POLITICAL   REPRESENTATION

IN

COLONIAL   SOUTH   AUSTRALIA

1857 - 1901

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POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN COLONIAL SOUTH AUSTRALIA

VOLUME TWO

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Diagrams

List of Maps

PART THREE

Independents, Factions and Parties - The Bases of 'Functional'
Representation in South Australia

> 'Government by faction is government
> by tyranny, bigotry and uncharitableness'.
>
> Register, 1857 (September 26).

As the previous chapters have shown, the inauguration of representative
and responsible government in South Australia brought in its train a series
of conflicts over the 'procedural' aspects of political representation.
There was, however, little early conflict over the role of the elected
representative.   Despite constant references in the press, on the
hustings and in the Parliaments to the functions of a representative, to
the relative values of 'men and measures', of representatives and delegates,
there was a wide acceptance of a tenet of representative behaviour, usually
defined in terms of a vague 'independence'.   The study of political
statements of candidates, members and contemporary commentators reveals an
almost complete acceptance of a Burkean conception of 'functional'
representation.   The nineteenth-century English Liberals, and especially
John Stuart Mill, were also clear on what they saw as the role of the
representative.   To Mill, the parliament should concern itself with the
'whole' and not with any 'part' and, to accomplish this, the representa-
tives should not be bound by any promises to constituents.

> No man pretends to instruct his physician.   No
> man exacts a pledge from his physician that he
> shall prescribe for him a particular treatment, [1]

and thus, by analogy, 'no pledges ought in any case whatever to be exacted
from representatives'.[2]   But this view was not new.   Despite the
differences between the Liberal and Whig approach to political representa-
tion which were outlined in Chapter I, both attitudes incorporated four
canons of representative government, canons which were exemplified by
Burke and emphasised later by Mill.   The tenets of representative
behaviour concerned the role and functions of parliaments, the role and
functions of the individual member and his relations with his fellow members,

the relations between members and constituencies and the necessity of ensuring the election of 'fit' and 'good' representatives. These four tenets, combined, formed the basis of Burke's 'independency', and equally the basis of the manner in which South Australia's early legislators saw their role.

In general terms, a delegate is a representative and a representative can and often does carry out the functions of a delegate. But in the narrow sense of legislative behaviour the two roles are taken to be antithetic. The legislative role has been described in terms of 'trustee' versus 'delegate', 'free mandate' versus 'imperative mandate' or simply 'representative' versus 'delegate'. In the extreme, the former in each case refers to a manner of legislative behaviour independent of constituency pledges, directives and pressures, and independent of faction or party control. Pitkin describes the range of the continuum from one extreme to the other in five 'stages':

- complete independent judgement

- act as the representative thinks best except where bound by campaign promises

- act as the representative thinks the constituencies would want, unless he receives instructions, then obey them

- representative has some discretion, but he must consult his constituency on any new or controversial matter and carry out this will

- representative acts only on explicit instructions.[3]

In modern political representation in Australia, each of these modes of legislative behaviour is complicated by the existence of political parties, and party pressure and discipline. In almost all cases, representation today is concerned with constituency and representative

relations and roles, with the party interposed between and upon both. This was not the case in England in the late eighteenth century, nor in South Australia in the second half of the nineteenth. In both systems of political representation the theory of Edmund Burke was dominant.

This focus of this study of political representation in South Australia now turns to an analysis of the ways in which these tenets of 'functional' representation were imported into South Australia, the ways in which they were modified, and the extent to which the emergence of political parties impinged on the theory of 'independence'. It begins with early South Australian theories, but it is necessary, first, to outline the methods used to establish patterns of legislative behaviour in South Australia.

Footnotes, Part III   Introduction

1.   Cited in J. B. Schneewind (ed.), Mill: A Collection of Critical
      Essays, (Macmillan, London, 1968), p. 284.

2.   Ibid., p. 285.

3.   H. F. Pitkin, op. cit., p. 146.

Chapter Eight

The Methodology of Legislative Analysis

Introduction

The study of legislative behaviour involves the analysis of a multitude of variables. In modern Australian legislatures, where individual behaviour is dominated and channelled by a disciplined party system, the number of variables is decreased, and consequently the analysis of legislative behaviour is made relatively simple. The differences of opinion and the variations in voting behaviour have been transferred to the party room. But behaviour in a non-party legislature is complex, and one of the fundamental tasks in this study of 'functional' representation in the colonial environment was to establish what is already evident in party situations - to identify the members of the contesting groups at any point in time, to establish the cohesion of these groupings and the changes in their membership and their cohesion over time. As well, the analysis sought to identify the political issues related to individual and group behaviour, to establish the general political nature of the groups, their roles in the legislative process, and any evidence of a development from such group behaviour towards a political party system.

The student of colonial political representation in South Australia is faced with a massive and bewildering collection of newspapers, journals and pamphlets, a few private collections, diaries and general histories, none of them providing much direct evidence of order in the information they contain. Consequently we know little about the political attitudes of members or their behaviour on the issues raised in the legislatures, about their relations with other members and with other groups, or about the role these groups played in the legislative processes. A study of campaign literature and campaign addresses reveals little, and a reading of

parliamentary debates even less, about political attitudes and alignments, or about the manoeuvering of members and groups which preceded and followed the constant ministerial changes.   We know, for example, that in the first session of the first parliament there were four separate ministries, two of which lasted eleven and twenty-nine days respectively.   We know that of the forty-three pre-federation ministries there were seven which lasted less than thirty days, and twenty two which lasted less than one year, but we know little about the patterns of support and opposition which brought these changes about.   To establish and quantify these patterns it is necessary to turn to an analysis of legislative behaviour.

Methods of Analysis

The methods of divisional voting analysis[1] are analogous to the use of a ruler in linear measurement.   As the use of a ruler provides a means of describing an object in linear terms, so techniques of legislative voting analysis provide a means of describing the behaviour of individuals and groups in terms of other variables.   Most techniques provide means of describing and measuring:

(i)   variations in the voting behaviour of individual legislators,

(ii)   variations in the voting behaviour of groups of legislators,

(iii) variations in the divisions themselves;[2]

and for the present study, a new technique was devised to provide a description of another important variable:

(iv)   variations in the structure of the voting patterns of the legislative
       membership as a whole, the result of the variations in individual
       and group behaviour.

It should be stressed from the outset that techniques of legislative analysis are means to an end, they are not an end in themselves. They provide means to identify patterns and variations in a given set of data, but do not explain the data, nor do they explain the patterns. They can be used to identify patterns of like and unlike behaviour, and can identify blocs of members on the basis of these patterns, but they do not answer such questions as why the groups formed in the first place, why the individuals and groups behaved as they did, or why the variations in individual and group behaviour occurred. They do not explain the pre-conditions which lay at the base of the patterns, such as the background of the individuals, their relations to pressure groups and parties in the electorates, and their relations with fellow legislators and with other groups. Secondly, any analysis describes the patterns of legislative behaviour over a specific temporal period. The analysis could be based on the voting on one division, or on one hundred, on legislative activity in one day, or over a parliamentary session as a whole, but patterns established in a non-party situation cannot be extrapolated to a different period of time, or to a different environment. In a modern, disciplined, bi-partisan legislature, one can extrapolate with a reasonable degree of certainty, with the note of caution that patterns established may not mirror the divisions in the party rooms. In a non-party legislature, there is no such basis for prediction, and cohesion in the voting patterns of one group of members at one time may well be entirely absent at another.

But as means to an end, these techniques are invaluable in a non-party situation. They enable preliminary conclusions about political attitudes and groupings to be tested, and they provide a means of establishing the

the most promising and meaningful lines for further research.

One of the first major attempts to analyse divisional voting data by statistical techniques was that carried out by Stuart Rice in a study of the New York State Assembly of 1921.[3] Since then, his and other techniques have been used to study such aspects of 'legislative' behaviour as 'split-party' voting in modern legislatures, group or faction behaviour in pre-party situations, and behaviour in courts, in the United Nations and in other deliberative organisations and institutions.[4] Many variations on a theme have been developed, but three main lines of methodology have emerged:

(i)   the cluster technique, developed from that of Rice, and exemplified by DB Truman's work on the 81st. Congress[5] has, as its prime aim the identification of those legislators who regularly voted in a similar manner, and whose behaviour was the basis of the formation of blocs;

(ii)   the method based on cumulative scaling of legislative votes and patterns, devised by Guttmann, and used, for example, by McRae and Aydelotte,[6] also seeks to establish blocs of members on the basis of this divisional behaviour;

(iii)   techniques based on factor analysis.[7]

These were used as approaches to the analysis of pre-party legislatures as in most of the parliaments of pre-Federation South Australia, and new modifications are being applied to similar and different problems elsewhere.[8]

In Australia, the first statistical analysis of colonial legislative behaviour was carried out by Loveday and Martin,[9] and there has been a growth of interest in this field of research.[10] But few attempts have been

made to clear up what has been called 'an obscure mess' which 'must remain to perplex and worry South Australian historians'.[11] One study half-heartedly subjected the eleventh parliament of 1884-6 to a cluster analysis, but was deterred by the lack of adequate facilities to carry out the 'arduous calculations'.[12] This is understandable for, as will be shown below, the calculations _are_ daunting, if not impossible without the use of computing facilities. The amount of labour required for a 'by-hand' analysis is shown in Peter Cook's analysis of the patterns of politics in the House of Assembly, 1857-1860,[13] and Stuart Rice faced a similar problem, concluding that

> application of the technique is not practicable in bodies
> exceeding twenty five or thirty in membership, because of
> the inordinate amount of labour which the tabulation and
> computation would involve.[14]

Modern computer technology has largely overcome this problem.

The basic data have varied little since the original work by Rice, and for the present study consists of the divisional voting of individual members. The analysis sought to identify patterns concealed in the mass of 'yes', 'no', paired 'yes' and 'no' and 'did not vote' data in a specific legislative period. Advances in technology have enabled this data to be used in different ways, have enabled the identification of more complex and subtle variations of patterns, and have led to a greater expectation of the statistical accuracy of the results.[15] The data for this study consisted of the votes of members of the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council at divisions of the 'whole house' in each of forty six sessions between 1857 and 1901.[16] Data matrices ranged from a base of between thirty five and fifty four members of the Assembly, and between

seventeen and twenty four members of the Council, and up to 108 divisions in any one session.

Three separate techniques were used to analyse this data:

PØLIT - a factor method developed specifically for this study;[17]

RICE - a cluster analysis technique, based on the original of Stuart Rice;

MULTBET - a hierarchical technique developed by the Commonwealth Scientifi and Industrial Research Organisation, originally for biological research.[18]

As the greatest emphasis was placed on the results of the PØLIT technique and as it contains some new and hopefully valuable features, it is describ in detail. The methodology of the other techniques has been described elsewhere and is summarized only.

The PØLIT Technique: Descriptive Summary

This technique, named PØLIT after its computer designation, is essentially a summarizing device, providing a means of condensing vast masses of data into a relatively small number of meaningful and intelligibl indices. PØLIT concentrates these data in such a way that any patterns are accented and identified.

The method is basically a principal component analysis modified to gi an approximate principal factor analysis. There are many variants of fac analysis the description of which requires considerable mathematical introduction. Rather than carry this out in this chapter we have summarized the technique, and refer interested readers to a general description of the factor method elsewhere.[19] Factor analysis aims at simplifying a complex

data matrix, such as the largest set in our data of nearly 6,000 separate voting possibilities, and expressing the significant aspects of it in ter of a lesser number of variables. These variables reflect the various groupings in the members' responses to the divisions, irrespective of the underlying reasons for these coherences.

There are four major aspects of the PØLIT summary of divisional dat

(i) a determination of independent patterns of voting behaviour graded according to their strength,

(ii) the selection of patterns which are sufficiently 'strong' to ma us reasonably sure of their reality (in our data usually two),

(iii) the nature of a significant pattern is defined with respect to the divisions,

(iv) each member's voting behaviour is measured in terms of the significant patterns.

A pattern consists of a set of positive and negative weights associated w: the voting at divisions. Since YES votes had been coded −1 and NO votes +1, a member whose voting pattern was 'NO' on all positively weighted divisions and 'YES' for the negatively weighted ones would have the maximum possible score for that pattern. Possible voting responses range from this situation through a continuum of voting behaviour to the exact rever: case when a member would have the largest possible negative score. In a modern parliament with clear-cut parties and settled inter-party alignment normally only one pattern would be present and all members would have one of two scores showing complete polarisation on such party lines. The set of weightings on the divisions would show, for example, the government

attitude on each division.   Of course, in such a case, the analysis produces an obvious and well-documented result, and one which had been pre-determined.

Depending on the nature of the session and the behaviour of the members more than one distinctive pattern may be present, and the technique can establish all possible ones.   For example, in the fifty-four member, seven division session fifty-three patterns are possible.   We are concerned with the most significant of these which we are reasonably sure are so strong that they stand out beyond an apparent pattern which may show in random numbers.   This was the basis of a unique test for the significance of the patterns present.   Other tests of significance were not applicable to our types of data or they were unsatisfactory in terms of the results they produced.   The Bartlett-Lawley test,[20] for example, is not applicable to the present data because the data are not multi-variate normal in their distributional properties[21] and the Cattel 'scree' test, which may be accura with very large data sets, is inaccurate with the smaller matrices of the data of legislative voting.[22]

The test of significance in the PØLIT technique was based on a parallel analysis of random numbers.   The computer produced for each session a numerically matching set of 'yes', 'no' and 'did not vote' data but with a known zero patterning.   The strengths of patterns from the analysis of th random set were compared to these of the actual data, and significant patterns identified.[24]   The strength of a pattern is estimated by an index ranging between 0.0 and 1.0, which reflects the proportion of the total variance attributable to that pattern.   The general factor model splits

this total variance into a part attributable to random variation and another part due to the significant patterns.   This latter part is further subdivided into parts due to each significant pattern.   It is here that the novelty and value of the Monte Carlo method lies, for the random number analysis is not only more valid, overcoming the objections of those who would contend that conventional factor analysis is inappropriate for this kind of data, but it is computationally less expensive.   Any bias arising from the inapplicability of factor analysis will be common to the real as well as to the random data and can consequently be allowed for in the estimation of the number of significant patterns present.

An index of total structure in a session comes from the ratio of the variance attributable to all the significant patterns to the total variance which includes both that due to structure and that which is undistinguishab! from random data.   With no significant patterns this index is zero while a example of the upper limit is that which would characterize a completely disciplined bipartisan legislature where all members of each party voted as one person on all divisions.   This index of structure thus provides a valuable summary of the polarity in any legislatures, especially a 'non-par' body, and a means of comparison of changes over time.   Of course changes i the membership in successive sessions, and in the nature of the issues they deliberated may lead to appreciable variability in structures, but beyond these, significant changes in structure which are maintained over longer periods of time may indicate the emergence of new factors and influences which have caused a polarization of the voting behaviour of members.   Such a significant change in structural patterns would be expected when politica!

322.

parties, more 'solid' than the factions, emerged in formerly faction-oriente legislatures, a point confirmed by the analyses of colonial South Australia data.

Finally, the groups of divisions which form identifiable and significa patterns can be used to identify issues related to the divisions, issues which may or may not have been the cause of such patterns but which, by the association with significant patterns may be themselves significant. We wi return to this below.

It should be pointed out that PØLIT is not specifically a method for finding how the members were clustered, i.e. it is not a technique like tha Rice method which is designed to identify groups and their members. Howeve if clustering is present the scores of the members in the significant patte provide direct information concerning this. The prime purpose of PØLIT i to provide a summary of the data which will provide guidelines in the very complex and time-consuming task of search through the masses of literary evidence. It therefore provides a valuable lead to further historical research.

In summary, PØLIT provides three valuable indices:

(i) An index of structure which, in essence, measures the extent of polarity of members and groups in the legislature and so provides evidence of marked changes of group affiliations over time.

(ii) A summary of major patterns in the voting data which are statisti cally significant and which can then be used to identify related issues.

(iii) A score for each member which described his voting record in relation to the significant patterns and which can be used to establish clusters, or as a new data set for cluster-oriented methods.

It is therefore a precis of an otherwise complex and often confusing mass o data. It has application in a wide area, and the most recent example of the use of PØLIT is Loveday's analysis of Federal Convention data.[23]

Before providing examples of PØLIT analyses drawn from nineteenth century South Australian parliaments, a brief numeric summary of the techniqu is provided.

THE METHOD: Numeric Summary:

The technique requires initial assumptions concerning the importance o each division, in the sense that each division has had its scale or measure altered to produce the same variance and we have given every division the same weight. In other words we used the sample correlation matrix. This be objected to, but when the number of divisions is large, as it is in the data we analysed, the results are not very sensitive to the initial variance given to the divisions providing they do not differ by a factor greater tha say, the square root of the number of divisions; this is most true when we are considering the first most distinctive patterns present in the data. An alternative procedure, for example, is to use the sample variance - covariance matrix rather than the correlation matrix, i.e. leave all measures unaltered. In this instance, a division which results in most members voting the same way has less variance than one which produces a clear

division between members.   This may be preferred by some investigators, but we found it made very little difference whether we used the correlation or the variance - covariance matrix of the data set.

The other point is the location of the central point of the frequency distribution of votes from which the 'variance' is calculated.   We used th sample mean of members' votes for each division.   This was because our initial emphasis was on the members and the way they might cluster.   Again investigators may differ.   For example, the original Stuart Rice procedure: used 0 as the central location.

There are other statistical difficulties, notably that the number of members is usually less than the number of divisions, and that the data are discrete and not always symmetrical to their distributions.   This means that multivariate normal large sample theory is not applicable, and this is why, as previously indicated, we have used Monte Carlo methods to analyse artificial random data in order to set up criteria for judging the likely significance of patterns established.

If we denote each member by the subscript j and each division by the subscript i, then the votes of members on divisions in a session can be denoted by an array of numbers x_{ij}, i = 1, 2, ..., P; J = 1, 2, ..., n; where there are p divisions and n members.   We can calculate the mean over members $\bar{x}_i$ and form a rectangular p row by n column matrix X, the general element of which is $[x_{ij} - \bar{x}_i]$.   From this a correlation matrix $R = S X X^T S$ is calculated where S is a diagonal p x p matrix which has non-zero elements equal to the reciprocals of the square root of the diagonal elements of $X X^T$.

We then calculate the eigen-values and, say, the first m eigen-vectors of $\underset{\sim}{R}$. Leaving aside, for the moment, the determination of m, we finally calculated the matrix $\underset{\sim}{Y} = \underset{\sim}{H}^T \underset{\sim}{S} \underset{\sim}{X}$ where $\underset{\sim}{Y}$ is the m x n matrix of scores of the members of the first m most distinctive axes and $\underset{\sim}{H}^T$ is the m x p matrix, the rows on which are the first m eigen-vectors of $\underset{\sim}{R}$.

As it stands this is essentially a descriptive device, replacing the jth member's set of p votes in a session (the jth column in X) by m new score (the jth column in $\underset{\sim}{Y}$) which summarize the distinctive features of the session (the m rows of $\underset{\sim}{H}^T$) and that member's response to them. This part of the analysis is identical to a principal component analysis. Thus each session is condensed to a few numbers per member, namely 0-4 in the data so far analysed and these numbers, scores, are associated with patterns in the divisions which we are reasonably certain arise from the data, and not from the method of analysis.

Regarding the determination of m, the number of distinctive patterns in a session, we generated samples from a random number generator which have the same sample size and distributional properties as the sample under study. These 'data', of known null structure, were then subjected to the same analys as the actual data in order to supply us with an ad hoc procedure for determining m. It is also from this analysis that we convert the principal components model into a factor model in the allocation of variance to significant structure.

Our estimation of m, the number of significant roots, was based on the following points, after letting the subscripts d and r refer to the actual data and the matched random data respectively.

(a) The total variance of the data set (trace $\underset{\sim}{R}_d$) is independent of the total variance of the null structure set (trace $\underset{\sim}{R}_r$).

(b) When we compare the largest latent roots from the two sets, their ratio is distributed approximately as an F-ratio on $(n-2, n-2)$ degrees of freedom.

(c) If the F-ratio of (b) is significant, the largest roots from each set are deleted. Then all the roots of one set, say the data set are proportionately adjusted so that its trace becomes equal to that of the random set and n is reduced by 1.

(d) The repetition of steps (b) and (c) is continued until the F-ratio is non-significant and the last pair of roots omitted is the mth pair. At this stage it is taken that the remaining roots, in both sets, m + 1 onwards, are not significantly different, and the scale of all the roots in the data is now matched to the null structure set. Comparison of the first m roots can now be made by F-ratios on $(n-m-2, n-m-2)$ degrees of freedom.

By this means the total variance in the data-set has been partitioned into portion associated with significant structure and a remainder associated with known null structure. This is the basic aim in factor analysis. Further, estimates of the likely reality of each observed pattern becomes available.

For the computer[25] the procedure consists of the following:

Let the subscript d denote data and the subscript r denote the random number set.

Step 1: Take data in whatever form it may be, set "Yes" votes to -1, non-vote to 0 and "No" votes to +1. Convert to standard form (blocked binary), which consists of a file comprising n logical records on magnetic tape. Each session requires one file.

Step 2: Produce frequency tables of members' voting behaviour on each division.

Step 3: Calculate $R_i = S\, X_i\, X^T_i\, S$, i = d first time through, i = r second time through.

Step 4: Calculate D_i, the eigenvalues of R_i.

Step 5: Calculate H_i, the first nine eigenvectors of R_i.

Step 6: Using a random number generator, produce n sets of p response Xr, which have expected frequency distributions identical t the observed frequency distributions of Step 2.

Step 7: Repeat steps 3 and 4 using dummy data, Xr.

Step 8: Match D_d and D_r and estimate m.

Step 9: Calculate $V = H^T\, S\, X_d$.

Step 10: Print out analysis.

In summary, PØLIT is a variant of principal factor analysis, but as indicated above, with the development of a unique procedure for estimating the number of factors, and a unique and simple approximate procedure for estimating the degree of structure, i.e. the proportion of the total varianc which has been allocated to the significant factors. Generally in factor

analysis the number of multivariate observations exceed the number of variates by a clear margin. In the analysis of legislative behaviour the reverse is usually the case, and this is the reason for the matched random number analysis which is a basis of the novelty of PØLIT.

EXAMPLE ANALYSES

The four sessions selected as examples include three in the pre-Labor period and one after the development towards a relatively cohesive bipartisan legislature had begun. Little was known about the first three examples of 1866-7, 1868-9 and 1884. Apart from some contemporary documen tion of ministries and generalisations about opposition leaders and members the remaining descriptive material consisted of vague electoral statements and predictions and after-thoughts of the press and of contemporary histori. In the pattern of much of this period the ministries holding the treasury benches at the opening of these four sessions faced 'confidence' motions, and three were defeated after only days in office. In 1866, the fifteenth ministry was forced to end its brief 156 day period in office whe:
its leader, John Hart, resigned and left/England. His colleagues resigned
                                     for
with him, but his place was taken by lawyer J. P. Boucaut who had been Attorney General under Hart and who reinstated all but two of the former administration. This group retained the support of the assembly througho the session, but disintegrated at the opening of the next. Boucaut was representing some claimants against the Moonta mines, questioning the validity of leases and was forced to impugn government titles while leading the government of the day. He resolved the dilemma by resigning and his colleagues again followed suit.

The second example, the first session of the fifth parliament, was one of the most complex sessions of the pre-federation period. When the session opened, the treasury benches were occupied by a ministry led by Henry Ayers from the Legislative Council, and this ministry faced a motion of no-confidence over its alleged inactivity in the Northern Territory, then part of South Australian jurisdiction, but survived, only to find its proposals on land taxation and utilization rejected less than two months later. After a week of uncertainty, during which two members of the Assembly found themselves unable to form a cabinet, John Hart, returned from England, succeeded. But _his_ proposals on land, including leases without rights to purchase, were also rejected by the Assembly and, after one week in office he was forced to resign. Henry Ayers was again summoned and, as shown above, formed a ministry of the same personnel, but presented a land policy directly opposed to the one on which he had been defeated only days earlier. This was too much for the Assembly, and his ministry was summarily defeated. The land issue still loomed large, for the new premier, H. B. T. Strangways, faced considerable opposition on his proposals, but he managed to retain a narrow majority support for the remainder of the session, and in fact his ministry lasted nearly two years.

In 1884, J. C. Bray whose ministry had set a record of two years 358 days was defeated on a no-confidence motion on the second day of the new

parliament.   The mover, John Colton, had questioned a reconstruction of the cabinet during the recess and was supported by a majority in the assembly only to fall to a similar motion exactly one year later when J. W. Downer attacked and defeated the Colton ministry.

The fourth example is drawn from a markedly different situation characterized by the ministerial stability under C. C. Kingston.   The votes analysed in this example of 1898-9 were taken during his sixth successive session as Premier.   In contrast with the analyses of the three earlier sessions, which dealt with diffuse and fluid combinations of members, this analysis provided evidence of three more or less cohesive groups during the session, two of which had a documented membership and a relatively clear policy.   The members of the United Labor Party (ULP) and those who had joined the conservative National Defence League (NDL) faced each other belligerently across the house and continued sniping at one another's policies, programmes and personalities in the constituencies The third group, the 'Ministerialists' emerged as a more diffuse group of members centred on the Kingston ministry.   These were generally regarded as 'liberals', occupying a political position between the ULP and NDL.   There were also other members whose political affiliations or views were virtually known, but for this session there was considerable documentary evidence which provided a test of the value and accuracy of the technique.

These four examples include three which showed evidence of a 'peak'
in the pattern of structure 1857-1901, and one showing a structure well
below the mean (Diagram 8:13).   As Table 8:1 shows, there was considera
variation between these sessions in terms of the numbers of significant
patterns and the significance of these.

Table 8:1   <u>Summary of major numerical results</u>

Example		1	2	3	4
Parliament		4	5	11	15
Session		3	1	1	3
Date		1866-7	1868-9	1884	1898-9
Number of divisions		43	35	59	61
Number of members		36	33	51	53
Fraction of variance due to structure		0.27	0.10	0.35	0.41
Number of significant patterns		1	1	4	2
Significance	pattern one	4.87^{***}	2.02^{*}	4.45^{***}	8.67^{***}
of	pattern two	$1.56^{n.s.}$	$1.34^{n.s.}$	3.54^{***}	4.14^{***}
Patterns in	pattern three	$1.60^{n.s.}$	$1.15^{n.s.}$	2.89^{**}	$1.56^{n.s.}$
forms of	pattern four	$1.26^{n.s.}$	$1.10^{n.s.}$	2.03^{*}	$1.30^{n.s.}$
approximate F. ratios	pattern five	$1.09^{n.s.}$	$1.02^{n.s.}$	$1.51^{n.s.}$	$1.15^{n.s.}$
Proportion of	1	0.27	0.10	0.12	0.28
Variance attributable	2	-	-	0.10	0.13
to patterns.	3	-	-	0.08	-
	4	-	-	0.05	-

Note: ***, **, * represent significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% levels
of probability: n.s. - not significant.

A significant change is evident in example four.   The increase in
structure is marked and the strength of the significant patterns indicated
the extent of the change in the 'polarity' of the legislation.

Although a session's nature in terms of the divisiveness of issues
is quite variable, and this is clearly a factor in determining the degree
of structure, it is not evident that the issues changed their general
nature after 1892 compared with those prior to this date.   More
specifically, Table 8:2 summarizes the issues associated with the
significant patterns.   The term 'ministry' indicates that the bulk of the
divisions forming the respective pattern were concerned specifically with
the position of the members of the government or of the collective
ministry vis-a-vis the Assembly;   'government legislation' indicated
that most divisions were concerned with public bills, mainly on second and
third readings, and where more specific issues were the subject of a high
proportion of the divisions, general descriptions are provided in brackets.

Table 8:2   Issues and Patterns, PØLIT example analyses.

Session code	Date	Pattern	Main subjects of pattern
043	1866-7	1	ministry
051	1868-9	1	(ministry (government legislation [Lands,Public Wc
111	1884	1	government legislation[Payment of member
		2	ministry
		3	government legislation[Federal Council
			bill]
		4	ministry
153	1898-9	1	ministry
		2	ministry and government legislation

There was little evidence that the increased structure in the 1898-9 session was due to any fundamentally divisive issue or issues.   Rather, the evidence pointed to a 'pre-determined' pattern of voting behaviour for many of the members, a pattern which was closer to that of modern party behaviour, than to that in a faction dominated legislature.   This point, to which we will return in greater detail in later chapters, was reinforced by the analysis of the scores of individual members.

A graphical representation of such scores indicates where each member was placed, or rather where each placed himself, in relation to the other members in the significant patterns.   Where two patterns were establishe as significant, as was the case of many of the colonial sessions, a two-dimensional diagram provides a description.   For example, in the following hypothetical case, the axes represent a zero score on the

respective patterns. In the five-member situation, members 01 and 02 voted similarly on the divisions constituting the first pattern, members 03 and 04 also voted similarly, but in opposition to 01 and 02, and member 05 voted in a random manner, relative to the opposed pairs of members. On the second pattern, members 02, 04, 05 agreed in terms of divisional voting behaviour, and were opposed to members 01 and 03.

```
                            pattern
                               2  |
                                  |
         01                       |            03
                                  |
                                  |
                                  |
 Pattern  1 ─────────────────     ─────────────────
                                  |
                                  |
         02                       |            04
                               05 |
```

Where three or more patterns were established as significant, the scores can be represented by a series of plots: pattern 1 against pattern 2; pattern 1 against pattern 3, etc.

Examples of this plotting technique are drawn from session 051, 111 and 153. Each member in these sessions has been represented by a numeric code, and where overprints occur, that is, when two or more members have similar scores, then brackets have been used to show such agreement. Table 8-3 provides a member - code key to the following plots.

Table 8-3:   Key to member codes.

P5 S1		P11 S1		P15 S3	
01	Andrews	01	Atkinson	01	Archibald
02	Baker	02	Bagot J.	02	Batchelor
03	Bean	03	Bagster	03	Blacker
04	Blyth N	04	Basedow	04	Brooker
05	Boucaut	05	Beaglehold	05	Burgoyne
06	Bower	06	Bower	06	Butler
07	Bright	07	Bray	07	Caldwell
08	Carr	08	Bucknall	08	Carpenter
09	Cavenagh	09	Burgoyne	09	Castine
10	Cheriton	10	Caldwell	10	Catt
11	Colton	11	Castine	11	Cock
12	Cottrell	12	Catt	12	Coneybeer
13	Everard	13	Cockburn	13	Copley
14	Fisher D	14	Coglin	14	Cummins
15	Fuller	15	Coles	15	Darling
16	Glyde	16	Colton	16	Downer J. W.
17	Hart	17	Copley	17	Dumas
18	Hay	18	Downer J.E.	18	Duncan
19	Hill	19	Downer J.W.	19	Foster
20	Hughes	20	Duncan	"0	Gilbert
21	Lewis	21	Fox	21	Giles
22	Mortlock	22	Furner	22	Glynn
23	Neales	23	Gilbert	23	Goode
24	Pearce	24	Grainger	24	Grainger
25	Playford	25	Green	25	Griffiths
26	Reynolds	26	Hardy	26	Hague
27	Riddoch	27	Harvey	27	Handyside
28	Rogers	28	Hawker J.W.	28	Holder
29	Sandover	29	Hawker G.C.	29	Homburg
30	Santo	30	Henning	30	Hooper
31	Simms	31	Homburg	31	Hourigan
32	Strangways	32	Howe	32	Hutchinson
33	Townsend	33	Johnson J.C.F.	33	Jenkins
34	Watts	34	King	34	Kingston
35	Fisher J	35	Kingston	35	Landseer
		36	Krichauff	36	McDonald
		37	Landseer	37	McGillivray
		38	Mattinson	38	McLachlan
		39	Miller	39	Miller
		40	Moody	40	Moody
		41	Moule	41	Morris
		42	Newland	42	Mortlock
		43	Playford	43	O'Loughlin
		44	Rees	44	O'Malley
		45	Rounsevell	45	Peake
		46	Smith E.T.	46	Poynton
		47	Stirling E.C.	47	Price
		48	Stirling J.L.	48	Rendell
		49	Symon	49	Roberts
		50	Tennant	50	Scherk
		51	Ward	51	Shannon
				52	Solomon
				53	Wood

Diagram 8-1 provides a plot of the scores of members on the first two patterns in the divisional voting, 1868-9, and the scores of members in the single significant pattern. The codes of the members of the first and third (Ayres) ministries are circled, those of the second (Hart) ministry are 'squared', and those of the fourth (Strangways) ministry are underlined.

Diagram 8-1: PØLIT analysis, 051, plot of scores 1 and 2.

Pattern One Scores

Pattern Two Scores

Pattern One Scores

Documentary evidence suggested that there was a split in the Assembly over the issues of land sales and rural taxation[26] and on the basis of this external evidence, a multi-bloc pattern was expected. However, on the voting patterns in the only significant pattern, a loose bi-polar division is identified. On the one hand, there was a relatively loose group of twenty members, including the Ayers and Hart ministries and their supporters, and on the other a tighter group associated with Strangways. Despite the apparent divisive nature of the conflict over the land issue which was associated with the defeat of three separate ministries and to which we will return in the following chapter, the PØLIT analysis of legislative voting not only indicated a relatively low index of structure where a high index was expected on external evidence, but there was an apparent underlying cohesion of Ayers and Hart supporters which belied their apparent opposition over the land question. Thus, for this session at least, the PØLIT analysis suggests that the fluidity of members emphasised in most studies of this early decade, and the divisive nature of the land issue, may be overstated. We will return to both questions in later chapters.

Diagram 8-2 provides a plot of the first two significant patterns of parliament 11, session 1. The codes of members of the defeated (Bray) ministry are circled, those of the main (Colton) ministry are underlined. There was little to distinguish these two groups on the scores of the first pattern but they were sharply differentiated on the second, indicating that these two groups of members with the exceptions of Catt (12) and Colton (16) generally agreed on the issue of payment of members but were strongly opposed on the question of support for the new ministry. Similar

preliminary conclusions which are guides to further research can be
obtained from plotting scores of members on patterns one and three, two
and three, and so on, and from comparisons of positions of other groups
of members whose like attitudes or behaviour may be known from external
sources or which may be indicated from the plots.   The relatively close
association of the five members marked 'A' is such a guide.

Diagram 8-2: PØLIT analysis, 111, plot of scores 1 and 2

Parliament 11, Session 1.

Pattern Two Scores

Pattern One Scores

24
31 17 39 09 32 33 A
22
10 13
27
41
51
38 36 (05) ⑫
21
40 01 14
15
35 34 14
45 49 37
50
04 08 ⑦
48
43 26
20 ㊻
02 23 47 28 30
29 25 18 03(11) ⑲
42
16
⑥

A comparison of diagrams 8-2 and 8-3 indicates the extent of the changes which occurred in the 'nineties. The sessional analysis identified two significant patterns. The first, which accounted for two-thirds of the total variance, was based on twenty two of the sixty six divisions in the session, details of which are summarized in table 8-4.

Table 8-4: Summary of divisions and issues on the most significant pattern, 1898-9.

SAPP 1898-9 page	Division subject	Result	Voting
34	Confidence motion	defeated	36-17
96	Restore Seating in Shops Bill	carried	29-17
132	Adjourn Early Closing Bill	defeated	30-14
133	2R Early Closing Bill	carried	33-16
142	Precedence of business	defeated	20-28 *
142	Precedence of business	carried	25-23
154	2R Household Suffrage Bill	carried	33-18
184	2R Railways Bill	defeated	25-28 *
203	Recommit Crown Lands Bill	carried	25-28 *
210	2R Land Value Assessment Bill	carried	29-22
215)			(22-18
215) Adjourn Tied Houses Bill		defeated	(22-17
215)			(21-16
249	Recommit Law Reform Bill	defeated	28-15
254	2R Agricultural Holdings Bill	carried	24-23
255	3R Law Reform Bill	carried	32-18
262	3R Household Suffrage Bill	carried	34-17
304	2R Merchant Seamen Bill	carried	34-11
326	Resolution, purchase Glenelg Railways	carried	28-24
371) Resolution: to disapprove of plans			(34-16
372) for referendum on Franchise Bill		defeated	(29-24
372	Resolution: to affirm referendum	carried	33-19

Notes: SAPP pp. obtained from the Codes to divisions identified as significant by POLIT.
Voting figures are given in relation to the intentions of the government, which were frustrated on three occasions (*).
2R, 3R: Second, Third readings of Bills.

The second significant pattern consisted of eighteen divisions,
and on seven of these the government was defeated.   Diagram 8-3 shows
the nature of the bloc behaviour in the House of Assembly which caused
this.   The cohesion of the three known groups - the Ministry (circled) ,
the ULP members (underlined) and the NDL members (*) - is clear.

Diagram 8-3: Graphical representation of scores of members, POLIT technique.

Parliament 15, Session 3.

Pattern One Scores

Pattern Two Scores

(33)
(28)
(43) (06)
(34)
04

51 39   14
40 03   41 38
      45 11
05
17   30
48   10
35   19

13* 52
  21*   23
    16*
  26*   25   22
  07* 29*

24

47

37
50 44   49(02)
  08 46 12(01)(32)
        31

53

36*   27*
18* 15* 20*
  09*
42

However, while the cohesion of the two parties[27] is clear, two members, Hooper (30) and Wood (53) who were elected as ULP nominees in 1896, showed behaviour which was clearly divergent from that of their colleagues. The former, an unpledged member for the country copper-mining seat of Wallaroo, differed from his colleagues on some of the subjects important in the second pattern, but was closer to them in the first. Wood, who had resigned from the ULP in 1897 still agreed with his former colleagues on the second pattern, but drifted away from them in divisions on support for the ministry in the first. We will return to the reasons for this divergent behaviour below.[28]

These three more or less cohesive groups form the apexes of a triangle in the plot. The Kingston ministry was strongly supported by the ULP members on the divisions comprising the most significant pattern, and the members of the NDL were in clear opposition to both. On the divisions in the second pattern, however, the main line of opposition was that between the ministry and the ULP, with the NDL occupying a more diffuse, central position. The ULP voted with the Kingston ministry on only two of the eighteen divisions, both of which concerned the procedures of the house, and seven of the divisions were carried against government wishes. This pattern is, however, complicated by a number of members whose scores placed them between these three groups, and we will return to the patterns of behaviour in this important session below.

As noted above, a factor technique such as POLIT divides the total variance attributable to patterns of voting into parts due to each significant pattern, and this enables conclusions to be made about the importance of specific issues and divisions in any one session. For example, the index of structure for the 1898-9 session was 0.45, and the

two significant patterns accounted for 0.32 and 0.13 respectively.   In
fact, in all but two of the sessions in which there was more than one
significant pattern, the amount of variance attributable to the most
significant pattern was at a high level.[29]   This division of the total
variance can be described graphically in two ways, both of which indicate
further values of the PØLIT technique.

As mentioned earlier, where there are more than two significant
patterns in a session, a series of plots can be used to represent them.
Diagram 8-4 shows the scores of members of the 1884 parliament on the
first and third most significant patterns.   A comparison with diagram 8-2
indicates important similarities and variations.   The general agreement
between the past and present ministries is more evident, and the as yet
unexplained cohesion of members at 'A' is noticeable, but less obvious.
The marked change is evident in the polarity of the individuals and groups.
The conflict between the past and present ministerial members evident on
pattern 2 did not occur in pattern 3, and the range of scores from the
origin - the co-ordinates of which would indicate a random voting pattern -
is less than in the plot of the first two most significant patterns.   Such
a result was expected from the division of the variance in this session,
for the four significant patterns constituted respectively 0.14, 0.08,
0.07, 0.06 of the total structure of 0.35.

Diagram 8-4: Graphical representation of scores of
members, 1884, first and third patterns.

Parliament 11, Session 1

07   01
         38
   46   13 10
19   35 14
03 06 (30) 45 35 15
           37   40 36 05   22
16   18 23 43   04   21 12

Pattern One Scores ─────────────────── 50 ──────── 27 32
42   17(39) A
              26   33
         20   48 08
      29   09   24
   25 11   44   51
      47   41   31
              34
   02
              49
      28

Pattern Three Scores

The second advantage of this variance analysis in PØLIT is that it enables an analysis of the internal cohesion of groups and of the polarity of the groups to be carried out over a series of data sets, that is, over a series of sessions.   Although each session included a different membership and saw debates and votes on different issues and, as a consequence would be expected to show evidence of different groupings and of different indices of patterning and variance, a comparison of individual and group behaviour over a series of sessions provides a graphic representation of both the levels of cohesion of known legislative groups and the degree of polarity between them.   If cohesion within a group of members is maintained over a series of sessions and across changes in ministry, changes in issues and in the legislative environment, then this would provide guidelines for research into party development in this period. We will return to this in Chapter X below.   At this point, the intention is to demonstrate the ways in which the PØLIT technique was used.

Diagram 8-5 shows the result of plotting the scores of ULP and NDL members on the first three patterns in each session of the Assembly from 1893-1901.

Diagram 8-5: POLIT analysis; scores of ULP, NDL members; 1893-1901

Diagram 8-5: POLIT analysis; scores of ULP, NDL members; 1893-1901

The result indicates the extent to which the conflict between members of these two legislative groups was contained within the proportion of variance attributable to the most significant pattern. These most significant scores, plotted at 'A', show both a clear division between the ULP and NDL members and a relative cohesion within the two groups. The second most significant pattern, 'B', shows that the polarity of the two groups has disappeared and the clear separation of the members has blurred. By the stage of the third pattern, the polarity and the cohesion of the two groups has all but disappeared. We will return to this unique period of the 'nineties in later chapters.

As research proceeded using PØLIT a shortcoming became evident. The original analyses were carried out including all members in a session, regardless of the extent to which they took part in the divisions. However, a high rate of absenteeism from the divisions tended to place the member at or near a null score position when, in fact, the divisions on which he did vote placed him in a different position in the faction continuum. As a result, the PØLIT program was modified[30] to the extent that members who were absent from a relatively high proportion of the divisions, and were not paired, were excluded from the analysis. In this way, it was possible to differ between those members whose absenteeism resulted in scores which indicated an independent voting pattern, and those whose actual voting behaviour over the session was, in fact, of such an independent nature. As well, the modification defined the polarity of members and groups of members more sharply, and allowed a better definition of the patterning and structure of any one session. Table 8-5 and diagrams 8-3 (above) and 8-6 compare the results of the PØLIT analysis of session 153, 1898-99, on the basis of the original and the modified program.

Diagram 8-6: PØLIT (modified) analysis, 153, plot of scores 1 and 2

(34)
(33)
(28)
(43 06)

39

51   38   14

40   03

41   04

05   45

*36

11

*28

17

*20   Pattern One Scores   48 | 10

35   30

19

*18   *15

*13

52   *09

22

*26 *16

*21

*07   01

32

44 50

47 37

29   08   49 02

24   12

46   31

53

Pattern Two Scores

Table 8-5: Comparison of numerical results of POLIT techniques, 1898-99.

	original program	modified program
number of members in analysis	53	50
number of significant patterns	2	2
total structure	0.41	0.45
proportion of) pattern 1	0.28	0.32
structure in) pattern 2	0.13	0.13

The three members excluded in the modified analysis, Goode (23), Griffiths (25) and Mortlock (42), were loosely allied with the NDL members on the first pattern, but were relatively random in their voting patterns on the second. The effects of their exclusion from the analysis emphasised the essential tri-partite division of the remainder of the members, and increased slightly the apparent cohesion of the three major groups in the house. At the same time, the independent behaviour of those members not closely associated with the ULP, the NDL or the ministerialists is more evident.

As a preliminary conclusion, before we turn to the other techniques which were utilised, and to the extent to which they, and POLIT, are complementary, it should be emphasised again that POLIT, in producing the patterns and indices noted above, is not explaining them. Such explanation can be achieved only by reference to other kinds of evidence. POLIT is not, and cannot be a substitute for research into documentary material. But, as the examples show, POLIT is a valuable summarizing device which, in establishing patterns of like and unlike behaviour in the legislatures, and in reducing a vast amount of data to a series of

indices, provides a means of checking conclusions arrived at from documentary research, and a means of suggesting guidelines to further research. It should also be emphasised that PØLIT is not designed as a clustering technique, it is not designed primarily to establish the groupings of members in the legislature. As shown above, PØLIT does suggest the existence of such groups and, as will be shown below, the indices which are provided by the analysis can be used as a new data bank for a clustering technique. Before turning to this, however, it is valuable to outline the other two techniques used in the analysis of behaviour in the South Australian legislatures.

The MULTBET Technique

MULTBET is the method of hierarchical classification devised by Lance and Williams, modified to apply to the divisional data. The voting patterns of individual members are compared to establish a matrix of indices of similarity, and the pair of members with the highest level of agreement is then taken as a new 'individual'. The index derived from this is then compared to those of all other individual members and the closest level of agreement is added as a third member. This process is continued until all individuals have been included in the hierarchy, and until all indices have been linked at differing levels of agreement. The result is then summarised in the form of a plot, indicating where each individual was situated in the hierarchy in relation to other individuals, and the degree of cohesion of the various groupings.

Diagram 8-7 provides the results of the MULTBET analysis of session 153, 1898-99, and diagram 8-8 shows the groupings of members and the levels of agreement.

Table 8-7: MULTBET Analysis, 1898-9. Parliament 15, Session 3.

Level of Agreement

Bloc I

Bloc II

Bloc III

(a) (b) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b)

Member Code

53 50 14 22 25 24 49 16 2 37 1 47 31 32 12 8 51 40 3 41 39 14 38 48 35 17 10 5 45 36 19 43 34 33 28 6 4 11 52 42 36 27 23 18 20 9 29 16 15 13 7 13 21 26

Diagram 8-8: MULTBET Abalysis, 153, showing group structures.

```
          452                                    452
           △                                      △
           |                                      |
          220                                     |
     ┌──────────────────────┐                     |
     |                      |                     |
    107                    105                     |
  ┌──────┐          ┌────────────┐                 |
  |      |          |            |                 |
  |      |         61            |                50
  |      |      ┌──────┐         |            ┌────────┐
  32     25     41     40        11           24       25
```

32	25	41	40	11	24	25
_ Glynn	* Archibald	Blacker	Burgoyne	Brooker	+ Castine	+ Caldwell
Grainger	* Batchelor	Cummins	Catt	= Butler	+ Duncan	+ Copley
Griffiths	* Carpenter	Randell	Dumas	Cock	+ Gilbert	+ Darling
O'Malley	* Coneybeer	Miller	Foster	= Holder	Goode	+ Downer
Scherk	* Hourigan	Moody	* Hooper	= Jenkins	+ Handyside	+ Giles
Wood	* Hutchinson	Morris	Landseer	= Kingston	+ McDonald	+ Hague
	* McGillivray	Shannon	Peake	= O'Loughlin	Mortlock	+ Homburg
	* Poynton		Randell		Solomon	
	* Price					
	* Roberts					

* Members of the United Labor Party
+ Members of the National Defence League
= Members of the Kingston Ministry.

The evidence from MULTBET suggests that the 1898-99 session saw a division of the House of Assembly membership into three major blocs, but differing in internal cohesion. Two of the blocs showed a relatively low level of agreement in opposition to the third. Diagram 8-7 shows the way in which each of these major blocs was further subdivided in terms of group voting behaviour, until the level of individual membership is reached. The subdivision of the major blocs shown in diagram 8-8 is based on a 'cutoff' from further subdivision at the point when all members have been accounted for, and on this basis, there are seven relatively discrete groupings of members. The internal cohesion of these groups varied from the relatively independent nature of Ia to the fairly tight cohesion in IIc, and the comparison of these groupings with known 'party' membership supports the evidence of the PØLIT analysis.

Table 8-6: Membership of groups in the 1898-99 session by MULTBET, showing independent membership of 'parties', where known.

	Ministry	ULP	NDL	unknown
BLOC I (a)				22,24,25,44, 50,53
(b)		1,2,8,12,31,32, 37,46,47,49		
BLOC II (a)				3,24,38,39, 40,41,51
(b)		30		5,10,17,19, 35,45,48
(c)	6,28,33,34,43			4,11
BLOCK III (a)			9,18,20, 27,36	23,42,52
(b)			7,13,15,16, 21,26,29	

This analysis was carried out with the inclusion of the three members whose absenteeism level was high, and a comparison with the PØLIT plot of the same session, diagram 8-3, tends to support the conclusions derived from the latter.   The divergent behaviour of ULP member Hooper (30) is again evident, and the general levels of support and opposition of the three major groups which was noted in the PØLIT analysis is emphasised. We will return below to a more detailed comparison of these methods.

The RICE Technique

Statistically the simplest of the three used in this study, the RICE technique was based on the original method devised by Stuart Rice as used by Truman.   Like MULTBET, it is primarily a clustering technique.

The voting patterns of each individual member are compared to establish an index of agreement from the calculation of

$$\frac{F}{T} = \frac{\text{Number of times the votes of two members agree}}{\text{Number of divisions on which both voted}}$$

and an index of absenteeism from the calculation of

$$\frac{T}{N} = \frac{\text{Number of divisions on which both voted}}{\text{Number of divisions on the session}}$$

with both indices ranging between 0.0 and 1.0.   The index of agreement was used in the analysis when the index of absenteeism was sufficiently low so that the result would not be biased by a lack of data from one or both members.   That is, indices of agreement were used when both members voted on at least half of the total number of divisions, when $T/N > 0.5$.   As well, the index of agreement was used when the absenteeism index was within the range 0.40 to 0.49 if the level of agreement was very high or very low, that is, when $0.3 > F/T > 0.7$.   Members whose index of absenteeism was beyond this accepted range were excluded from the analysis.   The data was

refined further to the extent that those divisions which showed a marked polarity of voting patterns, that is, when 90% or more of the members who voted at a specific division voted on one side, or those divisions at which less than 40% of the total members voted (or were paired), were excluded from the analysis. On these bases, four divisions were excluded from the data of the example 1898-99 session, and four members, J. S. Downer (16), Goode, Griffiths and Mortlock were also excluded.

Diagram 8-9 provides the matrix of the RICE analysis of this session. Following the suggestions by Truman, who broadened Rice's original emphasis on the most cohesive groups only to include the 'fringe' members and the 'isolates' [31] the groupings in this session are divided into 'core', 'tail' and 'fringe' relationships.

Diagram 8-9: RICE analysis, 153.

As in the first two techniques, three major groupings of members were clearly identifiable, but in this case, these groups were further 'refined' in terms of the general levels of support for the 'core' members of each group.   Blocs I and II showed a relatively high level of agreement, indicated by the indices at 'A' in diagram 8-9, while the 'core' of bloc III were equally clearly in opposition to both blocs I and II, indicated by the low levels of agreement at 'B' and 'C'. Table 8-7 summarises these results.

