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ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES
IN PERSIA 1906-1911

by

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Dedication

To my husband Sadegh Nezam Mafi and
my children without whose under-
standing and support this work
would not have been accomplished.

Origin and Development of Political Parties in Persia
1906-1911. Mansoureh Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi.

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a discussion of the political parties which originated and developed in the First and Second Majles between 1906-1911. It begins with an analysis of the secret societies of the pre-Revolutionary era and looks at the Anjoman-e Makhfi and Melli and the latter's offshoot the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb, which was connected with the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn or Social Democrat party, organized in turn under the aegis of its Russian counterpart. An attempt is made to explain why the Constitutional laws and the six social classes represented in the Majles did not offer a sound basis for party development. The Majles divided into Āzādīkhāhān and Moderate groups, with the former connected to the Socialists, and the latter to the more conservative political and religious leaders. The relationship of the Majles and the Shah, to whom the Majles in general and the extremists in particular were obnoxious, is examined as well as the development of the various kinds of Anjomans, particularly the extremist ones which in conjunction with the extremists in the Majles helped to create a total impasse in the Majles's relationship with the Shah. Eventually this led to the overthrow of the Majles in June 1908.

The second part of the thesis is devoted to the Second Majles and traces the emergence and development of new political parties after the interval of the Estebdād-e Şaghīr. A detailed exposition of the programme of these four parties is given; chief amongst these were the Democrats, descended from the Āzādīkhāhān, and the E'tedāliyūn who owed much to the earlier Moderates. None had a majority so the governments were often impotent. In an attempt to remedy this, the Regent Nāşer al-Molk encouraged the formation of a coalition which excluded the Democrats. The coalition with a majority backed the Government which became stronger than before. The main problem which confronted successive Cabinets however, were finance and security, and to solve these an American, Morgan Shuster, was employed as Treasurer General. He was supported by the Democrats against the Government and the

Great Powers but this brought about a final confrontation with Russia, culminating in the closure of the Majles and the dispersal of the parties.

Throughout those distinct phases of the First and Second Majles, an attempt has been made to trace the gradual emergence of the concept of 'party' in political life with other concepts such as democracy or elections and the Majles. The history of both these Parliaments illustrates the many vicissitudes through which they had to pass before these principles were assimilated with the body politic. The credit for this lies more with the Democrats who in the political programme they advocated and the party organization they initiated were the forerunners followed by their closest rivals the Moderates. The Government who regarded the activities of the parties as inconvenient if not troublesome, in collaboration with the foreign powers were able to dissolve the Majles for almost three years; but at its reconvening after new elections it was clear how the Democrat party especially had retained its earlier coherence and organization despite the exile of its leaders and attempts to suppress it.

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Notes on Transliteration, Abbreviations and Dates

The transliteration system used in this thesis is basically phonetic. In the case of place names and certain other terms the common Europeanized spelling has been retained such as Iran, Azarbaijan, Gilan, Eslam, Qajar and Ulama. The hamzeh and 'ain have both been indicated by (').

In general few abbreviations have been used (as I explained on page 13). The Mozakerāt-e- Majles or debates of the Majles of the First National Assembly has been abbreviated to M.M., and in the case of the Rūznāmeḥ-ye Majles to R.M. For the Second Majles the Mozakerāt is abbreviated to M.M. Maj 2, and the newspaper Majles, now the organ of the E'tedāliyyūn Party is given as Majles

The dates of the publication of Persian books and articles vary between Hejrī-ye Qamarī and Shamsī. Whenever it was thought necessary and in order to avoid confusion, these are indicated as H.Q. and S. All the Shāhanshāhī dates have been converted to Shamsī.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES

The political parties which developed in the Second Majles have been either ignored by historians or have been summarily dismissed although they played a significant and decisive role in the events of this period. The reasons for such a cursory treatment of the parties are multiple. Firstly, books on the Revolution have generally concentrated on accounts of the causes of the Revolution or on the history of the First Majles, and much less has been written on the later phases of the Revolution or on the history of the Second Majles. Secondly, the political parties were unpopular and considered as the cause of the divisions in the Majles. Their small size and short duration also made them seem insignificant. Thirdly, after the 1917 Revolution in Russia when Social Democracy became associated with Communism and Soviet hegemony, those associated with the early Democrat party in Persia became loath to admit their early association with Russian Social Democracy or to divulge much about their early connection. Fourthly, it must be remembered that much of the early party activities were secret and as such little is known about them. Moreover, very little in the way of documents has come to light on the activities of these early parties.

The information we obtain from existing sources is thus scant. It must be added that a good, accurate and all encompassing history of the Constitutional Revolution has still to be written. Moreover, the Constitutional period remains to this day an idealized event, so people associated with it

are also idealized or treated as villains, and few have written objectively about those events. There are various sources for the study of the political parties:

1. The secondary sources in Persian and other languages which can be divided into two parts, the older works and more contemporary volumes. These range from general histories of the Constitution to books on special aspects of it.
2. The primary sources which likewise can be divided into published and unpublished material. These include a number of Marāmnāmehs (programmes) and Neẓāmnāmehs (organizational frameworks) of the political parties; the newspapers and Mozākerāt-e Majles (discussions of the Majles) and various diaries and collections of private papers.

The British Public Record Office archives is another very important primary source for the study of the Constitutional Revolution as well as the foreign relations of Persia.

The secondary sources can be divided into several groups, the oldest books on the Revolution, books of reference, more recent general books, biographies and local histories.

1. Primary Sources

From the point of view of this work, the primary sources can be divided into several sections. First the Marāmnāmehs and Neẓāmnāmehs of the political parties which are the declaration of their policy and their organization. There are in this series some pamphlets as well, which are important explanations of party politics and policy as well as criticism

of the rival party, which tell us a lot about their relationship and operations. Secondly, there are the newspapers which are a valuable source of information in the study of parties especially as each had its own organ. Thirdly, there are the Mozākerāt-e Majles or the debates of the Majles, which as their name implies is limited to the discussions of the deputies in the Assembly. Fourthly, there are a number of published and unpublished private papers, memoirs and party orders which will be discussed later.

The earliest documents found are the Marāmnāmeḥ and Nezāmnāmeḥ of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmiyūn Party, published by Donyā, the periodical of the Tūdeh or Communist Party of Persia. These are translations from the Russian of the original documents of 1323/1905. Only a fragment of the Marāmnāmeḥ 1323/1905 survives and has been published by Donyā in 1345 in an article entitled Sanadī Nāshenākhteh dar bāreh - ye Hezb-e Sosial Demokrāt-e Iran (Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmiyūn). As this document was found in Baku it is referred to as the Baku Programme. Another document, published by the same periodical in 1341, is entitled Dastūrnāmeḥ-ye (Qavā'ed-e) Hezb-e Sosiāl Demokrāt-e Iran and is dated 1324/1906. It concerns the organization of the party and its membership. It is a very interesting document as it illustrates the long-term aims of the party.

The next documents of great importance also concerning the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmiyūn is their Nezāmnāmeḥ and Marāmnāmeḥ, also published by Donyā in 1342. One is entitled Nezāmnāmeḥ-ye Sho'beh-ye Irānī-ye Jam'iyat-e 'Mojāhedīn Moteshakeleh dar Mashad.

This Nezāmnāmeḥ states that it was prepared on the

15th Sha'bān, the birthday of the 12th Emām with the cooperation of the central committee and the representatives of the branches. It also states that their central Committee would remain in Baku as before and it enumerates the duties of each section of the organization. It also points to the organization and duties of the Fada'īyān, which was obviously their armed supporters.

The Marāmnāmeḥ of 1324/1907 published in Mashad, is called the Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Jam'īyat-e Mojāhedīn and begins by quoting a sentence from the Qorān, emphasising that no-one achieves anything except through endeavour. It goes on to praise the Mojāheds and their holy duty which was the support of the Majles and the Constitution.

When the Democrat party was formed in the Second Majles, they also published their Marāmnāmeḥ and Nezāmnāmeḥ. These are in the form of pamphlets and no doubt had quite a circulation whereas we do not know how well known those of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn were. Qavā'ed va Nezāmnāmeḥ-ye Ferqeh-ye Siyāsī, ye Demokrāt-e Iran Āmīyūn was published in 1328. It gives details of the party organization and was to hold good, it said, until the next party Congress. It considers the manner in which its various branches were to be set up, the connection in the hierarchical organization, their various duties, the conditions for membership, the election of the cadre, the congresses, their relationship and the manner of settling disputes, and the need to maintain secrecy.

There is also a Nezāmnāmeḥ of the Majma'-e Adab, the club or /official association of the party. It states that it was set up

in 1329, in order to propagate and cleanse the public character. The members put up a sum of 1000 Toman as a capital fund, and later each member contributed a sum to it. It had two kinds of members, private and public; the former were those who bought shares and could vote in the meeting. They also chose by vote the directors of the club. They would meet regularly, but all the members could attend the public meetings.

The Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Ferqeh-ye Siyāsī-ye Demokrāt-e Iran, ('Āmiyūn) was published several times. The issue consulted is the fourth, dated 1329, and obviously it was originally published earlier.

It begins with an introduction which discusses human development and the progress of man from barbarity to civilization and then feudalism to capitalism. In a country which lacks the means to modernise and is beset by foreign powers which weaken her, it is necessary to reform the country and strengthen what has been gained in recent years its said, and it was in order to achieve these that the Democrat party announced its programme. This was divided into seven sections and dealt with political, civil, electoral, judicial, religious, defence and economic reforms. It upheld the principle of parliamentary government and especially demanded the appointment of ministers from amongst deputies. It also demanded freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Elections were to be direct, secret and equal. The judicial power must be separate and independent; education must be free and compulsory; military service must also be compulsory. The longest section was given over to economic affairs which formed

the most important part of the Democrats' programme.

There are two other publications by the Democrats in the same series, called Tanqīd-e Ferqeh-ye E'tedāliyyūn va yā Ejtemā'iyūn E'tedāliyyūn, by Rasūlzādeh, dated 1328. It is a criticism of the E'tedāliyyūn party and a discussion of socialism. The arguments used by Rasūlzādeh in criticizing the E'tedāliyyūn was so strong it obliged them to put forward a fuller programme later. The Oṣūl-e Demokrāsī, Sharḥ-e Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Demokrāt 'Āmiyyūn 1326, is an Islamic explanation of the Democrats' policy. Its author is an anonymous writer who calls himself a Democrat. The issue consulted is the second issue dated 1326 and is fully discussed later. It is interesting because it is the Islamic explanation and justification of socialism, a trend already met with in the programme of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmiyyūn.

There are also two other pamphlets by a Social Democrat called Grīgor Yeqīgiyān, published in Rasht, called Sosiāl Demokrāt-hā Cheh Mikhāhand and Nazariyāt-e Emrūzi-ye Sosiāl Demokrāthā-ye Iran. These are interesting because they show that there was a Socialist party other than the Democrats who during the Second Majles called themselves Democrats or 'Āmiyyūn. The word Socialist was omitted from their name.

The Armenian Dashnāksūthiun party which was an Armenian National Socialist party also translated its programme and published it in 1910, announcing that the party supported the Persian movement which was overthrowing feudalism and was of great importance to the movement in Turkey and the Caucasus. The Armenians in Iran stood to benefit by this movement, it said, they announced their support of the Persian Revolution

and especially wished to establish a connection between those in Persia who supported the Democrats and the workers. The same party published another pamphlet in 1911, which is a translation of a work by an Italian Socialist addressing the peasants.

The other parties too published their Marāmnāmeḥ and Nezāmnāmeḥ. The Marāmnāmeḥ of Ettefāq va Taraqqī consulted by me is in the form of a proclamation printed on a sheet called E'lām which introduced the party and its programme which is discussed later. The Nezāmnāmeḥ was published in 1328 in the printing house of the party, and is in the form of a pamphlet similar to those of the Democrats. It is called Nezāmnāmeḥ-ye Dākhelī-ye Jam'īyat-e Ettefāq va Taraqqī published in 1329. The party had a central committee, provincial committees and Dasteh or groups of 12 who were to be armed; 12 Dasteh would form a Sho'beh or branch, with 12 members. Above this was the committee. The party was to organize the peasants also. What strikes one in this party is its secret origin, not dissimilar to the origin of the Democrats, and the fact was organized very early after the fall of Tehran, first in the form of the committee of Sattār set up by the Mojāhedīn of Gilan, then developing into a small political party, with a small membership.

The nature of the other small party, the Taraqqīkhāhān, is rather controversial, as explained later. There exists a pamphlet called Dastūr-e Asāsī-ye Jam'īyat-e Taraqqīkhāhān-e Iran. This belonged to the deputies of the south.

The majority of the deputies of the two Majles were moderates, and in the Second Majles they organized a party which was called Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn. They at first

published a very short insignificant Dastūr-e Maslakī-ye Ferqeh-ye Ejtemā'iyūn E'tedāliyyūn as their party programme which was ridiculed by the Democrats in the pamphlet Tanqīd mentioned above. Then they published a longer programme which discussed their ideology and offered their practical policy. This was called Dastūr-e Mashrūḥ-e Maslakī, yā Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Hezb-e Ejtemā'iyūn E'tedāliyyūn. It has a long preamble in which it discusses the progress of man from a barbaric state to a state of civilization and the development of laws, justice and order. It divided this progression into three stages, passing from a barbaric state to a state of slavery, then to a third state of civilization. These processes were sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent. Persia too had in 1324 passed through such a state; now this period of violence was left behind. Two schools of thought presented themselves now, one being moderate and in accordance with Eslām, the other was unrealistic, idealistic and after childish dreams it said.

Then the pamphlet puts forward its "socialist" Ejtemā'ī ideology which presents a certain confusion in the exact meaning of the word Ejtemā'ī. In Persian this word is used to denote society, Ejtemā' or pertaining to social questions, Ejtemā'ī. (During the Constitutional Revolution, Socialism was also called Ejtemā'ī. (We have come across it for instance in the name of the party Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmiyyūn.)

It is necessary to make a distinction between the function of this word. This pamphlet discusses for instance the principles of society, Hey'at-e Ejtemā'ī or the basis of the principles of socialism Mabnāy-e Oṣūl-e Ejtemā'ī. The Oṣūl-e Ejtemā'ī it discusses, is a form of very mild reformist

principle offered in the guise of socialism. It states that its aim is public welfare and the encouragement of people to overcome their needs by work. The Oṣūl-e Ejtemā'ī will also overcome the contradictions between people, it says, and the principle of help, moderation and better character will replace it. The truth of justice and equality will also develop.

It then enumerates how by a progressive development, according to the special circumstances of Persia, the problems will be overcome. In the realm of practical reform and policy it offered a set of propositions which are neither reform nor policy, and little better than what was offered in the original short programme already mentioned. For instance, in the section dealing with economic reform it divided society into seven sections, as for example the peasants and workers, and the merchants. It then added that the propagandists of "socialism" suggest three ways to propagate their aims: a) by propaganda, invitation and discussion b) by writing and publication c) by work and achievement.

The E'tedāliyyūn also published some pamphlets in defence of their policy or in an attempt to blame the Democrats. One is a pamphlet by one of the Khorasan deputies, Hāj Sheykh 'Alī Khorāsānī, called Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Ferqeh-ye Taraqqī va Tamaddon yā Khīyāl-e Khām Barāy-e Farīb-e 'Avām. It is a humorous Marāmnāmeḥ but its aim is to ridicule the Democrats. Another pamphlet is a long article about the Russian Ultimatum by an anonymous writer published in Moḥarram 1330 and is an attempt to put all the blame for what happened on the Democrats. These Marāmnāmeḥ and Nezāmnāmeḥ are discussed more fully later but here an attempt is made to introduce them. Their importance

is very great to the study of the parties, for although these policies were not actually put into practice, they show us the plans discussed and policies suggested.

The newspapers of the period are another primary source of great importance to the study of the political parties. These too follow the same division as the deputies and show three tendencies. Some are moderate, some extremist and some are unattached and act as critics but follow no party. In the First Majles the weekly Sūr-e Esrāfīl and Mosāvāt were extremist and supported the Āzādīkhāhān. Ḥabl-al-Matīn published both in Tehran and Calcutta, was a moderate paper, but often critical of the governments. It provided a great deal of information on foreign affairs. It is interesting to note that during the Second Majles, Ḥabl-al-Matīn of Calcutta was very critical of the Russians and the occupation of Persia. It supported the Democrats and Taqīzādeh particularly and on the occasion of the murder of Behbahānī Ḥabl-al-Matīn was very outspoken against the Russians.

During the Second Majles the Iran-e Nou became the organ of the Democrats, and is an invaluable source for the study of that party's programme and policy. The E'tedāliyyūn had their own newspapers Vaqt, and Majles. Ettefāq va Taraqqī had Esteqlāl-e Iran and the Taraqqīkhāhān had the Jonūb. These papers not only defend their own party but blame and attack each other, and thus illustrate much of the political atmosphere prevalent at the time.

Another important newspaper was the Sharq which was an extremist newspaper supporting some of the ideas of Social

Democracy, but was not attached to the Democrats. These parties also had other provincial newspapers which are no less important. The newspapers are often mentioned in this thesis, and it suffices here to say that they show how seriously the political parties considered themselves at the time and how unrealistic historians have shown themselves to be in treating them so lightly.

Besides the newspapers of the period, we must mention Qānūn, which though not actually a newspaper, was important at the time of its publication, since it inspired the reformers and taught them to organize and form secret societies, some of the deputies of the Majles also show a knowledge of Malkam's thoughts in the course of their discussions. The newspaper Kāveh, published by Taqīzādeh in Berlin during the First World War, is also important, though reference can now be made to the collection of Taqīzādeh's writings published recently by Iraj Afshār. Of particular value is the article in which Taqīzādeh divides the deputies according to their party affiliations. This article was entitled Doureh-ye Jadīd-e Mashrūṭiyyat dar Iran and published in Kāveh in the summer of 1336/1918.

The Revue du Monde Musulman published in France was in sympathy with the Persian Revolution, comparing it to the French Revolution. It carries many articles and analyses aspects of the Persian Movement which have in more recent years formed the subject of research and scholarly work, such as for instance on the Shi'eh Ulama's role in the Revolution, or the Tabriz Anjoman, or some of the Social Democrats' activities.

The Times followed the Persian Revolution with a

sceptical eye and has many articles and news items about the events in Persia which are useful, though more often than not, critical of the nationalists.

In this same context we must mention the debates or discussions of the Majles. The original reports of the discussions of the First Majles disappeared in the bombardment which destroyed it, but fortunately they survived as they had been published in the newspaper Majles. This newspaper or Rūznāmeḥ-ye Majles was edited by Mīrzā Moḥammad Sādeq Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the second son of Seyyed Moḥammad, one of the important leaders of the Constitutional Revolution. The idea for this newspaper had come from Yaḥyā Doulatābādī, and was taken up by Moḥammad Sādeq.

This newspaper reported the discussions of the Majles and included certain other articles written by its readers. We mention it together with the Mozākerāt of the Majles because it was mainly limited to reporting the discussions of the Majles. It omitted to report all the discussions, however, out of deference and also for political reasons. This we know by comparing the reports of the British Representative who covered the discussions of the First Majles, for often quarrels or embarrassing topics were omitted from the newspaper. This omission is unfortunate because it was used as a source for the publication of the Mozakerāt-e Majles, Rūznāmeḥ-ye Rasmī-ye Keshvar. In turn some of the topics originally reported are omitted from this official publication.

For the purpose of this study both these have been used.¹ It must be added that the Rūznāmeḥ-ye Majles has both the European and the Ḥejrī dates and is numbered, but the Mozakerāt-e Majles, Rūznāmeḥ-ye Rasmi-ye Keshvar only has the Ḥejrī dates and is not numbered in the First Majles. Rūznāmeḥ-ye Majles must not be confused with the later newspaper of that name published by Seyyed Moḥammad Sādeq, which was the official organ of the Ejtemā'iyūn E'tedāliyyūn.

In the Second Majles, the discussions are reported with even more discretion, especially as most important matters were settled privately, and only the results are brought to the Majles, so the discussions are not fully representative of actual events. Most often unimportant legislation is covered fully, while such an important matter as the reason for the resignation of the President of the Majles, for instance, finds no echo in these reports. Despite this drawback, the discussions of the Majles are very essential to the study of the political parties. Ever since the First Majles a difference of opinion is noticeable between the deputies which grows and takes shape in the Second Majles, so that even if the discussions are at times irrelevant, the voting tells us much.

Amongst published primary sources mention must be made of several pamphlets written by some of those involved in the Revolution which are particularly important as they throw

1. In the text abbreviated initials of these two publications are given: Rūznāmeḥ-ye Majles is R.M., and Mozakerāt-e Majles as M.M. The Second Majles discussions are written M.M. Maj.2 The later issue of the Majles newspaper which was the official organ of the E'tedālis, is referred to as Majles.

some light on the way they thought and the means they used. Chief amongst these is Lebās-e Taqvā' written in 1318 by Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Vā'ez promoting home materials produced by the Sherkat-e Eslāmīyeh of Esfahan. It is a religious argument in favour of using home produce so as to cut imports. This would not only strengthen home industries but would also help strengthen the homeland, the Vaṭan, at the same time it would strengthening religion. It would in fact be like a Jehād, a holy war.

The example of this company was followed in Tabriz and we know that there too, there was a movement to help support home produce.

Another pamphlet is Rūznāmeḥ-ye Gheybī, Rou'ya-ye Sādeqeh which was written at about the same time by Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez and Malek al-Motekallemin. This was a dream in which Ḥell al-Soltān the Prince Governor of Esfahan and the Ulama were criticised for their interference in politics or for their venality to the disadvantage of the poor. It especially criticizes three of the chief Ulama, the three brothers, Āqā Najafī, Āqā Nūrallāh, and Sheykh Moḥammad 'Alī.

Ṣanī' al-Douleh wrote a short pamphlet entitled Rāh-e Nejāt, in which he discusses the question of reform and the way to achieve it. He puts the building of roads, but particularly railways uppermost amongst all the other necessary reforms and writes that not until Persia had a good communication system could she achieve any improvements. Ṣanī' al-Douleh, it must be remembered, introduced in the First Majles a bill suggesting that taxes should be raised on tea and sugar to pay the expenses of building railways, he is in fact one

of the rare politicians of the period to offer a concrete answer to the economic problems of Persia other than a suggestion for a loan. He was especially unpopular with the Great Powers who found his schemes not to their liking.

A very interesting book published in 1327 H.Q. is Hoqūq-e Asāsī yā Oşul-e Mashrūţīyyat by Manşūr al-Saltaneh 'Adl. He had studied law in Paris and was appointed Under Secretary of the Ministry of Justice in the Cabinet of Mostoufī-al-Mamālek in 1328. In this book he discusses constitutionalism and makes a comparison between various European constitutional countries and Persia.

Mohammad Esmā'īl Rezvānī has published the newspaper of Sheykh Fażlallah Nūrī in Tārīkh, the new periodical of the Department of History of Tehran University in 1356. This article entitled Rūznāmeḥ-ye Sheykh Fażlallah Nūrī is not easily available, but it sheds light on the Sheykh's arguments, in the name of Eslam, against the Constitution.

Among the published primary sources we must mention the series of articles by Taqīzādeh, in Maqālāt-e Taqīzādeh. These were originally published in various newspapers and magazines and then were compiled in 5 volumes by I. Afshar.

Unfortunately Taqīzādeh never wrote a complete history of the Constitutional Revolution though he was in a position to do so. Throughout his long public life he repeated one never changing version of these events and thus avoided having to touch on certain subjects he did not want mentioned, as for instance his early association with the Social Democrats.

Taqizādeh is one of those people about whom historians have not been impartial: he has either been treated as a hero or as a villain. He has been blamed for having been a Freemason, or a British agent, and for being in touch with the British Embassy. With such accusations, some people find a means of proving the often repeated argument that the Constitutional Revolution was a product of the British machinations because they wanted to limit Moḥammad 'Alī Shah who had fallen under the influence of the Russians. Though this argument is widely held, no concrete proof exists. Taqizādeh of course denies such accusations, but his articles hardly do justice to the position he himself held in the First Majles, when as a devoted young nationalist he defied the Shah; or in the Second Majles, when he emerged as the leader of the Democrats, and was considered dangerous, accused of the murder of Behbahānī and obliged to leave Persia. (His later career does not concern us here).

The articles by Taqizādeh are nevertheless important because they show his opinion before and in the course of the Revolution, on the parties, on those who worked with him as colleagues and, at times, as rivals and on the general events of this period. One of Taqizādeh's earliest articles is called Tahqiq dar Ahvāl-e Konūnī-ye Iran, bā Moḥākemāt-e Tārīkh, published in 1323 H.Q. first in Egypt and then in Tabriz. This is a long verbose article in which he discusses the reasons for Persia's failure and weakness as a country, and draws attention to the need for reform, modernization and democratization of the government before the Imperialists obliterate them.

In a very old-fashioned and flowery style, which he abandoned later, he described the conditions of Persia. His description of the reasons for the growing decadence and foreign threat in Persia and all over the East shows the influence of Malkam but especially of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn's thought. There is no trace of socialism however in his writings and his discussion of the position of the poor and the peasant is only a repetition of what was said at the time by other reformers in the Majles.

The reason for all the misery of Persia and the recurrent defeats and foreign occupations, he said, lay in the selfishness of its rulers who were only interested in their own pleasures and cared little for the people and peasants. This was the real cause of the ignorance and the static nature of the Eastern people, repeating old useless philosophic arguments while the West progressed and made new scientific discoveries. Now the West had made such strides that it was nearly hopeless to catch up with it. In the meantime the peasants and the poor suffered and the rich became richer and exploited them. The only remedy was for a European model government to enact and execute laws especially by improving education. There was, he said, a law of the survival of the fittest; the more civilized would win.

Several of his articles are particularly useful.

Tārīkh-e Mokhtāṣar-e Majles-e Mellī-ye Iran published in Berlin in 1337 H.Q. is, as its title suggests, a short history of the Majles, but what is invaluable for the purpose of this study is the short biographical notices he gives about most of the important deputies and their political standing. Though the

list is incomplete, it is of importance because Taqīzādeh knew these men and worked with them. He could thus judge and classify their political standing. In this study, the division of Taqīzādeh between moderates or Mo'tadel and Āzādikhāh (this can be translated as Liberal or Nationalists but the British insisted on calling them Extreme Nationalists) has been followed in the First Majles because it seems the best analysis. In the Second Majles of course it is easier because the political parties indicated each of their members when they introduced themselves.

Taqīzādeh has written an article called Kāshef al-Ghatā' published in Şafar in 1329 H.Q. in Ḥabl al-Matīn. This is his version of the rise of the political parties and an attack on the E'tedāliyyūn. He writes that the E'tedāliyyūn party was composed of politicians who were in favour of a compromise with the Entente Powers and accused their enemies who were young nationalists of being revolutionaries. He further adds that the Democrat party was formed to confront this organization. This version is not strictly true as the Democrats were a much older organization with links with international socialism from the time before the Revolution.

Another of Taqīzādeh's important works is the Tārīkh-e Avāyel-e Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭiyyat-e Iran. This is the history of the early period of the Revolution and was originally given in lecture form in the Mehregān Club. It traces the origins of the thought of reform and he gives his opinion about some of the books on the Revolution. His mention of Moḥammad'Alī Shah is couched in mild terms, and he says that some injustices were committed towards him, and that

after the bomb thrown at him, all hopes of reconciliation were lost. He ends his lecture with a long expostulation about how he spent his last days before the bombardment of the Majles, for he has been blamed and even accused because he did not go to the Majles that day, but rather took refuge in the British Legation. In the article entitled Lafz-e Mashrūṭeh va Yādī az Avāyel-e Mashrūṭiyyat, published in Eṭelā'āt-e Māhāneh in 1333 Shamsī, he discusses the word Mashrūṭeh and states that it came to Persia from Turkey where it was used in the reign of 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, and that it is possible that it originated from the French word Chartre rather than the arabic word Sharṭ (a condition).

He also wrote a full autobiography, Sargozasht-e Seyyed Hasan Taqīzādeh, which is interesting not only because it tells us about his early education and interest in modern science, but also because it contains information on the activities of the early reformers in Tabriz with whom he worked. I. Afshār writes that Taqīzādeh was asked by him to write an autobiography and that this was written in 1340 Shamsī and was published in Rāhnamā-ye Ketāb in the same year.

Another piece of writing which must be mentioned here is Ākharīn Defā'-e Taqīzādeh, which was in note form and was not completed as he wrote it in very old age in 1346 Shamsī. It was published posthumously in Rāhnamā-ye Ketāb. This is an answer to his biography by E. Ṣafā'ī in Rahbarān-e Mashrūṭeh. He points out the mistakes Ṣafā'ī apparently made, and is in self-defence against the accusations of that author. He denies having been responsible for the

extremism of some deputies for example, but above all he denies having been involved in the murder of Atābak, in the bomb thrown at the Shah, and in the murder of Behbahānī.

Another contemporary account is the collection of letters by Taqīzādeh to E.G. Browne, published by Ḥasan Javādī in 1351 under the title Nāmeḥhā'ī az Tabriz. These deal with the Russian occupation of Tabriz after 1911 and has important biographical notes. It dwells in particular on the Russian atrocities committed there.

Another book published by Eqbāl Yaghmā'ī is the collection of the speeches of Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez which had been originally published by Majd al-Eslām Kermānī in his newspaper al-Jamāl. This book is entitled Shahīd-e Rāh-e Āzādī, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez Eṣfahānī. Seyyed Jamāl was the companion of Malek al-Motekallemin, both of whom played a very central role in the early phase of the Revolution and who both perished after the bombardment of the Majles. Seyyed Jamāl apparently had a great influence amongst the common folk, and could stir them deeply. These sermons he gives are very important, not only because we can follow what he told people about the Constitution, but because, as pointed out later, they deal with the same topic as the programme of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmiyūn which is a further proof of the connection between that party and these men.

Another important and very interesting section of this book is the reports by the spies who followed the Seyyed. They went everywhere he went, knew his connections and often heard what was planned, but obviously not enough to be effective,

as for instance, in the case of the murder of Atābak.

Extensive use has been made of the biography of Šaqat al-Eslām by Noṣratallāh Fathī, entitled Shahīd-e Nīknām, Šaqat al-Eslām. The writer has had the use of the archives of the family of Šaqat al-Eslām, but unfortunately has misused these letters by quoting extracts from them, punctuating them with his own repetitive and eulogizing comments, thus destroying what could have been a very unique source on the Constitutional Revolution. Nevertheless these letters are very important as they include for the most part letters of the Azarbaijan deputies to Šaqat al-Eslām and give us an insight into their thoughts, their reactions to events, and their rivalries. They also illustrate the centralizing authority of Šaqat al-Eslām and partly account for the fact that the Azarbaijan deputies had a semblance of unity which put them above the others.

The same author has written another book in the same style, entitled Majmū'eh-ye Qalamī-ye Shādravān Šaqat al-Eslām, which is composed of extracts of his letters to colleagues and friends as well as his private letters to relationships, and complements the former book. It also shows the political role Šaqat al-Eslām played as mediator between the moderates and the extremist Anjoman-e Tabriz which he frequented less and less.

Šaqat al-Eslām also mediated with 'Ayn al-Douleh during the siege of Tabriz which came to nothing. He even went to Basminch, the headquarters of 'Ayn al-Douleh, on the eve of the Russian march on Tabriz; but he could achieve nothing as the Shah would not relent. These letters throw light on Šaqat al-Eslām's extreme patriotism and his great disappointment at

the turn of affairs.

This book also holds his opinion on many other political questions, as for instance several letters illustrate his opinion about the Third Electoral Laws the Majles was preparing. He opposed manhood suffrage and thought the poor and the peasants would not understand these questions. There is also an interesting letter by Šaqat al-Eslām in reply to the Taraqīkhāhān party which had apparently invited him to join it. He refuses politely, saying he was sick and tired but that he agreed with their policy, which he himself had announced in his Resāleh-ye Lālān, but that he did not agree with some of the articles of their Neẓāmnāmeḥ.

The Resāleh-ye Lālān is an important pamphlet which he had written in Rabi' al-Avval 1326 H.Q. and was presented by Šaqat al-Eslām to the Najaf Ulama. He announces in this that the duty of the Constitutionalists was to safeguard religion. He wrote that the reason why the world of Eslam lagged behind the rest of the world was because it was under tyranny and lacked freedom and unity. Now the West was going to conquer Eslam and change her religion. The only way to stop their inroads was by boosting her religion with Constitutionalism. Our country, he wrote, was in peril and bankrupt. We were still suffering from the aftermath of debt due to the Regie, if we were not careful we would lose everything left us according to him. Then he defended Constitutionalism against those who accused it of spreading lawlessness, and said that this condition was caused by the reactionaries who would not rest until they overthrew the Majles.

Şaqat al-Eslām then discussed what the Vaṭan, homeland meant, (it must be added that he was primarily a nationalist as witnessed by his letters). He said that the preservation of the homeland and the monarchy which was associated with it was like the preservation of Eslām. If Eslām were to remain, we must have a Constitutional monarchy; a tyranny would weaken the monarch and his government as proven by past experiences. If the monarch became weak, religion would grow weak also.

Two books by Ebrāhīm Safā'ī which carry published documents must be cited here. They are Asnād-e Siyāsī-ye Doureh-ye Qājāriyeh published in Tehran, 1346 and Asnād-e Nou Yāfteh published in 1349, but Şafā'ī does not divulge the sources of these documents which makes his books unreliable.

Another book of this kind is the Vaqāye'-e Nāserī va Touziḥ-e Marām by Sheykh Reżā Dehkhāreqānī, one of the Democrat deputies. This was published in Tabriz in 1355 and is important because it gives us the thoughts of one of the Democrats and his analysis of events. He was particularly an enemy of Nāşer al-Molk and found him responsible for everything, which seems an exaggerated view at times.

The second part of his work, which is a discussion on whether Democracy is contrary to Shi'ism, is an interesting academic argument. In this pamphlet he explains Shi'ism and Constitutionalism and finds these two ideologies compatible. He wrote that the essence of Constitutionalism is representative government; but representative government was not in itself the thing which would stop injustice. Only by having freedom would people learn and choose better

representatives who would work for reforms. However as people were ignorant and had no liberty there had been no good government. What did Shi'ism say? he asked. The Prophet appointed 'Alī as his successor, he wrote, because of 'Alī's superiority which would ensure a just government, and not because of his relationship. 'Alī too did not intend the Califate to become hereditary, but Mo'āvīyeh took all the power into his own hands and did not allow freedom and good government.

The memoirs of Heydar Khān were published by 'Abbās Eqbāl in Yādegār in an article entitled Heydar Khān 'Amūz Oghlī and holds important information about his early activity in Persia as discussed later.

The memoirs of 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī, a brother of Yaḥyā, who were both important figures in the Revolution has been appearing for many years in Khāṭerāt-e Vaḥīd and now in Vaḥīd. Doulatābādī was an active member of E'tedālī party during the Second Majles, and in the Third became one of the leaders of that party. These memoirs are entitled Khāṭerāt-e Seyyed 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī, Līder-e Hezb-e E'tedālīyūn. In their early issues it deals with the question of the Ultimatum and is in defence of the E'tedālīs, accusing the Democrats, as discussed in the text.

Another interesting memoir also published in Khāṭerāt-e Vaḥīd are extracts from the memoirs of Sepahdār:

Yāddāshthā-ye Moḥammād Valī Khān Sepahsālār A'zam by

A. Khal'atbarī. In these extracts Sepahdār's role in the attack

on Tehran is described by himself and he expresses his devotion to the Constitution. The interesting question, as pointed out in the text, is the attempt by the Anjoman of Tabriz and Taqīzādeh to stop him from taking Tehran because they were afraid he would not succeed with the small force he had and the large Russian force behind him. The fact that the Sepahdār was in touch with the Shah and negotiated with him throughout before taking Tehran is worthy of notice.

Khāṭerāt-e Vahīd has also published extracts from the memoirs of Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī, which though very short, contain one or two very interesting points which have been discussed in the text. This is entitled Rūḥānī-ye Bozorgavār, Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī Sangelajī, Za'īm-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran by Ḥesām al-Dīn Doulatābādī.

Vahīd is beginning to publish the memoirs of Nāṣer al-Molk, and as this study was being prepared the first part of these was seen by me. Nāṣer al-Molk gives a short account of the beginning of the Revolution, and he makes a few interesting remarks. He says, for example, there were two groups who made the Revolution, those who had personal axes to grind, as, for instance, Sa'd al-Douleh, who wanted to oust Naus and to take his revenge for having been exiled. He also hoped to be made Minister of Customs. There were also those who had the public good at heart. He also writes that there were people in Azarbaijan and Tehran who knew that after Moḥaffar al-Dīn Shah his son would succeed him, they also knew what he was like. They gave a great deal of publicity to his misdeeds to arouse emotions. He maintains that most people did not know what was going on, and some expected the Majles to be something

like a meeting of Aṣnāfs or guilds.

Then he says that when the Bast of the Ulama in Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm was upsetting everyone, and 'Ayn al-Douleh still would not resign nor would the Shah let him go, the courtiers, including Sepahdār and Sardār Bahādor, plotted and informed the Shah that the army was no longer to be depended upon, so 'Ayn al-Douleh was made to resign.

The unpublished material used in this research also includes a collection of press cuttings donated by Taqīzādeh to the Majles Library, mentioned here as Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh. This includes proclamations or Entebāhnāmeḥ by the Democrat party on specific questions, but more important are several of the orders by the party's Central Committee to its parliamentary branch on how to vote or what stand to take on political problems. These are invaluable because they show how the party worked and how its affairs were conducted.

Another collection dealing with the E'tedāl party is the Anṣārī documents. These are a series of documents belonging to the family of Mas'ūd Anṣārī. They consist of some of the documents of the E'tedalīyūn party which have survived and are in the possession of Mrs. Nūshāfarīn Anṣārī (Moḥaqqueq), grand-daughter of Moḥsen Mas'ūd Anṣārī (nephew of Moḥammad 'Alī Khān Noṣrat al-Solṭān, one of the friends of Malek al-Motekallemīn and active in the early course of the Revolution). Moḥsen Mas'ūd Anṣārī was appointed as one of the members of the central organization of the party in its second year, and its treasurer, Mrs. Anṣārī points out that as he was very meticulous, his collection of documents

are in very good order. They mainly deal with the expenses of the party but also include many other important points. In an unpublished thesis for her Master's degree in Tehran University, 1351, Mrs. Anṣārī has made use of some of these documents cited also here about the E'tedālī party. Hereafter we shall refer to them as Anṣārī documents.

Some private documents of a miscellaneous nature have also come to light, as for instance in the family of Neẓām al-Saltāneh, but full access has not been possible. Of course there are many diaries and letters which will eventually come to light and prove very useful, but as yet people are rather reticent to admit certain facts, either for the sake of their families or friends.

The Public Record Office archives have been another source of utmost importance to the study of the political parties. The volumes consulted have been FO 371 General Correspondence after 1906, Political, and FO 416 Confidential Print, Affairs of Persia (Further Correspondence.) So much of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century history of Persia has been entwined with British history that no study of Persian history is complete without a perusal of the reports of the British officials in this country. However, it must be qualified that as Persian historians have had much easier access to British sources than Russian ones, they have become obsessed with the power and omnipotence of Britain and often represent a one-sided view of history. All matters such as local events, finance, trade, foreign policy and internal

affairs were kept under scrupulous and constant watch by British officials and their comments and judgement on people and events are very important. Also with the knowledge they had of so much that happened they had certain invisible means of influencing politicians, but this is a main source of weakness in Persian historiography, because these connections are intangible. Sometimes certain policies which were followed by politicians become clear now when we become aware of the pressures brought on them. For instance, Sardār As'ad was threatened by the withdrawal of H.I.M.'s Government's friendship if he opposed their interests so he stopped sympathising with the Democrats. On another occasion the Bakhtiyārī khāns asked the British and Russians if they thought it advisable that they should make a coup d'etat to overthrow the Majles, and we know that the reply was a guarded assent. Such pieces of information are very valuable indeed. Also judgements passed on certain politicians, or the discussions of their motives or connections, though not absolutely accurate, are always extremely useful.

These reports sometimes dispel the myth of British omnipotence. The reports of Grant-Duff on the early period of the Revolution, for example, and of the Bast in the British Legation and his negotiations with the Bastīs are indeed very illuminating. They also prove, contrary to what some people have said, that the British were not the architects of the Revolution. However, as all powerful nations stand to benefit from the outcome of any event in weaker countries, the British too benefited from such rumours.

At other times these reports dispel the myth concerning some politicians. Nāṣer al-Molk has been held to have been a liberal who understood Constitutionalism, but in these reports a different light is shed on him. He had told the British Representative that after the Majles's term finished he would find means of not recalling it for a time, which he did not.

When the Majles met, there are full reports in the British archives of its meetings which often gives us certain information which the Mozākerāt of the Majles omit. Of course what we do not know is the influence they exercised on the politicians which however was a cornerstone of the British policy in the East. Sometimes their reports are misleading, perhaps owing to the source of information. For instance, on the murder of Atābak, they repeat what was told to them by Ṣanī'al-Douleh to Dr. Pollock and pay no attention to other rumours. In this way they implicate the Shah, who according to most accounts was not responsible for this event. The murder of Behbahānī is not reported nearly as fully, but they do say that the local press found the Russians guilty. The murder of Ṣanī'al-Douleh is mentioned briefly but without comment.

Of course the major parts of these reports deal with foreign affairs but they also shed an unexpected light on the political parties. Naturally the British Ministers were not aware of all that went on, as they did not have access to the private affairs of the parties, but nonetheless they were very much aware of their existence. From the very beginning of the meetings of the Majles it was reported that the Majles was divided between the moderates and the extremists, whom they

also called extreme nationalists, as this latter group opposed British and Russian influence.

In the Second Majles they pay more attention to the alignment of the politicians on each side as the divisions were now much more concrete and definite, and they give detailed descriptions of party politics, intrigues and alignments.

What they do not seem to notice, or at least place little emphasis on at this time is the growth of Social Democracy and the association of the Democrats with them; they seem to the British to be extreme nationalists who had integrity and intelligence, though they preferred to deal with the Moderates or E'tedāliyūn who were less of a threat to their interests. On several occasions only, the nationalists were considered as socialists. Sometimes they wrongly call politicians Democrats or extreme nationalists, whereas they were only more independent than most. For instance Voṣūq al-Douleh, Ṣanī' al-Douleh and Qavām al-Saltāneh were not Democrats, but the British sources vaguely label them as such.

The British Ministers jealously guarded their own interests, and at this period this also meant support for the Russian policy which was so often crudely aggressive. But they were at least fair enough to admit for example that the Russian behaviour was provocative. Despite this mild sense of justice, which is not however always the case, there are ministers who are less sympathetic than others, yet the reports have one thing in common, that is a self-righteous feeling of always being in the right in everything, and Persia always being the culprit.

2. Secondary Sources

One of the best accounts of the Constitutional Revolution is by Yaḥyā Doulatābādī entitled Tārīkh-e Mo'āṣer yā Ḥayāt-e Yaḥyā published in Tehran in 1328 in three volumes. Doulatābādī was one of the actors in the events which led to the Revolution and exerted considerable influence on its later course. He was not elected deputy, however, as he was suspected of being on Azalī (a Babī sect and unpopular in Persia) as were two other leaders of the Revolution, namely Malek al-Motekallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl Va'eẓ. These men were debarred from the Majles but it did not stop their activities outside. Though Doulatābādī does not mention this, he often complains about the unfair treatment he received, especially when he was trying to set up modern schools in Esfahan, or when he first had the idea of publishing the newspaper Majles which was taken over by Seyyed Moḥammad Ṣādeq, the son of Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī.

Not only is Doulatābādī one of the best informed writers on this period but the fact that he pays particular attention to the relationship of people, their private ambitions and rivalries makes his book very significant for the study of political parties, since so many events were basically influenced by such relationships. His insight is very astute as he was well acquainted with the participants. Doulatābādī gives important information concerning the negotiations of the Ulama, who had taken Bast in Qom with the Government, with him as mediator. According to him, the Ulama's aims were limited to certain vague demands and the establishment of a

House of Justice, 'Edālatkhāneh. It was through his efforts and those of other liberals like him that the demand for a parliament, Majles-e Shourā-ye Mellī was voiced and put through.

Doulatābādī was well aware of many of the weaknesses of the Majles, of the deputies and their leaders. He especially blames Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī for his personal ambition. Particularly noteworthy is his account of the reasons for the failure of the First Majles and he mildly blames the extremists who had antagonized Moḥammad 'Alī Shah to the point of risking the overthrow of the Majles.

In the third volume he gives an account of the activities of the emigrès in Turkey where he had gone after the bombardment of the Majles. In general little has been written about this phase of the history of the Revolution, and Doulatābādī's account is incomplete. One point he mentions which is worthy of notice from our point of view, and to which other writers refer also, is the existence of two movements among the emigrès, some being more extremist than others, and the split between them. Doulatābādī's account of the Second Majles is incomplete because he left Persia to attend a Congress on racial questions, and he was away from Persia when Morgan Shuster came. His leaving is no doubt due to the disappointment he felt at the course events were taking. Nonetheless he does pay some attention to the emerging political parties.

Another early work on the Constitutional Period is by Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, entitled Tārīkh-e Bīdārī-ye Irānīyān. Nāẓem al-Eslām was also involved in the events which led to the Revolution, and his information on the period before

it is very valuable. This edition of his work is divided into three volumes, an introduction published in 1346 and the first and second volumes published in 1349 in Tehran.

The introductory volume deals with the precursors or reform, the question of the Regie, and includes certain important documents. He also provides much biographical data of people who were politically involved in these events. However, as he was personally acquainted with them he frequently praises them. This is of course understandable considering he published these in the newspaper Kokab-e Dari.

The two other volumes are in the form of diaries. In the first volume the author deals with the activities of the Anjoman-e Makhfi which was set up at the suggestion of Ṭabāṭabā'ī. It is interesting to note some of the discussions of the members of this Anjoman and the topics they touched on. In particular they confirm what Doulatābādī says, namely that some of the reformers and revolutionaries had broader aims than mere reform and they kept these more or less secret. It also throws light on the secret activities of people before the Revolution.

This volume also contains details of the events which led to the granting of the Constitution and the activities of the Anjoman-e Makhfi in these events and following the granting of the Majles. He includes some important documents as for example several Shabnāmehs, and a letter by Nāṣer al-Molk to Ṭabāṭabā'ī in which he expresses his scepticism about the Constitution, which is so revealing of the man who was to become Regent in the Second Majles. Another important document

is the congratulatory note sent by the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmiyūn of the Caucasus addressed to the poor people of Persia asking them to unite and seek their rights.

The second volume of the Tārīkh-e Bīdārī was a private diary which was published posthumously, and as the editor 'Alī Akbar Sīrjānī explains, had not been edited by the author for publication as had the first. It contains daily narrative of the course of the First Majles to the fall of Moḥammad'Alī Shah. Then it comes to an abrupt end for no known reason, and Sīrjānī thinks probably the rest has been lost. It relates some of the problems which faced the Majles and the reasons for its fall. He also recounts the history of the second Anjoman-e Makhfī and its activities as well as those of other Anjomans. Nāẓem al-Eslām was amongst those who thought the Shah had shown a great deal of patience and that it was the fault of the extremists that the Majles was lost. He particularly seems to have disliked Malek al-Motekallemin and accuses him of working for money. After the bombardment of the Majles, Nāẓem al-Eslām was thoroughly frightened and tried to keep out of danger. From then on he was careful lest he should be accused of being in sympathy with the Majles, his comments are consequently couched in discreet words and he generally tried to keep in step with the government.

A friend and colleague of this author was Majd al-Eslām Kermānī who was also a political activist involved in the Anjoman-e Makhfī and a writer who has compiled two works on the Constitutional Revolution. One is the account of his exile to Kalat whither he was sent by 'Ayn al-Douleh in 1323/

1905 because of his activities in the Anjoman-e Makhfi. This work is entitled Tārīkh-e Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran, Safarnāmeḥ-ye Kalāt. This was published in Esfahan in 1347 Shamsi. The other is entitled Tārīkh-e Enḥelāl-e Majles, Faṣlī az Tārīkh-e Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran, also published in Esfahan in 1351. This book is an exception of its kind because it is a severe criticism of the Majles and the deputies, and the author condemns many of their actions, especially those of the extremists whom he holds responsible for the failure of the Majles. Of course he wrote after the failure of the Majles and had ample time to change his mind.

Another very important history of the Revolution is by Dr. Mehdī Malekzādeh, the son of Malek al-Motekallemīn, entitled Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran in 6 volumes and published in Tehran in 1328. Malekzādeh gives details of the Anjoman-e Mellī and the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb which would have remained more or less unknown but for his account. Malek al-Motekallemīn was a member of the Komīteh and probably its leader. There are certain reasons which lead us to believe that the Komīteh was a branch of the Ejtema'īyūn 'Āmīyūn party which originated in the Caucasus, and though Malekzādeh does not say this, and possibly did not know it, there are many clues which would confirm this. For instance the Komīteh claimed to have committed the murder of Atābak; Ḥeydar Khān a Social Democrat who had come from Russia, also claimed responsibility for the murder. Malekzādeh's opinion about the political parties is vague, though he seems to have sympathized with the Democrats.

In particular he seems deliberately to refrain from passing judgement on the politicians of his day who had been involved in the two phases of the Revolution and shows a deference in this regard which characterizes the style of many of the historians of the period.

The biography of Malek al-Motekallemīn has also been compiled by his son and is entitled Zendegānī-ye Malek-al-Motekallemīn, published in Tehran in 1325. This however hardly does justice to the role Malek al-Motekallemīn played in the early course of the Revolution. Malekzādeh's father died early and many of his famous speeches were lost, but Malek al-Motekallemīn's role must have been much more important than that of speech-maker in support of the Majles. He was involved in the secret activities of the more extremist side of the movement, and acted through the Anjomans, and possibly led them. This book however only hints at this and does not contain any details as to the actual role of Malek al-Motekallemīn and his connection with the secret activities of the Anjomans.

Khāṭerāt va Khaṭarāt by Mokhber al-Saltāneh Hedāyat, published in Tehran in 1329 S. is the autobiography of a brother of Ṣanī'al-Douleh, one of the chief figures of the period. He himself played an important role in the early negotiations and the enactment of the Constitutional laws. Later he was made Minister of Science and Education, and later still Governor of Azarbaijan. Despite such important positions and his sympathy for the cause of the Revolution, he gives few details about the very many important affairs in which

he was involved. He could, for instance, have said much about the Anjoman of Tabriz or the Russian infiltration in the North. This abstention is no doubt out of deference for many colleagues in a long political life, and for the great powers as well. One exception to this fact is his apparent accusation of Nāṣer al-Molk for the murder of his brother Ṣanī'al-Douleh.

The summary treatment of the political parties is best noticed in the Tārīkh-e Mokhtaṣar-e Ahzāb-e Siyāsī-ye Iran, Enqerāz-e Qājāriyeh, by Malek al-Sho'arā Bahār. As its title suggests, this book is mainly concerned with the fall of the dynasty, and Bahār gives little important information about the early history of the political parties. He was too young to have taken an active part in the early phase of the Revolution, but he joined the ranks of the revolutionaries during the period between the two Majles. He mentions that Heydar Khān who was the leader of the nationalists, organized the committee of the Democrats in Khorasan which he joined; but he gives no information about the activities of the party in Mashad which must have been known to him. Later his newspaper Noubahār became one of the organs of the party in Mashad.

Bahār in general gives a very short account of the political parties of this early period. He briefly mentions the aims and programmes of the Democrats and makes scant and inaccurate reference to its membership, treating the E'tedālīs in the same manner. This book, it must be remembered, was published in 1321 Shamsī: a year after the fall of Reżā Shah; he may possibly still have been reluctant to admit the early association of the Democrats with the Russian Social Democrats,

a fact which he could not have ignored. Of course he might not have deemed this early period relevant to his general history of the fall of the Qajars. In all, this book is of little value in the study of the political party's early history.

In this same context we must mention two other authors sympathetic to the Persian Revolution: the first is E.G. Browne, with his History of The Persian Revolution 1906-1909. This book was published in Cambridge in 1910. He is also the author of the very important work on the press and poetry of modern Persia which will be discussed later. Professor Browne's history of the Revolution covers the first phase of this movement and is interesting for the particular sympathy and optimism with which he treats it, so rare in Western writers. He pays particular attention to Russia's and Britain's role in bringing about its failure. He obtained much of his information from those who were involved in its course and played host to them when they came as exiles to London; together they organized the Persia Society and tried to foster sympathy in Europe for the cause of Persian nationalism. Browne particularly regretted that Britain which had been regarded by the Persian reformers as a friend should have committed herself with Russia to suppressing the Majles.

He was close to Taqīzādeh whom he praises as a nationalist and liberal and kept in touch with him when the latter returned to Persia. This connection was the source of further information for Browne on later developments and occasioned a series of pamphlets on the Russian atrocities in Tabriz in 1911.

The other author, Morgan Shuster, who wrote The Strangling of Persia, was a sympathizer of the Persian cause, but unlike Browne he was a participant in the later phase of the Revolution. He came to Persia as Treasurer General in 1910 and was immediately given full powers over the financial transactions of the Persian Government. Soon however he fell foul of the Russians and British who were tightening their grips on Persia and would not tolerate his independent policy. The powers were given to more subservient foreign advisers like Naus, a Belgian, and Bizot, a Frenchman, who were in the service of the Persian Government; Shuster was a different kind of person. He came from America, a country far removed from involvement with the great powers in Asia, he was also in sympathy with underdeveloped people; he had in addition studied Browne's history of the Persian Revolution which set his mind and influenced him before he came. On the way to Tehran, he met Taqīzādeh and other Persians in Constantinople, who no doubt impressed upon him some of their own opinions of the situation he was to meet. So it is not surprising that when he arrived in Persia he should take an independent line which was so repugnant to the powers. He accused them of wanting to hold Persia back, and not really wanting her to grow strong and independent. He also accused some of the politicians of peculation and dishonesty and he tried to stop some of these by keeping a tight grip on the purse strings. This lost him their support, so that they finally joined the Russians and British in wanting him to leave. On the other hand Shuster received the support of the

Democrats who shared his views and policy. Having been close to them he naturally pays more attention to them than do most authors. The Strangling of Persia is above all a justification of his own work and the line he took in Persia, and as the name implies, he blamed the powers for his failure. But opinions of Persian writers about Shuster have varied, and ironically some blame him for what happened while others excuse him.

The two volumes of Aḥmad Kasravī's history of the Constitution entitled Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh-ye Iran, published in 1319 in Tehran, and Tārīkh-e Hījdah Sāleh-ye Azarbaijan, first published in 1317 are two very important books with much detail on the course of the Revolution, especially in Azarbaijan. These books have been extensively used and quoted and still remain by far the best study of this period.

Kasravī himself says that his purpose was to show who really served the Constitution and who ruined it, and especially to emphasize the role of the poor nameless people who were most instrumental in the process, and who have been ignored. He particularly undermined the role the Ulama played in the Revolution, but he lays special blame for the failure of the Revolution on the ruling class. He deplores the fact that there occurred a split between the revolutionaries and that they were divided into Enqelābīs and E'tedālīs.

Kasravī gives us important information on the connection of the Socialists or the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn in Azarbaijan, and he also pays much attention to the Anjoman of Tabriz and its activities. Kasravī needlessly changed the dates from Lunar to Solar and thus causes a confusion in the

relationship of events. He uses many documents which would otherwise have disappeared. He also uses the Blue Book, Ketāb-e Ābī, which was the translation of the British Documents published in 1331 H.Q. on the recommendation of Sardār As'ad. Kasravī, however, wages an unceasing vendetta against Taqīzādeh, and accuses him of being an opportunist, treacherous and timorous. Amīrkheyzī, whose biography of Sattār Khān will be dealt with later, points to this fact in detail and repudiates some of these accusations against Taqīzādeh which have no foundation.

The second volume is less detailed than the first, but the author pays some attention to the political parties. In passing judgement on them and on the acceptance of the Ultimatum he expresses doubts as to whether resistance would have benefited Persia. He adds that he does not think the Democrats were to be blamed for what happened as the Regent and the Government tried to show, but that he did not think that they were really ready to take up arms against the enemy in 1911.

He still continues the same attacks on Taqīzādeh. For instance, he states that when Taqīzādeh came back to Tabriz from Europe his relationship with the Mojāhedīn was poor, but he does not take into account the fact that the Mojāhedīn were becoming a nuisance by misbehaving and taking advantage of their position. Further, he says that when the Gilan forces were approaching Tehran, Taqīzādeh had telegraphed Sepahdār not to take Tehran, and says this was a proof that he had come to some agreement with Moḥammad 'Alī Shah and was

anxious to please the great powers. There is however no foundation for such an accusation. We must take into account the fact that the Democrats did not trust Sepahdār who was leading the Mojāhedīn of Gilan, and that Sepahdār himself was hesitating and was in touch with the Shah.

He further says that the Russians and British were doing their utmost to keep Moḥammad 'Alī on the throne, but in fact the British and the Russians allowed these forces to take Tehran, and only made a slight show of stopping them. In addition, as a consequence of Sepahdār's march to Tehran, the Russian forces advanced as far as Qazvin, where they were in a good position to threaten the capital, so that it is not certain that Sepahdār's act was not according to a plan.

A contemporary autobiography is by 'Abdallāh Mostoufī, Sharḥ-e Zendegānī-yeman, yā Tārīkh-e Ejtemā'ī va Edārī-ye Doureh-ye Qājāriyeh. This is a long and detailed book in three volumes published in 1343 in Tehran. It deals with the Nineteenth and early Twentieth century administrative history of Persia, and therein lies the importance of the book. It does not contain much original information on political history. However, as he was a government employee in the Finance Ministry in Shuster's time and was attached to his departments Mostoufī gives some insight into the activities of the Treasurer General. Mostoufī was not greatly in sympathy with Shuster, probably due to professional jealousy, but he admits that he worked well. He especially disliked the Democrats and considered the failure of Shuster's mission to be due to his association with the Democrats who misled him,

although he does not specify this.

Another series of books on the Constitutional Revolution is of a more general type and provides a source of reference. One such is by 'Abd al-Ḥoseyn Navā'ī Doulathā-ye Iran as Āghāz-e Mashrūṭīyyat tā Ultīmātūm published in 1355 in Tehran. This book is a chronology of events and as such useful for reference. The most original part of the work is based on the private papers of Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh Pīrnīyā and deals with the exile of some of the revolutionaries in Europe. As such it gives important information on their activities at that period. Ebrāhīm Ṣafā'ī, Rahbarān-e Mashrūṭeh is a biography of some of the notables in the course of the Revolution, though it does not include all the leaders of this movement. The work is somewhat biased and therefore should be used with great care. For instance, Ṣafā'ī is another of those authors who have attacked Taqīzādeh, accusing him of being sold to the West.

Another important general collection of biographies is by Mehdī Bāmdād, Sharḥ-e Ḥāl-e Rejāl-e Iran dar Qarn-e 12,13,14 H.Q. in six volumes. Bāmdād has referred to the various political figures by their first names which makes the book rather difficult to use, but it is a unique piece of work of its kind, covering three centuries. Also in the same series we can name Rejāl-e Azarbāijān dar 'Aṣr-e Mashrūṭīyyat, by M. Mojtehedī, published in Tehran in 1327. Ṣadr-e Hāshemī's Tārīkh-e Jarāyed va Majellāt-e Iran is a monumental work in four volumes, published in Esfahan in 1332. It has proved valuable in tracing the history of some of the newspapers and complements E.G. Browne's The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia.

Among more recent general books useful for this research we can name two works by Esmā'īl Rā'īn, Farāmūshkhāneh va Frāmāsonry dar Iran, and Hoqūq Begīrān-e Engelīs dar Iran.

Both have been consulted but the opinion and approach of their author is more sensational than accurate.

In the same series we can name two books on Persia's foreign policy. The first is by Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and England in Iran, 1864-1917. The second is by Hosseyn Nazemi, Russia and Great Britain in Iran, 1900-1914. Reference has been made to Iran: Monarchy Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars, 1858, 1896 by Shaul Bakhash and Leonard Binder's Iran, political Development in a Changing Society.

We must also mention several books which though not directly concerned with Persia, nonetheless throw some light on the Democrat party. These are The Revolutionary Internationals 1864-1943, edited by M.M. Drachkovitch, and La Deuxieme Internationale et L'Orient edited by Georges Haupt et Madeleine Reberieux. Some of the chapters of this book deal with the growth of socialism in Persia: Les Premiers groupes Socialistes parmi les Musulmans de Russie and L'Internationale et le probleme Colonial, by A. Bennigsen, and G. Haupt and M. Reberieux respectively. Also Le Parti Social-Democrate d'Iran by N. K. Belova, and L'Internationale et Les Revolutions en Chine et en Iran, by Marianne Rachline and Claudie Weill. Another book is by A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier Quelquejay entitled L'Islam en Union Sovietique, which has been useful on the history of Hemmat and Social Democracy

in the Caucasus and amongst the Persian workers there.

Amongst recent books on more specific subjects which have been consulted and have been useful for this research are ^{books} by Nikki R. Keddie Religion and Rebellion in Iran, The Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892, by Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia 1917-1921, by Pierre Oberling, The Qashqa'i Nomads of Fars by Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Iran.

Of greater importance than the above mentioned for the purpose of this research is Namāyandegān-e Majles-e Shourā-ye Mellī dar Bīst va Yek Doureh-ye Qānūn Gozārī, by Zahrā Shajī'ī, published in Tehran in 1344. This is an original book in Persia, as it constitutes a sociological research of the Majles, and the composition of the deputies' family, background, class, education, and business. It is of special importance in the study of the parties as it shows the class composition of each party and of the Majles. It must be allowed, however, that this has been a difficult research, as detailed biographical information, particularly on the early Majles, is rare and accounts for some of the inaccuracies in this book.

In recent years a number of articles have appeared in foreign journals dealing with particular aspects of the Constitutional Revolution, but we shall mention only those directly used for this research.

In two articles by Ann K. S. Lambton entitled Persian political Societies 1906-1911, and Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6 published in St. Antony's Papers, all available Public Record Office material and

existing secondary sources have been used but the newspapers of the first period which contain a great deal of information have not been consulted so it can be said that as far as the secret societies are concerned the subject is not exhaustive.

N. R. Keddie has written numerous articles on the Revolution, one of her main themes being the position, influence and role of the Ulama in society in general and in the Revolution. One such article is The Origin of the Religious Radical Alliance in Iran in Past and Present. In this article she traces the suggestions of such an alliance from the time of Malkam and Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn and its culmination in the Regie, and then the continuation of this tactic in the Revolution - a tactic, she says, used by some Azalīs and freethinkers such as Mīrza Jahāngīr Khān, editor of Šūr-e Esrāfīl, Seyyed Jamāl-al-Dīn Vā'eẓ and Malek al-Motekallemin.

This alliance, however, was short-lived because the Ulama soon faced the consequences of their deeds, namely the secularization of government. This split first the Ulama, and then in 1910 the Ulama from the reformists. By the same author is the article British policy and the Iranian Opposition, 1901-1907, published in the Journal of Modern History. This article is mentioned here at some length because it dispels a myth that the British were behind the Constitutional Revolution in Persia. Keddie traces the relationship between the British representatives and the Persian opposition in the early Twentieth century. The power of the Ulama had become apparent in the Regie as in their opposition to the Russian loan in 1902. Hardinge established contacts with

some of the Ulama, including Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī, and in 1903 with the Ulama in Najaf.. Keddie shows that suggestions for more seditious movements were ignored but that the contact with the Ulama was maintained as a lever against future Russian loans. She adds, however, that no more documents on the British contact with the Ulama of Najaf after 1903 have come to light and that any help by the British to the 1905-7 movement must have been unsanctioned. Grant-Duff, the Charge d'Affaires and later Spring Rice, the Minister, had sympathies with the Revolution but were prevented by the British Government from encouraging it.

Two very good articles by the same author are the Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969 in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, and Iranian Politics 1900-1905 : Background to Revolution, in Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. By the same author is the Economic History of Iran 1800-1914, and its Political Impact in Iranian Studies.

Three articles have been particularly useful on the merchant class and their position in society. These have been discussed in the text, and are only briefly mentioned here. They are Demographic Development in Late Qajar Persia 1870-1906, and The Big Merchants (Tujjar) and the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, by Gad G. Gilbar, both in Asian and African Studies. Another article is by William M. Floor, The Merchants (Tujjar) in Qajar Iran in the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

Few articles have been written on the political parties in general and in particular in this period. G.H. Razi Genesis of Party in Iran, a Case Study of the Interaction between the Political System and Political Parties, in

Iranian Studies is scanty on the early parties, but the author does stress the fact that the failure of the Persian Revolution was the responsibility in part of the foreign powers. Also on the political parties, and always with a minimal attention to the earlier parties, is an article by R.W. Cottam in Iranian Studies: Political Party Development in Iran. He describes the parties in the period 1906-21 as being composed of a few dozen individuals who had little contact with the masses and were no more than parliamentary groups; but he adds "Their failure to organize extensively outside parliament is not indicative of their lacking any purpose beyond advancing the self-interest of individual members. There was ideological homogeneity in each of the groups...." ¹ But then Cottam adds that the Democrats were "the more intensely and consciously ideological and the ideology was a compound of French enlightenment and nationalism...." This in fact is a simplification because the Democrats were a parliamentary Socialist party which descended, as shown in the text, from the Social Democrats or Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn.

Another article in Iranian Studies which has been of use in this study is The Memoirs of Heydar khān 'Amū Ughlū, translated by A. R. Sheikholeslami and D. Wilson with an introduction. These authors comment on the work, stating that the authenticity has been questioned because of certain errors

1. R.W. Cottam, "Political Party Development In Iran", Iranian Studies, Summer 1968, P. 84.

in chronology, although they rightly claim that this fact cannot now be substantiated.

In the original text published by 'Abbās Eqbāl, mentioned earlier, Ḥeydar Khān speaks of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn party and his contacts with it. These authors have translated this party as the Social Democrat party. This should, I think not have been changed. The Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn with its headquarters in Baku was organized in 1905 by the Hemmat party which was the Moslem Social Democrat party of the Caucasus. Of course Ḥeydar Khān was in Persia when this was organized, but this does not prove that he should not have been in touch with it. Besides, these authors argue that Ḥeydar Khān retained his Russian nationality and was therefore not the nationalist he would appear to Persian historians. Neither Ḥeydār Khān nor Rasūlzādeh were Persians but they both worked for the Persian nationalists. Freedom, the Constitution and the Majles symbolized this nationalism and boosting one was boosting the other. By fighting for Persian independence these men were helping to weaken Russian imperialism and therefore Russian strength. One point discussed in the text and which can be touched on briefly here is that Hemmat was a Socialist party, but at the same time it was separate from the mainstream of Social Democracy by being the party of the Moslem population of the Caucasus, and this identified it with the nationalist feelings of the people which flared up in 1917. So if Ḥeydar Khān posed as a nationalist and encouraged it, it was not a move out of step with the mainstream developments in the Caucasus.

Another scholar, Ervand Abrahamian, has done much work on the Persian Constitutional Revolution and also on the Tūdeh party, but only one of his articles is mentioned here at some length because it has a direct bearing on the subject of this study. This is The Crowd in the Persian Revolution, published in Iranian Studies.

Abrahamian has examined the social composition of the crowd in this period with particular emphasis on the crowd which opposed the Constitution and which he calls the conservative crowd. Very little attention has been paid to this crowd, and generally it has been regarded as a bunch of ruffians or despots.

This group was composed of two kinds of people: firstly, the very poor who were barred from the Majles and given no help whatsoever. They suffered from rising prices and gained nothing from the Revolution. Amongst these were the retainers of the Shah and palace officials and those who worked as craftsmen, journeymen, labourers, camel drivers, etc. The second dissatisfied group were the conservative Ulama, made uneasy by the innovations of the Majles, the equality of the religious minorities, the secularism of the laws, and they influenced their many students and followers. The aristocrats also feared the potentiality of the Revolution and the cuts in their salaries, and joined these groups. This conservative crowd had therefore genuine grievances, and after 1907 there were reports of uprisings beginning in Tabriz and spreading to other cities and culminating in the events of the Meydān-e Tūpkhāneh.

An article by R. L. Greaves, Some Aspects of the

Anglo-Russian Convention and its working in Persia, 1907-1914 in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies is a very good discussion of the repercussions of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Negotiations for this Convention began in September 1906 but Grey who had taken office since December 1905 had been sounding the Russian Government about such an Entente. This fact, I think, gives further proof of what has been pointed out in the article by N. R. Keddie that the Persian Revolution was not a product of the British Government's policy which was based on the Entente with Russia rather than a policy of antagonism towards that power.

Three books which have been of some value in this research are Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar period by Hamid Algar published in 1969; Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, by Abdul-Hadi Hairi published in 1977 and Les Fonctionnaires Belges au Service de la Perse 1898-1915 by Annette Destree published in 1976.

The subject of the book by Algar does not concern the question under discussion directly, but in the latter part he is concerned with the growing role of the Ulama in politics which culminated in the Constitutional Revolution, and as such is valuable to this research. In addition his description of the career of some of the Ulama like Behbahānī, Tabāṭabā'ī and Sheykh Faḡlallāh Nūrī is very important for it helps our understanding of these men who left their mark on these events. The second deals with the thoughts of Mīrzā Moḡammad Ḥoseyn Nā'īnī on the question of constitutionalism and helps to explain the approach of some of the Ulama to the thorny



question of constitutionalism and modernism. Nā'īnī was close to Mollā Kāẓem Khorāsānī, one of the three Ulama of Jajaf who upheld the Constitution. He wrote a book Tanbīh al-Ommat va Touzīh al-Mellat, (The admonition and Refinement of the people) in which he tried to argue and justify constitutionalism and prove its conformity with Eslam. This justification and similar writings helped the Ulama in their support of the Revolution. The author, A. H. Hairi, believes that the Ulama did not understand the full implications of constitutionalism and that when once they saw it and the secularism which came in its wake, they moved away from it. It could be argued that originally many of the reformers too did not realize all the later implications of the reforms they were demanding, which were especially pursued by the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn, and the Democrats. But, as pointed out in this work, the Ulama were not a homogenous class with one interest; these ranged from the highly educated Ulama to those who were less learned like the Sheykhs, Rożehkhān or Pīshnamāz. Their ideas ranged from the reactionary to secular socialism, or some aspects of it and we cannot say the Ulama turned against the Constitution any more than we can say they all supported it.

The other book deals with the Belgian custom officials who worked in Persia. This book contributes to an understanding of the reasons for the deep hatred caused by Naus who personified for many Persian merchants Western imperialism and occasioned their participation in the Revolution. The author, however, is sympathetic to these functionaries who were not the paragon of honesty, financially

or politically. She quotes for example the improvements of the customs as a proof of their success, but belittles the part they had in the new customs agreement with Russia so unpopular in Persia and so much to her disadvantage.

Two other recent books must be mentioned in this context as they have been of particular use and relevance to this study. One is by Robert A. McDaniel entitled: The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution published in Minneapolis in 1974 and the other by Schapour Ravasani, Sowjetrepublik Gilan, Die Sozialistische Bewegung in Iran Seit Endedes 19 jh. bis 1922 published in Berlin.

McDaniel makes some use of the British archives and his judgement of Shuster, his relationship with the Persian Government and the political parties and the Majles is very important. McDaniel begins with a long introduction on the conditions of Persia and the Constitutional Revolution to the Second Majles. He considers Russo-British interference and the conditions of society, personal relationships and personal interests which impeded the success of the reform. In the midst of these, Shuster's reforms could not but fail. On the one hand there were men like Sepahdār and Şamşām al-Saltāneh who would not forgo their personal interests; on the other were the great powers who jealously guarded their interests. Shuster, as McDaniel shows, was supported by a minority party in the Majles. He was defeated and brought disaster to Persia. McDaniel's judgement is that Shuster was wrong in the independent line he took and that the Democrats were idealists who misled him.

The book by Ravasani is about the Socialist uprising of Gilan at a later period, but he also gives a useful history of the growth of Socialism in Persia, using some Russian documents. He shows clearly the connection between Social Democracy and the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn and its development into the Democrat party in the Second Majles. He also includes in his work many statistics taken from Russian authorities' reports on the number of Persians in the Caucasus.

Several books have been written by Russian historians on the Persian Revolution. Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran, Rīsheh-hā-ye Ejtemā'ī va Eqtešādī-ye ān, by Pavlovitch, Tria and Iranski who were Socialists, each involved in the Persian Revolution in some capacity. This book, however, lacks details which could have made it invaluable. Another book of this type is by M. C. Ivanov, Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran. This is a translation of a larger work by this author on the modern history of Persia. These books make some use of the Russian Tsarist archives.

Two books on the Communist party of Persia must be mentioned here. They are The Communist Movement in Iran by Sepehr Zabih, published in 1966 and Nazarī beh Jonbesh-e Kāregarī dar Iran by 'Abd al-Ṣamad Kāmbakhsh, published in 1337 in Tehran. Neither mentions the Democrat party as the precursor of the Communist or Tūdeh party. The reason was possibly because the party compromised and took a non orthodox line of policy due to Persia's backward conditions. It could also be due, in the case of Kāmbakhsh, to the fact that

Rasulzadeh, a one time activist and leader of the Democrats, later turned against the Bolsheviks that the Democrats were thus ignored. In fact, however, in many instances the Democrats' tactics and ideology followed those of the Bolshevik party of Russia as will be seen later, but they were naturally made to suit Persian conditions, and we can describe them as the parliamentary Socialist parties which developed in the West.

Zabih begins by describing the Jangalī movement as the first phase of Communist activity in Persia. Kambakhsh considers the Social Democrats or Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn party in Persia, then describes the activities of the Socialists in the nineteen twenties, omitting the period between.

Here mention must be made of the unpublished thesis of Ervard Abrahamian entitled Social Basis of Iranian Politics. The Tudeh party 1941-1953. Abrahamian discusses the origins of the Tūdeh party from the time of the organization of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn in Baku and the activity of the Social Democrats in the Revolution. He states that this party was not a Socialist party but that it advocated constitutionalism, secularism and parliamentary and land reforms. He also states that the majority of the radicals who joined this organization were not attracted by Marxism, but wanted the help of the Caucasians in 1909. Thereafter the party dwindled. The Democrat party founded after this was not a Socialist party he says.

A series of books on the Constitutional Revolution by Fereydūn Adamīyat must be cited in this series. They include Fekr-e Āzādī va Moqadameh-ye Nehzat-e Mashrūṭīyyat.

Also by the same author is Fekr-e Demokrāsī-ye Ejtemā'ī dar Nehzat-e Mashrūtīyyat-e Iran, and Īde'olojī-ye Nehzat-e Mashrūtīyyat. These books all published in Tehran in 1340, 1354 and 1355 are unique because Ādamīyat follows a consistent method of tracing the ideological background of the Constitutional Revolution and its outcome. He also makes extensive use of hitherto unpublished sources.

In general, Ādamīyat undermines the influence and the role of the Ulama in the Constitutional Revolution. He says they were mostly conservative and some were even doubtful about the 'Edālatkhāneh. According to him it was the Roshanfekrān, intellectuals who wanted to change the political system and used the Ulama to this end.

In Fekr-e Āzādī he deals with the ideology of Malkam and his suggested reforms. The second part of the book is based on the documents of his father, 'Abbās Qolī khān Ādamīyat the founder of the Jāme'-e Ādamīyat. 'Abbās Qolī claimed to be a disciple of Malkam and based this organization on the Majma' organized previously by Malkam. The information in this book is very important because so few documents of this kind have come to light. It is, however, possible that Ādamīyat gives more importance to this organization than was actually the case. Besides other contemporary accounts are not favourable to the organization and shed a different light upon some of its activities.

The second book on the ideology of the Constitutional Revolution consists of a large number of contemporary documents which discuss the different aspects of reform and

constitutionalism. The second part of the book is a discussion of the First Majles, but it is not a history of it. Ādamīyat's work which in many ways is very original is marred by a personal grudge against Taqīzādeh and he does not acknowledge the very central position he had in the First Majles; on the contrary he ignores him.

He divides the deputies into four ideological groups from extreme right to extreme left, but this is not very successful as such a distinction is at best arbitrary. Most of the deputies judged an event or a motion on its merit. The distinction we can make is between the moderates and a small group who were inspired by socialism, and their sympathizers in and out of the Majles, who follow a more distinct policy. He does not pay attention to personal relationships, which are of course difficult to surmise but very important.

In the third book Ādamīyat has followed the same pattern, namely a discussion of the ideology of Rasūlzādeh and the history of the growth of Social Democracy in Persia and the Second Majles. Despite good insight and the use of original documents the book is not a full account of the subject it touches, nor is it a history of the Second Majles. He finds the Democrats wanting in action, but does not state that they were a minority party and as such had limited power. There is some contradiction in this book, for though he expresses admiration for Rasūlzādeh, he is very critical of the Democrats with whom he was closely allied.

He also continues his criticism of Taqīzādeh whom he considers responsible for the murder of Behbahānī without

questioning it and generally accuses the Democrats of being the cause of the weakness of the governments without questioning for example what Sepahdār stood for. In all, these two books give a sense of being hastily compiled and incomplete though their author has a very original approach to historiography.

In the article, Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-6 in a book edited by P. J. Vatikiotis, entitled Revolution in the Middle East and Other Case Studies, published in London in 1972, A. K. S. Lambton argues that the Persian Revolution was not considered by those involved in it as a revolution. It was a protest against tyranny, she says, and argues that the leaders were not a group of conspirators with an ideology; what they wanted was freedom and civil liberty. But this is only partly true. As shown in this research, there was a small group of men with an ideology who were aiming at the transformation of society and not at mere reform. They had to be cautious and had to hide behind the veil of religion, but nonetheless they led the movement through the Anjomans and the Majles. Miss Lambton then argues that the basis of society was not transformed and that power did not change hands. This in fact is quite true and, as shown in this work also, the tradesmen and merchants and even the Ulama did not remain long in politics, power returned to the class which had previously held it and who now won the leadership of the Majles as well.

Another series of books on the Constitutional

period is a number of biographies. Amongst these we might mention Malkam's biography by Hamid Algar entitled Mirza Malkam Khān, a Study in Iranian Modernism. Malkam's thoughts are the subject of another book by Fereshteh Nūrā'ī, Tahqīq dar Afkār-e Mīrzā Malkam Khān Nāẓem al-Douleh. Another useful work of an earlier date is by Moḥammad Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭabā'ī called Majmū'eh-ye Āṣār-e Mīrzā Malkam Khān.

Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn's life and thoughts have been the subject of two extensive studies by N. Keddie, entitled Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāni, a political biography and Homa Pakdaman Nateq, Djamal-ed-Din Assad Ābādi dit Afghāni. These are not directly related to this subject though the Seyyed's activities in Persia in the latter part of the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah had a great influence on many people who later became protagonists of reform, the most important among these being Malek al-Motekallemīn and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭābā'ī.

Biographies by Persian authors are rarely satisfactory. They are written either in praise of some personality or in order to accuse the subject. Moreover they contain little personal correspondence as such documentation is generally not available or has been purposely destroyed or hidden. Such biographies consequently lack analytical quality.

Mehdī Mojtehedī is the author of Tārīkh-e Zendegānī-ye Taqīzādeh, but this latter book contains ^{little} original information.

There are two biographies of Ḥeydar Khān 'Amū Oghlī, both are repetitive of the details of his life. One is by Esmā'īl Rā'īn, entitled Ḥeydar Khān 'Amū Oghlī, and the other is by Reżāzādeh Malek, published in 1351 with the same name.

This author maintains that the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb represented the Social Democrats or Ejtemā'īyūn' Amīyūn which Heydar Khān organized and that these two were one organization, a fact which is no doubt true and of great significance because it connects the Social Democrats with the First Majles as shown in this research.

The biography of Heydar Khān was published on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of his death entitled Yekī az Derakhshāntarīn Mardān-e Enqelābī-ye Iran, by R. Rūstā, in the Tūdeh or Communist periodical Donyā, in 1341. This article is mainly based on earlier accounts of Heydar Khān's life in Yādegār and Rūznāmeḥ-ye Azarbaijan. Unfortunately all the accounts of Heydar Khān's life are fragmentary and though much has been written about his influence and actions, and he has been treated as a national hero, we know very little about his actual contacts and his thoughts. 'Abbās Eqbāl¹ has published the memoirs of Heydar Khān dictated to a colleague Monshīzādeh, in Yādegār entitled Varaqī as Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh-ye Iran Heydar Khān 'Amū Oghlī, in 1325. In this memoir Heydar Khān gives the accounts of some of the activities he was involved in up till the murder of Atābak. In another article in the same periodical of the same year entitled Qātel-e Haqīqī-ye Mīrzā 'Alī Asghar Khān Atābak, Eqbāl maintains that the enigma of the death of Atābak is not solved. On the one

1. The author of this article is anonymous, but it is assumed that all the anonymous articles in Yādegār were by Eqbāl himself.

hand Heydar Khān claimed to have been responsible; on the other, Mokhber al-Saltāneh suggested in a letter that the Shah and Sa'd al-Douleh were responsible. We must cite here one controversy which arose over the question of the murder of Atābak between Javād Sheykh-al-Eslāmī and Taqīzādeh. Sheykh al-Eslāmī published in Sokhan in 1344 an article entitled Asnād-e Rāked-e Vezārat-e Omūr-e Khārejah-ye Engelīs va Mas'alah-ye Qatl -e Atābak.

The writer quotes reports of the British which are based mainly on what Şanī'al-Douleh had told them about this event which implicates Sa'd al-Douleh and the Shah. Mokhber-al-Saltāneh also suggested as much in a letter to Eqbāl already quoted.

Sheykh al-Eslāmī writes that apparently Sa'd al-Douleh was implicated in this plot and that he had let it be known in some of the secret Anjomans which were infiltrated that the Shah and Atābak were plotting against the Majles, and had thus encouraged his murder which was committed by the Anjoman or Komīteh-y Serrī, (Enqelāb). The British documents mention an Anjoman also but are confused as to which it was. (Sa'd al-Douleh was a member of the Anjoman-e Ādāmīyat). Sheykh al-Eslāmī concludes that the person who can erase this enigma is Taqīzādeh.

In a reply to this article also published in Sokhan in the same year entitled Taqīzādeh dar Bāreh-ye Qatl -e Atābak Sokhan Mīgūyad he denies any knowledge of this event, emphasizing that the British documents should not be regarded as the absolute truth.

Sheykh al-Eslāmī in a second article published in 1345 continues the argument by replying to Taqīzādeh, but he entitles it Ravesh-e Tahqīq dar Bāreh-ye Asnād-e Marbūt beh

Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran va Shīveh-ye Arzyābī-ye Daqīq-e ānhā Here he further argues the points he had already made in stating that the Komīteh of which Ḥeydar Khān and Malekzādeh speak of was the one which killed Atābak; the Shah too was plotting the death of Atābak and thought to the end that he had been responsible. He then discusses the British documents, pointing out that they must be read bearing in mind the purpose of the writer. Nevertheless, they are a very important source of history.

In this same series we can point to several biographies which have been of some significance, namely Dou Mobārez-e Jonbesh-e Mashrūteh Sattār Khān va Sheykh Moḥammad Khīyābānī, by Raḥīm Ra'īsniyā, Ḥamāseh-ye Yephrem by G. Kārāpetīyan published in Tehran in 1345 and Qīyām-e Sheykh Moḥammad Khīyābānī by 'Alī Āzarī, dated 1354.

Another account of the Revolution in the form of a biography is by Esmā'īl Amīrkheyzī, first published in Tehran in 1339 entitled Qīyām-e Azarbaijan va Sattār Khān. This author was a close companion of Sattār Khān and he gives us important biographical information on the life of his friend in Tabriz and the siege of the city and of the activities of the nationalists. When Sattār Khān came to Tehran with Bāqer Khān, Amīrkheyzī accompanied them and was in a position to witness the problems encountered by these two men. He was also a witness of the fighting of the Mojāhedīn in Pārkh-e Atābak and of their disarmament. He had warned Sattār Khān against getting involved in party politics but could not stop his friend from being lured by the E'tedālīs to their side. He deplores this fact which he says was a

result of the naivete of the Sardār.

Another biography is that of Moshīr al-Douleh, by Ebrāhīm Bāstānī Pārīzī, first published in Tehran in 1341 entitled Talāsh-e Āzādī. This is an account of the political life of Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Khān Moshīr al-Douleh but contains no information on the thoughts and opinions of this politician. He was considered as one of the liberals and nationalist politicians of his day, a judgement Bāstānī shares, but he gives no proof. What becomes clear is the extreme caution of the two brothers, Moshīr al-Douleh and Mo'tamen al-Molk, who true to their class, managed to keep their ministerial and government posts in a period of extreme upheavals and under different regimes.

Sokhangūyān-e Sehgāneh-ye Azarbaijan dar Enqelāb-e Mashrū-tīyyat-e Iran by Noṣratallah Fathī is the biography of three of the orators of Azarbaijan. All three came from the religious class but were of lowly birth who by their support of the Constitution and the Majles played a very decisive part in Azarbaijan. These are Sheykh Salīm, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Vā'eẓ and Mīrzā Javād-e Nāteq. The latter kept a diary which Fathī has used. Unfortunately his book is marred by eulogies and repetition.

Sheykh Salīm was from a very simple peasant family. He had originally studied in Najaf and he was a Pīshnamāz in Tabriz when the Revolution began. During the Bast in the British Consulate in Tabriz he had begun to preach to the people, discussing what constitutionalism entailed. He was elected member of the Anjoman of Tabriz, and played a very significant role as orator and advocate of constitutionalism.

Another important figure was Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Vā'ez, who also came from a peasant family. He had studied in Tabriz in a religious school, and later visited the Caucasus and on his return to Tabriz, along with many others, organized a boycott of imported goods. During the course of the Revolution and afterwards he actively supported the reform movement in Tabriz.

The third orator in this category was Mīrzā Javād-e Nāteq, also called Nāṣeḥ who came from a family of Mollās. He studied religion and had been closely linked with the circle of Tarbiyat, Farshī, Fażl'alī Āqā, Abū al-Żiyā' and Taqīzādeh who worked for reform in Tabriz, and in his own biography he recounts some of the activities of this group. During the Revolution these men worked in close collaboration. Mīrzā Javad was very active as an orator, helped to set up the Anjoman of Tabriz, made a journey to Maku to talk to people about Constitutionalism, and later went to Tehran where he was in touch with the Majles.

Another series of books deal with local history of the Revolution. Rabino, the representative of the British Bank in Rasht, wrote a diary of the events in Gilan which have been published in a book entitled, Mashrūṭeh-ye Gilan az Yāddāshthā-ye Rabino, be Enżemām-e Vaqāye'-e Mashad dar 1330 H.Q. 1912, edited by Moḥammad Roushan and published in Tehran in 1350. In this book Rabino gives some information about the situation in Gilan during the Revolution, but unfortunately the details lack clarity, probably due to a confused situation. Of particular value to us in our research is the information he

gives on the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn and its connection with Baku. The second part of the book deals with the events of Mashad after the Russian occupation and the bombardment of the Shrine in 1330/1912.

Ebrāhīm Fakhrā'ī, a companion of Mīrzā Kūchīk Khān, the nationalist leader of the Jangālī movement at the end of the First World War, has written a book entitled Gīlān dar Jonbesh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, published in Tehran in 1353. This contains some important information about the internal situation in Gilan during the Revolution, but is written in a confused manner. Nonetheless it is a useful source of local history.

In an article by Taqīzādeh he mentions those who by their writings, thoughts, speeches and work were instrumental in awakening people in Azarbāijan. It is entitled Tahīyeh-ye Moqadamāt-e Mashrūṭīyyat dar Azarbāijan. This was given as a speech in the National Library of Tabriz in 1338 Shamsī and published in the first issue of that Library's publication.

Another local history of the Constitution is by Nūrallāh Dāneshvar 'Alavī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh-ye Iran va Jonbesh-e Vaṭan Parastān-e Esfahan va Bakhtīyārī. As its title suggests this is specifically an account of the Bakhtīyārī uprising and their march to Tehran.

This is by no means an exhaustive survey of the sources for the Constitutional Revolution. In many ways the objective study fo this crucial phase in Persian history is just beginning and most aspects remain obscure and uncertain. The works described here have been assessed in terms of their relevance to the political parties more specifically to the activities of the parties during the First and Second Majles.

In the course of time it is to be hoped that more personal documents particularly letters and diaries will come to light and help to elucidate the motives, relationships and actions of those most intimately involved in these events. Without such sources at hand the cut and thrust of political life in these years often seems opaque, reflected as it is for the most part in the highly partisan newspapers of the period, the all too laconic entries in the Majles. Mozākerāt, and especially the British official archives give an aloof and disdainful view of political development, which often remains slightly out of focus and therefore misleading.

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PART 1

THE FIRST MAJLES

CHAPTER IHISTORICAL BACKGROUNDSECRET SOCIETIES: THE ORIGIN OF CONCERTED POLITICAL ACTION

The origin and development of political parties in Persia was connected with the course of the Constitutional Revolution and the creation of the Maljes, but in order to trace their origin we must first look at earlier instances of concerted political action and the people who organized it.

No political parties appeared in Persia to lead the Revolution as had been the case in Turkey for instance, but the Anjomans (secret societies), organized towards the end of the reign of Naser al-Din Shah and the reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah, fulfilled this function to a certain extent. They helped to formulate the demand for reform, and to bring about that alliance between the merchants and the Ulama which lay at the roots of the Revolution and was the key to its success. The Anjomans described here are the early ones, organized before the Revolution, and attention is centred on their origin, organization, aims and membership. Little information is available concerning their activities and their influence upon the course of events due partly to the lack of sources.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century there began in Persia a quest for ways to reform the Government and the administration. The early reformers had two major aims: to halt further foreign military encroachment and to reform first the army, then the administration. It was argued that the way to stop the increase of foreign influence was to

strengthen and reform the country, and this could only be achieved by reform on western models.

From the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, the conditions in Persia compared increasingly unfavourably with those of the West, and the main cause of her backwardness was said to be the lack of laws, the lack of security and the lack of freedom. The need for reform was first voiced amongst a small group of officials, ambassadors and representatives of the Government abroad who had become familiar with the methods of Western governments. These men, though few in number, contacted each other, and even addressed Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah on occasion to suggest reform. What they sought was an enlightened absolutism; no one could suggest a limited monarchy to the Shah. Besides, they were bureaucrats and mainly sought modernization and administrative reform. But since this was not effected, the Shah gave up attempts at reform and ruled as an absolute monarch, becoming more despotic as time went on. Despite the Shah's repression, the idea of reform grew and spread gradually from the bureaucracy to the other classes of society. Their main desire was for administrative reform; they believed in material progress to modernize Persia and solve her economic problems.¹ They also advocated the rule of law to ensure security and progress.

This discontent found its main expression in the

1. S. Bakhash, Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qajars: 1858-1896, (London, 1978), p.28.

resistance to and rebellion against the tobacco monopoly in 1891.¹ One writer points out that the tobacco monopoly was taken as the occasion to express all the major grievances of the people and that it had more widespread aims than just resistance to the Regie.² This monopoly touched upon the lives of many people in Persia and was particularly obnoxious to the Ulama and merchants. Resistance began in several of the major cities as the effects and full impact of the monopoly were realized. This resistance was encouraged by Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Asad Ābādī,³ who stirred the people against the monopoly with great success. He attacked the Shah and Government from London, and also through his adherents whom he had left behind when forced out of Persia in 1891. According to *the same* author co-operation between the Ulama and the merchants was advocated by Seyyed Jamal al-Din who proclaimed that the Ulama should save Persia. He also called for the dethronement

1. The monopoly for the production, sale and export of tobacco was granted by the Persian Government to Major G.F. Talbot for fifty years. In return he had to pay the Shah £15,000 annually, one fourth of the annual profits after all the expenses were paid and five per cent dividend on the capital.
2. N.R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Iranian Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892, (London, 1966), p.127,131.
3. Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn was both a reformer and an advocate of pan Islamism. He was, like Malkam, a Freemason and organizer of pseudo-masonic secret societies. He was forced out of Persia in 1891 because of his activities and criticism of the Government, and joined Malkam in London. They each conducted a campaign against the tobacco monopoly and the Persian Government. S. Bakhash, op.cit. p.328. It must be added that evidence on the secret societies said to have been set up by Seyyed Jamāl is scarce. T.E. Gordon, who revisited Persia in 1895 mentions briefly that such a society existed which printed the revolutionary message of the Seyyed. T.E. Gordon. Persia Revisited. 1895. (London, 1896), p.186.

of the Shah.¹

Not much is known about the secret society Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn is said to have established in Persia, or whether it was very active in organizing and co-ordinating the rebellion. More generally, the influence of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn on the Persian Revolution has often been discussed and some of the ideas in the Revolution can be traced to him.

He advocated the unity of Eslam against foreign activity, and resistance to autocracy through reform and education. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī mentions that his aim was republicanism and constitutionalism.² Several of the leaders of the Revolution had met him and had no doubt been influenced by his ideas. We know that Malek al-Motekallemīn, Hāj Moḥammad Ḥasan Amīn al-Ẓarb, the father of Hāj Ḥoseyn Amīn al-Ẓarb who was active in the Revolution, and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī knew him.³ Though the ideas and attitudes of these men diverged later, they must originally have been deeply impressed by him; for instance we find much of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn's ideas repeated in the speeches of Malek al-Motekallemīn, or we are told by Kermānī that Ṭabāṭabā'ī was in favour of a republic.⁴ Besides these men many other reformists who worked in the Anjomans were also influenced by Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn.

