন্যত্র রাখিয়া সেইস্থানে উহা সংযোজন করিয়া দিলেন। তদনন্তর দধীচ তাঁহাদিগকে ঐ বিদ্যা প্রদান করিলেন। তিনি আরও বলিয়াছেন, এই ইতিহাসটি শাটায়ন ও শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণে বিস্তারিত বলা আছে। এখানে কিন্তু তিনি কোন ব্রাহ্মণেরই মূল উদ্ধৃত করেন নাই।

নীতিমঞ্জরী গ্রন্থে এই আখ্যায়িকা সম্বন্ধে বলা হইয়াছে যে, বুদ্ধিমান ব্যক্তিগণ বিদ্যাদানের নিমিত্ত মস্তুক কতনও সহ্য করেন। যেমন দধীচ মধুবিদ্যা প্রদানের জন্য স্বকীয় মস্তুক ত্যাগ করিয়াছিলেন। বিদ্যা দেয়া ইত্যাহ—

“শীর্ষোহপি কতনং সহ্যং বিদ্যাং দাতুং প্রবুদ্ধিভিঃ।

দধ্যঙ্ মধুপ্রদানার্থং তত্যাঞ্জ শিরসো দ্বয়ম্॥” (৪০ শ্লো)।

এইস্থানে নীতিমঞ্জরীকার সায়ণোক্ত ইতিহাসটিরও উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন। পরবর্তী কালের পুরাণগুলির মধ্যে ভাগবতে দধীচের নাম দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। ভাগবতে দধীচের পিতার

(১) ১-ব্রা-১৪।২।৫।১৬-১৭; উক্ত ব্রাহ্মণখণ্ডে ১।১১৬।১২ ও ১।১১৭।২২ ঋকৃ দুইটি অবিকল উদ্ধৃত হইয়াছে।

নাম অথবা এবং মাতার নাম চিত্তি বলা হইয়াছে এবং অশ্বশিরেরও উল্লেখ আছে (ভাগ ৬।৯।৫২)।  
শ্রীধরস্বামীও উক্ত স্থানে 'তথা চ শ্রুতিঃ' বলিয়া শতপথোক্ত ইতিহাসটি উদ্ধৃত করিয়াছেন।  
অন্যান্য পুরাণে ইহার সেরূপ উল্লেখ নাই।

#### (৭) কবচ—

ঋষি কবচ ১০ম মণ্ডলের ৩০—৩৪ পর্যন্ত পাঁচটি সূক্তের দ্রষ্টা। ইহার মধ্যে ৩০ সূক্তটিকে  
কবচ সূক্ত বা আপোনপত্রীয় সূক্ত বলা হয়। এই সূক্তের দেবতা অপাংনপাং বা আপ। (১)  
এজন্যই ইহাকে আপোনপত্রীয় সূক্ত বলা হইয়া থাকে। ইহাতে ১৫টি ঋকের দ্বারা কেবল  
জলেরই স্তুতি করা হইয়াছে। এই সূক্তটি 'বসতীবরী' ও 'একধনা' নামক যজ্ঞীয় জল সংমিশ্রণের  
সময় পাঠ করা হয়। (২)

ঋগ্বেদ সংহিতায় একজন দ্যূতকাররূপে কবচের পরিচয় পাওয়া যায় এবং তাহা ঋষির  
স্বীয় উক্তি হইতেই পরিস্ফুটিত হয়। তিনি একটি ঋকে বলিতেছেন, "আমি যখন মনে ভাবি,  
আর এই পাশা খেলিব না, তখন খেলার সঙ্গীদিগকে দেখিলে দূরে চলিয়া যাই। কিন্তু  
পাশাগর্দিল সন্দর পিঙ্গল মূর্তিতে ছকের উপর বসিয়া আছে দেখিয়া আর থাকিতে পারি না।"  
দৃষ্টান্তে বলিয়াছেন, "দ্রষ্টানারী যেমন উপপতির নিকট গমন করে, আমি সেইরূপ খেলার  
সঙ্গীদিগের ভবনে গমন করি।"

“যদাদীধ্যে ন দবিষাণোভিঃ পরায়ম্ভ্যাহব হীয়ে সখীভাঃ।

ন্যুপ্রাশচ ব্রহ্মবো বাচমক্রতং এমীদেমাং নিষ্কৃতং জারিণীব॥” (১০।৩৪।৫)।

ইহা ছাড়াও তিনি (১০।৩৪) সূক্তে দ্যূতকারদিগের প্রচুর নিন্দা করিয়াছেন। ইহা ভিন্ন  
সংহিতাগ্রন্থে কবচ সম্বন্ধে কোন ঐতিহাসিক উল্লেখ পাওয়া যায় না।

উক্ত ঋষিকে অবলম্বন করিয়া ব্রাহ্মণগ্রন্থে একটি আখ্যায়িকা রচিত হইয়াছে। একজন  
দাসীপুত্র, দ্যূতকার, অরাক্ষণ সরস্বতীর অনুগ্রহে কিরূপে সূক্তদ্রষ্টা ঋষি হইলেন তাহাই  
ব্রাহ্মণে প্রতিপাদিত হইয়াছে। ঐতরেয় ব্রাহ্মণে আছে—পুরাকালে ঋষিগণ  
একটি সত্রে (৩) মিলিত হইয়াছিলেন। ঋষিগণ ইলুষপুত্র কবচকে 'এই দাসীপুত্র, কিতব,  
অরাক্ষণ কিরূপে আমাদের মধ্যে দীক্ষা গ্রহণ করিল' এই বলিয়া সোমযাগ হইতে কবচকে  
অপসারিত করেন, এবং 'পিপাসা ইহাকে বিনাশ করুক, সরস্বতীর জল যেন এই ব্যক্তি পান  
করিতে না পায়'—এইরূপে কবচকে বহিষ্কৃত করিয়া দেন। তিনি জলহীন দেশে বহিষ্কৃত করিয়া দেন।  
তিনি জলহীন দেশে অপসারিত হইয়া ভীষণ পিপাসায় আক্রান্ত হইলেন এবং সেইসময় "প্র দেবত্রা  
.....ইত্যাদি (১০।৩০) সূক্তটি দর্শন করেন ও উহা জপ করিয়া তিনি অপ্ দেবতার প্রিয় হন।

(১) প্র দেবত্রা পঞ্চো না কবচ ঐলুষ আপমপোনপত্রীমং বা ॥ সর্বা-১০।৩০।

(২) পশুযাগান্তর বসতীবরী নামক জল আনয়ন করা হয়। পরদিন উহার সহিত একধনা নামক জল  
সংশ্লিষ্ট করা হয়। ষড়্গুরুশিষ্য উক্ত দুই প্রকার জলের লক্ষণে বলিয়াছেন, যাহা পূর্বদিনে আনিয়া রাখা  
হয় তাহা বসতীবরী, আর যাহা পরদিন প্রাতঃকালে আনা হয় তাহা একধনা।

“তা আপো বসতীবর্যেয়া যাসাং পূর্বেদ্যুরাহতিঃ।

প্রাতর্ভাসাং গ্রহস্তাষু প্রোজা একধনা ইতি ॥ ঐ-ব্রা-২।৮।১।

(৩) দ্বাদশদিনের অধিকদিনব্যাপী বহুযজ্ঞমান কর্তৃক অনুষ্ঠিত যাগকে সত্র বলা হয়।

তখন সরস্বতী নদীও তাঁহার চতুর্দিকে আসিয়া ধাবিত হইলেন। এইজন্য উক্ত স্থানটিকে এখনও পরিসারক বলা হয়। (১) তখন ঋষিগণ পরস্পর বলিলেন, দেবতাগণ কবষকে জানিয়াছেন অতএব ইহাকে আমরা আহ্বান করিব। এইরূপ স্থির করিয়া কবষকে সমীপে লইয়া এই সূক্ত প্রয়োগ করিলেন। তদ্বারা তাঁহারাও অপ্‌দেবতার প্রিয়ধাম ও সামীপ্য প্রাপ্ত হইলেন (ঐ—ব্রা—২।৮।১)।

একমাত্র শাংখায়ন ভিন্ন অন্যান্য ব্রাহ্মণে কবষের ইতিহাসটি দেখা যায় না। অনুরূপ একটি আখ্যায়িকা শাংখায়ন ব্রাহ্মণে বলা হইয়াছে। কবষ যে এই সূক্তের দ্রষ্টা তাহা উক্ত আখ্যায়িকায় স্পষ্ট উল্লেখ আছে। (২) পুনঃ শাংখায়নেরই অন্যত্র এই উপাখ্যানটির পরিবর্তন হইয়াছে। যেমন—(৩) পুরাকালে যজ্ঞবিঘ্নকারী রাক্ষসগণ তীর্থসকলের জল রক্ষা করিত। সেই সময় কেহ জল লইতে আসিলে রাক্ষসগণ তাহাদিগকে হত্যা করিত। তখন কবষ এই সূক্তটি দর্শন করিয়া পাঠ করিলেন এবং তদ্বারা তিনি যজ্ঞবিঘ্নকারী রাক্ষসদিগকে তীর্থ হইতে দূরীভূত করিলেন।

বৃহদ্দেবতা গ্রন্থে উক্ত সূক্তের দুইটি ঋক্‌ সম্বন্ধে শৌনক বলিয়াছেন, প্র দেবত্যা.....ইত্যাদি সূক্তে জলের স্তুতিতে তৃতীয় ও চতুর্থ মন্ত্রের অপাংনপাং শব্দের দ্বারা মধ্যমাগ্নির স্তুতি করা হইয়াছে। (৪)

যাস্ক 'অপাংনপাং' শব্দের নির্বাচন কালে ১০।৩০।৪ ঋক্‌টি (৫) উদ্ধৃত করিয়া তাহাকে অগ্নি বলিয়া নির্ধারিত করিয়াছেন। তিনি বলিয়াছেন, 'অপাংনপাং—তন্নপাদিত্যনৈব ব্যাখ্যাতঃ' (নিঃ ৫।৪।১১)। ভাষ্যকার দুর্গাচার্যের মতে জলের পৌত্র অপাংনপাং। "অদ্ভা আদিত্যস্ততো মধ্যমঃ, এবমপাং পৌত্রঃ॥" (নিঃ—৫।৪।১১)।

ঋগ্‌বৈদ্যানে উক্ত সূক্তটি জল আনয়নে বিনিয়ুক্ত হইয়াছে।

"প্র দেবরোতি নিয়তো জপেত মরুধ্বস্ৱ।

প্রাণান্তিকে ভয়ে প্রাপ্তে ক্ষিপ্ৰমম্ভঃ স বিন্দতি॥" (৩।৫০)।

নীতিমঞ্জরীর মূল শ্লোকের মধ্যে ইতিহাসটির উল্লেখ নাই, কেবল গ্রন্থ প্রারম্ভে মঙ্গলাচরণ শ্লোকে গ্রন্থকার বলিয়াছেন, 'হে শারদে (সরস্বত), তুমি যেমন কবষের প্রতি প্রসম্মা হইয়াছিলে সেইরূপ আমার প্রতি প্রসম্মা হও' (২ শ্লোক)। এইস্থানে টীকায় গ্রন্থকার কয়েকটি শ্লোকের দ্বারা উপাখ্যানটির সংক্ষেপে উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন। (৬)

(১) প্রদক্ষিণীকৃতো নদ্যা হীপস্বঃ কবষো মুনিঃ।

পরিতঃ সরণানুদ্যাঃ স দেশঃ পরিসারকঃ॥ ষড়্‌গুরুশিষ্য ঐ-ব্রা-২।৮।১।

(২) স এষঃ কবষস্যৈষ মহিমা সূক্তস্য চানুবেদিতা। শাং ব্রা-১২।৩;

(৩) তদ্ব স্যুর্বে পুরা যজ্ঞমুহো রক্ষাসি তীর্থেষুপো গোপায়সি। তদ্যেকৈ চাপোচ্ছজ্জমু স্ততএব তান্ সর্বান্ জমু স্ত  
এষ তৎ কবষঃ সূক্তমপাং। পঞ্চদশর্চঃ প্র দেবত্যা ব্রহ্মাণে গাতরে স্থিতি তদনুব্রবীন্তেন যজ্ঞমুহো রক্ষাসি তীর্থে  
ভ্যোহপাহনু॥ (শাং ব্রা-১২।১)।

(৪) বৃ-দে ৭।৩৩।

মধ্যমাগ্নিঃ, অর্থাৎ বৈদ্যুত্যাগ্নিঃ।

(৫) যো অনিধো দীদমদপ্‌স্বস্ত্বং বিপ্রাস ঈড়তে অধুরেষু।

অপাংনপাংনুধমতীরপো দাম্যভিরিজো বাবুধে বীর্ষায়॥ (১০।৩৪।৪)।

(৬) "ঋষয়ো হি সরস্বত্যং চক্রুঃ সত্রাপি মাধ্যমাঃ।

সসাদ কবষো মধ্য প্রোচুস্তে তস্য চাপ্ৰিয়ন্ ॥

দাসীপুত্রোতি নাস্মাকং সোমপানং স্বয়া সহ।

দুজ্জাব স ব্রবন্ ক্রুচ্ছঃ প্রেতি চান্তৌৎ সরস্বতীম্ ॥

ভেন স্ততা পুশনু। তমনুয়াম সরস্বতী।

বধ্যমা স্তং নবস্কৃত্য বিনিন্যুঃ ক্রোধশাদরাৎ॥" (নীতি-২)।

সায়ণ এই আখ্যানিকারটির উল্লেখ করেন নাই। ষড়্‌গদ্রুশিষ্য তাঁহার ব্রাহ্মণভাষ্যে এইস্থলে কয়েকটি শ্লোক উদ্ধৃত করিয়াছেন।

“সগ্ৰদেশাঽহিভূতে দেশে ধন্বানি নির্জলে।  
 অদ্রাবস্মদ্রুবহন্ ধন্বঙেল্‌র্দক্ নলোপবৎ ॥  
 ইল্‌ষপদ্রৎ কবষমাগতং তে মহর্ষয়ঃ।  
 সোমাদদ্রাবসন্ সগ্ৰাঽহির্গচ্ছ্‌তি বাদিনঃ ॥  
 দাস্যাঃ পদ্র ইত্যল্‌ক্ তু ষষ্ঠ্যা আক্রোশ ইত্যতঃ।  
 দ্যতক্‌ৎ কিতবঃ কিস্তে পণং স্যাদিতি বৈ বদন্ ॥  
 অত্রাঙ্গশ্চ সন্ধ্যাদি সদাচারং বিবর্জয়ন্ ॥” (ঐ-ব্রা-২।৮।১)।

পদ্রাণগদ্রুলির মধ্যে ভাগবতে বহুদ্রই কবষের উল্লেখ আছে (১) বটে, কিন্তু ঐসকল স্থানে আখ্যানিকার উল্লেখ নাই।

ঋগ্বেদের ১০।৩০ সূক্তের বিনিয়োগটি ধর্মশাস্ত্রে অন্যরূপে কথিত হইয়াছে।—

“প্র দেবদ্রোতি সূক্তেন যজ্ঞশালাং প্রবেশয়েৎ।  
 তত্র নীরাজনং দত্ত্বা কুর্ষাদিষ্যাদিপূজনম্ ॥”

(বৃহস্পতী—সং ৭।২৬২)।

(৮) অবর্দ—

ঋক্ সংহিতার ১০ম মণ্ডলের ৯৪ সূক্তের দ্রষ্টা ঋষি কদ্রুর পদ্র অবর্দ। সেজন্য ইহাকে অবর্দ সূক্ত বলা হয়। সোমোভষ্যের সময় এই সূক্তদ্বারা গ্রাবস্থিতি করা হয়। (২) গ্রাবখণ্ডই ইহার দেবতা। ইহার ১৪টি ঋক্ দ্বারা গ্রাব (পাষণ) খণ্ডের স্থিতিই করা হইয়াছে। মূল সংহিতায় ইতিহাসটি না থাকিলেও ব্রাহ্মণ ও শ্রোতসূত্রে এই সূক্তোক্ত ঋষিকে অবলম্বন করিয়া একটি উপাখ্যান কথিত হইয়াছে। প্রথমতঃ ঐতরেয় ব্রাহ্মণে দেখিতে পাই যে, দেবগণ পদ্রাকালে সর্বচরু নামক দেশবিশেষে সগ্ৰানুষ্ঠান করিয়াছিলেন। কিন্তু তাঁহারা পাপনাশ করিতে সক্ষম না হইলে কদ্রুর পদ্র অবর্দ নামক মন্ত্রদ্রষ্টা সর্পঋষি তাঁহাদিগকে বলিলেন—তোমরা হোতার কর্তব্য একটি ক্রিয়া কর নাই, আমি তোমাদের জন্য ঐ ক্রিয়া করিব; তাহা হইলে তোমরা পাপনাশ করিতে পারিবে। দেবগণ তাঁহার বাক্যে সম্মত হইলে সেই ঋষি প্রতিদিন মাধ্যম্নিন সময়ে তাঁহাদের নিকট আসিতেন এবং পাষণখণ্ডের স্থিতি করিতেন। তিনি যে পথে আসিতেন সেইস্থানে এখনও অবর্দদোদাসপর্ণী নামক পথ রহিয়াছে। ইহারই একস্থানে বলা হইয়াছে, রাজা সোম দেবগণের মন্ততা উৎপাদন করিয়াছিলেন। দেবগণ বলিলেন, ‘অহো! এই সর্প

(১) ভাগবত (বঙ্গবাসী সং) ৯।২২।৩৭; ১০।৭৪।৭; ১।১৯।১০।

ঋগ্বেদে আরও একজন কবষের নাম দেখিতে পাই। তাহাকে ইন্দ্র জলমগ্ন করিয়াছিলেন। মনে হয় ইনি ইতিহাসোক্ত কবষ হইতে ভিন্ন।

“অথ শ্রুতং কবষং বৃদ্ধমপ্‌স্বনু দ্রুহুং নি বৃণগুজ্‌বাহুঃ। (৭।১৮।১২)।

বৃদ্ধবাহু ইন্দ্র শ্রুত, কবষ, বৃদ্ধ ও দ্রুহুকে জলমগ্নে নিমগ্ন করিয়াছিলেন।

(২) সুক্তং গ্রাবস্তোত্রম্ (সায়ণ)।

আমাদের সোমের প্রতি দৃষ্টি দিতেছে, অতএব উষ্ণীষদ্বারা ইহার চন্দ্র বন্ধন করা হউক'। এইরূপ বলিয়া তাঁহারা উষ্ণীষ দ্বারা সেই ঋষির চন্দ্র বন্ধন করিলেন। এইজন্য আজকাল ঐ ঘটনার অনুকরণে ঋষিকগণ উষ্ণীষদ্বারা মৃদু বেষ্ঠন করিয়া গ্রাবস্থিতি করিয়া থাকেন। পুনঃ, সোম দেবগণের মত্ততা উৎপাদন করিলে তাঁহারা বলিলেন, 'এই ঋষি স্বকীয় মন্ত্রদ্বারা গ্রাবস্থিতি করিতেছেন, আমরা ঐ মন্ত্রকে সম্পৃক্ত (যুক্ত) করিব'। এই বলিয়া তাঁহারা সপর্ষ্যঋষির মন্ত্রকে অন্যমন্ত্রের দ্বারা যুক্ত করিলেন। (১) তাহাতে সোম দেবগণের মত্ততা উৎপাদন করিতে পারিলেন না। এইরূপে দেবগণ পাপনাশ করিয়াছিলেন। ইহাই আখ্যায়িকাটির সারাংশ (ঐত-ব্রা-৬।২৬।১)।

শাংখায়ন ব্রাহ্মণেও অনুরূপ ইতিহাস বলা হইয়াছে (২)। আর একটি স্থানে সূক্তটির উল্লেখ প্রসঙ্গে এইরূপ আছে, দেবগণ অবর্নদসূক্ত এবং পাবমানীমন্ত্রের দ্বারা গ্রাবখণ্ডের স্থিতি করিয়া অমৃতত্ব ও সত্যসঙ্কল্পস্থ লাভ করিয়াছিলেন। সেজন্য আজকাল যজমানগণ ইহার স্মারা স্থিতি করিয়া অমৃতত্বাদি লাভ করে। "দেবা বা অবর্নদেন চ পাবমানীভিঃ চ গ্রাব্গোহাভিঃ চ ত্যাপ্নুবন-মৃতত্বমাপ্নুবন সত্যং সঙ্কল্পং তথো এবৈতদ্ যজমানো যদবর্নদেন চ পাবমানীভিঃ চ গ্রাব্গো-হাভিঃ চোতি, আপ্নো গ্যমৃতত্বমাপ্নোতি সত্যং সঙ্কল্পম্.....॥" (১৫।১)। তাণ্ড্য মহাব্রাহ্মণে উক্ত সূক্তটি সর্পদিগের জীর্ণত্বক্ দূরীকরণের মাহাত্ম্যরূপে বর্ণিত হইয়াছে। যেমন—

"অবর্নদঃ সর্প এতাভিঃ স্মৃতান্ স্বচমপাহত মৃত্যমেবৈতাভিঃ স্বচমপঘ্নতে ॥" (৪।১৫)। (৩) শতপথ ব্রাহ্মণের দ্বয়োদশকাণ্ডান্তর্গত পারিণলব্যাক্যানব্রাহ্মণ নামক অধ্যায়ে এই ঋষির উল্লেখ আছে এবং এইস্থানে উক্ত অবর্নদসূক্তটি হোতৃকর্তৃক পাঠ্য বলিয়া নির্দেশ দেওয়া হইয়াছে। "অবর্নদঃ কাদ্রবেয়ো রাজেত্যাহ তস্য সর্পা বিশস্ত ইম আসত ইতি সর্পাঃ সর্পবিদশেচাপ-সমেতা ভবান্ত, তান্দুর্পদিশতি সর্পবিদ্যা বেদঃ সোহয়মিতি সর্পবিদ্যায়া একং পর্ব ব্যাচক্ষাণঃ...॥" (১৩।৪।৩।১৫) আর্ষেয় ব্রাহ্মণে সূক্তটির ঋষির নির্দেশদান প্রসঙ্গে বলা আছে, "প্রজাপতেঃ স্ত্রীঃ সর্পরাজ্যাঃ সর্পাণাং বাবর্নদস্য বা সর্পস্য ॥" (৩।১৫)। আশ্বলায়ন-শ্রোত-সূত্রে এই সূক্তটির উল্লেখ আছে। (৪) ইহাতেই পুনঃ শতপথের ন্যায় বলা হইয়াছে, "পশুমেহনি অবর্নদঃ কাদ্রবেয়স্তস্য সর্পা বিশস্ত ইম আসত ইতি সর্পাঃ সর্পবিদঃ ইত্যুপসমানীতাঃ স্যাস্তান্দুর্পদিশতি বিস্ববিদ্যা বেদঃ সোহয়মিতি বিস্ববিদ্যাং নিগদেৎ ॥" (আশ্ব-শ্রো-সূ-১০।৭।৪)।

নিরুক্ত, বৃহস্পতি, সর্পানুক্রমণী প্রভৃতিতে এই ইতিহাসটির উল্লেখ নাই বটে, কিন্তু প্রত্যেকেই উক্ত সূক্তটির উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন। নিরুক্তে অবর্নদশব্দের নির্বচন প্রসঙ্গে ইহাকে (অবর্নদ) মেঘ বলা হইয়াছে। যাস্ক অবর্নদ অর্থে সর্পরাজের উল্লেখ করেন নাই। তিনি বলিয়াছেন, "অবর্নদো মেঘো ভবতি, অরণং অস্বদ্ তন্দঃ, অস্বদ্মদ্ ভবতীতি বা, অস্বদ্মদ্ ভাতীতি বা" (নিঃ-৩।১০)।

(১) অর্থাৎ মূলমন্ত্রের সহিত আর একটি মন্ত্রের মিশ্রণে মল মন্ত্রটির শক্তি হ্রাস হইল। তাহাতে সেইমন্ত্রের কার্যক্ষমতা রহিল না এবং সেইজন্যই দেবগণের মত্ততাও উৎপন্ন করিতে পারিলেন না।

(২) শাং-ব্রা ২৯।১।

(৩) এখানে সাময়িক বলিয়াছেন—'সত্রিণোপোত্যভির্নৃত্যং পাপাত্তিকং স্বচরুপামপঘ্নতে অপগময়ন্তি ॥'

(৪) "প্রেতে বদন্ত ইত্যবর্নদ" ॥ আশ্ব-শ্রো-সূ-১৫।১২।১।

শাংখায়ন শ্রোতসূত্রে এই সূক্তের ঋষির উল্লেখ আছে। ৭।১৫।৪-৬; ৯; ১০; ৩ ৬।৭।১।

বৃহস্পতিবতায় আছে, প্রৈতে ইত্যাদি সূক্তে অবর্দ ঋষি গ্রাবসকলকে দেহখারীর ন্যায় স্থতি করিতেছেন।

“যজ্ঞস্য বো বৈশ্বদেবে প্রৈতে ইত্যুস্তরস্তু ঋৎ।

তগ্রাবর্দস্তু গ্রাবাগং মূর্তিস্তমিবাচর্চিৎ ॥” (বৃ-দে-৭।১৪৬)।

সর্বানুক্রমণীতেও এইরূপ বলা হইয়াছে—‘প্রৈতে ষড়না সর্পোহবর্দঃ কাদ্রবেয়ো গ্রাব্গোহস্তোৎ’ ॥ (১০।৯৪)। সায়ণ এবং দ্যাবিবেদ এই সূক্ত সম্পর্কে কিছুই বলেন নাই। বিভিন্ন পুরাণে অবর্দদের উল্লেখ আছে, (১) কিন্তু সেইসকল স্থানে এই আখ্যায়িকাটির উল্লেখ দেখিতে পাই না।

(১) ভাগবত ১৬।৩০।১৮; ঋগ্বেদ ১১৪।৫১; ঋগ্-৪৫।১৩১; ৫২।২০; ৬২।১৮০; ৬৯।৭৪; বিষ্ণু ২।৩।১৬; ১।২১।২০-১; ব্রহ্মাণ্ড ৩।৭।৩১।



# বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তর পুরাণের প্রহেলিকা লক্ষণ

## শ্রীসিদ্ধেশ্বর মুখোপাধ্যায়, পঞ্চতীর্থ

বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তর পুরাণের তৃতীয় খণ্ডের ষোড়শ অধ্যায়টি ‘প্রহেলিকা-লক্ষণ’ নামে অভিহিত হইয়াছে। ইহার পূর্বে পঞ্চদশ অধ্যায়ে ‘কাব্যস্বরূপ’ প্রভৃতি কতিপয় বিষয়ের বিবরণ বিন্যস্ত হইবার পর কাব্যের দোষ সমূহেরও আলোচনা লিপিবদ্ধ হইয়াছে। উক্ত দোষ-বিবরণেরই আনুষ্ঠানিক বা পরিশিষ্ট রূপে এই অধ্যায় রচিত হইয়াছে। এই অধ্যায়ের সূত্রপাতে বলা হইয়াছে—যে সমস্ত দোষের উল্লেখ পূর্বে করা হইয়াছে তাহাদেরই কতিপয়ের সাহায্যে ‘প্রহেলিকা’ রচনা করিতে হয়। এই রচনার নিয়মরূপে প্রথমেই বলা হইয়াছে—(১) একটি অথবা অনাধিক দুইটি শ্লোকের মধ্যেই প্রহেলিকা সীমাবদ্ধ রাখিতে হয়। বহু শ্লোকে প্রহেলিকা রচনা করিলে তাহা নিন্দিত হইবে। প্রহেলিকা বিবরণের উপসংহারে আরও বলা হইয়াছে যে, ইহাতে অশ্লীলতা লেশমাত্রও যেন প্রযুক্ত না হয়। কারণে বলা হইয়াছে—কাব্যে অশ্লীলতার প্রয়োগে সঞ্জনগণের বিরক্তি উৎপাদন করিয়া থাকে তাহাতে কাব্যের মৌলিক উদ্দেশ্য যে আনন্দ দান তাহাই ব্যর্থ হইয়া যায়।—প্রহেলিকা সম্বন্ধে উক্ত পুরাণকারের অভিমত এই মাত্র জানা যায়।

নিম্নোক্তক্রমে প্রহেলিকার একবিংশতি প্রকার ভেদ, প্রত্যেকের পৃথক পৃথক নাম ও লক্ষণও উক্ত পুরাণে উল্লিখিত দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়—

(১) সমাগতা, (২) বিন্দিতা, (৩) বৃত্তান্তগোপিকান্তা, (৪) দৃষ্টিখিতা, (৫) পরিহাসিকা, (৬) সমানরূপতুল্যার্থা, (৭) পরুষা, (৮) সংখ্যাতা, (৯) কল্পিতা, (১০) নামান্তরিতা, (১১) নিভূতা, (১২) সমানশব্দা, (১৩) ব্যামৃঢ়া, (১৪) গৃচ্ছা, (১৫) সংকীর্ণা, (১৬) সম্ভবোপেতা, (১৭) ব্যাভিচারিণী, (১৮) নষ্টার্থা, (১৯) নষ্টাক্ষরা, (২০) বর্ণভ্রষ্টা, (২১) লেশাখ্যা।

প্রহেলিকার স্বতন্ত্রভাবে এতগুলি নাম এবং প্রত্যেকের পৃথক পরিচয় অন্য কোন পুরাণ বা প্রাসঙ্গিক আলংকারিকগণের গ্রন্থে পাওয়া যায় না। ভামহের কাব্যালংকারে প্রহেলিকার একবার মাত্র উল্লেখ দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। সেখানে ‘যমক’ আলোচনার প্রসঙ্গে বলা হইয়াছে—

নানাধাত্বর্থগম্ভীরা যমকব্যপদেশিনী।

প্রহেলিকা সা হৃদিতা রামশর্ম্মাচ্যুতোত্তরে॥

শ্লোকটির অর্থ আলোচনায় জানা যায়—বিভিন্ন ধাতুর অনেকার্থের সাহায্যে একটা গম্ভীর বা জটিল কিছু অর্থ সৃষ্টি করিয়া রচনা করাই ভামহের মতে প্রহেলিকা। এই প্রহেলিকাকে যমকও বলা হইত কিন্তু ভামহের তাহাতে সম্মতি ছিল না। রামশর্ম্মার ‘অচ্যুতোত্তর’ নামক গ্রন্থে এই জাতীয় রচনা পাওয়া গিয়াছিল, তাহাকে ভামহ প্রহেলিকাই বলিয়াছেন। প্রহেলিকা সম্বন্ধে ভামহের আর কোন উক্তি আমরা তদীয় গ্রন্থ আলোচনায় দেখিতে পাই না। এইজন্য প্রহেলিকার প্রতি ভামহের অনাগ্রহ বা বিতৃষ্ণাই প্রমাণিত হয়। যাহা হউক ভামহের এই একবার মাত্র উল্লিখিত প্রহেলিকার সহিত বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মোত্তরের বিশদভাবে বর্ণিত প্রহেলিকাসমূহের তুলনামূলক সমালোচনা চলে না। তবে এই পর্য্যন্ত বলা চলে বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মোত্তর পুরাণের এই অধ্যায় রচনাকালে প্রহেলিকার যে সমাদর ছিল ভামহের কাব্যালংকার রচনাকালে তাদৃশ সমাদর ছিল না এইজন্যই কাব্যে ইহাকে স্থান দান করিতে ভামহ সম্মত হন নাই।



দণ্ডী কিন্তু এ বিষয়ে ভামহের একেবারে প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বী। অন্যান্য প্রসঙ্গেও দেখা গিয়াছে ভামহ যেখানে নীরব বা সঙ্কেত-মাত্র করিয়াছেন দণ্ডী অতি বিশদভাবে সেই সকলের আলোচনা করিয়াছেন। এখানেও ভামহের সূচনা মাত্র দেখিয়া দণ্ডী যেন বিশেষ ক্ষেত্র লাভ করিয়াছেন মনে হয়। দণ্ডী ‘প্রহেলিকাচক্র’ নামে একটি পৃথক প্রকরণ রচনা করিয়াছেন যাহাকে আমরা বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ‘প্রহেলিকা লক্ষণের’ পরবর্ত্তী স্তর বা পর্যায় বলিয়া উল্লেখ করিতে পারি। যদিও প্রহেলিকা সম্বন্ধে দণ্ডীর মত বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তর পুরাণকারের সহিত মেলে না তথাপি উক্ত পুরাণোক্ত প্রহেলিকার বহু নাম এবং লক্ষণ সাদৃশ্য দণ্ডীর প্রহেলিকাসমূহে দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় ; এমনকি পুরাণের অস্পষ্ট বা অসংলগ্ন উক্তির স্পষ্টতা, সঙ্গতি প্রভৃতির পরিচয় দণ্ডীর লেখনে সম্যকভাবে প্রাপ্ত হওয়া যায়। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরে দোষ হইতে প্রহেলিকাসমূহের উদ্ভব স্পষ্টত উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে। দণ্ডী ‘গোমূত্রিকা’, ‘পদ্ম’ প্রভৃতির ন্যায় প্রহেলিকাকেও দৃষ্কর মার্গের রচনা\* বলিয়া স্বীকার করিয়াছেন ; এবং বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরে যেমন পঞ্চদশ অধ্যায়ে দোষসমূহের উল্লেখের পর ষোড়শ অধ্যায়ে প্রহেলিকার বিবরণ সমাবেশিত করা হইয়াছে কাব্যাদর্শে সমস্ত প্রহেলিকার আলোচনা সমাপ্ত করিয়া দোষের বিস্তৃত আলোচনা করা হইয়াছে। সুতরাং উভয়ের মতবৈষম্য বেশ পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠিয়াছে। তবে বিশেষ লক্ষণীয় এই, দণ্ডী প্রহেলিকার সবগুলিকে দোষবিহীন বা সাধু প্রহেলিকা বলেন নাই, প্রথমে ষোড়শটি সাধু প্রহেলিকার নাম উল্লেখ করিবার পর উদাহরণ প্রদর্শনের পূর্বে বলিতেছেন—

এতাঃ ষোড়শ নিন্দিতাঃ পূর্বাচার্যোঃ প্রহেলিকাঃ।

দৃষ্টাঃ প্রহেলিকাশচান্যাস্তৈরধীতাশ্চতুর্দশ।।

দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার চতুর্দশ সংখ্যা নিন্দেদর্শ করিয়া তিনি বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের দোষ হইতে প্রহেলিকার সমৃদ্ধত্ব স্বীকার করিলেন। এবং পরে দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার লক্ষণাদি প্রদর্শন না করিবার কারণে বলিতেছেন—

দোষানপরিসংখ্যান্ মন্যমানা বয়ং পদনঃ।

সাধনীরেবাভিধাস্যামস্তা দৃষ্টা যাস্তদলক্ষণাঃ ॥

দোষ বহু এই আশঙ্কায় তিনি দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকাদির বিশদ আলোচনায় নিরস্ত হইয়াছেন। অতি সংক্ষিপ্তভাবে কেবল বলিলেন “তা দৃষ্টা যা স্তদলক্ষণাঃ”। তাহারাই দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকা, যাহারা পূর্বেই সাধু প্রহেলিকাসমূহের কোন লক্ষণাক্রান্ত নহে। অথচ আশ্চর্যের বিষয় এই যে দণ্ডী সাধু প্রহেলিকা বলিয়া যাহাদের উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন তাহাদের নয়টি নাম অবিকলভাবে এবং অবশিষ্ট সাতটিও বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের অন্যান্য প্রহেলিকার লক্ষণাদি হইতে প্রাপ্ত হওয়া যায়। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের চতুর্দশটি প্রহেলিকার মধ্যে দণ্ডীর সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকার নিদর্শন পাওয়া যাইতেছে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের অবশিষ্ট সাতটি প্রহেলিকা দণ্ডীর দৃষ্ট চতুর্দশ প্রহেলিকার কৃষ্ণগত হইয়াছে ইহা সাহস করিয়াই বলা চলে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের দোষোক্ত প্রহেলিকাই দণ্ডীর নিকট সাধু ও দৃষ্ট এই দুই বিভাগে বা নামে পরিণত হইয়াছে। এই বিভাগকরণকেই আমরা বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তর পুরাণের প্রহেলিকার পরবর্ত্তী পরিণাম বলিয়া অবশ্যই স্বীকার করিতে পারি। দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার অতি দোষ বা অনেক দোষ দর্শনেই দণ্ডী তাহাদের

\* ইতি দৃষ্করমার্গেহপি কশ্চিদাশিষ্যঃ ক্রমঃ ।

প্রহেলিকা প্রকারাণাং পুনরুক্তিতে গতিঃ ॥ কাব্যাদর্শ, ৩।১৬

উল্লেখ করেন নাই, এ সম্বন্ধে তদীয় 'দোষান্ অপারিসংখ্যেয়ান্' ইত্যাদি উক্তিই সাক্ষ্য প্রদান করিতেছে।

আমরা প্রথমে দণ্ডীর সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকার নামগদূলি দেখাইবার পর বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের সহিত তাহাদের কি জাতীয় সাদৃশ্য আছে তাহা ক্রমে প্রদর্শন করিব।

### দণ্ডীর সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকা

(১) সমাগতা, (২) বর্ণিতা, (৩) ব্যুৎক্রান্তা, (৪) প্রমদ্বিতা, (৫) সমানরূপা, (৬) পরদ্বা, (৭) সংখ্যাতা, (৮) প্রকল্পিতা, (৯) নামান্তরিতা, (১০) নিভূতা, (১১) সমানশব্দা, (১২) সম্মুঢ়া, (১৩) পরিহারিকা, (১৪) একচ্ছিন্না, (১৫) উভয়চ্ছিন্না, (১৬) সংকীর্ণা।

উল্লিখিত নামগদূলির মধ্যে নিম্নোক্ত নয়টি বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের প্রহেলিকা নামের সহিত অবিকল সমান। (১) সমাগতা, (২) সমানরূপা, (৩) পরদ্বা, (৪) সংখ্যাতা, (৫) প্রকল্পিতা, (৬) নামান্তরিতা, (৭) নিভূতা, (৮) সমানশব্দা এবং (৯) সংকীর্ণা।

ইহাদের মধ্যে বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের 'সমানরূপতুল্যার্থা' এখানে 'সমানরূপা' এই সংক্ষিপ্ত নামে এবং সেখানকার 'কল্পিতা' এখানে 'প্রকল্পিতা' নামে নির্দিষ্ট।

ইহা ব্যতীত দণ্ডীর 'একচ্ছিন্না' ও 'উভয়চ্ছিন্না' নাম দুইটি বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের 'সংকীর্ণা' লক্ষণের পদ পরিচয় হইতে গৃহীত এবং এখানে ভেদধরূপে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের মতে এই দুইটি সংকীর্ণার অবাস্তুর ভেদরূপে কল্পিত হইতে পারে।

দণ্ডীর অবশিষ্ট পাঁচটি প্রহেলিকা ও বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের অপর পাঁচটির নামের সহিত সাদৃশ্য না থাকিলেও তাহাদের লক্ষণের সহিত অনেকাংশে সমান। সেই পাঁচটি যথা—

দণ্ডীর বর্ণিতা বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে: 'বলিতা'র অনুরূপ।

দণ্ডীর ব্যুৎক্রান্তা বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে: 'বৃত্তান্ত গোপিকান্তা'র অনুরূপ।

দণ্ডীর পরিহারিকা বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে: 'পরিহাসিকা'র অনুরূপ।

দণ্ডীর সম্মুঢ়া বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে: 'ব্যামুঢ়া'র অনুরূপ।

দণ্ডীর প্রমদ্বিতা বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে: 'দুঃখিতা'র অনুরূপ।

বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের নিম্নলিখিত সাতটি প্রহেলিকা দণ্ডীর সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকার মধ্যে স্থান লাভ করে নাই।

(১) সম্ভবোপেতা, (২) গদুচ্ছা, (৩) ব্যাভিচারিণী, (৪) নষ্টার্থা, (৫) নষ্টাক্ষরা, (৬) বর্ণভ্রষ্টা ও (৭) লেশাখ্যা।

এই প্রহেলিকা সাতটির উল্লেখ দণ্ডীর সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকামধ্যে না থাকিবার কারণরূপে বলা যায়, যে সমস্ত দোষের উপাদানে এইগদূলি গঠিত হইয়াছে সেগদূলির মধ্যে অনেক দোষই দণ্ডীর দোষ বিবরণে বিস্তৃতভাবে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। এইজন্য দণ্ডী যে বহু দোষ আশঙ্কায় দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার লক্ষণাদি প্রদর্শন না করিবার অভিমত ব্যক্ত করেন সেই অভিপ্রায়ক্রমেই এইগদূলিকে দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার অন্তর্ভুক্ত করিয়াছেন ইহা বলা চলিতে পারে। এ পর্যন্ত আমরা

বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের নামের সহিত দণ্ডীর প্রহেলিকাগুলির নামের সাম্যই প্রধানতঃ প্রদর্শন করিয়াছি। এক্ষণে উভয়ের লক্ষণাদি আলোচনায় পরস্পরের সাদৃশ্য এবং পৌর্স্বাপর্য্য প্রদর্শনের চেষ্টা করিব।

(১) বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের প্রথম প্রহেলিকা “সমাগতা” নামে উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে ইহার লক্ষণ সেখানে দেখা যায়—“তস্য্য মাত্ৰাবশাদর্থো গোপ্যতে সাসমাগতা।” দণ্ডীরও প্রথম প্রহেলিকার নাম ‘সমাগতা’। ইহার পরিচয়ে দণ্ডী বলিয়াছেন—“আহুঃ সমাগতাং নাম গুঢ়ার্থ্যং পদসন্ধিনা।” বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে মাত্ৰাবশতঃ অর্থের গোপন করা হইলে সমাগতা হইবে বলা হইয়াছে। দণ্ডী মাত্ৰাকে কারণ না বলিয়া পদসন্ধিকে কারণ বলিয়াছেন। বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের ‘অর্থো গোপ্যতে’, দণ্ডীর ‘গুঢ়ার্থ্য’ সহিত অর্থের পার্থক্য কিছুমাত্র না থাকায় সমানই বলা যায়। মাত্ৰা এবং সন্ধি এই দুইটি বিভিন্ন বস্তু। মাত্ৰা উচ্চারণের ক্ষণ বিশেষকেই বলা হয়, হ্রস্ব দীর্ঘ প্রভৃতি মাত্ৰা বিশেষেই ঘটয়া থাকে। এবম্বিধ মাত্ৰা অবলম্বনে অর্থগুণ্ডিপ্ত যে কিভাবে ঘটিবে এবং সেই অর্থগুণ্ডিপ্ত দ্বারা প্রহেলিকার আকার কিরূপ ঘটিবে তাহা আমাদের জানিবার উপায় নাই। কারণ বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরে কোন প্রহেলিকারই উদাহরণ প্রদর্শিত হয় নাই। পরবর্ত্তীকালের কোন আলঙ্কারিক বিশেষের গ্রন্থেও এই জাতীয় প্রহেলিকার উল্লেখ বা উদাহরণ দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না। অথচ দণ্ডী সেই ‘সমাগতা’রই লক্ষণে যে পদসন্ধিকে কারণ বলিয়াছেন তাহা সর্বজনবোধ্য এবং এই জাতীয় প্রহেলিকার উদাহরণ অতি আধুনিক কালেও দৃষ্ট হইতে পারে। দণ্ডীর সমাগতার উদাহরণ—

ন ময়া গোরসাম্ভিজ্ঞং চেতঃ কস্মাৎ প্রকুপ্যাসি?

অস্থানরুদিতৈরেভিরলমালোহিতৈক্ষণে॥ ৩।১০৮

এই উদাহরণটিকে ‘সন্ধিগুণ্ডিত’ বা ‘সন্ধিগুঢ়’ ইহার উদাহরণও বলা চলে। ভোজরাজ সরস্বতী কণ্ঠাভরণে ইহাকে ‘সম্বন্ধগুঢ়’ কাব্যের উদাহরণরূপে উল্লেখ করিয়া দেখাইয়াছেন। ইহাতে মনে করা চলিতে পারে বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের প্রহেলিকা বিবরণ রচনাকালে যাহাকে ‘মাত্ৰা-গুণ্ডিত’রূপে ‘সমাগতা’ আখ্যা দেওয়া হইয়াছে দণ্ডীর সময়ে তাহার ‘সমাগতা’ নাম রাখিয়াও সন্ধিগুণ্ডিত প্রকারে লক্ষণ করা হইয়াছে। আবার ভোজরাজের সময়ে ‘সমাগতা’ নাম লোপ করিয়া ‘গুঢ়’ কাব্যের অন্তর্ভুক্ত করিয়া তাহাকে ‘সম্বন্ধগুঢ়’ এই নাম প্রদান করা হইয়াছে। বিষ্ণু-ধর্মোন্তরের সময়ে যাহা স্পষ্ট ছিল আর্মানদের নিকট তাহা অস্পষ্টই রহিয়া গিয়াছে। অথচ দণ্ডীর লক্ষণ ও উদাহরণ দর্শনে তাহার অস্পষ্টতার কিছুই থাকে না। এইজন্যই আমরা বলিতে পারি বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের সমাগতা প্রাচীন এবং দণ্ডীর সমাগতা তাহার পরবর্ত্তী।

(২) বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের দ্বিতীয় প্রহেলিকা বন্দিতা। ইহার লক্ষণ—

পর্যায় বচনাদ্ বস্য্য বন্দিতা সা প্রকীন্ত তা।

দণ্ডীর দ্বিতীয় প্রহেলিকা বণ্ডিতা নামে খ্যাত। ইহার লক্ষণেও বন্দিতারই প্রতিধ্বনি শ্রুত হয়। তবে তাহাতে পরস্পরস্বাক্ষরের বৈশিষ্ট্যের পরিচয়ও পাওয়া যায়। দণ্ডীর বণ্ডিতার লক্ষণ—

বণ্ডিতান্যত্র বৃঢ়েণ যত্র শব্দেন বণ্ডিতা।

বিষ্ণুধর্মোন্তরের মতে পর্যায় শব্দের যোগে অর্থগুণ্ডিত ঘটিলে সেখানে ‘বন্দিতা’ হইবে— এইটুকু মাত্রও পূর্বে সমাগতা লক্ষণের ‘অর্থোগোপ্যতে’ কথাটির অনুবর্ত্তন করিয়া জানা যায়

ইহাতেও সম্যক্ পরিষ্ফুট হয় না। দণ্ডী সদৃশপরিষ্ফুটভাবে বলিতেছেন—অন্যত্র প্রসিদ্ধ শব্দের দ্বারা (অর্থাৎ সেই স্থলে অপ্ৰসিদ্ধ শব্দের দ্বারা) যেখানে অর্থের বস্তুনা ঘটে সেখানেই ‘বিশ্ণুতা’ (এই সার্থক নাম্নী) প্রহেলিকা হইবে। আমরা লক্ষ্য করিতে পারি দণ্ডী নামটির প্রতি বিশেষ দৃষ্টি রাখিয়া লক্ষণে কোন অস্পষ্টতা রাখেন নাই। অথচ বিষ্ণুধর্মোক্তরে এই জাতীয় কোন যন্ত্রের নিদর্শন পাওয়া যায় না। এইজন্যই বিষ্ণুধর্মোক্তরে পুরাণের প্রহেলিকা প্রাচীনতার দাবী করিতে পারে।

(৩) বিষ্ণুধর্মোক্তরের তৃতীয় প্রহেলিকা ‘বৃন্তান্ত-গোপিকান্তা’ নামে কথিত হইয়াছে। ইহার লক্ষণ—

বৃন্তান্তগোপিকান্তা যা পদৈর্ব্যবহিতৈর্ভবেৎ।

ব্যবহিত বা ব্যবধান ক্রমে বিন্যস্ত পদসমূহের দ্বারা যেখানে বৃন্তান্ত বা সারার্থ গোপন করা হয় তাহা ‘বৃন্তান্তগোপিকান্তা’ নামে খ্যাত হইবে। দণ্ডীর তৃতীয় প্রহেলিকা ‘ব্যুৎক্রান্তা’ এই ভিন্ন নামে উল্লিখিত হইলেও পুর্বেক্ত বৃন্তান্ত-গোপিকান্তার লক্ষণের সহিত সর্ব্বাংশে মিলিয়া যায়। ‘ব্যুৎক্রান্তা’র লক্ষণ—

ব্যুৎক্রান্তা ইতি ব্যবহিতপ্রয়োগান্মোহকারিণী।

পুর্বেক্ত লক্ষণের সহিত এই লক্ষণের আলোচনা করিলে দেখা যাইবে—দণ্ডীর অতিব্যবধান, ক্রমে পদ প্রয়োগবশত যাহা মোহ সৃষ্টি করে অর্থাৎ অর্থের বোধে ভ্রান্তি উদ্ভূত করে তাহার নাম “ব্যুৎক্রান্তা”। ‘ব্যুৎক্রান্তা’ এই নামের মধ্যেও ব্যুৎক্রম বা পদের বিষম সন্নিবেশের কথা স্মরণ করাইয়া দিতেছে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোক্তরে কিন্তু দেখা যায় ‘বৃন্তান্তগোপিকান্তা’ নামটির সার্থকতার প্রতি দৃষ্টি সেখানে নাই এবং এই নামটি সেই প্রহেলিকার কোন বৈশিষ্ট্যের ইঙ্গিত করে নাই; বৃন্তান্ত গোপন বা অর্থগূঢ়প্তি সকল প্রহেলিকাতেই অস্পষ্টতার ঘটনাই থাকে, তাহার জন্য সকলেরই নাম অর্থগূঢ়প্তি বা বৃন্তান্তগোপিকান্তা হইতে পারে না। যে যে প্রহেলিকার যে যে বিশেষ বৈশিষ্ট্য আছে সেই সেই বৈশিষ্ট্যের স্ফূরণ যাহাতে নামের মধ্যে ঘটে সেই চেষ্টা পরবর্ত্তীকালেই দেখিতে পাওয়া স্বাভাবিক। এইজন্যই দণ্ডীর চেষ্টা তদীয় পরবর্ত্তী প্রমাণিত করিতেছে ইহা সাহসের সহিতই বলা চলে।

(৪) বিষ্ণুধর্মোক্তরের চতুর্থ প্রহেলিকা ‘দৃষ্টিখিতা’ নামে খ্যাত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

অপ্ৰসিদ্ধৈস্তু পর্যায়েদৃষ্টিখিতা নাম-সাম্প্রত।

দণ্ডীরও চতুর্থ প্রহেলিকা ‘প্রমুখিতা’ ইহার অনুরূপ, তবে ‘দৃষ্টিখিতা’র লক্ষণটি যেমন দৃষ্ট (অতিব্যাপ্তি দোষে), দণ্ডীর লক্ষণে সেরূপ দোষের কোন স্পর্শই নাই। দণ্ডীর প্রমুখিতা লক্ষণ—

সা স্যাৎ প্রমুখিতা যস্য্যং দূর্বোধার্থা পদাবলী।

যেখানে পদাবলী সমাবেশে অর্থ দূর্বোধ থাকিয়া যায় তাহাই প্রমুখিতা হইবে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোক্তরে পুর্বে পর্যায়ে শব্দের বিলক্ষণ সমাবেশে ‘বন্দিতা’ হইবে বলা হইয়াছে, আবার এখানেও অপ্ৰসিদ্ধ পর্যায়ে শব্দাবলীর দ্বারা দৃষ্টিখিতা বলা হইল। সূত্রায়ং বন্দিতার সহিত ইহার ভেদ প্রদর্শিত না হওয়ার উভয়ের মধ্যে একটি নিরর্থক হইয়া যায়। এইজন্যই দণ্ডী এখানে পর্যায়ে শব্দের

কোনও উল্লেখ না করিয়া ‘দুবোধার্থী পদাবলী’ বলিয়া স্পষ্টত বর্ণিত হইতে ইহার বৈশিষ্ট্য প্রদর্শন করিয়াছেন। ইহা দ্বারা নিষ্ঠীকভাবেই বলা চলে দণ্ডী বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের দুটি সংশোধন করিয়াছেন।

(৫) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের পঞ্চম প্রহেলিকা ‘পরিহাসিকা’ নামে খ্যাত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

কল্পনা গোপিতার্থান্তরু কথিতা পরিহাসিকা।

দণ্ডীর পঞ্চম প্রহেলিকা ‘সমানরূপা’র সহিত ইহার সাম্য দেখা যায় না ; তদীয় ষষ্ঠ প্রহেলিকা পরিহারিকার সহিত ইহার নামের কতকটা মিল আছে কিন্তু লক্ষণের ভঙ্গী স্বতন্ত্র। দণ্ডীর পরিহারিকা—

যোগমালাস্বিকা নাম কথিতা পরিহারিকা।

যোগমালা শব্দের অর্থ যৌগিক পদসমূহ। এই যৌগিক বা ব্যুৎপত্তিন্ধর্ম পদ সম্বন্ধে প্রকৃত অর্থের পরিহরণ ঘটাইলে সেখানে পরিহারিকা নাম্নী প্রহেলিকা হইবে, ইহাই দণ্ডীর লক্ষণের অর্থ। তিনি উদাহরণেও ইহার বিচিত্র রূপ দেখাইয়াছেন—

বিজিতাশ্চভবস্বৈষি-গদ্রুপাদহতো জনঃ।

হিমাপহামিরথরৈব্যাপ্তং ব্যোমভিনন্দ্যতি ॥

এখানে বিচিত্র যৌগিক শব্দের আড়ম্বরে ‘নিদাঘতপ্ত জন মেঘমেদুর ব্যোমতলের অভিনন্দন জানাইতেছে’ এই অর্থটির পরিহরণ ঘটাইয়াছে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরে পরিহারিকার উপায়স্বরূপে বলা হইয়াছে ‘কল্পনা বশে অর্থ গোপন করা’ এই মাত্র। ইহাতে বেশ বৃদ্ধা যায় অত্যন্ত সংক্ষিপ্ত-ভাবে বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ইঙ্গিত বা সংকেত প্রাপ্ত হইয়া দণ্ডী সূচ্য উপায়ের আবিষ্কার করিয়া তাহা লক্ষণেই যোজনা করিয়া দিয়াছেন। ইহাতে আমাদের আর কল্পনার বিশালরাজ্যে প্রবেশ করিতে হয় নাই। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরকার ইহাকে পরিহাসেরই নামান্তর ভাবিয়া ‘পরিহাসিকা’ এই নামকরণ করিয়াছেন ইহা বলিলে তাহার প্রতি সন্নিবিচারই করা হইবে। দণ্ডী কিন্তু তাহাতে সন্তুষ্ট না হইয়া অর্থের পরিহরণ দেখিয়াই সার্থক পরিহারিকা নামে তাহাকে অভিহিত করিয়াছেন। সুতরাং বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের পরিহাসিকাই দণ্ডীর পরিহারিকায় নামান্তরিত হইয়াছে ইহা বিনা দ্বিধায় বলা চলে।

(৬) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ষষ্ঠ প্রহেলিকা ‘সমানরূপতুল্যার্থা’। ইহার লক্ষণ—

সমানরূপতুল্যার্থা শব্দরন্যোঃ প্রকীর্তিতা।

দণ্ডীর পঞ্চম প্রহেলিকা ‘সমানরূপা’ ইহারই সংক্ষিপ্ত ও সূচ্য নাম। তাহার লক্ষণ—

সমানরূপা গোণার্থারোপিতৈর্গ্রথিতা পদৈঃ ॥

বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরে (যথোচিত শব্দের পরিবর্তে) অন্য শব্দের সাহায্যে অর্থতুল্যতা ঘটাইলে ‘সমানরূপ-তুল্যার্থা’ হইবে বলা হইয়াছে ; দণ্ডী কিন্তু এখানকার ‘অন্য’ শব্দটির অনুসরণ না করিয়া স্পষ্টভাবে বলিতেছেন গোণার্থবোধক পদাবলীর সাহায্যে যেখানে সমান অর্থের বোধ হইবে তাহাকে সমানরূপা বলা হইবে। উভয়ের তাৎপর্যে কোন তারতম্যই নাই, অথচ দণ্ডীর লক্ষণে ও নামে বেশ সামঞ্জস্য লক্ষিত হয়। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ‘সমানরূপতুল্যার্থা’ এই দীর্ঘ নামে কোন

