


See p. 91


# TRICONTINENTAL

north american edition

no. 4

75¢





SEPTEMBER  
9-13  
1971

## to the reader

The Indochinese war is in its twenty-seventh year. Its effects have been worldwide and beyond measure. From their desire for peace and self-determination, the Vietnamese people have forged an unshakable unity that is defeating the most powerful aggressor in history. They are a source of inspiration and strength, showing the world that Richard Nixon's effort to make peace is simply a mask covering U.S. imperialism.

The government of our country drops the equivalent of one atom bomb a week on Vietnam. The American Air Force has mined Vietnamese rivers and harbors, bombed hospitals and schools and now attacks the critical dike system of the Red River delta. Is this peace? Recent Vietnamese offensives are smashing the "Vietnamization" program and it is now clear that only the B-52 bomber prevents the total defeat of the Army of South Vietnam and the Thieu regime.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam has offered a plan for peace which takes into account the needs of both the Vietnamese and American people. The PRG Seven Point Peace Plan creates the basis for the peaceful reunification of Vietnam through free and open elections. For the United States, the Seven Point Plan provides for the safe and orderly withdrawal of all American forces and the return of American POWs. The return of the POWs would begin on the same day as the withdrawal of American troops and end the same day that the last American soldier is out of Indochina.

Inside the United States, the horror of the war and Nixon's lies are opening the eyes of Americans to the real nature of the American dream. People are realizing that the war in Vietnam is more than a tragic mistake; it is the inevitable result of a system of corporate exploitation which cultivates racism, sexism, and hatred as pillars of its stability. To this system, Southeast Asia is a source of raw materials and human resources, as well as a potential marketplace for U.S. products. As U.S. corporations encroach on Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East, massive opposition to the war steadily increases.

In 1964 U.S. antiwar sentiment was such that Lyndon Johnson had to talk about "ending U.S. involvement" while preparing major escalations. By 1968 antiwar activity was so intense that Johnson had to resign and Nixon ran as a phony peace candidate. By 1972 ten years of war in Vietnam and antiwar activity at home have raised the consciousness of the American people to the point where the democratic presidential candidate — George McGovern — bases his candidacy on ending U.S. military involvement in Vietnam within 90 days. This is a plan consistent with the Seven Point Plan of the PRG.

We don't believe McGovern is going to solve the basic problems facing America. We specifically oppose his past anti-labor record, his approval of aid to foreign dictatorships, and the rearmament of Israel. But we must acknowledge the difference between him and Nixon. McGovern is the only presidential candidate to ever set a date for the total withdrawal of American forces from Indochina. Because of his public commitment and the pressure of the majority of Americans, we believe McGovern will end the war. Fighting imperialism by any means necessary at this point in history means defeating Nixon by using the ballot.

However, defeating Nixon is not enough. We must educate that the war, and future wars like it, will always be a threat as long as the U.S. government continues its imperialist policies of economic and military interference in the affairs of other countries. Our responsibility is to fight the aggressor from within through demonstrations, marches, rallies, small group actions, and massive educational campaigns—anything that turns the American people against the war machine. Long after the elections in November our opposition will continue—strong, loud and clear. Vietnam will win—so will we.

# Contents

- A VIETNAMESE FIGHTER** 4  
Nguyen Van Quang  
The autobiography of a Vietnamese hero. His own words, about why he became a fighter for the NLF, are more potent than any we can write.
- INDONESIA: PORTRAIT OF A NEOCOLONY** 11  
Since Sukarno was ousted from the presidency in 1966 amidst a blood-bath against Indonesian communists (over 500,000 people were killed, it is estimated), a New Order has been established under Generals Suharto and Nasution, and Foreign Minister Adam Malik. The New Order—unlike Sukarno—is pro-U.S. and has opened Indonesia, one of the richest nations in raw materials in the world, to U.S. corporations under the guidance of the World Bank. This is a report on how the Generals have helped create another neocolony for the U.S.
- APARTHEID, IMPERIALIST MONSTER** 18  
Alex La Guma  
On May 31, 1971, South Africa celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Republic. But this Republic is "white only": 3 million whites keep the 17 million blacks, mulattoes and Asians in virtual slavery. This article, by a South African intellectual, studies the nature of white South Africa's colonialist-imperialist policies and the struggles of the Africans to be free.
- EDUCATION IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE** 30  
Mozambique is still a colony of Portugal; but not for long. Led by FRELIMO, the black people of Mozambique have liberated large areas once under the control of the Portuguese. One major facet of the struggle there is education of FRELIMO cadre. These are first-hand accounts of the meaning of education to FRELIMO fighters.
- PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A YANKEE BASE** 37  
Roberto Correa Wilson  
Eritrea is located in the northern part of Ethiopia. It is the only section of that country which touches the Red Sea. Because of its strategic location Eritrea is an important pivotal point for the entire Middle East. Its geographic location also makes it ideal for the establishment of a major U.S. communications base at Kagnew Station near the Eritrean capital of Asmara. This article includes a history of the struggle for control of Eritrea and an analysis of the importance of Kagnew Station to the imperialist control of Africa.
- IRRINTZIK** 41  
Ernesto Gonzalez Bermejo  
Irrintzik is the war cry of the Basque people who live in the north of

Spain and south of France in the mountainous Pyrenees region. The Basques are a nation with their own history and culture, although they now live under General Franco's Spanish dictatorship. Ernesto Bermejo, a Uruguayan journalist from Prensa Latina news agency, has written a summary of the history of the Basque people, their struggle for national self-determination and freedom, and one of their organizations, the ETA.

- THE FORD OF BETRAYAL** 53  
The story of the last days of Tania's column in Bolivia in 1967.
- THE IRREGULAR ARMIES** 74  
Carlos Maria Gutierrez  
A short story, true in all details, about the execution of the Bolivian colonel-turned-consul in West Germany last year. The colonel was the man who cut Che's hands off after he was killed in Bolivia in 1967.
- BOLIVIA: PEOPLE APLENTY, BUT THEY LACK ARMS** 83  
Bolivia has had many military seizures of power (golpes) in its history. This is the story of one of them. It is the story of the fall of the nationalist-reformist government of General Juan Jose Torres and the rise, with a little help from Brazil and the U.S., of an ultra-right-wing government in 1971.
- PANAMA CANAL, SOCIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT** 91  
Hector Danilo  
Panama is best known for its canal, located in U.S.-held territory called the Canal Zone. Danilo summarizes the history of the Zone, how it came to be in U.S. hands, and U.S. cultural penetration of Panama.
- ECUADOR: THE OIL ORGY** 94  
Jaime Galarza  
For 40 years it was thought there were no major oil deposits in Ecuador. Recently it has been revealed that Ecuador's oil deposits, far from being small, are some of the largest in the world. Ecuador will soon be able to produce five million barrels of oil a day. Over the last ten years the rights to remove oil from large areas of the country have been sold to various major oil companies. The Ecuadorian petroleum "festival," as some international circles call it, is not so much a festival as an orgy, in which the biggest oil companies of the capitalist world are taking part.
- TO THE EDITOR: A LETTER ON PERU** 103  
A northamerican reader writes a response to Tricontinental's articles on Peru in the northamerican edition no. 2. The writer argues that contrary to Tricontinental's view that Peru is undergoing an anti-imperialist "revolutionary process," the military junta of Peru is actually cementing a new relationship with imperialism under the leadership of a dynamic urban-industrial bourgeoisie in Peru.

# A VIETNAMESE FIGHTER NGUYEN VAN QUANG

Nguyen Van Quang is a hero. His life has been that of a fighter. To kill. Because it happens that Nguyen Van Quang was born in Viet Nam, land coveted by foreigners, successively invaded, subjected throughout its history to the most barbarous attacks, victim of the most unequal and cowardly aggression that contemporary mankind has known: the confrontation with Yankee Imperialism and all its power and its weapons of death put to the task of subjugating the Vietnamese people, devastating the population and the countryside in punishment for its valiant resistance.

In this strange silence and this atmosphere so different from that which has surely been his guerrilla life, to listen to him recalling the experiences of those years, one can feel only admiration for this young man, his calm attitude, his casual dress, his short hair, his freshly shaven, clean-cut look. We cannot help but think that this same Nguyen Van Quang could well have been a farmer, a woodsman or a poultry raiser in his native Vin Ling; he would have been married to a young girl in his village like any other young man his age and would have started a family, he would have children and would have built a house with his strong hands. He would have been able to enjoy all the little joys and fulfill the hopes to which every human being born aspires and has a right.

Nguyen Van Quang, then, who could be all this to which a man aspires and has a right, had no alternative: he is a soldier, a soldier with full consciousness and with total conviction. And he conducts himself correctly, living up to the best of his compatriots, his history, his dead, and he fights fiercely and tenaciously with that love for liberty and full dignity that characterizes his people, this heroic people whose heroic fighter he is.

But it is better to let Nguyen Van Quang, son of Viet Nam, Vietnamese hero, speak for himself.

---

My family were peasants. We lived in the province of Bien Hoa, in the liberated zone of South Viet Nam during the resistance war against the French. When I was seven years old, I lost my parents in a bombing. A month later my sister perished, also because of the occupying army, and I was left alone. I then went to live with an aunt, but because it was a very poor family, I had to leave their house and go out and look for work.

From that time until I was sixteen years old, I spent my time living and working with different bosses. Finally I went to stay in the house of a landowner who pretended that my parents owed him a great debt which I had to pay in forced labor for the rest of my life.

Daily I had to haul the water for all the family needs: for bathing, cooking, cleaning, etc., and washing clothes; look for fuel to heat the house; take care of the buffaloes. Thus my life revolved around nothing more than working and obeying the orders of the bosses. For all those duties, I received no pay whatsoever, and only the minimal food to go on living. I was like one more animal, a servant, a slave who could even be killed if they chose.

While I was very small I didn't realize all this. Then I was able to wash the clothes of the landowner's wife and daughter without it bothering me. But when I was older and had reached my sixteenth birthday, I felt ashamed of the type of work given me and the life I led. One day when I brought the water to wash the family clothes, they found a leaf with littlewigs in a bucket and insulted me and threw the water over me. This made me furious and I reacted by fleeing from the house in search of some kind of help. But I failed because the landowner was an influential man throughout the region. He followed me, succeeded in capturing me, and brought me back into his service. Then the treatment was worse and the abuses and humiliations became insupportable, to the point where I had to dodge like a hunted animal, defending myself with my fists from the boss and his family, and had to flee to the forest.

I didn't know where the revolution was nor where I would find the guerrillas, but I had to get to them. Three days and four nights I wandered through the woods hungry and thirsty but without giving up. I didn't know the exact spot where they were but I knew the guerrillas existed. This was in 1960. In October of the previous year, the puppet regime of Ngo Dinh Diem had decreed the death penalty by guillotine for all who opposed their despotism. From that time many who dared to resist them paid with their heads and many others took the forest road, fleeing from repression and organizing themselves for the struggle. So I was certain I would find them someplace.

At the end of three days, I succeeded in finding the guerrillas, who took me to their revolutionary base in which they were collecting crude arms and preparing to initiate the struggle.

The first objective of the detachment into which I was incorporated was to attack the enemy post of Tua Hai, which was quite strong at that time. We were about thirty, but we succeeded in coming out victorious, annihilating the enemy post and capturing more than 1000 arms. In this battle my arms consisted only of two machetes: one held in the hand and the other in the belt, like a sword. I wasn't nervous or afraid in my first fight. I felt only the hatred and rancor accumulated over much time. I didn't forget for a minute that the soldiers in Tua Hai were precisely those who had followed me and turned me in to the landowner. And so I had no room in my head and in my heart for fear, but only a great feeling and a strong desire to make up for my humiliation. And so I threw myself into the battle with violence, machete on high, ready to cut off the heads of whoever opposed me on my road; and when the soldiers fled from the trench, I ran out behind them.



They had been abusive before and now they were afraid of my arm with its weapon, and ran like cowards to flee my vengeance.

After the battle of Tua Hai (Tay Ninh province), the leaders of the detachment designated me artilleryman in charge of a machine gun. At the end of the month I had learned how to manage it and dominated its great firing power against the enemy. In actual combat, I completed my apprenticeship and together we helped each other take many posts and annihilate whole platoons and companies. From then on, the guerrilla movement grew and spread over the whole of South Viet Nam and with the development achieved and the arms captured we were able to pass on to a stage of organization by units. Throughout this period, I participated in numerous actions up until 1964 when I took part in the important battle of Binh Gia where we liquidated 7000 enemy soldiers.

After this defeat, the enemy concentrated his forces in a place called Bau Bang, so the guerrilla leaders also mobilized their units toward that region in order to attack on a military concentration; the result was 6500 of the enemy eliminated and 200 tanks and armored cars and 39 airplanes destroyed. This was the outcome of the first victory of the People's Liberation Armed Forces when it confronted a great concentration of enemy troops. Later, guerrillas all over South Viet Nam studied this battle and we compared our capacity with that of the enemy army, drawing the conclusion that we had sufficient capacity to destroy the adversary. Then we developed the movement of annihilating all the enemy groupings in South Viet Nam, and achieved such victories as Play Me, Da Nang, Plei Ku, Dak To and many others in which the guerrillas liquidated a considerable number of the enemy forces, leaving the puppet army practically annihilated.

This series of victories marked an ascent, the beginning of another stage, demonstrating that the South Vietnamese guerrillas had sufficient power to change the course of the war. Thus, at the end of 1964 and the beginning of 1965 they caused the failure of the "special warfare" strategy of the Yankee aggressors and their puppets, who found themselves forced to engage in local warfare.

By the middle of 1965, the United States began to introduce large contingents of expeditionary troops into South Viet Nam. And during the dry season of 1965-66, they launched the first "strategic counter-

offensive," which consisted of "five arrows," or five fronts. Thus we had our first direct confrontation with North American troops in these days of 1965 in a region of southeast Saigon when these troops advanced from the naval base of Vung Tau toward Saigon. For the guerrilla forces, the success was total. But because of the massive and concentrated aerial and artillery fire used by the Yankees, against which we still lacked the necessary experience, my unit, which was acting as a shock force, suffered great losses—as extreme as 24 out of 25 comrades, so that I was the only survivor at the end of the battle. I felt very sad for my fallen comrades, but at the same time courage surged up in me, impelling me into the fray. It was as if I heard their voices, "Quang, go on for us; Quang, go on for us," leaving me with the responsibility of continuing to resist for them. When the battle was over and the count was taken, each man in my unit had killed 30 Yankee soldiers and I—who had more time to inflict losses among the enemy ranks—had 102 killed.

This action won for me the medal of First Class Military Merit, which I esteem doubly because it represents my first direct combat with Yankee soldiers and reminds me of my comrades who fell in this battle. After the failure of their dry-season operation in 1965-66, which was the first strategic counter-offensive in local war, the Yankee aggressors sent more troops to South Viet Nam to launch a second, the campaign of Junction City, during the dry season of 1966-67. They mobilized 45,000 soldiers against the Tay Ninh region with the objective of capturing alive the high command of the PLAF in South Viet Nam, which they thought they would find there. But they were unsuccessful and were repulsed by the patriotic forces. During this period I was platoon chief, but I also handled the machine gun at the request of the regiment comrades, who had confidence in my ability to protect their movements in the combat area. At the end of the battle we had destroyed 1027 motorized enemy cars. I personally blew up two cars with hand grenades and destroyed an airplane with my machine gun.

After this combat, I accumulated a total of 16 medals and decorations for various war actions, at the climax of which I was honored by the high command of the PLAF of South Viet Nam, which designated me National Hero. It was after this recognition that I participated in the Tay Ninh campaign, in which we won another great victory, and in the battle of Loc Ninh, where we inflicted many enemy losses (among them 27 Yankee soldiers with the fire of my machine gun). Later my unit received the order to transfer to the region of Dak To to fight against the U.S. cavalry division. This campaign ended with two enemy regiments liquidated and another decimated, that is to say, a smashing victory against the renowned Yankee cavalry division, which came out of the encounter with us pretty badly off.


And so it was at the beginning of 1967 when my combat record had risen to more than 100 battles in which I almost always handled the machine gun, my weapon of preference and the one I always felt at home with. But it wasn't the only one because, with the advance of the

struggle and the great quantity of arms captured from the enemy, we learned to manage all types and calibers of machine guns and every type of weapon, such as B-40, B-41 anti-tank rifles, 75 and 57 caliber recoilers, cannons, 12.7 machine guns, AKs, anti-aircraft weapons, etc.

At the beginning of 1968, when the struggle had reached a high level of development and with the high command of the PLAF in control, the great Tet offensive of 1968 was launched, with my unit participating in the general plan. At the end of the operations our contribution was eight battalions and seventeen companies out of combat.

I would like to stop here in this somewhat summary account of my participation in the war against the foreign aggressors and their lackeys, to refer to several aspects of guerrilla life, among them our relationship with the enemy soldiers we captured. In the guerrilla units, we followed the principle of always treating any soldier captured or wounded in a humane manner. For example, at the front there was always a scarcity of medicine, but the normal thing is to share it equally, without questioning whether it is for an enemy soldier or one of ours. It is a fact that we PLAF fighters follow the principle that whoever confronts us with a gun will be given no respite until he is liquidated; but when that same person falls into our hands, we respect his life and never maltreat him, but instead practice a policy of humanity toward him. It is frequently the case that we capture the same soldier three, four or five times and we ask him: "Why, after you were freed, did you again join the enemy ranks?" He answers us: "There's no other way; if you don't rejoin the ranks you can't get work; if you don't have work and remain there, they claim you are a revolutionary element and jail you or kill you. Thus there is no other course than to enlist again!" There are other cases in which we know of an enemy agent infiltrated into our ranks who, after completing his sinister work, has returned to the enemy ranks. Sometimes they fall into our hands and the treatment we give them is the same we give the other prisoners. Because after all they are people who fear death, who are empty-headed. They have no politics—nothing, nothing. They are only trying to find a better life according to their concept. But, I repeat, we treat them according to a humanitarian policy just like the other prisoners.

As far as my personal life as a guerrilla is concerned, I can say a great deal because truly, it began with the guerrillas; before that it couldn't be called a life. Study, for example. I didn't even know how to read and write when I joined the Revolution and I had to begin with the ABC's. I remember that on one occasion a girl in the village sent me a letter and I begged a comrade to help me because I didn't know what it said. Then he read what it said, "Nguyen, how are you? I think about you all the time and about our wedding day and that we're going to have lots of children and raise chickens and . . ." I was watching his face while he read and I don't know what it was, but I noticed something strange. After he finished, I went to another comrade and said to him, "Please, can you read me what it says here." Then I discovered that it was all a joke, because it didn't say what the comrade had read. So I



said to myself, "Nguyen, you better learn to read your own letters." That finally impelled me to learn to read and write, and today I have reached the eighth grade on a cultural level.

Thus, fighting and learning, I reached the eighth grade. Now I would like to study mathematics and also history because through history one can see the relationship between one people and another, for example between Africa and the Latin American countries, underdeveloped countries. People like us who have lived or are living in shameful conditions, like our peasants. Then one understands that it is not just one battle and one is stimulated to learn about the preoccupation with the U.S. aggression against our country that exists throughout the world. For example, Cuba's message, the words of Comandante Fidel Castro in difficult moments, that if the Vietnamese need them, Cuba is ready to send volunteers to South Viet Nam to fight directly against the Yankee aggressors. We South Vietnamese guerrillas were greatly moved by Comandante Fidel Castro's words and his solidarity message. The same is true of the example and the messages of Che who is also very well known in Viet Nam—his whole life and his work, mainly the *Diary*, which all the Vietnamese have read and studied. And his slogan, that of having to *create two, three, many Viet Nams*.

After victory, I await only an order from the PLAF high command, to go anywhere necessary with my arms and fight and help in the struggle of other peoples. I would also like to go back to the countryside and give all my forces to the construction of the country. To raise a family, have a wife, children, although, well, this is still an illusion, because this is struggle, and without struggle there are no plans, no future.

Finally, I would like to say something about this trip to Cuba. For a long time I have dreamed of visiting Cuba. In South Viet Nam this island is very well known—its history, its people. I had never traveled before. When I received the news I couldn't believe it. I spent the whole trip imagining that I was dreaming. Only when we landed on Cuban soil in the airport did I realize it wasn't a dream, that it was true I was in Cuba. The period of my visit passed rapidly, very rapidly; but I was able to go different places, meet many people, hear accounts of the struggle of the Cuban people and answer questions about Viet Nam. Every night I had trouble sleeping as I recalled the events of the day. Now I must return to the ranks and continue fighting; my machine gun awaits me, and the struggle until the aggressors are expelled. When I get back to Tay Ninh, I will share with my comrades in the unit my recollections of my trip: the greetings from the sugar harvest workers, the children chanting: "Cuba, Viet Nam, together we will win!," the border soldiers guarding the coasts of the sister island blockaded and constantly menaced by the Yankees, the history and life of the Cuban people, builders and fighters at the same time. From now on I will carry with me always images of Cuba, memories, and each time I enter combat, I will count on this double force in fighting against the aggressor—the Vietnamese force and the Cuban force!

# PORTRAIT OF A NEOCOLONY

---

## THE WORLD BANK

---

In September 1968 Indonesia was readmitted to the International Financing Company, IFC (Sukarno had withdrawn the country's membership in 1961). The new economic policy, which included the so-called attempts at stabilization which cost half a million communists their lives and 150 000 political prisoners, was the condition necessary for foreign investment, thereby fulfilling the interests of the World Bank. But as Eugene R. Black has put it, "Readjustment to stability calls for sacrifice and discipline." At the fourth conference attended by Indonesia and the "donor" countries, the World Bank presented a 450-page confidential report which judged the political situation in Indonesia to be "most confidence-inspiring" and presented a list of projects costing between \$200 and \$800 million which the World Bank felt should be given high priority. Among these were the financing of Indonesian investment banks which were to work in the private economic sector dealing in loans to private Indonesian corporations for purchase of foreign capital goods.

McNamora has ordered high priority to be given to Indonesian affairs on the budget of the World Bank. In 1968 the country was promised a loan of 350 million dollars as soon as there was order in the economy of the country. To this end, a permanent delegation of ten economists was appointed to control the economy of the country and to serve as "advisers" to the regime in the preparation of five-year plans.



Official name:	Republic of Indonesia
Area:	575,896 sq. miles
Population:	Between 115,000,000 and 123,000,000
Capital:	Djakarta
Official language:	Bahasa—Indonesian
Religion:	80% Muslim; most of the rest of the people are Christian
Production:	47% of the GNP comes from agriculture—rubber, copra, tea, coffee, tobacco, sugar, palm oil, rice; 28% comes from manufacturing, chiefly the production of agricultural and mineral products.
Per capita income:	Less than \$80
Infant mortality rate:	125 per 1000 births
Life expectancy:	44 years
Illiteracy:	54%

## NATIONAL EMBLEM OF INDONESIA

A Garuda, a type of eagle, is the symbol of the people's power of reconstruction. The 17 feathers on each wing and the eight on its tail represent the 17th of August of 1945, when the revolution broke out and independence was proclaimed. From the chain around the bird's neck hangs a heart-shaped medal signifying the struggle in defense of the people and the State. The slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity) expresses the fusion of various territories and groups of the population into one big union. What a sad parody that this possible symbol, representation of national pride and dignity, is used today by the right-wing generals who overturned Indonesia's liberation process in 1965 under the protection of international reaction directed from Washington: they unleashed the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of sons of the people, the most combative and brave citizens, opened the doors to imperialism's markets and established themselves as its front men and its police.

Guilt of betraying history, of crimes and shame for the Indonesian nation, they will pay dearly. The patriotic symbols will be redeemed and will again represent national dignity and pride. The Garuda will fly proudly in the free sky of Indonesia.



**I**n order to understand the functioning of the World Bank in Indonesia, it is first necessary to cast some light on the economic situation.


The changes within the government since 1966 have led to a new attitude toward foreign capital in Indonesia. The interest is no longer political or ideological, it is now economical. Those of us within the government, as well as those outside, have realized the importance of foreign capital. We have realized as well that state-owned corporations ought to be forced to compete freely with private corporations, domestic as well as foreign, and should no longer benefit from special favors. We have simplified the administrative procedures for export and have allowed export corporations to have a greater part of the profits. We have already taken serious steps to bring our bank system in order. Foreign capital may operate within all sectors with the exception, of course, of military industry (the US

has a monopoly in this sector). Gentlemen, Indonesia is a gold mine of natural resources, no one (not even I) knows the full extent of our riches... I will remind you of the large supply of cheap labor which we can offer you. Our 30 universities and colleges have produced a large number of educated personnel who will serve new corporations with pleasure. Indonesia is waiting for your advance technology, experience, and initiative.

These remarks are from a speech given by the Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, Sri Sultan Homeno IX Buwano, Sultan of Djakarta — who even before the change of power had 10,000 servants in his palace — in November 1967, at the Indonesian Investment Conference in Geneva. The conference was held at the initiative of Time, Inc., which has among its board members Eugene R. Black, former president of the World Bank.

The Sultan, who together with General Suharto, General Nasution and Foreign





Minister Adom Molik, formed the leading quartet in The New Order, did not speak to deaf ears. Already a half-year after the coup, it was declared that Indonesia should be neutral, and it was particularly emphasized that American investment should be encouraged and Indonesian-American relations, which had suffered under the anti-imperialist politics of the Sukarno regime, should be normalized. A Law on Foreign Capital Investment was signed on the 10th of January 1967. It stated, among other things, that the state would guarantee to foreign investors and corporations protection from war and war-like situations, including revolution and upheaval, for a period of at least 30 years. It enacted legislation for the legal protection of invested capital, the unconditional right to send full profits to the home country, a tax-free period of between three and five years for foreign investments (depending on the size of the investment) and provision for further tax reductions for up to five years.

Imported machine parts, raw materials, and semi-fabricated goods were made duty free. Foreign firms were permitted to own 100% of their factories. Those corporations which were nationalized under Sukarno were of course returned to their "legal" owners. The plantations previously owned by US Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company were returned to them after December 1966. On New Year's Eve, 1966, Shell, Coltex, Stonvox and Pan American Oil got their oil rights again. The Rockefeller concern signed a contract for 50 million dollars to provide Indonesia with lubrication oil in spite of the fact that the country is richly endowed with oil. Indonesia has its own oil refineries.



Between January 1967 and January 1968, 88 foreign corporations invested a total of \$389 million in Indonesia. In 1969 alone, 84 foreign investments were made with a

total amount of \$704 million, that is nearly double the previous year. The greater part of the investments — \$114 million — stem from the United States.

*Foreign investments in Indonesia 1969*

Millions of dollars

USA	114	Hong Kong	11
Canada	75	Panama	9
South Korea	48	West Germany	5
Holland	19	France	5
Japan	17	England	4
The Philippines	12		

Note: The oil and banking sectors have been omitted from the statistics.

### Mining

The greatest interest is centered on the exploitation of mining. International Nickel Company of Canada has special nickel mining rights, covering an area about one and a half times the size of Denmark. This involves a strengthening of the Canadian monopoly over world production of nickel, which is an important element in the steel industry (stainless steel) and essential to the weapons industry. Since 1963 Canada has held more than half of the world deliveries of nickel.

US Freeport has gained all rights to all minerals in West Irian (42 900 square kilometers). The daughter corporation, Indonesian Freeport, has already begun the mining of copper.

Indonesia has large tin deposits. Tin is already the country's third biggest export product after oil and natural rubber. The tin is mined by Ocean Mining (US), Ocean Science & Engineering (US), Amerado Petroleum (US), Dillingham Overseas Corp., etc. The last-named firm is especially known for its active use of aluminum in so-called Portuguese Guinea. Several of these multinational corporations have joined together to assure themselves the greatest possible returns on their investments.