Table 8-7: Membership of blocs, 1898-99, by RICE technique, showing independent membership of 'parties', where known.

		ministry	ULP	NDL	unknown
BLOC I	core		1,8,12,31,32 37,46,47,49		
	tail		2		50
	fringe				35,44,53
BLOC II	core	6,28,33,34,43			4,11,14,41
	tail		30		5,17,19,38, 39,45
	fringe				3,10,40,51
BLOC III	core			13,15,18,21	
	tail			7,9,26,29,36	52
	fringe			20,27	
INDEPENDENT					22,24,48
EXCLUDED					16,23,25,42

As table 8-8 shows, the MULTBET and RICE techniques agreed closely in the basis lines of support and opposition in the house, but there was some disagreement on the 'positions' of some members in relation to these.

Table 8-8: MULTBET, RICE comparison, session 1898-99.

	MULTBET	RICE
Members included in analysis	53	49
Number of blocs identified	3	3
Blocs corresponding	I	I
	II	II
	III	III

Both techniques were agreed on the 'placement' of the following

	ministry	ULP	NDL	unknown
Bloc I		1,2,8,12,31 32,37,46,47 49		44,50,53
Bloc II	6,28,33 34,43	30		3,4,5,10,11,14, 17,19,38,39,40, 41,45,51
Bloc III			7,9,13,15,18 20,21,26,27, 29,36	52

The methods disagreed on the 'placement' of four members; Glynn, Grainger, Landseer and Randell, (22,24,35,48, respectively). RICE placed Landseer in bloc I, with the remainder as independents, while MULTBET placed Landseer and Randell in Bloc II and Glynn and Grainger in bloc I. As well, there were the four members excluded in RICE on the grounds of absenteeism. To resolve these problems and differences it is necessary to turn to documentary evidence.

As will be shown in later chapters, J. W. Downer was a leading member of the NDL, Glynn and Goode were closely associated with the League, and Mortlock was clearly identified by contemporaries as of 'conservative leanings'. Documentary evidence also indicated that Landseer and Randell

were associated with the Kingston ministry.   At this point, then, only

Grainger and Griffiths remain as 'unknowns'.   A later chapter will

analyse this, and other sessions in the Kingston ministry in more detail,

but on the evidence put forward at this point the membership of the House

of Assembly can be summarised.   In terms of 'party', the National Defence

League contained the largest bloc of members, fourteen, while the United

Labor Party had eleven members in the Assembly.   There were five members

of the Kingston ministry.   The Ministry and the ULP members were

generally associated on issues of most significance, as the PØLIT analysis

showed, although the general patterns in the house became tripartite on

the second pattern.   On the bases of the evidence from the three analyses,

and from documentary evidence outlined above, the three major groupings in

the house were the 'ministerialists', consisting of five members of the

Kingston ministry with Hooper from the Labor party, fourteen 'independent'

members with Landseer and Randell who were excluded from the analysis, a

total of twenty two;   the Labor members and close supporters with a total

of thirteen;   and the NDL members and their close supporters, totalling

sixteen members.   At this point, the Speaker, Coles, and members Grainger

and Griffiths are 'unknowns'.   On such a basis as this, further

analysis of the political manoeuverings in this session, and of the events

in the session, notably the growing insecurity of the Kingston ministry to

which we will return, can be analysed more fully and more meaningfully.

One further point needs to be noted concerning PØLIT.   It was mentioned

above that while PØLIT was not designed specifically as a clustering

technique, any principal factor method can be used, as MacRae points out,

to produce a cluster matrix.[32]   In numeric terms, if, instead of using

sample means over members as the central points for the corrected sums

of squares and products matrix $\underset{\sim\sim}{XX}^{T}$, zero central points had been used,

and $\underset{\sim}{S}$ had been replaced by unit matrix $\underset{\sim}{I}$, then the PØLIT analysis would

produce similar results as the original RICE procedure.   The PØLIT plot

of the 1898-99 session certainly suggests clustering, especially in

terms of the known affiliations of members, and Diagram 8-10 shows the

PØLIT plot superimposed by the blocs agreed on by the other two methods,

and the members about whom the MULTBET and RICE techniques disagreed,

connected by dotted lines.

Diagram 8-10: Graphical representation of scores of members, POLIT technique,
showing bloc structure of MULTBET and RICE techniques.

Parliament 15, Session 3.

II

(33)
(28)
(43) (06)
(34)

51   39   14   04

03   41
40   38

45   11

05

17   30

Pattern One Scores   42   48   10

35   19

13* 52
21*
16* 23

26* 25   22

07* 29*

24

III

36*   27*
20*
18* 15*
09*

I   47

44   37
49(02)
50

08   46 12(01)(32)
31

53

Pattern Two Scores

As well as suggesting such clusters, the PØLIT results can be utilised as a new data set for a specific cluster analysis on the basis of the scores of individual members on the significant divisions.   This is a simpler, and consequently computationally cheaper method than the original cluster technique, and, as will be shown, accents the clustering.

This method, using the scores of members, starts from a calculation of the linear distance from the 'position' - the co-ordinates on the plot - of each member from each other member, and this enables each individual to be considered as a possible focus for a cluster.   These linear distances are then converted into indices in a similar form to that of RICE, and an equivalent matrix is obtained.   Of course, the RICE technique could have been utilised from the beginning, and was for the purposes of this study as a whole, but the intention of this sub-program was to establish the validity of POLIT as a starting point for a cluster method, and to test the results obtained against such a recognised method, and thus to establish whether the new and refined data would be more discriminating. The test of this would be in the answer to such questions as did the technique produce a more accurate result when tested against evidence from other sources?, did the two methods provide the same basic results in terms of numbers of blocs and numbers of members in each?, did the refined method enable the identification of the 'core' members of each bloc with greater clarity and accuracy, and did it establish more clearly the lines of opposition and support between the blocs?

Diagram 8-11 shows the matrix of the analysis of the 1898-99 session using the scores of members as the new basic data.   To enable the results of this refined analysis to be compared to diagram 8-9 above, the members excluded from the original RICE analysis were excluded from the modified data.

Diagram 8-11: RICE analysis, 153, on basis of POLIT scores.

CORE

BLOC II

TAIL

CORE

BLOC I

TAIL

INDEPENDENT

CORE

BLOC III

INDEPENDENT

Table 8-9 compares the results of the RICE and the PØLIT-RICE analyses of session 153. It should be noted that the original RICE analysis excluded four divisions on the basis outlined above, while the PØLIT-RICE analysis excluded nineteen as not significant. Of these latter divisions, one was in common with the four excluded by RICE.

Table 8-9: Comparison of results of RICE and PØLIT-RICE analysis of Session 153, 1898-99.

	RICE	PØLIT-RICE
Members analysed	49	49
Divisions - total	61	61
Divisions excluded	4	19
Number of Blocs	3	3
Numbers Bloc I	14	14
of members Bloc II	20	20
in Bloc III	12	12
Independents	3	3
Number of Bloc I	9(?)*	10
members in Bloc II	9(?)	8
core of Bloc III	4(?)	11(?)

Extent of agreement on placement of members on the basis of known membership of 'parties'

Ministry	Core Bloc II - 5	Core Bloc II - 5
United Labor Party	Core Bloc I - 9 Tail Bloc I - 1 Tail Bloc II - 1	Core Bloc I - 10 Tail Bloc II - 1
National Defence League	Core Bloc III -4(?) Tail Bloc III - 5 Fringe Bloc III - 2	Core Bloc III - 11(?)

*(?) indicates that there is an element of doubt about the inclusion of the member or members in such blocs.

The PØLIT-RICE method and the original RICE analysis do show similar overall results with the former providing a greater clarity of the inter- and intra-group relationships. The opposition between the members in the

cores of blocs I and II and those in bloc III is more apparent, while the level of agreement between the ULP members and their supporters in bloc I and the 'ministerialists' in bloc II is shown to be less strong than in the original RICE analysis.   This latter evidence is a more accurate description of the legislative activities of these two groups, as later chapters will show.   Bloc III, consisting in the main of the members of the NDL is distinguished more in the PØLIT-RICE analysis, both in terms of internal cohesion and their external relations with the other members and blocs.   The 'position' of the three independents is also clarified. Glynn (22) and Grainger (24), as mentioned above, were allied more with the NDL than with the ULP or the ministry on the basis of documentary evidence, and this is shown more clearly in the PØLIT-RICE matrix.   To some extent, this greater clarification would be expected, for the cluster analysis in PØLIT-RICE was carried out on the basis of the significant divisions - that is, those which showed the most polarity of the members and groups.   Hence, any patterns of support and opposition over the sessional data as a whole would be accented when only such significant data is used.

*   *   *   *

These techniques, and the modifications outlined above, formed one basis for the analysis of 'functional' representation in colonial South Australia.   Each has shortcomings in both technique and output, [33] and further refinements and developments are necessary.   However, such methods of analysis do provide a means to identify patterns of legislative behaviour and provide guidelines for further research.   It should be emphasised that such numerical analyses <u>are</u> a starting point, not an

explanation.   The results of the PØLIT, RICE and MULTBET analyses and
their modifications were used in the analysis of legislative behaviour in
South Australia, but on to these was built the data from other sources -
newspapers, diaries, journals and parliamentary debates.   The analyses
were invaluable in that they refined and extended such external evidence,
but they were not sufficient as an explanation in themselves.

Before turning to the results of this research into legislative
behaviour, it is necessary to stress one of the unique features of the
PØLIT technique, and we turn briefly to the patterns of structure in the
South Australian Parliaments in the colonial period.

The Structures of the Parliaments

One of the more important aims of the following analysis of 'functional'
representation was to attempt to establish when the acceptance and practice
of 'independence' began to break down, and when political parties emerged.
There are two parallel issues involved in this question.   As previous
chapters have shown, the stress on the independence of legislators was
almost totally accepted in theory, although in practice the legislatures
were dominated by factional alliances.   Part of the analysis which follows
is therefore concerned to establish when and why the adherence to the
concepts imported from Burke began to break down in theory - when and why
candidates and members began to consider themselves members of a political
party first, and relate this to their adherence to the tenet of
'independence' second.   Another concern was to establish when this was
carried into practice - when the patterns of legislative behaviour took on
a party rather than a faction emphasis.   The answer to the first question
will be discussed below, and it involves research into documentary material.

The answer to the second began with the results of the PØLIT analysis, and especially with the indices of structure established by it.

The formation of political parties, and the emergence of a political party system would be evidenced by changes in electoral and legislative patterns and a later chapter will discuss these changes more fully.   In legislative terms, such a change from a faction to a party situation would be shown by a change in the structure in the patterns of voting, that is, in the increased polarity of members and groups of members.   This will be developed further below, but at this point it is valuable to summarise the changes in structure which were evident in the legislatures, partly to explain the division of the following analysis into chronological periods, and partly to set the stage for the analysis of functional representation as a whole.

As shown above, the Legislative Council played an important role in the history of political representation in South Australia.   Yet, in only one parliament prior to the emergence of the Labor Party was there evidence of significant structure in the patterns of voting in that house.   The decade after 1891 showed a markedly different result, and this period will be analysed further in later chapters.

Table 8-10: Significant Patterns and Indices of Structure, Legislative
Council, 1857-1901.

Session.	Date	Number of significant patterns	Index of Structure
011-032	1857-65	nil	nil
041-044	1865-68	1	0.27
051-131	1868-90	nil	nil
132	1891	1	0.32
133	1892	1	0.40
141	1893	2	0.44
142	1894	1	0.47
143	1895	1	0.35
151	1896	1	0.45
152	1897	1	0.19
153	1898-99	1	0.20
161	1899	1	0.47
162	1900	1	0.43
163	1901	1	0.46

AMOUNT OF STRUCTURE IN VOTING PATTERNS
SOUTH AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
1857–1901

MEAN STRUCTURE,
1891–1901

DEGREE OF STRUCTURE

50%
40%
30%
20%
10%

P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16

SESSIONS IN SEQUENCE

Diagram 8—12

As mentioned above, the small number of divisions in the Legislative
Council in the early sessions necessitated the use of parliamentary rather
than sessional data, and even with this broader base, the data for the
fourth parliament, 1865-68 consisted of only thirty four divisions from the
four sessions.   Twenty two of these divisions were identified as signi-
ficant, and on the basis of these, an explanation for the markedly divergent
behaviour was sought.

Two political questions were important in this parliament;   the
Boothby issue, including his removal, which brought heated debates in both
houses and an evident polarity of members;   and an instability of
ministries.   Between the 1865 and 1868 elections, there were five
ministries, those of Dutton, Ayers, Hart, Boucaut and Ayers, a period of
instability which was not equalled by any other parliament.   This was a
time of relatively constant faction manoeuvering, compounded by the fact
that two of these ministries were led from the upper house.   Later
chapters will analyse this period, and the evident and unusual polarity in
the Council.

All remaining sessions of the Legislative Council to 1891 were
characterised by a lack of significant structure, and hence a lack of
internal legislative polarity.   This changed markedly with the election
of ULP members to the Council in 1891, following which PØLIT identified an
evident polarity in the membership.   Whether the advent of the ULP into
the Council was the cause of such a change is analysed below.

There was no such 'general agreement' among the members of the House
of Assembly in the decades before the 'nineties.   However, as table
8-11 and diagram 8-13 show, there was a similar change in the structure of

574

the voting patterns following the election of ULP members in 1893.

Table 8-11: Significant patterns and indices of structure, House of
Assembly, 1857-1901.

Session	Date	Number of Significant Patterns	Index of Structure	Session	Date	Number of Significant Patterns	Index of Structure
011	1857-58	1	0.09	092	1879	2	0.23
012	1858	1	0.25	093	1880	2	0.17
013	1859	1	0.10	101	1881	1	0.17
021	1860	2	0.16	102	1881	1	0.13
022	1861	1	0.11	103	1883-4	2	0.23
023	1862	1	0.17	111	1884	4	0.34
031	1863	1	0.12	112	1885	3	0.23
032	1864	2	0.21	113	1886	2	0.21
041	1865	2	0.21	121	1887	3	0.22
042	1865-66	1	0.22	123	1888	1	0.08
043	1866-67	1	0.28	124	1889	2	0.18
044	1867	1	0.10	131	1890	1	0.09
051	1868-69	1.	0.10	132	1891	2	0.16
052	1869-70	1	0.21	133	1892	3	0.17
061	1870-71	1	0.15	141	1893	2	0.29
062	1871	1	0.13	142	1894	2	0.39
071	1872	0	-	143	1895	2	0.33
072	1873	1	0.13	151	1896	2	0.38
073	1874	1	0.18	152	1897	2	0.33
081	1875	1	0.13	153	1898-9	2	0.40
083	1876	1	0.16	161	1899	2	0.38
084	1877	1	0.22	162	1900	2	0.33
091	1878	1	0.10	163	1901	2	0.32

DEGREE OF STRUCTURE

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

P 04
S 3

P 11
S 1

MEAN STRUCTURE
1893-1901

P 15
S 3

MEAN STRUCTURE
1857-1892

P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14 P15 P16

SESSIONS IN SEQUENCE

Two periods in the pre-Labor decades showed a relatively high degree of structure, 1864-67 and 1884-87. The sessions in which the index of structure reached an apex, 1866-67 and 1884, provided two of the example analyses discussed above, and both periods occurred concurrent with the debates and divisions on important issues. The first period, 1864-67 was characterised by disagreements over issues of land sales and land assessment in the colony, issues which, to the Register, had brought a change to the patterns of politics in South Australia.

> The elections... which are to take place tomorrow, will
> be the first under the existing constitution in which a
> deliberate attempt has been made by a small political
> clique to force party candidates upon the people, they
> have been brought forward solely because they have been
> ready to pledge themselves to anything and everything
> on the squatting question. 34

The second period was apparently characterised by a division in the colony and in the parliament over the issue of the tariff, with an effective freetrade opposition to a committed protectionist government. However, as later chapters will show, these impressions left by contemporaries are not an accurate representation of the political divisions in the colony. Both issues were resolved without the formation of political parties.

A further divergent pattern of voting was evident in the 1872 session. The PØLIT analysis identified no significant patterns in this session. However, on the basis of the modified PØLIT analysis - when members were excluded on the basis of absenteeism, one significant pattern was identified, and an index of structure of 0.12 was obtained. This session saw three ministerial changes; the defeat of the Blyth ministry (No. 23) on the opening day, the defeat of the Ayers ministry after forty two days, and his reconstruction noted in an earlier chapter. It was also notable for the

highest number of divisions in any session of the colonial period. Yet, despite the fact that the house divided on 108 occasions, only nineteen of these were identified as significant, and the degree of polarity in the parliament was relatively low. As well, of the total membership of thirty seven, fifteen were excluded in the modified analysis on the grounds of absenteeism. The remaining twenty two members in the modified analysis showed no evidence of a party division within their ranks, and in fact the degree of structure was the lowest in the colonial period, in both the original and the modified analyses. There was no definite pattern of issues in the significant divisions - almost one half of the divisions identified as significant were concerned with procedural matters in the House of Assembly, with such diverse subjects as the arrangement of seats in the house, points of order, and adjournments. The overall conclusion was that of a legislature showing considerable instability of faction membership and of ministries, with little evidence of cohesive factions let alone parties, and the main lines of conflict decided on the basis of support for the ministry of the day.

One of the most evident changes in both the Council and the Assembly was that of the patterns of structure before and after the election of Labor Party members to the legislature, and this tends to support the conclusions of some historians that the factional system of government in the Australian colonial situation did not break down until the advent of Labor. Others, however, have disagreed. In chapter IX, we will seek to resolve such differences, and examine the South Australian context in terms of the growth of political parties. Before this, however, we turn to the faction system itself, and especially to the extent to which the essentially Burkean concept

of independence was accepted and put into practice in South Australia, and to the ways in which faction government was carried out in the pre-Labor years. The methods of legislative analysis outlined above provide one means of describing such matters, and the conclusions reached in later chapters will depend partly on such techniques.

Footnotes, Chapter 8

1. Often referred to as 'roll-call' analysis, especially in American texts.

2. L. F. Anderson, M. W. Watts, A. R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll Call Analysis, (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966), pp.7-10.

3. S. A. Rice, 'The Behaviour of Legislative Groups', Political Science Quarterly, (Vol. 40, 1925), pp. 60-72.

4. See, for example:
    D. B. Truman, The Congressional Party, (John Wiley, New York, 1959).
    B. M. Russett, 'Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations', American Political Science Review, (Vol. 60. No. 2, 1966),pp.327-339.
    S. S. Ulmer, 'The Analysis of Behaviour Patterns of the United States Supreme Court', Journal of Politics,(Vol. 22, No. 4, 1960),pp. 629-653.
    R. N. Douglas, 'Judges and Policy on the Latham Court', Politics, (Vol. 4, No. 1, 1969), pp. 20-41.
    See also, bibliography in
    D. MacRae, Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting, (Harper and Row, New York, 1970).

5. D. B. Truman, op. cit.

6. D. MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Voting, (University of California Press, 1958).
    W. O. Aydelotte, 'Voting Patterns in the British House of Commons in the 1840's', Comparative Studies in Society and History, (Vol. 5, No. 2, January 1963), pp. 134-163.

7. See, for example,
    J. G. Grumm, 'A Factor analysis of Legislative Behaviour', Midwest Journal of Political Service, (Vol. 7, No. 4, 1936), pp. 336-356.

8. See, for example, articles in Midwest Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, American Behavioural Scientist.
    See also:
    W. Crane, 'A Caveat on Roll-Call Studies of Party Voting', Midwest Journal of Political Science,(Vol. 4, No. 3, 1960), pp. 237-249.

9. P. Loveday, A. W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, (Melbourne University Press, 1966).

10. See, for example, P. Loveday, 'Grouping M.P.s: The Use of Cluster Analyses', Politics, (Vol. 5, No. 2, 1970), pp. 180-194.

11. D. R. Beer, South Australian Politics in the 1880's, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1960), p. 64.

12. A. M. Priestly, The 11th Parliament of South Australia, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1964), p. 80.

13. P. Cook, Faction in South Australian Politics, 1857-1861, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1966).
See especially his tables of calculations in the Appendix to his study, pp. 190-194, and his tables of divisional comparisons.

14. S. R. Rice, op. cit., p. 72

15. Some research has been carried out on the basis of selecting the most significant of the divisional data.
See W. H. Riker, 'A Method for Determining the Significance of Roll Calls on Voting Bodies' in J. C. Wahlke, H. Eulau, Legislative Behaviour, (Free Press, New York, 1959).
Some techniques have an 'inbuilt' selection device; see below.

16. Divisions at the Committee stages of Bills were omitted from the analysis. Absenteeism was high at these divisions, with the usual attendance between one third and one half of the total membership. This is not to say that such divisions have no value, for they can be used to establish further patterns in behaviour, especially on specific issues. Limitation of finance was also a reason for omission of Committee divisions from the analysis, as the use of computing facilities proved costly.
Three 'special' Sessions were omitted on the basis of limited divisional data, viz:

			Sitting Days		Number of Divisions	
Parliament	Session	Date	Assembly	Council	Assembly	Council
8	2	1875	10	8	2	1
9	4	1881	3	3	1	-
12	2	1887	5	5	1	3

17. I am indebted to Mr. Lindsay Veitch, Principal Research Officer, CSIRO Division of Mathematical Statistics, Glen Osmond, South Australia, for his time, efforts, program and invaluable assistance at many stages in this research.

18. See articles by G. N. Lance, W. T. Williams, especially 'Mixed Data Classificatory Programs', Australian Computing Journal, (Vol. I, 1967), No. 1, pp. 15-20, No. 2, pp. 82-5, No. 3, pp. 178-81, and 'Computer Programs for hierarchical polythetic classification', The Computer Journal, (Vol. 9, 1966), pp. 60-64 . I am indebted to Mr. B. McDowall, Officer in Charge, CSIRO Division of Computing Science, Adelaide, for his assistance in the conversion of the original MULTBET programs.

19. D. MacRae, op. cit., Chs. 4, 5.
see also H. H. Harman, Modern Factor Analysis, (Chicago University Press, 1967) and R. C. Tryon, D. E. Bailey, Cluster Analysis, (McGraw Hill, New York, 1970).

20. D. N. Lawley, 'Tests of Significance for the Latent Roots of Covariance and Correlation Matrices', *Biometrika*, (Vol. 63, 1956, p. 128).

21. L. Veitch, J. Court, W. Cramond, 'Studies of the Correlation structure of the N.S.Q.', (1973, Unpublished).

22. R. B. Cattel, 'The Scree test for a Number of Factors', *Multivariate Behavioural Research*, (Vol. 1, 1966, p. 245); L. Veitch, J. Court, W. Cramond, *op. cit.*

23. P. Loveday, 'The Federal Convention, an analysis of the voting', *The Australian Journal of Politics and History*, (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1972), pp. 169-188.

24. For example, the PØLIT analysis of actual and random data in two Parliamentary sessions provided four and two significant patterns respectively

Matched amounts of variance (eigenvalues)

Parliament 11	Session 1	Parliament 15	Session 3
Actual	Random	Actual	Random
10.97*	3.99	20.23*	4.00
8.00*	3.85	9.00*	3.78
6.34*	3.29	3.05	3.43
4.10*	3.10	2.37	3.31
2.88	2.93	2.06	3.04
2.39	2.86	1.98	2.92

* Significant patterns.

25. The program was written originally in 32-FORTRAN for use on CDC 3200 computers. It has since been modified for use on the CDC 6400 at Adelaide University.
The subroutines BLKIØ 32, SSQ, EVAL and EVECT were supplied by the C.S.I.R.O. Division of Computing Research, while the subroutine LPPLØT was written by R. C. Lamacraft, Biometrics Section, Waite Agricultural Research Institute, Glen Osmond, South Australia.

26. See Chapter IX.

27. See Chapter X for a discussion of the use of the term 'party', and Chapters X to XII for analyses of the development of parties in South Australia.

28. See Chapter XII.

29. The split-up of variance between the respective patterns is shown
by the following examples:

Session	Date	Total Structure	Proportions of Variance in Significant patterns			
			1	2	3	4
021	1860	0.16	0.084	0.076		
032	1864	0.21	0.12	0.09		
092	1879	0.23	0.17	0.06		
111	1884	0.35	0.14	0.08	0.07	0.06
141	1893	0.29	0.21	0.08		
153	1898-9	0.40	0.27	0.31		
162	1900	0.33	0.24	0.09		

30. I am indebted to Dr. Peter Loveday for his assistance on this point.

31. D. B. Truman, op. cit., p. 47.

32. D. MacRae, op. cit., pp. 52, 91ff.

33. For example, there is no attempt on the RICE method to judge the
likely reality of the clusters established. The PØLIT technique
included a new comparative analysis, based on a matched random
number set, as one means of getting some idea of the reality of
the patterns revealed. It is not claimed that this procedure is the
best such method, or even that it is completely valid in establishing
the number of factors, but it has been shown to be of value. The
complementary use of the three techniques proved to be of
assistance in overcoming such problems.

34. Register, February 28, 1865.

Chapter IX

'Functional' Representation: Independents and Factions

All that is required is that the spirit of faction should be laid aside.

Register, 1857 (April 2)

Electors should delegate not opinions, but power.

Thursday Review, 1860 (March 8).

'I do not believe in being a mere delegate', a candidate remarked at an election meeting, and some of his hearers wondered at his courage.

Register, 1899 (April 14)

Burke's concept of political representation was national rather than sectional.

> Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different
> and hostile interests;   which interests each must main-
> tain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and
> advocates;   but parliament is a deliberative assembly
> of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where,
> not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but
> the general good, resulting from the general reason of
> the whole. [1]

The 'general good' of the nation as a whole was the keystone, but Burke stressed that this 'general good' was not that of a general will, but of a general reason.   His co-representative in Bristol, Henry Cruger, had told the electors that his will ought to be subservient to theirs, and Burke agreed that 'If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior'.   But 'government and legislation are matters of reason and judgement and not of inclination'. [2]   Burke did not claim absolute liberty and independence of action for the representa-tive, but his liberty as a representative was to be limited only by a vague 'political sense' of the people as a whole.   If this ordered society indicated a widespread and deeply felt 'sense of the people' then the representative should carry this into legislation.   But, this public 'political sense' had to be very strong and widely expressed before it carried such a legislative obligation. [3]

From these premises followed three core aspects of the functions of a representative.   Firstly, he should retain close contacts with those who elected him, and thus

> it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representative,
> to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence,
> the most unreserved communication with his constituents.
> Their wishes ought to have great weight with him;   their
> opinion high respect;   their business unremitted
> attention.   It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his
> pleasures, his satisfactions, to theirs;   and, above all,
> ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his
> own.

But it did not follow that he should automatically carry into legislation

the whims, wishes, desires or wills of his constituents.   A representa-

tive should 'rejoice to hear' the opinions of his constituents and seriousl

consider them:

> But authoritative instructions, mandates issued, which
> the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to
> vote and to argue for, ... arise from a fundamental
> mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.

The role of a representative was that of 'real public counsellors' and

not that of 'canvassers at a perpetual election'.[4]   Thus, as Burke told

the electors of Bristol,

> his unbiassed opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened
> conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you;   to any man,
> or to any set of men living.   These he does not derive
> from your pleasure;   no, nor from the law and the constitu-
> tion.   They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse
> of which he is deeply answerable.   Your representative
> owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement;   and
> he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to
> your opinion.

The nature of these representatives was the third aspect of the theory.

To attain this 'reasoned judgement' it was essential that the representativ

be fit for his task, and as a test of this fitness, Burke proposed that

constituents 'look to the whole tenour of your member's conduct' and if

he was free of ambition, avarice or sloth, then mark him 'for sterling'.[5]

As discussed above, Burke conceived of a nation composed of broad, fixed interests which were clearly identifiable and essentially economic, and he based his theory of 'procedural' representation on these. Mercantile, agricultural and professional interests, for example, should be represented.   In 'functional' terms, Burke's insistence on 'independence' appears a contradiction, but there was no such conflict in his mind about a member of parliament representing the trading interest, either directly or through virtual representation, and at the same time represent ing the national interest.   A member elected to represent the mercantile interest was a representative _for_ that interest, and _for_ the nation as a whole, as well as a representative _of_ the mercantile interest.   In colonial South Australia, as shown above, the rural interests were well represented, and this was justified, among other grounds, by the belief that the economic interest of the colony was centred on these.

Burke's theory of 'functional' representation included four canons of representative government, canons which were embraced by South Australian legislators and commentators in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These concerned the role and functions of parliament, the relationship of member with member, between the member and his constituents, and the necessity for 'fit' and 'good' legislators.   The first was an emphasis on the Whig attitude to the deliberative and legislative role of parliamen the last three, combined, formed the Burkean theory of 'independence'.

'Independence' was necessary, but this did not rule out joint politic endeavour.   Burke was not inimical to Party government and Parties, so long as they did not constitute what he decried in his Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents,

knots or cabals of men who have got together avowedly
without any public principle, in order to sell their
conjunct iniquity at the higher rate, and are therefore
universally odious, ought never to be suffered to
domineer in the State'. [6]

But Burke was not only inveighing against such self-interested action.

Although, as H. C. Mansfield points out[7] the protagonist in the <u>Thoughts</u>

is not named, it is clear that Burke was attempting to counter Bolingbroke'

argument that 'faction is to party what the superlative is to positive:

party is a political evil, and faction is the worst of all parties'.[8]

Certainly, faction was tyranny, but not all parties were 'evil'. Burke's

theme was to 'propose the respectability of Party to counter the menace of

a party whose programme was hostility to partisanship'.[9] There is a

'movement in the "Thoughts" from statesmanship to party government',[10]

against Bolingbroke's advocacy of 'an anti-party party ... based on princip

which were essentially non-partisan'.[11] Burke criticized those who

described the nation as 'generally divided into parties with views and

passions utterly irreconcilable',[12] and the danger to the well-being of the

state was found in a

> faction ruling by the private inclinations of a court,
> against the general sense of the people; and that this
> faction, whilst it pursues a scheme for undermining all
> the foundations of our freedom ... weakens all the powers
> of executory government, rendering us abroad contemptible,
> and at home distracted ... Nothing but a firm combination
> of public men against this body, and that, too, supported
> by the hearty concurrence of the people at large, can
> possibly get the better of it'. [13]

The answer was not the 'party' of Bolingbroke, for this could, itself,

become as 'factional'. The answer was the encouragement of government

by Party, which he defined as

> a body of men united, for promoting by their joint
> endeavours the national interest, upon some particular
> principle on which they are all agreed. [14]

But how was this to be reconciled with his later views on the necessity for independent representatives? How could the representative be an independent, yet a member of a Party? The resolution depended on a specific definition of 'Party'. To Bolingbroke, a 'true party' was 'th means of applying true principles', and thus there was only one legitimate party.[15] To Burke, on the other hand, there could be a plurality of Parties, which may, or may not, agree on principles and their applications. Thus, because 'men thinking freely, will, in particular circumstances, think differently', it is possible for men to disagree on 'leading general principles in government', and, if the representative

> does not concur in these general principles upon which
> the party is founded, and which necessarily draw on a
> concurrence in their application, he ought from the
> beginning to have chosen some other, more conformable
> to his opinions'. [16]

The members of this Party, then, are so because they agree on principles, not because they see the Party as a means to fulfil personal ambition, nor because they are acting as agents for, or are pressured by, outside sources and they remain members of that Party so long as they continue to agree on the general principles. To Burke, there was no contradiction in the position of a representative acting as a 'trustee' and, at the same time, belonging to such a Party. It was only when the Party became a 'faction', and the independence of the individual was threatened or limited, or when the Party became a party in Bolingbroke's conception, the only source of 'right' principle, that party government became reprehensible.

Such a Party is taken as the precursor of the modern political system, and Burke is taken as the founder of party government. But there is a vast difference between Burke's Party, essentially a 'statesman' or 'independent' Party, and the modern political party. Burke explicitly rejected the idea of internal or external party discipline, beyond a general agreement on principles of government. He denied that either constituency pressure or party pressure, as distinct from Party agreement, had any rightful place in representative government. Thus, when attempting to establish when the concept of party first took root in South Australian political theory and when parties first emerged on the South Australian political scene, it is necessary to distinguish between the two senses of the term - the Burkean Party and the modern political party. The transition from a non-party system to one in which there was at least one political party, did not occur until 1891 and, as following chapters will show, by 1901 the Whigs were still fighting against the slow growth of a modern political party system. To 1891, 'functional' representation in South Australia was dominated by a theoretical commitment to Burkean 'independence' but was, in practice, channelled by a faction style of legislative behaviour. This chapter is concerned with both aspects of the colonial political scene, and the following chapter will analyse the forces which began to break down both the theory and the practice of the pre-'nineties decades.

We turn first to the extent to which Whig principles of 'functional' representation were accepted in South Australia, and to the extent to which they were applied.

'Independence' in South Australia

Although the great majority of South Australian legislators placed great stress on the 'common good', the greatest exponents were found in the Legislative Council.   To one member,

> if he understood it, the Legislative Council was repre-
> sentative of the public good ... they had to deliberate
> on what was best for the country as a whole, [17]

another was 'proud to be elected by the whole colony and not by a particular district of it',[18] and a third agreed:

> the colony was thoroughly represented in the House of
> Assembly, and their wants could be attended to there;
> the members of the Council should have to judge of the
> whole Colony.   [19]

Such views were best summarized by a correspondent, Another Equally Interest in Town and Country who, in 1857, wrote,

> mark well ... how necessary it is that good, patriotic,
> unselfish and tried men should be elected ... The Assembly
> is the place for the representation of class interests,
> local prejudice and of party cliques;   but let not these
> partial considerations have a place in that House where
> the broad and general interests of the Community should
> alone be conserved.   [20]

Although, as we have seen above, the majority of Council members considered their role to be primarily that of protectors of the special interests and special rights of property this was, to them, no denial of the principle of legislating for the good of all, for it was only by the preservation and conservation of such rights that the good of all could be ensured.   And despite the low opinion of Another Equally Interested ..., there was no dearth of commitment to the 'common good' among the candidates for the House of Assembly.   One sought election so he could work 'in the interests of the whole colony',[21] another 'knew of no ambition but that which arises from

honesty and purpose and sincerity of desire to serve the best interests of
the Colony',[22] while another put his views more poetically:

> personnally, I care not whether you elect me or not; but
> for your sakes I am willing to face your enemies, masked
> or unmasked, to fight your battles and to plead the cause
> of your Queen, your adopted Country and that of your
> prosperity. [23]

There was one important difference between two groups of legislators,
especially up to the 1881 Reform Act.   The members of the Council could
claim that their election _by_ the colony as a whole enabled them to legislate
for the colony as a whole, divorced as far as possible from constituency or
sectional pressures.   The Assembly members, on the other hand, elected
from smaller areas and smaller populations based essentially on a community
of interest, often found themselves under considerable electoral pressure.
In defence, they fell back on an essentially Burkean ideal of 'independence'

Candidates for election placed great stress on their independence. To
George Morphett in 1860

> a representative ought undoubtedly to be one who agreed
> in general opinion with the bulk of his constituents. It
> was impossible that he should agree with every particular
> elector upon every particular point and for that reason it
> seemed absurd to send him into Parliament fettered by
> positive pledges. [24]

But it was left to William Dale to echo Burke: 'He would do his duty
faithfully to the best of his ability, and uninfluenced by any man or
party of men'. [25]   J. P. Boucaut, a future Premier, told his constituents
they h
'he would never betray them, but would do all in his power to honour the trus

placed in him ... [but] he did not go into Parliament to represent any particular branch',[26] and J. C. F. Johnson 'would do what he thought best ... he did not think he should come to them and ask what he should do'.[27]

Candidates placed great stress on their 'independence' from sectional or 'party' control, at least until the emergence of the United Labor Party in the 'nineties, a disrupting development to which we will return in a later Chapter.[28] P. B. Coglin told his electors he would 'take his seat as a representative of the electors of Adelaide, and not as the delegate of any party';[29] J. Hallett told his constituents 'my political sentiments are well known to you as an independent member, free from party or faction;[3] Philip Santo invoked 'the right of an Englishman - freedom of thought and action' and he hoped 'he should be able to form an independent opinion on every measure';[31] and B. A. Moulden was emphatic that he was 'absolutely independent and ran in the interests of no party, sect or creed'.[32] The result was that in public statements at least, most candidates asserted an 'independence' from electoral pressures. They were representatives of interests, but these interests were of the constituency or the colony as a whole. They would bow to no pressures, accede to no influence but, in almost an exact repetition of Burke, would 'represent' the people as a whole.

This creed of 'independence' was carried on from the constituency relationships to legislative behaviour but, as the <u>Advertiser</u> asked in 1860

> 'Independent members' we all want, but what is meant
> by independent? Not members 'independent' of the
> electors; not 'independent' of the source of their
> legislative authority; not 'independent' of their
> constitutional relations and obligations. No, by
> members 'independent' of government patronage, of
> party blandishments, of all those various and corrupt
> and sinister influences. [33]

Thus,

> the M.P. is not a mere delegate or a voting machine
> ... [but] in some sense an attorney ... empowered to
> act in unforeseen as well as foreseen circumstances. [34]

But the members themselves had different ideas and expressed differing

views on the meaning of the term in regard to legislative behaviour.   On

occasions, comments indicated that 'independence' was reserved to those

who were not part of the present Ministry, and to Townsend in 1862,

'what an independent member said was one thing, but what was said by a

member holding a position on the Treasury benches was another',[35]   and

Arthur Blyth, Commissioner of Public Works in 1860, referred to his past

'as an independent member'.[36]   But it was also clear that the freedom fro

pledges which was an essential part of 'constituency independence', was

equally a tenet of legislative behaviour.   In 1859 Thomas Reynolds was

emphatic that while 'he was a warm friend of the working classes' he would

not accede to the demands of a working-men's delegation, as 'he should

ever act as an independent member, and had ever done so'.[37]   The conserva

tive _Thursday Review_ was Burke's greatest proponent, and its readers were

advised that

> the men we want are those of moderate leisure and
> education; of strong sense and sound judgement ...
> throw away all pledges, give them your confidence,
> and let them follow their own conscientious convictions. [38]

On hearing of one member who attended a meeting of electors 'to see which

way the wind blows' and who was 'bound to respect such expressions of

opinion', the _Thursday Review_ expressed disgust.

> The idea of any man deliberately allowing himself to be
> made the instrument for carrying into effect, principles
> which he considers erroneous, is in itself so utterly
> un-English. [39]

As a correspondent to the Thursday Review put it, 'I want the upper house to guide me, and not be guided by me'.[40]

But on what grounds were the constituencies to select these representatives? The contemporary theory was, as the Register put it, that

> men who enter parliament will not properly discharge
> their functions unless they devote themselves to
> honestly and fearlessly representing the interests of
> all and not merely the interests of a class, however
> strong it may be in numbers and influence. [41]

But how were candidates to be judged, and what constituted a 'fit and proper' man?

It was a natural progression from the acceptance of Burkean theories of political representation that the 'advice' given to electors placed national, above local interests, and broad questions above sectional issue To the Register,

> it is the fitness [of each member] to deal with the
> public questions generally which should be accepted as
> the criterion of suitability rather than the supposed
> soundness of views upon one particular subject. [42]

'Can anything be more absurd', it asked, 'than to send men to Parliament ... simply because they are thought to be sound on the subject of local option, or on the question of bible-reading in State schools?' To the Register,

> What electors have in reality to determine is who
> amongst the candidates are the men best fitted by
> their experience, training and character to assist
> in framing the legislation best calculated to benefit
> the whole community and to ensure progress on sound
> national lines. [43]

And the _Advertiser_ added:

> The men who represent us in Parliament should have
> sufficient intelligence and experience to enable them
> to comprehend the questions submitted to them for
> consideration ... they should be men capable of exerting
> on their co-representatives with healthy influence,
> with integrity, with intelligence and consistency. [44]

It was therefore the members 'fitness to deal with the public questions

generally which should be accepted as the criterion of his suitability'. [45]

> It is of secondary importance to consult statistical
> returns of attendance and votes.   The duty of electors
> is to ask - how did their representatives vote on the
> leading questions of the day;   what leading questions
> (if any) did they shirk;   what efforts did they exert -
> by speech or by working on committees, to give effect
> to their views, and what has been their general influence
> on the legislation of the colony?   These are the
> points to be considered.   Electors might send any noodles
> or dummies into parliament, if all they had to do was
> to show themselves once a day to the Clerk, and run up
> from the refreshment room or elsewhere on the ringing
> of the bell. [46]

A 'good' representative implied more than its use in a 'narrow or conven-

tional sense'.   Certainly, seek men of 'unimpeachable character' who

'would not prostitute their position ... [nor] sacrifice the interests of

the country to their own greed and ambition'. [47]   But

> A man's goodness will not enable him to drive an engine
> if he has never had any instruction in that calling, neither
> will it, if it is his only qualification, enable him to
> legislate wisely.   Good legislation has often been
> hindered by selfish knaves, but it has sometimes been
> even more hindered by men of good intentions but feeble
> intellects. [48]

The _Register_, therefore, proposed a stringent qualification that, in the

future, 'nobody shall take part in the work of legislation until he shall

have passed an examination in some academy of political economy'. [49]   Abov

all, representatives should act so at no time could they be considered as

'mere acoustic tubes through which ... commands [of constituents] should be blown to the legislative chamber'.[50]

Why was there such emphasis on 'independence'?   One explanation is in terms of a conservative reaction, a reaction to the liberality of the 1857 Constitution.   To men like Baker who had opposed male suffrage and called for the 'moderating effect' of nominee members at the time of constitution making, who had a habit of 'sneering at members who kept pledges to the great unwashed',[51] 'independence', especially in the Legislative Council, was the only remaining means of ensuring security from pressures from the 'mass'.   While 'democracy' had been attained by triennial elections and a wide suffrage, 'independence' was a defence against the aspects of democracy which the conservatives feared.   But radicals as well as conservatives in South Australia accepted this tenet of legislative behaviour. It was an acceptance of a Whig, and especially a Burkean theory of 'functional' representation, and the colony was fertile ground for its application.   There were no 'great divisions' in the South Australian society by the mid-'fifties.   The fundamental issues of the constitution and of religion had apparently been settled.   And, as we have seen, the legislatures themselves consisted of a relatively homogeneous 'middle-class' group and it was not until the 'nineties, for reasons which will be discussed below, that there were members of Parliament who were members of as well as representatives for, the 'working-classes'.   There were few divisive class or economic issues, and contemporaries generally described legislation in terms of administration rather than 'high policy'.

This is not to say that 'party' government was totally rejected.   In fact, as the following excerpt from the Register in 1857 indicates, the Burkean sense of Party was quite accepted.

No one who has studied political economy would for a
single moment wish to obliterate party distinctions.
Political parties are political checks, political
guarantees, political stimulants.   Unanimity is desirable
too;   but only such unanimity as results from the
fusion and blending of parties for the accomplishment
of a common object.   Political parties will not
prevent unanimity - will not destroy it.   Where unanimity
is really necessary, there a common consent will be found
to prevail and party distinctions will be wholly
forgotten.   But by far the greater number of questions
coming under the notice of the legislature will be
determined all the more satisfactorily when exposed
to the free breath of independent criticism - when
subjected to the ordeal of party test, and challenged.
Political parties need not be intolerant, bigoted or
rancorous;   but the business of the country will be
infinitely better conducted by means of parliamentary
parties than by any other means.   52

But both theories, the 'independence' of members and the value of Party,

broke down in practice.   From the first session in 1857, representative

government was carried on by a system of factions.   Most candidates and

members, at least to the 1890's, remained aloof from formal constituency

alignments but, as will be shown below, constituency pressures played an

important role in some issues of legislative activity.   Until the 1890's

members claimed to be independent representatives, they accepted a Burkean

theory of legislative behaviour.   But this theory, borrowed from

eighteenth-century England, and stressed in South Australia when it had

been superseded 'at home', was not put into practice.   The legislative

aspects of political representation for most of the half-century of coloni

government were resolved not by representatives who acted independently,

nor by Burkean Parties, but by groups.

The theory of political representation in colonial South Australia, at

least until the advent of the United Labor Party in 1891, combined two

apparently contradictory concepts.   On the one hand, the electoral distri

were drawn up on a firm basis of representation of interests, of communities based on a likeness of socio-economic strata. Interests remained supreme as the electoral system changed, and throughout, as in 1871, 'the object of representation is to secure the representation of interests'.[53] From this was derived the justification for the different electoral weightings to the 'great' interests, with relative parity between the populations of districts within each category. On the other hand, there was almost unanimous agreement with the view of Kingston, in 1871, that

> the less we deal with local matters the better. We should confine our legislation to the grand principles of governing. Local interests do not prevail in the Parliament of England, and the less it appears in this parliament, the better. [54]

It was possible for members to complain that too many of their colleagues were returned 'in consequence of their views on local matters, more for their general political views'.[55] But this apparent contradiction in theory, was, for the colonial legislators, easily solved in theory. There should be a representation of interests, but not government by interests. It was important that interests should not clash electorally. It was equally important that interests should be subjugated to the general good in the legislature. In theory, this was achieved by an independence of all members of parliament.

In practice, from the inception of representative and responsible government, the legislatures were dominated by factions. 'Independence' remained the theory for all but a few candidates and members for three decades after 1857, and for the majority even after the emergence of the first parties. But public statements of political intent were one thing; actual political behaviour was another. In practice, South Australia's

representatives were predominantly members of factions.

The Faction System in South Australia

Representative government had been in operation for only a short time in South Australia before the use of 'faction' and 'factious' as epithets had become common.   In 1857, Finniss described his government's defeat as 'an effect of faction'.[56]   In 1864 the Advertiser described the political manoeuverings in the House of Assembly as 'factionalism' and 'cliquism' which resulted in the colony 'being not ruled by constitutional principles ... but by the "club" or the weekly whist party'.[57]   Whenever a ministry found itself under attack, or found its policies or activities questioned, it was convenient to stigmatise the opposition as factious, as a group of members who were wilfully self-seeking and were subordinating the public good to their own private gain.   The term became a means of defence, and even of counter-attack by the ministry, a means whereby the opposition could be labelled as acting against the best interests of the colony.

But faction was seen in a Burkean as well as in a Madisonian sense. The use of the term as an approbation was overlain by a specific acceptance of the Burkean notion of Party.   As shown above, the representatives in the early colonial period committed themselves to the independent mode of legislative behaviour.   Contemporaries equally accepted the Burkean concept of Party.

Following the rapid ministerial changes in 1857, the Register wrote:

> Many persons are wholly ignorant of the real significance
> of political parties.   When we speak of government by
> party it is supposed that we mean government by faction;
> government by tyranny, bigotry and uncharitableness....
> But such persons wholly misinterpret party alignments.
> There may be the utmost strife and ill will, without
> party alignments.   58

As early as 1857, the <u>Register</u> was sure that 'party government is a political necessity, it must and will develop itself',[59] and by 1860, the <u>Observer</u> was convinced it had.   'The great majority of the people of South Australia are democratic conservatives' and they constitute the main influence, 'and the minority consists of ... the retrogressive faction ... and the discontented faction'.[60]   Within this 'grand party', it was possible for 'public men who have opposed each other ... [to] shake hands, form a coalition and work truly and unitedly for the common good'.[61]

But this praise of a 'party' soon became censure when its possibilities were abused.

> Gentlemen who denounce each other as wholly unfit ...
> unblushingly turn around and associate with those whom
> they declared to be unfit, and throw overboard those
> whom they praised and complimented.   The one thing is -
> to get into office;   with friends or with foes;   with men
> who are competent or with men who are incompetent;   but -
> to get into office somehow. [62]

The approach depended on the instability of the ministries.   At times of 'smooth running' the 'grand party' was a success;   at times of crisis, accusations of factious behaviour and cliquism dominated the scene.   It was generally accepted that the organisation of 'grand parties' was essential to good government, but the problem was that 'unscrupulous' men 'deserted parties simply in the hope of office', which resulted in a situation which was 'depressing' and 'emphatically a life in which it was wise to remember that your enemy might someday be your friend, while your friend would probably become your enemy'.[63]   The cause of this degeneration was consistently blamed on the faction system, with little, if any, attempt made to detail what was being attacked.

The term 'faction' is commonly used to describe any smaller group of a larger unit which works to advance particular persons or policies within the larger unit.   As such, the term is applicable to non-political and to political situations.   Leiserson described a faction as

> that of the personal following of a leader, who is seeking
> or possesses control over the formal and symbolic
> structure of political authority in the community.   The
> followers identify either with the personality of the leader
> or with the ... name or label with which someone is
> skilful or ingenious to provide them.   Closely connected
> with the symbolic relationship of leader and followers is
> the relation of friendship which ... admits the idea of
> ... non-primary group associates joining in a common
> fellowship to advance the ideal and material aims of the
> group leader against a real or personified enemy, a hostile
> rival competing for the symbols and instruments of power. [64]

In the South Australian context, these factions were essentially legislative in membership, nature and activity.   The 'political authority' which was being sought was that of the ministry, and the 'hostile rival' or rather, the rivals, were the present incumbents of the ministry.   The aim was to replace them, or, in individual cases, to become part of them.   As will be shown below, there was no evidence that these legislative factional groups were associated with an extra-parliamentary organisation which sought to obtain or use this administrative power, nor was there evidence of any associated electoral organisation promoting the faction in any cohesive and long term sense.   The factions lacked internal structure, and they lacked a coherent and formalised body of opinion, which could be called a policy in the sense of that of a modern political party.