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1. Keddie, N.R. : The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran, Past and Present, 34, (1966), p.74. Same author, Seyyed Jamal ad Din al-Afghani, a political Biography, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972) pp. 355-67.
 2. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī: Tārīkh-e Bīdārī-ye Īrānīyān, (Teheran, 1346) Introductory Volume, p.82.
 3. For a more detailed list see Ibid., pp. 82-3. He mentions Mīrzā Naṣrallāh-Khān Moshīr al-Douleh, Zokā'al-Molk and many others amongst the notables who knew him.
 4. Ibid., 1, p.33.

The Farāmūshkāneh

Another advocate of reform since 1858 was Mīrzā Malkam Khān. He was an important though controversial figure, but one who played a considerable part in the awakening of the Persians to the need for reform. He was an Armenian who had been educated in France and on his return became a translator at the Dār al-Fonūn. He accompanied Farrokh Khān Ghaffārī on his mission to Paris in 1856. In a large number of pamphlets and letters he criticized the existing situation, pointed out the causes of Persia's backwardness and suggested reform. He also founded the Farāmūshkhāneh to implement his plans of reform. Malkam worked through this secret organization, the Farāmūshkhāneh, which he modelled on the masonic lodges of Europe. One writer points to similarities between Ṣūfī orders and the Farāmūshkhāneh, and the deliberate use by Malkam of Ṣūfī, themes familiar to Persians which he says, accounted for the popularity of Freemasonry in Persia.¹ However he adds that traditional groupings were religious organizations whilst the latter, including other secret societies, were of a political nature. The Farāmūshkhāneh, he says, was a transitional organization between the two types of organization.

Malkam had joined the masonic lodge of Sincère Amitié, which was a branch of the Order of Grand Orient, in 1856 in Paris.² It was on his return to Persia that he

1. H. Algar, Mīrzā Malkum Khān: A Biographical Study in Iranian Modernism, (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 40, 229.

2. H. Algar, An Introduction to the History of Freemasonry, Middle Eastern Studies, 6, 1970, p.281.

had founded the Farāmūshkhāneh. This organization had no apparent affiliation with any of the European lodges but it had some common aims, such as the promotion of progress and a humanist concept of ethics.¹

The fact that a masonic form was used by Malkam to implement his reform programme was not original. In Europe too the model of masonic organizations was found appropriate for political activities.² Freemasonry seems to have played a part in the genesis of radical and liberal parties in Europe especially in France and Belgium.³ In an interview many years later, Malkam explained his aims to W. Scawen Blunt, saying that he had learned the spirit of the various sects of Christendom and the organization of the secret societies and Freemasonries, and had "...conceived a plan which should incorporate the political wisdom of Europe with the religious wisdom of Asia..."⁴ But Malkam is known for his exaggerations and possibly here he is giving too much significance to the Farāmūshkhāneh.

The Farāmūshkhāneh wished to promote the seven duties of man: to shun evil, strive to do good, fight oppression, live peacefully, seek learning, diffuse learning

1. H. Algar, Mīrzā Malkum Khān, p.37.

2. In France, for instance, the lodge of Philadelphians founded in the 1850s, part of the Order of Memphis, had a mixture of pseudo-Eastern mysticism and leftist political sympathies. In general, however, this lodge had no ties with official masonic lodges and was by its nature one of the secret societies which outwardly imitated the masons but were essentially conspiratorial political organizations. B.I. Nicolaevsky, Secret Societies and the First International, The Revolutionary International, 1866-1943, ed. by M. Drachkovitch, (Oxford, 1966), p.40.

3. M. Duverger, Political Parties. Translated by B.R. North, (Cambridge, 1976). Introduction, p.31.

4. H. Algar, "Freemasonry in Iran", p.280

and strive for harmony amongst one's compatriots.¹ Members paid a fee for membership and swore secrecy. Malkam argued that this was not a question of innovation, it was not a Bed'at; and he justified all his arguments on Eslamic grounds, a method he followed throughout his career. Despite this pseudo-mystical facade, however, he had definite political aims. He wanted to teach men political activity and unity, and at the same time advocated reform.

In reply to one of the Ulama of Tabriz who had demanded the purpose of the Farāmūshkhāneh, he had defended it by saying that people were not aware of everything. They did not know, for instance, whether their forefathers did not have such secret organizations. Besides, many things were known to the prophets but they did not divulge everything. They kept their secrets by Ketmān, secret dissimulation. He added that those who attacked the Farāhmūshkhāneh only saw the fact that there was some mystery, and became suspicious. They only judged appearances because they did not know the truth. They could not understand for instance how two wise men who had previously been enemies could now become friends; so they concluded that the founder must be a non-believer. What was their crime, what had they said against religion, he asked? He added that the organization had nothing to do with foreigners but was an alliance between Moslems. Eslam itself was based upon unity. This unity was between those who understood human qualities, were wise and learned and were worthy of joining the organization. Such people could not

1. Ibid., p. 281.

cause evil.¹ In fact, Malkam was trying to set up an organization in which he could combine reform and modernism with religion, but instead he caused suspicion and mistrust, for these were incongruous aims and innovations despite his assertion to the contrary. Malkam's organization soon incurred the mistrust of the Shah and the Ulama,² and on the 12th Rabi' al-Sani 1275 (19th October 1861), the Shah banned it by decree.³ It was some years later that Malkam was reinstated in the Shah's favour by the mediation of Mirza Hoseyn Khan Moshir al-Douleh, Ambassador in Turkey. Mirza Hoseyn Khan shared Malkam's interest in reform and the two worked closely to persuade the Shah of the need for reform. Mirza Hoseyn Khan was recalled to Persia in 1287 (1871) and was made first Minister of Public Works, then Minister of Justice and War, and finally ten months later Prime Minister.⁴ Malkam had followed him to Persia, and was made Ambassador to Britain in 1873. He revisited Persia twice, once in 1299 (1881) and again in 1303 (1886), when it has been said that he set up a secret society to continue his work,⁵ but nothing is known about this. He still continued, however, to advocate reform and to propose new methods of administration.

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1. E. Ra'in, Farāmūshkhāneh va Frāmāsonry dar Iran. (Tehran, 1347), 1, pp. 545-554.
 2. The Shah was afraid of all secret activities, and the Farāmūshkhāneh were accused of Babism and republicanism. H. Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, p.37.
 3. Malkam was exiled immediately and his father Mirza Ya'qub as head of the Farāmūshkhāneh too was exiled some time later. Algar makes a mistake on this point and says that Malkam left after his father. Mirza Malkum Khan, p.54. S. Bakhash, op.cit., pp. 22-23.
 4. F. Adamiyat, Andīsheh-ye Taraqqī va Hokūmat-e Qānūnī (Tehran, 1351), p.126.
 5. Ra'in, op.cit. 1, p.574. F. Adamiyat, Fekr-e Azādī va Moqadameh-ye Nehzat-e Mashrūṭiyyat (Tehran, 1340), p.207.

In 1889, Malkam was dismissed from his post as Ambassador for his attempt to take advantage of the lottery concession which had been cancelled by the Persian Government. He was stripped of his titles and disgraced. Two months later he began to publish a newsletter, Qānūn (Law), from London, and thus began to propagate his ideas of reform among a much wider circle, which previously had been limited to a close circle of friends and court officials.¹ Qānūn appeared from Rajab 1307 (February 1890) to the Spring of 1309 (1892) regularly and thence irregularly till 1315 (1898).² It soon gained great popularity and, though banned, began to circulate clandestinely in Persia.³ Malkam's aim was to unify the enlightened classes to seek redress for all their grievances. He always repeated that the way to achieve reform and regenerate Persia was through unity and this unity was to be brought about by ^{the} Majma'-e Ādamīyat, or the League of Humanity, which was organized on the same pseudo-masonic lines as the Farāmūshkhāneh. Malkam spoke of national unity and of unity among the members of the League, but it was this latter which really interested him.⁴ No violence was intended; the people or all the Ādams collectively, should act peacefully. They could differ in their personal opinions, he wrote, but they should be united in their demands.⁵ They should not be indifferent

1. S. Bakhsh, op. cit., p. 314.

2. H. Algar, Mīrzā Malkum Khān, p. 193.

3. S. Bakhsh, op. cit., pp. 313-317.

4. Qānūn - ed. by H. Nateq. (Tehran 1335), Nos. 7 and 9.

5. The members were to be selected for their human attributes. They had to perform the seven duties of man which had been the aim of the Farāmūshkhāneh also, and in addition, they had to distribute the Qānūn, recruit further members, propagate the principles of humanity and extend aid to fellow members. He discussed the principles of humanity in another pamphlet entitled Oṣūl-e Ādamīyat.

tō the conditions of their country - it was indifference which had been the cause of so much evil.

It has been said that both of Malkam's organizations, the Farāmūshkhāneh and the League, were intended to function as a party, the Hezb, to put forward his ideas of reform, and that his political ideas cannot be fully discussed without reference to these organizations.¹ He himself claimed that he was playing the role of opposition to the Government, a role which according to European principles was a great service to the country. He even called the latter organization the party of God, Hezb-e Allāh. The question arises why Malkam who had obviously knowledge of political parties as they existed in the West should deem it expedient to organize a pseudo-masonic lodge in Persia, especially as it was unconnected to any official lodge in Europe. One main reason was secrecy. Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah had become more despotic and tyrannical in the latter years of his reign, and to suggest an open organization with any hope of success was out of the question, whereas a secret organization could escape detection. Besides, there was no parliament in Persia where political parties could function and no elections were envisaged by Malkam. Moreover, it is possible that the organization of political parties would have seemed too much of a European innovation.

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1. F. Nūrā'ī, Tahqīq dar Afkār-e Mīrzā Malkam Khān Nāẓem al-Douleh (Tehran, 1352), pp. 75, 194.
 2. Algar gives a list of those arrested because of their connection with Malkam, when he started the Qānūn. Mīrzā Malkum Khān, pp. 203-4.

Malkam had already been victim of various accusations, of Bābīsm for instance when the Farāhmūshkhāneh was first organized, and he always retained a pseudo-Eslamic front to escape such accusations. Further, Malkam counted on the Ulama and the religious classes to help modernize Persia.¹

Further, he was too much of a political realist not to have fashioned his tactics to suit the situation. Malkam not only criticized the Government of the Shah, and advocated the organization of the League, he also suggested the setting up of Majles-e Shourā-ye Kobrā-ye Mellī, a consulative assembly, to cover all the legislation of the Government. He foretold the means by which this assembly would be set up, a forecast that, as one authority points out, was close to what actually happened in 1906.² The Majles would represent the Ulama, the great men, the learned, the military leaders, and they would represent the whole country. It would have legislative power and would control the budget; and Ministers would be responsible to the Majles.³

1. In an article in the Contemporary Review LIX, 1891, he argued that Eslam as a religion was not inferior to Christianity; what had been the cause of backwardness of the East had been the tyranny of her governments. In the Eslamic world the spiritual and temporal worlds were not separate, and for people of the East to accept Westernization it had to be justified on Eslamic principles. Malkam fully realized the place of importance the Ulama held in Persia, and in all his schemes to reform he gave them prominence, for instance see Qānūn, No. 29.
2. S. Bakhash, op. cit., pp. 338-9.
3. Ibid, p. 337.

Malkam was a very consistent political thinker and throughout all these years his basic ideology did not change, though his tactics changed. In the last years of his activities, however, he seems to have become somewhat out of touch with the realities of the situation in Persia. In 1891 the people who rebelled against the tobacco monopoly were mostly of the middle classes, people who did not count generally in Malkam's political schemes.¹ Possibly he did not realize the people's rebellious mood. His aim was always political, but he expressed them in a mystical and religious manner special to himself which make his ideology seem unrealistic and ambiguous, but perhaps not so strange coming from one who was not himself a political activist, but a theoretician living abroad for so long. Despite these reservations, however, Malkam's great influence on the political awakening of Persia has never been doubted.

The League, so often discussed in the Qānūn was not as important as Malkam made it sound, and there is no reliable evidence that it actually existed.² Algar says it was an efficient organization to distribute the Qānūn. What is important about the League is perhaps not so much its ambiguous ideology, but the fact that it not only taught people how to organize a secret society, but actually seemed to tell them to

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1. Although he said that a Kāseb, a merchant, could become an Amin (that is the leader of the League's branches) the same as a prince, he generally did not address a very extensive audience. It was always the great Ulama, the famous and learned men that he had in mind.
 2. One secret society based on the Farāmūshkhāneh and Malkam's pseudo-masonic organization was the Jāme'e Adamiyat. This group was founded in 1904 by Abbās Qolī Khān, a disciple of Malkam, who had been involved in the distribution of Qānūn.

do so, and in this respect it must have been influential in the organization of secret societies in the years immediately prior to the Revolution.

During the last years of the reign of Naser al-Din Shah all secret political activity and advocacy of reform was deemed highly suspicious and was officially banned; in the reign of his successor Mozaffar al-Din Shah a little more freedom was given. This resulted in the spread of reformist activity all through Persia by means of secret societies or Anjomans.

In discussing the activities of secret societies in Persia, it has been stated that the secret societies had nothing in common with Western political parties, but that they were modelled on ancient Eastern societies.¹ It must be mentioned, however, that such secret societies or conspiratorial organizations were not unknown in the West, especially in France, during the Restoration and the July Monarchy (1815 and 1848) when many small groups of revolutionaries and conspirators were active.² The formation of secret societies must be a natural phenomenon under any despotic government. Besides, it is unlikely that the Persian reformers who looked to the West for ways to reform Persia, should have modeled their societies on purely Medieval organizations and ancient societies. It is more likely that

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1. A.K.S. Lambton, "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-6", St. Anthony's Papers, 4, 1958, p.43.
 2. B.I. Nicolaevsky, op. cit., p. 40.

their models were inspired by the West. The use of Islamic themes to justify reform and modernization by these societies was a tactical move throughout the years before the Revolution and during the course of the First and Second Majles, even amongst Socialists. It was also aimed at attracting the religious classes to support modernization, a method suggested by Seyyed Jamāl ad-Dīn and Malkam and taken up by the religious leaders themselves.

At the very end of the nineteenth century and in the first few years of the following decade, increasing foreign pressure and deteriorating internal conditions gave way to renewed attempts at organized protests in one form or another. Behind many of these, whether public or secretive, were the activities of the secret societies that suddenly sprang to life in the years immediately prior to the Constitutional Revolution. The term that all these adopted was a traditional one, Anjoman, but in the different political climate of the early twentieth century this was given a new connotation. Most of the important Anjomans were centred in Tehran, but all the major provincial centers had branches or regional varieties. Inevitably the secret nature of these societies has prevented any thorough documentation of their activities, much of which remains largely conjectural. Among those most influential and about whom some evidence have survived, however, are two that require more detailed discussion since their membership and programmes had a profound influence on subsequent events.

Anjoman-e Makhfī

This was founded in Zīhājeh 1322 (February 1905)¹ at the suggestion of Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī, whose father, Seyyed Šādeq, had been one of the members of Malkam's Farāmūsh-khāneh. Seyyed Moḥammad had certain masonic connections as well,² and had been in touch with Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn during his stay in Persia.³

According to Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, the aim of the Anjoman and of Seyyed Moḥammad was at first political; in particular they wanted to awaken the people. Gradually, it seems, the aims of the Anjoman became more radical. It is, however, not clear whether the original organizers had these aims from the beginning, or whether these developed gradually. As the Anjoman gained more adherents some became fearful of the consequences of their aims, despite the fact that some of the real plans were kept secret amongst a smaller core of members. The Anjoman set about recruiting more members and prepared a Neẓāmnāmeḥ, or a plan of organization.⁴ The members were called Fadā'ī by Kermānī who states they had sworn to do their utmost in order to obtain an 'Edālatkhāneh, a house of Justice, and a Majlēs.⁵ On another occasion he says

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., 1, p. 6.

2. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran (Tehran, 1938), 1, pp. 217. Malekzādeh maintains that after the death of Ṭabāṭabā'ī it was discovered that he had been a Freemason. Algar who has studied the Freemasons movement in Persia is not so sure, but he points out that the movement had been well-known in Persia since the nineteenth century. The fact that Ṭabāṭabā'ī should have resorted to this method, that is in organizing a secret society not dissimilar to a Freemason Lodge, is however worthy of notice.

Algar, "Freemasonry in Iran", p. 292.

3. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., Introductory Vol., pp. 64, 82.

4. Ibid., 1, pp. 23-29.

5. Ibid., p. 19.

that Seyyed Moḥammad's aim was the foundation of a republic.¹ In a meeting of the Anjoman some had argued that the establishment of a republic was not contrary to the establishment of constitutionalism, and that their aim was to overthrow injustice either by republicanism or by constitutionalism. Some of the important members of this Anjoman besides Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī were Sheykh Moḥammad Shīrāzī, Zolrīyāsateyn, Seyyed Borhān Khalkhālī and Sheykh Ḥoseyn 'Alī Adīb Behbahānī. Other members were Mīrzā Āqā Eṣfahānī, also called Mojāhed, who was later elected to the Majles, and Majd al-Eslām Kermānī. Both were exiled in Rajab 1323 (July 1905) to Kalat by 'Ayn al-Douleh. Mīrzā Ḥasan, the director of the Roshdiyeh school was exiled at the same time for his activities in favour of reform and the 'Edālatkhāneh.²

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1. No good analysis of Seyyed Moḥammad's thoughts exists. A.H. Hairī has attempted to do so but has written a rather slight account. He mentions Seyyed Moḥammad's nationalism and the fact that he wanted to establish a constitution.
A.H. Hairī, Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran (Leiden, 1977), pp. 83-86.
Seyyed Moḥammed had left a very short account of his experience and the Constitutional Revolution in which he says he wanted to set up an 'Edālatkhāneh.
'Yāddāshthā-ye Seyyed Moḥammed Ṭabāṭabā'ī, ed. E. Kāẓemīyeh, Rahnamā-ye Ketāb, No. 14, 1350.
 2. Majd al-Eslām had been a colleague of Malek al-Motel-kallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl Vā'eẓ in Esfahan, and had worked to open a modern school but was stopped by Ẓell al-Solṭān. He later edited the newspaper Adab which was critical of the Government and advocated constitutionalism. He had worked with Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī in the Anjoman-e Makhfi and was later exiled to Kalat by the Government. He returned to Tehran after the Revolution and proceeded to publish four newspapers, Nedāy-e Vaṭān, Mohākemāt, Kashkūl and al-Jamāl which was devoted to publishing the speeches of Seyyed Jamāl.

Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī writes that this Anjoman was instrumental in bringing about the union between the two leading Mojtaheds, Seyyed'Abdallāh Behbahānī and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī. However, another Anjoman, the Anjoman-e-Melli also claims to have been the author of this alliance.

Anjoman-e-Melli

This Anjoman was organized in great secrecy in Moḥarram 1323 (March 1905) and it had about sixty members.¹ One of its active members was Malek al-Motekallemīn, whose son, Malekzādeh, describes this Anjoman in his history of the Constitutional Revolution. This author maintains that this Anjoman was organized in order to unite the dispersed efforts of various Anjomans and that it was a revolutionary society. Malek al-Motekallemīn had said that not until power was in the hands of the people could they propagate reform. Their aim was to prepare the way for revolution, and Malekzādeh writes that this Anjoman had sought the cooperation of the two chief Mojtaheds,² an honour also claimed by the Anjoman-e-

1. Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, pp. 8-18.

2. Behbahānī's role is more controversial than Ṭabāṭabā'ī's. During the Regie he was the only one of the Ulama not to have followed the legal ruling, Fatvā, against smoking. He led a life of luxury, had connections with the Court, and was suspected of receiving money, he was particularly close to Amin al-Solṭān during the Minister's life and intrigued against his great rival Sheykh Faẓlallāh Nūrī who supported 'Ayn al-Douleh. Ṭabāṭabā'ī was more trusted and had had more connection with the reformers through his membership of the Anjoman-e Makhfi and Melli. In the Majles he was a moderate and even suggested that some deputies should be expelled and some Anjomans suppressed as they were extremists.
H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906. The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period (Berkeley, 1969) passim.

Makhfi, as has been mentioned earlier. It is probable that the two Mojtaheds had been approached from several directions before agreeing to combine their efforts in the cause of reform.

Some of the members of the Anjoman-e Melli were important revolutionaries.¹ and played significant roles. They were Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān, the editor of the weekly newspaper Sūr-e Esrāfīl, Seyyed Moḥammad Reżā Mosāvāt, Malek al-Motekallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez, two orators who had the power to stir the people with their speeches. A few of the members became prominent Deputies, such as Ḥājī Seyyed Naṣrallāh, and Mīrzā Soleyman Khān Meykadeh. Yaḥyā Doulatābadi and his brothers, also active participants in the Revolution, were members of this Anjoman, as were for instance men who had known Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn, like Ḥāj Sayyāḥ, Mīrzā 'Alī Akbar Ḥakīm Sā'atsāz, and Zokā' al-Molk. Yaḥyā Mīrzā, a revolutionary and a prince of the royal family, was also a member. Later his brother, Soleyman Mīrzā, played a prominent role in the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb, and became the Parliamentary leader of the Democrat Party in the 2nd Majles. The membership of this Anjoman was fairly representative of the social classes. There were leading merchants, important Mojtaheds, members of the guilds and of the bureaucracy; the Zoroastrian community and some tribal Khān were also members of this organization.

The Anjoman elected a smaller committee of nine which met every week, and a still smaller branch of five was organized later. These nine were Malek al-Motekallemīn, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez,

1. For a list of these members see Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, p. 10.

Mosāvāt, Soleyman Khān Meykadeh, Yaḥyā Doulatābādī, Noṣrat al-Soltān, Sheykh al-Ra'īs, Seyyed Asadallāh Kharaqānī and Mīrzā Mohsen the brother of Ṣadr al-Ulama.² According to Malekzādeh, the Anjoman was very active throughout the struggles preceeding the granting of the Constitution, and led it from behind the scenes.

As already mentioned, general dissatisfaction had been growing in the early years of the twentieth century. There were several contributing factors: the Russian loans which were squandered by the Shah and his court on his foreign travels, the new tariff negotiated with Russia in 1320 (1902), the power given to the unpopular Belgian customs official, Naus, were concrete and immediate questions which united many people against the Government.

The dismissal of Amīn al-Soltān and the appointment of 'Ayn al-Douleh as Premier in Rajab 1321 (October 1903) worsened the situation. Seyyed 'Abdallāh, one of the influential Ulama who supported Amīn al-Soltān, began intriguing against 'Ayn al-Douleh, supported by Sheykh Faḥlallāh Nūrī, another of the eminent Mojtaheds. In the midst of the ensuing intrigues, a photograph of Naus dressed as a religious person

1. Details of these men's activities are given later.
2. These men were known for their reformist activities. Kharaqānī and Sheykh al-Ra'īs were adherents of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn, Ṣadr al-Ulama and his brother were active in the reform movement before the Revolution, as was Noṣrat al-Soltān.

at a fancy dress ball was made the pretext for an outcry against him. At the same time the merchants and Bāzārīs were closing the Bāzār in protest against the Shah's trip to Europe in, Tehran and the provinces. In Shavāl 1323 (December 1905), Ala' al-Douleh, the Governor of Tehran in an attempt to overawe the merchants, called some of the prominent sugar merchants to a meeting and had them bastinadoed as a punishment for the high cost of sugar. In fact, the price of sugar had risen because of the Russo-Japanese war. This act caused a large-scale protest by the merchants and Ulama. The former took Bast in Masjed-e Shah and the Ulama went as a body to the Shrine of Shah'Abd al-A'zīm. From there they formulated their conditions for a return. It was on this occasion and later when the Ulama left for Qom that the Anjomans already mentioned were making every effort to keep up their revolutionary spirits in the hardships they were encountering and providing a revolutionary wing to the movement.

It has been claimed that the idea of an 'Edalatkāneh, a House of Justice, which the Ulama in Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm demanded was suggested to them by the Anjoman-e Mellī.¹ This has also now been claimed by the Anjoman-e Makhfī, and Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī writes that Ṭabāṭabā'ī had been talking about an 'Edālatkhāneh in private, especially in the Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm Shrine, and he assumes that they may have forgotten to include this in their demands.² Another writer active in the course of the Revolution, Yaḥyā Doulatābādī, and a member of the Anjoman-e Mellī, gives a different account of how the idea of an 'Edālatkhāneh arose. He wrote that the

1. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, pp. 16, 49-51.

2. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., 1, p. 118.

original demands of the Ulama put forward in Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm did not contain the demand for an 'Edālatkhāneh, and that the Ottoman Ambassador who had agreed to convey these demands to the Government had suggested that a more general demand should be made, and Doulatābādī had included this in the demands.¹ The idea of an 'Edālatkhāneh was not new and had been discussed for a time. It is possible that the Ulama purposely thought of omitting it out of caution. We are also told that the two leading Mojtaheds had dissuaded the liberals amongst them from asking for a constituent assembly at this time for fear it would ruin their chances of success.² These claims put forward by the above-mentioned authors are not necessarily contradictory. These points had been discussed and suggested before and even Malkam had requested an 'Edālatkhāneh and a Majles-e Shourā-ye Mellī.³

The two Anjomans were busy as we see in formulating demands and seeking a solution to the question of reform. They thus provided the leadership to the Revolution and formulated the demands of the reformists, although these demands were somewhat vague and ill-defined.

These Anjomans had none of the prerequisites of political parties, and once the Constitution was granted they did not continue their activities as before, nor did their members enter the Majles except in a few instances as will be

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op. cit., 2, p.23

2. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, pp. 85-6.

3. Qānūn, No. 22.

discussed later.¹

A second Anjoman, called Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Šānī was set up by the son of Seyyed Moḥammad, who wished to take a more independent line.² This Anjoman included some of the former Anjoman's members, and Kermānī gives more details about this in his diaries. In general, however, it was not very active. The Anjoman-e Mellī is more interesting. Though it did not continue as such, some of its more important members organized a committee, the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb, to support the Majles. They had, it seems, some connection with the Russian Social Democrat party of the Moslems of the Caucasus called the Hemmat. The counterpart of Hemmat amongst the Persians in the Caucasus and in Persia was the Ejtamā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn party which should be described here though it is anticipating events somewhat. This socialist party, far superior in its aspirations to all the projects discussed among the Persian reformers, was a parallel movement, but with far more extensive programmes. Discussion of its function is necessary at this juncture as it gives us an insight into some of the background of the Constitutional movement which has hitherto been ignored. Further, it will explain the initial appearance of the political divisions of the First Majles and the development of the Democrat Party in the Second Majles. It must be added that as the Farāmūshkhāneh was a transitional organization between the medieval and modern secret societies, so it can also be said that the Ferqeh-ye Etjemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn was a transitional organisation between the secret societies and the Democrat Party.

1. See pp. 258-259.

2. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., 1, pp 223-4.

Ferqeh-ye Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn

Historians have often pointed to the influence of Britain upon the Persian Revolution, and it has been stated that they purposely encouraged it in order to weaken the monarchy, which was coming under the influence of Russia. But little attention has been paid by historians to the relationship between the Persian Revolution and the Russian Socialists who took a great interest in the events in Persia, assisting the country in various ways, and were especially effective in the second half of the Revolution. This relationship is the least known aspect of the Revolution, for the obvious reason that it was clandestine. The primary sources are either inaccessible or imprecise and fragmentary. Soviet writers whose works are available in the West and in Persia, and who have access to the Russian archival material, write in a politically biased way which makes their interpretation open to question. The available information in Persia is very scanty and poorly documented. The British archives are of little value as so much was done secretly and rarely came to their notice.

The British Minister did suspect the existence of certain ties between the Persian Revolutionaries and the Russians, but was not very well informed. Spring Rice wrote that he had been in Russia and had seen the growth of revolutionary feeling there. "I recognized in Persia the familiar symptoms. There was abundant evidence that the movement had

spread from the Caucasus to Northern Persia."¹ In another report he wrote, "The leaders of the movement are unknown. The inspiration seems to come from the North, perhaps from the Caucasus. The South is comparatively quiet."² He added that the movement was strongest in North Azarbaijan, and was also very strong in the capital where secret societies were spreading. There were bands of devotees in Baku and North Persia sworn to devote their lives to the good of the country, and he added that there was a strong resemblance between the reform movement in Russia and Persia - the same absence of leaders, instinctive hatred of the Government and secrecy; but he concluded that the difficulty for the Persians was their lack of money, an army, and power.

Such a connection was not obvious to E.G. Browne, who wrote his now classic account of the Persian Revolution in 1910. He only mentioned that a considerable number of Caucasians had managed to make their way to Persia and were in Sepahdār's army.³ More recent writers have pointed out some of the similarities between the two Revolutions.⁴

1. Spring Rice to Grey, July 10th 1907, No. 136 FO 416/33.

2. Ibid., May 23rd 1907, No. 113 FO 371/30.

3. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), p. 293.

4. I. Spector states that the two Revolutions followed a parallel course. The Tsar's October Manifesto in 1905 granting the Constitution in Russia was followed in August 1906 by the Shah's Farmān granting a Constitution and a Majles. The opening of the Duma in May 1906 was followed a few months later by the first session of the Persian Majles. I. Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World 1917-1958 (Washington, 1967) p. 20.

No doubt the Persian revolutionaries did derive inspiration from the Russian Revolution of 1905, but what is more important is the connection established between the revolutionaries, especially the Social Democrats and the Persians. Effective help was given during the second phase of the Revolution after the break-up of the Majles,¹ but the connection was established much earlier, and the influence of the Social Democrats was very great in the leadership of the first phase of the Revolution. It is worthwhile here to analyze the origin and development of this contact.

At the turn of the century there was a very large population of Persian emigrants in the Southern Russian towns in search of work, who naturally came into contact with the currents of thought and political ideas there. Russian sources give the number of Persian workers as 62,000 in 1905, and 200,000 in 1911. A total number of about 10,000 people crossed the frontier and about 71,400 passes were issued to Persians in 1904; 90% of such passes were issued from Azarbaijan. There were no doubt also many who crossed the border without passes. In 1897 11% of the workers in Baku were Persians, in 1903 this number had increased to 22.2%.² Many of the Persian workers were seasonal or returned to Persia after some years, especially after the Revolution of 1905. Some writers have referred to the existence of Caucasians amongst the Persian revolutionaries, but most were not Russian national. They dressed in the Caucasian fashions

1. M. Pavlovitch, "La Caucase et la Révolution Persane", Revue du Monde Musulman, 13, 1911, p. 324.
2. S. Ravasani, Sowjetrepublik Gilan Die Sozialistische Bewegung in Iran (Berlin N.D.) pp. 124-6.

and it was not always easy to distinguish between them and the real Caucasians¹ and Russians who came to help the cause of the Revolution.²

Socialism had made its appearance amongst the Moslem population of Russia in the early years of the twentieth century, and gained many adherents, particularly in Baku where there was a large working population, especially in the oil industry. The Russian Social Democrats made a point of gaining over the Moslem minorities. In 1905 the Hemmat (Endeavor) party was organized by some of the local Bolshevik leaders, Stalin, and his two close associates Azizbekov and Dzaparadze.³ Hemmat was for a time in close association and under Bolshevik influence, especially as the Bolsheviks were very strong in Baku. This ascendancy, however, varied and the more moderate Mencheviks eventually gained the upper hand. This fluctuation had its bearing on the condition and development of the Persian Social Democrat party, as will be seen later. Hemmat gradually became an important organization and spread its activities to other cities of Trans-Caucasia, and even to Persia through the

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1. Both Kasravī and Taqīzādeh mention this fact. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh-ye Iran (Tehran, 1934), p. 194. H. Javādī, ed., Nāmeḥhā'ī az Tabriz, (Tehran, 1951), p.204.
 2. M.C. Ivanov, Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran (Tehran, N.D.) p.50.
 3. The Moslems were the only minority allowed a separate Party organization by the Social Democrat party in Russia. This exception was due to the great enmity between the Armenians and the Moslems. The leadership of the Hemmat remained in the hands of the Bolshevik Russians for a time. The initiative for the foundation of a Moslem Social Democrat party was no doubt due to the Bolsheviks, who believed that political consciousness did not grow spontaneously, but had to be led by the party, a theme discussed fully in a pamphlet entitled, "What is to be done?" by Lenin. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23. (London, 1950), 1, pp. 27-79.

Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn¹ The membership of Hemmat was mixed; it comprised middle-class intellectuals as well as aristocrats and workers. It did not take a very strong stand on religious questions and did not break its ties with the nationalists, who had previously been politically active.² This rather disparate membership was also reflected in the Persian Social Democrat party, the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn.

Two of Hemmat's leaders were Nariman Narimanof and Moḥammad Amīn Rasūlzādah.³ Narimanof helped to organize the Social Democrat party amongst the Persian workers at the end of 1905 in Baku. It was called the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn (an exact rendering of the terms social democrat or Mojāhed . It was closely connected with the Hemmat and had branches in Petrovsk, Kars, Baku, Tiflis and Erevan. The Central Committee was at Baku, and one authority states that there exist many police records in the Tsarist archives which point to the widespread and secret activities of this group.⁴ As in the case of Hemmat, the initiative for this organization must probably have been taken by the Bolsheviki who believed that social democracy was an international movement. Indeed

1. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Trans-Caucasia 1917-21 (Oxford, 1950) p. 19.
2. A. Bennigsen, C. Lemerrier-Quelquejay, L'Islam en Union Soviétique, (Paris, 1968) pp. 64-66.
3. Moḥammad Amīn Rasūlzādeh was an active participant in the second phase of the Revolution. Both these men had originally been Social Democrats but turned against the Bolsheviki in 1917. Rasūlzādeh organized a pan-Islamic party, the Mosāvāt, which defied the Bolsheviki.
4. S. Ravasani, op. cit., p. 135.

the slogan of social democracy was "Workers of all countries unite."¹ It must be added that Stalin in furthering the role of Bolsheviks too was very active in this area.²

It is easy to understand the birth of the organization of the Persian workers was a natural development of this expanding movement. Later the Persian Revolution gave an opportunity to this party to exploit the situation in their struggle against despotism and imperialism. The Persian Revolution was regarded by the Russian Bolsheviks as a bourgeois nationalist revolution, and, as such, worthy of exploitation for the ends of social democracy which was international socialism.³ Even though the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amiyun was not in fact a party of proletariats, but its membership was mixed as was the membership of the Democrat Party formed later and the Hemmat party organized earlier.

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1. Lenin particularly believed in using any force against the enemy, therefore socialists could even support nationalist movements or religious groups in their struggles. R. Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism, and Nationalism 1917-23 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964), p. 35.
 2. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin, a Political Biography (Pelican Books, 1961) just published by OUP, 1949 - passim.
 3. The right of national self-determination had been proclaimed in the Russian Social Democrat party's programme. This declaration originally encompassed only the Russian national minorities, as pointed out by Carr. The attention and help bestowed on the Persian Revolution shows that the Bolsheviks particularly thought in terms of international socialism and autonomy for other nations as well as the Russian minorities. However, the full implication of the theory of national self-determination was developed from 1913 onwards. E.H. Carr, op. cit., 1, p. 422. In another article entitled the 'National Liberation Movement of the People of the East' Lenin analyzed these movements, and never again did his attention divert from such events which he believed showed the awakening of Asia. G. Haupt, M. Reberieux, "L'Internationale et le Probleme Colonial." La Deuzieme Internationale et L'Orient (Paris, 1967), p. 36.

Lenin paid particular attention to the Turkish and Persian Revolutions and in August 1908 in an article entitled "Explosive Material in World Politics" he stressed the need to help such nascent national movements of Asia. In general, Hemmat and the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn of Transcaucasia paid special attention to the Revolution in Persia.

The Russian Social Democrats sent material help to the Persian Revolutionaries. Besides such leaders as Narimanof, Rasūlzādeh and Heydar Khān 'Amū Oghlī (about whom more will be said in this chapter), many others joined the ranks of those who fought the Shah's forces in Tabriz¹ and Rasht in the later stages of the Revolution. Besides assistance in the form of men and material, Hemmat gave help in the equally important field of exchange of ideas which is manifested in the latter's political programmes. What is especially noticeable is the emphasis on the plight of the poor and the necessity to alleviate their lot that was inserted into the subsequent programme of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn as a result of the Hemmat's more advanced socialist ideology. Mention has been made by several writers of letters sent from the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn of Persia in the Caucasus² encouraging people to unite against the Government, or calling on the poor to unite in the name of Eslam to stop injustice.³

1. M.C. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 49.

2. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., pp. 368-372 and also 358.

3. M. Pavlovitch, "La Caucase et la Revolution Persane", p.319. There are also two articles in this periodical dated March 1907 signed Gīlān and Īrānī describing the Tabriz Anjomans. These articles might have been inspired by the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn with the aim of attracting international attention.
Revue du Monde Musulman, 12, pp. 1-9 and 205-219.

There is another letter published in the Majles newspaper from the Mojāhedīn of the Caucasus in Tiflis dated 1st Zīqa'deh 1325 (December 7th 1907) and signed by M.H.R. Zādeh who could possibly be Moḥammad Amīn Rasūl-zādeh. In this letter the writer expressed surprise that certain Deputies spoke of things which were outside their duty, and were often opposed to the principles of consitutionalism. For instance, it accused the Deputies of defending the Ministers who were being criticized in the press. The writer continued, saying the Deputies should act as representatives of the people not of the Ministers, and that they should not ask for the suppression of the newspapers because the principle of constitutionalism was based upon such freedom. He then gives a list of the basic freedoms and the meaning of constitutionalism.

- (1) Personal Freedom.
- (2) Freedom of Speech.
- (3) Freedom of Thought.
- (4) The responsibility of the eight Ministers; meaning that their appointment and dismissal should be done with the approval of the Majles, not, as at present they were appointed by the Shah.
- (5) The reform of the budget, to be carried out with the approval of the Majles, not that of the Ministers.
- (6) Universal education in primary schools.

The letter ended by saying that the country should have only one set of laws for the punishment of crimes, to be enacted by the Majles for the Ministry of Justice. These should be in accordance with the religious laws, but there should not be one set of religious

and one set of separate common laws.¹

The Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn party was also called the Mojāhedīn party in Russia as well as Persia. These two names applied to the same party simultaneously, which has caused some confusion.

Taqīzādeh writes about the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn called the Mojāheds, and there are many instances when the revolutionaries use either one or the other name. For instance, in Qazvin they were called Mojāheds, in Rasht Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn, but it is clearly the same group. The strong religious connotations of the word Mojāhed may have been the reason for the adoption of this alternative name for this party and its members by the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn in Persia.

Mojāhed is a religious fighter, but to call the party, a party of religious fighters at a time when there was no real war suggests either that the possibility of some fighting was contemplated or that the name was chosen to denote a fighter for their rights. Moreover, it was an attempt to identify and associate socialism with religion. This tactic was used by the socialists vis-a-vis the religious class particularly, and they explained that Eslam was socialistic in its origins. In time, the name Mojāhed gradually lost some of its political meaning, especially when it came to be associated with strong groups of fighters who took up arms against Moḥammad 'Alī Shah, for these were not all socialists.

1. R.M. No. 222. These points are interesting because they are part of the party programme of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn to be given later.

This dualistic trend has from the outset been evident in the Persian reform movement. There was on the one hand a group of militant radicals, or socialists, and on the other there were those who were nationalists and reformers and inspired more by religion. This dualism was reflected in the ranks of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn as well, and the two sides clashed especially over religious questions. However it must be added that these two different trends were not always clear-cut. Many of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn members were above all nationalists, very much as some of the leaders of Hemmat were. It has been well-observed that the character of the first Marxist parties of the Moslems of Russia remained bourgeois and retained some of its earlier Moslem revolutionary and nationalist attributes. The Hemmat itself had a national and Moslem base.¹

The Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn in Persia

The most important question from our point of view is when and how the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn made its appearance in Persia and who were its members, what were its activities and influence. We must keep in mind that we are speaking of a small secret political organization. Apart from the leading members of the Tehran branch, the Komīteh-ye Engelāb, most of whom had earlier participated in the Anjoman-e Mellī,

1. A. Bennigsen, "Les Premiers Groupes Socialistes Parmi Les Musulmans de Russie, 1904-1914." La Deuxieme Internationale et L'Orient, ed. G. Haupt et M. Reberieux (Paris, 1967), pp. 370-385.

their members and leaders are mostly unknown and their activity is shrouded in mystery. The actual date of the foundation of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn is not clear.

A document has been found in the archives of the Soviet Azarbaijan confiscated by the Tsarist police of Baku which is the programme of the party of the Mojāhedīn of Persia and is dated 1323 (1905).¹ It actually points to the fact that at that date the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn of Baku was active and extending its activities. Another document published in Mashad in 1326 (1907) after the granting of the Constitution points to the fact that this party's activities were spreading to Northern Persia with special consideration for the existing conditions of the country. In Tabriz, for instance/ the liberals organized a Mojāhed party which had a smaller secret core called the Markaz-e Gheybī and we are told that they translated the programme of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn of the Caucasus.² These groups were influential during the course of the Revolution in Azarbaijan and in supporting the Constitution and the Majles.

In Gilan too there was much activity during the course of the Revolution due to Russian influence and Rabino, the representative of the British Bank, gave details of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn organization and its connection with Baku,

1. Şāleḥ 'Alīof originally published this document in the periodical People of Asia and Africa in 1965. It was subsequently reprinted in Donyā in the summer of that year under the title "Sanadī nāshenākhteh dar bāreh-ye Ḥezb-e Demokrāt-e Iran".
Donyā 7th y. No. 2, Summer 1345.

2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūteh, pp. 49 and 175.

There are, however, much more tangible indications of similar activity in Mashad and Tehran at this early date. The personality who is crucial in this development is Ḥeydar Khān, whose activities will be described later.¹ He says in his diaries that while in Mashad in 1900 to 1903 he had been ordered from Russia to organize a political party, but he had only found one adherent, Ebrahīm Mīlānī. He added that his efforts had been in vain as people were too backward, so he left Mashad for Tehran in October 1903. As mentioned before a programme was published in Mashad on 15th Sha'bān 1325 (10th September 1907) showing that a branch had after all been organized in that city. Apparently Malek al-Sho'arā Bahār led a few intellectuals to form a committee and established ties with Baku.

The 1907 programme was written in a conference and was no doubt inspired by Ḥeydar Khān. We do not know how far this programme was adhered to or how effective it was. However, Ravasani mentions that a copy of the 1907 Mashad programme was also published in Batum bearing the seal of the organization with the motto 'Justice, Equality and Freedom'. It had apparently come into the possession of the Russian Consulate of Rasht. This discovery would go some way to show that this programme was known in other Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn branches.²

Whereas the Baku programme advocated the establishment of an organization to discuss political aims, the Mashad

1. See pages 106-109.

2. S. Ravasani, op. cit., pp. 149-150.

programme written after the granting of the Constitution and the formation of the Majles, had a much more practical and pragmatic approach.

The Baku programme was apparently written by Nariman Narimanof.¹ It said that all the countries of the world should live in peace, and that wars should be denounced. All lands were to belong to those who worked them, and not to those who paid others to work for them. Working hours were to be limited to eight, and the Government was to be responsible for the old, the orphans and the widows. Homes were to be built for the workers, taxes were to be limited and tariffs on everyday goods abolished. It further said that this party wished to free people from the clutches of blood-thirsty governors and generals and called for the freedom of association of the press and of religion and the right to strike.² strike.²

1. Şāleh 'Alīof, "Sanadī nāshenākhteh", p. 99.

2. An illuminating comparison could be made between the 1902 Russian Social Democrat programme and the 1905 programme of the Ejtemā 'iyūn 'Amīyūn which shows their close connection.

Besides the theoretical part and the details of labour and peasants' land reform, there is much similarity between the two, except that in the case of Persia everything is far more simplified. Moreover the Russian programme insists on the proletarian revolution whereas in the Persian programme no mention of such a revolution is made. The Russian programme deals only with the immediate aims of the Social Democrats, of which some of the relevant points are the replacement of the monarchy with a republic, it demands a constituent assembly, universal equal direct suffrage, secret ballots, freedom of religion, of domicile and of occupation and equality of all religions. It calls for a people's militia rather than a standing army, the separation of Church and State, universal free and compulsory education, the limitation of the working day to eight hours. It also called for the abolition of indirect taxes and the introduction of a programme of taxation, the confiscation of the royal lands and the imposition of a special land tax on the landed nobility.

Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 6 (Moscow, 1961) pp. 27-33.

An interesting article of this programme concerns the way to save people from tyranny, claiming that the Government should ask people's opinions about the conduct of their affairs and that the people should be free to give their opinion about their needs.

In most respects, the Mashad programme of 1907 (given in full in the Appendix) is less radical and it seems that certain concessions were made to the particular case of Persia. It is possible that Persia was considered too backward, especially with regard to land reform and freedom of religion, to need modification. For instance, the Baku programme advocated freedom of religion, whereas the Mashad one only mentioned that the holy aim of the Mojāhedīn was in accordance with Eslam. The Baku programme further called for the confiscation of the landlord's estates, but in the Mashad programme it was stated that the lands should be bought by a special bank and distributed between the poor peasants. In the Baku programme no mention of the Majles is made, and it merely states that the Government should ask people's opinions about their own affairs. In the Mashad programme, however, it declares its support and advocacy of the Majles.¹

Besides these two early programmes,

1. S. Ravasani, op. cit. pp. 454-6.
The original document has disappeared, and the copy found is a Russian translation, as one writer points out, the fact that the members of the party had to have a profession or an income, shows that this was not a proletariat party, and that it aimed at attracting and organizing a group from any class.
A.Ş. Kāmbakhsh, Nazarī beh Jonbesh-e Kāregarī dar Iran
(Tehran 1337), p.20.

there exist two Nezāmnāmeḥ (organizational programmes) dated 1906¹ and 1907. The earlier one is mostly a detail of the duties of members, and their relationship together. The latter one, published in Mashad in 1907² deals with the detail of the party organization and is of great importance in that it served as a model for the organization of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn. It said that the headquarters of the party was to remain at Baku, and that each branch had to take its orders from the Central Committee, and that the Central Committee would provide the branches with weapons and literature and directives. The organization had to have public and private branches, and also district branches. On the whole it was to be a very centralized party like the Bolshevik Party. The private branches were to be formed with five to seven members and were to receive their orders from Baku. Its membership was secret and questions were to be discussed and decided by vote. The public branches were composed of fifteen to seventeen members and were to be under the orders of the private branches. One member acted as a go-between, otherwise they could not get in touch directly with the private branches or the Central Committee. District branches were under the direction of the public branches and were to be organized in the provinces. The members had to be intro-

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1. This document has been published by Donyā: "Hezb-e Sosīāl Demokrāt (Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn)".
Donyā, 3rd year, No.4, Winter 1341, pp.86-87.
 2. 'A.S. Kāmbakhsh, "Nezāmnāmeḥ-ye Sho'beh-ye Irāni-ye Jam'iyat-e Mojāhedīn Motesḥakeleh dar Mashad."
Donyā, 4th y., No. 3, Autumn, 1342.

duced and vouched for by two members and they had to swear to secrecy or else they could be punished.¹

The Mojāhedīn had a corps of fighters called Fadā'īs who were under the direction of the private branch and were usually unknown to each other. If a member committed an unlawful act he could be traced by the public branch and fined or even executed.²

The Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Amīyūn of Tehran owed much to the activities of Heydar Khān. He was a social democrat and an unceasing revolutionary who has left his mark on the course of the Persian Revolution. He was in Persia when the Hemmat was organized but he must have been a member of the Russian Social Democrat party when he came to this country.³ He was an electrician in Baku and had been invited by Mozaffar al-Din Shah in 1900 to come to Persia and set up an electric

1. It is interesting to point to the Bolshevik party organized as written by Lenin in "What is to be Done?" The Bolshevik party organization was to have a central committee, local committees which were established in every locality with a few members each, and were to be organized with the approval of the central committee. Some had even smaller committees of five or six members. There were district committees, which had to act under the direction of the central committee. Everything, especially all policy, was very centralized. There are great similarities in essence between the party organization set up by Lenin and that of the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Amīyūn, which proves the close connection with Baku.

2. S. Ravasani, op. cit., pp. 141-6.

3. E. Abrahamian, Bases of Iranian Politics, p. 178.

light factory in Mashad. He had been in that city until 1903, and had then left it and gone to Tehran. He writes in his memoirs¹ that when he came to Tehran and started work on the electrical plant, he met a number of people there including the Ulama with whom he discussed reforms. They talked of the need for the government to be based on law and that representatives of the nation should be elected to interpret these laws, and that the King, the Ministers, and the Government should possess limited powers and not act arbitrarily. He added in his memoirs that those who agreed with him worked amongst the people who had taken Bast in Qom and in the British Legation. They had often discussed these questions, and when the elections began he and his followers had tried to influence their course by having knowledgeable people chosen as candidates. Heydar Khān further stated that later he kept in touch with some of the Deputies of the Majles and worked in cooperation with them.² He also organized a group of Bāzār merchants who met and consulted on important questions. They had a more secret committee as well which consisted of seven people and a more public committee of which a great number were Bāzār merchants. Heydar Khān seems to have had

1. These memoirs published in 1946 by 'A. Eqbāl in Yādegār periodical have been translated by A.R. Sheikholeslami and D. Wilson, "The Memoirs of Heydar Khān 'Amū Ughlū". Iranian Studies, Winter 1973.
2. F. Ādamīyat claims to know who these Deputies were. He says that they were Taqīzādeh and Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Āqā because the former mentions knowing one of the members of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn in Baku. He was Mashadi Moḥammad Osku'i 'Amū Oghlī. F. Ādamīyat, Fekr-e Demokrāsī-ye Ejtemā'ī dar Nehzat-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran. (Tehran, 1351), p. 19 and H. Javādī, op. cit., pp. 204 and 240.

more influence with the lower class than with the merchants, namely the workers at the Tehran electrical plant. Habl al-Matīn mentions a strike by the workers there in Jamādī al Šānī 1325 (August 1907) for better pay, special working clothes and a pension if maimed by accident during work. This must have been due to Heydar Khān's influence as we know he worked there.¹ The public committee later became disorganized, because most people joined smaller groups and only the seven man secret committee was not dissolved. According to him, this committee had connections with the Russian Social Democrats, which had instructed him that having opened a branch in Tehran he should work with the party in the Caucasus. He also mentions that Malek al-Motekallemīn and Āqā Seyyed Vā'eẓ were members of this small executive committee, and that it was in this committee that it was decided to murder Atābak.²

Komīteh-ye Engelāb or the Committee of Revolution

It is possible that Heydar Khān's organization or

1. Habl al-Matīn No. 84.

2. In general, the Russian Social Democrat party was opposed to individual terroristic acts, but Lenin wrote "We have never rejected terror on principle, nor can we ever do so. Terror is a form of military operation that may be usefully applied or may even be essential in certain moments of battle. The point is, however; that terror is now advocated not as one of the operations which the army in the field must carry on in close contact with the main body and in harmony with the whole plan of battle but as an individual attack completely isolated from any army whatever....."

B.D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution (London, 1956), p. 89 quoted from "Where to Begin" by Lenin.

the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn branch of Tehran¹ was in fact the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb which was organized by the members of the smaller committee of the Anjoman-e Mellī.²

Malekzādeh in his history of the Revolution gives the names of the fifteen members of the Komīteh and its aims which were to protect the Cōnsitution and the Majles. The members were his own father, Malek al-Motekallemīn, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez,³ Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān, Seyyed Moḥammad Mosāvāt, Taqīzādeh, Ḥakīm al-Molk, Seyyed 'Abdallāh Khaikhālī, Seyyed Jalīl Ardabīlī, Mīrzā Soleymān Khān Meykadeh, Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb, Mīrzā 'Alī Akbar Dekhodā, Ḥājī Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Āqā, Mīrzā Dāvūd 'Alī Ābādī, Adib al-Saltāneh, Naṣrat-al-Soltān and Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh.⁴ Five of these men had been members of the smaller committee of the Anjoman-e Mellī already mentioned. They were Malek al-Motekallemīn, Seyyed Moḥammad Mosāvāt, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez, Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān and Soleymān Khān.

Malekzādeh writes that the meetings were held in the house of Ḥakīm al-Molk and that Mīrzā Moḥammad Nejāt,

1. R. Reżāzādeh Malek, Heydar Khān 'Amū Oghlī (Tehran, 1351), p. 40, and J. Sheykh al-Eslāmī "Asnād-e Rāked-e Vezārat-e Omūr-e Khārejeh-ye Engelestān va Mas'aleh-ye Qatl-e Atābak", Sokhan, Vol. 5, No. 10, 1344, pp. 1019-1032.
2. See pp. 86-87.
3. These two had also been mentioned by Ḥeydar Khān as members of his organization.
4. Taqīzādeh gave the number of the members as seventeen, including Ḥoseyn Āqā Parvīz and Mīrzā Moḥammad Khorāsānī Nejāt, and he excluded Naṣrat-al-Soltān.

"Taqīzādeh dar bāreh-ye Qatl-e Atābak Sokhan Mīgūyad", Sokhan, No. 1, Bahman, 1944, p.-6.
Also published in Maqālat, vol. 3.

Hoseyn Āqā Parvīz and Mīrzā Moḥsen Najmābādī were intermediates who carried out the orders of the committee. He added that the committee had a large organization of Mojāheds who were armed and were destined to guard the Constitution. In addition the committee had a secret executive group which had decided on the murder of Atābak. He added that lots had been drawn in this small group as to the actual executor and that the name of 'Abbās Āqā had come up.¹

This small secret executive committee must have been the secret committee of which Ḥeydar Khān speaks and of which Malek al Motekallemīn, Seyyed Jamāl, himself and probably 'Abbās Āqā too were members. It is therefore possible that the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb was the Ejtemā 'īyūn 'Āmīyūn branch of Tehran or one of its branches. Ḥeydar Khān had written that the committee he had organized had been dissolved, but the number of members mentioned by Malekzādeh corresponds to the number of members of the public committee stipulated by the 1907 Mashad programme. Moreover, Malekzādeh emphasizes that the aims of this committee, like those announced in the Mashad programme, were the safeguarding of the Constitution, and the protection and preservation of the Majles. Besides, many of the activities of this committee correspond to those stipulated at Mashad. Thus it would seem that though Ḥeydar Khān's larger committee was dissolved there did exist at least one such organization in Tehran. It is of course possible that there was more than one committee, under different leadership and name.

1. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, pp. 218-222.

It must be added that of all the organizations thus far examined and also to be examined henceforth, the Ejtemā 'Īyūn 'Āmīyūn and the Komīteh were the most important. They had an ideology, proper organization, defined aims, consistent membership, all of which were probably due to their connection with the Russian Social Democrats and the Bolsheviks.

It must be borne in mind that the Ejtemā 'Īyūn 'Āmīyūn did not divulge their programme and organization, so the membership of deputies and others outside the Majles is not apparent. Possibly the reason was not to frighten others who only wished to effectuate a mere limitation of the powers of the Shah and introduce justice and the rule of law. The programme of the Ejtemā 'Īyūn 'Āmīyūn was very radical and they aimed at changing some of the fundamental social conditions, as indicated in their land reform programme suggested in the Baku and Mashad programme. But they had to proceed with caution and not announce this openly. It must be added that the parent organization in Russia was also clandestine. Some of the aims, however, did not remain secret once the Majles was constituted and brought about the opposition of the moderates, but as those who advocated them were in a very small minority it did not occasion too much fear at the time.

Although the members of the secret societies before the Revolution had spent considerable energy and thought on the nature of the change and had discussed it in previous years, the actual manner of the change had not been considered and there was a surprising degree of confusion over the desires

of different sections when the time came to devise a constitution and the Majles. The fact that there was such a divergence and confusion meant that a single political organization with defined aims did not appear to give leadership and cohesion to the movement.

The Constitutional Revolution and the problems it engendered divided people into roughly two sides - those who supported the Revolution and those who opposed it. Later those who supported the Revolution also split between those who advocated compromise and those who wanted an all-out showdown and a real revolution. The clash of interests intensified and many shades of opinion appeared which complicated the issues and made peace between the two sides impossible.

The division between the supporters and opponents of the Revolution did not follow clear class divisions. On the contrary it cut across the social divisions of society. There were, for instance, constitutionalists amongst the upper classes and reactionaries amongst the lower echelons of society as well. Despite the Revolution no change was made in the governing class, which retained the status quo. The Ministers were from a class which differed socially from the majority of the Deputies or those who had brought about the Revolution.

We must see whether these divisions, which formed the base of the later political parties, were due to the weakness of the constitutional laws or the electoral laws or whether they were the result of more deep-seated problems. Were they, for instance, due to the nature of society itself, or were they ideological differences which divided the Majles? In the next chapter we shall look at some of these problems. First we shall examine some of the aspects of the constitutional law and the problems they engendered.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS.

The failure of the Persian Constitutional Revolution has been blamed on the Shah's enmity, on the reaction of the ruling class or on foreign interference, but no attention has been paid to the Constitutional laws and the Electoral laws which were partly responsible for the failure to solve Persia's problems.

The Persian law makers had the particular conditions of their country in mind when they prepared the Constitutional laws and changed the models they took to suit their purpose, which made these laws inconsistent in certain respects. As will be seen, there were certain weaknesses in the Belgian and French Constitutional laws which they used as models and these were transported into Persia's parliamentary system and worked to its disadvantage.

The demand for a Constitution grew gradually in Persia and those who took Bast (asylum) in the Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm Shrine in Shavāl 1323 (December 1905) formulated their demands haphazardly. They asked for the dismissal of 'Alā'al-Douleh, the Governor of Tehran, the dismissal of Naus, the unpopular Belgian Customs Minister, the punishment of the carriage driver named 'Askar, on the road to Qom, an amnesty for them all and the return of the Touliyat (administration) of the

Marvī School to the Ashtīyānī family. They asked for reparation to be made to the Mojtahed of Kerman, Mohammad Reżā, who had been beaten by the Governor, and the abolition of the stamp duty on the Ulama's salary.¹

Y. Doulatābādī recounts that he had been to see the Turkish Ambassador and had asked him to mediate between the Bastīs and the Shah, and in order that the demands would not be seen to be too shallow, he had changed the last item to a demand for redress of the Ulama's rights. Despite this, the Ambassador had found the last demand unsatisfactory. Doulatābādī thinks he must have been briefed by some of the liberals, who thus conveyed through him a demand for an 'Edālatkhāneh or a House of Justice.² It has been said that if a demand for an Assembly had been made, it would have ruined all chances of success for it would have frightened the Shah and strengthened the hands of 'Ayn al-Douleh.³

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit. 2, p. 22-23.

2. There had already been some discussion about an 'Edālatkhāneh. Malkam had mentioned it and we are told by Kermānī that Ṭabāṭabā'ī's aim was partly the establishment of such an institution. Besides, the very early aims of all Persian reformers was the establishment of justice. According to E.G. Browne this 'Edālatkhāneh was to consist of representatives elected by the Ulama, landed proprietors and merchants, and presided over by the Shah. Other authors do not discuss what this organization's aims were to be or how it was to be organized. Kasravī mentions that this would have guaranteed more justice, for despite the fact that there was a Minister of Justice, he only existed in name, and sole power rested with the Government and the rich who abused it at will.

3. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, pp.83-85.

Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Seyyed 'Abdallāh Bahbahānī, the two important religious leaders, dissuaded the more liberal amongst them not to ask for an Assembly at this time, and to limit their demands to the 'Edālatkhāneh, for if the rule of law was established, they said, there would be complete security in Persia. It has been said that the religious leaders were afraid that if the negotiations dragged on for too long, people would disperse.¹ It should be added here that there was another group whose aims were more radical still, but they were not divulged at this time.

Eventually the Shah granted a rescript, or Dastkhat in Zīqa'deh 1323 (January 1906) and accepted these demands. Thereupon the exiles returned to Tehran amidst much rejoicing, but hopes were soon disappointed, as the Government took no steps to implement its promises. As a result, dissatisfaction increased, and when a crowd collected to oppose the exile of Sheykh Moḥammad, one of their leaders, a religious student, was shot dead by the Government forces in Rabī'al-Sānī 1324 (June 1906). This was the signal for the closing of the Bāzārs and a general exodus of the Ulama to Qom. The merchants and the liberals took refuge in the British Legation, their numbers growing to about 14,000.²

1. A. Kasravī, Tarīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p.72.

2. In an interesting letter written by Vakīl al-Douleh to Atābak, it was said that the Tojjār spent large sums of money to feed the Bastīs in the British Legation. Then the writer adds that of course the money must be paid by the British. This kind of allegation shows the kind of rumour rampant at the time, but none has been substantiated by any of the British documents available. E. Ṣafā'ī Asnād-e Mashrūṭeh (Tehran 1348), p.78.

They demanded the return of the Ulama, and the dismissal of 'Ayn al-Douleh, the opening of an Assembly, and the punishment of those guilty of the shooting. The negotiations between the Bastīs and the Government was carried on by the British Representative Grant-Duff. At last the Shah granted their demands, and issued a Farman, on the 14th Jamādī al-Šānī 1324 (5th August 1906), followed by another rescript reaffirming these. In the meantime, 'Ayn al-Douleh was dismissed and Mīrzā Naṣrallāh Khān Moshīr al-Douleh was appointed Prime Minister. He was a former government official who had worked in the Foreign Ministry and was probably a moderate nationalist but very cautious. He has been credited with being a liberal and instrumental in the early success of the Revolution but this is doubtful.¹ For example when the Azarbaijani deputies arrived at Tehran he argued with them against the Constitution saying the Shah had only granted a Mashrū'eh not a Mashrūṭeh.² He might have been genuine in this belief or he might have been

1. E. Bāstānī Pārīzī, Talāsh-e Āzādī (Tehran, 1354) p.20 1st ed. 1341. It must be added that he was one of the persons arrested for his connection with Malkam in 1891. He had also been a member of the Farāmūshkhāneh. H. Algar, Mirza Malkum Khan, pp.203 and 243. (Algar's source for this assertion is a letter by Mīrzā Āqā Khān to Malkam. Supplement Persan 1996, pp.125-126). Grant-Duff described him as speaking no foreign language, having never left Persia and having practically no education, but as having tact and judgement. He added that his two sons were educated in Europe and probably persuaded him to accept office as they were well educated and ambitious. Grant-Duff to Grey, August 13th 1906, No.208 FO 371/113.

2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p.217.

repeating the Shah's wish. Also, we have a private letter which mentions the fact that Mīrzā Naṣrallāh Khān might have hinted to the Shah to recall Atābak.¹

About two thousand persons, including members of the Ulama, nationalist leaders and nobles were invited to meet at the Madreseh-ye Neẓām, the military school, where they were entertained and where patriotic speeches were delivered. A temporary Majles was thereupon appointed, including representatives of the Ulama, and A'yān, or Ashrāf, merchants and Aṣnāf and some of the Ministers. Doulatabadi says this was a free Majles which discussed the Neẓāmnāmeḥ or the price of bread and meat.² They met twice weekly while the Electoral laws were being translated and prepared by Ṣanī' al-Douleh, Mokhber al-Saltāneh, Moshīr al-Molk and Moḥtasham al-Saltāneh. The two sons of Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Seyyed Moḥammad Ṣādeq and

1. This letter is by a certain Moghīs al-Saltāneh, secretary of Reżā Qolī Khān Māfī the nephew of Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Neẓām al-Saltāneh who had been in turn secretary to Moḥammad Shah when he was the Prince Governor of Azabajan, and was later made Prime Minister. In this letter Moghīs al-Saltāneh relates that Moshīr al-Douleh had told the Shah to recall Atābak. The writer, who hints at the fact that the relationship between these two had not been too cordial, questions why Moshīr al-Douleh should do this, and concludes that he probably knew the Shah wished it and wanted to please him. (Private collection of the Neẓām Māfī family).

2. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.88.

Abū al-Qāsem were also involved in preparing the Electoral Laws which were signed in Rajab (September).¹

The Constitutional or Fundamental laws, called Nezāmnāmeḥ (regulations) or Qānūn-e Asāsī, were also prepared in great haste as the Shah was dying. They were signed on the 14th Zīqa'deh 1324 (December 30th, 1906). Basically they dealt with the nature of the Assembly. They were therefore incomplete for they were in reality a set of regulations respecting the rights, nature, and duties of the Assembly, the Senate, the manner of passing laws and the limitations of the power and duties of the Ministers. There is no theoretical and no ideological principle mentioned. These laws, 51 articles in all, were inadequate and deficient as they had been prepared in great haste before Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah died, and it soon became clear that they had to be supplemented by further laws.

It has been said that the Persian Constitution was based upon the Belgian Constitution.² Taqīzādeh has.

1. Ibid., 2, pp. 86-87. According to one authority, the translation of these laws had already been done during the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah who ordered all kinds of laws to be translated. Moḥammad Moḥīṭ Ṭabāṭabā'ī, private interview.
2. The Belgian Constitution was written in 1831 and had been based on the French Constitutional laws. Both had been later modified and revised. These revisions were sometimes taken into consideration in Persia and sometimes not as shall be seen. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, who was closely linked with the process of law making at this period, writes that the French law which was the basis for the Belgian Constitution had caused enough havoc in France and was to do so in Persia, causing the interference of the rabble in politics. He added that in reality the laws of England should have been used but could not have been because of political considerations. He does not add that the English laws were unwritten and impossible to copy. Mokhber al Saltāneh Hedāyat, Khāṭerāt va Khaṭarāt, (Tehran, 1344) p.145.

added that some parts of it were based upon the Constitution of some of the Balkan countries as they were more modern.¹ Another writer mentions that the Bulgarian Constitution was the model used.² It is possible that the first laws, the so called Nezāmnāme were based upon the Bulgarian laws though this assertion is not substantiated. The supplementary Fundamental laws were clearly a direct translation of the Belgian laws and follow the same form and idea as the Belgian laws.

The main stumbling block with regard to the first set of Constitutional laws, was its deficiency as far as the important question of ministerial responsibility was concerned. Clauses number 28, 40 and 42 did not make this question clear enough.³ These clauses discussed the duties of the Ministers and called them responsible ministers, but this responsibility was not defined. Moshīr al-Douleh had said that the Ministers were responsible to the Zāt or *persons* of the Shah, which did not satisfy the Deputies. Indeed it was a difficult step to accept and to make Ministers,

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1. H. Taqīzādeh, "Lafz-e Mashrūṭeh va Yādī az Avāyel-e Mashrūṭīyyat." Maqālāt-e Taqīzādeh, ed. I. Afshār, (Tehran, 1349) 1, p.392.
 2. L. Lockhart, "The Constitutional Laws of Persia, Outline of their Origin and Development", Middle East Journal, 13, 1959, p.382.
 3. Clauses No. 40, 42 and also 27 and 28 dealt with the question of ministerial duties and position vis-a-vis the Majles.

always appointed by the Shah as his own servants, now responsible to the Majles, especially as this responsibility was not clearly specified.

This question first arose in connection with the unpopular Belgian Minister Naus who had been engaged as the Director of Customs in 1898 and had been so successful that in 1901 he was made Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.¹ He was a foreigner and therefore unpopular in certain religious circles; he was also unpopular with the merchant class because he had negotiated with the Russians a new tariff treaty which worked to the disadvantage of the Persian mercantile community. So the question of ministerial responsibility was linked to Naus in a very clever manoeuvre by Sa'd al-Douleh²

1. A. Destrèe, Les Fonctionnaires Belges au Service de la Perse 1898-1915 (Tehran, Liège, 1376). *Acta Iranica VI* pp.76-9, 111, 121.
2. Mīrzā Javād Khān Sa'd al-Douleh had originally negotiated the employment of the Belgians when he was Ambassador in Belgium. Later, as Minister of Commerce, he had attacked Naus who obtained his exile in 1323 (1905), thus creating a martyr to the cause of liberty. When the Revolution was successful, the Shah recalled him to Tehran and he received a hero's welcome and was elected to the Majles. Thus he had an old quarrel to settle with Naus. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, who acted as a mediator between the Majles and the Government, gives an interesting account of this. He writes that when Azarbaijan and the Anjoman of Tabriz were putting pressure on the Shah to declare the principle of constitutionalism in Shavāl (November), a meeting was held between some of the Deputies and the Government; the dismissal of Naus was accepted by the Government and thereupon Sa'd al-Douleh had declared himself satisfied. Taqīzādeh, however, had said that they had included the dismissal of Naus because of Sa'd al-Douleh's private grudge, and that their real purpose was the strengthening of the Constitution. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, *op.cit.*, p.147.

and made a popular issue which soon showed up the deficiencies of the Constitutional laws. First, the fact that Naus was a foreigner was raised and objected to in Zīhājeh 1324 (February 1907). Sa'd al-Douleh said he could not be introduced to the Majles as such. Then Nāṣer al-Molk, the Minister of Finance, was questioned as to his responsibility as a Minister, he replied that he was not responsible for the Ministry of Customs.¹ The question of ministerial responsibility was not solved and the attendance of the Ministers in the Majles was demanded in a letter written to the Ṣadr A'zam on 5th Zīqa'deh (20th January). A few days later, Mohtasham al-Saltāneh, as the representative of the Prime Minister, introduced the Ministry, and the name of Naus was omitted. But the campaign was continued, with the question of Ministers' attendance at the Majles being raised. Taqīzādeh recounts that he wrote to his friend Moḥammad 'Alī Khān Tarbiyat in Tabriz, complaining that the Government was uncooperative and not acting constitutionally.² This letter triggered an uprising

1. R.M. No. 37, 18 Zīhājeh 1324 (2nd February, 1907) & No. 43, 8th Moḥarram 1325 (22nd February 1907). The Minister of Finance was Nāṣer al-Molk. He had been educated in England and had served at the court of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah, then as Minister of Amīn al-Douleh in 1314 and again in the same capacity under Amīn al-Soltān, and now he was once again Minister of Finance. He had come to the Majles and had denied responsibility for the Customs, and had thus initiated the uproar which led to the dismissal of Naus. For an account of his life see M. Bāmdād Sharḥ-e Ḥāl-e Rejāl-e Iran dar Qarn-e 12, 13, 14 Hejrī (Tehran, 1347) 1, pp.66-70.

2. It must be added that when the Azarbaijan Deputies reached Tehran, Taqīzādeh was already in Tehran. Tabriz was in the midst of the uprising engendered by his

in Tabriz, he says, which lasted a week, and only ceased when the Shah relented and promised to uphold the Constitution and agreed that a body in the Majles be appointed to prepare the Supplementary Fundamental Laws.¹ This uprising in Tabriz/ⁱⁿZihajeh 1324 (February 1907) was particularly aimed at obtaining from Moḥammad 'Alī Shah acceptance of the principle of Constitutionalism which he had originally signed with his father. The Azarbaijan Deputies and the Tabrizis who knew him did not trust him, and wanted him to accept this principle once again. The dismissal of Naus was also demanded but the principle of ministerial responsibility was not included in these demands. It was the Supplementary Fundamental Laws which included the necessary articles making the Ministers responsible to the Majles. So the question of ministerial responsibility plagued the Majles for a long time because the new laws were not signed until 20th Sha'bān 1325 (7th October 1907), but the Majles imposed this principle in practice, as some Ministries declared that they accepted this principle though it was not yet law.

Within the first few months of the life of the Majles there were no outstanding issues which affected the development of the embryonic parties. Votes were

/cont'd. letter, so the Azarbaījānī Deputies were called immediately to meet the Prime Minister, Moshīr al-Douleh, as already mentioned. He had told them that the Shah had granted a Mashrū'eh and not a Mashrūṭeh. This had led to much argument in which the Deputies persuaded the Prime Minister that on the contrary the Shah had granted a Constitution. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p.217.

2. M. Taqīzādeh, "Tārīkh-e Avāyel-e Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran". Maqālāt 1, p.274.

taken on small issues but there was no continuity and, apart from the activity of the more radical group there was no formal organization of parties. The Prime Minister, Moshīr al-Douleh, made no independent attempt to create a circle of supporters on whom he could rely.

With the death of Mozaffar al-Dīn Shah and the accession of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah, the position of Moshīr al-Douleh was no longer secure. The new Shah had his own clique of courtiers who opposed the Premier. These were referred to as the Kāshī clique as most were from that province (Kashan).¹ There were many other old courtiers and Princes who also opposed the former Premier. One was Kāmran Mīrzā² who was at the same time uncle and father-in-law of the young Shah. He had held the post of Minister of War during his father Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah's reign, but had been out of office all through the reign of Mozaffar al-Dīn Shah, his brother. Now naturally he wanted to make a come-back, and found the position of Moshīr al-Douleh, the Prime Minister, an obstacle.

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1. Some of these were former courtiers who had been attached to Moḥammad 'Alī when he was Crown Prince in Tabriz. They were headed by Gholām Hoseyn Khān Ghafārī, the Governor of Tehran. He had been at court since the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah, and had held many governmental posts, including that of Minister of Justice and Minister of Court, also Vazīr Makhsūṣ, Governor of Kashan, and Vazīr Homāyūn were of this group.
 2. Y. Doulatābādī also mentions the courtiers who opposed Moshīr al-Douleh, op.cit. 2, pp. 104-5.

The Majles, too, was dissatisfied with Moshīr al-Douleh, as he did not show much support for it, and only accepted the principle of responsibility reluctantly and was always evasive. The Shah had explained to Spring Rice the reason for the dismissal of Moshīr al-Douleh, saying that the post of Grand Vizier was not necessary and that Moshīr al-Douleh had refused to accept that of Minister of the Interior, and had resigned. On the whole, according to Spring Rice, it must have been difficult for Moshīr al-Douleh to satisfy the Shah and work with the Majles.¹

Moḥammad 'Alī Shah did not appoint a Prime Minister immediately, but Vazīr Afkham who had previously held the post of Minister of the Interior in the Ministry of Moshīr al-Douleh now acted as First Minister and Head of the Government.² He presented the Cabinet officially to the Majles on the 6th Šafar (29th March) and declared that they all accepted the principle of responsibility. Vazīr Afkham was unpopular in the Majles and often criticised, this led to a deterioration in the relationship between the Majles and the Government, which was accused of lack of cooperation³ and of not understanding

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1. Spring Rice to Grey, March 28th, 1907 No. 55 FO 371/301 Incl. in No. 1.
 2. For details of his life, see M. Bāmdād, op.cit., 2, p.102.
 3. R.M. No. 71, 30 Šafar 1325 (14th April 1907). At this time and for a short period, the discussions of the Majles were published without mention of the names of the speakers.

the meaning of responsibility. It was said about Vazir Afkham that he could not even keep two sheep and that he should resign.¹ At last, votes were taken and he was forced to resign by 79 votes cast against him.² The next Prime Minister was Amin al-Soltan, the Atabak-e A'zam, who had had very long experience of administration during the reign of Naser al-Din and Mozaffar al-Din Shah as Prime Minister. He had been very unpopular and even the Mojtaheds of Karbela had sent a Takfirnameh³ (excommunication) against him. He now posed as a Constitutionalist, which can be justified by saying that he was a great opportunist and wished to make a come-back to politics.

The return of Atabak did not solve anything but rather increased the problems and tensions. In fact it was his resumption of office that was fundamental in giving rise to the emergence of groups that took on much greater coherence within the Majles. In a certain sense he can be said to have been the catalyst that gave rise to 'parties'. In the meantime, the group nominated to write the Supplementary Fundamental laws set out to do so, but

1. R.M. No. 82, 18th Rabi' al-Avval 1325 (2nd May 1907) and No. 71, 30th Safar (14th April).
2. Kasravi says that these criticisms were a trick to make him resign in order to bring back Amin al-Soltan and that the Deputies unknowingly played into the Shah's hand. This is possibly true, for San'i al-Douleh, who favoured the return of Amin al-Soltan, had insisted that according to the Constitution they could vote out one Minister and the Cabinet did not have to resign as a consequence. A. Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashru'eh, p.255.
3. M. Amiri, Zendegani-ye Siyasi-ye Atabak-e A'zam (Tehran 1346) pp.412-413.

these laws were not destined to be signed by the Shah until the 20th Sha'bān 1325 (7th October 1907).

The Supplementary Fundamental Laws

Taqīzādeh, Seyyed Naṣrallāh Akhavi, Sa'd al-Douleh, Moḥaqeq al-Douleh, Amīn al-Zarb, Mostashār al-Douleh and Ṣadiq al-Ḥazrat¹ were appointed to write these laws. The choice of Deputies shows a clear contrast with the past policy. Whereas those appointed to prepare the original Constitutional laws were the two sons of Moshīr al-Douleh the Prime Minister and Sa'd al-Douleh, prominent Deputies were now chosen. Besides the Deputies of Tehran, two leading Azarbaijan Deputies were also chosen, which shows not only their personal standing but also the preponderance of Azarbaijan after Tehran; the more radical nature of the Supplementary

1. Seyyed Naṣrallāh was from the Ulama class and represented the Tollāh. He had been a member of the Anjoman-e Mellī and the Jāme'-e Adamiyat and was a moderate Deputy. He was particularly mindful of guarding the privileges of the Ulama. Ṣadiq Ḥazrat was a teacher at the Political Science school, the Deputy of the A'yān of Tehran and related by marriage to the family of Ṣani' al-Douleh. Moḥaqeq al-Douleh and Amīn al-Zarb were Deputies of the Tojjār. The former was a friend of Sanī' al-Douleh and left the Majles when he did. The latter was a prominent merchant, representing the Tojjār of Tehran, and Mostashār al-Douleh the A'yān of Azarbaijan. He was related to Ṣani' al-Douleh. Sa'd al-Douleh, who had also been related to Ṣani' al-Douleh through marriage, but had divorced his wife and hence fallen foul of the Hedāyat family, represented the A'yān. He had been Ambassador in Belgium and therefore was considered an authority on Constitutionalism.

laws was no doubt due to these men.

After the reappearance of Atābak, and the drawing up of the clear lines of allegiance and affiliation, the first real issue on which a division can be clearly seen was that of the membership of the Commission to draw up the Supplementary Fundamental laws. On one side were the supporters of Atābak, the most prominent of whom were attached through relationship and interest to the Hedāyat family. On the other side were those connected with Sa'd al-Douleh, and especially the group of the more progressive Azarbaijan Deputies. Mostashār al-Douleh was related to Ṣanī' al-Douleh at the same time was an Azarbaijan Deputy of a liberal but moderate disposition. His presence on the Commission might have had a salutary effect and we can surmise that it resulted in a compromise to satisfy both sides.

Unfortunately we do not know any of the arguments used by the law makers, nor the way they actually used their models. There are instances when the laws are not clear, and are open to interpretations, there are other instances when they are insufficient to solve the problems of government.¹ There are certain purely

1. For instance, the law-making procedure was very inefficient, and when a Bill came to the Majles there was much discussion about whether it was fit for signature by the Shah, or whether it should be returned and written properly. In order to remedy this problem it was suggested by Mokhber al-Molk and Taqizadeh that a body of experts consisting of some Deputies and Ministers should be set up to write all the laws and prepare them for discussion in the Majles, (R.M., No.60) on the model of the French Conseil d'Etat. This same suggestion was made by the French experts and was taken up later in the Second Majles by the Government of Mostoufī al-Mamālek. Barclay to Grey, Jan.23, 1910. FO 416/43. Also G. Demorgny. Essai sur l'Administration De la Perse (Paris, 1913), p.25.

Persian additions such as the very controversial religious clauses, especially the right of veto granted to five of the Mojtaheds in the Majles, in Article No.2 of the Supplementary Fundamental laws. They were to supervise the enactment of all laws so that nothing contrary to religion would be passed.

The most important element in a constitution according to eighteenth and nineteenth-century political thought was a representative government, a limited executive, the separation of powers, and the theory of checks and balances, or a mixed government. Those who wrote the Supplementary Fundamental laws were aware of these principles for although the separation of powers is not mentioned in so many words in the Belgian or French laws, they are included in the Persian Constitution, Article 27. However, a real separation of powers has always been difficult to operate in Europe and was much more so in Persia.¹

1. There were many complaints that the principle of the separation of powers was not being acted upon. Taqizādeh had once said that the essence of constitutionalism was this separation, but that neither the Majles nor the Ministers concurred to it. The Ministers performed the duties of the Majles. For instance the Minister of Science came to the Majles and complained about a newspaper whereas this was the Majles's duty. He had added that the Majles also interfered in the duties of the Ministers and listened to complaints, which was not its duty. When the situation became critical in Zīqa'deh 1325 (December 1907), the Shah sent a letter to the Majles demanding that the Executive and Legislative should be kept separate. This had been discussed in the Majles and one of the Deputies had retorted that the Shah himself took measures without the knowledge of the Ministers, and that a separation of powers should be effected within the Executive also. R.M. No.33, 21st Zīhājeh 1325, (26 Jan. 1908) and No. 218 23rd Shavāl (30th Nov.).

The theory of checks and balances and of a mixed government was in principle included in the Persian Constitution but they were not put into effect.¹ The law makers wished to accumulate sole power in the hands of the Legislative, thus upsetting the balance they meant to set up. This was caused naturally by their deep suspicion of the Shah and the governing class.

The Shah was Head of the Executive and as such he had certain rights and prerogatives, and all through this period, even at times of crisis, deference was always shown to him in the Majles by the Deputies. The Supplementary Fundamental laws limited his powers. Article 35 said the sovereignty of Persia is a trust by the grace of God conferred on the Sovereign by the people, and Article 36 said that the Sovereignty of Persia was a limited monarchy. The Ministers were said to be responsible to the Majles and not to the Shah in Article 44; the Shah's decrees were to be signed by the responsible Ministers.² The Belgian Constitution Article 64 decreed

1. The idea of checks and balances was originally conceived to be amalgamated with the idea of the separation of powers in order to stop the use of arbitrary power by one section of the Government upon the people. It was thus hoped that each section would exercise a check upon the other. Thus the Executive was to have a veto power over the Legislative, or the legislative branch was given the power of impeachment, but this power to interfere was limited; however each branch could exercise some authority over the other. The idea of a mixed government, that is the government of King, Lords and Commons, was an older concept, but designed for the same purpose. M.J.C. Vile. Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers. (Oxford, 1969), pp. 13, 17.
2. When the Shah ordered the arrest of certain people suspected of having been responsible for throwing a bomb at his carriage, without the signature of the

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the same. The Shah could not delay or suspend laws, but he could appoint or dismiss Ministers. This had been an old prerogative of the Shahs of Persia and was also that of the King of the Belgians, Article 65. But in fact it meant that a censure of the Government meant an indirect censure of the Shah, and was naturally taken as an affront by the Shah, whose predecessors had been solely responsible for all government. The Majles had not alternative but to accept the Shah's choice of Ministers, for no provision was made for the case of disapproval of the Shah's candidate. This flaw was due to the fact that the whole concept of Cabinet and Prime Minister arose later than the period when the Belgian Constitution was devised. This omission was also evident in the Persian laws.

Another of the Shah's prerogatives was the signing of laws. One writer has raised the interesting question of whether according to the Persian laws the King could or could not abstain from signing. Mansūr al-Saltāneh, in a book on the principles of constitutionalism says that when the Fundamental laws were being prepared, there was much discussion upon this point between the representatives of the nation and those of the Government, and also upon

/contd. Minister, an awful scene ensued whereby the Majles enforced the trial of the Chief of Police and the Governor of Tehran who were responsible for this unlawful act. (All translation of the Persian Constitutional laws has been taken from the P.R.O. correspondence, namely Spring Rice to Grey, Tehran Jan. 27th 1907, No. 21, FO 371/301 and Marling to Grey, Nov. 7th 1907, No. 242 FO 371/313).

the question of the Shah's right of dissolution of the Majles. He added that the representatives of the nation had refused both instances so that these rights were not included in the Persian laws.¹ In the second Majles, when the Regent Nāṣer al-Molk took office he alluded to the right of the Crown with regard to this question and deplored the fact that the Crown had no right even to modify or hold back a law passed by the two houses of the National Assembly.²

The Persian law makers were particularly sensitive to the royal prerogative, and omitted two of the important articles of the Belgian laws from the Persian laws. This was a deliberate step possibly due to the influence of the Azarbaijan Deputies. These articles are Numbers 71 and 72 of the Belgian laws. Article 71 decreed that the Monarch had the right to dissolve the Chambers either simultaneously or separately with the provision that the electors would be convoked in 40 days and the Chambers in two months. Article 72 stipulated that the King could adjourn the Chambers for a period

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1. Mansūr al-Saltāneh argues that in a true democracy, the Sovereign cannot refuse to sign, for the bills presented by the Ministers are bound to be accepted by him as Head of the Executive; if a bill is presented by the Legislative despite the wish of the Ministers, it will lead to the dissolution of the Legislature and the question of signature would not arise. Mansūr al-Saltāneh 'Adl, Hoqūq-e Asāsī ya Oṣūl-e Mashrūṭīyyat (Tehran, 1372H.Q.) p.215.
 2. Barclay to Grey, March 7th, 1911, No.33 FO 371/1187 Encl. in No.1.

not exceeding one month, and not more than once in one session without the assent of the Parliament. The omission of these two prerogatives tipped the balance in favour of the Majles and gave it unlimited power theoretically; it had sole control of financial matters and could censure the Government, but the Government and the King did not have the power to dissolve the House, and so to check it. It is no wonder that Mohammad 'Alī Shah would not sign these laws.

According to the Persian Constitution the Senate, with the Shah, could dissolve the Majles under Article 48 of the Fundamental laws.

But the Senate was not set up, and its membership became a question of controversy between the Government and the Majles. The Deputies wished for a third of the members to be chosen by the Government and two thirds by the Majles. Eventually a compromise was reached by deciding that half would be chosen by the Majles and half by the Government. In the Second Majles the question of the Senate was strongly opposed by the Democrats, and practically shelved. In any case, by not setting up the Senate, the whole notion of a balanced Constitution was upset, and naturally predisposed the Shah to suspect the intentions of the law makers.

The main weakness of the Constitutional laws however, was due to a certain weakness in the Belgian and French laws. When the 1830 French Constitution was written the Cabinet system had not fully evolved in Europe and much was left to practice; therefore the whole position

of the Cabinet and the relationship of the Ministers with the Government and the position of the Prime Minister is unclear. This weakness found its way inadvertently into the Persian laws as well.

This defect in the Persian laws has been previously pointed out, but with the suggestion that it was due to the fact that the Cabinet was treated as the descendant of the old indigenous Dīvān and its position was accepted as it had existed previously.¹ However, a closer look at the Belgian and French laws reveals that these weaknesses existed in the European models used.

Closely related to the position of the Cabinet is the question of ministerial responsibility, which has been pointed out and which was the source of so much controversy in the First Majles. When this question first arose, the Government said that the Ministers were responsible to the Shah, which was objected to severely until it was accepted that the Ministers were to be responsible to the Majles. This defect was put right in the Supplementary Fundamental laws, which decreed in Article 61 that Ministers were collectively responsible before the Chamber for the general policies of the Government and individually for their personal acts. This clause is taken from the French Constitution of 1875² and does not exist in the earlier Belgian law; and

1. L. Binder, Iran, Political Development in a Changing Society, (Berkeley, 1962), pp.97, 107.

2. J. Godechot, ed., Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789 (Paris, 1970), p.33.

despite this adjustment there is a serious discrepancy between the Persian and the Belgian laws with regard to the position of the Ministers, a discrepancy which went further than anything else in bringing about the malfunctioning of the Constitution and unsettling the relationship between the Government and the Majles. Further, the Shah appointed Ministers and, as the Constitutional laws were interpreted, they were made to resign from the Majles if they were Deputies. This was a strict interpretation of the theory of the separation of powers, which meant that each government branch had to be kept separate, and Articles 32 and 68 of the Supplementary Fundamental laws were interpreted in this sense.¹ This Article had existed in the Belgian laws, number 36,² but had been reworded later in the revision of the Constitutional laws in 1890, which excluded Ministers who could remain Deputies, but not other Government officials. It is possible that the law

1. These Articles are worded thus:- Article 32: As soon as a member becomes a salaried government servant he ceases to be a member. He can only become a member again after resignation of this government post and his re-election by the people.
Article 68: Ministers cannot undertake any salaried employment other than their own duties.
2. The 1831 Belgian Constitution Article 36 said exactly what Article 32 cited above said. "Le membre de l'une ou de l'autre des deux Chambres, nomme par le gouvernement a un emploi salarie qu'il accepte, cesse immediatement de sieger et ne reprend ses fonctions qu'en vertu d'une nouvelle election." This Article was changed in the revision of 1890 to this version, and exempted the Ministers. "Le membre de l'une des deux Chambres nomme par le gouvernement a toute autre fonction salariee que celle de ministre et qui l'accepte, cesse immediatement de sieger et ne reprend ses fonctions qu'en vertu d'une nouvelle election." J. Servais, E. Mechelynck ed. Les Codes Belges. (Bruxelles, 1927), p.4.

makers in Persia were using an old version of the Belgian laws as Moḥīt Ṭabāṭabā'I suggests or it might have been deliberately done in order to curtail the power of the Government over the Majles. In any case, it meant that there appeared a discrepancy in the Persian laws, for if Ministers were separate from the Assembly they could not be held responsible to that body, or, at least, the problem of enforcing that responsibility became impossible. It can be added also that if the Ministers had also been in the Majles, there would have been a possibility that political parties might have evolved in their support, the Executive would have had more power with regard to the King as well as the House, and would have been able to act more effectively. But the system which arose could not function efficiently and, as Moshīr al-Douleh complained, he had all the responsibility without power, and the Shah had all the power without responsibility.¹ He could have added that the Majles aspired to power but had no means to effect it.

This defect with regard to the question of ministerial responsibility and the non-existence of political parties was apparent to some political thinkers and writers,² and there were certain articles published

1. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 54, March 15th 1907, FO 416/32.

2. R.M., No. 68, 25th Safar 1325, (9th April 1907).
 Ibid No. 119, 15th Rabi'-al-Sānī 1326 (11th May, 1908).
 Also Habl al-Matīn No. 56, 30th Jamādī al-Avval 1325,
 (2nd July, 1907).

describing these questions, which not only show an awareness of political parties, Hezb or Ferqeh¹ as they were called, but also show that a few people thought the existence of political parties desirable for the solution of these dilemmas. Examples were drawn from Britain and Russia by these writers, and the position of political parties was discussed at great length. But on the other hand, the whole general emphasis was on unity and any partisan politics was criticized as weakening the Reform movement. This insistence on unity had two reasons, one, the resistance put up by the reactionaries, the other, which was possibly more dangerous and linked to the first, the religious controversy.

The enemies of reform, especially the religious ones, attacked it in the name of Eslam and accused the Deputies and the Majles of Bābism. They were led by Sheykh Fażlallāh Nūrī one of the influential and powerful Mojtaheds. The reformers of all shades of opinion countered this threat by being very careful over the religious clauses of the Constitution, by trying to give every law an Eslamic colour, and by arguing that the institutions they were taking from the West were in accordance with Eslam.

1. Traditionally the word Hezb had a religio-sectarian connotation. In the First, but more especially the Second Majles the words Hezb, Ferqeh or even Pārtī were used interchangeably, the word Hezb became the accepted name for party in the Third Majles.
A. Banani, "Hezb", Encyclopaedia of Islam N.E. (London, Leiden, 1971) 3, pp.527-530.

So far some of the weaknesses and discrepancies of the Constitutional laws have been examined which considerably nullified the results of the Reform movement and made the question of governing the country a very difficult one. No well-defined political party emerged to give leadership and coherence to the Majles, on the contrary the very nature of these laws and the fact that their signature was delayed occasioned a long controversy and further helped to widen the split in the ranks of the Deputies.

Moreover, the deliberate attempt by the law makers to weaken the Executive in the face of the Legislative antagonized the Shah and created a split. One side was more extremist and anti-monarchist and logically opposed the Prime Ministership of Atābak which symbolized the Monarch. They were a small minority but vocal and active. On the other side were the moderates, in a majority, who supported Atābak and wished to find a solution to the differences between the Shah and the Majles. The Majles itself had many internal problems which weakened it and discredited it in the eyes of the sceptic, despite the efforts of the law makers to strengthen it.

Internal Problems of the Majles

The Deputies were aware of these weaknesses but were generally unable to remedy them. They were inexperienced, and there was no precedent to call upon.

Meetings were irregularly attended and there were often many absentees. The provincial elections met with many difficulties and were often delayed. The local Governors were in general uncooperative or unsympathetic. There were very many complaints sent from all over the country, and not only was the Majles powerless to remedy them, but it took much of its time just to deal with these complaints. The problem of elections at times triggered off old local quarrels and degenerated into fighting and lawlessness, as for instance in Kermanshah or Shiraz.

From a very early date certain Deputies began to voice criticism of the Majles itself, especially the more moderates, who wished to show that all the fault did not lie with the Government. This naturally lost the Majles much of its prestige in some quarters.

The internal regulations of the Majles were not often enforced, and none of the three Presidents, Şanī'al-Douleh, Eḡteshām al-Saltāneh and Momtāz al-Douleh really controlled the house. Discussions were haphazard and no proper programme was prepared until towards the end, despite many complaints by the Deputies. Very seldom was a decision arrived at, and most topics were abandoned after discussion. The Majles became a forum for voicing complaints. These negative conditions increased with the increasing lawlessness and the general disturbances in the country.