### Curbing National Industry

In spite of declarations made by the Suharto regime that investments that serve to strengthen the country's own industries

should be shown highest priority, it is those corporations that export raw materials out of Indonesia to the foreign capitalists' own industries which in practice receive the best investment conditions. Nickel, tin, copper and bauxite ore minerals necessary for the building of advanced technological industry. The military regime has wasted all chances to build the country's own industry up by its active support of the international capitalists. As investments increase, the standard of living decreases and for the first time in a very long period there are reports of famine in Indonesia... a famine that is claiming thousands of victims.

### Forsaken Agriculture

In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that 70% of the population lives on agriculture, no investments have been made yet in the agricultural sector. Essential projects such as irrigation, fertilizing and equipment are set aside in favor of the interests of foreign capital.

In order to fulfill the most elementary needs — food, clothing and the like — the Suharto regime increases its debt to those countries which are normally referred to as "donating" countries, primarily the USA, Japan and Holland. The country as a

whole borrowed \$200 million in 1967, \$350 million in 1968, and in 1969 the military regime needed \$500 million extra to balance the budget.

The food problem is solved by buying surplus food from the USA (in 1967 the country purchased one million tons of rice for \$140 million) instead of supporting development programs which could improve the country's own production of food.

Neither is the clothing problem solved by support of the internal textile industry. Large quantities of Japanese textiles are imported, purchased with foreign credit. This has dealt the death blow to Indonesia's own small industries, which were spread throughout the country and which only needed new spare parts and raw materials to survive. These industries' capacities have been reduced by 80-90%, which has caused 500 000 unemployed in that branch and made many of them victims of the famine. Now the market is open for foreign investment and the Dutch textile firm, Koninklijke, has already begun production. According to Dr. Sedti, president of the Indonesian Board of Investment, the foreign investments in Indonesia have only created about 25 000 jobs, which do not even absorb the unemployed from the textile industry who have survived famine.



## Apartheid, Imperialist Monster

Alex La Guma

1971, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly as the "International year of struggle against racism and racial discrimination," is, paradoxically, and thanks to the interests and ambitions of the Western powers, the year in which the racist South African regime will begin to produce its own weapons and ammunition, will launch a modern air force, and will have the facilities to produce atomic weapons, so that the little more than three million whites can keep the 17 million blacks, mulattoes and Asians in virtual slavery.

With a policy entitled "development of races through separatism" and the creation of black republics and the bantustans, the bastion of apartheid seeks to divide the natives, and avoid global revulsion and the heretofore innocuous political and military sanctions recommended by different international organizations.

This article comes from Alex La Guma, a South African intellectual who has collaborated with *Tricontinental* on other occasions. Here, one sees the colonialist-imperialists' hidden motives as well as the intransigent decision of the African peoples to be free.

THE SOUTH African Government celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Republic on May 31 this year. In 1960 a referendum had been held, but only whites were allowed to

vote and by a majority of 52.3% of these voters (the pro-republican whites) the racist republic was born. It was proclaimed in 1961 amid the jubilation of the racists and a general strike by the nonwhite people. The 10th anniversary celebrations hardly received any support or recognition from the oppressed people; in schools, universities and other institutions of apartheid, the nonwhite people made it known that they had nothing to celebrate. In spite of massive intimidation, repression and terror, the people continue to show their abhorrence of the system of racism, violence and blatant exploitation.

Racism in South Africa — the ideology of white supremacy and black inferiority — was born with the invasion of our country by white settlers in the 17th century. The capitalists and traders of Europe, dissatisfied with the pillage of their own people, sought new sources of wealth in other parts of the world. By armed force, fraud and intrigue they plundered the people of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Australasia. The settlers came to South Africa as the henchmen of the Dutch East India Company.

Jan Van Riebeeck, leader of the first Dutch settlers, referred to the Khoikhoi people, the aboriginal people of the Cape, as "dull, stupid, and lazy," and described them as "a stinking nation." Thus justified, the settlers organized commandos and hunting parties to shoot adult members of these people. They shot as many as they could and took the younger ones as slaves and cattle herders. Predatory raids against these people who owned large herds of livestock resulted in rich booty for the settlers. Because of inferior weapons the aborigines naturally lost the battle against colonization.

White settlers gradually penetrated the interior of the Cape and drove the indigenous people from the best farmlands. Slaves were also imported from the East Indies and other parts of Asia and Africa to reinforce the decimated labor supply. The pattern was set for the ruthless colonial exploitation of the country, the expropriation of the land, the enforced harnessing of the labor power of the blacks.

When in 1806 the Dutch colony was seized by the British, the pattern did not change substantially. The British colonialists mounted a series of savage campaigns against the Amakhosa in the Eastern Cape and the Zulu people in Natal. They imported more white settlers from Britain and extended their conquest further through Bechuanaland, Basutoland and later into Zimbabwe, which they called Rhodesia.

However, as the ranking capitalist country of that time, Great Britain was opposed to direct chattel slavery. When this type of slavery was abolished, large contingents of Boers (farmers, descendants of the original Dutch settlers) who wanted to maintain chattel slavery, left the Cape on "the Great Trek" and advanced into those areas later named the Orange Free State and Transvaal, and into Natal. In the course of these advances the Boers conducted repeated aggressive wars against African tribes who owned the land of those regions. The Boers seized these lands, established the Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, based upon white domination, the exploitation of the black populations, and the principle of "No equality in church and state." The spirit of the white slave-owner remained as the core of their outlook.



<i>Official name:</i>	<i>Republic of South Africa</i>
<i>Area:</i>	<i>471,445 sq. miles</i>
<i>Population:</i>	<i>21,447,000</i>
<i>Capital:</i>	<i>Cape Town</i>
<i>Official language:</i>	<i>Afrikan and English are the official languages</i>
<i>Popular language:</i>	<i>Several Bantu languages</i>
<i>Religion:</i>	<i>Most of the population is Protestant. 20% of the Bantus claim membership in various Bantu churches.</i>
<i>Production:</i>	<i>23% of the GNP is derived from manufacturing—textiles, iron and steel, chemicals, fertilizer, automobile assembly, mining machinery; 10% is derived from agriculture—sugar, tobacco, wool, corn; 12% is derived from mining—gold, platinum, coal, diamonds, uranium, chrome.</i>
<i>Per capita income:</i>	<i>\$633</i>
<i>Infant mortality rate:</i>	<i>128 per 1000 births</i>
<i>Life expectancy:</i>	<i>47 years</i>
<i>Illiteracy:</i>	<i>22%</i>

The discovery of diamonds and then gold had profound and far-reaching effects: more foreigners flocked into South Africa: British and European financiers exported vast sums of investment capital to South Africa. In order to gain complete control over the gold in the Transvaal, British imperialism invaded the two republics and brought them into the British Empire; but no change in the conditions of the African people followed. Their colonial status and subjugation continued and was in fact intensified. The mining interests were now masters of the country and they had only one interest as far as the black inhabitants were concerned: to force them into labor in the mines at the minimum rate of pay. The British found the harsh colonial and racist policy of the Boer republics well suited to this purpose. Taxation, the pass laws and land-grabbing followed.

#### **New Colonialism**

British imperialism and Afrikaner (Boer) nationalism found common ground in the dispossession, oppression and exploitation of the non-whites. On this foundation the Union of South Africa was established in 1910. The racist constitution legitimized racism in the country and prepared the ground for the legalized national oppression, exploitation and humiliation of the black masses, and for all the atrocities committed against the people, individually and collectively.

The conceding of independence to South Africa by Britain in 1910 was not a victory over the forces of colonialism and imperialism. It was designed in the interest of imperialism. Power was transferred not into the hands of the mas-

ses of the people of South Africa, but into the hands of the white minority alone. The evils of colonialism, insofar as the nonwhite majority was concerned, were perpetuated and reinforced. A new type of colonialism was developed, in which the oppressing white nation occupied the same territory as the oppressed people themselves and lived side by side with them.<sup>1</sup>

Controlling the all-white parliament, the Boer landowners and imperialist mine-owners combined in a brutal alliance to extract the last ounce of cheap labor out of the African people. The first assault of the new Union of South Africa against the African was the Land Act of 1913. This law prohibited the African from owning land outside the "reserves," which constituted approximately 13% of the country. The whites seized the remaining 87% of the land, which was naturally the best and most fertile. The reserves, being insufficient and agriculturally poor, were incapable of supporting the population; thus the men-folk were driven by hunger to work for the white-owned enterprises. The state developed the contract system of migrant labor, which separated the wage-earner from his family, so that the bosses would not have to pay for the upkeep of the worker's dependents. The reserves became nothing less than reservoirs of cheap labor and the burial ground of those Africans who worked themselves to death under the semi-slave conditions which prevail in mines and on

<sup>1</sup> Program of the South African Communist Party, 1962.

farms.

The cooperative basis of the old tribal societies was broken down, and the entire African people transformed into a community of impoverished peasants and underpaid forced laborers.

Today the stratum of "white South Africa" is characterized by all features of the advanced capitalist state in its final stage of imperialism: highly developed industrial monopolies and mergers of industrial and finance capital; agriculture pursued on capitalist lines, employing wage labor and producing for local markets and export. South African monopoly capital is likewise closely linked with British, United States and other foreign imperialist interests in South Africa and they jointly share in the exploitation of the nonwhite peoples and uphold the racist apartheid policy.

Foreign investment clearly plays an important role in the economy of South Africa. In 1968, the total of foreign assets in the country was estimated at \$6416 million. The principal creditor countries were the United Kingdom, whose holdings were the largest, accounting for more than half of the total, and the United States. The two countries combined represented about 70% of the total value of foreign investments in South Africa at the end of 1968. There were much smaller, nonetheless significant, investments on the part of international organizations, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and several other countries. Among the major industries, foreign investments concentrated primarily in mining and manufacturing, though they were also of impor-

tance in South African finance and trade.<sup>2</sup>


The alliance between local capital and foreign imperialists naturally has developed internal conflicts. These are represented in the main white political parties and groupings, but they find common ground in the continued colonial-type subjugation of the nonwhite peoples.

South African monopoly capitalists also export capital, especially in Africa, and their expansionist character is plainly reflected in the inroads made by the regime into South West Africa, the open threats to African states to the north, and the political and economic interests in former British "protectorates" and Rhodesia, Malawi, etc. The recent news that South Africa is now also capable of developing the atom bomb is the latest manifestation of the racist republic's imperialist ambitions.

The white workers, on the whole, form the "aristocracy of labor." The ruling class has granted numerous concessions to them. They have the monopoly of the best-paid work and are invariably given positions of authority over nonwhites. They go regularly to the polls and vote for apartheid or racism in one form or another. The high standard of living and remuneration enjoyed by the whites come from their share in the superprofits accumulated by the capitalist class from the exploitation of the nonwhites.

The progression of white economic privilege is shown in the wid-

<sup>2</sup> Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa. Department of Political and Security Council Affairs: Unit on Apartheid; United Nations, NY, 1970.



ening gap between recent black and white wages. For example,

...in 1945-46 the ratio of white and African wages in private industry was 100:26. By 1957 it was 100:18. Statistics for 1970, which include mining and construction in addition to private industry, show a ratio of 100:12. Figures reveal that a white miner earns 19 times as much as a black miner; a white worker in industry gets five times as much as the black worker; and a white worker in the construction industry over six times as much.

Together with economic privilege and political superiority the white population is systematically indoctrinated with the creed of white supremacy and regards itself as part of the ruling class; thus it willingly acts as a tool and accomplice in the maintenance of colonialism and capitalism.

The lower strata of "black South Africa" exhibit all the characteristics of a colony. The indigenous population is subjected to extreme forms of national oppression, exploitation and poverty, lack of democratic rights and the domination by a group advocating its "European" or "Western Christian" character and "civilization." Characteristic too of imperialist rule is the reliance upon brute force and terror, the army and police, and the encouragement of the most backward of tribal elements and institutions.

The African people today constitute 69.7% of the population. The 1970 census figures disclosed by the Ministry of Statistics give the following population figures: whites, 3 799 000; Africans, 14 893 000; Coloureds (mixed descent), 1 996 000; Asians, 614 000. Total, 21 282 000.

The African inhabitants, living

and working in all parts of the Republic, form the basic population and are the main victims of the colonial system. The former divisions of the Africans on tribal lines have steadily broken down. The tribal system was suitable for the simple, self-sufficient economy of the past, but there is no place for it in a modern economy based on large-scale industry, mining and farming. The present government, pursuing the policy of "divide and rule," is attempting to revive tribalism, but these attempts cannot succeed. The African people are moving inevitably towards the formation of a single modern nation.

Under its so-called "Bantustan" policy, the Government proposes to partition South Africa. Nearly one third of the African people live on the reserves. The largest of these are the Transkei and Ciskei, in the Cape Province, and there are also others scattered widely in the other three provinces. All these the Government hopes to make the "homelands" of the African population. But these are unable to sustain the additional population — those Africans in the remaining 87% of the country, whom the authorities consider "aliens" or "temporary sojourners" in the "white" areas. The reserves are grossly overcrowded already and far too small to maintain the present population. Most of the Africans in the reserves are not independent peasants or do not have sufficient land by which to make a living. To support their families most of the men in the prime of life are away working for the whites.

<sup>a</sup> "African Workers and the National Struggle," *African Communist*, No. 44, 1971.

"More than 40% of the economically active men in the reserves are absent at any given time, working in the mines, factories, farms and homes in the white areas." "About 46.5% of the Africans live in the 'homelands,' the remainder live in the so-called white areas."

Likewise, soil exhaustion and lack of opportunity for crop rotation and intensive scientific farming is a feature of all the reserves which are the most backward and undeveloped areas, typical of colonial Africa. In spite of its boasts, "the number of jobs created in the past ten years for Africans in industry in the 'homelands' is about 2000."

The South African Government presents the "Bantu Homelands" scheme as a concession to the growing freedom struggle among the African people and to world opinion but it has been rejected with contempt by freedom-loving Africans and even by those who had approved of the racist-colonialist plans. In any case, the regime has no intention of conferring any genuine independence on any sector of the nonwhite people.

The special character of colonialism in South Africa and the appropriation by the white minority of all those opportunities which in other colonial countries have given rise to the growth of a national capitalist class, have strangled the development of a class of African capitalists. All positions of economic power and influence are held by members of the white group alone. There are very few Africans who make profits from the exploitation of labor power, since most of them are wage-earners in agriculture and industry. A few independent farmers own holdings, usually so small

that they can only be cultivated by the farmer himself and his family. There are a few African traders and shopkeepers who have to contend with numerous color restrictions; and their capital is so small that their businesses are rarely profitable. The professional groups, mainly teachers, do not as a rule receive better salaries, nor do they live better, than their fellow Africans.

The colored people live mainly in the Western Cape Province and comprise workers, farm laborers, professional people and small businessmen. The Asian community, mainly people of Indian origin, are descendants of indentured laborers brought in the last century to work the sugar plantations. The majority of them are industrial and agricultural workers and they have also developed a considerable merchant class. Both these nonwhite minority groups are subject to the various racist laws and restrictions.

#### The Revolutionary Force

The African workers in the towns comprise the most dynamic and most revolutionary force in South Africa. The wages of urban Africans, in relation to the very high living costs, are scandalously low. In shops and factories they are relegated to the heaviest and least rewarding forms of labor. Pass

<sup>a</sup> P. Smit, Head of the Department of Geography at the Africa Institute, reported in *The Star*, Johannesburg, July 12, 1969.

<sup>b</sup> House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), September 25, 1970.

<sup>c</sup> J. A. Grobbelaar, General Secretary of the Trade Union Council of South Africa, quoted in *The Star*, February 16, 1970.

imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of a powerful socialist system and a significant sector of newly-liberated areas has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control meaningful — economic emancipation. It is also happening in a new kind of South Africa... in which the independent expressions of the working people — their political organization and trade unions — are very much part of the liberation front. Thus our nationalism must not be confused with chauvinism and narrow nationalism of a previous epoch. It must not be confused with the classical drive by an elitist group among the oppressor in the exploitation of the mass.

The primary aims of the South African democratic revolution are defined in the Freedom Charter which is the joint program of the national liberation organizations of the various nonwhite peoples. The Freedom Charter is not a program for socialism.

It is a common program for a free, democratic South Africa, agreed upon initially by the mass Congress of the People in 1955, attended by thousands of the people's representatives, socialist and nonsocialist alike. However, in order to guarantee the abolition of racial oppression and white minority domination, the Charter calls for distinct economic changes: drastic agrarian reform to restore the land to the people; widespread nationalization of key industries to break the

grip of monopoly capital; radical improvements in the conditions and standards of living for the working people.

#### Armed Struggle

Neither the national liberation movement nor the Communist Party has ever adopted the theory of violent struggle or guerrilla warfare as the only possible road to freedom in South Africa or any other country, irrespective of conditions and circumstances. As is well known, the movement, for many years and particularly during the fifties, sustained prolonged campaigns of mass political and trade union activities, embracing hundreds of thousands of people, making the widest possible use of militant but nonviolent struggle. The policies and campaigns in that period were fully justified and correct. It has always been the view of the movement that a revolutionary policy should be that which holds out the quickest and most fundamental transfer of power from one class to another. But in real life such radical changes are brought about not by imaginary forces but by those whose outlook and readiness to act is very much influenced by historically determined factors. To ignore the true situation and to entertain imaginary forces, concepts and ideals is to invite failure. The art of leadership consists in providing leadership to the masses and not only to its advanced elements.

The militant actions and resultant persecutions also purged the South African movement of opportunists, waverers and careerists and gave it its revolutionary character. These struggles convinced the masses of the people and all their honest leaders and spokesmen that

there is no other road towards the achievement of their aspirations than that of revolution. Furthermore, the victory of the anti-imperialist forces in World War II, and the tide of independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America, combined with the struggles within South Africa in the past 50 years, created in the beginning of the sixties the possibility and feasibility of the turn in the direction of armed struggle in South Africa.

The establishment of the Spear of the Nation, the military wing of the ANC, in 1961 was recognition that from then on the liberation movement would have to achieve its goals not only by traditional political methods, but also by means of armed struggle, by answering fascist violence with revolutionary violence.

"The molding of mass political consciousness reached a new intensity," states the ANC report quoted above. "The response of the authorities was such that the overwhelming majority of the people, through their own participation in the struggle and confrontation with the state, recognized that in the long run the privileges of the minority will only be wrenched away from it by armed combat."

In a New Year's message in 1968, Oliver Tambo, Acting President General of the ANC, declared on behalf of the South African liberation movement: "For centuries the white oppressors of our country have lived by the sword. Now they shall perish by the sword. For decades white supremacy has been maintained by the gun. Now freedom shall be achieved by means of the gun."

Since the launching of the armed struggle in South Africa, the guer-

rilla detachments of the freedom movement have clashed with the racist troops of Vorster and those of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. The Battle of Wankle in the Zambesi Valley in 1967, between combined ANC and Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) forces and the white troops was a beginning of hard and serious battles still to come. Reports from South Africa indicate that guerrillas and armed political cadres are now infiltrating into the Republic, after training abroad.

In an illegal broadcast made by means of tape recordings placed at vantage points in several South African cities, the ANC called on the oppressed people to prepare for armed struggle.

The ANC calls on all the oppressed to organize and struggle and fight in the town and countryside.

We fight a guerrilla war. A guerrilla war is not a war of big armies. We have no big army. We organize ourselves into small groupings. We attack the enemy suddenly, when he is not expecting us. We kill him and we take his guns and disappear.

The countries of Southern Africa have yet to break the chains of colonialism and racism which hold them in oppression. In the Portuguese colonies, South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the Republic of South Africa, white racists and fascist regimes maintain systems which go against the current of the African revolution and world development. But the war of national liberation is on and it will develop and be fought to the finish.

Victory or Death!



# EDUCATION IN FREE MOZAMBIQUE

The education program in Tete Province is developing at a vigorous pace. There are already 16 schools with several thousand students in the various


stages of primary schooling. And now a pilot school, whose function is to direct and coordinate the work of all others in the sector, has been set up.

THE FRELIMO pilot school in Tete is located in K., on a hill in the middle of thick bush. The spreading branches of high trees cover the whole area of the school, hiding it from enemy airplanes. A small tributary of the River Copoche runs about 20 meters from the students' houses. The huts of the students and teachers, the kitchen, dining hall, bathrooms, infirmary and storehouse form a unit which is about 200 meters away from the classrooms. And about half an hour's march from the school are the shambos, whose produce feeds the 30 people of the school. Four sentry posts at vantage points around the edge of the area are manned to warn students and teachers of any attack.

In our political classes we teach what

FRELIMO is, why we are fighting, the aims of our struggle, and the statutes, program and organs of FRELIMO. We define who the enemy is and what the characteristics of the struggle are. The accent is on its revolutionary, popular and protracted nature, and on the role of the student in the revolution, why he is here and what FRELIMO expects of him during his stay at the center and afterwards. Students must also learn what a pilot center should be, relations of the center with the people, the kind of education we aim at, and its differences from colonial education.

We already have opportunities to open many more schools as soon as the teachers finish their preparation. This year, on the other hand, food production was intensi-





ried, although the shortage of seeds continues. In this pilot center we have ten students in second class who should all pass to third class judging by their present progress. In certain boarding schools we have more than 100 students.

All the students are from this province. But we had to bring the teachers from other provinces; two are from Manica and Sofolo, one from Cabo Delgado and one from Zambezia.

Agriculture — learning how to use the land to produce food — is very much part of the education program. Everyone at the school takes part every day in the cultivation of the fields. The center has three big shombas, two of maize and one of ground nuts. We are now going to introduce cassava and sweet potatoes, crops traditionally unknown in this province. Within their program the students also go periodically to help the villagers in different jobs, such as agriculture, house building and cleaning. The people, in their turn, help the school. They give them food, lend hoes, oxes and pangos. Shortly we are going to organize a program to exchange experience and skills with the local people. The people will teach the students things like making mats, pottery and other handicrafts. And the students will teach them how to read and write.

The military situation is normal. Since the center was created, it has not yet been attacked, but we are always on the alert and the students receive military training. In the morning a group of students goes on reconnaissance. During class time the soldiers from the nearest base do sentry duty for us.

Among the gravest difficulties we face is lack of school materials. We need exercise books, slates, pencils, blackboards and textbooks. Textbooks, especially, are a rarity. In most of the schools, only the teachers have them. And it is very difficult for a student to learn if he has no books through which to orientate himself. So it is hard for a teacher to be strict when the students face such difficulties. Other shortages make hardships; we lack clothes, soap, blankets, food, kitchen equipment and agricultural tools. Sometimes it is the material we capture that saves us. Some weeks ago we received several bales of cloth and 17 slates captured from the enemy by the comrades of a military base in this sector.

When it comes to recruiting students, we have difficulties in some regions. Traditionally the children must take care of the cattle, so that many parents refuse to let their children go to school. They must stay and watch the herds, parents insist. We are undertaking intensive political work in order to make the parents understand the advantages and the necessity of sending their children to the school. But we have to do it in stages. For example, if the father refuses to understand and he has, let us say, three children, we try to convince him to let two children go to school while one stays to take care of the cattle. Or we tell him that his child can go to school in the morning and in the afternoon he can carry on his normal duties. Or else we suggest that during certain periods after the harvesting, when there is no danger of the cattle damaging the shombas and thus no need for a cowherd, the children should be allowed to go to school.

Another problem is the participation of women. In this province girls traditionally marry very young, sometimes when they are ten years old — and that is just the age when they should go to school. And when this happens, of course, the husbands do not allow them to go and study. We have launched a big campaign aimed at the parents and now many of them understand that they should not permit their daughters to marry so young. Since

the revolution started, this kind of marriage has diminished very much. And the proof of our success can be seen by the attendance of girls in our schools — in five schools we have more girls than boys. But this does not happen everywhere, women's participation in schools is still a problem.


(Taken from *Mozambique Revolution*)



... FORGE SIMPLE WORDS  
THAT EVEN THE CHILDREN CAN  
UNDERSTAND  
WORDS WHICH WILL ENTER  
EVERY HOUSE  
LIKE THE WIND  
AND FALL,  
LIKE RED HOT EMBERS  
ON OUR PEOPLE'S SOULS.

JORGE REBELO  
FRELIMO

## María Njanje, Student: The Woman's Role



When I was 17 years old my parents forced me to marry. This is the custom here — women marry very young. I would prefer to study rather than to marry, but as I did not see any possibility of being able to continue studying, and as tradition is very strong, I married. I have a son. When FRELIMO arrived my husband joined the guerrillas. He is a FRELIMO fighter. I showed a willingness to study and so FRELIMO placed me in a school. Before that I was in a FRELIMO base — as I already had first grade, I taught the comrades at the base how to read and write. In my class I had 141 students. Then after that I studied second and at the end of last year I was transferred here to the pilot school where I am studying third grade.

I am very happy to have come to FRELIMO. First of all because I can study — that was always my dream. With the colonialists only those who have money can study. Here everybody who wants to study is allowed to do so. Another difference I notice is that the Portuguese teachers were not interested in explaining to anyone who did not understand something; while here our teachers make every effort to ensure that we understand everything.

The Portuguese troops, when they arrive in a village, steal chickens, pigs, cattle, from the people. The guerrillas never take anything from the people. When the Portuguese soldiers find girls on the roads they violate them. In FRELIMO we women are very much respected — and this impresses our sisters who come from the enemy zone, as I did. We are accustomed to something quite different. Under the colonialists, when a man in uniform appeared, it usually meant ill-treatment. We are so surprised at first when we see the guerrillas treating us as sisters, not as objects of pleasure.

The problem of participation of women in our education program is serious in this province. We must change the traditions which force us to marry when we are very young. I myself am engaged in a campaign aimed at the families in this region to explain to them the need to change this custom: it is harmful to us and to the revolution.

## Head of the School

My name is Roxue Vicente, I am 23 years old, I was born in a Nhamitanga District of Mueda, Cobo Delgado Province. My parents are peasants. I went to school at the Catholic Mission of Nongoiolo where I finished primary education in 1960. As there was no secondary school for Africans in the whole province I was forced to enter the seminary of Morriri where I did three years. In 1964, I was expelled from the seminary, accused of being part of a group of students connected with subversive activities. After my expulsion I joined FRELIMO. I have been teaching in the FRELIMO schools of Bagamioyo and Tunduru. In 1970 I was sent to the interior of my country to the Province of Tete, where I am teaching in the pilot center of this province.

Portuguese colonialist oppression against the people in my region, mass arrests to fill the PIDE prisons, terrorist acts by the Portuguese troops, people without education through lack of schools — it was this which compelled me to join the liberation struggle and fight in order to end all kinds of exploitation and oppression in my country. That is why I am here in Tete, and I am happy to be here, it is exactly the same as being in Cobo Delgado or in any other province because it is part of one and the same Mozambique. That is also what we teach our comrades in the school — for them to know our country, to know that Tete is part of Mozambique as is Niassa, Cobo Delgado, Zambezia. Because only thus will we be able to take the liberation struggle to the whole country.



## José Jeque. Student: A Real Chance to Learn

I attended the second grade in Chiuto in 1958, but was compelled to abandon school because the Portuguese forced me to pay personal tax. So I went to Maotize to work as a servant. I was very ill-treated, I received 125 escudos per month. I gathered the necessary money to pay the tax — 175 escudos — then I went home where I stayed until 1963 working in the shambos. In 1963 I went to Tete where I got a job helping in the maintenance of bulldozers. I was there one year, then the company moved to Lourenço Marques and I was again unemployed. I returned home. In 1966 I got a job in Beiro in the stores at the railway station, I earned very little, I was alone — but even so I endured it for four years. In 1970 I returned home. When I arrived there was war in my area. The Portuguese had killed many people. My family had been arrested: the colonialists had accused my mother of having given food to the guerrillas and they arrested the whole family.