Faction leaders and factional groups were most easily identifiable at times of ministerial crisis.   It was a relatively easy task to establish who supported the ministry of the day, and who was in opposition at such

times, by reference to the debates on 'confidence' motions or in the attacks on personalities and policies, as well as by reference to the actual divisions votes on such questions. It is more difficult to establish the factional manoeuvering which led to the formation of the ministries. The making of ministries followed no formal pattern. There was no formal process. There was, especially in the early years, no formal opposition party, clearly identified or identifiable, and there was no 'shadow cabinet'. In some cases, there was no evident opposition leader. There was, rather, a confident expectancy amongst most of the members, and certainly amongst those who had emerged as leaders of groups within the parliament, that changes in the existing ministry were imminent, and that they could, at almost any time, play a role in the formation of a new administration. There were certain conventions which were generally followed. It was the convention for the defeated leader of the ministry to advise the Governor to summon the mover of a confidence or censure motion to form the new government. It was the convention that if the existing ministry had not been defeated in such a formal manner, then the most prominent member of what had constituted the opposition to the ministry should be summoned, and, on such occasions it was not unusual for two or three such opposition leaders to attempt to form a ministry before one succeeded. As the analysis of instability showed, these conventions were not always followed and, on occasion, the opposition leaders were absorbed into the ministry which they had sought to depose. It was a convention that the new ministry leader would be given an opportunity to outline his policy to the House before facing opposition moves of censure, and Strangways, for one, was critical of a 'departure from tradition' when his reconstructed ministry was defeated on its first day in the house before

he had outlined a policy.   He understood that

> at a caucus meeting held the day before, twenty four
> or twenty five members had arranged to eject the
> ministry without any knowledge of what measures they
> proposed to submit.   A fixed determination was
> arrived at irrespective of the public questions the
> government intended submitting, and such course of action
> was entirely without precedent. 65

The grounds for this criticism rested on what was at least publicly accepted
as two principles of representative government, of Party government in the
Burkean sense.   Firstly, this caucusing was criticized on the ground
that it weakened the necessary independence of members.   It tended to
destroy the possibility of the individual members carrying out their functio
of independent members, acting as deliberators on policies and programmes.
As well, it was considered not to be in the best traditions of Party govern-
ment in the accepted Burkean sense, as it took away from the membership of
the parliament the right and the power to decide on the leadership and
the policies of the parliament.   As Tom Price put it in 1899,

> the system which is followed for making and unmaking
> ministries is quite undesirable.   Men go muttering
> from one to another in corridors or rooms, and small
> knots are gathered together concocting against the
> government instead of standing on the floor of the
> house - as they ought to do - boldly declaring their
> policy. 66

But this muttering was not only difficult to stop, it was essential to the
process of ministry formation.   Essential, that is, given the lack of
formal political parties, given the faction system of legislative behaviour.
Once a ministry had fallen, and, on occasions, to bring the downfall of a
ministry, informal and secret meetings, caucusing, the 'gathering of
small knots' was the only realistic way of dealing with the fluid state of

political opinion in the chamber, with the low degree of adhesion between
the members of a specific legislative group.   Given these loose alignments,
and the emphasis in the faction system on the friendship of follower for
leader, rather than the adherence of follower to policy, then, at such times
as ministerial crises, support for moves against the government, support
for defence of the government, or support for the formation of a new
ministry, could only be achieved through such methods.   The absorption of
an opposing member into the ministry team as a means of retaining or winning
back the majority support of the house, such as that carried out by Reynolds
to include R. I. Stow who had moved a censure motion against him in 1863,[67]
was feasible only if a survey of possible support of the followers of that
opposing leader showed that they would be likely to transfer their support
as well.

There is little evidence that policies and issues played an important
role in such moves, which the _Advertiser_ called the 'clever shuffling of the
political cards'.[68]   This is not to say that issues played no part in the
system of faction government for, as will be shown below, the faction
manoeuverings were played out within major issues.   But, as an example
from the 1860's shows, policies were not the factor which determined whether
or not a ministry would succeed in retaining a majority in the house.   Table
9:1 summarises the changes in ministry membership between 1863 and 1865.

Table 9:1   Ministry membership, 1863-65.

Ministry No.	10	11	12	13	14
Date	1863-4	1864	1864-5	1865	1865
Period (days)	372	13	230	182	33
Members	*Ayers	*Ayers	Ayers	Ayers	*Ayers
	Andrews			Andrews	Andrews
	Glyde				
	+Hart	+Hart	Hart		
	Santo	Santo			Santo
		Stow	Stow		
		Milne	Milne		
			*Blyth		+Blyth
				Reynolds	
				Strangways	Strangways
				*Dutton	

Note: * formed ministry,   + Leader of ministry in the Assembly.

This brief period of time epitomises many of the aspects of the faction system of politics.   There was a relatively rapid change in the ministries, but a low turnover of ministers.   The defeat of ministry 10 came following a censure motion moved by Stow, and seconded by Milne.   Both were incorporated in the succeeding administration.   Both men were under immediate attack in the house over both their inclusion in the ministry they had attacked, and Milne faced the censure of the house on the grounds that his interests in grazing leases precluded him from the office of minister for lands which he had taken.   Both he and Stow resigned, the ministry collapsed, only to reappear with its membership almost intact, but under a new leader.   Stow's defeat at the 1865 elections resulted in the resignation of the ministry.   Dutton's ministry resigned when he was

appointed Agent-general in London, and the succeeding inclusion of Blyth
was not sufficient to retain the support of the Assembly.   Throughout this
period, the issue which had dominated the parliament had been that of land,
land sales and the assessment of tax on stock.   But this issue was not
the cause of the ministry defeats.   In fact, it was as if the changes in
the administration bore little relation to the dominant issue, a situation
epitomised by further changes in 1868.   In September, the fourth Ayers'
ministry was defeated on its proposals concerning land, following a censure
motion by Hart.   Hart's ministry was defeated on October 17 when his
proposals for land reform and taxation were rejected, and Ayers returned
with precisely the same personnel, but with a policy on land which, in the
space of nineteen days had become directly opposed to that he had submitted
earlier.   Needless to say this was soundly defeated.

Before turning to an analysis of the factional changes which lay at
the base of this ministerial instability, it is worthwhile setting out in
detail the experiences of one member who was involved in such a process.
Samuel Davenport's private diary of 1861 provides one of the best accounts
available of the task facing a prospective premier.[69]   The Reynolds
ministry, defeated on May 10, could not be immediately reconstructed, and
Davenport was summoned.

Thursday, 16th May, 1861

About 11 a.m. Gov. sent to me to form a ministry. He
stated that the late Attorney General had so fixed
himself with the H of A as to render his longer tenure
of office, at present, impossible: and that regarding
the ground of his quitting office as technical
and attacking him alone;   and not on the series of
policy of the general cabinet, he had summoned the late
Treasurer with a view of his reconstructing a ministry
leaving out Strangways.   At this trial, Mr. Reynolds
had failed: the other members considering that as they
had concurred in the course the late Attorney General

had pursued, tho not party to the <u>manner</u> of his proceeding; they were equally responsible with himself and should in honour share the consequences.

<u>Question</u> - under circumstances, which course to pursue -

<u>Object</u> - to conduct the business of the country to its satisfaction and good, an essential of which is the current co-operation of the Legislature.

<u>On the wants</u> of the country at the present moment, scarcely as party exists; neither can there said to be great differences of opinion on the way to provide for these wants:

<u>Course</u> - Get a party - agree on principle and measures - call a meeting of presumed supporters, and, submitting to them the programme of men and measures, test the degree of support to be calculated on, and act accordingly. The late ministry does not go out on the grounds of policy - tho in the method to be pursued in the declaration of Hundreds they were defeated. Therefore, the formation of a new ministry does not involve the gathering of the pillars of a party but rather the linking together the elements of former parties in the persons of such members as appear most acceptable to the House and the country in relation to questions now pending - forming, in fact, a Coalition Government.

In the Legislative branch of public business, there is already a policy before Parliament, to which the Parliament including the members of the new Govt., have given a <u>general</u> adhesion: an adhesion at least which may, I think, be regarded as equivalent to their consent to consider the adaptibility of the measures to meet the exigencies of the times. These measures are <u>admitted</u> for discussion. These measures are in two stages - some as the <u>Declaration of Hundreds Bill</u> and <u>Education Bill</u> are in <u>the hands of Parliament and</u> being proceeded with, and these, involving questions for which the Legislature and the country asks a solution, it is not proposed to check their progress, but rather to adopt them, tho under moderation of terms.

Other measures were promised the Parliaments but not yet laid before them - such as a Lands bill - a bill to define and adjust the boundaries of runs....

Had interview with Hanson, then with Reynolds. Reynolds makes no advance till he has met his supporters. Take no further steps today.

<u>17th.</u> Reynolds declines coalition - desiring apparently to see present attempt fail, when his party would come in again. See Hanson -
A. Blyth and Milne cannot agree as to a Treasurer. Reynolds' side of House too strong for anyone we could nominate.

18th.   Thought by taking Stow and Santo to weaken
Reynolds' party. No good.   Surrender the duty.
No appearance existing of constituting a permanent
ministry and better Reynolds' party should go in
and be beaten on their measures.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

Reynolds, in fact, succeeded in reconstructing his ministry but, as will be

shown below, his support was tenuous, and he survived only 141 days.

While the Burkean concept of the independent representative was accepte

in South Australia as a theoretical tenet of legislative behaviour, it

was never really carried into practice.   While members and candidates

protested their independence from constituency pressures and from 'undue

influence' by their fellow members, few remained independent of factional

groupings in the parliament.   Almost from the beginning of responsible

government on April 22, 1857, legislative behaviour was essentially group

behaviour, and by the early 'sixties, relatively stable and cohesive

factional grouping had emerged.   Of the forty two ministries which held

office in the colonial period, only two could be characterized as non-

faction.   The remainder owed their formation, and their support for

greater or lesser amounts of time, and their defeat, to a faction style

of legislative activity.

The constitutuional and political position of the first (Finniss)

ministry has been outlined above.   It was an 'imposed' administration, and

did not depend for its formation on factional pressures.   However, as

pointed out above, Finniss claimed its defeat was due to faction, and we

will return to this below.   The second non-faction ministry was that of

Waterhouse in 1861.   Formed with the one specific purpose of resolving

the Boothby issue, its membership was decided not by the balance of the

various groups in the Assembly, but by which members would support the proposals which Waterhouse put forward to resolve the matter. Once the resolution to call for the removal of Boothby had been passed, the ministry resigned, and faction government resumed.

The resignation of the Finniss ministry brought in its train a brief but tubulent period of instability as, for the first time, the various factional groups were given the opportunity to make a new administration. The Baker ministry which emerged was in doubt from the beginning. It was the first ministry formed from within the legislature at a time when the group allegiances could be expected to be most fluid. It was also formed by a member of the Legislative Council, and a well-known conservative who had played a leading role in the Council's objections to the privilege question, and it was to be expected that his government was not to be warmly received in the Assembly. The Baker ministry faced the Assembly for only two days, and was soundly defeated on the second. The third ministry, tha of Torrens, was only marginally more successful, retaining the confidence of the Assembly for only nine sitting days. As Peter Cook's analysis points out,[70] both these ministries were based on attempts to resolve the differing patterns of factional support in the legislature, but both failed to satisfy sufficient members. It was left to R. D. Hanson to show a sound recognition of faction leaders and faction support, to form a ministry which was based on a clear majority, a ministry which retained this majority for nearly three years.

Our analysis of the workings of the faction system in South Australia begins with the Hanson ministry. This is not to say that faction pressure were not evident in the three ministries prior to this, but that the

Hanson ministry, essentially a coalition of factions, was the first which was based primarily on manipulation of the various and relatively fluid groupings in the parliament.

The development from an essentially group system of government to an emerging political party system in South Australia was slow. It was not until the last decade of the colonial period, after thirty years of representative government, that evidence of embryonic parties can be observed. There were four broad stages in this developmental process, stages which were identifiable in terms of changed patterns of legislative and electoral representation, in both theory and practice. At the same time, it should be emphasised that the dividing points between such stages are, to a certain extent, arbitrary. There was no sudden change from one stage of representative government to another. However, there was a period of transition from one style to another, a transition which was evidenced in both the procedural and functional aspects of political representation. The intention of this and the following Chapters is to outline the general aspects of the phases in the process of development towards party government, and to attempt to establish how and why the process as a whole occurre

The four periods in this development, and the distinguishing aspects of each period are as follows.

(i) The brief period, 1857-1861/2. These years were dominated in the legislative sense by the Hanson ministry, by a rapid turnover in the membership of the parliament, by a multi-factional legislative process and by a period of formation and disappearance, agglomeration and breakdown of faction leadership and faction groupings. It was, i short, a period of 'settling in'.

(ii)   The years from 1861/2 to 1878 were notable for a high level of
       ministry instability.   There were twenty four ministries in the
       period from May 20, 1861 to September 27, 1878, and fifteen of these
       lasted less than one year.   At the same time, there was a marked
       stability of a core of ministers who held office during this time,
       a stability which was due in the main to relatively cohesive
       groupings in the parliaments.   There was evidence also that the
       pattern of multifactionalism which had been established in the
       first few years of the colonial period had been maintained, but
       with the development of an increased internal stability of membership.

(iii) The decade 1880/1 to 1893 saw the House of Assembly dominated by
       larger groupings of members, by a relatively stable group of large
       factions which, for the first time, could be described in terms of
       relatively stable political attitudes.   But, even with this quali-
       tative change in the faction system, there were no political parties
       prior to the 'nineties.

(iv)   The 'Kingston Era' of the 'nineties was characterised by the emergence
       of the United Labor Party in South Australia, and the slow erosion
       of the faction system of government.

The 'points of transition' are not clearly identifiable.   Emphasis
should be on the process as a whole rather than on the separate periods
which could be established.   But the fact that these differing stages
can be identified, the fact that there were differing approaches to
representative government needs to be described and explained, before the
process as a whole is analysed, and the remainder of this Chapter is
concerned with the first twenty years of representative government, with
two decades of a 'classic' faction system.

Diagram 9-0: Faction Leaders

YEAR	1857	1858		1860		1862		1864		1866		1868		1870		1872		1874		1876

ELECTIONS

HANSON

DUTTON

A. BLYTH

MILNE

HART

REYNOLDS

ANDREWS

STRANGWAYS

GLYDE

SANTO

BOUCAUT

COLTON

KEY

MEMBER — MEMBER OF MINISTRY — LEADER OF MINISTRY IN ASSEMBLY — LEFT AND RETURNED — LEFT — CONTINUED

| YEAR ELECTION | 1875 | 1876 | | 1878 | | 1880 | | 1882 | | 1884 | | 1886 | | 1888 | | 1890 | | 1892 | 1893 |

A BLYTH

GLYDE

SOUCAUT

COLTON

PLAYFORD

BRAY

ROUNSEVELL

HAWKER

DOWNER

KINGSTON

COCKBURN

HOLDER

Factions and Governments, 1857-1878

As Peter Cook has shown, the first months of responsible government was marked by considerable legislative fluidity, and diffuse group memberships.[71]   The first five years of the colonial period were years of consolidation and formation of legislative groups, and Hanson's record long-term ministry was due to astute management of the faction system.

Table 9:2   Ministries and Faction Leaders, 1857-61.

Ministry No.	Led by	Faction leaders included in Ministry	Period
1.	Hanson	(a) Dutton, Hart, Reynolds	Sep.30, 1857-June 12,1858
		(b) Blyth, Dutton	June 12,1858-July 5,1859
		(c) Blyth, Milne	July 5,1859-May 9,1860
2	Reynolds	Strangways	May 9,1860-May 20,1861
3	Reynolds	Strangways	May 20-October 8, 1861
4	Waterhouse (Blyth)	Santo	October 8-17, 1861

The ephemeral legislative groupings in the Finniss, Torrens and Baker ministries had, by September 1857, become more distinct and cohesive. Hanson's selection of Dutton, Hart and Reynolds indicated his appreciation of faction strengths.   These three men had emerged as the leaders of the largest groups in the Assembly.   It was not surprising, then, that the Register saw the resignation of both Hart and Reynolds from the ministry in 1858 as 'both significant and ominous'.[72]   But Hanson replaced Hart with Blyth, at that time a lieutenant in the Hart faction and thus retained the support of a large group of members.   Reynolds' resignation was less of a problem.   Few of the members who constituted Reynolds' faction had voted consistently for the ministry containing their 'leader', and the inclusion

of Dutton replaced any lost support by cementing the general support
from the Dutton-Finniss faction.   One result of the changes was that the
opposition became more formalised in 1858.

But Hanson faced a more severe test in the following year.   Hart's
absence had allowed Blyth to become the leader of a new faction, containing
most of the original Hart supporters, and H. B. T. Strangways, elected in
1858, had joined with Reynolds in opposition.   Thus, when Hanson and
Dutton faced a censure motion over the Babbage expedition[73] they faced a
stronger opposition.   Hanson successfully moved for the prorogation of
the session, but he faced a motion of no-confidence on the first day of
the next sitting in 1859.   Strangways moved the censure on grounds of
maltreatment of Babbage, and with specific criticism of Dutton, the
Minister of Crown Lands.[74]   Despite an attempt by Neales, a member of the
Blyth faction, to amend the motion to censure Dutton only, an attempt
rejected by Hanson in the colony's first clear commitment to the principle
of collective responsibility,[75] the original motion was carried narrowly.[7]
But Strangways faced a 'cool reception'[77] from a meeting of interested
members, and the attitude of the Register left its readers in no doubt.

> Let Mr. Strangways enjoy the felicity of endeavouring
> to construct a cabinet, and, if he succeed in that attempt,
> the still more delightful chance of surveying the House
> from the right hand of the chair.   It will be good practice
> for him while it lasts, and capital fun for onlookers to
> mark how the guerilla chief deports himself when shut up
> in command of a garrison.   [78]

Hanson was recalled or, as he was still the head of a caretaker government,
he was reinstated.   He sacrificed Dutton, and included Neales.   To
Reynolds, this was a blatant 'shuffling of the cards'[79] and Townsend could
not

> understand a gentleman occupying the position of
> Commissioner of Crown Lands who was capable of pocketing
> his principles with his first month's salary. He
> understood principles to be the result of full and
> deliberate conviction. He could have no confidence
> in a minister who stated on Friday that he could have
> no confidence in a ministry who defended a particular
> colleague, and on Tuesday consented to occupy the
> position of that colleague, and co-operate with a
> ministry whom he had formerly denounced. [80]

Needless to say, Neales resigned within a month.[81] His replacement, Milne, had opposed the ministry on the censure motion, but at that time he was leader of a faction in the Assembly,[82] and his inclusion brought his followers to the ministry side[83] and provided Hanson with a majority, albeit an unstable one, for the remainder of the life of the parliament.

The first parliament also showed evidence of instability of the membership as a whole. Part of the problem of the Hanson ministry was to resolve the almost constant changes in personnel in the Assembly, and the steady influx of new members provided little opportunity for factions, whether in support or opposition, to become cohesive to the degree evident in later parliaments. Of the thirty six members elected in March 1857, seven had left the house by the close of the first session, a further five left in 1858, and only twenty two of the original membership were still in the house at the close of the first parliament. As a result, there were constant changes in faction membership, and the elections of 1860 further disrupted an already fluid system. Only twenty three of the thirty six members at the dissolution sought re-election, and of these, nineteen were returned.

The main faction leaders had been returned, and when the Assembly met in April 1860, Hanson, Dutton, Hart, Blyth and Milne supported the Hanson

ministry and Reynolds and Strangways led the opposition. But there was a markedly different membership, and a motion of no-confidence came almost immediately. Hanson's support had been a rather shaky majority throughout 1859, and a censure motion on the last day of the first parliament had been defeated only on the casting vote of the Speaker.[84] Reynolds' successful move against the Hanson ministry was no surprise.

Reynolds' two successive ministries, 1860-1, and 1861, were indications that the faction system had become more cohesive and that the lines of support and opposition were more sharply drawn. His first defeat, over Strangways' actions regarding Crown Law opinions, what the Register called a 'coup de theatre',[85] led to Davenport's abortive attempt which was outlined above. But this isolated instance did not bring permanent changes in the patterns of faction support, and the end of the second Reynolds' ministry came through the Boothby issue, divorced from the normal affairs of faction politics.

The temporary end of the Boothby issue, and the resignation of the non-faction Waterhouse ministry which had resolved it, was the beginning of the 'classic' period of faction government in South Australia. For the next two decades, government was by groups which brought an apparently kaleidoscopic time of unrest. In fact, there was a considerable element of faction stability, and the leadership of both the Assembly and of the factions was in the hands of a relatively small core of men.

By the opening of the 1862 session, faction leadership had become centred on five men. Hart's temporary absence had resulted in the formation of a Blyth-Milne faction which became increasingly that of Blyth.

Hart's return in 1862 drew back some of his former supporters, but Blyth rather than Hart was to be the dominant personality in the following decade. Dutton had become the leader of the former Hanson, Dutton and Finnis groups, but in a decreasing role until he resigned in 1865, when most of his supporters reinforced the Blyth faction, giving it a strength which was rarely ignored by any prospective ministry makers. Reynolds' resignation and subsequent re-election in 1862, his defeat at the November 1862 elections and his absence until 1864, allowed Strangways to consolidate his own faction into the major opposition to Blyth. Reynolds' return provided two factions which, although they voted consistently on most occasions, were identifiable as separate groups. As well, and especially in the early part of this classic faction period, there were smaller groupings in the Assembly. Glyde had abandoned his strict independence by 1862 and had become the leader of a small faction, and Santo retained the support of a discernible group. By the early 'seventies, new leaders had emerged as the old ones left the House. Dutton had resigned in 1865, Santo left in 1870, Strangways in 1871 and both Hart and Reynolds left finally in 1873. Of the original leaders, only Arthur Blyth retained a strong faction into the mid 'seventies. But as the old men went out, a new group of leaders emerged. J. P. Boucaut (elected 1861) and Playford (1868) soon attracted a personal following in the Assembly, and these were augmented by J. C. Bray (1875), W. B. Rounsevell (1875) and G. C. Hawker, who had been a member of the Blyth-Hart faction in the first parliament, but who led his own group on his re-election in 1875. As the following tables show, the governments of these two decades were dominated by relatively few faction leaders.

Table 9:3. Ministries and Faction leaders, 1862-78.

Ministry No.	Led by	Faction Leaders included in Ministry	Period of service (days)
8	Waterhouse (Blyth)	Strangways	634
9	Dutton	Hart, Glyde	11
10	Ayers (Hart)	Glyde, Santo	372
11	Ayers (Hart)	Santo	13
12	Blyth	Hart	230
13	Dutton	Reynolds, Strangways	182
14	Ayers (Blyth)	Santo, Strangways	33
15	Hart	Boucaut	156
16	Boucaut	Blyth	391
17	Ayers (Reynolds)	Glyde, Santo	509
18	Hart		19
19	Ayers (Reynolds)	Glyde, Santo	21
20	Strangways	Colton	555
21	Strangways		18
22	Hart	Blyth	18
23	Blyth		73
24	Ayers (Boucaut)		42
25	Ayers (Reynolds)		505
26	Blyth	Glyde	681
27	Boucaut	Colton	296
28	Boucaut	Blyth, Hawker, Playford	73
29	Colton	Bray	507
30	Boucaut	Playford, Hawker	336

417

Diagram 9-1: Ministries, faction leaders, faction support, House of Assembly, 1861-1878.

Year	1861	1862	1863	1864	1865	1866	1867	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	1878
Session	022	023	031	032	041 042	043	044	051	052	061	062	071	072	073	081	083	084	091

Ministry No.:
Waterhouse [Blyth] 8 | Ayers [Hart] 10 | Blyth 12 | Dutton 13 | 15 | Boucaut 16 | Ayers [Reynolds] 17 | Strangways 20 | Hart 22 | Ayers [Reynolds] 25 | Blyth 26 | Boucaut 27 | Colton 29 | Boucaut 30

Dutton 9 | Ayers [Hart] 11 | Ayers [Blyth] 14 | Hart 18 | Ayers [Reynolds] 19 | Strangways 21 | Blyth 23 | Ayers [Boucaut] 24 | Boucaut 28

Level and pattern of ministry support and opposition, faction leaders and members

| Session: | 023 | 031 | | 032 | 041 | 042 | 043 | 044 | 052 | 061 | 062 | 071 | 072 | 073 | 081 | 083 | 091 |
Min. No:	8	8	10	12	13	15	16	17	20	22	22	25	26	26	27	29	30
Support strong	Blyth Strang. 10	Blyth Strang. 6	Hart Glyde Santo 4	Blyth Hart 15	Dutton Reynolds Strang. 12 Santo	Hart Boucaut 12 Blyth	Blyth Boucaut 16	Reynolds Glyde Santo 9	Strang. Colton 4 Boucaut 12	Hart Blyth 4	Hart Blyth 4	Reynolds 4	Blyth 4 Glyde	Blyth Glyde 6	Boucaut Colton 6	Bray Colton 6	Boucaut Hawker Playford 12
Support unsteady	6	13	Dutton 8			5	7			9	11	17	Boucaut 7		12		Glyde 19
Independent			Colton 4		Colton 10			Boucaut Colton 16			Playford 12		10	26	Hawker 14 Rounsevell	13 / 13	
Opposition unsteady	Glyde Hart 6 Boucaut Rey. 13 Santo	Colton 4	Blyth Strang. 19	Glyde Santo Strang. 20 Dutton Colton	Blyth Boucaut Glyde 13 Hart	7			Playford 7		Boucaut Glyde Playford 19	Blyth Boucaut Bray 14 Glyde Hart	Bray 14	Boucaut 4	Blyth Bray Playford 12	Blyth 13 Boucaut Hawker Playford Rounsevell	Bray Colton Downer 17
Opposition strong		Dutton Glyde Hart Santo 12				Colton Glyde Reynolds Strang. 11	Colton Glyde Reynolds Santo Strang. 13	Blyth Strang. 10	Blyth Glyde Hart 11 Reynolds Santo	Glyde 10 Strang.							
Unplaced	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1
Totals	35	35	35	35	35	35	36	35	34	35	34	35	35	36	44	45	48

The role of Sir Henry Ayers in South Australian politics has been outlined above, but it is notable that despite the fact that he managed to secure strong faction leaders in the Assembly to lead his ministry in that house, only three of his seven ministries lasted more than one year, and the remaining four had an average life of only thirty days. Hart, Blyth, Reynolds and Boucaut normally carried considerable faction support with them into the administrations they formed, but this support tended to evaporate when they were acting as the Assembly spokesmen for Ayers. Part of the reason for this was the depth of feeling in the lower house against domination by the Council, a fear which had its origin in the dispute of 1857, and had been built on by the attitudes and activities of the Council in the succeeding years. Overall, nine of the twenty three ministries in this 'classic' faction period had very short lives, ranging from the eleven days of Dutton's ministry of 1863 to the seventy three days of both Blyth in 1871-2 and Boucaut in 1876. But the time spent in front of the Assembly, and accountable to it, was even shorter. Dutton (1863) and Strangways (1870) for example, faced the Assembly for only one day before they were forced to resign on an adverse vote. In many of these short term administrations, sudden defeat came through an inability to include the leaders of the majority of the House in the ministry. As the Davenport diary showed, attempts were made on each occasion of a ministry crisis to ensure, or to attempt to ensure that the ministry contained leaders who could confidently expect to carry a majority with them. An analysis of these short ministries, then, is one indication of the erosion of faction following over time. No one faction leader could command a majority of the total membership of the house, and ministries formed on the basis of one faction leader were almost immediately doomed to failure. The

ministries of Hart (1868), Strangways (1870), Blyth (1871), Ayers (1872)
fell into this category. In each case, they were soundly defeated after
only a short time in office. Of the short ministries which were based
on a coalition of factions, notably those of Dutton (1863) and Ayers (1864),
(1865) and (1868), in three, the antipathy of the Assembly towards ministries
led from the Council was a factor, but they also indicated a weakening of
the formerly dominant factions. Hart's peak, in terms of the members he
could expect to support him, was in the early 'sixties. By 1870, his
personal support had waned, and his ministry of 1870-1 retained the support
of the Assembly on a very uneasy basis.

Table 9:4.   Short-term Ministries.

Minis-try No.	Leader in Assembly	Days Facing Assembly	Vote on Defeating motion	Faction leaders in opposition
9	Dutton	1	18-16	Blyth, Strangways
11	Hart	4	nil	Blyth, Dutton, Glyde, Strangways
14	Blyth	10	19-13	Boucaut, Glyde, Hart, Reynolds
18	Hart	3	17-14	Colton, Playford, Reynolds, Santo, Strangways
19	Reynolds	4	20-10	Blyth, Colton, Playford
21	Strangways	1	26-6	Blyth, Glyde, Hart, Playford
23	Blyth	4(062) 1(071)	19-13	Boucaut, Bray, Glyde, Reynolds
24	Boucaut	16	19-12	Blyth, Bray, Glyde, Hart
28	Boucaut	4	23-20	Colton, Bray (Blyth, Glyde)

It was clear that any ministry leader was forced to take into account the
relative strengths of the Blyth, and the Reynolds and Strangways' factions
in calculations of possible support, and this is evident in the formation
of the long term, as well as in the short term ministries.   Of the eleven
long-term ministries to 1874, five were led by, or included Blyth, and
Reynolds and Strangways each featured prominently in three.   This pattern
of virtually alternating ministries broke down in the following five years,
and we will return to this important period of transition below.

One further point needs to be emphasised about this 'classic' period of
faction government.   As the analysis of structure in the Assembly showed,
these years were not characterized by a marked polarity of the members and
factions.   In fact the mean index of structure in the pre-Labor period
was low, with notable exceptions of sessions 043 and 111, to which we have
referred, and to which we will return.   This low level of political
conflict in the house is equally indicated by the attitude of the factions
indicated in table 9:4 above.   For the most part, the short term ministries
included too few divisions for a discrete analysis to be meaningful, but
the long term ministries indicate that on only few occasions was the
Assembly strongly divided.   For most of these long term ministries, the
faction leaders were dependent on relatively unsteady supporting groups, and
often on the vagaries of an overall majority in a position of independence
or a rather unsteady opposition.   On only few occasions, most notably the
ministries of Boucaut (1866) and Ayers (1872), was there a clear overall
majority support over the session as a whole.   At the other extreme, the
Ayers' ministry of 1867 was maintained only by the support, on crucial votes,
of a relatively large number of members, whose overall patterns of voting
showed them to have taken a relatively independent position between the

Reynolds-Glyde-Santo ministry and the core of the opposition in Blyth and
Strangways.

Yet, when issues are considered, this relative lack of polarity is
surprising. South Australia 'was born with the belief that correct control
of the disposal of Crown lands was the key to prosperity', [86] and it was in
these two decades that the question of how this key was to be utilised was
most often debated. The seven parliaments to 1874 debated twenty six
bills concerned with the sale and disposal of waste lands and passed half of
these, and a further twenty bills concerned with pastoral leases were brought
into the parliament. The details of many of these bills have been
summarised elsewhere, [87] and we are not concerned here with such details, but
with the legislative groupings which led to their passage or defeat, and
especially with the question of the extent to which this dominant issue
overlaid the faction system.

Land Legislation and the Faction System

As noted above, there was a pastoral influence in the membership of
the early parliaments, and many ministry leaders had considerable pastoral
interests. F. S. Dutton, Lavington Glyde and J. P. Boucaut of the faction
leaders had important financial interests in the pastoral industry, and most
of the other leaders, at some time, held some interests. In fact, few
men of substance in South Australia did not at some time own, or lease
pastoral lands. But the peak of the representation of pastoralists by
pastoralists occurred following the 1865 elections, when there were five
men who classified themselves as pastoralists in the Assembly, and a further
three who were identified as holding considerable pastoral interests. Thus,

nearly one quarter of the membership of the house had direct financial interests in the pastoral industry.   On the other hand, many of these pastoralists were often more interested in their leases than in parliament, and some played only a marginal role in the legislature, in terms of both attendance and debate.   These were best represented by R. R. Leake, who was a member for only one session in 1857, and resigned having attended for only fifty two of the ninety six sitting days, voted on only thirteen of the thirty nine divisions, and made no contribution to the debates. The rural electorate of Victoria could hardly claim adequate representation. His replacement, G. C. Hawker, reversed this approach, and became a dominant personality in faction governments.

There is no doubt that the land question was a crucial one in this period.   However, we need to question the generalisation that, during the 1860's, the prized independence of at least some members was abandoned when 'several governments were either broken or held in power because the pastoralists, being the largest single group in the Assembly, held the balance of power'.[88]   In fact, the evidence of legislative behaviour is to the contrary.   While the Pastoral Association certainly attempted to bring pressure to bear on members of parliament, and while it certainly revived the electoral methods of the Political Association, the great majority of members continued to play out their legislative activity in a predominantly faction style.[89]

The most controversial of the land issues of these years began with the Assessment on Stock Act passed in 1858 by the Hanson ministry.   Intended primarily as a means to increase revenue, rather than as an Act in favour of any particular interest, it faced considerable dissent during its passage,

and was amended in a way more favourable to the leaseholders than Hanson had first intended.[90]   The first valuations for the tax on stock were to be carried out in 1864, and preliminary planning for these was carried out by the Ayers-Hart ministry in 1863-4, when Goyder, the Surveyor General, was appointed as valuator.   Leaseholders formed the Pastoral Association to act as a pressure group to limit, and if possible end the proposed tax and, to most accounts it played a crucial role in the ensuing crises.

Goyder presented his report to the Ayers-Hart ministry, but before this could be debated by the Assembly the ministry was defeated.   Ayers reshuffled, and included Stow and Milne, who had brought about his defeat. But Milne, appointed as Commissioner of Lands, came under immediate criticism for an alleged conflict of interest .   The house made it clear that his appointment could not be supported while he held a large interest in pastoral leases himself.   The matter came to a head when he was forced into the position of defending the Goyder valuations following his own earlier criticisms of them, and he resigned.   Stow, whose actions in turning out the previous ministry had been referred to in the Advertiser as the 'actions of an advocate of the pastoral interests',[91] found his own conflict of interest and resigned also.   The ministry collapsed, and Blyth was called to form a new one. He made only one change, excluding Santo in his own favour, and retained the two men, Stow and Milne, who had been the direct cause of the Assembly's criticism.   Strong faction support for Blyth enabled the ministry to see out the remainder of the 1864 session, but Stow was defeated in the 1865 elections.   His electorate, Victoria, was essentially a pastoral area, and the decision of the government to implement the Goyder valuations had not been popular.   Blyth was unable

to obtain a new Attorney-general and he resigned. Dutton's ministry was little concerned with the land issue, and resigned during the 1865 recess, when Dutton was appointed Agent General in London. Ayers returned, on this occasion with Blyth, Santo and Strangways, but the ministry was immediately subject to strong attacks on the appointment of Dutton, and on the Goyder valuations which Ayers was still determined to implement. After only ten days of the 1865-6 session, the Ayers ministry was defeated on a confidence motion by Hart who, it was alleged, had promised concessions to the Pastoral Association.[92] But Hart had included Glyde as his Commissioner of Lands, in the face of the former's consistent opposition to the Pastoral Association. The necessity to obtain a majority from the faction system had over-ridden the valuations issue. However, Glyde remained for only four days before he resigned from the ministry, alleging pressure from the Pastoral Association against him, and he became one of Hart's most vocal opponents. His replacement, Neales, was more amenable to the land policy of the Hart ministry, and it survived until Hart resigned to take a trip to England.

The land issue came to the fore again in the 1868 elections. The valuations issue, which had been deferred, had been augmented by debates on the methods of land disposal in the colony, and most candidates in 1868 made some mention of both. But it was clear that resolution of the issues was not easy, and the Register noted eleven different methods proposed by candidates. It bewailed this 'brilliant coruscation of originality', and saw little hope for a solution satisfactory to the majority.[93] The membership of the Assembly had changed markedly. Only nineteen of the thirty six members present at the 1867 dissolution had returned, and

the Ayers-Reynolds ministry found its support markedly eroded. And this
support was tested and found wanting when the Commissioner of Lands, Glyde,
introduced the government's Waste Lands Bill, 'confident of its acceptance'.[94]
The proposals to sell land by tender were attacked, notably by Hart, Hughes
and Neales, and a motion of dissatisfaction was moved and carried decisively.
However, the Governor found difficulty in finding a replacement. Hay,
regarded as a land reformer, and Townsend, both of whom had opposed the
Glyde plan, were unable to find sufficient support to form a ministry. Hart
succeeded, but had no opportunity to put his proposals into effect. He
outlined his plan to retain the auction system, and to allow the continua-
tion of leasehold rights, but faced strong opposition, not only from the
Ayers-Reynolds supporters, but also from those who demanded conditions for
improvements of all occupied land. After only two days, Hart was defeated.
Ayers returned with, as noted above, a policy completely reversed. He
attempted to mollify the pastoralists in the Upper House and in the
Pastoral Association by 'three principles' of land reform:

> that reform should not interfere with vested interests
> ... that it should not impair the public revenue ....
> and that it should not place the Government in the
> position of being overpowered by the farming class at
> the time of election. 95

Strangways, for one, objected to the 'thimble rigging that had been going on',
and began a confidence debate which lasted three days.[96] But the final
motion which brought the end of the ministry was equally critical of
Strangways:

> This House is dissatisfied with the present ministry,
> and does not accept the policy propounded by the hon.
> member for West Torrens, the hon. H.B.T. Strangways. 97

Ayers refused to accept the vote, and was granted a dissolution, a decision which incensed Boucaut. 'The doctrine of _quos deus vult perdere, prius dementat_ has never been better exemplified'.[98] But by the next day, the Governor had reconsidered, and Ayers resigned.

The defeat of Ayers, and the addendum to the motion critical of Strangways were both due to the efforts of the 'new' members who had been elected in April. Most of these had aligned themselves on an independent stance, under the spokesmanship of H. R. Fuller. Fuller was called to form a ministry, but as he held a number of government contracts in his business, he declined. The 'new' members then moved back to the leader they had explicitly rejected, and Strangways formed a ministry which reflected his newfound support. The ministry included H. K. Hughes, elected in April, and J. T. Bagot (MLC) and Colton who had been included in the abortive Fuller attempt. Despite tenuous support in the Assembly, and his dependence for survival on a small group led by Playford, Strangways remained until 1870,[99] and carried through the parliament the land reform bill named after him. Although the Strangways Act was far from the last word on land disposal, it was a radical change, and brought a new system to the colony, and on this basis, the Strangways Act marked the end of a period.[100] But to what extent had the land issue overridden the faction system? Certainly there were leaders on both sides, and the Pastoral Association was both praised and criticised for its activities in the 'sixties. Men such as Glyde were apparently opposed to the pressure from the pastoralists, while John Baker 'distinguished himself by his opposition to Goyder's valuations'.[101] On the other

hand, men such as Ayers and Hart appeared to use the land issue to resolve factional pressures rather than attempt to gain faction support for a determined principle or policy.   To what extent was the faction system eroded by the formation of squatter and anti-squatter 'parties'?

The analysis of the structure of the two houses tends to indicate that a marked change had occurred.

Diagram 9—2: Structure in voting patterns, House of Assembly and Legislative Council, 1857—1868

Mean, 1857—1892

P 1
S 1
1857

2

3

P 2
1
1860

2

3

P 3
1
1863

2
1864

P 4
1
1865

2
1865
—66

3
1866
—67

4
1867

P 5
1
1868
—69

...... Legislative Council

The structure of the voting patterns in the Assembly showed a marked increase
in this period, and the fourth parliament, 1865-8, was the only pre-Labor
period in which there was significant structure in the Legislative Council.
On the other hand, the analysis of the membership of the ministries provides
little indication that the faction system had been temporarily overcome.
Despite the dominance of the land issue, it was apparent that opponents
of one ministry were as readily absorbed into it to form the next as in the
earlier decade, and the rapid changes of policies on land tends to indicate
that it was not the policy but the members themselves who were still the
determining influence.   During this five-year period, eight major land
bills were introduced, debated, and eventually passed,[102] without breaking
down the faction system.   The divisions which lay at the base of the
significant patterns included these land bills, but they equally included
other government legislation.   As well, the constant pressures on the
ministries in the form of censure and confidence motions were evident in the
significance of the patterns.   The land question was a dominant issue, but
it did not break down the faction system.

But the evidence of a breakdown of traditional behaviour in the
Legislative Council is stronger.   As noted above, the Council was more
homogeneous in membership than the Assembly.   It contained a greater
proportion of pastoralists and men with a 'stake in the country', and it
divided rarely in the pre-Labor period.   In 1864 it contained three of
the colony's biggest pastoralists, Angas, Baker and Davenport, and these
were joined by C. H. Bagot in 1865, Hogarth and Mildred in 1866 and J.
Crozier in 1867.   Throughout this period, therefore, there was a strong
minority group of men in the Council who could be expected to closely examine

any legislation concerned with their interests and with the pastoral
industry as a whole.

The Council divided only nine times in the 1864 session, and six of
these were concerned with the pastoral Bills.   On each occasion, the pastora
group voted as one, but on each occasion they were in a minority in their
opposition to Blyth's proposals, and both the Valuations of Leases Act
and the Pastoral Leases Act passed with only minor amendments.   In the
following session, the Council divided on eight occasions, four of these on
resolutions critical of the government's policy on pastoral leases.   Again,
the pastoralists voted as one, and attempted to declare the policy 'impolitic
and unjust', but again they were in a clear minority.   The three
succeeding sessions saw twenty seven divisions, but only two were concerned
with the land issue, on both occasions with attempts by Angas, Bagot,
Baker and Davenport to force the Waste Lands Amendment Bill to lapse.
Strangway's Bill of 1868 returned the land question to prominence in the
Council, but on this occasion the pastoralist group favoured the bill and in
fact forced through an amendment with a degree of liberalisation in terms
of the amount of improvements required on leases which, at first, was
rejected by Strangways.   The opposition to the Bill was led by Emanuel
Solomon, a wealthy merchant, who considered that the pastoral industry was
being more than fairly treated.   But he had, at most, three supporters
and his was the only dissentient voice on the second reading.

The general patterns of support and opposition in the Council during
the 1865-7 parliament were basically concerned with the division between
the ministerial supporters on the one hand, and opponents on the other,
with the pastoralists in consistent opposition.   The leadership of the

successive ministries fluctuated between Ayers, Blyth, Boucaut, Dutton and Hart; Ayers and English provided the Council representatives in the ministry.

Table 9:5. Patterns of voting behaviour, Legislative Council, 1865-67.

Ministry members and strong support	Unsteady support	Unsteady opposition	Strong opposition
Ayers (M) Barrow English (M) Everard Tuxford	Bonney McEllister Morgan	Angas (P) C.H.Bagot (P) J.T. Bagot Davenport (P) Hodgkiss Hogarth (P) Magarey Mildred (P) Parkin Solomon	Elder Baker (P)

(M) - ministry member, (P) pastoralist

But the pastoralists were unable to force their policy on the Council. They voted as a bloc only on the land bills and resolutions, and on other occasions reverted to an 'independence'. The issues which provided the patterns in this parliament were concerned not only with land, but with the Boothby question, and a series of government proposals on public works and railway developments, which have been mentioned above.

There was no equivalent pastoral bloc in the Assembly. At no time did the nine pastoralists, or men with pastoral interests who were members of the house between 1864 and 1868, vote as a bloc. Even on the various land bills, the general patterns of their legislative voting were faction-oriented rather than issue-oriented, and they showed similar patterns of support and opposition to the existing ministry as those of the house as a

whole. These patterns, of both the house as a whole and of the 'pastoralists' as a group, and the changes of ministry which resulted, occurred within a faction rather than a party situation. This is made evident by an examination of the manoeuverings in the Assembly in 1864-65 when Goyder's valuations and their implementation provoked the strongest reaction from the pastoralists, and in 1868 when the Strangways Act was passed.

Hart's personal diary provides some explanation of the former situation, when the Blyth ministry, embroiled in the valuations dispute, resigned following the electoral defeat of Stow. Hart makes clear the lack of formal contact between the members of the ministry and between the various faction leaders at the time, despite the interpretation that the land and valuations issue was the deciding factor in the making of the ministries of the period.[103]

> 21 March, 1865
> Saw Blyth who professed to know nothing of what was doing.
> Said that we were to meet at Ayers' office at 11.30. Went
> there with Stow accordingly. We were evidently not
> expected and when the Chief [Secretary, Ayers] arrived he
> was almost immediately followed by Dutton and Strangways.
> - We went off at once, but looked very foolish.... [Ayers]
> should have done nothing without first saying to us what
> he proposed doing. Shortly afterwards saw Reynolds ...
> who said he had been asked to join but refused because he
> could not agree with Dutton's views with respect to Ad
> Valorem duties. Dined ... then to the Exchange where
> I hear that Reynolds and Strangways have joined Ayers and
> that Blyth is the fourth man. If this is so what becomes
> of Reynolds' consistency? Another rumour is that the
> team is Ayers, Reynolds, Andrews, Strangways and Dutton.
> If so, what becomes of Ayers political character? [104]

The second rumour was correct, and Hart commented, 'Ayers ... has ruined his political character'.[105] The resultant changes have been outlined above.

Strangways' Bill in 1868 brought considerable opposition, due not only to the nature of the proposals, but to the continuation of factional antipathies. As mentioned above, Strangways' land policy had been rejected by the Assembly, and it was to be expected that this opposition would continue when the policy was formulated as a Bill. His success, therefore, provides further evidence in support of the continuation of the faction system. In the pattern of the previous decade Strangways' ministry had not come to power on the basis of any distinct mandate, legislative or electoral, and in fact he had become the leader in the face of consistent opposition to his policy. He was in the position of leader of the ministry simply because he had temporarily won the constant battle for power among the factions in the parliament. His Bill received overwhelming support on the second reading, opposed only by Fisher and Glyde on the grounds that the measure leant too far in favour of the pastoralists. To Glyde, the Bill was the result of 'negotiations in caucus' which were not aligned with promises made earlier to the electorate.[106] Certainly the provisions of the Bill were conservative,[107] were readily acceptable to the pastoralists, and provided a way out of the impasse of the whole question of land sales and valuations. But, taking the patterns of voting over the session of 1868-9 as a whole, there was no evidence of a 'pastoral' party in the Assembly.

Table 9:6.   Patterns of ministerial support, 1868-69.

Strangways' ministry and strong support	Unsteady support	Unsteady opposition	Strong opposition
Bower	Bean	Andres (M3,M3)	Baker
(P) Cavenagh (M4)	Bright	Boucaut	Blyth (M2)
Colton (M4)	(P)Carr	Hart (M2)	Everard (M2)
Hughes (M4)	(P)Cheriton	Hay	(P) Glyde (M1,M3)
Strangways(M4)	Cottrell	(P)Lewis	(P) Mortlock
	Fisher D	Neales	Riddoch
	Fuller	Pearce	Townsend (M2)
	Hill	Reynolds (M1,M3)	Watts
	Playford	(P)Rogers	(P) Fisher J
	Simms	Sandover	
		Santo (M1,M3)	

(M1 - M4) - member of ministry of Ayers (M1), Hart (M2), Ayers (M3),
            Strangways (M4)
(P) Pastoralist, or member with pastoral interests.

The disposal of land, the valuations on stock and land and the size and cost of rural settlement, were all issues in the 'sixties.   But they were not the only issues, and they did not lie at the base of the causes of ministerial changes.   The polarity of the patterns of voting were relatively high during the latter part of the 'sixties, but the cause of this was not one single issue.   The land policies of the four ministries, Ayers, 1865, 1868, Hart 1868 and Ayers 1868 were the apparent causes of their defeat, but the issues connected with land were but one part of the debates and votes of the Assembly.   During the same period, taxation, immigration, public works proposals, the development of roads and railways and the divisive Boothby case were all important, both in debates and divisions.   This decade of the 'sixties was essentially characterized by a faction system of government, dominated by personalities rather than

policies, epitimised by the view that the 1868 Ayers' ministry was defeated
because the Assembly was 'tired of seeing old faces on the treasury
benches'.[108]   The land question was important, and it played a part in
increasing the general level of structure in the parliament.   But it did
not change the faction system.   Rather, the faction system resolved the
land question.

New men and new factions

The marked changes in the membership of the Assembly wrought by the
1868 elections set a pattern which was to continue into the 'seventies.
Of the thirty six members elected in 1868, only eleven remained at the
opening of the 1875 parliament.   Many of the old faction leaders who had
played a role in the instability of the 'sixties left the house, and new
men emerged in their places.   The elections of 1870 brought the defeat of
Andrews, Boucaut, Colton and Santo.   Hart died in January 1873, Reynolds
resigned for the fourth and last time in August of the same year.   Boucaut
was re-elected in 1871 and Colton in 1875, but their absence had broken down
their former group allegiances, and on their return they were faced with
other faction leaders who, on occasions, had pre-empted much of their former
support.   Playford, defeated in 1871 after a brief term in the house
returned in 1875, J. C. Bray was elected in 1871, G. C. Hawker, owner of
the prestigious Bungaree stud and member from 1858-65 returned in 1875 with
more time to spare for legislative rather than pastoral pursuits; W. B.
Rounsevell was elected in 1875 and J. W. Downer in 1878.   Arthur Blyth,
who had been a dominant faction leader in the 'sixties, resigned in 1877
to be succeeded by his brother, Neville.   Thus the breakdown of the old
faction system, and the transition to a new one, came through electoral

influences rather than through internal changes in the patterns of support in the legislature.

These changes brought with them an element of stability.   Between 1872 and 1881 there were but six ministries, compared to the sixteen in the previous decade, and the various factions in the Assembly had begun a process of coalition which was to reach its highest level in the 'eighties.

Table 9:7.   Ministries and faction leaders, 1872-81.

Ministry No.	Led by	Faction Leaders included in ministry	Period of service	Days
25	Ayers (Reynolds)	Reynolds	1872-3	505
26	Blyth	(a) Glyde (b) Hawker, Bray	1873-5	681
27	Boucaut	(a) Colton (b) Colton, Playford	1875-6	296
28	Boucaut	Blyth, Hawker, Playford	1876	73
29	Colton	Bray	1876-7	507
30	Boucaut	Playford, Hawker	1877-8	336
31	Morgan (Playford)	(a) Playford, Hawker (b) Playford (c) Playford, Rounsevell	1878-81	1000

Both the Ayers and the Blyth ministries were notably unstable, and both were dependent on rather unsteady support.   The rapid changes in the membership of the Assembly had brought the old factional alignments to a state of flux, and both were dependent on the support of a 'new generation' of independents, typified by the liberal editor of the Advertiser,   J. H. Barrow.[109]   These provided sufficient support for Blyth to survive three motions of censure in 1873 and a further three in 1874, but it was sufficiently unpredictable for a contemporary to comment that the ministry

'had experienced many reversals and accomplished very little'.[110] But the resignation of two ministers, Bundey and Glyde, provoked the final censure. Blyth included Bray in his reconstructed ministry, despite, perhaps because of, his consistent opposition in 1873-4, but this did not bring the expected faction strength, but polarised the unsteady support into opposition, and Blyth was defeated. Boucaut was similarly dependent on the support of a relatively large number of independent members, and his defeat also followed ministerial changes. Boucaut appointed his Attorney General, S. J. Way, to the position of Chief Justice on Hanson's death,[111] but was unable to find a member of the parliament willing to replace him, and was forced to go outside the parliament.[112] Finally Charles Mann accepted the position, but in the process, Colton was excluded from the ministry. He followed 'the duty which a public man owed to his country',[113] condemned the reconstructions and carried a majority with him.[114] Despite the fact that Blyth, Boucaut, Hawker and Playford all opposed Colton in his ensuing ministry he managed to retain the support of an independently-minded house until late in 1877. Boucaut ousted Colton with the aid of the casting vote of the Speaker, G. S. Kingston, and could depend on slightly stronger support from a majority until he resigned to become a Supreme Court judge in September 1878. However, his ministry continued, virtually unchanged, under the leadership of Morgan from the Legislative Council, until Morgan's retirement in 1881.