Mostashār al-Douleh, whose thoughts and actions will be described later, gave vent to his opinion on the

shortcomings of the Majles in Rabī'al-Avval (May) in these words:

"Thirty Crore Persians want the remedy to their ills from this Majles, and it is obvious that the Majles has not worked according to their expectations, but it is not true that the Majles has done nothing as is announced these days; on the contrary, despite all the difficulties, it has achieved a lot, but in all fairness we must say that we have not been able to live up to all our responsibilities. I divide the reasons for this lack of success into three; one is in connection with the Government, the second with the Majles, and the third is due to the people. About the responsibility of the Government, I shall not say anything because of the reasons discussed in the special Commission, and due to the change in their attitude, now things will be different. But about the responsibility of the people, each person looks upon the situation with a different view. One group talks about bread and meat, they think the Majles must arrange the condition of bread and meat. Others talk about the roads and streets; people demand reform or an end to these rebellions, some have found an instrument to waste the time of the Majles, and we must get over all these. What concerns the Majles itself is the lack of internal regulations. According to the Nezāmnāme it is agreed that matters should be presented as bills to the President of the Majles, and the Deputies must know beforehand the topics to be discussed. Until now this condition has never been taken into account. Another point which causes delay is the lack of an arrangement for discussion. It is obvious that the meaning of consultation is to talk and to listen, but here whenever a question is brought up there is an attack from four different quarters and the speaker must cease to speak after a few words. In such a way there never will be any result, and instead of improving, speeches have been deteriorating." 1

1. R.M. No. 83, 20th Rabī' al-Avval 1325, (4th May 1907).

With many such crucial problems unsolved it is hardly surprising that in the months from Zīqa'deh 1324 (September 1906) to Jamādī al-Avval 1326 (June 1908) the Majles, the Shah and the Ministers were continually at loggerheads and the Majles was the scene of incessant turmoil. Each of the seven Ministries which followed faced much the same problems and each failed to surmount them. Certain problems faced them all. The Shah's enmity, the lack of cohesion between the Ministers who could neither lead the Majles nor satisfy the Shah, and the intransigence of the Majles made the smooth working of the Constitution well nigh impossible. The fact that none of the Ministries was supported by a political party in the Majles meant that they had to rely on the Shah who appointed them. Moreover, the Shah delayed signing the Supplementary Fundamental laws which weakened the Majles. There were other problems too, such as the very important and dangerous religious controversy, the increasing lawlessness and insurrections blamed on the Shah and the Government, and the apparent inactivity of Atabak the Prime Minister who took over from Vazīr Afkham. Before going further, the question of the Ministry of Atabak must be discussed as this was a test of strength between the Shah and those Deputies who wanted to assert the ascendancy of the Majles.

As has been said, Atābak's return not only failed to alleviate the situation but widened the gap between his supporters and his opponents, thus creating a division of opinion among the Deputies.

The return of Atābak was discussed in the Majles before he came. Some said that he was an outcast because of treason and should not hold a job again, but Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī, ready for a compromise, said Atābak was one of the Shah's servants and as such he had the right to recall him. If they noticed any wickedness then they should dismiss him.¹ The return was prepared before he came back from exile and it is interesting to note that he was considered as the only person who could save the situation by many people even during the last month of the reign of Moḥammad al-Dīn Shah, and there exist several letters which indicate that Moḥammad 'Alī Shah in fact desired Atābak's return before his accession.²

The return of Atābak was a mistake. Although he was a strong man, he had a notorious reputation which could not have placated the real reformers. He had too much influence and was a past master at intrigue, and he played at first so as to win the support of the moderates in the Majles and the Shah, but he could not satisfy the extremists.

It was said of him that he had had a change of heart and was now a liberal and a pro-constitutionalist. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, as the Minister of Science and an important figure in the Government, and Ṣanī' al-Douleh were staunch supporters of Atābak and helped influence the

1. R.M. No. 66, 23rd Ṣafar 1325 (7th April 1907) and No. 72, 1st Rabī' al-Avval (15th April).
2. E. Ṣafā'ī, Asnād-e Siyāsī-ye Doureh-ye Qājāriyeh (Tehran 1346) pp.388-90.

Deputies in his favour.¹ Some of the influential merchant Deputies such as Amīn al-Ẓarb, Mo'īn al-Tojjār, Ḥājī Moḥammad Esmā'īl Tabrīzī, and many of the Aṣnāf Deputies who looked to the more important merchants for leadership, supported Atābak, so did Seyyed 'Abdallāh, Ḥājī Naṣrallāh Akhavī and some of their supporters. According to Malekzādeh, he had the support of Behbahānī among the Ulama² and Doulatābādī points out that by combining such small cliques, Atābak obtained a majority in the Majles.³ There was some opposition to his coming in the Majles and a private session was arranged where his return was agreed to and compromised upon.

Most writers have believed that Atābak was not genuine in his support of the Constitution. Kasravī thinks he tricked the Majles⁴ Doulatābādī says he played a double game between the Shah and the Majles, and that he pretended to support the Majles whilst he had promised the Shah to suppress it.⁵ The newspaper Ḥabl al-Matīn suspected the Premier and in a long article insinuated that the disturbances in the country were deliberate. It wrote asking what had recently changed. Had money been spent in bribes? Had the Deputies changed? Had the Senate

1. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, op.cit., p.152.

2. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh e Mashrūṭīyyat 3, p.70.

3. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.125.

4. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p.445.

5. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.127.

been constituted? Had any one new arrived?¹

Despite the fact that Atābak had a majority in the Majles, Taqīzādeh never stopped his attacks. Atābak had the support of the Hedāyat family, and the group of Amīn al-Zarb, and the sympathy and following of the Aṣnāf and Bāzārīs. On the other hand, there was the small core of opposition of Azarbaijānīs, and particularly Taqīzādeh who, as disturbances spread, even accused the Government of treason. He said that he could not say much as two months previously he had made a compromise, meaning that he had submitted to the opinion of the majority when the question of the return of Atābak was voted on. Now, however, he was protesting and claiming that the Government was responsible for these disturbances.² Some Deputies joined Taqīzādeh in accusing Atābak of having the responsibility for the rebellion led by the son of Raḥīm Khān in Rabī'al-Sānī (May) in Tabriz.³ Āqā Sheykh Ḥoseyn said that this was

1. Habl al-Matīn No.41 3rd Jamādī al-Avval 1325 (14th June 1907).

2. R.M. No. 130, 25th Jamādī al-Avval 1325 (1st July 1907).

3. Raḥīm Khān was a robber chief of Azarbaijan who had been imprisoned by the Shah when Crown Prince; now he was in Tehran but his son Būyūk Khān attacked Qarajehdaq, and Tabriz even feared an attack. It was suspected that the real instigators of this were his father and the Government. After much agitation in Tabriz and Tehran, Raḥīm Khān was imprisoned in Tehran to ensure the good behaviour of his son. E.G. Browne, op.cit., p.141.

the same Minister who some years previously had kept the country absolutely in order, but now could not manage it.¹ In general, however, all the Ministers were blamed for not taking action, but Taqīzādeh's criticism was more direct and was based much more on principle than the others, and he insisted on the point of responsibility of all the Ministers in addition to Atābak.

Gradually Taqīzādeh grew more fearless and increased his attacks. He particularly criticized the autocratic Kāmran Mīrzā, now Minister of War in the Cabinet, and Farmāfarmā,² the Shah's brother-in-law and a Prince of the Qajar Royal house, as Minister of Justice.³ He also called for the resignation of the Government if it could not control the country,⁴

1. R.M. No. 98, 12th Rabī'al-Šānī 1325 (25th May 1907) and No. 101, 16th Rabī'al-Šānī (29th May).
2. Kāmran Mīrzā was accused of peculation of Army funds by Taqīzādeh, and 78 Deputies voted against him. Farmāfarmā, as Minister of Justice, was not so directly accused, but Taqīzādeh insinuated as much. The occasion was the trial of Aṣef al-Douleh, the Governor of Khorasan, who was accused of having been involved in the sale of girls to Turkomans. Farmāfarmā had, as Minister of Justice, been holding the trials, and had acquitted Aṣef al-Douleh with a small fine. M.M., 13th Jamādī al-Avval 1325
3. Aḥsan al-Douleh, member of the Committee of Petitions, stated that there were more than 1000 petitions which had been referred to the Minister of the Interior and had been left without reply. R.M. No. 167, 17th Rajab 1325 (27th August 1907).
4. Ibid., No. 98, 12th Rabī'al-Šānī 1325 (25th May 1907). But it must be pointed out that Taqīzādeh's request was unconstitutional as he was in the minority. The majority of the Majles was still not ready to vote against Atābak.

and accused it of not attending the Majles more often and not being a united body. Atābak's supporters exempted him from responsibility and were apologetic in their defence of him. Some blamed the Majles and not the Government for all the disturbances and rebellion which had become widespread in the country.¹ On one occasion, Taqīzādeh blamed the Government and asked it to put down the disturbances; an angry scene ensued in which Mostashār al-Douleh said in such cases of disturbance the Government should act before the Majles even petitioned it. Mohtasham al-Douleh, who was in the Majles on behalf of Atābak, said that such criticism weakened the Government; Taqīzādeh replied that if the Government fulfilled its duty there would be no need for criticism, and that criticism did not weaken the Government. On the whole Taqīzādeh's attitude was to force Atābak to resign as he thought him to be in league with the Shah, and could not believe that such a person could change his mind.

Much of the restlessness and rebellion in Persia was due to the open opposition of a section of the Ulama headed by Sheykh Fażlallāh, who took bast in the Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm Shrine and from there made violent attacks on the Majles and the Deputies on religious grounds. Many felt that this was encouraged and even paid for by the Shah and the Government. Open conflict

1. Ibid. No. 110, 29th Rabī'al-Avval 1325 (10th June 1907).

was only averted, as Spring Rice points out, by the sagacity of the Liberals who persuaded the Majles not to take any action.¹

One problem was lack of funds. The Government was in great need of money to carry on but Atābak had promised not to borrow from abroad, and encouraged the Deputies to finish organizing the National Bank as had been decided, in order to avoid having to arrange a loan.² However, he was apparently thinking of a loan, as Doulatābādī says he had met some of the Deputies to discuss a loan, and Spring Rice had even warned Atābak that a foreign loan would be dangerous to him.³ However Taqīzādeh's main criticism centred round the question of ministerial responsibility and not the loan, and he demanded the putting down of lawlessness and the signature of the Fundamental laws. He particularly held Atābak as responsible for all that was happening and asked him to resign on many occasions. On the other hand, Taqīzādeh too was accused of irreligion and anarchy by his opponents. In an important speech on the

1. Spring Rice to Grey, July 19th 1907, No. 164, FO 371/304 Inc. in No. 1.
2. Ibid., No. 89 27th Rabī'al-Avval 1325 (11th May 1907).
3. Spring Rice to Grey, May 20th 1907 No. 127 FO 416/32. It must be added here that during the Ministry of Moshīr al-Douleh the loan already negotiated with Russia and Britain had been brought to the Majles but had been opposed and in its stead the Deputies, led by the Deputy of the merchants, Mo'īn al-Tojjār had offered to organize a Bank and to provide the Government with the money it needed. The question of the Bank is discussed in the section about the Tojjār.

17th Rajab (27th August), Taqīzādeh explained his way of thinking and his attitude to the Government. He said that his policy was based on two things, to keep within the bounds of religion and the Constitution. No one had the right, he said, to accuse him of the contrary. He was opposed to the majority, but the Majles did not have the right to curtail the freedom of the minority and everyone who kept within the bounds of religion and the Constitution should be free. He added that everywhere it was customary that the Deputies in a Majles were of two sorts, those who supported the Ministers and those who opposed them, but the majority must not attack the minority. Being of the minority did not mean they opposed religion or the Constitution. Then he had said he would prove the faults of the Government, the least of which was that they did not resign.

But Atābak held to his position despite such criticisms for he had the backing of a large section of the Deputies. Before going further, however, we must look at the divisions in the Majles which we have indicated. Were these due to ideological divergences, to particular ephemeral issues, or were they based on class divisions? To analyse these questions we must first look at the Electoral laws, because these were responsible for the composition of the Majles and dictated its membership.

CHAPTER III

THE ELECTORAL LAWS

The elections were conducted according to social classes in Tehran. The six important classes or Ṭabaqāt of society were to elect their representatives to the Majles; they were the princes or Shāhzādegān, the nobles and aristocrats or the A'yān and Ashrāf, the Mālekīn and Fallāḥīn or landlords and landed peasants¹, the merchants or Tojjār, the Ulama and Ṭollāb or the religious class and religious students, and the Aṣnāf or guild members.² The number of Deputies for Tehran in each class or Ṭabaqeh was to be divided thus: the princes 4, Ulama and Ṭollāb 4, Tojjār 10, Mālekīn and Fallāḥīn 10, and the Aṣnāf 32, one from each guild. At the time of the elections it had become apparent that there was no distinction between the A'yān and the Mālekīn, and it was decided to give no representation to the A'yān as one Ṭabaqeh. However a distinction was made at the last minute in the

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1. The Fallāḥīn or peasants had to be owners of land worth a thousand tomans. This would naturally disqualify landless peasants, only small landowners could therefore vote along with the large land owners or sit in the Majles.
 2. The members of the Aṣnāf were described as those who owned an independent business.

case of three men who were elected as representatives of the A'yān - Sa'd al-Douleh, Moshār al-Molk and 'Oun al Douleh. The reason in the case of Sa' d al-Douleh was that the revolutionaries especially wished to give him a seat in the Majles, and 'Oun al-Douleh and Moshār al-Molk being his friends and supporters were probably suggested by him, both left the Majles when Sa'd himself left.

The notion of class or Ṭabaqeh in Persia is different from that held in Europe. There were no fixed and defined classes, and there was often much overlapping and fluidity among the Persian Ṭabaqāt. A prince could also be a landowner, as indeed most were; a merchant too could become a rich powerful landowner, and even marry into the royal family. The same was true of the members of the higher Ulama. There was a very big gap between the status of a Mojtahed and that of a simple Mollā or or Ṭalabeh, or a Sheykh (a religious student or a holy man). The same fluidity was true of the merchants, and small members of guilds or Aṣnāf. Titles such as Douleh and Molk, Saltāneh or Mamālek were not hereditary and were bestowed on members of the aristocracy, the higher bureaucrats, who might have arisen from modest beginnings, or even princes. At the same time there could be very wealthy princes or impoverished ones. There was thus a very vague and fluid social class system in Persia, which meant in fact that when their representatives came to the Majles,

there was very little class solidarity between each Ṭabaqeh. Indeed there were all shades of opinion among the members of the Ṭabaqāt because of this fact.

The Electoral Laws in Persia dealt with the Ṭabaqāt more in the nature of estates, as in the Russian Revolution or even the earlier French Revolution. But contrary to the practice in Europe, there was not in Persia any precedent of corporate organization except in the case of the Aṣṇāf, who were dealt with each as a separate corporation for taxation by the Government.

The Electoral law for Tehran was based on class divisions; the capital was over-represented and received sixty votes out of 160. The reason is obvious and has been mentioned by the law makers themselves. They were in a hurry to hold the elections and to open the Majles at the earliest opportunity, as the Shah was sick and likely to die at any moment, and it was rightly guessed that the provincial elections would be delayed. This consideration gave Tehran a start before the other Deputies began to arrive. Moreover, they were representatives of their Ṭabaqeh, but the provincial Deputies were chosen by a second degree election and only in the Ayālāt and Valāyāt which sent 12 and 6 Deputies respectively was the class distinction preserved. The small towns each sent one Deputy. One writer believes that the nature of the electoral laws caused a division between the Deputies because he says each Deputy was interested in his own province, and caused factions to appear (in this context

the writer talks of pārtī but he means factions and not political parties.¹

The reason for basing the elections on the Ṭabaqāt has never been explained. The Russian and French examples might have been in the minds of the law makers. On the other hand attempts were made to satisfy every Ṭabaqeh which mattered politically or which had participated in the elections.² Many assumed that it was quite natural to base the Electoral Laws on the traditional divisions for it would have been generally more comprehensible. A full description of the writing of the electoral law is given by one writer which shows the difficulties encountered by the more liberal reformers and the resistance of the reactionaries. The final draft accepted was the one prepared by the liberals and the Tojjār³. Parts of these laws were translations from foreign electoral laws, with certain changes or additions to suit the condition of Persia.

1. Majd al-Eslām Kermānī, Tārīkh-e Enḡelāl-e Majles, Faṣṭā'ī az Tārīkh-e Enḡelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran (Esfahan, 1351) p. 32.
2. In a letter by Dabīr al-Molk, a politician and courtier to Atābak, an insight is given on some of the negotiations before the drawing up of the electoral laws. Moshīr al-Molk had prepared a set of laws, but he was told that he and the Ṣadr A'ḡam, his father, were co-operating with the Constitutionalists, so this was not accepted, and the Ulama and others were told to prepare their own Neḡāmnāmeḡ. One was written by the Tojjar and one by Seyyed Moḡammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī but none had been acceptable, and people had become restless at the delay. E. Ṣafā'ī Asnād-e Sīyāsī Y. Doulatābādī also tells a similar story. *Op. cit.* 2, pp. 86-89.
3. Y. Doulatābādī, *Ibid.*, pp. 86-88 also see Malekzādeh, Tārīkh e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, pp. 187.

On two occasions the electoral laws were discussed in the Majles, as certain difficulties arose for the elections of the Deputies of Gilan and of the Deputies elected by the Majles.¹ These discussions throw light on some of the basic ideas of the law makers in this respect.

In Gilan the Aṣnāf had cast 1000 votes for their Deputy whilst the Ṭollāb had cast only 500, so the former argued that they should send two representatives to the Majles instead of the Ṭollāb. This request was dismissed in the Majles and the President Ṣanī'al-Douleh argued that it would be unfair to change the laws in this respect as under the existing system each Ṭabaqeh had the right to send its representative to the Majles. Mokhber al-Molk, his brother, who was a moderate Deputy had said that as the Qajar princes were few in Gilan their candidate should be given to the Aṣnāf, but this suggestion was not taken up. The discussion turned upon the question as to whether the class basis of the elections should be retained or not; one of the Deputies, Mīrzā Faẓl 'Alī Āqā, the representative of the merchants of Azarbaijan, said that if this class basis were changed, the Aṣnāf and the Ṭollāb would have no chance of being represented.² Indeed this must have been the

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1. According to the Electoral Laws, if 6 months were left to the end of the session, the Majles could elect Deputies to replace those who had died or had resigned.
 2. R.M. No 165, 16th Rajab 1325 (26th Aug. 1907).

main reason why the elections were based on the Ṭabaqāt, for it must have been obvious that otherwise these poorer people, who had participated in the Bast and the Revolution would not be represented in the Majles, as indeed happened when the Electoral Laws were changed.¹

On this occasion votes were taken on whether or not to exempt Gilan from the class basis of the Electoral Laws, but it was voted 75 against 6 that the principles be maintained. Indeed the mood in the Majles was to retain the Electoral Laws for the time being for fear of the effects of further changes.

On another occasion again the Electoral laws were discussed and it was decided to elect new members for the Majles. This question posed many problems. It was unclear whether the new members to be elected should be of the same class as those who had left or were deceased. It was also unclear whether the representatives of the A'yān and Ashrāf who had been first overlooked, but had then been

1. The Electoral Laws were changed before the Second Majles met, as will be pointed out, and the class basis was abolished, only property qualification and a certain level of literacy being maintained. In the Third Majles these qualifications too were abolished, and it meant that the Mālekīn's influence and number increased, whereas the membership of the Ašnāf and the small merchants decreased. For more detail see:

Z. Shajī'ī, Namāyandegān-e Majles-e Shourā-ye Mellī dar Bīst va yek Doureh-ye Qānūn Gozārī, (Tehran, 1344) pp. 178 & 185.

chosen in the person of Sa'd al-Douleh, 'Oun al-Douleh and Moshār al-Molk as representatives of the A'yān should, now that Sa'd al-Douleh had left, be chosen as representatives of the A'yān or of the Mālekīn.¹ All these and many such problems posed themselves mainly because of the haste with which the laws had been originally prepared.² So the Deputies showed a sense of reality and did not insist on their personal interpretations of the laws in order to ease the matter and to elect new members to reinforce their ranks, and it was at all times insisted that worthy men should be elected who could assist in the process of reform.

How far, it must be asked, was the Electoral law, with regard to the class basis it imposed, satisfactory? It was understood at the time that it was the only feasible solution for Persia, as it could be best understood by men who were sending their representatives to the Majles for the first time. It had many obvious flaws, as for instance the fact that the peasants and religious minorities and tribes were not represented though this omission was discussed later and remedied to some extent in the second Electoral Laws by giving one representative to the minorities and the tribes. The qualification to elect or be elected remained unchanged so those without property were still

1. R.M. No 17, 1st Zīhājeh 1325 (6th Jan. 1908).

2. Another problem for instance was the fact that the number of Deputies to be elected was according to the Constitutional laws 160, and according to the Electoral laws 156.

debarred from being represented. Moreover, Tehran had a share out of proportion to its population but it was understood to be a temporary measure.

The class basis of the election of Tehran however did not ensure any solidarity between the Tehran members who came from very different social backgrounds, nor did any class solidarity develop between men who were divided by their wealth, birth or levels of interest, even if they belonged to the same group. Also, by giving the majority of seats to the Aṣnāf and merchants who were the least influential and powerful politically, it ensured a disparity of strength with the Tabaqeh which had held, and still held, real political power, namely the A'yān and Ashrāf. Though this upper class of landowners and rich influential magnates were very few in the Majles, they still held power outside and particularly the Executive was still manned by them so that the antagonism which developed between the Majles and the Government and the distinction within and outside the Majles was to a certain extent due to this disparity of strength.

At this juncture it must be asked whether the fact that no political party developed in the first Majles was due to the nature of these laws? What would have been the nature of the Majles had such a class division not been imposed? There is no doubt that if the electorate had not been fragmented in this way in order to ensure a more democratic return, the influence of the oligarchic class

would through patronage and power have ensured a totally different representation.¹ In that case possibly political parties would have appeared earlier than they did, in support of class interests. What did appear in fact in the First Majles was a division between what is termed as moderate and extremist, or Mo'tadel and Āzādīkhāhān (these two groups and the names chosen will be discussed later). This division was not based on a clear-cut class basis, and there were members of each Ṭabaqeh on each side, although the moderates counted amongst their ranks more upper class Deputies and supporters outside the Majles, and the Āzādīkhāhān more of the lower classes. Of course there was no cohesion amongst these two groups. Had there

1. As one writer, G. H. Razi, points out, the Third Electoral law of 1911 (1329) which removed property qualification and established universal male suffrage, promised to be more democratic but in fact increased the power of the landowners and major tribal leaders. G. H. Razi, "Genesis of Party in Iran. A case study of the Interaction between the political system and political parties". Iranian Studies, Spring, 1970, pp. 69-70. Despite the fact that the elections of the first Majles were free there were certain cases of the use of patronage reported. Ḥājī 'Ez al-Mamālek, a Liberal Deputy in the Second Majles, who had been present at the first elections of Tehran, recounted in a private interview how the Hedāyat family used its influence to win four seats in the Majles for their family and several of their friends. Kermānī also mentions that Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī used his influence in favour of his son-in-law. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit.1, p. 39.

appeared a clear division based on the Ṭabaqāt, no doubt political parties to support their class interests would have arisen in the First Majles. In the Second Majles the class bases of the election were abolished and the composition of membership was different, as will be seen later, but the parties which developed were still based on political differences rather than on class differences.

Of course there were many other complex reasons for the fact that no actual political party appeared, but one reason was due to the special characteristics of the Persian Ṭabaqāt, as described, which ensured that no group or particular Ṭabaqeh could develop into a political party. These points will now be examined in detail with regard to each Ṭabaqeh.

Qajar Princes

According to the Electoral laws, four Qajar Princes were to be elected for Tehran. In fact there were a few more who were elected by other provinces and Ṭabaqāt. The Princes in Tehran elected their representatives reluctantly, being coaxed into doing so by Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah, and in general those who were elected were not among the famous and very well-known or wealthy princes. Only one, Asadallāh Mīrzā Shohāb al-Saltāneh, showed a lively interest in political questions and took part in discussions; the others rarely did so. He remained in politics and became a Minister in the Second Majles.

It is possible that at first the Princes were overawed by the Majles and by the attacks on their wealth and privileges made in the press or in discussions and meetings. When Kāmran Mīrzā, the Minister of War and influential father-in-law and uncle of Moḥammad'Alī Shah, was attacked in the Majles, only one voice was raised in his defence. That was Yaḥyā Mīrzā Ṣāqat al-Saltāneh, Deputy for Khorasan and brother of Asadallāh Mīrzā, and described by Taqīzādeh as a reactionary.¹

The strength and influence of the Qajar Princes and their political activity lay outside the Majles and not within it, and their reaction and attitude to the Majles varied; and though they were assumed to be naturally opposed, some supported the Constitution. Two of these very influential and powerful Princes were 'Abd al - Ḥoseyn Mīrzā Farmānfarmā and Kāmran Mīrzā Nāyeb al-Saltāneh, Another very influential prince was the powerful Governor of Esfahan, Solṭān Mas'ūd Mīrzā Ṣell al-Solṭān. These and others of their family were generally very unpopular and even hated because of their abuse of privilege. Kāmran Mīrzā never compromised with the constitutionalists and only after the murder of Atābak, did he appear in the Majles, and then only by joining the Anjoman-e Khedmat². Farmānfarmā and Ṣell al-Solṭān took

1. For details of Asadallāh Mīrzā's life see M. Bāmdād. Op. cit., 1, p. 114.

2. See pages 163, 256.

a different attitude, and both posed as constitutionalists, risking great disfavour with the Shah, for they were personally strong and very influential and had men working for them in Tehran and the provinces and possibly in the Majles too. This attitude was the one which eventually prevailed amongst the Princes and A'yān, who accepted the Majles as a force to be reckoned with and tried to work with it rather than against it in order to save themselves. The revolutionaries fully realized the opportunism of such men but could not do without their services. Farmānfarmā was a strong administrator, and as Minister of Justice in the Cabinets of Vazīr Afkham and Atābak, tried with some success to reform that Ministry. He was nonetheless badly criticized in the Majles because of the trial of Āṣef al-Douleh and those involved in the sale of girls to the Turkomans, and even accused indirectly of receiving bribes. He was however appointed immediately as Governor of Azarbaijan.¹ This appointment poses a very interesting

1. Farmānfarmā had been Governor of Kerman when the revolution occurred. He immediately declared his support for the Majles, and leaving his seventeen years old son, Noṣrat al-Douleh, as Governor of that Province, he came to Tehran (Moṣaffar al-Dīn Shah had always feared him and had kept him out of the capital for many years). The governorship of his son caused much criticism, especially in the newspaper Ṣūr - e Esrāfīl edited by Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān. On the other hand Ḥabl al Matīn defended him, and so Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān made indirect mention of bribes. Taqizadeh too accused Farmānfarmā in the Majles and, as mentioned above, insinuated bribery and objected to the whole process of the trials of Āṣef al - Douleh.

question which characterizes the whole contradiction existing in the constitutional Revolution and probably one of the reasons for its failure. Farmānfarmā stood for all that was anathema to the revolutionaries. His wealth, influence, patronage and privileges were what they wished to abolish, but when a strong governor was needed in Azarbaijan they had to turn to him, and he went there with the strong recommendation of the Azarbaijan Deputies, as the Anjoman of Tabriz had originally refused to receive him.¹ The attitude of Taqīzādeh on this question is not clear from the Majles discussions. He may well have remained silent because of the urgency of this problem.²

Zell al- Soltān had been unpopular in Esfahan as Governor, and when he left that province to come to Tehran on the occasion of the accession of Moḥammad'Alī Shah there was such a rebellion in Esfahan that the Government was obliged to depose him. He then posed as a constitutionalist,³ and even paid secret sums to the revolutionaries.

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1. It was the same need for a strong government which brought back Atābak, that lay behind the appointment of Farmānfarmā as Governor of Azarbaijan. Šaqat al-Eslām, one of the chief Mojtaheds of Tabriz and a very influential constitutionalist, believed, as did many others, that a strong governor was needed. N. Fathī, Zendegānī-ye Shahīd-e Niknām Šaqat al-Eslām Tabrīzī, va Bakhshī az Tārīkh-e Mostanad-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran (Tehran, 1325). p. 186.
 2. R.M., Nos. 149 and 151, 24th and 26th Jamādī al-Šānī, 1325. 4th and 6th Aug. 1907.
 3. Y.Doulatābādī, op. cit., 2, p. 168.

He was looked upon as a possible alternative monarch to Moḥammad 'Alī Shah,¹ though this possibility did not materialize. In Ramaḡān 1325 (November 1907), 'Ayn al-Douleh and Ḥell al-Solṡān offered their services and wealth to the Majles; one of the Deputies, Vakīl al-Ro'āyā, who was generally a moderate, but at times attacked the wealth of the rich, replied that the declarations of these two Princes should be regarded as sincere. Seyyed Naṡrallāh, Deputy of the Tollāb, added that 'Ayn al-Douleh had once been a convinced reactionary, but as he had now declared he would be a sincere constitutionalist, he should be trusted. "We have only such people to work for the country", the Seyyed said, and they should not be left without work for the country needed them and their past behaviour should not be held against them.² Taqīzādeh and his followers naturally disagreed with such a stand, but this was generally accepted.

1. R.M. No. 200, 25 Ramaḡān 1325 (2nd Nov. 1907).

2. Taqīzādeh often voiced the view that ministerial posts and governorships should not always be given to the members of the A'yān and princely class; there were other men who could perform such jobs equally well, he said, though from more modest backgrounds. For instance, when the ministry of Moshīr al-Salṡaneh was being discussed after the murder of Atābak, he said that there were at least thirty people who could be appointed as ministers and who were different from previous ministers.
R.M. No. 173, 2nd Sha 'bān 1325 (11th September, 1907).

The Qajar Princes, whether in or out of the Majles, could not form a cohesive group. They would have been unable to coalesce had they wished to do so, as they came from very different backgrounds and belonged to different generations of a very prolific family and were as often as not on inimical terms for political as well as other reasons. On the one hand there was a small group amongst them such as the princes Soleyman Mīrzā and his brother Yaḥyā Mīrzā 'Eskandarī, who were both revolutionaries, the former becoming the leader of the Democrat Party in the Second Majles. On the other hand there was also a group who wanted to reach a compromise between the Shah and the Majles. Eḥteshām al-Saltāneh, the second President of the Majles and his brother, the reactionary 'Alā' al-Douleh, were among this group.

'Alā' al-Douleh had as Governor of Tehran been responsible for beating the sugar merchants in 1323(1905), which led to the closing of the Bāzārs and the beginning of the Revolution. He was, it seemed the arch-reactionary. Eḥteshām al - Saltāneh his brother had on the other hand been an advocate of reform. He had been exiled by 'Ayn al-Douleh,¹ and was therefore popular with the revolutionaries, so that when Ṣanī' al - Douleh resigned after the

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., 1, pp. 145-6.

murder of Atabak he was chosen as the President of the Majles.¹ Now with his brother who changed his line and posed as a constitutionalist, they tried to reconcile the Shah with the Majles, and arranged for his attendance and declaration of his allegiance to the Constitution. They also organized the Anjoman-e Khedmat which comprised all the A'yān, courtiers, politicians and princes, who had so far stood aloof or been opposed to the Majles, and who now came to the Majles and swore allegiance to it. What this Anjoman stood for and what it did is not clear, though opinions are generally unfavourable to it.² It certainly was not trusted by the revolutionaries.

1. Two special phenomena amongst Persian politicians must be mentioned here. Politics was a personal matter and one way of maintaining power for the family, so it often happened that members of one family backed opposing factions in order to be able to retain power, whatever happened. It is not clear therefore whether these men acted out of necessity or conviction. Another observation which must also be mentioned is shifts in opinion by many politicians. One such was 'Alā'al - Douleh, who posed as supporter of the Constitution after the death of Atābak. Though the revolutionaries did not trust him, for he was prevented from accepting the governorship of Fars, he was asked, nonetheless, to intercede with the Shah to persuade him to send away some of his courtiers as a sign of his goodwill, in Zīqa'deh, 1325 (5th June 1907), but the Shah instead had him and his brother Mo'īn al - Douleh beaten and exiled.
Y. Doulatābādī. Op. cit., 2, pp. 164-5.
2. This Anjoman has been described as "a conglomeration of people establishing new political alliances rather than changing their politics; it was a major threat to constitutionalism and the one that finally harmed it most."

R.A. Sheikholeslami and D. Wilson "The Memoirs of Heydar Khān", p.3.

The Anjoman-e Khedmat cannot be described as a political party, though it was the nearest to such an organization, which the A'yān and princes organized to defend their interests, their privileges and riches which were coming more and more under attack. No doubt the cut in the salaries of some must have been very unpopular though they did not express it openly. Later, as the danger to their interests increased and became more obvious, some elements among them supported the political party that emerged in the Second Majles as the E'tedāliyyūm. At this early period it was still only a vague threat, especially as the Āzādīkhāhān were beset by so many problems they did not undertake the social and economic reforms they advocated.

A'yān and Ashrāf and Mālekīn

The interests and privileges and the attitudes of the Princes corresponded very much to those of the A'yān and Ashrāf and Mālekīn, and we find the same lack of cohesion amongst this Tabaqeh as well.

The aristocracy and the landowners were given the right to vote, but according to the Electoral Laws only the landowners and Fallāhīn had the right to be represented in the Majles. However, as already mentioned, several Deputies were elected who sat in the Majles under their status as A'yān. They were given ten seats for Tehran and

according to one authority in all they held 21% of the seats.¹ This number compared with the merchants and the Asnāf, is not considerable; their power lay outside the Majles and not within it, as in the case of the Princes. As already mentioned, there is little distinction to be made between the Mālek and A'yān as most of the A'yān were also Mālek. Their background too was often similar, having arisen from the bureaucracy or from service at court; heredity was never a criterion of rank in Persia.

This class, which will be called by the general name of A'yān for the sake of brevity, was by far the most experienced in administration and politics, had very useful family connections, was better educated, many having been educated in Europe, and enjoyed through their privileges and patronage great power in and out of the Majles. All the Ministries were staffed by members of the A'yān class, and we must examine this Ṭabaqeh in a wider perspective than the A'yān in the Majles, especially as many of the Deputies

1. Z. Shajī'ī compiling her statistical data has not followed the original division of the Deputies in the First Majles, and we do not know the percentage of the A'yān in the Majles. She has concentrated on the landowning or Mālek class, the bureaucracy, the Ulama and the merchants, and those who had non-governmental jobs and those who for instance held one job or more or were at the same time Mālek and government official. Moreover it must be mentioned that these statistics are only theoretical, because the provincial Deputies arrived very gradually and were not present all the time in the Majles. In fact the composition of the Majles varied at different times.
Z. Shajī'ī, op. cit., p. 178.

were connected with the Ministers through various ties, and also because the really important A'yān except the Şanī' al-Douleh group, were outside the Majles. Disparaging remarks have been made about this Tabaqeh asking how such men as Voşūq al-Douleh and Mokhber al-Molk and other titled Deputies representing the A'yān could have had any concern for the common people and support the Constitution,¹ when they had not helped the two Seyyeds and their supporters in their struggle to obtain the Constitution.² This remark is in general true; for instance there were no A'yān reported amongst the Bastīs, however many of them did sympathize with reform. Kermānī reports how the Anjoman-e Makhfī had decided to make use of such men³ and that many had been

1. In fact these two represented the Tojjār, and both came from old bureaucratic families and belonged more to the A'yān than the Tojjār class. Both were moderates in their opinions. Voşūq al-Douleh had been contacted by the Anjoman-e Makhfī and had been a friend of Malek al-Motekallemīn. He had had experience in the financial administration of Azarbaijan and was elected Vice-President of the Majles and Director of the important Financial Committee of the Majles and helped to prepare the budget, Mokhber al-Molk was the brother of Şanī'al-Douleh, the President of the Majles, and highly thought of. He took part in many discussions and was instrumental along with his relatives in bringing back Atabak to Persia.

2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūteh, p. 168.

3. Nāzem al-Eslām Kermānī op. cit., 1, p. 52.

willing to help but probably not at the risk of exile or persecution.¹

As already mentioned, many of those who had first voiced the need for reform and the limitation of monarchy were men of this Tabaqeh. The revolutionaries also made a distinction between despots like 'Ayn al-Douleh and families like the Moshīr al Douleh² or the Hedāyats, who

1. Sa'd al- Douleh for instance had been exiled to Yazd because of his opposition to Naus, and Ehteshām al-Saltāneh had been sent to the Turkish border as arbitrator in the border dispute, which was also a kind of exile, as in a meeting he had defended constitutionalism. Kermānī refers to an episode when Malek- al-Motekallemin was visiting Vošūq-al-Douleh. News came that his sons had been arrested and Vošūq, in fear for his brother Qavām al-Saltāneh who was 'Ayn al-Douleh's secretary, and for the position of his father, excused himself and his guest had to leave. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., pp. 144-6 and 259. Mokhber al- Saltāneh also refers to the considerations of such men and says Nāṣer al-Molk and Ṣanī'al- Douleh were reduced to silence through fear. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, op. cit., p. 137.
2. Mīrzā Naṣrallah Khān Moshīr al-Douleh's two sons, Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān Moshīr al- Molk who later inherited his father's title, and who was related to 'Alā al-Douleh through marriage, and his younger brother Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Khān Mo'tamen al-Molk were both educated in Europe, the former in Russia and the latter in France. Both had studied law, and Grant Duff wrote that the task Moshīr al-Douleh had accepted (as Ṣadr A'ẓam) was very difficult and came as a surprise, but his two sons may have persuaded him to accept, as both were well educated and ambitious. Grant-Duff to Grey, Aug. 13th 1906, No. 208 F.O. 371/113. E. Bāstānī Pārīzī maintains that both brothers and their fathers were liberals and in sympathy with the constitutionalists. However it must be qualified that their liberalism was very cautious and they strove particularly to establish a working relationship between the king and the Majles, and that they were not in full support of the Majles.

played a very prominent part in the enactment of the Constitution and were backed by a large group of the moderates of the Majles.

Another member of the A'yān who co-operated with the Majles and the Constitution was Nāṣer al-Molk, who came from a very old bureaucratic family and had been educated at Oxford. He had been Minister of Finance in 1314 and retained his post after the Revolution, but the Majles trusted him and approved his plans of reform of the country's finances. He was the first Minister to accept the principle of ministerial responsibility. He was chosen as Prime Minister by the Majles after Moshīr al-Saltāneh and was probably the only Premier trusted by the Majles.

There were amongst the A'yān men of a different calibre too, as for instance Mīrza Abūl Ḥasan Khān Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh, or Mostashār al-Douleh,¹ who co-operated with the Āzādīkhāhān.

1. Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh was the nephew of Mīrzā Naṣrallāh Khān Moshīr al-Douleh and had studied in Najaf with the great Mojtahed Āyatallāh Na'Inī. He was employed by his uncle in the Foreign Ministry and served in Tiflis and Baku. He no doubt had access to the Socialists in Baku, and was later one of the active members of the Komīteh-ye Engelāb and the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan. He was later chosen by the Majles as Deputy. Mostashār al-Douleh was the representative of the A'yān of Azarbaijan and worked closely with Taqīzādeh on occasions.

In general however, the A'yān were moderates, not extremists. One example of their moderation is seen in the First Constitutional Laws. The Supplementary Fundamental Laws¹ were much more extremist in comparison and were drawn up by the co-operation of men such as Taqīzādeh and Mostashār al-Douleh who tried to go further than setting up of the Majles and the limitation of the Shah's power.²

Many A'yān, it must be added, were sceptical about the outcome of Constitutionalism and of the opinion about the need for reform and the extremist attitude of some of the Deputies. For instance, Nāṣer al-Molk wrote a letter to Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī which throws some light on his opinion. He maintained that the demand for the 'Edālatkhāneh was too premature for Persia and suggested the example of the Russian Emperor. He said that Persia was like a very sick person who had not eaten for many days and was being forced to swallow a half-baked leg of camel. First he should be treated for his sickness, then made to swallow the meat.³ He suggested that the first step should be the setting up of schools to train people for a modern

1. See page 131.

2. The question arises whether the first set of laws were deliberately milder in character and more limited in scope or were so because of the inexperience and great haste of those who wrote them. It is true that, though those who prepared them had studied in Europe, they had had no experience of parliamentary life, and probably were over cautious due to their social standing, whereas Taqīzādeh and Mostashār al-Douleh had not gone to Europe but were more fundamentalist and determined reformers.

3. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit., 1, pp. 214-222.

government. Other members of the A'yān were also sceptical. Mokhber al-Molk for instance had declared in the Majles that people in Persia did not yet know what Mashrūṭeh was about; they needed a guardian; they could not be left to themselves, and no minister could work with the existing freedom.¹ Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān² Neẓām al-Saltāneh was also very sceptical about the outcome of the whole reform movement, and expected disturbances to increase.³

Such men co-operated with the Constitutionalists as long as there was hope of a compromise, but if it came to a choice between the Shah and the Majles they would naturally choose the former. Ṣanī'al - Douleh for instance as Minister of Finance paid Amīr Bahādor's debts.⁴ Nāṣer al-Molk, though a favourite with the Majles, agreed to the Ministry of Āṣef al-Douleh, the unpopular ex-Governor of Khorasan. The similar cases of Sa'd al-Douleh and Mokhber al-Douleh both changed their political standing and began to support the Shah. Above all it must be pointed out that, when the Majles was bombarded, Ministers

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1. R.M. No. 167, 17th Rajab 1325 (Aug. 27th 1907).
 2. He was one of the A'yān and Pīshkār of Mohammad'Alī Mīrzā when Crown Prince. He was made Prime Minister in Zīqa'deh 1325 (December 1907) to Rabi'al-Ṣanī 1326, (June 1909).
 3. E. Ṣafā'ī Asnād-e Sīyāsī, p. 388.
 4. Amīr Bahādor was the Shah's favourite courtier and one who, as a very convinced reactionary, used his influence to the detriment of the Majles.

like Mostoufī al-Mamālek,¹ Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān Moshīr al-Douleh and Mo'tamen al-Molk did not resign their posts as a sign of protest.² There was no ideological conviction amongst the A'yān, which could have given them cohesion as a group, and there were far too many personal and public considerations to divide their ranks.³ In general, as the majority of the Majles Deputies were moderates, and the Āzādīkhāhān were in the minority, the A'yān and princes did not feel threatened. On the other hand they were not opposed to the need for reform. Mokhber al-Molk declared that freedom and the Constitution should be as much as the existing capacity and possibilities of the country allowed.

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1. Mostoufī al-Mamālek came from a very old family of Mostoufīs, his father and grand-father had held high posts in the reign of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah and Mozaffar al-Dīn Shah. He was educated in Persia and Europe and was well thought of by the moderates and extremists. He was Minister of War in the Cabinet of Nāṣer al-Molk and Moshīr al-Saltāneh, but was made to resign before the bombardment of the Majles when Amīr Bahādor Jang was appointed Minister of War.
 2. It must be qualified that according to Bāstānī Pārīzī Moshīr al-Douleh had resigned as a result of the enmity of Amīr Bahādor and the Shah, and that he and Mo'tamen al-Molk had even been arrested in Bāgh-e Shah but had been spared. Bāstānī does not give any information about the activities of these two brothers in the Estebdād-e Ṣaghīr, but it must be added that both retained their ministerial posts in the Cabinet of Moshīr al-Saltāneh after the bombardment of the Majles in Jamādī al Šānī 1326 (June 1908). Bāstānī Pārīzī, op. cit., p. 127.
 3. There are many examples of conflicts and factional political groupings in the private letters of the time. For examples of these see E. Ṣafā'ī, Asnād-e Sīyāsī, pp. 367-373.

"Today", he said, "we do not have the instruments for a complete constitution".¹

Though not really threatened in their basic powers, and still retaining their posts, the A'yān and princes however, were criticized and attacked in the Majles and especially in the press as representing reaction, particularly because they had accumulated undeserved riches at the expense of the poor and the peasants. It had become unpopular or unpolitical to defend the old order or to excuse it, and the degree of intolerance of the reformers was at times as bad as the old order's repression.² Some of the privileges of the rich such as Tīyūl and Tas'ir³ were abolished as

1. We possess very little information about the private opinion of people about the Constitution. Not everyone approved or found it desirable or feasible. In a diary by a certain Mīrzā Ahmad-e Tafreshī, a Government employee, for instance, he expresses his fears and scepticism and particularly his anxiety about the loss of his livelihood. Seyyed Ahmad Tafreshī-ye Hoseynī, Rūznāmeḥ-ye Akhbār-e Mashrūṭīyyat/va Enqelāb-e Iran. ed I. Afshar (Tehran 1351) passim. The private secretary of Reżā Qolī Khān Māfī, named Moghīš al-Saltaneh, wrote to his employer in Lurestan of the extreme excitement of the people and the chaos and added that every greengrocer and draper saw himself as an Amīr. He also pointed to the intolerance of the Majles and the fact that people frightened their enemies by threatening they would complain about them to the Majles. The Ministers, he wrote, stood in such awe of the Majles that they could not utter a word, and the Ulama and Deputies blamed everything on the Government to gain popularity. (Private correspondence of Neẓām Māfī family).
2. For instance the aforementioned Moghīš al-Saltaneh wrote that no one had the courage to criticize the Majles even if it were a rightful criticism, for his life would be endangered.
3. Tīyūl is land assignment and Tas'ir is a conversion rate by which tax was assessed into money.

were the undeserved government salaries and the sale of offices. Suggestions were made that taxes should be reassessed so that it would become fairer. It was even suggested that the governors should not be sent to provinces where they possessed land, and that no one should hold more than one job. It was also said that the same class should not be always given the same jobs, and that there were capable and deserving people in other Ṭabaqāt as well.

Such reforms were not unpopular in the Majles, and in the case of Tīyūl and Tas'īr it was voted for unanimously, since it was accepted generally that they were abused; besides, the number of the A'yān and princes was not such as to be able to stop them. Moreover their abolition was not a threat to the basic privileges of the A'yān. These were not yet an issue.

On the other hand, the moderate members were in agreement that the finances of the country had to be reformed, and the Government's excessive need for money had to be met by all kinds of measures if they were not going to undertake a further foreign loan. So many reforms were readily accepted; even the cut in the salaries of the princes and their families being thought equitable by many in the face of the poor state of the country's finances. These measures were not sufficient to cause a closing of the ranks amongst the A'yān and were not yet considered as a threat to them. The programme of the Āzādīkhāhān or of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn was not publicized openly, and, as mentioned, the Āzādīkhāhān were in a minority in the Majles and outside. It was later that they appeared to become a threat, and obliged these classes to form a party in the Second Majles.

The Ulama

The next Ṭabaqeh to be discussed is the Ulama, but they did not comprise one simple, easily definable Ṭabaqeh. Their religious and social standing, as well as their wealth, embraced a very wide compass and disparity which suggests that they would have no more cohesion than the other Ṭabaqāt: the privilege the Ulama enjoyed was unlike that enjoyed by other Ṭabaqāt. They were revered and looked on as the natural leaders of society, and their prestige increased with the role they played in the Revolution. There was however, a certain section of society which opposed the increase of their power, amongst whom were particularly the Āzādīkhāhān reformers. This becomes clearer when we look at the number of seats allocated to them in the Majles in Tehran, for despite their great support of reform, they were given only four seats. Doulatābādī suggests an interesting reason for this. He says that when the Electoral laws were being written the Ulama wished to insert certain clauses to the advantage of their own class and religion but that this was nullified by the Āzādīkhāhān who were this time in agreement with the Government circles which also wished to limit the power of the Ulama.¹ Nonetheless they held a quarter of the seats, for many of the other Ṭabaqāt chose as their representatives members of

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op. cit., 2, p. 86.

the Ulama. It is believed that had there been male suffrage, the Ulama would have gained comparatively many more seats than they had as in the Third Majles,¹ for they were popular with the people.

The position of the Āzādīkhāhān vis-à-vis the Ulama was rather ambiguous. As leaders of religion they had to be shown respect and obedience; as leaders of the reform movement they held prestige and a position of authority. The Āzādīkhāhān, many of whom were Mo'ammam (those who wore the turban), had to express their submission and we have seen how Taqīzādeh for instance emphasized his religious beliefs when he attacked the Government of Atābak.

The enemies of reform, especially the religious ones, attacked it in the name of Eslam and accused the Deputies and the Majles being of Bābīs. They were led by Sheykh Fażlallāh Nūrī, one of the influential and powerful Mojtaheds. He had originally supported the Revolution, but fell out with the reformers, and especially with the two leading Ulamas, so he began criticizing and attacking the Majles and the Constitution on religious grounds. He organized a large following and was a very dangerous threat for the Reform movement. The reformers of all shades of opinion countered this threat by being very careful over the religious clauses of the Constitution, by trying to give

1. Z. Shajī'ī, op. cit., pp. 193-4.

every law an Eslamic colour, and by arguing that the institutions they were taking from the West were in accordance with Eslam. It was argued that all the European laws and customs were based on Eslam, so it was not wrong to imitate them. For instance, on one occasion when it was argued that one person should not hold more than one job, Mostashār al-Douleh had suggested they should see what was done in such cases in other countries. Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī had replied that he begged him not to say directly that what had been done by such and such a government should be done in Persia too. This was objectionable, the Persians had laws, and they had the Qorān, and he added that if they went deeply into the question they would see that all Western laws were based on the Qorān also.¹

Besides the deep ideological cleavage mentioned caused by the religious question, the religious clauses of the Constitutional laws caused another controversy within the Majles, but a rift was averted by the moderation of both sides, the liberal or Āzādīkhāhān and the moderates. It was particularly fortunate for the reform movement that the two leading Mojtaheds, Behbahānī and Ṭabāṭabā'ī did not support Sheykh Faḡlallāh who attacked the Constitution.

In the view of an acute foreign observer, Spring Rice, it was thought that the religious party was caught

1. R.M. No. 67, 24th Ṣafar 1325 (8th April 1907).

in a trap and that it was aware of this. They therefore tried to add certain clauses to the Constitution safeguarding its privileges by providing that all bills before being passed should be referred to a committee of five Mojtaheds, who would make sure they were in accordance with the Sharī'at. He added that the Liberals, especially the Tabriz Deputies, tried to resist this, but were unable in the face of the strength of the religious body for fear that they would turn to the king and that they accepted this clause in a "spirit of conciliation".¹

As a group, the Ulama were no more cohesive than the others. On the one side of the scale there were for instance, rich, educated Mojtaheds with a large following of Talabeh or religious students and much influence, some being related to the important families or even royalty or were landowners. On the other side of the scale were a large number of poor Tollāb, or religious students, Rouzehkhān, Sheykhs, Pishnamāz, and Seyyeds,² a whole group of people which could be given the general name of Mo'ammam or Rūhanīyūn, religious leaders.

1. Spring Rice wrote "It is curious to note the persistence with which the movers of the popular party strive to identify the cause of Islam with the cause of liberty..."
Spring Rice to Grey. July 16th 1907, No. 147 FO 371/301
Inc. In No. 1.

2. Rouzehkhān = Religious preachers, Sheykh = a holy man
Pishnamāz = leader of Prayers, Seyyed = descendant
of the family of the prophet.

One particular aspect of the Reform movement in Persia is the support it received from the great Mojtaheds in Tehran and in Najaf, who were the ultimate authority on religious questions in the Shi'ite world. The collective support of the two great Mojtaheds in Tehran, Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Behbahānī, which was of immense help has been discussed by many authors though no individual biography of either of them has been written. One aspect we are not quite certain about is their relationship with each other and how united they really were. There are only a few lines written by Seyyed Moḥammed in his diary dated 20th Jamādī al-Sānī 1329, where he expresses the opinion that the reconstitution of the Majles was not as he had wished, and he adds that the situation had been spoilt by two, Sheykh Fażlāllāh through enmity and Seyyed'Abdallāh by his friendship.¹ Just as important as their support of the Reform movement was the support of lower ranks of the Ulama or the Mo'ammamīn, men such as Malek al-Motekallemin, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez, Sheykh Salīm, Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Vā'ez and Mīrzā Javād Nāṭeq in Tabriz and many others. These men had received a religious education, and used the Mambar (pulpit) to advocate constitutionalism and to legitimize the Majles

1. Ḥ. Doulatābādī "Rūḥānī -ye Bōzorgavār, Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī Sangelajī" Vahīd, 9th year, No. 2, 1350.

in the eyes of the sceptical, often criticizing their own class for their venality or corruption. It is certain that their co-operation was a very important and effective means of stirring the masses.¹

As we have thus seen, the Ṭabaqeh of Ulama was not homogeneous as a class and comprised different social strata of people with opinions which ranged from extreme radicalism to more moderate reaction, but generally there was some solidarity between them on questions of religious privileges. The Ulama in the Majles were moderates, a few were extremists; the reactionaries were outside the Majles. The most important question which divided the Ulama was the conflict between constitutionalism - Mashrūṭeh, and religious law or Mashrū'eh. Sheykh Faḏlallāh Nūrī, who had originally agreed to the need for reform and the demand for an 'Edālatkhāneh, later began to oppose it, insisting that clauses should be included in the Supplementary Fundamental Law giving the right of veto to five Mojtaheds in the Majles.

1. There has been some controversy between historians about establishing the importance of the role of the Ulama. Some writers believe they were the most important Ṭabaqeh in bringing about the Revolution, others have minimized their role. In both cases, however, attention has been focussed on the high-ranking Ulama, while the lower ranks and their contribution have not been given sufficient attention. The Tollāb, for instance, not only took part in the Revolution, but later through the Anjomans supported the Majles and the Āzādīkhānān. There were reports of these men exchanging their clothes for military uniforms and undertaking military work in the defence of the Majles.
E. Ṣafā'ī, Asnād-e Nou Yāfteh. (Tehran, 1349) p. 233.

The Āzādīkhān, and particularly Taqīzādeh, opposed this, arguing that the fact that the Ulama were in the Majles as a body was sufficient guarantee against uneslamic legislation, but the Sheykh and his adherents were not convinced.¹ Taqīzādeh further argued that the essence of this power of veto had already been included in the Fundamental Laws in the 27th Article which decreed that laws should not be contrary to the tenets of Eslam.

After this deadlock Sheykh Fażlallāh retired to the Shah 'Abd al-A'ẓīm Shrine, and from there declared the Majles and the Constitution sinful, illegitimate and Un-Eslamic and accused its advocates of being Bābīs, who wanted to weaken Eslam.

On the 18th of Jamādī al-Šānī 1325 he wrote in the newspaper he published from the Shah 'Abd al-A'ẓīm Shrine that the advocates of the Majles were of several Ferqeh (parties), who denied religion and God; they were anarchists, nihilists, socialists, 'naturalists' and Bābists. All the disturbances and evils were committed by these people.

1. There is a letter by Mostashār al-Douleh to Šaqat al-Eslām in which he describes this matter. Sheykh Fażlallāh had brought about sixty of his adherents to the Majles and threatened it physically. Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī had mediated, and the two Mojtaheds, Behbahānī and Ṭabāṭabā'ī also had intervened so the Āzādīkhān would not react. But the next day, the latter group had brought its adherents to the Majles - they were from the Tabrīzī Bāzārīs and the Anjoman-e Eteḥādīyeh. The mood had looked ugly, and there was fear of bloodshed. Eventually however, the dispute was settled and a compromise was worked out.

He demanded firstly that the Constitution should include the word Mashrū'eh after Mashrūteh, secondly that it should include a clause that all laws must be in accordance with the laws of Eslam and so provide for the setting up of a group of Mojtahed to supervise the Majles, thirdly that the members of this group be chosen by the Ulama and not the Majles, and fourthly that in order to stop the spread of irreligious groups the laws of Shar' should be administered against the Bābīs and the irreligious people.

In another issue (not dated) he declared himself a supporter of the Majles, but a Majles based on Eslam. He attacked the Anjomans and the freedom of the press granted by the Constitution.¹ The Sheykh's stance was dangerous to the basic freedoms which the Constitution guaranteed, especially as he won a number of adherents, particularly in the provinces, and caused great anxiety to the Majles and the Deputies. Had not the Sheykh been associated with the reactionaries and court circles, he would have posed a much greater danger, but this connection worked to his disadvantage,² and also because the two leading Mojtaheds closed ranks with the other Deputies against him.

1. Rūznāmeḥ-ye Sheykh Fażlallāh Nūrī, ed. M. E. Reżvānī, Tārīkh, Nashriyeh-ye Gorūh-e Āmūzeshī-ye Tārīkh -e Dāneshgāh-e Tehran, No. 2, Vol. 1, 1356 p. 159-209.

2. Y. Doulatābādī, who is not impartial towards Behbahānī, mentions some private motives for the opposition between Behbahānī and the Sheykh.

Ṭabāṭabā'ī defended the Āzādīkhāhān and the Azarbaijan Deputies against the accusation of irreligion, but he did not oppose the inclusion of the power of veto to be granted to the Ulama. Mostashār al-Douleh commented on the attitude of the two leading Ulama, saying that Seyyed 'Abdallāh opposed Sheykh Fażlallāh and tried to oust him, but Seyyed Moḥammad was simple at heart and "Poor thing he is like a phonograph, what he hears last he repeats first and insists on it."¹ Ṭabāṭabā'ī argued that they should placate the Sheykh, but Taqīzādeh opposed him saying that he should be ignored and not be made a martyr. He also opposed some who suggested severe action by the Government to bring the Sheykh to heel. Taqīzādeh won his point on this question, and soon after the murder of Atābak the Sheykh returned to Tehran, but continued his attacks, and was quite prominent in the events of the Meydān-e Tūpkhāneh.²

The most important issue beside the question of the veto between the Ulama on the one hand and the Āzādīkhāhān was the freedom of all Persians before the law. This was a very controversial question in itself, but was not made

1. N. Fathī, Shahīd'-e Nīknām, p. 172.
2. The events of the Meydān -e Tūpkhāneh took place in Zīqa'deh 1325 (December 1908), when the supporters of the Shah took up a threatening stance in this Meydān near the Majles, and from there threatened the Majles. Sheykh Fażlallah who had left his place of self-imposed exile in the Shrine of Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm after the murder of Atābak joined these.

a point of controversy in the Majles, (as far as the discussions which are reported show). One reason was the support Ṭabaṭabā'ī gave to this motion, for he supported the freedom of religion. There was also the threat of Sheykh Fażlallāh, which united the Deputies and prevented them from dividing on this issue.¹ Above all the fact that the Āzādīkhāhān were ready for a compromise on the question of the veto saved this clause. In its stead they accepted the inclusion in the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of Article 2 which gave five of the Ulama in the Majles the right of veto.

The majority of the Ulama in the Majles and especially the higher ranking amongst them were moderates and lent this group their support and strength. Besides the two leading Mojtaheds, Mīrzā Naṣrallāh Akhavī, the Deputy of the Tollāb,² Aqā Seyyed Ja'far of Fars, Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī of Azarbaijan were of this group (the latter at times co-operated with Taqīzādeh but was not an extremist). Opposition between the Ulama and the Āzādīkhāhān

1. It had been reported the Behbahānī would be threatened if he opposed this issue. A.H. Hairī, op. cit., p. 233. Hairī quotes this from an article in Armaghān by Abū al-Ḥasan Būzūrg Omīd Mokhber Homāyūn "Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah va Mashrūṭīyyat", Armaghān, 32, 1963, pp. 104-107.

2. He was one of the founders of the National Library, which was designed to educate people. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, p. 116.

went deeper and was more fundamental than these controversies; they eventually culminated in the murder of Behbahānī in the Second Majles.

What were the causes of this fundamental opposition? Was it the implications of secularism and socialism that the Ulama feared? Did they feel a threat to their privileges? The freedom of the press, the abolition of Bast, the secularism of law courts and of education were all unpopular motions with the Ulama. What was worse, however, was the attack on them generally for their corruption and bad influence, their ignorance and superstition, voiced by some of the Azādikhāhān.¹

It has been said that the Ulama did not understand the true meaning of Constitutionalism and its implications, and that when once they realized this they backed away from it.² Though this is an arguable point, what is clear is

1. For instance, Malek al-Motekalemīn and Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez wrote a book called Ro'yā-ye Šādegeh in 1318 in which they described a dream. In this dream they criticized Aqā Najafī (the chief Mojtahed of Esfahan who worked closely with Zelli al-Solṭān), but they address all such people generally. They criticized some of the Ulama for seeking worldly remuneration instead of doing their duty, and blamed them for their ignorance and superstition, which was the cause of the plight of the people, they said. Rūznāmeḥ-ye Gheybī, Ro'yā-ye Šādegeh The weekly newspapers Šūr-e Esrāfil, and Mosāvāt also continued the same arguments. Both belonged to the Azādikhāhān.
2. Mīrzā Moḥammad Nā'īnī one of the important Mojtaheds who was very close to Āyatallāh Khorāsānī in Najaf wrote a book called Tanbīh-al Ommat va Tanzīh al-Mellat in 1327(1909) with the approval of the chief Mojtahed of Najaf, justifying constitutionalism on religious grounds. Nā'īnī discussed tyranny and declared it un-Islamic and the source of ignorance. He stated that a constitutional government was the only form of government possible, and he thus justified parliamentarism as the only way to stop tyranny. His thoughts are discussed by A.H. Hairi. Hairi continues to say that after 1909 the Ulama became disillusioned by the Majles and

that the Ulama came to oppose the stand taken by the Āzādīkhāhān in the Majles, but not the whole process of constitutionalism. There was between these two poles a basic difference of approach; for instance, whereas the Ulama expressed their meekness and lack of strength rather than action, the Āzādīkhāhān were militant reformers who did not wish to stand for half measures or compromises. Whilst the Ulama called for compromise, unity and peaceful action, the Āzādīkhāhān threatened popular action. Ḥājī Naṣrallāh Akhavī, for instance, thought that the difficulties ahead were like almost inaccessible mountains, whereas Taqīzādeh believed that it was inevitable that Persia should go through a revolution, and that not until such a period was traversed would the Constitution become strong.¹

Had not this deepening chasm developed between the two sides and had they been able to strike a working coalition in the face of the Shah, the Majles would have become stronger because of the Ulama's prestige; but this antagonism was inevitable as each side had strong and contrary beliefs. It must be reiterated however, that at

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and withdrew their support of Constitutionalism. Nā'inī collected as many copies of his book as he could and threw them into the Tigris River.
A.M. Hairī, op. cit., passim.

1. R.M. No. 97, 13th Rabī'al-Avval 1326 (15th April 1908).

no time did the Āzādīkhāhān make an overt attack on religion, and that they too insisted on justifying everything on Eslamic grounds. Despite this however, they were often accused of irreligion which weakened them.

Tojjār

Another vital group in the Revolution was the big Tojjār¹ who represented the richest and most influential section of the mercantile community, and who through their connections with the provincial merchants and their domination of the Bāzār had a far greater influence than their limited number might suggest.²

The mercantile community was dissatisfied with the economic policy of the Government, as shown for instance in the power granted to Naus, the Director of Customs, the concessions granted to foreigners, the European loans contracted under highly unfavourable political conditions, the new customs tariffs contracted with Russia. All these brought about great hardship and dissatisfaction among the Tojjār. It was possibly the smaller of these who suffered most as

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1. They had already given an example of their power in organizing the opposition to the Regie.
G. Gilbar, "The Big Merchants (Tujjar) and the Persian Revolution of 1906" Asian and African Studies Vol. 11, No. 3, 1977, p. 291.
 2. C. Issawi, The Economic History of Iran (Chicago, 1971) p. 43.

they were more vulnerable, but it was the big Tojjār who had the means to influence this class by their connections and wealth. It must also be added that of all the other sections of the community the Tojjār were not only most affected by foreign dominance, but most exposed to foreign ideas.

However it must be asked whether they really wanted a democratic and modern government¹ or a constitution to guarantee the establishment of law and order and a strong government.²

1. There is a long article in the Calcutta Habl al-Matīn which calls on the merchants to modernize their methods and join together to work. There would not have been any need for such an article if the contrary did not exist. Habl al-Matin (Calcutta), 18th May 1906 quoted from Ibid. p. 67.
2. W.M. Floor in an article entitled "Merchants (Tujjar) in Qajar Iran" points to the fact that the merchants and many Persian industries were ruined by the influx of European goods and capital and the growing political influence of the foreigners, especially the Russians and British which led to the demand for reform. The same writer points to the fact that they had taken part in government jobs and that they were active in the First Majles, but that in the Second they were not so well represented and therefore less active.

W.M. Floor, "The Merchants (Tujjar) in Qajar Iran" Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. 1976 pp 101-135.

Another writer points out that the reason for the dissatisfaction of the Tojjār was the fact that the Government in need of money granted foreign concessions which adversely affected the position of the merchants. The first manifestation of this was the protest against the Tobacco Regie in 1891. The reform of the customs by the Belgians now caused great dissatisfaction. This changed the customs duty to the disadvantage of the Persian Tojjār which led to a protest against the Belgians in 1905 and the bast in the British Legation later. G. Gilbar, "The Big Merchants", pp. 298-303.

Some of these big merchants were engaged in trade as well as banking. Mo'īn al- Tojjār was one who had large estates in the South of Persia and concessions for the exploitation of ochra in the Gulf Islands; he also carried on a lucrative trade with India and London. Another important and wealthy Tājer was Amīn al- Żarb, who had a large business in banking and trade and some capital invested in industry.¹ Hāj- Moḥammad Esmā'īl Maghāzeh was another very rich merchant of Tehran, as was Arbāb Jamshīd, a rich Zoroastrian merchant who had a large banking business operating all over Persia. Another was Moḥammad Taqī Bonakdār, an opium merchant from Esfahan. These big merchants and others had great influence among the Kasabeh of the Bāzār and the small traders and craftsmen, and used their influence to make them take Bast in the British legation and provided for their needs and those of their families while the Bast lasted, until the Government granted the demands of the revolutionaries. The big merchants themselves did not take Bast but acted as mediators between the Ulama in Qom, the Revolutionaries and the large number of people in the British Legation and the Provinces.

Some of the big merchants including Ḥoseyn Amīn al-

1. C. Issawi, op. cit., p. 43.

2. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, p. 172.

Żarb¹ participated in the writing of the Electoral laws and no doubt ensured for themselves and the Aṣnāf a large proportion of the representation. Of the ten representatives of Tojjār in Tehran, five had been prominent and active in the Revolution - Amīn al-Żarb, Mo'īn al-Tojjār, Āqā Maḥmūd-e Shālforūsh, Ḥāji Moḥammad Esmā'īl Maghāzeh, and Āqā Maḥmūd Tājer-e Eṣfahānī. Two others of the merchant Deputies were Ḥāji Moḥammad Taqī Shāhrūdī and Ḥāji Seyyed Morteżā Mortaḥavī.³ Shāhrūdī had a large and important export trade with Russia'. Ḥāji Seyyed Morteżā was a well-known Azarbaijan Ṣarrāf and a close associate of Kuzekanani, one of the politically active Azarbaijan merchants who later was also a member of Anjoman of Tabriz. Three of the merchant Deputies were not in fact merchants, Moḥaqqueq al-Douleh was the supervisor of the Political Science School,

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1. Ḥāj Ḥoseyn Amīn al-Żarb's father Ḥāj Moḥammad Ḥasan had been a friend of Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn.
 2. The latter's activities have been described by Kermānī, He had made a fortune from trade, and took a trip in 1311 to Russia and met Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn, who had a great influence on him. When the sugar merchants had been beaten by the order of 'Alā' al-Douleh, he and some of the other Tojjār and members of the Anjoman-e Makhfī had worked all night in persuading the Ulama to go to the Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm shrine. He again was active during the Bast in the British Legation and afterwards was elected as Deputy. He was also active in the Majles and the head of the Anjoman of Esfahan. As an extremist he was an exception amongst the Tojjār, who were generally moderates. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op. cit. Introductory vol. p. 220.
 3. He seems to have been the head of the Anjoman of Azarbaijan but was later changed probably because he was a moderate. Taqīzādeh gives his name as Aḥmad the son of Morteżā.

Vošūq al-Douleh had been a Mostoufi and had done clerical work, co-operating with the Anjoman-e Makhfi and Mokhber al-Molk from the influential Hedāyat family and brother of Ṣanī' al-Douleh. Of course it was an accepted fact that deputies did not have to represent their own Tabaqeh, and there were merchants who represented the Aṣnāf. Arbāb Jamshid represented the Zoroastrian minority which was given the vote (the Jewish community and the Armenians gave their vote to the two leading Mojtaheds.)

The number of merchants in the Majles was of course not limited to these men, and the large Ayālāt which carried on their elections according to the class basis sent their merchants Deputies to the Majles also. From Esfahan Adīb al-Tojjār Naqshīneh was elected, from Kerman, Naṣrallah Mo'āven al-Tojjār, from Khorasan Ra'īs al-Tojjār, and from Rasht, Vakīl al-Tojjār. These came sporadically to the Majles, as did all provincial Deputies. Vakīl al-Tojjār¹ from Rasht was an exception to the Tojjār Deputies for he worked closely with the Āzādīkhāhān. The merchant Deputies of Tabriz were two, Mīrzā Aqā Tājer-e Eṣfahānī and Taqīzādeh.²

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1. Vakīl al-Tojjār was originally from Yazd and had been in Baku as the representative first of Amīn al-Zarb, then had become a trader on his own. He and Ḥesām al-Eslām, also from Gilan, supported Taqīzādeh and the Āzādīkhāhān. In the second Majles, however, he was not a Democrat.
 2. Taqīzādeh was not a merchant but had been politically active in Tabriz and was well known for his reformist ideas.

When once in the Majles some of the special interests of the merchants were put forward. Naus was dismissed, it was decreed in the Constitution that in future no loan or foreign concession would be made without the approval of the Majles, and it was to have sole control of all financial questions. The powers of provincial governors were to be limited, especially with regard to taxation. Above all it was planned to set up a Bank. This was suggested by Mo'in al-Tojjār and many of the Tehran merchants contributed large sums to make up its original capital; the sum of 400,000 Toman was lent to the Government from the sum collected to pay the army temporarily in order to stop the foreign loan already negotiated.

The bank was never set up however, and no money was paid after the initial expression of fervour. The reasons for its failure have not been discussed satisfactorily. It was said at the time, and it has been repeated since by historians, that the reason was lack of security. On the 18th of Jamādī al-Avval (7th October 1907) the question of the Bank was discussed in the Majles. Āqā Seyyed Moḥammad Ja'far, a moderate, said that people would pay if they were sure not to lose their money, and Mīrzā Āqā Farsh Forūsh, an Azarbaijan Deputy, hence called Farshī, added that the lack of security was due to the Government. Taqīzādeh disagreed, and said that anyone who had the least feeling of nationalism and knew anything about the conditions of the country would agree that the people of Persia had no choice; and that if they wished to save their country from

these disturbances they must contribute what they could to the Bank and not make lack of security an excuse.¹ Such arguments, however, were useless as people did not trust the Government and doubts were beginning to arise.

It should be noted that the first objection to be made to the plan of the Bank was voiced by Tabriz on the 13th Shavāl (30th November). They telegraphed that they wanted guarantees before they paid the required sum; that the Supplementary Fundamental Laws should be passed, and that in the meantime the rich and the Ministers who had exploited the country so long should pay the Government's debt.²

It has always been assumed that everyone and especially the merchants wanted the foundation of the Bank and the stopping of the loan.³ However, it is not certain that all the merchants wanted the establishment of the Bank, and that it would have been particularly to the advantage of all of them, for many already carried on a lucrative banking business and had made very large fortunes; moreover the Bank might have embroiled the Persians in foreign troubles which the big merchants did not want, or it might have broken their monopoly of the money market.

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1. R.M. No. 125 18th Jamādī al-Avval 1325 (27th June 1907)
 2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p. 185.
 3. Spring Rice wrote to Grey that the moderates had no objection to the borrowing of money from abroad by the National Bank. Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 27th 1907 No. 38 FO 371/301 Incl. in No. 1.

The idea of a National Bank had great nationalist propaganda value, and the offer by the merchants to organize it was one way to stop the loan. Later, as it was not organized it gave the Government the opportunity to blame the Majles for its failure, and was an excuse for justifying its lack of activity by saying it had no money. On one occasion when the question of the Bank was discussed in the Majles on the 6th Sha'bān 1325 (15th September 1907), veiled insinuations were made to the effect that certain people had interfered in order that the question of the Bank should remain unresolved.¹

Sūr- e Esrāfīl, the newspaper of the Āzādīkhāhān, refers to this misconception about the bank in number 17 of the 14th Shavāl 1325. It said that the rich did not pay any sum from their vast wealth to make up the capital of the Bank, nor did the Tojjār who preferred to act as entrepreneurs for foreign firms. Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez also blamed the Tojjār in a sermon for not being trustworthy. "For the moment the people do not trust these merchants, this is why the Bank cannot be formed," he said. "The Bank is the key to our happiness, but the merchants want to set up a private bank, a Ṣarrāfkhāneh" (a money-

1. R.M. No. 178 6th Sha'bān 1325 (14th September, 1907) According to some of the Deputies the stumbling block was the fact that it was agreed the Government should pay its revenue to the Bank, which should then be kept as a separate amount. Vakīl al-Tojjār and Mo'īn al-Tojjār said that the Shah had signed the charter of the Bank, but Atābak had made certain changes in it and the whole scheme had come to a stop.

lending bank). The National Bank should be under the supervision of the people and should be set up by foreign experts. The bank the merchants here wanted to set up was a private institution, and the people who had greeted the idea so enthusiastically at first became disheartened.¹ In another speech he called the Tojjār the middle men for the foreigners and attacked the imports of goods from Europe.²

Of all the other Ṭabaqāt probably the merchants and Aṣnāf had the widest experience of co-operation, either together, or as separate groups, often against the Government or foreign competition or for their own gains; no doubt if they had kept up their co-operation they could have presented a stronger front to the Government, but this was not the case because of basic differences of economic interests. Another reason was the fact that, having once achieved some of their economic demands, they were no longer interested in politics because they had no ideological aims.³ Besides they did not aim at political power, for despite their influence and their wealth there were no merchants

1. E. Yaghmā'ī, ed. Shahīd-e Rāh-e Āzādī, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez-e Esfahānī; (Tehran, 1357) pp. 184-5 .

2. Ibid., p. 193.

3. The same thing had happened after the victory over the Regie, when once the merchants achieved their aims they ceased their political activities despite appeals to them by Mīrzā Ḥasan Shīrāzī, Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn and Malkam Khān, see Gilbar, "The Big Merchants", p. 291.

appointed to government posts. They did not object to this however, and considered sufficient the political control which the Majles now exercised over the Government.

On the other hand the unsettled situation and the growing disturbances would naturally have an unfavourable affect on the merchants' business, and it is no wonder that some began to back Atābak and his Government. Amīn al-Ẓarb and Mo'īn al-Tojjār in particular were said to favour his return, as also Ṣanī' al-Douleh and Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī. It must be remembered that Ṣanī'al-Douleh's brother, Mokhber al-Molk, was Deputy for the merchants. It is therefore no wonder that the Majles voted almost unanimously for Atābak's return and resumption of office, for the big merchants could influence the Aṣnāf members and the other moderates, and A'yān and Ulama who were a majority also favoured it. It was outside the Majles and especially amongst the common people and the Kasabeh that he was obviously unpopular, as witnessed by the great rejoicing at his death.

Doulatābādī even recounts that by the time of the bombardment of the Majles the attitude of many of the big Tojjār Deputies had changed. In fact he says that those Tojjār whose businesses were not going well and who had entered the Majles for their own personal ends, amongst whom were Ḥāj Moḥammad Esmā'il, Seyyed Morteżavī, Mīrzā Maḥmūd, Ḥāj'Alī, Ḥajī Ḥabīb, and Mo'īn al-Tojjār, who was engaged heavily in the Gulf and was afraid the Majles might look into his affairs, took a middle of the road attitude. Ḥāj Ḥoseyn Aqā Amīn al-Ẓarb was left alone. He did not trust the King, and felt endangered, and at the same time

was so involved with Seyyed 'Abdallāh and the influential group in the Majles that he could not separate and did not know what line to follow. It has been said that Arbāb Jamshīd who had greatly helped the Majles in the past, was afraid after the murder of Fereydūn¹ and did not co-operate either.²

It must also be added that the interests of the big Tojjār corresponded far more with those of the moderates. The moderates, as already explained, were for compromise. On one occasion Mo'īn al-Tojjār said that the Persian Parliament which had been set up for a year and a half, could not act as those which were seven hundred years old. In every country where constitutionalism began it was the same at the beginning; it would be impossible to work and achieve big results until the Revolution stopped. This argument was repeated by others and was, as already pointed out, opposed to that of the Āzādīkhānān who were more fundamentalist. Another argument of the moderates was to confront the criticism of the Government with criticism of the Majles.

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1. Arbāb Fereydūn was a Zoroastrian merchant and banker who supported the Revolution, and was murdered in Zīhājeh 1325 (Jan. 1909) by some of the Shah's men. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, p. 199.
 2. Y. Doulatābādī, op. cit. 2 p. 274.

The co-operation and relation of the merchants with the Aṣnāf, their leadership of this group and their strong ties with the Bāzār, have already, been mentioned. This was of the utmost importance in the course of the Revolution, and was in fact the only force at the disposal of the Revolutionaries. It is also true that the members of smaller trades and guilds were dissatisfied with the situation in Persia, as were the bigger merchants, and it was easy to play on their feelings of nationalism. The big Tojjār used their influence to close the Bāzārs and to encourage the Kasabeh to take Bast in the British Legation. They paid them and provided for their upkeep, keeping them there until the Government granted their demands. It is difficult to know how much was understood by the majority of the people about constitutionalism and parliamentary government. In any case we are told that in the British Legation they were taught these questions by the Revolutionaries.¹

The Aṣnāf

When the Electoral laws were enacted, the Aṣnāf in Tehran were given thirty-two votes, but they did not always choose their own members, and there were some Ulama and merchants amongst them. It has been calculated that

1. M. Malekzādeh. Tārikh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 2, p. 157.

26% of the Majles seats were held by the Aṣnāf¹ which would have been a considerable group had they been led, but as it was, the leadership of the big merchants was sporadic and at times they sided with the Āzādīkhāhān. The Aṣnāf Deputies represented the poorer Ṭabaqāt of society, and despite the property qualification of a *place of work* they were the representatives of the lower classes. The large number of votes given to this Ṭabaqeh was quite deliberate and unique in the history of the Persian Majles. It was partly due of course to their contribution to the Revolution. But it can be asked whether it was wished to give the Majles a more radical character, or on the contrary to include a large inarticulate body of Deputies in the Majles in order to make it easier to be led. The purpose of the law-makers has not been divulged; it is also possible that no thought was given to the future development of the Majles at the time the Electoral laws were made.

In general it was agreed that next time better educated people with more political experience should be elected. The Aṣnāf Deputies were generally criticised for their ignorance and were looked down upon, then².

1. Z. Shajī'ī, op. cit., p. 187.

2. There is an article by Moḥammad 'Alī al-Tehrānī, a Ṭalabeh Deputy, attacking the Aṣnāf Deputies in Ḥabl al-Matīn, No. 22, 13th Sha'bān 1325 (22 Sept. 1907). In general the idea of Ḥabl al-Matīn itself was against the Aṣnāf Deputies.

as they have been since by historians.¹ When members of the Finance Committee or any other committees were elected, for instance, none were of the Asnāf Deputies.² Again when the Anglo-Russian Convention was mentioned, Marling wrote that in the Majles the rank and file were assured that there was nothing in the agreement detrimental to the public interest, and it was agreed that speeches on the subject should be made by a chosen number of the principal members who had prepared their speeches beforehand. "The agreement was therefore read in perfect silence and the remarks passed upon it were moderate".³ He wrote that this attitude was taken because of fear and because the news of the agreement was sudden and they had not yet formed any opinion, but it also no doubt shows the attitude towards those Marling calls "the rank and file". Later much of the work of the Majles was done through committees

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1. Both A. Kasravī and Kermānī are of the same opinion about the worthlessness of the Asnāf Deputies. Kasravī asks what men such as Mashadī Bāqer, and Ḥājī 'Alī Akbar-e Polopaz (rice-maker) could do in the Majles. A. Kasravī, Tarīkh-e Mashrūṭeh p. 169, also see Nāẓem al-Eslāmī Kermānī, op.cit. I p. 397.
 2. For instance Mīrzā Abu al-Ḥasan Khān from Shiraz, Amīn al-Ẓarb, Ḥāj Moḥammad Esmā'īl, Voṣūq al-Douleh, 'Oun al-Douleh and Sa'd al-Douleh, all of them A'yān, or of the merchant class, were chosen for the Finance Committee.
 3. Marling to Grey, October 10th 1907, No. 231, FO 371/301.

and the really important discussions were kept secret.

Taqizādeh on the other hand paid homage to one of the Aṣnāf Deputies, especially naming Mashadī Bāqer the Deputy of the Baqāls (grocers) the one Kasravī chooses to belittle. He wrote that on the occasion when there was a discussion about Mashrūṭeh or Mashrū'eh, and the King insisted on the latter expression being included in the laws, and the Ulama were beginning to agree, Mashadī Bāqer exclaimed: "We Aṣnāf and the dirty collared and the common people don't understand these deep sounding Arabic words; what we have acquired with so much hardship and bloodshed is called Mashrūṭeh and we shall not part with our Constitution with a play on words." The other Aṣnāf Deputies supported him and the Ulama backed down. Taqizadeh continued to name several of the other Aṣnāf Deputies who exerted great influence on the course of events and said that they should not remain anonymous.¹ However outbursts such as these were exceptional, in general the Aṣnāf Deputies remained silent as did most of the Deputies of small provincial towns, and Taqizādeh does not mention their political opinions when he classifies the political stance of the members, in a list to be discussed later, nor do we often come across their names in the discussions of the Majles.

1. H. Taqizādeh, "Lafz-e Mashrūṭeh va Yādī az Avāyel-e Mashrūṭīyyat." Maqālat, 1, p. 393.

One reason for this unfavourable and disparaging opinion may be the fact that they were easily malleable, and could be influenced by the more professional politicians.¹ They were also susceptible to religious propaganda, and were worried at being called Bābīs by Sheykh Fażlallāh. They generally took an ambivalent attitude to many questions. In the eyes of one British Minister, the mercantile and lower class generally supported the extremists in the Majles.² But this opinion cannot be substantiated and, as already explained, politically the big merchants who were generally moderates, often led the Aṣnāf Deputies. Moreover the moderates were more numerous and stronger in number in the Majles, as admitted by Taqīzādeh, which eventually made the Āzādīkhāhān turn to activity outside the Majles. Besides they had no unity and there were quite a considerable number who were reactionaries.³ Nonetheless the National Anjomans or Anjomanhā-ye Mellī (as opposed to the reactionary Anjomans)⁴

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1. Marling wrote that "The ignorant majority of the Deputies are often swayed by five or six powerful and self-interested members who really guide the work of the House". Marling to Grey Jan. 2nd 1908, No. 1, FO 416/135.
 2. Spring Rice to Grey, 27th Feb. 1907, No. 43, FO 371 304 Incl. in No. 1.
 3. It has been pointed out that the crowds who gathered in the Meydān-e Tūpkhāneh and demanded the repeal of the Constitution had genuine grievances. They were the conservative Ulama and Talabeh, the lower classes without property who were dissatisfied with the Constitution for various reasons and the members of the upper classes.
E. Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution". Iranian Studies, Autumn, 1969, pp. 128-151.
 4. See Chapter V.

and amongst them the Anjoman-e Aṣnāf, of which Doulatābādī gives some information, were important instruments of the Revolutionaries, but the exact connection of the Aṣnāf Deputies with the Anjoman-e Aṣnāf is not clear.

On the whole in assessing the activities of the mercantile groups in the Majles, we see a lack of a determined and specific political aim, and a lack of solidarity amongst the two groups or within each group. Yet of all the others these had the most experience of cohesive action in the economic field, and could have applied their experience to politics. It was the absence of an ideological goal which weakened the mercantile interest once some of their economic goals had been achieved, with the result that no permanent working group developed in the Majles as their interest shifted and divided. Further, it must be mentioned that there was no precedent for members of the mercantile class to participate in politics. This was a new departure from custom and was of short duration.

The Ṭabaqāt bases to the choice of Deputies to the First Majles owed something to the traditional division in Persian society as well as a possible emulation of the estates of earlier Revolutions, or division of power. Yet it was a system that fitted uneasily into the Parliamentary system which had at least in the minds of the few in the fore front of the movement, the goal of a just and democratic representation of the different economic and social interests of society. The artificial classification of the Ṭabaqāt division soon was seen to be an inadequate and unwieldy reflection of these particular interests, and individuals quickly began to coalesce around

more coherent ideological platforms. Indeed even at the elections themselves the different Tabaqāt had transgressed Tabaqāt divisions. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that at the time of the Second Majles this method was abandoned and a new one found.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL GROUPS, MO'TADEL AND ĀZĀDIKHĀH

The last three Tabaqāt considered, namely the Ulama, Tojjār and Aṣnāf, can be said to have been in the forefront of the Revolution. They represented three substantial groups in the Majles, but they did not contain within themselves any unity which could have been transformed into a more coherent organization. As has been seen, there were enormous divisions in these groups especially amongst the Ulama. Further, there were conflicting loyalties which cut across the basic lines of the Tabaqāt which meant that the groupings in the Majles were not based on a clear-cut professional or class division. The real divergence which did appear was based far more on ideological grounds, and especially on a different approach by each side to the problems. Yet here too there did not exist complete solidarity between the two sides. The Deputies had been elected on no specific political platform and had little previous organization and the Anjomans which might have been expected to provide both organization and ideological leadership did not participate fully in the elections.

The activities of the Anjomans, especially the Anjoman-e Makhfī and Melli, have already been mentioned. Now we must see whether vestiges of these previous organizations survived in the Majles, and whether they provided any ideological or personal leadership. Originally the demands for reform

had been vague in order to attract the largest number of adherents.¹ These demands had not been very carefully considered beforehand. For example, no discussion was given to the composition or duties of the 'Edālatkhāneh, and in fact the real aims of the Revolutionaries were deliberately not divulged to the Ulama or Tojjār. At the time of the elections few of the members of these two Anjomans were elected to the Majles; there were two from the Anjoman-e Melli, namely Ḥajī Seyyed Naṣrallāh Akhavi, and Mīrzā Moḥsen², and one member of the second Anjoman-e Makhfi was elected, namely Mīrzā Maḥmūd Eṣfahāni.³ Shams al-Ḥokamā, the brother of Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermāni, who was an active member of the Anjoman-e Makhfi, was elected as deputy for Kerman. According to Kermani himself, Farmānfarmā the then Governor of Kerman had used his influence in this election on the suggestion of Nāẓem al-Eslām.⁴

It is not known why no more of the Anjoman members were elected. It is possible that they did not have enough influence socially or that the election of a

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermāni, op.cit., pp. 59 and 371. M. Malekzādeh, Tārikh-e Mashrūṭiyyat 2, p.13.
2. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermāni says that Mīrzā Moḥsen, the brother of Ṣadr al-Ulama and son-in-law of Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahāni, was elected because of the latter's influence.
3. This list might not be quite complete as all the members of the first Anjoman-e Makhfi are not known.
4. Bāstāni Pārīzi, op.cit., p.201.

larger number of Deputies than meets the eyes was due to patronage.¹ It is also possible that the leaders of these two secret societies did not feel it necessary to send their members to the Majles. It was probably later, when the threat to the Majles was felt, that several members of the Komīteh-ye Enqelab, which replaced the Anjoman-e Mellī, were elected by the Majles. Three of the very important leaders of the Revolution, Malek al-Motekallemīn, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez and Doulatābādī were suspected of being Azalīs, a Bābī sect, which disqualified them as Deputies.² It is also possible that the Anjomans preferred to stay outside the Majles, for they would thus have more freedom of action. In any case there were very few members of the Anjomans in the Majles, and hence no organized action could be learnt from their previous experience.

There developed in the Majles three sides; the Mo'tadel, the Āzādīkhāhān and the Bīṭarafān or neutrals whose allegiance shifted with the events. The moderates or Mo'tadel had a certain element of conservatism in

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1. Though it was decreed that each Deputy did not have to represent his own Ṭabaqeh, the Princes or A'yān were represented by their own members. The Ulama were elected as representatives of other Ṭabaqāt and two of the Tojjār Deputies of Tehran were of the A'yān. It would have been inconceivable that the lower classes should be elected as representatives of the upper. The fact that few members of the Anjomans, who belonged mainly to what can be termed middle classes or the intellectuals, were elected suggests that much patronage and influence was used at the election of the Aṣnāf Deputies.
 2. This point is not adequately substantiated in Persian sources, but it is readily accepted by some Western orientologists that these men were Azalīs. See N. Keddie, Origin of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran, p.77.

their policy and ideology. The Azādīkhāhān were variously called liberals or nationalists (Vaṭanparastān or Melliyyūn), also Tondravān or extremists, and Engelābiyyūn or revolutionaries, and we must keep this element of extremism in mind in discussions about them. This extremism is manifest in their ideology and some of their actions, especially if we accept the assassination of the Atābak as having been their responsibility.¹ This group was extremist not only in its methods of action but also in some of its demands. It especially wanted the Majles to arrogate to itself supreme power, and accepted no compromise on that question. Spring Rice called it the popular party. In this context the terms Mo'tadel and Azādīkhāhān will be used, although the latter is not satisfactory for the moderates or Mo'tadels were not against liberty, but it is the term mostly used at the time and afterwards, and so has been used here. There was a fundamental difference of approach between the two groups which is repeatedly reflected in the Majles debates. For instance, on one occasion, there was an interesting argument between the two sides which throws some light on their basic difference of approach to the question of constitutionalism. Mīrzā Morteżā Qolī Khān Nā'īnī, Deputy of the Mālekīn of Esfahan and a moderate, brought up the question of the duties of the Deputies and said that none acted in accordance with them.

1. See pp. 217-220.

"When we enter the Majles, we think that we are stepping into the British Parliament, and that our President is the President of the British Parliament, and that each of us has studied in higher schools, that we are all diplomats and that everyone in the country is educated and literate. Unfortunately this is not the case. When the sun shines on a place for three hours it leaves its mark for a while. For 6,000 years we have been burning in ignorance; surely its effects will remain with us for some time."

Taqizādeh replied

"We must do something which will benefit the people; if we continue to say our country is not like France and our Deputies are not like the French Deputies, in another twenty years we shall still be saying the same. A Deputy must be a person who will make this Parliament into a Parliament like the French or English ones." 1

On another occasion Mokhber al-Molk said that the criticism directed at the Government would weaken it, and the disturbances would consequently grow, but the Azādikhāhān maintained that by argument and by criticism better solutions would be found.

There was amongst the Mo'tadels outside the Majles too, some misgiving lest there might be a strong reaction by the governing classes if the more extreme demands of the Azādikhāhān were implemented. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, for instance, thought that if the Majles abolished the Tiyūl and cut the salaries of some rich

1. R.M. No. 33, 20th Zihajeh 1325 (26th Jan. 1908).

people, those who suffered would not remain silent but would begin to oppose the Majles. This question had been discussed in the Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Šānī and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī was approached and asked to obtain a postponement on this decision by the Majles. Seyyed Moḥammad agreed to speak to the Deputies, but said he did not think it would be of any use as the Deputies were intent on these measures.¹ When this question was brought up in the Majles, some Deputies expressed the opinion that if this were accepted now, whatever the Majles wished to do in the future, the same kind of argument would be made.

The division of the Deputies between Azādīkhāh and Mo'tadel was not based on a class conflict, and there were members of each Ṭabaqeh on either side. Of course there were fewer upper-class Deputies amongst the Azādīkhāhān and vice versa, but the divisions were not too clear-cut. Loyalties to individuals still played an important role in the people's actions, and personal relationship is a factor to be taken into consideration. Moreover, there were certain questions upon which all the Deputies were in agreement. For instance, they agreed on the question of the abolition of Tīyūl and Tas'īr, the need for a bank, the necessity to put a stop to the deprecation of the son of Raḥīm Khān or the resistance to Sheykh Fażlallāh. They unanimously voted against Kāmran Mīrzā as Minister of War and they

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., 2, p.117.

also unanimously voted against Vazīr Afkham and Moshīr al-Saltāneh.

In general however, the Deputies were divided on their political views, but though in the early stages of the Majles at least there existed these differences of view and opinion, in terms of leaders they were remarkably similar.

The moderates in the Majles were led by Ṣanī'al-Douleh who was married to one of the daughters of Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah. There was nothing official, of course, in Ṣanī'al-Douleh's leadership, especially as he was the President of the Majles, and as such had to remain neutral. So whatever leadership he gave had to be very discreet and was particularly aimed at supporting Atābak. After the death of Atābak, Ṣanī'al-Douleh retired and Eḥteshām al-Saltāneh became President, but he did not take up the leadership of the Mo'tadels in the same way, and they consequently lacked a strong hand.