In a single day 12 people — 12 women — had been killed in my village. They had gone to cultivate the fields and they had taken maize flour to eat during the day. At noon they went to a nearby well in order to use the water to cook. When they were near the well they met the Portuguese troops. The Portuguese commander asked them where they were taking the flour. They answered, "we are going to cook for us to eat." The Portuguese then answered, "what you are going to do is to take that to the terrorists... you collaborate with them, I am going to teach you a lesson." He shot off several rounds of his machine gun and killed all 12 women. Their bodies remained abandoned near the well.

When I heard this I decided to run away before the Portuguese found me: I entered the bush and went to a FRELIMO base. I was there teaching first grade (I had 109 students), before coming to this pilot school where I am now studying in third grade.

Of course I am very happy that I came to FRELIMO. I am only doing third grade although I am 28 years old, but this is one of the consequences of colonialism. Our struggle will enable our children to have better conditions.



# PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A YANKEE BASE

by Roberto Correa Wilson


Eritrea, a strip of land 500 miles long and 100 miles wide at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, is an important pivotal point for the entire Middle East. Iranian oil, extracted by Western oil companies, is shipped around the Arabian peninsula, past Eritrea through the Red Sea, and overland through Israeli pipelines to the Mediterranean. The United States has a major base at Kagnev in the mountains near the Eritrean capital of Asmara, and 1800 Dept. of Defense personnel are stationed there. The base, with its satellite tracking station, is a strategic link in the worldwide American intelligence system. When Senator Fulbright questioned State Dept. officials about the role of the 1800 men at the base, the officials' replies were deleted from the public record. In addition, the U.S. has given Ethiopia, which formally annexed Eritrea in 1962, over \$153 million in military assistance since 1953 (including at least two squadrons of T-28, F-86 and C-119 warplanes). This constitutes over half of total U.S. military aid to Africa during the period.

Estimates of unmined iron ore deposits in Eritrea total 225 billion tons. Gold has been mined there since 1897, and the annual production reached \$20 million in 1940. Since World War II production has been discontinued because of the instability in the area. Other unexploited resources are sodium, potassium, mica, beryl, marble, nickel, copper, manganese, titanium, magnesium, feldspar and petroleum. In 1963 the Ethiopian government leased the oil rights to coastal Eritrea and 10,500 square miles off her shores to Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil. Agriculture is the primary occupation of Eritrea's two million people, yet one cash crop, coffee, dominates the economy, and there is starvation every year. The land is fertile but needs major irrigation works to really develop.

The Eritreans speak Arabic, or its Hamitic dialect Tigrinya, and the population is equally divided between Christians and Muslims. It is impossible to assign them to one racial type, for as with many groups in this part of the world, a long history of immigrations, invasions and migrations, from the Egyptians and Ptolemaic Greeks through the Portuguese, Turks, Italians and British has left its mark on the original nomadic tribes of Negro people who inhabited the area.

In 1885 Italy wrested Eritrea from the Egyptians who had taken it from the Turks who had taken it from the Portuguese. . . . In 1889 King Menelik of Ethiopia, the predecessor of the present emperor, Haile Selassie, signed a treaty granting Italy possession of Eritrea, though it was never his to give away.

During World War II Eritreans fought alongside Ethiopians against Mussolini's forces. After the war, with British forces occupying the country, the question of independence for Eritrea was thrown to the United Nations. In 1952, after two UN commissions visited Eritrea but failed to conduct a plebiscite, the General Assembly voted for Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia in a vaguely-worded resolution calling for civil liberties and equal representation for the Eritreans, but leaving implementation of the resolution to the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie. An Eritrean assembly was formed and enacted a democratic constitution, but this was in conflict with the autocratic police laws in force in Ethiopia. The appointed Eritrean chief executive, Selassie's son-in-law, consistently overturned decisions of the Eritrean courts and acts of the assembly. Throughout the 1950s the emperor, over Eritrean protests, suppressed political party activity, abolished labor unions, confiscated Eritrean customs collections and sent a 14,000-man U.S.-equipped armed force to occupy the country. Finally, in November 1962, Selassie dissolved the Eritrean assembly and officially annexed the territory. In the same year the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) began the guerrilla operations which have continued to escalate.



ONE morning in 1953, the Eritreans, accustomed to the desolate landscape of a medieval country in mid-20th century, suddenly saw a thick forest of antennae arise, followed by two radar screens which revolved silently from eight-story buildings, cutting off the fresh air of the tableland north of Asmara.

The Eritreans, who throughout the centuries have been attacked and occupied by the Egyptians, Turks, Italians, British, and now by the Ethiopians, associated this American base with the rule Emperor Haile Selassie has maintained over their country under the status of "federation," since 1952.

Although less well-known than the many bases in South Viet Nam and Okinawa and the recently dismantled Wheelus Fields in Libya, the US Kognew Station in Ethiopia is equally important to US world political and military strategy. And although it does not have the characteristics of a "combat base," like those of Kadena or Da Nang (the latter is the biggest military, naval and air complex in South Viet Nam), Kognew is vitally important to Washington's huge system of strategic communication.

The Ethiopian government signed a treaty with the American authorities in 1953, by which this radio-communications complex was to be set up in Asmara, capital of Eritrea, two thirds of which is already under the control of the Eritrean Liberation Front (FLE). Two agreements were signed that year, one for mutual defense and military aid, by which the United States promised to equip and train Emperor Haile Selassie's armed forces, and a second which arranged for the installation of a communications center in Asmara.

The choice of Ethiopia for the building of the base meant, apart from its utility from a geographical point of view, that Washington officially considered the country, which for more than 30 years has been under Selassie's iron rule, to be politically the most stable, not only in East Africa, but on the whole continent.

Kognew Station, which cost 63 million dollars and is managed by communications specialists from the US Navy and Signal Corps, is the most important of five similar installations in the world. The other four are in the Philippines, Hawaii, San Francisco and Maryland.

Some 7600 feet above sea level, and only 15 degrees north of the Equator, Kognew Station has an exceptional position in world communications. The unusual combination of altitude and nearness to the Equator means it can offer radio communication service remarkably free from the interference found in other parts of the world.

The huge base is the latest big military installation to be set up in Africa.

According to American experts, Kognew Station provides instant communication for the American president should he wish to contact the White House during flights over the Eastern Atlantic, Europe and Africa. It can send messages from overseas American bases to the Pentagon, from Navy warships in the Indian Ocean and diplomatic communications from embassies and military missions in Europe, Africa and parts of Asia to the State Department.

Kognew also transmits messages to American satellites and plays an important role in the US space program. Many space-ship flights are controlled from it, as are sea operations should the capsule come down in a neighboring area.

The base is also used for US espionage activities. Progressive forces have declared that Kognew's electronic listening devices monitor the Arab states and extend deep into the territory of the USSR and other socialist countries. Over 1500 American specialists are employed on the base.

Kognew's importance to the United States is seen in Washington's far-reaching undertaking to supply and equip the Ethiopian armed forces which have suffered many defeats at the hands of the FLE. In fact is also training some of them — for

## ETHIOPIA

Official name:	Empire of Ethiopia
Area:	471,778 sq. miles
Population:	25,000,000
Capital:	Addis Ababa
Official language:	Amharic is predominant
Popular language:	Arabic is spoken by 1/3 of the population
Religion:	About half the population is Ethiopian Orthodox; about 1/3 is Muslim
Production:	About 70% of the GNP comes from agriculture—coffee, cotton, corn, sugar, wheat, sorghum, oilseeds
Per capita income:	\$63
Infant mortality rate:	45.6 per 1000 births
Life expectancy:	35 years
Illiteracy:	95%

instance, the Israeli police are training an antiguerrilla commando which operates mainly in Eritrea, as well as the imperial secret services. The German Federal Republic is offering a million dollars per year to train and arm Haile Selassie's police force.

"Our aid consists simply of paying the rent for Kognew Station," said an American official recently. But there was a lot more to it than this, for apart from the million and a half dollars' rent, Ethiopia gets over half of all the military aid the US gives to African countries. According to latest figures, the program has already cost over 100 million dollars.

The 110 officers and soldiers of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group that advises the three corps of the Imperial Armed Forces is the biggest

United States base on this continent. High-ranking American officers work in buildings a few meters from those of the Ethiopian chief of staff.

All this helps to perfect and equip the Ethiopian Army (which has about 40 000 men mobilized and has modern artillery and supersonic planes) for the task of containing the growing menace that the Eritrean liberation forces are becoming to Kognew Station. At present, Washington and Addis Ababa appear nervous about the nearness of the guerrilla forces' operations. The future of this radio-communications complex (which Washington believes "vital for the defense of the free world") depends on what the Eritrean Liberation Front can do in the next few years.

## Irrintzik


Ernesto González Bermejo

The Franco dictatorship survives anachronistically in Europe due to the efforts of the imperialists, since the defeat of fascism in the Second World War.

In this small empire of well-defined nationalities which is Spain, the Basque people have demonstrated solidly their libertarian desire, as vigorous as their character, and as ancient ("the Basques have no date of origin," a Basque once said) and they proved it in their courageous confrontation with the German troops and the bloody repressions they suffered in defeat. Guernica is the heritage.

Ernesto González Bermejo, Uruguayan journalist from Prensa Latina, and one of our magazine's collaborators, brings to this work an historic summary of the Basque people and their struggle, now crystallized in ETA, political vanguard of the Euzkadi people.

YOU HAVE to be here, at this resort with its belle époque atmosphere, where in spite of the sports cars and unisex fashions, figures from impressionist paintings seem to walk along the Paseo de la Concha, under the tamarind trees; you have to stop at the huge bay with its Santa Clara island, walk along the Boulevard, climb the Urgull, and reach the Barrio Viejo (old section), where, on one side of the ancient square with its arcades, there are probably more cafés per square meter than in any place else in the world: Alcalde, Tiburcio, El Bartolo, La Astelena, ask for a chiquito, a small glass of good wine, a few *banderillas* — those little plates of ham, eggs, fish in sauce, shrimp; you have to recall some key name, and then the muteness of the Basques, their sullen welcome, will suddenly be broken and they will talk about "their boys" and how "you have already seen what it is to face death without blinking an eye": they will speak of Euzkadi Ta Askatazuna, the ETA.



### Basque Origins: A Secret of Time

Within a realistic national aspiration, the country known as Euzkadi<sup>1</sup> with some 2 600 000 inhabitants, is a small territory subjected in part to Spanish rule and in part to French. In terms of Basque patriotism this fictitious division comprises South Euzkadi (Spanish zone) with four provinces: Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, Navarra and Alava; and North Euzkadi (French zone) with three provinces: Labourd, Basse-Navarre and Soule.

Euzkadi is a national community with a number of its own characteristics which range from ethnic, organizational and cultural to those of language, customs, a way of life, which have existed in its territory from time immemorial. Even the origin of its language and its people's roots are unknown.

The geographic characteristics of the Basque territory are such that its inhabitants do not undergo the same penetrations that affect the rest of the Iberian peoples: having escaped Roman colonization neither Latin nor the Catholic religion is imposed on them; nor do they suffer the Arab invasion. Living in isolation, they are not subject to all the influences which come together in what will later be the Spanish nation. During the Middle Ages, too, they maintain a practically independent regime without participating more than marginally in the Reconquest, and they establish a very singular organization, a primitive form of democracy based on neighborhood councils. Euzkadi, at that time, is an area profusely divided into small farms, with basically agricultural and fishing resources and certain rudimentary industries

such as the construction of boats and iron arms. Its foundries have been famous since the 11th century.

In that period, the Iberian peninsula is a conglomerate of kingdoms: Castile, Aragon, Arabs, the earldom of Catalonia. One can speak of the formation of the Spanish state at the end of the 15th century when the Catholic Monarchs join the vast territories of Catalonia and Aragon to those of Castile. The Basque country retains a special status: it joins, but with certain conditions which give it the right — maintained until the mid-19th century — to democratic ratification of its incorporation into the Kingdom of Spain.

During the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries, the participation of the Basques in the Spanish colonial conquest overseas corresponds to the interests of their own development; it is they who provide the majority of experts in seamanship, with a great mastery of navigation, a proven capacity for enterprise in sailing the seas. This is the case, for example, with El Cano, who goes around the world. If one reviews the pilots and captains of the ships that sailed during the Conquest, it is clear that there is a very high percentage of Basques.

Other institutions typical of Spanish formation, such as the latifundio, never come into existence in the Basque country, in part because the old small-farm structure resists the change, in part because of the long democratic tradition in Euzkadi where, from the beginning, no one permits himself to be considered anyone else's vassal.

When feudalism reaches the frontiers of Euzkadi, the Basques make

<sup>1</sup> Euzkadi can be translated as "Basque country" but in the Basque language it has a connotation of fighting for national rights.

a decision: to declare themselves nobles. From that time on, all are nobles. This is why their surnames start with de. Thus they continue equal as before: no one is anyone else's vassal.

The Inquisition, another of the institutions that forms the structure of the Spanish state, also fails to penetrate the Basque country; it has no jurisdiction there. When in 1610 a great "Burgos trial" of "Basque witches" takes place, the hearings and executions have to be held in Logroño, the frontier for the penetration of the Spanish empire.

#### Wars and the PNV

With industrial development, the Basque nationalist sentiment remains more or less latent until, at the end of the 19th century, it undergoes a resurgence as a result of the Carlist wars. The traditional view of these wars — which can be considered historically correct — is that in them the defenders of the ancien régime, the integristas, confronted the liberals, representatives of the government of Madrid.

But from the Basque point of view this version overlooks one detail: for Euzkadi, the ancien régime did not mean feudalism; on the contrary, the centralism of Madrid with all its enlightenment, its advanced ideas, was a step backward for the Basques.

This explains why the Basques almost naturally joined the Carlist band, and as a consequence of the wars the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) appears, the first vehicle of national sentiment in its modern phase. It is a progressive party that is politically reactionary nationally — that is, in relation to the world of Madrid.

Euzkadi remains an agricultural country to the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th; it accomplishes the mechanization process at an accelerated rate and

occupies an advanced position in Europe with respect to industrial development. It is then that the interests of the PNV begin to differ from those in the countryside and come to ally themselves with those of the bourgeoisie, the democrats, the developmentalists of the petite bourgeoisie and the Spanish bourgeoisie. In the Spanish parliament, the PNV on the one hand supports Basque national interests and on the other hand the interests of a bourgeoisie with a considerable degree of industrial development.

In 1936, paradoxically for many, the PNV allies itself with the Republic. It is because the Republic guarantees Euzkadi an autonomous status, gives it a number of nationalistic concessions and maintains an objective relationship, both economic and political, between the Spanish Republic — which, after all, is headed by the Spanish petite bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie — and the interests of the Basque bourgeoisie in their confrontation with the latifundist, centralist and repressive forces of the Spanish "nationalist" group.

After 1939 and the Republican defeat in the Civil War, the Basques begin to suffer discriminatory treatment which sweeps away their rights, with the guarantees that they have jealously defended throughout their history. They were set up like the other Spanish provinces; worse yet, until a year ago the country's constitutional laws spoke of the "traitorous provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya."

After the Second World War, the PNV continues to be the vehicle of the Basque people's national and independent aspirations, but it manifests a growing unity with a rightist bourgeois opposition, tied to the fate of the European bourgeoisie, with perspectives which, rather than being autonomous, seek

incorporation into Europe and the Common Market. It is therefore a strictly bourgeois movement but it still has a Basque nationalist content and one other characteristic: strong roots in the Basque clergy. In contrast to what happened in other regions of Spain, in Euzkadi there was no religious persecution during the Civil War; on the contrary, religion was protected. This explains in part why today there is such unity between clergy and people in defense of Basque interests and why two of the accused in the Burgos trial were priests.

#### ETA: The Angry Sons

In 1952 there was a meeting of students, most of them from Bilbao, some from San Sebastian. They were the wrathful sons of the old PNV militants — restless youth, nationalists — who decided to publish a magazine, *Ekin* (Act), as an organ of the group's thinking. Its title is significant: it reflects their need to do, to act.

As yet they had no fundamental ideological difference with PNV: they were more combative, more radical in their action, they condemned party inactivity, but they were nationalists and nothing beyond that.

For four years they neither established their own organization nor joined the PNV. They published the magazine, they placed Basque flags in the church bell towers, in conspicuous spots in the towns, they blew up the monuments of the régime; they put posters in the streets.

En 1956 they request membership in the PNV and constitute the *Euzko Gaztedi* (Basque Youth). They remain within the party for only two years; in 1958 one of the youths is expelled as a communist — he wasn't moreover — and the

remaining members of the Youth maintain solidarity with him, leave the PNV, and at the end of 1958 set up the *Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna* (Basque People and Liberty), which does not proclaim itself an organization publicly until the beginning of 1959 with a first manifesto of Basque ideology.

But the organization begins to evolve and an initial split occurs. Certain national leaders, young bourgeois (industrial engineers, technicians) charge in a public letter that ETA is moving toward extremely radical positions, is abandoning the purity of Basque ideas and is trying to introduce Marxism, a "foreign ideology" of a revolutionary nature.

The first resounding action by the organization is unfortunate: on July 18, 1961, it derails a train it believes to be occupied exclusively by "nationalist" ex-combatants who attended an anniversary celebration of the Franco uprising. But the families of the ex-fighters are also travelling in the train. There are wounded: among those gravely hurt is a little girl, whose life is saved in spite of everything. The action is unpopular, easily exploited by the organs of the régime, and the strong repression which follows is a hard blow to the organization.

Later the ETA criticized itself for the derailment of the train. It called it "an unpremeditated adventurist action, based on poor information." It provided basic experience for proposals for future action in the double sense of popular repercussion and the repressive response that may result (although this latter aspect can be questioned with the execution of Melitón Manzanas in 1969).

#### The Fifth Assembly: Zarra and Barri

There follows a shadowy period for the organization until 1966,

when an event of importance to its future occurs: the Fifth Assembly (from which one concludes that there were four prior assemblies on which little or no information is available).

In the Fifth Assembly, the organization splits into two large groups, the ETA zarra (old) and the ETA berri (new). This designation of zarra is unacceptable to this majority sector of the organization and is circulated by the berri who consider themselves to be representatives of the new orientation in the movement.

Both tendencies agree on the characterization of ETA as a socialist movement for national liberation, but the berri want to make public the Marxist-Leninist character of the organization and the zarra don't. The fundamental difference between the two sectors of the organization is that while the berri propose a total reconsideration of ETA strategy, they argue, although they declare themselves to be Marxists to the death, that their activity should be directed toward study, toward a theoretical development which will allow them to associate themselves closely with the masses. The zarra continue to be partisans of action and call the berri "liquidationists."

But at the same time, within the dynamics of the Fifth Assembly, the zarra, who have not precipitated any definition in order to avoid an authentic solution for the left, undergo an accelerated radicalization process and take revolutionary positions.

The berri, who at that moment split and take apparently more leftist positions, actually become a sort of Marxist study circle that publishes a magazine called Zutik (Onward); (the zarra publish another one with the same name) until the actions begin and the repression falls on them as well — although they have no responsibility

for any of them — and they abandon the letters ETA, stop using the title Zutik for their magazine, and dissolve into a group called Komunistak (Communist). At present, the ETA that continues is the zarra.

After the split at the Fifth Assembly, the ETA laid out the basis of its organization. It structured itself along two types of divisions, one vertical in four areas: political, military, worker and cultural; and the other horizontal by territorial zones.

The political front, responsible for the general ideological line of the movement, relations with other forces, and propaganda, creates a political office for all this.

The work of the military front is intense. It has accumulated a record of 114 actions from the time of the Fifth Assembly up to the Burgos proceedings, surpassing that well-publicized first phase and others that provide the regime with still more problems: bombing of two Civil Guard barracks, explosion of dynamite charges in another with a warning to evacuate, since they are houses — that is, barracks where families live; machine gunning of a civil guard; reprisals against traitors; frequent raids to finance the organization, culminating on August 3, 1969, with the execution of Melitón Manzanas.

The organization's type of armed struggle has very peculiar characteristics determined by the conditions of the surrounding area. It is not, of course, a mass struggle with armed support in the traditional sense; nor is it a rural guerrilla, given the high degree of urbanization in the Basque country, and it cannot be a typically urban guerrilla in cities such as San Sebastian, which have no more than 150,000 inhabitants. The whole province of Guipuzcoa, which has fairly exten-

sive rural zones, considering the small size of the territory and the broad network of highways, roads and communications, becomes a kind of extended city which includes rural islands.

Without mountains at a sufficient distance, without cities large enough to afford sufficient protection, the struggle develops mainly along the highways. An ETA leader would say: "our jungle is the highway." It is therefore a new kind of struggle, semirural, semiurban, which covers the entire province — some 600,000 inhabitants — and has as its principal stage the highways (there they execute a civil guard and there an important leader of the organization, Echevarrieta, dies); it is a fight that often has to be waged with the use of racing cars.

#### The Complexity of the Workers' Front

Given the new ideological tendency which gives considerable importance to the mobilization of the working class, the ETA tries to establish connections with existing mass organizations and workers' movements, the most important of which is the Communist Party of Spain.

What makes the problem more difficult is that approximately 80% of the unskilled working class in the Basque country is Spanish, due to the Euzkadi industrial development and the technically qualified level of its cadres. Particularly in Vizcaya, in Bilbao, the presence of blast furnaces, of the iron and steel industry and of very developed shipyards, attracts a type of Spanish worker whom it is difficult to win over because he suffers neither the linguistic nor national oppression that affects the Basque workers.

It was almost impossible at first

to establish any kind of joint work because class factors pitted the Communist Party of Spain against Basque organizations such as the PNV.

Originally, the ETA creates the Workers' Committees parallel to the Communists' organization of Workers' Commissions, with a content that is more Basque nationalist. But in the Fifth Assembly an important step is taken with ETA's definition of class: what is to be understood as "the Basque people." The ethnic and linguistic origins common to both bourgeoisie and workers are left aside in order to define, as a member of the Basque people, "all who sell their labor power in Euzkadi." The thesis is proposed by Echevarrieta and approved. This step facilitates enormously the labor of the workers' front of ETA which now has real class support. ETA now maintains that national oppression is just one more drop added to the general class oppression that the Basque working people suffer and consequently proposes workers' unity without any discrimination.

Although the matter is under discussion, ETA's tendency, which has reached the point of understanding with the Communist Party of Spain, is to dissolve its Workers' Committees and become a part of the Workers' Commissions set up by the CP, as specific representatives of the Basque people.

#### The Recovery of a Culture

The ETA does not propose an abstract cultural development. Its work on this front is aimed at rescuing and disseminating Basque culture among the masses, developing a national consciousness along with class and revolutionary consciousness. This view is manifested in such efforts as the ykastoias (schools), a grade school system, semiclandestine at the beginning, enjoying church and other institu-



# ESPAÑA



tional support, to teach children the Basque language and the rudiments of national culture. Today there are 14 000 students in the *ykastolas* and they are beginning to open schools for secondary education.

The knowledge and use of the Basque language is one of the determining elements in understanding the oppression of Euzkadi. Since the end of the Civil War, there is fierce repression against Basque people who speak in their own language. The ETA thus touches a sore spot with this activity. The other important thing is that the formation of teachers and professors and their work in the *ykastolas* presupposes a clandestine practice which facilitates their later incorporation into other and more committed organizational activities.

Finally, it can be said that this is how the organization functions on the vertical level, by fronts, while at the same time it has as territorial zones, the *erialdes* (on the side of the people). There are two for each of the Spanish provinces, or eight, and one for the three French provinces. Each *erialde* has a person in charge of it, the *erialde buro* (head).

Practice has demonstrated — and actually ETA is revising this aspect of its organization — that among those in charge of the fronts and *erialdes* there is often a duplication of functions and a confusion concerning lines of authority.

As far as organic structure is concerned, the highest authority of ETA is the *Biltzarr Nagusia* (Great Table), the general assembly or plenary of the organization. Since in clandestine conditions this assembly cannot meet frequently there is a *Biltzarr Tipia* (Small Table), composed of those responsible for different fronts, and the *erialde buro*. And finally there is another body, still smaller, made up of six members and known as

the *Ket* (Tactical Executive Committee) which is actually in charge of carrying out the decisions of the *Biltzarr Tipia*. The function of this last body includes ideological control and the supervision of the decisions which the *Ket* must put into practice.

## Who Are the Members of ETA

The members of ETA come from various origins and different social groups. They are university youth reflecting Paris May, Che Guevara, the Third World, a type of radicalized existentialist intellectual, later radicalized toward Marxism; then there are the industrial workers — these are newer members — or those who belong to a rural Basque left strain. In Euzkadi there is no peasant class in the Latin-American sense; it is a rural petite bourgeoisie linked to the industrial process, whose sons generally go into the factories, to the universities. And a fourth component — more than a component, a point of support — are the Basque priests.

Making a rapid survey of those on trial at Burgos, we see that Gorostide, a metallurgical worker, had been president of his trade union, that there are two economists and a student, two priests, three young women who have something of the image of the "fighter's companion," one bank employee, a metallurgical worker and Izco, a typographer.

Thus a Third World university consciousness coincides with that of the working petite bourgeoisie which at times owns a piece of land, means of production, but works with definitely workers' sectors.

The struggle is based — and this is decisive — on a working platform which does not exist, not at least with this intensity, in any other part of Spain: Basque national feeling.

### The Climax: Manzananas' Execution

Francisco Javier Echevarrieta, one of the six members of the **Ket**, was a twenty-three-year-old Bilbaoian and recent graduate in economics, who was machine-gunned by the police on a highway.

Faced with the death of a leader of this caliber, the organization decided to make a reply that would fulfill two objectives: first, it should correspond to the importance of the assassinated leader, and second it should have broad repercussions and popular acceptance.

Melitón Manzananas had been the head of the Political-Social Brigade of Guipuzcoa Province for 30 years. Anyone who had ever let out a cry in the streets had had something to do with him: Socialists, Communists, simple Basque nationalists; for three decades he had monopolized ideological repression. As if all that weren't enough, everything seems to indicate that during the Second World War, he and his associates were in charge of handing over to the Nazi occupiers in France, Jews and maquis who entered the Basque country.

There was probably no other man who aroused such unanimous hatred in Euzkadi as Melitón Manzananas. The ETA decided on his execution as a reply to the death of Echevarrieta. Ambushed at the door of his home, Manzananas died, machine-gunned by an ETA commando on August 3, 1969.

The execution of Manzananas had diverse and contradictory consequences for the organization. On the one hand, it was an action of unprecedented popularity which gave it enormous prestige; on the other hand, it unleashed large-scale repression which hit ETA brutally. The ETA militants, some very new to the organization, all of whom led very discreet lives, were for the

most part not in the dossiers of the social-political brigade. It was with the support of the Civil Guard — which controls movement in provincial towns and nonurban zones and notes certain absences — and with the intervention of a specialist sent by the central government to coordinate persecution, that various important members of the organization were arrested. It is also known, and proved, that systematic torture was applied.

### The Sixth Assembly: Another Split

At the time the Sixth Assembly of ETA was convened, a high percentage of the members of the **Biltzarr Nagusia**, the highest body, and of the **Biltzarr Tipia**, the intermediate body, and even of the **Ket**, were in prison, in exile, or dead like Echevarrieta.

Over the years from the time of the execution of Manzananas to the Council of Burgos, José María Escubi was the only member of the **Ket** who was inside the country and had freedom of operation.

In the course of action, in accord with the necessities of the organization determined by the death of its leaders, Escubi went about designating an emergency **Biltzarr Tipia** and, in the summer of 1970 (August), convened the Sixth Assembly.

This emergency **Biltzarr Tipia** was characteristically Marxist-Leninist and the remainder of the leaders elected by the previous assembly — considering the probability that the calling of an assembly at this time could be unfavorable to their positions which were notably nationalist and militarist according to the other tendency — used the formal recourse of declaring the convocation illegal.