The ministry leaders in this decade had to contend with a relatively high proportion of independently-minded members, and the stability of the decade was due to the astute management of these. As Table 9:7 shows, there were a number of reconstructions, not all of which had the desired

effect, and the dominant aspect of legislative behaviour was the lack of cohesion of a substantial majority of the representatives.   This was to change in the following decade, when, for the first time, there were factions in the South Australian parliaments which could be distinguished from each other by a general political outlook rather than solely on the basis of legislative behaviour over a discrete period.   In the next Chapter, then, we turn to the question of whether these tighter and more evident groupings were political parties.

Footnotes, Chapter IX

1. *Speech to the Electors of Bristol*, 1774.

2. Cited in F. P. Canavan, *The Political Reason of Edmund Burke*, (Duke University Press, Durham, 1960), p. 148.

3. Ibid., p. 147.

4. Cited in ibid., p. 146.

5. Ibid., p. 151.

6. *Works* (1893), Volume I, p. 334.

7. H. C. Mansfield, *Statesmanship and Party Government*, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965), p. 18.

8. Cited in H. C. Mansfield, 'Whether Party Government is Inevitable', *Political Science Quarterly*, (Vol. 80, No. 4, December 1965), p. 523.

9. H. C. Mansfield, *Statesmanship and Party Government*, op. cit., p. 18.

10. Ibid., p. 19.

11. Ibid., p. 113.

12. *Works*, op. cit., p. 335.

13. Ibid., pp. 378-80.

14. Ibid., p. 375.

15. H. C. Mansfield, *Statesmanship and Party Government*, op. cit., p. 181.

16. *Works*, op. cit., p. 378.

17. *SAPD*, 1891, p. 616.

18. Ibid., 1881, p. 289.

19. Ibid., p. 349.

20. *Register*, March 9, 1857.

21. *Observer*, April 8, 1893.

22. Ibid.

23. *Register*, February 14, 1857.

24. *Observer*, March 10, 1860.

25. Ibid., March 17, 1860.

26. Ibid., December 14, 1861.

27. Ibid., April 1, 1893.

28. See Chapters XI, XII.

29. Register, March 7, 1857.

30. Observer, March 10, 1860.

31. SAPD, 1860, pp. 25-6.

32. Observer, April 8, 1893.

33. Advertiser, February 27, 1860.

34. Observer, February 18, 1893.

35. SAPD, 1862, p. 1244.

36. Ibid., 1860, p. 37.

37. Ibid., 1859, p. 427.   Cited in P. Cook, op. cit., p. 66.

38. Thursday Review, February 2, 1860.

39. Ibid., July 26, 1860.

40. Ibid., February 28, 1861.

41. Register, April 17, 1893.

42. Ibid., April 2, 1877.

43. Ibid., April 25, 1896.

44. Advertiser, April 23, 1860.

45. Register, April 2, 1877.

46. Advertiser, February 23, 1860.

47. Register, March 12, 1884.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., April 29, 1899.

50. Cantab, Upper Chambers and Constitutional Reform, (Melbourne, 1878), p. 7.

51. Cited in D. Pike, op. cit., p. 464.

52. Register, April 27, 1857.

53. SAPP, 1871, No. 137, question 74.

54. Ibid., question 30.

55. Ibid., question 537.

56. SAPD, 1857, p. 484.

57. Advertiser, August 6, 1864.

58. Register, September 26, 1857.

59. Ibid.

60. Observer, April 14, 1860.

61. Register, February 21, 1862.

62. Ibid., August 8, 1864.

63. W. P. Reeves, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 66.

64. A. Leiserson, Parties and Politics, (Alfred Knopf, New York, 1958), pp. 47-8.

65. SAPD., 1870, p. 14.

66. Cited in T. H. Smeaton, From Stonecutter to Premier and Minister of Education, (Hunkin, Ellis and King, Adelaide, n.d.), p. 78.

67. For other examples see Chapter VII. The most notable cases were those of 1863 when Ayers reconstructed by including the mover and the seconder of the confidence motion, and in 1875 when Arthur Blyth reconstructed to include his most vocal opponent, J. C. Bray.

68. Advertiser, July 22, 1864.

69. SAA 535

70. P. Cook, op. cit.

71. Ibid., especially p. 195.

72. *Register*, June 15, 1858.   Hart resigned for 'personal reasons'.
     The *Register* claimed that he found 'official functions more onerous
     and less remunerative than other labours' (June 15, 1858), but it
     was later alleged that there was some dissension with his colleagues
     and with Hanson in particular. (*SAPD.*, 1862, p. 932).   Reynolds'
     resignation left no undecided question.   He had clashed with the
     board of railway commissioners over the letting of tenders and
     alleged that he had been deliberately isolated by his colleagues.
     See P. Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-9.

73. See above, Chapter VII.   Babbage, a former member of the Assembly,
     had been dissatisfied with his treatment by the government in his
     role as leader of the expedition, and had finally petitioned
     parliament against his dismissal.

74. For details, see P. Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-9.

75. Hanson told the house that 'they would deserve the censure more if
     they permitted the effects to fall upon the Commissioner of Crown
     Lands personally'.   *SAPD.*, 1859, p. 140.

76. *SAPD.*, p. 145.   The motion was carried 15-13.

77. P. Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

78. *Register*, May 28, 1859.

79. *SAPD.*, 1859, p. 152.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

81. Neales had forwarded official plans for mineral leases to the Governor
     for his consent without consulting his colleagues, and this was the
     explicit reason for his resignation.

82. See below and in the following Chapter for an analysis of faction
     leadership.

83. This was not always the case, as later analyses will show.

84. *SAPD.*, 1859, p. 614.   The vote was 10-10.

85. *Register*, May 11, 1861.

86. K. B. Bowes, *Land Settlement in South Australia*, 1857-1890,
     (S.A. Libraries Board, 1968), p. 91.

87. See *Ibid.*, Chapters 5,6; G. Buxton, *South Australian Land Acts
     1869-1885*, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1961), and J. B. Hirst, *Adelaide
     and the Country, 1870-1914*, (Ph.D. Thesis, Adelaide, 1970).

88. K. R. Bowes, op. cit., p. 94.

89. Stow pointed out that ' "killing a squatter" was a favourite device
with impecunious treasurers', but he was convinced that the par-
liamentary proceedings of the 'sixties were 'of ephemeral interest.
Apart from the judicial difficulty (Boothby) ... there could hardly
be said to be any great questions disposed of.... A stranger could
hardly tell what they were all about'. J. P. Stow, op. cit., pp.62-6.

90. K. R. Bowes, op. cit., pp. 118-121.

91. Glyde, cited in P. L. Edgar, Sir James Penn Boucaut: His Political
Life, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1961), p. 62. Glyde made his
views clear when he told the Assembly that 'he believed one of the
objects of the Pastoral Association was to embarrass any government
who ventured to check the Association, one of whose objects was,
he believed, to make the ministry five puppets, the strings of which
would be at their service'.

92. K. R. Bowes, op. cit., p. 149.

93. Register, March 24, 1868.

94. SAPD., 1868, p. 461.

95. Ibid., p. 601.

96. Ibid., p. 615.

97. Ibid., p. 689. The final vote was 19-7, a relatively low turnout
for such a censure motion. Commissioner of Crown Lands, Glyde,
complained that 'during the ringing of bells', members were leaving
the house rather than entering it, including Boucaut and Strangways.
Ibid., p. 711.

98. Ibid., p. 720.

99. He faced, and narrowly survived, two no-confidence motions in
November 1869 and January 1870.

100. The substance of the change was that sales of land were to be made
on four years credit, with interest of 4% per annum to be paid in
advance of the purchase. Land in the proclaimed agricultural areas
were not open for sale by auction, but for selection, and simultaneous
applications were to be decided by lot. A minimum of £1 per acre
was set, with a maximum holding of 640 acres. See J. P. Stow,
op. cit., p. 667.

101. G. Morphett, The Bakers of Morialta, (Pioneers Association, 1946),
unpaged.

102. These were: Valuations of Leases Act, 1864; Pastoral Leases Act, 1864; Assessment on Stock Act, 1865; Waste Lands Act, 1865-6; Pastoral Rights Act, 1866; Rent and Assessment Remissions Acts, 1865-6, 1866-7, and the Waste Lands Act, 1867.

103. See, for example, A. Forster, op. cit., pp. 192-3.

104. Hart Diary, 21 March, 1865.

105. Ibid., 22 March, 1865.

106. SAPD., 1868-9, pp. 1014-8.

107. See K. R. Bowes, op. cit., pp. 191-3.

108. A. Forster, op. cit., p. 193.

109. See J. Darling, 'John Henry Barrow of "The Advertiser"', Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, S.A. Branch, (Vol. 66, 1965), pp. 81-91.

110. E. Hodder, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 58.

111. See A.J.Hannan, op. cit.

112. Henry Gawler, solicitor, Lands Office.

113. SAPD., 1876, p. 37.

114. The vote was 22-19.

Chapter X

Factions and Parties

> We know that parties must ever
> exist in a free country.
>
> > Burke   1775
>
> Party government is a political
> necessity;   it must and will
> develop itself.
>
> > Register   1857

Introduction

In his introduction to his <u>Political Parties</u>, Duverger wrote that

> We must not be misled by the analogy of words. We
> use the word "parties" to describe the factions which
> divided the republics of antiquity ... the clubs
> where the members of the revolutionary assemblies
> met, and the committees which prepared the elections
> under the property franchise of the constitutional
> monarchies as well as the most popular organisations
> which give shape to public opinion in modern
> democracies.   There is some justification for
> this identity of name, for there is a certain under-
> lying relationship - the role of all these institu-
> tions is to win political power and exercise it.
> Obviously, however, they are not the same thing. [1]

As shown above, contemporary historians and commentators in South Australia
were apparently often misled.   While there was a general acceptance that
Party in the Burkean sense was in no way inimical to democratic represen-
tative government, the terms 'party', 'faction', 'group', and 'clique' were
used often, generally indiscriminately, and generally in a pejorative sense.
Certainly the factions of the 'fifties and 'sixties attempted to win
political power, and to exercise this to the ends which they had in mind,
as do the modern political parties.   But, as Duverger points out, they
are not the same thing.   There were important differences between the
factional groupings of the 'sixties and the parties of the 'nineties -
the National Defence League and the United Labor Party.   There were
important differences between these two parties and the political parties
of the present day.   The factions of the 'sixties were not parties.
The United Labor Party <u>was</u> a political party.   The question : this
chapter will seek to answer is whether the ULP was the <u>first</u> political
party in South Australia, or whether there were precursors to the ULP
which could be so considered.   When, in fact, did political parties
emerge?

Political historians have differed widely over this question, and one of the tasks of this chapter is to come to terms with these conflicting arguments. This requires discussion at two 'levels' - on the question of what attributes must be present before a political group can reasonably be termed a political party, and the dependent question of when and why political parties emerged in the Australian colonies as a whole, and in South Australia in particular.

On the first point, it is obvious that conflicting lists of necessary attributes can lead to conflicting conclusions about the existence of political parties, and we will return to two such conflicting attitudes below. But a distinction is necessary from the beginning. Differences in quantitative attributes have little bearing on the immediate question. The United Labor Party of the 1890's and the South Australian Labor Party of the 1970's differ markedly in such ways as complexity of organisation, the breadth and size of mass membership, extent of parliamentary representation and in electoral organisation and methods. But there is no question about both being political parties, and later chapters will expand on this. The quantitative differences between the two organisations are not relevant to their existence as political parties.

This chapter, then, is concerned with qualitative attributes of political organisations, and with the overall question of whether political parties emerged in South Australia prior to the ULP. To attempt to answer this question, this chapter examines arguments about colonial political parties in general, and South Australian parties in particular, and then turns to an analysis of the faction system of the 'eighties and of organisations which were referred to as 'parties' by contemporaries,

or which showed evidence of some of the necessary qualitative attributes.
The first step, however, is to identify these attributes, that is, to
establish a meaningful definition of 'political party'.

'Party' in the Colonial Context

As shown above, South Australian colonial leaders accepted the
application of a Burkean notion of Party, and were hostile, in theory, to
faction and pressure group activities.   In practice, however, the faction
system was the core of legislative behaviour, and factions still played an
important role after the emergence of the Labor Party.   What we are
seeking to establish at this point are the characteristics of a political
party which would distinguish it from the Burkean Party, from a faction,
and from a pressure group, and which would allow conclusions to be made
about pre-Labor parties in South Australia.

Both contemporary and more modern analysts have provided a plethora
of definitions.   In 1897, Sidgwick defined parties as

> political combinations, designed for indefinite
> duration, and having distinctive aims and opinions
> on some or all of the leading political questions
> of controversy in the State in which they are
> formed. [2]

But this would include the factions of the South Australian colonial period.
As shown, these were intended to be of 'indefinite duration', and they had
policies and opinions.   But they were clearly not parties.   A definition,
then, can be too broad.   In a similar way, such early electoral pressure
groups such as the Licensed Victuallers Association, the Farmers Mutual
Association, the Association for Bible Reading in State Schools and the
Pastoral Association, were parties under the definition of a political
party as

> an association organised in support of some principle
> or policy which by constitutional means it endeavours
> to make the determinant of government. [3]

Epstein argues that 'having a label ... rather than an organisation is the crucial defining element'. He continues,

> [although] some degree of organisation seems
> characteristic of modern parties ... [and] the
> degree of organisation is often taken as an important
> mark distinguishing a party from a faction ...
> it seems better not to make so sharp a distinction.[4]

Undoubtedly the degree of organisation is not the distinguishing factor, as a comparison between the ULP and the modern Labor Party indicates. But the label does not make the party. I agree with Epstein if he is claiming that a label is necessary, but I would disagree if he is claiming that the label is sufficient for a party to be in existence. This applies also in the modern situation. In 1970, one candidate in the South Australian elections called himself the candidate for the Combined Party. He was the sole candidate for this 'party', he had no formal _party_ organisation behind him, and was, in fact, an independent. Similarly, the fact that various colonial electoral associations campaigned for their aims and views under specific labels did not make them political parties. To Epstein, 'the single criterion is the functional one: seeking votes for a labelled candidate or candidates'.[5] The United Trades and Labor Council in South Australia 'labelled' nine candidates in 1887 and nineteen in 1890 as UTLC-supported, yet none of these who were elected acknowledged such a label, and none saw their role as so defined.[6] Epstein's criterion is either too broad, or it is not sufficiently defined. If the 'label' makes the party, then one needs to establish more clearly what is inferred by the label.

A definition of 'party' can also be too narrow and too restrictive to allow for any meaningful conclusions. The recent debate between Loveday - Martin and Nairn, about the formation of political parties, and a paper by R. L. Reid on parties in South Australia, provide examples.

To one reviewer, the thesis of <u>Parliament, Factions and Parties</u>, that in New South Wales the faction system was replaced by party politics in the 'eighties, 'must be accepted as positions won'.[7] To Loveday and Martin,

> In 1887 the patterns of politics established for thirty years were disrupted ... the faction system ... was transformed ... In the general election of 1887, two distinct political bodies - the freetrade and protectionist organisations - played a new and leading role and it seemed that the faction system was about to be replaced by a power struggle between two groups which can only be called parties of principle, formally organized and overtly managing currents of pressure and opinion.... Elements of change and continuity were thus intermixed: the new parties at once represented a reaction against the old faction system and a redirection of many of the techniques on which it had rested.

Thus the conclusion that, by mid-1889 and prior to the Labor Party,

> though overtones of the old faction system survived, that system no longer provided the mainspring for the operation of the colony's political institutions. New men, new issues and new organisations had undermined its viability, broken through the sanctions which the old 'liberal' ethos had erected against sectional political activity, and insensibly prepared the ground for the painless acceptance in 1891 of the Labor Party.[8]

But Nairn could not agree that these 'parties' were true political parties. They were, rather, 'but merely the fag end of the factional groups whose gyrations had all but demoralised responsible government in New South Wales,[9] and therefore, 'the major changes in the parliamentary

system were begun in 1891 by the Labor Party'.[10] In their reply, Loveday and Martin went to the core of the disagreement, the core of the definition of 'party'.

> Nairn says that, to be called a party, an organisation
> must have an 'integrated and operative disciplinary
> system complete with sanctions' and a 'political pro-
> gramme to which Ms.L.A. and party members [are] pledged
> under penalty of expulsion'. ... [Thus],
> there is clearly room for allowing that the Freetrade
> and Protection parties were parties of a different
> type from Labor but sharing certain features with it,
> namely organisation, publicly created and avowed, and
> intended to combine both parliamentary and extra
> parliamentary forces and central and branch units
> in the advancement at the electoral level of a
> collectively formulated programme....
> The conclusion, that they were only 'slightly improved'
> models of the factions, can only follow by assuming
> the truth of a supposed premise which makes an
> exhaustive dichotomy between party of the Labor type
> on the one hand and faction on the other, at least
> for this period and colony.   [11]

Nairn differed strongly.

> In my opinion the parties calling themselves protection
> and free trade in 1887 and 1889 were similar to pre-
> ceding groups who, at various elections and in Parlia-
> ment, called themselves, or were labelled, the 'Liberal
> Party', the 'Orange Party' ... 'The Wheat and Corn
> Party' and other similar descriptive titles.   These
> were generally ephemeral groups superimposed on a
> system that has been named the 'Faction System'....
> Loveday and Martin have not given a clear statement
> of _their_ definition of a party.   It seems, however,
> that they would include in it the protectionist and
> free trade parties of 1886-9.   If this is so I think
> their definition is so wide as to be of little use.   [12]

Thus, to Nairn, 'on the problems of definition it seems we must agree to differ'.[13]

To Loveday and Martin, Nairn's argument was 'loaded' and was based on 'questionable assumptions'.

> Must the freetrade and protectionist formations
> be denied the name parties because they were not
> controlled by extra parliamentary organisations?
> Why was the fiscal issue 'politically spurious'
> ...?   Must a true party be based on a 'horizontal'
> class division in society? ... Must a body have
> a comprehensive programme to merit the label
> 'party'?   Why is it that a body without any 'real
> vision' of reform and development - a conservative
> party, for example - does not deserve the name of
> party'?   14

It seems to me that Nairn's approach is based on a definition of 'party'
which is too rigorous, too detailed, too self-limiting.   It demands the
clear identification of a long list of attributes before one can refer
to a political organisation as a party.   If, for example, it is necessary
that to be called a party, an organisation must have a 'disciplinary
system' by which members are 'pledged under penalty of expulsion',[15] then
the existing Liberal and Country League in South Australia cannot be called
a political party.   The attempt to define a 'party' in terms of such
rigid attributes as the necessity for a pledge, for sanctions, and for a
base in a horizontal class division is essentially seeking a 'black-white'
dichotomy, and one weakness of the Nairn definition is that it does not
allow for a transition from a non-party, factional system to a party system.
The process of change from an essentially faction system to an essentially
party system in South Australia was slow.   As a later chapter will show,
the colony justified Duverger's thesis that there may be 'authentic parties
possession a minimum of organisation and stability in juxtaposition to
inorganic and unstable groups',[16] and the decade of the 'nineties epitomised
this situation.   The important aspect is that parties develop, they do
not suddenly appear in the political arena.   The attempt, therefore,
to set rigid criteria, to apply a set of rigid characteristics, under-
emphasises, if it does not ignore, this process of development.

The second example is drawn from the specific South Australian context. In his paper, 'The Price-Peake Government and the formation of political Parties in South Australia',[17] Reid concludes that 'in the first decade of the twentieth century only one modern political party - the Labor party - existed in South Australia and only a minority of MPs. were members of it'.[18] This conclusion pivots on the term 'modern', and to his early reference to 'the essentials of a <u>major</u> political party'.[19] Reid's criteria for such a modern, major party include 'representatives in parliament' who are 'a disciplined body ... prepared to thrash out their differences in the privacy of the party room and present a united front in Parliament', a 'headquarters staff' and 'the mass party membership', which 'selects either directly or through the executives and committees the candidates that the party puts up for Parliament'. Thus,

> Modern political parties only begin when you have
> a combination of certain factors - an organisation
> with a more or less mass base; a fairly tightly-
> knit parliamentary group, connected to the base by
> ties of principle and need for party nomination;
> and a professional core, centred on party headquarters
> and paid to provide liaison between the mass base
> and the parliamentary members'. [20]

In the general terms of his paper, Reid's criteria are acceptable. The thrust of his argument is concerned with <u>modern</u>, <u>major</u> parties, and he refers to 'the first South Australian Cabinet [in 1910] composed entirely of Labor members', the 'first time a political party as distinct from a parliamentary group was in charge of the government'.[21] It is less applicable to the emergence of political parties <u>per se</u>, to the stage prior to a system of major parties, to the period of transition from faction or pressure group to political party. It is sound, as will be shown below, to state that the ULP was the only <u>modern</u> political party in South Australia in 1901, but was it the <u>only</u> political party?

It is this question which is the central concern of this and the two succeeding chapters. At this point we are concerned with the pre-Labor period, not to establish whether the ULP was the only party, for we will return to this, but to establish whether it was the first party in South Australia.

There is, therefore, the necessity for a definition of 'party' in the context of this present analysis. Such a definition must be wide enough to allow for aspects of the process off development, to allow for the emergence of 'authentic' parties which bear little organisational, quantitative resemblance to the modern mass party, yet narrow enough to allow a clear distinction between such 'authentic' parties and the factions and electoral groups which may have preceded them, and which may co-exist with them. Such a definition, therefore, will seek to establish certain aspects of a political organisation as essential and sufficient.

Political parties can, and have had their origins in the electoral context, or in the legislatures, or in both contemporaneously. As will be shown in the following chapter, the United Labor Party developed from societal organisations, and from electoral pressure groups. It was formed outside the legislatures. On the other hand, the National Defence League had its genesis in the parliament. As has been shown above, there was no shortage of legislative groups, of factions, in the parliaments of the 'fifties and 'sixties, neither was there an absence of electoral associations and pressure groups. But there were no political parties. What was lacking was the third, and most essential aspect of a political party, the formal, institutional link between the electoral and the legislative foci, and it was the absence of this link which played a major role in the

maintenance of the faction system of government. Representatives emphasised their independence both from electoral and legislative pressures, and actively rejected any formal links with electoral organisations. The pressure groups and the electoral organisations which sprang up trienially, militated further against the development of parties by their mode of action. Unlike modern party organisations, which seek to influence the electorate and thus secure support for the party candidates at times of elections, the pressure groups of the 'fifties and 'sixties sought to influence the candidates themselves. Some electoral organisations did publish lists of candidates as those who were worthy of support, but these selected men were not nominees of that organisation. As shown above, they stood as independents, and their selection by the electoral organisation was no more than a public expression by the organisation that the views of the candidates came closest to its views, often on limited subjects.

This modern practice is the nomination of a candidate, or a team of candidates, who are willing to stand in the name of a specific electoral organisation. The dividing line between this concept of nomination and that of the selection of candidates is important, as it is part of the formal and institutional link between electoral organisation and legislative members which is the essential determinant of political party as against faction or pressure group. The distinction between nomination and selection, and the consequent determination of the existence of a political party is shown by the following summary of the brief life of the Political Association in the first few years of representative government.

In July, 1859, the Political Association was formed in Adelaide, basically as a working-man's organisation, with a comprehensive political policy.

(1) We believe the time has now arrived when immigration at the public expense should cease.

(2) We believe that property should never be considered in comparison with manhood;   that the happiness and well being of the mass is paramount to the aggrandisement of the few.

(3) We believe that all citizens should have equal political rights.

(4) We believe that members of the Legislative Assembly should be paid.

(5) We believe that all lands alienated from the Crown and unimproved should be taxed.

(6) We believe in law reform.

(7) We believe the press should be free and unrestricted.[22]

Reaction from the press was mixed, but both the opposition to the Political Association from the Register and the support expressed in principle by the Advertiser can be interpreted in a Burkean sense.   The Advertiser took the view that the Political Association was a group of men united on certain principles which they were perfectly in order in furthering.   It saw no cause for

fear at all of any mischief resulting from the
constitutional exercise of a constitutional right.
We maintain the constitutional right of the people
to combine.... Do we not see combinations every
day of our lives?   Do not lawyers combine, and
doctors combine, and bankers combine and land agents
combine?   Do not farmers combine and squatters
combine and schoolmasters combine, and do not members
of parliament combine sometimes to turn ministers
out of their places? ... [in history some combinations]
were conducted by those who had political power and
who sought, by means of legal combination to
exercise that power successfully.   And this is all
that we understand is contemplated by the existing
Political Association.... They are simply organising
voters ... let those who differ from them organise
on the other side ... we believe that while the
political associations are organising publicly,
other parties are organising privately. 23

To the Register, however, the very nature of the Political Association, its

basis as a working-man's association, was sufficient for the 'correct'

principles of party to be in danger of being subverted.

Why men, ... should deem it necessary to take the
trouble of organising themselves for no apparent purpose
... which may not be obtained by the people without
its interference.... it seems to us to be an anomaly
... to have sectional political associations.   We
already form one complete political association in which
every member has equal rights and equal powers ....
There is ... something dictatorial in the attitude
assumed by the Political Association.   It implies that
the people, possessed of the suffrage, are not intelligent
enough to use it witout guidance.... The course once
commenced will necessarily be adopted in self defence by
persons holding different opinions for seeking other
objects.   Sectional associations will almost inevitably
become factional powers, class will arm against class
instead of all seeking unitedly to promote the common
weal, and party conflicts ... will be strengthened and
embittered by all the stimuli of association.   24

To the Association, however, its aims were already self-defence.   As

spokesman T. Murphy told the Register,

> ... We are the scattered sticks that individually
> have been broken and trodden underfoot, - that
> have found it necessary to associate ourselves
> together, though perhaps widely differing in our
> individual views, to protect ourselves against
> the combination of the rich few.   It is with the
> view of making our liberal constitution a great
> fact and not a sham at the coming election that
> our efforts aim.   25

The Association had a comprehensive policy, it had overall aims.   It

intended to influence the activities of government, if necessary by having

its members _in_ government.   It also had a considerable electoral

organisation, claimed, only weeks after its formation, to consist of twelve

branches and over a thousand members.[26]   Through this, the Association

hoped to return candidates favourable to the cause, who would defend the

rights of the working man, and promote his interests.   Its aim was to

'ensure the right men were being put in the right place at the next

election'.[27]   By early 1860, the Association was organised in the city

and in areas of mining and industrial activity in the country, notably in

Gawler, Kapunda, Burra, Clare and Mintaro.   Still defending the Asso-

ciation in the face of continuing attacks by the conservative press, the

Advertiser noted that although it did not have a 'skilful organisation',

nor 'influential names as its patrons', it was not to be 'despised', either

in principle, or as a political force in practice:

> its members can make their power felt.   They can vote
> together ... and we do not hesitate to say that if,
> by legitimate cooperation, they can carry the elections,
> no-one is entitled to blame them.   They have political
> influence, and they use it;   use it in support of the
> men of their own choice, just as their richer neighbours
> do.   28

The <u>Thursday Review</u>, on the other hand, thundered against the Association which 'avows Socialist and Communist doctrines', called on men of property to beware,[29] and viewed its successes with considerable alarm.

In the two districts of Port Adelaide and Burra and Clare the Association 'endorsed' five of its members, two of whom were on the executive. In Adelaide and Barossa the Association selected from the list of candidates who had already nominated, those considered worthy of support.[30] Of these 'candidates', eleven were elected. In Burra and Clare, the Speaker, G. S. Kingston was soundly defeated, and all three Association members were elected. Both Association members were returned in Port Adelaide, from where the conservative sitting member Neales, aware of the support for the Association in the seat of Adelaide, had moved his candidature, only to be defeated. Five of the six 'selected ' candidates in Adelaide were successful, the sixth being only narrowly defeated. As well, the new parliament contained a solid complement, other than those supported by the Political Association, who had given strong public support for the Association 'plank' of the cessation of free immigration. The Association was well pleased. Not so the <u>Thursday Review</u>.

> the cant we deprecate is the class boasting which
> these people have adopted ... during these past
> elections, ... we have been nauseated with this
> cant. The rights of labour seem to have become
> some fresh privilege, which no-one had ever heard
> of before; and that, hitherto, the condition of
> an English working man had little in it to distinguish
> it from the serf or the slave.... We want good
> government. We require sound laws. We wish for
> security for our property and safety for our persons.
> We want our liberties preserved untouched - our
> honour as a people unsullied. Should we enjoy
> this long, think you, with such men at the head of
> our affairs? ... Do you think that a House of Assembly
> of working men, snapping up their pay with greediness,
> and betraying in their proceedings inevitable imbecility,
> would keep up that credit? ... We should like to land
> some hundreds of these discontended needles on an
> uninhabited island. [31]

But, for all these fears, the Political Association influence in the parliament was slight, its electoral success was short-lived, and its legislative activities were channelled and directed by faction rather than party behaviour.

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the second general elections of 1860 wrought considerable changes in the membership of the Assembly, with only nineteen members returned, just over half of the 1859 membership. The defeat of the Hanson ministry followed almost immediately on the opening of parliament in 1860, with eleven of the twelve members associated with the Political Association on the opposition side. Duffield had given early notice of his intention to act independently by supporting Hanson. As diagram 10:1 shows, although both the members of the Political Association and those who were given electoral support were generally in favour of the succeeding Reynolds ministry, there was no evidence of these men voting as a bloc, either in the patterns of voting over each session as a whole, or on the issues which were debated. The majority occupied a relatively independent position on the ministry-opposition continuum in the 1860 and 1861 sessions, and split over the no-confidence motion against Reynolds in November 1861. Cole and Owen supported Reynolds; Coglin, Dale, Duffield and Grundy opposed him.

Diagram 10-1: Legislative group membership of Political Association members and 'candidates', 1860-1862.

Session 1, 1860.

```
Ministry Bloc                        Opposition Bloc
Reynolds
Moorhouse
Cole *
Dale *
Owen *
        10 members                       5 members

              Coglin   *   Bakewell
              Duffield*    Parkin
              Grundy   *   Santo
              Lennon   *

                    21 members
```

Session 2, 1861

```
Ministry Bloc                        Opposition Bloc

Reynolds                             Duffield *

        4 members                        9 members

              Coglin  *   Bakewell
              Cole*       Moobhouse
              Dale *      Parkin
              Grundy  *   Santo
              Owen *

                    22 members
```

Session 3, 1862

```
Opposition Bloc                      Ministry Bloc
Coglin  *   Bakewell
Cole *      Moorhouse                Duffield *
Grundy *    Parkin
            Reynolds
            Santo                        16 members

      19 members
```

The demise of the Political Association followed changes in the
electoral system and a general economic improvement in the colony.   The
numerical strength of the Association was in the working-men's clubs of
Adelaide, and the single electorate for the city had provided the
Political Association with the opportunity to influence the election of one
sixth of the total membership of the Assembly.   It should be noted,
however, that of the six 'selected' by the Association in 1860, all had
previously nominated for the district and they were not seen by the
electorate, as were the 'nominees' in the other districts contested, as
'Association men'.   It is difficult to establish the degree to which
Association 'selection' was an electoral advantage.   The redistribution
of 1861 reduced the city representation to four, and effectively limited
the influence of the Association.   As described earlier, the more
conservative members had expressed concern from the beginning about the
'massing of the city', and the success of the Association added fuel to
these fears.   The effects of the 1861 Act on the City should be seen
as a product of both.   As the _Advertiser_ put it,

> The radicals in West Adelaide are neutralised by
> the Conservatives and gentry of the western portion
> of North Adelaide whilst the radicals on the east
> side of North Adelaide are thrown along with the
> conservatism of the eastern portion of South Adelaide.
> The result is entirely to break up the former
> compactness of the Political Association.   [32]

A second factor was the return of economic prosperity in 1861.   The
Political Association was born in a period of high unemployment and
depressed economic conditions, and its immigration plank was one result.
As economic conditions improved, the incentive of membership of the
Association weakened, and its political purpose faded.   Meetings were

held, but by the elections of 1862 it had become little more than a collection of working men's clubs again.   Of the seven members of the Association who had been elected in 1860, only Cole remained in the Assembly after 1862 as a member of the Association.   In Barossa, reduced to two members, Grundy was defeated and Duffield returned, but without Association support.   As table 10:1 shows he had moved to the 'opposition' early in the piece.   Dale had resigned before the third session opened in 1862, and Lennon had been declared insolvent in 1861, succeeded by former member Kingston.   Cole was re-elected from the new district of Burra, but had returned to the fold of the 'conservative-democrats', and Owen had resigned early in 1862.   Coglin was re-elected in Port Adelaide, but resigned as treasurer of the Political Association and, as his personal prosperity grew through involvement in pastoral leases, he resigned completely from the Association in 1863 and joined the Pastoral Association, on the opposing side of the political arena.   Of the five 'selected' candidates in Adelaide, only Bakewell and Santo stood for election, and both were returned.

The Political Association faded out rather than was defeated.   In its epitaph to the Association, the _Advertiser_ wrote that

> It may be difficult to establish political parties
> here;   first because there are few leading questions
> that sufficiently interest public opinion to draw
> men off to opposite sides, and partly because there
> are really so few intelligent and active politicians
> that they scarcely bear dividing.   [33]

Once the recession of the late 'fifties had moderated, politics in the colony did not see another 'workingman's party' until the emergence of the Labor Party in the 'nineties.   The Political Association was not, in fact, a political party.   It was a well-organised and unusually effective pressure group during a brief period centred on the 1860 elections.   It

could boast of some men in parliament who had been elected as members of the Association, but there was little evidence that these members formed anything more than a relatively cohesive faction which weakened over time, gave general support to the dominant Reynolds group, and disintegrated at the 1862 elections.

To return to the context of the South Australian colonial period as a whole, and to the problem of establishing when and why political parties and a party system of government emerged, it is necessary to establish what is being sought. To establish the existence of a political party, it will be necessary to identify both a legislative group, and an extra-parliamentary organisation or a group of candidates seeking to win representation in the legislature in the name of that organisation, and evidence of a functioning, nominating link between the two. Despite the difficulties implied by the qualification to the second factor, difficulties raised in the case of the seven candidates who stood in the name of the Political Association, this qualification is necessary. To use a modern example, the Democratic Labor Party in South Australia has consistently fought elections since 1956, with little electoral support and no success in terms of seats. Yet there is no doubt that the DLP is a political party. It can, of course, be so described on the basis of its affiliations with the federal DLP which has won representation, but even before Senate seats were won, the DLP was still clearly a political party. On the other hand, and at the other extreme, an electoral organisation which continually fails to win any legislative representation over a long period of time may lead to doubts as to whether the label 'party' can be applied in that instance. To some extent, then, a judgement has to be made when there is no legislative

representation.   Such a judgement would be based on such factors as the degree to which the continuing candidatures and candidates espoused the same 'label', and the degree to which the electoral organisation functioned as an organised body in a continuing attempt to win legislative membership.

When the two factors of electoral and legislative membership are evident, and it would be expected that this would be the situation in all but a few cases, then the evidence to establish whether or not these comprised a party organisation will be both electoral and legislative.

In the former, there will be evidence that the electoral organisation was a relatively permanent one, that it did not come into existence merely as an ephemeral pressure group in the immediate period of the elections, and dissipate afterwards, that it nominated candidates to stand for election in the name of the organisation, that these candidates accepted and acknowledged that they were standing for that organisation, and evidence that the link between organisation and candidate was transposed into a link between the member of parliament and the organisation.   In legislative terms there will be evidence of a consistency of voting patterns maintained over time, and a consistency of members of the legislature who remain as members of the political organisation.   We will expect to find that, unlike the Political Association, the 'party' was retained as a political unit over a series of elections, and that the association between the electoral and the legislative groups was maintained.

In Duverger's words, the electoral associations and the parliamentary groups are the 'mother cells', and

> it is enough that some permanent co-ordination can
> be established between them and that regular connec-
> tions unite them, for us to find ourselves faced by
> a true political party.   34

Such a broad definition is a far cry from the detailed list of attributes which Nairn demands, and it would be rejected by him for its broadness. The important aspect, that which needs to be emphasised in the analysis of any likely party, is the aspect of 'permanent co-ordination' and the 'regular' connections'. It is this 'link' between the electoral and legislative groups which is the determining factor in deciding when parties emerged.

An important subsidiary question is when to look for the development of parties in South Australia. In New South Wales, Loveday and Martin established the formation of parties in the late 'eighties, on the basis of the tariff issue. But it does not follow that one limits the search for parties in South Australia to the same period. As will be shown below, the tariff issue was not such a divisive one in the central colony, and did not lie at the base of party division. Some clues to the emergence of parties can be found in both electoral and legislative areas. One would expect political parties to bring in their train a markedly increased stability of ministerial office, and an increased polarity and stability of group voting patterns in the legislature. One would expect, therefore, that the index of structure in the POLIT analysis of voting would show a marked increase. In electoral terms, one would expect to find immediate evidence of organisations which were more than electoral pressure groups, and which were organised and evident in the inter-election periods.

In terms of ministerial stability, the period 1878-1884 suggests that a change had occurred in the legislature. In the previous six years there had been eight ministries with a considerable turnover in membership. The record ministries of Morgan, 1878-1881, and Bray, 1881-1884, suggests that this period may be fertile for a search for further evidence. In the nine

years following 1884, there were seven ministries, suggesting on the surface that the earlier patterns had returned.   But these ministries were led by a small number of men, in order, Colton, Downer, Playford, Cockburn, Playford, Holder and Downer, and contained a relative stable core of leading members.   As well, as table 8:13   indicates there was a peak in the patterns of the structure of voting patterns of members of the Assembly, maintained at an above-average level from 1883-1887, and at the highest pre-Labor level in 1884.   On this legislative evidence, then, one would expect that the search for pre-Labor political parties should be carried out in the period 1878-1892.

On the other hand, a superficial analysis of the electoral organisations in this period does little to suggest any real change.   Like those of the 'classic' faction period of earlier years, the elections from 1878-1890 were fought on a conglomeration of issues, and apparently in the same format.   In fact, the Register was forced to comment in 1887 that

> It is quite possible, indeed, after the elections
> are over that parties will assume a more definite
> shape, but in the meantime the electors are placed
> in an unfortunate, not to say unfair position.
> In the majority of instances it would be exceedingly
> difficult for an elector to know how to vote unless
> he allows himself to be influenced almost exclusively
> by personal preferences.   It is impossible for him
> to know when he is supporting a candidate what issue
> he is helping to decide.   [35]

This is not to say there were no electoral organisations.   As with the earlier elections, there was a plethora of pressure groups, each attempting to influence and 'test' the candidates.   These were diverse to the extreme in nature, organisation and effect.   They included such groups as the United Trades and Labor Council, The Farmers' Mutual Association,

prohibitionist groups, Licensed Victuallers Organisation, protectionist groups, free traders, groups favouring payment of members, groups opposing payment of members, the Social Purity League, The Bible Reading in State Schools Society, various temperance societies, the Anti-Capitation League, the Tramways Employees Association, and the Alma Farmers' Union. None of these, at least on the surface, showed evidence of being more than an extension and development of the various similar groups that had preceded them. None showed any immediate evidence of being part of the growth of a political party.

However, on the basis of the immediate legislative evidence, the period of pre-Labor politics from 1878 seems the most likely to show the development of the attributes which can be taken as evidence of a growth of a political party system in South Australia.

The Factions of the 'eighties

By the opening of the 1881 parliament, the faction leaders who had dominated colonial politics in the preceding twenty years had all but disappeared. Of the leaders of the 'sixties and 'seventies only Colton retained an important role in the Assembly, and only until 1887. Men such as Bray, Flayford and Rounsevell had consolidated their positions as leaders, and had attracted strong factional support in the house. J. W. Downer and C. C. Kingston, elected in 1881, soon emerged as strong leaders, and the election of John Cockburn in 1884 and F. W. Holder in 1887 completed the list of those who dominated the factions and the ministries in the 'eighties.

Table 10:1.   Ministries and faction leaders, 1881-1893.

Minis-try No.	Formed by	Faction leaders included in ministry	Period of service	Days
31	Morgan (Playford)	Hawker, Rounsevell	1878-81	1000
32	Bray	Downer, Glyde	1881-4	1088
33	Colton	Kingston, Playford, Rounsevell	1884-5	365
34	Downer	Bray, Cockburn	1885-7	725
35	Playford	Kingston	1887-9	746
36	Cockburn	Holder	1889-90	418
37	Playford	(a) Bray, Rounsevell (b) Kingston, Rounsevell	1890-92	672
38	Holder	Cockburn	1892	116
39	Downer	Rounsevell	1892-3	244

Each of these nine ministries, except that of Morgan, was forced to resign following direct confrontations with hostile majorities in the Assembly, seven following formal motions of no-confidence, Downer's of 1892-3 on a simple adjournment motion, and each of the five general elections from 1881 to 1893 was almost immediately followed by a ministerial defeat.

Table 10:2.   Ministry defeats, 1881-1893.

Minis-try No.	Led by	Date of opening of final session	Date of ministry defeat	Mover of motion leading to defeat
31	Morgan	June 2, 1881	June 21, 1881	(Resigned)
32	Bray	June 5, 1881	June 12, 1884	Colton
33	Colton	June 4, 1885	June 22, 1895	Downer
34	Downer	June 2, 1887	June 8, 1887	Playford
35	Playford	June 6, 1889	June 21, 1889	Cockburn
36	Cockburn	June 5, 1890	August 14, 1890	Playford
37	Playford	June 9, 1892	June 16, 1892	Holder
38	Holder	June 9, 1892	Oct. 12, 1892	Downer
39	Downer	June 8, 1893	June 8, 1893	Kingston

At first sight, then, these ministerial changes tended to indicate that a new pattern, that of defeat immediately following an election, resulted from the existence of a party system of government which enabled the results of an election to so change the membership of the Assembly as to make the tenure of the existing ministry no longer viable.   But the changes were not due to party pressures.   The faction system was still the dominant aspect of the South Australian legislative scene, but it was a faction system with a difference.

The transition from the 'classic' faction system of the first two decades occurred between 1878 and 1884, and was characterized by an unusual ministerial stability.   As noted above, the first impression of the Morgan and Bray ministries was one of long term stability, and a possible cause was the development of party rather than faction government.   But

neither electoral nor legislative evidence supported this. In electoral terms, the actions of various pressure groups 'selecting' candidates who continued to state their 'independence' continued the pattern of the preceding decades. And there was little evidence of party behaviour in the legislatures.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, these years saw the disappearance of many of the old faction leaders and the emergence of new ones, and as will be emphasised below, they were characterised in the Assembly by a relatively unsteady support for the two ministries of Morgan and Bray. There were few divisive issues in the period from 1878 to 1883, and the pattern of Structure in the Assembly reflected this.

Table 10:3. Numerical results of POLIT analysis, House of Assembly, 1878-83.

Session	091	192	193	101	102	103
Year	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883
Number of significant patterns	1	2	2	1	1	2
Total Structure	.10	.23	.17	.17	.13	.23
Proportion of Structure attributable to patterns	1→.10	.17	.10	.17	.13	.15
	2→ .-	.06	.07	-	-	.08

The general 'political quietude'[36] of these years is shown by the fact that there was only one no-confidence motion in the three sessions of the Morgan ministry, and this was overwhelmingly defeated. There were matters of controversy in the parliament, and the Legislative Council dealt severely with the ministries' proposals for public works on the grounds that they would necessitate further tax on the propertied. But the matters which

did bring division in the House of Assembly did not result in concerted attacks on the ministries of the day.   The former situation of a multi-faction system, with relatively high levels of internal cohesion, the consequent necessity to form coalition ministries and hence face the difficulty of ensuring that the support of the faction members followed the leaders, and the constant turnover of a small 'core' of faction leaders in the ministries, was replaced by a more diffuse situation dominated by large minorities of members who acted more in the tenet of Burkean independence than had their forebears in the house.

Part of the reason for this transition was that before the close of the 1878 session, a virtual power vacuum had occurred in the House of Assembly.   Of the faction leaders who had dominated the ministries and their oppositions for the last twenty years, only four remained in the legislature, and none of these had led a ministry.   Thus, on the breakup of the Boucaut ministry, it was to some extent natural that the Governor should look to the Legislative Council, and to William Morgan who had been Boucaut's Chief Secretary, to form a new ministry.   With the dearth of experienced members in the Assembly, it was also natural that Morgan should include Hawker and Playford from the old ministry.

The three years of the Morgan ministry saw the emergence of new faction leaders, notably J. C. Bray (elected 1871) and J. W. Downer (1878), and both men were dominant in the Bray ministry which followed the resigna-tion of Morgan.   Again, this ministry was remarkably stable, given the preceding two decades, and this stability came from similar factors which had provided the record Morgan term.   Despite the fact that Playford, Hawker (until his resignation in 1883), Rounsevell and the newly elected

C. C. Kingston were in general opposition to the Bray-Downer administration, there was a significant proportion of the membership which remained uncommitted to either a ministerial or an opposition side and, as table 10:4 shows, it was this uncommitted membership which held a numerical balance of power between the more cohesive and opposing factions. Like Morgan before him, Bray faced only one frontal attack. A censure motion alleging an incompetent financial policy was supported by Hawker, Kingston, Playford and Rounsevell, but, as the 28-14 vote against them and in favour of the ministry shows, the later role of Kingston and Playford, especially as leaders of large and cohesive factions, was only in a formative stage.

But following the 1884 elections, this period of transition was clearly over. A new and less ephemeral element of faction division emerged in the South Australian parliaments. The factions of the 'sixties and, to a lesser extent those of the 'seventies, were more or less cohesive, but bore little relation to issues. As the analysis of the land legislation in the late 'sixties showed, ministries and faction leaders were quite willing to change their policies if such actions meant an increased likelihood of returning to, or retaining, the treasury benches. The factions of the 'eighties differed in important ways. They were far more cohesive internally, and they were divided from each other in terms of a vague political attitude which fell short of being either a political ideology or a distinct platform which would be associated with modern parties, but which was sufficiently evident for distinctive comparisons to be made. Once the fundamental issues of political representation in the early 'fifties had been resolved, albeit temporarily, the terms

'conservative' and 'liberal' had little relevance in terms of the factional

divisions in the parliaments. Most members claimed to be, and most acted

in a manner best described as, 'conservative-democrats', and the constant

procession of 'ins and outs' could not be described within a model of

conservative and liberal ministries. But by the 'eighties, these terms

were being constantly used in the press, in journals and in the contemporary

literature, as well as in the legislatures, and with some basis. By the

mid-'eighties, a relatively small group of legislative leaders had emerged

with comparatively distinctive political attitudes. On the one hand, the

conservative outlook was epitomised by R. C. Baker in the Legislative

Council who had taken over the mantle of his father in opposition to 'class

influence' and 'experimental social'legislation, and who was later to form

and guide the National Defence League in its activities against the United

Labor Party. On the other hand, there were men such as C. C. Kingston,

son of the leader of the liberal group in the 'hybrid' Council, who was

regarded as the 'friend of the working man',[37] and was at the forefront

of much of the progressive legislation of this latter part of the colonial

era. But these labels must be applied with care. Their use is limited,

in fact, to a comparative sense. One can distinguish, for example,

a liberal ministry such as that of Playford, Holder or Cockburn from a

conservative ministry such as that of Downer in 1892-3. The use of the

terms, then, is limited to a comparison of the intentions, policies and

actions of the ministries, and the faction leaders and members, rather

than to an ideological stance which determined such actions. In the

South Australian context it is more accurate to refer, as Coghlan does,

to the more progressive and the less progressive factions rather than to

conservative or liberal.   We will return below to the history of political liberalism in South Australia, but it should be noted that this trend was important in qualifying the use of 'liberal' and 'conservative' in the 'eighties.   As table 10:1 showed, pragmatism had not entirely disappeared from the legislative scene, and the formation of a ministry containing J. W. Downer, who had become the least progressive of the Assembly leaders, and Cockburn, who was among the most radical in relation to social legislation, was evidence that the necessity to balance the factions in the house had not been overcome by a new style of group behaviour.   The tenet of 'independence' was also far from abandoned, and as a later chapter will show, was maintained into the 'nineties when clear political parties had emerged.   But, in the 'eighties more than any other time, this tenet of legislative behaviour became changed in practice, and the factions showed a degree of cohesion which was new to the South Australian scene.

Table 10:4 summarises the patterns of support and opposition to the ministries between 1878 and 1892, and outlines the patterns of faction leadership and support.   It should be noted that each of the six ministries from 1884 were coalitions between faction leaders, and on occasions were coalitions between unusual bedfellows.

Diagram 10-2: Ministries, faction leaders, faction support, House of Assembly, 1878-1893.

Year	1878	1879	1880	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	1891	1892	1893
Session	091	092	093	101	102	103	111	112	113	121	123	124	131	132	133	141

Ministry No. / Leader: 31 Morgan [Playford] · 32 Bray · 33 Colton · 34 Downer · 35 Playford · 36 Cockburn · 37 Playford · 38 Holder · 39 Downer

Session:	091	092	093	101	102	103	111	112	113	121	123	124	131	132	133
Min. No.:	31	31	31	32	32	32	33	34	34	35	35	36	37	37	38
Support Strong	Playford Hawker 12 Boucaut	Playford Hawker 25	Playford Hawker 6	Bray Downer Glyde 13	Bray Downer Glyde 9 Colton	Bray Downer Glyde 5	Colton Kingston Playford Rounsevell 7	Downer Bray Cockburn 6	Downer Bray Cockburn 10 11	Playford Kingston Rounsevell 5	Playford Kingston Rounsevell 5	Cockburn Holder 5 Kingston 18	Playford Bray Rounsevell 5	Playford Bray Rounsevell 6	Cockburn Holder 8
Support Unsteady				Colton 17		7	Cockburn 23	7 23 Glyde Hawker					Kingston 7		Kingston Playford 16
Independent	Glyde 14 Rounsevell 5		Downer 24 Rounsevell		9 Kingston Rounsevell	18					21	Hawker Holder Rounsevell 20	18 Butler Hawker	Kingston 21 Hawker Butler Downer	
Opposition Unsteady	5				13		11 Hawker		14 Colton Hawker	9 Holder	26 Cockburn Rounsevell Downer	18 Playford Rounsevell			19 Butler
Opposition Strong	Bray Colton Downer 12	Bray Downer Glyde Rounsevell 20	Bray Colton Glyde 16	Hawker Kingston Playford Rounsevell 15	Playford 13	15 Colton Kingston Playford Rounsevell	10 Bray Downer	15 Colton Kingston Playford Rounsevell	15 Glyde Kingston Playford Rounsevell	16 Bray Cockburn Downer Hawker		10 Downer Hawker	23 Cockburn Downer Holder	26 Cockburn Holder	10 Downer Hawker Rounsevell
Unplaced	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Totals	48	46	47	46	46	46	52	52	53	52	52	52	54	54	54

Left axis label: Level and pattern of ministry support and opposition, faction leaders and members.