নৈপুণ্যের পরিচয় পাওয়া যায় না 'সমানরূপাই' যথেষ্ট এবং যথার্থ। এই উভয় প্রহেলিকা যে অভিন্ন ইহাতে সন্দেহের কোন কারণ নাই।

(৭) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের সপ্তম প্রহেলিকা 'পরদৃষা' নামে নির্দিষ্ট। তাহার লক্ষণ—

দূর্বোধাক্ষরবন্ধা চ পরদৃষা নামতঃ স্মৃতা।

দণ্ডীর ষষ্ঠ প্রহেলিকাও পরদৃষা নামে খ্যাত। তদীয় লক্ষণ—

পরদৃষালক্ষণান্তিমাত্রাব্যুৎপাদিতশ্রুতিঃ।

উভয় নাম অভিন্ন হইলেও লক্ষণে কিছুমাত্র সাম্য দেখা যায় না। এই উভয় লক্ষণের মধ্যে বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের লক্ষণটিই অধিকতর স্পষ্ট বলিয়া মনে হয় কারণ সেখানে পরিষ্কারভাবে 'দূর্বোধ অক্ষরবন্ধে'ই 'পরদৃষা' হইবে বলা হইয়াছে। দণ্ডী লক্ষণটিকে অত সহজ করিতে চাহেন নাই। তিনি বলিতেছেন 'পরদৃষা' লক্ষণের অন্তিমাত্রাই যেখানে শ্রুতিগোচর হইবে তাহা 'পরদৃষা'। যেন প্রকৃত লক্ষণের পরিচায়করূপে কিছু বস্তু নাই। দণ্ডীর এইভাবে লক্ষণ প্রণয়নের উদ্দেশ্য তাহার উদাহরণ না দেখিলে বুঝিবার উপায় নাই। পরদৃষার উদাহরণ—

সূরাঃ সূরালয়ে সৈবরং ভ্রমাস্তি দশনাচ্চিষা।

মঞ্জন্ত ইব মত্তাস্তে সৌরে-সরাসি সম্প্রতি ॥

উদাহরণটির শব্দ সমাবেশে দেখা যায় এখানে 'পরদৃষ' বর্ণ 'রকারের' অঙ্গস্র বিন্যাস। অর্থ আলোচনায় দেখা যায়—এখানে 'সূরাঃ' এই প্রসিদ্ধ দেববাচক শব্দটি সেই অর্থে প্রযুক্ত না হইয়া উচ্চৈঃস্বরে চীৎকারপরায়ণ উন্মত্ত মদ্যপায়ীর অর্থে প্রযুক্ত হইয়াছে এবং অন্যান্য শব্দাবলীও এইরূপ কঠোর বা কৰ্কশভাবে পারদৃষ্য প্রকাশ করিতেছে। ইহাতে বলা যায় দণ্ডী পরদৃষা লক্ষণের বাক্যে বুঝাইতে চাহিয়াছেন, যেখানে প্রহেলিকা শ্রবণ মাত্রে রচনাকারীর পারদৃষ্য প্রকটিত হইয়া উঠিবে তাহাই পরদৃষা নাম্নী প্রহেলিকা। যদি 'দূর্বোধ অক্ষরবন্ধে'ই তাহার সৃষ্টি বলা যায় তবে 'প্রদৃষিতা' প্রহেলিকার সহিত ইহার কিছুমাত্র ভেদ থাকে না। কারণ সেখানেও 'দূর্বোধার্থা-পদাবলী' বলা হইয়াছে। সূত্রায় সেই লক্ষণের সহিত ইহার বিশেষ বৈশিষ্ট্য প্রদর্শনের জন্যই দণ্ডী পরদৃষার এবিম্বন্ধ রহস্যপূর্ণ লক্ষণ রচনা করিয়াছেন। অগ্রপশ্চাদ্ বিবেচনার এই উৎকর্ষ দ্বারাই দণ্ডীর পরবর্ত্ত্ব প্রমাণিত হইয়া যায়।

(৮) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের অষ্টম প্রহেলিকা 'সংখ্যাতা' নামে অভিহিত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

সংখ্যামাত্রসমানত্বাৎ সংখ্যাতাখ্যা তথোচ্যতে।

দণ্ডীর সপ্তম প্রহেলিকাও 'সংখ্যাতা' নামে নির্দিষ্ট। তদীয় লক্ষণ—

সংখ্যাতা নাম সংখ্যানং যত্র ব্যামোহকারণম্।

এই উভয় নাম ও লক্ষণে কোন বিভিন্নতা নাই। কেবল দণ্ডীর লক্ষণবাক্য অধিক পরিষ্কৃত এবং সেই জন্যই দণ্ডী পরবর্ত্ত্বী।

(৯) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের নবম প্রহেলিকা 'কল্পিতা'র লক্ষণ।

অর্থাস্তরান্ কল্পনয়া কল্পিতা চ তথোচ্যতে।

দণ্ডীর অষ্টম প্রহেলিকা 'প্রকল্পিতা' ইহারই সমান। ইহার পরিচয়ে দণ্ডী বলিয়াছেন—

অন্যাথা ভাসতে যত্র বাক্যার্থঃ সা প্রকল্পিতা।

দণ্ডী বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মাস্তরের 'কল্পিতা'কে প্রকল্পিতা আখ্যা দিয়া পদার্থাপেক্ষা লক্ষণটিকে আরও স্পষ্ট করিয়াছেন, অন্য কোন বৈষম্য নাই।

(১০) বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মাস্তরের দশম প্রহেলিকা 'নামান্তরিতা' নামে খ্যাত। ইহার পরিচয়ে বলা হইয়াছে—

অন্যস্য সংজ্ঞা ব্যামোহান্নামান্তরিতসংজ্ঞতা।

দণ্ডীরও নবম প্রহেলিকা 'নামান্তরিতা' নামেই উল্লিখিত হইয়াছে। ইহার লক্ষণ—

সা নামান্তরিতা যস্যান্নি নানার্থকল্পনা।

বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মাস্তরের অন্যের 'সংজ্ঞাব্যামোহ' বা নামের ভ্রান্তি অপেক্ষা দণ্ডীর কথিত 'নামের মধ্যে নানার্থের কল্পনায় আমরা অধিক স্বাভি লাভ করিতে পারি। ইহা ব্যতীত উভয়ের নাম ও লক্ষণে কোন বৈষম্য দেখা যায় না।

(১১) বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মাস্তরের একাদশ প্রহেলিকা 'নিভূতা'। ইহার লক্ষণ—

অর্থব্যামোহতঃ প্রোক্তা নিভূতা চ মহানুপ।

দণ্ডীর দশম প্রহেলিকাও 'নিভূতা' নামে খ্যাত। তদীয় লক্ষণ—

নিভূতা নিভূতান্যার্থা তুল্যধর্ম্মস্পৃহা গিরা।

উভয় নাম এবং লক্ষণার্থ অভিন্ন, কেবল দণ্ডীর প্রকাশভঙ্গীর বৈচিত্র্য আমাদিগকে অধিক আশ্বস্ত করে। বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মাস্তরের 'নিভূতা'র মধ্যে বিশেষ বৈশিষ্ট্য লক্ষিত হয় না কারণ 'অর্থের ব্যামোহে নিভূতা' হইবে এই উক্তি মানেই কোন বৈশিষ্ট্যের সন্ধান পাওয়া যায় না, অর্থ ব্যামোহ বা অর্থের দুরূহতা ত সকল প্রহেলিকাতেই কিছদ না কিছদ থাকিয়াই যায়, তবে ইহার প্রয়োজন সম্বন্ধে কি বলা হইল? দণ্ডী বিশেষভাবে ইহা লক্ষ্য করিয়াই বৈশিষ্ট্য প্রখ্যাপনের উদ্দেশ্যে বলিতেছেন—

সমধর্ম্মস্পৃশী বা সমধর্ম্মিক পদাবলীর বিন্যাস-বৈচিত্র্যে যেখানে অন্যার্থ নিভূত বা আচ্ছাদিত থাকিবে সেখানেই 'নিভূতা' এই সার্থকনাম্নী প্রহেলিকা হইবে। 'অন্যার্থ' এই শব্দ দ্বারা দণ্ডী নিভূতার 'সহজ' এবং 'সংবরণীয়' এই দুইটি অর্থের সত্তা স্বীকার করিতেছেন ; উদাহরণেও তিনি দেখাইতেছেন।

হৃতদ্রব্যং নরং দৃষ্ট্বা ধনবন্তং ব্রজন্তি-কাঃ?

নানার্ভঙ্গসমাকৃষ্টলোকা বেষ্যা ন দৃষ্ট্বাঃ॥

প্রথম অর্থটি সহজগম্য দ্বিতীয়ার্থে নদীর বিষয় বলা হইয়াছে। সমান বিশেষণ শব্দের প্রয়োগে প্রসিদ্ধ শব্দার্থও পরিত্যক্ত হইয়া কৃত্রিম ব্যুৎপত্তিক্রমে নিভূত বা গৃপ্ত অর্থের সৃষ্টি করা হইয়াছে। এই জাতীয় বৈশিষ্ট্যের বিষয় আমরা বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মাস্তরের লক্ষণে জানিতে পারি নাই। দণ্ডীর লক্ষণে এবং উদাহরণে তাহা স্পষ্টই প্রতীত হইতেছে। এই নিভূতা এবং ইহার কাঞ্চিৎ পরবর্ত্তী প্রহেলিকা 'ব্যামূঢ়া' বা দণ্ডীর 'সম্মূঢ়া' প্রভৃতি পরবর্ত্তীকালে প্রহেলিকার রাজ্য হইতে অন্তর্ধান করিয়া অগ্নিপদারণ, রুদ্রটের কাব্যালঙ্কার এবং ভোজরাজের সরস্বতীকণ্ঠাভরণে

‘গুপ্ত’, ‘গুঢ়’, কারকগুপ্ত ক্রিয়াগুপ্ত, এবং নানা ‘গুঢ়’ কাব্যের অন্তর্ভুক্ত হইয়া বিভিন্ন নামে আত্মপ্রকাশ করিয়াছে। আমরা সময়ে তাহা প্রদর্শন করিব।

(১২) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের শ্বাদশ প্রহেলিকা ‘সমানশব্দা’ নামে কথিত হইয়াছে। ইহার লক্ষণ—  
সমানশব্দা কথিতা তুল্যাশব্দনিবন্ধনা।

দণ্ডীরও একাদশ প্রহেলিকা ‘সমানশব্দা’র লক্ষণ—

সমানশব্দোপন্যাস্তশব্দপর্ষায়সাধিতা।

উভয়ের নাম ও লক্ষণ একই প্রকার হইলেও দণ্ডীর লক্ষণে শব্দ যোজন্যের কিছু বৈচিত্র্য লক্ষিত হয়। ইহার কারণরূপে বলা যাইতে পারে দণ্ডী ‘নিভূতা’র লক্ষণে ‘তুল্যাধর্মস্পৃশা গিরা’ বলিয়াছেন। নিভূতার লক্ষণেই তুল্যাধর্মস্পর্শী বাক্যের প্রয়োজন হইয়াছিল। এখানেও ‘তুল্যাশব্দ নিবন্ধনা’ এই বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের বাক্যটি অনূসরণ করিলে ‘নিভূতা’র সহিত ‘সমানশব্দা’র কোন ভেদ থাকে না। দণ্ডীর লক্ষণে যেটুকু বৈশিষ্ট্য লক্ষিত হয় আমরা তদীয় উদাহরণে তাহার কারণ লক্ষ্য করিতে পারি। উদাহরণটি এই—

জিতপ্রকৃষ্টকেশাখ্যা যন্তবাত্মিসাহস্বয়ঃ।

স মামদ্য প্রভূতোৎকং করোতি কলভার্ষিণি॥

এখানে ‘প্রকৃষ্টকেশাখ্যা’ এবং ‘আত্মি’ এই শব্দদ্বয় লক্ষিত-লক্ষণার সাহায্যে প্রবাল ও অধরকে বুঝাইতেছে। এবং সেই লক্ষিত পদদ্বয়ের শব্দবশত তাদৃশ অর্থদ্বয়ের উপস্থিতি ঘটাইতেছে। এই সমানশব্দের যোজনায় অর্থগুপ্তি ঘটানোর জন্য ‘সমানশব্দা’ নামে প্রহেলিকা হইয়াছে।

(১৩) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ত্রয়োদশ প্রহেলিকা ‘ব্যামূঢ়া’ নামে খ্যাত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

অর্থান্দুলোম দ্বর্বোধ্য ব্যামূঢ়েতি তথোচ্যতে।

দণ্ডী এই ‘ব্যামূঢ়া’কে ‘সম্মূঢ়া’ বলিয়া তাহার লক্ষণ করিতেছেন—

সম্মূঢ়া নাম যা সাক্ষান্নির্দিষ্টার্থপি মূঢ়য়ে।

এই সম্মূঢ়া দণ্ডীর দ্বাদশ প্রহেলিকা। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ব্যামূঢ়ার সহিত ইহার ভেদ না থাকিলেও দণ্ডীর লক্ষণের বৈশিষ্ট্য প্রাধান্যযোগ্য। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের নিভূতা লক্ষণেও ‘অর্থব্যামোহে’র কথা বলা হইয়াছে এখানেও ‘অর্থান্দুলোমক্রমে দ্বর্বোধ্য’ ইহা বলা হইল। তবে নিভূতার সহিত ইহার ভেদ যে কি তাহা জানিবার উপায় নাই। দণ্ডী এই ভেদ আবিষ্কারের জন্যই লক্ষণে কিছু বৈশিষ্ট্যের সংযোজন করিয়া বলিতেছেন, যাহা সাক্ষাদ্ভাবে বলা হইলেও মোহের সৃষ্টি করিবে তাহাই সম্মূঢ়া নামে খ্যাত হইবে। রূদ্রট ইহাই লক্ষ্য করিয়া তদীয় প্রহেলিকার লক্ষণে বলিয়াছেন—

স্পষ্টপ্রচ্ছন্নার্থা প্রহেলিকা ব্যাহতার্থা চ।

এখানকার ‘ব্যাহতার্থা’ দণ্ডীর ‘সম্মূঢ়ার’ লক্ষণের উদ্দেশ্যেই বলা হইয়াছে ইহার আলোচনা আমরা পরে করিব। এই ‘সম্মূঢ়া’ সম্বন্ধে আমরা পূর্বেই বলিয়াছি ইহা পরবর্ত্তীকালে ‘গুঢ়’ কাব্যের অন্তর্ভুক্ত হইয়াছে।

(১৪) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের চতুর্দশ প্রহেলিকা ‘গুচ্ছা’ নামে অভিহিত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

গুচ্ছাখ্যা কথিতা বৃন্তে নানাবন্ধ নিবন্ধনা।



দণ্ডী সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকা মধ্যে ইহার উল্লেখ করেন নাই স্মৃতির দৃষ্ট চতুর্দশ প্রহেলিকার মধ্যেই ইহাকে নিষ্কপ করিয়াছেন বলা চলে। পুস্তকেই বলা হইয়াছে বহু দোষ আশঙ্কায় দণ্ডী দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকাগর্ভের নাম ও লক্ষণাদির উল্লেখ করেন নাই। দণ্ডীর দোষ বিবরণে 'ভিন্নবৃত্ত' নামক একটি দোষের উল্লেখ পাওয়া যায়। তাহার লক্ষণ—

বর্ণানাং ন্যূনতাদিকো গদ্রদলঘবধাশ্চিতিঃ।

তত্রতদ্ ভিন্নবৃত্তং স্যাদেবদোষঃ স্দনিশ্চিতঃ ॥

কাব্যঃ ৩।১৫৬

এই দোষের সহিত 'গদ্রদলঘবধাশ্চিতি' নামক দোষের উল্লেখ পাওয়া যাইতেছে, তখন সেই দোষ যে 'গদ্রদলঘবধাশ্চিতি' প্রহেলিকার বৃত্তে নানাবন্ধ সৃষ্টি করিতে পারে না ইহা জোর করিয়া বলা কঠিন। দণ্ডী বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মান্তরের অধিকাংশ প্রহেলিকা গ্রহণ করিয়াও যখন কয়েকটি মাত্রকে বর্জন করিয়াছেন, এবং দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার চতুর্দশ সংখ্যা পর্য্যন্ত স্বীকার করিয়া কাহারও নাম উল্লেখ করেন নাই তখন সেই অনূর্ণিত চতুর্দশ প্রহেলিকার মধ্যে এই গদ্রদলঘবধাশ্চিতির অন্তর্ভাব স্বীকার করিলে আশা করি সঙ্গতই হইবে।

(১৫) বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মান্তরের পঞ্চদশ প্রহেলিকা 'সংকীর্ণা' নামে খ্যাত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

একোভয়বহুচ্ছমে যথার্থ পরিগোপিতে।

সংকীর্ণা - ॥

দণ্ডীর চতুর্দশ, পঞ্চদশ ও ষোড়শ সংখ্যক প্রহেলিকা যথাক্রমে, একচ্ছমা, উভয়চ্ছমা ও সংকীর্ণা নামে অভিহিত। তাহাদের লক্ষণ—

(ক) একচ্ছমাশ্রিতং ব্যস্তং যস্যামাশ্রয়গোপনম্।

(খ) সা ভবেদুভয়চ্ছমা যস্যামুভয়গোপনম্।

(গ) সংকীর্ণা নাম সা যস্যং নানালক্ষণসংকরঃ ॥

বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মান্তরের সংকীর্ণা লক্ষণের সহিত পরিচিত হইবার পর দণ্ডীর এই তিনটি প্রহেলিকার বিবরণের প্রতি দৃষ্টপাত করিলেই দেখা যাইবে দণ্ডী পুস্তকেই সংকীর্ণা অবলম্বনে এই প্রহেলিকাটয় সৃষ্টি করিয়াছেন। যদি বলা হয় দণ্ডী সমস্ত প্রহেলিকাকেই প্রাচীন আচার্যগণের নির্দেশিত বলিয়া উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন, তবে এখানে প্রাচীন এক প্রহেলিকা হইতে প্রহেলিকাটয় কিরূপে তাহার সৃষ্টি হইতে পারে? ইহার উত্তরে বলিতে হয় বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মান্তরের সংকীর্ণার লক্ষণে এমনভাবে শব্দ বিন্যাস করা হইয়াছে তাহাতে ত্রিবিধ সংকীর্ণারই বোধ হইতে পারে, কিন্তু সেখানে তিনটির নির্দেশ মাত্রই দেখা যায় না; সংকীর্ণার অবাস্তর ভেদরূপে 'একচ্ছমা' 'উভয়চ্ছমা' ও 'বহুচ্ছমা' এই তিনের সংকেত স্পষ্টতই সেখানে রহিয়াছে। দণ্ডী স্দর্পিত ব্যস্ত এজন্য তিনি একচ্ছমা ও উভয়চ্ছমাকে পৃথকরূপে স্বীকার করিয়া 'বহুচ্ছমাকে 'সংকীর্ণা' বলিয়া নির্দেশ করিলেন। এবং প্রত্যেকের পৃথক বৈশিষ্ট্য প্রদর্শন করিয়া উদাহরণে স্দর্পিত করিয়াছেন। বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মান্তরের সূচনাই তদীয় লেখনী স্পর্শে রূপ পরিগ্রহ করিয়াছে। একমাত্র এখানে বলা চলিতে পারে বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মান্তরের বহুচ্ছমা সংকীর্ণার সহিত দণ্ডীর সংকীর্ণার লক্ষণের সাম্য ত দেখা যায় না। কারণ দণ্ডী সংকীর্ণার লক্ষণে নানা লক্ষণের সমন্বয় হইবে বলিয়াছেন, এখানে যথার্থ পরিগোপনের বহুচ্ছমতা ত স্বীকৃত হয় নাই। এই আক্ষেপের উত্তরে প্রথমে বলা যায়, নানা লক্ষণের সাংকর্য্য স্থলে অর্থের পরিগোপন অব্যাহতই থাকে এবং তাহা বহু

প্রকারে আচ্ছন্নই থাকে স্দুতরাং অর্থ-গোপনের বহুচ্ছন্নতা এখানে অবশ্যই পরিলক্ষিত হইতে পারে। দ্বিতীয় উত্তরে বলা যায় দণ্ডী বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের অনেক পরবর্ত্তী। পুর্বে যাহা অক্ষুট বা অস্পষ্ট অবস্থায় ছিল দণ্ডী সর্বজনবোধ্যরূপে তাহা স্দব্যস্ত করিয়াছেন এবং সঙ্কীর্ণ নাম শ্রবণে যে সাঙ্কর্ষ্যের কথা স্মরণে আসে সেই সাঙ্কর্ষ্য উপস্থাপিত করিয়াছেন বিভিন্ন প্রহেলিক্যুর সাঙ্কর্ষ্য স্বীকার করিয়া। এই সঙ্কীর্ণার আরও পরিচয়ে বলিয়াছেন—

সা নামান্তরিতামিপ্রা বশ্ণতা রূপযোগিনী।

এবমেবেতরাসামপ্যুমেয়ঃ সঙ্করক্রমঃ ॥

নামান্তরিতার সংমিশ্রণে বশ্ণতার স্বরূপও যেমন সঙ্কীর্ণায় পরিণত হইবে এইরূপ অপরাপর প্রহেলিকাও পারস্পরিক মিশ্রণে নানা 'সঙ্কীর্ণা' রচিত হইতে পারিবে। এই প্রকারে সঙ্কীর্ণার অনেক সংখ্যাও স্দচিত করিয়া দণ্ডী পুর্বারূপে অনেক অগ্রসর হইয়াছেন।

(১৬) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকার নাম 'সম্ভবোপেতা'। ইহা সঙ্কীর্ণার সাহিত সংযুক্ত অথচ সঙ্কীর্ণা নহে। সম্ভবোপেতার লক্ষণ—

একোভয় বহুচ্ছন্নে যথার্থ পরিগোপিতে।

সঙ্কীর্ণা, “সম্ভবোপেতা যা তদর্থকরী ভবেৎ ॥”

যথার্থের পরিগোপন এক উভয় ও বহু পদে আচ্ছন্ন হইয়া তাহা যেমন সঙ্কীর্ণা হইয়াছে ; আবার সম্ভব বা সামঞ্জস্যপূর্ণভাবে যথার্থের পরিষ্করণ ঘটিলে তাহাও 'সম্ভবোপেতা' নামে প্রহেলিকা হইবে। ইহাই বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের বক্তব্য। ইহারও উদাহরণ না থাকায় এবং দণ্ডী ইহার উল্লেখ না করার জন্য আমাদের নিকট এই সম্ভবোপেতা রহস্যবৃত থাকিয়া গিয়াছে। এবং রহস্যের প্রাবল্যের জন্যই দণ্ডী সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকায় ইহার স্থান নিশ্চেষ্ট করেন নাই। স্দুতরাং ইহার স্থান দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকা মধ্যেই নিশ্চেষ্ট করিয়া থাকিবেন এইমাত্র বলা যায়।

(১৭) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের সপ্তদশ প্রহেলিকা 'ব্যভিচারিণী' নামে উল্লিখিত ; ইহার লক্ষণ—

তদর্থকারী যদ্বার্থো জ্ঞায়তে হন্যার্থকামদুঃ।

রাজ্ঞশ্চন্দবশাৎ সা চ কথিতা ব্যভিচারিণী ॥

শব্দের বিচিত্র সমাবেশে যেখানে এক অর্থ পরিষ্কৃষ্টে অপর অর্থের কামনা করে তাহাই বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ব্যভিচারিণী। আমরা দণ্ডীর প্রহেলিকাচক্রে ইহার উল্লেখ পাই নাই, স্দুতরাং দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকা চতুর্দশেই ইহার অন্তর্ভাব করা ব্যতীত উপায় নাই। তবে অগ্নিপু্রাণ এবং রুদ্রটের গ্রন্থে যে আর্থী প্রহেলিকার বিবরণ পাওয়া যায় এবং ভোজরাজের সরস্বতীকণ্ঠাভরণে যে 'অর্থবতী' নামে ষষ্ঠ প্রহেলিকার উল্লেখ দেখা যায়, তাহারা যে এই ব্যভিচারিণীরই পরবর্ত্তী স্তর এ বিষয়ে সন্দেহ করিবার কারণ নাই। আমরা যথাসময়ে তাহাদের আলোচনা করিব।

(১৮) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের অষ্টাদশ প্রহেলিকা 'নষ্টার্থা' নামে খ্যাত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

উক্তেহর্থে বৃন্তবন্ধেন মাত্যভিঃ স্থাপিতা তথা।

নষ্টার্থা বা চ সা প্রোক্তা বৃন্তবন্ধনিদর্শিতা ॥

এই 'নষ্টার্থা' বা 'বৃন্তবন্ধনিদর্শিতা' প্রহেলিকাটি পুর্বেই ব্যভিচারিণী হইতে স্দৃষ্ট। উক্তে অর্থাৎ ব্যভিচারিণীতে প্রদর্শিত অর্থ যদি বৃন্তবন্ধের বৈচিত্র্যে অথবা মাত্রা সংযোজনের বৈশিষ্ট্যে উপস্থাপিত করা হয় তাহা 'নষ্টার্থা' নামে খ্যাত হইবে। অথবা বৃন্তবন্ধনিদর্শিতা (ব্যভিচারিণী) এই নামে অভিহিত হইবে, ইহাই লক্ষণের অর্থ জানা যায়। দণ্ডী সাধু প্রহেলিকায় ইহার

উল্লেখ করেন নাই কারণ এই জাতীয় প্রহেলিকা বহু দোষেরই আকর ভাবিয়া তিনি দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকা মধ্যে নিষ্কেপ করিয়া থাকিবেন ইহাই সম্ভব। আমরা দণ্ডীর ‘অপার্থ’ নামক দোষের মধ্যে ইহার অবস্থান অনেকাংশে দেখিতে পাই।

(১৯) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের ঊর্নাবংশ প্রহেলিকা “নষ্টাঙ্করা”; ইহার লক্ষণ—

নষ্টাঙ্করা তু কথিতা বিনৈকেন তদার্থদা।

একটি অঙ্কের নাশ বা চ্যুতিবশত যেখানে প্রহেলিকার অর্থবোধে কোন বাধা না ঘটে, সেখানে ‘নষ্টাঙ্করা’ নাম হইবে। ইহার উল্লেখও দণ্ডী সাধু ষোড়শ প্রহেলিকা মধ্যে করেন নাই। দণ্ডীর ‘শব্দহীন’ নামক দোষের মধ্যে ইহার কিছু সাম্য দেখা যায়, যদিও সেখানে অঙ্করচ্যুতির উল্লেখ নাই শব্দহীনরূপেই অঙ্করচ্যুতি উপলক্ষিত হইতে পারে। মোট কথা বিশেষ দোষের সম্ভাবনার দণ্ডী ইহাকে দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকার অন্তর্গত করিয়াছেন এ বিষয়ে সন্দেহ নাই, কারণ পরবর্ত্তীকালে অগ্নিপূরণ ও রুদ্রট কাব্যালঙ্কারে ইহার অবলম্বনে ‘চ্যুত’ কাব্যের সৃষ্টি হইয়াছে এবং ভোজরাজ স্পষ্টভাবে প্রহেলিকার প্রথম ভেদরূপে ‘চ্যুতাঙ্করা’ স্বীকার করিয়াছেন তাহা যে ‘নষ্টাঙ্করা’রই ভিন্ন নামমাত্র ইহাতে সংশয় নাই। অগ্নিপূরণের শাস্ত্রী প্রহেলিকা মধ্যেও ইহার প্রভাব দেখা যায়।

(২০) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের বিংশ প্রহেলিকা ‘বর্ণভ্রষ্টা’। ইহার লক্ষণ—

অন্যার্থতা তথৈবোক্তা বর্ণভ্রষ্টা নরেশ্বর। বর্ণচ্যুতিবশত যেখানে অন্যার্থের বোধ হইবে তাহা বর্ণভ্রষ্টা নামে খ্যাত ইহাই লক্ষণের অর্থ। এই বর্ণভ্রষ্টা নষ্টাঙ্করার ভিন্ন বিশদরূপ মাত্র। দণ্ডী ইহারও উল্লেখ করেন নাই। দৃষ্ট প্রহেলিকা মধ্যেই ইহার অন্তর্ভাব তাহার অভিপ্রেত ছিল বলা চলে। দণ্ডীর ‘ব্যর্থ’ নামক দোষের মধ্যে ইহার প্রভাব দেখা যায়। এই দোষ আশঙ্কা করিয়াই দণ্ডী সাধু প্রহেলিকায় ইহার উল্লেখ করিতে পারেন নাই। অগ্নিপূরণ প্রভৃতিতে চ্যুত, চ্যুতাঙ্করা, চ্যুতদণ্ডাঙ্করা প্রভৃতি ইহারই নামান্তর মাত্র।

(২১) বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের একবিংশ বা অস্তিম প্রহেলিকা লেশাখ্যা নামে অভিহিত। ইহার লক্ষণ—

কালস্য রূপরূপাণাং ব্যাখ্যানেন তদার্থদা।

বীজমাশ্রেণ লেশাখ্যা ভূমিপাল প্রকীর্তিতা॥

এই লক্ষণটির অর্থ কিছু রহস্যপূর্ণ মনে হয়, উদাহরণ না থাকায় ইহার মথার্থ স্বরূপ জানিবারও উপায় নাই। তথাপি শব্দার্থ অনুসারে যাহা জানিতে পারা যায় তাহা এই—কাল ও রূপ প্রভৃতির স্বরূপ ব্যাখ্যানে যাহার অর্থপ্রতীতি ঘটে এবং বীজ বা মূলমাত্র উল্লেখ যাহার সম্বন্ধে পাওয়া যায় তাহাই লেশাখ্যা প্রহেলিকা। দণ্ডী সম্ভবত এই রহস্য দর্শনেই সাধু প্রহেলিকায় ইহার স্থান বিধান করিতে ইতস্ততঃ করিয়াছেন। সুতরাং তদীয় দৃষ্ট চতুর্দশ প্রহেলিকা মধ্যে ইহার অন্তর্ভাব কল্পনা করা চলিতে পারে। তবে দণ্ডীর অর্থলঙ্কার বিবরণে ‘লেশ’ নামক একটি অলঙ্কারের উল্লেখ দেখা যায়। ইহাকে লেশাখ্যার সংশোধিত কাব্যরূপ বলা চলে। লেশের লক্ষণ—

লেশো লেশেন নির্ভিন্নবস্তুরূপনিগূহনম্।

উদাহরণ এবাস্য রূপমাবিভবিত্যতি। কাব্যঃ ২।২৬৫

উদাহরণ—

রাজকন্যান্দরন্তং মাং রোমোন্মভদেন রক্ষকাঃ।

অবগচ্ছেন্নুরা স্জাতমহো শীতানিলং খনম্ ॥ কাব্যঃ ২।২৬৬

অলঙ্কার বলিয়া ইহার মধ্যে প্রহেলিকা জাতীয় অর্থের দূরত্বতা দেখা যায় না বলিয়া দণ্ডী ইহাকে প্রহেলিকার মধ্যে অন্তর্ভুক্ত হয়ত করেন নাই। কিন্তু বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের 'লেশাখ্যা'র লক্ষণে যে বীজমাণের উল্লেখ এবং কাল প্রভৃতির পরিচয় সন্নিবেশের বিষয় পাওয়া গিয়াছিল এখানেও আমরা কিছ্, কিছ্, যে না পাইয়াছি তাহা বলিতে পারা যায় না। এই কিঞ্চিং সাম্যের সন্ধান পাইয়াই আমরা বলিতে পারি বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের 'লেশাখ্যা' প্রহেলিকার সৌষ্ঠবমাণ্ডিত ও দোষশূন্য পরবস্তী পরিণামরূপে দণ্ডীর এই লেশ অলঙ্কারের উদ্ভব হইয়াছে। রুদ্রট এবং ভোজরাজ প্রভৃতির 'গৃঢ়' নামক কাব্যভেদেও ইহার প্রভাব আরও পরবস্তী যুগে দেখা যায়। রুদ্রট ক্রিয়াগৃঢ় ও কারকগৃঢ়রূপে দ্বিবিধ গৃঢ় কাব্যের উল্লেখ করেন এবং অতি সংক্ষিপ্তভাবে লক্ষণ করিয়াছেন—

প্রচ্ছন্নম্বাদ্ ভবতস্তদ্ গৃঢ়ে কারকক্রিয়ান্তরয়োঃ। কাব্যালং ৫।২৬

ভোজরাজ অবশ্য এই ভেদম্বয় স্বীকার করিয়া আরও অতিরিক্ত চতুঃশ্লোক উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন, যথাসময়ে তাহা আলোচিত হইবে। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের প্রহেলিকা লক্ষণ নামক ষোড়শ অধ্যায়ে ইহার অতিরিক্ত কিছ্, পাওয়া যায় না এবং দণ্ডীর প্রহেলিকাচক্রেও অন্য কিছ্, বিশেষ আলোচনা দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় না। সুতরাং উভয়ের তুলনামূলক আলোচনা এইখানেই সমাপ্ত করিবার পূর্বে উপসংহার কথন হিসাবে কিছ্, বক্তব্য উপস্থাপিত করা হইতেছে।

পূর্বে বলা হইয়াছে বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের দোষ বিবরণের শেষে প্রহেলিকা বিবরণের উল্লেখ করিয়া স্পষ্টভাবে প্রহেলিকাসমূহকে দোষজরূপে স্বীকার করা হইয়াছে। দোষজ হইলেও প্রহেলিকা রচনায় বিশেষ সাবধানও করা হইয়াছে যেন যথেষ্টভাবে রচনা করা না হয়। ইহা দ্বারা অনর্দিত হইতে পারে তৎকালে প্রহেলিকার প্রচলন থাকিলেও বিধ্বংসমাজে তাহার তাদৃশ সমাদর ছিল না যাদৃশ দণ্ডীর সময়ে দেখা যাইত। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের কিয়ৎকাল পরেই ভামহ অবতীর্ণ হন, এইজন্য তাহার লিখনেও বিতৃষ্ণার ভাব লক্ষিত হয়। দণ্ডী ভামহের পরবস্তী তখন প্রহেলিকার প্রতি বিরক্তির ভাব কিছ্,টা শাস্ত হইয়া জিজ্ঞাসা ভাবের উদয়ের সঙ্গে সাধু প্রহেলিকার প্রতি আকর্ষণও আসিতে থাকে এবং সাধু ও দুষ্টের ভেদ বিষয়েও প্রশ্ন উত্থিত হয়। সেই প্রশ্নের সমাধান হিসাবে আমরা তদীয় গ্রন্থে সাধু ও দুষ্ট এই দুই প্রকার বিভাগ প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার সম্বন্ধেই দেখিতে পাইলাম। এবং বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের বিবৃত বহু নাম ও লক্ষণের পরবস্তী সুস্পষ্ট রূপও তাহার গ্রন্থে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে, যাহাতে বিদ্বজ্জনের ইহার প্রতি অনাসক্তির ভাব কাটিয়া যায় এবং তাহার বিচার করিয়া যেন সাধু প্রহেলিকাগুলিকে পরিত্যাগ না করেন, তাহার আবেদনও দণ্ডীর প্রহেলিকাচক্রে যেন ধর্নিত হইয়া উঠিয়াছে। দণ্ডী সাধু প্রহেলিকাগুলিকে 'দুষ্করমাগের' রচনারূপে যে স্বীকার করিয়াছেন তাহার মধ্যেও আমরা প্রহেলিকার প্রতি অবজ্ঞার ভাব অপনোদনের প্রচেষ্টা লক্ষ্য করিতে পারি। বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরের প্রহেলিকার নামগুলি যাহাতে সার্থক হইয়া উঠে এবং যে সব নামগুলি একেবারেই সেকেলে বা নিরর্থক মনে হইত, সেগুলির পরিবর্তন ও পরিবর্ধনসাধনও দণ্ডী করিয়াছেন। ইহার মধ্যেও পূর্বে প্রচেষ্টা লক্ষিত হয়। প্রহেলিকার উপযোগ সম্বন্ধে বিষ্ণুধর্মোত্তরে বিশেষ কিছ্,ই বলা হয় নাই। দণ্ডী যেন ঘোষণার ভাবে সেই উপযোগ ব্যক্ত করিয়াছেন

“ক্বীড়াগোষ্ঠী বিনোদেষু তজ্জৈঞ্জরাকীর্ণমন্ত্রণে।

পরব্যামোহনে চাপি সোপযোগাঃ প্রহেলিকাঃ॥” ৩।৯৭ কাব্যঃ

উল্লিখিত শ্লোকে। এই শ্লোকটি দণ্ডীর গ্রন্থেই প্রথম দেখা যায়, সুতরাং দণ্ডীরই রচনা বলা যাইতে পারে। ইহার অবিকল উল্লেখ আমরা ভোজরাজের সরস্বতী কণ্ঠাভরণেও প্রহেলিকা-প্রসঙ্গে দেখিতে পাই, সুতরাং শ্লোকটি যে এক বিশিষ্ট মতবাদের সমর্থক এ বিষয়ে সন্দেহের কারণ থাকিতে পারে না। দণ্ডীর প্রচেষ্টায় প্রহেলিকার প্রতি যে সমাদর সৃষ্ট হয় তাহা সম্ভবতঃ অধিককাল স্থায়ী হয় নাই, কারণ অগ্নিপু্রাণে প্রহেলিকার স্থান অতি সঙ্কুচিত দেখা যায়। প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকাগুলির কোন নাম পর্যন্ত তাহাতে পাওয়া যায় না। প্রহেলিকাগুলিকে ভাস্কর্য্য চূরিয়া বিভিন্ন চিত্রকাব্য ভেদে পরিণত করা হইয়াছে। অথচ দণ্ডীর উপরোক্ত শ্লোকের প্রতিধ্বনি সেই চিত্রকাব্যের লক্ষণেই ধ্বনিত করা হইয়াছে

“গোষ্ঠ্যাং কুত্‌হলাধ্যায়ী বাগ্‌বন্ধশ্চিহ্নম্‌চ্যতে।” (১)

এই বাগ্‌বন্ধ যে প্রহেলিকা ব্যতীত আর কিছুই নহে তাহাই আমরা প্রদর্শন করিবার চেষ্টা করিব (এবং অগ্নিপু্রাণের পরবর্ত্তী হিসাবে রুদ্রট ও ভোজরাজের অভিপ্রায়ও এই সম্বন্ধে প্রদর্শিত হইবে।

পশ্চিমভাগের মতে দণ্ডীর অনেক পরে অগ্নিপু্রাণে কাব্যবিবরণ সংযোজিত হইয়াছে। দণ্ডীর প্রহেলিকাচক্রে প্রহেলিকার যে স্বাতন্ত্র্যের পরিচয় পাওয়া যায় অগ্নিপু্রাণে তাহার কিছুমাত্র দৃষ্টিগোচর হয় না, বহুকাল প্রহেলিকার উপর অবজ্ঞা বা অনাসক্তিই তাহার কারণ। সেখানে চিত্রকাব্যের ‘দ্বিতীয়’ ভেদরূপে প্রহেলিকা কোন রকমে যেন নিজ সত্তা রক্ষা করিয়া আছে। সেখানে ‘প্রশ্ন’ বা প্রশ্নোত্তর, ‘গদ্য’ বা গদ্য, ‘চ্যুত’, ‘দন্ত’, ‘চ্যুতদন্ত’ এবং ‘সমস্যা’ এই ছয়টি অপরাপর চিত্রভেদের সহিত প্রহেলিকা অবস্থান করিতেছে। অথচ সেই ভেদগুলির সব কয়টিই প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার পরবর্ত্তী পরিণাম মাত্র। আমরা প্রথমে অগ্নিপু্রাণের ‘প্রহেলিকা’ নামক চিত্রভেদের আলোচনা করিয়া উল্লিখিত অন্যান্য চিত্রভেদগুলির আলোচনা করিব। অগ্নিপু্রাণের প্রহেলিকা—

শ্বয়োরপ্যর্থমোগ্‌দুহ্যমানশব্দা প্রহেলিকা॥ ৩৪৩।২৪ অগ্নিপু্রঃ

ইহার ভেদে বলা হইয়াছে—

সা শ্বিধাধী চ শাব্দী চ তত্রাধী চার্ধবোধতঃ।

শব্দাববোধতঃ শাব্দী, প্রাহ্ঃ ষোড়া প্রহেলিকাম্॥ ৩৪৩।২৫

অগ্নিপু্রাণের প্রহেলিকা লক্ষণের অর্থ দাঁড়াইতেছে, সহজ এবং অস্ফুট এই উভয় অর্থই যেখানে শব্দসম্মিলনের বৈচিত্র্যে গৃহিত করা হয় তাহাই প্রহেলিকা। অর্থের দ্বৈবিধ্য এবং শব্দের বৈচিত্র্য এই বস্তুটির ‘শাব্দী’ (শব্দপ্রধান) ও ‘আধী’ (অর্থপ্রধান) ভেদে ছয় প্রকার হইবে। এই পরিচয়ের দ্বারা বেশ বৃদ্ধিতে পারা যায় প্রাচীন সমস্ত সাধু প্রহেলিকাগুলিকে এই ছয়টি ভেদের কারাগারে আবদ্ধ করা হইয়াছে, কাহারও বৈশিষ্ট্য জানিবার উপায় নাই। কারণ, অগ্নিপু্রাণে বিষ্ণু ধর্ম্মোত্তরেরই ন্যায় উদাহরণ একটিরও প্রদর্শিত হয় নাই। আমরা মোটামুটিভাবে বলিতে পারি প্রাচীন ‘সমানশব্দা’, ‘পরুধা’, ‘সমানরুপা’, ‘দুর্ভাষিতা’ বা ‘প্রদূষিতা’, ‘বিন্দিতা’ বা ‘বিশৃঙ্খতা’,

‘বৃহস্পতি গোপিকান্তা’ বা ‘বৃহৎকান্তা’ প্রভৃতিতে লক্ষ্য করিয়া অগ্নিপুত্রের কাব্যবিবরণকার ‘শাস্ত্রী’ ভেদগ্রন্থের উল্লেখ করিয়াছেন, এবং ‘নামান্তরিতা’, ‘কাম্পিতা’ বা ‘প্রকাম্পিতা’, ‘সংকীর্ণা’ বা ‘একচ্ছিন্না’, ‘উভয়চ্ছিন্না’, ‘ব্যভিচারিণী’, ‘সম্ভবোপেতা’ প্রভৃতির অনুরোধে আত্মী ভেদগ্রন্থ স্বীকার করিয়াছেন। কারণ পুস্তকপ্রতিলিপিতে প্রহেলিকাগদ্য শব্দপ্রধান এবং শেষোক্ত প্রহেলিকাগদ্য অর্থপ্রধান। এই সমস্ত প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকা ব্যতীত যে সমস্ত প্রসিদ্ধ প্রহেলিকাগদ্যের ক্রমিক বিপর্যয় ঘটিয়া ভিন্ন নামে বা ভিন্ন প্রবাহে প্রচলন হয় তাহাদিগকে সেই সমস্ত নামেই চিত্রকাব্যের অপরাপর ভেদরূপে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। সেইগুলির মধ্যে প্রহেলিকা দ্বিতীয় ভেদ; অন্যান্য ভেদগুলির উল্লেখ পুস্তকেই করা হইয়াছে। অগ্নিপুত্রের শ্লোকটি এই—

প্রশ্নঃ প্রহেলিকা গুপ্তং চ্যুতং দত্তে তথোত্তরম্ ।

সমস্যা স্ত তদভেদা নানার্থস্যানুযোগতঃ ॥

এখানকার ‘প্রশ্ন’ নামক প্রথম ষট্‌শ্লোকটির পরিচয়ে অগ্নিপুত্রের বলা হইয়াছে—

যত্র প্রদীয়তে তুল্যবর্ণ বিন্যাসমুত্তরম্ ।

স প্রশ্নঃ স্যাদেকপৃষ্ঠোৎপৃষ্ঠোত্তরভেদতঃ ॥ ২৩

দ্বিধৈকপৃষ্ঠো দ্বিবিধঃ সমস্তো বাস্ত এব চ ॥

আমরা যদিও এবম্বিধ প্রশ্ন বা প্রশ্নোত্তরের সন্ধান প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার মধ্যে পাই না তথাপি প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকা ‘নিভৃতার উদাহরণে দণ্ডী কিছুর প্রশ্নের অবতারণা করিয়াছেন দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। দণ্ডীর নিভৃতার উদাহরণ—

হতদ্রব্যং নরং দৃষ্ট্বা ধনবস্তং ব্রজন্তি কাঃ ?

নানার্ভঙ্গি সমাকৃষ্টলোকা বেষ্যা ন দৃষ্ট্বাঃ ॥

সরস্বতীকণ্ঠাভরণে ভোজরাজ প্রহেলিকার পরিচয়ে বলিয়াছেন সৰুৎ প্রশ্নস্বরূপ। শ্লোকটি এই—

‘প্রহেলিকা সৰুৎপ্রশ্নঃ’ সাপি ষোড়শ চ্যুতাক্ষরা ।

দস্তাক্ষরোভয়ং ঋষ্টির্বিন্দুমত্যাৰ্হবত্যাপি ॥

সুতরাং প্রহেলিকা যে সৰুৎপ্রশ্নাত্মক ইহা পরবর্ত্তীকালেও স্বীকৃত হইতেছে। তবে যেখানে প্রশ্নোত্তরের একাধিক সমাবেশ দেখা যাইবে তাহাকে প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার পরবর্ত্তী বিস্তৃত রূপ বলা যাইতে পারে। এইজন্য রুদ্রটও বলিয়াছেন—

প্রশ্নানাশ্চ বহুনাশ্চুত্তরমেকং ভবেদ্ যত্র ॥

প্রশ্নোত্তরং তদেতদ্ বাস্তসমস্তভাদিভেদাম্বহুধা । (১)

এবং ভোজরাজেরও ‘প্রশ্নোত্তর’ নামক কাব্যলক্ষণেও ইহার বিশদ বিবরণ পাওয়া যায়—

যন্তু পর্য্যায়নুযোগস্য নিভেদঃ ক্রিয়তে পদৈঃ ।

বিদগ্ধগোষ্ঠ্যাং বাক্যৈর্বা তং হি প্রশ্নোত্তরং বিদুঃ ॥

অন্তঃপ্রশ্ন-বহিঃপ্রশ্নবহিরন্তঃ সমাহর্যৈঃ ।

জাতিপৃষ্ঠোত্তরাভিধৈঃ প্রশ্নেনস্তদপি ষড়্‌বিধম্ ॥ সং কঃ ২।১৩৬-৩৭

রুদ্রট এবং ভোজরাজ প্রশ্নোত্তরের উদাহরণ উত্তরোত্তর বিশদভাবে প্রত্যেক ভেদানুসারে প্রদর্শন

করিয়াছেন। এই সমস্তই অবশ্য পরবর্ত্তী কালের বিস্তার সাধন। কিন্তু মূল 'প্রশ্ন' নামক চিত্রভেদটি প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকা হইতেই যে সংগৃহীত, ইহা পূর্বেই উল্লেখ করা হইয়াছে।

(২) অগ্নিপূরাণের দ্বিতীয় চিত্রভেদ প্রহেলিকা ; ইহাও পূর্বে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। এই প্রহেলিকার শাস্ত্রীভেদ রুদ্রট স্বীকার করেন নাই। তিনি প্রহেলিকার পরিচয়ে বলিয়াছেন—

স্পষ্টপ্রচ্ছন্নার্থা প্রহেলিকা ব্যাহৃতার্থা চ ॥ ৫।২৫

সরস্বতীকণ্ঠাভরণে ভোজরাজ প্রহেলিকার যে ছয়টি ভেদ স্বীকার করেন তাহার মধ্যে 'চ্যুতাক্ষরা', 'দন্তাক্ষরা', 'চ্যুতদন্তাক্ষরা' অগ্নিপূরাণের শাস্ত্রীভেদের অন্তর্ভুক্ত বলিয়া বলা চলে না। কারণ অগ্নিপূরাণে 'চ্যুত' বা চ্যুতাক্ষরা 'দন্ত' বা দন্তাক্ষরা এবং উভয় অর্থাৎ চ্যুতদন্তাক্ষরার উল্লেখই রহিয়াছে, কিন্তু তাহাদিগকে সেখানে প্রহেলিকা বলা হয় নাই, তন্মত্রে চিত্রভেদই বলা হইয়াছে ; অথচ সরস্বতী কণ্ঠাভরণে স্পষ্টত ইহাদিগকে প্রহেলিকা বলিয়া উল্লেখ করা হইয়াছে। এই উল্লেখ দ্বারাই আমরা সাহসের সহিত বলিতে পারি যে অগ্নিপূরাণের চ্যুত, দন্ত প্রভৃতি ভেদ প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার পরবর্ত্তী পরিণাম মাত্র।

(৩) অগ্নিপূরাণের 'গুপ্ত' নামক চিত্রভেদের লক্ষণ—

যস্মিন্ গুপ্তেহপি বাক্যাস্তে ভাবার্থোহপারমার্থিকঃ।

তদঙ্গবিহিতাকাক্ষস্তুদ্ গুপ্তং গুঢ়মপ্যদঃ ॥

যেখানে বাক্যস্তু বা বাক্যের অংশবিশেষ গুপ্ত থাকিলে তাহার অপেক্ষাবশতঃ ভাবী সারার্থও অপারমার্থিক বা অপ্রকৃত অর্থরূপে অবস্থান করে, সেখানে 'গুপ্ত' বা গুঢ় নামক চিত্রভেদ হইবে। অগ্নিপূরাণের এই লক্ষণার্থের সহিত প্রাচীন 'নিভূতা' বা 'সম্মূঢ়া'র বিশেষ কোন পার্থক্য নাই ইহা পূর্বেও সেই সেই লক্ষণ আলোচনাপ্রসঙ্গে বলা হইয়াছে। অগ্নিপূরাণের অনুসরণেই রুদ্রট ও ভোজরাজ ইহাকে প্রহেলিকা না বলিয়া 'গুঢ়'রূপেই নিশ্চেষ্ট করিয়াছেন। রুদ্রটের 'গুঢ়' দুই প্রকার এবং ভোজরাজের মতে ইহা ছয় প্রকার। রুদ্রটের 'গুঢ়' পরিচয়—

প্রচ্ছন্নম্বাদ্ ভবতস্তদ্ গুঢ়ে ক্রিয়াকারকাস্তরয়োঃ।

ক্রিয়া এবং বিভিন্ন কারকের আচ্ছাদন করা হইলে তাহা 'ক্রিয়াগুঢ়' এবং 'কারকগুঢ়' নামে খ্যাত হয় ইহাই রুদ্রটের বক্তব্য। এইখানে আমরা বলিতে পারি, 'গুঢ়'ের কিছু বিশিষ্ট অভিযুক্তি রুদ্রট দেখাইয়াছেন যাহা প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার লক্ষণে পাওয়া যায় নাই।

ভোজরাজও 'গুঢ়'কাব্যের বিশদ পরিচয় দিয়াছেন। অগ্নিপূরাণ এবং রুদ্রটের অনুসরণেই তাহা প্রদত্ত হইয়াছে—

ক্রিয়াকারকসম্বন্ধে পদাভিপ্রায়বহুভিঃ।

গোপিতৈঃ ষড়্বিধং প্রাহুর্গুঢ়ং গুঢ়ার্থবোদিনঃ ॥

তিনি রুদ্রটের অনুসরণ করিয়াও তৎকালপ্রসিদ্ধ আরও অতিরিক্ত ভেদ যোজনা করিয়াছেন। তাহার মতে 'ক্রিয়াগুঢ়', 'কারকগুঢ়', 'সম্বন্ধগুঢ়', 'পাদগুঢ়', 'অভিপ্রায়গুঢ়' এবং 'বহুগুঢ়'রূপে ছয় প্রকার গুঢ়কাব্যের ভেদ হইতে পারে। প্রত্যেকটির পৃথক্ উদাহরণ প্রদর্শন করিয়া সমস্ত পরিষ্ফুট করিয়াছেন। এই 'গুঢ়' নামক চিত্রভেদটি যে প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকা হইতে উদ্ভূত, এ বিষয়ে সংশয় অপনোদনের আর একটি প্রমাণ আমরা সরস্বতী কণ্ঠাভরণে দেখিতে পাই। ভোজরাজ 'সম্বন্ধগুঢ়'ের উদাহরণে দণ্ডীর সমাগতার উদাহরণটিই অবিকল উল্লেখ করিয়া দেখাইয়াছেন। অন্যান্য প্রমাণ আমরা পূর্বেই প্রদর্শন করিয়াছি।

(৪) অগ্নিপুত্রাণের চতুর্থ চিত্রভেদ 'চ্যুত' নামে প্রসিদ্ধ। এই 'চ্যুত' কাব্যের লক্ষণে বলা হইয়াছে—

যদ্যর্থান্তরনির্ভাসো বাক্যাংগচ্যবনাদিভিঃ।

তদঙ্গবিহিতাকাঙ্ক্ষস্তচ্চ্যুতং স্যাচ্চতুর্বিধম্ ॥ ২৭

'স্বরব্যঞ্জনিবিন্দনাং বিসর্গস্য চ বিচ্যুতেঃ।'

বাক্যের অংশবিশেষের বিচ্যুতিবশত স্বেই অংশবিশেষের অপেক্ষায় যেখানে প্রকৃত অর্থের বোধ না হইয়া অন্য অর্থের বোধ ঘটায় সেখানে 'চ্যুত' নামক চিত্রভেদ হইবে। সেই 'চ্যুত' স্বর, ব্যঞ্জন, অনুস্বার এবং বিসর্গের বিচ্যুতিরূপে চতুর্ভেদে বিভক্ত হইবে। সুতরাং চ্যুতস্বর, চ্যুতব্যঞ্জন, চ্যুতিবিন্দু এবং চ্যুতিবিসর্গ নামে চ্যুতকাব্যের চারিভেদ অগ্নিপুত্রাণে পাওয়া যাইতেছে।

(৫) ইহারই সমপর্যায়ে 'দন্ত' নামক চিত্রভেদের লক্ষণে সেখানে বলা হইয়াছে—

দন্তেহপি যত্র বাক্যাংশে দ্বিতীয়োহর্থঃ প্রতীয়তে।

দন্তং তদাহস্তস্তেদাঃ স্বরাদৈঃ পৃথ্ববিন্দতাঃ ॥ ২৮

(৬) এবং 'উভয়' বা 'চ্যুতদন্ত' নাম চিত্রভেদের লক্ষণে বলা হইয়াছে—

অপনীতাক্ষরস্থানে ন্যস্তে বর্ণান্তরেহপি চ।

ভাসতে হর্থাস্তরং যত্র চ্যুতদন্তং তদুচ্যতে ॥

অগ্নিপুত্রাণের অনুসরণে রুদ্রটও 'চ্যুত' নামক চিত্রভেদ স্বীকার করিয়া 'মাত্রা বিন্দু চ্যুতকে' অর্থাৎ মাত্রাচ্যুত ও বিন্দুচ্যুত বলিয়া তাহাদের সংক্ষিপ্ত পরিচয় দিয়াছেন—