The assembly took place anyhow. The emergency leaders attended, the group including Escubi — who after having named the new **Bilt-**

**zarr Tipia** went into exile — and Madariaga as representative of the dissidents. It is the leadership that remains in the country and that for convenience of expression can be called the interior ETA. Its first act was the dissemination of a document signed by Echave, Madariaga, López Zaval, Arregui and Krubigh — leaders opposed to the convocation — which expelled Escubi, whom they considered to be the top leader of the organization. The Assembly, in its turn, decided to expel the opposition group whose most important representative is Echave, accusing him of being a "militarist," and presented a new organizational strategy placing emphasis on the mass struggle, in alliance with other forces such as the Communist Party of Spain, and declaring itself in favor of armed struggle but subordinating it to political considerations.

The other sector, decidedly in the minority and for the most part in exile (which might be called the ETA abroad) is composed of former members of the military front. It has trained people with immediate and effective operative capacity, and seems to hold positions that fall within the scope of extreme nationalism (for example, they oppose the alliance with the CP not because they are Communists but because they are Spaniards). Among their leaders is Madariaga, the only ETA leader who participated in that student meeting way back in 1952 which was the embryo of the organization.

When the Burgos trial began and various of the accused were threatened with death, it was the ETA abroad that kidnapped the West German consul. It proposed neither exchange nor precise conditions and there is no clear version of why it liberated the consul before obtaining a concrete result. It is speculated — but this is no more than an insistent rumor — that there

was a secret agreement between the West German Government and the Opus Dei sector of the Spanish Government (Foreign Minister López Bravo was on a visit to Bonn at the time) which stipulated that, if the diplomat was returned alive, there would be no executions in Burgos. Otherwise, West Germany would withdraw its ambassador from Madrid and suspend its investments in Spain. What is certain is that ETA abroad freed the consul and issued a communiqué "reserving the right to take reprisals against persons in the Spanish repressive apparatus if there are executions at Burgos."

Finally, the 16 accused at Burgos issued a joint communiqué with the National Leadership of ETA (interior) making known that:

- 1) the ETA has no part in the kidnapping of the consul;
- 2) in the summer of 1970, the group that continues using the initials ETA and is presumably the author of the kidnapping, was expelled from the organization;
- 3) we support armed struggle but we understand that it must be politics that directs the gun and not the gun that directs politics;
- 4) we believe that the way to save the lives of those on trial in Burgos (who have not yet been sentenced) and, in general, to continue the Basque people's liberation struggle, is by placing the main accent on mass struggle;
- 5) consequently, only history will be able to determine whether the kidnapping action has been positive or negative, in so far as it has a positive or negative effect on mass actions;
- 6) despite these considerations, the 16 defendants have the express authorization of the nation-

al leadership of ETA to utilize whatever advantages they may be able to obtain as a result of the kidnapping.

#### A Resounding Trial and Its Implications

The Burgos proceedings left an enormous political capital for the initials ETA. For this reason it will be no small problem to decide which of the two sectors that claim them can do so legitimately. The valiant behavior, the unbroken dignity evidenced by the accused, extended the great pride in being Basque throughout all Euzkadi.

The consequences are not only emotional in nature: ordinary people who were viscerally linked to the condemned ask themselves today in San Sebastian where is the alleged "foreignness" of this ideology if these young people are Marxists and so completely Basque. The most reactionary Basque sectors have seen themselves dragged along by this compelling event.

The impression that the Basque country has a true vanguard in the ETA was extended. These youth who, in the face of these gold-braided and cutlass judges, when the death sentence is pronounced, sing the Euzkadi hymn, have created a nationalist and revolutionary mystique around themselves. The lawyers who defended them, because they were close to them, because they touched them, are received with almost religious admiration everywhere. Anecdotes circulate in the cafés the one about Izco, the typographical worker, whom another of the condemned, his brother-in-law, had reproached for not having a sufficient Marxist formation and when it was reported that two death penalties had been given to him and his comrade had received "only" one, said: "Now let's see

who's more Marxist, you or me?"

San Sebastian lived through dramatic days during the trial. Almost 100% of the working class of Guipuzcoa was on strike; trees were used as barricades across the streets, there was shouting; Christmas Eve was a sad night, without any celebration, and all the bars of the old section closed, except for three (which will probably have to close now because nobody will go to them any more). San Sebastian was like London under German bombing. There was no life in the streets. The Basques were waiting with clenched teeth.

The death sentences were made known on December 28th. The condemned issued a communiqué saying: "This brutal decision in no way affects our revolutionary morale. We could expect no less from fascist barbarism. Long live the Revolution! Long live the Basque people!" And on the 30th when the commutation was made known, joy exploded among the people: they paraded through the streets with a bottle of champagne in each hand, singing Basque songs, shouting "Vivas" for the ETA.

The six who were sentenced issued another communiqué:

This pardon is not a concession but a triumph for the Basque people and the other peoples of the world in the struggle for liberty. We know that our lives belonged and belong now more than ever to the Basque people and the other peoples of the world, and therefore we dedicate our lives completely to them.

Perhaps no one has summed up this disposition like Gorostide, one of the pardoned who, when the guards took him out of the room after giving him the news, looked into the faces of the judges and said to them: "You'll live to regret this."



## The Ford of Betrayal

HERE then was Tania with a fever of 39°, her feet swollen and covered with sores from having to extract a small insect called the anigo which penetrates below the skin. Here was Alejandro, with a fever of 38°, and worn out with the hardships of February and early March, his limbs swollen, and his body badly in need of rest. And here was Moises Guevara, suffering from a bilious attack due to eating some pork which had poisoned him. Here was El Negro, a Peruvian doctor, whose job was to stay and look after the sick. And lastly here was the added burden — four guerrillas in disgrace: Paco, Pepe, Chingolo and Eusebio. During the meeting on March 25, a resolution had been passed to expel them from the guerrilla. They were told that if they didn't choose to work, they wouldn't get anything to eat; their cigarettes had been suspended and they were told that their personal effects would be given out among the others who were most in need. They were also to remain as

prisoners until an opportunity came to get rid of them.

On April 16 we had covered good ground and reached the river Ikira, but the sick stopped our planned advance. So we left them behind with El Negro and Serapio (who was lame) and went on towards Bella Vista, a hamlet where four peasants in fear of their lives sold us potatoes, a pig and some maize.

We had intended to go on as far as Tikucha, and from there to Muyupampa to drop Régis Debray (Danton) and Ciro Roberto Bustos (Carlos), but we were told of a short cut to Muyupampa via Vaca Guzman.

So after much hesitation Che decided to continue on his way. He gave orders that the four left behind — that is, the three who were sick and El Negro — besides the four "captives" and Serapio, as well as the whole rear guard under the command of Joaquin: Braulio, Marcos.

Ernesto, Víctor, Walter, Pedro and Polo, should all remain. We were 17, all told.

Che's orders were that we should divert the Army's attention with a small maneuver, but not get ourselves engaged in a full-on fight. He said that he would be back again in three days' time. He wanted to "get the Frenchman and Carlos out of there once and for all." He would then return.

It was April 17. Che went off with his men at 10 pm. We were never to see him again.

#### The Double Search

When Che failed to return, we stayed on near the River Nanchahuazu in a region called Monte Dorado, on the way to Muyupampa. We waited for him several days. As he didn't come back we thought it better to change places. We didn't go far — just two kilometers further up the river. We found good camping ground and waited again.

We weren't badly off for food there, as we could get supplies from the peasants. Once it was Braulio who went for supplies, and once Marcos, always with the hope of getting news, but each time they came back with no news of either the Army or of Che.

Benigno and Aniceto will go to hunt for Joaquin — four days... Joaquin joins us, having received orders to bring everyone, only leaving there one of the drifters, if sick. (Che Guevara, *Diary*, April 23)

We spent about ten days before abandoning the second camp. Joaquin was informed by the scouts that the Army was approaching the peasants' house. He then decided to prepare an ambush for the Army before leaving the spot.

So we got up early and took cover. But the ambush failed through a momentary slip: someone fired a shot by mistake and the Army was alerted. Thereupon we left immediately and went to a place near the Ikira, a tributary of the Nanchahuazu. To be more precise, we actually crossed the river and moved to higher ground above the Ikira.

At 4 pm Benigno and Aniceto came and told us they had fallen into an ambush (or rather they had clashed with the Army) losing their knapsacks but getting out unhurt. According to Benigno, this occurred when they were just a short distance from Nanchahuazu. (Che Guevara, *Diary*, April 25)

We camped on high ground above the Ikira, a good strategic point where there also happened to be a well. We were all right for clothes and shoes. We took a load of maize and some beans. From there on we sent out constant patrols for the purpose of finding out what was happening.

#### The Men Get to Know Each Other

Through radio bulletins which we got from both inside and outside the country we had a pretty good idea of what was happening to our comrades. But the trouble was we couldn't reach them as the roads were blocked. Our scouts could see troop movements at certain points. The best thing to do was to hold out as long as we could in the same place, until Che could send us some comrades and get in touch with us again.

So we just lay low — as quiet as possible. Our orders were to make no noise at all, not even when gathering wood. So we cooked by night and concealed the fire. Joaquin had chosen a good spot: we were on a hillock protected by the shoulder of

a mountain. We cooked behind a wall: no one could see us. We remained there several days. We began to know each other well — the newly recruited and the veterans.

Joaquin was a man with very great military experience. He was a born leader who knew how to impose discipline — the fighter's self-discipline — without ever raising his voice. Marcos was another man who stood out. He was a bit hurt by his recent demotion but not demoralized at all. He always did what was expected of him, like any of us. He would load the machine gun 30 or be perfectly ready to make good suggestions without showing any rancor. As for Braulio, what more can one say than that he was our guide and the strongest man of the column. He could spend the whole day hacking the undergrowth to open up a path and when it was his turn to cook — well, he cooked and when it was his turn to be sentinel — well, he was sentinel.

Tania did all the jobs incumbent on a fighter: she cooked, gathered wood, and kept watch, like everyone else. She was a little reserved, but when she started speaking she spoke well, and she knew how to argue too. You should have heard her! She had a strong character. We always tried to help her, to take care of her.

And then it was that Pepe left us. We had a deserter while waiting for Ramón. It was Pepe. He was one of those that were executed. (Braulio, *Diary*, May 23)

Pepe, who was out of camp on a trip to bring back supplies, took advantage of being on his own to make off. He surrendered to the Army and was promptly killed.

The most frustrating thing at present is the impossibility of getting into contact with Joaquin despite our search for him in the hills. There are signs that he

has moved north. (Che Guevara, *Diary*, May recapitulation)


#### Marcos, Victor and Death

On June 4 Marcos and Victor lost their lives in another of those trips. After a time we resumed contact with the peasants. A party went out and managed to buy some supplies. They bought so much that the first party was unable to bring back everything with them. So it was decided that a few should go back the next day: Marcos as leader, and Victor and Pedro — unfortunately the best of the bunch. The disaster happened because of a small breach of discipline — but in the guerrilla a mistake, however small, can prove fatal: Joaquín had told them not to go back the same way as the day before and to be very much on their guard. But it appears that they disobeyed and went the same way and were not too careful. The Army ambushed them, shooting first Marcos and then Victor. The bodies of the two fallen comrades protected Pedro. He got off unscathed, even escaped with his gun, and managed to reach the camp where he told the news. The death of Marcos came as a blow to us all, but particularly to Joaquín. We had all loved and admired him. He seemed to be a man who was not of these times. He was indeed a great loss to the column.

After that we had to abandon the camp and go elsewhere. We went further upstream and came near an inhabited region called Monte Dorado. We weren't very far from the peasants' house.

#### The General's Daughter

One of General Barrientos' daughters was called Cintia. That was



why the Army's maneuver to encircle us was called by that name. We knew about the maneuver. One day our sentinels came face to face with a body of soldiers that had been advancing towards our observation post. Our sentinels were taken by surprise.

The soldiers surprised Alejandro and Polo at their observation post. We had to leave the camp with the Army at our heels. (Braulio, Diary, July 8)

As soon as they saw the soldiers, Alejandro and Polo fired at them. We heard the shots. They came running to warn us. We left the camp and moved on as quickly as we could. It must be pointed out that the job of suddenly having to abandon a camp is a problem: to gather up one's things, to stamp out all traces, and to transport all one can, especially not forgetting any maize there may be. Maize, indeed, was our staple food. Every night two portions of boiled maize were given out — one to eat then and one for the morning. When we had beans, they were also given out. As for our clothes, they were pretty worn out, but we had to hang on to what we had since the peasants themselves in those parts had very few. As for our shoes — well, they were in an appalling condition, each person was responsible for taking care of his own, but with all the walking, they were in pretty bad shape.

When we left that camp we went back to the second one we had been at before, called the Well Camp. As was our custom we placed a sentinel on guard. It was Maimura (alias Ernesto). He suddenly saw another Army column coming down a gully and fired. Apparently he killed one of them, for he could hear their shouts. A skirmish followed. Braulio rushed to the spot and start-

ed shooting. We managed to drive them back — at least temporarily — and took advantage of the pause to collect our things. Pedro and Paco's job was to see to the removal. Tania was the first to leave the camp.

We realized that the circle was closing in on us, that we were being gradually trapped and that the Army intended to wipe us out.

According to a radio bulletin there's been a clash with guerrillas in the El Dorado region, which doesn't figure on the map and is somewhere between Samaipata and Rio Grande. They admit to one injured and claim to have killed two guerrillas. (Che Guevara, Diary, July 10)

We didn't have any casualties in the fight. But the Army must have had some.

#### Serapio: His Last Warning

After clashing with the soldiers, we moved on to the River Ikira, and there, so as not to leave traces, we waded upstream from dawn until about noon. It was hard going. Serapio was suffering from a bad foot. He was not only lame but sick and could scarcely walk, especially with a load. Joaquín, seeing this, ordered us to help him by each in turn carrying his knapsack. But he couldn't keep up with us. He moved slowly along with the aid of a stick.

During one of our halts Joaquín told Serapio to go on ahead. We had nearly reached the place we were heading for, and this way Serapio would not be left behind as we would soon catch up with him.

So Serapio went on ahead without any load, and we started soon after. When the first of our party was about to overtake Serapio we heard him shout: "Don't come this way, don't come!" He had seen soldiers. One of the soldiers yelled at him.

"Shut up! move on and shut up!" but Serapio warned us again: "Don't come, there are soldiers!". At the same instant they fired killing him. But he saved us.

Now the radio has come out with another bit of news which looks true. It speaks of a fight on the Ikira with one of our side killed. The dead man's body was taken to Lagunillas. The euphoria over the body does point to some veracity in the report. (Che Guevara, Diary, July 12)

We immediately got out of the water and went and hid in the mountains. Then as we didn't see any more military movements we started to reorganize our party and to withdraw. We reached a certain spot and took up fighting positions till nightfall. Once it was dark we were told we could leave our posts and were to gather wood and to cook what we could. In the next few days we would have to somehow or other break the ring encircling us.

#### Hacking One's Way Out

Joaquín had decided to fight his way out of the mountainous region, because he was certain that all the exits were closed. So the only alternative was to hack our way through the jungle and climb the enormous mountains. We cooked the whole night, and slept a little before daylight came. We then doled out food rations. We had to leave behind our loads and go unburdened and ready for combat. At any moment we might come up against a patrol and would have to fight.

Next day very early in the morning, we got ready and started to climb the highest mountain. Braulio acted as machetero. We arrived at the peak and it was there that we decided to rid ourselves of our superfluous baggage. Tania had to leave a lot of things — clothes and odds

and ends women like to have about them. We hid everything away carefully. Each one of us took a load of five to eight kilos of maize. Nothing else. The normal weight we carried was anything between 30 and 45 kilos.

We came down the other side of the mountain and had a long trudge which lasted six days. Almost non-stop. Just a short rest by nights. We were determined to get out of the danger zone. Everything went all right until we got to the neighborhood of Taperillas — Che had passed this way.

Our intention was to by-pass the village without being noticed. But — as will happen at such times — some kids who were running around with their dogs saw us. Pedro called out to them: "Come here, don't be afraid!" They must have been about eight years old. Pedro said, "Don't go and tell anyone that you've seen us. We'll give you some money." And we gave them a few pesos. But of course we knew they'd run and tell their mothers and fathers and that they in turn would tell the soldiers.

As we had been discovered we decided to climb to the top of a low hill. We were exhausted. But that day we had at last broken through the military ring!

#### "Come and Get Us if You Want to"

We found a stream and camped beside it. A party went to buy food at the peasants' house before the Army arrived. The one in charge was El Negro. Everyone went with him except Joaquín, Alejandro, Tania, Chingolo and Paco, who all remained in the camp. The idea was to get as much food as possible, since we had none left. They were lucky

and brought back with them lots of provisions, even bread and chankanka. So the ones who had stayed behind in the camp set to cooking with a lot of good will and cheerfulness.

That night we ate well and slept well. Next morning we were late leaving. Maimura, who was in charge of the food distribution and bookkeeping, delayed somewhat over the rationing. The delay may have been anything between half an hour to an hour. Anyhow it was because of this delay that the Army found us.

The column of soldiers was coming down the mountainside and ran into Alejandro, who was on guard. Alejandro fired at them, stopping their advance. Everyone got ready to fight. We were at a disadvantage because they could shoot down at us. We had to get out of the camp as fast as we could; but it was extremely difficult — the soldiers were shooting right into where we'd been cooking. Tania, Pedro and Paco gathered up the things, while the others went on fighting.

Joaquín, Braulio and Alejandro had managed to drive them back. The fighting was partly verbal. On our side Moisés Guevara was spokesman. To the soldier's shouts of "Surrender! You're encircled!" Moisés shouted back: "Shut up you bastards! If you want us, come and get us!" Or else something like, "Soldiers, don't let yourselves be had! We who are fighting here are workers and miners. Don't let the military reactionaries deceive you. We are revolutionaries. We are fighting for you!" But the shooting went on and so did the shouts of the officers: "Surrender, sons of bitches!"

The soldiers were coming down and were at a vantage point. The situation was so bad for us that Joa-

quín sent someone to tell Tania to "take care of the films" but she was already down in a hollow busily getting rid of them.

When we began moving from there with our goods and chattels we discovered that Eusebio and Chingolo were missing. Someone was sent to look for them. "They must be hiding somewhere there" we said; but the only thing there were the knapsacks. They had deserted, and had taken a gun with them.

A Santa Cruz radio station gave the news in passing that the Army had taken two prisoners from the Muyupampa group. Now no doubt remains that this is Joaquín's group. He must be in a bad way, apart from the fact that these two prisoners talked. (Che Guevara, Diary, August 15)

#### Wanting to Do the Same Thing

We continued our march, and passing a hill, finally reached a spot where we could hide in ambush. We waited the whole afternoon for the Army to come, but there was no sign of soldiers anywhere. We camped the night there and next day, instead of going on in the same direction towards Monteagudo, we turned back and got across to the other side of Taperillas.

We sheltered there and rested. A party started out in search of food and returned with the carcass of a cow. But the trouble was carrying it which was heavy work. Moisés Guevara came to call for help as he couldn't manage to bring the whole carcass, all he could carry was one leg. So we all went to lend a hand and came back laden with meat which we set about preparing. Tania ground salt. The rest of us either cooked or salted. We had enough meat to last a fortnight. It was a real banquet we had that night!

Next we heard on the radio how Che had taken Samaipata. That meant we were very far away from where he was. We decided that in spite of the awkward position we were in, we simply had to make our presence felt as an independent armed group. So we set out for Monteagudo with two alternative objectives: either to take possession of a village ourselves for the sake of our prestige or if not, at least to hold up a truck, preferably one carrying food, and take it.

We camped very near the summit of the highest mountain near Monteagudo called Iñau. We spent a day resting and exploring the land around. We were then told to go out and take one of those little villages at the foot of Iñau. All of us were armed and ready for a fight. The only one to remain behind was Tania. She bravely bid us good-bye and took over the machine gun 30 in case of an emergency attack. It was early in the morning when we left the camp and we got to the village in the afternoon. It was called Chuhuaiaco. We arrived surreptitiously and got into contact with a few of the villagers. There were no soldiers in view. Some of our men went first to buy provisions. We were soon loaded with bread and poultry.

The climb up the mountain to deposit our goods was hard work. It took us the whole night and part of the following day. We were worn out. Tania was very happy to see us. She congratulated us. "My, that's fine! But I bet you haven't brought any chankaka," she added — she was very fond of chankaka. When we proceeded to give her some she was still more delighted.

#### Pedro Hugging the Gun

We prepared an ambush for the Army but there was still no sign of


its approach. So we withdrew from our positions leaving someone on the lookout. Next day a peasant came. I think his name was Vicente Soto. He had been climbing the mountain slowly, following in our footprints. We took him prisoner. Then to save himself he said: "I have come to warn you that the soldiers are down there and I've come this way to join you."

We didn't believe him. We insisted on his telling us the truth. We said that if not, we'd hang him from the highest tree. Then he told us that the Army had sent him on our tracks, that they had forced him. We kept him prisoner but treated him well and that night we gave him food.

So orders were to abandon the camp: for if the peasant had managed to reach us, it meant that the troops too knew our whereabouts. Joaquín told us to cook as much as we could that night and said we would move on next day. We did this.

Early next morning before day-break we started out. Braulio loaded the peasant with his knapsack and placed him at the front of the group to guide us. No sooner had we left the camp than they began to bomb it. Had we stayed there another ten or fifteen minutes we would have been caught. The Army had us now under observation.

We hurried along, and started up the mountain to get to the other side for protection. When we'd been walking for a good hour and a half we had a feeling they were coming down on us. Quickly our watchword was to move as rapidly as possible but in the greatest silence. So we went forward stealthily: Braulio, Moisés Guevara, Walter, Paco and Pedro, who since Marcos's death was in charge of the machine gun;



and then came El Negro. Bringing up the rear were Joaquin, Tania, Maimura and Alejandro.

We stopped at a glade near the top and Braulio found a way to continue up that would keep us under cover. But just at that moment the Army saw us. They began to shout the usual order: "Surrender, you're surrounded!" Braulio answered, "We'll carry on somehow!" They started shooting in his direction, but he observed the direction of the shots and, moving a little to the right, he managed to dodge them and to continue climbing to the top. Then Moisés Guevara, followed by the others, came to the opening.

Braulio warned them: "Keep to the right as much as you can!" Some were able to, but Pedro, who was heavily loaded, could not bend. They got him in one shot. He fell still hugging the machine gun. Walter tried to reach him but the firing was so heavy that he had to move back. We couldn't do anything either. We just had to leave Pedro's dead body clutching the gun and move on.

#### Anguish for the Rear Guard

Walter passed through the opening. Then came Paco. El Negro stayed behind to wait for the rear guard. When those in front had joined Braulio on the other side of the mountain the first question he put to them was, "How's Joaquin managing?" "They're still down there," was Walter's answer. We then hid in the undergrowth and waited for the others to turn up. But time went by and no one appeared. The soldiers started shouting again and firing. "Curse it!" said Braulio, "I bet anything they've got Joaquin cornered." We all felt that way too. "I believe they've killed off our rear guard," said Braulio over and over again, adding, "Joaquin's not going to give himself up; he'll fight on to the bitter end." We, the vanguard, could do nothing. If we went back we'd just be shot down one by one.

So we decided to wait and not move far. Over an hour went by — we could hear absolutely nothing at all. "It's strange," said Braulio, and we still kept on hoping.

Braulio, whose sight and hearing were extremely sharp, and who knew the jungle like the inside of his pocket, was the first to catch a faint noise coming from below.

He moved away stealthily whispering to Walter and Paco to stay where they were. Now we could distinctly hear the sound of people moving forward — but we didn't know if they were our men or the Army. Then Braulio gave the signal — a sharp clicking of the tongue. They answered. We went to meet them. They were coming by a different way. There was Joaquin followed by the others. We were terrifically relieved, and terribly glad to see them again. It seemed an age that we'd been waiting there in suspense. Braulio, who'd been so despondent, was absolutely wild with joy.

#### The Last Fortnight

It was on August 9 that Pedro was killed. The remaining part of the month we spent walking in the direction of the Rio Grande in search of Che. It was a long hard march, with little to fill our stomachs, and shoes that were worn out and only held together by strands of dried grass. We followed the River Nencohuazu down toward its junction with the Grande. When we got there we found the house of Honorato Rojas a peasant known to Joaquin and Che on their first expedition there in February. We trusted him, and what he did was to betray us

to the Army. They laid an ambush. We fell into it and the whole party was killed — all except one survivor: José Castillo Chaves, alias "Paco." That's where the odyssey of Joaquin's group came to its tragic

end.

DON LORGIO aims high and shoots. The thickness of the underbrush and the everglades stretching around us quickly muffle the noise of his Remington 22. A shadow of feathers falls, breaking some branches. The man runs in and out of the trees with the skill of a hunting dog. He returns with the prey in his hand: a small parrot — a yellow frigate around the neck amid the brilliant green of its plumage, its head hanging down on one side. The man smiles revealing his few teeth and lifts up one wing: he shows us the red, bleeding hole of the bullet wound. "You got him right through the side, Don Lorgio."

We walk on the beach of damp, soft sand. There are tiger prints. "If that tiger comes you leave him to me," boasts Don Lorgio, a landowner of the zone, "I'll shoot him in each eye." At times the ground becomes rocky, full of round stones washed smooth by the river, glistening in the pitiless noonday sun. The man plucks the feathers from the parrot, now a small bloody mass in his hands. He carries his machete in its sheath under his arm.

It's been a good while since we left the house of Honorato Rojas and we now reach a turn of the river. "Won't be long now," says the man. He finishes plucking the parrot clean, lays it on the trunk of a fallen tree and cuts off its head with one blow of his machete.

We keep on walking, on pure rock now, our boots gripping and slipping, until the man scales a small precipice, shades his eyes with his hand and says: "Here it is."

end.

Che wasn't far off at the time — just a day's march away. When he came to the house of Honorato Rojas next day, he didn't know what had happened.

We look at the Rio Grande: an esplanade of rocks extends from the beach — the river, working for four years, made a new arm, now near us, stretching out to some one hundred meters from the other shore. The river flows and becomes turbulent a little way down where it churns against a chain of rocks. And a little beyond: the opposite beach, reddish earth and thick underbrush.

"This is the spot I brought the soldiers to when they ambushed Joaquin and his people," the man says. "This was the line of fire," and putting the parrot aside, he traces with his bloodstained hand an imaginary line across the river. "This is where they crossed."

#### The Making of a Traitor

Tall, thin, dark, with bear-like hands and lots of black hair, Honorato Rojas was a peasant, some 50 years old, with eight children. He had a collaboration pact with the guerrillas. Che and his men went to his house during their first explo-atory march (Diary, February 10) and in one glance (he recognized him as a "potentially dangerous" man.

He lived for a time in El Trigal, 25 kilometers from Vallegrande, until in 1961 he went to try his luck working on some land rented from Sanvago Morón, one of the richest men in Masicuri, in Yajopampa. In 1963 he was tried for cattle rustling: to feed his children he had killed a yellow ox belonging to Morón. He



was sentenced to six months in jail. A hard worker, he later went to live in humble quarters on the shores of the Rio Grande, working a 40-hectare plot.

Since he also had a little store it was not too strange that, after the first contact with the guerrillas, he traveled frequently to Vallegrande to buy medicine in the pharmacy of Don Julio Durán and clothing and food from the Manacos store.

But somebody got suspicious and told about it: Honorato was dressing better, he now wore good boots and a striking jacket. In June 1967 he was arrested with 40 peasants and taken to the Vallegrande Military Casino, headquarters of the antiguerrilla command. He was brutally tortured: beatings and electric shocks. As far as we know, Honorato did not talk although he had much to say.