The Hon. John Colton wasted no time in disposing of the Bray-Downer ministry when the eleventh parliament opened in June 1884. The newly-elected Cockburn was the only one of the faction leaders who were to dominate the following decade who supported the administration. Colton's recognition of the current factional support in the house in the inclusion in his ministry of Kingston, Playford and Rounsevell, provided him with a clear majority throughout 1884, and Downer, Bray and Hawker were the only faction leaders to oppose him. The consistency of his support led to a new complaint in the South Australian parliament, the allegation that sychophantic behaviour had produced a situation of 'total abolition of ministerial responsibility and the abolition of responsible government'.[38] These allegations of 'ministerial dictatorship' formed the major plank of Downer's attack at the opening of the 1885 session, and the backbench members exerted their independence once again. The patterns of support and opposition which had maintained Colton were disrupted when Cockburn took his faction into opposition on the censure vote. Despite the criticisms of the strength of the 1884 support for Colton, the faction system, with its constant possibilities for office, was still dominant. This was shown by the sudden move of Cockburn from support to opposition, and the parallel move by Hawker and his faction in the opposite political direction, and by the formation of the succeeding ministry. Cockburn was rewarded with the position of Minister of Education in the Downer administration, and the coalition of the two least progressive leaders in the Assembly, Downer and Bray, with the self-styled most radical member, was evidence that political parties, if they had formed, were not based on any firm commitment to an ideology. As the Register put it,

> the more we study the list of names the more puzzled
> we are as to the principle upon which the Cabinet
> has been brought together.... one charge against
> the Colton ministry was that they were not in harmony
> with each other.... this latest combination is more
> suggestive of discord than of harmony.   39

Ministry formation was still essentially a matter of personality rather
than policy, with the resolution of the balance of the various factional
groups rather than with stable majority government.   Downer was dependent
on a very unsteady house, and found that while there was support for his
actions in turning out the Colton ministry, this was not necessarily
transposed to the programme he put forward.   The government faced a
majority in opposition in terms of the voting patterns of the session as a
whole, and was forced to accept amendments to many bills.   Where Colton in
1884 had been accused of dictating to the House, Downer faced accusations
that his ministry had been too pliant and had 'struggled through by permit-
ting the House to shape its policy for it'.[40]   It was 'a ministry of no
policy ... as shifting as the sands of the Murray mouth',[41] it 'could not
claim any credit for the policy they had got', and was led by a Premier
who had become a 'regular political wabbler'.[42]

The elections of 1887 destroyed even this unsteady balance.   Only
thirty four of the fifty two members returned to the Assembly, and of these,
only thirteen had been Downer supporters in 1886.   The Observer pondered
on whether the eighteen new members could be 'cajoled' into supporting the
Downer ministry, and emphasised that ministries in the 'eighties, as they
had in the 'sixties, depended ultimately on faction politics.

> If the fate of ministries depended absolutely on the
> acceptance or rejection of their policy by the country,
> the tenure of office of the present cabinet would be on
> the point of closing, but where ministries are pliant
> and members are largely influenced in their support of
> governments by personal considerations, there are no
> definite data on which to place conclusions.   43

The new men held the 'balance of power', and the initiative for the attack on the Downer ministry was left to Saul Solomon, after only days as a member. Downer's absence from the colony during the elections was one of the main charges against his ministry, and the final vote was a strong repudiation of the coalition. Only four of the new members supported Downer, and he was defeated 29-16 with seven members absent from the division,[44] all but one of whom had been in opposition during the previous session. No faction leader crossed the floor to support the coalition and, in the limited sense, the ministry was defeated by the electorate.

The Playford-Kingston ministry survived for two years, but again dependent on a large and wavering independent group, The inclusion of Kingston was, in Coghlan's words, 'certainly a guarantee for the liberalism of its tendencies',[45] but it was no guarantee of support from the other liberals in the house. Cockburn joined Downer and his former colleagues to be the strongest opposition to Playford, and Holder offered only an unsteady support. There was, as yet, no unity among the liberals, and legislative politics was still faction oriented. The confidence motion on which the Playford ministry fell, moved by Cockburn, was supported by all faction leaders, conservative or liberal. Despite the fact that the spokesman for the opposition groups in the 1887 and 1888 sessions had been Downer, the formation of the new ministry was entrusted to Cockburn, a decision which angered the Observer.

> It must be a funny sort of opposition which is ready
> to follow a conservative and an imperialist one week,
> and a leader who is just the opposite the next week ...
> whose principles must be of the reversible order, and
> warranted to suit all changes of the political atmosphere.[46]

It was, however, not a matter of principles, but of purely pragmatic considerations. Given the state of the Assembly membership and the lack of a majority in support of a liberal or a conservative attitude, let alone of a particular faction leader, then the formation and defeat of any ministry was still a matter of numbers and factions and not of principles. And the succeeding patterns of support in 1889 showed this clearly. Playford went into opposition to join Downer and Kingston gave qualified support to Cockburn. There was no evident continuity of stable patterns of support and opposition for the new ministry which, the Observer noted, bore 'a strong family likeness to the party [which defeated Playford] in that it is made up of most incongruous elements'.[47]

The ministry survived only a brief time after the 1890 elections, which again played a major role. Attorney-General Moulden was defeated at the polls, and Cockburn was initially rejected by all lawyers in the Assembly in his attempts to fill the vacancy.[48] However, just before the opening of the new parliament, H. E. Downer, brother of J. W. Downer, accepted the position, and Cockburn faced the Assembly on June 5, confident that this move would bring support from the former premier, and from the conservative members. But there were marked changes in the membership, and many of Cockburn's former supporters had been defeated. Only thirty six of the former fifty two returned and there were seventeen new members in the house which had been increased to fifty four following the declaration of the Northern Territory as an election district. Cockburn secured the support of a majority of the new members,[49] but the opposition, although 'heterogeneous in political nature', had apparently been 'secretly plotting and resorting to diverse stratagems' in a 'determination to get rid of the ministry', and the 'reckless and unpatriotic conduct'[50] of the

inclusion of H. E. Downer was the explicit reason for the censure motion.
Kingston deserted Cockburn and voted with J. W. Downer, Bray and Playford
to defeat the ministry, 29-24.

Playford's ministry was again a coalition, including Bray and Rounsevell.
He retained a generally unsteady majority support during the 1890 session,
partly through the faction support for Kingston who, although he was not a
member of the ministry, was claimed to be the 'power behind it' and the
driving force for the liberal programme which emerged.[51]   When Bray was
appointed as Agent General in London in early 1892, this de facto relation-
ship was formalised, and Kingston was appointed as Chief Secretary.   But
his stay was brief.   The opening of the 1892 session saw an attempt by
one liberal leader, Holder, to displace a ministry formed by two other
equally liberal leaders, a situation which prompted the comment that 'there
was no other purpose in the change except that six members of parliament will
get substantial salary increases at the expense of six others'.[52]   The
extent to which ideology was absent from these changes is indicated by the
explanation of one supporter of Playford who had voted against him on the
confidence motion that he had done so because the ministry 'had threatened
to remove a policeman from his district'.[53]

The election of members who had stood as 'working class' candidates[54]
brought little change in the general patterns of behaviour in the house,
and liberal and conservative 'party lines' were no more clear in the early
part of 1892 than they had been earlier.   The second Holder-Cockburn
ministry, on this occasion under the leadership of the latter, was supported
originally by Kingston and Playford, but they joined forces with Downer
and Bray on Downer's censure motion against the ministry.   Again, there
was little of 'high political principle' in the confidence debates.   Downer

had moved against the 'collective supineness' and the 'pusillanimity' of the government, against the 'heterogeneous condition' of the members,[55] and after two days of debate on personalities rather than policies, the ministry was defeated narrowly, 28-24.[56]

Downer returned to office for the second time, but on this occasion he faced, for the first time, an opposition which included all the liberal leaders in the house. One Downer supporter had described the preceding Holder ministry as a 'conglomerate mass',[57] and this was an equally sound description of the new ministry. Downer included Copley, Homburg and W. B. Rounsevell, all of whom had been members of the Playford ministry which he had so strenuously attacked and voted out of office only four months earlier, and also included L. Grayson, a self professed 'labour supporter and advocate'.[58] This was clearly an attempt to continue the pattern of preceding ministries, to attempt to resolve the factions in the house, by including men who would, hopefully, provide an overall majority. But only G. C. Hawker of the faction leaders gave even conditional support to Downer. Cockburn, Holder, Kingston and Playford were together in opposition for the first time. But Downer managed to survive the two months to the end of the session. The Kingston-Playford faction could command seventeen votes and the Holder-Cockburn group nine out of the fifty four members, and while Downer could retain the support of Hawker and a large independent group he managed to pass his legislation. But only for the remainder of the 1892 session. The 1893 elections brought a new dimension to South Australian politics, and we will return to this below.

There was little evidence in the house of the development of voting
patterns on party rather than factional lines.   Leaders who opposed each
other at one time became colleagues in a succeeding ministry, as easily
in the 'eighties as they had in the previous twenty years.   The 'eighties
were characterised by a greater degree of cohesion in the various factions
in the Assembly, and by a relatively smaller number of members who emerged
as strong faction leaders.   But the legislative politics of this decade
were faction politics, at least in the terms described - in terms of the
making and breaking of ministries.   The questions remains: were these
more cohesive groups founded on a different electoral basis?   Was there
evidence of the genesis of party in the elections during this period?

The Electorate of the 'eighties

As mentioned above, the 'eighties was characterised by the emergence
of numerous electoral pressure groups at the time of general elections,
groups which 'put questions' to the candidates and recommended a list as
worthy of support.   Two such groups showed evidence of being more than
these ephemeral electoral associations;   one centred on the rural areas
of the colony and concerned essentially with rural matters, the other
essentially urban, even working class in nature, concerned mainly with the
situation of the urban worker.   The former, the Farmers' Mutual Associa-
tion, and the latter, based on the remnants of the former Political
Association and later on the trades unions, at first sight provided possibilit
of a conflict of rural and city interests, of the genesis of a country
versus a city party, the pattern which characterises the electoral politics
of the State in the mid-twentieth century.

The FMA was formed in 1879 after a poor harvest, originally as a co-operative to develop agricultural techniques, but increasingly as a means to unite farmers politically. Two years later it was reported to have thirty seven branches,[59] its representatives met periodically in Adelaide, and it had a full-time secretariat as well as an official publication, the Areas Express at Gladstone.[60] The FMA was active in the 1881 election campaign, and there was evidence that the new Bray ministry tailored its land policy after strong representations from the Association.[61] The Register claimed at the 1881 elections that the FMA 'ticket' had been 'pretty well adopted throughout the colony',[62] and certainly the sitting members from the farming electorates offered their support. But the FMA retained the approach of its predecessors and contemporaries. It was an electoral pressure group rather than a party. It supported and recommended candidates, but did not endorse them, and, although these candidates accepted such a recommendation, they did not stand as nominees of the FMA. In fact, in the Flinders electorate, different branches of the FMA had supported different candidates and this 'effectively nullified its influence'.[63]

A recent study by J. B. Hirst[64] concluded that the FMA had considerable electoral success, and wielded considerable political influence. But this needs to be tempered in two ways. Certainly the FMA was electorally successful in the terms that it saw its 'selected' candidates elected. Rankine was elected as an FMA 'nominee'[65] to the Legislative Council in 1881, and the FMA 'ticket' of six members was elected in the 1882 election to the upper house. As well, Miller, the President of the FMA, and Howe and Catt who were members, were elected to the Assembly in 1881, with Ward who was 'selected' as worthy of farmer support. But, of the FMA selections

for the Council, two had been former members of the upper house, and a further two had been members of the Assembly. Thus, four of the FMA 'ticket' carried with them into the single province elections, the advantage of being well-known legislators. The FMA could claim greater success in the Assembly elections, for Howe, Catt and Miller were elected for the first time, although the incumbent members retired rather than were defeated. But, even granting electoral success to the FMA, the members, once elected, returned to the 'independent' mode of behaviour which had characterised the 'nominees' of the Pastoral Association two decades earlier. There was no stable pattern of ministry support or opposition among the FMA members in the 1881-4 parliament. Howe gave qualified support to the Bray administration in 1881 while Ward opposed it, despite the fact that Catt was the Minister for Lands, and both Howe and Ward voted against their colleague in the confidence motion of 1884.

In the 1884 elections, seven FMA-backed candidates were elected. Howe, Catt and Ward were returned, and FMA president, Miller, was elected from Stanley. Burgoyne and Copley were elected from the northern districts of the colony, and P. B. Coglin, whose political career had encompassed the Political Association in 1859, when he was a self-styled working man's representative and the Pastoral Association in the mid 'sixties when he had become one of the most vocal opponents of the valuations, was elected under the FMA banner for the district of Newcastle. However, the increase in representation brought no parallel increase in legislative solidarity. The seven FMA 'nominees' gave a rather unsteady support to the Playford ministry in 1884, and voted for the ministry in the 1885 censure motion, but were divided in their attitude to the succeeding Downer-Cockburn administration.

Howe was included in this ministry as the Commissioner of Crown Lands,
and Burgoyne and Copley gave a qualified support over the 1885 session.
However, Catt, Coglin and Ward were in opposition.   On only one issue of
the eleventh parliament were the FMA-backed members in agreement.   They
all opposed the legislation to allow payment of members.[66]   But these were
the only divisions[67] on which the seven members voted as one.

The zenith of the FMA was in 1882, when it claimed 1250 members in
sixty country branches.[68]   But at no time was it a political party.   It
had been formed at a time of rural recession, and owed its membership and
political drive to the continued low level of the rural economy.   But
its efforts were circumscribed to some degree by its nature and programme.
Its electoral successes were in the 'farming belt' of the colony, from the
districts of Frome, Gladstone, Newcastle and Stanley, and it made no attempt
to influence the results in the more urban districts.   It was in opposition
to the various groups who were active at elections in favour of the working
man, and opposed the activities of the urban pressure groups.   But it was
not the precursor of the anti-Labor party of the 'nineties.   As will be
shown below, the National Defence League looked for its success to the
rural areas of the colony, but it depended for its leadership on city
entrepreneurs.   The FMA, like the Pastoral Association which preceded it,
was a relatively large and relatively organised and stable pressure group,
which could claim some electoral and legislative success.   But it was not
a political party.   It lacked the necessary third attribute of an
institutionalised link between its electoral organisation and its legislative
membership.   By the 1887 elections, following a marked rise in the
level of the rural economic situation, the FMA had all but disappeared from
the electoral and political arena.

The 'eighties also saw the revival of the influence of working men's organisations in electoral politics in South Australia. The Political Association of the early 'fifties and its successor of the 1859-1862 period had both a genesis and a reason for continued existence in the issue of assisted immigration. As Craig points out,[69] the working men of the colony had little awareness of a common interest early, and their involvement in the elections in the first two decades was paralleled by economic fluctuations. In times of recession, the issue of immigration was to the forefront, and working men's clubs and associations sprang up. In times of affluence, these generally reverted to being social rather than political organisations. The revival of the Political Association in 1866 and its disappearance by 1868 followed a similar pattern. As one speaker at a meeting to revive the Association in 1866 put it, 'when the workmen have plenty of work ... they forget about political associations'.[70]

By the 'seventies, these workingmen's clubs and social organisations had grown in number, and had extended out from the city of Adelaide to the other urban settlements in the colony, notably the mining areas. In 1874 a Labour League was formed, based on tradesmen's societies, and in 1877 a new Political Association was formed, reviving the aims and methods of the earlier organisations.[71] The Political Association acted as a usual electoral pressure group in the 1878 elections; it questioned candidates and bestowed support on those found to be worthy of it, but its activities were as transient as its predecessors. In 1882, however, the National Liberal Reform League was formed, with the object of organising unions and working men into a powerful and effective political group. In 1884 the United Trades and Labour Council was formed, with a Parliamentary

Committee established to lobby the parliamentarians for increased concessions
for the working man, and to provide a more centralised and hopefully more
effective means of judging and backing the various electoral candidates.

These organisations were limited by both internal and external factors
from nominating direct candidates for election.   The tenet of both electoral
and legislative behaviour was still that of the Burkean independent, and the
extent to which this was accepted by the labour organisations is shown by
the fate of a motion before the United Trades and Labour Council in 1886.
The resolution sought to nominate a direct Labor representative to the
Assembly, but it lapsed following a lack of support from the affiliated
unions.[72]   The external factors included the fact that the working man was
effectively barred from election until the passage of the Payment of Members
Act in 1887,[73] and the apparent unwillingness of voters to support men who
stood as 'representatives of the working man'.[74]

The Liberal Reform League reached its organisational zenith at the
1884 elections, but despite its organisation, and its efforts in questioning
and backing candidates, it had little success.   To the short lived South
Australian Times,[75] essentially favourable to the cause of the League, there
was one serious shortcoming which had to be overcome before the working
man could attain the political power he deserved.

> There has been one important lesson which the electors
> should have gathered from the present parliamentary
> elections ... that mere numerical combination without
> properly effective organisation and unanimity of
> purpose is utterly powerless to advance or sustain
> the interests of any cause. We have on previous
> occasions commented on the short comings in this
> respect of the National Liberal Reform League of S.A....
> was formed some 12 months ago, and was supposed to
> possess at least the numerical element of potentiality
> ... The great blunder of the League has been that it
> has seemed to have made its chief objects the gathering
> within its embrace the largest possible number of
> members. In order to secure this end the platform
> has been made as comprehensible as possible. Payment
> of members has been made a plank to please some,
> protection to please others, free education to attract
> others, and so on.... In fact the League has been
> nothing more than a heterogenous collection of politicians
> of all types, making altogether a motley group. There
> has been no common aim, and consequently no concentrated
> and uniform plan of action.... No wonder, under such
> government, that the League should be able to command
> no influence.... If it is desired that any influence
> whatever should be secured by them the Reform League
> must go in for an entire reorganisation. Let it be
> started upon the basis of one single reform, as, for
> instance, payment of members. Let no-one join the
> League who will not pledge himself distinctly to
> support that object. 76

But it was not until the 'nineties, following a serious and devastating

strike, that the labour movement accepted the necessity for direct nomination

of pledged candidates. Throughout the decade of the 'eighties, the various

trades unions, the working men's associations and the Liberal Reform League

all accepted the contemporary mode of electoral activity. They, like the

Political Associations which preceded them, and their contemporary organisa-

tions on the other side of the 'political fence', were essentially electoral

pressure groups, differing only in the degree of organisation, the extent

of their membership, and the amount of pressure they could apply as a lobby

once their selected candidates had been elected.

On the evidence of both electoral and legislative behaviour analysed
to date, there was no evidence of the emergence of a political party system
prior to the formation of the United Labor Party in the 'nineties. Factions
apparently dominated the legislatures as they had done for the previous
decades, and pressure group activity was the main function of electoral
organisations. But we are still left with the necessity to explain one
notable attribute of the analysis of legislative behaviour in the 'eighties -
the marked rise in the degree of structure in the House of Assembly.

Patterns of Legislative Behaviour - a Tariff division?

The emergence of political parties in an essentially faction oriented
legislature would produce clear evidence of change in the voting patterns of
members of that legislature. The members of each party would show a degree
of cohesion not apparent in the faction style of legislative activity, a
cohesion which would be evident over time, and there would be an evident
increase in the overall polarity of the voting patterns of the membership
as a whole. The previous analysis of factions and faction government in
the 'eighties indicated a relative increase in the degree of cohesion of the
factions, compared to those which had dominated the parliaments in the first
two decades. On the other hand, the continued ease with which the faction
leaders and their groups of followers took office in, or supported, ministries
with which they had been in opposition, tended to indicate that if the
factions had become parties, then they were not divided by any ideology or
political principle. By the mid-'nineties, as following chapters will
show, there was no doubt that a party system was in genesis, that political
parties were in the process of replacing the factions which had dominated
the political life of South Australia. The legislative evidence showed

this clearly.   The index of Structure in the voting patterns in the
House of Assembly rose significantly after the election of the first members
of the United Labor Party, and, as will be shown below, this was supported
by other aspects of legislative as well as electoral behaviour.   The mid-
'eighties, the years from 1884-1887, also showed evidence of a significant
increase in the Structure of the Assembly, an increase which is striking
in comparison with the levels of structure immediately before and after
those years.

Diagram 10-3: Structure, House of Assembly, 1875-1892.

Mean, 1857-92

P 8			P 9			P 10			P 11			P 12			P 13		
S 1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
1875			1878			1881			1884			1887			1890		

To establish whether political parties emerged in this brief period and temporarily replaced the faction system, we need to establish the three factors noted above; the existence of an electoral organisation, the existence of a legislative group standing in the name of that organisation and acting on divisions as a cohesive group, and the existence of a permanent link between the two groups.

As shown above, the lines of factional support and opposition during the life of a specific ministry were generally disrupted when that ministry fell. Although it was possible to identify relatively cohesive factions across and above these lines of support and opposition, factions which retained their cohesion over more than one ministry, the patterns of cohesion in a party system would show evidence of more than this. We would expect to find also that the cohesion in the voting patterns of the members of a party would be maintained over all issues which were debated. Thus, while the Boothby case polarised the parliament of South Australia in the 'fifties and 'sixties, the patterns of voting on that issue were not carried through to the next series of issues - those of land and taxation. Specific groups of members voted as one on specific issues in the colonial parliaments, as did the members supported by the FMA on the issue of payment of members, but this cohesion was not evident on the other issues and divisions in the sessions. Political party members, on the other hand, would show evidence of a high degree of cohesion on all issues, but especially on those which were established as the most significant.

The POLIT technique, as was explained in Chapter VIII enables the identification of the significant issues, and the levels of cohesion in the voting patterns on these issues. The scores of members obtained from

their patterns of voting on the most significant divisions in any one session, provides a measure of the extent to which party cohesion rather than factional behaviour was apparent. Diagram 10:4 provides a graphic representation of the scores of all members of the House of Assembly between 1884 and 1892 on the most significant pattern in each session. Two brief periods, 1887-8 and 1890-1 show evidence of a small group of members whose patterns of voting were markedly dissimilar from those of the remaining members. However, further analysis of these small groups in terms of the degree of cohesion before and after the evident periods indicates that this was a transient cohesion. The patterns of similar voting evident in diagram 10:4 were essentially patterns of support or opposition to a specific ministry, rather than patterns which would characterise a party system. The following diagrams refine the complexity of diagram 10:4, showing the voting patterns over the period of the members of the Assembly who were

(i)   members of the apparently distinctive groups in 1887, and 1890 (10:4B).

(ii)   members of ministries.   (10:5).

(iii)   agriculturalist or pastoralist in occupation. (10:6A).

(iv)   FMA nominees (10:6B).

(v)   in the remainder of the membership of the house. (10:7).

Diagram 10-4: Scores of members, House of Assembly, 1884-1892.

A. Total membership.

B. Showing behaviour of two blocs.

Diagram 10-5: Scores of members of ministries, 1884-1892,

Colton, 1884-5:   Downer, 1885-7:━━━   Playford, 1887-9:━━━

Cockburn, 1889-90:   Playford, 1890-2:   Holder, 1892:

Diagram 10-6: Scores of 'rural' members of the House of Assembly, 1884-1892.

A. Members whose occupations were predominantly in primary industry.

B. Members of the F.M.A.

Diagram 10-7: Scores of the members of the Assembly, 1884-92, who were not in groups.

These diagrams support the conclusion arrived at earlier, that the patterns of legislative behaviour in the pre-Labor period were essentially faction rather than party based. There is no evidence that the members of the FMA or those who were predominantly agricultural or pastoral in their occupations constituted the legislative aspect of a political party. The patterns of voting were essentially oriented in regard to the position of the ministry of the day.

One final question relating to the possible emergence of a party system remains to be examined, that of the tariff issue which, as Loveday and Martin point out, lay at the base of the pre-Labor parties in New South Wales.

South Australia had never embraced free trade. From 1857, the colony had been committed to a policy of ad valorem duties as a major source of revenue,[77] to the point that, in 1860, following strong mercantile pressure the Government had proposed to cut duties, but 'when it came to the acid test, the need for revenue was too great'.[78] The failure of an Intercolonial Tariff Conference in 1863 saw heavier tariffs and duties applied in South Australia, with the intention primarily of increasing revenue, and this policy was continued. This is not to say that there were no members committed to the principle of free-trade, and bills concerning tariffs and duties were opposed in principle and on details at all stages in the Parliament,[79] but there was a continual majority in favour of continuing a tariff policy. In 1870 tariffs were raised further, and in 1875 the terms of an Intercolonial Free Trade Bill introduced into the Assembly, including an assimilation of South Australian Tariffs to those of New South Wales[80] were so acceptable that second and third readings passed without division,

and there were no amendments.[81]   The ensuing revision of tariffs in 1876
raised some duties, bringing them in line with New South Wales, again with
no divisions of the House necessary,[82] a unanimity which was described as
the result of 'a compromise between free-traders and protectionists'.[83]

The turning point on the issue of protection came with the depression
of 1884.[84]   As Pantis described it, 'the years after 1876 were the most
prosperous in the history of the Colony', but, by 1885, the colony was
'pressed internally by a deficitary situation, unemployment, the need for
the continuation of public works and an acute shortage of revenue'.[85] The
solution, to the Treasurer when he introduced the Customs Bill of 1884, was
that tariffs would have to provide the necessary revenue.[86]   He received
clear majority support at all stages of the Bill.[87]   Although, in 1884,
Treasurer W. B. Rounsevell had stated the purpose of the Bill was to offer
protection to local industries as well as raising revenue, it was left to
a succeeding Treasurer, Playford, to emphasise the former.   In a financial
statement to the House in 1887 he made it clear that the tariffs were to
be revised 'with the view of affording substantial encouragement to local
productions and manufacturers, [not] for the purposes of revenue'.[88]   His
government's 'four principles' made the point clear:

1. The encouragement of products and manufactures by increased
   duties on imported products and manufactures.

2. The admission of raw material free.

3. ... a free breakfast table.

4. The taxation of luxuries. [89]

Few members expressed absolute opposition to the principle of tariffs; the
majority attitude was epitimised by one member who 'was neither a strong
free-trader nor a red-hot protectionist'.[90]   The main opposition came

on the grounds that the Bill introduced 'too much protection' and one member
called on 'moderate protectionists' to vote against it as 'it was every-
thing except a moderate Bill'.[91]   Even a self-named 'ardent free-trader',
G. C. Hawker, opposed the bill not on principle but on extent, and 'if it
had provided for moderate protection ... he would not have felt so bitter'.[92]

The passage of this Bill meant that by the close of 1887, South
Australia was fully committed to protectionist policies.   The extent
of this commitment and the general agreement on the question is shown by a
press comment prior to the 1890 elections.

> A ministry including in its ranks two theoretical
> freetraders but pledged absolutely to protection
> has been for some time past a standing proof of the
> popular acceptance of the present fiscal policy ...
> The fact of the matter is that neither in the country
> nor in the city has there been the slightest attempt
> to make freetrade an electioneering cry.   On the
> other hand, candidates suspected from their first
> utterances of a want of sympathy with Protection have
> been at pains to indicate that they have no intention
> of interfering with the tariff.   93

By 1890 the issue had apparently been resolved without a deep political
division and, to the Register at least,

> It is rather unfortunate that there is no burning
> question before the country to over-ride all subordinate
> issues.   There is no single question which is likely
> to be paramount ... To a large extent the elections may
> be said to turn upon the question whether the present
> ministry shall remain in office. 94

But did the Parliament divide on party lines?   Tariff revision,
Protection and Freetrade were issues at the elections of 1881, 1884 and
1887,[95] but were they party issues?   In New South Wales such a
'party division' did occur,[96]   but to Alison Priestly 'South Australia
faced [such] "tricky problems" without dividing'.[97]

When we turn to the division lists to establish answers, we are faced
with the problems of legislative voting analysis described in Chapter VIII.
Following the third reading of the 1887 Tariff Bill one member explained
he had voted against the Bill 'not with any regard to the Tariff question
but on entirely different grounds',[98] and another was forced to vote 'no'
as he had not had sufficient time to leave the House to honour a pair and
was therefore 'duty-bound' to vote as his 'paired member' would.[99] However,
even with such shortcomings,[100] the analysis of divisions indicates there
was a clear majority in favour of protection in both the Eleventh (1884-7)
and Twelfth (1887-90) Parliaments, and supports the conclusion of analysis
by POLIT above that there was no evidence of a party division in the
legislature over the tariff.

The crucial votes were those on the second readings of the 1885
Customs Bill and the 1887 Tariff Revision Bill and the third reading of
the latter.[101]   Table 10:4 outlines the opposition on these votes.

Table 10:4.   Voting on Customs Bills;   1885, 1887.

102.

Member	1885 [2R]	1887 [2R]	1887 [3R]
Bill carried	27-11	20-12	25-18
Bagot	No	(N)	(N)
Bagster	-	-	No
Bewes	-	-	No
Burgoyne	No	No	No
Caldwell	Yes	No	-
Castine	No	No	No
Coglin	No	(N)	(N)
Coles	No	*Yes	*Yes
Copley	No	(N)	(N)
Downer, H. E.	-	No	No
Duncan	Yes	No	No
Furner	Yes	-	No
Gilbert	Yes	No	No
Glynn	(N)	No	No
Hawker, E. W.	No	No	No
Handyside	-	-	No
Holder	(N)	No	No
Horn	(N)	-	No
Howe	*Yes	-	No
Hussey	(N)	No	No
Krichauff	No	Yes	Yes
Moody	No	(N)	(N)
Rees	Yes	-	No
Rounsevell	No	No	No
Ward	No	No	No

(N) = not a member of House

No   = voted against Bill

Yes = voted for Bill

*   = Minister

-    = member, but did not vote, and not paired.

Two members, Coles and Howe, while supporting the respective Government Bill while members of that Government, opposed the proposal when voting as 'private' members.   Six other members supported one bill and opposed the other.   The 'core' of opposition to the Tariff proposals consists of members such as Burgoyne, E. W. Hawker, Rounsevell and Ward who voted against both Bills.   Ward, and his colleague Rees, who voted for reasons outlined above cannot be considered as members of this 'core', and in fact Rees' explanation for his 1887 vote places him in the 'supporting' list.

Unlike the situation at most elections in the colonial period, where attempts to isolate candidate opinion on the hustings requires the sifting of pages of reports in the press of the day, which usually made brief reference to candidates who 'spoke' and were 'well' or 'not well' received, the elections of 1887 were documented fully by the Register.[103]   We can, therefore, establish what the elected members said was their 'stance' on the issue of free-trade/protection with more than the usual accuracy. Against this evidence, we can put the details of how these members voted on the tariff legislation before the Parliament.

Electoral opinion on the tariff question ranged over a wide continuum, from Holder who called himself a 'freetrader to the backbone',[104] through Hussey who was a 'freetrader on principle',[105] and Kimber who described himself as a 'weak-kneed freetrader, but considered protection was necessary in some cases',[106] to Moulden, a 'moderate protectionist'[107] and Solomon who was an 'out-and-out protectionist.[108]   The Government policy, expressed by Bray was 'against altering the tariff in the next session, but when altered it should be so altered as to make local industries flourish'.[109] Of the fifty two members, eleven leant towards a freetrade position within this wide continuum, twenty three towards a policy of protection, sixteen

had nothing to say on the issue and four took a median position, epitimised by Catt, who was 'neither a freetrader nor a protectionist, but would encourage local industries without unduly increasing general burdens'.[110] But these 'groups' by no means acted as 'legislative parties'. Diagram 10:8 shows the scores of the 'pure' and 'alleged' freetraders in the Assembly, compared to the scores of the Playford ministry (1887-8), and the scores of members who opposed the tariff bills of 1885, 1887.

Diagram 10-8: Scores of 'free-trade' members of House of Assembly, 1884-1892.

A. Members reported as freetraders, showing the members of the 'protectionist' Ministry

B. Opponents of Tariff measures, showing opposition 'core'.

There is little evidence to support the claim by Combe that between 1876 and 1890 'a member's political allegiance was determined according to his adherence to the principle of either protection or free trade'.[111] In fact, the evidence is towards the opposite conclusion - that the issue of the tariff had little legislative effect and did not disrupt the faction system even to the extent that the issue of land had in the 'sixties. There were ministries which could accurately be termed protectionist, exemplified by that of Playford, but these were formed through the pressures of the faction system rather than through pressures engendered by the tariff issue. There were members who were strong freetraders in principle, but were pragmatic in their electoral statements, and more so in their legislative behaviour.   As in Western Australia,[112] the issue of the tariff played no part in the formation of political parties in South Australia, and there were no organisations in the electorates which could be compared to those in New South Wales.[113]   As with the issue of land and land valuations in the 'sixties, the problems associated with the tariff in South Australia, problems which were essentially concerned with the extent of the customs imposts rather than whether there should be any, were settled by the faction system of legislative activity;[114] they did not disrupt it to any significant degree.

Conclusion

To establish the existence of a political party, or of a party system, we need to establish three factors.

(i)   The existence of a legislative group whose members showed a cohesion of voting behaviour beyond that of the ministerial patterns of opposition and support evident in the early faction system of the

'sixties, a group whose allegiance and voting cohesion was evident beyond distinct ministries and distinct issues, and whose members accepted the label of the 'party' in the legislature.

(ii) The existence of an extra-cameral organisation which nominated candidates for election. That is, the existence of an electoral group which was more than the ephemeral electoral pressure groups of the 'sixties. As a corollary, we need to establish that candidates stood for election in the name of that organisation, rather than simply with its support. It was not sufficient for the FMA, for example, to publicise a list of candidates who were 'acceptable', nor for candidates to state they supported the views of that organisation. What was necessary was that a team of candidates stood in the name of the FMA, as FMA nominees.

(iii) The existence of a formal and institutional link between the electoral organisation and the legislative nominees, an organisation which was evident and active at the elections and in the inter-election periods, and to which these nominees owed, and recognised and stated that they owed allegiance.

These are the necessary prerequisites of party in South Australia, and the preceding analysis has argued that they are sufficient for the existence of a party. This is not to say that the more specific prerequisites outlined by Nairn will not be in evidence, but rather that these specific attributes are not the determining factors.

In legislative terms, the 'eighties in South Australia were characterised by relatively cohesive groups which have been described as conservative or liberal in terms of their political programmes. But there

was no pattern of consistent cohesion of these groups. Cockburn (liberal)
joined Downer (conservative) in 1885-7, and he joined Holder (liberal)
in 1889 and 1892. Bray (conservative) joined Downer in 1881-4 and
1885-6, and Playford (liberal) in 1890-2. There was no consistent
pattern of opposition between the conservative and liberal groups until the
last weeks of the 1892 parliament, and this, as will be shown below, was
a factor in the ready acceptance of the United Labor Party in the following
year. There was no consistent pattern of support and opposition across
the major issues of the decade. The 'eighties in fact, saw the continua-
tion of a faction system of legislative activity, showing evidence of both
qualitative and quantitative changes from the faction system of the
'sixties, but still a faction system.

There was evidence that issue-oriented electoral groups emerged at
various times. The Pastoral Association and the Farmers Mutual Associa-
tion became active when their members saw their interests or their
livelihood threatened, and the United Trades and Labour Council became
increasingly active in the electorates in the late 'eighties. There
were exponents of Freetrade in South Australia, and there was a majority
in favour of Protection - for both revenue and strictly protectionist
purposes. But these did not result in the formation of political parties.
The issues raised were resolved by a faction system of politics.

The decade of the 'eighties, as the 'sixties, was a decade of faction
governments which were dominated by leaders

> who could by patronage, prestige, negotiation, and
> diplomacy, forge out of the several factional groupings
> a working majority ... of the legislature to co-operate
> with, or support the executive. [115]

The faction system had changed from the extreme fluidity of the earlier years, and the new leaders in the parliaments of the 'eighties were more ideologically oriented than their predecessors, but they were not leaders of political parties, they were leaders of factions.

To some degree it is possible to point to relatively discrete factors which lay at the base of the formation of political parties. The transition from a faction to a party system in New South Wales was sparked off by the tariff issue. In Western Australia, the transition was not accomplished until the labour movement turned to direct political action.[1] In more recent times, the formation of the Democratic Labor Party was directly affected by the issue of communism in Australia. The catalyst for the development of a party system in South Australia was the maritime strikes of 1890. But it is more difficult to establish clear reasons why a party system did not emerge. At this point, it is sufficient to note that on the evidence of the analysis in this chapter, political parties did not emerge in South Australia before the 1890's, and they did not emerge because there was no necessity for them. Most groups in the South Australian society achieved political satisfaction without political parties, most demands were able to be met, and most ills remedied through a system of faction government. There were 'parties' in the pre-Labor period, but these were 'parties' in the Burkean sense - they were not programmatic. Once representative and responsible government had been achieved in 1855, then there was a sufficiently dominant and generally

accepted ideology in South Australia which was not disrupted until the 1890 Maritime strikes, and even then it did not entirely disappear.

We turn now to the decade of the 'nineties, to the period which showed the greatest divergence from established patterns of political behaviour in colonial South Australia. We turn, therefore, from a study of a faction system of government to an analysis of how and why political parties emerged in the colony, to the role they played in and out of the legislatures, and to the effects they had on the accepted tenets of 'procedural' and 'functional' representation.

Footnotes,   Chapter X

1. M. Duverger, Political Parties, (Methuen, London, 1964), p. xxiii.

2. H. Sidgwick, The Elements of Politics, (MacMillan, London, 1897),p.589.

3. R. M. MacIver, The Modern State, (Oxford University Press, London, 1964), p. 396.

4. L. D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, (Pall Mall Press, London, 1967), p. 9.

5. Ibid., p. 11.

6. See below, Chapters XI, XII.

7. Historical Studies, (No. 48, 1967), p. 598.

8. P. Loveday, A. W. Martin,. op. cit., pp. 121, 148.

9. N. B. Nairn,'The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes; New South Wales Politics, 1871-1891', Royal Australian Historical Society Journal, (Vol. 53, Pt. I, 1967), p. 4.

10. Ibid., p. 40.

11. P. Loveday, A. W. Martin, 'The Politics of New South Wales, 1856-1889: A Reply', Historical Studies, (No. 50, 1968), pp. 223-5.

12. N. B. Nairn, 'The Politics of New South Wales, 1856-1889: A Note on a Reply', Historical Studies, (No. 52, 1969), pp. 540-3.

13. Ibid., p. 540.

14. P. Loveday, A. W. Martin, 'The Politics of New South Wales 1856-1889: A Reply', op. cit., p. 225.

15. N. B. Nairn, 'The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes: New South Wales Politics, 1871-1891', op. cit., p. 39.

16. M. Duverger, op. cit., p. 229.

17. R. L. Reid, 'The Price-Peake Government and the formation of Political Parties in South Australia', SAA. n.d.

18. Ibid., p. 10.

19. Ibid., p. 1, my italics.

20. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

21. Ibid., p. 5.

22. Cited in E. Hodder, op. cit., p. 319.

23. Advertiser, December 6, 1859.

24. Register, November 30, 1859.

25. Ibid., December 2, 1859.

26. Advertiser, November 26, 1859.

27. Ibid., June 8, 1859.

28. Ibid., February 21, 1860.

29. Thursday Review, February 23, 1860.

30. These six held widely divergent views on issues, and varied markedly in the level of their acceptance of the 'selection'. See Ibid., March 10, 1860.

31. Ibid., March 28, 1860.

32. Advertiser, November 12, 1862.

33. Ibid., February 12, 1862.

34. M. Duverger, op. cit., p. xxix.

35. Register, March 16, 1887.

36. E. Hodder, op. cit., p. 81.

37. See below, Chapters XII, XIII. For a political biography of C. C. Kingston, see C. B. Campbell, Charles Cameron Kingston. Radical Liberal and Democrat, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1970), and E. J. Wadham, The Political Career of C. C. Kingston, 1881-1900, (M.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1953).

38. SAPD., 1885, p. 55. Cited in A. Priestly, op. cit., p. 16.

39. Register, June 16, 1885.

40. E. Hodder, op. cit., p. 104.

41. S. Solomon, SAPD., 1887, p. 27.

42. P. M. Glynn, ibid., p. 35.

43. Observer, April 16, 1887.

44. Including Downer, in London for an Imperial Conference.

45. T. A. Coghlan, op. cit., p. 1916.

46. *Observer*, June 22, 1889.

47. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1889.

48. He was forced to include a solicitor from the Lands Office.

49. Of the seventeen new members, ten supported Cockburn on the 'confidence' motion.

50. *Observer*, December 6, 1890.

51. See *ibid.*, June 18, 1892.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Ibid.*

54. Notably Hooper from the copper-mining electorate of Wallaroo. We will return to his role as an 'independent' labour representative in a later chapter.

55. *SAPD.*, 1892, pp. 1231-4.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 1303. Pairs included.

57. *Ibid.*, 1892, p. 1269.

58. *Observer*, October 22, 1892.

59. K. R. Bowes, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

60. Gladstone, a thriving market town, was a central point of the mid-north farming district.

61. K. R. Bowes, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

62. *Register*, May 12, 1881.

63. *Ibid.*, March 23, 1881.

64. J. B. Hirst, *Adelaide and the Country, 1870-1914: A Study of their Social and Political Relationship*, (Ph.D. Thesis, Adelaide, 1970), pp. 243-253.

65. 'Nominee' is the term used by Hirst, *ibid.*, p. 245.

66. See A. Priestly, *op. cit.*, pp. 25, 36-7 for an analysis of group voting on major issues. Priestly did not include Ward in the FMA bloc, but he was a member of the Association and similarly opposed payment of members.

67. This issue constituted only six of 146 divisions analysed.

68. J. B. Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

69. J. I. Craig, History of the South Australian Labour Party to 1917, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1940), p. 28.

70. Advertiser, July 6, 1866; cited in J. I. Craig, op. cit., pp 30.

71. See below, Chapters XII, XIII, and H. M. Disney, op. cit., pp. 36ff.

72. J. Scarfe, op. cit., pp. 22-3.

73. Passed in that year as an experimental measure, and ratified as a permanent provision in 1890.   See J. M. Robertson, Payment of Members. The Issue in South Australia, 1871-1887, with reference to Victoria, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1959).

74. In 1884, for example, Fuller stood in East Adelaide as a 'workingman's candidate', committed to the aims of the United Trades and Labour Council, but he secured only seventeen percent of the votes. Register, April 9, 1884.

75. First published September 9, 1881; closed December 26, 1885.

76. South Australian Times, April 11, 1884, my italics.

77. G. D. Patterson, The Tariff in the Australian Colonies, 1856-1900, (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968), p. 39.

78. Ibid., pp. 39-40. See also, Advertiser, July 1, 1863.

79. In the 1870-1 session for example, a tariff bill was 'in committee' for only one day, but there were ten divisions of the committee on details.

80. G. Pantis, 'The 1891 South Australian Royal Commission of Inter-Colonial Free Trade', (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1964), p. 1.

81. SAPD., 1875, pp. 1089, 1090-2, 1108.

82. SAVP., p. 142.

83. G. Pantis, op. cit., p. 5.

84. See A. Priestly, op. cit.

85. G. Pantis, op. cit., p. 8.

86. SAPD., 1884, pp. 1018-22.

87. Second reading passed 27-11. SAVP., 1884 , p. 208. No division called for on the third reading, and only minor amendments moved in Committee. SAVP., 1884, pp. 209-12.

88. SAPD., 1887, p. 553.

89. Ibid., p. 554.

90. C. H. Hussey, ibid., p. 1063.

91. *Clement* Giles, Ibid., p. 1121.

92. Ibid., p. 1125.

93. Register, April 16, 1890.

94. Ibid., April 9, 1890.

95. See Beer, op. cit., A. Priestly, op. cit., T. A. Coghlan, op. cit., p. 1801.

96. See P. Loveday, A. W. Martin, op. cit.

97. A. Priestly, op. cit., p. 74.

98. Ward, SAPD., 1887, p. 1130. He did not expand on this.

99. Rees, ibid.

100. Which in fact under-represent the 'protection' side of the House.

101. There was no division on the third reading of the 1885 bill.

102. SAVP., 1885, p. 208, 1887, pp. 246, 258.

103. 'The "Register" guide to the Parliament of South Australia, 1887'. (Register press, Adelaide, 1887).

104. Ibid., p. 33.

105. Ibid., p. 34.

106. Ibid., p. 35.

107. Ibid., p. 37.

108. Ibid., p. 40.

109. Ibid., p. 25.

110. Ibid., p. 26.

111. G. C. Combe, op. cit., p. 122.

112. See B. K. DeGaris, C. T. Stannage, 'From Responsible Government to Party Politics in Western Australia', Australian Economic History Review, (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1968), pp. 54-61.

113. In 1887 the UTLC took up the cause of protection and 'selected'
      candidates partly on their attitudes to the tariff.   But there
      was no protectionist party as in New South Wales.

114. The Freetraders in the Council passed the protectionist legislation
      partly in the hope that the increased revenue, which was the **main**
      aim of such early bills, would obviate the need for increased
      direct taxation on land or income.

115. A. Leiserson, op. cit., p. 61.

116. B. K. DeGaris, C. T. Stannage, op. cit., p. 61.

Chapter XI

The Kingston Era I - Electoral Politics in the 'Nineties

Introduction

The decade of the 'nineties was the beginning of a new style of politics in South Australia. These pre-federation years were years of transition, of a change from a political system dominated by factions to a system which, by 1910, was essentially bi-partisan. Before 1890, as previous chapters have shown, the people of South Australia were pressed to support factions, to support personalities. They were not given a clear choice between ideologies, they were only seldom given a choice of policies, and only rarely was there evidence that electoral claims in terms of classes were made. As late as October, 1892, the Advertiser was able to comment that

> sometimes it is convenient to distinguish broadly
> between cautious and progressive lines of policy
> by use of the terms conservative and liberal, and
> in the same way we speak of members as belonging to
> one or other party, according to the general
> complexion of their views, but this does not mean
> that clearly defined and thoroughly organised
> parties are actually in existence. [1]

In March, 1893, one month before the election date, the Register was certain that 'party lines' would not

> be observed in this election, as the conditions of
> the colony do not supply the necessary raison detre
> for Whigs or for Tories, with whatever shades of
> meaning the terms may be employed. [2]

The change from an essentially faction system of government, from a system dominated by shades of Whigs, to a system which was characterised by

relatively stable political parties with relatively clear class bases and distinctive programmes, was slow in South Australia. The evidence of such a change is both electoral and legislative, and from both documentary and analytical sources. The record ministerial term of C. C. Kingston, encompassing six years and a half , coupled with the significant rise in the levels of structure in the two houses of parliament indicates that changes in the dominant patterns of politics were occurring. The emergence of a United Labor Party which sought electoral support for a team of nominees, rather than follow the accepted pattern of selecting 'tested' and worthy candidates was a new aspect of electoral politics in the colony.

The study of electoral and legislative behaviour in the 'nineties, the Kingston Era, is closely linked with the study of the Labor Party and its role. The record Kingston ministry was paralleled by, and to some degree dependent on, changes in the nature of the political system in South Australia, and this and the succeeding chapter will be concerned with these changes. To some degree, the 'nineties was a continuation of the major issues of political representation discussed above - the relation of the houses, the role of the Legislative Council, the faction system in both electoral and legislative terms, the election systems and the election campaigns, and the role of the ministry of the day - but there were important changes, and each was, in some way, related to the activities, role and position of the United Labor Party. To Labor historians, the long term Kingston ministry, and the forces which enabled such stability were inextricably linked, and even utterly dependent on the ULP.[3] One purpose of these two chapters is to establish whether this

claim is justified. On the other hand, this study of the Kingston era
is not intended as a general political history of the Labor Party. This
has been surveyed elsewhere. Rather it is a study of the electoral
and legislative role of the ULP and its members, of the effects of ULP
representation in the legislatures, on the faction system of government
and on the development towards a stable political party system in South
Australia. As such, it will be concerned with the reactions to the ULP,
and with the overall effects of the ULP, its supporters and opponents, in
terms of political representation. This chapter is concerned essentially
with the changing electoral position in the 'nineties; chapter XII will be
concerned with the changing nature of 'functional' representation in
South Australia in the last decade in the colonial period, and especially
with the emergence and role of political parties.

Previous chapters have shown the extent to which the electoral scene
in the years prior to the 'nineties was dominated by the activities of
pressure groups rather than parties, and by 'independent' candidates rather
than party nominees, and the extent to which the legislatures were faction
rather than party oriented. South Australia mirrored its sister
colonies in this respect, and, as chapter X has shown, maintained this
emphasis on 'independence' when New South Wales at least was undergoing
a transition to a party system in the late 'eighties. As in the other
colonies, the labour movement in South Australia did not seek its ends
through the formation of a direct political party until the early nineties,
and there were a number of factors at the base of this, some general, and
some peculiar to South Australia. As R. P. Griffiths points out in his
history of the ULP and Federation, the early trade unions in South Australi

> pre-occupied themselves with everyday bread-and-
> butter matters, like the eight hour day, early
> closing, collection of members' fees, rather than
> with class agitation, and the propagation of
> socialist ideals. 4

This is not to say that they were not concerned with wider political matters, for the growth and activities of the Political Association discussed above was evidence of a deliberate involvement in electoral and legislative politics. But this was in line with the contemporary tenet of political behaviour, in terms of pressure group rather than party activity.

There were a number of factors which tended to reinforce this moderate view among the unionists and working men, which tended to mitigate against the formation of a Labor Party before 1890. The full male suffrage of the original constitution guaranteed to all men, working class or not, the right to take part in the politics of the colony and to have some say in the elections. There was, therefore, no basis for the formation of a 'party', seeking constitutional change to allow them the right to such participation. And the specific nature of the South Australian society and economy tended to reinforce this. As Craig points out, there was a lack of interest among the working men in collective action and unionism, and only during times of severe economic recession was there evidence that any collective action was transposed to the electoral scene. As was evident in the Political Association, this activity tended to evaporate as conditions improved. There were a number of influences which affected this level of working class activity. Recessions were essentially colonia rather than Australian phenomena, and the ease of migration to other colonies in hard times eased the situation in South Australia to some

degree. South Australia's rural emphasis on wheat and mixed farming rather than on grazing and wool growing meant that the shearers were fewer, and less powerful than in the other colonies. Even in the city, industrialisation was slow, and when it did occur, it was in the hands of small employers and craftsmen. The absence of coal in the colonial development meant that the traditionally militant miners of this industry did not gain a foothold in South Australia. The copper miners, especially those of the Moonta and Wallaroo mines, provided the dominant labour-intensive industry in the colony, and as will be shown below, they played an important role in the activities of the Labor Party in the 'nineties, but even in this situation, the aim was not socialism, but welfare. We will return below to the essential factors of the structure of the South Australian colonial society, but it should be noted at this point that there was not sharp division in economic terms which isolated and alienated the working men and their unions to the point that direct political action was felt to be a necessity.