The leadership of the Āzādīkhāhān was taken for a short time by Sa'd al-Douleh, and when he left the Majles in Rabī'al-Avval (April) he was replaced by the younger extremist Taqīzādeh. In the past there had been between Sa'd al-Douleh and Ṣanī'al-Douleh a personal animosity¹ which became apparent in the Majles when each took a different side, but behind their personal quarrel lay a question of principle which continued after

1. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, op.cit., p.27.

both left the Majles.

It is extremely difficult to know with precision the composition of these major groups as there exist only a very few contemporary lists of the affiliation of individual members.¹ Taqīzādeh has made two lists of the political division of the Majles Deputies.

Taqīzādeh had first-hand knowledge of the Deputies, but no doubt his classification is somewhat influenced by his own personal opinion. It must also be mentioned that he omits to list about sixty Deputies who were mostly of the Aṣnāf and provincial Deputies. He gave the names of twenty Deputies as Āzādīkhāhān and thirty-five

1. Given the discrepancies and different interpretations in these sources the political affiliation assumed in this work does not adhere strictly to any list but is based on the contemporary lists available. There are in fact two contemporary lists by Taqīzādeh and some reference to the division of the Majles by the British representative of some of the Deputies. He mentions, for instance, that the Aṣnāf Deputies supported the extremists. See page 177 Taqīzādeh's lists are "Doureh-ye Jadīd-e Mashrutīyyat dar Iran" Kāveh 6th Shavāl 1336 (15th July 1918) pp. 4-6 and "Tārīkh-e Mokhtaṣar-e Majles-e Shourā-ye Mellī-ye Iran" published originally by Kāveh in 1337. This contains more biographical information about the Deputies. Maqālāt, 5, 2nd part, pp. 32-50.

as Mo'tadels.¹ According to Taqīzādeh's list the Mo'tadel comprised five A'yān, eleven Tojjār, seven Ulama and Tollāb, and eight Aṣnāf, two princes and two provincial Deputies from Qazvin and Damavand.

Some of the prominent members of this group who played active parts in the Majles were Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī and Seyyed Naṣrallāh Akhavī (also called Taqavī) who had been a member of the Anjoman-e Mellī and the Jāme'-e Adamīyat, as mentioned.² There was also Seyyed Moḥammad Ja'far, a Fars Deputy, and Dr. Valīallāh Khān, an intellectual who knew much about constitutionalism and could have been an important theoretician for the moderates, but spoke rarely, possibly because he was related to Sheykh Faḡlallāh Nūrī. Mo'īn al-Tojjār was also

1. F. Adamīyat has also divided the Deputies according to their political alignment, but there are great discrepancies between his and Taqīzādeh's list. Adamīyat's list is not complete either, and both contain certain mistakes. Adamīyat divides the Deputies into four groups, extremists or revolutionaries, radicals or reformists, moderates and conservatives. This list is not absolutely dependable as his criterion is the Majles debates which are not reproduced fully. Moreover, it has some mistakes as has the list of Taqīzādeh. The lists of Taqīzādeh for example, do not include the name of Morteżā Qolī Khān Nā'inī. Adamīyat on the other hand makes a mistake about Yaḥyā Mīrzā whom he describes as an extremist. There were in fact three Yaḥyā Mīrzās, one being Šaqat al-Saltāneh Deputy of the princes, the second was Yaḥyā Mīrzā Lesān al-Ḥokamā, Deputy from Khorasan, and the third was Yaḥyā Mīrzā Eskandarī. He was not a Deputy in the First Majles but was elected to the Second Majles though he died before the Majles met, so his brother Soleyman Mīrzā was elected by the Majles in his stead. However he and his brother were politically active in this period.

2. See footnote p. 126.

a member of this group. Though the Mo'tadel was the more numerous and influential group, the balance of power shifted between the two sides. Without doubt the Mo'tadel were also supported from outside the Majles and they had the sympathy of those who thought some of the actions of the Āzādīkhāhān in the Majles and their Anjomans too extremist.

Though both leaders were backed up by the small groups of like-minded supporters, there were others who were linked with them through family or personal connections. Şanī'al-Douleh had a strong group. Three of his relatives and brothers were Deputies. Ḥasan 'Alī Khān Naşr al-Molk and Mekkber al-Molk were his nephews, *and brother*, Şadiq Ḥaẓrat a son-in-law. He was also related to Mostashār al-Douleh the Azarbaijan Deputy of the A'yān who supported Atābak. Moḥaqeq al-Douleh, also close to Atābak, and whose father was a Kāshī who worked at court, was a close friend. Ḥāj Moḥammad Taqī Shāhrūdī the Deputy of the Tojjār was also a close friend and associate of Şanī'al-Douleh. In addition, he was supported by the important merchants such as Mo'in al-Tojjār, Amīn al-Żarb and Arbāb Jamshīd. Those linked with Sa'd al-Douleh through these kinds of ties were fewer and a less influential group. He had two friends, 'Oun al-Douleh and Moshār al-Molk and also the support of Taqīzādeh and the Āzādīkhāhān.

When the Majles opened the issue centred round the demand of the Āzādīkhāhān for the acceptance of

ministerial responsibility and the dismissal of Naus,¹ and the acceptance by the Shah of the principle of constitutionalism. These demands were successfully won by this group, and Şanī'al-Douleh and his group could not resist such popular issues which were the basis of the whole movement. However a confrontation was not slow to develop. One occasion for the alignment of the two sides was over the question of taking the oath as soon as the Majles met. On this occasion Şanī'al-Douleh and his adherents insisted that an oath of allegiance to the Shah should be taken, but Sa'd al-Douleh insisted that they should await the completion of the Fundamental Laws. There was a very severe confrontation between the two sides and it was even feared that some of the Deputies who did not want to take the oath would resign which would have been fatal for the Majles. However, at last the question was settled by the mediation of Seyyed 'Abdallah Behbahānī.

This confrontation between the two sides became violent over the question of the Senate. According to Spring Rice, when the question of the Second Chamber and the number of its members was raised, Sa'd al-Douleh took a leading part against it and insulted Şanī'al-Douleh who was hardly accorded a hearing and therefore left the assembly, expressing his desire to resign. Forty of the Deputies offered to resign with him,¹ but he was at last

1. Presumably this group included a solid core of moderates plus the personal friends of Şanī'al-Douleh who supported him on the issue of the Senate.

induced to return.¹ The Azādīkhāhān insisted that a third of the Senators should be appointed by the Government and two thirds by the Majles, not the contrary, but at last a compromise was arrived at by which half were to be appointed by the Government and half elected.

The Mo'tadel group was successful on occasions and imposed its policy, as on the occasion when it voted for the return of Atabak. This was however their biggest mistake for it divided the two sides and exacerbated the relationship of the Azādīkhāhān and the Mo'tadel, making the latter appear the supporters of the Shah. The issue then became the position of Atābak himself. The Azādīkhāhān feared Atābak would help the Shah; and the situation worsened when Sheykh Fażlallāh began his campaign against the Majles about Jamādī al-Avval (June). The Government would take no action, which made it seem as though it was done at the Shah's behest. In consequence, the accusations against Atābak increased. His supporters on the other hand tried to place the responsibility on the Majles, the Azādīkhāhān and the Anjomans in order to absolve him and apologize for him. They also tried to show that he was not to be blamed but that the Shah's friends were the real instigators of all the disturbances, and that the fault was not the Prime Minister's. However, despite such defence, the moderates became associated in the minds of many with the Government and the Shah. In

1. Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3rd 1907, No.5, F0371/301
Incl. in No.1.

the Majles Atābak's supporters defended him and stood by him. For instance, on the 25th Jamādī al-Avval 1325 (June 1907) a strong attack was made by Taqīzādeh on the Government declaring that if they could not guarantee peace they should resign. They added that the wise men of the world had come to the conclusion that this was the solution. Mokhber al-Molk tried to shift the responsibility on the Ministers other than Atābak - he said they should call all the Ministers to the Majles and establish the limits of their responsibility, adding that the choice of Ministers should be the responsibility of the Prime Minister. By this he meant that the Cabinet was not the choice of Atābak, which indeed it was not. In keeping in mind this attitude of the moderates, it is easy to understand why they joined Taqīzādeh in attacking Kāmran Mīrzā, the corrupt Minister of War and the Shah's uncle. Not only was he on bad terms with Atābak, but it also helped to shift the responsibility from the shoulders of the Premier to others, especially those close to the Shah and his personal choice. Šanī'al-Douleh once defended Atābak and replied to the criticism of the Government, saying that at least whenever the Minister of the Interior, namely Atābak, was addressed he at least replied - something which the other Minister never did.¹

The Azādīkhān could not do much in the Majles while Atābak was in power, especially as he had strong

1. R.M. No. 167, 17th Rajab 1325 (27th Aug. 1907).

backing there, so they turned to activity outside, and pressure was brought on the Government through the Anjomans, the press and demonstrations, to such an extent that Mokhber al-Saltāneh and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī called on several occasions for the suppression of the Anjomans and the censorship of the press. Ṣanī'al-Douleh even resigned as a protest to these pressures and said that nowhere in the world was it customary for people to cause disturbances in this way and put pressure on the Deputies. Another Deputy, Ḥāj'Abd al-Ḥoseyn, added that the Government was in line with the wishes of the people. Delays were the result of these gatherings.¹

The subject of attack gradually shifted from differences of issues to Atābak himself. From the point of view of the Āzādīkhāhān, it became imperative that Atābak should be removed. This was a fundamental issue, and the assassination of Atābak was the culmination of this development.

The background to the assassination is extremely complex and lies in the relationship of Atābak on the one hand with the Shah, and on the other with the Āzādīkhāhān. Just before his death, on 15th Rajab 1323 (24th August 1907), he joined the Jāme'-e Ādamīyat. This organization was founded by Sa'd al-Douleh and 'Abbās Qolī Khān a disciple of Malkam.² It is possible that

1. R.M. No. 93, 5th Rabī'al-Ṣanī 1325 (16th May 1907).

2. The exact date of its foundation is not clear. Algar mentions 1322 (1904), but F. Ādamīyat, the son of 'Abbās Qolī Khān who has had the use of the documents of the Jāme' is vague about it. I think the date given
/cont'd.

Sa'd al-Douleh who had wished for the prime ministership, was trying to form a party after he left the Majles in Rabī' al-Avval 1325 (April 1907), or else he might have wished to be reconciled to the Shah whose Kāshī group¹ were members of the Jāme'. 'Alā al-Douleh and his brother, Ehteshām al-Saltāneh, who later tried to bring about a reconciliation between the Majles and the Shah were also members of the Jāme'.

It is, however, not clear why Atābak joined the Jāme'. It might have been out of fear, for he was being threatened from many quarters,² and wanted supporters vis-a-vis the Majles or the Shah. It is also possible

/cont'd. by Algar is not precise, and Sa'd al-Douleh could not have been involved in this organization at this early date. Moreover, there is a letter by Mostashār al-Douleh to Šaqat al-Eslām in which he writes that Sa'd al-Douleh who was beginning to lose his popularity organized an Anjoman called Ādamīyat. The date of this letter is Jamādī al-Avval 1325 (June-July 1907). This must be approximately the date of the foundation of the Jāme'.

F. Ādamīyat. Fekr-e Azādī, pp.208-9.

H. Algar, Mīrzā Malkum Khān, p.249.

N.Fathī, Shahīd-e Niknām, p.90.

1. See p. 123.

2. He had been severely attacked by two of the members of the Jāme', Soleyman Mīrzā and Yaḥyā Mīrzā, who blamed all the disturbances on him. It must be mentioned here that these two brothers were also members of the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb and later disowned the Jāme'.
Habl al-Matīn No.38, 26th Jamādī al-Sānī 1325.

that the Jāme' worked with the Shah and lulled him into believing that he could reconcile the Shah with the Majles. In any case, on the 22 Rajab (1st September), he visited the Majles to introduce two new Ministers, Mostoufī al-Mamālek as Minister of War, and 'Alā'al-Molk as Minister of Justice - instead of the unpopular Kāmran Mīrzā and Farmāfarmā. He also brought a letter from the Shah in reply to his own in which the Shah once more promised his support for the Constitution and the promulgation of the Supplementary Fundamental law. The meeting ended with Atābak expressing his hope that with God's help and the co-operation of the Deputies all matters would be put right.¹ He was killed as he left the Majles.

Ṣanī al-Douleh believed the Shah and Sa'd al-Douleh instigated the murder² and in fact 'Abbās Qolī Khān was arrested but was later released for lack of evidence. He blamed Ṣanī'al-Douleh for his arrest.

On the other hand, the Komīteh-ye Engelāb also claimed to be the author of the murder, as did Ḥeydar Khān.³ In fact it seems there were two plots of murder and that the extremists succeeded in achieving the Shah's wishes.⁴

1. R.M. No. 169, 22 Rajab 1325 (1st Sept. 1907).

2. Spring Rice to Grey, Sept. 13th 1907, No.459, F.O.416/33.

3. N. Keddie, "The Assassination of Amin al-Soltan (Atabak-i A'zam)" Iran and Eslam ed. C.E. Bosworth (Edinburgh 1971) p.322.

4. There was another mysterious death at this time. Mīrzā Naṣrallāh Khān Moshīr al-Douleh had at this time endeavoured to warn the leaders of the popular movement against Sa'd al-Douleh, but he died under suspicious circumstances, and all questions in the Majles were hushed by his sons. It must be remembered that his son Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān was the son-in-law of 'Alā'al-Douleh and it was rumoured at this time that he had been involved in the murder.

The murder of Atābak was so popular that his murderer, 'Abbās Āqā became a national hero. It also frightened the nobles, courtiers and princes into either joining the Jāme' or the Anjoman-e Khedmat organized by 'Alā'al-Douleh. His brother Ehteshām al-Saltāneh, a member of the Jāme'-e Ādamīyat, was elected President of the Majles on the retirement of Şani'al-Douleh, and on the suggestion of Asadallāh Mīrzā, also another member of the Jāme'. Both brothers worked towards a reconciliation between the Shah and the Majles. The Shah on the other hand was now quite isolated¹ and exposed directly to the criticisms of the extremists who had up till then concentrated their attacks on Atābak. Therefore in Ramazān (November) the Shah too joined the Jāme' and came to the Majles to swear allegiance to it. This friendly mood did not last long as will be seen.

The murder of Atābak was a watershed in the development of the Āzādīkhāhān. While Atābak was in power the Āzādīkhāhān were generally weak, but after his murder the situation changed. Taqīzādeh and his group became momentarily more powerful and even some of Atābak's supporters joined him, chief amongst whom was Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbāhanī. Despite this fact however, their number remained smaller than the moderates. According to Taqīzādeh's list

1. Marling even expressed fear for the Shah's safety. He reported in November that there was a movement for the Shah's deposition.
Marling to Grey, October 10th 1907, No. 231, FO 371/301.
Ibid., No.326 FO 371/313.

there were 20, but Marling mentions there were 25 Deputies who supported Taqīzādeh,¹ but he gives no names.

The list Taqīzādeh gives does not apply to all the life-span of the Majles for it varied at different times. Four of the Āzādīkhāhān Deputies only joined their rank when they were elected by the Majles. They were Mo'āḏed al-Saltāneh, Momtāz al-Douleh, Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb and Ḥakīm al-Molk. Besides these the list included two merchant Deputies, Taqīzādeh and Vakīl al-Tojjār of Gilan, three Asnāf Deputies from Tehran, Molla Ḥasan Vāreś, Ḥāj Moḥammad Sā'atsāz and Ḥāj Esmā'īl Bolūrforūsh; two from Āzarbāījan Ḥāj Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Āqā and Ḥāj Mīrzā Āqā Farshforūsh. Two A'yān Sa'd al-Douleh and Mostashār al-Douleh, three Ulama, Bahr al-'Olūm from Kerman, Hesām al-Eslām from Gilan and Sheykh Yūsef from Fars. The Ṭabaqeh of the other three provincial Deputies labelled by Taqīzādeh as Āzādīkhāh is not given by him. They were Ḥāj Moḥammad 'Alī from Khorasan, 'Amīd al-Ḥokamā from Semnan and Neḏām al-Ulama from Malayer.²

It must be added that neither the Āzādīkhāhān nor the Mo'tadel were a homogeneous group and we must not expect a disciplined action. There were shifts of opinion and defections on both sides as for instance in the case of Sa'd al-Douleh and Mīr Hāshem.³

We can trace three groups amongst the Āzādīkhāhān in the Majles, the Azarbaijan group of Deputies, the inner

1. Marling to Grey Jan. 29th 1908, No.14, FO416/35.

2. Y. Doulatābādī too mentions 20 Deputies or less as backing Taqīzādeh and being extremists.

3. See p. 224.

core of extremists inside and outside the Majles who were connected with the Komīteh-ye Engelāb and the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmiyūn party mentioned earlier, and a third group of Deputies who supported these sporadically but were not strongly committed.

There were twelve Azarbaijan Deputies¹ elected in Tabriz, two from each Tabaqeh, according to the electoral laws. They were Fażl'alī Āqā and Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī from the Ulama,² Mostashār al-Douleh and Sharaf al-Douleh from the A'yān, Hāj Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Āqā and Mīrzā Āqā Farshforūsh from the Aṣnāf; Aḥsan al-Douleh represented the Fallāhīn, Hedāyatallāh Mīrzā the princes. Hāj Moḥammad Āqā Ḥarīrī represented the Tojjār as well as Taqīzādeh. Tāllebof, who lived in the Caucasus, was also elected as he was a well known Constitutionalist and writer, but he refused to attend. When the Azarbaijan deputies left Tabriz they were only seven as Emām Jom'eh and Hājī Moḥammad Āqā were not yet ready to leave³ and Taqīzādeh and Mīr Hāshem were already in Tehran. They were feted all the way and welcomed to the capital⁴ where

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1. For a complete list see H. Taqīzādeh, "Doureh-ye Jadīd-e Mashrūṭīyyat".
 2. As there had always been much tension between the two religious sects of Sheykhī and Moteshar'eh, which each followed different religious leaders, when the Revolution began these sects settled their differences partly due to the influence of Ṣaqat al-Eslām, and decided to support the reform movement. During the elections of the representatives of the Ulama, one of each sect was elected, - Hājī Fażl'alī Āqā by the Sheykhī and Hājī Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī by the Moteshar'eh. M.Mojtehedī, Rejāl-e Azarbaijan dar 'Aṣr-e Mashrūṭīyyat. (Tehran, 1327) p.60.
 3. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p.191.
 4. Azarbaijan was considered the second city of Persia. It had during the movement against the Tobacco Regie taken a very active part and now its people were enthusiastically responding by helping Tehran and sending their Deputies quickly. The Anjoman-e Tabriz paid for their journey.

they immediately began to play an important role.

The confrontation between the Premier Moshīr al-Douleh and the Azarbaijan Deputies has already been described.¹ As soon as the latter had arrived Moshīr al-Douleh declared that the Shah had granted a Mashrū'eh not a Mashrūteh, that is not a constitution, but a body to enact laws.² Sa'd al-Douleh and the newly arrived Azarbaijan Deputies had argued against the Premier and won their point. Mostashār al-Douleh reported to Saqat al-Eslām that "it would not be exaggerating if I said that the constitutional monarchy was saved by the three of us" (meaning himself, Farshī, and Taqīzādeh). He also added that "all the people's hopes are concentrated on us."³

Spring Rice commented on the Azarbaijānīs enthusiastically, saying that since their arrival and the retirement of Sa'd al-Douleh, the Majles meetings had improved. He was full of praise for them and wrote "Here is a leaven of honest and unselfish men such as the Tabriz Deputies.

1. See page 116.

2. A. Kasravī, *Ibid.*, p.217.

3. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām, p.124. Mostashār al-Douleh also wrote to Saqat al-Eslām that this early success they had in a meeting with the Prime Minister and some of the Deputies had made all Tehran, perhaps all Persia, look to the people of Azarbaijan and their Deputies with hope, and he added that people who had until a few days before scorned the word Tork, now all wanted to meet the Azarbaijānī Deputies. Moghīś al-Saltāneh already mentioned had commented that he had met some of the Azarbaijānī Deputies in Baku. They were all full of great ideas and expressed them fearlessly, he said, and he wondered whether they would continue in this vein once they came to Tehran. He added that the people had become impertinent and fearless, thanks to the machinations of 'Ayn al-Douleh and 'Alā'al-Douleh, and that they would not easily be subdued.

These are the stuff of which true democrats are made. They do not take their cues from foreign powers, or Ministers; they are independent and liberal."¹

Some of the Azarbaijan Deputies formed a nucleus of members with the Āzādīkhāhān who had most cohesion in the Majles. According to Taqīzādeh's list already mentioned, five of the Azarbaījānī Deputies were Āzādīkhāh, four Mo'tadels. He omits to give his opinion of Aḥsan al-Douleh and Sharaf al-Douleh. The Azarbaījānī Āzādīkhāhān were Taqīzādeh, Mīrzā Ebrahīm Āqā, Mīrzā Āqā Farshī, Mostashār al-Douleh, and Mīr Hāshem. The Mo'tadels were Ḥāj Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī, Fazl'alī Āqā, Ḥāj Moḥammad Āqā Ḥarīrī and Mīrzā Āqā Eṣfahānī. There was however not a constant and total solidarity between members of either of these groups. Mīr Hāshem who had been very active in the early days of the Revolution in Tabriz became suspect and was exiled to Tehran. While there he was elected Deputy as a consolation, but left the Majles after a few months to return to Tabriz where he organized the Anjoman-e Eslāmīyeh and began anti-constitutional activities. Fażl'alī Āqā was not always steady and was even suspected of counter-revolutionary activity as was Mīrzā Āqā Eṣfahānī.

Mostashār al-Douleh who was related to Ṣanī'al-Douleh supported Atābak when that Minister came to Tehran. He justified this by saying to Ṣaqat al-Eslām that Atābak had changed completely, and that people in Tabriz should not

1. Spring Rice to Grey, July 16th 1907, No. 147, FO 371/301.

listen to certain things said about him by some Deputies.¹ After the death of Atābak he joined Taqīzādeh.² However even before that date there were occasions when he had co-operated with the Āzādīkhāhān. Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī too, on occasions supported the latter group.

There were more Turkish Deputies in the Majles than those who represented Azarbaijan and at times their aid was called. For instance on the 11th. Šafar 1325 Taqīzādeh, Farshī, Mostashār al Douleh and Emām Jom'eh called on Ḥakīm al-Molk, Mokhtār al-Douleh, Ḥāj Moḥammad Esmā'īl Āqā Mortaḏavī and Ḥāj Mīrzā 'Alī Āqā to help them to intercede with the chief Mojtahed of Tabriz to return to that city. He had been ousted by the extremists in that city and was now the source of much intrigue in Tehran.³ The Deputies wanted him to leave before he joined Sheykh Faḏallāh.

1. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām p.148.

2. Mostashār al-Douleh's opinion about Taqīzādeh was expressed in a letter to Šaqat al-Eslām who did not know him: "This person is not at all corrupt; he has a very straight and consistent policy. He knows no deceit, he is sincere and not mysterious, he does not slander anyone, and is faithful and pure. His only weakness is that he relies too much on his own knowledge. He has learnt constitutionalism, like other things, from books and he does not have enough experience. One of his wrong beliefs is that according to the rules of constitutionalism, if ministers resign everything will be put right, but he does not realise that the number of capable and useful ministers is limited. When I argue with him he becomes convinced because he has a healthy nature and is wise, but despite this he has become known amongst the Ulama as anti-religious and the main cause is our own Āqā Mīrzā Faḏl'alī Āqā."

3. N. Fathī, Ibid., p.297.

Sometimes the coldness existing between the two groups of moderates and Azādīkhāh was temporarily removed. On the occasion of the troubles caused by Raḥīm Khān and his son, three of the Azarbaijan Deputies, Farshī, Taqīzādeh and Mostashār al-Douleh, who caused great trouble in the Majles by criticizing the Government and stood in great danger of their lives, organized a front by approaching Aḥsan al-Douleh and Sharaf al-Douleh.¹

There were several reasons for this small but nonetheless effective amount of co-operation between the Azarbaijan Deputies, despite their different ideas. First of all, they came from Azarbaijan and so had an "esprit de corps". Besides, Azarbaijan was one of the most advanced provinces of Persia economically and naturally. Its Deputies were active and liberal minded. The extremist and active Anjoman of Tabriz also kept an eye on them. Four of them corresponded, often in code, with Šaqat al-Eslām, one of the chief Mojtaheds of Tabriz and a great constitutionalist. He directed them, advised them² and kept them informed of events in Tabriz. At times he acted as an intermediary between them and the extremist Anjoman of Tabriz, which had even wanted to depose Mostashār al-Douleh at one time for being too moderate and pro Atābak. Šaqat al-Eslām was a moderate who disapproved of the extremism of Taqīzādeh. For instance, he thought the peasants'

1. N. Fathī, Ibid., p.197.

2. For instance he advised them never to trust the Shah and to fear him most when he seemed most friendly.
N. Fathī, Ibid., p.214.

refusal to pay taxes and their rebellious mood were due to the speeches of Taqīzādeh of which he disapproved.¹ He wrote to Mostashār al-Douleh: "About the country, you are going too fast, it is absolutely not necessary that you should deny Taqīzādeh; he is very good in all affairs, but he is not worthy of Mostashar al-Douleh sacrificing himself for him ...". He added that the result of Taqīzādeh's and other people's speeches had been the revolt of the peasants.

Despite such guarded advice which was no doubt heeded by some of them, the Azarbaijan Deputies soon won the reputation of being extremists and irreligious, and at times even their lives were threatened. Fażl'alī Āqā expressed something of this dilemma when he said, in the Majles, that whenever there was any talk of religion, they said that they (the Azarbaijan Deputies) were causing difficulties and would not let the work proceed, but there was another group who, if they saw the slightest thing wrong they said You see now that you couldn't work in accordance with religion, they were caught between these two sides".²

1. N. Faḥḥī, Ibid., p.165.

2. Şaqat-al-Eslām obviously must have warned them against extremism and even the accusation of anarchism, for Farshī assures him that they were not anarchists but moderates, and that not even Taqīzādeh was an anarchist. He added that they were all friends though they had different ideologies. In another letter dated 23rd Rabī'al-Avval 1326 he wrote to assure Şaqat al-Eslām that he and Mostashār al-Douleh did not approve of some of Taqīzādeh's actions. N. Faḥḥī, Ibid., p.318.

Earlier it was mentioned that three groups could be distinguished amongst the Āzādīkhāhān - the Azarbaijan Deputies, the non-aligned Deputies and the small core of extremist Deputies and their colleagues outside the Majles. This group was connected with the Komīteh-ye Engelāb which we must now describe in more detail.

The Komīteh already referred to in the first chapter was an important secret organization which would however have remained secret had it not been mentioned by M. Malekzadeh. The reason for so much secrecy, despite the fact that the Constitution granted freedom of association, was probably due to its revolutionary and uncompromising character which would have endangered it.¹ We must also point to its connection with the Social Democrat Party of Russia² and the fact that it too was a secret party persecuted by the Russian Government. In Persia the Āzādīkhāhān suspected that the Russian Government was inciting the Shah to put a stop to their activities and naturally kept a low profile. Besides, we must point to one of the characteristics of most of the socialist parties which often began by being organized outside parliament, then appointed members to stand at elections as Deputies. This type of organization was only embryonic in the First Majles for there were no party organizations, but in the Second Majles this system was set up officially as we shall see.

1. It is possible, as already mentioned, that the Komīteh even wished to replace the Shah whom it feared.

2. See pp. 93-96.

Though the connections of the Komīteh with the Majles remained secret the activity of its members was obvious and was a challenge to the Shah, the notables and the governing class. In this connection the activities of Malek al-Motekallemīn more than anyone else, stand out, and we can conclude that even if he were not its most eminent leader, he must have been one of the most important leaders of the Komīteh. In discussing the work of that body special attention must be paid to him but also to those of the other members of the Komīteh. Chief amongst them was Malek's life companion Seyyed Jamāl Vā'eẓ.

Reference must be made to their activities before the Revolution which throw some light on their aims. Malek al-Motekallemīn called Naṣrallāh Beheshtī had met Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī in Bushehr. He must have been deeply influenced by his ideas because there are traces of the Seyyed's thoughts in the few speeches of his which have survived. Seyyed Jamāl Vā'eẓ worked closely with him. Both were powerful orators who impressed and stirred the crowds. Both came from Esfahan from Ulama families, had received religious education and had shared similar ideas. Together they wrote the Ro'yā-ye Ṣādeqeh which is a criticism of Ḍell al-Solṭān and Āqā Najafī, the chief Mojtahad of Esfahan. Together with Majd al-Eslām Sheykh Aḥmad Kermānī they encouraged some of the merchants of Esfahan to boycott foreign imports in favour of home products and set up the Sherkat-e Eslāmī in 1316 (1898), a company with 150,000 Toman capital for this purpose, and branches were opened in other large cities including

Tabriz and Shiraz. Seyyed Jamāl had also written a pamphlet to propagate this idea called Lebās-e Taqvā which enjoyed some popularity.¹

Malek al-Motekallemīn also took a trip to Tabriz where he met some of the leaders of the reform movement such as Tarbiyat and Farshī. In Tehran, in 1317 he worked closely with Ṭabāṭabā'ī who was also engaged in political activities, and later went to Gilan, Baku, Khorasan and Fars. These journies were no doubt undertaken with ulterior motives and in order to establish contacts between the leaders of the reform movements.

Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez also had had a long career as a revolutionary. He was the chief instigator of the riots of 1321 (1904) and was instrumental in the dismissal of 'Ayn al-Douleh. He had great influence with the humble folk. When the Revolution began Malek al-Motekallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl were very active in working with the Anjomans sustaining the Majles and the Āzādīkhāhān.

The question arises as to why Malek al-Motekallemīn, for instance, was unable to organize a large co-ordinated group to lead the Revolution and act as a party.² One

1. E. Yaqmā'ī, op.cit., pp.9-11, also M. Malekzādeh, Zendegānī-ye Malek al Motekallemīn (Tehran, 1325), passim.

2. Majd al-Eslām Kermānī who had a poor opinion of the extremists, mentions the activities of these two and adds that they had organized a group of orators called the orators of the nation and exerted great influence over the people. He criticizes Malek al Motekallemīn however, saying he helped found the two newspapers, Šūr-e Esrāfīl and Mosāvāt, which were given to criticizing the Shah. Majd also goes on to say that Malek al-Motekallemīn thought of replacing the Shah, either by Sālār al-Douleh or Żell al-Soltān, and concludes by
/cont'd.

main reason was the fact that men such as he did not have the social standing and power in society. Those who followed him were also the weaker members of society socially and economically. Had one of the A'yān held his convictions and power of oratory and ideology, he might have been a more effective leader of the disparate groups he and Taqīzādeh led.

The other members of the Komīteh, some of whom were closely connected with Malek al-Motekallemīn, were also outstanding in their own fields, but not socially. Four of them were engaged in press activities: Moḥammad Rezā Mosāvāt who was Malek al-Motekallemīn's secretary and together with 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khalkhālī published the extremist weekly Mosāvāt. 'Alī Akbar Dekhodā and Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān published Šūr-e Esrāfīl. These two newspapers already mentioned were extremist in their approach and supported the Āzādīkhāhān and their policy. Ebrāhīm Ḥakīm al-Molk was an Azarbaijānī who had studied medicine in Paris.¹ It was in his house that the members of the Komīteh used to meet in secret.

Cont'd. saying that Malek obtained a very great influence over the Majles and the Anjomans, but that unfortunately he had a weakness for money. Majd al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., pp.60-68. Majd wrote his book after the Coup d'etat of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah in 1326, and in order to ingratiate himself he poured blame on the extremists.

1. His uncle had been the doctor of Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah but had been exiled to Gilan by Amīn al-Soltān, where he died in 1321 (1903) under suspicious circumstances. Ḥakīm al-Molk's adherence to the Āzādīkhāhān, however, was not due to his enmity for Atābak as he remained true to his convictions as a nationalist and socialist.

Hājī Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Āqā was a close companion of Taqīzādeh. Noṣrat al-Soltān was very active in the months preceding the Revolution but was not elected to the Majles. Mīrzā Ḥoseyn Adīb al-Saltāneh Samī'ī from Gilan worked closely with the Komīteh.¹ Mīrzā Dāvūd Khān 'Alīābādī and Seyyed Jalīl Ardabīlī were also very active and remained so, returning to the Majles as Democrats. The others, Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh, Soleymān Khān Meykadeh, Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb are described elsewhere in this work. Taken as a whole we must add that they were a group of highly educated men, who had both knowledge of Western education and the traditional and religious learning of Persia. Six of them were writers, two were great orators. Five or six had worked in governmental posts and knew the problems of Persia, so taken collectively they represented a section of the intelligentsia of Persia which was deeply committed to reform and modernism.

Though the Komīteh never came out into the open, it probably co-ordinated the activities between the Āzādīkhāhān and the national Anjomans by arranging that the Anjomans support the demands of the Āzādīkhāhān.² Although no actual proof of this connection has come to light, the fact that there was so much co-operation and similarity of aim would point to the fact that it must have been co-ordinated for otherwise the large National Anjomans could not have systematically supported the Deputies who were in a minority

1. For more details of his life see M. Bāmdād, op.cit., 1, p.392.

2. Malekzādeh states that the Komīteh led the events from behind the scene, though he gives no actual proof of this. Doulatābādī also mentions such connections.

in the Majles. Their demands, as already discussed, were based on the wider framework of the Mashad programme which in turn was a watered-down version of the Social Democrat programme of Russia to suit Persia. After the departure of Sa'd al-Douleh from the Majles in Rabī'al-Avval 1325 (April, 1907) the leadership of the Āzādīkhānān fell to Taqīzādeh. Some of his ideas and activities have already been referred to, and indeed the history of the first Majles is not complete without reference to his position.¹ He often carried the day by his oratory and logical arguments based on the principle of democracy, socialism and nationalism.

The British representative described him thus:

"He is credited with very advanced views, a familiarity with European thought and socialist conviction. It would, however, be a mistake to look upon either him or his colleagues (the Azarbaijan Deputies) as visionaries or revolutionaries. Taqīzādeh especially displays not only great debating ability, but gives proof of practical businesslike qualities ... He is always heard with great attention for his colleagues know that he will not open his lips unless he has something to say."²

There is no trace of socialist influence in Taqīzādeh's early thoughts of the pre-Revolution period and even if he did have an understanding of it he did not display it. But very soon in the Majles a different

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1. Taqīzādeh had had a traditional religious education. Later he studied medicine, and still later he joined a circle of reformers and educationalists such as Mīrzā Moḥammad 'Alī Tarbīyat, Seyyed Moḥammad Shabestarī, known as Abū al-Ẓiyā', and Seyyed Hoseyn 'Edālat who had known Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Asadābādī.
 2. Spring Rice to Grey, No. 147 July 16th 1907, FO 371/301. Inc. in No.1.

tone can be detected in his thoughts. In Zīqa'deh 1324 (December 1906) he addressed the Asnāf Deputies saying:

"Join your voices to mine and unite, you who are the pillars of this country and its real owners, and who are the ones from whose work the rich and influential people eat and who sit above you and look upon you with disdain and spend your earnings to acquire for themselves education, and then sell you their knowledge." 1

He himself has written that in the first Majles there were two groups - the more extremist with ideologies touched on socialism, and a more conservative group.² He often attacked the rich, especially the landlords and the ruling class, for all the ills of the people, but never actually suggested reform.

What did the Āzādīkhāhān stand for in the First Majles? Their demands and policies are nowhere fully discussed, but by a study of their debates and some of the articles in their press one obtains an insight into some of their policy and programme. What the Āzādīkhāhān wanted was more than a setting up of a Majles and the Constitution; they aimed at wider and more basic social reforms. They were intransigent on constitutional questions, as far as possible accepting no compromise on that ground. But Taqīzādeh was realistic enough to realize that fiscal

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., 2, p.28.

2. H. Taqīzādeh, "Tārīkh-e Avāyel-e Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran" Maqālāt, 1, p.316.

reform was too complicated to be achieved quickly and that time was needed for a survey. On the other hand he insisted on the supremacy of the Majles on fiscal matters such as taxation.

The most important question on which they compromised was with regard to the religious questions. Though they stood for secularism in governmental, judicial and educational matters, they kept a cautious and outwardly respectful relationship with the Ulama.¹ For instance, their cautious attitude towards religion is illustrated by their position towards the freedom of women. As true socialists they would have had to stand in favour of equality of both sexes, but this could not have been feasible in Persia. They only mildly and cautiously defended the right of women to organize a society which they had demanded and which produced a negative response in the Majles from other members. They also insisted on educational improvements.

They stood for such liberal democratic tenets as the freedom of the press, of speech and of association, which they justified on democratic as well as religious grounds. For instance Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez said that it was the duty of Moslems to enjoin right and forbid indecency, Amr be Ma'rūf va Nahy al-Monker, and that the newspapers were doing just that. Their attitude was socialistic towards wealth, calling for fairer taxation

1. See pp. 175, 182.

and fiscal reform.¹ However, the problems which soon beset the Majles obliged them to fight for the life of that body and all thoughts of social and financial reform were shelved. Above all, they wanted a very strong Majles, and a weak Executive, and did their utmost to gain the preponderance of the Majles,² and on this matter they opposed the Senate. Taqīzādeh, for instance, said that this Parliament was not to be compared to the European Parliaments which had been constituted two or three hundred years ago. Therefore if this Parliament only voted and supervised the Government, it would be a useless body for Persia. It could not work in the ordinary way, but needed an extraordinary strength and laws of iron in order to reform the country and to set up the necessary institutions, as Moḥammad 'Alī had done in Egypt, and Napoleon in France.³

The Āzādīkhāhān, particularly in the Majles, did not criticize the Shah openly but their general attitude was to attack his choice of ministers or courtiers, which was an indirect attack on him. The question of the deposition of the Shah was discussed outside but not inside the Majles. Several of the leaders of the Anjomans even contacted Z̄ell al-Solṭān and Sālār al-Douleh. The question of republicanism, too, was touched upon the discussed by the weekly newspaper Mosāvāt. The Āzādīkhāhān Deputies, however, showed respect to the Shah

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1. It was soon realized that fiscal reform would have to await a proper survey and it was decided that for the first budget the necessary sums would be raised by cutting the extra salaries of the rich.
 2. M.M. 24th Jamādī al-Avval, 1325.
 3. R.M. 2, No.124. 16th Rabī'al-Šānī 1326 (17th May 1908).

in the Majles as the Constitution recognized his legitimacy as Head of the Executive but they did nothing to placate him, and we can even detect instances of deliberate provocation against the Shah.¹

The policy of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn as declared in the 1907 programme was never actually brought up in the Majles, but each clause of it was sustained, discussed and defended when the occasion arose. Further, the two weekly papers Şūr-e Esrāfīl and Mosāvāt suggested some of its policy and programme without in fact mentioning the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn. The most radical of these involved a discussion of the exploitation by landlords and the poor conditions of the peasants.

Şūr-e Esrāfīl, in a number of articles beginning the 21st Shavāl 1325,² discussed the exploitation of the peasants by the landlords. It said that to grow in wealth the workers must be secure in their earnings and profits. The best way to increase their wealth would be to improve the agriculture of the country, but this was only possible if the peasants felt secure, otherwise they would not work and would become lazy. The only way to improve the economic conditions was to entrust the ownership of the land to the peasants. The paper added

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1. An article in Mosāvāt, for instance, dated 28th Zīqa'deh 1325 from the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn asks all the freedom-loving people and parties of Ottoman Turkey and Russia to help the poor people of Persia against the reactionaries. As one writer points out, this article worried the Shah and seemed like a warning to him. R. Reżāzādeh Malek, op.cit., pp.109-110.
 2. Şūr-e Esrāfīl, No.18.

that such suggestions of course sounded incredible to people who had always exploited the peasants, but the urgent needs of the country would soon free Persia's peasants from their misery. It added that in the early days of Eslam the treatment of the peasants was no doubt in accordance with the laws of contract. "The day our country becomes a law-abiding country then the laws of Eslam will be put into execution, and there is no doubt that our treatment of the peasants will change." It continued saying that it would then suffice for the pen of a few journalists, the speeches of a few Roužehkhān and the attempts of fifty Mojtaheds to free the peasants. This article was continued on the 28th Shavāl,¹ by mentioning the possibility of a peasant Revolution. It said that once these points are explained to our ignorant peasants that same day there would be a general Revolution. The meaning of Yad Allāh ma'a al-Jamā'eh 'the hand of God is with the crowd', would come true. Then the true religious laws which are the same in all religions would replace the present state of disorder. The paper also called attention to Rasht where these theories were proving their truth.

The only way to stop such revolutions would be to make the peasants the owners of their own lands. It added that no sequestration was contemplated but rather the organization of land banks as in other countries. This was the last and only solution, and all those who expressed

1. Şur-e Esrāfīl No. 19.

their devotion to the Revolution could prove it by contributing funds to the Bank.

On the 18th Zīhājeh it gave specific details of how the peasants were to be made the owners of their own lands. It said how the agricultural Bank should be organized and how it would buy the land from the landlords and sell it to the peasants.¹

Mosāvāt too discussed the question of class which had a bearing on the general ideology of the Ejtemā'īyūn, 'Āmīyūn. On the 19th Šafar 1326 (22nd March 1908), it wrote that there were three reactionary classes: the governing class, the Rūḥānīyūn (religious leaders) and the class which supported these two. Then it said that when we talk of the nation we mean the peasants, the workers and the traders. The intellectuals were not a class, they were the product of these three classes of the nation, all the others were parasites. On the 2nd Rabī'al-Avval, 1326 (19th April 1908), it advocated republicanism quoting the French newspaper Le Matin which said a republic was a more complete form of government and that false constitutions were a facade enabling Monarchs to hide. In most countries constitutionalism was a weapon in the hands of the autocrats and the enemies of freedom. In Persia, people were ignorant but they were nationalists, and they would fight for a National Government, viz. a Republic. Then it added a religious touch saying that

1. Ibid., No.21.

Islam had cursed all Kings and Pharaohs.¹

These are some of the topics discussed in the newspapers published by four of the members of the Komīteh, and as we see they are indirectly leading the way and trying to prepare the minds of their readers for their programme. In this same context we must point to some of the speeches of Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez. These are very interesting and obviously had a deep influence on people. If followed carefully, they reveal the Seyyed's ideology which is based on the same lines that the Āzādīkhāhān followed in an Eslamic context. He said that the laws of God and the prophets were imbued with equality, which is the basis of Eslam. To reach this state of equality we must educate our children and we must provide security, security of life and property, and the security of the country. All Moslems should help to secure their country and to try to make it less dependent on the West. This could be achieved only by unity. Besides equality and security, we must also have freedom to be able to strengthen our country. This freedom included women, and encompassed also the freedom of the pen, of speech, of association and of the press. It also included freedom of religion. The fourth tenet of his ideology is to make promotion dependent on the intellect and not on connections and privilege. This, he says, is very important, otherwise those who rule us will not have obtained their position through

1. Mosāvāt, No.21, 2nd Rabī'al-Šānī, 1326, (29th April 1908).

their own merit, and the best people will not rule.

Another important emphasis is his discussion of human rights, the Hoqūq-e Ādamīyat. Everyone should enjoy this privilege, whether rich or poor. The rich and the despots have always ruled and have been unjust, such people were ungodly people. All human beings have rights, the landlords treated their peasants like animals as if they possessed them, and our peasants seem to be asleep like sheep. They do not know that they possess rights in the eyes of God, just as their lords do.

All the people were asleep while the country was being divided by Russia and Britain and no one seemed to care; we should contribute and work for the security of our country, he advocated. Not only do all people have rights, but there is a limit to power; even the power of the Shah should be limited by law. There was no difference between the rights of a King and those of a poor man. It was justice, security, freedom and equality which made a country strong, and anyone who wronged the Constitution should be punished.¹

The foreign policy of the Āzādīkhāhān was cautious, though they were deeply nationalistic. We must remember that much of the original impetus for the Revolution came from the feeling that the country was being sold to the foreigners, and the Āzādīkhāhān tried to keep this spirit alive. There is much reference to Vaṭan, the

1. E. Yaghmā'ī, op.cit., passim.

homeland, in their newspapers. However in the Majles there was a feeling that they should be cautious and not give the foreign powers a pretext for interference. Indeed Article 5 of the Nezāmnāmeḥ of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn of 1906¹ had stated that the members must try as far as possible to protect the rights of foreigners, in case the foreign powers should make this a pretext to undermine the independence of the country.

Taqīzādeh, too, on one occasion expressed his opinion that Persia could not disavow its foreign agreements because of existing international laws, but that a time would come when other laws would be made in the world to obliterate all such concessions.² On another occasion, however, he had very sternly warned the Government against any new foreign contract or loan and said that any Minister responsible for this would forfeit his own life and that of his family.³

This cautious attitude was not restricted to the

1. "Ḥezb-e Sosīyāl Demokrāt (Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn)" Donyā, p.86.
2. R.M. No. 162, 11 Rajab 1325 (25th August 1907).
3. Ibid., 61, 14th Ṣafar 1325 (30th March 1907). Another kind of argument optimistically put forward by Taqīzādeh was that the foreign powers would not stop Persia's attempts at financial reforms because they were Persia's friends and wanted to see her strong. This was on the occasion when Ṣanī'al-Douleh, as Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of Neẓām al-Saltāneh, had introduced a Bill to tax sugar and tea in Rabī'al-Ṣanī 1326 (May 1908), which was met with the objections of Britain and Russia who had the monopoly of the import of these commodities.
Ibid., No.112, 2 Rabī'al-Ṣanī 1326 (3rd May 1908).

Azādikhāhān,¹ but all the Deputies were cautious in this regard, and the criticism of the Russians for instance was usually aimed at the two Russian subjects close to the Shah, Shapshal, his tutor when Crown Prince, and Liakhoff, the Russian officer in command of the Cossack brigade.

There was a feeling that the Russians were encouraging the Shah to overthrow the Majles,² and such a provocation as the Russian attack on Pilleh Savar³ was seen as its beginning.

The attitude of the Deputies to the 1907 Convention was one of bewilderment generally, and these who understood or foresaw its implications deliberately tried to restrain public opinion from becoming provocative. The newspapers, especially Habl al-Matīn, were particularly vociferous on this question and denounced the intentions of the powers, but the Deputies did not discuss the Convention at any length, and it was left to the Minister of Foreign Affairs to question the powers.

The Government, too, deliberately kept the Deputies

1. Outside the Majles, of course, the Āzādikhāhān were freer to express their opinion and Malek al-Motekallemin did not fear denouncing the Shah for selling himself to the Russians. Marling to Grey, Dec. 31st 1907 No. 283 FO 416/35.
2. The British documents bear witness to the fact that the Russians were giving the Shah money. Spring Rice to Grey, Nov. 7th 1907 No.243, FO 371/313.
3. See p. 279.

in the dark by refusing to discuss foreign affairs - a power granted to them under the Constitutional laws. But at times the Deputies and particularly the Āzādīkhāhān asked embarrassing questions, blaming the Government for acting secretly. In Zīhājeh 1325 (January 1908), for instance, the Russians increased their guards in the Tabriz consulate and the British their guards in the oil installations. In answer to Taqīzādeh, who questioned the Government as to what steps it was taking it was replied that they could not divulge what they were doing. This had occasioned a vehement attack by Taqīzādeh on the Government for its secret actions.¹

At this juncture, however, foreign interference in the internal affairs of Persia had not generally become so flagrant or overt as it was to become, and was mainly limited to financial questions; the Persians were still faced with the old pattern of rivalry rather than co-operation, which was familiar and not especially dangerous as it was to become after the bombardment of the Majles. In the First Majles foreign affairs was not a main issue as it was to become in the Second, as will be seen.

So far we have discussed some of the most important political aims of the Āzādīkhāhān. During all the debates and all the questions which arose in the Majles, they argued and reacted within this basic framework of thought.

1. R.M. No. 19, 4th Zīhājeh 1325 (7th Jan. 1908).

If we compare their policy as formulated in outline here with the programme of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn of 1907 of Mashad¹ their similarities become obvious and this leads us to the conclusion that the Āzādīkhāhān drew their inspiration and the tenets of most of their ideas from that party, whose membership overlapped with the composition of the Komīteh-ye Engelāb. Only in one instance, however, that of Heydar Khān, is this link between the Komīteh and the larger group of Āzādīkhāhān inside and outside the Majles obvious. Heydar Khān is the key figure; he was known to be extremely influential within the ranks of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn, and was recognized as a leading member of the Āzādīkhāhān group outside the Majles, but his name is not mentioned as a member of the Komīteh. Neither Malekzādeh, who discusses that organization, nor Taqīzādeh, who mentions it,² recall his name. Malekzādeh wrote that his father, Malek al-Motekallemīn, was in the same Komīteh which decided to kill Atābak. This, we must remember, was a very popular act, and Malekzādeh was not averse to

1. See Appendix A.

2. Taqīzādeh mentions knowing Heydar Khān and says that without doubt he was responsible for the murder of Atābak, but that he (Taqīzādeh) was not implicated in this plot at all. About the Komīteh-ye Engelāb, he denies the existence of such a komīteh but says there were about 140 various Anjomans at the time. Some were supporters of the Majles much like the one Malekzādeh mentions, but its members were all law abiding people and could not have been responsible for a terrorist act.
 "Taqīzādeh Dar Bāreh-ye Qatl-e Atabāk", Maqālāt 3, pp.312-313.

mentioning his own father's implication in the plot which was to rid Persia of Atābak. Taqīzādeh was in a different position, and could not have admitted personal membership and responsibility while Malekzādeh had no such consideration as his father was a martyr to the cause and he had not been a member of the Komīteh. But on the other hand, the membership of Heydar Khān in the Komīteh was a different matter for Malekzādeh.¹ Either he did not know it or he might have deliberately kept it secret due to Heydar Khān's later Communist affiliation which might have been ruinous to Malekzādeh's later political career. For it must be remembered that though Malekzādeh was not elected to the Second Majles, he co-operated with the Democrats, led by Heydar Khān.

Besides, the fact that the Āzādīkhāhān followed the programme of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn and the fact that some of them were members of the Komīteh and also became Deputies, leads one to conjecture that there was indeed some contact and co-operation between them, and that they were deliberately working to put forward the programme of social democracy, with much wider aims than hitherto considered. The Āzādīkhāhān cannot be said to have been a real party with discipline and cohesion, but they were the nearest to one which developed in the

1. It must be remembered that Heydar Khān in his memoirs mentions the membership of Malek al-Motekallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez in his organization. See p.107.

First Majles. However they did not limit their activities to the Majles where they were in a minority, but organized a mass movement through the political Anjomans which backed them and gave their demands much more force and legitimacy and also intimidated the Government and the Shah. These political Anjomans became sufficiently powerful and numerous to monopolize the political scene and overshadow the Majles eventually, and it is now necessary to turn our attention to these organizations.

CHAPTER V

THE ANJOMANS

It has been clearly shown in the previous chapters that secret societies or Anjomans were at the forefront of the demands for a Constitution and the Reform movement. Some survived and continued to play an important part after the granting of these demands,¹ and many new ones were also founded after the Revolution. Indeed it has been well put that the measure of the success of the secret societies before the Revolution "is to be seen in the large numbers of Anjomans which sprang up almost immediately in the capital and the provinces in defence of the Constitution and the National Assembly."² The Anjomans after the Revolution differed in many respects from the earlier secret societies already described, and they had the potential to become political parties performing many of the tasks which fall to the parties in a parliamentary government. The former were in the nature of revolutionary cells. The latter were mostly open, had a large membership, and were in touch with each other. It is possible that these latter Anjomans were modelled on the Soviets set up in 1905 in Russia. They

1. In the general histories of the period only disparate reference has been made to the Anjomans and their role, and their real place in the constitutional period is not established. An exception is an article by A.K.S. Lambton entitled "Persian Political Societies 1906-11" which gives a general analysis of the Anjomans, St. Antony's Papers 16, 3 (1963).

2. Ibid., p.41.

generally acted as a medium between the Majles and the people. They had local or guild and trade associations and their basic purpose was generally declared to be the protection of the Majles, rather than the advancement of a particular policy.

There were two kinds of Anjomans, the provincial Anjomans, Anjoman-e Ayālatī or Valāyatī, and political Anjomans, and as has been pointed out the line of distinction is not clearly drawn between them,¹ and thus much confusion exists about them and their function and achievements.

The provincial Anjomans were meant to represent the Central Government, to act as supervisory body and to watch the Governors. Their status was established by a law passed by the Majles in Šafar and signed by the Shah in Rabī'al-Šānī 1325. It settled the conditions of the electors and those to be elected and the duties of these Anjomans. For each Ayālat there were to be twelve and for each Valāyat six members. Their duty was to supervise the administration of the province, to reply to complaints against the Governors and to control the collection of taxes. The Majles was eager for these Anjomans to be set up and one of the first bills to be passed was this bill, especially as one of the duties of the Anjomans was to supervise and speed the election of Deputies.

1. Ibid., p.46.

The political Anjomans were permitted by Article 21 of the Supplementary Fundamental law which allowed the freedom of association, but even before this law was actually passed, there were many Anjomans functioning in Tehran and other provincial cities. Many Anjomans were formed during all this period and their number has been variously given as between one hundred and two hundred.¹

The Government often complained about the Anjomans from the beginning of their formation. For instance, Mokhber al-Saltāneh, the Minister of Science, conveyed the Government of Atābak's suspicion of the Anjomans to the Majles. The Shah hated and feared them and had them watched by his spies, and in Shāval 1325 (December 1907) he even asked for their suppression,² but the Deputies argued that they were lawful according to the Constitution, and Taqīzādeh drew attention to the fact that Anjomans had always existed under Eslamic governments.³

The main purpose of these Anjomans was always announced to be the safeguarding of the Constitution

1. Marling to Grey, Feb. 28th 1908. No. 39 FO 371/499 and Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat 2, p.207.
2. For instance, Seyyed Jamāl Vā'ez's steps were watched by a number of spies who sent their reports of his activities to the Government. They contain interesting information about the Seyyed's activities and his connection with the Anjomans. E. Yaghmā'ī, op.cit, passim.
3. R.M., No. 219, 24th Shavāl 1325 (1st Dec. 1907).

and the protection of the Majles. The political Anjomans after the Revolution had the potential of political parties and even Mostashār al-Douleh called them "Hezb" in a letter to Šaqat al-Eslām. They fulfilled much of the function of political parties, and as time went on their role and power grew and politicians of all shades of opinion resorted to this kind of organization. They provide a link between the Majles and the people and could stir and influence them, a thing the Majles by itself could not. What distinguished them from political parties, however, was their lack of a particular programme and ideology, and the fact that only a few had a national base. The Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Šānī wanted to organize branches in Persia, the Anjoman-e Tollāb and Ašnāf also had something of a national base, but they mostly came into being either in support of personalities or certain trades or districts, and they seem to have kept their secretive nature which characterized them before the Revolution. The few Nezāmnāmeḥ which have come to us show this perfectly, for instance the Nezāmnāmeḥ of the Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Šānī as written by Nāzem al-Eslām.¹

Whenever one of the Deputies or politicians had a cause to defend, an Anjoman was organized for that purpose. For instance, we are told by Mostashār al-Douleh that Sa'd al-Douleh had set up an Anjoman with two of the notables of the period of Mozaffar al-Dīn Shah and intended to encourage a fight between Persians and Turks. In general

1. Nāzem al-Eslām Kermānī- op.cit., 2, p.75.

however we know little of the membership of the Anjomans or their internal organization, and above all we do not know how many of the Deputies were members of these Anjomans though it may be conjectured that many were. The names of some Deputies are mentioned occasionally. It is possible that their membership of the Anjomans was not deemed important enough to be recorded, for most of them must have been known to each other at the time for many meetings were public. It is also possible that in certain cases such memberships were kept secret especially in the case of the Deputies, for the Anjomans were more free to criticize the Government or the Shah.

Much remains to be known about the Anjomans. For instance we do not know how they operated, who took decisions or how they were connected together. Despite the fact that a central Anjoman was organized, we do not know whether decisions were taken by the representatives of this Anjoman-e Markazī or whether they were led by a small core of secret leaders who were instrumental in decision-taking. It must be added that in all likelihood the Anjomans, with a large unruly membership, could hardly have been conducive to decision-taking especially in very sensitive questions such as the relationship with the Shah. The nature of the Anjomans was much more appropriate for large meetings when the crowds could be stirred by the moving oratory of Malek-al Motekallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl, and made to strike or demonstrate. Decisions could not be taken in such meetings. We know of many secret meetings between some of the

leaders of the Revolution, reported by the spy who followed Seyyed Jamāl, and it seems probable that the more important decisions were taken at such meetings.

We can divide the Anjomans into several categories. There were Anjomans composed of provincial people in Tehran, such as the Anjoman-e Esfahānīs led by Mīrzā Maḥmūd Eṣfahānī, or of the Shīrāzīs or of the South, or the very important Anjoman-e Azarbaijan of which much will be written later. The various Tabaqāt had their own Anjomans, as for instance the Shāhzādegān¹ the Tollāb and Aṣnāf. The last two were very important and had widespread influence,² working closely with the Āzādīkhāhān and the Anjoman of Azarbaijan, though we have few details.

The people of Tafresh, Ashtiyan and Garakan had also organized an Anjoman as advertised in Habl al-Matīn called the Majma'-e Ensānīyat, its leader was Mostoufi al-Mamālek, the Minister of War.³ There were reactionary Anjomans such as Anjoman-e Varamin led by Eqbāl al-Douleh or the Anjoman-e Hemmatābād or Anjoman-e Foutovvat.

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1. The Deputy of the Princes, Asadallāh Mīrzā, declared in the Majles in Ṣafar 1325 that the Princes had organized their own Anjoman in order to protect the Constitution, and he added that Farmānfarmā had asked him to read its address to the Majles. R.M. No. 69, 27th Ṣafar 1325 (11th April 1907).
 2. Habl al-Matīn No. 94, 9th Rajab 1325 (19th August 1907).
 3. Habl al-Matīn No. 183, 4th Zīqa'deh 1325 (10th December 1907).
 4. Ibid., No. 158, 4th Shavāl 1324 (11th November 1907). Y. Doulatābadī, op.cit., 2, p.161. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām, p.240. The Anjoman-e Hemmatābād, too, was a reactionary Anjoman. The police had complained about its activities and the Majles had decreed that it should be suppressed. The Minister of the Interior had seized on the occasion to try to suppress all the Anjomans, but
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These often took the shape of religious Anjomans, such as the Anjoman-e Āl-e Moḥammad or Eslāmīyeh. Nāẓem al-Eslām writes that the leader of this Anjoman was Mīrzā Abu al-Qāsem the eldest son of Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī who was pro-Shah and believed that with the existing chaotic and unconstitutional conditions, constitutionalism had come too soon for Persia. Moreover, he supported the Shah, was also the leader of Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Sangelaj and belonged to another secret Anjoman. He supported the Shah in all these Anjomans, and after the fall of the Majles he managed to help his father Seyyed Moḥammad and his brother Seyyed Ṣādeq to be spared from hardships and persecutions.¹

It is not quite clear which religious Anjomans were reactionary and which were not, but there must have been many of both types.² One known reactionary Anjoman was the Anjoman-e Foutovvat. On the 4th Shavāl 1325, Habl al-Matīn advertised that an Anjoman called Foutovvat was founded. Its leader was Ẓafar al-Saltāneh and a meeting was held at the house of Emām Jom'eh Ko'ī with the presence of the Azarbaijan Deputies where its public policy was declared and its Nezāmnāmeḥ was read to

/cont'd. the Deputies had complained pointing to the Constitution which guaranteed the freedom of association. R.M. No. 73, 3rd Rabī'al-Avval 1325 (17th April 1907).

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., 2, p.158.
2. Habl al-Matīn, No. 79, 21 Jamādī al-Sānī 1325 (1st August 1907), wrote that the Anjoman-e Fāṭemīyeh had joined the Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Darvāzeh-ye Qazvin and Tollāb and Markazī in protesting against the confiscation of Habl al-Matīn. In the same newspaper No. 214 dated 21st Zīḥajeh (25th January 1908) a new religious Anjoman called Elāhī was advertised.

disprove, the newspaper adds the accusation that it was a reactionary Anjoman. Doulatābādī, however, writes that it was meant to organize this Anjoman in order gradually to disrupt the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan. It is doubtful that Taqīzādeh was a member of this Anjoman which was obviously conceived as an alternative organization to the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan. Its purpose soon became obvious anyway, and Mostashār al-Douleh wrote that the demonstrations against the cuts in salaries were organized through this Anjoman but luckily the other Anjomans foiled these plans and the important members of Foutovvat resigned and ran away.

Another important Anjoman of this category was the Anjoman-e Khedmat, (service).¹ There seems, however, to be some confusion about the name, purpose and membership of this Anjoman. Doulatābādī says it was variously called Akāber, (elders), Omarā (notables) or Khedmat. Marling, the British representative, suggests that the Anjoman-e Akāber was organized from a larger body he calls the Committee of Notables. The chief cause for the formation was, according to Marling, fear after the murder of Atābak and the resignation of Şanī'al-Douleh. The knowledge that there were secret societies with members who were ready to lay down their lives, and the feeling that their wealth was in danger made the rich and the notables realize that it was prudent to declare their support of the Majles as the Shah could no longer protect them. He adds that the President and Vice President of this organization were Amīr A'zam (the

1. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.149.

nephew of 'Ayn al-Douleh) and Ḥoseyn Qolī khān Navvāb.¹ He further states that the creation of this body is practically the outcome of the Committee of Notables, whose secession from the autocratic party had modified the situation.²

The Anjoman-e Khedmat was organized by Eḥtesham al-Saltāneh and his brother 'Alā'al-Douleh after the death of Atābak. Princes, important landlords, civic officials and well-known reactionaries joined it and came to the Majles to declare and swear their allegiance to it. But this Anjoman was suspected of being reactionary and Ḥeydar Khān even threw a bomb at the house of 'Alā'al-Douleh because he wished to scare the absolutists who were suspected of working secretly with the Shah for the destruction of the Constitution.³

It is noteworthy that although many Anjomans declared similar aims, namely the support of the Constitution and

1. Marling to Grey, Oct. 10th 1907, No. 230 FO 416/34. It must be pointed out, however, that Marling's association of Navvāb, a well-known extremist, with this Anjoman could not have been accurate, being uncorroborated by other sources, and shows the unreliability of some of the British reporting at this time.
2. Marling had added that this Anjoman had no official standing and no responsibility, but advised the Ministers and the influence of its members was such that its advice could not be disregarded. He also wrote that perhaps this might evolve into the Senate. Though this is rather a vague description, it must be added that Nāẓem al-Eslām also mentions the organization of an Anjoman by Arshad al-Douleh with the membership of seven Deputies, and seven Ministers who advised the Shah.
Ibid., also Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., 2, pp.197-8.
3. R. Sheikholeslami, D. Wilson, "The Memoirs of Ḥeydar Khān" Iranian Studies, p.36.

the Majles, they never actually coalesced except for the loose organization called Anjoman-e Markazī led by Arshad al-Douleh.

Arshad al-Douleh came from a great Kerman family and had worked with Amīr Bahādor Jang in the Shah's guards. When Mozaffār al-Dīn Shah died, Amīr Bahādor lost his employment temporarily, and Arshad al-Douleh was also without work for a time. He was an acquaintance of Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī and was invited to join the Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Šānī in 1325, eventually obtaining great influence over it. Nāẓem al-Eslām gives a list of the numerous Anjomans in which Arshad al-Douleh was either a member or a leader. His three brothers too, Sadīd al-Molk, Loṭf'Alī Khān and Ḥeshmat al-Mamālek also organized the Anjoman-e Emāmzādeh Yahyā, and he himself organized the Anjoman-e Ettefāq-e Jadīd, the Anjoman-e Kerman and the Anjoman-e Anṣār. According to the same authority, he represented the Anjoman-e Jadīd when the Anjoman-e Markazī was being formed and was elected its leader.¹ The reasons for organizing this central Anjoman have been given by Majd al-Eslām, who wrote that while the Anjomans worked separately the Government was strong, so it was decided to coalesce.² However, he also writes that the courtiers and reactionaries who were

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., passim.

2. Majd al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., pp.47-49.

afraid of the power of the Anjomans infiltrated them and posed as Constitutionalists while they worked against them. The Anjoman-e Markazī was organized at their suggestion so that all power should be concentrated in this organization. He also adds that Arshad al-Douleh as its Head had much power. He then queries whether Arshad al-Douleh meant to upset the Majles or whether he worked for Amīr Bahādor, and concludes that he was a reactionary from the beginning, and worked for Amīr Bahādor. Later he adds that as his purpose was discovered he was ousted from the Anjomans by Malek al-Motekallemīn.¹ This obvious infiltration worked very much to the detriment of the cause of the Āzādīkhāhān who were aware of it but could do nothing about it. It is also possible that these men acted at times as agents provocateurs and exacerbated the relationship between the Shah and the Majles purposely in order to justify the action of the Shah. Another Anjoman called the Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Šānī was organized in Zīhājeh 1324 and thanks to Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī we know quite a lot about it. This was organized to continue the work of the previous Anjoman-e Makhfī which was to support the Majles and to watch the Deputies. This Anjoman had a newspaper called Kokab-e Darī and published secret missives, Shabnāmeḥ it had a Nezāmnāmeḥ and consisted of a secret and open organization; most of its members were Kermānīs. Later this Anjoman

1. Ibid., pp.53-56.

joined another one which was better organized, called Anjoman-e Anṣār. Later still it joined the Anjoman-e Jonūb which consisted of Shīrāzīs and it was decided to work for the welfare of the South.¹

The Anjoman-e Makhfī-ye Sānī survived the fall of the Majles and made its peace with the Shah. They justified this change of attitude by saying that they did not oppose constitutionalism, but that the past system had meant chaos and not constitutionalism.²

So far we have discussed the Anjomans generally and some of the known right wing Anjomans. Now we must mention the more extremist ones or as they were known Anjomanhā-ye Mellī or National Anjomans.

The National Anjomans worked closely with the Āzādīkhāhān and their activities together with the pressure they put on the Government by their petitions and demonstrations had an important effect on the course of events. The National Anjomans seem to have been led from behind the scenes and their activities were to a certain extent co-ordinated and planned. Malekzādeh maintains that the co-ordinator was the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb. The National Anjomans were instrumental, both directly and indirectly, in a series of striking victories achieved by the wider groups of the Āzādīkhāhān.

These are some of the points won with the help of the Anjomans: the arrest of Raḥīm Khān in Tehran, the passing of the Supplementary Fundamental laws, the forced resignation of Sa'd al-Douleh and Moshīr al-Saltāneh

1. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., 2 pp.74-78, 99.

2. Ibid., p.194.

and of Āṣef al-Douleh, the passing of the law establishing the freedom of the press, the punishment of those guilty of the outrages in the Meydān-e Tūpkhānēh, and of the murder of Fereydūn, the exile of some of the Shah's courtiers and the trial of those who had been arrested unconstitutionally by the order of the Shah. The moderates tried to water down some of these points but they could not oppose the Āzādīkhāhān too openly for fear of being accused of being reactionaries and in league with the Shah. Moreover, the Āzādīkhāhān and the Anjomans had the initiative in opposing and attacking the Government and the Shah. There were also many instances when some of the moderates agreed with the Āzādīkhāhān, especially against the Shah's courtiers. Seyyed Naṣrallāh, a moderate who had said in Shavāl 1325 (November 1907) that the Governors should be given back their old despotic powers so that they could impose peace and security in the provinces¹ now in Rabī'al-Avval 1326 (April 1908) supported the Āzādīkhāhān and Taqīzādeh, who drew attention to the unconstitutional arrest of those suspected of throwing the bomb at the Shah. Seyyed Naṣrallāh said that the question was discussed by the leaders of the Majles and the Anjomans, and as there was fear of a revolution, they had deemed it necessary to warn the Ministers who agreed to take action.

Several important Anjomans worked closely with the Āzādīkhāhān. They were for instance the Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Darvāzeh-ye Qazvin headed by Mīrzā Soleymān

1. R.M. No. 204, 2nd Shavāl 1325 (9th Nov. 1907).

also a member of the Komīteh-ye Engelāb and as already mentioned a close friend of Malek al-Motekallemīn. There was the Anjoman-e Shāhābād, of which we know less, but it was an important Anjoman according to Doulatābādī,¹ which even dared attack the Shah openly. Another important Anjoman was the Anjoman-e Mozaffarī.

The most important in this category was the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan which was said to have 2962 members,² and was located in Tehran. This Anjoman was important because of the policy of some of the Azarbaijan Deputies already described and also because of its connection with Tabriz and the extremist Anjoman-e Tabriz, but above all because of its connection with the Komīteh-ye Engelāb.

Some of its activities were advertised in Habl al-Matīn. For instance, it was advertised that Mīrzā Javād Nāteq, a member of the Anjoman-e Tabriz, would give a talk in the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan, or else it said that if any of its members failed to attend its meetings three weeks running they would be disqualified from membership. After the murder of Fereydūn, many Zoroastrians joined this Anjoman. In Shavāl (November) it was advertised that Taqīzādeh had been elected Head of the Anjoman instead of Morteżavī, and also that Mo'āżed al-Salṭaneh (another member of the Komīteh-ye Engelāb) had been elected as his assistant.³ Two weeks later, Mo'āżed al-Salṭaneh sent a letter to the paper denying that he had

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.162.

2. Marling to Grey, February 28th 1908, No. 29, FO, 371/499.

3. Habl al-Matīn, No. 166, 13th Shavāl 1325 (20th November 1907).

been elected as assistant, saying that the elections were held in order to elect twelve members to prepare the Nezāmnāme of the Anjoman.¹ In fact, many years later Taqīzādeh declared that he was not Head of the Anjoman, but that it was Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh who had been elected as Head of that organization.² It is possible that Taqīzādeh wished to hide all his early connections with the more extremist line he had taken previously. It could also signify some internal dissension between the organizers of the Anjoman. As our information stands Taqīzādeh was considered the Head of this Anjoman, Doulatābādī mentions it, as do other writers.

All through the difficult times and all through the vicissitudes of the Majles, Malek al-Motekallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl were closely associated with the Azarbaijan Deputies, the Āzādīkhāhān and the ^{various} Anjomans, including the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan. Indeed, the Anjomans provided the forum where the national leaders spoke and led the masses. There is an interesting advertisement translated from the Caspi, a Baku newspaper, in Habl al-Matīn, No. 214 dated 21st Zīḥajeh, 1325 (25th January 1908), which is worth quoting. It stated that Malek al-Motakallemīn and Seyyed Jamāl were the most famous and best loved men in Persia, and if their names were omitted it would seem as if an empty space were left amongst the real Mojāhedīn.

1. Ibid., No. 170, 25th Shavāl (2nd December).

2. Ḥ. Taqīzādeh, "Ākharīn Defā'-e Taqīzādeh", Rāhnamā-ye Ketāb, Khordād-Tīr 1349, 13th year, No. 3 & 4, passim.

But these two leaders were supporters of no particular party or Anjoman; they both supported the principle of constitutionalism and were the followers of the holy ideal of liberty. This letter might suggest that there were certain accusations against them, especially as they were said to be Azalīs.¹

Malek al-Motekallemīn also worked closely with Taqīzādeh. Often we find him repeating to the Anjomans what Taqīzādeh had said in the Majles; for instance in the case of the petition of the Anjoman-e Tollāb, Anjoman Fars and Azarbaijan, demanding some action against Sheykh Fażlallāh Nūrī, or in the case of the protest against the behaviour of the son of Raḥīm Khān. As has already been mentioned, the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan worked closely with the important local Anjoman of Tabriz. This was one of the earliest such Anjomans and had its links with Tehran and the Azarbaijan Deputies. Therefore we shall speak of it at some length.

The Anjoman of Tabriz was one of the first. It was established in 1324 (1906). According to Kasravī, when the people in Tabriz who had taken Bast in the British Consulate to make Moḥammad 'Alī Mīrzā accept the Constitution, came out of the Bast their leaders set up an Anjoman.² It had twenty members, and the Ulama promised their co-operation and agreed to send their representative

1. Ḥabl al-Matīn, No. 214, 21st Zīḥajeh 1325 (25th January 1908).

2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūteh pp. 159-165 and 175.

to it. This Anjoman acted both as a political Anjoman and as a provincial Anjoman and interfered in the affairs of local government. No doubt, as Spring Rice points out, and as already mentioned, the Soviets set up in Russia served as models.¹ They also translated the programme of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn of the Caucasus and formed the Mojāhedīn party of Tabriz. Prominent amongst this group were 'Alī Mosīeū, Ḥājī 'Alī Davāforūsh, and Ḥājī Rasūl Ṣadaqīyānī. This organization had a smaller, more secret core called the Markaz-e Gheybī which had a strong influence on the Anjoman of Tabriz. This group does not, however, seem to have been under the direction of Baku, and was rather more under religious influence and called itself the protector of Eslam. The Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn in Tabriz and a number of Caucasians seem also to have been active, and as a result of their propaganda which Ṣaqat al-Eslām and the moderates deplored, the peasants refused to pay taxes. This extremism together with the religious controversies were the cause of the split between the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn and the more moderate group of 'Alī Mosīeū,² but

1. Spring Rice to Grey, May 27th 1907 No. 113, FO 371/301.

2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh p.149, also N.K. Belova, "Le Parti Social Democrate de l'Iran", G. Haupt et M. Roberieux ed., La Deuxieme Internationale et L'Orient pp.387-393. Habl al-Matīn gives a detailed account of this quarrel so does Kasravī. This quarrel seems to have been a quarrel between those who had come from the Caucasus, and the Tabrizīs, but it also had some roots in old local quarrels between the different sections of the town. Habl al-Matīn, No. 77, 19th Jamādī al-Ṣānī 1325 (30th July, 1907).

eventually their differences were patched up and they worked together, with the extremists seeming to have had their way. For a while the Anjoman-e Tabriz functioned well, but soon there were signs of tension and division between the more moderates and the Ulama on the one hand and the more extremist members on the other. It showed intolerance as for example when it exiled Mīr Hāshem from the Dochi area of the city,¹ the chief Mojtahed of Tabriz, Aqā Seyyed Ḥasan, accusing him of being a Bābī. Such dissensions weakened the Reform movement, but no one in the Anjoman was ready for compromise according to Ṣaḡat al-Eslām, who tried to mediate. The Anjoman-e Tabriz had on the other hand a link with the organization of 'Alī Mosīeū and the Markaz-e Gheybī which led it from behind the scenes. It also had the support of the Mojāhedīn or Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn.² It seems it was a similar situation as that in Tehran between the Komīteh-ye Engelāb and the Majles. The Tabriz Anjoman published its own newspaper, as did the Mojāhedīn. It also sent deputations to set up similar Anjomans in the other towns of Azarbaijan and, according to Spring Rice, its fame was so widespread that it received many appeals from other provinces. On one occasion it was

1. N. Fathī Majmū'eh-ye Āsār-e Qalamī-ye Shādravān-Ṣaḡat al-Eslām-e Shahīd. (Tehran, 13) p.99.

2. The Mojāhedīn in Qazvin also helped to set up a local Anjoman and cooperated with it. Ḥabl. al-Matīn, No. 144, 9th Ramazān, 1325 (17th October, 1907) reported. In fact the Mojāhedīn seem to have had considerable influence on the local Anjomans of Qazvin, Anzali and Rasht.

even referred to as a Majles. The Anjoman-e Tabriz held an extremist policy and even called for the deposition of the Shah, an attitude which caused the embarrassment of the Deputies.

This Anjoman won its fame not only by being one of the first to be organized but by the support it gave the Majles in Zīhājeh 1325 (February 1907) when it organized a large scale strike in Tabriz to obtain Moḥammad Shah's word to support the Constitution, and to oust Naus. From then on, it watched carefully over events, and was in touch with the Azarbaijan Deputies.¹

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1. Other local Anjomans were also of great importance, such as the Anjomans set up in Gilan and Esfahan and Qazvin, but here attention is mostly paid to Tabriz because firstly little information exists about the other local Anjomans, and also because of the prominent part played by the Azarbaijānī Deputies in general. However, the information given by Rabino, the Representative of the British Bank, of the situation in Gilan must be mentioned here. He called the revolutionaries the Fadā'īs and said they had two meeting places, one of which was secret with strict regulations and anyone who wished to enter it had to ask permission. The committee drew lots and if the applicant's name came out his name was sent to Baku and permission was asked for his membership. He then had to take an oath not to divulge the place of the committee's meetings, and if anyone did so, he would be removed. He added that in Baku there was a party of Fadā'īs which was part of the Mojāhedīn and was called the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Amīyūn and had a secret committee. In Baku its members numbered about 6000, and they were mostly Persians who had come to earn their living. Rabino also stated that these people co-operated with the Russian liberals and made dynamite and collected firearms.
- Mashrūṭeh-ye Gilan (from the notes of Rabino).
M.Roushan ed., (Tehran, 1352) p. 102.

There was a clear and direct relationship between the wider group of National or Mellī Anjomans and the Azādīkhāhān Deputies. Many instances illustrate this connection. The Anjomans, for example, petitioned in support of their line of policy and when petitioning was insufficient they collected in large numbers in the Bahārestān gardens to demonstrate and to protest.¹ On several occasions very large crowds gathered in the Bahārestān in connection with events of Azarbaijan. On the first occasion, it was in connection with the attacks of the son of Raḥīm Khān in Qarajehdagh when two hundred people had been killed. The Bāzārs had closed and people had thronged to the Majles, even schoolchildren carrying flags had marched by and the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn were very active amongst them. Such commotion ensued for three days that at last the Government relented and Raḥīm Khān who was in Tehran was arrested and put in chains as a guarantee of the good behaviour of his son. Twice more when Turkish forces attacked Urumiyeh the same kind of demonstration was staged in support of the criticisms of the Government in the Majles. On the

1. On the 23rd Şafar 1325 (7th April 1907), for instance, Sharaf al-Douleh, one of the Azarbaijan Deputies brought a Bill to the Majles demanding the conclusion of the Supplementary Fundamental laws. Taqīzādeh and Vakīl al-Tojjār backed him. On the 25th of the same month (9th April) the Anjoman-e Ṭollāb petitioned the Majles to the same end. On another occasion, Taqīzādeh began to criticize the Minister of Justice, Farmānfarmā, saying that the Government was procrastinating, that people were dissatisfied and were complaining about the Ministry. At the same time, a crowd gathered in the Bahārestān protesting against the same things. This sort of demonstration was staged specially, and Şanī'al Douleh had been so angry at the way pressure was put upon the Majles that he even wanted to resign in Şafar (April).

26th Jamādī al-Šānī 1325 (16th August 1907), for instance, about 15,000 people gathered in the Bahārestān. It was on this occasion that Soleyman and Yahyā Mīrzā attacked Atābak as already mentioned.¹ On a later occasion, 11th Rajab (21st August), 5,000 people gathered and their mood was so angry that a deputation of five was chosen from amongst them to talk with the Government.

The person who led this deputation was Šādeq Ṭāhbāz Raḥīmof who was, according to one writer, a member of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn and a co-worker of Heydar Khān.² Mokhber al-Saltāneh had replied for the Government. Ṭāhbāz asked for the Government's plans for the defence of Urumiyeh which had been attacked by Turkish forces, and whether the Minister of the Interior undertook to guarantee the internal peace of Persia, saying what Taqīzādeh always repeated, that the Government should resign if it could not keep the peace. He also asked that the missing thirteen Deputies of Tehran should be elected,³ that the

1. See footnote p. 218.

2. R. Reżāzādeh Malek, op.cit., pp.70-78.

3. According to S.A. Āzarī, the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn had appointed Šādeq Ṭāhbāz to give Atābak an ultimatum. On this instance Ṭāhbāz had given the Government ten days to reform its ways. Atābak was killed ten days later, on the 21st Rajab and Ṭāhbāz was amongst the people arrested when Atābak was killed, although he was soon released. 'A. Āzarī, Qiyām-e Sheykh Mohammad Khīyābānī (Tehran 1346) p.52.

Supplementary Fundamental laws should be finished, and that the Deputies should not associate with any of the Ministers. The Government's promises were conciliatory but no results ensued and Atābak was killed soon after this meeting as described earlier.

Just as the position in the Majles changed and the Āzādīkhāhān became stronger and more vociferous, so likewise the Anjomans became more aggressive. Many even had armed bands and Fadā'īs.¹ Spring Rice wrote that there was no sign of agreement between the Shah and the Assembly and that the political Committees really ruled the country, distrusting the Shah and the Minister.² Most of the agitation began to be done through the Anjomans. Whereas before, crowds had been incited to gather, now the representatives of the Anjomans came to the Majles officially with their demands. For instance on the 10th Sha'bān (3rd October), for about a fortnight, all the members of the Anjoman-e Markazī headed by Arshad-al Douleh and three representatives of the other Anjomans had camped in the Bahārestān and had sworn not to move until they had obtained the signature of the Supplementary Fundamental laws. The

1. In one of the reports of the spies who followed Seyyed Jamāl Vā'eẓ dated 4th Jamādī al-Šānī 1325, it is written that the Seyyed insisted that the armed Fadā'īs should come out into the open, and that in a meeting between Seyyed Moḥammad, some of the Deputies and Seyyed Jamāl it was decided how to arm the Anjomans. G.Yaghmā'ī, op.cit., p.281.

2. Spring Rice to Grey, Sept. 13th 1907, No. 201 FO 371/312.

names of forty Anjomans are given by Habl al-Matīn as each had put up their signs. The supply of food was undertaken by Moḥammad Reżā Khān Shojā' Lashkar and Khalkhālī who was also the Nāzem of the Anjoman of Azarbaijan.

We can only guess at the extent of the co-ordination existing between the Deputies and the Anjomans, but at this juncture it is obvious that a close co-ordination existed. For instance, we see how these popular agitations helped to oust the Government of Moshīr al-Saltāneh¹ which had been imposed upon the Majles, despite the opposition of the Āzādīkhāhān, and Taqīzādeh expressed the gratitude of the Majles to the Anjomans which had, in such cold weather, accepted such hardships, and gathered in the Bahārestān in support of the Majles.²

With the appointment of Nāṣer al-Molk as Prime Minister in Ramażān, (October), the Majles meetings were for a time more peaceful, for except for the ministry of Aṣef al-Douleh, accepted to placate the Shah, the other ministers had been selected with the approval of the Majles. Taqīzādeh had even suggested that full

1. The next Prime Minister after Atābak was Moshīr al-Saltāneh who had already held the post of Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Moshīr al-Douleh, and was reputed to have no sympathy with the Constitution. He was, according to Spring Rice, a typical representative of the old order of things. Sa'd al-Douleh was now included in this Cabinet as Foreign Minister; he had gradually approached the Shah. The Cabinet of Moshīr al-Saltāneh was first accepted by the Majles conditionally and was voted out of office unanimously in Ramażān (October) by 84 votes.
2. R.M. No. 212, 13 Shavāl, 1325 (20th November 1907).

powers should be given to this Cabinet, which shows the trust they had in Nāṣer al-Molk who was chosen by the Majles.

The Shah also showed his co-operation and spirit of conciliation at this time by swearing allegiance to the Majles which seemed to promise well; but the new budget was expected to make trouble. Although this was not a proper budget, and only engendered some cuts of salaries in order to balance the expenditure of the Government, it caused widespread dissatisfaction. Mostashār al-Douleh reported to Šaqat al-Eslām that on the day when people had demonstrated in Tabriz against the expected cuts in their salaries, there had been demonstrations in Tehran too, adding that an attack on the Majles was expected as there was a plot to kill him and Taqīzādeh. There is one important sentence in his statement which might indicate the lines along which they were thinking, and it foreshadows the future plan which culminated in the bomb thrown at the Shah. He wrote, "The wisemen ('Uqalā) are thinking that those who threaten should be killed."¹

The cuts in salaries effected by the new budget dissatisfied many. This had been talked about for some time before and Taqizadeh had tried to conciliate the people and put their minds at ease by repeating that only the salaries of the rich would be cut.² But on this occasion

1. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām, p.240.

2. In a letter from Mostashār al-Douleh to Šaqat-al-Eslām, the former explains that the Majles had wished to cut the salaries of all the people, but had been afraid of the repercussions and had limited the cuts to the salaries of the very rich. N.Fathī, *Ibid.*, p. 238.

not only was the Shah dissatisfied, for his salary was limited to one Crore toman and 20 Kharvār wheat, but many of the Princes and courtiers who had received salaries were angry at these cuts. Besides, many of the poorer retainers and employees of the Shah were referred by him to the Majles for their salaries and met with a refusal.¹ Soon troubles began with demonstrations staged in Tehran and Tabriz against the cuts in salaries as mentioned, and Farshī who reported these events to Šaqat al-Eslām as well as Mostashār al-Douleh said that the 48 National Anjomans were so united that whenever they wanted they could prepare four thousand people.² Taqīzādeh had again warned that if there were disturbances in Tehran they would have to be stopped by national effort.

The Anjomans collected in the school of the Sepahsālār Mosque and addressed a petition to the Majles on the 14th Shavāl (21st November), saying that it was rumoured that the mulateers and the stable hands intended to disturb the peace, but that they were aware of what lay behind such rumours and knew that a few devilish people caused them; therefore the Anjomans were upset at such unruly behaviour. They also complained of attacks by the Turkomans, which the Government would not stop, and the fact that the sum the rich had agreed to give to

1. E. Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Persian Revolution", pp. 128-151.

2. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām, p.290. Both Mostashār al-Douleh and Farshī express great distress in their letters to Šaqat al-Eslām, especially about the plots of those around the Shah, such as Amīr Bahādor and Sa'd al-Douleh, and of the intentions of the Shah and the Russians, op.cit., pp. 245 and 255.

the Government to help the financial plight of the country had not been paid. Therefore, they had now armed and gathered in the Madreseh demanding that these points be dealt with. They also asked for a force to be organized to keep the peace. These requests were repeated by the Anjomans twice more.¹ The Āzādīkhāhān also prepared their own defences and put systematic pressure on the Government through the Majles, the press and the Anjomans. Two of their demands were for the setting up of a National Guard, and the exile of the Shah's courtiers. Criticism of the Shah's courtiers had been voiced many times before in the Majles and in the press, now their exile was demanded officially. The idea of a National Guard was new, but some of the Anjomans had previously organized their own armed Fadā'īs. But this attempt to organize an official force now shows that the Anjomans and the Āzādīkhāhān not only feared the Shah's retaliations, but were themselves aggressive. This mood could only worsen the situation; there was in fact undeclared war between the two sides, and no compromise was possible. It is doubtful if the Āzādīkhāhān even wished for a compromise. The question of a National Guard had already been brought up by Ḥabl al-Matīn ten days earlier, and now it was discussed at some length in the Majles, Taqīzādeh particularly insisting upon it, and emphasizing that what was intended was a National

1. Ḥabl al-Matīn No. 167, 14th Shavāl 1325, (21st November 1907).

Guard and not a new army.¹ The Majles shelved this demand, however, and the question was referred to a Military Commission.² But the Anjomans which had gathered in the school did not disperse and thus remained in touch and on the alert. A real Revolution was being prepared; it seems these National Anjomans no longer acted separately but as one body and they were all opposed to the Shah. The Anjoman Azarbaijan was particularly active, and Doulatābādī gives an account of the defences being prepared by Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh and Shojā' Lashkar.³ The Anjoman-e Aṣnāf supplied food, and both Malek al-Motekallemin and Seyyed Jamāl Vā'eẓ were busy encouraging the people while military preparations were made.

In the course of this crisis there was some attempt at reconciliation by the moderates, but this came to nothing. They argued, for instance, that the Shah was, according to the Constitution, irresponsible, and the Majles should confront the Government and not the Monarch with what it wanted.⁴ But such argument

1. One of the Deputies, Dr. Valīallāh Khān, a moderate, explained that "what they mean is that they do not trust some people, and perhaps what they want to say is that they are on the alert and that they will defend the Constitution if need be, and that they know what goes on." M.M. 16th Shavāl, 1325.
2. In Habl al-Matīn, it was advertised in No. 180, 1st Zīqa'deh, (11th December), that the Mojāhedīn-e Okhovvat of Anzali had petitioned the Majles for such a force to be set up, saying that they were ready to do military service.
3. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.168.
4. R.M. No. 218, 23rd Shavāl 1325 (30th November 1907).

was not heeded; the Āzādīkhāhān believed the Shah was responsible for all the unrest and disturbances in the country, and the inactivity of the Government.

Thus a confrontation was becoming inevitable. The Shah seemed to be determined to overawe or even overthrow the Majles; the Āzādīkhāhān and the Anjomans and their press, on the other hand, seemed arrogant and made no attempt to placate him.

On the 9th Zīqa'deh (15th December) Nāṣer al-Molk and the Ministers were called to the Palace and the Premier was put in chains. He was only saved by the intervention of the British Legation.¹ At the same time, the Shah's retainers and mulateers, and a detachment of Cossacks gathered in the Meydān-e Tūpkhāneh menacing the Majles; in turn the Anjomans' armed members set up a defence in the Majles and the Sepahsālar Mosque for a week. From all over Persia local Anjomans sent telegrams of support to Tehran, and from areas near Tehran such as Shemiran, Shahriyar and Shah 'Abd al-A'zīm help was sent, and such a show of resistance was made that the Shah became afraid and relented. Neẓām al-Saltāneh was given charge of forming a Cabinet on the 16th Zīqa'deh (22nd Dec.) and of negotiating peace with the Majles.

The conditions insisted upon by the Majles were the exile of Sa'd al-Douleh, the punishment of the notorious people who had caused the disturbances of the previous week, the appointment of two hundred soldiers

1. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution pp.162-3.

under the order of the Majles, and the placing of all military forces under the direction of the Ministry of War.¹

Taqīzādeh made a moving speech on the day the Majles was reconvened after a week pointing out the advantages of united action. He said:

"At this moment and on this night we are thankful that a curtain which went up last Sunday is now coming down. In fact this was a very frightening historical act. We are very thankful to our dear and gallant countrymen. On the day when most of the Deputies were attending committee meetings and were not present here, the sound of shooting was suddenly heard, although there was no armed person here. As a result of these beastly acts, these doors were closed. Thank God that, in spite of this, the nation was ready to defend its rights in earnest, and did not allow these rights which are God's gifts, to be undermined by such happenings. Now this act is past. The efforts that the nation made showed to all the world that Persia is a civilized nation. We had forgotten one of the prophet's teachings, that about collective strength. He said that 'the hand of God is with the crowd'. Thank God we saw that the unity of the nation caused a stir throughout the world. Now I remind the nation that a year ago individuals had no such strength and power and were under the yoke of despotism. Now since they cooperate and unite they have obtained their rights; and we hope that this unity and solidarity will last till the day of the appearance of the last Emām." 2

The Majles and the Āzādīkhāhān had been victorious in this important confrontation and the Majles's victory is obvious by the acceptance of the conditions; but still

1. R.M. No. 7, 18th Zīqa'deh 1325, (24th December, 1907).

2. Ibid.

the Shah's power was not nullified as some desired.

Nezām al-Saltāneh was over eighty when he took office; he had been a government official since his youth. He had served as Vazīr or Minister to Moḥammad 'Alī Shah as Crown Prince in Azarbaijan and knew him closely. That he accepted office at this delicate stage probably means that he thought it still possible to save the situation, or he might have been too devoted a servant to have refused. Before the accession of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah he had expected the Majles not to last long and he had worked for the return of Atābak, probably hoping that Atābak, as a strong man, could take the situation in hand. Later, however, he is reputed to have told the Shah that the Majles was there to stay, and like a sword which had been drawn out it could not be put back into the scabbard. This change of mind was no doubt due to the strong place the Majles had won for itself. But Marling, commenting on this Ministry, said that Nezām al-Saltāneh was not popular and was even distrusted, and that his Cabinet was disunited.¹ This is probably because he retained Āṣef al-Douleh as Minister of the Interior despite the great unpopularity of that Minister, which caused constant criticism by the Deputies until Āṣef resigned in Moḥarram 1326 (February 1908). Thereupon Nezām al-Saltāneh took up the Ministry of the Interior, and Ṣanī'al-Douleh became Minister of Finance, but Nezām al-Saltāneh remained unpopular.

1. Marling to Grey, May 21st 1908, No.14 FO 416/35. This attitude is corroborated by the discussions of the Majles, as Taqīzādeh and the Āzādīkhāhān particularly were very critical of him.

The main issue during this period was the punishment of those guilty of outrageous behaviour and murders in the Meydān-e Tūpkhāneh, and of the murder of Fereydūn, a Zoroastrian constitutionalist by some of the Shah's supporters, two points which Taqīzādeh insisted upon again and again as the Government remained inactive.