মাত্রাবিন্দুচ্যবনাদন্যার্থেইন তচ্চ্যুতে নাম।

কিন্তু ভোজরাজ চ্যুতাক্ষরা, দন্তাক্ষরা এবং চ্যুতদন্তা প্রহেলিকারই ভেদরূপে স্বীকার করিয়া প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকা নষ্টাক্ষরা, বর্ণভ্রষ্টা ও নষ্টার্থারই পরবর্ত্তী পরিণাম প্রমাণিত করিয়াছেন। এ সম্বন্ধে পৃথ্ব সর্বিস্তারে বলা হইয়াছে অধিক কিছুর বলিবার নাই। তবে রুদ্রটের 'মাত্রাচ্যুত' নামক ভেদের বীজ রূপে নষ্টার্থার লক্ষণটি এখানে উদ্ধৃত করা হইতেছে—

উক্তেহর্থে বৃন্তবন্ধন মাত্রাভিঃ স্থাপিতা তথা।

নষ্টার্থা চ সা প্রোক্তা বৃন্তবন্ধনিদর্শিতা ॥

এই লক্ষণে মাত্রা স্থাপিতা এবং মাত্রা নষ্টার্থা 'মাত্রাচ্যুত' ভেদের অবলম্বন স্বরূপ বলা চলে।

(৭) অগ্নিপুত্রাণের সপ্তম চিত্রভেদ 'সমস্যা'র লক্ষণে দেখা যায়—

সুশ্লষ্টপদ্যমেকং যম্মনাশ্লেকাংশনির্মিতম্।

সা সমস্যা পরস্যাঋপরয়োঃ কৃতিসঙ্করাং ॥

এই 'সমস্যা' নামক চিত্রভেদের উদাহরণ অগ্নিপুত্রাণে না থাকায় ইহার স্বরূপ যে কি তাহা জানিবার উপায় নাই। তবে 'সমস্যা' নামটি প্রাচীন, কারণ অমরকোষে 'সমস্যা তু সমাসার্থা' বলিয়া ইহার পরিচয় পাওয়া যায় এবং কাদম্বরীতেও এই 'সমস্যা' নামক বিচিত্র কাব্যবিশেষের উল্লেখ দেখা যায়। আমরা বিষ্ণুধর্ম্মস্তির এবং দণ্ডীর গ্রন্থে ইহার উল্লেখ বা উপাদান যথার্থ-ভাবে পাই না; একমাত্র বলা যায় দণ্ডীর 'সঙ্কীর্ণা' নাম্নী প্রহেলিকায় যেমন "নানালক্ষণ সঙ্করঃ" বলা হইয়াছে এখানেও 'নানা শ্লেকাংশনির্মিতম্' বলিয়া উল্লেখ করা হইয়াছে। এখন প্রাচীন 'সঙ্কীর্ণা' প্রহেলিকা হইতে ইহার উদ্ভব হইয়াছে কিনা বলা সহজ নহে। তবে যদি



বলা হয় প্রাচীন লক্ষণ সাংস্কৃতিকের অংশে যেমন সংস্কীর্ণা প্রহেলিকা হইয়াছিল, সেইরূপ বিভিন্ন শ্লোকের অংশবিশেষ হইতে রচিত এক বিচিত্র শ্লোকে আত্মপরের কৃতি সাংস্কৃত্য সৃষ্টি করিয়া পূর্ব্বাপেক্ষা বৈশিষ্ট্য প্রদর্শন করা হইয়াছে তাহা হইলে বিশেষ দোষের আশংকা নাও থাকিতে পারে।

এই সমস্যা নামক চিত্রভেদের উল্লেখ আমরা পরবর্ত্তীকালের প্রসিদ্ধ আলংকারিকগণেরও গ্রন্থে দেখিতে পাই না। রুদ্রট না হয় এষ্ট সমস্ত চিত্রকাবের প্রতি আকৃষ্ট ছিলেন না, কারণ তিনি “ক্ৰীড়ামাত্রোপযোগিমদম্” বলিয়া ইহাদের গুরুত্বই স্বীকার করেন নাই; কিন্তু ভোজরাজ সমস্ত বিষয়েরই আভিবিম্বিত বিন্যাসের পক্ষপাতী হইয়াও সমস্যার প্রতি কেন যে দৃষ্টিপাত করেন নাই তাহা বুঝিতে পারা যায় না। একমাত্র বলা চলে ভোজরাজের সময়ে ইহার প্রচলনই হয়ত ছিল না। আমরা ধর্ম্মদাস স্মৃতিরূপিত ‘বিদগ্ধ-মুখমুণ্ডন’ নামক গ্রন্থেও প্রহেলিকা প্রভৃতির বহু বিচিত্র ভেদ দেখিতে পাঠ অথচ সেখানেও সমস্যার কোন উল্লেখ পাওয়া যায় না। তবে সেখানে নামান্তরে কথিত হইয়াছে কিনা বলা যায় না।

আমরা ভোজরাজের অর্থবতী প্রহেলিকার উদাহরণে—

উত্তরতকাণ্ডনাভাসং সংদর্শদশনচ্ছদম্।

সরসং চুম্বাতে হৃষ্টে বৃদ্ধৈরপি কিমুজ্জ্বলম্॥

এই শ্লোকটি দেখিতে পাই। এই জাতীয় প্রহেলিকা প্রাচীন ছিল, কারণ দ্ব্যর্থক পদ প্রয়োগে আশ্চর্য রূপ অর্থ যেমন এখানে দিগদর্শনক্রমে প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে, প্রাচীন ‘সমানশব্দ’র লক্ষণেও এই জাতীয় প্রহেলিকার বীজ প্রাপ্ত হওয়া যায়। পূর্ব্ববর্ত্তীকালে যাহা অধিক রহস্য-পূর্ণ করিয়া রাখা হইয়াছিল পরবর্ত্তীকালে তাহা সহজবোধারূপে দেখান হইয়াছে মাত্র। এই-রূপ পরবর্ত্তীকালের বহু ভেদ পূর্ব্ববর্ত্তীকালের প্রহেলিকা হইতে উপাদান সংগ্রহ করিয়া ভিন্ন নামে প্রচলিত ও প্রচারিত হইয়াছে দেখিতে পাওয়া যাইবে। আমরা পূর্ব্বেই দেখাইয়াছি দণ্ডীর ‘নিভূতা’ প্রহেলিকার উদাহরণে যে প্রশ্নের অবতারণা করা হইয়াছে অগ্নিপদ্রাণে তাহা ‘প্রশ্ন’ নামক চিত্রভেদে সফুৎপৃষ্ঠ প্রশ্নোত্তরে পাওয়া যায়। অগ্নিপদ্রাণের সফুৎপৃষ্ঠ প্রশ্নোত্তরকে রুদ্রট ‘প্রশ্নোত্তর’ কাব্যে স্থান দেন নাই। তিনি বহু প্রশ্নের এক উত্তরেই ‘প্রশ্নোত্তর’ হইবে স্বীকার করিলেন। ভোজরাজও প্রহেলিকাকে ‘সফুৎ প্রশ্নাত্মক’ বলিয়া পৃথক করিয়া রাখিলেন এবং প্রশ্নোত্তরের ‘অন্তঃপ্রশ্ন’ ‘বহিঃপ্রশ্ন’ ‘বহিরন্তঃপ্রশ্ন’ ‘জাতিপ্রশ্ন’ ‘পৃষ্ঠপ্রশ্ন’ এবং ‘উত্তরপ্রশ্ন’ রূপ ছয় প্রকার বিচিত্র প্রশ্নোত্তরের ভেদ প্রদর্শন করিলেন। অথচ অগ্নিপদ্রাণের একপৃষ্ঠ ও দ্বিপৃষ্ঠ এবং বাস্ত ও সমস্তভাবে প্রশ্নোত্তরের চতুর্ভেদ স্বীকার করিলেন না। যদিও রুদ্রট বহু প্রশ্নাত্মক স্বীকার করিয়াও বাস্ত ও সমস্তভেদে প্রশ্নোত্তরের বহু ভেদ স্বীকার করিয়াছেন। আমরা বিদগ্ধ মুখমুণ্ডনেও অগ্নিপদ্রাণ বা রুদ্রটের প্রশ্নোত্তর অনুসরণে ‘বাস্ত’ ‘দ্বিবাস্ত’ ‘বাস্তসমস্ত’ ‘দ্বিবাস্তসমস্ত’ ‘দ্বিসমস্তকবাস্ত’ এবং ‘একালাপক’ ‘প্রভিন্তক’ এবং আরও অনেক প্রকার ভেদ দেখিতে পাই। আবার ‘শ্লোকোত্তর’ ‘খণ্ডোত্তর’ ‘পদোত্তর’ প্রভৃতিও বিচিত্র ভেদ এই প্রশ্নোত্তর কাব্য হইতে সৃষ্ট হইয়াছে দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। এবং প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকার আর্থী ও শাব্দী ভেদ অবলম্বনে সেখানে—আর্থী, শাব্দী, কালসার, কালসারাদিহৃদ্য, অজমারাদিগৃঢ়, পাদগৃঢ়, অর্থগৃঢ়, স্থূর্তিনন্দা, দ্ব্যর্থ, অপহৃদ্য, বিন্দুমৎ, ক্লিয়াগুপ্ত এবং কারকগুপ্তের ছয় প্রকার ভেদ, সম্বন্ধগুপ্ত, আমন্ত্রিতগুপ্ত, সমাসগুপ্ত, লিঙ্গগুপ্ত, সন্দ্বচনগুপ্ত, তিঙ্ণবচনগুপ্ত, মাত্রাচ্যুতক, বিন্দুচ্যুতক, বিসর্গচ্যুত, অক্ষরচ্যুত, স্থানচ্যুত, ব্যঞ্জনচ্যুত, চ্যুতদত্তাক্ষরা—এই একত্রিশ প্রকার ভেদ এবং তাহাদেরও কতিপয়ের অবাস্তর ভেদ প্রদর্শিত হইয়াছে। এইরূপেই প্রাচীন প্রহেলিকাগুলি বিভিন্ন সময়ে বিভিন্ন বৈশিষ্ট্য যুক্ত হইয়া বিচিত্র নামে অভিহিত হইয়াছে।

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## WIT, HUMOUR AND SATIRE IN ANCIENT INDIAN LITERATURE

BY DR. S. K. DE

ALTHOUGH some manifestation of the bizarre and the grotesque may be found in Indian Art and Architecture, one must look to literature for the proper display of Wit, Humour and Satire. But since the earliest Indian literature, comprised in the *Veda*, *Brāhmaṇa*, and *Upaniṣad* was predominantly religious, ritualistic or speculative in character, there was very little scope for the sparkle of wit or pleasantness of humour. There is, no doubt, a comic side to some of the myths and legends, but to the ancient Indians themselves they never appeared in a fantastic light. It is witty, for instance, in view of Indra's immoderate indulgence in Soma drink, to call the Soma-vats 'the belly of Indra' (*indrodara*), but the exhilaration of Soma partook of a serious religious character. Indra's monologue (*Rg-v.*, x. 119), in which he boasts, apparently under the influence of Soma, of his superior power and greatness, may be amusing as the earliest specimen of inebriate braggadocio in literature; but since Indra's cosmic acts are attributed to Soma, such a profane view is out of the question. The curious Frog Hymn (*Rg-v.*, vii-103), in which the croaking frogs in the rainy season are likened to priests chanting at the Soma ritual, or to Vedic students repeating their lessons, is sometimes taken as a raillery or satire on the Brahmans; but it is more properly a *captatio benevolentiae* to the frogs, the great wizards who have the magical power of bringing rain; the simile is for flattery and not for fun, for graphic and not for satiric effect. In the same way, it is misdirected ingenuity which would interpret the well-known, but obscure, Male-Monkey (*Vṛṣākapi*) Hymn (*Rg-v.*, x. 86), in which a favourite monkey is apparently the subject of dispute between Indra and Indrāṇī, as a satire directed against a certain prince and his wife; the coarse language of some of its stanzas is no argument, for such language is not inadmissible in magic spells, especially in those connected with fertility rites.

Scattered throughout Vedic literature we have witty, but cynical, remarks about wealth and woman. In the *Ṛg-veda*, for instance, one poet observes that wealth in the form of cows makes even the lean man fat and the ugly handsome (iv. 28.6), and buys the affection of many a maiden (x. 27.12); another attributes the saying to Indra himself that the mind of woman is fickle and her temper ungovernable (viii. 33.17); while Urvasī herself tries to persuade Purūravas that with woman can be no lasting friendship, for their hearts are those of hyenas (x. 95.15). The *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* (i. 10. 1116; iii. 6.3) describes woman as untruth and classifies her with dice and drink as one of the three chief evils; the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (xiv. 1. 1. 32) speaks of woman along with the Śūdra, the dog and the crow, as something wrong; while the *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā* (xxx.1) alludes sarcastically to her ability to obtain things from her husband by cajolery at night. These observations, meant to be more earnest than jocular, are indeed interesting; for moralising, which underlies all satire, is as a rule foreign to the spirit of the Vedic texts, while such denunciation is a commonplace of later ascetic literature of India which, from the Buddha to Śaṅkara, condemns woman as the gate of hell. There is also some raciness, as well as ferocity, in the unmeasured language of some of the Atharvanic spells and incantations meant for the destruction of enemies in general and co-wives in particular. For driving away worms, tiny fantastical worms in the entrails, in the ribs and in the head, worms that move about in the eyes, in the ears and in the middle of the teeth, there are exorcising spells (*Atharva-veda*, 11.31; v. 23), which naively speak of them as demoniacal beings, males and females, of many colours, black, white, red and brown, having mothers, brothers and sisters, as well as kings and viceroys! The personified Fever, with its brother Consumption, sister Cough and nephew Herpes, is also imagined (*Atharv.*, v. 22) as a spotty yellow demon and asked not only to go to the enemy tribes, but also to "seek a lascivious Śūdra girl and shake her through and through"! But less savage and more amusing is the spell for inducing sleep (*Atharv.*, iv. 5), in which the lover stealing to his sweetheart at night wishes: "May the mother sleep, may the father sleep, may the dog sleep, may the eldest in the house sleep, may her relations sleep, may the people round about sleep!"

These and other secular hymns, some of which are of a narrative character, as well as short legends in the *Brāhmaṇas*, are indications that contemporaneous with the religious literature of the Veda, there probably existed a profane literature which is now lost, but from which in course of time emerged, on the one hand, the rich collection of tales and fables in the Buddhist and Jaina literature, and on the other, the narrative miscellany of the Epic and Parāṇa literature, with their diversified content of inexhaustible legendary and didactic material. This later phase of Indian literature was abundantly developed on the secular side, but it was still elevated in tone and became distinctly moralising in spirit. Perhaps it was no longer hieratic, but in the strict sense it cannot be described as popular literature: it was nearer to the popular mind, but scarcely composed or

inspired by the people. There is, therefore, some quaint and racy flavour in the parables and fables, in the popular tales and smaller narratives, but there is no consistent or pervasive expression of general comic spirit.

The didactic passages, however, are not entirely devoid of witty sayings, quaint similes and clever epigrams. The traditional gnomie wisdom, for instance, is often expressed with a nimble sagacity of apprehension which amuses the fancy. Here is a specimen from the sayings of Vidura (*Mbh.*, v. 33.7), where six kinds of people are enumerated as flourishing on six others: thieves on the heedless, physicians on the diseased, women on the libidinous, priests on the worshippers, kings on the litigants, and wise men on the fools! With this may be compared the enumeration of 'eight powers' in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (viii.27): crying is the power of the child, weapons are the power of robbers, sovereignty is the power of kings, pride is the power of fools, humility is the power of sages, reflection is the power of scholars, and meekness is the power of ascetics and Brahmans. We have also passages in the lighter vein on the temptations of monastic life, but nothing perhaps surpasses the amusing description, in the Jaina *Sūyagaḍaṅga* (1.4.1.9f; 2.1f), of the plight of men caught in the snares of women, who make them slaves and drudges, hold the baby, and "wash clothes like a washerman"! The well-known dialogue also of the canonical *Nijjuttī*, which passage is traditionally copied in Vallabhadeva's *Subhāṣitāvālī* (No. 2402) and other much later works, shows that archness of pungent wit could be attained in ridiculing the dubious character of a certain class of Jaina monks:

"O monk, your cloak has many folds". "Yes, it serves me as a net when I catch fish". "You eat fish?" "I eat them along with my wine". "You drink sweet wine?" "O yes, with the harlots". "What, you go to harlots?" "After I have crushed my enemies". "You have enemies, then?" "Only those whose house I rob". "You are a thief, then?" "Only because of the love of dice". "How, are you a gambler?" "Am I not, after all, the son of a slave mother?"

Each age has its folly and foible, which do not escape observation, but the irrepressible desire to reprove or ridicule finds expression in this age chiefly in the didactic admonition of the delightful parables, tales and fables. From remote antiquity religious wisdom favoured the use of parables, generally from a serious motive and not from a mere sense of humour; but very often, as in the case of the well-known Udāna parable of the elephant and the blind men, there is considerable wit in making small and familiar things symbolical of great and strange varieties. The illustrative tales of common life are perhaps more amusing and more in keeping with the popular *bonhomie* and good humour. The Buddhist *Jātaka* and the Jaina *Kathānaka*, as well as the Epic and the *Purāṇa*, abound in entertaining little stories of naughty wives and foolish husbands, of clever people trying to outwit one another but generally overreaching themselves, of hopeless fools whom—to quote a memorable phrase of Dryden's—"God for mankind's mirth has made". The beast-fable, closely allied to the parable in its definite

didactic motive, has a different kind of humorous appeal in its drollery and mummery of human life, in its looking askance at human nature and depicting it in the palpable hieroglyphics of brute creation. Perhaps the R̥gvedic Frog Hymn, whatever might have been its object, already recognises a certain kinship between men and beasts; and the Upaniṣadic parable (*Chāndogya Up.*, 1.12) of dogs, who search for a leader to howl food for them, goes a step further; but the dogs do not yet bark wisdom nor do the frogs croak humanity. The beast-fable is not yet recognised as a distinct literary *genre* either in the Epic or in the Jātaka, although the beast-motif, in which animals fare better than men, is utilised in numerous fables for purposes of moral instruction. In the Epic, for instance, we have the old fable of the innocent mice and the crafty cat (found also in the Jātaka); of the clever jackal, the greedy vulture and the dead child at the cremation ground; of the hypocritical flamingo eating up the eggs of deluded birds. In the Jātaka we have a much larger number of diversified fables, for instance, of the monkey outwitting the crocodile; of the ass in lion's skin; of the cunning crane leading the unsuspecting fishes into pleasant waters and devouring them all, but ultimately receiving punishment from the clever crab; of the wicked jackal bringing about estrangement between two friends, the lion and the bull; of the ox envious of the pig on account of its good food, but becoming wise on learning that the pig is being fattened only for slaughter; of the obstinate donkey who would not move being lured by the eternal feminine; of the jackal all-tooth, riding a lion rampant on the back of two elephants and going to war against the king of Benares, only to be foiled by the cunning of the priest of the king; and so forth. All these undoubtedly suggested the materials out of which the full-fledged beast-fable developed in the *Pañca-tantra* in a more systematic literary form.

The serious narratives of the Epics do not naturally give us a rich harvest of humour. One may perhaps find some grim humour in the Mahābhārata conception of the son of Dharma as an inveterate gambler and clever casuist, of the lofty teacher of the Gītā as a great diplomat and unscrupulous strategist, or of Draupadī's anger as the pivot on which the terrible family-feud and wholesale carnage turned; but one cannot justly regard such aspects as expressions of the comic spirit. In the smaller narratives and legends there is nothing more than a little rough and racy flavour, occurring here and there only incidentally, for instance, in the legend of Nahuṣa becoming Indra overnight and yoking the divine ascetics to his chariot; in the story of the two wives of his worthy son Yayāti, who in his old age had youthful inclinations; in the description of the naive R̥ṣyaśiṅga seduced by the experienced courtesan; or in the recasting of the old Vedic legend of the rejuvenation of decrepit Cyavana for the sake of the youthful Sukanyā. In the more refined and poetical *Rāmāyaṇa* even, such instances are not rare. We have the story of the child Hanūmat jumping at the sun because his mother instructed him to eat red fruit, the smashing of his body by the Sun's kick and subsequent piecing together of his dismembered limbs; the description of Kumbhakarṇa's enormous meal or Hanūmat's long tail which created havoc

at Lañkā, and so forth ; but these are very slight and poor specimens of real humour. Some of the narratives are repeated in the Purāṇas, but there they lose whatever rough-hewn facetiousness they have in the Epics.

When we come to what is known as the classical period of Sanskrit literature, which commences roughly with the beginning of the Christian era, we come across a much more diversified literature, which is different in form, matter and spirit from the Vedic or the Epic. With the disappearance of Epic didacticism and Buddhist rigorism, we find the emergence of a new sense of life and its pleasure and a general desire for refinement, beauty and luxury. With increased secularisation and sophistication, traces of wit and humour become more frequent, but the conditions were such that there was no effective evolution of a really humorous literature. The complex and cultured society had undoubtedly many features which could have furnished fair sport for the literary purveyor of fun, but the essentially romantic and sentimental literature which came to prevail, and which had its own standardised theory and practice of art, was precisely the reverse of the humorous. Leaving aside the further developed literature of tales and fables, which had a simpler style and perhaps greater popular appeal, we have for our purpose, only some lighter erotic verses with their verbal wit and humorous fancy, some gnomic stanzas of mocking wisdom, a thin surplus of satiric arabesques of men and manners, some coarse and jocular stories, and a small body of comic writing of the farcical kind. All these have a piquancy of their own ; but considering the vast extent of Sanskrit literature, this is indeed a meagre showing. Even if the wit displayed is certainly striking and, to a certain extent, peculiarly Indian, the type of humour that is scantily represented is hardly *sui juris*. The authors are all either poets, dramatists, moralists or story-tellers ; there is no need of classifying any one exclusively or outstandingly as a humorist.

The modern reader may feel flattered and think a great deal of his own sense of humour, but he need not presume that his worthy ancestors necessarily had a stupid time. That they had the disposition and ability to laugh is clear from the diffused and spasmodic specimens, but the conditions were scarcely propitious to humorous literature. There was nothing wrong with the Indian genius, which could achieve brilliant success in poetry, drama and certain forms of fiction, but there was something wrong in the way in which the Indian literary mind evolved and the Indian author was expected to behave. Although there was at its start no limitation of form, and the immense fund of legends, as well as the unlimited diversity of life, was open to it, Sanskrit literature from the beginning appears to have been sequestered for the study or for cultured society, which was not quite the best nourishing soil of wider human interest and intercourse. It had little, therefore, of the *gaieté de coeur*, the broad and joyous popular exuberance, its robust good sense, its simplicity, directness and freedom ; the literature was lofty, exclusive, refined and cultivated. It was composed for an urban and sophisticated audience, and had its own system of phraseology, its own set of

imageries and conceits, and its own refinement of emotional analysis. In course of time its stylistic elegancies and sentimental subtleties must have spread down and reached the masses, and there is no reason to suppose that their appreciation was always restricted to a privileged circle. But when the really creative stage had subsided, there was greater respect for texts and traditions and less universality of natural appeal. The literature receded further from common life and common realities, and became predominantly a product of remote and recondite fancy. This complacent literary attitude falls in with the placid view of Sanskrit Poetics, which distinguishes the actual world from the world of poetry, insists upon a super-normal or super-individual realisation of artistic emotion, and rules out personal passion or a direct mirroring of life. It is for this reason that the delineation of heightened poetic sentiment in a more or less affected poetic diction becomes important—even disproportionately important—in the idealised poetic creation, and a secondary or even nominal interest is attached to the realities of theme and character. The tendency is towards the finical rather than the robust, towards the ornate rather than the grotesque, towards harmonious roundness rather than jagged angularity. In this distinct cleavage between life and literature, between art and experience, there could be no breezy contagion of wit and humour as an overspreading or distinct stylistic quality.

And yet the spring of humour did not become entirely dry in the earlier classical poets; it bubbles and sparkles in unexpected ease and geniality. The earliest known Kāvya-poet, the ascetic Aśvaghōṣa, is too earnest in poetically expounding his noble doctrine to indulge in idle pleasantries; but one may suspect touches of sly humour, as for instance, in the episode of Nanda's ascent to heaven, in which Nanda indignantly repudiates the Buddha's suggestion that the ugly one-eyed she-ape, seen by them on their way in the Himalayas, may not be less beautiful than the wife for whom Nanda still yearns; while Nanda subsequently avows on reaching heaven, where he sees the heavenly nymphs, that besides these, his wife looks like the wretched ape! With regard to another predecessor of Kālidāsa, it is not clear what Jayadeva means when he speaks of Bhāsa as the laughter (Hāsa) of poetry; but leaving aside the conventional Jester (Vidūṣaka), there are some piquant scenes in the so-called Bhāsa-dramas, such as the scene in the *Avi-māraka*, where king Kuntibhoja is too confused to apprehend the tangled facts of relationship disclosed to him, or where in the *Svapna-nāṭaka* Vāsavadattā, with fine dramatic irony, is driven to weave the nuptial garland for Padmāvati who is going to be the new wife of her husband, or where the now queen Padmāvati is made to hear, unseen but accompanied by Vāsavadattā, the king's confession, made unawares to the Vidūṣaka, regarding his deeply cherished love for the old queen.

Coming to Kālidāsa, however, we find for the first time a more subtle and delicate sense of humour. His refined poetic sensibility shows a keen realisation of what is agreeable and disagreeable and an intuitive perception of the happiest attitude of things. His humorous imagination, therefore, is something not to be detached

from his theme ; it lies at the root of his poetic sense of balance and restraint, of his power of tragic pathos, of his warm humanism and many-sided sympathy with life. The direct touches of humour are very rare indeed, but its tone is clear throughout, whether it manifests itself in the maidenly jests of Śakuntalā's companions, or in the description of the debauched king Agnivarman who, unable to tear himself from the caresses of his women, lazily puts out his royal feet through the window when his loyal subjects entreat his blessed appearance ! The finest example of what Kālidāsa's charming fancy and gentle humour could achieve is to be found in the whole scene of the young ascetic's appearance in Umā's hermitage, his self-confessed volubility, his apparently earnest but good-humoured raillery about Śiva, which evokes a firm rebuke from Umā, leading on to the hermit's revealing himself as the god of her desire to her surprised but agreeable embarrassment. The smile of Kālidāsa's Comic Muse has nothing in common with the loud laughter of the caricaturist or the bitter mirth of the satirist ; it is charged with poetry and kindness, with the finest romance and the profoundest good sense.

And yet some critics would take Kālidāsa's *Mālavikāgnimitra* as a veiled satire on some royal family of his time, if not on Agnimitra himself. But it is really a light-hearted comedy of court-life, whose key-note is nothing more than the pursuit of pleasant and idle gallantry ; and its trifling with the tender passion is quite in keeping with the breezy outlook of the gay circle which is not used to any profounder view of life. Love in it is a pretty game ; the hero need not be of heroic proportion, he is only a carefree and courteous gentleman on whom the burden of kingly responsibility sits but lightly, and who possesses an amazing capacity for falling in and out of love ; while the heroine need not be anything more than a frail and fragile *ingénue* with only good looks and willingness to be loved by the incorrigible royal lover. One need not wonder, therefore, that while war is in progress in the kingdom, the royal household is astir with the amorous escapades of the somewhat elderly, but youthfully inclined, king. We have polite banter, witty compliments and frivolous philandering, but no satire or caricature appears to have been meant. Kālidāsa was a greater poet than wit ; he played with comedy, but put his strength into poetry. The type of courtly comedy, however, which Kālidāsa standardised in this play, had its peculiar appeal ; but while Harṣa achieved success in it with his two pretty playlets on the amusing amourette of the gay and gallant Udayana, the beau-ideal of Sanskrit legend, Rājaśekara banalised it with his two weakly sentimental and tumidly poetical imitations. It is a pity that this elegant comedy of courtly intrigue and gallantry could never divest itself of its sentimental and poetical atmosphere, its legendary and fictitious material, its romantic world of fancy for the real world of fashion, to become a full-fledged comedy of manners. It never developed into the genteel comedy, which would have afforded ample hunting ground to wit and humour in the egregious oddities and absurdities, affectations and imbecilities of a meretriciously urbane society.



In this connexion a reference may not be out of place to the Vidūṣaka or Jester, who is already known to Vātsyāyana (1.4.46), and who figures in these and other romantic comedies as the professional fool. It is possible that the Vidūṣaka's attempts at amusing by his witticisms about his gastronomical sensibilities were originally unavoidable concessions to the groundlings ; but much of his wit has lost its flavour which we must believe it once possessed, while most of his oddities became fatuously conventionalised into mere buffoonery. It is unfortunate that the outworn jests of yesterday's literature, like the exposed relics of yesterday's feast, leave us cold to-day, and even repel. It is perhaps an inevitable consequence of working out a particular *genre* to its last shred and coarsest grain ; but the truth seems to be that wit is the salt of literature and not its food ; and unsupported by other qualities, it seldom survives. The particular type of character could not survive, because the Vidūṣaka of Sanskrit drama was of the author's making, and not of nature's. Like the Fool of *King Lear*, he was seldom invested with individuality or even dramatic justification. The only fine exception, where the dry bones of convention are given the flesh and blood of a human being, is perhaps Maitreya of the *Mṛcchakāṭikā*, who is not the common Jester with his gluttony and tomfoolery, but who is a simple-minded, whole-hearted friend with his doglike blundering devotion.

From what has been said above it is clear that whatever might have been the case with the earlier poets, it would be idle to seek traces of wit and humour in the later serious poetry, whose whole cast of thought and style and atmosphere of idealised sentiment were unfavourable, almost fatal, to a desirable blending of imagination and reality. The later poetry preferred literary quality to human interest, and reposed with complacency on the pedantic and the far-fetched. It evolved its fixed principles and patterns, its literary etiquette regarding what to say and how to say it, and its stabilised poetic diction as the proper uniform of poetry. The poets were profoundly learned and cultured men, but their genius was too sane and orderly ; and whatever their *forte* might have been, it was not playful trifling. When they attempt it, as Śriharṣa does in the episode of Dama's feast (*Naiṣadha*, xvi), it is steeped in excessive eroticism and disfigured by unhesitatingly introduced vulgar innuendoes in what is supposed to be witty repartee of cultured society. The sense of relative proportion, without which there can be no sense of the ridiculous, becomes rare, and poets think nothing of obvious exaggeration and extravagance. The poetic frenzy, which describes the eyes of maidens as compendious oceans or arms of men as capable of uprooting the Himalayas, is delightfully hyperbolic, but the poet is funny without meaning to be so.

This tendency to exaggeration and over-elaboration reaches its climax in the gorgeously ornamented Prose Kāvya, which deals with romantic tales and pins its faith on the cult of style, believing, as it does, that nothing great can be achieved in the ordinary way. Its prose is actuated by an outrageous tendency to reproduce the manner or mannerism of poetry, thereby becoming neither good

prose nor good poetry : and in evolving its own sesquipedalian affectation, long-drawn-out brilliance and overwhelming profusion, it loses raciness, vigour and even sanity. Although there is great ingenuity, and even wealth of real wit, in the veritable battalion of puns, similes, hyperboles and antitheses, there is no sense of restraint and proportion ; and as the narrative is reduced to a mere skeleton in favour of romanticised sentiment and array of pompous phrases, there is hardly any room for real humour. It is doubtful whether Bānabhaṭṭa ever saw the comic aspect of putting the entire tale in the mouth of a parrot, or realised the ludicrous side of some of his enormous exaggerations and strange conceits ; and it is no use upholding his picture of the Drāviḍa ascetic or his description of Skandagupta as having a nose as long as his sovereign's pedigree. The richness of verbal wit of these old-time romancers may be admitted ; but when Subandhu, for instance, tells us that a lady is *raktapāda* (red-footed) like a grammatical treatise, her feet being painted with red lac as sections of grammar with red lines, or that the rising sun is blood-coloured because the lion of dawn clawed the elephant of the night, he is blissfully unconscious that he is descending to the ridiculous from the sublime. Daṇḍin's *Dasa-kumāra-carita*, however, is a delightful exception of a different type, which we shall consider in its proper place below.

One would expect that since the drama is, more or less, a transference of human action on the stage, there would be more exuberance of life and attention to the realities of human nature. But Sanskrit drama was considered, both in theory and practice, as a subdivision of Sanskrit poetry, and could not escape its traditional limitations. The earlier drama, however, afford one or two exceptions. The wit and humour of Śūdraka, for instance, who must have realised that he was not composing an elegant series of sentimental verses but was writing a real drama of artistic and social challenges, are indeed remarkably refreshing in their unique dramatic setting. A story of unconventional love of a high-souled and cultured Brahman for a witty and wise courtesan, the *Mṛcchakaṭika* is not shorn of real poetry and sentiment, but it unfolds an amusing world of rascals, schemers, idlers, gamblers, thieves, courtiers, constables and even hangmen,—riff-raffs of society indeed, but all amiable gentlemen ! With great ingenuity the private affairs of the lovers are linked with a political intrigue which involves the city and the kingdom ; and into the cleverly conceived plot are thrown a comedy of errors which leads to disaster and an act of burglary which leads to happiness, a murder and a court-scene. In the diversity of individualised characters and dramatic situations from common, even low, life, Śūdraka's comic spirit, as one of his Western critics justly says, “ runs the whole gamut from grim to farcical, from satirical to quaint ”, while his corresponding sense of pathos is equally real and impressive. An exception should also be made in favour of Viśākhadatta who, judged by modern standards, was also able to write a real drama. He had consummate skill in weaving an ingenious plot and creating amusing characters, but his *Mudrārākṣasa*, as a drama of political intrigue, is of a somewhat prosaic cast, its action taking the form essentially of a game of skill, in which the

interest is made to depend on the plots and counter-plots of two rival politicians. There is little room here for softer feelings or lightness of touch ; but it is an alert and really humorous imagination which can conceive and create the scene of feigned quarrel between Cāṅakya and Candragupta, carried on with effective gravity and dignity, but with the purpose really of a ruse to deceive Rākṣasa.

These are fine dramas indeed ; but the rather formless poetical plays of Bhavabhūti (8th century A. D.), the youngest of the earlier group of classical dramatists, are typical of Sanskrit dramatic composition in general. If the courtier and the man about town (Nāgaraka) stood at the centre of this literature, it gained in urbanity and elegance ; but we have seen that the atmosphere became too refined and artificial to convert the comedy of polite life into a real comedy of manners. Not the courtier, nor the Nāgaraka, but the Sahrdaya, the expert aesthete, came to dominate the taste and inclination of later literature. The playwrights preferred to draw upon the epic and legendary cycles of stories with a more conscious leaning towards poetic extravagance and greater lack of dramatic power and originality. The taste for elegancies of language and sentiment increased with greater isolation of drama from life. The result was that what was produced was neither good drama nor good poetry. Even middle class life was presented by Bhavabhūti in an excessively poetic and sentimental atmosphere. The heroic and erotic drama alone survived, with the thinnest surplus of plays of other kind ; but the heroic degenerated into the pseudo-heroic and the erotic into the namby-pamby. Common life was left to inferior talents, and their productions were allowed, in course of time, to pass into neglect and oblivion.

It is natural, therefore, that expression of wit and humour, like angel's visit, should become few and far between. Bhavabhūti, very wisely, drops the Vidūṣaka, and leaves the perilous side of humour alone. In his *Mālatī-mādhava*, however, he attempts some comic relief in the episode of the pretended marriage of Nandana to Makaranda disguised as Mālatī, while Makaranda's impresonation involves Madayantikā's mistaking him for Mālatī and confessing unawares her own love for him. The device is well conceived<sup>1</sup> and has points in its favour, but Bhavabhūti is generally too earnest to be really humorous. And as a corollary, in the matter of pathos also, which is closely allied to humour, he has not the true delicacy which can distinguish the pathetic from the maudlin. The love-agony in his plays becomes too prolonged, unmanly and unconvincing. For instance, he makes his Mādhava faint too often, and this happens even at a time when he

<sup>1</sup>Rājasēkhara copies this, with much less success, in his *Viddha-śālabhañjikā*, in arranging marriage of the king to the boy of unsuspected sex.—Stray instances of witty or humorous incidents are not wanting : such as, the comedy of costume in Harṣa's *Nāgānanda*, where the Viṭa mistakes the Vidūṣaka, sleeping covered by a woman's mantle, to be his own *inamorata*, embraces and fondles him ; or in the scene in Kṛṣṇamiśra's allegorical play, the *Probodha-candrodaya*, between Egoism and his grandson Deceit who are good examples of hypocrisy, or where Peace searches in vain for her mother, Faith, in Jainism, Buddhism and Vedicism (Soma Cult), each of whom appears with a wife who claims to be Faith. But it cannot be said that they show a true appreciation of that fine form of humour which has at its root an abundance of amused sympathy with human frailty.

should have rushed to save his friend's life in danger! The interminable lamentations, tears and faintings of even his more mature and royal Rāma are certainly overdone to the verge of crudity.

What we find foreshadowed in Bhavabhūti becomes, in an exaggerated form, a definite posture with the decadent play-wrights who succeed him. There is a vast amount of distress in what are meant to be pathetic scenes, but we read through them comfortably without tears or emotion, unless the sham-tragic lingo becomes too much for our patience. The extreme rarity, and when they occur, the utter worthlessness, of comic or pseudo-comic scenes are on a par with the extravagance and tediousness of this diffused rhetorical pathos, as well as with the huffiness and exaggerated passion of its impossible stage-heroes. The fact is that the lack of humour explains and is explained by the lack of pathos, and both spring from a lack of grasp on the essentials of human nature. These sentimentally idealised writings hardly show any sense of the stress and contradiction from which both tragedy and comedy arise. The attitude is ethically clear and regular; there is no situation of moral complexity, as well as no appreciation of the inherent inconsistencies of human character; no shadow of tragic error qualifies heroic grandeur as no shade of good is allowed to redeem foulness. We have consequently neither really tragic heroes nor really lively rogues. As humour often degenerates into coarse and boisterous laughter, by tragedy is understood a mere misfortune, a simple decline from good to evil hap, the nodus of which can be dissolved in sentiment or cut away by the force of merciful circumstances. The theory insists on a happy ending even of an intrinsically tragic theme. Very often the hero undergoes real and grievous affliction, but all pangs and perils give way before him, and the poignancy of tragedy is warded off. The calamity never comes home, but becomes the means of sentimental effusion; and the hero is seldom brought to the point where he can utter the agonised cry of Oedipus or Lear in their last straits. The comedy, in the same way, is confined chiefly to insignificant characters and to equally insignificant incidents. There is no breadth of sympathy for the follies and oddities of human nature, no amused allowance for its ugliness and rascality, no inclination to look at life more widely and wisely, and no sense of tear in laughter, which consequently descends to puerile and tasteless vulgarity. There is hardly any passage where the reader laughs but lays down the book to think. Sanskrit literature has enough of wit, and it is often unquestionable and strikingly effective; but it rarely achieves tragedy in its deeper sense or comedy in its higher forms.

The failure, with rare exceptions, to achieve real comedy even in satiric or farcical sketches is best illustrated by a class of small erotico-comic compositions, namely, the Monologue-play or Bhāna and the professed Farce or Prahāsana, both of which, closely allied in certain characteristics, represent direct attempts at raising laughter. Both these types of dramatic entertainment contain popular traits in their theme and rough gaiety, and must have, in a limited sense, been popular in appeal; but they belong, not to the popular theatre, but to the literary

drama. They are definitely literary productions of the elegant and mannered kind and, therefore, exhibit their normal stylistic merits and defects. Both have for their theme the coarse and shady acts of debauchees, rogues and vagrants ; but in effect they develop the character of the old Viṭa<sup>1</sup> and Vidūṣaka of the regular drama, who become principal and not merely incidental. The exaggeration of oddity and vice found in these two types of plays, therefore, is no more nor less removed from real life than the picture of ideal virtue in the serious drama.

The Bhāṇa is a peculiar one-act and one-character play in which the Viṭa, neglected as a character in the serious drama, figures alone as the 'hero' in all his glory. Most of the existing specimens (about a dozen so far published) are comparatively modern and belong mostly to the South. They lack variety and are of the same pattern ; and whatever comic or satiric touch they contain, it is almost lost in their excessive eroticism and their failure to achieve more than conventional quality. The theme may be described as the record of the Rake's Progress. There is no action, but only a prolonged monologue, carried on by suppositious dialogues between the Viṭa and his unseen friends, and involving a perfect day of adventure in his imaginary promenade through the city. In this way he describes the shady lives and amorous adventures of a large number of his acquaintances, mostly rogues, hypocrites, bawds and harlots. Satire is slight and only incidentally introduced in some Bhāṇas, ridiculing, for instance, lewd Paurānikas, old Śrotriyas and fraudulent astrologers, or particular sects like Jaṅgamas, Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas ; but the language and imagery throughout are, as we have said, hopelessly erotic and sentimental.

But there are four Bhāṇas which definitely belong to an earlier age and show greater variety and liveliness, as well as a larger zest for social satire and comic relief. In one of these, the witty and accomplished Viṭa finding the rainy season too depressing comes out to spend the day in some form of amusement. He cannot afford dice and drink—even his clothes are reduced to one garment ; so he wends his way towards the colony of harlots, meeting and jesting with various kinds of people, and ultimately reaching the house of the roguish couple, namely, a decrepit Nagna-śramaṇaka Viśvālaka and his dried-up mistress Sunandā, where he passes the day discussing with considerable wit and pose of authority certain knotty problems of love put to him by his friends. The title of the work, ascribed to Iśvaradatta, namely, *Dhūrta-viṭa-saṃvāda* or 'Dialogue of a Rogue and a Rake', is amply justified by its content, which gives, among other things, an amusing epitome of the aesthetic and erotic laws governing the life of a rake. In

<sup>1</sup>Sanskrit Dramaturgy takes the Viṭa as an assistant in the love-affairs of the hero, although the *Mṛchakaṭīka* and *Cārudatta*, where he chiefly occurs, represents him differently. Originally he was perhaps a witty and accomplished companion of a prince or of a Nāgaraka or of a courtesan (cf. Vātsyāyana 1.4.45). He resembles distantly the Parasite of the Greek Drama, but he is not a despicable character. He figures as a man of wit, polish and culture, a frequenter of the gay society, a poet skilled in the arts, especially in music and erotics ; and even if he is a voluptuary, he does not lack taste and breeding. In the later Bhāṇas, he retains the ho of his old polish but becomes degraded as a worthless professional amouirist, widely acquainted with the ways of the demi-monde.

the *Pāda-tāḍitaka* or 'Kick of the Foot' of Śyāmilaka, the theme is more interesting and treatment more amusing. The Viṭa sets out to attend an assembly of rogues and rakes who meet to consider the question of expiation referred to them (for the learned Brahmins could not find any prescribed mode in the orthodox codes of Manu and other authorities) by Tauṇḍikoki Viṣṇunāga, the son of a Mahāmātra and himself a high official, for the indignity he has suffered by pay-fully allowing an intoxicated courtesan, a Saurāṣṭra girl, named Madanasenikā, to kick him on such a sacred spot of his body as his head. Various amusing modes of expiation are suggested ; but in the end it is agreed on the proposal of the presiding rake, that Madanasenikā should put more sense into her lover by setting her foot on the president's own head in the sight of Viṣṇunāga !

It is true that the prevailing erotic atmosphere even of these earlier Bhāṇas spoils much of their decided leaning towards satiric and comic portraiture, but one scarcely finds elsewhere their greater freedom of natural humour and polite irony, their power of shrewd observation and presentation of a motley group of amusing characters, not elaborately painted but suggested with a few lively touches. Characters like Dattakalaśa, the pedantic Pāṇinian with his sesquipedalian affectation and war on the Kātantrikas ; Sārasvata-bhadra, the sky-gazing poet with a verse written on the wall ; Saṃdhilaka, the Śākya-bhikṣu who consoles the hataera Saṃghadāsikā with words of the Buddha ; the prudish and hypocritical Pavitraka, shrinking from the defiling touch of other people in the street, but secretly visiting houses of ill-fame ; the Śreṣṭhiputra Kṛṣṇilaka, a young blood averse to marriage, who thinks his 'misbegotten' father to be an obstacle to his enjoyment of wine, women and gambling ; the sanctimonious Buddhist nun Vilāsakaunḍinī, of easy virtue, who always quotes the scriptures ; the decrepit actor Mṛdaṅgavāsulaka, who apes youth ; the Pustaka-vācaka Upagupta, a sort of Falstaff, at war with his mother-in-law,—to quote at random only a few— are specimens which are as ridiculous as they are rare in later literature. F. W. Thomas is undoubtedly just in his remark that the natural humour of these four Bhāṇas "need not fear comparison with that of a Ben Jonson or a Molière".

Although there is greater opportunity of direct comedy and satire, the Prahasana or Farce which, like the Bhāṇa, consists of one but sometimes two Acts, does not deserve much praise. The earliest farcical sketch in one Act, the *Mattavilasa* or 'Diversion of the Drunk', of king Mahendravikrama of Kāñcī (about 620 A.D.), depicts the drunken revelry of a Śaiva mendicant, bearing a human skull in lieu of an almsbowl and accordingly calling himself a Kapālin, his wandering with his wench through the purlieus of Kāñcī on his way to a tavern, his scuffle with a hypocritical Buddhist monk whom he accuses of the theft of the precious bowl, his appeal to a degenerate Pāśupata to settle the dispute, and the final recovery of the bowl from a lunatic who had retrieved it from a stray dog. The work does not evince much distinctive literary merit ; the incident is amusing but slight, the satire caustic but broad. Within its limitations, however, it shows power of vivid portraiture in a simple and elegant style, and certainly deserves an indulgent verdict as the earliest known specimen of Sanskrit Farce.

The next work, undoubtedly old but of uncertain authorship, is the *Bhagavad-ujukīya* or 'Farce of the Saint and the Courtesan'. It can be distinguished from all other Sanskrit farces in that the comic element is found not in the oddities of character but in the ludicrousness of the plot. The saint is here a true ascetic and learned teacher, well versed in Yoga, even if his pupil Śāṅḍilya, sceptical of Yoga, is the typical Vidūṣaka of the serious drama. The courtesan, who enters the neighbouring garden and awaits her lover, does not show the vulgar traits of the common harlot, ridiculed in the normal Prahāsana. The funny situation arises when the girl falls dead bitten by a serpent, and the saint, finding an opportunity of impressing his scoffing pupil by an actual display of Yogic powers, enters the dead body of the courtesan. The messenger of Death (Yama), coming to fetch the departed soul and finding that a mistake has been committed, allows the soul of the courtesan to enter the lifeless body of the saint. The curious exchange of souls makes the saint speak and act like the courtesan, while the courtesan adopts the language and conduct of the saint, until the messenger of Yama restores the equilibrium and returns the souls to their respective bodies. Although a small piece, the play attains real comedy, not by cheap witticisms and antics, but by a genuinely amusing plot and commendable characterisation; it is easily the best of the Sanskrit farces.

For, the later farces are erotico-comic productions of an unredeemingly coarser type, and have little to recommend them. The earliest of the group, the *Laṭakamelaka* or 'Conference of Rogues' by Kavirāja Śāṅkhadhara (12th century) is typical of the rest. It describes in two Acts the assembly of all kinds of knaves, in the house of the bawd Danturā for winning the favour of her daughter Madanamañjarī. They represent a number of types, each labelled with a particular foible, indicated by their very names. First comes, with his parasite Kulavyādhi, the profligate professor Sabhāsali who, having a ferociously quarrelsome wife Kalahapriyā, seeks diversion in the company of harlots. As Madanamañjarī has accidentally swallowed a fish bone, the quack doctor Jantuketu is called in; his methods are absurd, but his words and acts make the girl laugh, with the happy result of dislodging the bone. Then appear the Digambara Jaṭāsura and the Kāpālika Ajñānaśrī quarrelling; the cowardly village headman Saṅgramavisara, accompanied by his sycophant Viśvāsaghātaka; the hypocritical Brahman Mithyāśukla; the fraudulent preceptor Phuṅkaṭamiśra; the depraved Buddhist monk Vyasanākara, interested in a washerwoman, and other similar characters. There is a bargaining of the lovers, and in the end a marriage is satisfactorily settled between the old bawd Danturā and the Digambara Jaṭāsura.

The other extant farces, belonging to a much later time, are even less attractive. There is some wit, as well as board satire, but they are often defaced by open vulgarity and immoderate eroticism. The method of presenting a single trait, instead of the whole man, in an exaggerated form, and of attaching a descriptive name to it, can hardly be expected to produce life-like results. But the device becomes an almost established convention in a sense much more stereotyped

than that of Ben Jonson's "humour". We have, for instance, curious names like Anaya-sindhu, Kali-vatsala or Duritārṇava, of kings ; Viśvabhaṇḍa, Dharmānala or Anṛta-sarvasva, of court chaplains ; Abhavyaśekhara, Kukarma-pañcānana or Kumati-puñja, of courtiers ; Vyādhi-sindhu or Āturāntaka, of physicians ; Samara-kātara or Raṇa-jambūka, of generals ; Śiṣṭāntaka or Sādhu-hiṃsaka, of police chiefs ; and even obscenely repulsive Praçaṇḍa-śepha, of the overseer of the royal harem ! It is the letter, and not the spirit, of comedy to fasten such professional badges and define characters by cut-and-dried peculiarities.

The Sanskrit farce, as a whole, suffers from poverty of invention and lack of taste. It has all the point that is in ribaldry and all the humour that is in extravagance. The interest seldom centres in the cleverness of the plot or in well developed intrigue, but in the absurdities of character which are often of a broad and obvious type. We have neither thoroughly alive rascals nor charmingly entertaining fools, for they are all thrown into fixed moulds without much regard for proportion or reality. Apart from the inevitable eroticism which, however, is open and not insinuating like that of Wycherley or Congreve, the whole atmosphere is low and depressing. No doubt, the theme of tricks and quarrels of low characters is allowed by Sanskrit theory, but the prescription is taken too literally. The characters in the Prahāsana are low, not in social position, but as unredeemingly base and carnal ; and there being credit for no other quality, they are hardly human. The procession of unmitigated rogues and their rougher pastimes need not be without interest ; but there is no merit in attempting to raise laughter by deliberately vulgar exhibitions and expressions, which mar the effect of the plays even as burlesques or caricatures. The parody of high-placed people loses its point, not only from tasteless exaggeration, but also from its extremely sordid and prosaic treatment. Even if refinement is out of place in the farce, the detailed and puerile coarseness of what Hazlitt calls 'handicraft wit' is redundant and ineffective.

There is, however, a small body of distinctly humorous writings which, composed in the normal literary mode and style, do not profess to be regular comedy or satire, but which, under a thin narrative or didactic veil, show clearly comic or satiric tendency. The most remarkable of these works is Daṇḍin's *Daśakumāra-carita* or 'Adventures of Ten Princes'. Though ostensibly a prose Kāvya, it differs in matter, form and spirit from the normal specimens of Bāṇa and Subandhu, and it is rightly described as a romance of roguery. Although it never abandons the romantic interest and finds a place for marvel and magic and winning of maidens, it is yet primarily concerned with the adventures of wicked tricksters, who are yet loveable rascals. Daṇḍin deliberately violates the prescription that the Prose Kāvya, being allied to the Metrical Kāvya, should have a good subject (*sad-āśraya*) and that the hero should be noble and elevated. Gambling, burglary, cunning, fraud, violence, murder, impersonation, abduction and illicit love constitute, jointly or severally, the dominating incidents in every story. The princes



are all accomplished gentlemen, but the two chief motives, which actuate their wild deeds, are the desire for delights of love and possession of a realm ; for which ends they are not at all fastidious about the means. Take, for instance, the story of Upahāvarman, which is one of the longest and best, being rich in varied incidents and interesting characters. The seduction practised on the ascetic Marici by the accomplished but heartless courtesan, Kāma-mañjarī, who also robs and deceives the merchant Vastupāla and turns him into a destitute Jaina monk, but who in her turn is deceived, robbed and punished by the equally unscrupulous but large-hearted hero of the story ; the adventure in the gambling house ; the ancient art of thieving in which the hero is proficient ; the punishing of the old misers of Campā who are taught that the goods of the world are perishable ; the motif of the inexhaustible purse and subterranean passage borrowed from folk-tale ; all these, described with considerable humour and vividness, are woven into the story of the Indian Robin Hood, who plunders the rich to pay the poor, unites lovers, reinstates unfortunate victims of meanness and treachery, and passes with ease from the prison to the royal harem.

The work of Daṇḍin is, no doubt, imaginative fiction and absorbs much from the folk-tale, but in its lively series of pictures of the rakes and ruffians of great cities, it somewhat approaches the spirit of the picaresque romance of Europe. Even if it is not open satire, the trend is politely satirical in utilising, with no small power of wit and observation, the amusing possibilities of incorrigible knaves, hypocritical ascetics, heartless harlots, cunning bawds, unfaithful wives, fervent lovers and light-hearted idlers, who jostle along in the small compass of its swift and racy narratives. The pictures are, no doubt, heightened, but in all essentials they are true ; not wholly agreeable, but free alike from affectation and repulsiveness ; not truly moral, but bordering upon fundamental non-morality. Even the higher world of gods, Brahmans and princes is regarded with little respect. The gods are brought in to justify the unscrupulous deeds of the princes themselves ; the Buddhist nuns act as procuresses ; the teaching of the Jina is declared by a Jaina monk to be nothing more than a swindle ; and the Brahman's greed of gold and love of cock-fights are held up to ridicule. The style and diction of the work is comparatively free from the extended scale and ponderous stateliness of the normal Prose Kāvya ; it is elegant, vigorous and effective enough for the graphic dressing up of a cheat, a hypocrite, an amourist or a braggart. These qualities, rare indeed in Sanskrit literature, make Daṇḍin's delightfully unethical romances a unique literary masterpiece, almost creating a new *genre*.

Unfortunately, the difficult type inaugurated by Daṇḍin's unconventional romance never found favour with the theorists ; and there was no gifted follower who could develop its many possibilities. An extremely limited number of satirically inclined works, however, came into existence after Daṇḍin ; but they are all written in verse and are entirely different in style and spirit. The earliest and most noteworthy of these is the erotico-satiric *Kuṭṭanī-mata* or 'Advice of a

Procuress' which, in spite of its ugly title and unsavoury content, was written by a highly respectable person, named Dāmodaragupta, who was a poet and minister of Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (779-813 A.D.). The theme is slight but the treatment is the poet's own. A courtesan of Benares, named Mālatī, unable to attract lovers, seeks the advice of an old and experienced bawd, Vikarālā, who instructs her to ensnare Chintāmaṇi, son of a high official, and describes in detail the art of winning love and lucre. The discourse is strengthened by stories of some courtesans and their lovers in which, however, the comic is intermingled with the erotic and pathetic sentiments. The stories, though well told, are without distinction, and cannot be compared to those of Daṇḍin; while the more squalid subject-matter, though delicately handled, is not above reproach. But it would be unjust to reject the work merely for its content. It is a distinctly artistic production, the merit of which lies in the elegantly polished and facetious style with which the droll life, possibly of contemporary society, is painted with considerable power of polite banter and gentle ridicule. The erotic tendency, no doubt, prevails, but there is no didactic moralising, nor any squeamish language in describing women and their ways. Dāmodaragupta is a humorist rather than a satirist, an artist in words and a poet; he neither hates the knaves nor despises the fools into which he finds his society divided. But if his good-natured raillery is not biting, it is not entirely toothless.