This is not to say that the labour movement did not become involved in electoral politics before 1890, but apart from the Political Associations of the 'fifties and 'sixties, it is true that there was little collective action from the working classes. By the 'eighties the trade union movement had become more involved, albeit following the general consensus of the period, selecting 'worthy' candidates rather than nominating direct candidates. In the 1887 elections for the House of Assembly, the United Trades and Labour Council 'selected' nine candidates as worthy of union support, including Kingston, Jenkins and Scherk, and seven of these selections were elected. In 1888, G. W. Cotton was re-elected to the Legislative Council with strong UTLC support and, as will be shown

below, he carried his self proclaimed role as a representative of the working men into practice. In 1890, the UTLC selected nineteen candidates and proudly acclaimed the election of fourteen of these. However, none of these elected members acknowledged the UTLC after the elections; the tenet of 'independence' had not yet broken down. The UTLC also supported the candidature of A. A. Kirkpatrick, a typographer and union president, as a UTLC candidate for Port Adelaide and West Torrens in 1887, but he was soundly defeated in both seats. Six years later, in 1893, Port Adelaide was to return two Labor Party members and West Torrens one, in the Party's first attempt to win representation from these seats.

Three factors lay at the base of this changed pattern of electoral support. The Payment of Members Act of 1887 provided the possibility for working men to become members of the parliament, the maritime strikes and the manner in which they were resolved in 1890 provided an incentive for the working men and their unions to take direct political action, and the formation of the United Labor Party provided the means. The history of these three factors has been outlined elsewhere,[5] we are concerned with the results of the conjunction.

In the first weeks of 1891, a series of meetings culminated in the formation of the United Labor Party of South Australia. A Constitution, a platform and a pledge were quickly drafted and ratified,[6] and a mere four months after its formation, the ULP contested its first elections as a party. The period of dependence by the working man and his unions on sympathetic treatment and consideration from such liberals as Kingston, Playford and Cockburn in the legislature, and the dependance on the pressure group mode of action in the electoral sphere had ended.

Labor's Role in Council Elections, 1891-1901

In 1888, G. W. Cotton, a well-known land broker and estate agent who was regarded as a man of liberal political tendencies, and who had been a member of the Legislative Council from 1882-6, was approached by the UTLC to stand as a representative of the working man.   Following his resignation from the Council in 1886, he had made two attempts to return, but was defeated in the Northeast division in 1886 in a by-election and again in 1887 in a by-election in the Central division.   His success in Central in the general elections of 1888 was evidence of the effect of UTLC support,[7] and his election was greeted by the Council as 'conclusive evidence of the possibility for labour representation'.[8]   The rather effusive welcome offered to him as a member representing the interests of the workingman was due partly to his being a former member for, as will be shown below, the later representatives of the Labor party were not received in the same way.

In 1891, the newly-constituted Labor party nominated three candidates for the Legislative Council divisions of Central and Southern.   All three were elected, a result which, to the Advertiser, was 'full of political import', and was not only a surprise but a sensation.

> If such successes can be repeated to any considerable
> extent the Legislative Council may be made more
> democratic ... than even the Assembly itself. 9

The Brisbane Worker hailed a 'notable success' with the comment that

> South Australia has driven the Labor wedge into the
> very propertied chamber which for the first time in
> Australian History has heard its own members declare
> that privileged classes are iniquitous and that
> propertied chambers must go.   10

In the face of a restricted franchise, the ULP nominees in the Central division secured the highest level of support ever given to two successful candidates to defeat eight other candidates. In Southern, a division which had traditionally supported the more conservative candidates, the Labor nominee defeated one sitting member and came close to achieving the top of the poll over R. C. Baker. The ULP had achieved 100% success in its first electoral attempt.

1893 brought further success. W. A. Robinson defeated two conservative candidates in a by-election in Southern when a new record turnout was set.[11] In the general elections of 1894 the 'labor wedge' was augmented to six members, one quarter of the members of the Council, but this was to be the zenith of Labor Party representation in the upper house. At the same time, the 1894 elections brought the first defeat of a ULP candidate in the Council elections, and in the area of its strongest support.

Despite this loss, the overall success of the ULP had been remarkable, and especially so given the nature of the electoral system for the Council. But this control of one quarter of the membership of the upper house was short-lived. Only on two occasions since 1894 to the present day has the United Labor Party or the modern Australian Labor Party been able to equal this.[12] In terms of the decade of the 'nineties, the ULP's hold on two of the six Southern seats was tenuous. The electoral support which had secured the election of Kirkpatrick and McGregor had come from the urban developments in the Assembly districts of East Torrens and Noarlunga, and this support was to fall. The more rural Assembly districts in Southern rejected the ULP candidates. The Central division offered the ULP more chance not only of maintaining its four seats, but of securing control of

the entire Central representation, for the City of Adelaide and its suburban developments had given very strong support to the party's candidates. The party had no real chance of winning seats in the remaining divisions. Both the Northern and Northeastern divisions were essentially rural in nature, the population was dominated occupationally by pastoral and farming pursuits, and the electors continued to return members to the Council who were conservatives. Table 11:1 summarises ULP involvement and success in the Council elections to 1901.[13]

Table 11:1   The ULP and Council elections, 1891-1901.

1891   Central Division, turnout-54%

D.M. CHARLESTON (ULP)	2942	27.5%
R.S. GUTHRIE (ULP)	2155	20.1
C.H. Goode	1625	15.2
S. Davenport	1358	12.7
G.H. Cargeeg	792	7.4
G.F. Bollen	602	5.6
P.G. Coglin	535	5.0
W. Bickford	428	4.0
J. Sellar	270	2.5

Southern Division, turnout-63%

R.C. BAKER*	2478	26.0%
A.A. KIRKPATRICK (ULP)	2325	24.4
A. Hay*	1871	19.6
A. Mackie	1848	19.4
S. Solomon	1026	10.7

1894   Central Division, turnout 73%

H. ADAMS (ULP)	3542	26.5%
H.R. FULLER	2720	20.4
J.N. Birks (ULP)	2620	19.6
P. Whelan	2616	19.6
G. Thompson	1764	13.2
G.F. Hopkins	92	0.7

Southern Division, turnout -75%

E.T. SMITH	3782	31.7%
G. McGREGOR (ULP)	2454	20.6
S. Tompkinson *	2115	17.7
L. Cohen	2036	17.1
F.E.H.W. Krichauff*	1539	12.9

1897   Central Division, turnout-45%

R.S. GUTHRIE (ULP)*	3417	27.9%
S. TOMPKINSON	3119	25.4
J. Hutchinson (ULP)	2739	22.3
J.L. Parsons	2657	21.7
W. Hutchins	259	2.1
J. Jones	66	0.5

Southern Division, turnout-62%

R.C. BAKER*	5368	40.3%
A.W. SANDFORD	4503	33.8
A.A. Kirkpatrick (ULP)*	3438	25.8

1900   Central Division   turnout-48%

J. VARDON	4015	25.7%
A.A. KIRKPATRICK (ULP)	3979	25.5
J.L. Parsons	3827	24.5
W.A. Robinson (ULP)*	3813	24.4

1901   Central Division, By-elections

February 9

| J.L. PARSONS | 4665 | 63.6% |
| W.A. Robinson (ULP) | 2671 | 36.4 |

June 1

G. BROOKMAN	4400	63.2%
F.S. Wallis (ULP)	1944	27.9
W.D. Ponder	618	8.9

* Sitting member

Following the 1894 elections, the ULP members in the Legislative Council constituted a numerically and, as will be shown in the following chapter, a politically solid and important bloc. They represented a wide spectrum of the workingmen of the colony. Adams, for example, was a sometime miner, carpenter, pattern maker and railway inspector, born in the colony and forty three years of age when elected. All were closely associated with at least one trade union, and Guthrie and Kirkpatrick had held executive office in the Seamens and Printers unions respectively. McGregor was a farm labourer turned stonemason, and Robinson was employed by a coach-builder. Charleston was the odd man out in terms of his background as an engineer and, as will be shown below, he was the party's first internal problem. In 1894, however, the only setback had been the narrow defeat of Birks in Central, and the future looked promising for the young party in the Council.

By the 1897 elections, however, the evidence supported the view of the Chronicle that 'the novelty of direct Labor representation has no doubt worn off'.[14] Guthrie and Kirkpatrick faced their electors in Central and Southern respectively, and the ULP nominated J. Hutchinson in an attempt to win a fifth Central seat. But the ULP was no longer the only political party on the hustings, and the conservative National Defence League, to which we will return below, spent considerable time and effort to counter the successes of the Labor Party. As well, as the Chronicle implied, interest had fallen in terms of turnout, with the net result that the ULP representation fell to five. Guthrie was returned at the head of the poll in Central, Hutchinson emulated Birks' narrow defeat in 1894, and the two National Defence League candidates in Southern soundly defeated Kirkpatrick.

The reduced Labor bloc was further depleted when Charleston resigned from the party and from the Council in 1897, after the general elections. He had, for some time, failed to acknowledge the Party Whip in the Council, and had been denounced by Party leaders,[15] and it was even more distressing for the ULP when he was subsequently re-elected as an independent liberal, defeating the ULP nominee, Hutchinson.[16] To the conservative Observer, this was a triumph for 'personal honour and political reputation',[17] but to the ULP it was disaster in the Council, with legislative effects to which we will return in the following chapter.

The erosion of the ULP representation continued in 1900. The Party abandoned the Southern election to the conservative sitting members Gordon and Stirling, and concentrated their efforts on maintaining rather than increasing their numbers, but with only partial success. The ULP nominated the defeated Kirkpatrick with W. A. Robinson as the retiring sitting member, and in an unusually close result found the incumbent defeated and Kirkpatrick returned.

In 1901, Gregor McGregor resigned from the Council on his election to the Federal Parliament, and the ULP made two electoral attempts to replace him, but on both occasions the conservative candidates were strongly supported. In a straight contest with NDL member Parsons, Robinson was soundly defeated when only forty three percent of the Central voters turned out, and the ULP nominee F. S. Wallis was equally soundly defeated in an even smaller poll, (39.6%) three months later. After achieving so much in its early electoral competition, the Labor Party representation in the Legislative Council had fallen to three by the close of the colonial period.

Labor and the Assembly elections in the 'nineties

Labor's achievements in the Council elections of 1891 and 1894 were noteworthy, and to some extent, remarkable. The ULP candidates faced large electorates and large populations, and especially in Southern they faced strong sitting members with high support in the past. The restricte franchise limited the support they could hope to achieve from the working-man, and they had no strong patterns of past party support as a nucleus. In comparison, Labor's task in the 1893 House of Assembly elections was intrinsically easier. The full adult suffrage provided the hope that the workingman and his sympathisers would be able to be effective to the maximum degree, <u>if</u> they turned out to the elections. The smaller districts and smaller populations provided an increased opportunity for the ULP candidates to publicise their cause, and, as well, the smaller districts provided a more meaningful basis of support. The copper miners of Wallaroo and Moonta, for example, were only a small proportion of the total voting strength of the Northern division for the Council, even assuming that they all had the property qualifications to vote. But the Assembly district of Wallaroo was another matter. The concentration of miners was the dominant demographic feature. In the 'urban' district of Port Adelaide and, to a lesser extent West Adelaide, the industrial, marine and commercial work-force provided an equally strong basis of support for Labor Party candidates. As will be shown below, 1893 was the first election in the history of South Australia when districts could be referred to as safe for a party rather than for a personality.

The ULP and its candidates had a further advantage in 1893. They could not only look forward to a relatively stable base of support in the industrial and mining seats, but they encountered no <u>party</u> opposition.

The newly former National Defence League was the best organised pressure group in 1893, and the most effective, but it <u>was</u> a pressure group, not a party. Its members stood as independents rather than as members of the NDL, and the League followed the traditional electoral methods of suggesting worthy candidates. By 1896, this essentially Burkean independence had changed. The NDL had become a political party.

In 1861, the <u>Thursday Review</u> had called for 'a Patriotic Society or Association ... adverse to class legislation - adverse to the Political Association'.[18] Thirty years later, the NDL was the answer. Its original target was the Georgian single tax movement, and it attempted to infiltrate what was left of the Farmers Mutual Association with this aim in mind. But, as will be shown below, the farmers of South Australia were independently minded - they resisted attempts to form them into parties. As a consequence, the NDL never became the party of the country in opposition to the ULP as the party of the city.

The NDL was instigated by R. C. Baker, and the incentive for its formation was the success of the ULP in the Council elections of 1891. Its organisation was rapid, and by early 1893 it was reported as having forty nine branches and over 2,500 members. It received strong editorial support from the <u>Register</u> and its weekly summary, the <u>Observer</u>, and boasted a large group of supporters in the parliament. Its declared aims were:

    i. to conserve the interests of all classes

   ii. to oppose class legislation

  iii. to bind in one body the electors who wished to aid in the prosperity and advancement of the colony

   iv. to urge electors to register their names and exercise their votes at elections

v.   to restore confidence at home and abroad by the return of members to Parliament who would advocate just and equitable in place of class legislation

vi.   to support fairly proportional taxation rather than single tax or other modes of Taxation bearing unreasonably on any one class of the community

vii.   to appoint local branches in the country so as to make the influence of the country party felt by a bond of union. [19]

But its immediate electoral target was the ULP. In the clearest exposition of the aims and purposes of the NDL, the then secretary told the Observer that 'the League is distinctly opposed to the extremists of the Labor Party'.[20] The objects of the League were to

> oppose all undue class influence in Parliament, and to promote in all ways agreement, security and general confidence, so that public credit may be maintained, the producing interests protected, the investment of capital encouraged and a continuance of employment provided, thus ensuring that all interests may share in a common prosperity. [21]

The Observer praised this 'conservative outlook', for the 'views of the NDL' mark it out 'as the champion of existing rights, and the opponent of any new or more radical order of things'.[22]

The first reported general meeting of the League was held on January 28, 1892.[23] The foundation members of the central Council of the League showed a strong representation from the sitting members of parliament, including five members of the Council; Baker, J. Darling, J. J. Duncan, D. Murray and W. Copley.[24] But, despite its aim of opposition to the ULP, the League did not nominate direct candidates in 1893. Its spokesmen were, in fact, careful to stress their independence, to make comparisons between the 'undemocratic' nature of the ULP pledge, and the practice of the NDL whereby

we neither nominate candidates for districts, nor
determine whether they shall or shall not stand, nor
do we ask them to become delegates for an organisation.[25]

The NDL clearly showed the effects of thirty years of tradition in the
electoral sense.   But, if it did not nominate candidates, the NDL set
out to ensure that, as far as possible, the electors of the province knew
and understood the aims of the League, and that they knew who the League
recommended as worthy of support.   Thomas Hogarth, a past member of the
Legislative Council over a period of almost twenty years, became the
'travelling agent' of the NDL,[26] and toured country districts, lecturing
and enrolling members.

Three months prior to the 1893 elections the Register correctly foreca
that 'it is likely that fighting will be more fierce than in any previous
engagement'.[27]   But the 'fighting' was not yet fully on party lines.   Bot:
the members of the NDL and the candidates selected as worthy of NDL
support campaigned in the traditional manner - as independents.   The
great majority of non-Labor candidates campaigned as independents, rejecte(
any party affiliations or pressure group labels and provided the usual
bewildering variety of opinions.   The usual conglomeration of electoral
groups emerged, including a Liquor Trades Defence Union, which was opposed
by the South Australian Alliance but supported by the Licensed
Victuallers Association, the Young South Australian Patriotic Association,
the Scripture Education League, the South Australian Horticultural
Association, the Single Tax League, the Womens Suffrage League, and the
almost defunct Farmers Mutual Association.   All of these, and the
many other groups, acted in the traditional electoral manner, questioning
candidates, and circulating lists of those found to be acceptable.[28]

Over and above all these electoral groups, the 1893 contest was essentially one between different shades of conservatives and different shades of liberals, except in the most rural of the electorates. Taking the exceptions first, the contests in such electorates as Gumeracha and Albert, markedly different in the nature of their dominant agricultural pursuits,[29] but overwhelmingly agricultural, were still determined by the traditional 'independent' stance of all candidates. But in the metropolitan, suburban and mining electorates, the voters were generally offered a clearer choice between political outlooks. Not that there was a clear conservative-radical division. The NDL members and the candidates the organisation had 'selected' made clear that their opposition was towards the Labor Party, and the ULP was equally certain who its main opponent was, as the following statement by ULP candidate Robinson indicates.

> They have formed a National Defence League...
> Mr. Baker's defence of individualism ... is another
> name for the incarnation of covetousness and
> selfishness, and which he has made the watchword
> of his precious association.   These "individualists",
> ably represented by the Hon. C. Baker, consider they
> have bought not only the services but the common
> rights and privileges of the workers. ... Our recent
> successes in the election for the upper house seem
> to have thoroughly scared our old arch enemy, and
> he is doing his level best to frighten others in
> turn.   30

But there were other shades of opinion represented in the campaign. As noted in the previous chapter, the Downer ministry formed in 1892 was opposed by what were formerly warring factions in the Assembly, those led by such men as Kingston, Cockburn and Holder, which were combined in opposition for the first time.   The electoral contest in 1893 was equally

a test for the more conservative Downer ministry in the face of this combined liberal opposition.

However, even with this polarisation of the lines of support and opposition in terms of the ministry, even with the evidence that ideology had intruded into the elections to a greater extent than ever before, even with the emergence of the NDL as a unified organisation, only the United Labor Party went to the voters <u>as a party</u>. By 1896, this trend had changed, but before turning to the details of such changes, the results of the 1893 election are analysed in detail.

There were fourteen ULP nominees in twelve of the twenty seven district. Of these, nine pledged members contested seven metropolitan districts, and the remaining five were nominated as unpledged candidates by country branches. Two of these were sitting members. J. A. McPherson was the first ULP nominee to be elected to the Assembly when the party contested a by-election in East Adelaide in 1892,[31] and R. Hooper had been elected as a non-Labor candidate, but with UTLC and ULP backing in a by-election for the mining seat of Wallaroo in May, 1891. The party took into consideration both the nature of the districts and the political attitudes of the sitting members in formulating their electoral strategy. Separate electoral committees of the ULP were given the task of presenting lists of candidates to the party Council which made the final decision,[32] and some non-Labor sitting members were not opposed. Scherk (East Adelaide), Kingston (West Adelaide) and Brooker (West Torrens) were considered by the ULP to be 'friends of the working classes' and only one ULP candidate was nominated in those districts. Similarly, Cohen (North Adelaide) had consistently supported Kingston in the previous parliament, and the ULP

nominated only one candidate, presumably with the hope that/the two
of
sitting members, G. C. Hawker would be defeated.   Playford was also

opposed by only one ULP candidate in East Torrens.   The unpledged ULP

nominees in the country districts each contested only one of the two seats

in each district.

Although the results were far short of the complete success of the ULP

in the Council elections of 1891, they provided the party with a powerful

bloc in the House of Assembly.   The electors in the city gave strong

support to both the ULP nominees and the labor-backed independents, and of

the direct ULP nominees, only Adams in Sturt was defeated.   Four sitting

members were defeated, three directly, and Rounsevell indirectly as a result

of ULP intervention in his former district.   Gould, in West Torrens, had

been returned at the head of the poll in 1890, G. F. Hopkins in Port

Adelaide was relegated to the bottom of the poll, and W. B. Rounsevell who

had transferred his candidature from Port Adelaide to Yorke Peninsula -

he was far from being a supporter of Kingston and his policies - failed to

win either of the two seats in this volatile district.[33]   The ULP failed

to secure the maximum return of all its pledged nominees when it failed to

defeat J. G. Jenkins in Sturt by the narrow margin of twenty one out of

the 5666 votes cast.

Table II:2   ULP support, House of Assembly, urban districts, 1893
             by percentages.

District	ULP candidates	votes	plumpers	sitting members defeated
East Adelaide	J. A. McPHERSON*	37.4	50.7	nil
West Adelaide	E.L. BATCHELOR	41.0	38.5	L. Grayson
North Adelaide	R. WOOD	35.9	50.5	L. Cohen
West Torrens	F.J. HOURIGAN	29.5	28.3	B. Gould
East Torrens	F.W. CONEYBEER	33.5	65.7	nil
Port Adelaide	W.O. ARCHIBALD	29.5 }	12.9	G.F. Hopkins
	I. McGILLIVRAY	28.5 }		
Sturt	T. PRICE	25.3 }	12.6	nil
	H. Adams	24.9 }		

The extent to which the support for the ULP nominees was an exclusive
support is shown by the figure of plumping.   Over half of the total votes
for McPherson, Wood and Coneybeer came from voters who had plumped, and
while a greater proportion of the electors in West Adelaide and West Torrens
coupled the ULP candidates with Kingston and Brooker respectively, the
levels of plumping were still relatively high.   The reverse is evident
in the two districts where electors were faced with two ULP candidates.
Most support in these came from 'paired' votes.

The results in the non-metropolitan electorates were not as favourable.
Only two of the five ULP nominees were elected, and Hooper was a sitting
member and can be granted some advantage from this incumbency.   Again,
levels of plumping were high, except in Wallaroo where Hooper and Grainger,
the latter a strong supporter of liberal policies and a member of the
Kingston faction, received almost equal support.   But the support for the
ULP nominees was essentially in the industrial settlements in these

districts,[34] and in all but Wallaroo and Flinders, the support from these was insufficient to overcome the generally conservative vote in the agricultural areas.   This pattern of support was especially evident in Flinders, where Poynton received over a quarter of his support from Port Lincoln, only one of the twenty six polling places.   Moule, on the other hand, who had consistently supported Downer in the preceding parliament, received much greater support from the farming and grazing areas.

Table II:3   ULP support, House of Assembly, extra-metropolitan districts, 1893, by percentages.

District	ULP candidates	votes	plumpers
Wallaroo	R. HOOPER *	31.6	5.1
Barossa	J. Jones	20.6	44.7
Gladstone	A. E. Roberts	30.0	89.7
Frome	A. Dungey	16.4	46.3
Flinders	A. POYNTON	27.1	58.1

The 1893 elections wrought great changes in the House of Assembly.   O: the fifty four members in the house at the close of the 1892 session, only thirty nine were still present at the opening in 1893.   Four sitting membe: had not sought re-election, and eleven had been defeated.   Notable absentees were two members of the Downer ministry.   Grayson, the Commissio of Public Works had been defeated by ULP member Batchelor in West Adelaide, and Treasurer W. B. Rounsevell had been defeated in his new choice of district.   But, above all else, the most notable political effect of the election had been that Downer's unsteady majority had been turned into a clear majority on the opposition side.   Of those who had given him general support in his brief term as Premier in 1892, only twenty remained in the house and he could expect no support from the politically solid phalanx of

ten ULP members.   We will return in the following chapter to the immediate
legislative effects of this electoral decision - to the immediate defeat
of the Downer ministry and the inauguration of the Kingston administration
and to the patterns of legislative behaviour which lay at the base of the
Kingston Era.   Before this, we continue the analysis of the electoral
changes in the decade of the 'nineties, and especially with the changing
patterns of electoral politics and the role of the ULP.

The elections of 1896 were important in a number of aspects.   They were
the first test of the policies and actions of the Kingston ministry.   They
were a test for the ULP.   They were a test for the NDL which had moved
away from traditional electoral methods to those of a political party.   As
well, it was the first test of the female voters of the colony.[35]   The
ballots could have some surprises in store.   Certainly a new element had
appeared in the pre election publicity, epitimised by one advertisement
in the Register addressed to

> Women electors of the Province.
> Carefully enquire into the characters of the various
> candidates for your suffrages, and only vote for good
> moral men, not for homebreakers, wreckers, and
> drunkards... [36]

But the traditional methods did not disappear.   The laws of libel were
still often tested.   Charles Tucker, an independent candidate for North
Adelaide faced two opposing opinions in the electoral columns of the
Register:

> Electors of North Adelaide.
> Down with unmanly curs and cowards who strike a man
> below the belt.   They are humbugs and hypocrites,
> they care nought for anything except to maliciously
> injure and hurt
>   A REAL WHITE MAN
> whose boots they are not fit to clean.
>   DOWN WITH SUCH TACTICS AND VOTE FOR TUCKER

Electors of North Adelaide
Don't vote for a "doubtfully married man".
Don't vote for a man who is afraid of the truth.
Don't vote for a moral coward,
the guilty and cowardly,
     CHARLES TUCKER 37

Tucker failed in his bid in this election, but was successful in the district of Encounter Bay in 1899.

Unlike the situation of 1893, when the ULP went to the voters opposed by the traditional heterogeneous list of candidates, most of whom stood by the traditional 'independence', the contest in 1896 was essentially between three groups of candidates, leavened by a number of independents. The ULP nominated twenty members to contest sixteen districts, the NDL went to the polls with thirty candidates in nineteen districts, augmented by a further six who described themselves as conservatives, and fourteen candidates who acknowledged their support for Kingston, readily accepted the label of 'ministerialists'. The ULP Weekly Herald made its analysis of the candidates, and concluded that

> It is not, therefore difficult to see which party
> is trying to capture the legislature and swamp the
> Assembly by their votes. This accusation has been
> hurled against the Labor Party again and again, but
> now it fairly recoils on the heads of those who have
> made it. Of the 27 electorates only 8 are without
> an acknowledged NDL candidate, while out of these
> there are at least ten men who will receive the
> support of the members of the League if there are
> any in their districts. 38

The conservative Register also made its views clear, and asked,

> are we to have steady progress on safe and sound
> lines, with individual rights observed, or an
> uncertain, spasmodic movement governed by experimental
> socialist legislation? 39

And it decried the results.

> The verdict of the country has gone ... in the
> directions of condoning deliberate violations of
> law, wasteful experiments upon socialist issues,
> arrogant, high-handed and mischievous procedure;
> ... and wanton effects on the part of the Premier
> in particular to set class against class ... by
> pernicious legislation and autocratic administration.[40]

Certainly there was little doubt about the 'verdict of the country'.

Table II:4   Election results, 1896, by 'parties'.

'party' area	No. seats contested	sitting members defeated	No. seats won
ULP metropolitan	9	–	8
country	11	–	4
total	20	–	12
NDL metropolitan	6	2	2
country	24	3	15
total	30	5	17
Ministerialists			
metropolitan	3	–	3
country	11	1	10
total	14	1	13

The ULP augmented its representation from ten to twelve with the election
of W. H. Carpenter (Encounter Bay) and A. E. Roberts (Gladstone), at the
expense of two conservative members.   The NDL found five of its sitting
members defeated, and only two of the replacements held a similar political
commitment.   We will return to the effects of these changes below.

What role did the newly-enfranchised women play in this apparent swing
to the liberal side?   Final rolls prepared for the elections showed a
total of 59,066 women who were registered to vote, and as the Review of
Reviews put it, 'they voted in solid battalions'.   But, on the other
hand,

the result of women's franchise in South
Australia, as in New Zealand, is simply to
increase the volume of ballot papers, rather
than of political ideas.   41

Certainly the women turned out in proportions which surprised those who

had forecast an apathetic reaction, and in fact, they turned out in greater

proportions than the men in almost half of the districts.

Table II:5 Turnout 1896, by sexes.

Metropolitan			Country		
District	Male %	Female %	District	Male %	Female %
East Adelaide	57.5	59.7	Albert	76.4	69.0
West Adelaide	53.4	40.4	Barossa	68.8	73.9
North Adelaide	77.0	73.6	Burra	64.6	64.9
Port Adelaide	66.4	58.0	Encounter Bay	81.6	73.7
East Torrens	68.6	69.2	Flinders	38.9	57.7
West Torrens	68.6	74.9	Frome	52.1	58.8
Sturt	68.8	70.6	Gladstone	67.1	76.6
			Gumeracha	70.9	60.2
			Light	72.7	64.5
			Mt. Barker	82.6	70.0
Metropolitan	66.3	66.1	Newcastle	55.3	61.1
Country	66.3	66.9	Noarlunga	71.4	59.3
Total	66.3	66.4	Onkaparinga	73.3	73.5
			Stanley	74.4	72.7
			Victoria	78.9	81.9
			Wallaroo	60.4	51.7
			Wooroora	75.6	73.3
			Yatala	71.1	62.0
			Yorke Peninsula	67.2	63.6

Eleven of the sitting members who stood for election in 1896 were

defeated, including four leading NDL members;   H. E. Downer and Hussey in Encounter

Bay, E. W. Hawker in Stanley, and Riddoch in Victoria.   These 'swings'

away from the NDL in these districts were evident also in four other

country districts, and Randell (Gumeracha), Short (Yorke Peninsula), Howe

(Gladstone) and Moule (Flinders), all of whom had opposed the Kingston

ministry in the preceding 1895 session, were also defeated.   The only

defeat of a sitting 'ministerialist' was that of Bartlett in Yorke

Peninsula.   There was a 'swing' to the liberals and to the ministerialists in 1896, but the extent to which the female voters contributed to this, or the extent to which they favoured either the liberal or the conservative candidates in a way distinct from their male counterparts, cannot be established.

However, if the ministerialists and the ULP had reason to rejoice in 1896, none of the three major electoral groups could claim the 1899 polls had been decisively in their favour, and the Review of Reviews was certain that the 'tenure of the ministry had not been disturbed'.[42]   Yet, despite this apparent stability, the Kingston ministry was defeated and was forced to resign before the end of the session.

The 1892 defeat of Downer and his ministry could be traced back to the changes at the preceding election, as will be shown below.   Not so the defeat of Kingston in 1899, for of the forty eight of the fifty four sitting members who stood for re-election, only two were defeated.   The erosion of the ministerialists and their support had started earlier.   Wood had resigned from the ULP in 1897, and had been re-elected as a liberal with increasingly conservative attitudes, as will be shown below.   Cock, Cockburn and Gillen did not stand for the elections, and they were replaced with members who were more independent than ministerialist.   The degree of the electoral stability is shown by the fact that of the forty two sitting members in the three 'parties', only one, O'Malley, was defeated.

Table II:6   Election results, 1899, by 'parties'.

'party' area	No. seats contested	No. seats won	
		1896	1899
ULP metropolitan	8	8	7
country	9	4	4
total	17	12	11
NDL metropolitan	4	2	2
country	19	15	15
total	23	17	17
Ministerialist			
metropolitan	4	3	4
country	9	10	7
total	13	13	11

However, this electoral stability was not transposed into the parliament, as the following chapter will show, and Kingston's record ministry was coming to a close.

Electoral Change and Stability, 1893-1901

In terms of known membership of the three major groups which contested the three general elections between 1893 and 1899, there was considerable stability in electoral choice overall, especially in terms of the Labor Party.   Following its success in the Council in 1891, the Labor Party won almost one fifth of the seats in the Assembly in 1893.   Succeeding general elections augmented the ten seats to twelve in 1896, but fell to eleven in 1899.   As in the case of the Council, the elections to the Federal parliament damaged Labor representation in the Assembly to the extent that vacancies caused by the move to the commonwealth parliament by Batchelor and Poynton were filled by non-Labor members.   On the other hand, Poynton had indicated by his actions in the Assembly at the close of the Kingston Ministry that his allegiance to the Party was far from certain

and he had resigned from the ULP in 1901, [43] and the resignation of
Kingston from the Assembly in 1900 had been followed by the election of
W. J. Denney, who styled himself an 'independent Labor' representative.
Overall, the ULP had started its life in the Assembly with ten representa-
tives, and by the end of the colonial period in 1901 it retained ten out
of the house of fifty four.

As mentioned above, these elections of the 'nineties were the first
at which the term 'safe seat' in terms of party support could be
meaningfully used.   The following analysis sets out the way in which the
electoral successes of the ULP and the NDL were related to the occupational
structures in the respective electorates, and the extent to which one can
refer to stable party support.   Unfortunately, the report of the census
of 1891 did not include an analysis of the electoral districts, nor did it
include an analysis on the basis of hundreds or counties from which general
patterns of occupations could be derived.   Consequently, the necessary
use of data from the 1901 census has a major shortcoming in terms of the
analysis of the 1893 and 1896 elections, in that marked changes within
specific electorates may have occurred.   Crude comparisons tend to indicate
that such marked changes did not occur, [44] but the indices in the tables
below should be read with this cautionary note in mind.   As well, the major
occupational categories summarised in the 1901 census at the electoral
district level made no distinction between employer, self employed and
employee.   Under the category 'industrial', therefore, one finds both
the owner, employers and workers in any one specific category of industry.
However, in the occupational categories which would be expected to provide
Labor's strongest support, the numerical relations of employer-employee
over the colony as a whole, the only data published, indicated that over

eighty percent of the males in those categories were employees.[45]

Table II:7 summarises the occupational structure of the House of Assembly districts on the basis of 1901 census data. The indices are based on the number of adult males in each occupational category in the census as a percentage of the total adult males in each electoral district. Three districts contained a large proportion of miners, Flinders, the Northern Territory and Wallaroo, and it would be expected that these miners would provide a solid base of support for ULP candidates. The seven metropolitan districts, East, West, North and Port Adelaide, East and West Torrens and Sturt, were dominated in occupational terms by an industrial and commercial work-force. Only three districts showed more than ten percent of the adult males concerned with specific pastoral pursuits, but it should be noted that of the twenty extra-metropolitan districts fourteen contained an adult male population of which more than half were involved in pastoral, farming or other agricultural pursuits. South Australia was clearly a colony based on farming, and it was in such electorates dominated by the primary producers that the NDL found its greatest support.

Table II:8 summarises the involvement and successes of the ULP and the NDL in the general elections, 1893-1899, together with the overall occupational indices - total agricultural and total industrial/commercial/ mining - and emphasises the different electoral strategies and support of these two parties.

Table II:7 House of Assembly Districts, 1893-99, occupation indices
by percentages of total adult males in work force.

District   Occupation Indices

	Min-ing	Indus-trial	Com-mercial & Trans-port.	TOTAL	Agri-cultural	Pastoral	TOTAL
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Port Adelaide	–	36	50	86	2	1	3
West Torrens	–	54	29	83	6	3	9
West Adelaide	1	47	34	82	3	1	4
North Adelaide	1	37	41	79	5	2	7
Wallaroo	38	26	13	77	18	–	18
East Adelaide	1	41	43	75	3	1	4
N. Territory	48	11	16	75	9	7	16
East Torrens	1	36	37	74	10	2	12
Sturt	2	37	35	74	11	2	13
Gladstone	1	40	21	62	29	2	31
Barossa	2	41	14	57	35	2	37
Mt. Barker	2	30	17	49	38	4	42
Flinders	20	15	12	47	29	20	49
Victoria	–	27	14	41	44	8	52
Burra	2	21	16	39	45	9	54
Gumeracha	2	19	8	39	62	3	65
Newcastle	3	15	18	36	48	11	59
Frome	3	14	17	34	55	6	61
Light	1	20	13	34	59	2	61
Noarlunga	1	21	12	34	58	3	61
Onkaparinga	2	20	12	34	57	2	59
Wooroora	–	20	13	33	60	2	62
Encounter Bay	–	21	11	32	55	7	62
Stanley	1	19	10	30	60	4	64
Yorke Peninsula	6	15	8	29	66	1	67
Albert	–	16	13	29	47	18	65
Yatala	1	17	9	27	65	3	68

Table II:8 House of Assembly Districts, 1893-99, occupational structure and party involvement.

District	Occupational Index Ind.-Comm.	Agrico-Past.	ULP Involvement 1893	1896	1899	NDL Involvement 1893	1896	1899
East Adelaide	75	4	1/1	1/1	1/1		0/1	0/1
North Adelaide	79	7	1/1	1/1			1/2	1/1
Port Adelaide	86	3	2/2	2/2	2/2			
West Adelaide	82	4	1/1	1/1	1/1			
East Torrens	74	12	1/1	1/2	1/2		1/1	1/1
West Torrens	83	9	1/1	1/1	1/1			
Sturt	74	13	1/2	1/1	1/1		0/1	0/1
TOTAL			8/9	8/9	7/8		2/5	2/4
Albert	29	65		0/1		2/2	2/2	1/1
Barossa	57	37	0/1			2/2	2/2	2/2
Burra	39	54			0/1		1/2	1/1
Encounter Bay	32	62		1/1	1/1	1/1	0/2	0/2
Flinders	47	49	1/1	1/1	1/1			
Frome	34	61	0/1			1/1	1/1	1/1
Gladstone	62	31	0/1	1/2	1/2			
Gumeracha	39	65			0/1	1/1	2/2	1/1
Light	34	61					1/2	
Mt. Barker	49	42					0/1	1/1
Newcastle	36	59		0/1				
Noarlunga	34	61				1/1	1/2	1/1
N. Territory	75	16						
Onkaparinga	34	59		0/1	0/1	1/1	2/2	2/2
Stanley	30	64					0/1	0/1
Victoria	41	52					0/1	0/2
Wallaroo	77	18	1/1	1/2	1/1			
Wooroora	33	62		0/1	0/1	1/1	1/2	1/1
Yatala	27	68		0/1		1/1	1/1	1/1
Yorke Peninsula	29	67					1/1	1/1
TOTAL EXTRA METROPOLITAN			2/5	4/11	4/9	11/11	15/24	13/18
TOTAL ALL DISTRICTS			10/14	12/20	11/17	11/11	17/29	15/2

Notes: Party involvement; 1/2 indicates that two candidates stood for the party in that district and one was elected.
: NDL in 1893. Only those candidates who were members of the NDL. That is, those who were 'selected' have been excluded. In 1899, Playford rejected his NDL 'selection' in the district of Gumeracha and he was excluded from this analysis.

The ULP was essentially an urban party, both in terms of contests and suppo and its successes outside the metropolitan area were confined to the mining complex of Wallaroo and the relatively 'urbanised' populations in Encounter Bay, Flinders and Gladstone. Despite the relatively large number of miners in the Northern Territory, the ULP made no attempt to capitalise on their votes, and would probably not have succeeded if it had. Apart from the large settlement of Palmerston, the miners in the Territory were scattered, and turnout in the elections was generally low. Many who would have provided the ULP with strong support would have found difficulty in attending one of the seventeen polling places. [46] The NDL, on the other hand, concentrated on the extra-metropolitan districts, and especially on the more rural communities. Although there is some difficulty in the analysis of the 1893 election, as the NDL was still campaigning essentially as a pressure group in the traditional manner, those candidates identified as NDL members clearly sought support from the farmers and graziers of the colony. It is notable that two of the districts which showed a considerab pastoral population - Flinders and Newcastle - were not contested by the NDL. In both cases, the large towns and mining centres provided a 'balance' against the rural interests. In Newcastle, over one third of the enrolments were in the centres of Port Augusta, Quorn and Hawker, and in Flinders, the combination of the 'urban' occupations in Port Lincoln and Port Augusta West and the miners in the country tended to support the ULP, as Table II:8 shows. The League's successes in the metropolitan area were confined to two districts - North Adelaide and East Torrens - both of which contained a high proportion of the properties, town houses or permanent homes of the older and more wealthy colonists. However, as the tables above indicate, both districts were divided in their support for the NDL

and the ULP.   The NDL was essentially a party of the country in that it
sought its main support there but, as will be shown in the following
chapter, it was by no means a country party.

The following table is based on an attempt to establish the stability
of party support for the NDL and ULP.   Any such analysis in the colonial
environment needs to be qualified.   Previous chapters have shown the
extent of the volatility of voting support in many of the electorates
before 1893 when the elections were fought on personality rather than party
issues.   It would be expected that a degree of this volatility would
still be present in the first few elections under an emerging party system
of politics.   Personalities still played a part in electoral choice,
certainly to a greater extent than surveys of the modern voter and his
party identification would suggest is the case today.   As well, the
voluntary nature of the enrolment and voting system makes such a
comparative analysis difficult, and the multi-member districts added a
further complication.   As a consequence, the analysis of voting stability
was limited to those districts which saw a ULP or NDL candidate at at
least two successive elections, and the support for each party is expressed
in terms of the mean vote obtained in the case of two candidates standing
as a percentage of the total votes cast.   Again, plumping provided a
difficulty for the analysis, and consequently the conclusions drawn from
the table must be tentative.

Table II:9 Stability of Party Support, House of Assembly, 1893-99

District	ULP support			NDL support		
	Mean Percent Vote per Candidate					
	1893	1896	1899	1893	1896	1899
East Adelaide	37	34	31		23	29
North Adelaide	36	27			(24)	34
Port Adelaide	(29)	(39)	(35)			
West Adelaide	41	44	36			
East Torrens	34	(26)	(29)		25	31
West Torrens	30	30	33			
Sturt	(25)	30	33		25	28
MEAN	32	33	33	–	24	31
Albert				(28)	(30)	NC*
Barossa				(30)	(30)	(35)
Burra					(21)	22
Encounter Bay		22	24	29	(14)	(12)
Flinders	27	32	35			
Frome				28	25	21
Gladstone	30	(30)	(35)			
Gumeracha				39	(28)	40
Mt. Barker					24	26
Noarlunga				35	(23)	40
Onkaparinga		19	22	33	(23)	(30)
Stanley					31	15
Victoria					26	(19)
Wallaroo	32	(25)	25			
Wooroora				24	(20)	41
Yatala				28	31	25
Yorke Peninsula					19	22
MEAN: Extra Metrop.	30	26	30	28	24	26
OVERALL MEAN	31	30	32	28	24	27

Notes: * not contested.
          ( ) indicates that two candidates stood in the district

Given the qualifications noted above, there is evidence of fairly
stable support for ULP candidates, especially in the metropolitan area.
NDL support, however, showed greater fluctuations, with the most stable
support evident in the district of Barossa.   In both cases, however,
there was evidence that the party support established in the elections of 18
was maintained over the next two contests.   On the basis of these indices
of party support, and it should be emphasised that there are shortcomings
in the analysis, one can refer to electoral support for parties rather than
for personalities for the first time in the history of colonial South
Australia.

To this point we have been concerned with the elections of the
decade of the 'nineties, and especially with party involvement in the
contests.   We turn now to the legislative scene in an attempt to explain
the long-term Kingston ministry, and to establish whether the changes
in the practice of (procedural) representation were transposed into the
legislatures, to establish whether the parliaments in the 'nineties saw the
development of a party system of legislative behaviour and to clarify
the role of the United Labor Party in the unique Kingston Era.

Footnotes Chapter II

1. *Advertiser*, October 19, 1892

2. *Register*, March 22, 1893

3. See, for example, N. J. O. Makin, *A Progressive Democracy. A Record of Reference Concerning the South Australian Branch of the Australian Labor Party in Politics*, (Daily Herald Printers, Adelaide, 1918), T. H. Smeaton, *From Stonecutter to Premier and Minister of Education. The Story of the Life of Tom Price, a Welsh boy who became an Australian Statesman*, (Hunkin, Ellis and King, Adelaide, n.d.), T. H. Smeaton, *The People in Politics. A Short History of the Labour Movement in South Australia*, (The Daily Herald, Adelaide, 1914).

4. R. P. Griffiths, *The South Australian Labour Movement and Federation 1887-1898*, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1968), p. 10. See also J. I. Craig, *op. cit.*

5. On Payment of Members, see J. M. Robertson, *Payment of Members. The Issue in South Australia, 1871-1887, with Reference to Victoria*, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1959); on the 1890 Strikes, see especially K. R. Bowes, *The 1890 Maritime Strike in South Australia*, (M.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1957); on the ULP see n. 3 above, and ▩▩. L.G.Churchward(ed.)▩▩▩, *The Australian Labour Movement, 1850-1907: Extracts from Contemporary Documents*, (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965.), B. Fitzpatrick, *A Short History of the Australian Labour Movement*, (Wilke and Co., Melbourne, 1944), N. J. O. Makin, *op. cit.*, T. H. Smeaton, *op. cit.*, J. I. Craig, *op. cit.*, N. Ganzis *Tom Price: First Labor Premier. A Political Biography*, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1959), J. Scarfe, *op. cit.*

6. The following pledge was adopted at the formation of the ULP in 1891:
   'I hereby pledge myself not to oppose the selected candidate of this or any other branch of the Political Labour League. I also pledge myself, if returned to Parliament, on all occasions to do my utmost to ensure the carrying out of the principles embodied in the Labour Platform, and in all such questions, and especially in questions affecting the fate of a Government, to vote as a majority of the Labour Party may decide at a duly constituted caucus meeting'.

7. Cotton was defeated by J. Bosworth in 1886, 1455 votes to 706, and was even less popular at this second attempt to return. Results, Central Division, 1887

	Votes	Percent votes	plumpers
A. M. SIMPSON	2562	29.3	267
J. H. ANGAS	2399	27.4	258
P. B. Coglin	1678	19.2	306
G. W. Cotton	994	11.4	51
J. Darling	782	8.9	30
J. Z. Sellar	165	1.9	9
J. B. Spence	163	1.9	12

Although turnout was lower in 1888 (42.3%) than in the 1887 by-election (50.1%) Cotton's 'selection' by the UTLC provided him with a marked increase in support.

	Votes
S. J. MAGAREY	2354
G. W. COTTON	1517
P. B. Coglin	1232
W. C. Buik	1064
W. Storrie	942
J. Z. Sellar	285

8. F. S. Wallis, History of the South Australian Labor Party, 1882-1900, SAA, n.d., p. 6.

9. Advertiser, May 11, 1891

10. Worker, June 27, 1891. Cited in C. M. H. Clark, Select Documents in Australian History, 1851-1900, (Sydney, 1965), p. 586.

11. Turnout - 78%
   Results:
W. A. ROBINSON (ULP)	49.5%
A. Ware	27.4%
A. Tennant	23.1%

12. In 1912, the Labor Party won six of the Council seats, and augmented this by one in 1915. That year was the zenith of Labor representation in the Council, and for the past twenty five years since 1947, Labor has held only four of the twenty seats, all from the one division - Central No. 1.

13. See Appendix III for full results.

14. Chronicle, May 29, 1897.

15. See J. Scarfe, op. cit., pp. 142-9 for the charges and counter-charges which preceded his resignation.

16. By-election, September, 1897. Turnout 47%.
   Results:
CHARLESTON	3932
Hutchinson	3170

17. Observer, September 18, 1897.

18. Thursday Review, December 26, 1861.

19. Cited in H . M. B. Disney, op. cit., p. 31.

20. Observer, January 28, 1893.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., February 18, 1893.

23.   _Ibid._, January 30, 1892.

24.   _Ibid._, September 24, 1892.

25.   _Ibid._, May 6, 1893.

26.   _Ibid._, September 24, 1892.

27.   _Register_, January 7, 1893.

28.   For an analysis of the role of these electoral groups, see H. M. B. Disney, _op. cit._, Chs. 1-3.

29.   See below, tables II:8   and II:9.

30.   W. A. Robinson, _Direct Representation of Labour in Parliament_, (Scrymgour and Sons, Adelaide, 1892) pp. 12-13.

31.   Results:

			Votes	%
On Roll	3740	J.A. McPHERSON	1200	53.9
Voted	2244 (60.0%)	G.S. Fowler	1026	46.1
Informal	18			

32.   See H. M. B. Disney, _op. cit._, pp. 46-9.

33.   The District of Yorke Peninsula was formed in the 1882 redistribution, and was essentially a community of farmers.   Both the candidatures and results in elections supported the thesis that South Australian farmers were strongly independent.   Sitting members were defeated in 1893 (Lamshed), 1896 (Short, Bartlett), and at most elections there was a higher number of candidates than in other rural districts. Only three candidates stood in 1884, but there were five in 1887, twenty in 1890, nine in 1893 and 1896, and four in 1899.

34.   The main centres of population, and the proportion of the total ULP vote from these centres were:

District	Main Centres *		Proportion of ULP support from these centres
Wallaroo	Wallaroo, Kadina, Moonta	(4)	95%
Barossa	Gawler	(10)	67%
Gladstone	Port Pirie	(8)	63%
Frome	Orroroo, Petersburg	(26)	47%
Flinders	Port Lincoln	(25)	25%

   * (4) - number of other polling places.

35.   See E. J. Wadham, _Women's Suffrage in South Australia, 1883-1894_, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1952).

36.   _Register_, April 24, 1896.

37.   _Ibid._, April 25, 1896.

38. The Weekly Herald, April 17, 1896.

39. Register, April 13, 1896.

40. Ibid., May 4, 1896.

41. Review of Reviews, May 20, 1896, p. 437.

42. Ibid.

43. Rejoined AIP in House of Representatives, 1904-1916.

44. The total population of the colony increased by 12% from 1891 to 1901, compared to 15% and 54% for the preceding two decades.   Electoral enrolments for the House of Assembly (and it should be emphasised that these were voluntary) increased from 73,619 in 1893 to 137,747 in 1896 after adult suffrage had been passed, an increase of 88%, but by only 11% between 1896 and 1899.   This latter increase occurred almost entirely in the seven districts which constituted the metropolitan area;   the overall increase in the 20 extra metropolitan districts between 1896 and 1899 was a mere 168 voters.   Overall patterns of occupations changed only slightly between 1881 and 1901 – see Chapter XII.

45.

Major occupational group	No.	Percentage of male work force		
		employer	own account	employee
Professional	5372	7.4	10.4	82.2
Commercial	17080	12.3	18.0	69.7
Transport	12591	2.6	5.0	92.4
Industrial	34255	8.4	7.1	84.5
Agricultural	34646	20.5	20.8	58.7
Pastoral	4951	16.7	12.7	70.6
Mining	6301	1.3	18.1	80.6
Domestic Indefinite }	5132	10.5	6.2	83.3

46. See Appendix IV, especially pp. 213, 227, 241.

Chapter XII

The Kingston Era - 2

Groups, Factions and Parties

'In colonial parliaments the English
party system has survived the rough
experience of acclimatisation'.

W. P. Reeves. 1902

'Never in the constitutional history
of any British country was a
government so little troubled by
opposition within Parliament.   It
had favourable currents and helpful
breezes all along its voyage'.

Register, November 29,
1899.

Introduction

The transition from a purely faction system of government to a fully developed political party system is rarely rapid. It was especially a slow and complex process in South Australia. The elections of 1890 were dominated by the activities of a multitude of pressure groups, and the great majority of candidates stood as independents, rejecting any party ties or constituency pledges. The legislative process in the parliament which followed was clearly faction orientated. The emergence of the United Labor Party at the Council elections of 1891 and the Assembly elections of 1893 did not bring the rapid development of a party system, and it was to be twenty years before the electorate was given a clear choice between two political parties.[1] Following the entry of Labor into South Australian politics, elements of a developing new order existed side by side with aspects of the old. Factions did not expire abruptly or immediately coalesce into political parties, and the independent member still had a role to play. The emergence of a political party was the catalyst for marked changes in the political scene in South Australia, in both the procedural and functional senses of political representation, but it was not the catalyst for the rapid development of a party system.

The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to establish the extent to which political parties existed in the Kingston Era, the extent to which party politics replaced faction politics in the legislatures, and in the electorates, and the extent to which a party system had begun to replace a faction system by Federation. The chapter is concerned, centrally, with the role of the United Labor Party and of its members, and its effects as a political catalyst. It is concerned with the relations of the

ULP and the Kingston ministry, the National Defence League and the
various groups and factions which remained, in an attempt to establish
whether, as Labor historians claim, the ULP was both the driving force
and the deciding factor in both the long term stability of the Kingston
ministry and the thrust of progressive legislation in this final
colonial decade.