The increasing lawlessness which had spread to most provinces, and the Government's inertia was also another important issue, which was raised in the Majles especially as it was suspected that it was purposely instigated to discredit the Majles.¹ The Majles was also attacked by its enemies, for instance Hāj Mīrzā Ebrāhīm brought to the Deputies' notice that a certain Mollā had even excommunicated the Deputies.²

More important was the event of the 25th Moḥarram (February 28th) when a bomb was thrown at the Shah's carriage. This ruined all chances of a settlement with the Shah.³ The Deputies made appropriate speeches expressing their disapproval of such an act and asked the Government to find the culprits, but the search was half-hearted and the culprits were not found. To begin with, several persons were arrested by the police and

1. Taqīzādeh gave the Government one month to quieten the country or resign. R.M. No.122 14th Rabī' al-Sānī 1326 (17th May 1908).
2. Ibid.
3. Taqīzādeh wrote many years later that this act changed the Shah's attitude to the Majles and he became suspicious of it. This is a very mellowed comment by the much older Taqīzādeh. The Shah had been suspicious of the Majles from its inception. H. Taqīzādeh, "Tārīkh-e Avāyel-e Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran," Maqālāt, 1, p.282.

questioned with the Anjomans's representatives attending the trials, but as they were not found to be guilty they were set free. Then the Shah wrote to the Majles that if nothing was done to find the culprits strong action would be taken by him.¹ Several people were arrested by order of the Shah in Rabī' al-Avval 1326 (April 1908) without a warrant signed by the Minister of Justice. This caused a great uproar of protest by the Deputies, especially by Taqīzādeh and the Anjomans, and was so violent that it was promised at last that those who were responsible for these unlawful arrests, the Governor of Tehran and the Chief of Police, would be brought to trial.

Before the actual resignation of Neẓām al-Saltāneh, another distressing event took place which upset the situation further. Several Russian officers crossed over into Persia in search of a lost horse and killed a Persian peasant. In revenge the Persians killed the Russians. In retaliation a Russian force crossed over into Persia and burnt the village of Pilleh Savar killing several people. This caused a feeling of dejection and of impending danger, and it was expected that the Russians would use it as an excuse to overthrow the Majles. It was even suspected that this was a plan

1. Mostashār al-Douleh wrote to Saqat al-Eslām in Tabriz that the Shah had threatened personal action, but that the President of the Majles, Eḩteshām al-Saltāneh had not given that text to the newspapers. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām, p.287.

to give Russia an opportunity to help the Shah overthrow the Majles. It is possible that the real reason for Neẓām al-Saltāneh's resignation was in fact a feeling that some such plot was beginning to take shape, for despite the success of the Majles and the Āzādīkhāhān after the Meydān-e Tūpkhāneh, the Shah's increasing fear and anger made it obvious that some extreme action would be taken. Moreover, the situation within the Majles was beginning to deteriorate, and many expressed their hopelessness. In contrast, power and initiative shifted to the Anjomans.

Whereas before all hopes were concentrated on the Majles, now its weakness and division became apparent. The Anjomans on the other hand, appeared to be the only force to stand against the Shah. Gradually they became much more aggressive and took matters into their own hands more and more. For instance, they not only demonstrated and demanded the punishment of those guilty of the murders in the Tūpkhāneh and of the murder of Fereydūn, but their representatives impudently attended the trials of the above mentioned people.¹ According to Doulatābādī, the Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Darvāzeh Qazvin, and Mozaffarī, Shāhābād and Mojāhedīn were all arming and training their members, and openly attacked the Shah. They had written to the Majles informing it that they had about

1. Habl al-Matīn, No. 254, 14th Şafar 1326 (17th March 1908).

2000 armed men ready.¹ As we see, power had dramatically shifted to the Anjomans. They were now so powerful that they arrogated to themselves certain duties which belonged to the Majles.² They even voted for the retirement of Ehteshām al-Saltāneh. On the 25th Şafar (28th March 1908), the Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Darvāzeh Doulat invited representatives from other Anjomans and they all voted unanimously for the resignation of the President.³ He had been using a peremptory manner in the Majles, was being received in private audience by the Shah, and worst

1. The Anjoman-e Mojāhedīn is rarely mentioned, but obviously there was such an Anjoman. Kasravī says that these armed men were only training in Tabriz, but probably Doulatābādī is more accurate as he was actually in Tehran. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p.569.
2. For instance, Qavām al-Molk, the powerful local magnate of Fars, who had been exiled in Tehran and allowed to return to Shiraz was killed in Şafar 1326. Thereupon two of the Ulama in Shiraz who sympathized with the nationalists were killed in revenge. When news of this reached Tehran, the Anjomans once again collected in the Sepahsālār mosque and sent petitions to the Government and the Mojtaheds demanding that the six people implicated in these murders be sent to Tehran.
3. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, p.218. Majd al-Eslām Kermānī who thought that the failure of the Majles was partly due to the activity of the Anjomans explained that a young man named Mīrzā Dāvūd had a personal quarrel with Ehteshām and strong words were spoken. Mīrzā Dāvūd was a member of the Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Darvāzeh Qazvin and complained to his Anjoman which immediately took his side and began to attack Ehteshām; the other Anjomans followed, and at last Ehteshām was forced to resign. Majd al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., pp.49-51. But the British representative explained that the unpopularity of Ehteshām was due to the fact that he liked working secretly and thus incurred the suspicion that he worked for the Shah.

of all had quarrelled with Seyyed 'Abdallāh.¹ Now at this juncture the Āzādīkhāhān feared his influence with the Shah, and also his attempt to have his brother 'Alā' al-Douleh made Foreign Minister was deemed suspicious. Momtāz al-Douleh² was elected in his stead by the Majles. (Mokhber al-Molk, brother of Ṣanī' al-Douleh refused the Presidency). Mostashār al-Douleh commented on the President when he wrote to Ṣaqat al-Eslām that "he is our own man".³ In general the mood was pessimistic,⁴

1. Eḥteshām and Seyyed 'Abdallāh had had an old quarrel, and now they quarrelled over the Supplementary Fundamental laws; Eḥteshām had even accused Seyyed 'Abdallāh of taking bribes. The Majles discussions omit this embarrassing episode, but the British Minister and also Doulatābādī mention it. The latter author blames both Eḥteshām and the Seyyed for being both over-ambitious and wanting to control the Majles.
2. He came from an old merchant family of Tabriz, had worked in the Foreign Ministry, and in 1324 he translated the judicial laws of Ottoman Turkey. See M. Bāmdād, op.cit., 1, p.140.
3. N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Nīknām p.313.
4. The condition and the attitude of the Azarbaijan Deputies is well illustrated by a letter from Mostashār al-Douleh to Ṣaqat al-Eslām dated Moḥarram 1326. He even guessed at some of the actions the Shah was about to take. He wrote: "the situation on the border, the lack of power of the Ministers, the enmity between the Deputies, the extremism of some, the lack of action of others, new plans for the destruction of the principle of constitutionalism or at least the destruction of parts of it, the lack of funds, the poverty of the Government, the lack of a system in all affairs, the lack of people, the lack of means, a Constitution existing on paper, despotism in the depth of the hearts, black days, all these have changed our hopes into despair, regret, weakness, poverty. What should be done?" N. Fathī, *ibid.*, pp.274-280. The Azarbaijānīs expected the worst, and were particularly afraid the Shah might seek Russian aid. The Shah's insincerity was also noticeable to Marling who feared for his position. Marling to Grey, Jan. 16th, 1908, No. 22, FO 416/35.

and conflict was building up again. The power of the Majles and its confrontation with the Shah was at least legitimate and the criticism of the Shah was done very discreetly, but the National Anjomans did not take precautions, nor did they maintain the customary respect to the Monarch. It even looked as if the Anjomans were destroying the power of the Majles and going too far with their unconstitutional behaviour.

This behaviour of the Anjomans was resented by some Deputies and even some objections were made by the Azādīkhān. Mīrzā Āqā Mojāhed¹ made a very significant speech criticizing the Anjomans in Šafar 1326. He said that matters discussed in the secret meetings of the Anjomans were divulged outside, and it was not known whether the Deputies divulged them or the audiences. He suggested that the public should not be allowed to attend such secret meetings. Then he said that the Anjomans were angry with him because he had expressed his opinion about their unconstitutional behaviour,² but that he now wished to define the limits of the Anjomans' and the Majles's powers. This Majles he added had been set up by God's will and the Anjomans existed in the light it diffused. The Majles was like the sea and the Anjomans were like drops of water; they were necessary to each other and the Anjomans had to oversee the execution of the acts of the

1. There were several Mīrzā Āqās in the Majles. In this instance it is possible that he was Mīrzā Āqā Farshforūsh, referred to as Farshī in most writings.

2. M.M. 14th Šafar 1326.

Majles, but they had no right to interfere in the relationship between the Deputies and the Ministers. The Anjomans had to realize the limits of their power.¹ Habl al-Matīn went further, drawing attention to the role of the Anjomans; it said the Majles did not act until pressure was put on it by the press and the Anjomans, and added that the Anjomans' duty was to watch and oversee the action of the Ministers and to demand co-operation and action, and only to apply pressure if necessary.

The lack of co-operation by the Government and the movements of troops to Tehran when they were needed in the provinces seemed to justify the feeling that another confrontation with the Shah was inevitable. Taqizadeh drew attention to this movement of troops cautiously in the Majles, but his argument was not pursued. The Majles knew itself to be powerless because the Shah controlled the troops.

In the meantime, in answer to the Shah's demand for the suppression of the Anjomans, the Assembly asked for the dismissal of six of the Shah's most notorious courtiers² ^{to} which he yielded with bad grace after much negotiation. The next day, the 4th Jamādī al-Avval 1326

1. Habl al-Matīn No. 254, 14th Şafar 1325 (17th March 1908).

2. Nāzem al-Eslām Kermānī was of the opinion that this demand was first put forward by those who wished to overthrow the Majles in order to aggravate the relationship between the Shah and the Majles. Op.cit., 2, p.199.

(June 3rd 1908), he took refuge in the Bāgh-e Shah, where a few days later he appointed Moshīr al-Saltāneh as Prime Minister after Nezām al-Saltāneh had resigned. It seemed that the final catastrophe was near.

At this time there were attempts by the Āzādīkhāhān in the Majles to moderate their attitude and conciliate the Shah, but the Anjomans remained aggressive. The question arises as to why they took such extremist attitudes in comparison to the Āzādīkhāhān at this time. As already hinted, they might have been infiltrated by certain elements who now wanted to bring about the final showdown, and some contemporary accounts corroborate this. On the other hand, they might have been under the influence of irresponsible men who remained in the dark and whereas the Deputies had many more considerations in mind such as the British and Russian warnings against the deposition of the Shah, these men had no responsibility or might not even have understood the great peril they were facing. There were timid attempts made by the Deputies to placate the Shah, but they had no control over the Anjomans, and chaos was becoming widespread. Petitions were sent to the Shah through the mediation of 'Ażad al-Molk the venerable Qajar chief, but to no avail. Instead three of those who had accompanied 'Ażad al-Molk to an audience with the Shah were arrested and exiled on the 5th Jamādī al-Avval 1326 (4th June 1908). They were 'Alā'al-Douleh, Jalāl al-Douleh and Sardār Mansūr. An attempt at reconciliation was also made by Moshīr al-Douleh as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by his brother

Mo'tamen al-Molk, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, but nothing came of these attempts. In the meantime, on the 3rd Jamādī al-Avval, (June 2nd), the Russian Minister and the British Charge d'Affaires had warned Moshīr al-Douleh against attempts to depose the Shah. This message was conveyed to some of the Deputies including Taqīzādeh and Mostashār al-Douleh who had duly warned the Majles.¹

The Shah sent reassuring messages to the Majles, but also demanded the dispersal of the volunteer forces, the control of the press and the exile of the more extremist leaders of the people, such as Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān, Moḥammad Reżā Mosāvāt, Seyyed Jamāl al-Dīn Vā'ez Malek al Motekallemīn and Bahā'al-Vā'ezīn, another of the orators who had worked closely with the Anjomans. These people offered to leave Tehran, but the Deputies would not hear of it.

During the last days of the Majles there was not only a division of attitude between the more extremist elements who no longer knew what to do, but a general demoralization had set in, while the Shah's boldness increased. No one trusted anyone and everyone suspected everyone else. On Jamādī al-Avval 18th (17th June) the Anjomans and people were ready for a fight and had gathered in the Sepahsālār Mosque, but on the other hand some of the Deputies including Taqīzādeh, Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Malek al-Motekalemīn deemed a fight to be out of the

1. E. Bāstānī Pārīzī, *op.cit.*, p.125. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, p.201.

question. They considered that the nationalists did not have sufficient strength¹ and tried to disperse them because of the Russian and British warning which was not generally known.

Last minute actions were taken to control the situation, but they were disjointed and unco-ordinated. For instance, a Commission of Defence was organized as well as a Commission of Reconciliation and plans were made to organize a mixed Commission with the Ministers to discuss a settlement. All this time the Shah continued to send reassuring messages. When his forces attacked the Majles on the 24th Jamādī al-Avval (23rd June), no defence was put up to save the Majles. The popular leaders were either caught and brought in chains to Bāgh-e Shah where many were put to death, or they went into hiding, some taking refuge in foreign embassies.

The course of the last days of the Majles, the fate of many of the leaders/^{of the Revolution} and the reasons for their failure have been described often and need not be repeated here. Moreover, the Majles discussions do not give a clear and significant picture of the negotiations which were taking place elsewhere. On the whole, opinions have varied about the causes of the failure of the Majles. Some writers have been of the opinion that it was the uncompromising attitude of the extremists which drove the Shah to despair and culminated in the destruction of the Majles, others have thought that, on the contrary, it was the compromising and mild attitude of the Deputies

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 2, pp.278-80.

which was the cause of the weakness of the Majles. The judgement on this question depends on the writers' personal political point of view. It seems, however, that there could have been no compromise. Moḥammad 'Alī Shah was set on overthrowing the Majles before he ever became King, and was encouraged by the Russians. The Majles, too, was divided as we have seen in its opinion about him, and the Āzādīkhāhān seemed bent on deposing him. Of course had there been co-operation and a united front the Majles would have been much stronger and it could not have been defeated so easily. But the fact that it was divided as we have seen gave the opportunity to its enemies to play on these divisions. Moreover, those who had the tools and the power did not wish or were not ready to sacrifice themselves or their positions; those who were ready to sacrifice did not have the experience or power to do so. Nor did a single strong ideology or party appear to unite those who wished for reform and those who wanted a revolution. In all these events the Anjomans which backed the Āzādīkhāhān and from whom much could have been expected only exacerbated the situation, and brought the final catastrophe nearer. The lessons of the First Majles were learnt, and when the Second Majles was convened there emerged two political parties instead of the loose groupings in the First Majles, and no Anjomans which had caused so much chaos and undisciplined action. But, on the other hand, when there was a need for outside support there was no means of stirring the masses.

PART 2

SECOND MAJLES

INTRODUCTION

The Formation of the Political Parties

The Second Majles came into being as a result of fighting and resistance to the Shah and much was expected from it, but because of certain elements which either existed from the past or had recently come about it met a fate little better than the first.

A Russian author says that the Persian Revolution was a failure because the old feudal and religious elements won what they had set out to win. The Revolution did not displace them, it only weakened the Shah. The feudal class now camouflaged itself with Constitutionalism, and the bourgeois class did not gain power.¹ This Marxist interpretation of the Persian Revolution is not far from the truth.

Doulatābādī also deplores the fact that the Second Majles differed in its essence from the First and was represented by the A'yān and Ashrāf or their nominees. This was made possible by the two degree election imposed by the second electoral laws which eliminated the representative of the Kasabeh and Tojjār. The other factor which,

1. Pavlovitch, Tria, Iranski, Enqelāb-e Mashrūṭīyyat-e Iran. Rīshehhā-ye Ejtemā'ī Eqteṣādī-ye ān. Trans. Hūshyār (Tehran n.d.), p. 139.

according to this author, ensured a conservative type of Majles was the insistence of Nāṣer al-Molk the Regent that the deputies should organize two political parties. He was certain, says Doulatābādī, that the moderates were in the majority and that they would back Sepahdār. Thus by backing the moderates he encouraged the newcomers to join their ranks even if they had very little merit. People who never hoped to be included in a national government were now admitted to the government circles to the disadvantage of the real Āzādīkhāhān. The Second Majles showed the reactionaries the way to enter the political arena.¹

The class which managed to consolidate its power was the richer A'yān and Ashrāf class. They no longer opposed the Constitution but worked with the Majles and grew to dominate it. Those amongst them who had wished for limited monarchy and reform were well enough satisfied and now became much more powerful with the eclipse of the Shah. The Tojjār, who had helped the course of the Revolution stood aloof.² Generally they do not seem to

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 3, pp. 151-152.

2. This class had often been called the bourgeois class but, as has already been pointed out, the European classification does not hold for Persia, and the Western capitalist class has often wrongly been equated with the Tojjār or merchant class. These two classes are not the same. The Western bourgeois class was a capitalist industrial class. In Persia the Tojjār made their capital in foreign trade; it was not an entrepreneurial industrial class, and their interests did not necessarily coincide. Russian authors have equated these classes and have seen the Persian Revolution as a bourgeois capitalist revolution.

have aimed at political power or to have tried to participate in the administration. They were now eclipsed after their initial period of importance.¹ They had neither such a social standing as to obtain administrative or ministerial posts, nor did they have the real economic power or interests to enter politics. Iran-e Nou, the official organ of the Democrats even wrote that after the time of the Revolution the Persian bourgeois capitalist class hardly existed as a class and did not understand its role.²

1. One interesting episode in connection with the merchants is worth mentioning. In Jamādī al-Avval 1329, 8th May 1911, the government was encountering difficulties with Shuster, it called a conference with the big merchants who included Amīn al-Ẓarb, Ḥāj Mo'īn and Ḥāj Moḥammad Taqī Bonakdār to obtain their backing. Iran-e Nou objected to this act which it called unconstitutional. On another occasion the same paper published an article by a Pā-berehneh, barefoot, accusing the new Anjoman of Aṣṅāf set up with the government's backing, because it was trying to interfere in government affairs. Obviously the Democrats feared the influence of the big Tojjār with the Aṣṅāf. Iran-e Nou, No. 39, 9th Jamādī al-Avval 1329, 8th May 1911, and No. 79, 1st Rajab 28th June.
2. The election of the five Ulama Deputies was to be carried out from amongst twenty names suggested by Najaf. This election was delayed until after the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh. Then with great difficulties because first of all the rules of the election were vague, and because of the death of Seyyed 'Abdallāh, the list was reduced to nineteen, they proceeded to the elections. It is interesting to speculate whether there was any connection between this murder and the election of the five Ulama. On the face of it there is not because the controversy over the election had not yet arisen, and besides most of the difficulties encountered were due to technical questions whether they should be elected by lots or by votes.

The Ulama were in a different position. There were a large number of Mo'amam deputies in the Second Majles in both parties. The five Ulama with the power of veto did not play an important part and the power of veto was not actually exercised. Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī was sick and did not attend the Majles. Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī was murdered in an event which will be described later. Thus these two important figures of the First Majles disappeared. In general, the important Ulama in Najaf still played a very significant part supporting the Majles, but in general the Ulama's role and their influence had come to an end.

The point of issue at this juncture was between the old group of Āzādīkhāhān who became known as the Democrats (but were also called Enqelābīyūn or revolutionaries), who stood for a strong national policy and upheld the power of the Majles and the moderate or Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn party. These wanted a weaker Majles, the setting up of the Senate as before, and a policy of general compromise. There were other issues besides this original and basic controversy such as the question of foreign relationships, internal social and economic reform and the relationship between the Majles and the Cabinet.¹ Then however social or economic reform

1. Already in the first part of this work we have drawn attention to the inherent inconsistency of the constitutional laws. The Constitutionals deliberately omitted any control the Executive could exercise over the Majles, and now this weakness became a point of controversy and on several occasions the Government tried to overcome this by asking for extraordinary powers.

were not the basic issues but more of an ideal. The main issue centred around the insolvency of Persia's finances and her lack of internal security, both of which were connected with her foreign policy. Above all, in this period the implications of the 1907 Convention became apparent and much of the events centred round it.

The divergence of opinion and division on ideology and methods which appeared in the First Majles and which cut across the class or Ṭabaqāt as we have seen, persisted and became much more fixed and overt in the Second Majles.

As a result of this there now appeared for the first time several groupings in the Majles which may be called political parties, and these gave the whole political process a different characteristic. Moreover, some new elements came to the fore in the entangled Persian political scene. The same slogans of nationalism and reform were used for different policies; each side accused the other of selling the country to the foreigner and of being false. Hopelessness and bitterness increased with insecurity caused by tribal and local feuds which were in turn worsened by foreign occupation and the lack of real freedom.

CHAPTER 1

ESTEBDĀD-E ŞAGHĪR¹

23rd Jamadī al-Şānī 1326 to 27th Jāmādī al-Şānī 1327

23rd July 1908 to 15th July 1909

After the bombardment of the Majles, the Shah reigned supreme. Many of the nationalist leaders and deputies were caught and put to death or took refuge in one of the foreign embassies or went into hiding or even fled the country. Mīrzā Jahāngīr Khān and Malek al-Motekallemīn were put to death, Seyyed Jamāl was killed near Hamadan. Taqīzādeh, Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh, Dekhodā and about thirty or forty others took refuge in the British Legation, Momtāz al-Douleh and Ḥakīm al Molk hid in the French embassy. Mostashār al-Douleh and Yaḥyā Mīrzā were kept in chains in Bāgh-e Shah for a long time, whilst Mosāvāt fled the city and wandered as a fugitive before going to Tabriz. Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī were arrested and later exiled. Some made their peace with the Shah gradually as most of the Tojjār, and Ulama; such as Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī² and some were saved by the intercession of their friends, such

1. The lesser dictatorship.

2. See for instance Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit., 2, p. 166.

as for instance Mīrzā Soleyman Khān who was saved by Mostoufī-al-Mamālek¹ and Nāẓem al-Eslām himself who was saved by Neẓām al-Saltāneh. Thus the Shah eliminated all opposition in the capital, but several centres of resistance to the Shah sprung up inside and outside Persia. These movements are important because they display the divergence of opinion inherent in the whole revolutionary movement in Persia. The emigres were no more united than the deputies had previously been when actively engaged in politics.

After the bombardment of the Majles many nationalists fled to London, Paris, the Caucasus and Turkey where they began to organize and work for the return of the Constitution. Taqīzādeh, Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh, Mīrzā Moḥammad Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Moḥammad'Alī Tarbiyat, Ḥoseyn Āqā Parvīz and Mīrzā Āqā Farshī gathered in London.² There, with the help of Professor E.G. Browne and several British M.P.s who were sympathetic to the cause of the Persian Constitution, they organized the Persia Society and lectured and wrote articles to win support for their cause.

1. Ibid., p. 151.

2. Taqīzādeh had taken refuge in the British Legation on the day of the bombardment of the Majles with several other Nationalists. They all left under a safe conduct from the Shah. Some of these refugees were Dekhodā, Seyyed Ḥasan Kashānī, the editor of Ḥabl al-Matīn, and Khalkhālī. Taqīzādeh was invited by E.G. Browne to London.

Mo'āẓed al-Saltaneh and Taqīzādeh together published a Manifesto in defence of the Persian Majles emphasizing its progressive character, the economic steps it had taken to effect reform and the tolerance it had shown towards the minorities. They added that the Majles had been overthrown by foreign interference and had put up no fight because the Russians had threatened to use force if the Shah was overcome. They emphasized that they were reformists and not revolutionaries, and that the political Anjomans were by no means revolutionary as was being said in the West. They ended by stating that Mohammad 'Ali Shah would never voluntarily consent to convene another assembly, especially if he obtained a loan. They begged the British Government not to interfere and not to lend any money so the Persian Government could win their liberty and with foreign experts and instructors modernize her administration.¹

Later Mo'āẓed al-Saltaneh² proceeded to Paris,

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1. Manifesto of the Persian Nationalists in London, published in The Times dated October. Cuttings from The Times Intelligence Department, Feb. 1908 to Sept. 1911, pp. 80-81.
 2. In the Second Majles, Mo'āẓed al-Saltaneh and Dekhodā joined the E'tedāliyyūn party, contrary to expectation. It is not clear whether this separation was based on personal or ideological motives. In a private interview his son H. Pīrnīyā, asserted that this was due to the fact that Mo'āẓed al-Saltaneh was devoted to Sardār As'ad and supported the Bakhtiyārīs. Dekhodā too joined the E'tedāliyyūn but he took little interest in the Second Majles and was often absent. There is a very interesting letter by Dekhodā apparently written after the defeat of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah in 1327, when the new elections were being prepared. It is from

/Continued over

but we do not know why. It is possible that there was at this time some divergence of opinion with Taqīzādeh. In Paris he joined the circle of other emigres such as Eḥteshām al-Douleh, Sardār As'ad, Dabīr al-Molk, Mo'tamed Khāqān and Dehkhodā. According to one writer this was a more moderate group. Its members desired the reintroduction of the Constitution, and were not set on deposing the Shah, whereas the more extremist group wanted to remove him. These men had much at stake by way of their privileges and positions and were therefore cautious, of course.¹ Dehkhodā is an exception here. Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh generously put up the sum for the publication of the newspaper Şūr-e Esrāfīl in Switzerland and for the

Footnote 2 continued from previous page.

Turkey and is addressed to Şanī'al-Douleh. Dehkhodā expresses a deep feeling of depression and pessimism, and complains about the behaviour of the emigres in Europe which he says was embarrassing. Then he paints a very dark picture, saying he believed Persia had been granted a very short respite before it was taken over by the big powers. The only solution he saw was to elect people who were educated, despite the fact that there was a dearth of such notables, especially those educated in Europe. Another reason for the problems of the past, he thought, was the fact that the tribes had not been given the right to be represented in the First Majles to elect their representatives which made them ill-disposed towards the Majles. He ends his letter by suggesting the names of several people in Turkey who were highly educated and worthy of being elected. E. Şafā'ī, ed., "Yek Nāmeḥ az Dehkhodā", Anjoman-e Tārīkh (Tehran 1357), pp. 24-32.

1. 'A.H. Navā'ī, Doulathā-ye Iran az Āghāz-e Mashrūṭīyyat tā 'Ultīmātūm (Tehran 2535), p. 121.

subsistence of some of the other poorer emigres.¹

Mo'āżed al-Saltāneh and Dekhodā managed with great difficulty to publish three issues of Şūr-e Esrāfīl in Switzerland and when their money ran out they left for Turkey where a large number of Persians had taken refuge.²

In Turkey the Persian refugees had organized the Anjoman-e Sa'ādat in Constantinople which kept in touch with the Anjoman of Tabriz, the Najaf Ulama, and the refugees in Paris and London. Doulatābādī says most of its members were Azarbaījānīs. He probably means by this that they were more extremist than the others. They had the support of the Young Turks and the party of Union and Progress. Doulatābādī who had been very close to the Āzādīkhāhān, as related, was amongst the refugees in Constantinople and recounts the efforts of the Anjoman-e Sa'ādat and of a more secret committee he organized to coordinate the effects of the refugees there.³ These

1. He was of the opinion that they had to support the poor, and those who had no hope of ministerial posts, "the others will never join our policy", he wrote and "will never work sincerely".

In another letter he showed interest in the fate of his late colleagues of the Komīteh-ye Engelāb, namely Mosāvāt, Seyyed 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khalkhālī and Āqā Seyyed Jalīl Ardabīlī. Ibid., p. 123 and 125.

2. For more details see E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, Chapters 8 and 9, and also by the same author, Brief Narrative of Recent Evens in Persia, dated January 1909, passim

3. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 3, p. 74.

efforts had little real effect, however, other than encouragement and moral support. The real fight was centred in Persia, and the only other important centre outside Persia was the Caucasus which sent real help to the Mojāhedīn.

As soon as the news of the bombardment of the Majles reached Tabriz, fighting broke out between the Mojāhedīn¹ and Royalists who were reinforced by Raḥīm Khān and his son. The Mojāhedīn fought well and held parts of the city. The Shah, despairing of an early victory, despatched 'Ayn al-Douleh and later Moḥammad Valī Khān Naṣr al-Saltāneh, known as Sepahdār, to invest Tabriz. Sepahdār, however, soon quarrelled and left. The Mojāhedīn had the support of the Ulama of Najaf and the help of two popular leaders, Sattār and Bāqer Khān. In addition, significant help came from the Caucasus in the shape of men and arms. So Tabriz began a long resistance.

When 'Ayn al-Douleh arrived outside the city, Šaqat al-Eslām tried to negotiate with him² although the

1. This term became a common name for the nationalists fighting for the Constitution. All special connection with the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn now seems to disappear in the common fight for the restitution of the Constitution, however the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn were active behind the scene, sending help, and keeping up their connections and organization. HeydarKhān and Rasūlzādeh for instance worked to this end.

2. For more details see N. Fathī, Shahīd-e Niknām, p. 381; also Amīrkheyzī, Qīyām-e Azarbaijan va Sattār Khān (Tehran 1356) passim; A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, passim.

more extremist Anjoman of Tabriz which was organizing the fighting was opposed to any compromise. The terms of the Mojāhedīn's conditions were the reinstatement of the Majles which Moḥammad 'Alī Shah was not ready to grant so no result ensued from Šaqat al-Eslām's mediation. Indeed all negotiations were very sensitive as any compromise of the Mojāhedīn's position could be held to be anti-national and a betrayal, nor was the Shah yet ready for a settlement. Gradually Tabriz faced starvation and the threat of Russian occupation.

All through the months of fighting, the Anjoman of Tabriz acted like a Majles, publishing its own newspaper Anjoman, dealing with matters of concern to the provincial centres, and organizing the fighting, which made Tabriz the centre of resistance. Many refugees arrived in Tabriz at this time and joined in the fight. Heydar Khan arrived, so did Mosāvāt who having fled Tehran reached Tabriz where he began to publish the Mosāvāt.¹ Another newspaper, Nāleh-ye Mellat, was also published by Mīrzā Āqā, in support of the Revolution.

Taqīzādeh also came from London sent by Šādeq Raḥīmof one of the members of the Baku Committee of the Ejtemā' īyūn 'Āmīyūn.² He was accompanied by Moḥammad 'Alī

1. For details see Šadr-e Hāšemī, Tārīkh-e Jarāyed va Majellāt-e Iran (Esfahan, 1332), 5, p. 254.

2. It must be pointed out that Šādeq Raḥīmof is possibly Šādeq Ṭāhbāz already referred to in connection with the death of Atabāk, and as working closely with Heydar Khān. See page 268; also Ḥ. Javādī, ed., Nāmeḥhā'ī az Tabriz (Tehran, 1351), p. 20.

Tarbīyat. Taqīzādeh's relationship with some of the Mojāhedīn, was poor especially with Sattār and Bāqer Khān,¹ whose followers often seem to have acted somewhat arbitrarily. One eye witness and a close friend of Sattār Khān, Amīrkheyzī, mentions this very discretely for it still remains a delicate national question to this day. He mentions that for instance in Ziḥajeh 1326, the Mojāhedīn were made to swear and sign a book not to take advantage of their position.² Some of this existing tension might have been due to the Mojāhedīn's misdeeds but there must have been a more fundamental reason underlying the existing tension. On one side were the more extremist depending on the large number of Caucasians who had arrived to help the Persian Revolution. On the other side were the more moderates represented by Sattār Khān and Bāqer Khān. The tension might have also been caused by a struggle for ascendancy between the various factions and by personal rivalry. This split was to become an important issue later.

Mention has been made of the Caucasian help sent to Azarbaijan and we have already mentioned the connection of the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn with the Russian Social Democrats,

1. A. Kasravī is prejudiced against Taqīzādeh and states that this antipathy between Sattār Khān and Bāqer Khān on the one hand and Taqīzādeh on the other was the latter's fault. Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh, p. 808.

2. E. Amīrkheyzī, op.cit., p. 594.

ever since the beginning of the Persian Revolution. Now this connection became much more important as considerable help was sent clandestinely to Persia.¹

The correspondent of The Times who followed the fighting in Tabriz and Rasht made many observations about the Caucasians who fought amidst the Persian Nationalists, but their connection with the Russian Social Democrats seems to have escaped him for he insinuates that maybe the Bāhā'īs were helping the Nationalists. He also mentions that the Nationalists had little control over these men who were demanding money from the rich and who were professional revolutionaries.² They came by boat, were provided with proper papers and were armed. He thought that they would have to be disposed of before good government was possible. The British Consul too reported the arrival of the Caucasians, and Barclay, the British Minister, concluded that these Caucasians were a menace to Russia.³

Lenin paid special attention to the Persian Revolution.⁴ He sent Vlas Mazedadze 'Tria' who fought and

1. Barclay states that he did not believe the rumours of Germans and Turks aiding the nationalists in Tabriz but that there were numbers of Caucasian revolutionaries continuing to arrive. It seemed, he wrote, that it was beyond the power of the authorities of the Caucasus to prevent their crossing the frontier. Barclay to Grey, Dec. 1st 1908, No. 408F.O.416/38. On December 3rd he said that the Russian Government was very anxious that these people should aim at something beyond the Constitution that would be ultimately damaging to Russian interests.

2. The Times, 18th March and 21st April, 1909.

3. Barclay to Grey, March 5th 1909, No. 274, FO 416/39.

4. It is possible that he might have met some of the emigres in Switzerland in 1908 namely Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh and Dehkhodā. J. Haupt, M. Reberieux, op.cit., p. 64.

was wounded in Tabriz.¹ In August 1908 he referred to the Persian Revolution in a pamphlet in which he discusses such risings, and their eventual implications. He especially pointed to the role of the Russian Government acting as international executioners in helping to suppress it. But he argued that the resistance of Tabriz showed that a revolutionary movement could stand up against reaction and win. Each counter-reactionary movement and each struggle of the proletariat was a step towards the common end, and that the proletariat could only free itself by escalating such movements.²

As the *siege* of Tabriz was dragging without any success to either side the Russians took the pretext of a threat to the lives of foreigners to state they would open the road to bring in food to the city. In Rabī' al-Avval, April, therefore, Šaqat al-Eslām and two others were chosen by the Anjoman of Tabriz to proceed to Basminch the headquarters of 'Ayn al-Douleh to negotiate peace once again in order to avert foreign interference. The Shah, however, refused to renew the Constitution which was the

1. Tria gave a series of lectures in Europe describing the condition of Persia in May 1910 in Paris, Zurich and Baku. Iran-e Nou, No. 228, 4th Jamādī al-Šānī 1328, 12th June 1910.

He also with Pavlovitch and Iranski wrote a book especially giving details of the help the Russian socialists sent to Persia. *Op.cit.*, *passim*.

2. Lenin, "Explosive Material in World Politics", Collected Works 15, pp. 182-190.

sine qua non of peace and deadlock was reached. Then on the eve of the Russian entry Taqīzādeh, on behalf of the Anjoman, telegraphed a nonconditional surrender to the Shah, but it was too late, the answer of the Shah accepting the surrender of the nationalists did not reach 'Ayn al-Douleh in time and the Russian forces entered Tabriz on the 8th Rabī' al-Šānī 1327, (24th April 1909).

At the same time as Tabriz was the centre of resistance, so was another area in Northern Persia long known for its advanced views and the courage of its people. Rasht had been in upheaval during the First Majles and it became a place of resistance to the Shah during the Estebdād-e Šaghīr. The Governor was killed and the city was taken over by the Mojāhedīn⁴ who set up the Komīteh-ye Sattār and organized the march to Tehran with Sepahdār at their head. Some of the leaders of the Gilan uprising

1. The Times, 18th March and 21st April 1909.

2. Šaqat el-Eslām expressed his suspicions that this had been a plot to occupy Azarbaijan. E. Šafā'ī, Asnād-e Sīyāsī, p. 424.

3. Barclay to Grey, March 5th 1909, No. 274, FO 416/39.

4. Two accounts of the Gilan rising are by E. Fakhrā'ī, Gilan dar Jonbesh-e Mashrūṭīyyat (Tehran 1353) passim; 'A.H. Navā'ī, "Enqelāb-e Gilan Chehgūneh Aghāz Shod", Yādegār, 4th year, No. 3, 1326-1947.

were Mo'ez al-soltān and his brothers Karīm Khān, and 'Amīd al-Soltān, and Hoseyn Khān Kasmā'ī.¹ Another of the leaders was 'Alī Moḥammad Tarbiyat² an Azarbāijānī and brother of Moḥammad 'Alī who was with Taqīzādeh in London and then came to Tabriz. There were Caucasians and other Russian fighters in Gilan as well. We know that Heydar Khān visited Rasht, and organized much of the resistance. Another of the leaders of the Revolutionaries, and one who was to gain quite an influence on the later events was an Armenian Dashnāk, Yephrem. The Dāshnāks' purpose was to aid the Persian Revolutionaries with the purpose of aiding the course of Revolution anywhere in the Middle East and the Balkans; so the Armenians in Azarbaijan and Gilan joined in the fight against the Royalists. Yephrem was the leader of the Armenians in Rasht, a member of the Committee of Sattār and one of the leaders of the forces which took Tehran.

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1. 'Ali Moḥammad Tarbiyat was the brother of Moḥammad 'Alī who founded the famous Tarbiyat Library and worked closely with Taqīzādeh. 'Alī Moḥammad was later killed in retaliation for the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh. He was well-known for his daring and courage and had been the leader of the Mojāhedīn in Gilan and an organiser of the Committee of Sattār.
 2. For a short account of his life see "Sharḥ-e Hāl-e Marḥūm-e Mīrzā Hoseyn Khān Kasmā'ī," Yādegār, 4th year, No. 4, 1326-1947.
 3. The Dāshnāksūthīyūm was a federation of Armenian Socialists and Nationalists and had branches in Turkey, Persia and Russia. They had decided to back all progressive parties in this part of the world with the aim of achieving independence for Armenia. See A. Pādmāgrīyān, Tārīkh-e Siyāsī va Ejtemā'ī-ye Arāmaneh, Trans. G. Aqāsī (Tehran 1352); also G. Kārāpetīyān (and others), Ḥamāseh-ye Yephrem (Tehran, 1354), pp. 29-40.

As mentioned the Mojāhedīn of Gilan invited Moḥammad Valī Khān Sepahdār to lead the revolutionary force to Tehran, despite his past reactionary attitude and his known connection with Russia.¹ The change of heart on Sepahdār's part is not unusual in the politicians of this time and he was said to hate Moḥammad 'Alī Shah, but the fact that the Mojāhedīn chose him to lead them though he was a mere figurehead according to most accounts, is surprising. They might have been afraid to leave him behind, and Barclay reported that he seemed to be entirely in the hands of the four hundred Caucasians who were with him.²

Why Sepahdār was used by the Mojāhedīn is not obvious. He might have been the choice of the moderates who were afraid of the ascendancy of the more extremist of the revolutionaries, he might on the other hand have been acting on the promptings of the Russians, or he might have

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1. Sepahdār was the largest landowner in Persia whose estates were in Northern Persia. Spring Rice had reported earlier that he had handed over considerable property to the Russian Bank d'Escompte as security for a loan. This property commanded the shortest road from the Caspian to the Capital. The First Majles had demanded his recall as Governor of Gilan because of complaints about him. Spring Rice to Grey, July 13th 1907, No. 146, FO 416/33.
 2. Barclay to Grey, May 20th 1909, No. 106, FO 416/40. Also see Memorandum by George Churchill, August 21, 1909, No. 116 (Enclosure in No. 672) FO 416/41.

been after personal gains and he had approached them.¹ It must be noted that all the time the troops with Sepahdār were approaching Tehran he was negotiating with the Shah, and it is more interesting to remember that Taqīzādeh and the Anjoman of Tabriz asked Sepahdār not to take Tehran.²

Esfahan was another centre of resistance to the Shah. As soon as the bombardment of the Majles became known secret societies were set up and it was decided to seek Bakhtiyārī aid.³ One of the chief instigators of this plan was Hājī Āqā Nūrallāh, brother of the influential Mojtahed of Esfahan, Āqā Najafī. Sardār As'ad, the Chief of the Bakhtiyārī tribe, visited Esfahan incognito from Europe and plans were made in secret for an uprising. Heydar Khān too visited Esfahan and was in touch with the Secret Committees there.

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1. Sepahdār obtained a prestigious position and became very powerful, but he was never a true believer in Constitutionalism and did much to harm it. It has been said that he had received 60,000 tomans from the Shah to proceed to Tabriz but this money was never accounted for as Sepahdār left Tabriz and went to Gilan. There he set himself up as a Constitutionalist whilst his son Amīr As'ad remained a reactionary. Father and son no doubt deliberately sat in different camps so as to be able to save the family property.
 2. A. Khal'atbarī, ed., "Yāddāshthā-ye Moḥammad Valī Khān Khal'atbarī Sepahsālār", Khāterāt-e Vahīd, No. 35, 36, 37 (Tehran 1353). passim.
 3. N. Dāneshvar-e 'Alavī, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭeh-ye Iran va Jonbesh-e Vaṭan Parastān-e Esfahan va Bakhtiyārī (Tehran, 1325), p. 24.

After much planning and settlement of family quarrels the Bakhtiyārī force under Şamşām al-Saltāneh,¹ a brother of Sardār As'ad, marched to Esfahan and took the city. Then under Sardār As'ad, who joined them once again, the forces began to march to Tehran in Rabī' al-Avval 1327 (May 1909).

Historians like Malekzādeh and Doulatābādī have given lengthy explanations of why Sardār As'ad took the field against Moḥammad 'Alī Shah.² He is said to have been a patriot who believed in freedom and democracy as he had lived in Europe. He was also a liberal. Further, he was coaxed by the emigres, while in Europe, to take the field. Basically, however, the support of the Bakhtiyārīs for the cause of Constitutionalism was caused by their enmity for the Qajars³ and the hope for profit. Later when in power Sardār As'ad at times flirted with the Democrats, but in general he advanced the interests of his tribe and this not only caused the unrest of the rival tribe of the Qashqā'īs in the South, but also brought into Persian politics the unsettling force of men who by their background had no sympathy or understanding of true

1. He had been deposed as Ilkhān of the tribe by the Shah, and this caused him to revolt against him.
2. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 5, pp. 184-5.
3. The father of Sardār As'ad had been treacherously murdered by Żell al-Soltān and one of his brothers had been imprisoned by him.

parliamentary government.¹ One writer points out that the rival Bakhtiyārī Khāns had concluded a secret agreement by which all the wealth and position obtained as the result of their support of the Constitution would be equally divided between the two families, the writer concludes that, the "true motivation behind Bakhtiyārī unity and their reasons for participation in the Revolution are thus revealed in this agreement",² which was made at Malamīr on the 11th Rabī 'al-Avval 1327, (3rd April, 1909).

In any case the motives of Sardār As'ad and Sepahdār and the Mojāhedīn could not have been the same, and this duality of purpose was to become an important factor when they took power.

While Tabriz was being occupied by the hostile forces of Russia, the Gilan Mojāhedīn were on their way to

1. Another point must be added here. Some historians have hinted but not clearly stated that the march of the Bakhtiyārīs to Tehran had nothing fortuitous about it and that it had been undertaken with British assent as they were nervous at the Russian ascendancy established in the North and by the march of Sepahdār with the Mojāhedīn to Tehran.

A pretence was made to stop their march but no real step to stop Sepahdār nor Sardār As'ad was taken, and the occasion was taken by the Russian force to advance as far as Qazvin.

2. G.R. Garthwaite, "The Bakhtiyārī Khans the Government of Iran and the British 1896-1915", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3 (1972), p. 37.

Tehran, and the Bakhtiyārīs reached Qom. Events thereupon moved fast in the Capital. The British and Russians had urged the Shah ever since the overthrow of the Majles to reissue the edict of the Constitution and to reconvene the Majles, but he had procrastinated. Now under real pressure by the powers and with the threat of the invasion of Tehran by the Mojāhedīn, with the Bāzārs closing once again and people taking bast in the Turkish embassy, he relented. Gradually those deputies who had gone into hiding came out and a committee was formed representing the Nationalists which negotiated with the Shah and recognised the newly formed Government.¹

The Shah appointed Nāṣer al-Molk, who was in Europe at the time, to head the Cabinet and Sa'd al-Douleh was made Foreign Minister and put in charge of the Cabinet during his absence. This Cabinet, chosen with Russian and British advice, was meant to be popular.² Mostoufī al-Mamālek was Minister of War, Mo'tamen al-Molk Minister of Education and Moshīr al-Douleh Minister of

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1. Barclay mentions a lack of cohesion amongst this group in Tehran. Of course such a lack of cohesion and aim was characteristic of all the centres of resistance and amongst most of the Nationalist leaders, as has already been pointed out.
 2. Barclay wrote to Grey saying: "To let the Shah know whom he should appoint is only giving him a fair chance, and our suggestions might be made quite privately. It should at any rate be made quite clear to him that the appointment of Naser al-Mulk is a sine qua non of financial assistance from either Powers. Naser-al-Mulk would, I believe, be willing to take office if he received a hint from us." Barclay to Grey, March 21, 1909, No. 174, FO 416/39.

Justice. Farmāfarmā the powerful Prince already mentioned in previous chapters was given the post of Minister of the Interior. Mokhber al-Douleh was retained as Minister of Posts and Telegrams.

Most historians such as Doulatābādī, Malekzādeh and Kasravī believed that Moḥammad 'Alī Shah was not sincere and that sooner or later he would have tried to overthrow the Constitution. They felt that foreign interference would have increased and the Cabinet led by Sa'd al-Douleh was rightly seen as the example of such interference. It was believed generally that the Shah had wanted the Russians to occupy Tabriz.

With the fall of Tehran on 26th Jamādī al-Šānī (13th July), the Shah took refuge in the Russian Legation, thereby forfeiting his throne. The eldest son of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah, Aḥmad Mīrzā, then about 12 years of age, was recognized as Shah, 'Aẓad al-Molk an old Qajar Prince being made Regent. He was respected and acted in an unassuming way and was the best choice under the circumstances. A period of confusion and chaos now ensued about which we possess little information, however, an overlapping of authority and divided responsibility seem to have added fuel to the fire, and worsened the confusion.

A new Cabinet with Sepahdār as Minister of War and Prime Minister and Sardār As'ad as Minister of the Interior was set up.¹ In order to be able to have executive authority before the Majles met. A Council of State called

1. For a complete list of the members see M. Malekzādeh Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 6, p. 92.

Majles-e 'Ālī with the membership of about five hundred people was also set up representing the Aṣnāf, Tojjār, the Nationalist leaders, the A'yān and princes. This body chose the Cabinet but as it was too large to be effective a smaller Committee was set up called the Hey'at-e Modīreh, also referred to as the Directoire. Some of the Cabinet members were also made members of the Directoire, notably Sardār As'ad and Sepahdār; but the relationship between the Cabinet and the Directoire was somewhat hostile. Sepahdār in particular often acted independently. Barclay wrote to Grey in September that he thought Sepahdār even acted against that body and that the Russian Minister had told him confidentially that Sepahdār had begged him to prevent any money being advanced to it. But he concluded that he did not consider there was a very great divergence between the Cabinet and the Directoire.¹ In October however, he wrote that the Cabinet no longer had the backing of the Directoire as before.² The workings of the Directoire were secret³ and not much is known about the politics behind the scene.

With the arrival of Taqīzādeh and Tarbiyat from

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1. Barclay to Grey, September 9th, 1909, No. 168, FO 416/41.
 2. Ibid., October 7th, No. 186.
 3. Iran-e Nou mentions this secrecy, saying that it was unconstitutional to conduct affairs in secret. In another issue, dated 13th Sha'bān, it said that people were losing hope as the Hey'at-e Modīreh was acting arbitrarily. On the 28th of the same month it gave news of its resignation because it could not see eye to eye with the Cabinet. Iran-e Nou, No. 18, 28th Sha'bān 1327 (12th September 1909).

Tabriz, the composition of the Directoire took on a different complexion. They were made members of the Directoire and gradually managed to obtain power for a small number of their followers, thus leading that body. According to Doulatābādī, Hoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb, Ḥakīm al-Molk, Soleymān Mīrzā and Vahīd al-Molk were with him.¹ Another group composed of Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh, 'Alī Moḥammad Vazīrzādeh, Asadallāh Khān Kordestānī, Nāṣer al-Eslām Gīlānī, Mīrzā 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī the author's brother, and Moḥammad Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabā'ī opposed the former group. Apparently Sardār As'ad and Sepahdār were in sympathy with this group. They were joined later by Mīrzā Moḥsen, the son-in-law of Behbahānī, and Sardār Moḥīī one of the Mojāheds of Gilan.

Just as there had been conflicts and tensions during exile and in Tabriz, so now there appeared the same conflicts amongst the members of the Directoire, especially between the ministers and the extremists assembled round Taqīzādeh. But it must be remembered that in fact this conflict had arisen much earlier during the First Majles and was over fundamental issues of policy and the general principle and concepts of the Revolution.

One immediate cause of this conflict at this juncture centred around the leadership of the Mojāhedīn which was disputed between Sardār Moḥīī and 'Alī Moḥammad.

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 3, p. 120.

Whichever side won the leadership of the Mojāhedīn would naturally wield power in Tehran.

The early issues of Iran-e Nou point to the troubles existing between the Mojāhedīn, and also accused the reactionaries of sewing discord. It also points to the behaviour of the Mojāhedīn which was far from ideal. They were armed, irresponsible and had no single leader.¹

'Alī Moḥammad Tarbīyat,² a relative of Taqīzādeh, had been very active during the Revolution of Gilan when he led the Mojāhedīn, and was appointed head of the Committee of Mojāhedīn organized in Ramāzān (September) in Tehran. He tried to organize the Mojāheds into a proper orderly group and Iran-e Nou reported that a War Commission was set up to register their names and to listen to their complaints. Each one was given a card to show he was registered and the name and number of his gun was also taken

1. No doubt some of these armed fighters had become a nuisance. For instance in No. 13 of Iran-e Nou, dated 22nd Sha'bān (8th September), we read that a man called 'Alī Mojāhed had been executed for killing 'Abbās Mojāhed in Rasht. In No. 12, it stated that a fight had broken out when Mehdī Khayāt had killed two people in the Tehran Bāzār. In the same month it quoted from the newspaper Sorūsh, published in Egypt, saying that a Mojāhed's duty was to fight for freedom, but that he should expect nothing in return.

2. See page 306.

down. They were also organized into brigades and made to exercise and an attempt was made to discipline them.¹

It was also agreed that they should be paid a salary. As already mentioned, the position of 'Alī Moḥammad seems to have been one of the causes of the split of the Mojāheds.

There were attempts to reconcile these two sides and a meeting was held in Bahārestān on 26th Ramaḏān (September) to discuss their programme. On the 27th of the same month another meeting was held in the Park-e Atābak to discuss the same topic, as reported by Iran-e Nou, but it is not clear whether the same groups were involved or another one. The existence of the Caucasians amongst the Mojāhedīn complicated the issue, especially as they occasioned the wrath of the Russians. Later the Majles made plans to include as many Mojāheds as wished in the army, and to disband the rest. This move, however, was delayed despite the legislation of the Majles, until the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī.

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 9, 17th Sha'bān 1327 (3rd September 1909). It added that all the Mojāhedīn received equal pay from the Sephadār down, and that their funds had been collected by taxes, donation or sequestration. The connection of some with Baku is obvious. On the 5th Ramaḏān (21st September) Iran-e Nou, No. 24 wrote that the list of the expenses of the Mojāhedīn had been received from Baku but that it abstained from printing it.

The Directoire was but an interim arrangement created in a period of national crisis. With the re-establishment of a modicum of stability thoughts soon turned to the reconvening that had always been at the heart of the Constitutional movement, the Majles. Even before the fall of Moḥammad 'Alī there had been an attempt to negotiate a new electoral law.

It was negotiated in Jamadī-al-Šānī 1327 (June, 1909), between the Government of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah and the Anjoman of Tabriz, to which all the other provincial Anjomans delegated their power.¹ This law was enacted in haste and was a compromise which was reached between the Shah and the Anjoman of Tabriz. These new electoral laws differed from the first in many respects. The number of Deputies was decreased to 120. The class basis whereby the princes, Ulama, Aṣnāf, Tojjār and A'yān were each separately represented, was abolished. Instead each province or town constituency was to elect three times the number of representatives required and these were to appoint the necessary number of Deputies of each constituency. The age of the electors was lowered from 25 to 20 and the property qualification was fixed at 250 Toman tax. If the elector was an educated person these property qualifications were unnecessary. One previous disqualifying

1. The chief representatives of the Government in the Committee of twenty appointed to elaborate the electoral law were Moshīr al-Douleh, Mo'tamen al-Molk, Šanī'al-Douleh, Farmānfarmā, Hoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb and Mostashār al-Douleh.

condition had been bad character; this was now changed to a proof of religious belief with the religious authorities.¹

One important and significant difference from the First Electoral law was the lowering of the number of Deputies for Tehran from 60 to only fifteen, which no doubt was done to satisfy the Shah; on the other hand Azarbaijan was allotted 20 instead of 12 seats. By introducing the two degree election and lowering the number of Deputies of Tehran it might have been hoped the Majles would be more easily dominated. On the other hand it was hoped that by the abandonment of the class basis and the lowering of the condition for being elected a more democratic representation would be possible. But as it turned out the general formation of the Majles was less democratic than before as the Aṣnāf Deputies who formed the lowest class in the First Majles were not represented.

1. H. Taqīzādeh, "Kholāṣeh-ye Tārīkh-e Advār-e Mashrūṭīyyat dar Iran", Maqālāt, 5, part 2, p. 29.

2. The new electoral laws held the same stipulation as the first, namely that whenever a Deputy died or resigned the Majles could elect new Deputies in his stead. This clause in fact gave the E'tedāliyyūn the occasion to bring into the Majles more of their own supporters. Indeed, besides Soleyman Mīrzā and 'Alīzādeh, all the 23 Deputies elected by the Majles were E'tedālī with one or two Ettefāq va Taraqqī and Tarqqīkhāhān or Liberals. (This clause was abrogated in the third electoral law)

The Democrats made strong objections because as a minority party they could not use the occasion to bring their own adherents to the Majles. According to Hāj' Ez al-Mamālek in a private interview, the Ettefāq va Taraqqī the E'tedāliyyūn and Liberals compromised and arranged for their own adherents to be elected. For example, he as the Liberal leader had Entezām al-Ḥokamā, a family doctor and a friend, elected; the E'tedāliyyūn's candidate on this occasion was the son of Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī, and the Ettefāq va Taraqqī's candidate was Moshīr Ḥozūr.

By the time of the dissolution of the Majles all the 120 Deputies had not yet been elected. Besides the number of Deputies varied at different times, and no list is really expressive of the number of Deputies in the Majles at one time. Some left to receive government appointments, some never took their seats and some died to be replaced by others elected by the Majles. In the Second Majles, the minorities, Zoroasterians, Jews and Armenians each had one Deputy.¹ The tribes too were represented, the Bakhtiyārīs, Qashqā'īs² and Turkomans had a deputy in the Majles. The Ulama too were represented according to the Supplementary Fundamental Laws which decreed the election of five representatives of the Ulama to the Majles.

According to the classification one authority has made of the deputies, 22 were of the Ulama class, 18 were landowners, or ^{former} government employees and merchants. There were several newspaper reporters and doctors and 4 princes. An interesting fact, and one which was a growing characteristic

1. The Armenian Deputy, Mīrzā Yāns, was the representative of the whole Armenian community, but the Armenians in Esfahan claimed a second representative, though nothing was done about this in this session. Mīrzā Yāns, a Dāshnāk, was an employee in the Customs and a translator. He was personally of the opinion that the minorities should not be represented separately and that as Persians they should all vote together, but no attention was paid to this proposition.
2. It was said of the Qashqā'ī deputy that he had been sent as an agent to collect information rather than to represent his tribe. M.G. Demorgny, Essai sur L'Administration de la Perse, (Paris 1913), p. 31.

in Persian parliamentary life, was the ascendancy of the Malākīn, government employees, and especially the Ulama,¹ which naturally gave the Majles a conservative character, an unforeseen development which must have been far from the aim of Taqīzādeh and the Anjoman of Tabriz.

Only about twenty of the Deputies of the First Majles were re-elected. Some now changed their ideas or policy, for instance Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh, Momtāz al-Douleh and Vakīl al-Tojjār, who joined the E'tedālīyūn. On the other hand Ṣadīq Ḥaẓrat became a Democrat. Amongst those re-elected were four Democrats, Taqīzādeh, Ḥakīm al-Molk, Farshī, and Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb. Ṣanī'al-Douleh and Voṣūq al-Douleh, though not amongst the Democrats were considered liberals (to be distinguished from the Liberal party). Naṣr al-Molk, son of Ṣanī'al-Douleh's brother, Mokhber al-Molk, was also re-elected, as were the princes Asadallāh Mīrzā, and Yahyā Mīrzā Lesān al-Ḥokamā and Vakīl al-Ro'āyā an influential merchant.

Despite this small number of deputies returned to the Second Majles, their presence gave the Majles a sense of continuity. Of the old Committee of Enqelāb there were now Ḥakīm al-Molk, Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb, Mosāvāt, Taqīzādeh, Seyyed Jalīl Ardabīlī, Seyyed 'Abd al-Raḥīm Khalkhālī, Mīrzā Dāvūd Khān 'Alīābādī and Mīrzā Maḥmūd Nejāt, elected as Democrat deputies shows that the Committee

1. Shajī'ī, op.cit., p. 185.

had remained active. Nonetheless, a large number of deputies were new to the Majles without past experience of parliamentary life.

Only 27 out of the 120 deputies were Democrats, and given the bias in favour of Azarbaijan in the electoral law, it is not surprising that 12 of the Democrats were from that province. Some of them like Khīyābānī, Kozāzī and Nobarī had fought in the war. Of the other Democrats three were elected by the Majles, two were from Khorasan and two from Kermanshah, while three were from Semnan, Shahrud and Khonsar. An interesting fact is that none of the Deputies from Gilan, or Esfahan were Democrats, although the Democrats had committees in these two cities. This fact must be due to an exercise of influence by Sepahdār and Sardār As'ad in the elections. On the other hand, the elections of Khorasan could have been influenced by Heydar Khan who had been there, and Soleyman Mīrzā, it must be remembered, had been active earlier in organizing a branch of the Jāme'-e Ādamīyat in Kermanshah.

The political groups which now appeared as parties were not divided strictly on class lines. Amongst the Democrats there were two princes, several newspaper writers and landowners, a few whose fathers were merchants, and above all there were amongst them a considerable number of Mo'amam or religious Deputies. These were none of the great Mojtaheds or religious leaders but were nonetheless trained in religion. The stand these men took in politics,

especially their socialist policy which was justified on Eslamic grounds, was done genuinely and not out of expediency. It was a natural justification as Eslam was an all comprehensive religious ideology it had to be adjusted to other ideologies.

Though there were two princes and several landowners amongst the Democrat party, none were of the very famous or rich. The Democrats maintained that political parties were representative of class divisions and thereby each party upheld its own class interest. For instance in a controversy with Farmānfarmā who as Minister for War was criticized by the Democrats, Iran-e Nou wrote that men like him could never be invited to the party because they could never agree to forego their interests; in particular they could never accept equality. This was not strictly true as the Democrats supported such men as Mostoufī al-Mamālek or Ṣanī'al-Douleh who had liberal ideas, but were of the ruling class.¹

1. Iran-e Nou, which published its first number on the 7th Sha'bān 1327 (24th August 1909) pointed to this and asked for the punishment of the reactionaries who had so harmed the Majles. It added a theme which was often to be repeated, that jobs must be given to young Nationalists not to the same old class. If the former system prevailed there would be no improvement. It added that the influence of such people should be lessened and that Taqīzādeh was right to say that he was surprised at the destiny of men like Farmānfarmā during reactionary and constitutional days: "This Ṭabaqeh has all the luck and is always in the highest degree of mastery and with full bags and erect necks never disappear and are the owners of everything." It added that a true Nationalist was not to be rich and he had to have a conscience. Iran-e Nou, No. 35, 20th Ramażān 1327 (6th October 1909). This point was mentioned by the Ettefāq va Taraqqī party as well.

The Democrats' basic weakness lay in the fact that they neither had the support nor the sympathy of the very rich nor much contact with the lower class whose cause they defended. They were a small group but because of their organization, and because of their consistent ideology, they were stronger than would be expected and not only influenced in the course of events but played a very decisive part in them. As a contrast Marling described the moderates as a "leaderless but rather silent mass of members".¹

In contrast to the Democrats, it is difficult to be precise about the other parties E'tedāliyūn and the smaller ones. These joined a coalition to make up the majority party in the Majles in Şaffar 1329 (February 1911), called the Hey'at-e Mo'talefeh which will be discussed later. There were several neutral Deputies as well. Before discussing the influence of the political parties on the course of events, we must look at the ideologies of these parties and their organization, as far as available documents allow.

1. Marling to Grey, May 15th 1910, No. 74, FO 371/950.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL PARTIES: IDEAS, TACTICS, POLICIES

With the opportunities that their stronger representation in the new Majles gave them, the Democrats were faced with a need to reconsider some of their basic precepts as well as tactics they had adopted in the First Majles. Whereas the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn had been a secret organization with armed Fadā'īs, the Democrat party became an official party, which especially wished to live down the stigma of the revolutionary connections it had had in the past. It called itself Democrat or 'Āmīyūn, the name of Socialist or Ejtemā'īyūn being dropped from its name for the same reason cited. Two months after the Majles met, the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn party declared itself abolished and stated that no one could claim membership of this party. Inevitably in endeavouring to make this transition and to reformulate their ideas they have been open to a number of different interpretations or misrepresentations. The British for example, considered them and described them as extreme nationalists, without properly finding what they meant by this. The later Tūdeh party rejected association with them though it is possible to see the Democrats and before them the Āzādīkhāhān and the Komīteh-ye Enqelāb in the First Majles as being the genuine antecedents of the later Communist party. They themselves maintained their

contacts with the Russian Social Democrats. The Persian Democrat Party of Persia must be likened to Parliamentary Socialist parties which developed in the West and not the revolutionary Communist party which gained power in Russia in 1917. Their aim was to introduce Socialism gradually through the Majles. But it must be pointed out that much of their programme was based like that of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn on the Social Democrats' programme, and their tactics and organization were those of the Bolshevik party. In reality, however, they compromised. In fact some of their arguments were unorthodox or controversial, as for instance their justification of their programme on Eslamic or Nationalist grounds, but here too they show one of the dilemmas of Communism in colonial or semi-colonial countries. Indeed, their contemporary rivals looked upon them as Socialists and Revolutionaries and they even produced a programme to counter them.

The members of the Democrat party included intellectuals, Ulama, richer bourgeois, civil servants and two royal princes. One writer points out that they were not all Socialists;¹ in fact it is difficult to say that all the Democrat Deputies understood Socialism.² However, years later Soleymān Mīrzā was elected leader of the Tūdeh or

1. E. Abrahamian, "Social Basis of Iranian Politics", (unpublished thesis), pp. 181-3.

2. S. Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran, (California, 1960), p. 71.

Communist party in 1941,¹ and Heydar Khān worked closely with the Communists in Persia. The Democrats could not form a government and had to work with liberals such as Mostoufī al-Mamālek or Şanī'al-Douleh. Besides they were never in a position of policy-making; their activity was limited to criticism and keeping watch on the majority party.

The sources for the study of the ideology of the Democrats are several; first there is the programme,² Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Ferqeh-ye Sīyāsī-ye Demokrāt-e Iran, 'Āmīyūn.³

1. A speech by one of the Democrats is given below to illustrate some of the arguments put forward to justify their policy. Sheykh Mohammad Khīyābānī said in the Majles that the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn or Socialists began by gaining many adherents in Azarbaijan, those who were Āzādīkhāh (meaning Nationalist) joined them until they realized what Socialism meant, then left and now there were very few Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn left. Then he added that he joined the Democrats but could not agree with all their programme, especially if they wished to establish a republic. What they should do was what religion had decreed, namely the reform of the country. Then he added that the laws of Persia could not be changed and no party should say that laws should be changed because these laws were Eslamic and unchangeable. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 215, 23rd Şafar 1329.
2. According to 'A. Gharavī this Marāmnāmeḥ was published in 1328 (1910). The copy consulted by me is the fourth edition, dated 1329. A. Gharavī, Hezb-e Demokrāt-e Iran dar Doureh-ye Dovvom-e Majles-e Shourā-ye Mellī, (Tehran, 1352), p. 64.
3. The programme of the Democrat political party of Iran.

It has a short preamble and several chapters on political organization, civil rights, electoral laws, the reform of the judiciary, religious and educational questions, national defence and economic principles. This Marāmnāmeḥ was probably written by Rasūlzādeh for the style and ideas are similar to those of another pamphlet called Tanqīd-e Ferqeh-ye E'tedālīyūn yā Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn¹ by Rasūlzādeh which is a criticism of the Moderates.

The Marāmnāmeḥ states that Persia was a backward feudal country, that she lacked the means to effect the necessary changes and that the rivalry of foreign capital weakened her. The Democrat party, it said, was organized by the intellectuals and the liberals to put power into the hands of the common people who were the majority of the population.

This programme is much more complete than the Baku or the Mashed programme but it also combines ideas from each. Under the Chapter on political organization it emphasized that there should be one Majles, the elections should be direct and they should abolish all class distinctions. The Ministers were to be responsible to the Majles, and should be selected from amongst the Deputies.

The second Chapter of the programme concerned civil laws and it guaranteed the equality of all before the law. The third Chapter concerned the electoral laws

1. Criticism of the Moderate party or the Socialist Moderates..

and the fourth the judicial situation. The fifth Chapter advocated compulsory education and paid attention to women's education as well. This chapter also concerned clerical questions and is important because it advocated the separation of spiritual from temporal powers, a clause not included in the Mashad programme which was now to provoke many doubts and questions. The Baku programme of 1905 advocated freedom of religion and equality of all before the law.

The next Chapter concerned military affairs, and called for compulsory military service. The most important and complete part, and one which was an improvement on both the Baku and Mashad programmes, concerned economic affairs and deserves fuller treatment. It is interesting also because it makes certain concessions with regard to the conditions of Persia, and has been misinterpreted, as for instance clauses one and three. The Baku programme (like the Bolshevik programme) had advocated that land should belong to the person who cultivated it. The Mashad programme and also that of the Democrats is milder and it was said that government lands Khāleseh should be divided between the peasants, and the land which belonged to the landlords should be bought by agricultural banks and then be divided between the peasants. Nonetheless it prohibited many of the privileges of the landlords and was no doubt abhorred by this class.

The economic clauses of the Marāmnāmeh of the

Democrats were as follows:

1. Direct taxation was preferable to indirect taxation, but despite this, indirect taxation was necessary for the development and advancement of internal industry and would be maintained.

2. Taxation was to be adjusted to income.

3. The maintenance of concessions which concerned the source of the people's nourishment.

4. The gradual abolition of pensions.

5. All pious endowments to be placed under the supervision of the Government and the income from them to be spent on education and charity.

6. The abolition of forced labour or work without remuneration.

7. The nationalization of all rivers, pastures, jungles or mines.

8. The prohibition of mercenary work or child labour under 14 years.

9. The limitation of work from twenty four hours to ten hours.

10. A compulsory and public rest day once a week.

11. The imposition of safety and public health in all factories.

12. The prohibition of hoarding by the imposition of heavy taxation.

13. The dealings of landlords with the peasants concerning all kinds of debts, or other rights of the landlords,

also the dealings of the government concerning all matters of taxation and military service, to be under one equal law in all Persia.

14. The abolition of all kinds of taxes and impositions or burdens by landlords on peasants, under whatever name, other than their lawful rights.

15. The government of landlords in their lands, and their judgement of civil offences or crimes of any kind to be prohibited and to be conducted by Government officials.

16. The prohibition of the eviction or the exile of peasants from their homes.

17. The division of government lands Khāleṣeh among the peasants and landowners, and the organization thereof for the landlords' estates by the establishment of agricultural banks in the provinces and by giving precedence to peasants to buy first.

Another important source of information about the Democrat party is the Oṣūl-e Demokrāsī. It is a discussion and justification of the Democrats' programme from an Eslamic point of view. The author of the Oṣūl who is anonymous, begins by stating that he wished to discuss the term democracy which had been used recently in the Parliament of Ottoman Turkey and the Persian Majles. He believed that Democracy was the most just and best ideology in the world and was in accordance with Eslam. People were naturally divided into two major classes, the rich and the poor. The rich wanted to keep their privileges through the Majles. They had a moderate policy

and were called either Conservatives or Moderates. The other class wished to regain their rights and achieve justice and equality. This group was called Democrat or Liberal.

Eslam, says the author, overthrew inequality; the prophet used to sit on the ground and eat with the poor. Later these principles were lost sight of, but the Westerners who fought the Moslems in the Crusades learnt these principles from them and practised them. So today they were strong, while the Moslems were weak. It was necessary to form a party to defend these principles, and people must understand the party's programme so that they could choose their representatives; otherwise the poor would be deceived by the rich. The differences between the two sides had nothing personal about it, and was like the difference of ideas between two Mojtaheds over religious problems and the people should know that the aim of the Democrats was to restore the principles of Eslam.

The Oṣūl then discussed and explained the points of the programme. A constitutional monarchy was opposed to absolutism. In an absolute monarchy the king was all powerful; but in a constitutional monarchy the laws stood between the Monarch and the people. The Democrat party believed that Eslam had made everyone equal with equal rights, and everyone should have the right to choose his representatives. All privileges, titles and signs must

be abolished. No one should enjoy exemption from the law, from taxation or from army service. All powers must be assembled in the hands of the Majles which must be supreme. There should be no Senate; everyone who accepted Eslam should oppose the Senate because it was based on inequality. The Oṣūl then discussed the equality of all before the law, regardless of nationality and religion. It said the only time when religion would be taken into consideration was in marriage and inheritance. It also discussed the liberties of the press and of association, the right to strike, and the right to have a day of rest, stating that these articles were included in their programme because in some countries these rights had been forbidden or were non-existent. Judicial power was to be separate from the Executive and the judges who passed judgement should not execute it.

As already mentioned, one of the important points of the Democrat's programme which was lacking in that of the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn was their suggestion that spiritual and temporal powers should be separate. The Oṣūl defended this point at some length since it could cause misunderstanding, it said. The religion of Eslam was not attached to any particular class; all who had knowledge and were virtuous could take care of religious questions. This was not limited to a class or group. Anyone who had knowledge and virtue could act as an Emām Jom'eh or a Mojtahed or Judge. This had been the case until the advent of the

'Abbāsīds. They separated spiritual from temporal powers and politics and appointed the judges to act on religious questions. Gradually there appeared a group known as the Ulama.¹

When a Shi'ite monarchy appeared matters changed. According to the Shi'ite religion, during the absence of the Emām, legitimate government was in the hands of the Ulama who had all the necessary qualities, but this did not mean that in every town and village the Ulama should govern. In any case the Shi'ite kings looked after certain matters such as defence, taxation, etc., the Ulama taking care of other matters such as justice, endowments, education and religion. The separation between these two powers was not in actual fact effected completely. The king and his representatives interfered in religious matters, and the Ulama interfered in affairs of state. No one, according to the Oṣūl, would doubt the benefit of such a proposal which was the maintenance of the principles of Eslam and no one would question the fact that the rivalry between these two powers was working to the detriment of the country.

1. The E'tedālī newspaper Majles attacked this point saying it was the negation of the bases of Eslamic law which unlike Christianity had laws for everything dealing with temporal and spiritual affairs. The Democrats had taken this article from Europe which had no bearing on Persian conditions, it added. Majles, No. 102, 22 Jamādī al-Šānī 1329 (21st June 1911).

The next section dealt with the necessity of free and compulsory education, emphasizing the need to educate women. Women, it said, should be educated in matters such as the upbringing of children and the dangers of superstition and ignorance.

The need for military service was also discussed. Then it said that taxes should be direct and privileged people should pay as well as the poor. As matters stood, it said, those who had more than 100,000 Tomans paid nothing, whilst the peasants who had nothing paid all the taxes. The Oṣūl advocated a better organization regarding religious endowments and said that their proceeds should be used for educating the children of the poor. Forced labour was to be abolished because it was un-Islamic; rivers, jungles and mines were to be nationalized, work for children under fourteen was to be forbidden. Working hours were to be limited. Fridays were to be set aside for prayers, and factories should be made safe for workers.

The Democrats' economic programme was discussed at great length by the Oṣūl, basing the argument on Islamic grounds, but as we have already mentioned it in the section concerning the Marāmnāmeḥ, we shall omit it here.

The third major source for the study of the Democrats' political philosophy is the newspaper Iran-e Nou¹.

1. E.G. Browne calls this "the most important and best known of all the Persian newspapers". Iran-e Nou was first owned by Seyyed Moḥammad Shabestari, known as Abū al-Ẓiyā, and was financed by an Armenian called Basil. Abū al-Ẓiyā was previously editor of the Al-Ḥadīd and 'Edālat in Tabriz and also the Mojāhed. Iran-e Nou was confiscated several times, especially because of its violent

edited by Rasūlzādeh. Rasūlzādeh was the party theoretician and he had a great influence on the formulation and explanation of the Democrat Party's ideology.¹ He was a Marxist and believed in the Marxist conceptions of society, of parties, of history of economic and social reform. He was also a protagonist of Nationalism and put great emphasis on the role of Nationalists in saving Persia. He argued that the Russians and British were united on all points. The reactionaries in Persia who wanted to keep their privileges helped the foreign enemies of Persia and opened the way for them. If Persia was reformed and became strong the foreigners could not gain any ascendancy. It was up to the people, the downtrodden

Footnote continued from previous page.

anti-Russian attacks. It also went out of circulation for several months owing to financial difficulties. Then it reappeared as the official organ of the Democrat party which financed it and Seyyed Mehdī Afcheh'ī became its owner. The editor and chief writer of Iran-e Nou was Moḥammed Amīn Rasūlzādeh. He had been a member of the Hemmat in the Caucasus, where he had written for the newspapers Takāmol and Ershād. He came to Rasht in 1908 and later went to Tehran. Rasūlzādeh helped found the Democrat party and was one of its leaders, but was eventually forced to leave in Jamādī al-Avval 1329 (May, 1911). E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, 1914), p. 52.

1. There is, I think, little doubt that many of the articles in this paper were written by Rasūlzādeh. Although he rarely signed his name, much that appears in these articles is a repetitious explanation and development of the themes put forward in the Tanqīd or are Marxist themes not too familiar in Persia.

exploited people, to obtain their economic and social rights and save the country. The rich would not lift a finger to save her. The Democrats were the representatives of the poor and defended their rights.

Here brief mention must be made of Leninist opinion and his most famous declaration made in 1913 on Imperialism. Lenin's pamphlet entitled Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism in which he stressed the fact that the Social Democrats should not only defend the right of the proletariat but also help to emancipate them from colonial rule. However in 1908 he paid special attention to the Persian Revolution, and that of Turkey and China, and publicized the fact that a movement for freedom was growing and spreading in Asia. He declared the role that Socialism was to play in this new development of colonial and semi-colonial countries and described how any such movement should be utilized for the ultimate aim of combatting Capitalism. He said that the bourgeois Capitalists would ally with the Imperialists, it was therefore imperative to overthrow one in order to overthrow the other.

The emphasis Rasūlzādeh puts on Nationalism as an arm of Socialism is in keeping with this aspect of Leninist thought and is specially interesting, for it shows us the man who in 1917 organized the Mosāvat Party of the Caucasus, aimed at uniting all the Moslems and aiding them in their struggle for independence. No doubt Rasūlzādeh's experience in Persia against Russo-British Imperialism influenced him

somewhat in the steps he took. Later he came to believe that Eslam could become the rallying cry to save them from Imperialism.

It is important to point out that at the time when Persia was at grips with the problems of Imperialism two of the leaders of its progressive party were two Russian subjects, Rasūlzādeh and Heydar Khān. It seemed logical that to fight reaction was to fight Imperialism, and by fighting Imperialism they would be dealing a blow at the reactionary Tsarist regime which all Social Democrats wanted to overthrow. This fact however, was a weakness on the part of the Democrats, and the E'tedālīs attacked them often, pointing out that those who expressed themselves as Nationalists were not even Persians.¹

On the question of Imperialism the Persian Democrats were adamant.² They believed that only a strong stand against Russia and Britain was the answer to all their aggressions, and that if the Persian Government stood its ground the Imperialists would back down. Iran-e Nou wrote

1. The newspaper Majles, the organ of the E'tedālīs, often pointed to the fact that Rasūlzādeh was not Persian, even insinuating he might be a spy. Majles, No. 112, 6th Rajab 1329 (3rd July 1911); also No. 26, 3rd Zīhājeh 1328 (6th December 1910).

2. Iran-e Nou blamed the Persians for their lack of Nationalism and blamed the Imperialists for keeping them backward. In one article it said Persians were selfish, their Nationalism meant their own individual benefit, and equality and freedom was for them personal freedom.

that they had some hope based on Marxist ideas that Capitalism created its own downfall by engendering thoughts of liberty. This was why Japan and Turkey had escaped Western Imperialism it said. The Democrats warned the Majles which was about to be opened, that Persia's independence hung on a string and that the Russian army of occupation must be made to evacuate.¹

The Democrats' main attack was concentrated on the Russians, especially because they were occupying Persia. Their attitude to the British differed somewhat; indeed the attitude of the Persians towards the British and their expectations also differed. For instance, it was to the Imperial Bank they turned for a loan after the negotiations for the loan from the International Syndicate failed, as will be described later. But the Democrats in general feared the British too, and often pointed out that they were the allies of Russia. Their attitude to the Germans was reserved, but they were aware of the difficulties which could be incurred by approaching that power. In general, the Democrats' foreign policy was based upon a strong and independent policy, and they argued their case well, but whether such a policy was feasible or mere idealism is a question which we shall deal with later.

Rasūlzādeh believed in a process of evolution

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 67, 1st Zīqa'deh 1327 (5th November 1909).

from a barbaric state to the Capitalist state of the twentieth century. The development of the world never ceased for there was an iron law of progress. This is indeed a Marxist idea of the process of growth of mankind¹ which he put forward. On one occasion the paper took up the theme of the change in the mode of production, and said that each time a new discovery was made new thoughts and new political ideas appeared and even a new vocabulary was made. For instance, when a railway was built, the donkey driver would take a job as railway porter; he would thus acquire new thoughts and learn new things.²

Despite these claims, there is ample evidence that Rasūlzādeh and his colleagues believed in Revolution. In an article entitled The Philosophy of Revolution published in Iran-e Nou, in Zīqa'deh 1328 (November 1910) it said that the great founder of Socialism, Karl Marx, had said that National revolution was the broomstick which sweeps the dirt from society. Those who supported Constitutionalism and progress but declared themselves opposed to a National revolution showed their ignorance of historical truth. They were ignorant and basically reactionaries. Revolution was the elixir of progress and development. A revolution could only occur when all its requisites were ready, but it concluded saying that in the case of Persia

1. R.C. Tucker, The Marxist Revolutionary Idea, (London, 1969), p. 218.

2. Iran-e Nou, No. 207, 8th Jamādī al-Avval 1328 (18th May 1910).

none of the requisites were present either culturally, socially, economically or politically. The Persian Revolution had occurred before its time, and the bourgeois Capitalist class did not understand its role; it hardly existed as a class in fact. The main reason which had triggered the Persian Revolution was Russo-British Imperialism. The Persian Revolution was in reality a Nationalist revolution - Persians were at grips with internal reactionaries and external Imperialists. The only possibility of progress was by the employment of foreign experts and the Government was at fault for not speeding the employment of foreign experts, despite the fact that the Majles had voted in its favour.

Rasūlzādeh believed that Socialism was as yet impossible in Persia. The country was backward with a medieval economy and social structure. It had no bourgeois or Capitalist class and no proletariat; it was impossible to think of the rule of the proletariat as that class did not exist.

The Iran-e Nou also put great emphasis upon another aspect of Marxist thought, which in Persia had more meaning at that time. This was the division of society into two classes, one ruling, the other ruled, and it stressed the existing antagonism or the class war. This theme was repeated by Rasūlzādeh in Tanqīd also. It is full of references to the division of society into two classes and stresses the fact that the ruling class had always tried to

keep the common people down. He asked how the feudal landlords could have the same interests as the peasants. However, they could not stop the course of progress and there was always a tug of war between these two sides. One side was static and conservative, the other was dynamic and liberal. One was darkness, the other was light. Ever since classes had appeared this antagonism had occurred, but it had a positive result as the development of mankind resulted from this class war.

As seen in this exposition of the theories and arguments of the Democrats, they emphasized that they were not aiming at revolution but believed in evolution. As Persia had none of the characteristics necessary for a Marxist revolution which they recognized it can be assumed that the Democrats were in earnest when they claimed that their aim was not revolutionary. However the enemies and rivals of the Democrats accused them of being revolutionaries, which they denied but in fact their theories and their emphasis upon class war had a potentiality of revolution which did not escape notice. Iran-e Nou said in its own defence that if anyone wanted to change Persia's millennial-old ways he was accused of being a revolutionary.¹ The programme of the Democrats had many revolutionary themes such as their attack upon the rich, their plan to

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 54, 16th Shavāl 1327 (31 October 1909).

divide the land between the peasants, their reference to class war and the eventual triumph of the poor. It called the landlords leeches who sucked the blood of the people; such ideas bode nothing good for those who had still through their wealth and influence and family connections, wielded political power and had control over the wealth of the country.

In Shavāl 1327 (October 1909) Iran-e Nou wrote that the Persians were always told to be patient and moderate. These qualities would lead them nowhere. It was patience and moderation which had allowed them to be exploited so long. Perhaps if the common people took matters into their own hands their exploiters would cease their selfishness. In another article entitled Bread Knowledge Liberty it called on the workers who had always been exploited to look only to the Majles as their saviour. The Constitution should be preserved as it guaranteed the equality of all.¹ In a Constitutional country no one was above the law, not even the religious class.² This mention of the religious class is a rare reference; in general writers abstained from much reference to religion. In a vehement article it called attention to the existence of a party in Europe which supported the poor everywhere and ended by saying "Beware of the day when all the poor unite".³

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1. Iran-e Nou, No. 19, 29th Sha'bān 1327 (15th September 1909).
 2. Ibid., No. 243, 28th Jamādī al-Šānī 1328 (6th July 1910).
 3. Ibid., No. 7, 14th Sha'bān 1327 (31st August 1909).

The main argument of the Democrats was however, directed at the Kasabeh and the Tojjār. In many of their resolutions and Entebāhnāmeḥ¹ they made this point clear. For instance they called for the boycott of Russian goods, and especially called on the Tojjār to promote this in order to help the poor. They said that the poor women who made carpets for export worked under very severe conditions. In return for these carpets, tea and sugar and luxury materials were imported. We could do very well without those luxury goods as our ancestors did and help enrich the country by stopping such imports, it said. It pleaded with the Tojjār not to help the foreigners.² In another such proclamation the Democrats called on the Tojjār to remember that they were those who could develop the country, but unfortunately they were ignorant, and were deceived by the foreigners and acted as middlemen. In one of their Entebāhnāmeḥ they called on the Deputies to help promote the boycott.³ The Entebāhnāmeḥ said people were weak and, like minors, they needed leadership. It called on the Deputies' religious and national feelings to help promote the progress of Persia as they were better aware than the common people and warned them of the growing

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1. Entebāh means to awaken from sleep. There were many such proclamations issued declaring their policy. They are signed D.K.T.
 2. Entebāhnāmeḥ, Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh, Not numbered.
 3. Ibid., No. 4.

ascendancy of the Russians. It also called on the Tojjār to help promote national goods.

The problem of class, as already pointed out, was evident to the Socialist theorists. The equivalent of the bourgeois Capitalist class did not exist in Persia. There were the Kasabeh and the Tojjār who might be regarded as the equivalent of the Western Capitalist. However the richer Tojjār were not interested politically and found Socialism obnoxious. The Kasabeh were the ones who could be influenced, although they were generally religious and resisted Socialism. The only hope was to stir the proletariat and peasantry, a near impossible task in Persia. So with a practical sense the Democrats followed Lenin's dictates that first Capitalism and a bourgeois dominated government should be set up and that their role was to help to establish it.¹ The plight of the peasantry and their poverty and the fact that they were exploited by the landlords was also one of the main themes of the Iran-e Nou and the Democrats' programme. According to Iran-e Nou the working class in Persia consisted of the peasantry who created all the wealth of the country but lived in inhuman conditions. All their earnings were taken away by the

1. In an important private resolution issued on 2nd Saraṭān, 1329 by the provincial committee of Azarbaijan 3 months before the legal dissolution of the Majles, they said that they should prepare for the next elections which were going to be direct and one degree and that they must especially work amongst the Bazārīs and Kasabeh and Tojjār and Aṣnāf whom they considered would play a very important role in the elections. Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh (not numbered).

landlords and the Government taxes, whilst the rich hardly worked or paid taxes. It suggested that the peasants should organize their own party.¹

Before the formal creation of political parties, the Iran-e Nou pointed out of their existence and very strongly advocated their formation. One reason was tactical, another being ideological. The Leninist theory was based on working through political parties for it was the way to mobilize and lead.² Rasūlzādeh made this theory applicable to Persia, when the Majles was about to be opened Iran-e Nou he wrote in favour of political parties, saying they were different from partisan politics (partībāzī) of the time of reaction.³ In a pamphlet called What is to be done? Lenin had emphasized the need for a proletarian party, and thus made from the Marxist theory of Socialism a revolutionary party doctrine. A political party was composed of individuals who wished to make their country safe and strong. All people could not agree on everything, therefore they divided according to their ideas, but their ultimate aim was the safety of their country. In the age of Constitutionalism only political parties with an ideology and programme existed, not personal parties.

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 106, 23 Zīhājeh 1327 (6th January 1910).

2. J.E. Connor, ed., Lenin on Politics and Revolution, selected writings (New York, 1968), p. 20.

3. Iran-e Nou No.76, 19th Zīqa'deh 1327 8th Nov. 1909.

Political parties must come into the open and leave off secret politics and people must be able to choose amongst them. The Majles must be the arena of open politics and parties must openly express their aims, wishes and programmes, and as there is freedom of political ideas there should be no secrets. He added that recently a party called Ejtemā'iyūn Enqelābīyūn of Qazvin sent a telegram of congratulation to the Majles, but even the telegraph office should not have accepted it since it did not have a formal signature.

In another article it again insisted that the deputies should make their aims and programmes known ahead of time so people could choose between them. The fact that there were no political parties made the position of the Majles very precarious, even dangerous. Later on as the situation deteriorated and the Government became unstable, Iran-e Nou insisted that the reason was because there was not a stable and fixed majority party in the Majles. The Government should be appointed and backed by the majority of the Deputies, it said; the reform and the function of Parliament depended on the existence of political parties and those people who were opposed to their formation did not understand the true workings of democracy. Political parties represented the aims and wishes of a class and were the political and material expression of it. A political party only came into existence when the political and material needs of a class became evident and were formulated into a programme and

an ideology. A class became a political party when it was organized with a plan of action and programme - that is when the members of the class join it for the defence of their interests. The political parties were the defenders of class interest and characterized their rivalry and political warfare. All parties expressed the political, economic, cultural and social interests of their class and the cleavages in society were reflected in the different political parties. Cabinet Government was only possible when there were political parties and the superior party which was organized first had the better chance of winning the majority of seats in the Majles, but without parties events were like winds shifting the sand from side to side.¹

It also discussed the right-wing and left-wing parties. It said that the right-wing parties represented the rich, the reactionaries and the feudal classes. The parties of the left represented the majority of the population, the poor, the exploited, the workers and peasants. If the Majles identified itself with the right, the workers would be more exploited and progress would stop.²

On the question of political parties the Democrats had two aims and in these the dictates of Lenin and the

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 110, 5th Rabī'al-Avval 1329 (7th March 1911).

2. Ibid., No. 195, 23 Rabī'al-Šānī 1328 (4th May 1910), and also No. 200, 29th Rabī'al-Šānī 1328 (10th May 1910), and No. 207, 8th Jamādī al-Avval (18th May 1910).

Bolshevik tactics were followed. Insistence on the formation of political parties whilst the Democrats were obviously the minority party and would not be able to hold power, was a point of policy in the face of other advantages. For instance, it could mean it would be heard in the Majles and could propagate openly and prepare for the future. The Bolsheviks placed great emphasis on the role of the party, and here too the same policy was followed. Besides, the Democrat party followed the line of all Socialist parties, it was not only meant to win at elections, but it was meant to educate people and indoctrinate them.

One very important doctrine of revolutionary Bolshevism besides What is to be Done? already referred to, was entitled Two tactics published in 1905.¹ This was about the concrete tactics of the party, how to appraise the situation, how to educate the masses and how to lead the party. It dealt with the party's character and method of political activity, and how it was to participate in a bourgeois government and to defend the interest of the proletariat. The Social Democrat members were to keep independent and the members were to be strictly controlled. They were to propagate amongst the broadest number of people and they were to be made aware of their interests. According to the Two tactics the conditions of Russia were not ready for a complete emancipation, so the proletariat were to be educated and trained; only after a democratic

1. "The Two Tactics of Social Democracy and the Social Revolution", Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.9, pp. 15-104.

transformation could the situation be ready for Socialism, so the Social Democrats could participate in a bourgeois government, and work for the development of Capitalism which would prepare the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Therefore the proletariat and peasantry must unite to wage the class war. The tactics outlined in Iran-e Nou are to a considerable degree based on this blueprint.

In Shavāl 1328 (October 1910) the Democrats in Persia published their tactics in Iran-e Nou¹ and although it is not a word for word copy of the Bolshevik Two tactics it is based on this blueprint to a considerable extent and also throws light upon their method of political workings, revealing that they followed their methods as well as their policy. Moreover it shows the position the Democrat party was taking in the Majles and in the country as a whole. The Democrats as seen through this document appear to be a pragmatic party with an optimism in the future, and a concrete and well-defined plan of action which was followed as far as they could to the end of the Majles. It also throws light on their organization, although that is better expressed in their Nezāmnāme. All these plannings, ideological politics and concrete aims are naturally a result of their connection with Bolshevism, and especially due to the person of Rasūlzādeh; and this

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 3, 21st Shavāl 1328 (24th October 1910).

is what makes their programme superior to that of the other parties.

As already pointed out, some tenets of their policy were changed in accordance with Persian conditions and were especially curtailed on questions which had no bearing for Persia. It declared that a party like a battle needed a plan of action. Then it added that these were more appropriate tactics for the present circumstances in Persia. The party believes in the law of progress and gradual development, if it takes strong action it will deviate from its straight line and will not be able to follow its aim; otherwise it will have to use extraordinary powers above the law contrary to the constitution. Such a policy will never be accepted in the name of the general tactic of the party. They argued, that their aim was to reach their political demands as written in the Marāmnāme. All the aims and efforts of the party must be used to propagate and publish its plans to influence the minds and spread thoughts of democracy. "If we think well we shall notice that we can do nothing until we first create thoughts in people's minds. Secondly we must know that we are a party of the future and must not interfere in details of everyday affairs, but must endeavour to propagate the ideology of the party."

As the forces of conservatism and reaction are united and liberalism is in great danger, our party must seek a coalition with other liberal parties such as leftist

parties as soon as possible, otherwise the right-wing parties will be foremost. The central committee of the party must establish friendly relationships with the parties of the left and try to form a coalition. As the Democrat party follows a policy of gradual progress and believes in the philosophy of gradual development, we must only propagate our ideology orally or in writing and use all lawful methods such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets and Entebāhnāmeḥ. We must also send speakers to villages and provinces amongst the tribes to give conferences and organize discussions.

The only way to achieve victory is in the elections of the Majles; therefore we must, without waste of time, and with all our strength, begin to prepare the preliminaries of the elections. We must publish numerous pamphlets to show the importance of the elections, we must discuss and explain our principles and we must attract the thoughts and minds of the people to the party.

As our first thought and wish is the independence of the homeland and its greatness, the party must act according to the first things first principle in all national reforms. At the first opportunity it must use its influence and power to press for the organization of an army for the reform of the finances of the country, for the centralization of the government powers and for the expulsion of the foreign forces.

For the propagation and explanation of the ideology of the party three kinds of people must always be

considered as important and we must seek to educate and influence them as much as possible and move them to win their adherence. They are the Kasabeh, the army and the youth, especially schoolchildren. As our party is the party of the people and the real group of Democrats comprises the workers and peasants the party must lead and work mostly amongst these groups. In order to keep a constant exchange of thoughts and in order to strengthen friendly links, a club will be organized in Tehran so that the members of the party can gather together and benefit from such gatherings.¹ The members of this party must use all such gatherings for the benefit of the Democrat party and to win attention and to invite others to join.

As explained in the tactics, and as often declared by the party in the Majles, the Democrat party accepted its position as a minority party. It hoped and worked for a future victory through the teaching and the preparation of others. The important groups who should be attracted to these ideologies were enumerated and it pointed to the fact that they should seek an alliance with the other parties of the left. This question was brought up in the Majles by Soleymān Mīrzā with regard to the Ettefāq va Taraqqī. The Democrats declared that as they

1. The club mentioned was organized in 1329 and was called the Majma'eh Adab and was the official meeting place of the Democrats. It too published a Nezāmnāme which established the activities and organization of the club. It was to have a library and reading room, to hold weekly conferences on historical, economic and political matters. It was also to organize plays and other recreations.

were the minority party, they were leaving all the legislative duties to the majority and would not oppose it unless they saw that the majority's policy was undermining the essence of the independence of the country, then they would protest officially by all means possible. In the meantime the task of the minority was objectivity and criticism.¹

The Democrats offered one major solution to all the problems which they propagated at great length in Iran-e Nou, that was the organization of the Committee of National Deliverance, Komīteh-ye Nejat-e Mellī. This was suggested by the Central Committee of the Democrats and was published from Zīqa'deh 1328 to Zīhajeh 1328, December 1910.