Kṣemendra, also a Kashmirian of the second half of the 11th century, takes Dāmodaragupta as his model; but he is not a poet and humorist, but an industrious polymath, a devotee of what may be called miscellaneous literature and when he chooses, a foul-mouthed lampooner of contemporary society. In his *Samaya-māṭṛkā* or 'Source-book of Convention' for the courtesan, he is, no doubt, inspired by Dāmodaragupta, and selects a similar theme of the tricks and snares of the harlot. A small tract of eight chapters, written mostly in the fluent Śloka and not in the slow-moving Āryā metre of its prototype, it gives the slight story of a young harlot, named Kalāvati, who is introduced by a roguish barber to an 'owl-faced, crow-necked and cat-eyed' old bawd, called Kaṅkāli, for detailed but witty instruction in her difficult profession, and who succeeds with the advice and assistance to ensnare a prococious stripling and rob his rich and foolish parents. The most curious part of the work is the amusing account, given with touches of local colour, of Kaṅkāli's own adventures, her wanderings in younger days through the length and breadth of Kashmir as a whore, pretended wife and widow to many men, nun, procuress, thief, shop-girl, seller of cakes, barmaid, beggar-woman, flower-girl, woman-magician and holy saint; while her spicy anecdotes from a vast store of experience, her classification of different types of men after different birds and beasts, and her shady but ingenious ways of cheating fools and knaves are not without interest. The merit of the work as a whole lies, not indeed in its indecorous subject, but in its heightened yet graphic picture of certain types of men and scenes, painted with considerable sharpness of phrasing and characterisation, and with an undertone of mocking satire against many forms of prevalent depravity. Like Dāmodaragupta, Kṣemendra never shows any

squeamishness regarding delicate, questionable and even repulsive topics, nor any tendency to romanticise them. He is an equal expert in erotics and shrewd observer of life, but he lacks Dāmodaragupta's lightness of touch and polite wit, and often lapses into coarse realism or bitter sarcasm. It is true that he is more a satirist than a humorist, and is in a sense privileged to present things in a repulsively naked form, which his subject demands and is often unable to avoid ; but it cannot be said that his outspoken frankness does not often slip into deliberate gloating over bald and unnecessary vulgarity. Nevertheless, the *Samaya-māṭṛkā* as *chronique scandaleuse* is not mere pornography, nor an immoral work with a moral tag, any more than the *Kuṭṭani-mata* is ; it is, in spite of its obvious grossness, an interesting specimen of an approach to realistic satirical writing which is so rarely cultivated in Sanskrit.

It is not necessary to consider in this connexion some smaller works of Kṣemendra, such as the *Sevya-sevakopadeśa* (sixty verses on the relation of master and servant), *Cāru-caryā* (a century of moral aphorisms on virtuous conduct illustrated by miscellaneous myths and legends), *Caturvarga-saṃgraha* (on the four general objects of human activity, namely, virtue, wealth, love and salvation). They are not as richly descriptive or narrative as astutely homiletic, although there are occasional flashes of trenchant wit or the flavour of amusing word-pictures and anecdotes. Of the same type but a much better and larger work, is his *Darpa-dalana*. It is a diatribe against human pride, which is described as springing from seven principal causes, namely, birth, wealth, learning, beauty, valour, charity and asceticism ; they are treated separately in as many chapters, with illustration of each type of bragging by an invented tale. Here the moralist is dominant, but the satirist is irrepressible and peeps out very often, as for instance, in the description of pretenders to learning and to sanctity.

In his *Kalā-vilāsa*, however, Kṣemendra reverts more distinctly to satirical sketching of various forms of human frailty, with less coarseness and greater sense of comedy, and adopts the moric Āryā metre of Dāmodaragupta's work. It is a poem in ten cantos, in which Mūladeva, the master of trickery, famed in Indian legend, instructs his young disciple Chandragupta, son of a merchant, in the art of knavery and illustrates his exposition by amusing tales. The first canto gives a general account of the various forms of cheating ; the second describes greed ; the third discusses the erotic impulse and wiles of woman ; the fourth is devoted entirely to the harlot ; the fifth depicts the wicked Kāyasthas, skilled in crooked writing, who as high-placed executive officers, possessing little conscience but great power of mischief, form the target of Kṣemendra's special invective ; the sixth dilates upon the follies of pride ; the seventh describes with much wit the wandering singer, bard, dancer and actor, who steal people's money by their device of making harmonious noise and meaningless antics ; the eighth deals with the tricks of the goldsmith who steals your gold before your eyes ; the ninth is concerned with various forms of swindle practised by the astrologer, quack doctor, seller of patent medicine, trader, vagrant, ascetic and *chevalier*

*d'industrie* of the same feather ; while the tenth and last canto winds up with a constructive lecture on what the arts should be. The work is thus a fairly comprehensive discourse on the activities of notorious tricksters known to Kṣemendra ; and his easy and elegant style makes the pictures amusing and the satire effective.

The two works, *Deśopadeśa* and *Narma-mālā* of Kṣemendra, the one in the form of ironical advice and the other in that of jesting pleasantry, are in some respects complementary to each other and conceived in the same spirit and style ; but they are directed, more narrowly but with greater concentration, against the hypocrisy, corruption and oppression which prevailed in Kashmir in Kṣemendra's days. The *Deśopadeśa* deals, in eight sections, with the Cheat, who builds castles in the air to delude other people ; the avaricious Miser, miserable, dirty and desolate, who never enjoys what he hoards ; the Prostitute, described as a mechanical wooden puppet, with her cheap tricks and one hundred and one amulets worn on her body for luck ; the snake-like old Bawd, who can make the possible impossible and *vice versa*, but who cannot help getting bruised in constant brawls ; the ostentatious Voluptuary, monkey-like with his foppish dress, curly hair, dental speech and love for loose women ; the students from foreign lands, especially from Gauḍa, who sanctimoniously avoid touch of other people lest their fragile body should break, but who, under the bracing climate of Kashmir, acquire over-bearing manner, refuse to pay shop-keepers, and are ready to draw the knife on the slightest provocation ; the old man, marrying a young wife to the amusement and joy of other people, and begetting a child, like a withered tree bearing unexpected fruit ; the degraded Śaiva teacher, ignorant and lecherous, and the people who come to him, namely, the inevitable Kāyastha and his fickle wife favoured by the Guru, the poetaster struggling with his shabby verses, the crafty merchant, the bragging alchemist, the false ascetic, the boastful grammarian, the stupid, ink-bosmeared scribe. In the *Narma-mālā* we have a similar series of pen-pictures, but its three chapters are specially meant to be a sharp satire on the misrule and oppression of the Kāyastha administration before the time of king Ananta of Kashmir. The Kāyastha, whose pen was his sword, monopolised all key-positions in the state, as the Gṛhakṛtyadhipati (or chief executive officer of internal administration), the Paripālaka (or provincial governor), the Lekhopādhyāya (or clerk-in-chief), the Gañja-divira (or chief accountant) and the Niyogin (or village executive officer). In the first chapter are described the public activities of these and other officers, their parasites and myrmidons, their corrupt and atrocious misdeeds ; the rest of the work outlines, with great skill, the degraded private life of the typical Kāyastha and his frivolous wife, in the course of which we have again a quack doctor, a foolish astrologer, a Buddhist nun acting as the traditional go-between, a surgeon-barber, and the Śaiva Guru who institutes a religious sacrifice to restore the mysteriously failing health of the Kāyastha's wife. Much of the satire in these two works has its specific direction, local and temporal ; but a very large proportion, substantially faithful even if squalidly exaggerated *cum grano salis*, will always be applicable so long as there exist in the

world sharpeners, boasters, liars, hypocrites and pettifoggers. The manners may be obsolete and the topical details superfluous, but the pictures, painted with the unerring insight of a shrewd observer, will never be out of date. The value of Kṣemendra's satirical sketches will be clear when one considers them in the light of the vein of originality which practically failed and ceased after him. We have some feeble attempts, but these later moralising authors, anxious to maintain respectability, are afraid of descending to repellent reality, and only touch the fringe of it, from a safe distance, with the long end of the stick of romantic verse.

A much more pleasing and abundant expression of delicate wit and humour will be found scattered in the hundreds of miniature love-stanzas than what one finds so scantily in the limited number of long-drawn poems of serious literature. These little stanzas occur throughout in the erotic Śatakas, in the Anthologies, as well as in the gallant toying and trifling of the light-hearted love-dramas. Love is depicted here, not in its infinite depth and poignancy, nor in its ideal beauty, but in its playful moods of vivid enjoyment breaking forth into delicate blossoms of fancy. If Sanskrit poetic theory insists upon impersonalised enjoyment of personal emotion, this cultured attitude of artistic aloofness is shown by the way in which the poet lifts his tyrannical passion into a placid mood of delectation, whereby even the darkening sorrows of love dissolve into sparkling tints of laughter. The artistic mood thus becomes akin to the humorous.

The earlier centuries of stanzas, ascribed to Hāla, Amaru and Bhartṛhari, as well as later collections, abound in fine verses which make light of the serious passion with their subtle wit and gentle humour. An early example of pure wit, in which a quotation or hackneyed idea is dexterously turned to another strange purpose is found in the clever, if somewhat gross, application of two lines of Aśvaghōṣa by Bhartṛhari in his own two lines. Aśvaghōṣa in his *Saundara-nanda* echoes the age-old denunciation of woman as the source of all evil :

In the words of women there is honey,  
In their hearts there is deadly poison ;

Repeating this half-verse in his *Śṛṅgāra-śataka*, Bhartṛhari twists the idea into a flippant effect, at which the austere Aśvaghōṣa would perhaps have frowned with distaste :

Hence doth one drink from those lips,  
And strike at the heart with the fist !

But instances of wit or witticism, which relax the tension of high-strung sentiment or playfully make fun of the amorous condition, are much finer than this. They are, however, so plentiful and diversified that we can, for illustration, refer only to a very few. The wife is offended and angry, the husband falls at her feet in penitence ; their little boy spoils the pathetic effect by seizing the opportunity of riding on papa's back, so that the incensed mother could hardly repress her laugh. The lover's heart is filled by thousands of women, the poor girl is unable to find a place in it ; hence she is making her already thin body thinner and thinner. On hearing Yaśodā says that Kṛṣṇa is but an infant, the maidens of the village

smile knowingly at the so-called infant. As the fair maiden pours out water for the thirsty traveller, he feasts his eyes on her and lets the water escape through his fingers, while she with equal zest lessens the stream of water. The young couple quarrel and pretend to sleep with breathless silence ; it remains to be seen which of them will stick to the last ! The maiden who guards the field has no rest from wayfarers who insist on asking their way, however much they know it. Once bitten twice shy ; the monkey which mistook a bee for a black plum will pause before it ventures again. To the question why the bust of a woman never remains firm, it is wittily replied that nothing stays firmly on a woman's heart. A young lady wonders why all gossip centres on *her* lover alone ; is there only one young man in the village ? The futility of her anger in the presence of her beloved is thus confided by a young girl to her companions : "I turned my face down from the direction of his face and fixed my looks on my feet ; I stopped my eager ears from listening to his words ; I concealed with my hands the thrill on my sweating cheeks ; but, O friends, what could I do to prevent the knots on my bodies from bursting asunder ?" The house-parrot, overhearing in the night the words murmured in confidence by the young couple, began to repeat them loudly in the morning before their elders ; embarrassed but quick-witted, the young wife stays his impudence by placing before his beak a piece of ruby from her earrings on the pretext of giving him the seed of a pomegranate.

The same light of jewelled and factious fancy plays on the surface of many a gnomic or reflective stanza, which gives us droll bits of homely wisdom, often cleverly polarised into antithesis or crystallised into epigram. It is difficult to convey the terseness of metaphorical or paronomastic wit, on which much of the raciness depends, for the expression is often characteristically Indian ; but we risk here just a few examples, for want of more space to illustrate their witty sententious style. Where could the stag-like solecism flee pursued by the lion-like grammar, were there not cavern-like mouths of teachers, actors, astrologers, doctors and priests ? Better death than feeding an uninvited guest who calmly sits down, though you glare angrily at him. For a man to serve a king is as wise as to lick the edge of a sword, embrace a lion or kiss the mouth of a serpent. Be not too upright ; go to the wood and see, —the erect trees are those that are felled, the crooked are left standing. When the West unites with the Sun, her face glows, the face of the East is dark ; there is no woman who is not jealous. Even if a serpent has no poison, he should swell out his hood ; poison or no poison, the expansion of the hood itself is enough. The light and insignificant dust, daily trampled by the feet, is tossed high by the fickle wind, and it sits on the top of lofty mountains. The capable man, becoming a victim of his qualities, bears the burden of work on his shoulder ; but the wicked bull, whose shoulder is not hardened by work, sleeps comfortably.

It is difficult to characterise the versatile and multiform wit scintillating in such breezy little stanzas, or to say in what sense or how far the wit is specifically Indian. But Sanskrit literature will furnish abundant illustration of the various

forms of wit enumerated in Isaac Barrow's well-known description (*Works*, Ser. 14) :

“Sometimes it lieth in a pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in the forging of an apposite tale ; sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound ; sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of luminous expression ; sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude. Sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly restoring an objection ; sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense ; sometimes a sconical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it ; sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being ; sometimes it riseth only from a lucky hitting upon what is strange ; sometimes from a crafty wresting of obvious matter to the purpose ; often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how !”

A much more sustained vein of quiet, but incisive humour, resting not so much on sparkling sayings as on the rich setting of human nature, runs through and enlivens the fable and the popular tale which, made out of traditional material but reduced to a literary form in the *Pañca-tantra* and the *Brhat-kathā* respectively, had perhaps a direct popular appeal. They are interesting not only because of their lively narrative but also because they show a sense of the value of simple and direct style ; and the large number of recensions of these and other later story-books bears witness to their wide currency. The *Pañca-tantra* is not only one of the greatest books which have an interesting history in world-literature, but it is also the solitary surviving example in Sanskrit of a masterpiece of its own kind, the unique work of a great but quiet humorist. The author, whoever he is, is a wise and amusing moralist who, under a transparent veil of pedagogic seriousness, can clothe his abstractions with wings, or a beak, or a tail, or claws, or long ears, and can make them talk and act with greater sense and shrewdness, or with greater stupidity and drollery, than the presumptively superior human beings. The work is a fantastic travesty of natural history in the service of moral philosophy. Even if it inculcates expediency in the practical affairs of life rather than a strict code of uprightness, there is much sound sense, which usually means sound morality. Its appeal stands by itself ; it does not depend on subtlety of verbal wit, and has nothing to do with the mawkishness or eroticism with which humour is almost universally associated in Sanskrit literature. The frankly fictitious disguise presents eternal truths of human nature in a deliciously distorted but impressively instructive form, which is delightful alike to children and grown persons, to all ages and all lands.

The interest of the *Brhat-kathā* or “Groat Tale” is different. The work is polymorphous like the *Pañca-tantra*, but it is neither a well knit nor a well pro-

portioned book of practical wisdom ; its extent is vast, content miscellaneous, and form chaotic ; and its countless number of emboxed tales, legends and witty stories of human adventure would, in their rich and overwhelming mass, justify the quaint, but appropriate, title of Somadeva's largest version (of more than 21,000 verses !) as 'the Ocean of Streams of Stories' (*Kathā-sarit-sāgara*). Although the hero Naravāhanadatta is a much married prince, his chief and best love Madanamāñjukā is the daughter of a courtesan ; and the story is not of court-life or courtly adventure, nor even of heroic ideals. The work presents a kaleidoscopic picture of men and things, which is consonant with middle-class view of life, but which is sublimated with marvels of myth, magic and folk-tale, with the romance of strange adventure in fairy lands of fancy. It is, therefore, a book of larger and more varied appeal, containing, as it does, a gallery of sketches, both romantic and real ; and Keith is perhaps just in characterising it as a kind of bourgeois epic. From our point of view, it is an unparalleled store-house of spicy stories concerning the eternally interesting fools, knaves and naughty women—a veritable mine of comic invention—which evinces a wide, intimate and amused experience of human life, quite in keeping with the good-natured wit and humour of the ordinary man.

The later story-books are neither so vast nor varied in content. But the enigmatic 'Twenty-five Tales of the Vetāla' (*Vetāla-pañcaviṃśati*) is deservedly popular for its ingenious and witty narratives, while the 'Seventy Tales of a Parrot' (*Śuka-saptati*) would repay reading, if one's taste inclines towards frivolous but perennially entertaining anecdotes of cunning women, who get out of embarrassing scrapes, deceive their foolish husbands, and even exact apologies from them for their very suspicion. But not so attractive is the *Bharaṭaka-dvātriṃśikā* or 'Thirty-two Tales of Śaiva Mendicants', of equally unknown date and authorship, in which are ridiculed the Śaiva mendicants, who are made to quote the parallels of gods and saints to justify their own dubious conduct. Much better told are the 'Tales of Rogues' (*Dhūrtākhyāna*) of the Śevatāmbara Haribhadra Sūri (middle of the 8th century), which, with a Decamerone-like frame-work, satirises the incredibility of absurd Epic and Purāṇic tales by means of equally fantastic tales narrated by the assembled rogues. The Jaina authors are fond of stories, and have produced them in amazing profusion ; some of the collections contain really amusing examples, and one need not speak disparagingly of Jaina achievement in narrative literature ; but in whatever form they are presented, the stories are often inspired by religious propaganda, or have a moral implied or attached to them ; they are seldom intended for mere entertainment.

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There is no study of the subject as a whole ; but the erotico-satiric writings of Dāmodaragupta, Kṣemendra and others, the erotico-comic Bhāṣas and Prahāsanas and Daṇḍin's romance in their humorous aspect, have been dealt with in some detail by the present writer in the *History of Sanskrit Literature*, Vol. I, by S. N. Dasgupta and S. K. De, University of Calcutta, 1947. This work may



also be consulted generally for other classical works and authors referred to in this article ; for which one may also refer to A. B. Keith, *Sanskrit Drama* (Oxford 1924) and *History of Sanskrit Literature* (Oxford 1928), as well as M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur* in three volumes (Leipzig 1909, 1920 and 1922). All these works furnish full bibliography of editions, translations and relevant studies. For the Bhāṇa and the Prahāsana especially, see F.W. Thomas in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1924, p. 262 f and Centenary Supplement to the same, 1924, pp. 129-36 ; S. K. De in the same *Journal*, 1926, pp. 63-90; and *Poona Orientalist*, vii, pp. 149-56. For witty erotic verses, see S. K. De, *Treatment of Love in Sanskrit Literature*, Calcutta, 1929. For Dhūrtākhyāna see edition of the work by A. N. Upadhye, Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan, Bombay 1944. As some of the matter in this article is traversed by the present writer's other works, some repetition, but in a different bearing and perspective, has been unavoidable.

# THE INDIAN CONCEPTS OF KNOWLEDGE AND SELF

## (Third instalment)

BY KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

THE Prābhākaras had claimed that as reflective correction presents the past awareness of 'this snake' to have been conative (*vyavahāra*), not cognitive (*jñāna*), it must have been so even before correction. This was challenged in the last instalment. It was suggested that though there was no genuine cognition of 'this snake' there might have been a seeming one. 'Seeming cognition' is not an absurd notion. If in the absence of a genuine reality there may yet be a seeming one (as in error), this may be true of cognition also<sup>1</sup>.

There is another point against the Prābhākaras. Is not their conative awareness (*vyavahāra*) a misnomer? Awareness, according to them, as according to most of the Indian thinkers, is only another name for cognition, and conation, like feeling, is only a result, not a form, of cognition. How would the Prābhākaras react to these charges?

Their reply to the first charge would be that a cognition cannot be seeming. It is always genuine. As cognition, according to them, is self-revealing (*svayamprakāśa*) it is not possible that there may be a cognition which is not at the same time apprehended in that form, and, conversely also, if anything is apprehended (even retrospectively) as cognition it cannot but be cognition. There is no scope, therefore, for a seeming cognition. Further, if at all it seemed to be cognition what was the genuine state that seemed that way? If it too were cognition there is no question of seeming; and if not cognition, what was it then? Any attempt, again, to explain this seeming by a theory of error would involve indefinite regress.

To the second charge they would reply by analysing the concept of *vyavahāra*. All speak of *vyavahāra* of things known. This proves that it is not identical with knowledge. It is not also identical with *icchā* or *prayatna*. *Ichchā* (wish) is of the form 'Let there be such and such' or 'Let me bring such and such into existence', and *prayatna* (will) entails bodily movement, both springing from *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*. But the *vyavahāra* of a thing known is neither such pious wish nor always entailing bodily movements, and it may not spring from *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*. The minimum that is required of it is that the content known is spoken or asserted as real, 'speech' here meaning no overt use of language but being what is roughly called in Western logic *judgment*.<sup>2</sup> Judgment is not merely the cognition of something as real, it also asserts that as real. This assertion, as neither conation nor cognition, may be understood as a conative overtone of cognition. It does

<sup>1</sup>The exact nature of seeming cognition will be elaborated afterwards.

<sup>2</sup>Vide Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.4., to cite a typical use of the term *vyavahāra*. Vide also Citsukha's definition of *svayamprakāśatva* as *avedyatve sati aparokṣe bhārayogyatvam*. Vide also Advaitasiddhi and Viṭṭhaleśa (N.S.), p. 278.

How far the definition of *vyavahāra* above applies to the Advaitin's *vyāvahārika* reality will be seen later.

not follow cognition but is synchronous with it as a fringe. Loosely to call it awareness=cognition does not matter much if only we remember its real nature<sup>1</sup>.

The Prābhākaras claim that 'this snake' was, at the pre-correction stage, *vyāvahārika* in this sense. It is not necessary that what is asserted is to be of the exact form in which it was apprehended. In his theory of *savikalpapratyakṣa* the Naiyāyika too has claimed that the thing known comes to stand with a name attached to it, so that in *vyavahāra*=assertion a name at least has intervened<sup>2</sup>. As to how the name gets unified with the thing, the Naiyāyika believes that it is all due to assertion<sup>3</sup>. In our interpretation of the Prābhākara view of conative unity (in the second instalment of this essay) we only elaborated this process of unification<sup>4</sup> in the light of what happens in gross conation.

Generally the total content where different items are unified through *vyavahāra* is also, on the fundamental realistic postulate of the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras, real. In other words, the items made to unify are also believed as already unified in *rerum natura*. The Prābhākaras only exempt error from this rule. In error the unity is taken as not known, but only made through assertion. In normal cases knowing and making-through-assertion coincide. It is only in error that the knowing side is absent<sup>5</sup>.

The Prābhākara view of error stands so far on a solid ground. The real defect of this view, as also of the Nyāya one, will be shown in the next sub-section.

#### L. Advaita theory of error

The Naiyāyikas hold that the unified content of illusion at least appeared as known though it was not real. Correction, according to them, is an act<sup>6</sup> of rejection (*bādha*). The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, believe that the illusory unity was not known, whether genuinely or apparently, and so conclude that there is no *bādha* in correction. If 'object' means the real-as-known there was no unified object, according to the Prābhākaras, at the pre-correction stage. Some constituents of it, *viz.*, *this* and *snake* were known reals, but these were not known in unity. The unity that appeared was only *vyāvahārika*.

But both these views are one-sided. *Bādha* is a phenomenon evident to everyone. Any attempt to deny it would involve indefinite regress. If *bādha* itself were false the Prābhākaras would have to explain it by their theory of error. They would have to say that there was no cognitive but only a *vyāvahārika bādha*,

<sup>1</sup>The conation that as an effect follows cognition is gross *vyavahāra* which is no form of awareness, if cognition alone has a claim to that title. But even at the root of this gross conation there is assertion as subtle *vyavahāra*.

<sup>2</sup>Vide Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4.

<sup>3</sup>Here he differs from the Śābdika according to whom the name is the very essence of the thing, or at least stands eternally unified with it.

<sup>4</sup>Not merely a name is unified with the *savikalpa* real, there is also unification of the reals themselves.

<sup>5</sup>Generally Western philosophers have not distinguished between cognition and assertion. They usually consider the entire situation—cognition *cum* assertion—and so speak of knowledge as an act. Obviously this act is not a form of gross will. It is cognition *as* assertion. There is, according to them, no cognition *and* assertion.

<sup>6</sup>The word 'act' should not be unnecessarily mystified.

which amounts to saying that there is no *bādha* of *bādha*, and so on. If, on the other hand, *bādha* is admitted there would be nothing to deprive the unified content of its cognitivity.

The Nyāya view is wrong in another way. 'This is snake' is, according to Nyāya, a cognitive object but unreal. But according to the fundamental realistic postulate to which Nyāya adheres as much as the Prābhākara there cannot be a cognitive object which is not real at the same time. If the Prābhākaras have unjustifiably denied cognitivity of 'this is snake' the Naiyāyikas have erred in another way. They have compromised the realistic postulate.

The Advaitin would do neither. Rejection, with him, is a genuine phenomenon and, therefore, the false object genuinely cognitive. Yet he admits that even this rejected object was real. To remove the apparent contradiction<sup>1</sup> between the rejection of an object and its being at the same time real he holds that this reality is qualitatively different from that of a non-rejected object, without, however, ceasing to be reality for that reason. The reality of the former is *vyāvahārika*, and that of the latter is *pāramārthika*. It may be that what is now *pāramārthika* is false from a higher metaphysical standpoint. But then the ultimate real will have to be called *pāramārthika* and 'this is rope' *vyāvahārika*. In contrast, at that stage, with the *vyāvahārika* 'this is rope' the content 'this is snake' could no longer be called *vyāvahārika*. The Advaitin finds a new name for it, *viz.*, *prātibhāsika*. With this ultimate metaphysical development, however, we are not concerned here.

'This is snake' is a cognitive object with *vyāvahārika* reality. This novel concept saves Advaita from both the Nyāya and the Prābhākara one-sidedness. Against Nyāya it justifies a type of reality for 'this is snake'. It may not have *pāramārthika* reality, but may well be real in the *vyāvahārika* way. Against the Prābhākaras it claims that this content was a cognitive object. They had denied cognitive objectivity of 'this is snake' in deference only to the fundamental realistic postulate. But if that content be granted *vyāvahārika* reality there remains no difficulty that way.

The Prābhākara position requires closer examination in this context. That the illusory content at least appeared as a cognitive object is as much evident as that it is rejected in correction. If the Prābhākaras are intent on dismissing this objectivity itself as illusory they will, as in the case of the illusory 'this is snake', be forced to deny even the objectivity of this objectivity as illusory, and so on *ad infinitum*. They cannot argue that the second objectivity is the *svarūpa* of the first; for on the same ground Advaita might also contend that the first too was the *svarūpa* of 'this is snake'. Nor can the Prābhākaras claim that at least to them the content 'this is snake' appeared as non-cognitive, appeared, in other words, as only the cognitively non-distinguished 'this' and 'snake' unified through mere *vyavahāra*. If to them it appeared that way, to others it appeared otherwise.

<sup>1</sup>It will be seen later that the contradiction is only apparent.

At least that other appearance has to be declared false. Again, even Advaita would not object to 'this' and 'snake' being unified through *vyavahāra*, but it would still call the unity cognitive. As *vyavahāra* is a conative overtone of cognition its rejection might mean that the assertion element is dropped and the cognition of the *pāramārthika* real stands out alone in correction. Only Advaita, for reasons to be soon considered, holds that the *pāramārthika* reality is here not 'this' and 'snake', but merely 'this', i.e., the rope.

The concept of *vyāvahārika* reality so far works well. But if nothing further is known about it the entire hypothesis would be *ad hoc*. The concept has to be developed further. The relation of this reality to the other type of reality, viz., the *pāramārthika*, which alone is normally called reality, has to be shown. It has also to be shown if the concept is at all tenable intrinsically.

The two realities are not disparate. Everybody knows what is genuinely real. It is what is independent of its knowledge. It is the *adhiṣṭhāna* which is bodily revealed through its objectivity. If, at different times, it is revealed through numerically different objectivities we are yet aware of it as by itself a definite that appeared as those objects—it is what continues (*anuvṛtta*) in them. Object thus is continuous with the real, it is the *appearance* of the real. So is also the case with the false object. It too is the appearance of a real *adhiṣṭhāna*. By the 'false object as yet real' the Advaitin means (i) that it has a real *adhiṣṭhāna* and (ii) that it is continuous with that *adhiṣṭhāna*. Were it not continuous, the *vyāvahārika* reality of 'this is snake' would be scarcely different from the Naiyāyika's unreality.

The content of a normal *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is a valid appearance in the sense that the reals that are bodily apprehended in *nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa* themselves appear as related to one another in a determinate unity. The false object too is equally a determinate appearance of the *nirvikalpa* real and itself called real on that account much as all normal objects are. A normal object is called real because it is the appearance of a real *adhiṣṭhāna*, maintaining a bond of identity with that. The false object is no doubt rejected. But that does not detract from its reality. It can at most be real and yet rejected. The distinction that Alexander has drawn between real and unreal appearance would be of no avail against the Advaitin. His real appearance is, we have seen, a misnomer. The term 'appearance' there is not merely inappropriate but positively misleading. By that term he only intended a portion of the reality-continuum, just cut loose by selective response.

The two realities—*vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika*—may not be disparate: the former may be taken as an appearance of the latter. But is the concept of appearance itself tenable? Is it, again, intelligible that an object is both real and rejected? There might be a third objection as follows:

It is not clear whether according to the Advaitin the *savikalpa* object is the appearance of one or more than one *nirvikalpa* real. If, of one, this is unintelligible.

How can a unified object develop out of one item only? If, of more than one, that would be untenable for another reason. An appearance is always of *one* thing; the other factors present are only accessories. Though there must be a plurality of factors only one of them is the essence (material cause) that has appeared. The Advaita reply to these three charges will considerably clarify the concept of *vyāvahārika* reality and its relation to the *pāramārthika*.

The first charge is that the concept of appearance is untenable. The distinctive mark of appearance is that between it and that of which it is an appearance there is a bond of identity. The charge is that if there is any difference between the two they cannot be identical also.

In our essay 'The Concept of Cause as in India and the West'—Part II<sup>1</sup> we have defended the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Advaita concept of *bhedābheda* against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. We have shown that a material cause and its effect do not fall apart, that the former is bodily present in the latter, constitutes it and is its essence. The material cause, in other words, *appears* as the effect. The appearance is an accident, and that of which it is the appearance is its *svarūpa*. We need not repeat our arguments here. The false object is, from this point of view, as much an appearance of the *nirvikalpa* real as any normal *savikalpa* object. The only distinction between them is that one is false and the other not; and falsity, it will be seen later, does not exclude reality altogether.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may ask if the *nirvikalpa* real is at all the material cause of the *savikalpa* object. Advaita would reply that it is, because, according to it, the former is bodily present in the latter and is itself known in the *savikalpa* manner<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, is not the *nirvikalpa* Brahman the material cause of the *savikalpa* world, and is not the latter an appearance (though false) of the former? There is no reason why ordinary *nirvikalpa* reals, *qua* *nirvikalpa*, should be qualitatively different from the *nirvikalpa* Brahman.

The bond of identity between a *nirvikalpa* real and its *savikalpa* appearance is evident in normal cases: the former is found bodily present in the latter. But can this be true of the *adhiṣṭhāna* rope and its snake-appearance? Within the snake-appearance we do not perceive the rope. Can it be said, again, that the rope here is a *nirvikalpa* real and the snake a *savikalpa* object? Advaita replies that the *adhiṣṭhāna* rope is, as a matter of fact, perceived in the snake-appearance, though not as rope. It is perceived as barely 'this'. Even the Naiyāyikas and the Prābhākaras have admitted this. A false object differs from a normal *savikalpa* object exactly in this point. In normal cases the *nirvikalpa* object is not perceived as a bare 'this', it stands rich with content. But in error it is not perceived that way because of some defect (*doṣa*). It cannot be said that the 'this' element belongs to the snake only, not to the rope. True, it belongs to the snake: the *savikalpa-pratyakṣa* is of the form 'this is snake'. But after correction it

<sup>1</sup>The essay was published in the second issue of this Bulletin.

<sup>2</sup>This point will be developed in connection with the Advaita reply to the third objection above.

is also felt that the rope too was, at the time of error, perceived as a bare 'this'. Not merely felt, unless the rope was so perceived there could not be error at all. None but the Sūnyavādins admit *niradhiṣṭhāna-bhrama*, and their view will be explained away in the next instalment of this essay. Every error must have had an *adhiṣṭhāna*, and we could not know this law unless in errors that we have actually experienced we have perceived *adhiṣṭhānas* somehow, i.e., in the form of bare 'this'. Moreover, whenever an error is corrected the locus with which the false object was identified remains over in tact, though everything else is rejected. *Adhiṣṭhāna* is that which stands out when an error is corrected, and when it stands out there is the inevitable feeling that it had been peeping all through. We feel we had all along been perceiving it, though also as what it is not. If, in cases of total hallucination, and sometimes in dream, no specifiable basis stands out after correction, this is because the basis here is the whole world or, may be, my body round which the world centres, and we are always aware, however implicitly, of the world as a whole and my body.

So 'this' is as much a feature of the rope as of the snake. It cannot, again, be claimed that there are two 'this's, one belonging to the rope and the other to the snake. After correction we inevitably feel that the two are the same. There is also no valid reason to the contrary, unless the Nyāya point, to be refuted later, is affirmed, *viz.*, that the *nirvikalpa* and the *savikalpa* objects fall apart.

With this is also answered the objection—why is the rope to be called a *nirvikalpa* object, and why the snake a *savikalpa* one? The rope is *nirvikalpa* because it was perceived as a vague lump, as a mere 'this', and the snake is *savikalpa* because it is perceived definitely *as snake* in the form 'this is snake'<sup>1</sup>.

The Advaitin understands every effect as an appearance of its material cause. To this the Naiyāyika may object that sometimes the relation between the two cannot be expressed in this language. A substance is the material cause of its attributes, and contact is an attribute. But a tree-in-contact-with-a-monkey<sup>2</sup> cannot be said to be an appearance of the tree. When A appears as B there are in B the half-distinguished A and an unspecifiable something else—the two forming a homogeneous unity; and though in reflection A can be distinguished (realised) apart from B such distinguishment of B is not possible. But in the case of the tree-in-contact-with-a-monkey neither the tree is half-distinguished, it standing quite clear from the beginning to the end; nor is monkey unspecifiable, nor do they form a homogeneous unity, nor is it true that the monkey can never be found apart from the tree. In other words, when A is in contact with B this contact with B does not *permeate* A. The category of appearance is inapplicable to cases of contact. Even if the contact with B were, as according to the Advaitin, in

<sup>1</sup>Be it noted that we have moved a long way from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika notion of *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa pratyakṣa*. The justification of this departure will be seen later in connection with the Advaita refutation of the concept of joint appearance.

<sup>2</sup>The Advaitin never understands attribute as separate and in itself. Attribute he understands in the form *substance-with-attribute* or *attribute-as-in-substance*. This follows from his theory of *tādātmya* or *bhedābheda* relation between substance and attribute.

*bhedābheda* relation with A, this would be no mystery. The *abheda* relation would have to be understood in respect of one part of A and the *bheda* in respect of other parts (*avyāpyavṛtti*).

So far with cases where an attribute does not permeate a substance. Even in cases of permeation there is no *bhedābheda*—so argues Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In such cases either the locus of permeation is only in name, having in reality ceased to exist by the time the permeator has come into being, or the locus and the permeator are both present and there is only a new relation, called *samavāya*. A quantity of hydrogen (and also oxygen) is said to remain permeating a glass of water. But the real situation here is water only and not that gas also which is now non-existent. The water can indeed be decomposed into hydrogen and oxygen, and retrospectively it is often said that the hydrogen (also oxygen) had permeated it. But, as a matter of fact, when decomposition has taken place there is no water, there are only the two gases<sup>1</sup>. When, again, red colour stands permeating a flower, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that though both the flower and the colour then exist there is the relation of *samavāya* between them. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thus refuses to recognise the concept of appearance once again.

As regards the case of the monkey in contact with the tree, Advaita would reply that the contact is between the *tree* and the *monkey*, not between *parts* of either. It is not also between two *wholes*. The question of part and whole arises, as we have seen in the second instalment of this essay, at a higher reflective level where alone, therefore, the question of *vyāpyavṛtti* and *avyāpyavṛtti* is relevant. A thing may have parts, and as with parts it may be a whole. But at the unreflective level the part and the whole are each perceived as an absolute thing, neither being understood, at that level, as referring to the other. They are so understood—and, therefore, literally as part and whole—only at a higher reflective level. Each having reference to the other is not, at that higher level, a mere epistemic phenomenon. The reference is apprehended as a factual relation, like that between objects corresponding to relative terms. Even if it were merely epistemic the question of *vyāpyavṛtti* and *avyāpyavṛtti* would not be affected. Even then it would be true that *so far as facts are concerned* there is no whole or part, there are only absolute things. The tree and the monkey are absolute things, and the contact is between them, not between parts and wholes. It may be noted that even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in its doctrine of *avyāpyavṛtti* has not considered the *monkey* in the aspect of a part. If the monkey is *avyāpyavṛtta* in the tree, the relevant part of the tree also is *avyāpyavṛtta* in the monkey, and between two relevant parts—one of the tree and the other of the monkey—there is no *avyāpyavṛtti*.

The case of hydrogen and water and that of the flower and its red colour create no difficulty for the Advaitin. He does not believe that a material cause and its

<sup>1</sup>We have excluded cases like salt dissolved in water. In such cases there is no permeation, a particle of salt having only intervened between two particles of water, and *vice versa*. Chemical combination, on the other hand, is always a case of permeation.



effect fall apart. The idea that one has ceased to exist or that there is a relation of *samavāya* follows really from this presupposition of falling apart. If there is no falling apart, it is not unintelligible that there is *bhedābheda* or *tādātmya* in these cases, as between all material causes and their effects. Everywhere the effect is an appearance of its material cause.

The possible Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika objections set aside, it may still be asked if the concept is as intelligible as could be desired. All depends on what is meant by intelligibility. If it is intended that the relation between the real and its appearance is to be understood in terms specifically of one only of the two categories, *bheda* and *abheda*, it is, we admit, unintelligible. But that logic is not binding. If facts are otherwise logic has to submit and adjust its application accordingly. A fact is exactly as it is known to be, provided there is no evident contradiction or imposition. A contradiction or imposition that is *inferred* may also be accepted, but on condition that some defect in the primary cognition is discovered or believed as discoverable. There is nothing like this—no evident or inferred contradiction or imposition—in something *appearing* as something else. Hence it is a fact that a real *appears* in another form which is both identical with and different from it. Logic to adjust its application will have to say either that the identity is in one way and the difference is in another, as the Mīmāṃsakas have done, or that either the real or the appearance is ultimately non-existent, as some Advaitins hold, or that the same thing can remain in two forms—explicit (*abhivyakta*) and implicit (*anabhivyakta*)—as Sāṅkhya-Yoga believes. Of these three alternatives the first and the second are untenable. The first is wrong because the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *kāryātmanā bhinnatvam kāraṇātmanā abhinnatvam* amounts, as we have seen<sup>1</sup>, ultimately to the third alternative above. The error of the second alternative is evident from the fact that neither the real nor the appearance is taken actually as non-existent in spite of the formal logic of dichotomy. If, yet it be argued that one of these must be non-existent this would speak for one's devotedness to that logic, but would fall short of facts. How would one then distinguish between a real appearance (*parināma*) and a false one (*vivarta*)? It is a fact that some appearances are rejected and some not. The distinction cannot be obliterated all too easily by a sweeping application of logic.

Normally, then, appearance is no unintelligible concept. Difficulties arise when an appearance is found false. The difficulties, it will be seen immediately, are so intractable that a false appearance will have to be taken as really unintelligible though it does not for that reason cease to be an appearance.

In a normal *savikalpa* unity the *vikalpas*, though knowledge-wise, are believed as clinging to the *nirvikalpa* real, and the unity is taken to be as much real as the *nirvikalpa* content. But as the *nirvikalpa* corresponding to the rejected judgment 'this is snake' is not snake but only the rope in the aspect of 'this', the *vikalpa*

<sup>1</sup>In the essay 'The Concept of Cause as in India and the West'—Part II.

relation between it and the snake-character<sup>1</sup> cannot cling to it. It follows that the unity 'this snake' so far falls outside the *nirvikalpa* real. As they thus stand disconnected the former cannot so far be said to have appeared as the latter. Yet, however, the unity cannot at the same time be taken as wholly disconnected. For, then, 'this is snake' could not be a judgment asserting something. The fundamental realistic postulate is that every object is a real object. So it is impossible to deny that the *nirvikalpa* real, otherwise called *pāramāthika adhiṣṭhāna*, has itself appeared as the unity.

With regard, again, to the relation between the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the appearance we are faced with a similar difficulty. The false object cannot be taken as either identical with or different from the *pāramārthika adhiṣṭhāna*. As neither sundered from the *pāramārthika* nor yet as maintaining continuity with it, it is called a *vivarta*, as opposed to *parināma*, of the *pāramārthika adhiṣṭhāna*.

It might be asked if even a real appearance is not in the same plight. It too falls aside and yet remains in identity with the *adhiṣṭhāna*. Was it not actually described that way?

It was described that way. But there is a difference. In the case of real appearance 'both identity and difference' was not unintelligible, but it is so in the present case. There was nothing in the former that challenged its reality. But the difference-side in the latter amounts to a challenge that way. So far as the false appearance is sundered from the *adhiṣṭhāna* it cannot be taken as its appearance. But no such *gap* is felt between an *adhiṣṭhāna* and its real appearance. Some difference indeed is felt, but that does not amount to a *gap*. In spite of the difference-side the appearance was all along felt as retained on the bosom of reality. In false appearance, on the other hand, it is felt that the appearance is ever slipping from reality. Yet, however, there is no denying that it is an appearance of that reality. How there can be both *gap* and continuity at the same time is a genuine mystery, so inscrutable that we feel we have no right to assert both in the same breath; and yet error is a genuine occurrence in the world. We were permitted, however, to assert both identity and difference in the case of real appearance. If, in the case of false appearance, we cannot assert both *gap* and continuity the language we use should be one of our incapacity. We should say we *do not know* the false appearance as either falling asunder or retained in reality. The Advaitin means this when he says in a pseudo-objective language. 'It is neither identical with nor different from the *adhiṣṭhāna* (or, in a simpler way, neither real nor unreal)'. *Anirvācyatva* is a category of privation, not of objective assertion. The false appearance is *anirvācyā*, but not so a real one.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>This does not clash with what will be said later, viz that the *svikalpa* unity is, according to the Advaitin, the appearance of a single *nirvikalpa* real. The snake here is no *nirvikalpa* real. 'This is snake' is the appearance of the rope only. The memory (according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) or the disposition (according to Advaita) of snake here acts as a *nimitta kāraṇa* in such a manner that the content of that memory or disposition comes to be foisted upon the rope. The content of a *disposition* to be foisted means that it is constructed (by *ajñāna*) on the locus of the rope. More of this later.

<sup>2</sup>It has been too hasty on the part of some Advaita dialecticians to have declared even a real appearance as *anirvācyā* on the ground of its being both identical with and different from the *adhiṣṭhāna*.

The *anirvācyā*, when detected, is reduced objectively to the real *adhiṣṭhāna*, and what remains over is only an epistemic privation, which means that nothing else has remained. What remains over in the case of real appearance is, on the other hand, a novel assertion.

There is another aspect of false appearance worth mention in this connection. Normally the snake is declared false after the rope is known as real. But this is not necessary. As the judgments 'the rope is real' and 'the snake is false' are different it is not impossible that the latter may occur independently of the former<sup>1</sup>. As a matter of fact, it so occurs when some defect in the perception-situation corresponding to 'this is snake' is discovered. The point worth noting is that even such independent judgment 'the snake is false' asserts something as real. It asserts at least the reality of the situation that the snake is false. Either, then, even the false snake has some form of reality or, though false, it is the appearance of some real *adhiṣṭhāna* which is virtually asserted in that judgment (and the two alternatives really coincide). Here too the appearance is not understood as either identical with or different from the *adhiṣṭhāna*. Not identical, because there is some difference—one is the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the other its appearance. Not different, because, after correction, there are no two judgments here, *viz.*, 'this is snake'<sup>2</sup> and 'the snake is false'. The latter stands undistinguishedly fused in the former. The *adhiṣṭhāna*, in other words, is known as real only through the false appearance. It at most demands dissociation, but is not yet actually dissociated.

There is actual dissociation when the correction of 'this is snake' is supplemented by another judgment 'this is rope'. At this stage the rope no longer peeps through the snake as constituting its 'this' part. It stands evident as a full-fledged reality withdrawing the 'this' part from the snake into itself, and the snake divested of individuality turns into a nullity. Not that the apparent individual was really a universal<sup>3</sup>. Individuality is not an extrinsic property added to the universal that constitutes the individual. Even when the universal is distinguished as having constituted it what remains over is not individuality, but just that old individual. Or, from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, the individual has always its own *svarūpa* (distinctive character) on account of which the universal as a different entity inheres in it. In any case no individual is a universal *plus* a bare individuality. When, therefore, we have the judgment 'this is rope' the content 'this is snake' has disappeared altogether. The snake, at this stage, is not merely not false, it is not even *tuccha*. It is nothing at all, no content even that is tried to be constructed. It is then absolute zero. If even after the judgment 'this is rope' we feel that the snake is false, this is because we have turned (on account of a persisting *samskāra*) to the snake and rediscovered a *doṣa* in it implicitly or explicitly. Rediscovered, because the *doṣa* was already discovered implicitly in the form of incommensurate disappearance. It cannot be said that even the first discovery was *after* the judgment 'this is rope'. It is not known for certain which of these occurred earlier. Add to this uncertainty the fact that the judgment 'the snake is false' may occur independently of the judgment 'the rope is real' and also the fact, to be substantiated later, that there is nothing in the rope as real to reject the snake, and there will be no ground for holding that the

<sup>1</sup>Why the other side is not mentioned will be evident toward the end.

<sup>2</sup>'This is snake' considered retrospectively from the view-point of correction

<sup>3</sup>Some modern realists believe this.

discovery of the *doṣa* was later than the judgment 'this is rope'. The retrospective feeling that the snake is false is thus due to a turn-back to the snake. Unless for whatever reason *we* have turned back there is no occasion for the content 'this is snake' and no question, therefore, of falsity. There is nothing in the content 'this is rope', now known, that would necessitate this turn-back. The turn-back is, as we have said, due to the *saṃskāra* (inertia) of the old cognition that continues for some time. After a few moments we forget all about it, unless indeed the *saṃskāra* is very strong. Sometimes the turn-back is effected by the continued presence of the old content itself, as in the case of the bent appearance of a straight stick immersed in water. As long as the bent appearance will last there will be continued occasion for the turn-back. The primary *doṣa* here for which the appearance is declared false is no disappearance, but the presence of the water, and on every turn-back the same defect is discovered. The difference between the two cases is that in one the *doṣa* is wholly inherent in the false content<sup>1</sup>, in the other it is not so.

To consider now the second objection raised in page 184. How can the snake be both real and rejected at the same time? Is this not self-contradictory? Advaita replies by paraphrasing 'real' as 'not unreal' and developing its consequences. This paraphrasing would not only remove the contradiction but throws additional light on the error situation.

'Unreal' here does not mean something positive that falls outside reality. In the judgment 'X is Y' it is inevitably presumed that X is a *reality* which is related in a manner with Y. But in the statement 'X is unreal' X, to begin with, is not real. Whatever be the meaning of 'unreality', it is at least not reality, which means that there is no presumption that X is real. 'Unreal', therefore, means sheer absence of reality. The judgment 'X is not Y' is not, again, to be necessarily understood as that X falls in the positive region outside Y. The literal meaning of 'X is not Y' is that X is related in a peculiar manner with the absence of Y.

The unreal as the absolute absence of reality is not real even as absence. In all judgments, affirmative or negative, the simple reals, the relation and the unity are all real. The only exception to this rule is the case of a content spoken of as unreal: the factor absence of reality is not real, and so its relation to the content and, therefore also, the unity formed that way cannot be real. 'X is unreal' is, then, no judgment.

The content X, as just seen, is not real. It is not merely not real, it was not even presumed to be real. It is not merely not real now, before or after, it neither is nor was nor will be even spoken of that way. Its status is peculiar. From the beginning to the end it is spoken of as bereft of all reality. The false snake, on the other hand, is not of this type. It was once spoken of as real. It is not spoken of as unreal from the beginning to the end. Hence the false snake is not *unreal*. The corresponding judgment would be 'this snake is false' where 'this snake' is not

<sup>1</sup> *Kāchādidōṣas* only prevent the rope from appearing as rope, and the straight stick from appearing as straight. They have nothing to do with the snake and the bent appearance.

*aprasakta*: it is the snake that was taken as real before correction. That *prasakta* snake is now rejected. The unreal, on the other hand, is intrinsically *aprasakta*. The only contents which are unreal in this sense are those which are either unaccomplished or problematic only<sup>1</sup>, and they include what are self-contradictory and what from the beginning are known as merely imaginary. The unreal, literally understood, is, then, the self-contradictory or merely imaginary. The Advaita name for both is *tuccha*<sup>2</sup>.

'Not unreal', on the contrary, means what belongs to the region outside the self-contradictory and the merely imaginary. For two reasons it has to be understood in that positive way. First, there is no difficulty that way. In the judgment 'X is not unreal' the subject is not from the beginning taken as bereft of reality. Secondly, there is no conceivable negative way here. 'Not unreal', negatively understood, would mean that unreality is absent. But whatever is spoken of as absent must have been taken as real somewhere. The unreal, however, is never speakable as real. Hence there is no question of its absence. 'Not unreal' means what falls outside the self-contradictory and the merely imaginary. Understood that way it comprises objects, like the rope, which are not rejected and also objects, like the false snake, which are rejected. The false snake is not unreal and is yet rejected, and there is so far no contradiction in that. The snake is, in other words, neither self-contradictory nor known from the beginning as merely imaginary, and in that sense not unreal.

We have seen that the false snake is real in the sense of being non-different from the *pārmārthika adhiṣṭhāna* rope. It is now shown that it is not also unreal. Viewed either way, there is no clash with its rejection. So far as one feels a gap between the *adhiṣṭhāna* and the appearance the latter cannot, it is true, be spoken of as real; but undeniably it is also an appearance of, and so non-different from, the *adhiṣṭhāna*, and cannot as such be spoken of as not real; and between two *privations* there is no clash. That there is no clash also between the not-unreal and the rejected we have just seen. The snake, then, is either speakable as neither identical with nor different from the real *adhiṣṭhāna* or objectively both not-unreal and rejected.

When the Advaitin calls it *neither real nor unreal* he understands by 'real' not what is an appearance of the *adhiṣṭhāna*—not a *savikalpa* object coincident with the *nirvikalpa* real—but that *nirvikalpa* real itself considered reflectively as not rejected. 'Not real' would, from this point of view, mean what is rejected; and the snake as neither real nor unreal would mean that it is rejected and yet an appearance. Unless reflective rejection is qualitatively different from rejection

<sup>1</sup>*Bandhyāputra* is an unaccomplished content, and *khapuṣpa* problematic only.

<sup>2</sup>The Naiyāyikas do not recognise any fundamental distinction between *mithyā* (false) and *tuccha* (unreal). Both, according to them, are equally rejected and both were apprehended before rejection. They are wrong, however, in the second point and, therefore, also in the first. *Bandhyāputra* or *khapuṣpa* might in a sense be taken as apprehended, but they were not apprehended as real. It follows that they were not apprehended in any normal sense of the term. It is of the very nature of apprehension (knowledge) that the content apprehended is, at least primarily, taken as real. The *tuccha* was not, therefore, actually apprehended; there was at most a trying to apprehend it through language-construction. Hence its rejection also is qualitatively different from that of a false content.

The *tuccha* is not, again, the *vikalpa* of Yoga. The latter is an accomplished content, though effected through language only, in the sense that the relations involved in that *savikalpa* content are merely verbal *prāṭīti*.

that is unreflective, this is no new report about the false. We are only told that the false is a sub-class under the wider class 'not unreal', which, we have seen, follows from the very analysis of the concept unreal. The question of reflective rejection and what follows from it will be taken up later in this section.

In the judgment 'the snake is false', and consequently in 'this is snake', the reality directly asserted is the rope as 'this', the snake being only what is indirectly asserted as real, as the form in which the direct reality had appeared. All our act-response (including assertion) was to the snake; and even now when it is known as false there is imagined act-response to it. There was no act-response to the rope, and if now when we have detected the rope it is responded to these are a new set of responses totally unconnected with any earlier and all present imaginary response. The rope as 'this' was, however, *known* all along as the direct reality and is so known even when the snake is declared false. The direct reality so known is *pāramārthika* and is called *adhiṣṭhāna*. But even as the *pāramārthika* is so known the indirect reality—the snake—continues to be responded to at least in imagination and is called *vyāvahārika* for that reason. When, however, the *pāramārthika* comes to be clearly known in the form 'this is rope' the snake ceases altogether to be referred to, unless the inertia of that reference lasts for some time more<sup>1</sup>.

*Pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika* are only relative terms. The rope in relation to the snake is *pāramārthika*, in which context the snake is *vyāvahārika*. It may, however, happen—and as a matter of fact the Advaitin has claimed it—that the rope too is, from an ulterior point of view, false, the direct reality corresponding to it being existence as such or pure consciousness. From this point of view the rope will be *vyāvahārika*, *vyavahāra* being understood more sweepingly as experience=*bhoga* in general<sup>2</sup>, as opposed to absolutely unattached pure cognition; and pure existence or pure consciousness is *pāramārthika*. From this point of view the ordinary false content—the snake—would come down to a level lower than the *vyāvahārika*. The false content so understood is technically called *prātibhāsika*<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>The false bent appearance of a straight stick immersed in water is no exception to this rule. There we have only a double imaginary response to the false appearance. The straight stick was perceived before and is never perceived at the time the bent one comes to be known as false. Hence when the latter is known as false the response to it is imaginary in the context of the straight one which, in its turn, is itself imaginary at that time. When, however, the stick is taken away from the water the case would be analogous to the rope *vis a vis* the snake, except that the disappearance of the bent stick is not intrinsic to that appearance but due to the relation with the water having ceased.

<sup>2</sup>This meaning of *vyāvahāra* does not differ in essence from the meaning given earlier, *viz.*, assertion. To cognition the real is presented exactly as it is, and assertion always represents it as *savikalpa*. If explicit *vikalpas* are, to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, knowledge-wise (though not denied to be real), Advaita would only equate knowledge, in this context, with experience=*bhoga*. Explicit *vikalpas* are, in other words, *bhoga*-wise. *Nirvikalpa* reals (with or without implicit reference to other such reals) as data for these *vikalpas* are not for *bhoga*, *bhoga* meaning experience by the individual *jīva*. These reals are, according to Advaita, created by God—it may be for the common *bhoga* of all individuals. It should be borne in mind that nowhere the *bhoga*-wise is denied to be real also.

The distinction between cognition and *bhoga* (experience) above is that while in cognition the real (*nirvikalpa* or *savikalpa*) is just revealed, in experience it is also asserted, *i.e.*, made closer to the knower or incorporated. It may be that such incorporation is ultimately untenable, the knower or knowledge being constitutionally incapable of it. But ultimately tenable or not, such incorporation is a fact to start with. At the empirical level cognition and incorporation go together.

<sup>3</sup>If the *prātibhāsika* is *pratīṣamakālīna* or *pratīṣarīra* the *vyāvahārika* is also *bhoga*-*samakālīna* or *bhogasarīra*.

So far with the second objection raised in page 184 against Advaita. We now turn to the third objection raised there. It concerned the impossibility of joint appearance.

Advaita would agree that joint appearance is an illegitimate notion. Where behind an appearance there are several factors, either the appearance is definitely of only one of these, where the other factors are only non-constitutive causes or it is the appearance alternately, not jointly, of each of the factors.

Consider two cases of so-called joint appearance—the bent appearance of a straight stick immersed in water and a whole as the appearance of parts.

The bent stick cannot be as much an appearance of the straight stick as of the water. No one calls the bent stick an appearance of the water. There is no bond of identity between it and the water. The water may have something to do in that situation ; yet the very fact that the appearance is called bent *stick* proves that the required identity obtains between it and the straight one. The water is only a non-constitutive accessory<sup>1</sup>.

In some cases indeed an appearance is not named after its material cause. But even there everyone, questioned on the point, would certify that it is the appearance of one particular factor and not of the other factors which are, therefore, only accessories (*nimitta* or *sahakāri kāraṇas*). Some of the accessories, again, are often treated, not without reason, as more toward constituting the appearance than the rest. When a seed, for example, develops into a tree (where, therefore, the seed is the material cause), soil and water look more constitutive than air and light : soil-properties and water enter into the seed for its development. But either this is a superficial account, air and light also influencing the seed no less than they, or where there is really such difference among the accessories we may recognise a third causal category, viz., *sahakāri kāraṇa*, it being that accessory which remains, either unaltered or in a modified form, in the body of the effect<sup>2</sup>.