The emphasis is on analysis of legislative behaviour in the 'nineties.
As previous chapters have shown, there was often a wide difference between
what candidates and members said they were, and what they would do if
elected, what they said their relationship was to 'parties' factions and
pressure groups, and what they actually did.   Thus, to establish the role
of factions and parties, and especially the role of the ULP, it is essential
to consider the legislative behaviour of members, rather than their claims
or the claims of others, as to what they would do, and what they actually
accomplished.

This chapter is basically concerned, then, with the legislative
behaviour of members of the parliaments of the 'nineties and with the
legislative role of parties and factions. It is concerned to establish
the role of the United Labor Party and its members, and the party and
faction reaction, and the extent to which a party system of government
emerged in South Australia prior to federation.   There is no doubt that
parties existed in the 'nineties, but to what extent did these parties
dominate the legislatures and to what extent was the faction system of
legislative behaviour maintained?   To what extent did the acceptance of
a Burkean 'independence' break down under the pressure of the ULP?

The answers to such questions are closely tied to the political position, role and activities of the Kingston ministry, and to the changes in the legislature following its defeat in 1899. To set the 'nineties into perspective, then, we turn first to a summary of the formation and defeat of this record Kingston ministry.

Kingston- Rise and Fall

As noted above, the ministry of J. W. Downer suffered a set-back when two of its members, Grayson and Rounsevell, were defeated at the 1893 elections. To survive in the house, Downer had to fill the vacancies with members who would carry sufficient support with them to enable the unsteady majority of the last months of 1892 to be at least maintained. But the general legislative pattern which had first appeared at the formation of the Downer ministry in 1892, the polarisation for the first time of the liberal members together on one side and the more conservative members on the other, had remained, and the former had been strengthened. Downer took the Treasury portfolio himself, and filled the vacancies with J. W. Castine and J. Moule, both conservatives who had given him strong support in the previous session, but neither of whom would attract support from the liberal side of the house, and he faced the Assembly on June 8, 1893.

In the tradition of contemporary legislative practice, Downer would have expected a vote of confidence soon after the opening of the session, and the election of the ULP members had made this more probable. But it did not eventuate. On the third day of sitting, the leader of the opposition, Holder, rose to make the traditional speech on the Address in Reply, but

> he was not disposed to talk of ... policy. A few
> weeks ago the country declared its opinion of the
> present government, and as he believed the majority
> in the House were prepared to endorse that opinion
> it would be a pity to waste a week's time in discussing
> it.   The best would be for some hon. member to move
> the adjournment of the House ... and save acrimonious
> debate.   2

With a lack of hesitation which implied a planned manouevre, C. C. Kingston complied, and with no further debate allowed under the standing orders, the Downer ministry was defeated, albeit narrowly, 27-25.   The two non-voters on this division were the Speaker, Sir Jenkin Coles, who had been an avid opponent of progressive and liberal measures before taking up the post, and E. W. Hawker, the son of the prominent faction leader of earlier years, and equally a conservative.   Thus, if the vote is seen in terms of a division between two ideologies, then the Assembly was split 27-27.   However, as will be shown later, this close vote was not an accurate indication of the patterns of support and opposition which would emerge over the succeeding sessions.

Of the fourteen newly elected members in the Assembly, the nine Labor party members voted for Kingston's motion, but the remainder supported Downer.   Three of Downer's supporters in the last weeks of 1892, Blacker, Kelly and Landseer, crossed the floor to vote against him on the adjournment motion, and only Handyside of his 1892 opposition voted for him.   No member explained his actions, but it is clear from the analyses of later behaviour that the close vote against Downer was not based on ideology, especially in the case of the newly elected non-Labor members, who were not found amongst Downer's strong supporters when he went into opposition.

Why Kingston?   If the ministry was defeated, then on the record of
the manouevrings of the 'eighties, there were other faction leaders on the
more liberal side of the House with strong claims to the leadership of a
new ministry.   Holder, Cockburn and Playford were previous Premiers, and
leaders of numerically important factions, but it was Kingston, who although
he had not led a ministry before, emerged as the dominant political figure.
Part of the answer was in Kingston's own personality.[3]   He had strong
convictions, and a fierce determination to get his own way.   Although he
had not led a previous ministry, he had been a driving force in those in
which he held a portfolio, and was generally regarded as more than just a
lieutenant to the Premier.   He was especially the driving force behind the
more progressive legislation of the two Playford ministries of 1887-89 and
1890-92.   As well, Kingston had the respect and the support of the Labor
Party and of the working men.   Of the four possible leaders in the Assembly
after the defeat of Downer, Kingston was the most acceptable to the Labor
Party, and as there were now nine members of the ULP in the House, and in the
terms of the narrow defeat of Downer, it was apparent that ULP support could
well be a necessity for the formation of a stable ministry.   Kingston had
shown in the last weeks of the 1892 session that he had been able to unite
the various liberal factions in the Assembly behind him in opposition to
Downer, and he continued to lead when the 'party' lines were more clearly
drawn.   As shown above, the 'eighties saw the situation of the more liberal
factions opposing each other as often as they were in agreement.   Not until
the Downer ministry in 1892 had they all been under one 'political roof'.
Consequently Kingston's base in his ministry on three former premiers and
two former ministers was a notable achievement.   The conflicts between
the liberal leaders in the 'eighties had not been on matters of policy, but

on the more simple matters of personality and of ministry making and
defeat.   For this reason they had often been bitter, and Cockburn and
Holder had earlier been two of Kingston's strongest opponents.   Neither
had been in the same ministry as Kingston prior to 1893, and both had been
in the strongest core of opposition to ministries which included him.
However, once these antipathies had been overcome to the extent that the
coalition into one ministry was possible, then Kingston had achieved what
the faction leaders in the past had been unable to do, - he had secured
the support of a _stable_ majority in the house, a majority which was based
not on personalities alone, but on a distinctive policy and ideology.

In terms of past ministerial experience, the Kingston ministry was one
of considerable talent.

C. C. Kingston: Attorney General. Previously Attorney General under
Colton (1884-5) and Playford, (1887-89) and Chief
Secretary under Playford, (1892).

T. Playford: Treasurer. Previously Premier, (1887-89, 1890-92), Crown
Lands under Boucaut (1875-76, 1876, 1877-78) under Morgan
(1878-81) and under Colton, (1884-85). He took the
portfolio of Treasurer in both of his own ministries.

P. P. Gillen: Commissioner of Crown Lands.   Previously Crown Lands
under Holder, (1892).

F. W. Holder: Commissioner of Public Works. Previously Premier, (1892),
Treasurer under Cockburn (1889-90), and took the portfolio
of Treasurer in his own ministry.

J. A. Cockburn: Minister of Education and Agriculture. Previously Premier
(1889-90), Education under Downer (1885-87), Chief
Secretary under Holder (1892), and took the portfolio of
Chief Secretary in his own ministry.

J. H. Gordon: Member of the Legislative Council and Chief Secretary.
Previously Education under Cockburn (1889-90), and under
Holder (1892).

The ministry was also notable for its 'progressive' nature, not only in
terms that it consisted, for the first time, of a coalition of the former

warring factions on the liberal side of the house and lacked only a member
of the ULP to represent all of the more progressive groups in the Assembly,
but also for the policies it proposed to put into practice. Kingston
outlined the policy of his ministry to the parliament a mere two days after
the defeat of Downer. In the light of previous ministry changes, and
the common occurrence in the earlier decades of granting an adjournment of
a week for the new ministry to prepare its programme, this was an
achievement, and suggests that the move against Downer was by no means a
decision of the spur of the moment.

Kingston called his government's policy 'a programme worthy of a
progressive and a liberal party', [4] and there was no doubt that it pleased
the members of the ULP.

> Extra taxation is necessary. The question then arises
> whence is it to come? ... We feel that large landowners
> whose holdings may in some degree to be said to constitute
> a monopoly may fairly be asked to contribute a larger
> amount.... absentee landowners should receive special
> attention.... an increased income tax ... fairly increased
> and graded ... We shall support progressive probate and
> succession duties ... We shall give effect to Bills
> registering factories, aiding early closing, and providing
> for the inspection of steam boilers. The Workmens Liens
> Bill will also find a place ... as will the Trades Hall
> site.... [5]

But if the Labor members were pleased, R. C. Baker as spokesman for the
conservative members was not.

> ... the policy was to a very great extent the policy of
> the Labor Party .... it appeared to him the government
> proposed to gradually arrive at a State socialism, and
> the methods ... were to destroy the constitution and to
> establish the principle of representation without taxation.
> Where was the equality of sacrifice? [6]

The ministry had sunk to such a stage that its members were

always ready to vote at the Trade's Hall call,
And never think of thinking for themselves at all. [7]

Legislative politics had entered a new era. Personalities were still important, but they were being increasingly subordinated to policies.

Despite the vehemence of this conservative opposition from the beginning, Kingston retained control of the House of Assembly for over six years and through two general elections, despite some important changes in the ministry. Playford was appointed as Agent General in London in April, 1894,[8] and was replaced by the Government Whip, J. G. Jenkins. Gillen's death in 1896 left a vacancy which was filled by the new Whip, O'Loughlin, and in 1898, when Cockburn replaced Playford in London, a third Government Whip, Richard Butler, was elevated to the ministry. Kingston had less success with support from the Legislative Council, and his eventual defeat in the House of Assembly was partly the result of troubles in this area. But before turning to the patterns of legislative behaviour which lay at the base of this stable period, and to the role of the ULP in this stability, we turn to the brief period of instability following Kingston's defeat in 1899, and to an outline of the changes which occurred in the leadership of the Assembly, as these changes were an important catalyst in the development of a new role for the Labor Party.

Despite the inclusion of dominant faction leaders, the Kingston ministry was dominated by its leader. Of the original six members of the ministry, only Kingston and Holder remained at its defeat in 1899, and the Premier and his ideas remained the dominant factor throughout. As will be shown below, the ULP provided Kingston with strong and cohesive support over the first five years of his ministry, and his defeat, following the weakening of both ULP cohesion and ULP support for the ministry, must have

appeared as just retribution in the eyes of the more conservative members.

The first indications of weakening of ULP support were made evident at the opening of the 1898 session, when Kingston faced his first no-confidence motion. Coghlan suggests that, as early as 1897, some members of the ULP had considered that an over-reliance on Kingston had weakened the electoral possibilities of the party,[9] and certainly by early 1898 some ULP spokesmen were considering whether 'to take a more independent position'[10]. Downer's motion of no confidence in the ministry at the opening of the session was clearly planned to take advantage of any such independence. However, an independent stance was one thing, but the possibility of the end of the flow of progressive policies and programmes was quite another. Most ULP members were still fascinated by Kingston and 'by the fertility of his legislative ideas',[11] and although there were aspects of the 1898 Governor's speech which displeased them,[12] they had no desire to see the general trend of legislation stopped, or even reversed if J. W. Downer and the NDL were to win the treasury benches. Consequently, Glynn's proposal, 'that we have no confidence in the administration and the sincerity of the ministry', was simply not acceptable to even the most independent of the ULP members. Batchelor moved a ULP amendment that 'we have no confidence in the administration, but agree generally with the legislative proposals', and there is little doubt that this was moved to criticise the Kingston ministry, but not to defeat it. The wording of the amendment was not acceptable to the NDL members who had constantly inveighed against the policy of the ministry, and the ULP amendment was defeated by a unique combination of the NDL and the ministerialists, thirty five votes to fourteen, with Hooper, the unpledged Labor member voting with the ministry, and Wood, despite his resignation, with the ULP. The ULP considered their point had

been put strongly enough, and they voted with Kingston to defeat the original no-confidence motion by a similar margin.[13]

Kingston's defeat in November of the following year came at the hands of some of his former supporters, and most notably some of the ULP, but the explanation for the defeat is linked with the Legislative Council. As will be shown below, a relatively liberal majority in the Council in the first few years of the ministry had allowed, even encouraged, the passage of much of the progressive legislation proposed and passed through the Assembly by Kingston, his ministerialists and the ULP. But by 1898, this liberal majority had disappeared, due in no small part to the erosion of the ULP representation in the Council, and the flood of progressive legislation which was allowed to pass relatively unscathed through the upper house had all but stopped.

The catalysts for the process which led to Kingston's defeat were the Council's rejection of the Franchise Bill, and the results of the 1899 referendum. ULP member Hooper demanded that Kingston use all constitutional means to ensure the passage of the Bill, but Kingston would not commit himself to the use of the deadlock provisions. To carry these through, he would have had to request a dissolution of the House of Assembly before introducing the Bill again. With the evidence of the referendum results before him, and little indication that the electors would consider the issue more important at elections than they had at the referendum, Kingston was loth to follow this course. As well, it was then, as now, a truism that some individual members of parliament did not look forward to elections with any sense of urgent desire, and such a proposal could well have brought another, and possibly a successful no-confidence motion.

Kingston stressed his determination to carry the measure even to the extent

of relinquishing his ambitions to enter the Federal parliament until it

had been carried.[14]   But Walter Griffiths, for one, was not satisfied.

Still worried about the possibility of a dissolution,[15] he pressed Kingston

for a clear statement of government policy if the Bill was defeated in the

Council, and the ensuing dialogue between the ministry and its opponents

revealed little.

> (Kingston)'The Government have not changed their minds'.
> (Grainger) 'Has any member of the ministry informed any hon.
> member that it is the intention of the government not to
> dissolve this house'?
> (Kingston) 'No, Sir'.
> (Grainger) 'I will ask the Commissioner of Crown Lands if
> he has made any such statement'.
> (O'Loughlin) 'I made no such statement, and anyone who says
> so says what is untrue'.
> (Grainger) 'I ask the Commissioner of Public Works the
> same question'.
> (Kingston) 'I have answered it for all. It is a gross
> fabrication'.
> (Jenkins) 'No sir, certainly not'.
> (O'Loughlin) 'It is wilfully untrue'.
> (Brooker) desired to ask Mr. Burgoyne whether he had
> received a promise –
> (Speaker) 'That is a question which really cannot be put'.
> (Burgoyne) 'I shall be happy to answer any question'. [16]
> (Speaker) 'That question cannot be put or answered'.

But the matter was not allowed to rest there.   A brief series of questions

on ordinary business followed, and then the ministry was attacked and

defeated.

A simple adjournment motion brought the end of the Kingston ministry,

a motion which had a number of similarities with the motion which had

prefaced its formation.   The motion was moved by an 'agent of the leader

of the opposition' in 1893 and 1899;   Kingston as 'agent' for Holder in

1893, and Burgoyne as 'agent' for V. L. Solomon in 1899.   The vote on

the motion was close, with Kingston defeated twenty seven votes to twenty

six, including the pair of Downer, for the ministry, and Livingstone against, a full vote of the Assembly which was in itself a notable event.

To this point, the Kingston 'ministerialists' had survived the divisions in the new parliament by depending on the unsteady support of a group of fourteen, eleven of whom were ULP members.

Table 12:1 Patterns of legislative support for the Kingston ministry, 1899.

'ministerialists'

Brooker	Burgoyne
(M)Butler	Catt
Foster	Cummins
(M) Holder	Dumas
(M) Jenkins	McLachlan
Livingstone	Morris
(M) O'Loughlin	Peake
	Shannon

NDL - conservative opposition

(N) Caldwell
(N) Castine
(N) Copley
(N) Darling
(N) Downer
(N) Duncan
(N) Giles
(N) Hague
    Handyside
(N) Homburg
(N) McDonald
    Paech
(N) Rounsevell
    Solomon
    Tucker
(N) Von Doussa

unsteady 'ministerialist' support

* Archibald
* Batchelor
* Carpenter
* Goneybeer
* Hooper
* Hourigan
* Hutchinson
* McGillivray
  McKenzie
* Poynton
* Price
* Roberts
  Scherk
  Wood

Unsteady conservative support

Blacker
Glynn
Grainger
Griffiths
Playford

* ULP members, (N) NDL members, (M) members of the Kingston ministry

Of the ministerialists, only Burgoyne and Morris deserted the Government, but of the unsteady ministerialist support, McKenzie, Poynton, Roberts and Wood crossed the floor.   Of the unsteady conservative support, only Playford crossed to support Kingston on the Adjournment vote.

The fact that two unpledged members of the ULP had crossed the floor
to vote against the ministry provoked a short but bitter exchange in the
house.   ULP parliamentary leader, Price, told the house that despite the
desertion by two members, there had been no dissension at the caucus meeting
prior to the meeting of the parliament that day.[17]   Heated interjections
by Roberts challenged Price to produce the party minute book which showed
that the party _had_ divided.[18]   In admitting this, Roberts brought the wrath
of the other ULP members on his head for forgetting

> what was due to himself and his colleagues as to
> bring into that House matters which ought to have
> been regarded by him as sacredly private. [19]

Both Poynton and Roberts stressed that they had the right to cross the floor
if they wished - they stressed that they were unpledged members.   But
Poynton made clear why they had voted against their colleagues:

> he held the strong conviction that it was the intention
> of Kingston to plunge the colony into political warfare
> ... They were going to have a double dissolution.   They
> were going to penalise friend and foe alike.   They were
> going to enter upon that warfare to get a reduction of
> the franchise.... To prevent this was the chief reason
> he had voted as he did. [20]

Certainly the fears of a threatened dissolution had been uppermost in most
members' minds, and

> for weeks this crisis has threatened, as the members
> were known to be opposed to the purpose of Mr. Kingston
> to dissolve. [21]

In fact, as Kingston was certainly sufficiently politically astute to realise,
there was no political advantage in a dissolution.   Rather, his position
in the Assembly could have been weakened still further.   As was mentioned
in an earlier chapter, the deadlock provisions of 1881 were complex, time
consuming and finally in the favour of the Legislative Council in that the

upper house still retained the final say on the issue which provoked the
dissolution.   As well, there were political trends which mitigated against
any gains for Kingston.   The trend in the Council elections had been away
from the ULP candidates specifically, especially in the Southern division, as
was shown in the preceding chapter, and, as will be shown below, the
progressive majority which, for a short time aided the passage of progressive
legislation through the upper house had been eroded.   Given the temper of
the times, Kingston had little chance of winning a majority in the Council
which would be favourable to his franchise bill and, in fact, ran the risk
of seeing his main support there, the ULP members, depleted still further.

But it was clear that the opinion in the parliament was that Kingston
was considering such a move, and, as the <u>Advertiser</u> put it, his 'refusal to
allay the fears of several hon. members sealed the fate of his administra-
tion.[22]   A clear majority of the Assembly members had agreed to the franchise
reform proposal and they were will favourable to it, to the extent that
Roberts made it clear in a statement to the House that his vote against the
Kingston ministry was not to be regarded as a vote against the principles of
the Bill.[23]   But the majority were not prepared to face an election on the
issue, an election which would not resolve the deadlock, but which would,
in fact, only lead to a further election, and they were in no mind to place
themselves in a position of double electoral jeopardy.

Kingston refused to accept the vote as a <u>final</u> vote of no confidence,
and on the following day he surprised the house by announcing that he had
advised the Governor that a dissolution was necessary 'for the purpose of
reversing the expression of want of confidence which was undoubtedly
contained', but cheers greeted the report that this request had been refused.[24]

In the short term, the sequel was to all intents and purposes a matter of 'the king is dead: long live the king'. Kingston's leadership had been rejected, but apparently not his ministry, nor his policies. It was Kingston's equivocation over the matter of the dissolution which lay at the base of the adverse vote, not the general policies of the ministry, and this was shown clearly by the reception given to the succeeding ministry.

Burgoyne declined the Governor's invitation to form a ministry in favour of Solomon, who included Burgoyne, Rounsevell, Glynn and Poynton in his administration. But this rather heterogeneous mixture - Poynton a former unpledged member of the ULP, Rounsevell a member of the NDL, Burgoyne a former Kingston supporter - was given little chance to explain its policy. Solomon faced the house on December 5, and outlined his policy, but was defeated, again by a simple adjournment motion, when he met the house for his second day. Including paired votes, there was again a full vote of the house, and Solomon was defeated narrowly, twenty eight votes to twenty five. Of those who had supported Kingston on the adjournment motion which was carried against him, only Playford crossed the floor to vote with Solomon,[25] an action which brought him in line with the position he had maintained for the majority of the session, that of opposition to his former leader. Roberts returned to vote with his ULP colleagues, and Morris and Blacker also crossed the floor to vote for Holder.

The Solomon ministry was described by its leader as a 'short but merry government'.[26] In fact it had little chance of success. As a non-party government - the mixture of unpledged ULP, NDL, conservative and formerly liberal members did not even merit the term coalition - Solomon's ministry was forced to depend on the hope that the essence of the former faction system of government could be revived, that he could carry sufficient personal

support for himself and his ministers to secure a working majority. But the political environment had changed too much. As will be shown below, the legislature was essentially a party house, although elements of the faction style remained among the independents. Issues and policies had become important, and Solomon's announcement that his government intended to drop the Kingston franchise Bill was too much for most of the liberals in the house.

The Solomon ministry was replaced by the Kingston ministry - without Kingston - and with one notable addition.

Kingston ministry, 1899		Holder ministry, 1899
J. V. O'Loghlin, MLC	Chief Secretary	J. G. Jenkins
C. C. Kingston	Attorney General	J. H. Gordon MLC
F. W. Holder	Treasurer	F. W. Holder
L. O'Loughlin	Crown Lands	L. O'Loughlin
J. G. Jenkins	Public Works	R. W. Foster
R. Butler	Education/Agriculture	E. L. Batchelor

J. H. Gordon had been Chief Secretary of the Kingston ministry, 1893-6, and R. W. Foster had consistently voted with the Kingston ministry since his election in 1893. The unique addition was Batchelor, leader of the parliamentary ULP, and this was the first instance of a pledged Labor member in a South Australian ministry, an action which, to the Weekly Herald, marked 'an epoch in the forward movement which, when history comes to be writ, will not be the least important item.[27] The Labor caucus allowed Batchelor to revoke the relevant section of his pledge, and replaced him as party leader with Tom Price.

Holder's ministry governed the colony until its leader resigned in May 1901 to become a member of the Federal parliament. He was replaced as Premier by his Chief Secretary, Jenkins. In both ministries, the personnel of the old Kingston ministry was emphasised to the extent that, at

first sight, the Solomon ministry was an interregnum. Holder included
Jenkins, Gordon and O'Loughlin from the Kingston administration, and these
three formed the core of the Jenkins ministry after Holder's resignation.
But while there was an apparent continuity of the Kingston ministers, and
thus in the leadership of the parliament, there were marked changes in both
the personnel of the houses and the policies of the ministries, changes
which emphasised that the defeat of Kingston was the end of an era.

In terms of personnel, many of the legislative leaders who had played
important roles not only in the Kingston Era, but in the decade which
preceded it, resigned from colonial, now State politics, and were elected
to the Federal houses. Of the dominant faction and party leaders of the
'eighties and 'nineties, Downer, Holder, Kingston, Playford and Batchelor
were elected to the first commonwealth parliament. R. C. Baker, who had
been in the forefront of the formation of the NDL, and its spearhead in the
Legislative Council; V. L. Solomon, Leader of the opposition to Kingston
in 1898-99 and Premier for a brief period; Alexander Poynton, who had
played an important role in the defeat of Kingston and who was to continue
his rather vacillating political allegiances into the commonwealth
parliament;[28] and P. M. Glynn, also left the colonial political scene.
With one stroke, the federal elections of 1901 had decimated the legislative
leadership of South Australia. And, more importantly, they had changed the
direction of the political outlook of the remaining members of Kingston's
supporters and lieutenants. It was this change in policy and direction
which brought a new orientation to the aims and methods of the ULP in the
South Australian parliaments, and which marked the end of an era of 'Lib-
Lab' government in the colony.

Following his defeat, Kingston resigned from the Assembly in the 1899-1900 recess, but after a year out of legislative politics he stood successfully for a seat in the Legislative Council.[29] His role, there, was far more subdued, and he no longer dominated politics in the colony. It was his defeat which prefaced a change in the nature of legislative and electoral behaviour in South Australia. Despite the virtual return of the personnel of the Kingston ministry under Holder, and despite the inclusion of Batchelor, the United Labor Party carried out its stated intentions of adopting a more independent position. Its support for the Holder ministry was far from enthusiastic, and often the party found itself in opposition to the leaders it had supported so strongly before.

The forging of the coalition of the contending liberal factions in 1893 had prefaced a period of five years when 'progressivism' and 'liberalism' were dominant in South Australia. The conservative members of the NDL were almost always in opposition, and even the Legislative Council was 'captured' by a liberal majority for a short period. This was disrupted in 1899. The defeat and resignation of Kingston removed the one man who had been able to bind the 'Lib-Lab' coalition together, albeit tenuously towards the end, and the process of transition to a bi-polar rather than a tri-polar legislature had begun.

In Queensland, 'orthodox Liberalism was becoming fearful for the future ... horrified by the programme issued by the ALF in 1890 ... (and was) rapidly becoming more conservative'.[30] In South Australia, only a minority of the members did not, at the beginning, welcome the presence of the ULP. The Baker and the Langdon Parsons reactions were in the minority. And for five years liberals in the Assembly were glad of, and even dependent on the support from the Labor members. By 1901, however, the former liberals had

become more conservative, and they had moved away from being necessary for the programme which the ULP sought, and from being the means for these policies to be carried through, to the main focus of the opposition to the Labor party.

It is to such changes in the patterns of faction and party support in the decade of the 'nineties that we now turn, beginning with the final stumbling block of the Kingston ministry, the Legislative Council. We will then turn to the patterns of legislative behaviour in the Assembly, and then analyse the role of the United Labor Party in both houses, its perceived and actual role during the Kingston Era, the changes in its aims following the defeat of Kingston, and finally, the slow development of a bi-polar party system which had its genesis with the downfall of the Kingston ministry.

Party in the Legislative Council, 1891-1901

Throughout the first thirty-odd years of colonial period, the Legislative Council was the house of 'settled property' and, as has been shown above, it saw its main role as the protection of this property. It would be expected, then, that the election of Labor party members to this chamber would have the effect of fairly rapid polarisation of the membership into two opposing camps.

Two notable features of the membership of the Council prior to 1891 were the stability of its membership, and the relative lack of division between the members. The first factor was especially evident after the division of the Province into Council electorates in 1882. From the special election in 1882, when the house was enlarged to twenty four members until 1890, no sitting member who stood for re-election was defeated, and in the

twenty years from 1882 until the emigration of a group of members to the Federal parliament, even considering the effects of the ULP, there was still a relatively low turnover of members.[31]   The second notable factor is evidenced by the few occasions on which the Council divided prior to 1891, the proportions of divisions after that election,[32] and the lack of any significant structure in the voting patterns of the members pre-Labor.[33]   The internal patterns of legislative behaviour were disrupted after 1891, to an extent that the degree of structure exceeded that in the House of Assembly for comparable sessions.

Diagram 12-1: Comparison of structures, House of Assembly
and Legislative Council, 1884-1901.

P11   P12   P13   P14   P15   P16
S1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1884   1887   1890   1893   1896   1899

_____ House of Assembly

_ _ _ _ Legislative Council

On the surface, this marked polarisation of the members of the Council could be attributed to the changing nature of the legislation they discussed, and voted on. The formation of the Kingston ministry was followed by the introduction of a number of matters of social and industrial legislation into the upper house, matters which would be expected to bring reactions from the traditional conservatives such as Baker, widely divergent from those of the ULP. But, on the other hand, not only had the Council debated and rejected[34] equally controversial legislation such as industrial Bills, workmen's conditions, taxation proposals, Stamp and Succession Duty Bills before 1891 without polarising the membership, but the marked rise in structure in the Council was evident prior to the Kingston ministry. It followed immediately on the election of the ULP members.

An analysis of the voting patterns of members of the Council establishes a relatively clear bi-polar division after 1891. Documentary evidence indicates that this division was essentially between the members of the ULP and those who had joined the NDL. These members showed a considerable degree of cohesion, not only in their own bloc, but in the constant opposition between the two major blocs. There were some members who voted relatively independently of these cohesive groups, but the overall pattern of conflict in the Council from 1891 was essentially Labor opposed to the members and supporters of the conservative National Defence League.

Diagram 12:2 provides a plot of the scores of members of the Legislative Council from 1887 to 1901, identifying members of the two major groups. This provides further evidence of the marked increase in the polarisation of the members, and indicates the cohesion of the voting of the ULP and DNL members on the significant divisions. It also shows graphically the divergent behaviour of Charleston after his resignation from the ULP in 1897.

Diagram 12-2: Patterns of Voting Behaviour, POLIT scores,

Legislative Council, 1887-1901.

——————— ULP   ———————— NDL (1892-)

1891

Table 12:2 sets out the membership of these two groups, and the members who remained relatively independent in the decade of the 'nineties. The members of the NDL have been used as a conservative 'core', and those members who voted with this 'core' in a specific session have been characterised as conservatives. Similarly the ULP 'core' was augmented by other members who gave consistent support to the party in any session.

Table 12-2: Groups in the Legislative Council, 1891-1901.

Conservative			Independent		
	*			*	
Angas		CCC........	Addison		ICILIIILLIL
Baker	N	CCC++++++.	Campbell		LLIIIII....
Darling		CCCCCC.....	Copley		LIC........
Duncan JJ	N	CCCCCC...CC	Haslam		LILIIII....
Bosworth		CCC........	Krichauff		IIL........
Simpson		CCC........	Magarey		LIIILI.....
Stirling	N	CCCCCCCCCC+			
Tompkinson	N	CCC...CCC..			
Ward	N	CCCCCCICC..	Liberal		
Warren	N	CCCCCCCCCCC			
Martin	N	IICCCCCC+..	Charleston	U	LLLLLLIILI.
Basedow	N	...CCCCCC..	Gordon		LLLLL+I+LLL
Fuller	N	...CCCCCC..	Guthrie	U	LLLLLLLLLLL
Smith	N	...CCCCCCCC	Kirkpatrick	U	LLLLLL...LL
Howe	N	......II+CC	O'Loghlin		LILLLLIILLL
Sandford	N	CCCCC	Robinson		..LLLLLLL..
Willcox	N	CCCCC	Bice		...LLLILLLL
Lewis		CCCC	Russell		...LLIILL..
Tennant		CCC	McGregor	U	...LLLLLLL.
Duncan KW	N	CC	Adams	U	...LLLLLLLL
Lucas	N	CC	Kingston		.........L.
Pascoe	N	CC	Cotton		LL.........
Vardon	N	CC			
Parsons		C			
Von Doussa		C			
Brookman		C			
Riddoch		C			

Notes

* N- NDL, U- ULP, membership where known.
+ members, but excluded from analysis — Gordon, Howe, insufficient attendance
                                      — Baker, Stirling, President.
C — voted in pattern closely allied to NDL members
I — voted independently of major groups
L — voted in pattern similar to ULP.
. — not member.

From these analyses, it is possible to establish the relative strengths of the competing groups, the conservatives and the liberals. In most sessions, the members classified as relatively independent on the basis of their voting behaviour, were allied with one or other of the major groups in the sense that they gave an unsteady support over the session. Where this was evident, these members have been considered in the respective 'camps'.

Table 12:3 Numeric strengths of major groups, Legislative Council, 1891-1901.

		1891	1892	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901
A.Divisional analysis	conservative	10	11	12	9	9	9	9	11	11	13	13
	independent	3	6	3	3	3	5	10	4		2	
	liberal	10	6	8	11	11	8	4	7	10	8	10
B. After 'independent support' is 'allocated' to groups	conservative	13	11	12	9	9	9	9	11	11	13	13
	independent					3	5	10				
	liberal	10	12	11	14	11	8	4	11	10	10	10
C After inclusion of members not placed *	conservative	14	12	13	10	10	10	10	12	14	14	14
	independent					3	5	10				
	liberal	10	12	11	14	11	9	4	12	10	10	10

* President of Council: 1891-3 H. Ayers, 1893-1900 R. Baker, 1901 J.L.STIRLING Gordon, Howe: insufficient attendance to be included in divisional analysis.

The liberal majority in the Council from 1894-7 was based on the members of the ULP at the zenith of their representation. With six members out of a House of twenty four, the ULP required the support of only a further six to have a majority at divisions[35] if, and this was a rare occurrence, all members were present to vote. The sessions of 1895-6 saw consistent

support for the ULP from Bice, Gordon, Magarey, O'Loghlin and Russell, with
less consistent support from Addison, Campbell and Haslam, and such liberal
support is at least partial explanation for the passage through the Council
in 1894 of the Adult Suffrage Bill, a measure which had been rejected in
1890 and 1891,[36] of the Franchise Extension Bill of 1896, carried 12-11 but
which lapsed due to the lack of a constitutional majority, a Factories Bill
in 1894 which had been defeated in the previous session, a Conciliation
Bill in 1894 following the defeat of four similar bills in the preceding
three sessions and a Workmens Lien Bill in 1896.   However, by 1897 the
liberal majority had become tenuous.   The defeat of Kirkpatrick and the
resignation of Charleston left the ULP with only four members, and the
support from the 'independent liberals' was no longer as certain.   By
1898 even this unsteady support was insufficient to provide the ULP - liberal
group with a consistent majority, and Kingston's Bills were no longer as
acceptable in the Council.   The fate of the franchise extension bills
and the eventual defeat of the Kingston ministry have been outlined above.

This brief period of three or four years was the first and the last
time that the Labor Party could count on consistent support for its
policies, and consistent support on divisions, from a majority of the
Legislative Council.   The Labor representation of six in 1894 was only
exceeded once by the seven members in 1915 and equalled only once in 1912.
By 1898 the Labor 'core' had decreased to four and the conservative hold
on the Council had become unassailable.   This brief period in the
'nineties is notable for the fact that from the inception of the House in
1857 until the present day for only three or four years could 'liberals'
claim a majority in the Legislative Council.

Patterns of Conflict in the Assembly, 1893-1901

Earlier chapters showed the pitfalls of any attempt at an analysis of
group or 'party' behaviour in the legislature based on the views expressed
by the candidates. Although the emergence of the ULP in 1891 and the NDL
by 1893 provided a means of identifying groups of members with more
accuracy on such electoral bases, many problems remain. Not only were such
electoral labels inaccurate in describing the legislative behaviour of some
members, as is instanced by the NDL's inclusion of Playford in its 'selected
lists', but such groups accounted for only a minority of the members of the
Assembly. To establish reasons for the long-term Kingston ministry we
need to build up a picture of political behaviour utilizing all available
information; electoral opinions, contemporary descriptions, 'party' labels
and, most importantly, the patterns of legislative behaviour.

Documented evidence in newspapers[37] and other sources provides some of
the membership patterns of 'party' allegiance, and Table 13:3 summarizes
these. Hughes and Graham[38] allocated elected members into four groups on
evidence of affiliations at elections but, as they point out,[39] these do not
take subsequent legislative action into account.

Table 12:4 Party and group allegiance, House of Assembly, 1893-1901

A from newspapers

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901
NDL	11	11	12	15	13	13	18	18	15
ULP	10	10	20	13	12	11	11	10	9
Other	33	33	32	26	29	30	25	26	30

B Hughes and Graham

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899*	1900	1901
Conservative	21	22	22	21	20	21	28	28	27
Liberal	23	22	22	18	20	20	14	13	16
ULP	10	10	10	13	12	11	11	10	9
Independent				2	2	2	1	3	2

* Including Playford as conservative following his NDL endorsement.

To refine this, it is necessary to turn to the analysis of legislative behaviour, but first an important point should be noted. The patterns of group allegiance and group conflict which emerge from such divisional analyses are patterns of behaviour over the session as a whole. They do not describe any one division in a session, but are overall patterns. Thus, while Poynton voted against the ULP on three divisions of the Assembly in 1899 , his full. pattern of legislative behaviour over the session as a whole showed a close similarity to his colleagues. Where such divergent behaviour occurred, the specific instances need to be discussed as discrete periods; we are concerned in the first instance with the overall patterns of group behaviour.

The analysis of the sessions 1893-1901 produced patterns from which four major groups could be identified.

(a) a group of members around a core of the ULP representatives

(b) a group of members whose pattern of behaviour was in direct opposition to the ULP group

(c) a group of members whose patterns of voting were closely associated with those of ministry members

(d) a more diffuse group of members whose patterns were more or less independent of the other three groups.

Table 12:5 outlines the patterns of legislative behaviour of each member 1893-1901 and table 12:6 summarises the groups evident.

Table 12-5: Groups in the House of Assembly, 1893-1901.

Conservative

Ash	N	ICCC.....
Caldwell	N	ICCCCCCC
Castine	N	ICCCCCCC
Downer JW	N	ICCCCCC.
Downer HE	N	ICC......
Gilbert	N	IIICCCCCI
Giles	N	ICCCCCCC
Hague	N	ICCCCCCC
Handyside	N	IICCCCCC
Hawker EW		ICC......
Hawker GC		IM......
Homburg	N	IIICCCCC
Howe		ICC......
Johnson		IC+......
McDonald	N	IICCICCCC
Moule		ICC......
Riddoch		ICC......
Solomon	$N	ICCCCCC.
White		ICC......
Packham		.CC....I.
Glynn	$N	..C.CICI.
Copley	N	...CCCCC
Darling	N	...CCCCC
Duncan	N	...CCCCC
Goode	N	...ICC...
Harrold	N	....C.....
Mortlock		...CCC..I
Von Doussa	N	CCC
Paech	N	CIC
Rounsevell	$N	CCC
Jamieson		C
Dixson		C
Herbert		C

Independent

Bartlett		IIM......
Blacker		IIIIIICII
Burgoyne	$	IIMIIIIIL
Catt		IIMIIIIII
Foster	M	IIMIIIMMM
Grainger		IILILICI.
Griffiths		IICI+IC+.
Kelly		MII......
Lake		MII......
Landseer		MLMIII...
McLachlan		IIIIIIIII
Playford	M	M.....CI.
Randell		IIIICI...
Scherk		ILLLLILIL
Short		III......
Cummins		...TMIIMI
Miller		...IIIMI
Moody		...III....
Morris		...IIIIII
O'Malley		...ILI....
Shannon		...IIIIM
Peake		IIIIL
Dumas		IIII
Livingstone		......MII
Tucker		CII
Deany		II
Keogh		I
Mitchell		I

Ministerialists

Brooker		LLLLMMMM
Butler	M	IIMMMMMM
Cock		ILMLMM...
Cockburn	M	MMMMM....
Gillen	M	MMMMM.....
Holder	M	MMMMMMMM.
Jenkins	M	MMMMMMM.
Kingston	M	MMMMMMM..
O'Loughlin	M	IMMMMMMM

Liberal

Archibald	U	LLLLLLLL
Batchelor	U-M	LLLLLLLM.
Coneybeer	U	LLLLLILLL
Hooper	U	LLLLLILIL
Hourigan	U	LLLLLILLL
McGillivray	U	LLLLILLLL
McPherson	U	LLLLL....
Poynton	$U	LLLLLLLI.
Price	U	LLLLLLLLL
Wood	U	LLLLLILIL
Carpenter	U	...LLLLLL
Roberts	U	...LLLL+L
Hutchinson	U	LLLL
McKenzie		LIL
Coumbe		L
Russell		L
Verran	U	L

Notes   See also, notes to Table 13-1.

M- member of a ministry at some time in the period, 1893-1901 (excluding Solomon ministry, members
    of which are shown $
] - resigned from party or from ministry,   [- became part of ministry
Speaker, J Coles, unplaced.

Table 12:6 Summary of legislative groups, House of Assembly, 1893-1901

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898	1899	1900	1901
Conservative	-	15	18	16	16	15	22	15	16
Independent	33	17	8	16	12	21	9	20	14
Ministerialist	9	7	13	7	8	7	8	9	6
Labor	11	14	13	15	16	10	14	7	17
Unplaced	1	1	2	1	2	1	1	3	1
Total	54	54	54	55	54	54	54	54	54

In no session did one of the three groups - Labor, Ministerialist, NDL - constitute an absolute majority of the Assembly, and with the basic line of opposition between the combination of Labor and Ministerialists and the NDL (and we will return below to this point) then those members classified as 'independent' held a numerical balance of power. As explained in Chapter VIII, the scores of members on the basis of PØLIT which placed them in such an 'independent' situation could have been due to problems associated with absenteeism from the divisions as well as to a 'random' voting situation. Consequently the data in Table 12:6 has been refined by the use of the modified PØLIT analysis, thus excluding those members whose absenteeism caused their 'independence' and, where possible, allocating both this group, and those who were unplaced in the original analysis, to one of the three major blocs on the basis of documentary evidence.   Thus, for example, Speaker Coles who was included in the NDL 'list' of 1896, has been classed as a conservative;   J. C. F. Johnson, absent for most of the 1895 session voted solidly with the NDL in 1894; and Griffiths has been allocated to the conservative group in the 1897, 1900 sessions on the basis of his voting behaviour in the preceding and intervening sessions.   As well, those members whose voting patterns in a session were 'independent' of the major groups were loosely associated with one of these groups.   For

example, Cockburn and Foster were both elected in 1893 as liberals, and both were associated with the Kingston ministry in 1893 and 1894. Hence, in 1895, when their scores placed them in as 'independents', they have been classed as ministerialists in table 12:7.

Table 12:7 Party and group membership, House of Assembly, 1893–1901.

A: On the basis of modified POLIT and RICE analyses.

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898/9	1899	1900	1901
Conservative	–	10	20	15	10	13	15	11 }	} 33
Independent	28	6	1	4	4	5	3 }	32	
Ministerialist	} 20	14	10	16	18	17	15 }	}	}
Labor		14	12	14	12	15	14 }		13
Unplaced	6	10	11	6	10	4	7	11	8
Total	54	54	54	55	54	54	54	54	54

B: After 'allocation' of independents

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898/9	1899	1900	1901
Conservative	–	10	20	15	10	13	17	11 }	} 33
Independent	28	–	–	–	–	–	– }	32	
Ministerialist	} 20	20	11	20	19	22	16 }	}	
Labor		14	12	14	15	15	14 }		13
Unplaced	6	10	11	6	10	4	7	11	8
Total	54	54	54	55	54	54	54	54	54

C. After inclusion of unplaced members

	1893	1894	1895	1896	1897	1898/9	1899	1900	1901
Conservative	–	16	26	17	18	16	23	28 }	} 37
Independent	34	–	2	–	–	–	– }	26	
Ministerialist	) } 20	24	13	23	20	22	17 }		
Labor		14	13	15	16	16	14		17
Total	54	54	54	55	54	54	54	54	54

In numerical terms, and over the patterns of the session as a whole, the members of the ULP bloc held a _numerical_ balance of power. But, as will be shown below, the ULP was not in a position to exercise a _political_ balance of power. The first session under the Kingston ministry was dominated in numerical terms by a large group of members who acted in a relatively independent manner, and no significant groups were evident.

Traditional factions were still viable, and the tenet of 'independence'
remained relatively firm.   Only the ULP members, and the ministerial bloc,
augmented by Brooker, Government Whip Jenkins, Kelly, Lake and Landseer
showed consistent cohesion in voting.   By the 1894 session, however,
lines of conflict had become more sharply drawn.   As well, from 1895,
the cohesion of the groups were high, indicated by the small proportion of
the total membership whose sessional patterns of support placed them in
different groups in succeeding sessions.   The main 'paths' of this inter-
group movement were between the Labor, Ministerialist and Independent
members, and diagram 12:3 summarizes this movement.

885

Diagram 12-3:   Changes in group membership, House of Assembly, 1893-1901.

Note: elected to house / resigned, defeated, or deceased.

See also, tables 13-1, 13-4.

What this diagram does not show is the change in the main lines of opposition and support, a change evident in the session of 1898-9, continued in the 1899 and 1900 sessions, but which came to a head in the 1901 session. It was noted above that the members of the Labor Party had threatened to take a more independent stand towards the close of the Kingston ministry, and the analysis of legislative behaviour indicates that on specific divisional voting patterns this was carried into practice.   The session of 1898-99 provided one of the examples for the explanation of the methodology of legislative analysis, and the results of the analysis of session 153 have been outlined in Chapter VIII above.   There was a clear tri-partite division in the House of Assembly, with the ministry and the ULP in general agreement on the divisions which made up the most significant pattern, and the NDL members in clear and consistent opposition.   The second set of divisions, which made up the second significant pattern, produced a situation where the main lines of opposition were drawn between the Kingston 'ministerialists' and the members of the ULP, with the NDL bloc in a 'neutral' position.   To this extent, and specifically on the issues outlined following Table 8:4 above, the ULP could be said to have taken a 'more independent stance'.

Such a pattern of behaviour was evident in the 1899 session under the Kingston and Holder ministries, and it was evident also in 1900, again under Holder.   But the patterns of bloc behaviour were markedly different in 1901.   Despite the continued presence of three of the main members of the Kingston and Holder ministries to whom the ULP had given qualified but overall support, and the fact that the Jenkins ministry, in terms of personnel, was the Holder ministry without Holder, the lines of legislative

opposition and support had become essentially bipartisan, with the ULP
in consistent opposition to both the 'ministerialists' and the NDL and,
more importantly, in an increasing isolation from them.   This is shown
in Table 12:8, and we will return to this changing pattern of party
politics below.

Table 12:8 — Structure and Party Blocs in the House of Assembly, 1898—1901.

Parliament		15	16	16	16
Session		3	1	2	3
Date		1898—9	1899	1900	1901
Structure		0.41	0.37	0.33	0.31
No. of patterns		2	2	2	2
Ministry		Kingston	Kingston+	Holder	Jenkins
Group level of support for Ministry	support	'liberals' ULP	'liberals' ULP	ULP 'liberals'	'liberals'
	independent				NDL
	opposition	NDL	NDL	NDL	ULP
Numbers of members*	Session	54	54	54	54
	Ministry support	38 (ULP)	31 (ULP)	36 (ULP)	37
	Ministry Opposition	16	23	18	17 (ULP)

Note * See above for the 'allocation' of members to these groups

+ The brief Solomon ministry excluded from the analysis.

This marked change in the overall patterns of support and opposition was due almost entirely to a change in the attitudes of the ministry members and their 'ministerialist' supporters. The position of the members of the National Defence League had changed little - they were as intractable as ever towards what they saw as the dangerous and socialistic policies of the Labor representatives. This was to have two important effects. Firstly, it was the genesis of an essentially two-party orientation in South Australian politics, a process which was to come to fulfilment with the formation of the first Labor Party Government in the Verran ministry of 1910, following a Liberal-Labor coalition in the Price Ministry of 1905. Secondly, it was the catalyst for a change in the overall aims and strategies of the Labor Party itself. To some extent, both effects are beyond the area of this study although, as the following analysis will point out, there were trends towards each effect evident before 1900.

It is to these trends that we now turn, and specifically to the perceived and actual role of the Labor Party, during the Kingston ministry, and in the political changes which followed its defeat. To many Labor historians, the stability and legislation of the Kingston Era was attained through, and dependent on, the support given to the ministry by the Labor members.[40] In fact, the ULP was never in the position to play the classic role of a 'balance of power', it could not, therefore, force its wishes on the government, and in South Australia in the 'nineties it could lay little claim to be the party 'of initiative'. Part of the reason for this was the numerical balance of the 'parties' in the parliament, but an important aspect was the nature of the ULP itself and that of the Kingston ministry, and it is to this latter point that we turn first.

Patterns of Conflict - Pragmatism and Principle

J. Langdon Parsons voiced the opinions of the members of the
National Defence League when he wrote in 1893 of the

> epoch of the demagogues, the theorist, the experi-
> mentalist, the faddist, the dreamer, the man of one
> idea, the unionist, the socialist, the communist,
> the disturber, the anarchist, the nihilist, the
> dynamitard ... [which results in a Parliament with]
> much parochialism, experimental and class legislation,
> want of confidence, tampering with State contracts,
> assaults on property, inaugurating State socialism,
> the exhaltation of the proletariat, [41]

and the entry of the working man into the legislatures of South Australia

apparently had much to answer for.   But this was neither an accurate

description of the activities of the United Labor Party, nor a correct

analysis of its aims.   From its beginnings, South Australian Labor was

a moderate political movement, practical rather than ideological in its

outlook and essentially pragmatic in its activities.

As Atkinson points out,

> where real political parties have existed in
> Australia, their origin has usually been in the
> desire to promote or to defend some material
> interest, individual or class, [42]

and in the case of the South Australian Labor Party, the aim was to promote

the material interests of the working man.   Pragmatism was the means to

achieve this.   From the comments of most contemporary observers, from

the platforms on which the ULP went to the voters, and from the statements

of the ULP members and members of parliament, it was clear that the

decision to seek direct representation of the working man in parliament,

and the actions of these ULP representatives, did not derive from any

desire to create a new society by the overthrow of the old, and did not

rest on any revolutionary ideology.   As one of the most astute contem-
porary analysts of colonial society put it, 'in South Australia the Party
had no desire for a social revolution, but merely to secure advantages
for labour',[43] and a visitor to the colony caught well the aims of the
ULP policy.

> The members of the South Australian Parliamentary
> Labour (sic) Party impressed me with the conviction
> that they were eminently practical, rather than
> eloquently visionary, in their politics.   They did
> not seem to place the achievement of the Socialist
> millenium as the one and only mission of their party.[44]

If the intention of seeking a 'socialist millenium' had been in the
forefront, then it would most likely have been in evidence in the policies
of the party immediately following the maritime strikes, the Moonta Mines
industrial troubles and the widespread industrial bitterness which affected
South Australia in 1890.   But the platform of the ULP in 1890 gave
little indication of such an aim.   In fact, the platform emphasised
cautious reforms and material benefits rather than any theoretical demands.

1. Protection for the purpose of encouraging local
   industries and the further development of the resources
   of the colony.
2. Lien Bill on the lines of the Queensland Bill.
3. Workshops and Factories Act on the lines of the New
   Zealand Act.
4. Payment of members.
5. Progressive tax on land values without exception.
6. Tax on goods and passengers carried inter colonially
   in foreign vessels.
7. Inspection of land boilers.
8. Free education, with maintenance of the present
   standard.
9. Absent Seamen's Voting Bill.
10. Reform of the Council in the direction of manhood
    suffrage and shortening of the term of election.

11. Working-men's blocks and loans to blockers.
12. Trades Hall site or a sum on estimates for that purpose.
13. Eight-hours Bill.
14. Removal of duties from tea, coffee, cocoa, and kerosene.
15. Reciprocity treaty with Queensland.
16. Against free and assisted immigration.
17. Amendment of the Railway Commissioners Act.
18. The establishment of the Department of Labour.
19. Redistribution of Seats Bill.