This was a very difficult period. Behbahānī had been killed, Nāṣer al-Molk had not yet arrived as Regent, the Government of Mostoufī al-Mamālek was under severe pressure by Russia and Britain without the support of the majority of the Majles, no money was forthcoming, the British ultimatum about the lack of security in the south and the Russians' presence in the North caused further insecurity. So the Democrats declared their solution to the problem in the formation of the Committee of National Deliverance. In a series of articles they repeated some of their past arguments on revolution and

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 32, 25th Zīqa'deh 1328 (November 1910).

social classes, and called attention to the great danger surrounding Persia. The parties of the left were not strong or large enough to defend her alone, it said; the only salvation was for other parties of the left, namely the Ettefāq va Taraqqī and the Dāsh nāksūthīyūn, to unite with the Democrats to work for a solution. They could resolve their differences which were all due to the intrigues of the reactionaries. The E'tedāl, it said, had no well-thought-out policy. They were composed of two kinds of people, those who believed in Constitutionalism and those who were reactionaries; the former could also join the leftist parties.¹

Then the article discussed the tribes who were the only true defenders of Persia, and with their armed members could be invited to serve the cause. The Social Democrats believed no revolution was possible without the aid of the tribes. Some of the tribes had helped the cause of the Revolution but usually they were exploited by the reactionaries and the imperialists, as proven by the failure of the Southern Tribes' Union.

Then it added that the policy of the committee would include all the ideological policies of the other parties, and anything which could cause a divergence of

1. It is interesting to point out that the E'tedālīs in response to this invitation suggested a plan for a conference to be held in Persia and in Europe to discuss Persia's problems, to show Persia's rights and to prove her capable of independence. Majles, No. 37, 6th Zīhājeh 1328 (10th December 1910), and No. 38, 9th Zīhājeh (13th December 1910).

opinion would be avoided. Each party would keep its individual programme and only cooperate for the ulterior motive of Persia's safety. The Committee would have full powers and would be separately responsible to each party.¹

In the same way as the tactics were based on the Bolshevik tactics, so were their internal organization and leadership, and here something must be said about this question. The Democrat party was built on the Bolshevik model of a close hierarchy.² The party was composed of Houzeh or branches which were the most fundamental units of the party. Then there were district committees, Komītehhā-yē Maḥalī and above these were provincial conferences, Konferānshā-ye Ayālatī, provincial committees of the general congress, Komītehhā-ye Ayālatī-ye Kongereh-ye 'Omūmī a central committee, Komīteh-ye Markazī and the Parliamentary branch, Sho'beh-ye Pārlemānī. The Nezāmnāmeḥ

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 23, 41 Zīqādeh to Zīḥajeh 1328, (December 1910).

2. Nezāmnāmeḥ was entitled "Qavā'ed va Nezāmnāmeḥ ye Ferqeh-ye Siyāsī-ye Demokrāt-e Iran 'Amīyūn", 1328, 2nd publication 1329. It added that the programme and Nezāmnāmeḥ held good until the next Congress of the Party. The text seems to be a translation, for some sentences are not strictly grammatical, as for instance, p. 17, article 8. The Russian Social Democrat party's organization too consisted of a central organization which included the board of their central organ the Iskra, a central committee, a party council of five responsible to a biennial congress and local organizations responsible to the central committee. E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vol. 1, (London, 1960), p. 30.

Also "Reorganization of the Party" Lenin, Collected Works, vol.10, pp.29-37.

decreed that the Houzeh were to propagate the political ideology of democracy and prepare the ground for gaining power. It then enumerated the conditions for membership and the activities of the Houzeh and its organization at the time of general elections for Parliament, when the Houzeh were to meet as electoral committees and work hard to win votes for the candidates of the party.

The Komīteh-ye Maḥalī was composed of the candidates of the Houzeh elected according to special regulations decreed by the Party Congress or the Central Committee. The members of these Committees, whether in the cities or villages, were to be elected at an annual meeting. Each Committee represented five Houzeh. These Komīteh-ye Maḥalī were to control the Houzeh and to deal with local matters and they could under no circumstances come in touch with other parties. All their discussions and decisions were to be reported to the Central Committee.

All the Houzeh of one province met at an annual provincial conference and elected the provincial Committee. This small congress would discuss and deal with all local problems and try to provide all their needs. This provincial Committee could inspect all the affairs of their locality and report to the Central Committee.

The Party Congress was the ultimate organization and held the legislative power of the party which led the way and decreed all the programmes. The District Conference elected their members to attend the Congress; each fifty members could elect one representative. The

Congress discussed the party affairs and its rules, regulations and tactics. It also proposed the budget and its expenditure. The Congress would elect the Central Committee for a period of one year.

During the period between the meetings of the Congress, the Central Committee was responsible for the affairs of the party. It published the central party newspaper and helped in every way possible the advancement of the aims of the party. It had a special seal and could inspect all the branches. It could make contact with other leftist parties and if necessary form a coalition. It could make contact with any other party but not make any agreement with them. It prepared a yearly budget to submit to the Congress. The parliamentary branch of the party was composed of the party deputies. Each time before the opening of the Majles the Central Committee and the parliamentary branch of the party would meet in order to settle the party programme and tactics for the session and the deputies would follow that line. The parliamentary branch would make an annual report to the Congress.

The Democrats' parliamentary leader was first Taqīzādeh, then Soleyman Mīrzā. The members of the Central Committee were, according to Maḥmūd Maḥmūd (called Mīrzā Maḥmūd Khān at that time),¹ were Taqīzādeh,

1. Maḥmūd Maḥmūd, a later historian, came from Azarbaijan and was a Constitutionalist and a sworn Nationalist. He has left some notes which have been published by

Vahīd al-Molk Sheybānī,¹ Hājī Mīrzā Bāqer Āqā Qafqāzī (a friend and close associate of Ḥeydar Khān) Soleyman Mīrzā, Mosāvāt, Rasūlzādeh, Mīrzā Aḥmad 'Amārlū² and himself Maḥmūd Maḥmūd.³ He does not mention Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb, but Malekzādeh writes that Navvāb was the member and leader of the party's Central Committee.⁴ On the other hand, F. Ādamīyat says Maḥmūd Maḥmūd was the leader of the Democrat's Central Committee. It is rather unlikely however that Maḥmūd Maḥmūd should have been the leader when Ḥeydar Khān who had been associated with

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F. Ādamīyat in Fekr-e Āzādī. He was the person in whose house Ḥeydar Khān took refuge in Rabī' al-Avval 1329 (March 1911) until he was forced to leave Tehran.

1. Vahīd al-Molk was the brother of Moḥammad 'Alī Parvaresh, and had been The Times correspondent in Persia. His support of the Revolution occasioned The Times to cut his salary. He worked with the Nationalists after the Coup d'etat. Iran-e Nou, No. 8, 15th Sha'bān 1327 (1st September 1909).
2. He had been one of the Ulama of Najaf. Amīrkheyzī, op.cit., p. 281.
3. F. Ādamīyat, Fekr-e Āzādī, p. 334.
4. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 6, p. 262.

the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Āmīyūn party from the beginning was in Persia. After Ḥeydar Khān it is possible that Navvāb became the leader of the Central Committee, for the British Minister also names him as one of the leaders after Taqīzādeh.¹

What is not clear is the relationship of the Deputies with the leaders. Some of the leaders or members of the Central Committee were also Deputies such as Taqīzādeh, Soleymān Mīrzā, Vaḥīd al-Molk Sheybānī and Mosāvāt. Did the Deputies lead the Central Committee or was it the reverse? There exist several directives by the Central Committee of the party addressed to the Deputies about how they were to vote in the Majles, which points to the way the system functioned. For instance, on the 22 Zīḥajeh 1328 it was decreed that the relationship of the Democrat party with the Regent, Nāṣer al-Molk, was to be friendly and no opposition was to be made to him as long as the Regent's neutral position had not been undermined or the independence of the country jeopardized.²

A previous resolution issued on the 6th Zīḥajeh decreed that the Central Committee should adopt a neutral policy with regard to the Cabinet of Mostoufī al-Mamālek, and should defend the person of the Prime Minister, Ḥakīm

1. Barclay to Grey, November 3rd 1910, No. 204, FO 371/966.

2. "Qat'nāmeḥ-ye (Resolution) Ferqeh-ye Demokrāt-e Iran".

Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh, No.4 22nd Zīḥajeh.

al-Molk and Hoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb (the latter two were Democrats). Another resolution dated 9th Moḥarram 1329 concerns the rumour of the closing of the judiciary, and brings to the knowledge of all the members the danger of such an act, asking the members of the Houzeh to beware of any attempt to put this into practice because this was the preliminary step to the dissolution of the Majles.¹

The Houzeh of the capital had a temporary central organization called Edāreh-ye Houzeh-ye Pāyetakht which was supposed to coordinate the working of the different Houzehs. It had to meet weekly and a representative of the Central Committee was to attend the meetings.² This organization was to collect the membership fees, try to win members to organize conferences and discussions; it was to act as intermediary between the local Committee of Tehran and the individual Houzeh, and was to be responsible to the local Committee of Tehran.³

1. "Qat'nāmeḥ", Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh, No.2, 7, 6th Zīḥajeh 1328, 9th Moḥarram 1329.

2. The Central Committee naturally addressed many confidential orders to the local Committees. For instance on the 20th Zīḥajeh, 1328 (November 1910) at the time of the British Ultimatum it wrote that the members must beware of the grave danger Persia was in and the very important responsibility of the members, and that they should be specially active and awake. Then it added a warning for the future which was to prove true. It wrote that the party was going to be the target of attack, and that they should meet these attacks with discipline. Democracy was going to be in the forefront of the attacks and all the problems of the country would descend on it. Then all the duties of the Committee were enumerated. Amongst others, they were to further enforce discipline and centralize all activities.

3. "Qat'nameḥ" (Not numbered) 30th Zīḥajeh 1328, Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh.

As the situation was growing more dangerous, it warned the members, especially those in Government employment, not to work openly. The members had to undergo military training and learn the use of firearms, and a list should be made of those members who possessed firearms.¹

So far we have only concentrated on the central organization and programme of the Democrats. A few words must be added about their provincial organizations. In addition to the organization in Tehrān, they had provincial organizations and newspapers in Tabriz, Qazvin, Urumiyeh, Mashad, Rasht, Kermanshah, Esfahan and Hamadan. The Democrat's provincial Committee of Tabriz was very active and several of its Entebāhnāmeḥ existed in the Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādēh. They published the newspaper Shafaq in Tabriz. In Mashad, Ḥeydar Khān set up with Malek al-Sho'arā Bahār the Nou Bahār, and the Ṣedā-ye Gilan and Zāyandehrūd were published in Gilan and Esfahan. In Qazvin a newspaper, Qazvin, was published and in Urumiyeh the Farvardīn.

Despite their comparatively well organized party, the Democrats remained a minority; in fact, they were very much aware of this and matched their policy to their position.² At the same time they continually declared that as a minority party they would criticize and draw attention to

1. "Qat'nāmeḥ-ye Ferqeh-ye Demokrāt-e Iran, Komīteh-ye Ayālatī-ye Azarbaijan." Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādēh, not numbered.

2. In an article in Iran-e Nou it was argued that the Democrats were not in reality a minority party for they should not consider only Tehran, but also the provinces. The provinces had suffered much more through bad government and it was there that oppo-
(Footnote continued on next page)

reform.

The question still remains to what extent this organization was implemented, in any real sense, at a central and provincial level. There are rare instances when we have a glimpse of their actual functioning. For instance on the 20th Shavāl (1st October) Iran-e Nou announced that the elections for the seven members of one of the five Houzeh of Tehran had been held. These seven men with twenty-eight members of the other Houzeh had then elected their district Committee. At the same meeting telegrams of congratulation for Azarbaijan, Hamadan, Kermanshah and Gazvin were read. The report of the work of the Central Committee and the report from the activities of Azarbaijan and Qazvin were also read at this meeting.¹

These policies and tactics and the broad structure of the organization of the Democrat party began to take shape in the first weeks of the fall of the Shah and provided a framework for action in the course of the first month of the new Majles. After the murder of Seyyed

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sition to Moḥammad 'Alī Shah had begun. It added that in civilized countries the number of newspapers was a criterion of modernization and progress, and then it named the party newspapers to prove its strength. Iran-e Nou, No. 15, 13 Rabi'al-Sānī 1329 (13th April 1911).

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 2, Shavāl 1328 (23 October 1910).

'Abdallāh however they became increasingly the object of attacks and were obliged to move cautiously and to emphasise the orthodoxy of their policy from a religious stand. In some respects this represents an extension of the view already forged in the earlier phase, in other ways it marked a departure. The Democrats came under attack for being irreligious and revolutionary, the same accusations as had been made in the First Majles against the Āzādīkhān. Now these attacks were directed against the Democrats with much virulence and Taqīzādeh was at the forefront of these accusations. The murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī in Rajab 1328 (July 1910) which was pinned on him, weakened the party. The Democrats suffered from this event for not only was one of their effective leaders removed, but their name having become associated with the murder of a great Mojtahed, their arguments were discredited and there could be no reconciliation. Their only chance was that in general the religious class was at this time not very active on the political scene and was not as strong as in the First Majles.

As mentioned, the Democrats' programme contained a clause demanding the separation of temporal and spiritual powers. This was not discussed at any length by the Democrats, and in general they seem to have kept clear of the more sensitive religious controversies, but they did try to explain their programme on religious grounds, as we have seen. For instance, in order to

refute the Senate, they argued that Eslam was opposed to aristocracy. In one of their Entebāhnāmeḥ they wrote that the prophet Moḥammad had told his followers to be brave, united and strong and to take the flag of Eslam to the furthestmost corners of the earth, and during the reign of the first four Caliphs this policy was followed. What happened then? Why did Moslems become weak? The reason was that the people did not act according to the dictates of religion. The Prophet did not wear cloth of felt four toman the metre, he did not eat sugar at four Qerān the Man (Persian measures of weight equal to 3 kilos). He used to say "my dress is so patched that I feel ashamed of my handkerchief".¹ Then the article reminded its readers of the presence of the non-Moslem Russian troops, and said that as Moslems they should not suffer their presence.

The Democrats equated religion with Nationalism. This was a clever and important move for this associated Persian religious feelings which had so much helped bring about the Constitutional Revolution with their nationalist feelings. This shows the fact that they understood the power of religion in its historical perspective and used it. Unfortunately the stigma of irreligion which was attached to them, another clever move by their opponents, weakened their argument.

1. Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh, No. 37, not dated.

In one of their Entebāhnāmehs they appealed to religion to save the nation and to the religious feelings of the Tojjār and Kasabeh. It said if we do not act soon, one day will come when all the revered tombs of our Moslem ancestors which we have looked after with our tears and hearts, will become the stables for the Russian cavalry. Be careful of the time when our Mosques will be turned into churches and the publication of the Qorān stopped. One of the European thinkers has said that if you want to obliterate Eslam forbid the Qorān; so let us not allow our Qorān to disappear; our independence and religion depend on it.¹

In general the Democrats' attitude to religion was much more liberal and modern than could be acceptable to many and hence gave their enemies occasion to criticize them. For instance, on the occasion of the month of mourning, Iran-e Nou wrote that in the past during the ten days of Moḥarram those who sang the martyrdom of Ḥoseyn, wanted to tell people to stand up against tyranny. The groups which gathered in the villages trained in military practice and this practice was the reason for the victory of the Safavids. Unfortunately during the last century ignorant people changed this practice, and this national movement was turned into a ceremony of mourning and

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 112, 4th Moḥarram 1328 (16th January 1911).

flagellation. As a result, many simple-minded people came to believe that instead of religious duties it was sufficient to shed some tears and all would be forgiven.

In formulating the new tactic vis-a-vis Eslam, the Democrats were supported by the membership of the more articulate and progressively minded Ulama among their ranks. The speech of one such member will be quoted here for it reveals the kind of arguments used by the Ulama Deputies who were Democrats as well. In the month of Şafar 1329 (February, 1911) when the Regent insisted that political parties should be formed each side declared its policies and introduced its members. Şadr al-Ulama declared that he was going to explain his ideology. "I am a Constitutionalist. I believe in National government, central administration and the concentration of all powers in the hands of the liberals. I believe in equality, that is if a person owns millions he should be under the same laws and have the same rights as the one who sells beetroots. I am against all kinds of privileges and special exceptions except the respect due to learned people." Then he mentioned the very poor conditions of the peasants. He said he was himself a peasant and had often seen how very old and poor men in rags had to sow lands far from their village, carry water to it with so much pain and hire cattle to earn a little bread; then the representatives of the Governors came, tied them to a tree and took from them what they had earned with so much difficulty. Therefore, he said, he was a Democrat by his beliefs and religion .

and added that the Hojat al-Eslām Āqā Moddares Eṣfahānī was going to examine all the Marāmnāmeḥs including that of the Democrats, and if it had a point contrary to religion he would point it out. He concluded by saying he had sat on the left (meaning the opposition) from the moment he had come to the Majles and would continue to do so.¹

Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn

The most important party other than the Democrats was the Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn or, as its name implies, the Moderate Socialists. Barclay described them as the "invertebrate and heterogeneous body known as the Moderates". Of those named as E'tedālīs some were moderates from the First Majles, like the princes Asadallāh Mīrzā and Yaḥyā Mīrzā Lesān al-Ḥokamā, Ulama like Ḥājī Seyyed Naṣrallāh Akhavī and Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī, Tojjār like Vakīl al-Ro'āyā, and Government officials like Mostashār al-Douleh, Morteżā Qolī Khān Nā'inī/^{who} had been the private secretary of Zell al-Solṭān. Some deputies now changed their Maslak and joined this party such as Momtāz al-Douleh, Dekhodā Mo'āzed al-Salṭaneh, Mīrzā Āqā Farshī and Vakīl al-Tojjār. During the Estebdād-e Ṣaghīr Mo'āzed al-Salṭaneh, Dekhodā and Seyyed Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabā'ī had gone into exile, Mostashār al-Douleh, Morteżā Qolī Khān, and Emām Jom'eh hid in Tehran and gradually made their peace with the Shah.

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 216, 25th Ṣafar 1329.

The development of the Democrat party is much more clear, but nonetheless the E'tedālī party too had its roots in the First Majles as already pointed out. The date of the organization of this party is not precisely cited; according to some writers it was organized at the time of the meeting of the Second Majles.¹ Taqīzādeh repeats the Democrats' interpretation stating that it was organized two months before the opening the Majles; and during the first few weeks the deputies and politicians began to recruit members from amongst the new deputies who arrived in Tehran. The aim of this party, added Taqīzādeh, was to oppose the true Nationalists who wanted to resist the Entente powers; so they accused the Democrats of being revolutionaries in order to discredit them.² The Majles newspaper, the E'tedālī's organ wrote the party's official version and justification for its formation, stating that they organized this party to protect and strengthen the Majles. They were all good Nationalists. It added that as their power and influence grew, their enemies became worried and united to organize their own party. They

1. Dehkhāreqānī too wrote that the E'tedāl party was conceived by Nāṣer al-Molk to oppose the Democrats and that he with Şeyyed Moḥammad Sādeq, Mo'āżed al-Molk, Mo'āżed al-Saiṭaneh prepared the programme of this party to oppose the Democrats. R. Dehkhāreqānī, Vaqāye'e Nāşerī va Toużīḥ-e Marām, Dou Resāleh, ed. A. Siyāhpūsh (Tabriz, 1356), pp. 32-33.

2. H. Taqīzādeh, "Kāshef al-Ghatā'", Maqālāt, 5, pp. 50-51.

accused the E'tedālīs of being rich reactionaries opposed to progress and the party of Sepahdār.¹ In fact the E'tedālīs and Democrats originated in the First Majles as already discussed, and must have begun to organize before the Majles met, but we have no proof of the elections having been conducted on any particular political platform. Moreover these mutual accusations were only to justify the organization of political parties which was not popular at the time, and to blame the other.

According to some historians the leader of the E'tedālīyūn was Seyyed Moḥammad Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabā'ī.² Yaḥyā Doulatābādī's brother, 'Alī Moḥammad has also been named, but he was in fact one of the leaders of the E'tedālīs in the Third Majles. Yaḥyā Doulatābādī remained unattached according to his own account though he sympathized with the Democrats.³

1. Majles, No. 23, 26th Shavāl 1328 (30th October 1910).

2. Seyyed Ṣādeq had published the newspaper Majles during the First Majles. He was also forced into exile along with the others after the Coup d'etat and joined Doulatābādī in Turkey, working with him and his Anjoman rather than the Anjoman-e Sa'adat. He was elected to the Second Majles from Khorasan and began to publish the newspaper Majles once again. Later this paper became the organ of the E'tedālīyūn. He was forced to take a temporary leave of absence from the Majles on account of the illness of his father, so he was not an active Deputy for part of the time.

3. He writes that he did not join either party, though elected by Kerman as Deputy, because of objections which were made against him instigated mainly by the Ulama. He says he was opposed to the policy of the E'tedālīs and rejected their invitation to join them. He could not accept membership of the Democrats unconditionally and calls them revolutionaries, Engelābī. So he

The E'tedāliyyūn had a numerical advantage and the backing outside the Majles of the more influential politicians such as Sepahdār, and of Sardār Moḥīī one of the Mojāhedīn of Gilan, and Sattār and Bāqer Khān. Amongst the Ulama Seyyed 'Abdallāh before he was shot, and Seyyed Moḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī before he died supported them. Farmānfarmā and Nāṣer al-Molk too were said to support this party.¹

If the date of the organization of the E'tedālīs is not specified, their motives are clear; it is obvious that their main purpose was to refute the Democrats rather than to put forward a policy. The arguments in support of their policy and the programme they present all point to this. The articles in Vaqt,² another of the organs of this party, presented as an explanation of policy are all refutations of the Democrats who are presented as extremist revolutionaries who would ruin the country; all non-moderates were revolutionaries, it argued, and declared that it was dangerous to criticize men like Sepahdār

Footnote 4 continued from previous page.

remained unattached. The Ulama opposed him on religious grounds for it must be remembered he was suspected of being an Azalī. They also opposed him because he agreed with the Democrats' idea of the separation of powers temporal from spiritual.

1. Malek al-Sho'arā Bāhār, Tārīkh-e Mokhtaṣar-e Aḥzāb-e Sīyāsī-ye Iran, Enqerāz-e Qājāriyeh (Tehran, 1323), p. 9.
2. Vaqt (Time) explained its own name, saying it implied that time was needed for reform, and that time was very precious. Vaqt, No. 53, 25th Jamādī al-Avval, 1328.

who had saved the country.¹

There is little more specific evidence for the details of the party organization of the E'tedālī'yūn. The Anṣārī documents contain a list of the members who contributed to the party funds in 1329-30. It includes such famous names as Mo'āven al-Douleh Ghafārī, Dekhodā, Seyyed Ṣādeq Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh Mo'īn al-Tojjār, Noṣrat Solṭān (Anṣārī) Morteżā Qolī Khān Na'īnī (who later became the leader of the coalition or Hey'at-e Mo'talefeh), and 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī, brother of Yaḥyā.²

The Majles newspaper also has the same characteristic, although it was much more violent in its attacks. For instance, it said that what Persia had to fear was the internal enemies who were in secret league with the enemy;

1. Ibid., No. 34, 1st Jamādī al-Avval 1328, and No. 25, 20th Rabī'al-Sānī. Hoseyn Khān Kasmā'ī, the editor of Vaqt, was from Gilan, and a staunch supporter of Sepahdār. The paper for instance does not often mention Sardār As'ad. It was even hinted that the paper was financed by Sardār Manṣūr and Sardār Mohīī, both supporters of Sepahdār.

2. In addition these documents include a detailed list of expenditure. This ranges from small items, such as expenses for stationery or petrol for the stoves, to money paid for publications to provincial branches, the salaries of the employees or electoral expenses. For instance in Zīqa'deh 1329, the party spent 1520 rial on arming a number of soldiers to defend Tehran in case of an attack by Salār al-Douleh.

One item of expense was cited as money paid to the Mojāhedīn. Another item of interest is the rent paid for the club house which was rented from Hoseyn Khān Khayyātbāshī. It also paid the expenses of the newspaper Majles and the salary of their representatives in the provinces. The party had representatives in Kerman, Kermanshah, Esfahan, Tabriz, Mashad, Mazandaran and Arak.

N. Anṣārī, "The documents of the E'tedālīyūn Party", unpublished thesis.

these people organize new parties with such new names as Socialist or Democrats. They accuse the servants of the people and encourage worthless people, deceive them and waste time.¹ In another article it accused the Democrats of having no country of their own while pretending to be Nationalists.² The Majles has many articles in which the E'tedālīs put forward their ideological arguments. These often appear to be an answer to the Democrats and prove the fact that their aim was more a refutation of the Democrats than the enactment of a policy. In Rajab 1329 (July 1911) in an article entitled The Philosophy of Ideology or The Road to Progress and Development, it argued in favour of moderation, taking examples of moderation in the laws of the universe and of nature to prove the advantage of such a policy. It added that development must be gradual or else it would be dangerous; besides, all the difficulties facing us must be taken into consideration before progress can be made. The E'tedālīs, it said, were not opposed to reform, but changes had to be gradual. The Government must take care of the poor and the peasants, nor were the E'tedālīs opposed to liberty and equality, all Moslems were brothers. But the Government could not take people's lands; besides the peasants and workers first needed education. Equality

1. Majles, No. 27, 6th Zīqa'deh 1328 (9 November 1910).

2. Ibid., No. 26, 3rd Zīhājeh (6th December).

could not be imposed quickly, if we begin to divide the land and property as Karl Marx says, we would be courting disaster. It then suggested the setting up of agricultural banks in villages, which would give small loans to the peasants.¹ The theoretical discussions of Majles improved as time went on, but it staunchly upheld the E'tedālīs and never ceased its attacks on the Democrats.

The E'tedālīyūn published their Marāmnāmeḥ twice. One was very short and incomplete one was called Dastūr-e Maslakī-ye Ferqeh-ye Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn.² It said that development and independence could only be achieved by means of the gathering of national strength, and that would be attained by means of unity. This unity was achieved by a programme. We Persians believe in one religion, Eslam, and had the means of achieving such a union, but we have been ignorant of each other's wishes. Today by declaring our programme we shall unite with our other brothers who share the same opinions and we declare our aim to be the independence of the homeland, the development of the country and the establishment of national Government.

The means by which these aims were to be achieved were enumerated thus:

1. Majles, No. 125, 22 Rajab 1329 (19th July 1911).

2. The first Marāmnāmeḥ was published in the Royal Publishing House (Maṭba'eh-ye Shāhanshāhī, whose director was Ḥoseyn Kasmā'ī), Decree of programme of the Social Moderate Party.

1. Procuring the means of progress by favouring the principle of development.
2. Attempt to conduct the affairs of the country from the centre.
3. Consideration for the condition of the labourers of the country, and easing their livelihood.
4. Attending to ways to increase public wealth.
5. Diligence in universalizing culture and compulsory education.
6. Striving to organize and increase the military force according to modern methods.
7. Maintenance of foreign relations with political, commercial and economic connections.

This programme was severely criticized by the Democrats for its weakness and for the fact that it was actually a set of generalized headings to which no one could object, but which in reality did not constitute a programme, but a means to deceive people. Rasūlzādeh wrote a strong attack in an article already mentioned called the Tanqīd-e Ferqeh-ye E'tedālīyūn yā Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn, dated 1328.¹ He wrote that he did not so much fear a bloody reaction, as a Conservative party, which behind the veil of Constitutionalism encouraged reaction. He added that his fellow party men were suspicious

1. This article was published in Iran-e Nou on the 27th Shavāl 1328 (3rd October 1910). It was also published separately as a pamphlet.

of the E'tedāliyyūn lest it should be the Conservative Party in disguise.

According to Rasūlzādeh the aristocracy tried to overthrow the Constitution and helped the Shah and the Russian officers against the Majles. Now, however, they understood that the old days were gone and they were trying to resist by a new method. This was why they were forming a reactionary political party. He gave examples of so-called moderate parties in Europe which were all right-wing and supported the rich and privileged classes. The founders of this party in Persia had assured him, he said, that the E'tedāliyyūn was a different kind of party, but that now he noticed that their acts showed the contrary, and their Marāmnāmeḥ proved his worst fears to be true. He then quoted their programme and discussed the word Socialism because they called themselves Moderate Socialists. All Socialists agree, he said, that Capitalism must change to Socialism. Some wanted this to be effected by means of progress, some by a revolution, but for Socialists moderation was impossible. It was like someone who accepted Eslam moderately. Socialists could not be moderates. This was an innovation unheard of even in Europe. "Our E'tedāliyyūn call themselves Socialists," he said, "Do they want to abolish Capitalism? Give power to the proletariat? Free women and place them in the Majles? Would they accept the distribution of the land between the peasants? They had no such ideas." Besides, Persia had

no Capitalists and no proletariat, was it not surprising therefore that in a country like Persia, landowners should call themselves Socialists? He then gave a full description of Socialism in order to reveal its true meaning.

Then he discussed their programme, saying its seven articles were only headings and a play on words. None of the other parties could deny any of these aims. For instance, he discussed the third article which stated that the party would consider the condition of the labourers. Would anyone say that he wanted to worsen the condition of the labourers or wish people to be poorer? He concluded by saying that obviously they were hiding their real purpose. They had taken the name of Socialists because at one time the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn had formed a party and achieved some success, so by adopting the name Ejtemā'īyūn they hoped to attract people. At the same time they called themselves moderates so as not to frighten the rich. Its continuation was impossible, concluded Rasūlzādeh. They were for the moment only a group who had gathered together to promote their own interests.

It is very likely that the criticisms by the Democrats as pointed out in Tanqīd occasioned the publication of a second and much more detailed Marāmnāmeḥ. It was called Dastūr-e Mashrūḥ-e Maslakī yā Marāmnāmeḥ-ye Hezb-e Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn.¹ It is in fact a combination of an ideological discussion of their political

1. Detailed Decree of the programme or the policy of the Social Moderates.

beliefs and a practical plan of reform, but owing to its length only some points of interest will be mentioned, especially as many points have already been repeated in the newspaper Majles. It must be added that it further confirms the assumption already made, namely that it is a reply to the Democrats and would go to show that the Democrats' policy must have won some success and caused uneasiness. The insistence on moderation and gradual reform is particularly significant and was in opposition to a Revolution for which they attacked the Democrats.

The ideology of the E'tedāliyūn centres round a belief in a gradual progress of mankind. There existed two trends of thought and policy, one was moderate, practical, gradual and in accordance with local conditions. The other was revolutionary, impractical and idealist. They claimed that their ideas were based on Eslam and its essence which advocated equality and justice. Then it puts forward a curious argument explaining its Socialist ideology. It says the principle of Socialist ideology Asās-e Maslakī-ye Ejtemā'i varies in different countries. This group did not follow the path of Marx and Engels, but such teachers as Bernstein¹

1. Edward Bernstein was a leading German revisionist socialist. He worked with Kautsky in 1898 and broke with the orthodox Marxists later. He was of the opinion that contrary to Marxist ideology, Capitalism was stabilizing and that there would be an increase in production and mass consumption. He also drew attention to a rising middle class and refuted the Marxist belief in a society divided into two classes. He also denied their historical materialism.

and Merlino¹, and took Persia's conditions into view as well. Human affairs were divided into three categories: political, economic and spiritual. Under all these headings there was insistence on the need for gradual reforms and their accordance with practical conditions. Another point of interest is the insistence on public morality and spiritual reform and the need for a cleansing of character and behaviour and performance of religious duties.

It divided people into three classes: the rich, the middle class and the worthless, jobless class, which was a parasite on the other two. This class gap was to be bridged by a reform of taxes and other reforms and a practice of justice. Concerning private property it said that the principles of Socialism did not condemn private property.

The E'tedāliyyūn's discussions of their reforms represented an attempt to be more practical and clear, but they were still far too brief and lacking in detailed knowledge to be a feasible programme for action. The reforms they suggest are also divided under three headings: political, economic and spiritual. They deal with such topics as electoral reforms, the organization of the Senate, reforms in government ministries, military service, the organization of a military school, tax reforms, the protection of the

1. S. Merlino was the author of Formes et essence du Socialisme, published in 1898 in Paris. It is possible that the E'tedāliyyūn were referring to him.

peasants against the injustices of the landlords, the prohibition of hoarding, the formation of more schools and the encouragement of newspapers.

The Marāmnāmeḥ of the E'tedāliyyūn was no great improvement on the first one and it remained weak and insignificant. But their power lay elsewhere. It had the backing of the ruling class and the more influential politicians and contrary to what Rasūlzādeh predicted, the E'tedāliyyūn continued to function and gained much more power when Nāṣer al-Molk made them organize the coalition.

In this work attention has been mainly paid to the ideological divergences which separated these two major political parties and distinguished them from each other. But despite such differences these parties had certain similarities due particularly to the circumstances which gave rise to them both. For instance, they all had a small membership limited mainly to the Deputies of the Majles together with a small following outside. They all had a similar organization such as clubs, newspapers, Marāmnāmeḥs and Nezāmnāmeḥs. They all protested their nationalism, their Islamic faith and their support for the Majles. They all showed deference to certain leaders which was the accepted norm of public behaviour. But more important than these was similarity in Social background of the members of the Democrat and E'tedāli parties. In fact this must have been one reason why the Democrats posed such a menace. Had that party been composed of members of the lower classes, for example, they could have been barred from the Majles, but they came from the same ranks of society as the E'tedālis,

and posed a potential danger to all vested interests. The E'tedāl party was conceived as a counter to the Democrats and herein lay its weakness. The defensive character of the Marāmnāmeḥ of the E'tedālī party, and the justifications it gave for its policy is a proof of this.

The Democrats had by far the better programme which was not surprising, considering its international connections. They could appeal to all those who wanted to carry out reforms to their logical conclusion and to see Persia strong and independent, and the poor economically and socially better off. Thus they posed a threat to many interests which were not long in coalescing together against the Democrats. The other two small parties to be described now were insignificant by themselves, but their allegiance helped to shift the balance in the favour of the E'tedālī'yūn and the Government.

Ettefāq va Taraqqī

Both the Democrats and E'tedālīyūn were comparatively large parties, but two smaller ones developed in the Majles as well; they were the Ettefāq va Taraqqī, Union and Progress,¹ and the Taraqqīkhāhān or Liberals. Though these were insignificant as far as membership was concerned, nonetheless they are worthy of notice as they helped to compose the coalition.

The organization of the Ettefāq va Taraqqī party is described by their newspaper Esteqlāl-e Iran. It wrote on the 18th Zīqa'deh 1328, (21st November 1910), that five months before taking Tehran, the political party of Ettefāq va Taraqqī was set up in Tehran with the help of the Holy Committee of Sattār.² It also added that there had been many secret organizations during the last Majles which had caused a great deal of trouble; now it was agreed to form a union between these secret organizations; they would appoint their delegates to organize

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1. It is possible that there was some connection between this party and the Ottoman party of Union and Progress as some of the emigres were no doubt influenced by Turkish political ideas, and Doulatābādī mentions an agreement for mutual help between them. Y. Doulatābādī, op. cit., 3 pp. 65-68.
 2. Esteqlāl-e Iran, No. 124, 18th Zīqa'deh 1328, 21st November 1910.

a Central Committee called Ettefāq va Taraqqī.¹ According to the Esteqlāl-e Iran, one of the most famous Committees of Ettefāq va Taraqqī was called the Committee of Jahāngīr which was organized in Tehran. After victory the party began to organize other branches in Tehran and the provinces, though the paper does not specify any of their names.

The leader of the Ettefāq va Taraqqī outside the Majles was Mosta'ān al-Molk² who became the editor of the Esteqlāl-e Iran in Shavāl 1328, (9th October 1910). This party had four members in the Majles but none were of great importance. They were Esmā'īl Khān Farzāneh, Mīrzā 'Alī Eṣfahānī³, Fathallāh Khān Moshīr Hożūr who were deputies of the Majles,⁴ and Mīrzā Moḥammad Khān

1. Esteqlāl-e Iran, No. 124, 18th Zīqa'deh 1328, 21st November 1910.
2. Mosta'ān al-Molk worked closely with Mīrzā Maḥmūd Eṣfahānī during the Estebdād-e Ṣaghīr; Mīrzā Maḥmūd had taken bast in the Ottoman embassy. It can be conjectured that Mosta'ān al-Molk might have been influenced by some of the ideas and methods of the Ottoman party. Nāẓem al-Eslām Kermānī, op.cit. Introductory Vol., p. 224.
3. Taqīzādeh described him as the son of 'Abd al-Karīm brother of Adīb al-Tojjār, an E'tedālī deputy of Qazvin. The family lived in Tabriz. Ḥ. Taqīzādeh, "Tārīkh-e Majles", Maqālāt, 5, p. 59.
4. As already mentioned, the Democrats could not obtain support for their candidates to be elected by the Majles. Ḥāj 'Ez al-Mamālek himself member of the Liberal party has said that the other parties agreed amongst themselves for the elections. (Private interview).

Vazīrzādeh from Gilan.¹

Ettefāq va Taraqqī had certain articles in their programme which bore on Socialism. The Democrat party even offered to unite with it on several occasions, but the Ettefāq va Taraqqī did not accept; on the contrary they coalesced with the E'tedāliyyūn despite the fact that many of their demands touched on questions similar to the Democrats. For instance, they called for unity of the political parties, opposed the Senate² and attacked the landlords. Despite this Esteqlāl-e Iran also attacked the Democrats on many occasions and relationships between these two parties were bitter.³ The reason was probably due to the fact that they had their origin one in Azarbaijan and the Caucasus, the other in Turkey and Gilan and also the fact that from the beginning there was a deep-seated controversy between the Nationalists. The social and economic demands of the Ettefāq va Taraqqī were probably due to the influence of the Caucasian Socialists who had come to Gilan as well as to Azarbaijan. They were certainly not amongst the

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1. Mīrzā 'Alī Khān later changed to E'tedāli. He was given the title of Sharīf al-Douleh and was employed by the Foreign Ministry. Iran-e Nou gave an account of his life in No. 20, 30th Sha'ban 1327 (16th September, 1909).
 2. Esteqlāl-e Iran, No. 124, 18th Zīqa'deh 1328 (21 November 1910).
 3. For instance Esteqlāl-e Iran No. 29, 1st Rajab 1329 (28 June 1911) or No. 8, 29th Jamādī al-Šānī (31st May).

demands of the Ottoman party of Union and Progress.

The paper announced the purpose of the party was the permanence of the Constitution and the endurance of the independence of Persia and the support of all the poor nations and liberal classes of the East. Its programme included the attainment of freedom of meetings, of holidays, of conferences, of the press, of thought, conscience and speech, and the unity of the underprivileged nationalities Mellat-e Mazlūmeh. Minorities were to have equal civil and judicial rights, education was to be promoted, aristocracy to be abolished, all laws which caused the dispossession of the peasants' lands to be abrogated, all reactionaries to be dismissed from Government services and their places to be given to young educated people; the foundation of factories were to be encouraged, in case of attack on Persia by foreigners or the undermining of Persian independence, members of these organizations would defend her. It concluded by saying that gradually other secret clauses would be divulged.

The point which is of note in this programme is the attempt to seek the support of the minorities¹ which is not in the Socialist party's demand, but grew from the party of Union and Progress of Turkey with which this party probably shared more than a name.

1. The ethnic minorities of Persia did not have the same problems as the minorities in Turkey. In Persia they had been granted equal rights under the Constitution and the Second Electoral law had given them the right each to send a representative to the Majles.

The Ettefāq va Taraqqī also had a Nezāmnāme¹ which illustrates its secret origin. It announced that the aim of this group was to maintain by any means possible the independence of Persia, the Constitution and Human Rights (Hoqūq-e Bashari) and political rights of all the underprivileged people, the rights of all classes and middle-class workers. It had a Central Council, Majma'e 'Omūmī which met once a year to draft the programme of the Party. They were to be local Councils in the provinces which sent their representatives to the Majma'. The smallest unit was the group Dasteh consisting of 12 members, each of whom paid a subscription. The members were to be armed, to report to the group and to learn military tactics; those who possessed arms were to be registered with the Committee. The members of a group had to meet once a week and were to elect a leader. They had to organize plays and conferences and propagate their ideas. Each 12 groups of Dasteh were organized into a Sho'beh, or branch. The members, twelve in number, were elected for a year by secret ballot, and they were in charge of the activities of their groups. The branches had to be under the authority of the Committee. Branches had to be organized in the villages according to these regulations,

1. This was entitled Nezāmnāme-ye Dākhelī-ye Jam'īyat-e Ettefāq va Taraqqī. It was published in the private publishing house of the party in 1328.

Mohammad Āqā Borūjerdī, and Lavā'al-Douleh. According to him, Sheykh Mohammad 'Alī Behjat from Dezfūl had organized a different party called Taraqīkhāhān-e Jonūb. It is possible that there were in fact two parties; the one we shall describe here is the party of the Southern deputies which had 6 members.¹ On the Marāmnāme of this party called Dastūr-e Asāsī-ye Jam'īyat-e Tarāqīkhāhān-e Iran,² it is written by hand that this party was formed by some of the Deputies of the South to protect their interests and that the newspaper Jonūb was their party newspaper.

The Jonūb is different from the other party newspapers. It does not attack any party, nor does it defend any particular Deputy. It mainly deals with the questions of the Southern provinces, such as security, poverty, the plight of the people, bad government and the inroads the British were making. Naturally it demanded a change in the electoral laws which was unfair as it left many parts of the South without a representative, to the advantage of the North. It also advocated a very strong centralized Government, and urged that the Government should take soldiers from the tribes. It was strongly anti Qavām and accused the family of

1. Soleyman Mīrzā gave this number in a speech in the Majles. M.M. Maj 2, 18th Šafar 1329.

2. Basic Rules of the Liberal group of Iran.

Taraqīkhāhān (Liberals)

Existing accounts of the parties are very scanty, but the opinions about the Democrats, the Etedāliyyūn and the Ettefāq va Taraqqī are consistent. The case of the other party on the other hand is not clear.¹ The lists of Taqīzādeh, one in Kāveh, and another published as a pamphlet in 1337 in Berlin are not consistent. In Kāveh he mentions the Taraqīkhāhān party, in the Berlin article he gives them the name of Liberal, and mentions only one deputy, Behjat, as Taraqīkhāh.²

In a private interview with Ḥāj 'Ez al-Mamālek, the Deputy of Khuzestan already mentioned, he stated that these two parties were separate, adding emphatically that his party was called Liberal, and that he had constituted it on the model of the British Liberal party and that its members were himself, Entezām al-Ḥokamā,

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1. It is not clear by the lists of Taqīzādeh who its members were. It must be added however that as Taqīzādeh was absent from Persia when these parties were declared he might have confused these two. Moreover the existence of political parties was kept secret more or less until Nāṣer al-Molk insisted on the formation of a majority party in Ṣafar 1329 (February 1911). Soleymān Mīrzā once referred to this secrecy saying no one was ready to say to which party he belonged. M.M. Maj 2, 18th Ṣafar 1329.
 2. H. Taqīzādeh, "Doureh-ye Jadīd-e Mashrūṭiyyat dar Iran", Kāveh, Summer 1336, 1918; and "Tārīkh-e Mokhtaṣar-e Majles-e Mellī-ye Iran", published in Berlin 1337.

to defend the peasants' rights against the Mālēkīn. They were to organize agricultural banks to give loans to needy peasants. The Committees had nine members to supervise the branches and groups. Each Committee had to publish a newspaper to propagate the ideas of the party. The members were to keep their membership secret.

In Jamādī al-Šānī 1329 (June) and Rajab (July 1911) the Ettefāq va Taraqqī published the duties of its members and a detail of its programme in Esteqlāl-e Iran. It called for a plan of expansion and announced its intention to make the under-privileged people and the peasants realize their lawful rights so that they could share in the wealth of Persia, at all times to sharing equal rights with the rich; at the same time the members of the party should prepare for the next elections.¹

The Ettefāq va Taraqqī never amounted to much as an individual party, its only significance was in relation with the coalition which was organized in Šafar 1329 (February 1911). The other small party to be described next, namely the Taraqqīkhāhān was also of the same category.

1. Esteqlāl-e Iran, No. 15, 12th Jamādī al-Šānī 1329 (10th June 1911) and No. 44, 29th Rajab (26th July).

always causing disorder in Fars. It also advocated Capitalism and argued that only by strengthening Capitalism would the Government grow strong.¹

The Marāmnāmeḥ of the Taraqīkhāhān announced that Persia was caught in the midst of a revolution and that each group demanded something different, a situation which was leading her to destruction. Then it added that no group could act effectively unless it had a programme. The Majma'e Markazī, or the central organization of the Party, which had existed for a time in secret, watched the events, and was now publishing its programme which was in accordance with the interests of the country, and did not differentiate between religion and ideology.

Its general aim was announced to be maintenance of the independence of the country, the defence of the principle of Eslam, the preservation of the Constitution and the National Government, the introduction of civilization into Persia, the enforcement of the laws of the country and the development of Persia by Persians. Their programme was divided into eight parts which dealt with the Government, the affairs of the country, the elections, the military force, religion and cultural affairs, taxation and the basis of common wealth, public works and the judiciary. This programme is rather lengthy

1. Jonūb, No. 27, 4th Rajab 1329.

but contains some interesting and original points not dealt with in the other programmes.

One point which remains enigmatic is the fact the Deputies of Fars and the Qashqā'ī Deputy are not cited as members, nor do we know its connection with the league of Southern provinces, Etteḥād-e Jonūb.

This League was between the leader of the Arab tribes Sheykh Khaz'al, the Qashqā'ī Khān Ṣoulat^{al-} Douleh, and the Vālī of Posht-e Kūh, the tribal Khān of the Lurs. It was formed in Rabī' al-Avval 1328 (February 1910), against the Bakhtiyārī ascendancy in Tehran,¹ although its aim was declared to be support for the Majles, the defence of Persia's independence and security and the maintenance of the Constitution.² We do not know whether the party of Taraqīkhāhān was formed to protect the interests of the South against the great tribal leaders who had the South at their mercy or against the ascendancy of the North with 20 Deputies from Azarbaijan, 15 from Tehran, 6 from Khorasan, 4 from Gilan, etc.³

The development of political parties was not limited to these discussed here. Often reference was

1. P. Oberling, The Qashqā'ī Nomads of Fars (Hague, 1974), p. 96.

2. Iran-e Nou, No. 196, 24th Rabī' al-Šānī 1328 (5th May 1910).

3. The attention paid to the North had been questioned in the First Majles and the Second and it was to be changed to a more equitable distribution of seats by the Third Electoral Law passed in this Majles.

made to other parties particularly socialist parties such as for instance, the Eṣlahīyūn 'Āmīyūn¹ and the Social Democrats, but as they had no deputies in the Majles they are not discussed here.

Unlike the two latter parties, the origin of the Democrats and the E'tedāliyyūn can be traced to the early embryonic groupings of the First Majles and the greater necessity for co-operation and joint action brought about by the Estebdād-e Ṣaghīr inevitably meant a greater definition of purpose and policy during the first months of the Second Majles. Even though the committed membership of both the Democrats and the E'tedāliyyūn remained small, and the majority of the Majles Deputies could still be swayed by personal interests and votes determined by private patronage, the emergence of a solid core representing two distinct generally held political philosophies, having their own party organization, financing themselves, choosing their own leadership, publishing their newspapers and manifestos, signifies a fundamental change and advance in the assimilation and experience of new political and party procedures. Most of the initiative for this came from the more purposeful, well organized, dedicated in a group of the Democrats, an initiative that was directly influenced by the Bolsheviks and the Russian Social Democrat models and owed little or nothing to any indigenous tradition. Yet this had a wider impact on Persian public life as the E'tedāliyyūn tried to respond to the telling criticism

1. M.M. Maj 2, 18th Ṣafar 1329.

of their opponents by adopting the same method realizing the need to define, to argue, to publish, and to recruit. Given the time to develop and to let these experiences be properly absorbed into the political consciousness of the nation, there would have been a chance that the course of a new political experience would have been securely established; but as shall be shown, this was denied to such experiments and initiatives.

CHAPTER III

PERIOD FROM ZĪQA'DEH 1327 (DECEMBER 1909) TO

RAJAB 1329 (JULY 1910)

The First Prime Ministership of Sepahdār

It was not until Zīqa'deh 1327 (December 1909) that the Majles met. The elections were always difficult and took a long time. The First Electoral Laws had foreseen this delay and had stipulated that the session would begin when the Tehran deputies were elected. This was changed in the Second Electoral Laws, however, and it was decreed that the Majles would begin when a majority (half plus one) of the deputies reached Tehran, which naturally caused this delay. Much was expected from this Majles and it was greeted enthusiastically, especially because it was hoped the Russians would evacuate when it met.

The Second Majles had the example and experience of the First to follow on, and it began to function more efficiently. The Commissions were set up, the internal regulations were prepared and order was kept without difficulty. Mostashār al-Douleh as the first President had had previous experience of Parliamentary life and controlled the Deputies well. A roll call was taken every day and the names of the absentees were registered. The programme of each session was prepared and announced beforehand, and each Deputy spoke for and against

a motion alternatively.¹

One important difference was the amount of secrecy exercised on many topics; most questions were discussed in Commissions, and in general only details of specific Bills were discussed openly. On questions of foreign relations² or the relations with the Government a veil of secrecy was deliberately drawn, despite many objections. Even the resignation of Ministers was not openly questioned or discussed.³

Besides this secrecy which was exercised throughout the session there was another problem which makes the study of this period difficult, namely the personal relationship between the Deputies and the Ministers, of which we know very

1. Mostashār al-Dōuleh resigned as President in Jamādī al-Šānī (June), and was replaced by Moḥammad 'Alī-Khān Zokā al-Molk. The real reason for his resignation is not clear but the occasion was a quarrel between one of the Deputies, 'Ez al-Molk, and the President. Zokā' al-Molk in turn resigned from the Presidency of the Majles in Moḥarrām 1329 (December 1911) and was replaced by Mo'famen al-Molk.
2. Marling commented that this change was generally regarded as a sign of the increasing influence of the party which favoured good and intimate relations with Russia and Britain (meaning the Moderates).
Marling to Grey, May 28th, 1910, No. 83 FO 371/962.
Barclay, for instance, gave an account of the secret agreement between the Persian Government and the Imperial Bank on the question of the import of silver. This agreement was concluded by Vakīl al-Ro'āyā and the Bank without the knowledge of the Majles.
Barclay to Grey, March 24th, No. 45, FO 416/44.
3. For instance, on the 11th of Jamādī al-Šānī, the Prime Minister told the Majles that Moshīr al-Douleh had resigned as Minister of Justice and that Sardār Manṣūr had been appointed in his stead, but as Moshīr al-Douleh was indispensable he was made Minister of Commerce: no explanation was given and even the newspapers did not discuss such questions much, probably either because they could not divulge the reasons or did not know them.

One other important point which contrasted greatly with the past was the actual appearance of political parties. This was a novel development and was not always popular. From the very first session of the Second Majles, those same groups who had experienced a measure of continuity from the First Majles and had cooperated during the Estebdād-e Saghīr once again began to coalesce and work together on a basis that tended towards party organization. The appearance of parties was inevitable though they were unpopular and at first they kept more or less secret. Possibly this unpopularity was due to the fact that they had armed bands of followers, and were reminiscent of the old Anjomans. In Rajab 1328 (July 1910), for instance, Sardār As'ad voiced some of the opinions held at the time about the parties, saying that he expected everyone, even the worst enemies to coalesce, but on the contrary, there was talk of E'tedāl and Enqelāb, "This is what is ruining our house" he said. "Not until such talks are left aside will we reach our goals."²

1. Iran-e Nou often voiced its criticism of the secrecy of the Majles. On the 26th Jamādī al-Šānī (14th June) for instance, the secret sessions of the Majles and the irresponsibility of the President were criticized and also the fact that amidst such crises, the Majles was discussing very unimportant questions. It added that the President of the Majles did not like objections to his methods by such Deputies as 'Ez al-Molk, and quit the Majles, which, like the Cabinet, was going through a crisis. The Cabinet crises must be made known to the People, added the newspaper, which pointed out the need for a united Cabinet.
Iran-e Nou, No. 230,26 Jamādī al-Šānī 1328 (14th June, 1910).

2. E. Amīrkheyzī, op. cit., p. 577.

Some of the most important questions to be settled concerned finance, security, and the evacuation of the Russian forces of occupation and the disarmament of the Mojāhedīn, and we shall deal with these in our attempt to see the parties in action and their reaction to these questions. All these formed a vicious circle which could not be broken. The Government had no means of putting down local rebellions and the general unrest brought about by financial difficulties, but the more insecurity increased the less they could collect taxes. The foreign loan was not negotiable because of its disadvantageous conditions, so the Persian Government could not maintain security. The Russians would not evacuate on the pretext that there was no security, but the mere fact of their staying on increased insecurity and unrest.¹ They resented any criticism and held it up as the example of the Majles' non-compromising attitude and made it a further excuse for not evacuating Persia. Tribal rivalry increased as the Central Government had no means of enforcing law and order, and this in turn culminated in the British Ultimatum of Shavāl 1328 (October 1910). All hopes in this difficult situation centred around the employment of foreign financial experts to reform the chaotic finances of the country and this was the cornerstone of everything.²

1. Barclay bore witness to this, and wrote that he thought that the maintenance of the Russian troops in the country increased troubles and that he believed that the sooner the force stationed at Qazvin was recalled the greater the chance there would be of a return to order.
Barclay to Grey, September 23rd, 1910, No. 376 FO 371/952.

2. The French financial expert, Bizot, had been employed in 1907 to advise the Persian government on its finances, but he had left without achieving much except making a long report on the situation.
A. Destrée, op. cit., p. 199.

The head of the Government at this juncture was Sepahdār. He had no party affiliation in the Majles and the E'tedāliyyīn did not support him at this time. However, he still enjoyed some popularity in the country due to the role he had played in ousting the Shah; but soon he was criticised on practical issues and Marling wrote to Grey that he "...will never win the confidence of Persia where he is regarded merely as the creature of Russia, which in spite of good qualities, he certainly is."¹ Nor was the relationship between the Government and the Democrats amicable, and Taqīzādeh often reminded the Ministers of their responsibility to the Majles² and pointed to the army of occupation.

The Cabinet Sepahdār introduced to the Majles was not united and soon became weak because of a division of policy. The members of this Cabinet included Sardār As'ad as Minister of the Interior, the unpopular Sardār Manṣūr as Minister of Post and Telegraph, and the equally unpopular 'Alā al-Salṭaneh as Minister of Foreign Affairs. These two were made to resign later by the Democrats. On the other hand, the Cabinet also included more popular politicians, credited with relative liberalism; they were Ṣanfī' al-Douleh as Minister of Science and Education, Voṣūq al-Douleh as Minister of Finance, and Moshīr al-Douleh as Minister of Justice. Sepahdar intro-

1. Marling to Grey, 18th July 1910, No. 292, FO 371/962.

2. As in the First Majles, Taqīzādeh who acted as leader of the Democrats often made a general case out of a specific question, and criticized the Government thereby.

M.M. Maj. 2, No. 14, 24th Zīqa'deh 1327.

duced the programme of his Government in the Majles on the 16th Zīqa'deh. (30th December).¹ He began by saying that the Government wished to reform and develop the country as soon as possible, but this could only be achieved gradually. Then he enumerated the different reforms and measures intended. First and foremost was the maintenance of security. In order to pay the police force, it was necessary to raise a loan which was being negotiated, and it was necessary for all the existing debts of the Government to be consolidated.

He then continued that the Finance Ministry had to be reformed, it was essential to establish a supervisory body to control the expenditure of the Government. Another measure in connection with financial reforms was to set up a court of accounting to study the methods of taxation of the Central Government. The ministerial budgets would also be studied as soon as possible and a general reform of all the Government offices would be made. In order to do this foreign experts would be employed. The Judiciary too should be reformed, but in the meantime temporary measures would be taken until the necessary reforms were prepared. The same comprised education and the necessary Reform bill would be presented to the

1. It is interesting to note that the Programme was similar to one suggested by Rasūlzādeh in the Iran-e Nou in an article entitled Parliament is opening under what conditions? He suggested the Government must solve the financial problems even if it entailed making a loan. It should arrange for an army to bring peace to the country, also to arrange for the evacuation of the Russian army, to put education on a proper standing by increasing schools and strengthening the Ministry of Education, to reform all the ministries and to employ foreign experts. All these measures, with the exception of the evacuation of Persia, were included in the programme of the Government. Iran-e Nou, No. 67, 1st Zīqa'deh 1327 (15th November 1909).

Majles.¹

This programme was accepted by the Majles. As has already been pointed out, some of these measures had been suggested by Rasūlzādeh, so the Democrats had no objection. It was however said that these were for the moment only words, and that they would wait for real action in a month.² There was some discussion of the programme, but in general its tenets were accepted.

Relations, however, between the Government and the Majles (and here it must be specified the Democrats) were generally poor. From the beginning there was an inherent lack of trust between the Taqīzādeh and Sepahdār and more generally between the Democrats and the Government. If the view about the ruling class as expressed by Iran-e Nou is accepted, then this lack of trust is not at all surprising for Sepahdār and his Cabinet was composed of the same reactionary class as the paper described.³ However, criticism was especially directed against Sepahdār for the Democrats trusted Mostoufī al-Mamālek who was also from the same class. Sepahdār was considered

1. Iran-e Nou No. 79, 17th Zīqa'deh 1327 (1st December 1909).

2. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 45, 17th Moharram 1328.

3. At times the discussions of the Majles shows some of these feelings of distrust although in general the real criticism of the Government was expressed by the press. In the Majles the Deputies obstructed the Government rather than overtly criticizing it, especially at the beginning when Sepahdār enjoyed comparative prestige. Asadallāh Mīrzā, a deputy in the First Majles and reputedly of liberal ideas, once said that certain things were said in the Majles which were insulting and hurt everyone; those who wished well for the country should not say such things. He added that a Deputy gets up and says all Government employees are traitors. This is impossible and insulting: perhaps one or two are traitors, all cannot be so.

M.M. Maj. 2, No. 93, 7th Jamādī al-Avval 1328.

as pro-Russian by many, especially by the Democrats. Barclay pointed out this feeling of distrust towards Sepahdār and Sardār As'ad since November, and added that it had been hoped they would leave politics when the Majles was convened.¹ Why then, it could be asked, did the Democrats originally accept the Government of Sepahdār? It is possible that they counted on his prestige to be able to govern, and possible hoped that by his remaining in power the Russians would evacuate, but when Sepahdār was seen in action and proved his pro-Russian leanings, criticism and obstruction began; nor did Sepahdār alleviate the suspicion raised against him. He distrusted the Democrats and the Majles which curtailed his power and was irksome to him. Thus there could be no cooperation between him who wished to curtail the powers of the Majles and the Democrats who were for the ascendancy of the Majles over the government.

As mentioned, the Democrats were particularly opposed to the Russians, and any occasion was seized upon to criticize and attack that power, but the unpopularity of the Russians was not limited to the Democrats only and in general the mood of the Majles was anti-Russian.²

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1. Barclay to Grey (Monthly Summary), Nov. 14th, 1909. No. 202, FO 371/713.
 2. On the 6th Moḥarram 1328, Taqīzādeh brought up the subject of the Cossack Brigade which had engaged in a fight with the police and censured the Government and the Minister of War, Sardār Manṣūr saying it had been increased by 250 men adding that this was a very dangerous move as the Cossacks acted like foreigners. He was supported by non-Democrats. Sepahdār came to the Majles and promised to keep the peace, and the quarrel was momentarily patched up. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 42, 6th Moḥarram 1328 and No. 43, 13th Moḥarram.

One major confrontation between the Government and the Majles led by Taqīzādeh and the Democrats occurred over the question of the Russian evacuation, and culminated in the unanimous vote of censure passed by the Majles against the Foreign Minister 'Alā'al-Saltaneh, who was accused of not expediting the evacuation of Persia. As yet the E'tedāl party was not effective as a body, nor did it support Sepahdār unanimously. This is why the Democrats managed to put through their motions satisfactorily. Moreover, the E'tedālīs did not have a majority before the coalition, and often many neutral Deputies and Deputies of the other parties supported the Democrats.

Taqīzādeh and the Democrats drew attention to the occupation of Persia in and out of the Majles, and Iran-e Nou in particular was very outspoken, and blamed the Government. It went as far as to accuse the ruling class of being in league with the Imperialists.¹ That year the paper called on all Persians not to celebrate Nourūz, the New Year, because Persia was occupied.

1. Marling wrote in July that one or two of the Persian Ministers were nervous as to the effects of the withdrawal of the Russian army as was Nāṣer al-Molk, but that "none of them dare avow it openly." Barclay reported that anti-Russian feeling in the Majles was such that no condition offered by Russia would be considered dispassionately.
 Marling to Grey, July 3rd, 1910, No. 272, FO 371/952.
 Barclay to Grey, February 18th, 1910, No. 22, FO 416/43.

But the Russians did not evacuate and found one excuse after another to remain. The British Minister was of the opinion that the continued occupation of Persia would strengthen the Party that opposed them and would make the acceptance of the joint loan more difficult. Grey even suggested to Barclay that the Persian Government should be asked to show the Russians some sign of their friendship if they wanted them to evacuate.¹ But especially the Democrats made vehement attacks in the Iran-e Nou which led to the confiscation of this newspaper and Sharq which, though independent, supported the Democrats' line of argument. The Democrat Deputies now attacked the Government in the Majles on this issue and were joined by some of the non-Democrats such as Vakīl al-Tojjār, and Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh.²

Gradually the relationship between the Government and the Democrats deteriorated³ especially on financial questions. They blamed it for not bringing in a proper budget to the Majles and presenting it with a small list of expenses every day.⁴ This lack of trust and deterioration in relations

1. Grey to Braclay, February 15th, 1910, No. 30, FO 371/952.

2. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 97, 16th Jamādī al-Avval, 1328.

3. There were other occasions when the Government of Sepahdār was criticized by non-Democrats, for instance, for not bringing in a proper budget, for bad government in the South, for insecurity in Fars or the inactivity of the Government. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 71, 15th Rabī'al-Avval, 1328, or No. 42, 6th Moharram, 1328.

4. Ibid., No. 70, 12th Rabī'al-Avval, 1328 and No. 71, 15th Rabī'al-Avval.

increased further when the question of the foreign loan finally came up in January. We shall have to discuss the question of the loan at some length because it is very important and gradually led to the defeat of the Government of Sepahdār. Opposition to the loan was not voiced in the Majles, but outside in newspapers, especially in Iran-e Nou.

The demand for the loan had been made in December but it took a long period of negotiation before its terms were agreed upon by the British and the Russians and was at last communicated to the Persian Government. The question of the loan was the real test for Sepahdar, whether he could keep in office or not. Barclay had already warned his Government that his continuance depended on the loan and that it was being kept in office at the moment because of its prestige.¹

A joint note was communicated to the Persian Government in Šafar 1328 (February 1910) about the advance of £400,000. This was in six clauses.

1. The use of the money had to be approved by the two Legations, and the expenditure would be supervised by a Financial Council composed of the Administrator of the Customs, two members of the Majles, and two Government officials and would be presided over by the Minister of Finance. No sum would be spent without the approval of this Commission.

2. The list of expenses would not be approved by the Legation if it did not include the engagement of seven French financial advisors who would act according to the proposals of the report of the French Financial Advisor (Bizot).

1. Barclay to Grey, January 26th, 1910, No. 6, FO 371/950.

These advisors would work according to instructions prepared by the Financial Adviser. No part of the advance would be paid to the Persian Government before they made their official request to the French Government for the employment of these advisers.

3. This programme would not be approved either if it did not contain a measure for the organization of an armed force to supervise the security of the roads and commerce.

4. Persia would agree not to give any concession for the building of railways before offering the choice to Britain and Russia.

5. The society of the road between Tabriz and Jolfa would receive the concession of navigation on the Urumi-yeh Lake.

6. This advance would be the first part of the loan asked for by the Persian Government, if the Russian and British governments agreed to advance the loan. The sum advanced, at 7% a year, would be ^{repaid} in ten equal payments and guaranteed by the revenues of the customs and if this was insufficient the revenue would be an additional guarantee.¹

The Persian Government did not refuse these proposals outright but made enquiries as to the conditions of a larger loan² asking for further explanations.³ But there was immediate

1. Barclay to Grey, February 18th, 1910, No. 22 Enclosure in No. 356, FO, 416/43.

2. Ibid, March 7th, 1910, No. 33, FO 416/44.

3. The loan was not discussed in the Majlès, but its terms were referred to as unacceptable and it was decided to raise an internal loan.

M.M. Maj. 2, No. 91, 2nd Jamādī al-Avval, 1328.

opposition to these proposals by the Democrats and Iran-e Nou was especially very vehement. The Prime Minister even complained to Barclay that the people were being incited to demonstrate against the loan.¹

As early as the 27th Zīhājeh 1327 (16th January 1910) Iran-e Nou drew attention to the conditions of the loan which were said to be very severe. A campaign against the loan was organized by the Democrats not on principle but on its conditions. They agreed that Persia needed a loan, but they maintained that the conditions the British and Russians wished to impose would undermine Persia's sovereignty. Iran-e Nou wrote that now it was becoming clear why the Russians were not evacuating Persia, obviously they wanted to impose those conditions on her. A few days later it again drew attention to the loan, blaming the secret negotiations of the Government and saying it was acting unconstitutionally, a characteristic of the E'tedalīs. Other newspapers such as Sharq joined the attack. From all over Persia telegrams poured into Tehran attacking the loan, offering to raise the money locally and asking for taxes to be raised.² Iran-e Nou suggested that indirect taxes be imposed on tobacco for instance or on luxury goods to raise money.³

1. Barclay to Grey, March 11th, 1910, No. 34, FO 371/953.

2. Iran-e Nou, No. 144, 16th Şafar 1328 (28th February, 1910).
No. 148, 22nd Şafar (March 4th).

3. The Salt Monopoly must be mentioned in this respect as it has occasioned attacks on the Democrats. A Bill was introduced in the Majles on the First of Rabī'al-Avval (13th March) giving the Government a monopoly on the sale of salt, and was passed by a majority. It was expected to raise about four Coror. Later it proved a disadvantage as it made foreign salt cheaper and the foreign merchants profited thereby, so Soleymān Mīrzā on the 5th of Rabī'al-Avval 1329 suggested the abrogation of this tax. This occasioned many an attack by the E'tedalīs who blamed the Democrats of inconsistency. M.M. Maj., No. 220, 5th Rabī'al-Avval, 1329.

As a matter of policy the Democrats were opposed to all indirect taxes, but they declared that if the taxes were used for the development of the country they could be accepted. This was quite in line with the policy Taqīzādeh had suggested in the Taqīzadeh First Majles when he had agreed to the indirect taxes Ṣanī' al-Douleh suggested should be imposed on tea and sugar to build railways. An internal loan was raised and women contributed their jewels; meetings were held where patriotic speeches were made. The wife of the late Malek al-Motekallemīn and the wife of Yephrem Khān, the new Chief of Police, spoke at women's meetings, and money was collected for the Government officials and the wealthy. All through the month of Ṣafar (February/March), these agitations continued, until the Government announced in the semi-official newspaper of the Ministry of War, Polīs-e Iran, that it had changed its mind about the loan.¹ This was not the end of the financial problems of Persia, and in the crisis which followed an alignment of the Democrats became more obvious.

While the terms of the loan were being discussed by the Russian and British Government, Voṣūq al-Douleh and Ṣanī' al-Douleh, Ministers of Finance and Public Works, had begun to negotiate for a private loan from the International Oriental Syndicate.² It seems this negotiation was carried out either

1. Iran-e Nou, No. 150, 24th Ṣafar, 1328 (7th March, 1910).

2. In a letter from Mr. J. Woolf of the International Syndicate to Sir C. Hardinge, dated April 8th, 1910, he explained how in November when in Tehran, where he had gone to represent his syndicate which had been negotiating with the Persian Government, he had become aware that the Persians would accept the Russo-British loan under no conditions, and decided that the Syndicate could do useful work in reorganizing the Persian finances. As a result the British would

without the knowledge of all the Cabinet members or without their approval. Şanī'al-Douleh had openly opposed the loan in the Majles and now there occurred a split in the Cabinet on the question of the new loan. This split was in fact a reflection of the division in the Majles. It was a division between those who supported a policy of compromise and those who wanted to follow an independent line. According to Marling the Ultra-Nationalists (Democrats) of the Majles were represented amongst the Ministers by Voşūq and Şanī' al-Douleh. This is of course not strictly true for these two Ministers were not Democrats, they held independent views which were always interpreted in this way by the powers. It was the Democrats who supported them because of their independent policy and non-subservience, as they were to do later with Shuster. Moreover the attitude of the powers seemed a further justification of the policy of the Democrats.

This negotiation came to the knowledge of the British Government in March. Grey passed on this information and his objections to Nicolson, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to be conveyed to the Russian Government. He pointed out that the Persian Government was arranging to obtain a loan of £200,000 now and £300,000 later on the security of

F/note continued ...

obtain more political influence. Then the Syndicate had decided to contact the firm of Samuel and Co. which often undertook the financial part of their business. Messrs. Samuel had decided to consult the Foreign Office on the understanding that the information would be kept confidential, but soon it became known that the Foreign Office had informed the Russian Government, and both Governments made representations against these arrangements at Tehran. However, the Persians were determined to continue their financial re-organization. Messrs. Samuel were no longer interested, so the Syndicate made contact with some continental firms which, they added, did not include any German ones. They concluded with a warning that if action was not taken soon Germany would step in.

Mr. J. Woolf to Sir C. Hardinge, April 8th, 1910, No. 12062
FO 371/954.

the Persian Government's entire interests in the Darcy concession, the mint profits, and the undercharged revenue of the Persian state and receipts from the Posts and Telegraphs revenue. Those securities would be authorized by the Majles and were irrevocable.¹ He suggested that the Ambassador should ask the Russians to make a joint protest that while the Persian Government was negotiating the loan she could not pledge her sources of public revenue. He added that if this argument failed the Russians could still veto it as being in contravention of the Russian loan contract.

Thereby a note was presented to the Persian Government on 26th Rabi' al-Avval (7th April) protesting against the negotiations. They wrote that in answer to the enquiry of the Persian Government of the 8th Rabi' al-Avval the Russian and British Governments recognized the right of Persia to borrow money from sources other than the Russian and British Governments, but on condition that:

1. The revenue of the customs and other revenue which are guaranteed as security for the Russo-British loans should under no circumstances be used as guarantees to the new loans before any financial engagement be made.

2. All financial obligations contracted by Persia

1. There was a great amount of secrecy involved in these financial questions. It was said by the Foreign Minister, Mo'aven al-Douleh (appointed to succeed 'Alā' al-Saltāneh), to the British and Russian Ministers' representatives that there was a strong divergence of policy among the Cabinet members and that he was opposed to their policy. On March 14th, Şanī' al-Douleh and Voşūq al-Douleh had sent Mo'in al-Vezāreh to see the British Minister and explain the reasons for negotiating with the International Syndicate and defended their right to do so, but persisted in the fact that no British or Russian interests would be undermined. The British and Russians, however, warned him that they might have to ask Şanī' al-Douleh for his dismissal.

in Russia and England, floating debt included, must be embodied in a regular engagement which would determine a fixed annuity for interest and sinking fund as well as revenues to serve as security.

It added that while Russia and Britain did not wish to hamper the rights of nationals or other powers to purely commercial affairs, they could not admit that any concession which might affect their strategic or political interests in Persia should be given to other powers. Another note was presented to the Persian Government on May 20th which stated that the British and Russian Governments expected that before granting any concession for telegraph or harbours or any means of communication, Persia would consult with their respective Governments. The reply to this note was delayed owing to a Cabinet crisis. There was hardly any discussion about the loan in the Majles. All the negotiations were secret and the discussions were carried out by the newspapers, especially Iran-e Nou which had less consideration for the Government Ministers. This was one reason why Sepahdār tried to impose a censorship of the press at this time.

The Second Cabinet of Sepahdār (to be discussed later) showed itself conciliatory, as was to be expected, and sent a reply to the note of the 26th Rabī'al-Avval (7th April) on the 10th Jamādī al-Avval (7th May), agreeing on the first point. With regard to the second, they said Persia saw no connection between the debts of the Persian Government to the Russian and British, and the right to obtain a fresh loan, and that special revenues would be set aside for the debts of the Persian Government. As to the floating debt, the Persian Government was ready to make a definite arrangement, it said, which would

include a fixed yearly interest.¹ This question, however, was not settled satisfactorily at this time, and the search for a loan was continued in the Cabinet of Mostoufi al-Mamālek as will be seen. If the Democrats were unable to enforce the evacuation of Persia by the Russian force, they were victorious in blocking the loan. Unfortunately, however, the negotiation for another loan with no political strings attached was unsuccessful. However, in the eyes of the Russians, the Democrats were responsible for the failure of the joint loan.

Consequently, a long, protracted Cabinet crisis ensued.² The Russians believed that the Majles was dominated by "rabble" which caused the proposal for the loan not to be accepted.³

1. Marling to Grey, May 29th, 1910, No. 80, Incl. in No. 1 FO 371/954. It must be added that this answer was made in secret. On the 10th of Jamādī al-Šānī, Iran-e Nou commented that it was rumoured that the Persian Government had promised Russia and Britain that it would accept their demands. It added that it was hoped this was only a rumour - the Persian Government could not have done this. Iran-e Nou, No. 233, 10th Jamādī al-Šānī, 1328 (19th June, 1910)
2. Vošūq al-Douleh, Šānī' al-Douleh and Moshīr al-Douleh were said to have resigned because of the appointment of Mo'āven al-Douleh as Foreign Minister. Barclay commented on this appointment, saying that the Russians were satisfied with the appointment but that the Minister did not have a high reputation for honesty. Marling to Grey, March 24th, 1910, No. 45, FO 371/950.
3. Nicolson to Grey, March 18th, 1910, No. 101, FO 416/43.

The Democrats on the other hand, feeling stronger, criticised the Sepahdār and obstructed him to such an extent as to occasion a Cabinet crisis and his eventual resignation. The Prime Minister also agreed with this version and blamed the Majles for its unreasonable attitude. He, in fact, favoured a policy of compromise, thinking Persia was not in a position to force Russia to withdraw her troops, and that only patience and friendly methods could make her withdraw. He found the Majles intolerable and did not know how long he could put up with it.¹ He also secretly warned the Russian Representative that there seemed to be a plot afoot in the Cabinet to place all loan negotiations in the hands of Ṣanī'al-Douleh and Voṣūq al-Douleh, who might even engage in negotiating with the Germans.² He also complained that these two Ministers were in sympathy with the Majles, and particularly with the Democrats and incited it not to accept the loan.³

Sepahdār was trusted by the powers, and Marling even went as far as to say that they (the Russian and British Ministers) had the gravest apprehension about the formation of a Cabinet from which Sepahdār would be excluded.⁴

Sardār A'sad in the meantime flirted with both sides, and Marling wrote that he had been privy to the negotiations of the two Ministers to raise a loan other than one from the British or Russians, and it seemed that Sardār As'ad and

1. Barclay to Grey, March 11th, 1910, No. 34, FO 416/44.

2. Ibid., April 9th, 1910, No. 150, FO 416/44.

3. Ibid., March 11th, 1910, No. 34, FO 371/953.

4. Marling to Grey, May 15th, 1910, No. 74, FO 371/950.

Sepahdar did not see eye to eye.¹ Sepahdār complained that Sardār As'ad had joined the Nationalists, and it was deemed necessary by Marling and the Russian Minister, Poklewski, to put pressure upon him and to threaten him with the withdrawal of the favour of their Governments.

In the meantime, the Cabinet was not only weakened by the dissension, but was attacked by the Deputies with the Democrats in the lead who hoped to defeat the Prime Minister and Russian influence. This was in fact a contest of force, and the Democrats' strength becomes obvious by the fact that Sepahdar felt obliged to give the Majles a kind of ultimatum. He felt the Democrats to be obstructive, but the ultimatum went beyond either the relationship of the Sepahdār with the Democrats or the question of the loan or the Russians. The Government was obstructed on many small questions, for instance any small sum it wanted to spend was either changed or stopped, whilst it was often criticized for not preparing the budget, not performing its duties, not being able to guarantee peace and security, and not even being able to solve the problem of the shortage of bread and meat in Tehran. Such criticisms were not limited to the Democrats and all joined in it.

Sepahdār presented the Majles with a sort of ultimatum

1. One reason for this attitude of Sardār As'ad was the fear his position in the capital had raised amongst the powerful southern tribes. He had some opponents in his own tribe as well, so he tried to approach the Democrats. The best account of these relationships is by Doulatābādī who was well aware of the events behind the scene, and many of his conclusions bear out the opinion of the British Minister.

which was discussed in secret sittings. It dealt with three topics, foreign relations, finance and the question of the Mojāhedīn. In fact, it aimed at increasing its own power. It asked whether the Majles wished them to pursue a policy of "bluster vis-a-vis Russia" or to obtain the evacuation of Persia by friendly methods. The Cabinet favoured a policy of friendly pressure. If this were not effected, he would prefer to resign. On the financial question, it said there was no money, and the Cabinet begged to carry on the negotiations and consult the Majles in time if the negotiations progressed. On the question of the armed Mojāhedīn and the Caucasians who were included amongst them, the Cabinet proposed that he be disarmed. It also wanted stricter censorship to be imposed on the press and on the parties which had been formed within the Nationalist groups and were mainly concerned with intriguing against each other.¹ (By the Nationalist groups, he meant the groups around Taqīzādeh and Sattār Khān.) At this time, no open answer was given to these demands by the Majles and it was referred to a Commission. In fact, the powers Sepahdār wanted anticipate the policy he followed later and the full power he obtained eventually with the backing of the E'tedālīyūn party. It further illustrates his attitude to the Majles, which he thought to be a nuisance and was ready to dispense with.²

1. Barclay to Grey, March 11th, 1910, No. 34, FO 371/953.

2. This attitude of Sepahdār is well-illustrated by the confrontation with the newspapers which culminated in the confiscation of Sharq and Iran-e Nou when they had both criticized him severely in Jamādī al-Avval (May).

M.M. Maj. 2, No. 97, 16th Jamādī al-Avval 1328.

The Cabinet crises dragged on until the end of Jamādī al-Avval (the middle of May). Marling believed that it was impossible to form a Cabinet without either Sepahdār or Sardār As'ad, partly because of their prestige, but partly also because he thought it was believed by the people that they enjoyed the confidence of Britain and Russia.¹ In fact the new Cabinet was formed with Russo-British backing. Sepahdār and Sardār As'ad exchanged the office of Minister of War and Interior², but an attempt by Marling and Poklewski to exclude from the new Cabinet those Ministers they called the Ultra-Nationalists, namely Ṣanī'al-Douleh and Voṣūq al-Douleh, was unsuccessful and these two were included in the Second Ministry of Sepahdār. This was no doubt due to the influence of the Democrats, and in defiance of the powers.

1. Marling to Grey, May 15h, 1910, No.74, FO 371/950.

2. No explanation was given as to the reason for this exchange in the Majles on the 19th of Rabī'al-Ṣanī when Sepahdār came to the Majles, and declared that as the Cabinet members had not changed their programme remained the same. Iran-e Nou took the occasion of the resignation of the Cabinet to insist that there was a need for a party to back the Ministers, and that the existing parties should come out and declare their policies, Iran-e Nou No.163 15 Rabī' al-Avval 1328 (26 March 1910).

The Second Cabinet of Sepahdār: Jamādī al-Avval 1328

(May 1910) to Rajab (July)

Relations between the Democrats and Sepahdar did not improve despite this reshuffle. Of course there was no real change in the Government or in the composition of the Cabinet. In fact, Sepahdār's Cabinet was reshuffled four times before he actually resigned. Therefore, there could not be any improvement of relationship between the Majles and the Government. The Democrats at this time were stronger than the E'tedālīs. The latter did not support Sepahdār as a body until the formation of the coalition. Besides, they were much less organized than the Democrats, and did not have the same sense of purpose. Marling repeated again that Sepahdār was unpopular because of his alleged subserviance to Russia¹ and because he seemed not to care for the Constitution. He added that Sepahdār resented the interference of the Majles Committees with the Executive, that the two of the Ministers were still hostile and Sardār As'ad was false and that Sepahdār only had the support of the Ulama, merchants and artisans.² Marling particularly complained about the interference of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Majles, four of whose members were Democrats, Ḥakīm al-Molk, Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb, Taqīzādeh and Vaḥīd al-Molk.³

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1. The behaviour of the Russians was calculated to outrage the Persians' feelings and generally to overawe them. In Rabī' al-Sānī (April), for instance, Dārāb Mīrzā the son of the Qajar prince Bahman Mīrzā, who had taken refuge in Russia in the days of Moḥammad Shah, and was now in the Russian Cossack force, came to Qazvin. There he collected together a force to whom he gave Russian protection, and set about pillaging the villages. The Persian Government wanted to arrest him but was not allowed to do so and the Russians themselves sent a force to arrest him. The worst Russian outrage was, however, in Tabriz, as described by A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Hījdah Sāleh, pp. 122-3.
 2. Marling to Grey, June 17th 1910, No. 103, FO 371/950.
 3. Ibid., July 4th 1910. No. 117. FO 371. 962.

The new Cabinet of Sepahdār satisfied no one, and even those who became known as E'tedālīs later or were E'tedālīs from the beginning attacked it.¹

At this juncture the extraordinary powers Sepahdār had demanded previously were discussed in the Majles, and an angry meeting ensued and when the motion was put to the vote, it was found that many Deputies had left the Chamber so no votes could be taken.²

As mentioned, dissatisfaction and criticism with Sepahdār was not limited to the loan question nor the non-evacuation of the Russian forces. The Minister of Justice, for instance, Sardār Manṣūr was badly criticized on account of not carrying out his duties, but it must be remembered that he was close to Sepahdār, who could not continue in office with so much dissatisfaction and criticism coming from the deputies in general. However, the British Minister thought his eclipse temporary and that he would come back on his own terms and probably dissolve the Majles. In any case he resigned in Rajab

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1. Vakīl al-Tojjār, for instance, criticized the behaviour of the Minister of Justice, Sardār Manṣūr, who accepted the intermediation of important personages. Hājī Āqā, who later became very anti-Democratic, attacked the Ministers for not attending the Majles when questioned. This criticism was followed by Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh who said that not only did his Ministers not work, but they tried to halt all progress. They did not send troops to Ardabil in time until the foreigners occupied it and attacked people; why did the Government not stop those who were trying to cause disturbances? They did nothing for those poor people; what was the Majles to do with these Ministers? The Democrats too joined in these criticisms; Noubarī and Āqā SheykhEbrāhīm were very critical, the latter saying they were afraid these people might plot against the Majles, and the Ministers paid no attention to the problems of the people.
M.M. Maj. 2, No. 111, 24th Jamādī al-Sānī 1328.
 2. Ibid., No. 101, 28th Jamādī al-Avval 1328, and No. 102, 3rd Jamādī al-Sānī.

(July). The reason for this was the continuous attacks by the Democrats, reported Marling.¹

There was one weapon with which the Democrats could be fought and weakened, and that was religion. The E'tedāliyyūn, Seyyed 'Abdallāh², and all the enemies of the Democrats used this weapon to fight them. There were many intrigues at this time and a deliberate campaign was conducted in particular against Taqīzādeh, and his followers and they were accused of being revolutionaries and irreligious. The Democrats on the other hand, wanted to stop Seyyed 'Abdallāh's interference in politics.³ Just before his murder there were two articles in Iran-e Nou hinting at his ambition to control the Majles, saying people would not accept even a religious leader to use the Constitution for his own ends.⁴ Doulatābādī, who is well informed on all the intrigues, wrote that the democrats had murdered Amīn al-Molk, a person very close to Sepahdār and one who was especially active against them. According to the same authority,

1. Marling to Grey, July 15th, 1910, No. 132, FO 371/950.
2. Seyyed 'Abdallāh had been exiled during the Estebdād-e Saghīr, and returned after the fall of the Shah. He did not take an active part in the Second Majles' discussion but obviously he was active mainly behind the scenes, and it has already been mentioned that he was one of the politicians who organized the E'tedāliyyūn party.
3. Y. Doulatābādī recounts that when he was on his way from Baku to Tehran, the Ejtemā'iyūn 'Amīyūn's leaders had asked him to tell Behbahānī not to interfere in political matters. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 3, p. 116.
4. Iran-e Nou, No. 243, 28th Jamādī al-Šānī 1328, 6th July 1910. Y. Doulatābādī, also says the same. Op.cit., 3, pp. 129-30.

Taqizādeh was close to Sardār As'ad who did not get on with Sepahdār,¹ to the great worry of the E'tedāliyyūn who had been joined by Sardār Mohīī and Sattār Khān, and one of the Bakhtiyārī Khāns.² Sepahdār encouraged them, as did Nāṣer al-Molk. They also organized an Anjoman called Anjoman-e Ahrār which denounced and threatened Taqizādeh.³

Amīrkheyzī, a close companion of Sattār Khān, also mentions this Anjoman, and states that Sattār Khān signed a petition which was being addressed to the Regent that Taqizādeh and several of his companions must leave.⁴ These attacks on Taqizādeh were growing and at last obliged him to take leave of the Majles. Apparently the E'tedāliyyūn had asked the Ulama in Najaf to send a Takfīrnāmeḥ (excommunication) against Taqizādeh. According to Ḥabl al-Matīn, the Russian newspapers had spread the rumour that Taqizādeh had been excommunicated.⁵ In any case Taqizādeh, who was no doubt frightened, took leave of absence at the end of Jamādī al-Šānī (June) but he was still in Tehran when Seyyed 'Abdallāh was murdered.

1. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 3, pp. 134-137.

2. Sattār Khān and Bāqer Khān, the two popular leaders of the Revolution of Tabriz, were made to leave that city owing to Russian pressure. When they came to Tehran they joined in all the local intrigues.

Amīrkheyzī, op.cit., pp. 538-559 and 573-576.

3. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., 3, p. 135.

4. E. Amīrkheyzī, op.cit., p. 576.

5. Ḥabl al-Matīn, (Calcutta) No. 16, 13th Shavāl, 1328 (7th October 1910).

Seyyed 'Abdallāh Behbahānī was murdered on 9th Rajab (July 29th). Taqīzādeh and Heydar Khān were suspected of the murder and there was such an angry outcry against them that Taqīzādeh had to leave Persia and Heydar Khān went into hiding. The Bāzārs closed and there was talk of taking Bast in the two legations.¹

There is still a controversy about this murder. Some writers emphatically state that Taqīzādeh and Heydar Khān were responsible for the murder because the Seyyed was going to read the Takfīrnāme in the Majles,² but Marling doubted these accusations and wrote to Grey that it was said the letter of the Najaf Ulama had been dictated by Sepahdār and Seyyed 'Abdallāh, but that this was later denied.³ Doulatābādī wrote sceptically that either he had been murdered because of personal revenge or because they feared his ascendancy.⁴

In fact there is a note in the Iran-e Nou dated Zīqa'deh 1328 (2nd November 1910) in which Mollā Kāẓem Khorāsānī denies having sent a Takfīrnāme against Taqīzādeh.⁵ On the other hand, the two Ulama, Khorāsānī and Māzandarānī wrote in

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1. The Bāzārs remained closed until the Committee of Union and Progress (Ēttefāq va Taraqqī) published a memorandum to the Persian Foreign Office from Russia threatening that if they were not opened they would march to Tehran. This was a fake, and Marling wrote that it was published in the Government publishing house, but as a result the Bāzārs opened on the promise that the assassins would be caught. Marling to Grey, July 29th 1910, No.138, FO 371/950.
 2. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Hījdah Sāleh, p.130.
 3. Marling to Grey, July 15th 1910, No.129, FO 371/962.
 4. Y. Doulatābādī, op.cit., p. 137.
 5. Iran-e Nou No.18, Zīqa'deh 1328, 2nd November 1910.

reply to Ḥabl al-Matīn which had questioned them as to whether they had excommunicated Taqīzādeh, stating that they had not excommunicated him formally but wanted his exile as he was a Mofsed, a corrupter of men.¹ The cause of the deterioration of the relationship between the Ulama and Taqīzādeh is nowhere explained, but there is a letter also published in Ḥabl al Matīn by the two Ulama which gives some indication. In this letter they deny the accusation brought against them that they had contacts with the Russian Consul and accepted the Russian occupation as published in Shams No.28. They admit, however, to having seen the Russian Consul but insist that they had always worked for the independence of Persia, declaring that such accusations were pure lies which would endanger Persia. They were, they said, the only ones who could guard the country against the divisions and troubles which were besetting her with the strength of religion.² Such accusations had obviously been voiced widely and Taqīzādeh was held responsible.

The E'tedāliyyūn retaliated by murdering 'Alī Moḥammad Tarbīyat and Seyyed 'Abd al-Razāq, a Mojāhed close to the Democrats. In any case, the murder of Behbahānī served the E'tedāliyyūn for Taqīzādeh had to leave, and it was hoped that with his disappearance the Democrats would be weakened, but in fact this was not so as shall be seen. The British Minister was also

1. Ḥabl al-Matīn (Calcutta) No.16 12th Shavā1 1328, 17th Oct. 1910.

2. Ibid., No.13, Shavā1 1328, 17th Oct. 1910.

glad about his disappearance from the scene. He wrote that Taqīzādeh's sincerity of purpose no one would deny, but "his utility to the cause of freedom in Persia ceased with the abdication of Mohamed Ali, and he would probably now best serve his country by taking an almost passive part in public affairs".¹

It must be asked who benefited from the Seyyed's murder. For the E'tedāliyyūn who pointed the finger of accusation at the Democrats it was a victory, for it connected them with the murder of a revered Seyyed, and one of the leaders of the Constitutional Revolution. Besides it removed Taqīzādeh who was a much more effective leader than Soleyman Mīrzā who replaced him. It must be added that the Russians also benefited by it and indeed this was hinted at in the Nationalist papers.²

This event not only had the effect of removing Taqīzādeh, but it also helped to hasten the disarmament of the Mojāhedīn which was another of the demands of the Russians.³ The murderers were never caught, nor was any attempt made to arrest them (one was a Caucasian called Rajab).⁴

Immediately after the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh there was a great flare up of party feelings in the Majles and especially the E'tedāliyyūn became more outspoken. The arguments and discussions of their members are much more party conscious and organized, especially after the formation of the government of Mostoufī al-Mamālek. However the Democrats were

1. Marling to Grey, July 15th 1910, No.129, FO 371/962.
2. Marling to Grey, July 22, 1910, No.297, FO 416/45/Habl al-Matīn in fact declared this openly, Habl al-Matīn (Calcutta) No. 15, 12th Ramażān, 1328 (26th September, 1910).
3. Izvolsky to Benckendorf, Communication to British Foreign Office, July 23rd 1910, No. 26593 FO 371/962.
4. Marling wrote that the identity of the assassins was known but that no measure had as yet been taken to arrest them despite many requests to the Regent by many deputations. Izvolsky to Benckendorf-Communications to British F.O. July 21, No.26521, FO 371/962.

still stronger as they had the support of the neutral deputies and some of the members of the other parties, and also because they still had a better organization and a more purposeful policy.

On the 12th Rajab, Vakīl al-Tojjār made a long speech condemning "Pārtībāzī" factional politics, saying that the person who committed this act was an enemy of Persia's independence. He reminded the Majles of the fact that there was still no government after 5 days, and called eloquently for unity. No names were mentioned in the discussions and no insinuations were made against any one in particular. These discussions were continued in a much more impassioned manner a few days later. Although no names were mentioned insinuations and blame was voiced against those people "who had sowed seeds of disunity and intrigued for their personal ends".

The worse thing was the absence of a government since the resignation of Sepahdār, and Sardār As'ad said that the safety of the country was at stake. Asadallāh Khān asked for the letter from the Āyatallāhs to be read in the Majles and Āqā Seyyed Hoseyn Ardabīlī drew attention to the existence of the armed people going loose in town. However, Sheykh Reżā Dehkhāreqānī speaking for the Democrats, denied the fact that the country's safety was at stake, and added that if the country could not fight its external enemies it could at least fight the internal ones. Besides, he added, the crisis of having no government was not new: they had encountered worse crises. Then he answered those who blamed everything on the lack of unity. He asked how this was to be effected, how and with whom were they to unite? There is talk of E'tedāl and Enqelāb, but who is E'tedāl and who is Enqelāb, he asked; Enqelāb means revolution,

"the curse of God on anyone who seeks revolution". E'tedāl means someone who can compromise with anyone, such a person is a traitor." Of course the murder of this Seyyed is a great loss, but it must be remembered that according to the law of Eslam when a person is killed his next of kin must seek revenge. In the law of Islam a man's next of kin is his son, and while he has a son all his near relatives have no right to seek revenge. Of course it is the duty of the Government to find the culprits, and it has nothing to do with Bāzārīs to interfere with the duty of the Government. "It is you," he accused, "who are causing disturbances and yet you call yourself E'tedālīs." He then commented on the speeches of Asadallāh Khān, saying he had made insinuations but had mentioned no names. In this way each person would think he meant them.