Shortly after, he was arrested again and taken to Santa Cruz. This time the interrogation was more "scientific." And from it Honorato emerged with something swimming insistently in his head: an offer of \$3000 dollars and his emigration papers to the United States where he and his family would "live like princes," as promised him by Irving Rosi, a CIA agent. It seems that the pact was made then and there: if Rojas saw the guerrillas again he would help the Army ambush them.

#### The Guerrillas Will Be Back Tomorrow

On August 30, 1967, an Army medical corpsman, Faustino Garcia, went to Honorato's house to collect a debt. He came, following the course of the Masicuri (half the distance by road) from La Laja, some 13 kilometers away, where a part of the Manchego Battalion was stationed. With him was the soldier

Fidel Rea.

While Garcia was talking to Rojas, they heard some guerrillas coming. Pretending he was one of Rojas' peons who had fallen ill, the medical corpsman got into bed, hiding his rifle underneath it. The soldier Rea was fishing upstream, far from the house.

Says the only survivor, José Castillo Chaves (Paco):

Around two in the afternoon of August 30 we in Joaquin's column approached the house of the peasant Honorato Rojas. We camped some 150 meters from there and sent a two-man commission to the house — Ernesto and Walter — to make contact with Rojas. They returned without fulfilling their mission because they had heard shots and thought that the Army was stationed there.

Braulio was in favor of going on without making contact with Rojas, but Alejandro asked Joaquin to reconsider the matter and offered to go himself. After consulting with Braulio again, Joaquin agreed to send out a new commission composed of Alejandro, Walter and Armando (Ernesto stayed behind) who returned an hour later, telling us they had made an agreement with the peasant. They had promised to bring him a doctor [El Negro] who would attend to the "sick peon." In return the peasant promised that he would buy us some foodstuffs, sugar in particular, because it was so essential to us.

We originally had no intention of crossing the river. We were looking for a safe place to establish ourselves. And that was exactly what the commission told the peasant. We wanted to stake a camp and from it to send out groups to look for Che. It was Rojas who said that there was a safe place across the river — a hill there that even had some water. They trusted the peas-

ant and gave him money to go to Vallegrande or any other nearby town to buy supplies. Rojas offered to help us cross the Rio Grande and he suggested we do it the following day at five-thirty because that was the best time. We were to get to Rojas' house a half-hour before then, at five. Many people say we were careless: "Why did you trust him that way?" But our trust was based exactly on the time: I'm sure that Joaquin was confident because of the hour most of all, because then it begins to get dark, all activities stop, the people go into their houses and there's more safety in moving. On the night of the 30th, a third commission — Joaquin and El Negro, the doctor — went to Rojas' house to attend to the "sick peon" and to confirm the agreement.

José Cardona Toledo (Army guide): After the guerrillas left in the afternoon, or when they were still there — I don't remember — Rojas sent his eight-year-old son to alert the soldier Rea who was fishing in the Rio Grande. The soldier put on civilian clothes, hid his uniform and his Mauser. Barefoot, he ran to La Laja to tell the Captain (who is a Major today) — Mario Vargas. When he arrived, we were playing football with the soldiers. Vargas had come from Vallegrande the day before with supplies and camouflage uniforms for the entire troop. Rea arrived so exhausted that he couldn't talk. Finally, he gave us Rojas' message.

Since I was there, Captain Vargas asked me to be their guide. I accepted. I helped them in the hope that they would help me. There were 29 soldiers and two students. They were stationed there, in La Laja, in the house of Nicolás Pérez [the "rich brother" who exploited Miguel Pérez, mentioned by Che, Diary, February 15]. Around six in the afternoon, Vargas ordered us to set off.

We arrived at Rio Grande at dawn on the 31st.

On the way a soldier who was nicknamed El Pico got a thorn in his leg and had to stay behind. So there were 33 of us when we arrived: 28 soldiers, the two students, Captain Vargas, Lieutenant Pedro Barbery and myself. Vargas and Barbery carried M-2s, some had FALs and the others had Mausers. As we neared Honorato's house, he was on his way out with all his family.

Vargas: Where are you going, Honorato?

Rojas: I'm leaving because this thing scares me. There's going to be a battle here: they'll kill me or my family.

Vargas: Don't leave your house, Honorato. Because if the guerrillas come and don't see you, they'll be suspicious. The battle won't be in your house, it'll be at the ford. Tell us where you're going to cross.

Rojas: Up further I know a ford. I was thinking of crossing there.

Vargas: Show us the place and go back home.

Rojas took us to this place, a kilometer and a half from his house, upstream.

Rojas: This is where I'll cross them. They're going to camp in front, there, and then they're going to send people down in the direction of Frias to look for Che.

Vargas: Go back home before they get there and bring them here. Don't tell them we're in contact with you. Your life is at stake.

Rojas: And if I get killed when I bring them here?

Vargas: We're not going to shoot at you. It's them we want to kill. All of them.

Vargas crossed over to the other bank, taking with him 18 soldiers,

two students and Lieutenant Barberv. The rest of the contingent stayed on this bank under the command of Sergeant Barba. We began to wait, a long day's wait, a day that seemed to go on forever.

#### Cardona Likes to Be Free

On our way we go to José Cardona's house. He lives in a windowless adobe hut, with his wife, five children (11, 8, 6, 3 and one month old), chickens, ducks, and dogs. He has possession of a 50-hectare farm but by himself he can't farm more than five. He grows maize. For two years he has been harvesting only two hectares because of the drought. He sells some ducks and chickens. His monthly income never goes above \$20. He has two little girls sick, the one-month-old who has "stomach trouble and cries all the time" and the three-year-old who, from the symptoms he described, has epilepsy. His wife raises her blouse and shows us her flaccid breast and says, "I have a lump that hurts and grows" and asks us to bring her penicillin to "cut the growth."

—Why don't you take them to a doctor, Cardona?

—How? The nearest hospital is in Vallegrande 115 kilometers away. How will I pay all the expenses: the truck from Masicurí, our stay there, the doctor? They say that the hospital is public but that the doctor charges a fortune for the smallest examination. And the medicine? They charge ten pesos for a bandage. You have to pay through the nose even for aspirin. I can't take them to a doctor because I don't have the money.

—Don't you get credit from the state to work, for your seeds and fertilizer?

—None at all. The little I have I built with my own hands without anybody's help.

—Do the older children go to school?

—There isn't a school for two leagues around. I asked for a teacher and they told me that I had to build a place for the school. I did what I could, they came to see it and told me it didn't meet with the regulations. They never sent a teacher. So the children can't study.

—Why did you help the Army?

—I already told you, because I thought they would help me. I saw General Barrientos twice: once after the ambush and again when we found Tania. He came in a helicopter. He congratulated me and said, "That's the way a real man acts, not those who go around hiding." He gave us money: 200 pesos for me. I don't know how much he gave to Honorato; he also gave money to the kids. He apologized for not bringing more, but he promised to help us. I asked him to give me the property title to my farm, because I only have possession. "It's yours," he said, "come to La Paz and we'll talk about it there." I went and spent one month waiting to see him. I even went to the Palace, but it was very well guarded and he never received me. In all, I spent 700 pesos and for nothing.

—And you never asked yourself why the guerrillas were fighting?

—They came to bother us, that's what the Army said -- to make communism. The military explained to us that under communism everybody has to work like a soldier for the state, they have to wear the same clothes and the family is broken up. They told us that the guerrillas raped women, they robbed and killed you if you didn't help them. And

above all, they came to enslave us. And me, I like to be free.

—And what kind of freedom do you have now, Cardona?

—The freedom to do whatever I please.

—Is that right?

#### The Water Turned Red

Paco: On the 31st, at five exactly we were ordered to get ready. As usual, we wiped out our footprints and left the camp. Then we gradually approached Rojas' house. We were on the path, in the bushes. Rojas was waiting for us at a prearranged point. We didn't go into the house, we went right by it. The peasant was there and greeted us cordially and said, "Wait a minute and I'll give you something to eat." Immediately he appeared with a big pot full of jagua, a soup made of cornmeal. We ate hurriedly because we had to. After he had served us the peasant took away the pot and told us to go on descending to the river bank and that he would catch up with us. That's exactly what happened. He caught up with us and we began to walk on the shore. He walked beside Braulio, who was up in front. We walked with much precaution. I noted that Braulio was very suspicious. He made us stop three times to take a look around. Braulio was leading us: if we had to stop, if we had to crouch down, if we had to go on, he had a way of telling us. He was the chief of the column vanguard. We reached the bend and walked toward the Yeso Ford, but it wasn't there that we crossed.

José Cardona: We saw the guerrillas at around 500 meters, when they came round the bend. They were walking on the beach, the way we are now. We were already about to leave. After waiting all day, and since it was getting dark, Captain

Vargas said that we weren't going to be able to fight, that we would wait a little longer and that if they didn't come we would leave. He said that perhaps Rojas had pulled a fast one, that he had lied. But they appeared at the bend of the river at nightfall and everybody took up his position.

Vargas: Don't forget the order: nobody shoot until I do.

Paco: Some 20 meters before we got to the crossroads, Rojas stopped and said: "Up to here, no more. I'll go with you up to here. Go ahead 20 or 30 meters more — you'll see the ford and cross it. I'll stay here because I don't want them to see me." He said goodbye to Braulio. Braulio asked him for some more instructions, as far I could see, because I was far away, in the seventh place. He said goodbye cordially to each of us, as the column passed him by.

José Cardona: The guerrillas delayed entering the water because they were saying goodbye to Honorato.

Paco: He said goodbye to all of us, until he came to Joaquín, who was the last. Then Joaquín asked him to do some things for him and said that he was very grateful. The peasant said goodbye and disappeared in the direction of his house. José Cardona: The first to enter the water was Braulio, a very big and tall black man. He cut the water with his machete and when he arrived in the middle of the river he drank some water. He signalled the others to advance.

Paco: Braulio signalled to us to hurry because we were walking slowly. He crossed rapidly as was his custom and we began to hurry across. After Braulio went Armando; the third, El Negro; fourth, Walter; fifth, Poio; sixth, Ernesto;

seventh. Alejandro; eighth, me; later came Tania and last, Joaquín. We walked separately as always, six, seven paces away from each other.

José Cardona: Braulio continued to advance and got to the other side, to the other shore. We were only a few meters away from him. The others were entering separately. Braulio began to walk on the beach. When the last guerrilla entered the water, Vargas took a shot at the group and everybody opened fire.

Paco: The gunfire began when Joaquín was a few meters in the water. What I heard were bullets whizzing everywhere. Instinctively, I let myself drop into the water. I saw that everybody was being dragged by the current, some were lifting their arms, others were shouting.

José Cardona: We wounded Braulio in the right arm, near his wrist. His face was full of surprise. Immediately he lay down on his back, adjusted the Browning between his legs and began to fire on us. He killed a soldier — Rea, nicknamed Monango, the same little soldier who had come to alert us for the ambush. But Braulio couldn't keep on shooting because the bullets got him from all sides and he died.

Paco: I didn't see who fell or who didn't fall.

José Cardona: As we were shooting, somebody shouted: "Don't shoot at her, she's a woman." It was Tania. She was wearing a pair of beige pants, a discolored green military shirt and a camera hanging around her neck. A carbine was on her shoulder. It was obvious she was a woman. But the soldiers were so scared and nervous that they shot at her too.

Paco: I heard Tania shouting. When I let myself drop, I turned around to see what was going on behind me, but I couldn't see much,

because the current immediately dragged me away and anxiety, the instinct of preservation, concentrated all my efforts on getting out of the range of fire. Everybody was dragged by the current.

José Cardona: A soldier shouted: "They're escaping down river, Captain!"

Vargas: Charge!

José Cardona: When Vargas gave the order to charge we ran on both shores, downstream, along the beach and continued to shoot. The water was red everywhere. A guerrilla, I don't know who it was, came out of the water about one hundred meters from us and as he was trying to escape into the underbrush they shot him.

Paco: The current took me to some rocks in the middle of the river and I grabbed on to them. It was a little difficult because the rocks were very slippery. Then I saw the soldiers running on the beach, firing at us. But I was in between two rocks and they didn't see me. From there I saw that Joaquín had returned to the shore from where we had started. He was trying to protect himself, but from his movements it seemed to me he was wounded.

José Cardona: They had wounded Joaquín in his leg. He tried to stand up but he couldn't. But since he was on shore, in a gully, he had protection and it was very difficult to get him. He didn't fire, he tried to drag himself but couldn't. I don't know how many bullets they shot at him until they hit him and he stopped moving.

Paco: After watching Joaquín, when I turned around toward the other side, I saw some of the comrades' bodies floating, the current which was stronger downstream was dragging them. In a short while — everything happened in a matter of seconds, fractions of seconds — Ernesto, the Bolivian doctor, appeared

by my side. He came and said: "Damn what's happened." I said: "We have to stay hidden here. This is a disaster," and I don't remember what other things we talked about. We saw the soldiers running on both sides, shouting instructions: "Get the bodies, get their knapsacks." Then one of them saw me, because the arm that I was holding on to the rock with stuck out, and they began to shoot at me. Two bullets hit me, grazing my arm and the armpit and one hit me deeper in the shoulder. I had to let go of the rock and Ernesto held me up. Then we said: "Well, we can't do anything here, we have to surrender." Ernesto threw some of the papers he had into the river, we also threw away our knapsacks and left the rocks. "Don't shoot, there's a wounded man here", Ernesto shouted.

#### Two Survivors From the River

José Cardona: The two guerrillas who had remained alive came out from between two rocks. One helped the other who was wounded. When they arrived at the shore they were questioned.

Soldier: Identify yourselves.

José Cardona: "I'm Paco," said one of them very humbly. A soldier hit him with the rifle butt. They asked him his real name: "José Castillo Chávez," he said.

Paco: The first to question us were the officers. "What is your name? Where do you come from?" and all that. They wanted to know if I were Cuban or Bolivian.

José Cardona: The other man barely spoke. He was white, with a beard, medium height. He was defiant with the Captain. He looked at him with hate in his eyes.

Vargas: What is your name?

Ernesto: Freddy.

Vargas: Freddy what?

Ernesto: Freddy Maimura.

José Cardona: They began to hit him and to ask him for more information. But he had identified himself and wouldn't talk any more. They hit him. He got worse.

Ernesto: Why do you want me to talk? You're a bunch of cowards and traitors. If we had wanted to we could have killed many more of you.

Paco: I was a little to one side and couldn't hear everything this: Maimura was saying — probably something foolish. But his attitude was good. He didn't let anybody kick him around. Without arrogance, without false manliness — he was there, defeated but serene. And he answered them back. Then somebody shot him in the arm, they destroyed his left arm.

José Cardona: Vargas gave us instructions to pick up the bodies. The prisoners were taken to the other bank.

Paco: We were crossed over to the shore from which we had entered the river. I got closer to Maimura and asked him: "How do you feel?" "They've destroyed my arm, brother," he told me. He was moaning with pain, he could hardly walk.

Paco: They asked me to identify the bodies. They were all very disfigured. I said: "This seems to be Braulio; I think this one is Joaquín." José Cardona: Since Maimura didn't talk Captain Vargas ordered two soldiers, Tito Vargas and Algañaraz, to give him a beating. They both kicked him twice and the guerrilla fell down. The Captain continued to talk to Paco.

Tito Vargas: Traitor to my country, from the Beni zone just like I am. I know you well.

José Cardona: Tito went to the Captain.

Tito: I carried out your order, my Captain. He doesn't want to talk.



José Cardona: They wanted him to tell what group this was, who was leading it, where Che was.

Vargas: Never mind, we'll get rid of him. What do the others say?

José Cardona: Suddenly some soldiers told him that there weren't enough horses to carry all the bodies.

Vargas: We'll take this one even if we have to carry him ourselves.

José Cardona: Tito went to where the doctor was.

Tito: If you don't talk I'll kill you, those are my orders.

José Cardona: They wanted to make him say "Viva Bolivia, Viva the Army," but the doctor didn't answer. He just looked at the soldier. Then he said something.

Ernesto: I have nothing to say.

José Cardona: Tito Vargas and Algañaraz each shot him in the back. The doctor fell and said "Oh, my God." Lieutenant Barbery said: "He just found out there is a God."

Paco: They had taken me to a place with high sides formed by the erosion of the river. They told me that they had killed the doctor but I didn't want to believe them. By now it was completely dark. All I could see was the coming and going of the soldiers, some with flashlights — a lot of movement. I heard orders being given. Knapsacks were being picked up, the bodies were collected on the shore, near where I was. When things had calmed down a bit, a medical corpsman came, took out some bandages and made a tourniquet for my wounds.

José Cardona: We couldn't see anything anymore. That night it rained hard. We slept on the beach with the bodies.

#### **El Negro Lives Three Days**

Paco: The next day at dawn the soldiers began to mobilize. Vargas

came and ordered me to stand up. When I got up and got closer to where the bodies were, I saw Malmura's body along with the rest.

José Cardona: Tania and El Negro were missing. The next day when we searched the zone we found Pollo's body, near Rojas' house.

Paco: They told me to cross to the other side again, where the road to Masicuri was. Behind me, they were bringing the bodies, all tied up, dragging them across the river. They were swollen. Each one had five, eight bullets in his body.

José Cardona: We had to wait for them to bring the horses. Meanwhile the troop ate some roast pork that Honorato had brought.

Paco: They gave me a piece. I took it but I couldn't eat it.

José Cardona: The soldiers kept on looking but they couldn't find Tania or El Negro. They killed El Negro three or four days later, between the Grande and Nancahuazu rivers. He was killed by the soldiers from the Motorized Battalion under the command of Colonel Augusto Calderón. I found out because he had been my chief in the Army and I saw him later and he told me. He said that El Negro was ragged and fleeing. He was taken prisoner and beaten to death by rifle butts. They took the cadaver to Choretí.

Honorato said that when the shooting began, he was already some way off. He ran about 200 meters and hid behind a big rock. When El Negro ran by him, without arms or anything, he called out to Rojas: "Shitty traitor, we'll see you again later." And that's what happened: El Negro didn't see him but somebody else did and put a bullet through Honorato's head.

#### **Tania Was Washed Up on the Beach**

A shot had gone through her chest from one side to the other. She

still had her knapsack on her back when they found her body seven days later. There are several versions but the most likely says that her body appeared almost three kilometers away from the place of ambush; one kilometer downstream from Rojas' house, in a zone called Tiger's Well. The river had washed her up on the beach. Decomposition had made her lose her hair, her face was disfigured, the body hardly at all.

The soldiers opened her knapsack and took her belongings: a black threadbare chompa (pullover), a new pair of Argentine-made low-heeled shoes, underwear, a blue nail brush, what looked like a white powder-compact, two pairs of pants ripped at the knees, a Yashika camera filter, a sleeping bag, some photos, documents, a notebook with almost illegible names and \$100 they found "tucked away" in a spool of film.

Barrientos came in a helicopter to the place where they found her body. Dr. Moisés Abraham from the Vallegrande Hospital — the man who would later take part in Che's autopsy — took pictures of the body.

The soldiers took her away on a stretcher. They tied her body to the helicopter rungs. The helicopter flew straight to the Headquarters of the Number Three Engineers' Battalion in Pando, Vallegrande.

Hers was the only body that received a coffin. She lay in the coffin for one night at headquarters. The next day it disappeared.

#### A Ford In Need of a Name

The trail was longer than expected and not until 18:15 did we realize that we were at the creek at Honorato's house.

Miguel continued at full speed but had only reached the main road by the time it was completely

dark. Benigno and Urbano advanced cautiously and did not notice anything abnormal; they occupied the empty house noting that it had been enlarged with several barracks for the Army, which had abandoned it for the present. We found corn meal, lard, salt. We killed two goats and had a banquet together with the cornmeal, although the cooking made us spend all night on guard. In the early morning we withdrew, leaving a sentry at the little house and at the entrance to the road.

h - 740

The quote is from Che's Diary, dated September 1 — that is, 24 hours after the fatal ambush of Joaquín's group. The house of the traitor could have been the meeting point for the two guerrilla groups that had zealously searched for each other for so many months.

Today the broken down house of Honorato Rojas — a room with a straw-thatched roof and tree-trunk staircase with the steps hacked out by an axe — is abandoned. Its only occupants are thousands of termites that form moving stains on the walls. The garden has been swallowed by the man-high grass. Of the soldiers' camp — which one time was the Puerto Mauricio military camp — only four stakes remain.

They say that Barrientos, after he saw all this, asked: "Which of my little soldiers wants Honorato's farm? I'll give it to him, cattle and all." Nobody answered.

A too-weighty accusation; something too abominable seems to hang in the atmosphere in that one-and-a-half-kilometer distance between the house and the ford, the ford that needs a name — probably, the Ford of Betrayal.

But not Yeso Ford, which was a deliberate falsification of history

that appeared in the official documents of the Bolivian Army. Because the real Yeso Ford is seven kilometers from Honorato's house.

Today we know the reasons for that falsification: Captain Mario Vargas belonged to the Eighth Division commanded by Colonel Joaquín Zenteno Anaya, whose jurisdiction extended up to the Río Grande. From there began the jurisdiction of the Fourth Division commanded by Colonel Luis Reque Terán, whose headquarters was in Camiri.

In order to credit the "glorious victory" to the Eighth Division, it had to happen at some geographical point to the north of the Río Grande, before the mouth of the Masicuri River. So, the Yeso Ford was chosen.

Four young men who a short time ago began to farm a ranch at the place where the ambush really took place, baptized it themselves: Tania's Everglade.

#### The Road of Blood

The horses and mules were supplied by people of the zone: Zacarías Gutiérrez, Evaristo Caballero and Santiago Seas. Seven animals for seven bodies. They were tied with straps, face down, their heads hanging on one side and their feet on the other.

From the place of ambush they were taken to Yeso Ford, along a road which sometimes becomes a narrow path between two walls of jungle; later they travelled three kilometers to Yajopampa, to Morón's farm where Che's men had killed a soldier. Then they waded across the Masicuri River four times; went another three kilometers to El Batán, humping against the trees, the vilca with fine leaves, the lanzalanza with white flowers, the cari, the tarijo used to build houses, the

quiche, the papaya, getting tangled in the vines hanging like curtains from the top of the jungle. Braulio's horse fell twice under the weight of his body. They reached Arenales, El Toco, marched in front of the few peasants who peered at the macabre caravan, until they got to La Laja, to the house of Miguel Pérez who one day had welcomed the guerrillas. They banged against the rocks during the last ten kilometers of the journey where the horses stretched themselves in an effort to ascend almost perpendicular slopes or carefully chose where they put down each hoof in descents along the edges of precipices. The bodies kept losing their sole-less shoes that had been tied on with vines; their hair, blood. They reached La Seca and then on to Peñones Ravine where there is a road, near Masicuri, a village of 20 houses.

There at the end of the hellish 35-kilometer road — the road of guerrilla blood — their wrecked bodies were loaded on a Caiman Army truck. Some time had to go by before the people would freely walk on that path travelled by the seven mutilated corpses.

From Masicuri the truck took them 100 kilometers to the hospital of a Mr. De Malta in Vallegrande. They sprinkled the bodies with formaldehyde and completed the identification process.

During the night, a dump-truck took them outside the city to Pozas del Panteón, a place which erosion has turned into a lunar landscape. There, in front of the airport, between the Headquarters of Number Three Engineers' Battalion of Pando and the cemetery, a tractor had dug out a common grave. The truck went in, raised its back and the bodies rolled into the hole.

The next day, flowers appeared on the earth over the grave; anonymous gifts of the people.

# THE IRREGULAR ARMIES

## CARLOS MARÍA GUTIÉRREZ

(translated by Margaret Randall)

Carlos María Gutiérrez is a revolutionary journalist from Uruguay. He is well-known throughout Latin America for his poems and articles about the revolutionary struggle in Latin America. In 1970, he won the Casa de las Americas prize for his books of poems, *Prison Diary*, which reflect his experience in prison the year before. He is now in exile from his native Uruguay.

Most recently Gutiérrez has been working on a book about Ché who was killed in Bolivia in 1967. This short story is about the killing of the Bolivian colonel-turned-consul in West Germany last year, the same man who cut Ché's hands off. His execution was done by a woman member of the Bolivian ELN, the army Ché organized in Bolivia. The story is true in every detail.

This story is not a reprint from the Havana edition of *Tricontinental Magazine*. It was sent to us by Margaret Randall living in Cuba, who did the translation.

*Et quand on retrouve au soir  
des années incertaines*

ARAGÓN

The young woman with blond hair dropped a coin in the pay phone, waited for the tone and dialed an international number she'd memorized. When it answered she simply repeated another number, the one belonging to her Italian passport, and added: "Monday morning, at ten." For a moment she listened to the unfamiliar voice, and repeated the phrase once more. Then she hung up and stood a moment, looking through the glass at two children playing happily on the Hyde Park grass. A fat woman, her huffy face framed in a white kerchief, tapped on the door of the booth, but the woman kept looking at the children or maybe at the sun strong on the green grass. At last she left the booth and walked slowly towards Oxford Street, looking at a city map. In the park a soap box orator saw her approaching and noticed her delicate face and her large eyes whose color he couldn't make out. When

the woman stopped in the front row of the dozen or so listeners, the orator stumbled on the idea he'd been looking for the past ten minutes and finished, so the woman with him could pass the velvet bag among the gathering. "If we don't all, each and every one of us, decide we're going to kill the Beast of Sin, then I say to you, my brethren, that each and every one of us will become the Beast! The Lord has said: 'Thou shalt not kill!' But the only death allowed is the death of the Beast!" He stood there with his hands crossed on his chest and his eyes closed, wondering if the collection would bring enough for dinner.

On the Heilwigstrasse it began to rain and the Consul hurried his daily exercise walk. In front of the nearby police station the cop on guard greeted him as he always did. The Consul was tempted to return the greeting with the rigid Prussian salute his German instructor had taught him back in Cadet School.

The Consul continued to be a Colonel in his country's army but in the past five years he'd only worn the uniform twice. (Once, when he graduated from the U.S. Specialist's Academy.) In any case, he repressed the urge to answer with the salute. The Cadet School was lost in hazy years. Back in the distant country there were also the memories of a Colonel in civilian dress.

Under the Hamburg drizzle, the Consul almost couldn't picture that great rose colored mansion on the *plaza*, where the agents came and went all the time, nor the barred window from which he could see the arrival of the President of the Republic, across the street. Nor the street of steep stones and curbs, where the Indians passed with their short ageless steps, not the violent sun in a very clear blue sky, surrounded by eternal snow and composed of such tenuous oxygen that the foreign cigarettes always went out. Sometimes he remembered a cellar, sometimes a dark, sweaty man appeared, his eyes full of tears, breathing slowly under the reflectors. But that also might have been in the dusty village to the South, and then the man was white with a beard the color of honey. Sometimes the man lay on a stretcher and was pale and his eyes were closed and he smelled bad; on his eyelids and the creases of his nose there were traces of fresh plaster.

As time went by the memories blurred and ran into each other. Then the Consul could conjure up the rose colored mansion and the barred window but the sun was humid and it burnt like it did in the village. Though he strained against the bars he couldn't see the face of the President, entering the Palace accompanied by the Colonel himself. At other times, the man with his eyes closed faded into the darkness of the cellar and someone intoned indistinguishable phrases in English and finally there was only the bright circle of the reflector and the blind eyes of the death mask with bits of skin and eyelashes stuck to it. Sometimes it was night outside and the man blinded by the light was himself and he felt the blood dripping on his new stateside shoes, but the blood was his own and he woke up in Hamburg, filled with horror at the stumps of his own amputated hands.

For the Consul, those fragments of memory belonged to the Colonel, or to a dream in which the Consul dreamt of a Colonel. Reality was the Heilwigstrasse wet with rain and the handsome red brick housefronts, all the same. (The Consul always joked with his German friends, telling them that if the neighborhood police used high black helmets and didn't carry pistols, the Heilwigstrasse might be taken for a London street. The thought brought him great inner peace and he laughed and laughed. His German friends rarely laughed with him.)