And Labor spokesmen themselves left no doubt as to the aims of the new party. The ULP was not intended by its planners to be militant and socialist. It 'had not set itself the task of re-organising the world or even South Australia; it was content to obtain what it could',[45] and this was exemplified by the actions and intentions of the members of the ULP in the legislatures. Tom Price in 1893 dissociated himself from 'revolutionary socialism' in favour of a gradual process 'to get a little, then a little more of what one wanted'.[46] And it was not as if this outlook was an electoral statement, designed to mollify the fears of those who were uncertain of the intentions of the new party. The members of the ULP carried this outlook into practice. As well, such pragmatism was equally evident at the close of the decade as in the beginning. In 1898, Price again emphasised that the role of the parliamentary Labor Party was 'not so much to alter the trend of politics as to better the status and condition of those known as workers'.[47] Even in the clear statements of what the ULP members considered to be their own 'radicalism', we find statements that while

596 is at top right

> there can be only two great political parties in
> South Australia - the party of progress and the
> party of stagnation ... the ULP does not by any
> means include the whole of the party of progress, [48]

and it was this aspect of the South Australian political environment in

the 'nineties which was one of the basic causes of the moderation and

pragmatism of the Labor party.

As Coghlan puts it,

> The most interesting characteristic of the Labour
> movement in South Australia was its position as an
> element in a wider movement of which it was not always
> a pioneer nor even the extreme wing. Before ever
> there was a Labor Party there was a strong democratic
> element, against which the more conservative part of
> the community found it expedient to organise. [49]

In the eastern colonies, the emphasis in the various labour movements and

Labor Parties was more on doctrinaire statements, brought by a climate of

opinion which was divided between those in the labour movement and those

opposed to it. In South Australia, as was noted above, the ideas and

policies of such legislative leaders as Kingston, Cockburn, Holder and

Playford in the Assembly, and G. W. Cotton in the Council, were far from

opposed to the working man and his ideals. And much of Labor's aim had

already been carried into practice when the ULP emerged. By 1890, there

was a settled and stable pattern of Governmental intervention in, assistance

for, and development of, the fields of public works, education, business

enterprises and social welfare; there was no need for the new Labor

Party to seek to initiate such State involvement. Thus, when Hancock

wrote for the Australian Labor Party that it

> had only to emphasise and make more urgent the
> programme which it inherited from the Liberals ...
> [(who)] still continued to tread ... the familiar
> path of semi-socialism, [50]

the United Labor Party in South Australia at its very formation found
itself to be increasingly the echo of a liberalism which, in some ways,
was more radical than its own.   And the government at the time of the 1890
strikes had given strong testimony of its different attitude to the
workers.   The bitterness and disillusionment of the labour movement and
the Trades Unions in the East was marked, especially over the tactics of
employers to break the strikes and the role of governments in opposition
to the strikers.   The result was a strong, vocal and active class
antagonism, especially in Queensland.   In South Australia, however,
while the employers were as firm as their eastern counterparts, the minis-
tries of Cockburn and Playford were not.   The South Australian Govern-
ment refused to intervene on the side of the employers, and consequently
the Labor Party in South Australia did not have the legacy of bitterness
towards the existing ministries as in the other colonies.

The ULP typified the approach of democratic socialism, with an
emphasis on 'democratic' rather than socialism.   As F. J. Hourigan put
it in 1894, his party sought 'reforms in a constitutional way'. [51]   The
means to this were a 'gradualist' approach, legislative rather than social
action, and the winning of concessions from the clearly sympathetic
liberals, especially those of the Kingston ministry.

But was the South Australian ULP in a position to seek and to win
concessions?   Many historians have assumed they were, and thus the
common view that

> in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia
> and Victoria Labour became the third, or corner party
> in parliament, and like all corner parties offers
> support to one of the two others in return for
> concessions. [52]

Such a policy was put into practice, as one New South Wales spokesman
put it, in the following way:

> If you give us our concessions, then our votes will
> circulate on the Treasury benches; if you do not,
> then we shall withdraw our support. [53]

But when South Australian Labor historian Smeaton summarised the methods
of the ULP, there was a subtle difference.

> ... the wiseheads of the Party diligently applied
> themselves to the support of such measures as helped
> to, in any degree, fulfil the ideals which they were
> elected to fight for. Kingston ... understood this
> ... and used the support which the Labor Party gave
> him.... But for that support, Liberalism, politically,
> would have been as the voice of one crying in the
> wilderness; with it, it spoke as one having
> authority. [54]

There was no mention of support for concessions in the style of the New
South Wales member above. There was no suggestion that the ULP would
offer its support elsewhere if the ministry of the day did not provide the
concessions. In fact, the ULP in South Australia was not in a position
to play the role of a 'balance of power', corner party, to offer support
in return for concessions. There is little doubt that the party intended
to carry this strategy into practice if necessary. But it was not in a
position to do so, at least in the period to 1901.

As Loveday's analysis of the concept of 'support in return for
concessions' [55] points out, there are quantitative and qualitative aspects
to be considered in analysing whether such a strategy was possible or
practicable in a given situation. To hold a balance of power in the
South Australian House of Assembly, the ULP needed a specific numerical
advantage in a three-party situation. That is, if two parties in the
Assembly held, say, twenty seats each, and the ULP held the remaining

fourteen, then Labor could hold a numerical balance of power. But, to

utilise this numerical balance of power, the ULP members needed to be

'solid', they needed to offer a bloc of votes at each division to ensure

that the strategy was viable.   As well, as Loveday points out, if the

three groups each held a minority of the seats in the house, if the

combination of any two would provide a majority, and if there were no deep

ideological divisions between the parties, then it is impossible to

identify which of the three parties held _the_ balance of power.   Any of

the three parties in such a situation could, at any one time, act as a

'corner party', and offer support in return for concessions. Thus, to

establish whether the ULP in South Australia successfully adopted this

strategy, we need to consider both the numbers and the nature of the

parties in the House of Assembly.

Loveday summarised the possible courses of action within the overall

strategy into four types.[56]

(i)   coalition: involving the sharing of ministerial offices
      by two parties, and usually including some arrangement to
      eliminate electoral competition between the two.

(ii) conditional: the party in question tries to get the
      governing party to guarantee it legislation it wants,
      and promises steady support in return, but there is no
      coalition.   There may be agreements or unilateral
      decisions to limit electoral competition.

(iii) independent: the party in question judges the
      legislative proposals of the other two parties and gives
      legislative support to the one offering the more acceptable
      programme.   This usually involves no mutual commitment,
      legislative or electoral.

(iv) a possibility where 'the party holding the balance of power
      might refuse to trade its support for anything. [57]

Only one of these modes of action was open to the ULP in South

Australia.   The last, especially, was beyond the hopes of the party in

the 'nineties for, as parliamentary Labor leader MacPherson put it,

'ten Labor members cannot dictate'.[58]   There was too much that the ULP
wanted for such an isolationist political tactic to be of value, and the
members and leaders of the party were astute enough to realise that what
they wanted would not be achieved without help.

There was no coalition between the ULP and the Kingston ministry.
The pledge effectively precluded members of the ULP from joining the
Kingston ministry, and it should be emphasised that they were not invited
to, nor was it likely that Kingston would have issued such an invitation.
In the tradition of the Burkean liberalism which had been such a dominant
influence in the politics of the colony, Kingston decried the pledge -
it was a restriction of the basic rights of a representative, a restriction
on the necessity for the representatives to be, above all, trustees for
the good of the nation.   It should also be emphasised that the direction
of the support was essentially one way.   The ULP supported the policies
and bills of the Kingston ministry when they agreed with them, and this
was the case in all but a few instances, but the Kingston ministry
rarely supported the ULP in its demand for some policy or some action which
was not, at that time, part of the policy of the government.   And this
was especially the case when the ULP sought compensation for individuals
which they considered had been dealt with harshly by the government in
general and when they sought amelioration of what they saw as wrongs to
individuals.[59]   As was shown above, the votes of the ULP members were a
necessity for Kingston, but only rarely did he or his government offer much
in the way of concessions in return.   Even after the defeat of the
Kingston ministry, and the inclusion of ULP member Batchelor in the Holder
ministry, there was no coalition behaviour as defined above.   It was not
a case of sharing the ministerial positions between the members of two

parties, but the release of a member of the ULP from the relevant section of his pledge so that he could join a ministry. That he was required to relinquish his position as leader of the ULP[60] indicated that this was not a coalition situation. In fact, it is difficult to see what lay behind the decision of the ULP in this case. There was no political gain to the ULP from Batchelor's inclusion, and the portfolio he took, Education and Agriculture, was certainly not central to the aims and policies of the Party.

There was some evidence of an electoral understanding between the ULP and the members of the Kingston ministerialists. But this was evident in the relationships between the UTLC and the Labor League prior to the formation of the ULP. As was noted above, the UTLC gave strong support to Kingston and to other selected candidates in the elections of 1887 and 1890, and only on few occasions after the formation of the ULP was there evidence that these acceptable progressives around Kingston were allowed to contest seats without ULP interference on the basis of a bi-lateral agreement. Rather, this situation derived from a unilaterial decision of the ULP not to impede the electoral opportunities of those who would be of greatest legislative benefit to them. In 1896, Kingston successfully requested that the ULP withdraw one of its candidates from the electorate of Sturt so that the electoral chances of his Commissioner of Public Works, J. G. Jenkins, should not be damaged. But the great majority of the decisions to run only one candidate in the districts where a sitting member was an ally was, as the minutes of the selection committees show, solely a ULP decision. This was especially deliberate policy in the case of Kingston[61] so that his chances 'should not be spoiled'.[62] And the ULP advertisements in the press stressed the intentions of the party.

Where only one ULP member was nominated, the supporters of the party
were urged to seek the election of a liberal as well. Hence the
following ULP advertisements in 1896.

> The ULP strongly urges electors NOT TO PLUMP, and it
> is not responsible for any advertisement recommending
> plumping.
>
> All supporters are earnestly requested to exercise
> their full franchise. Where only one LABOR CANDIDATE
> is standing, give him ONE VOTE and after doing so
> give the other to the LIBERAL CANDIDATE of whom you
> best approve.
> <div align="right">W. A. Robinson
Trades Hall.   63</div>

No such statements were made by the Kingstonian ministerialists, and,
as in the case of legislative support, the electoral link between the
ULP and the Kingston ministry was essentially one way.

To some extent, the Kingston ministry and its liberal policies were
both an asset and a liability to the Labor Party.   That it was an
asset is clear from an examination of the policies and the legislative
programmes of the Kingston ministry and, as was noted above, the ULP
was still expressing strong support for the policies while making some
criticism of the methods and the personnel in 1898 and 1899.   It was
a liability to the extent that by the very progressive nature of the
ministry, Labor had almost no opportunity to act as a balance of power
party, to seek concessions through the 'independent' strategy.   In the
late 'eighties, and especially in the closing months of the Downer
ministry of 1892, there had been a clear polarisation of liberals and
conservatives.   The 'liberal ethos' into which the ULP was born gave it
a greater opportunity to expect success for its aims, but it weakened
its opportunity to apply political pressure if the progress on such
aims slowed, or even stopped altogether.   Both instances occurred before

the close of the colonial period.   As was noted above, the ULP was
expressing discontent with the ministry in session 153, but it voted
against a motion of censure against the ministry, and in the Jenkins
ministry of 1901, to which we will return below, the ULP was left in a
solitary legislative position.

The 'independent' course of action was not available to the ULP in
either the Kingston ministry, 1893-99 or the Holder ministry of 1899-
1901,   For the first eight years of its life in the South Australian
legislature, the ULP was in a numerical position to use the strategy,
but it was denied the opportunity.   The public antagonism of the
NDL towards the ULP   and of the conservative members who consistently
voted with it, the opposition of the NDL to any progressive bills and
resolutions emanating either from the ministry or from the ULP, made it
impossible for the ULP to offer its support in return for concessions to
the NDL rather than to the Kingston ministry, and impossible for the NDL
to offer concession if any overtures had been made.   The 'independent'
course of action depends on a situation where two of the three parties
in the legislature are willing to offer concessions to the third, in
return for support on legislative matters generally.   In the South
Australian legislative environment in the years from 1893 to the early
part of 1901, it was not a question for the ULP of which offered the most
acceptable programme, the most beneficial policies and the most
concessions;   one of the parties was wholly unacceptable.

This was equally the case for the Kingston ministry.   The opposition
from the NDL was directed at Kingston and his policies of social
progress as well as at the ULP.   As the President of the NDL summarised
it,

> The League ... asked for no alteration in the electoral
> laws, <u>or for that matter in any laws at all</u>. They
> were <u>merely asking that the laws should be kept</u> inviolate
> and intact, unless it could be shown that any change
> was an improvement. [64]

There was, therefore, little possibility of Kingston securing support

from that side of the house.   The Kingston ministry needed the ULP

almost as much as the ULP needed the ministry, and there was no doubt

that for the first few years of this 'Lib-Lab' conjunction, the arrange-

ment was mutually advantageous.   'The Labor Party was very well satisfied

with the position',[65]   said MacPherson in 1894.   But the fact that the

ULP had nowhere else to go was emphasised by its actions at the first

test of the Kingston ministry in 1898.   Price, in that year, had

threatened to withdraw Labor's support unless Kingston ceased his 'bowing

to conservative pressure'[66] and in 1899 he emphasised that when the time

came 'for a separation', the ULP 'would not hesitate'. [67]   But, as the

confidence motions of 1898 showed, there was no alternative.

It was in 1901 that the separation finally occurred, and it came

about not on the initiative of the ULP, but through the actions of former

Kingstonian liberals.   Diagrams 12:4 and 12:5 set out the general

patterns of support and opposition in the sessions of 1900 and 1901 on

the basis of scores of members on the two significant patterns identified

by the POLIT analysis.   Members who were excluded from the analysis

on the grounds of absenteeism (see Chapter VIII) and were able to be

placed in a bloc on the basis of known party membership or strong

allegiance are shown by *, and the key to the member codes are as follows:

Name	No.	Party	Ministry		Name	No.	Party	Ministry
Archibald	01	ULP			Hourigan	33	ULP	
Batchelor	02	ULP	M(1900 only)		Hutchinson	34	ULP	
Blacker	03				Jamieson	35		(1901 only)
Brooker	04		M-1901		Jenkins	36		M
Burgoyne	05				Keogh	37		(1901 only)
Butler	06		M-1901		Livingston	38		
Caldwell	07	NDL			McGillivray	39	ULP	
Carpenter	08	ULP			McDonald	40	NDL	
Castine	09	NDL			McKenzie	41		
Catt	10				McLachlan	42		
Coneybeer	11	ULP			Miller	43		
Coombe	12		(1901 only)		Mitchell	44		(1901 only)
Copley	13	NDL			Morris	45		
Cummins	14				Mortlock	46		(1901 only)
Darling	15	NDL			O'Loughlin	47		M
Deeney	16				Paech	48		
Dixson	17		(1901 only)		Peake	49		
Downer	18	NDL	(1900 only)		Playford	50		(1900 only)
Dumas	19				Poynton	51		(1900 only)
Duncan	20	NDL			Price	52	ULP	
Foster	21	M			Roberts	53	ULP	
Gilbert	22	NDL			Rounsevell	54	NDL	
Giles	23	NDL			Russell	55		(1901 only)
Glynn	24	NDL	(1900 only)		Shannon	56		
Grainger	25		(1900 only)		Scherk	57		
Griffiths	26		(1900 only)		Solomon	58		(1900 only)
Hague	27	NDL			Tucker	59		
Handyside	28				Verran	60	ULP	(1901 only)
Herbert	29				VonDoussa	61	NDL	
Holder	30		M(1900 only)		Wood	62		
Homburg	31	NDL						
Hooper	32	ULP						

Note: M signifies member of Holder and Jenkins ministries;   Brooker and Butler in Jenkins ministry only.

Diagram 12-4 : Graphical Representation of Scores of Members of
the House of Assembly, Session 162, 1900.

Diagram 12- 5 : Graphical Representation of Scores of Members of the House of Assembly, Session 163, 1901.

For the first time, the ULP had no clear ally in the House. In the 1900 session, the general patterns of support and opposition which had been evident throughout the Kingston ministry were maintained. The ULP and the ministry were closely allied on the divisions which constituted the most significant pattern, in opposition to the members of the NDL, but on the second pattern, the main line of opposition was between the ministry and the ULP. In the 1901 session this general pattern which had dominated liberal-labor and especially Kingston-Labor relations in the house, was reversed. On the most significant divisions making up the first pattern, the Jenkins ministry and the members of the NDL, were relatively close legislative allies, in opposition to the members of the Labor party. On the divisions making up the second pattern, the ULP took the 'central' position, and the main line of opposition was between the NDL and the ministry.

It should also be noted that the new members elected before the 1901 session tended to support the NDL-ministry groups, and of the 'old' members who had been relatively unsteady supporters of the Holder ministry in 1900, most had transferred their allegiance in the house to the NDL. Some members were omitted from the plots on the grounds of absenteeism at divisions and the lack of documentary evidence of party affiliation:

1900:   Coles (Speaker), Denney (16), Griffiths (26), Herbert (29), Livingstone (38), Morris (45), and Peake (49);

1901   Coles (Speaker),   Burgoyne (05), Mortlock (46), Peake (49), Scherk (57)

Of those members placed in both plots and who were not members of any of the three groups - ministry, NDL or ULP, - all but McKenzie (41) and McLachlan (42) moved in the direction of the NDL.   Three members who

had given consistent support to the Holder ministry in 1900, Blacker (03),

Cummins (14) and Miller (43), became strong NDL supporters in 1901.

Butler (06) joined the ministry in 1901.   The general shift to the right

in terms of political outlook in the house is epitimised by the pattern

of Dumas.   His divisional behaviour placed him in a relatively

independent position in relation to the three major groups in 1900, but

he was a close ally cf the NDL in 1901.

As with the previous seven sessions, the divisions which made up the

most significant pattern in 1900 were concerned with government legisla-

tion, primarily that which would have strong ULP support and which would

tend to alienate the more conservative members of the NDL.   The issues

included divisions on Factories Act Amendment Bills, a Workmen's

Compensation Bill, a move to widen the franchise of the Legislative

Council and a further Land Value Assessment Bill.   The second set cf

divisions which provided the opposition between the ULP and the ministry

included divisions on two private members' Bills from the Labor Party,

compensation matters, and Bills to modify wages and rates for railway

cottages.   In 1901, the divisions which made up the most significant

pattern were similar to those of 1900, and were concerned mainly with

government legislation, but the ULP found that its former allies on such

Bills as on minimum wages, land values, mortgage liability and old age

pensions were now its opponents.   The second pattern in 1901 was

dominated by government legislation as well, but the divisions were concerned,

in the main, with attempts by the NDL and its supporters to have debate

adjourned, or to force to lapse such bills as the Pastoral Amendment Bill,

Closer Settlement Bill, and a proposal to allow clergymen to sit in the

parliament as members.   On these and the other divisions making up the

second pattern, the ULP took an independent position.

Over the session of 1901 as a whole, it was evident that the pattern
of 'Lib-Lab' domination of South Australia's legislature had ended.   For
the first time since the election of its original members, the ULP could
no longer claim that it was the driving force behind the government.
In 1901 it suddenly became a minority opposition party.

To what extent was the ULP the party of initiative in South Australia?
As Henry Mayer puts it, this concept of 'Labor-Initiative and Non-Labor
Resistence' is

> supposed to give us the key to Australian politics
> in general, and to the interaction of the parties
> in particular.... The Australian Labor Party is
> presented as the party which, whether in or out of
> power, has been the "magnetic pole by which all
> political ships must set their courses",   68

and the non-Labor parties are seen as parties of 'resistance', parties
of 'caution', as 'indefinite, incompetent' and essentially defensive. [69]
Only in organisational terms could the South Australian Labor Party lay
claim to such initiative.

Alone of the electoral associations of the 1890-93 period, the ULP
formed a structured extra-parliamentary organisation, bound its candidates
and representatives to the party and party principles, and set out to
appeal to the electorate for support for the party.   In 1893, there was
only one party on the hustings, and the extent to which the traditional
methods of selection of independent candidates was followed by the pressure
groups and the non-Labor candidates was summed up by the Observer's
comment that electors 'will in due course be perplexed by the variety of
schemes offered for our political regeneration'. [70]   But it was the
efforts of the ULP, and their notable successes in 1893, that was the

catalyst for the National Defence League to change itself from a well-organised pressure group to a political party by 1896.   In that election, the Register noted 'the inauguration of more distinctly defined parties ... which has had the effect of compelling legislators to hoist their colours', but it also noted that 'these have been in many instances as varied in their tints as the rainbow'.[71]   By 1899, the change from an essentially faction system to a party system in the legislature, and from an electoral environment dominated by independents and pressure groups to one in which there were three main groups - the ministerialists, the ULP and the NDL - had gathered momentum.   The development of a party system had proceeded to the extent that the Register, which had been the staunchest of the advocates of the necessity for a Burkean independence of candidates and members, was adamant that

> it is no loss, to either the candidates or the
> constituencies, that men should recognise the
> futility of seeking to attain legislative honours
> unless they are supported by some parliamentary
> organisation or other.   [72]

And the initiator of this change was the Labor Party.   Equally, the party of resistance in the 'nineties was the NDL.   In its aims, expressed by president R. C. Baker as 'to defend what we now possess and to protect ourselves, our property, rights and liberties',[73] in its attitudes to the social and industrial policies of both the ULP and the Kingston ministry, and especially in its attitude to any inroads on property, in the nature of its formation as a reaction against the members of the ULP elected to the Legislative Council, the NDL was concerned, above all, to conserve what existed and to resist 'progressive' legislation.   In organisational terms, it caught up and finally surpassed the efforts of the ULP in branches and membership, and its wide publicity, 'self education' lectures

and enrolment campaigns were electorally effective.   The ULP could

claim that it was the first to produce a mass party organisation;   it

could not claim that it was the most successful in the long term.

The 'party' of initiative in South Australia was not the United

Labor Party, but a loose conjunction of Labor members and liberals under

the leadership of C. C. Kingston.   Throughout the Kingston era, legisla-

tive initiative was predominantly in the hands of Kingston, and the role

of the ULP is well summed up by Coghlan.

> such measures ... were achieved by the Labor Party
> only in the sense that their votes weighed down
> the parliamentary balance on the side of a ministry
> which needed no stimulus to exertion where social
> improvement was concerned.   74

Political Labor could not claim any monopoly of liberal idealism, and it

could not claim to be the sole representative of the working classes.

It could not claim to be the sole spokesman for the principle of the

right, even the duty, of the State to limit the rights of some to the

benefit of the many.   While Kingston was Premier, and while he and his

policies were ascendent, 'socialism' had a strong spokesman outside the

ULP.   As Kingston told a Sunday public meeting in 1891;

> the State had ample right to interfere... The
> right of the State to interfere with the few for
> the good of the many was admitted... He wished to
> be classed as a State Socialist ... as one who
> recognised it was right for the State to interfere
> for the good of society.   75

It was this strong element of progressive liberalism in Kingston which, on

the one hand, provided the ULP with the means whereby it could carry its

policies through, but, on the other hand, denied it a role as the dominant

progressive 'party' in the colony.   It was not until the Kingston

ministry was defeated, and returned without Kingston, that the ULP began

to emerge as the party 'of the left' in opposition to both the 'party of the right' - the NDL, and the ministerialists!

Conclusion

The manner in which the members of the United Labor Party saw their role in the political arena of the last decade of colonial South Australia began the process which brought the eventual breakdown of Burkean perceptions of, and attitudes to, political representation which had been dominant since 1857.   The election of the first ULP-nominated candidates at a general election in 1891 was the turning point in the slow process of change from an essentially faction system of government towards a bi-partisan party system.

There was a strong resistance to such a change, a tendency to adhere to the traditional principles of independence in both 'procedural' and 'functional' representation, and this resistance was epitomised by the cautious reaction, in terms of _party_ reaction, from the National Defence League.   Despite the intensity of the reaction from the NDL to the formation of the ULP and its policies, it was not until 1896 that candidates stood for election _as_ NDL members and _for_ its policies, rather than as candidates selected by it.   It was noticeable that this hesitancy to combine was not reflected in the legislatures where the representatives of the NDL voted consistently in opposition to the Labor Party, and from the inception of the ULP, showed an equivalent degree of cohesion, especially on the more significant divisions.   However, although there was adequate legislative evidence that the NDL members were _acting_ as a party as early as 1894, it was not until 1896 that they sufficiently overcame their 'independence' in the electoral arena, and the NDL became a political

party.   In 1896, it was apparent that there were two political parties
in South Australia, and by 1899 the evidence suggested that the party
system which would emerge would consist on the 'left' of a party
consisting of the ULP and the Kingston liberals, and on the 'right', the
NDL.   By 1901, the first clear bi-partisan picture had emerged in the
legislature, but the former liberals were now in opposition to Labor.

The keys to the unique Kingston Era, the six years from 1893 to 1899,
with the possible addition of the Holder ministry to 1900, were two-fold:
the progressive outlook of the Kingston ministry and the personality and
politics of its leader;   and the policies, outlook and strategies
adopted by the United Labor Party.   Labor's programme were reformist
rather than revolutionary, social welfare rather than socialist in aims,
and essentially pragmatic in strategy.   Despite the frantic cry of one
pamphleteer, bewailing 'socialists, socialists everywhere', demanding
'lovers of liberty to arise' and stop the tendency which had 'spread with
alarming rapidity, and was now a deadly menace to the progress of our
civilization',[76] the South Australian Labor Party was based on an
ideology which, in Coghlan's words, was 'not doctrinaire socialism, but
... a wide and popular sanity'.[77]   The socialism of the ULP in the
'nineties was practical, it was concerned to alleviate problems of the
working man and of the poor, and above all else it was a liberal reformist
socialism which sought practical results within and through the existing
political system.   It stressed 'reforms in a constitutional way'.[78]   The
unique feature of the South Australian ULP was that it was not the first,
nor was it the most vocal proponent of such progressive policies.   Not
only had the ULP emerged in an environment in which there was no squatter
dominance to counter, no real class battles to fight, in which there had

already been carried such constitutional reforms as male adult suffrage,
payment of members and, in comparison with the eastern states, a
relatively liberal electoral system, but it emerged into the position
of being virtually an echo for the plans and policies of a ministry
which, in most aspects, was its equal in terms of progressivism, and
in some was its leader.   In Queensland, the Labor party emerged in
opposition.   In New South Wales, it was a propelling force, attempting
to influence a relatively conservative government.   In Victoria, the
ULP emerged first in opposition, but in 1894 became a close ally of the
new Liberal government, and sought to impress on it the necessity for
attention to labour matters.   In South Australia the United Labor
Party found itself in the unique position of supporting a strong liberal
government from the beginning, and a government which needed no
redirection to further the labour cause.

In New South Wales, Loveday and Martin established that by mid-
1889,

> though overtones of the old faction system survived,
> that system no longer provided the mainspring for
> the operation of the colony's political institutions.
> New men, new issues, and new organisations had under-
> mined its viability, broken through the sanctions
> which the old "liberal" ethos had erected ... and
> insensibly prepared the ground for the painless
> acceptance in 1891 of the Labor Party.   [79]

There was no such 'smoothing' in terms of the emergence of parties in
South Australia.   But the entry of the ULP into the legislatures and
the electorates was 'smoothed' in the sense that there was an influential
group of faction leaders in the legislatures who were sympathetic, and
even strongly favourable to the aims of the Labor Party.[80]   The ULP
members in 1893 did not enter a wholly hostile environment, but joined

a situation which, by the closing weeks of the 1892 session, had already seen, albeit for a brief period, a coalescence of the progressive factions in opposition to an identifiably conservative group.

The United Labor Party was trade unionist rather than socialist, it accepted the structures and processes of a capitalist system - wages, rents, interest, private ownership and free enterprise.   It aimed not to replace this system with something different, but to work within it to obtain better conditions for the workingmen.   It stood as the party of a class, and sought to obtain more material benefits for that class, but it was not the only political group which had the latter interest in mind. It did not emerge in a political system which was entirely inimical to its aims, but it was born into a legislative system dominated by middle class representatives seeking to better the lives of the urban as well as rural populations.   The decade of the 'nineties was both a continuation and the zenith of a liberal tradition in South Australian colonial history.

Footnotes to Chapter XII

1. And even then, the 'clear choice' was for a brief period only. In 1905, the elections were contested by four main groups: Ministerialists, Liberals, Labor and the Conservative Australian National League. In 1910, two major groups went to the electorate, the Liberal Union and the Labor Party, but by 1918 this bi-partisan picture had been disrupted again by the emergence of rural-based farmers' groups.
    See K. Quartly, The Liberal Union in Power: the Peake Government, 1912-1915, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1966), and E. H. Venning, Liberalism and Liberal Organisation in South Australia, 1890-1938, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1967).

2. SAPD., 1893, p. 40.

3. See C. B. Campbell, Charles Cameron Kingston, Radical Liberal and Democrat, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide 1970), E. J. Wadham, The Political Career of C. C. Kingston (1881-1900), (M.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1953).

4. SAPD., 1893, p. 110.

5. Ibid., pp. 97-107.

6. Ibid., pp. 163-171.

7. Ibid., p. 163.

8. See Register, April 16, 1894, for the background to this appointment.

9. T. A. Coghlan, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 2294.

10. SAPD., 1898, p. 72.

11. T A. Coghlan, op. cit., p. 2294. He went on to add that the ULP members were, however, 'ignorant or incapable of realizing his profound incompetency in all matters of business or administration.'

12. See especially the speech by Hutchinson, SAPD., 1898, pp.

13. SAVP., 1898, p. 34

14. SAPD., 1899, p. 917.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 1022.

18. Ibid., p. 1024.

19. Ibid., p. 1096.

20.   Ibid., pp. 1017-8.

21.   Register, November 29, 1899.

22.   Advertiser, November 29, 1899.

23.   SAPD., 1899, p. 1036.

24.   Ibid., p. 919.

25.   SAVP., 1899, p. 237.

26.   Review of Reviews, December 15, 1899, p. 728.

27.   Cited in F. S. Wallis, op. cit., pp. 53-4.

28.   He was elected and re-elected as member for Grey in the House
       of Representatives 1901-1922, but changed his allegiance from
       non-Labor Free Trade 1901-1904 to Labor, 1904-1916 and finally
       from National Labor to Nationalist, 1916-1922.

29.   He was defeated on his first attempt in the general elections
       of May 1900, by two conservative candidates in Southern, but
       defeated one of his strongest opponents, J. L. Parsons, in
       Central on September 22, 1900.   For results of these elections,
       see Appendix III, pp. 116, 117.

30.   A. A. Morrison 'Politics in Early Queensland', Journal,
       Historical Society of Queensland, (Vol. 4, No. 3, 1950) p. 761.

31.   From 1882-1891 there were only eighteen changes in the member-
       ship of the Council, all due to the retirement or death of the
       sitting members.   After the changes in 1891, when seven new
       members were elected, there was one change in 1893, a further
       seven in 1894, four in 1897 and two in 1898.   Of these twenty
       one changes, only six followed the electoral defeat of sitting
       members.

32.   For example:

	Pre-ULP			Post-ULP			
	1880	1886	1890	1891	1896	1898-9	1900
No. of Divisions	13	15	35	62	84	100	55

33.   Except the voting patterns of the fourth parliament which have
       been analysed above.

34. See Chapter VI. There were, certainly, more social and industrial Bills debated after the emergence of the ULP.

Nature of Bill	Number of Bills introduced	
	pre 1891	post 1891
Factories	-	3
Conciliation	-	5
Steam Boilers	1	3
Workmens Conditions, liens etc.	3	11
	4	22

See A. Vilkins, Industrial Legislation: An outline of the Regulation of Wage-earners' Conditions in South Australia, 1884-1906, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1960).

35. However, if an amendment to the constitution was proposed an absolute majority of the whole House, namely thirteen, was necessary.

36. See E. J. Wadham, op. cit.

37. See Introduction to Appendix I for an analysis of newspaper sources.

38. C. A. Hughes, B. D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1968).

39. Ibid., p. xv.

40. See, for example, T. H. Smeaton, op. cit., pp. 25-6.

41. J. L. Parsons, Address on the Evolution of the Present Social and Political Conditions, (Vardon and Pritchard, Adelaide, 1894), p. 3.

42. M. Atkinson (ed.), Australian Economic and Political Studies, (Macmillan, Melbourne, 1920), p. 101.

43. T. A. Coghlan, op. cit., p. 1929.

44. M. Davitt, Life and Progress in Australia, (Methuen, London, 1898), p. 51.

45. T. A. Coghlan, op. cit., p. 2281.

46. SAPD., 1898, p. 1423.

47. Ibid., 1898, p. 131.

48. E. L. Batchelor, The Labor Party and its Progress, (Webb and Son, Adelaide, 1895), p. 9.

49. T. A. Coghlan, op. cit., p. 1915.

50. W. K. Hancock, <u>Australia</u>, (Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 1945), p. 188.

51. <u>Advertiser</u>, April 23, 1894.

52. M. Clark, <u>A Short History of Australia</u>, (Heinemann, London, 1964), p. 171.

53. Cited in L. F. Crisp, ~~op. cit., p. 156.~~ <u>Australian National Government</u>, p. 156

54. T. H. Smeaton, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 60.

55. P. Loveday 'Support in Return for Concessions', <u>Historical Studies</u>, (Vol. 14, No. 55, October 1970), pp. 376-405.

56. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 381-3.

57. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 381.

58. <u>Advertiser</u>, February 12, 1894.

59. As one example of the 'one-way' pattern of support between the ULP and the Kingston ministry, the second significant pattern of session 153, 1898-99, included eighteen divisions. On only two of these was the ULP solidly in support of the ministry, although on a further three, ULP members 'split'. The ULP resolutions in this pattern included five divisions on compensation matters, two attempts to remit duties on tea and kerosene and three procedural matters. On each division, the ULP proposal was opposed by the Kingston ministry and was defeated. It is not surprising, then, that the ULP was weakening in <u>its</u> support for the ministry.

60. Batchelor was also excluded from all meetings of the ULP caucus.

61. And also ACTU policy prior to 1893. The ACTU supported Kingston as a candidate at all elections he contested.

62. <u>Register</u>, January 16, 1893.

63. <u>Ibid.</u>, April 25, 1896.

64. Cited in T. A. Coghlan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 1981.

65. <u>SAPD.</u>, 1894, p. 1093.

66. <u>Ibid.</u>, 1898, p. 789.

67. <u>Ibid.</u>, 1899, p. 214.

68. H. Mayer, 'Some Conceptions of the Australian Party System, 1910-1950', <u>Historical Studies</u>, (Vol. 7, No. 27, November 1956), pp. 253-270, p. 254.

69. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 254-5.

70. *Observer*, February 18, 1870.

71. *Register*, March 31, 1896.

72. *Ibid.*, April 13, 1899.

73. *Advertiser*, January 29, 1892.

74. T. A. Coghlan, *op. cit.*, p. 2281.

75. *Observer*, November 7, 1891. The extent to which this is accepted is shown by the following 'lesson' in a school text book for South Australian primary schools in the 'eighties.

    'In a new country, which has a small population, a great many things are undertaken by Government for the general good, which in England are left to be done by private persons or public companies'. C. H. Spence, *The Laws We Live Under*, (Government Printer, Adelaide, 1880), p. 59.

76. T. Harry, *Some failures of Democracy* (Adelaide, 1893), p. 7.

77. T. A. Coghlan, *op. cit.*, p. 1936.

78. *Advertiser*, April 23, 1894.

79. P. Loveday, A. W. Martin, *op. cit.*, p.

80. Cockburn, for example, in a speech to the Royal Colonial Institute in London, eulogised the ULP.

    'In each House the direct representation of labour forms about one-fifth of the total membership. The individual members of the Labour party rank high among the best informed, most eloquent members of the Legislature, and they are unsurpassed in their industry and diligent application to the business of Parliament. Although their advent into the Legislature was bitterly opposed by some of the Conservative elements, their presence has come to be recognised as beneficial by many of those who are not completely in line with the planks of their policy. Here, again, the educative influence of responsibility asserts itself. Admitted to an intimate knowledge of the nice adjustments which maintain the balance among the working parts of modern civilisation, men become convinced of the futility of attempting to carry into immediate effect the sweeping changes which mere theoretical contemplation of the claims of abstract justice would seem to approve. They learn that evolution is necessarily a gradual process, and fall into rank as highly efficient members of the army of solid progression. It is considerations such as these that have converted previous opponents into supporters of the presence in Parliament of direct representatives of labour'. *Proceedings*, *Royal Colonial Institute*, (Vol. 30, 1898-9), p. 216.

Chapter XIII

Conclusion

CONCLUSION

The main object of this thesis has been to describe and analyse
the colonial South Australian political system with the emphasis on the
dominant theme of political debate in the pre-Federation period, that of
political representation.   Attention has been focussed on specific
aspects of political representation in order to show how and why the form
and informal institutions of political life were inaugurated, the ways
in which these were modified over time, and the theoretical roots and
practical precedents of the functioning system.

The tendency of many historians to ignore, or at least to under-rate
distinctive aspects in the political development of South Australia was
noted in the introduction to this study.   In fact, as this thesis has
shown, there <u>were</u> distinctive and important developments in South
Australia.   Above all, the view that South Australian political history
from 1857 to Federation was uninteresting and unimportant misinterprets
the debates and changes in the political life of the colony.   The
'quiet orthodox' thesis is epitomised by Pike who feels that 1857 was a
turning point in South Australian political history.

> After its lusty youth Adelaide became sedate, gentle
> and unenterprising.   No new ideas disturbed the calm
> of orthodoxy as generation succeeded generation.   The
> leading colonists had fought hard for the things they
> wanted, but when the struggle was over, they seem to
> have exhausted their enterprise. [1]

There is little doubt, as Pike points out, that the 'religious question'
had been settled by 1853 and, at first sight, the compromise which lay at

the base of the 1855 constitution reads as a similar political settlement.
But the struggle was far from over on the political arena.   1855 was a
compromise, and both the progressives and the conservatives continued the
battle throughout the colonial period.   It was the fact that, despite the
power given to the Legislative Council the 'balance' in the constitution
was continually in favour of the more progressive elements which is at
least a partial explanation of the leadership of South Australia in the
fields of progressive constitutional and social legislation, a liberalism
which was to reach its peak in the 'nineties when the emergent Labor Party
found that it could add little to the programme already encompassed by the
Kingston ministry.   If one excludes such Tory revivalists as Samuel
Davenport and J. Langdon Parsons as a conservative rump in the political
continuum in the colony, then the bulk of the members of the South
Australian parliaments, self styled 'conservative-democrats', were essentia
liberals who paved the way for the ULP in the last decade.   Labor's
policies were gradualist and constitutional and mirrored the programmes of
the liberal groups and factions which they joined.   There had been calls
for social upheaval, for socialism, in the 1890 strikes, but once Labor
became part of the system of representative government, with its own
representatives in the legislatures, there was no 'revolutionary' action.
But to assume that this was an 'exhausted orthodoxy' is to place too much
emphasis on such comments as the following which appeared in the press at t
inauguration of responsible and representative government.

We have achieved universal suffrage and vote by ballot;
we have thrown open the doors of the legislature to poor
as well as rich;   we have enacted without exception the
most liberal constitution extant in the Queen's dominions,
and all we now require is to conserve our institutions,
and carry through their essential principles. 2

It was which 'essential principles', and the ways in which they would be

applied which remained divisive and important throughout the colonial perio

South Australia's political ~~life~~ was quiescent only to the extent that

the basic structures of the State and the continuity of responsible and

representative government were not seriously disrupted or questioned. But,

within these broad parameters, there were serious conflicts which were

not resolved by a willingness of conservatives and progressives to compromi

The 'exhaustion' which Pike suggests was more a general agreement on the

basic edifice which allowed disagreements on principles and practices witho

a breakdown of the whole.   These disagreements encompassed the whole gamut

of issues of political representation, and were resolved in a way which

provided an overall picture of steady if cautious reform, and a style

based on pragmatism not ideology.   Despite the extent of the changes of

the 'nineties, the activities of the Kingstonian liberals and the ULP

accelerated rather than changed the direction of the picture while

epitomising the style.

The disagreements about and within the principles and practices of

political representation were played out within the boundaries of five

separate yet interrelated questions, each of which has been examined in

some detail.   These basic themes were the institutional framework of

politics in the colony, the general nature of political life, the faction

system and faction politics, the development of political movements and
political parties and the theme which, in many ways, was the focus - the
nature of bicameralism and the role of the Legislative Council.

The analysis of the institutional framework of politics in the colony
showed how South Australia received and reconstructed a constitution
patterned on the British model. The original product was akin to the othe
colonies in such features as responsible bicameral government, but it
differed from them in such important facets as male adult suffrage for the
lower house, the secret ballot, and the relatively liberal Council franchise
The modifications to this framework, whether carried into practice in the
areas of electoral reforms and female voting rights, payment of members and
deadlock clauses, or rejected as in the case of franchise extensions for the
Legislative Council, were shown to be fundamentally divisive questions both
in and out of the legislatures. The second theme, that of the general
nature of political life in the colony stressed the hegemony of economically
independent men and the reflection of this economic independence in the
strong adherence, in theory, to the principle of political independence.
The analysis of such political 'movements' as the Political Association, the
Farmers Mutual Association and the early National Defence League showed that
periods of economic or political tension could bring shortlived changes to
this commitment to independence but that the change was temporary, and it
reverted to, and was ultimately rooted in a Burkean ethos. The reversal
of this trend in the case of the NDL in 1894-5 was an indication that the
ethos itself had come under question.

The instability of ministerial office which was the dominant contemporary description of the colonial legislative scene was presumed to be a natural corollary of such an ethos: men acting independently of party, faction or local constituency constraints would produce such an unstable situation. But both the fluidity and the instability were shown to be far from an accurate description. The relative stability of a basic core of ministers derived from the third major theme - faction politics - but it also directed attention to the practice rather than the ethos of political representation.

The analysis of ministerial instability and of the workings of the faction system showed that the commitment to independence was a theoretical commitment only. Until the 'nineties, electoral and legislative politics were played out within an ethos derived from a Whig model but with practice firmly based on pressure groups and factions. While this changed in the 'eighties to the extent that internal organisation and political outlook of the factions was modified and polarised, there was no evidence that political movements, either impelled from earlier political divisions in the history of the colony such as the liberal-conservative divisions in the early 'fifties, or derived from new issues such as the tariff question which formed distinct political parties in New South Wales, transformed the South Australian faction system to one based on political parties. In fact, South Australia's recurrent economic and social issue - that of the sale, use and taxation of land - was solved and re-solved through the faction system.

The fourth major theme was that of the development of political parties

in the 'nineties, and, as the analysis showed, both the reasons for the emergence of parties and their nature, and the reasons for the lack of party development earlier were based on both the ethos and the practice of political representation.   Rural recessions and economic depressions provide fertile ground for the formation of political parties as early as 1859, but there were stronger negative pressures, impelled by a firm commitment to political independence.   Although all but a few members of the legislatures to 1891-93 were members of factions and played out political life as members of factions, they also asserted their independence from constituency interest group and party pressures.   While most electoral candidates were only too happy to have their names selected by electoral organisations as worthy of support, they resisted strongly any attempts to label them as representatives of and for that organisation.

A second reason for the lack of political parties was shown to be the nature of the political issues which were debated in the pre-'nineties decades.   The tariff question was of little consequence in South Australia; the question of land, although fundamentally divisive, did not form parties due, to a great extent, to the 'closeness' which Hirst emphasises in his study of Adelaide and the Country.[3]   South Australia was a 'free' society from its inception in the sense that it had no convicts.   It had no gold rush, although it felt the effects of gold in both an economic and a political sense.[4]   Its rural sector was dominated by farmers rather than squatters and from the beginning these men were fiercely independent.   Like the working man of Adelaide who lost interest in Political Associations when employment and wage opportunities improved, the South Australian farmer lost

interest in collective action and organised political activity when the harvests were good. It was a society whose political leadership was dominated by urban commercial and professional men. Overall, there was little evidence of a horizontal class which was barred from some effective political power, and the full male suffrage of 1857 had allowed all men to participate, or at least to feel that they had the right to participate.

A precondition for the formation of a political party is that there would be some basis for it, some economic or related factor which provided the incentive for unified activity on the political scene, or some economic change which brought formerly discrete units to a realisation that common action was not only necessary but desirable, or some fundamental ideological difference between two or more groups, perhaps based on economic factors, which did not allow of a political solution other than polarisation. Political parties do not appear, they are first desired, and then they are actively built. Both the desire and the construction were absent in South Australia until 1891. The questions facing the people and the politicians in the first thirty years of responsible government and, as the analysis of the aims and methods of the ULP and the NDL showed, even after the formation of parties, were basically concerned with _how_ things should be done, not with _what_ should be done. Thus, above all, the issues of political representation loomed large in the political history of colonial South Australia. And it was here that the divisions between the houses - the peculiar strains in bicameralism which dominated the South Australian political scene - received their focus. In the sense of the Burkean concept of Party, there was evidence of two Parties throughout - a Party

for, and a Party opposed to the Legislative Council.

There were two parallel strands of politics running throughout the colonial period.   On the one hand, the dominant theory of 'procedural' and 'functional' representation was Whig, essentially based on the twin Burkean precepts of representation of interests and legislative independence.   On the other hand, the dominent political practice was liberalism.   Emphasis was given to representation of economic interests, especially that of the interests of property and of the rural property owner, and on the need for 'good' representatives in parliament, men who would be able to act as independent deliberators in the Burkean sense.   These emphases were carried into practice in electoral systems and electoral behaviour - over the institutions of 'procedural' representation.   They were far from fully applied in terms of 'functional' representation, and legislative behaviour was dominated by factions, at least until the mid-'nineties.   The adherence to a principle of independence in theory, the development of factions as the predominant means of legislative behaviour and the patterns of the years of party development in the 'nineties which showed a domination by liberal elements, were all based on the unique nature of the South Australia leadership.   To the legislative leaders; merchants, manufacturers, farmers and professional men such as Blyth, Hart, Glyde, Kingston, Cockburn, Rounsevell and Santo, liberalism was the touchstone of their economic activities, and this was transferred to their political attitudes and legislative behaviour.   These men did not see their interests threatened by male suffrage as did the squatter-dominated legislatures of the eastern colonies.   And, although these traditions of political representation were

maintained and dominated by urban liberals, country interests and country representatives played an important role.   It was as the Advertiser pointed out in 1901:

> The ministry may plant, and the Labor party may water,
> but it is the country members who give the increase ...
> It is fortunate for South Australia that the influence of
> the country members has almost invariably been on the side
> of progressive liberalism. [5]

The rural members did have a 'fear' of the city, to the extent that they opposed the 'massing of seats' in the urban areas.   But this was not the contempt of Wentworth and the graziers in New South Wales.   It was not a fear of the urban working classes as such, but a fear that the rural dwellers would lose what they considered to be their rightful share of electoral representation.   In fact, many South Australian farmers had roots in the labour movement and had particularly liberal ideals and ideas. The system of small selections which dominated the South Australian agricultural pattern brought many from the working classes, the gold miner the shearers and former agricultural labourers into the rural areas, and their principles and political behaviour were far from alien to liberal reforms. [6]   It was a peculiar combination of 'urban liberals and country radicals' [7] which lay at the base of the theories and practices of political representation in South Australia, and this contributed to the essentially pragmatic nature of the United Labor Party in the 'nineties.   Even when other parties developed in the last years of colonial political life, it w clear that it was not the case that the ULP was the initiating force and the NDL the resistance, for the unique Kingstonian liberals were the innovators.

The Paradise of Dissent of the 1840's had developed into an economically open and politically liberal society by the 'sixties, and the 'forces of reaction' did not, in the words of the Register merit the label "Conservatives", for what would be considered as conservatism in this colony would probably be looked on as pretty strong radicalism in England' But the issues which did polarise political opinion and political action were those concerned with political representation.   While, in a broader sense, one can characterize the political history of South Australia in terms of an agreement on political conservation rather than in terms of conflict between conservatism and radicalism, this did not apply to political representation.   When Premier Bray, in 1881, stated that

> in a country such as this, the question was not so
> much what was to be done, but when it was to be
> done, and how, [9]

important aspects of political representation were not included.   Politic quiescence disappeared, and the spirit of compromise waned, when such issues as rural over-representation, property taxation, electoral franchis the role of the Legislative Council, and responsible government were debated.   And these debates over factors of political representation were made both more acrimonious and more complex by the fact that distinct party lines did not begin to emerge until the last decade of colonial political life, and the fact that it as to be another decade before the electorate and the legislature were divided on modern party lines.   What continued the acrimony was the gulf between theory and practice;   the commitment to the Whig ethos at the same time as the practice of managing

political matters denied many of its basic precepts.

There were economic and political issues which divided the colony. Immigration, rural and urban recessions and the sale and taxation of land did draw people off to political sides, but only temporarily. For brief periods in the political history of the colony it appeared that electorates and legislatures were dividing on more stable lines, but the issues and organisations which emerged, such as the Political Association and the Farmers Mutual Association were ephemeral. As a result of the lack of any long-term divisive economic or social issue or issues which resulted in the formation of a seriously dispossessed strata in society, patterns of political conflict in South Australia were introspective. But this did not mean that such conflicts were muted or meaningless. Debates about, and conflicts over the theories and practices of political representation recurred throughout the pre-Federation period, and these provide the key to the political history of colonial South Australia.

Footnotes - Chapter XIII

1. D. Pike, ~~Paradise of Dissent~~, op. cit., p. 516.

2. Advertiser, April 23, 1857.

3. Op. cit., p. 226. 'In South Australia ... administrative and social
    history alike suggest that the terms "distance" and "remoteness" are
    as misleading as "sparsity of settlement", and that all three should
    be discarded in favour of a new term, "closeness".'

4. See W. R. C. Jaques, The Impact of the Gold Rushes on South Australia,
    1852-1854, (B.A. Thesis, Adelaide, 1963).

5. Advertiser, July 19, 1901.

6. For example, in 1896, a Progressive League of South Australia was
    formed to replace the FMA. Fourteen of its sixteen executive members
    were farmers (Observer, June 6, 1896), and its political platform read
    as follows:

    1. Longer tenures and lower rates for pastoralists.
    2. To stop the efflux of yeomenry, repurchase of estates at a fair
        valuation, and a land tax to be collected and expended locally.
    3. No progressive land tax.
    4. Mortgage liability
    5. Village settlement extension
    6. Labour bureau
    7. Lend lease railways
    8. Referendum
    9. The qualification of the Legislative Council to be lowered to £20
    10. Technical education
    11. Federation
    12. Electoral registration facilities
    13. No alien immigration
    14. Taxation according to means and benefits

7. R. L. Reid in S. Davis, op. cit., p. 337.

8. Register, February 12, 1862.

9. Ibid., March 23, 1881.

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652

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