He then asked who had seen the letter (meaning the Takfīrnāmeḥ) from Najaf, and added that he did not believe this, as the Ulama would not do such a thing without a good reason. Of course to excommunicate a person who was a Moslem was worse than killing him, and someone who is a Mojtahed would not call a person irreligious without reason. Sometimes it was said such and such a person was corrupt. "Did this mean that he did not comply with our neighbours' wishes?" In such a case there were many in this Majles, in fact all were corrupt. If the meaning of Enqelāb was considered to be corrupt, he said, I am one myself.¹ The President closed this meeting so that no more speeches in this vein should be made. In the next meeting, Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh began by saying if such accusations were made there should be a trial, but Soleyman Mīrzā in a very conciliatory

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No 120, 16th Rajab 1328.

speech drew attention to the fact that Persia was under foreign occupation and that all should work for her independence.¹

Thereupon no more was said about the murder.

Despite the setback the Democrats suffered they were still a power in the Majles, and retained their influence. Marling described them as weak but he added that they were the only party.² According to him owing to the unpopularity of the government, "all malcontents rally to the Nationalists' banner". In another letter Barclay commented that the majority of the assembly were moderates, but the Nationalist minority had the brain and energy, and they stop any cabinet from adopting a subservient attitude.³

Despite the strong resistance to overt party stance and activities, inevitably in these few months of Sepahdār's primeministership from December 1909 to July 1910, the bitterly fought issues of the Russian presence, the loan and the role of religion and of leading Mojtaheds meant that there was a significant increase in party feeling. The murder of Seyyed 'Abdallah Behbahānī and the retaliatory assassination represented a watershed in the increasing acrimony on both sides. Although the departure of Taqīzādeh robbed the Democrats of their most outstanding leader and so led to something of a readjustment of strength within the Majles, nonetheless the new Prime Minister Mostoufī al-Mamālek was a man of noted liberal tendencies, and the Democrat party as a whole had sufficient influence and

1. Ibid., No.122, 19th Rajab 1328.

2. Marling to Grey, July 15th 1910, No.132, FO 416/45.

3. Barclay to Grey, September 26th 1910, No.383, FO 416/45.

strength to force upon him to take some of their most loyal members of long standing into the Cabinet. The stage was now set for the next phase in the development of real party politics.

CHAPTER IV

THE CABINET OF MOSTOUFĪ AL-MAMĀLEKRAJAB 1328 (JULY 1910) TO RABĪ' AL-AVVAL 1329 (MARCH 1911)

Mostoufī al-Mamālek was appointed by the Regent to form a government. He was an obvious choice as he had the support of the Democrats who were now a force to be reckoned with¹, and he was credited with having liberal ideas. However the attested liberalism of men such as Mostoufī al-Mamālek, Moshīr al-Douleh and his brother Mo'tamen al-Molk or Vošūq al-Douleh and Qavām al-Saltāneh was a qualified liberalism. They were more tolerant and reformist than other politicians but on controversial issues they were not so courageous or radical as to risk endangering themselves, their families or their class interests. As far as the Democrats were concerned, however, this was a sufficient ground to support such men, and on this instance they managed to put two of their own candidates in the Cabinet.

Mostoufī took some time to form his Cabinet owing to the great difficulties raised by the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh. The membership of this Cabinet was a controversial question as the Democrats who had ousted Sepahdar were determined to put into office some of their own candidates. These were Qavām al-Saltāneh, Asadallāh Mīrzā

1. Mostoufī had for instance befriended the Āzādīkhāhān in the past, and had even saved Mīrzā Soleyman Khān Meykadeh who had been arrested by order of Moḥammad 'Alī Shah just before the bombardment of the Majles.

Hoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb and Hakīm al-Molk. But these men's ministerial appointment was unacceptable to some of the moderates who refused to join,¹ so a compromise was reached by including first Farmānfarmā and later 'Ayn al-Douleh² in the Cabinet. This compromise illustrates both the weakness and strength of the Democrats. They were obviously a force to be reckoned with, however they were basically weak and had to depend on politicians who were not Democrats.

Marling commented on the new government, saying that the new Ministry was Nationalist, "a term which I regret to say implies in foreign affairs a policy of mistrust and of distant relations with the two powers."³ He described Mostoufi, who had been Minister of War in the Ministry of Sa'd al-Douleh as having little experience of affairs and no conspicuous ability, but he had integrity and was of good family. He also described the other Ministers in the new Cabinet. He said Asadallāh Mīrzā was intelligent but vain and intriguing, Qavām al-Saltāneh was credited with having done good work as Under-Secretary of War, and Hakīm al-Molk, he said, had neither brains nor experience. These four represented the Nationalist

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1. For instance Moshīr al-Douleh, a cautious politician refused to join the Cabinet after the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh.
 2. R. Dehkhāreqānī in a conversation with Nāṣer al-Molk had said that 'Ayn al-Douleh had been imposed upon them by the reactionaries. R. Dehkhāreqānī, op.cit., p.140.
 3. In fact this Ministry was nominally under the premiership of Nāṣer al-Molk, but as he was in Europe at the time, Sa'd al-Douleh was put in charge as the same time as being Minister for Foreign Affairs.

element in the Ministry or, as the press called them, the E'jtemā'iyūn or Socialists.¹ In the same Cabinet was Farmānfarmā who was according to Marling given the post of Minister of the Interior to give this Cabinet some respect.

Mostoufī faced the same problems as Sepahdār but he had the support of the Democrats: on the other hand he was unpopular with the E'tedālīs and the Russians who were particularly opposed to Navvāb. The problem of evacuation, the employment of foreign experts, the establishment of peace and security, the solution of the financial problems and the disarmament of the Mojāhedīn were the major concerns of this Government.

On the 23 of Rajab (July) Mostoufī brought his programme to the Majles. It contained the following points:

1. Immediate employment of foreign experts.
2. Necessary reforms in the police forces.
3. The organization of a military force comprising a regular force of 6600 men with modern weapons in the capital, and a force organized like former forces, but with necessary reforms for the provinces. These would constitute about

1. Marling to Grey, July 24th 1910, No. 138 FO 416/45. The Russians' attitude to this Cabinet was related by Barclay in September, "Russia" he wrote, "could at any moment instigate its adherents to revolt and give herself a good excuse to interfere", and he added that he believed Sepahdār was intriguing to this end. Barclay to Grey, September 26th, 1910 No. 383, FO 416/45.

25 or 30 thousand and they would be armed with modern weapons.

4. Reforms of the financial situation: adjustment of the taxes and the immediate establishment of a board of accounting after the necessary bills were presented to the Majles. The preparation of a sum for the immediate expense and necessary measures for the increase of revenue and the supervision of expenditure.
5. Necessary reforms in the affairs of the judiciary and an enquiry into the preparation of bills, and a better conduct of affairs in the law courts. Before the regulations for the election of the directors and members of the courts were prepared, the Minister of Justice would have the power to select the members. Immediate establishment of a Court of Appeal.
6. Reform of education. Some teachers were to be sent to Europe to complete their studies.
7. The preparation of a Bill to set up a Council of State for the enquiry into the legislation of the Majles.

There followed immediate discussion on this programme which in fact was not so much different from that of Sepahdār, and held none of the items of the Democrats' Marāmnāmeh. Hāj Āqā said he hoped this time the Government would not give words to people as the last one had, but act and perform its promises. Fahīm al-Molk asked about foreign occupation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Navvāh, replied that this was of course understood and was the first duty of the Government.¹

This programme was discussed much more thoroughly on the 14th and 17th Sha'bān. Objections and criticisms were made by the non-Democrats, and particularly by the E'tedāliyyūn who had become much more vocal and organized after the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh. Ḥāj Āqā, Mo'āẓed al-Molk, Fāteḥ al-Molk and Nāṣer al-Eslām all E'tedālīs, criticised the Government's policy. It was defended mostly by Asadallāh Mīrzā as Minister of Posts and Telegrams. Farmānfarmā and Navvāb also spoke in favour of their programme. Some of the Deputies who defended the ministerial programme were Seyyed Ḥoseyn Ardabīlī, a Democrat, Ḥasan 'Alī Khān and Vakīl al Ro'āyā. The Democrats' leader, Soleymān Mīrzā, and Vaḥīd al-Molk, another of the important Democrat Deputies, said nothing, without doubt because the party generally had been told to be neutral towards this Government.

The main objection to this programme was that it was not specific enough and was more like a list of headings which did not specify how the measures were to be carried out. One of the Deputies, Behjat, said that the Ministers' programme was "so colourless that it would suit any colour", and he gave as an example the fact that they said they wished to reform the Ministries. This needed some explanation, he said. Another government could come along with a different policy, but suggest the same programme; what they should know was how these reforms

1. M.M. Maj 2, No. 124, 23rd Rajab 1328.

would be carried out. Matīn al-Saltāneh also made the same kind of objection, saying this programme lacked the necessary details. At last, as the arguments became repetitive, votes were taken out of 66 - 45 voted for, 6 against and fifteen abstained.¹

Despite this early success, Mostoufī al-Mamālek's Government did not enjoy a definite support in the Majles. As mentioned, the position of the parties was fluid, the Democrats supported him but they were in a minority, the moderates wanted his downfall. The non-aligned Deputies' support changed from time to time and this shifted the standing of the Government. Unfortunately this Cabinet was not united and all the Ministers did not see eye to eye, which weakened their argument. More important than their lack of unity was the fact that the Cabinet of Mostoufi did not have a definite support in the Majles, as mentioned, and the majority put a great pressure on him² and on Navvāb particularly.³ He was often interrogated in the Majles by Kāshef, Behjat and 'Ez al-Molk about his policy towards the Russians.⁴ Ironically

1. Ibid., No.131, 14th Sha'bān 1328, and No. 132 17th Sha'bān.
2. The same complaints were voiced now as before; for instance the Deputies pointed out to the non completion of the budget and Hāj Āqā said that the Government did not reply to questions in the Majles. Ibid., No. 162, 21 Shavāl 1328.
3. Barclay to Grey, Oct. 31st, 1910, no. 197, FO 371/366 and M.M. Maj 2, No. 135, 24th Sha'bān, 1328.
4. Ibid., No.130, 12th Sha'bān 1328 and No. 135, 24th Sha'bān.

he could only give the same reply that the Government of Sepahdār had given to the same question by the Democrats, namely that the Russians were friendly, they would evacuate soon, and that he could not reveal all the negotiations. On the 21st Shavāl (September) the Government was *censured* for doing nothing about the Russian occupation for not presenting the budget and for undermining the articles 13, 15 and 16 of the Constitutional laws.¹ The E'tedālīs further, often drew attention to the disturbances in the provinces, but the Democrats vehemently denied that they were so widespread as alleged.

The Democrats' attitude to the Government of Mostoufī as ordered by the Central Committee dated Zīhājeh 1328, was to be one of support for Mostoufī, Navvāb and Ḥakīm al-Molk. In case of censure of the other Ministers the party should abstain from voting. This was ordered at the time of the British Ultimatum but no doubt reflected the Democrats' attitude to the Government in general.²

The lack of support in the Majles, and the troubles which arose in Fars, caused a change in the Cabinet at the end of Ramāzān (October). 'Ayn al-Douleh, the notorious reactionary prince who had been in charge of the siege of Tabriz, was made Minister of the Interior and Farmānfarmā, too ambitious to refuse, Minister of War.³ The return of 'Ayn al-Douleh to the political

1. Ibid., No. 162, 21st Shavāl, 1328.

2. Majmū'eh-ye Taqīzādeh, No. 2. Zīhājeh 1328

3. Barclay wrote that Farmānfarmā was opposed to the Foreign Minister Navvāb, but he had always wanted the Ministry
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scene, especially in the Government of Mostoufī which included Democrats, proves the fact that the Democrats always needed the support of such powerful men. It also shows that the old aristocratic class was regaining its position. Of course it had never lost its strength, and those amongst them who had supported the Constitution had remained in power. The difference was that those who had actively opposed it could now be given important posts and be acceptable. This trend had began with Sepahdār and is a proof that much of the revolutionary fervour of the movement, especially in the Majles, had been lost or had deviated. This is also a defeat for the Democrats who could not stop the return of 'Ayn al-Douleh to the political scene. It is however, not surprising that they accepted his membership in the Cabinet. Mostoufī was not a Democrat himself, and it has already been mentioned that the membership of this Cabinet was a compromise between the two sides. Moreover the influence and power of men such as 'Ayn al-Douleh or Farmānfarmā was a lever against local magnates and feudal Khāns who could not be brought under control by the weak central government. Further, their wealth might have been used to acquire them such positions in a

Cont'd. of War and now he found the bait too tempting to refuse.
Barclay to Grey, October 31st 1910, No. 197,
FO 416/46.

government in dire need of money,¹ nor must the foreign influence be overlooked, and possibly such men might have had the support of the great powers.

The first act of this Government was to deal with the armed bands of Mojāhedīn and try to stop the waves of murders. There was an argument in the Majles as to whether or not the Government should demand extraordinary powers for a limited period or declare martial law. The Government considered the granting of extraordinary powers sufficient and the Minister of War presented four articles which defined these powers. They were:

1. Disarmament of the non military.
2. Disarmament to be carried out by the police and the army.
3. The arrest of anyone who resisted.
4. The prohibition of meetings or the criticism of this procedure in the press. The period was limited to 3 months.

1. In the summer 1328, 1910, for instance, it was decided to collect money from the wealthy in order to balance some of the financial deficit of the Government. A Majles Commission was set up under Vakīl al-Ro'āyā, and a total sum of 739,046 Toman was collected in cash and real estate. The largest sum was taken from Zell al-Soltān, the next largest sum was the amount of 87,300 Toman paid by 'Ayn al-Douleh. Farmānfarmā paid the third largest sum, namely 60,000 Toman. It can be surmised that having paid these large sums, these politicians gained some influence in the Majles and government.
Marling to Grey, July 8th 1910, No.122, FO 371/962.

The E'tedāliyyūn tried half-heartedly to put some arguments forward to stop the granting of full powers because it meant disarming their own supporters such as the men of Sardār Mohīī and Sattār and Bāqer Khān,¹ whilst the Bakhtiyārīs and the men of Yephrem Khān, and the Armenian Head of Police were undertaking the disarmament.² The role of Sardār As'ad in these events is not clear, and one writer thinks he intrigued against the Mojāhedīn as he was on not too friendly terms with Sepahdār.³ This problem was one of the main causes of the fighting which ensued, for it meant that some of the

1. Hāj Āqā had called the Government's suggestion unacceptable; several others had also objected, but the motion was carried by the Government. R.M. Maj. 2, No. 125, 26th Rajab 1328.
2. A Kasravī says that the Mojāhedīn of Heydar-Khān and those who opposed Sardār Mohīī had joined the force of Yephrem and were now an official body. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Hījdah Sāleh p.136. The case of Yephrem is rather mysterious. He had been a Russian subject before coming to Persia and as such would have been a target for the Russian Government. Grey himself had expressed some misgivings about his case in July, writing to Marling that if he were included in the disarmament would not the Persian Government be deprived of his services as he had been the only one capable of coping with disorders? Marling replied that the Russians agreed that Yephrem be regarded as a Persian subject and had taken a friendly attitude towards him. Obviously the Russians were ready to leave Yephrem and have him co-operate to oust the rest of the Caucasians who were revolutionaries. Grey to Marling, July 23, No. 225, 1910, FO 371/962 and July 25th, No. 301.
3. R. Ra'īsniyā, Dou Mobārez-e Jonbesh-e Masrūteh, Sattār Khān va Sheykh Moḥammad Khīyābānī (Tabriz 1349) p.153.

Mojāhedīn disarmed the rest, and a group remained armed whilst their adversaries were disarmed.

Originally Sattār Khān as leader of some of the Mojāhedīn was invited to the Majles where he promised to co-operate in the disarmament, and the Government agreed to buy their rifles. But he did not keep his word either because he could not, or did not wish to. In any case there was a severe fight before the Mojāhedīn, about 300 of whom had collected in the Park of Atābak where Sattār Khān resided were defeated and their rifles retrieved. Sardār Mohīī took refuge in the Ottoman embassy on the day of the fighting.¹ It has been mentioned also that some of the Mojāhedīn who collected in the Park of Atābak were those who had come from Gilan. Of course some must also have been the men of Sattār Khān from Azarbaijan. It is not at all clear which group backed whom but no doubt all the Caucasians were not with Yephrem. Suspicion arises that this was so staged by the Democrats and Sardār As'ad² as to disarm the men of Sattār Khān who supported the E'tedālīs, and at the same time to appease the Russians who called for the disarmament of the Caucasians. It

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1. It should be noted that the Ottoman and German Ambassadors had tried to dissuade Sattar Khan from putting up a resistance to the Government but when the Government officials had come to collect the arms two Turkish subjects, members of the Ottoman Legation, had turned up in the Park and incited the people to resist.
 2. R. Ra'isnīyā, op.cit., p. 153.

also made the Government stronger for a time and master of the situation.

The disarmament of the Mojāhedīn and the problems it raises has not been fully investigated and many questions remain unanswered.¹ Some writers have considered it to be a plot to break up Sattār Khān's power,² some have regretted it and presented it as a great blunder. But if we take into consideration all the undercurrents of intrigues and the political murders, it seems it was inevitable that a bloody fight would occur before the men were disarmed. The British and the Russians also advocated disarmament; the Russians especially wished the disarmament of the Caucasians. In July, Marling wrote that the foreign Fadā'īs supported the ultra-Nationalists and that they depended on these terrorists to maintain their authority.³

The Government of Mostoufī also faced the question of Persia's evacuation and this concerned the whole relationship of this country with Russia. But Russia's attitude was more unfriendly to this Cabinet than before, given the inclusion in it of four ministers associated with the

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1. Amīrkheyzī who was Sattār Khān's companion has given a detailed account of the events and the negotiations before the fighting. He queries many of the events such as for instance the disappearance of Sardār Mohīī or the role the two Turks played in encouraging the men not to give up their arms, and insinuates that there was a plot which ensued in fighting. E. Amīrkheyzī, op.cit., pp.616-638.
 2. R. Ra'īsnīyā, op.cit., pp.139-40 and 153.
 3. Marling to Grey, July 22, 1910, No. 297, FO 371/962.

Democrats, and particularly of Hoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb as Foreign Minister.¹

On August 4th Navvāb had a long conversation with Marling about the evacuation of Persia. He had told the Minister that he would try his best to establish Persia's relationship with Russia on a friendly footing, but that Russia's insistence on the dismissal of Mokhber al-Saltāneh from the Governorship of Azarbaijan and the non-evacuation of the country were the two problems standing in the way of a better relationship. The Russians demanded several concessions for withdrawing from Qazvin.² These demands were the concession to bring motor cars without customs duty to work on the Anzali-Tehran road, also the granting of concessions for motor cars to work on the Jolfa-Tabriz road. The renewal of the mining concession of the mines of Qarajehdagh, the renewal of the Cossack Brigade's agreement, and the concession to sail on the Orumiyeh Lake.

Navvāb had replied that there would be no difficulty about the extension of the period of the Qarajehdagh mining concession, but that public opinion would not accept that the Russian Road Company should place motor cars on the Rasht-Tehran road. Marling had advised him to give way on one of the questions at least to satisfy the Russians. In general this meeting was found satisfactory

1. Navvāb had been a member of the Foreign Commission of the Majles, and the anti-foreign attitude of this commission was well known. It must be added that the brother of Navvāb, 'Abbās Qolī Khān, was an employee of the British Legation and possibly some of the Russian animosity was due to this fact.

2. Marling to Grey, Aug. 4th 1910, No.144, FO 371/960.

by Marling and he thought that he had succeeded in mitigating some of Navvāb's opinions of Russia.¹ Whether Marling was right or not, the Russians were by no means satisfied. They wanted to avoid any appearance of giving way to Persia and thought the Persian attitude was becoming intolerable. They had refused satisfaction in the case of every demand recently put forward by the two powers, complained Sazanov the Foreign Minister, and he suggested that pressure should be put on them. He had even suggested that a threat should be made to move the Qazvin force to Tehran or a demand for the immediate payment of the arrear of the Persian Government's debts should be made.²

Two other problems which worsened the relationship between the Persian Government, especially Navvāb, and

1. Marling to Grey, Aug. 4th 1910, No.144, FO 416/45. In another dispatch dated Aug. 11th, Marling expressed more hopes of the conversion of Navvāb to the belief that the Russians were ready to establish a good relationship with Persia, but that he still had to persuade his party and the Majles. Ibid., Aug. 11th, 1910, No.153, FO 416/45.
2. Mr. O'Beirne to Grey, Sept. 14th, 1910, No.379 FO 371/963. Barclay wrote that if he kept a conciliatory attitude towards the Persians the relationship between Russia and Britain would be strained. In another letter he wrote that there were complaints about the Cabinet from all sides, and added: "Unfortunately there is no reason to expect that any Cabinet which may replace it will be more successful until the Persian Government can bring itself to a more amenable mood towards Russia. Until it can gain some measure of Russia's sympathy it will meet with embarrassments at every turn". He continued by saying that the Russians expected a subservient attitude from Persia as in the pre-Majles days. Barclay to Grey, Oct. 3rd 1910 No. 184 FO 416/46 and Ibid., Oct. 6th 1910, No. 186.

the Russians, were the questions of the employment of foreign experts about which the Persians had not taken the Russian advice not to employ Americans, and the loan which was being negotiated with the Imperial Bank. Of course the Russians held the Democrats responsible for the resistance of the Majles, and the pressure the Majles put on the Government.

The employment of foreign experts had been included in the Government's policy and now the problem came up before the Majles. It was understood that the powers would not agree to the employment of experts from other great powers in Europe. The Persians on the other hand did not want any Belgians or French men because they would be too much under the influence of the Russians. The Government suggested a list which was considered in commission and was changed, and then presented to the Majles. According to this list, the experts for the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior were to be French, for Finance, Swiss, for the Nazmīyeh (police), Swedish and for the Amnīyeh (gendarmerie), Italian. Two of the Deputies, Dr. 'Alī Khān and Sheykh al-Ra'īs, suggested that financial experts be employed from America. This suggestion was apparently decided upon beforehand because the Deputies refuted any of the objections Asadallāh Mīrzā, speaking for the Government, made against Americans, and the motion was carried through with a majority.¹ These discussions were long and many technical

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 138, 1st Ramazān 1328.

questions were also brought up. Barclay wrote that though the Majles had disregarded their advice not to choose from among large nations it was decided to accept their choice because America, not being a European power, was less objectionable. Besides it was feared that the attitude of the Majles would become even more obstinate if they had disagreed.¹

The Russians accepted with bad grace but they eventually brought about Navvāb's resignation on Zīhājeh 24th 1328 (November 30th, 1910), for he was held responsible for the Government's intractable attitude. The occasion for the resignation was Russian insistence that the Minister should apologize for the forceful entrance of the house of the Russian Consular agent a Persian, at Kashan, by the Chief of Police in search of an offender.²

Iran-e Nou wrote that the resignation of Navvāb was not an ordinary event, as he represented the policy of nationalism and resistance to Russia. He had been brave enough to accept office when no one else would out of fear, and had served for 5 months despite threats and pressure. Then it blamed the Minister of War, Farmanfarma,

1. Barclay to Grey, Sept. 11th 1910, No. 29750 FO 371/963 and Sept. 13th, No. 360.
2. Barclay to Grey, Nov. 30th, 1910, No. 220, FO 416/46. In another dispatch of the same date Barclay wrote that he regretted the resignation of Navvāb because he gave a good guarantee of the effective expenditure of the money the Government was about to borrow, and he expressed doubts as to whether a change of minister would produce an improvement in Russo-Persian relations. Ibid., Nov. 30th 1910, No. 219, FO 371/966.

for not backing him up,¹ and especially Persia's internal enemies, those who were the enemies of a strong policy of resistance. It also blamed the fact that he did not have support in the Majles and concluded that the fall of Navvāb showed that the policy of resistance was about to fail.² The dismissal of Navvāb was not only a blow to the Democrats who were weakened thereby but it was a lesson for others that they could not survive as politicians if they resisted Russia. The choice of Mohtasham al-Saltāneh, suspected of Russian sympathies was another turn to the right, and shows that the Cabinet of Mostoufī's liberalism was changing under pressure.

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1. The occasion here referred to was about the situation in the South as shall be mentioned, but it must be added here that Farmānfarmā and Navvāb were not friendly terms and in particular the Democrats never liked Farmānfarmā. In the month of Šafar 1329 (February 1911), Iran-e Nou attacked Farmanfarma as Minister of War for some misdeeds in that Ministry. Farmānfarmā published an article in the Majles attacking Iran-e Nou and the Democrats, saying they were criticizing him because he had not paid them a bribe, and had added that he had been invited by the party to join it. He had also insinuated that they were irreligious. Iran-e Nou replied that first of all the Democrats could not accept him as a member because he stood for something that all their ideology and policy opposed. It then attacked him as a landlord and added that he was the one who asked to be admitted to the party and was refused. It also replied about the attack on their irreligiosity saying the reason for such attacks was the fact that they said the spiritual powers should be separated from the temporal, but these were only accusations. Iran-e Nou No. 83, 1st Šafar 1329. (1st February 1911).
 2. Iran-e Nou, No. 59, 29th Zīhājeh 1328 (21st Dec. 1910). Navvāb was replaced by Mohtasham al-Saltāneh, who declared in the Majles that the attitude of the Russian Government towards Persia and towards the new Regent was most friendly. Indeed the Russians withdrew their force from Qazvin when Našer al-Molk arrived as Regent.

The British Minister expected the Cabinet to fall too, and he reported that Sardār As'ad was working to bring back the Sepahdār but that the moderates could not agree to the composition of a Cabinet especially as many of the Deputies did not want Sepahdār or Sardār As'ad. The Government of Mostoufī however, had to remain in power until the arrival of the new Regent, Nāṣer al-Molk who was elected after the death of 'Aẓad al-Molk but who did not arrive in Tehran until Ṣafar 1329 (February 1911). Before the resignation of Navvāb, the question of the British Ultimatum occasioned by the insecurity of the South had arisen and caused much heated argument led particularly by the Democrats in the press and at public meetings. In contrast to the relationship of the Democrats and their policy towards the Russians which led to failure, they were much more successful in their relationship with Britain, and this success seemed to justify the policy they always advocated, namely a policy of strength vis-a-vis the foreign powers.

The problem of the South was nothing new, but now insecurity had been increasing and questions were posed about it in the Majles. According to the 1907 Convention, Fars was situated in the neutral zone where Britain could not intervene with arms. On the other hand there were in Fars two contending families, the Qashqā'ī tribe, long time rivals of the Qavām family who had certain affinities with the British as a trading family. The Qashqā'īs were also the enemies of the Bakhtīyārīs who enjoyed great power in the country, and now the existence of oil in Bakhtīyārī country made the friendship of these Khāns

valuable to the British as well. With the presence of the Bakhtiyārīs on the political scene in Tehran the Qashqā'īs became more restless than before and here lay the root of the problem at this time. It led to increased insecurity on the Southern trade routes especially endangering the British trade coming from Bushehr.

Şoulat al-Douleh, the Qashqā'ī Ilkhān who was in opposition to the Central Government because of Bakhtiyārī presence, formed an alliance in early 1910 with the Sheykh of Khuzestan, Sheykh Khaz'al, who had also fallen out with the Bakhtiyārīs over the governorship of Behbahan, and Sardār Ashraf, Vālī of Posht-e Kūh of Lorestan.¹

A confrontation between the Bakhtiyārīs and the Qashqā'īs seemed imminent and Sardār As'ad intrigued in Tehran to displace Şoulat from his position as Ilkhānī, but nothing came of it. In the meantime Qavām al-Molk, the head of that family had been made Governor of Fars, but Şoulat al-Douleh could not accept this preponderance of an erstwhile foe and disturbances grew.

On the 13th Ramazān the problem of Fars was discussed in the Majles. Hāj Āqā, the Deputy of Fars, attacked the Government. He was very indignant at the lack of

1. P. Oberling, op.cit., pp.88 and 96. It is worth drawing attention to an interesting letter by Nezām al-Saltāneh to Şoulat al-Douleh dated Ramazān 1329, advising him to bring a force of about 500 horsemen to Tehran to counter the ascendancy of the Bakhtiyaris. As an encouragement, he points out that this would cost very little and was nothing to compare with its advantages. If the Bakhtiyārīs go unchecked we should "cry for the living not the dead" he concluded. (Private Nezām al-Saltāneh collection).

attention paid to Fars, and he accused the Bakhtiyārīs of causing all the problems and suffering. Sardār As'ad, now a Deputy in the Majles, defended the Bakhtiyārīs and accused Farmānfarmā the Minister of the Interior, who had resigned in the meantime, of being the cause of the disturbances and of intriguing. Nothing came out of these discussions as the Ministers were not in attendance on that day, but as the situation became worse Hāj Āqā continued his attacks on Sardār As'ad. In another meeting on the 5th Zīqa'deh (November) he accused him of monopolizing all powers in his own hands.¹ The Democrats in general took no part in these arguments as they did not touch on political questions which interested them.

On the 14th October, the British who had complained of the situation in the South now offered the Persian Government a near ultimatum that unless the South was pacified in three months, a local force would be raised under British officers to police the Bushehr-Isfahan road.²

There was an indignant uproar against this note, especially by Iran-e Nou which suggested a boycott of Russian and British goods. It also reported meetings in which many spoke against this ultimatum and where the slogan "Yā Marg yā Esteqlāl" (death or independence) was heard. Those who spoke were from all parties, Ṣadr al-Ulama, a Democrat, Sheykh Moḥammad 'Alī Tehrānī, Dr. Mehdī Khān Malekzādeh son of the late Malek al-Motekallemīn,

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 172, 5th Zīqa'deh 1328.

2. Barclay to Grey, Oct. 27th 1910, No.428, FO 371/958.

Yahyā Doulatābādī, and an Ettefāq va Taraqqī Deputy, Mīrzā 'Alī Eṣfahānī.¹ The co-operation of the Deputies of various party affiliations gave Iran-e Nou the occasion to suggest the formation of the Committee of Public Deliverance as mentioned.² The paper also reported meetings of protest which were held against the Ultimatum in Istanbul by the Committee of Sa'ādat, also in India, and a protest which came from Najaf. The Anjoman-e Ayālatī of Azarbaijan also protested and invited other provinces to do so. Navvāb gave a conciliatory reply to the British,³ but denied their claims and refuted their rights to organize such a force. The Persian Government at the same time promised to organize a local gendarmerie which would police the roads under European officers to ensure peace. Later Nezām al-Saltāneh⁴ noted for his strong policies was despatched to Fars as Governor, but the problems of insecurity did not come to an end.

On the whole this was a period of triumph for the Democrats, as mentioned, but it was of short duration, because soon Navvāb was made to resign, and the murder

1. Iran-e Nou No. 12, 2nd Zīqa'deh (5th Nov.) No. 24, 16th Zīqa'deh 1328 (19th Nov. 1910).

2. See pp.354-6

3. Iran-e Nou gave Navvāb's reply to the British as an example of a strong policy of resistance which the Democrats advocated against one of compromise. It wrote that the fact that the British did not pursue their ultimatum was a proof that they would step down when confronted with a strong stand. Iran-e Nou No. 59, 29th Zīqa'deh 1328 (31st Dec. 1910).

4. He was Rēzā Qolī Khān, the nephew of Hoseyn Qolī Khān, the Ṣadr A'zam of the First Majles.

of Şanī' al-Douleh further weakened them, though he was not a Democrat, nonetheless they could work for him as he was independent and liberal.

Şanī' al-Douleh was murdered on the 6th Şafar 1328 (February 5th 1911) by two Armenians who were Russian nationals. This murder remains another of those unresolved political murders so recurrent in this period, but the reasons for it are perhaps more obscure than in the other cases. Şanī' al-Douleh's brother, Mokhber al-Saltāneh, Governor of Azarbaijan, was of the opinion that this deed had been instigated by the Sepahdār and Sardār Mohīī who had given the guns to the Armenians in Sepahdār's house.¹ He also mentions that Nāşer al-Molk was opposed to Şanī' al-Douleh and had wondered how he could go to Tehran when Şanī' al-Douleh was there, and that the latter had been told not to come out of his house for a time. One of the Democrat Deputies, Sheykh Reżā Dehkhāreqānī, accused Nāşer al-Molk of having been implicated in this murder. He says that Nāşer al-Molk had to overthrow the power of the Democrats and of Şanī' al-Douleh before he took office.²

Most Persian writers, however, hold the view that Şanī' al-Douleh was murdered at Russian instigation.³ The

1. Mokhber al-Saltāneh, op.cit., p.222.

2. R. Dehkhāreqānī, op.cit., p.40.

3. Şanī' al-Douleh was unpopular with Britain and Russia. In April, when the Cabinet of Sepahdār had resigned, Barclay had written that the crisis seemed likely to result in a Ministry of extremists, and Şanī' al-Douleh was their leader. He had therefore exerted unofficial pressure to secure either Şanī' al-Douleh's exclusion or
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reasons put forward are generally vague. We have already mentioned that there was objection to his ministerial post in the Cabinet of Sepahdār.

At the time of his murder it was said that he had been engaged in negotiating a railway concession with the Germans¹ and a loan from the Imperial Bank to which the Russians were particularly opposed.

The loan from the Imperial Bank was negotiated in this Cabinet but not actually finalized until Jamādī al-Šānī 1329 (June 1911). After the loan from the International Oriental Syndicate fell through, the Persian Government was approached in Shavāl (October) by

Cont'd. "a written undertaking that the policy of the new Cabinet in regard to the loans and concessions will not run counter to that of the two powers ..."
Barclay to Grey, April 17th 1910, No. 169, FO 416/44.

1. Not much is known about this concession to be granted to the German Bank. Navā'ī quotes Rasūlzādeh as saying that he had been about to sign a concession joining Tehran to Baghdad. Safā'ī, on the other hand, says it was a concession to build a railway from Tehran to Varamin; but both seem to be mistaken. In November, the Russian Tsar had met the German Kaiser at Potsdam where they had agreed that Russia had special interests in Persia, and Germany's economic interests had also been recognized. Russia had undertaken to build a railway to join Tehran to Khaneqeyn, where the Baghdad railway built by Germany was to end. It would thus seem unlikely that the Germans should have been contemplating to build a railway from Tehran to Baghdad. It is however possible that all together Sanī'al-Douleh's activities posed a threat. It must be remembered that at Potsdam the Germans had been given an open door to Persia and that economically they could begin to exploit the Persian market to the disadvantage of Russia and Britain.

another international firm, Seligman and Co. which was ready to lend Persia the sum of 1,200,000 pounds. But the Imperial Bank which had been contacted by Seligman offered to lend the money itself and was backed by the British Government. The Russians objected to this loan by saying that before it was concluded the Russian debts must all be consolidated, which was done by Ṣanī'al-Douleh by the end of Moḥarram (January).¹ Ṣanī'al-Douleh had also drawn up a Bill for the control of the expenditure of the money, and the question was referred to a Commission, but he did not survive to sign the loan contract which was signed by his successor, Momtaz al-Douleh on 7th Jamadī al-Avval 1329 (8th May, 1911).

Mostoufī remained in office until the arrival of Nāṣer al-Molk and the appointment of Sepahdār's third Cabinet. During the last weeks of his office, his government was weak and discredited and his support in the Majles was depleted. In Moḥarram (January) Mo'āẓed al-Saltāneh made a very severe attack against Mostoufī's negative attitude, and said the deputies did not want the government, but he made no actual accusations. Another Deputy, Ḥasan 'Alī Khān, was more specific and said that the Government should ask for a vote of confidence as the majority did not support it,² however nothing could be done in the absence of the Regent. Mostoufī could only count on the support of the Democrats,

1. Barclay to Grey, Jan. 23rd 1911, No. 3, FO 371/1187.

2. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 196, 6th Moḥarram 1329.

who were in a minority, for they had lost the backing of the independents. The E'tedālīs now much more vocal and active, had attracted the Deputies who wavered between the two sides; a development which was speeded up by Nāṣer al-Molk when he obliged them to form the coalition. Before his arrival however, the E'tedālīs had been gaining in number and strength, and when votes were taken for the Regency, their candidate, Nāṣer al-Molk obtained 40 votes against Mostoufī, the candidate of the Democrats who had only 29 votes.

The Democrats had begun as a much stronger party even to the extent that they ousted Sepahdār who had great prestige in the country. They weathered the storm of abuse and criticism as the result of their alleged implication in the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh and they survived their loss of their outstanding leader, Seyyed Ḥasan Taqīzādeh. They successfully included two of their numbers in the Cabinet of Mostoufī as well as turning the disarmament of the Mojāhedīn to their own advantage. However their good fortune did not last, and it was inevitable that a stop should have been put to it. This provided the impetus for the emergence of their chief opponents, the E'tedālīs, who led the Majles in the next phase to be described.

CHAPTER VTHE FORMATION OF THE COALITIONThe Regency of Nāṣer al-Molk

Nāṣer al-Molk was deeply involved with the Persian Constitutional movement from the beginning, and has left a deep and controversial mark on its course. Opinions about his influence are by no means unanimous because judgement depends on the point of view of the writer.

Nāṣer al-Molk's attitude was one of extreme caution and basically one of scepticism, if not disbelief, in the whole process of the reform movement. He had expressed his belief on reaching Tehran that the "outlook was exceedingly hopeless".¹ It is indeed very ironical that one of the leaders of this movement did not believe in it and it further shows the process of evolution to the right which this movement was undergoing and which has already been mentioned. Nāṣer al-Molk believed that Persia was weak and could not resist Russo-British encroachment. He considered Germany to be deceitful and that Persia had to try and obtain the maximum benefit from the friendship of Russia and Britain.² Marling commented on the Regent's

1. Barclay to Grey, March 6th 1911, No. 31, FO 371/1189.

2. Barclay wrote that Nāṣer al-Molk would be passing through Russia where the occasion would be taken to impress upon him a more conciliatory attitude to Russia, and to try to influence the extremists. Barclay to Grey, Oct. 11th 1910, No. 401, FO 371/964.

opinion saying he was "an adept at sheltering himself behind amicable generalities, and that he had the nickname of a gramophone."¹

Nāṣer al-Molk had left Tehran after the murder of Seyyed 'Abdallāh, Tarbiyat and Seyyed 'Abd al-Razāq, in Rajab 1328 (August 1910), and he was elected Regent during his absence. He was the candidate of the E'tedālīs, the Democrats' candidate was Mostoufī al-Mamālek. The election was the manifestation of the party cleavage, and the majority, whose candidate was Nāṣer al-Molk, won with over 40 votes as against 29 for Mostoufī al-Mamālek. This indeed was a defeat for the Democrats who distrusted Nāṣer al-Molk, but on this occasion could do nothing against the united front of the other parties. Obviously the coalition which Nāṣer al-Molk was to create had begun to function before he arrived, and the E'tedālīs' strength had increased at the expense of their rivals, the Democrats.

Nāṣer al-Molk gave a qualified answer to his election at first. Grey wrote to Barclay that he hesitated to accept because he was not sure of the Democrats' attitude; whether they had voted against him as individuals, or whether the election had been on party lines. If it had, then they would make his position difficult.² Malekzādeh

1. Marling to Grey, July 8th 1910, No. 121, FO 371/961.

2. Grey to Barclay, Oct. 15th 1910, No. 174 FO 371/964. Malekzādeh writes that the reason why the Democrats were opposed to Nāṣer al-Molk is not clear, but the A'yān and the Ulama believed that if the candidate of the Democrats won, they would all find themselves in great difficulties, so they tried hard to defeat Mostoufī. On the other hand, the Democrats distrusted Nāṣer al-Molk as shown by some of their writings but they could not express it too openly. The Deputies particularly were forced to declare their support for him.

quotes Farmānfarmā as saying that though he was in the Cabinet of Mostoufī, he had lobbied feverishly for the election of Nāṣer al-Molk. One reason for the unpopularity of Mostoufī with the E'tedālīs was the fact that Sardār As'ad was one of his supporters and many feared the further ascendancy of the Bakhtiyārīs in Tehran. Sardār As'ad was particularly credited with having great ambitions;¹ even Nāṣer al-Molk distrusted him and told Mr. Churchill that the Sardār had sent his brother or cousin to meet him at Rasht and he had urged him to plan a coup d'etat. This, Nāṣer al-Molk thought, reflected Sardār As'ad's secret intention and he meant to act as dictator.² Nāṣer al-Molk insisted that he would accept the Regency only if the Democrats invited him to. Thus they were obliged to write and announce their allegiance to him; but he did not forget that they had voted against him originally. As soon as he reached Tehran, he met Barclay at an audience on 22nd Ṣafar 1329 (22nd February), and expressed his despair at the situation which he said was chaotic with the absence of a stable majority in the Majles paralyzing all affairs. The Cabinet of Mostoufī was supported by about twenty Deputies who formed the only proper party, the others were small groups divided by personal dissensions which only hampered the Cabinet, but they could not form a government.³

1. M. Malekzadeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 6, p.244.

2. Barclay to Grey, February 22nd 1911, No. 24, FO 371/1188.

3. Ibid., No. 20, FO 371/1187.

In another despatch, Barclay wrote of certain information Nāṣer al-Molk had given him, especially denigrating the Democrats and accusing them of being in league with Caucasian terrorists who had already threatened that they were going to murder him. Barclay added that he could not check these assertions but that the Democrats had suffered more at the hands of assassins. "I would instance the recent assassination of Sani ed-Dowleh, late Minister of Finance."¹

The Regent had begun complaining about the Democrats, as soon as he took office and he looked upon them as little better than terrorists. He told Dr. Neligan, who had been sent by Barclay to see him, that the Democrats were opposed to him and that there was a secret plot to kill him and Sepahdār as they had killed Seyyed 'Abdallah. They were well organized, he had said, and held secret meetings and had hired assassins from the Caucasus. Heydar Khān, a Russian subject, received 200 toman a month from the late Cabinet and was a member of this party. The Democrats were not the party they said they were, namely a party of "young Persians". The other group included such liberals as Mostashār al-Douleh, and Montāz al-Douleh.²

Formally of course Nāṣer al-Molk posed as a neutral³

1. Ibid., Feb. 22nd 1911, No. 24, FO 416/97.

2. Ibid., March 6th 1911, No. 31, FO 416/48.
Enclosure, Memorandum by Dr. Neligan, Feb. 28th.

3. When he arrived in Persia, the Russians withdrew their army from Qazvin as a friendly gesture. The Majles seized upon this to justify the policy of moderation, and of praising Nāṣer al-Molk for this victory. Majles, No. 61, 18th Safar 1329 (18th Feb. 1911).

and insisted on the formation of political parties and especially of a majority party. The vote which had been taken for the regency showed clearly the existing division of the Majles; on the one side stood the Democrats and on the other side were the E'tedālīs, the Liberals and Ettefāq va-Taragqī in a temporary alliance. Now Nāṣer al-Molk in a clever move gave this alliance a more permanent form, and arranged the formation of a strong coalition to stand against the Democrats.

He declared it was necessary to organize a majority party to support the Government and not to have the difficulties of the past when the government of Mostoufi was backed precariously by a minority party. There was no alternative to this solution. Had the Majles remained split as before none could have a real majority. On the other hand, the Democrats argued that they could also join the coalition, but had they also joined it, the party system would have become meaningless, especially the two party system Nāṣer al-Molk wanted to introduce. Yet the Regent must have had other motives in mind. It has already been mentioned that he had been involved in the organization of the E'tedālīyūn party, and we have already pointed out his prejudice against the Democrats. Thus it can be conjectured that by organizing the coalition and by putting the Democrats in a minority he had an ideal as well as a practical purpose. The ideal of imposing the two party system which functioned as effectively in Britain, and the practical purpose of containing the Democrats. Thus on the 12th Safar 1329 (12th February 1911) he told the Deputies that

in a parliamentary government a stable majority must support the Cabinet and a specific programme, and not until such a majority in favour of a particular minister was formed would he take the oath of office. The answer of the Deputies however, was unsatisfactory.¹

The address of the Regent was discussed in the Majles on the 18th Şafar (18th February). Extracts from it will be given here because they show not only the divergence of opinion and scepticism of some Deputies about parties in general, but they also show what the Deputies thought about Persian politics in general. The Democrats supported the Regent's idea of the need for parties which accorded with their own policy.

The other parties were particularly reluctant. They first signed their names to an agreement to stand with each other, and selected Sepahdār as their candidate, but Nāşer al-Molk was not satisfied. "The failure to produce a programme", wrote Barclay, "and the attempt to dictate the composition of the Cabinet shows a misunderstanding of the functions of the Medjliss and His Highness intends to insist on obtaining satisfaction on these points."²

On the 18th Şafar (18th February) the Minister of Foreign Affairs began by coaxing the Deputies saying that the Regent had mentioned that he would do nothing until an agreement was reached on this question and the majority of the Majles was presented to him as a responsible body.

1. They had replied on the 16th February that they were ready to support the Government especially in rooting out terrorism in the capital and expressed their hope that the Regent would entrust the Government to a person who had the trust of the Majles. Barclay to Grey, Feb. 22nd 1911 No. 20, FO 371/1187.

2. Barclay to Grey, Feb. 22nd 1911, FO 371/1187.

Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Khān, the Deputy of Esfahan who had E'tedālī leanings and had been the Secretary of the French Embassy, replied that he thought the discussion which they had had with the Regent about the formation of parties was sufficient as one of the members of the minority party and one of the majority had represented their parties. The majority could not write the programme of the future government, he said; they could only present their own programme.

Zokā'al Molk the President of the Majles replied that the Foreign Minister had meant the party programme and not the programme of the Government. The same Deputy replied that the majority of the Deputies who had come together as a majority was not a political party. They were individuals who felt that this Majles needed a majority to back reforms. The Foreign Minister then made a long speech explaining what was meant by parties, and said it was true that such parties existed in the Majles but it was necessary to see what each of them wanted so that the Premier would know which Ministers to choose. If this were not done, the point of view of the Ministers and the Government would not be known and both sides would start criticizing the Government. The Regent wanted this arrangement, he said, for the good of the country but the replies given him so far were not acceptable.

Eftekhār al-Vā'eẓīn, a moderate Deputy, elaborated on what Mīrzā Ebrāhīm Khān said, explaining that he had not meant that there were no political parties but that there was not one party but two or three and each had a separate policy. However, they were united in their practical

programme, and formed a coalition because they felt the Cabinet needed strong support. They had thus formed the coalition, prepared their practical programme and expected the Government to carry it out until the end of the session. Therefore there was a majority party and they had a political programme which they had presented to the Regent. Whenever the Regent expressed his trust of a Prime Minister the majority would accept him.

Asadallāh Mīrzā the Minister of Posts explained what he understood the wishes of the Regent to be. He said that what was being said was a play on words. The Regent knew everything, and was waiting to know their programmes. It was not enough that the parties should write a programme and ask for it to be implemented by the Ministers because many unforeseen problems might arise. The Regent expected things to be done in a proper manner with each party presenting its programme.

Kāshef representing the E'tedālīs' reluctance to organize, said there were two problems, one about the programme and the other about the majority of the Majles, and they should not be confused. Under the circumstances, they should not delay the appointment of the Cabinet. He then added that it had been said that the parties who shared similar ideas should coalesce and agree on one programme for the good of the country, and should support the Cabinet. Their programme had nothing to do with their original ideology which was a long term wish. There were some Deputies who had certain ideologies which they could not be asked to change. What had been achieved in these

few days was the best that could be done, but they could not appoint the Prime Minister, Kāshef said, and added that all these problems did not justify the fact that they still did not have a Cabinet.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the Regent's mind was made up, he had a good knowledge of what should be done, and if they did not comply he might resign. He suggested that a few Deputies be appointed to discuss these points with Nāṣer al-Molk and see exactly what he wanted.

Montaṣer al-Soltān, a Democrat Deputy, commented that they thought the Regent wanted to see the programme of the parties as the Democrats had already given all the Deputies a copy of their programme, but that he thought what the Regent wanted was the organization of a fixed majority. The Regent wanted to act according to the law, and insisted that the parties should declare their policy so that the majority should become known to him. He would then be able to appoint the Prime Minister. This, he concluded, was the best thing that could be done.

Soleymān Mīrzā added that they were absolutely obliged to have a majority and that parties were a necessity in a constitutional government. He then gave a long speech on the differences between a despotism and a constitutional government and added that since the beginning of the Majles there had been no proper majority which could maintain a cabinet. If someone examined the votes taken in this session he would notice how they shifted between right and left; this was the reason why the Cabinets could achieve nothing. So far none of the governments had had a real

backing. One of the Deputies said that they were backed by a majority, sometimes they even received an almost unanimous vote but what happened afterwards. They could never maintain this kind of unanimity. Mostoufī al-Mamālek was given a unanimous vote of confidence, but next day he was censured, because there was no fixed majority. The majority should be in accordance with the political parties, visible, and responsible for everything, good or bad, in the country. He added that he had declared to the Regent that he was speaking on behalf of the parliamentary branch of the Democrat party, which followed a neutral policy with regard to Mostoufī's Cabinet, and never joined in the votes of censure or discussions. This party was a minority with 21 votes and had no responsibility.

Hāj Āqā, a Shīrāzī Deputy, had declared that they (E'tedāliyyūn) had 48 votes and were responsible for the affairs of the country. But Soleyman Mīrzā declared a majority should be known to all the people of the country and should not be hidden. "We are together and we don't know them," he said, "those parties which have organized a majority with 48 votes must come forward and freely announce their individual programmes; for instance they should say: 'We thirty Deputies are the Ejtemā'iyūn E'tedāliyyūn and this is our programme, and we six Tarāq-qīkhāhān (Liberals) have this Marāmnāmeḥ, and we four from Ettefāq va Tarāqqī have this'". He added that he was not sure whether there were more parties or not, but he said he had seen one programme called Eslāhīyūn 'Amīyūn of which he knew nothing. They should announce themselves

as also should the neutrals. He then added that he could not understand the meaning of neutral. If a Deputy is working for the development and good of his country he must accept responsibility, if he does not agree with either of these two lines, he must have a third line of his own. This, too, constitutes another party and must introduce itself. He then advised the deputies that they should comply with what Nāṣer al-Molk, who was learned and well versed in politics and constitutionalism, wanted. Then he recalled how important it was to have a majority to support the Ministry and to accept responsibility; opposing it will be the minority which will watch them and keep them to their words. A Majles which has no party becomes like a despotic monarchy and will do what it wants. Besides, this insistence that parties should be open and visible was for people to see who did what; if a mistake was made people would not blame the Majles or Constitutionalism but the party responsible.

Then he called upon the majority to introduce its members, to explain the various parties which constituted it, to state how many members each had and to publish their programme. He had, for instance, asked Moshīr Ḥożūr to which party he belonged, and he had said Ettefāq va-Taraqqī, but ever since then he had not been able to find out who else was a member of that party. He would like to know to which party Mo'tamen al-Molk, Seyyed Naṣrallāh and Moshīr al-Douleh belonged, who had declared themselves to be neutral. Matīn al-Saltāneh, an E'tedālī journalist, approved what Soleyman Mīrzā had said

and added that in the past the majority had no influence on the course of events because they could not impose their programme on the Cabinet and that it was generally the minority which led those people who had similar opinions. Now they had formed a fixed majority and had accepted a practical programme, but this had nothing to do with their ideals and hopes. They were obliged to form a coalition and so had agreed on a practical programme which they would insist that the Cabinet should carry out. These were all practical matters and not just wishes and ideals. But he doubted the wisdom of asking for a declaration of policy by each party. They all knew that the divergences of opinion were political rather than personal, but these divergences were misinterpreted, and would be even more so if they became known outside the Majles. There was no reason in his opinion why the majority which had come into existence should not come into the open.

Adīb al-Tojjār declared that those Deputies who had been elected had not held political ideas or ideologies; they were elected to protect the people's rights, but now that the Regent had insisted on the open organization of political parties and the formation of a majority to support the Government, they could not prepare a long-term programme but only a temporary one for this session. This had already been presented to the President of the Majles and would also be presented to the Regent. He added that he did not think it was customary in Europe for each Deputy to have to announce his party allegiance.

Mo'āzēd al-Molk brought up the question of the Senate which had been mentioned in the Constitutional laws, and

said that no government could be called truly national while they had only one Majles. He also raised the point that as the Monarch did not have the right of dissolution of the Majles according to the Constitutional laws, if the Majles were to act beyond its power it could not be brought to heel. "What we have is not a complete constitution" he said, "and the ministers are afraid to mention the Senate." He suggested they should prepare a short-term programme for the session, and leave the formulation of a long-term programme to another time.

Moḥammad Hāshem Mīrzā who had begun as an E'tedālī and changed to a Democrat according to Taqīzādeh, argued now against the E'tedālīs and objected to the fact that it had been said there were 48 E'tedālī. The number of E'tedālī and Democrats was about equal, he said, and they never had such a majority. Two or three months earlier each of these two would have been angry to be called E'tedālī, right wing or Conservatives, and Engelābī or revolutionaries. He declared that as for himself he was on neither side. Then he answered Matīn al-Saltāneh who had said that the electorate had not heard of the parties, saying that this was true a year ago, but now the electors were aware of the existence of parties, each with its own club and committee.

Hāj Āqā, who was always vehemently opposed to the Democrats, said in answer to Soleyman Mīrzā that there were always several ideologies which were similar, and these now formed the majority but if they had no name for it, it did not mean that it did not exist. If they adhered to one ideology and acted contrary to it, people

would soon notice, for instance if a man should say he was of the Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedāliīyūn but advocated land reform everyone would know he was a Democrat because the Democrats' ideology maintained the division of lands. The Deputies' ideology would become obvious by their voting and speeches.

When Tehran had been conquered by the two Sardārs, he said, there was such a hurry to start action that appointments were made haphazardly without considering whether the majority of the deputies supported them or not, nor were the Deputies elected on a particular party platform. It was only gradually that different groups began to emerge and occasioned the recurrent Cabinet crises of Sepahdār's Government. When the Cabinet of Mostoufī was formed, each Minister was chosen to please one group and consequently it could achieve nothing. Then he added that if the 48 Deputies who constituted the majority accepted responsibility, the group of Soleyman Mīrzā should also accept responsibility and not attack the Cabinet constantly; the minority should follow the majority and their duty was to stop mistakes being made.¹

As we can see, these discussions were not conclusive, and the Deputies were rather reluctant to declare their allegiances. On the 22 Şafar (22nd February) they once again discussed the same question at great length. The

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 212, 18th Şafar 1329 (18th February 1911).

President recalled that the parties had been asked for their programmes, and the majority had also been asked to appoint their candidate for the Prime Ministership, but despite the notes from the Regent, no proper answer had been given. Now he wanted to know their answer officially so that he could inform the Regent.

Morteżā Qolī Khān Na'inī, the Deputy from Esfahan introduced himself as the leader of the majority.¹ He said that the E'tedālī which had had a small but not complete majority now formed a coalition with those parties whose ideologies were most compatible with theirs. They would present their practical programme and leave their idealistic programme for the future; furthermore, he added, this programme would have to be acceptable to the Cabinet which would be chosen. This programme would be published the following day and distributed so that those who agreed with its tenets could support it. For the moment he announced the names of those who had joined the coalition and formed the majority. He gave the names of forty-two but said that there were more whose names would be announced later, and added that they had let the name of their candidate be known to the President.

Soleymān Mīrzā asked them to read their programme, but Morteżā Qolī Khān refused saying it would be published and distributed. He added that what had been written so far was a practical programme of action which had been

1. He had been the Private Secretary of Zēll al-Solṭān.

submitted to the Regent and would be made known soon.

The President then asked the minority to introduce its members. Soleyman Mīrzā objected, saying that the minority had already declared its Marāmnāmeḥ. Today he had asked to hear the programme of the majority, which would not remain secret anyway. He said that he wished to know the programme in case Democrats could agree with it as it was their pragmatic programme of action. Perhaps all would agree and unite. No doubt its first clause would be the establishment of peace. That was something everyone wished, and there were other general and common aims. He repeated that what was offered by the minority was their political Marāmnāmeḥ, but the majority offered their practical Marāmnāmeḥ. They could not be called a party, because a party must have a political and an ideological programme. Then he added that he was the temporary spokesman of the Democrat party; their parliamentary leader would be introduced in the next meeting and he would announce the names of the members. Then he replied to Ḥāj Āqā who had said in the last session that he hoped the minority party would accept responsibility, and not cause difficulties. How could the minority be responsible if it had no executive powers, he asked. Its duty was to criticise a bill and when it was passed, to obey it.

Mo'ez al-Molk repeated many of the past arguments, saying that the Legislature had in the past stood in the way of any achievement by the Executive and the Ministers had a precarious existence because they had no permanent support. Many defeats were due to a lack of patience in

waiting for Ministers to act. He added that the coalition was not a party, it had been formed in order to demand certain things from the Government. The different parties had compromised in their different programmes to form this coalition and their aims were all practical. They would support the Government and the Government would act according to their programme. The minority should not attack the majority just because the majority was doing something; such attacks would weaken all.

Hāj Aqā replied to Soleyman Mīrzā that the coalition was based not on one or two practical and specific items which Deputies agreed on, but entailed a broader conception of their ideals and was so worked out as not to cause any opposition. These were not only general goals but the practical means to achieve them. When a coalition of several groups is formed in Europe, it is to oppose other groups who have different political views. Here, too, this group could not coalesce with the Democrats and that was why they had not shown them their programme. Sheykh Reżā Dehkhāreqānī (whom we must remember was very much opposed to the Regent) made a very heated and revealing speech at this time. He said he had been a true Moslem and had been a Democrat ever since he understood Eslam and he was going to divulge some of the things which had passed between Soleyman Mīrzā and the President. This was a session of excommunication and slander. The Regent had insisted that there should be no secrets, and had said that there was no majority in the

Majles, but there was a majority which had elected him. In the presence of the Regent, Soleymān Mīrzā had said that the Democrats were a minority party and could not by themselves form a Government, but if there was another minority party which had a similar programme they could form a coalition. He had also declared that if the majority was not an ideological party they could also join it. He added that they had kept quiet out of respect for the Regent but now it was apparent that a coalition had been formed of the Ettefāq va Taragqī, E'tedālī and Taragqīkhāhān. The Ettefāq va Taragqī differed only slightly from the Democrats, and those who had read their programme knew this. The President was asking for the names and programmes of both parties, but the coalition had not announced its programme. If they had announced it perhaps there were other parties who would have joined them. They should have said what the points of coalition were. "If one of the points, for instance, was that there is one God, then let there be a curse upon the one who would deny this. If one of its points was that the rights of all, poor or rich, are equal, let there be a curse upon the one who would contradict this. If one of the articles of the programme said that the independence of the country should be defended, let there be a curse upon the one who would deny this. When the Democrats say they support the poor, it does not mean that they want the poor to climb on the shoulders of the rich; until now the rich have acted unjustly towards the poor and they want to prevent them from climbing on the poor man's back."¹

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 214, 22 Safar 1329.

Again, no conclusion was reached, and the Democrats postponed the announcement of their members and promised to announce them in the next meeting. On the 23rd Şafar (23rd February) the Regent addressed a further note to the Majles.¹ In this note he explained that in a Constitutional Government the people choose their representatives, and the party with a majority would enact laws and check their execution by the government. Also it approved and supported the Executive which shares the same ideology and entrusts it with executive powers. Therefore it was imperative, in a country where the executive powers were entrusted to a group, that a permanent majority should exist in the Majles which would protect the Government and help it in the development of the country. Any kind of contradiction between the Government and the majority party should be avoided, and before a suggestion is made by the Government, the view of the majority party should be sought. On the other hand the Legislature should not throw small difficulties in the path of the Government. The Deputies should also keep in touch with public opinion. The Monarch, who is head of the Executive, should be close to the Ministers as well as to the parties, and be aware of the wishes and needs of the people so that no crisis should arise.

1. This note was printed as was his address to the Majles dated 2nd Rabī'al-Avval (4th March) and circulated. Mīrzā Yāns, the Deputy of the Armenians, had said that this note was like a lecture that everyone should read, and had asked for it to be printed.
R.M. Maj. 2 No. 215, 23rd Şafar 1329.

He then added that as Constitutionalism was new in Persia, special care was needed in order for it to flourish, but people were not well aware of all its tenets and often had divergent opinions about the interpretation of the Constitutional laws. The Regent was the representative of the Monarch, and had no power, all the responsibilities resting with the Majles.

Then he added that he wanted to discuss the political parties and hoped that his opinion would be accepted. Recently the existence of the parties had only weakened the Government, but now he hoped that all personal enmity between them would disappear. The formation of political parties without a viable programme gave rise to personal enmity and occasioned the formation of factions as in the past, which threatened the freedom and independence of the country. The good of the people would be sacrificed to personal motives and would end in an oligarchy which was the despotic rule of a clique. As the Deputies knew, what Persia needed was a strong government which, with the help of the Majles, would enable all the goals and ideals of the country to be achieved. There were certain general goals which all parties wanted, but these were not the ideology of the parties. A party's programme was the means envisaged to attain its goal. Individual freedom was naturally everyone's wish, but if it were not restrained it would lead to chaos, so individual freedom had to be such as not to undermine the freedom of others. The Deputies should take into consideration the existing possibilities

and the customs of the country in order to reach their aims, and take the means most in accordance with their programme to reach their goal. The parties should not be intolerant of each other's views and should discuss their opinions even if opposed to each other. Another point to take into consideration was that their ideology should include a practical plan and not be a mere philosophical declaration. Fortunately all were agreed on generalities like the different sects of Islam, who differ only on small details but agree on the basic principles.

On the same day, 23rd Şafar (23rd February) Soleyman Mirza announced in the Majles that he had been appointed the leader of the Democrat party and would introduce the party members. It might seem surprising that the Democrats who believed in the party system should ask to join the coalition which would in fact have annulled the effect of the parties. However, it must be remembered that at the crises they had advocated the formation of a united front, the Committee of Public Deliverance. On the other hand they might have felt that the organization of a coalition, whose programme was deliberately kept secret from them was a plot which they could unravel by joining it.

Soleyman Mīrzā now repeated what Sheykh Reżā had so much insisted upon, namely that they were not opposed to the coalition. He was the one who, in the presence of the Regent, had declared that he was ready to form a coalition, but now either by mistake or through forgetfulness

or for other reasons, the coalition was formed without showing them its terms. They had promised to show them these that very day but had not. He then repeated the same arguments about joining the coalition and protested that he did not recognize it as a political party. He then gave as example the British Parliament which was composed of four large parties, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Irish and the Labour parties; the three last always coalesced against the Conservatives and appointed one leader, but they each had their own leaders whose names he mentioned and asked that the same should be done in Persia.

He also discussed briefly the question of the responsibility of the Deputies. He asserted that naturally all Deputies, whether of the majority or minority, were responsible, but qualified this saying that as far as the minority was concerned it meant that they were not indifferent, but how could they be held responsible for legislation which they did not enact or a Cabinet which they did not support? He then gave the names of the 20 Deputies who composed the Democrat branch of the party and added that he only gave 20 names as one Deputy had not yet answered him as to his membership.¹

On the 25th of the same month, Soleymān Mīrzā declared that he had been given the twenty clauses of the programme of the coalition and he added that these were all general and the Democrats were not opposed to any of them. However,

1. Ibid., No. 215, 23rd Šafar 1329.

they were told that there were still certain conditions which had not been divulged; if the problem was the enactment of these, perhaps there would be no disagreement on them either. He added that he had prepared a long address to introduce the Democrats which would be published in their newspaper.

Morteżā Qolī Khān expressed his thanks that the 20 articles had been accepted and added, as an explanation that their aim had been to organize a fixed majority, and that it had been necessary that they should come to some arrangement. It was still possible that they might meet some divergence of opinion, so that it was necessary that the points of the agreement should be general so that the coalition should be lasting.¹ Once the parties were duly announced, the Regent came to the Majles and made a very important speech asking for a spirit of compromise² before taking his oath of office.

The Democrats announced their attitude and policy towards the coalition or Hey'at-e Mo'talefeh in a resolution dated 9th Rabī'al-Šānī 1329 (9th April, 1911) in Iran-e Nou. It was at the same time a warning. It said that the Coalition party was opposed to democracy, incongruous and against the interest of the majority. It was trying to curtail such freedoms as the freedom of the press. Its foreign policy was one of support for the

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1. These points were not discussed in the Majles and were not published in the newspapers consulted.
 2. See Appendix B for the text of the speech.

foreign powers.¹ Only democracy could save the country.

The Democrats were announcing that their policy would be one of criticism to stop the retrograde actions of the Government. It would also continue to propagate its own policy in order to achieve democracy. They also warned the Government not to undermine the Constitution or the independence of the country, saying they would fight for the Constitution if necessary, but if they saw no threat to it they would take no action.²

A few days later Iran-e Nou published an interesting article entitled Why we were left alone? It said they were left alone because they were the first party to announce that political parties were based on class interests, that classes opposed each other, and that the workers would emerge victorious from the contest. The Democrats had the interests of the poor at heart and could not form an alliance with the rich, and this contest with the E'tedālīs was one between rich and poor. But it concluded that they were left alone only temporarily.³

Leaving aside the coaxing attitude of Nāṣer al-Molk and his near ultimatum to the Majles to organize and introduce parties, it must be mentioned that such notables or great personalities as Sepahdār, Farmānfarmā Sardār

1. Iran-e Nou published an article by Habl al-Matīn of Calcutta which called the Democrat party the only true party and accused the Coalition of being in favour of the 1907 Convention, "Ententephil". Iran-e Nou, No.12 9th Rabī'al-Šānī, 1329 (9th April 1911).

2. "Qat'nāmeḥ-ye Ferqeh-ye Demokrāt", Ibid. No. 12, 9th Rabī'al Šānī 1329 (9th April 1911).

3. Ibid., No.15, 13th Rabī'al-Šānī 1329 (13th April 1911).

As'ad and 'Ayn al-Douleh or even Seyyed Moḥammad Šādeq Tabātabā'ī, who was emerging as an eminence grise of the E'tedālīs, played a significant role in the formation of the coalition.¹ The same cannot be said of the Democrats² who had a much stronger ideological base. Theirs was a minority party which accepted its position at the time, and more ambitious politicians would have jeopardized their position by joining it. The coalition on the other hand was an artificial organization. Some of its members had been active as E'tedālīs before, but some joined it at the insistence of Nāṣer al-Molk, expediency or no doubt through the lobbying of others.³

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1. It must be recalled here, that in the Anṣārī documents, where the names are given of those who contributed to the funds of the E'tedālī party, there were some first names, which did not show who these contributors were, but in general the sums are small and infrequent for the year 1329; there are many more contributions for the year 1330.
 2. Barclay wrote to Grey that the more prominent personalities were in groups other than the Democrats. March 22n 1911, No. 44 FO 371/1188.
 3. For instance, we read that Sardār'As'ad who was angry about the fact that in Fars Neẓām al-Šaltāneh had imprisoned the Qavām brothers who were enemies of Šoulat al-Douleh, who was in turn the Sardār's enemy, threatened to cast in his lot with the opposition and overthrow the Cabinet. This could only be effected if Sardār As'ad had certain followers amongst the Deputies. He played a very prominent part on the political scene at this time. After the disarmament of the Mojāhedīn he had great prestige and was even cited as a possible candidate for the Regency. On 12th November 1910, he discussed the situation with Barclay who wrote that he gave the impression that "the formation or overthrow of Cabinets lay pretty much in his hands." In December, it was reported that the Sardār had been present at many of the Majles sessions and discussed a change of Cabinet. He had added that he was arranging that the Majles should be subservient, and if it did not support the new Cabinet, it would be changed. Obviously Sardār As'ad had great influence on the Majles.

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We have mentioned the lobbying of Farmānfarmā, there must have been others, or Nāṣer al-Molk's policy would not have succeeded so well. In June 1911, Barclay reported that Nāṣer al-Molk had told him that the Majles was split into numerous cliques which pursued various interests in the provinces. For instance, one clique opposed the Bakhtiyārīs and encouraged Ṣoulat al-Douleh, another was in the pay of Ṣoulat al-Douleh, another backed the Bakhtiyārīs etc.¹ All these naturally undermined the unity of the coalition.²

The parties as seen had existed before Nāṣer al-Molk's influence and his prodding obliged the Deputies to organize the coalition, thus putting the Democrats in a minority. This action of Nāṣer al-Molk was clearly

cont'd. Two Deputies were his friends, and one was his nephew. These were Dabīr al-Molk and Dr. 'Alī Khān, and Morteżā Qolī Khān Bakhtiyārī son of Ṣamṣām al-Saltāneh, the Sardār's brother. Barclay to Grey May 16th 1911, No. 70, FO 371/1189; *ibid.*, Nov. 12th, 1910, No. 465 FO 371/966; *ibid.*, Dec. 30th, 1910, No. 245, FO 371/1184.

1. Barclay to Grey, June 2nd 1911, No. 222, FO 416/48.
2. One other reactionary clique active in the First Majles was the Kāshī group; though we do not hear about this group now, it might have been quite active. Mo'āven al-Douleh Ghafārī, who contributed to the funds of the E'tedālī, was one of the Conservative Kāshīs. Another one who contributed to this fund was Mo'āzed al-Molk. He was a Kermanshahi doctor, who had attended Sālār al-Douleh (the rebellious brother of the ex-Shah).

deliberate, when we know what he really thought about the Democrats.¹ In this way he weakened them hoping no doubt for their eclipse.

Whenever the Majles was confronted by a truly national question the divisions disappeared for a time. This was the case in the First Majles, it was in the Second too, as for instance over the question of the impeachment of 'Alā'al-Saltāneh or the British Ultimatum. The Democrats, however, were the leaders in such instances.

Now with the organization of a permanent two party system such a possibility faded. On the other hand, behind Nāser al-Molk's thinking and action lies a possibly genuine commitment to the ideals of a two party system which alone might have provided the crucial support for the government within the Majles. The bane of the rapid succession of previous Cabinets had been the lack of a well organized, loyal party and his policy might have been interpreted as an attempt to emulate this pattern which had been traditionally successful in Western Democracies. Yet at the same time, it is more than understandable that the most able of the political groups of the First and Second Majles felt itself to have been unfairly deprived of the chance of attaining this position and it is clear to see why they accused Nāser al-Molk of duplicity in his support of the E'tedālīs as the leading element within the coalition. However fragmentary the coalition might have seemed, however dubious its genesis,

1. The Democrats believed that this action of Nāser al-Molk was aimed at breaking them.
R. Dehkhāreqānī, op.cit., pp. 136-8.

to some extent Nāser al-Molk's aim was achieved in practice for the Democrats found themselves in Sepahdār's Cabinet at a distinct disadvantage, and their opposition, the E'tedālīs were able to provide the Cabinet with the support that Nāser al-Molk's had thought essential for the implementation of good government.

CHAPTER VITHE THIRD CABINET OF SEPAHDĀR

RABĪ'AL-AVVAL 1329 (March 1911) to
RAJAB 1329 (July 1911).

The Regent announced the Prime ministership of Sepahdār when he made his speeches as Regent in Rabī'al-Avval (March). Barclay wrote that the Regent had made it clear that if the choice of the Majles "fell upon Sepahdār their decision would meet with his own inclination"¹, but he had the same reservation as before. He added that Sepahdār was closely associated in people's minds with Russian interests, and that, though not a protégé, he enjoyed great Russian confidence. There was, however more chance now for Sepahdār to succeed as he could depend on backing in the Majles. The Democrats still opposed Sepahdār, but they could not be as effective as before for the E'tedālīs and their allies led the Majles. In fact the character of the Majles had changed, the government was

1. Barclay to Grey, March 21st 1911, No. 43, FO/416/48.

now much stronger as it was backed by a dependable majority, and for the first time was in a position to put through its policies without much effective opposition.

Sepahdār's Cabinet was more united than before and he excluded Ministers who had acted independently. It comprised two Ministers who were newcomers to ministerial posts but who had been Āzādīkhāh Deputies in the First Majles, namely Momtāz al-Douleh and Mostashār al-Douleh. They were Minister of Finance and Minister of the Interior respectively.¹ Mo'āven- al-Douleh was made Minister of Trade, Posts and Telegraph and Moshīr al-Douleh was Minister of Justice. Both had already been in Sepahdār's earlier Cabinets, but were more acceptable than some of the ministers of his previous Cabinet. Barclay however thought them incapable and lacking energy or the capacity to carry out reforms. Mohtasham al- Saltāneh kept his portfolio as Minister of Foreign Affairs having already given proof of his pro-Russian leanings and being

1. Barclay commented on the Ministers of Finance, Justice and Interior saying they were all three taken from the Majles where they had played conspicuous roles. They were "an entirely modern type in Persia. Having been educated in Europe, they all speak French and may be described as representatives of the young Persian school, though they have preferred not to identify themselves with Hussein Kuli Khan's party of extreme nationalists known locally as the Democratic party."
Barclay to Grey, March 21st 1911, No. 43, FO 416/48.

consequently unpopular with the Democrats. Sepahdār was Minister of War as well as Education.

Sepahdār's speech to the Majles made on the 9th of Rabī'al- Avval (11th March) shows his attempt to redeem the weakness of the Executive vis-a-vis the Legislature. "Everywhere the meaning of Government is power and authority, in our country the Constitutional Ministers lack this. Until now they have been incapable of exercising any kind of power for the purpose of gathering the reins of the Government as is customary". He added that they had no means at their disposal to arrest corruption because the Executive had not been appointed according to a special law, and as a result the Legislature had interfered in the details of administration and left no power to the Executive. This present state of affairs was the result of this lack of power. Then he gave a description of the chaotic condition of the country, of the army and of the finances. He pointed out that the existence of the parties even upset the Civil Service¹ and he especially complained about the freedom and licentiousness of the press. He said that he wanted to know his powers, reminding the Deputies that the country was in great danger and concluded "that if in reality the aim was to serve the interests of the country, it was only possible to do so if the Majles paid detailed attention

1. The E'tedālīs argued that the civil servants political ideologies had to follow those of the Ministers. This naturally eliminated the Democrats during an E'tedālī Cabinet.

and helped until these problems were overcome."¹ He then asked for special powers and enumerated four measures to stop the deterioration of the existing conditions. Firstly, to eradicate all sources of terrorism, namely to destroy anything which went against Constitutionalism or upset the peace of the provinces and stopped the Government from exercising its duties, which could only be done by granting full powers to the Government.

Secondly, he suggested the punishment of those guilty of criminal and civil offences. Thirdly, he wanted the establishment of order amongst the Government administration and the necessary improvement of discipline in the Army especially by exercising the principle of obedience. Fourthly, the enforcement of the press laws. Some newspapers had misused their freedom and had often exercised it to the detriment of the Government he said. Therefore there was a need for wider powers, not only to reform the law courts but to exercise the law, in case one of the newspapers exceeded its limits.

He made it a condition that unless the Deputies accepted these measures, he would not continue in office. The programme consisted of 12 articles and stipulated that public security would be improved, expeditionary forces would be organized and cordial relations with friendly powers maintained. The loan negotiations already undertaken by the

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 222, 9th Rabī' al - Avval 1329.

former cabinet would be continued and a general budget would be prepared, and financial reforms would be undertaken with the help of foreign experts. It also proposed the formation of a special committee to draw up temporary laws which would only require the approval of the Committee of the Majles, the sanction of the Cabinet and the signature of the Regent. The judiciary the municipal laws were to be reformed as was the educational system.¹

Ḥāj Sheykh al-Ra'īs replied that terrorism had not been rooted out, and now the Ministers had to do their utmost to put an end to it. Vahīd al-Molk objected to the powers the Government wanted on constitutional grounds. He recalled the articles of the Constitution which had some bearing on this question. The articles which guaranteed the rights of the people and the duties and rights of the Majles, were articles number 12 to 27, 30 and 33; in none of these was there a question of full powers, and the Government could not now ask for them. He then mentioned at length the French Fundamental Laws, articles 15 to 24, saying that according to those laws no such thing as extraordinary powers could be granted, nor were such powers mentioned in the Belgian Constitution.

1. Barclay to Grey, March 20th, 1911, No. 40, FO 371/1188
Barclay commented on this programme saying that the major questions were still security and finance, and that an appeal for "full powers" figured prominently in this programme and a desire for good relations with friendly powers was also expressed. He added "much of the rest of the programme has done duty before..."

He then said that the Government wanted full powers to stop terrorism and anything which was harmful to the Constitution, but the Constitution was new in Persia and people's character and behaviour had not changed whereas these powers were dangerous. But he was not allowed to continue his argument.

The Prime Minister heatedly said that he had asked for powers so that people would be able to sleep peacefully in their houses at night. Mostashār al-Douleh supporting him said that the Deputies feared that by giving these powers they would be once again bringing in despotism, but despotism meant the imposition of one man's will. Unless such powers were granted the Constitution itself would be endangered.

Votes were taken after much more discussion, and out of a total of seventy-three, forty-seven voted for, seventeen against and nine abstained.¹ The Democrats were naturally defeated and the Government obtained the extraordinary powers it demanded.

Some of the uses made of these powers were to persecute the Democrats as pointed out by Dekhāreqānī and Iran-e Nou.² The Government obtained the exile of

1. M.M. Maj 2, No. 229, '14th Rabī' al-Avval. Of the 120 deputies to be elected, only 73 voted, so obviously the remainder were either absent due to sickness, promotion etc., or had not yet been elected, due to the disturbances in the country.

2. Iran-e Nou, No. 52, 28th Jamādī al-Avval 1329, (27th May 1911) and No. 55, 1st Jamādī al-Sānī (30th May).

Rasūlzādeh, for example, in Jamādī- al- Avval 1329 (May, 1911). Heydar Khān (one of the Mojāhedīn who supported the democrats and not to be confused with Heydar Khān Amū Oghlī) and Yār Moḥammad Khān of Kermanshah to whom the murder of Behbahānī was attributed were also exiled.¹ Many of the Democrats employed in Government departments were thrown out of office or exiled, including liberal Governors such as Şāḥeb Ekhtiyār from Khorasan,² and Mokhber al-Saltāneh from Azarbaijan.

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1. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat. 6, p. 265. Yār Moḥammad Khān was one of the Mojāhedīn who had come to Tehran and had helped the Government in the disarmament in Park -e Atābak. Now he was arrested and exiled. A. Kasravi, Tārīkh-e Hijdah Sāleh, pp. 157-8.
 2. Sheykh Reżā Dehkhāreqānī wrote bitterly that the coalition's whole programme was full of falsity. He explained what clauses to overthrow terrorism, corruption, misuse of freedom by newspapers, the establishment of better relations with friendly and neighbouring countries, and the reform of the Ministry of Justice, meant. They meant by terrorism to suppress the armed supporters of the Democrats and by corruption they meant the Democrats' Anjomans in Azarbaijan and Khorasan- by newspapers they meant their newspapers, and by the friendly nations they meant Russia and Britian, he explained. R. Dehkhāreqānī, op. cit., pp. 44-48.

The next confrontation between the two parties occurred over the question of the loan from the Imperial Bank¹ and the expenditure and control of it. The loan from Russia and Britain, and the one from the International Syndicate had fallen through as mentioned, so now the Government turned to the Imperial Bank. This measure was unpopular with the Russians, and was out of desperation that the Government undertook to obtain a loan from the Imperial Bank.

The debates of the Majles on the question of the loan and especially on the scheme of expenditure reflect the effectiveness of Nāşer al- Molk's policy, for the Democrats could do little but ask embarrassing questions.² It further shows the stand each party took on this question, as well as the consistency (though impotence) of the Democrats. They were reduced to opposing the government backed by a majority in the Majles which made it invincible. Nāşer al- Molk not only succeeded in imposing a relatively strong government but also limited the influence and power of the Democrats. Moreover, these arguments illustrate

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1. See Appendix C for details of the loan.
 2. Once Barclay commented that "The criticism of the Opposition on this score (arms purchase from Russia) was so embarrassing to the government that the Ministers, finding themselves hard pressed, brought the sitting to an end by stating that they were invited out to dinner". Barclay to Grey, May 6th, 1911, No. 73 FO 416/48.

the impasse the affairs had reached. The government argued that unless they had funds, they could not pay the army, but the Democrats did not trust Sepahdār or the E'tedālīs nor the financial transaction they suggested.

Despite the relative success of Sepahdār's third Cabinet there still remained the dominant financial problem. The Scheme of expenditure and control of the £1,250,000 to be raised in London had been drawn up by Şanī'al - Douleh¹ and was later somewhat altered. The loan was to be spent under the supervision of a Committee of Control. The sum of 3,396,697 toman was to meet the accounts of the Imperial Bank; 1,562,800 toman was to be paid to the garrisons in important frontier cities; and 300,000 toman to be spent on arms purchase. The Committee of Control was to be made up of the representatives of the various administrative branches and seven Europeans in the employment of the Persian Government. It was to be presided over by the Finance Minister with the Vice Presidency of the Belgian Director of Customs. The Committee of Control would draw up the plan for the army expenditure and would present it to the Majles. The Arms would be purchased under the supervision of European and Persian officers.²

1. Barclay to Grey, May 16th 1911, No. 73, FO 371/1184.

2. The Cabinet of Sepahdār proposed the following alterations:

Article 1. (a) 3,396,697 tomans to be paid to the Imperial Bank of Persia to meet the amounts due to them.

On the sitting of 22 Rabī'al -Šānī, (22nd April), the scheme of expenditure was discussed. The Democrats once again put up a fight, opposing this scheme on the grounds that the Government should spend it on something constructive not on previous debts to the Bank and the arrears of salaries of the Army and Police and the Ambassadors abroad. These arrears of payments should be included in the budget. Further^{more} to the embarrassment of the Government Soleyman Mīrzā insisted that they should know the details of how the money was going to be spent. The other parts of the loan were also discussed, such as the purchase of weapons from Russia. It was said that better German weapons could be purchased at cheaper prices. On the 25th of Rabī'al-Šānī, (25th April), these discussions were continued and the Democrats made a declaration of their

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2. Cont/....
 (b) 341,510 tomans to pay off the advances on the loan.
 Article 2, 500,000 tomans for the arrears of the Army, Gendarmerie, and Police.
 Article 3. 100,000 tomans for the arrears of the Persian representative abroad.
 Article 4. 220,000 tomans for the purchase of arms partly already purchased from the Caucasian Army Headquarters.
 Article 5. 200,000 tomans for the Gendarmerie.
 Article 6. 1, 243,000 tomans for the Army for the current year.
 Barclay to Grey, May 16th, 1911, No. 13 FO 371/1184.

policy with regard to the loan. Soleyman Mirza declared that the Democrat party was not opposed to practical policies, and a mercantile loan which had no political conditions would help develop the resources of economy and trade of the country. They believed that such a loan was necessary for the development of trade and essential reforms. Therefore they were not opposed to the present loan, although it was not completely free from political conditions. However, the Democrat party was obliged to make the following observations, he said the most important duty of the Parliament of any constitutional country was the supervision of financial matters, especially the proper use of expenditure. In reality the main difference between a despotic country and a constitutional country lay in such problems. In despotic countries the finance of the country was the private property of one or of a few people, but in a constitutional country the finance was considered to be the income of the nation.

Parliament which was the representative of the nation fixed the amount and place of the expenses. The nation must be completely assured that the revenue from taxes was spent on national programmes according to a plan approved by Parliament. The supervision and accounting by the Majles must be so accurate and strong that not a Dīnār was wasted. The proceeds of this loan though not such a great sum, had historical importance, therefore the Democrat party thought that responsibility lay with the

Government to ensure that the loan should be spent on things which would guarantee essential reforms and the security of the country, and to produce a practical supervisory plan which would guarantee the correct use of the expenditure. Therefore the Democrats were absolutely opposed to the payment of any kind of arrears of salaries to Government servants and any kind of expense not included in the budget approved by the Majles and which had not been controlled or supervised from the proceeds of this loan.

The Democrats made the following suggestions to the Majles, namely that the Bill of the loan and the Bill setting up the control and plan of expenditure and supervision be postponed until the arrival of the financial experts and police officers who were coming from America and Europe, so that this Bill would be passed according to their views. The necessary control which was the guarantee of fundamental reforms and security should be established according to a plan of scientific supervision.

Morteżā Qolī Khān replied for his party saying that they agreed to postpone the Control Bill, but the loan must be discussed for it was not possible to postpone everything until the Americans came.¹ Their views were important on the question of control but had nothing to do with the actual loan.

1. The employment of the American financial experts was settled in the Cabinet of Mostoufī al-Mamālek. See pp. 440-1.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs also added that the Government accepted that the Bill of Control should be postponed until the Americans came, but added that the Deputies knew the loan was for immediate expenses and that they were aware of the necessity to establish peace and security. The Government had suggested this loan for this purpose, and in the meantime when the Loan Bill was passed a plan of control and supervision would be prepared by the Government. The foreign experts who were already here knew the problems of the country, and the Government trusted them, so that it was possible to control these expenses by the existing means.

Votes were taken to discuss the loan itself and it was voted for by a majority of 43. Soleymān Mīrzā again repeated his point that a commercial loan should be spent on reforms not on the payment of arrears of salaries. He was however, opposed by Eftekhār al-Vā'ezīn who said that if the troops were not paid they could not collect the taxes. Vaḥīd al-Molk then took the floor saying that everywhere in the world it was customary to see first what the expenses were, then to decide whether or not to arrange a loan; how could they approve a loan if they did not know how it was going to be spent? None of the Deputies of the left could vote on it; nowhere was it customary that a loan was first suggested by the Government, then the expenses. This was absolutely contradictory. He then added that he was not opposed to the loan, on condition that the expenses and the manner of its control should be made known first. He concluded saying for his part he could not vote his assent to these proposals.

Matīn al-Saltāneh attacked the Democrats for being contradictory and not honest. He said he did not know what they wanted. The loan was nothing new and had been discussed before in Mostoufī al-Mamālek's Cabinet.

It was at this stage that the President intervened here and severely reprimanded the Deputies for extra-parliamentary pressure put on the government. He said that he thought everything should be done overtly; but a few days earlier a telegram had been sent by the Anjoman-e Ayālatī of Azarbaijan to the Deputies of Azarbaijan telling them to oppose the loan and to leave when votes were being taken. The President objected strongly saying that this practice was contrary to Constitutionalism. He had warned the leader of the Democrats, because most of the Azarbaijan deputies were Democrats, that he would never accept such behaviour. He had also spoken to the leader of the coalition, he said, and it had been decided that as the Bill of Control and the expenditure of the loan was a point of controversy between the Deputies, and in view of the telegram from Azarbaijan, it would be preferable to bring in the Loan Bill first. It had also been agreed to add a clause at the end of this Bill, saying that the Government should not spend this money until the Majles approved the expenditure and manner of its control. He then warned the Azarbaijan Deputies not to act according to the telegram of the Anjoman-e Azarbaijan.¹

On the 27th Rabī'al-Šānī (27th April) the discussion

1. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 247, 25th Rabī'al-Šānī 1329.

about the loan resumed. The question which now raised a controversy was the rate of interest of 12.5% on the loan. The Democrats objected to this rate, saying it was too high. Such high rate was only fixed when conditions were unsettled, and a country was at war. It was also suggested that if the Government gave the Imperial Bank the permission to sell the shares of this loan in Tehran and London and if the Government paid for the expenses of this enterprise, only 6% or 7% would be discounted and she would receive about 93% which would amount to the larger sum of about £700,000.

The Government replied that the Europeans asked for such a high rate because Persia was in dire need of money. Previously the loans were at 85%, now they were at 85.5%. Vahid al-Molk, who spoke for the Democrats, was not satisfied. He said that the conditions attached to this loan were political, and the customs of Ahwaz and Mohammareh were being added to those already placed under guarantee. He added that all the advantage would again accrue to the Bank and the Government would again lose. But the Democrats, could make no headway with their arguments however hard they tried. Despite the very fundamental objections of the opposition and the eloquence of Vahid al-Molk who took the lead, the Democrats were eventually outvoted. Only the question of the postponement of expenditure was agreed to and the loan was frozen until the arrival of the Americans.¹

1. See Appendix D for text of the Bill.

16. This was another evidence of the strength of the coalition.

On the 17th Jamādī al-Avval (18th May) the Government brought another Bill to the Majles for the plan of the expenditure of the loan. The ministers attended this session. This Bill proposed to spend most of the money on military purposes and included the following clauses:

1. After paying the Imperial Bank's debt the remainder of the loan will be spent on the following: From the 3 Coror the arrears of salaries of 17,500 men will be paid which would amount to 1,375,000 tomans for the expeditionary troops, and 150,000 tomans for the troops.
2. 220,000 tomans will be spent on the purchase of arms.
3. 100,000 tomans for the payment of the arrears of salaries of Ambassadors and Government representatives abroad.
4. 200,000 tomans for the expenditure of the Amniyeh. 80,000 tomans will be spent when the Swedish experts arrive.
5. 125,000 tomans will be spent on the roadguards.¹

Soleymān Mīrzā and Vahīd al-Molk again repeated their objections. They objected to the way the purchase of arms was going to be made and said that they had a responsibility to the country. Soleymān Mīrzā especially appealed in the name of the workers, toilers and labourers that the money should not be wasted, and asked for the details of the expenditure. Vahīd al-Molk mentioned the

1. Barclay to Grey, May 19th 1911, No. 80 FO 371/1184.

arrears of salaries, saying at least their list should be seen by everyone, but once again they were out voted.¹

Another Bill to control the expenditure was passed on 19th Jamādī al-Šānī (30th May) on the eve of the arrival of Shuster and the Americans.^{1,2} According to this Bill, which had been presented before a mixed Committee of Control would be set up which included representatives of the Government, and seven European employees, and would be placed under the Presidency of the Finance Minister and the Vice-Presidency of the Belgian Director of Customs. This Committee of Control was to cause a great amount of trouble when the Treasurer General Morgan Shuster arrived and was confronted by the Belgian Director of Customs who would not easily yield his place to him.

The Government was successful in passing the

1. M.M. Maj: 2, No. 247, 17th Jamādī al-Avval 1329.

Iran-e Nou repeated some of the arguments of the Democrat Deputies, declaring its lack of trust in Sepahdār and accusing him of working for the reactionaries.

Iran-e Nou No. 30, 1st Jamādī al Avval 1329 (30th April 1911) No. 68, 16th Jamādī al-Šānī (14th June).

2. This Bill was pushed through the Majles by Russian influence.
A. Destrée, op. cit., p. 215.

loan Bill, and the Bill for its expenditure and control, but Sepahdār had many other problems on his hands particularly in Fars.¹ All hopes centred on the arrival of the American financial experts and momentarily brightened the prospects of the government.

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1. In another despatch, Barclay gave details of the problems facing Sepahdār. Neẓām al-Saltāneh had imprisoned the Qavām brothers who caused mischief and particularly were enemies of Şoulat al-Douleh; Sardār As'ad objected and threatened to throw in his lot with the opposition and upset the Cabinet as already mentioned. Thereupon Sepahdār had threatened to resign as had the Minister of the Interior, until the Cabinet obliged Neẓām al-Saltāneh to exile the two brothers, but they were murdered on the way to the coast. Nothing happened for a time as Neẓām and Şoulat were strong and the Government was occupied in Tehran with more immediate problems. Barclay to Grey, May 16th, 1911, No. 70, FO 371/1189. P. Oberling, op.cit., pp. 102-104.

CHAPTER VIITHE SHUSTER EPISODE

The great importance attached to the need for foreign advisers has already been mentioned. It was not only included in the programme of all the governments since the fall of the ex-Shah, but was also one of the conditions of the Russo-British loan, which shows the importance the powers attached to the need for such persons to reform the Persian finances. Unfortunately the Shuster Mission raised several questions which brought to a head a latent confrontation between the Russians and the Constitutionalists, a development that had always been feared from the beginning of the Revolution. It also became a test of Persia's independence in the light of the 1907 Convention.

So far we have discussed the first and second periods of this Majles session. In the first period the Democrats were in ascendancy and despite their numerical weakness managed to influence and control events to a great extent. In the second phase this situation was reversed through the organization of the coalition to support the Government, and the Democrats were weak and often powerless. The respective strength of the parties were once again upset in the next phase of the Majles through the arrival of the Shuster Mission.

The Shuster Mission has caused a controversy between historians. Shuster himself has given his reasons for the failure of the mission in a book appropriately entitled The Strangling of Persia. Persian historians have dealt with the rights or wrongs of his performance. Some have blamed his strong uncompromising stand, some have blamed the Government, but the general consensus is that the Russians were opposed to any successful reform which would have strengthened or made Persia less dependent. More recent assessment of the Mission has also been made in a recent study which shows how his honest and forceful but undiplomatic behaviour and lack of understanding of a very complicated situation, influenced by a Nationalist but naive set of politicians inevitably led to failure.¹

In the present study attention is mainly focused on the connection of Shuster with the political parties and particularly the Democrats with whom he was said to have been close, and the consequences of this connection. Particulars of his mission have been recorded elsewhere and need not be repeated. Here we shall deal with his influence on the Persian political scene, and party politics.