In front of Heilwigstrasse Number 125 the Consul looked up to the second-floor window. He told himself he had to hang the National coat of arms once and for all, he'd meant to do it from the moment he'd assumed the post. Then he remembered what he'd read in this week's paper and that now it didn't matter any more. Or should he put it up in any case, as one of his last official acts? He'd always avoided the bothersome proceedings, the report to the Ministry in Bonn, the supervision of the painter, who more than likely wouldn't be able to trace the llama's graceful neck. (Or was the heraldic animal a vicuña?) But neither did the Consul believe in the press too much and he decided not to worry. He thought: "They'll have to notify me personally. As long as the telegram doesn't come, I have the right to put up the coat of arms."

Before boarding the first Sunday BEA flight for Paris, the young blond woman bought a hook by Louis Aragon and a nice felt-tip pen in the Heathrow airport. The pen wrote in violet ink, almost amethyst. (The woman had been born in Liege, one autumn, and the amethyst was her birthstone.) An hour later she got into a taxi on the Le Bourget and asked to be taken to the Place Contrescarpe, in the Latin Quarter.

She went down Mouffetard and came back up, walking slowly, stopping to look at a few photographs on the small theaters or to examine the scarves that hung in clusters in the doorways of the Arab boutiques. She chose one in red and black, and tied it loosely around her neck. Farther on she bought a large apple and a bag of strawberries from a fruit vendor. At noon she sat at a small cafe on the square, to eat the fruit. When the Saint Etienne-du-Mont bells rang two p.m., she was completely absorbed in reading the last poems in the book. She paid for the coffee she hadn't drunk and walked to the river, slowly. There she stopped a while, leaning on the bridge, watching the water that flowed west. Then she tossed the Aragon book into the current and waited for it to disappear in the whirlpools formed by the pillars that supported the bridge. At Orly at nine that same night she caught a plane for Germany with a ticket she'd had in her purse for a month.

On Monday morning she woke very early in the Hamburg hotel and arrived at the department store just after it opened. There she bought a grey wig at a bargain table - where no one asked her what she wanted it for - an expensive coat, boots and a grey suede purse. In Hamburg the early spring was damp and cold for the elderly, not at all like the Hyde Park sun. There were almost no children in the streets.



At ten a.m. she stood at the store's main entrance. A young man, tall and with tanned skin (he could have been Arabic, Italian or from South America) took off a pair of sunglasses beside her and carefully folded them before introducing them into their case. On his left hand there was a strange ring, a kind of dull cylinder.


The woman had never seen this man. But for a long time another man she loved had told her in his slow, tender voice: "Remember. The glasses. The aluminum ring from Vietnam. There's no sun, but I've got to protect myself from the rain, don't you agree?" In Hamburg, the tall man said: "There's no sun, but I've got to protect myself from the rain, don't you agree?" The woman nodded, and looking straight into his eyes simply said: "A 38 is better." The man put his glasses on again and they walked arm in arm to the car he had rented.

Later, in the new hotel where they registered as a businessman from Milan with his wife, the blond woman took a piece of paper and wrote in large block letters with the amethyst marker:

VICTORIA O MUERTE  
SIEG ODER TOD

The Consul was getting ready to take his morning walk and his wife was handing him his raincoat, when the secretary stopped him in the vestibule: "Sir, the old Australian lady is here again. It's been four times this week." The Consul made a gesture of exasperation, it was the Colonel's gesture and he himself recognized it as belonging to the rose colored mansion, not to the Heilwigstrasse with its brick fronts. He told the secretary to tell the Australian lady to come in.

The secretary was German and very shy; she'd always really been afraid of the Consul, even though she never knew the Colonel. There was hardly any work in the office, especially lately. The secretary spent her spare time reading STERN or rosy novels. Sometimes the Consul's wife came in with two demitasses of coffee and a stupid smile on her mestizo face, but the secretary hardly understood her mumbled Spanish and was silent until the woman returned to her quarters. At night the secretary - who was from Bad Godesberg and missed the poplars and the green banks of the Rhine - put the light out in her tiny room invaded by the smoke and noise of a nearby train station. And in the dark she saw the wolf teeth the Consul showed when he spoke, like a mask of war that didn't go with the peacetime face. That morning, she was sure she'd seen the wolf teeth for an instant, when she told him about the Australian woman. She barely had time to add: "A coded telegram



arrived. I left it on your desk."

The blond woman entered the office, following the secretary. The Consul was on his feet, very pale, with his hands against his desk and his head down. Without touching it, he was staring at a piece of yellow paper open on top of the leather brief case. He didn't seem to have heard them.

The woman was wearing the grey wig and the scarf from Mouffetard. She had two coats on; under her slacks she was wearing another change of clothes. She had used a yellowish makeup base, expertly accentuating certain natural lines and had darkened the skin around her eyes. The coat hid the pure line of her throat and chin. "The lady from Australia, Sir," said the secretary, hesitating. The blond woman began to speak English in a voice she had practiced for a long time, the metallic voice of her grandmother during their vacations at Brabant.

Old, a widow, and slightly eccentric, the Australian sociologist asked for information and publications concerning the distant country, talking all the time about a complicated research project. The Consulate didn't have that kind of material and he was very sorry, the Consul said, barely raising his head. She should speak to the secretary. But the metallic voice kept on speaking English, invading the Consul's thoughts, preventing him from concentrating on the five columns of coded figures that told him everything was over, that the General was no longer afraid of the secrets the Colonel kept, now it was time for the return and humiliation; perhaps even shame. The telegram was addressed to the Colonel, but the Consul would have to suffer the consequences. Flooded with indignation, he kept staring at the yellow piece of paper.

Neither of the two women knew that at that moment the Consul was insulting the Colonel in one of the offices of the rose colored mansion. They both shouted obscenities and their voices clashed with the drone of the Indian cigarette vendors, with the grumbling *inayan* spilling from an agent's radio on the second floor of the Ministry of the Interior, with that crazy Australian lady's stupidities. In the midst of that dissonant chorus, the Consul couldn't distinguish his own voice. The blond woman thought: "God, I've got to get him alone with me!" At least he could shut that old bitch up and, while the Colonel insulted him, the Consul said: "Fraulein,



please see if there are any tourism pamphlets left." The secretary went out; he went back to the numbers on the yellow paper.

The blond woman came up to him and stood at the Consul's right, just two steps away. With her gloved hands she opened the large purse which held only a piece of paper and a 38-caliber revolver. (This revolver had been her idea and she had argued obstinately in that far away place, defending it: "I don't want pistols that jam; I don't need spare grips. All I want are six bullets and I'll still have three too many.") She held the familiar gun still hidden beneath the flap of the purse. She moved a little further to her right. The man had to see her, the hunter had to give the trapped animal its chance, for this was a military action but it was also a political job; it had to be carried out face to face. And at the same time she thought that everything was superfluous, that the Colonel was already dead; he died the moment the Australian lady entered the office.

At that moment the Colonel's cadaver raised its eyes out of the white death mask and looked at the blond woman who smiled. She looked back at him without hate now, as she lowered the purse and uncovered the revolver in firing position. Then, with a graceful movement of her body, she moved her feet just a little apart and let her weight gravitate to her right leg (like they'd taught her long ago). At the same time she brought her arm up and fired three shots one two three at the dead Colonel. She saw three holes opening in the same part of his chest and she could almost follow their horizontal trajectory until they reached his heart, because the Colonel's eyes, fixed on her, suddenly went dull. The Colonel got smaller and smaller as he went down; first to his knees, then back on his heels, and at last his hands coming away from the desk, taking the yellow telegram with them. The Consul was caught between the desk and the wall, silenced. The shots still reverberated in the office and a wisp of bluish smoke drifted beneath the lampshade. Still holding the revolver, the woman took from her purse the paper with the amethyst words and placed it at the Colonel's feet.

She hadn't straightened up completely when the door opened as if it had exploded. She felt a terrible blow on her neck and two frantic arms holding on her knees, as the face of the Consul's wife came up against her own between shrieks and







shoulders. She's smiling. The door is slightly open and she calmly gets into the car. The Opel pulls away.

The one-way street makes it necessary to turn right and enter Heilwigstrasse, in order to turn the far corner onto the highway going toward Holland. The windshield wipers are flooded by a harder rain now, and the woman can only see blurry images that belong to the land of the dead: the policeman is in his place, the door of Number 125 is closed, just as she left it. There is no one on the sidewalk, where it's been raining since dawn, washing all the dirt into the sewers. The Heilwigstrasse is clean.

The woman begins to shed the Australian lady's clothing. She'll finish changing and dry her hair in the second car, that waits in a garage in Lüneburg, with other luggage and new documents. Then they'll enter Holland and then France. Perhaps in a few months they'll be able to return to South America.

All this is what the woman who just a few moments ago was dead is thinking. The highway railings fall behind with an isochronic hum, at a hundred and thirty kilometers per hour. The man drives in silence, behind his dark glasses. The woman looks at his fine, strong hands, his bony jaw, his shoulders solidly set in the leather seat. She looks at her own hands that have just killed for the first time.

The blond woman looked at the calendar again and felt a new kind of joy. She walked to the window. It was five in the afternoon, the hour school lets out in Buenos Aires. Bands of children walk along the Avenida de Mayo, swinging their school bags. The woman goes back to counting on her fingers and remembering the hotel room in Amsterdam, the indescribable exhaustion, the loneliness, her breathing beside the man who looked at her from the same pillow, the hand with the aluminum ring reached out to turn out the light. She finished counting the weeks out loud, smiled and knew she was pregnant, that nothing had happened in Hamburg, that all the additions and subtractions checked out.

# People Aplenty, But They Lacked Arms

## BOLIVIA:

AT the last foreign minister's conference held by the OAS in Costa Rica, US Secretary of State William Rogers said in a menacing tone to Huáscar Taberno, Bolivian Minister of Foreign Relations, that the Nixon Administration proposed to overthrow the nationalist-reformist government of Torres.

On October 7, 1970, General Juan José Torres, with the support of the workers' movement and the university students, assumed the presidency of the oliplano nation, following the overthrow of the military group led by General Rogelio Miranda who sought to establish an ultrarightist dictatorship following the golpe de Estado against General Alfredo Ovando.

Five months after his ascent to power, General Torres told a group of workers who asked him to define the objectives of his government, that he proposed to make a revolution for the dispossessed classes.

Although certain popular sectors considered Torres to be a petit-bourgeois reformist and progressive who could not lead the people toward a revolutionary process, they did not underestimate nor exclude the possibilities which the revolutionary struggle rising within the reality of Bolivia, had for organizing the people toward the seizure of power through the democratic opening provided by the new government.

Thus they supported the nationalist measures promulgated by Torres' cabinet, on several occasions confronted gelpista threats and attempts by the military fascists, and tried to radicalize the nationalist process initiated in October by means of the unity of left forces, the creation of the People's Assembly and the upsurge of the people's militias.

### *An Organ of Proletarian Power*

The People's Assembly was born an international workers' day as the organ of power of the Bolivian

Official name:	Republic of Bolivia.
Area:	1 098 581 km <sup>2</sup> .
Population:	4 500 000 (85% Indian). The demographic concentration is on the plateaus, where the mines are also located. More than 35% of the population resides in the five most important cities (La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Santa Cruz and Sucre).
Capital:	La Paz (Sucre is the constitutional capital).
Official language:	Spanish.
Popular language:	Quechuo and Aymoro (more than 70% of the inhabitants speak these Indian tongues).
National date:	August 6 (proclamation of independence in 1925).
Religion:	Catholic.
Production:	Tin and other metals, sugar, cocoa, corn, oil. Although statistics indicate that 73% of the population depends on agriculture and livestock for its subsistence, the economic base is mining which represents 90% of the exports (in 1968: tin, 49%, other metals, 25%; oil, 1 6%). The principal capitalist countries that acquire metals in this process are: England, the United States and the German Federal Republic. More than 50% of Bolivian imports (food products, manufactured goods, livestock and machinery) come from the United States with whom Bolivia has a deficit trade balance. The majority of foreign investments are North American and North Americans control the exploitation of oil and some metals.
Infant mortality rate: (0 to 1 year)	90 per 1000.
Life expectancy:	40 to 45 years. Hidden hunger and the lack of medical treatment cause the death of thousands of poor citizens from such illnesses as silicosis, pneumonia, yellow fever, malaria, parasitic diseases, cerebral hemorrhages and others. The miners and peasants (Indians and mestizos) consume large amounts of coca (10 000 kg per year) to combat hunger, thirst, cold and fatigue.
Illiteracy:	78%.



working class which would act as the instrument of pressure and would force the government to apply the revolutionary methods that would transform the economic and social structure of this South American country which has been called "the beggar on the throne of gold" because of the impoverished existence of its inhabitants in a territory of incalculable natural wealth.

On June 22, the solemn doors of the bourgeois parliament building opened for the inauguration of the People's Assembly. More than 200 delegates representing workers, peasants, students, organizations and left parties participated in the ten sessions and made important decisions, such as the right of the Assembly to decree a general strike throughout the country and to occupy all work centers should a military golpe by the fascist forces be imminent; the trial of the militarists who participated in the massacre of the miners in Cotavi, Llagua, Siglo XX and Huanuni during the Barrientos dictatorship; the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba, Chile, the People's Republic of China and other revolutionary governments, and workers' control of the management of the Bolivian Mining Corporation [COMIBOL].

For its part, the government adopted a position of "political equilibrium" between the people's forces represented in the People's Assembly, which demanded the deepening of the process, and the military forces that were proposing to implant fascism.



### Arms for the People

When at the beginning of this year, the government made known the existence of "an international conspiracy against Bolivia," thousands of miners invaded the streets of La Paz which shook with dynamite explosions and shots from the ancient rifles the tin miners owned. They then concentrated in front of the Quemado Palace and demanded that Torres give them arms to fight the reactionaries who were seeking the establishment of an extreme right-wing regime in the country, proposed the nationalization of certain foreign enterprises and the promulgation of other measures of benefit to the people.

The official reply to the demands of the working class was the deceitful pretext of lack of state funds for the purchase of arms and the impossibility of a revolutionary process without the participation of the armed forces which according to the Bolivian President, were on the side of the people.

Despite the government's attitude the Peasant Federation of La Paz decided to organize the people's army Tupac Katari, to defend revolutionary conquests and land tenure, while the Bolivian Workers' Confederation (COB) undertook the organization of "armed militias of the working class on a national scale in the face of the imperialist threat which is bound to unleash civil war in Bolivia."

Months later, the military and civilian ultraright became alarmed at the publication of a manifesto entitled "Revolutionary Thought of the Anonymous People's Sector," which carried the signature of a new organization called the People's Military Vanguard (VMP). In this historic document the rank-and-file and junior officers of the Bolivian Army proposed the substitution of the Armed Forces for an army that would defend the people's interests, demanded the trial of militarists compromised in crimes against trade union leaders, petitioned for better economic conditions, denounced the class differences in the military apparatus, opposed the trips of officers to the United States for special counterrevolutionary courses and rejected the military aid agreements with North American imperialists. A few days later the fascist *golpe* occurred.

### The Counterrevolutionary Escalation

During the days of combat, the People's Nationalist Front (FPN), which included representatives of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) and the right-wing militarists, issued a communiqué over the mutinist radio station of Cochabamba stating that reactionary sedition would pursue the "restoration of the reign of the law against international communism which seeks to convert Bolivia into a second Cuba."

The real purpose of *golpe de Estado* 187 in the Bolivian republic was the beginning of a fascist escalation against the revolutionary governments and movements of South America, which menace imperialist interests and the political and economic power of the ruling classes.

Once more the CIA exercised the imperial command of Washington to overthrow a government with a nationalist tendency. It did so in league with the Brazilian, Argentinian and Paraguayan guerrillas and the intervention of the *golpista* ex-officers in complicity with high officers of the constitutional army headed by its Commander-in-Chief General Luis Reque Terón, former military attache for his country in the United States who, two weeks before the barracks uprising, had made a demagogical call to the soldiers and officers to support "the revolution the people were carrying out."

Torres' lack of decision culminated in his vacillations over arming the people and cleaning the rightist officers out of the military apparatus, among them Colonel Andrés Selich, head of the Bolivian Rangers, who participated in the assassination of Comandante Che Guevara in 1967 and who intervened actively with his green beret troops in the barracks mutiny, and General Florentino Mendieta, head of the Seventh Army Division in Cochabamba. These two, along with Cavalry Colonel Hugo Banzer, ex-military attache in the United States and ex-Minister of Education in Barrientos' cabinet, composed the military triumvirate initially constituted before the latter became the principal head of the mutinous forces.

The Brazilian intervention in the Bolivian military *golpe* was decisive through the presence, in the Department of Santo Cruz, of Brazilian tanks and arms painted with the colors of the Bolivian Army, as well as for the \$100 000 gift to Banzer from General Bethlem, former Brazilian ambassador in La Paz, who had proposed that the lands of the Quechuas and Aymorae be converted into a Brazilian protectorate. This spokesman for fascism attacked the People's Assembly declaring it to be "a menace to Brazil's unpopulated areas."

A week before the fascist uprising, the US Embassy in La Paz distributed a confidential memorandum in which North American residents and diplomatic personnel were instructed to take security measures and to stock food supplies, in preparation for the *golpe de Estado* which was to take place in the country.

A front page article in the daily *Washington Post* emphasized that the great success of the Bolivian *golpe de Estado* was possible thanks to the outstanding participation of US Air Force Major Robert J. Lundin, who facilitated radio communication between the chief Banzer and the capital over the Yankee mission's transmitter in Santa Cruz, and held various conversations with him during the period of the military uprising that took place on August 19.

### *Days of Blood and Fire*

For three days the revolutionary forces fought the armies of military fascism which applied their *golpista* tactic of first controlling the military units of eastern Bolivia in order to then win the support of the rest of the altiplano garrisons.

While the barracks announced themselves against Torres and deserted the government ranks — the traitors Reque Terón, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Arnex, Chief of the Air Forces; Zenteno Anaya and many others, in order to head the *golpista* forces in the capital — the COB political commando exhorted the workers and the people to arm themselves by every means possible to defend the nation from the horrible threat of fascism.

The peasant organizations called on their members to shoulder the rifles "to defend the conquests of the revolution and fight to deepen them, particularly in the area of agrarian reform so that it might become an instrument for the real liberation of the peasantry."

Hundreds of thousands of La Paz residents ran through the streets of the capital on the day following the military pronouncement in Santa Cruz, begging arms to contain the advance of the fascists under the revolutionary slogan "They shall not pass!"

The people of La Paz together with soldiers from the Colorado battalion, the only military unit that remained loyal to Torres, commanded by Major Rubén Sánchez, undertook to expropriate the arms controlled by the secessionists of the *Miraflores* General Headquarters.

Sánchez had handed more than 400 rifles from his unit's arsenal over to civilians but this was not enough for the thousands of hands that demanded arms.

"People aplenty, but they had no arms," Mayor Rubén Sánchez stated on his arrival in the Peruvian capital as an exile, when asked what had been the basic factor in the defeat of the patriotic forces.

More than 100 dead, hundreds wounded and some 300 arrested was the price paid by the Bolivian people to the hordes of reaction which, the day after "Shorty" Banzer assumed power, carried out a massacre of students and workers in the capital's university region.

At 11:40 a.m. on August 21, the criminal attack against the San Andrés university building began with tanks, the air force and ranger troops commanded by Zenteno Anaya, one of the accomplices in the assassination of Che Guevara in Higueros.

Various witnesses testified that when the first young men left the high academic center after hours of desperate resistance, they were machine-gunned down, while others were hit in the face by the soldiers with their arms. Later more than 300 students were taken to Viacha barracks, 18 kilometers from the capital.

The new pro-Yankee dictator justified the massacre by declaring that "it was a necessary action in order to frighten the students." It cost the lives of 12 students and another 30 were wounded.

Later the regime sent military airplanes to machine gun the population of Matilde mine, returned to the state by the former government, and announced through its Minister of the Interior Colonel Selich, that a governmental operation was undertaking the arrest of all those citizens opposed to the official concept of respect for property, tradition and family.

In his first political statement that the Minister of Mines and Metallurgy, Carlos Serrato, gave to the press, he demagogically defined the twenty-ninth military regime in the 146 years of the country's republican life as "a nationalist and people's government composed of the alliance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and the Bolivian Socialist Falange with the Armed Forces as its fighting branch."

The Banzer dictatorship will extend fascist ideals through such laws as that guaranteeing national and foreign private investments and the revision of the conditions agreed to in the Andes Pact for the treatment of foreign capital.

### *The "Victory" of Fascism*

After nine days, the US Government recognized the Bolivian *golpistas* with whom it found itself disposed to continue "friendly and cooperative relations" according to a statement by Robert J. McCloskey, State Department spokesman.

Various US newspapers openly praised the violent change of government in Bolivia, among them the *Washington Evening Star*, which affirmed that Washington is obviously pleased because the new dictator is unequivocally anticommunist."

At the close of his meeting with Banzer to inform him that his country recognized the new military regime, the US ambassador and recognized CIA agent, Ernest Siracusa, stated confidently that "now we will be able to open greater opportunities for mutual advantages."





Immediately the Bolivian branch of the Bank of America made known the grant of a credit of \$12 000 000 to COMIBOL, headed by General Rogelio Miranda, in recognition of the counterinsurgency that the tyranny of Banzer will unleash against the urban guerrillas, the revision of certain nationalist measures taken by Torres and considered "demagogical" and the rejection of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba and Chile.

Fascism's victory in Bolivia on August 21, 1971, does not destroy the liberation aspirations of the peasants and miners who have grasped the essential necessity for armed struggle.

The bloody repression that the ultrarightist military and civilians unleash against the revolutionary forces, will not prevent Bolivia from becoming — as Comandante Che Guevara foresaw — a new Viet Nam.

The revolutionary forces state the necessity for creating a people's army made up of all civilian and military patriots who are prepared to struggle against the dictatorship and for the liberation of the people who are subjected to the triple slavery of imperialists, fascists and the leech of private enterprise.

### *The Nationalism of the Ultraright*

Once invested with presidential powers, the Santo Cruz latifundist gave a brief speech from the Quemodo Palace balcony to a small group gathered in Murillo Square.

"I am not a man of speeches," he said, "I am a man of action and I let my actions speak for me." Curfew and martial law were imposed on the entire country that day.



# PANAMA CANAL SOCIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT

---

by Héctor Danilo

---

**A**T one period of its history, Panama and later her canal were the preoccupation of kings, pirates and philosophers.

Some dreamed that one day this little country with a population of one and a half million and an area of 77 000 km<sup>2</sup> would become the capital of the earth.

But since the end of the 19th century the United States has concentrated its forces on permanently controlling this interoceanic canal plus an area of 1432 km<sup>2</sup> where commercial operations worth thousands of millions of dollars are carried out.

Thus a sociological laboratory has been set up in the heart of Latin America which has attracted the attention of the most experienced investigators.

The so-called Canal Zone, practically all of which is used for military activity, is symbolic of the clash between two utterly different cultures.

You can see this clash by simply crossing the street, or from the central avenue of the city, the Plaza Cinco de Mayo, where so many popular big-scale demonstrations have taken place to protest the US presence in this section of Panamanian territory.

Many believe it has been definite US policy to eliminate Panamanian culture in order to strengthen American control from a sociological point of view.

In 1902 a policy of cultural assimilation began, its first step being to present Panama as a State officially created by the United States.

The building of the canal gave the US an opportunity to lay the socio-cultural bases which we see today in the Canal Zone.

In the early years when the canal was being built, the United States was still suffering from the effects of its Civil War. The US Government gave the military from the south — those who had lost the war — the responsibility of building the canal, publicizing it as "the last wonder of the world."



Thus generals, colonels and soldiers, all fine old southern gentlemen, come to Panama, filled with bitterness and firmly convinced that their job was to introduce the American way of life there — especially the southern way of life. Thousands of blacks, mulattoes, mestizos, Jomoicans, Guyonese and Central Americans were contracted to work under extremely harsh conditions, and were organized with military discipline so that every possible ounce of work could be squeezed out of them.

Statistics from the time show that thousands of blacks died during the building of the canal. A French historian says over 30,000 perished.

Along with the construction work, a policy of classes was being built on the basis of racism. The white camps were established in exclusive areas; the tents of the black Caribbean workers were set up elsewhere; while Panamanians were isolated from their fellow workers, in an apparently deliberate attempt to keep the social groups separated.

Thus the socio-political system which had prevailed in the deep south of the US, with its segregation and separatism, was transferred to Panama, and still exists in the Canal Zone.

The Canal Zone is inhabited by "Zonians," descendants of Americans, and "Latin" — Panamanians, Central Americans, blacks, mulattoes and Indians.

There are 50,000 Americans; they pay no taxes, and enjoy free education, electricity, water and medical services, and buy new cars every year.

Official name:	Republic of Panama
Area:	29,208 sq. miles
Population:	1,500,000
Capital:	Panama City
Official language:	Spanish
Religion:	93% Roman Catholic
Production:	About 25% of the GNP is derived from the Canal Zone in the way of lease fees and labor services. Most of the economy is based on agriculture—rice, sugar and bananas.
Per capita income:	\$477
Infant mortality rate:	43 per 1000 births
Life expectancy:	61 years
Illiteracy:	20%

The "Latin" work as gardeners, street cleaners, cooks, and clean the canal locks. They are not permitted to be treated in the Zone hospitals should they be involved in an accident, nor can they produce certificates signed by Panamanian doctors when they have been off work because of illness.

An important London paper once described the Canal Zone as "a flourishing avenue in the middle of a slum."

The "Zonians" houses are the most noticeable in the country, and are typically American. Plastic and aluminum rocking chairs make a strong contrast to the wooden containers and packing-boxes which those on the other side of the Peerless fence use for furniture. But the white ranch-type houses cannot hide the rows of miserable huts on the outskirts of the zone, often made with metal Coca-Cola cans or old pieces of wood.


But most outstanding is the Summit, a forest with over 20,000 varieties of tropical flowers, where the "Zonians" go for recreation purposes, and which they do not share with the inhabitants of Panama City. The only blacks seen there are neatly dressed nurses looking after American children.

Visitors are struck by the aseptic atmosphere of the entire area, which Panamanians try to avoid since they are always under the vigilant eyes of the US military police.

There is also a very clear difference in food, music and dress. Roast beef, fat rock and soft drinks made in USA have little in common with the rhythm of drums and the showy colorful hooped petticoats Panamanian women wear on feast days.

Finally, the American authorities in the Zone are not in the least interested in publicizing the fact that the Historical and Anthropological Museum of Panama has an excellent collection of ceramics and other exhibits which clearly indicate the homogeneous and national identity of the country.

In the Canal Zone everything is reduced to a simple but very explicit publicity phrase: "Advance and prosper in your work by speaking English."



# THE OIL ORGY

by Jaime Galarza

Of Ecuador's four regions, there is only one — the archipelago of Galapagos — in which the monopolists have not planted their flags. In all the others — the Coast, the Sierra and the East, — they are firmly entrenched.

On the Coast, the most important of the concessions granted in recent years is that handed over to Standard Oil of New Jersey, the rich Gulf of Guayaquil, key to the Guayas river basin, one of the potentially richest sections of the country, with an area of 30 000 km<sup>2</sup>, where technicians calculate that 10 000 000 persons can live and work, a figure that surpasses by 4 000 000 the present Ecuadorian population.


The Andes region, at least up until now, does not offer the same panorama of territorial roviishment as the Coast except for one of the concessions of Pacific Brad Co., part of which is located near Quito.

The area that suffers most from this avalanche of concessions is the East, situated in the great Amazon basin, where 66 000 km<sup>2</sup> out of a total of 110 000 have been given away. This handing over has occurred within the last ten years.