A whole as the appearance of parts is a new case altogether. All the parts that constitute the whole are of the same status. It cannot be said that one only of these is the material cause and the rest *nimitta* or *sahakāri*. Yet there is no joint appearance here. The concepts of whole and part are ambiguous. A thing which is a whole or one which is a part may be perceived absolutely, i.e., not as whole or part, but just as a given thing ; or it may be perceived clearly as a whole or a part. In the former case there is no question of part-*things* constituting the whole-*thing*. Of the whole and the part each is alternately perceived as absolute, 'alternately' meaning (a) that there is no preferential ground why one

<sup>1</sup>Alexander's theory of mere and false appearances has been refuted in the second instalment of this essay.

<sup>2</sup>Vide *Yuktidīpikā* (Metropolitan)—page 64 (*pūrvapakṣa*) and *Śātaratnasamgraha*. (Arthur Avalon Tantrik Texts)—pages 24-25.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *asamavāyī kāraṇa* comes near it, differing in only one fundamental point, viz., that in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika no effect is ever taken as in whatever way identical with its cause, not even when the cause is *material*.

should be perceived and the other not, and (b) that, as a matter of fact, one only is perceived at a time. Not merely the whole-thing and the part-thing but each of the part-things also is alternatively absolute in this sense. The alternate perception of the part-things is not their *samūhāmbana-pratyakṣa*. A part, again, may be perceived (or inferred, as the case may be) *as a part* and the whole *as a whole*, where in the former case the whole as a whole, and in the latter a part as a part, comes to be known by *implication*. But there is no question in the former case of *other* parts and, in the latter, of any *definite* part. There is no question, therefore, in either case, of the whole being constituted by *several* parts. A part understood as part is necessarily known as constituting the whole. There being no need so far of other parts, it alone is the material cause. A whole, similarly, understood as whole, is necessarily known as constituted by some parts; but there is no need of knowing the parts definitely<sup>1</sup>. As, therefore, the parts are not definitely known and as a single definite part is sufficient to constitute a whole, this whole is the appearance of either that single definite part or alternately of each part.

What is true of part-whole is true in the same manner of any other phenomenon loosely called joint appearance. Every such appearance is at most alternately constituted by X, Y, Z, *etc.*, and it is only a weakness of language that alternation is represented as conjunction. Either the word 'conjunction' is not to be taken literally or, if literal, it means conjunction of *alternatives* which, again, is a mere word representing no fact.

Joint appearance is thus an illegitimate notion. Appearance is always of one definite thing. Other factors do not constitute it conjointly with that definite constituent. They either constitute it alternately or work as *nimitta* and *sahakāri kāraṇas*.

The *savikalpa* object might, from this point of view, be understood as the appearance of either each of the *nirvikalpa* reals alternately or definitely of only one of them. As, however, the latter alternative is here absurd we have to accept the former. *Nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* that forms the basis of *savikalpa pratyakṣa* has not for its object a plurality of discrete reals<sup>2</sup>. The object is here the alternation of simple reals. This, in essence, is the Advaita<sup>3</sup> notion of *nirvikalpa* object. Let us see how.

At the *nirvikalpa* stage the simple reals were perceived as alternately absolute. But we have already<sup>4</sup> seen that they were also perceived each with a vague

<sup>1</sup>It is strange that even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has held, though on another ground, that in perceiving a whole we need not perceive all the parts simultaneously. Their ground is that the whole is a self-complete entity, even apart from the parts.

<sup>2</sup>It may be asked if even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is consistent so far as the false *savikalpa* object 'this is snake' is concerned. Are there two or more *nirvikalpa* reals here? There is only one *nirvikalpa* real here, *viz.*, the rope, snake (*sarpamātram*) as the object of *pramūṣṭatāvāka-smṛti* coming to be complicated with it in the *jñānalakṣaṇā* way. The salient point in this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account is that this other object is *sarpamātram*, not this or that snake, and so far looks like a *nirvikalpa* real. But it is not a real revealed in any *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*, now remembered. The memory here is of the object of a past *savikalpa pratyakṣa*. Only that object is now divested of its spatio-temporal specificity, without, however, being a universal for that reason. It is doubtful, then, if the bare snake (*sarpamātram*) is, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a *nirvikalpa* real, though it looks like that.

<sup>3</sup>The Bhāṭṭas also hold this view.

<sup>4</sup>In the second instalment of this essay.



differential quality, vague in the sense that this quality was perceived neither as a definite content nor like other qualities that remain in a substance. It appeared as a felt undefined fringe involving an equally undefined reference (which, therefore, is not yet a determining or determinate *relation*) to the other reals perceived alternately at that stage. It follows that in the alternate perception of each *nirvikalpa* real-with-that-differential-quality other *nirvikalpa* reals are apprehended as so vaguely referred to. The content of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* is thus everytime somehow a vague totality of those reals.

This vague totality is not of the form A and B and C, etc. And is either a defined relation or merely verbal. If former, it is no part of *nirvikalpa* content. If latter, the content would be simply A, B, C, etc., without even togetherness. But if even togetherness is absent how could it be known that *all these*, not one of them, are the content of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*? A *nirvikalpa* content cannot involve defined relation, but in it there must be some vague counterpart of relation. That counterpart is the vague differential quality in each, referring in an equally vague manner to the other reals concerned. Togetherness has sometimes been understood as not additional to A, B, C, etc., but real and yet exhausted in them in the sense that while these entities are imaginable apart from togetherness the converse is not true. But such exhausted reality is only another name for the functional differential quality of each of them. The content of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* is A with a differential quality or B with a differential quality or C with a differential quality, etc., and in each case it is a vague indeterminate whole. In *savikalpa pratyakṣa* this vague whole stands defined as a determinate unity involving explicit relations.

The vague whole is not, as some Hegelians believe, a homogeneous concoction where the constituents are in no way discernible. It is a whole where A, B, C, etc., are each discerned in its identity, but alternately and each with a vague differential quality. There is no question of total homogeneity or absolute absence of definiteness.

According to Advaita, the *savikalpa* object is the appearance of such *nirvikalpa* reality. But there are two points yet to be clarified. (a) O to be an appearance of R requires that R is bodily present, though largely veiled, in O and that in the same act by which O is perceived R is also perceived to whatever extent.<sup>1</sup> Is the *nirvikalpa* object so present in the *savikalpa*, and does it necessarily belong to that *savikalpa* content? Again, (b) if the *nirvikalpa*, as already seen, is itself a reality-core with<sup>2</sup> a differential quality, may it not be said that it too is an appearance of the core?

Advaita would admit all this, but with qualification. As regards the point (a) it would say that the *nirvikalpa* content is bodily present in the *savikalpa* and, so far identical with it, is also perceived in that *savikalpa pratyakṣa*; but it would add that there is also difference between them: while the *nirvikalpa*

<sup>1</sup>The Naiyāyika will deny this.

<sup>2</sup>This 'with' is no defined relation.

real is a vague whole and perceived that way the *savikalpa* is explicitly relational and perceived also as relational. As regards the point (b), it would admit that *nirvikalpa* reality is an appearance of the reality-core, but would add that there is no specifiable difference here between reality and appearance if by 'difference' is meant an explicit relation. As the differential quality is not explicitly different from the core the difference between this core and the *nirvikalpa* object as appearance is not also explicit. That object is as much a reality as an appearance. If through the *savikalpa* object the *nirvikalpa* real only peeped, the core does not peep through the *nirvikalpa* object, the vague differential quality being its functional nature (*śakti*) and the core only *demanding* separation, never to be had as separate in any normal empirical attitude. Relatively to the *savikalpa* object, on the contrary, the *nirvikalpa* object often remains separate, as when we have mere *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* which has not developed into *savikalpa pratyakṣa*. If the core is at all to be separated, this is possible at a higher spiritual level not under consideration here.

A meaning of 'reality' suggested in page 192, but not developed there, may now be taken up for consideration. It was suggested that 'real' may mean *un-rejected* and that the false object as evidently rejected might not be real in that sense.

Unrejectedness may be understood in two attitudes. A content may be un-rejected in the sense that the explicit question of its rejection or not has not yet arisen, or it may mean that such question having arisen it is found to be un-rejected. In the former case the attitude is one of primary (unreflective) acceptance. In the latter the content is recognised in a reflective attitude of confirmation: it presupposes that the content was challenged but that it has stood the challenge.

From the point of view of primary acceptance the falsity of a content would be an immediately felt vague differential quality that is only later defined in reflection as rejection, *doṣa*, incompatibility with the real, *etc.* Reality too, as primarily accepted, is, as we have seen, another immediately felt vague differential quality, to be later defined in reflection as explicit unrejectedness, confirmedness, coherence with other reals, *etc.* The distinction between primary and reflective reality and equally between primary and reflective falsity is no mere epistemic phenomenon. *Prima facie* the contents themselves are known as different. In one case there are gross relations and qualities, in the other these are subtle. To understand grossness and subtleness as due entirely to the intensity or otherwise of knowing would be dogmatic. The *prima facie* objectivity (reality) of these cannot be dismissed except on explicit ground. But no such ground is evident<sup>1</sup>.

An object primarily apprehended as false is also real in the sense that it is the appearance of a real *adhiṣṭhāna*, the reality of the false object being *vyāvahārika*

<sup>1</sup>Even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has admitted a distinction between gross and subtle *bhūtas*, between *udbhūtarūpa* and *anudbhūtarūpa* and also between explicit sound and felt vibrations as its implicit form.

only. *Vyāvahārika* reality thus does not clash with *primary* rejectedness. Indeed it is only on account of primary rejectedness that the object was taken as real in the *vyāvahārika* way. *Vyāvahārika* reality does not also clash with reflective rejection. Only *pāramārthika* reality clashes with rejectedness, primary or reflective. It follows that both reflective and primary rejection (falsity) is *pāramārthika*.

Reality, on the other hand, is, as we have seen, of two kinds—*pāramārthika* and *vyāvahārika*. An object primarily accepted as real is *vyāvahārika*, and one with reflectively established reality is *pāramārthika*.

This does not conflict with the Advaita doctrine that Brahman alone is *pāramārthika* reality and all else, even the rejectedness and the reflectively established reality of empirical objects, is *vyāvahārika*. In the context of this essay the *vyāvahārika* is exactly what the Advaitin, from a higher point of view, calls *prātibhāsika*, and our *pāramārthika* is, from that point of view, *vyāvahārika*. Rejectedness and confirmed reality are *vyāvahārika* from that point of view only. But they are *pāramārthika* in comparison with the primarily accepted reality. They are *adhikasattāka* and the primary reality is *nyūnasattāka*. Rejection of the higher *vyāvahārika*<sup>1</sup> in favour of the ultimate *pāramārthika* would similarly be a phenomenon at that *pāramārthika* plain. Rejection of O by R, even as necessarily referring to O, is a free function of R, ever slipping from the self-contained being of R and yet freely retained on account of the persisting *samskāra* of the old perception of O, which *samskāra* ceasing, the rejection would also cease, leaving only the self-contained R behind. The positive being of the rejection is R itself which only acted for some time as the negation of O<sup>2</sup>. O is *vyāvahārika*, but its rejection somehow belongs to R. If O continues for some time as *anirvācya* this does not affect the sole reality of R in that context.

<sup>1</sup>According to Advaita there is no reflective confirmation of the higher *vyāvahārika*.

<sup>2</sup>*Vide* the Bhāṭṭa view of negation which Advaita accepts.

The status of the rejection as the *svarūpa* of the real has been established in another way in Advaitasiūdhī—*mūhyāvamūhyāva*. It is not clear, however, whether according to Madhusūdana the *pāramārthika* rejection of O by R is merely epistemic or something more. Were it merely epistemic, his view would clash with the general Advaita view of negation and would be in line with the Prābhākara view of negation, which is that negation is only *my taking* the positive in a manner. We have also seen and shall again see in greater detail why the rejection cannot be merely epistemic. But, if not epistemic, we shall have to recognise that even according to Advaita the *pāramārthika* reality would, even as *pāramārthika*, have a rejective function (*ajñāna-śakti*) in general which comes to refer to a particular O because of a persisting *samskāra* of O or because of the continued presence of that O. *Ajñāna* as a *śakti* of (*āśrita* in) Brahman has been admitted in Pañcapādīkā, Vivaraṇa and Pañcadaśī. This does not affect the pure monism of Advaita. The entitative reality of this *śakti* is Brahman itself. *Śakti* means that which by itself is no entitative reality but which yet is the very same reality as function. Function is indeed neither identical with nor different from the reality; but this neither-nor represents no mere epistemic privation. Nor is it both identical with and different from the reality. It is an objective neither-nor, and, therefore, no appearance, real or false. (Brahman is the sheer entitative reality, and this Brahman considered as also the Lord of that function is *īśvara* as *māyādhīśa*. *īśvara* as *māyāvaśaṅga* is, however, *vyāvahārika*. It is either *īśvara* as we understand him or one among, though having created or lording over, us. *īśvara* as *māyādhīśa*, on the other hand,—as *sarvajña* and *sarvaśaktimān*, as one who has *īkṣaṇa*—is not *vyāvahārika*. He is Brahman-with-*śakti*. It is only some later Advaitins who have denied this, having too easily understood the negation of the identity of the *śakti* with Brahman and the negation of its difference from Brahman as its *anirvācya*, i.e., as its falsity.)

Or, there is another explanation. Rejection may be understood in two ways—as belonging to R in the form of R rejecting O or as belonging to O in the form of O as rejected. Understood in the first way as a relational property of R it is not false, but understood in the second way as belonging to O it is rejected with the rejection of O. The two representations of rejection are not epistemic only. Each is an objective situation. Rejection is an objective relation between R and O, and there is no possible decision here as to which one of the two possible representations is finally right. Every relation, moreover, unless it be a third separate entity, belongs equally to either relata, and rejection, like pure negation, is no conceivable third entity. While, again, a negation is related more closely to its *pratiyogin* and only loosely attached to the *anuyogin*, no such discrimination is possible in the case of rejection. Rejection is not also a negation *plus* some epistemic attitude. Not-A does not exist, and *as not-A* it was never taken as existent. But the rejected snake, though in a way it does not exist, was yet taken as existent even though it is now known as rejected. Not that the two sides—the negation and the past position—just go together. If the past position was as much real as the present negation the two cannot go together; for the present negation, if real, was also a past negation. The past position was not, again, merely epistemic. The fundamental realistic postulate is that every appearance is, even as appearance, real.

In the rope-snake context the rope is not merely reflectively real, it had primary reality too, like the snake. It too was just accepted as real before its reality could be reflectively established, before, in other words, it could be taken as *pāramārthika*. From this point of view it was *vyāvahārika*.

The rope is *pāramārthika* so far only<sup>1</sup> as it has rejected the snake, not because it has been accepted primarily as real. There is nothing in its primary reality that could reject the snake. That it occupies the space of the snake does not prove that therefore the snake is rejected: on the same ground the snake might also reject the rope. The snake is rejected unreflectively. When its space has been unaccountably occupied by the rope it comes to evince a vague differential quality, loosely called *disappearance*<sup>2</sup>—a quality which is later defined as some *doṣa*, sometimes as the explicit rejectedness, of that snake. The snake having evinced that differential character, the rope now, in contrast with it, comes to be known as reflectively real. Reflective reality of an object is apprehended either through its confirmation by other cognitions or, as here, through the rejection of the corresponding falsity. This reflective reality, as not merely epistemic, is called *pāramārthika*.

It cannot be said that the rope is taken as real because it is the object of a later knowledge (*uttarajñāna*) for which we have natural partiality (*pakṣapāta*). The later knowledge has not, it is true, been yet contradicted; but there is no evidence

<sup>1</sup>The adverb 'only' is relevant in the present context only. It will be seen a few pages below in the text that the rope is reflectively real even when its primary acceptance is confirmed by other cognitions.

<sup>2</sup>This is wholly unlike any other disappearance. The false here is not removed or destroyed in any normal sense of the terms. *Vide* Advaitasiddhi—the third definition of *mithyātva*.

yet that the earlier knowledge has been contradicted. To the question how both the cognitions can go uncontradicted the reply is that *as a matter of fact* one—generally the earlier—comes at this stage to have evinced the differential quality of contradictedness. This is why there is *pakṣapāta* for the *uttarajñāna*. Merely to have an uncontradicted *uttarajñāna* does not justify the *pakṣapāta*. Merely to have it is no sufficient evidence that the *pūrvajñāna*, even though it is opposite, is contradicted. It is not, again, true that if there is an uncontradicted knowledge of A the knowledge of its opposite stands automatically contradicted. The opposite of A in the present case is not its formal contradictory. It is only a contrary. But there is no *a priori* determination of contrariety. B can be called a contrary of A either if on A occurring B is rejected (or ceases) *as a matter of fact* or if A and B are known as co-ordinate determinations of a common determinable. But the latter condition would be of no avail here. The rope is taken as real *now*, but the snake was taken as real at another point of time. Unless, therefore, the as yet uncontradicted acceptance of the rope means that it is real for all time there is no rejection of the snake. Not that though there is no assurance that it will remain real in the future it is yet believed as having been real in the past. If its future reality is doubtful, so is also its past reality; for if per chance in future it comes to be rejected it will not then be taken as having been real in the past. The rope can be taken as real for all time if only its reality is known reflectively either as confirmed or through the rejection of the snake. Unreflective acceptance of it does not guarantee reality for all time.

There is no *uttarajñānapakṣapāta* even when an object as merely inferred<sup>1</sup> to have been in a locus is found to be the contrary of one perceived in the same locus earlier. That it is an object of inference is by itself no evidence that the opposite cognition is an error. The opposite cognition could be known as erroneous *only as* evincing some defect. Often the defect stands immediately evident as the inference takes place, as when the apparent smallness of the perceived sun is found to have been due to the defect *distance*. Often, again, on the basis of many such rejections-due-to-defect we *infer* one. The latter happens when immediately as an inference takes place the opposite cognition is rejected. It is not rejected *a priori* on ground of opposition. The cognition of A can on its merit reject the cognition of its opposite B if only that B had not already appeared as real<sup>2</sup>. Where it had so appeared it could be rejected only on account of some defect in the prior cognition. This is particularly evident when one inference rejects another *inference*. Till we come to know some defect in the process of the second inference there is no question of its rejection<sup>3</sup>.

The knowledge of A, then, rejects that of B either when the latter has evinced primary rejectedness or, as noticed before, when the former comes to be confirmed.

<sup>1</sup>Merely inferred, not confirmed through inference. In the latter case the object was already known before that inference took place.

<sup>2</sup>This presents in a nutshell the arguments given toward the end of the last paragraph.

<sup>3</sup>*Vide Satpratipakṣa* (antinomy) in Nyāya. In Nyāya, however, *satpratipakṣa* has been understood as a form of *hetvābhāsa*, though it is not known for certain which of the two inferences in a case of *satpratipakṣa* is wrong.

A cognition is confirmed when its object, primarily taken as real in that cognition, is also inferred from other considerations, so that there is no longer primary reality only; the object has now come to be known as also a reflective reality, though the latter, as will be shortly evident, is not known as an imposition but as what the former was in disguise or implicitly.

The rope, thus, as not contradicting the snake on the mere ground that it is perceived in the space occupied by the snake, is in no way better than that snake which too was primarily accepted. The rope as primarily accepted is, therefore, as much *vyāvahārika* as the snake. It is elevated to the *pāramārthika* status when either the snake has evinced primary rejectedness or the knowledge of the rope has been confirmed. Of the two methods, however, the former is more convincing. When the snake has evinced primary rejectedness we realise the *pāramārthika* status of the rope, but when the acceptance of the rope has been confirmed (and the snake has not revealed that character) we only believe its *pāramārthika* status, not realised that. *Yauktika tiraskāra* is never on a level with realisation. Brahman similarly may, from the higher metaphysical point of view, be apprehended as *pāramārthika* in two ways. When the mere acceptance of the self (or existence) is confirmed ratiocinatively, either through inferring it again or through inferring the untenability of everything else<sup>1</sup>, its *pāramārthika* status is *yauktika* only. But when everything else has come to be perceived as defective and so rejected, the *pāramārthika* Brahman stands realised<sup>2</sup>.

The question whether with the confirmation of a cognition or the rejection of its opposite the *pāramārthika* reality comes to be supervened on the primary or whether the primary reality comes to be known as itself having been *pāramārthika* in disguise may now be taken up.

The question is that of *prāmāṇya*—*parataḥ* or *svataḥ*—understood here from the point of view of the *object* of knowledge, not in the traditional form as to whether the truth of a knowledge is additional or not to that knowledge, whether, in other words, the conditions of the origination (and also the knowledge) of the truth of that knowledge are not or are identical with the conditions of the origination (and also the knowledge) of that knowledge itself. We shall answer the question in the traditional form, but throughout in the light of *our* problem. Naturally many of the traditional details will be left out of consideration.

In the primary attitude an object is just taken as real. In the reflective attitude it is asked whether I am justified in so taking it, whether, in other words, the object is really real or not. In the primary attitude there is only *grahaṇa*<sup>3</sup>, in the reflective attitude there is *niścaya*<sup>4</sup>. In the language of Western

<sup>1</sup>This is no new way of confirmation. It is fundamentally knowing *pāramārthika* reality through rejection of the opposite. Only, the rejection here is not direct, but inferential.

<sup>2</sup>The footnote 1 above was from the Advaita point of view. There are other philosophers who speak of realisation of Brahman as *pāramārthika* without the rejection of everything else. Their method is a form of *samādhi* on the intellectually confirmed Brahman. Or it may be that *samādhi* had all along been synchronous with ratiocinative confirmation.

<sup>3</sup>Sometimes called *samśaya*.

<sup>4</sup>Sometimes called *avadhāraṇa* or *adhyavasāya*.

philosophy, in the primary attitude there is only knowledge, but in the reflective attitude there is *truth* or otherwise of knowledge.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in India and Russell and Logical Positivists in the West believe that the truth or error of a cognition is an additional phenomenon due to some additional ground. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the truth of a cognition is an additional merit known through the content being inferred in a secondary cognition, and its erroneousness is a defect additional to the cognition and known through its conflict with other cognitions. Logical Positivists believe that as the truth of a cognition has nothing to do with its object which is already accepted as real it has no metaphysical import and is either a way of restating the already accepted real or relevant in some non-metaphysical interest ; and similarly with falsity. Russell holds that there is truth only as the content of naive cognition<sup>1</sup>—to which alone the characterisation 'real' or 'unreal' is appropriate—consists with the contents<sup>2</sup> of other possible or actual cognitions, and truth as thus different from reality or unreality is either due to or itself that consistency.

The Advaita view is entirely different from these. Truth, according to the Advaitin, is no extrinsic property of knowledge due to some additional ground. It belongs intrinsically to cognition, which means that the conditions of that cognition are *ipso facto* the conditions of its truth. Truth is also known in the same way as that cognition is known, and, therefore, immediately with that cognition. But erroneousness is not of this nature. A cognition is known as erroneous when it is reflectively rejected, and the rejection, we have seen, is due to some defect in that cognition.

It may be asked of the Logical Positivist, Russell and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika if truth, as they conceive it, has anything to do with the previously accepted reality. Logical Positivists have openly denied this and consider the problem itself as extra-metaphysical. But they are mistaken from the very beginning. When one cognition supports another the support lent is, as a matter of fact, such as does not fall flat on the content of the former. The reality of that content is taken as at least known in a better way, if not as established just now. This knowing or establishing is no mere epistemic phenomenon. As *valid* it claims that the form in which an object appears to it must be a real character. The form is here confirmedness, and it is objective<sup>3</sup>, no mere subjective confirmation. Such objectivity could be denied if only the new form could be reduced without remainder to one or more of some primitive forms of objects accepted primarily as real or if the objectivity could be taken as lying in its use only, as in cases of hypothesis. But according to Logical Positivists themselves confirmedness cannot be treated that way. Indeed, it is on this ground that they have dismissed truth as unmetaphysical (unverifiable). But it would have been more consistent if

<sup>1</sup>The content is called by him *proposition*.

<sup>2</sup>These contents were also naively accepted, and in their case also truth is known through that very consistency.

<sup>3</sup>In these few paragraphs we have not always distinguished between objectivity and reality. We have often used the terms synonymously under the idea that no confusion is likely.

they had rather recognised its objectivity and only added, with perfect justice, that truth is categorically different from common objects. The validity that an awareness has been claiming cannot be dismissed all too easily. There is no special reason why only primary objects, and at most those also which are verifiable in use, should be real. These are real because they are so taken in common parlance. But truth and many other things are also so taken. Common sense, we do not deny, sometimes misleads. But every time the exact error has to be demonstrated. If no error is visible and if what is commonly taken as real is neither reducible to primary objects nor yet verifiable through use, there must be some other criterion for its reality. Criteria which are arbitrarily chosen cannot lawfully dismiss its reality.

Perhaps doubtedness, disjunctive character, probability, suggestedness, *etc.*, of an object may be<sup>1</sup> reduced to some primary objective features *plus* a privation on the epistemic side. But this is not possible with regard to truth or confirmedness. Truth as a factual character of knowledge, and so confirmedness as a similar character of the object of that knowledge, could not be denied even by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. *Arthavattā*<sup>2</sup> of a *pramāṇa* has not been reduced to *samarthapravṛtṭijanakatva* :<sup>3</sup> it is inferred as a factual character of knowledge through that *hetu*. Only Pragmatists have attempted such reduction. But they are out of consideration here<sup>4</sup>.

Russell's view is not clear enough. By separating truth from naive reality he has in effect either denied that the latter is real at all, the adjective "naive" being only apologetic, or intended that truth is only an epistemic attitude that does not affect the primary reality, or, as truth, according to him, is either the system or knowledge of the system, he intends that this system is a higher reality, naive reality being lower. The first alternative is untenable. The content of primary acceptance is felt from the beginning as real. The Russellian distinction between subsistence and existence would be of no avail here. Even if the content were subsistent, the reality which is felt in primary acceptance is never what he means by 'truth'. There is no question of *system* at this stage. The second alternative too is unacceptable. On his own admission truth is either the system itself or knowledge of the system, and in either case it is no mere epistemic attitude. The system itself has to be taken as a sort of reality. The

<sup>1</sup>This requires good deal of analysis and cannot be asserted all too easily.

<sup>2</sup>*Pramāṇato 'rthapratīpattau arthavat pramāṇam*—Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya

<sup>3</sup>*Samarthapravṛtṭijanakatva* is obviously a compound of primaty reals.

<sup>4</sup>If Logical Positivists have denied objectivity of some characters without sufficient ground, the Hegelians, going to the other extreme, have arbitrarily taken every apparent character as objective. Some modern realists have gone even beyond Logical Positivism. They hold that even existence is no objective character. An existent object is, according to them, only a subsistent content *plus* the epistemic attitude of assertion. But they have offered no reason why it should be so. If existence be merely epistemic there is no reason why subsistence too will not be so, the subsistent being only an abstract content (separable through language) *plus* the attitude of mere entertainment. It should be borne in mind that reduction can pass as complete only when a complex object is broken up into simple ones with at most a privation on the epistemic side. If, on the contrary, a new positive epistemic attitude is to be postulated, this indicates that the reduction has failed.



third alternative does not say much. To distinguish between naive reality, on the one hand, and the system, on the other, as lower and higher realities would throw no light on the relation between the two.

It is not known for certain how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika views the relation between truth and naive reality. Sometimes it appears that truth, in that system, is only a psychological betterment of knowledge, having nothing to do with its content, that content continuing in its naive reality. So understood, the view would fall in line with Logical Positivism. Often, again, it appears that truth, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is not so detachedly psychological : truth, though a psychological merit, has something to do with naive reality, because that reality is now understood as *really* real. But this would mean that naive reality as such might not be ultimately real, that, as ultimate reality alone is reality proper, naive reality as such is no reality at all. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, understood this way, would be scarcely different from Russell's view refuted above. It is a fact, again, that according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika every object of primary acceptance *is* real, unless rejected. But if unrejectedness here means that the object is unrejected only *up till now*, this cannot constitute genuine reality. Either, then, the as-yet-unrejectedness is an accidental adjective, the object being real on its own account, not on account of its unrejectedness, or the unrejectedness that would constitute reality is not limited in time, but known as absolute, and such knowledge is possible if only the primary acceptance—and, therefore, its object—is confirmed. In the former case the view would be perilously near the Logical Positivist's notion of truth. In the latter case confirmedness would have to be regarded as an objective character, so that the question of the relation between primary and confirmed reality crops up again. Either, then, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is wrong or there are two realities the relation between which is a pressing problem. It will be seen immediately that when the relation is deciphered the theory of *parathprāmānya* gives way to that of *svatahprāmānya*.

Confirmedness, we have seen, is not merely epistemic. It is an objective character of the content. But this does not mean that there are two realities—one primary and the other confirmed. In true knowledge the primary reality is itself taken as confirmed. Nor does it mean that the primary reality has developed in the Hegelian way into the confirmed. The idea of objective development of reality springs from a wrong notion that confirmedness is *not at all* epistemic, that the so-called epistemic confirmation is only a necessary parallel, itself also metaphysical, to the metaphysical augmentation of reality. That notion is wrong. If confirmedness is objective, there is no denial also that it is a subjective process of confirmation which comes to reveal that objective character for the first time. Confirmedness was, in this sense, implicit in the primary reality. That reality had all along been *pāramārthika*, though it was not known in that way. The Advaitin had, with Sāṅkhya, recognised objective grossness and subtleness elsewhere. But here the question is of the grossness itself having

remained implicitly in the subtle. The implicit being of the very grossness in the subtle cannot itself be a subtle being. At the most we are entitled to say that even the subtle was objectively gross though the grossness so far was unknown. Or, better, when the grossness—in our actual case, confirmedness—is revealed through a subjective process it cannot be said to have not been already present, though so long unrevealed. The non-revelation in these particular cases was not due to any *ajñāna* as attached to *objects*. Objective *ajñāna* conceals the being of only a *full-fledged* content in the past. Here, however, the content as in the past is not full-fledged : it remained in the past as only a *saṃskāra*. In all such cases—indeed at every place where the Advaitin speaks of gross and subtle—the concealing principle and, therefore also, the revealing one are epistemic<sup>1</sup>.

Till this confirmed reality came to be known explicitly it had remained non-distinguished from other associates. In explicit knowledge it is distinguished, *i.e.*, dissociated from those associates. This dissociation may be effected in two ways—either through continued concentration or through getting the old fused content into systematic connection with other contents. In the former case the confirmed reality is realised, in the latter it is understood ratiocinatively. In any case, the primary reality was already the confirmed reality implicitly<sup>2</sup>. From the point of view of truth, we might say that truth (*prāmāṇya*) was already present as a character in primary acceptance : primary acceptance is implicitly true. This is the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya*.

*Aprāmāṇya*, however, cannot be intrinsic. If knowledge is intrinsically true it cannot be intrinsically an error also. In the language of *object*, what is reflectively confirmed cannot be false at the same time. Error, we have seen, is due to some defect in the primary cognition and known through another cognition which is either the knowledge of this defect or the confirmed knowledge that contradicts the primary knowledge. *Aprāmāṇya* is *parataḥ* and is also known *parataḥ*.

Several questions may be asked of Advaita at this stage. It may be asked (i) whether reflective reality cannot co-exist with falsity, much as primary reality can, (ii) whether if every cognition is intrinsically true error is at all possible, seeing that a true cognition cannot be erroneous at the same time and (iii) if *svataḥprāmāṇya* is so incompatible with *svataḥ aprāmāṇya* how at all the Sāṅkhists could hold the two together.

The reply to the first question is that if the primary reality of an object does not clash with its unreflective rejection this is because even the false object is the *appearance* of what is primarily real, and if it does not clash with reflective rejection this is because the two attitudes are different. But neither the con-

<sup>1</sup>All Advaitins have not drawn this distinction.

<sup>2</sup>We are here developing only the Advaita view of grossness-subtleness. Another view has been developed—though that too is ultimately Advaitic in character—in my 'The Business of Philosophy' in the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1955, and also in 'Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper' in K. C. Bhattacharya Memorial Volume.

firmedness of an object (or the confirmed object) is an *appearance*, it being identical, as we have seen, with the primary reality, nor are confirmedness and reflective rejection in two different attitudes. Confirmedness clashes also with unreflective rejection because, as already seen in page 197, unreflective rejection is factually identical with one that is reflective, though the attitudes in the two cases differ. Rejection is always *pāramārthika* and must, therefore, clash with *pāramārthika* reality. The confirmedness of an object can never co-exist with its rejectedness.

The reply to the second question is more far-reaching. A cognition that is rejected as erroneous is no genuine cognition at all. It is only an apparent cognition (*jñānābhāsa*). By 'genuine cognition' is meant what psychologically is an actual case of cognition. Apparent cognition is one which, like a false outer appearance, is indescribable as either cognition proper or no cognition. It is also indescribable as either what actually happened in the mind or did not happen. It cannot be urged that though the snake is false there was yet a genuine cognition of it. We have refuted this popular notion in 'Objective Attitude and Idealism Proper' in K. C. Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume. We quote here the relevant lines.

"Is there any guarantee, again, that the subjective side can never be false? Falsity here does not mean invalidity, it means that the subjective side did not really occur, that it only appeared to occur. May there not be false subjectivity in this sense? There may be, and for the following reason:

"A subjective affair, let us call it *cognition*, does not really occur if it does not refer to (reveal) a real object. A false object is no real object. Hence the so-called cognition of the false object did not really occur. So long indeed as its falsity was not detected the cognition was taken as having really occurred. But when the object is found unreal we are compelled to say that it did not really occur. The non-occurrence is not unintelligible on the ground that before the object was found false the cognition was apprehended. For, everywhere, as much with regard to subjectivity as with objects, the false which was taken as a real event till the falsity was discovered comes now, with that discovery, to be regarded as what was only an apparent occurrence, not real. Like the false object the false cognition also is thus only an apparent occurrent. In the objective attitude *apparent occurrence* is as much a form of objectivity as real occurrence. It cannot, in this attitude, mean the mere situation that *I was aware of something though that something was not real*. Initial ego-centricity is as much banned here as with regard to real objects.

"It cannot be objected that as the awareness of this false cognition has to be similarly treated there would be indefinite regress. No cognition is the object of another cognition. An object in itself, it is only enjoyed, reflectively or unreflectively. It is either self-luminous or apprehended by a form of subjectivity which,....., not being co-ordinate in status with it, is eternal pure consciousness.

“The first premise of our argument for a cognition being false, viz., that a cognition does not really occur if it does not refer to a real object, is not untenable. A cognition of its own nature asserts its object, and this assertion is nothing but positing the object as real. The object may later be found false, but this is not incompatible with the first assertion which is of the very nature of cognition. Not that as not cognition it continues to be regarded as having been some non-cognitive mental affair. That would be meaningless. A subjective occurrence which refers of itself to an object—real or unreal—cannot but be cognition.....”<sup>1</sup>

As, therefore, the awareness of the false object is no genuine cognition the question of *svataḥprāmāṇya* about it does not arise at all. It is a *jñānābhāsa* which, in Advaita metaphysics, is a modification of *ajñāna*, not of *antaḥkaraṇa*.<sup>2</sup> It does not reveal an object in the proper sense of the term ‘revelation’. *Ajñāna* does not go over to a reality which is already there and assume its form. The *ajñānavṛtti* and the false object—the snake—are simultaneous. Nyāya believes that the snake is an existent elsewhere reality now remembered as bare snake (*sarpamātram*) divested of its spatio-temporal co-efficient (and that this memory acts here as the *sannikarṣa*). Advaita does not believe that there can be bare snake. If remembered, it must be some definite snake with a spatio-temporal co-efficient. Yet, since a definite snake with *that*-ness cannot be fused with a presented *this*, something like *sarpamātram* has to be postulated. It is true also that unless I had perceived some snake previously I cannot mistake the rope for a *snake*. Hence something like memory too has to be admitted. But only *something like*, not the exact bare snake or memory proper. Not the bare snake, because bare snake is ordinarily a universal; and not memory proper, because the content of memory is always definite and retains *that*-ness. What is here *like* bare snake and *almost* remembered is the content of *sarpa-samskāra* (disposition left by a previous perception of snake). In error this *samskāra* has to be understood as directly operative—directly, because the operation is not through its maturation into a definite psychosis, viz., memory. Such direct operation of *samskāra* is not possible in the region of *antaḥkaraṇa*. Hence the resulting *vṛtti* is a modification of *ajñāna*. This *vṛtti* occurs *after* the rope has been perceived as ‘this’, *after* in other words, *antaḥkaraṇa* has identified itself with the bare ‘this’ aspect of the rope and assumed its form. Hence for the *ajñānavṛtti* to occur the *antaḥkaraṇa* has not to undertake a second journey to the rope. How corresponding to the *ajñānavṛtti* the object also assumes the snake form is a subtle metaphysical question that we need not consider in detail. It is enough to note that, as much as the *vikalpa* in ‘this is rope’ and the semi-*vikalpa* in ‘the snake with a differential quality’, even the snake-character is here an imposition. It is *ajñānasṛṣṭa*, it endures just so long as the awareness of it lasts, it:

<sup>1</sup>With this is refuted once again the Prābhākara view that the awareness of the snake was no cognition. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika understands it as cognition but is at difficulties regarding its exact nature and status. The Advaita theory is in this respect a distinct improvement.

<sup>2</sup>This point will be elaborated in the next instalment of this essay.

is *pratīśarīra*. The awareness of it is not knowledge: we cannot say that the snake was already there and is now revealed. It is only *jñānābhāsa*.

The third question asked in page 205 was how if *svataḥprāmāṇya* is incompatible with *svataḥ aprāmāṇya* the Sāṅkhya philosopher could hold both. The reply to it would be as follows:—

Is this really the Sāṅkhya view? There is no hint even to this effect in the extant Sāṅkhya literature, though some Advaitins tell us that it is the Sāṅkhya view. But may they not have misinterpreted Sāṅkhya?

If Sāṅkhya has at all believed in both *svataḥprāmāṇya* and *svataḥ aprāmāṇya* the concepts must have been understood in a different way. Sāṅkhya might have meant that *those cognitions which are true* are true intrinsically and *those which are errors* are erroneous intrinsically, not that *all* cognitions are true intrinsically and yet the erroneousness of some cognitions is intrinsic. It might be meant, in other words, that the confirmed reality of an object was implicitly present in its primary reality and its rejection, in case it comes to be rejected, was also implicitly present, and that as the subjective process of confirmation does not create that confirmedness so is the case with the subjective process of rejection. The interpretation appears to agree also with the Sāṅkhya theory of *satkārya*.

But the difficulty is that the object which has come now to be rejected was, to start with, taken as real, and the question is whether at the previous stage there were both primary reality and (implicit) rejectedness. This is impossible. If there was reality there could not be rejectedness, and *vice versa*. Primary reality could have co-existed with rejectedness if only the rejectedness were *vyāvahārika*. But Sāṅkhya does not allow *vyāvahārika* reality as standing over against rejection. Nor can it hold that an object now rejected was, even before rejection, not real in any way. The fundamental realistic postulate is common to all Hindu thinkers. If a content appeared at all as an object it must have been real also in whatever way. It is thus impossible to hold both *svataḥprāmāṇya* and *svataḥ aprāmāṇya* of cognition.

Against Nyāya according to which confirmedness is created for the first time by the subjective process of confirmation Advaita, as we have interpreted it, holds that the subjective confirmation only reveals the confirmedness that was already there implicitly. We have all along interpreted Advaita in this way. But may it not be questioned if it is actually the Advaita view? Has not Advaita maintained that there is *svataḥprāmāṇya* even from the point of view of *jñapti*? If so, how could confirmedness be only revealed by the subjective process of confirmation which is evidently other than the primary cognition? Does not *svataḥprāmāṇya* from the point of view of *jñapti* mean that the way in which the primary knowledge is apprehended is itself the way also in which its truth also is apprehended? Does it not, in other words, mean that knowledge which, according to Advaita, is known (*by the sākṣin*) immediately as it occurs is known at that very moment as true also?

We reply, all this is true, but not literally. Were the truth of a cognition evident from the beginning there would have been no occasion for confirming it through other cognitions, and the Advaitin would have had no need whatsoever of justifying any of his doctrines. As a matter of fact, he has attempted justification at almost every step. This implies that confirmation is not useless, and we have seen that according to Advaita it is not entirely unmetaphysical either. This means again that the description of the theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya* attempted in the last paragraph is not to be taken literally.

What the Advaitin means is that the *prāmāṇya* which was implicit in the primary cognition was at that stage known, but not as explicitly as through confirmation. The primary reality of the object of unreflective acceptance was, in other words, confirmed reality also, though implicitly. The awareness of primary reality is itself the awareness, though not clear enough, of confirmed reality. *Sākṣibhāṣyatva* of a *vṛtti* does not preclude a deepening of that *bhāṣyatva* at a later stage.

In valid cognition, whether *savikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*, the *padārtha* that is known as object is indirectly contacted as having the rope-character really in it. The *padārtha* as such is not indeed of the form 'this is rope'. But undeniably it is a rope, though with the rope-character undistinguished. It is apprehended as 'this is rope' in *savikalpa pratyakṣa*, and as rope with a vague differential quality in *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*. So far with valid cognition. In error, however, the snake perceived is not *as such* a *padārtha*: the *padārtha* here is the rope-as-'this' and the snake an imposition. Yet, however, as an *appearance* of that rope-as-'this' and, therefore, non-different, so far, from it, the snake cannot be denied also to be a *padārtha*. Evidently, again, it is not as unreal as a square circle or a castle in the air. It is not *asat* altogether. It still possesses *vyāvahārika* reality.

Thus through a prolonged discussion we show how the Advaitin has consistently distinguished between object and reality and has yet stuck to the maxim 'every object is real' even in his theory of error. Unless, indeed, there was such a maxim, somehow universally accepted, there would be no problem of error at all. We have seen how the Prābhākara, the Naiyāyika and the Vijñānavādin progressively compromised the principle; and we have shown, through criticism of their views, as also of a few other views aligned, why the principle in its crudest form has to be adhered to. The Śūnyavādin's theory of error will be examined in the next instalment.



# The Condition of Vedic Studies in Ancient and Mediaeval Bengal

(as Reflected in Epigraphic Records and Literary References)

By DURGAMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA

HALĀYUDHA, a great scholar of the twelfth century at the court of king Lakṣmaṇasena of Bengal, presented in the introductory portion of his *Brāhmaṇa-sarvasva*<sup>1</sup> a picture of the condition of Vedic studies obtaining in his days among the different sections of Brāhmaṇas of Bengal. Some of them, as has been stated by Halāyudha, used only to memorise the Veda (*adhyayanamātraṃ kriyate*) without understanding the meaning; some others, on the other hand, cared only for the sacrificial application of the Vedic texts and discussed the meanings of a limited number of Mantras in the light of the rules of Karma-mīmāṃsā, without paying any regard to the *adhyayana* or memorisation (*adhyayanam vinā kiyad eva vedārthasya karmamīmāṃsādvāreṇa yajñetikar-tavyatāvicārah kriyate*). Halāyudha's observations here may be correct in a restricted sense, and may be applicable to the particular time he had in his mind. They do not however imply in any way the absence of Vedic studies in Bengal, laying emphasis, as they do, on an ideal method of study to be pursued viz., the memorisation of texts together with the comprehension of their meanings—*vedādhyayanānantaram vedamantrārthajñāne hi tātparyam*. In view of the admonishing nature of the remarks, it is probable that they also contain an element of exaggeration, probably used by the author as a corrective for any lapses in regard to the Vedic studies among his contemporaries in the land of his birth. Ādityadarśana of Kashmir has also lamented in a similar way over the absence of proper Vedic studies in his own province<sup>2</sup>.

The evidence of an enormous number of epigraphic records and literary references of various nature, however, proves convincingly that so far as the proper study of the Vedic texts and the strict performance of the Vedic rites are concerned, Bengal in ancient days did in no way fail to keep pace with any other

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<sup>1</sup>Edited by D. Bhattacharyya, Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad Series, Calcutta 1958.

<sup>2</sup>See Introduction to the *Laugākṣigṛhyasūtra*, Kashmir Sanskrit Series, p. 8 :

इह ते छान्दसाः प्रायः सर्वे वेदमधीयते । पदमप्येकमेतस्मात्तु बुध्यते कदाचन ॥



part of India. The Vedic *Bhāṣyas* produced in old Bengal, some of which have now been brought to light, are the most tangible proofs of the glorious achievement of the Bengali scholiasts in the sphere of Vedic study<sup>1</sup>.

From the internal evidence of Vedic literature, it has generally been concluded that Vedic civilisation had first been confined among the Gandhāras, Kekayas and Madras in the region of the Punjab and adjacent places, and had established a stronghold among the Kurus and Pañcālas of Madhyadeśa. The people from these places then advanced towards the east and other directions, introducing the Vedic religion and culture into the new territories. According to this theory, Vedic practices were adopted in the eastern lands only at a later date. From some deprecatory allusions to the eastern countries found in certain passages of the Veda, Smṛti and Purāna literature, it has been surmised that places like Vaṅga remained for a time outside the range of Vedic culture.

But even in the later period, when the people of Bengal in general yielded to none in regard to the adoption of Vedic religion and the acquisition of Vedic learning, the attitude of disapproval continued to show itself in literary pieces here and there.

Udayanācārya, the author of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, attacking Prabhākara's views in regard to the nature of verbal testimony, condemns a Gauḍa Mīmāṃsaka, who is described as being unable to distinguish the words of Manu from those of the Veda<sup>2</sup>. Varadarājamīśra in his commentary on the *Kusumāñjali* identifies the Gauḍa Mīmāṃsaka with the famous author of the *Pañcikā*, i.e., Śālikanātha, adding a remark that the Gauḍas do not read the Veda, and have not therefore any idea of what is not Veda<sup>3</sup>.

Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā* has been published, and the unjustifiability of the condemnation hurled against him has now become obvious<sup>4</sup>. That the

<sup>1</sup>Halāyudha's *Brāhmaṇasarvasva* and Guṇaviṣṇu's *Chāndogyamantrabhāṣya* have been published by the Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad; Nārāyaṇa's *Parīṣṭāprakāśa* on the *Chāndogopariṣṭa* was partially published in the Bibliotheca Indica; Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa's *Saralā* on the *Gobhilagrhyasūtra* is a publication in the Calcutta Sanskrit Series. Guṇaviṣṇu's *Bhāṣya* on the *Chāndogyabrāhmaṇa* has also been published now in the Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series.

<sup>2</sup>*Kusumāñjali* III : भवति हि वेदानुकारेषु पठ्यमानेषु मन्वादिवाक्येषु पौरुषेयत्वाभिमानिना गौडमीमांसकस्यार्थनिश्चयः ।

<sup>3</sup>Varadarāja's *Kusumāñjalibodhinī* (Sarasvati Bhavan Texts, p. 123) : गौडो मीमांसकः पञ्चिकाकारः । गौडो हि वेदाध्ययनाभावाद्देवत्वं न जानातीति गौडमीमांसकस्यैवम् ।

<sup>4</sup>The *Ārvāṇapadamāñjarī*, a sort of a conversational grammar for the beginners of Sanskrit composed by another Varadarāja, a pupil of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita flourishing between 1600 and 1660 A.C., contains a discourse on evil practices current in different provinces of India, the abandonment of the Veda being mentioned as such a practice in Gauḍa : गौडदेशे वेदत्यागो दुराचारः ।

A manuscript of the work (vyā.—24) is preserved in the Sanskrit College Library, Calcutta. See P. K. Gode, *Some Provincial Customs and Manners, Bharatiya Vidya*, vol. VI, 2, February, 1945, p. 27.

Brāhmaṇas of Bengal in the ninth or the tenth century were not deficient in Vedic knowledge will be clear from the evidence adduced in this paper. Further, such statements about the dearth of Vedic learning are of little value, as they have been made also with reference to various places other than Bengal. Kṛṣṇamiśra's *Prabodhacandrodaya*, a drama composed in the eleventh century under the Chandella king Kīrtivarman, refers to the people of the north and the west including the region of Kurukṣetra as devoid of Vedic learning<sup>1</sup>.

It must however be conceded that Jainism had once held a mighty sway over Suhma and Puṇḍra in West and North Bengal several centuries before Christ. The growing influence of this non-Vedic religion in the country together with the sweeping waves of Buddhism in the neighbouring land of Magadha had retarded the speedy progress of Vedic learning in Bengal in the early period.

The genealogical chronicles (Kulapañjis) of the Rāḍhiya Brāhmaṇas indicate that Ādiśūra, said to be a Gauda king of the eighth century, had brought to his court five Sāgnika Brāhmaṇas from Kanauj to guide him in the performance of certain sacrificial rites<sup>2</sup>. Again, genealogical books of the Vaidika Brāhmaṇas affirm that five Brāhmaṇas of Kanauj, well-versed in the Veda, came to Bengal in the eleventh century in order to perform the rites of Śakuna Satra for king Sāmāla Varman of the Varman dynasty of East Bengal. The Brāhmaṇas claiming descent from these later immigrants still call themselves Pāścātya Vaidikas<sup>3</sup>. In spite of the obvious anomalies in the narratives of the genealogical books, the central fact of the stories cannot but be true. But it will be quite apparent from the various kinds of evidence given below that there existed in Bengal a considerable number of Brāhmaṇas versed in the Veda even before the advent of Vedic scholars from Kanauj<sup>4</sup>.

The inscriptions of the five copper-plate grants obtained from the village of Damodarpur in the district of Dinajpur prove that the Brāhmaṇas of Bengal

<sup>1</sup>*Prabodhacandrodaya*, 2, 25 (N. S. Press, 2nd ed., p.76) :

तत्रोत्तराः पथिकाः पाश्चात्याश्च त्रयीमेव स्याजिताः । अन्यत्रापि प्रायेण जीविकामात्रफलैश्च त्रयी । . . . तेन हि कुक्षेत्रादिषु तावद्देवेन स्वप्नेऽपि विद्याप्रबोधोदयो नाशङ्कनीयः ।

It may be mentioned here that the author of the drama was rather inclined to consider Rāḍha, a place in Bengal, as a safe asylum for the Upaniṣad : अस्ति राḍाभिधानो जनपदः । तत्र भागीरथीपरिसरालङ्कृते चक्रतीर्थे श्रीमांसानुगतया मत्या कथञ्चिद्द्वार्यमाण-प्राणो . . . विवेक उपनिषद्देव्याः सङ्गमार्थं तपस्तपस्यतीति ।

*Prabodh.* IV, 5, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup>See R. C. Majumdar, *History of Bengal*, vol. I (Dacca University, 1943) p. 580ff.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 203, 582f.

<sup>4</sup>See R. G. Basak, *Epigraphia Indica*, xiii (1916), p. 288.

used to perform sacrifices even in the times of the Gupta kings (fifth to sixth century)<sup>1</sup>.

Two Brāhmaṇas are said to have purchased lands from the ruler of Koṭi-varṣa in the Puṇḍravardhana Bhukti for facilitating the performance of their own Agnihotra (mamāgnihotrāya) and Pañcamahāyajña (mama pañcamahāyajña-pravartanāya)<sup>2</sup>.

Three records found in the district of Faridpur clearly show that Vedic rites used to be performed and Vedic studies used to be prosecuted in the Vāraka Maṇḍala during the reigns of Dharmāditya and Gopacandra in the sixth century. Candrasvāmin, the donee of the first grant belonged to Bharadvāja Gotra owing allegiance to the Vājasaneyā school of the Yajurveda. He was versed in the six Vedāṅgas<sup>3</sup>. The donees of the second and the third grants are described as followers of the Kāṇva Recension of the Vājasaneyā Yajurveda<sup>4</sup>.

The Tipperah Copper-plate Grant of the seventh century informs us that one Pradoṣa Śarman asked for lands from king Lokanātha for settling more than one hundred Brāhmaṇas who had among themselves students of all the four Vedas (cāturvidya)<sup>5</sup>. Budhasvāmin, the maternal grand-father of Pradoṣa Śarman was an 'agnyāhita' maintaining the sacrificial fire perpetually in his home<sup>6</sup>.

The facts recorded in these copper-plates definitely prove that Brāhmaṇas well-versed in the Vedas were available in Bengal long before the emigration of some Brāhmaṇas from outside as described in the genealogical books.

Caturbhujā, the author of the *Haricarita* tells us in the colophon of his poem that his ancestor Svarṇarekha had received from king Dharmapāla a village named Karañja in the Varendra region, which was inhabited by Brāhmaṇas versed in Śruti, Smṛti, Purāṇa and Kāvya<sup>7</sup>. Svarṇarekha's grandson Divākara is described as an 'ācārya' specially devoted to the Vedas (trayīpara)<sup>8</sup>. It is therefore evident that Vedic scholars were not rare in Varendra during the reign of the Pāla king Dharmapāla.

<sup>1</sup>Damodarpur Copper-plate Inscriptions, *E. I.*, xv, p. 129.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 130, 133.

<sup>3</sup>Grant of the Time of Dharmāditya, l. 19—*Indian Antiquary*, xxxix, p. 196.

<sup>4</sup>Second Grant of the Time of Dharmāditya, ll. 10, 11; Grant of the Time of Gopacandra, l. 13—*Ibid.*, pp. 200, 204.

<sup>5</sup>Tipperah Copper-plate Grant of Lokanātha, l. 24—*E. I.*, xv, p. 307.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, l. 18.

<sup>7</sup>प्रामोत्तमोऽस्त्यमलमञ्जुगुणैः अजः

श्रीमान् करञ्ज इति बन्धतमो वरेन्द्राम् ।

यत्र श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणपदप्रवीणाः

सच्छास्त्रकाव्यनिपुणाः स्म वसन्ति विप्राः ॥

—*Catalogue of Palm-leaf and Selected Paper Manuscripts belonging to the Durbar Library, Nepal* by H. P. Sastri, vol. I, p. 134.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 135.

We learn from the Garuḍa Pillar inscriptions of Bhaṭṭa Guravamiśra that his ancestor Darbhapāni, a minister of king Devapāla of the ninth century, was deeply versed in the four Vedas<sup>1</sup>. Darbha's grandson Kedāramiśra could, even in his boyhood, imbibe the contents of the Veda by merely seeing them once and could recite them verbatim later.<sup>2</sup> The statement in the inscription possibly suggests that Darbhapāni and Kedāramiśra had got the Vedic Mantras by heart. King Śūrapāla used to grace the sacrificial sessions (ijyā) of Kedāramiśra by his presence in order to receive the auspicious waters on his head.<sup>3</sup> This shows that Vedic sacrifices were held in Varendra during the reign of Śūrapāla deva. We are able to gather from this important stone-pillar inscription that in the ninth and tenth centuries during the reign of the Pāla kings, the ancestors of Guravamiśra were hereditarily experts in the Vedic lore. Guravamiśra has been described also in the Bhagalpur Copper-plate of Nārāyaṇapāla as one 'who had mastered the Vedas with all the auxiliary sciences' and 'who had performed sacrifices bestowing large bounties'.<sup>4</sup>

Nārāyaṇa's *Chandogapariśiṣṭaparakāśa* is a commentary on the *Chandogapariśiṣṭa* of Kātyāyana. Only a part of the commentary has been published so far. Though a treatise on the Smṛti, it reveals the vast Vedic erudition of the author. In the preface of his commentry Nārāyaṇa has given an account of his ancestors living in Uttara Rāḍha. Paritoṣa among them had performed the Soma sacrifice and was the Veda incarnate, as it were.<sup>5</sup> One of his sons had his mind always engaged in the performance of vedic rites.<sup>6</sup> These statements prove that Soma sacrifices used to be performed in Rāḍha and that there was no scarcity of deeply read Vedic scholars.

<sup>1</sup>Akshay Kumar Maitreya, *Gauḍalekhamālā*, p. 78. The original expression in Sanskrit विद्याचतुष्टयमुखाम्बुरुहात्तलक्ष्मा perhaps implies that Guravamiśra had the four Vedas at the tip of his tongue.