Shuster was not quite unprepared for what he found in Tehran. He had read Professor Browne's book on the

1. R.A.Mc Daniel, The Shuster Mission and the Persian Constitutional Revolution (Minneapolis 1974) passim.

Persian Revolution, and he writes himself that his "high opinion of, and desire to secure justice for the nascent Constitutional movement in Persia strengthened my own determination to proceed."¹ On the way to Persia he passed through Constantinople and met Taqīzādeh and some of the Nationalists there, and talked with Taqīzādeh of the troubles of Persia. He wrote:

He was given friendly warning of many things, ranging from foreign intrigues to personal injury, but among all the diverse advice vouchsafed there was a clear agreement of opinion to the effect that the Persian Medjliss or National Parliament represented the actual progressive movement of the people of Iran, and that it was both by laws and reputation the symbol of Persian Nationalism and liberty."²

Shuster came to Persia with preconceived ideas,³

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- I. W. M. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, (London 1912), p. 50.
 2. Ibid., p.74.
 3. R. A. McDaniel writes that "his stance had been determined by his preconception of the nature of the Persian Revolution and of the country's problems, but it was the most efficacious approach to them. It was true that the single most important force in Persian politics was the Majles, and that he had succeeded in bringing that force to his side was a major triumph. That he had done so by appealing to its anti Russian, or perhaps, anti foreign bias was to cause him great difficulty in the future, as was the fact that he had been successful in his first encounter with foreign opposition. Shuster's appeal to the Majles broke the delicately balanced two-party system that had been created in the Spring 1911".
R. A. Mc Daniel, op. cit., p. 132.

and was close to the Democrats, particularly to Ḥoseyn Qolī Khān Navvāb of whom he speaks very highly.¹ This connection was the reason why some of those who worked with him attributed his mistakes to the Democrat's influence.

'Abdallāh Mostoufī, who worked closely with Shuster and was appointed by him to a post in the Treasury General as Chief of Direct Taxation, wrote that the Democrats misled him for their own ends to weaken the E'tedālīs,² and Mostoufī blames the Democrats for Shuster's mistakes, accusing them of being illogical and following their personal ambitions.³ Mostoufī gives credit to Shuster, for his work but he believed him to be unaware of Persia's problems. He does not take into consideration the fact that Shuster might have sided with the Democrats out of personal inclination, which was certainly the case. In a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Washington it is reported that Shuster was said to have sided with the natives in the Philippines where he had been in charge of reorganizing the customs, and had caused such an embarrassment to the administration that he was recalled. In the

1. M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 6, p. 262.

M. Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

2. 'A Mostoufī, Sharḥ-e Zendegānī-ye man yā Tārīkh-e Ejtemā'ī va Edārī-ye Doureh-ye Qājārīyeh (Tehran, 1343) 2. (2nd ed). p. 344.

3. He particularly blamed Soleyman Mīrzā, who, he said had benefitted by the death of Yaḥyā Mīrzā his brother who had been arrested and tortured by Moḥammad 'Alī Shah and had died as a consequence of these tortures. *Ibid.*, pp. 326-7.

same letter it was reported that his work was said to have been rigorous and even judged to have been somewhat vexatious.¹ This report would help to explain Shuster's behaviour in Persia and point to the fact that the position he took was deliberate and accorded with his personal views.

The Democrats saw in this idealist sympathetic young American a weapon with which they could confront the government more particularly thwart the imperialist designs of the two great powers. They were aware of the implications of the Russo-British Convention of 1907; indeed, they were far more conscious of foreign policy than the others, and they understood that the Convention took its impetus not from Persian but from international politics. They knew that the division of Persia was the modus vivendi reached by the powers to retain their agreement, and that neither would jeopardize it for Persia. The British had gone as far as accepting the occupation of Northern Persia for the sake of peace so she would put no interest above that. Were the Democrats then so naive as to ignore all these implications? Were they so anti Russia and anti-Imperialist as to be blind to the dangers? Amongst the small group of highly able politicians in the Democrat party there were some who had a deep understanding of the implications of the Anglo-

1. A. Destree . op. cit. Quoting F. Kazemzadeh, p. 584.

Russian Entente, but at the same time they felt the Russians were not sincere and would at every possible stage create pretexts to prevent any real reform. Shuster was similarly conscious of the baleful influence of the Russians and thought, more generally, that from the beginning he was opposed by a number of Persians. In an open letter to The Times he says that there was a "deliberate agreement between a number of foreign legations here, headed by the Russian Legation to defeat my execution of that law (the law concerning the full powers for the Treasurer General) and to thwart the general system of centralisation, payments and accounting prescribed thereunder. The pretexts urged against the system were flimsy and untenable in the extreme, and their manifest purpose was to prevent any material change in the old style of conducting Persia's fiscal affairs."¹ In this same letter Shuster refers to the Russo-British Convention of 1907 which in its preamble expressed the desire of the signatories for the preservation of order and peaceful development and for both to engage to respect the integrity and sovereignty of Persia. He argued that at every turn of events this sovereignty was being undermined and the Persian collapse hastened. This sovereignty which Shuster tried to respect was in fact non-existent to a large extent,² and, as one writer points out,

1. M. Shuster, op.cit., p.314.

2. He expressed some of his indignation and the hopelessness of the situation, saying that if money was to be obtained for permanent improvements it must be taken on impossible political terms. If railroads were to be built, they must be coterminous with our old friends' "spheres of influence". If rifles were to be bought, they must be bought from rich and friendly foreign governments at just three times their market price; if officers were to be taken into the Persian service they must come from

Grey had observed, that Persia was not in fact a sovereign nation,¹

When Shuster came he had a choice of either to work in the same way as the Belgian Custom official and French financial expert, that is, to be under the influence of the two great powers, or to act honestly in the interest of Persia. He chose the latter course and kept aloof from the foreign colony to show his independence. In this case it was natural that he should be supported by the Democrats,² but support for him was not limited to them: the Majles was said to be at his "command" and "proposals by him have only to be made to be accepted with practical unanimity."³

2. Cont/.

a minor power, or prove themselves to have been of the spineless, nerveless type of which the tools of foreign interests were produced; even if they were from a minor power, there must not be so many of them taken as to indicate a serious attempt at reform. Shuster, op. cit., p. 325.

1. R.A. McDaniel, op.cit., p.120.
2. Barclay to Grey, July 11th, 1911, No. 115, Fo.O. 371, 1185.
3. It is interesting to quote an article in Iran -e Nou in support of Shuster which at the same time justifies the Democrats' argument in his support. The article said that Shuster had a very difficult task ahead of him; he had not only to free the finances of Persia from being the monopoly of one class but to reform them. Those classes which stood to lose their wealth by his reforms naturally opposed him. This class benefitted by the chaotic condition of the finances, and naturally if the loan money were controlled they would make no profit. Those who worked in the Finance Ministry also wanted to stop his reforms. Iran-e Nou, No. 81, 4th Rajab 1329, (1st July 1911).

The E'tedālīs too supported Shuster because from the beginning of the Second Majles, all the governments whether of Sepahdār or Mostoufī had included the employment of foreign expert in their programmes. The Foreign powers, too, held that this was the only way to stabilize the financial problems of Persia. Before the confrontation between Shuster and the Russians, and the government, the E'tedālīs supported him and voted for the bill which gave him full powers.

The Bill Shuster put through to Majles immediately gave him full powers over the financial and fiscal affairs of Persia, including the collection of taxes and the control of all accounts of the Government.¹ The discussions on this Bill in the Majles were not too heated and the Democrats had little to say. The bill was voted 61 for, 3 against with six abstentions.² On the 30th May another law was passed, also unanimously, abolishing the previous Committee of Control and entrusting the control of the loan to a branch of the Ministry of Finance to be formed under the Treasurer General. This law brought about a severe confrontation between Mornard, the Belgian Customs official backed by Russia, and Shuster. After much diplomatic wrangling a compromise was agreed - Mornard was asked to obey the law,

1. Barclay to Grey, June 6th 1911, No. 84, FO 371/1191, Ibid. June 13th, 1911, No. 95, FO 416/49.

2. M.M. Maj. 2, No. 259, 15th Jamādī al-Šānī 1329.

but Shuster assured him he would keep the customs receipts separate.¹

Two events of importance occurred at this juncture which paralyzed the Government and the smooth working of the Treasurer General's plans. One was the sudden departure of Sepahdār on the 17th Jamādī al-Šānī, (15th June) and the other was the arrival of the ex-Shah with Russian connivance, the news of which reached Tehran on the 21st of Rajab, (18th July). This latter event throws a slightly different perspective upon this episode and one can surmise that the Russians did not really want Shuster to succeed. Most writers have seen no apparent connection between these two events, and say that Sepahdār left because he had no hope to control the loan money which was put under the control of Shuster.² In fact, he wrote a note to the Majles saying he was proceeding to Europe for the health of his son; however he only went as far as Rasht and, there the provincial Anjoman prevented him from going further. In an interview Nāṣer al-Molk had given his version to George Churchill to

1. Shuster believed the Committee to be the result of Russian intrigue, but McDaniel says this belief was instilled in him by the Democrats.

R. A. McDaniel, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

2. Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 91. R.A. McDaniel, p. 128, *op. cit.* M. Malekzādeh, Tārīkh-e Mashrūṭīyyat, 6 p. 263.

the effect that for some months there had been dissension in the Cabinet and that Mostashār al-Doulēh and Momtāz al-Douleh had schemed against the Premier¹ Mohtasham al-Saltāneh had also joined in the plot on the promise of the post of Prime Minister and that the majority party which had been brought together with such difficulty was far from being loyal. They included even persons who were secretly loyal to the Democrats whom he characterized as "fiendish". He maintained that the Democrats and their supporters had decided to get rid of Sepahdār,² and wanted to censure him about the revolt of Rashīd al-Soltān in Mazandaran, the previous Autumn, which Sepahdār was thought to have encouraged. It had been arranged that many would vote against the Sepahdār to get rid of him. The Regent had added that the Premier had wanted to relinquish office, but that he had dissuaded him, and told him to go to the Majles and answer the questions, but that the Premier had left. Whether Nāṣer al-Molk's version of events was correct or not, it is obvious that not only the fragile coalition collapsed, but

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1. Momtāz al-Douleh had changed portfolios with Mo'āven al-Douleh Ghafārī in Jamādī al-Šānī (May). McDaniel writes that the official reason was said to be his health, but that in fact it was because he had come into conflict with the Sepahdār over the Premier's expenditure. R. A. McDaniel, op. cit., p. 126.
 2. In fact Barclay points out that the Cabinet was dissatisfied with the Sepahdār. Barclay to Grey, 14th June 1911, No. 98 FO 416/49.

the problem had undermined the unity of the Cabinet as well.

As a consequence of this departure, Nāṣer al-Molk summoned the members of the Majles and the Ulama and discussed the situation with them. They kept silent however, and not even the President of the Majles would reply. Only the representative of the Ulama suggested that Sepahdār be recalled. Nāṣer al-Molk refused because he said the same problems would still face him and Sepahdār would only agree to return on condition that he could remove those who obstructed him. No decision had therefore been reached at that meeting.¹ Eventually however, the Deputies faced with the chaos, and the danger of the return of the ex-Shah, telegraphed the Premier to come back. Dekhareqānī on the other hand believed that the return of the ex Shah was known to Sepahdār and the Regent.²

The Persian Government had been aware of the activities of the ex-Shah and attention was drawn to it in the Majles. Navvāb in particular had wanted to stop the payment of his salary but had been forced not to take such action by the British and Russians. Dekhāreqānī also

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1. Barclay to Grey, June 26th, 1911 No. 104 FO 371/1191. Enclosure in No. 1, memo. By G. Churchill.
 2. On July 4th Nāṣer al-Molk had asked the British Minister whether the British Government would oppose the return of the Shah which proved that he knew about it.
F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914. A Study in Imperialism. (New Haven and London 1968). p. 603.

writes that the Deputy of Mazandaran and the representative of the Turkmans had warned that they had heard of plans for the return of Moḥammad 'Alī. He assumes that the Regent knew of it and that it had been agreed that the Premier should ask for fuller powers as a condition of his return, but that it was obvious the Deputies would refuse. This departure had been so arranged, he says, to avoid the impeachment planned in the Majles which might have obliged the Sepahdār to resign. A new government might not have complied with the plan to bring back the ex-Shah.¹

Sepahdār might have been in the plot, but it is more likely that he deliberately took this ambivalent attitude in order to save himself if the ex-Shah was successful. At the same time, by being inactive, but by not resigning, he was ingratiating himself with the Russians.

Iran-e Nou however says that the purpose of Sepahdār was to weaken Shuster who had received full powers. It says Sepahdār's idea was to disband the Majles so that Shuster would lose his backing, but he had not been able to persuade the Coalition to accept this so he had left.² It is indeed possible that the Sepahdār had lost hope of retaining the unity of the coalition which had began to break up, but it is more in line

1. Another writer points out that the Russians had in the Summer 1911 regained a stronger situation in Europe as a result of the Treaty of Potsdam and that now they tried to regain a stronger position in Persia too by bringing back the ex-Shah. They considered the Persian Revolution a British plot and wished to undo its effects by backing Moḥammad 'Alī to regain his throne.

F. Kazemzadeh Russia and Britain, p. 597.

2. Iran-e Nou No. 82, 5th Rajab 1329, (2nd July 1911).

with his character that he left in order not to be compromised if the ex-Shah returned.

In fact he returned to Tehran a few days before the ex-Shah landed in Gumish Tapeh on the 25 Rajab, 22 July, but he remained in his estate and took little action. The Democrats who could not form a Cabinet of their own, and faced with the prospect of the ex-Shah's return, discussed this question with the other parties and agreed to join the E'tedālīs in asking him to resume work. Sepahdār then agreed to accept responsibility as all the parties supported him,¹ and organized his Cabinet². This included Şamsām al-Saltāneh as Minister of War. (He was the brother of Sardār As'ad who was in Europe at this time). Mohtasham al-Saltāneh was made Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mo'āven al-Douleh remained Minister of Finance and Moshīr al-Douleh Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Voşūq al-Douleh was Minister of the Interior and Qavām al-Saltāneh his brother, was Minister of Justice, Ḥakīm al-Molk being Minister of Science.

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1. On the 21st Rajab 1329 (18th July 1911) Iran-e-Nou published the Resolution of the Democrat party concerning the new Cabinet of Sepahdār. They declared that they gave their promise they would support the Government if they did their utmost to fight the outlaws and overthrow the despots. Iran -e Nou, No. 94, 20 Rajab 1329 (17th July 1911) and No. 95, 21 Rajab (18th July),
 2. M. M. Maj. 2, No. 275, 22nd Rajab, 1329.

Ḥakīm al Molk was a Democrat, Vošūq al-Douleh and Qavām al-Saltāneh were also known to hold liberal views; and their inclusion in this Cabinet was calculated to win the support of the Democrats. The Cabinet however, remained inactive and was split. It was even rumoured that Moḥtasham al-Saltāneh, Sepahdār and Mo'āven al-Douleh were plotting against the Democrats, and according to Shuster, the Regent and Şamsām al-Saltāneh also suspected Sepahdār.¹

As Sepahdār continued to remain inactive, eventually a deputation of the Majles went to meet the Regent. Included in their number was Soleyman Mīrzā, with Asadallāh Khān Kordestānī representing the E'tedālīs, and Mo'āzed al-Molk representing the neutrals. They also met the Sepahdār who was still vacillating,² so they first asked the President of the Majles, Mo'tamen al-Molk to accept the Prime Ministership, and when he refused, they asked Şamsām al-Saltāneh who agreed to form a government.

The Government of Şamsām al-Saltāneh. Rajab 1329 (July 1911) to Moḥarram 1330 (December 1911).

The Cabinet of Şamsām al-Saltāneh included 'Alā' al-Saltāneh as Minister of Science and Vošūq al-Douleh

1. M. Shuster op. cit., pp. 113-117.

2. Sepahdār had remarked that if the ex-Shah won his throne he would be angry with him but if he helped to defeat him, the Majles would still treat him as before, criticize and impeach him. R. Dekhāreqānī, op. cit., pp. 49-54.

as Foreign Minister, Ḥakīm al-Molk Minister of Finance, Dabīr al-Molk Minister of Post, Qavām al-Saltāneh Minister of the Interior and Moshir al-Douleh Minister of Justice. Dabīr al-Molk soon resigned and was replaced by Mc'āẓed al-Saltāneh.

Šamsām al-Saltāneh, the Bakhtiyārī Ilkhānī, had been involved in the rising of his tribe against Moḥammad 'Alī. His promotion at this juncture first as Minister of War and Military Governor of Tehran, and then as Prime Minister, shows the importance of the Bakhtiyārīs in the war against the ex-Shah; it also shows the eclipse of Sepahdār who was mistrusted and suspected of being dishonest.¹

Military plans were made and Bakhtiyārī forces came to Tehran to take the field against the ex-Shah and his brother Sālār al-Douleh who had invaded Persia from Kermanshah. Another force was organized under Yephrem the Armenian Chief of Police.²

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1. It is true that the Russians had helped the ex-Shah to prepare for his invasion of Persia, but they could not support him overtly owing to the protocol of 1909 in which they had agreed with the British to his exile. The British now did not change their policy, so any support the Russians could give had to be done secretly. It is possible that the removal of Sepahdār is not unconnected with this policy of 'wait-and-see'.
 2. Moḥammad 'Alī Shah and his loyal supporter Arshad al-Douleh attacked Tehran from two sides. He marched on the capital from the North East and was defeated by the Bakhtiyārīs at Firuz kūh in Sha'bān 1329 (August 1911). Arshad al-Douleh attacked from the South and was defeated by Yephrem in Ramaẓān (September). The ex Shah however, remained in the North until Moḥarran 1330 (January 1912) when he left under a safe conduct with the assurance that his salary would be paid. Sālār al-Douleh was later defeated by Yephrem and Farmānfarmā.

The Prime Ministership of Şamsām al-Saltāneh marks another turn to the right which so characterized the course of the Persian Revolution. The Bakhtiyārī ascendancy assured the eventual defeat of the forces of reform, for now with their power behind the politicians and bureaucrats the Democrats stood no chance.¹

Despite the fact that Moḥammad'Alī was defeated, his return helped to further weaken the Democrats who could do nothing against him by themselves and had to rely on the Bakhtiyārīs. At the same time the position of Shuster too became weaker because the Democrats' support was not as effective as before. In particular there was a gradual shift of men such as Voşūq and Qavām to the right. Of course it was a time of emergency, and the membership of men like Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh, Voşūq al-Douleh and Ḥakīm al-Molk in this Cabinet is justifiable, but it should be noted that they remained in the Cabinet after the danger had passed, and helped to defeat Shuster, much as happened after the overthrow of the Majles in 1908. Such men had liberal ideas in the First Majles, but now they had obviously changed their stance, and one can see a rift opening between the real reformers and the Government forces. Obviously the Democrats must have been regarded as posing a real danger to the interests, for in reality they seemed little better than irresponsible forces of chaos and danger. As this

rift widened the Democrats became weaker and isolated. Their only strength could have been from the people of the Bāzārs and the Kasabeh and intellectuals, and these were generally only roused in times of danger and national distress.

In fact Ṣamsām al- Saṭṭaneh did not produce a programme. He made a Bill to obtain extraordinary powers which was offered to the Regent and the Majles on the 14th Sha'bān, 9th August. Then this bill was formulated as a programme and presented to the Majles which only accepted it by force of the Regent.¹ This was once more an attempt to obtain extraordinary powers as Sepahdār had done. Dehkhāreqānī discusses these powers in great detail and comments on them fully accusing the government of ulterior motives. This Bill included originally three headings dealing with internal politics, emergency measures and foreign politics. It began thus:

1. As the Government had not participated in the electoral laws now being passed by the Majles, these must be studied by the Ministers who will give their opinion about them to the Majles.

2. In the next elections it must be announced that the Deputies must be delegated such powers to be able to revise the Fundamental Laws; therefore the Deputies who will be elected must have the necessary capability to perform this duty.

1. Barclay to Grey, Sep. 5th 1911, No. 169, FO 416/49.

Under emergency matters it said:

1. The Government must be strong and must have the power necessary to assume its responsibility. It must take the interests of the country into consideration and it must not be attacked by irresponsible accusations. It must be empowered to stop the spreading of false rumours and the organization of secret societies or weakening the Government.
2. The Government must act immediately to centralize the strength of the country and to stop the weakening forces of decentralization. In order to achieve this the laws of the provincial Anjomans must be revised with the advice of foreign experts. Before effectuating this revision and before its results are made lawful, the Government must have the right to dissolve the Anjomans which cause decentralization and occasion local corruption.
3. People who have misused the absence of subsidiary laws and the ambiguity and doubts concerning the fundamental laws, have caused chaos, upset the peace, spread rumours, taken disadvantage by other means, obstructed the conduct of the Government's duty, or called on the laws of other countries in the furtherance of their own interests must be stopped by the Government. The Government must have a free hand to stop all corruption occasioned by the weaknesses of the laws.
4. In order to establish order and peace in the country which is the Government's main duty, it is necessary to organize an ordered gendarmerie under the direction and training of Swedish officers. The Government must have the proper powers to buy the necessary arms, etc.

5. The Government must be free to reduce or dissolve any department or organization set up owing to a lack of experience or unnecessarily, the maintenance of which is contrary to the interests of the country.

6. The Ministry of Justice has so far been the cause of complaints and trouble to the Government authorities. The Government must suggest a reform after the necessary study of the case. Before that it must have the power to act according to the necessity of the situation and to execute justice where it seems necessary.

7. While the law of punishments has not been enacted by the executive, the Government must be empowered to punish as the Ministers think necessary.

About foreign policy the Bill said:

1. It is obvious that the internal politics of each country is to a certain extent dependent on its foreign policy contrary to what has been customary. Not until it acquires a distinct policy is any improvement in its internal politics possible. Therefore the Government must include in its foreign policy a programme to attract the friendship and trust of friendly governments, especially those governments whose friendship is very important, and public opinion must help this policy.¹

This Bill was referred to a Commission by the Majles. The Democrats believed, Dehkhāreqānī says, that the Regent

1. R. Dehkhāreqānī, op. cit., pp. 55-58.

had taken this opportunity, when the country was in danger, to impose these measures which would in fact curtail to a great extent the powers of the Majles. He further interpreted these points in a polemical manner, and especially attacked the Regent.¹ But he is not far from the truth. He discussed the clauses dealing with it and then gave a description of how this Bill was offered as the Government's programme. He wrote that as the Commission had rejected the Bill, the Government offered it as its programme and the Democrats who did not want to defeat the Government at this very sensitive period in case the Sepahdar returned to power, accepted a slightly revised version. He added that he stayed away when votes were taken because he disagreed with the procedure. The Democrats did not discuss these proposals, though there was quite an opposition to them in the Majles.² The main problem was the fact that the ex-Shah still posed a grave threat so the government managed to push its proposals through the Majles.

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1. There is no doubt that the Regent felt the Majles to be obstructive, and had told one of the staff of the British legation who was sent to interview him by Barclay that not much improvement could be expected from the present Majles and that his hopes centred on the fact that the Majles had only six more weeks before its term came up. He added that he thought it was desirable to postpone the new elections as long as was possible and he had thought to prescribe the registration of the voters which would take some time.
 2. M. M. Maj. 2, No. 290, 9th Ramażān 1329.

According to Barclay when the programme was submitted to the Majles, only two Deputies rose in its favour, so the Prime Minister threatened to resign. On the 28th August the Regent summoned the Deputies, gave them a lecture and threatened to resign as well. Consequently the programme was passed,¹ but the problem centred round the relationship of the Government with Shuster.

On October 4th Barclay made an appraisal of the situation and of the relationship of Shuster with the Majles and the Government. He wrote that the relationship of the present Cabinet with the Russian Minister was satisfactory and it was hoped that it would last the 3 weeks left to the Majles' term. He added that the ultra-Nationalists distrusted the Government and wished to replace it with a more democratic Government before the Majles was dissolved. On the other hand the relationship of the Government with Shuster was aloof but he enjoyed the full confidence of the ultra-Nationalists he wrote.

Shuster worked separately from the Government and was negotiating a loan with the Seligman firm which the Foreign Minister, Vošūq- al- Douleh, had let it be known was on his own responsibility alone.²

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1. Barclay to Grey 5th Sep. 1911, No. 167, FO 371/1194. Now the Government supported by Russia and Britain faced the problem of dealing with Shuster and the Democrats. Shuster in the meantime had done nothing to gain favour with the powers.
 2. Ibid., Oct. 4th 1911, No. 190, FO 416/50.

One of Shuster's difficulties was to deal with the demands made for money by the various Bakhtiyārī chiefs who had come to fight the ex-Shah and Sālār al Douleh, and as he was very reticent on this point he became very unpopular with them.¹

Barclay reported that the Cabinet wanted to curtail the powers of the Treasurer General but that the Majles would oppose this and Shuster might resign. He added

Samsam -es- Sultaneh, whom I saw yesterday, expressed himself very bitterly in regard to the Treasurer General. H. E. gave me to understand that the Cabinet greatly resented the firm control Shuster is exercising over Government funds, and that they are alive to the danger which his defiant attitude towards the two powers involves.

In fact the Bakhtiyārīs who had posed as the champions of constitutionalism in November presented themselves to him and complained about the Democrats and Shuster saying that by provoking Russia they made government impossible. The Democrats had obstructed the formation of a Cabinet which Şamşām al-Saltāneh had wished to form to curtail the powers of Shuster and to give satisfaction to Russia. They had then added that they were debating

1. On October 17th Barclay reported that the Regent and Şamşām al-Saltāneh both wanted to resign again owing to a Cabinet crisis caused by the extremists. This crisis was the result of a letter written by Shuster to the Foreign Minister complaining that the latter had settled a Russian claim without referring to him. This crisis was however overcome, and the Ministers returned to work. Ibid., Oct. 17th 1911, No. 498, 20 Oct. No. 507, FO 371/1199.

whether to effect a coup d'état and take power into their own hands or leave the country to the mercy of the ex-Shah, and demanded the opinion of the Powers in case of a coup d'état. Barclay and the British Government did not give their answer immediately, but this was considered as a possibility in case the situation became out of hand. The Russians too did not dismiss a Bakhtiyārī coup d'état.¹

Shuster had a very difficult problem on his hands. The Russians opposed his appointment of Major Stokes² a British officer and the Military attaché whom he wanted to appoint to organize the Treasury Gendarmerie. Another of his measures which was particularly obnoxious to them was his project to extend his economic activities to Northern Persia. He also proposed to redeem the Russian debt which had been converted to a fixed sum in the Winter of 1911. The new loan to be negotiated from the Seligman firm would have been used for this purpose, and for his railway projects.³

1. Barclay to Grey, Nov. 21st 1911, No. 592, FO 416/50
2. According to the Under secretary Norman Stokes was known for being anti-Russian, and was said to be in touch with and in sympathy with the Persian ultra-Nationalists and to attend their secret meetings. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 587.
3. McDaniel gives details of this loan of £ 4,000,000 from an English firm, for the Seligman firm had originally been American, but now was centered in London. R. A. McDaniel, op. cit., pp. 149-161, 164.

As one writer points out, the Russians could not forgive him the fact that he had been, to a large extent, instrumental in defeating Moḥammad 'Alī.¹ Gradually the British too came to regard his activities as irksome to good relations with Russia. They at first thought his powers should be limited, and later it was concluded he should leave.

Shuster at this juncture issued a statement to the Persian press which was reproduced in The Times on the 10th and 11th November. In this he set out his views about the situation and the fact that both the Russians and the British were obstructing his work.² He accused both Governments of undermining Persian sovereignty which they said they guaranteed, and gave instances of this.

Shuster complained bitterly about the Government and the demands made for money by the Prime Minister. In Sha'bān (late August) he had to refuse outright to pay more to the Bakhtiyārī chiefs until some result in the war with the ex-Shah was reached.³

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1. F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, p. 613.
 2. R. A. McDaniel points out: "It was not until he broke through that mask and spoke directly to a European audience that he not only lost the diplomatic support of the British and then the Russians, but also incurred their opposition." R. A. McDaniel, op. cit. pp. 173-4.
 3. Shuster, op. cit., pp. 120 and 134.

In particular he mentions Vošūq al- Douleh and Qavām al-Saltāneh, and those Ministers who co-operated with him less and less¹. At the same time he became unpopular in many quarters and was even threatened by an attack on his residence and asked to resign. This he refused, saying he would not resign unless the Majles asked him.²

Russia and Britain were of course aware of the tensions existing between Shuster and the Government, and this naturally strengthened their hands against him. Vošūq al- Douleh had told Paklowski that the Cabinet did not approve the policy of Shuster and wanted to limit him, but that they must not be rushed. At the same time he settled two small Russian claims without Shuster's knowledge, and when the latter objected Vošūq threatened to resign, but did not do so on condition that Shuster's powers be curtailed. But when this question was to be discussed in the Majles, the Democrats walked out of the meeting so that the debate could not be held.³ The Cabinet all but disintegrated at

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1. M. Shuster, op. cit., p. 162.
 2. M. Shuster particularly mentions two of the Ministers, Vošūq al- Douleh and his brother Qavām al- Saltāneh as being unfriendly when he appointed Lecoffre, another Englishman, to Tabriz to control the revenue of that province, which had been collected hitherto by their father, the tax collector of Azarbaijan.
 3. Barclay to Grey Nov. 1st 1911, No. 215, FO 416150. Barclay further reported that Vošūq was anxious to carry out a policy of close relationship with Russia and Britain. Ibid. Sep. 5th No. 167, FO 371/1194.

this time; only Vošūq al- Douleh and Şamsām al- Salteneh remained at their posts. The Premier tried to compose his Cabinet but found difficulties in the Majles. Whereas the Deputies wanted Qavām al- Saltaneh as Minister of Interior which the Premier would not accept,¹ the Premier wanted to include Mohtasham al- Saltaneh in the Cabinet which the Majles opposed. In fact the situation was very confused when the Russians presented the Government with an ultimatum; but before discussing this, we must look at the question of the prolongation of the Majles session which was coming to an end.

After two years, the Majles' term was coming to an end in Zīq'adeh (November). Telegrams had been sent from some of the provinces to the Majles asking it to extend its term. The Anjoman of Tabriz suggested that the Majles should extend its term by six months until a majority of the Deputies were elected for the next Majles. These telegrams were sent through the influence of the Democrats but particularly through the initiative of Seyyed Ḥasan Moddares.

The E'tedālīs were split on this question and some argued for the closing of the Majles. They had of course a lawful argument which contained some technical questions. The neutral Deputies played a significant role at this

1. Ibid.,

Nov. 28th 1911, No. 230, FO 371/1198.

junction, like Mo'ez al-Molk, and Zokā' al-Molk, but in particular it was some of those Deputies who had joined the coalition without being E'tedālīs now changed their allegiance and had the last word. Two of these were Sheykh al Ra'īs, and Kāshef, but especially Seyyed Ḥasan Moddares was the leader on this occasion.

Ḥāj Āqā, a diehard E'tedālī, opposed the measure, maintaining that it was an unconstitutional step. In addition, those who had sent the telegrams thought that if the Majles was closed, the Constitution would be threatened but they were wrong. If there were a Cabinet which was trusted by the Majles they could hold the elections. If this Majles was continued and passed laws, some people might say they were unlawful. He finished by saying he no longer thought of himself as a Deputy.

Mo'In al-Ro'āyā refuted him, saying it was not true that people did not understand Constitutionalism; these were the same people who had fought for it. Farzāneh, the Ettefāq va Taraqqī Deputy, was of the opinion that the prolongation of the session was not possible just because some telegrams had been received, but Kāshef said it was no light matter to dissolve the Majles now, even though they all trusted Ṣamsām al-Saltāneh. Ḥāj Sheykh al - Ra'īs admonished them, saying that at such a time they should not even discuss this. In particular, they should not compare Persia with any other country. Matīn al-Saltāneh speaking for the E'tedālīs asked the Deputies to keep calm and made a rather conciliatory speech. He said all the Deputies wanted to keep

the Constitutional system, but that those who argued for the dissolution of the Majles thought it preferable because they thought that it would speed the new elections. The telegrams, he pointed out, were all coming from the North; none were from the west or the south or elsewhere, they could not be said to be from all over Persia.

Dehkhāreqānī, with whose opinions we are familiar, answered that they were discussing whether they thought the Deputies should or should not discuss these telegrams. If not, the actual prolongation of the session would have been decided upon at the meeting with the Regent. He added that of course they should discuss these telegrams because those who had sent them knew that the cinders of despotism were still burning under the ashes. The only thing which resisted the power of despotism was the Constitution, and its centre was the Majles. If that centre disappeared the enemy would regain its strength. The present situation was very sensitive; it would be difficult to recall the Majles once it dispersed.

Then he discussed the question of the telegrams and the fact that they were only from certain parts of the country. He argued that Azarbaijan and Khorasan were the most populated provinces of Persia. Other provinces knew this fact and it could be said that these provinces spoke for all of them. Besides, some provinces had not benefitted by the Constitution - if they had no doubt they would have joined these demands. He concluded by saying the Majles

was within its rights in prolonging its session.¹

Despite these arguments and those to the contrary, no decision was reached at this sitting and the discussion was continued the following day on the 20th Zīqa'deh. Haj Aqa began once again by opposing the continuation of the Majles. He said that he was a patriot and believed in the Constitution. He thought that the people elected their representatives for the limited period of two years and that they had a right to change them. Why had a limit been set? It was because they must have a right to change their representatives if they were not satisfied; the electorate must have a right to express its will. Besides those who thought Constitutionalism would disappear if the Majles were to close were wrong because the Constitution was in the hearts of everyone. It did not depend on the activity of fifty or sixty people. He added that he had looked at other countries and had read and discussed this question. What he understood was that in times of war or revolution the Government closed the Majles and could dissolve it. If they prolonged the Majles it would be a repetition of what had happened to the English Parliament during the time of Cromwell.

Another Deputy, Hāj Sheykh 'Alī Khorāsānī of the Hey'at-e Mo'talefeh, refuted him, saying the Majles was the representative of the people and reflected its wishes.

1. M. M. Maj. 2, No. 320, 19th Zīqa'deh 1329.

When the people expressed their wish to prolong the session until half plus one of the Deputies were elected and came to the capital, their wish should be respected. Then he added that such a clause could even be added to the Fundamental laws. In Azarbaijan there had been a large meeting and they had all agreed to send this telegram. The fact that there had been no telegram from Shiraz did not cancel the importance of what was sent from Azarbaijan.

Seyyed Hasan Moddares, an ardent Nationalist, destined later to play a very important role in the defence of the Constitution, then made a moving speech. He said that he was one of those persons who had tried hard to prolong the session of the Majles. About a month earlier, he said, he had organized several meetings in his own house and in the Majles which Hashtrūdī had attended. There it had been decided to use any means to stir Tabriz. He had himself written to places such as Esfahan to organize meetings and discuss this point. Some of his friends acted in the same way. He thought that the only lawful way was to attract the attention of the electorate as the country was in great danger. There was a difference, he said, between what was wrong and what was impossible. "It is possible to do wrong, but it is impossible to do the impossible". He added that he could not appoint himself a Deputy. This had to be done in a lawful manner, by a majority vote. But those who had sent these telegrams had an ideal like himself, and they wished to prolong the Majles for the sake of the

improvement of the country, and to avoid a crisis. He then said he wanted to express his own feelings.

"There shall never be a Majles like this one; one day history will show that this nation will not have Deputies such as those we have now. They stood up bravely when we were surrounded by rebels, if these rebels had come to Tehran the first thing they would have done was to have overthrown the Deputies".

He said he had attended every session to see whether some would waver, but all had remained steadfast. He added that there would be other sessions but there would never again be such determined Deputies. They had to act lawfully now, he said, but also in accordance with the necessity of the situation.

Sheykh al-Ra'īs suggested that a clause be added to the electoral laws that in each session the Majles should be dissolved after half plus one of the Deputies of the next session arrived in Tehran. This suggestion was submitted to a Commission and the session was closed.¹

On the 21st Zīqa'deh the suggestion of Sheykh al-Ra'īs had been approved by the Commission, but Emām Jom'eh, who generally took little part in the Majles discussions, objected to it and pointed out some technical questions. He said that he thought it was necessary to have the Majles at this particular time, and no one denied that, but that he thought such a vote was contrary to the Constitutional Laws. The Azarbaijan provincial Anjoman had changed some of the original electoral laws. For instance the First

1. Ibid., No. 321, 20th Zīqa'deh 1329.

Majles began when the 60 Deputies of Tehran were elected, but the Anjoman of Azarbaijan had changed that, and had decreed that the Deputies of Tehran were to be 15. It also decreed that when half plus one of the Deputies were present, the session should begin. But now with the new Law it had been decreed that the session would begin when all the Deputies were present. The Majles sessions were from the first two years. This clause had not been changed and he said he doubted if the Majles could change this now. He suggested they should keep the Majles as a consultative body, not as a legislative body.

Zokā' al-Molk who had been the reporter of this Commission and was personally in favour of prolongation replied, and said there was a precedence for the suggestion of the Commission which was in favour of the prolongation of the Majles. When they were writing the new electoral laws there had been a suggestion to change the period of the Majles session from two to three years. Some Deputies had not thought this would be contrary to the Constitutional laws then. So he suggested this should be done now. Then he discussed article 50 of the Fundamental Laws which fixed the session to two years, saying this article meant that the Government could not dissolve the Majles before 2 years. He also denied that the Majles wished to re-elect itself. He said they could prolong the session until the new Deputies arrived, but refuted Emām Jom'eh Kho'ī who had said the Majles should remain as a consultative body. This would make it very useless.

There were further discussions. The President then resorted to an interesting device to solve the question. He counted those provinces which had sent telegrams and the number of their Deputies as against those which had not. These were Khorasan, Semnan Gilan, Qazvin, Azarbaijan. The Deputy of the Armenians and the Bakhtiyārīs were also counted, because Şamsām al- Saltāneh was partially in favour as he wanted to remake his Cabinet before the Majles dissolved. These made up 44 Deputies. Those which had not sent telegrams were Kermanshah, Borujerd Lorestan, Arak, Mazandaran, Astrabad with only 17 Deputies. These provinces could not send telegrams even if they wished to do so, he said because of disturbance. Tehran with 15 Deputies also supported the prlongation he said. In all this made 59 Deputies in favour.¹

Thus this question was settled and the decision was to prolong the session until a majority (half plus one) of the Deputies should be elected. The coalition's fragility had now become apparent. It could only hold on certain issues, or when coaxed to do so, in general it had become more and more unreliable.

The tendency of the Majles occasionally to unite in the face of really national questions had already been mentioned. This was to be again the case now. Not only was the policy of Shuster popular with most Deputies, but the prlongation of the Majles at this time of crisis was

1. *ibid.*, No. 322, 21st Zīqa'deh 1329.

an important question and broke the coalition temporarily. However there could not be a real and permanent unity between the parties and particularly between the Democrats and E'tedālīs, for they differed on their political philosophy and policy, and inevitably after the particular problem was solved the split reappeared again.¹

THE RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM AND THE END OF THE MAJLES

The question of the prolongation of the session of the Majles was thus settled and the Democrats obtained renewed power, but a very severe question and a dangerous controversy with Russia arose which must now be dealt with. We have seen how Shuster was unpopular with almost everyone except the Democrats.² He had not only antagonized the

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1. On November 28th Barclay reported on the condition of the Majles saying "the artificial moderate majority so carefully nursed by the Regent has disappeared, and the Democrats who have been joined by a section of the Medjliss which had hitherto wavered between the two parties now appear to command a majority. It is the incompatibility of a compact and united moderate Cabinet within the present Medjliss which is the Regent's despair, and there seems little likelihood of the new elections thinning the Democrats' ranks." Barclay to Grey, Nov. 28th 1911, No. 230, F.O. 416/50.
 2. Shuster began to collect taxes from some of the rich influential men in Persia like Farmānfarmā, Sepahdār and 'Alā'al - Douleh which infuriated them and made Shuster's position even more untenable and his life was threatened. Plots were hatched against him and there were rumours of coup d'états and of the return of the ex-Shah.
Shuster, op. cit., p. 159.

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Russians, but he had also lost what little good will he had with the British, but now he began to challenge the rich and powerful politicians and notables who had no reason to support his policy of retrenchment and collection of overdue taxes.

The Government ordered the Treasurer General to confiscate the property of the Prince Shōjā'al-Saltāneh, who had taken part in the fight against the national Government in favour of the ex-Shah, his brother. Shōjā' put himself under the protection of the Ottoman Government, but when the gendarmes arrived at the Prince's residence they realized it was guarded by the Cossacks with Russian officers, despite the fact that the Russian Legation had been warned of this step. Shuster then sent a larger force with American assistants. They discussed the question with the Russian consul Pokhitanov, who was a much more aggressive Nationalist than the Minister Poklewski Koziell, and asked him to remove the Cossacks, but he refused. Thereby the Americans and the gendarmes disarmed the Cossacks, but later Russian officers arrived and threw the gendarmes out, replacing them with the Cossacks.¹ Following this seeming affront to Russia Shuster appointed two more British subjects to serve in the Russian zone. These were Haycock who was to serve in Esfahan and Lecoffre was appointed to Tabriz. This new appointment was made on November 2nd, the day a note of protest by the Russian Government was made. This demanded the withdrawal of

1. R. A. McDaniel, op. cit., pp. 173-4.

Shuster's gendarmes from the property of Shojā' al-Saltāneh, and asked for an apology from the Persian Government. The Russian demands were offered in the shape of an ultimatum on 10th Zīqā'ded (November 11th) despite the fact that the Persian Government had replied that they would investigate the question of the property of the Prince.

In the meantime Şamsām al-Saltāneh, confronted by Shuster made a show of resigning, and when the Russians broke off diplomatic relations there was no Government officially in office, though Voşūq continued to work. Barclay however commented that the post which caused the greatest difficulty was that of the Minister of the Interior held by Qavām al-Saltāneh who was disliked by the Regent and Şamsām al-Saltāneh, but supported by the Majles.¹

At last the Treasury gendarmes were removed as the Russians demanded and the Foreign Minister made an official apology on November 24th. The British had assured the Persians that if they complied with and satisfied the Russian demands, the Russian troops would be withdrawn.² Now however the Russians presented a second Ultimatum on the 29th, demanding the dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre, the undertaking not to engage the service of foreign subjects without the consent of Russia and Britain, and the payment

1. Barclay to Grey, Nov. 28th 1911, No. 2 30 FO 371/1198. The new Cabinet was presented to the Majles on the 7th Zīhājeh (29 November).

2. Ibid. Nov. 24th 1911, No. 226 FO 416/50.

of an indemnity to defray the expenses of the dispatch of troops to Persia. The amount of the indemnity would be made known later, and the period for an answer was fixed at 48 hours. In the meantime troops would remain at Rasht and would advance if the reply was not sent, the indemnity would increase. At this time there was no proper government, and the Regent also threatened to resign. The Ultimatum caused a great confusion as Russian troops began pouring into Qazvin. Barclay however did not think that the Majles would yield to the Russian demands even if the Russian troops were stationed in Qazvin as they had not yielded the year before. He wrote that the Russians would not mind a Bakhtiyārī coup d'état, but that the outcome of such a coup was unpredictable as Yephrem with his force would no doubt defend the Majles.¹

On 7th Zīhājeh (November 29th) Şamsām al-Saltāneh came to the Majles to present his new Cabinet which included besides himself as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, and Sardār Moḥtasham, another Bakhtiyārī, as Minister of War, Voşūq al-Douleh in his previous post, Zokā'

1. Barclay to Grey, Nov. 28th 1911, No. 230, FO 416/50 In another despatch Barclay wrote that he thought the Russians had blundered and were now in an impasse. Only a Persian coup d'état would save the situation or the Russians would have to take Tehran. Ibid. Dec. 3rd 1911, No. 237 FO 371/1198. When the Ultimatum was presented to the Persian Government, the British in an aide-mémoire made their position clear. They said that the British Government would not accept the return of the ex-Shah under any circumstances; that the successor of Shuster must be acceptable to the British as well as the Russians. A joint loan should be given to the Persian Government after the Russian demands had been accepted. The British Government wished that the Russians should not insist on the indemnity and that the occupation of Persian territory should not be permanent.

Buchanan to Grey Dec. 9th 1911 No. 360, FO 371/1198 Enclosure in No. 1.

al-Molk Minister of Finance, Mo'āzed al-Saltāneh Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Moshīr al-Douleh Minister of Science, and Mohtashām al-Saltāneh Minister of Justice. Soleyman Mīrzā in a speech declared his trust for the Bakhtīyārīs who had saved the Constitution, he said, but not for the others and expressed his doubts about the sudden resignation of the Cabinet.¹ He said: "those secret hands which wished to cause the present crisis were succeeding". It is not clear in the discussions of the Majles whom Soleyman Mīrzā meant, but Shuster gives the details of this session, and it becomes obvious that the Minister referred to by Soleyman Mīrzā was Mohtasham al-Saltāneh who had previously been in the Cabinet of Sepahdār and was considered to be close to the Russians. In fact besides Mohtasham al-Saltāneh and Sardār Mohtasham the Bakhtīyārī, the other Ministers were not so objectionable from the point of view of the Democrats.

Soleyman Mīrzā said that the Cabinet must have the trust of the Democrats, and called on Article 67 of the Fundamental Laws and asked for open ballots so it could be obvious who was and who was not for the Cabinet. Eftekhār al-Vā'ezīn spoke for the E'tedālīyūn, and proclaimed that they could not support a Cabinet alone at this time, but that they announced their complete trust of Šamsām

1. Dekhāreqānī was of the opinion that the resignation was with the assent of Nāṣer al-Molk. Op. cit., p.89.

al-Saltāneh, and any minister he chose. The Prime Minister became very heated in the course of these discussions and attacked the Democrats directly, saying that from first to last they were ruining the country. The President interrupted him but Emām Jom'eh also became angry and that increased the President's anger. Shuster reported that the Premier left the Chamber declaring he would call his Bakhtiyārīs and kill all the Democrats.¹ Eventually calmer speeches were made and votes were taken. 41 voted in favour, 18 against the Cabinet with one abstention.² The majority obviously still held together, and Barclay was needlessly worried that the coalition was splitting up. The fact that Şamsām al-Saltāneh obtained a majority now meant that when the real confrontation over the Ultimatum arose the Government could rely on the support of this majority.

On the 9th of Zīhājeh (1st December), the Foreign Minister came to the Majles and made a long speech about the need to accept the Ultimatum. He said that the Cabinet was unanimous on this and he emphasised the position of Shuster which had caused the present crisis. He added that they had sought British mediation, and they had been recommended to accept the Ultimatum without delay. He

1. M. Shuster, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

2. M.M. Maj 2, 7th Zīhājeh 1329.

concluded by saying that it was now for the Majles to decide.¹

Here a very fundamental question arose between the Government and the Majles, but in particular with the Democrats it was the ultimate test of the party system, indeed of the parliamentary system, and caused its downfall. This party had from the beginning of its formation been adamant on national questions, and now it was faced with a very important decision the acceptance of the Russian Ultimatum or the risk of the occupation of Tehran. However unjust it might have been the rejection of it meant the acceptance of the possibility of a more severe occupation of Persia, and at worst, of war. They chose the latter course which is not surprising and led the opposition with the support of a number of the other Deputies. Had the Government not used other methods, besides arguments, it would have been defeated. Though many of the discussions and negotiations for the acceptance or rejection of the Ultimatum were carried out in private the mood of the Deputies is obvious. Three Majles sessions were dedicated

1. It is interesting to note that the British Government was shaken at the prospect of the Russian occupation of Tehran. The Russian acting Minister for Foreign Affairs had assured the British chargé d'Affairs O'Beirne that if the Persian Government complied about the case of Shuster the troops would not move. R. L. Greaves, "Some aspects of Anglo-Russian Convention and its working in Persia, 1907-1914." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 23, . 11, 1968, p. 294. The Persian Government was of course not in a position to have known this, but the Democrats possibly guessed as much and it can be concluded that they were not as naive and foolhardy as it seems to have defied the Russians in this way.

to this question, and then the Majles was dissolved. Though the whole picture is not entirely clear, much of the machinations behind the scenes become obvious from these discussions.

Sheykh Moḥammad Khīyābānī, who was destined to play a very important role later, and who was a Democrat but above all a very ardent patriot, now took the lead in opposing the acceptance of the Ultimatum. He made a long speech in answer to Voṣuq al- Douleh, saying that from the moment the Russian note had been read in the private session of the Majles to that hour, he as a Persian was astonished and shocked. He considered that this was not an ordinary note to be discussed in an ordinary way. All those present and probably all the world would agree to what he was going to say. This answer had been made many hundreds of years earlier, when people had appeared in the world and begun to build the basis of life and passed from wildness to civilization. Then if a person wanted something he would take it, regardless of the law, and this would cause chaos. Thousands of years earlier therefore, people gathered together and thought out how to maintain order and organize a government. Thereafter people could not step outside their limits and had to be satisfied with their own lot. Before national governments were organized similar standards applied to all nations, but luckily now people lived in a century when that kind of wrongdoing had disappeared from the world. People agreed on certain international laws which all the world accepted.

Then Khīyābānī touched upon the Russian demands and said they were contradictory. They asked for an indemnity, whilst Persia was not in any way at fault, so he suggested that these demands should be separated and dealt with according to their merit.

Matīn al-Saltāneh on the other hand suggested the Ultimatum be taken as a whole, but said it could not be denied that it undermined their independence, and they could not sign it away, as Soleyman Mīrzā had said.

Soleyman Mīrzā discussed the Ultimatum, clause by clause. He first argued about the dismissal of Shuster and Lecoffre. He said that in a country which wanted to modernize and become strong she must begin by reforming her Government, her finances and her army. The employment of foreign experts seemed to be the best solution, and to carry out this Persia did not have to obtain the agreement of anyone, because she was independent. Those she employed had worked with great devotion and efficiency and had begun to reform the finances, she could not accept their dismissal. The reason for the demand for the dismissal of the Treasurer General is said to be an insult to the Russians, but this did not seem to be of such gravity and could be referred to a high court.. The second clause was even worse and more opposed to Persia's independence because according to that she had to agree not to employ any foreign servant without the previous agreement of the powers. This was opposed to her independence and she could not accept it.

Matīn al-Saltāneh reminded the Deputies that they

had little time and should not waste it on long speeches. He then added that the problem was that both alternatives were dangerous and only the future would judge which was the best choice. No one was ready to give up the independence of Persia; but one side was danger, on the other safety. All must be of one mind on this question and they could not deny responsibility by throwing it on the Ministers alone. The articles were not all contrary to their independence, the first one dealt with the dismissal of one servant, which would not undermine the independence of the country. The second article however, limited their freedom. These two were not of equal importance. The Government should be requested to enter into communication with Russia to modify some of these. This motion was carried practically unanimously; only six voted against.¹ It was a face-saving compromise, and was taken as a vote of non-acceptance but in fact it solved nothing. The Government made a show of resignation, but remained in office.

The next Majles session was held on the 22 Zīhājeh (14th December) when the death of the Āyatallāh Khorāsānī was announced and the session was closed as a sign of mourning.²

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1. Barclay to Grey, Dec. 3rd 1911, No. 237, FO 371/1198. Enclosure 2 in No. 1.
 2. It was suspected that he had been poisoned as he was about to announce a Holy War, M. Shuster, op. cit., p. 178. A. H. Hairī, op. cit., p. 117.

There were only two more sessions after this. In the meantime Russian troops were increasing their control in Northern Persia and reached Qazvin. The Government negotiated a respite with the Russians, and on the 14th December it was announced that there were only 6 more days left until the threat to invade Tehran was carried out.

In between time many private meetings were held in the Majles and in the homes of the politicians, but with little result. Public feeling had flared up and meetings were held as described by Shuster and other writers.¹ The general consensus was to resist, so that the acceptance of the Ultimatum appeared practically impossible. The private negotiations however did not help solve the question despite some threats against the Deputies. It was said that bribes were offered and intrigues were rife.

Several things are clear however, despite the confusion. The Government and the Regent were for accepting the Ultimatum but not for assuming responsibility and the onus of submission. The Bakhtiyārīs were intriguing, as already mentioned, and Sardār As'ad who had returned from Europe was acting as their leader; the majority of the Deputies were doubtful about the action that should be taken and the Democrats were strongly opposed to acceptance. The Government should have resigned but did not in fact do so. It offered to resign twice, once it was dissuaded

1. M. Shuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 183.

from doing so, and once it actually refused to resign and remained in power.¹ The only concession to the Democrats who were the real opponents of acceptance was the dismissal of Mohtasham al - Saltaneh and the appointment of Hakīm al-Molk and Qavam al-Saltaneh to the Ministry of Finance and the Minister of the Interior. These men were trusted by the Democrats. Hakīm al-Molk was a Democrat and Qavam despite his opposition to Shuster was still acceptable to them. However, the change in the Cabinet did not solve the problem. The Government could not understand that the Democrats were abiding by the decision they had always maintained; namely their extreme non-compromising Nationalism, and the fact that they would not be satisfied with such changes in the Cabinet. The Democrats believed that if they held fast, the Russians would back down rather than fight and occupy Persia.²

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1. The first time they claimed they had resigned, but that many people, including a commission of the Majles, had insisted they should remain in power. The second time they said they would resign when the Opposition had formed its Cabinet. Mostoufi the Candidate of the Democrats refused to accept.
 2. 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī wrote that the leaders of the Mojāhedīn, Yephrem and the Democrats had produced a kind of Ultimatum to the Majles to remodel the Cabinet to include Hakīm al-Molk, Qavam al-Saltaneh and several others trusted by the Democrats. He adds that this Ultimatum showed that the Democrats were co-operating with the Dashnāks, who were represented in the Majles by Mīrzā Yāns, the Deputy of the Armenians. "Khāṭerāt-e Seyyed 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī, Līder-e Ḥezb-e Etedāliyyūn." Khāṭerāt-e Vahīd, 9th year, No. No.2, 1350, p.88.

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The alternative was a change of Prime Minister, and Mostoufī al-Mamālek was the candidate of the Democrats, but this plan did not succeed, which reflects their basic weakness. It is noteworthy to point out, at this juncture to the basic weakness of the Democrats. They still could not put forward their own members as candidates for the Prime Ministership for the person appointed could not have won the support in the Majles as the Democrats were in a minority; nor was it conceivable to appoint as Prime Minister men of lesser social standing than Sepahdār, Şamsām al-Saltāneh or Mostoufī al-Mamālek for example.

On the 26th Zīhājeh (18th December) the Foreign Minister came to the Majles once again and recounted all the dangers facing Persia. The ex-Shah was still in the country, Sālār al-Douleh and Sho'ā' al-Saltāneh were still active, some of the Turkoman tribes were restless, Şamad Khān in Azarbaijan and Rashīd al-Molk in Rasht were threatening the Government which had no power and no money. The behaviour of the parties would stop the formation of any cabinet, he said, and the Ultimatum still remained unanswered. He then made an appeal for strong government and peace, declaring that their policy was based on peace but it must first be based on order and a well organized internal situation. At this time when the internal situation was chaotic and foreign troops were within 24 Farsakhs of the Capital, some people had taken the opportunity to appeal to the whole country and had even appealed to America that the Government had accepted bribes. This act was very unfortunate, he said, and added that if they had a better

candidate whom they trusted he should organize a government.

Then he mentioned the Ultimatum. They had discussed at great length the clauses of the Ultimatum, but contrary to what was rumoured they had not yet accepted it. It was also said that the Government wanted Mr. Shuster removed. This was false, they had discussed this clause with the Russians but they did not accept. As regards the indemnity clause too, they had discussed it at great length and had been promised it would be within their means and the conditions of it would be made easier. The other clause about the employment of foreign experts in future, had also been pursued and the Russians agreed that the employment of expert would be made by the joint agreement of the three Governments. The Persian Government asked instead for the evacuation of the Russian troops which at first they did not accept. Later they agreed to it, and besides they gave an assurance that they had no other demands. These he said were the result of the discussions, so far, and if the Majles did not accept, the Ministers could not accept responsibility.

Sheykh Moḥammad Khīyābānī who had taken the lead in the last session, now attacked the Government and said he was going to answer him one by one. About the internal dangers he said, the Ministers had mentioned the danger of Moḥammad 'Alī but who had brought him to Persia? It was the lack of action on the part of some people despite the fact that attention was often called to the need for preparations in the Majles. Then he said that the present Government had helped defeat him, but had not carried its

act to a conclusion. They could for instance have pursued the troops which had been defeated at Varamin, but they did not; the same was true about the fight with Sālār al-Douleh.

He blamed the Deputies for not insisting that the Government should act according to the Constitution, and he blamed the Government for asking for extraordinary powers and being inactive. He criticized the Regent for saying he had no responsibility. He even blamed them all for conspiracy.

He then discussed the Ultimatum and said that they could not give away Persia's independence. This question did not concern Mr. Shuster alone. It also concerned the powers given him so far. He should remain and retain his powers, especially now that they knew him better; and he refuted the fact that the Ministers had said the Government wanted to retain him. Some Ministers opposed Shuster, as everyone knew, and even before the Ultimatum, the Ministers always blamed him for not giving them the funds they needed for reform. The Russians too wanted to remove Shuster because of the reforms he had undertaken. If he remained for two years, the finances of Persia would be very different from their present state, and that was why the Russians wanted to remove him. He then added that they must not remove him. If he went, no one would continue his work. If they stood firm the Russians would back down. He also refuted the fact that the Foreign Minister had said that in future they would employ foreign experts by agreement. This was a difference in words only. It meant that in

future they would only be employing men with very large salaries who would achieve nothing.

Concerning the indemnity, he said that Persia had done nothing wrong. Russian troops were in Persia and had been creating chaos and tyranny in Azarbaijan for three years. This was no different from their being in Qazvin now; what was the difference between the troops, he asked. They were a poor, down-trodden people with 6000 years of independence. They must not give it away and the Majles could not accept those demands. The Ministers, it was true, did resign after the Majles refused the Ultimatum, but the Regent did not accept their resignation. A Commission was then set up to discuss the matter with them. The question however, was not one of resignation, but that the Ministers must act in accordance with the wishes of the people, not the wishes of the Russian Government. They must act openly so that people knew what they were doing. He added that the Deputies had no idea what was being negotiated up till then. The Foreign Minister had always insisted there was no way but acceptance, and the Majles had refused the conditions. If this highly complex question was to be settled, it must be settled with the knowledge of the Majles. The Majles could not recognize a Ministry which wished to settle this question by itself.

Vošūq al- Douleh, whose attitude had completely changed,¹ replied in a conciliatory manner, that the

1. He might have changed because of the fear of the Democrat's ascendancy, or he might have really thought the Russians would succeed and he did not want to be in the opposite camp.

Government had come to the Majles not to fight but to discuss and find a solution, and he added that he would not answer Khīyābānī because his answers would not be accepted. He would answer one thing only, namely that the Ministers must act according to what the Majles decreed. The Ministers gave their opinion and if it were not accepted they would resign. The present Government had wanted to resign but had been prevented from so doing. Then he suggested that either the Government should resign or the Majles should appoint a Commission to settle the question with the Ministers, or that the government be empowered to negotiate.

The suggestion of a Commission was a way out of the dilemma, but although the Democrats stood on their ground the Government proved the stronger. It had a following in the Majles and means of influencing reticent Deputies, as hinted by some writers.

The suggestion of the Commission was touched upon in the Majles. Dehkhāreqānī said that this suggestion had already been discussed and rejected in a private meeting and added that the Constitution had been won in order to stop foreign concessions. There was no difference between a Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah and Moḥammad 'Alī Mīrzā or a government which acted as they did. Therefore he concluded that the Majles could not vote its agreement with these demands. He added that even the removal of Shuster would undermine Persia's independence. What would the Commission achieve, even if it were chosen? The Majles had already voted against acceptance, the Commission could not act contrary to that. What was the difference between voting or giving

one's vote to a smaller body? The alternative was a change of government.

Voṣūq al-Douleh replied that this suggestion which had been discussed in private was not rejected by all and that was why the Government had brought up the question in the Majles at that point. Besides, he added that the idea was to discuss and reach a solution not to accept the actual demands as they had stood; but to negotiate with the Russians. Besides, the Russian demands were not all contrary to Persian independence. He then added that the Ministers too had feelings of Nationalism. The best solution was, he added, the resignation of the Government because it was obvious that the Deputies did not agree with their policy.

He suggested that they should vote either to give the power to the Ministers to negotiate or to appoint a Commission, and he reminded them that they were about to decide the fate of their country.

Solyṃān Mīrzā said it should be clearly stated what they were voting for, and that in either case they were voting to accept these conditions. He insisted that the negotiations should be carried out openly, but the Foreign Minister said that he could not divulge many details until the Commission entered into negotiation.

A proposal was made that votes be taken; the Democrats insisted on written votes or an open ballot. The suggestion was made by Nāṣer al-Eslām that a Commission should be appointed by the Majles which would work with the Ministers, the President of the Majles and the Regent to solve the question, but Soleyṃān Mīrzā disagreed and said

that this would be the same thing; the Majles had already voted against acceptance. The suggestion however was put to the vote. The result was inconclusive. 26 voted for and 17 against. The Minister who could not control the Majles thereupon left and the Foreign Minister asked them to appoint a new Cabinet. At this juncture a device was resorted to by the Government, namely that some of the Deputies should resign, so that the Majles should be left without a majority. About twenty of the Deputies prepared their resignation.¹ But before this became effective, a final session of the Majles was held on the 29th Zīhājeh,² (21st December 1911). The Democrats once again put up a valiant fight. Again Sheykh Moḥammad Khīyābānī made a long patriotic speech. He said two suggestions had been made either to give power to the Government or to a Commission, and no decision had been reached because many opposed both these suggestions. There were some who favoured the suggestion of a Commission but those who opposed it had an alternative, though unfortunately

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1. 'A.M. Doulatābādī recounts that on this session (which he says was 28th Zīhājeh) there was a fight between the Deputies, Eftekhār al-Vā'eẓīn had blamed those who had changed their minds and had not voted for the commission, then Adīb al-Tojjār and Mīrzā 'Alī had blamed him for reporting private matters of the Majles to the Regent, and they had come to blows.
'A.M. Doulatābādī "Yāddāshthā" Khāṭerāt-e Vahīd, No. 4. 1350, p. 75.
 2. 'A.M. Doulatābādī gives the names of 16 Deputies and says there were probably more. They were mostly E'tedālīs. Ibid. No. 2, p. 92.

they had failed to carry it out. It was 22 days since the Ultimatum had been given, and it had been discussed in private and in the Majles. All the Deputies had rejected it, contrary to the opinion of the Foreign Minister. Those who opposed it had thought of a change of government, but when the ultimatum was rejected, the Government did not officially resign, but postponed decision. Now at this late hour they were hard-pressed and must take a decision. This was not the fault of those who had an alternative answer; they could not give a different vote from one already given. Outside, too, people were against acceptance.

Once again there were many speeches for and against the Government, some accusing it of bad faith in not resigning, some defending it. At last the E'tedālīs suggested that a Commission should be appointed to work out a solution with the Government.

Vošūq al-Douleh made another long speech defending the Cabinet. He said they had resigned but had remained in their office out of a sense of responsibility until the formation of a new Cabinet, especially as foreign troops were so near and they could not vacate their posts. He added that the Regent too was about to resign and pointed out that this kind of delay was very dangerous. He then drew attention to the fact that time was pressing and a decision must be arrived at.

At last votes were taken and the Commission was approved by 39 votes to 19. The votes were secret, and the members of the Commission to be appointed later were to be either five or six. As mentioned, Sheykh Ebrāhim

Zanjānī, a Democrat Deputy, accepted membership of the Commission, thus giving that body the appearance of a coalition of the parties so that all the responsibility for the acceptance did not fall on the Government and the E'tedālīyūn.¹

As has been mentioned there were no further Majles meetings. When the Deputies next went to the Majles there were soldiers stationed at the Bahārestān led by Yephrem and they were dispersed. The Ultimatum was thereupon accepted and Shuster had to leave Persia. As has been observed, the really important negotiations were carried out secretly, and the Majles was only called to sanction them and free the Ministers of responsibility.

Two versions of these events have been written, one is by those who sympathized with the Democrats, or were Democrats themselves, like Dehkhāreqānī, the other is by their opponents such as 'Alī Moḥammed Doulatābādī; We might also mention a pamphlet written in Moḥarram 1329, by an anonymous writer.

The main point of controversy beside the actual acceptance or non-acceptance, was the question of the Government's resignation; how true was their announcement that they would resign once the acceptance of the Ultimatum

1. In fact, the night before, the President had called a secret meeting of the Deputies and votes had been taken to appoint the Commission. Forty two had voted for, but next day only thirty six voted in favour of the Commission.

was rejected by the Majles? The E'tedālīs maintain that once the Government really resigned, the Commission which was appointed by the Majles to discuss the Ultimatum made them take back their resignation. The second time they said the Government would have resigned, had the Democrats formed their Cabinet. They also accused the Democrats of wanting to replace Şamşām al-Saltāneh with Mostoufī al-Mamālek. On the other hand, the Democrats rejected the Ultimatum outright and led the Majles in rejecting it. They said that the Regent, Şamşām al-Saltāneh and Sardār As'ad did not wish Mostoufī to take office, and though on the face of it they agreed to a change, they so manoeuvred it that Mostoufī could not take office.

At the same time it became clear that neither the Government nor the Regent nor the E'tedālīs were ready to accept responsibility alone. They wanted all to be involved, and managed at last to include Sheykh Ebrahim Zanjānī in the Commission to give them the semblance of co-ordination. Barclay reported that the principal member of the Commission was Sardār As'ad; and Yephrem¹ had

1. Yephrem's reaction to these events are enigmatic. Kasravī says he helped to overthrow the Majles because he had been deceived by the Russians and the British because he believed they would eventually evacuate Persia. On the other hand, 'A. M. Doulatābādī believes that Yephrem had come to some agreement with the Democrats. and the Mojāhedīn and gave an Ultimatum to the Majles to form a new Government. Kasravī mentions this Ultimatum but says it was in support of the Government. It was offered on the 28th of Zīhājeh and ended the dilemma and the Majles was closed after it. I think Kasravī's account is more accurate and 'Alī Moḥammad Doulatābādī is not impartial in this report. 'A.M. Doulatābādī, "Yaddāshthā", Kāṭerāt-e Vahīd, No. 2, 1350, p. 88. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Hījdah Sāleh, pp. 257-259.

told him in a conversation that "with Mauser pistols at their heads" they had consented to the acceptance of the Russian demands.¹ There were references to bribes and threats as well. It must also be mentioned that the latest news of the Russian aggression on the 29th of of Zīhājeh (26th December) at last compelled them to accept the Ultimatum. The Russians took Mashad and bombarded it for several days, killing a great number of people.² The same was done in Rasht and Anzali and particularly Tabriz.

Thereupon the Majles was expediently closed, both to avoid further criticism by the Democrats, and because the Regent had always found it an impediment. The closure of the Majles was demanded by the Cabinet on December 24th³ and in their demand they accused the Majles,

1. Barclay to Grey, Dec. 24th, 1911, No. 250, F0371/1422
2. For details see A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-e Hījdah Sāleh pp. 260-274.
3. Dehkāreqānī recalls that Hashtrūdī and Khīyābānī tried to organize a meeting, and that a letter objecting to the closure of the Majles was signed by 40 Deputies and sent to the Regent, but to no avail. On the 5th of Moḥarram an invitation was sent to some of the Deputies to attend a meeting with the Regent. Dehkāreqānī attended this meeting which was also attended by the Ministers. He says that the Regent had tried to explain why he had dissolved the Majles, saying that this act was quite constitutional in some countries, and was justifiable although it was not included in the Persian Constitutional Laws; and it should not be the cause of complaints. He added that the Ministers had asked him to do this and that he was not responsible. Dehkāreqānī and Khīyābānī had stood up to Nāṣer al-Molk and questioned his action, strongly objecting to it, which had made Nāṣer al-Molk very angry, and he had accused them of wanting to cause chaos. They had also been firmly accused by Ṣamṣām al-Saltāneh and Sardār Moḥtasham; no result had been achieved and the Deputies had dispersed after this.

but particularly the Democrats, of obstructing the Government and of being responsible for the recent incidents of Tabriz, Rasht and Khorasan.¹

The Majles was not reopened until the eve of the First World War, for Nāṣer al-Molk, the Regent, and the Government preferred not to work with the Majles which had been so obstructive. The Russians moreover, opposed the reopening of the Majles. The defeat of the Shuster Mission which had raised so much hope, the bombardment of Tabriz and later Mashad left many frightened and apathetic. The exile of political party leaders such as Soleyman Mīrzā, and the suppression of the party newspapers helped to cast a deep gloom and leave people leaderless.

Nevertheless, it was not so easy to overturn the political traditions that had been established since Mozaffar al-Dīn Shah's granting of the Constitution and the Majles in 1906. Over five years had passed during which not only the political elite had learned to work within this new framework, but a wider society had seen and accepted the beginnings of a political structure had potentially and would give men a much greater role in the shaping of their own affairs. It was the Democrats above all who had fought for this participation and their ideals had awoken sufficient response among this wider public that despite the thinly

1. Barclay to Grey, Dec. 30th 1911, No.257, FO 371.1422. As a comment on this letter it was written that the Bakhtiyārī Chief Sardār Mohtasham was asking for permission to "string up the Democrats", and added that if they were given a free hand they would deal with the Majles as successfully as they had with the Shah.

disguised hostility of Nāṣer al-Molk and the bleak years in the wilderness, they were still able to take advantage at the first opportunity to re establish themselves at the centre of the political arena. This occurred after Nāṣer al-Molk's departure on the young shah reaching his eighteenth birthday, at which time it was no longer possible to postpone elections for the Third Majles. The deep roots that the Democrats had struck in the major provincial centres such as Mashad, Shiraz, Kerman and Esfahan was evident in the turns after the elections, and their central role in politics in Tehran was vindicated when all the seven 'by elections' to replace the deputies who had become ministers were from the Democrats.

Indeed unlike the First and Second Majles, they now found themselves as the largest single party and with the tacit approval and assistance of the neutrals they were numerically superior to any or all of the new factions that arose such as the new E'tedālīs or the 'Elmīyeh (the Ulama) party, on the basis of the old E'tedālī party. With this situation and given the much greater ideological coherence and dynamism of the Democrats, much could have been expected from this new balance of forces. Persia was now poised to reap the fruits of almost ten years of often bitter bloody political experience that at times had brought her to the verge of civil war, produced a measure of political sacrifice and idealism that the cynicism and arrogance of the Great Powers had denied her and cost the lives in battle or political assassination of several of her leaders. The composition of the principle parliamentary parties and their established position in the political life of the nation had been won,

but the promises and hopes founded on that victory were dashed as the opening salvos of the First World War put an end to these domestic and local experiments, thrust Persia again in the vortex of international machination and led to the direct intervention of the powers in the political life, the throttling of the young party system that had precariously emerged, the dispersal of its organization and disillusionment of its supporters. From this Tabula Rasa after the end of the war emerged not the earlier party structure but the basis of a new more efficient and dreaded dictatorship.

CONCLUSION

The Persian reformers had often discussed reform from the middle of the nineteenth century and after the death of Nāṣer al-Dīn Shah during the first years of the weaker Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah, secret societies were organized to coordinate and formulate the demand for reform. Chief among these were the Anjoman-e Makhfī and Melli who were very influential in the events which led to the Revolution of 1906. One of the major characteristics of that Revolution was its lack of a well thoughtout plan of reform other than a naive resistance to foreign encroachment and the limitation of the Shah's powers by the introduction of the rule of law. The various groups who momentarily coalesced soon fell apart and the six social classes represented in the Majles did not offer a viable base for the development of political parties.

On the other hand there appeared in the First Majles two groups of moderates and extremists Āzādīkhān and this division, which cut across class boundaries, became the basis for the emergence of later political parties. These two groups differed essentially in their concept of fundamental reforms and the extent to which they should effect change. The moderates formed the majority in the Majles but had no organization. Only when Atābak, the ex Ṣadr A'zam brought back by Moḥammad 'Alī Shah from exile, became premier did Ṣanf' al-Douleh, the President of the Majles, together with the moderates back him and so start the nucleus of a group of supporters that in discipline ideological unity and organization had some semblance of a party born in and

outside the Majles. After the murder and the resignation of Sanī' al-Douleh this group was left leaderless and the initiative fell to the Āzādīkhāhān. Different in their dedication to a more forceful political ideology, with an experience of joint action and cooperation that went back to years before the Revolution, to the Komīteh-ye Engelāb and with friendships and alliances forged in the successive victories of the summer of 1906, the Āzādīkhāhān initially had many advantages as a party grouping over their rivals. Yet within their ranks here too there was the same tendency towards fragmentation and individualism that is so characteristic of Persian private and public life. One group consisted of some of the Azarbaijan Deputies led by Seyyed Hasan Taqīzādeh, another group was the old membership of the Komīteh-ye Engelāb, an offshoot of the Anjoman-e Mellī, and connected with the Moslem Social Democrat party of the Caucasus, the Hemmat, and the Ejtemā'īyūn 'Āmīyūn its Persian counterpart. The Komīteh led the Āzādīkhāhān from behind the scene and was responsible for the murder of Atābak and the bomb thrown at the Shah. In these different splinter groups there was inevitably much overlapping as the ranks of dedicated forceful committed activists remained extremely small. Further the Āzādīkhāhān had the support of the extremist political Anjomans, mostly in Tehran such as the Anjoman-e Barādarān-e Darvāzeh-ye Qazvīn, or Anjoman-e Azarbaijan. Many Anjomans had been formed in this period with a large membership, all expressing their support of the Majles, but some were infiltrated by agents provocateurs and became suspect or acted in time in the counter revolutionary cause. Gradually, however, the initiative fell to the extremist

Anjomans and the relationship with the Shah deteriorated. He first tried to overawe or even perhaps overthrow the Majles by collecting his supporters in the Meydān-e Tupkhāneh in Zīqa'deh, 1325 (December 1907) from where they threatened the Majles which was saved by the show of force assembled by the Anjomans and their armed members. After the bomb incident in Moharram 1326 (February 1908) however, there could be no peace, and a clash was inevitable. He gathered his forces which attacked and bombarded the Majles despite some last minute attempts at reconciliation.

The leaders of the Revolution and many deputies were arrested or executed, the rest fled and a period called the Estebdād-e Saghīr or lesser dictatorship began when the Shah ruled once again supreme without any of the checks that had been imposed on his position in the previous years.

Resistance began first in Tabriz then spread to Rasht and Esfahan and gathered momentum. The Revolutionary armies under Sepahdār from the north, helped by Caucasians, and from the south under Sardār As'ad, the Bakhtiyārī chief, marched on Tehran, took the city and made the Shah resign. New elections were held and the Second Majles was convened and met shortly afterwards.

Unlike the First Majles there were now two distinct parties from the beginning of the session that could trace their antecedents back to the Majles before the bombardment of June 1908 but had changed and developed during the Estebdād-e Saghīr. In addition to the larger groupings of the Democrats and moderates there were at least two new small factions that made some pretence to follow the pattern

established by their larger rivals. They all published their Marāmnāmeḥ or programmes and their Nezāmnāmeḥ or organizational plan, they had their own newspapers, branches in some of the provinces and clubs or societies for political and social activities. Despite this they had little popular basis in comparison with the older Anjomans which had been able to operate within a much more traditional social and practical framework but they had given rise to considerable disorder and even violence.

During the debates and in the commissions of the Second Majles, it was soon evident that much of the arguments and discussions of the successive Cabinets and mobilization of public opinion outside the Chamber, came from the Democrats. They were now in a position to declare themselves independent of the Russian Social Democrats at Baku under whose shadow they had formulated their political objectives and ideology. Many of their ideals were clearly socialist in inspiration, but they were at the same time deeply nationalistic and opposed the foreign powers especially the Russians which occupied Persia since 1908. They also advocated a separation between temporal and spiritual powers, thus becoming a threat to all vested interests by challenging the landed class, with a well-thought-out land reform, the Russians, the British and the Ulama. Their weakness lay mainly in the fact that they had no majority in the Majles, and little following in the country.

The Ejtemā'īyūn E'tedālīyūn party was conceived as a counter to the Democrats and the programme which they presented was more an answer to the Democrats than a practical plan of reform and ^{they} were thus weak ideologically. These parties

were not based on a clear cut class division, but were more representative of two opposed political philosophies. One stood for fundamental change, socialist reform and extreme nationalism, the other wanted to retain the status quo which favoured their own class, and advocated co-operation with the British and Russians. This fundamental incompatibility and the fact that both parties were numerically weak in loyal support meant that the government, whether of Sepahdār the hero of resistance to the Shah, or Mostoufī al-Mamālek never had a solid core of support in the Majles. In turn the role of the Majles Deputies tended to become one of obstructive criticism and that delayed the passing of urgent legislation at a time when the government became increasingly harrassed by external complications financial impecunity and the breakdown of domestic law and order. The result was that the concept of party often became associated with factions divisive political activity and the fundamental differences in political objectives between the major groups were obscured. As a result a coalition, the Hey'at-e Mo'talefeh excluding the Democrats was formed which guaranteed a fixed dependable majority. This arrangement worked well for a time and Sepahdār, the new Premier, through his support from the E'tedālī party was in full control of the Majles for the first time since the establishment of the Constitution and the Assembly.

However this period of relative stability and a majority party in the Majles in support of the Government was of short duration because of general financial instability. It was necessary once more to reconsider the possibility of a loan, the government looked to an International Syndicate and later

the Imperial Bank, to solve the problem. The proceeds of the loan was to be administered by a financial expert from a neutral country, and Morgan Shuster had at first the support of all sections of the Majles as well as the Government. But this unusual unanimity coincided with the attempted return of the ex-Shah with secret Russian support. The effect of this was on the one hand to strengthen the unity of the Majles, but at the same time in this moment of crisis, Sepahdār fled to Rasht without resigning and the Government was thus paralyzed until the Bakhtiyārī ascendancy. But the latter was never able to gain the total support of a substantial majority in the Majles, even though whilst the ex-Shah remained on Persian soil, the Assembly was obliged to accept most of the measures put forward by Şamsām al-Saltāneh's Cabinet. One of the casualties of this situation was the expulsion of the Shuster Mission as the result of the Russian Ultimatum for even though the majority of the Majles were opposed to this, eventually through skillful manipulation of the Hey'at-e Mo'talefeh, the Government and the Russians were able to impose their wishes. As soon as they were successful on this issue, the Government with the official approval of Nāşer al-Molk, took the even more important step of forcibly closing the Majles which would not be opened for another three years.

Even though party issues and conflicts tended to become confused in the last months of a bewildering and deteriorating political situation, the assimilation and establishment of the principle of 'Party' within the Majles and throughout the country at large is shown by the rapid reappearance of both major parties as soon as real political life was

allowed to begin again. This is an indication that the experience of the First and Second Majles had at least brought this positive result, an indication of the increasingly mature and responsible attitudes among Persian political leaders who if left to themselves and not overtaken by the general calamity of the First World War would perhaps have established political institutions and a modus vivendi that might have saved Persia from the disasters of two Pahlavi dictatorships and this bitter period of vengeance and retribution and total re-assessment through which she now must pass.

APPENDIX A

The Programme of the Revolutionary Organization of the Mass
of People of Persia, "Mojāhedīn".

The overthrow of force and the protection of the nation is the duty of everyone. Under the prevailing conditions of the times, this is only possible with the establishment of the Majles and a Constitution based upon human equality and justice which will give people faith in the responsibility of those they have elected. The ministerial cabinet on the other hand, is as mistrusted as it was in the past, and therefore remains silent.

Those in the Anjoman-e Mojāhedīn will protect the people. It is essential, therefore, that the holy Anjoman-e Mojāhedīn of Persia should be part of the Constitutional law, just as in other European and Asian countries there are such Anjomans with different names. These members work day and night and sacrifice themselves for equality and the establishment of the Majles, and the achievement of their aims.

As the Qorān says, "God loves those who try hand and not those who are lazy". These words give foundation to the aims and position of the Mojāhedīn. It is necessary, therefore, that each person wishing to join this holy Anjoman should first understand the real meaning of the Mojāhedīn, next know their aims (which are as follows), and then wait for his turn to be honoured with its honoured name: The aims of the Mojāhedīn are as follows:

- Article 1 - The establishment and the perpetuation of the holy Majles of Persia.
- Article 2 - The Universal right to vote without discriminating on the grounds of nationality, wealth or poverty.
- Article 3 - Secret ballots, voting to be held everywhere at the same time.
- Article 4 - The division of Majles seats according to the population and not according to class or status.
- Article 5 - The achievement of the seven bases of liberty:
- a. Liberty of law and the press; that is, every one should be free to publish books and newspapers for the sake of ending injustice, and putting them at the disposal of the people. No one should be allowed to stop their publication and distribution except on the strength of law passed by the Majles, and made known to the people.
 - b. Freedom of speech, that is, if anyone has a useful word for the progress of the country, or the defence of its frontiers, or about the misdeeds of some, he should be able freely to state it without risk of prosecution or complaint.
 - c. Freedom of association, that is, the government and authorities should not have the right to stop people from gathering where they wish, for the purpose of exchanging their ideas on political matters, or other questions, concerning the progress of the country.

- d. Freedom of speech, that is, no one should have the right to stop people from expressing their beliefs and political ideas.
- e. Freedom of person, that is, the government should not have the right to arrest people or to enter their houses unless that person's guilt has been established by a law court.
- f. Freedom of forming Anjomans, that is, any group should have the right to organize an Anjoman for the purpose of discussing political questions and the government should not have the right to stop or to forbid such associations.
- g. Freedom to strike, that is, if workers strike in order to settle their disputes, or even if they have political aims, the government has no right to stop them or to oblige them to work.

Article 6 - Education must be compulsory and free. That is, in every town or district the government should build primary and secondary schools and universities and all Iranian nationals must, regardless of their position or status, send their children to school to be educated.

Article 7 - The villages and lands which belong to the royal family must be appropriated without compensation. The villages and lands belonging to the landlords, much of which is unnecessary for their livelihood, must be bought by banks and distributed amongst the peasants.

- Article 8 - The government must build hospitals for the old, the poor, and the sick, so that the needy do not die.
- Article 9 - Taxation must be collected in accordance with wealth and possession, and not from everybody, that is, taxes must be taken from the proceeds of trade and wealth and those with no income should be excluded from paying taxes to the government and the Shah.
- Article 10 - The Majles must have only one chamber, that is, there should not be a second chamber called the Senate.
- Article 11 - The number of soldiers in the army must not be limited, all Persians must do military service. For this purpose the government must prepare a list of boys of eighteen and they must do military service for two years regardless of class or status. They will learn all the military tactics and then return to their jobs. In case the country is menaced by danger and its rights are threatened, all those boys will defend it as one body.
- Article 12 - The Ministers must be responsible to the Majles and be elected by it.

These are nearly all our aims. In the future, with the help of God, and according to the needs of the times, when the nation wakes up, we shall add to these aims.

15th Sa'bān 1325

10th September 1907 Mashad

Long live the Majles, long live the Mojāhedīn .

APPENDIX B

AFTER stating that he had particularly requested that his present visit to the Medjliss should not be attended by any ceremonial, the Regent went on to explain at great length the cause of his delay in coming to Persia. His election had not been properly conducted, it had been done in haste; and though he had refused the Regency when it was offered to him at the time of the opening of the present Medjliss, he had not been consulted as to whether he would accept it on this occasion; nor had his conditions been ascertained. His telegrams to Tehran on the subject had been ignored, and his enquiries as to the manner in which his election had been conducted had remained without answer. The election of a Regent, he stated, was not a party question. The Regent was outside party politics, and yet his election had been conducted on party lines. After dwelling on this point at some length, the Regent expressed his opinion that his election should not form a precedent, and that laws should be enacted governing the election of a Regent for the future. Resuming, he stated that, as his telegrams remained unanswered, he resolved, though reluctantly, to come to Persia to discuss the matter personally with those concerned. In the meantime, both in Persia and in the European press, his delay had been attributed to fear and a refusal to take office. Moreover, when in Europe he had received threatening letters. But he desired to say that it was neither fear nor a refusal to take office which had caused him to delay. The reason was, as he had already stated, that though he was chosen as Regent, the Cabinet did not send an answer to any of his questions. He

must add, however, that the personal telegrams he had received from his friends in the Cabinet, from the deputies, and the telegram signed by all the deputies, had served as a personal recompense for shortcomings in another respect. On arriving at Tehran the Premier had tendered his resignation, and he had therefore found himself confronted with a Cabinet crisis. In order not to allow this uncertain state of affairs to continue, he had come to the Medjliss to take the oath. Before continuing, however, he desired to allude to the general impression which existed at Tehran and in the provinces, namely, that he was expected personally to put everything right. This, he declared, was quite an erroneous idea, and contrary to the fundamental laws, which gave no power to the Crown. He would dispel this error, as he did not wish to be blamed if the expectations of the people were not fulfilled.

The Regent then went on to discuss what he thought was expected of him, and said he would follow that by stating what he expected of the Medjliss and the people. He said:

"Regarding your expectations of me, I think the fundamental laws are sufficient on this score. The deputies know this point better than I do, and my explanations are intended for the general public. In accordance with article 12, the framing of laws is the business of the National Assembly or the two Houses; the Crown must pass them, and has no power to modify them or hold them back. In accordance with article 44, the Ministers are responsible to the Medjliss, and article 67 decrees that if the Medjliss passes a vote of censure on the Ministers, they must be dismissed. If we take these laws into consideration, we will see that, though in form the appointment of the Premier is the prerogative of the Crown, nevertheless, seeing that the Ministers are responsible to the Medjliss and that they can be dismissed in consequence of the want of confidence of the majority, it is the custom in all constitutional countries, in order to provide against this contingency and continual Cabinet crises, for the Crown first to find out, through the President of the House of Representatives, the views of the majority, and then .

to appoint a Premier. He, in his turn, is entirely independent as to the choice of the members of his Cabinet, who will naturally be persons holding the same political convictions as himself. It will therefore be obvious that both the executive and legislative bodies are independent of the will of the Crown. It is clear from this that all power and responsibility for the conduct of the affairs of State lie with the National Assembly or the two Houses and the Ministry. All that remains for the Crown is to express opinions on State affairs in general, and that only unofficially, and the Cabinet is free, in view of its responsibility to the Medjliss, either to accept or refuse such suggestions from the Crown as it thinks fit. These observations on my part are not to be taken as criticism or as an appeal for extended powers. If under certain circumstances the Medjliss should think it necessary to extend the powers of the Government - and such a contingency is quite conceivable - they must give such extended powers to the Ministers who are responsible to this House. After what I have said it will be quite clear to everyone that the form of oath prescribed by the fundamental laws is not compatible with the limited authority of the Crown, and, of course, everyone who is aware of these facts will take the oath in this spirit, and it is in this spirit that I will take the oath. I will with all my power strive to serve my country, the Government and nation, and to strengthen the foundations of the constitution."

The Regent then earnestly entreated the Medjliss and the Cabinet to direct their attention to pressing current affairs, and to strive earnestly, in complete accord with one another, to bring about the reforms so urgently needed. He thought it was perhaps superfluous to state that if the reintroduction of a parliamentary form of Government had not been attended with that measure of success which had been so generally expected when the principal obstacles in its way had been removed, this want of success had been due to the unfortunate conflicts between parties and persons which he so much deplored. He earnestly hoped that these conflicts would in future be put an end to, and that complete harmony and brotherly co-operation would take their place. It was only by this means that the benefits of freedom and progress, such as are enjoyed by countries with

parliamentary forms of Government, could be secured.

In conclusion, the Regent, who spoke with much deliberation and earnestness, delivered the following warning:-

"If there should again appear symptoms of the former enmity, and if I see that affairs do not advance, but that, on the contrary, the difficulties are increased, by this oath which I am about to take, my conscience prompts me - and every right-minded person will agree with me - not to continue to hold this office and to witness such an unfortunate state of affairs. I am sure every individual member of the nation will in his heart approve, and in such circumstances - which I hope will not supervene - they will not be astonished if I withdraw, because I shall have acted in accordance with my duty both from a legal point of view and in accordance with the dictates of ordinary intelligence and in the interests of the State. I hope that the way in which I have drawn your attention to the defects of affairs will not cause anyone to protest, since it is important for all to know of important matters concerning internal affairs, and nothing should be hidden from them. Abroad also it will cause hope if they see that we are aware of our shortcomings, for it will seem as if we are trying to correct them."

The Regent then read the oath prescribed by the fundamental law and kissed the Koran.

He afterwards informed the House that the majority of the deputies having let him know their choice, he had appointed Sipahdar-i-Azam to the office of Premier, and that he was forming a Cabinet. The Premier would, in the course of the next two or three days, lay his Cabinet's programme before them, and would in the meantime conduct the current affairs of State.

Barclay to Grey, March 7th 1911, No.33 FO 371/1187.

APPENDIX C

THE following Act empowering the Persian Government to raise a loan of £1,250,000 through the Imperial Bank of Persia was passed by the Persian Parliament on the 2nd May, 1911, and the following four clauses, comprised in the Act, are translated from the Persian Government's official "Gazette", No.14, of Thursday, the 18th May, 1911:-

Article 1. The Persian Government is empowered to borrow, through the Imperial Bank of Persia, £1,250,000 at the rate of 5 per cent. interest, and under a discount of 12½ per cent.

Article 2. The amortisation and guarantee for this loan will be as follows:

(1) The amortisation at the rate of ½ per cent. will be paid five years after the date of this loan.

(2) The guarantee for this loan will be the same as the guarantee for the former loan of the Government from the Imperial Bank of Persia, in accordance with the conditions in the agreement dated the 20th March, 1910, i.e., the first receipts of the southern customs after the deduction of the expenditure to be met from that source.

(3) In the event of the Imperial Bank of Persia making proposals regarding the non-payment of the principal of this loan, by which the Persian Government would not have the right to pay off the whole of the loan for a given period, the Government is empowered to agree to this proposal on condition that the said period is not more than five years from the date of the signature of this loan.

Article 3. The bonds of this loan will be exempt from every kind of tax or imposition which may be levied in the future.

Article 4. After the payment of 3,396,697 tomans, the sum already owed to the bank, and 340,000 tomans, a sum which has lately been advanced on the loan, the balance of the loan will remain in the bank until such time as the project of expenditure and projects of control have been approved by the Parliament.

APPENDIX D

THIS contract, made the 8th day of May, 1911, between the Imperial Government of Persia of the one part, and the Imperial Bank of Persia (hereinafter called "the Bank") of the other part.

Whereas the Imperial Government of Persia is desirous of issuing in London a loan to the amount of £1,250,000, and the Bank has agreed to take the said loan firm at the price of £87.10s. net per £100.

Now these witness and declare that it is agreed between the Imperial Government of Persia and the Bank as follows:-

1. The Bank shall take the said loan firm at the rate of £87.10s. net for every £100 of the said loan.
2. The Imperial Government of Persia shall issue in London 12,500 bonds of £100 each, such bonds to carry interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum, and to be framed in the usual form of Government bonds. The loan to be redeemable at par by means of a cumulative sinking fund of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. per annum, commencing in 1916 and extending over a period not exceeding fifty years. The drawings will take place in London in April in each year, and the drawn bonds will be paid off at par on the 15th May following, after which date the interest on the bonds so drawn will cease.
3. The Imperial Government of Persia shall duly observe and perform all the provisions contained in the said bonds as to payment of the loan and interest thereon, and otherwise.
4. The Persian Government has the right to redeem the loan at any time after the year 1916 on giving six months' notice.
5. The Imperial Government of Persia specially assigns to the service of the loan, and as a first charge thereon, subject only to prior charges amounting to £15,714.1s.10d. per annum for three years, and £30,278.12s.7d. per annum from the year 1913 to the year 1928, the full net customs receipts of every description which the Government now is, or at any time hereafter may be, entitled to collect and receive at all ports or places in the Persian Gulf, including Bushire, Bunder Abbas, Lingah, Mohammerah, .

and Ahwaz, which receipts are hereby made payable to the Bank, and the Imperial Government of Persia hereby engages forthwith after receipt thereof to pay to the Bank all such customs receipts as aforesaid without deduction other than for actual expenses of administration of the customs of the said ports disbursed prior to the date of such payment.

(a) The Imperial Government of Persia undertakes that throughout the continuance of the loan all sums collected by the Customs administration shall be paid to the Bank at the ports of collection, or at its nearest branch, week by week for meeting the prior charges referred to above and for the service of the loan, and an account of such receipts shall be submitted to the Persian Government by the Bank at the end of each month.

(b) The Bank shall, out of the monies so collected, pay the prior charges above-mentioned and the interest and sinking fund of the loan, and shall hold the surplus at the disposal of the Imperial Government of Persia.

(c) The Bank undertakes, out of the monies so received, to pay on behalf of the Imperial Government of Persia the half-yearly coupon in London, and supervise the working of the sinking fund and service of the loan free of charges connected with the same.

(d) In the event of the customs receipts of the above-mentioned ports for any three months falling short of the amount required for the prior charges and the service of the loan, either for interest or amortisation, the Imperial Government of Persia binds itself to make good such deficiency from other sources of Government revenue, and further, should receipts from these sources fall below the amount required as above, the Persian Government hereby assigns for this purpose the revenue derived from the receipts of the telegraphs - this assignment to constitute a second charge on the said telegraph receipts up to the year 1928, after which the telegraph receipts will be free.

6. Out of the proceeds of the loan the Bank is authorised by the Imperial Government of Persia to pay off the outstanding liabilities of the Imperial Government to the Bank, and hold the remainder at the disposal of the Government within three months after the signing of the contract.

7. During the continuance of the loan, or for such less period as the Bank shall desire, the Bank shall be the sole agent and representative of the Government of Persia in England with respect to the said loan and all matters connected therewith, but undertakes no pecuniary liability whatsoever towards the bondholders.

8. The bonds of the present loan are for ever exempt from all or any Persian tax or deduction. The interest and capital, therefore, will not at any time or under any circumstances be liable to any reduction whatever on the part of the Persian Government.

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