THE Ecuadorian petroleum "festival," as some international circles call it, is not so much a festival as an orgy, in which the biggest oil companies of the capitalist world take part, as do many governments, including those of the United States, Great Britain, Holland, Japan, etc.

Amid obscure machinations, various mechanisms and pressures, Ecuador's oil orgy has been notable for the systematic violation of the country's laws and the constantly increasing squandering of this underdeveloped country's great oil resources.

The international press has ventured the information that Ecuador will soon be able to produce 5 million barrels per day, thus becoming the world's second largest producer and the largest exporter. No one has been able to confirm or deny this. However, we do know that in less than three years the eastern part of the country, which had never produced a single barrel of oil before, is now producing 60 000 barrels daily from 50 wells, on average of 1 200 barrels from each well, compared to a daily average of scarcely 14 barrels per well in the United States.





Moreover, drilling has taken place in only two of the almost 50 concessions in the country, which cover the whole eastern area and most of the Pacific coast. Wells have been drilled in only a small area, while the amount of land conceded to the oil companies equals more than 90 000 km<sup>2</sup> — more than a third of the whole country.

### *A well-kept secret*

For 40 years the country has been accustomed to a routine which raised no suspicions: the coming and going of oil companies that obtained concessions, and later left, declaring they had not found oil either in the East or on the Coast, except for the deposits on the Santa Elena Peninsula, which did not amount to very much according to the Anglo-Ecuadorian Oilfields Company, which traditionally was given the concession in this area.

Important chapters in the mysterious history of Ecuadorian oil include the eastern concession of 2 500 000 hectares given in 1931 to the Leonard Exploration Company, and the concession of 10 million hectares given in 1937 to Anglo Saxon. The Leonard Company was simply a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Anglo Saxon of Royal Dutch Shell, the big Anglo-Dutch company.

The results of surveys done by the Leonard Company over a period of six years were never made known, and Royal Dutch Shell, profiting from the economic hegemony and influence that British capital had in Ecuador then, took over from Leonard in 1937.

When Leonard's contract was cancelled because it had not carried out the required agreements, Anglo Saxon took over with all its equipment, and later transferred its concession to the Shell Company which, after 11 years of surveying (they had the right to explore for only five years), calmly declared it had found no oil in the East.

Despite the fact that in 1948 it returned four of the ten million hectares in then held, Shell obtained a new concession for the same amount of land, this time in association with Rockefeller's Standard Oil, which profited from the presence in the government of a man in whom it had great confidence: Galo Plaza Losso.

The companies were given permission to survey for five years and to exploit for 40 years any oil found. But in 1950 they decided to leave the country, declaring once more that there was no oil in the East.

Defending the withdrawal of the American-English-Dutch company, Plaza Losso declared at the time: "The East is a myth. It has been clearly shown there is no oil there. It is not even good for agriculture. Ecuador must concentrate on the coastal lands."

Despite these declarations by the companies and the government, unemployed workers, Ecuadorian technicians, legislators and journalists all insisted repeatedly that the company had found big reserves of oil, and that about 100 wells had been sealed for later use.



## A "banana republic"

Having discouraged the country from becoming a producer of oil, and having discredited the East's agricultural possibilities, Golo Plozo opted for the cultivation of bananas, much needed by the US fruit monopolies which had been ruined by the decline of Central American banana growing due to hurricanes and floods.

Making use of her coastal lands in accordance with official plans and foreign needs, Ecuador became the world's foremost banana producer and exporter. This monoculture of one fruit completely deformed the country's economy, and later, when the American market shrank, massive unemployment and financial difficulties followed, with other tragic consequences for the economy.

At the same time, after having been an exporter of crude oil up to 1958, Ecuador became an oil importer, with serious results for its foreign exchange. True, through the years, the oil firms had been importing constantly increasing supplies of by-products, but the importation of crude oil began in 1958 and still goes on.

Is there really no oil? Of course there is and not only in the East, but also in the Santo Elena Peninsula. What is happening is that from the point of view of those who stand to profit from it, it is better for the oil companies to import crude oil and refine it in Ecuador, thus multiplying their profits.

Jacques Boulanger, a French technician contracted by the government, explained this with reference to the year 1963, when he wrote in an official report published by the Planning Board:

There is evidence that the reason for the country's oil situation is on the one hand the inactivity of many of the concessionaires, and on the other the very limited activity of the producing firms, because for them it is more convenient and more profitable to import oil at present prices, than to drill for it in Ecuador.

Boulanger spoke moderately when he unmasked the policies of the oil firms in Ecuador, but the American Colonel Leonard Clark was very indiscreet when, in 1947, he told the US press that there were oil reserves in Ecuador comparable to those in the Middle East.

Clark certainly was not unaware of his country's international policy; he was head of counterintelligence behind the Chinese lines during World War II.

The strange coincidence between the encouragement of banana cultivation and the discouragement of oil production at the end of the 40s and early 50s was connected with similar calculations about profits envisaged by imperialist monopolies. Up until then Ecuador had appeared as a "reserve country" in the files of the big international oil cartel. Thus for years the cartel's main worry was to keep control of the reserves by obtaining concessions, but the work never went beyond preliminary surveys. Forced by circumstances

Official name:	Republic of Ecuador
Area:	104,505 sq. miles
Population:	6,089,000
Capital:	Quito
Official language:	Spanish
Popular language:	Quechua
Religion:	Catholicism (est. 92.4%)
Production:	31.2% of the GNP is derived from agriculture—bananas, coffee, cocoa, rice, sugar, cotton, grains, fruits and vegetables. Petroleum is the primary mineral product.
Per capita income:	\$213
Infant mortality rate:	86.1 per 1000 births
Life expectancy:	52 years
Illiteracy: 40%	40%

to hand over the concessions to other companies, the original concessionaires had to quit the stage and new ones became responsible for continuing the myth that there was "no oil in Ecuador," especially not in the Amazon region.

## Three for one

After 1956 the world oil situation changed considerably. That year Egypt closed the Suez Canal, which had been ideal for transporting Arabian crude oil to Europe and the United States. More alarming was the fact that the closing of the Canal was accompanied by angry nationalist noises from Arab and Persian Gulf nations. The oil moguls began to get worried and European and American industry became uneasy. Eventually the nationalists were able (for a short time) to shipwreck the fat juicy oil concessions throughout the area.

Immediately the iron hand of the cartel, which for ten years had been carefully concealed in its velvet glove, moved against Ecuador. In 1957, under the chairmanship of Comilo Ponce Enriquez, the nebulous Leonard Exploration Company returned and received a concession of 9 million hectares in the East, much more than it had obtained in 1931, and this despite the fact that it had been thrown out of the country in 1937 for not having carried out the terms of its contract.

Then the world situation became somewhat more stable. There was no reason for alarm. Ecuador's wells could remain closed for a time. The Leonard Company, as was the custom, returned the area conceded.

In 1960 the oil empire was shaken by two big explosions: the Cuban government's nationalization of the refineries of Texaco, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Shell; and the foundation of OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

By defending the prices the international cartel paid the producing countries for their oil, and by carrying out certain measures to make bribing, boycotts and the usual pressure on the various governments impossible, OPEC — without wishing to (or knowing it was doing so) — caused the cartel to blow the dust from its file on Ecuador, and decide finally to change it from a "reserve country" to the world's foremost oil producer, but naturally within a neocolonial framework.


It should be remembered that the members of the cartel (Standard Oil of New Jersey, Royal Dutch Shell, Gulf, Texaco, Standard of California, Socony Mobil Oil and British Petroleum) are the same ones which have taken Ecuadorian oil. With its national and international consequences, this is the cartel's reprisal against the oil-producing countries after the three defeats it suffered — the closing of the Suez Canal, Cuba and the creation of OPEC.

### *The shark in action*

After the second disappearance of the Leonard Company from Ecuador, there appeared in 1961 an unknown Mining and Oil Company which was given a huge concession — 4 500 000 hectares in the East.

This concession, differing from previous ones in the same area, in a sense marked the opening ceremony of the "oil orgy." The concession allows for a period of surveying and exploiting which will last up to the year 2002. Among privileges offered are free action as regards foreign currency resulting from exportation, the traditional tax holidays and exemption from customs tariffs. In later years this firm handed over its concession to the Compañía Aguero y Postaza, a well-known subsidiary of the Texaco-Gulf consortium, which has another concession in the same area. Among the main agents of these negotiations are two Ecuadorians — the Christian-Socialist politician, Manuel de Guzmán Polanco, and Ricardo Crespo Zaldumbide, Golo Plozo's son-in-law.

When everything seemed to indicate that an oil rush was beginning, Velasco Ibarra's government fell in November 1961 and was succeeded by that of Carlos Julio Arosemena. Accused of many errors and crimes, such as "handing the country over to communism," Arosemena was thrown out on July 11, 1963, by a military golpe. But before that, he had dictated Emergency Decree No. 11, according to which the State has the right to organize the importation of oil and its by-products, from which the companies were getting such big



profits. This decree also said that if they wanted to make imports of this type, the government would allow it, but at the same time the companies must invest in production and the finding of new deposits. A real slap in the belly with a wet fish for all the powerful companies which had organized the decisive coup!

With Arosemena overthrown and the main clauses of the Decree annulled, the military junta began the second part of the orgy: the handing over to Texaco-Gulf of about a million and a half hectares in the East, with the right to build pipelines and refineries, export oil and its by-products freely, the usual tax holidays, etc. In case of any disagreement with the State, the contract stated that any problems were to be put into the hands of the World Bank, in which Washington has decisive power and to which Ecuador owes much money.

In its turn, the military junta was overthrown in March 1966 by a movement which represented popular discontent and the maneuvers of a sector of the oligarchy which had been affected by the dictates of the junta.

Then came the government led by Clemente Yerovi. That same year the press reported that a sordid dispute was going on in the National Palace among the aspirants to Ecuadorian oil, including American, English, Dutch, German, French, Japanese and Italian companies. At that time news came out about the huge oil reserves Ecuador had in the East and on the Coast.

Yerovi did not increase the concessions nor the privileges given to the oil companies (nor did he reduce them); but President Otto Arosemena, who replaced him in the last

months of 1966, hastened to hand over the last reserves, giving ten concessions in the East to various subsidiaries of the cartel members, and giving the Gulf Company of Guayaquil to Rockefeller's Standard Oil, which was masquerading under the name of Consorcio ADA.

When Velasco came to power for the fifth time in September 1968, the new government partly revised the concession given to Texaco-Gulf, offering other concessions in the East and the Pacific area. By 1970 most of Ecuador's oil was divided up, after a battle between the State and the companies about building the first important pipeline (which the companies claimed as their property) and later about possession of the refineries planned. The 5000 barrels per day produced by the first well in the East, which was drilled in Lago Agrio, added fuel to the fire.

### Climax of the orgy

The participants in this orgy wavered between discreet silences and noisy action. Such is the case with the ten projects envisaged in the new Petroleum Law, produced or suggested — and in each case insisted upon — by the oil companies, so strongly that on October 16 an official declaration concluded: "The contracts will be respected." In other words the new law will not change present concessions.

Now there is talk of 5 million barrels daily, huge new pipelines which will stretch from the East to the Pacific, one of them operated by Anglo (a subsidiary of British Petroleum). The magazine *Vistazo* speaks also of a secret pact between the government and the Somoza dictatorship, its aim being to assure the passage of Ecuadorian oil through Nicaragua before the United States eventually loses control over the Panama Canal.

Many rumors are going about, aggravated by official secrecy. What is definitely known is that the international cartel has taken possession of Ecuadorian oil to do with as it pleases; and that, given the conditions in which this occurred, it apparently believes this oil will be the cheapest in the world, since the companies decide the prices, organize manpower, lower wages (maximum, two dollars per day), enjoy tax holidays for 20 years, pay small token tariffs, and up to now have not had to hand over to the State any of the profits derived from exports.

Thus Ecuador's situation worsened at the beginning of last year because of the higher prices decreed by OPEC for member countries, an increase in which other nonmember Arab countries participated.

The shaking up of the oil empires, the blows given the big companies by some countries, the "need" for the cartel to be sure of a cheap and ample source of oil — all these constitute poor Ecuador's "oil orgy": Ecuador which, from a "reserve country," went on to its new status as oil company.

## TO THE EDITOR: A LETTER ON PERU

Dear *Tricontinental*,

It was with great dismay that I read the two articles on "revolutionary" Peru in No. 2 of your North American edition. Neither of these articles clarifies the class nature of Peruvian society. Nor do they explain the contradictions in world imperialism that have allowed this particular regime to emerge in this historic period. One of the articles, "Peru: A Step" by Pedro Higa paints Peru as a classless society:

In Peru today a new society is being built. A society in which social justice rules, a society in which *there are no exploited nor exploiters*, a society in which our children can live without the anxiety of an uncertain tomorrow . . . This perspective, *sufficiently broad and without limitations*, is now in view in our country.<sup>1</sup>

Or if not a classless society, at least a dictatorship of the Proletariat:

In the public meeting of October 3 of last year, more than 400,000 workers gathered in the Plaza de Armas. It is important to note that there were practically no white collar workers, all were *real workers*. So we see that *it is the working masses that are deciding things in this whole process*.<sup>2</sup>

Not the generals, not imperialist or domestic capital, but the working masses are today the true makers of policy in Peru, according to Mr. Higa.

While the first article is completely wrong about who holds power in Peru today, the second article, "The Discrepant Military" by Gabriel Molina, confuses the question and incorrectly analyzes the role of the military junta that took power in 1968 and the reasons for its ascendancy. The crux of his argument is the following:

Peru's social convulsions provoked what was perhaps the *most important cause* for the upsurge of this [progressive] current. The army was given the criteria that, in order to combat "subversion," an understanding of its causes was indispensable. This task was assigned principally to the Army Intelligence Service, which established itself within the trade unions and peasant communities for on-the-spot study of social conflicts that could lead to armed struggle. *The contact with the misery in which the vast majority of the Peruvian people lived strongly impressed the officers, who began to change their concepts of "subversion"*.<sup>3</sup>

The rest of Molina's article is praise, although muted compared to Higa's, of the "revolutionary" policies of the military junta.

He would have us believe that the army, and more specifically the elite U.S.-trained intelligence high command, came into contact with the misery and suffering of the masses (by infiltrating their organizations), had a change of heart, and decided to champion the people's cause against the forces of world imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism.

What he fails to mention is that these very same officers first crushed the armed peasant movement lead by Hugo Blanco and then annihilated the guerrilla insurrection that took place on three fronts in 1965 lead by the ELN and the MIR. It was only after destroying genuine people's movements that these generals decided to "come over" to the side of the people.

In fact nothing of the kind has happened. The exact same techniques used by the military before coming to power are once again being used today to crush the worker's and peasant's movement. What we are witnessing in Peru is the transformation of a weak and divided bourgeoisie, completely dominated by and dependent upon U.S. imperialism, into a unified national bourgeoisie organized and lead by the generals of the armed forces.

These officers, who time and time again had proven themselves fully committed to the most bloody repression of the masses in the service of capital, found themselves serving a "ruling class" which had lost all direction and ability to rule. It was only natural that they stepped into the breach, seized state power, and began organizing the economy in a way that would prevent a real revolution and preserve the system of private property. To do this some of the rules of the game had to be altered and the relationship with imperialism modified.

At the end of February, 1972 the Consultative Group for Peru of the World Bank reacted very favorably to the government's request for almost \$800 million in development aid over the next three years (1972-1974). The key reason for this conclusion was "the Government's intention to implement flexible policies for encouraging private investment." They agreed that assistance should be granted on the most "favorable terms as possible".<sup>4</sup>

Quite a commitment and quite a good bill of health from a major imperialist institution to a "revolutionary" government. Either these international predators have lost their minds or they do not share Higa's view that Peru is a society in which there "are no exploited nor exploiters". Who then is right?

To answer this question we must examine the events in Peru over the last three and a half years in the context of worldwide and Latin American developments.

## BACKGROUND TO THE COUP

The last several years have been a period of decline of absolute U.S. imperial hegemony throughout the world. This decline has been the result of the heroic resistance of the Indochinese (and especially the Vietnamese) people to U.S. imperialism; and the growing rivalry and competition between the major imperialist powers. The latter has resulted in a strengthening of Japanese and European (especially German) imperialism relative to the U.S.

While the U.S. continues to be the number one imperialist power, it no longer exercises absolute domination over its imperialist rivals nor even over some of the dependent bourgeoisies who now see that they have gained

greater freedom to maneuver on the inter-imperialist battlefield, with the result that they are pressing for new advantages, for more flexible economic ties, and for new political alliances.<sup>5</sup>

These kinds of developments can be seen even in Latin America where U.S. imperialism has its oldest and perhaps strongest ties.

Imperialist domination of Latin America today takes two overlapping and contradictory forms. The first, or traditional model (most closely associated with the U.S.), operates in the economic field mainly through "enclaves", i.e., enterprises totally controlled by imperialist capital and part of the economy of the host countries only geographically. This model is most often found in the agro-extractive sectors (mining, plantations, etc.).

The second and more recently evolving model is the penetration of foreign capital in the urban-industrial sectors. Although the U.S. is still by far the leading investor, other imperialist powers, especially Germany and Japan, are also quite active.

It is this latter form of economic domination that is the more dynamic and which has been on the ascendancy over the last decade. The major imperial powers, while obviously not voluntarily giving up their "enclaves" have been investing more and more heavily in the urban-industrial sector as capital seeks new markets and cheaper supplies of labor.

These two major economic developments: the growing inter-imperialist rivalry and the shift in domination to the urban-industrial sector have produced political, social and economic changes in many parts of Latin America.

In many countries the old oligarchy has been weakened but not destroyed, new middle sectors (petty bourgeoisies and white collar workers) have emerged and begun to assert themselves and various sectors of the dependent bourgeoisie have been strengthened through alliance with new imperialist investment in the dynamic sectors of the economy. In addition there has been the growth and development of an urban-industrial proletariat in both numbers and consciousness as well as peasant movements in the countryside throughout Latin America.<sup>6</sup>

In some countries this has resulted in the growing fragmentation of power leading to a situation in which the intermediate levels of authority (the armed forces and the technocratic bureaucracy, but especially the former) have gained a tremendous amount of autonomy, both politically and economically.<sup>7</sup>

This latter development can be seen most clearly in Peru where the military junta has acquired

a degree of autonomy never before possessed in non-revolutionary conditions by a Latin American government. The Peruvian military regime gained not only complete control of the political aspects of power, as in other countries, but also a corresponding control over the economic order.<sup>8</sup>

It was precisely the weakness of the major contending class forces in Peru, prior to 1968, that allowed the generals to gain this position.

The great weakness of the Peruvian bourgeoisie lay in the fact that it was completely controlled by its imperialist masters. The "enclaves" were integrated into the economies of the metropolis, not into the host country, and therefore were entirely out of control of the local bourgeoisie, even though they had some capital invested. Similarly, the urban-industrial sector was 80% owned and 100% controlled by foreign capital. All the Peruvian "ruling class" could do was to follow the dictates (often contradictory) of the imperialists and gather whatever crumbs came their way.

On the other hand there was the weakness of the popular forces; the working class and the peasantry. The former remained a numerically small and somewhat

privileged section of the population, without revolutionary leadership, while the latter engaged in many mass movements (including armed peasant unions, land invasions and seizures, as well as guerrilla warfare in 1965), all of which were savagely repressed by the military.

The imperialist distortion of the Peruvian economy finally culminated in a severe crisis beginning in the middle of 1966 which deepened in the latter half of 1967.

A key aspect of this crisis can be seen in the problem of agricultural production (including cattle-raising). From 1950 to 1964 this sector grew at a rate of only 2.6%, far below the growth rate of the economy in general, and barely equal to population growth.<sup>9</sup> Between 1950 and the time of the coup (1968) agricultural production dropped as a share of the Gross National Product from 25% to 14.8%.<sup>10</sup>

Even more significant, 70% of this production was cash crops — sugar, cotton, etc. — grown mainly for export on large imperialist agricultural "enclaves" along the coast. Systematically Peruvian agricultural development (or lack of it) was distorted to meet the needs of imperialist corporations to improve their position on the world market. For Peru it meant the reduction of both the amount of land and the quantity of agricultural staples available for consumption. For the Peruvian masses, who already had a near starvation average intake of merely 2,000 calories per day (the lower classes obviously consumed much less) it meant a decreasing domestically grown food supply. This was occurring at the same time as masses of peasants were migrating to the cities of Peru, already among the most densely populated in the world. The result in the cities as early as 1963 was that "93 out of every 100 children in Lima suffer from hunger and 2 out of every 100 drink milk". In Peru as a whole the infant mortality rate was 97 per 1,000 compared to an average of 80 per 1,000 in all of Latin America.<sup>11</sup>

The civilian government's attempt to solve these contradictions only deepened them. In an attempt to avert mass starvation it increased its imports of staple food products from the metropolis. In 1960 this amounted to \$40 million worth, in 1965 to \$134 million and in 1966 to \$170 million.<sup>12</sup> These developments had a drastic effect on the nation's financial system. In three years, from the end of 1963 to the end of 1966, the foreign obligations of Peru more than doubled and the service charges on these debts soared.<sup>13</sup>

In the latter half of 1967 the crisis deepened as the Sol, a staple currency for more than a decade was compelled to devalue by a drastic 40%. This in turn drove the prices of imports (including dietary staples for the lower classes) up at a rapid rate and spread inflation throughout the economy.

The Peruvian bourgeoisie was unable to act. Although the more dynamic urban-industrial sector was being considered for lack of a domestic market the dependent bourgeoisie was afraid of land reform. It was afraid because land was the original basis of its wealth, and at least a portion of that class, the oligarchy, still had *all* of its capital invested there. But even more it was afraid to move against the interests of the imperialist corporations that really controlled that sector. The majority of the class had contradictory interests because at one and the same time they were landowners (and therefore opposed to land reform) and owners of urban-industrial capital in need of land reform to expand their markets. It was this bourgeoisie, normally the "ruling class" of Peru, but in reality a dependent appendage of imperialist (mainly U.S.) capital, that found itself paralyzed despite the crisis spreading across the country.

The popular classes on the other hand were active. In the early 1960's the peasantry, as a result of mass mobilizations, unionization and land seizures had established powerful bases in large sections of the country, especially in the valleys of La Convencion and de Lares in the Department of Cuzco. While repression was able to contain this movement and arrest its principal leaders no government has been able to take back the seized lands. During the 1965 guerrilla uprisings the MIR

reported that seven U.S.-trained Peruvian rangers defected and joined the guerrilla forces, indicating that even among the highly select the influence of the revolutionaries' program was being felt . . . The U.S. and Peruvian High Military Command are aware of the possible complete dissolution of their authority when the mass of the soldiers of peasant stock confront their kinsfolk seeking to implement values that the peasant-soldiers recognize as legitimate.<sup>14</sup>

The guerrilla insurrection was crushed, partly because, in their own words, the Peruvian generals, "put into use complicated machinery that bombed, burned and utilized resources of psychological warfare and 'softening up' against the guerrilla-led popular forces."<sup>15</sup> But the high command was convinced that repression, without reform, would destroy the army in the long run.

The military, which for years had been urging the civilian leadership to make reforms, now stepped up these pleas. But all to no avail. Laws were passed, but carried out, if at all, in a very limited way. The generals understood the necessity for reforms because it had been their task to destroy the people's movements that were taking the revolutionary road and they knew the potential strength of these movements.

By 1967 the Peruvian masses were again becoming active, showing recovery from the defeat of guerrilla warfare two years earlier. Spurred on by the economic crisis and in the face of terrible repression

there is a growing movement by peasants against the traditional landowners, which in some areas has acquired a surprising degree of revolutionary political organization . . . In the cities certain sectors of the working class have gone out on violent strikes, using semiinsurrectional methods, such as occupying the factories and keeping the bosses as hostages.<sup>16</sup>

The military feared that the people's growing unrest would develop into real revolutionary movement that would destroy the army and with it bourgeois class rule in Peru: for they understood that without an army of repression the bourgeoisie has nothing. But they also realized that the Peruvian popular movement was still weak enough to be co-opted and manipulated with reforms and nationalist rhetoric. Taking advantage of the temporary weak position of the imperialists they acted on these understandings and seized power in a bloodless coup on October 3, 1968.

U.S. imperialism, the one with the most to lose, was unable to intervene. The coup took place just one month before the U.S. presidential elections in which Johnson was forced to resign because of opposition to the Vietnam war (and of course because the Vietnamese were winning). Both Humphrey and Nixon had to run as "peace" candidates. Clearly neither a lame duck Johnson, not the eventual winner of the election Nixon, would have been able to raise an army to "fight for freedom" in Peru. The Peruvian junta was thus assured of no direct U.S. military

intervention against their "revolution"; and since the "revolution" was carried out by the unified leadership of the army high command, the U.S. lacked a way to "Peruvianize" the conflict.

This was no ordinary Latin American golpe; neither was it a socialist revolution, nor even the first step along the road. The seizure of state power by the junta, with a development and reform program, had two effects. First, it prevented a real revolution from below and thus saved Peru for capitalist exploitation, which was in the interest not only of the dependent bourgeoisie, but ultimately in the interest of the international class as a whole. And second, it attempted to elevate the Peruvian national bourgeoisie from a position of complete domination by imperialism into a position of relative independence at least in so far as the exploitation of Peru is concerned.

Due to their intermediate position in the international class structure, a nascent national bourgeoisie in an underdeveloped country, the Peruvian junta has been forced to follow a zig-zag course. They have used the strength of the Peruvian working masses to gain concessions from the imperialist corporations, and thus bolster the national class, while at the same time always keeping the working masses under their complete control.

To overcome the gross distortions to the economy and to discipline the multinational corporations, the working masses are partially mobilized and encouraged to act in a "nationalist" fashion. But when the basic principle of the sanctity of private property come under attack by the masses the junta has proven itself as capable as ever of drowning the class struggle in the workers' and peasants' blood.

The outline of this general strategy was clearly etched in the weeks immediately following the coup. One of the junta's first acts was the seizure, without compensation, of the Rockefeller-owned International Petroleum Corporation.<sup>17</sup> This was an immensely popular action that was worth a fortune in gaining the support of the Peruvian masses and in rallying them *behind* the government thus diverting them from a possibly revolutionary path. At the same time, despite the great weakness of the imperialists to intervene, the junta pledged that this expropriation was an exceptional act. To this day it remains the only piece of imperialist property to be seized without compensation. Thus the imperialists were immediately assured that in dealing with the junta they were dealing with class brothers (even if the reforms were going to cause limited injuries to the interests of some corporations) and the masses were co-opted into believing that at last they had a government that was going to act in their interests.

Within a month of seizing power the junta issued a 20 year development plan, that, according to Petras and Rimensnyder, embodies four strategic economic goals:

1. The establishment of a dynamic, capitalist, industrial society in which *public and private Peruvian entrepreneurs* will play a *dominant role*.
2. The incorporation of the peasantry into the market economy through the expropriation of the large traditional haciendas of the Sierras and the distribution of land to the peasants.
3. The exclusion of those foreign firms whose behavior violates the political rules and economic guidelines established to foster *national industrial development*.
4. The transfer of *private capital* from agriculture to non-agricultural pursuits, especially in the manufacturing secondary sector.<sup>18</sup>

At this point began the series of balancing acts that the junta has followed to gain for itself, and the national class it represents, a larger partnership role in the capitalist exploitation of Peru. How that complicated struggle is being waged can be understood by examining the junta's policies in agrarian reform and mining and by analyzing the General Law of Industries, which embodies the new weapon designed to eliminate class struggle, the Industrial Community.

## AGRARIAN REFORM

This has been the area in which the greatest changes have been made. Foreign control of agricultural exports have been eliminated and many, if not all, of the large landed estates have been broken up and the land distributed to the peasantry in one form or another (cooperatives, medium sized farms, etc.).