<sup>2</sup>*Gauḍalekhamālā*, p. 74 :

सकृद्दर्शनसम्पीतान् चतुर्विद्यापयोनिधोन् ।  
जहासागस्त्यसम्पत्तीनुद्गिरन् बाल एव सः ॥

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.* अद्भ्यःभःप्लुतमानसो नतशिरा जग्राह पूतस्ययः ।

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*

यः सर्वासु श्रुतिषु परमः सार्धमङ्गैरधीती  
यो यज्ञानां समुदितमहावक्षिणानां प्रणता ॥

अरितमहति त्वेषामन्वये सोमपीथी  
समजनि परितोषदृष्टन्वसां देहबन्धः ॥

*Chandogapariśiṣṭaparakāśa*, śl. 3 (Bibliotheca Indica, p. 2).

श्रीते विद्यो सततनिर्मलधीप्रसारः—*Ibid.* śl. 5, p. 2.

Kṛṣṇāditya of Cabaṭigrāma, described in the Bāṅgaḍ inscription of Mahīpāla-deva in the tenth century, was a follower of the Vājasaneyā Yajurveda.<sup>1</sup>

In the next century, Khodulla Devaśarman, the donee of the Āṅgāchi Grant of Vighrahapāla III, and Vaṭeśvara Svāmiśarman mentioned in a copper-plate grant of Madanapāla were students of the Kauthuma Recension of the Sāmaveda.<sup>2</sup>

It is stated in the Sangli Plate of the Rāṣṭrakūta king Govinda IV that the father of the donee had come from Puṅḍravardhana and had studied the Vājasaneyā Yajurveda.<sup>3</sup> Here is an instance of a Vaidika of North Bengal going to take up his residence in another province in the ninth century A. C.

In the twelfth century, Vaidyadeva, the king of Kāmārūpa donated some lands to one Somanātha, who had hailed from Varendrī. In the copper-plate concerned, Somanātha has been called 'the best of the Śrotriyas' for his acquisition of Vedic knowledge, performance of sacrifices and other achievements.<sup>4</sup>

We learn from a copper-plate grant of Bhāskaravarman that during the reign of king Bhūti-varman towards the close of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century, a large number of Brāhmanas professing allegiance to different Vedic Śākhās lived in a village now included in the north-eastern part of Bengal.<sup>5</sup> The assertion that there was not a sufficient number of Veda-knowing Brāhmanas in Bengal before the eighth century can therefore have no basis. It is probable that Vedic culture had already spread over the whole of Eastern India by the fifth century A. C., and that the Vaidikas had settled in lands up to Kāmārūpa to the east of Bengal. These were the Brāhmanas detailed in Bhāskaravarman's copper-plate inscription mentioned above. Of these Brāhmanas, 105 have been described as Vājasaneyā, 74 as Bāhvryeā, 15 as Chāndogya, 9 as Cārakya and 2 as Taittirīya.<sup>6</sup> Bhūti-varman, the great-great-grandfather of Bhāskara had donated lands to these Brāhmanas.

Balavarman's Copper-plate Grant records the fact that Devadhara Bhaṭṭa of the Kāṅva Vājasaneyā school used to officiate with confidence<sup>7</sup> in Vedic sacrifices as an Adhvaryu.

<sup>1</sup>See Bāṅgaḍ Inscription, ll. 47, 48—*Gauḍalekh*, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup>Āṅgāchi Grant of Vighrahapāla III, ll. 38, 39—*E.I.*, XV, p. 298; Manahali Grant, l. 43—*Gauḍalekh*, p. 154.

<sup>3</sup>Sangli Plate of the Rāṣṭrakūta Govinda IV, ll. 46, 47—*Indian Antiquary*, xii, p. 257.

तीर्थेषु भ्रमणाच्छ्रुताध्ययनतो दानात्तथाध्यापनाद्

यज्ञानां करणाद्वर्तकवरणात् सर्वोत्तरः श्रोत्रियः ॥— śl. 26.

श्रौतस्मार्तरहस्येषु वागीश इव विभ्रुतः ।— śl. 27.

Kamauli Grant, *Gauḍalekhamālā*, p. 134.

<sup>5</sup>See Padmanath Bhattacharya, *Kāmārūpaśāsanāvalī*, p. 9.

<sup>6</sup>Copper-plate Grant of Bhāskaravarman, ll. 54-126—*Ibid.*, pp. 17-26.

<sup>7</sup>अध्वर्युणा येन कृतं विभ्रज्य वैतानिकं कर्म निराकृतेन ।—

Balavarman's Copper-plate, śl. 27.—*Ibid.* p. 78.

The First Copper-plate of Ratneśvara, a contemporary of Balavarman, informs us—"there was in Vāmadevapāṭaka, a Brāhmaṇa of the Parāśara Gotra, named Devadatta, the foremost of the Vājasaneyins of the Kāṇva Śākhā. Having gained this great Vedic scholar as her devotee, the Vedic Learning felt much gratified."<sup>1</sup> His son Gaṅgadatta was an 'agnyāhita', maintaining the Gṛhya fire in his home.<sup>2</sup>

Dharmapāla's First Copper-plate describes the village of Kosañja in Śrāvasti where sacrifices were performed in such profusion that Kali's evils could not enter the village at all.<sup>3</sup> Rāmadeva of that village was a formidable scholar of the Sāmaveda (sāmavidām akhaṇḍyaḥ).

In the Silimpur Stone-slab Inscription of the eleventh century the village of Tarkāri in Śrāvasti has been described as a famous home of the Brāhmaṇas (viditaṃ sthānaṃ punarjanmanām). The Śrauta and Gṛhya rites were frequently performed there according to the precepts of the Vedas and Smṛtis. The sacrificial smoke rising to the sky, already brightened by the glorious acts of the villagers, used to wear the appearance of the black moss floating in the Milky Ocean.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, two epigraphic records, found in two different places, describe Śrāvasti as famous for Vedic culture.<sup>5</sup>

Another copper-plate of Dharmapāla mentions the village of Khyātipali in Kāmarūpa, wherefrom sacrificial smoke used to rise to the heavens,<sup>6</sup> while the whole village resounded with chantings of the four Vedas.<sup>7</sup>

पराशरोऽभूद्भू वि देवदत्तः काण्वोऽग्रजो वाजसनेयाकाग्रः ।  
आसाद्य यं वेदविदां परार्ध्यं त्रय्या कृतार्थायितमेव सम्यक् ॥

*Ibid.*, p. 99.

अन्याहितस्तस्य बभूव सूनुः सद्गङ्गवत्तो गुणशीलशाली ।

*Ibid.*

ग्रामः कोसञ्जनामास्ति श्रावस्त्यां यत्र यज्वनाम् ।  
होमधूमान्धकारान्धं नाविशत् कलिकल्मषम् ॥

*Ibid.*, p. 155

यस्मिन् वेदस्मृतिपरिचयोद्भिन्नवंतान-गाह्यं-  
प्राज्यावृत्ताहृतिषु चरतां कीर्तिभिव्योम्नि शुभे ।  
व्यभ्राजन्तोपरि परिसरद्वोमधूमा द्विजानां  
दुग्धाम्भोधिप्रसृतविलसच्छैवलालीचयाभाः ॥

*E.I.*, XIII, p. 290

<sup>1</sup>R. G. Basak and K. N. Dikshit have placed Śrāvasti in North Bogra in Bengal (*E.I.*, XIII, p. 287 XXIII, p. 103), while Padmanath Bhattacharya has made it a part of Kāmarūpa near the eastern border of Paundra (*Kāmarūpaśāsanāvalī*, p. 166). The identification of the locality is however disputed. See *History of Bengal*, vol. I, pp. 579-80.

होमधूमवलये ।व्यद्गते यज्वनां क्रतुषु कालिकाभूमात्—

*Ibid.*, p. 174.

चतुर्वेदीपाठध्वनिरतनु वाचालयति यद्-  
यमीगङ्गासङ्गोच्छलितजलकल्लोलबहलः ॥

*Ibid.*, p. 175.

Rāmadeva Śarma in of North Rāḍha, the donee of the Belāva Copper-plate grant of Bhojavarma was a student of the Kāṇva Śākhā of the Vājasaneyā Yajurveda.<sup>1</sup>

The donees of the Belwa Copper-plate of Vighraḥapāli<sup>2</sup> and the Madhainagar Copper-plate of Lakṣmaṇasena<sup>3</sup> were students of the Paippalāda Śākhā of the Atharvaveda.

There are hundreds of other records describing scholarly individuals and testifying to their proficiency in Vedic subjects.

Though these records have spoken of persons adhering to each of the four Vedas, the followers of the Kāṇva Śākhā of the Śukla Yajurveda and the Kauthuma Śākhā of the Sāmaveda appear to have formed the majority of the Brāhmaṇas of ancient Bengal.

Thus far evidence has been adduced mainly from epigraphic records. It is not probable that Brāhmins mentioned in these records acquired the appellation 'vedādhyāyin' merely by reciting the Gāyātrī as the Brāhmaṇas of the present times do. By a proper analysis of the statements concerned, we have come to the conclusion that these appellations have been used with proper care and consideration. There is no mention of Vedic studies in the cases of some donees named in the inscriptions. Keśavasena's Idilpur Copper-plate and Viśvarūpasena's Madanapāḍa Copper-plate give the Gotras and Pravaras of the donees, but make no reference to their proficiency in Vedic subjects.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the donee of Viśvarūpasena's Sāhitya Pariṣad Copper-plate has been called 'a student of a part of the Kāṇva Śākhā (ekadeśādhyāyin)<sup>5</sup>, while the donee of Dāmodara's Chittagong Plate has been described merely as a Yajurvedin, there being no reference to his ever being a student of the Veda. It may further be noted here that in the description of his ancestors, Guravamiśra has referred to the Vedic scholarship only of his father and great-grandfather, making no comment on the learning of his grandfather and other ancestors.<sup>6</sup> It may therefore be concluded that the persons who actually read the Veda were called 'Vedādhyāyins' in the inscriptions, while those who read only a portion of their own Vedic Śākhās were described as 'śākhāikadeśādhyāyins'. But in the case of those who had no knowledge of the Vedas, only the Gotras and Pravaras of them were mentioned without any reference to their knowledge of the scriptures. The qualifying appellations applied in the inscriptions to the individuals may therefore be taken as representing truth.

<sup>1</sup>See *Inscriptions of Bengal*, vol. iii, p. 21, Copper-plate ll. 42-45.

<sup>2</sup>See *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, 1951 (Letters), p. 134 ; *E.I.* XXIX, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup>See *Inscriptions of Bengal*, vol. iii, p. 112.

<sup>4</sup>See *Inscriptions of Bengal*, vol. iii, pp. 125, 137.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>6</sup>*Gauḍalekh.*, pp. 71-75.

It has been truly said that 'the Vedic culture made a great headway in Bengal under the patronage of the Varman and the Sena kings.'<sup>1</sup> King Ballālasena of Bengal has been described in his *Adbhutasāgara* as one singularly devoted to the Vedic path (vedāyanauikapathika). He has also been given the appellation 'vedāyanauikādhvaga' in at least four copper-plates.<sup>2</sup> Aniruddha Bhaṭṭa, the guru of Ballālasena was one of the foremost scholars of his time in Veda and Smṛti (vedārthasmṛtisankathādipurusa).<sup>3</sup>

If it is true that scholarly Brāhmanas had sometimes been imported to Bengal from outside, it is also equally true that Brāhmanas of Bengal with great reputations for their Vedic learning were invited to other places and were held in high esteem there.

The Cheedivalasa Copper-plate of the Kalinga king Devendravarman V dated in the Gāṅgeya era 397 (891 A. C.) records several grants of lands to Āditya Bhaṭṭa and others, who are described as scholars from Bengal.<sup>4</sup>

The Gaonry Copper-plates of Vākpati Muñja (10th century) give us the information that learned Brāhmanas from different parts of India had migrated to Malwa and received donations at the hands of the Paramāra prince Vākpati Muñja. Some of the donees from Bengal are stated to have been specially proficient in the Vedic lore, a large majority of them being Sāmavedins.<sup>5</sup>

Viśveśvara Śambhu, a Vedic scholar of great repute born at Pūrvagrāma in Dakṣiṇa Rāḍha, has been mentioned in the Malkapuram Stone-pillar Inscription of the Kākatīya queen Rudrāmbā.<sup>6</sup> Viśveśvara was profusely honoured by the royal families of the Kākatīya and the Kalacuri lines. He is said to have founded near Jabalpur a great educational institution named Viśveśvara Golakī. Here also Viśveśvara showed his devotion to the Veda by appointing along with others three Professors for the three Vedas—Ṛk, Sāman and Yajus.

<sup>1</sup>*History of Bengal*, vol. i, p. 397.

<sup>2</sup>See Anulia, Govindapur, Tapandighi and Śaktipur Copper-plates of Lakṣmaṇasena.

<sup>3</sup>See *Dānasāgara*, śl. 4 :

वेदार्थस्मृतिसङ्ख्याविपुहवः श्लाघ्ये वरेन्द्रीतले  
निस्तन्द्रोज्ज्वलधीविलासनयनः सारस्वते ब्रह्मणि ।

<sup>4</sup>See *Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, vol. ii, pp. 150, 152.

<sup>5</sup>K. N. Dikshit in describing the copper-plates says in the *E. I.*, **xxiii**, p. 103: "In several instances the donees seem to have migrated all the way from Bengal, which thus appears as a country where Brāhmanas studying different Vedas were flourishing".

<sup>6</sup>*Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society*, vol. iv, pp. 158-162. See also *History of Bengal*, vol. i, p. 884. Names of many other Brāhmanas who migrated from Bengal are found in various epigraphic records. But their achievements in respect of Vedic studies are not clearly recorded therein.



These sons of Bengal, who were honoured in other parts of India for their proficiency in the Veda can certainly be regarded as convincing testimony to Bengal's attainments in the Vedic field. But the Vedic *Bhāṣyas* produced in ancient Bengal are the living proofs in this regard.<sup>1</sup> Some of these *Bhāṣyas* had been written here long before Sāyānācārya did compose his famous Vedic commentaries in the South.

In the past, Bengal had, no doubt, her days of glory in the field of Vedic studies. But signs of a serious decline in such studies in the later days are clearly noticeable. The onrush of the Bhakti movement or the distraction caused by the ardour for the newly found Navya Nyāya may have contributed to this decline. Actually, an anonymous stanza found on the cover of a Nyāya manuscript gives a hint to that effect.<sup>2</sup> The stanza expressly names 'Śiromaṇimata' and 'Avadhūta' as the two factors instrumental for the disappearance of Vedic studies (vedavāda). 'Śiromaṇi-mata' points to the contributions of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, whose genius is credited with having raised the status of Navya Nyāya very high among the Bengali scholars of the fifteenth century. The word 'Avadhūta' stands for the great Nityānanda, who made the devotional Vaiṣṇavism specially attractive to the people of Bengal.

<sup>1</sup>Three of these works have been described elsewhere. See D. Bhattacharyya, *Our Heritage*, vol. i, pt. 2; vol. ii, pts. 1 and 2.

<sup>2</sup>See Dineschandra Bhattacharya, *Vaṅge Navya Nyāya Carcā*, p. 103.

शिरोमणिमते हृतं सकलमात्मतत्त्वे बुधै-  
 र्बिधूतमवधूततो जगति नाम कंसद्विषः ।  
 स्वतन्त्रपथकल्पनाविगतवेदवादोऽधुना  
 बली कलिपराक्रमो विरम विभ्रमेभ्यो मनः ॥

# THE SOURCES OF DHARMA

## Part III

BY R. C. HAZRA

THE word 'Smṛti', literally meaning 'memory' or 'recollection', came in the remote past to be applied in relation to Dharma technically to mean those individual traditions about the various acts of Dharma which were carried in memory by the orthodox Vedic scholars and transmitted by them to the succeeding generations. It was due to this use of the word that Śabara, Kumārila and other Mimāṃsakas cited particular acts of Dharma as instances of 'Smṛti', viz., the complete covering of the Udumbara-post by means of a piece of cloth, the observance of celibacy for forty-eight years for the study of the Veda, the priests' taking food at the house of the sacrificer after he purchased Soma plants (for the Soma sacrifice), the Adhvaryu priest's taking of the cloth worn by the sacrificer at the Vaisarjaniya Homa, the same priest's taking of the cloth with which the sacrificial post was covered, and so on<sup>1</sup>. That the same use of this word was equally prevalent in later days is shown by many of the commentators and Nibandha-writers, of whom Śrīdatta Upādhyāya quotes on one occasion verses from the works of Manu, Yama and Devala to show the conflict of views between the first and the last two writers on a certain practice and says that the views of both Yama and Devala are to be set aside on the authority of Bṛhaspati who prescribes the rejection of a Smṛti that goes against Manu's provision<sup>2</sup>. The word 'Smṛti' was also used to mean the above-mentioned traditions generally. For instance, the *Kauṣītaki-gṛhya-sūtra* (alias *Sāṅkhāyana-gṛhya-sūtra*) mentions 'the Smṛti of those who are thoroughly conversant with tradition (āgama)<sup>3</sup>, and in the *Taittirīya-āraṇyaka* 'Smṛti' has been said to be one of the four means of knowledge of the Solar orb<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>See, for instance, Śabara, Kumārila and others' comments on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup>See *Ācārādarśa* (printed and published by the Sūrya-prabhākara Press, Banaras, Samvat 1939), p. 1—

'manuḥ—

mūtroccāra-samutsargaṃ divā kuryād udañ-mukhaḥ/  
dakṣiṇ-ābhimukho rātrau samdhyayoś ca yathā divā//  
evam manunā sarva-kāla-vyūpi-mukha-niyama-vidhānāt  
pratyañ-mukhas tu pūrvāhne sāyāhne prāñ-mukhas tathā/  
udañ-mukhas tu madhyāhne nīśāyāṃ dakṣiṇā-mukhaḥ//  
iti yama-vacanaṃ  
sadaiv-odañ-mukhaḥ prātaḥ sāyāhne dakṣiṇā-mukhaḥ  
iti devala-vacanaṃ ca nādartavyam,  
manv-ārtha-viparītā yā smṛtiḥ sā na praśasyate  
iti bṛhaspati-vacanaṃ//

See also Vijñāneśvara and others' comments on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 2. 21 (smṛtyor virodhe nyāyas tu, etc.).

<sup>3</sup>*Kauṣītaki-gṛhya-sūtra* (ed. Ratna-gopāla Bhaṭṭa, Banaras Sanskrit Series, No. 145, Banaras, 1908), vi. 6. 16—

...yath-āgama-prajñā-śruti-smṛti-vibhavāt.... /

<sup>4</sup>*Taittirīya-āraṇyaka* (ed. Ānandāśrama Press, Poona), i. 2. 1—

From the literal meaning of the word 'Smṛti' and from the recognition of both the Veda and the Smṛti as sources of Dharma by all the Smṛtikāras and Mīmāṃsakas from early times it appears that originally this word was applied to mean only those time-honoured traditions of Dharma for which no basic texts could be found in the Vedas. With the separation and settlement of many of the Vedic schools in widely distant parts of India and with the growing unpopularity of Vedic studies with the progress of time there was a gradual increase in the ignorance<sup>5</sup> of the people about the relevant Vedic texts which formed the basis of their Dharma. Consequently, they were compelled to depend, for the validity of their own duties, rites and customs, more and more on the recollection (smṛti) of reliable Vedic scholars belonging to such families as were noted for hereditary study and knowledge of the Vedas and performance of acts prescribed by these works. Thus, coming to be used to mean also those acts of Dharma for which there were corresponding Vedic texts, the word 'Smṛti' had a wider application and covered all traditions of Dharma, no matter whether the corresponding basic texts of the Vedas could be found or not.

Even as early as in the days of Gautama<sup>6</sup>, if not earlier, the word 'Smṛti' came to be used to mean also a distinct class of works recording a mass of the above-mentioned traditions, and this is shown by Gautama's recognition of 'Smṛti' as one of the secondary sources of Dharma and his mention of the 'Dharmaśāstras' among the works to be used by kings in administering justice<sup>7</sup>. There is an aphorism, very often ascribed to 'Śaṅkha-and-Likhita' and rarely to Gautama (but not found in the present *Gautama-dharma-sūtra*), in which 'Smṛti' has been expressly said to be the same as the 'Dharma-śāstras'<sup>8</sup>; and we

smṛtiḥ pratyakṣam aitihiyam anumānaś catuṣṭayam /  
etaiḥ āditya-maṇḍalāṃ sarvair eva vidhāsyate //

"Tradition, Perception, Legendary Account, and Inference—(these are) the fourfold (proofs), and with all these the orb of the Sun will be known."

According to Sāyaṇācārya the word 'Smṛti' means 'the works of Manu and others which are based on the Śruti (texts) to be presumed' (smṛtir anumeya-śruti-mūlāṃ manv-ādi-śāstram), 'Pratyakṣa' means 'the Vedic texts to be perceived by all people through the ear' (pratyakṣam sarva-puruṣāṅām śrotroṇa grāhyam veda-vākyaṃ ca), 'Aitihiya' means 'Itihāsa, Purāṇa, Mahābhārata, Brāhmaṇas, etc.' (aitihiyam itihāsa-purāṇa-mahābhārata-brāhmaṇ-ādikam), and 'Anumāna' is 'the practice of Śiṣṭas' (anumānaś śiṣṭacārah).

<sup>5</sup>It related not only to the different recensions of the Vedas but also to the right interpretation of their texts.

<sup>6</sup>According to P. V. Kane, Gautama, the author of the famous Dharma-sūtra connected with his name, 'cannot be placed later than the period between 600-400 B. C.—Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, I, p. 19.

<sup>7</sup>See *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* (Ānandāśrama Press ed.) I. 2, and II. 19 (tasya ca vyavahāro vedo dharma-śāstrāṇy aṅgāny upavedāḥ purāṇam).

<sup>8</sup>" smṛtir dharma-śāstrāṇi, teṣāṃ pranētāro manu-viṣṇu-yama-dakṣ-āṅgiro-'tri-brha-paty-uśana-āpastamba-vasiṣṭha-kātyāyana-parāśara-vyāsa-śaṅkha-likhita-samvarta-gautama-sātā-tapa-hārta-yājñavalkya-prācetas-ādayaḥ //"—

Quoted as from 'Śaṅkha-and-Likhita' (śaṅkha-likhitau) in Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalyāṇ-taru*, I, p. 23, Hemādri's *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* (ed. Bibl. Ind., Calcutta), II (Dāna-khaṇḍa), Part 1, p. 18 (v.l. 'smṛtayaḥ' for 'smṛtiḥ'), Caṇḍeśvara's *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 28, Mitramīśra's *Vṛtramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 16, and so on, but ascribed to 'Gautama' in Aparārka's commentary (on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* I. 4-5), p. 7. Aparārka changes the order of the names, includes 'Ātreya', omitting 'Yama', 'Vasiṣṭha' and 'Hārta', and reads 'Prācetas' for 'Prācetas'.

Only the list of the names (which follows that of Aparārka very much) has been given as from 'Śaṅkha' in Devaṇabhaṭṭa's *Smṛti-candrikā* (Mysore ed.), I (Saṃskāra-khaṇḍa), p. 2.

have already seen that Manu also bears the same opinion<sup>9</sup>. This new use of the word is important in that it not only points to the nature of the works known as 'Smṛti' in those days but also suggests a much earlier beginning of the Dharmaśāstra literature. As a matter of fact, Gautama's use of the word 'Dharmaśāstra' in the plural number<sup>10</sup> and his frequent references, made indefinitely or anonymously on all occasions but one<sup>11</sup>, to the opinions of other Smṛti-writers on different points of Dharma, show definitely that he was preceded by great literary activity in the sphere of Dharmaśāstra. Although, for extreme paucity of information, it is now impossible to say definitely when and under what circumstances formal treatises on Dharma began to be composed, it can hardly be doubted that the Smṛti literature, *as we have it now*, had its beginning much earlier than 600 B. C. and that it was connected, in its origin, with the different Vedic schools then situated in different parts of India. The comparatively early Dharma-sūtras, now extant, amply testify to their affiliation with particular Vedas; and even as late as in the eighth century A. D. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa found particular Dharma-sūtras to be studied in particular Vedic schools, as he said: "Barring the Purāṇas, the Smṛti of Manu, and the Itihāsa, all other Smṛti works, such as those of Gautama, Vasiṣṭha, Śāṅkha-Likhita, Hārīta, Āpastamba, Baudhāyana and others, as also the works on Gṛhya (rites), are each seen to be studied exclusively in distinct Vedic schools (caraṇa), exactly like the Prātiśākhya. For instance, the (Sūtra) works of Gautama and Gobhila are accepted (i. e., studied) by the Chandogas only; that of Vasiṣṭha by the Bahvṛcas (R̥g-vedins) only; that of Śāṅkha and Likhita by the Vājasaneyins; and those of Āpastamba and Baudhāyana by the Taittiriyas"<sup>12</sup>. It is true that at present some of the Sutra-caraṇas are not found to possess Dharma-sūtras of their own, but this may be due to the fact that the Dharma-sūtras of these schools have not come down to us for some reason or other, or, more probably, that the peculiar features of these schools were not considered sufficient to necessitate the composition of independent

<sup>9</sup>The relevant verse of Manu is *Manu-smṛti* 2. 10 (śrutiḥ tu vedo vijñeyo dharma-śāstram tu vai smṛtiḥ), which has been quoted in Part II of the present essay.

<sup>10</sup>For the relevant Sūtra of Gautama see foot-note 7 on page 2 ante.

<sup>11</sup>Gautama's references to other authorities in his Dharma-sūtra are as follows:

'Aparāṇ'—*Gautama-dharma-sūtra* 19. 6.

'Ācāryāḥ'—*Ibid.*, 3. 35; 4. 18.

'Ānuḥ'—*Ibid.*, 19. 4.

'Eke'—*Ibid.*, 1. 19, 42; 2. 15, 40, 56; 3. 1, 18; 4. 13, 17; 6. 6; 7. 23; 10. 25, 45, 53, 67; 11. 16; 12. 27; 13. 12; 14. 3, 30, 33; 15. 11, 20, 31; 16. 14, 39, 45; 18. 7, 19, 23; 21. 6, 8, 14; 23. 13, 29; 24. 4.

'Ekeṣāṃ'—*Ibid.*, 16. 27; 27. 14; 28. 17, 24, 38.

'Sarve'—*Ibid.*, 16. 41.

It is only Manu who has been referred to by name in *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* 21. 7 (trīṇi prathamāny anirdeśyāni manuḥ). But the Anandāśrama Press edition wrongly reads 'anu' (for 'manuḥ'), and Haradatta, who accepts this reading, takes it to mean 'anukrāntāni'.

The *Manu-smṛti*, referred to by Gautama, must be the earlier one, on which the present text of Manu was based.

<sup>12</sup>purāṇa-mūnav-etiḥāsa-vyatirikta-gautama-vasiṣṭha-śāṅkha-likhita-hārīta-āpastamba-baudhāyan-ādi-praṇīta-dharma-śāstrāṇāṃ gṛhya-granthāṇāṃ ca prātiśākhya-lakṣaṇavat prati-caraṇaṃ pāṭha-vyavasth-opalabhyate / tad yathā gautamīya-gobhīlīye chandogair eva ca parigrhīte / vasiṣṭham bahv-ṛcāir eva, śāṅkha-likhit-oktam ca vājasaneyibhiḥ / āpastamba-baudhāyanīye taittirīyair eva pratipanne...../

Dharma-manuals for them. Kumārila-bhaṭṭa says that as all the Dharma-sūtras give instructions about (the duties of) the castes and stages (of life) and the Dharmas are mostly uniform, the mutual agreement between the Dharma-sūtras is quite proper<sup>13</sup>. However, being originally meant for the use of the members of one or more Vedic schools, the Dharma-sūtras had rather a limited scope and a comparatively small number of social and other problems to deal with. Yet they contain numerous references to the difference of opinion among ancient authorities as regards particular points of law or custom<sup>14</sup>. In Yāska's *Nirukta* (3. 3-6) we find mention of heated controversies among ancient teachers on various questions of inheritance; and, besides referring to others' opinions anonymously on a large number of occasions, Baudhāyana names seven Smṛti-writers (viz., Aupajāṅhani, Gautama, Hārīta, Kāśyapa, Kātya, Maudgalya and Prajāpati), Vasīṣṭha names five (viz., Gautama, Hārīta, Manu, Prajāpati and Yama), and Āpastamba names as many as eleven (viz., Eka, Hārīta, Kaṇva, Kāṇva, Kautsa, Kuṇika, Kutsa, Prajāpati, Puṣkarasādi, Śvetaketu and Vārsyāyaṇi). From all these names and references it is evident that a fairly extensive Smṛti literature had come into existence even by the time of compilation of the *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra*; but it is remarkable that in none of the extant Dharma-sūtras there is any list of the names of reliable Smṛti-writers like those contained in the works of Yājñavalkya, Parāśara and others, nor has any indication been given in them for discriminating between the Smṛti works as sources of Dharma or rejecting any of them for its unauthorised statements. This shows that, in spite of remarkable difference of opinion between the ancient law-givers on various points of law and custom, no necessity was felt by them to reject any Smṛti work as a whole. This attitude of respect, borne by the ancient writers on Dharma towards the Smṛti works, was due most probably to the facts that these works were meant principally, if not absolutely, for the members of the different Vedic schools who cherished very high regard for their ancient rites and customs and tried to follow them with the utmost fidelity, and that they recognised as sources of Dharma the Vedas and also the traditions and practices of only those (Brahmin) members of the Aryan society who *studied and learnt the Vedas* and assiduously performed from generation to generation the acts prescribed by these works. However, their strict adherence to the Vedas allowed them little scope for introducing remarkable innovations in Dharma, although there was difference of opinion on various points of law and custom.

We have already said how during the few centuries following the ages of Baudhāyana and Āpastamba the social, religious and political life of the Hindus

<sup>13</sup>yat tv itara-smṛtinām prāyeṇa sārūpyāt.....iti / tad ucyate / sarva-dharma-sūtrāṇām varṇāśramopadeśitvād dharmāṇām caikarūpatvāt paraspara-sampāditvaṃ yuktam...../—*Tantra-vārtika*, I, p. 285.

<sup>14</sup>Besides referring to the divergent opinions of other Smṛti-writers (for which see foot-note 8 on page 2 *ante*), the *Gautama-dharma-sūtra* (1. 5—tulya-bala-virodhe vikalpaḥ) clearly refers to the conflict of views of ancient authorities on Dharma and prescribes that in case of conflict between authorities of equal force, either may be followed at pleasure.

It is to be noted that in referring to the divergent views of the different authorities on Dharma Gautama, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba and others do not say that these varying prescriptions were meant for people of different Yugas.

was affected very seriously by repeated inroads of casteless foreigners as well as by the spread and popularity of Buddhism, Jainism and other heresies and the systems of the Brāhmas (i.e., Brahmā-worshippers), Pāñcarātras, Pāśupatas, Sāṃkhyas, Yogins and others. During this period it was the spirit of compromise, and not that of negation, which was most needed for the life and vigour of the Hindu society ; and the hard task of bringing about religious syncretism was undertaken in all earnestness by the Purāṇas and the *Mahābhārata*. But in spite of their high idealism in admitting the sources of, and authorities on, Dharma, their deep regard for the Vedas, and their great reluctance to admit of any remarkable change in their outlook as regards Dharma, the Smṛti-writers could not keep their eyes completely closed to the hard realities which confronted them and their society. They deemed it necessary to modify and liberalise their views as regards Dharma and made concessions more or less with an eye to their human tendencies which had so long been sacrificed to their strict idealism. We have already seen that Manu gave full recognition to as many as four sources of Dharma and thus made a remarkable advance over his predecessors, although he claimed to be a faithful follower of the Vedas<sup>15</sup>. From the statement of the Manu-smṛti that after compiling the (original Dharma-) Śāstra Brahmā himself taught it to Manu, who, in his turn, taught it to Bhṛgu, Marīci and other sages<sup>16</sup>, it appears that the Smṛti works of Marīci and some other sages, (and evidently not those of Gautama, Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, and other Sūtra-writers<sup>17</sup>), which were thus taken to have been derived from the *Mānava-dharma-śāstra*, generally followed the views of Manu and had no serious difference of opinion with him. But the *Manu-smṛti* itself, though not giving any list of reliable Smṛti works, testifies to the fact that besides the extra-Vedic Smṛtis, which it denounces as wholly unauthoritative and unreliable, there grew up a number of other Smṛti works which, though claiming to be based on the Vedas, were to be rejected as useless for correct knowledge of Dharma. The relevant verse of the *Manu-smṛti* (12.95) runs as follows :

yā veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayo yāś ca kāś ca ku-dṛṣṭayaḥ /  
sarvās tā niṣphalāḥ pretya tamo-niṣṭhā hi tāḥ smṛtāḥ //

“Those Smṛtis which are outside (the pale of) the Veda, and those (others) in

<sup>15</sup>*Manu-smṛti* 2. 7—

yāḥ kaścit kasyacid dharmo manunā parikīrtitaḥ /  
sa sarvo 'bhīhito vede sarva-jñānamayo hi saḥ //

<sup>16</sup>*Ibid.*, 1. 58—

idam śāstram tu kṛtv-āsau mām eva svayam āditaḥ /  
vidhivā grāhayāmāsa marīcy-ādīms tv ahaṃ munin //

<sup>17</sup>It is to be noted that Gautama and Āpastamba have been enjoying wide reputation as authorities on Dharma from very early times, and this is amply testified to by the Smṛti-writers as well as the Mīmāṃsakas including Kumārila. Yet the *Manu-smṛti* names Marīci, who is mentioned neither in any of the extant Dharma-sūtras nor in the lists of Smṛti-writers given by Yājñavalkya, Parāśara, Śaṅkha-Likhita, Yama, Paiṭhīnasi, Aṅgīras and many others. For these lists see *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, 1. 4-5, *Parāśara-smṛti* 1. 12-15, *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 23, *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, pp. 1-2, Mādhavācārya's commentary on the Parāśara-smṛti, ed. V. S. Islampurkar, Bombay, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 108, *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, pp. 28-29, *Nītyācāra-pradīpa* of Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, ed. Bibl. Ind., Calcutta, I, p. 20, *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 15-18, and so on.

which there is bad vision (or knowledge, of their authors), are all useless after death, because they have been declared as based entirely on ignorance.” In this verse the reading ‘smṛtayah’ is given by Kullūka-bhaṭṭa and Rām-candra who comment on the *Manu-smṛti*, as well as by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Govinda-svāmin, who quote this verse in *Tantra-vārttika*, I, p.196 and the commentary on *Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* ii. 9. 12 respectively; but Medhātithi, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, Lakṣmīdhara (in *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 262) and Aparārka (in his commentary, p. 14) read ‘śrutayah’ in its place. That the reading ‘śrutayah’ cannot be the right one, is shown by the facts that the Smṛtikāras and the Mimāṃsikas use the word ‘Śruti’ exclusively to mean the ‘Veda’, that Manu expressly says that ‘Śruti’ is the same as the ‘Veda’<sup>19</sup>, and that, as we shall see hereinafter, Medhātithi himself uses the word ‘Smṛti’ (and not ‘Śruti’) to mean the literatures of the Śākyaas, Bhojakas, Kṣapaṇakas and others who are said to be outside the pale of the Vedas (bāhyāḥ). Kumārila, Jayanta-bhaṭṭa (author of the *Nyāya-mañjarī*), and others also use one or more of the terms ‘Smṛti’, ‘Āgama’ (i.e., Tantra) and ‘Śāstra’ to mean extra-Vedic scriptures of the Baudhhas, Jainas, Sāṃkhyas, Pāñcarātras, Pāśupatas, Śaivas and others<sup>19</sup>.

According to Medhātithi the word ‘ku-dṛṣṭayah’ in the above-mentioned verse of Manu is a Tatpuruṣa compound meaning ‘the philosophical systems based on wrong reasonings, such as the proving of the Veda being the work of a personal author, the rejecting of Apūrva, deities, etc., and so on’<sup>20</sup>; following Medhātithi Kullūka-bhaṭṭa takes it to mean ‘the anti-Vedic philosophical systems of the Cārvākas which are based on bad reasonings and consist in the rejection of deities, Apūrva, etc.’<sup>21</sup>; Lakṣmīdhara means by it the philosophical treatises of the Baudhhas and others<sup>22</sup>; and Kumārila-bhaṭṭa understands by it the extra-Vedic (trayī-bāhya) scriptures of Pākhaṇḍins (heretics), Vikarmasthas (habitual doers of unlawful acts), and Haitukas (sceptics)<sup>23</sup>, who are the same as the Śākyaas (Buddhists), etc. Others’ interpretations of this word, though

<sup>19</sup> *Manu-smṛti* 2. 10—śrutis tu vedo vijñeyah, etc.

<sup>19</sup> See, for instance, *Tantra-vārttika* (on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 4), I, pp. 186 ff.; Jayanta-bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāya-mañjarī* (ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1936), pp. 239 ff.; Mitraniśra’s *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 20 ff.

<sup>20</sup> ku-dṛṣṭayah asat-tarka-darśanāni / veda-kartuḥ sādhanam apūrva-devat-ādi-nirākaraṇam evam-ādyāḥ ku-dṛṣṭayah /—Medhātithi’s commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 12. 95.

<sup>21</sup> yāni cāsat-tarka-mūlāni devat-āpūrv-ādi-nirākaraṇ-ātmakāni veda-viruddhāni cārvāka-darśanāni . . . . . /—Kullūka-bhaṭṭa’s commentary on *Manu-smṛti* 12. 95.

<sup>22</sup> *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 262—ku-dṛṣṭayah ku-darśanāni bauddh-ādi-śāstrāni.

<sup>23</sup> *Tantra-vārttika* (on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* i. 3. 4), I, pp. 195-6—

śākyādayas ca sarvatra kurvānā dharmā-deśanāni /  
hetu-jāla-vinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate //

.....

eta eva ca te yeṣāṃ vān-mātreṇ-āpi nārcanam /  
pākhaṇḍino vikarmasthā haitukās caita eva hi //

etadyā granthā eva ca manv-ādibhiḥ parihāryatven-oktāḥ /

yā veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayo yās ca kāścit ku-dṛṣṭayah /

sarvās tā niṣphalāḥ proktās tamo-niṣṭhā hi tāḥ smṛtāḥ //

tasmād dharmam prati trayī-bāhyam evam-jātiyakam prāmānyen-ānapekṣyam  
syād iti siddham //

According to Kullūka-bhaṭṭa, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa, Rāghavānanda and others, the Śākyaas, Bhikṣukas, Kṣapaṇakas and others are Pākhaṇḍins (see Kullūka-bhaṭṭa and others’ comments on *Manu-smṛti* 4. 30).

differing in some cases<sup>24</sup>, equally relate to the extra-Vedic or anti-Vedic works or ideas. It is to be noted that Medhātithi takes the expression 'veda-bāhyāḥ śrūṭayaḥ' (extra-Vedic Śrūṭis) to mean 'such anti-Vedic and non-Vedic declarations as "Heaven is attained by bowing down to Caityas" and the like, which are well-known as the doctrines of the Nirgranthas, Śobhas (?) and others'; according to Lakṣmīdhara, it is 'directive of such acts as bowing down to Caityas'<sup>25</sup>; and Kullūka-bhaṭṭa explains the words 'veda-bāhyāḥ smṛṭayaḥ' saying that 'the Smṛtis that are not based on the Vedas, are such statements of visible purpose as "Heaven is attained by bowing down to Caityas" and the like'<sup>27</sup>. It is needless to refer to others' interpretations. All these show that in spite of Medhātithi and others' difference of opinion as regards the reading the word 'smṛṭayaḥ' and their interpretation of 'dṛṣṭayaḥ' (in 'ku-dṛṣṭayaḥ') to mean, in most cases, the 'philosophical systems' (darśanāni), they cite instances which clearly show that they practically make no distinction in meaning between 'śrūṭayaḥ' and 'smṛṭayaḥ' but take both the expressions 'veda-bāhyāḥ smṛṭayaḥ (or śrūṭayaḥ)' and 'ku-dṛṣṭayaḥ' to mean the literatures of *only* those who are outside the pale of the Vedas. As a matter of fact, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī includes the Cārvākas (cited by Kullūka-bhaṭṭa) among the 'Veda-bāhyas'<sup>28</sup>; and Medhātithi mentions Śākyas, Bhojakas, Kṣapaṇakas, Nirgranthas, Anarthavādas, Pāñcarātrikas, Pāśupatas and others in the same capacity, saying: "Nor is it right to assert that 'the Smṛti-and-Śīla of persons versed in the Veda is also merely referred to for the purpose of pointing out the unauthoritative character of the heterodox Smṛtis (bāhya-smṛtīnām)'; because the unauthoritative character of these latter is already well established by reasoning. For such heterodox people as the Śākyas, Bhojakas, Kṣapaṇakas and the rest, there is no possibility of any knowledge of the Veda, by virtue of which they might be regarded as authoritative on matters treated of in their Smṛtis; because in the first place they do not admit any connection with the Veda; secondly, they openly declare that the Veda is not authoritative; thirdly, they contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; and lastly, these Smṛtis clearly prohibit the study of the Veda. If Buddha and others had been students of the Veda, then alone could there be any question as to whether or not their Smṛtis are based upon the Veda. When however, as a matter of fact, any connection with the Veda is not even remotely possible, how could there be any possibility of these being based upon the Veda? On the contrary, these writers themselves put forward an entirely

<sup>24</sup>For instance, Sarvajñanārāyaṇa takes the word 'ku-dṛṣṭayaḥ' to mean Inference (anumāna) and other modes of proof, which, being anti-Vedic, are false; and according to Rāghavananda it means the Buddhists and others' knowledge about self arising out of Inference (anumāna).

<sup>25</sup>atha veda-bāhyā veda-viruddhā aveda-mūlāḥ śrūṭayo grantha-saṃdṛbdeṣu nodanāḥ 'caitya-vandanena svargo bhavati' ity-ādyāḥ nirgrantha-śobhādi-siddhāntāḥ prasiddhāḥ.

<sup>26</sup>veda-bāhyāḥ śrūṭayaḥ caitya-vandan-ādi-nodikāḥ.—*Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 262.

<sup>27</sup>yāḥ smṛṭayo veda-mūlā na bhavanti dṛṣṭārtha-vākyāni 'caitya-vandanāt svargo bhavati' ity-ādini.

<sup>28</sup>*Prasthāna-bheda* (ed. Vāṇī Vilāsa Press, Srirangam, 1912), p. 2— . . . . .  
 evaṃ saugatānāṃ prasthāna-catustayam / tathā dehātma-vāden-aikam prasthānam  
 cārvākānām / evaṃ dehātrikta-deha-parimāṇ-ātma-vādena dvitīyam prasthānam digamba-  
 rānām / evaṃ militvā nāstikānāṃ ṣaṭ prasthānāni / tāni kasmān nocyante / satyam /  
 veda-bāhyatvāt teṣāṃ mleccādi-prasthānavat paraṃparay-āpi puruṣ-ārth-ānupayogitvād  
 upekṣāniyatvam eva /



different basis (for their codes) in the form of tradition handed down through a series (of several Buddhas), as for example, in the following words: 'With my divine eyes I perceive the good and bad conditions of Bhikṣus'. Exactly in the same manner, all such heterodox people (bāhyāḥ) as the Bhojakas, Pāñcarātrikas, Nirgranthas, Anarthavādas, Pāsupatas and the rest hold that their scriptures are the works of gifted personalities, particular deities, capable of directly perceiving the subjects dealt with by them; and they do not admit that Dharma has its source in the Veda; in fact their scriptures contain teachings directly opposed to the Veda; e.g., some of these people, holding that death frees the living beings from the troubles of living, hold all killing to be meritorious; ..... So that there is distinct disagreement (between the Veda and the said heterodox scriptures)<sup>29</sup>. We have already seen that according to Kumārila-bhaṭṭa also the word 'ku-dṛṣṭayah' means the extra-Vedic scriptures of the Bauddhas and others. It is remarkable that by the word 'dṛṣṭayah' (in 'ku-dṛṣṭayah') most of the above-mentioned authorities understand the 'philosophical systems', though without sufficient reason<sup>30</sup>, and none of them takes into account those Smṛti works which, though professing to be rooted in the Vedas, were not based on a correct interpretation of the Vedic texts due to their authors' want of proper insight into the meanings of the Vedas. So, we should take the line

'yā veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayo yās ca kāś ca ku-dṛṣṭayah'

to mean two kinds of Smṛti works, viz., (1) 'veda-bāhyāḥ smṛtayah' (the extra-Vedic Smṛtis) and (2) 'ku-dṛṣṭayah<sup>31</sup> smṛtayah' (i.e., those Smṛtis which, though not being extra-Vedic, suffered from a lack of right vision or knowledge of their authors as regards the correct meanings of the Vedic texts on which these Smṛtis were based). Manu's mention of the prevalence of extra-Vedic Smṛti works in his days and his recognition of the practices of Sādhus as well as of self-satisfaction (ātmanas tuṣṭiḥ) as sources of Dharma, indicate that besides the two extreme kinds of Smṛtis, viz., the extra-Vedic ones and those based on Vedas, there were others which, though claiming to have their basis in the Vedas, were influenced very much by popular ideas and practices and were consequently rejected by Manu as 'ku-dṛṣṭayah'. We have already seen how Manu was an ardent follower of the Vedas<sup>32</sup> and urged learned men to engage themselves in their own duties by resting upon the authority of Śruti<sup>33</sup>. So, it was not at all

<sup>29</sup>Modhātithi's commentary (on *Manu-smṛti* 2. 6), I, pp. 56-57.

<sup>30</sup>We must not overlook the fact that the 'philosophical systems' (darśanāni) have nothing to do with the sources of Dharma or the places of its occurrence (sthānāni—*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 3) and are consequently irrelevant here.

<sup>31</sup>We take the word 'ku-dṛṣṭayah' to be a Bahuvrīhi compound and analyse it thus: kutsitāḥ (ninditāḥ) dṛṣṭayah yāsu tāḥ (smṛtayah).

<sup>32</sup>About the basis of the Dharma described by Manu, the *Manu-smṛti* (2. 7) says:

"yaḥ kaścit kasyacid dharmo manunā parikirtitaḥ /  
sa sarvo bhīhito vede sarva-jñānamayo hi saḥ //"

Bṛhaspati also says:

"ved-ārth-opanibandhatvāt prāmānyam tu manoh smṛtam /  
manv-ārtha-viparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na śasyate //"

This verse of Bṛhaspati has been quoted in *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 42, *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 17 (v. 1. 'vedād upanibaddhatvāt prādhānyam tu, etc.'). *Vīramitrodaya*, *Paribhāṣā-prakāśa*, p. 27 (v. 1. 'prādhānyam'), and so on.

<sup>33</sup>*Manu-smṛti* 2. 8—śruti-prāmānyato vidvān sva-dharme nivīseta vai.

unnatural for him to reject those Smṛti works which, in his opinion, were not based on the Vedas.

Manu's eloquent advocacy for the Vedas and his rejection of the above-mentioned Smṛtis as sinful and perfectly useless for the life beyond, could not bring about the extinction of those Smṛti works which claimed to be based on the Vedas but recorded views considered by Manu to be non-Vedic. Manu's age was followed by one of great religious struggle, which was marked by zealous activity not only among the various 'extra-Vedic' sects (including the Pāñcarātras, Pāśupatas, etc.) but also among the followers of the composite Dharma advocated by the present Purāṇas and the *Mahābhārata*. This latter class of people, as well as the followers of those Smṛtis of the Vedic fold which were stamped out by Manu as totally unacceptable, must have found great encouragement in Manu's wider outlook in recognising the sources of Dharma as stated in Part II of the present essay. As a matter of fact, the works of the post-Manu Smṛti-writers show clearly that, like the authors of the present Purāṇas and the *Mahābhārata*, these Smṛti-writers also were more or less progressive in their views and literary activity and tried in their own way to establish the Varṇāśrama-dharma and the authority of the Vedas among the people. Thus, flourishing a few centuries after Manu and making remarkable advance over him in the matter of recognition of the sources of Dharma, Yājñavalkya said :

“śrutiḥ<sup>31</sup> smṛtiḥ sadācāraḥ svasya ca priyam ātmanaḥ /  
samyak-saṃkalpajaḥ kāmo dharmā-mūlam idaṃ smṛtam //

(*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 7).

“Śruti, Smṛti, practice of good men, and what is agreeable to (one's) own self, (and also) the desire arising from complete (i.e., unswerving) determination—(all) this is (traditionally) remembered as the source of Dharma.”

It is to be noted that in making this statement Yājñavalkya made no distinction between the Śiṣṭas and the Sādhus<sup>35</sup> but took all of them together to form one respectable class whose practice was to be regarded as a source of Dharma without any discrimination. He also added one more source, viz., desire arising from complete (or unswerving) determination (samyak-saṃkalpajaḥ kāmaḥ). His mention of the 'Purāṇa' as distinct from the 'Dharma-śāstra' and as one of the fourteen places of occurrence of Dharma (dharmasya sthānāni)<sup>36</sup> indicates that his main intention for recording this additional source of Dharma was to give recognition to those Purāṇic rites and customs which the followers of the Vedas felt a strong desire to perform without any feeling of hesitation. We have already seen that in early times the Pāñcarātras, Pāśupatas and other extra-

<sup>31</sup>For 'śrutiḥ' Viśvarūpa reads 'vedaḥ' (see T. Gaṇapati Śāstri's edition with Viśvarūpa's commentary). According to Aparārka the first half of this line reads 'śruti-smṛti-sadācārāḥ'.

<sup>35</sup>We have already said that the Śiṣṭas are those (Brahmins) who are well-versed in the Vedas and assiduously perform the acts prescribed by these works, whereas the Sādhus are such persons as lack knowledge of the Vedas but are faultless in respect of character, conduct, attainments and high regard for everything Vedic.

<sup>36</sup>*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 3—

purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharmāśāstr-āṅga-miśritāḥ /  
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa /

Vedic sectaries had round them a class of people who, though taking to the worship of sectarian deities for the accomplishment of particular objects (arthasiddhyartham)<sup>37</sup>, had high regard for the Vedas, attached great importance to Varṇāśrama-dharma and the Smṛti-rules, and did not like to give them up. On the other hand, with an eye to the prescriptions of the Vedas and the Smṛtis, they devised their own method of worship and way of life and did not allow themselves to be guided by the Āptas who joined the orders wholeheartedly. For various reasons the number of such adherents to the different sects increased so much in those days that it was neither wise nor possible for the Smṛti-writers to shut them out from the Vedic society or to ignore their rites and customs as unlawful. So, as we have already seen, Yājñavalkya placed the Śiṣṭas and the Sādhus on the same level, overlooking, for practical reasons, the distinction made between them by Vyāsa, Manu and others, and added another source of Dharma to provide for the recognition of the rites and customs of those members of the Vedic society who had high regard for the Vedas and the Smṛti-rules but could not be dissuaded from sectarian observances and worships in their own composite way (as is described in the present Purāṇas). However, the credit for such remarkable innovation in the recognition of the sources of Dharma does not go to Yājñavalkya alone. His use of the word 'smṛtam' (meaning 'remembered' or 'traditionally known') in his verse quoted above, shows that in enumerating these sources he was preceded by other authorities, of whom we have got no knowledge at present.

The provisions, recorded in the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*, for the development of the Smṛti literature and the life and growth of the Hindu society, were not taken in their right perspective by the commentators and Nibandha-writers, who came long after Yājñavalkya. Being eager to bring about a compromise between the divergent statements of the Smṛti-writers, early and late, and working under the influence of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, Śaṅkarācārya and others who fought hard to uphold Brahmanism against the onslaughts of Buddhism, Jainism and the anti-Vedic and extra-Vedic systems of religion and to re-establish the Vedas in their right place of authority, these writers explained the above-mentioned verse of Yājñavalkya in their own scholarly way, which obscured Yājñavalkya's views and minimised the value of his contributions to the life and growth of the Hindu religion and society. For instance, Viśvarūpa, Vijñāneśvara and Aparārka took the word 'sat' (in 'sadācārah') to mean the Śiṣṭas<sup>38</sup>; and according to the first, such persons were to be regarded as 'good' (santaḥ) as had no desire, were devoid of pride, etc., learnt the Veda, and performed the acts prescribed by it. In his opinion, 'the practice of good men'

<sup>37</sup> *Jayākhya-saṃhitā* 22. 34b-37a.

<sup>38</sup> Vijñāneśvara's *Mitākṣarā* (on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 7)—*sadācārah satām śiṣṭānām ācāro 'nuṣṭhānam*. Aparārka's commentary (on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 7)—*sadācārah śiṣṭācārah*.

also was 'Smṛti', but as it was not recorded, it was mentioned separately.<sup>39</sup> Thus, Viśvarūpa and the other two commentators excluded from the scope of Dharma the practice of those numerous members of the Vedic society who were not learned in the Veda. This was a clear denial of history, which could not but be harmful to the life and expansion of the Hindu society. In interpreting the expression 'samyak-saṃkalpajaḥ kāmah', the commentators and Nibandha-writers, being guided merely by their scholarship and not by their critical judgment and historical outlook, were equally wide of the mark. According to Vijñāneśvara, this expression means 'wish, such as "I must not drink water without taking food", which arises from proper determination and does not go against (the prescriptions of) the Śāstra';<sup>40</sup> Lakṣmīdhara, who is followed by Caṇḍeśvara, Mitrāmīśra and others, himself follows Vijñāneśvara, whom he wrongly names as Viśvarūpa, but suggests another explanation saying that the expression 'samyak-saṃkalpajaḥ kāmah' means desire for the performance of such acts as doing good to Brahmins,—a desire which arises from determination not caused by love, etc. and which has been called 'śīla' (conduct) by Manu<sup>41</sup>; Aparārka takes it to mean wish for performing some act of Dharma at some particular time according to such directions of Śāstras as "Whenever faith (śraddhā) becomes strong (in a person, he) should kindle (the sacrificial fire for the sacrifice)" or "(Whenever a person will have a) liking for (the performance of) the Śraddha ceremony, (he should do it)";<sup>42</sup> according to Śūlapāṇi, it means one's wish for doing such acts as making gifts,—a wish which arises from one's resolve not going against the prescriptions of Śāstras;<sup>43</sup> and according to Narasiṃha Vājapeyin and Gaḍādhara it means such wish for refraining from physical enjoyments as arises from one's determination for keeping aloof from these.<sup>44</sup> It is needless to refer to others' views. The interpretations, referred to above, will show how unsatisfactory they are. There is no reason why the acts of Dharma, cited in them as instances, should necessitate the recognition of

<sup>39</sup>Viśvarūpa's commentary (on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 7)—

akamātmāno dambhādi-rahitā vedārtho-vido nuṣṭhātārāś ca santah, teṣāṃ yad adṣṭāyācaranaṃ sa sadācūrah / tathā ca vaśiṣṭhaḥ—"śiṣṭah punar akamātmā, agrhyamāna-kāraṇo dharmah" iti / anupanibandhanāc ca smṛtito brāhmaṇa-parivrajakavad bhedenopanyāśah /

<sup>40</sup>*Mitākṣarā*—samyak-saṃkalpāj jātaḥ kāmah śāstrāvīruddho yathā 'mayā bhojana-vyatirekenodakaṃ na pātavyam' iti /

<sup>41</sup>*Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 21—'samyak-saṃkalpaja' iti samyak-saṃkalpāj jātaḥ / 'kāmah' śāstrāvīruddhe arthe [yathā] mayā bhojana-vyatirekeṇa udakaṃ na pātavyam iti viśvarūpaḥ / athavā, 'samyak-saṃkalpāt' rāgādi-rahita-saṃkalpāt, jñānād upajātam brāhmaṇopacikirṣādi [yad eva] manunā śīlatvenoktam [tad eva] samyak-saṃkalpaja ityanenaivocyate /

See also *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 27 (where Viśvarūpa is named in place of Vijñāneśvara); *Vīramītrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 10; and so on. Caṇḍeśvara suggests a third interpretation, saying: "athavā śāstrōṇa vaikalpika viśaye pratibodhite ātma-tuṣṭir icchaiva niyāmiketi".—(*Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 27).

<sup>42</sup>Aparārka's commentary (on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 7)—samicīnaḥ śāstrārtha-viśayo 'nenedaṃ sādhaयāmlī manaḥ-karma saṃkalpaḥ / tajjah kāmo dharmā-cikirṣā /..... kāla-viśeṣe saṃkalpajaḥ kāmah, yathā—"yadaivainaṃ śraddhayopanayet (? śraddhōpanamet) tadaivādadhita" iti / athavā "śraddham prati ruciś caiva" iti /

<sup>43</sup>Śūlapāṇi's commentary on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (ed. J. R. Gharpure, Bombay, 1939) 1. 7—samyak-saṃkalpaja iti / śāstrāvīruddha-saṃkalpajaḥ kāmāś tu dānādir mayā kartavya iti janitecchā /

<sup>44</sup>samkalpo nivṛtti-saṃkalpaḥ / taj-janyaḥ kāmō nivṛtticchā /—*Nityācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 17. See also *Ācāra-sāra* (p. 12), which reads 'tajjanya-kāmah'.

an additional source, viz., 'samyak-saṁkalpajah kāmah'. These acts may easily be taken to be based on one or other of the first four sources of Dharma mentioned by Yājñavalkya.

Although, in recognising the sources of Dharma, Yājñavalkya was more liberal and accommodating than his predecessors now known to us, he was not willing to regard all the Smṛti works current in the Hindu society in those days as equally authoritative. We have already seen how a fairly extensive Smṛti literature had grown up by the time of compilation of the *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* and how Manu rejected as unauthoritative all those Smṛti works which claimed to be based on the Vedas but made statements considered by Manu to be non-Vedic. Consequently, being inspired by his more advanced views and the noble intention of adding life and vigour to the Hindu society, Yājñavalkya made a selection of as many as twenty writers of Dharma-śāstra (including himself),<sup>45</sup> whose works he recommended as authorities on the subject. With the progress of time and the consequent expansion of the Dharma-śāstra literature as a matter of great social necessity, a number of other closed lists were prepared by different authorities for the guidance of the people, who must have felt very much confused at the multiplicity of and variety in the works on Dharma. As these authorities hailing from different climes and ages, could not have exactly the same notion of Dharma or be equally informed about the Dharma-śāstras followed in different parts of the country, their lists naturally differed in names or lengths in accordance with their attitude towards the individual authors. Thus, the *Parāśara-smṛti* (I. 12-15) names twenty authoritative writers of Dharma-śāstra (including Parāśara), who, except three, namely, Kāśyapa, Garga and Prācetasā, are the same as those named in Yājñavalkya's list (in which the names of Yama, Bṛhaspati and Vyāsa occur in place of those of Kāśyapa, Garga and Prācetasā); Yama, as quoted in the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, *Caturvarṅa-cintāmaṇi* and *Kṛtya-ratnākara* gave a list of twenty compilers of Dharma-śāstra,<sup>46</sup> naming all in Yājñavalkya's list except Śātātapa,

<sup>45</sup>According to Vijñānośvara, Aparārka and Śūlapāṇi, the verses of Yājñavalkya, containing this list, run as follows :

manv-atri-ṛṣṇu-hārīta-yājñavalky-ośano-ṅgirāḥ /  
yam-āpastamba-saṁvartāḥ kātyāyana-bṛhaspatī //  
parāśara-vyāsa-śaṅkha-likhitā dakṣa-gautamau /  
śātātapo vasiṣṭhaś ca dharmā-śāstra-prayojakāḥ //

(*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* I. 4-5).

But Viśvarūpa reads these two verses thus :

vaktāro dharmā-śāstrāṇāṃ manur ṛṣṇur yamo ṅgirāḥ /  
vasiṣṭha-dakṣa-saṁvarta-śātātapa-parāśarāḥ //  
āpastamb-ośano-vyāsāḥ kātyāyana-bṛhaspatī /  
gautamaḥ śaṅkha-likhitau hārīto 'trir ahaṃ tathā //

These verses, as given by Viśvarūpa, have been quoted in Narasiṃha Vājapeyin's *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 19, and Gadādhara's *Ācāra-sāra*, p. 11.

The text of these verses, as given in *Garuḍa-purāṇa* (ed. Vaṅgavāsī Press, Calcutta) i. 93. 4b-6a, is the same as that given by Viśvarūpa.

<sup>46</sup>For the verses of Yama containing this list see *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 23, *Caturvarṅa-cintāmaṇi*, II. i, p. 19, *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 29.

In *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 20 and *Ācāra-sāra*, p. 11, a list of sixteen sages has been given as from 'Yama-smṛti', but this ascription is undoubtedly due to a confused reading of the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* (I, pp. 23-24), where the names of almost all these sixteen sages have been given by Lakṣmīdhara himself after quoting the verse of Yama mentioned above.

who was replaced by Nārada ; the *Caturvīṃśati-mata* summarises the teachings of twenty-four sages looked upon as authorities, and these include all except Kātyāyana in Yājñavalkya's list and also five more, namely, Vatsa, Nārada, Gārgya, Baudhāyana and Sāṃkhyā ; similarly, the *Ṣaṭtrīṃśan-mata* was based on the teachings of thirty-six sages ; according to Paiṭhīnasi<sup>47</sup> the number of the sages recognised from ancient times as authoritative writers on Dharma was 'thirty-six', and the names of these sages, as given by him, include as many as sixteen<sup>48</sup> who were mentioned neither by Yājñavalkya nor by Yama ; in the five anonymous verses derived from the *Prayoḡa-pārijāta* in Mitramiśra's *Vīramitrodaya*, eighteen sages have been named as 'the promulgators of Dharma-śāstras' (dharma-śāstra-pravartakāḥ) and eighteen others as 'the authors of secondary Smṛtis' (upasmṛti-vidhāyakāḥ)<sup>49</sup> ; and in three other anonymous verses quoted in the same work, the authoritative Smṛti works have been said to be twenty-one in number and their names given.<sup>50</sup> Although most of the Nibandha-writers were for taking these closed lists merely as suggestive of other names,<sup>51</sup> there is little scope for doubt that for the guidance of the people

<sup>47</sup>For the relevant verses of Paiṭhīnasi see *Smṛti-candrikā*, pp. 1-2, Mādhavācārya's commentary on the *Parāśara-smṛti*, I. i, p. 11-8, *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 15-16, Nilakanṭha's *Samskāra-mayūkha*, p. 2, and so on.

In Paiṭhīnasi's list Bhaspati has been named as Guru, and Yājñavalkya as Yogī.

The *Smṛti-candrikā* names Baudhāyana as Bodhāyana, and Laugākṣi as Logākṣi ; the *Vīramitrodaya* and Mādhavācārya's commentary on the *Parāśara-smṛti* name Bhṛgu in place of Guru ; and the *Samskāra-mayūkha* names Kāśyapa for Kaśyapa.

For 'Kārṣṇājini' the *Samskāra-mayūkha* wrongly reads 'Kātyāyanah'.

<sup>48</sup>These sixteen sages in Paiṭhīnasi's list are the following :

Pracetas, Baudhāyana, Pitāmaha, Sumantu, Kaśyapa, Babhru, Paiṭhīna, Vyāghra, Satyavrata, Bharadvāja, Gārgya, Kārṣṇājini, Jābali, Jamadagni, Laugākṣi, and Brahma-sambhava.

According to Mitramiśra, Brahma-sambhava is the same as Brahma-garbha (see *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 16).

<sup>49</sup>For these verses see *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 18.

For Gadādhara's mention of 'eighteen Smṛtis' and 'eighteen Upasṛtis' see *Ācāra-sāra*, p. 11.

In *Smṛti-candrikā*, p. 2 the verses on the Upasṛtis have been ascribed to Aṅgiras. As the *Smṛti-candrikā* reads the last line as

'upasṛtaya ityotāḥ pravadanti manīṣiṇah',

its list of Upasṛtis consists of sixteen names, omitting those of Paiṭhīnasi and Gobhila.

In the *Smṛti-candrikā* Laugākṣi, Jātūkarnya, Baudhāyana and Kāṇāda have been named respectively as Logākṣi, Jātūkarna, Bodhāyana and Kāṇāda.

Of the eighteen names of 'promulgators of Dharma-śātra', one each has been named exclusively by Yājñavalkya and Paiṭhīnasi, and sixteen by both of them ; but of the names of the authors of Upasṛtis two are found both in Yājñavalkya and Paiṭhīnasi's lists, four only in that of the latter, and the remaining twelve are as follows :

Nāciketa, Skanda, Kāśyapa, Sanatkumāra, Śantanu, Janaka, Jātūkarnya, Kapiñjala, Kāṇāda, Viśvāmītra, Paiṭhīnasi and Gobhila.

<sup>50</sup>For these verses see *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 18.

Of the twenty-one Smṛti-writers named in these verses, two have been included in the lists of Yājñavalkya and Paiṭhīnasi, one in those of Yama and Paiṭhīnasi, seven in that of Paiṭhīnasi only, and the rest are as follows :

Devala, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Ātreya, Gaveya, Marici, Vatsa, Pāraskara, Ṛṣyaśṛṅga, and Vaijavāpa.

<sup>51</sup>See, for instance, Viśvarūpa, Vijñāneśvara, Aparārka and Śūlapāṇi's comments on *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* I. 4-5.

After quoting Yājñavalkya's list of twenty compilers of Dharma-śāstra in his *Madana-pārijāta* (ed. Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p. 11 Madanapāla says : 'neyam parisamkhyā, kim tu pradarsanārtham etat, yato baudhāyan-ādayo 'pi dharma-śāstra-prayojakā bhavanti'.

Similarly, Devanabhaṭṭa and Mādhavācārya quote Paiṭhīnasi's list of thirty-six writers on Dharma and say : "nanu, kim iyam parisamkhyā ? maivam, tathā sati vatsa-marici-devala-pāraskara-pulastya-pulaha-kratu-ṛṣyaśṛṅga-likhita-cohāgaleyādīnām dharmā-praṇetṛtvaṃ na syāt'.

After quoting the above-mentioned list of Paiṭhīnasi, Nilakanṭha also says : "ṣaṭtrīṃśad itī na parisamkhyā / tena viśvāmītrādīnām dharmā-praṇetṛtvaṃ siddham /" (*Samskāra-mayūkha*, p. 2).

the authors of these lists intended to make exhaustive enumeration of the authoritative writers of Dharma-śāstra known to them ; and this can be established by a number of facts, which are as follows :

(1) The list of Yama, mentioned above, has been followed immediately by the verse

‘etair yāni praṇītāni dharmā-śāstrāṇi vai purā /  
tānyevātipramāṇāni na hantavyāni hetubhiḥ //’<sup>52</sup>

in which the word ‘eva’ is significant and shows definitely that Yama intended to make an exhaustive enumeration of those writers of Dharma-śāstra whose authority he considered unquestionable.

(2) The express mention of the numbers ‘twenty-four’, ‘thirty-six’ and ‘twenty-one’ in the lists (including that of Paiṭhīnasi) mentioned above, are equally significant.

(3) The classification of the writers on Dharma into ‘eighteen promulgators of Dharma-śāstra’ (dharmā-śāstra-pravartakāḥ) and ‘eighteen writers of Upa-smṛtis’ (upasmṛti-vidhāyakāḥ) in the anonymous verses mentioned above, and the fact that Vyāsa and Kātyāyana (who have been mentioned by Yājñavalkya, Paiṭhīnasi, Śāṅkha-Likhita<sup>53</sup> and others as compilers of Dharma-śāstras and whose works have been said by Yama to be highly authoritative) have been classed with the authors of ‘Upa-smṛtis’ (which, as works on Dharma, were certainly less important in the eyes of the author of these anonymous verses than the ‘Dharma-śāstras’), indicate that the person, who made this classification, followed his own way of discrimination in preparing the list, which, consequently, was exhaustive.

(4) Even in much later days when numerous Smṛti works had already come into existence, there were some Smṛti-writers who believed in a limited number of authoritative Dharma-śāstras. For instance, in his *Kṛtya-kalpataru* Lakṣmīdhara quotes the open list of Śāṅkha-Likhita and the closed one of Yama, which together contain the names of twenty-two Dharma-śāstra-writers<sup>54</sup> and then takes the word ‘ādi’, occurring at the end of the open list of Śāṅkha-Likhita, to mean the following fourteen authors : Budha, Devala, Soma, Jamadagni, Viśvāmitra, Prajāpati, Paiṭhīnasi, Pitāmaha, Baudhāyana,

<sup>52</sup>See *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 24, *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi*, II, i, p. 19, and *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 29.

For ‘ati-pramāṇāni’ the printed edition of the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* wrongly reads ‘atipraṇītāni’.

<sup>53</sup>For the list of *Śāṅkha-Likhita*, see foot-note 8 on page 2, *ante*.

<sup>54</sup>Of these, twenty are the same as those mentioned in Yājñavalkya’s list (for which see foot-note 45 on page 12, *ante*), and the remaining two are Prācetasā and Nārada (named respectively in the list of *Śāṅkha-Likhita* and Yama).

Chāgaleya, Jābāla, Cyavana, Marīci and Kāśyapa<sup>55</sup>. According to Lakṣmīdhara, it is *only* the works of these fourteen sages which, besides those of the twenty-two writers named in the two lists mentioned above, enjoy universal recognition (*sarva-parigṛhīta*) as authorities on Dharma and go to make up the list of the thirty-six authoritative Smṛtis of Manu and others mentioned in the following verse quoted from the '*Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*' :

manv-ādi-smṛtayo yās tu ṣaṭtriṃśat parikīrtitāḥ /  
tāsāṃ vākyaṃ kramaśaḥ samālocya bravīmi te //<sup>56</sup>

As regards the works of Vṛddha-śātātapa, Yogi-yājñavalkya, Vṛddha-vaśiṣṭha, Vṛddha-manu, Laghu-hārīta and others Lakṣmīdhara is of opinion that these were compiled under changed circumstances by the same authors as formed the said group of thirty-six Smṛti-writers<sup>57</sup>. But he rejects the *Ṣaṭtriṃśanmata* and similar other works as unauthoritative (*apramāṇam*) on the ground that these were accepted and recognised as authoritative by some persons only<sup>58</sup>.

<sup>55</sup>See *Kṛtya-kalpataru* I, p. 24—ādi-śabda-grāhyāś caite—budha-devala-soma.....  
.....kāśyapāḥ.

That the printed edition of the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* wrongly includes the names of Vṛddha-śātātapa and Sumantu in this group, is shown definitely by the facts that these two names make the number of these sages sixteen (which, in addition to the twenty-two named in Yama and Śaṅkha-Likhita's lists, would make the total number of sages thirty-eight, and not thirty-six as said in the '*Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*'), that the Smṛti of Vṛddha-śātātapa has been mentioned again with those of Yogi-yājñavalkya, Vṛddha-vaśiṣṭha, Vṛddha-manu, Laghu-hārīta and others, that Aparārka, Caṇḍeśvara, Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, Gadādhara, Mitrāmīśra and others, who repeat this list of Lakṣmīdhara, do not mention Vṛddha-śātātapa (see Aparārka's commentary, p. 7, *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 29, *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 20, *Ācāra-sūtra*, p. 11, *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 16, and so on), and that Aparārka, Hemādri and Mitrāmīśra do not include the name of Sumantu (see Aparārka's commentary, p. 7, *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* II. i, p. 19, and *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 16).

It is only Hemādri who is found to include Vṛddha-śātātapa among the fourteen sages named by Lakṣmīdhara.

Caṇḍeśvara includes Sumantu in this group of fourteen sages, and in doing so he is followed by Narasiṃha Vājapeyin and Gadādhara.

Aparārka and Hemādri name Jābāla as Jābāli; and these two writers as well as Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, Gadādhara and Mitrāmīśra name Kāśyapa as Kaśyapa.

<sup>56</sup>*Kṛtya-kalpataru* I, p. 24—  
tathā ca bhaviṣya-purāṇe—

... manv-ādi-smṛtayo yās tu ṣaṭtriṃśat parikīrtitāḥ / ...

'manv-ādi-smṛtayah', tās cānantar-oktābhīr ova sarva-parigṛhītābhīḥ pūryante /  
(The above verses, ascribed to the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*, are not found in the present text of the work).

<sup>57</sup>*Kṛtya-kalpataru* I, p. 24—vṛddhaśātātapa-yogiyājñavalkya-vṛddhavaśiṣṭha-laghu-hārīta-ādīni tu prasiddha-ṣaṭtriṃśad-antargata-kartṛkāny eva avasthā-bhedena tair eva karaṇāt.

These words of Lakṣmīdhara have been repeated almost *verbatim* in *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 30, and *Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 16. For similar expressions see also Aparārka's commentary, pp. 7-8 (evam vṛddha-manv-ādayaś ca vayo-'vasthādi-bhedena manv-ādi-pranētāra eva draṣṭavyāḥ), *Nityācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 20 (yogiyājñavalkya-brhanmanu-vṛddhaśātātapa-prabhṛtīni tair eva kṛtāni), and *Ācāra-sūtra*, p. 12 (same as in the *Nityācāra-pradīpa*).

<sup>58</sup>The relevant text (viz., yat tu ṣaṭtriṃśanmatādi tat kaiścid eva parigṛhītadvā vijñānāc ca pramāṇam, as given in the printed edition of the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* (I, p. 26) and repeated in *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 31, is certainly wrong. That the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* originally read 'apramāṇam' (for 'pramāṇam') is shown not only by the context but also by Mitrāmīśra and Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, who quote Lakṣmīdhara's words thus :

"ṣaṭtriṃśan-matādikam tu kaiścid eva parigṛhītadvā vigṛtadvā apramāṇam ity uktam kalpatarupā" (*Vīramitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 17), and

"yat tu ṣaṭtriṃśan-matādi tat kaiścid eva parigrahād vigānāc cāpramāṇam iti lakṣmīdharah" (*Nityācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 22).

According to Mitrāmīśra and Narasiṃha Vājapeyin, Lakṣmīdhara's ground for rejecting the '*Ṣaṭtriṃśan-mata*, etc.' was that these works were accepted by some persons only but decried by others.



Lakṣmīdhara is followed by Hemādri who repeats Lakṣmīdhara's words in his *Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi* II. i, pp. 18-20 and gives the number of the authoritative Dharma-śāstras as thirty-six on the strength of the authorities quoted by his renowned predecessor.

Pratāparudradeva, on the other hand, says that as the respective duties (dharma), prescribed in the Dharma-śāstras, have to be practised by the different castes, and the non-duties (adharmā), pointed out in them, to be shunned, it is necessary to know exactly which works are to be followed for the correct knowledge of Dharma and Adharma<sup>59</sup>. He then divides the authoritative Dharma-śāstras into 'Smṛtis' and 'Upasmṛtis' and makes exhaustive enumerations of these as follows :

(a) Smṛtis compiled by Manu, Aṅgiras, Vyāsa, Gautama, Ātreya, Yama, Vasiṣṭha, Dakṣa, Saṃvarta, Śātātapa, Parāśara, Viṣṇu, Āpastamba, Hārīta, Śaṅkha, Kātyāyana, Guru, Pracetas, Nārada, Yogīśvara, Bodhāyana, Pitāmaha, Sumantu, Kaśyapa, Babhru, Paiṭhīnasi, Vyāghrapāda, Satyavrata, Bharadvāja, Gārgya, Kūrṣṇājini, Jābāli, Jamadagni, Laugākṣi, Vatsa, Marīci, Devala, Pāraskara, Likhita, Chāgaleya and Atri.

(b) Upasmṛtis compiled by Jābāli, Nāciketa, Skanda, Laugākṣi, Kaśyapa, Vyāsa, Sanatkumāra, Śantanu, Janaka, Vyāghra, Kātyāyana, Jātūkarṇi, Kapiñjala, Bodhāyana, Kaṇāda, Viśvāmītra, (Paiṭhīnasi and Gobhila)<sup>60</sup>.

Pratāparudradeva says that Jābāli, Laugākṣi, Kaśyapa, Vyāsa, Kātyāyana, Bodhāyana (and Paiṭhīnasi), mentioned in the second group, are not the same as their namesakes mentioned in the first<sup>61</sup>.

(5) Serious difference of opinion as regards the authority of certain Dharma-śāstras was also found among scholars of much later dates. For instance, Lakṣmīdhara rejected the *Śaṭtriṃśan-mata* and similar other Smṛti works as unauthoritative, but Mitramīśra tells us that Vijñāneśvara, Aparārka, Śūlapāṇi and others recognised these works as authorities<sup>62</sup>. A similar statement has been made by Narasiṃha Vājapeyin also<sup>63</sup>. Aparārka says that the *Caturviṃśati-mata*, *Parīśiṣṭa*, etc. are to be recognised as Dharma-śāstras<sup>64</sup>. As a matter of fact, verses or extracts have been quoted by Lakṣmīdhara, Vijñāneśvara, Aparārka, Devaṇabhaṭṭa and others from the *Śaṭtriṃśan-mata*, *Caturviṃśati-mata* and similar other Dharma-śāstras not mentioned in the lists already referred to.

<sup>59</sup>*Saravali-cilāsa*, Vyavahāra-kāṇḍa (ed. R. Sharma Sastry, Mysore, 1927), p. 13—manu-  
smṛtes tad-aviruddhānām anyāsūp smṛtīnām itarāsām upasmṛtīnām purāṇ-etiḥās-ādīnām  
veda-mūlakatvena prāmānyam aṅgikṛtaṃ nyāyavidbhiḥ / ..... atāś ca tad-ukto  
dharmo 'nuṣṭheyaḥ sarveṣāṃ varṇānām tat-pratipādyāś cādharma nānuṣṭheya ity avivādam /  
etac ca manv-ādi-svarūp-āparijñāne tu na śakyam iti tan nirūpyate //

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 13—jābāli-laugākṣi-vyās-ādayaḥ pūrv-oktā na bhavanti.

<sup>62</sup>*Vīramīrodāya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 17-18—śaṭtriṃśan-matādikaṃ tu kaiścid eva  
parigṛhitatvād vigītatvād apramāṇam ity uktaṃ kalpataruṇā / vijñāneśvar-āparārka-  
śūlapāṇi-prabhṛtibhis tu pramāṇatvena parigṛhitam / yuktaṃ caitat //

<sup>63</sup>*Nīyācāra-pradīpa*, I, p. 22—yat tu śaṭtriṃśan-matādi tat kaiścid eva parigrahād vigā-  
nācōpamāṇam itī lakṣmīdharaḥ / vijñāneśvarādi-yogīśvara-likhanāt tu tad-vākyaṇy apy  
ādriyante / tatrasmadādi-pravṛttāv ātma-tuṣṭir eva pramāṇam //

<sup>64</sup>Aparārka's commentary, p. 8—caturviṃśatimata-parīśiṣṭādayo 'pi dharmasāstra-  
tvenaiva jñeyāḥ.

From what has been said above it is evident that the closed lists of Yama, Yājñavalkya and others were intended by their authors to be exhaustive and not suggestive of other writers as many of the commentators and Nibandha-writers try to make us believe.

Besides the closed lists of authoritative Smṛtis mentioned above there were also some open ones (such as that ascribed very often to Śaṅkha-Likhita and on rare occasions to Śaṅkha or Gautama<sup>65</sup>), which were framed in view of the endless number of the Dharma-śāstras current among the Hindus in different parts of India. The authors of these open lists, which appear to have been very few, were fully conscious of the limitation of their knowledge of the numerous Dharma-śāstras followed in distant places and did not like to be dogmatic in their statement about the authority of these works. They knew fully well that the rejection of any of the popularly accepted Dharma-śāstras was sure to disaffect its followers and serve adversely the interest of the Hindu society by practically disowning these people as its members and thus encouraging the non-Vedic and anti-Vedic religionists, who were always eager to take all unfavourable circumstances and cases of conflict to their own advantage for religious conversion. So, by taking the social problems into full consideration the authors of these open lists, with their liberal outlook, made provision for the recognition of as many Dharma-śāstras as possible and thus tried to save the Hindu society from disintegration and death.

With the progress of the time and the consequent changes in the social, religious, political and economic life of the Hindus, the Vedic schools got dispersed in distant places and Vedic study lost much of its popularity, so much so that many of the Vedic schools died out altogether and a good number of ancient Vedic works became extinct. Consequently, for want of direct perception of the various Vedic texts, it became extremely difficult for one to understand how far the varied statements of the Dharma-śāstras were rooted in the Vedas. On the other hand, the hard struggle for existence, necessitated by the rise and spread of the non-Vedic and anti-Vedic systems of religion and philosophy, made a considerable section of social and religious thinkers feel keenly that for the sake of unity and solidarity the Hindu life and society were to be based more surely and firmly on the Vedas. So, there came forward a number of Smṛti-writers who did not like to be liberal in their outlook like many of their immediate predecessors but thought it wise to follow Śabara-svāmin and other early Mīmāṃsakas in entertaining stricter views as regards Dharma and its sources. It was most probably these people who recognised only eighteen works as 'Dharma-śāstras' and stamped out eighteen others as 'Upasmṛtis'. That this selection was made much earlier than the eighth century A. D. is shown by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa's mention of 'eighteen Dharma-saṃhitās' (aṣṭādaśa-dharma-saṃhitā) in his *Tantra-vārttika* on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*

<sup>65</sup>See foot-note 8 on page 2 ante.

i. 3. 7 (part ii, p. 201). There is no doubt that the strict attitude of these scholars continued to much later days, and this is amply evident from Medhātithi's explanation of the *Manu-smṛti*. We have already seen how, with an eye to the Vedas, he interpreted the sources of Dharma recognised by Manu. The prominently Vedic inclination of the present *Manu-smṛti*, its great popularity, and the statements made in the Vedic works about Manu as the father of mankind and as an ancient law-giver of unrivalled authority<sup>66</sup>, prompted some Smṛti-writers to follow an easier method of discrimination between the Dharma-śāstras. They took the *Manu-smṛti* as the ideal one, with which the other Dharma-śāstras, to be accepted as authorities, were not to disagree. Thus, Bṛhaspati said :

“vedārthopanibandhatvāt prāmānyam tu manoh smṛtam /  
manv-ārtha-viparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na śasyate //”<sup>67</sup>

“Being a compilation of the meanings of the Vedas (the Dharma-śāstra) of Manu is traditionally known to have authority. The Smṛti that goes against Manu's (intended) meaning is not approved of.”

Āṅgiras also said :

“yat pūrvaṃ manunā proktaṃ dharma-śāstram anuttamam /  
na hi tat samatikramya vacanaṃ hitam ātmanaḥ //”<sup>68</sup>

“No statement (of any Smṛti-writer) is salutary to (one's) ownself, in case it transgresses (what has been said in) the excellent Dharma-śāstra formerly declared by Manu.”

This way of selection, in which the *Manu-smṛti* was made the touch-stone of the Dharma-śāstra literature, was followed conveniently by the later Smṛti-writers, many of whom declared the superiority of the *Manu-smṛti* in unequivocal terms. For instance, Devaṇabhaṭṭa said :

“yatra punar mānavasya smṛty-antereṇa virodhaḥ tatra manūka eva śreyān”<sup>69</sup>.

Pratāparudradeva also said :

“manu-smṛtes tad-aviruddhānām anyāsām smṛtīnām.....  
.....prāmānyam āṅgikṛtaṃ nyāyavidbhiḥ”<sup>70</sup>.

We have already seen how Śrīdatta Upādhyāya set aside the views of Yama and Devala in preference to that of Manu on a certain practice.

(To be continued).

<sup>66</sup>For the relevant passages see P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, p. 136.

<sup>67</sup>Quoted in *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 42. See also *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 17, *Vṛtramitrodaya*, *Paribhāṣā-prakāśa*, p. 27, and so on.

<sup>68</sup>Quoted in *Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 16.

<sup>69</sup>*Smṛti-candrikā*, I, p. 16.

<sup>70</sup>*Sarasvatī-vilāsa*, Vyavahāra-kāṇḍa, p. 13.

# AN ASPECT OF JUSTIFICATION OF R̥K-MANTRAS IN THE AITAREYA BRĀHMAṆA

BY VIMAN CHANDRA BHATTACHARYYA

A CRITICAL study of the ṛkverses with their corresponding applications in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* will at once tell us that the author of this text, though bearing all along an attitude of justifying the ṛkverses, can, only in a very few places, satisfy even himself with his mode of justification. Apparently his arguments are carefully planned and efficiently led, but emotions, more than reasons, seem to have swayed him. When a mantra appears to him as very much suited to the occasion in which it is applied, he at once earmarks it as *rūpasamṛddha* (that is, 'opulent' or 'perfect' in form) and declares that part of the rite 'successful' (*samṛddha*)<sup>1</sup>. But the statistics of these *rūpasamṛddha* ṛkverses by the side of the total number of ṛkverses dealt with in the *A. Br.* will only disappoint us. *Prima facie* it is difficult to believe, from the insignificant number of the *rūpasamṛddha* verses, that the ṛkverses could have been originally planned for liturgical employment which the orthodox school undoubtedly stands for.

Like all framers of later ritual texts the *A. Br.* too can not successfully fit all the ṛkverses in their ritual frames. The reasons are not far to seek. As days pass on, the body of the sacrifices as they were prevalent in the Samhitā period goes on continually expanding itself in dimension.<sup>2</sup> New offshoots in performances are incorporated, making, thereby, a sacrifice more complicated.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, a parallel protuberance in the number of ṛkverses needed to meet the growing demand of the new ritual offshoots was completely lacking. Or, the case might have been just the reverse. There is every reasonable probability of a Ṛgveda rite being totally forgotten leaving behind it the corresponding mantra to be cited during its performance. The position of this surviving mantra having become sacrosanct and therefore unassailable by then, it can not be wiped out of the Samhitā and retains its use somewhere in later rituals though its corresponding ceremony is totally wanting. When the author of the *A. Br.* perchance comes across such a verse, the task of justification is not easy for him. To meet such cases he has some stock devices<sup>3a</sup> by using one or the other of which he has shown ingenuity in justifying even inconvenient texts. One of these devices is, which I have named the R̥K-device, introduced with the expression *tad etad ṛṣiḥ paśyann*

<sup>1</sup>The very common expression on such occasion is *etad vai yajñasya samṛddham yad rūpasamṛddham yat karma kriyamānam ṛg abhivadati*. Sūyana, in his commentary on the word says that the ṛkverse is called *rūpasamṛddha* as it describes the rite just as it is being performed : *paśyamāneyam ṛg anuṣṭhyamānam karmā 'bhivadati sākalyena braviti ti yad asty eṣai va rūpasamṛddhiḥ*—on *A. Br.* III. 5.

<sup>2</sup>The sanction of additional assistants to the usual band of four priests amply testifies to this fact.

<sup>3</sup>As Caland has pointed out, the last Kāṇḍa of the *Atharvaveda* owes its creation to this steadily growing complication in ritual—*Das vaitanasutra des Atharvaveda*, P. VI; See also Oldenberg, *Prolegomena*, P. 387.

<sup>3a</sup>For the other devices see V. C. Bhattacharyya : Application of Ṛgveda Mantras Rubricated in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* : *Our Heritage*, Vol. I, Part II, p. 289.

*abhyānūvāca* or *tad etad ṛcā 'bhyuktam*. By having recourse to this device, our author alludes to, in his favour, an authority for the particular ritual even in the very body of the *Ṛgveda saṃhitā*.

A study of this device is made in the following lines.

The examples of R̥k-device are, of special importance as, by adducing a R̥k, in support of a ritual or any part thereof, the *A. Br.* tries to find out a Saṃhitā-basis for it. As a device, therefore, it has more than a mere justificatory importance. It definitely suggests that the mantras thus quoted are of ritual origin. But the number of such mantras is so negligible in this great work that one is naturally inclined to doubt if this can be accepted as a general theory. The usual expressions<sup>4</sup> with which these verses are quoted, go to prove that even before the composition of these verses, the rituals they celebrate or in support of which they are introduced, were performed. This is tantamount to saying that mantras evolved out of sacrifice. On the other hand, evidence to the contrary is not lacking. To quote the words of Prof. K. R. Potdar "Even though, for all practical purposes, it is true that the question of the priority of the hymns, or the sacrifices can not be definitely decided either way, one of the poets, who is probably looking back on the growth of the hymns and the sacrifices, remarks that the hymns came to be written first and then the sacrifice came into existence (*sūktavākam prathamam ād id agnim ād idd havir ajanayanta devāḥ/sa eṣāṃ yajño abhavat tanūpāḥ—Rv. X. 88. 8*). This solitary reference can not prove much; but it is certainly worthy of note as an opinion of one, who though he may have been relatively late in the tradition of the hymns and the sacrifices, was certainly much nearer to them than the later speculators in the field of the interpretation of the *Ṛgveda* and hence, it is not altogether improbable that his statement may be containing precious grains of truth in it."

"Another poet appears to be hinting at the fact that all the hymns were certainly not being composed for the sacrifice nor were they considered to be of a particular standard for the sacrifice (*Rv. VII. 29. 3*). All the hymns might have been composed in honour of certain deities but only some of them were considered as 'Competent' (*aramkṛtiḥ*) for the sacrificial performance. It was only when a particular hymn was admitted as competent that the offering was considered as acceptable to the divinity and hence could be given in the sacrifice as indicated by *kadā nūnaṃ maghavan dāsema*<sup>5</sup>". It is, therefore, practically impossible to determine which of the two—the mantra or the sacrifice—is earlier and which is later. The learned Professor says: "All the hymns therefore need not be imagined to have a sacrificial setting, though that must have started becoming more and more defined with the growth of the idea and practice of sacrifice. It is for this reason that even

<sup>4</sup>*tad etad ṛcā paśyann abhyānūvāca* (seeing this the seer declared) *A. Br. IX. 1; XI. 2; XII. 9, tad apy etad ṛcānoktam* (this is also declared by a seer)—*Ibid.*, *XL. 3, tad etad ṛcānoktam* (this is declared by a seer)—*Ibid.*, *X. 5*, and so on.

<sup>5</sup>K. R. Potdar, *Sacrifice in Ṛgveda*, Chap. II, p. 20-21.

Brāhmaṇas could not pick up all of them for their purposes and Yāska too, when he attempted a critical study of the R̥gvedic hymns could not apply the criterion of sacrifice in their classification<sup>6</sup>”, and concludes thus: “We may therefore reasonably conclude that the relationship of the hymns and the sacrifice suggests the fact that the ritual has been evolving in certain stages, though all of them cannot be very precisely determined for want of any clear-cut data regarding the chronological priority or otherwise of the hymns<sup>7</sup>”. Now let us in the following lines make a study of the mantras quoted under this device in the *A. Br.* and see how far they actually celebrate the ritual in support of which they are introduced.

*A. Br.* IX. 1.

The Brāhmaṇa says that in the Indra-Vāyu cup (*Aindravāyava graha*) Indra is entitled only to a quarter of the drink (*sa eṣa indraturīyo graho gṛhyate yad aindravāyavaḥ*). This the text justifies by a story preceding that states that of gods running a race to decide the right to drink Soma first, Indra and Vāyu won conjointly. This story can, at best, justify Indra's jointly sharing the cup (*graha*) with Vāyu and not Indra's admittance to only a fourth share in the same. To make good of this flaw, the text puts forward in its favour the epithet *indrasārathiḥ* ascribed to Vāyu in the *R̥gveda Samhitā*<sup>8</sup>. The epithet means ‘with Indra as charioteer’ which is only vaguely suggested by the story already referred to. In spite of the fact that the hymn<sup>9</sup> in which Vāyu is characterised with this epithet, can be believed as the foundation of the brahmanic<sup>10</sup> story, there is every reason to doubt if the epithet can be regarded as competent enough to justify Indra's one-fourth share in the cup with Vāyu. In other words, even granting that Indra was the charioteer of Vāyu in the race which they two conjointly won, it cannot be deduced therefrom that Indra should have one-fourth share in the cup. From the text<sup>11</sup> following we learn that in the days of the *A. Br.* a charioteer could claim a fourth share of the booties conquered by his hero and obviously this social custom prevalent by that time serves as an incentive to advance the R̥k in favour of division of the cup as applied to ritual. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is an example of justification by a R̥kverse but by social practice and custom. Our text argues that charioteers of its time claimed a fourth of the booty by force of the example that Indra becoming a charioteer of Vāyu conquered such<sup>12</sup>, it implies that even at the time of the composition of the R̥gveda verse where the epithet

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 37

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>8</sup>*Rv.* IV. 46 2b or 48. 2b.

<sup>9</sup>*Rv.* IV. 46.

<sup>10</sup>In fact, the very first verse *agram pibā madhūnām sutam vāyo diviṣṭiṣu | tvam hi pūrvapā asi* seems to refer to the race the gods ran to decide the right to drink Soma first.

<sup>11</sup>*īasmād dhā py etarhi bharatāḥ saivanām vittim prayanti turtiye haiva samgrahītāro vadante.*

<sup>12</sup>*turtiye haiva samgrahītāro vadante 'munāvānūkāṣena yad ada indrah sārathir iva bhūtvodajyat.*

occurs, charioteers were entitled to a fourth share of the booty. This gives rise to a vicious circle, inasmuch as, the verse presupposes the custom which again at the time of the text, is regarded as having its foundation in the verse. It is true that being essentially a social institution sacrifice originated and developed in ancient society not as an isolated phenomenon but in association with social ideas and ideals and it is practically impossible to determine as to which the chronological priority should go.

A. Br. X. 1.

By way of praising the Nivid the text tells, 'Prajāpati was here being one only in the beginning. He desired 'May I be propagated and become greater'; he practised fervour; he restrained speech; at the end of the year he uttered twelve times. The Nivid has twelve clauses; it was just the Nivid that he uttered; after it were all beings created"<sup>13</sup>. The half verse<sup>14</sup> which it quotes immediately after, in support of its praise of the Nivid means, according to the interpretation of Sāyaṇa here, that Prajāpati attained poetic power (*kavyatā*, *śabdasaṣṭrtvam*—*Sāy.*) with the first-born Nivid and then created the sons of Manus<sup>15</sup>. Obviously, the mantra-portion seems to be adduced in support of what the Brāhmaṇa has to serve by way of speculation regarding the holy origin of the Nivid. It is, therefore, a case of justification of the brahmanic speculation and not of a mantra in its ritual setting as is the proper function of a Brāhmaṇa.

The most glaring discrepancy that readily arrests our attention here is that the hymn (*Rv.* 1. 96) in which the mantra occurs has Agni Draviṇodas<sup>16</sup> as its deity and therefore, *sa* in the first *pāda* can only refer to Agni and not to Prajāpati as our text wants to make it mean. In fact, Sāyaṇa renders *saḥ* as *so'gnih* when explaining the mantra in the *Samhitā* while, here he succumbs to the wrong fitting of the mantra in the context of the Brāhmaṇa<sup>17</sup>. Even after a careful study of the entire hymn where the verse occurs, one fails to understand how *sa* can make any reference to Prajāpati and is inclined to consider it as only an attempt of the text to dupe the society in regard to process of justification by hastily pulling the mantra-portion out of its original context and adducing the same with a twisted interpretation suited to the occasion.

A. Br. X.

In the Soma sacrifice the Sāman-singers sing the Bahispavamānastotra with *Rv.* IX. 11. 1. of which Soma Pavamāna is the deity. The rule is that the Bahispavamānastotra should be followed by an Ājya śastra sung by the Hotṛ

<sup>13</sup>Keith's rendering of the passage concerned.

<sup>14</sup>*Rv.* 1.96. 2ab

<sup>15</sup>Comp. *sa prajāpatiḥ pūrvayā prathamam prādurbhūtayā nividā dvā daśapadarūpayā kavyatā kavitrām śabdasaṣṭrtvam āyor āgatavān prāptavān ity arthah | tata ūrdhvam manūnām vaivasvatādīnām sambandhinīr imā brāhmaṇakṣatriyādirūpāḥ prajā ajanayat*—*Sāy.* on *Rv.* 1.96. 2ab in the A. Br.

<sup>16</sup>*draviṇodastvaguṇaviśiṣṭo'gnih śuddhāgnir vā devatā*—*Sāy.* on the hymn in the *Rv.*

<sup>17</sup>*Sāy.* also gives altogether different meanings of the other two words *kavyatā* and *āyoh* while commenting on this mantra in the *Samhitā*.

priest and the two should have the same deity. Here the discrepancy lies in the fact that the verse in which the Ājya śastra is sung is Rv. III. 13. 1, the deity of which is Agni and not Soma Pavamāna. This discrepancy being pointed out by the Brahmvādins<sup>18</sup>, our text at once advances a Rk<sup>19</sup> to show that it is, after all, apparent and not real because the Rgvedic seer identifies Soma Pavamāna with Agni characterised as Pavamāna (purifying)<sup>20</sup>. This justification of a settled practice in ritual is made on the sheer strength of the attribute *pavamāna* ascribed<sup>21</sup> to Agni. But *pavamāna* as an attribute of Soma is not identical in meaning with *pavamāna* as an attribute of Agni. When Agni is called *pavamānaḥ* evidently he is thought of as 'Purifier *per excellenti*'<sup>22</sup> but Soma Pavamāna of the ninth Maṇḍala of the *Rgveda Saṃhitā* is Soma as it is pressed by the stones and flows through the woolen strainer into the wooden vats<sup>23</sup>.

A. Br. XII. 1.

By adding the syllables of calls (*āhāva*) and replies (*pratigara*) of Hotṛ and Adhvaryu priests in each of the three Savanas, an attempt is made here to show them as equalising the number of syllables of a *pāda* in a particular metre and thereby as equalising the metre itself. As an argument, it does not certainly appeal to our sense of reasoning and this is no unusual feature of the brahmanic mode of reasoning and speculation. What is really repulsive is to see the Brāhmaṇa telling us that this luxuriant speculation as given by it, serves as the motive power behind the composition of the Rgveda verse 1. 164. 23<sup>21</sup>. If we could somehow know exactly the circumstances under which the first hymn came to be written, it would have been of great help to unravel the mystery to a considerable extent. Yet, a critical acumen applied to the study of Rv. 1. 164 where this verse occurs shows that the hymn is full of higher, nobler and mystic thoughts wrapped in spiritually allegorical expressions and the seer-composer assumes the role of a mystagogue there. Sāyana in the *Rgveda Saṃhitā* introduces his commentary on the hymn according to its spirit<sup>25</sup> and regards the verse<sup>26</sup> in question as primarily speaking of the three divinities as located in the three regions<sup>27</sup>. It is only secondarily that he gives an alternative explanation, obviously from the viewpoint of the

<sup>18</sup>Comp. *tad āhur yathā vāva]stotram evaṃ śastram pāvamanīṣu sūmagāḥ stuvata āgneyam hotā ājyam śaṃsati katham asya pāvamānyo 'nuśastā bhavantīti.*

<sup>19</sup>Rv. IX. 66. 20.

<sup>20</sup>Comp. *yo vā agniḥ sa pavamānaḥ tad apy etad ṛṣinoktam agniḥ ṛṣiḥ pavamāna iti.* Also comp. *agna āyūṃṣīty ādyaś tisraḥ pavamānaviśiṣṭāgnidevatākāḥ*—Sāy. on Rv. IX. 66.

<sup>21</sup>In Rv. IX. 66. 20.

<sup>22</sup>Comp. *yad vā sodhakatvād agniḥ eva pavamāna iti mantrārthah*—Sāy. in A. Br. on Rv. IX. 66. 20.

<sup>23</sup>Comp. 'As passing through the strainer Soma is usually called *pavamāna* or *punāna*' flowing clear (from *pū*)—Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 106.

<sup>24</sup>*tad etad ṛṣiḥ paśyann abhyanūvāca yad gāyatre, etc.*

<sup>25</sup>Comp. *prāyeṇa jñānamokṣākṣarapraśaṃsā, asmīn sūkte prāyeṇa śaṃsayotthāpanādayo bahavo 'rthāḥ pratipādyante.*

<sup>26</sup>Namely, Rv. 1.164.23.

<sup>27</sup>*tad idam triṣu sthāneṣu trayāṇām agnyādīnām padādhānam.*—Sāy.—on Rv. 1.164.23. in the *Rgveda Saṃhitā*.



Ritualistic school of thought as he himself professes by the expression *athādhiyajñam*, and this, too, clearly follows the *A. Br.* in every<sup>28</sup> detail. With all regard to the ready talent of the *A. Br.* to pick and choose a ṛkverse in its favour, it must be said that the present case provides us with an example of the brahmanic craftsmanship in making the maximum use of what minimum resources it can trace in the wordings of a mantra.

*A. Br.* XII. 9.

To account for the place of the Maruts in the Niṣkevalya Śāstra, the text here gives us a story and draws upon *Ṛv.* VIII. 96. 7 as the basis of the same<sup>29</sup>. Undoubtedly, the verse tells the same tale of which the *A. Br.* thinks it to be the basis and a study of like quotations in the Brāhmaṇa literature may be of immense help in determining mantra-basis of many later myths and legends.

*A. Br.* XL. 3.

Three ṛk-verses<sup>30</sup> are here put forward to show the indispensability of a priest to a king. The parent hymn where these verses appear extols Lord Bṛhaspati excepting the tenth and the eleventh verses of which both Indra and Bṛhaspati are the deities. The verses in question, if regarded as an eulogy of Lord Bṛhaspati, suit the context<sup>31</sup> well and there is no reason why they should be taken as specially composed for praising a priest as the Brāhmaṇa<sup>32</sup> thinks.

<sup>28</sup>Comp. *etat sarvam aitareyabrāhmaṇe devaviśaḥ kalpayitavyā iti khaṇḍe vispaṣṭam āmnātam.*

<sup>29</sup>*tad etad ṛṣiḥ paśyann abhynūvāca vṛtrasya tvā, etc.*

<sup>30</sup>*Ṛv.* IV. 50. 7-9.

<sup>31</sup>Comp. *idam ādy ṛktrayaṃ purohitapraśaṃseti brāhmaṇam, athavā sūktasya ṛgdvaya-varjitasya bṛhaspatyatvād bṛhaspater eva stutiḥ*—Sāy. *Ṛv.* IV. 50. 7.

<sup>32</sup>Sāy. introduces the three verses with the expression *tad apy etad ṛṣinoktam.*

# THE ADVAITA VIEW ON THE PERCEIVEDNESS OF OBJECT .

## SECTION IV

BY BRAHMANANDA GUPTA

IN THE Advaita system of philosophy we come across the definitions of both *jñānagata pratyakṣatva*, i.e., the perceptual character of cognition, and *viśaya-gata pratyakṣatva*, i.e., the perceivedness of object, as respectively the identity of the *antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinna caitanya* with the *viśayāvachchinna caitanya* and of the *antaḥkaraṇāvachchinna caitanya* with the *viśayāvachchinna caitanya*<sup>1</sup>. A cognition, in plain language is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) when it is felt as identical with the object, when, in other words, the *Vṛtti* is felt as identical with the object. But when the question is as to why an object is taken as perceived, we, in order to reply to it, have to be more interested in the object, not whether on the subjective side there is a content or not. It is enough then if we say that on this side there is merely the subject-*antaḥkaraṇa*. The question of identity with object is there as in the case of *jñānagata pratyakṣa* . . .

The Advaitin adds to this his metaphysical doctrine of one *cit* (consciousness) that pervades both *antaḥkaraṇa* and object and consequently another doctrine, viz., that everything, whether object or *Vṛtti* or *antaḥkaraṇa*, is but delimited *cit* ; it is either *cit* as delimited by object or *cit* as delimited by content or *cit* as delimited by *antaḥkaraṇa*.

In the Advaita theory of perception, then, there are the following points:—

(1) There is *cit* or absolute consciousness which is the ultimate reality and all entities of the universe are dependent upon *cit* for their existence and manifestation. Thus *cit* is the *adhiṣṭhāna*, i.e., locus of both object, on the one hand, and content and *antaḥkaraṇa*, on the other.

(2) In perceptions two delimited *cits*—one subjective and the other object—become absolutely identified through the *antaḥkaraṇa* coming out through the senses and assuming the exact shape of the object.

(3) The shape *qua* the shape of *antaḥkaraṇa* is the *Vṛtti*.

(4) There is an ontological distinction between perceptuality of the cognition and perceivedness of the object.

(5) Perceptuality of cognition is but the *Vṛtti* (or better *cit*, as delimited by the *Vṛtti*) being identified with the object (or better, *cit* as delimited by the object).

The last two points we have already refuted in a previous issue of the Bulletin. The second and the third points will be refuted in a later issue. In this section

<sup>1</sup>“*Ādye pramāṇacaitanyasya viśayāvachchinna-caitanyābheda iti brumah*”. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Ed. by M. M. Ananta Kriṣṇa Śāstri, p. 44.

“*Svākāravṛttyupahita pramāṭṛ caitanyasattātirikta-sattākatvasūnyatve sati yogyatvam viśayasya prakṣatvam*”. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. Ed. by A. K. Śāstri. Page 73.

we shall refute the first point and that by itself would be a sufficient blow to the Advaita theory of perception.

The Naiyāyikas will not admit that the *sattā* of an object is dependent upon *cit*. The Nyāya realism, i.e., the independent existence of the object, has been already established in a previous issue. The Advaitin may indeed counter-argue that it would be self-contradictory to say that I know that the object has a separate entity beyond the scope of knowledge. For how could we know the existence of a thing which is beyond our knowledge? Thus to describe a thing as independent though it is dependent on our knowledge (the Advaitin is an ego-centricist) is self-contradictory. If the Naiyāyikas argue that we infer the independent existence of the object from the object-as-known, the Advaitin will reply as follows :— The Naiyāyika himself believes that the *sādhya*, i.e., the thing which is to be established, must have been experienced in a general way (*sāmānyatayū*). But in this particular case of dispute they will not be able to point out a single instance where we had perceived the independent object associated with an object-as-known. It would be self-contradictory to know the unknowable or to speak about the unknown. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas themselves have said “*Sarvam jñeyam vācyaivāt*”.

The Naiyāyikas, however, may support their cause by the argument that when we know a thing we actually believe in the pre-existence of that thing. How otherwise could there be a statement like “*Sat eva saumya idam agra āsīt*”<sup>1</sup>? Or, we take it for granted that this particular thing which I know at this moment existed before it was revealed to me and will continue to stay (in the absense of any *pratibandhaka*) in the future without being known to me.

The Advaitin has of course a reply to this, which the Naiyāyika will have to counter. The Advaitin will partly agree with the Naiyāyika that in our statements such as “this thing existed before its revelation” we believe in the prior existence of the object. But he has further analysed the statement and drawn momentous implications. He says that when we say “this thing existed”, by the term “this thing” we mean “this known thing” or “this particular thing which is now revealed to me”. So when we talk about “this thing as past” we mean “the present known thing as past”. This is realism from the ego-centric point of view, i.e., realism as involved in idealism. Whenever we talk we talk about a known thing though that thing need not be confined to this present. It has a past and future for their theories and this past or future is nothing but the history of the present “known thing”. Thus when we say that this thing existed in the past we mean that the present known thing was in the past or will remain in the future, the pastness or the futureness being involved in the present knownness. If the question is asked as, to how the present known thing could remain in the past as unknown, how, in other words, the past existence which inevitably was in a state of unknownness, can be reconciled with the Advaitin’s ego-centricity, Advaita

<sup>1</sup>Chāndogyopaniṣad.

will take shelter behind his theory of *ajñāna* (nescience). He will say that the thing, i.e., this known thing, was yet as past unknown only because though known (for otherwise we could not say "this thing") it was nevertheless covered by *ajñāna* (nescience). Thus he will argue that the pastness of this known thing is but its being known as unknown (*ajñātatayā jñātam*) and so also the future. It (this known thing) could not reveal itself in the past because it was then covered by *ajñāna*, its knownness consisting in its description as "this thing". At the present moment this veil of nescience is broken and the object is revealed to us. This is how the Advaitin fights Nyāya realism.

True to his realism the Naiyāyika cannot accept this Advaita account. He will directly attack the ego-centricity. He will argue that to treat any object as known object or to hold that object has no separate existence beyond knowledge is fallacious. "This thing" may, if one likes, be written as "this known thing"; but we must not forget that in both the expressions the term "thing" at least claims for itself a separate identity in the form of "thingness". So the "thingness" and its revelation or "knownness" are two separate aspects, though they are supplemented by each other. Thus it appears that the objective character and manifestation are not identical. Hence it cannot be held that all things are known things and that the thingness necessarily involves knownness.

This being the case, the Vedāntic objection that as all things are dependent upon knowledge to conceive the independent identity of those objects is self-contradictory is no longer tenable. Objects exist independently of their knowledge. They exist on their own right. It is only by accident that an object becomes associated with knowledge and therefore related in the relation of *viśayatā-viśayitā*.

We have so long criticised the Advaitin under the idea that its *cit* is subjective. This is why we described him as an ego-centric philosopher. But there are Advaitins—and not a few of them—who regard *cit* as specifically neither subjective nor objective. *Cit*, according to them, is *prakāśa*, i.e., the principle of manifestation, and *antaḥkaraṇa* are as much manifested as outside objects. *Cit*=consciousness=the principle of manifestation is subjective only when psychic states or *antaḥkaraṇa* are manifested, i.e., when this *cit* is delimited by these two. But it is objective when other objects are manifested, i.e., when it is delimited by these latter. Perception, according to these Advaitins, takes place when the two delimited *cits* stand identified through the identification of the two delimiting adjuncts.

The metaphysical grounds for this Advaita view of consciousness will be examined in detail and the view refuted in a later essay. In the meanwhile, however, we may refute this Advaita view from another point of view.

It is desirable that in discussing problems in logic and theory of knowledge we should presuppose only the minimum of metaphysics. Elaborate theories in

metaphysics have to be worked out through logic and theory of knowledge and hence should not be presupposed. True, it is not possible to keep clear of all metaphysics. But then only that much of metaphysics is to be presupposed about which there is no serious dispute.

Now whether there is one pure consciousness at all, and if so, whether this consciousness is the ultimate substantive substratum and everything else is adjectival to it, is a matter of serious dispute. It is a highly sophisticated theory like that existence is the ultimate substantive and everything else is adjectival to it. Rather, if at all some metaphysics is unavoidable in logic and theory of knowledge, that metaphysics should be the commonsense one, which everyone, even the Advaitin, admits till he philosophises in his own way. Such common metaphysics rather tells us that consciousness (knowledge) is a product which sometimes happens and sometimes not, and that there is no question of its being treated as the ultimate substratum. Further, the *prakāśa* of outside things is, to commonsense, nothing but the awareness of these. Hence there is no question of one neutral consciousness being delimited by *antaḥkāraṇa* and outside objects.

# FALSITY OF FALSITY

By NIROD BARAN CHAKRABORTY

THE ADVAITIN considers the world as false. The opponent now makes him face a dilemma which appears to shake the very foundation of Advaita. Is this falsity itself false or not? If the first alternative be allowed, it would mean that the world the falsity of which is itself false is rather confirmed as true. If, then, the Advaitin proves the falsity of the world, bearing all the while in the mind that this falsity is nevertheless false, he is in effect proving the very reality of the world which the opponent has already accepted. The Advaitin is thus only proving the proved. There is a further difficulty for him. *Śrūti* according to him, speaks only the truth. But if the world is real, the *Śrūti* texts relating to the non-dualism of reality will have to be taken as lies.

If, again, the falsity of the world is not sublated, this falsity at least is real, and it would be an easy step from this to the reality of the world. For, first, this falsity is itself a phenomenon of the world, and if even one item of the world is real, the Advaitin cannot hold that the entire world is false. Secondly, this falsity is an objective appearance (*drśya*), so that we can infer from its reality, the reality of the world which also is an objective appearance. If falsity be real because it is *drśya*, even so the world also should be real because it is *drśya*. This alternative that falsity is not false would also entail that the famous inductive premise of Advaita, viz., that whatever is *drśya* is false comes to be contradicted. For falsity itself is *drśya* and yet not itself false. Thus whichever alternative is accepted, Advaita is gone.