Even here, in their most radical form, the junta's policies in no way challenge the property relations that previously existed in Peru. If anything it reinforces them. How is this accomplished?

1. All the land expropriations have been *with compensation*. Only land *abandoned* for more than three years can be confiscated without compensation. All other is being paid for in 20 and 30 year bonds which pay an annual rate of interest of from 4 to 6%. Special incentives are granted to those former landowners who invest their capital, previously held in land, in the growing (and more profitable) urban-industrial sectors. In addition no distinction has been made between native and foreign agrarian capital. Both have been allowed to freely transfer their capital into the urban-industrial sector, thus reinforcing the domination of imperialism.

2. The peasants have to buy the land from the government and pay for it over a period of 20 years. For many of the peasants who had previously seized and held the land, this "reform" is a step backward. They already possessed the land and now they are being forced into paying for the title to that land. In less advanced areas, gaining the land, even though they have had to pay for it, is a reform. But the overall purpose, explicitly stated by the government, is to create a large and stable class of rural petty bourgeoisie to provide an expanding market for the developing industries in the cities.

3. Although the most powerful sectors of the landowning bourgeoisie have been liquidated,

a relatively broad sector of the middle level bourgeoisie remains unaffected . . . Thus the reform favors the consolidation and the expansion of a relatively broad stratum of rural petty and middle level bourgeoisie. This stratum may for a considerable time constitute an effective obstacle to the process of change going deeper, as has happened in other countries.<sup>19</sup>

4. The condition of the landless rural proletariat has been made even worse. Before the coup they comprised about 30% of the rural population. Because of the reforms there will be less need for labor in the rural areas. Many of these workers will be forced to join the increasing ranks of urban proletariat, often as unemployed, and often forced to live marginal existences.

5. Finally, the Agrarian Reform Law has built in repressive features including a ban on mobilizations of the peasantry. In February of 1971 when the peasants of Carchuaz invaded lands, they were driven out by the special "anti-subversive" corps of the army, resulting in the death of 5 peasants and the wounding of many more.<sup>20</sup>

In addition many strikes on the government-run sugar co-operatives have been harshly repressed.

It was after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law that the U.S. (irked over the IPC expropriation) decided to re-evaluate its assessment of the events in Peru. "They decided to take a less hard line for fear of driving the generals leftward and even though U.S. aid was cut the sugar quota worth about \$42 million in hard currency was maintained."<sup>21</sup>

Perhaps U.S. imperialism came to agree with General Montague, the Prime Minister and Minister of War, who pointed out in July, 1969 that,

There is no more anti-communist law than the Law of Agrarian Reform, since it opposes the advance of communism and will serve to refute the statements of those who criticize the Revolutionary Government for being extremist.<sup>22</sup>

## MINING

In seeking a new position in the exploitation of Peru, for itself and the national class it serves, the junta has played the Peruvian working masses off against the imperialist corporations. This can be most clearly seen in its mining policy.

Prior to the coup 75% of the profits of the imperialist corporations came from mining. This sector was a classic example of enclaves. U.S. imperialism controlled almost all of Peru's mineral wealth, developed and undeveloped.

Companies operating the Toquepala mine were able to produce copper at the world's lowest prices — slightly over \$0.10 (U.S.) per pound. This was made possible by the most brutal repression of the unions. In the decade before the coup more than one massacre resulted from workers struggling to improve their conditions.<sup>23</sup>

At the time of the coup the Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC — a U.S. consortium) was seeking to exploit Peru's financial crisis by offering to help the government get its foreign debt refinanced in exchange for an even more favorable contract on the giant Caujone copper concession.

The result of these policies was that Peru's minerals were being developed (or left undeveloped) according to the needs of the U.S. corporations and their world markets.

The junta's aim has been to gain as much control as possible over the development of the country's mineral resources by becoming a full-partner with the imperialist corporations; to integrate these projects into the urban-industrial development plans; and to earn foreign exchange by trading in the world markets. To accomplish these goals the stranglehold of the U.S. corporations had to be broken. Because of the junta's unwillingness to make any decisive break with any section of imperialism a zig-zag course had to be followed.

On the one hand the U.S. corporations had to be assured of the possibility of continuing profitable operations in Peru, while on the other hand, they had to be made sufficiently insecure so that they would accept the junta's new terms and give up some of their undeveloped concessions. This was accomplished by a skillful combination of threats and hard bargaining by the government; and most importantly by allowing a partial mobilization of the Peruvian miners against the corporations.

In August 1969 the government threatened to annul all previous concessions (including Caujone) if satisfactory development plans were not submitted to the government by the end of the year. But that same month they signed a \$10 million contract with the U.S.-owned Homestake Mining Co. for the development of a new iron mine and granted the company special tax benefits for the first five years.

This pattern continued until the end of the year when the Caujone contract was finally signed. Before the signing of this \$355 million contract, on terms "not very different from traditional agreements of this kind in Peru",<sup>24</sup> there was fear in some business quarters that the junta might be moving in a left-wing direction. The signing of this contract quieted most of these fears. But the struggle was not over.

Part of the reason for the concern was the government's attitude toward the miners. Beginning in late 1969 the imperialist corporations were hit by a series of long and militant strikes. Just before the signing of the Caujone contract the government decreed "that striking workers of Cerro de Pasco be awarded a raise 23 percent greater than that offered by the company."<sup>25</sup> Under the leadership of the then outlawed Communist dominated General Confederation of Peruvian Labor (CGTP) these strikes continued throughout 1970 and 1971. They were directed at concessions that were already being worked and gave the U.S. corporations doubts about whether or not they wanted to invest fresh capital in new projects. In many of the early strikes the government took only limited action against the strikers and in some specific cases they intervened on the workers' behalf.

In February 1970 the Ministry of Energy and Mines rejected 400 out of 537 proposed development plans submitted by the imperialist corporations and warned once again that concessions would revert to the state unless suitable programs were presented.

In April a new mining law was announced which stipulated higher taxes, greater incentives to form mixed state-private operations and which provided for the takeover of all marketing and refining of Peru's mineral wealth by the government. The one U.S. owned refinery was not to be affected.

The combination of the new law, the increasing strikes and lingering doubts about just what direction the junta would follow prompted the imperialist corporations to give up their concessions on all the major projects by the beginning of 1971. The role played by the militant workers in depriving the U.S. imperialist corporations of these undeveloped concessions cannot be overstated. In October 1971 the *Engineering and Mining Journal* wrote:

Cerro has lost more than 800,000 man-days to labor conflicts since January 1970, which is more than the entire amount lost in the preceding 20 years. Southern Peru has lost 6 weeks of production at Toquepala in the first half of this year, and new settlements will raise labor costs by almost \$4 million a year. Marcona has lost 287,000 man-days through July, and for the first time in history is operating its iron ore venture at a loss . . . The value of Peruvian mineral production lost to strikes during the first four months of this year alone was \$31.4 million — representing incidentally \$12.1 million in lost tax revenue to the government . . . Since they have consolidated their power there now seems to be no controlling the unions.<sup>26</sup>

Hardly a conducive climate to gain further investments from U.S. corporations, or any foreign capital for that matter.



But as we have pointed out the junta was most anxious to attract foreign capital and to gain control over the mining concessions. Once the workers had helped in gaining a reversion of the undeveloped concessions the junta turned on them with a vengeance. *Business Latin America* reported the new turn in government policy. Claiming that strikes had been crippling the mining industry since June of 1970 and that "government imposed settlements favored the union side" they went on

A significant turnabout came on March 31. The government rounded up 10 mining officials who had been leading strikes . . . [and] whisked [them] away to Lima, where they were sternly lectured to by cabinet members. The strikes ended a few days later, following the unionists' release. Since then the mines have been quiet . . .<sup>27</sup>

The class struggle once unleashed however is not so easy to contain. Having allowed the miners to pressure the imperialist corporations the junta was now faced with the problem of controlling these same workers in order to attract new foreign capital to develop the state-owned concessions in partnership with the government-owned mining company Minerio Peru. The worst strikes in the long history of the Peruvian metal industry continued throughout most of 1971 and despite stern warnings from the government took on increasingly radical demands. The struggle finally came to a head toward the end of the year. According to the *Wall Street Journal*,

The strikes are believed to be attempts by Communist-dominated unions to pressure the government into nationalizing its mines, as neighboring Chile has already done . . . The strikes worry the junta, which blames them on ultraleftists seeking to topple the government. And the government has taken a tough line toward the strikes. During a recent strike at mines of Cerro Corporation's Cerro de Pasco subsidiary, *five miners were killed in a clash with police. The government has also promised a new labor law aimed at undermining the power of the Communist-dominated mining unions.*<sup>28</sup>

So we see that in less than three years the "revolutionary" government, instead of nationalizing the country's mineral wealth, is slaughtering workers in the streets in defense of imperialist property and passing laws against unions which for the most part are moderate and reformist and have consistently supported the "revolutionary" government.

In an interview with the *Wall Street Journal* President Velasco summed up his government's position. He stated that he supports the "legitimate" demands of the miners and he asserted that "the miners have gotten more under his government than any in the past, but he indicates that he won't tolerate politically motivated strikes."<sup>29</sup> Tolerate them hell! He drowns them in workers' blood!

While there is no space in this letter to go into all the details we must report the rest of this story which did not appear in WSJ. Following the killing of the five miners in the streets the Peruvian junta reverted to its old ways of infiltrating the people's organizations in order to destroy them. The following are excerpts from a statement from Peruvian miners:

The companies were given a deadline to file their ownership situation to comply with the law. This left many 100% foreign-owned companies in a dilemma: whether to get rid of 25% of their interests immediately in order to preserve an extra 16% in the long run; or to hang on to the full 100% in the hope that further pressure would get the junta to again modify its views. Having already seen the junta's flexibility and recognizing its class nature, almost all the imperialist corporations held on to 100% ownership. Their patience and continuing pressure on the junta has been rewarded.

Peru, along with Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Columbia, is a member of the Andean Common Market (Ancom). Ancom also has a fade out provision for foreign controlled companies which is less severe than the measures originally embodied in the Industrial Law. In early 1972 the Peruvian regime yielded to imperialist pressures and formally declared that Peru's regulations would accord with those of Ancom. According to *Business Latin America*,

The new law states unequivocally that *all industrial enterprises more than 49% owned by foreign interests must formulate a contract with the state specifying the terms and conditions for their transformation into "mixed industrial enterprises".* These enterprises are defined in the Peruvian law, as they are for Ancom, as companies owned between 51% and 80% by Peruvians, or owned at least 30% by the state. The 30% equity rule, which means that the remaining 70% can be foreign held, was incorporated into Ancom rules a few weeks ago and was explicitly accepted by Peru in this most recent decree.<sup>31</sup>

Thus the 33% fade out requirement was eliminated and those foreign firms which enter into joint ventures with state-owned companies (the dominant trend) can be granted up to 70% ownership. Those companies not in partnership with the state are going to lower their holdings to 49% but there will be no expropriations of foreign property in the manufacturing sector and no transfer of imperialist property to the state. Capital above 49% will have to be sold to Peruvian capitalists thus strengthening the national bourgeoisie relative to its present position, but this will not eliminate imperialism's dominant role.

At least a portion of this reflection in equity will be accomplished through the Law of Industrial Community. How does this law work?

On the surface this law appears to be a means for altering the relations of ownership by allowing the "workers" in a company to eventually own 50% of the capital and a corresponding voice in management. Originally the law applied only to industrial enterprises but the same principles have been incorporated into the fishing and mining laws, although with modifications favorable to the capitalist class.

In regards to industrial enterprises the law states that 25% of a company's pretax income must be distributed to the company's "workers" — 15% in the form of shares in a cooperatively run Industrial Community (IC), and 10% in cash benefits. In the fishing industry (one of Peru's largest) the percentages were dropped to 20% — 12% in equity and 8% in cash and when applied to the mining industry another drop, this time to 10% — 6% in equity and 4% in cash.

At first glance it seems that the "workers" are going to share from 10 to 25% of their company's pretax profits depending upon which industry they work in, part in cash and part in ownership shares. But the matter is not that simple.

Five days following the first killing, the assault troops massacred us in the most cowardly and perfidious way. Disguised as miners, the troops got into our union headquarters at which point they opened fire with sub-machine guns. Over 30 comrades were killed, a hundred were arrested and tortured, the union offices have been occupied by troops. A few of us managed to escape and hide in the mountains where the Sinchis [the Peruvian special anti-guerrilla corps] are tracking us down. They go into our homes by day and in night search for us, they wreck the homes, steal our money, rape our wives and our daughters.<sup>30</sup>

The junta's clever and viscious scheme is apparently working out. Minero Peru has emerged as the country's major mining company, holding almost all of the undeveloped concessions, and is moving ahead on at least three major projects. And imperialist capital is starting to flow back in. The Cerro Verde Copper deposit, once held by Anaconda, is being developed by Minero Peru with the help of British and Canadian capital. The preliminary agreement was signed at the end of 1971. In May of 1972 Sweden's Granges AB agreed to form a mixed company with Minero Peru to exploit the Bambas development. The government owned company will hold a 51% interest. The Tintaya development (formerly held by Cerro) is now also being developed. Minero Peru has been authorized to go it alone, but foreign capital is expected to enter soon. Japanese and other foreign capitalists have been traveling to Peru to consider the possibilities of further investments and some East European countries have also started talks. Finally several U.S. mining corporations, including Matcona have increased their investments over the last several months. Present government plans call for an additional *private* investment of \$991 million in mining by 1975. The state will add \$540 million.

## INDUSTRY AND THE GENERAL LAW OF INDUSTRIES

In order to spur national industrial development the General Law of Industries, issued in July 1970 and modified numerous times since, provides for a much greater state role in "basic industries". These include iron and steel metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, basic chemical, petrochemicals, fertilizers and cement. Three approaches will be taken: 1) The state will buy new plants in this field; 2) The state will *purchase* existing facilities now in private hands on a case by case basis; and 3) The state will enter into mixed ventures with private (including foreign) capital, in which the latter can hold up to 70%. In addition the state will participate in some mixed ventures with private capital in vital areas of the manufacturing sector.

The basic law also contains two other major provisions: 1) An equity fade out requirement for foreign capital investments; and 2) The Law of Industrial Community.

Before the promulgation of this law President Velasco stated that foreign investments would be allowed in Peru only for a limited period of time (10 to 15 years) in order to recover investments and obtain a reasonable profit. After that ownership of such companies was to revert to the state. This was quite a severe measure from the imperialist's point of view.

However, the actual law issued a few months later contained a completely different set of terms. This law stated that 100% foreign-owned companies had to reduce their equity to 33%; while those 75% foreign-owned had to reduce to 50%.

The Peruvian military junta has a novel way of defining "workers". According to their laws people who work full-time for companies are "workers". President Velasco himself has explicitly stated that this includes all levels of management, up to and including, the owners. Furthermore, distribution of cash benefits are to be given out 50% prorated (equally) to all employees and 50% in amounts proportional to the employee's base salary. This means, of course, that the lion's share of the cash benefits will be given to those "workers" who already receive the highest compensation, i.e., management and owners.

This novel definition of the term "workers" begins to expose the real nature and purpose of the I.C. It is a clever mechanism designed to reduce, and hopefully eliminate, the class struggle by leading workers to believe that they have common interests with their bosses. This, of course, fits in with the regime's stated doctrine that the conflicts between capital and labor are only "apparently irreducible."

By holding out the possibility to some workers that they can become small shareholders in their companies the I.C. has the effect of dividing and weakening the working class. When the workers and owners do clash the bourgeoisie will find itself in an even stronger position because of the divisions introduced into the working class through the I.C. How is all this accomplished?

If and when the I.C. attains a 50% interest (and it is by no means certain that this will ever be the case in many companies as will be demonstrated below) the "workers" become *individual* shareholders in the business. Before this all shares are held collectively in a cooperative. Thus some "workers", including real workers, may eventually own equity stock in a capitalist business. But this represents not "a modification of the *type of ownership* that now exists, but a *limited expansion of capitalist ownership*."<sup>32</sup>

Since the membership of the I.C. includes managers and owners and since the "workers" share in the I.C. depends upon the number of days worked and the number of years employed the law puts pressure on the workers not to strike because every day lost decreases their share in the I.C. and increases that of management, which of course "works" during strikes. Further the law tends to divide the working class depending upon their years of employment and days worked, giving some a greater incentive not to strike in order to increase their share in the I.C.

Even more, the shares are only divided individually among the "workers" after the I.C. reaches 50% and the law explicitly states that "If a worker should leave his post, he would be excluded from benefits of the Industrial Community."<sup>33</sup> This gives the bosses even greater leverage than normal in disciplining "disruptive" workers, because a fired worker is not only deprived of his job, but also of all rights he has acquired in the I.C.

Finally the I.C. has the tendency to weaken, and perhaps destroy, the workers class organizations. Because the I.C. promotes the idea among the workers that they are co-owners of the business there is no longer a contradiction between the owners and workers. Everyone has a common interest in increasing productivity and profits. As Quijano puts it, now that the interests of the opposing sides in the class struggle are "integrated", "The class struggle supposedly no longer makes sense and neither therefore, do labor unions". There is some evidence that the junta sees it exactly this way. In the mining industry, for example, union leaders are barred from holding leadership positions in the I.C. In other sectors the government has created "Industrial Guild Associations" which are assigned many of the tasks traditionally performed by unions, with the notable exception of waging the class struggle.

Not only is the I.C. a weapon designed to weaken and divide the working class, it is at the same time a method for disciplining the national bourgeoisie and encouraging it to invest its capital in Peruvian development. The number of years required for the I.C. to gain 50% of a company's stock varies considerably depending on the "rate of reinvestment of their profits by private capitalists with a company."<sup>34</sup> Quijano estimates that in the best of cases this process would take 20 years and if the present owners reinvest 30% of their profits in the company the I.C. would never reach 50%. Thus the junta has devised a method by which the capitalists are pressured into reinvesting their profits in industry to prevent capital from being transferred to the workers through the I.C. This is a clear attempt to change the Peruvian's "old dependent bourgeois habits of consuming luxury goods or exporting capital."<sup>35</sup>

The situation for companies now more than 51% controlled by foreign capital is similar. They can be expected to sell a large proportion of their excess equity to Peruvian capitalists and to transfer a much smaller percentage to their I.C.s before the 1986 deadline. At that time, when the company becomes a mixed foreign-Peruvian enterprise, the same methods applied by the Peruvian bourgeoisie with their own companies will probably be applied to the mixed companies. Here again it may take forever for the I.C.s to gain anywhere near a 50% interest in ownership and management.

The foreign-owned mining companies receive one further significant advantage. Unlike industrial and fishing enterprises, mining companies are not subject to the 49% Ancom equity fade out rule. They can therefore be expected to act more like the Peruvian owned companies from the beginning. Because of the much lower percentage of profits allocated to their I.C. the chances of these I.C.s reaching a 50% interest before the mines are exhausted are remote.

Quijano's overall conclusions regarding the Law of Industrial Community seem more than justified. He states that,

Even with all the apparent benefits it offers to the workers of Peru, the Industrial Community would thus seem to represent first and foremost a poisoned pie being proffered to them in exchange for greater submission to the interests of capitalist enterprise and subordination to the authority of the capitalist state.<sup>36</sup>

But this "poisoned pie" may eventually be withheld. In May of this year the government formed a new wholly state-owned company InduPeru, which is exempt from the I.C. This new company's purposes include establishing, by itself or with private capital (up to 70%), new manufacturing ventures assigned to it by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The company has already been directed to establish a cement factory in the Amazon Basin. In the future, other new ventures, including those with private participation, may also be formed without the inclusion of the I.C.s.

Proof that the capitalist class, both foreign and Peruvian, see developments in Peru in a favorable light is given by the fact that private investment increased by 8.4% in 1971, after four straight years of decline, as the laws have been modified and clarified. And this rate is increasing. At least three U.S. corporations, Sunbeam, Celanese and B.F. Goodrich have carried out expansion plans; and one, Dresser Industries, has entered into a new joint venture with the state development agency, Cofide. In addition many other imperialist corporations from many countries are following a similar path and all indications are that this will continue.

## CONCLUSION

Che once said, "Either socialist revolution or the caricature of a revolution." The above analysis, while it only scratches the surface of developments, should make clear which path is being followed in Peru today.

The socialist revolution organizes the masses of working people to destroy the rule of capital, both imperialist and domestic. The military junta has belatedly tried this rule; the Peruvian revolution is yet to come. When it does it will be made by the masses of workers and peasants who will sweep away private capital and all of its servants, including the present ruling junta.

In struggle,  
Joe Blum  
August 1972

## FOOTNOTES

1. *Tricontinental*, No. 2, p.36, emphasis added
2. *Ibid.*, p. 39, emphasis added
3. *Ibid.*, p. 28, emphasis added
4. News Release of International Bank For Reconstruction and Development Washington, D.C., 2/25/72.
5. Anibal Quijano, "Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neo-Imperialism", *Monthly Review*, July/August 1971 (hereinafter known as Quijano I), p.5. Much of this letter is based on Quijano's analysis and interested readers should definitely read this book.
6. See Quijano I, pp. 6-12
7. *Ibid.*, p. 8
8. *Ibid.*, p. 10, emphasis added
9. Anibal Quijano, "Peruvian Development and Class Structure", in Petras and Zeitlin, *Latin America Reform or Revolution?*, Fawcett, 1968, p. 302 (hereinafter known as Quijano II)
10. Quijano I, p. 122
11. Hectar Bejar, *Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience*, Monthly Review Press, 1970, p. 31
12. Quijano II, p. 294
13. Bejar, p.33
14. James Petras, "Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America", in Petras and Zeitlin, p. 349
15. *Ibid.*
16. Quijano II, p. 291
17. In 1971 Peru was reopened to the imperialist oil companies following a huge oil strike in the Amazon region. For full details see *Pacific Imperialism Notebook*, April, 1972, pp. 138-9 and May, 1972, pp. 153-159.
18. James Petras and Nelson Rimensnyder, "What is Happening in Peru?", *Monthly Review*, February, 1970, p. 15 (hereinafter known as Petras II)
19. Quijano I, pp. 52-3
20. *Ibid.*, p. 112. See also Hugo Blanco on Chile and Peru, pp. 9-11
21. Mike Locker, "The Military Modernizers: The Development of Under-development in Peru", *NACLA Newsletter*, p. 12
22. Quoted in Quijano I, p. 53
23. *Ibid.*, p. 23
24. *Ibid.*, p. 24
25. Petras II, p. 27
26. E/MJ, 10/71, pp. 99-100
27. BLA, 5/27/72, pp. 162-3
28. WSJ, 12/2/71, p. ?
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Palante*, 3/72
31. BLA, 1/20/72, p. 21, emphasis added
32. Quijano I, p. 94
33. Law of General Industries, Article 27, p.21
34. Quijano I, p. 94
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 101

## ON HEADACHES

It's beautiful to be a communist  
even though it gives you lots of headaches.

And the thing is that the communist's headaches  
are supposed to be historical, that is to say  
they don't go away with aspirins  
but only with the realization of Paradise on Earth.  
That's how it is.

Under capitalism our heads ache  
and they decapitate us.  
In the struggle for the revolution the head is a time-bomb.

In the construction of socialism  
we plan headaches  
which doesn't make them any less frequent, just the other way around.

Communism will be, among other things,  
an aspirin the size of the sun.

Roque Dalton (El Salvador)

from THIS GREAT PEOPLE HAS SAID: "ENOUGH!" AND HAS BEGUN TO MOVE . . . , a collection of poems from the struggle in Latin America selected and translated by Margaret Randall, which will be printed by Peoples Press this winter

**Tricontinental** North American edition  
SUBSCRIPTION COUPON

Enclosed please find check for \_\_\_\_\_

Subscriptions are \$3.00 per year or \$5.00 a year with Tricon reprint series.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Address \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_ State & Zip \_\_\_\_\_

Peoples Press  
P O Box 40176  
San Francisco, CA. 94140

Tricontinental Magazine (5 or 6 issues) . . . \$3.00 per year  
Tricontinental Magazine and individual  
reprints of articles from back issues . . . \$5.00 per year  
Subscriptions are free to anyone incarcerated in a U.S.  
prison.

**BULK RATES**

*Individuals and Organizations:*

Single copy . . . . . 75¢  
2-50 copies . . . . . 50¢ each  
51-100 copies . . . . . 45¢ each  
101 or more . . . . . 40¢ each

*Bookstores:*


5 or more copies (90 day consignment) . . . . . 50¢ each

For more information on  
bulk rates write to:

Peoples Press  
PO Box 40176  
San Francisco, CA 94140

In the New York metro-  
politan area write to:

Red Ink  
5 Great Jones St.  
New York, NY 10012



**TRICONTINENTAL**

**SUGGESTED READING LIST**

1. *Racism and the Class Struggle* - James Boggs, Monthly Review Press
2. *The Enemy* - Felix Greene, Random House
3. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* - Alex Haley, Grove Press
4. *Vietnam Will Win* - Wilfred Burchette, Monthly Review Press
5. *Notes on the Cultural Life of the DRVN* - Peter Weiss, Dell Publishing Co.
6. *American Negro Slave Revolts* - Herbert Aptheker, International Publishers
7. *Blood In My Eye* - George Jackson, Random House
8. *Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War* - Che Guevara, Monthly Review Press
9. *Crazy Horse* - Mari Sandoz, University of Nebraska Press
10. *The Wretched of the Earth* - Frantz Fanon, Evergreen Press
11. *Black Skin, White Mask* - Frantz Fanon, Grove Press
12. *Black Elk Speaks* - John Niehardt, University of Nebraska Press
13. *Monopoly Capital* - Paul Baran & Paul Sweezy, Monthly Review Press
14. *John Brown* - W.E.B. DuBois, International Publishers
15. *Soledad Brother* - George Jackson, Bantam
16. *We the People* - Leo Huberman, Monthly Review Press
17. *Vietnam: The Endless War* - Paul Sweezy, Leo Huberman & Harry Magdoff, Monthly Review Press
18. *Sisterhood is Powerful* - Robin Morgan, Random House
19. *Soul On Ice* - Eldridge Cleaver, Delta Book
20. *Look For Me in the Whirlwind* - Collective Autobiography of the New York Panther 21, Random House
21. *Fanshen* - William Hinton, Random House
22. *Age of Imperialism* - Harry Magdorf, Monthly Review Press
23. *Red Star Over China* - Edgar Snow, Grove Press
24. *The Bending Cross: The Biography of Eugene Debs* - Ray Ginger, Collier Books
25. *Living My Life: The Autobiography of Emma Goldman* - Emma Goldman, Plenum Publishers
26. *If They Come For Me in the Morning* - Angela Davis, Signet Books
27. *Labor's Untold Story* - Boyer & Morais, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America
28. *Letters From Attica* - Sam Melville, Morrow Books
29. *The Black Women* - Toni Cade, Signet Books

PLEASE NOTE--CORRECTIONS FOR LETTER ON PERU  
PAGE: 113 AND 114 ARE REVERSED.  
Other major errors--p. 106, par. 3 line 2: "1050" should read "1950"; last par.  
line 2: "considered" should read "constricted"--p. 111, par. 7 line 1: "900,000"  
should read "600,000"-- p.113(now 114)par. 4 line 4: "have to" should be in-  
serted between "to" and "lower"; par. 5 line 1: "reflection" should read "re-  
duction".



...FORGE SIMPLE WORDS  
THAT EVEN THE CHILDREN  
CAN UNDERSTAND  
WORDS WHICH WILL  
ENTER EVERY HOUSE  
LIKE THE WIND  
AND FALL,  
LIKE RED HOT  
EMBERS  
ON OUR PEOPLES  
SOULS.

JORGE REBELO  
FRELIMO