If falsity is sublated, the world becomes real. So, Brahman and the world have to be taken as two real principles. Again, if falsity is not sublated, it is real. This means not merely that falsity is a second real principle side by side with Brahman, but that even the world stands as real side by side with Brahman. In any case it appears impossible to stick to the Advaita position.

The Advaitins reply that to them falsity is false, and that yet there are none of the difficulties mentioned. The difficulties which are said to arise when falsity itself is regarded as *real* do not concern them. And the difficulties said to arise when falsity is negated as false can all be explained away.

The falsity of the falsity of the world would have implied the reality of the world if only both the cases of falsity had not the same metaphysical status. The silver-character in the nacre and the eternal absence of that silver-character do not have the same metaphysical status and this is why the falsity of the silver-character implies the reality of its eternal absence, and similarly the falsity of that eternal absence implies the reality of the silver-character. But in the case of the falsity of the falsity of the world, both the

cases of falsity have the same metaphysical status—both are equally *appearance*. So, the negation of the negation of the world does not imply the affirmation of the world.

To explain the sameness or difference of metaphysical status. When the silver-character is denied of shell it is denied *qua* silver-character, and this silver-character is not to be found (indeed it would be meaningless to seek it) in the 'absence of silver-character'. The relevant aspect (*avacchedaka*) in which the silver-character is denied of shell does not thus belong to the 'absence of silver-character'. But this rule does not obtain between the false world and the falsity of the false world. When the world is denied of Brahman it is not denied *qua* world. The relevant aspect (*avacchedaka*) in which it is denied is not its being the world, but its just being an 'appearance' (*drśya*). But, now, when even this false world is denied (false) the relevant aspect in which this second denial is made (or the aspect in which the false world is again false) is verily the same fact of this second falsity also being an 'appearance' (*drśya*). From the first case of silver-character and its absence we can have the general proposition that the denial of x-character implies the truth of its contrary *if only* the relevant aspect in which the x-character is denied is not found in the contrary (and in all such cases the two terms are x and not-x, i.e., *contradicting* each other, not merely *contrary*; or they are subsumable under a relation of contradiction). The world and the falsity of the world do not, however, come under this general proposition. Hence the denial of the falsity of the world does not posit the truth of the world.

We may offer another analogy to clarify the issue. Cowness and horseness are not two contradictory characters. So if we deny cowness of the elephant we do not necessarily affirm horseness of it. When cowness is denied of the elephant it is denied not *qua* cowness, but as a property subsumable under 'not-elephantness'. Now, horseness is equally a property subsumable under 'not-elephantness'. This is why the denial of cowness of the elephant does not imply affirmation of horseness of it. Similarly with the denial of the falsity of the world: the aspect of *drśyatva* in which alone it is denied is present in the world also.

One might even simplify the case and argue that of two contrary, as opposed to *contradictory*, characters, the denial of one does not necessarily entail affirmation of the other. Reality and falsity, now, are not two contradictory characters, they are only contrary. Reality is that which is eternally non-contradicted and the false is that which appears before sublation. The contradictory of reality would include not merely this but also what is contradicted without ever appearing at all, viz., the *asat*, e.g., the son of a barren woman. If there were only two categories, viz., reality and falsity, the denial of falsity would have entailed affirmation of reality. But there is a third category also, viz., *asat*. Hence the denial of falsity might entail affirmation of *asat* also.

Here it may be argued by the opponent that in the second definition of falsity<sup>1</sup>, the Advaitins themselves have admitted reality as the contradictory of falsity, which means that reality and falsity are indeed contradictory. Again, if they are not contradictory and are related in the same way as cowness and horseness are, we cannot understand how the Advaitins could at all speak of the falsity of the world. The world, to say the least, *appears* as real. How can it be called false at the same time? Cowness and horseness cannot both be present in the elephant. So reality and unreality also cannot both be found in the same world.

To the first objection, it may be urged that reality and falsity do not belong to the same order of reality. Reality is transcendental (*pāramārthika*) whereas falsity is only phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*). So their contradiction does not imply the force of contradiction of two things belonging to the same order of reality. In the case of a contradiction of two things of the same order of reality the falsity of one will imply the reality of the other. But in this case where two things belong to different categories the falsity of one does not necessarily imply the reality of the other. So the falsity of the falsity of the world cannot imply its reality.

To the second objection the Advaitin will reply as follows :—

When the Advaitins call the world real and again false, they do not make the statements from the same standpoint. From one standpoint the world is real and from another standpoint it is false. When we say that the world is real, the reality is apparent (*prātibhāsika*) and not empirical (*vyāvahārika*). If it were empirical, there would have been a contradiction to think both empirical reality and empirical unreality of the same world. It may be said by the opponent that there is no harm if the reality of the world be understood as transcendental (*pāramārthika*). But then we should reply that in the absence of the empirical order of reality the world cannot have transcendental reality also. When we have said that the world has no empirical reality what we have meant is that it is not uncontradicted even in our experience. So, the attribute 'eternal non-contradiction' cannot be applied to the reality of the world. Therefore it cannot be transcendently real, as eternal reality implies eternal non-contradiction. The world which has empirical falsity may very well have apparent reality.

Here the opponent may raise an objection as follows :—

If from a certain standpoint the reality of the world has to be admitted, there would remain no distinction between empirical truth and empirical falsity. If the world as apparent be real from the standpoint of appearance, equally so would be the case with the silver appearing in the locus of nacre.

<sup>1</sup>Prakāśātman offered the second definition of falsity and it is as follows :—  
The false is that which is eternally negated in the locus where it appears.  
(*Pratipannopādhan traikālika-niṣedha-pratīyogivam.*)



Moreover, if the empirical world has only apparent reality, the śrūti text 'Truth and error equally come out of the Truth' (*satyam cāṅṛtam ca satyamata-bhat*) cannot be explained satisfactorily. The term 'error' in this text would become redundant. The text means that Brahman being covered by *Māyā* (nescience) was transformed into the empirical world and apparent silver which is found in the case of silver-nacre illusion. Now if the Advaitins accept the apparent reality of the world, we shall have to say that Brahman was transformed into the world and the silver which both have a,pparent reality or truth. The apparent reality is present both in the world and in the silver perceived in the locus of nacre. Now, if we think that both of them should be understood as true, then nothing as error is found which may be regarded as the manifestation of Brahman. As both the world and the silver are apparently real, nothing remains as false. In order to avoid this difficulty, the Advaitins have to admit—so argue the opponents—the transcendental (*pāramārthika*) reality of the world. The world is neither apparently real (*prūtibhāsika*), because then the distinction between truth and falsity would be abolished, nor, empirically real (*vyāvahārika*) because the falsity of the world has already been granted (by the Advaitin) empirical reality. The Advaitin would thus be forced to acknowledge transcendental (*pāramārthika*) reality of the world.

The Advaitins, however, in reply, will say that this cannot be. If the falsity of the world be empirical, the world can have no transcendental reality. When we say that the falsity of the world is empirical, we have to admit that the world is not empirically real. Now, the world cannot be empirically real in the sense that it is not uncontradicted in empirical experience. What is not uncontradicted even in empirical experience cannot be eternally uncontradicted and what is not eternally uncontradicted cannot also be transcendently real. Therefore the world can never be eternally real. The first term 'truth' in the Śrūti text above implies the world which has pragmatic value, and the second term 'error' stands for the silver of the nacre-silver illusion, which has no pragmatic worth whatsoever. If we understand the terms 'truth' and 'error' in this way, then the term 'error' does not turn out superfluous. The empirical falsity and the apparent reality are already admitted in the silver of nacre-silver illusion. From this standpoint, the world also is admitted to have empirical falsity and apparent reality. As the ignorance of the falsity of the silver appearing in nacre implies the apparent reality of the silver, so in the same way the ignorance of the falsity of the world suggests the apparent reality of the world. The valid knowledge of the falsity of the world removes the ignorance about the falsity of the world and the empirical reality which follows from ignorance. In this case, the reality of the world is negated by the valid knowledge of the falsity of the same. This means that the reality of the world is sublated by some other knowledge than the cognition of Brahman. So, the reality of the world is definitely apparent. If it were empirical, it would have been negated only

by the knowledge of Brahman. As the reality of the world is apparent, so the belief of the Advaitins in only one ultimate reality remains unshaken.

The above is not indeed accepted by all Advaitins. There are good many Advaitins who hold that (1) the world is sublated only by the final knowledge of Brahman and (2) the knowledge of the falsity of the world can do nothing but expose the knowledge of the truth of the world as invalid. To all such Advaitins the world has obviously empirical (*vyāvahārika*) reality.

This view of other Advaitins need not be challenged. Even if this is admitted the Non-Advaitin opponents will gain nothing. In this case the falsity and the reality of the world would come to have the same empirical reality. But even then it is obvious that they are not transcendental (*pāramārthika*) realities. In any case the Advaita position that the eternal reality is one without a second does not suffer at all.

Here it may be objected that empirical reality and empirical falsity are two contradictory concepts and so both of them cannot be true of the same thing at the same time. From this, it would follow, the opponent might urge, that the world cannot be both empirically real and empirically false.

The Advaitins reply that this is not impossible. They point to a similar paradoxical case in Nyāya. The Naiyāyikas believe that conjunction (*samyoga*)\* and its eternal absence are not contradictory. This means that a particular conjunction and its absolute negation may exist in the same thing. Now, if this is not impossible, why should we think that empirical reality and falsity cannot be there in the same world ?

Inference and verbal testimony can again speak for such a possibility. The Śrūti text 'there is no manyness' (*neha nūnāsti kincana*) implies that the world and its falsity are equally false. This may also be shown with the help of an inference. In Advaita philosophy 'to be an appearance' (*dṛśyatva*) is regarded as a mark of falsity. Now the world and its falsity are equally appearances (*dṛśya*), so they are false for the same reason.

Now the question is—In the case of silver superimposed on nacre, the silver and its falsity have not the same grade of reality, the silver being apparent (*prātibhāsika*) and its falsity being empirical (*vyāvahārika*); why, then, in the case of the world should reality and falsity be of the same empirical grade ?

The Advaitins support their stand in the following way :

When the knowledge of a particular thing negates another, they must be of different grades of reality. The knowledge of the falsity of the silver implies

\*Conjunction is a temporary relation between two things which can easily exist independently of and separately from one another. The relation between a man and his pen with which he writes is an instance of conjunction. The Naiyāyikas admit that conjunction and its absence may be had in the same thing. "A monkey, for example, can be both posited and negated in the same tree through the same conjunction at the same time—it happens to be present in the top but absent at the foot of the tree !" (Dr. A. K. Roy Chudhury, *Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedanta*, p. 166).

For a fuller discussion of the point 'Siddhāntamuktāvai' may be consulted.

the negation of the reality of the silver. So, the reality and falsity in the case of the silver superimposed on nacre cannot have the same grade of reality. But this is not the case with regard to the world. The knowledge which establishes the falsity of the world cannot negate the reality of the world. So, the reality and falsity in the case of the world cannot be of different grades.

*Dṛśyatva* is found to be the common factor in both the reality and the falsity of the world. As both of them are equally sublated by the cognition of Brahman, so they are negated by the same cognition, and those which are negated by the same knowledge are of the same order of existence. Sometimes the nacre is perceived as silver due to the ignorance of the actual nature of the nacre and the perceived silver appears as different from the nacre also. Now when the nature of the nacre is known, the silver and its perceived difference from nacre are equally destroyed. As the silver and its perceived difference from nacre are sublated by the same knowledge of nacre, so they are of the same order of existence.

Udayanācārya contends in his 'Ātmatatvaviveka' that reality and falsity cannot be true of the same locus as they are contradictory and the absence of reality and falsity cannot, on the same account, be understood in the same thing.

This objection does not hit the target as the Advaitins do not admit reality and falsity as contradictory. The contradictory of reality is *asat* which cannot appear at all. But the false appears and so it is other than *asat*, and this again implies that the false is not the contradictory of reality.

The world and its falsity are of the same order of reality as both of them are negated by the knowledge of Brahman. So it is clear that the world, its reality and also its falsity are negated with the realisation of Brahman. Therefore, the falsity of the falsity of the world does not posit the reality of the world, and the non-duality of reality remains intact.

# THE BASIC AUTHORITIES UTILISED IN THE SMṚTI WORKS OF MITHILĀ

BY JOYDEV GANGULY

IT is well-known that the Smṛti literature that has come down to us consists mainly of five classes of works, viz., Dharma-sūtras, Dharma-śāstras, Bhāṣyas (or commentaries like that of Medhātithi), commentary-cum-digests (such as the Mitākṣarā), and pure digests or Nibandhas. But, saving the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*<sup>1</sup>, most of the extant Smṛti works of Mithilā belong to the Nibandha class and cover a comparatively short period of her history. These works, unlike those of other provinces, show unique vigour of life and growth which is due, to a great extent, to their authors' selection of basic authorities.

Regarding the sources of Dharma Gautama says :

“vedo dharma-mūlam / tadvidāṃ ca smṛti-śīle //”

“The Veda is the source of Dharma, and the tradition and practice of those who know it (i.e., the Veda).”

Following Gautama and going a step further, Manu also says :

“vedo 'khilo dharma-mūlam smṛti-śīle ca tadvidāṃ /  
ācāraś caiva sādḥūnām ātmanas tuṣṭir eva ca //”

“The entire Veda is the source of Dharma, and the tradition and conduct of those who know it, and also the practice of good men, and the satisfaction of (one's) own self”.

Similar views are to be found in the works of Baudhāyana, Āpastamba, Vasiṣṭha and other early law-givers also, and the Maithila Smṛti-writers are never found to question their authority. Manu's statement is taken to include the entire Veda, viz., the four Vedic Samhitās and their Brāhmaṇas, although certain remarks of Medhātithi, Mitramiśra and others<sup>2</sup> bear testimony to the fact that the *Atharva-veda* was not included by a section of scholars in the list of the sources of Dharma. The Veda consists of five constituent

<sup>1</sup>It is only tradition which connects Yājñavalkya, and consequently also the Yājñavalkya-smṛti, with Mithilā, but we have got no decisive evidence in favour of this contention.

<sup>2</sup>See *Medhātithi-bhāṣya* on the *Manu smṛti* (ed. Mm. Ganganath Jha, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), Vol. I, p. 59.—

“nanu naiva kecid ātharvaṇaṃ vedaṃ manyanto, yataḥ 'trayī vidyā rcaḥ sāmāni yajūṃṣīti' 'vedair aśūnyas tribhir eti sūryaḥ' / tathā 'traivedikaṃ vrataṃ caret' ityādau na kvacid ātharvaṇa-nāmāpy asti' / pratiśodhaś ca śrūyate 'taamad ātharvaṇena na śaṃṣet' iti / atas trayī-bāhyān ātharvaṇikān pāṣaṇḍinaḥ pratijānate //”

See also *Vīramītrodaya* (ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras, 1906), Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 8-9-

'Yajñam vyākhyāsyāmaḥ, sa tribhir vedair vidhīyate' ity-āpastambādi-vacanāt trayyā eva dharma-mūlatvaṃ nātharvaṇasyeti śāṅkā-vyāvṛttyartham vā'khila-śabda-grahaṇam..../.

parts, namely, Vidhi, Niṣedha, Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya ; and of the Maithila Smārtas there is at least one, viz., Caṇḍeśvara Ṭhakkura, who confines the sanction of the Veda to the Vidhi (injunctive) and Niṣedha (prohibitory) parts of it and rejects the other parts consisting of Arthavāda, Mantra and Nāmadheya<sup>3</sup>. Caṇḍeśvara may thus appear to some to be a faithful follower of the Prābhākara school of Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, as Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and others' statement about Prabhākara's attitude towards the Arthavāda-texts as a trustworthy means of knowledge of Dharma would make them believe, but a perusal of Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* gives us a totally different impression. In discussing this controversial point Mahāmahopādhyāya Ganganath Jha says : "In regard to Prabhākara's view regarding the Arthavāda-text, there seems to be some confusion in the minds of students, created by what Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya has said in his Śaktivāda, to the effect that according to Prabhākara, the Arthavāda-texts cannot be regarded as a trustworthy means of knowledge because they are inexpressive, as in accordance with the Anvitābhidhāna theory of Verbal Expression only that sentence is really expressive which lays down something to be done ; and hence under this theory, it is only the Injunctive Sentence that can be really expressive and hence capable of providing knowledge of Dharma. Though this may be true regarding the Arthavāda-text taken by itself, it cannot be accepted as the view of Prabhākara regarding Arthavāda-text, as forming part of the Veda ; because on referring to the *Bṛhatī*, we find that the above view is only the *Prima Facie View* on the question of the reliability and authority of Arthavāda-texts ; and this *Prima Facie View* is demolished in the Finally Established View, under which the Arthavāda-text also is decided to be as Vedic and authoritative as the Injunctive text. The *Prima Facie View* on this question as put forward by the Bhāṭṭa is simply that these texts are untrustworthy, while as put forward by the Prābhākara it is that they are inexpressive (and hence untrustworthy) ; and this is that has been adopted by the opponent in view of Prabhākara's views regarding Verbal Expression referred to above. The finally established Conclusion adopted by Prabhākara, however, is that the Arthavāda-text is as much 'Veda' as the Injunctive text, as like the latter the former also expresses the performability of certain acts, through commendation that it directly expresses. Though it may be true that, strictly according to Prabhākara's view, the Arthavāda-text cannot be expressive, yet this can be urged only against such Arthavāda-texts as are absolutely incapable of being construed and co-ordinated with an Injunctive text. Most of the Arthavāda-texts, however, are actually found capable of being so construed and co-ordinated. And thus helping, through commendation, the initial prompting

<sup>3</sup>Caṇḍeśvara's *Kṛtya-ratnākara* (ed. Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p. 26—atha pramāṇaḥ / tatra Maṇuḥ—'vedo 'khilo dharma-mūlam..... / akhilo vidhi-niṣedhātmako dharma-śabdaś cājahat-svārtha-lakṣaṇayā dharmādi-paraḥ / .....

It is to be noted that in making this statement Caṇḍeśvara shows no originality. He simply copies it from Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru* (Baroda ed.), Vol. I (Brahmacāri-kāṇḍa), p. 20.

done by the Injunctive text, it serves a useful purpose in pointing out the performability of the action enjoined, and hence it is perfectly entitled to the title of 'Veda', says the *Bṛhatī*<sup>4</sup>". However, it may be said generally that on the strength of the views of Manu and other ancient law-givers the Maithilas look upon all the four Vedas along with their Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Aṅgas as the final sources of Dharma. But they discriminate between the Smṛti works known to them, although Manu says :

śrutis tu vedo vijñeyo dharmā-śāstraṃ tu vai smṛtiḥ /  
te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsye tābhyāṃ dharmo hi nirbabhau //

"The Veda should be known as the Śruti (Revealed Word), and the Dharmā-śāstra as the Smṛti (Recollections) ; in all matters, these two do not deserve to be criticised, as it is out of these two that Dharma shone forth."

From Manu's statement it is very natural for one to assume that each and every Dharmā-śāstra work is competent enough to guide a man in his religious pursuits. But the number of such works being innumerable and their contents varied, the force of this statement of Manu has been checked and modified by some of the Smṛti works of later origin.

There are enumerations of Smṛtis in the works of Yājñavalkya, Parāśara, Yama, Paiṭhīnasi, Śaṅkha-Likhita, and others. These lists can be divided into two groups,—(1) closed lists, and (2) open lists. In the lists of the first group some particular sages are specifically mentioned as authorities of Dharma, and thereby a doubt in the authenticity of other writers is naturally raised. Thus in the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (i. 4-5) we have

manv-atrī-viṣṇu-hārīta-yājñavalky-ośano 'ṅgirāḥ /  
yamāpastamba-saṃvartāḥ kātyāyana-bṛhaspatī //  
parāśara-vyāsa-śaṅkha-likhitā dakṣa-gautamau /  
śātātapo vaśiṣṭhaś ca dharmā-śāstra-prayojakāḥ //

From this exhaustive enumeration one may say that according to Yājñavalkya only these twenty Smṛti-writers were reliable authorities on Dharma. It is remarkable that important writers like Baudhāyana were excluded from this list. The closed list, given from the *Yama-smṛti* in the works of Lakṣmīdhara, Caṇḍeśvara and others, also omits the name of Baudhāyana. This list is found to be followed immediately by a verse which runs as follows :

etair yāni praṇītāni dharmā-śāstrāṇi vai purā /  
tāny evātipramāṇāni na hantvyāni hetubhiḥ //

In this verse the word 'eva' is significant and shows that the *Yama-smṛti* could not appreciate the views of Baudhāyana,—and the history of Dharmā-śāstra reveals that divergence of opinion among scholars always existed and the rival groups not rarely criticised and denounced each other.

<sup>4</sup>Ganganath Jha, *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā in Its Sources*, pp. 201-2.

The second kind of list (i.e., the open list), given by Caṇḍeśvara, was derived by him, indirectly through Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, from the work or works of Śaṅkha-Likhita. In this list the names of some twenty-one writers on Dharma-śāstra (viz., Manu, Viṣṇu, Dakṣa and others) have been given, and it ends with the expression 'ādayaḥ', obviously showing that other names also were known to the author<sup>5</sup>. Caṇḍeśvara's mention of only one list of each kind was clearly meant for indicating that in spite of exhaustive enumeration of the names of Smṛti-writers in some lists, these were not really exhaustive but could be added to by other names not mentioned therein.

Although, as regards the recognition of the sources of Dharma, Lakṣmīdhara's influence on the Smṛti-writers of Mithilā has been immense, as is evinced by the reproduction of long passages on this topic from Lakṣmīdhara's work in the *Kṛtya-ratnākara* of Caṇḍeśvara, the latter did not follow him doggedly in all matters. An instance of how the Maithilī Smṛti-writers differed from and made advances over Lakṣmīdhara, may be cited here. After giving the abovementioned lists of the names of the Smṛti-writers from the works of Śaṅkha-Likhita and Yama<sup>6</sup> and taking the word 'ādayaḥ', used by the former, to mean Budha, Devala, Soma, Jamadagni, Viśvāmitra, Prajāpati, Vṛddha-śātātapa (?), Sumantu, Paithīnasi, Pitāmaha, Baudhāyana, Chāgaleya, Jābāla, Cyavana, Marīcī and Kāśyapa<sup>7</sup>, Lakṣmīdhara quotes the following two verses from the '*Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*'—

aṣṭādaśa-purāṇeṣu yāni vākyaṇi putraka /  
tāny ālocya mahābāho tathā smṛty-antareṣu ca //  
manv-ādi-smṛtayo yās tu ṣaṭtriṃśat parikīrtitāḥ /  
tāsāṃ vākyaṇi kramaśaḥ samālocya bravīmi te //.

and opines that the list of the thirty-six Smṛti works (including that of Manu), as referred to in the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*, is to be completed only with those of the sages already mentioned by him<sup>8</sup>. Thus, in spite of his liberal outlook as shown by his acceptance of the open list of Śaṅkha-Likhita, Lakṣmīdhara displays rigidity in taking the expression 'manvādi-smṛtayaḥ' to mean only those

<sup>5</sup>Such as Devala, Soma, Jamadagni, Prajāpati, Viśvāmitra, Budha, Sumantu, Paithīnasi, Pitāmaha, Baudhāyana, Chāgaleya, etc.

<sup>6</sup>See *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup>*Ibid.*, I, p. 24—

ādi-śabda-grāhyāś caite—budha-devala-soma-jamadagni-viśvāmitra...kāśyapāḥ /

It is to be noted that in this list, as given in the printed edition of the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, the name of 'Vṛddha-śātātapa' also has been included. But Lakṣmīdhara himself mentions (the Smṛti of) 'Vṛddha-śātātapa' a little afterwards in giving the list of subsidiary Smṛti works composed by the famous sages. Moreover, the *Kṛtya-ratnākara* and the *Vīramītrodaya*, which repeat the above-mentioned list from the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, omit the name of Vṛddha-śātātapa.

<sup>8</sup>*Kṛtya-kalpataru*, I, p. 24—'manvādi-smṛtayaḥ' tās cānantaroktābhir eva sarva-parigṛhītābhiḥ pūryante.

The words 'eva' and 'sarva-parigṛhītābhiḥ' show that according to Lakṣmīdhara it was only the sages named by him on the authority of Śaṅkha-Likhita and Yama and also independently in the *Kṛtya-kalpataru* (I, pp. 23-24) who were accepted universally as authorities on Dharma.

Smṛti-writers who were named by him immediately before quoting the verses of the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*. The Maithilas, however, do not agree with Lakṣmīdhara on this point. Caṇḍeśvara quotes the above-mentioned verses of the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa* and refutes Lakṣmīdhara's view, saying that by the expression 'tathā smṛty-antareṣu ca' the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa* itself recognises the authority of Smṛti works other than those forming the group of thirty-six, that Lakṣmīdhara himself draws upon the Smṛti works of Gobhila, Ṛṣyaśṛṅga and others who are not included in the above-mentioned list of thirty-six Smṛti-writers, and that Vyāghra and other sages have been accepted as authorities on Dharma by persons like the author of the *Kāmudhenu* and others<sup>9</sup>. So, Caṇḍeśvara concludes, it is acceptance by great men, and not inclusion in the list of thirty-six Smṛti works, which counts in the matter of recognition of a particular Smṛti work as authoritative<sup>10</sup>. Thus, Caṇḍeśvara makes provision for the acceptance of a far greater number of Smṛti works as authoritative in the field of Dharma. As a matter of fact, we find the Maithila Smṛtikāras drawing upon the works of Jātūkarna, Kuthumi, Kārṣṇājini, Māṇḍavya, Śāṭyāyana and many others who have not been mentioned by Lakṣmīdhara. Thus, we see that the Maithila writers generally do not want to put any restriction on the statement of Manu referred to above. With regard to the *Ṣaṭtriṃśanmata* (which embodies the essence of the teachings of thirty-six sages) and similar other works, however, the author of the *Kṛtya-ratnākara* says :

"yat tu ṣaṭtriṃśan-matādi tat kaiścid eva parigrahāt vijñānāc ca pramāṇam"<sup>11</sup>,

and for this statement he is certainly indebted to Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru* as the present text of this work shows. But according to Mitramiśra, who also consulted Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru* in his *Vira-mitrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, Lakṣmīdhara did not recognise the *Ṣaṭtriṃśan-mata* as an authority on Dharma<sup>12</sup>. As a matter of fact, Caṇḍeśvara also does not appear to look upon the *Ṣaṭtriṃśan-mata* as an authoritative work, and for this he is certainly not to be blamed, because the *Ṣaṭtriṃśan-mata* was not an original work but only secondary in importance. With regard to the Dharma-śāstras of those writers who were recognised as authorities on Dharma by the people as a matter of customary usage, the Maithilas were unanimous in accepting their views.

In course of time many writings on Smṛti evolved with conflicting views. As all of them were supposed to be based on the Vedas, there should not have

<sup>9-10</sup> *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, pp. 29-30—

tās cānantaroktābhir eva sarva-parigṛhitābhiḥ pūryante iti kalpataruḥ /

tanna, tathā smṛty-antareṣu cetyanena bhaviṣya-purāṇa eva ṣaṭtriṃśat-smṛter vyatirikta-smṛter darśitatvāt gobhila-ṛṣyaśṛṅgādīnām apara-smṛtikārāṇām tatra tatra svayam evādarāt /

<sup>11</sup> *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 31.

<sup>12</sup> *Ṣaṭtriṃśan-matādikaṃ tu kaiścid eva parigṛhitatvād vigṛtatvād apramāṇam ityuktam alpataruṇā.—Paribhāṣā-prakāśa*, p. 17.



been any conflict amongst them. Hence attempts were made to summarise, and also perhaps to reconcile, the opinions of different Smṛti-writers, and the works like the *Ṣaṭtriṃśan-mata* were the results of such attempts. At that period Manu's code was given supreme position, and thenceforward his injunctions came to be looked upon with the highest esteem. Those codes which differed from Manu were declared invalid. Thus in the *Bṛhaspati-smṛti* (Samskāra-kāṇḍa v. 13) we have

vedārtha-pratibaddhatvāt prāmāṇyam tu manoh smṛtam /  
manvartha-viparītā tu yā smṛtiḥ sā na śasyate //

This shows that all the Dharmaśāstras were no longer unquestionable (amīmāṃsya) as Manu declared (te sarvārtheṣv amīmāṃsye tūbhyāṃ dharmo hi nirbabhau—*Manusmṛti* 2. 10). Only those Smṛtis which closely followed the steps of Manu were recognised. But this verse of Bṛhaspati has been differently interpreted, and this will be clear from the following example. The *Parāśara-smṛti* (4. 26) permits widow-remarriage, saying :

naṣṭe mṛte pravrajite klīve ca patite patau /  
pañcasv āpatsu nārīṇāṃ patir anyo vidhīyate //

But Manu does not permit it. So, following Bṛhaspati, one should reject the *Parāśara-smṛti*. Yet, in the closed lists of Yājñavalkya and Yama, in the open list of Śaṅkha-Likhita Parāśara is mentioned as an authority. In such cases tradition declares only that portion as invalid which is not in keeping with the dictums of Manu. In this particular case it is generally said that acceptance of a second husband is prohibited in the Kali-yuga (kali-varjya), whereas in other Yugas plurality of husbands (i. e. polyandry) was in vogue<sup>13</sup>. Hence there can be no conflict between Manu and Parāśara. But there are some cases where the conflict cannot be said to be apparent. An example of such difference of opinion is cited here from Śrīdatta Upādhyāya's *Ācārādarśa* (Banaras ed.), in which the following passages on answering the call of nature have been cited from the works of Manu and Devala :

mūtroccāra-samutsargaṃ divā kuryād udanmukhaḥ /  
dakṣiṇābhimukho rātrau sandhyayoś ca yathā divā //

(*Manu-smṛti* 4. 50)

and

sadaivodanmukhaḥ prātaḥ sāyāhne dakṣiṇā-mukhaḥ //

(Devala).

Another passage from the *Yama-smṛti* is also quoted in the *Ācārādarśa*, and that passage runs thus :

pratyañmukhas tu pūrvāhṇe sāyāhne prāñmukhas tathā /  
udanmukhas tu madhyāhṇe niśāyāṃ dakṣiṇā-mukhaḥ //

The difference between Manu and Devala on this point is obvious, and hence the digest-maker had to say “.... .devala-vacanaṃ ca nādartavyam /

<sup>13</sup>For the different views on remarriage of women see P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol II, Part ii, pp. 608 ff.

'manvartha-viparītā yā smṛtiḥ sā na praśasyate' iti bṛhaspati-vacanāt /"<sup>14</sup>. Thus, according to Śrīdatta, this much only of Devala, which goes against the view of Manu, is to be rejected. This passage proves the pre-eminence of the code of Manu and the subordinate position of the other writers. But as the occasional differences between Manu and the other Smṛti-writers were in most cases only superficial and not vital, all the Smṛti works of popular acceptance were more or less authentic in the eyes of the Maithila Smṛti-writers. In fact, these Nibandha-writers believe that there can be difference in interpretation but not in the texts<sup>15</sup> because all the writers of original Smṛtis looked upon the very same veda as the final authority and all of them were men having thorough knowledge of the Veda and inheriting reliable tradition. Even if there be in their works any strange and unwarranted opinion, we should take it as an instance which represents a particular tradition of a particular Śākhā of the Veda now lost to us.

From the above discussion it is evident that the most direct source of Dharma is Smṛti; and this Smṛti has been divided by the Maithilas following Lakṣmīdhara into five parts according to their angle of vision, viz., Dṛṣṭārtha, Adṛṣṭārtha, Dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārtha, Nyāya-mūla, and Śiṣṭādṛṣṭa. The portions dealing with Rāja-dharma, Śāḍgunya, the four Upāyas, etc. come under the head of Dṛṣṭārtha Smṛti. Such sections have not absolute validity, while the others have it because they are based on the Veda<sup>16</sup>.

The different topics that come within the scope of Smṛti are : Āhnika (daily duties), Saṃskāra (periodical rites), Aśauca (impurity), Prāyaścitta (expiation), Śrāddha (funeral ceremony), Pūjā, Pratiṣṭhā, Dāna, etc. The epics and some other texts which pass under the titles 'Śiva-dharmottara', 'Viṣṇu-dharmottara', etc., contain a large mass of such Smṛti matter. They have been accepted as authority by Caṇḍeśvara and other Maithilas on the strength of the expression 'tathā smṛtyantareṣu ca' of the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa* quoted above.

The Purāṇas also contain a large mass of Smṛti matters<sup>17</sup>; hence they were also recognised as authorities on Dharma. In fact, the Maithilas have recognised the Purāṇas without the least objection. But the acceptance of these works as authorities in the field of Dharma has a long history behind it; and this will be clear from what follows.

<sup>14</sup>See *Ācārādarśa*, p.1.

<sup>15</sup>Thus, even in the glaring example cited in the *Ācārādarśa*, the Nibandhakāra reconciled the diverging views in the following way: "athavā mānavam divā-padam prātar-madhyāhna-param iti na virodhaḥ /"—*Ācārādarśa*, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup>*Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 36.

<sup>17</sup>See, for instance, the *Matsya-purāṇa*, which gives a list of its contents thus :

utpattim pralayaṃ caiva vaṃśān manvantarāṇi ca /  
vaṃśānucaritam caiva bhuvanaśya ca vistaram //  
dāna-dharma-vidhim caiva śrāddha-kalpaṃ ca śāśvatam /  
varnāśrama-vibhāgaṃ ca tatheṣṭā-pūrta-samjñitam //  
devatānām pratiṣṭhādi yac cānyad vidyate bhuvī //

(*Matsya-purāṇa* 2. 22-24a).

The Purāṇas are not recognised as a source of Dharma in the earlier and important texts like the *Manu-saṃhitā*, etc. Manu mentions the Purāṇas but not as authorities on Dharma. According to him, one should recite the Vedas, the Dharma-śāstras, the Purāṇas, etc. before the invited Brahmins attending a Śrāddha ceremony<sup>18</sup>. It is as late as the time of the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* that we find some support for the Purāṇas. In this work the Purāṇas have been enumerated as one of the fourteen sources of Dharma<sup>19</sup>. The Smṛtis which may be placed chronologically after that of Yājñavalkya, follow it. Thus, in the *Hārīta-smṛti* it is said that the rules about anadhyāya are to be known from the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas<sup>20</sup>. Most of the later works in the field, viz., the Nibandhas, quote frequently from the Purāṇas, certainly due to the influence the latter came to exercise on the religious and social life of the Hindus. At the same time, we should take notice of some works which willingly and carefully avoid quoting passages from the Purāṇas. Thus, there is not a single quotation from the Purāṇas in the *Bāla-kṛīṇā* (a famous commentary on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* by Viśvarūpa), although it has many citations from the Sūtra and Saṃhitā works of a large number of Smṛti-writers and refers (under *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 3.263-4) even to the commentary of Asahāya.

Thus, we see that the Smṛti-writers were divided into two schools, viz., (i) one headed by Manu and followed by Viśvarūpa and others who did not recognise the authority of the Purāṇas, and (ii) the other headed by Yājñavalkya and followed by Sumantu, Hārīta, Caṇḍeśvara, Vācaspathiāra and others who were liberal enough to accept the Purāṇas as an authority of Dharma.

One may naturally ask the cause of such difference in outlook. To answer this we shall have to review briefly the early religious movements and their effect on the Brahmanical society. India in olden times saw the rise and development of various religious systems which have been classified into three groups, viz., (i) anti-Vedic (as Buddhism, Jainism, etc.), (ii) semi-Vedic (as Vaiṣṇavism, Śaivism, etc.), and (iii) non-Vedic (as Śāktism). Besides the staunch followers of these systems there was another class of people who believed both in the Vedic and the non-Vedic way of life and thought, and it is said that they were the persons who gave rise to the present Purāṇas. So, the Purāṇic Dharma assumed a composite character. But the aim of the orthodox Smṛti-writers was to preach the Vedic ideas by establishing the Varṇāśrama-dharma. So, one

<sup>18</sup> *Manu-smṛti* 3. 232—

svādhyāyaṃ śrāvayot pitrye dharmasāstrāṇi caiva hi /  
ākhyānāntihāsāṃś ca purāṇāni khilāni ca //

<sup>19</sup> purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharmasāstrāṅga-miśritāḥ /  
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa //

(*Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1. 3).

<sup>20</sup> śiṣyān adhyāpayoc cāpi anadhyāye viśarjayet /  
smṛty-uktān akhilāṃś cāpi purāṇoktān api dvijaḥ //

*Hārīta-smṛti* (incorporated in the *Aṣṭādaśa-smṛti*, Veṅkaṭeśvara Press ed.) 4. 70.

would look in vain for the Vyāsa Dharma of the Purāṇas in such works. But in course of time, as history reveals, the sacrificial religion of the Vedas gradually lost ground, and its place was taken by the religious faiths and practices of the Śaivas, Śāktas, Vaiṣṇavas, and others. The strict followers of the Vedas had to struggle against odds, and, finding no other solution, they keenly felt the necessity of making a compromise between their own religious views and the Purāṇic Dharma. In such a stage of religious restlessness some gods of the Purāṇic pantheon (like Hari, Gaṇeśa, Kālī, etc.) were taken into the Brahmanical fold. Even the Buddha was recognised as an incarnation of Lord Viṣṇu. Truly speaking, the orthodox Hindus were, by this time, forced to recede to the background. It is stated that during the Pāla regime many Buddhist tantras were written and Buddhism spread all over Bengal. Later on some social reforms and re-adjustments were made by Ballālsena in order to counteract the social and religious disturbances with which Tantricism, Buddhism, and various local cults threatened the very basis of the Hindu society. Even a number of spurious Purāṇas came to be composed by the followers of various sects for their religious interests. In such a critical period the service of Purāṇas was looked upon as highly valuable for the preservation of the Varṇāśrama-dharma, and consequently the dogma against these works was given up. Moreover, some of the Purāṇas sought to bring about a compromise between the Vedas and the Āgamas (i.e. Tantras). Thus, in the *Devī-bhāgavata* it is said that Śruti and Smṛti are the direct sources of Dharma, while the other scriptures are but secondary. For the deliverance of some virtuous persons the Āgamas were composed by Śaṅkara. In some places of these works there are some portions which do not go against the Vedas. By accepting these portions the Vaidikas do not incur sin<sup>21</sup>.

The recognition of the Purāṇas as a source of Dharma took hundreds of years, in the course of which many Smṛti-writers arose, and some of them accepted the authority of the Purāṇas, while others rejected it. Thus, Yājñavalkya was the first of the Smṛti-writers who accepted the authority of the Purāṇas. Even the later Mīmāṃsakas like Kumārila recognised the value of the Purāṇas, which was also accepted by Vyāsa and Sumantu<sup>22</sup>, Vyāsa, however, gave an unimportant position to the Purāṇas, saying :

śruti-smṛti-purāṇānāṃ virodho yatra dṛśyate /  
tatra śrautaṃ pramāṇaṃ tu tayor dvaidhe smṛtir varā //

(*Vyāsa-smṛti* 1, 4.).

<sup>21</sup>*Devī-bhāgavata* viii. 39. 15-16a, 25a-b, 26-31 ; xi. 1. 31-32.

<sup>22</sup>See Sumantu cited in *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 28—veda-vedāṅg-etiḥāsa-purāṇa-tarka-  
u. māṅgala-dharmaśāstrāṇi. . . . . dharma-vyavasthā-pravartakāni.

The *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*, following the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (1. 3), unambiguously establishes the authority of the Purāṇas on Dharma, saying :

aṣṭādaśa-purāṇeṣu yāni vākyaṇi bhārata /  
tāny ālocya mahabāho tathā smṛty-antareṣu ca //  
manvādi-smṛtayo yās tu ṣaṭtriṃśat parikīrtitāḥ /  
tāsām vākyaṇi kram īśaḥ samālocya bravīmi te //

In fact, in the opinion of the *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*, a Purāṇa also is a kind of Smṛti as the word 'smṛty-antara' indicates.

When the Maithila digest-writers held pens, they had before them the sanction of three Smṛtis (of Yājñavalkya, Sumantu and Vyāsa) and at least one Purāṇa. Hence the Maithilas and other later writers on Smṛti accepted the Purāṇas as a source of Dharma. Yet the Purāṇic Dharma was regarded by the orthodox Brāhmaṇists as only inferior to the Vedic. As an instance one may quote Vyāsa who says :

ataḥ sa paramo dharmo yo vedād avagamyate /  
avarāḥ sa tu vijñeyo yaḥ purāṇādiṣu sthitāḥ //

(Vyāsa as quoted in Aparārka's commentary, p. 9). Whatever that may be, the influence of the Purāṇas on the later Smṛti works is immense. The traditional number of the Purāṇas is eighteen, but variations may be seen in different lists. There are the Mahāpurāṇas and the Upapurāṇas, and the Maithilas quote from both of them. Ballālasena in his *Dānasūgara* derided the indiscriminate citation of Purāṇas and other sources without any consideration of their intrinsic authority. Thus Ballāla did not quote from the *Devī-purāṇa*<sup>23</sup>. But no such discrimination has yet been detected in the writing of the Maithilas.

The next important factor which subscribed towards the development of the Smṛti texts was the Tantra literature. From about the beginning of the ninth century A. D. some Purāṇas began to recognise the Tantras as one of the authorities on religious matters. This recognition was no doubt due to the great appreciation of the Tantric cult by the common people, though in its earlier stage this recognition seems to have been made under many restrictions. According to the *Devī-bhāgavata*, the Tantras contain some portions which do not go against the Vedas, and even the Vaidikas may accept them<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>23</sup>*Kṛtya-kalpatoru*, Dāna-kāṇḍa (Upodghāta), pp. 337-345 (for the relevant verses of the *Dāna-sūgara*).

<sup>24</sup>*Devī-bhāgavata* vii. 39. 28-31—

dagdhā ye brāhmaṇa-varā veda-mārga-bahiṣkṛtāḥ /  
teṣām uddharaṇārthāya sopāna-kramataḥ sadā //  
śaivās ca vaiṣṇavās caiva saurāḥ śāktās tathaiva ca /  
gāṇapatyā āgamās ca pranītāḥ śaṅkareṇa tu //  
tatra vedāviroddho 'mśo 'py ukta eva kvacit kvacit /  
vaidikas tad-grahe doṣi na bhavaty eva karhicit //

The *Varāha-purāna* goes one step further. In it Nārāyaṇa is found to recommed, next to the Vedas, the sectarian scriptures of the Pāñcarātras<sup>25</sup>.

That the view of the *Devī-bhāgavata* was not merely a theory but was carried into practice, is evident from Aparārka's commentary (p. 17) on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti*. We learn from Aparārka that he was liberal enough to accept the sectarian customs and rituals of the Vāmas, Dakṣiṇas, etc., if these did not go against the Vedic rites and customs (.....viruddhasya tu tyāga eveti.....—Aparārka's commentary, p. 17). The same idea is repeated in *Viramitrodaya* (Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, pp. 20-21), which says :

‘namu, sāṅkhyayoga-pañcarātra-pāśupatādy-āgamāḥ kiṃ dharme pramāṇam  
uta na ? .....ucyate / te pi vedāviroddhāḥ pramāṇam  
eva / tathā ca yogi-yājñavalkyaḥ—

.....

sāṅkhyam yogaḥ pañcarātram vedāḥ pāśupatam tathā /  
atipramāṇāny etāni hetubhir na virodhayet //

The *Bhaviṣya-purāna* recognises the Tantras as authority on the consecration of trees, parks, tanks, etc.<sup>26</sup>. The *Skanda* and the *Brahma-purāna* also emphasise the value of the Tantras. Thus, we see that a liberal idea came to be entertained by the followers of orthodox faiths regarding the Tantras. Experts on the subject have proved that Tantric mystical elements like yantra, mudrā, nyāsa etc., entered into the body of Purānic rites. Examples of this invasion can be best found in the *Garuḍa* and the *Agni-purāna*.

The Tantras then invaded the Vedic Dharma through the Puranic one. Thus, the performance of nyāsa came to be regarded as a part of Vaidikī Sandhyā. This inclusion of Tantric practice along with others remarkably influenced the later Smṛti-saṃhitās and Smṛti-nibandhas. Thus, the Tantras influenced the Purānas first and then the later Saṃhitās. So, when the Nibandhakāras took the ground, they had before them at least some writers who recognised the authority of the Tantras. Even in this case (as in the case of the Purānas) the writers were divided into two groups : (i) the orthodox group, and (ii) the liberal group who took the Purānas as authority. Most of the Maithila Smṛti-writers belong to this group, and they quote from the Purānas and Tantras as well. Thus, Śrīdatta Upādhyāya refers to the Āgamas and actually quotes verses from the *Śaivāgama*, etc. in his *Chandogāhnikā* and *Samaya-pradīpa*. Caṇḍeśvara, quoting the *Pārijāta*,

<sup>25</sup> *Varāha-purāna* (66. 10-11b)—

devadeva uvāca

pauruṣam sūktam ādāya ye yajanti dvijās tu mām /  
te mām prāpsyanti satatam saṃhitādhyayanena ca //  
alābhe veda-śāstrāṇām pañcarātroditena hi /  
mārgena mām yajante ye te mām prāpsyanti mānavāḥ //  
brāhmaṇa-kṣatriya-viśām pañcarātram vidhīyate //  
atha tantra-vidhīm vakṣye purāṇeṣv api gīyate /  
tantrē caiva pratiṣṭhām ca kuryāt puṇyatame 'hani //  
etc.

admits the authority of the Tantras<sup>27</sup>. He also prescribes the worship of Śyāmā (a Śākta deity) in autumn (hemanta). But his *Gṛhastha-ratnākara* bears no trace of Tantric influence. Possibly Caṇḍeśvara wanted to differentiate between the ordinary Kṛtyas and the Gṛhastha-kṛtyas. Vācaspatimiśra, another digest-maker, drew upon the *Saurāgama*,<sup>28</sup> *Kulārṇava-tantra*<sup>29</sup> and *Muṇḍa-mūlī-tantra*<sup>30</sup>.

Thus, we see that although Tantric influence on the Nibandhakāras was slow, yet it was steady and increased in course of time, so much so that writers like Vidyākara Vājapeyin (author of the *Nityācāra-paddhati*), Śūlapāni, Raghunandana (the great jurist of Bengal), and some others law-givers of Mithilā and other places, fully recognised the authority of the Tantras and drew profusely upon them in almost all matters concerning Dharma<sup>31</sup>.

The sources of Dharma, which have been mentioned above, are scriptural, and only the Traivedikas were entitled to study them. But woman, Śūdras, outcastes, and others also existed in society and for their guidance in religious pursuits Śiṣṭācāra was prescribed by the sages. That is, the practice of the good was also a source of Dharma. Hence Vasiṣṭha said :

śruti-smṛti-vihito dharmah / tad-abhāve śiṣṭācārah  
pramāṇam / śiṣṭāḥ punar akāmātmā /

If no direction either from the Veda or from the Smṛti was available, the practice of the Śiṣṭas was the authority. The same opinion was expressed by Manu<sup>32</sup>, Yājñavalkya<sup>33</sup>, and others also. This Sadācāra (or sādḥūnām ācārah) was also an important source of Dharma. Naturally one may raise a question as regards the standard of śiṣṭatva. From the definitions cited in the Nibandhas of Mithilā we learn that the Śiṣṭas are to have those qualities which are likely to influence the life and conduct of men. They must be free from pride and conceit, must be unassuming and must not be greedy and wrathful. Thus, Baudhāyana describes the Śiṣṭas as follows :

śiṣṭāḥ khalu vigata-matsarā nirahaṅkārāḥ kumbhīdhānyā alolupā dambha-  
darpa-lobha-moha-krodha-vivarjitāḥ /

(*Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 5).

<sup>27</sup>itihāso 'pi purāṇam eva—'itihāsa-purāṇābhyām vedaṃ samupabrṃhayet' iti vacanāt / pañcarātra-pāsupatīdīny api śāstrāṇi vedāvīruddha-bhāge pramāṇam eveti pārijātaḥ /  
*Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 31.

<sup>28</sup>*Kṛtya-cintāmaṇi* (Banaras ed.), p. 45.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 97.

<sup>31</sup>In his works Śrīdatta Upādhyāya draws profusely upon the Purāṇas but very rarely upon the Tantras. Just his opposite was Mītramiśra, who not only recognised the authority of the Tantras but refuted the view expressed in a passage of the *Kūrma-purāṇa* in which the Tantras have been denounced as Mohana-śāstra (see *Vīramūrodaya*, Paribhāṣā-prakāśa, p. 23—kaurme—kūpālam pañcarātram ca yāmalam vāmam āriṣṭam / evaṃvidhāni cānyāni mohanārthāni tāni tu // iti pañcarātrasya yan mohakatvābhīdhānam tad avaidika-pañcarātra-param //).

<sup>32</sup>vedo 'khilo dharma-mūlam smṛti-śīle ca tadvidām / ācāras caiva sādḥūnām etc.—*Manu-smṛti* 2. 6.

<sup>33</sup>śrutīḥ smṛtīḥ sadācārah svasya ca priyam ātmanah / etc.

says :

dharmenādhigato yeṣāṃ vedāḥ sapaṛibṛṃhaṇaḥ /  
śiṣṭās tad-anumānajñāḥ śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ /

(quoted in *Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 33).

Ṭha puts further restrictions on the way of becoming a śiṣṭa—the man belong to a family of Śiṣṭas, and he must be a Brahmin.

pāraṃparyāgato yeṣāṃ vedāḥ sapaṛibṛṃhaṇaḥ /  
te śiṣṭā brāhmaṇā jñeyāḥ śruti-pratyakṣa-hetavaḥ //

Sūtra of Āpastamba says that those duties which are mentioned neither śruti nor in Smṛti, are to be learnt from women and even the Śūdras. Even women and Śūdras also were entitled to contribute to one's knowledge Ācāra. But it has always been said by the early Smṛti-writers that we should never follow the evil acts of Śiṣṭas. After all they were human beings ; any immoral act on their part was not unnatural. But as they were men of human power, no offence due to their violation of Dharma clung to them. People in general are not spiritually powerful ; so, they should refrain from committing such wrongful acts. Thus Gautama said :

dr̥ṣṭo dharmā-vyatikramaḥ sāhasaṃ ca mahatām /  
na tu dr̥ṣṭo 'rtho 'vara-daurbalyāt //

Ṭamba also said :

dr̥ṣṭo dharmā-vyatikramaḥ sāhasaṃ caiva pūrveṣāṃ /  
teṣāṃ tejo-viśeṣeṇa pratyavāyo na vidyate //

A man of later times, who does the same thing, falls (tad anvīkṣya yuñjānaḥ śidaty avarajo 'balaḥ). "tejīyasāṃ na doṣāya" seems to be the guiding principle with regard to Śiṣṭācāra. Closely connected with the Śiṣṭācāras are the Deśācāras or local customs. Local customs may sometimes be regarded as precedents. Sometimes the local customs went against the practice of Dharma. Baudhāyana cited some examples of such local customs and condemned them all.

pañcadhā vipratipattiḥ dakṣiṇatas tathottarataḥ / yāni dakṣiṇatas tāni vyākhyāsyāmaḥ / yathaitad anupetena saha bhोजनाṃ striyā saha bhोजनाṃ mātula-pitṛsvasṭī-duhitṛ-pariṇayanam iti / athottaraḥ—ūrṇā-vikrayaḥ śidhupā-nam ubhayatodadbhir vyavahāraḥ āyudhiyakaṃ samudrasaṃyānam iti / . . . . . tatra tatra deśa-prāmāṇyam eva syāt / mithyaitad iti gautamaḥ / ubhayaṃ caiva nādrīyeta śiṣṭāgama-virodha-darśanāt śiṣṭa-smṛti-virodha-darśanāt ca / (*Baudhāyana-dharma-sūtra* i. 1. 18-24).

Gautama, however, in his Dharma-sūtra declared—'deśa-jāti-kula-dharmā nāyair aviruddhāḥ pramāṇam'. Thus, Deśācāra, like Śiṣṭācāra, which is not against the sanction of Śruti and Smṛti, can be relied upon. That the Maithilas recognised the value of Śiṣṭācāra is evident from the writings of Caṇḍeśvara, Caśpatimīśra and others. According to Caṇḍeśvara, the value of a Smṛti lies in its enumeration in the list of 36 Smṛtis but its appreciation made by good men (cf. mahājana-parigṛhītatvam eva tantraṃ na tu śaṭtrimśad-anyatamatvam dhyeyam.—*Kṛtya-ratnākara*, p. 30). In his *Śrāddha-cintāmaṇi* (p. 24) Caśpatimīśra quoted a śiṣṭa-parigṛhīta-vacana. Caṇḍeśvara also quoted some



śiṣṭa-parigṛhīta-vākyas and mahājana-parigṛhīta-vākyas in his *Kṛtya-ratnākara* (pp. 95, 126, 138, etc.). As regards Deśācāra we can say that sometimes usages not only of the native province but also of neighbouring provinces crept into the body of the text. For instance, the use of the Aparājītā plant for binding the Nava-patrikā (in Durgā-pūjā) is peculiar in Bengal; yet it was borrowed by the author of the *Durgā-bhaktitaranṅiṇī* (p. 63). It is quite natural for the writers of a particular province to look up to the writings of a neighbouring province for support. Thus, Caṅḍeśvara and his followers in many places refer to the Gauḍīya-smṛti with the words 'iti gaudāḥ' or 'iti gauḍāḥ paṭhanti'. The famous Maithila Vidyāpati Ṭhakkura prescribed the use of Karuṇa (lemon) in Durgā-pūjā and said "karuṇaṃ gauḍa-prasiddham". Thus a Gauḍa upacāra came into use in a Maithila form of worship. Thus, in the development of Maithila Smṛti, not only local but foreign customs, especially of the Gauḍas, made important contributions.

A peculiar source which made valuable additions in Maithila Smṛti was constituted by the countless floating verses. In more than one place verses are found quoted without any reference to their source and sometimes such a floating verse of a particular province was utilised in the other provinces under the titles 'iti śiṣṭāḥ' or 'iti gaudāḥ' or 'iti durgā-bhakti-taranṅiṇī-dhṛtam', etc. What is all the more curious is that sometimes verses were composed in support of a particular local custom and then they were declared to have belonged to a particular Purāṇa. Thus, an attempt was made to give a Śāstric value to their local customs by attributing the floating verses to some Purāṇa. Such spurious Purāṇic verses were then utilised by others as genuine ones. The purport of the above statement will be clear from the following example. Raghunandana, in his *Durgā-pūjā-tattva* (p. 12), quoted a passage under the heading '*durgā-bhakti-taranṅiṇī-dhṛtam*'. Thus, Raghunandana named as his authority not the actual source but a secondary one, viz., the *Durgā-bhakti-taranṅiṇī*. In his *Durgotsava-viveka* (p. 3), Śūlapāṇi, a Bengali writer, thus resorted to an indirect source (devī-māhātmya-pāṭha-phalam āha saṃvatsara-pradīpe). The, *Durgā-bhakti-taranṅiṇī* (p. 46) also had the 'Gauḍa-nibandha' as his source. Sometimes these untraceable Purāṇic verses were rejected on the ground that they were not accepted by other important writers. Thus Vācaspatimiśra in his *Śrāddha-cintāmaṇi* (p. 23) says :

"..... matsya-purāṇa-nāmnā likhita-vacanaṃ lakṣmī-dharādya-likhitatvān nirmūlam / .... ."

But the very same author quoted many untraceable verses in many cases. These are some instances to show how local customs first affected the local Smṛtis and then, somehow acquiring the prestige of Śāstra, influenced the Smṛtis of the neighbouring provinces also. So, the basic authorities utilised by the Smṛti-writers of Mithilā are (i) Veda, (ii) Smṛti (including the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa), (iii) Purāṇa, (iv) Tantra and (v) Śiṣṭācāra, Deśācāra, etc. Another source which is not directly mentioned, yet the influence of which is obvious, was the Artha-śāstra literature. With regard to the Vyavahāra-padas (eighteen topics of dispute) and Rāj-niti the digest-writers quote from the Purāṇa passages which are obviously based on Artha-śāstra.





